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thesis entitled

The Austrian Foreign Office and Foreign
Policy, 1848-1856.

presented by

David M. Baehler

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

Major professor

 

June 30, 1975

 

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ABSTRACT

THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE AND FOREIGN POLICY,
1848—1856

By

David Morgan Baehler

This is a study of the role of the Austrian Foreign
Office in foreign policy formulation for the period 18b8—
1856. It is conceived of as a supplement to the more
traditional and somewhat oversimplified method of explaining
motivations in policy-making solely in terms of the per-

sonalities of a state's supreme leaders. While not denying

 

the importance of such personalities, the approach taken
3 here reflects a belief that there are factors capable
0f exercising decisive influence on a state's foreign

Policy imbedded in the bureaucratic constitution of the

,_._.——-

agency primarily responsible for conducting foreign affairs,
and in the relationship, embodied in the governmental
SYStem, between that agency and other official state
agencies. To identify those factors and to weigh their

relative importance are the purposes of this work.

 

The subject requires a dual approach. In the first
place, a close examination must be made of the develop—
ment and character of the Foreign Office as an agency

capable of influencing its chief in his role as foreign

 

 

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David Morgan Baehler

policy formulator. The operational routine, the organ-

izational structure and the bureaucratic character are

discussed in considerable detail preparatory to drawing

conclusions about the actual influences exerted by specific
I advisers in the Foreign Office on their administrative
superiors. With the exception of a few inadequate
biographies of several of the senior advisers, virtually
nothing has previously been written on even the most
rudimentary aspects of the Foreign Office. All of the
research for this initial section was thus conducted in
the unpublished records of the administrative files and
certain special collections contained in the Vienna State
Archives.

In the second place, the relationship between the

Foreign Office and other governmental agencies had to
be examined as a means of determining the ability of the
Foreign Office and its advisers to carry through in the
name of the Habsburg Monarchy the policies which were

formulated, with or without outside input, within its

 

confines. For this purpose, the unpublished minutes,
held by the Vienna State Archives, of all formal govern-
mental proceedings involving foreign policy matters in
these years supplied the most important material. Pub—
lished accounts, primary and secondary, of both the
Austrian governmental system and the Austrian role in

the international questions of the day were exploited

 

 

 

 

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David Morgan Baehler

'uasupplement such records.

From an examination of the two aspects of the Foreign
(Hfice's position in the policy formulation sphere, several
significant conclusions emerge. The structure and mode
ofcumration established in that agency in early 18u9
facfljtated the exertion by the senior Foreign Office
mhdsers of substantial influence on policy. At first,
'Ufis influence, which derived its focus and its impetus
frantme question of Austria's future role in Central
lhuope and which strove for objectives markedly distinct
frmntmose commonly valued on this issue in mid-nineteenth
cenhnw'Austria, was less important for Austrian policy
Munithat exerted at the higher level of collective and
responsible leadership then existing in the Monarchy.
Buttw‘lBSl, with the waning of the authority of the
constitutional system of government upon which this form
mfleadership depended, the Foreign Office influence
ggedually increased until foreign policy was made, vir—
inwlly without any sort of outside input, solely by the
:flneign minister and a small but articulate group of
mbfisers holding some highly unusual political ideas.
Byexufly 1853, with the other major agencies of the Mon~
euchy having completed the work.of transforming the governing
Equeratus into a system of neo-absolutism, the time and
(uxmrtunity once again existed for broader participation

hifbreign policy formulation. But precisely because a

 

 

 

 

 

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David Morgan Baehler

neo—absolutistic system had been created, there was at
that time no institutional medium through which that par-
ticipation could be fashioned, as it had been under the
earlier system of collective leadership, into a cohesive
and consistent foreign policy. Outside participation
thus turned into challenges to the Foreign Ministry's
authority to make policy, and Austria's behavior in the

Crimean War became inconsistent and fraught with duplicity.

 

 

 

 

THE AUSTRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE AND FOREIGN POLICY,
1848—1856
By

David Morgan Baehler

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
_ Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1976

 

 

 

 

® Copyright by
DAVID MORGAN BAEHLER
1976

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to my major professor,
Paul R. Sweet, for his encouragement of this project and
for his helpful comments on its contents. I wish further
to thank the other members of my doctoral guidance com—
mittee at Michigan State University, Professors Robert
M. Slusser and Donald N. Lammers and Dean Richard E.
Sullivan, for their careful reviews of the final draft.
The assistance provided me by the staff of the Vienna
State Archives in locating records was also appreciated.
Finally, to all of those persons involved in the Fulbright
Scholarship Program, both in the United States and in
Austria, I owe the opportunity for nearly a year and a
half of research in Vienna. Without that, this work would

not have been possible.

ii

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

Chapter
I. THE OPERATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE . . .

II. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE . .

III. THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

IV. FOREIGN OFFICE INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY
V- THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM,

18u8‘l850 I I I I I I l I I I I I I I U I I
VI. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND NEO—ABSOLUTISM,
1851—1856 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
CONCLUSION I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I U '
Appendices
A- THE FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION,
JANUARY 1, 1850 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 0

B. THE FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION,
NOVEMBER 1,1853 . . . . . . . . .

0- SPHERE OF COMPETENCE SCHEMA FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, 1848 . . . . . . . . . .

D. SPHERE OF COMPETENCE SCHEMA FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, 1852 . . . . . - - -

E' REMARKS ABOUT THE MINISTERIAL AGENDA
CONCERNING THE IMPERIAL HOUSE - - -

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15
92

- 155

232

328

406

. 487

503

506

509

511

514

518

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

Most histories of foreign policy are undertaken
from one of two standpoints: either the state in question
assumes a personality and a will of its own, whereby it
determines in a detached sort of way an objective set of
interests and, on that basis, guides its own destiny in
'dm international arena; or, less simplistically, certain
key leaders of the state interact in such a manner that
a prospective course of action emerges through a process
Of conflict or consensus among individual values, per—
ceptions and judgments to become the policy of the state.
While the former conception is essentially divorced from
the realities of foreign policy—making and suited to appli-
cation only in summary treatments, the latter cannot be
so easily dismissed as a fundamentally flawed approach
to foreign policy studies. Based on the personalities
of the most conspicuous members of the state's political
hierarchy, this approach has at least the advantages of
clarity, in that the policy options realistically available
to the state are personified in a few easily identifiable
Persons, and of offering possible explanations for the
mmcess or failure of a policy: unanimity on an issue
hlthe views of a foreign minister, a monarch, a famous
military leader, a prime minister or president and a key

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leader of a parliamentary party, for example, can lend
a decisive weight to the chosen course of action; division
between such highly placed leaders can have fatal conse—
quences for the policy's effectiveness. The preservation
of these advantages in foreign policy studies is basic
to transmitting an understanding of the practice of diplo—
matic relations.

The problems involved with approaching foreign
policy studies on the basis of key personalities are
nevertheless significant. In the first place, the approach
does not permit an adequate assessment of all the influences
and motivations which affect foreign policy decision—
making. A false aura of rationality emerges from a por—
trayal of a policy~formulation process in which a few
statesmen develop fully their own attitudes on specific
issues, then represent among themselves in the highest
councils of government their respective, well—articulated
proposals for a solution to the problem at hand. In
reality, all high governmental leaders, sometimes except—
ing and sometimes not excepting the foreign minister
(0r his equivalent), have interests and obligations which
prevent them from being fully conversant with every foreign
Policy issue confronting the state. Such preoccupation
With outside responsibilities is obvious in the cases of
a chief of state, a military leader or a finance minister,
each of whom has obligations which can actually conflict

With the necessity rationally to assess an international

 

 

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question on its own merits. But even a foreign minister
unencumbered with other responsibilities can scarcely
hope to have a complete command of all aspects of every
foreign problem. At least in a modern Great Power faced
with numerous and complex questions of international im—
portance, each top governmental leader, with a few remark—
able historical exceptions, needs experienced subordinates
to do some of his thinking for him. A study of foreign
policy-making must thus go beyond the personalities of
the top leaders to the persons who influence those leaders,
and to the means by which that influence is wielded.

In the second place, even within the narrow con-
fines of a state's supreme leadership, there is more than
mere force of personality to the question of how final
foreign policy decisions are made. At the most rudimentary
level, the character and quality of decision—making depends
on the forum in which a final course of action is selected
as the state's foreign policy. If the political system
is an absolutistic one, where all state actions are the
responsibility of one supreme ruler, then explanations
for the state's foreign policy course must be sought not
only in the personality of the ruler, but also in his
ability to use effectively those chief advisers who have
no formal authority, but who are in positions to influence
the views of the ruler by imparting suggestions and in—
formation. If, as is more likely in a modern Great Power,

the system is a variation of the pure absolutistic form,

 

z,
or if it is one of constitutionalism, then explanations
for foreign policy actions might better be sought in the
manner by which various important leaders—~e.g. , a prime
minister, a foreign minister and a military leader——
interact, not as informal confidante of the supreme ruler,
but as the legitimate heads of well—defined and author—
itative institutions within the government. One govern-
mental form does not necessarily assure better foreign
policy than another; but an adequate analysis of the policy
formulation process must take into account the precise
character of the governmental system at any given point
as a preliminary to explaining why foreign policy emerged
as it did at the supreme level of government. Only then
can the importance for foreign policy of key personalities
and of key governmental institutions be accurately assessed.
It is along the foregoing lines that the following
Chapters will approach the study of Austrian foreign
Policy during the years 1848—1856. Falling naturally
into two sections, the study will examine first the problem
0f input into the decision—making process by way of in—
fluence exerted by subordinates on the supreme leader—
Ship of the state; it will then describe and evaluate
the means by which and the environment in which this input
was ultimately transformed into foreign policy at the
highest levels of government. The first question is an
immensely complicated one. The vast complexity of the

Austrian bureaucracy, even at this date, coupled with

 

 

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5

the propensity of the military to play politics and the
latent possibility, for the first three years under con—
sideration, of the emergence of a parliamentary regime,
render almost innumerable the sources and potential sources
of input into foreign policy decision—making. It would
be hopeless to attempt to identify and evaluate the im-
portance of each of these sources. Most of them would
prove to have been of relatively little importance for
the final determination of a course of policy, so that
a minute examination of the structure and personnel of
the institutions from which such marginal influence eman—
ated would be virtually meaningless for a foreign policy
study. To be sure, certain institutions, such as the
emperor's private cabinet and the high command of the
nfilitary, had more than a marginal influence on foreign
policy, and a complete account of the policy formulation
process in all of its complexity would certainly have to
devote considerable space to the amount and direction of
influence exerted by such institutions on their chiefs.

Rather than attempt to examine in detail each
hmtitution which may have played at times a significant
role in foreign policy—making, it seems desirable to
Concentrate on the one agency most immediately and con—
tinuously concerned with the conduct of foreign policy,
the one taking its primary point of reference from the
hmernational system of the day and basing whatever advice

and influence it might have imparted on an exact knowledge

 

 

 

6

of Austria's position within that system. That institution
was the Foreign Office, and its operation, organization
and bureaucratic character comprise the subjects of the
bulk of the pages which follow. Concentration on only
one institution, albeit the most important, admittedly
leaves incomplete the analysis of foreign policy formu—
lation during the period following the I848 revolutions.
It is a fault mitigated only by the certainty that, if
successful, this study will go well beyond its predecessors
for this period in explaining the reasons why Austrian
foreign policy took the course that it did.

The period was a crucial one for Austria and Europe.
If 1848 was the turning point at which history failed to
turn, it was very largely due to what happened and did
not happen in Austria. The future organization of Central
Europe and the future organization of the Habsburg Monarchy
after 18h8 were so mutually interdependent that they were
at certain points indistinguishable. The very real question
of whether Austria would continue to exist in 1848 and
1849 was the point around which all considerations of
European politics revolved, and the methods chosen to
resurrect Austria to the status of Great Power determined
much of what was to happen in Europe during the Crimean
War, the Sardinian War of 1859 and the crises of the fol—
lowing decade. As the following chapters will demonstrate,
the ideas represented in and the activities pursued by

the Austrian Foreign Office had a great deal to do with

 

 

 

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the choosing and application of those methods.

Moreover, focusing on the one agency deemed the
most important in the foreign policy—making process is
complicated enough. For one thing, the waters in this
time period for this sort of study are almost completely

uncharted.l The simple fact that historians of this

 

1Two very general essays, one by Ludwig Bittner,
“Das Osterreichisch—ungarische Ministerium des Aussern,
seine Geschichte und seine Organisation," Berliner
Monatshefte, 15/2(July—December l937):819—853, the other
by Friedrich Engel—Janosi, "Der Ballhausplatz, 1848-1918,"
hiEngel—Janosi, Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz (Graz:
Styria, I963), touch on the subject of the Foreign Office
as an institution in the years immediately following the
1848 revolutions. Both serve to raise the question of
Foreign Office influence rather than provide answers.
Joseph K. Mayr's study of Metternich's State Chancellery,
Geschichte der deterreichischen Staatskanzlei im Zeitalter
des Ffirsten Metternich (Vienna: Haus—. Hof— und Staats—
archiv, hereafter identified as HHStA, 1935), while not
complete or systematic, is very useful for background
information for the post—Metternichean period. As
discussed at length in the following chapters, Metter-
nich's State Chancellery possessed a legal position and
powers which extended beyond those held by the Foreign
Ministry which replaced it in 18U8. Its functions, how—
ever, were those generally associated with a foreign office,
and the term "State Chancellery," when applied to the
permanent bureaucratic agency existing under Metternich,
gill thus be used interchangeably with the term "Foreign

ffice."

For the period of German unification, Heinrich von
Srbik's chapter on the Foreign Office in the third volume
Of his monumental work, Deutsche Einheit; Idee und
Wirklichkeit vom Heili en Reich bis KOni ratz, Eivols.
(Munich: Bruckmann, 1935-19525, demonstrates the author's
interest in the effect on decision—making of certain
key sub~ministerial bureaucrats in the Foreign Office,
many of whom had been serving since the revolutionary
period of the mid—century. Of more immediate interest
for the 18503 is Srbik's article "Aus den Erinnerungen
eines alten Osterreichischen Beamten," Archiv fur
dsterreichische Geschichte, 117/l(l94’+):37—100. It
ls based on the unpublished manuscript of memoirs by
Anton von Hammer—Nemesbany entitled "Meine Erlebnisse,
1809-1887," 3 vols. (n.d.), and an accompanying folder

 

 

 

 

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8
era have ignored the Foreign Office as an institution
capable of influencing policy requires that a detailed
examination of that agency be undertaken prior to drawing
conclusions about instances and directions of any influence
which it might have exerted. In the three chapters which
begin the study, therefore, an effort is made to identify
as precisely as possible the operational, organizational
and bureaucratic features of that body of Beamten2 which
constituted the Foreign Office. The assumption underlying
these chapters is that the qualities embodied in these
operational, organizational and bureaucratic features
were important in the final decisions reached by those
who bore final responsibility for foreign policy matters.
In the first instance, those responsible were the foreign
ministers, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, then Graf Karl
Ibrdinand von Buol—Schauenstein. The assumption is jus—
tified because it is patently obvious that both Schwarzen-

berg and Buol belong in the category of those who, burdened

 

entitled “Notizen fiber den Ffirsten Metternich und die

nach ihm gefolgten acht k.u.k. Minister des Aussern,"

both of which were discovered by Srbik in a Viennese

book store and deposited in the Haus-, Hof— und Staatsarchiv.
Hammer—Nemesbany, not to be confused with the more famous
Austrian orientalist, Joseph von Hammer—Purgstall, was

the Oriental Desk Chief from 1846 until 1868 in the Foreign
Office. While not especially important himself, Hammer's
observations about other members of the staff proved
extremely useful for this study.

2The term Beamtegr} is used because its least
Clumsy translation, "official," could be confused with
the term designating the lowest rank of personnel in the
Foreign Office, the Offizial. All rank designations will
be given in the German.

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9

with additional responsibilities, conflicting interests

and simple ignorance of many foreign issues, were in
less than complete personal command of foreign policy—
making. Schwarzenberg was Minister—President and therefore
the head of all governing functions, domestic and foreign.
Buol possessed less authority, but was nevertheless Pres—
ident of the Ministerkonferenz,3 a post that demanded the
exertion of much energy on non—foreign affairs. Both
naturally lacked the vast knowledge and experience of
their predecessor, Metternich. Both often had to make
final foreign policy decisions in cooperation with other,
equally or less qualified heads of the supreme governing
agencies. Both were therefore obliged to use their senior
policy experts in the Foreign Office to a greater extent
than had Metternich in order to bring a semblance of
rationality into the process.

How that use of policy experts took place, in terms
of the operational routine prevailing in the Foreign
Office, is the subject of the first chapter. The second
deals with the related but distinct question of the organ—
izational channels through which the senior Beamten were
able to establish positions of influence relative to the

minister. The third chapter deals with yet another aspect

 

3The terms Ministerrat and Ministerkonferenz will
be left in their original German, since they are proper
names of very specifically defined institutions and are
not to be confused with conferences held on an irregular
basis and called arbitrarily by the emperor or a minister
for discussing a particular issue.

 

 

 

 

10
of the Foreign Office as an institution: the intellectual,
moral, social and religious atmosphere pervading the
bureaucracy in which advice was imparted and decisions
were made. In a sense, each of these chapters is intro—
ductory to the fourth chapter which attacks directly the
question of specific instances of influence exerted on
the foreign minister by his key subordinates. At this
point, a second set of complicating factors enters into
the attempt to determine the degree of influence held
by an institution over the process of foreign policy—

making. None of the few truly crucial Foreign Office

 

personalities left accounts of their experiences. Of

a size small enough to permit nearly continuous personal

 

contact between such advisers, the Foreign Office conduced

to oral rather than to written communication within itself.
The evidence for specific instances of influence on de—
cisions, in short, is extremely meager, and a great deal

must be drawn from occasional letters to friends, from

chance expressions of personal opinions in drafts of official
documents by particular Beamten, and from references by
colleagues to the political attitudes and actions of

fellow advisers.

In conformity with the dualistic nature of a foreign
policy study based on an institutional approach, the second
Part of this work begins and ends on a level altogether
different from that of the first. While the first four

chapters discuss the role of the permanent bureaucracy

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in the formulation of foreign policy ideas, the second
section directs itself to the question of how such ideas
came to be implemented as state policy at the highest
levels of government. From the standpoint of the effect
of the Foreign Office on policy, the two approaches are
naturally related, since an ability to influence the
minister was of importance only if the minister was able
to carry through the ideas of his advisers at the supreme
level of government. The question was one of authority,
and the effect of the ideas and attitudes held in the
Foreign Office was important only to the extent that the
Foreign Ministry could maintain its position as prime
mover behind Austrian foreign policy. To identify the
degree of such authority and to examine the reasons for
its existence or non—existence are the purposes of the
final two chapters.

The period 1848-1856 in Austrian history offers
a good opportunity to study foreign policy formulation
under absolutism and under constitutionalism, and to
compare the differences between the two. It will be ar-
gued that, while the constitutional system established by
Schwarzenberg after the 1848 revolutions by no means assured
a successful foreign policy, and while that policy was in
fact unsuccessful in its most important aspect (the German
question), the channels of input and the means of reaching
decisions were more conducive to intelligent policy than

was the case after the return to absolutism in 1851.

 

 

 

 

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Before 1851, foreign policy decisions were reached on
the basis of a sober assessment of Austria's international
position, balanced against considerations of internal
conditions as represented by constitutionally responsible
members of the government. After 1851, such decisions
were reached on a much more capricious basis, depending
upon who had the ear of a young and impressionable emperor,
so that foreign policy became inconsistent and erratic.
The assessments in the earlier years were often wrong,
due largely to the character of the advice and influence
emanating from the internal structure of the Foreign Office;
but at least the reasons for the success or failure of
particular policies can be explained for this period by
reference to the actions of the Foreign Ministry as the
chief conductor of foreign policy. In the later years,
and especially during the Crimean War, the Foreign Ministry,
while still predominantly in control of policy, experienced
challenges to its integrity which necessitate referring
to outside institutions—-especially the Crown and the
military—~in order to explain fully the course of policy.
Whatever the approach, therefore, the Foreign Office
looms as the key institution in foreign policy formulation:
hence the title of this study. The Operational routine,
the organization and the bureaucratic composition all
combined to allow the exertion of considerable influence
on the policy of the foreign minister. Since the foreign

mhfister's policy became, as a rule, Austria's policy,

F51" ’

 

"the For

13

the Foreign Office was directly important in the course
of European international relations in the mid—nineteenth
century. In the cases when the foreign minister did not
succeed in transforming his Ministry's policy into Austria's,
it was precisely because the right of the Foreign Office
to provide input into the policy-making process was success—
fully challenged by other institutions operating in a
political system which facilitated such intrusions. The
result of significant Foreign Office input was not neces—
sarily good policy; but the result of challenges to its
authority to participate in the policy—making process
was inevitably inconsistent, and hence bad, policy.

If the pages which follow convey an image of an
added dimension to the process of foreign policy formu—
lation in some of the most critical years of the Habsburg
Empire, if they specify with a reasonable degree of
accuracy the extent to which and the direction in which
the Foreign Office as an institution was able to influence
its chief in his policy considerations, if they illuminate,
by identifying the relative authority of the Ministry
as a whole, the ability of the institution most directly
charged with the conduct of a Great Power's foreign affairs
to formulate and implement a policy based upon a definite
conception of state interests, however arrived at, then
they have achieved their purpose. There is implied no
pretense in this work of having developed an approach

to foreign policy studies which denies the validity of

 

 

Ne tr:

 

14
more traditional approaches based upon the study of dip—
lomatic notes and of the personalities ultimately respon-
sible for their dispatch and their effects. The present
study is rather conceived of as an addition and a refine-
ment, helping to place the process of foreign policy—
making back in the environment from which decisions actually

emerged, which is where it belongs.

 

 

CHAPTER I

THE OPERATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

When Maria Theresa in 1742 separated from the Austrian
Court Chancellery an office charged with the conduct of
flw Monarchy's foreign affairs, the offspring immediately
dispossessed the parent of its lodgings. These were
constructed on Vienna's Ballhausplatz in 1717 and remain
even today the seat of the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
Located not a hundred yards from the entrance to the
imperial apartments and offices used by Maria Theresa
and her successors, the State Chancellery building, as
itwas called then and long after the name of the institution
it housed had been changed to "Foreign Ministry," consisted
of two wings, each with a cellar and four stories. Since
the building was the official residence of the foreign
minister and at least one of his secretaries, a considerable
portion of its floor space was reserved for the gratification
of the inhabitants' creature comforts. The cellar contained
Wine, the ground floor consisted of a kitchen, stalls for
the minister's horses, and servant quarters. The minister
lived on the third floor where his offices, library, recep—
‘fion hall and salons were also located. More servants,

excess children, if any, and those individuals responsible

15

 

 

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Y. the

hither

 

 

l6
fbr managing the household and estate affairs of the high
nobility of which the Empire's foreign ministers were

rmarly universally a part lived on the fourth floor.1

After Metternich's departure, this top floor was gradually
converted into offices in order to ease the space squeeze
on the ever-growing contingent of Foreign Office Beamten,
hitherto located exclusively on the second floor. In the
early 1840s, Hofrat DePont, a senior adviser under Metternich,
Muew up his hands in dismay as the State Chancellor's
protégés claimed positions promised by their patron for

their sons or nephews, complaining that neither the need

nor the physical space existed for any additional personnel.2
Although the reorganization undertaken by Schwarzenberg

and his Undersecretary of State Baron Werner in early

1849 reduced the number of Beamten in the Foreign Ministry,

the overcrowded conditions nevertheless persisted, playing

havoc with established limitations on spheres of authority
assigned to the various divisions and rendering the main—
tenance of secrecy virtually impossible.3 During the

18508, certain alterations in the physical structure were

carried out, so that eventually each of the top—level

Beamten had a separate office in which he and his assistants

 

lMayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 7—8.

 

2Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F4,
K 237 (Odelga), DePont to Metternich, Feb. 25, 1843.

 

3Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisier_
ung, Fasz. 5, Mensshengen to Schwarzenberg, June 13, 1849.

C
0
these

MI

5
"V

III
5\U

...—v
Flu

quid
IFV

if
-. I4 dth.
1. I Muulnn

 

 

«H 3
3

C/
\II\

 

 

 

17

could concentrate the affairs pertaining to his division.
But, given the power and high social status enjoyed by
these persons, their working conditions remained incredibly
primitive.“ Between the two wings of the building was
a courtyard and to the rear of that stood the chapel of
the State Chancellery, the existence of which once provoked
the deeply pious Ludwig von Biegeleben to make the curious
observation that the Foreign Office was a separate, self—
contained world of its own.5

The State Chancellery building housed only a part
of the personnel and agencies which were subject to the
authority of the Foreign Ministry. All diplomatic per-
sonnel in the foreign service were subordinated to the
Foreign Minister and received their salaries from the
Ministry's Paymaster's Office. Effective in August 1853,
the consular system in the Levant, and, after 1859, the
consular system in its entirety also fell under the super—
vision of the Foreign Ministry. Legally considered a
part of the Foreign Ministry, the totality of Austrian
missions in foreign areas will be considered for the
Purposes of this study an institution distinct from the
Foreign Ministry. But besides the foreign service, there
existed six separate branches of the Foreign Ministry,

only three of which were housed after 1849 in the State

 

uLudwig von Przibram, Erinnerungen eines alten
Oesterreichers, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag,

l9lO~l9125. 1:173-

. 5Rfidiger von Biegeleben, Ludwig Freiherr von Biegeleben
(Vienna: Amalthea, 1930). p- 239-

 

Meal
the Men
lation
were ’51

llamas

 

 

l8

Chancellery building. These three were the Policy Branch,
the Mechanical Services Branch,6 and the Coding and Trans-
lation Office. Outside the State Chancellery building
were the State Archives, the Oriental Academy and the
Paymaster’s Office.

The Policy Branch formed the heart of the Foreign
Ministry and was the division having the most contact
with the foreign minister, influential court and govern—
nwntal figures and foreign diplomats. As the first repre—
sentative of the foreign minister, the undersecretary of
state supervised the entire operation of this branch and
provided the key link between its two major divisions,
the Political and the Administrative Sections. Each of
these Sections was further subdivided, respectively, into
Desks, having responsibility for correspondence with
assigned geographical areas, and Departments, with respon—
sibilities defined in functional rather than geographical

terms.7 The purpose of the Policy Branch as a whole was

 

6The terms "Policy Branch" and "Mechanical Services
Branch" are rather liberal translations of Konzeptdienst
and Manipulationsdienst, respectively, the first being
that division which was concerned mostly with the substan—
tive content of dispatches and memoranda, the second being
responsible for copying, filing, recording, etc. See
Appendixes A and B for schemata.

7The Political and Administrative Sections of each
Branch were also termed, respectively, "Diplomatic" and
'Administrative," "Diplomatic" and "Current," "Foreign"
and "Interior," or, simply, "First" and "Second." "Political"
and "Administrative" will be used throughout this work.
"Desks." as the smallest subdivision in the Political
Section of the Policy Branch, is an arbitrary translation
0f the term Referate. The French term Département was
Lmed to identify the Administrative Section's counterpart
0f the Referate. See Appendixes A and B for schemata.

Wfimflw mh<hk$xiflvfiu§fl<¥v¥ VJ l

r fir: :7 . . l
r n S n “a e ..C .l. 1 i
a .1. e .3. 0 .n. ma .0 A: a ..I. .\ ( ,
c ..u 1Al. a. . ,Tv Au M.» .W "V. S «T hm m ..I. I v v
r! L :1. , u ~ . .w "\v «V ‘0 n A. .0.
«U. C F» T. Au 3 ..n. . . w . L/zu . M. M!» kl. y‘lx 1‘ ..W.\ Ad
. ... 3. . . . ~ 5. I. .. px. ‘ .: pu is "J i \. «.4

 

 

19
to carry on correspondence with foreign governments in
dealing with Austrian political, economical, legal and
ecclesiastical state interests, with the activities, rights
and interests of Austrian citizens in their relations
to foreign areas, and with the private material interests
of the imperial Habsburg family.8 In addition to the
two major sections of the Policy Branch, there existed
a nebulous but influential Minister's Cabinet which con—
sisted of trusted confidants serving in the capacity of
private secretaries and traveling companions.

Closely connected to the Policy Branch in terms of
physical proximity and types of documents handled, but
differing widely in functions, was the Mechanical Services
Branch. Its general purpose was to copy dispatches drafted
by members of the Policy Branch, record all correspondence
and file copies of every piece entering and leaving the
Ministry. After 1849, the Branch consisted of four
offices: an Incoming Correspondence Registry, attached
only to the Administrative Section prior to 1853; a

Copying Office for each section; a Registry for all

 

8Friedrich Walter,

   
     
  

 

 
 
   

1 O

, Veroffentlichung
neuere Osterreichs, vols. 49,
50. 54 and 55 (Vienna: Holzhausens, 1964—1970), 2:156-
15 ; see also Appendixes C and D.

 

I TL -. I" " .— ,. . . A
"', 44.3.: ---.

f

cures;
Registl
lays o:
organs

whereu

hildi

dish:

«3. l—‘lH W

 

 

 

 

20

correspondence of each section; and the so—called "Old
Registry" which contained unorganized records from the
days of the Holy Roman Empire. These records were finally
organized in September 1853 and delivered to the Archives,
whereupon the "Old Registry" was dissolved.9

The third branch housed in the State Chancellery
building was the Coding and Translation Bureau, to be
distinguished from the deciphering office subsumed under
the Political Section's Copying Office. The latter office
performed the functions suggested by its title. The
former was the central headquarters for the Austrian es—
pionage system. While it in fact performed translation
and cipher services, its clandestine operations included
intercepting communications between foreign governments
and between private citizens suspected of activities which
threatened Austrian interests. Originally a part of the
Imperial Cabinet, this Bureau was moved to the Foreign
Office as a safeguard for the secrecy of its operations
during the l8u8 revolutions.lo Its functions were trans—
ferred to the Supreme Police Authority under Johann von
Kempen in 1853, but its personnel remained in the State

Chancellery building and on the Foreign Ministry's

 

9Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F L»,
K #02, Vortrage, Buol to Franz Joseph, July 2%, 1853.

 

loAustria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, 18h8,
K €96, two draft proposals by Lebzeltern, May 3, 18b8,
Ibld., Lebzeltern to Wessenberg, Sept. 8, 18h8; Ibid.,
18 9. K 297, undated (probably Sept. 8, 18u8) draft pro-
posal by Lebzeltern.

 

,sproll
minori
c: the
the rm

u
,

 

 

 

FYI-Tr“

..I. .l , 0 hi, .I. 5x Wt m at 71. g ,
Q c . U! A» \flu. l R» N VA
WV . Nw Tl. ulc. MP» A» LN.» 0 m pl n0: rd. \Ji . h \ .( .. Ni . .
I}. “I. A; V|~ YV‘N F i. ‘ yum.“ \. \l» F
r. ”U. C . w .. . r . . , ,

 

 

 

 

21
payroll.ll
The three remaining branches which fell under the
authority of the Foreign Ministry but which resided outside

of the State Chancellery building held no influence over
the routine operation of the Ministry and will thus merely
be identified.12 The State Archives found their quarters
in the Hofburg until 1902, when an annex to the Foreign
Ministry was built to house them. Because of the simil—
arity of the work in the Archives to that in the Foreign
Ministry, members of the archival staff were occasionally
found to be useful in either the Mechanical Services
Branch or even the Policy Branch of the Ministry, and
vice—versa, so that some considerable interchange existed.
The Oriental Academy, Austria's only claim to an institution
intended specifically for the training of diplomats, also
provided several important members of the Foreign Office
bureaucracy and will be further examined in that context
in the third chapter. Apart from this rather special
connection, the only current link between the Academy

and the Foreign Ministry lay in the fact that the staffs
Of both agencies were paid by the same office. This was

the Paymaster's Office, the sixth branch of the Foreign

 

llJohann von Kempen, Das Ta ebuch des Polizeiministers
Kempen von 1848 bis 1859, ed. Joseph K. Mayr (Vienna:
Bundesverlag, 1931), p. 285.

12Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 39?. Organisierung—Auskfinfte, Note to the Netherlands'
Foreign Ministry, Apr. 5, 1853.

 

 

Finish
not on]

branch

I

 

 

22

Mhfistry. It was responsible for paying the salaries
notonly of the members of the Foreign Ministry's various
branches, but also of the members of the foreign service
and of the spies employed by Austria in every European
country.13

Such, in rough outline, were the organizational
components of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. While these
components will be examined in the following chapter in
Immh greater detail with respect to the Policy Branch and
'flw Mechanical Services Branch, the foregoing provides
sufficient organizational information for a description
and an analysis of the routine operation of the Foreign
Office during the period 1848-1856. The character of
this operational routine, significant insofar as it deter—
mined the manner in which decisions were made and imple—
mented, was fully defined in the reorganizations under—
taken by Schwarzenberg and Undersecretary of State Werner
mudng the first half of 1849. These reorganizations
concerned only the two branches most closely connected
With the actual handling of affairs of current significance
Ibr Austrian foreign policy—~the Policy Branch and the
Mechanical Services Branch. Reforms of varying thorough-
Imss occurred in the four remaining branches before, during,
and after this period, but none of them had any effect

mlthe operation of the Foreign Office in its prime capacity
_i____.________________

l3Ibid., Organisierung, Budget Requirement Schema
for 1855.

 

Peri
be i

3M

 

 

 

23

as a policy—making and policy-implementing institution.
Peripheral in this connection, these four branches will
be ignored in the following discussion, which begins with
an examination of the conditions out of which the 1849
operational reforms developed.

Operational procedures, as well as the type of
organization and the criteria for selecting personnel,
arose in Metternich‘s Foreign Ministry out of the special
legal position held by the State Chancellor in the Habsburg
Empire. Unlike the other central governing agencies,
where decisions were reached by means of binding votes
cast on important issues by several selected senior Beamten
who were under the leadership of a court—appointed pres-
ident, the chief of foreign affairs was solely responsible
for every matter entering or leaving the Foreign Ministry.
This non—collegial system was a direct legacy of the time—
honored principle that foreign affairs were the exclusive
mmrogative of the monarch. Other governmental functions,
emmcially in an empire composed of several historic nations.
each with a claim to special rights guaranteed by ancient
constitutions, could be handled by commissions of advisers
sworn to uphold the Monarchy. But the emperor alone repre—
sented the Monarchy in its relations to other nations or
states, and no autonomous person or body had the right
toimtrude in the slightest on this sacred prerogative.
Itwas no happenstance that the institution through which

HHS prerogative was exerted was named "the Imperial

 

 

 

draw
dorm

0W?

4iiiilaJF-————-~—“"“""m"‘_’

24
House, Court and State Chancellery." No distinction was
drawn between the affairs of the emperor's family and
domain and those of the foreign relations of the state
over which he ruled. And while the 1848 revolutions altered
the legal fundaments on which non-collegiality was based,
the principle itself was confirmed, and unlike the other
central governing institutions, where radical transfor-
mations were undertaken, only minimal changes were required
in the Foreign Ministry's structure in fulfillment of

14 Its name was changed on March 17, 1848,

this principle.
from "State Chancellery" to "Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and of Affairs of the All—Highest House and Family."15
Non-collegiality therefore meant that Metternich
was legally the direct agent of the emperor's will on
foreign affairs. No persons subordinated to Metternich
had the authority to initiate any measures concerning
foreign affairs without the approval of Metternich in
his capacity as the emperor's representative. From the
standpoint of the Foreign Ministry's operation, this
POSition posed one cardinal legal requirement: there
had to be adequate supervision to ensure that no action
taken in the Ministry transgressed the minister's, and

hence the emperor's, authority. Added to this legally

 

luBittner, "Dag Bsterreichisch—ungarische Ministerium
des Aussern," p- 823'

l5Engel—Janosi, "Der Ballhausplatz, 1848—1918,"
p' 114’.

 

25
imposed requirement, the practical fact that the mass
of material on foreign affairs vastly exceeded the ability
of one person, even one as experienced and talented as
Metternich, to digest and to process, forced upon that
person the necessity to establish regular channels of
specialized information and advice. Whatever success
Metternich might have achieved in satisfying these two
operational requirements in his early years, he had clearly
failed on both counts by early 1848.

The prime reason for this double failure was that
the Foreign Office operated in a capricious, personality—
based, paternalistic manner, rather than according to
fixed rules.16 As one result of this, Metternich had
virtually no means of control over the operation of the
Administrative Section. An incoming dispatch addressed
to the "Ministry" was delivered automatically to the
chief of the Administrative Section (Staatsrat Franz von
Lebzeltern from 1845 to 1848) who decided its disposition
and directed it to the Department Chief he considered
most capable of handling it. The chosen Department Chief
drafted a response in accordance with Lebzeltern's in—
structions and sent it with Lebzeltern‘s approval to the
Cepying Office. Once in final form, the draft was de-

livered to the Records Office, where the incoming piece

 

léAustria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F L»,
K 401, Referats—Einteilung, Schwarzenberg Directive to
the Foreign Office, Feb. 19. 1849-

30 whf

and t]

 

26
to which it was a response may or may not yet have arrived,
and the final copy was delivered to the State Chancellor
for signature.17 If the latter so desired, and if he had
the time, he could read the dispatch at that point, with—
out, however, having had any prior knowledge of what
instigated its authorship. The only one who had current
knowledge of Administrative Section affairs was Lebzeltern,
and the only consecutive record of these affairs was in
his head. Supervision of the Administrative Section by
Metternich therefore depended on Lebzeltern's memory,

physical presence, and heartbeat.l8

 

l7Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 54-56.
Mayr's discussion of this operational routine and of many
other facets of Metternich‘s Foreign Office is confused
by the erroneous claim that a reform occurring in 1846
instituted a new organization under the direction of an
undersecretary of state who was in charge of maintaining
sound operational procedures. In fact, no such reorgan—
ization occurred at that time and those observations by
Mayr which are based upon its presumed occurrence are
therefore to be ignored. The document upon which Mayr
bases his belief was drafted by Franz von Mensshengen,
the Chancellery Director under Schwarzenberg and Buol,
revised by Werner and submitted to Franz Joseph on December
8. 1852, in fulfillment of the Emperor's order that an
operational and organizational description for each ministry
be provided him in order to facilitate his supervision
of all affairs of the Monarchy. This document describes
the Foreign Office as it had existed since the reforms
of February, April and June of 1849 (to be discussed pre-
sently). The clear copy, which was delivered to the
Emperor, is to be found in the HHStA, Ministerconferenz—
Kanzlei, 1852, K 20, KZ/4915; MCZ73958, Buol Proposal
to Franz Joseph of Dec. 8, 1852. For some reason, the
rough draft which Mayr used was dated (in pencil and in
a hand different from that of the author or reviser)
April 23, 1846, and deposited mistakenly in HHStA,
Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung, Fasz. 3.

18Alfred von Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2 vols.
(Vienna: Holzhausen, 1891—1892 . 2:3— .

 

27

The Political Section permitted much closer super—
vision by Metternich. An incoming dispatch addressed to
the "Minister" was delivered directly to Metternich who
either opened it himself or had a member of his family
open it and report on its contents.19 Thus aware of all
affairs of a political nature, Metternich would either
delegate the responsibility for processing the matter to
one of his subordinates or draft a response himself.
As he was an extremely prolific writer, many affairs of
importance were never handled in the first instance by
the Desk Chiefs to whose spheres they theoretically per—
tained. If Metternich did decide to delegate an important
work of composition to one of his subordinates, it went
generally to one of a small group of confidants selected
more on the basis of personal whim than special competence
in the field to which it pertained.20 This small circle
of friends, to which Metternich also delivered for revision
the dispatches he wrote personally, consisted by no means
of persons ignorant of European diplomacy, but they were
nearly all of a very special religious and philosophical
bent not at all representative of the majority of Beamten
who staffed the Desks of the Political Section.21 To

these outsiders fell indeed a great deal of writing but

 

19Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 144.

 

20Ibid., p. 149.

211bid., pp. 144—149.

 

28
little of much consequence.22 Metternich thus had very
close personal control of all affairs of the Political
Section. The difficulty was that, in surrounding himself
with an "inner cabinet" with no clearly delimited functions,
and in largely ignoring those who did possess specific
areas of competence, he effectively cut himself off from
potentially useful and certainly more broadly conceived
suggestions for Austria's course of policy.

The reliance on personalities which caused the
imperfect supervision of affairs on one hand and the in—
complete utilization of advisory resources on the other,
led, moreover, to a system of patronage which further
impeded the operation of the Foreign Office and corres—
pondingly reduced the degree of reliance Metternich was
Willing to place on it. Sons, brothers, cousins and
friends of currently employed Beamten were attached to
the body of personnel, with minimal regard paid to their
competencies, in the category known as "extraordinary
service" or "provisional service." Their functions were
virtually nil, and as their increasing numbers made the
permanent bureaucracy ever more unmanageable,23 Metternich
Withdrew from the bulk of that bureaucracy more and more

responsibility. With no clear idea of its functions,

 

22Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Ffirst
Felix Schwarzenberg."

23Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F h,
K 237 (Odelga), DePont to Metternich, Feb. 25, 1843.

 

 

with E
the
chic]
clothi
pose

Each
Pcrei
the 1

FSVO

POM
Mi
Shel
tic
TEa

the

 

29
with all operations depending on the personal fancy of
Metternich or Lebzeltern and with all the important de—
cisions being made by a small group of "Jesuits in civilian

clothes,"2LP

there is little wonder that a sense of pur—
pose and any semblance of efficient operation was utterly
lacking. The net result was a boundlessly ineffective
Foreign Ministry.

Given the dependence on personal relationships in
the Foreign Office during the years prior to the 1848
revolutions, it can come as no surprise that the Foreign
Office virtually ceased functioning when its only sup—
porting pillar, Metternich himself, was forced to vacate
both his dwelling and official position in the State
Chancellery on March 14, 1848, less than 24 hours after
the outbreak of the Viennese revolution. The primary
reason for the paralysis plaguing the Foreign Office from
then until the advent of Schwarzenberg as its chief in
late 1848 was the lack of an imposing figure who pos-
sessed the knowledge and the respect which Metternich-had
used to control this otherwise unregulated organ. Karl
Ludwig Graf Ficquelmont, Metternich's replacement in
the spring of 1848, certainly had the knowledge, but

he lacked the respect of his predecessor.25 The single

 

2”Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 1.
See also chapters 3 and 4 for a full discussion of the
rellgious propensities of the Foreign Office bureaucrats.

25Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 17. See
below, pp. 338—344, for a discussion of this period.

 

 

 

 

5159/5

 

30
Significant foreign political decision taken during his
six—week tenure, that of sending a mission to London to
seek support for a compromise solution to the problems
raised by the Italian revolt, was initiated by the Minister
of the Interior, Franz von Pillersdorf, rather than by

the Foreign Minister.26

In these first weeks after the

outbreak of revolution, in which there were a number of

sympathizers, if not collaborators, in the Foreign Ministry,27

the mood was that of a "gemutliche Anarchie," each member

coming and going as he pleased, all Beamten under 50

years of age having been required by the revolutionaries

to enroll in and drill with the newly created National

Guard, a duty which they tolerated more than enjoyed.28
The anarchy became less "gemfitlich" as further up—

risings of an increasingly proletarian nature in the

late spring of 1848 forced the imperial family to flee

to Innsbruck for safety. Gradually, more and more Beamten

deserted their posts for summer homes or for Baden, a

health resort which formed a haven for the worried aris~

. . 2 .
tocracy several miles removed from Vienna. 9 A new Foreign

 

26Joseph A. Helfert, Geschichte Osterreichs vom
AEflfiflEE des Wiener Oktoberaufstandes 1848, vol. 1:
Die Belagerung und Einnahme Wiepgl Oktober 1848 (Prague:
Temsky, 1869), p. 142.

27Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 1:292-296.

28Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 3.

29Joseph von Hfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, 1848—
l§32 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1891). P- 251-

 

recur»

zeipo

 

30 cc

(4475'
c_,

 

 

 

 

31
Minister, Johann von Wessenberg, was named in early May
1848 but illness and a carriage accident prevented him
from taking up his post until early June.30 By this time,
his post had been moved with the court to Innsbruck and,
one by one, the foreign diplomatic missions assigned to
Vienna followed along. With that ceased any reason for

31

the Vienna Foreign Ministry's existence. Wessenberg's
return to Vienna on June 22, 1848, ended the Ministry's
temporary demise, but his presence, and hence his ability
to control the operation of the Foreign Office, was spor—

32

adic throughout the remainder of the summer. Yet even
under these circumstances, a movement not only toward
restoring the control exerted by Metternich, but also
toward placing the entire operation on a sounder basis,
governed by fixed principles rather than by personalities,
was discernible. Wessenberg was a knowledgeable pensioner,
having served as one of Metternich's experts for German
affairs during the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815. He
Possessed among the Beamten a modicum of respect which

was bolstered by the fact that he took out of temporary

 

 

3OWalter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,
p' 72-

 

311bid., p. 118.

32The Ministerratsprotokolle (Austria, HHStA,
Kabinettsarchiv) for the summer of 1848 betray the fact
that Wessenberg was in Vienna only between June 22 and
Tfly 7. then absent, due to his accompaniment of Archduke
Johann to the Frankfurt Parliament, until August 23. He
thereafter remained at his post until the renewed outbreak
of revolution on October 6.

 

 

relic
fume
Heme
Hesse

draw

L7,:

 

32
retirement as his chief assistant a trusted friend, the
former Chief of the German Desk, Joseph Freiherr von
Werner, who was much feared by his subordinates.33
Wessenberg's good reputation helped morale and tended to
draw absent Beamten back to their desks. More importantly,
he initiated a system of regular consultations with all
of his senior Beamten, and in so doing, adhered to the
adversary principle.3u This was a long step away from
Metternich's predilection for dealing only with his cleri—
calist cronies on a very capricious basis. It was indeed
the first step toward the fairly complete reorganization
that was to take place under Schwarzenberg along guide—
lines set down by Werner in early 1849. Drawing on his
experiences under Metternich, Werner probably advised
Wessenberg to adopt the adversary principle sometime
during the summer of 1848.

The incipient reform was not destined to take place
without interruption. Well before the radical October
revolution, every member of the Foreign Office recognized
that the end of his career was very possibly approaching,
and while the efficiency of the operation enjoyed a partial

rejuvenation, the gloom about the futility of it all

 

 

33Austria, HHStA, Politisches Archiv (hereafter,
"PA") I, K 5330, Rechberg Nachlass, Werner to Rechberg,
Innsbruck, June 14, 1848.

 

34Austria, HHStA, Hammer, ”Notizen . . . : Johann
Von Wessenberg."

 

thicke
the Be
resili
city v
heart
mop
did 0
State
there
side

of s

...n 0 NW

 

33

thickened.35 When the storm broke on October 6, 1848,
the Beamten were apparently prepared: all but the most
resilient left the State Chancellery building and the
city within a matter of hours. The number of strong—
hearted bureaucrats became even more depleted as the
troops of Prince Windischgratz surrounded the rebel city
and commenced a bombardment which moderately damaged the
State Chancellery building. On the day of the battle,
there remained only a half dozen Beamten barricaded in—
side the Foreign Ministry.36 It was easily the low point
of the Ministry's existence under the Empire.

But at this very time, the seeds of its rebirth
were being sown. For to a far greater extent than any
of his post—Metternichean predecessors, Prince Felix zu
Schwarzenberg, the Foreign Minister—designate effective
October 23, 1848, exuded an air of confidence in his ability
and a determination to rejuvenate the Habsburg Monarchy.
The person chiefly responsible for thrusting Schwarzenberg
into the midst of whatever decision-making was taking
place in the early fall of 1848 was Joseph Alexander von
Hflbner, a confidant of Metternich during an early career

in the State Chancellery, a well—travelled diplomat in

 

35Hubner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 181.

 

36Austria, HHStA, Hammer. "Meine Erlebnisse," vol.
3- Hfibner's generalization (Ein Jahr mpines Lebens, pp-
225~226) about the resilient character of the lower Beamten
of the Austrian government during the days of the battle
Over Vienna seems not to have applied to those Of the
Foreign Office.

 

“he miy

July a
throng
quick;
hf ho:
Power
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they
to y
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a F

few

7—: ea
"oea

a):

I 2:11

53.”

 

34
the mid-18403, and a hostage of the Italian insurgents
at Milan for 106 days during the spring and summer of
1848. Upon his release, Hfibner traveled to Vienna in
July and acquired an insider's view of the Foreign Office
through his many good friends who remained there. It
quickly became obvious to him that the effective conduct
of foreign affairs as well as the restoration of monarchical
power could be achieved only by someone in possession of
an iron, nearly dictatorial will. Accordingly, he wrote
in August to Schwarzenberg, at that time a commander under
Radetzky in Italy, requesting him in vague terms to come
to Vienna.37 The reasons for this are not altogether
clear, since the two men were not even well acquainted,
but the suspicion is that the process of elimination had
a great deal to do with it. Schwarzenberg was one of the
few high aristocrats (a virtual prerequisite for the
position of foreign minister) who combined a knowledge
0f foreign affairs with a staunch opposition to European
revolution, first as Austrian representative in Naples
through March of 1848, then, in June, as Radetzky's special
emissary to the court at Innsbruck, where he successfully

oPposed all compromise with the Italian rebels.38 He

 

37See Hfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, especially
PP- 217—222; also Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Der Freiherr

von Hfibner 1811—18 2 (Innsbruck: Universitats—Verlag
Wagner. 1933 -

3éRudolf Kiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg,
fig? politische Lehrmeister Kaiser Franz Josephs (Vienna:
BOhlau, 1952), pp. 22—25 and 35-37-

1
'-

 

 

has, me
the he
cleric:

have b

 

35

was, moreover, sufficiently unknown to avoid exciting
the Viennese rebels as did the mere mention of those
clericalist friends of Metternich who might otherwise
have been qualified.39

Schwarzenberg knew little about the operation of
the Foreign Ministry, but having arrived in Vienna after
much delay on September 30, 1848, he immediately made
the more knowledgeable Hfibner his closest confidant.
During the week preceding the October revolution, the
two men engaged almost continually in conversations about

40 and it is probably not

the condition of the Monarchy,
too much to assume that Hfibner, well acquainted with

the Foreign Office as he was, brought up its dilapidated
state as a matter of concern. Schwarzenberg certainly
had the post of foreign minister very much on his mind
at this time, since his brother-in—law, Prince
Windischgratz, probably the most influential figure in
the Empire as a result of his suppression of the Prague
rebellion in June, had already approached Schwarzenberg
With the suggestion that he accept a ministerial post.
Schwarzenberg answered evasively, claiming inexperience
as a deterring factor.b’l Certainly part of the process

0f acquiring that experience would have been finding

 

 

39Hiibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, PP. 217—222.

 

 

 

36
his way around the operation of the Ministry on which he
had set his sights. Moreover, he visited the State
Chancellery building for political reasons in early
October on a daily basis, on which occasions he certainly
would have come in contact with Joseph von Werner,
Wessenberg's closest adviser, whom he knew from their
years of common service in the Berlin legation in the

42

early 1830s. Between Werner and Hfibner, Schwarzenberg

learned very quickly how the Foreign Ministry was run.43
Any reflections Schwarzenberg may have made regarding
the reorganization of the Foreign Office were, however,
suspended by the outbreak of the new revolution on October
6, 1848. Hastening to take command of his troops, he
sent Hfibner to Olmfitz as his representative to the Habsburg
court, which immediately fled to that city for its safety.
On October 15, 1848, Schwarzenberg and Wessenberg joined

4L:

him there. Immediately, a new and informal Foreign

Ministry was formed to handle the pressing problems presented

 

“21mm, p. 365.

43In his "Notizen, . . . : Schwarzenberg," (Austria,
HHStA) Hammer remarks with surprise that Schwarzenberg
seemed to know a great deal about the operation of the
Foreign Ministry from the moment of his first arrival
in'flm capacity of Foreign Minister in December 1848:
"It seemed to me as if he had already long reflected on
the succession to Metternich and had attempted to inform
himself in the appropriate ways about how matters stood
1n the State Chancellery."

uuHfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 243.

 

 

by the

 

37
by the German question and the French and English demand
for a conference to deal with the Italian situation.
Since both of these questions were intimately connected
with Austrian territorial integrity and indeed the con—
tinued existence of the Monarchy, the government could
not afford the luxury of distinguishing foreign from
domestic affairs and concentrating on the latter while
postponing treatment of the former. The necessity for
immediate action was to determine in part the future
organization of the Foreign Ministry. And within a matter
of weeks, the existence of a Foreign Ministry by which
these crucial foreign policy affairs were handled and
which lay more than a hundred miles distant from the
Ballhausplatz, where all of the pertinent records and
permanent bureaucracy were lodged, created logistics prob-
lems which proved to be determinants in the course taken
in revamping the Foreign Office's operation.

At first, there were no such problems, since the
Vienna Foreign Office was, for all practical purposes,
inside enemy lines and hence of no use to Schwarzenberg.
The initial difficulties arising in Olmfitz stemmed from
the presence of two Foreign Ministers, Wessenberg in
name and Schwarzenberg in fact. Because, to outsiders,
no change in leadership was evident, the sudden change
in the tenor of Austrian foreign policy pronouncements
occurring in late October must have been perplexing, for

the contrast in diplomatic styles between Schwarzenberg's

Ff

hhc

 

 

38

abrasiveness and his predecessor's circumspection immedi~

ately became apparent in the period of the dual ministry.45
Schwarzenberg's preference for a sharp tone in his dis—
patches would later have a direct effect on the procedures
followed by his senior advisers, and would eventually

form the occasion for the outbreak of a power struggle
among these advisers over the course of Austrian policy.L"6
The tone of future Foreign Office operations was thus
established from the very beginning.

The practice of arriving at decisions by means of
the adversary principle, initiated by Wessenberg, once
again took root in Schwarzenberg's ministry. Hfibner
pointed out that this practice was born of necessity,
since Schwarzenberg's own education was very incomplete,
especially in constitutional affairs upon which the con—
duct of foreign policy after 1848 depended. This was
particularly important with regard to the German question,
which would shortly begin to dominate Austrian foreign
concerns, but applied to relations with other states as
well.”7 The future chiefs of German affairs and of Oriental
affairs in the Foreign Office would likewise complain of
Schwarzenberg's lack of practical knowledge. Like Hfibner,

however, they would also praise the compensating personality

 

 

45Ibid., pp. 261—262; also Austria, HHStA, Hammer,
"Notizen, . . . : Wessenberg;" and Ibid., "Schwarzenberg."

46

 

See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this episode.

47Hflbner, Ein Jahr meines Leben, pp. 302—308.

 

 

 

trait:
in th
ready
what

him 2
circi

fuiu'

Cab
iii

Cor

 

39
traits which permitted Schwarzenberg to keep an open mind
in the face of opposing arguments on a subject.48 Al—

ready in October 1848, when Hfibner personally constituted
what remained of the Foreign Office, Schwarzenberg used
him as a sounding board. In November, the Minister's
circle of advisers was broadened by the gathering of his
future cabinet. Bruck, the future Commerce Minister,

and Bach, the future Justice and Interior Minister,
quickly became part of the adversary system with regard

to foreign affairs};9

One other aspect of the future operation of the
Foreign Office also became visible during this shadow—
cabinet period. Schwarzenberg suffered from a crippled
writing hand, so that nearly every important piece of
correspondence had to be drafted by someone else. The
omnipresent Hfibner took upon himself the entire respon—
sibility in October and November of 1848;50 later, one
of Metternich's protégés who was also well known to the
Schwarzenberg family, Gustav Buhl, acted as a presidial
secretary while Schwarzenberg remained with the court in
Olmfitz. He became Schwarzenberg's personal secretary

and constant companion when the Foreign Ministry was

M.

48Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzen—
berg;" Kempen, Tagebuch, pp. 172—173.

 

#9Hub bner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, pp. 261— 262,
293. 296, 302- -308.

5OIbid.

 

 

reunii
of cox
as he

hath

40

reunited in Vienna.51 But as the relative importance
of correspondence with foreign governments increased and
as the Vienna Foreign Office gradually acquired an organ—
ization after the suppression of the revolution, the
amount of work expanded far too rapidly for one or two
personal confidants to handle it. The weight of affairs
thus fell on the regular Foreign Office personnel to a
far greater extent than it had under Metternich.52 Not
only did the Desk Chiefs have to do all of the writing
previously done by the indefatigable State Chancellor,
but they had to spend many hours getting specific oral
drafting instructions from Schwarzenberg. He was, more—
over, a perfectionist who had no conception of what was
involved in drafting instructions and dispatches.53 The
net result was a far heavier work load for the Beamten,
whose number, incidentally, was sharply reduced.5[+

Such, then, were the basic preconditions from which
the reform of the Foreign Ministry's operation would begin:
a more energetic, sharper tone of communication emanating
from the Foreign Ministry, the use of the adversary system

in arriving at decisions, and an increase in the amount

—_.

51Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 42 (Buhl), Andrassy Proposal to the Emperor, July 10, 1873,

52Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen, . . . : Metternich."

 

53Ibid., "Schwarzenberg."

59Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
$126 (Biegeleben), Schwarzenberg Proposal to Emperor, June
’ 1850 I

 

 

 

Md hi
the iii
to wai
his

his m
0i the
hinis
ihe hi
iorei

berg

50h

41
and range of work performed by the permanent staff of
the Ministry. The actual reform of its operation had
to wait until the individuals of which it consisted found
their ways back to the Ballhausplatz. Sometime during
the month following Windischgratz' final suppression
of the Vienna revolution on October 31, 1848, the Foreign
Ministry reached full strength for the first time since
the March revolution.55 It also became known in the
Foreign Office sometime during November that Schwarzen—
berg had plans for a thorough rejuvenation of the Minis—
try, despite the fact that his succession to Wessenberg
was not yet public knowledge. On the day prior to
Schwarzenberg‘s official accession to power, Lebzeltern
wrote a note of congratulation to him in which he also
hastened to resign his position. Noting that Schwarzen—
berg had emphasized to him the importance of a thorough—
going reform, Lebzeltern felt compelled to admit his
inability to carry out the necessary measures because of
his "advanced age, old habits and views in the service,
and relationships to the personnel of the Chancellery."56
He thereupon requested to enter retirement, the first
victim, albeit voluntary, of a thorough purge which was

to follow over the next months.

 

 

55Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse,“ vol. 3.

 

56 Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, 1848,
K 296. Lebzeltern to Schwarzenberg, Nov. 20,1848.

 

 

...-l .. _......_.__J.

reorgz

york E

38 S
in I
With
its:

Chi

42

With Lebzeltern out of the way, the real work of
reorganization could begin. The major share of this
work Schwarzenberg entrusted to Joseph von Werner who
came to Olmfitz with Wessenberg in mid—October and was
probably still there when Wessenberg was officially re-
lieved of his duties on November 21, 1848. Werner
possessed more than any other suitable individual the
broad knowledge of international affairs and Foreign
Office operations that Schwarzenberg lacked, and his ranking
as senior Hofrat made him Schwarzenberg's obvious selection
to replace Lebzeltern as his personal representative
with the foreign diplomatic corps (by then once again
resettled in Vienna) and as the temporary responsible
chief of the Foreign Office.57 Having arrived in Vienna
in early December, Werner rapidly became aware that his
authority to carry out either function was constricted
by his position, in replacing Lebzeltern, as chief only
of the Administrative Section of the Foreign Office. In
such a capacity, he was able to enforce those existing
operational rules which had been ignored during the pre—
ceding months, such as requiring that the prescribed
working hours of 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. and 7 p.m. to 9 p.m.

be strictly observed.58 But he was not able to initiate

 

57Ibid., Schwarzenberg Proposal to Emperor, Olmutz,
Nov. 29,1848.

58Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ-
isierung, Fasz. 3, Circular Memorandum of Dec. 14,1848

 

 

 

 

is the

search

 

43
new operational procedures applying to the entire Ministry
until he acquired a position of authority over the entire
Ministry. This he received in being named Undersecretary
of State on January 1, 1849, as a result of a proposal
to the Emperor in which Schwarzenberg demonstrated a full
awareness of the significance of this measure for the
future course of Foreign Ministry operations:

Up to now the range of competence of the Staatsrat
[Lebzeltern] who is assigned to the State Chancellery
has consisted as a rule only in controlling the so—
called Inner or SeCOnd Section and the division hand—
ling personnel affairs of the individuals assigned

to the diplomatic corps and the State Chancellery.
The Staatsrat has remained almost completely ignorant
of political activity.

The extended sphere of competence of the Foreign
Minister, especially when he is, as currently, also
Minister—President, resulting from the transformation
of the Monarchy into a constitutional state possessing
a parliamentary element, and the accumulation of
affairs arising from this extension, make it absolutely
necessary to extend the duties and the powers of the
senior Beamte who will replace the former Staatsrat
and to entrust to him the secondary control of the
so—called Political or First Section of the Ministry,
heretofore standing exclusively and directly under
the minister, in addition to the aforementioned branch
of service.

A temporary reason, nevertheless worthy of con—
sideration, for the immediate filling of this post
lies in the circumstance of my absence from Vienna.
This makes indispensable my representation by a diplo—
mat of distinguished reputation in dealing with the
foreign diplomatic corps which has remained in Vienna.59

Werner's new position, giving him broad discretionary
Powers over all activities of the Ministry, was created

out of the loftiest considerations of state politics,

 

591bid., Personalia, Fasz. 22 (Werner), Schwarzenberg
PI‘Oposal to the Emperor, Olmfitz, Dec. 30, 1848.

 

 

cod one

york 0:

he fi
iocisi
oism
loco y
the,
the hi

or r

 

 

44

and once endowed with it, he was able to begin the real
work of reform.

Operational reforms now occurred in rapid succession.
The first innovation stemmed from the fact that the final
decision—making authority was located at a considerable
distance from the office where the incoming correspondence
upon which the decisions depended was delivered. At this
time, approximately 25 packets of correspondence entered
the Ministry every day.60 It was neither practicable
nor necessary to forward all of this material to Olmfitz,
since much of it was of little or no importance for the
major political questions with which Schwarzenberg was
concerned. It was, however, necessary to have at least
an overview of everything that entered the Foreign Ministry,
so a new office called the Incoming Correspondence Registry
was instituted in the Administrative Section of the Mech—
anical Services Branch. Its functions were to keep a
consecutively numbered record of every piece of corres—
pondence addressed to the Ministry (as opposed to the
Minister), to abstract the subject with which each piece
dealt, to direct each piece, in conjunction with the
Undersecretary and by way of the Registry where it was
recorded, to the Administrative Department responsible
for it, to note whatever action, if any, was taken in

response to it, and to deliver it promptly to the Registry

 

6oIbid., Organisierung, Fasz. 6, Mensshengen
Memorandum to Buol, July 13, 1853.

after 2‘
of hi:
foncti
oh ya

irai i‘l

_.
‘3
ii

73'
1’1

 

 

45
after its processing had been completed.61 The creation
of this office was, in effect, the fulfillment of those
functions previously performed personally by Lebzeltern,
who was once described as carrying the entire Adminis—
trative Registry in his head.62 One step was thus taken
in a direction away from the dependence on personalities
so prevalent under Metternich and toward reliance on a
regulated system. For Schwarzenberg's immediate purposes,
a glance at the ledger of the Incoming Correspondence
Registry during one of his numerous visits to Vienna in
early 1849 provided him with a summarized overview of
everything currently transpiring in the Administrative
Section. While there is no direct evidence to prove it,
the suspicion that the creation of this new institution
was instigated by Franz Joseph himself may be justified
by the new Emperor's concern from the very beginning of
his reign with bureaucratic detail and by his future
obsession with the necessity of having access to infor—
mation about the routine operation of individual ministries.63
Nearly all communication between Franz Joseph and Schwarzen—

berg was oral, but the strong interest shown by the

 

 

61Ibid., Fasz. 3, Operational Description presented
to the Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 18 ——
see above, footnote 17).

6

 

2Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:4.

63Eduard Heller, "Die ersten zwei Jahrzehnten der
Regierung Franz Josephs" in Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I,
ed. Eduard Steinitz (Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpolitik,
1931). p. 22.

i

 

 

46

former in foreign affairs suggests that he also wanted
at his disposal a written record of what transpired in
the Foreign Office. A similar institution for the
Political Section was not created at this time because
the Political Section itself was totally unorganized.
When it was implemented four years later, it was obviously
done at the direct instigation of the Emperor.64

Having thus solved the immediate problem of adequate
transmission of information to all appropriate authorities,
the operational reform progressed to broader and more
long—range problems. On January 9, 1849, Werner submitted
to Schwarzenberg a document in which he exhaustively ana—
lyzed the faults of the operation, organization and per—
sonnel structure of the Foreign Office as it existed
under Metternich and his successors.65 Regrettably, the
collection which housed this document was lost during the
Second World War, but at least some of the points con—
tained in it can be deduced from the subsequent orders
for reform implementing its suggestions. One of these
is the order of February 19, 1849, providing for a re—

organization of the Administrative Section.66 Although

 

 

. . 64Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
lSierung, Fasz. 4, Werner Instruction to the Foreign Office,
Dec. 31. 1852. A discussion of this follows in Chapter 2.

65Mayr used this document extensively in Geschichte
der Staatskanzlei.

66Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 401. Referats-Einteilung, Schwarzenberg Directive of
Feb ' 19 l 1849 I

 

 

 

this
huiic
Depao
the :

 

4?
this order dealt chiefly with the more rational distri-
bution of organizational responsibilities among the
Department Chiefs, and will therefore be considered in
the following chapter, the author (Werner) gave a clue
to contemplated operational reforms as well:

The nature of the division of affairs heretofore
maintained in the State Chancellery is, I am convinced,
fragmentary and defective, and I have decided to move
immediately toward the abolishment of the shortcomings
resulting from it.

Above all it is necessary that the management
of affairs in the Ministry be more concentrated than
has been the case, that the various sections into
which these affairs must be divided be delimited,
their borders clearly denoted, and a higher official
with full responsibility for the thorough and regulated
processing of the matters falling within his sphere
of competence be assigned as chief of each such section.
The primary criterion in ascertaining these divisions
must be the nature of the affairs——which is constant--
and not, as previously has usually been the case, the
inconstant personalities of the individuals with whom
the affairs have been entrusted; so that in the future
each matter will be assigned not—~as earlier—~to the
concerned Chief, but to the concerned Department.
Within the latter, the further assignment of affairs
among the assistants employed in the Department and
assigned specifically to it belongs solely to the
Chief of same . . . ; he takes full responsibility
by means of his vidi for the content of every piece
of correspondence which comes out of his Department.67

 

Thus was recognized one of the major deficiencies in
Metternich's Foreign Office——the lack of clear respon—
sibilities for each piece of correspondence handled by
the staff. In rectifying this fault, Werner went on to
give the new Foreign Office his own personal stamp by
SPSCifying in great detail the future lines of authority.

Werner was conscious, as was no other, of the limits to

 

 

67Ibid.

 

rue-W

his a

in ii

i
i he

 

 

48
his and his subordinates' authority, and no one exceeded
in the 1850s his prescribed limits without suffering for it.
The new guidelines became effective on March 1, 1849,
and the operation of the Administrative Section, despite
numerous changes in its organization, remained smooth
through 1859. When a communication addressed to the

"Ministry" was delivered to the Foreign Office (generally

 

meaning that it was of an essentially non—diplomatic char—
acter and thus destined for processing by the Administrative
Section), the undersecretary of state opened the packet,
took cognizance of its contents and delivered it to the
Chancellery Direction. This latter position was held by

one of the Administrative Section's Department Chiefs,

 

Franz von Mensshengen, from 1849 to 1868. The Chancellery
Director determined the Department to which the affair
pertained and forwarded the packet to the Incoming
Correspondence Registry where it was provided with a
consecutive number, the date of receipt, and an extract
of its content. If the incoming piece was designated
"urgent," it was forwarded directly to the pertinent
Department; otherwise, it was first sent to the Adminis-
trative Section Registry, recorded, and then sent to the
Pertinent Department. The Department Chief or one of

his assistants under the direct supervision of the former
drafted a response to the communication and sent it to
the undersecretary of state for approval to copy. Only

with this express approval was the draft delivered to

the (

the

was

who

i

A
,,

pJ.

C

ii i i
...» .t n. 0
‘1!“ it Lii- ~ h

 

 

49

the Copying Office of the Administrative Section. Once
the final copy had been made with all possible speed, it
was delivered once again to the undersecretary of state
who signed it in the name of the foreign minister. Ex—
ceptions to this last procedure were made if the document
was a proposal to the emperor or if its content concerned
some matter of principle, in which case the minister's
Signature was required. The original draft of the docu—
ment was noted in the records of the Copying Office, then
delivered to the Incoming Correspondence Registry where
its content was recorded under the rubric "disposition"
Of the matter contained in the incoming communication
to which the draft was a response. It was then delivered
to the Administrative Section Registry, whose director
was responsible for circulating it among all Chiefs of
that Section, in order that all concerned be kept in
constant knowledge of all administrative affairs. The
draft was then filed and the final copy dispatched.68

It is worthy of note that under this system the
undersecretary of state held all lines of control over
What entered and left the Administrative Section. In
this: he played a role similar to that of Lebzeltern under
Metternich. The differences were that the responsibility

for each step in the process was clearly delimited, and

.. 68Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
lSlerung. Fasz. 3, Operational Description delivered
to the Emperor, Dec. 8. 1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 1846).

 

 

50

that the record of what transpired in the Section was

embodied in the Incoming Correspondence Registry rather
than in Werner's head. Out of these differences can be
derived the main characteristics of the system: it was
highly centralized, very efficient, and open to easy and
immediate supervision not only by the minister, but by
the emperor himself.

Placing the more important Political Section in a
comparable state of high efficiency proved less simple.
For one thing, the personal contact between the Desk Chiefs
and the minister had to be, by the nature of the affairs
involved, much closer than that between the Department
Chiefs and minister. Until March 8, 1849, Schwarzenberg
spent most of his time in the vicinity of Olmfitz and
Kremsier where the court and parliament to which he was
responsible were located.69 His contact with those Desk
Chiefs already on the job in Vienna was therefore
intermittent at best. Hfibner, Bruck and Bach, all in
Olmfitz, remained his chief foreign affairs advisers.
Moreover, Schwarzenberg was still in the process of
selecting his future Desk Chiefs at this time. Even after
their installation and the Minister's permanent return
to Vienna, Schwarzenberg spent several months evaluating
their performances before deciding on the detailed reforms

that he would institute.

 

 

69Hfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 357.

 

halo

mo

is‘or

 

 

 

 

51
Acting once again on Werner's January 9, 1849,

analysis of the Foreign Office operation under Metternich,
and satisfied with the success of the reform of the Admin—
istrative Section, Schwarzenberg instituted on June 22,
1849, a reorganization of the Political Section analogous
to that carried out four months earlier in the Adminis—
trative Section.7O While it is not specifically expressed
at this point, the content and the tone of the order which
instituted this reform clearly suggest a reversal of the
relative neglect earlier inflicted by Metternich on those
Desk Chiefs who were not intimates of the State Chancellor.
In contrast to the practice under Metternich, each Desk
Chief received a clearly delimited set of responsibilities
for specific geographical areas. Out of Schwarzenberg's
determination to see to it that these responsibilities
were effectively fulfilled arose the reform of the
operational procedures for this Section. No longer would
a communication from outside be opened by a member of
the minister's family or guarded for processing in a
small, unofficial inner cabinet. Instead, every incoming
piece was to be delivered as rapidly as possible to the
71

concerned Desk Chief for a response. To be sure, one

Of Werner's cardinal points in his January 9. 1849,

 

 

‘ 7OAustria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
isierung, Fasz. 3, Instruction to the undersecretary of
state, June 22, 1849.

 

7lIbid.

 

52

memorandum was that all important dispatches should be
drafted originally by the minister, then given to the
appropriate Desk Chief for revisions and additions of
data which required research into old records.72 But
since Schwarzenberg had neither the will nor the ability
to do much writing himself, the maxim was revised to
provide that the Desk Chiefs would "receive guidance for
their actions in the first instance from the political
viewpoint of the minister, and, as a rule, from him
personally."73

Usually, the Desk Chief with the responsibility
for,correspondence with the country in which the message
originated would process the incoming piece and initiate
a response. But if the jurisdiction over the matter to
Which the message pertained was in question, there was
a regular procedure to be followed. After conferring
with the Desk Chief to whose sphere the affair pertained,
the Desk Chief who originally received the piece would
yield to the former's authority. It was the undersecretary's
responsibility to enforce these lines of authority. For
this, he had to be constantly aware of the entire body
of affairs in the Political Section. In order to facil—

itate this, three rules were established:

 

72Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 144.

73Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ_
isierung, Fasz. 3, Operational Description delivered to
the Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 1846).

 

no A
u A. pi
i he
rl. , Pu e
Av

 

53

a. No Desk Chief can order to be copied for dispatch
a draft which he has not either submitted to the
minister personally or to the undersecretary for
provisional approbation;

b. All drafts which have been copied for dispatch
on the minister's authorization must be presented
to the undersecretary within 24 hours of their
dispatch for the vidi of the latter;

0. The Desk Chiefs are required to communicate to
the undersecretary of state, with the least possible
delay and, where possible, even before processing,
any incoming correspondence received by them from
the minister or through channels other than those
of the undersecretary.7

With this terse instruction to the Undersecretary,
the major faults of the Foreign Office operation which
had existed under Metternich were corrected. Each Desk
Chief knew precisely what his responsibilities were, was
fully informed at all times of all aspects of Austrian
relations with the countries within his sphere, and stood
under the obligation to ensure that actions taken in his
division were coordinated with those taken in other divi—
sions. As with the Administrative Section, the operation
of the Political Section was thus rationalized by mid-
1849 in a manner which was to endure throughout the 1850s.
An incoming piece of correspondence which was addressed
to the "Minister" (meaning it was of an essentially political
character) was opened by the minister personally, but

in the presence of the undersecretary of state and all

Desk Chiefs. If the matter were judged to be of possible

 

7“Ibid., Instruction to the Undersecretary of State,
June 22, 1849.

i
i
y
i
i

sw—f*

 

Lu‘
(1)

 

54

interest to the emperor, the document was forwarded im—
mediately to him. If not, or, in the latter case, when
it was returned, the document was given by the minister
with instructions concerning its disposition to the appro—
priate Desk Chief. The Desk Chief would draft a response
to the incoming piece and submit it for approval to copy
either to the minister in more important cases, or to
the undersecretary in less important cases. After having
been put in final form by the Copying Office, all dispatches
were sent to the minister for his signature. The draft
was recorded in the Copying Office ledger, then sent to
the Registry for filing.75

As in the case of the Administrative Section, the
operation of the Political Section can be characterized
as highly centralized, efficient, and subject to rigorous
supervision. What rendered the reform of the Political
Section so different from that of the Administrative
Section is that the former was now based on a new con—
ception of its functions rather than on merely a more
effective organization of the old functions, as in the
latter case. The entire Political Section was now brought
into the decision—making process. Under Metternich,
only those members to whom the State Chancellor took an
occasional or regular fancy had any influence over what

came out of the Foreign Office. It is true that a

 

 

751bid., Operational Description delivered to the
Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 1846).

 

hioie

 

'IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII________________________________________'—*—iif '“"‘ ”"“

55

Minister's‘Cabinet existed after 1849, just as it had
existed under Metternich. But instead of consisting of
a small group of powerful Ultramontane confidants who
were sometimes used to circumvent the rightful authority
of the Desk Chiefs, it was now limited to a very few
low-ranking Beamten whose prime functions were secretarial
rather than political. Given the intimacy they enjoyed
with the minister and with affairs of high politics, it
would be unsafe to assume that they held no influence
whatever.76 But the balance of influence had shifted to '
those possessing as their most notable attributes func-
tional expertise rather than personal connections to the
minister. The opportunity for all senior members of the
Political Section to make known their views now existed
on a daily basis and in an institutionalized manner.
Conversely, the work performed by these Desk Chiefs, which,
in view of Schwarzenberg's inability to write and of the
increased importance of the advisers' role, represented
the sum total of Austrian diplomatic correspondence,
could now be better supervised than earlier.

Once again, the undersecretary of state held the
crucial position in preventing the overstepping of authority
and in expediting the course of business. He was, moreover,

better able than the minister himself to keep abreast

 

76Hammer suggested that the chief member of this
Cabinet, Gustav Buhl, may have been quite influential
("Notizen . . . : Schwarzenberg"). See below, pp. 302—
303-

i
y

 

of all
ooiike
Coobii

isioa'

 

 

56
of all political affairs, since his responsibilities,

7?

unlike the minister's, lay solely in the Ministry.
Combining this with his capacity as chief of the Admin—
istrative Section, it becomes clear that the undersecretary
was at that time the only individual in a position to
grasp the routine operation of the Ministry in its en—
tirety. Yet, far from constituting an usurpation of the
minister's power, the extraordinary breadth of the under—
secretary's authority was an invaluable asset to the
minister in supervising the Ministry. Armed with the
resources of Werner's encyclopedic mind, the minister

could quickly identify any contradiction in Austrian

policy resulting from one division's ignorance of another's
activities. Coordination of this sort was never possible
under Metternich, which is why he personally assumed all
affairs of importance. With the work load distributed
among several well-supervised specialists, each with

access through the undersecretary to the broad scope of
Foreign Office activities, the capacity for work and the
level of efficiency were vastly increased. Nor was the
improvement in the quality of supervision confined to that
exercised by the minister. The emperor himself was able,
through direct contact with the minister, to observe ‘

closely everything of importance entering and leaving

 

77Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Per—
sonalia, Fasz. 22, Schwarzenberg Proposal to the Emperor,
Dec. 30, 1848.

 

Fore

 

57

the Foreign Office, a fact that would take on increasing
importance after the Schwarzenberg years. Ironically,
out of this greater ability of the Emperor to supervise
arose the single factor tending to decrease the effective—
ness of the Foreign Office: the Emperor would often delay
action on a matter for days simply by neglecting to return
a document promptly to the Ministry.78

Before assessing the general performance of the
Foreign Office in the years following its reform, it is
necessary to examine one further, if less important, aspect
of its operation. This has to do with the activities
of the offices embodied in the Mechanical Services Branch.
By far the greatest part of the reform in this Branch
dealt with organizational and personnel aspects of the
various offices. In Werner's January 9, 1849, memorandum,
however, there was one extremely important criticism
concerning its earlier operation which was remedied by
the subsequent proposal for the reform of the Branch.79
Under Metternich, systematically arranged offices for
the copying and recording of documents existed only in
the Administrative Section. In the Political Section,

no clear distinction was made between those Beamten

 

78Austria, HHStA, PA 40, K 277L, Buol Nachlass,
Letter from Werner to Buol, Vienna, Oct. 10, 1857.

 

79Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
isierung, Fasz. 3, Werner Proposal to Schwarzenberg, Apr.
21. 1849, subsequently submitted to the Emperor and
approved on July 7, 1849.

 

perfom
helpei
times
Secti
were

docim

 

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIT_—_——_—_______________________________FETEZEKcf

58
performing mechanical services and those who drafted or
helped draft dispatches, so that the same person was some—
times occupied by both functions. Even in the Administrative
Section, Beamten who were assigned to the mechanical tasks
were often used by those in the Policy Branch for drafting
documents. Werner viewed this mixing of functions as
one of the most important faults of Metternich's Foreign
Office and went about correcting it by establishing a
permanently staffed Copying Office and Registry for the
Political Section, assigning a director, an assistant
director and the necessary number of junior Beamten, called
Offizialen, to each. Henceforth, these persons were for—
bidden participation in any activities of the Policy

Branch.80

The object, as with Werner's other innovations,
was to concentrate functions as much as possible in order
to establish clear lines of responsibilities and to
facilitate supervision.

The creation of an Incoming Correspondence Registry
in the Administrative Section has already been discussed.
It had at one time existed under Metternich but had grad—
ually died out and was supplanted only insofar as the
chief of this Section could personally remember what
correspondence had entered his sphere. This was, according
to Werner, one of the main causes of the "chaotic con—

dition of many affairs in the State Chancellery and of

 

80Ibid.

