NELSON T. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN
POLICY TOWARD CHINA 1925-1941

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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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ABSTRACT

NELSON T. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN
POLICY TOWARD CHINA 1925—1941

by Russell D. Buhite

Nelson Johnson first became intimately involved
in shaping American policy toward China in 1925 when he
assumed the office of Chief of the Division of Far Eastern
Affairs in the State Department. From this date until
May 1941 he was a major force in determining the conduct
of relations with that country. Based primarily on Johnson's
personal papers in the Library of Congress and the pub—
lished and unpublished State Department records, this thesis
discusses his activities over the 1925—1941 period em—
phasizing his ideas and suggestions regarding policy.

Johnson made major contributions during the Coolidge
and Hoover administrations. He favored going as far as
American interests would allow in helping China regain her
sovereignty and he consistently guided Secretaries of
State Kellogg and Stimson on a moderate course in their
policy.

Under Kellogg, he continually opposed interference
in the civil war in China. He opposed joining the British

at Canton and Hankow in punitive measures against Chinese

Russell D. Buhite

strike pickets and other natinnalists. He opposed harsh

or recriminatory action against China during the Nanking
Incident of 1927. He advocated conciliation in answering
China's note of June 1925 requesting treaty revision. He
suggested going as far as possible, unilaterally if nec—
essary, in writing a new tariff treaty, and on the question
of extraterritoriality, favored gradual relinquishment.

Under Secretary Stimson, he made a significant con—
tribution, when as American Minister in China, he influenced
the Secretary's policy during the Shanghai affair. His
advice that the United States make a statement in favor of
upholding the terms of the Nine Power Treaty was chiefly
responsible for Stimson's letter of February 1932 to
Senator William E. Borah.

In the mid-thirties his influence continued although
other officials gained ascendency as policy became more
Japanese oriented. During this period, he grew increasingly
impatient with Japanese aggression and began suggesting a
reappraisal of American policy toward Japan. Not yet re-
commending that she assume any responsibility for the
Chinese, he merely advocated United States rearmament and
reconsideration of its intention to grant independence to
the Philippines.

By the end of the decade, he openly advocated material
support for China. The Chinese had then established-

a measure of order, had demonstrated a will to resist
Japan and he believed they deserved support. His descriptions

of the events of the war and of China's valiant fight were

Russell D. Buhite

instrumental in the decision to grant assistance.

As a policy maker and diplomat, Johnson was alert,
‘had a critical inquiring mind, and a profound and sym-
pathetic understanding of China. His knowledge of China's
language, art, and history and his warm and personable
nature evoked great respect and esteem from the Chinese
and helped sustain Sino-American friendship during a most

difficult period.

NELSON T. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN
POLICY TOWARD CHINA 1925-1941

By

Russell D. Buhite

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History
1965

PREFACE

Nelson Johnson spent his entire adult life in
the service of his government. Except for the final
fifteen years of his career he dealt primarily with
China, as a student interpreter, consular officer,
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Assis-
tant Secretary of State, and Minister and Ambassador.

In this work I have attempted to discuss and
evaluate his background, influences on his thinking,
and his ideas and suggestions regarding American
policy toward China over the 1925-1941 period;

My thanks go out to all those who assisted me
in the research and writing: to Paul A. varg who
directed the work and whose timely comments on content
and advice regarding form and style were invaluable;
to Mrs. Nelson Johnson and Miss Elizabeth Johnson,
wife and sister of the former diplomat, who were most
gracious in talking with me about Mr. Johnson; to the
Honorable Stanley K. Hornbeck, who gave so much of
his time and shared with me his vast knowledge; to
my wife who worked tirelessly at typing and proofreading

the manuscript.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. THE EDUCATION OF A DIPLOMAT. . . . . . . . 1
II. NELSON JOHNSON AND CHINESE NATIONALISM . . 30
III. DISCUSSING EXTRATERRITORIALITY . . . . . . 66

IV. THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY DISPUTE AND
THE KELLOGG PACT . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

V. JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN MANCHURIA
1931-1932 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0109

VI. JOHNSON AND A STRONGER POLICY TOWARD
JAPAN 0000 00000000000150

VII. NELSON JOHNSON AND UNITED STATES
SILVER POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . .195

VIII. FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE UNDECLARED
WAR TO MY 1941 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0218

IX. IN RETROSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . .262

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . .266

THE EDUCATION OF A DIPLOMAT

The author of the biography of w.w. Rockhill des-
cribes the great scholar-diplomat as being a man "incapable
of personal warmth", "austere, self-sufficient" and a
"kind of tyrant" ruling over his Legation staff.l Among
the members of Rockhill's staff was a slender, pink com—
plexioned, red-haired young man, a mere student interpreter,
who stood as much in terror of the "Big Chief" as anyone
and who was seldom even recognized by the Minister when
they met on the street. This young man, Nelson T. Johnson,
was some twenty years later to have Rockhill's job.
Possessed of a delightful sense of humor, sociable, friend-
ly and approachable, Nelson Johnson brought to the Minis-
ter's post a personality strikingly differentirom that
of his former boss.

While Rockhill was cold, Nelson Johnson was the
essence of amiability; he made friends easily and his
friends were legion. While Rockhill was self-sufficient,
Johnson relied on other people, believing with China's
greatest sage that when one walks with two others there

are two from whom he may learn. While Rockhill was

 

1Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat:The Life 2; w.w.
Rockhill (Urbana, 111.,19555, pp. 2,6.

2
reserved and formal, Johnson was an extrovert and very
informal--whether it took the form of singing along with
a couple of Chinese coolies as he rode in his chair or
playing cards with members of his staff. When he first
went to China as Minister in 1950 he even insisted on
riding in a ricksha wherever he went instead of in an
automobile, causing much lifting of eyebrows in diplo—
matic quarters. It might also be noted that he smoked
cheap Chinese cigarettes and often travelled about
China unescorted.

Extremely popular with the Chinese, he was equally
esteemed by both his colleagues and his subordinates.
Willys Peck, Counselor of the Embassy under Johnson at
Chungking in the late thirties, commenting in a special
memorandum said that he thought his chief always did a
miraculous job with his staff even under the most trying
and difficult conditions. He took the position of a
fellow worker with those on his staff. His decisions
were always final but he was ready to assign duties to
others who were allowed to perform them with as much
freedom as possible. He maintained high morale and always
fostered a cheerful and sociable atmosphere. Animated
discussions flourished about him and there was always time
out for the playing of games. "Each man on the staff”
Peck added, "has responded tirelessly to this type of‘
treatment.”21

This is not to say, however, that Johnson was never

 

2Memorandum prepared by Willys Peck Feb. 2, 1941, in
Stanley Hornbeck's personal possession,Washington, D.C.

3

(:ritical of a subordinate. If a man were not doing his
job or if there was something amiss about him, he con—
sidered it both his duty and a service to the individual
to let his feelings be known. Speaking once to Mr. Robert
Olds of an unnamed subordinate he said: "You are dealing
here with a sea lawyer. It is quite apparent from the
man's record that he is egocentric, obstinate, and to a
certain extent clever. He is also pugnacious and his
record shows that from the time he entered the Service down
to the present he has been bombarding the Department for
the purpose of getting the Department to recognize and
accept his own estimate of himself...".3 On another
occasion: "Mary Martin should be dropped as she is inca-
pable of performing the work that she is required to do."4
And, "McVay at Yokohama should be sent home and dropped
from the Service as he continues to drink to excess."5
Commenting in 1925 on Douglas Jenkins, American Consul

in Canton, and indicating his own regard for sense of
humor, he said: "Neither Jenkins nor his wife have the
scintilla of a sense of humor but with it all, though,

Jenkins has the cleanest office that we have ever had in

 

3Nelson Johnson to Robert E. Olds, Dec. 23, 1927,
Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Library of Congress. (hereafter
referred to as the Johnson Papers)

4Johnson to the Secretary of State, Dec. 8, 1924, ibid.

51bid.

Canton and I am proud of him."6

Indeed, Johnson himself had a fine sense of humor,
a sense of humor coupled with an infectious smile and a
quick wit. Always ready to see the fun in any situation,
he enjoyed a joke on himself as much as on others. Until
his death he enjoyed telling peOple one particular story
about his days as a judge in the mixed court at Shanghai
where one day while he was holding forth, a workman—~a
Chinese dressed as a workman——entered the courtroom, put
a ladder up the wall, tinkered with a large clock hanging
there, took the clock down from the wall, and left; clock
and "workman" disappearing, never to be seen again.7 Sim—
ilarly, he always enjoyed turning a phrase in a letter,
adding thereby a bit of humor. Writing to a friend in
March 1930 and commenting on his recent activities he
quipped, "Yesterday I went out to P'ao Ma Ch'ang which,
being interpreted in the language of Naryland, means
racetrack."8 And, later in his career while stuck in
desolate, isolated Chungking with bombs dropping all around
and virtually nothing to do to amuse himself, he said to
Colonel McHugh: "Be as gentle as you can when you report on

me. I have tried to conceal from my sister and from my

 

6Ibid.

7Miss Elizabeth Johnson to the author, Jan. 27, 1965.

8Johnson to Mrs. Frank Bunker, Mar. 31, 1930, Johnson

Papers.

5
friends and superiors the roistering hell-raising life that
I normally lead. Don't dwell too much on the fact that
we dine out every evening, spend a great deal of our time
at the race track and the dance halls and other Chungking
hot spots."9

As might be eXpected, Johnson's sense of humor allowed
him to take an active role and have fun at activities that
most diplomatic officials would have considered demeaning
or beneath their station. Thus, he could take his guitar
or ukulele to a dinner party and lead the guests in
singing "Ivan Skavinski Skavaar.“ Or he could take part
in a Spoof State Department production in 1927; a play
entitled Kellogg's Cadets or Academy Life Exposed, in which
he played the Honorable J. Reuben Bumbleby, American
Minister to Danubia--such character being dressed in a
top hat, cutaway, white spats, wing collar, grey tie, etc.,
who in giving the students a lecture on court ceremonial
and protocol was called upon to sing the following song
to the air of the First Lord of the Admiralty's Song in
"Pinafore:"

When I was a lad I served a term,

As office boy in a banking firm.

I cleaned the windows and I swept the floor,

And I polished up the handle of the big front door.

I polished up the handle so carefulee
That now I am a Master of Diplomacee.

 

9Johnson to Col. James M. McHugh, Aug. 12, 1940,
Ibid.

Chorus:
He polished up the handle so carefulee
That now he is a Master of Diplomacee.

I grew so rich that I was sent,
On a secret mission to the Orient.
I always answered to the Minister's call,
And I never thought of thinking for myself at all.
I thought so little, they rewarded me,
By making me a Master of Diplomacee.
Chorus:
He thought so little, they rewarded him
By making him a Master of Diplomacee.
Now, consuls all, whoever you may be,
If you want to become a Double E.M.P.
If your mind doesn't stop with what you learn in school
Be careful to be guided by this golden rule-
Leave cards on everybody and don't avoid tea,
And you all may be Masters of Diplomacee!
Chorus:
Leave cards on everybody and don't avoid tea
And you all may be Masters of Diplomacee!lo
It is not surprising that Johnson possessed a friend-
ly and personable nature considering his happy childhood
and the benefits derived from his excellent old-stock—
American family, a family that had by the time of Nelson's
birth been in America for a century and a half. The first
Johnsons had come from Boston on the Ash in Lincolnshire
in the early part of the seventeenth century, settling in
the vicinity of Boston, Massachusetts, in about 1636.
Moving from there, they went to Connecticut and established

a home near Stafford Springs at the town of Stafford in

 

loIn Johnson Papers 1927, undated as to month and day.

7
the Hartford area where they made their living by tilling
the soil. Like most New Englanders, they were apparently
good puritans who, having read Leviticus and Chronicles
every morning in their homes, went their ways feeling they
had conversed with God and knew what was right. Also,
like so many New Englanders and other Easterners as well,
they were eventually dispersed by the recurring depressions
and financial panics in America. After the War of 1812
and during a period of economic crisis Nelson's great-
great grandfather left his Connecticut home and moved to
Washington. Tradition in the Johnson family had it that
this adventuresome ancestor helped rebuild the United
States capital, got enough money to move to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania where he bought ample saleable supplies,
floated down the Ohio River to Cincinnati, then struck out
across the country to what is now Indianapolis, Indiana
and opened a store, it being one of the very first build—

ings in that city.11

Nelson's more immediate family came
from that area.

His father, Jeremiah Johnson, left Indiana and went
to Washington D.C. at about the time of Benjamin Harrison's

election to the presidency. Having read law in the office

 

11The Reminiscences of Nelson Trusler Johnson, Oral
History Project, Columbia U. vol. I and Nelson Johnson
to Miss D. B. Johnson Dec. 30., 1935, Johnson Papers.

rt

of Harrison and with W.W. Dudley, the man responsible

for putting Harrison in the White House, Jeremiah Johnson
studied at Georgetown University and received his Master
of Laws degree in 1886. He later opened a law office on
F Street in Washington.

Nelson's mother, Salome Trusler, was the daughter of
Colonel Nelson Trusler, of the 84th Indiana volunteers
during the Civil War. Colonel Trusler died shortly after
the war, his widow and daughter moving to Washington where
the widow (Nelson Johnson's grandmother) went to work as
a clerk in the old pension office. No feminist, she was
the daughter of pioneers filled with the wholesomeness and
hardiness that was their lot; she came to be a great
influence on the life of young Nelson. Here in Washington
Jeremiah Johnson and Salome Trusler, a charming young
lady who had attended Western College in Oxford, Ohio,
met, were married, and settled in a house on Third Street.
Son Nelson Trusler Johnson was born on April 3, 1887.

When the depression of 1893 came along Jeremiah
Johnson did what so many Americans of his era did, he
moved West. Leaving son Nelson and daughter Elizabeth
and his wife in Washington, he went to the Oklahoma terr-
itory where he participated in the famous land run. Soon
thereafter, he and some cohorts decided to build a town;
when one member of the group owning a portable press

elected to give up on the venture, Nelson's father bought

 

9
the press and was on his way to becoming a newspaper man.
Soon the group decided to move to the railway-~to Kildare,
Oklahoma. Here in about 1896 Jeremiah set up a weekly
paper and his wife and two children joined him, the
family living in a small frame house on the edge of the
prairie. After a short stay there, the family moved to
nearby Newkirk. Nelson Johnson's earliest and fondest
recollections were of Oklahoma; of the covered wagons,
of the prairies, the animals that roamed the countryside,
and of the hardy settlers that populated its territory.

Young Nelson was not to spend much time in Oklahoma,
however. He had been there only about four years (from
1896-1900) when his parents decided to send him back to
Washington to stay with his grandmother and to re-enter
the schools. Placed in Friends School, a non-denomina-
tional, co-educational institution, young Johnson fell
under the gentle guidance and quiet influence of Thomas
Sidwell its founder and head. Sidwell was a fine man
with deep and abiding affection for children and plenty
of progressive ideas, who taught his students tolerance and
Optimism toward people, life and government. Although
Friends was considered a fashionable school, children
of both wealth and modest means attended; even children
of all nationalities. Nelson attended Friends School
until he graduated in 1906 at age 19. Then, desirous of

going to Yale but not having sufficient financial means to

10
do so, he entered George Washington University. There
he studied Greek, General logic, English, Iathematics
and other required first year subjects, joined the Delta
Tau Delta Fraternity and helped edit the college annual.
A good mixer, Johnson quickly made friends with the son
of a German professor at college and learned through him
of the consular service. Apparently this was the beginn-
ing of his interest in the Foreign Service. It was also,
by his own admission, the beginning of his awareness of
the outside world.12

The summer after his freshman year at George Washing-

ton Johnson spent doing chores around the family place in
Maryland, enjoying his leisure, and reading. One day
while working, his mother came up to him and called his
attention to a newspaper advertisement announcing an
examination for student interpreters who were to be sent
to China and Japan. Fired by the idea but never eXpecting
to make the grade, he sent letters to the Department of
State preparatory to taking the examinations. When told
that he had been chosen to take them, he was completely
astonished. He then went to the Library of Congress,
loaded himself up with books in the areas that he would
have to know, and Spent the rest of the summer studying.

Since no briental language was required, he planned to use

 

12Johnson Reminiscences, I.

11

German, the only foreign language that he knew very well.
When time came to take the examination he still was not
seriously considering the possibility of passing. And,
if he was surprised to learn that he had been chosen to
take the exams, he was doubly so when he learned that he
had passed them! Neither he nor anyone in the family
expected that he would do so. When word finally came
that he was to go to China, it began to dawn upon him that
he knew absolutely nothing about China. He was soon to
learn, however. Johnson never returned to college after
that first year. After taking the State Department
examinations he took a thirty day leave, went to Oklahoma
for a visit, went to San Francisco, and sailed from there
for China, soon to begin his language studies. From this
time on China was to be a major part of his life.

Arriving in Peking, the twenty year old Johnson was
assigned to a Chinese language teacher, an old gentleman
who knew absolutely no English. In his first lesson he
learned Shgi the word for water and the words for “what
does that mean" and with this meager beginning he was
able, after about six months, to carry on a conversation
in a fragmentary way. After two years in which he worked
daily on his Chinese, he could speak the language well;
by the end of his career he Spoke it like a native.
However, he never did learn to read and write it, beyond a

rudimentary stage.l3

 

13Ibid.

12

After completing his language training Johnson was
assigned on November 1, l909,to Mukden as vice and deputy
Consul General and Interpreter. In April 1910 he was
given the same position at Harbin; the same at Hankow in
July; and the same at Shanghai in December 1911. In 1913
he was named Mixed Court Assessor designated to exercise
judicial authority and jurisdiction in civil and criminal
cases; then in 1914 he was appointed Consul at Chungking.
He was assigned as Consul to Changsha in 1915, detailed to
Shanghai inl9l8, and to the Department also in 1918. In
June 1920 he was named Expert Assistant for the Conference
on the Limitation of Armament, in which position his
chief function was to prepare memoranda on the Lansing-
Ishi agreement and on spheres of influence-~memoranda

that no one ever bothered to read.14

In the early twenties
he was appointed Consul General at Large to inspect Con-
sular offices throughout the Far East and Australia; in
April 1925 he was detailed again to the Department and on
July 1, l925,was named Chief of the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs.

Asked later what compelled him to leave college after
only one year to enter the Foreign Service, Johnson said it

was probably the Spirit of adventure although he never

was much of a scholar and, intellectually, he was never

 

l4Stanley Hornbeck to the author,Jan. 16, 1965.

13
at the head of his class.15 While it may be quite true
that he was never an intellectual leader in a formal
sense and although he was considerably more interested in
skating, swimming, walking in the woods, and other
athletic pursuits than he was in scholarship, it is a
fact that he was also a bookish boy-~the type person who
made life and his own books his principal teachers; the
type who could make himself a scholar, outside the oft-
times narrow confines of the classroom. An omnivorous
reader, he began at age nine to read Abbot's Little
Histories. At thirteen, he was reading Dickens and
Thackeray, and like others of his generation, §§§g_Eyg
Digk_which he said he kept hidden in the barn. He also

read Alice lg Wonderland, a work that he loved so dearly

 

that he kept a copy by his bed throughout his life. Fond
of the classics, he was equally interested in history,
geography and related subjects. He read Thucididyes and
Gibbon, MacCauley, Trevelyan, Parkman, Rhodes and other
famous scholars. After going to the Far East he became
interested in Chinese art, Chinese history and Chinese
literature. He also read Chinese geography and geology
and on various occasions set out on his own to study
rock strata and soil composition. He read Sansom's works
on Japan, Lafiimore's studies of Mongolia, Pearl Buck's
novels, George Creel's work, and by the end of his career

it could safely be said that he knew just about every

 

15Johnson Reminiscences, Vol. I.

14
major piece of scholarship produced relative to the Far
East. He also knew the works of A.W. Griswold, S.F.
Bemis, T.A. Bailey and others who dealt with American
foreign policy.

Appalled at the lack of understanding of China among
most of his colleagues, Johnson showed a curiosity about
things that others did not possess. PeOple living merely
on the surface whether in regard to China or other matters
he came to refer to as having "Treaty Port Minds" or

"Shanghai Minds."16

These "Treaty Port Minds" had no
knowledge of Chinese art, they knew no Chinese peOple,
knew nothing of Chinese religion or culture. Johnson did;
he read, he traveled, he explored, he mixed with the
people; he came to know China even as few natives knew it.

Although possessed of an inquisitive, extremely active
and agile mind, Johnson was never one to spend a great
deal of time on theories. He busied himself finding out
about people, about things, about life. Filled with what
is popularly called "common sense" he reflected accurate-
ly his heritage-~his pioneer background.

During his early years Johnson's grandmother, with
whom he lived during the most impressionable age from
thirteen through nineteen, was a major force in his life.

She was a woman of superb character, determination and

 

l6Ibid., III.

15
humor, and although stern she was dearly loved by her
grandson. She read to him, encouraged him in his school
work, nursed him when ill, and more importantly instilled
in him those traits of personality that were her own
forte. Among others influencing his young life were
Thomas Sidwell, head of Friends School who helped cement
tolerance and Optimism into his personality, and a
physical education teacher at Friends, a German by the
name of Godes who taught him an appreciation of athletics
and the value of organized physical exercise.

Once he began his career in the Foreign Service, he
came to serve with and under numerous people, some of
whom also influenced his thinking. Roger Greene was one
such person. He was Consul at Harbin when Johnson met him
and served under him as his interpreter. Son of a miss-
ionary to Japan, Greene had a fine mind and an excellent
education, the first officer under whom Johnson served
directly who had such an education. Greene's encyclo-
pedic knowledge reinforced Johnson's respect for learning
by demonstrating its value to the Consular officer.17
Willard Straight was another individual who made a great
impression on young Johnson. Although he and Straight
never spent much time together, Straight's handsomeness,
his fertile brain, and his informal air made him particu—

larly attractive to the young student interpreter. Straight

 

17Ibid., II.

16
who could play a guitar, mix with any group, quote
Kipling and be at home on the polo field, on one occasion
joined Johnson and his fellow students in the mess to
play penny ante.l8 A person like this, eschewing sham,
avoiding pretense and relying on his own ability for
recognition always appealed to Johnson.. Another person-
ality that he always admired was Theodore Roosevelt.
Roosevelt who was always active and vigorous stood for
things that Johnson wanted to stand for; a manly man who
lived a free and open life, hunted, climbed mountains and
talked to the learned and ignorant alike, he was what
Johnson considered the essence of the true American.19

Johnson was always a little less enthusiastic when
referring to his old chief, W.W. Rockhill. Rockhill, he
thought, was one of America's better diplomats but he
Spent too much time on his studies and not enough on his
job. And, he was a strange Sort of person who had no
social gifts, who attended parties only reluctantly and
who always went to bed at ten o'clock regardless what
was going on. As Johnson said, he and his colleagues

20

"stood in holy terror of Rockhill." They did so

chiefly because of his formal manner and because Rockhill

 

Ibid., I.

 

191bid., III.

2OIbid., I.

l7

himself always supervised the Chinese examinations and
had a habit of asking questions until he found some one
not knowing an answer; then leaping on him verbally.
Never wishing to imitate Rockhill's manner, Johnson did
admire his scholarship and although fearing him, he also
respected him. Later, he came to have a high regard and
even affection for his former boss.21
Among others who influenced Johnson's early career
and added to the shaping of his ideas were Charles E.
Hughes and E.T. Williams. Hughes, whose entrance into
the Department Johnson likened to a breath of fresh air
after the"fumbling" and "stumbling" of Bryan, Lansing,
and Colby, was extremely well-informed and knew what he
was doing at all times. As late as 1954 Johnson said he
still thought of the State Department in terms of Hughes
because of this contrast and because he was so impressed
with the fact that Hughes always was so clear about what
he was saying and doing, and left no doubt to anyone of

his knowledgeability on a given subject.22

E.T. Williams,
former Chief of the Far Eastern Division, was a close
personal friend of Johnson's. A man like Johnson in many
respects, Williams was learned, had great cultural

appreciation and possessed patience, understanding and

 

21Ibid.

22Ibid., III.

 

l8
gentleness. He was an inspiration to the young Johnson
and the two became very close, Johnson always holding a
deep affection for the much older gentleman.

Among the superiors withWhom he worked after gain—
ing positions in which he was intimately involved in shap-
ing American Far Eastern Policy, Johnson thought
particularly highly of Secretaries Kellogg and Stimson.
Johnson believed in what he thought was the clearsightedness
of Secretary Kellogg, liked his vivid personality and
great energy and by the end of his tenure admired him
greatly. He was particularly impressed by Kellogg's
rise from the pioneer world of his birth to the sophis-
ticated world in which he was to play such a great part.
Kellogg and Johnson worked very closely on Far Eastern
policy from 1925-1928, agreed on nearly every aspect of
this policy; and it can be confidently stated that
Kellogg's policy was essentially Johnson's policy.
Stimson, who was Johnson's chief from 1928-1932, was to
a large extent also guided by Johnson in shaping Far
Eastern policy. And, Johnson and Stimson, like Johnson
and Kellogg, were usually inagreement regarding action to
be taken in that part of the world. While others were
critical, Johnson defended Stimson's nonrecognition
doctrine as the only feasible or practical way to meet
Japanese aggression, not because it was a substitute for

stronger action but because it would keep the legal record

19
clear as far as the United States was concerned and would
see her through the period when she was unable or unwill-
ing to take a more forceful posture to the period when
she was prepared to act.

Johnson did not think as highly of President Franklin
Roosevelt. He had great admiration and reSpect for him
when he first came to office as he considered the Pres-
ident's overcoming the effects of a dread disease and rise
to the highest office in the land as being indicative of
great courage and fortitude. He continued to hold
Roosevelt in great esteem until later in his career; then
when he became acquainted with Lauchlin Currie administra-
tive assistant to the President, and "people like that"
with whom the President surrounded himself, his opinion
diminished considerably. Johnson, particularly upset
when Roosevelt sent Currie on a "fact finding mission"
to Chungking in early 1941, once said of the hastily
commissioned envoy:

”he reaches the scene (the Embassy Office) si-

multaneously with me, I after some thirty

years of travel, talk and observation; he

after an elapsed period of twelve days during

which he has had contacts with no minds or

facts that might have prepared him for what

he is to hear or see."23

Roosevelt also at one point even attempted to replace

 

23Johnson to Hornbeck, Feb. 11, 1941, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C.

20

Johnson as Minister to Australia with a political
boss from New York, Johnson's job only being saved by
the Senate which refused to confirm the President's
appointment.24 However, the major cause of Johnson's
disillusionment with Roosevelt was the President's
agreement to the terms of the Yalta conference.25 As a
diplomat and policy maker who considered the fundamental
goal of United States policy to be the promotion of
American self interest, it is understandable that Johnson,
looking back, would be upset at the decisions reached at
Yalta. As a friend of China, it is understandable that
this feeling would be exacerbated.

Traditionally, as Johnson conceived it, American

policy toward China had had two basic goals. First, it

 

24In early 1943 President Roosevelt appointed
Edward J. Flynn, a New York politician, to Johnson's post
and directed Johnson to "retire". Flynn, who was not
satisfied with the title of Minister, was to be made
Ambassador to the whole South Pacific. However, the
Senate refused to confirm the President's appointment and
Flynn withdrew. Since Johnson had never wanted to retire,
the administration then decided to keep him on. Issues
of the New York Times in early 1943 carry a good account
of the Senate's handling of Flynn but do not present a
full picture of Johnson's position. The author's know-
ledge of the matter is based primarily on personal
correspondence between Johnson and Stanley Hornbeck from
December 1942 through early 1943 in Hornbeck's possession
in Washington D.C. and on conversations with Hornbeck.
Hornbeck, a close personal friend of Johnson's, warned the
Miniater of the impending ouster and did all he possibly
could to prevent it.

25Johnson Reminiscences, III.

21
had served to protect legitimate American interests,
insuring Americans of equality of commerCial opportunity
and; second, it had served to aid China and to help her
with her internal development--whenever such action
coincided with American interests. The Open Door policy,
which really began in 1842 when Admiral Kearney demanded
that the opening of treaty ports of China to others be
accorded also to the United States, was a manifestation
of the former. The United States sought no colonies,
no unique privileges; it wanted only the right for its
merchants to compete freely in the China market with
those of other nations. This was the basis of the Open
Door--the basis for the notes sent by Secretary Hay in
1899. Thus the Open Door, in Johnson's view, was simply
a statement of an American principle, an appeal to the
powers to allow trade without discrimination, nothing
more; it was the policy under which the United States
always operated prior to 1900 and under which she always
attempted to operate after 1900. Action, like the
consortium arrangements and the railroad schemes under
Taft were merely attempts to maintain American influence
in the face of the other more aggressive powers. Such
action was completely justified.26

When Wilson and Bryan, who were filled with pious

26Ibid., I.

22
hopes for the world, attempted to exercise American
moral propensities in the western hemiSphere, they soon
found that our security as a nation demanded such a
degree of forceful interference in the affairs of our
Latin neighbors that their actions looked grossly
inconsistent, and foolish. However, since the United
States was more detached from the Far East, the errors
of this new "uplift" policy did not appear as quickly
in that part of the world and thus the result was a policy
of drift and the gradual reduction of American influence--
influence that had to be maintained if the United States
were to retain its position as a trader avoiding discrim-
ination against its goods and servims. Eventually seeing
that the exigencies of the situation required that the
United States act more realistically but refusing to
admit the lack of wisdom of his previous policy, Wilson
had to return to a policy similar to that of his prede-
cessors. Johnson always considered Wilson's infusion of
"ideals" into American policy toward China as particularly
ill—advised.27 Such ideals were to be espoused only
when coincident with American interests.

While the Open Door was nothing more than an

attempt to retain equality of opportunity for Americans

in China, the Nine Power Pact did undertake to protect

 

27Ibid., III.

23

China's territorial and administrative integrity.
Johnson viewed this agreement as an attempt by the United
States to befriend the Chinese--an attempt to keep the
powers from victimizing China while she was going through
a period of revolution. In this sense, he saw American
policy as being idealistic. However, he also saw that
the agreement was completely consistent with American
interests since it involved no undertaking to use force
to protect China and implied to United States policy
makers a continuation of American influence and activity
there without possible exclusion by any other power and
without any "messy" involvement. It was a manifestation
of an American desire to help, Johnson thought, but it
was a manifestation emanating from a highly materialistic,
acquisitive people who were very ambiguous about their
foreign policy-~a people whose ideas had been shaped by
the characteristics predominant in the American pioneer.

"We are a nation of pioneers;" Johnson once said;
"our forefathers pitted their wits against nature to
build upon this continent the nation that we know today."28
This idea was fundamental in his conception of his country's
heritage and was fundamental in his conception of his

own personal heritage as well. There seems to be little

28Speech entitled "Should the United States Explain
Itself", undated in the Johnson Papers.

24
doubt that Johnson was affected by what could adequately
be termed the "pioneer spirit." In his writing, he
continually referred to the pioneer and the glory of his
way of life; he extolled the pioneer's individualism and
the great courage that was a part thereof. He, likewise,
praised his proclivity for helping his neighbor, for
although the pioneer was a rugged individualist, he
possessed the Spirit of cooperation; and it was this
Spirit as much as the former that made the United States
a great nation. He praised the pioneer's masculinity,

_ his love of hard work, his idealism, and his deep and
abiding faith in the future. Johnson thought of Abraham
Lincoln as the greatest American of all time; he gloried
in Lincoln's humble origins, his simplicity and his
compassion for his fellow man. At one time while still
with the Department in Washington, he made a trip
following the Lincoln family's route over the mountains
westward. He often extolled the virtues of Lincoln's
pioneer mother, the traits hammered into her character
by the rugged comfortless life that she led. He thought
it the epitome of life in America that Lincoln, a humble,
unsophisticated but intellectually superior individual,
born in the wilderness and receiving few of the benefits
of formal education could come to play such an important
role in national and world affairs.

Similarly, Johnson often stated to Secretary Kellogg

25
that in writing his memoirs he could make his story
infinitely more meaningful to other Americans if he would
only endeavor to contrast the pioneer world in which he
was born with the SOphisticated world in which he was
to play a part. Deeply impressed by Carl Sandburg's
Lincoln, Johnson thought Sandburg could tell the story
of Frank Kellogg better than anyone else and on one
occasion even suggested that Kellogg go to him and ask
him to do this.29 It seems probable that Johnson thought
of himself in somewhat the same light as Kellogg-~in the
sense at least that he thought of himself as rising from
a pioneer heritage to a position of prominence. Although
not born to a pioneer family, he went to Oklahoma at a
very early age and knew its pioneer or early statehood
days. And, although his stay there was Short, the short-
ness of his stay proved no obstacle to the impressions
that it made upon his mind. In fact, it is conceivable
that the four years that he spent there, the years from
age nine to thirteen, proved just long enough to impress
him with the glamour of the frontier, yet not long
enough to impress him with its less savory features.
Thus, throughout his life, the fondest memories were of
the frontier, of the dust of Oklahoma, the hardiness

and healthfulness of the place, and the rugged men that

29Johnson to Frank Kellogg, July 16, 1936, Johnson
Papers.

,0

1V

26
it made; men who were friendly in spirit but who knew
that one must be ready to "shoot or give up the street."

Since policies are to a large extent the expression
of mental attitudes, Johnson's own thoughts as well as
his views of what might be called the composite mind of
America are important in understanding his role in the
making of American policy toward China; they are impor-
tant in understanding how he thought the United States
should act in conducting its foreign affairs. As
indicated, Johnson conceived of himself if not specifi-
cally as a pioneer, at least as a person stamped by most
of the characteristics thereof. Like himself, the
American that he came to represent as Chief of the Far
East Division, Assistant Secretary of State and Minister
and Ambassador to China he also considered as bearing
the pioneer stamp. This by no means meant that this
American possessed uncomplicated thoughts or simple
attitudes, however. 0n the contrary, his thoughts were
complex because the pioneer characteristics were superim-
posed on the mythology, ethics, hero worship and traditions
of his forefathers, the Jews, Romans, Franks, Norse and
Germanic peOples. The qualities growing out of exper-
iences on the series of frontiers in America then, added
to, tempored or altered the European heritage. Thus the
American was a complex person, a person who was individ-

ualistic, resourceful, materialistic, inventive, and

I.

IV

27
sympathetic, and who was willing to help his neighbor--
if in so doing he did not become involved so intimate—
ly in his neighbor's affairs that he lost his freedom
for individual action.

In Johnson's view Americans always pursued a
foreign policy that reflected these attitudes. The
pioneer life of having to do without the material goods
that could do so much to bring him comfort taught the
American to be materialistic. The pioneers also learned
to depend on one another to battle the elements and to
cope with emergency situations and this taught them con—
cern for and interest in the welfare of others. Thus
one could see Americans traveling abroad scorning other
people for not having the material goods that they had,
the washing machines, automobiles, vacuum cleaners, bath
tubs and the like. But, at the same time, one could see
a genuine desire on the part of the American to help
these people; pe0ple that he considered less fortunate
than he, for the American always had profound sympathy
for the underdog. In response to this stimulus, the
American's altruism, his idealism and his philanthropy
appeared. Missionary work was a part of this response.

The pioneer by his ingenuity, resourcefullness and
initiative built America into one of the greatest
empires the world has ever seen. So, along with his

altruism and idealism and desire to proselytize there

28
went an acquisitive, constructive, practical development
which had to be served. And, a world which did not take
this phase of American life into consideration Johnson
said, "will suffer a sad awakening some day." "We our—
selves must obey and not forget that side of our develop-
ment; the spirit is in our blood and we will forget our
altruism and ouridealism if and when we become con—
vinced that our interests are at stake."30 It was the
a0quisitive, materialistic aspect of the American's
makeup Johnson thought that built the United States
into the great country that it is; it was this aspect that
conquered the vast expanse of the Northwest and the
Louisiana territories and developed agriculture and
built great industrial plants therein, that built the
great cities and expanded from the East coast to the
West. It was also this materialistic side of the
American that drove him onto the high seas to seek
trade in Latin America, Europe, and eventually in Asia.
It motivated him to build new and faster ships and
led to the growth of American business in China and to
the opening of Japan.
Indeed it seems apparent that Americans in deter-

mining their policy toward China were motivated by both

30Johnson to Roy Howard, Aug. 29, 1933, ibid.,
Johnson reiterated this view of America very often through
his career.