 

 

oer“

 

 

 

59

the possibility for the irresponsible neglect of which

certain Department Chiefs were guilty."81

An analogous

office for the Political Section was deemed necessary

only in 1853, for reasons very different from those causing

its introduction into the Administrative Section.82
The operations of the Copying Offices of both Sections

revolved around tedious work which blinded many pairs of

 

eyes and crippled many writing hands. No draft in either
Section could be copied if it did not show the approval
of either the minister or the undersecretary, unless the
Desk Chief or Department Chief considered it extremely
urgent and neither of his superiors was available for

approval. In such a case, the director of the Copying

 

Office would take responsibility for directing the minister's
special attention to the document before it was signed.83
Apart from their major function of producing accurate and
clear copies with a minimum of delay, the Copying Offices
also included sections for calligraphy and lithography

to be used on such occasions as the conclusion of a treaty

or the proclamation of an imperial decree.84 Also subsumed

 

81Ibid.

828cc below, pp- 86-87-

83Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ-
isierung, Fasz. 3, Operational Description delivered to
the Emperor, Dec. 8,1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 1846).

84Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,

K 399. Organisierungs-Auskunfte, Note to Netherlands
Foreign Office, Apr. 5, 1853.

5301'”
ith
:iih

modem

:. ii ,ri my :
... ..y. .... “Ml .m, o ..
. E» a mi. ..i no. i
.o . V Di. .. . a N\U ; . 1 t \\v A?

 

 

 

60
under these divisions was the office for deciphering
coded reports and telegrams from Austrian missions abroad
and for coding instructions destined for these missions.
With the construction of a telegraph bureau in the third
story of the State Chancellery building in 1849, the func—
tions of the coding office assumed greater importance.85
Although it received its cipher keys from the Coding and
Translation Bureau, it stood completely separate from
this branch both physically and functionally.

Due to their incredibly disordered conditions, the
Registries of both Sections required much more reorgan—
ization than did the Copying Offices, but from an oper—
ational standpoint their functions remained the same under
Schwarzenberg as they had been under Metternich. Both
offices were simply responsible for storing in an orderly
fashion the documents deposited with them and for keeping
a records ledger. The Administrative Registry was further
required to circulate among the Department Chiefs of that
Section all documents of common interest in order to
ensure consistency in their activities.86 In the Political
Section, on the other hand, the Registry director was

expressly forbidden to allow a Desk Chief to inspect a

 

' . 85Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
iSierunE, Fasz. 5, Mensshengen Proposal to Schwarzenberg,
Oct. 18 9.

86Ibid., Fasz. 3, Operational Description delivered
to the Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852 (misdated Apr. 23, 1846).

 

 

 

of i
oar:
tho:
and

Mi

 

—’—'Vf i H

61

document which did not fall within his geographically
defined sphere of competence without the permission of
the Desk Chief in whose sphere it did fall.87 The reason
behind this restriction lay in preventing any single
Desk Chief from overstepping his bounds of authority.
Without such a restriction, the danger existed that there
could occur either a return to the Metternichean system
of ill—defined responsibilities, with the accompanying
paralysis of routine affairs, or a challenge to the au-
thority of the undersecretary by a particularly inquisitive
and ambitious Desk Chief., It is well to note at this
point that, as a result of these operational procedures,
besides the minister and undersecretary, the directors
of the Political Section Registry and Copying Office were
the only individuals with access to a complete overview
of the foreign political affairs of the Habsburg Empire.
Therein lay the potential importance of these offices,
the functions of which were otherwise exclusively
mechanical.

It is now possible to identify in brief the chief
characteristics of the operation of the Foreign Office

as these emerged from the Metternichean practices, from

 

the organizational concepts developed in Olmfitz by Schwarzen—

 

berg, and from the reforms which occurred during the first

half of 1849 when these earlier experiences were exploited

 

 

87Ibid., Fasz. 4, Instruction from Mensshengen to
the Political Section Registry, May 13, 1850.

 

 

diff

62
and the new concepts applied. Non—collegiality as the
basis of the operational procedures of the Foreign Office
remained intact during and after the revolution. The
difference between its operation under Metternich and that
under Schwarzenberg lay in the extent to which each was
able to fulfill the supervisory requirements dictated by
this underlying principle and to instill in the Ministry
at the same time a high level of effectiveness in the
face of practical, day—to—day foreign policy problems.
Largely as a result of the State Chancellor's dependence
on personalities as the sole method of supervision and
of obtaining information and advice, Metternich's Foreign
Office was poorly regulated, insufficiently utilized,
and consequently unsure of its purpose and thoroughly
ineffective. In choosing as his chief lieutenant Baron
von Werner, one of the most perceptive former members
of this defective system, Schwarzenberg became apprised
of its weaknesses and exposed to specific recommendations
for its reform. The net effect of the resulting reforms
was to shift the conduct of the Foreign Office's operation
from a reliance on personalities to a dependence on
established rules based on sound organizational principles.
As a consequence, supervisory functions became highly
centralized, expertise in strictly defined spheres of
competence was fully utilized, the bureaucracy became
an organism with a sense of purpose, and the effectiveness

0f the entire operation was dramatically improved.

 

 

 

63
The key to this shift in character lay in the post

of undersecretary of state. Created initially as a result
of the need for an official political representative of
the Foreign Minister with the foreign diplomatic corps
while Schwarzenberg was in Olmfltz, the position rapidly
became the center of all Foreign Ministry operations.

Its occupant was responsible for supervising and coordin—
ating all operations in the Administrative Section, served
as the key link between the Desk Chiefs in the Political
Section and was the sole individual possessing both the
knowledge and the authority necessary to coordinate the
operations of the Foreign Ministry in their entirety.

But there were also other important innovations. As a
supervisory measure, the creation of an Incoming Corres—
pondence Registry for the Administrative Section grew

out of Schwarzenberg's and Franz Joseph's immediate need
in Olmfitz to be kept informed of current affairs in Vienna.
As a measure to improve the use of the available advisory
talent, Wessenberg introduced the adversary principle

of consultations with the senior Beamten of the Ministry
on a regular basis during his brief tenure. Because of
Schwarzenberg's fundamental ignorance of the details of
foreign affairs, the principle enjoyed a resurrection
during the Olmfitz interregnum and persisted when the
government returned to Vienna. Coupled with Schwarzen—
berg's physical inability to write, this adversary system

assured the Desk Chiefs of regular and significant

 

64

participation in the affairs concerning their spheres.
The bureaucracy thereby acquired a sense of purpose un—
paralleled in preceding or succeeding eras. Finally,
and as a result of each of the reforms of this period,
the efficiency of the entire operation was vastly improved.

The assessment of the operation of the Foreign
Office in principle can only, therefore, be judged favor-
ably. In practice, the verdict is only slightly less
uniform. Under Schwarzenberg, the efficiency of the
operation and the effective use of talent, reflecting
his own personality, remained high. There is evidence
that these admirable qualities gradually deteriorated'
during Buol's tenure, but that the supervisory functions
incumbent on the minister were better fulfilled after
April 1852, when Schwarzenberg died, than before. It
will be hypothesized that there existed a direct connection
between decreased efficiency and tightened supervision,
not as a result of an intrinsic fault in the principles
governing the operation of the Ministry, but because the
Operations themselves were disrupted by the intrusion
into the process of an outside authority——the emperor
himself. But more than that, the changes in the operational
characteristics were the result of factors extending well
beyond the minister's and emperor's personalities. These
factors were part of the organization and personnel
composition of the Foreign Office and for that reason

a thorough analysis of the causes of operational changes

 

 

 

falls
deal
char:

supe‘

071E

65
falls logically in succeeding chapters. Here we shall
deal only with their effects on the general operational
character, on the use of talent, and on the adequacy of
supervision in the Foreign Ministry.

As noted earlier, the general tone of correspondence
as set by Schwarzenberg from the first days of his shadow
ministry was a sharp one. This was in contrast to Wessen—
berg's and Metternich's much more conciliatory style.

It was met with a mixed reaction by those with whom Schwarzen-
berg entrusted the work of drafting dispatches. On the

one hand, his sharp style was welcomed by his subordinates

as a sign of the rehabilitation of Austria as a European

Great Power, an objective which Schwarzenberg pursued

Nith such single—mindedness in the months following his

88 But with the final

appointment as Foreign Minister.
suppression of the Hungarian revolution in August 1849,

me insulting tone which the Desk Chiefs were required

0 take in their correspondence with foreign governments
egan to offend both their long—nurtured sense of
iplomatic propriety and their equally firm ideas about
istrian foreign policy goals.89 While repaying their
)rmentor Palmerston in kind may have struck a chord in

e heart of every Foreign Office Beamte, the application

the same rough treatment to Prussia and the other

M

88Hfibner, Ein Jahr mgines Lebens, pp. 261—262.

89Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . .
warzenberg."

o
Wit]
0m

b
fac
sec

31a

aff

I
x.»
PW

‘ 1\\h1.d‘

 

 

66

}erman courts found far less approbation and led to the
only intra—office power struggle perceptible during the
period. Schwarzenberg's selection as his Chief of German
affairs, Adolf von Thierry, shared Schwarzenberg's scorn
of Prussian pretensions in Germany and devoted himself
Nith great vigor to the attempt to humiliate the
dohenzollern state. Not content with the achievements

of the so-called "humiliation of Olmfitz" in late 1850,

ae pursued his insulting manner, to Schwarzenberg's satis—
faction and presumed amusement, throughout 1851.90 Under—
secretary Werner, who, as a participant in the 1815 nego—
3iations leading to the Confederal Act, as an embassy
>fficer in Berlin from 1816 to 1832, and as Chief of
Erman affairs in the State Chancellery from 1832 to 18MB,
as thoroughly imbued with the Metternichean tradition

f cooperation with Prussia, found Thierry's manner

ffensive and sought to moderate his tone.91

In so doing,
arner fell out of Schwarzenberg's favor during the last
vnths of the Minister's life.92

The ultimate victory, however, was Werner's. Buol,

 

90Kempen, Tagebuch, pp. 218, 226.

9lKarl Friedrich Kfibeck von Kfibau, Aus dem Nachlasse
Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kfibeck von Kfibau, ed.
edrich Walter (Graz: thlau, 1960). P. .

92Austria, HHStA, PA I, K 528, Rechberg Nachlass,
ter Letter to Mensdorf, Dresden, Jan. 28, 18 5.

 

 

 

 

who

am

67

ho succeeded Schwarzenberg on April 12, 1852, preferred
much more reserved tone in the correspondence going

ut over his signature.93 Moreover, he knew little of
armany,9u and so deferred to Werner, who knew more of

t than any Austrian still in public life. Thierry was

r now afflicted with a seemingly chronic respiratory
1ment and was in no position to resist his elimination
en had he been healthy. He was replaced in October

52 by Ludwig von Biegeleben, scarcely a friend of Prussia,

t opposed to using an abrasive tone in correspondence

 

Berlin,95 and inclined to comply with the wishes of
ner to whom he owed his acceptance into Austrian state
vice in 1850. The style set by Buol was henceforth
:challenged and no further discernible conflicts among
personnel over the issue took place.
If the tone of the work produced by the Foreign
ice changed with the transfer of power in 1852, the
a of work did not. Without exception, every member
:he staff who left an account of his experiences noted
awe the dramatic increase in his individual work

when Schwarzenberg came to power, and none mentioned

 

93Ibid.. Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Buol."

94Waltraud Heindl, Graf Buol-Schauenstein in St.
sburg und London (Vienna: B6h1au, 1970), p. 24.

95Kfibeck, Aus dem Nachlasse. p. 51.

 

 

 

any 5
Schwz
ener,
whil
have
impc
hm
his

Eff:

dec

the

 

68

96

any slackening in the pace on Buol's accession to office.
Schwarzenberg was a man with a mission and he breathed

energy. Those who worked for him respected his dedication

while at the same time recognizing, as most historians
have not, the severe limitations that his single—mindedness

imposed on him as a statesman. He was a man of crises,

brought to power by a crisis, making his name and finding
his opportunities in crisis, lacking knowledge of foreign
affairs, lacking imagination, but possessing the single
quality Austria needed most in the years 1848—1851-—
decisiveness.97 For that, he had the respect, if not

the adoration, of his subordinates and he was able to

demand an uncommon amount of work from each.
Buol accorded more with the image to which his sub—

ordinates had long been accustomed. Circumspect, patient,

1 diplomat rather than a soldier, he lacked the personal
tttraction Schwarzenberg possessed, but exuded an air of
mofessionalism not present in Schwarzenberg. Some of
is subordinates disagreed with his policies, just as
hey had disagreed with Schwarzenberg's, but none ever

:cused him of incompetence, as did many of his powerful

'mPetitors for power at the top level of the Austrian

 

 

_ 96Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen;" Arneth, Aus
Lnem Leben, pp. H30—h31; Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben,

259.

 

97Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzen—
g:" Kempen, Tagebuch. pp. 172—173-

 

 

goven
with

to co
and c
Despz‘
of i]

iuri

suit
has
his
was
but

i101

r ’77 ~77. V. I.
' >-).r,»

69

government.98 Buol's bad press, in short, did not start

 

with those who knew him best, and in fact Buol was able

to command as much respect, if for different reasons,

and consequently demand as much work, as did Schwarzenberg.
Despite a rapidly increasing volume of affairs, the size

of the Foreign Office bureaucracy increased only slowly

during Buol's tenure.99

But Metternich too commanded great respect from his
subordinates, yet the amount of work his Foreign Office
IaS capable of generating was not as great as that under

[18 successors, despite the fact that its bureaucracy

 

as larger. The difference in productivity can be attri—

uted to the more effective use of available talent.

 

ore rational organization was primarily responsible for

his, since, during the 18#9 reforms, each Beamte was

itrusted with a clearly specified task at which he could

rquire expertise. Each Administrative Department Chief

d Political Desk Chief possessed full responsibility

r the distribution of his affairs among his assistants.

ice the number of lower Beamten assigned to any one

.ef in the Policy Branch rarely exceeded six or seven
was no more than eight in the Mechanical Services

noh. the relationship between supervisor and subordinate

 

 

98Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . . Buol."

99Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
- 6. Memorandum by Mensshengen, July 13, 1853.

 

WES C
a bu]

purgi

 

 

70

as close enough to permit an accurate assessment of where
100

bureaucrat could most profitably be utilized. The
urge in 1849 from the Foreign Office of many ancient,

f venerated, Beamten also allowed fresh blood to assert
tself, which thus resulted in the more effective use of
slent. Both the organizational and personal elements
ill be elaborated at a later point.

The quantity of paper which an organization is capable
Tshuffling, however, does not necessarily reflect the
ality of work it produces. As noted earlier, Metternich's
sk Chiefs did considerable writing, but little of it
s of much importance, unless the Desk Chief happened
be part of Metternich's inner cabinet. Wessenberg
i Schwarzenberg set out to make full use of their chief
visers, each of whom (especially under Schwarzenberg)

i a far greater and more detailed knowledge of his

acified area of responsibility than did the minister.

e adversary system of decision—making was thus established.
hle lodged in Olmfitz, Schwarzenberg obviously could not
lly implement the practice, since none of his senior

eign Office advisers were there. But he repeatedly

eld the principle by conferring on foreign political

ters with competent persons of sharply varying political
philosophical concepts. Hfibner appears to have been

sulted on all questions, both domestic and foreign.

 

looArneth, Aus meinem Leben, pp. 430, #37.

 

Partii
18%

 

 

7l

Particularly with respect to the Italian issues of late
101

1848 and early 1849, Hfibner was his prime adviser.
The real contest out of which Schwarzenberg developed

policy centered on the German question. On this issue

he consulted with Hfibner, Trade Minister Karl von Bruck,

Justice Minister Alexander Bach, and sometime diplomats

Bernhard von Rechberg, Friedrich Thun and Anton von

hpkesch-Osten. A wide range of social and political

>ackgrounds with correspondingly differing views toward i
Tussia, Germany and the Frankfurt Parliament, was repre—

ented in this group.102 The same observation can be made

ith respect to policy toward Russia, particularly during

he discussions over requesting a loan from St. Petersburg

n February 1849,103

and then military help in March and
pril.104 Participants in the discussion of the issues
inged from the reactionary Windischgratz to the left—
iberal Finance Minister Karl Krauss. The respective
mws on the issues will be identified later; here it

ssufficient to note that a fairly drastic shift from

etternich's practice of consulting primarily with a very

 

 

lOlHiibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 296.

l”Ibid., pp. 293. 354—355-

103Austria, HHStA, Kabinettsarchiv, Ministerrats—
otokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Feb. 26,1849 session.

loLPIbidH Minutes of the Mar. 29 and April 21,
4'9 sessions.

 

 

spec

had

 

72

ecial and single—minded set of advisers on an issue

1 taken place.

The practice adopted immediately upon Schwarzenberg's
:manent removal to the Ballhausplatz on March 8, 1849,
>wed how seriously he took the principle of institution—
.zed conferral with expert advisers. Holding no official
ition, Hfibner was immediately dropped as an adviser,
he himself rather mournfully remarked:

Undersecretary of State Baron Werner and the Hofrate
will divide up the work among themselves according

to hierarchical rules. I myself have nothing more

to do with it . . . . The Prince [Schwarzenberg]
always treats me as a sure and trusted friend, but

he has no commands to give me and I have nothing more
to do for him.
ier speaks here only of work, but since he was Schwarzen—
fis chief adviser up to the day of their return to
ma, it is safe to assume that he includes the imparting
dvice in this term. Definite rules would henceforth
rn the functioning of the already established adversary
em. Windischgratz, as a result of his bumbling cam-
i in Hungary, was no longer part of the system, nor

the diplomats, most,of whom were soon to be packed
:0 new posts. With the important exceptions of Bruck
Lach, who were very much a part of the system, the
ministers exerted influence through channels en—

y outside of this newly institutionalized practice.

The prime participants in this new system throughout

lo5Hx'ibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 357.

 

the 1
sipi
the
apex

hiss

 

 

73

he post—Olmfitz Schwarzenberg era were the Undersecretary

f State and the Political Desk Chiefs. If a vacationing

iplomat was in town, he too was occasionally drawn into

he discussions. As mentioned in the description of the

perational routine for the Political Section, the minister

imself opened all packets addressed to him personally

1the presence of his chief advisers. Did this practice

>nsist wholly of sessions at which Schwarzenberg merely
.stributed orders to carry out his already predetermined

cisions, or did the sessions have a real influence on

e decisions? One of those who regularly attended these

rning meetings, Oriental Desk Chief Anton von Hammer,

ovided a clue:

He [Schwarzenberg] read aloud to the Desk Chiefs
gathered around him all of the political reports and
other documents of that sort which arrived daily with
emphasis so correct that it seemed as if he had already
read through them earlier for that purpose. During
these readings, he would exchange his views over the
individual pieces with those of the Desk Chiefs in
order to determine how the affair was to be handled.
Everyone had to express his opinion uninhibitedly.
If the Desk Chief was of a View other than that of
the Prince and if this View was, according to his
sincere conviction, the more correct, he had to take
a stand and not shrink from pressing forth his con—
ception according to his best knowledge and conscience
in order to create in the Minister—President a com—
plete understanding. Schwarzenberg had a firm will.
Yet he was not closed—minded, so he bowed before the
superior force of logic and truth, as long as one
understood how properly to present the case in dis—
cuss10n with him . . . . Absolute openness between
film and his advisers had to rule over sgerything
Vthh was to be discussed or decided.l

 

106 . -
Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzen—

 

The t
clea
whic

exer

 

74
daily conferences between Desk Chiefs and minister
srly provided the major institutional channel through
3h direct and positive Foreign Office influence was
rted on Austrian foreign policy.

The excellent use Schwarzenberg made of his talent
fered some compromising in the Buol years. The reasons
Buol's retreat from the adversary principle lie in
own enigmatic personality. While he certainly knew ,
a about foreign affairs at his accession to power than
Schwarzenberg when he assumed office, he lacked the l
1e—minded sense of mission, the self—confidence, and
willingness to draw on whatever resources were at
disposal that Schwarzenberg possessed. He was con-
ently more inclined to rely on a smaller circle of
sers for important political counsel than was Schwarzen—
. Indeed evidence exists that even during a period
.me as fateful for Austrian policy as the spring of

when most of the critical decisions regarding the
ian alignment during the Crimean War awaited resolution,
drew around him during his regular morning readings
:oming material only two of his advisers, Werner
tto von Meysenbug.107 In constricting his channels
ivice, the reasons for which lie in the organization

rsonal relationships within the Ministry and in

 

E07Joseph von Hfibner, Neun Jahre dgr Erinnerungen
>sterreichischen Botschafters in Paris, 1851—1859,

, ZBerlin: Gebr. Pa Tel, 1904), 1:135—136.

4‘

a thi

‘31

Y

chi

was ‘

l0

 

 

75
threat to its integrity from without,108

Buol reverted

.a certain measure to Metternich's practice of consulting
dy a small clique on important issues. That the reversion
s not complete, however, is demonstrated once again by

.e Oriental Desk Chief Hammer, who claims to have had
Limportant role in the implementation of the Leiningen
.ssion to Constantinople to prevent the Turkish conquest
'Montenegro in late 1852 and early 1853.109 But the

y word here is "implementation." The mission's conception,
representative of a new policy course, originated in
her quarters and through other channels than the daily
aff conferences which were traditional under Schwarzen—
Pg. The pertinent Desk Chiefs were still entrusted with
e drafting of correspondence of the most critical nature,
they often were not under Metternich, but they possessed
a body a decreasing influence on the formulation of
'eign policy guidelines. Finally, it should be noted

t on certain occasions even the authority to draft
ortant dispatches intended for areas outside of his
igned sphere of competence was arrogated by the Chief
the Western European Desk, Otto von Meysenbug.llO

operational principles intended to ensure expert and

 

108See below, Chapters 2, 4, and 6.

109Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Buol."

 

llOIbid., PA 40, K 277L, Buol Nachlass, Werner
lI“ "t0 BUOl, oct. 31 1857-

 

 

variw
mde:

were

 

76

'ied information and advice suffered serious setbacks

.er Buol. From a broadly based system in which decisions
'e reached by means of constructive conflict evolved
:ystem of consensus politics on a relatively narrow
e.

Use of talent by the minister was not confined
ely to the processes of arriving at decisions and
patching correspondence on the basis of those decisions.
other important function of the Political Section of
Foreign Office was to represent Austrian policy in
Ling with the foreign diplomatic corps accredited to
ina. Since the organization of the Ministry was a
-collegial one, the minister alone was responsible
diplomatic representation. In his absence, the under—
etary of state possessed formal authorization to speak
the minister, just as did Staatsrat Lebzeltern under
ernich. The difference was that Lebzeltern had no
iing in the Political Section and was at best hap-
édly informed about its current operation, whereas
wr was probably better informed under Schwarzenberg
uol than anyone else in the Foreign Office.111
As a general rule, the Desk Chiefs and Department

3 were forbidden to engage in official conversations

 

 

lllIbid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Personalia,
22 {Werner}, Schwarzenberg Proposal to the Emperor,
10, 1848.

 

 

with
tact
hea
Schw
eaci
com
for

the

77
‘ith foreign diplomats.112 They were allowed social con-
act with them and at least under Schwarzenberg were
reated to frequent opportunities for such contact.
chwarzenberg had the dinner table set for twelve persons
ach day and usually invited all those with whom he had
onducted official business earlier that day to remain
or the meal. Should this number be fewer than twelve,
he Desk Chiefs in rotating order were invited to fill
e empty places. The Minister's chief advisers were
ereby able to learn the substance of confidential con—
rsations between Minister and diplomat.113 But if any
litical remarks were directed by a foreign diplomat to
Desk Chief on any such social occasion, the latter
s required to refer the diplomat to the minister and
report the remarks either to the minister or under—
cretary. Exceptions were made in the case of the Oriental
sk Chief, since he doubled as the official Court Trans-
;or for Oriental languages, and for the Director of
Political Section Copying Office over matters of form

114

nissives intended for a diplomat's sovereign. The

sptional position of the Oriental Desk Chief served

 

112Ibid., Organisierung, Fasz. 3, Memorandum to
Desk Chiefs, Jan. 7, 1849-
113 . . u
Ibid., Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzenberg.
ll4

Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
3. Memorandum to the Desk Chiefs, Jan. 7, 1849.

 

78
feed his already considerable vanity, but does not
ear to have had any influence on Austrian policy toward
key.

There is some evidence that this operational stricture
inst diplomatic intercourse by Desk Chiefs was violated
3r Buol. Ludwig von Biegeleben, German Desk Chief
3r October 1852, has been described by his biographer
as inhumanly over-burdened with work during the mid—
Eties, "partly because of the time—consuming claims
>fficial conversation and especially of diplomatic
-ts which customarily beleaguered his office."115
.s not entirely clear from this whether the diplomatic
ts were paid by foreign diplomats or by Austrian
omats vacationing or on official business in Vienna.
he former, such visits would have constituted a serious
ch in regulations, but would have been in keeping
Biegeleben's conduct in the 1860s under Rechberg
Hensdorff, when the Chief of German Affairs held a
:ion substantially independent from the minister,
Llating his own foreign policy toward Germany and
ting it through all of the methods and channels
lly reserved for the minister alone.116
On the other hand, conduct of this sort would have

iighly uncommon under the supervisory principles

 

ll5Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, p. 259.

116Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:149—150.

worhe
durin
orgar
alone
depai
this
into
that

Fore

 

 

79

rked out by Werner in 1849 and loyally enforced by him
sing the Schwarzenberg and Buol years. The non—collegial
anization of the Foreign Ministry meant that the minister
vne was solely responsible for seeing that all of his
artment's functions were fulfilled. Metternich solved

s problem by drawing all of the important functions
0 his own little circle of confidants. Recognizing
t this was incompatible with the effective use of
sign Office talent, Schwarzenberg through Werner sought
solve the problem by better organization and better
ilation of the operation of the entire institution.
specific reforms have already been discussed in detail.
heory, the idea of removing the supervisory functions
.the caprice of personality and placing it under
lated procedures appeared promising enough. In prac-
. it was less simple. Ultimately, supervision still
dded on personalities, and in the final analysis, on
personality of the minister. The practical problems
1is sphere arose from the physical inability of the
ster to devote enough time to his foreign policy
:ations.

Schwarzenberg held not only the office of Foreign
ter but also that of Minister—President. In the
r capacity, he was required to preside over meetings
e Ministerrat, composed originally of all constitution—
appointed ministers and existing for the purpose

scussing all matters which concerned the Empire as

 

a wh<
with
part
Pres

witi

80
a whole, which were important enough to be submitted
with recommendations to the emperor, or about which a
particular minister was uncertain. Either the Minister—
hesident or an individual minister could convene a meeting,
Nth the result that sessions were held sometimes daily

117 In addition to this,

tnd usually several times a week.
he Minister-President had responsibility for the
inisterrats—Bureau, which was in turn responsible for
eeping minutes of each meeting and for copying and filing
ritten recommendations presented to the emperor by the
inisterrat. Finally, the Minister—President was person—
Lly required to present to the emperor all such joint
scommendations. This position alone was for any mortal
full—time one. Since most of the business conducted by
e Ministerrat dealt primarily with domestic questions,
e preparations required for the performance of Minister—
esidential tasks and those of the Foreign Minister seldom
incided, thus adding more hours of work to an already
srfilled week. This in itself was enough to kill Schwarz—
)erg after more than three years of uninterrupted work.118
Demands placed on Schwarzenberg's time by his position

Minister-President increased even more beginning in

e 1850. By this point, Franz Joseph had decided that

 

ll7Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien
owrat: Aktenstficke, "The Statute of the Ministerrat,"
_2-

118Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 171.

JOS'

the

her
w

 

 

 

81

a time was ripe for a reconstruction of the Monarchy
an absolutistic basis. Karl von Kfibeck, President
the Court Treasury before 1848, then Austrian commis-
ner to the Frankfurt Interim Council for the settle—
t of the German question from December 1849 until
ober 1850, was selected by the emperor to form a
chsrat whose functions would to a certain degree in—
nge on those of the Ministerrat. Schwarzenberg, a1—
igh not objecting in principle to the Reichsrat, spent
t of 1851 and early 1852 defending the integrity of
Ministerrat, through which he had exerted his tre-
ious power during the preceding years. Again and

.n, Franz Joseph requested from him lengthy treatises
,ining his ideas on the future political organization
he Monarchy.119 He nevertheless lost the contest
fibeck and the court. And in the process, he also
control of the Foreign Ministry.

In order to substantiate this last claim, it is first
ssary to discuss briefly the control Schwarzenberg
over the composing and dispatch of an important
lent. Once the basic decisions on the line of policy
9 pursued in response to an arriving piece of corres—
nce had been taken in conference, Schwarzenberg

d specific oral instructions to the concerned Desk

119Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,

35: 4637 497' 5001 501415059 5089 523'531'

 

 

 

 

info:
saii
copy
iuri
3 w

WES

82
hief for drafting a reply. Schwarzenberg, who did vir—
ually no drafting himself because of his crippled hand,
sd no conception of the difficulty involved in this task.
Desk Chief would work through the night on a dispatch
1 order to meet an impossible deadline, only to have

:hwarzenberg heap orders for repeated revisions on the

120

ifortunate soul. Once the piece met the Minister's

Ltisfaction, he would place his mark of approval for

ipy on it and leave its rapid expedition to Werner.121

ring Schwarzenberg's energetic early years, therefore,
very tight supervision of important communications
8 maintained.

At this point, a "Chancellery Order" to the Desk
iefs composed by Werner on the day on which Buol took
Ll control of the Foreign Ministry offers insight into
it happened to Schwarzenberg's tight control during
; last months:

His Excellency the Minister has declared himself
ready to provide all drafts of the first [Political]
Section with the "for copying" mark as a symbol of
his approval. The Desk Chiefs are hereby informed
of this and are further instructed that the order
issued at the command of the deceased Minister-
President on December 10, 1848, whereby no draft in
either Section may be submitted for copying without
prior approval of the Minister or of myself [Werner],
shall once again be placed in full force.

In special cases——when, for example, the departure
deadline for the dispatch is approaching and neither
I nor the Minister are in the office——exceptions to

 

120See above, pp. 39-40-

121Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 1:431-432.

 

firs

pro-

iro

m
f
Drt
s

 

 

 

83

the above rule are allowed, in reliance on the exper—
tise and discretion of the Desk Chiefs; but they must
be restricted to the most urgent and less important
cases and such a piece in any case must be brought

to the special attention of the Minister when he
signs it.

Werner's use of the word "again" at the end of the
first paragraph would seem to indicate that Schwarzenberg's
movision to ensure that he exercised close personal con—
;rol over the content of outgoing dispatches was frequently
iolated in his last years. In repeating the substance
f the December 10, 1848, order covering this operational
rocedure, Werner reminded the Desk Chiefs that such a
rovision did exist, thereby providing further evidence
f its recent neglect. If the average amount of time
:hwarzenberg was forced to devote to domestic affairs
as anything approaching a normal work week, as we have
stimated it was, the resulting loss of time available
Ir details of Foreign Office operations would explain
e decline in the degree of authority exercised by the
nister over his subordinates. This may also explain
e power struggle alluded to in the discussion of the
he of dispatches leaving the Foreign Office. As long
Schwarzenberg exercised close supervision over him,
finer would have never considered speaking out in favor

a more reserved manner of addressing foreign govern—

ts, however much he disagreed with the sharp tone adopted

 

122Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ-
erung, Fasz. 4, Werner "Chancellery Order," Apr. 13,
9

-0

 

 

 

 

84

Thierry and approved by Schwarzenberg.123 But once
rner became the effective chief of the Ministry's
actical operation, he was placed in a position of having
approve or disapprove the content of all dispatches.
nfronted by a document written by Thierry in a tone
ich Werner found offensive for its abrasiveness, the
iersecretary, before approving it for copy, would have
in inclined to revise the piece in accordance with his
imore moderate form of expression. Once copied,
warzenberg would receive the piece for final signature
a form displeasing to him, and would most likely take
his displeasure on Werner. This is in fact precisely

124 The conclusion must therefore be that

t happened.

warzenberg lost the effective current supervision of

>rtant political affairs which his position as head
non-collegial department required of him.

This fact was certainly not lost on Buol, as wit—
ed by the Werner order cited above. Suffering from
iting disability, as did his predecessor, Buol's

ice of personally drafting important dispatches

ore in accordance with the sound operational principles

ned by Werner in his January 9, 1849, memorandum

 

123See below, pp. 244-245, for a discussion of
r's personality.

 

lzu'Austria, HHStA, PA I, K 528, Rechberg Nachlass,
r Letter to Mensdorff, Dresden, Jan. 28, 1865.

 

than
of c
case

one

 

 

85

an was that of Schwarzenberg.125 Ministerial supervision

current political affairs was thus automatic in such

ses. In the case of important affairs initiated by
e of his advisers, Buol nearly always approved the draft
the dispatch before it was copied. In order better
control individual spheres of authority, exact pro—
sions for the handling of the assigned responsibilities

an absent Desk Chief were put on paper and circulated,
m far greater frequency than under Schwarzenberg.126

er struggles and personal vendettas of the sort occurring
1851—1852 as a result of the Minister's failure properly
supervise his subordinates were unknown under Buol.
it is true that Biegeleben conducted diplomatic inter—
127

vs with foreign emissaries in his office, it would

2 been an isolated breach of operating procedures
2r Buol. It is very likely untrue, or at least mis-
ed chronologically. With the exception of Werner
uol's absence, no Foreign Office adviser dealt with
direct affairs of diplomacy, and even Werner was sub—
to detailed instructions in such instances.
But more importantly for the future operation of

oreign Office, Franz Joseph had also recognized

 

125Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 144.

 

126Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
. Referats—Einteilung.

127Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, p. 259.

 

the

hm

hm

 

 

 

86

e inadequacy of the supervision exercised by Schwarzen—
-rg and had laid the groundwork for its rectification

'ng before Schwarzenberg's death. An absolutist from

e very beginning, Franz Joseph took the throne with
s tutor for military affairs, General Coronini, advising
m to occupy himself with the routine bureaucratic affairs
his Empire in order to breathe life into the lethargic

vernmental machinery.128

Temporarily intimidated by

s self-assurance of Schwarzenberg in the foreign political

iere, Franz Joseph began to assert himself in accordance

h this advice by the end of 1850.129 This was the

inning of the period of the transformation of the

ire from a constitutional to a neo—absolutistic state.
of the many implications this transformation had for

eign policy, to be discussed later in detail, was

ected in an imperial order of April 12, 1852, instruc—
all ministers to present to the Emperor a precise
ription of the operational routine of their respective

rtments in order that Franz Joseph could personally

130

rvise the operation of each. Buol presented the

ested description for the Foreign Office on December

 

128Heller, "Die ersten zwei Jahrzehnten der Regierung
: Josephs," p. 22.

129Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : SchwarZen—

130Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien
rat: Aktenstucke, p. 143.

 

 

 

87

1852,131 and followed it with an order of December

., 1852, to institute a Registry for all correspondence

 

mering the Political Section of the Ministry, effective
nuary l, 1853.132 This order was clearly conceived
‘as a logical complement to the operational description,
asmuch as it indulged in practical terms the Emperor's
sire to insert himself into the daily routine of the
listry. Franz Joseph needed a means for obtaining an
erview of the important correspondence before it was
idled by the Ministry, so that he would not be dependent
ely on the Minister's judgment for receiving whatever
erial might be of interest. An Incoming Correspondence
istry for the Political Section, analogous to that in
Administrative Section, provided that overview.

For Kfibeck the absolutist, even these measures
not provide adequate assurance that the Emperor would
tess sufficient control over the Foreign Ministry's
ation. He suggested that procedures for ensuring
regular delivery to Franz Joseph of all important
ming correspondence and of drafts of outgoing dis—
hes for the purposes of inspection and revision be

rporated into the operational description.133 Neither

 

131Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
rung, Fasz. 3, Operational Description delivered to
Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852 (misdated Apr- 23, 1846).

13211331., Fasz. 4, Order of Dec. 31, 1852.

133Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom Durch-
1 des Absolutismus: Aktenstficke, pp. 24-35,

 

 

 

 

 

 

the
its
but
was

was

 

88
1e operational description nor Kflbeck's suggestion for
:s revision, it is true, was acted upon by the Emperor,
it the absolutistic spirit motivating their authorships
.s in no way weakened as a result. That Franz Joseph
s in fact very much involved in the routine processing
diplomatic reports during this period is attested to
Hfibner.134 The Emperor's involvement was not new with
e arrival of Buol. Important incoming material had
an delivered to Franz Joseph for his inspection and
nments on a regular basis under Schwarzenberg as well.135
: this does not mean that the Emperor was at any time
‘ing these years his own foreign minister. It is true
.t the Buol Nachlass is filled with notes by Franz
eph commenting on foreign affairs, but these are all
a most elementary nature and tend to seek out Buol's
ion rather than order the implementation of a policy

136

rmined by the Emperor. In any case, they are most
1y no different from the exchanges which had earlier
red orally between the Emperor and Schwarzenberg.

two were in much more frequent personal contact than

the case with Buol, thus rendering unnecessary the

ten notes which have since been used as historical

 

134

Hfibner, Neun Jahre, 1:52.

l35Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 46,
rzenberg Proposal to the Emperor, Mar. 24, 1851.

136Ibid., Interna, K 277a, Buol Nachlass.

. —-

 

pm

the

0H

 

 

89

dence that Buol took his orders directly from the
eror.137

Yet the submission of an operational description

the resulting establishment of an Incoming Corres—
ience Registry for the Political Section did mean that
opportunity now existed for Franz Joseph to intrude
1 regular and independent basis into the supervisory
-Vities normally reserved for the minister himself as
sf of a non—collegial organization. It both symbolized
contributed to the loss of authority over foreign
,irs which the Foreign Office was to suffer as an
itution during the following years.

In practice, moreover, the institutionalization
means by which the Emperor could remain currently
3 of the management of foreign affairs proved to be
pediment to the efficient operation of the Office.
ntioned earlier, one of Werner's greatest concerns

s 1849 reform measures was to expedite the flow of
rs. The ability of the Emperor to select at will
ocument entering or leaving the Political Section
0 hold it as long as he pleased proved to be a bottle—
in Werner's system. The problem became worse as
Joseph emerged emboldened from the Crimean War,

ced that he had personally pursued a successful

, and began increasingly to consider himself

 

137As does Heller.in "Die ersten zwei Jahrzehnten
gierung Franz Josephs," pp. 2 —27.

 

 

capai
ohm
or b

disp

Offf
Sch

Bus

9O

able of sound foreign policy decisions. Days would
an pass before an incoming piece could be processed
)efore an otherwise completed response could be
satched.138

On the whole, however, the operation of the Foreign
.ce had no serious defects under Schwarzenberg or Buol.
arzenberg made better use of his personnel than did
, but allowed the tight control characteristic of his
t years to slip as his outside responsibilities in—
sed and his health deteriorated. Buol re—established
control but found himself in competition for it with
Emperor, about which he was to complain with some
erness shortly after his dismissal in 1859.139 He
slipped to a certain degree back toward the pre—1848
tice of consulting only selected advisers of a very
al philosophical bent on most issues. But in every
ct, the operation of the Foreign Office was far superior
at it had been before March 1848. It was more pro—
ve, more intelligently used, and more efficient.
ey figure in this rejuvenation was Joseph von Werner,
along with his subordinates, we shall discuss

ntly. But in order to discuss the relative importance

138Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, K 277L, Buol
ass, Werner Letter to Buol, Oct. 10, 1857.

 

139Joseph Redlich, Das osterreichische Staats— und

3 roblem, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Der neue Geist Verlag,
L927), l/2:234—240.

 

 

 

 

 

91
the personnel in the Austrian Foreign Office, it is
st necessary to examine the significance of the positions
ch the Beamten held. We therefore turn to the organ—

tion of the Foreign Ministry.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The quality of an institution's organization can

: be measured by the extent to which its various sections
‘espond to the fulfillment of the institution's pre—
ermined functions. If the functions are not well—
.ned by a superior authority, the institution will

likely assume whatever roles its own political author—
will permit. Political authority by its very nature
matter determined by changing personalities and by
varying degrees of success enjoyed by the institution
esponse to specific political events. Rational organ—
‘on of the institution whose sphere of competence
stermined by this ever—changing authority is impossible,
2 the number and nature of matters with which it is
ged changes with its authority. It follows that a
.se delimitation of an institution's functional area
mpetence is necessary for a rational organization
ist. But while necessary, such a delimitation is
ufficient for rational organization. The perceptions
are held by the key persons in authority, both
1 and outside the institution, about the character

slative importance of each function are also crucial

92

 

 

 

ins

93

termining the manner in which the concerned institution
ganized to discharge its obligations. Since such
ptions are by their nature subjective and prone to
e, the organization of the institution must be capable
iptation in order to maintain efficiency in the face
tered goals.

There are, then, two criteria against which an
:ution's organization is to be judged: Are its
.ons well—defined? Is it capable of expeditiously
ming these functions regardless of the interpretation
them when they are applied to specific political

or conditions? If the answers to these questions
the affirmative, then the organization can be
rational. With qualifications, this was the case

1e Austrian Foreign Office from 1849 until 1856.
ilifications, however, are important, for they deal
1e Austrian role in the Crimean War. On the one

Ln unclear conception of Austrian interests vis-a—vis
:oman Empire tended to impart to the Foreign Office
rtain sense of its functions in this sphere prior
1853, and a contradictory sense of its functions

hat point. Both senses were reflected in and

:ed by the organizational structure. On the other
iere occurred in the sphere of one Desk within the

ll Section during this period a concentration

‘ to an extent which proved damaging to the rational

,of labor that had been established by Schwarzenberg.

This
into

Fore

had

it

om

I ;
I
l
l
w
I

 

 

94

ended to impair the flexibility earlier incorporated
he responses made to political problems by the
n Office by virtue of its utilization of the adver—
ystem. The result, as will only become fully clear
following chapters, was a compromise in the ability
Foreign Office to perform its functions in the
Tfective manner.
Fhe primary general functions of the Foreign Ministry
en fairly clear since its inception in 1742. Indeed
Maria Theresa's chief purpose in creating the

y to unite all authority over foreign affairs in
se, Court and State Chancellery. Prior to 1742,
isunity, competition and confusion existed in the
tion and implementation of foreign policy, partly
asequence of the parallel character of Austrian
V Roman Imperial institutions, partly because
strian crownland had its own constitution and
.aim to foreign policy authority, and partly be—
wreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire was handled,
irmity with the Austrian views of the Turks at the
lely by the Court War Council. As the Holy Roman
institutions, especially the Imperial Chancellery,
lose authority as a result of the Thirty Years'
Austrian Court Chancellery assumed its foreign
inctions. When the disunity remained due to the
r of the Austrian constitutional structure, Maria

:imply dispossessed all other chancelleries of

 

theii
crea'
affa
exis
poli

or}

95

foreign policy authority and gave it to her new
ion.1 The new State Chancellery also included the
‘s of the imperial family and court because of the
ence of a highly revered tradition by which foreign
' was the exclusive prerogative of the monarch. His
affairs and those of the state in their relations
side governments were one and the same.
Representation of the interests of the Austrian

of the monarch and of his or her subjects in all
ir relations with foreign governments was thus the
3 general function of the Foreign Office from 1742
No essential changes in this function occurred
.918.2 What did change were the more specific func—
reflected primarily in the means for achieving
l policy goals as the practice of foreign relations

new aspects, notably in the area of foreign trade

  
  
  
  
  
  
   
   

trol of public opinion, and demanded greater em—
on long—existing practices, such as espionage.
anges required numerous alterations in the organ—
of the Ministry, many of them occurring under

ch, first as a result of the fragmentation caused
apoleonic Wars, then due to more gradual shifts
gn policy needs in the 1830s and 18408. More

ons occurred as a result of the 1848 revolutions,

     
 

ittner, "Das 6sterreichisch—ungarische Ministerium
ern," pp. 819—843.

bid., p. 823.

|
w
!
1

 

the i
gove

solu

pret

185i

 

96

:ubsequent establishment of a ministerial system of
-nment, and finally as a result of the return to ab—
;ism in 1851—1852.

The Foreign Ministry's specific functions were
.sely defined during the period extending through the
: only insofar as they related to the representation
artain administrative interests of the Austrian sover—

state and subjects. Political interests of the
'ian state were specified as being within the Foreign
try's sphere of competence, but virtually nothing

fic concerning guidelines for the maintenance or

 

it of these interests was provided. Whether or not

xplicit official guidelines sanctioned by the emperor

ed for the Foreign Ministry during Metternich's

d is unclear, but a schema of responsibilities of

iministrative Section dating from April 23, 1846,

that the Ministry's non—political functions were

Ly understood. Very specific categories of affairs

1g with the imperial family, foreign service per—

_, the church, the Orient, the consular system, foreign
ministry finances, imperial orders, international

ranting of passports and visas, censorship, police,

an subjects in foreign lands and much else were

ed out to the personnel employed in the Administrative

d.3 If these responsibilities were not explicitly

 

3Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
lg, Fasz. 3, Administrative Section organization
Apr. 23, 1846.

 

expr

.l,ll.,.,l::- ...

 

97
messed by imperial decree, it was because they had long
we been clearly understood by all to be part of the
te Chancellery's sphere of competence.

The revolution of 1848 resulted in a new name for
ternich's State Chancellery-—"The Ministry of Foreign
airs and of the Imperial House"——and a new legal position
the institution.“r This did not mean that its functions
3 altered appreciably, but it did result indirectly
:he drafting of a specified list of responsibilities
.ing within the Ministry's sphere of competence.

Ir to 1848, all central governing institutions except
Foreign Ministry possessed a collegial organization
an advisory character vis-a—vis the emperor, as opposed
hat of ministerial responsibility.5 The revolution
the constitution of April 25, 1848, transformed all
iese central agencies into specialized responsible
:tries.6 Since no precedents for the spheres of
itence of these specialized ministries existed in
ia, it was deemed necessary formally to establish
spheres in writing and with imperial, ministerial
irliamentary sanction. During the spring and summer

#8. therefore, documents of this sort were drafted

 

4Bittner, "Das 6sterreichisch-ungarische Ministerium
ssern," p. 823.

5Engel—Janosi, "Der Ballhausplatz, 1848—1918," p. 14.

)Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,

 

for

new

 

98

r each ministry. Although the Foreign Ministry had
ver been organized collegially, and although it pos—
seed a clear idea of its functions, a functional schema
stinguishing its area of responsibility from those of
a other ministries was also considered useful and there—
‘e included as part of a common draft.7

The section of the sphere of competence schema
dying to the Foreign Ministry confirmed the assignment
the Ministry of the administrative functions reflected
the April 1846 document. The political functions were
sed over very generally in the first four clauses:
respondence with the governments of other states,
ining of diplomats, conclusion of treaties and handling
affairs of the German Confederation. Guidelines about
principles to be used in achieving these political
s were not present. Matters concerning the protection
representation of the rights of the imperial family
house were spelled out in greater detail, thereby
ing considerable limitations on the options available
éganizing the section charged with the execution of
e functions. Not surprisingly, the organization of
dministrative Section after 1848 was much more similar

s pre~1848 counterpart than was the case in the

7Ibid., pp. 73, 104. The schema drafted as a pro—
1al guideline for the organization of the Justice
:ry is printed in Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der
erien Kolowrat: Aktenstficke, pp. 14-18.

 

Pol

in'i

9W

 

 

99
tical Section.8
The transformation of the Monarchy's government

a neo—absolutistic system in 1851—1853 required an
more precise delimitation of the functions pertaining
ach governing institution. As the key figure in an
lutistic system, the emperor became theoretically
snsible for every governmental activity, and, along
the necessity to supervise the operations of each
:y, he became further burdened with the task of en—
ig that no agency exceeded its own functional
leters.9 With this requirement before him, Franz
wh demanded from the head of each central institution
ubmission of a sphere of competence schema.lo These
ceived in a collective proposal signed by Schwarzen—
on January 9, 1852.11 In the schema submitted by
rzenberg specifically for the Foreign Ministry,
pproved by Franz Joseph on April 12, 1852, the respon—

-ties for the representation of the imperial family's

8Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—

ng, Fasz. 3, untitled, unsigned, undated fragment
chema probably compiled collectively for each central
ing agency and never published. See Appendix C

e text of the document.

 

9Bittner, "Das Ssterreichisch—ungarische Ministerium
ssern," pp. 819—843.

LOAustria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—

>11e, K 9, Minutes of the Aug. 27, 1851 session.

 

'lSee Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien
t: Aktenstficke, pp. 135—188, for the full text,
ng all attachments.

 

 

for
Add

the

100

>gatives were spelled out in much greater detail than
in the schema of 1848. So too were the Foreign
:try's obligations in the realm of essentially adminis-
.ve matters more sharply delimited than in 1848. The
llment of each such designated responsibility called
correspondingly specific subdivision within the
istrative Section. Yet, while the organization of
dministrative Section was determined to some extent
plicitly stated functions, nothing in this schema,
3 the case with the 1848 document, conditioned the
ization of the Political Section. The sole require—
smerging from the schema was that an agency capable
idling foreign political affairs exist.12
What did condition the organization of the Political
in, as well as to some degree the Administrative

n, the Mechanical Services Branch, and all other

es of which the Foreign Ministry was composed, were
the exigencies of international politics. It is
is reason that the general shape of the Foreign
by, corresponding to the unchanging general char—
)f international diplomacy, did not change from
:eption in 1742 until its final demise in 1918.
2 more specific features of the practice of inter—

1 politics did change with the times and specific

 

2Ibid., pp. 156—158 (see below, Appendix D); also,

—l56 for Schwarzenberg's interpretation of the
concerning the imperial house for which the Foreign

V had to assume responsibility (see below, Appendix E).

 

p)

D)

101

rganizational alterations of the Foreign Office were
:cordingly required in order to meet the new conditions.
.e effectiveness of the Foreign Office at any point during
is 176 year period depended in part on the degree to
ich those individuals charged with its supervision

re able to respond with intelligent organizational
iovations and reforms to the new practices and require—
its of diplomacy.

The general goal of the Foreign Ministry being de—

.ed as the representation of Austrian state, dynastical
private interests abroad, it followed logically that
ranch should exist to assist the minister in analyzing
oming communications and drafting appropriate replies.
also followed that a branch handling the mechanics,
., the filing and copying of such correspondence,
dd exist. Thus were established the Policy Branch
the Mechanical Services Branch. Since effective
cy formulation depended in part on earlier actions
treaties, a repository for documents recording these
iecessary, with the result that the state archives
gradually brought under the control of the Foreign
:try.13 Since effective policy formulation depended
er in part on effective intelligence gathering,

ing and Translation Bureau, while never under the

 

13Ludwig Bittner and Lothar Gross, eds., Gesamt—
tar des Wiener Haus-, Hof— und Staatsarchivs, 5 vols.
1a: Holzhausen, 1936—1940), 1:*66.

set

new

cip
for

the

102

ial formal control of the Ministry before 1848, was
artheless brought into very close cooperation with

.n order to serve not only as the office charged with
ering Austrian dispatches and deciphering those of

ign governments, but also as the headquarters for
Austrian espionage system.lu Because effective policy
ementation depended largely on the presence at im—
int posts of well—trained diplomats, the Oriental
smy was established and placed under Foreign Office
rvision in order to train foreign service officers
assignments to regions under the suzerainty of the
1an Empire. A specialized training academy of this
was deemed sufficient because it was assumed that
mats destined for any other European posts would
from a class whose members received as a matter of
e the necessary skills through their normal education.
was later to prove a false assumption, but it seemed
Ll at the time. Finally, all of the personnel assigned
‘ various branches attached to the Foreign Ministry
be paid, for which purpose the Paymaster's Office

eated.l5

 

LL‘Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, K 296,

s 284—287), Proposal (Lebzeltern draft) for sub—
1 to the Emperor, undated (mid—March 1848).

 

5Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
ierungs-Auskfinfte, Note to Netherlands Foreign
Apr. 5, 1853.

 

was '
requ
poii

deli

 

 

103
The general organization of the Foreign Ministry

hus determined from the very beginning by the simple
'rements imposed by the general conduct of foreign

y. But partly as a result of the increasingly detailed
nitation of functions, as outlined above, and partly
ise of the use of changing instruments of foreign
:y as Europe moved into the nineteenth century, changes
specific nature within the organizations of each
h of the Ministry did occur. Nothing of importance

his study happened to the organization of the Oriental

 

my, the archives or the Paymaster's Office. Each
urposes generally related to the operation of the

gn policy mechanism, but reforms within each, most
ly in the archives,16 had no influence on the operation
it mechanism. Reforms within the Policy Branch,
iical Services Branch and Coding and Translation

1 did, however, affect the foreign policy mechanism.
‘eatest of these reforms occurred simultaneously

nd as a part of the 1848-1849 operational reforms
ed in the previous chapter. In order to discuss
sracter and effect of these and later reforms, it
st necessary to examine briefly the internal organ—
L of each of these three branches and the foreign
demands they were meant to meet during the last

f Metternich.

5Bittner and Gross, eds., Gesamtinventar, vol. 1,
:tion.

 

ihtd

est:

 

 

104

As early as 1816, the Policy Branch had been divided

a Political and an Administrative Section, thereby
wlishing the principle that a distinction existed

:en affairs concerning state political interests on

)ne hand and state economic and administrative affairs,

all as representation of the individual rights of

fian subjects, on the other.17 It was never intended

the two Sections should split off from each other

>ecome separate chancelleries, each isolated from the

.edge of what the other was doing. Isolation of each

levertheless developed by 1830, when Metternich sought

:ctify the situation by re-invoking an old provision
eby the senior Beamten in both Sections could be

rned at the request of any one of their number to
.nge information and views and to reach an accord
the handling of a situation of common interest to

18 That this attempt remained fruitless

Sections.
ident from the comments of a first—hand witness of
te Metternichean Foreign Office organization who

of the vast improvement in the connection between

0 Sections with the creation of the post of

ecretary of State in 1848:

 

l7Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 16.

18Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
g, Fasz. 2, Directive by Metternich, July 21,

 

 

 

 

 

105

Its [the creation of the new post] prime advantage
existed in the fact that the ever—looser link of the
Foreign with the Domestic, the Diplomatic with the
Administrative Section, whereby the entire service
had suffered, was once again tied more closely.
Metternich had paid virtually no heed to the latter
Section, while the Beamte ranked immediately below
him, the Staatsrat, be he Ottenfels or Lebzeltern,
knew practically nothing of the current handling of
affairs in the First, the Diplomatic Section. Yet
the connection between the two——one needs only to
consider everything that relates to the affairs of
trade policy——is so great that the mutual isolation
of each Section was extremely detrimental to the
business at hand. But since the minister must devote
his primary attention to the conduct of genuine diplo—
matic affairs, it appeared urgently necessary that
his immediate subordinate, the undersecretary of state,
combine the leadership of the Administrative Section
with exact and continuous knowledge of the current
state of purely political affairs.19

dualistic character of the Policy Branch was thus a
toy of the Metternichean organization and its prime
(ness, that of the mutual isolation of the two Sections,
one of the first objects of the 1849 reform.
Within the Administrative Section of the Policy

ch, a fairly clear division of responsibilities,

ated either explicitly by an imperial order delimiting
functions or implicitly by traditional usage, existed
16 and remained in basically unaltered form until
rnich's departure. The Section was headed by a

srat, the highest rank beneath minister within the

gn Office. He also controlled one Department, that
ng with foreign service personnel affairs (including

in the MinistrY). the affairs of the imperial

 

19Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:5.

 

fami

all

the

tri

De;

CUE

MW.

[[103

 

 

 

 

106

ily and household, and religious affairs. Following
importance this Department was the one dealing with
affairs, both political and administrative, concerning
Ottoman Empire, and with the supervision of the Aus—

an consular system. Beyond these, seven additional
artments existed by 1846: a Department for trade,

toms, steamship and railway travel, banking affairs,
German customs union, slave trade, salt and tobacco
opolies and industrial affairs; a Department for Foreign
istry budget affairs; a Department for affairs of

trian imperial orders, academic societies, libraries,
Court Translator, foreign missions stationed in Vienna,
nchises, contraband, etc.; a Department for justice

airs in cases where international law was involved,
handling of debts owed to Austria by foreign

rnments and for archival affairs; a Department for

ing passports, certifying official charters and

ection of taxes; a Department of censorship affairs,

ce questions, relationships with the military,

ersity curriculum affairs and support for political

vity favorable to Austria; and a Department for affairs
ivate Austrian citizens in all foreign lands.20
Two facts become visible out of this sketch of the

istrative Section's organization. First, it

 

20Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
ung, Fasz. 3, Organizational Schema for the Admin-
tive Section, Apr. 23, 1846.

 

 

incl
tio
aga
eve

pee

 

107
icluded provisions for the fulfillment of all those func—
.ons explicitly imposed upon the Ministry in 1848, and
:ain in 1852, by imperial decree. For this reason nearly
ery heading of this 1846 schema was also subsumed under
st-1848 schemata. Secondly, the division of the Section
to nine Departments caused considerable fragmentation
authority over the functions represented by these headings.
s most obvious of these had to do with commercial affairs,
ismuch as trade relations with Turkish territories were
)arated functionally from general trade policy toward
, other countries. Likewise, those dealing with pre—
:atives of the imperial family, household and court
e unnecessarily divided. Why, moreover, should a
artment having supervision over state libraries also
e had jurisdiction over affairs concerning foreign
sions stationed in Vienna and over contraband questions?
impression conveyed, borne out by later evidence, is
t Administrative Section affairs were assigned on the
is of which bureaucrat was the least burdened, rather
1 on any sound functional principles.21 For this reason,
Administrative Section would acquire different, more
.cal groupings of essentially the same responsibilities
tr the 1849 reforms.

The organization of the Political Section is less

 

21

Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,
ats-Einteilung, Schwarzenberg (Werner) Directive,
19, 1849.

 

 

easy

 

 

 

108
asy to determine for Metternich's period. This is due
artly to the dearth of specific functional guidelines
or this Section, and partly to Metternich's personal
esponse to the requirements imposed by the non—collegial
fstem prevailing in his sphere, as discussed in the pre—
Lous chapter.22 The prevention of any single Desk Chief
‘om competing with the minister for authority required
.ther good supervision on the part of the latter or
eping the potentially threatening individual ignorant
his precise functions. Metternich selected the latter
urse, and the lack of sharp delimitation of functions
ong the Desk Chiefs became a matter of principle.23
a body, the Political Section incorporated responsi—
Lity for political relations with all European and
erican states, with the important exception of Turkey,
min its sphere of competence. There was no formal
ef of this Section, although the senior Hofrat, Werner
1847—1848, acted as informal supervisor of the work
h which it was entrusted.24 Each Desk Chief had a
eral idea of his geographical responsibilities: Werner
1 the lion's share, including Germany, Switzerland

Russia; Otto von Meysenbug had Italian affairs; Carl

 

22See pp. 23-25.

23Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 13.

 

24Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
rung, Fasz. 3, Metternich Directive to Lebzeltern,
19, 1847.

 

woni

rela

VOA

int

 

 

109

Hummelauer controlled Western European and American
tions. There was also a Desk with responsibility
police affairs in the Political Section, run by Franz
Mensshengen. Its function was to control Austria's
rnational intelligence network.25
This arrangement would probably have worked had it
been for the fact that Metternich's personal cabinet
far more important in foreign policy formulation
,were the combined Desk Chiefs of the Political
ion. The Minister's Cabinet defies an analysis of
own organization. It was simply an agglomeration of
ign Office Beamten who had flocked from the old German
rial lands to Vienna as refugees from Napoleonic
rialism at the beginning of the century, just as the
ernich and Stadion families had done. To a large
it, they were adherents to the old Imperial idea in
?al Europe and professed a type of Catholicism which
:ened back to a medieval conception of the pope as
iniversal leader of Christendom and of the Habsburg
*ch, best exemplified by Charles V, as his temporal
enant. This traditionalist group, not at all typical
ennese society in the early nineteenth century, was
reinforced by an influx of equally atypical ad—
ts to a reform—Catholic, messianic movement origin—

in South and West Germany which was complemented

 

25Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 21, 23.

 

L, l{
t

 

by a s
the Re
decade
combir
into i
impose
Which
pehde
inclu
at a:
detei
usurj
Wors
incl
Char
41ft

T01

 

110

a similar movement originating on Austrian soil with
e Redemptorist monk Clemens Maria Hofbauer in the second

26 Metternich was attracted to this

:cade of the century.
wmbined movement, incorporated several of its members

mo his personal cabinet as his closest confidants and
1posed no limitations as to the types of matters with

LiCh this body could concern itself. Its existence de—
ended solely on Metternich, and its responsibilities

icluded whatever Metternich thought appropriate for it

3 any given time.27 For the Desk Chiefs with geographically
etermined functions, its existence meant an arbitrary
surpation of responsibilities, a bad situation rendered

)rse by the fact that Metternich's confidants usually
Lcluded at least one of the Desk Chiefs. In the State
,ancellor's last years, Werner was one of his closest

formal advisers.28 Thus possessing a dual political

1e, such an individual's authority in his capacity as

sk Chief was extended to an uncertain extent over the

heres of competence of other Desk Chiefs. The result

3 that functions within the Political Section were

3 Sharply delimited, with some affairs being processed

 

' 26This very special group and its further ramifi—
ions for Austrian policy in the 1850s will be discussed
length in Chapters 3 and 4.

427Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 105—108,
-1 9. "“"‘”‘“"' '

28Ibid., p. 144.

“‘M . .-._.- :

 

by m

and

iti‘

hat

the

n

pm

 

 

111
y more than one authority, others being entirely neglected,
nd all being handled haphazardly.

The Minister's Cabinet did, however, have its pos—
tive side. Public opinion had become a force in inter—
ational affairs by the time of Metternich's arrival on
1e Ballhausplatz in 1809. Recognizing this, he took
nmediate steps to utilize it for his foreign political
1rposes. He sought to control the Wiener Zeitung, Aus—
‘ia's most popular newspaper, established as his foreign
licy mouthpiece in 1810 the Osterreichischer Beobachter,
ich lasted until 1848, and created the Wiener Jahrbficher
r Literatur, an intellectual journal which he maintained
1y at great cost.29 In foreign areas, he subsidized
wspaper editors, such as Cotta of the Allgemeine Zeitung ‘
Frankfurt, who would support his foreign policy.
also recruited from abroad writers who would interpret
strian history in a sense favorable to the Monarchy.
seph von Pilat and Friedrich Hurter, both strong reform
:holics in the mold of Clemens Maria Hofbauer, were

prime figures in these efforts to influence public
ion by the 18408.30 Pilat was the heart of Metter—
's cabinet in the 1840s, and Hurter, like his good
nd Werner, was an important member of it. Their

icist activities gave to the cabinet its only

 

29Ibid., pp. 43—44.

3OIbid., pp. 45—49.

legi
com

the

it

 

112
gitimate political purpose which was not simultaneously
interproductive to the other political functions of
a Ministry.

But while Metternich's organization proved adaptable
the increased importance of public opinion in foreign
’airs, it remained basically a flawed system. An in—
quate division of responsibilities within the Political
tion, an irrational distribution of functions in the
inistrative Section, and the lack of any connection
coordination between the two Sections doomed it to
ffectiveness. One of the most flagrant examples of
ffectiveness can be found in the manner in which
nercial policy was handled, as intimated in the above
irks by Arneth.31 Metternich showed in 1841 a dreadful
: of appreciation for the importance of a coherent
Le policy when he made what he considered an improve—

in organization by assigning trade affairs with
and, Western Europe and America to a Desk Chief in
Political Section, those regarding the German states,
y instituted commercial treaties with Turkey and
irs of Danubian and Elbian shipping to one Department
f in the Administrative Section, and those arising
told treaties with Turkey and from the existence of
onsular system as a whole to another Administrative

tment Chief. Any facets of commercial policy not

 

318cc above, p. 105.

inc
whc
upc
wi‘

wi-

idE

 

 

113

:luded in the above were to remain in the domain of those
J had handled them previously. All this was conditional
>n the stricture that each Beamte having anything to do
:h trade relations would remain in the closest contact
:h all others concerned, a stricture that remained a
Ld letter from the beginning since no individual in
2 Section had any idea of the existence of trade policy
:ters currently being handled in the other.32 The result,
course, was the absolute lack of any trade policy what—
r. In its place was a fragmented series of responses
issues, the overall significance of which was only
1y perceived.

As we shall see, the problem of properly organizing
Foreign Office to accommodate commercial policy re-
aed even after the 1849 reforms, although for somewhat
Eerent reasons. The significance of Metternich's
.ure adequately to provide for it lies in the general
Lnizational problems with which Werner and Schwarzenberg
to contend in late 1848 and early 1849 in reforming
Policy Branch of the Foreign Office. Fragmentation
unctions and indistinct lines of authority were the
test of these. But before discussing the specific
rms, a word about the Mechanical Services Branch under

srnich is in order. As noted in the previous chapter,

 

32Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
ung, Fasz. 3, Proposal from Metternich to the
or, June 13, 1841.

 

the
A C

the

 

 

 

114
Incoming Correspondence Registry existed in either
9 Administrative or Political Section prior to 1848.
fopying Office did exist for each Section, but only
it of the Administrative Section possessed a permanently
:igned Director and Adjutant. Those serving in these
)acities in the Political Section Copying Office were
iultaneously entrusted with functions in the Policy
nch. The consequence was a further clouding of political
ponsibilities, a condition already overly prevalent
this Section. To do the actual work, each Copying
ice employed approximately six Offizialen, the lowest
d rank of Beamten in the Foreign Office. Attached
the Copying Office of the Political Section was a
iography bureau and an office to decipher coded messages
n Austrian missions abroad. To the Administrative
ring Office was attached a section for calligraphy,
erally utilized for drawing up treaties and imperial
‘ees. Similarly to the Copying Office organization,
gistry for documents received and produced by the
cy Branch existed in both Sections. Only that of the
nistrative Section had a regularly assigned Director
Adjutant, with those filling these positions in the
tical Section once again mixing simultaneously in
:ics.33 Finally, the Old Registry, consisting of

‘ds retrieved from lands no longer under Habsburg

 

 

33Ibid., Proposal from Werner to Schwarzenberg,

21, 1849.

 

control
until 5

was tr:

under i
tuhity
Orgahi

Decemt

 

115
ontrol, remained a part of the Mechanical Services Branch
atil it was fully organized in 1853, whereupon the Registry
is transferred to the archives.34
As one of the key figures in the Foreign Office
ider Metternich, Werner had certainly had ample oppor-
Jnity to study the rather serious failings in the Ministry's
oganization by the time Schwarzenberg selected him on
scember 1, 1848, to return to Vienna and undertake its
aform. Werner had considerable license in this mission.
it much in the way of reorganization had taken place
.nce March and April 1848 when the Ministry was made
.rt of a constitutional system with responsibilities to
parliament and Ministerrat. The aforementioned schema
‘Foreign Ministry functions, consideration of which
uld have been necessary in any reorganization under—
ken earlier, had been predicated upon the April 25,
48, constitution, which was effectively invalidated
th the declaration of martial law when Vienna was sub—
;ated on October 31, 1848.35 And even had the schema
mined in force, it was sufficiently general and
ficiently congruent with the functions traditionally

formed by the Foreign Ministry that it would not have

 

34Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 402,
Alirte Vortrage, Buol Proposal to the Emperor, July
1853.

 

35Wa1ter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,

 

 

appreci
berg es
of orgz
refleC'
politi
deasur

in the

of it
Senic
foref

Chart

 

116

preciably constricted Werner's considerations. Schwarzen-
?g certainly had few of his own ideas about the intricacies
organization, in contrast to his fairly specific ideas,
lected in the revamped operational routine, about how
itical decisions should be reached and administrative
sures implemented. Werner thus had a nearly free rein
the process of reorganization.

The sole facet of reorganization which occurred
are Werner took charge of it had to do with the dis—
ition of the imperial Coding and Translation Bureau
the incorporation into the Foreign Ministry of some
-ts earlier functions and personnel. Metternich's
.or advisers recognized the importance to Austrian
ign policy of the emphasis placed by the old State
cellor on espionage activities.36 Under the cover
he Coding and Translation Bureau, the administration
1e espionage service, which included 31 active spies
>reign countries and many more within the domestic
‘ian postal service in 1848,37 was connected very
1y with the Foreign Office. The outbreak of the
revolution spelled doom for this agency as it then

ed. Blaming a lack of discretion and a flawed

 

36Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, K 296,
Proposal from Lebzeltern to the Emperor, undated
arch 1848).

 

37Ibid., Draft Proposal from Lebzeltern to the
r, Apr. 1848.

 

117

eganization, Lebzeltern perceived that "the agency for

ie supervision of correspondence, existing under the

ime of the Secret Coding Cabinet, has attracted public
:tention," and advocated immediate measures "to preclude

: far as possible any compromising of the government's
sition . . ."38 Those measures included the dissolution
ccomplished March 25, 1848) of the Bureau, the transfer
all of its tools and part of its personnel to the

ate Chancellery building, the transfer of domestic

ies to the control of the postal administration which

3 to retain a secret link to the Foreign Ministry, and
2 transfer of foreign spies to the payroll of the Foreign
1istry.39 The urgency of the problem could not allow
.iting approval of the specific proposals submitted

the paralyzed court in April and May.“0 so that the
t suitable personnel were simply transferred to the
eign Office under the guise of translators (which
:tions they also did in fact perform) during the summer
.848. Although a similar bureau was later re-established
wart of the Emperor's Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry

tained as a separate branch its intelligence office,

 

38Ibid., Draft Proposal from Lebzeltern to the
cor, undated (mid—March 1848).

 

39Ibid.
4OIbid., Lebzeltern Proposals of Apr. 1848 and
1 E

y o

which consisted
four years .41
With the e
personally respc
changes during '
the Undersecretz
“Oi only filled
need for a repr
COI‘PS in Vienna
figure in the 1:
of the most im;
I‘eill‘ganization:
At the heat
the highest

the Uriderse
ensum

118

ich consisted of 13 persons, throughout the following

ur years.41

With the exception of this innovation, Werner was

sonally responsible for the remaining organizational

nges during the post—revolutionary months. In becoming

Undersecretary of State on December 30, 1848, Werner
only filled Schwarzenberg's immediate operational

d for a representative with the foreign diplomatic

ps in Vienna, but also became at once the leading
ure in the process of reorganization and the bearer

the most important innovation to arise out of that

rganization:

At the head of the Ministry stands the Minister as

the highest authority and, immediately below him,

the Undersecretary of State, whose mission it is to
ensure that the service in both Sections is run in
accordance with the political system prescribed by

the Minister and in keeping with integrative principles,
and that it is conducted at all times in an orderly

manner.
one fell swoop, all of the flaws arising from the
ation of the two Sections under Metternich were thereby

retically swept away. Henceforth, supervision over

functions of the Foreign Office was to be concentrated

1e comprehensive post rather than in one for each

on, as had previously been the case. The control

the material order which was embodied in the new

l'Ibid., Lebzeltern Proposal of Sept. 8, 1848.

tIbid., Interiora, Organisierung, Fasz. 3, Operational
ption delivered to the Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852.

post also sugges'
unclear spheres .
to find its solu
The same can be
Branch personnel
in short, the ir
of State provide
izational reforr
have been meanii
The intro:
Office, effecti'
cussed in detai
lost memorandum
0f reorganizati
memorandum cove
of the Foreign
aHairs. In ti
the PrOblems 01
am of Confusic
TOSition of th.
Were discussed

the Policy Bra
I"Eiillted .43

 

119

t also suggested that the problem of overlapping and
lear spheres of authority among Desk Chiefs was meant
find its solution in the establishment of the new post.
same can be said for the problem of Mechanical Services
lCh personnel mixing in affairs of the Policy Branch.
short, the introduction of the office of Undersecretary
State provided a means of enforcement for future organ—
:ional reforms without which all such measures would
been meaningless.

The introduction of the Incoming Correspondence
ce, effective January 1, 1849, has already been dis—
ed in detail and need not be repeated. With Werner's
memorandum of January 9, 1849, the systematic work
eorganization got underway. The contents of this
candum covered the operation and personnel aspects
as Foreign Office as well as purely organizational
,rs. In this last category, it can be assumed that
roblems of fragmentation in the Administrative Section
f confusion over authority arising from the powerful
ion of the Minister's Cabinet in the Political Section
Tiscussed. Likewise, the lack of separation between
ilicy Branch and Mechanical Services Branch was
d.43 During the following six months, detailed
proposals dealing with each of these three general

were presented and approved.

BIbid., Werner Proposal to Schwarzenberg, Apr. 21,

 

 

The first
Section. Schwar
February 19, 184
of the discussic
sonalities to a
normal routine <
applied to the z
in the Administ:
tent Of those r
decree or Simpl
work load of th
"by the nature
division of the
by a more integ
designated by 2
assigned to Frz

 

120

The first object of reform was the Administrative
tion. Schwarzenberg's Directive to the Ministry of
ruary 19, 1849, has already been cited in the context
the discussion over turning from a dependence on per—
alities to a reliance on fixed rules of order in the
mal routine of operation.44 The same criteria were
lied to the assignment of functional responsibilities
the Administrative Section. No longer was the assign—
: of those responsibilities, be they a result of imperial
‘ee or simply of long usage, to be determined by the
: load of the respective Department Chiefs, but rather
the nature of the responsibility" itself.“5 The former
sion of the Section into nine Departments was replaced
more integrated system of five Departments, each
gnated by a letter (A through E).46 Department A,
gned to Franz von Mensshengen, was responsible for
iaterial affairs concerning the Foreign Office in all
:s branches, the foreign service personnel, and the
gn missions accredited to Vienna. As such, it in—
d a sub—Department which handled exclusively Foreign
try budgetary affairs. It dealt further with questions

iorary distinctions and titles for the Beamten,

 

ausee above, p. 47.

45Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
Referats—Einteilung, Schwarzenberg (Werner) Direc—
reb. 19, 1849.

 

'6See Appendix A.

 

diplomatic pass;
drawn up in the
and military. 5
of police affai:
those had been 1
This inconsiste‘
months later to
Mensshengen's D
personnel affai
1”espOIisible for
on hiring, pron
ed.,, divisi<
as Philosophy},
the AuStrian F‘
crucial one, a:
degree far 6X0
math. Office
Departme
charged Primer:
from the fact
Ministry of ti
pquQSe’ it (is
represent-mg .

foreign goiter;

4?
sagging:
to

 

121

Lomatic passports, certifications of legal documents
wn up in the Ministry and relations with the press
military. The only real anomaly was the inclusion
>olice affairs in its functions, apparently because
:e had been Mensshengen's speciality before 1848.

inconsistency was resolved by their transfer several
hs later to Department D.”7 The chief importance of
shengen's Department lay in its responsibility for
onnel affairs. After Werner, he was the one mainly
ansible for presenting suggestions and alternatives
iring, promotions and transfers of Beamten between
Jus divisions. In an organization containing personnel
iilosophically and politically varied as those of

Q8 this function was a

,ustrian Foreign Ministry,
a1 one, and it brought to Mensshengen power to a

e far exceeding his nominal position as an adminis-
ve officer.

Department B, headed by Wilhelm von Pflfigl, was

ad primarily with fulfilling those functions arising
Ihe fact that the Foreign Ministry was also the

ry of the Imperial House and Family. For this

a, it dealt both with affairs of substance in
anting the Habsburgs' hereditary rights toward

1 governments and individuals, and with ceremonial

7Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
g, Fasz. 3, Werner Directive of Dec. 26, 1849.

3See Chapter 3.

 

and protocol af:
and the Ministr‘
was later def in
Joseph sought t
ment.”9 For re
Department alsc
the archives ar
as Protection <
Suitzerland, De
Concerned With
“flier Metterni.
demanding the .
nature rather
some Compromis
with Mensshehg
related reopen
after only till
to the imperig
time to Memes}
Departm,
Foreign Minis-
responsible f
for administr

u
9See A

. 50A
without:

122
protocol affairs at court. The extent to which its
the Ministry's authority extended over imperial affairs
later defined in detail by Schwarzenberg when Franz
eph sought to do the same for all aspects of his govern—
t.“9 For reasons not easily perceived, Pflfigl's
artment also supervised affairs of the German Order,
‘archives and the State Chancellery library as well
protection of Austrian citizens' rights in Germany,
tzerland, Denmark and Holland. Because he had been
brned with at least some of these latter responsibilities
r Metternich, it can only be assumed that the standards
hding the distribution of affairs according to their
re rather than on the basis of personalities suffered
compromises in this instance. But as was the case
Mensshengen's police affairs, these apparently un—
ed responsibilities were more rationally apportioned
only three months. All affairs not pertaining directly
3 imperial house and family were assigned at that
to Mensshengen's Department.50
Department C was the legal affairs division of the
n Ministry. Its Chief, Johann von Vesque, was
sible for drafting all laws initiated by the Ministry,

ninistration of justice in affairs concerning the

 

P9See Appendix E.

OAustria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
s. Fasz. 3, Werner Directive of June 30, 1849.

 

Ministry, for qt
fications, for '
legal relations]
gration and cit
of cartels, for
dents and for is
foreign nationa
sented the priv
France, England
These functions
by imperial dec
themselves. 13,
that of matter,
of the Monarch:
Finance Minist;
Department for:
Permanent bure
the rest of th
to numequ in
then Such comm
invite any 0th
interest in tr
so that Consic
oimatters 00(

5i
Ref

Ibis.
lisiiatS‘Eint

 

123

stry, for questions of jurisdiction and border recti—
tions, for the affairs of religious orders in their
1 relationships to the state, for immigration, emi—
ion and citizenship standards, for the legal position
artels, for collecting debts owed by foreign govern—
; and for the collection of taxes owed Austria by
ign nationals. Finally, this Department also repre—
sd the private interests of Austrian subjects in
:e, England, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
functions, all of which were assigned to the Ministry
perial decree, were politically insignificant by
elves. But their nature was so closely related to
of matters handled in other central institutions
a Monarchy, most notably the Justice Ministry, the
:e Ministry and the Interior Ministry, that the
ment formed one of the main links between the
ant bureaucracy of the Foreign Office and that of
st of the government. Vesque himself was assigned
arous inter-ministerial committees for legal questions.
10h committees convened, Vesque was required to

any other Department or Desk Chief possessing an

t in the agenda destined for discussion to attend,
considerable official interchange on a wide variety

ars occurred at levels below the ministerial rank.5l

”Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,
-Einteilung, Schwarzenberg Directive of Jan. 10,

 

 

Departmen
Liehmann, handl
they related to
attitude toward
foreign policy
an object of ti
administrative
Depertinent in ;
Hammer. Under
of trade, Oust
agl‘iculture, 1
bulking, Pater
insofar as it
and excepting
alSO fell wit}
the resPonsib
Private Austr

countries (We
that Supervis
completely ar
Departments I
billed in a Si
redistribute,

124
Department D, under the leadership of Ignatz von

ehmann, handled commercial and financial questions as
ey related to foreign affairs. Reflecting the Austrian
titude toward the role of the Ottoman Empire in Habsburg
reign policy and the international system as primarily
object of trade expansion, all Turkish affairs of an
ninistrative nature were subsumed under this commerce
oartment in a sub—Department controlled by Anton von
nmer. Under Liehmann's direct supervision stood affairs
trade, customs, steamship and railway transportation,
‘iculture, industry, the international postal system,
Ming, patents, and slave trade. The consular system,
ofar as it fell under the authority of the Ministry,
excepting that part belonging to Turkish regions,
0 fell within Liehmann's sphere. Lastly, he possessed
responsibility for representing the interests of
rate Austrian citizens in Russia, Sweden and all
[tries overseas. It should be noted at this point
supervision of such interests was distributed in a
letely arbitrary manner among the Administrative
rtments until September 1858 when they were all com-
1 in a single Department for a brief period, then
:tributed among the various Chiefs in 1859.52 This

rary distribution was made necessary by the fact

 

521bid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
4. Schema of Sept. 7, 1858; and Administrative
:ratur, F 4, K 401, Referats—Einteilung, Rechberg
Iive of Aug. 30, 1859.

 

 

that the affair
included everyt
the Administrat
so diverse that
would have led
in general, the
safely be hand
assigned to the
Liehmann
nificant organ
tears for two
01" the Ottoman
nature. The l
affairs in the
among the Grea
uncertainty em
gWeanent uni
consulates in
but Were in e:
politiCal arm;
issue at that

turn required

Deharmen t . 53

53See C

 

125

at the affairs of private citizens in foreign lands
cluded everything not covered in the other rubrics of
e Administrative Section and were thus of a character
diverse that any attempt to divide them functionally
11d have led to a hopeless proliferation of categories.
general, they were fairly routine affairs that could
Eely be handled by the middle- or low-ranking Beamten
signed to the Chief.

Liehmann's Department was to undergo the most sig—
'icant organizational changes during the following eight
rs for two reasons. First, the inclusion of the affairs
the Ottoman Empire made the Department unstable by
ure. The line drawn between political and commercial
airs in the area most subject to economic competition
1g the Great Powers in the 1850s was extremely fine.
ertainty existed in the highest levels of the Austrian
rnment until early 1853 over whether to regard Austrian
ulates in areas which were nominally claimed by Turkey,
Nere in effect autonomous, as primarily economic or
tical arms of Austrian policy. The resolution of the
a at that date involved fundamental changes in the
ions of the Oriental Department, changes which in
required a reorganization of the entire commercial
tment.53 From this specific issue arose a general

assment of the character of the Austrian consular

53See discussion below, pp. 145—lu8.

 

 

system in its e
second major re
Commercial poli
the Foreign anc'
evil, the highe
over all consui
1111858.“; Th
in attitudes t
in foreign pol
But the Prime
nition was fir
a filll deCade
flaws and cont
over the issue
this We shall
Departm
affairs insof
Ministry. It
its Chief, 0»,
tightly knit
by MeySEnbug
of the 1855 <

f

\

51L

whinging:

 

 

....
,,,

126

'stem in its entirety, the course of which formed the
cond major reason for the Department's instability.
mmercial policy generally suffered from overlap between
e Foreign and Commerce Ministries. Recognizing this
il, the highest governmental authorities shifted control
r all consulates from the latter to the former Ministry
1858.54 This transformation reflected a healthy change
attitudes toward the importance of commercial affairs
foreign policy, a recognition never made by Metternich.
the prime fact of importance is not that the recog—
ion was finally made, but that its evolution required
ull decade for completion, during which period fateful
ws and contradictions resulting from the uncertainty
r the issue appeared in Austrian foreign policy. To
8 we shall return shortly.

Department E was responsible for all ecclesiastical
airs insofar as these were handled by the Foreign
.stry. Its prime significance lay in the fact that
Chief, Otto von Meysenbug, was the most vocal of a
tly knit group of Ultramontanes in the Ministry. Led
eysenbug, this group heartily approved of the conclusion
1e 1855 Concordat with the papacy, and the Department

ecclesiastical affairs was in fact involved in the

 

5fiAustria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—

ung, Fasz. 4, Schema of Sept. 7, 1858.

 

 

diplomatic meas
The new C
Administrative
1, 1849. remed:
which characte:
of its functio
decree, remain
better organiz
either by decr
relations, pal
Metternichean
inadequately .
but its full .
not yet fully
on the goverm
divis'l0n tha t
ChI‘Onol

begen With a

April 21. 18L

Branch ‘56 Sf

early Years.

 

127

plomatic measures leading up to it.55
The new division of responsibilities for the

ministrative Section, which became effective on March
1849, remedied the irrational fragmentation of affairs
ich characterized it during Metternich's time. Most
its functions, specified by tradition or imperial

ree, remained the same as before; they were simply

ter organized. But the one major function not specified
her by decree or traditional usage was that of trade
ations, particularly with regard to Turkey. Under the
ternichean organization, it had been handled entirely
dequately. An improvement was made under Schwarzenberg,
its full consequences for political relations were

yet fully appreciated and as its importance dawned

the governmental leaders of the day, the Foreign Office
ision that handled it was forced to adapt.

Chronologically, the next stage of reorganization

.n with a proposal from Werner to Schwarzenberg of

l 21, 1849, for the reform of the Mechanical Services
ch.56 Since the offices dealt with in this proposal
existed in fact if not in name since Metternich's

' years, except for the Incoming Correspondence

try which had existed in fact only since January

 

55Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 216
anbug), Beust Proposal to the Emperor, Jan. 29, 1867.

56Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
4. Werner Proposal to Schwarzenberg, Apr. 21, 1849.

 

 

 

18%, the suggw
the regulariza'
These need not
motives for th
Adjutants to e
examination ma
the mobility c
the Mechanical
de”Grimental tc
it beclouded 5
advantages of
approval of W
films its remw
The las‘
implemented w
Section 0n Ju
Select-mg and
berg put his
of four geog,
functional a]
handled Com
States. Dem“;
Meysenbug I‘e
Wilhelm Von
Belgium, Spa
Kitten VOn Ha

 

128
-9, the suggestions made by Werner concerned mostly
regularization of personnel assignments to each.
se need not detain us at this point. In stating the
ives for the definitive assignment of Directors and
itants to each office, however, Werner alluded to the
iination made in his January 9, 1849, memorandum of
mobility of personnel between the Policy Branch and
Mechanical Services Branch. This mobility proved
imental to the entire service under Metternich because
eclouded spheres of competence and neutralized the
ntages of a rational division of labor. With the
oval of Werner's Proposal on July 7, 1849, the flaw
1 its remedy in the abolition of this mobility.

The last and most important reform measure was
emented with a reorganization order for the Political
.on on June 22, 1849. Having spent several months
‘ting and evaluating his future Desk Chiefs, Schwarzen—
put his decisions in effect by a simple designation

geographical areas of responsibility and one
'onal area of responsibility: Adolf von Thierry

d correspondence with Prussia, all other German

, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland; Otto von
bug received France, England and the Italian states;
m von Pflfigl was responsible for Russia, Sweden,

, Spain, Portugal and the transatlantic states;
von Hammer took over correspondence with the Orient;

atz von Liehmann handled affairs of the "Higher

 

"57

Police.
The first
responsibilitie
each Desk Chief
trative Section
from the Metter
to either one E
made in a consc
0f mutual isol:
Desk for "High
01" the Politic
matters for wh
00dins and Tr;
later, the Ca
Kempen (MSW
Liehmann's re
Department f0
"Lower Police

ass'lsneu, in

C‘ 8
hief's The

varied with
note that th

Italian C OI‘I‘

57 . ,
22, 18%ng

Bill ‘1‘

\

 

129

ce."57

The first notable fact about this allotment of
ansibilities is that, with the exception of Thierry,
Desk Chief was also assigned affairs in the Adminis—
ive Section. Such a distribution was a departure
the Metternichean practice of exclusive assignments
-ther one Section or the other. The change was clearly
in a conscious effort further to remedy the problem
itual isolation of the two Sections. Liehmann's
for "Higher Police" affairs was the least important
e Political Section divisions, since it involved
rs for which the primary responsibility fell to the
g and Translation Bureau within the Ministry and,
. the Central Supreme Police Authority under Johann
3 outside of the Ministry. By far the bulk of
nn's responsibilities lay in the Administrative
ment for trade affairs, to which affairs of the

Police" (probably domestic postal spies) were later
ed, in order to unite all police affairs under one
58 The importance of the other Political Desks
with international events, but it is worthy of
hat the Chief of the Desk for British, French and

n correspondence possessed an expanded range of

 

57Ibid., Schwarzenberg Directive to Werner, June
49; see Appendix A.

8Ibid., Werner Directive of June 30, 1849.

I.
I
l
I

 

influence insoi
for ecclesiast;
from Italy and
France, tended
Sign policy in
petence than w
same Could be
Pondence were
Certainty eXis
a Political a,
Policy--an uni
Desk to under
administrativ
The sec
Political Sec
Rally, Were
cause of the
agency Chief:
national Cl:
noted earns
adversary Sy
to the fulle
of the Clem
A cabinet I‘e

privy to thé

M

 

130

.uence insofar as his Administrative responsibilities
ecclesiastical affairs, which by their nature emanated
Italy and concerned chiefly catholic Austria and
ce, tended to unite in his hands more threads of for—
policy instruments applicable to his sphere of com—
qce than was the case with other Desk Chiefs. The
could be said for the Desk Chief for Oriental corres—
ance were it not for the fact that considerable un—
iinty existed over whether Turkey was to be treated as
.itical and sovereign state or as an object of economic
y-—an uncertainty which was to cause the Oriental

to undergo changes as significant as those of its
istrative counterpart as the question crystallized.
The second noteworthy aspect of this reorganized
ical Section is that the functions, defined geograph—
y, were clearly delimited. Thus was removed another
of the faulty organization under Metternich. The
r chiefly responsible for the earlier lack of organ—
>nal clarity had been the Minister's Cabinet. As
earlier, Schwarzenberg's propensity for using the
:ary system, and hence his expert senior advisers,
fullest possible extent spelled doom for the power
clericalist clique which had surrounded Metternich.
net remained, and the persons included in it were

to the deepest secrets of Austrian foreign policy,59

S9Ibid., Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzenberg."

 

 

 

out they lacked
predecessors he
fact of the mix
were of relati‘
permanent seer
and lowest ran
by and a conf i
important unde
Whatever influ
less from his
@0061 Will that
he fulfilled:
assigned to e.
milling (Prio
In this multi
between minis
Currently inf
Finally
ization was :
foroemehh of
it proVided.

Shoulders 0f
In D-

60

Ibic
“who. as

See

 

 

131

hey lacked the influence over decisions that their
cessors had held earlier. The cabinet consisted in
of the minister's personal secretaries, all of whom
of relatively low rank. Schwarzenberg's and Buol's
nent secretary was Gustav Buhl, who, as a young man
owest ranking Beamte, had been earlier patronized

a confidant of Metternich.6O Buhl was not un-

ant under the State Chancellor's successors, but

er influence he might have claimed with them stemmed
rom his being the beneficiary of his superiors'
ill than from the very real integrative functions
-filled: he was, at one time or another, an assistant
led to every one of the Political Desk Chiefs, ex—
Lg (prior to 1853) only the Oriental Desk Chief.61
s multiple role, he served as a continuous link
n minister and senior adviser, keeping each side
tly informed of the affairs and desires of the other.
Finally, the decree whereby this political reorgan—
i was implemented also specified the means of en—
ant of the clear authority delimitations for which
rided. The full weight of enforcement fell on the
are of the Undersecretary of State:

In making certain that . . . harmony among the
k Chiefs is strictly maintained, it is primarily

 

OIbid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 42
Andrassy Proposal to the Emperor, July 10, 1873.

 

1See below, pp. 302—304, for a discussion of Buhl.

 

 

 

your-the Ur
that corres
carried on
in an ordel
to the reqi
In 0rd,
it is absoj
and immedi
in the Fir
Schwarzenberg
l"wles. discuss
Chiefs had to
for their disy
lieutenant we]
nent.

With th
mafimw mi
(June 29 and
of the reorgg
years, but SC
War the int,
Branch persoy
because of c
Dam rank of
perms were

Such as fill

highly Quali

 

132
your—the Undersecretary's— duty . . . to see to it
that correspondence with the particular courts is
carried on by the Desk Chiefs to whom it is assigned
in an orderly fashion and in a measure corresponding
to the requirements of the location and of the moment.
In order to fulfill this obligation as you should,
it is absolutely necessary that you remain constantly
and immediately aware of the entire course of affairs
in the First Section.6
iwarzenberg continued the directive by establishing the
es, discussed in the first chapter, by which the Desk
efs had to abide in the process of obtaining approval
their dispatch drafts. The Minister and his chief
utenant were clearly intent upon maintaining the spirit
the principles guiding their newly reorganized depart—
t.

With the exception of the two aforementioned and
itively minor redistributions of administrative affairs
1e 29 and December 26, 1849), not only was the spirit
:he reorganization maintained over the following two
s, but so too was its substance. A clarification

the intermixing of Policy and Mechanical Services
ch personnel was necessary in November of 1850, largely
use of confusion over the functions of the lowest-

rank of Beamten, the Offizialen. In theory, these
>ns were to be used solely for mechanical operations

as filing and copying. But in many cases, they were

.y qualified individuals destined at the rank of

Inzipist to enter the Policy Branch. At times, such

 

62Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
4, Schwarzenberg Directive to Werner, June 22, 1849.

 

as in November
from the Pruss
these qualifie
force, but onl
This did not 8
Services offic
Policy affairs
Between
last strongnoj
RegiStW syst.
Experts from 1
in these af fa
and Suggest r
Registry. Pr
Cause it had
miniSiilow lite
Mingle famf
was scarcely
governing ma‘
were formula

and’ on J anu

 

 

133

en November 1850, when an overload of work resulting
r the Prussian war threat swamped the Policy Branch,
e qualified Offizialen were used to bolster its work
e, but only subsidiarily to their main functions.
did not affect the stricture against Mechanical
ices office Directors or Adjutants participating in
cy affairs.63

Between April 1851 and sometime during 1852, the
stronghold of Metternichean disorganization, the
stry system, fell before more rational principles.
rts from Bach‘s Interior Ministry, more enlightened
lese affairs, were summoned to analyze the faults
:uggest revisions for the Administrative Section
try. Prior to this, the system had worked only be—
it had been handed down since the formation of the
try literally from generation to generation within

64

gle family. A patriarchal system of this sort

:arcely in keeping with the newly rationalized Austrian

ling machinery, so new rules for keeping ledgers
‘ormulated, documentary collections consolidated

n January 15, 1852, new instructions for the office

63Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,
ts—Einteilung, Werner Directive of Nov. 23, 1849.
Julbid., Werner Request to Bach, Apr. 11, 1851;
Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Personalia, Fasz. 10,
: by Karl von Kesaer of Sept. 30, 1842.

 

 

 

were promulgatw
same day to thy
afflicted with
scaring famil
smaller Regist
affairs, in th
Translation Bl
Registry and w
Ministry.66 '.
and by J anuar;
COlldition sui
Incoming Corr
During
Change, unim;
come, Occurre
18’ 1851. CO]
from ThiErry
Ellgland and
existEd' Sin
Provinces We

thereby Prov

65mm

0f Jan. E
66

l a

16’ 18mg

67 ‘

Refe Q

SeptiaES‘El

 

 

 

134

e promulgated.65 The organizers then turned on the
e day to the Political Section Registry, which was
licted with similar organizational problems but lacked
aring family to compensate for them. Within a month,
ller Registries were unearthed in the office of German
airs, in that of police matters and in the Coding and
slation Bureau, in addition to the general Political
istry and the Old Registry common to the entire
Istry.66 These were consolidated to varying degrees
by January 1, 1853, the Political Registry was in a
iition suitable for the incorporation into it of an
rming Correspondence Registry for the Political Section.
During this same period, one other organizational
.ge, unimportant in itself but a portent of things to
, occurred in the Political Section. On September
1851, correspondence with Switzerland was shifted
Thierry's German Desk to Meysenbug's Desk for France,
and and Italy.67 Very good reasons for this transfer
zed, since political fugitives from Austria's Italian
.nces were finding refuge in Switzerland at this time,

by providing not only the main subject for exchange

65Ibid., Organisierung, Fasz. 4, Werner Directive
n. 15, 1852.“

 

66Ibid., Fasz. 6, Mensshengen Memorandum of Feb.

352.

67Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,
.ts—Einteilung, Schwarzenberg Directive to Werner,
18, 1851.

 

 

 

between Vienna
between Vienna
was ill and so
But the transi
German Desk a1
office, a pro<
under Buol.

At appr
the reorganiz
on Principles
he of the ef
on the Foreig
Under Mettern
to the Supper
policy in par
of this shift
Friedrich Hui
aPendent h
Ministerrat
Hunter ha d b

1848 beCause

Which’ it we

the State C}

 

135

een Vienna and Berne, but also considerable discussion

een Vienna, Paris and London. Moreover, Thierry
ill and swamped with work on the German question.
the transfer signified a loss of authority by the
an Desk and a corresponding accrual to Meysenbug's
ce, a process which was to continue and accelerate
r Buol.
At approximately the same time, preparations for ‘ T
reorganization of the Empire‘s governing institutions A
inciples of absolutism were reaching their climax.
f the effects of this transformation was a re—emphasis
e Foreign Ministry's responsibility, well recognized
? Metternich, to shape, guide and coerce public opinion
1e support of governmental policy generally and foreign
y in particular. The first official manifestation
is shift in emphasis came on May 25, 1852, when
rich Hurter, a Swiss Ultramontane who had worked as
ident historian under Metternich, requested the
:errat to contract once again for his services.
' had been driven from his post by public outcry in
ecause of his extremely reactionary political ideas
it was commonly supposed, had heavily influenced
ate Chancellor. Although the majority of the minis—
including Buol, opposed granting the request, Franz
on June 7, 1852, overrode them. The office of

1 Historiographer was thus once again attached

 

 

to the Foreign
But well
of Foreign Aff
a joint commit
‘werner, for ti
both inside ax
hinistries am
the organizat
its payroll e
who contribut
newspapers in
These individ
hinigtry and
Prised the P1
mine both the
matiers and .
be aPplied.6

 

 

136

the Foreign Office.68

But well before this event, in mid—1851, the Ministries
Foreign Affairs and of the Interior had formed de facto
joint committee, headed by Undersecretary of State
ner, for the purpose of influencing the daily press
h inside and outside of Austria. To this end, both
istries acquired divisions which were not included in
organizational schemata. The Foreign Office had on
payroll throughout the 1850s three or four persons
contributed regularly to German, French and English
spapers in a sense favorable to Austrian policy.
se individuals and their counterparts from the Interior
istry and later from the Supreme Police Authority com—
sed the Press Committee, whose function it was to deter—
8 both the general lines of policy in these publicist
ters and the specific instances to which they should
applied.69 On July 15, 1852, when the transformation
ibsolutism was nearing its completion, the Committee
:ented a common proposal to the Emperor asking for

official sanction for this body, a request which was

 

68Ibid., Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerratsprotokolle,
, Minutes of the May 25, 1852, session; Minutes of
Tune 5, 1852, session; Ibid., Administrative Regis—
lr, F 4, K 145 (Hurter), Buol Proposal to the Emperor,
7. 1852.

 

 

69Ibid., K 373 (Weil); K 315 (Selinger); K 402,
.irte Vortrage, Rechberg Proposal of Nov. 2, 1860;
.von Wollheim da Fonseca, Neue Indiskretionen (Berlin:

1! 1881+), p. 20

 

 

 

 

 

smsequently 2
Other s
Fmeign Offic
absolutism re
ofthe Suprem
Johann von Ke
came at the 6
Foreign Minis
eSpionage ac-
and Translat;
0nOctober 9
rtsulted on
the Work of
bUtleaving
MiniStl‘y in
included 011]
BUt e2
organiZat-lo]
Ofthe Mona

flCan-t’ Was
\

D 70Wal

W

71Ken

72h

73
31101 Notléut
~ 28 5.

137

usequently approved.7O

Other substantive organizational changes in the
eign Office occurring during the transformation to
olutism resulted from the creation on June 1, 1852,
the Supreme Police Authority under the direction of
ann von Kempen.7l While the major share of his authority
e at the expense of Bach's Interior Ministry, the
eign Ministry lost to him the direct control of the
ionage activities heretofore performed by the Coding
Translation Bureau.72 Buol presented to the Emperor
October 9, 1852, a history of the Bureau out of which
ulted on April 4, 1853, an imperial decree assigning
work of the division to the Supreme Police Authority
leaving its personnel on the payroll of the Foreign
istry in order to perpetuate the myth that its functions
Luded only those activities suggested by its title.73

But each of these alterations in the Foreign Office
lnization, resulting directly from the remodeling
:he Monarchy along absolutistic lines, while signi—

Lnt. was largely peripheral to the main policy—making

 

7OWalter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom
hbruch des Absolutismus: Aktenstficke, pp. 67—70.

71Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 37.

72Ibid., pp. 254—255.

73Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 47,
Note to Grfinne, Oct. 9, 1852; Kempen, Tagebuch,
35.

 

body of the in
Sections. Inc
direct effect
noted earlier
Foreign Offic
1852. in resp
to supervise
alterations 1
Various subdi
the extent 01
House and Far
Precisely thz
no actual ch:
national an.
Emperor on D
Its Purpose ‘
matelial COu
Bubsetluent i
Registry f0:
taken Volum
the EmDeI‘Or
of the Mini;
to ”am do
was approve
should have
74

See

 

138

dy of the institution—~the Political and Administrative
ctions. Indeed, the Monarchy's transformation had no
rect effect on the organization of these latter. As

ted earlier, the sphere of competence schema for the

?eign Office, presented by Schwarzenberg on January 9,

$2, in response tthranz Joseph's desire more closely
supervise the institution, contained no rubrics requiring
erations in the distribution of affairs to the Ministry's
ious subdivisions. An accompanying memorandum concerning
extent of the Foreign Ministry's authority over Imperial
se and Family Affairs specified certain functions more
:iser than had earlier been the case, but this involved
actual changes in organization.74 Nor did the organ—
:ional and operational schema presented by Buol to the
aror on December 8, 1852, necessitate any changes.
‘purpose was simply to make Franz Joseph aware of the
rial course of affairs within the Ministry. The

equent introduction of an Incoming Correspondence

stry for the Political Section was a measure under-

n voluntarily in fulfillment of the implied wish of
Emperor to be able more easily to supervise the operation
1e Ministry. An official opinion submitted by Kfibeck
‘anz Joseph on March 12, 1853, in which the schema

lpproved with the qualification that more emphasis

 

d have been placed on the Emperor's need and right

 

74

See Appendix E.

 

to examine imp
also involved
Franz Joseph r
But if r
organization v
absolutistic :
important ind
the course of
Franz Joseph
observance of
in late 1851
of all bureau
Sohemata, he
make his pow,
em'; flaw in ,
Cenflict bet
was a matter
monarch, and
highest leve
A flaw or a
from One of
at the time
SebSeQUent
ability 0f

01‘ another .

\

7 SW
D a]
eeehbl‘ueh

 

 

 

139

examine important incoming and outgoing dispatches,

0 involved no organizational changes.75 In any event,
nz Joseph never acted on the schema of December 8, 1852.
But if no direct influence on the Foreign Office
anization was exerted by Austria's evolution into an
solutistic state, there was a less visible but very
)ortant indirect effect, one which in turn influenced
course of Austrian foreign policy from 1853 to 1856.
nz Joseph attributed great importance to the strict
ervance of the sphere of competence schemata drawn up
late 1851 and early 1852 to facilitate his supervision
all bureaucratic affairs in the Monarchy. These
amata, he felt, were a prime means by which he could
a his power absolute. Given this standpoint, any appar—
flaw in a ministry's functional schema or an apparent
?1ict between the schemata of two or more ministries
a matter of significance for the prerogatives of the
rch, and thus a matter requiring resolution at the
est level of government as expeditiously as possible.
aw or a conflict in these schemata could have resulted
one of only two causes: either from an oversight
me time that the schemata were drawn up, or from a
equent shift in attitudes concerning the justifi—
Lty of a function's assignment to one governing body

other. In the latter case, the motive for such a

 

 

75Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom
bruch des Absolutismus: Aktenstficke, pp. 24—35.

 

 

dmftwould ha
state interest
assignment of
have been bett
nition of prec
theissue of v
01‘ the Commer<
sulates in th«
that was to r
hithe Foreig
Ostensi
Proper assigr
theottoman E
role which g,
in Austrian :
tension, alsu
France and G
element cf A
formulated.
Turkish agre
thurkish 1
who had fle.
territorial
some meaSur

by the gene

\

76Hef

 

140

'ft would have been a new recognition that Austrian

te interests had not been well served by the current
ignment of functions and that these interests would

e been better served by a reassignment. A new recog—
ion of precisely this sort was made in late 1852 on
issue of which governing body-~the Foreign Ministry

the Commerce Ministry——was to have authority over con—

.ates in the Orient, and it set off a sequence of events

t was to result in the most basic organizational reform

the Foreign Office that occurred between 1849 and 1860.

 

Ostensibly, the issue provoking the reform was the
per assignment of the consular affairs which involved
Ottoman Empire; but fundamentally, the issue was the
= which government—directed imperialism was to play

'

lustrian policy toward Turkey, which, by natural ex—

   
  
  
  
   
  
  
   
  

ion, also included Austrian policy toward Russia,

cc and Great Britain. It was here, in fact, that one
ent of Austrian policy during the Crimean War was
ulated. There had been, since the 1849 Austro-Russo—
ish agreement over the right of Austrian consulates
rkish regions to detain the Hungarian revolutionaries
ad fled there,76 a vague Austrian claim to extra—
'toria1 rights. Austrian citizens in Turkey were in
measure subject to Austrian law which was administered

e consulates. Since 1848, the oriental consular

 

   

76Heindl, Graf Buol—Schauenstein, pp. 56-58.

 

system had bee
and Commerce M
administration
assigned to ei
The consulates
tation of the
The accord it:
it was of an
I‘esoonsibilit
Sphere of the
1111850, any
held earlier
administratic
lost importal
In the
the Emperor
administrat‘l
assigned by
members of E
Ministries .7
definitiwh
hhch about .

of the Bethe

\

77%

then 7feta]
W

 

141
stem had been under the dual control of the Foreign
i Commerce Ministries, but the specific control of this
ninistration of justice was apparently never expressly
signed to either. Nor did it seem very important.
a consulates merely became the agencies for the implemen—
:ion of the accord worked out on the fugitive issue.77
2 accord itself was the important point, and because
was of an international political character, the prime
ponsibility for its negotiation fell naturally in the
ere of the Foreign Ministry. Once the issue subsided
1850, any political usefulness which may have been
d earlier by the Foreign Ministry in the sphere of

inistration of justice by the Levantine consulates

 

t importance.

In the sphere of competence schemata submitted to
Emperor on January 9, 1852, jurisdiction over the
.nistration of justice by the oriental consulates was
.gned by the drafting commission (which consisted of
ers of each ministry) to the Justice and Commerce
stries.78 Since these affairs had never before been
nitively assigned to any ministry, no one thought
about the step until late in 1852, long after all

1e schemata had been approved. It is not clear who

77Ibid., p. 56.

78Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat:
stficke, p. 17 -

 

initiated the
session of Dec
ations betweer

resulted in a
tration of jug

he then asked

this decision

was that thes

Foreign Minis

to endow the

torial rights

huncio in Cor

of e0mien A1

0“ January If

The cl:

; in the Orien‘

Minieellf Was
Ministry to
of the Minis
dermaht fOr
the Cohherc,
examined by
is that the
and that On

eueel‘ian pc

79 (
eeee‘lkollee

 

 

142

itiated the process, but early in the Ministerkonferenz
ession of December 23, 1852, Buol announced that negoti—
tions between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries had
esulted in a decision to transfer control over adminis—
ration of justice by oriental consulates to the former.
e then asked for ministerial and imperial sanction of
his decision. The justification for such a maneuver
as that these affairs had belonged traditionally to the
oreign Ministry, and, more importantly, that the failure

endow the Foreign Ministry with control over extraterri—
rial rights "would impair the reputation of the Inter—
ncio in Constantinople and the stature of the Ministry

Foreign Affairs."79 Franz Joseph approved the measure
1 January 18, 1853.

The claim that control over extraterritorial rights
,the Orient had belonged traditionally to the Foreign
nistry was false. And why, if the failure of the Foreign
nistry to control them was so detrimental to the reputation
the Ministry and the Internuncio, did the issue lie
'mant for 13 months after the schema assigning them to

Commerce Ministry was first drafted and thoroughly
mined by all members of the Ministerrat? The answer
that the assignment had not previously been detrimental
that only recently had it become an issue of status.

:rian policy toward the Orient, for reasons to be

79Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats—
3kolle, K ll, Minutes of the Dec. 23, 1852, session.

 

 

 

discussed late
desire for the
terests to an
in areas nomir
Using the alrr
in these regi
fullest possi‘
territorialit
natural means
maximum polit
it had to be
F°Teisn Mini:
rather than .
confined to j
The fi
was the Lein
same time ar
emphasiZe t}
by Shifting
was Submitt.
attempt to
Which might
dispatch fr
Posed large
claims of 2.
also an ef:

 

 

143

iscussed later, had shifted from a relatively passive
esire for the protection and extension of economic in—
erests to an active desire to exert political influence
n areas nominally belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

sing the already extensive network of Austrian consulates
n these regions for this purpose by exerting to the
ullest possible extent political rights (i.e., extra—
rritoriality) already claimed by Austria seemed the
tural means to this end. But in order to derive the
ximum political benefit from this consular network,

had to be subordinated to the jurisdiction of the

)reign Ministry, dealing primarily with political relations,

Lther than to that of the Commerce Ministry, which was
infined to matters of trade.

The first manifestation of this new active policy
s the Leiningen mission, formulated at precisely the
me time and for the same reasons that the proposal to
phasize the political role of the oriental consulates
shifting part of their control to the Foreign Ministry
3 submitted. Leiningen's mission was justified as an
tempt to protect Austrian borders against uprisings
ich might have proved threatening as a result of the
;patch from Constantinople of an army led by and com—
:ed largely of Austrian fugitives to suppress Montenegrin
.ims of independence. But much more than that, it was
0 an effort to legitimize Austrian claims and to make

sible further encroachments on land traditionally

 

belonging to Turkey

1850, the suggestior.
to seize the Montene
Turkey continued to

although legally val
recognized right of

own ships.80 When T
over the religious i
ation on the Montene
negotiations with Au
intransigent and neg
Certain very powerfu
ment hit upon the id
and of achieving the
in it by using the 'II
independence as a p]
to use the threat 0:
in order to force T1
in order simply to

control over Bosnia

1853, in gaining Tu

 

80Ibid., K 7.
Nov. 28. l§50, sese

81Bernhard U1
Studien zur Politi]

L135 (Lu“beck : Matt]

8211331., pp.

 

 

loo

onging to Turkey in the Balkans. As early as November
.0, the suggestion had been made in the Ministerrat
seize the Montenegrin ports of Klek and Suttorina if
key continued to assert her claim to them, which,
hough legally valid, seemed to contest the long-
ognized right of Austria to use these ports for her

ships.8O

When Turkish quarrels with Russia and France
the religious issues placed her in an untenable situ—
vn on the Montenegrin port issue in 1852, she opened
>tiations with Austria. But both sides remained
ansigent and negotiations were stalled by late 1852.
:ain very powerful individuals in the Austrian govern—
hit upon the idea of solving this specific question
of achieving the Austrian territorial goals reflected
t by using the Turkish attempt to suppress Montenegrin

81 Authorized

oendence as a pretext for intervention.
se the threat of an Austrian occupation of Bosnia
‘der to force Turkish capitulation, or failing that,
*der simply to salvage compensation in the form of
01 over Bosnia, Leiningen succeeded on February 14,

in gaining Turkish acquiescence to his demands.82

801bid., K 7, Minutes of the Nov. 25, 1850, and the
38, 1850, sessions.

81Bernhard Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg.
>n zur Politik der Donaumonarchie in den Jahren 1852—
Lfibeck: Matthiesen, 1959). PP. 64—68.

82

 

Ibid., pp. 74—77.

 

 

 

The apparent s
to the Foreign Offic‘
of competence in the
which was to require
Sections. For by Ma:
of Austrian eastern j
character to one of :
imperialistic charac
fact was made clear :
onMarch 29, 1853, w
accommodate this new

His Majesty
the necessity fo
consular system
and to legitimiz
Turkey, both in
that of the Chri
very important 1
the commercial i
taneously devel:
in the politicai
connection. the:
to them by the ?
Austrian agent i
and who will pr
Herzegovina aga
authorities. wh
stantly repeate
Minister remark
reports show hc
agents has rise
Foreign Minist:
cussions with ‘
of the task or!

A commission

 

83Austria, lj
protokolle, K 12,

 

145
The apparent success of the Leiningen mission gave
the Foreign Office a much more clearly defined sphere
:ompetence in the Orient, and with it, a set of functions
:h was to require a series of reorganizations in both
:ions. For by March 1853, the shift in the perceptions
iustrian eastern policy from one of a commercial
‘acter to one of a predominantly active political and

rialistic character had finally crystallized. This

 

was made clear at a meeting of the Ministerkonferenz
arch 29, 1853, when the organizational measures to
mmodate this new recognition were also initiated:

His Majesty opened the session by alluding to
the necessity for a reorganization of the Austrian
consular system in the Levant to maintain, to strengthen
and to legitimize the recently acquired stature in
Turkey, both in the interest of the Monarchy and in
that of the Christian subjects of the Porte. It is
rery important that the consuls represent effectively
she commercial interests, but also that they simul—
;aneously develop an intelligently pursued activity
.n the political field. Particularly in this latter
onnection, they must follow the impulses imparted
0 them by the Internuncio. The appointment of an
ustrian agent who is capable of impressing the Turks
nd who will protect the Christians of Bosnia and
erzegovina against the oppressions of the local
uthorities, which, despite all assurances, are con—
tantly repeated, is indispensable . . . . The Foreign
inister remarked that already the arriving consular
aports show how much the influence of the Austrian
gents has risen since the Leiningen mission. The
>reign Ministry will without delay undertake dis—
1ssions with the Commerce Ministry in fulfillment
‘ the task ordered by the Emperor.

A commission to offer specific proposals about the

83Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
olle, K 12, Minutes of the Mar. 29, 1853: session.

 

 

 

reorganization of the
in April 1853 and by
session of April 29,

of the predominantly
had been completed.

by referring to this

The diplomatic a1
Imperial-Royal cc
ordination in tha
and in the secom
must be the primr
of the consuls tr
their commercial
remain undisturb
must take precedl
The distinct impress
that the Austrian le
selves to be exclud
violations of Turkic
form of the Menshikc
that very moment eng
experiment in Austr:
Was to be the consu;
marching orders fro
Internuncio in Cons
consular reorganize

Of 1853 and ordere<

 

84mm . , Min

 

‘ 85Paul W. Sc
Crimean War (Ithac

19725. pp. 28—30.

 

'- cine:;¥

146
'ganization of the oriental consular system was created
ipril 1853 and by the time of the Ministerkonferenz
sion of April 29, 1853, the shift toward a recognition
:he predominantly political character of this system
been completed. Franz Joseph again opened the session
referring to this reorganization:

The diplomatic and political effectiveness of the
Imperial—Royal consuls in the Levant and their sub—
ordination in the first instance to the Internuncio
and in the second instance to the Foreign Ministry
must be the prime consideration. The subordination
of the consuls to the Commerce Ministry as far as
their commercial effectiveness is concerned shall
remain undisturbed; bgt their diplomatic character
must take precedence. 4

 

distinct impression left by these discussions was
:the Austrian leaders did not intend to allow them—
es to be excluded from perpetrating the imperialistic
ations of Turkish sovereignty in which Russia, in the
of the Menshikov mission to Constantinople, was at
very moment engaged.85 The prime agent in this first
‘iment in Austrian imperialism in southeastern Europe
0 be the consular system, which was to receive its
ing orders from the Foreign Ministry through the
iuncio in Constantinople. Formal proposals for this
.ar reorganization were submitted in the late spring

3 and ordered by Franz Joseph on June 2# to take

 

34Ibid., Minutes of the Apr. 29, 1853, session.

‘5Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the
War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
pp. 28—30.

 

—

effect on August 1.E

The practical
reforms resulting f1
portance for Austria
oriental consulates.
purposes, thus laste
thrust upon the Fore
greater authority 0
consulates and by t

mission had already

 

change in the organ
Since 1849, Liehma

supervisory control
Hammer for the Orie
Liehmann's authorit
Department, designa
next several months

Empire were concent

one person.

Then, in the
of the Levantine Ct
Foreign Ministry's

\

86h t
K1402. C Slfia, E
Jilly Zhugl‘égrte V
8?
Ibi

W t, “tibia

 

 

1U?

ct on August 1.86

The practical implementation of organizational
rms resulting from this new recognition of the im-
ance for Austrian foreign political policy of the
ntal consulates, previously used primarily for economic
oses, thus lasted about six months. The new activities
st upon the Foreign Ministry by the acquisition of
ter authority over juridical affairs in the oriental
slates and by the preparations for the Leiningen
ion had already resulted on January 11, 1853, in a
;e in the organization of the Administrative Section.
2 1849, Liehmann, as Chief of Department D, had held
'visory control over the sub—Department headed by
r for the Orient. The latter was now removed from
ann's authority and upgraded to an independent
tment, designated D—l, for the Orient.87 For the
several months, all affairs concerning the Ottoman
, were concentrated independently in the hands of
rson.
Then, in the summer of 1853, the sudden addition
Levantine consular system in its entirety to the

. Ministry's functional sphere of competence,

/
aAustria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F #,
)umulirte Vortrage, Buol Proposal to the Emperor,

1853.

Ibid., K 401, Referats-Einteilung, Werner Directive
11, 1853.

 

 

44

—

coupled with the tree
dealing with the Ori
in mid-1853, require
work load and hence

Administrative Orien
affairs dealing with
sulates. To his Po]
added all affairs d
responsibilities of
this load at such a
partly because Hamm
political affairs i
Political Section r
to the Oriental Dep
Orient was combine

Russia, Sweden, Spa
states, headed sine

earlier by Eduard \

at Constantinople .

 

apart of the Desk
at this point to t?
thus representing
°f Writs in to

added responsibilf

o
98k made it into

883
Tessie be]...

 

 

148

Dupled with the tremendous increase in correspondence
aaling with the Orient as the threat of war increased
1 mid—1853, required a drastic redistribution of the
>rk load and hence a major reorganization. To Hammer's
ministrative Oriental Department (D—l) were added the
fairs dealing with the personnel of all Levantine con—
lates. To his Political Section Oriental Desk were

ed all affairs dealing with the newly acquired political
ponsibilities of Levantine consulates. Partly because
'8 load at such a time was too much for any man, and
tly because Hammer was not the man for such weighty
itical affairs in any case,88 he was relieved of his
.itical Section responsibilities and assigned exclusively
the Oriental Department. His Political Desk for the
ent was combined with that for correspondence with
sia, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and the transatlantic
tes, headed since Pflfigl's retirement several weeks
Lier by Eduard von Klezl, a former charge d'affaires
lonstantinople. Correspondence with Belgium, formerly
rt of the Desk for Russian affairs, was transferred
his point to the Desk for Italy, France and England,
representing one further stage in the accumulation
1thority in the hands of Meysenbug. Finally, the

responsibilities falling within Klezl's Political

made it impossible for him to assume Pflflgl's former

88See below, pp. 312—316, for a discussion of Hammer's
:ter.

 

 

 

   
  
   
    
   
  
   
   

duties as Chief of th
affairs of the Imperi
quently transferred 1:
Chancellery Directio

The number of
four, three excludi
of these three could
another the Western
Desk. Affairs in th
concentrated, as pre
for Imperial House a
independent Departme
divisions now compo
Office were captain
two, Liehmann and Me
services in both Sec
of the affairs in t1
Section was mostly 1
actual responsibili‘
this altered arrang
by virtue of the fa
were personally inv

but it also tended

NW

89Ibid., Werx
Appendix B for a sw

901mm. nor:

 

 

149

duties as Chief of the Administrative Department for
affairs of the Imperial House. These latter were conse—

quently transferred to Mensshengen's Department for the

89

hancellery Direction, henceforth designated as ”A,B,B—l."
The number of Political Desks was now reduced to

our, three excluding the Desk for Police Affairs. One

f these three could safely be called the German Desk,

nother the Western European Desk and the last the Eastern

esk. Affairs in the Administrative Section remained

oncentrated, as previously, in five Departments, that

or Imperial House affairs having been replaced by an

dependent Department for the Orient. The nine sub-

'visions now composing the Policy Branch of the Foreign

ffice were captained by seven Hofrate. Of these, only

ro, Liehmann and Meysenbug, were required to perform

rvices in both Sections, and since Liehmann's supervision

the affairs in the Police Affairs Desk in the Political

:tion was mostly nominal, Meysenbug alone was left with

:ual responsibilities in each Section.9o Not only did

8 altered arrangement afford Meysenbug a special position

firtue of the fact that he and the Undersecretary alone

* personally involved in the affairs of both Sections,

it also tended to weaken the bond established in

 

89Ibid., Werner Directive of Aug. 24, 1853. See also
dix B for a schema of this new arrangement.

9OIbid., Work Force Distribution Schema, Nov. 1, 1853.

 

 

 

181%) between the two
trative responsibili
Klezl, in replacing

matters, and Hammer

Werner remained, the
Metternich did not 1‘
remained that power

more concentrated wi
with states which we
War. Prior to 1853.
and administrative

unclear enough to w
for the Orient in e
During the first h

in the Austrian gov
had become sufficie1
of the character of
of the means by whi
assignment of funct
from this new defir
led to adaptations
Purpose of fulfillz‘
administrative aff:

from that of polit

sally, were assign

 

91Ibid., Sta
Fasz.. it. Werner D5

 

150
149 between the two Sections in the assignment of adminis—
ative responsibilities to Political Section Desk Chiefs.
ezl, in replacing Pflfigl, dealt only with political
tters, and Hammer was excluded from them. As long as
rner remained, the mutual isolation prevailing under
tternich did not fully reappear.91 The fact nevertheless
nained that power within the Ministry had become much
ce concentrated with respect to the political relations
5h states which were to become involved in the Crimean
7. Prior to 1853, the distinction between political
l administrative affairs in the Turkish Empire had been
lear enough to warrant placing a division exclusively
'the Orient in each Section and under the same Chief.
ing the first half of 1853, an imperialistic impulse
the Austrian government, evident for several years,
become sufficiently strong to induce a clear definition
the character of Austrian interests in the region and
:he means by which these were to be achieved. A new
.gnment of functions to the Foreign Ministry resulting
;this new definition, which was essentially political,
to adaptations in the Ministry's organization for the
ose of fulfilling these functions. Supervision of
distrative affairs concerning the Orient was separated
that of political affairs. The latter, quite logi—

U were assigned to that Desk having authority over

 

91

Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
4. Werner Directive of Nov. 7, 1853.

__—_A

 

political aspects of At
Turkish and Russian que
from 1853 forth. Acces
parties and authority <
in response were there]
Desk Chief. The same 1
British policy were al:
pondence with the West
of a separate Desk Chi!
An examination 0
from the concentration
With the belligerent p
than in three Politica
Department as earlier.
of the respective Chie
following chapters. H
adaptation of the Fore
tional exigencies was
in the 18LL9 reorganize
suited precisely to tr
to the Ministry.
Indeed mechanic:
With the organization
as it adapted to new :
the qualities of inter

in a rational manner .

by March 1853 to indu

 

 

 

I51
alitical aspects of Austrian relations with Russia, since
irkish and Russian questions were inextricably bound
70m 1853 forth. Access to information regarding both
.rties and authority over policy measures to be applied
. response were thereby combined in the hands of one
sk Chief. The same benefits with regard to French and
itish policy were also derived from combining corres—
ndence with the Western European states in the hands
a separate Desk Chief.

An examination of the policy implications resulting
>m the concentration of responsibility for correspondence
:h the belligerent powers in two Political Desks, rather
n in three Political Desks and one Administrative
artment as earlier, must also involve the personalities
the respective Chiefs, and must therefore await the
Lowing chapters. Here it is worthy of note that the
itation of the Foreign Office organization to new func—
1al exigencies was a tribute to the principles developed
he 1849 reorganization. It was rapid, efficient and
ed precisely to the new functions which were entrusted

e Ministry.

Indeed mechanically, little fault can be found
the organization as it existed from 1849 forth and
adapted to new functional exigencies. It combined

ualities of integration and delimitation of authority

rational manner. Its reputation had grown sufficiently

rch 1853 to induce the authorities in the Dutch

 

foreign service to requm
an aid in reorganizing
followed suit in mid-l8
1860 swallowed enough 0
organization of the ent
order to establish guid
The second observ
ization in 18 53 is that
shall be drawn about pc
by the two Desk Chiefs
pondence between the C1
motivations which indu:
Desk Chiefs their new 1
to Austrian state inte
are effective in imple
bad policy as well. w
were re-defined in lat
the control over extra
the Levantine consula‘
sular system in all 0
activities, the organ
for the pursuit of a
Prior to this time, A
had been guided chiej
92%. , Adminf
Organisierungs—Auskfii

Austrian Note to the
British Note to Rech‘

 

 

 

 

152

:reign service to request information concerning it as
. aid in reorganizing their own office. The Russians

llowed suit in mid—1857 and even the British in late

60 swallowed enough of their pride to inquire as to the
ganization of the entire Austrian foreign service in
ier to establish guidelines in revamping their own.92

The second observation to be made about the reorgan—

ition in 1853 is that, whatever conclusions can and
111 be drawn about policy formulation and implementation
the two Desk Chiefs most concerned with the corres-
1dence between the Crimean War belligerents, the
ivations which induced the reorganization giving these
k Chiefs their new authority were essentially harmful

Austrian state interests. Well organized institutions

effective in implementing not only good policy but

policy as well. When the Foreign Office functions

3

. re-defined in late 1852 and 1853 to include, first,
control over extraterritorial rights administered by
Levantine consulates, then over the Levantine con—

r system in all of its recently expanded political
vities, the organizational framework became a vehicle
the pursuit of a dangerous imperialistic policy.

to this time, Austrian policy toward European Turkey

een guided chiefly by an attitude based on restraint

 

 

921bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
isierungs—Auskfinfte, Dutch Note to Buol, Mar. 6, 1853;

ian Note to the Russian government, July 16, 1857;
sh Note to Rechberg, Nov. 14, 1860.

 

by both Austria and RUS
Austrian views on the i
aggressive, while her d
policy remained intact-
iundamentally false P01
with the Austrian p0W€I
including in one P011155
Austrian policy toward
ization carried througl
Office incorporated an
and inconsistent princ
Whatever that Buol at
the faults and disagre
Despite that, his mini
that the inconsistency
the policy remained it
Yet these obsen
Others made up to thi:
eC'lsions were reache.
practices and Organiz

aus ‘
e lnfluenee to be

 

153
0th Austria and Russia.93 Beginning in late 1852,

rian views on the issue of European Turkey became
essive, while her demand that Russia maintain a passive
cy remained intact. This was a new departure and a
amentally false policy.94 It accorded not at all

the Austrian power position at that time. Yet by
uding in one Political Desk the responsibility for
rian policy toward both Russia and Turkey, the reorgan-
ion carried through so responsively in the Foreign

e incorporated and institutionalized these flawed
'nconsistent principles, and it made no difference

ver that Buol at the head of the Ministry recognized
faults and disagreed with the policy containing them.95
Lte that, his ministry was organized in such a manner
the inconsistency was assured in fact as long as
Jolicy remained intact in name.

Yet these observations concern, as have most of the

8 made up to this point, the framework in which

ions were reached and implemented. Operational

ices and organizational forms do not in themselves
influence to be exerted, policies to be formulated

isions to be effected. People, particularly those

93Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 79.

9QSchroeder, "Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute over
in Eastern Policy, 1853—1855," Journal of Modern
5, 40/2 (June 1968).

’5Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 79.

 

persons in the key posf
must still take some i1
and organizational asp:
is therefore to the pe:

Office that we now tur'

 

154

rsons in the key positions identified in the foregoing,
st still take some initiative for these operational

d organizational aspects to have any importance. It
therefore to the personnel of the Austrian Foreign

fice that we now turn our attention.

 

THE BUREAUCRN

In the two prece'
operation and the orga'
Office have emanated i
and functional responS
and its chiefs. The n
to a large extent the
maintained in the Mini
necessary for the prac
determined the general
Foreign Office, while
SQhemata necessitated

of ‘ ‘
its organization .

perceptions of its ro

Balkans) also determi

0 I o
Tganization. So als

d v
etermine the more re

 

 

CHAPTER III

THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

In the two preceding chapters, the analyses of the

ation and the organization of the Austrian Foreign

ce have emanated in part from a discussion of the legal
functional responsibilities incumbent on the institution
its chiefs. The non—collegiality principle dictated
large extent the type of operation that was to be
tained in the Ministry. The various instruments
ssary for the practice of international diplomacy
rmined the general organizational structure of the
Lgn Office, while officially mandated functional
lata necessitated certain more specific components

s organization. Changes in the Austrian government's
ptions of its role in specified areas (e.g., the

ns) also determined aspects of the Foreign Office
ization. So also did legal and functional dictates
line the more rudimentary aspects of the personnel
rition within the Foreign Office. The number of

s employed in the Ministry depended primarily on
ount of work generated by the conduct of Austrian
ens in the international system. Hierarchy of

is conditioned partially by the fact that the

155

 

 

organization was non-CO
divisions, Personnel di
lationship to the signi
national relations witl
was concerned.

But, as with the
structure, caprice of i
in determining the com
indeed far more import
The philosophies, prej
those persons directly
in the Ministry were i
was to be employed, wt

that order and to what

Certainly, objective é

education counted for
emDlOyment or promoti-
aLCAuired through the ‘

c .
hief and subordinate

 

 

 

156

ganization was non—collegial. Within the various sub—
visions, personnel distribution varied in direct re-
tionship to the significance of those facets of inter—

tional relations with which the particular subdivision

.‘

i
3 concerned.

But, as with the operational system and organizational
ructure, caprice of personalities was also significant
determining the composition of the bureaucracy, and
leed far more important than in the two former cases.

a philosophies, prejudices and relative influence of

 

>se persons directly concerned with personnel affairs
the Ministry were the primary factors in deciding who

; to be employed, where they were to be used, and in

.t order and to what degree they were to be promoted.
'tainly, objective guidelines did exist: experience and
cation counted for a great deal. But ultimately, the
loyment or promotion of a Beamte depended on perceptions
uired through the mutual personal acquaintance of

ef and subordinate. The Foreign Office was small

15h to ensure that no single individual was entirely
iown to any other. It does not, therefore, fit into

arn bureaucratic analyses predicated on the assumption
inonymity of its members. The "bureaucratic age" in
modern sense was not to engulf Austria for many decades.
eamte occupied his position more by virtue of personal
raction with the high authorities in the Ministry

,by any fixed system of selection. For this reason,

 

 

an examination 0f the ‘
the character, in term
level and lmilOSOPhiCE1
cracy, but also of tho
the bureaucracy.
Excluding that C
assigned to Austrian m
number of persons empl
extent, by the six bra
in Vienna never excee<
to the March revoluti4
Payroll of the central
At that time, the God
formally belong to th
individuals associate
its subsequent attach
1848 are not included
00mll€11"1son,it is hel
0tEll actually on the

Bylate 1853, the p0
Statistics is availed

Fol
18'2 In 1856, th

 

157

examination of the bureaucracy should give a clue to

character, in terms of political viewpoint, social

91 and philosophical outlook, not only of that bureau—
:y, but also of those persons who recruited and organized
bureaucracy.

Excluding that considerable body of state servants
igned to Austrian missions in foreign lands, the total
oer of persons employed and used, to however small an
ant, by the six branches of the Foreign Ministry located
Vienna never exceeded 140 prior to 1860. Just prior
:he March revolution of 18fi8, 102 persons were on the
“011 of the central branches of the State Chancellery.l
Ihat time, the Coding and Translation Bureau did not
ally belong to the Foreign Ministry, so that the 13
viduals associated with this branch at the time of
subsequent attachment to the Ministry in the fall of
are not included in this number. For the sake of
irison, it is helpful to add these 13 persons to the
. actually on the payroll, bringing the number to 115.
.te 1853, the point at which the next set of reliable
stics is available, 124 persons were on the Ministry's

.2 In 1856, there were 138 and in 1860, 140 were

lHof— und Staatshandbuch des 6sterreichischen
rthumsz 18fl8 (Vienna: Aus der KK Hof— und Staats—
_al—Druckerey, l8u8).

2Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
Status, List of Beamten employed in the Foreign
ry for Nov. 1853.

 

 

emploled'3 NOt includé
officially assigned to
residing in Vienna and
The central admit
was obviously not a la
size becomes even more
more than half of the
had no contact whateve
administrative functic
in the foregoing numbe
administrators of the
state archives, bookke
and decipherers in the
but also doormen, off
other individuals wit?
Mm Of these seldom
report or a dispatch.
“int no relation to

included on the rolls
se ‘ "
Nice. This categ

\~ for 1860
allay

S v . 1‘, G ' '

“€::%‘f§ rexamfigcshfi

Cott ard

Mk: 19i9)' Rechb

 

 

he‘ll _ a" 5; ,

158

Loyed.3 Not included in these totals were individuals
icially assigned to foreign posts, but temporarily
iding in Vienna and at the disposal of the Ministry.4
The central administration of Austrian foreign policy
obviously not a large-scale operation. Its small
3 becomes even more notable with the realization that
2 than half of the persons employed at any given time
no contact whatever with the current political and
.nistrative functions of the Foreign Office. Included
:he foregoing numbers were not only professors and
.nistrators of the Oriental Academy, archivists in the

e archives, bookkeepers in the Paymaster's Office,

 

decipherers in the Coding and Translation Bureau,
also doormen, office messenger boys, couriers and

r individuals with functions of a purely manual sort.
of these seldom or never laid eyes on an incoming

rt or a dispatch. Several persons on assignments

1g no relation to Foreign Office functions were also
Lded on the rolls under the rubric "extraordinary

ce." This category, however, encompassed at the

3Hof- und Staatshandbuch des 6sterreichischen
:‘thumsz 1856 (Vienna. KK Hof— und Staatsdruckerei,

. This was the first edition to be published after
Ibid. for 1860.

4Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 26, 38—39;
ic examples were Rechberg in 18 9 Heinrich Friedjung,
Bernhard Rechberg," in Historische Aufsatze, Stuttgart:
1919); Hubner in 1854 {Neun Jahre, 1: 135-136); and

:h in 1853 (Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . .

same time persons who

hierarchy, but for who

(33.th o

More important ”6
listed on the rolls, t
actual and regular con
of the Foreign Ministr
in 1848, 1+2 Beamten we
Policy and Mechanical
mined number of others
personnel participated
in any question for wt

The fact that unclear

lletternich‘ s last yea:

between the Minister'
State Chancellery pre
personnel distributio
the "extraordinary se
passing time in Vienr

suggests, however, tt

dllllomatic affairs m'

mid~18t0s. As early

greater than that re

>
W

 

159

me time persons who occupied crucial positions in the

erarchy, but for whom no regularized slots were allo—
ted.

More important than the total number of persons
sted on the rolls, therefore, was the number having
tual and regular contact with the current operations

the Foreign Ministry. Prior to the March revolution
1848, 42 Beamten were regularly used by the combined
licy and Mechanical Services Branches, and an undeter—
1ed number of others carried as "extraordinary service"
rsonnel participated solely at the behest of Metternich
any question for which he thought they might be useful.5

a fact that unclear spheres of authority existed during

 

:ternich's last years between the two branches and

ween the Minister's Cabinet and the main body of the

te Chancellery prevents a closer determination of the
sonnel distribution. Metternich's extensive use of
"extraordinary service" category and of diplomats

sing time in Vienna for his personal Minister's Cabinet
:ests, however, that the total number involved in current
,omatic affairs may have exceeded 50 throughout the
18405. As early as 1843, the supply of Beamten was

ter than that required to fill the demands placed on

 

5Hof- und Staatshandbuch, 1848; Mayr, Geschichte der
:skanzlei, p. 51.

 

 

the Foreign Office by

with this overabundanc
functions do not appea
formed. The Mechanica
trative Section was ur.
sary to press "extraor
and filing activities

cared less .7

The glut and ma]
ample material for rel
to power in late 1848.
regard in his January
a subsequent proposal
showed that personnel
with lightly or in ha
by Mensshengen and re
that the reform could

wh'
ich was to become j

 

160
Foreign Office by its responsibilities.6 Yet even
h this overabundance of labor, the most rudimentary
ations do not appear to have been satisfactorily per—
med. The Mechanical Services Branch in the Adminis-
tive Section was understaffed, so that it became neces-
y to press "extraordinary service" Beamten into copying
filing activities about which they knew little and
ed less.7
The glut and maldistribution of personnel provided

;e material for reform upon Schwarzenberg's accession
)ower in late 1848. What Werner suggested in this
.rd in his January 9, 1849, memorandum is unknown, but
:bsequent proposal from Schwarzenberg to the Emperor
ed that personnel questions were not to be dealt

lightly or in haste. The document, which was drafted

ensshengen and revised by Werner, presented the opinion

the reform could occur only by steps, the first of

1 was to become intimately acquainted with the talent
.able in the Ministry and with the demands placed on
' its functions. Then it was necessary "gradually
place the unsuitable elements with more talented
iduals; and finally to make the rejuvenated body

ganism which will be suited to guaranteeing its

6Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
(Odelga), DePont to Metternich, Feb. 25, 1843.

 

7Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interior, Organisierung,
3, Metternich Proposal of Mar. 22, 1844.

 

salubrious PartiCipati
life in its new form."
is that there was Curr
deadwood in the Foreig
days. In continuing t
the authors took the f
by reducing the number
Undersecretary of Stat

The trend towarc
during the spring of I
leading up to Werner':
Schwarzenberg in whic?
was organized. In pe:
for regulariz ing Dire
each office of this B
01" ten persons receiv
Adlutant and eleven C
six Offices now form
to comPare this total
six Offices to the m
era in the performanc
Mechanical Services j

b
elveen Policy and M

8
I o
M's Vortrfi

h 91bid
°p°sal or'dpintglli

 

161
,ubrious participation in the general Austrian state

8 The implication of this passage

’9 in its new form."
that there was currently a considerable amount of

dwood in the Foreign Office left over from Metternich's

s. In continuing the proposal on a more specific level,
authors took the first step in remedying this situation
reducing the number of Hofrate, the highest rank below
ersecretary of State, from eight to six.

The trend toward a smaller body of Beamten continued
ing the spring of 1849, permeating the lower ranks and
ling up to Werner's proposal of April 21, 1849, to
rarzenberg in which the Mechanical Services Branch
organized. In pensioning various individuals, vacancies
regularizing Directors, Adjutants and Offizialen in

office of this Branch were made available. A total
en persons received the title of either Director or
tant and eleven Offizialen were divided among the
offices now formally constituted.9 It is impossible
>mpare this total of 21 persons assigned to these
:ffices to the number involved during the Metternichean
.n the performance of the functions assigned to the
nical Services Branch. The prior lack of distinction

en Policy and Mechanical Services Branch allowed a

8Ibid., Vortrage, K 297, Proposal of Feb. 2, 1849.

9Ibid., Interiora, Organisierung, Fasz. 3, Werner
:al of Apr. 21, 1849-

constantly changing nm
the activities of each
Branch was of more int
Mechanical Services Bl“
in the performance of
while a surplus of hel
cumbersome and unwielc'
of a work force of 21
the imbalance was rec
Schwarzenberg' s
the reorganization of
demonstrated the exte
the personnel distrit
February 1849. Besic‘
Were assigned to the
number which include<
"em‘aerdinary servi.
F0reign Office affa‘l
include diplomats be

as'
18 by the Ministe

Metter '
nlch' 8 Cabinet

the
39 Persons to bec
tfi
\ C .
e orgemization

2
Persons With the

1a
mob activities

10 .
Mg” SChw

162

stantly changing number of persons to be involved in
activities of each. But since the work in the Policy
nch was of more intrinsic interest than that in the
hanical Services Branch, a chronic shortage had existed
the performance of the mundane copying and filing work,
e a surplus of help in the Policy Branch had made it
ersome and unwieldy. With the definitive assignment

work force of 21 persons in the former division,
imbalance was rectified.

Schwarzenberg's proposal of June 22, 1849, whereby
reorganization of the Policy Branch was completed,
nstrated the extent of the process of streamlining
personnel distribution and utilization begun in
'uary 1849. Besides the minister himself, 22 Beamten
assigned to the various Desks and Departments, a
er which included all of those in the category of
raordinary service" who were actually occupied with
ign Office affairs.lo Once again, the number did not
[de diplomats being used on a strictly temporary
by the Minister in Vienna, but the abolition of
rnich's Cabinet sharply reduced the opportunity for
persons to become permanent fixtures in the Foreign
' organization. Exact comparison of this total of

sons with the number of those involved in Policy

activities under Metternich is once again impossible

 

OIbid., Schwarzenberg Proposal of June 22, 1849.

due to the lack of em
more than 50 persons we
prior to 1848, and if 1
Mechanical Services Bra
adequate in early 1849
in the Policy Branch P‘
and perhaps approached
berg reduced the work
least one-third and p0
employed in the Policy
was also appreciably 1
despite the fact that
correspondence remains
This was clearl;
those who left accoun
work load was the dom
Teetine during the ea
be true that there we

and faster action"
hich'l3

lllbid

l ' a M l:

mu mmhengintfi,
12

163
to the lack of distinction between branches. But if
2 than 50 persons were involved in the two branches
>r to 1848, and if the number of those employed in the
ranical Services Branch was fewer than what was deemed
[uate in early 1849 (21), then the total number occupied
1he Policy Branch prior to 1848 must have exceeded 30
perhaps approached 40. In effect, therefore, Schwarzen—
reduced the work force in the Policy Branch by at
t one—third and possibly more. The total of 43 persons
oyed in the Policy and Mechanical Services Branches
1so appreciably lower than the number prior to 1848,
'te the fact that the volume of incoming and outgoing
espondence remained nearly constant (50 pieces per day).11
This was clearly a bare minimum. At least among
a who left accounts of their experiences, the crushing
load was the dominant feature of the operational

me during the early Schwarzenberg years.12

It may
us that there was "less talking and writing and more
aster action" under Schwarzenberg than under Metter—

L3 but basic Foreign Office functions nevertheless

'ed a tremendous amount of correspondence. In the

 

llIbid., Metternich Proposal of Mar. 22, 1844;
Mensshengen Memorandum of July 13, 1853-

 

'ZIbid., PA 1, K 5330, Rechberg Nachlass, Thierry
to Rechberg, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1849; Arneth, Aus
Leben, 1:430-431; Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen
chwarzenberg."

 

 

 

firneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:2.

late eighteenth centul
mostly of a diplomati<
nineteenth century, 9‘
indirect interest in '
and every private cit
foreign country used
mediary, with the res
ten-fold over 50 year
Mpire's administrati
nothing to lighten tt
is international cris
Pondence increased 81
oruited to handle the
the summer and fall .
deteriorated almost
By late 18 53,
m the Administrat iv

ll381849 level of 1c

l6
year . Although I'lC

 

164
eighteenth century, Foreign Ministry functions were
Ly of a diplomatic—political character. By the mid—
teenth century, every internal institution with an
rect interest in the activities of a foreign state
every private citizen with claims of any sort in a
ign country used the Foreign Ministry as an inter—
iry, with the result that the work load had increased
?old over 50 years.14 The transformation of the
‘e's administration into a ministerial system did
ng to lighten the pressure on the Foreign Office.
ternational crises erupted, the volume of corres—
Pce increased suddenly, and new personnel were re—
ed to handle the emergency. Such was the case during
ummer and fall of 1850 as relations with Prussia
iorated almost to the point of war.15
By late 1853, the total volume of correspondence
Administrative Section alone had increased from
49 level of 10,000 pieces per year to 18,000 per
Although no figures exist for the Political

1 at the time, other evidence indicates that the

of correspondence in the two Sections remained

I
+Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ-
;, Fasz. 3, Metternich Proposal of Mar. 22, 1844.

 

’Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 26
ben), Schwarzenberg Proposal of June 11, 1850.

[bid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
Mensshengen Memorandum of July 13, 1853.

nearly equal,17 thus 1
pieces per year. or he
doubling of volume in
partly to the additior
to the diplomatic exci
the Crimean War, obvi
November 1853, 53 Bea
Mechanical Services B
and 22 in the latter.
ical Services Branch
ness of the sound (fit
It was the pride of 1
it began to deteriore
Per cent in the numbe
during the period in
by 80 per cent is al
improvement in the e
The lack of an
F0reign Ministry and
exchange Pertaining
OrganiZng': Qdmi]

ung Wirkui
over the or . .
(contentS cginlzatl'

l8

‘ ‘ Ibid'o K
distribution chart“)

19

Fasz. QMH Staa

 

 

165

rly equal,l7 thus resulting in a total volume of 36,000
ces per year, or nearly 100 per day. This virtual
bling of volume in a mere four years, attributable
'tly to the addition of oriental consular affairs and
the diplomatic exchanges during the period approaching

Crimean War, obviously required more personnel. In
ember 1853, 53 Beamten were occupied in the Policy and
hanical Services Branches, 31 of them in the former

18

22 in the latter. The slight increase in the Mechan—

1 Services Branch personnel is a tribute to the effective—
s of the sound division of labor established in 1849.
llas the pride of the Office until the late 18503, when
aegan to deteriorate.19 An increase of just over 40
cent in the number of personnel in the Policy Branch
,ng the period in which the volume of affairs increased
0 per cent is also dramatic evidence of a qualitative
ovement in the expertise of the Foreign Office.

The lack of any new functional assignments to the
.gn Ministry and the cessation of the diplomatic

nge pertaining to the Crimean War prevented the

l7Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
isierung Wirkungskreis, Vesque draft of a memorandum
:he organization of the Foreign Office, undated

nts correspond to the 1853 conditions).

18Ibid., K 401, Referats—Einteilung, Personnel
)ution chart of Nov. 1, 1853: see Appendix B.

 

 

'9Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
. Werner Circular of Aug. 27, 1858.

volume of corresponden
tween 1853 and the end
of Beamten concerned w
Ministry increased frc
in 1856.20 A clear de
number assigned to eac
it is for the Metternf
especially those in t1
used in both the Poli<
although the interchat
as it had been prior
“0W aesisrved to the P
EXCIUSiVely ‘60 the Me
the 36 in the former
the latter as well, 5
changes Occurred betvt

a
nd nature of work ir

 

 

166
.ume of correspondence from increasing appreciably be—
len 1853 and the end of 1856. Accordingly, the number
Beamten concerned with the current affairs of the
istry increased from the 1853 level of 53 only to 55
1856.20 A clear determination at this date of the
ber assigned to each Branch becomes difficult much as
is for the Metternichean era. Certain individuals,
acially those in the Offizialen rank, were once again
1 in both the Policy and Mechanical Services Branch,
tough the interchange was not nearly as widespread
.t had been prior to 1848. Thirty—six persons were
assigned to the Policy Branch, and only 19 were assigned
usively to the Mechanical Services Branch. But of
36 in the former Branch, at least four were used in
latter as well, so that no significant proportional
ges occurred between 1853 and 1856. Given the amount
nature of work in the Ministry, the body of personnel
ined throughout the 1850s a fully utilized and highly
:ient group. Growing from a low of 43 in 1849 to a
lum of 55 in 1856, it was a group in which each member
'ell known to every other, in which the most highly-
‘d bureaucrat, to whom the responsibility of employ-
and promotion ultimately fell, could and did acquire

ost exact knowledge of the capabilities and attitudes
___~___________

20Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,

ats—Einteilung, Personnel distribution chart of
l, 1857-

 

 

of every Beamte below
The existence of a grl
extremely important t:
decisions about who w
in the first place, a
important positions i
structure of the Fore
Before turning
bureaucracy as a resu
however, it is helpft
ture of the Office as
addition to operatior
discussed earlier, or
Once again, the fact
collegial organizati
type 01” the hierarch

where the president

amo
os equals. each (

Q .
lain ’00 authority ,
the hierarchy has i'

F o
Orelgn Office, the

Immediately below h

 

167

every Beamte below him, down to the lowliest copyist.

existence of a group of this size, therefore, made
remely important the question of personalities in the
isions about who would be employed in the Ministry
the first place, and which of those would rise to
ortant positions in the operational and organizational
ucture of the Foreign Office in the second.

Before turning to the qualities emerging in the
eaucracy as a result of these selection processes,
ever, it is helpful to delineate the hierarchical struc—
e of the Office as a means of determining what, in
ition to operational and organizational considerations
cussed earlier, constituted an important position.

9 again, the fact that the Foreign Ministry was a non-
Legial organization determined to a large degree the

a of the hierarchy. In a collegial organization,

‘e the president of the institution is simply the first
Lg equals, each of whom possesses a legally binding

m to authority over the policy of the entire institution,
hierarchy has in effect several summits. In the

ign Office, the minister alone formed the summit.
iiately below him, and directly responsible to him,

the undersecretary of state whose duty it was to

:ain the operation of the institution in an orderly

.on.21 Following him was the rank of Hofrat, usually

 

21Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
3, Operational Description for the Emperor, Dec. 8, 1852.

 

 

 

 

reserved for those wh
number was reduced fr
then increased to sev
of Staatskanzle irat .
such slots existed ur
them to five at Werne
see no real use for i
memorandum, consider:
ground for Hofrat rat
for marginally useful
theless survived, si
it were blocked from
Hofrat slots and pro
for their pride and
Squeeze of the late
decree whereby all E
or Department were g
and Simultaneously 1

their number was al

The next leve

221cm Ad '
u .' ml
Vortragemel Prop

2
3Not to be (
rank compare
24Ma

yr. Gesc
25
. . Aus ‘
lSleNos. Fig?” 8:}

higher

 

 

168

served for those who led a Desk or a Department. Their
ber was reduced from eight to six by Schwarzenberg,
n increased to seven in 1853.22 Next came the rank
Staatskanzleirat, later called Sektionsrat.23 Six
h slots existed under Metternich. Schwarzenberg reduced
m to five at Werner's request in 1849. Werner could
no real use for this rank in the January 9, 1849,
orandum, considering it at best an unnecessary training
und for Hofrat rank and at worst a gentle repository
marginally useful semi-competents.2L'L The rank never—
less survived, simply because persons falling within
ere blocked from advancing by the limited number of
rat slots and protected from demotion by compassion
their pride and material condition, until the budget
eeze of the late 1850s and early 1860s resulted in a
ree whereby all Sektionsrate who did not head a Desk
)epartment were gradually eliminated.25 Prior to this
simultaneously with the rise in Hofrat slots in 1853,
r number was also increased from five to six.

The next level of rank was Hofsekretar. Metternich

 

22Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 402,
Page, Buol Proposal to the Emperor, July 24, 1853.

 

23Not to be confused with the Sektionschef, a much
2r rank comparable to undersecretary, introduced in 1868.

24Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 100.

25Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
ung, Fasz. 8, Mensshengen Memorandum of May 25, 1860.

 

 

 

 

had five such slots a
to eight by beStOWing
granting the pay rais
along with it. This
of the bureaucracy, <
liferation of sub-ti'
AHofsekretar, for e:
Hofsekretars, Bag;
eines Hofsekretéirs, f
Titel und Charakter
Wirklicher Hofsekret
these qualifications
and their meaning re
The right of a Beamt
than that for which
great deal to the Be

STE money. but the

Feed by the histu
3311849, the 1111111er
1853! With One eXC

Hofsekretar ever le

The same rule

 

 

 

169
five such slots allocated to him but increased it
eight by bestowing the title of Hofsekretar without
iting the pay raise that would have customarily gone
1g with it. This was a much—used practice at all levels
;he bureaucracy, one which led to an incredible pro—
ration of sub-titles and qualifications to sub—titles.
fsekretar, for example, could possess the Titel eines
ekretars, Rang eines Hofsekretars, Rang und Titel
s Hofsekretars, Charakter eines Hofsekretars, or the
l und Charakter eines Hofsekretars, or simply be a

Licher Hofsekretar. Kfibeck attempted to sort out

 

a qualifications in 1843, with no success whatever,
;heir meaning remained murky throughout the 1850s.26
‘ight of a Beamte to be addressed by a title higher
that for which he was being paid no doubt meant a
deal to the Beamte and certainly saved the state
money, but the minute distinctions are better left
ed by the historian. Left by Schwarzenberg at five
+9, the number of Hofsekretare slots became six in
With one exception, that of Anton von Hammer, no
:retar ever led a Desk or a Department.
The same rule, with the same exception, applied to
west rank category theoretically permitted after
n the Policy Branch——that of Hofkonzipist. Nine
se slots existed prior to 1848, although three of

 

D
“élbid., Fasz. 3, Kfibeck Proposal of July 21, 1843.

1____________1.__‘I“l

 

 

them were left vacant
Hcfsekretéir. Schwarz
1849 and it was incre
the lowest rank found
with documents in the
Offizialen. Under Me
most of whom were use
State Chancellery. A
persons of this rank,
exclusively to the Mt
elimination of a siz‘
their positions in t
necessity of using c
Offizialen as assist
Even after a sharp ]
P0110}; Branch and t1
with the introducti,
for those aspiring
who had not Passed

Branch, subject to

assignments lay in
under Metternich W

t
hat of the Unpaid

 

170
em were left vacant by the honorary promotions to
fsekretar. Schwarzenberg maintained this number in
49 and it was increased to ten in 1853. After 1849,
e lowest rank found among those having actual contact
th documents in the Foreign Office was that of the
fizialen. Under Metternich there had been ten Offizialen,
st of whom were used indiscriminantly throughout the
ite Chancellery. An attempt was made in 1849 to assign
‘sons of this rank, to which two more slots were added,
-lusively to the Mechanical Services Branch.27 The
.mination of a sizeable number of senior Beamten from
ir positions in the Policy Branch led, however, to the
essity of using certain particularly well—qualified
izialen as assistants to the Desk or Department Chiefs.
n after a sharp line was drawn between Beamten of the
icy Branch and those of the Mechanical Services Branch
1 the introduction in 1851 of the diplomatic examination
those aspiring to Policy Branch positions, Offizialen
had not passed it continued to be used in the Policy
rch, subject to the explicit condition that their prime

28 One rank existing

gnments lay in the other Branch.
r Metternich which was still lower than Offizial was

of the unpaid Praktikant, of which there were three

 

27Ibid., Werner Proposal of Apr. 21, 1849.

28Ibid.. Administrative Registratur, F k, K 401,
bats-Einteilung, Werner Directive of Nov. 23, 1850.

 

in1848. This was at
until 1858’ although
in order to satisfy 1
and Vesque for his S<
During Mettern.
between the rank of '
of a Mechanical SerV
ployed in the Policy
could range from Hof
on the same criteria
in the Policy Branch
were combined in a c
promotion ladders we
individual being pe:
from the Mechanical
all of the necessar
Greatsinely strict i
erVices Branch her.
the Policy Branch.
fOr‘mal titles, and

mated as those wh<

171

1 1848. This was abolished in 1849 and not re-introduced
itil 1858, although positions were created informally
I order to satisfy the ambitions of Werner for his nephew
_d Vesque for his son.

During Metternich's era, no distinction was drawn
tween the rank of those assigned as Director or Adjutant
a Mechanical Services office and that of a person em—
oyed in the Policy Branch. A Director or an Adjutant
uld range from Hofkonzipist to Staatskanzleirat, depending
the same criteria which were applied to promotions
the Policy Branch. All personnel in both Branches
‘e combined in a common promotion pool. After mid—1849,
imotion ladders were created for each Branch, with no
,ividual being permitted to enter the Policy Branch
m the Mechanical Services Branch unless he possessed
of the necessary qualifications, which became in—
asingly strict in the 1850s.29 Titles in the Mechanical
vices Branch henceforth reflected its separation from
Policy Branch. "Director" and "Adjutant" became the
1al titles, and the more traditional titles were elim—
:ed as those who held them retired or died. An Offizial
did not attempt or succeed in passing the diplomatic
ination would advance solely through the ranks of
tant and Director within the Mechanical Services

ch, never acquiring the coveted prefix Hof— or suffix

 

29Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
- 4. Buol Directive of Oct. 17, 1853.

 

-R_a_t_ unless it was gr
of the Beamte‘s caree
In addition to
rankings for Foreign
Beamten, employed on
basis, who possessed
common of such titles
diplomatic corps, frc
selected for Ministry
to the bureaucratic '
able with a Hofrat,

Sektionsrat, a junio

a Gesandtschaft Atta

konzipist.30 Other

prevailing in certaf
Regierungsrat or sit
sons involved in pa
liaison with intern
the bearer of the t
with the notation:

carers of the norm
Organiiiimn Adm.

. run ~ '
organizationil iii?

 

 

172

at unless it was granted simply as an honor at the end
the Beamte's career.
In addition to all of these regularly established

nkings for Foreign Office personnel, there were also
mten, employed on either a temporary or long—term

is, who possessed other titles of rank. The most

on of such titles were those appertaining to the
lomatic corps, from which Beamten were sometimes
ected for Ministry service. They corresponded roughly
the bureaucratic titles: a Legationsrat was interchange-
.e with a Hofrat, a senior Legationssekretar with a
:tionsrat, a junior Legationssekretar with a Hofsekretar,
figgndtschaft Attache or a Legationscommis with a Hof-
zipist.30 Other titles borrowed from ranking systems
vailing in certain domestic institutions, such as
ierungsrat or simply Bat, were sometimes used for per—
3 involved in publicist or other activities requiring
ison with internal authorities.31 In all such cases,
bearer of the title appeared on the Ministry's rolls
L the notation: "in extraordinary service." Furthermore,

“ers of the normal Foreign Office titles for whom no

 

301bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
nisierungs-Auskfinfte, Reply to a British request for
nizational information, Jan. 25, 18 l.

 

31Joseph Anton Pilat, Metternich's editor of the
erreichischer Beobachter," and Karl von Weil, a member
1e Press Committee after 1855. held the Regierungsrat

B-

regular slot existed ‘
service“ categorbf- S
actual service within
extremely important 3
in l8h9, Biegeleben i
It was primarily beca
slots for the require
devised this rubric i
to what Schwarzenberg
Metternich, but it he
dividuals whose loss
depletion and partly
on the rolls were un
dealt a severe blow

cracy in terms of kr

reservoir, it nevert

Who were regularly <

throughout the 1850:

 

 

-gular slot existed were also listed in the "extraordinary

-rvice" category. Some of these persons performed no
tual service within the Ministry. Others performed
tremely important services, such as Thierry as Hofrat
l8h9, Biegeleben in 1850—1852 and Gagern in 1855—1860.
was primarily because an inadequate number of regular
ots for the required work force existed that Gentz

ised this rubric in 1822.32 The category had swollen
what Schwarzenberg called "perverse heights" under

ternich, but it had also included some excellent in—

 

iduals whose loss, resulting partly from numerical
vletion and partly from the fact that those who remained
the rolls were unusable in the changed political climate,
.lt a severe blow to the post—1849 quality of the bureau-
cy in terms of knowledge and experience.33 As a talent
ervoir, it nevertheless contained five or six persons
were regularly occupied in Foreign Office service
oughout the 18508.

As the crowning element in the confused picture of
ranking system in the Foreign Ministry, the fact must
lentioned that titles previously beginning with the
'ix flgf— were re—named in 1848 to begin with the prefix

sterial- in accordance with the new concepts of the

 

32Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 103.

33Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
(Biegeleben), Schwarzenberg Proposal to the Emperor,
ll, 1850.

 

 

legal position of bur
Theoretically, the BE
a constitutional mini
provision that remaii
born state of the cm
who was nothing if n
characteristically d
earlier M- prefixe
Paradoxically, the p
to the Emperor, in w
concerned other matt
never did resolve ti
the old practice, h:
W- gradual
From the fore
Office Personnel co
“lade- First, the o

of Sishificance, de

174
legal position of bureaucrats vis—a-vis their superiors.
Theoretically, the Beamten were legally subordinate to
a constitutional ministry rather than to the emperor, a
provision that remained meaningless in view of the still-
born state of the constitution. Nevertheless, the Emperor,
who was nothing if not a stickler for questions of form,
characteristically demanded that the titles revert to the
earlier figf— prefixes in a directive of August 27, 1851.3u
Paradoxically, the proposal submitted by the Ministerrat
to the Emperor, in which Franz Joseph's wishes were met,
concerned other matters of such weight that the Emperor
never did resolve the issue. Buol favored reversion to
the old practice, however, so that the use of the prefix

Ministerial— gradually disappeared.35

 

From the foregoing rudimentary sketch of the Foreign
Office personnel composition, two observations can be
made. First, the opportunity for employment in a capacity
of significance, defined as direct and routine contact
ith current diplomatic affairs, and for advancement through
he ranks to a relatively exalted position in the Austrian
tate service was extremely limited. It must be considered
ven more limited if the definition of a "capacity of
ignificance" is confined to those 22 to 35 persons em—

loyed in the Policy Branch, and still more so if the

 

3LPIbid” Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerratsprotokolle,

.—_____

9, Minutes of the Aug. 27, 1851, session.

35Ibid., K 11, Minutes of the Dec. 7, 1852, session.