29
their acquisitive or materialistic and altruistic sides.
There were times during the course of Sino-American
relations when it appeared that the former side was
pushed into the background; when the greater emphasis
was laid on cultural or missionary work, when missionary
groups colored and even attempted to dominate policy.
But altruism never really gained the fore in United
States policy. It may have been the altruistic side of
the American character which hailed the settlements of
the Washington Conference, as Johnson believed, and the
policy followed by Johnson and his superiors in the late
twenties may have occurred as a direct result of a
sincere desire to help the Chinese, but it should not
be forgotten as Johnson himself stated, "that this was
the altruism of a very practical, acquisitive, energetic
people;"31 a people whose desire "to help" could blur
their vision but could never really block their view
of their own self-interests. Johnson, like the American
of whom he often spoke, was both the idealist and the
realist, a friend of the Chinese, but an American

nationalist first and foremost.

 

31Ibid.

"I'

II

II

NELSON JOHNSON AND CHINESE NATIONALISM

In May, 1925, American Minister John V.A. MacMurray
wrote:

"I have found Chinese feeling...aroused to

an emotional fervor which I was scarcely

prepared to realize even after a dozen years

of observing the growth of national self-

consciousness. The Shanghai Incident seems

to have awakened instincts and passions

hitherto dormant, and given an element of

fanaticism to what were behind the somewhat

unsympathetic and desultory aspirations of

the small articulate portion of the Chinese

people."l

The trouble at Shanghai began in mid-May when strikes
in Japanese cotton mills resulted in violence with the
Japanese firing on the Chinese strikers, wounding a
number of them and killing one. On May 30, Chinese
laborers and students held a memorial service in Shanghai
for their dead fellow. After the service the group
demonstrated in the International Settlement. Declaiming
against conditions in Japanese cotton mills, they shout-
ed anti-foreign slogans and insisted that the Japanese
go home. When the mob appeared to get out of control
the police inspector in that sector, a man of British

nationality named Everson, gave the order to Sikh and

 

lJohn V.A. MacMurray to the Secretary of State,
July 28, 1925, Papers Relatingwtg the Foreigp Relations

Of 323 United EEEEEE. 1925, 1,799 (hereafter referred

I3 as F.R.I. 30

{Q

31
Chinese constables to fire. Nine Chinese were killed
and numerous more were wounded.

Chinese nationalism or anti-foreignism then Spread
feverishly. Consul General Cunningham at Shanghai
reported: "general strike resolutions were passed by
students...to become effective June 1st and demands
were made and wild resolutions passed on all conceivable
questions." "Conditions are regarded exceedingly ser—
iouS and indications are that the activities will not be
confined to Shanghai."2 In Peking students harangued
passers-by on the Shanghai affair. Thousands of stu-
dents began parading and called on the President and
Minister for foreign affairs. At Canton a general
strike and boycott was called against the British,
Japanese and Americans. Consul General Douglas Jenkins
stated: "foreigners will find it will probably be a long
time before they will find it safe to move about freely
....Business is at a standstill."3 Strikes and street
demonstrations spread as far into the interior as
Chungking. China was no longer the dormant country

that the treaty powers had known. She no longer limited

 

2Consul General at Shanghai to the Secretary of
State, June 3, 1925, ibid., 648-649.

3Consul General at Canton to the Secretary of
State, June 22, 1925, ibid., 751-754.

32
herself to requests relative to the treaties that had
for so long limited her sovereignty; she demanded revision.

The treaty system, developed during the nineteenth
century severely compromised China's sovereignty. In
the treaties concluded in 1842, 1844, 1858, and 1876,
Great Britain, the United States and the other powers
secured from the Chinese extraterritorial jurisdiction
for their nationals, control over China's tariff system,
the right to build schools and preach Christianity
within China, control of China's post office and
communication system and the establishment of an Inter-
national Settlement at Shanghai.

Although resenting these impingements of her
sovereignty, until World War I, China was never in a
position to do anything about them. She had carried
out a successful revolution against the Manchus in 1911
but she was still too weak to throw out the foreigners.
However, during the world war by virtue of her joining
the allied cause she was enabled to abrogate all treaties
with Germany and Austro—Hungary. She thus pushed the
door open for the expulsion of all foreign "rights".

When the Versailles Conference Opened China hoped
to make even further gains against the foreigners. She
hOped to get Japan out of Shantung by dispossessing her
of all the former German rights there, to secure the

abrogation Of the Twenty-One demands of 1915 and to

33

achieve consideration for the eventual abolition of the
special rights enjoyed by the powerSunder the treaty sys-
tem. During the course of the negotiations, first signs
of Chinese nationalism appeared as student groups in
China began demonstrations and sent Off telegrams to the
delegation at Paris. However, the public support achieved
at home did little to benefit the cause of China at the
Conference. The Powers refused her requests to discuss
the broad treaty question, and on the specific issue of
the expulsion of Japan from Shantung supported Japan.

The one favorable development resulting from the
conference was the broadening of nationalistic spirit
throughout China. News of the Shantung award set Off
student demonstrations. In May 1919, students marched on
the Legation quarter, student strikes were called and
student fervor exerted so much pressure On the national
government that it had eventually to refuse to sign the
Versailles Treaty. A new national consciousness was
burgeoning.

Unable to achieve the degree of treaty revision
that she had hoped for at the Versailles Conference
and thwarted in her attempts to have her problems made
a part of the agenda there, China hoped to receive more
consideration when the Washington Conference convened.
Accordingly, the Chinese proposed in Washington that the

powers agree to a self-limiting declaration to the

34

effect that China's territorial and administrative
integrity be reSpected and that the powers examine
their existing agreements with her with a view to
treaty revision as soon as such revision was practicable.
The requests of the Chinese dealing with the
preservation of their administrative and territorial
integrity were agreed to by the powers, in Slightly
amended form, and were made a part of the Nine Power
Treaty. China, therefore, achieved a part of her goal.
But only a part for the powers were unwilling to commit
themselves to sacrifice their own interests to the
degree that they would consent to broad and comprehensive
treaty revision. They rejected China's bid for tariff
autonomy and the elimination of extraterritorial jur-
isdiction, and promised, as a straw, only to hold a
Special Tariff Conference which would at some future
date alter the tariff schedules. On the question of
extraterritoriality, the powers would only agree to
consider the establishment Of a Commission that would
survey the situation and recommend possible means of
reform. They took the position that nothing could be
done until China revamped her laws and judicial system,
and until such time as they were content that she had
done so in a satisfactory manner. China was tO put
her house in order and the powers would let her alone

do to this, but they would concede nothing until this

35

was done.

Notwithstanding the powers' commitlnent to reSpect
her territorial and administrative integrity, China re-
ceived only minor benefit from the Washington Conference.
It was agreed that foreign post Offices would be
abolished in China (except those in leased areas) under
the condition that China set up and Operate an efficient
postal system and not alter the status Of the foreign
CO-Director. The powers also agreed that radio stations
owned and operated by foreigners might be restricted.
Aside from these resolutions, the only other measures
taken that even resembled favorable actions toward China
were Britain's commitments to return Weihaiwei and a
French offer to discuss at some future date their holdings
in Kwangchow-wan.4

As far as China was concerned, therefore, the
Washington Conference served chiefly to preserve the
status quO. The attempt of the major nations to keep
a lid on the Chinese "problem" created a highly explo-
sive and dangerous situation. Revolutionary conditions
within China were progressing to a point where the

powers were either going to have to pursue a hard line

 

4Dorothy Borg, American Ppligy_§ndeh§_9hinese
Revolution, 1925-1928, (New York, 1947'). pp. 9-11‘.

 

36
against China, which meant the use of armed force, or
they were going to have to admit to gradual relinquishment
of their influence and control. Given these conditions,
the effective conduct of Sino-American relations was to
demand a good deal of patience and understanding on the
part of American policy makers.5

Although the actions of all the powers prevented
China's achieving the fulfillment of her desires at
the Conference, it can be said that the United States
was more favorably disposed toward her than the others.
The American delegation was responsible for securing the
adherence by the powers to the preservation of China's
territorial and administrative integrity; they believed
that a strong China was essential to the peace of the
Far East and were undoubtedly sincerely interested in
allowing her time to develop and to work out her own
destiny.

Although it is a fact that in securing the formal
declarations of adherence to her traditional principles
and in getting abrogation of the Sino-Japanese treaty,
the United States was serving its own interests in the
Far East as much as China's, the altruism which had
previously appeared in the conduct of American foreign

policy was demonstrated in part through these agreements

\.

 

SIbid.

37
reached at Washington. The United States wanted the
other powers to agree to let China alone because it
considered it in both the Chinese and American interest
to secure such agreement. If the Open Door were main-
tained and China were not carved up by the powers,
American interests, business and cultural, would prosper;
if this situation prevailed, China would have a chance
to develop to the point where she could take her proper
place among the nations of the world. This was the
interpretation that Secretary Kellogg and Chief of the
Far Eastern Division, Johnson placed on the Washington
Conference when they came to deal with the difficult
and complex problems emanating from a revolutionary
China.6

Nelson Johnson assumed the office of Chief of the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in time to grapple with
the difficult policy problems occuring as a result of the
Shanghai Incident of May 1925. His first task was to
help decide upon a prOper reply to a Chinese note of
June 24, 1925, asking treaty revision. A direct result
of the nationalism engendered by the Shanghai Incident,

this note stated:

 

6The Reminiscences of Nelson Trusler Johnson, Oral
History Project, Columbia U. vol. III, and Johnson to
Tyler Dennett, June 8, 1934, Johnson Papers.

38

"There should be a readjustment of China's
treaty relations with the foreign powers

to bring them more in line with the gen-
erally accepted conception of international
justice.... 30 long as these inequalities
and extraordinary privileges continue to
exist there will always remain causes of
disaffection which are apt to produce
friction and disturb the cordial relations
and good understanding between China and
the foreign powers, such as...in the recent
deplorable incident which took place at
Shanghai...."7

Consistent with his stated belief that the United
States should do all that was practicable to befriend
the Chinese, Johnson took the position that his nation
should go beyond the letter of the Washington treaties
and agree to initiate discussions eventually leading to
the end of tariff controls and extraterritoriality. In
a conversation which he and Kellogg had with the Chinese
Minister on June 50, the Chinese Minister asked if the
United States would be willing to urge upon the other
powers the hastening of the calling of a conference on
tariff matters as provided for in the Nine Power Treaty.
Kellogg said the United States would be glad to do this,
and, moreover, would be willing to urge the hastening

of the sending of the Commission on extraterritoriality.

But the Chinese Minister pointed out that the conference

 

7Charge/é’affaires, to the Secretary of State, June
24, 1925, F.R., 1225, I, 763.

39
on tariffs would not give China the fiscal relief she
desired, in other words, tariff autonomy. Johnson
suggested then that something further might be accom-
plished if the instructions to the conference on tariffs
could be amplified to include a request or recommenda-
tions upon which a plan for giving complete tariff autonomy
might be worked out after the Special tasks of the
conference had been completed.

When the Chinese Minister also stated that the
Commission on extraterritoriality did not give promise of
anything concrete for the Chinese, Johnson suggested
further that something could be accomplished in this
regar¢,if there could be included in the instructions toiflua
several commissioners a request that they submit with
their report recommendations upon which a plan for the
gradual relinquishment of extraterritorial rights might
be based.8 In short, Johnson was suggesting that the
United States should consider sympathetically and in a
Spirit of helpfulness the Chinese position. This
attitude originated with him; it was also the attitude
soon taken by Secretary Kellogg.

In accordance with this attitude, Kellogg sent a

message on July 1 to Charge/Ferdinand Mayer in Peking

 

8Memorandum by Nelson Johnson, June 30, 1925,ibid.,
768-769.

40
which stated the American position clearly:

"In discussing with your colleagues the text
of the reply which each will make to the
identic notes of the Chinese Foreign Office
of June 24 you will take occasion to impress
upon them this Government's desire that the
Powers concerned expedite preparations for
the holding of the Special Conference regard—
ing Chinese customs tariff stating that this
Government believes that that Conference
should be requested, after accomplishing the
work required by the treaty, to make concrete
recommendations upon which a program for
granting complete tariff autonomy to China
may be worked out. You will also make clear
to your colleagues this Government's desire
that the preparations for the despatch of the
Commission to investigate the question of
extraterritoriality be proceeded!with without
delay and state that this Government feels
that this Commission should be requested to
include in its report recommendations upon
which a program for the gradual relinquishment
of extraterritorial rights may be based..."9

Although the American government took a conciliatory
position on the question of treaty revision,the other
powers and particularly the British were afraid that if
they agreed to go beyond the letter of the Washington
agreements their action would be viewed as capitulation
to Chinese demands. Britain thought that China was
setting out to expel the foreigner and to extort forcibly

10 Japan also considered the American

his rights.
proposals as too liberal especially on the tariff question.

The Japanese Ambassador indicated to Kellogg that his

 

9Secretary of State to Charge’d'affaires, July 1,
1925, ibid., 767-768.

10British Charge’d'affaires to the Secretary of State,
July 6, 1925, ibid., 775-776.

41
government was constrained to take exception to the
American proposal to make reference in the Powers' note
to China to the extending of the scope of the tariff
Conference.ll However, criticism of the American pro—
posals was not limited to the other powers. American
Minister MacMurray in Peking took a more conservative
position than Kellogg and Johnson. He thought that
it would be much more sagacious to adhere literally to
the provisions of the Washington Conference. "To go
beyond the letter and beyond the Spirit of our Washington
treaty obligations," he stated, "... is not only to exceed
what I recall as the purposes of the Washington Conference
but also to encourage a Spirit of irresponsibility with
which even the soberest Chinese have recently been
infected through various Bolshevik and juvenile national-
istic influences."12

Here one can see the basic difference between the
positions of Kellogg's major advisors. Johnson was
willing and even anxious to see China regain her sover-
eignty. Viewing China realistically, he believed that
revolutionary conditions within that country demanded

a degree of leniency on the part of the powers. MacMurray

 

11Secretary of State to MacMurray, Aug. 1, 1925,
ibid. e , 806’807 o

12MacMurray to the Secretary of State, Aug. 1, 1925,
ibid., 809.

42
on the other hand believed that leniency would breed
more anti-foreignism. Both respected the Washington
agreements but MacMurrary viewed them in terms of
obligations on the part of the Chinese while Johnson’/
viewed them in terms of commitdnents by the Powers.

With slight alteration, the identic messages which
the treaty powers communicated to the Chinese government
on September 4, 1925, reflected accurately those pro-
posals first advanced by Nelson Johnson. The powers
agreed to appoint delegates to the Special Conference
on Chinese Tariff matters provided for in the Treaty of
1922 and agreed to consider and discuss any reasonable
proposals made by the Chinese for a revision of the
tariff treaties. On the question of extraterritoriality,
they agreed to send a Commission to see what steps if
any could be taken as regards to the gradual relinquish—
ment of extraterritorial rights and agreed to empower
the Commissioner to submit reports which were to serve
as recommendations to be used in determining proper
steps to be taken toward that relinquishment.13

When the United States began work with the Conference

on Tariffs in October 1925, it did so then with serious

intentions of working out some equitable solution on the

 

13MacMurray to the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Sept. 4, 1925, ibid., 831—833.

t

43
vexing question of treaty revision, Kellogg, like
Johnson, believed that the Conference should go beyond
its activities as defined in the Customs Treaty and
enter into a discussion of the entire subject of the
conventional tariff, even including proposals looking
toward ultimate tariff autonomy. "It is my desire,"
he said, "if we can work out a plan whereby tariff
automony will now or eventually be given to China and
extraterritoriality be given up that this be done."14
Later he stated: "We are going to the Conference ser-
iously to cooperate with the Chinese in arriving at
some workable solution of the question of Chinese tariff
which will go as far as it is fair to go in satisfying
the nationalistic aSpirations of the Chinese and yet
insure American trade freedom from unequal or discrimin-
inating treatment. If we cannot do this in cooperation
with the other powers at this conference we must then
negotiate separately."15

However favorably disposed the two American policy
makers were toward tariff revision, nothing of great
consequence came of the powers working in concert through

the Special Tariff Conference. They did agree on resolu-

tions relative to tariff autonomy but then much to China's

 

14Secretary of State of MacMurray, Sept.l2, 1925,
ibid. ’ 8490

15Secretary of State to MacMurray, Oct.5, 1925, ibid.,
855.

 

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44
dismay, they began debate on the purposes for which
funds from increased tariffs would be used. With many
details still to be worked out, the Conference recessed
in December not reconvening until February. During the
whole course of the negotiations Chinese political con-
ditions were extremely unstable and this as well as the
powersxintransigence on certain issues produced a poor
climate for serious or conclusive agreement.

In April 1926, the formal work of the Conference
ended as the government at Peking was overthrown. Since
the powers refused to recognize the government formed in
mid-May, the Chinese cooperated no further with the
Conference. Although the delegations of the Treaty powers
continued informally to attempt to work out a settlement
and although they agreed on certain aspects of a settle-
ment, for all intents and purposes the Conference ended
With the overthrow of the Peking government in April.16

The Commission organized to study the question of
eXtraterritoriality achieved little more success. Orig-
inally scheduled to meet in December of 1925, the
Commission did not hold its first meeting until January
1926 and then when it did meet its effectiveness was
limited by various factors.

As mentioned previously, the purpose of the Commission

l6Borg, pp. 109-110.

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was, first, to study the judicial system in China
indicating its effectiveness and efficiency and secondly,
to make recommendations to be used in determining poss—
ible steps to be taken toward relinquishment. Relative
to the first purpose, it was extremely difficult for
the Commission to ascertain the true facts relative to
the administration of justice in China because of the
unsettled conditions created by the northern march of the
uncooperative Kuomintang armies and because of communica-
tion difficulties. On the second, the Commission was to
do its work at such an inopportune time, at a period of
such great upheaval in China, that the report finally
submitted when the Commission ended its work was so
colored by events that it proved not to be the beginning
guide to the eventual relinquishment of extraterritoriality
that Johnson and Kellogg envisaged, but rather a series
of suggestions relative to the reform of existing con-
ditions in China. It did little but advocate the
Preservation of the status quo, at least until China
"Cleaned house."

However, the report did correspond accurately with
the attitude taken by American Minister MacMurray on the
question of extraterritoriality. He had recommended in
February 1926, and maintained this posture all along,
that the powers of the Commission be not enlarged to make

ag‘reement relative to relinquishment until the report of

I‘

46
the Commissioners was read by the governments involved.
Moreover, he recommended that there be absolutely no
modification of the treaties because of the revolutionary
conditions existing in China; Chinese demands for such
modification he considered preposterous.l7

Although not in direct contact with the chaos of a
revolutionary China as MacMurray and the Commissioners
were, both Secretary of State Kellogg and Nelson Johnson
realized quite well the situation existing there. Never-
theless they still believed that the United States should
continue to look in the direction of relinquishment. In
June 1926, Kellogg wired to Silas Strawn, the American
Commissioner, telling him not to recommend requirements
from China as a prerequisite to relinquishment of extra-
territoriality that he considered not absolutely necessary
for the protection of American interests. He stated, in
Effect, that while it expected adequate protection of its
Citizens the United States did not expect ideal conditions
in China.18

Nelson Johnson, like his chief, had long been in

faVor of taking steps in the direction of the abolition

, . 17MacMurray to the Secretary of State, Feb. 27, 1926,
lhig,, 968.

18Secretary of State to Silas Strawn, June 11, 1926,
Department of State File 500. A4e/708.

47
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and was in sympathy

with Kellogg. As early as 1916 he believed that the

Chinese had made a sufficiently serious effort toward

constructive reform within their country that the

United States should attempt to meet her half way. If

she did not, he believed, revision would eventually be

forced upon her.19 He was always exasperated by the

shortsightedness of those like Charles Denby who once

told him in conversation in 1925 that the United States

should be extremely cautious about giving up its extra-

territorial rights for in so doing it would be sacrificing

the great interests of the Standard Oil Company and

the Robert Dollar Company. The sacrifices of American

interests would be far greater, Johnson believed,

if the United States did not view realistically what was

happening in China and conduct its policy in such a way

as to not thwart unnecessarily China's attempt to regain

her sovereignty.2O
Consistent with his poSition, when the preliminary

report of the Commission was made in 1926 Johnson reported

to Kellogg that he agreed with it in the sense that the

United States should not give up extraterritorial rights

19Johnson Papers 1916, undated as to month and day.

20Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
Charles Denby, June 18, 1925, D/S File 893.00/6317.

48
until certain Chinese legal and judicial reforms were
carried out. However, he also indicated that he believed
that the United States had no right to dictate to China
the kind of government or laws it should have in dealing
with foreigners. Moreover, a hard line taken by the
United States at this time would appear grossly incon-
sistent since she had supported China in depriving Germany
and Austria—Hungary of their extraterritorial rights.

His opinions were undoubtedly a major factor in deter-
mining the tenor of Kellogg's note to Strawn of June 11.21
Once the Commission on Extraterritoriality had com-
pleted its work no significant Sino-American negotiation
took place on the subject until the Kuomintang had ac-
quired control of the government and could speak, at
least nominally, as the voice of all of China. Satisfied
that a degree of stability had been achieved, in July
1928, the United States concluded a tariff agreement with
the Chinese. When this agreement, which constituted
American recognition of the Nanking regime, had been
consummated, the United States could once more begin to
discuss the knotty problems of extraterritoriality.
JOhnson was to play an even greater role in this round
of negotiations.

In the meantime United States policy makers had

21Johnson to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1926,
D/s File 500. A4e/707.

49
to deal with the difficult problems of late 1926 and
1927, problems arising after the Kuomintang launched the
Northern Expedition which was ultimately to carry it to
control of the National government. This campaign formally
began in May of 1926 when the military arm of the Kuom-
intang under Chiang Kai-shek managed to defeat the armies
of Northern Marshal Wu Pei-fu. Continuing, in July
Chiang's army managed to capture Changsha; and in
October they took Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang; in Dec—
ember they moved in to Kiangsi and Fukien. In January
1927, they moved the government from Canton to Hankow.
Then in April 1927, Chiang and the Kuomintang conserva-
tives formed their own National government at Nanking
and expelled the Communists. Since the Nationalists were
committed not only to the extermination of the Northern
militarists during this period but also to a policy of
anti-foreignism, the powers had to meet numerous problems
involving chiefly the protection of their nationals and
the preservation of their "rights."

One such problem arose in September 1926 when actions
that the British termed "piratical outrages" against them
were perpetrated in Canton harbor by some Chinese strike
pickets participating in the Hongkong boycotts. Apparent-
ly what happened was that the pickets fired upon British
and other Nationals doing business there, injuring some

and doing some damage. In retaliation, Britain instructed

50
her naval forces at Canton to seize and disable all
boats employed by strike pickets. Wishing to cooperate
with the United States, the British government on
September 2 notified the United States of the action it
was taking in the case and asked her if in view of the
fact that an outrage on and imprisonment of an American
had recently occurred she would not like to associate her-
self with the action she was taking.22 Maintaining the
liberal attitude toward China adopted earlier, Chief of
the Far Eastern Division Johnson took the position that
the United States should act to give adequate protection
to its citizens in this case but should not agree to join
the British in the use of force against the Chinese.23 In
a message to the British Ambassador he stated: "I regret...
to inform you thatthis Government is not in a position
to associate itself with the action which His Majesty's
Government is taking in this matter as set forth in your
note."24

In November of 1926 another incident occurred which

 

, 22British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, Sept.
2, 1926, F.R., 1926, I, 723. Account based in part on
Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution

192§-1928 (New York, 1947K pp. 140-141.
23Memorandum in Johnson Papers, April 22, 1929.

24Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, Sept.
9, 1926, F.R., 1926 I, 726-727.

I‘D

51
Similarly demonstrates the continued liberal policy of
Washington in its relations with the Chinese. Reflect-
ing their anti-foreignism, certain Chinese nationalists
at that time made an attempt to get control of the
Customshouses at Hankow—-to demobilize the Customs
Administration. Immediately upon seeing the impending
problem, the InSpector General of Chinese Customs put
the matter before the Diplomatic body at Peking and
appealed for protection for the foreign staff of the
Customshouse for the purpose of keeping the house open
and working in case a Chinese Union should precipitate
a strike of the Chinese and attempt to oust the foreign
staff. Minister MacMurray, as he had on most other issues
during 1925 and 1926, advocated a hard line against the
Chinese, supported the Inspector and said that, if
necessary, the United States should join the other
powers in landing naval forces to keep the Customs working.25
Once again, the ideas of policy makers in Washington
prevailed and MacMurray's suggestions were overruled.
Consequently, Kellogg wired the American Legation at
Peking indicating that in the Opinion of the Department
the Chinese Maritime Customs was a Chinese national

service under the Chinese Government, that foreigners

 

25MacMurray to the Secretary of State, Nov. 27, 1926,
ibid., 964-966. See also Borg, p. 141.

52
employed there were servants of the Government of China,
and that if the Chinese Government wished to destroy
that administration the United States had no right to
intervene. The United States, therefore, would not join
the powers in landing naval forces to prevent the closing
of the Hankow Customs Houses.26

During the next few months civil commotion and even
mob violence prevailed to such a great extent throughout
China that the United States was undecided as to how to
proceed with its "pro—Chinese" policy. While it was
quite willing to avoid victimizing the Chinese while
they attempted to work out their internal problems, the
United States could make no progress toward treaty re-
vision by simply watching and waiting; waiting for a
Chinese government to create sufficient unity and stability
so negotiations could begin. The difficulty was, however,
that the great spurt of nationalism or anti-foreignism was
creating a condition that was to demand that the United
States and the other powers re—examine their posture even
if China did not get stability. The exigencies of the
Situation were to require that the powers be willing to
negotiate and to express this willingness even if there
was no well-defined group with whom to negotiate.

Thus, the British in late December, indicating a

 

26Secretary of State to MacMurray, Nov. 29, 1926,
ibid., 966, and Memorandum in Johnson Papers, April 22,
1929.

I.

‘0

55

softening in their position, stated that they were
willing to negotiate the question of treaty revision and
to go a long way toward meeting the Chinese aspirations
on the matter. The United States, which had all along
been pursuing a policy similar to the one that the British
now were beginning to advocate, in reply to the British
statement indicated that it would go even further on
treaty revision; would, as a matter of fact, go it alone
if necessary in working out a solution with China. The
United States would, moreover, not even require that a
Chinese government demonstrating its ability to insure
peace and stability be a prerequisite to discussions, but
rather only one that seemed to represent the "authorities
or the people” of China. This was the essence of the
policy statement issued by Secretary Kellogg on January
27, 1927.27

As the leader of the group in the State Department
advising Kellogg on this matter, and as an advocate of a
liberal Chinese policy, Nelson Johnson took the position
that in following this seemingly even more liberal tack
in its relations with the Chinese the United States could
possibly accomplish a good deal by winning the friendship

of China. The only reservation he had was that in

 

27Secretary of State to the Charge/in China, Jan. 25,
1927, F.R., 1921, II, 350.

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54
prematurely indicating American willingness to negotiate,
the United States could precipitate a fight among those
dopposing groups in China who might wish to carry on the
negotiations and thereby carry off the prestige involved.28
However, generally speaking, he was in complete agreement
with Kellogg's policy as stated in the message of
January 1927.

American policy makers advocating a liberal policy
toward China were to eXperience great frustration in the
months subsequent to January, for political conditions in
China during this time were to go from bad to worse. From
the point of view of foreigners the most difficult times
came in late March when the "Nanking Incident" occurred.

The trouble at Nanking began on March 24 when a group
of soldiers wearing Nationalist army uniforms perpetrated
a series of outrages on all foreigners living there. Look—
ing very much like part of a pro-arranged plan, the
assaults continued and soon even the British, American
and Japanese Consulates were also being attacked; the
American Consul and his family eventually having to
seek refuge in a foreign house near the city wall. As
the attacks did not cease and when it appeared that the

lives of a good number of Americans were in very real

 

28Johnson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 12, 1929,
D/S File 711.93/113.

55

danger, the American Consul ordered American gunboats
to lay down a barrage to kill or scare off the attackers.
The attacks ended shortly thereafter but not before a
good deal of damage had been done and a number of
Americans and other foreigners killed. As a result, on
April 11 the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France
and Italy presented jointly a group of three demands to
the Nationalist government. Seeking a quick end to the
crisis, the powers asked early and adequate punishment
for those reSponsible for the murders and material damage
done, an apology in writing from the Commander in Chief
of the Nationalist Army along with a promise that such
outrages would not happen again, and complete reparation
for all personal injuries and material damage.29

Bolder than previous Chinese governments and not
willing to evidence traditional Chinese quietism, the
Nationalists shot a reply to the American government on
April 14 saying that it would make good damage done to
the American Consulate; that it would make "reasonable
and necessary" reparation for personal injury and other
material damage, except for damage done by the American
Naval bombardment or by Northern rebels and agents pro-

vocateurs; that it would mete out punishment only after a

 

29The Consul General at Hankow to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government, April 11,
1927, F.R., 1927, II, 189—190.

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56
government inquiry of the incident; that it favored an
international investigating commission to look into the
whole matter; and that it would not apologize until the
findings of such commission indicated that it should
apologize. Concluding, the Chinese reply stated that
the best guarantee for the protection of American and
other foreign lives and pr0perty in China would be to
end the "unequal treaties."30

Although somewhat angered by this note and by the
fact that Chiang Kai—shek did not take the bit in his
mouth and attempt to settle the incident promptly and
equitably, Johnson adOpted a fairly lenient posture on
the matter. He believed that it was obvious that the
Nationalist Government, located at this time at Hankow,
did not really control the situation and that the out-
rages at Nanking were committed by a section of the army
under a General Cheng Chien who was subservient to a
radical group also at Hankow that was intent on embarr—
assing Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, the outrages, he
believed, were not participated in by the people of
Nanking and those responsible had left the city probably
never to be seen again. But, even if the guilty could

be found, there would be no assurance that they would

 

30The Consul General at Hankow to the Secretary of
State, April 14, 1927, ibid., 192-194.

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57
heed the rebukes of the government of Hankow. Thus
when American Minister MacMurray advocated that the
United States join the other powers and issue an ulti-
matum to China with a time limit set for compliance
before military action be used, Johnson raised his
voice in opposition. Kellogg, predisposed in Johnson's
direction, therefore followed a more moderate line.31

On May 6, the State Department was notified that C.C.
Wu had been appointed Chinese Foreign Minister and that
he was desirous of settling the Nanking Incident. This
information was quickly conveyed to the acting American
Consul General at Shanghai who was told to listen to
all that Wu had to say. The United States began waiting
then for a more suitable reply to its demands of April
11 but did not indicate that it would not modify these
demands in order to reach a settlement.32 Indeed,
Johnson and Kellogg were quite willing to make American
demands correspond to the realities of the situation.
On the Chinese side, Minister Wu soon prOposed to the
American Consul the settlement of the incident along
the following lines: First, that the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs would say that the acts had been
perpetrated by irresponsible soldiers in the nineteenth

division and that they had been punished; second, that

 

31Johnson to R.S. Norman, June 29,1927, Johnson Papers.

32MacMurray to the Secretary of State, May 6, 1927,
F.R. 1927, II, 219.

 

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the Minister of Foreign Affairs would express regret
and give guarantees of future protection; third, that
the Nationalist Government would make good on all damage
done to the Consulate and to Americans where it was
clear damage was done by Chinese troops and in other
cases would pay according to the findings of a joint
Commission according to international law; and fourth,
that the Commission would decide on damage done by
bombardment by the Americans and decide how much was
due China.33

In response to these proposals, Johnson in November
drafted a memorandum which was ultimately sent to
MacMurray for his guidance and which indicated the
American position. The message stated that the United
States wanted to be convinced of the sincerity of the
Nationalist Government and wanted that government to
accept full responsibility for the affair, such reSpon—
sibility to be absolute and not to be interpreted as
indicating that it was in some way limited by the prin—
ciples of international law. Also, the United States
would expect the Chinese Government to promise to punish
the guilty persons, where possible, but if it was clear

that this could not be done that this point be not pushed

 

33MacMurray to the Secretary of State, May 28, 1927,
ibid. ’ 222-2230

3:1

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59
too far. In lieu of punishment the Chinese should at
least disavow and stigmatize as "worthy of punishment"
those known to have been involved. In lieu of an
apology, the United States would accept a statement of
profound regret from Chiang Kai-shek if the Nationalist
government would promise an end of violence to Americans
and American interests. On the question of an investi-
gating commission, the United States would consent to
the appointment of a joint Sino—American Commission
solely to ascertain the facts and to fix the amount of
damage to be paid, and in addition, the United States
would be willing to take up the question of treaty
revision but not as a condition of settlement of this
particular question. However, it would not express regret
for the naval bombardment, for as Johnson himself always
insisted, it was not a bombardment in any case, but
merely a protective barrage laid down to prevent the
killing of American nationals. Concluding, the mem—
orandum went on to state: "The Government of the United
States desires that this incident in so far as it concerns
the United States, should be settled.... It is therefore
to be hoped that the Minister will seek to bring about
such a settlement at the earliest favorable opportunity."34

However, unsettled conditions in China made it

'd

 

34Memorandum by Johnson, Nov. 3,1927, ibid,232-234.

 

6O
virtually impossible to make much real progress toward
settlement of the issue during the remaining days of
1927. The condition of the Chinese Nationalist govern-
ment had been by no means stable throughout the early
discussion of the Nanking Incident as at one point there
were even three competing and very vocal Chinese
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a condition prompting
Johnson to quip: "It is going to be very difficult for
these three gentlemen to find enough words to go around."35

If the Nationalist government lacked unity and was
unstable through the spring and summer of 1927, it
experienced nearly as precarious an existence in the
fall. Chiang Kai—shek had resigned as Chief of the
Nanking faction of the government in August and the split
between the opposing groups of the Kuomintang (Nanking and
Hankow) had ostensibly been breached with the establish-
ment of a united Kuomintang government in Nanking in
September. However, neither Chiang, nor Wang Ching-Wei
nor others whose support was desperately needed would
throw themselves behind the government and the result,
of course, was that this government simply marked time
through late 1927. In addition, the fact that during this

period American Minister MacMurray was home in Washington

 

35Johnson to Jacob Gould Schurman, May 17, 1927,
Johnson Papers.

0’1

 

61
made it all the more difficult to proceed with the
negotiations. Very little was accomplished, therefore,
until early 1928.

In early 1928, Chiang Kai-shek returned from re—
tirement in Japan, once more took control of the Chinese
Nationalist army, and took powerful political positions
in the Kuomintang. Aiming at unity, Chiang and the
other Kuomintang members did achieve more cooperation and
much more stability than had previously existed, and,
as a result negotiations toward the settlement of the
Nanking Incident resumed.

Throughout February and March proposals and counter
proposals were made between MacMurray and the Chinese
officials with little optimism, at least on MacMurray's
part, that a satisfactory agreement would be reached.
However, a final round of whirlwind negotiations
between the American Minister and General Huang Fu in
late March proved fruitful and on March 29 a settlement
was achieved. Released on April 2, the terms of the
settlement were as follows: China agreed to express its
regret for indignities to the American flag and for loss
of pr0perty, personal injury, etc.; the Nationalists
accepted responsibility for the outrages even though
they were perpetrated by radical elements; they pro-
mised to protect American lives and property in the

future; they indicated that punishment had been meted out

rw—fl

 

62

VVhere possible to those responsible; they promised to
Ioay reparations for damage done, a joint commission
:fixing the amount; and they looked forward to serious
eefforts on both sides to effect treaty revision.36

"It seems to me," Johnson wrote in September 1927,
"that it is possible for us to discard most of the
jprovisions covering our official and personal rights in
China."37 Once the Nanking Incident had been settled and
'the Nationalist armies had captured Peking, the United
States and China could resume negotiations toward this
end. Still wary of anything but the gradual relinquish—
Inent of extraterritoriality and still wishing to take
Inore of a wait and see attitude‘on this matter American
policy makers did, however, believe that more immediate
treaty revision could be effected in the area of tariff
automony.

By its actions prior to and during the Special
Tariff Conference, the United States had made a committo
ment to the Chinese on the question of the tariff. There-
fore, most department officials believed, as did MacMurray,
that the United States should go ahead, even independently
in an effort to grant tariff autonomy to China, especially

since China had now achieved a degree of stability beyond

 

36MacMurray to the Secretary of State, Mar. 30, 1928.,

F.R., 1928, II, 331—553. See also Borg, 376-385 for an
account of the preliminaries to the settlement.

37Johnson to MacMurray, Sept.29,1927, Johnson Papers.

63

ainything seen in that country for some time. As a
c:onsequence, MacMurray was commissioned to discuss the
Inatter with the Chinese and after discussions lasting
zabout two months, on July 25, 1928, the American
Tfiinister and the Chinese Minister of Finance signed a new
'tariff treaty. The treaty gave China independence of
action on tariff questions provided there was no discrim-
ination against American goods or commerce, and constituted
complete recognition of the new Government of China.

The conclusion of the tariff treaty marked the end
of the first chapter in the negotiations regarding
treaty revision, 3 chapter during which the chief
.American policy makers in Washington continually ex-
pressed a willingness to "help" China whenever such a
course was possible or practicable. Nelson Johnson's
role in shaping policy during this period was extreme-
ly Significant for he brought to his post of Chief of
the Far Eastern Division genuine and profound knowledge
of China and an astute recognition of what was actually
happening there. Moreover, as an official in Washington
and not on the scene of mob violence or civil disorder
he was able to view the course of events with detachment
and recommend policy based on reason rather than emotion.
Friendly toward the Chinese, he believed that the
United States could and should do all possible to avoid

interference in Chinese affairs and should be patient

64
'while China developed to nationhood. America Should
intervene, he thought, only to protect its nationals.
Given the fact of China's revolutionary condition, not
only idealism but also realism told him that the only
course for the United States to follow was one of gradual
relinquishment of its treaty privileges. For in this
difficult time in China the only other alternative was
forceable intervention--a policy that he knew the
American people would not support and a policy that his
own conscience would not allow.

Johnson's chief, Secretary Kellogg, was predisposed
to lean in Johnson's direction most of the time during
their years together, Kellogg often, however, leaning
that way and adopting a soft policy because of a very
real fear of Bolshevism and because he felt that this
situation demanded that we make certain concessions to
the Chinese. However this may be, Kellogg undoubtedly
would not have followed a consistently lenient policy
toward China had it not been for Johnson, for it seems
certain that he would have been much more susceptible to
the advice of the American Minister in China, MacMurray,
had he not had some one in Washington to advise him and
to reinforce his own ideas. MacMurray, interpreting the
Washington treaties more in terms of Chinese obligations
than in terms of foreign powers' promises, frequently

suggested harsh and recriminatory action to deal with

65
what he considered frustrating situations in China.

While holding the Washington treaties in equally great

esteem Johnson, on the other hand, viewed them more in

terms of United States commitments to China-~commitments
that would not necessarily lead to any significant com—

promising of American interests and therefore commitments

to be carried out.

III

DISCUSSING EXTRATERRITORIALITY

With the tariff question settled by the treaty of
July 1928, future discussion of treaty revision was to
center on the problem of extraterritoriality. Johnson,
who in August 1927 had been promoted to Assistant
Secretary of State, was to play an even greater role
in these discussions than he had in those related to
tariff autonomy. As the major authority in the De-
partment on China his was one of the determining voices
in the conduct of American policy toward relinquishment.
As a policy maker possessed of a benevolent attitude
toward the Chinese, he continued to believe that the
United States Should relinquish its extraterritorial
rights whenever this was possible. However, since he
had no desire to sacrifice American interests unnecess-
arily, he like Kellogg and later Stimson, adhered to
the position that relinquishment should be gradual and
should be made contingent on the effecting of certain
reforms within China.

Slightly less than a month after the signing of
the tariff treaty, Secretary Kellogg and Assistant
Secretary Johnson held conversations with the Chinese

Minister during which the whole question of the treaties

66

67
once again arose. Asked what the American attitude now
was, Kellogg stated that he did not want the Chinese to
think that the door was closed to further discussion of
the matter; that if the Minister would ask his Govern—
ment for its suggestions on treaty revision, the
Secretary had an open mind and would be glad to listen
to whatever suggestions they had.1 Apparently, however,
the Chinese were not ready to discuss the question
seriously as when Minister Sze heard from his govern-
ment, he was told that he need not bother with the
matter—-at least in the immediate future. Given the
nature of the Chinese reply, Johnson like Kellogg quite
naturally assumed that the Chinese were not too
interested in discussing the question at that moment.2

Undaunted by the Chinese delay, in late September
the American policy makers once again indicated the
American readiness to discuss further the question of
extraterritoriality. The United States, Kellogg said,
was anxious to take up the matter as soon as possible;
but the problem was what to do. The Chinese had not

made any significant progress toward the enactment of

 

1Memorandum by Johnson, Aug. 14, 1928, F.R., 1928,
II, 195-196. See also Borg, pp. 410-411.

 

2Memorandum by Johnson, Sept. 1, 1928, ibid, 196-198.

 

68
law codes called for by the Commission; nor were con-
ditions in China stable enough to allow much concrete
to be done about extraterritoriality. However, if some
acceptable formula could be arrived at, the United
States would be willing to discuss the matter with the
Chinese. American willingness was speeded, Kellogg
concluded, by the danger of Russian Communist activity
in China which could be resisted affectively only if
a stable government were built up in China; and the
best way to achieve this he thought was, "by going as
far as each country could go, consideringits own
interests, towards solving these questions of the
treaties..."3

Taking the lead at this point, the Chinese in early
October proposed that the United States simply surrender
its extraterritorial rights unequivocally and immediate-
ly. The United States, the Chinese stated, could
demonstrate best its friendship to China by giving up
its rights even while other powers held theirs. Once
the United States had negotiated the question independ-
ently she could then go to the other powers and request

them to follow her example. This would be the best

 

3Memorandum by Johnson, Sept. 29, 1928, ibid.,
427-430. See also Borg, pp. 410-411.

 

L

 

69
and simplest way to solve the problem. American policy
makers, needless to say, rejected this proposal out
of hand.4

While they rejected this Chinese suggestion and
disdained the use of American "influence" to induce
other powers to 000perate in securing treaty revision,
American policy makers were not opposed to a contin-
uation of conversations on the matter. As a result,
throughout the fall of 1928 numerous conversations took
place between the Chinese Minister and certain members
of the State Department in an effort to find a satis-
factory formula for settlement. Eschewing haste,
Nelson Johnson maintained that the parties to the con-
versations should find some formula of gradual
relinquishment which could eventually be written into
a treaty and which would take the recommendations of
the extraterritorial Commission as indicating exactly
what acts on the part of the Chinese Government should
be carried out.5

While discussions were being carried on in Wash-
ington between the Chinese and members of the State

Department, Secretary Kellogg began to sound out the

 

4Secretary of State to MacMurray, Oct. 29, 1928,
ibid., 433.

5Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, Nov.2, 1928, Johnson
Papers.

 

Iv
,.

l

7O

attitudes of the other powers on the question of
treaty revision. In an Aide Memoire delivered to each
of the treaty powers he stated: "The American Govern-
ment, while it has felt that conditions in the past have
not warranted entering upon negotiation of a new general
treaty with China, nevertheless feels that the National—
ist Government gives promise of greater stability and
national unity than has prevailed heretofore; it
believes that all possible encouragement should be
given to the Nationalist Government; it is willing to
discuss the subject of revision of the treaties;..."6
Concluding, Kellogg indicated that the United States
thought that the situation in China had changed in
recent months and that it would like to be informed of
the present views of the powers on the question of
revision of the treaties with China.7

The replies received by the Secretary of State
in answer to his queries generally were unfavorable.
Most nations either took the position that they had

already gone as far as it was possible for them to go

or that it would be extremely dangerous to relinquish

 

6Aide Memoire by the Secretary of State, F.R., 1928,
II, 435.

 

71bid.

71
extraterritoriality at that time. Thus, the French
stated that they did not think that it was in the
interest either of foreigners or of the Chinese people
to do so for "these guarantees allow French nationals
to do useful work which has already contributed to
bringing closer together Chinese and occidental civ-
ilizations."8 The British replied that they had done
all that was practicable in their proposals of January
27, 1927, which proposals they thought were concrete
evidence of readiness on the part of Britain to take
practical steps toward ending their extraterritorial
rights.9

The Italian answer was to the effect that the
abolition of foreign rights would have to be accom-
panindi by certain guarantees. The Dutch went even
further and stated that they did not feel that conditions
ill China had changed enough to warrant the Powers' re—
liquuishing their position and subjecting their citizens
"to the jurisdiction of the kind of courts which the

\

8French Embassy to the Department of State, ibid.,
443-444. “—

9In brief, in these proposals Britain offered to

gecognize Chinese law courts in certain cases; to rec-
:lgfillze the validity of a "reasonable" Chinese nationality
(fikv; to apply in British Courts in China the modern

klilnese Civil and Commercial Codes; to make British sub-
.teczts liable to pay "legal" Chinese taxation; to consider
i519 use of the new Chinese Penal Code in British Courts
trl China; to keep missionaries from purchasing land in

he interior etc. etc., Jan.28, 1927, ibid., 440-441.

72

Chinese had."lO Upset over the Chinese position that

the treaty between Japan and China be repudiated uni-
laterally, Japan indicated that she wanted to be liberal

on the whole matter of treaty revision but felt that

China had some obligations as well. The Japanese

Ambassador in conversation with Johnson stated that

Japan placed great importance on the hope that the nations
should lend assistance to China in fulfilling her
aspirations but that China should not disregard conditions
within her own territory and the commitments which

she had previously made.

Indicative of Johnson's attitude toward treaty
revision and toward the broader scope of policy toward
China as well, was his reply to the Japanese Ambassador.
.He stated first in regard to China's promises in the
past that he was of the Opinion that frequently China had
Inade promises under duress or in the hope of obtaining
Scnne benefit thereby, promises which neither the Chinese
Peubple nor Chinese officials ever hoped to fulfill. As
arl example of this type of promise he cited the question
CIT likin, indicating that on various occasions China had

IIPCDmised to abolish likin. But, since there was no

loMemorandum by Johnson, Dec. 20, 1928, ibid., 442-
4453. See Borg, 412-414 for a good discussion of the
re plies.

73
general feeling within China opposed to it the Chinese
would find it almost impossible to fulfill this promise.

Thus, Johnson indicated that he was opposed to con—
certed action to coerce China to fulfill her obligations
since frequently her obligations had not been entered
into seriously, and frequently her obligations were
such that they could not be carried out. When the
Japanese Ambassador questioned him further on this
issue, Johnson said he would qualify a little his oppo—

Jsition to concerted action; that he felt there were
certain things upon which the powers could agree to take
action alike. "At least", Johnson said," we could take
concerted action in constructive measures, or in the
line of moderation...".11
What Johnson was suggesting was that cooperation was
extremely difficult for the United States as long as
c00peration was toward repression. However, cooperation
would be easy for her if she were acting to assist China.
The United States wanted a strong China to insure peace
in the East and would only cooperate to this end. Most
of the other powers did not. Therefore, consistent
concerted action was nearly impossible to achieve.

Although Johnson favored following a moderate line in

11
449.

Memorandum by Johnson, Dec. 29, 1928, ibid.,446-

74
discussions with the Chinese on the question of extra-
territoriality, there was a point past which he would
not go. As conversations on the matter continued
through the winter of 1928 and 1929 chiefly between
Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division and
the Chinese Special Representative C.C. Wu, it became
increasingly apparent that the only basis on which China
wished to settle the question was that of the immediate'
unilateral relinquishment of extraterritorial rights .
by the United States.

In accordance with this position, on January 5, 1929,
in a discussion with Johnson and Hornbeck, Wu suggested
that the United States conclude with China a treaty in 5‘
which American nationals and American interests would
be divested of their extraterritorial rights regardless
of what the other powers did--whether or not extraterr-
itorial rights continued in force with other countries.
Neither Johnson nor Hornbeck would sanction this sugges-
tion even as a basis for further discussion; Johnson
stating simply that the United States would not contem-
plate "an agreement which would place American interests
and nationals in a position of inferiority to that

enjoyed by those of other foreign powers in China."

Moreover, he said, "it has always been the policy of

75
the United States to insist upon most-favored-nation

treatment."12

The vexing question of extraterritoriality was batted
back and forth between C.C. Wu on the one hand and John-
son and HOrnbeck on the other through the winter and
early spring of 1929, with nothing of much significance
accomplished. Not long after the departure of Kellogg
and the entranaaof Henry Stimson into the Secretaryship
of State, however, the Chinese made another move.

In a message to the American Government dated April
27, China indicated that a good deal of progress had
been made in judicial reform, that the nationals of those
countries not enjoying Special privileges suffered no
hardship in China and that they wished the United States
to abolish extraterritoriality at the earliest possible
moment:

"As the American Government has always maintained a
friendly attitude towards China and has always shown its
readiness in the adoption of measures for the removal
of limitations on China's sovereignty, the Chinese Gov-
ernment is happy to express to the American Government
the desire of China to have the restrictions on her
jurisdictional sovereignty removed at the earliest
possible date and confidently hopes that the American
Government will take this desire of China into immediate
and sympathetic consideration and favor it with an early
reply so that steps may be taken to enable China, now
unified and with a strong Central Government, to right—

fully assume jurisdiction over all nationals within her
domain."l3

 

12Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck,Jan.9,l929,ibid.,547.

13The Chinese Minister to the Secretary of State, May
2, 1929, F.R. 1929, II, 561.

76
An early reply from the American Government was not
forthcoming for most American policy makers mirrored the
attitude taken by Johnson when he stated: "The Chinese
are again knocking at our door, as they doubtless are
at Downing Street, asking about extraterritoriality. I
think we shall move cautiously in this matter."14

However, the difficulty from the Chinese point of
view was that some American policy makers were a good
deal more cautious than Johnson. Some, like American
Minister J.V.A. MacMurray in China felt that the matter
should not even be discussed seriously. Commenting to
Stimson on the Chinese request, MacMurray said that he
felt that China based her request on a series of assumpt-
ions contrary to fact, that in truth there was little
in the way of unity in China and that, as a matter of
fact, China had not made appreciable progress toward
judicial reform or administration of law.

If extraterritoriality were relinquished, MacMurray
continued, "the result would be once more a progressive
intensifying of ill feeling and misunderstanding between
foreign nations and China." In conclusion, he stated:
"May I state I am personally convinced that this is a

matter in which action concerted with the other chiefly

 

14Johnson to Ray Atherton, May 13, 1929, Johnson
Papers.

77
interested powers can best safeguard important interests
and trade in China of American citizens."15 Meeting with
the other interested Ministers, MacMurray helped work out
a suggested reply to the Chinese which reflected quite
accurately his views on the matter.

Although not assuming as harsh a posture as MacMurray
on the question, State Department officials hoped to
avoid an early termination of American "rights" in
China. They, therefore, set about the difficult task of
deciding upon a satisfactory reply to the Chinese consis-
tent with this attitude. When, in late May, MacMurray
notified the Department that he had heard from his
Japanese and Belgian colleagues that China planned to
declare the abolition of all extraterritorial rights on
January 1, 1930, the task of the American officials was
made that much more difficult. The United States would
not be ready to give up its rights by that date. But
what would happen if she took a negative position in reply
to the Chinese note? Would China abrogate the treaties?
Should the American reply be stiff or conciliatory?

Nelson Johnson leaned toward the latter but favored
extreme caution. In a memorandum prepared on May 25 for

the guidance of Secretary Stimson, Johnson indicated that

 

15MacMurray to the Secretary of State, May 7, 1929,
F.R., 1929, II, 562-563.

78

he believed the reply should state that it was an
obligation of the United States that was to be discussed
rather than a privilege enjoyed by American Citizens.
Itwould also be wise, he thought, for the United States
to say in the note that China was passing through a
period of tutelage and that realistically it could not
be expected that foreign powers surrender their rights
until this time had passed.

However, Johnson continued, the United States should
recognize the state of mind in China-~her desire for a
new deal and should indicate that it was ready to discuss
these matters if China were willing to accept the basis
upon which discussion should be conducted; namely, the
Report of the Extraterritorial Commission and compliance
with the conditions thereof. In addition Johnson said,
the United States should make it apparent that it was
sympathetic with Chinese aspirations and was willing
to cooperate with China to attain a satisfactory agree-
ment for the gradual abolition of extraterritoriality.16

As evidenced by an earlier memorandum prepared by
the Far Eastern Division and signed by Stanley Hornbeck,
a general consensus of opinion was achieved on the matter

of a reply to China among officials within the Department.17

As a result of this apparent unanimity among his advisors

 

16Memorandum by Johnson,May 25,1929, D/S File
711.933/43.

17Memorandum by Hornbeck, May 11, 1929, D/S File
711.933/48.

79
and their influence upon him, when time came to send the
note to the Chinese, Secretary Stimson adopted not the
position advocated by MacMurray but one reflecting the
views of his men in Washington.

Throughout the summer of 1929, MacMurray on his part
had advocated a hard line against the Chinese even
suggesting in July that the United States take the lead-
ership in organizing an international anti-China bloc to
indicate that the United States and the other powers
would countenance no further disregard of their rights.18
Rejecting the harsh policy proposed by MacMurray but by
no means surrendering to the demands of the Chinese,
Stimson in August sent to China a message closely re—
sembling the memorandum prepared by Johnson in late May.

The note, delivered to the Chinese along with those
from the other powers on August lO,began by saying that
the United States was prepared to give sympathetic
consideration to the desires expressed by the Chinese
but that it had certain responsibilities to its nationals
living in China and in all candor could not be neglectful
of those responsibilities. However, it also stated that
the United States had always maintained friendly feelings

for the Chinese people and that it observed "with attentive

 

18MacMurray to the Secretary of State, July 5, 1929,
F.R., 122 , II, 578-580.

80
and sympathetic interest the changes which are taking
place in China;" and would "be ready...to participate
in negotiations which would have as their object the
devising of a method for the gradual relinquishment of
extraterritorial rights either as to designated areas
or as to particular kinds of jurisdiction...provided
that such gradual relinquishment proceeds at the same
time as steps are taken and improvements are achieved by
the Chinese Government in the enactment and effective
enforcement of laws based on modern concepts of juris-
prudence."19 Disappointed with the American reply,
the Chinese apparently concluded that they would have to
be satisfied with it for in early September they indi-
cated their willingness to continue negotiations.

Johnson who had been intimately involved from the
start in the discussions of the extraterritoriality
question was given the chief responsibility in the fall
of 1929 to discuss the matter further with the Chinese
Minister, C.C. Wu. Inclined to view favorably China's
desires on the matter, the Assistant Secretary favored
the eventual relinquishment of American rights. However,
he opposed having the United States, as Wu put it, "break

the ice" on the question of extraterritoriality. For

 

19Secretary of State to MacMurray, Aug. 1, 1929,
ibid., 596-599.

81
"very frequently the man who cracked the ice fell in
and got wet, while those who followed him might have a
chance to steer away from the hole, or if they did fall
in prepare themselves by getting a life preserver."2
Johnson's role, as he conceived it, was to go as far as
seemed practical in meeting the wishes of the Chinese,
but to keep the United States from "falling in and
getting wet."

Through early November brief exchanges between
Johnson and Wu disclosed the fact that the Chinese were
reluctant to discuss the issue on the basis of United
States proposals, wanting instead some kind of an
American commitiment on relinquishment. When serious
discussions finally began between the two men, Johnson
promptly informed the Chinese Minister that the United
States would not consider what the Chinese wanted; the
immediate abolition of extraterritoriality. Again he
said, relinquishment had to be gradual and was to be
made on the condition that China did certain things on
her part.

But Johnson said he had one thing in mind that Wu
might consider; namely the possibility of enforcing
Chinese law through the American courts then in Operation

in China. This would be an effective way to proceed

 

20Memorandum by Johnson, July2, 1929, D/S File
711.933/74.

82
toward gradual relinquishment. In line with this, he
stated further that the United States would have to know
Of China's new law codes and new courts and Americans
would have to become accustomed to them and for this,

a period of transition was necessary. During a tran-
sitional period if Chinese law were applied to the
adjudication and settlement of controversies among
Americans through the existing American courts in China,
Americans could become acquainted with the Chinese law
codes and could adjust their affairs to the new codes.
They would also come to understand the Spirit behind the
laws. At the same time, the Chinese would become accus-
tomed to their own laws through the Operation Of their
own courts. Many of the Chinese laws were so new that
even the Chinese themselves were not acquainted with
them; it would be folly to commit Americans to this
type of situation.21
The Chinese Minister stated at this meeting and
confirmed at a later meeting that he could not accept
Johnson's proposal--that it would be unworkable chiefly
because of the language problem. He countered with a

proposal of his own, a proposal to the effect that

 

21
Papers.

Memorandum by Johnson, Dec. 2, 1929, Johnson

 

A.\

85

American citizens come under jurisdiction of Chinese
courts after January 1, 1930, and that special
Chinese courts with American legal advisors be set
up at five different ports. Johnson rejected both parts
of the proposal, saying again that the United States
would negotiate only on the basis of gradual relinquish-
ment.22

After rejecting the Chinese Minister's proposala
Johnson came back with another proposal of his own.
This time he suggested the setting up of a Commission
to determine if laws were being effectively applied in
Chinese courts; the United States was interested more
in the application of the laws than in the laws them-
selves. Wu quickly rejected this proposal saying it
took them backwards, and on December 26 countered with
a new proposal of his own which Johnson hastily labeled
as amounting to nothing more than that Americans should
come under the jurisdiction of Chinese laws without any
knowledge of what the instrumentality to enforce the
laws would be.23

The exchange on December 26 ended the Johnson - Wu

negotiations-negotiations that ended just about where

 

22Memorandum by Johnson, Dec. 17, 1929
I

II, 651-652 and Dec. 21,1929, F.R., 1929,

H
\O

, F.R , 29,
I, 655-656.

23Memorandum by Johnson, Dec. 26, 1929, ibid., 660.

84
they started. The Chinese Minister had stated that his
Government was interested in the abolition of extra-
territoriality but had no real means short Of that
end to suggest. Johnson on the other hand would not
retreat from his stated position that the~ only con-
ceivable way to relinquish American rights was through
a gradual step by step process. During the remaining
days of 1929 discussions were carried on in Washington
between Stanley Hornbeck and the Chinese Minister.

When Johnson again took up the negotiations it was as
American Minister in China.

In November 1929, President Herbert Hoover chose
Johnson to succeed John MacMurray as Minister to China.
MacMurray had lost his effectiveness in China in part
because of great hostility between him and the Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, C.T. Wang, a feeling Of
hostility growing out of their contacts at the Special
Tariff Conference of 1925 and 1926 where Wang served as a
Chinese delegate. He could no longer maintain the con-
tacts necessary to continue United States relations on a

profitable basis.24 Johnson, as his successor, was better

 

24Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and

Thomas Millard Advisor to the Chinese Government, June 21,
1929, Johnson Papers. Millard told Johnson that he had
just been to see President Hoover and had told him that
there should be a new Minister sent to China as MacMurray
could no longer work effectively with the Chinese. It
seems reasonable to the author to interpret MacMurray's
"resignation" as occuring largely for this reason.

85
able to get along with Chinese officials and in his
approach to Sino-American problems, like extraterritor-
iality, was more disposed to view sympathetically the
Chinese position.

Johnson arrived in China on January 28, 1930, and
began his official duties on February 1. In late March,
the new American Minister once again took up the extra—
territoriality question. He proposed to the British
Minister Sir Miles Lampson that the two men get tbgether
to work out concrete prOposals which they might give to
their respective governments and which could serve as a
basis for later negotiations with the Chinese. Lampson
agreed and on March 26 the two Ministers submitted to
their governments prOposals, which in Johnson's case,
were redrafted and amended slightly by the Department
and sent back to him to be used in future discuSsions
involving efforts with Britain to settle the question.25

Discussions between the representatives of Britain
and the United States continued through the summer of
1930 but little of any consequence could be accomplished
for both the British and American Ministers were mind-
ful of the itate of China's domestic political affairs.

Appalled by the lack of cohesiveness in Chinese affairs,

 

25Johnson to the Secretary of State, Mar. 28, 1930,
F.R., 1930, II, 418-423 and Secretary of State to Johnson,
April 9, 1930, ibid., 426-434.

86

Johnson said that he thought the civilian leaders were
"doctrinaire and inexperienced" and that the military
leaders were "selfish, self-seeking, and enamored of
their new-found power," that there was no bond between
government and military men, "except at such time when
for a very short period, the soldier leaders seem to
think it necessary or wise to invite civilians to
support them with slogans and other political claptrap."26

When late in the summer this situation got so bad
that civil war broke out and a new government was set up
at Peiping, the Department of State cabled Johnson for
his advice as to whether formal negotiations with the
Chinese might be postponed. In reply, Johnson stated
that he was in full sympathy with this proposal and
that the United States should.te11 the Chinese govern-
ment that in the face of existing conditions it would
be extremely difficult to carry on serious discussions.
It appeared that the Chinese were either unable or
unwilling to protect American citizens as evidenced by
the sudden abandonment by government forces of Changsha and
failure of government troops to protect Hankow from the
threat of "Communist" invasion. Moreover, Johnson said,

government forces were withdrawn from Kanchow in Kiangsi

 

26

Papers.

Memorandum by Johnson, June 10, 1930, Johnson

87

Province in the face of the enemy without any attempt
on the part of the troops to take Americans with them.
It would be better to delay.27

Although hoping for delay, when the British Foreign
Office indicated to the Department of State that Britain
was committed to continue the discussions, the United
States also opted for a continuation of negotiations.
Thus, the negotiations resumed with the communication
of proposals to the Chinese government in late October.
Very detailed, these proposals offered as their major
concession; that the United States would agree to the
transfer to the Chinese of jurisdiction over Americans
in civil cases and on petty criminal matters (police
offenses, gambling etc.)--a concession that Johnson
himself had suggested a year earlier-—in return for
certain concessions regarding the Chinese court system.28

Unacceptable to the Chinese, the American proposals
were met by Chinese counterproposals. However, the
Chinese reply amounted to little more than a statement
to the effect that they hOped to abolish extraterritor-
iality completely and immediately. But, when they saw

they were getting nowhere with the British and American

negotiators the Chinese tried another method; they tried

 

27Johnson to the Secretary of State, Aug. 14, 1930,
D/s File 793.003/391.

2
8Draft Agreement, Oct.28, 1930, F.R.,l930,II,472—480.

 

f?

88

bludgeoning the powers into surrendering their rights.

In December they issued an ultimatum to Washington
and to the other powers stating that negotiations must
be concluded by the end of February at which time all
foreign rights would be abolished. Neither the British
nor the Japanese Ministers viewed the threat seriously.
Although not willing to surrender to their demands,
Johnson, however, informed the Department of State that
he took the Chinese ultimatum seriously and that he
thought the United States should do something to fore-
stall unilateral action by the Chinese.29

In January, as the crisis in the negotiations
continued, he wired the Department again, stating that
he thought the present government of China was so intent
on staying in power that it would make any sacrifice to
that end. The National People's Conference was to be
held in May, and unless the government could show great
accomplishments it would be seriously attacked there.
It must show progress toward unity, establishment of
peace and the ending of the unequal treaties. If the
Foreign office could get rid of extraterritoriality it
would have something concrete to present at the Con-
ference.

"I believe," Johnson said, "that the Government is

 

29Memorandum by Johnson, Dec. 19, 1930, Johnson
Papers.

89
interested in its own existence to a far greater extent
than it is interested in the maintenance of friendly
relations abroad." This being the case, Johnson went on,
the time was not propitious for the consummation of a
reasonable treaty, for the Chinese Foreign Office would
not make the necessary concessions. Therefore he
concluded, the powers would have to join hands and force
the situation by persistent and joint negotiations, neVer
forgetting that they must "agree on a minimum" as they
ran the risk of getting nothing.30

Johnson's suggestion that the powers "agree on a
minimum" once again raised the old policy question as to
whether the United States should COOperate. with the

other powers or pursue an independent policy. In his

book, Americans lg Eastern Asia, Tyler Dennett states

 

 

that there are three ways in which the United States
could carry out a OOOperative policy: concurrent yet sep-
arate action, joint action, alliance. During the
discussion of the extraterritorial issue with Britain,
the United States had pursued the first of these. Now
Johnson was suggesting that it pursue the second.

But the United States had also consistently main-

tained an independent policy. Thus through the course of

 

30Johnson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 8, 1931,
D/s File 793.003/493.

90
the extraterritoriality negotiations it pursued both
lines. It chose to c00perate when such was in the
American interest; it chose to follow an independent
line when that course seemed best. It often pursued
the two lines Simultaneously. But this was true to
the American heritage, as Johnson conceived it. Thus
when he suggested cooperation among the powers to
protect their rights against the Chinese he was not
proposing a bold new plan; nor was he evidencing any
wholehearted commitinent to cooperation. He was merely
responding to the exigencies of the situation.

Since the British were attempting also to follow a
policy of independent cooperation, policy makers in
Washington had a difficult time deciding what to do
regarding the American Minister's suggestion. Finally,
when it was determined that the British could not be
expected to cooperate at this particular time, American
officials elected to go ahead alone in negotiating
with the Chinese.

In early February, Chief of the Far Eastern Div-
ision, Hornbeck, and C.C. Wu resumed discussions in
Washington, with Hornbeck suggesting that the United
States would concede certain issues to effect a com—
promise between Chinese and American positions as taken
in the fall of 1930. When Wu remained intractable and

stated that China still insisted on nothing less than

91
complete abolition, Hornbeck replied that the United
States had to take the internal conditions in China
into consideration and could not assent to any
arrangement failing to protect its nationals.31 With
this exchange, the negotiations once again deadlocked.

However, in March Johnson cabled the Department
that he thought that the time was ripe for further
discussions as the Chinese Government would be more
conciliatory with the elimination of the old conservative
Kuomintang member, Hu Han Min, from power. He further
suggested that the Department might wish to switch
the negotiations to China. Rejecting Johnson's
proposal, the Department replied that the time was not
propitious for negotiations as Britain was vacillating
and the United States did not want to switch negotia-
tions to China and thus make common cause with her
until it had a better idea of what she wished to do.32
Similarly, on March 12, C.T. Wang told Johnson that he
thought there was no point in switching the scene of
negotiations unless the United States was prepared to

concede on three controversial points; the matter of

 

31Memorandum by Hornbeck, Feb. 7, 1931, F.R., 193;,
III, 730-731.

 

32Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Mar. 2, 1931
and Secretary of State to Johnson, Mar. 3, 1931, D/S
File 793.003/543.

1’)

92
co-judges, (the United States wanted legal advisors to
act as judges,) the matter of jurisdiction over both
civil and criminal jurisdiction, and the matter of
reserved areas.53

Although taking a truculent attitude toward the
Americans in the negotiations, the Chinese in late
larch did almost come to a meeting of minds with the
British. However, no accord was reached as neither
party could agree on the subject of reserved areas, and
negotiations continued through the spring and early
summer. The United States and Britain, working parallel
with one another and consulting on various aspects of
their respective drafts, made proposals and counter
proposals to the Chinese through May and June, all
unacceptable. During this period Chinese politics were
in their usual state of disruption, as a split in the
Kuomintang resulted in a factional government being set
up in Canton and this situation did not facilitate
satisfactory negotiations.

In July and August both the British and the
Americans discontinued negotiations, but they were re—
sumed in mid-September. Then just as Johnson was

preparing to go to Nanking to continue discussion of the

 

33Memorandum by Johnson, Mar. 12, 1931, F.R., 1931,
III, 751—755.

93
question, the Sino-Japanese clash occurred at Mukden.
This incident signalled the end of the extraterritoriality
negotiations--negotiations which were not to be resumed
for over ten years.

By hedging and holding out for better terms, it
appears that the United States and Great Britain
thwarted China's attempts to regain her sovereignty and
that Nelson Johnson, a friend of China, played a major
role in the move. However this may be, Johnson's per-
sonal motives were pure. Although he did not necessarily
like it, Johnson saw extraterritoriality as a fact of
life, as a system under which Americans had lived and
done business in China for nearly a century. And,
American cultural and business interests in China were
many, also a fact of life. While he, as much as anyone,
would have likedto see complete abolition; given his
regard for American interests, he could not take this
position--he could not chiefly because of the chaotic
conditions prevailing in China. Thus, from 1925 through
1931, he assumed the attitude that only gradual relin-
quishment would be satisfactory.

However, Johnson's mind was flexible on this
matter. He still favored the surrendering of American
extraterritorial rights as soon as conditions in China

looked like they would permit such action. Consequently

94
in the late thirties when China had achieved a more
significant measure of political stability he advo-
cated that the United States permit far reaching
relinquishment of its rights.

By 1937, he was saying that conditions had reached
the point that extraterritorial privileges were more
likely to be an embarrassment than an advantage to
American life and business in China. Americans as
extraterritorial foreigners, he thought, were becoming
more and more the objects of suspicion and envy. But,
they were also being forced by changing circumstances to
comply with requirements of new Chinese legislation
previously held incompatible with their status as
extraterritorial foreigners. And if the United States
did not negotiate the question, such a process would
eventually leave the United States nothing to concede
in exchange for a new treaty. Moreover, the United
States could not much longer demand that Americans
living and doing business in China and asking Chinese
police protection need not comply with the regulations
of a rapidly progressing Chinese government. As further
evidence that a new treaty was desirable Johnson cited
the number of Germans and other foreigners who had no
treaty rights but who lived and conducted their business
in China without complaint.

Reflecting on the abuses of the system, Johnson

95
maintained that extraterritorial privileges had been
extended to lengths never dreamed of in the treaty of
1844. American exemptions from Chinese tax laws
caused a privileged class to grow; factories employing
Chinese labor were not subject to Chinese law;
Americans moving about thought they could do what they
wished in China and frequently committed serious and
inexcusable violations. The United States had witnessed
these abuses and had failed to do anything about them.
American Officials were even forced to fight in behalf
of Americans in unworthy work lest the system fall and
the worthy fall with the unworthy. However, the time
had come, Johnson thought, to let the system fall.
China had achieved a significant degree of stability
and that was all that was necessary. She could never
guarantee"complete protection" of Americans. Extra-
territoriality had to be abolished, he said, for "we
can no longer travel this road and be true to our-

selves and our ideals."34

 

34Johnson to the Secretary of State, April 2, 1937,
Johnson Papers.

IV

THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY DISPUTE AND THE KELLOGG
PACT

"We here place a higher value upon the Kellogg
Pact," Nelson Johnson once wrote, "than is placed upon
it by those who gossip and wag their heads over innuen-
does concerning political and financial intrigues....
We desire to place ourselves on record as saying...
that we all meant what we said when we signed and
ratified the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as an instru—

l .
". On another occaSlon

ment of international policy...
Johnson said to a friend that he believed wholeheartedly
that judicial settlements would solve all international
disputes of the future; he believed in them. He said

he thought the Kellogg Pact was an excellent document
and that its signing was a step forward in the preserva—
tion of civilization. As proof of its value he cited
the fact that during the dispute between Russia and
China over the Chinese Eastern Railway the Pact was

invoked, hostilities stopped, and negotiations began!2

The Chinese Eastern Railway dispute occurred as a

 

1Johnson to Sydney Strong, Dec.3, 1929, Johnson Papers.
2Johnson to Mrs. Ann Archbald, Jan.6, 1932, ibid.

96

97
result of a Russian confrontation with Chinese nation-
alism. Although professing its purity regarding imperial-
ism, and indicating its willingness to relinquish its
concessions in China, the Soviet Union considered it too
great a sacrifice to put an end to the joint management
arrangement under which Tsarist Russia and China had
long controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway. Thus, in
an agreement concluded in 1924 it opted to continue to
maintain its rights to the road. Like the other
imperialist powers, the Soviet Union proceeded to
establish its own schools, build museums and other
establishments along its concession, and even got control
over the telephone and telegraph systems in Northern
Manchuria. At the same time however, Chinese national
consciousness was Spreading feverishly and the Chinese
were becoming increasingly critical of the presence of
foreigners on their soil. As the drive for unity pro-
gressed, attacks on foreigners were frequent and
occurred thrOughout China.