 

 

definition is furthei
affairs having direC‘
political policy tow:
sense, the number fl
excluding the minist
second observation i
Beamten employed by
steps on the promoti
Beamte achieved depe
his own personality
observation of those

promotions . Persona

 

of the applicants ft
of the grantors of
roles in all personm
From the stam
policy, the personal
important in themse
and perhaps also to
attitudes and conse
individuals standi:
who were at once rt
and exerting influi
judgment on the fa
of that elite grou
concentrated will

of the characteris

 

 

175

definition is further restricted to those dealing with

affairs having direct bearing on the conduct of Austrian
political policy toward foreign states. In this last
sense, the number fluctuated between nine and eleven,
-xcluding the minister, in the years 1849—1856. The
.econd observation is that, given the small number of
:eamten employed by the Ministry and the relatively few
.teps on the promotion scale, whatever advancement a
ieamte achieved depended on the judgments derived about
is own personality and character from the personal
bservation of those individuals in charge of granting
Iomotions. Personal qualities and backgrounds, not only
f the applicants for employment and promotion, but also
f the grantors of such positions, thus played paramount
ales in all personnel assignments within the Ministry.
From the standpoint of direct influence on foreign
)1icy, the personal qualities of subalterns were not
rportant in themselves. They served merely to reflect
d perhaps also to reinforce the personal qualities,
titudes and consequent motivations of those few important
dividuals standing near the pinnacle of the institution,
3 were at once responsible for formulating decisions
1 exerting influence over policy matters and for passing
igment on the fate of a subaltern's career. A discussion
that elite group in which power in the Ministry was
icentrated will be taken up in due course; the analysis

the characteristics of the entire bureaucracy which

-4

 

follows immediately
the operational rout
to illuminate anothe
this small bureaucra
Since the elite belo
the Foreign Office,
cording to the time
included in the ove
Because the c
mined in the first '
by the Foreign Mini
for hiring and the
individuals is nece
recognition counted
explicit norms in t
alities of those re
in both of these as
facets of Foreign C
was also the key fi
especially Schwarzr
to rejuvenate his ]
talent into critic
the demands of the
to become well acq
permanent bureaucz

with respect to tr

of Hofrat was the

 

 

 

 

176

follows immediately is intended, as were the analyses of
the operational routine and the organizational structure,
to illuminate another element of the environment in which
this small bureaucratic elite performed its functions.
Since the elite belonged to the total personnel body of
the Foreign Office, and since its membership varied ac—
:ording to the time period and the specific event, it is
included in the overall analysis of the bureaucracy.

Because the character of the bureaucracy was deter—
mined in the first instance by the type of person employed
)y the Foreign Ministry, an examination of the motivations
‘or hiring and the criteria used in the actual choice of
ndividuals is necessary. In a situation where personal
ecognition counted for much more than established and
xplicit norms in the process of employment, the person-
lities of those responsible for hiring were critical
1 both of these aspects. As was the case with all other
icets of Foreign Office operations, Undersecretary Werner
LS also the key figure in this process. The ministers,
:pecially Schwarzenberg during the period when he sought
rejuvenate his Ministry by the introduction of new
lent into critical positions, were also important, but
a demands of their positions reduced their opportunity
become well acquainted with the resources of the Austrian
rmanent bureaucracy. Equally as important as Werner
:h respect to the recruitment of persons below the rank

Hofrat was the Chancellery Director, Franz von

 

   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

Mensshengen. It was
applications for crop
Werner, to submit th
The minister, accept
Wmflflmm,mm
totheEmperor in th
ofwhich by Franz Jo
dring the period
of the minister, th
Director, each of w
detail, were theref
of recruitment .

To assume tha
employment of perso
needs of the servic
of cold rationality
needs were taken in
in the years follow
Metternich. In kee
tration, the old Si
his gratitude for ‘
associates by accej
nepheWS, regardles
for them. Likewis

36Werner sug
approved automatic

K 2771., Buol Nach]
185?

 

 

177
Mensshengen. It was his responsibility to evaluate all
applications for employment and, in conjunction with
Werner, to submit these evaluations to the minister.
The minister, accepting as a rule the judgments of these
two assistants, forwarded the results of these evaluations
to the Emperor in the form of a Proposal, the approval
of which by Franz Joseph was merely a matter of form
during the period under consideration.36 The personalities
of the minister, the Undersecretary and the Chancellery
Director, each of which will be examined later in more

detail, were therefore the important ones in the process
of recruitment.

To assume that these persons' motivations in the
employment of personnel were always determined by the

needs of the service is to inject an unwarranted sense

of cold rationality into the picture. Certainly, such

needs were taken into consideration far more regularly
in the years following 1848 than had been the case under
detternich. In keeping with his paternalistic adminis-
3ration, the old State Chancellor liberally dispensed
Lis gratitude for the faithful service of his long—time
,ssociates by accepting into the Ministry their sons and
ephews, regardless of whether the need or space existed

or them. Likewise, due to a regulation that prohibited

 

36Werner suggested that all personnel matters were
Dproved automatically by the Emperor: Ibid., PA 40,
‘277L. Buol Nachlass, Werner letter to Buol, Oct. 22,
57-

 

 

subalterns in the dip
Beamten were given p0
married individuals w
ranks, in order to gr
again without regard
was a major reason 1‘
"extraordinary servi
practices ceased dur
brought with him a ci‘
a resumption of the 1
whose current positii
regard to the requir
example of this occu
son of the former Cc
Adalbert Zaremba, wt
while awaiting a nev‘
He was accepted intt
to hold off his "no:

The prevention of h

 

371mm. Staa
Proposal to Emperor
case was Moritz Ast
from his Dresden pc
maimed in the State
until receiving in
Administrative See“
in 1865: Ibid., Adi
(Asten), Lebzeltern

 

38min. , Sta
Fasz. 8, Menssheng

 

 

 

178
subalterns in the diplomatic service from marrying, many
Beamten were given posts in the State Chancellery, where
married individuals were permitted even in the lowest
ranks, in order to gratify their personal desires, once
again without regard to need or physical space.37 This
was a major reason for the outlandish expansion of the
"extraordinary service" category before 1848. Such
practices ceased during the Schwarzenberg era, but Buol
brought with him a certain genial compassion that permitted
a resumption of the earlier beneficence toward persons
whose current positions worked a hardship on them, without
regard to the requirements of the service. The most striking
example of this occurred in the case of Johann von Zaremba,
son of the former Coding and Translation Bureau Director
Adalbert Zaremba, who was afflicted with a mental disorder
While awaiting a new assignment to a diplomatic post.
He was accepted into the Foreign Office in December 1857
to hold off his "normal treatment as long as possibler38

The prevention of his consignment to an insane asylum

 

37Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Vortrage, K 295, Metternich
Proposal to Emperor Ferdinand, Sept. 30, 1847. One such
case was Moritz Asten von Schmuttermayer who was recalled
from his Dresden post in 1834 in order to marry. He re_
mained in the State Chancellery in "extraordinary service"
until receiving in 1840 an established position in the
Administrative Section, where he remained until his death
in 1865: Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 12
(Asten), Lebzeltern Proposal to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1834.

38Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
Fasz. 8, Mensshengen Proposal to Rechberg, Jan. 15, 1860.

 

 

 

 

 

was considered worth
on the premises.

In most cases,
or not to employ new
siderations of insti
varied according to
different criteria 0
in the recruitment f
destined to lead a D
ployment of an Offiz
Office of the Mechan
however, several ge
to all candidates f
of these was that t
citizen before he c
of all bureaucrats .3
allegiance was SWOI‘I
years, it was sworn
When the diplomatic
for all those aspir
employment in the P
Ship was tightened
the examination bei

Shortly thereafter

 

39Ibid., Adm
Organisierungs—Aus
Organizational inf

 

 

179

was considered worth the inconvenience of having a madman
on the premises.

In most cases, however, the decision on whether
or not to employ new personnel depended on sound con—
siderations of institutional needs. The specific needs
varied according to the positions that were open. Very
different criteria obviously had to be used, for example,
in the recruitment from outside of a Hofrat or Sektionsrat
destined to lead a Desk in the Policy Branch and the em—
ployment of an Offizial needed to fill a gap in the Copying
Office of the Mechanical Services Branch. There existed,
however, several general and explicit criteria applicable
to all candidates for employment in either Branch. One
of these was that the aspirant had to be an Austrian
citizen before he could take the oath of loyalty required
of all bureaucrats.39 Prior to 1848 and after 1852,
allegiance was sworn to the emperor. In the intervening
years, it was sworn to the Austrian state and constitution.
When the diplomatic examination was instituted in 1851
for all those aspiring to the diplomatic service or to
Employment in the Policy Branch, the restriction on citizen_
ship was tightened to prohibit an individual from attempting
the examination before becoming an Austrian citizen.

Shortly thereafter, this last condition suffered its

 

39Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
Organisierungs—Auskfinfte, Reply to a British request for
organizational information, Jan. 25, 1861.

 

 

  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 

first violation when
Metternich through
giance to the king 0
matic examination be
Another explicit con
applicant for either
of both German and
have been better fol
guage than to the fa
in his memoirs that
conversation in the
German and that m
with a foreign acce
Werner once compla'
(including French) 1
badly, although grea
facility in French :'

Additional er
Specifically for ear

the Mechanical Serv

 

40m” K 29

”1min” K 39
to a British reques
Jan. 25, 1861.

42%., Harm

”hair. seed

 

 

 

180
first violation when Graf Gustav Blome, a grandson of
Metternich through an illegitimate line which swore alle—
giance to the king of Denmark, took and passed the diplo-
matic examination before becoming an Austrian citizen.“O
Another explicit condition for employment was that each
applicant for either branch possess a thorough knowledge

of both German and Frenchfll

a provision that seems to
have been better followed with regard to the latter lan—
guage than to the former under Metternich. Hammer claimed
in his memoirs that the use of French even in ordinary
conversation in the Foreign Office was more common than
German and that many of the Beamten only spoke German

with a foreign accent.42 Under Buol, on the other hand,
Werner once complained that the foreign language capability
1(including French) in the Foreign Office had deteriorated
badly, although great stress was still placed on a thorough
facility in French in the hiring process]+3

Additional explicit conditions for employment existed
Specifically for each of the two major branches. For

:he Mechanical Services Branch, good handwriting was the

 

uolbid., K 29 (Blome), Buol Proposal, Nov. 6, 1852.

ulIbid., K 399, Organisierungs—Auskfinfte, Reply
o a British request for organizational information,
n. 25, 1861.

42

 

 

Ibid., Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 3.

43Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 114.

_-,___.

 

prime necessity and

tn hmroduction of

since Franz Joseph 1
address until the ve
of foreign languages
Branch, since Italia
ally used in corres

possessing a formal
the Copying Office

ndmfl, Joseph von

Coding and Translat
copyist matters of

18 foreign language
1867.4” But beyond
lammages, an aspir
Services Branch was
pnsmn Indeed, ex
have been at one ti
ment in this Branclr
Butby the early 1E
these grounds seem:
of Paul Manker and

Copying Office. M

 

MAustria , P

K 303 (Schneid), I

 

 

 

181
prime necessity and one that remained crucial even after
the introduction of the typewriter many decades later,
since Franz Joseph insisted on the traditional forms of
address until the very end. Insistence upon a good command
of foreign languages was, if anything, stronger in this
Branch, since Italian, Latin and Hungarian were occasion—
ally used in correspondence, decrees and credentials
possessing a formal character, for the execution of which
the Copying Office was primarily responsible. One indi—
vidual, Joseph von Schneid, assigned primarily to the
Coding and Translation Bureau but used occasionally in
copyist matters of the above nature, was competent in
18 foreign languages by the time of his retirement in
1867.4u But beyond a sound knowledge of several different
languages, an aspirant to employment in the Mechanical
Services Branch was not expected to be a highly educated
person. Indeed, extensive formal education may even
have been at one time a deterrent to a person's employ-
ment in this Branch on the grounds of over—qualification.
But by the early 18505, exclusion from consideration of
these grounds seems to have been abolished by the hiring
of Paul Manker and Anton Klaps as Offizialen in the

Copying Office. Manker had completed a juridical course

 

uuAustria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 303 (Schneid), Proposal, Apr. 13, l867.

 

 

 

   
  
  
   
 
   
    
  

of study and Klaps h
A sound formal
a requirement for em
at least after 1851,
of study at a Hochsc
in particular.”6 W
requirement under M
Policy Branch holdo
educational informa
such a course of st
German university.
ated from the There
established by Mari
leaders for the Aus
the course of study
until 1856, no addi
were employed in th
member of the burea
included the Orient
dicate, however, t1

juridical educatio:

 

”5113mm Sta
Fasz. 6, Menssheng
Fasz. 7, Menssheng
Fasz. 6, Menssheng

uélbidu Adn
Conzepts-Beamten 4
Education, Nov. 2-

 

 

 

 

 

4.4L; ~

182
45
of study and Klaps held the degree of Doctor of Law.
A sound formal education, on the other hand, was
a requirement for employment in the Policy Branch and,
at least after 1851, the completion of a juridical course
of study at a Hochschule or a university was specified

46

in particular. Whether or not this was an explicit

requirement under Metternich is unclear, but most of the

Policy Branch holdovers from Metternich's era for whom ”
educational information is available had in fact completed I
such a course of study either in Austria or in some other

German university. Of those who did not, four had gradu—

ated from the Theresianum, the prestigious military academy

established by Maria Theresa for the purpose of training

leaders for the Austrian army, and three had completed

the course of study at the Oriental Academy. From 1848

until 1856, no additional graduates of the Theresianum

were employed in the Policy Branch and only one added

member of the bureaucracy emerged from a background which

included the Oriental Academy. This last fact does in—

dicate, however, that even after the point at which a

juridical education can clearly be regarded as mandatory

 

uSIbid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
Fasz. 6, Mensshengen Proposal for Werner, Nov. 11, 1851;
Fasz. 7, Mensshengen Proposal for Werner, Feb. 15, 1855;
Fasz. 6, Mensshengen Proposal for Werner, Jan. 16, 1853.

uéIbid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 396,
Conzepts-Beamten (Nachwuchs). Note to the Ministry of
Education, Nov. 21, 1856.

 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
     
    
     
     

for employment, the

Academy was deemed a
of a diploma in lega
esiamm in the 1850s
been considered an a
law as a qualificati
those persons with ll
Theresianum or Orien
for 90 percent of a1
hdormation is avail
10percent had recef
mmmmmfldmug
university.

Another expli
employment was that

citizen had to sper

university career 1‘

  

versity.u7 Coupli

a juridical educat

 

lmowledge of Germ
site for any appl‘
Oriental Academy.
by historians to
Germany, Prussia

in the 1850s and

   
   

LWIbid. , s
Fasz. 7, Vesque

 

E ‘ «~25: V.

 

183

for employment, the training received at the Oriental
Academy was deemed adequate to compensate for the lack
of a diploma in legal studies. A diploma from the Ther-
esianum in the 1850s, on the other hand, may not have
been considered an adequate substitute for a degree in
law as a qualification for employment. In any event,
those persons with legal training or an education at the
Theresianum or Oriental Academy in the 1850s accounted
for 90 percent of all Policy Branch personnel for whom

information is available during the 18508. The remaining

 

10 percent had received a university education in the ,
philosophical discipline, either in Austria or at a German
university.

Another explicit requirement for Policy Branch
employment was that an aspirant who was not an Austrian
citizen had to spend at least two years of his four—year
university career in either an Austrian or a German uni—
versity.47 Coupling this with the requirement stipulating
a juridical education, it becomes clear that a thorough
knowledge of German Confederal law was a virtual prerequi—
site for any applicant except those emerging from the
Oriental Academy. If the charge which has been raised
by historians to the effect that Austrian policy toward
Germany, Prussia and especially the Frankfurt Bundestag

in the 1850s and 1860s was based too much on legal

 

47Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
Fasz. 7, Vesque Memorandum, Apr. 29, 1855.

 

 

L4

  
  
   
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
   
   
    
      

niceties rather than

. . t8
valld1ty, the reas
be found in the educ
of the institution w
policy. Even in ins
advocated an active
than the simple main
the means recommends
nemoranda which just
basis of whether it

ally sanctioned Con:

W practic
at the Frankfurt Ce
on legal propriety

Finally, the
became an explicit
1850s. In additior
administered to al
prescribed by a de
for employment in

Branch of the Fore

  
  
     
  

examination. This
section. each adm'
minister and comp

and two profe s sio

     

usAs Srbik
for example, in D

   

 

 

 

 

184
niceties rather than on political realities has any
validity,48 the reasons for its legalistic character may
be found in the educational background of the members
of the institution which formulated and implemented the
policy. Even in instances where Foreign Office members
advocated an active policy directed toward reform, rather
than the simple maintenance of the Confederal organization,
the means recommended for the reform always relied on
memoranda which justified or rejected a measure on the
basis of whether it was reconcilable with the internation—
ally sanctioned Confederal Act of 1815. Against the
Realpolitik practiced since 1851 by the Prussian emissary
at the Frankfurt Central Authority, Bismarck, this emphasis
on legal propriety ultimately proved no match.

Finally, the passing of a series of examinations
became an explicit requirement for employment during the
1850s. In addition to the normal civil service tests
administered to all aspirants to the Austrian bureaucracy,
prescribed by a decree of July 30, 1850, the applicant
for employment in the diplomatic service or the Policy
Branch of the Foreign Ministry had to pass the diplomatic
examination. This consisted of a written and an oral
section, each administered by a board designated by the
minister and composed of one member of the Foreign Office

and two professional scholars. The written portion consisted

 

48As Srbik claimed with respect to Biegeleben,
for example, in Deutsche Einheit, 3:150.

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
     
     
   
   
 
  
      

of one question pos
international law (

the high seas and r
history and over Au
had to be answered
the same areas, was
applicant's knowled
failed depended on
If he failed, the n
retake the examinai
particularly broad
ever, the minister
ment. Nor did it 2
who were deemed qu
ination administer
Because the
comparable under M
and because the t
very low in the 1
Branch during the

the examination .

most junior level

  

isierung , Fasz _ Ly,
Regierungsblatt , "

   

50Roger Fr
Denkenberg and G

 

 

185

of one question posed by each of the three examiners over
international law (of war, peace, neutrals, rights on

the high seas and rights of embassies), over international
history and over Austrian state treaties. One of these
had to be answered in French. The oral portion, covering
the same areas, was meant to measure the breadth of an
applicant's knowledge. Whether an applicant passed or
failed depended on a majority vote of the board members.
If he failed, the minister could grant him the right to
retake the examination. In cases where the applicant had
particularly broad experience in practical affairs, how—
ever, the minister could waive the examination require-
ment. Nor did it apply to Oriental Academy graduates

who were deemed qualified if they succeeded on the exam-
ination administered by the Academy.49

Because the examination, to which there was nothing

comparable under Metternich, was instituted only in 1851
and because the turnover in Policy Branch personnel was
very low in the 1850s, very few of the Beamten in this
Branch during the period under consideration had passed
the examination. Only seven persons, all of them at the

most junior level, succeeded on it, and three of these50

 

1+9Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
isierung, Fasz. 4, "All emeines Reiches—Gesetz— und
Regierungsblatt," pp. 9 —95, Jan. 31, 1851.

50Roger Freiherr von Aldenburg, Karl von Becker-
Denkenberg and Gustav von Blome.

 

were thereafter only
Office while they aw:
post. 01‘ the other :
only after a long teo
Services Branch and .
latter for the forme
suspiciously, were M
Undersecretary, and

Department Chief for
Policy Branch immedi
under the characterf
Whether the examina'
inate in favor of S‘
society or whether

than others is uncl
reduction in the nu
Branch work during

for and additions 1
consequently, came
employed in other 1
tration, since the
application of the

the minister of th

 

510tto Lowe:
Friedenthal, resp!

52Austria, 3
K 396, Conzepts—B
the Ministry of E

 

 

186
were thereafter only used provisionally in the Foreign
Office while they awaited assignment to a diplomatic
post. Of the other four, one entered the Policy Branch
only after a long tenure as Offizial in the Mechanical
Services Branch and another never managed to escape the

l The two remaining, somewhat

latter for the former.5
suspiciously, were Maximilian von Werner, nephew of the
Undersecretary, and Johann von Vesque, Jr., son of the
Department Chief for legal affairs. They entered the
Policy Branch immediately upon passing the examinations
under the characterization of "Konzepts—Praktikanten."
Whether the examination was actually intended to discrim—
inate in favor of such a narrow representation of Austrian
society or whether this group was simply better prepared
than others is unclear, but the effect was a drastic
reduction in the number of young applicants for Policy
Branch work during the decade. Most of the replacements
for and additions to the personnel of the Policy Branch,
consequently, came by means of lateral transfer of persons
employed in other branches of Austrian or foreign adminis-
tration, since their previous experience permitted the
application of the clause providing for the waiver by

the minister of the examination.52 It seems likely that

 

5lOtto L6wenberg and Eduard Freiherr Pino von
Friedenthal, respectively.

52Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 396, Conzepts—Beamten (Nachwuchs), Mensshengen Note to
the Ministry of Education, Nov. 21, 1856.

 

 

 

the standards establ
too rigorous for the
by young talent with
Office service.
Since reliance
Foreign Office emplc
talent was not effec
conditions for empl<
The first of these 4
84 percent of those
the 18503 had had p
state service. 0f
served previously i
had served in domes
(8 percent had serx
Ministry). Of the
service, 35 percen'
commercial and fin:
terior Ministry or
tary, 13 percent i
in the police serv
12 percent of tho:
Ministry later we:
or a total of fivl

of Austrian state

 

53The above
follow have been

 

 

187
the standards established by the examination were simply
too rigorous for the regular replenishment of the ranks
by young talent with a primary career interest in Foreign
Office service.

Since reliance on the explicit conditions set for
Foreign Office employment for an adequate supply of fresh
talent was not effective, the unofficial and implicit
conditions for employment took on much greater importance.
The first of these conditions was experience. Fully
84 percent of those employed in the Foreign Office during
the 1850s had had previous experience in Austrian or other
state service. Of the total personnel, 36 percent had
served previously in diplomatic service and 56 percent
had served in domestic branches of the state administration
(8 percent had served in both prior to joining the Foreign
Ministry). Of the 56 percent which began in domestic
service, 35 percent were in branches of government handling
commercial and financial matters, 33 percent in the In—
terior Ministry or its equivalent, 17 percent in the mili—
tary, 13 percent in the state's legal system and 2 percent
in the police service. In the other direction, only
12 percent of those serving at one time in the Foreign
Ministry later went into diplomatic service and 6 percent,
or a total of five persons, later entered a domestic branch

of Austrian state service.53 Of those five persons,

 

53The above percentages and all of those which
follow have been derived from a compilation of the data

 

 

two (Thierry and Leo
of Police and Financ
in other words, was
Ministry. By the ti
crat of the 1850s re
cases, transferred 5
government, he had 5
service and 23 of t]
In most cases, then
career in the Forei,
whether he arrived
matic service, done
directly from the u
very likely to rema
The tendency
and keep experience
in the great prestf
Metternich's preset
bureaucrat was com‘

and material compe'

 

contained primaril
served in the Fore
These files are fc
F 4, Kartonen 3—39
Personalia, Faszil
eous sources also
included in these
since personnel f:
incredibly incompl
two sheets which

files purely by c‘

 

 

 

188

two (Thierry and Leopold von Hoffmann) became the Ministers
of Police and Finance, respectively. The flow of talent,
in other words, was virtually entirely into the Foreign
Ministry. By the time the average Foreign Office bureau—
crat of the 18508 retired, died or, in relatively rare
cases, transferred into another branch of the Austrian
government, he had spent a total of 30 years in the foreign
service and 23 of those years in the Ministry itself.
In most cases, there was nothing transitory about a person's
career in the Foreign Office. Having reached that level,
whether he arrived on the Ballhausplatz from the diplo—
matic service, domestic branches of administration or
directly from the university or Oriental Academy, he was
very likely to remain there for the duration of his career.

The tendency of the Foreign Ministry to attract
and keep experienced personnel probably had its origins
in the great prestige conferred on the institution by
Metternich's presence. The status of a State Chancellery
bureaucrat was comparable, in terms of personal regard

and material compensation, to that enjoyed by members

 

contained primarily in the personnel files of those who
served in the Foreign Office between 1849 and 1856.
These files are found in the Administrative Registratur,
F 4. Kartonen 3—395, and in Staatskanzlei. Interiora,
Personalia, Faszikeln 1—24. Innumerable other miscellan—
eous sources also yielded bits of information which were
included in these figures. The figures are not exact,
since personnel files emanating from these years were
incredibly incomplete, sometimes containing only one or
two sheets which seem to have found their way to the
files purely by chance.

 

 

 

of the Staatsrat, th
the highest imperia
It was therefore no
on his considerable
corps to fill needs
many diplomatic sub
of experience in p0
fer to Vienna in or
marry. Apart from
the lower diplomati
them and Foreign O
in terms of qualif'
are or that of his
matic examination
eligibility-matic:
of education, langl
aspirants to either
for passing the ex:
British in 1860 ab
Foreign Office and
therefore reply th
"transfers of this

quently, partly 0‘
~_________________.__

SuAuS 'b 1‘ ia !
Kiibeck Memorandum

 

 

189
of the Staatsrat, theoretically (although not in fact)
the highest imperial advisory body in the pre—1848 era.54
It was therefore not difficult for Metternich to draw
on his considerable personnel resources in the diplomatic
corps to fill needs in the State Chancellery. Indeed,
many diplomatic subalterns, sometimes with several years
of experience in political affairs, actively sought trans—
fer to Vienna in order that they might be permitted to
marry. Apart from the stricture against marriage among
the lower diplomatic personnel, no distinctions between
them and Foreign Office Policy Branch personnel were made
in terms of qualifications during the late Metternichean
era or that of his immediate successors. When the diplo—
matic examination was introduced, the regulations governing
e1igibi1ity—-national citizenship, level, place and type
of education, language competence——were the same for
aspirants to either service. So too were the standards
for passing the examination. To an inquiry from the
British in 1860 about the rules governing mobility between
Foreign Office and diplomatic service, Mensshengen could
therefore reply that no set norm existed, but that
"transfers of this sort nevertheless occur not infre—

quently, partly out of personal considerations, partly

 

 

54Austria, HHStA, Staatsrat Akten, 1847, K 30,

{fibeck Memorandum, Dec. 5, 1847.

 

 

 

out of consideration

Along with Met
personal relationshi
of the Court Treasur
a great deal to do v
number of people on“
Specifically, the em

personnel with form

 

administration prob
willingness to sco
than with an aware
importance of trad
years, the large p
and of former Inte
due to the close rt
Minister Bruck and
that the flow did '.
dicate that experi
widely recognized
Foreign Office the
institutions. Bec
had no difficulty
and the clause in

stipulating the d‘

   
 
  

     
   

55Ibic1.. A
Dr anisierungs‘ .
organizational 1

    
 

 

 

190

out of considerations for the service."55

Along with Metternich's great prestige, the close
personal relationship which he held with Kfibeck, the head
of the Court Treasury from 1841 until 1848, probably had
a great deal to do with his ability to recruit a large
number of people out of non—diplomatic governmental service.
Specifically, the employment of a large percentage of
personnel with former experience in trade and financial
administration probably had more to do with Kfibeck's
willingness to scout for talent for the State Chancellor
than with an awareness on the part of Metternich of the
importance of trade policy. Similarly, in the post-1849
years, the large proportion of personnel in this speciality
and of former Interior Ministry people was undoubtedly
due to the close relations between Schwarzenberg, Commerce
Minister Bruck and Interior Minister Bach. But the fact
that the flow did not operate reciprocally seems to in—
dicate that experience in bureaucratic affairs was a more
Widely recognized prerequisite for employment in the
Foreign Office than was the case with these other central
institutions. Because of this recognition, Schwarzenberg
had no difficulty in acquiring experienced personnel,
and the clause in the 1851 diplomatic examination decree

stipulating the discretionary waiver of the examination

 

55Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
Organisierungs—Auskfinfte, Reply to a British request for
Organizational information, Jan. 25, 18 1.

 

 

in cases where the
outside experience
the decree.

Buol, on the
as Foreign Ministe
sonal prestige or
leaders in the min
perienced personne
thus proved much 1
somewhat more on t
cruiting non-Austr
Gustav Blome and M
6, 1852, wherein h
Buol noted with so
of the diplomatic
the number of appl
Still, in late 18 f
for talent had in
mance of the Forei
ently did nothing
tial staff member:

that Joseph Ender

WM

56Unckel I g

57Austria.
K 29 (Blome). Bu

581bid.. 1%
hengen Note to

 

 

 

191

in cases where the applicant had already acquired broad
outside experience explains the rarity with which he applied
the decree.

Buol, on the other hand, replaced Schwarzenberg
as Foreign Minister without possessing either great per—
sonal prestige or good connections to other highly placed
leaders in the ministries or at court.56 Acquiring ex—
perienced personnel from other administrative branches
thus proved much less easy for Buol. He therefore relied
somewhat more on the diplomatic examination and on re—
cruiting non—Austrians, of whom the two best known were
Gustav Blome and Max Gagern. In his Proposal of November
6, 1852, wherein he sought approval for employing Blome,
Buol noted with some concern that the required passing
of the diplomatic examination had drastically reduced
the number of applicants for Foreign Office employment.57
Still, in late 1856, the necessity to raid other ministries
for talent had in no way been reduced.58 The perfor-
mance of the Foreign Office during the Crimean War appar—
ently did nothing for its reputation in the eyes of poten-
tial staff members. In late 1857, Werner informed Buol

that Joseph Enders, currently employed in Austria's

 

56Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 25.

57Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 29 (Blome), Buol Proposal, Nov. 6, 1852.

 

58Ibid., K 396, Conzepts-Beamte (Nachwuchs), Menss—
hengen Note to the Ministry of Education, Nov. 21, 1856.

 

 

Hamburg legation, ha

transferred to Vienn
“characteristic of t
for the scene on th
the Ministry to rec
siderably during Bu
The great emp
dition for service
Schwarzenberg's 181»
their operational a
less severely the p
Office. Indeed, by
18’49, every Beamte
had also served un
Chancellery (90 per
(10 percent). Wher
of his staff in the
Mechanical Service:
from the old State
of the Policy Bran
Metternich, altho

  
  
  
     
   

Services Branch 1)
Throughout the pe
therefore, the he

aries dealing diI‘

59Ibid.. PA
to Buol, Oct. 3.

 

192

Hamburg legation, had rejected Buol's invitation to be
transferred to Vienna, a rejection which Werner considered
“characteristic of the regard which is held generally
for the scene on the Ballhausplatz.“59 The capacity of
the Ministry to recruit experienced talent suffered con-
siderably during Buol's tenure.

The great emphasis placed on experience as a con—
dition for service in the Foreign Ministry explains why
Schwarzenberg's 1849 reforms, radical as they were in
their operational and organizational aspects, affected
less severely the personnel composition of the Foreign
Office. Indeed, by the end of the reform period in July
1849, every Beamte currently serving in the Foreign Office
had also served under Metternich, either in the State
Chancellery (90 percent), or in the diplomatic service
(10 percent). When Buol took power in 1852, 85 percent
of his staff in the Policy Branch and 63 percent in the

echanical Services Branch still consisted of veterans
rom the old State Chancellor's days. By 1860, 60 percent
f the Policy Branch Beamten had begun their careers under
etternich, although only 28 percent of the Mechanical
ervices Branch people remained from before l8h8.
hroughout the period which ended with the Peace of Paris,
herefore, the heavy majority of the permanent function—

ries dealing directly with Austrian foreign policy

 

59Ibid., PA #0, K 277L, Buol Nachlass, Werner Letter
0 Buol, Oct. 3, 1857.

 

 

 

 

 

 

formulation and impl

Foreign Office and i
to Metternich.

It is easy to
Schwarzenberg did no
some from outside t
but it should be re
by at least one—thi
involved in the P01
were deemed dispens
Since the most elde
the highest positio
longest periods of
Schwarzenberg‘s re
the Metternichean ‘
Franz Lebzeltern, l
as long as Mettern
cellor‘s senior as
Hofrat Ignatz von
since 18% after h
1791, died on Jan‘
Sr., part of that

 

Administrative Se
12. 1849 after 4?
service behind h'

Hammer-Purgstall ‘

out to pasture w

 

 

 

 

 

193
formulation and implementation owed its existence in the
Foreign Office and its initial training in foreign affairs
to Metternich.

It is easy to make too much of this last observation.
Schwarzenberg did not replace any of his staff with per—
sons from outside the Metternichean tradition in 1849,
but it should be remembered that he did reduce its size
by at least one—third. The ten or so persons formerly
involved in the Policy Branch whom Schwarzenberg eliminated
were deemed dispensable largely on the basis of age.

Since the most elderly were also often those possessing
the highest positions, the greatest influence and the
longest periods of service under Metternich's spell,
Schwarzenberg's reform did in effect remove the core of
the Metternichean "system" from the Ministry. Staatsrat
Franz Lebzeltern, having served in foreign affairs nearly
as long as Metternich and since 1845 as the State Chan—
cellor's senior assistant, resigned on November 20, 1848.
Hofrat Ignatz von Brenner—Felsach. in semi—retirement
since 1846 after having served in oriental affairs since
1791, died on January 10, 18u9. Hofrat Karl von Kesaer,
Sr., part of that long family line which dominated the
Administrative Section Registry, was pensioned on February
12, 1849 after #7 years of service. With 42 years of
service behind him, Hofrat Valentin von Huszar, Josef
Hammer—Purgstall's successor as Hofdolmetsch, was put

out to pasture with Kesaer. One of the most strident

 

 

reactionaries of th

Hmnmelauer, formerl
was assigned as adm
Ferdinand upon the
18%. Having serve
was thus relegated,
service," to an inn
to spew vitriol aga
reforms for the ne
of "extraordinary
translator and his
lost much of his p
over his alleged i
even less influent
Carl Ernest .
Gentz in 1832, rem:
Staatskanzleirat t
see, to his presum
the Monarchy into
the two memoranda
On March 3 and 12

constitution, 62 '1

  
 

   
    
  
 
   

6oKempen .

61Austria ,
K 123 (Hammer-Pu

621m” K
5 (Schwarzenberg

 

, , , . l

194
reactionaries of the Foreign Office, Hofrat Karl von
Hummelauer, formerly the Desk Chief for Western Europe,
was assigned as administrative assistant to Emperor
Ferdinand upon the latter's abdication on December 2,
1848. Having served under Metternich since 181?, Hummelauer
was thus relegated, in the category of "extraordinary
service," to an innocuous position from which he continued
to spew vitriol against Schwarzenberg's character and

reforms for the next several years.60 Also in the category

s--

of "extraordinary service," Hammer—Purgstall, the famous
translator and historian of eastern civilizations, had
lost much of his political influence due to a squabble

61 He remained

over his alleged insubordination in 1839.
even less influential after 1849.

Carl Ernest Jarcke, Metternich's choice to replace
Gentz in 1832, remained on the Ministry's rolls as
Staatskanzleirat throughout the revolution and lived to
see, to his presumed satisfaction, the transformation of
the Monarchy into an absolutistic system. But despite
the two memoranda which Jarcke submitted to Schwarzenberg
on March 3 and 12, 1849, concerning the granting of a

constitution,62 it is clear that he had lost by the early

 

60

 

Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 232.

 

61Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 123 (Hammer—Purgstall).

62Ibid., Kabinetts—Archiv, Geheim—Akten, K 11, Fasz.
5 (Schwarzenberg Nachlass), Memoranda of Mar. 3 and Mar. 12,
1849.

 

 

 

 

days of the revolut

earlier enjoyed as
He and Friedrich H
had been singled o
embodiment of the
as minister, was 0
to remove them fro
Lebzeltern's assur
on policy.63 Jarc
was eventually rec
capacity. Joseph
closest confidants
and accompanying h
Europe, remained s
sixteen years afte
service," reading
icant articles for
routine was a far
editor of the “Ust
official organ, f1
member of Mettern:
years,65
M

May 7. 6lEZt'ii‘sessi

61
Ibid e A(

65Mayr, gs

;

 

w “i7 7“

195
days of the revolution the considerable influence he had
earlier enjoyed as a leading member of Metternich's Cabinet.
He and Friedrich Hurter, the Imperial Historiographer,
had been singled out by the revolutionaries as the very
embodiment of the old regime, so that Lebzeltern, acting
as minister, was obliged by the Ministerrat in May 1848
to remove them from their conspicuous positions, despite
Lebzeltern's assurances that neither had any influence
on policy.63 Jarcke died on December 29, 1852, and Hurter

was eventually recalled to the Ministry in his former

 

capacity. Joseph Anton von Pilat, one of Metternich's
closest confidants since entering his service in Berlin
and accompanying him on every journey throughout Napoleon's
Europe, remained semi-active in the Foreign Ministry for
sixteen years after 1849 as Regierungsrat in "extraordinary
service," reading foreign newspapers and circling signif-
icant articles for the perusal of the minister.64 This
routine was a far cry from Pilat's powerful position as
editor of the "Osterreichischer Beobachter," Metternich's
official organ, from 1810 until 1848 and as an important
member of Metternich's private Cabinet for nearly fifty

years c 65

 

 

63Ibid., Ministerratsprotokolle, I, Minutes of the
May 7. 1848—session.

 

6“Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 402,
Vortrage, Rechberg Proposal, Nov. 2, 1860.

65Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 45, 144—145.

_________________—___————-———————————

 

 

 

Nor did Schw

of the most powerf
Staatskanzleirat
especially compete
of experience, was
grounds that he co
most ancient relic
Dilgskron, who, de
the Hofsekretéir
same time. He ha
Reichshofkanzlei '
the State Chancel
Roman Empire. Li
Schwarzenberg, he
private Cabinet.
Joseph von Huszar,
he had served in ‘
Section Registry 1
and thus had fewe:
for drawing a ful
loyalty was in do
Hungarian whose
of his dismissal
01‘ any connectio
Hungary at this

Nicholas Czeremi

and arrested on

 

 

196

Nor did Schwarzenberg stop at eliminating many
of the most powerful of Metternich's former associates.
Staatskanzleirat Karl von Stradiot, never considered
especially competent by Metternich despite his 47 years
of experience, was pensioned on March 17, 1849, on the
grounds that he could not withstand the fast pace. The
most ancient relic of them all, Johann Philipp Dilg von
Dilgskron, who, despite 59 years service, had only attained
the Hofsekretar rank, was pensioned with Stradiot at the
same time. He had begun as a copyist with the old German
Reichshofkanzlei in 1789 and was transferred in 1806 to
the State Chancellery after the dissolution of the Holy
Roman Empire. Like so many of the others eliminated by
Schwarzenberg, he too had been a member of Metternich's
private Cabinet. Another close adviser of Metternich,
Joseph von Huszar, was pensioned on May 4, 1849, although
he had served in the Foreign Ministry (as Administrative
Section Registry Director most recently) only since 1822
and thus had fewer than the forty service years required
for drawing a full pension. It was possible that his
loyalty was in doubt, particularly since he was a born
Hungarian whose motherland was in full revolt at the time
of his dismissal. There was certainly great suspicion
of any connections between Foreign Office Beamten and
Hungary at this time, reflected further in the fact that
Nicholas Czeremisky, a senior Hofkonzipist, was dismissed

nd arrested on June 6, 1849, on charges. ultimately

 

 

 

 

 

 

proved, that he was

Foreign Office seer

Despite the f
raining in Schwarze
of its reform emerg
by Metternich, a co

of the most importa

 

removed from their
some of the experi
Office personnel w
thorough purge of
institution consis
reform had simply

viduals in order t
Operational system
age of personnel 1]
Branches probably I
1848 and July 1849
rising only to 46

rest of the decade

Persons holding th

   
  
 

in these post-184
identical to the
Office, and were

01' German imperia

 
  
 

  
 
 

._ 66Austria,
1s1erung, Fasz. 3

  

 

197

proved, that he was guilty of high treason in passing

Foreign Office secrets to the insurrectionists.66
Despite the fact, then, that every individual re—

maining in Schwarzenberg's Foreign Office at the completion

of its reform emerged from a tradition which was dominated

 

by Metternich, a considerable number, and indeed some
of the most important, of Metternich's associates were
removed from their former positions of power. Certainly,
some of the experience so highly valued among Foreign
Office personnel was lost in the course of the relatively

thorough purge of 1849, but the result was far from an

 

institution consisting of novices. The intent of the
reform had simply been to remove the most elderly indi-

viduals in order to implement a fast-paced and efficient

   
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  

operational system as rapidly as possible. The average

age of personnel in the Policy and Mechanical Services
Branches probably dropped rather drastically between March
1848 and July 1849. It stood at 44 on the latter date,
rising only to 46 by 1852 and remaining steady for the

rest of the decade. Perhaps more significantly, those
ersons holding the ten or twelve most influential positions
'n these post-1848 years were of a combined average age
dentical to the average among all members of the Foreign
ffice, and were thus much younger than those relics out

f German imperial days whom they in large measure

 

66Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interior, Organ—
sierung, Fasz. 3, Circular, June 16, 18 9.

 

 

supplanted. The co

sisting of men who
than had been the c
nevertheless served
within the so-calle
It would be w
maining Beamten who
in foreign affairs
herents to his pr'
and Alfred Arneth,
like Anton von H
liked the clerical
But even among tho
political philosop
on adoration for t
had a reputation a
impress his subord
that the impressic
in 1848. He was V
berg or Buol, and
While these minis
many qualities by

seems justifiable

W

67Arneth , g

68Austr ia ,

691b1d. , "

 

 

 

198

supplanted. The composite result was an institution con—
sisting of men who were much younger and more energetic
than had been the case under Metternich, but who had
nevertheless served on the average more than twenty years
within the so—called "Metternichean system."

It would be wrong to assume that all of those re—
maining Beamten who received their practical education
in foreign affairs from Metternich were necessarily ad—
herents to his principles. Several, such as Johann Vesque
and Alfred Arneth, were constitutional liberals.67 Others,
like Anton von Hammer, were Josephinist liberals who dis-
liked the clericalist company kept by Metternich.68
But even among those who disagreed with Metternich's
political philosophy, there existed a respect verging
on adoration for the old State Chancellor.69 Metternich
had a reputation and a charisma which could not fail to
impress his subordinates and it would be foolish to assume
that the impression vanished after his forced retirement
in 1848. He was vastly more gifted than either Schwarzen—
berg or Buol, and everyone in the Foreign Office knew it.
While these ministers were certainly respected for their
many qualities by their subordinates, the conclusion

seems justifiable that Metternich's successors received

 

67Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:31.

68Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 1.

69Ibid., "Notizen . . . : Metternich."

 

 

 

 

a lesser degree of

from their assistan
perienced than they
case during the reg
If that was in fact
well-entrenched bur
very probably cont
cussed presently.
minister and chief
selves during the
If experienc
plicit condition f
and the one with p
for its character
others of no small
one was born const
it was surprisingl
in a monarchy whic
of a loyal aristoc
two-thirds of the
out the late Mettt
either born into :
nobled as a resul
All of those at i

were at least ent

M

See Kempi
attitudes on Schi

 

 

 

 

199

a lesser degree of confidence in their overall ability

from their assistants, who were in many cases more ex-
perienced than they in diplomatic affairs, than was the
case during the regime of the old State Chancellor.7O

If that was in fact the case, then the retention of a
well-entrenched bureaucracy by Schwarzenberg and Buol

very probably contributed to the divisiveness, to be dis-
cussed presently, which characterized the relations between
minister and chief advisers and among the advisers them—

selves during the years 1849-1856.

 

If experience in bureaucratic service was one im-
plicit condition for employment in the Foreign Office,
and the one with perhaps the most far—reaching consequences
for its character after 1848, there were nevertheless
others of no small moment. The social class into which
one was born constituted one such condition, although
it was surprisingly less important than might be assumed
in a monarchy which had traditionally rested on the support
of a loyal aristocracy. It is true that approximately
two-thirds of the personnel in the Foreign Office through—
Out the late Metternichean period and the 1850s were
either born into a noble family or were themselves en—
nobled as a result of long and true service to the state.
All of those at the upper levels of rank and responsibility

were at least entitled to use a 'von' in their names,

 

7OSee Kempen, Tagebuch, pp. 172-173, for Thierry's
attitudes on Schwarzenberg; p. 48 for Weiss on Buol.

 

 

but many at lower 1

Branch were of com
itations to the has
of peasants or of
and even if one co
wise qualified, it
accepted. Those '
down the social sc
artisan. Mensshe
a vacancy in the M
that Joseph Enders
well equipped to h
on whether to acce
presume that it wo
of the Beamten of
who stems from a f
It is noteworthy ‘t
clause before havi
to Buol, and that
the Ministry.71
Although th‘
Beamten at the ti
Foreign Office ca

from the extreme]
M

, , 7Jiltustria,
leiegung. Fasz. e

I o

 

 

 

 

200

but many at lower levels and in the Mechanical Services
Branch were of common stock. There were, of course. lim—
itations to the baseness of a Beamte's birth. No sons
of peasants or of unskilled laborers were represented,
and even if one coming from these classes had been other-
wise qualified, it is doubtful that he would have been
accepted. Those in charge of hiring did, however, reach
down the social scale far enough to accept the son of an
artisan. Mensshengen, in making suggestions for filling
a vacancy in the Mechanical Services Branch in 1852, noted
that Joseph Enders, the son of a Viennese tailor, was
well equipped to handle the work, but left the decision
on whether to accept him to Werner and Buol, "since I
presume that it would affect unpleasantly the majority
of the Beamten of this Ministry to acquire a colleague
who stems from a family belonging to the artisan class."
It is noteworthy that Werner crossed out the above—quoted
clause before having the proposal copied for submission
to Buol, and that Enders was subsequently employed by
the Ministry.71

Although the social status enjoyed by the lower
Beamten at the time of their entry into Metternich’s
Foreign Office can be derived only in a very few cases

from the extremely incomplete personnel records of this

 

. . 71Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
§Sligung, Fasz. 6, Mensshengen Proposal to Werner, June
D 52.

___—_A

 

period, it is clear
some time a policy V
non-nobles. He did
level, but he certa

72 Schwarz

geoisie.
ability of the Aust

even more inclined

 

He considered the ‘r
effort to unify th
cooperation in all
lawyer, and Bruck,
in the shipping tr
by the Foreign Of
were untitled when
six more from the
31101.75

Most of the:

either in the Mec]

 

72Among the
Henhappel, Joseph
Ernst Niebauer.
Johann Suchanek
later ennobled.

”Heinrich
2 vols., 4th ed.

7”Paul Ma
and Karl Weil .

”Joseph .
Engelbrecht Sel

 

 

 

201

period, it is clear that Metternich had practiced for
some time a policy which did not discriminate against
non—nobles. He did not, perhaps, dip to the artisan
level, but he certainly utilized persons from the bour-
geoisie.72 Schwarzenberg had a very low regard for the
ability of the Austrian aristocracy and was consequently
even more inclined to recruit members of the bourgeoisie.
He considered the bourgeoisie a positive force in the
effort to unify the Empire, which explains his close
cooperation in all governmental affairs with Bach, a
lawyer, and Bruck, a self-made man who acquired a fortune
in the shipping trade.73 Of those few Beamten employed
by the Foreign Office under Schwarzenberg, at least four
were untitled when they entered the service.7Lp At least
six more from the bourgeoisie or lower were accepted by
Buoi.75

Most of these individuals nevertheless remained

either in the Mechanical Services Branch or in the lower

 

72Among them were Alfred Arneth, Gustav Buhl, Johann
Henhappel, Joseph Hflbner, Willibrord Mahler, Felix Miessl,
Ernst Niebauer, Joseph Pernhofer, Dominik Protiwenski,
Johann Suchanek and Johann Teichmann. Many of these were
later ennobled.

73Heinrich Friedjung, Usterreich von 1848 bis 1860,
2 vols., 4th ed. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1912—1918), 1:262.

7”Paul Manker, Pius Mayerhofer, Julius Rupprecht,
and Karl Weil.

75Joseph Enders, Anton Klaps, Leopold Munsch,
Engelbrecht Selinger, Heinrich Weber and Wilhelm Weiss.

 

   
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  

echelons of the P01
The remaining two—t
came from the nobil
part of what was
Falling between th
upper bourgeoisie,
virtue of the serv
its members or the
Its origins extend
history and geogra
been the combined
its growth into
Maria Theresa's a
military officer
tration. Under J
Primary instrumen"
and the ultimate :
in the extinction
Whose members had
the Austrian Enli
the sons and gram
new nobility fili
Chancellery and ‘

To be sure

old landed arist

w

76Friedjuzc
286—290 .

 

 

 

202

echelons of the Policy Branch, at least during the 1850s.
The remaining two—thirds of the Foreign Office personnel
came from the nobility, and the great bulk of those were
part of what was known in Austria as the Dienstadel.
Falling between the hereditary landed aristocracy and the
upper bourgeoisie, this class held noble rank solely by
virtue of the service, either civilian or military, which
its members or their ancestors had performed for the state.
Its origins extended chronologically far back into Habsburg
history and geographically to all parts of what had once
been the combined Habsburg and Holy Roman Empires. But
its growth into an important class really began with
Maria Theresa's attempt to create both a professional
military officer corps and a competent civilian adminis—
tration. Under Joseph II, the Dienstadel became the
primary instrument in the attempt to centralize the Empire,
and the ultimate failure of this effort had not resulted
in the extinction or even the weakening of this new class,
Whose members had by then become the standard bearers of
the Austrian Enlightenment.76 To a very large extent,
the sons and grandsons of this first generation of the
new nobility filled the offices of Metternich's State
Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry of his successors.
To be sure, there were also several members of the

old landed aristocracy in the bureaucracy. Anton von

 

 

76

Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:270,
286—290.

 

 

Hammer and Leopold
Austrian stock, Kar
Cagern were of old
Gustav Blome was p
ven Vesque came fr
Belgium in the sev
when the Netherlan
Theophil Revertera
clan that traced 1
But in every case,
had been employed
or some other sta

part of the Diens

 

tocracy lacked 9.
Office, as oppose
names as Esterhaz:
still common. Thq
was by Metternich
belonging to that
ment for gaining
deal.

Simply belt
was by no means :
Office, regardle:
affairs a person
Experience and n

Conditions for e

 

 

 

203
Hammer and Leopold von Hoffmann were both of old German—
Austrian stock, Karl von Mfinch-Bellinghausen and Max von
Gagern were of old Holy Roman Imperial families, Graf
Gustav Blome was part of a landed Danish family, Johann
von Vesque came from a French family that settled in
Belgium in the seventeenth century and migrated to Austria
when the Netherlands escaped Habsburg rule, and Graf
Theophil Revertera—Salandra was a descendent of a Spanish
clan that traced its origins back to the Carolingian period.
But in every case, the father and sometimes his forebears
had been employed as civil servants, either in Austrian
or some other state service, thereby becoming in fact a

part of the Dienstadel. The currently existing high aris—

 

tocracy lacked a single representative in the Foreign
Office, as opposed to the diplomatic corps where such
names as Esterhazy, Rechberg, Thun and Schwarzenberg were
still common. The heart and soul of the Foreign Ministry
was by Metternich's last years the Dienstadel, and although
belonging to that class was by no means a strict require—
ment for gaining employment, it certainly helped a great
deal.

Simply belonging to the Dienstadel class, however,
Was by no means sufficient for acceptance into the Foreign
Office, regardless of how experienced in bureaucratic
affairs a person of such social standing may have been.
Experience and noble social status among the implicit

conditions for employment, which gave to the Foreign

 

 

Office its basic c

preliminary qualit'
applicant's quest
sonal connections
was in this very 1)
mm was of
Office Beamte. Ne
personnel in the F
relatives who had
Almost without ex
within the bureau
to the W
percent had relatz'
service generally
ceded them in the
half of these per
rest being uncles
Possess such fam'

employment often

or in the highes
Belonging

aOuntage not so

Prejudices of th

 

 

 

20@

Office its basic character, were nothing more than helpful
preliminary qualities. What ultimately counted in an
applicant's quest for employment was whether he had per—
sonal connections placed in positions of influence. It
was in this very practical sense that belonging to the
Dienstadel was of great advantage to a prospective Foreign
Office Beamte. Nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of all
personnel in the Foreign Office during the 1850s had
relatives who had preceded them in service to the state.
Almost without exception, those who had family connections
within the bureaucracy were the same persons who belonged
to the Dienstadel. Of the total number of Beamten, 34
percent had relatives who preceded them in the foreign
service generally, and 2H percent had relatives who pre—
ceded them in the Foreign Office itself. Approximately
half of these percentages consisted of fathers, with the
rest being uncles or older brothers. Those who did not
possess such family connections as an aid in gaining
employment often had patrons either in the high nobility
or in the highest level of Austrian administration.77

Belonging to the Dienstadel, therefore, was an
advantage not so much in terms of gratifying the social

Prejudices of those responsible for employing new Beamten

 

77Examples are Gustav Buhl's connections to the
Schwarzenbergs (Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . :
Schwarzenberg") and Heinrich Hussian's links to the Im-
perial Mother, Sophie (Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei,
Interiora, Organisierung, Fasz. 3, Mensshengen Note to
Buol, Oct. 31, 1858).

 

 

   
  
  
  
  
 

as in terms of poss
could give them an
of another class.

Office Beamten in
in some branch of

the Dienstadel had

 

and of its mission
reign of Franz I.
caste and was con
the Dienstadel in

propagating class

to replenish with
bureaucracy it cor
as the administra'
With a personnel .
members belonged

the most influen

bureaucracy in t

to the feelings

class. The res
bureaucracy pose

in common with ’0

closer enumerati

More impo

 

 

205

as in terms of possessing the proper connections which
could give them an edge over well-qualified applicants
of another class. The fact that 63 percent of the Foreign
Office Beamten in the 1850s had been preceded by a relative
in some branch of state service indicates to what extent
the Dienstadel had become a class conscious of its origins
and of its mission in the state and society during the
reign of Franz I. While it had by no means become a
caste and was constantly infiltrated by the bourgeoisie,
the Dienstadel in general terms had become a self—
propagating class recognizing the right of its members
to replenish with their offspring the ranks of the
bureaucracy it controlled in carrying forth its mission
as the administrative class of the Habsburg Empire.
With a personnel composition in which two—thirds of its
members belonged to the Dienstadel, many of whom held
the most influential positions. the Foreign Office
bureaucracy in this period could scarcely have been immune
to the feelings of affinity which were infecting that.
class. The result of this affinity was a Foreign Office
bureaucracy possessing numerous characteristic features
in common with the Austrian bureaucracy in general, a
closer enumeration of which will follow shortly.

More important for the bureaucratic character of
the Foreign Office was the fact that 34 percent of the
personnel was preceded by a relative in the foreign service

generally and 24 percent by a relative in the Foreign

 

Office particularly.
reflected an inbree
tended to operate i
of community result
ships between Forei
is to say, the sens
gave to the Foreign
other bureaucratic
the inbreeding ore
it from all other
widespread Foreign
lay in Metternich'
decades. One prim
the personal loyal
an honorable livel
practice of passin
to nephew position
institutionalized
Once starter
easy to stop, esp
after 1848, where
ciaries of the pr
Positions. Nepoi
after Schwarzenb:

means . in additi

 

78Mayr, Q’E

 

 

 

206

Office particularly. These comparatively high percentages
reflected an inbreeding within the Foreign Office which
tended to operate in a direction opposite to the sense
of community resulting from the many personal relation—
ships between Foreign Office and outside Beamten; that
is to say, the sense of community with the Dienstadel
gave to the Foreign Office characteristics common to the
other bureaucratic institutions of the Monarchy, while
the inbreeding created characteristics which distinguished
it from all other such institutions. The origins of the
widespread Foreign Office nepotism during these years
lay in Metternich's paternalistic rule during the earlier
decades. One primary way of acquiring and recompensing
the personal loyalty of his subordinates was to ensure
an honorable livelihood for their offspring, and the
practice of passing down from father to son or from uncle
to nephew positions in the State Chancellery became
institutionalized under Metternich.78

Once started, moreover, such a practice was not
easy to stop, especially in conditions, like those existing
after 1848, where persons who had earlier been benefi—
ciaries of the practice now held the most important
positions. Nepotism thus became further entrenched even
after Schwarzenberg's reforms and provided a further

means, in addition to the stress placed on experience

 

78Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 110.

 

as an employment qua
between the Metterni
evolved and was stre
arising from familiz
mentioned Maximiliai
and Johann Vesque,
Legal Affairs. Wer
rat in the Presidia
had become one of t

time of his death i

 

to the rank of Hofi
he died in 1891.

Felsach, son of th
Constantinople Int
who served as Off'
when he began a di
ambassadorship to
Father and son hal
for an uninterrup
Even more impress
in the Mechanical
Kesaer, who reti:
Joseph Kesaer wh

Jr., who broke t

 

79Worthy t
uncles or brothr
Metternich and ‘
Foreign Office

 

 

207
as an employment qualification, by which the continuity
between the Metternichean and the succeeding periods
evolved and was strengthened. Examples of the continuity
arising from familial relationships include the previously
mentioned Maximilian Werner, nephew of the Undersecretary,
and Johann Vesque, Jr., son of the Department Chief for
Legal Affairs. Werner had risen to the rank of Sektions—
rat in the Presidial—Bureau (created in 1860) where he
had become one of the minister's closest advisers by the
time of his death in 1869. The younger Vesque had risen
to the rank of Hofrat in the Chancellery Direction when
he died in 1891. Another example is Ernest Brenner-
Felsach, son of the Oriental Department Chief and former
Constantinople Internuncio Ignatz von Brenner—Felsach,
who served as Offizial in the Foreign Office until 1852
when he began a diplomatic career that ended with an
ambassadorship to Portugal from which he retired in 1889.
Father and son had served in the Austrian foreign service
for an uninterrupted span of 98 years by that time.
Even more impressive is the Kesaer family which served
in the Mechanical Services Branch from 1749 forth. Karl
Kesaer, who retired in 1849, was survived by his brother
Joseph Kesaer who died in 1852 and his son, Karl Kesaer,

Jr., who broke the line in 1856 when he died.79

 

79Worthy of mention are several others whose fathers,
uncles or brothers began service either under or before
Metternich and who filled important positions in the
Foreign Office into and well beyond the 18503: Phillip

 

To summarize,
factors working in
the bureaucracies o
berg and Buol perio
placed on the recr
sons; the second wa
inant Dienstadel cl
portion of it repre
tain its dominance
of nepotism. What
influence exerted
making. however, i

ditions and charac

the above manner

 

von Dilgskron was

Mtinch—Bellinghause
furt Bundestag. by
by his son Joseph;
Friedrich and Glen
ambassador to Parf
and Johann Reymom
periods in the F0:
Anton Sohweiger-D‘
Registry, the lat
lation Bureau. bo
matic corps; Fran
a member of the d
life assigned to

Niebauer, the one
budgetary affair:
Richard Weiss v01
the Offizial Will
assigned later t
Victor, Vienna' s
of the Austrian

and Alois Siber.
deciphering Offi
Administrative 5

 

 

208

To summarize, then, there were two complementary
factors working in favor of the striking continuity between
the bureaucracies of the Metternichean and the Schwarzen—
berg and Buol periods. The first was the high value
placed on the recruiting and holding of experienced per—
sons; the second was the inexorable tendency of the dom—
inant Dienstadel class in general, and especially of that
portion of it represented in the Foreign Office, to main—
tain its dominance in state service through the practice
of nepotism. What matters from the standpoint of the
influence exerted by the bureaucracy on foreign policy
making, however, is the nature of the bureaucratic tra—
ditions and characteristics which were transmitted in

the above manner and became prevalent during the period

 

von Dilgskron was succeeded by his son, Karl; Joachim von
Mfinch—Bellinghausen, the Austrian ambassador to the Frank—
furt Bundestag, by his nephew Karl; Urban Joseph Obermayer
by his son Joseph; Joseph Anton Pilat by two sons,
Friedrich and Clemens, brothers—in—law to Joseph Hfibner,
ambassador to Paris until 1859. Brothers included Ludwig
and Johann Reymond, both of whom had served for long
periods in the Foreign Office after 1820; Joseph and

Anton Schweiger—Dfirnstein, the former employed in the
Registry, the latter as Director of the Coding and Trans-
lation Bureau, both with two other brothers in the diplo-
matic corps; Franz von Mensshengen and his brother Ferdinand,
a member of the diplomatic corps who spent most of his
life assigned to various German courts; Ernst and Karl
Niebauer, the one assigned to the sub—Department for
budgetary affairs, the other to the Paymaster's Office;
Richard Weiss von Starkenfels (not to be confused with
the Offizial Wilhelm Weiss), an irresponsible diplomat
assigned later to the Press Committee, and his brother
Victor, Vienna's grim commander in 1850 and later a member
of the Austrian legation in Constantinople; and Karl

and Alois Siber, the former as director of the Ministry‘s
deciphering Office, the latter as subaltern in the
Administrative Section.

 

 

18181856. These 1
derived partly fror
and partly from thz
Foreign Office whet
which sometimes me
ideas prevailing g
One such character
legalistic frame c
as a result of the
education in order
the bureaucratic <
religious and phil
the bureaucracy c
tended, were of s
ness emerged in t
of the nineteenth
form into the Set
C(”uphiluented the
due to that C er t2
resoective minis.
Under Jose
corps Which comp
of eighteenth ce
chief agents of
eradicate the pa

a
nd of the relig
th

e
mOdemiZati‘

 

209

1848-1856. These traditions and characteristics were
derived partly from Dienstadel class attitudes and values,
and partly from that process of inbreeding within the
Foreign Office whereby distinctive developments occurred
which sometimes merged and sometimes clashed with the
ideas prevailing generally in the Austrian bureaucracy.
One such characteristic, already discussed, was the
legalistic frame of mind existing in the Foreign Office
as a result of the requirement for a sound juridical
education in order to gain employment. But beyond that,
the bureaucratic character was determined by the political,
religious and philosophical views of the persons of whom
the bureaucracy consisted. These views, it will be con—
tended, were of such varying natures that a basic divisive—
ness emerged in the Foreign Office during the early decades
of the nineteenth century and was transmitted in a hardened
form into the Schwarzenberg and Buol periods, where it
complemented the element of discord already prevailing
due to that certain diminution of confidence held in the
respective ministers' capabilities by their chief advisers.

Under Joseph II, the bureaucracy and military officer
corps which composed the Dienstadel became the vanguard
of eighteenth century liberalism. These groups were the
chief agents of the Enlightened Despot's attempt to
eradicate the particularism of the old landed aristocracy
and of the religious orders which stood in the way of

the modernization and strengthening of the state.

 

 

Eliminating the adb
groups and the lam
aspect of the miss;
The positive aspec
of the administrat
supervision of the
an anti-aristocrat
placed high politi
Austrian society.E
Revolution thoroug
by this class in ‘
Reliance on the oj
Church not as an 2
been the case und
rationalist insti
that had existed
began t0 assert j
Allotria Was ruled
But by this time,
of the Habsburg z
easily dislodged

Stlf‘PeI‘Petuatin:

influence Well b

800

mimhice
81 .
Ib\ld')

]

 

 

 

210
Eliminating the administrative power of the clericalist
groups and the landed aristocracy was thus the negative
aspect of the mission to be performed by this new class.
The positive aspect was the germanization and centralization
of the administration in order to place it under the direct
supervision of the emperor. The Dienstadel thus became
an anti—aristocratic and an anti—clericalist class which
placed high political value on the German element in
Austrian society.8O Joseph's failure and the French
Revolution thoroughly discredited the liberalism represented
by this class in the eyes of Emperor Franz and Metternich.
Reliance on the old particularist aristocracy and on the
church not as an agent in centralizing the state, as had
been the case under Joseph II, but rather as an anti—
rationalist institution in support of the social order
that had existed in the pre—rationalist days, once again
began to assert itself as an important means by which
Austria was ruled in the early nineteenth century.81
But by this time, the Dienstadel was in firm possession
of the Habsburg administrative organs and was not to be
easily dislodged. It became, as noted previously, a
self-perpetuating class, extending its Josephinist-liberal

influence well beyond the life span of those who had

 

800scar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg
Monarchy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929),
PP- ~73-

81lbid., p. 79.

 

 

served under J osePh
right to fill vacano
its own progeny. T‘
mate this class ‘11
for the sense of th
terations in favor
ciated with the em
centralism and the
0f the Empire neve‘
class.

Yet not only
tinction between t
lChose of the admix
of how Austria wa:
this Question wit
also emerged. Th
dangers of Joseph
generation of the
during the Napolw
members of the n

of their SErVice
of this new gene
Privileged 80m
forces of natio]

revolut'lonary e

2 .
Friedj,

211

served under Joseph by means of its acquired implicit
right to fill vacancies in the Austrian bureaucracy with
its own progeny. To be sure, it would be wrong to desig—
nate this class '1ibera1' by the late Metternichean period,
for the sense of that word had undergone significant a1—
terations in favor of the laisser-faire definition asso—
ciated with the emerging bourgeoisie. But the state
centralism and the emphasis placed on the German character
of the Empire nevertheless remained basic tenets of this
class.

Yet not only did there exist at this period a dis—
tinction between the values of the state leadership and
those of the administrative bureaucracy in their conceptions

82 but a division over

of how Austria was to be ruled,
this question within the Josephinist bureaucracy itself

also emerged. The French Revolution demonstrated the
dangers of Josephinist liberalism not only to the new
generation of the supreme leadership emerging in Austria
during the Napoleonic wars but also to at least some
members of the new generation of Dienstadel. By virtue

of their service to the state, the fathers and grandfathers
of this new generation had created for their heirs a
privileged social position which was threatened by the
forces of nationalism and democracy represented in the

revolutionary epoch. To some extent, therefore, the

 

82Friedjung, Usterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 1:114,

 

 

 

early nineteenth ce
from a force for no
against the central
values of its prece
the new generation
to seek support fo
including the parti
crownlands and the
had pre-dated the l
of upheaval result
Specifically
under Metternich.
between bureaucrac
solution in 1806 <
who served in the
institutions suddl
and they came nat

0f Germany. to 8

sons in occupati

 

 

 

 

212

early nineteenth century Dienstadel transformed itself
from a force for modernization into a force of reaction
against the centralistic, germanizing, anti-clerical
values of its preceding generation. Certain members of
the new generation found themselves once again willing
to seek support for their social position in institutions,
including the particularistic constitutions of Habsburg
crownlands and the independent Catholic Church, which
had pre—dated the rationalist era and the quarter century
of upheaval resulting from it.83

Specifically with regard to the Foreign Office
under Metternich, a factor which further clouded the dualism
between bureaucracy and leadership arose from the dis—
solution in 1806 of the Holy Roman Empire. Many persons
who served in the bureaucracies of the Holy Roman Imperial
institutions suddenly found themselves without employment
and they came naturally to Austria, the traditional head
of Germany, to seek positions for themselves and for their
sons in occupations comparable to those which they had
performed earlier. Like the traditional Josephinist
bureaucracy with which they merged, these persons of
predominantly West and South German heritage placed a
high value on Austria's German character. Like the newly
emerging, highly conservative part of the Josephinist

bureaucracy, they recoiled from the liberalism formerly

 

83Ibid., 2:270.

 

 

 

permeating its ran

effect on Germany

in the French nati
and, in many cases
to their homelands
element to the div
bureaucracy. For

within Austria, bu
as the primary ten
Roman Empire. Con
of Central Europe
in its spiritual

salistic empire.

eval conception 0
Church as its gui
as the temporal ]
tinguished these
Holy Roman Empir

Origins lay in s

eighteenth and e

”Mull. formed

more idealistic

 

 

213

permeating its ranks, having witnessed first—hand the
effect on Germany of the embodiment of this liberalism
in the French national state. But with their emotional
and, in many cases, family ties still bound very tightly
to their homelands, these newcomers imparted an additional
element to the diverse character of the Foreign Office
bureaucracy. For not only did they exalt the German element
within Austria, but also Austria's centuries—old role
as the primary temporal power in Germany and the Holy
Roman Empire. Complementing this temporal conception
of Central Europe was the critical role of the papacy
in its spiritual capacity as ideal leader of a univer—
salistic empire. It was basically this idealistic, medi—
eval conception of Germany as an empire, with the universal
Church as its guiding light and the Austrian emperor
as the temporal lieutenant to the Church, that dis—
tinguished these refugees out of the shambles of the
Holy Roman Empire from the bureaucrats whose attitudinal
origins lay in service to the Austrian state of the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.84

Himself having come from the Rhineland, Metternich,
despite being basically a rationalist of the eighteenth
century, formed the point toward which gravitated his
more idealistic, romantically oriented countrymen who

flocked to Vienna rather than submit personally to a

 

BQSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 1:170—171; Friedjung,
Usterreich von 1838 bis 1350, :h47.

 

 

 

reorganization of t

To be sure, the onl

 

of German-conserva

Office after the 1

several sons of £0
time with this bac
in the Foreign Off:
whose father came ‘
father entered Aus
property in Luxemt
later in detail, I
well as Karl von 1
Dfirnstein and J oh:
immigrants from 1
Empire. The repr

possessed a stron

   
   
  

by the addition
whose forebears
as Karl von Dilg
the presence in

direct roots an

 

 

214
reorganization of their homelands on Napoleonic principles.
To be sure, the only individual in this earliest category
of German-conservative immigrants remaining in the Foreign
Office after the 1849 reforms was Joseph von Pilat. But
several sons of former Beamten who immigrated at the same
time with this background held very important positions
in the Foreign Office during the 18503. Besides Werner,
whose father came to Vienna from Trier, and Thierry, whose
father entered Austrian service after deserting the family
property in Luxembourg, both of whom will be described
later in detail, Pilat's sons, Clemens and Friedrich, as
well as Karl von Mfinch-Bellinghausen, Joseph von Schweiger—
Dfirnstein and Johann Vesque were all second generation
immigrants from lands formerly a part of the Holy Roman
Empire. The representation of families which had once
possessed a strong attachment to the Empire was augmented
by the addition to the bureaucracy of native Austrians
whose forebears had served in the Reichshofkanzlei, such
as Karl von Dilgskron and Leopold von Hoffmann. Given
the presence in the Ministry of several persons whose
direct roots and interests lay in the old Imperial lands
and institutions, and given the importance of personal
relations and other such connections in gaining employment
in this Ministry, it can come as no surprise that the
body of personnel continued to be replenished with Beamten
for whom Austria‘s former idealized role in Germany exerted

a special attraction. Through these processes, Otto

 

 

 

won Meysenbug , Ludw

found their ways in
in the case of the
the occurrence of
for the trend of w
The very high
of bureaucrats witl
perial tradition w:
bureaucracy not on
politically foreig
service, but also
a colony of persor
outlook which difi
natively Austrian
viously mentioned
conception of the
these immigrants
Period was often
Which was itself
was common in Vi

fai‘thfully adher

Which remained t

0f subordinatin

 

 

215

von Meysenbug, Ludwig von Biegeleben and Max von Gagern
found their ways into the Austrian Foreign Office, and,
in the case of the latter two, a full half century after
the occurrence of the event providing the initial impetus
for the trend of which they were a part.

The very high concentration in the Foreign Office
of bureaucrats with their family roots in the German Im—
perial tradition was important for the character of the
bureaucracy not only because it continued to bring persons
politically foreign to Austria into the Austrian foreign
service, but also because it brought to the Ballhausplatz
a colony of persons with a religious and philosophical
outlook which differed rather sharply from that of the
natively Austrian strains of the Dienstadel. The pre—
viously mentioned emotional dependence on an idealistic
conception of the Holy Roman Empire which characterized
these immigrants from Germany during the Metternichean
period was often conditioned by a form of Catholicism
which was itself sharper and more mystical than that which
was common in Vienna.85 The Josephinist policies, still
faithfully adhered to by that part of the Dienstadel
Which remained true to the Enlightened Despot's ideals,
Of subordinating the Austrian Catholic Church to the state,
prohibiting the promulgatiOn of papal bulls except at

the pleasure of the government, and abolishing religious

 

 

85Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 1:296.

 

orders, such as the
authority in instit
trol,86 were anathe
heavy emphasis in '
on the independent
But it was n
that this new colo
oellery took issue
Even those members
the Enlightenment
in their professi
group of West and
Catholicism had n
zealous or social
variety introduce
had forced from t
was this latter v
But it found an e
to transform the
against Napoleon
sense, into an i

Austrian governm

M

86Jaszi, f
p. 69'

87As desc

J°se h Em eror
Putnam. 1927 .

M. 2:“47; a:

 

 

 

216
orders, such as the Jesuits, which recognized their supreme
authority in institutions existing outside Habsburg con—
trol,86 were anathema to this pious group, which placed
heavy emphasis in its philosophical and religious ideals
on the independent authority of the Church.

But it was not merely with the traditional Josephinists
that this new colony centered in Metternich's State Chan—
cellery took issue on philosophical—religious grounds.

Even those members of the Dienstadel who had reacted against
the Enlightenment ideals of Joseph differed basically

in their profession of the Catholic faith from this new
group of West and South German intruders. Viennese
Catholicism had never been particularly mystical, romantic,
zealous or socially oriented, as was the case with the
variety introduced by those whom Napoleon's church policies
had forced from their original German homelands.87 Nor
was this latter variety ever widely accepted in Vienna.

But it found an enclave in the State Chancellery and began
to transform the Foreign Office, the heart of the reaction
against Napoleonic Europe in a political and spiritual
sense, into an institution quite different from the other

Austrian governmental institutions in these years.

 

86

6 Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Empire,
Po 9-

87As described variously by Eugene S. Bagger, Francis
Joseph, Emperor of Austria, Kingiof Hungary (New York:
Putnam, 1927), p. 69; Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis
1860, 2:4h7; and Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:139.

 

Equally as signific
Ballhausplatz as a
formed the basic re
hateChancellery
h.

This colony,
of“Jesuits in civ
Joseph von Pilat,
nmh's personal se
tothe Ballhauspl
was soon to recei
ofEmperor Franz'
sister, Sophie, F
heme fresh from
ment.89 In 1819,
tooperate on Hat
Redemptorist monl
Maia Hofbauer ft
Catholic movemen
admred.9o Besi
Miinch—Bellinghat
qukfurt Bunde:

 

88Mayr a g

89Jaszi,
p' 79.

9O . .
Fr '
450. led;

 

 

217

Equally as significant, the special character of the
Ballhausplatz as a haven for a foreign type of Catholicism
formed the basic reason for a deep division within the
State Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry which succeeded
it.

This colony, later designated by Hammer as a group
of "Jesuits in civilian clothes," formed originally around
Joseph von Pilat, a native of Augsburg who entered Metter—
nich's personal service at an early age and followed him
to the Ballhausplatz.88 Initially a tiny body, the group
was soon to receive reinforcements, partly in the persons
of Emperor Franz's fourth wife, Caroline Augusta, and her
sister, Sophie, Franz Joseph's mother, who arrived in
Vienna fresh from the Bavarian romantic Catholic move-
ment.89 In 1819, the Jesuits were once again permitted
to operate on Habsburg soil, and at the same time, a
Redemptorist monk out of Moravia by the name of Clemens
Maria Hofbauer founded in Vienna an indigenous reform
Catholic movement to which the displaced Germans quickly
adhered.9O Besides Pilat, this group included Joachim
Mfinch—Bellinghausen, the Austrian ambassador to the

Frankfurt Bundestag and the uncle of Karl Mfinch, Friedrich

 

88Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, pp. 105—108.

p 79 89Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy,

9OFriedjung, Osterreich von 18b8 bis 1860, 2 ho?—

 

450.

 

 

 

 

won Klinkowstriim, w

out of which many 0
the Foreign Office

Centz's replacement
to name only those
future composition
Hofbauer died in 1
whose State Chance
Austrian and Germa
in Vienna.91 Once
anisms providing

of the State Chane

small core of refc

during the first <

Ballhausplatz thr

Occupied some of

1' “Ah.

 

218
von Klinkowstrfim, who founded a private Catholic school
out of which many of Metternich's younger recruits for
the Foreign Office were to come, and Karl Ernest Jarcke,
Gentz's replacement and erstwhile tutor of Franz Joseph,
to name only those having the most significance for the
future composition of the Ministry's bureaucracy. Although
Hofbauer died in 1820, his movement thrived under Metternich,
whose State Chancellery remained the focal point for the
Austrian and German reform Catholicism that had settled
in Vienna.91 Once again, the previously discussed mech-
anisms providing for continuity in the personnel composition
of the State Chancellery operated, and the originally
small core of reform Catholics which found protection
during the first quarter of the nineteenth century on the
Ballhausplatz thrived and expanded until its adherents
occupied some of the most critical positions in the Foreign
Office of Schwarzenberg and Buol.

The most strident of those adhering to this new,
mystical form of Catholicism became known as Ultramontanes,
Who, in contrast to the true Josephinists, advocated the
supremacy of the Church over the state. Although the
term 'Ultramontane' was widely applied by contemporaries
in an attempt to slander their personal or political

enemies,92 the number which deserved the classification

_____________
glIbid.

92Especially by Hammer in "Meine Erlebnisse."

 

 

 

in its pure sense s

Meysenbug, an immi
tent, was at once t
of those who were '
Most adherents to
the pious motives
short of advocatin
Clemens and Friedr
DePont, son of Met

had emigrated rec

son of Urban Jose
Copying Office Di]
group. All of tht

of reform Catholi

years. Others 1

Leopold won Hof

Chaim

 

 

 

219
in its pure sense seems to have been small. Otto von
Meysenbug, an immigrant from Hesse and a converted Protes-
tant, was at once the most identifiable and most important
of those who were in fact Ultramontanes during the 1850s.93
Most adherents to reform Catholicism sympathized with
the pious motives behind Ultramontanism, but stopped
short of advocating the supremacy of Church over state.
Clemens and Friedrich Pilat, Karl von Munch, Alphons
DePont, son of Metternich's powerful Hofrat whose family
had emigrated recently from France, and Joseph Obermayer,
son of Urban Joseph Obermayer who formerly served as
Copying Office Director, were all part of this latter
group. All of these were direct descendents of the group
of reform Catholics assembled during Metternich's earlier
years. Others included Undersecretary Werner, Biegeleben,
Leopold von Hoffmann, Heinrich Barb, a converted Jew,
and Gustav Blome, an illegitimate Danish grandson of
Metternich who entered the Foreign Office as a Protestant,
was converted by Hfibner while serving at Paris, and married
Buol's daughter, herself a religious fanatic who caused
Austria some embarrassment by her proselytizing at
Hamburg, one of her husband's many posts during the 18508

and 1860s.94 Hfibner, incidently, was a brother-in—law

 

 

93Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:352—353; Friedjung,
Osterreich von 1858 his 1850, 2:15h.

9%

Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Buol."

 

 

 

of the younger Pila

Finally, Hypolit Do
French tutor during
in the Foreign Off'
diplomat of Bohemi
Undersecretary in

of this group. Ko
Foreign Office in
any knowledge of

he became its chi

dominated by the

triumvirate during

at the end of whit

Koller's period t

War which was

Prior to 1866.

 

 

220
of the younger Pilats and a spiritual fellow traveler.
Finally, Hypolit Doré, Franz Joseph's and Maximilian's
French tutor during their younger days and later a Beamte
in the Foreign Office, and August Koller, a much—travelled
diplomat of Bohemian extraction who replaced Werner as
Undersecretary in 1859, should be mentioned as members
of this group. Koller had served provisionally in the
Foreign Office in 1856, but nevertheless utterly lacked
any knowledge of how the Foreign Office operated when
he became its chief three years later.95 He was thus
dominated by the powerful Meysenbug—Biegeleben-Gagern
triumvirate during his two—year tenure as Undersecretary,
at the end of which Meysenbug replaced him. It was during
Koller's period that the triumvirate acquired the inordinate
power which was to shape Austrian policy toward Germany
prior to 1866.

The religious views held to a greater or lesser
extent by each of these individuals were closely related
to the idealistic political conception, held by a certain
Clique in the Foreign Office, of Austria's role in Germany,
Central Europe and Europe generally. It is no coincidence
that many of the same persons who emerged from a back-
ground which included service to Holy Roman Imperial
institutions or family ties to German lands previously

forming the heart of the Empire also belonged to that

 

951bid., "Rechberg."