In Manchuria, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the old
Manchurian warlord, carried on his own private war
against foreigners and from 1924-1928 he proceeded with
a continuous harassment of Russian interests. He
seized the Russian schools, closed their museums and
captured the telephone and telegraph systems. When

Chang Tso—lin was assasinated by the Japanese, son

x‘l

98
Chang Hsueh—liang continued his work.

In late December 1928, Chang Hsueh-liang made his
first move against the Russians; he had the Chinese
Nationalist flag hoisted at Harbin along the Chinese
Eastern Railway replacing the previous flag of the
road which had been a combination of the Chinese and
Soviet flags. Indicating his recently adopted nation-
alist pose, Chang then prohibited the use of the
composite flag after December 28. Continuing their
anti-Russian activities, in early January the Chinese
took over the Soviet controlled telephone system in
Harbin. Then in May Chinese police raided the Soviet
Consulate at Harbin, arrested forty Communists and
rescued numerous incriminating papers, documents and
code books from the flames of the kitchen stove;
materials that were to be used in the Spreading of
Communist propaganda in China.

In early July local Chinese authorities took over
the Chinese Eastern Railway telegraph system and arrested
twelve Communist employees whom they accused of
communicating secretly with Moscow. 0n the same day
‘the Chinese arrested about sixty Soviet employees of
'the railway and deported them to Siberia. Later, they
C3llosed the Offices of the Russian Government Trading
Tlfilst, the Government Oil Trust, and other Soviet

ngVernment trading organizations and accused the officials

 

 

 

99

operating them of deseminating prOpaganda "dangerous
to the Chinese Government." Before the Russian
Government could effectively protest these actions, the
Chinese discharged the Soviet Manager and Assistant
Manager and all Russian heads of the departments and
took control of the railway. Further incensed by these
actions, the Russians protested vehemently. China
rejected these protests and she and Russia broke off
diplomatic relations. War seemed imminent.3

Although convinced that the United States should
not become directly involved in the affair, the situation
appeared so serious to the Secretary of State that
on July 18 he called in the Chinese Minister C.C. Wu
to talk over the matter. Immediately the Secretary
informed Wu that all news reports seemed to indicate
that an armed clash appeared to be a distinct possibility.
However, Stimson told the Chinese Minister that he
thought the dispute was of justidable nature, pecularly
fitted for arbitration and that it should be settled
in this manner. When Wu indicated that China was com-
pletely justified in her actions because of Russian

‘violations of her treaty obligations through her use

3Account based on Robert H. Ferrell, American Policy
221 the Great Depression, (New Haven, 1957), PP. 45-51.
alhd James W. Christopher, Conflict £3 The Far East,
JLeiden, 1950), pp. 71-85.

100

of propaganda, Stimson lectured him a little.

He said that this might have been the case but
that he thought China had acted too hastily. The Secre-
tary then told the Chinese minister that he thought
China should make clear its pacific intentions and
disclaim that they were seizing other's property. China
should avoid fighting if Possible, Stimson believed, and
should leave the matter to be settled by arbitration of
other nations. Possessed of great faith in the prin-
ciples of the Kellogg Pact, he called Wu's attention
to China's particular responsibility under this agree-
ment and indicated to the Chinese Minister that the
representatives of Britain, France, and Japan had all
agreed that each had an Obligation to see that war was
averted.4

In his position as Assistant Secretary of State,
Nelson Johnson believed with Stimson that the United
States and the other powers had an obligation in this
matter as signatories of the Kellogg Pact. However, he
also believed that this was where American responsibility
ended; the United States had no business getting impli-

cated on one side or the other in the dispute. American

4Memorandum by the Secretary of State, July 18, 1929,
Il/S File 861.77 Chinese Eastern.

 

"

101
interests were not that intimately involved. Besides,
Johnson was fairly Optimistic regarding the crisis. He
doubted that there would be a war. But, even if a war
were about to break out, the Kellogg Pact would militate
against it.5

After observing the date of the official proclaiming
of the Pact of Paris on July 24, Stimson the next day
called in the British, French, Japanese and Italian
diplomatic representatives and talked with them briefly
about the crisis. He asked them to implore their
governments to support his suggestions that a Commission
for Conciliation be organized to pursue a full and
impartial investigation of the facts in the case. This
prOposal, which Johnson had a part in drafting, pro-
vided that: the membership of the Commission be agreed
upon by both the Russians and the Chinese, the regular
operation of the railway would be restored while the
Commission did its work.6 While many of the powers
did not wish to stand in opposition to the Secretary's
proposal, their reaction was lukewarm at best, and Japan

came out forthrightly against it. Japan in particular

5Memorandum by Johnson, July 19, 1929, F.R., 1929
II, 218.

6Secretary of State to the French Ambassador,
JWlly 25, 1929, ibid., 242—244.

.1.

 

102
was unhappy about the suggestion because she thought
that it might set a precedent-—a precedent that would
at some future date allow for an investigation of her
own interests in Manchuria.

Knowing that Japan wished to remain neutral in
the dispute, Russia grew bolder and in August mounted
a series of attacks into Chinese territory, at one
point even occupying a couple of border towns. Although
not particularly serious from a military standpoint
these excursions into China boded ill for the future
and sent minds scurrying about for a "solution" for
the crisis. All sorts of schemes were devised.

In early September, Johnson became acquainted with
one such scheme. Shortly after the Russian Offensive,
Sun Fo, an official of the Chinese Government cabled
George Bronson Rea, longtime editor of the Far Eastern
Review, a business journal published in China, and asked
him if he would approach American bankers to see if
China could borrow money to buy back the Chinese Eastern
Railway. Liking the idea, Rea then came to Washington
and spoke with Johnson about the proposal. He told
the Assistant Secretary that he had recently been to
New York to talk with Martin Egan of Morgan and Company
and that Egan was favorably disposed toward the idea if

égood enough terms could be arranged and sufficient

103
security could be acquired. All that would be required
would be State Department sanction. To insure the
safety of the loan, Egan suggested (with Rea's con-
currence) that the Japanese be put in control of the
road on behalf of the bondholders! Taken aback momen-
tarily, Johnson said he did not know what to think of
the whole business. Then, he stated that he thought the
whole thing would come to naught since the Sino—Russian
Agreement of 1924 relative to the Chinese Eastern
Railway stated that if and when the Road was bought
back it was to be bought with Chinese capital. This
of course would be United States capital and the Soviet
Union would "raise cain."7

Undaunted by Johnson's remarks Rea persisted and
on September 14 he again came to see the Assistant
Secretary, maintaining still that the scheme had merit and
that all the American money lenders needed was an "Okay"
from the State Department to go ahead-that Thomas Lamont
and Martin Egan agreed with him. If the Department
approved, work then could be begun to help the Chinese
persuade the Russians to waive the pertinent clause of

the treaty of 1924, and thereby allow China to purchase

7Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
George Bronson Rea, Sept. 3, 1929, Johnson Papers.

3.,-

 

104
the Russian interest. Johnson once again expressed
his doubts about the scheme, but passed the buck by
saying that Rea could get the reactions of the Secre—
tary if he wished.8 Rea never did this and this
exchange signalled the unofficial end of the scheme.
As events progressed in Manchuria the idea simply withered
on the vine.

While this offstage episode was occurring, Germany
had Offered to mediate in the dispute and through early
September negotiations proceeded between Chinese and
Russian officials. However, negotiations reached an
impasse when China refused to accept a proposal that
would allow for the appointment of a new Russian manager
and a new Russian assistant manager prior to the actual
convening of a conference to settle the matter.

At this point Johnson called the Chinese charge/in
to see him and told him that he thought the Chinese
were being unreasonable in not agreeing to such an
arrangement. After all, Russia was not going to appoint
the old manager and assistant manager but would appoint
new ones. China would thereby gain a diplomatic victory.

China had agreed to run the railway jointly and now

8Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
(}eorge Bronson Rea, Sept. 14, 1929, ibid.

t

 

105
having ousted her partner, her former partner could
only use force to regain her position. It seemed to
Johnson that China should be willing to accept any
equitable Solution to the question.9

Johnson's remarks to the Chinese charge/reflect
accurately the two-pronged concern of both himself and
other American Officials in this dispute. Johnson
was now concerned, first, that the dispute might get
out of hand and eventually result in a war which could
embroil the United States. This was remote, but it
was a possibility. Secondly, however, and more
importantly, he was concerned about the action taken
by the Chinese in stripping the Russians of their
rights as guaranteed by treaty. He feared that this
action might be indicative of future Chinese action
toward American interests. While Johnson was willing to
see China re-acquire certain foreign concessions through
treaties, he did not want to see her usurp them forcibly.
For no matter how much of a friend of China's Johnson
was, it must be remembered that he lived in an era
prior to the one that was to see the large scale
nationalization of oil refineries and sugar mills. Part

idealist, like the American peOple that he represented

9Memorandum by Johnson, Sept. 17, 1929, F.R., 1922,

106
his idealism stopped short of the unnecessary sacri-
ficing of American prOperty.

The official Chinese response to Johnson's
admonitions to the Chinese Charge/was unfavorable;
the Chinese were not prepared to accept the proposals
regarding the Manager and Assistant Manager of the
railway. As a result of China's rejection of these
proposals, the Russians renewed their attacks across
the Chinese border.

By November the situation looked particularly
serious and the Chinese Government began notifying the
powers signatory to the Kellogg Pact of the Russian
attacks. Afraid unless something were done that this
episode would make the Kellogg Pact nothing but a
scrap of paper, Secretary of State Stimson cabled the
disputants and once more called their attention to
the Pact. When this proved ineffective, later in the
month he canvassed the other powers asking them to join
the United States in issuing a public statement to
be directed to Russia and China and which would invoke
the Kellogg Pact. Japan and Germany refused to assent
to such a move but Stimson went ahead nonetheless. On
November 30 he sent notes to the Soviet Union (through
France) and to China which asked them to end their

hOstilities immediately and to find a peaceful settlement.

 

107
On December 2 he made his appeal public.10

Previous to Stimson's invoking of the Kellogg
Pact, and unknown to him, the Chinese and the Russians
had begun to get together to settle peacefully the
trouble in Manchuria. As the Chinese National Govern-
ment was having a great deal of difficulty with
dissident Generals within China and since it could
not send sufficient trOOps to Manchuria to meet the
Soviet advances, it began to petition the Russians
for a settlement. Because of internal difficulties
the Russians wanted war just as little as China, so
they were duly receptive of the Chinese feelers. Con-
sequently, representatives of the two countries
conversed on the matter and on December 3 they agreed
to an armistice--an armistice which restored the status
quo on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Since the Russians and the Chinese had already
expressed to one another a willingness to settle their
conflict prior to the invoking of the Kellogg Pact, it
follows that its being invoked had nothing to do with
the amicable settlement. But Secretary Stimson did not

realize this. Neither did Assistant Secretary. Nelson

 

10Secretary of State to the Charge’d'affaires in
France, Nov. 30, 1929, ibid., 367—368.

108
Johnson. Both thought that because hostilities stopped
almost simultaneously with Stimson's public statement,
that his statement was responsible for the achieving

11 This circumstance created the illusion

of peace.
in Johnson's mind that the Pact itself brought peace-
an illusion that he harbored for some time chiefly
because of his tremendously high regard for the Paris
agreement.

It is apparent that the Kellogg Pact acquired
additional and undue prestige in the eyes Of Johnson
‘because of its seeming success in ending the Chinese
Eastern dispute. As a result, he came to place an
inordinate amount of faith in it. This distorted
view of the Pact's importance proved most unfortunate
for after Japan invaded Manchuria, Johnson believed
that if the world's attention were turned on Japan's
nefarious deeds, and world public opinion made itself
felt, Japan would ultimately end her aggression. No
force would be necessary to bring peace. Johnson soon
rejected this idea but his actions and suggestions

in the early 1930's indicate the difficult time he had

in doing so.

 

llSee Ferrell, pp. 61-67 for an excellent dis-
cussion of the ending of the crisis and of Stimson's
views.

\T

JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN V NCHURIA 1931-1932

At 2:30 in the morning on September 19, 1931,
jNelson Johnson's Chinese houseboy rushed into his bed—
Ix30m, switched on the light, and began shouting at him
irl Chinese. Waking from a deep sleep, Johnson heard
idle boy state that someone wanted to speak with him on
thus phone-~immediately. Still only half awake, the
Mirlister hurried downstairs to take the call. It was
W.Ii. Donald, the Australian advisor to Marshal Chang
Ikaueh-liang of Manchuria. Donald reported that the
thpanese had occupied Mukden at 10:30 that night.1

At 4:00 A.M. Johnson wired Washington and the
Ifinbassy at Tokyo, telling them of Donald's message.

ER? then began the wait for confirmation of the report.
AA; 2:00 P.M. the same day he again wired the Department,
13118 time saying that the Consul General at Mukden had

thst telephoned him to state that the Japanese had

tEflfien.all of Mukden and that they had also occupied

 

 

1Johnson to Frank Kellogg, Jan. 12, 1932, Johnson
Papers.

D 2Memorandum of conversation between Johnson and W.H.
analog Sept, 19, 1931, F.R., 1931, III, 10.

 

109

Changchow, Antung and Newchwang and were running

3

public services at all of those places. The same

afternoon he wired again to say that the Chinese

Foreign Minister, Wellington Koo, had just confirmed

what he had reported in his previous messages; that

Manchuria was completely cut off from China.4
Thus Japan began the gradual and deliberate occu-

pation of Manchuria. The immediate reaction in Wash-

ington to the Japanese move was that it was an incident

perpetrated by the Japenese military against the will Of the

civilian government and that the United States should

act so as to strengthen the hand of Japanese Minister

Shidehara. The United States therefore would not ex-

press its concern in terms of American interests, and

action on her part would not be featured as a manifestation

of American Far Eastern policy. Even though the

Japanese action was a direct violation of the Kellogg

Pact, the United States should not say so. Whether or

not the Pact should be invoked should be decided by the

world court. The United States would not take the lead.5

Never taken in by Japan's protestations to the

 

3Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/1799.

4Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/1804.

5Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Current
Information, Sept. 19, 1931, F;R.,1931,III,15-16 and
Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck, Sept. 20, 1931, D/S File
793.94/1889.

lll
contrary, American Minister Johnson's reaction was
that the Japanese actions were planned and deliberate.
It was absurd, he thought, to believe that the mere
destruction of railroad tracks by the Chinese would
lead to the occupation of Manchuria or that the chain
of events was accidental or Spur of the moment.
"Occupation of places as far apart as Changchun, New-
chang, Antung, Kaopangtzu and Hulutao," Johnson stated
to Secretary Stimson "implies a degree of staff work
which cOuld not be improvised. Furthermore it is our
understanding here that Japanese military headquarters
were transferred almost immediately from Port Arthur

to Mukden."6

The occupation of strategic points in
Manchuria constituted "an aggressive act by Japan
apparently long planned and when decided upon most
carefully and systematically put into effect."7
Johnson's thinking that Japan's actions were care-
fully planned were reinforced, he stated, by rumors that

he had heard earlier in September about a Sino—Japanese

clash. He discounted these as mere speculation at

‘— .‘-. ‘-.

6Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 21, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/ 1815.

7Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 22, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/1838.

112
the time but said that now that Japan had acted the
rumors gave credence to the theory that her? action
had been deliberate.

One such "rumor" Johnson should not have treated
so lightly. On September 11, Dr. John C. Ferguson,
advisor to the Chinese government, told the Minister
that he should stay in Peking and not go South as
planned to discuss further the question of extraterr-
itoriality because Japan was probably going to occupy
Manchuria very shortly. Ferguson told Johnson that he
had solid information that she would do this at least
within the next three months; that a high Japanese
official had recently toured China and had reported to
his government that the time was ripe for action. John-
son rejected Ferguson's warnings out of hand. There
was no reason for Japan to occupy Manchuria and take on
the expense of administration, he believed, when she
could eXploit the area without doing so. Johnson did
not transmit Ferguson's remarks to the State Depart-
ment until October 26, a month and one-half later.8

One must wonder why the Minister did not immediate-

ly convey this message to his government. Dr. Ferguson

 

8Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
Dr. J.C. Ferguson, Sept. 11, 1931, Johnson Papers.

113
was a trusted advisor of the Chinese government, an
individual of much repute who had access to the inner
circle of Chinese Officials. Not the type to circulate
false rumors, he would only relate to Johnson what he
considered to be the unqualified truth. Any information
emanating from him should not have been treated lightly,
as mere gossip. Moreover, he stated that his source
of information was unimpeachable. Was Johnson derelict
in his duty then in not relating the conversation to
the State Department? Probably so.

Even though he thought the possibility of Japanese
occupation of Manchuria utterly fantastic and even
though all logic might have seemed to militate against
such action, he still should have informed Washington.
However, in all fairness to Johnson it is difficult to
see what difference it would have made if he had.
Policy makers in Washington probably would have done
nothing differently. If they were unwilling to do
anything to oppose Japan after She acted, it seems
doubtful that they would have done anything prior to
September 19. 5

Moreover, Johnson's negligence becomes a little
more excusable in the light of a conversation that he
had on September 17. On that date Johnson talked with

Yano Makoto the Japanese Counselor of Legation and asked

114
him about an impending attack on Manchuria. The
Counselor replied convincingly that this was complete-
ly absurd and unthinkable since Japan could exploit
the territory as it was. All Sino-Japanese diSputes
could be settled peaceably.9 If the American Minister
had been inclined to send a record of his conversation
with Ferguson to Washington prior to this, he probably
would not have been afterward, given the strength of
the Counselor's statement.

Since Japan had acted aggressively. and deliberately
in occupying strategic points in Manchuria, Johnson
believed therefore that she had violated article II
of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as a means for the
settling of disputes. Her actions could only be
defined as war. "It seems to me," Johnson informed
Washington, "that the powers signatory to the Kellogg
Treaty owe it to themselves and to the world to pro-
nounce themselves in regard to this Japanese act of
agression which I consider to have been deliberately
accomplished in utter and cynical disregard of obli-

gations which Japan as a nation shares with the other

 

9Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
the Japanese Counselor of Legation, Sept. 17, 1931,
ibid.

115
signatories of the Pact."10

Johnson continued to advocate the invoking of the
Pact through September and October. He thought that
something should be done on the part of someone, either
the United States or the League, to restore confidence
in the Kellogg Pact. Pressure should be brought to bear
on Japan to withdraw and to allow the restoration of
Chinese control and administration in Manchuria. This
dispute could be settled like the Chinese Eastern
Railway diSpute was settled.

While China referred Japan's aggression to the
League, the United States continued its wait and see
attitude--reluctant to take any action lest it offend
the civilian wing of Japan's government. On September
30, the League drew up a resolution asking Japan to
withdraw from her positions in Manchuria. Defying the
world body, Japan continued her aggression and on
October 8 bombed Chinchow. Upset by this, Secretary
Stimson then indicated that the United States might
join the League powers in invoking the Pact. This was
ultimately done, although innocuously as the United

States still refused to do anything but follow the other

 

10Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 22, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/1838.

116
powers.

Japan continued her aggression undaunted by the
League's action. Still convinced that the treaty
structure could solve the crisis, Johnson thought that
if Japan ignored her obligations under the Pact of
' Paris she might still be induced to pull out of Man-
churia if she could do so without losing face. Accord-
ingly, in late October he proposed that Japan and China
be implored simply to discuss the question under article
seven of the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles
and policies. This would embarrass neither Side. The
Department refused to sanction his suggestion, however,
saying that it felt the United States should take no
action other than it had already taken!11

Johnson's frequent references to the treaty
structure throughout 1931 and 1932 reflect his true
concern regarding Japanese aggression. He believed that
the fate of Manchuria was of secondary importance as
compared with the fate of the League and the other
machinery set up by the powers for the purpose of pro-

viding for the amicable settlement of international

 

11Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Oct. 20, 1931,
and Secretary of State to Johnson, Oct. 22, 1931,
D/S File 793.94/3246.

117
controversies. Japan could control Manchuria and it
would make little difference to the United States.
However, if the Kellogg Pact and the other peace
apparatus were spurned, he maintained, the world was
headed for "a new Sarejevo."12

After the invoking of the Kellogg Pact in mid
October, Secretary Stimson decided that the American
obligation to the League had been fulfilled. He thus
asked Prentiss Gilbert, the American Consul at Geneva
whom he had designated to sit in observation with the
League, to withdraw. Upon the urging of the other
powers who insisted that Gilbert's withdrawal would
seem to be capitulation to Japan, Stimson agreed that
he could stay "if he changed his seat." Through the
remaining days of October the League attempted to
find a way to get Japan to withdraw. At the end of its
October session the League adopted a resolution asking
Japan to withdraw by November 16, the United States
once again vacillating, not wanting to offend Japan
by setting a time limit for withdrawal.

Japan's answer to the League resolution was more
aggression. On November 5, she launched an attack on

the Nonni river and later she captured Tsitsihar. On

 

12Johnson to Willys Peck, Nov. 3, 1931, Johnson
Papers.

118
November 16, Johnson reported that he found no evi-
dence "of any intention on the part of the Japanese to
withdraw from the stand which they have taken in Man-
churia...". Reflecting his dismay that nothing had
been done to induce Japan to stop, Johnson concluded,
"I assume that there is no way of bringing home to the
Japanese Government a sense of their responsibility for
such a situation so frought with danger to the interests

13

of everyone." Not advocating force, or a policy‘
radically different from the one Stimson was pursuing,
Johnson was merely saying what he had been saying, that
a strong appeal to Japan as a participant in the treaty
structure was desirable.

Although he condemned Japanese action in Manchuria
and believed that the powers should put "pressure" on
Japan to withdraw, Johnson was by no means convinced
that Japan did not have serious grievances against
China. He believed that judicial machinery was set up
for the benefit of weaker countries like China and that
settlements of diSpute should be made on the basis of

equity. However, China had provoked the stronger nations

by renouncing their privileges. She had only appealed

 

13Johnson to the Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1931,
F.R., 1931, III, 451-452.

119
to the peace machinery after the stronger powers had
taken some retaliatory action—-after they had done
something to recover their rights. In Japan's case,
she had told China that she would not agree to
negotiate her rights in Manchuria. But China had
proceeded to do the same things there against her that
she had done elsewhere in China. Japan therefore was
justified in taking action--if it had been the right
kind.14

"There are proprieties in these matters," Johnson
stated, "which it behooves the countries to observe,
and I feel that what might have been a very fine case
for Japan was grossly ruined in its initial handling."15
Japan was not in such bad straits in Manchuria that
she could not have gone to the International Court at
the Hague for a settlement. She probably could have
gotten a fairly satisfactory agreement with China
by so doing since she would have had the support of
world opinion. However, her use of force turned this
Opinion away from her--turned it away because the
western powers feared that Japan's action would harm

their interests and because Japan had shown contemptuous

 

14Johnson to Ellery Sedgwick, Jan. 28, 1932,
Johnson Papers.

15Johnson to Joseph Grew, June 13, 1932, ibid.

 

disregard for the peace machinery.l6

Japan could not have shown greater contempt for the
peace machinery than she showed in late November. While
the League debated, she acted. By the end of the month,
Japanese troops had moved southward from Mukden and
were threatening a large scale attack on Chinchow. They
had also provoked fighting at Tientsin.

"It would seem," Johnson wrote to Stimson, "that
actually Japan has timed its every advance in a way so
‘as to indicate to China and the world the low esteem
in which it holds the League of Nations and world
Opinion.... I feel that the powers owe it to themselves
to take measures in all seriousness to prevent not
only the complete destruction of confidence in the
intentions and support behind the League Covenant, the
Washington Treaties and the Anti-War Pact but also
the complete destruction of the Chinese Government."17
In Geneva the League powers discussed ways to meet
Japan's new moves.

In early December, the possibility of using

economic boycott or economic sanctions was mentioned

 

16Johnson to Mrs. Ann Archbald, Jan. 6, 1932, ibid.

 

17Johnson to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 1931,
F.R., 1931, III, 562—563.

 

121
seriously as a means of stopping Japan. However, the
proposal never got too far because of various opposing
pressures within each of the western nations. This was
a period of depression, and importers, exporters,
manufacturers, and financeers in all countries pro-
claimed loudly the disastrous effect sanctions would
have on economic recovery. In the United States there
were a few like Roy Howard of Scripps-Howard newspapers
who would have liked to see this course pursued, but
for everyone like him there were ten against. Even
State Department Far Eastern experts, Hornbeck and
Castle, opposed sanctions, as did Stimson himself at

-5

this point. And, President Hoover had Opposed their use r
from the start.18

Throughout 1931 and 1932 Nelson Johnson consis-
tently opposed the use of sanctions even after Stimson
and others believed they should be used. There were
two reasons for his stand. First, he believed that
Congress and the American people would never support
such a move because it would wreak such a hardship on

the American economy; particularly since the United

States traded in such volume with Japan. Moreover,

 

18Armin Rappaport, Henr L. Stimson and Japan
1931-1933 (Chicago, 1963 , pp. 88-91.

122
boycotts were force and any country advocating them must
be ready to back them with force. This the United
States was not prepared to do. However, secondly and
more importantly he Opposed their use because he
thought such action would completely wreck Japan's
economy. And, the United States, he said, could
not afford to let Japan "go to pot." Japan had already
extended herself into China to such an extent that she
was placing a great strain on her economy. Any
further stress would cause it to snap--would bankrupt
Japan. The United States, Johnson believed, had a
vested interest in keeping this from happening for
bankruptcy would ruin American trade and would throw
Japan into revolution.19

Since there were so many factors militating against
their use, it is impossible to determine how important
the fear of "wrecking" Japan was in the American
refusal to employ economic sanctions. The frequency
of his statements to this effect indicate that it was
of prime importance to Johnson. Stanley Hornbeck
20

also voiced the same view on at least one occasion.

Whether or not President Hoover as the major foe of

 

19Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, Sept. 13, 1932, John-
son Papers, and Memorandum of Conversation between
Johnson and Wellington Koo, Feb. 24, 1932, Johnson Papers.

20Undated note b Hornbeck attached to H.R. Robbins
to Stanley Hornbeck, D/g File 793.94/2304.

123
sanctions gave the theory much credence, however, and
whether it gained prominence in his mind is another
matter.

Before the use of economic sanctions got much
beyond the discussion stage in early December 1931,
Japan slowed her action and the tension in the Far
East eased a bit. It began to appear to the League that
a diplomatic settlement might be achieved. Accordingly,
on December 10 the League Council adOpted a resolution
creating a neutral Commission of inquiry to be headed
by Lord Lytton of England which was to go to the
Far East, discern the "facts" and report back to the
League. Secretary Stimson approved of this action and
consented to the appointment of an American, General
Frank McCoy to the Commission.

Only hours after the Official adoption of the
resolution, the Japanese government fell--the government
whose hand the United States had worked so diligently to
strengthen throughout the fall. This meant, of course,
that the more liberal and conciliatory Foreign Secre-
tary, Baron Shidehara, would no longer be able to
exercise a tempering effect on the Kwantung army.
Stimson, who had consistently followed a policy of
restraint and who had frequently urged the League to

avoid pressuring Japan too strongly lest it upset this

124
moderating influence, viewed the fall of the Cabinet
as a terrible blow.

The new Japanese government, under the leadership
of Inukai Tsuyoshi, quickly adopted a large new military
budget and reinforced its army in Manchuria. In mid-
December, the Kwantung army began an advance on Chin-
chow and on December 19 the Japanese War Office issued
an ultimatum to the Chinese to withdraw from the city.
When on December 23 no Chinese reply was given, the
Japanese began their attack. Meeting little in the
way of effective Chinese resistance, the Japanese
quickly overran the city and by January 3 had it in
their firm control; they had thus completed their
occupation of Manchuria.

With their occupation of Chinchow, the Japanese
had removed the last vestiges of organized Chinese
resistance from Manchuria and could now exploit the
area as they saw fit, repressing all Chinese and western
economic and cultural activities.21 They had also
placed themselves in a good strategic position vis—a-vis
the Soviet Union.

From his position in China, Nelson Johnson saw this
new Japanese move as the last in a series of acts aimed

at Russia. "More and more", he stated to a friend,

 

ZlAccount based on Rappaport, pp. 81-85 and Dorothy
Borg, The United States and The Far Eastern Crisis g:

1933-1938,’(Cambridge, 1964), pp. 6—8.

125

"am I convinced that Japan's moves in Manchuria are
to be interpreted in the light of Japan's position
vis—a—vis Russia."22 Japan, Johnson thought, had been
thinking primarily about Russia since the time of the
Sino-Japanese war when Russia entered the picture and
deprived her of the fruits of victory. Thus she pre—
pared militarily and fought the Russians in 1904, and
defeated them. In so doing, she was enabled to push
her strategic border as far west as Mukden and Chang-
chun in Manchuria, circumstances only preventmg her from
going further. This was the last direct push she was
able to make. But Japanese military maps drawn up
shortly thereafter indicated that her military leaders
believed that Japan must push farther and meet Russia
at a line passing through the Hingan mountains lying
one-half way between Tsitsihar and Manchouli station
(the western terminus of the Chinese Eastern railway.)

After the war of 1904 and 1905 and while Japan
marked time, Russia moved. In 1912, she succeeded in
drawing the Mongols into an agreement that recognized
Russian hegemony. In the 1920's Outer Mongolia was

Sovietized and became independent of China, Russia thus

22

Papers.

Johnson to Edward Carter, Jan. 12, 1932, Johnson

126
strengthening her position in the area. Then it was
Japan's move once again. Immediately after the Sino-
Russian railway dispute of 1929, Japan made a study
of the chaotic conditions within China and concluded
thatChjna‘ could not resist a Japanese drive into
Manchuria. Knowing that the western powers, too, would
be restrained by the world economic situation and that
Russia had great domestic troubles and would not
resist, Japan decided that she could push her boundaries
to the point determined in the early twentieth century.

Russia's interest in Manchuria was strategic,
Johnson said further, as she needed access to the
Pacific, while Japan's was both strategic and economic.
A stronger Russia could be a threat to Japan, therefore
Japan had to keep Manchuria out of her hands. Moreover,
Japan needed Manchuria for the raw materials and
markets that it provided and for a place to sand her
surplus population. Since China was too weak to con-
trol the area and since Japan had such strategic and
economic interests there, Johnson concluded, he and
other world statesmen should have known that Japan
would move in and take control.23

Japan's capture of Chinchow stirred and angered

 

23Johnson to Frank Kellogg, Jan. 12, 1932, ibid.

127

Secretary Stimson and sent him and other American
policy makers looking for a new policy-—a "tougher"
policy. What the Secretary finally decided upon was
a course similar to that followed by William Jennings
Bryan in 1915 after Japan had issued the twenty-one
demands, a policy of refusing to recognize any agree-
ments infringing upon American rights. Appropriately
termed "non-recognition", this idea had been resurrected
in November 1931, by President Hoover and Stanley Horn-
beck and mentioned as a possible course to follow in
lieu of the use of force and economic sanctions. Stim-
son took up the idea in December and by early January
had several draft notes prepared. The note eventually
sent to Japan and China on January 7 stated in brief:

"the American Government deems it to be its

duty to notify both the Government of the

Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese

Government that it cannot admit the legality

of any situation g3 facto nor does it intend

to recognize any treaty or agreement entered

into between those Governments, or agents

thereof, which may impair the treaty rights

of the United States or its Citizens in

China...and that it does not intend to recog-

ize any situation, treaty or agreement which

may be brought about by means contrary to the

covenants and obligations of the Pact of

Paris...".24

An attempt to put "teeth in the Kellogg Pact," the

 

24Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan,
Jan. 7, 1931, F.R. Japan 1931-1941, I, 76.

128
new policy, known as the Stimson Doctrine, was a weak
expedient at best. Even when Stimson broadened it by
basing it on both the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power
Pact, which he did in his famous letter to Senator
Borah of February 23, 1932,25nonrecognition did nothing
to deter Japan. It did nothing to protect American
interests, nor was it of much significance as far as
future events were concerned.

However, Nelson Johnson did not see it that way.
Always in agreement with Stimson's Far Eastern policy,
Johnson was particularly sympathetic to his employment
of the nonrecognition doctrine. He maintained that
there was nothing else Stimson could have done in
1932 except possibly to have remained quiet in the
face of Japanese aggression. And, that would have
been cowardice. Obviously, the United States was not
prepared to implement economic sanctions against Japan,
nor was she going to use force to drive Japan out of
China to enforce the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power
treaty. But, with her obligations under these treaties
the United States had to do something. That "something
was the Stimson Doctrine. What Stimson did in January

1932 was the "manly, straightforward, honest thing to

 

25New York Times, Feb. 25, 1932.

129
do."26
Moreover, the United States, Johnson said, had to

keep its record clear

"against the day when this whole situation

and the status of the 1922 treaties must be

worked out; that it is not a question of

meddling so far as we are concerned; nor is

it a question of attempting to dictate the

moral attitude or conduct of the various

powers; but purely a question of the legal

record against the time when we must sit

down with the Japanese and others and

determine once more whether we are going

to live in a world of regulated armaments

or not."27
Because the United States was not prepared at the
moment to do anything about Japan's aggression, did
not mean that she never would; nonrecognition would
tide her over until that day.

The "success" of Stimson's nonrecognition policy
is attested to by events subsequent to January 7. On
January 28, the Japanese performed their most sinister
action yet in their aggression against China; they
attacked Shanghai. Not unprovoked, the Japanese had
become very upset by the anti—Japanese activities of
Chinese living in Shanghai. Anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions were frequent, and numerous clashes had occurred
between Japanese and Chinese in which both sides saw

some killed and many wounded. On, one occasion during

the winter. a group of Chinese had carried out an attack

 

26Johnson to Tyler Dennett, June8, 1934, Johnson Papers.

27Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck,July 25,1934, ibid.

130

on some Japanese Buddhist priests killing one of them.

More importantly, however, the Chinese had for
some time been sustaining a boycott against Japanese
products and this hurt Japan tremendously since next
to the United States China was her largest customer.
On January 23, the Japanese Consul General issued
demands to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai requesting
suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda and apologies
for previous attacks. On the same day the Japanese
admiral of the Yangtze Patrol Shiozawa told the Chinese
that if they did not concede, he reserved the right
to take whatever action was required by the circumstances.
Then on the 27th day of January the Consul General
notified the Mayor that unless a Chinese reply came
within twenty-two hours, the Japanese would attack.
The Chinese Mayor acceded in time but the Japanese
navy, apparently not wishing to be outdone by the
Kwangtung army and its success in Manchuria, attacked
anyway. They began the aerial bombardment of the
Chinese area of Chapei.28

Minister Johnson had warned Secretary Stimson as

early as October 1931 that he thought Japan would

 

28See James w. Christopher, Conflict in the Far East

(Leiden, 1950), pp. 281—284, and Rappaport, pp. 107-115.

 

131
eventually attack Shanghai but Stimson was unprepared

29 Incensed, he immed-

for this new Japanese action.
iately began clearing the way for the sending of an
American naval force to Shanghai and sending a sharp
protest to the Japanese indicating American concern
for its property in Shanghai. However, before the
American policy could be effectively implemented, the
Japanese, on February 1, requested the good offices of
the United States and the other powers to settle the
affair. Unexpected by the Japanese, the Chinese had
fought back and had proved that Japan had embarked on
what Nelson Johnson termed a "hideous blunder."
Secretary Stimson then proposed settling the affair
along the lines of a five point program: that hostil-
ities be stopped at once; that no further mobilization
be carried out; that all combatants be withdrawn from
points of mutual contact; that the International
Settlement be protected by the creation of neutral
zones policed by neutrals; that advances be made in
negotiations to settle all controversies between the
two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the
Resolution of the League of December 9.30

The Japanese reply amounted to the acceptance of all

 

29Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York,

1936), pp. 133-135.

301bid., 147.

132
but the last of Stimson's points, Japan stating that
Manchuria was "special" and would have to be excluded

31

from the discussions. Stimson remained adamant,
refusing to concede to the elimination of the fifth
point and the negotiations appeared to be over. How-
ever, Japan was biding time in order to bring in
reinforcements against the Chinese and wanted to
continue discussions. Consequently, on February 9
she proposed the establishment of demilitarized zones
of between fifteen to twenty miles width around the
trading ports Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsen, Canton and
Tsingtau. Admitting that the proposal violated the
Nine Power Treaty, she termed it a "moral rather than
a political program."32

Hearing of the Japanese proposals before they were
made public and seeing them for what they were, Nelson
Johnson stated that he thought the powers should
"consider very carefully" the effect the Japanese pro-
gram would have on the Chinese before they thought

seriously about it. The scheme could create an ex-

tremely dangerous situation for Americans in China if

 

31Memorandum of trans Atlantic telephone conversation
between Stimson and Sir John Simon, Feb. 2, 1932, F.R.

1222, III, 179.

32Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 9, 1932,
ibid., 256—257.

133
the United States agreed to it.

"I feel certain," Johnson said, "that the

time is ripe for another disaster similar

to the Boxer Uprising unless we walk care-

fully with these sorely exasperated people.

And I therefore hope that the United States

Government will meet this sinister attempt

to involve us all in the debacle which the

Japanese have created for themselves with a

statement in favor of upholding the principles

and policies of the Nine-Power Treaty."33

This note made a great impression on Secretary
Stimson, who had previously been thinking of broadening
the nonrecognition doctrine to include the Nine Power
Treaty. It is unquestionable that Johnson's remarks
reinforced his determination to go ahead with his plan
and were responsible in large part for his sending the
letter to Senator Borah on February 24-—the letter in
which the Secretary stated that the United States had
traditionally been friendly to the Chinese and had
always based its policy on the Open Door for commercial
opportunity; that the Nine Power Treaty was a part of
the larger treaty structure created at Washington; and
that American naval limitation was based upon its being
34

observed.

Johnson believed that Japan would make an effort

 

331bid.

34Secretary of State to Senator Borah, Feb. 24, 1932,
D/S File 793.94/4291. See also Memorandum by the
Secretary of State, Feb. 25, 1932, F.R., 193;L III,
440-441.

134
to regain the position she had held prior to being
met by Chinese resistance and would not lay down
her arms until she had done so. He therefore suggested
that the Chinese might withdraw "Victoriously" from
the congested area of Chapel and give Japan no excuse
for further attack there. He thought Japan had gotten
herself into an embarrassing situation and would move
out if she could do so without losing face.35
On February 13, he reported that both sides hoped to
lay down their arms and that China was willing to
withdraw if Japan refrained from entering the territory
which she vacated. Japan was willing to withdraw to the
point they held as of December 31, 1931, if the Chinese
too would withdraw. Johnson and the British Minister
discussed the matter daily in an effort to find some
way to bring the two sides together.36
On February 13, Johnson talked with Wellington
Koo about the matter and Koo said that if Japan was
sincere about withdrawing, China would agree, the only

difficulty being the distance of withdrawal. Johnson

then went to Japanese Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and

 

35Memorandum by Johnson, Feb. 12, 1932, ibid.,

36Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 13, 1932,
ibid., 323-324.

155
told him of Koo's views, but Shigemitsu's response

37 On February 17, Japan landed

was not favorable.
more troops in the International Settlement Area, but
on that same day through the efforts of Johnson and
the British Minister, representatives of Japan and
China agreed to get together to discuss the matter.
This conference broke down completely as Japanese
demands were unacceptable to the Chinese. Johnson
notified the State Department that Japan's terms were
such that they showed that she did not expect

China to yield and that they were following a line
similar to their proposal for the demilitarization

of Chinese ports. In view of this fact, Johnson

said he believed that the United States should avoid
being forced into conflict with China in support of

38 This note, like the one on February

such a policy.
9, undoubtedly strengthened Stimson's determination
to broaden nonrecognition.

The situation at Shanghai looked most serious on
February 21 and 22 as Japan once again began advancing

and China announced her determination to resist with

all her strength. But at the same time Yosuke Matsuoka

 

37Memorandum by Johnson, Feb. 13, 1932, ibid., 327.

38Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 18, 1932,
ibid., 381-3820

136
was telling Johnson that he considered the whole
affair a "mess" and that it was Japan's desire to get

39

out--if she could get out with honor. When Shigemi-
tsu reiterated this desire on February 23, Johnson

then asked the Department whether he should continue

to try and get the two sides together.40 The Depart-
ment replied that it would be desirable if the American
Minister would take a position similar to that taken

by the "neutral" advisors of the United States at the
time of the settlement of the Shantung question during
the Washington Conference; in other words, to take no
direct part in discussions but to keep the diSputants

41 Johnson thus continued

working for a settlement.
his efferts in concert with the British, French and
Italian Ministers.

Fearing loss of face, Japan continued her thrusts
into Shanghai and on March 2 captured the Woosung
forts. She felt she could then negotiate. The next

day, heeding a League request, she ceased hostilities.

To go back briefly, at the beginning of the affair

 

39Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 21, 1932,
ibid., 412.

40Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 23, 1932,
ibid., 417-418.

41Secretary of State to Johnson, Feb. 23, 1932,
D/S File 793.94/4360.

137
the Chinese had appealed their case to the League
which through its Council made efforts at Geneva and
at Shanghai to find a settlement. When the efforts of
the Council proved fruitless through February, the
Chinese referred the matter to the League Assembly.
Before the League Assembly met, however, the Council
proposed a truce and a round table conference to be
held at Shanghai. On March 3, Japan and China accepted,
and subsequent negotiations toward final settlement
were carried on in the presence of Johnson and his
British, French, and Italian colleagues.

Japan, said Yosuke Matsuoka, was now ready to say
"sayonara" and get out of the Shanghai "mess". Accord-
ingly, he suggested that Johnson and the four Ministers
mediate the trouble and make it possible for Japan
to leave honorably. On March 14, 1932, the four Min-
isters got together and worked out an agenda for
negotiations. Through the next month the discussions
were exceedingly complex as the two sides bickered
over proper wording.

By mid-April, it seemed that an impasse had been
reached as China wanted a time limit for the with-
drawal of Japanese troops and Japan refused. Johnson,
although generally attempting to avoid interfering
in Chinese affairs, suggested to the Chinese that

they should not press the matter of a time limit as

138
their intransigence was directing the world's atten-
tion away from Manchuria—-that China should hasten to
sign the agreement without reservation.42

Finally, on May 5, the long and difficult ne—
gotiations came to an end as Japan and China agreed
upon terms. In brief, the settlement reached was not
radically different from the plan first advanced by
the Ministers on March 14, providing that both sides
withdraw to their reSpective positions prior to
the incident of January 28 and that a joing commission
of neutral powers certify the mutual withdrawal.43

Except for the Japanese establishment of the
puppet state Manchukuo, the summer following the
settlement of the Shanghai dispute was not too event—
ful. The powers were all anxiously awaiting the
report of the Lytton Commission which had begun its
work earlier in the year.

Named for its head, Lord Lytton of England, the

Lytton Commission had been designated by a League

resolution of December 10, 1931, to go to the Far

 

42Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
Chiang Kai-shek, April 20, 1932, Johnson Papers.

43Johnsonto the Secretary of State, Mar. 14, 1932,
F.R. 1932, III, 583, and the same May 5, 1932, 753.

139
East and ascertain the true facts in the Sino-Japanese
dispute. It was made up of five members: Alexander
George Robert Bulwer Lytton, General Henri Edouard
Claudel of France, Dr. Heinrich Schnee of Germany,
Count Luigi Aldravandi of Italy and General Frank McCoy
of the United States.

Leaving Europe in early February, the group
arrived in Japan on the last day of the month. It
spent a little more than a week there, then went on
to China Spending the months of March and April in
Nanking, Peking, and Shanghai. In late April they
went to Manchuria, returned in a month to Peking, went
to Tokyo and on July 20 returned to Peking. During
this whole period the group found its investigative
activities extremely difficult to carry out because of
the uncooperative attitude adopted by the Japanese.

Ostensibly on a fact finding mission, in early
June the Commission began leaning toward the poss-
ibility of exceeding the letter of its duties and to-
ward making recommendations for the settlement of the
dispute. Because he believed that there were certain
fundamentals connected with questions of sovereignty
and control in Manchuria not subject to settlement by
legal or judicial means, American Minister Johnson urged

the Commission not to do this. Manchuria, he maintained,

140
was like a long thumb between a door which was Japan
and a jamb which was Russia. If China as the owner of
the thumb could substitute an iron bar for that thumb
in the shape of a strong national sovereignty, the
door and the jamb would be prevented from coming
together. But there was no evidence that China would
do this. "The jamb (Russia)", Johnson said, "is
stationary; the door (Japan) is moving. Forces are
at work moving Japan, which I do not believe can be
stopped by outside influences unless these influences
are prepared to apply force equal to that moving
Japan."44 The Manchurian problem was already settled
Johnson thought; Japan would not withdraw.

Since the Commission could not accomplish the
removal of Japan from Manchuria by whatever recomm—
endations it offered, it should limit itself to pointing
out the manner in which Japan had violated all
international agreements since 1919 and should let the
world draw its own conclusions. The peoples of the
world were interested in knowing how Japan had violated
the Kellogg Pact, the Washington Treaties, and the
League Covenant, but these issues would be forgotten

"in the controversy which will arise over any suggestion

 

44Johnson to Robert E. Olds, June 11, 1932,
Johnson Papers.

141

which the Commission may make for a settlement."45
Undeterred by the Minister's comments, the Commiss—
ion went ahead toward preparing a report which included
an acceptable solution to the controversy. Before
its work was concluded, a dispute arose between two of
its members. Lord Lytton and General Claudel differed
as to the position that should be taken toward Japan,
Lytton believing that Japan's actions should be con—
demned; Claudel believing that the Commission's
report should recognize the reality of the situation--
that Japan was in Manchuria to stay and that "Manchukuo"
was not in existence. Claudel maintained that what the
West had to deal with was an illegitimate child and
the problem was how to legitimize it.46
Johnson took issue with Claudel, saying that he

thought "it was getting somewhat dangerous when a
frenchman began to be concerned about an illegitimate
child."47 However, since Johnson himself took the
position that the fate of Manchuria wasalready settled and
the League could do nothing about it, he and Claudel

were actually in agreement! Both took what could be

 

45Johnson to the Secretary of State, June 22, 1932,
D/S File 793.94 Commission/271.

46Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
George Blakeslee, June 13, 1932, Johnson Papers.

471mm.

‘1:
I,‘

 

142
termed a "realistic" position. But, Johnson's
"realism" differed with the Frenchman's on one basic
point. He believed that while the illegitimate child
would continue to exist it should not necessarily be
baptized. Consistent with his belief in the Stimson
doctrine, he maintained that Japan's action should not

48 A strange sort

be condoned by official recognition.
of realist, Johnson was still enough the idealist that
his "realism" was tempered by a desire to preserve the
legal record.

By August 30, a report was finally agreed upon
but not before the Commission had experienced extreme
difficulty. In mid-August Johnson reported that Lord
Lytton was a sick man, with prostate trouble, and
that he had become irritable and pathological on all
matters. And, he refused to let anyone else help
in writing the final draft. Moreover, Johnson said, "he
is using too many "1's" and "We's" in the report."
In addition, the group was experiencing a good deal
of sickness as Lord Lytton's secretary sustained a

leg infection, assistant to the German delegate Hans

Von Kotze got cholera and an American assistant got

typhoid fever.49 However, the work was finally completed

 

48Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, Aug.30, 1932, ibid.

49Johnson to Hornbeck, Aug. 16, 1932, ibid.

143
and signed by the members on September 4 and was made
ready to go to Geneva.

The Commission report complete with a resume of
the facts in the case and including its recommended
solution to the controversy was released by the League
on October 2. The solution called for an autonomous
demilitarized regime in Manchuria, a guarantee of
Japanese rights there, and for an advisory conference
to help determine the government of the area. Still
maintaining that the League should not have offered
a solution, Johnson nevertheless hailed the report as
a classic since it pointed out to the world the
situation in Manchuria.50

Japan delayed and then refused to accept the
proposals, thus defying the League. She maintained
that she alone should determine whether or not her
action was justified and would make her own decisions
regarding the future of Manchuria. The remainder
of the year saw the League, with Sir John Simon of
Great Britain as the leader, refusing to uphold its

Commission and attempting to shift responsibility to

the United States; trying thereby to get the United

 

50Johnson to Joseph Grew, Oct. 21, 1932 and
Johnson to George Blakeslee, April 7, 1933, Johnson
Papers.

144

States to take the lead in opposing Japan.

Stimson adroitly evaded the League's attempt to
"pass the buck" maintaining that it was not the
primary responsibility of the United States to lead
the world against an iniquitous Japan. The problem
was essentially between the League and one of its
members. Johnson, once again in agreement with his
chief, also maintained that the matter was the peculiar
responsibility of the League and that Geneva should
not look to Washington for guidance. The United
States should not go out on a limb and oppose Japan.
Stimson had already adopted a firm, consistent position
that should not be changed.

Instead of placing herself in the path of Japan
in Asia in the fall of 1932, Johnson believed that
the United States should first try smothering her
with kindness. In a letter to Stanley Hornbeck, he
lamented the fact that Japan was turning away from
the West and seeking her destiny solely in Asia.
Because it had Hawaii and the Philippines, because it
had such a long coastline on the Pacific, and because it
needed the trade and commerce of the East, the United
States had to do something to prevent this or "one day

we will have a fight in Asia."51 One way to avoid this

 

5lJohnson to Hornbeck, Sept. 13, 1932, ibid.

145
struggle would be for the United States to encourage
Japan to overextend herself in China and thereby
destroy herself. But, the United States did not want
this because a prostrate Japan would be no good to her.
What then could she do?

Johnson proposed the holding of a large inter-
national conference at Tokyo (which would flatter the
Japanese) to deal with the broad spectrum of Asian
problems. Economic and armament problems related to
Japan's action in Manchuria would be discussed there;
and the conference could also be used to work out a
new codification of international law. Since the
Kellogg Pact had outlawed war, Johnson maintained
that it was essential that the powers draft a new code
to settle problems--for indeed Japan had grievances

52

against China. His theory was that the powers
should make a statement of internationallaw resembling
the rules of equity: that equity will not suffer a
wrong to be without a remedy, that equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights, that
one who seeks equity must do equity, that he who comes
53

into equity must come with clean hands.

In this way the United States could offer Japan

 

t’

146
the hand of friendship. If the hand were pushed aside
and all conciliatory tactics were rejected by the
Japanese then the United States would know exactly how ,
to conduct itself. If the United States found it
impossible to come to some settlement of these diff-
iculties at the conference table, then she must
withdraw from that conference table ready to consider
what preparation she would make for the future; a future
frought with difficulties and dangers. And, Johnson
said, "In the presence of a nation like Japan that
is ready and willing to shoot, we must be prepared
to shoot or yield the street."54

Although still reluctant to countenance the
thought that force would have to be used to settle
future international disputes, Johnson's statements
in the fall and winter of 1932-'33 indicate that he
was beginning to believe that indeed it alone could
stop an aggressive, belligerent nation like Japan who
disregarded all international agreements. Thus, in
October he stated to Joseph Grew, American Ambassador
to Japan, that for ten years the United States had

based its policies on the new ideas which had originated

 

54Ibid.

147
after the world war. But since Japan had cast down
these ideas, the United States must prepare to fight—-

55

she must be ready. In November, he lamented to a
friend that Japan was asking the world to accept the view
that black was white; her actions were turning the

clock back twenty years. The United States therefore
would have to consider increasing its arms. She

should also think twice about granting the Philippines

56 On a later occasion he stated

their independence.
that while peaceful solutions were the ideal, there
were times when one must use force--when one must
fight. In fact, peace itself could be an issue or
reason for men to give up their lives.57
In January 1933, when Japan was threatening Jehol,
Johnson repeated his views in a letter to his former
chief, Frank Kellogg. After indicating first that he

was very discouraged about the future in regard to the

Kellogg Pact, the Washington Treaties, and the League

 

55Johnson to Joseph Grew, Oct. 21, 1932, ibid.
56

ibid.

Johnson to Lt. Col. K.F. Baldwin, Nov. 6, 1932,

57Johnson to Reginald Sweetland, Dec. 31, 1932,
ibid.

 

148

Covenant, he concluded:

"It seems to me that it is all very well to

talk about public opinion and its effect; but

when I was a boy in Oklahoma the only influence

that had any effect on the gentlemen who used

to come to town on Saturday, get drunk, and

then take command of the streets with their

guns, was a public opinion that was willing

to step out in the street equally armed with

a gun and do some shooting."58

Thus by the time of Japan's occupation of Jehol
and subsequent withdrawal from the League, Johnson
seemed to be leaning toward a more forceable policy—-
a policy of strength. However, this could be over—
played for as evidenced by a letter he wrote to
Stanley Hornbeck in late December he was still very
ambivalent. "Whatever else we may use," he stated,
"we are not going to use force. Force breeds force,
and whoever forces Japan out of Manchuria will
probably have to remain in Manchuria for the purpose
of stabilizing the place in the interest of the
Chinese and everyone else."59

Johnson was not convinced that the United States
had sufficient interests at stake in Manchuria to
warrant a confrontation with Japan. Nor did he see

how the United States could commit itself to such a

policy in view of the lack of political cohesion and

 

58Johnson to Frank Kellogg, Jan. 23, 1933, ibid.

59Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 20, 1932, ibid.

149
willingness to resist Japan within China itself.
Moreover, while he considered Japan's wrecking of the
treaty system to be the major issue, he certainly did
not believe that the United States had any obligation
to fight to preserve this structure. Although he
recognized that Japan had changed the rules, not until
later was he convinced that the United States should
play the international game the way Japan played it.
He talked about force but essentially he continued to
believe that the United States could protect what
concrete interests it had with a policy based on

abstractions.

VI

JOHNSON AND A STRONGER POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

Chinese philosopher Lao-tze once said: "Do nothing
and there is nothing that shall not be done." Had he
lived in the 1930's he might have said: "Do nothing
and there is nothing that shall not be done to you."
When Japan invaded Manchuria, China did nothing; when
she invaded Jehol Province, China did nothing; when
Japan moved south of the Great Wall, China still
offered no effective resistance.

Because of Chinese quiescence, Nelson Johnson
questioned whether a stronger policy by the United
States was possible. Thus when Japan invaded Manchuria
and then occupied Jehol, he rationalized and concluded
that Japan's actions would not be detrimental to
American interests; that her aggression would not
remove a dollar from the American purse; that the
United States should remain passive. But, after Japan's
invasion of North China it seems doubtful that he
believed this reasoning, for he then began talking
about a black future, about how Japan was going to
eliminate American influence from Asia, that eventually

the United States would have to fight to preserve its

150

151
position.

It will be remembered that after the publication
of the Lytton Commission report in October 1932, the
Japanese delayed and then defiantly rejected its
proposals while the League powers sat paralyzed in
Geneva. Knowing that opinion at Geneva was by no
means unanimous regarding ways to punish her aggression,
Japan prepared for a new series of thrusts into
Chinese territory. Consequently, on January 3 her
troops entered Shanhaikuan in Southern Jehol Province,
captured the city in a matter of days, and began a
march toward Jehol city.

On January 10, Nelson Johnson notified Washington
that he felt certain that Japan planned to take the
provincial capital and that if China made any attempt
to resist, Japan would say that she took the
initiative. If possible, Japan would call the move
a "punitive" measure. Upset over this projected action,
Johnson said to Hornbeck that he was "fed up" with the
Japanese and their hypocrisy regarding the League,
the Washington Treaties and Kellogg Pact. "They have
used every bit of the machinery that implied a certain
standard of international sportsmanship," he stated,

1

"until the whole business is a stench in the nostrils."

The League, on January 24, responded to Japan's

 

1Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, Jan.10, 1933,
Johnson Papers.

IQ

152

activity in Jehol province by officially adopting
the Lytton report, issuing a statement of nonrecog—
nition regarding the puppet "Manchukuo? and condemning
the course Japan had pursued since September 19, 1931.
Angered by the League action, the Japanese delegation
stormed out of the session never to return. Mean-
while Japanese troops stepped up their drive toward
Jehol. Johnson reported from China that there was
Speculation that when Japan had captured this city
she would then push south of the Great Wall.2

In early March, Japanese troops poured into Jehol,
thus completing their offensive. Although outnumber-
ing their foe three or four to one, the Chinese armies
collapsed almost without a fight and retreated south-
ward. Thoroughly disgusted with Japan's action,
American Minister Johnson was almost as upset by
the Chinese failure to resist. Reporting the "battle"
to the State Department, he stated that he considered
the inability of the Chinese to understand or exhibit
anything resembling occidental patriotism, their
inability to understand the Spirit that made man give
his life for a cause and their inability to COOperate

where personal interests were involved, to be the

 

2Johnson to Frank Kellogg, Jan. 23, 1933, ibid.

153
chief reasons for the debacle. The disloyalty of
Commanders and the impossibility of achieving coordin—
ation between ignorant officers also contributed to
the farce. However, the "farce" made little difference
to the rest of China for each province had its own
problems and its own rulers all ready to proclaim their
patriotism to the heavens, but as Johnson put it, each
trying only "to maintain his own satrapy."3

Johnson's comments regarding the Chinese "resistance"
at Jehol are indicative of his estimate of the domestic
situation in China throughout the first five years
of Japan's aggression. Reporting his views in a
dispatch to the Department in February 1933, he stated
that he considered the Chinese Government to be
factional rather than national; that he thought it had
"allowed affairs to drift aimlessly." Moreover, the
prestige of the Kuomintang party was at a low ebb and
people generally had lost faith in it. The Central
Government did not have control over an army, in fact
there was no national army in a western sense and even
though there were two million Chinese in uniform, China

could not resist an outside force. Although she had

 

3Johnson to the Secretary of State, Mar. 29, 1933,
D/S File 893.00 P.R./65.

154
made some progress in "certain directions", Johnson
concluded, China was in a state of serious turmoil as

mercenaries, bandits, and "so called" Communists

4

roamed the countryside."

In September 1932, Johnson had written that China's
main difficulty was that she could not present a united
front, that she could not manage to push her petty
quarrels and political differences into the background.
"The spectacle China presents abroad today," he stated,
"is pathetic and humiliating, and should explain to

the Chinese why foreigners often speak scornfully of

"5

Chinese patriotism and intelligence. In November,

he wrote:

"So long as the so-called Central Government
has no effective authority and is obliged to
spend most of its time, money, and energies in
trying to find futile formulas to bridge the
deep-seated rivalries between semi-independent
regional Chieftains, not much progress can be
expected. The military will continue to be

a law unto themselves, and their private armies-
instead of being used to resist foreign in-
vasion will be engaged upon the sordid business
of satisfying the thirst for territory and
revenues of their commanders in China proper."

During the months subsequent to the Jehol defeat,

 

4Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 13, 1933,
F.R., 1933, III, 171-174.

 

5Johnson to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1932,
D/S File 893.00/12183.

6Johnson to the Secretary of State, Nov. 15, 1932,
D/S File 893.00/12232.

/‘I

155
chaos reigned supreme in China. The Chinese armies
had been defeated and forced to retire, there was no
government that could exercise control over any signi-
ficant portion of Chinese soil and there was extreme
political disunion in both the North and South. What
is more, there seemed to be no possibility of any
agreement between Chinese leaders to end their dis-
cord.

Although occasionally showing slight signs of
improvement, China's domestic conditions continued
to be exceedingly confused throughout the next year.
No one seemed to be ready, willing, or able to lead
her out of the political and economic morass. In
January 1934, Johnson informed the State Department
that the Kuomintang had become increasingly impotent
with its leadership divided and weak. He likened the
Party to a rice bowl that was badly cracked. In
addition, numerous provinces in the Northwest were
practically independent of Nanking with the militar-
ists in each treating the Central Government with
the utmost cynicism. The great mass of the peOple
was completely uninterested in government.7

Following a trip to Nanking in early 1934 Johnson

7Johnson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1934,
F.R., 1934, III, 491-493.

156
became extremely discouraged about the fate of
China. Chinese leaders were quarreling over things that
seemed to him to be of little or no importance; the
peeple who had been interested were losing reSpect
for their leaders and for their plans and purposes.
He had a feeling, he stated to a friend , that the
country was "never in greater danger of conquest from

8 What China

without than at the present time."
needed the American Minister always maintained was a
leadership with qualifications other thafi those

possessed by ”the average bandit leader." She did

not need western advice or even western money; but a
competent leadership capable of putting affairs in

order.

From time to time Johnson commented on the leading
Chinese officials indicating his Opinion of their
abilities. Chang Hsueh-liang, former Manchurian war-
lord and member of the military council, he said possessed
only mediocre ability. .Moreover, his drug addiction
made him a most difficult person to respect. General
Chang Ch un, another member of the military council,
Johnson thought to be an interesting man but most

"foul mouthed". H.H. Kung, onetime Minister of Finance,

was fairly capable but there was considerable laxity

 

8Johnson to Owen Lattimore, Jan. 6, 1934. Johnson
Papers.

157
of discipline under him and a significant "letdown in
ethical principles in finance." T.V. Soong, onetime
Mfinister of Finance, was one of the most able of all
Chinese possessing excellent ability. Chiang Kai-shek
was patriotic, extremely modest; lived a very simple
life, ate plain food, and wore unadorned clothing.

But he was also exceedingly ambitious:

"he would be dictator of China; he is in fact

at the present time a dictator for there is

no one in the government at Nanking apparently

willing to take the reSponsibility for any-

thing without consulting Chiang."9

Given the lackluster quality of her headership and
the extremely fluid situation within China, it is
little wonder that the Japanese could advance almost
undeterred. Apparently learning nothing from the
Jehol debacle, the Chinese were unprepared for Japan's
next move. When Japan pushed south of the Great Wall,
China's armies collapsed almost as readily as before.

After making a few short halfhearted thrusts
across the Wall in April, Japan determined in May that
she should invade North China in earnest. By mid-month
she began sending flights over Peking drapping prepa-

ganda leaflets which indicated her far reaching plans.

Only days later she unleashed a force that quickly

 

9Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, May 31, 1934, ibid.

158
crumbled all Chinese resistance before it, pushed
across the Chinese plains, and moved on toward Peking.
Like the Mongols of old, a new horde poured down from
the North through the gates of the Great Wall a horde,
which came not from the dry steppes of Mongolia, but
from the over~p0pu1ated islands of Japan.

On may 22, the American Minister wired the State
Department that the Chinese were retreating and that
it only seemed a matter of time until Japan would have
either occupied or encircled Peiping. But this did
not necessarily imply danger for Americans since the
Chinese retirement was orderly and if this continued

there should be no fighting.lo

Before the Japanese
got to Peiping, Johnson again cabled Washington, this
time to say that the Chinese Foreign Minister had
stated that because of lack of money and because the
best Chinese troops in the North had already been
destroyed, China could no longer resist. The same
day he reported that it appeared that a preliminary
arrangement had been arrived at for the cessation of
hostilities.11

Because they feared the hostility they would

 

10Johnson to the Secretary of State, may 22, 1933,
F.R., 1933, III, 340.

11Johnson to the Secretary of State, May 24, 1933,
ibid., 344.

l59
engender with their own pe0ple, the Chinese who were
concerned with the arrangements for the truce Operated
with extreme caution. Moreover, because the Japanese
had stated that they would brook no mediation from a
third party, the Chinese did not officially notify
the Legations, lest in so doing they jeOpardize the
arrangements. Thus, Johnson reported that there
seemed to be no doubt that a truce had been effected
but it had all come about in strictest secrecy and

12 On May 31, about a

no one really knew the facts.
week after the discussions began, the terms of the
agreement signed at Tangku were made public. Known

as the Tangku Truce, this agreement provided that

China immediately withdraw all her tr00ps to districts
south and west of a line connecting Yenching, Changping,
and Kaoliying and not advance beyond this line; that
the Japanese in order to ensure that China did not
violate the agreement could fly over the area to make
epot checks; and that the Japanese, when they had

decided that China had carried out the first provision,

would withdraw to the Great Wall.13 Clearly a dictated

 

12Johnson to the Secretary of State, May 26, 1933,
ibid., 347.

13Consul General at Tientsin to the Secretary of
State, May 31, 1933, ibid., 349-350.

160
truce, the arrangement gave the Japanese additional
rights in Hopei province and enabledthem to carry out
further aggression' against China at a later date. It
proved but a temporary expedient for the Chinese.

Once Japanese troops had invaded North China there
is little doubt that Nelson Johnson believed that the
United States should adopt a stronger policy against
Japan. As long as her activity had been limited to
Manchuria, he was not ready to risk the danger of such
a course, particularly in view of the reluctance of
the Chinese themselves to do anything to stop Japan.
He was not certain that her aggression was much more
than a striving for the economic resources which
Manchuria had to offer and he convinced himself that
Japan would not appreciably harm American interests
in that area. Moreover, as a "realist” he was willing
to admit that Japan and also Russia had special rights
in Manchuria; that prOpinquity and tradition were most
important and that there could be no final settlement
of the Manchurian question that did not consider
Japan's position.

North China was a different matter. Japan's
activity there indicated something decidedly greater
to him than mere economic aggrandizement or the
establishment of a stable area for her surplus popula-

tion. Japan had gone well beyond her special ”preserve"

161
and all signs seemed to show that she would go still
farther. Johnson now believed that American interests
eventually would be severely impinged as Japan would
have sufficient strength along the Chinese coast to
restrict the free movement of American ships and to
limit her trade. It is true that political conditions
within China were still as chaotic as ever. But where-
as during the Manchurian aggression Johnson viewed this
as a possible deterrent to American action against
Japan, at this juncture he did not. The United States
should adopt a stronger policy independent of the
Chinese. He did not want to intervene in China's
behalf to pull her chestnuts out of the fire, to
protect her territorial or administrative integrity;
he merely wanted the United States to arm, to reconsider
its attitude toward Philippine independence, and to
assert itself determinedly toward the Japanese.

Because he knew that the temper of the country
opposed such a policy and because he knew that the
administration in Washington also opposed it, the
American Minister did not often reveal these thoughts
in official dispatches to the State Department but
rather in long philosophical letters to his many
personal friends. Thus when Japan made her beginning
forays south of the Wall, he revealed his first im-

pressions to Stanley Hornbeck. "Apparently“, he said,

I‘

162

"there is little the world can do about it," but "it
is...discouraging to sit here helplessly and watch it
all happen without being able to do anything about it.”
Two days later his ideas were better formulated; this
time he stated that Japan could not continue her
activity for long until American interests would be
affected, that the United States had a direct interest
in the Pacific and in its future.14 Once Japan's
march toward Peking was under way he said that the
Japanese force was"one that sooner or later we will
have to reckon with, for I have no doubt that as a
nation we will aspire to play a part commensurate with
our needs in the Pacific."15

Reflecting on the situation in the East after the
signing of the Tangku Truce, Johnson said to Hornbeck
that Japan had now violated the administrative and
territorial integrity of China, set up a puppet
government in Manchuria and Jehol, and threatened
Chahar and Suiyuan. But these things did not effect
the united States directly. What was of prime im-

portance to her was the possible

14Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, May 15, 1933 and
May 17, 1933, Johnson Papers.

lSJohnson to William Hard, May 18, 1933, ibid.

163

"extension of Japanese influence through
China and along the coast of China so as
to set up a barrier past which we and our
ships must go if we seek intercourse with
Chinese ports or pe0p1e. That is the
situation closely related to our future
attitude in regard to the Philippine Is-
lands. Sooner or later the increased
prestige of Japan in China...must give us
cause to wonder just what our position in
the Pacific is to be.”16

The period of relative calm following the cease
fire of May 1933, gave Johnson an Opportunity to
consider further exactly what American interests in
the Pacific were and what American policy should be.
By August, he was reiterating that Sino-Japanese
relations were only academic to the United States,
that if the Japanese were concerned merely with the
settlement of outstanding questions between themselves
and China "that was one thing;' but if they

”threaten America's right to sail her ships

freely and without handicap in the Pacific,

and the right of American citizens to trade

freely...in Asia, or threaten policies which

we have undertaken in good faith to fulfill

in regard to the future of the Philippines,

then American interests are vitally concerned,

and we must be as ready to defend our interests
as the other man is to attack them. We should
be as brutally frank about our intentions as
the other fellow is; it is suicide to leave
him in any doubt.”l7

Throughout the next year he frequently expounded

 

16Johnson to Hornbeck, June 1, 1933, ibid.

17Johnson to Hornbeck, Aug. 16, 1933. ibid.

164

this theme and variations thereof. In a letter to
Hoy Howard, he stated that he was a little miffed at
Americans who always discussed any Sino-Japanese con-
troversy by taking either a pro-Chinese or pro-
Japanese position. Actually, Johnson maintained, there
was a distinctly American interest at stake which was
neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Japanese and which had to
be considered with one eye cocked on future developments
in the East. American interest in the Pacific area was
fundamental for the United States had a long coast-
line on the Pacific, and she did a tremendous portion
of her trading in Asia and on the Pacific. In addition,
the United States had taken the Philippines and had
guided them along toward independence. They were an
”American enterprise“, a product of American ”idealism”,
and simply because the United States granted them
independence, she could not abandon them; this would
be a violation of her ideals. She would have to fight
if necessary to protect them.18

It was on the question of independence for the
Philippines that Johnson revealed his true thinking
in official terms to the State Department. In dispatches

 

18Johnson to Roy Howard, Aug. 29, 1933, ibid.

165

to Washington, he indicated that he did not believe
the Japanese could satisfy their needs either economic
or for relief from pOpulation pressure in Northern
Asia and therefore thgrwould eventually move southward.
The departure of the United States from the Philippines
would be the signal for the beginning of this move.
And once the Japanese got there they would shape their
policy so as to exclude American interests. Any attempt
to neutralize the Islands such as was proposed under
the Hare-Hawes Cutting bill would be futile in view
of Japan's disregard of all international agreements.
Violation of any neutralization scheme would be
inevitable.19

Johnson believed that the Japanese would hesitate
a long time before they would try to drive the United
States out of the Philippines. He thought, therefore,
that if the United States stayed she would act as
a brake on Japan. Even though the expense of staying
might not be justified by future trade, it was better
not to run in the face of Japan's aggression.

By early 1934, Johnson was suggesting that the
United States should build up its military might. The
United States had entered into the Nine Power Treaty and

 

19Johnson to the Secretary of State, June 12, 1933,
F.R., 1222, III, 360-3620

166
had reduced its arms because Japan and others had
promised to respect the integrity of China. But Japan
had violated this agreement. Viewing the treaties
as a composite, Johnson believed that when Japan
violated one part of the treaties all parts were vio-
lated. Consequently, Japan's action had released the
United States from its agreement and it now had the
right to build up its fleet, and its army and to
establish the naval bases necessary for defense. "If
force is the only language that the Orient understands",
he said to Hornbeck, "then we must be prepared to
encase our swords in steel."20

Here Johnson touched upon what he considered to be
the basic difference between East and West. While the
West based its international relations on idealism
and advocated the settling of disputes by Conference,
the East believed that right was to be claimed by the
strong. Western idealism was being challenged by the
realism of the Orient. In a lengthy dispatch to the
Department in late 1933, the American Minister discussed
the varying attitudes of the peOples involved in the
Far Eastern crisis by analyzing the "Chinese mind,” the
"Japanese mind”, and the "Western and American mind.”

The "Occidental mind", Johnson maintained was

 

20Johnson to Hornbeck, April 12, 1934, Johnson Papers.

167
extremely complex because it had its religious source
in Palestine; its artistic and legal sources in the
Mediterranean Sea area, and its collection of heroes
of Judaic, Persian, Greek, Latin, Frank, German,

Saxon, Celtic and Spanish origin. This diverse back-
ground naturally made the western mind complex. In
contrast to this was the Chinese mind. It was actually
very simple! The Chinese were not influenced by the
collection of ideas of the west. Moreover, Confucious
separated the ceremony of life in this world from the
ceremony of preparation for life in the next. Thus no
Chinese suffered from religious scruples in conducting
business or in relations with others. It has been the
complex western mind that has read complexity into the
simple Chinese mind.