 

 

 

 

group, peculiar to

the reform variety
from that of the mo
The role of the Ch
stitution was inse
embodied an elemen
More about the con
following chapter.
the political, phi
its adherents dif

state-oriented po

universalistic re]
more typically Au:

whether in its tr:

its post-Napoleo

Sumeriority in t

itis neverthele

 

 

221

group, peculiar to the Foreign Office, which professed
the reform variety of Catholicism so profoundly different
from that of the more typically Austrian Dienstadel.
The role of the Church as a living and independent in—
stitution was inseparable from a political outlook which
embodied an element of universal empire as its basic ideal.
More about the content of this ideal will be said in the
following chapter. For now, the important point is that
the political, philosophical and religious outlooks of
its adherents differed sharply from the more Austrian
state—oriented political views and the milder, non-
universalistic religious and philosophic views of the
more typically Austrian bureaucrat. If this latter category,
Whether in its traditional Josephinist liberal form or
its post—Napoleonic conservative state, enjoyed a numerical
superiority in the Foreign Office in the period 1848—1856,
it is nevertheless a fact that many of the most powerful
members of the bureaucracy, Meysenbug, Biegeleben and
Werner among them, were confessors of a very distinctive
faith and proponents of a conception of Europe and Austria's
role within it which was foreign and romantic and which
hearkened back in some ways to a pre—1804 ideal that was
no longer generally accepted in Vienna.

Specific positions taken on particular issues with
Which a Beamte was involved on a current basis depended
ultimately, of course, on the development of the issue

and on many personal factors peculiar to the individual

 

 

 

 

 

in question . The

of the person, eve
political aspects
the case with the
early 1850s, is th
predicting the pe
orientation certa'
ment in which has
problem, the Ge
policy to be purs
only the most imp
in the Foreign 0

questions becaus

Josephinist Diens

 

logical revisions
ception of churcl
hand, the Ultraml
induced by perso
realities, both
compromise in tt.
in thought, as v
and formed part
tures of the W
izational struc

decisions were

Given the

forenoes that ‘

 

 

222

in question. The religious or philosophical orientation
of the person, even when intimately connected with the
political aspects of a question, as was, for example,
the case with the German problem in the late 1840s and
early 1850s, is thus not to be considered definitive in
predicting the person's response to the issue. Yet the
orientation certainly affected in some measure the environ—
ment in which basic decisions were taken on the Italian
problem, the German question and the alliance or alignment
policy to be pursued in Crimean War diplomacy, to name
only the most important. The cleavage between orientations
in the Foreign Office was not absolute even on these
questions because, on the one hand, the heirs to the
Josephinist Dienstadel had undergone considerable psycho—
logical revisions away from the eighteenth century con—
ception of church and state and because, on the other
hand, the Ultramontane-German-Imperial romantics were
induced by personal experiences and hard political
realities, both domestically and internationally, to
compromise in the act what they clung to so fervently
in thought, as we shall see. But a cleavage did exist
and formed part of the background along with other fea—
tures of the bureaucracy, operational routine and organ-
izational structure heretofore discussed, against which
decisions were made and implemented.

Given the sharp religious and philosophical dif—

ferences that existed in the Foreign Office, it would

 

 

 

be only logical to

of one sort or arm
informal, implicit
Ministry. This we
for high level pos
After 181t9, the t
issue was reflect
to fill the most
But it may come a
Catholicism was n
levels. At least
the artisan's so
least two Jews.
employed. The 12
who offered his E
and became its so
1853. He was ad:
Austrian service
a veiled threat
Buol capitulateé

Joseph that it A

W

96Friedju‘
154, and Louis
de186fz; étudg.
claim that this
leadership as a
more to it thatr

97Austr'1j
probed), W911 ‘

 

 

223
be only logical to expect that profession to Catholicism
of one sort or another would have been an additional
informal, implicit condition for employment in the
Ministry. This was indeed the case among those recruited
for high level positions as Hofrat or Sektionsrat.96
After 1849, the tension on the religious—philosophical
issue was reflected in a contest between the two parties
to fill the most critical positions with its own adherents.
But it may come as some surprise to discover that non—
Catholicism was no real deterrent to employment at lower
levels. At least three Protestant candidates, including
the artisan's son Joseph Enders, were accepted and at
least two Jews, Victor Herzog and Karl von Weil, were
employed. The latter was an accomplished German publicist
who offered his services to the Press Committee in 1851
and became its second leading member (behind Werner) in
1853. He was admittedly not formally enrolled in the
Austrian service until 1855, and then only after issuing
a veiled threat to offer his services to some other state.97
Buol capitulated to this threat by admitting to Franz

Joseph that it was not beneficial to the state to employ

 

96Friedjung in Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:153—
154. and Louis Eisenmann in La com romis Austro-Hon ois
de 186?; étude sur le dualisme tParis, 19055, chapter 2,
claim that this was a practice consciously pursued by the

leadership as an anti—Prussian measure. There was much
more to it than this, as discussed in the following chapter.

97Austria, HHStA, Archiv—Behelfe 169b (Handschriften—
proben), Weil Letter to Werner, Nov. 21, 1854.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jews in the bureauc

an exception in th'
objections, Weil w
Like religio
origins of a Beamt
important consider
Most, as part of t
either from the G
or Moravia, or fr
There were a few
origins. Several
Peter Fisko, a ho
with Nicholas Cze
to the Hungarian
Beamten were born
heads were static
non-German parts
as Vesque, Kesaei
ancestors who em'
Possessions such

the important ex

from former Hold

 

98mm. 1
(whi),bddl Pr
mo.353-35A-

99Ausoria
sonalis, Fasz-
Zeitumg accoun”c

 

 

 

224

Jews in the bureaucracy, but nevertheless pleading for
an exception in this case. Over the bigoted Kempen's
objections, Weil was placed in "extraordinary service."98
Like religion, generally speaking, the national
origins of a Beamte do not seem to have been an especially
important consideration in his acceptance for employment.
Most, as part of the Dienstadel, were of German extraction,
either from the Germanic part of the Empire, from Bohemia
or Moravia, or from German lands outside of the Empire.
There were a few of French extraction, fewer yet of Italian
origins. Several Slavic names are apparent, such as
Peter Fisko, a born Galician who was falsely arrested
with Nicholas Czeremiski on charges of passing secrets
to the Hungarian revolutionaries in June 18LA9.99 Many
Beamten were born of German Dienstadel families whose
heads were stationed in military or civilian service in
non-German parts of the Habsburg Empire. Others, such
as Vesque, Kesaer, Thierry and Schweiger—Dfirnstein, had
ancestors who emigrated from former non—German Habsburg
possessions such as Spain or the Netherlands. But with
the important exception, already discussed, of the Germans

from former Holy Roman Imperial lands, nationalities

 

 

981bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 373
(Weil), Buol Proposal, Jan. 31, 1855: Kempen, Tagebuch,
pp- 353—354-

99Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Per-
sonalis, Fasz. 6, Clipping of a July 3. 18h9, Wiener
Zeitung account.

 

 

 

apparently played

to accept an appli
of the applicant 0
to the Habsburg Mo
of national parti
so clearly in the
teenth century is
Office in the 185
Before conc
motions within th
the promotion po
was sensible, bu
to avoid a decli
the personnel as:
the Mechanical Sl
notional scales
21 persons in th
persons in the I
dependent as the
ments and death:
especially fier
budgetary reall
departure of se
positions were

Services Brand
quency of prom

this latter Br

 

 

 

225

apparently played no role either in the decision on whether
to accept an applicant as a colleague or on the attitudes
of the applicant once he was employed. Absolute loyalty

to the Habsburg Monarchy was what counted and evidence

of national particularism in the form which was to emerge
so clearly in the Austrian bureaucracy in the late nine—
teenth century is completely lacking for the Foreign

Office in the 1850s.

Before concluding this chapter, a word about pro-
motions within the hierarchy is necessary. On the whole,
the promotion policy established during the 1849 reforms
was sensible, but it was not employed frequently enough
to avoid a decline in morale. Werner's desire to separate
the personnel assigned to the Policy Branch from that in
the Mechanical Services Branch required separate pro-
motional scales for each group. With an average of about
21 persons in the Mechanical Services Branch and of 28
persons in the Policy Branch during the 1850s, promotions,
dependent as they were on budget increases and on retire—
ments and deaths, came very rarely. The competition was
especially fierce in the Policy Branch, since special
budgetary reallocations in 1849, made possible by the

departure of several relatively highly paid persons whose

 

positions were left vacant, tended to upgrade the Mechanical

Services Branch in terms of salaries, benefits and fre-
quency of promotion. Competition among the personnel of

this latter Branch was deemed detrimental to the needs

 

 

 

 

of the service, si

pedantic attention
the possibility fo
a possibility whi
pensated by great
advantages of Pol
frequency of prom
reduced. The ave
from Hofkonz ipis
exclusively to t
8.1 years. From
years and from S
If the observati
granting promotio
motion in the F0
Austrian central
than that in 0th
Nor do the
throughout the I
because vacanci
This practice w
which only two

attain after 15

w

100mm.

to Semen-me"

lmfl’ifii
tortrige. 3‘10

 

 

226
of the service, since the work was of a sort requiring
pedantic attention to detail. Moreover, the removal of
the possibility for advancement into the Policy Branch,
a possibility which had formerly existed, had to be com—

pensated by greater material advantages.100

The material
advantages of Policy Branch personnel, including the
frequency of promotion, were thereby correspondingly
reduced. The average length of time between promotion
from Hofkonzipist (theoretically the lowest rank assigned
exclusively to the Policy Branch) to Hofsekretar was
8.1 years. From Hofsekretar to Sektionsrat took 8.0
years and from Sektionsrat to Hofrat required 7.2 years.
If the observations of those primarily responsible for
granting promotions are to be believed, the rate of pro—
motion in the Foreign Office, one of the smallest of the
Austrian central governing institutions, was much slower
than that in other ministries.101
Nor do the statistics reveal all. Time and again
throughout the 1850s, promotions were denied subalterns
because vacancies were filled by bringing in outsiders.
This practice was especially common at the Hofrat level,

Which only two Foreign Office bureaucrats were able to

attain after 18Q9, despite the existence of seven

 

looIbid., Organisierung, Fasz. 3, Werner Proposal
to Schwarzenberg, Apr. 21, 1849.

lOlIbid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K #02,

Vortrage, Buol Proposal. Sept. 17. 1853.

 

vacancies. The otl
diplomatic service
The reasons for th
lay in an especial
at the top levels,
and, at least to

contest over the

the bureaucracy.

for promotion wer
employment, large
in charge of sug

rat level. In c

handled exclusiv
hengen usually (1
political issues
alone, as Chiefs
persons, as a ru
decision-making
evaluated on nor
in seniority coo
deciding who wo
But it was by r.
Personnel files
over for promo-
with plaintive

made by the ag

 

 

227
vacancies. The others were recruited from the Austrian
diplomatic service or from the service of another state.
The reasons for this practice, unhealthy in terms of morale,
lay in an especially strong desire for broad experience
at the top levels, the necessity for leadership qualities,
and, at least to a certain extent, the mechanics of the
contest over the philosophical-religious character of
the bureaucracy. Below the Hofrat level, the criteria
for promotion were more congruent with the criteria for
employment, largely because Mensshengen was primarily
in charge of suggestions for promotions up to the Sektions—
rat level. In contrast to Werner and the minister, who
handled exclusively promotions to the Hofrat rank, Menss-
hengen usually did not need to take into account large
political issues in promotions of subalterns. The Hofrate
alone, as Chiefs of Desks and Departments, were the only
persons, as a rule, who were directly involved in the
decision—making processes, so that subalterns could be
evaluated on non-political bases. Experience, reflected
in seniority considerations, certainly was a factor in
deciding who would fill a vacancy at levels below Hofrat.
But it was by no means the only consideration and the
personnel files of marginally competent individuals passed
over for promotion despite their seniority are filled
With plaintive, irritating and sometimes pathetic claims

made by the aggrieved, protesting that he was in fact the

 

 

right man for the
hengen, as we sha.‘
insensitive to pe:
with him the need
also the case wit
do not seem to h
non-Germanic nat'
There is simply
of promotions to
noteworthy patte
is that graduate
progressed to t
Salaries
able to relate
comparison demo
competition for
one-fifth the s:
senior Sektions
The most striki
Sektionsrat ant
salary doubled
sequences for ‘
vacancies with

mice as much
M

102K r1

8.
the most loud
grounds .

 

 

 

 

228

102 Menss—

right man for the job which he did not get.
hengen, as we shall see, was by no means heartless or
insensitive to personal considerations in promoting, but
with him the needs of the service came first. As was

also the case with employment, promotions at lower levels
do not seem to have been influenced by prejudice against
non—Germanic nationalities, non-Catholics or non-nobles.
There is simply no discernible pattern in the relationship
of promotions to any of these considerations. The single
noteworthy pattern, as discussed in the following chapter,
is that graduates of the Oriental Academy nearly always
progressed to the Hofrat level in this period.

Salaries are utterly insignificant without being
able to relate them to the cost of living, but a percentage
comparison demonstrates another reason for the fierce
competition for promotion. A junior Hofkonzipist earned
one-fifth the salary of a senior Hofrat, one—third of a
senior Sektionsrat and one-half of a senior Hofsekretar.
The most striking difference, however, was between a junior
Sektionsrat and a senior Hofrat, in which interval the
salary doubled. In that can be perceived the full con-
sequences for morale of the practice of filling Hofrat
vacancies with outsiders. The undersecretary earned

tWice as much as a Hofrat and received the same base pay

 

102Karl von Chabert and Johann Teichmann complained
the most loudly about their alleged mistreatment on these
grounds.

 

 

as the minister, a

by virtue of his e
he received a dwel
Buol complained t
obligations that
diplomat, and his
half of what Mett
It would be
description of th
the main features
position reflects
free of class, r
ground of some 0

and the history

and late ninetee
Personal charact

Foreign Office w

its composition

those who held ‘

and promotions

activities. pm

We "

 

 

229

as the minister, although the latter quintupled his earnings
by virtue of his expense allowance, in addition to which
he received a dwelling in the State Chancellery building.
Buol complained that this was inadequate, given the social
obligations that were imposed upon him as Austria's chief
diplomat, and his total earnings were indeed less than
half of what Metternich had received as State Chancellor.103

It would be possible to continue ad infinitum a
description of the bureaucracy and its character, but
the main features are by now clear. The personnel com—
position reflected a manner of selection surprisingly

free of class, religious or national bias, given the back—

 

ground of some of the leading authorities in the Monarchy

 

and the history of Austrian social policy in the eighteenth
and late nineteenth centuries. This is not to say that
personal characteristics were unimportant. Since the
Foreign Office was of a sufficiently small size to render
its composition determinable by the personal contact of
those who held ultimate authority in matters of hiring

and promotions with those who were the objects of these
activities, personalities, as opposed to standardized

and explicit norms, are indeed the crucial elements in
identifying its most important characteristics. Apart

from sound legal training, which was specified as a

 

103Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K b7,
Buol Proposal, May 25, 1852; Mayr, Geschichte der Staats—
Kanzlei, p. lUO.

 

 

 

 

standardized norm,

cratic, administr
uniform, if impli
ranks of the Fore
of this character

the Dienstadel cl

 

had been unrival
its sole raison
Predominating as
the Dienstadel,

 

infused by outsi
and philosophic
the Holy Roman
a cleavage betw

and transmitted

the 1850s and bl

German romantic

resurgence of a

empire deriving

of modern stat

that a more

3 hi

 

230
standardized norm, broad and deep experience in bureau—
cratic, administrative and foreign affairs was the single
uniform, if implicit, requirement for enrollment in the
ranks of the Foreign Office bureaucracy. The existence
of this characteristic feature led to an entrenchment of
the Dienstadel class, whose experience in such affairs
had been unrivalled for a century due to the fact that
its sole raison d'etre lay in service to the state.
Predominating as it did from generation to generation,
the Dienstadel, once its ranks in the Foreign Office were
infused by outsiders who owed their material existence
and philosophical outlook to a tradition of service to
the Holy Roman Empire before its final collapse, developed
a cleavage between members of widely differing traditions
and transmitted the cleavage intact and strengthened into
the 18503 and beyond. A highly conservative group of
German romantics who saw in Austria the germ for the
resurgence of an essentially medieval Central European
empire deriving its guiding spirit not from the principles
of modern statehood, but from the Roman Catholic Church,
Opposed a more typically Austrian faction descending,
although in somewhat modified form, from the powerful
bureaucracy created by Joseph II to carry out his cen—
tralizing, modernizing and anti-clericalist reforms.
In this more or less constant dichotomy can be found
the mainspring behind the influences exerted by the Foreign

Office bureaucracy on Austrian foreign policy from the

 

 

 

 

beginning of its 1‘

Crimean War . We

influences and of

 

231
beginning of its resurgence in I848 until the end of the
Crimean War. We now turn to an examination of those

influences and of the men who wielded them.

to“,

 

 

 

FOREIGN OFF:

The basic p
faced by the Habs
following the out
was that of its i
first several m0]
Austria Would he
that She could w
WhiCh engulfed in
and 1849. The I
flights of the (

Vienna, the Juno
revolutim’ Whi
September and O
appearance abrc
danger} To a
to 111%er d.“
rulers, but ev

had been insta

lFI‘ied'
Chapters 2 31

 

 

CHAPTER IV

FOREIGN OFFICE INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY

The basic problem, domestic as well as foreign,
faced by the Habsburg Empire in the months and years
following the outbreak of the March revolution of 1848
was that of its future role in Central Europe. For the
first several months, there were doubts about whether
Austria would have any role at all, for it was not clear
that she could withstand the revolutionary onslaught
which engulfed her repeatedly throughout most of 1848
and 1849. The revolution and war in Northern Italy, the
flights of the court in May and October from hostile
Vienna, the June uprising in Prague and the Hungarian
revolution, which only assumed its full dimensions in
September and October of 1848, all lent themselves to the
appearance abroad that Austria's integrity was in mortal
danger.l To a certain degree, this danger was exaggerated
to illusory dimensions by inept leadership among Austria's
rulers, but even after a new emperor and a new ministry

had been installed in late 1848, the threat to the Empire's

 

lFriedjung, Usterreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 1,
Chapters 2, 3 and 5; Carlile A. Macartney, The Habsbur
Empire, 1220—1218 (New York: Macmillan, 1969 , chapter 9.

232

 

 

existence from the
discounted. The 2‘
but not without me
or without most 0
into Turkish terr
t0 Obsess the Aus
subversion.2 Whj
the Habsburg Empf
“WC. her statui
her own domestic
ference had been
Yet. for a
Vienna in her Ea
t° acquire for r
in Central Eur 01
since late 18h8
uninterruptemv
the revOllltion.

2Fri .
;hapter :egilofi
oli‘tik 0 terr
Lelpzig:

 

 

 

233

existence from the Hungarian quarter was scarcely to be

discounted. The insurrection was crushed by August 1849,
but not without massive Russian military intervention

or without most of the insurrectionaries having escaped
into Turkish territory, where their presence continued

to obsess the Austrian leadership with fears of renewed
subversion.2 While in the early fall of 18U9, therefore,
the Habsburg Empire's integrity was no longer in immediate
doubt, her stature as a Great Power capable of settling
her own domestic affairs independently of outside inter-
ference had been badly shaken.

Yet, for all of the difficulties experienced by
Vienna in her Eastern European backyard, Austria's effort
to acquire for herself a position as the leading power
in Central Europe had nevertheless been underway already
since late l8h8. It was an effort which was to continue
uninterruptedly until 1866. For the first years after
the revolution, one needs look only as far as Frankfurt

to see why this effort to assure herself of an

 

2Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 1,
chapter 7; Richard Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen
Politik Osterreichs im 1 . Jahrhundert, 2 vols., 2d ed.
Leipzig: Teubner, l9l , 2:19—22; Heindl, Graf Buol-
Schauenstein, pp. #1, 55; Helfert, Geschichte Usterreichs,

2:328-339; Kiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg,
PP- 84—101; Otto Lohmann, "Der Konflikt der Turkei mit
Oesterreich und Russland wegen der ungarischen Flfichtlinge
von 1849," Zeitschrift fflr internationales Recht, 22:
228—250; Kenneth W. Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas I,
Round One: The Negotiations of the Habsburg-Romanov Alliance
against Hungary in 18u9," Austrian History Yearbook,
6—7:109—141.

 

       

 

 

independently impc
overriding concert
Main River, the Gt
the old Confedera
creating out of t
calling themselve
0f ensuring domes
iii in Central E1
the Weight 0f SE]
the Presidency 0
hands of the Aus
the Old Confeder
a sizeable body
inclusion of the
ization) To m
ization or eith
mount to the ex
Great Powers.
most of the em
to cohesiVe’ m‘
Austria Could

Elll‘Ope if Germ

{£13861 19%
Wit,” 3,,

 

 

 

234

independently important role in Central Europe was of such
overriding concern for Austria. In this city on the

Main River, the German National Parliament had supplanted
the old Confederal Bundestag in mid—1848, preparatory to
creating out of the loosely connected group of states
calling themselves German a new state organization capable
of ensuring domestic tranquillity and international author-
ity in Central Europe. By late 1848 it was clear that

the weight of sentiment at Frankfurt was opposed to leaving
the presidency of the new organization exclusively in the
hands of the Austrian emperor, as had been the case under
the old Confederation. It was also clear that there was

a sizeable body of persons who opposed altogether the
inclusion of the Habsburg Empire in the new state organ—
ization.3 To most of the Austrian leadership, the real-
ization of either of these desires would have been tanta-
mount to the exclusion of Austria from the ranks of the
Great Powers. As a hybrid, multinational empire lacking
most of the-economic, ethnic and social attributes common
to cohesive, modern states of the mid—nineteenth century,
Austria could scarcely hope to play an important role in

Europe if Germany, her traditionally-claimed, time—honored

 

3Charmatz, Geschichte der auswarti en Politik
Osterreichs, 2:14-18, 23—25; Friedrich Engel-Janosi,
"A Struggle for Austria in Berlin and Frankfurt, 18fi9-
1855." Journal of Central European Affairs, 2/1-2 (April—
July 19E25:3E—58, 190-202; Fried'ung, Osterreich von 1848
his 1860, 1:122—126, 168, 185-18 3 Srbik, Deutsche Einheit,
1653—3111». 3u9—35o. —‘~

 

 

 

field of political
originally as the 1
Roman Empire, more
Confederation unde
from her control.“

But the Gerr
importance in Aus
her leaders‘ perc

because it was in

 

question.5 Alree

1*. 181t9. constitt
henceforth a cen-
threw down the g
that 9°th forth
was established
historic and leg
who claimed tha‘
in Germany by h
non‘German terr

 

 

 

 

 

235

field of political activity and source of prestige,

originally as the heart of the Habsburg-dominated Holy
Roman Empire, more recently in the form of the German
Confederation under Austria's presidency, was removed
from her control.Lp

But the German question rose immediately to central
importance in Austria not only because it was crucial to
her leaders' perceptions of Great Power status but also
because it was inseparable from the Austrian constitutional
question.5 Already with the promulgation of the March
A, 1849, constitution, wherein Austria was pronounced
henceforth a centralistic state, the Austrian leadership
threw down the gauntlet to its enemies in Germany. From
that point forth the character of the German question
was established as a contentious issue. Standing on her
historic and legal rights, Austria challenged all parties
who claimed that she had abdicated her pre-eminent position
in Germany by her attempt to incorporate huge chunks of
non-German territory-~her Slavic, Hungarian and Italian

provinces--into the new organization.6 That was the

 

”Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 1:385-386, 396; Enno E.
Kraehe, "Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in
the Habsburg Monarchy, 1800-1867," Austrian Histogy
Yearbook, 3/3z3-36.

5Redlich, Das Ssterreichische Staats- und Reichs-

problem, 1 140.

6Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:10—12.

 

 

 

 

underlying issue i
over political prf
temporarily suspet
Olmiitz in Novembe
followed immediat
to destroy the PI
to replace it wit
was motivated by

to Central Europ
8

 

choosing.

The all—pe
for Austria's p(
was reflected '11
Significantly “n

among Austria' s
assistance to 1.
which they demc
sequent years ;
plicailion that
hegemony in Ce
\
71th..
8 .
1849_18Fr1edjt

1919) ’ 33' '83

9
R0
1th “911$:

 

 

 

236

underlying issue involved in the Austro—Prussian struggle
over political primacy in Germany, a struggle that was
temporarily suspended by the so—called humiliation of
Olmfitz in November 1850 and the Dresden Conferences which
followed immediately thereafter.7 Likewise, the effort
to destroy the Prussian Customs Union in 1851-1852 and
to replace it with one including all of Central Europe
was motivated by a desire to make valid Austria's claim
to Central European leadership in a form of her own
choosing.8

The all—pervasive character of the German question
for Austria's political life, domestically and externally,
was reflected in these same years less directly but equally
significantly in Austrian policy toward most other European
states. Particularly acute embarrassment was experienced
among Austria‘s leaders by the necessity to call in Russian
assistance to help suppress Hungary, and the hostility
which they demonstrated toward St. Petersburg in the sub-
sequent years resulted from the desire to erase the im-
plication that Russia had thereby reasserted her claim to

hegemony in Central Europe.9 The insuppressible hostility

 

71bid.. pp. 119, 130.

8Friedjung, "Mitteleuropaischen Zollunionsplane,
1849-1853," in Historische Aufsatze (Stuttgart: Cotta,
1919), pp. 80—8I1

9Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas I," pp. 109-
1A1; Heindl, Graf Buol—Schauenstein, pp. 70—77.

 

demonstrated by Aus
was caused by the 2
Austria give up a

herself, as well a
of the Hungarian 1

Austria .10

Initiz
ation of a heredi'
from a fear of a
in Central Europe
perialistic impu]
as part of an Au:
P0sition by acti
culture and econ
state leaders it
more acutely awe
fruits of the s
Europe, The so
attitude toward
far less income

381mg focal p.

 

 

237
demonstrated by Austria toward Palmerstonian England
was caused by the latter's self—serving suggestion that
Austria give up a part of Central Europe (Italy) to save
herself, as well as by England's championing of the cause
of the Hungarian fugitives who had earlier sought to destroy

Austria.lo

Initial wariness over Louis Napoleon's declar—
ation of a hereditary French Empire emanated originally
from a fear of a French challenge to Austrian authority

in Central Europe.11 From the Austrian standpoint, im—
perialistic impulses in the Balkans appeared repeatedly

as part of an Austrian attempt to strengthen her German
position by acting as the prime mover in spreading German

12 Finally, no group of

culture and economic influences.
.state leaders in the Europe of the Crimean War era was
more acutely aware than the Austrian that the ultimate
fruits of the struggle would be won or lost in Central
Europe. The so-called vacillating policy of Buol in his
attitude toward Russia and the Western powers becomes

far less inconsistent when viewed with Central Europe

as the focal point of his policy. Germany and Italy were

 

lO Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik

Usterreichs, 2. 9, Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . -
Schwarzenberg"; Heindl, Graf Buol- Schauenstein, pp. 81- 82
Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War, p. 8

 

ales W. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III
1852-186g4h(New York: Bookmann, 1955). Chapter 2.

12

86 Unckel, Csterreich und der Krimkrieg, pp. 57-59,
-87_

 

 

clearly his prime
if he missed his a
his target.13
Because the
the prime concern
because the form I
determined the ba
administrative st
Prisms that Cent
the disagreement:
members of the p
primarily. altho
that an assessme
the key individx
If, in the fore{
Suggested that
and Chief advis
for regular EKG
and if the We]
the attitudes :
emergjmg frOm
Characters, it
the important
through these

\

13
Ibid
\ Q
Septfng’g Vor‘c

 

238

clearly his prime considerations throughout the war and
if he missed his aim, it was not because he did not know
his target.13
Because the role of Austria in Central Europe was
the prime concern of Austria's supreme leadership, and
because the form Central Europe would ultimately take
determined the basic form to be assumed by the internal
administrative structure of the Monarchy, it is not sur—
prising that Central Europe was also the focal point for " i
the disagreements among and the activities of the senior u
members of the Foreign Office bureaucracy. Thus it is

primarily, although not exclusively, to this basic issue

 

that an assessment of the attitudes and influences of

the key individuals in this bureaucracy must address itself.
If, in the foregoing pages, the operational analysis has
suggested that the channels existing between minister

and chief advisers after 1848 provided the opportunity
for regular exchange of views and exertion of influence,
and if the overview of the bureaucracy has suggested that
the attitudes represented therein and the influences
emerging from these attitudes were of widely diverse
characters, it is in the organizational structure that
the important personalities who wielded these influences

through these channels must be sought. They must be

 

l3Ibid., pp. 159, 187, 192; Austria, HHStA, PA to,
Interna, Vortrage, K 48, Buol Proposal to the Emperor,
Sept. 26, 1854.

sought in that Str
institution's orga
through which POWE
there are no othel
member of this st:
at all comprehens
in which advisers
went unrecorded.

the decision-makf
kept, and none wl

, influence are th

means .

Lacking a1
Organizational :
the following t
the Period 1849
the most import
on a higher 1e,

Shim Unders

Chief Adolf Th
Biegeleben; ti
Meysenbug; th<
Metternich th‘
at the Wester

AlphOng DePOI

14

See 1

 

 

 

 

239

sought in that structure not necessarily because an

institution's organization is the only important medium
through which power is commanded, but rather because
there are no other options in this case. Only one major
member of this structure left memoirs and these are not
at all comprehensive. Most of the specific instances
in which advisers influenced the minister consequently
went unrecorded. The daily sessions at which most of
the decision—making occurred required no minutes to be
kept, and none were. Those Desk Chiefs with the most
influence are thus not readily determinable by direct
means.

Lacking any other options, then, besides using the
organizational structure and a few random references,
the following ten members of the Foreign Office during
the period 1849-1856 can be tentatively identified as
the most important, with the first four occupying positions
on a higher level of significance than the following

14

six: Undersecretary of State Werner; the German Desk
Chief Adolf Thierry; his successor in 1852 Ludwig von
Biegeleben; the Western European Desk Chief Otto von
Meysenbug; the personal secretary to each minister from
Metternich through Rechberg, Gustav Buhl; the assistant

at the Western European and Russian (Oriental) Desks,

Alphons DePont; the Russian Desk Chief Wilhelm von Pflfigl;

—_‘

l”See Appendixes A and B.

 

 

 

 

his successor as 01
in 1853; the Orien
Oriental Departmen
Chancellery Direct
of the pages whic}
identify the pers
0f the first four
remaining to the
others who, as mg
deserve brief me]
tion, for the re
Position held by
Political, relig
briefly outlinec
Austrian POlicy
be Placed there
Europe pervaded
to an eXtent m
questions are 3
but also becau
the greatest I
To most of the
Questions Wen
t° the queen

AS the
the Pel‘io d It

the Undersec;

 

 

 

240

his successor as Oriental Desk Chief Eduard von Klezl
in 1853; the Oriental Desk Chief (prior to 1853) and
Oriental Department Chief Anton von Hammer; and the
Chancellery Director Franz von Mensshengen. The bulk
of the pages which follow are devoted to an attempt to
identify the personal and political beliefs and influences
of the first four of these individuals, and most of the
remaining to the latter six, although there were several
others who, as marginal or irregular influencers of policy,
deserve brief mention. By far the greatest share of atten—
tion, for the reasons just adduced, will be placed on the
position held by each individual in the context of the
political, religious, and philosophical orientations,
briefly outlined in the previous chapter, which conditioned
Austrian policy toward Central Europe. The emphasis must
be placed there not only because the issue of Central
Europe pervaded the totality of Austria's political life
to an extent uncommon even among Great Powers, where foreign
questions are normally closely connected to domestic issues,
but also because these key individuals themselves placed
the greatest part of their own emphasis on the issue.
To most of them in most cases, all other foreign political
questions were important primarily insofar as they related
to the question of Central Europe.

As the truly pivotal figure in every sense during
the period 1848—1856, it seems appropriate to begin with

the Undersecretary of State, Joseph Freiherr von Werner.

 

 

Born in Vienna in
Ludwig von Werner,
professor of Germ:
from 1781 until h
appeals in 1788.
Imperial administ
ranking transferr
all titles pertaj
EmDire had been 2
Administration a
the Gran Provinc
ident 0f the M01
and president 0:
in 1828. He d1.
seemed destined
he graduated f1
took a Course (
he continued a'
1811,15 But p
of responsibil
welfare of 0.6,
he agreed in 1
Quest that hi

l
(163 5 OnSJi

C
Kai
55: 0‘ :e'l‘tun

l6
Fem. zzAust:
MdI‘Ch 12) an:

 

 

 

241

Born in Vienna in 1791, Werner was the son of Johann
Ludwig von Werner, a native of Trier where he was a
professor of German imperial history and imperial law

from 1781 until his appointment to the state court of
appeals in 1788. He became Hofrat in the Holy Roman
Imperial administration in Vienna in 1791, had his Hofrat
ranking transferred to the Austrian service in 1807 after
all titles pertaining to the newly defunct Holy Roman
Empire had been abolished, entered the Supreme Justice
Administration at that time, then became president of

the Graz Provincial Justice Administration in 1811, pres-
ident of the Moravian—Silesian Court of Appeals in 1822,
and president of the Imperial Commission on Justice Affairs
in 1828. He died a year later. His eldest son, Joseph,
seemed destined to follow his father's legal career when
he graduated from the Vienna Piaristengymnasium and under—
took a course of study in law at Vienna University, which
he continued at Wfirzburg and completed at G6ttingen in
1811.15 But perhaps because Metternich shared that feeling
of responsibility burning in the Foreign Office for the
welfare of other natives of Catholic South and West Germany,
he agreed in December 1811 to honor Johann Werner's re—

quest that his son be accepted into the diplomatic corps.16

l5Constantin Wurzbach, ed., Bio ra hisches Lexikon
des Kaisertums Osterreich, 6O vols. (Vienna, 1835-1891},
55:60—62 3

16Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Personalia,

Fasz. 22, Letters from Johann Werner to Metternich, Graz,
March 12 and December 5, 1811.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hmsbegan a careei
59 years and was t
being one of Europ
Beginning in
after a brief peri
part of Metternic}
he mfibreak of w:
1&3. Rapidly at
attended the Chat
for seven months
second Plenipotei
1-815.Johann Von
A“ Which both m
COT“I’l'lshment dtu
accompanying Me'
was assigned in
Post Since ente
there, after 15
most political]
Capacity, and .
mettemich's c
CongreSS of V6
Metternichean
maintaining s

\\

l
7W11m

 

242
Thus began a career in foreign affairs which was to last
59 years and was to bring Werner to within one grade of
being one of Europe's most powerful statesmen.

Beginning in March 1812 as Legationscommis at Paris
after a brief period in the Foreign Office, Werner became
part of Metternich's travelling Foreign Ministry after
the outbreak of war between Austria and France in August
1813- Rapidly attaining Legationssekretar status, he
attended the Chatillon Congress, then served in London
for seven months before returning to Vienna to help Austria's
second plenipotentiary to the famous Congress of 1814-
1815. Johann von Wessenberg, draft the German Confederal
Act which both men would defend with great pride of ac-
complishment during the following half century. After
accompanying Metternich to Paris and Milan in 1815, Werner
was assigned in 1816 to Berlin, his first truly permanent
Post since entering the service.17 He was to remain
there, after 1819 as Legationsrat, for sixteen of the
most politically formative years of his life. In this
caPacity, and especially after 1821, when he entered
Metternich's circle of confidants as an adviser at the
Congress of Verona, Werner became deeply imbued with the
Metternichean principle of cooperation with Prussia in
maintaining stability in Germany. While in Berlin, Werner

succeeded in making the acquaintance of several Prussians

 

l7Wurzbach, ed., Biographisches Lexikon, 55:60—62.

with whom the dram
out in 18b9, most
opinion. He also
tagonist, Felix S<
mission in J anuar;
Werner was
ordinary service"
the State Chancel

Jarcke was Gentz ‘

 

any single perso:
by Gentz seems t
influence among

y lhese, holding a

1 Chief for Germai

In 183“. Werner
of an effort by
M honor suited
t0 the Vienna C
Was, in fact, j

m a Similar c

By 181W . when

Senior active

l8Srbik
118an l: 07-
~20 .

19
Aust:
K 377
8, 183£wemel

 

 

243

with whom the drama of the German question was to be played
out in 1849, most notably Radowitz, of whom he had a high
opinion. He also came to know their chief Austrian an—
tagonist, Felix Schwarzenberg, who arrived at the Berlin
mission in January 1832 to begin a six—year assignment.l8

Werner was one of several persons in the "extra—
ordinary service" category whom Metternich brought into
the State Chancellery upon Gentz's death in 1832. Although
Jarcke was Gentz's nominal replacement, the failure of
any single person to attain the personal standing enjoyed
by Gentz seems to have led to a diffusion of his former
influence among several confidants. Werner was one of
these, holding at the same time the position of Desk
Chief for Germany and Russia over the next sixteen years.
In 1834, Werner received the Hofrat ranking as a result
Of an effort by his superiors to confer on him a position
0f honor suited to his upcoming assignment as secretary
to the Vienna Conference of Ministers of that year. He
was, in fact, likened in that role to Gentz, who acted
in a similar capacity at an 1819 Ministerial Conference.19
By 1847, when Hofrat Alphons DePont died, Werner was the

senior active Hofrat in the Foreign Office and seems to

 

18Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:15§; Arneth, Aus meinem
Leben, 1:407—408; Kiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg,

pp' 18—20o

l9Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 377 (Werner), Metternich Proposal to the Emperor, Jan.
8. 1834.

 

have been granted
Swiss religious st
which the Catholi<
was defeated. An
atthat time, Ber
imthe Interior M
throughout this I
lmkng hidecisf
asa man of half
at nearly all co
That did n
Drnmiples. His
hiunwillingnesg
princiPies.21 y
Partially into ‘
camury Josephi
Ofthe Experiep
Wars, relected
Older, Dre—rat:
andreligiOuS
Totheml the M

0
Srbik
e .er» EI‘l

21 Au
prot°k011eft§

 

244

have been granted considerable latitude in handling the
Swiss religious strife of that year, in the course of
which the Catholic party, though supported by Austria,
was defeated. An Ultramontane driven out of Switzerland
at that time, Bernhard von Meyer, later a high Beamte
in the Interior Ministry, characterized Werner's policy
throughout this period as full of good will but utterly
lacking in decisiveness. Werner was gaining a reputation
as a man of half measures, avoiding doing anything definite
at nearly all costs.20

That did not mean, however, that Werner had no
principles. His resignation on May 6, 1848, demonstrated
an unwillingness to serve an Austrian state based on liberal

21 As a second-generation immigrant, he fitted

principles.
partially into the category of those sons of eighteenth
century Josephinist liberal bureaucrats who, as a result
0f the experience of the French Revolution and Napoleonic
Wars, rejected their parental values and reverted to an
older, pre—rationalist adherence to traditional social
and religious values as a support for their position.

To them, the March uprising looked like a second coming

of the social disorder of the beginning of the century.

 

ZOSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:155; Bernhard von
Meyer, Erlebnisse des Bernhard Ritter von Meyer, 2 V018.
(Vienna: Sartori, 1875), 1:152, 279.

 

21Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 1, 1848, Minutes of the May 6, 1848, session.

 

 

Yet this powerful
insufficient to ov
his superiors, a 5
personal honor. V
able to bring Wer:
by Playing on thi
Step out of devot
despite the fact
rlation still exis
loyalty represen'
his future chief
their COurses of
Werner ret
Imisbruck in la‘
is scanty, seem
Foreish Office
throughout the
burst again On
him on his flip

Played at the ‘
\\

22
Ib‘
“he fits;

 

 

245

Yet this powerful aversion in Werner to liberalism proved
insufficient to overcome a sense of personal loyalty to
his superiors, a sense which, to him, was synonomous with
personal honor. Wessenberg, now Foreign Minister, was
able to bring Werner back into his service in early June
by playing on this sense of loyalty. Werner took this
step out of devotion to an old friend and associate,
despite the fact that "the reasons which caused my resig—
nation still exist in full force . . ."22 The intense
loyalty represented here was to be transferred to all of
his future chiefs regardless of whether he agreed with
their courses of political behavior.

Werner returned with Wessenberg to Vienna from
Innsbruck in late June 1848 and, although the evidence
is scanty, seems to have taken practical control of the
Foreign Office during the Minister's extended absences
throughout the summer.23 When the revolutionary deluge
burst again on October 6, Wessenberg took Werner with
him on his flight to Olmutz.2” What, if any, role he

Played at the displaced Habsburg court in October and

 

22Ibid., PA 1, K 5330. Rechberg Nachlass, Werner
Letter to Rechberg, Innsbruck, June 14, 1848.

23The Ministerratsprotokolle of July 6 and 7, 1848,
indicate that Colloredo was to fill in for Wessenberg
and that Lebzeltern was to handle current affairs. In
fact, Colloredo never assumed the post and Lebzeltern, by
virtue of his Foreign Office position (see chapter 1),
was not equipped to handle political affairs. Werner was
senior after him.

quurzbach, ed., Biographisches Lexikon, 55 60—62.

 

 

November remains 1
Schwarzenberg's p:
Schwarzenberg's r
diplomat, so that
Minister's repres
ately with an exp
in him in the f0]
Austrian relatio:
new, more aggres
a new stage of h
secretary of Ste
development and
the single persl
the total Opera-
limitatiOn of t
members, and W5,
members, WErnex
and practice 0:
eign policy fo:
But more
of the Specifi
DeriOd 1849-15
tendEd to all

funct 10,1511 te‘

 

 

246
November remains unknown, but he was clearly not one of
Schwarzenberg's primary advisers. Yet he did enjoy
Schwarzenberg's regard for him as a competent Beamte and
diplomat, so that his appointment on December 1 as the
Minister's representative in Vienna was followed immedi-
ately with an expression of Schwarzenberg's confidence
in him in the form of an instruction for Werner to place
Austrian relations with Great Britain on a thoroughly
new, more aggressive level.25 With that, Werner began %
a new stage of his career and his appointment to Under— .
secretary of State on December 31 both reflected this
development and gave him the authority to pursue it. As
the single person now most immediately entrusted with
the total operation of the Foreign Office, with the de-
limitation of the spheres of competence of each of its
members, and with the selection and placement of those
members, Werner was to be the key figure in the methods
and practice of formulating and implementing Austrian for-
eign policy for the next eleven years.

But more than that, he was also important in terms
of the specific content of foreign policy during the
period 1849-1856. While his sphere of authority now ex-
tended to all facets of policy, in both geographical and

functional terms, his expertise and interests remained

 

25Helfert, Geschichte Osterreichs, 4/1 (Appendix):
l9-21, Lettre particuliére au Baron de Werner, from
Schwarzenberg, Olmfitz, Dec. 4, 1848.

 

 

in Central Europe,
uninterrupted year
1818, it can come
for something und
counted for less
is to be explains
and more basic df
than with that 0:
that owed its so
t0 a state, the
ideal or the H01
teem, For him,
ideal as an int.
EUPOpean empire
as in the days
truly feudal sc
monarch who ma<
rule as the de:
Catholic Chum

 

 

247

in Central Europe, and especially in Germany. With 33
uninterrupted years of experience in these affairs by
1848, it can come as no surprise that his word counted
for something under Schwarzenberg and Buol. That it
counted for less under the former than under the latter26
is to be explained by the fact that he was in sharper
and more basic disagreement with Schwarzenberg's policy
than with that of Buol. Werner emerged from a family
that owed its social position and attitudes to service
to a state, the Archbishopric of Trier, in which the
ideal of the Holy Roman Empire was held in very high es—
teem. For him, Austria, conceived by the terms of this
ideal as an integral and leading part of a Central

European empire, took its chief and best characteristics,

as in the days of Charles V, from the maintenance of a

truly feudal social and political structure led by a supreme
monarch who made claim to the right of universal temporal
rule as the defender of the spiritually universal Roman

Catholic Church.27 The Austria to which the veteran

 

26As noted by Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:155.

27It is in this sense that the term 'universalism',
used by Ranke and adopted by other German and Austrian
historians, such as Srbik, is to be understood. Applied
to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there is really
nothing 'universal' about the intellectual and emotional
phenomenon to which they refer. Its usage relates essen—
tially to those areas falling within the old Holy Roman
Imperial boundaries, and the universalism pertains to
a shared sense of common traditions, an organic social
hierarchy and the idea of political unity in that limited
sphere.

 

 

Beamte Werner devc
a light very diff
national states,
from the medieval
in the mid-ninete
Yet Werner
the Holy Roman 11
ideal had been p
emerging from Na
not have been Si
the final defeat
Empire have bee]
form Capable of
for that Would
centraliZat'lOn
the sense of a
characteristic
of those Germs:
felt a deep pe
the destrumC
Native to cent
through Mette;
princiDle in .
ger‘el‘alnr the

Empire was, i

 

248

Beamte Werner devoted his loyalty was an entity seen in
a light very different from that in which more modern
national states, founded on principles quite divorced
from the medieval idea of empire, were commonly perceived
in the mid-nineteenth century.

Yet Werner was no romantic. He recognized that
the Holy Roman Imperial institutions incorporating his
ideal had been proved inadequate in the face of the forces
emerging from Napoleonic France. These institutions could
not have been simply restored in their earlier form after
the final defeat of Napoleon. Nor could the Holy Roman
Empire have been revived in a remodeled, highly centralized
form capable of defending Germany against outside threats,
for that would have been a contradiction in terms. Forced
centralization in Germany would have violated not only
the sense of a spiritual commonality of interests
characteristic of the Empire, but also the sovereignty
of those German Imperial vassal states to which Werner
felt a deep personal affinity. It would have thus meant
the destruction of the old Imperial ideal. The alter-
native to centralization was federalization and it was
through Metternich's application of the federalistic
Principle in Austria, in Central Europe and in Europe
generally that the animating ideal of the Holy Roman

Empire was, for Werner, to be both defended against

 

249

outside incursions and realized internally.28

To speak
of Werner as a nationalist or anti-nationalist in this
context is to speak in terms altogether foreign to Werner.
Rather he was a—national, sensing that Germany required

a cohesiveness for moral and philosophical reasons, but
denying that popular sentiment or sovereignty had any—
thing to do with fulfilling this requirement. He thought
on a plane altogether different from that represented

in the Frankfurt Parliament and in certain quarters of

the Austrian and Prussian leadership.

Schwarzenberg's most rudimentary goal of maintaining
some kind of a social and political order coincided with
that of Werner. Like the latter, he was neither a liberal
nor a nationalist.29 But the similarity ceased at that
point. Having no roots in the Holy Roman Empire,
Schwarzenberg was alien to those, like Werner, who regarded
the maintenance of small—state sovereignty as a funda-
mental aspect of the social order. For the new Minister,
there was no philosophical barrier to forsaking the
federalistic principle, in which Werner had so large an
emotional stake, in favor of the centralization principle.
His focus lit on Austria, the centralizer, while Werner's
remained on Germany, the Confederation. For Schwarzenberg,

the maintenance of social and political order demanded

 

28Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:155.

291bid., 1:385—388.

 

 

 

250

Austrian state supremacy, both within the Monarchy and
in Central Europe. His cynical use of the German Con—
federation for the centralization of Germany under Austrian
supremacy was the very opposite of Werner's conception
of that institution's function. Schwarzenberg maintained
the imperial principle, but it became in his hands an
Austrian, not a German-universalist, principle.30 Re—
flected in Schwarzenberg's tactical use of the medium
states against Prussia and the small states, as well as
in his imperious tone toward Berlin, his methods in the
eyes of Werner conduced rather to divisiveness in Germany
than unity.

Werner, like any adherent to the ideals of the Holy
Roman Empire, also possessed a certain element of religious
universalism. But unlike the case of other strong Catholics
in the Foreign Office whose religious—reformist views
were reminiscent of Jesuitism, his beliefs were not suf—
ficiently messianic to lead to anti—Prussian prejudice
or to approval of Schwarzenberg's insulting manner toward
Prussia. His religious beliefs tended to strengthen his
loyalty to the Austrian state as the chief promoter of
that spiritual unity incorporated in the old Imperial
idea. In describing a friend, Hessian Staatsrat Julius

von Linde, whom Werner proposed to Franz Joseph as a

 

 

301 Ibid., 1; 385; Kraehe, "Foreign Policy and the
Nationality Problem," pp- 3- 36

 

 

251

suitable candidate for employment with the Austrian mission
in Frankfurt, Werner noted that Linde, born in the former
Electorate of Cologne—Westphalia, was Catholic and had
been dependent since birth on Austria in a way which

"has always been peculiar to the children of the former

"31 In this phrase,

ecclesiastical regions of Germany.
Werner, whose own family had come from one of Germany's
ecclesiastical regions, the Archbishopric of Trier, was
describing himself. Werner seems consciously to have
sought the employment of persons from these "ecclesiastical
regions of Germany" as supporters of the Austrian state,
conceived by Werner in its traditional role as the pro—
moter of the German Imperial ideal. In fact, a letter
dated April 26, 1850, in which Werner, preparatory to

the submission to the Emperor of the above—quoted Pro—
posal, offered Linde employment in Austrian service,
contains evidence that Werner's purposes in hiring were
different from, and indeed conflicting with, Schwarzen-
berg's purposes. After having explained Schwarzenberg's
intention of convening the Frankfurt plenum and drafting

a new constitution, for which Linde's expertise in legal
affairs was deemed indispensable, Werner appended some
personal observations. Schwarzenberg, who did not know
Linde personally, had asked Werner to recruit him for

the purpose of meeting the immediate needs of Austrian

 

31Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 45,
Proposal (Werner draft) to the Emperor, May 21, 1850.

 

 

 

252
policy. But Werner had more long—range plans for Linde,
and sought to attract his talents by portraying an Austria
riding the wave of the future:
The times are now different here and what we want,
we want earnestly and immediately. If Your Excellency
is disposed now, as earlier, to devote your valuable
service to a powerful state which is developing into
a rejuvenated force, if you still believe that, as
a good German, you can best serve the vast Fatherland
by representing its cause in the fortress of its old
emperor and in the cabinet of its most powerful prince,
then the acceptance of the position offered you today
could easily form the transition to your formal en—
trance into the Imperial service . . . . [This]
would be regarded by our jurists, our politicians,
our clericals and our scholars as a valuable ac—
quisition.3
While Schwarzenberg sought an expert in juridical affairs
for a specific occasion, Werner sought the strengthening
of those adherents to the old German Imperial ideal whose
principles would ultimately come in basic conflict with
those of Schwarzenberg.

Werner may have succeeded only too well in acquiring
personnel friendly to the German Imperial ideal. In
political terms, his goal was to reassert the Metternichean
practice of cooperation with the German states within a
federal framework. The recruitment of Catholics from
the old Imperial territories seemed a sound way to
strengthen the party of adherents to the old collective

idea incorporated in the Holy Roman Empire and passed

along to the federalistic system which replaced it.

 

185 32Ibid., Werner Letter to Linde. Vienna, Apr. 26.
O.

 

 

 

 

 

253
He did not reckon with the possibility that the strong,
universal Catholicism, which was for him an element strength—
ening Austria as the bearer of the cooperative principle,
would be for others an aggressive, messianic element
tending to split Germany along Catholic and Protestant
lines.33 Werner's Catholicism never turned into an anti—
Protestant prejudice capable of affecting his view of
Prussia or the other North German states. In those non—
Austrians whom he succeeded in enrolling in the Austrian
foreign service, Catholicism was borne of a much sharper,
more pervasive religious psychology which had its roots
in the reformist movement centered in Bavaria in the post—
Napoleonic years,3u and it tended to submerge the cooper—
ative principle beneath a zealous quest for the resur—
rection of the Holy Roman Empire rather at the expense
of Prussia and her satellites than in harmony with them.
The consequent satisfaction of these recruits with
Schwarzenberg's sharp tone, despite emanating from entirely
different motives, left Werner isolated as Prussia's
sole friend in the Foreign Office in the l850s.35

It is better, however, to regard Werner during this

 

. 33See below, pp. 281—301, for discussions of
Biegeleben and Meysenbug in this context.

3“Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 1:296-297.

35As noted by Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain

and the Crimean War, p. 21.

 

 

 

254
period not as an isolated and besieged adherent to the
cooperative principle, but as a single and effective
bulwark against the exercising of anti—Prussian hostility
motivated by the anti—Protestantism of this reform—
Catholic, German—Imperial clique. The ascendency of this
clique was to occur only after, and as a direct result
of, Werner's departure from the scene in 1859.36 During
the 1850s, its members approved Schwarzenberg's anti—
Prussian tactics, but their ultimate focus on the good
of Germany rather than on the achievement of narrowly
Austrian state interests was that of Werner. He was
therefore able, by virtue of his dominant position as
Undersecretary, to use these intellectual comrades-in—
arms to combat Schwarzenberg's centralistic, Austrian
state—imperial policy while keeping a check on their
anti—Protestant and hence anti—Prussian sentiments.
The battle, of which the recruitment of these adherents
to the German Empire was a part, against Schwarzenberg's
centralistic, imperialistic policy was initially a very
circumspect struggle. Werner was too much the loyalist
to attempt to depart from normal channels in advocating
a change in policy. He was most reluctant to put on

paper views opposing those of his chief for fear of later

 

 

36Austria, HHStA, Hammer, “Notizen . . . : Rech—
berg."

 

 

255
being compromised.37 Whatever influence Werner may have
sought to exert would have occurred privately or during
the daily briefing sessions at which incoming reports
were discussed.

No direct accounts of these routine proceedings
exist, but it is nevertheless clear from the letters which
he wrote to Rechberg in 1849 during the latter's assign—
ment as the Austrian plenipotentiary at the Frankfurt

Central Executive that he was doing what he could to place

L“ l

Austrian policy once again on the right course.38 Further
evidence of Werner‘s activity in the German question

prior to late 1850 can be derived from the letters sent
him by Wessenberg, in which specific programs were outlined
for Schwarzenberg's consideration. Wessenberg would
scarcely have entrusted Werner with the advocacy before
the Minister of his own program for Germany if he were
not certain that Werner was in complete agreement with
his ideas on the issue. The themes prevailing throughout
a series of letters in 1849 and 1850 were cooperation,
compromise and concessions toward Prussia. The effort
to centralize Austria in the manner being pursued by
Schwarzenberg was misguided, he felt, because it meant

that the inclusion of the German parts of Austria in

 

37Ibid., PA 40, K 277L, Buol Nachlass, Werner Letter
to Buol, Vienna, June 24, 1856.

 

381bid., PA I, K 533C, Rechberg Nachlass, Werner
Letter to Rechberg, Vienna, June 25, 1849.

 

 

256

Germany, regardless of her future organization, could
either occur with the additional inclusion of the non-
German provinces of the Monarchy, or not occur at all.
The latter alternative was anathema to anyone who, like
Werner, valued the traditional German Imperial ideal.
The former alternative was likewise unacceptable not only
because it foresaw the reduction in relative importance,
by virtue of the addition of a large Slavic element, of
those regions of the Third Germany which had formerly
been the heart of the Holy Roman Empire and to which
Werner still felt a strong emotional attachment, but also
because the former head of the Holy Roman Empire, the
Habsburg ruler, would thereby have become more a Slavic
Eastern European prince than a German, Central European
emperor. Finally, this alternative was rejected on the
practical grounds that its pursuit would have led to re-
sistance from Prussia and Germany and thus have resulted
in a divisiveness incompatible with the maintenance of
the Metternichean federalistic principle.39

Despite Werner's opposition to the basic principles
of Schwarzenberg's foreign policy, he does not appear

to have succeeded in altering its course during the first

 

39Ibid., Wessenber Nachlass, K 311, Ed. 110,
"Auszfige aus Briefen, 18 9," 2. Heft, Wessenberg to
Werner, Mar. 20, 1849; Mar. 27, 1849; Apr. 10, 1849;
June 4, 1849; July 2, 1849; Aug. 2, 1849; Aug. 18, 1849;
Ed. 114, "Correspondenz Buch," 3. Heft, Aug. 25, 1849;
Sept. 3, 1849; Oct. 1, 1849; Feb. 11, 1850; Apr. 10,
1850; Apr. 19, 1850.

 

 

 

257
two years of Schwarzenberg's tenure as Minister. After
an initial attempt to conciliate Prussia, Schwarzenberg
shifted in January 1849 to a policy of alliance with the

40 The tensions

medium states against Prussian pretensions.
created by this contest were reflected in the uneasy ar—
rangement known as the Interim which was implemented at
Frankfurt in December 1849 as another attempt to cooperate
with Prussia in the reorganization of Germany. This too
was a divisive maneuver, since it represented an attempt
by the two German Great Powers to come to an agreement
using the old Confederal apparatus, but excluding the
medium and small states which had traditionally formed

the heart of that apparatus. With the failure of the
Interim to provide a solution, Schwarzenberg simply re—
called the old plenum of the Confederation in April 1850,
not as an attempt at reconciliation, but as a maneuver

to force Prussia to back down from her newly instituted
Union plan for a Kleindeutsche solution by which Berlin
sought to exercise hegemony over non—Austrian German lands.
The struggle over this issue continued through the summer
Of 1850 and was finally resolved by extreme diplomatic
force verging on war with the so—called "humiliation of

Olmfitz" in late November 1850.41 For Werner, the entire

 

uOKiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 115.

#lFriedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 2,
Chapters 1 and 2.

 

 

 

 

258
experience had been most unedifying. Austrian policy
had consisted largely of negative and hostile responses
to proposals put forth by other parties, and those positive
proposals which Schwarzenberg had advanced, such as the
centralization of the Confederal organization by con-
solidating the sovereign states of the Third Germany into
six or seven districts, and such as the plan for an empire
of 70 millions which would have included Austria's non—

42 violated Werner's traditional German

German provinces,
Imperial principles.

But by the time of the moral victory over Prussia
at Olmfitz, Schwarzenberg seems to have lost the drive
to continue formulating positive policies toward Germany.
If he regarded the German question in essentially negative
terms, in terms of the necessity for Austria to demonstrate
by exercise of force her supremacy over Prussia as a
German Great Power, as seems likely,“3 then it stands to
reason that Olmfitz represented for him the crowning
achievement and that what happened thereafter was of lesser
significance. He therefore left more free the field for
others to take an active role in the German question.
Already in July 1850, he had asked Kfibeck, the Austrian

representative to the Frankfurt Central Executive, to

 

‘ uZSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 1:396; Friedjung,
"M1tteleuropaische Zollunionsplane," pp. 6 —89.

b uBAustria, HHStA, Hammer. "Notizen . . . : Schwarzen—
erg ' H

 

 

259

outline his suggestions for future Austrian policy toward

Germany. Kfibeck responded with the suggestion to under—
take any reorganization by starting from the basis of

the old Confederal institution, and if agreement could

not be reached, simply to resurrect the original Confederal

8.44 This was supportive

form as it existed prior to 184
of Werner's principles, and although Kfibeck complained
bitterly prior to November 1850 that the headstrong
Schwarzenberg ignored every proposal he made,45 it was
Kfibeck's July plan that was finally accepted in December
as the basis for the instructions transmitted to Buol,
Austria's first plenipotentiary at the Dresden Conferences,
for his guidance in the upcoming negotiations.)+6
By late 1850, therefore, the conditions were ripe
for Werner to advance to a position from which he could
exert direct influence on Austria's German policy. What—
ever influence he may have held earlier would have resulted

from the vast gulf between Schwarzenberg's ignorance and

Werner's encyclopedic knowledge of German affairs, and

the consequent reliance by the Minister on the Undersecretary

for his information. That indirect influence may explain

 

nuPrinted in Karl Freiherr Kfibeck von Kfibau, Tag —
bficher des Carl Friedrich Freiherrn Kfibeck von Kfibau,
ed. by Max von Kfibeck, 2 vols. (Vienna: Gerold, 1909),
2:212—215.

8 45Ibid., Kfibeck to Werner, Sept. 1, 1850, pp, 2171
21 .

uéKfibeck, Aus dem Nachlass, p. 57.

 

 

260
the reason for Schwarzenberg's repeated return to the
use of the old Confederal institution for implementing
his policy, despite the fact that the policy itself was
far removed from Werner's conception of what a federalistic
policy should have been. Schwarzenberg had to get his
information about the legal prerogatives of the Confeder—
ation from some place in order to use those prerogatives
against Prussia, and no better expert on these matters
than Werner existed in Austrian service.u7 Once Schwarzen—
berg had achieved his immediate purpose of demonstrating
Austrian supremacy, however, Werner's role in policy form—
ulation became more active and independent than that of

a mere legal expert. In the course of this transformation,

 

Werner fell into direct conflict with the Minister. The
conflict did not develop into a frontal attack on Schwarz—
enberg, but rather on Werner's subordinate and successor
as German Desk Chief, Adolf von Thierry, the person pri—
marily responsible for implementing Schwarzenberg's
narrowly Austrian, largely negative policy measures against
Prussia. In a letter to Mensdorff more than a decade
later. Werner described this period of activity as follows:
. . those who were in a position to know will re—
member that, in the last period of the administration
of the unforgettable Prince Schwarzenberg, when his
trust and favor were to some extent denied me, I

attributed this to my reputation, contributed to by
others, as a friend of Prussia——a reputation to which

 

47Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:154.

 

 

 

 

261

I also contributed . . . particularly by my disapproval

giriifiiiifii ssgdziuttizgchi‘srt: BEEkdéfiiZ§?£§S 1”
The conflict, ultimately resolved by the removal of Thierry,
was reflected in a disagreement over diplomatic form,
but it was fought over the continuation of the divisive
anti—Prussian policy initiated by Schwarzenberg in early
1849. After Olmfitz and Dresden, the policy of confrontation
in Germany shifted from the issue of the Confederation
to that of commercial union, but the conflict in the
Foreign Office between the new Austrian imperial principle
represented by Schwarzenberg and the old German Imperial
principle represented by Werner remained not merely un—

diminished, but was in fact sharpened by the growing

 

conflict between Thierry and Werner. The first signs of
the reaction perceived by Hfibner in late 1852 against
Schwarzenberg‘s politics49 had already appeared in 1851.
Werner's advocacy of cooperation with Prussia on
German issues by no means meant, however, that he held
Prussia blameless in the altercations between the two
Great Powers. In his conception of the German Imperial
ideal, Austria rightfully claimed undisputed leadership,
While the Prussian king was relegated to the secondary
role of the emperor‘s chief lieutenant. Already in mid—

1849. Werner was to write to Rechberg about the German

 

 

”8Austria, HHStA, PA 1, K 528, Rechberg Nachlass,
Werner Letter to Mensdorff, Dresden, Oct. 30, 1864.

49Hiibner, Neun Jahre, 1:49.

262
question:

What will, what can come of it? Little good, if
Berlin continues to be ambitious—-or, better said,
insane (for a ra ing ambition without a rational
goal lg insanity§.5

His distress over Prussia's irrational striving for domin-
ance in Germany had not lessened by year's end:

De Germanicis——sileo! What can I say reasonably

or practically? Prussia risks total destruction by

her relentless pursuit of the most nebulous chimeras
that ever existed . . . .

 

Outrage at Prussia's pretentiousness, combined with a
sharp disapproval, borne of the conviction that two wrongs
do not make a right, of Schwarzenberg's coarse conduct

of Austria's German policy were the driving forces behind
Werner's conception of German politics, a conception which
had already initiated on the one hand the reaction against
the Schwarzenberg policy and which was on the other hand
to influence strongly the course of Buol's German policy
after he assumed power.

The key to understanding Buol‘s German policy lies
in the recognition that he did not have one when he came
to office. He therefore had to depend more on his advisers
and his diplomats for policy formulation in this sphere
than had the supremely self—confident Schwarzenberg.

And if even Schwarzenberg had depended to some extent

 

50Austria, HHStA, PA 1, K 5330. Rechberg Nachlass.
Werner Letter to Rechberg, Vienna. Sept. 1: 18 9-

 

51 bid., Werner Letter to Rechberg, Vienna, Dec.
30, 1849.

 

 

263
on Werner for his information, Buol's reliance on Werner
was incomparably greater. Buol's personality made co—
Operation with Werner much easier than was the case during
Schwarzenberg's reign. Buol, like Werner, was a diplomat
who preferred conciliation where Schwarzenberg, always
the military man at heart, preferred a dramatic victory.52
Buol's father, Johann Rudolf, was a career diplomat out
Of an old Swiss family that had served the Habsburg Mon—
archy for generations. Johann Rudolf Buol himself had
once been the Austrian legate to the Reichstag in
Regensburg where Karl was born in 1797. The father sub—
SeQuently became the first Austrian legate to the Frankfurt
Bundestag in 1816 where he served for seven years before
being recalled for advocating, against Metternich's wishes,
the strengthening of the Confederation's legal authority.
Karl's mother, moreover, was the daughter of a former
Bavarian legate to the Regensburg Reichstag.53 Thus,
While Karl Buol, who never saw Vienna before he was 25

years old,54 was a born Austrian, he, like Werner, had

strong family ties to Imperial Germany. For these reasons,

all of which distinguished him sharply from the purely

Austrian Schwarzenberg, Buol was much more attracted

 

52Ibid., Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Buol."

53Neue Deutsche Biograghlév VOl' 3’ "Karl Ferdinand
Buol-Schauenstein."

 

54Heindl, Graf Buol—Schauenstein, p. 119,

 

 

to Werner and was therefore more susceptible to his
influence than had been the case with his predecessor.

Buol immediately took up the foreign policy reins
Which had gone slack in Schwarzenberg's hands during the
period of the latter's preoccupation with the transformation
of the central administration into a nee-absolutistic
system. Nearly all draft dispatches of the period bear
both Buol's and Werner's "for copy" mark, whereas earlier
Werner alone seems to have taken primary responsibility
for such approval. Many important dispatches were drafted
by Buol himself. More significant from the standpoint
0f influence exerted on Buol's policy is the fact that
Werner occasionally revised important dispatches drafted
by the Minister, although such activity should have fallen
rather to a Desk Chief than to the Undersecretary according
to normal operating procedures. The most important of
such instances occurred two months after Buol's assumption
0f power and embodied the full shift against Schwarzenberg's
German policy that took place in 1852. The issue causing
the greatest tension in Germany since the end of the
Dresden Conferences was whether or not Austria was to
be permitted to join the Prussian—controlled Customs
Union. It had long since become clear that Prussia was
gaining considerable political influence among the states
belonging to the Customs Union, including nearly all of
non—Austrian Germany outside of the Hannover-dominated

Steuerverein in North Germany. The underlying threat

 

 

of this situation was that Prussia, by her continued
exclusion of Austria from this trade organization, could
ultimately place herself at the head of a German national
state from which Austria also would be excluded.55

When Prussia concluded a treaty on September 7,
1851, with Hannover providing for the latter's, and
ultimately the entire Steuerverein's entry into the Customs
Union, the threat became more serious.56 Schwarzenberg
responded characteristically by calling a conference of
the South German states, which feared Prussian domination,
for the purpose of formulating an ultimatum demanding
that Prussia permit the inclusion of Austria in the Customs
Union. Failing at first to reach agreement, the South
German states continued to meet, and were in fact holding
a session at Bamberg on the day of Schwarzenberg's death,
in order to work out a common proposal with which to
confront Prussia. Manteuffel in Berlin steadfastly held
his position in the face of this threat and sent Bismarck
from his Frankfurt post to Vienna in June 1852 to apprise
Buol of the Prussian refusa1.57 It was in response to
this visit that Buol, with Werner's assistance, drafted

a rePly reversing Schwarzenberg's policy and setting

 

55Friedjung, "Mitteleuropaische Zollunionsplane,"
ppl 6L”_89I

56Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 2:189-

57Ibid.. pp. 191—193.

 

266

the tone for Austro—Prussian relations for the next several
years.

Beginning the letter with an expression of regret
that Prussia had decided to decline Austria's request
to be included in the Berlin Conferences currently meeting
for the purpose of debating the renewal of the Prussian
Customs Union, Buol then proceeded to emphasize the pol—
itical importance which this question held:

We are convinced that the relations between Austria
and Prussia cannot be normal, that Germany would

not fulfill its calling in European politics as long
as one of the two German Great Powers, be it Austria
or Prussia, dominates the Confederation. Yet a re—
cognition of the claim that Germany may not enter
into a tariff unification with Austria would sooner
or later have such a consequence, and, as a further
unavoidable result of such a position, unreasonable
demands from all social and political quarters would
arise. The mission and the task of both Great Powers,
it seems to me, is to prevent such a result, and the
solution of this commercial question might just offer
the most excellent and the most accessible means.

The experts on the one side may harbor sanguine
hopes or, on the other, attach serious reservations
to it-—let them quarrel and raise doubts over it.

But what concerns us, the statesmen, is above all

to recognize from the political standpoint . . .

that where Austria and Prussia do not act in common
and from the same position, nothing durable in Germany
will result. The Imperial Cabinet will always be
ready to cooperate eagerly and sincerely in this dir—
ection, and it hopes constantly to concur with Prussia
in this endeavor. But if we should be deceived, if
Prussia should wish to delay the project without
completing it and to continue the material division,
then political unification would be threatened and

we . . . could only await the inevitable skirmishes
while hoping sincerely that the danger which such a
course must naturally have for the two Great Powegs
might remain spared Germany as long as possible.5

 

 

58Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, K 277g, Buol
Nachlass, Draft of letter, revised by Werner, to Manteuffel,
June 1852.

 

 

 

267

The views expressed in Buol's letter, always placing
considerations of Germany at the fore and advocating
cooperation between the two Great Powers in fulfilling
these considerations, were essentially Werner's views.

There were important individuals both inside and
outside of the Foreign Office who disagreed with this
resurrection of Metternichean politics and with the reaction
against the German policy of Schwarzenberg which it repre—
sented.59 At times of crisis, such as in 1854 when Buol
desperately needed the support of Germany in his attempt
to force the warring European powers to peace discussions,
certain of those individuals may have reinforced the
Minister's feelings of disgust and contempt toward Prussia
for her obstruction of his plan. Imbued with contempt,
Buol certainly made some important tactical errors in
failing to keep Prussia, an ally by the April 20, 1854,
treaty, properly informed of each Austrian decision vis-
a—vis the Balkans. But these failings resulted primarily
from the basic presuppositions behind the German—centered
policy which both he and Werner had been pursuing from
the first. Cooperation between Prussia and Austria was
desirable, but, in the last analysis, Vienna, as the
seat of the historical German Empire, to the ideal of

Which both men were committed, was the source of final

 

H 59Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben. Pp- 255-256;
Hubner, Neun Jahre, 1:51-

 

 

 

 

 

268

authority on issues which concerned Germany. At this
point alone the fatal conflict between Werner's practical
conception of a federalistic Germany and his fervently
espoused ideal of Central Europe modeled along feudal
and ideologically universalistic lines became evident,
and it was Buol's misfortune that his personality proved
receptive to the contradictory conception. Cooperation
backed by the constant claim to the right of coercion
by Austria was not a viable policy in dealing with another
member of the European Great Power system, regardless
of what historic function that member may have fulfilled
in an older, outmoded and idealized conception of Central
Europe. A strong anti—Prussian sentiment reminiscent
of Schwarzenberg need not be sought in Buol or his most
influential advisers in order to explain his imperious
treatment of Prussia during the Crimean War. Inherent
in the psychological conception of Germany which he held
and which was strengthened and made precise by Werner
was the attitude that the Prussian leadership wrongfully
violated the natural order of things. Through the use
of unilateral Austrian authority in the federalistic system,
both Germany in general and Prussia in particular were
to be saved from this pernicious influence. In Werner's
and Buol's View, the policy was not pro-Austrian or anti—
Prussian, but pro—German, and ultimately pro—European.

Werner frequently gave vent to his exasperation

With Prussian and German violations of his paternalistic

 

 

269
conception of Central Europe in letters written to Buol
during the Minister's occasional absences from Vienna
in the Crimean War period. When the medium states under
Prussian influence agreed at Bamberg in early June 1854
to resist Austrian demands for support in forcing Russia
to evacuate the Danubian Principalities, Werner cried
out to Buol:
Bamberg——the most disgraceful of coalitions, formed
out of filthy motives and calculated to fetter the
Great Powers in chains and to transform the Con—
federation into a fatal tool of foreign ambitions--
Bamberg, the foretaste of a new Rhine Confederation,
1854——to Bamberg the two Great Powers are supposed
to adhere . . . . Impossible!

June of 1854 was probably the point at which Werner's

anger at Germany's refusal to accept the leadership of

 

its old Imperial court reached its peak. By the end of
the war, he seems finally to have realized that a contra-
diction existed in this new age of nationalism and state
particularism, ushered in by the Gagerns, Radowitz and
Schwarzenberg, between the Imperial ideal to which he
was so deeply committed and the federalistic system through
Which, he was convinced, this ideal had maintained itself
during the Metternichean times. A letter to Rechberg,
dated March 6, 1856, bore a rueful tone:

The basic fault of the German Confederation . . .

lies, as you have correctly noted, in its organization.

Yet this organization, as you also know, is the only
one possible.

 

60Austria, HHStA, PA 40, K 277L, Buol Nachlass,
Werner Letter to Buol, Vienna, June 10, 1854.

 

 

270

But even with a faulty organization, a state
system can live if the spirit which infuses men is
a good one——as the elder statesmen of all countries
at all times have recognized. But this, the spirit,
is lacking completely in the so—called common Father—
land. The populace is either indifferent or, if it
is patriotic, more or less revolutionary; and the
governments know only their beloved egos and allow
themselves to be led by the basest motives. The chief
culprit in this idiocy is Prussia as she is now ruled,
exciting the scorn of every somewhat honorable German.
Germany has her to thank that, while she could have
played a large role with slight costs in the crisis
which is now ending, she must stand like a naughty
schoolboy in.the corner while her fellow students
receive prizes amidst drums beating and trumpets
sounding; and that Danes, Swedes and Dutchmen make
her the object of their ridicule. If I were only
an Austrian, I too could laugh; but since I also have
something of imperial, i.e., German blood in my vegns,
I cannot refrain from being sometimes truly angry. 1

In this brief statement lies the expression of Werner‘s
deepest concerns and convictions over the question of
Central Europe.

Far from being a stiff relic of the Metternichean
era, lacking the ability to make independent judgments,62
Werner was the single most influential Beamte in the
Foreign Office. His importance lay largely in the tight
control he held over his anti—Prussian subordinates who
would become decisive in the conduct of Austrian German
policy after Werner's departure. It lay also in his
wide responsibilities for the recruitment of senior ad—
visers whom he could use for support of his foreign

policy convictions. But it lay mostly in his possession

 

61Ibid., PA 1, K 5330, Rechberg Nachlass, Werner
Letter to Rechberg, Vienna, Mar. , 1856.

628rbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:155.

 

 

 

271
of more than three decades of experience in and knowledge
of German affairs——experience and knowledge which were
vitally important to the relatively inexperienced Schwarzen—
berg and Buol. If these qualities meant more to Buol,
to whom Werner, along with Meysenbug on non—German issues,
became virtually an exclusive adviser,63 than they did
to Schwarzenberg, it was because Werner's psychology and
convictions coincided much more closely with Buol's than
with his predecessor's. If his influence was not readily
perceptible in the drafts of dispatches leaving the Foreign
Office, it was because the drafting function was not
normally a responsibility of the Undersecretary, and be—
cause Werner, extreme loyalist that he was, avoided
officially committing himself on paper as much as possible.
His conflict with Schwarzenberg's German policy is never—
theless unmistakable, and it is clear that he led the
reaction against it during Schwarzenberg's declining
years and Buol's first months in power. Likewise un-
mistakable is the decisive stamp placed on Buol's German
policy by Werner, and, if Buol's actions on non—German
affairs were largely shaped by Schwarzenberg‘s example,64
his actions and his failures in the lands encompassed by
the former Holy Roman Empire were derived directly from

Werner's conception, and from the fatal contradictiom

 

63Hubner, Neun Jahre, pp. 135—136.

6LPHeindl, Graf Buol—Schauepstein, p. 129.

 

 

272
contained within it.

During the Schwarzenberg years, Adolf von Thierry,
Werner's successor as German Desk Chief, was the Under-
secretary's main opponent on the German question. Like
Werner, Thierry had his roots in the lands of the former
Holy Roman Empire; unlike Werner, his family was not
German, and that seems to have been the point at which
the basic philosophical differences of the two men origin—
ated. Born in Bohemia in 1803, Thierry was the son of
an Austrian major general whose family emigrated at some
unknown point from Luxembourg. Adolf received his education
at Brfinn and entered state service there in 1827 with
the provincial governorship. Having entered the diplo-
matic service in 1830, he was assigned in 1837 as
Legationssekretar to the Austrian representative to the
Frankfurt Confederal Legation, Joachim Munch. He was
promoted to Legationsrat in 18h5 and took over the
Chancellery Direction of this institution on May 3. 1848,
receiving on July 1 the title of Hofrat. The Bundestag
was dissolved shortly thereafter when Archduke Johann
arrived in the capacity of Imperial Regent, and the Con-
federal Legation was transformed at that point into a
Cabinet Chancellery, of which Thierry remained the head.65

Presumably disgusted by the liberal tenor of the

 

65Wurzbach, ed., Bio ra hisches Lexikon, 4h:228_
230; Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Vortrgge. K 296,
Lebzeltern Proposal, May 3. 1848-

 

 

 

 

273

parliament and the cabinet, Thierry left his post in the
fall of 1848 for a vacation in England, during the course
of which he received a letter, dated February 3, 1849,
from Schwarzenberg inviting him to assume the German
Desk in the Foreign Office. He arrived at the Ballhaus—
platz in early March.66

Thierry could probably be classified as the sole
reactionary in the upper echelons of the reformed Foreign
Office. Whereas the German Confederation for Werner was
the most practicable means to the attainment of those
German Imperial goals which inspired his conception of
Central Europe, Thierry saw the maintenance of the
Confederation as an end in itself. Lacking any wider
conception of Germany, either in the mystical medieval
sense, in the political-economic sense represented by
Bruck, or, least of all, in the nationalist sense, the
Confederation for Thierry became in effect an institution
by which Austria could wield and demonstrate her power.
This view fitted in very well with Schwarzenberg's nar-
rowly Austrian idea of Central Europe and the role of
the Confederation in it, which was undoubtedly the reason
for Schwarzenberg's selection of Thierry to handle German
correspondence. But Thierry sharply disagreed with the

Prime Minister's attempt to reorganize the Habsburg

 

66Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 350
(Thierryi, Schwarzenberg Letter to Thierry, Feb. 3, 1849.

 

 

 

274

Monarchy along more modern, centralistic lines, believing
that this violated the most basic principles upon which
a state consisting of many ethnic minorities had to rest,
and attributing the attempt to reform to the pernicious
influence on Schwarzenberg of the commoner, Interior
Minister Alexander Bach.67 In holding these attitudes,
he stood very close to the reactionary clique of so—called
"Old Conservatives" led by Prince Windischgratz and joined
by Kfibeck (on certain issues), Kempen and Hummelauer, F
With each of whom he maintained close personal contact
during these years.

Ideologically isolated in the Foreign Office and
used by Schwarzenberg merely as a tool for the shaping
Of Germany in Austria's image, Thierry was never happy
serving under Schwarzenberg.68 He admired the Foreign
Minister's energy and personal courage but doubted that
he was adequately endowed with a knowledge of German
affairs to fill effectively the position of Foreign
Minister.69 Yet Schwarzenberg was a merciless taskmaster,
and Thierry does not seem to have been much more than a

simple copyist during his first year of service in the

 

67Kempen, Tagebuch, pp. 172—173-

68Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 his 1860, 2:154.

69Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 189-

 

 

275

Foreign Office.70 He compared his situation to that of

a Negro slave in a letter of September 1849 to Rechberg.71
In a December 1849 letter, in which he spoke to Rechberg
of recruiting a publicist for the Austrian cause, Thierry
promised to attempt to apply pressure on Schwarzenberg

on the matter. “I shall certainly do what I can," he
said, "but that is damned little, for you would not be—
lieve what difficulty we have in carrying through even

"72 But already in March

the most insignificant things.
1850, Thierry perceived that Schwarzenberg‘s strength
was ebbing and feared that, as a result of that, the
despised Prussian Kleindeutscher would win out in Germany.73
It was at this point that he began to emerge from his
lowly position to make his influence felt. He had already
disposed of his only assistant, Arneth, whom he detested
for his middle-class liberalism, and had replaced him
with Leopold von Hoffmann, an aristocrat whom he could
tolerate. Shortly thereafter began the conflict with
Werner which would later result in Thierry's dismissal.

In a letter written to Rechberg in August 1851,

Thierry revealed the process by which his conflict with

 

7OArneth, Aus meinem Leben, 1:430—431.

 

‘ 71Austria, HHStA, PA 1, K 5330, Rechberg Nachlass,
Thierry Letter to Rechberg, Vienna, Sept. 22, 1849.

 

721bid., Dec. 21, 1849.

73Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 189.

 

 

276
Werner had by that time reached a climax. Thierry, who
had served as secretary at the Dresden Conferences under
Buol, did not receive the customary award distinguishing
those who served in similar capacities at international
gatherings of this sort. To Rechberg's expression of
condolences over this omission, Thierry replied that the
insults done to his honor over the preceding eight months
were of more concern to him than the non—receipt of a
medal:

I protected Germany and perhaps Austria from great

mischief on September 18, 1848, when I alone, by my

energy and firmness, prevented the weak Archduke

[Johann], who was pressured from all sides and even 1
by his closest associates toward an act of indulgence,
from delivering into the hands of Robert Blum and

his companions the command that all troops would have
to evacuate Frankfurt and its outskirts. In spite

of the most vigorous opposition from certain quarters,
I resurrected the Bundestag in May 1850 and thereby
led us to the path on which we have reached the point
where we now stand. Against almost insurmountable
opposition and with uncommon perseverance, I led our
sons into the Electorate of Hesse and Holstein and
thereby made two moves which exposed Prussia's hypo—
critical policy and drove our hereditary enemy into
straits in such a manner that nothing remained for
her but a humiliating retreat. Is it indeed possible
that one can have even a trace of awareness of such
faithful and honorable service and yet surrender me
to the wretched calumniators without doing anything
to quell their malicious attack or to vindicate me
before the world?

If there is at least a kernel of truth to these un—
doubtedly exaggerated claims of his own importance, it

is clear that Thierry began to exercise considerable

 

74Austria, HHStA, PA 1, K 533e, Rechberg Nachlass,
$§ierry Letter to Rechberg, Kirchberg am Walde, Aug. 12,

 

%

 

 

277
influence over policy formulation when Schwarzenberg's
health and ability to dominate his subordinates began to
dissipate in early 1850. The influence emanated from an
uncompromising hatred of Prussia and was directed toward
the simple establishment of an Austrian claim to absolute
supremacy in Germany through the use of the Confederal
mechanism, of which Thierry had been a part for eleven
years. No deeper conception of Germany emerges here than
a simple drive to transform her individual parts into
Austrian tributary states.

Thierry did not name in this letter the opposition 1
which he had been forced to overcome in the pursuit of
his crudely anti—Prussian goals, but Werner and Bruck
were certainly two of his most important antagonists.

In desiring to create a unified Central Europe on the
basis of economic cooperation between Prussia and a
modernized and centralized Austria, the bourgeois Bruck
violated virtually every principle held by the reactionary
Thierry.75 Werner, the child of the Holy Roman Empire,
who sought the establishment of a spiritual and social
universality in Central Europe through the cooperation

of all German states in a confederal relationship, like—
Wise found himself at odds with his subordinate. It is
certainly no mere coincidence that Werner's inquiries

about Biegeleben's suitability for employment in response

 

75Friedjung, "Mitteleuropaische Zollunionsplane,"
ppl 6L|’_89|

%

 

278
to Kfibeck's initial recommendation began in April 1850,
shortly after Thierry began showing signs of asserting
himself. As a German-universalist like Werner, Biegeleben
appeared the perfect antidote to Thierry's particularism
and was demonstrably more competent than Thierry.76
While neither Bruck nor Werner objected to the resurrection
of the Confederation in May 1850, they were fundamentally
opposed to the bellicose purposes for which Thierry thought
it was to be used. When he and Schwarzenberg used the
Confederation to humiliate Prussia in November 1850, the
incipient reaction against the prevailing German policy
became actual.

Thierry's decline in influence began with his assign-
ment as assistant to Buol at the Dresden Conferences, an
assignment by which he had expected to consolidate his
position as maker of Austria's German policy. He was
able to acquire the position of Conference recorder which
he regarded as important for the responsibility it thrust
On its occupant as drafter of all formal proposals and
Of the new Confederal Act, if one were to come into exis—
tence. But Buol took an immediate dislike for Thierry
and sought to force him "into the background at every

Opportunity in order to let no doubt arise that he acted

 

76See below, pp. 28h—285.

 

279
independently."77 Thierry also suspected, probably

justifiably, that Werner was working against him at home.
Biegeleben was by now drafting the important dispatches
with which Thierry had formerly dealt, so that Thierry's
assignment in Dresden proved more detrimental than helpful
to his position in the Foreign Office.78 Returning to
Vienna at the end of the Conferences, Thierry experienced
first—hand the disgraceful treatment, and Schwarzenberg's
reluctance or inability to do anything to stem it, about
which he complained in his August 12, 1851, letter to
Rechberg. On September 18, 1851, Thierry lost part of

his formal authority when responsibility for Swiss re~
lations was transferred from his to Meysenbug's Desk.79

This transferral probably resulted from Werner's distaste
for his radical views on the issue of the Swiss govern-
ment's harboring of Austrian revolutionary fugitives.

While no one appreciated the Swiss actions, and indeed
Schwarzenberg himself was obsessed with putting a stop

to them, the more diplomatic Werner advocated reconciliation
rather than confrontation.

The opening of the Vienna conferences in early 1852

 

77Austria, HHStA, PA 1, K 533e, Rechberg Nachlass,
Thierry Letter to Rechberg, Dresden, Jan. 25, 1851.

 

78Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, p. 251.

79Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 401, Referats—Einteilung, Directive, Sept. 18, 1851.

 

 

 

 

 

280
on the question of the entry of Austria into the Prussian
Customs Union or the possible formation of a new one
provided Thierry with his last significant role in the
Foreign Office. As the Conference recorder, he was in
basic agreement with Schwarzenberg's aims of allying with
the medium states on commercial questions in order to
force Prussia to relinquish her economic predominance in
Germany. Thierry became ill during the conferences, but
his sickness simply provided a pretext by which Buol was
able to send him on an extended vacation a mere two weeks
after he assumed the leadership of the Ministry.80 He
was officially transferred to the "extraordinary service"
category on October 23, 1852, and was not to serve again
until Rechberg assumed power in 1859. Thierry, in the
capacity of Police Minister, thereupon acquired a reputation
as a grim, anti—semitic, repressive reactionary.81 After
recovering his health in 1855, he had attempted to re—
enter the foreign service, but quickly saw that his former
relationship with Werner made Foreign Ministry employment
impossible. Buol offered him the unimportant Warsaw con—
sulate, but, dissatisfied with that offer, Thierry arranged
through Grfinne to go over the Minister's head to Franz

Joseph. Learning of this insubordination, Buol angrily

 

8OIbid., PA 40, Vortrage, K 47, Buol Proposal,
Apr. 27, 1852.

 

81Wurzbach, ed., Biographisches Lexikon, #4:228-230.

 

 

_,_-_ - “”4.-.

281

withdrew his original offer, and Thierry returned to his
forced retirement.82

Thierry's replacement as German Desk Chief, Ludwig
von Biegeleben, was to acquire great fame after 1859 as
a militant leader of the anti—Prussian forces in Austria‘s
ruling circles.83 Prior to Werner's departure from the
post of Undersecretary, Biegeleben enjoyed no such indepen—
dent importance, but his role as an ally of Werner in his
contest with Thierry and in his reaction against aspects
of Schwarzenberg's German policy should not in any way
be discounted. Like Werner, Biegeleben had his origins
in the old German Empire, having been born in 1812 in the
Duchy of Westphalia, formerly part of the Archbishopric
of Cologne, but incorporated during the period of Napoleon's
Rhine Confederation into the Grand Duchy of Hesse and
then into Prussia in 1815. Having emerged from an old
peasant family of strong Catholic beliefs, the Biegeleben
clan had attained noble status by virtue of a long tra—
dition of service to its native principality, but it
shunned the service of Protestant Prussia in favor of that
of Hesse after 1815. Ludwig himself entered the justice
administration in Darmstadt in 1832 after having completed
his studies at Heidelberg, Bonn and Giessen. He entered

the Hessian diplomatic service as chargé d'affaires in

 

82Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 377.

838rbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:142—150.

 

 

 

 

 

282
Vienna in January 1843 and remained until the revolution
caused the abolishment of his post in June 1848. By virtue
of his acquaintance with Heinrich von Gagern. the newly
elected president of the Frankfurt Parliament, Biegeleben
received in August 1848 the position of Undersecretary
in the Imperial Foreign Ministry over which Schmerling
and then Gagern himself were to preside in the following
months. As one of Archduke Johann's closest confidants,
Biegeleben remained in Frankfurt after the May 1849 dis-
solution of the Parliament and was instrumental as a
traveling diplomat in selling the Interim scheme of
September 1849 to the Prussian and Austrian leaderships.
Under the administration of the dual commission of repre—
sentatives from Prussia (Radowitz and B6tticher) and
Austria (Kfibeck and Schbnhals), Biegeleben was again in
charge of German foreign affairs and, as one of the few
individuals well acquainted with the representatives of
each side, acted as a reconciliatory link between them.
As the Interim drew to a close in April 1850, Biegeleben
began looking for new employment.84 With Kfibeck's support,
and driven forth by the only half—jesting threat by his
Wife, Marie Buol-Bernberg, whom he had married in Vienna

in 1846 and who was a distant relative of Buol—Schauenstein,

 

84Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 2:620—622; Neue

Deutsche Biographie, 2:224—2253 Robert von MOhlv
Lebenserinnerungen, 1799—1875, 2 VOlS' (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlag, 1902). 1:92-93-

 

 

 

 

283

to leave him if he chose Berlin,85 Biegeleben applied to
the Austrian Foreign Office where he was accepted as
Sektionsrat under Thierry on June 16, 1850.86

He was not accepted without reservations. As in
other instances, Werner was entrusted by Schwarzenberg
with the recruitment of an expert capable of submitting
memoranda on matters of German law for Schwarzenberg's
use as guidelines in pursuing his own German policy.
Werner saw the problem in somewhat different terms. He
had known Biegeleben during his years in Vienna and had
watched carefully his activities in Frankfurt. It had
long been obvious that Biegeleben was a warm adherent to

"German—unification ideas," which meant, for Werner, that

 

there was an element of national consciousness in
Biegeleben's soul. Bothered by this, Werner wrote on
April 5, 1850, to Kfibeck:

It is worth asking if Biegeleben possesses, besides

the degree of honesty which I attribute to him and
which would not permit him to strike out on a course
essentially opposing the system of his superior, suf—
ficient flexibility in his spirit to be able completely
and absolutely to tear himself away from his precon—
ceived ideas in his new situation; and can one depend
on him sufficiently—~should he ultimately take up the
obligation of devoting his service finally and ex-
clusively to our state~—in order to be able to entrust

 

. 85Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, letter from
Marie Biegeleben to her sister, Frankfurt, Apr. 15, 1849,
Pp. 208—209.

86Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 26 (Biegeleben), Werner draft Proposal for the Emperor,
June 11, 1850.

 

 

 

 

284

to him igportant affairs with confidence and ease
of mind?

Satisfied with Kfibeck's assurances that he had renounced
the grossdeutsche program,88 Werner accepted Biegeleben's
application and drafted a Proposal which was subsequently
submitted over Schwarzenberg's name to the Emperor. In
advocating Biegeleben's employment, Werner described him
as follows:
He is a jurist and an expert on early and recent
German law, thoroughly and broadly educated, a prac-
ticed stylist, already brilliantly proven in the com—
position of political memoranda, thoroughly acquainted
by his past experiences with the affairs and person-
alities of Germany-—which is very important——and yet
an honorable, simple character of tested faithfulness
to duty and deeply beholden to the Imperial House
ideologically and through family traditions. 9
The description fitted exactly the reputation which
Werner himself had acquired during his long years of
service under Metternich,9O and it is not too much to
Suppose that Werner saw his ideological successor in the
38 year old native of Werner's own Rhineland. It is true
that Biegeleben did not possess the personal stake in

the Confederation that Werner did and that his Catholicism

was of a sharper, more reformist variety typical of those

 

 

87Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Personalia,
Fasz. 2, Werner Letter to Kfibeck, Vienna, Apr. 5, 1850.

 

88Ibid., Kfibeck Letter to Werner, Frankfurt, Apr.
15, 1850-

89Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 26
(Biegeleben5, Werner draft Proposal for the Emperor, June
ll! 1850-

goSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3,154—155.

 

 

recent immigrants from South and West Germany than was
Werner's. By the end of the decade, these two facts formed
the basis of Biegeleben's increasing hostility toward
Prussia, a hostility that developed far in excess of
Werner's anguished disgust at what he considered Prussia's
blindness.91 Combined with his recognized legal expertise,
these facts also explain why Schwarzenberg was able to

use him so effectively in his policy of allying with the
Catholic South German states against Prussian pretensions
in the north and in Central Europe generally.92 Biegeleben
seems to have been exclusively responsible for forcing

a solution of the Schleswig—Holstein question in 1851—

1852 by means of mustering impressive legal arguments

over the extent of Confederation authority in these areas.93
He likewise succeeded Thierry as the recorder at the
reconvened Vienna Conferences of 1852 where he desired

a strong alliance of Austria with the South German states
as a measure to force Prussian acquiescence in the Austrian

94

attempt to enter the Customs Union.

But if Biegeleben harbored anti—Prussian sentiments

9llbid., p. 148.

92Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:153—154.

93Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:147; Johann A. Rantzau,
ed., Europaische Quellen zur Schleswig—Holstein Geschichte

im 12. Jahrhundert iBreslau: Hirt, 1934).

94Biegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, pp. 255—256.

 

 

286

and if his Catholicism inclined him toward a dualistic
Protestant—Catholic view of Germany, his basic principles
were much closer to Werner's than to Schwarzenberg's or
Thierry's. He saw the future ideally in the attainment

of a German universalism akin to the form existing under
the Holy Roman Empire when the Austrian emperor claimed

the temporal, and the papacy the spiritual, leadership

of Central Europe. This was a vision very much bound up
with his reform Catholic beliefs. Schwarzenberg's Austria-
centered policy was foreign to him; Thierry's rabid attempt
to save the shell of the old Confederal form without even
recognizing its true purpose was simply offensive. Nor

did his anti—Prussian sentiments in these early years
extend nearly as far as Thierry's: While Thierry advocated
war during the Hessian—Holstein crisis leading to Olmfitz,
Biegeleben stood firmly with Werner against it.95 When
Thierry later relished the humiliation suffered by Prussia

at Olmfitz, Biegeleben regarded the whole incident as a

tragedy for Germany.96 While Thierry hoped for a solution

giving Austria hegemony in Germany at the Dresden Con—
ferences, Biegeleben was drafting dispatches to Berlin
in which he advocated the conclusion of a mutual Austro-

Prussian defense treaty.97 In each of these instances,

 

95Kfibeck, Aus dem Nachlass, p. 51.
96Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:147.

97Biegeleben, Ludwigivon Biegeleben, p. 251.

 

287

Biegeleben and Werner stood on the same ground. Despite
Kfibeck's assurances, Biegeleben never gave up his
nationalist—based desire for German unification, but during
the 1850s, and especially in the late Schwarzenberg era,
these desires remained quiescent. He and Werner, hoping
for the attainment of the same philosophical—religious
goal for Central Europe, albeit by different, and ultimately
antithetical means, were firm proponents of the German—
centered policy which Schwarzenberg had abandoned.

The incipient division between the two German ex—
perts, Biegeleben and Werner, appeared only under Buol,
for reasons ultimately connected to the divergent means
which they sought to pursue in the attainment of their
common goal. For Biegeleben saw the solution to the
German question in the reform of the Confederation rather

98

than in its simple maintenance. Biegeleben seems to

have had a much clearer vision of the new national forces
Operating in Germany than did Werner. The Undersecretary
felt that, since the Frankfurt institution had maintained
tranquillity in Germany for 33 years prior to 1848, it
would continue to do so in the subsequent years. Biegeleben
recognized that the altered variable in the current situ—

ation was Prussia, and that the erratic, but predominantly

kleindeutsche ideas motivating her policy rendered

 

 

. 98Enno E. Kraehe, "Austria and the Problem of Reform
1n the German Confederation, 1851—1863," American Historical

Review, 56/2 :276—294-

 

 

 

 

288

incompatible Werner's hOpes for the maintenance of the
cooperative federalistic structure and the ideal of German
universalism. For the German Desk Chief, Austria could
either abandon her position in Germany or fortify it by
transforming her relationship to Germany in the Confed—
eration. Because of the new influence of public opinion
and nationalistic sentiment on Prussia, she could not be
expected to assent willingly to what, in effect, would
have been a limitation of her own power at Frankfurt.
She was not merely a temporarily misguided member of a
family, as Werner saw her, capable of being brought back
into the fold by coaxing, cooperation and perhaps coercion,
but a state with interests fundamentally different from
those of Austria. She was not to be destroyed, as Thierry
desired, or even humiliated, as Schwarzenberg hoped, but
she had to be forced to accept the principle of Austrian
leadership of Germany. Austria's position in the Con—
federation therefore had to be strengthened.99

In this context, the first perceptible division
with Werner came as a result of the dramatic shift in
Austria's Custom Union policy in mid—1852. Biegeleben
disapproved of Werner‘s hope, impressed upon Buol, of
returning to the Metternichean method of resolving
differences on this matter by cooperation with Prussia

Within the Confederal framework. He preferred rather

 

99Neue Deutsche Biographie, 2:224—225.

 

289
the Schwarzenberg strategy of forcing the acceptance
by Prussia of the entrance of the entire Austrian Empire
into the Customs Union by means of threatening the for—
mation of a separate and competing free trade area between
Austria and the South German states.100 Had such a threat
been made and had it succeeded, the resulting Central
European customs union would have been administered by
a reformed Confederal institution in Frankfurt, rather
than by one or the other of the Great Powers. Further
efforts to strengthen the unifying effect of Frankfurt
on Germany included Biegeleben's advocacy of the establish-
ment of Confederal judicial institutions and the guarantee
by the Confederation of Austrian possessions.lOl In all
of these efforts, Biegeleben failed to prevail over the
much stronger, more conservative and ultimately less
realistic influence of Werner. He nevertheless seems to
have remained on good personal terms with both Werner
and Buol, to whom he owed his position. His increasing
frustration at the Austrian failure to carry out his own
plans for Germany was directed with ever greater virulence

at Prussia.102

While Werner attributed to Prussia the
prime role in causing Germany to prostitute herself before

Europe, Biegeleben attributed to her the much more

 

looBiegeleben, Ludwig von Biegeleben, pp. 256-257,
lOlSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:148.
102

Ibid., p. 147.

 

 

 

290

sinister motive of the destruction of the old ideal of
Imperial Germany, to which both men fervently adhered,
and of its replacement by a particularist, artificial
and destructive creation serving the interests not of
Germany, but of a few greedy Prussian power—wielders.

Part of Biegeleben's tendency in the mid—1850s to
take on a much sharper view of Prussia than did Werner
or Buol may be explained by his close friendship with
the Desk Chief for Western Europe, Otto von Meysenbug.
Meysenbug was the most outspoken Ultramontane in the

103 and although his authority did not

Foreign Office,
extend formally to affairs concerning Germany, the in—
fluence of his strong religious beliefs in the supercharged
religious atmosphere on the Ballhausplatz in these years
permeated all aspects of foreign policy formulation.

His powerful belief in the earthly primacy of the Papal

See, with the Habsburg Emperor assuming the role of chief

lieutenant, led naturally to the old universalistic con—

 

ception of Germany which had been embodied in the Holy
Roman Empire. Unlike the old Metternichean Werner, however,
he did not see the realization of this conception in the
pursuit of a compromising, conciliatory policy toward
Prussia. For him, the German question was a moral issue
involving Good and Evil. If Prussia prevailed in her

desire to dominate, the system of independent duchies

 

103Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:352—353.

 

 

291

and principalities upon which the old feudal—Imperial
idea was founded was doomed to destruction. The sole
alternative was Austrian domination, since in her were
embodied all of the historic and religious traditions
of Empire. Placed in such black and white terms, hos—
tility to Prussia became a matter of principle.104

The close link between Meysenbug and Biegeleben
arose from strikingly similar backgrounds. Like the latter,
Meysenbug was an adoptive son of Austria who emigrated
from Hesse. Both came from families in which religion
was a pervasive influence. Meysenbug emanated from an
old French Protestant family which was driven out of its
homeland in the seventeenth century. Otto's father was
granted the rank of nobleman by the Hessian Elector to
whom he had devoted his life as civil servant.105 Otto
was employed by Metternich at the Dresden mission in 1833
while Otto's brother, Wilhelm, became in 1843 Baden's
representative in Vienna, where the future close friend-
ship between Biegeleben and the Meysenbug family had its
origins. At some point during his adult life, Otto Meysen-
bug converted to the new reform Catholicism then sweeping
South Germany, and he thereafter espoused his new con—

fession in a particularly outspoken way often characteristic

 

loLPSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:140.

lo5Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 21:660—661.

 

 

 

 

 

 

292
of converts to any new cause. His early Austrian diplo—
matic career included a tour of duty in Turin and St.
Petersburg in the period before 1844, at which date he
was assigned once again to the Turin mission, this time
as Legationsrat. The reasons given for his transfer to
this post were that he had distinguished himself as charge
d'affaires in St. Petersburg, and that a new ambassador
who needed an experienced assistant was just then being
assigned to Turin. The new ambassador was Karl Buol-
Schauenstein.106
The future Foreign Minister and Desk Chief for
Western Europe worked very closely together for twenty
months before Metternich called Meysenbug to the State
Chancellery to assist Hofrat Alphons DePont, currently
responsible for relations with Western Europe, "with
the pressing needs arising from the requirements of that
difficult era."107 Acknowledging Metternich's instruction
to send Meysenbug to Vienna, Buol wrote on March 7, 1846:
Concerning me, I can on the one hand only rejoice to
see honored by your confidence a man whose capabilities
and convictions I was in a position fully to appreciate;
I can, however, not refrain from declaring my true
regret at seeing myself robbed by his transfer of a

judicious as well as friendly support in the fulfill-
ment of my official duties.1 8

 

106Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
E8846 (Meysenbug), Metternich to Thun in Turin, Aug. 8,

 

107Ibid., Beust Proposal to the Emperor, Jan. 29, 1867.

10811131., Buol Note to Metternich, Mar. 7, 1846.

 

 

293
The heartfelt friendship motivating this description
was in no way diminished over the following years, and
in fact the personal link between the two men was, if
anything, strengthened by Buol's sharing in 1849—1850
of Meysenbug's earlier experience as Austrian representative
to the Tsarist court. When Buol was transferred in 1851
to the London embassy, Meysenbug was the individual im—
mediately responsible for dispatching communications to
him and handling reports submitted by him. The ties
between the two were thus numerous and close, and one
is tempted to speculate, although no direct evidence for
it exists, that Meysenbug was partly responsible for in—
fluencing Schwarzenberg to designate Buol as his successor
as minister, a designation that has otherwise proved
puzzling in view of the vast personality differences
between the two Foreign Ministers.

After becoming independent Desk Chief for Italian
affairs after DePont's death in February 1847 and remaining
at his post during the months of revolution, and even
during the bombardment of the city in October 1848,
Meysenbug was promoted to Hofrat and Chief of correspondence
With France, England and Italy by Schwarzenberg on February
2 and June 22, 1849, respectively.109 He remained at

that post, steadily acquiring personal power, until his

 

109Ibid., Schwarzenberg Proposal, Feb. 2, 1849;
Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung, Fasz. 3,
Directive, June 22, 1849.

 

294
appointment on June 4, 1862, to the post of Undersecretary,
whereafter he, Biegeleben and Gagern exerted extraordinary
power over the Foreign Office until the Kdniggratz debacle
of 1866. He was pensioned in 1868 and died in Vienna
in 1886 at the age of 81. Throughout his Foreign Office
career, Meysenbug was known for his advocacy of closer
relations with France and for his opposition to the pur—
suit of the traditional Metternichean policy of conservative

110 The motives for

alliance with Prussia and Russia.
such a view of Austria's interests lay in his fanatical
religious convictions. The goal of a Central European
universalist order under Austrian leadership, an order
defined in far stronger religious terms by this Hessian
heir to the West German romantic Catholic movement than

by the natively Austrian adherents to a more moderate
variety of Catholicism, could be attained with much greater
success in cooperation with Catholic France than with
Protestant Prussia or Orthodox Russia. Schwarzenberg
certainly did not share Meysenbug's Ultramontane outlook,
but he too saw France as a natural ally in Austria's
attempt to wrench Central European hegemony from the
domineering Russians and the presumptuous Prussians.

It was for the purpose of settling the differences

between the two Catholic Powers, arising largely over

 

lloChester W. Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 49; Srbik,
Deutsche Einheit, 1:140.

 

295

the Italian questions, that Schwarzenberg dispatched the
Francophil Hfibner to Paris in March 1849, where he re-
mained for over nine years.111

Without being fully aware of it, Hfibner had Meysenbug
as an ally on the home front for the entire period.
The extent of Meysenbug's influence over Schwarzenberg
is not clear, but it was not nearly as strong as it became
under his successor. He was not able, for instance, to
avert the fundamental inconsistency incorporated into
Schwarzenberg's circular note to Berlin and St. Petersburg
of December 29, 1851, in which the resurrection of the
conservative alliance in response to Louis Napoleon's
coup d'état was proposed. Since Schwarzenberg's entire
European policy had been based previously on friendship
with France and hostility toward Austria's traditional
allies, this note, which was to leave Buol with a fatal
dilemma during the Crimean War, constituted a partial

reversal of earlier actions.112

It can probably be ex—
plained either by Schwarzenberg's personal obsession
with the spectre of revolution which a new Napoleonic
Empire conjured up in his mind, or by Werner‘s pressure

on the failing Minister for a return to Metternichean

p01itics. The influence on Schwarzenberg's thoughts

 

lllKiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 117.

112Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:145—
147; Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, pp. 25-28.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

296
and actions of Meysenbug's hostility toward Prussia, on
the other hand, was consistently evident prior to late
1851.113 Although born of two completely different out—
looks, the political thoughts of the two men coincided
on most international issues facing Austria.

Meysenbug's real influence became evident, however,
only with the accession to office of his old friend Buol,
and with the increasing importance of non—German relations
in Austria's Central European policies. At least as early
as the initial months of the Crimean War, Meysenbug and
Werner were the only members of the Foreign Office bureau—
cracy who attended regularly the daily sessions with the
Minister during which the incoming correspondence was

read and discussed.llu

It is probably safe to assume

from this that all other members of the Ministry exerted

an influence in the decision—making process which fell

far short of that exerted by these two senior advisers.

It explains to some degree the dominance held by Werner

over Biegeleben in German affairs during these years,
although Meysenbug was surely an effective representative

of Biegeleben's View whenever his opinions on German matters
were solicited by Buol. Perhaps more striking is the

absence at these regular sessions of the Desk Chief

responsible for Russia and Turkey. Particularly with

 

113Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:154_

llLI’I-Iiibner, Neun Jahre, 1:135—136.

 

 

 

297

regard to the Ottoman Empire, about which Meysenbug could
not have been nearly as well informed as was either Hammer
or Klezl, the solicitation of Meysenbug's advice alone
seems highly peculiar at this critical point in the course
of Austrian relations with Southeastern Europe. Nor was
this disregard of the Desk Chief for Eastern Europe a
mere passing phenomenon. Late in 1857, Werner still passed
on, presumably as a matter of habit and with Buol's ac—
quiescence, the responsibility for drafting important
dispatches to the Porte to Meysenbug rather than to Klezl.ll5

In addition to participating directly in decisions
concerning the Crimean.War and appropriating for himself
the responsibility for correspondence that would not
normally have pertained to his sphere under the organ—
izational schema, Meysenbug was directly involved in
all decisions taken at the Austrian interministerial
level and at the level of international conferences during
this period. When the Ministerrat of Schwarzenberg's
day was transformed into the non-corporative body called
the Ministerkonferenz at Buol's accession, the forum for
reaching important decisions involving all branches of
the central government became conferences convened only

at the discretion of the Emperor for the purpose of

 

ll5Austria, HHStA, PA 40, K 2771., Buol Nachlass,
Werner to Buol, Oct. 3, 1857. Meysenbug was formally
in charge of Russian correspondence in July and August
1853 after Pflflgl had resigned and before Klezl arrived
(Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401, Referats—
Einteilung, Directive, July 1, 1853).

 

 

 

298

discussing specific topics. At each of those dealing

with Austria's participation in the Crimean War, Meysenbug

was the recorder. He headed the Chancellery established

for drawing up proposals for and keeping the records of

the international ministerial conferences held in Vienna

in the spring of 1855. He accompanied Buol to the Paris

Peace Congress in early 1856 as a senior adviser. In

1859, he was named the first Austrian plenipotentiary to

the peace conference convened in Zurich for settling the

Sardinian War, for which purpose he received the title

of Geheimsrat, a title not normally granted to bureaucratic

functionaries.116
Meysenbug's greatest importance, however, seems to

have lain in the part he played in bringing Austria to

an alliance with the Western Powers on December 2, 1854,

and then to an alliance with France, effective December

22, 1854, whereby the integrity of Italy was guaranteed.

Although the former has received the greater share of

historical attention, there is evidence that to Meysenbug

and Buol the latter was more important. The arguments

which Buol had been making over the preceding months in

favor of concluding an alliance with the Western Powers

were based upon calculations of maintaining Austrian

primacy in Central Europe. Plagued by the unpleasant

 

116Ibid., K 216 (Meysenbug). Beust Proposal to the
Emperor, Jan. 29, 1867; Ibid., Rechberg Proposal to the
Emperor, Dec. 27, 1859-

 

 

 

 

 

299

taste of Prussia‘s instigation in June 1854 of the attempt

by the German middle states at Bamberg to mediate the

disagreement over whether a common policy was to be pur—

sued by Central Europe in the Crimean War, Buol was forced

to rule out the possibility of cooperation with Berlin

during the war crisis. Prussia was clearly intent on

denying Austria her rightful and historical position as

the leader in Central Europe. Russia's revolutionary

policy prevented a return to the policy of conservative f

alliance, a policy that would have been undesirable even 4

if possible, because it would have placed Central Europe

once again under Russian control. The sole remaining

means of guaranteeing her position in Central Europe was

by allying with the Western Powers, thereby being able

to control the fate of the Danubian Principalities and,

much more important for Austria's position in Central

Europe, the river after which they were named.117
Buol's emphasis on Austria's interest in Central

Europe found echo in a memorandum written by Meysenbug

for submission by Buol to Franz Joseph one week after the

conclusion of the Austro—French convention on Italy.

France, he claimed, had been for centuries Austria's

traditional enemy in Italy. Only in 1849, with the

cooperative expedition of French and Austrian troops to

 

ll71bid., PA 40, Interna, Vortra e, K 48, Buol
Proposal to the Emperor, Sept. 26, 185 .

 

 

 

 

300
regain Rome and the papal states for the exiled pope
was a fundamental shift in Austro-French relations
effected. Since then the two powers "have worked together
in a uniformly conservative sense," with the result that
"the new relationship, so uncommonly beneficial for the
cause of social order, has been given for the first time
a binding expression in the convention of December 22."118
Meysenbug's gross miscalculation of French intentions
vis—a—vis Austria's needs in Central Europe was, like
Buol's considerations, based on an overwhelming, all—
pervasive desire to maintain Austria's traditional, con—
servative and dominating relationship with the rest of
Central Europe. Viewed in this context, alliance with
France was for both men an attempt to realize their con—
ception of a much older and long dead European order.
The Concordat concluded by Austria with the papacy less
than a year later must also be regarded in this same sense.
It can come as no surprise that Meysenbug, Ultramontane,
Department Chief for Ecclesiastical Affairs and Desk
Chief for Italy, was very much involved in the negotiations
leading to the conclusion of this new Holy Alliance.119
If Werner, who approved the Concordat, acquired about

this time a reputation as an Ultramontane, it was not

 

ll8Ibid., Meysenbug draft Proposal to the Emperor,
Dec. 29, 1854.

119Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 216
(Meysenbug), Beust Proposal to the Emperor, Jan. 29, 1867.

 

 

 

 

301

because he shared Meysenbug's extreme religious views
but rather because the ultimate political outlooks of
the two children of the Rhineland were identical in per—
ceiving in the Concordat a step toward the resurrection
of the political order of their highest aspirations.120

It can of course be argued that bureaucrats who
are swamped with the details of drafting documents in
order to beat the dispatch deadline do not always act in
accordance with their highest aspirations. While this
may be true in normal circumstances, the existence in
the Austrian Foreign Office of a religiously and politically
supercharged atmosphere, in which Beamten who spoke German
with a distinctly non—Viennese accent held many of the

121

top posts, considered themselves better servants of

Austria's interests than the native Viennese, and did
122

 

not mind saying so, created circumstances which were
far from normal. Hostility between the Foreign Office
factions, divided along these national, philosophical
and religious lines, was especially intense under
Schwarzenberg, when something of a balance existed, and

if the hostility abated under Buol, it was because the

group which was emotionally and intellectually attached

 

120Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 1.

lZlSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:139.

_ 122Hermann Hfiffer, Lebenserinnerun en, ed. Ernst
Sleper (Berlin: Reimer, 1912), p. 140.

 

 

 

302

to an ideal largely foreign to mid-nineteenth century
Austrians123 had by then gained ascendency. It cannot
be too strongly emphasized that the four most important
members of the Foreign Ministry from 1852 until 1859—-
Buol, Werner, Meysenbug and Biegeleben-~all emerged from
backgrounds rooted in the old Germany rather than in the
Habsburg crownlands, and that they thus possessed a common
belief in the primacy of Empire, defined in a German,
spiritually universalistic and Catholic sense, as the
guiding light of Austrian foreign policy.

In contrast to Werner, Meysenbug and Biegeleben,
not one of the six persons judged to be of secondary
importance in wielding influence can be definitively
regarded as adherents to the old Imperial ideal. None
of the six—~Buhl, DePont, Pflfigl, Klezl, Hammer, and
Mensshengen-—had his family roots in the old Germany.
Buhl, the personal secretary for Metternich, Schwarzenberg
and Buol, was born in 1814 in Moravia, apparently to a
commoner family with some sort of connection to the

Schwarzenberg clan.121+

He entered State Chancellery ser—
vice in 1841 after having completed a course of study in
law and after having served for four years in the imperial

financial administration.125 Metternich evidently took

 

124Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzen—

berg."

1251bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 42
(Buhl), Service Description, May 31, 1841.

 

 

303
an immediate liking to Buhl, whose official assignment
involved Registry work, and included him in that select
group which accompanied the State Chancellor on his business
and pleasure travels. Buhl thereby became acquainted with
many of Europe's leading diplomats, and it was because
of these contacts that he became secretary to Schwarzen—

berg, who lacked them.126

In this capacity he was a
regular guest at the Schwarzenberg dinner table where
Hammer got the impression that he was "very tactful, modest
and reserved," yet "completely aware of the vast majority
of relationships and persons which were discussed."127
Perhaps more significantly, Buhl was Meysenbug's chief
assistant in the Political Section from March 1849 until
1864 and in the Department for Ecclesiastical Affairs
from November 1853 until 1864, when he was transferred

to the Budget Division. He replaced Mensshengen as
Chancellery Director in 1868 and retired in 1873. During
his years at Meysenbug‘s Desk, he was also the senior
assistant to the Chief of Russian (and later Turkish)
correspondence. He received accelerated promotions to
Hofsekretar and Sektionsrat during this same period.

His close associatiOn with Meysenbug and the fact

that he made his most rapid personal advancement during

 

126

Ibid., Andrassy Proposal to the Emperor, July
10, 1873.

127Ibid., Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzenberg."

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

304

the very years in which Meysenbug acquired his remarkable
influence may indicate that the two thought along similar
lines. It is difficult to c0nceive of Meysenbug assisting
in the negotiations for the Concordat with a personal
subordinate who was not devoted to his cause. If Buhl
was indeed devoted to Meysenbug's philosophies and person,
an explanation becomes visible for the ease with which
Meysenbug was able to usurp the functions of the Desk
Chief for Eastern affairs during the Crimean War. Both
Chiefs had the same assistant drafting documents for
them and this assistant's loyalty lay predominantly with
Meysenbug. Moreover, if Buhl's political ideas coincided
with Meysenbug's, the influence of the latter on the minister
could only be reinforced by the constant proximity of the
former to the minister. Nothing direct can be concluded
from the numerous archival documents written by Buhl for
the minister, for these were most certainly dictated by
the minister himself. But the circumstance of Buhl's
intimate acquaintance with so much detailed and confidential
information concerning Austrian foreign relations, at
least part of which lay beyond the minister's knowledge
and experience, strongly suggests that Buhl was a signi—
ficant, if not a crucial, personality in the decision—
making process.

Except for the close connection to the minister,
Alphons DePont held a position of importance in the organ—

izational structure similar to that of Buhl. As in Buhl's

 

 

305

case, it cannot be proved that Depont was an adherent

to the old German Imperial idea, but circumstantial evidence
suggests it. Alphons DePont, Jr., was the son of the

senior Hofrat in the Political Section under Metternich,
Alphons DePont, Sr., a French immigrant. The father had
served for years in many different capacities, most re—
cently as Metternich's confidant on French and Italian

128

relations. As a special favor to the father, Metternich

accepted the younger DePont into Foreign Office service
in 1840, before he had even acquired his law degree.129 1
Once completed in 1843, DePont was sent to the Austrian
mission in Stuttgart, then to Paris in 1846. He remained
there after Hfibner assumed the ambassadorship in 1849
and, if the collection of excerpts of letters from Hfibner
to Vienna in the years 1849—1852, constituting DePont's
personal papers, can be taken as evidence, DePont became

130 In

quite enamored with Hflbner's Francophil outlook.
June 1850, DePont was recalled to the Foreign Office as
Hofsekretar and assigned as an assistant, like Buhl, to
Meysenbug's and Pflfigl's Desks. He remained in this dual
capacity until May 1857 when he was detailed to Archduke

Maximilian, Governor—General of Lombardy-Venetia.

 

128Mayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 23.

 

129Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 70 (DePont), DePont, Sr., to Metternich, Aug. 29. 1840.

 

1301bid., PA 40, K 327, DePont Nachlass.

 

 

306

On certain occasions, DePont was given considerable
independence in correspondence with the smaller states
of Western Europe and with some of the Italian states.131
His main importance, however, seems to have lain in his
function as another link between Meysenbug's Desk and
the Eastern Desk, another means by which Meysenbug was
able to exert his authority over affairs far exceeding
his nominal limits. With a French heritage, an attraction
to Hfibner's Francophilism and a close relationship with
Meysenbug, DePont not only bolstered the tendency in the
Foreign Ministry toward alliance with France during the
Crimean War, but may also have formed one of the key per-
sonal links during the Buol era between the ambassador
in Paris and Ministry in Vienna, a link which had other-
wise threatened to snap after Schwarzenberg‘s death.132
While the evidence for the significance of DePont's role
in this regard is scanty, the importance of personal
relations and contacts in an institution the size of the
Foreign Ministry should not be underestimated.

The divisions in the Foreign Office which were
nominally responsible for relations with countries east
Of Austria were led during the period 1849—1856 by three

graduates of the Oriental Academy, Austria‘s only school

 

131Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 401,
Referats—Einteilung, Werner Directive, July 1, 1853.

132Hiibner, Neun Jahre, 1:49.

 

 

 

 

307
specifically established for the training of diplomats.
Unlike their more powerful colleagues in the Foreign
Office, all three typified the Josephinist variety of
the Austrian Dienstadel. Wilhelm von Pflfigl became the
Desk Chief for Russia, Scandinavia and the Iberian Pen—
insula in 1849, after having replaced Werner for a brief
period as German Desk Chief upon the latter's resignation
in May 1848. Stemming from the family of a poor day—
laborer, Pflfigl's father became a state prosecutor at
Linz and was ennobled in 1818.133 Wilhelm, somewhat un-
usually, was assigned to the Dresden legation in 1812
after having completed his course of study at the Oriental
Academy, thus beginning a career that took him to the
Russian military headquarters in 1813, Berne in 1814,
Rome in 1815, St. Petersburg in 1817 and the Iberian
Peninsula in 1823. He received high praise and the Hofrat
title for his service as Austrian representative on the
Austro—Russo~Prussian commission for the reorganization
of Cracow in 1832—1833.134 After a brief assignment in
Madrid, he returned to Dresden for several years before
being summoned to the Ballhausplatz in 1842. His precise
functions under Metternich for the following six years

are unclear, but he seems to have been occupied mostly

 

133Wurzbach, ed., Biographisches Lexikon, 22:203.

 

13” Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Fasz.
l5. Metternich decree, Jan. 17, 1834.

 

 

 

308
in the work, completed in 1853, of reorganizing the Old
Registry. If his possession, as a result of this job
assignment, of a considerable number of documents concerning
Austro—Russian relations in the eighteenth century (the
submission of which to the archives Arneth demanded upon
Pflfigl's death in 1869) is any indication, Pflfigl had
become something of an expert on Russian relations by
the time Schwarzenberg assigned him responsibility for
their conduct in 1849.135

Pflfigl held as principle the Metternichean practice
136

of alliance with Prussia and Russia. In this stance
he differed fundamentally both from the Empire adherents,
for whose goals he, as a native Austrian, held no special
feeling, as well as from Schwarzenberg's and Thierry's
Austria—centered state policy. It appears unlikely that
he had any more influence on Schwarzenberg than did the
other senior Hofrate, but given Schwarzenberg's habit

of consulting regularly with all Desk Chiefs on policy
matters, that influence was not necessarily inconsiderable.
Pflfigl was evidently not the submissive type. Hammer
recalled an occasion on which he and Pflfigl both disagreed

With a view held by Schwarzenberg on a particular issue

 

135Ibid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 257
(Pflfigl), Arneth note, Dec. 15, 1869.

l361bid., PA 40, Vortrage, K 47, Pflfigl draft Pro—
Posal, Oct. 7, 1852; Ibid., K 48, Pflfigl draft Proposal,
Jan. 1, 1853.

 

 

 

affecting their respective areas. The two argued with
the Minister for days before he finally consented to accept
their idea. Unfortunately, Hammer did not identify the
issue.l3'7 Throughout Schwarzenberg's reign, however,
and during the first year of Buol's, at the end of which
Pflfigl became ill and retired, the Russian Desk Chief
argued consistently for demonstrating to the world the
monarchical solidarity between the three Eastern courts.
In this, he was very much out of tune with the predominant
strains within and at the head of the Foreign Ministry.
His replacement, Eduard von Klezl, is a more shadowy
figure even than Pflfigl. Having attended the Oriental
Academy from 1821 until 1826, Klezl spent his entire
diplomatic career at Constantinople, first as interpreter.
then as Legationssekretar and Legationsrat. Along with
the Testa family, into which he married in 1833, the
Klezl family became a permanent fixture in Austria's
relations with Turkey during the Metternichean period.
Klezl belonged to that group of subalterns which so re—
pulsed Rechberg that he declined the offer for an assign—
ment as Internuncio in June 1851, although the qualities

138

Which he found distasteful are unknown. Quite possibly,

the low morale and indolence bred into the bureaucracy

 

 

137Ibid., Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Schwarzenberg."

. l38Heinrich Friedjung, "Graf Bernhard Rechberg,"
Historische Aufsatze (Stuttgart: Gotta, 1919), p. 296.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

310

there by years of service under the personally obnoxious
Stfirmer were the offending characteristics. ‘Klezl himself
had tired of the post by 1848, when he requested reassign—
ment. No action was taken on this appeal, and indeed
Schwarzenberg found it expedient to place Klezl at the
head of the mission as charge d'affaires after Stfirmer's
retirement in April 1850 as a symbol of the Austrian dis—
approval of the Turkish policy on the Hungarian fugitive
question.139 Endowed with this inauspiciously bestowed
position, Klezl remained in the Turkish capital for another
three years until the aroused imperialistic impulses in
the Austrian government and the threat of Russian inter—
vention in the Ottoman Empire induced his replacement by
someone more significant——former Commerce Minister Karl
Bruck. Klezl was assigned to Athens in April 1853, but
was recalled to replace Pflfigl at the Ballhausplatz in
August before having had the chance to take up residence
in the Greek capital.“PO
As charge d'affaires in Constantinople, Klezl had
acquired a reputation as lacking in energy. Leiningen
had observed in early 1853 that anarchy ruled the Austrian

141

legation which Klezl supposedly controlled, and Bruck's

 

139Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 167 (Klezl), Hammer to Klezl, Apr. 30, 1850.

 

140
1853.

141

Ibid., K 402, Vortrage, Buol Proposal, Aug. 17,

Kempen, Tagebuch, p. 281.

 

 

 

311
private secretary, Isidor Heller, noted upon Bruck's
supercession of Klezl the existence of a local jest to
the effect that Klezl stopped in at the Russian embassy
to get instructions each time an important matter requiring

an immediate decision arose.”2

This last claim probably
bears no resemblance to the truth, for Klezl in fact
opposed the tsarist court's Menshikov mission, which fol—
lowed by a few weeks the Leiningen mission, and he sought
to cooperate with Stratford de Redcliffe, the English
representative to the Porte. in this opposition.143
Yet the scornful jest is indicative of the character of
the man. Since he was trained in an institution under

the ultimate control of Metternich, it is very likely

that his views were similar to those of his predecessor,
Pflfigl. But his views paled into insignificance when his
colorless character was placed opposite that of Meysenbug's
intensity. Having been given a newly reorganized Desk

that included responsibility for both Turkey and Russia,
Klezl was probably overwhelmed by the work. While he

was well acquainted with the Ottoman Empire, he knew much
less than either Pflfigl or Meysenbug about Russia and was
therefore singularly unqualified to assume his new post.

It is possible only to guess at Buol's motives in

 

luzlsidor Heller, ed., Memoiren des Baron Bruck aug
der Zeit des Krimkrieges (Vienna: Hartleben, 1877), p. 11.

 

lLBSchroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean
War, p. 31.

 

 

 

 

 

312

selecting him. There was either no one else available
or willing to accept the position, or the assignment was
made consciously in the full recognition that Meysenbug
would assume the major share of authority over the affairs
pertaining to the position. In either case, Klezl is
significant not for the influence he exerted, but for
the vacuum created by his presence which allowed entirely
new influences to supplant those that had previously
determined Austria's traditional Eastern policy.

Klezl's predecessor as Desk Chief for the affairs
of the Ottoman Empire was Anton von Hammer-Nemesbany,
the third of the three Oriental Academy graduates who
ascended to the highest levels of the Foreign Office
bureaucracy in these years. Like Pflfigl and Klezl, Hammer
was able to exert influence on policy which was only
secondary to that of Werner, Meysenbug and Biegeleben.
The son of an Austrian general whose family had been en—
nobled in the days of Rudolf II, Hammer was no relation
to his more famous predecessor, Joseph von Hammer—Purgstall,
the State Chancellery Orientalist and Court Interpreter,
although the two were personally well—acquainted. Born
in Brfinn in 1809, he entered the Oriental Academy in 1826,
served for over two years as an apprentice in the Foreign
Office after graduating, then left for Constantinople

in early 1834.144 Repulsed by the disrespect with which

 

lunSrbik, "Aus den Erinnerungen eines alten Sster-
reichischen Beamten," pp. 1- 7.

 

313

the corrupt Stfirmer treated his subordinates, he acquired
permission in 1835 to serve with the military command
in Temesvar as political liaison with the Turks. After
five years at this post on what he considered the edge
of civilization, he asked for and received a position as
Offizial in the Foreign Office, where he was attached
initially to the deciphering office.145 Between 1840
and 1853, Hammer made an extraordinarily rapid rise from
Offizial to Hofrat, assuming much of Brenner's responsibility
in the Oriental Department in 1841, officially supplanting
him in 1846 and acquiring an independent Desk in the
Political Section in 1849. After the 1853 reorganization,
he was consigned once again to the Administrative Section
Where he remained until his retirement in 1875.146

Firmly rooted in a family which had devoted its
service directly to Joseph II, Hammer himself was a Josephin—
ist liberal who swore his allegiance solely to the Austrian
state, who regarded the guarantee of its well—being in
its centralization around the German element which led
it, and to whom wider dreams of a second coming of the
Holy Roman Empire were entirely foreign. He had nothing

but contempt for "those Swiss—German converts who had,

 

like a tightly jointed tapeworm, eaten into the bureaucratic

 

lL‘L5Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 2.

146110101. , vol. 3.

 

 

 

314
body of the State Chancellery."147 He nevertheless re—
spected Metternich as the most capable conductor of foreign
affairs among those under whom he served. Schwarzenberg's
general political outlook coincided with that of Hammer,
and Hammer regarded him as an awesome human being. But
to the Oriental Desk Chief, Schwarzenberg was a poor diplo-
mat and a worse minister, perfectly suited for proving
through his confident military bearing that Austria was
not yet ready to succumb, but utterly incapable of for-
mulating viable long-range policy. Buol was better in
this latter respect, but was subject to so many irresistible
pressures that he became incapable of implementing his
own ideas. Specifically, Hammer agreed with Metternich
that Austrian security depended on the maintenance of
the status quo in the Balkans. But he accepted the loss
of Turkish control over these as inevitable and sought
to make Austrian influence felt in order to fill the vacuum.
Buol's occupation of the Danubian Principalities was not
the proper means, however, since it alienated the Russian
tsar. Like Pflfigl, Hammer accepted the conservative alliance
as the necessary basis of Austrian policy and objected
to the actions of the adherents to the Imperial idea on
the grounds that they were directed toward the ruin of

Prussia.”8

 

l[WIbidn Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Wessenberg."

148Ibid., "Metternich"; "Schwarzenberg"; "Buol."

 

 

315

Despite the high regard for his ability held by
his supervisors, as reflected in his extraordinarily
rapid promotions, Hammer probably had no more influence
than did Pflfigl over the course of Austria's Eastern
policy. Schwarzenberg was appealing to Hammer as a person
because he was open-minded in the face of opposing ar—
guments, and Hammer undoubtedly prevailed on certain issues.
But he was not able to divert Schwarzenberg from his
attempt to bludgeon Turkey into extraditing the Hungarian
fugitives after September 1849, an attempt which constituted
the central issue in Austro—Turkish relations until the
approach of the Crimean War and which itself set a precedent
for Russian meddling in Turkish domestic affairs.149
Nor did he have any role in the conception of the Leiningen
mission, a logical extension of Schwarzenberg's obsessive
concern with the fugitive question and the first clear
manifestation of Austrian imperialism in the Balkans.
The idea seems rather to have been forced on Buol by out—
side influences; succumbing to these, Buol instructed
Hammer to compile a list of Turkish sins to be used by

Leiningen as a pretext for perpetrating this act of

 

aggression. Once decided upon, however, Hammer by his
own account assured the short—term success of the mission
by inducing Buol and Franz Joseph to order troop mobil—

izations on the Turkish—Austrian border. After having

 

 

149Ibid., "Schwarzenberg."

44

 

 

316

been transferred to the Administrative Section, Hammer
was involved in numerous commercial negotiations with
Turkey, but beyond attempting to moderate the view held
by Bruck, newly appointed Internuncio to the Porte. that
Austrian trade should be actively pursued in Turkish
regions by prior governmental pressure, Hammer seems to
have exerted no further political influence during the
Crimean War and indeed appears to have been rather un—
aware of the true issues at stake in that era.150

The final character in the cast of those persons
commanding positions of secondary influence in the Foreign
Office was the Chancellery Director, Franz von Mensshengen.
His importance is to be sought less in terms of direct
influence on political actions than in terms of his per—
sonal connections and his responsibility for hiring and
promoting subalterns. Assuring the smooth functioning
of the mechanical aspects of the Foreign Office operation
was the primary duty of the Chancellery Director, and
Mensshengen was the ideal choice for the job. The Adminis—
trative Registratur of the Vienna Archives is filled with
his proposals advocating as the need arose the redistribution
of responsibilities among the best—qualified personnel,
the hiring of young applicants, whose qualities were
carefully compared with those of other applicants, and

the promotion of Beamten to vacant slots. For this last

 

l5°Ibid., "Buol."

 

 

317

function, Mensshengen always took into consideration the
effect of a possible promotion on the morale of the in-
stitution as a whole as well as on its mechanical operation.
Favoritism, while still existing, was sharply reduced
by Mensshengen from its rampant level under Metternich.
Yet he was a very compassionate person who would exert
every effort to assist a determined but indifferently
talented Beamte in gaining some favorable recognition
or monetary compensation. In his deep concern for the
welfare of his subordinates, he sometimes found himself
in direct opposition to Buol who continued to practice
favoritism. On such occasions, Mensshengen, unlike Werner,
who tended to back down on such questions when faced with
a preference clearly stated by the minister, continued
to hold his ground and sometimes emerged victorious.l5l

Beyond protecting morale, Mensshengen seems also
to have been one of Werner's few allies in persevering
on the principle of conducting German relations by co-
operation rather than confrontation. Born in Austria
in 1797 and a graduate of the Josephinist Theresianum
Ritter Academy, Mensshengen probably did not share Werner's
religious and philosophical propensity for the German
imperial cause, but by the time of his assignment to
Werner's German Desk in 1835, he had served in the Austrian

missions in Darmstadt, Nassau and Frankfurt, and therefore

 

l51Ibid., Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organisierung,
Fasz. 8, Mensshengen Proposal to Buol, Nov. 11, 1858.

 

 

 

 

 

 

318

had intimate knowledge of the Rhineland of Werner's
ancestry and of the Confederation of Werner's own hand.152
He remained there for eight years before receiving his
own sub—Department under Lebzeltern in 1843, then Lieh—
mann's future Police Affairs Desk in 1847. He had assumed
Lebzeltern's Chancellery Direction by mid-1848 and re—
tained the position until his retirement in 1868. In

this capacity, his closest colleague and immediate super-
visor was Werner. Mensshengen's contact with current
German affairs was also strengthened by the fact that

his younger brother, Ferdinand, who had joined Franz in

the Frankfurt Presidial Legation in 1823, remained in
Darmstadt and Frankfurt until 1853, when he was named
Austrian ambassador to Hamburg.153 Despite his official
removal from responsibility for German correspondence,
therefore, Franz Mensshengen had an insider's View of
Confederal affairs throughout his entire career. And while
any evidence on the subject is purely circumstantial,

the fact that Werner, as the most dedicated defender of
the order he had helped create in 1815, had the senior
Hofrat in the Foreign Office on his side should not be

discounted in assessing the ability of the Undersecretary

l521bid., Personalia, Fasz. 12, Decrees to Menss-
hengen, Nov. 27, 1819, and May 10, 1827; Mayr, Geschichte
der Staatskanzlei, p- 250

 

l53Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Per—
sonalia, Fasz. 12, Mensshengen Note, Mar. 3, 1853.

 

 

 

 

 

 

319
to control his more radical subordinates and to influence
his superior.

Before concluding this chapter, brief mention must
be made of several other Beamten who seem to have exer—
cised some occasional influence on policy but who, because
of either their personalities or their official positions
in the organizational structure, cannot be classified
in the first or second ranks of relatively important in—
fluencers of policy. Of the nine Hofrate, all in charge
of a Desk or Department, who served in the Foreign Office
from 1849 until 1856, seven (Thierry, Biegeleben, Meysenbug,
Pflfigl, Klezl, Hammer and Mensshengen) have been classified
as key individuals. The two remaining, Liehmann and
Vesque, do not appear to have held nearly the political
influence of these others. Ignatz Boleslaus vcn Liehmann,
the son of an Austro—German official assigned to the
Galician provincial administration, owed his entry into
Metternich's State Chancellery in 1846 to the abolition
of the Minister—in—Residence post in Cracow, a position
he had held for ten years, when that free city was incor—
porated into Austria as a consequence of its having in-

stigated a Polish revolt.154

Apparently having performed
no function under Metternich from 1846 through 1848,
Liehmann was selected by Schwarzenberg in 1849 as Desk

Chief for Police Affairs, the actual responsibilities of

 

. 1541mm, Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 195
(Liehmann), Liehmann to Metternich, July 14, 1847.

 

 

 

 

320

which fell to his subordinates, Julius Nadherny and Joseph
Eybler, and as Department Chief for Commercial Affairs.
Heavily occupied with the implementation of trade, postal
and communications agreements during the next eight years,
he does not appear to have taken much part in the formulation
of trade policy, claimed mostly by Commerce Ministers
Bruck and Baumgartner, or in the actual negotiations
resulting from these policies. Only in 1857—1858 when
he was dispatched by Buol as the Austrian representative a
to the international commission for reorganizing the
Danubian Principalities did he acquire any political
significance, and in view of the extremely brief duration
of the solution attained, whereby the two principalities
were to remain politically separate, even this influence
was at best of doubtful quality.l55

Of somewhat more importance was Johann Vesque von
Pfittlingen, a legal affairs expert whose family originated
in France, emigrated to the Habsburg Netherlands in the
seventeenth century, and journeyed to Vienna in 1794.
Following the footsteps of his father, who belonged to
the staff of the Imperial Library and was a scholar of
some renown, Johann entered state service first as a lawyer,
then as the Chief of the Department for Legal Affairs in
the State Chancellery in 1838. He maintained that position

for an uninterrupted span of 33 years, becoming in the

 

 

1857 l551bid., Buol Proposal to the Emperor, Feb. 28,

 

 

 

321

meantime an expert on international law and a musical
composer of some merit. His chief importance during
the Schwarzenberg-Buol era arose from his introduction
of the diplomatic examination in early 1851, and from
his assignment to the commission charged in late 1851
with the drafting of the spheres of competence schemata

156 In this latter

for the Austrian central institutions.
capacity, he became an important part of the transformation
of the Empire into an absolutistic system. This was the
case despite the fact that Vesque was the only liberal,
understood in the mid-nineteenth century sense of the
term, who possessed a high position in the Foreign Office
hierarchy.157 The use of Vesque in important affairs of
such an illiberal nature would seem to indicate that polit—
ical issues to him were of only secondary interest, and
that he was capable of bending with the breeze. In an
atmosphere where political hypertension and rigidity
were the rule, Vesque was clearly a rather isolated ex-
ception.

In view of his later importance, one conspicuous
omission from the cast of characters heretofore described
is Max von Gagern, the third member of the triumvirate

which included Meysenbug and Biegeleben and which heavily

 

156Wurzbach, ed., Biographisches Lexikon, 50:196-
200: Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 364 (Vesque), Rechberg Proposal, Apr. 21, 1860.

 

157Ibid., Hammer, "Meine Erlebnisse," vol. 3.

 

 

 

 

 

322
influenced Austria's German policy after 1859. Like
the others a Rhineland immigrant possessing strong reform
Catholic beliefs, Gagern entered Austrian service as a
functionary dealing with press affairs on May 23, 1855,
as a result of the Belgian King Leopold's intervention

with Franz Joseph on his behalf.l58

Contrary to claims
that Gagern was assigned to positions of insignificance
in the 1850s due to Buol's mistrust of him for his re—

159

putedly kleindeutsche views, it appears more likely
that his relative unimportance under Buol resulted simply
from the absence of any vacancies for him to fill. As

soon as a position opened in March 1857, that of Liehmann's
Department, Gagern was assigned to it, despite the presence
of a more experienced Beamte, August Odelga, who could

160 From the fact that

have filled it very ably himself.
Gagern acted as Chief of Commercial Affairs, a relatively
unimportant position, it is thus certainly erroneous to
conclude that Buol operated against him out of mistrust.
Gagern held no influence in the 1850s because no channels

through which he could exert it were available.

Among those sixty or seventy persons who served

 

158Ludwig von Pastor, Leben des Freiherrn Max von

Gagern, 1810—1882 (Munich: deel, 1912), pp. 357—364.
159Ibid., p. 362.

160Buol thought very highly of Odelga—-Austria,
HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 402, Vortrage,
Proposal, Sept. 17, 1853.

 

323
as assistants to the Desk and Department Chiefs and as
Mechanical Services Branch personnel from 1849 until
1856, the opportunity to exert any influence whatever
on foreign political matters, except in the aforementioned
cases of Buhl and DePont, was almost non—existent. Indeed
it appears that such subalterns scarcely came in contact
with any of the ministers from Metternich through Buol.161
Schwarzenberg, for one, made a conscious policy of opening
a wide gulf between him and his junior subordinates. On
one of his very first visits to the State Chancellery
building after becoming Minister, he introduced himself
to the bureaucracy with a few intimidating remarks, much
as a "rider who mounts an unknown horse for the first
time lets it feel the bridle as he swings into the saddle."162
Henceforth only those senior members of the bureaucracy
who were responsible for certain geographical or functional
spheres were to have direct access to the minister, and
any influence exerted by subalterns on policy had to come
by virtue of an individual's relationship to the senior
advisers, as in the cases of Buhl and DePont. One isolated
exception to this rule may have occurred in late March
1849 when Alfred Arneth, State Chancellery Offizial and
an elected representative to the Frankfurt Parliament,

returned to Vienna and urged Schwarzenberg, in his only

 

161Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2:1, 24.

162Hfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 327.

 

324
interview with the Minister, to recall the Austrian Frank-
furt delegates as part of an honest recognition that the
prevailing sentiments in the Paul's Church were incom-
patible with the course struck by Austria in promulgating
the centralistic constitution of March 4, 1849.163 The
delegates were in fact recalled several days later.

Among those who held positions similar to, but less
strategically important than, those of Buhl and DePont
was Leopold von Hoffmann, Arneth's successor as assistant
to the German Desk Chief in early 1850. An expert in
German Confederal Law, Hoffmann accompanied Thierry to
the Dresden Conferences in 1851 and became Biegeleben's
only assistant in 1852, in which Capacity he turned out
a volume of memoranda only scarcely less impressive than
that produced by Biegeleben. He remained under Biegeleben's
authority and influence for fifteen years and apparently
was converted during this period to the religious and
political outlook of the clericalist group that dominated

the Political Section.164

The fact that he emerged from
a family which, although old Viennese, possessed a strong
tradition of service in German Imperial institutions may

have contributed to his conversion.l65 From the standpoint

 

163Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 1:422—424.

164
P. 227.

Przibram, Erinnerungen eines alten Osterreichers,

384 165Usterreichisches Bio ra hische Lexikon, 2:383-

 

 

325

of direct political influence, Hoffmann's attitudes did

not become important until 1868 when, as Sektionschef,
he became Beust's closest confidant and a dominant force
behind Austrian policy. But his earlier presence at the
German Desk might be said to have reinforced the tendencies
which became virtually unchallenged in the Political
Section during the Buol years, and he was certainly an
able supporter of Biegeleben's ideas.166
Others of ever-decreasing or more doubtful influence
could be mentioned: Carl Ernest Jarcke, whose influence,
if he had any after the revolution, certainly ceased with
his March 1849 memoranda in which he elaborated on the
dangers of a centralistic constitution for Austria's
long-term interests in Germany and advocated close cooper-
ation with the conservative Catholic states of Germany;167
Alois Karl Freiherr von Kfibeck, nephew of the future
Reichsrat President, who was used provisionally by
Schwarzenberg at the German Desk in 1850—1851 as an ally

of Thierry;168

and the members of the Press Committee,
Engelbrecht Selinger from August 1852 until April 1853,

then Karl von Weil from 1853 until 1871. Selinger had

 

166Biegeleben, Ludwiggvon Biegelebgg, p. 242.

167Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Geheim—Akten,
K 11, Fasz. 5 (Schwarzenberg Nachlass), Jarcke memoranda,
Mar. 3 and Mar. 12. 1849-

l681bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 180
(Kiibeck), Mensshengen to Kiibeck, Sept. 23, 1850.

 

 

 

 

326

been Director of the Oriental Academy before being given
the publicist duties, to which he proved unequal:169 Weil
had already been a renowned German editor of several
journals when he accepted a contract for publicist work

70 Both were more

from the Austrian government in 1851.1
important in policy implementation than formulation.

It should thus be emphasized in conclusion that
the overwhelming weight of influences exerted on the
Minister of Foreign Affairs by his own staff was limited
to a very few persons. Theoretically accessible, according
to the operational schema, to every Desk and Department
Chief as well as to the Undersecretary, the minister in
fact received most of his advice from those who were most
intimately connected, politically and emotionally, with
the basic problem of the Habsburg Empire after 1848:
its role in Central Europe. Through the processes of
selection outlined in the previous chapter, and through
the mechanics of the actual power struggle, centering
on the German question, described in the present chapter,
there came to unchallenged prominence an elite body of
advisers who were fundamentally united in a View of Central
Europe which was more German—oriented, in many ways German-

Imperial—oriented, than Austrian-oriented. There were

 

169mm,, K 315 (Selinger), Buol Proposal to the
Emperor. Aug. 21, 1852.

 

170Ibid., K 373 (Weil), Buol Proposal to the Emperor,
Jan. 31, 1855.

 

 

 

32?
certain disagreements over the extent of the role to be
claimed by the universal Catholic Church and over the
political means for achieving the ultimately desired
Central European organization. These disagreements were
important in determining the policies to be pursued toward
Prussia and the other German states; they were to become
decisive in the 1860s. But of at least equal significance
during the 1850s was the fact that the fundamentally pre—
modern conception of Germany as an empire and Austria
as its temporal head distinguished rather sharply the
Foreign Office as an institution from other institutions
of the Monarchy claiming influence over foreign policy
making. It is the attempt to determine the extent to
which these other institutions were able to affect the
course of Austrian conduct of foreign policy by their
intrusions into the sphere of authority claimed by the
Foreign Office that forms the subject of the following

chapters.

 

 

 

CHAPTER V

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM,
1848—1850

Any study that focuses on only one small aspect
of a much larger phenomenon—-in this case, the role of
the Austrian Foreign Office in the conduct of a complex
foreign policy during the period 1848-1856—-runs the
risk of overvaluing its own subject's importance in the
larger scheme of things. In an effort to prevent such
presumption from infecting the present study, an antidote
must be administered in the form of a discussion of the
entire, broad process out of which foreign policy emerged
in the name of the Habsburg emperor during these years.
It scarcely needs mention that the foreign policy of any
Great Power must be the result of an evaluation both of
the international environment in which the state exists
and of the resources, political, economic, social, military
and otherwise, which it can command. Equally obvious
is the fact that the foreign ministry (or equivalent)
0f any modern state, while presumably in possession of
intellectual and technical resources permitting the
evaluation of the international environment, cannot pos—

sibly also have responsibility for the administration,

328

 

 

 

 

329

control or evaluation of all categories of the state's
resources upon which foreign policy depends. The process
of foreign policy formulation, in order to be effective,
must therefore involve some sort of interaction between
the various institutions which are responsible for ad-
ministering the state's resources on the one hand, and
the foreign ministry on the other.

To evaluate the methods and the effectiveness of
the Austrian Foreign Office in analyzing the position
of the Habsburg Empire in the international system of
the day has been a primary purpose of the foregoing pages.
To evaluate the ability of the Foreign Office to guide
Austrian policy on the basis of these essentially external
determinants, in contrast to the ability of the other
central administrative agencies to guide foreign policy
on the basis of other, chiefly internal determinants,
is the purpose of the pages which follow. The differences,
by way of illustration, between the points from which
the deliberations of the foreign ministry, the finance
ministry and the supreme military command of a diplo—
matically isolated, nearly bankrupt state would begin in
deciding whether to prosecute a war caused by an outside
attack would clearly be vast. Yet each standpoint would
require a thorough evaluation in order for a rational
policy to be implemented by the foreign ministry. And in
order for a thorough evaluation of each standpoint to

occur, the institution with which it originated and by

 

 

 

 

 

330
which it is represented must have itself recognized gener—
ally as authoritative in its particular province. The
fundamental problem, then, from the point of View of this
study, is whether and when the Austrian Foreign Ministry
possessed adequate authority to make valid its claim to
a degree of control over foreign policy through the repre—
sentation of its evaluations of external determinants,
however perceived, in any given foreign policy issue.

The thesis in the pages that follow is that the
Foreign Ministry's authority over foreign policy was depen—
dent on two sets of variables. The first was the intrinsic
ability of the Ministry to command recognition for the ‘
legitimacy of its sphere of activity in making any policy 1
affecting Austria‘s relations with foreign areas. What
was the Ministry's legal position in the new governmental
apparatus organized in 1848? What was the political
position of its chief? To what extent did the personal
qualities of its chief, including his physical presence
and well-being, affect his political position in the
new governmental structure? Such questions have widely
varying answers during the period after 1848 and the au—
thority of the Foreign Ministry changed in accordance
with them. The second set of variables pertains to the
specific character of the foreign issue with which the
Habsburg Monarchy was faced at any given point. The more
directly a foreign question affected the province of other

agencies, the less clear became the Foreign Ministry's

 

 

 

331
authority over the conduct of policy in response to it.
One of the peculiarities of the Austrian Empire after
1848 was that foreign and domestic questions became less
and less distinguishable from one another. A purely
domestic revolt by any of its component nationalities
could very rapidly be turned into a foreign war as a
result of support of the dissatisfied party by outside
forces. Conversely, a national movement among a foreign
group was often instantly translated into military and
constitutional crises inside Austria. Both of these cases
were represented in the Italian, Hungarian and German
questions, to be discussed in this chapter, as early as
1848. Both cases were just as surely represented as late
as 1914, and indeed in 1918, in the Slavic regions of
the Monarchy. Under such conditions, it was never easy
to tell where the authority of the Foreign Ministry ended
and that of other policy-making organs began.

Since each set of variables depended largely on
political conditions that changed with the foreign and
domestic winds, it seems logical to begin an examination
of the Foreign Ministry's authority with the one aspect,
the Ministry's legal position, which might be expected
to have remained constant. Unhappily, even the juridical
position of the Foreign Ministry was ambivalently ex—
pressed, at least until 1852. The uncertainty concerning
its legal authority was a direct result of the March

revolution of 1848. Prior to that, and indeed since

 

 

 

 

332
its formation in 1742, the State Chancellery had held a

position explicitly elevated above those of the agencies
responsible for domestic administrative affairs. When
Haugwitz established in 1749 a superagency incorporating
in itself all branches of internal administration, the
"Directorium in publicis et cameralibus," the State Chan—
cellery remained separate and equal. When Kaunitz suc—
ceeded in 1760 in creating the Staatsrat as a supervisory
body intended to neutralize the Directorium, the State
Chancellor was the only chief of an administrative agency '
to be represented on it. The Staatsrat was an advisory

body responsible solely to the emperor on questions of

internal policy; hence, representation among its members

of the State Chancellery implied that the latter agency

enjoyed a legal status in foreign affairs equal to that

of the Staatsrat in domestic affairs.l Even during the

late Metternichean era, when the State Chancellor was

no longer represented in the Staatsrat, the State Chan—

cellery was explicitly granted the recognition of equality

with the Staatsrat. Foreign Office Beamten thus received

more privileges and higher rates of pay than did the

Beamten of other central agencies.2

 

lFriedrich Walter, Osterreichische Verfassung -
und Verwaltungsgeschichte von 1500-1955, ed. Adam
Wandruszka, Verdffentlichungen der Kommission ffir neuere
Geschichte Osterreichs, vol. 59, (Vienna: Bdhlaus, 1972),
PP. 100—104.

2Austria, HHStA, Staatsrat Akten, 1847, K 27,
Memorandum, Nov. 3, 18 7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

333

The reason for this favored legal position lay in
the fact that the State Chancellery was responsible not
only for the foreign relations of the state, but also
for the affairs of the Imperial House and Court. Indeed,
to Emperor Franz (1792—1835). there was no distinction
between the two: Austria's foreign affairs, in consonance
with a pre—Theresian, purely dynastic View of the state,
were Franz's personal affairs.3 This outmoded conception
survived only until March 13, 1848. Repugnance at the
paternalistic idea of statecraft must be counted as one
of the reasons for the revolution which erupted on that
date. Within four days of its outbreak, the State Chan-
cellery had been dissolved and replaced by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. No longer the "personal chancellery
of the ruler, of the claimant of the hereditary offices
of Monarchia Austriaca," it became "one of the supreme
central departmental authorities of the unified state of
Austria, the legal personality of which was represented
by the ruler."LL On April 1, 1848, the statute of the
Ministerrat was promulgated: all ministries, by its pro—
visions, were to be represented equally by their respective
chiefs at regular sessions in which affairs of common

concern were to be discussed. Once decisions had been

 

3Walter, Usterreichische Verfassungsgeschichte,
Pp. 120—121.

”Bittner, "Das 8sterreichisch-ungarische Ministerium
des Aussern," p. 823.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

334
reached in the course of these deliberations, appropriate
proposals were to be submitted in the name of the Minister—
rat for the Emperor's sanction.5 Since questions of foreign
policy were undeniably matters of "common concern," the
position of the Foreign Ministry as an equal to all other
ministries of the state could be regarded as legally
established. The Ministerrat, moreover, was clearly in—
tended to be a corporative institution with a legal
authority superior to that of any of its constituent parts.
Initially, it was to be the crucial constitutional link
between the projected parliament and the emperor. Gone,
therefore, was the direct link previously enjoyed by the
State Chancellery as a supreme advisory body with im—
mediate access to the emperor.

Still, it was not quite that simple. The Foreign
Ministry maintained juridically its historic function as
"Ministry of the Imperial House and Family," thereby also
maintaining the tradition that foreign affairs belonged
not to the sphere of authority claimed by the state adminis—
tration, now represented by the Ministerrat, and certainly
not to a popularly elected parliament, but rather to the
person of the emperor himself. The obvious conflict em—
bodied in this dual conception of the Foreign Ministry
was no mere academic question. It had to do with the

rates of pay which Foreign Office Beamten were to receive.

 

5Printed in Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien
KolowratirAktenstficke, pp. 1—2.

 

 

 

 

335

In the case of some Beamten, a pay cut was involved when
the State Chancellery was reduced to the level of a min—
istry. The first hint of the struggle which was to rage
over this issue for the entire Schwarzenberg era came
with a proposal, dated September 1, 1848, by the Finance
Minister Philipp Freiherr von Krauss, the most outspoken
constitutionalist in the government, to effect new pay
rates for the Foreign Office personnel.6 Over the next

three years there occurred several fairly sharp exchanges

A3“. 1 ‘ A ~

between Schwarzenberg, who claimed that the Foreign Min—
istry took its legal character from its role as Ministry
of the Imperial House, and Krauss, who wanted to reduce
it to the level of all other ministries.7 The conflict
ended when Krauss resigned on December 26, 1851. His
successor, Andreas Freiherr von Baumgartner, who recog—
nized that the Ministerrat's position had been undermined
by the December 31, 1851, revocation of the constitution
on which it had been predicated, capitulated to the now—
persuasive claim that ministerial equality could no longer
be legally maintained.8 In the course of the contest

which he thus finally won, Schwarzenberg had never claimed

 

6Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ—
isierung, Fasz. 3, Krauss Proposal, Sept. 1, 1848.

 

71bid., Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399,
Organisierung, Schwarzenberg note to Krauss, March 1849;
Ibid., August 26, 1851; Ibid., Krauss to Schwarzenberg,
Oct. 25, 1851.

 

 

8Ibid., Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, Jan. 25, 1852.

4—4

 

 

 

336
that the Foreign Ministry was on the same level as the
Ministerrat (as the old State Chancellery had been with
respect to the Staatsrat), but only that it held a special
position relative to the individual ministries. Hence—
forth, the legal position of the Foreign Ministry was
merely recognized as elevated above that of the other
ministries.

On a more specific legal level, no clear delimitation
between the roles of the Foreign Ministry, the other min—
istries, and the Ministerrat in the actual formulation
of foreign policy was established with the transformation
of the central government in 1848. The Foreign Ministry's
sphere of competence schema clearly indicated that it
had authority over the implementation of policy,9 but
the only hint of a directive pursuant to policy formulation
appeared in the Ministerrat statute of April 1, according
to which all affairs of common interest requiring imperial
sanction were to be decided in the Ministerrat sessions.
This very general provision left a great deal to the
imagination, both because foreign affairs, by traditional
definition, were the emperor's affairs, thus rendering
the question of legal sanction irrelevant, and because
this traditional conception had not been definitively
invalidated. This question, as we shall see, was never

explicitly resolved during the 18508, and the confusion

 

9See Appendix C.

 

 

over the legal
removed any pos
of its or any c
policy.
Politica
thority depend
legal interpre
personalities
the Ministerrz
diplomatic co:
such as the m
the character
which it was
Position helc'
immonse Pers<
sorry state .
agency from
cursions int
in the forei
as of March
became uncel
was “named
Grai Ludw‘lg

had temp Ora

illness in

\

loMa,

 

337
over the legal basis on which the Foreign Ministry operated
removed any possibility of deciding the legal limits
of its or any other institutions' authority over foreign
policy.

Politically, therefore, the Foreign Ministry‘s au-
thority depended on variable factors, namely, the changing
legal interpretations given to its position; the varying
personalities of its chiefs; the relations it held with
the Ministerrat, the other ministries, the Crown, the
diplomatic corps and the non—ministerial central institutions
such as the military and police; and, most fundamentally,
the character of the specific foreign political issue with
which it was faced at any given point. The clear legal
position held by the State Chancellery before 1848, the
immense personal prestige of Metternich himself and the
sorry state of any other potentially competing central
agency from the throne on down, virtually precluded in-
cursions into the State Chancellor's political authority
in the foreign policy realm. That was no longer true
as of March 13, 1848. The institution's legal position
became uncertain on March 17 when the State Chancellery
was renamed the Foreign Ministry. On the following day,
Graf Ludwig Ficquelmont, an experienced statesman who
had temporarily replaced Metternich during the latter's

10

illness in 1839. but whose conservative political views,

 

loMayr, Geschichte der Staatskanzlei, p. 17.

 

 

A~—. _-

entirely out of
government, beca
March 20, the S‘
twelve years as
Emperor Ferdina
isterrat which
Foreign Affairs
Metternich's 02
Ficquelmont we
the Ministerra
WEiS a force (11
been Franz Fr.
10 the Interi
influence of
traditionally
“Weir of its ,
months to gr
the revoluti
the cOrltinue
Whereuron t1
for Innsbru
Arisi

ments tende
\

 

 

—“" 3M ' ' '

338
entirely out of step in 1848, left him isolated in the

government, became Foreign Minister. Two days later, on
March 20, the Staatskonferenz, after having served for

twelve years as de facto regent for the mentally incapable

 

Emperor Ferdinand, dissolved itself in favor of the Min-
isterrat which consisted initially of the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Finance and War with
Metternich's old tormentor, Graf Kolowrat, as premier.ll
Ficquelmont was to become premier on April 18, 1848, but
the Ministerrat's real force, to the extent that there

was a force during the next several months, seems to have
been Franz Freiherr von Pillersdorf, the liberal appointee
to the Interior Ministry. At the same time, the political
influence of the Crown, with which the ForeignMinistry
traditionally had a special relationship whereby it derived
much of its authority, was confined primarily in these
months to granting whatever concessions were demanded by
the revolutionaries. The concessions poured forth until
the continued survival of the throne was in jeopardy,
whereupon the Imperial Court in May simply fled Vienna

for Innsbruck.12

Arising from the revolution, each of these develop—

ments tended to create around the position of the Foreign

 

llWalter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,

12

Ibid., pp. 92—93-

 

 

 

 

Ministry an uncer
authority. But i
Ministry‘ 3 autho:
summer of 1848, '
in October, was
TeSponse to it,
northern Italia:
lasting until A”
Of Pore Pius 1x
the final subjt
1849. By far i
the Standpoint
Since it calle
integrity of ‘1
degree, becaus
best a periph‘
surrounding t

the military

his Chief 11:
Stage in all
atoms the Qt

was not mm

a war which
elemen.G 0f
represented

the Austr 1%

339

Ministry an uncertainty which served to sap its political
authority. But the development which was to bring the
Ministry's authority to point zero during the spring and
summer of 1848, before its revival under Schwarzenberg

in October, was the Italian crisis and the Foreign Ministry's
response to it. In reality, the crisis in Austria's
northern Italian provinces fell into two phases, the first
lasting until August 1848, the second until the restoration
of Pope Pius IX as temporal ruler of the papal states and
the final subjugation of the Venetian Republic in mid—
1849. By far the more threatening of the two phases from
the standpoint of Austrian state interests was the first,
since it called into immediate question the territorial
integrity of the Empire. Despite this, and, to a certain
degree, because of this, the Foreign Ministry played at
best a peripheral role in the process of policy formulation
surrounding the crisis. The Ministerrat initially, then
the military in the person of Field Marshal Radetzky and
his chief lieutenant Felix Schwarzenberg, took center
stage in all of the important decisions that were made
about the question from March until August 1848. That
was not unnatural in itself, since the crisis involved

a war which, while fought by the military, possessed an
element of common interest for all domestic institutions
represented in the Ministerrat. Yet the key danger to

the Austrian state derived less from the actual revolt

 

 

in her northern 1
than from the int
into this essentf
which ranged frm
Austria‘s Italia

f

the northwest .14

 

of the issue ma:
both were press
to perform its

can only be cor

 

to Austrian in
Preoccup
the Austrian g
0n the ltalia1
0‘11 On March
cOmmander, Re
Yet already 1
of war again
hm taken or
the Austria]
danger Was
Austria out
Lombardy b}
in Austria

perialiSm
\

\ 1
18 41832

 

340
in her northern Italian provinces, Lombardy and Venetia,
than from the intervention and potential intervention
into this essentially domestic affair by foreign powers,
which ranged from the tiny border states lying south of
Austria's Italian territory to revolutionary France in
the northwest.13 While the internal and foreign aspects
of the issue may not, therefore, be easily distinguishable,
both were present, and the failure of the Foreign Ministry
to perform its traditional responsibilities in this regard
can only be considered abnormal and probably detrimental
to Austrian interests.