The "Japanese mind" was still different. If a
Chinese and a Japanese were working together on a
lawn and Elijah in his flaming chariot were to appear,
the Chinese, Johnson said, would look up and say "oh
he has come down from heaven" and go on about his work,
slowly, methodically. But the Japanese, if he failed
in interviewing Elijah, "would soon be bobbing about
the chariot burning his fingers, and if Elijah was
absent long enough would be trying to see where the
flames came from." The Japanese mind was curious, very

intense about its convictions, bloodthirsty, and always

168
active. Characterized by Samurai and Ronin attitudes,
the Japanese mind naturally loved brutality; it honored
the sword. The Ronin could reap vengeance for his
former clan leader and the clan leader, although
disassociated himself, would derive the benefits
therefrom. The Japanese army in China Johnson likened
to the Ronin of old, only this ”new Ronin” worked for
different masters, the politicians in Japan.

The ”American mind" was the mind of a people who
though occupying a continent were too young to have
a continental mind like China and too mature to be
brutal like the Japanese. It was the mind of the
pioneer and its characteristics were helpfulness,
compassion, resourcefulness, individualism and caution
towards involvement. As far as its foreign policy
was concerned, the United States, contrary to Japan,
wanted only to sell its goods in China, it had no
political interests.21

Whether or not she was motivated by peculiarities
of her “mind“, Japan was determined to ”protect”
China from the imperialism of the western powers and
to build her own influence there. Thus through the

remainder of 1933 and early 1934, she maneuvered in

 

21Johnson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 21,
1933, D/s File 793.94/6513.

169
North China, applying pressure first here and then
there in an attempt to strengthen her position. By
April Of 1934. Japan was moved to define her policy to
the world in terms Of a ”Monroe Doctrine" for Eastern
Asia.

On the seventeenth Of that month Eiji Amau, a
spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office, issued a
statement to a group of foreign correspondents in
which he declared that it was Japan's particular
responsibility to maintain peace in Eastern Asia. As
far as China was concerned, Amau stated, her unifica-
tion and the restoration Of order within her borders
were ardently desired by the Japanese. But history
proved that this could be achieved only through the
awakening Of spirit within and by voluntary efforts
on the part of China herself. Therefore, Japan Opposed
any attempt on the part of China

"to avail herself Of the influence Of any other

country in order to resist Japan; we also

Oppose any action taken by China calculated to

play one power against another. Any joint

Operations undertaken by foreign powers even in

the name of technical or financial assistance

at this particular moment...are bound to acquire

political significance. Undertakings Of such

nature...must give rise to complications that
might eventually necessitate discussion Of
problems like division Of China and at the same
time would have most serious repercussions upon

Japan and East Asia."22

Appropriately termed the Amau Doctrine, this

 

22British Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents 2E.IntePR£§39§§l Affairs, 1933-1936, 1934,
472-1:3e

170
declaration was prompted by two major develOpments.
First, the Japanese were annoyed by attempts of the
League of Nations to effect the economic rehabilitation
of China. Through the first three years Of the
thirties, the League and China had worked closely
toward this end and significant progress had been made
in many areas. In 1933, the Chinese decided to ask
for technical assistance and the League responded by
establishing a special committee to implement technical
OOOperation. Headed by Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, the
Technical Agent Of the Council, whom the Japanese
considered to be antagonistic to them, the committee
proceeded in 1933 and 1934 to help China solve some
Of her problems in the area Of road construction, health,
and water conservation. Although not much was accom-
plished, the League action had great potential
significance.

Second, the Chinese had begun to secure economic
aid from the United States and other powers. Through
the facility Of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
in 1933. the Chinese had borrowed fifty million dollars
from the United States to be used by her to purchase
American wheat and cotton. In addition, the powers
had begun assisting China in the building Of an air
force and in the develOpment Of her commercial air-

lines. The United States sold China some fighting

171
planes, Italy sent her an air mission, and Germany
poured money into her civil air lines and sent General
Von Seeckt, former head of the Reichswehr, as military
advisor to Nanking. Japan feared that increased
non-Japanese "interference” in China and foreign aid,
which was being used for military purposes, would
seriously undermine her preemtory position and there-
fore reacted with the statement of April 17.23

”This statement", Nelson Johnson informed
Washington ”should not be permitted to pass unchallenged
as it runs directly counter to the spirit and letter
Of the Nine-Power Treaty... which is part Of a series
Of treaties which must be considered as a whole."

The Mflnister said further that in his opinion although
Japan had not given notice that she considered the
Treaty no longer binding, the powers should inform her
that abrogation Of one Of the treaties abrogated all
of them. If the policy covered by the statement was
pursued by Japan, it would severly limit America's
national and commercial dealings with an independent
country with which it had long had dealings. Consis-
tent with his current thoughts On American Far Eastern

policy, he maintained that it was not China's

 

23Account based largely on Dorothy Borg, The United
States and The Far Eastern Crisis 2; 19%3-1938,
(Cambridge, 1964) pp-55—80, and Harold inacke, A History

g£_the Far East in Modern Times, (New York,l959) pp.

*~m_”

547-549.

1‘

172

independence that concerned the United States at
this point, but rather America's independence of action
in the Pacific ”both now and in the future.”24

Discarding Johnson's advice, Secretary of State
Hull eventually delivered an gigg_memoire to the
Japanese that proved fairly innocuous. Deliberately
drafted to avoid offending the Japanese, the message made
no mention of Japan's violation of the Nine Power
Treaty; nor did it say anything specific about the
Japanese declaration; it simply stated America's general
position under international law and reaffirmed the
fact that by virtue Of treaties and in simple justice
the United States had certain rights and Obligations
in China. The American government sought tO be
considerate of the rights and Obligations of other
countries, the note continued, and it expected other
countries to show due consideration for the interests
of the United States. Concluding, the message stated:

"In the Opinion of the American peOple and

the American Government, no nation can, with-

out the assent Of the other nations concerned,

rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its

will in situations where there are involved

the rights, the Obligations and the legitimate
interests of other sovereign states."25

 

24Counselor of Legation to the Secretary of State,
April 27, 1934, F.R., 193 , III, 143-144.

25A;Q;_Memoire by the Secretary of State, April 28,
1934, F.R., Japan 1931-1941, I, 231.

173

Although he was prepared to make statements such
as this one reaffirming America's rights in the Far
East, Secretary Hull was no more anxious than his
predescessor to take a forceful stand to protect these
rights. Whereas Stimson with his nonrecognition
doctrine had "stuck America's neck out” knowing that
he could not back his action with force, Hull hOped to
avoid any kind Of a lead. In fact, over his first
years in Office he madeevery attempt to avoid friction
with Japan. The policy of the Roosevelt administra-
tion was essentially one of noninvolvement. Domestic
problems came first, and the great depression had
created a wealth Of problems.

Not long after issuing his gigg_memoire Hull
began seeking ways to change American policy toward
China in order to effect better relations with the
Japanese. Consequently he asked the Far Eastern
Division to determine what if anything could be done
toward this end. The Division reSponded by stating
that since China had not proved to be a good debtor
and since the K.F.C. wheat and cotton loan had not
worked out satisfactorily, the United States should
avoid any further economic assistance for her. Hull,
at least temporarily, put this recommendation into

effect. In addition, the Secretary asked the press to

174
make no inflamatory statements that would damage
Japanese-American relations. He also refrained from
taking a position in any Japanese disputes with the
League over technical assistance to China.26

Throughout the remainder of 1934, the Roosevelt
Administration attempted to clarify its Far Eastern
policy and at the same time solve the many problems
at home. It was hOping to achieve better relations
with Japan and to let nature take its course in
China. Except for Japan's maneuvering in North
China and rumors Of an impending conflict between
Russia and Japan, relative quiet prevailed in the
Far East during this period.27 In September, Nelson
Johnson prepared to take his family home on a vaca-
tion.

Johnson had not been back to the United States
since going to China as Minister in early 1930 and he
was anxious to visit his many friends there. He
therefore wrote to the State Department asking for
leave and for expense money for himself and his family.
Because of the economic hardship created by the

depression, the Department replied that it could not

 

26See Borg, pp. 81-87.

27Ibid., 92-99.

175
pay his way home for a leave nor could it justify
calling him to Washington for consultation; he would
have to pay his own way. Fortunately, however, the
Department was willing to grant him a sixty day leave,
the time that he needed to make the trip.

Traveling was not now as simple or as cheap for
the American Minister as it had been when he first
went to China. He went there as a bachelor; when he
returned to the United States in 1934. he had a wife
and a young son. He had married the former Jane Beck
on October 10, 1931, during the most difficult period
Of the Manchurian crisis. Miss Beck was the daughter
Of George Beck of Cody, wyoming, former state senator
and candidate for governor in that state, and the
grandaughter Of United States Senator James Burnie
Beck Of Kentucky. A graduate Of the University of
wyoming and a teacher in California, she had met
Johnson in Washington while he was detailed to the
Department in the late twenties. Their respective
families had been friends for some time but they had
never met prior to this date. Miss Beck went tO China
in 1931 and their marriage took place in Tientsen at

the home Of Frank Lockhart, the American Consul

176
General. The first or the Minister's "dividends",28
Nelson Beck, was born on April 8, 1933.

Johnson and his family sailed from Shanghai for
the United States on October 9, 1934. They arrived
in Washington on November 1, spent a little more than
a month there, and then went to Cody, wyoming for
another month. The Minister then secured an extension
of his leave until January 25, on which date the
family left San Francisco for the return trip to
China. They arrived back in China on February 12,
1935.

When Johnson returned to his duties he found
SinO-Japanese relations entering upon a new phase,
for Japan was shifting the emphasis Of her policies
from North China to Nanking. In North China the
Japanese military had tried to work out Japan's
destiny; now at Nanking diplomatic moves were being
made tO effect economic OOOperation and collaboration
with China. In the latter part Of March, the Minister
reported to Washington his ideas as to the reasons
for this change. He said that he thought that the

Japanese army had accomplished what it had intended

 

zaBecause he married later in life Johnson always
thought Of his children as an added blessing; he called
them his ”dividends”.

177
in North China and now coveted China prOper, not so
much for political as for economic conquest. Second-
ly, the Japanese military had possibly lost some
prestige at home to business and civilian leaders
who were apprehensive about Japan's economic position
and who desired new markets. Therefore, the military
was temporarily giving business leaders and the
Foreign Office a chance to take the lead in winning
concessions from China. Third, the Japanese military
may have figured that since Japan's withdrawal from
the League and her denunciation Of the Washington
Treaties would become effective in 1935, they should
”clean up" the outstanding questions between Japan
and China by the end of the year, thus enabling them
to face the tasks of 1936 with a peaceful China behind
them. 29

Whatever the reason, it was a fact that Japan was
now seeking economic advantage by negotiation rather
than by force. The American Minister reported that
he expected the results Of this diplomatic activity
eventually to be reciprocal credit and tariff advan-

tages, a financial assistance arrangement whereby

 

29Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Mar. 21, 1935,
F.R., 1935, III, 81-86.

178

Japanese cotton growing experts would help China
improve her cotton yield, authority by Japan to build
a railroad and get coal out of Shansi, and an effort
by the Chinese tO halt the boycott against Japanese
goods. Jehnson thought that generally relations
between the two nations would improve. China could
do nothing but go along with Japan's desires.30

But, the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations
would not help the West. Japan was turning to China
tO solve her two major problems; her pOpulation
problem and her need for markets for her industrial
products. Johnson doubted if she would succeed in
either area since relative to the first; Japanese and
Chinese never intermarried and hadt different
cultures and, on the second; Japan would try to
"run the show" like she did in Formosa and Korea and
Manchuria, and thus ruin any chance of develOping a
satisfactory Chinese Market. However, in attempting to
achieve her goals, Japan would wipe out every vestige
of western competition.31

Japan's more friendly policy toward China con-

tinued up through the first week of May 1935. On

 

3OIbid.

31Johnson to the Secretary of State, Mar. 29, 1935,
ibid., 97-100 and the same May 1, 1935, ibid.,134-144.

 

179
May 9, Japan proposed the raising Of her Legation in
China to an Embassy. The other powers fearing a loss
of good will with the Chinese quickly followed suit
and on June 18, Johnson was promoted from Minister
to Ambassador.32 Because Of this gesture on the part
Of Japan, it was expected by Johnson and other
Officials that she would continue her conciliatory
policy.

NO sooner had the Foreign Office announced this
new step, however, than the Japanese army again began
to act. Apparently miffed that they were not consulted
prior to the move and upset that the conciliatory policy
was going too far, they chased a group of Chinese ban-
dits into HOpei Province and anniliated them; they
ordered the military personnel of the Central Govern-
ment to be pulled out of HOpei and the Kuomintang
organization there to be dissolved; they ordered
the dismissal of General ru Hsueh, Governor Of HOpei
and stated that thereafter only Officials acceptable to
the Japanese should be assigned to the area. Again
helpless before Japan, China gave in to her every

request. ”The government at Peking," Johnson stated

 

32Johnson did not present his credentials as
Ambassador until September when the Senate had confirmed
his appointment.

.r‘:’

180
to Hornbeck, "has been reduced to a jelly like
consistency."33

Although on previous occasions of Japanese
‘aggression Johnson had consistently advocated calling
Japan's attention to the Nine Power Treaty, during the
Hopei crisis he did not. He advised the Department
that it would be Of little value to say anything to
the Japanese Foreign Office since in his Opinion the
course Of action had been determined upon by the
Kwantung army without the approval of the civilian
wing Of Japan's government; that the army was voicing
its disapproval Of the conciliatory policy and any
adverse comment by the United States would simply
infuriate the armyleaders and incite them to further
action.34 Johnson still believed that the United
States should conduct its own affairs in the area of
armament as though the treaties had been contravened;
he simply did not think that on this occasion saying
anything to Japan would do any good.

During the summer of the Hopei crisis the Japa-

nese also used an incident in Chahar as an excuse to

 

33Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, July 31, 1935,
Johnson Papers.

34Johnson to the Secretary of State, June 17, 1935,
F.R., 1935, III, 257-258.

181

present the Chinese with another set of demands.
Unable to resist, the Chinese once again gave in and
agreed to suppress all anti-Japanese activities, dis-
band all anti-Japanese organizations, and disband
Kuomintang headquarters in Chahar. Shortly thereafter,
Johnson reported to the State Department that he
thought the matter Of Hopei and also Chahar had been
settled but that the Chinese lived in great fear as
at any moment the visiting card Of a previously unheard
Of Japanese Major or Colonel might be presented and his
slightest whim could become the active policy Of the
Japanese military.35 The Minister said that he was
still very pessimistic about the future; activity in
China had evil forebodings for the western powers.
Japanese activities, political and economic, would
increase in China from then on, he thought.36 But,

”General Chiang Kai-shek continues his cam-

paign against the Communists nevertheless.

Chinese leaders in Nanking are discouraged.

There is little, apparently, that they can do....

It would be funny if it were not so tragic.'37

By the fall of 1935, Japan's activities in China

 

35Johnson to Secretary of State, July 10, 1935.
ibid., 303-306.

 

36Ibid.

37Johnson to Roy Howard, June 20, 1935, Johnson '
Papers.

182
were indeed increasing. In late October, Japanese
Foreign Minister Hirota outlined a three point program
that was to govern Japan's relations with China in
the immediate future. Termed by Johnson a plan to
place China directly under Japan's control, Hirota's
program "requested" China to ally with Japan or
collaborate to eliminate communism, stOp playing
foreign nations against one another, and to effect
economic cooperation between Japan, China, and Man-
churia.38 At the same time that discussion Of Hirota's
points was going on, Japanese General Doihara and his
military colleagues attempted tO induce the Chinese in
North China to establish an autonomous state in that
region, stating that if this were not done by November
20, Japanese forces would attack and set up the
state themselves. The Chinese apparently determining
that appeasement had not worked thus far decided to call
the "bluff” Of the Japanese military. General Doihara
remained silent. However, in the ensuing negotiations
both at Nanking regarding Hirota's three points and in
the North regarding the establishment Of an autonomous

region, Japan made significant gains for she got certain

 

38Johnson tO the Secretary Of State, Nov. 11, 1935,
F.R., 1935, III, 404-405.

183

privileges and brought about the establishment
Of a HOpei-Chahar Political Council which was to
enjoy a good deal of autonomy in governing these
two provinces. Near the end of the year, Johnson
wrote to Hornbeck saying that he thought these events
indicated that Japan planned to control and supervise
China and would continue ther; work until she' had
completed wher; task.39

During the crisis in North China, Britain thinking
that some action should be taken in China's behalf,
made inquiry as tO Japan's intentions as they related
to the Nine-Power Treaty. United States policy makers
then had to decide whether to follow suit or to pursue
some other line. Because he believed that as far as
protecting the sovereignty of China was concerned the
Nine-Power Treaty was now useless, Ambassador Johnson
advised the State Department against such a move. He
believed that making representations to Tokyo would
only give the Japanese militarists a pretext for
further aggression and would get the West or China
nowhere. However, consistent with his belief in a

stronger policy toward Japan, he did feel that the

 

39Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 3, 1935, Johnson
Papers.

‘—-l

184
United States should keep reminding the Japanese
privately Of their violation of the whole washington
treaty structure; informing them that their violations
justified the United States strengthening itself.40
In other words, the United States should not say or
do anything which could be construed as being on
China's behalf; it should simply warn Japan that it
was preparing itself for any eventuality.

The statement that Hull eventually made, like the
statement following the Amau Doctrine, made no mention
of the Nine-Power Treaty and was notable for its
unprovocative tone toward the Japanese.41 Thus, at
the end Of 1935 as at the beginning of 1933, the
Roosevelt Administration was following a passive Far
Eastern policy. Although Nelson Johnson had not
placed himself in Opposition to this policy, one must
certainly conclude that he was not altogether happy
with it. Indicative Of his attitude was a conversation
that he had in the fall of 1935 with Dr. Arthur Young,
Advisor to the Chinese government. Young, fearing the

future, asked Johnson if he thought there would be

 

4O”Ibid.

41Secretary Of State to the Chargé’in Japan, Dec. 5,
1935, F.R., 1935, III, 473.

185
any change in American policy to meet the ever ex-
panding Japanese. Johnson replied that he did not
know. But he said, grimly, that anyone interested
could probably surmise what it would be by looking at
the act creating the Commonwealth government in the
Philippines preparatory to granting them independence,
and the recent neutrality legislation-~actions that he
strongly Opposed.42

In 1936, as Japan stepped up her activity in
China, Johnson became even more firmly convinced that
the United States should adOpt a policy of strength.
At the beginning Of the year, he was saying that while
the United States would not engage in a war with Japan
over the Open Door, there were certain elements connected
with her eXpansion with which the United States might
become involved.43 Later, he said to a friend that he
did not believe that the United States necessarily
had to have a physical conflict with Japan but ”if
we are going to get along with the Japanese in this

world Of economic conflict we have to walk and talk

 

42Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and
Arthur Young, Spt. 25, 1935, Johnson Papers.

43Johnson to D.C. Poole, Jan. 10, 1936, Johnson
Papers and Johnson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 15,

1936, F.R., 1936, III, 11-14.

186
like a Samurai warrior...".44 At the end of January,
he stated that Japan could not be expected to respect
America's interests and views unless "we have ready
the force commensurate with our interests and our
resources to enable us to make our views and interests
worth respecting."45 Armament limitation was all
right in a world Of negotiations and arbitration but in
a world where the man with whom one has to deal has a
gun "the only safe thing for you to do is to carry a
gun also and be ready to use it, and use it quickly."46

In May, Johnson said he saw no reason why the
United States should keep quiet concerning action by
an aggressive power in an area where the United States
had interests.47 Shortly thereafter, he stated that he
thought the United States should and would build a
navy strong enough tO support American interests in
the Far East. The United States had built a great
empire and this was not accomplished by pacifism.

"Cruel force entered into the accomplishment.” And,

 

44Johnson to Hugh GibSOn, Jan. 31, 1936, Johnson
Papers.

45Ibid.
461bid.

47Johnson to I.V. Gillis, May 5, 1936, Johnson
Papers.,

187
no one should forget this.48 In July, he told Frank
Kellogg that people had to be willing to fight in the
interests Of their ideals or they would soon be sub—
jected to the ideals of someone else.

”Perhaps this is heresy,” he said, "but

I am convinced that the idealism that

inspired the Kellogg Pact cannot prevail

unless those who hold those ideals are

prepared to go and shoot it out with 49

the drunk who now confuses our thoughts.”

As her military got increased political power in
the spring of 1936, Japan continued her aggression
in China. During the first part Of the year, one of
the most vital aspects of her policy was her increas-
ed smuggling activity in North China. By pushing
goods free of duty, Japan apparently hOped to destroy
China's revenue administration and eventually weaken
the government tO such an extent that it would be
amenable to an agreement along the lines Of Hirota's
three points. Predicting the results if Japan
succeeded at this, Johnson stated to the Consul General
at Shanghai:

”we will wake up some day to find that

Japan has forced China into a kind Of

alliance with Japan which will be not
only a defensive and Offensive alliance,

A-

48Johnson to I.V. Gillis, may 19, 1936, ibid.

49Johnson to Frank Kellogg, July 16, 1936, ibid.

188

but also an alliance in the nature Of

a customs union, with special pri-

vileges enjoyed by Japanese goods and

discriminating tariffs on goods from

EurOpe and America.”50

At the same time Japan was carrying on her smugg-
ling activities, the Japanese military was stepping up
its attempts to detach the northern provinces. In
September, after a series of incidents in which some
Japanese were killed, the new Japanese Ambassador,
OOOperating with the military, presented orally a
set of demands to the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Among other things, these demands stated
that China should grant more freedom Of action to local
authorities in North China and that Japan and China
work together to suppress Chinese Communism. Contrary
to their action on previous occasions, the Chinese
replied with a set Of demands Of their own; demanding
the abandonment Of the East Hopei autonomous area,
treatment Of China as a sovereign equal nation, and the
end Of smuggling. Lengthy discussions ensued, but
China stood her ground. Japan talked Of war but no

war occurred. When in November the Chinese defeated

a Japanese force comprised of Mongols and "Manchukuo"

 

50Johnson to Consul General at Shanghai, June 12,
1936, ibid.

189
bandits at Suiyan, creating thereby an unexpected
wave of nationalist anti-Japanese spirit throughout
China, the Chinese negotiators became even more
intractable. By the time Of the Sian kidnapping
episode in mid-December, a settlement had still not
been reached.

On December 17, Nelson Johnson wrote to a friend
in the United States saying that China was in the
midst of another crisis--an astonishing crisis: ”The
young Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has seized the person
Of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage who
ventured into Chang's bailiwick...“.5l Chiang Kai-
shek had gone to Sian, thecapital of Shensi province,
in early December to quiet the demands for war with '
Japan on the part Of the young Marshal and the group
of Officers surrounding him. Chang had been sent
to Shensi province by Chiang to wipe out the Communists
as a part of the Generalissimo's plan to unify the
country. Apparently dissatisfied with their conditions
and with Chiang's reluctance to turn his efforts away
from fighting the Communists and toward a concerted

effort against the Japanese, Chang and his group on

 

51Johnson to Dr. William Hocking, Dec. 17, 1936,
ibid.

190

December 12 seized the Generalissimo--kidnapped
him, as Johnson put it, like ”Chicago gangsters."
The group then issued a list Of eight demands to the
nationalist government which included that Nanking
begin a stronger effort toward resisting the Japa-
nese, that greater democracy be attained, reversing the
trend toward military dictatorship, and that the
Communists be brought into a united front arrange-
ment.

The Nanking government rejected the rebel demands
and threatened the use Of force to smash the group
and if possible to secure the release Of Chiang. They
then ordered the Nationalist armies to move north-
ward. Chiang, however, apparently through a fellow
prisoner, managed to make contact with the govern-
ment and called for the suspension Of any hostile
action for about a week until the matter could be
negotiated. According to Official reports Chiang
adamantly refused to accede to the young Marshal's
wishes during the whole period of his detention. The
Nationalist government refused tO send an Official
negotiator to Sian to discuss the kidnapping, but did
allow T.V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law to go.
Soong went to Sian on the 20“, returned quickly to

Nanking, went back on the 22nd this time accompanied

191

by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and finally on December
25 secured the Generalissimo's release. Reportedly,
Chang Hsueh-liang had seen the error Of his ways; he
returned to Nanking himself in the custody Of the man
he had kidnapped.52

Although varying interpretations were Offered as
to the results of the affair and much Speculation
occurred as to the young Marshal's motives for the
kidnapping, Nelson Johnson's views appear to be as
accurate as any. First, interpreting the matter in
psychological terms, he maintained that Chang's army
was particularly susceptible to irresponsible
action. It had just been driven out Of Manchuria by
Japan and then forced upon the National government by
economic necessity; it was the butt Of jokes; it was
the army that would not fight. Its morale was low and
when it was shunted Off to North China to fight the
remnants Of the Communists, morale did not improve.
Japan had exacerbated this fehling by being especially
harsh to the families of Chang's soldiers who lived in
the areas they controlled; many Of whom fled to join
Chang's army in Shensi. Bickering was rife in the

young Marshal's army, many families were there, Shensi

 

52Summary of episode based partially on Borg,
pp. 218-223.

192
was not hospitable to them, and the Communists used
propaganda against them. “It was easy," Johnson
said, ”to appeal tO these homesick men under a weak
leader who had been a narcotic addict, who was the son

Of a bandit, with results which burst upon us on the

morning Of December 13th."53

A couple Of weeks later the American Ambassador
wrote to Stanley Hornbeck indicating that he had altered
his interpretation slightly. He now thought that the
attitudes of Chang's army were less responsible for
the affair than Chang himself.

"Personally," he wrote, "I am inclined to
believe that it was nothing more than a
kidnapping indulged in by Chang Hsueh—liang
and his friend Yang Hu-cheng, for the
purpose Of compelling Chiang Kai-shek to
give complete recognition tO their talents.
Just a kidnapping. As you know, I have
always felt that the confusion and com-
plications which we ascribe tO the Chinese
mind are very much the product Of our much
more complicated brain. I believe that
Chang Hsueh-liang had persuaded himself that
his suddenly-devised kidnapping would be
welcomed by a large portion Of the leaders
of the country...”54

In regards to the results of the Sian episode,

 

53Johnson to William Castle, Jan. 26, 1937.
Johnson Papers.

54Johnson tO Hornbeck, Feb. 6, 1937, ibid.Dorothy
Borg in her The 0.8. and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp.225,
episode as occurring as a result Of superficial factors
and that they therefore missed the role Of the Comm-
unists.

193

Johnson believed first that it was a blow to China's
self confidence and more importantly that it had dam-
pened the spirits Of those who wished to attack Japan.
However, he believed it had other results which were
less easily evaluated. Prior to Sian, he said, Chiang
Kai-Shek had stood alone in his efforts to bring unity
to China for Chiang was a cold, lonely individual who
did not attract peOple's confidence and who was hated by
many who thought him ambitious to become a dictator. But
when Chang Hsueh-liang seized him, he suddenly became a
symbol Of unity, the thing that the Chinese wanted most.
The Chinese were ashamed of their failure to stop the
Japanese, a people that they despised, but they knew
that Japan's success was attributable to her ability to
act as a unit, to direct her entire force at one point.
Knowing this all along, they simply needed an event such
as this to shake them out Of their lethargy. Johnson
believed, therefore, that since the central government
had not found it necessary to compromise, it had emerged
from the ordeal stronger than it had ever been.55

The Sian affair, when combined with the stand
which the Chinese had taken in the negotiations with

Japan during the fall, and their defeat Of a Japanese led

 

55Johnson to Thomas Lamont, May 11, 1937, ibid.

194
army at Suiyan, indicated to Johnson that unity was
being achieved in China. It appeared that she was
developing a patriotic Spirit, that she would resist
the aggressor. He was heartened by this for although
he did not believe that the United States had a special
responsibility for the preservation Of China, or should
necessarily do anything to this end, he hOped that
China could retain her sovereignty and independence.

He also saw that if China could fight her own battles
in Asia, Japan might eventually reconsider her aggression
because of its cost and the United States would not

herself have to become involved.

VII
NELSON JOHNSON AND UNITED STATES SILVER POLICY

"The chief cause for the abnormal and sudden de-
crease in our commerce with China during the latter part
Of 1929 and 1930," wrote Senator Key Pittman Of Nevada
in November 1930, "was the sudden great and unprecedented

"1 Concerned more with

fall in the price Of silver.
silver than with commerce, Pittman spent the next ten
years trying to increase the price of the white metal.
From early 1930 on, his and the other silver senators'
maneuverings were a constant headache to State Depart—
ment Officials as they added silt to the already muddled
waters Of SinO-American relations.

As head Of the silver bloc in Congress, Senator
Pittman had spent much time and effort during the
twenties lining the pockets of his silver mining con-
stituents. He had committed the federal government to

a couple of silver purchasing programs designed to keep

the domestic price Of the metal high.2 However, by 1929,

 

1Congressional Record, 71, Cong. 3 Secs. Vol. 74
pt. 5, (Feb. 12, 1931), p? 4701.

28cc Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Kay Pittman, (Lincoln,
1963). PP. 75-95.

195

196
both the domestic and world prices had slipped to an
all time low and the effect on Nevada and the other
silver states was disastrous; mines shut down; men
were thrown out of work. Something had to be done. The
silver senators tried first tO push a tariff bill
through Congress to insulate the United States from
the world price. Failing at this, in 1930 they launched
a plan devised tO raise the world and domestic prices
of silver and at the same time increase American
commerce--a scheme designed to please everyone. Nelson
Johnson's first contact with what later came to be
known as "American silver policy" occurred during this
year.

On April 29, 1930, Pittman introduced a resolu—
tion in the Senate which authorized the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to investigate the treaties and other
commercial arrangements of the United States with China
with a view to the possible denouncement, amendment, or
modification Of existing treaties or the execution and
ratification of additional treaties. Ostensibly nothing
more than an attempt to review American trade with China,
the resolution was actually much more than that. Pittman

and his fellows hOped generally to disclose that the low

197
price of silver was the major cause of world economic
ills and Specifically that its deflated price was harm-
ing American trade with China since cheapened silver
made higher commodity prices. When questioned by
Stanley Hornbeck in May, Pittman admitted that the pur—
pose Of the resolution was to make an investigation into
the subject of the price of silver and little else.3

As a part of their plan, the Silver senators had
in mind the floating of a large loan to China. This
would allow China tO purchase American products and at
the same time decrease the volume Of silver held in
the United States. In the fall Of 1930, a representative
Of the silver group went to China to secure Chinese
approval of the scheme. Nelson Johnson revealed in a
letter to Hornbeck in early December that a certain Isaac
Ezra, a member Of the American silver commission was
plaging him and the Chinese government, trying to get
the Chinese to agree to a loan. Specifically, the idea
put forth was that the Chinese government Should agree
to borrow 500,000,000 ounces of American silver at a
rate Of 2%, the loan to be repaid in fifty years. Then
the United States would buy up silver equal to this

amount with dollars from American producers. The only

 

3Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck, May 16, 1930,
D/s File 893.41—Silver/l.

198
problem with the scheme was, as Johnson said, that the
world price of silver was extremely low and going lower
and the loan would be of little value. However, the
group was ready to meet thisproblem; it prOposed the
holding Of an international conference to regulate the
price and to keep India, which had a large amount of
silver in its possession, from dumping it on the world
market. Johnson told Hornbeck that he hOped the State
Department would help China "fend Off” the “likes” Of
Ezra and his group.4

Through the remainder Of 1930 and into 1931, the
Silver group plumped for world wide regulation Of
silver prices as well as for the consummation Of the
loan deal with China. Senator Pittman attached recommen-
dations to this effect to the report submitted by the
Committee commissioned by his original resolution Of
April 1930. In the Spring Of 1931, he was sent to
China by the subcommittee studying the matter to
determine the ”facts” and the feasibility Of a loan.
He returned more convinced than ever that his ideas were
correct. He then began to push harder for an international
conference.

He finally got what he wanted. When the London

 

4Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 5, 1930, Johnson
Papers.

199

Economic Conference convened, Pittman was made one Of
the American delegates. By persistence and dogged
determination, he utilized his position as chairman Of
a conference subcommittee studying the necessity Of
stabilizing and regulating silver prices to effect an
agreement--an agreement which provided that countries
utilize silver instead of paper in low value currency,
that countries avoid legislation that would devalue
silver, that certain countries like India agree to
limit the amount they would sell in the world market,
and that the United States and other producers of
silver would commit themselves to purchase large
amounts Of the metal for a period of four years. In
December 1933, President Roosevelt implemented the
agreement by proclamation and directed the Secretary Of
the Treasury to begin buying silver at 64% cents an
ounce at a time when the world market price was only about
43 cents an ounce.5

Still not satisfied, the silver bloc increased its
activity and introduced a bill in Congress that would
have required the Treasury to purchase 50,000,000 ounces

Of silver a month. Although the bill was defeated, the

5See Israel, pp. 88-95 and John Morton Blum, From
The Morgenthau Diaries (Boston, 1959). pp. 183-190. _'

200
group continued its efforts and in June with little
Opposition from the President it pushed through a bill
known as the Silver Purchase Act. This act authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver until
it constituted one-fourth Of the entire monetary stock
of the United States or until the price reached 31.29
per ounce, the coinage price. Quickly put into effect,
the new silver act provided that the United States buy
the metal domestically at 64% cents, the price agreed
upon in December 1933, and at the world market price.
Once the United States began purchasing in volume, the
world price quickly scared and soon outdistanced the
domestic price, with the result that the silver
senators sought and secured an increase in the pegged
domestic price. As the buying continued, the price Of
the metal Spiraled.6

The effect of the American silver buying program
on China was immediate. The higher world price caused
silver to leave that country as fast as it could be
lOaded on boats. Even before the implementation Of the
act Of June 1934, China was beginning tO be concerned
about the external flow Of the metal; began in fact

to wonder what to do to combat what she considered to

 

Ibid.

201
be the undermining Of her currency. Viewing China's
dilemma, Johnson believed that she had three alterna-
tives and none of them was possible of attainment:
she could embargo the export Of silver, she could put
an eXport tax on silver or she could reduce the silver
content in the dollar. The first two courses Of action
she could not implement because of foreign attitudes
and because of the extraterritorial privileges enjoyed
by foreigners. The third was impossible because it was
complicated and her government was not stable enough or
strong enough to carry it out.7

But Johnson was not yet convinced that China had
anything to be alarmed about. At this point he did
not think that higher prices for silver in the world
market would have a baneful effect on China. Having
made a study Of the problem, he found that in 1920 when
silver was at its highest value exports and imports
of gold and silver respectively reached their highest
peaks. He believed that it followed then that a higher
price for the white metal would eventually increase the
supply of silver in China rather then decrease it. In

other words, Johnson believed, as did Senator Pittman,

 

7Johnson to Frank Lockhart, Mar. 21, 1934, Johnson
Papers.

202
that China considered silver and also gold to be commo—
dities to be bought and sold; that she bought gold when
gold was cheap in terms of silver looking for a rise in
the price and when gold was expensive in terms of silver,
she bought silver for the same reason. In addition,
Johnson thought that higher silver could benefit China
since higher silver would mean that She would have to pay
fewer dollars for what She imported.8 By the end Of
March, Johnson was saying that he thought silver prices
could be increased at least 25% without really harming
anyone.9

As time went by, Johnson began to change his
view. In the months subsequent to the passage of the
Silver Purchase Act, the export of Silver from China
increased tremendously until by October the Chinese were
exceedingly anxious that the United States do something
to relieve the situation. On October 5, Chinese Minister
Of Finance, H.H. Kung, prepared a memorandum which he
sent tO Washington stating China's case. Kung stated that
when silver became more valuable abroad than at Shang-
hai, as much as ten per cent more valuable, Chinese

banks naturally shipped the metal abroad as it let them

 

§Johnson to Frank Lockhart, Mar. 25, 1934 and Mar.
21, 1934, ibid.

9Johnson tO Julian Arnold, Commercial attachefi
Mar. 30, 1934, ibid.

203
replenish foreign balances. Previously, of course,
China had exported goods or merchandise to maintain bal-
ances but with the world wide depression there were no
markets as there was no buying power anywhere. The
difficulty with this situation, Kung went on, was that
the continued export of silver would drain China of
the precious metal base for her currency and lead to
higher interest rates, deflation and, a good deal of

10 In December, Kung again

hardship and suffering.
explained the gravity Of the Chinese position, this
time appealing for the United States either to agree to
reduce the purchase price of silver or help to reorganize
China's currency.11
At about this same time, Johnson in a letter to
Stanley Hornbeck stated that Bois Hart, Of the National
City Bank, had just called upon him and told him that the
Chinese were becoming extremely upset about American
silver policy and that anti-Americanism was Spreading

rapidly. Johnson said he could well understand the
Chinese feeling, but that it would do them little good

 

10Memorandum by the Chinese Minister Of Finance,
Oct. 5.1934. D/S File 893. 515/353.

11Chinese Minister Of Finance to the Chinese
Minister, Dec. 9, 1934, F.R., 1934, III, 455.

204
to protest because the Administration was required by an
act Of Congress to continue its purchase Of silver.
However, Johnson thought there was one thing that the
United States could do to relieve the situation. It
could buy up silver at Shanghai and hold it there,
perhaps in this way re-establishing Shanghai as a silver
market and discouraging shipment away from China.12

Not long thereafter, Johnson, in Washington on
leave, and Herbert Feis, State Department Economic
Advisor, prepared a memorandum suggesting a possible
course to follow in response to Kung's appeal. Reflecting
accurately Johnson's new views, the memorandum stated
first that bankers and business groups in China were
being affected by the American silver policy and this
was crucial to Sino-American relations. Moreover, there
were wideSpread disturbances in China caused by United
States purchases Of Silver and regardless Of who was
actually responsible for the act's passage, the Chinese
considered the President not Congress or the Treasury
as reSponsible. The Chinese had appealed to the United
States to do something but nothing had been done, thereby
indicating an inconsistency between friendly professions

and actual practice. China, the memorandum continued,

 

12
Papers.

Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 3, 1934, Johnson

205

was imploring the United States to agree not to pay
over forty—five cents per ounce for the metal if it
wanted to make good its professions and avoid hurting
her economy. However, Johnson and Feis concluded,
the best course for the United States to follow was to
suspend its silver purchasing entirely! If this could
not be done, then she might agree to the forty-five cent
limit or perhaps, as Johnson had suggested earlier, she
could leave in China what silver was purchased there,
or she could give China a silver credit to use in
international exchange payments. The United States
should not itself get involved in an attempt to reor-
ganize China's finances or currency; any attempt along
these lines should be an international project.13

One day after Johnson and Feis submitted their
efforts, Stanley Hornbeck also prepared a memorandum on
the subject. Like Johnson and Feis, he believed that
the American purchasing program was doing great economic
harm to China and possibly irreparable harm to Sino-
American relations. He stated that the United States
should end its buying Of silver; this would remove the
roots Of China's problem. But, with Johnson, he believed

that if this could not be done, and because of the stand

 

13Memorandum submitted to the Treasury by Johnson
and Herbert Feis, Dec. 15, 1934, ibid.

206
Of the Treasury Department and the President it appeared
that it could not, then the United States should leave
in China what it purchased there.14

Throughout December of 1934 and January Of 1935,
the Treasury Department maintained its position that the
United States should continue its buying program.
President Roosevelt, prodded on by Pittman and the other
"silver senators" gave no signs of changing his attitude
on the question, supported the Treasury Department, and
therefore paid little attention to the warnings Of the
State Department. Less interested in the welfare Of
China than in the domestic political situation, he
feared rocking the boat.

The economic situation in China appeared to
worsen almost daily. In early March, Johnson reported
to Washington that the financial situation at Shanghai
was extremely acute because Of the scarcity Of monetary
silver. The situation had been exacerbated because
cheap silver, which having gone to Shanghai for invest—
ment in Chinese government securities, had suddenly
left, thus wiping out an important factor in the govern—
ment's financial policy. The American Minister stated

further that he thought the collapse Of the financial

 

14Memorandum by Hornbeck, Dec. 16, 1934, D/S File
893.515/372.

207
structure at Shanghai could occur at any time and that
bankers and government Officials all over China blamed
American silver policy for their difficulties. Again
he said that the United States should end its buying
policy or in lieu of this leave silver in Shanghai, at
least until the crisis passed. If nothing more, this
would indicate the American desire to assist.15

In the meantime, China had Offered a suggestion
to the United States to help her out Of her economic
plight. She asked for a loan Of 100 million dollars and
for a credit Of 100 million dollars against future
delivery of silver to be drawn upon if and when required.
Because it was at this time trying to avoid friction
with Japan, the State Department indicated that such a
loan should be made only in cooperation with the other
powers who had in the past been interested in Chinese
financial projects-~the United States would grant the

16 The

loan only through the International Consortium.
State Department was caught on the horns Of a familiar
dilemma; if it agreed to help China, it would Offend

Japan, if it refused to help China, it would incur the

 

15Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Mar. 4, 1935,
n/s File 893.515/439.

l6Memorandum by the Far Eastern Division, Feb. 7,
1935. D/S File 893.515/402.

208
wrath of the Chinese.

Over the first three months Of 1935, China became
increasingly hostile toward the American silver policy.
At one point it appeared that she might even turn to
the Japanese in an effort to relieve her economic sit-
uation. In a letter to Roy Howard in April, Johnson
said that when he returned from a leave in the United
States in late February, he found China buzzing about
a possible change in SinO-Japanese relations--a change
directly attributable to American silver policy. He
said that interest rates were SO high and the situation
was so disastrous for China that Japan was almost
successful in effecting economic collaboration with her.17

By May, the situation looked so serious to China
that she acted on her own to ameliorate the effects of
the higher silver prices. She took over three semi—
government banks in Shanghai and reorganized or merged
them under the supervision Of the central bank, thus
coming in possession of large amounts of silver. This
put the Chinese government for the first time in a
position Of power in the silver market. Johnson now
felt Optimistic about the future-—if China could only

manage to effect certain currency reforms. In fact, the

 

17Johnson to Roy Howard, April 18, 1935, Johnson
Papers.

209
American Minister urged the Chinese on numerous occasions
to adopt a currency policy Of her own and not wait for
help from the outside. China could borrow money
domestically for administrative and military purposes.
Why could she not borrow domestically the money she

18 John-

needed to Operate an effective currency policy?
son believed that China should make still greater efforts
to help herself.

The increased Chinese hostility toward the United
States during the summer months led American Officials
to fear the possibility Of boycotts against American
products. However, in late June Johnson reported to
the State Department that as far as he could tell there
was no tendency toward such action. It was extremely
unlikely that it would occur, he thought, because Of
the general crisis situation in the Far East. There
was a good deal of resentment in Official circles, but
no retributive action would be taken. Johnson said

further that he now believed the United States silver

policy was simply a ”scapegoat" for those wishing to fix

 

18Memorandum Of Conversation between Johnson and J.

Lossing Buck, American Treas. Representative in China,
May 13, 1935, F.R., 1935 III, 580-581, and Memorandum
Of Conversation, Johnson and H.H. Kung, May 15, 1935,
Johnson Papers.

 

210
the blame somewhere else for the economic and financial
depression in China.19 The American Minister was
beginning to change his mind again regarding American
silver policy.

By the end Of July, Johnson was firmly convinced
that China had been helped rather than harmed by this
policy. In a letter to Stanley Hornbeck on July 31,
he emphasized his new theory. After reviewing the back-
ground tO the Silver problem and the activity in China
tO that date, Johnson discussed the situation at
Shanghai and the "real" reasons that silver left that
city. He said that formerly Silver collected at Shanghai
because the interior was unsafe and in addition most
wealthy Chinese went there to live. This brought a
boom in Shanghai real estate. Moreover, foreign firms
kept their silver in Shanghai and reinvested it because
it was worth a profit there and was cheap in terms Of
gold at home. However, when the various countries went
Off the gold standard, the gold price of silver rose
and there was no reason not to take silver out of
Shanghai. Also, with Chiang Kai-shek's successes in

the Yangtze Valley there was opened up another region

 

19Johnson to the Secretary Of State, July 19, 1935.
D/S File 893.515/615.

211

for investment and silver could go into that area.
These were the two main reasons silver left Shanghai; the
American silver purchasing program was not tO blame.20

Johnson admitted, however, that much silver was
shipped abroad for profit. But, he thought a good part
of it, if not most Of it, was used to fulfill Chinese
gold Obligations which eventually would have had to be
fulfilled! Therefore, China probably benefited in the
end by the American program. Her silver had been used
for the best possible purpose. Those who believed that
the United States policy was reSponsible for China's
financial straits or that this policy had weakened her
efforts to resist Japan were not aware Of the true
facts.21

Regardless who was "to blame", China's conditions
did not improve over the summer Of 1935. By autumn,
Great Britain became so concerned about the situatiOn
and the possible repercussions on her interests in the
Far East that she sent Sir Frederick Leith—Ross,
financial expert, to China as technical Official attache

to the British Embassy. She then proposed that the

other concerned powers send similar representatives and

 

20Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, July 31, 1935,
Johnson Papers.

21Ibid.

212
that they all cooperate with Leith—Ross possibly to
agree to float a loan to China and to stabilize her
currency. Once in China, the British financial expert
suggested to the Chinese themselves that they bring
about certain currency and banking reforms and then
appeal to the powers for a small loan.22

Nelson Johnson viewed very skeptically the Leith-
Ross mission and the British prOposals for cOOperation
to aid the Chinese. He believed thatthis move by Great
Britain was designed primarily to insure the prosperity
of Hong Kong in the face Of the American silver policy.
Since the welfare Of that colony was linked so closely
with China, she had a great interest in the financial
betterment Of China and was proposing a OOOperative
plan only for that purpose. Moreover, Britain knowing
that it must eventually cut back on its interests in
China because Of Japanese aggression, wanted international
cooperation or discussion Of China's finances and a
possible international loan to help her prepare her
retreat. In other words, to forestall independent action
by Japan. As far as financial reform within China was

concerned, force alone could do the job, Johnson thought,

 

22Memorandum by Johnson, Oct. 9, 1935, Johnson
Papers, See also Borg, pp. 128-132.

213

and only Japan was prepared to use force.23
On November 2, Johnson wired Washington to say

that Dr. Arthur Young, advisor to the Chinese Minister
Of Finance, had just informed him that the Chinese govern-
ment was about to take over all silver reserves held in
Chinese banks and such foreign banks as would COOperate.24
The next day China issued a decree nationalizing silver.
Britain, who had long favored such a move issued an
Order in Council advising British nationals to comply
with the Chinese decree.25 American nationals also were
ready tO comply as the Manager of the National City Bank
in Shanghai told Johnson that they had no Objections
to the decree and would hold their silver only until they
were certain they had been protected against suits.26
Japan, on the other hand, was greatly angered by the
Chinese move as she thought that China would not have
taken the step had she not been promised a loan by the

United States or Great Britain. She therefore stepped

 

23Ibid., also Borg, pp. 133.

24Johnson to the Secretary of State, Nov. 2, 1935,
F/s File 893.515/813.

25Johnson to the Secretary of State Nov. 4, 1935,
D/S File 893.515/815.

26Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Nov. 5, 1935,
F/s File 893.515/823.

214
up her activity in an attempt to create a semi-auton—
omous region in North China.27

Immediately after she nationalized silver, near
panic conditions reigned in Chinese money markets and
China appealed to the United States for help. She was
reorganizing her currency and she needed American
financial assistance. But, she was not prepared to
link the Yuan to the American dollar or to say to what
foreign exchange she would link it, and American Officials
remained dubious about helping her. Finally, American
Treasury and State Department representatives decided
that the best courseto follow would be for the United
States to purchase 50,000,000 ounces Of silver from
China on the condition that they keep the money in the
United States and that they use it for stabilization
purposes. On November 13, the United States and China
made an agreement along the prOposed lines.28

During the ensuing months, Secretary Of the Trea-
sury Henry Morgenthau and President Roosevelt became

disenchanted with the American silver purchasing policy

and wanted to drop the whole business. When the silver

 

27Memorandum Of Conversation between Johnson and
Leith-Ross, Nov. 20, 1935, Johnson Papers.

28Secretary of State to Johnson, Nov. 13, 1935,
F.R., 122:, III, 641.

215
bloc senators, who said they cared only about domestic
prices and not world prices Offered no resistance,
Morgenthau set about eliminating the artificial support
price of the whitemetal. By early 1936, the American
government had pushed the world price down as low as
forty-five cents per ounce.29

The dropping Of the American purchasing program did
not help the Chinese for now that they had control Of
large amounts Of silver they wanted to sell it. In
the spring Of 1936, they sent K.P. Chen, a Shanghai
banker, to the United States to work out another arrangement
with the United States similar to those made in late
1935. On May 18, 1936, the United States agreed to
make purchases Of substantial amounts Of silver from the
Central Bank Of China and to make available to the
Central Bank dollar exchange for currency stabilization
purposes.30

Slightly more than a year later, the United States
and China announced another economic arrangement; an'

arrangement under which the United States agreed to

purchase 62,000,000 ounces of silver held by the

 

29Blum, 197-198.

30Secretary of State to Johnson, May 19. 1936.
F.R., 1936, IV, 482—483.

216

Chinese government and to pay for the silver in gold
at $35.00 per ounce to be held in the Federal Reserve
Bank in New York to be used only for stabilizing the
Yuan. The American Government was to make short term
advances to China up to $50 million dollars and to
stabilize the Yuan at %% above the rediscount rate Of
the Federal Reserve Bank Of New York.31 The United
States had thus entered into a kind Of silver partner-
ship with the Chinese. Nelson Johnson believed that
this was the ”gentlemanly" thing tO do, for by starting
out to control the price Of silver, the United States
had, although unconsciously and unwillingly, assumed
control of the Chinese currency.32

The American Ambassador believed that the United
States silver policy proved tO be most beneficial to
China. By the end of the decade, he indicated that he
thought history would treat the silver purchase act
kindly for its enactment gave the United States control

Of China's currency and provided the American support

throughout all Of China's later trouble. China could

 

31State Department Press Release, July 9, 1937,
D/S File 893.515/1235.

32Johnson to George Tinkham, July 7, 1936, Johnson
Papers.

217
not have held out against Japan as long as she did had
it not been for large scale American purchases Of her
silver. Although for a time he believed that the
deterioration in domestic economic conditions was
directly attributable to this policy and although for
a time he advocated its repeal, he did not long remain
committed to this idea. He soon decided that there
were so many factors involved in China's domestic
situation that it was not correct to lay the blame on
higher silver.

As far as the end result Of the American policy
was concerned, Johnson was probably right. It probably
did help China to resist Japan, but only after China
had nationalized silver. Before that it seems unquest—
ionable that it did, as the Chinese said, lead to higher
interest rates, higher prices for Chinese peasants,

and a good deal of suffering and hardship.

VIII

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE UNDECLARED WAR TO MAY 1941

In the months immediately following the settle-
ment of the Sian episode Nelson Johnson became increas—
ingly Optimistic about China's position. China was
stiffening in her Opposition to the Japanese; she had
achieved greater unity than at any time since he had
gone there in 1930; Chiang Kai-shek's prestige was
at its highest.

When a period of quiet develOped in SinO-Japanese
relations during the winter and Spring Of 1937 the
American Ambassador naturally concluded that it was
directly attributable to China's calling of Japan's
bluff in previous months and to her increased national
consciousness. Japan, he thought, had recognized the
new Chinese spirit and had become more restrained lest
she induce a recrudescence Of anti-Japanese sentiment
throughout China and thereby jeOpardize her prOperty
and the lives of her nationals. Although Johnson rec-
ognized that China's unity had not led Japan to embark
on a revolutionary change in her policy toward her

neighbor, he did believe that future relations between

218

219
the two countries would be marked by less military
activity. He changed his view radically in July 1937.

One of the first concrete manifestations of
China's unification came in February 1937. During that
month the Chinese Communists submitted to the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang a set of proposals
indicating that they were willing to put their troops
under the command Of the Central government if the
Central government worked toward combating Japan and
agreed to abandon its drive against them. The Kuomintang
then drew up a group of resolutions Of its own which
demanded certain changes in policy by the Communists but
which essentially left the door Open for possible
reconciliation. Lengthy negotiations then ensued and
the two sides eventually agreed to end the civil war.

Subsequent to the start Of the Kuomintang-
Communist discussions Ambassador Johnson sent numerous
diSpatches to Washington indicating his views Of China's
growing solidarity. In late March he told the State
Department that in his Opinion China had developed a
sense Of security and self reliance as a result Of her
determined stand in the face of Japan's demands Of
the previous fall and her defeat Of the Japanese directed
"irregulars" and bandits at Suiyuan during the same
period. The Chinese peOple could be SXpected to rally

behind their leadership to repulse the Japanese aggressor

220

in any future military encounter.l

Two months later he said that he thought Japan's
diplomatic pressure tO partition China by separating
five northern provinces had further impelled the Chinese
toward unity. The Chinese had then come to realize that
unity was essential for the survival Of China as a
nation and in recent months with Chiang Kai-shek as their
symbol they had achieved a great measure of unification.
The people Of China, Johnson reported, now had great
determination to survive collectively and were quickly
changing their defeatist attitudes to a will to win.
Solidarity was growing so strong that even the elimina-
tion Of Chiang Kai-shek through illness or death would
not necessarily cause a disintegration Of the National
Government and its authority. "The majority Of Chinese
leaders," Johnson concluded, ?have come to realize that
China must become unified and Show a united front against
the common enemy."2

In June, the American Ambassador reported that he
thought unification Of China no longer depended entire-

ly upon what military force the Government, or the

 

1Johnson to the Secretary of State, Mar. 22, 1937,
F.R., 1937, III, 53-55.

2Johnson to the Secretary of State, May 11, 1937.
ibid., 87-91.

221
principal leader of the Government, could command. The
ideal of unity was rapidly becoming a part Of China's
national consciousness. As an example Of the growth
of this feeling he cited the peaceful liquidation of
the southwestern revolt Of June 1936, the peaceful
liquidation of the Sian revolt Of December 1936, and
negotiations that occurred between the Communists and
the National Government. Progress was being made
Johnson concluded, as the Chinese, "heterogeneous as
they are in Spoken language, physique, temperment and
political beliefs, have come to realize the necessity,
for their own salvation, Of joining together in forming
a real nation under effective government."3

Given the more stable conditions within China
and the fall of the Hirota government which in early
1937 brought the more moderate Hayashi Cabinet to power
in Japan, Johnson believed that the Sino-Japanese
situation was less dangerous than it had been for a
couple Of years. He likened the relations Of the two
countries during this period to that of a master-slave
relationship in which when the slave becomes increas-

ingly conscious of his power, the master becomes

 

3Johnson to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1937,
ibide ’ 111-1120

222
increasingly conscious Of his possible inability to
OOpe with the slave in numbers. Because Of the
blurred political picture and poor economic conditions
within Japan, the accretion Of self-confidence on the
part of the Chinese reacted upon the Japanese in des-
troying their confidence in their ability to push the
Chinese about indefinitely.4

The period of quiet did not long prevail. Japan,
Johnson said, always walked on two feet (one diplomatic
and One military) in climbing the steps to political
hegemony. She had temporarily put forth her diplomatic
foot. In July, she once again put her military foot
forward.

0n the night Of July 7, an "incident" occurred
between Japanese forces and the Chinese twenty—ninth
army at the Lukouohiao on Marco Polo bridge located
about ten miles west of Peiping. The Japanese, who had
been maneuvering in the area under a loose interpreta-
tion of rights granted to them in the Boxer protocal,
ventured near a Chinese military garrison, aroused the
already tense feeling Of the Chinese, and numerous shots
were fired, the Japanese claiming that the Chinese began

the firing; the Chinese claiming that the Japanese had

 

4Johnson to Joseph Grew, June 4, 1937, Johnson
Papers.

223
only heard shots and upon finding one Of their men
missing had Opened fire, which the Chinese were forced
to return in self defense. The clash was to mark the
beginning Of the long and bloody SinO-Japanese war.

Ambassador Johnson's reaction to the "incident"
was that it had not been planned or engineerede by
either the Japanese Government or the Japanese army.

What had happened, he believed, was that the Japanese
had prepared for some time to hold military maneuvers

at the Marco Polo bridge but that they had called them
Off because of the tense feeling on both sides. However,
the general in charge Of the Japanese troops grew ill
and became so incapacitated during the first week in
July that he no longer exercised any control Over his
men. A foolish and belligerent young Officer then
decided to go ahead with the night maneuver without the
consent Of his superiors. Shooting began; he lost a
good many men, and the Japanese army's prestige became

SO inextricably involved that they could do nothing but
continue to fight.5

On July 10, Johnson informed the State Department
that the Japanese were moving troops through a pass in

the Great Wall. He said further that the French

 

5Johnson tO the Secretary of State, July 14. 1937,
F.R., l9 7, III, 170-171 and Johnson to Adm. Harry
Yarnel , ug. 12, 1937, Yarnell Papers.

224
Ambassador expressed deep pessimism regarding the future;
that whether or not Japan had actually planned the
Marco Polo bridge incident, she seemed to have decided
that she could not now retreat. She would undoubtedly
use the incident as an excuse for further military
moves into China. The extreme seriousness Of the
situation led the French Ambassador to suggest that he
and Johnson recommend to their governments that they urge
moderation upon Tokyo and Nanking. Johnson said the
move would probably do no harm but that he thought it
would be basically useless.

AS the days passed the situation grew increasingly
tense. In mid-July the Japanese presented a group Of
demands to the Chinese, demands which if accepted would
have meant the virtual surrendering Of North China to
Japan. Since China was now committed to a policy Of
resistance and could not turn back, she moved troops
to the north to meet the Japanese threat. Japan also
began moving troops into North China. War seemed a
distinct possibility.

Although attempts at negotiating a settlement
continued through July no formula was found that would allow
either side to withdraw with honor. Chiang Kai-shek was

insisting that China would sanction no further agreements

 

6Johnson to the Secretary of State, July 10, 1937,
D/S File 793.94/8695.

225
limiting sovereignty and she would allow no change
to be made by an outside power in North China without
her consent. Consequently, negotiations broke down and
on July 26 another "incident" occurred at Lanfang; an
incident followed immediately by a Japanese ultimatum
requiring the withdrawal Of Chinese trOOps from North
China. When the Chinese quickly rejected the ultimatum,
the Japanese mounted an Offensive which drove the Chinese
forces from the entire Peiping-Tientsin area.

During the period of negotiations prior to the
Japanese Offensive the United States remained aloof,
refusing to be a part of any mediation attempt or any
cooperative effort to settle the dispute. Washington
policy makers were still attempting to steer a middle
course, professing friendship for both sides; they still
hOped tO avoid Offending the Japanese. Even the
assertions of Chiang Kai-Shek, who on July 25 told
Ambassador Johnson that the only way war could be averted
was by vigorous OOOperative action by the United States
and Britain, did not lead them to change their thinking.7

However, after the outbreak of hostilities in
the Peiping-Tientsin area the United States did become

involved in diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement. The

 

*—

7Johnson to the Secretary Of State, July 25, 1937.
F.R., 1931, III, 256-257, See also Borg, 286-293.

 

226

British asked the United States to join them in Offering
good Offices to Japan and China. American Officials
agreed and asked Ambassador Joseph Grew to discuss
the question with the Japanese Foreign Minister. The
Foreign Minister informed Grew that discussions were
already under way between Japan and China and that
Japan would not withdraw until China agreed to end anti-
Japanese activity in North China; the United States if
it wished tO be of assistance could urge China to accept
this condition.8

Upon learning of the Foreign Minister's remarks,
Johnson notified the State Department that he hOped
they realized the difficulty he would have if he had to
urge China to give a favorable reply to a prOposal sugges-
ting the ending Of anti-Japanese activity in North China.9
As he indicated in a later dispatch, Johnson was in
fact Opposed to the Offering Of any advice to China that
would imply that she yield to Japan in any way.

"It is my Opinion", he stated, "that nothing

can save China from the necessity Of deciding

sooner or later whether to Oppose Japanese

aggression with force or sink to the condition

Of a vassal state. If these are in fact the

only alternatives open to China, there is a

probability any appearance Of urging China to
purchase peace with the loss Of sovereign

 

8Grew to the Secretary Of State, Aug. 10, 1937.
ibid., 368-369.

 

9Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Aug. 11, 1937.
ibid., 374.

 

rights would appear to be encouragement 227
to a predatory national policy on Japan's
part."lO
Actually, the American Ambassador Opposed any compromise
solution even if one had been brought forward that
China would accept without urging, for as he put it,
"a compromise truce at this juncture would merely
postpone the inevitable decision whether China Shall
be dominated by Japan without resistance."ll
Whfle American Officials were still discussing a
possible course of action, new hostilities broke out
at Shanghai. Exceedingly bloody and cruel, the battle
there was marked by insidious bombings of the innocent
civilian pOpulation by both sides. By gaining command
of the air, Japan soon had the upper hand as she pro-
ceeded to wipe out Chinese railway terminals, air bases
and lines of communication in the area and strike terror
in the hearts of the Chinese. The struggle raged on
nevertheless and not until early November was Japan able
to claim victory.
During the course of the battle the question arose

as to whether or not the United States should invoke

its neutrality law. Accordingly, on August 16, Secretary

 

10Johnson to the Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1937.
ibide , 385-386e

Ibid.

 

. 228

Hull wired Johnson asking his Opinion. Opposed to its
invocation, Johnson replied that he thought the Chinese
would eXpress keen regret if the United States was the
first country to interdict all acts Of concrete assis-
tance to China and if the act Operated to the disadvantage
Of China, she would be inclined to emphasize this and
Offer it as an excuse for her failures. The Chinese
clung tenaciously to the belief that the powers party
tO the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact should
do something to restrain Japan; they believed that
actually they were fighting the battles Of Great Britain
and the United States. Consequently, Johnson continued,
the Chinese government still hoped for external material
assistance. They feared the effect Of the act on their
ability to resist.12 As is well known, President
Roosevelt refrained from applying the neutrality laws
throughout the SinO-Japanese struggle. Johnson's
advice was undoubtedly a factor in his thinking; whether
or not it was the major factor, however, one can only
Speculate.

Before achieving final victory at Shanghai, the
Japanese had extended their bombing activity up the

Yangtze river and by late September directly threatened

 

12Johnson to the Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1937.
ibid., 437-438.

 

229
the capital at Nanking. On September 19, Johnson received
a message from the commanding Officer Of the Japanese
Third Fleet advising the American Embassy and other
diplomatic missions to leave Nanking as on September
21 the city would be bombed. Fearing that there was
not sufficient time to permit measures ensuring the
safety Of Americans, and acting under a directive from
Washington giving him broad discretionary license in
case of an emergency, on the 20th he took his staff and
boarded the gunboat Luggn_anchored on the Yangtze river.
He stayed on the ship waiting "for hell to descend."

When by nightfall nothing had happened, the Ambassador
decided that he would go ashore the next day since
conditions on the Luggn.were not conducive to the proper
functioning Of an embassy. On the morning of the 22nd
as he made preparations to return to the embassy the
sirens blew, Japanese planes came, and he and his
staff delayed their departure and watched the bombings
from the ship. When the all clear was sounded Johnson
returned to the embassy.13
The Ambassador's short "excursion" evoked a storm
Of criticism from the Chinese and the open disapproval

Of numerous Americans in China. Johnson's actions were

 

13Johnson to Stanley Hornbeck, Sept. 27, 1937,
F/s File 124.93/3665.

230

termed "spineless" and contrary to the dictates of
"true Americanism" and certain American missionaries
advocated his resignation.14 The Chinese were extreme-
ly resentful as they thought his "running away" in the
face of the Japanese threat to be indicative Of a
continuing American Far Eastern policy--a policy that
completely ignored Chinese rights and interests and
feared Offending the Japanese. American newspaper
men Hallet Abend and Tillman Durdin Of the New York
Timgg likewise expressed their displeasure.15 Reginald
Wheeler of the University of Nanking wrote to
President Roosevelt vehemently decrying Johnson's action
as tacit assent to the Japanese bombardment of the
city. Even the State Department was upset as it feared
that the move would be interpreted as being directed
by Washington and indicative of an American desire to
"scuttle" out of China.16

In truth, Johnson's action was neither tacit assent
to the Japanese action nor "running away" in the face
of her aggression. As he understood it, United States

policy had two major Objectives in the Far East; one,

 

14New York Times, Sept. 26, 1937.

lslhlisa Sept. 21. 1937, See Borg, p. 331.

162219-: Sept. 26. 1937 and Borg, p. 331.

231
to insure the safety of American citizens, two, tO
avoid any situation that might involve the United
States unnecessarily in the conflict. Given these
considerations and his broad standing instructions,
he simply decided, upon the receipt of the Japanese
warning, to take his staff and board the nggn. He
knew the decision would cause resentment by the Chinese
and disapproval Of many Americans and he made it
reluctantly, but he determined that it was the only
course he could follow. The decision was entirely his.

Much Of the difficulty was caused by the newspaper
reporting of the episode. As the Ambassador left the
embassy, he confided to a newspaper man that he did
SO extremely reluctantly. The newsman interpreted this
as meaning that he was doing as against his will upon
instructions from the Department and reported it that
way. This caused agitation in washington. Then, as he
was boarding the ship, he said that if he were forced
to leave the river in front Of the city he would go
to Wuhu where telephone communication to Nanking was
possible. The press then spoke as though he had
already gone to Wuhu. This was largely responsible
for creating the notion that he was running away.17

Actually, the idea of "running away" from Japanese

 

17Johnson to Hornbeck, Sept. 27, 1927, D/S File
124.93/3569.

232
aggression in China was abhorrent to Johnson. Even
before the bombing Of Nanking he was becoming increas-
ingly anxious that the western powers do something
to aid China, for he thought that China was carrying on
a valiant resistance; that she was in fact fighting the
west's battles. After the Lg§2g_incident, he stated
to Stanley Hornbeck that he did not blame the Chinese
for ”whistling for the police” of the League, the Nine
Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact. "They are putting
up a good fight,” he said, "and in my humble and one
sided Opinion they deserve help in their struggle with

a mad man that knows no pity."18

The one good thing
that came from the incident, as Johnson saw it, was
that it may have awakened the "peace at any price boys"
in the United States.19

Through the fall of 1937, the Japanese military
continued its advance up the Yangtze valley, eventually
chasing the Chinese government 500 miles up the river
to Hankow. The situation appeared SO serious that in
October the League Of Nations assembly adopted a report
favorable to China made by its advisory committee and

recommended holding an international conference to find

a way to end the SinO-Japanese hostilities. Paralleling

 

18Ibid.

l91bid.

233
this activity was the action Of President Roosevelt,
who on October 5 made his famous "quarantine” speech
in which he stated that the epidemic of world lawless-
ness was Spreading and that the community of nations
would have to take action to prevent the Spreading Of
the disease.

Equally upset by the Japanese advances, Nelson
Johnson warmly approved Of the President's speech..
He said in a letter to Roy Howard on October 11 that
he thought the war in China was not necessarily America's
war and that she should probably avoid getting "mixed
up in it." "But," he said further, "the world cannot
afford, and we cannot afford to let this kind Of thing

20 Con-

go on without taking a stand in condemnation."
tinuing, the American Ambassador stated that he used

to smile at the efforts of the French and the other
EurOpean nations for building dugouts and other defense
edifices but he added, "I do not smile anymore. After
what I have seen here I think that every American town
should have its bombproofs...and the people should be
trained in their construction and use."21

In mid-November Johnson further expressed his

views to Joseph Grew in response to a letter Of Grew's,

 

20Johnson to Roy Howard, Oct.11, 1937, Johnson Papers.

21Ibid.

234

a copy Of which the Department had sent to him in
Nanking. In his letter, Grew had stated that the
United States should maintain friendship with both
sides in the Far Eastern crisis but Should "look out"
primarily for American interests and essentially
remain aloof. In reply Johnson said he agreed with
Grew basically but that Japanese planes were droning
over Nanking and dropping their bombs with impunity;
that Japan was making a mockery out of the International
Settlement; and that she was pushing American interests
completely out of China. ”It is hard to contemplate
these events,” Johnson said, "and be friendly. It is
difficult to think about these things and be happy."22
Moreover, Johnson said, Japan was wiping out China's
independence, and much as he tried to make himself
believe that this was not our concern and as much as
he Opposed fighting for China's preservation, he “was
not happy about it."23

Although he was not saying so directly here,

Johnson seemed again to be indicating that he would like

to see increased support for the Chinese government. It

 

22Johnson to Joseph Grew, Nov. 10, 1937, ibid.

23Ibid.

235
seems apparent that the constant and pitiless
bombing by Japan of innocent civilians and China's
continuing dogged resistance was instilling in him
greater sympathy for China's cause--sympathy that he
hOped would be backed by material assistance.

Not long after the Advisory Committee of the
League presented its report and called for an inter-
national conference tO deal with the war in the East,
Great Britain began discussions with the United States
in preparation for such a meeting. Since the conference
was to be attended by signatories of the Nine-Power
Treaty as well as the League powers, the United States
agreed to take part and on November 3 the conference
convened at Brussels. Almost as soon as the meetings
began it became apparent that nothing could be accom-
plished for Japan refused to be a party to the discussions
and neither the United States nor Great Britain was
prepared to use force or sanctions to stop the Spread
of aggression. After nearly three weeks of talks
the conference ended; and the war in the Far East
continued.

From his position in China Ambassador Johnson saw
little possibility that the Brussels Conference would
bring about an end of hostilities. The Japanese were
far from their goal which was the establishment of

hegemony over Asia and before they would agree to accept

236

mediation they would have to be convinced that the
goal was unattainable. Moreover, the Chinese were
united on a program Of resistance to aggression and
would brook no attempts to keep them from recovering
all that they had lost at the hands Of Japan. Thus,
the conflict was nearly impossible to settle peaceably.24
However, Johnson thought that the conference had to
be held if for no other reason than to demonstrate to
the people Of the United States and to the rest of the
world exactly where Japan stood. In early December, he
wrote to Stanley Hornbeck complimenting him for the
gallant effort he and Norman Davis made at Brussels.25

As Johnson saw it in the fall of 1937, China's
only hope was not mediation but that Japan would get
involved so deeply in China that she would exhaust
herself. Through the month of November Japan did push
farther inland attempting to subdue the Chinese but
hopes Of her exhaustion seemed feeble indeed. By the
end of the month, as Johnson joined the Chinese
government in its new capital at Hankow, Japan's mili-

tary activity increased in intensity.

In early December, Japan's sinister attempts to

 

24Johnson to Yarnell, Nov. 2, 1937. Yarnell Papers.

25Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 6, 1937, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C.

237
bring China to her knees brought her in direct conflict
with the United States. When the American Ambassador
left Nanking to follow the Chinese to Hankow he left
two foreign service Officers and the gunboat Pgngy at
Nanking, the purpose Of the gunboat being eventually
to evacuate embassy personnel. On Sunday, December 12,
as the Ambassador was visiting a friend in the hospital
at Hankow he was told that radio communication with
the ship had ceased. Alarmed, he asked the British
Ambassador to ask the British ship the B23 to check
to see if anything had happened to the Baggy. By
nightfall, when he learned that the‘ng had been fired
upon by the Japanese, he became increasingly concerned.
He immediately informed Washington that he could no
longer contact the Baggy and that in view Of recent
attacks on British shipping he was extremely worried.
He said further that he hoped the Department would
communicate his concern to Tokyo in an attempt to find
out what happened, thinking that by so doing the
United States could immediately put the burden Of
responsibility on Japan's shoulders. On Monday the
thirteenth, as he contemplated what to do further, he
was informed that the ship had been bombed and sunk
by the Japanese and that there were a number of

Americans killed and wounded. He then cabled the

238

information to the State Department.

Upon receiving the news Secretary of State Hull
sent a strong statement Of protest to the Japanese,
expressing shock and concern over Japan's indiscrim-
inate bombing and demanded expression of regret,
complete and comprehensive indemnification and assurance
that "definite and specific steps" be taken to ensure
the safety Of American nationals and their prOperty
in China in the future.2

Johnson's reaction to the affair from the start
was that although it may not have been a deliberate
attack on an American ship, it was a deliberate attack
on all shipping on the Yangtze without regard to national-
ity. Therefore, he thought that the United States
should stand firm in getting a prOper settlement of
the matter or more trouble would occur in the future.27
Unfortunately, however, this was not the general mood
in the United States. The episode raised little
excitement there beyond the cries of a few who demanded
to know what business the American ship had being in

China in the first place. Such cried angered Johnson

 

26Secretary of State to Grew, Dec. 13, 1937,
F.R. Japan, 1931-1941, I, 523.