Preoccupied at first with its own troubles in Vienna,
the Austrian government was in no position to take action
on the Italian problem when the Milan revolution broke
out on March 18 and succeeded in forcing the Austrian
commander, Radetzky, to evacuate the city on March 22.
Yet already by the time of the Piedmontese declaration
of war against Austria on March 23, the Italian question
had taken on international dimensions of a sort which
the Austrian government could not afford to ignore. The
danger was not only that the Piedmontese might force
Austria out of Italy, already having conquered all of
Lombardy by April 6, but also that France, reincarnated
in Austrian eyes as the embodiment of revolutionary im—

perialism reminiscent of 1792, might intervene in favor

 

lBWilliam L. Langer, Political and SocialUpheaval,
1832—1852 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 374~3761

 

 

 

 

ofthe Italian n2
cmmtances, the
for the overwhel
fished the fusi
state under Pie<
hereby act as
toFrench influ
France as it we
tence of such 1
therests, des
hmluences exc
smface as p0,
But it ,
reality that
gOVeI‘nment mi
huerests is
attention th
reVelutionar
government 1
Policy vis—
0“ April 4,
Vention am
British g0

Wm At t
\

Ml

15K

341
of the Italian nationalists. Under the objective cir-
cumstances, the fear of French military action was illusory,
for the overwhelming majority of Italian nationalists
desired the fusion of all of northern Italy into a strong
state under Piedmontese leadership, a state which would
thereby act as a barrier not only to Austrian, but also

14 This was just as unacceptable to

to French influence.
France as it was to Austria. At the same time, the exis-
tence of such a state was very much in Great Britain's
interests, desiring as she did the exclusion of all foreign
influences except the British from as much of the world's
surface as possible.l5
But it was the illusion rather than the objective
reality that counted, and the fact that the Austrian
government misread so completely the British and French
interests is probably to be explained by the overwhelming
attention that had to be paid the demands of the Viennese
revolutionaries for the creation_of a constitutional
government in March and April 1848. For when a foreign
Policy vis—a-vis the Italian question did finally emerge
on.April 4, it was predicated on the fear of French inter—
vention and the desire to gain the good offices of the

British government in mediating an immediate end to the

war. At the beginning of April, admittedly, this policy

 

l”Ibid., pp. 375—376.

l5Kiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 33-3h,

 

 

 

was not yet the p
the desires of tr.
Albert of Piedmo:
clearly articula‘

operate after a

 

was formally ent
relations. For
0f external det

roneous) perce;

 

The fact that "
utahle partly
French action
BY the E
uncertain com
mat'101'1211ists
the French go
and Venetia 1
this. that P
GiVen this b
and Turin, i
an attempt .
\ But on Apri

Mmistexup:I
i \
16
Zeit V

D
01112
1 185° . Pp.

 

 

342

was not yet the product of blatant miscalculation, for
the desires of the Italian nationalists, of King Charles
Albert of Piedmont, and of the French, had not yet been
clearly articulated. The Foreign Ministry continued to
operate after a fashion, and its chief, Graf Ficquelmont,
was formally entrusted only with the conduct of foreign
relations. Foreign policy could thus be made on the basis
of external determinants, i.e., rational (although er-
roneous) perceptions of the international situation.

The fact that they were erroneous, moreover, was attrib-
utable partly to the reinforcement of Austrian fears of
16

French action by the British themselves.

By the end of April, and especially in May, these

 

 

uncertain conditions no longer prevailed. The Italian
nationalists sought to avoid French intervention because
the French government demanded as its price that Lombardy
and Venetia be kept separate from Piedmont or, failing
this, that Piedmont cede Nice and Savoy to France.17
Given this basic disparity between the goals of Paris

and Turin, the logical policy for Austria would have been
an attempt to exploit the differences diplomatically.

But on.April 18, Ficquelmont had assumed the post of

Minister—President from the unfit Kolowrat, thereby

“

16Ludwig Graf Ficquelmont, Aufklarungen fiber die
§§it vom 20. Marz bis zum 4. Mai 1848 (Leipzig: Barth,
1850). pp. 6Ll3.

l7Langer, Political and Socia1_Upheava1. pp. 380—381.

 

 

becoming legally
entire governmen
sponsibility on
see how a confl:
new role and th
he maintained,
foreign nature
013 the Empire'
'50 hasten the
the masses, tr
EmFire, and t]
by the I”Sallie
a'SS‘éssment of
Problem, and

0' exoloitin
“890118111113
with intern;
could not p
weight to t

the Foreigx

\
18A

ghanges wi

 

343
becoming legally responsible for the leadership of the
entire governmental apparatus.18 With that kind of re-
sponsibility on his shoulders, it is not difficult to
see how a conflict could arise between his duties in his
new role and those in his role as Foreign Minister, which
he maintained, when faced with a problem of a dually domestic—
foreign nature like the Italian question. The spectre
of the Empire's capital city in full revolt, the necessity
to hasten the promulgation of a constitution to appease
the masses, the need to pacify the Hungarian half of the
Empire, and the concern over the financial drain caused
gby the Italianwar19 all tended to work against a reasoned
assessment of the international implications of the Italian
problem, and against the formulation of a patient policy
of exploiting the French—Italian differences. ‘With divided
responsibilities, the most important of which had to do
with internal affairs, the old and feeble Ficquelmont
could not possibly have been expected to give adequate
weight to those stemming from his position as chief of

the Foreign Ministry. This Ministry, from which a

 

18A most useful schema of the Austrian ministerial

changes with exact dates and explanations is to be found
in an appendix by Waltraud Heindl in Helmut Rumpler‘s
introductory volume to the first series of Ministerrats—
protokolle currently in the process of publication:
Rumpler, Ministerrat und Ministerratsprotokolle 1848—
E67: behb‘rdengeschichtliche und aktenkfindliche Analyse
(Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag. 1970).

 

 

l9Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,
pp. 18—59.

 

 

 

 

rational evaluati
the settlement 0:
been expected to
toward oblivion.
Ficquelmor
toiall entirel;
after April 18.
made by Pillers
provinces in 1‘!
assist in payi
clearly shifti
policy on the
and the angry
stitution pre

'Ue Foreign b
forced the P:
Minister P11

was named tc

May 8 and J1

01d Confida

‘ Placed Ficq
Unfortunate

\ from assum
Carriage e

the Imper:
\

201

 

34A
rational evaluation of the best policy to be pursued in
the settlement of the Italian affair could logically have
been expected to emerge, thus took its first great leap
toward oblivion.

Ficquelmont did not, to be sure, allow foreign policy
to fall entirely to the dictates of internal determinants
after April 18. In the Ministerrat he defeated a proposal,
made by Pillersdorf on April 20, to cede Austria's Italian
provinces in return for a promise that the latter would
assist in paying off the war debt. But the balance was
clearly shifting away from the determination of foreign
policy on the basis of the international situation,20
and the angry public reaction against the April 25 con—
stitution promulgated by the Ficquelmont ministry doomed
the Foreign Ministry to impotence. The public unrest
forced the Premier's resignation on May A, 18h8. Interior
Minister Pillersdorf, utterly ignorant of foreign affairs,
was named to replace Ficquelmont as Minister-President on
May 8 and Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg, Metternich's
old confidant during the early years of the century, re—
placed Ficquelmont on the same day as Foreigr.Minister.
Unfortunately for the Ministry, Wessenberg was prevented
from assuming his responsibilities by sickness and a
carriage accident, and by the time he had recovered,

the Imperial Court had moved to Innsbruck, where he

 

20Ibid., pp. 60-61.

 

 

 

 

arrived only on J
fore, the ForeigI
Represented in t‘
unable and unw il
Foreign Ministry
political autho:
During th
Italian interes
began to appea:
selves. The c
through diplon
throughout the
military vict
May 6 and cul

on May 29 to

“ 01" its des’m

diplomatic s

In northern

”ndit'mn t}
and Separat
Overture, 1
maneWerin,
French fro

was in no
\

21l

22]

345

arrived only on June 2. For nearly an entire month, there-
fore, the Foreign Ministry lacked an authoritative chief.
Represented in the Ministerrat by Lebzeltern, who was
unable and unwilling to undertake real leadership, the
Foreign Ministry reached new depths in its level of
political authority.21

During the month of May 1848, the divergent French—
Italian interests emerged ever more clearly and differences
began to appear among the various Italian states them-
selves. The chances for Austria to gain the upper hand
through diplomatic activity thereby increased correspondingly
throughout the month, beginning with the first significant
military victory by Habsburg troops at Santa Lucia on
May 6 and culminating with the overwhelming vote in Lombardy
on May 29 to fuse with Piedmont. Enraged by this disregard
of its desires, the French government itself sought a
diplomatic solution from Vienna. Austria's provinces
in northern Italy were to be granted independence on the
condition that the ceded provinces remain independent

22 This was not exactly a pro-Austrian

and separate.
overture, but it increased the probability of successful
maneuvering by the Austrians to separate further the

French from the Italians. But the government in Vienna

was in no position to perceive anything on the international

ZlIbid.. p. 133.

22Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, p. 382.

 

 

 

scene even as ru
Viennese unrest
further uprising
fled to Innsbru
structive since
removed as pres
was that most .
Vienna for the
a head, the Al
influence, vi:
With th
only importer
decided upon
‘30 appreciat
internationa
Step later 1
Problems in
government
idea of sex
British met
in April w
France etc
Desk Chis:

Von H\mme
\

2

, D. 118.

2A

3H6

scene even as rudimentary as this opportunity. The
Viennese unrest at the end of April was followed by two
further uprisings in May, as a result of which the court
fled to Innsbruck on May 17. Having done nothing con-
structive since March in any case, the court was as useful
removed as present, but the damaging aspect of the flight
was that most of the foreign diplomatic corps also deserted
Vienna for the Tyrol. Now lacking a function as well as
a head, the Austrian Foreign Ministry, along with its
influence, virtually ceased to exist.23

With the Foreign Ministry out of the picture, the
only important diplomatic step heretofore undertaken was
decided upon by a desperate Ministerrat in no position
to appreciate any of the possibilities offered by the
international situation. The Hummelauer Mission, as this
step later became known, was an effort to solve Austria's
problems in Italy by sending the wrong man to the wrong
government with the wrong instructions. Although the
idea of sending a special emissary to London to solicit
British mediation in Italy had originated under Ficquelmont
in April when it was still not clear where England and
France stood on the issue,24 the selection of the emissary,
Desk Chief for Western Europe in the Foreign Office, Karl

von Hummelauer, and the imparting of his instructions

 

23Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,
P. 118

24Ficquelmont, Aufklarungen, pp. 18—20.

 

 

 

in they fell to P1116
the absence of a F01
out of fear of Fren
Austria‘s populatio
finances in shamble
diplomatic support
Venetia under an A
from May 23 to 25,
Venetia, but demar
Russell then raise
for the complete
Compensation to b
01" the necessity
exceeded his ins.
1mlsbruck to rep
Capitulation to

an incredible ac'
given the far f]

was Still more
Vienna Minister
intervention, c‘
at the hands 0:

around the Inn
\

2
SHElfer

26
382. Lange:

 

347
in May fell to Pillersdorf, the Minister-President, in
the absence of a Foreign Minister.25 The mission, motivated
out of fear of French intervention just at the time that
Austria's population was in rebellion and the state's
finances in shambles, was intended to acquire British

diplomatic support in return for the autonomy of Lombardy—

Venetia under an Austrian archduke. During the discussions

from May 23 to 25, Palmerston accepted this formula for
Venetia, but demanded complete independence for Lombardy.
Russell then raised the demands still further to provide

for the complete exclusion of Austria from Italy, with

compensation to be granted in Eastern Europe. Convinced

of the necessity to pacify Italy quickly, Hummelauer

exceeded his instructions and accepted, then returned to

Innsbruck to report on his project. Hummelauer's

capitulation to the extraordinary British demands was

an incredible admission of an Austrian weakness which,

given the far from hopeless military picture in Italy,

was still more illusory than real. Despite this, the

Vienna Ministerrat, plagued as it was with fear of French
intervention, domestic insurrection and its own dissolution
at the hands of the reactionary clique that was emerging

around the Innsbruck court, did not repudiate the Hummelauer

 

25Helfert, Geschichte Osterreichs, #/l:l@2.

26Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, pp. 381-

382.

 

 

project.27

Nor did Wessen
Foreign Minister in
of a foreign pOliCy
than of calculation
take practical char
so that the Foreigr
totally without pol
along with Anton F:

rat‘s liaison man
the integrity of t
court,28 Open di:
not have helped b
Foreign policy th
rat. a body whicl

by responsible p:
was guided solel

in Austria. p11

and forwarded tc

Plenipotentiary

 

 

348

project.27
Nor did Wessenberg, having taken up his post as

Foreign Minister in Innsbruck on June 2, change the course

of a foreign policy which was the product more of panic

than of calculation. He was not to return to Vienna to

take practical charge of his department until June 22,

so that the Foreign Ministry remained a defunct institution,

totally without political authority. Moreover, Wessenberg,

along with Anton Freiherr von Doblhoff—Dier, the Minister~
rat's liaison man in Innsbruck, was at pains to maintain

the integrity of the Ministerrat against reaction at

court.28 Open disagreement with its foreign policy could

not have helped but weaken the court's regard for it
Foreign policy thus remained in the hands of the Minister-

rat a body which was cut off at that time from any input

by responsible professional diplomatic experts, and which

was guided solely by the desperate domestic circumstances
in.Austria. Pillersdorf, as Minister—President, drafted

and forwarded to Wessenberg instructions for an Austrian
29

Plenipotentiary to be sent to Milan to conclude peace

 

27Friedrich Walter, "Die Innsbrucker Mission des
Handelsministers Anton Freiherr von Doblhoff- Dier (23. Mai

bis 19. Juni 1848)," Mitteilungen des Instituts fur
deterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 68(1966): 518- 519.

281bid., p. 524.

29Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 2, Minutes of the June 9 and June 10,18M8,

seSSiOI’lS .

 

 

 

 

szamerg according‘
to negotiate an imme
Mdbegnito fancy I
first time on June .
thsterrat took pr
hiforeign policy f
hmtria should rele
Ofgood faith, Min
latmm rejoined th
Ministry to make i
agmy of the stat
Minister Sommarug:
disagreed:
Why the momer
be laid in tl
much the les:
sented solel
Minister of
of this agen
more POints
decision the
This was exh‘eme
faulty at that
fact Possess th
that being the
charm by the

3OKiszl

31
Au
Protokoueft;

 

349

Wessenberg accordingly instructed Radetzky on June 12

to negotiate an immediate truce.30 By then, Pillersdorf

had begun to fancy himself a diplomat, making for the
first time on June 14, 1848, the explicit claim that the

Ministerrat took precedence over the Foreign Ministry

in foreign policy formulation. To his suggestion that

Austria should release her Italian war hostages as a sign
of good faith, Minister of War Theodor Graf von Baillet-
Latour rejoined that this was a decision for the Foreign

Ministry to make in its capacity as the chief negotiating

agency of the state. Pillersdorf, supported by Justice

Minister Sommaruga and FinanCe Minister Philipp Krauss,

disagreed:

Why the moment for making use of the release should
be laid in the hands of the Foreign Minister is so
much the less clear because the government is repre—
sented solely in the collective ministry, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, as an agent and member
of this agency, could scarcely be in possession of
more points of reference in being able to make a

decision than is the ministry.

This was extremely important. It was a claim.which was

faulty at that time because the Ministerrat did not in
fact possess the most important "point of reference,"

that being the input that would normally have been dis—

charged by the Foreign Ministry. For that reason, the

claim was to be challenged immediately, but the baSic

k

3OKiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 35.

31Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 2, Minutes of the June 14, 18u8, session.

 

 

 

principle which was
policy-making over t
been for the first "
With the auth

diplomatic affairs
leftbeing filled c
foreign policy fort
quarters in mid—J u
couraged by his J r
by the tacit acce]
hummelauer‘s humii
Innsbruck court 0
Felix Schwarzenbe
for a SUValpension
atruce until th
its efficacy i1,
Recit‘mg in Inns

to fear from th.
Italian unifica
delaying any (16
had had a chant

rat in Vienna

a threat; to hi
1 the actiVe ad‘

V Was baged on
I \\

2
\ 3 Kisz]

 

350
principle which was to direct the process of foreign
policy-making over the next thirty months had nevertheless
been for the first time articulated.

With the authority of the Foreign Ministry in
diplomatic affairs at a low ebb, and with the vacuum thereby
left being filled only poorly by the bumbling Ministerrat,
foreign policy formulation gravitated to entirely new
quarters in mid—June——Radetzky's Italian command. En—
couraged by his June 9, 1848, Vicenza victory and disgusted
by the tacit acceptance in Vienna and Innsbruck of
Hummelauer's humiliating proposal, Radetzky sent to the
Innsbruck court one of his commanders, Major General
Felix Schwarzenberg. The future Foreign Minister argued
for a suspension of the government's efforts to acquire
a truce until the military could have a chance to prove
its efficacy in the solution of the Italian problem.
Reciting in Innsbruck the reasons why Austria had nothing
to fear from the French in view of Paris‘ disgust at the
Italian unification schemes, Schwarzenberg succeeded in
delaying any definite step toward an armistice until he
had had a chance to present his case before the Minister-
rat in Vienna on June 24.32 Wessenberg, perhaps sensing
a threat to his own personal authority, thereupon adopted
the active advocacy of Pillersdorf's own position, which

was based on such internal determinants as the threat

 

32Kiszling, Ffirst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 35.

 

 

 

of financial disaste:
the ministers once a
however, the integri
so that Wessenberg l
justifications for '
show a common front
The Ministerrat thl
superior logic, sa'
fusion of Lombardy
CleSpite the fact 1
eventuality had a
ment for several ‘
from his hands ev
ltalian policy 1;}
marking that no t'
France and En gla
0f the Pacificat
asserted that H
facilitate the
justice and fai
veiled the mag
\-

3

 

351
of financial disaster and further social unrest.33 With
the ministers once again united in Vienna on June 24,
however, the integrity of the Ministerrat seemed assured,
so that Wessenberg no longer needed to parrot Pillersdorf's
justifications for his weak foreign policy in order to
show a common front against the court reactionaries.
The Ministerrat thus gracefully yielded to Schwarzenberg's
superior logic, saving face by noting that the imminent
fusion of Lombardy and Piedmont had changed the conditions,34
despite the fact that the approach of this last—mentioned
eventuality had already been obvious to the Austrian govern—
ment for several weeks. Two days later, Wessenberg thrust
from his hands even that slight responsibility for the
Italian policy that he had only recently acquired. Re—
marking that nothing remained for diplomacy but to inform
France and England that the responsibility for the failure
of the pacification scheme fell to the Italians, he
asserted that "it was now up to them to promote and to
facilitate the pacification affair on the principle of

justice and fairness."35 This statement scarcely con—

veyed the image of the purposeful conduct of policy by

33Wessenberg made these arguments in a note from
Innsbruck of June 19, discussed in the Ministerrat session
of June 23.

3#

Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 2, Minutes of the June 24, l8h8, session.

35Ibid., Minutes of the June 26, 1848, session.

 

 

 

the Foreign MinistrZV
a problem directly 2
Austria‘s Ita
six weeks on the ti
victory of July 251
to the Piedmontese
plication, to the '
policy of subservi
now, Palmerston se
berg on August 2 '
French interventi
bluff by stating
presFeet, and Abe
berg was of cour
AAgust 6, the Fr
With the Pmpose
erHence to settj
the HHummelauer
should not be r
that, it was 01
agreement Ceas
Ellt weak
such a come“

\\

6
3 HSlfe

352

the Foreign Ministry of a Great Power which was faced with
a problem directly affecting its vital interests.

Austria's Italian policy was carried for the next
six weeks on the tips of Radetzky's bayonets. His Custozza
victory of July 25, 1848, dealt a direct defeat not only
to the Piedmontese, but also to the British and, by im—
plication, to the Viennese cabinet which had favored a
policy of subservience to the British. Grasping at straws
now, Palmerston sent Abercromby to Radetzky and Schwarzen-
berg on August 2 to revive once again the spectre of
French intervention. Schwarzenberg simply called the
bluff by stating that war with France was not a fearful
Prospect, and Abercromby left empty—handed.36 Schwarzen—
berg was of course right. When Radetzky seizedeilan on
August 6, the French did nothing more than turn to London
with the proposal that a joint call be made for a con~
ference to settle the Italian question on the basis of
the Hummelauer proposal. Both powers agreed that Austria
should not be readmitted to hegemony in Italy.37 Beyond
that, it was clear to the Austrian military command,
agreement ceased.

But weak as the Franco-British justifications for
such a conference may have been, the Ministerrat never—

theless accepted the principle. although the patent

*

36Helfert, Geschichte Usterreichs, 4/1:146.

 

37;p;g.; Langer, Political and Social Epheaval, p. 38h,

 

 

 

 

absurdity of basing
recognized even ther
ment‘s timidity in 5
face of an impressi‘
its disposal, had t
were still consider
minants. The condi
in its relations t:
to exist with one

On the one hand, t
lacked a chief fre
deprived of respo
Denied Archduke J
June 21». to the l
rthe Foreign Mini-

on August, 2339
1“epresented him
Wessenberg was 1
Johann had dism
Doblhoff having
interveL The
Emile-llment in

in mie‘Julv th

\
8
3 ion.

39
p‘ 207 . Wall-A

353

absurdity of basing it on the Hummelauer project was
recognized even there.38 Part of the reason for the govern-
ment's timidity in its foreign relations, even in the

face of an impressive display of the military force at

its disposal, had to do with the fact that foreign affairs
were still considered solely in terms of domestic deter-
minants. The conditions plaguing the Foreign Ministry

in its relations to the Ministerrat since April 18 continued
to exist with one brief interruption until August 23, 1848.
On the one hand, the Foreign Ministry, in practice having
lacked a chief from May 4 until June 22, was once again
deprived of responsible leadership when Wessenberg accom~

panied Archduke Johann, the Emperor's alter ego since

 

June 24, to the Frankfurt National Assembly on July 8.

The Foreign Minister returned to the Austrian capital only
on August 23.39 In the meantime, the ineffective Lebzeltern
represented him in the Ministerrat. On the other hand,
Wessenberg was named Minister-President on July 18 after
Johann had dismissed the weak Pillersdorf on July 8, with
Doblhoff having served provisionally during the ten~day
interval. The Foreign Minister, as was the case with
Ficquelmont in the latter half of April, thereby acquired
in mid—July the divided responsibility of heading the

government in all of its general functions while being

 

381bid.

39Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,
P. 207.

 

 

specifically respons
The Foreign Ministry
both absent and bure
which must have see
in the atmosphere c
over Austria in the
reassert itself as
formulating fore ig
was physically '11]
the assertion of :
headEId even after
late August. Lit
“thing but long
in the days prio
Although d
August and 38p.“
first and Most {
ended With Ra de
To the extent 1
diplomah'lC DOs
military in de
spite of gove]
directed towa
Empirees Com
was actually

mew the,1 th
\

40
Hlibr

 

354

specifically responsible for foreign affairs as well.

 

The Foreign Ministry, in possession of a chief who was
both absent and burdened with domestic responsibilities
which must have seemed more pressing than foreign affairs
in the atmosphere of civil insurrection that hung thickly
over Austria in the summer of 1848, was thus not able to
reassert itself as an authoritative agency capable of
formulating foreign policy. The fact that Wessenberg
was physically ill during most of these weeks prevented
the assertion of any kind of authority bythe Ministry he
headed even after he had finally returned to Vienna in
late August. Little wonder, then, that Hfibner found
nothing but long faces in the State Chancellery building
in the days prior to the October revolution.40
Although desultory negotiations continued through
August and September over the proposed conference, the
first and most dangerous phase of the Italian crisis had
ended with Radetzky's occupation of Milan on August 6.
To the extent that Austria enjoyed any improvement in her
diplomatic position in Europe, it was achieved by the
military in default of Foreign Ministry activity and in
spite of governmental activity generally, which seemed
directed toward demonstrating to the world that the Habsburg
Empire's continued existence was in more jeopardy than
was actually the case. A less productive period of diplo~

macy than that between March and June 1848 is difficult

 

Leo

Hubner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, p. 181.

 

 

to imagine, and the
ginning in the latte
military of the fun
the Foreign Ministr
rat deliberations c
considerations of '
almost completely
dormant state of t
there existed no e
qualified to make
military commands
matically througl
Central governme‘.
f°rei€§n problems
duct itself as 1
“as in immediate
the fallacy‘ s

a POSition to E
that such was I

1t was t‘

left behind W.
Vienna at the

But then Prio

Aus ' .
the'S in
\

4
1M

 

355

to imagine, and the only reason for its improvement be—

ginning in the latter month was the assumption by the
military of the functions fulfilled in normal times by
the Foreign Ministry. The introduction into the Minister—
rat deliberations of determinants arising from sober
considerations of the international situation was lacking
almost completely during the entire period due to the
dormant state of the Foreign Ministry. Consequently,
there existed no central governing institution which was
qualified to make rational foreign policy. And while a
military commander and his lieutenant saved the day diplo—
matically through an act borne of insubordination, the
central government by its inability to handle Austria's
foreign problems continued even after that point to con-
duct itself as though the survival of the Habsburg Monarchy
was in immediate doubt. Once having convinced itself of
this fallacy's validity, the Ministerrat was scarcely in

a position to persuade the other European Great Powers

that such was not in fact the case.

It was this rather desperate legacy that Wessenberg
left behind when he barely escaped with his head from
Vienna at the renewed outbreak of revolution on October 6.LLl
But even prior to this vivid demonstration of the Austrian
government's impotence, the disastrous consequences for

Austria's international position of weak leadership in

..—

ulIbid., pp. 225—226.

 

 

 

 

Vienna had been recc
fresh from captivitl
had realized that a
take place and that
was necessary for i
Schwarzenberg come
governmental appar
peace negotiations
arrived only on St
designated plenip
The fact that he
not at Wessenberg
that the initiat
hands 0f the mil
berg had lost a:

to prevail agai]
question in Jun

had Vindicated
Schwarzenberg. s

of October, ev
un‘mportance ,

the trend tow;
ultimately to‘

authority. T

to have datec‘
\

it
21mg

 

356

Vienna had been recognized. As early as late July, Hubner,
fresh from captivity at the hands of the Italian insurgents,
had realized that a fairly drastic reorganization had to
-take place and that an infusion of new blood at the top

was necessary for this reorganization. He requested that
Schwarzenberg come to Vienna to take charge of the petrified
governmental apparatus. Occupied with the preliminary
peace negotiations in Milan, the future Foreign Minister
arrived only on September 30, and then merely as the
designated plenipotentiary for the projected conference.

The fact that he came solely on Radetzky's authority and

not at Wessenberg's or the Emperor's invitation shows

that the initiative in foreign affairs still lay in the
hands of the military.42 Neither Radetzky nor Schwarzen—
berg had lost any of the prestige which had enabled them

to prevail against the entire government on the Italian
question in June, and indeed the reconquest of Lombardy

had vindicated their foreign policy calculations.
Schwarzenberg's presence in Vienna during the first week

of October, even in an official capacity of relative
unimportance, therefore seems to have been decisive in

the trend toward a more assertive foreign policy and
ultimately toward a revival of the Foreign Ministry's
authority. The period of the dual Foreign Ministry seems

to have dated from early October when Schwarzenberg was

.—

uzIbido ) pp. 217‘222.

 

 

 

 

able to induce Wesse
by hiibner and addre-
cerned with the Ita
the Italian policy
and Wessenberg Mini
Following th
the provisional F0
Obnhz when Schwai
on October 15, 18)
0f the real power
Wessenbergws posi
by the reVOlutior
monath' s fate :
Mhfisterrat,.mor
ofa.scattering
Philipp Krauss }
butchered by th.
berg thus had n
make foreign pc
CiSiveneSS whic
conduct and 13h
mtentirely he
late OCtOber,
Since the
regarded

e d0th
\ merely s:'
t of a dyi]
‘t sembled .

 

 

357
able to induce Wessenberg to sign a dispatch, drafted
by Hfibner and addressed to every Austrian ambassador con-
cerned with the Italian question, which effectively negated
the Italian policy previously pursued by the Pillersdorf
and Wessenberg Ministerrat.43
Following the precedent established in early October,
the provisional Foreign Ministry which was set up in
Olmfitz when Schwarzenberg and Wessenberg arrived there
on October 15, 18k8, possessed two chiefs, one with most
of the real power and one with primarily titular authority.
Wessenberg's position had been effectively undermined
by the revolution and the consequent delivery of the
Monarchy's fate into the hands of the military. The
Ministerrat, moreover, had become inoperative as a result
of a scattering of its members: Wessenberg was in Olmfitz,
Philipp Krauss had remained in Vienna, Latour had been
butchered by the mob, Each was not to be found. Schwarzen—
berg thus had no real competition for his authority to
make foreign policy decisions and he moved with the de~
cisiveness which was always his trademark to put the
conduct and the content of Austrian foreign policy on
an entirely new basis. Hfibner summed up the process in
late October:
Since the events of March, foreign countries have
regarded us as a patient who has been forsaken by
the doctors. And in fact, the content and tone of
Wessenberg's dispatches from the period when he not
merely signed them reminded one at times of the wheeze

of a dying man, while his diplomatic activities re—
sembled the dispositions of a last will. It is now

”31bid., p. 365.

 

 

 

 

a question'of mg
that the £11.35.
to live. still
not the moment
has been scarce
the name of am
ready a percept
courts in their
their tone in '
We are polite
tremely unplea
lationship, l_‘
basic princ ipl
also turned hf
For the tim
foreign policy wa
appointment to tr
Minister on Nove1
Affairs assumed
the days of Mett
At least to the
throughout the
Contrast, as in
bewew the ini
to and after S(
Italia“ quest:
the convening
w
ere dragging

Radetzky busj
\

4h
m

 

 

358

a question of making Europe cognizant of the fact
that the vieux bon homme still lives, still intends
to live, still shall live, and that it is therefore
not the moment to think about the inheritance. It
has been scarcely two weeks since Prince Felix, under
the name of another, has stood at the rudder and al-
ready a perceptible turn has taken place at foreign
courts in their valuation of Austria. They lower
their tone in the same degree that we raise ours.

We are polite in Paris, magnanimous in Gaeta, ex-
tremely unpleasant in London . . . . The close re-
lationship, l'entente cordiale, with Russia is the
basic principle of our future premifir, but he has
also turned his View toward Paris.

For the time being, Schwarzenberg's control of
foreign policy was unchallenged, and with his official
appointment to the posts of Minister—President and Foreign
Minister on November 21, 1848, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs assumed an authority which it had not known since
the days of Metternich and which it was not to relinquish,
at least to the extent that it had after March 1848,
throughout the following eight years. Nowhere is the
contrast, as intimated in the above—quoted Hfibner remarks,
between the influence held by the Foreign Ministry prior
to and after Schwarzenberg‘s assumption of power more
visible than in the methods used by the Austrian govern—
ment in handling the first and second phases of the
Italian question. While the desultory negotiations for
the convening of a conference to conclude peace in Italy

were dragging on in the late summer and fall of 1848,

Radetzky busied himself with the pacification of the

 

””Ibid., pp. 261-262.

“—

 

 

 

recaptured Austriar
involved the imposf
tax on the native
still harboring vi
question along the
objected strenuous
Schwarzenberg fir
cowhunicate to P0
He rePudiated onc
instructed Palmej
“059 Out of Aust
that, if Palmers
was ready to go
oiliated, hOpin;
existed between
next weeks, Sch
Palmerston, new
humiliating Au,
on the isSue a
jecti‘fes in nc
had C°ml>leteli

A considered
\

b5H91f(
A6

. 1’I‘in

LL
Germ 7.9%
w

 

 

359
recaptured Austrian territory. Part of this process
involved the imposition of an extraordinary war—debt
tax on the native population, a measure to which Palmerston,
still harboring visions of a settlement of the Italian
question along the lines of the Hummelauer project,
objected strenuously.45 In response to this objection,
Schwarzenberg fired off a stinging rebuke for Werner to
communicate to Ponsonby, the British ambassador in Austria.
He repudiated once and for all the Hummelauer project,
instructed Palmerston in no uncertain terms to keep his
nose out of Austria's domestic affairs, and even implied
that, if Palmerston wanted to make an issue of it, Austria
was ready to go to war.)-"6 In Paris, Schwarzenberg con-
ciliated, hoping to exploit the natural division that
existed between France and England over Italy. Over the
next weeks, Schwarzenberg realized this hope, and
Palmerston, never one to yield easily when it came to
humiliating Austria, finally recognized his isolation
on the issue and gave up on achieving his earlier ob-
jectives in northern Italy.47 With that, Schwarzenberg
had completely reversed his predecessor's Italian policy.

A considered response to the prevailing international

¥

u5Helfert, Geschichte Usterreichs, u/lzl57-l59.

46Printed in Ibid., Appendix, pp. 19-21, Lettre
Particuliere au Baron Werner, Olmfitz, Dec. 4, 18u8.

47Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik
Q§terreichs, 2:10.

 

conditions, as oppo:
domestic troubles, 1
toward Italy.
England now h
second phase of the
Pius‘ escape from :
November 24, 1848,
and the Italian st
was Simply one of
dominant influenc
unilaterally to t
stored to him. T
adiplomatic 183.
tegrity of the 1V]
dire” Politica]
friendly power
lands Contiguou
and modem) 001
also a dual .1 d‘
exclusion from
on the One har
Habsburg trea:
existem3e of
other hand Cc
Venetia to m
Were Very tV

   

360
conditions, as opposed to panicky reactions to Austria's
domestic troubles, now characterized Austria's policy
toward Italy.

England now having been pushed out of the way, the
second phase of the Italian crisis, initiated by Pope
Pius‘ escape from republican-controlled Rome to Gaeta on
November 2#, 1848, was played out between France, Austria
and the Italian states. At first, the problem for Austria
was simply one of preventing any single state from gaining
dominant influence in Central Italy by means of responding
unilaterally to the Pope's demand that his lands be re—
stored to him. It was, unlike the first phase, essentially
a diplomatic issue which did not directly affect the in—
tegrity of the Monarchy. There was nevertheless an in~
direct political threat, since the influence of an un—
friendly power (such as Piedmont) over formerly friendly
lands contiguous to Austrian territory (such as Parma
and Modena) could affect Austria's security. There was
also a dual ideological threat, since Catholic Austria‘s
exclusion from the act of restoring the Pope to his lands
on the one hand could be interpreted as an example of
Habsburg treason to Catholicism, and since the continued
existence of republican regimes in Central Italy on the
other hand could incite Italian radicals in Lombardy and
Venetia to new insurrections. The problems, in short,
were very typical of what the Habsburgs were to face

during the following decades in Central and Eastern Europe.

L_t— I

 

 

They were not exclt
of a domestic chars
aspects were separz
but each response 1
the response in th
the Italian crisis
the German questic
the same period a]
Poncy, thus prov
decision—making u
Schwarzenberg was
Prior to Fe

in its foreign p
the Schwarzenber
total COHtrol 85
Policy in 0Ct0b(
other institut-l
extended into t

18% when the
then SChWarzeni

the Foreign Mi

in foreign a f f

PillerSdOrf. S

.the Ministry

of the gOVern

Mints or ref

 

 

361
They were not exclusively either of an international or
of a domestic character. Their international and domestic
aspects were separable in the responses made in each sphere,
but each response affected in a more or less direct way
the response in the other sphere. The second phase of
the Italian crisis, as well as the Hungarian crisis and
the German question, all of which were crystallizing in
the same period and affected both domestic and foreign
policy, thus provided the key test for the process of
decision—making under the new and stable government which
Schwarzenberg was building in Olmfitz.

Prior to February 27, 1849, the Italian question
in its foreign policy dimension never once came before
the Schwarzenberg Ministerrat. Does this mean that the
total control established by Schwarzenberg over foreign
policy in October and November, at a period in which no
other institutions capable of making policy existed, was
extended into the period, beginning in late November
1848, when the Ministerrat once again convened? If so,
then Schwarzenberg's attempt to place the authority of
the Foreign Ministry on an absolutely dictatorial level
in foreign affairs would have meant the negation of
Pillersdorf's principle expressed on June 14, 18u8, that
"the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an agent and member"
Of the government could "hardly be in possession of more

points of reference" than the Ministerrat in making foreign

 

 

 

policy decisions, a
fore have ultimate
rat's functions, ix
As will only becom
German question, t
To substanti
at the activities
in late 18A8 and
revolved ultimate
Thewnnner in whi
different nation:
interests of eac
tive influence (2
had happened in
a solution by t]
Daned all 0the
and mOdei‘nizatj
to foreign prol
clusion of a p
relationship 0
central Politf
Venetia under

example , WOul
\

”8hr; t
protokolles. 1

9 .
der M‘ .DlSC
mlStex

 

 

362

policy decisions, and that the Ministerrat should there—

48 The Minister—

fore have ultimate authority over these.
rat's functions, in short, would have been debased.

As will only become fully clear in the discussion of the
German question, that was not Schwarzenberg's intention.

To substantiate this claim, it is necessary to glance
at the activities with which the Ministerrat was concerned
in late 1848 and early 1849. All of these activities
revolved ultimately around the constitutional question.)+9
The manner in which the Austrian state, composed of many
different nationalities, was to be organized so that the
interests of each special group would not exert a destruc—
tive influence on the Empire as a whole, which is what
had happened in 1848, was the first problem requiring
a solution by the Ministerrat. Upon this solution de—
pended all other activities involving the reconstruction
and modernization of the Austrian state, and that applied
to foreign problems as well as to domestic. The con—
clusion of a peace treaty in Italy depended on the future
relationship of the Austrian Italian provinces to the
central political system. Autonomy for Lombardy and
Venetia under the reign of a Habsburg archduke, for

example, would have been far more palatable to the French,

 

48Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 2, Minutes of the June 14. 1848. session.

 

49Discussed at length in Walter, Die Geschichte
der Ministerien Kolowrat, pp. 280—325.

 

 

and even to the Its
of all Austrian pr<
have been. The na'
was decreed on Mar

Austria‘ s foreign

 

rat was occupied \
mental task, Schw
for time on the i
appearance of a c
Policy, but it w:
Ministry‘s autho

At least c

rat 8LPPEars to l

t the decision-ma
i Prior '00 the cc
but by refrainf

\ on 1’58 own verj

, Foreism Minist
interim, Rat}

Sphere , a fun

18% When its
in InnsbruCk
and used it.
to usurp Cor
they Were wf

emperor, Fri

 

 

363
and even to the Italians, than the rigid centralization
of all Austrian provinces into a common system would
have been. The nature of the Austrian constitution which
was decreed on March 4, 1849, therefore bore directly on
Austria‘s foreign policy toward Italy. ‘While the Minister-
rat was occupied with the completion of this most funda-
mental task, Schwarzenberg as Foreign Minister was playing
for time on the international front. The result was the
appearance of a dictatorial control by him of foreign
policy, but it was in fact a subordination of the Foreign
Ministry's authority to that of the Ministerrat.

At least on the Italian question, then, the Minister—
rat appears to have been conceived of as the center of
the decision-making process. It was only latently so
prior to the completion of its work on the constitution,
but by refraining from making any fundamental decisions
on its own very considerable authority, Schwarzenberg's
Foreign Ministry did not challenge this conception in the
interim. Rather it seems to have formed a bulwark against
any other agency's pretensions in the foreign policy
sphere, a function it could perform only imperfectly in
1848 when its authority, personified solely by Wessenberg
in Innsbruck, was at a low ebb. Now it had the authority
and used it. Other ministries apparently never sought
to usurp control over the Italian question, occupied as
they were with their domestic obligations. The new

emperor, Franz Joseph, had assumed the throne only on

 

 

 

December 2, 1848, e
not owe its existei
old) and inexperie
interest and some
but there is no ex
witheir conduct
that he partic ipa
or even during tl
sisted mostly of
hmtria‘s ambass
were “0’3 influen
there was the mi
UlAustria'S It:

i general terms,
reactionary brc
important man :'

1 which was decl:

,5 Empire Ouliside

H to succeed in

i occupied 13mg1

‘ belliouS Vien;

to subdue Hur
\ \

\ 5OHiibn
W 51 Aust

\ 52Hiib‘.

 

 

364

December 2, 1848, so that the Schwarzenberg ministry did
not owe its existence to his person. Young (eighteen years
old) and inexperienced, Franz Joseph showed considerable
interest and some understanding of foreign affairs,50

but there is no evidence that he exerted any influence

on their conduct in these first months, and little sign
that he participated in foreign policy formulation before

or even during the Buol era. The diplomatic corps con—

 

sisted mostly of charges d'affaires after the recall of
Austria's ambassadors in mid-1848.51 and these individuals
were not influencers of policy in any sphere. Lastly,
there was the military which had played so large a role
in Austria‘s Italian policy in the summer of 1848. In
general terms, Prince Windischgratz, Schwarzenberg’s
reactionary brother-in-law, had been politically the most
important man in Austria since March l848. His army,
Which was declared responsible for subduing all of the
Empire outside of Italy, had become the first in Europe
to succeed in suppressing a revolution in 1848 when it
occupied Prague in June.52 It had then conquered re—
bellious Vienna at the end of October and had set out

to subdue Hungary on December 15, 1848. In the meantime,

BOHfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, pp. 338—339.

 

SlAustria, HHStA, PA I, K 533e, Rechberg Nachlass,
Werner Letter to Rechberg, June 14, 1848.

52Hfibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, pp. 297—301.

 

 

 

Windischgratz induc
Premier and Fore ign
whom Schwarzenberg
brother-in—law. T]
beneficence in the
would keep him inf
domestic and foref
not control, the
astounded Hfibner
between supervisi
unworkable arrang
disregarded the
internal and ext
with the agre em
0? his latest 0:
invaded Hungary
with the genera
eVentually 108i
astrous defeat

In Italy
his pacificatf
a completely

\-
533E
54%“

Pp.

27°~271.

 

 

 

 

365

Windischgratz induced the court to name Schwarzenberg
Premier and Foreign Minister, so that the only person to
whom Schwarzenberg was beholden for his power was his
brother-in-law. The latter exacted a price for his
beneficence in the form of a promise that Schwarzenberg
would keep him informed of all important political matters,
domestic and foreign, so that he could supervise, although
not control, the state administration. Schwarzenberg
astounded Hfibner by recognizing the absurd distinction
between supervision and control and by agreeing to the
unworkable arrangement.53 But the Premier consistently
disregarded the doubts raised by Windischgratz over both
internal and external measures, although he did comply
with the agreement to the extent of informing the general
of his latest official activities.54 When.Windischgratz
invaded Hungary in December 1848, he began to lose touch
with the general course of Austrian policy, and he
eventually lost all influence by blundering into a dis-
astrous defeat.

In Italy, meanwhile, Radetzky temporarily kept to
his pacification work, leaving the central government
a completely free hand in the diplomatic negotiations

between Vienna, Paris, Turin and Gaeta for the purpose

 

53Ibid.

5AWalter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrat,
pp. 270-271.

 

 

 

of re-installing ti
negotiations is 001
discussion. By la
the powers had pre
papacy, and the dy
former papal stat«
to remove the ini
Turin to Central
Charles Albert be
in late February
in Austrian Lomb
1Deming before 3
address itself -'
Abandoning for .
ntional Structu
ltaly in partic
Sible’ 80 that
mitted to the o
the military c
meet this fort
Precautions '

MW until
St it“; 101'} . r
\

SSLang

56 A _
protokollgs

 

366
of re-installing the Pope in Rome. The story of these
negotiations is complicated and not germane to the present
discussion. By late February 1849, disagreements between
the powers had prevented action in the restoration of the
papacy, and the dynamism of the republican regime in the
former papal states in carrying through reforms threatened
to remove the initiative for Italian unification from
Turin to Central Italy. For fear of missing the boat,
Charles Albert began moving troops southward into Toscana
in late February, thereby threatening once again the peace

in Austrian Lombardy.55 With the threat of hostilities

 

looming before it, the Ministerrat had no choice but to
address itself to the necessity for war preparations,
abandoning for the time being its work on a new constit—
utional structure for the Monarchy in general and northern
Italy in particular. Playing for time was no longer pos-
sible, so that on February 27, 1849, Schwarzenberg sub—
mitted to the Ministerrat for approval the suggestion that
the military command be issued the appropriate orders to
meet this foreign threat.56 Having taken the necessary
precautions, the Ministerrat did not actively enter Italian
policy until after the promulgation of the March 4 con—

stitution. That constitution represented the definitive

 

55Langer. Political and Social Upheaval, pp. 437-438-

56Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Feb. 27, 1849, session.

 

 

____—-————*
___.—’—r

\ \

basis upon which fc
government acted ft
in conformity with
the Ministerrat we
making activity ll
On March 12
armistice and res
Austria‘s Italiar
army, which succc
a dGeisive battl
Charles Albert f
Emmanue157 But
terms in Vienna
in foreism poli
1”“ the first i
read the very j

of March 31’ l

at base, Chan

of a foreign ]

not running t:

"hosfilities

in Order to 2
better the i

Minister, ir

57
lChs

 

 

367
basis upon which foreign policy was to be made, and the
government acted for the duration of the Italian crisis
in conformity with the constitutional stipulation that
the Ministerrat was the responsible center of policy—
making activity in affairs of common interest.

On March 12, 1849, Charles Albert denounced the
armistice and resumed war against Austria. At first,
Austria's Italian policy was borne exclusively by Radetzky's
army, which succeeded in defeating the Piedmontese in
a decisive battle at Novara on March 23 and in driving
Charles Albert from his throne in favor of his son, Victor
Emmanuel.57 But with the arrival of Radetzky’s armistice
terms in Vienna in late March, the role of the Ministerrat
in foreign policy became permanently active once again
for the first time since mid-1848. When Schwarzenberg
read the very lenient terms at the Ministerrat session
of March 31, 1849, a storm of protest broke out which,
at base, challenged Radetzky's right to meddle in affairs
of a foreign political nature. War Minister Franz Cordon,
not running the risk of underreaction, asserted that
"hostilities were to be resumed at the next opportunity
in order to attain peace under conditions which suit
better the interests of the Monarchy." Bruck, the Commerce

Minister, insisted that the truce would gain no acceptance

 

57Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik
Osterreichs, 2:10.

 

 

 

 

 

 

inAustria, Justic
adorcement guarar
war debt. Schwar:
wiamnesty for th
ofthese flaws in
mnt be sent an 2
trol Radetzky‘s j
heSuggested sen
his direct contr
Bruck, the Mini:
only to the Min:
Under 0rd

hm Schwarzenbe
for Writing out
carried 0n Sit]

by one of his

bureaucracy or

It is easy en<
Minister Was .

In late March

question was

the FOI‘Eign ‘

reorganize“?1

lay in Viem

sonal repre
\

58 Am
Protokolle“

 

 

368

in Austria, Justice Minister Bach complained that it lacked
enforcement guarantees and assurances of payment of the
war debt. Schwarzenberg spoke of the unacceptable terms
on amnesty for the insurgents. In order to rectify all
of these flaws in the final peace treaty, he felt, there
must be sent an able negotiator who would be able to con~
trol Radetzky‘s political activities. Significantly,
he suggested sending not a professional diplomat under
his direct control as Foreign Minister, but Karl Ludwig
Bruck, the Minister of Commerce, who answered legally
only to the Ministerrat.58

Under ordinary circumstances both before and after
the Schwarzenberg era, direct diplomatic negotiations
for working out international accords of any sort were
carried on either personally by the Foreign Minister or
by one of his legal subordinates from the Foreign Office
bureaucracy or, more often, from the diplomatic corps.
It is easy enough to explain why Schwarzenberg as Foreign
Minister was not able to pursue the negotiations personally.
In late March 1849, Hungary was in full revolt, the German
question was turning to the disadvantage of Austria and
the Foreign Office was still in its initial stages of
reorganization. Schwarzenberg‘s greatest responsibility
lay in Vienna, not Milan. But why did he not send a per—

sonal representative? There were surely adequate numbers

 

58Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts~Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Mar. 31, 1849, session.

i___

 

 

 

 

__-.'_‘——
___,___.-—————

of unemployed ambaf
18h8 and who knew
more than did Bruc
the Rhineland who
shipping trade an:
as the future Com
competent man, ve
benefit of forced
to dominate Cent:
of the body whic
of Austrian fore
the threat of it
or by the Forei.
be automaticall
of how serious]
primary foreig1
84513.10th subor
by the Foreigr
Bruck, c

the M'lhisterr:

for Italy in:
\
59

369

of unemployed ambassadors who had been recalled during
1848 and who knew a great deal about Italy, indeed much
more than.did Bruck. But Bruck, a bourgeois emigré from
the Rhineland who had made a fortune in the Austrian
shipping trade and whom Schwarzenberg designated in October
as the future Commerce Minister, was an exceptionally
competent man, very energetic, convinced that, with the
benefit of forceful leadership, Austria would rise again
to dominate Central Europe, and, most important, a member
of the body which made claim to the ultimate direction
of Austrian foreign policy.59 With him as negotiator,
the threat of independent diplomatic action by the military
or by the Foreign Ministry (or diplomatic corps) would
be automatically precluded. His appointment is indicative
of how seriously the Ministerrat took its function of
primary foreign policy-maker, and it demonstrates the
strictly subordinate position occupied in this sphere
by the Foreign Ministry.

Bruck, of course, was no mere robot activated by
the Ministerrat, and his own independent action, like
Radetzky's, caused moments of grief in Vienna. He left

for Italy immediately after having received his orders

 

59Richard Charmatz, Minister Freiherr von Bruck,
der Vorkampfer Mitteleuropas (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1916);
Friedrich Walter, "Beitrage zur Feststellung der politischen
Haltung und zum Kampf um die Rehabilitierung des Finanz-
ministers Karl Freiherr von Bruck," Mitteilungen des
Instituts fur deterreichische Geschichtsforschun , 71
19 3 = l- 50.

 

 

 

mMfllL wnm.
hisinstructions l
hiexcess of what
Periodically thro
unhl August 6, l
thority to denour
terms from the l“
visionary that h.
economic role in
Austrian territc
8Ldherence to a t
Mme again he h:
25. 1849, the M
’00 return to Vi
hithe governm.
ization due to
diseased Intex
would like to

Simply 1300 pr
\
6

0Aust:
prO‘tokolle. 1

61m

62m
63%

mm

 

 

370
on April 1. Within a mere three weeks, he had violated
his instructions by demanding an indemnity payment far
in excess of what the Ministerrat had intended.60
Periodically throughout the negotiations, which lasted
until August 6, 1849, he was to threaten on his own au-
thority to denounce the armistice in order to force better

61

terms from the Italians. In June and July, Bruck,
visionary that he was when it came to Austria's future
economic role in Central Europe, sought to trade off
Austrian territory to Parma and Modena in return for their
adherence to a vast Austrian—dominated customs union.

Once again he had acted on his own authority.62 On May
25, 1849, the Ministerrat had agreed to instruct Bruck

to return to Vienna in order to take his rightful place

in the government which was then undergoing a reorgan-
ization due to the departure of Franz Stadion, the mentally
diseased Interior Minister.63 Bruck replied that he

would like to return, but that affairs in Italy were

simply too pressing.6u The important point, however,

‘

60

Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Apr. 22, 1849, session.

éllhid-. Apr. 22. 1849: Ibid., July 9, 1849.

62Ibid., June 24, 1849; Ibid., July 5. 1849.

63Ibid., May 25, 1849.

6”Ibid., June 6, 1849.

 

is not that Bruck =
so in the name not
but rather of the
policy-making ins
to control him, s
Ministerrat, not
Ministry‘ 8 author
mained strictly :
But this t

the Ficquelmont
Place, the Forez'
in the minister
peace negotiati
External deteru

‘50 other state:

g 0“ the course
Sm“ by Schw

not been the c
Foreign Minis

OVEI‘ the rela
restoration c

of lands to .

It Was not c
French uh.“

Rome for 131,.
Austria had

Central ItE

 

371

is not that Bruck acted independently, but that he did
so in the name not of the Foreign Ministry or the Emperor,
but rather of the Ministerrat as the sole legitimate
policy-making institution. Whatever attempts*were made
to control him, successful or not, emanated from the
Ministerrat, not from the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign
Ministry's authority for the duration of the crisis re—
mained strictly subordinate to that of the Ministerrat.

But this time there were important differences from
the Ficquelmont and Wessenberg periods. In the first
place, the Foreign Ministry now assumed an active role
in the ministerial deliberations about the course of the
peace negotiations and the terms of the peace treaty.
External determinants, such as Piedmont's relationships
to other states and the effect of those relationships
on the course of the negotiations, were constantly in—
serted by Schwarzenberg into the discussions. This had
not been the case in mid-1848. In the second place, the
Foreign Ministry never relinquished exclusive authority
over the related but less fundamental question of the
restoration of the Pope in Rome and the consequent control
of lands to the south of Austria's Italian provinces.
It was not completely successful in this realm, for the
French ultimately succeeded unilaterally in occupying
Rome for the Pope on July 3, 1849. But in the meantime,
Austria had restored the legitimate princes to their

Central Italian possessions, so that the dangers of one

 

 

 

power gaining heger
revolution spillin
averted.65 Far fr
the Ministerrat‘ s
activity by the F1
complement to the
Why, of securing
in short, somethi
and interests of
istry seems to h
during the sprfu
01” this. the It:
reach‘Sd a solut
Milan WhiCh cor
to re‘es'thblisl
“htionally’ as
With the
the Process 0;
insurmcilion
Hungary‘s mm]
even before 1
become an in
existeme it
later, when
Monarchy Co

\

65
MW. L31

 

372
power gaining hegemony in Italy and of spontaneous
revolution spilling over into Lombardy and Venetia were
averted.65 Far from constituting an attempt to usurp
the Ministerrat's authority over foreign affairs, this
activity by the Foreign Ministry was thus much more a
complement to the main task, fulfilled by the former
body, of securing Austria‘s position in northern Italy.
In short, something of a balance between the activities
and interests of the Ministerrat and of the Foreign Min—
istry seems to have emerged over the Italian question
during the spring and summer of 1849. Perhaps as a result
of this, the Italian crisis as a foreign political problem
reached a solution with the August 6, 1849, Treaty of
Milan which corresponded quite well to the Austrian need
to re-establish her position, domestically and inter-
nationally, as a European Great Power.

With the model of the Italian question established,
the process of foreign policy-making during the Hungarian
insurrection can be determined fairly rapidly. Although
Hungary's move toward independence had been underway since
even before the March 1848 Vienna revolution, it did not
become an international issue fundamental to Austria's
existence in.the Great Power system until about a year
later, when it began to become apparent that the Habsburg

Monarchy could not settle its domestic affairs east of

 

44 65Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, pp. 441,
7.

 

 

the Leitha without
the clear recognii
Austrian leadersh'
as early as J anua
into one with a c
problem of the ff
a Hungarian army
crossed into Tra
under Puchner' s
Was mobilized 01
insurection fr
tegrity 0f the
adecisive defg
hm'Hungarians
corps Presente

0f l“sweating
Sibil‘rw once

it was 3180 a

from aPproach

The di;

\ it ignored t

. WOrSe yEt j

\ \
66

i 1141‘ R0

 

 

 

373

the Leitha without foreign assistance. But even before

the clear recognition of that fact was forced on the
Austrian leadership in April 1849, there had been hints
as early as January 1849 that the issue was developing
into one with a character similar to that of the Italian
problem of the first two months of 1849. At that time
a Hungarian army under the leadership of General Bem had
crossed into Transylvania and attacked the Austrian forces
under Puchner's leadership. A Russian observation corps
was mobilized on the border in order to prevent the
insurrection from spreading into Russia.66 If the in—
tegrity of the Monarchy were to have been threatened by
a decisive defeat of Austria‘s Transylvanian forces by
the Hungarians, the existence of this Russian observation
corps presented to the Austrian government the possibility
of requesting armed assistance. And if that was a pos-
sibility once the loss of the province had become imminent,
it was also a possibility as a measure to prevent events
from approaching that point.

The difficulty with this line of logic was that
it ignored the diplomatic aspect. Calling for outside
help would have meant the admission of the validity of
the claim of Austrian weakness, against which Schwarzen—
berg had striven so mightily in his Italian policy.

Worse yet in real political terms, the suppression by

66

Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas 1," pp. 109-

141.

 

 

 

the tsarist armies
forces by themsel‘
permitted the con
Habsburg Monarchy
by the grace of I
could have been
Austrian, sphere
had attempted tc
theyears after
important membe
included, were
dilemma which \
tire eastern h
Presaged by th
Either contiru
0f solving it
world Of fore
cOllapse of t
longer stood
call in fore
But 11
Transylvani:
Solution to
after all,

\

67He

 

 

 

374

the tsarist armies of a revolution which the Austrian

forces by themselves were unable to overcome would have
permitted the conclusion by every European that the
Habsburg Monarchy existed not by the grace of God, but
by the grace of Nicholas I. Central Europe, moreover,
could have been claimed as a Russian, rather than as an
Austrian, sphere of influence, a claim which Metternich
had attempted to dispute with only varying success in
the years after 1812: it was also a claim which the most
important members of the Foreign Office, Schwarzenberg
included, were forever loath to admit.67 The fundamental
dilemma which was to face Austria with regard to the en-

tire eastern half of the Monarchy in April 1849 was thus

presaged by the Transylvanian question already in January:

either continue to act the part of a Great Power capable
of solving its internal problems and of operating in the
world of foreign diplomacy, thereby risking the internal
collapse of the state, or openly admit that Austria no

longer stood among the first-rate powers of Europe and

call in foreign assistance to assure the state's survival.

But if the critical dilemma was posed in the
Transylvanian issue of January 1849, no foretaste of the
solution to that dilemma was yet forthcoming. This was,
after all, the ultimate matter of common concern to the

Austrian government. It was also fundamentally a

 

67Heindl, Graf Buol-Schauenstein, p. 38.

 

 

 

constitutional que=
of the eastern par
a crucial bearing
have to be prosecx
this portentous i
the fundaments of
currently in prog
time, Schwarzenb
on basic questio
be, and were, c2
only as an oste1
the military 00
Austrian goverr

aVOiding the 01

‘ Suppliant stat
ComPlete separ

In the meant it

____————
__—_.—-—-'

its Preparato

making instit
\ Hungarian cix
\ If sue]
would oorres
this same pg
The cmystic

\ before 39m
\

68
\ 1&1 . RO<

375

constitutional question. The future legal relationship
of the eastern part of the Monarchy to Vienna might have
a crucial bearing on the extent to which the war would
have to be prosecuted. Clearly, then, a decision on
this portentous issue had to await the reconstruction of
the fundaments of Austrian political life, a process
currently in progress in the Ministerrat. In the mean-
time, Schwarzenberg temporized, just as he had in Italy,
on basic questions of foreign policy. The Russians could
be, and were, called into Transylvania in January, but
only as an ostensibly independent action on the part of
the military command in the province. In that way, the
Austrian government could disavow responsibility, thus
avoiding the onus of having transformed Austria into a
suppliant state, while at the same time preventing the
complete separation of the state from one of its provinces.68
In the meantime, the Ministerrat could presumably complete
its preparatory work and take up, as the central decision—
making institution, the larger question posed by the
Hungarian civil war.

If such were Schwarzenberg's calculations, and they
would correspond to his policy in Italy and Germany during
this same period if so, then they worked out very well.
The constitution was promulgated on March 6, five days

before Bem defeated and drove out of Transylvania the

 

68Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas I," pp. 109-

141.

 

 

combined Russian—1.1
supreme commander
lessness of the A
illusory February
in March.69 On i
the Ministerrat,
policy, requesti
intervention. '1
leading reactiom
autocratic Russ
read by Schwarz
Ministerrat. y
leagues in the
a View objects
that it would
General Welds:
Franz 00rd0n
Smmon'mg aid
by the 5L“:
defile“3 of th
all of Euror
extreme Case

were at Sta

691a:

 

 

 

376
combined Russian-Austrian forces. Windischgratz, the
supreme commander in Hungary, began to recognize the hope—
lessness of the Austrian position once the glamor of his
illusory February 26, 18h9, victory of Kapolna wore off

in March.69 On March 24, he submitted a proposal to

the Ministerrat, now definitively in charge of foreign
policy, requesting that Austria apply for Russian military
intervention. The memorandum, written by the Monarchy's
leading reactionary who felt no reluctance in reviving
autocratic Russia's domination over Central Europe, was
read by Schwarzenberg in the March 29 session of the
Ministerrat. With Schwarzenberg deferring to his col—
leagues in the discussion, every minister who expressed

a view objected to Windischgratz's proposal on the grounds
that it would destroy Austria's international position.
General Welden, invited to the session by War Minister
Franz Cordon to present an expert military opinion, opposed
summoning aid, claiming that "Russia's help, requested

by the Austrian_government itself, would be a total moral
defeat of the latter, the confession of impotence before
all of Europe, and could be justified only in the most
extreme case, namely, if the existence of the Monarchy

were at stake."70 Foreshadowed in Transylvania three

F

69Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, p. 485.

70 Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Mar. 29, 1849, session

 

 

 

months earlier, t
was thus clearly
the earlier instz
began to move to
The suprem

ulation, however
impotence. Jus1
Pursued negotia'
as a measure su
noI‘thern Italy,
0W April 18lt9
rather than as
as a means to

to achieve its
being interna-
‘Hfiortunately
badly, Undec
Schwarzenberg
DEW refused .
and domestic

in the face
April 21’ Sc
Same Positi.
changed his

. With the 0V
\ \

71
\ 1A1 R0!

 

 

377

months earlier, the issue, now involving all of Hungary,
was thus clearly developed by the Ministerrat. But unlike
the earlier instance, the Ministerrat on this occasion
began to move toward providing a definitive answer.

The supremacy of the Ministerrat in policy form-
ulation, however, did not doom the Foreign Ministry to
impotence. Just as in Italy, where the Foreign Ministry
pursued negotiations concerning the papal restoration

as a measure supportive of the Ministerrat's policy in

 

northern Italy, it sought in the Hungarian question through

out April 18h9 to induce the Russian government to offer,

rather than assent to a request for, military assistance

 

as a means to strengthen the ability of the Ministerrat
to achieve its expressed goal of subduing Hungary without
being internationally humiliated. Throughout April,
unfortunately, the Austrian military situation deteriorated
badly. Undeceived because of that deterioration by
Schwarzenberg‘s effort to have it both ways, Nicholas

now refused the bait.71 With the dilemma between foreign
and domestic exigencies thus staring the government full
in the face by the time of the Ministerrat session of
April 21, Schwarzenberg noted that Welden, now in the
same position as Windischgratz three weeks earlier, had
changed his mind and now wanted Russian aid. Confronted

with the overwhelming success of the Hungarian armies,

 

71Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas I," pp. 109-

141.

 

 

 

the Ministerrat he
and to authorize S
to the Tsar at Wa
was given and, at
usurrection ends
Metrian govermum
we Austrians, b
Wows on Habsbt
During thi

Hm Foreign Min
mm Performed p
relation to the
Period of the 1
its 0bjeCtive :
Pursued in ach
Foreign Minis-t

t° SuPport the
rat. Schwarz
Russians not
the Austrian
the Austrian
were Constax

the policy (
\

72Au=
protOkolle:

73
218. Fr

 

 

378

the Ministerrat had no alternative but to assent grimly

and to authorize Schwarzenberg to make a direct request
to the Tsar at Warsaw.72 The request went out, the aid
was given and, at Vilagos on August 13, 1849, the Hungarian
insurrection ended. To the bitter disappointment of the
Austrian government, the Hungarians surrendered not to
the Austrians, but to the Russians, who now had 360,000
troops on Habsburg soil.73

During this period from April through August 1849,
the Foreign Ministry maintained precisely the same authority
and performed precisely the same kind of functions in
relation to the Ministerrat that it did during the final
period of the Italian question. The Ministerrat had decreed
its objective and the basic line of foreign policy to be
pursued in achieving it. Within those confines, the
Foreign Ministry utilized its own considerable authority
to support the spirit of the measures taken by the Minister-
rat. Schwarzenberg sought stubbornly to portray the
Russians not as saviors, but as auxiliaries to the saviors,
the Austrian troops themselves. Disagreements between
the Austrian government and the Russian military command
were constant largely because they resulted directly from

the policy of independence pursued by the Foreign Ministry.

 

72Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Apr. 21, 1849. session.

73Friedjung, gsterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 1:216-
218.

 

 

Buol, the Austria
himself very much
his advocacy of E
a product of the
The Austrians ad
Russians, fully
of benevolence .r'
in the Hungar iai
crisis: the Min
Policy formulat
18%, new main'
deliberations
Capacity to co
Shpport of the

It is difficui

\
7”(He ind
75Rock,

ML The Ts:

forth in r98'
0 a desire
were 130 be
victory; 2)
from the Aus
Joseph PeI‘St
aSSlstanCe ‘.

 

379
Buol, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, found
himself very much out of favor with the Tsar because of
his advocacy of Schwarzenberg‘s policy, which was in turn
a product of the sentiments expressed in the Ministerrat.7u
The Austrians adopted a policy devoid of gratitude; the
Russians, fully aware of it at the time, adopted one devoid
of benevolence.75 But the point is that decision-making
in the Hungarian crisis was the same as in the Italian
crisis: the Ministerrat was the final authority on foreign
policy formulation, and the Foreign Ministry, unlike
1848, now maintained considerable authority, both in the
deliberations during the Ministerrat sessions and in its
capacity to conduct important diplomatic exchanges in

support of the guidelines established by the Ministerrat.

It is difficult to judge whether the Hungarian policy

 

7“Heindl, Graf Buol—Schauenstein, p. 46.

 

75Rock, "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas I," pp. 109-
141. The Tsar demonstrated clearly by the demands he put
forth in response to Schwarzenberg's appeal for aid that
Russia was intervening less out of com assion than out
of a desire for political influence: 1 Russian troops
were to be permitted in numbers sufficient to guarantee
victory; 2) Russian forces were to operate separately
from the Austrian (i.e., as sole conquerors): 3) Franz
Joseph personally was to make an "official appeal for
assistance." Such conditions were bound to grate on
Austrian pride, designed as they were to neutralize
Schwarzenberg's effort to portray the Russians as auxil~
iaries: Heindl, Graf Buol-Schauenstein, p. #2. The mil—
itary commander of the Russian troops, Paskievich, resented
Schwarzenberg's attempt to de~emphasize the Russian role,
and the resentment developed into a feud between Buol and
Paskievich. The loss by Buol of the Tsar's confidence
can probably be attributed to this feud.

 

 

 

 

 

which emerged fro
The Monarchy surv
have been expecte
The patter.
crises in the de
making also char
German question
for the existen
than Italy and
PrOVided the ce
Office. but a1
'Ne developmen
fateful here 1
develoPment in
crisis or the
Ficquelmont,
aS‘MiniSter-}
comment to t]
\ to Call else
in a new hat
reformers b3
with the W1
That, in its
Showed the

was tied '1‘.
\

76st

 

l

 

380

which emerged from this relationship was successful.
The Monarchy survived, and that is about all that could
have been expected from any policy under the circumstances.

The patterns evinced by the Italian and Hungarian
crises in the development of a method of foreign policy—
making also characterized the process developed in the
German question. 0f the greatest long—range importance
for the existence of the Habsburg Monarchy, greater even
than Italy and Hungary, Austria's relationship to Germany
provided the central policy issue not only in the Foreign
Office, but also in the highest levels of government.

The development of policy-making institutions was more

 

fateful here than anywhere else, and the progress of this

 

development is more evident here than in either the Italian
crisis or the Hungarian crisis. Worried about Italy,
Ficquelmont, in his capacity both as Foreign Minister and
as Minister-President, at first simply assented without
comment to the decision of the Frankfurt pre-Parliament

to call elections for the purpose of reconstituting Germany
in a new national form. He later obliged the Frankfurt
reformers by changing Austria's electoral laws to comply
with the wishes of these foreign representatives.76
That in itself was an extraordinary concession, and it

showed the extent to which Austria's constitutional form

was tied in with that of Germany. The German question

 

76Ficquelmont, Aufklarungen, p. 55.

 

 

 

for Austria was n<
relations until a
cases, the German
dmmstic aspects
jurisdictions ove
For the tit
define jurisdict
all authority it
issue in mid-18l
Works, Andreas '
suggestion on J
able if the Mix
of affairs 111'
has heretofore
by'means of tr
M'ln'lster 30mm:
duPlicate the
matter was dr
“0‘6 at that 1
resPect to t]
to remain in
mOSt Vitally
years. It ‘
Baumgartner

that his Fc
\

77 Au
prOtQkolle

‘l

 

 

 

381

for Austria was not to become one strictly of international
relations until after 1866. Like the Italian and Hungarian
cases, the German issue was one in which foreign and
domestic aspects were constantly intertwined, so that
jurisdictions over the issue were not easily definable.

For the time being, however, there was no need to
define jurisdictions, for the Foreign Ministry relinquished
all authority it might conceivably have claimed over the
issue in mid-1848. It was finally the Minister of Public
Works,.Andreas Freiherr von Baumgartner, who ventured the
suggestion on June ll, 1848, "that it would be very desir-
able if the Ministerrat were to be apprised of the course
of affairs in the Frankfurt Parliament, about which it
has heretofore found itself in official ignorance . . . ,"
by means of the establishment of a liaison group. Justice
Minister Sommaruga feared—~unwarrantedly-—that this would
duplicate the function of the Foreign Ministry, so the
matter was dropped.77 Because the Foreign Ministry was
not at that time carrying out any of its functions with
respect to the Ministerrat, the Austrian government was
to remain in official ignorance of the matter which would
most vitally affect its existence over the next several
years. It was to Wessenberg's credit that he reiterated
Baumgartner's suggestion on June 30. He was fully aware

that his Foreign Ministry was not itself capable of

 

77Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 2, Minutes of the June ll, 1848, session.

 

 

 

 

 

maintaining effect
the Ministerrat a:
of a liaison comm
committee actuall
its intended func
German question ‘
rat (”113’ on Dece
In the meantime,
cOmstitution, A:
for Germany, th
the first signs
became Visible
Paragraphs of
Proved whereby
German Empire
between ruler
the minist err
BesideS
any Way with
no instituti
Policy initf
Ministry Get

that Which
\

7s 5
Alfred v63
Claims the

382
maintaining effective relations with Germany. Reluctantly,
the Ministerrat assented on this occasion to the formation
of a liaison committee for such a purpose. But if the
committee actually came into existence, it did not perform
its intended function, at least if the fact that the
German question.received its next mention in the Minister—
rat only on December 12, 1848, can be taken as evidence.78
In the meantime, and pending the completion of the
constitution, Archduke Johann was elected Imperial Regent
for Germany, the old Bundestag voted itself out of existence,
the first signs of the kleindeutsch—grossdeutsch split
became visible in Germany and, on October 27, 1848, the

Paragraphs of the proposed German constitution were ap-

 

 

proved whereby Austria was to be attached to the new
German Empire only by means of a tenuous personal pact
between rulers. None of these crucial issues came before
the Ministerrat.

Besides the military, which was not involved in
any way with the German question in these early months,
no institutions outside of the Ministerrat were taking
POlicy initiative in any sphere. Wessenberg's Foreign
Ministry certainly possessed a level of authority above

that which it could muster in the Italian question, if

78Ibid., Minutes of the June 30. 1848. session;
Alfred von Arneth, Johann Freiherr von.Wessenberg, 2 vols.
(Vienna and Leipzig: Braumfiller, 1898), 2:243. Arneth
claims that the committee was intended to consist of Werner,
Mensshengen and a representative of the Interior Ministry.

 

 

only by virtue of
of Archduke Johan
Regency post at l
as a result of a?

by the Parliamen

 

of Austrian pres
ticipation in i'
personal reputa
episode and Wes
first place, it
for six weeks,
he had already
Foreign Minist
'50 that it re]
Te'St of the g
Witnessing oj
favor of play
throne, even

for Austria

 

dominantly 1
setter by a
State they
COVered On‘
devoted to
terests as
Wessenber

the Germa

L l

383
only by virtue of the Foreign Minister's accompaniment
of.Archduke Johann on his way to assuming the new Imperial
Regency post at Frankfurt on July 12. This event, occurring
as a result of an overwhelming vote in Johann's favor
by the Parliament on June 26, constituted the high point
of Austrian prestige during 1848, and Wessenberg's par—
ticipation in it certainly bolstered his otherwise flagging
personal reputation. But there were two dangers to this
episode and Wessenberg fell into both of them. In the
first place, it removed him from the seat of government
for six weeks, in addition to the six week absence of which
he had already been guilty in May and June. The Vienna
Foreign Ministry was thus left without a responsible chief,
so that it remained isolated during this period from the
rest of the government. In the second place, Wessenberg's
witnessing of the overwhelming sentiment at Frankfurt in
favor of placing a Habsburg archduke on the German imperial
throne, even if temporarily, blinded him to the real danger
for Austria that was to arise from a congregation of pre—
dominantly non—Austrian German nationalists brought to-
gether by'a common desire to construct a new state. The
state they were to attempt to construct, Wessenberg dis—
covered only belatedly, was not necessarily based on or
devoted to the principle of preserving Austria's own in—
terests as a Great Power. Back in Vienna in late August,
Wessenberg seems to have been.willing complacently to let

the German question develop on its own, without taking

 

 

 

an energetic pos
The importance 0
in short, was be
By the tin
real power, the
divided and suf
an active posit
temporarily def
making decisiox
Hiibner took th
of hostility t
Berlin was ass
for reconstitl
With the assi
Bruck or Schw
this Program
Donna it. in
three years.
Cooperate to
Frankfurt, 1
agency at t}
The Plan Sp
Which Seeme

\

384

an energetic position vis-a-vis the other German states.
The importance of the German issue for Austrian interests,
in short, was badly underestimated in the summer of 1848.

By the time of the accession of Schwarzenberg to
real power, the mood in Frankfurt had shown itself openly
divided and sufficiently anti-Austrian to warrant taking
an active position on the issue. With the Ministerrat
temporarily defunct and no other institutions capable of
making decisions present in Olmfitz, Schwarzenberg and
Hfibner took the initiative. For the time being, an attitude
of hostility toward Frankfurt and watchful waiting toward
Berlin was assumed.79 At the same time, a positive program
for reconstituting Germany was being worked out, evidently
with the assistance of Karl Ludwig von Bruck.80 Whether
Bruck or Schwarzenberg held the dominant influence on
this program is not clear, but both of them were to pro—
pound it, in somewhat different forms, over the next
three years. Prussia and Austria, by its terms, were to
cooperate to reject the proposals being worked out in
Frankfurt, then organize between them a new executive
agency at the head of a confederation of German states.
The plan specifically rejected the idea of a federal state,
which seemed to be gaining acceptance in Frankfurt. The

Purpose of this plan was to protect Germany against the

 

79Hiibner, Ein Jahr meines Lebens, pp. 261-262.
8

OIbid.. p. 293-

 

 

 

 

 

outbreak of futu:
March, to Austri
Schwarzent
the Ministerrat
indicates the fi
limitations on
the right of th
Now regarded as
the Austrian E1
to be left to
government, ev
Even more reme
the Ministerr:
order to make
consisted of
a reconstitui
German and n,
fedEration.
federELtiVe (
Austr'lab-dm
Finally, as
Anarchy, Ge
imperial d‘
diSDatched

imposed by
\

81
A.
protokoll

A

 

 

 

 

385

outbreak of future revolutions which would spread, as in

March, to Austria and Prussia.

Schwarzenberg's decision to submit this plan to
the Ministerrat for its comments on December 12, 1848,
indicates the full extent to which he recognized not only
limitations on the Foreign Ministry's authority, but also
the right of the Ministerrat to formulate foreign policy.
Now regarded as the most fundamental foreign problem of
the Austrian Empire, the German question was too important
to be left to a single specialized department within the
government, even when its chief was the premier himself.
Even more remarkable was the determination with which
the Ministerrat undertook revisions of the program in
order to make it a truly collective effort. These revisions
consisted of clarifications of Austria's conditions for
a reconstituted Germany. All territories of the Empire,
German and non—German alike, were to enter the new con—
federationt Within this confederation, more limited
federative organizations could exist, as long as the
Austrian—dominated larger body kept final authority.
Finally, as a further protection against revolutionary
anarchy, Germany was to be consolidated into six or eight

imperial districts.81

In the note that Schwarzenberg
dispatched to Berlin on December 13, these conditions,

imposed by the Ministerrat, were included as part of the

 

81Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Dec. 12, 1848, session.

 

 

 

 

H—____—_— -__

386

. 82
Austrian program.

On December 26, 1848, there occurred another Minister-
rat session in which the German question received primary
attentiont The minutes of this meeting show as does no
other document the extent to which the future constitutional

form of Austria was bound up with the German question,

 

and it consequently provided at the time the fullest possible
justification for the participation of the Ministerrat

in all aspects of Austria's relationship to Germany. In

the interval between the December 12 and December 26
Ministerrat sessions, Schmerling, the Austrian premier

of the German Imperial Cabinet in Frankfurt and advocate

 

of a_g§ossdeutsche solution to the German problem, was

 

 

voted out of his post. He was replaced by Heinrich von
Gagern, President of the Frankfurt Parliament and an

avowed Kleindeutscher. On December 18, Gagern presented

 

to the Parliament his program for a unified German state.
By its terms, Austria was to be excluded from Germany in
all essential respects.83 The Prussian government im—
mediately showed itself inclined toward accepting Gagern's
program, sending to Vienna a note, dated December 25,

in which Austria was urged for the sake of Germany to

 

82Printed in Helfert, Geschichte Osterreichs, 4/l,
Appendix, pp. 2—5, Memorandum of Dec. 13, 1848, over
German affairs, communicated to Graf Brfihl, the Prussian

special emissary to Vienna.

83Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 1:387-388.

 

 

 

 

 

387

embrace this kleindeutsch program.

As a knowledgeable diplomat with direct experience
in this conflict of conceptions about Germany, Schmerling
was summoned to the Ministerrat session of December 26
to offer advice at this crucial turning point. He de-
manded that Austria seize the initiative on the constitu—
tional question rather in Frankfurt than in Berlin, thereby

placing herself in the grossdeutsch camp. The natural

 

result of Austrian success in such a policy would have
meant, he thought, the eventual acquisition by the
Habsburg emperor of the German imperial crown. But the
acquired crown would be one created by a popularly elected
parliament which would insist on its continued right to
exist and on the continued participation of Austria in
its activities and deliberations. The storm of protest
Which immediately broke forth in the Ministerrat when
Schmerling had finished presenting his program was moved
by fears of the disintegrative effect that program, if
implemented, would have on the non—German lands of Austria.
A German emperor with a crown bestowed on him by a German
parliament could not rule Hungary, Italy or any of the
Slavic lands. Schmerling's plan could be accepted only
if the new constitution to be drawn up for Austria was
made sufficiently federalistic to justify legally the
certain decrease in the Habsburg Monarch's ability to

control his non—German lands as a result of his tying

 

 

 

 

388

himself tightly to a German national state.8u That con—
stitution did not yet exist, and although it was not ap-
parent at the time, the one which did emerge, the one
upon which Austria's stance toward the German question
was ultimately based, was in fact destined by the pre-
dispositions of its eventual formulators, the Ministerrat
members themselves, to be very different from the feder-
alistic type that would have accommodated the ggossdeutsch
PrOgram of Schmerling.