27Johnson to Hornbeck, Dec. 22, 1937, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C.

239
for he believed that the ship and the people on board
certainly did have a right to be there and that the
United States should fight if necessary to maintain
this right.

"I commend our Americans here in China...

to you," he wrote to Stanley Hornbeck,

"as more nearly representing the Americans

that built America than those who cry out

for their evacuation when their presence

here is needed more than it ever was. I

yield to no one in my horror of war; I have

seen as much Of it as I want to see; but

we must be prepared to fight if we want

to be reSpected."28

The debate that raged in the United States over
the merits of remaining neutral at all costs upset the
American Ambassador. He believed that it was "just
as impossible“ for a state to remain neutral in world
affairs as it was impossible for a man or a woman to
be neutral in his reactions toward the group within
which he lived. People at home were foolishly hoping
to make a recluse Of the United States in the modern
world in which it was destined to play a part. Attempts
by legislators to make the United States permanently
neutral by statute discouraged him for he thought that
no man could determine how the United States should

conduct itself with other peoples six months ahead.

Besides, he believed that the United States was unlikely

 

28Ibid.

240
to stay out Of war by attempting to be neutral anyway.29
Following the settlement Of the Pgngy incident
the Japanese continued their aggression, advancing
still further into the interior Of China, while at
the same time they stepped up their diplomatic act-
ivity in an effort to get China to accept dictated
terms. As negotiations were conducted toward this
end, Ambassador Johnson in early January advised the
State Department that it should again inform Japan
that the United States would refuse to enter into any
arrangement violating the provisions Of the Nine-
Power Treaty, thus ”establishing a basis for concerted
action if that were later considered necessary."30
However, no such representations proved to be necessary
as China's determination to resist now precluded a
peaceful settlement on Japan's terms and by the end
of January discussions were broken Off.
China's determined resistance during the late

winter and early Spring of 1938 in the face of a merci-

less onslaught by the Japanese led Johnson tO conclude

 

29Johnson to William Crozier, Aug. 27, 1935;
Johnson to Roger Greene, Mar. 21, 1936 and Johnson to
E.M. Borchard, Johnson Papers.

30Johnson to the Secretary of State, Jan. 11,
1938, F.R., 1938, III, 12-13.

241

that she would fight on indefinitely. He thought
that Japan had actually lost the war when she captured
Nanking and had failed to get the Chinese to agree
to terms. When this occurred, Japan had two alterna—
tives: she could keep what She had and consolidate
her gains or she could attempt to conquer the whole
of China. She chose the latter and this was her down—
fall. But, while Japan could probably never defeat
China and had thus in a sense "lost" the war, She
would create unprecedented disaster and chaos in
China. Such a situation held little comfort for the
west for even if the war ended in a stalemate western
interests would be completely wiped out.31

As the war dragged on Johnson became more pess-
imistic about the future. By March, when the situation
looked particularly dark to him he again attempted
rationalizing, saying that the United States had no
part in the war and that it should have followed no
other policy over the previous three or four years
other than that it had followed. Developments in the
East were of primary concern to Russia and to England.

Their losses would be the greatest. America's only

 

31Johnson to the Secretary of State, Feb. 17, 1938,
Cordell Hull Papers, Library Of Congress.

242
losses would be the middleman trade and the elimina-
tion of cultural activity. But, the middleman's days
were numbered anyway and cultural efforts had already

32

been subordinated to Chinese nationalism. Observa-
tion Of incessant Japanese bombing at Hankow and the
bleak news from Europe undoubtedly created an aura

Of gloom in his mind and momentarily led him to think
that the United States could hide itself from the

evil of the world.

However, the progression of events in Europe
quickly eliminated Johnson's temporary isolationist
impulse. Hitler's annexation of Austria and his con-
tinuing efforts to detach the Sudetenland from
Czechoslavakia combined with activity Of the other
predatory power, Italy, appear to have convinced
the American Ambassador that aggression was becoming
a world problem and would soon have to be checked.
Once he linked Japan's action in China to this broader
question he again advocated more belligerent action
by the United States to stop the conflagration in the
East.

The world was entering a period Of lawlessness,

Johnson thought, which could only be checked by force.

Commenting on the problem in June he stated to Stanley

 

32Johnson to Hornbeck, Mar. 2, 1938, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in .Washington D.C.

243

Hornbeck:

'I recall that it was the vigilantes that
brought law and order to California and

that it was an armed citizenry ready and
willing to shoot that eliminated the bad
men from the communities in which I lived

as a boy in Oklahoma. And then there was
the police strike in Boston....It was the
use Of force that restored the rule Of law
to the excellent city of Boston....We will
never realize America's heritage as the

hope of a warweary world unless we are
prepared to stand at Armageddon with the
powers of righteousness and the rule Of

law against the gangsterdom that is

raising the banner of might, force and
international bad faith. The Democracies

of the world are crying out for a leader
that can think and Speak clearly the lan-
guage Of leadership in the course Of

law and order. Let him stand forth in America
if he is to be found there. He will find
plenty Of support when he cuts away the con-
fused thinking that is bemusing the minds of
people today."33

During the summer Of 1938, Johnson began to fear that
one Of the "lawbreakers", Japan, would soon turn to

the United States for aid in financing the conquest Of
China for he thought she could not continue her work
without it. However, he thought this would give the
United States an opportunity to assume moral leader-
ship as She could promptly rebuff the Japanese request.
Johnson informed Roy Howard Of his ideas on this matter,

Howard replying that he would see to it that the

‘.-.~.

33Johnson to Hornbeck, June 9, 1938, ibid.

244
American people were prOperly alerted so they could
head Off any such attempt by Japan.34
In September, the Ambassador was suggesting a
more concrete step to halt the Japanese "gangsters“.
Early in that month China had appealed to the League
to apply sanctions under article sixteen Of the
Covenant and had requested the United States if poss-
ible to support whatever action the world body decided
to take. Johnson wrote to Maxwell Hamilton, Assistant
Chief of the Division Of Far Eastern Affairs, suggesting
that the United States comply with the Chinese request
as this would be an excellent way to support the cause
Of righteousness in international affairs.35
With the consummation of the Munich agreement,
Johnson once more grew disillusioned and disgusted,
and concluded that perhaps the Versailles Treaty was
iniquitous and that Germany was justified in her action.
Similarly, China had failed tO give equity to Japan

in the twenties and could hardly expect equity herself

now. He again concluded that the United States should

 

34Johnson to Roy Howard, July 11, 1938 and Howard
to Johnson Aug. 4, 1938, in Mrs. Nelson Johnson's
personal possession in Washington D.C.

35Johnson to Maxwell Hamilton, Sept. 22, 1938,
ibid.

 

245
be "satisfied with its lot" and stand apart from it
all. This time a letter from Stanley Hornbeck put him
"back on the track." Hornbeck told him that not
"for long" could the United States stand apart from
it all. Moreover, he said he was not one of those
who saw the Versailles Treaty as wicked or evil, nor
did he believe that China's acts had caused Japan's
invasion; world aggression was perpetrated by the
predatory facist powers and could not be justified
by such liberal interpretations.36

By the end of the summer Japanese aircraft
hammered Hankow so pitilessly that the Chinese govern-
ment moved again; this time to Chungking six-hundred
miles still further up the Yangtze. In August the
American Ambassador and his staff followed and quickly
set up an "embassy" in the upstairs Of the former
Standard Oil headquarters in the city. In October
Hankow fell to the Japanese and a little later Canton
capitulated. At about the same time Japan announced
its "New Order of East Asia” through which it hoped

to combine Manchukuo, Japan and occupied China into an

 

36Johnson to Hornbeck, Sept. 28, 1938, and Oct. 4,
1938; and Hornbeck to Johnson, Oct. 28, 1938, in
Hornbeck's personal possession in Washington, D.C.

246
economic bloc for the betterment of the motherland.
It was becoming abundantly clear that Japan hoped
to dominate the East and would sanction nO western
interference.

Throughout 1938 the United States responded to
Japan's action with frequent protests and moral
remonstrances. In the winter and early spring it
expressed concern over attempts by the Japanese to
establish hegemony Over large areas Of China by
dictating a peace to the Chinese. By June President
Roosevelt had become sufficiently concerned about the
situation in China that he asked American manufacturers
and exporters of aircraft, bombs, torpedoes and other
military equipment to refuse to ship their goods to an
area where they would be used on civilian populations,
thereby securing a moral embargo on war items. On
October 6, the United States sent a note to Japan
protesting Japan's constant violationaof the Open Door--
violations carried out in spite Of her repeated pro-
mises to respect it. When Japan replied by saying that
in its interpretation the situation in China had changed
the traditional Open Door concept, the United States
in late December shot another and stronger protest to
her, this time indicating that Japan had no right to
impair unilaterally American treaty rights in China;
that she could not change the Open Door by interpreting

g 247
it differently.37 Thus by the end of 1938 the United

States was still talking and not yet applying force

or sanctions to stOp Japan. Signs were, however, that
she was moving in that direction. Ambassador Johnson
was not displeased.

At the end Of November he sent to Washington a
memorandum prepared by Assistant Naval Attache: James
M. McHugh, in which McHugh analyzed the situation
in the Far East and indicated what American policy
Should be during the growing crisis. Johnson said
he agreed fully with McHugh's conclusions which were
that the United States was the only power to which
China could now turn; that China was carrying on a
determined resistance; that the United States instead
Of giving only moral support should give her material
assistance; that the United States do something besides
talking in defense of itsprinciples; that it begin a
program in which pressure was applied on Japan step by
step with the will to fight if necessary as the last
move. The memorandum concluded by stating that it was
no longer a question of "pulling British chestnuts out
of the fire,” but rather of pulling our own out. But,

if those Of the British were saved in the process, that

 

37New York Times, Jan. 1, 1939.

248

would not hurt the United States either!38

Early in 1939 Johnson, home on leave, wrote a
letter to President Roosevelt in which he expressed
similar thoughts. He told the President that if
civilization were not to be lost, the United States
would have tO phiy a greater role in its preservation
than it was playing. Dictatorships like Japan
understood only force and would yield only to superior
power. The United States did not necessarily have tO
go to war but it should be ready to fight for its
ideals. If the dictatorships understood this they
would be more careful,with the United States and the
rest of the world. America would have to learn that
one could not send a policeman "armed with a truncheon"
to deal with a gangster with a "Machine gun."

"Unless we begin to Show our teeth now

and indicate to the world and specifically

to Japan that we mean business we may

forever find ourselves estopped from tak-

ing action. We may perhaps find ourselves

with a Japan taking everything west of the

180th meridian as the Japanese Sphere of

influence and interest within which we may

neither improve or fortify our own interests

nor enter without Japanese permission. Time

is with China in its conflict with Japan but

time is with the totalitarian states in

their relations with the democracies. W2
should do what we can to assist and encourage

 

38.1.M. McHugh to Johnson, Nov. 24, 1938, in
Hornbeck's personal possession in Washington, D.C.

249

the Chinese ip_their fight for an inde-
pendent national existencg,"39

Johnson's comments were particularly opportune
for Japan in early 1939 embarked upon a still more
adventuresome policy. She began negotiations with
Germany and Italy in the hopes of securing a military
alliance. In February she moved southward and occupied
Hainan Island. Shortly thereafter she occupied the
Spratly Islands and then the Hinnan Islands. Again,
the chief response from the United States was protest
and refusal to recognize Japan's ascendency over her
newly acquired "possessions".4O

However, in July the United States drastically
altered its course. In a bold step it notified the
Japanese that at the end of six months it was abrogating
their 1911 treaty of commerce and navigation. Hurt
but still undeterred, Japan continued its aggression
in China and stepped up its drive to establish its
"New Order in Asia”. Consequently, in January 1940
the United States announced that the treaty of 1911

was no longer in effect and broadened the "moral embargo",

 

39Johnson to the President, Feb. 27, 1939, F.R., 1939,
512-514, italics mine.

4OHerbert Feis, The Road 29 Pearl Harbor (Princeton,
1950), 18-20 and Meribeth Cameron, Thomas Mahoney, and
Geor e McReynolds, China, Japan ggd_2hg Powers (New York,
1960 , 480-485.

250

Operative since June 1938, by adding new items to the
list.41

After the war began in Europe Japan again looked
southward with covetous eyes. With the fall Of the
Netherlands and France in 1940 she demanded and
received greater economic advantages in the Dutch East
Indies and shortly thereafter forced France to Sign
an agreement closing the Haiphong-Kuming railroad
and prohibiting the shipment of supplies from Indochina
into China. She also forced the British temporarily to
close the Burma road. In September she secured the right
to establish air bases in and to send troops tn Indochina.
Also, in September she signed a tripartite agreement
with Germany and Italy in which each agreed to cooper-
ate if any one party was attacked by a power not in
the war.42

In the meantime, the United States stepped up
its pressure. On July 26, it banned the export of
aviation gasoline, scrap metals, and certain lubricants
to Japan. In September it embargoed scrap iron and
steel. After the signing of the tripartite pact it

persuaded the British to reopen the Burma road and

 

41Feis, 21m.

42Ibid., 66-75.

251
later began giving large amounts of aid to the
Chinese. By the end of 1940, it had given China over
$100 million, sent quantities of planes, and had
granted permission to American aviators and aviation
instructors to go to that country.43

Throughout 1939 and 1940 Johnson had believed that
aid to China was necessary and desirable and had
therefore expressed his hope that the United States
would fulfill China's frequent requests. In May, 1940,
when she asked for help in stabilizing her currency he
suggested to the State Department that "an obvious
method of giving protection to American investments
and interests in China...would be to find some way
whereby support could be given the Chinese in stabiliz-
ing their currency and thus helping them to help
themselves.”44 Two days later he told Secretary Hull
that China deserved "assistance.”45 In July he
informed Washington that China expected aid from the
democracies since she was helping fight the battles
of the democracies.46

In October Johnson sent a lengthy dispatch to the

 

43Ibid., 101-149.

44Johnson to the Secretary of State, May 13, 1940,
F.R. 1940,,21, 654-655.

45Johnson to the Secretary Of State, May 15, 1940,
ibide, 655-656e

46
Johnson to the Secretary Of State Jul 12 1940
D/S File 793.94/16091. ’ y , ,

252

Department further expressing his views. He stated
that for three years a badly armed and equipped China
had fought extremely valiantly against Japan thinking
that its cause was America's cause. The Chinese knew
they had the moral support and sympathy of the United
States. But they now wanted material assistance in
the form of planes and military materials. They now
wanted something beyond moral support and unless such
assistance came they would lose confidence in America's
willingness or ability to help. Therefore, Johnson
continued, the United States should grant China the
equipment she needed. ”The time for positive action
is here and I devoutly hope that the United States is
prepared and ready to take it and that soon." If
American aid were not forthcoming China would likely
turn to Russia.47

Johnson suggested on a number of occasions through
the summer and fall of 1940 that if the United States
and the democracies did not agree to help the Chinese
government the result would be closer ties between
China and the Soviet Union and ultimately an enhanced

position for the Chinese Communists. Russia would

 

47Johnson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 20, 1940,
F.R., 1940, IV, 674-676.

253
undoubtedly use closer relations with China to
intensify its efforts on behalf of the Communists in

China.48

It is not possible to determine the Ambass-
ador's exact thinking in this regard but since he
elaborated on this theme often, one must conclude

that he was using a projected Sino-Russian rappxnhement
and future strengthening of the Communists as a lever
to impel the United States to agree to China's aid
requests. Although it is doubtful whether it was

a factor in the administration's decision to grant
assistance, it seems unquestionable that this was his
motive.

The American Ambassador continued to advocate
assistance to China through the remainder of 1940 and
until he left there in May l941--assistance to Chiang
Kai-shek's government regardless Of its political
leanings. He believed that the United States should ask
no questions and make no attempts to give China lessons
in democracy; it should simply support the government
in power in its fight against Japan. China would solve
her own domestic problems and would develop a system of

her own in time. It might not be democratic but it

 

48Ibid., Johnson to the Secretary of State, July,
24, 1940, ibid., 406-408; and Johnson to the Secretary
of State, Oct. 24, 1940, ibid., 313.

254
would be suited to China's needs. His attitude toward
the Kuomintang-Communist struggle reflectaaccurately
his belief in non-interference in Chinese domestic
affairs.

When proposals for American aid to China were
under discussion in 1940 and 1941 the question arose as
to whether or not the United States should encourage
China to end its civil strife; in other words to en-
courage the Communists and the Nationalists to end
their conflict. Johnson on his part steadfastly main-
tained that this should not be done, first, because
the problem was a domestic one and one in which the
United States because of its traditional principles
should not interfere. Second, he thought that as
long as both groups were devoted to the expulsion
of Japan they would bury many of their differences
and achieve a semblance of cooperation without external
prodding.49

This, of course, did not mean that Johnson thought
of the Communists as simply another political party
or as a force that would not eventually have to be

dealt with. He thought that by cooperating to defeat

49Johnson to Hornbeck, Jan. 16, 1941, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C. and Johnson
to the Secretary of State, Oct. 1940, F.R., 1940, IV,

255
Japan the Communists would consolidate their position
and would be better able to combat the Kuomintang later.
They were in fact using the struggle against Japan
to further their long term goals. And, he was certain
that once the threat of Japan had been removed the
battle between the two groups would rage on. Their
aims were diametrically Opposed and in his view they
would eventually have to "fight it out" for supremacy.
Not long after the war was over, one or the other would
be left in power. Johnson hoped it would be the
Kuomintang.50
There seems to be no question that by 1940 and
1941 Johnson saw the Communists clearly for what they
were. Liberal or leftist writers like Edgar Snow and
Agnes Smedley who pictured the Communists as agrarian
democrats gave them far more credit than was their
due, he thought. Moreover, those in the United States
who were ”so concerned“ about the fate of the Chinese
Communists he considered badly ill-informed. He could
not understand why they saw in the Communists qualities
of democracy that they denied to the constituted
government of China. "Chinese Communism,” he remarked

to Francis B. Sayre, "...is no more democratic than

 

50Johnson to the Secretary Of State, Nov. 29, 1940,
IV, 450-452-

U

256

Trotsky or Stalin Communism."51

Similarly, he could
never understand those who cOndemned the Kuomintang for
trying to eliminate the Communists. Americans locked

up Earl Browder52 53

and tried to convict Harry Bridges
but the press of the United States seemed inclined to
condemn a Chinese government for taking draStic
action against a Communist force within its own area
that had not only been a political threat but which
had recruited an army of its own.54
However, during his last years in China Johnson
saw Communism a little differently than he saw it
earlier. In the mid-thirties he always referred to

members of that party as "so-called Communists" and

did in fact think that many of them were agrarian

 

51Johnson to F.B. Sayre, mar. 11, 1941, in Mrs.
Nelson Johnson's personal possession in Washington, D.C.

52Earl Browder, American Communist Party leader who
in 1940 was sentenced by a Federal Court to serve four
years in prison and pay a $2000 fine ostensibly for
misuse of a passport.

53Harry Bridges, labor leader and agitator who the
United States arrested and tried to deport in 1939
and 1940. In May, 1940 the House of Representatives
even passed a Special bill (mentioning no crime) 3:
under which he was to be put out of the country.

54Johnson to Sayre, Mar. 11, 1941, in Mrs. Nelson
Johnson's personal possession in Washington, D.C.

1:1.

2'

257
reformers. He also thought’except for bandits among
them, they possessed leaders of "considerable char-
acter", He thought that they were doing some excellent
work in the countryside and that they were the major
force Of resistance to Japan. Even as late as 1938
he was saying that where the business leaders had
failed the peasant, the Communist was helping him;
was often in fact actually thinking of the peasant's
welfare.55

Although it is difficult to determine what made
the Ambassador change his thinking, it seems probable
that his association with the Chinese government at
Chungking in the terrible days after 1938; his respect
for its resistance; and his friendship for Chiang
Kai-shek were largely responsible. Moreover, it seems
likely that once he had committed himself to the advo—
cacy Of American resistance to the Japanese through
the vehicle of the Chinese government, he looked with
less favor on the force that threatened to overthrow
that government.

If in truth common adversity could have drawn

Johnson closer to the Chinese government, there was

 

55Johnson to Thomas Lamont, Aug. 18, 1938; Johnson
to Roy Howard, Sept. 6, 1938 ibid., and Johnson to Carl
Bishop, April 8, 1936, Johnson Papers.

258

certainly ample reason for their affinity after the
move to Chungking. The life of misery that Johnson
led there was probably not exceeded in the annals
of American diplomacy.

He had arrived in Chungking on the morning of
August 9, 1938, and had set up the Embassy Offices on
the second floor Of the former Standard Oil Company
building there. An old four storied structure, the
first floor of the building was used by the officers
and men of the ship Tutuila which was anchored on the
river and the third floor was used as Offices by the
military attache. There was a portable radio set
installed in the attic. Bordering the one side of
the "embassy" was a factory and on the other a coal mine.
Johnson's ambassadorial residence was the first floor
of a bungalow, partially furnished with material
scraped up at the embassy "Office", located on a hill
some four hundred feet above the level of the Yangtze river.

Because of the extremely dangerous conditions in
China he was unable to have his wife and children with
him. He had little intellectual companionship, no
theaters, few newspapers and led an extremely lonely,
isolated existence. His recreation was confined largely
to playing cards or dominoes, reading, and writing to

his friends, his wife, and his "dividends". In the

259
summertime when the temperature frequently soared to
100° he performed his duties while sweltering in the
inferno that was his Office. In addition, he was
subjected to pitiless and incessant bombing by the
Japanese. He estimated that from May to July 1939 alone
about twelve hundred and ninety Japanese bombers flew
over Chungking, each dropping about ten tons of bombs.
Later, there were daily visits Of at least one-hundred
or more Japanese planes. With his staff he spent large
amounts of time in a bombshelter located under the
Embassy.56

After the start of the war, his only trip out of
China came in late 1938 when he was granted a leave to
travel to the United States.57 This afforded him
an opportunity to Spend time with his wife and beloved
"dividends" whom he had not seen in over a year and
who were staying at Mrs. Johnson's family home in Cody,
wyoming. When he returned to China in May of 1939 he
took his family back with him as far as Peking hoping

to be able to see them more frequently. However, as

 

56Johnson to Hornbeck, June 18, 1940, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C.

57When he came out of China, he came out over the
Burma Road to look it over and to help determine its
feasibility as a possible supply route to China.

260
conditions grew more dangerous in the East they
returned to the United States and he was again widely
separated from them. They did not live together as a
family from 1937 until he left China in 1941.

As the war droned on and the bombs kept falling,
life in Chungking became increasingly miserable for
Johnson. And, there seemed to be no change; no Sign of
change.‘ "Relieve me and let me go in peace," he

finally said to Stanley Hornbeck in 1940.58

Actually he
had begun indicating that he would like a transfer
shortly after his return to China in 1939. In letter
after letter to his friend Hornbeck he mentioned that he
longed to have his family about him, that he was "sick
and tired" of the life at Chungking, that his efficiency
was "slipping” and that he was nearing the end of
I'his'nervous rope."59 Hornbeck responded to his
justifiable complaints with a moving memorandum to the
Secretary of State in December 1939 reviewing Johnson's
superb service to the government and suggesting his
transfer to some other mission where he could have his

family with him.60 Then, in mid-1940 Johnson himself

 

58Johnson to Hornbeck, Oct. 21, 1940, in Hornbeck's
personal possession in Washington, D.C.

59Johnson to Hornbeck, Nov. 17, 1939, Aug. 21, 1939,
and June 18, 1940, ibid.

60Memorandum by Hornbeck, Dec. 13, 1939, ibid.

261
indicated to Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge
Long, that he hoped he would soon have a change.
Finally, early in 1941 Secretary Hull informed him
that he was being appointed Minister to Australia and
that he and Clarence Gauss would exchange positions.61

"I feel confident," Johnson had written upon
learning of his appointment as Minister to China in
1929, "that when my tour of duty is ended I shall
leave my successor as many problems as I shall find

62

when I reach my desk in Peiping." He left China

on May 20, 1941.

 

61Johnson to Breckinridge Long, July 8, 1940, D/S
File 123 J 634/684; Secretar of State to Johnson, Jan,
6, 1941, D/S File 123 J 634/H92; and Secretary of State
to the American Legation, Canberra, Feb. 3, 1941, D/S File
123 J 634/700.

62Johnson to Nicholas Roosevelt, Nov. 15, 1929,
Johnson Papers.

IX
IN RETROSPECT

Nelson Johnson was a friend of the Chinese but an
American nationalist first and foremost. He demon-
strated both sympathy and understanding of China, but
his friendship was always subordinated to American
interests. For all his love of China, that country
was to be viewed first as a problem of American foreign
policy.

During the late twenties Johnson favored going
as far as was practicable in assisting China. He
opposed joining the other powers in sending in troops
to quel domestic disturbances caused by the upheaval
there. He opposed joining the British at Hankow and
Canton in punitive measures against Chinese strikers.

He opposed harsh action against China during the Nanking
Incident of 1927. He advocated conciliation in answer-
ing China's note of June 1925 requesting treaty revision.
He suggested going as far as possible, unilaterally if
necessary, in writing a new tariff treaty.

Similarly, on the question of extraterritoriality

he favored revision of the old treaty and gradual

262

263
relinquishment. Unsettled conditions within China
indicated to him that to go further would do consider-
able harm to American business and cultural interests.
He believed the United States should keep China's
good will, should assist her in ridding herself of the
hated system of foreign privileges. But China should
be realistic and not expect the United States to cast
its interests to the winds. Later when it appeared
to him that greater stability had been achieved,
when China had acquired increased familiarity with her
own law codes and after many of the privileges of
Americans had already disappeared, he concluded that
the United States could surrender its extraterritorial
rights. It could do so without hurting its interests.
As a matter of fact, it had few interests left be-
cause of the activity of the Japanese.

Johnson's attitudes on China and American policy
toward China were not radically different through
the thirties. Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931
shocked him. He believed wholeheartedly in the
peace keeping apparatus of the twenties, the Kellogg
Pact, the Washington Treaties, and the League. Japan's
actions undermined the entire international peace
structure. Second, he was sympathetic to China.,

and hated to see her territory violated. However, he

(o

264
would never have advocated fighting to preserve the
treaty structure. And, he convinced himself that the
United States did not have enough at stake to risk
becoming involved. Similarly, consistent with his
conception of American attitudes, he would not advocate
helping China since she appeared unwilling to help
herself.

Once Japan extended her aggression into North
China and indicated more far reaching plans Johnson
came to believe in a stronger policy by the United
States in the form of rearmament and reconsideration
of its intention to grant independence to the Phili-
ppines. He still was not suggesting that the United
States resist Japan by bailing out the Chinese, for
China was still inert. He maintained consistently that
the United States had no great reSponsibility for
China, that the United States should look out for
its own interests, that it should oppose Japan with
this sole purpose in mind.

However, in late 1936 and 1937, particularly after'
the beginning of the undeclared war, Johnson began
to believe that the United States should implement
its stronger policy in part through the Chinese
government. China had achieved granted unity, she

had established a measure of order and more importantly

265
she was valiantly resisting the Japanese. In addition,
during the years between 1937 and 1941 affairs in
Europe made a great impression on him and he came more
and more to see aggression as a world problem that the
powers should cooperate to combat, as a cancer that
had to be eliminated. By 1940 and 1941 he was advocating
wholehearted support for China. As an idealist, he
believed China deservedhelp; as a realist he saw that
she was fighting America's battles.

From 1925 through 1941 Nelson Johnson was a
major force in shaping American policy toward China.
During the Coolidge administration and the first two
years of the Hoover administration he was probably
the major architect of that policy. His influence con-
tinued although other officials gained ascendency as
American Far Eastern policy in the early 1930's became
more Japanese oriented.

He was alert, had a critical inquiring mind and a
sympathetic understanding of the country to which he
was assigned. His knowledge of China's language, art,
and history, and his warn and personable nature evoked
great respect and esteem from the Chinese and helped
sustain friendly relations between the two countries

during a most difficult period.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Primary Sources

This study is based chiefly on primary sources.
The most important of these are the Nelson T. Johnson
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress,
Extremely rich for the author's purpose, Johnson's
papers consist basically of letters to friends and
acquaintances, memoranda of conversations, and personal
copies of dispatches covering the 1916-1937 period.
Johnson expressed his ideas more fully and more often
to his friends than he did to the State Department.

His personal papers for the period after 1937,
which the author also used, are in his widow's possess-
ion in Washington D.C.. Johnson's reminiscences in
the Columbia University Oral History Collection cover
his career through 1923 but indicate his thoughts on
policy after that date also and are extremely valuable.

Among other personal papers used were those of
Cordell Hull also in the Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress. Hull's papers are not as full
as one would expect and therefore yielded only a small

amount of correspondence between him and Johnson. Certain

266

267
boxes of the Harry T. Yarnell Papers in the Library
of Congress proved valuable for the period of the late
thirties, as he and Johnson had a good deal of
correspondence. The Key Pittman Papers, Division
of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, dealing with
the silver question were of assistance in preparing
the chapter on silver policy. Other papers like those
of Norman Davis were helpful for insight into the
policy of the period but provided little of value
relative to Johnson.

The unpublished papers of the State Department
in the National Archives, Washington D.C., both
Johnson's personal file and other files, were extreme-
ly valuable as were the published Papers Relating to
3h; Foreign Relations 2;,thg United States, Washington
D.C.

Lengthy interviews with Mrs. Nelson Johnson and
with Miss Elizabeth Johnson, the Ambassador's sister,
gave the author additional insight into Johnson's
character and personality. Stanley Hornbeck, longtime
friend and colleague of Mr. Johnson, gave freely of
his time and allowed the use of his own personal papers.
His comments both on Johnson and on American Far
Eastern policy were of inestimable value. Joseph

Grew's Ten Years in,Japan, New York, 1944 was of

268
assistance for discussions of policy but contained
little on Johnson. The same could be said of Cordell
Hull's Memoirs.

The major American newspapers used in the study
iwere the New York Timgg, the Baltimore Sun, the New
York Herald Tribune, the Washington ngt and the
Washington Star. Among the English language papers
published in China, those consulted were: the Chung-
king National Herald, the Hongkong Daily.grg§§, the
Hongkong Telegraph, the Manchuria 2E111.E£E§9 the
Peiping Leader and the Peiping Chronicle, the Shanghai
nggg, the Shanghai North China Daily News and the
Tinntlin Peking ang’Tientsin Timgs.

Secondary_§gu£ge§}

There are a number of general or textbook surveys
of the Far East and of Far Eastern International
relations that were of assistance to the author. Those
used were: A. Whitney Griswold's 23; Eastern Policy of
thg United States, New York, 1938, an interpretive work
that provides a view of American diplomacy in the Far
East during the early part of the twentieth century
and surveys briefly the Franklin Roosevelt policy;

Foster Rhea Dulles, China and America, Princeton, 1946;

H.B. Morse and Harley F. Mac Nair, Far Eastern

269
International Relations. Boston, 1931, an old work but
still of value; Tyler Dennett, Americans ig Eastern
Agig‘ New York, 1922, an interpretive discussion of
United States policy in the nineteenth century; Paul
Clyde, Thg'§g£,§g§t, New York, 1958, which gives a
general textbook account of internal affairs of the
Eastern countries as well as their diplomatic relations;
gimgg, New York, 1961; and Meribeth Cameron, Thomas
H.D. Mahoney and George McReynolds, thgg, £§2§E.§EQ
thg_Powers, New York, 1962.

The many Specialized works covering the period
from 1925-1941 were of course of much greater value.
Dorothy Borg's American Policy.§gg,thg’0hinese Revolu-
tion 1925:192§,New York, 1947 is an excellent study of
Kellogg's policy in which the Secretary's moderation
toward the Chinese is emphasized. Robert T. Pollard's
China's Foreigg Relations 1911-19:1 New York, 1933
covers China's relations with all the western powers
through the twenties. James W. Christopher's Conflict lg
_t_h_e_ Egg _E_a_..s_t,; American Diplomagy in _C_h_i_n_a_._ fig-9g $918;
$222, Leiden, 1950 is a poorly written but relatively
complete account of the diplomacy of the period.

The best work dealing with extraterritoriality
is Wesley Fishel's Th3 Ending o§_Extraterritorialityjig

270
thgg, Berkely, 1952. Fishel does an excellent job of
pointing out the evils inherent in the system while
at the same time showing the difficult problems faced
by policy makers who were attempting to negotiate its
relinquishment. Other works, superseded by Fishel's
but valuable nonetheless are Raymond T. Rich,
Extraterritorialityggd Tariff Autonomy_ig China,
Shanghai, 1925. G.W. Keeton, Th2 Development ngEgtgg
territoriality igDthgg, London, 1927 and Thomas F.
Millard,Thg.§ng_g§_Extraterritoriality,12.2hing, Shanghai,
1931.

For the Stimson years one of the best and most
recent works is Armin Rappaport's M .L_. Stimson and.
g§p§n_19§l-12§2, Chicago, 1963. Rappaport discusses the
Manchurian crisis in great detail and portrays Stimson's
actions in a more favorable light than did previous
scholars. Robert H. Ferrell's American Diplomacy in_thg'
figggt Depression, New Haven, 1957 provides an account
of Stimson's policy in all parts of the world and is
particularly good for its analysis of his rolein the
Chinese-Eastern Railway diSpute. Another less critical
work on this period is William Starr Myers' Thg’Foreigg
Policies gleerbert Hoover 1929-lgifi‘ New York, 1940.

Henry L. Stimson's own The Far Eastern Czisis, New York,

271

1936 is of value as are Elting Morrison's Turmoil
and Tradition: _A_ Study 92 3:113 _L_i§<_e_ and Times 2;" E2221 _L.
StimSon, Boston, 1960, and Richard N. Current's Secretary_
Stimson:_A,§tgdy IE Statecraft, New Brunswick, N.J.,
1954. Other works dealing with the early years of
the Far Eastern Crisis are Sara Smith's Thnganchurian
Crisis 1931-1932, New York, l949,a work harsh on Stimson
for his alleged failure to cooperate with the League
of Nations in 1931; and Westel Willoughby's Th2.§ing:
Japanese Controversy EQQDEQQ League gleations, Baltimore,
1935.

On the American silver policy of the thirties,
Fred Israel, Nevada's §§2.Pittman, Lincoln, 1963 is an
indispensable study for the background material that
it provides on the machinations of the silver bloc in
Congress. John Morton Blum's §§2m_thg_Morgenth§g Diaries,
Boston, 1959 provides an inside view of the discussions
regarding silver by the Roosevelt administration.
Crisis 9: 1923-1928, Cambridge, 1964 gives a short but
scholarly account of the question.

The above mentioned work by Borg is the only
substantial study of the diplomacy of the middle
thirties.. A solid, scholarly work, the book is highly

informative and contains a good deal of material on

272
Johnson. Herbert Feis' The Road in Pearl Harbor,
Princeton, 1950 is-a detailed and excellent study of
the years after 1938, emphasizing the widening Split
between the United States and Japan. William L.
Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge tn_l§nln;
tinn'l93j-l94OLNew York, 1953 is also helpful for this
period but contains far less on the Far Eastern
situation.

Articles of importance in preparing the work
include William R. Castle, "Recent American Policy in
the Far East" Annals n§_2ng,American Academy, CLXVIII
(July 1933), 46-53; Henry L. Stimson, "Bases of
American Foreign Policy During the Past Four Years,"
Foreign Affairs, II (1932-33), 383-96; Paul Clyde,

"The Diplomacy of Playing No Favorites Secretary
Stimson and Manchuria 1931," Mississippi Valley
Historical Revigw, XXXV (1948), 187-202; K.K. Kawakami,
”The Russo-Chinese Conflict in Manchuria," Foreign
Affairs, VIII (1929-30), 52-68; Payson Treat, ”Shanghai:
January 28, 1932" Pacific Historical Review, IX (1940)
337-43; Lawrence Lowell, "Manchuria, The League and

the United States," Foreign Affairs, X (1932), 351-368.