Such were the considerations foremost in the minds
of the Ministerrat members as they began in January their
deliberations on the Austrian constitution of March 4,
1849. Between late December and the promulgation of the
constitution, the Ministerrat did not discuss German affairs,
just as it did not discuss Italian or Hungarian affairs.
But Germany, Italy and Hungary were all very much on the
minds of the members, and Schwarzenberg's Foreign Ministry,
far from dictating foreign policy as it appeared outwardly,
was in fact awaiting during these weeks the final judgment
by the collective leadership about the bases on which
policy toward all three of these foreign policy areas
was to be formulated in the future. As was true in Italy
and Hungary, Schwarzenberg's actions toward Germany in

the first part of 1849 constituted a holding pattern,

 

84Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—

protokolle, K 3, Minutes of the Dec. 26, 1848, session.
Also printed in Redlich, Das 6sterreichische Staats— und
Reichsproblem, 1/2336-

 

 

389
an attempt to prevent the Frankfurt and Prussian plans
for Germany from developing any further before he could
get from the Ministerrat the collective leadership’s
directive, in the form of the constitution, concerning
Austria's future relationship to Germany.

In this context can best be understood his renewed
appeal of January 17, 1849, to Prussia for the adoption
of a common attitude of defiance toward Frankfurt. He
openly admitted in this appeal that Austria remained un—
certain of her future relationship to Germany, thereby
confessing to his current inability to formulate a positive
program.85 The Prussian government, on the other hand,
showed itself eminently capable of formulating a positive
program. It came in the form of a January 23, I849, cir—
cular dispatch to all of the courts of Germany, and it
advocated the adOption of the Gagern program for German
unification, emphasizing for good measure the predominant
position to be filled by Prussia in this scheme.86 Schwarz—
enberg responded to this demarche with another device to
win time. He issued orders on February 4 for two special
emissaries, Rechberg and Brenner, to revive the proposal
made by Schwarzenberg to the Berlin Cabinet on December 13

at the Ministerrat's behest. This time, however, the

85Helfert, Geschichte Usterreichs, 4/1, Appendix,
pp. ll-12, Schwarzenberg to Brfihl, Jan. 17, 1849.

86

 

Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik

Qsterreichs, 2:16.

 

 

 

 

 

 

390

proposal was not to be presented in Berlin, as part of

an effort to settle the German question between the two
Great Powers, but rather in Hanover, Saxony, Wfirttemberg
and Bavaria, in an attempt to block the combined forces
of Berlin and Frankfurt from carrying through the Gagern
Program. In.an addendum for Rechberg alone, who was to
go to Munich and Stuttgart, Schwarzenberg imparted further
instructions to be left in the course of his travels with
Schmerling, Austria's ambassador to the Frankfurt Imperial

Ministry since his Ministerrat appearance of December 26,

"One of his [Schmerling's] most primary concerns,"

"will have to be to win time, not

1848.

asserted the Premier,

just because we can expect within a few days, weeks or

months a turn favorable to us in Frankfurt, but for reasons

of internal politics estimated in terms of Austrian con—

ditions."87 0n the same day, Schwarzenberg revealed to

the Wfirttemberg ambassador the character of the con-

stitutional problem for Austria and gave a clear statement

0f the solution in the process of formulation by the

Ministerrat:

Emperor Franz Joseph has his crown, he wishes no other;

if another were offered him, it could cause only
the Emperor has enough to do for him—

embarrassment; .
self; but if the imperial office were transferred to
another monarch, we could not accept this . . . .

87Printed in Helfert, Geschichte Osterreichs, 4/3:
427—428, Instructions of Feb. 4, 1849, for Rechberg and

Brenner.

 

 

 

 

391

We shall not allow ourselves to be thrown out of

 

Germany.
The clear intent was to maintain Austria for an Austrian

emperor and not to allow another force to create a new

German state that could exclude Austria from her traditional

sphere of activity. But so far, it was only an intention,

and until it was realized by the completion of the con-
stitution, Austria could do no more on the international
front than play for time, using for its purposes essentially

negative and divisive tactics.
If this interpretation of Austrian policy—making

toward Germany in the late months of 1848 and the first
part of 1849 is correct, then it carries some rather im-
portant implications for the way in which subsequent policy

was made toward Italy, Hungary and Germany, for Schwarzen—

berg's own political character, and for the authority of

the Foreign Ministry in policy formulation. The Italian

and Hungarian problems were both issues which, like the
German issue, were fundamentally dependent for their

solution on the constitutional form to be assumed by the

Monarchy. The close relationship between foreign policy

and domestic needs never emerges as clearly in these two

cases as it does in the German question, primarily because
no records comparable to the minutes of the December 26,

1848, Ministerrat session exist for the Italian and

 

88Quoted in Veit Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen
Revolution, 2 vols. (Berlin: Ullstein, 1930), 2:361.

 

 

392
Hungarian questions. But the forceful implication that
the constitutional question had to be solved before positive
measures could be taken by the government on the German
question applies equally to Italy and Hungary in this
period. All of that is logical enough. The surprising
fact, in view of the decisive nature of Schwarzenberg's
personality, the virtual dictatorship over policy which
he was able to exert in October and November 1848, and
his unique opportunity to hand—pick the ministers who
were to constitute the Ministerrat, is that Schwarzenberg
fully accepted the Ministerrat's interpretation of its
own fundamental role in each of these cases. Except for
the formulation by the Ministerrat of the December 13
German program, no major step toward actually solving
any of the foreign policy problems was taken by any govern—
mental agency between the first convening of the Minister—
rat in November 1848 and the promulgation.of the March 4
constitution. Everything emanating from the Foreign
Ministry was holding action. Only after March 4 did the
Italian, Hungarian and German questions receive truly
positive action, and the action received its basic stamp
from the discussions in the Ministerrat.

Schwarzenberg was not compelled to yield to the
authority of the Ministerrat. He had demonstrated his
ability to make important foreign policy decisions in
June 1848 and again in September and October 1848. He

had won the confidence of the military and of the court,

 

 

 

 

 

 

393

which after December 2 was under the direction of a capable,
if very young and inexperienced emperor. He had created
the new government himself, so that each of its members
owed him his loyalty. Schwarzenberg could very probably
have become a dictator after the suppression of Vienna.
Instead, he put together a government of very capable
individuals who claimed the right to make policy concerning
all matters of common interest. These matters included
foreign affairs, and Schwarzenberg yielded willingly to

the claim. The conclusion is inescapable: Schwarzenberg
was a constitutionalist.89 He certainly did not believe

in parliaments or popular influence on policy. But neither
did he believe in the authoritarian rule of a monarch who
could exert unlimited control over the state's political
life, foreign and domestic, using his ministers only as
tools or, at best, advisers, in the imposition of his
will. Policy formulation had to occur as a collective
effort through a corporative institution in which all
lines of policy determinants came together and were care—
fully evaluated. A regular procedure to be followed by

a group of officially responsible public servants existed
and was to be maintained, and not even Schwarzenberg was
exempt from it. This was borne not of power~hunger, of

which Schwarzenberg has been accused in the context of

89This is a conclusion arrived at on the basis of
evidence drawn from the later period of transition toward
neo-absolutism by Helmut Rumpler in his introductory volume
to the Ministerrat und Ministerratsprotokolle, 1848-1867.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

394
the struggle with the absolutist Kiibeck in 1851,90 but

rather of a desire to place the state on a modern and
functionally sound political and administrative base in
order for it to meet the very severe problems it faced
in these early years.

With the Ministerrat forming the central point of
decision-making, the authority of the Foreign Ministry
was strictly subordinated to it. Because Schwarzenberg
believed in the rightness of the Ministerrat's central
role, the influence of the Foreign Office bureaucracy,
as noted in the earlier chapters, was quite limited in
1849 and early 1850. For Schwarzenberg, the primary foreign
policy formulation process was to occur among the ministers
rather than among the professional bureaucrats on the
Ballhausplatz. The latter group, and particularly Werner,
was important to Schwarzenberg in providing the information
necessary for formulating his own standpoints which he
in turn brought to the discussions held at the highest
level of government. It is true, moreover, that Schwarzen—
berg's vieWpoint was more often than not accepted by the
other ministers as the course to be taken on a foreign
issue. To the extent that the Foreign Minister's viewpoint
was shaped by his senior advisers, therefore, the Foreign
Office bureaucracy exerted influence on Austrian policy.

But Schwarzenberg's position on any given issue was

_

4 90Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien.Kolowrat,
P- 35-

 

 

I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

395

nevertheless open to review by the Ministerrat, and that

 

prevented the Foreign Ministry from exerting a dictatorial
influence on policy. There is little wonder, under these
conditions, that Thierry could complain in late 1849 about
his inability to push through for the Emperor's approval
even the most insignificant of his projects.91
Outwardly at least, the Ministerrat remained the
center of decision-making on German affairs, as well as
on the few other matters of international concern with
which Austria had to deal, until the end of 1850. The
minutes reveal substantive discussions on basic policy,
reports by Schwarzenberg on the receipt of important in—
formation from foreign governments and from the Austrian
ambassadors in Frankfurt and Berlin, and close scrutiny
of draft dispatches intended by the Foreign Ministry for
various German political authorities.92 The details of
the course of the German question need not be repeated
here. Suffice it to say that the Austrian constitution
of March 4, 1849, drawn up by the Ministerrat with
Schwarzenberg at its head, placed Austrian and Prussian

interests in Germany on a collision course. In the

 

 

9lAustria, HHStA, PA 1, K 5330, Rechberg Nachlass,
Thierry Letter to Rechberg, Vienna, Dec. 21, 1849.

92The instances are too numerous to enumerate, but
discussions of the German question are to be found in
the minutes of Ministerrat sessions at frequent intervals
in 1849-1850: Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 3—7.

 

 

396
political centralization for which it provided, the con-
stitution precluded the possibility of dividing juridically
and administratively the Habsburg Empire in such a manner
that the German crownlands could become a part of the
prospective new German organization, while the non-German

portions could remain outside of it, as had been the case

 

under the pre-1848 Confederations Now either all or none
of the Habsburg Empire had to be included. In the former
case,.Austria would establish hegemony in an empire of
seventy million souls by weight of numbers. In the latter,
Austria would become more an Eastern European, Slavic
empire than the Central European, German Empire upon which
all Habsburg traditions had rested for the preceding
six centuries. The latter case, because of those traditions,
was no alternative at all.

Various formulae were attempted in an effort to
persuade the Prussians to accept a position subordinate
to Austria in a Germany defined in this vastly expanded
sense of seventy million persons. Playing at first on
the threat of revolution, a cooperative dualistic policy
was proposed. Later a trialistic program, in which Austria,

Prussia and the larger kingdoms of the "Third Germany"

 

would hold the executive power, was developed. Prussia
proposed forming a purely German federation-~the Union
Proposal--over which she would have control and which
Would be included in the larger Empire of seventy millions

in.which Austria would remain the leading authority.

 

 

 

397

The dualistic program was tried, without lasting success,
during the period of the Interim, lasting from September
1849 until April 1850. Superimposed over all of these

were the plans for economic union advocated chiefly by
Commerce Minister Bruck and consistently resisted by the
Prussians, who saw their own already existing Customs

Union as their best resource in extending their influence
over Germany.93 None of these pr0posals or counter-
proposals could have solved the basic conflict between
Austrian insistence on hegemony and Prussian demands for

at least equal status in Central Europe. Out of frustration
more than out of a conviction of its effectiveness, the
Austrian government simply recalled the old Bundestag to
Frankfurt upon the expiration of the Interim in April
1850.94 Returning to a legalistic insistence on the
fulfillment of her rights in Germany as guaranteed by

the 1815 treaties was at least in part an admission of

the Austrian government's failure to develop a constructive,
workable program for the protection of its traditional
interests in Germany under the terms of the constitution

of its own creation. And to that extent, the ministerial

 

93Many thorough discussions of these various pro—
jects exist, most notably Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, vols.
l—2; Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, vol. 2:
Friedjung, "Mitteleuropdische Zollunionsplane, 1849~1853:"
and.Alfred Gartner, Der Kampf um den Zollverein zwischen
%ste§reich und Preussen von 1849 bis 1853 (Strassburg,
911 .

9LPFriedjung, Osterreich von 1848 his 1860, 2:41.

 

..L-A-fi." W

 

 

 

 

 

398
system created by Schwarzenberg began to lose its authority.
The change in institutional relationships starting
around April 1850 was subtle and is only dimly perceptible.
Indeed, the Ministerrat was consulted as frequently on
German issues after this date as before. Almost daily

reports on the course of the Austro-Prussian dispute over

 

the right of Confederal troops to suppress a revolt in
the Electorate of Hesse in November 1850, a dispute that
led to the brink of war, were submitted by Schwarzenberg
to the ministers.95 Substantive consultations remained
in evidence. But there was occurring simultaneously an
almost indefinable intrusion of other agencies into the
decision—making process. The high nobility murmured with

96

increasing vehemence against war with Prussia. Anton
Freiherr von Prokesch—Osten, the Austrian ambassador in
Berlin, became more specific and more insistent in his
advice over the course to be pursued by Schwarzenberg

toward the perfidious Prussians.97 Franz Joseph himself,

heretofore entirely absent from the course of policy

___

95Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv3 Ministerrats-
protokolle, K 7, Nov. 1850. Srbik, Deutsche Einheit,
vol. 2, and Friedjung, Osterreich von 1 bis 1 0,
vol. 2. discuss the crisis at length.

 

96Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:112.

97Anton Freiherr Prokesch von Osten, Aus den Briefen
des Grafen Prokesch von Osten, 1849-1855, ed. Anton Graf
Prokesch von Osten (Vienna: Gerold, 1896), pp. 129—194.

 

 

 

 

399
formulation, began to assert himself in the Ministerrat.98
He began to make a habit, moreover, of demanding the
submission to him of proposals on all types of foreign
issues, yet returned them to the Ministerrat, more often
than not, without resolution.99 This was probably an
immature attempt to assert the independence denied him
by Schwarzenberg and the other ministers since his

accession,loo but its effect was to impede the Ministerrat

in performing its functions. Equally as serious, and

ultimately more so, was the order of October 21, 1849,

evidently initiated by Franz Joseph himself, attracted

as he was from his earliest years to all things military,
to transfer authority over army operations and personnel

questions affecting the upper officer corps from the
War Ministry to the General Staff and the First Adjutant-

General.101 Both of these latter agencies were under the

Emperor's direct control and were not represented in the

.Ministerrat, which thereby lost one critical source of

foreign policy determinants. This loss was a problem

 

98Most notably in September 1850—-Austria, HHStA,
Kabinetts—Archiv,.Ministerratsprotokolle, K 7.

92Heller, “Aus den ersten zwei Jahrzehnten der
Regierung Franz Josephs," p. 20.

loowalter, Die Geschichte der.Ministerien Kolowrats,

p. 361.

lOtAustria,.HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Notenwechsel, Note
from the War Ministry to the Foreign Ministry, Nov. 12,

1849.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

400

which was to become fateful under Buol. And finally, the

senior Beamten of the Foreign Office seem to have become

far more influential on German policy in mid—1850, as

argued in the earlier chapters.
As suggested, the deepest reason for the Minister—

rat's loss of authority relative to other institutions

was probably its failure to develop a German policy that

worked to Austria's advantage. The fact that the task

was insoluble without extreme risks to the state was no
cause for outside persons or bodies to show patience
toward this body, for the Ministerrat's own creation,

the March 4 constitution, was what made it insoluble.
Moreover, the Ministerrat was not defended as the sole
legitimate policy—making institution as it had been a

heart and soul of the

year earlier. The creator,

Ministerrat was Schwarzenberg, and he was a dying man
by 1850. Perhaps the greatest fault of the system he
established in late 1848 arose from his decision to become

both Foreign Minister and Minister—President. The pressures
102

of the two offices were simply too great for one man.
At first, his extraordinary energy had prevented him from
falling into the trap, to which Ficquelmont had become

victim, of neglecting the responsibilities of one post
in favor of those of the other. But by 1850, Kfibeck,

the.Austrian representative to the Frankfurt Central

logKempen: Tagebuch, p. 171, record of conversation

held with Thierry on.Mar. 26. 1850.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

#01
Executive Authority, complained loudly to Werner that
Schwarzenberg never responded to any of his dispatches,
even the most important.103 Crucial as the Bundestag
was for Austrian policy at this time, such behavior was
highly peculiar, even according due weight to Schwarzen-
berg's dislike for Kfibeck, and it can probably be explained
only by an inability to maintain the torrid pace demanded
by the two posts.

For one last time, in November 1850 when the over-
riding concern of the Austrian.Empire became a foreign
crisis and the responsibilities of the Foreign Minister
and Minister-President therefore coincided, Schwarzenberg
responded in the forceful manner to which his associates
had been accustomed in 1849. In his response, he defended
the integrity of the Ministerrat as the sole legitimate
policy-making institution by consulting regularly with
its members during the daily development of the crisis.

As a military man with a great deal of courage, Schwarzen—
berg was at his best in a showdown with an adversary whom
he despised. Determined to force Prussia to recognize

the authority of the Bundestag which he had reconvened
in.April, Schwarzenberg utilized the domestic crisis in
Hesse, a principality which lay astride the road between
Prussia's main territory in the East and her provinces

in the Rhineland, and which was a part of the Prussian

 

lOBKfibeck. Taggbficher. pp- 217-218, Letter to Werner,
Frankfurt, Sept. 1. 1850-

 

402
Union scheme, to assert the dominance of the Austrian—led
Confederation in.German affairs, regardless of how much
these affairs may have affected Prussia's own interests.
Gradually throughout November, Prussia was forced to give
up first its Union plan for a federation within the Con—
federation, then to recognize all rights claimed by Frank-
furt in the suppression of revolution in Germany. Not
satisfied with her specifically expressed assurances to
this effect, Schwarzenberg issued an ultimatum on November
2h threatening war if Prussia resisted in any way the
Confederal troops' occupation of Hesse. That led to the
Olmfitz meeting of November 28 and 29, during which Prussia

was forced to a humiliating retreat.104

Throughout the
entire month, the Ministerrat seems once again to have
been the primary institution in charge of Austrian policy.
If the Emperor was involved, there is no evidence of it.
The crisis had temporarily papered over the long-apparent
cracks in the policy-making apparatus.

But it was only the crisis, and Schwarzenberg's
known adeptness in responding to crises, that prolonged
the authority of the Ministerrat through the end of the
year. For already in October, the decision to place the
Monarchy on a course leading back to absolutism had been

taken. Schwarzenberg, paradoxically, was himself respon-

sible for the creation of the institution, the Reichsrat,

l—h‘

louFriedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860. 2:87*

127.

 

 

 

 

 

 

was losing ground.

403

which was to form the vanguard of this transformation,

without, however, having intended the attainment of the

result which ultimately emerged. He had given to Franz

Joseph in early October a memorandum written by Kfibeck
in March 18fl9 concerning the desirability of establishing

the non-responsible Reichsrat provided for in.the constit—

ution as the emperor's chief advisory body. Kfibeck having

been recalled from Frankfurt on October 1, 1850, Franz
Joseph asked him to elaborate on this idea.105 Kfibeck
promised to do so, then visited Schwarzenberg on October

20 to discuss the question. He found Schwarzenberg

interested in the creation of the Reichsrat only as a

means of support for the besieged Ministerrat:

He [Schwarzenberg] discussed the Reichsrat affair

very superficially and I could learn only that he

and the other influential ministers indeed desire the
Reichsrat, but in a form which will serve them ac-
cording to conditions as a relief, and will at the

same time make the institution innocuous. The Reichs-
rat is to serve as a means to strengthen the ministerial

power where it is deemed necessary, but6is otherwise
to remain without specific influence.

Kfibeck's conception of the Ministerrat and the prospective

Reichsrat, as we shall see, was very different from

Schwarzenberg's view. More important here is the point

that Schwarzenberg, in both a political and personal sense,

The constitutional position of the

 

lojKfibeck, Aus dem NachlasS. pp- 52-53. diary entry

of Oct. 19, 1850.

106

Ibid., p. 53, diary entry of Oct. 20, 1850.

 

 

 

 

404
Ministerrat as sole policy-maker was being challenged
and that meant that he, as the creator and the defender
of that institution conceived in those terms, was losing
his authority.

The definitive date for the beginning of the
transition toward absolutism should probably be considered
December 5, 1850, for on that day Kfibeck was officially
named Reichsrat President and entrusted with its organ:
ization.107 But the preparations for this had originated
as far back as March or April 1850 when it became clear
that the governmental form as it then existed was not
capable of solving Austria's deepest problem, domestic
as well as foreign-~the German question. The new system
was not to solve it either, and foreign policy—making
was to suffer in quality as a result of the retreat from
collective leadership. Foreign policy formulation was
to factionalize and the activities of several interested
and mutually isolated agencies in this sphere were to
become disjointed and contradictory. By far the dominant
authority was to remain vested in the Foreign Minister,
but the input of policy determinants was to become severely
constricted. The Foreign Minister's central reference
point would no longer be the collective leadership of
the entire state apparatus represented in the Ministerrat,

but rather that institution with which he had most

107Ibid., p. 56.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

405
immediate contact——the Foreign Office. It is thus no
coincidence that the Foreign Ministry's authority over
foreign policy increased at the same time and in the same
degree that the authority of the Ministerrat decreased.

From a period in 1848 of absolute impotence, the Foreign

 

Ministry rose under Schwarzenberg to a position of sig—
nificance, but also of clear and regulated subordination

to the Ministerrat. Its primary function of analyzing

and representing external determinants on foreign policy
was fulfilled through the Ministerrat, and in a healthy,
balanced relationship to the functions of other, chiefly
domestically oriented agencies. The policies which emerged,
while reasonably successful under the circumstances in
Hungary and Italy, did not, it is true, succeed in Germany,
but that was due to factors lying outside the realm of
governmental organization and even outside the realm of
Austrian control. It had to do partly with poor evaluations
of the data at hand by the leading members of the govern-

ment, and Schwarzenberg, who consistently overestimated

 

Austria's power, was no less culpable for that than the
rest. .After 1850, the problem was more than simply wrong
evaluations. Because of the newly constructed form of
government, the balance in the input of foreign policy
determinants was broken, so that accurate evaluations
became so much the more difficult. That is the story of
Austrian foreign relations from 1851 until 1856, and the

Foreign Ministry's part in it forms the plot of the final

chapter.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND NEO—ABSOLUTISM.
1851—1856

The change which took place in Austrian foreign
policy-making in early 1851 was sudden and drastic.
Whereas foreign affairs were discussed in the Ministerrat
frequently, usually each week, sometimes every day, from
the proclamation of the constitution in March 1849 through
December 1850, months, and eventually years were to pass
after 1850 between sessions at which the Ministerrat
(later Ministerkonferenz) received information on or was
asked to pass judgment on foreign policy issues. Collec-
tive leadership in the foreign policy field had been chal-
lenged, as discussed earlier, by various persons and
institutions since early 1850: what iS remarkable is the
suddenness with which it collapsed in January 1851 after
having apparently triumphed in principle during the German
crisis of November 1850. No major changes in personalities
had occurred in the interval to cause this fateful turn.
Kfibeck had become Reichsrat President on December 5, 1850,
but he did not intervene in foreign affairs to any signif—
icant degree for many months. Otherwise, all those persons

previously engaged in foreign policy formulation remained

406

 

 

 

 

 

407
at their posts. Nor did the nature of the foreign issues
facing Austria change. The Dresden Conferences, convened
to discuss the future form of Germany, may not have been
so breathtaking as the November events culminating with
Olmfitz, but they were certainly as important for Austrian
interests as these. Protracted exchanges throughout 1851
and 1852 over the proposed customs union were very com—
parable in significance to the diplomatic correspondence
over Germany's political form which occupied the courts
of all of the states of Central Europe in 1849 and 1850.
Yet neither these issues, nor the question of Louis
Napoleon's acclamation in 1852 as hereditary emperor,
nor the renewed Italian crisis of 1853, nor the Balkan
issue of 1852—1853, received more than the most superficial
attention in the Ministerrat (Ministerkonferenz). Most
notably, the Crimean War, into which each of these separate
issues merged in 1853, remained entirely absent as a
matter of discussion in the Ministerkonferenz.

The causes of the sudden collapse of the regular
system of collective leadership in the formulation of
foreign policy are to be sought in the changed relation—
ships between governmental agencies rather than in new
personalities or new types of issues. The catalyzing
agent in this rapid collapse of the former process of
decision-making was the Reichsrat, which had evoked a
fundamental transformation in the constitutional positions

Of the Ministerrat, the individual ministries and the

 

 

 

 

408
throne, even before it was formally constituted in April
1851. Although the full reversion to absolutism in a
form similar in many ways to that of the Metternichean

1 most of the important

era lasted for more than two years,
changes involving foreign policy-making and the Foreign
Ministry's role in it had already been made in early 1851.
Those that remained were to occur just at the end of the
process in early 1853. The changes in policy-making,
foreign and domestic, which occurred with Schwarzenberg's
death and replacement by Buol in April 1852, were of minimal
importance compared to what had gone before and was to

come later. To describe the much more significant instit—
utional changes, insofar as they related to the process

of foreign policy-making, and to identify their effects

On the responses made by the Habsburg Monarchy to foreign
issues prior to and during the Crimean War, are the two
Purposes of this final chapter.

Before leaving for Dresden where he was to open the
conferences intended to hammer out a new state organization
for Germany, Schwarzenberg had been instructed by Franz
Joseph to join with Kfibeck in naming members of a commission
charged with drafting a sphere of competence schema for

2

the Reichsrat. By the time Schwarzenberg had returned

 

lWalter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,
gives an excellent account of the process; PP._434—578.

2

Ibid., p. 443.

 

 

409
to Vienna on January 15, 1851, the commission's work,
which had been.directed toward delimiting Reichsrat func-
tions only in terms specific enough to permit its formal
constitution, had been finished. Schwarzenberg was sur—
prised by the results. While a minority of the commission
members had consistently advocated the erection of an
agency with functions supportive rather than independent
of the Ministerrat, as Schwarzenberg and Bach had wished,
the majority, Kfibeckamong them, foresaw a body entirely
separate from the ministerial apparatus in its personnel
composition and in its political and legal authority.
It was to be a purely advisory body, to be sure, but was
to perform the advisory function solely as an agent of
the emperor, who was to have unlimited power to appoint
its members and to determine the as yet indefinite agenda
with which it could deal.3 Kfibeck‘s painstaking assurances
to the contrary notwithstanding, Schwarzenberg most
certainly recognized the serious threat to theauthority
Of the Ministerrat as the legally constituted executive
organ of government when he received the preliminary draft
of the Reichsrat statute on January 16, 1851. If it were
to be implemented, the most fundamental principles arising
from the 1848 reforms and from the March 4, 1849, con-
stitution, whereby the Ministerrat became the central

point of government and whereby its collective membership

*—

3Ibid., pp. 450—454.

 

 

 

410
was responsible for all activities of the government,
would have been negated.” In the place of the responsible
Ministerrat and collective leadership would advance the
non-responsible Reichsrat and absolute rulership by a
20-year—old emperor.

The effect on foreign policyemaking of this still
incipient transformation was instantaneous. Schwarzenberg
had delivered on January 15 a fairly detailed account
of the progress made at the Dresden Conferences.5 He
learned the contents of the proposed Reichsrat statute
on the following day. On January 17, he imparted a very
brief notice to the Ministerrat about a prospective change
of ministries in Paris. Ten days later he returned to
the same subject in equally brief fashion.6 On July 21,
1851, a discussion took place about Austria's future trade
relations with South America, and on October 13, 1851,

a matter involving the settlement of a war debt transaction
with Parma was resolved.7 That was all. Between January
16, 1851, and Schwarzenberg‘s death on April 5» 1852.

these four instances, very minor in relation to the much

more important issues of German unification and a Central

 

uIbid., p. 453.

5Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 8, Minutes of the Jan. 15, 1851, session.

6

Ibid., Jan. 17 and 21 sessions.

71bid., K 9, July 21 and Oct. 13, 1851, sessions.

 

 

 

411

 

European customs union, constituted the sum total of
Austrian foreign policy-making by the collective leadership.
In a comparable period prior to December 1850, the number
of substantive discussions of foreign affairs in the
Ministerrat had run into the hundreds.

The reasons for this suspension of foreign political
activity in the Ministerrat varied over the fifteen months
that Schwarzenberg was to remain its chief. At first,
it was certainly a question of priorities. The draft
given Schwarzenberg by Kfibeck was potentially a threat,
but it was only provisional and required approval and

further refinements by the Ministerrat before it became

 

clear what relationship between ministerial and absolutist

 

institutions would evolve. Schwarzenberg found himself
in an embarrassing position in this process. He had,
after all, personally revived the idea of the Reichsrat
in October 1850 and had convinced the Emperor of its de—
sirability, although in a form very different from that
which had confronted him in January.8 Franz Joseph him—

self, having been strongly influenced by his mother,

Sophie, and other reactionary members of the Imperial

\0

Court, such as his religion tutor, BishOp Othmar Rauscher,

had been an absolutist at heart from his accession to

 

8Kiibeck, Aus dem Nachlass, pp. 52—53. diary entry
of Oct. 19, 1850.

9Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 1:102;
2:209.

 

 

 

 

 

412

the throne and had been prevented from effecting his
favored method of rule only by the intimidating presence
of men like Schwarzenberg, who were much more experienced
and indeed in possession of much more native intelligence
and ability than he. Perhaps because of an unhealthy
recognition of this considerable difference in personal
capabilities, Schwarzenberg had treated Franz Joseph too
brusquely and too condescendingly in 1849 and 1850.10
With the failure of the Ministerrat, and specifically

the Minister-President, to attain a satisfactory solution
to the German question, Franz Joseph found his chance
for revenge. He seized on the Schwarzenberg proposal
for the creation of a Reichsrat, transformed it in his
own mind into an institution promoting his own absolute
rule, and in early 1851, fully supported Kfibeck, whose
conception coincided completely with his own.

To avert a confrontation in which he would have
been fairly certainly defeated, Schwarzenberg thus had
to support a proposal which he found distasteful and
attempt to alter it as it became more precise in such
a way as to circumscribe the jurisdictional spheres of
the Reichsrat and thus to retain some authority for the
Ministerrat. Pressured by an impatient Emperor, the

Ministerrat had little time during the latter half of

January 1851 for indulging in foreign policy discussions.

 

lOWalter, Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,

pp. 361, 434.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

413
That was equally true for the six weeks following Schwarzen-
berg's formal submission on February 1 of the proposed

11 The Premier's

Reichsrat statute to the Ministerrat.
concern could not have been alleviated by Kfibeck's re-
ceipt on February 1 of a Russian memorandum describing

the spheres of activity claimed by the tsar's Imperial
Council. One of the areas listed in this piece, written
by a friend of Kfibeck, Ludwig von Tegoborski, specified
"war declarations, peace treaties and other measures which
affect the foreign affairs of the state, insofar as cir-

cumstances permit their provisional general discussion"

as a sphere of competence pertaining to the Russian
12

 

equivalent of the proposed Austrian Reichsrat. Kfibeck,

 

it is true, never made so explicit a claim as this to
supervision by the Reichsrat over foreign policy matters,13
but this could not have been known to Schwarzenberg in
February 1851. Rather, it must have appeared likely that
Kfibeck intended to use this institution, already operative
in St. Petersburg, as a model for that which he, with
the Emperor's full support, was building for Austria.

This Russian memorandum transformed the issue of

the Ministerrat's participation in foreign policy from

 

lllbido. see pp. 454-457 for a discussion.

12Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien
.Eglowrats: Aktenstfickg, pp. 117—122.

l‘3Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,
p. 454.

 

 

———_ __ _

 

 

 

414
a mere question of priorities into a much more fundamental
problem. It now became a constitutional question with
similarities to the period in early 1849 when the March
4 charter was in the process of formulation. .At that
time, Schwarzenberg as Foreign Minister sought to win
time on the international front until the Ministerrat
could establish the legal basis on which positive foreign
policy could be made. That legal basis was now Once again
called into question. If the Reichsrat, as the prime
support for the emperor's absolute power, was to claim
authority over foreign affairs, then where did that leave
the authority of the Ministerrat and the Foreign Ministry?
The Ministerrat, fairly obviously, would lose, or at
least be forced to share, its ultimate control over foreign
policy. Less clear was the role of the Foreign Ministry
in this scenario. If the Ministerrat was to maintain
a share of influence, the Foreign.Ministry would continue
to subordinate its activities to the will of the collec—
tive leadership. Otherwise, it would be responsible to
the emperor and his advisers. But would the Foreign
Ministry have a legal right to assist the emperor and
his advisers in formulating policy, or would it be reduced
to an administrative organ charged only with implementing
the emperor's independently formulated policy? It will
be remembered that the State Chancellery had held a
Position equal to that of the Staatsrat, which had been

Similar to the projected Reichsrat but limited to domestic

 

 

 

 

415
affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in maintaining
after 1848 the title "Ministry of the Affairs of the
Imperial House and Family," had not been explicitly stripped
of its historic role as advisory agency to the throne

1” But if the Reichsrat

in questions of foreign relations.
now added to the domestic functions of the old Staatsrat
authority over foreign affairs, then the role of the
Foreign Ministry in these would be thrown into great
confusion.

Schwarzenberg was a constitutionalist. Matters of
legal authority were not to be discarded lightly, as his
actions in 1848-1849 had already demonstrated and as his
overriding concern with the future governmental form in
1851 and 1852 would continue to demonstrate. It therefore
seemed necessary in February 1851 to resolve the constit-
utional issue and eliminate the confusion over the Foreign
Ministry's authority on foreign affairs before any further
policy decisions could be taken. By the end of the month,
Kfibeck was relieved that "at least the main points" of
the projected Reichsrat statute had been preserved in
a draft worked out in conference with Schwarzenberg and

Bach.15 Among those main points, no mention of authority

over foreign affairs was apparent.» That fact is probably

 

1“See above, p. 334.

l5Kiibeck, Aus dem Nachlass, p. 63, diary entry of
Feb. 26, 1851.

 

 

 

416
to be attributed to Schwarzenberg's attempt to limit as
much as possible the Reichsrat's sphere of competence.
Kfibeck noted repeatedly throughout the month that the

16 a behavior

Premier seemed to be pursuing evasive tactics,
that could only give the more outspoken constitutionalists
in the Ministerrat who were not caught in Schwarzenberg's
own dilemma an opportunity to solidify their opposition
to Kfibeck's plan. Even after the draft agreed upon at

the February 26 conference had been presented to the
Ministerrat, delays continued to occur until Franz Joseph
himself appeared at the March 3 session and crudely
demanded that it be accepted as definitive.17 Yet not
until March 17 was the statute finally approved, and then
only after Bach had switched to the absolutists' side.18
Although Schwarzenberg had consistently voted with the
absolutists, as was required by his precarious position,

he had done nothing to assist the Emperor in acquiring

its speedy passage. The Reichsrat was formally constituted
by imperial decree on April 13 and its members, none of

whom had any connection with or experience in foreign

affairs, were appointed.19

 

léIbid., pp. 62-63.

l7Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,
P. 466.

18Ibid., p. 477.

l9Ibid.

 

 

 

 

417

Schwarzenberg and the Ministerrat had thus succeeded
in preventing the realization of any possible plan to
incorporate foreign policy into the jurisdictional sphere
of the Reichsrat. But they had failed to prevent the
Reichsrat from coming into existence as a body which pre—
sented a direct challenge to the constitutionally claimed
right of the Ministerrat to make Austrian policy. To be
sure, the Ministerrat was not stripped of its corporative
character, nor was it reduced to a purely administrative
organ without political significance; that was to occur
several months later. But the challenge to its former
authority was sufficient to create confusion about its
actual legal position, and that in turn sufficed to render
unclear the Foreign Ministry's relationship to both the
Ministerrat and the crown in the sphere of policy form—
ulation. Bruck resigned as head of the Commerce Ministry
on May 19, 1851, partly because his ministry‘s own sphere
had suffered serious incursions by the Reichsrat, but

also because of the collapse of collective leadership.

 

He gave Kfibeck his reasons:

Increasingly, a leading principle and a definite

goal is disappearing in the ministry; neither the

one nor the other has ever been made clear among these
men [the ministers]. Foreign as well as domestic
policy is a farce and dependent on the fluctuation

of events and on the ideas of the Minister—President
and his prompter [Bach] which surface sometimes here,
sometimes there. No thorough discussion is possible
in the Ministerrat because everyone converses among
themselves and no trace of leadership of the

 

   

 

418

. . . 20

discuss1ons 18 to be found.
Bruck's indictment of the Ministerrat provides fur-

ther evidence21

that Schwarzenberg was not nearly the
leader later historians have claimed he was. More sig—
nificantly, however, it indicates the depths to which

the principle of collective leadership had fallen, even
in the eyes of those who wielded it. The implications

of this loss of regard were enormous for the manner in
Which foreign policy was made during this early stage of
the political system's transformation. In early 1849,
when collective leadership was considered sacred by most
of those who held real power in Vienna, Schwarzenberg
Played for time in his diplomatic activities while the
Ministerrat prepared for the moment at which it would
take control at the basic policy level. The Foreign
Ministry played a crucial but subordinate role in this
process. In early 1851, with collective leadershiphaving
been largely discredited by its failure to solve the
German question, playing for time by the Foreign Ministry
in diplomatic affairs would have been pointless. Such
activity during this period of constitutional uncertainty

would have benefited only the absolutistic Emperor and

-—_

20Kiibeck, Aus dem Nachlass, p. 70, diary entry of
May 26, 1851. *

21See also Austria, HH§§A, Hammer, "Notizen . . .
Schwarzenberg," and various observations to this effect
by Thierry (Kempen, Tagebuch, PP- 171-173. 189)-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

419

Reichsrat President, and hence a system of government
at variance with Schwarzenberg's constitutionalist beliefs.
It must have been clear to all by that time that Schwarzen-
berg was losing the struggle and that any temporizing
on the international front could only have the effect
of transferring more authority over foreign affairs from
the ministerial system into the Imperial Cabinet.

But with the collective leadership principle of
the Ministerrat in disrepute, the only alternative to
transferring the Ministerrat's former ultimate authority
over foreign policy to the Emperor was to transfer it
to the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry during
Schwarzenberg's last year thus became dictatorial in foreign
affairs, much as it had been in late October and November
1848, but without the optimism borne of the expectation
of a better system to come and without the blessing of
an energetic chief who was to show the world that Austria
still had no intention of forsaking either her existence
or her position as a Great Power. Whereas the Foreign
Ministry, itself in a state of rebirth, could look forward
in 1848 and early 1849 to becoming one of the leading
forces in the collective leadership's effort to modernize
Austria, it could now, in early 1851, only be regarded
as a forlorn bastion against the total usurpation of
POlicy—making functions by the Emperor and the Reichsrat.
The Foreign Ministry was now isolated, both in terms of

the input formerly derived from its membership in a

 

 

 

420
vibrant Ministerrat, and in terms of its functions, which
were now performed in a vacuum between a defunct Minister~
rat and an Imperial Court single-mindedly intent on
gathering all threads of domestic policy into its own
hands. The loss of direction and purpose in foreign
affairs noted by Bruck is reflected in a letter from

Schwarzenberg to Prokesch complaining bitterly about the

 

destruction of Austrian hopes for a revitalized Germany
at the Dresden Conferences:

I am, God knows, no admirer of the existing Confederal
constitution: we have toiled honorably to achieve

a sound and practical organization: if absolutely
nothing should come into existence, then all will
remain as before because a threadbare, ripped dress
is always better than none at all. In my humble
opinion, the old Bundestag is a ponderous, wornout
tool not at all suited to present conditions: I even
believe that the thoroughly convulsed, very shaky
boutique will collapse weakly at the next blow from
inside or outside. If they want to let it come to
that, we cannot prevent it.22

 

Defensive, depressed and fatalistic, the Schwarzenberg

Of 1851 was a changed man from the Schwarzenberg of 1848.
The change was due partly to his failing health. It is
also true that the Dresden Conferences were not the proper
means to restore either the Premier's spirits or the

political position of his government. Consenting at

 

Prussia's request to settle the German question by Austro-
Prussian cooperation, the Austrian government forsook

the advantage it had gained at Olmfitz, underestimated

—

, 22Schwarzenberg to Prokesch, March 29, 1851, printed
in Prokesch, Aus den Briefen, pp. 208-209.

 

 

¥ _

 

 

 

421
the strength of Prussia's anti-Austrian sentiment, and
ignored the influence which the numerous small states of
Germany could and did wield. For Austria, Dresden was
a bad idea from the beginning.23 But in addition to both
of these factors, Schwarzenberg had lost the institutional
support, previously derived from the Ministerrat, which
he had enjoyed when he threatened to go to war with
Palmerston over Italy in 1848, when he harrassed Tsar
Nicholas during the suppression of the Hungarian revol~

24 and when he threw the Turkish ambassador out of

ution,
his office upon learning that the Porte had deceived him

on the question of interning the Hungarian fugitives in
April 1850.25 With the loss of this support, Schwarzenberg,
preoccupied throughout 1851 with domestic affairs in any
case, lost his enthusiasm for foreign policy. Its form—
ulation, now exclusively in the hands of the Foreign
Ministry, thus fell to the permanent bureaucrats who fought
out their feuds over the question of Austrian relations

to Central Europe.

The Dresden Conferences ended on May 15 with a

return to the organization in Germany which had been

23Srbik discusses the Dresden Conferences at some
length in Deutsche Einheit, 2:103-120.

2“See above, pp. 378-379~

25An anecdote related by Hammer in "Notizen . .
Schwarzenberg."

 

 

422
current prior to the March revolutions of 1848.26 A
similarly reactionary trend gained strength a few weeks
later in the Austrian political structure after Kfibeck's
Reichsrat had completed its own organizational work and
had begun to advise the Emperor on institutional changes
necessary for a return to absolute rule. The first of
these involved a reversion in the provincial governorships
to the collegial method of decisionemaking common prior
to the modernizing work of 1849. From this, the next
logical step was the reintroduction of the collegial
system in the central government. But because such a
measure would have meant not only the dilution of minis—
terial power, but also the effectual dissolution of the
Ministerrat, Franz Joseph, for fear of provoking the
resignation of Schwarzenberg, his compliant if reluctant
ally in reaction, sought by moderating the forcefulness
of Kfibeck's arguments to assure his Premier that collegial
rule in the central government was not contemplated.27
The tactic succeeded and Schwarzenberg did not resign,
even though his attempts to delay the implementation of
the decree stripping the governorships of their non—

collegial character reveal that his concern.was not entirely

 

26Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik
_§terreichs, 2:33.

27Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,
pp. “’87-4900

 

 

 

 

423

allayed.28

Indeed, on the day after the decision was

taken to reorganize the governorships, Kfibeck confirmed

Schwarzenberg's worst fears by taking aim at the individual

ministries for the first time. He proposed that each

ministry be required to submit to Franz Joseph a sphere

of competence schema in order that the Emperor might be

better able to supervise each ministry's routine operations.

.After another session of coercion by the Emperor, Schwarzen-

berg and Bach obligingly submitted Kfibeck's proposal to

the Ministerrat on August 17, 1851, and immediately

secured its approval. Three days later, the Ministerrat

was definitively transformed into an institution responsible

solely to the Emperor, so that its originally intended

function as the supreme agency for policy formulation

finally became a thing of the past.29 On August 27, 1851,

each individual ministry, pursuant to the Kfibeck proposal,

received the order to submit without delay a description

Of its specific jurisdictional sphere to the Emperor.

Also demanded were ideas on a means to ensure the obser—

vation by each ministry of the limits of each sphere.30
This was the first direct and explicit challenge

to the Foreign Ministry's authority since 1848. Clearly

28Ibid., p. 497.

29lPiQ-. pp- 498—505-

30Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 9, Minutes of the Aug. 27, 1851, session.

 

 

 

424
intended to permit the close supervision by the Emperor
of each ministry's activities, the measure was a thinly
'veiled attempt to transform the character of the minis—
terial institutions from one of political importance
into one of mere administrative significance. .All pro—
posals developed during Ministerrat sessions were to be
presented to the emperor for his decision by the individual
ministries, rather than by the Minister—President, and
the directives resulting from the emperor's decisions were
to be imparted for implementation directly to the individual
ministry, rather than to the Ministerrat.31 The emperor,
rather than the Ministerrat, of which each ministry had
been an integral political part, was now the central point
0f government. And since the emperor's power was in~
divisible, each ministry now lost the former legal authority
it had enjoyed as a part of the Ministerrat. No exceptions
were made at this time for the Foreign Ministry. Faced
with the loss of political authority, the ministers made
no particular haste, as demanded by Franz Joseph, to take
Up the work of burying their own political careers. The
question of jurisdictional spheres was raised for the
first time only on September 22, 1851,32 and after dis-

cussing the future sphere of the Ministerrat for over a

—

31Ibid., Minutes of the Aug. 28, 1851, session.

“

32Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats.
p. 508.

 

 

 

425

month, the ministers finally decided on October 29 to
create a commission to work out the respective spheres
of the individual ministries.33 The results of all of
this work were finally presented in a common proposal
to the Emperor on January 9, 1852.34

Sometime during the course of the commission's
deliberations, Schwarzenberg drew from the governmental
transformation the inevitable conclusions as they applied
to the Foreign Ministry. He noted that prior to 1848,
state treaties negotiated by the Foreign Ministry were
initialed by the emperor, the State Chancellor and the
Foreign Office Desk Chief whose sphere the treaty con—
cerned. With the definitive establishment of ministerial
responsibility in 1848, the practice was changed so that
only the Foreign Minister and the emperor were authorized
to initial such state documents. But by 1851, the time
of ministerial responsibility was past, even for the
Foreign Minister, and it became only consistent to recog~
nize that the Foreign Minister was no longer anything
more than the first administrative officer of his ministry.

35

The pre—1848 practice was thus restored.

 

33Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts- Archiv, Ministerrats—
Protokolle, K 9, Minutes of the Oct. 29, 1851, session.

3”Printed in Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Minis—
isrien Kolowrats: Aktenstficke, pp. 135-188.

35Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-Archiv. Ministerrats—
Protokolle, K 9, Minutes of the Nov. 12,1851, session.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

426

Nevertheless, that measure did not sweep away the
confusion persisting since March 1848 over the Foreign
Ministry's legal position, for a return to the pre-1848
concept of central leadership had its positive as well
as negative effects on the Foreign Ministry's authority.
In its capacity as Ministry of the Imperial House and
Family Affairs, the Foreign Ministry had legally maintained
vis-a-vis the emperor a direct advisory function, one
that was free from the constraints placed on its other
functions by the Ministerrat. In a memorandum drawn up
on the issue in October 1851,36 and again in a note of
November 25, 1851, to the Finance Ministry, in.which he
demanded special rates of pay for Foreign Office Beamten,37
Schwarzenberg reaffirmed the Foreign Ministry's claim
to this function. Finance Minister Krauss, as noted

earlier,38

had argued since 1848 that the constraints
placed on the Foreign Ministry by the Ministerrat applied
to all of its functions, presumably not excepting those
pertaining to the Imperial House and Family. ‘With the
Ministerrat now practically defunct as an authoritative

institution by virtue of the January 9. 1852, proposal,

Krauss' argument was neutralized. His successor,

 

36See Appendix E.

37Referred to in a note of January 25, 1852, from
the Finance Ministry to the Foreign Ministry: Austria,
HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4, K 399, Organisierung.

38See above, p. 335.

 

 

 

 

427
Baumgartner, thus assented on January 25, 1852, to the
claim that, while the Foreign Ministry like the others
was indeed a non—responsible institution, it possessed
special prerogatives vis-a-vis the emperor that the others
did not possess.39 From that date until 1860, the legal
position of the Foreign Ministry was recognized as some-
thing special in relation to that of the other governmental
agencies of the Monarchy.

Politically, the functions of the Foreign Ministry

 

during this period of uncertainty regarding its constit—
utional position were fulfilled in isolation, much as

they had been during the Dresden Conferences. While it

was clear by mid-1851 that real authority over all govern-
mental activities was shifting to the Emperor and Reichsrat,
all of Franz Joseph's and Kfibeck's exertions seem to have
been directed toward the reorganization of the domestic
system. Foreign policy, as in the early part of the year
when the shift in power was still a threat rather than

a reality, thus remained the province solely of the Foreign
Ministry. It is true that Franz Joseph demanded and
regularly received packets of incoming correspondence

from foreign sources,“0 and it is certainly possible

 

39Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 399, Organisierung, Note from the Finance Ministry to
the Foreign Ministry, Jan. 25, 1852.

“9;p;g., PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 46, Schwarzenberg,
ProPosal, Mar. 24, 1851.

 

 

 

 

428
that he gave advice or even instructions to Schwarzenberg
for their disposition. But it is highly unlikely. The
Emperor was preoccupied with other matters and was woe-
fully inexperienced in foreign affairs. His insistence
on a moderate tone in Kfibeck's proposals for stripping
Schwarzenberg of his constitutional authority as head
of the Ministerrat can be construed as a sign of the Em—
peror's unwillingness to part with Schwarzenberg as Foreign
Minister. In proclaiming upon the latter's death that
foreign policy would be carried forth on.Schwarzenberg's
principles, he revealed the extent to which he had been
dependent on the man in this realm.41 His quarrel was
With Schwarzenberg the Minister-President, not Schwarzen-
berg the Foreign Minister.

With neither the Emperor nor the Ministerrat nor
any other institution interfering in foreign policy during
the eleven months between the failure at the Dresden
Conferences and Schwarzenberg's death, and with Schwarzen~
berg himself ill and preoccupied with other matters,
Habsburg foreign policy remained the product of the
aspirations and the designs of the occupants of the State
Chancellery offices. The major issues throughout 1851
revolved around the attempt to salvage what had eluded
Austria at Dresden, yet to do so in such a way as to

avoid antagonizing Prussia. These two strains, represented

__

41
p- 569.

Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

429
by different Foreign Office Beamten, proved as irrecon—
cilable as did the personalities of their proponents.
This irreconcilability became evident in the German
commercial question. The Prussian Customs Union since
1834 had included all German lands except Austria and

the Hanover—dominated Steuerverein. On September 7, 1851,

 

Prussia and Hanover concluded a treaty designed to in-

corporate all of the Steuerverein into the Customs Union

 

and thereby give Prussia economic hegemony in North

42 Long aware of the political importance of

Germany.
the question of economic union, Bruck had argued force—
fully in 1849 and 1850 in favor of convening conferences
for the purpose of expanding the German economic community
to include all of Austria. Schwarzenberg, it appears,

was willing to use Bruck's ideas, but primarily as bar-
gaining points for achieving more immediate political
objectives during these years.43 When the Commerce
Minister resigned in despair over the loss of the Minis—
terrat's power in foreign and domestic policy, and foreign
policy-making fell exclusively to a divided Foreign
Ministry, Bruck's economic plans for Central Europe became

dormant.

Having thus been unable to present forcefully any

ugSrbik, Deutsche Einheit, 2:189.

3Friedjung, "Mitteleuropaische Zollunionsplane,"
pp. 64~89.

 

 

430

positive plans of its own during the summer of 1851,LW

the Austrian government had no alternative but to react
bitterly and negatively to what it rightly considered
Prussian.attempts to force Austria from Germany when word
of the Prusso-Hanoverian treaty arrived in September.

The angry Schwarzenberg seized the initiative, now that
it was too late, by convening a conference of the South
German states, whose governments, more than any other

in Central Europe, dreaded Prussian hegemony. Intended
to threaten the establishment of a second customs union
under Austrian leadership, the conference, which opened
in Vienna on January 4, 1852, failed to persuade Prussia
that Austria was capable of bringing economic hardship

to the existing Customs Union if Berlin did not cease

its exclusionary tactics. Austria had failed for too
long to take the initiative in Germany, and powerful
voices in the South German kingdoms now began to recognize
that the wave of the future, at least in economic terms,
was to have its origins in Berlin rather than in Vienna.
The conference thus failed to produce a common position
With which to confront the participants in the simultaneous
and parallel Cassel Conference, convened by Prussia and

L15

including only current members of the Customs Union.

unHfibner complained on August 10, 1851, that,

although the states of the "Third Germany" were crying
out for Austrian leadership, the government did nothing
to encourage their hopes: Neun Jahre, 1:14.

 

45Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 2:193.

 

 

 

 

431
Although the fruitless discussions among the South German
representatives were still in progress at the time of
Schwarzenberg's death, the divisions within the Austrian
Foreign Office were to cause a fundamental shift in the
Austrian stance within weeks of Buol's accession.“6 By
virtue of this shift, Austrian support for the common
action sought by Schwarzenberg evaporated. For different,
if for equally fundamental reasons, therefore, Austria's
German policy remained ineffective in 1851 and 1852, just
as it had failed to produce a solution in 1849 and 1850.

The only other international question of significance

for Austria during this period was the coup d'état of

 

Napoleon III in December 1851. Since the Italian crisis,
Schwarzenberg had sought to maintain friendly relations
with France, bordering as she did on the German and Italian
lands in which Austrian interests were most involved.
France provided a valuable counterweight to British in—
fluence in northern Italy and to Prussia and, less directly,
to Russia in Germany. While Louis Napoleon's assumption
of dictatorial power in late 1851 may have occasioned

some concern about the possibility of a new French Empire,
the incipient threat of this could not offset the value

of French cordiality in discouraging revolution in Italy
and_the loss of Austrian hegemony in Germany. Schwarzen—

berg's circular memorandum of December 29, 1851, in

46See above, p. 266.

 

432

support of maintaining and strengthening Austria's good
relations with France was therefore entirely consistent
with Habsburg interests. Not so consistent was the fact
that this memorandum was sent to the courts of Berlin
and St. Petersburg in what had to be construed as an
attempt to re—establish the old, dead conservative alliance
on the question of recognizing an act of force, committed
by Napoleon, which was potentially in violation of the
1815 treaties.47 A partial explanation can be found in
Schwarzenberg's desire to exploit whatever divergencies
in interests may have existed between France and England.
Palmerston had been dismissed on December 19, 1851,
apparently because he had overhastily recognized Napoleon
as dictator without the cabinet's approval. This seemed
to signal a Franco-British split which, if utilized
Properly, could isolate Britain from the continent. Its
Proper utilization for Schwarzenberg involved a cooper—
ative effort on the part of all of the continental powers.”8

The difficulty with this rationale was that Schwarzen—
berg had made a fairly consistent policy since 1849 of
systematically destroying the cooperation formerly em—
bodied in the idea of the conservative alliance. He was

now reversing this policy for a chimerical hope that, in

 

47Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 25.

48Kiszling, Schwarzenberg. pp. 199—200.

 

 

 

433
hindsight, had no chance of realization, given Napoleon's
basic principle of cooperation with Britain] Whether
this was simply bad judgment on the part of Schwarzenberg
or was the result of the conflicting interests represented
at the level of the senior Foreign Office bureaucrats
is difficult to determine. It is worth remembering, how—
ever, that the latter group had by this time attained
its pinnacle of influence. The Foreign Ministry now
operated in a vacuum while all other central governmental
agencies, including the Ministerrat of which Schwarzenberg
was the head, were concerned with abrogating the March 4
constitution by the promulgation of the Sylvester Patent
of December 31, 1851.49 Foreign Office influences,'
represented by the reactionaries and the Metternicheans
on the one hand and the reform Catholic German Imperialists
on the other, probably succeeded in asserting themselves
at this juncture to overcome Schwarzenberg's decreasing
ability to make foreign policy. The result was the es~
tablishment of a contradictory policy which Buol would
have to resolve one year later.

The changes which occurred between late 1848 and
Schwarzenberg's death on April 5, 1852, in the formulation
and content of Austrian foreign policy were astounding.
Beginning substantively with realistic assessments of

Austria's international position and methodologically

 

#9Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,

pp. 523—543-

 

 

 

 

 

434
with a manner of formulation calculated to utilize all
available channels of information and ideas, Austrian
foreign policy had become after three and a half years
negative and inconsistent in content and isolated from
all sources of input, outside of a small clique of Foreign
Office Beamten with some highly atypical views, in its
manner of formulation. The reason can be sought in
Schwarzenberg's declining health. But it will be found
mostly in the changes in the relationships between govern-
mental institutions. These changes had their origins in
the failure of the constitutional system erected by Schwarz—
enberg to find a solution to the basic problem of Austria's
position in Central Europe, and in the responses made to
this failure by an absolutist 20-year—old Emperor and
an equally absolutist 7l~year—old Reichsrat President.
Schwarzenberg's death and his replacement by Buol, not
as Minister—President, but as President of the Minister-
konferenz—~a distinction which reflected rather than
caused the transformation of the ministerial system from
a corporative to a non—corporative arrangement—~was of
relatively small importance in this context. Most of
the important institutional changes had already occurred
months earlier, and most of the damage that could have
been done to Austrian foreign policy had been done under
the tenure of Schwarzenberg as many as fifteen months

before his death. For Austrian policy, contrary to most

 

 

 

 

435

claims,50 the change in Foreign Ministers in April 1852
was not the major turning point.

The only important change which had not occurred
in the policy-making process under Schwarzenberg was the
intrusion of outside, non—responsible agencies into the
Foreign Ministry's jurisdictional sphere. Between the
time of the Ministerrat's demise and the definitive es—
tablishment on April 12, 1852, of the neo-absolutistic
system.,5l these non-responsible agencies had lacked both
the time and the occasion to intervene in foreign affairs.
That was no longer true after Buol became Foreign Minister
on April 11. The claim has already been.made at some
length that Buol was heavily influenced by his main Foreign
Office advisers, most notably Werner and Meysenbug.
What emerged from the interaction between these three
very often became Austria's foreign policy. But to an
increasing extent, beginning in late 1852, the policies
of the Foreign Ministry were altered or negated by direct
challenges from the Emperor, the military establishment,
and even members of the diplomatic corps. Buol at times

seemed compelled to defend the Foreign Ministry's

 

50Kiszling, §9hwarzenberg, p. 205; Joseph Redlich,
Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria (New York: Macmillan,
1929), Chapter 4; Heller, "Die ersten zwei Jahrzehnten,"

P- 26. to name only three.

51Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolow—
Lats: Aktenstficke, pp. 135-188. On this date, Franz
Joseph approved the collective Proposal of Jan. 9, 1852,
dealing with jurisdictional spheres.

 

 

 

436
prerogative, established in early 1852, of formulating
foreign policy in its capacity as exclusive imperial
advisory agency for international affairs. Legally) the
Foreign Ministry's elevated position was recognized:
politically, it was not.

.A discussion of the Foreign Ministry's authority
under Buol could most apprOpriately begin with one of
Buol's last official writings. Several weeks after his
dismissal from office in April 1859, Buol composed a
memorandum in which he sought "to make clear to myself
why, with such noble intentions from above and many loyal
exertions from below, the consolidation of the Monarchy
and the morale of the population leaves so much to be
desired."52 The distress of the Austrian Empire as re—
flected in the bitterness bequeathed by the loss of its
Italian provinces in the Austro—Sardinian.War, he felt,
was not primarily the result of evil men.in positions of
power or of the lack of a constitution of the sort found
in nationally homogeneous states. Certain basic rights
promised in the constitutions of 1848 and 1849, it was
true, should have been implemented for the sake of strength~
ening the loyalties of the populace toward the dynasty.
The Reichsrat should also have been reorganized to make
the government more responsive to the needs of the Mon~

archy. But the ministerial system itself, he claimed,

 

52Printed in Redlich, Das Usterreichische Staats—
End Reichsproblem, l/2:234—240, dated July 1859.

 

 

 

 

 

 

437

was primarily responsible for what was wrong with the

process of governing during the 1850s.

Buol explained that the Emperor, convinced of the
restrictions which the corporative Ministerrat had placed
on imperial power, had abolished both the title and the
functions of this body, demanding in the process that

"each minister proceed in his department according to

his individual conviction." Only the sovereign and his

Reichsrat were to hold any control over what emerged from
each ministry, and this control, at least in the sphere
of foreign policy, could only be applied in a negative

way. In the process of policy formulation, there was

thus no opportunity for a varied input:

In the Ministerkonferenz discussions, not much more
than empty straw is threshed. If it is on the one

hand uncomfortable for the Foreign Minister, with
extremely rare exceptions, to bring for All-Highest
resolution only directly and without consultations

with the other ministers the most important questions

in his branch, he lacks on the other hand all infor—
mation about financial and domestic conditions and

about the dependability of the army, information which
could so decisively modify his views and recommendations.
How dangerous seems especially the thorough and com-
plete exclusion of the War Department; and has this

not just now turned out so notoriously, when the
ministers had to cast their votes over war and peace
without being apprised of the condition of the army's
organization and of the preparations for war? Yet

even apart from this extreme case, is it not completely
abnormal that the branch which makes claim to the
greatest part of the Monarchy's resources is not
subordinated to the same control as the other ministries?
The army has as its direct chief the supreme ruler,

who can neither exert control nor, still less, submit

to it . . . .
In this way, an influence has formed itself around

the person of the Emperor which operates without noise
or ostentation, constricts the jurisdictional sphere
of the ministers and raises secret objections to which

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

438

the latter are not even capable of responding. These
high military men . . . naturally show enmity toward
all of those who seek to bring them under the same
control as that under which other agencies must operate.
Against such people they take the field, and they
cooperate to imbue the Emperor with mistrust against

them .

Buol was clearly thinking of the disaster suffered by
Austria in 1859 when he wrote these lines, but they also
describe the basically flawed system into which he was
thrust in April 1852.

.Although the lamentable effects of the destruction
of an integrated policy formulation process, occurring
as it did in 1851, must have been clear to Buol when he
assumed his new Foreign Ministry post, the negative in-
fluence on foreign policy of the Emperor's and the military's
direct infringement on ministerial decisions did not become
fully apparent until several months later. In the mean-
time, the transition to absolutism was nearing its com—
pletion, and the conditions under which the non—ministerial
organs could intrude into foreign policy—making were
consequently becoming more favorable. Having approved
on April 12 the sphere of competence schemata contained
in Schwarzenberg's January 9 Proposal, Franz Joseph
simultaneously went one step further by ordering the

submission to him of descriptions of the internal operational

 

53Ibid.

 

 

439
routine of each ministry.54 With this, Franz Joseph
revealed his true colors. There may have been some
justification for his demand that he, as the source of
all final authority, be made aware in detail of the juris—
dictional spheres of each ministry as a measure facilitating
his personal supervision of the government. The idea
was certainly damaging, because of its intimidating effect,
to the ability of the government to make policy, but from
the standpoint of Franz Joseph's and Kfibeck's absolutist
goals, it made sense. But to demand the formal means
by which the emperor could supervise the intra—ministerial
bureaucratic operations was simply absurd. Franz Joseph,
it seems clear from his entire 68 year reign, would have
been much happier as a bureaucrat than as the political
head of a legitimate Great Power and of Europe's oldest
dynasty.55 Perhaps this is the simplest possible explan—
ation for the entire reversion to absolutism: the Emperor
was a bureaucrat; consequently, no one below him could
be anything more than a bureaucrat, or he would be guilty
of insubordination. At least during the 18508, the
Austrian Empire was not well served by its emperor.

Once again, the besieged ministers were in no hurry

 

54Austria, HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F 4,
K 399, Organisierung Wirkungskreis, Buol Directive to
the Foreign Ministry, Apr. 13, 1852.

 

55Redlich, Emperor Francis Joseph, Chapter 2; Bagger,
Francis Joseph, p. 53.

 

 

440
to comply with the Emperor's wish that they forfeit another
portion of their functions, this time in the realm of
their most rudimentary supervisory responsibilities.
The April 12 order remained in abeyance while the less
important provincial governorships received their defin-
itive Operational procedures. After these were issued
in September,56 the suspicious Emperor on October 17
reissued the April 12 order. With delay no longer possible,
the members of the Ministerkonferenz decided to repeat
the procedure followed with the sphere of competence
schemata of the previous year and establish a commission
to work out the operational schemata. The work was com—
pleted in early December 1852 and submitted to Franz
Joseph on December 18.57 Although he repeatedly submitted
these schemata to the Reichsrat for opinions on their
adequacy, and although the Reichsrat consistently urged
imperial approval, Franz Joseph, for some unknown reason
never resolved the proposals. They were finally laid
ad acta on December 30, 1861.58 It is possible that the
Emperor, having satisfied his curiosity about the inner

workings of the bureaucracy. recognized the superfluity

_—

56Austria. HHStA. Kabinetts-Archiv, Ministerrats—
protokolle, K 11, Minutes of the Sept. 11, 1852, session.

57Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom Durch~
bpuch des Absolutismus, p. 9.

581bid., pp. 10—13.

 

 

 

 

 

441

of having these Operations fossilized by imperial decree.
Whatever the reasoning, the mere act of submitting the
schemata had its effect on the Foreign Ministry. On
January 1, 1853, an Incoming Correspondence Registry was
created for the Political Section in order that Franz

Joseph could supervise more closely the course of the g
Ministry's activity.59 With that, as far as the Foreign \
1

Ministry was concerned, the transformation from constit—

‘ 3v~1v71‘.'

utionalism to absolutism was complete. All of the con— t

ditions by which the Ministry could be excluded from

 

constructive collaboration with the other ministries

and could be exposed to intrusions into its legally

legitimate functions by other authorities were now in

existence. It was, as Buol recognized, a bad system.
Already since early 1852, however, the main work

of building an absolutist state had been completed.

Franz Joseph was therefore able to make his presence felt

in foreign affairs even before the final step in this

process was taken at the beginning of 1853. The practice

of submitting incoming political dispatches to Franz

Joseph, initiated under Schwarzenberg, continued on a

regular basis. Throughout 1852, Buol maintained a frequent

correspondence with the Emperor during the latter's

occasional absences from Vienna in order to keep him

 

59See Chapter 1; also, Austria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei,
igteriora, Organisierung, Fasz. 4, Directive of Dec. 31,
52.

 

 

 

442
currently informed about Austria's most important diplo-
matic relations.6O With much less regularity, Franz
Joseph replied to Buol's notes, but very rarely did he
impart any important advice, much less decisions, for
the Foreign Minister's guidance.61 Buol's (and Werner's)
policy toward the German Customs UniOn question was the
subject of many such notes, but basic policy motivations
were not discussed. If it can be assumed that the oral
conversations which replaced the exchange of notes when
the Emperor was in Vienna were of the same character as
the written correspondence, then Franz Joseph was merely
attempting to educate himself on foreign affairs, in which

he was to have a life—long interest. If any of his own

 

attitudes were expressed, they consisted either of tentative
probings for Buol's opinions or of simple assent to measures
which Buol had already taken and for which he now sought
approval post facto.

For his part, Buol recognized that Franz Joseph
was determined to become Austria's real ruler and thus
SOught to indulge the Emperor's ambitions by giving him
a sense of actual participation in the process. In addition,
Buol had to contend with the order decreed by the Emperor

on April 14 that all Austrian policy, domestic and foreign,

 

. 6OIbid., PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 47: thirty-
elght reports from June to December 1852.

61Ibid., K 277a, Buol Nachlass.

 

 

443
was to continue on the principles established by Schwarzen—

berg.62

Since there is no evidence that Franz Joseph
understood Schwarzenberg's foreign political principles,
Buol found it profitable to ingratiate himself at court
by arguing that a specific measure did in fact accord
with his predecessor's policies, whether that was true
or not. The fact that Buol was an outsider without good
contacts at court or in high Viennese society, and the
fact that he was appointed, unlike Schwarzenberg, by the
Emperor personally, made his task of acquiring personal
authority in a system where personal relationships had
become critical infinitely more difficult than had been
the case with his predecessor.63
None of this meant, however, as has been so Often
claimed, that Franz Joseph became his own foreign minister
upon Schwarzenberg's departure. At least for the first
several months of Buol's tenure, no foreign policy form—
ulation of any sort occurred in any quarter outside of
the Foreign Ministry. Austria's German policy, which
remained as always the most important, was fairly dras—

tically altered with the ascendancy of Werner's influence

 

over that of Thierry.64 Buol continued to assure the
6 62Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats,
p' 5 9!

63Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 25.

6“See Chapter 4.

 

 

444
Emperor that Prussia was being forced into a corner on
the Customs Union question,65 which, although not true,
would have accorded with Schwarzenberg's policy if it
had been. Buol was perfectly aware that Austria had made
important concessions concerning the prospect of her

66

future entry into the Customs Union. In the course
of the reconvened Customs Union conferences in Vienna
in late 1852, the decision was taken by the participating
South German states simply to have Bruck recalled to
public life as a plenipotentiary in negotiating a bilateral
Austro-Prussian commercial treaty. The Customs Union
question came to an end with the conclusion of this rather
unimportant treaty on February 19, 1853, and the result,
one that fitted Prussian kleindeutsch interests very well,
assured at least a lengthy postponement of Austria's
entry into any economic union.67
If Buol prolonged the string of failures in Austria's
German policy begun by Schwarzenberg two years earlier,
he added to his record, through no fault of his own, the

failure to bring to fruition a demarche made by the Turks

on a long—seething question of port rights at Klek and

65Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 47,
Buol to Franz Joseph, Aug. 29. 1852-

66Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 2:194.

67Charmatz, Geschichte der auswartigen Politik
_Qsterreichs, 2:36; Friedjung, "Mitteleuropaische Zoll~
unionsplgne," p. 88.

 

 

 

445

Suttorina on the Dalmatian coast. At the height of the
November 1850 German crisis, a Turkish ship had landed
at this harbor and claimed the land strips enclosing it,
long recognized as Austrian, for the Turkish government.
The threat of a confrontation with the Porte, and hence
also with its protector, Great Britain, was avoided when
the Turkish troops who were landed began to starve and
had to be evacuated, but the question of principle re—

68

mained unresolved. By August 1852, the Turks, with the
French exerting pressure concerning the rights of Christians
in Ottoman territory, decided to settle their differences
with Austria. Buol, who never showed much evidence of

a thirst for Turkey's Balkan lands, instructed Klezl at
Constantinople to make himself accessible to the Turkish
advances, then requested Franz Joseph's sanction for this
action.69 The Emperor felt that the step was a good idea
and approved it. Several weeks later, however, the Turks
returned to their obstinate ways and renewed their claims

70

to the land surrounding the harbor. Austro—Turkish
relations deteriorated and the prelude to the Crimean

War was about to begin.

 

68Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts—Archiv, Ministerrats—
Protokolle, K 7, Minutes of the Nov. 25, 28, 30, 1850,
sessions.

églbid-. PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 47, Buol report
0f Aus. 23. 1852.

7Olbig.. Buol report of Oct. 6, 1852.

 

446

In two instances--Germany and the Balkans—-Buol
had thus suffered reverses during the first months of
his tenure. There is no sign that Franz Joseph blamed
him for these, for it had been the obstinacy of the other
party in both cases that had caused the failures. But
having acquired by then several months of experience in
foreign affairs, Franz Joseph could justifiably assume
that he would do no worse in the conduct of the state's
foreign affairs than his more experienced Foreign Minister
who had, as yet, nothing to show for his efforts. Franz
Joseph's debut in foreign policy seems to have come with
the issue of recognizing Napoleon as the hereditary em—
peror of France.71 As noted earlier, Schwarzenberg had
accepted with equanimity the possibility of a resurrection
of the French Empire, although his diplomatic response
to it seems to have been rather peculiar. Buol was not
so complacent with the prospect of allowing France to
violate the 1815 treaties. He became increasingly excited
in his private dispatches to Hfibner as the date (December
2, 1852) on which Napoleon declared himself emperor
approached, exhorting his ambassador to do whatever he
could to prevent what Hfibner had long since regarded as
inevitable.72 Yet it is quite possible that Buol was

less concerned with Napoleon than with Franz Joseph in

 

71Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, pp. 30—32.

72Hubner, Neun Jahre, 1:40-48.

 

 

447
this matter. The Emperor had indicated a reluctance to
accept the parvenu Napoleon into the family of European
rulers by denying him the traditional "mon frere" salu—
tation in the congratulatory address. Hfibner considered
this matter of etiquette an absurdity and Buol most likely
felt the same way. But Buol now had on his hands an
emperor with a mind of his own, and he cast about des—
perately in search of a solution to the embarrassing
possibilities which might arise. After Buol had failed
to prevent Napoleon from declaring himself emperor, Franz
Joseph suggested to Berlin and St. Petersburg that the
three eastern courts deny in common the new French emperor
the customary form of address. That way, he reasoned,
Austria would not isolate herself on the issue. Buol
realized that the Prussians, who were courting Great
Britain at that point, had no intention of cooperating
in such a scheme and therefore sought frantically in
December to set aside Franz Joseph's idea.73 Although
he finally convinced him that Berlin would not take well
to snubbing the French, who were now supported by the
British, word of the altered plan did not arrive at the
tsarist court until after the insulting form of address
had been dispatched. The delay had elicited Napoleon‘s
anger, the lack of communication had infuriated Nicholas,

and Austria had suffered her third straight diplomatic

 

 

73Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 29.

 

 

 

 

448
defeat.

Either undiscouraged or unaware that he had lost
the round, Franz Joseph plunged ahead in indulging his
newly discovered taste for foreign policy—makingx From
the end of 1852 until the end of the Crimean War, Franz
Joseph remained actively involved in formulating policy,
although signs of his direct personal influence are very
rare indeed. The indirect influence to which he could
make claim resulted from his tendency to be persuaded by
the wrong arguments at the most crucial points, and from
his inability under pressure to draw the critical con-
nection, so typical of the Austrian condition, between
domestic and foreign policy. The effect on policy of
this dubious influence was fundamental and fateful, but
to recognize the existence of this influence is in no
way to justify calling Franz Joseph his own foreign min-
ister. What Franz Joseph was able to do to Austrian for—
eign policy, and it was usually detrimental, resulted
from the fact that he had created by late 1852 a system
of government which was much less effective in formulating
policy than had been the earlier system of collective
leadership. If Franz Joseph, still in his early twenties,
was not yet intellectually capable of formulating foreign
policy, that was not his fault. His fault lay rather
in the creation of conditions and the fostering of
mechanisms which put him in the position of being both

the only unifying factor in the entire governmental

 

449
apparatus and the final arbiter on all decisions which
emerged from that apparatus. He was equal to neither
responsibility.

The inadequacy of this now completed system became
strikingly clear during the period of the Leiningen
mission to Constantinople. Beginning about the time that
the French imperial question was reaching its unfortunate
conclusion, the Leiningen mission was conceived entirely
outside of the Foreign Ministry, and was borne of im—
perialistic motives which were not represented on the
Ballhausplatz. While it is true that Buol favored the
peaceful and gradual extension of Austrian influence over
the Balkan peninsula, there is no evidence that he sought
the forceful imposition of Austrian political authority
in any areas to the southeast.7u The same cannot be said
for Carl Graf Grfinne, the chief of the Emperor's private
cabinet, who exerted great influence over Franz Joseph.
Likewise, Prokesch, vacationing in Vienna after having
been recalled from his Berlin ambassadorship preparatory
to his imminent assignment to Frankfurt, seems to have
Played an auxiliary role in circumventing Foreign Ministry
authority in pursuit of imperialistic goals, although
he otherwise had little in common with the military in
general or Grfinne in particular. Desirous of utilizing

Balkan unrest to extend Austrian control over Bosnia,

7ulbid., p. 70.

 

 

 

450
Grfinne persuaded the Emperor to order Buol to formulate
a plan for preventing the Turks from suppressing a revol-
ution in Montenegro, which belonged legally to Constan—
tinople.75 Confronted by a direct order conveyed by
Prokesch, who acted as messenger between the Hofburg and
State Chancellery building, Buol asked Hammer to draw
up a "sin registry" to be used as a pretext for issuing
an ultimatum to this effect in Constantinople.76 Graf
Leiningen was entrusted with the mission and the Porte
capitulated to Austria on February 14, 1853, thus renouncing
Turkish authority in Montenegro.

That was Austria's first foreign political success
in quite some time, and it had been accomplished at the
initiative of persons outside of the normal foreign policy-
making apparatus. For Buol, therefore, the task of main—
taining the Foreign Ministry's authority became much more
complicated than it had been a few weeks earlier when
the only challenge came from an uninitiated Emperor who,
with proper handling, could be guided. The military,
clearly in favor of a forward policy in the Balkans, was
not so susceptible to personal persuasion. Nor was the
diplomatic corps, the most important members of which
could claim knowledge and experience equal to that of

the Foreign Minister himself. With these two institutions

u

75Ib1d.. p. 68.

76Austria, HHStA, Hammer, "Notizen . . . : Buol."

 

 

 

 

 

 

451

challenging the Foreign Ministry by means of their influence
over the Emperor, Franz Joseph too became much less mal-
leable in Buol's hands than he had been in 1852. This
last fact was reflected, in the bureaucratic way peculiar
to Franz Joseph, by his insistence in.March and April
that the organization of the Foreign.Ministry be modified
in such a way that the newly aggressive political role
recently assumed by Austria in the Orient could be better
accommodated administratively and more effectively super-
vised politically.77

It was no coincidence that the military authorities
further vitiated the largely superfluous Ministerkonferenz
just at the time of their sharp gain inpolitical power
in February 1853. The War Ministry had already lost most
of its important functions in 1849; on February 10, 1853,
it was replaced by an individual, Major General Joseph
Bamberg with the title of Military Administrator. He
was not, unlike the War Minister whom he had replaced,
a permanent member of the Ministerkonferenz, so that what
slight authority was still wielded over its members by
this latter institution could no longer apply to any aspect

Of the military.78 Even Bamberg's meaningless post was

 

77See Chapter 2; alSo, Austria, HHStA, Kabinetts-
Archiv, Ministerratsprotokolle, K 12, Minutes of the
Mar. 29 and April 29, 1853, sessions.

78Walter, Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom Durch—
bruch des Absolutismus, p. 34.

 

 

 

 

 

452
dissolved on May 12, 1853. For the remainder of the decade,

the military assumed a position.completely separate in
its authority and functions from the ministerial system.79
The military from this point forth became increasingly
bold in foreign affairs. Presumably encouraged by Lein—
ingen's success in intimidating the Turks for Austria‘s
gain, Tsar Nicholas sought the attainment of his own
imperialist goals by dispatching to Constantinople on
February 28, 1853, an emissary by the name of Menshikov
to place demands infringing, like Leiningen's, on the
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. It would be wrong to
construe this mission as a retaliatory act in response
to gains made by Austria in areas which the Russians liked
to consider within their own sphere of influence, for
Nicholas had known and approved of the Leiningen mission
prior to its dispatch.80 But despite that, the Menshikov
mission appeared in the eyes of some of the Habsburg
Empire's military leaders to be a threat to Austrian
imperialist interests. General Heinrich Ritter von Hess,
the Army Chief of Staff, who had bourgeois origins and
sympathies for Bruck's idea of an Austrian—dominated

Central European empire based on economic union, was one

of those who felt the threat most acutely. Sharing only

b

79Ibid., p. 35.

8OSchroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean
War. pp. 27-28.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

453

an imperialist instinct with the aristocratic, conservative
Grfinne whom he otherwise detested, Hess advocated a pred-
atory policy against Ottoman possessions. He had no
particular reticence about pre—empting Russia in the
Balkans, although he was not hostile toward Russia and
indeed ruled out war against her. Grfinne and his much
more conservative clique were inclined to defer to the
Russians at the slightest hint of a frown from the Tsar,
and fell over themselves to retreat from their aggressive
position in the Balkans when confronted with a positive
action from St. Petersburg in the form of the Menshikov
mission. Despising such deference, Hess thereupon took
up the banner of Great Austrian imperialism in southeastern
Europe in the late spring of 1853.81

At least partly as a result of a Hess memorandum
submitted to the Emperor on May 5, wherein the General
argued that the time was right for the establishment of

82 a further

an Austrian protectorate over the Balkans,
step was taken by Franz Joseph away from Austria's trad—
itional hands—off policy in the Balkans. He appointed

Bruck on May 31 to replace the weak Klezl as Internuncio

 

81Paul W. Schroeder, "A Turning Point in Austrian
Policy in the Crimean War: The Conference of March 1854,"
Agstrian History Yearbook, 4(1968):159—202; Heinrich
Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg und die Osterreichische Politik,
2d ed. (Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1911), p. 41.

 

82

Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 86.

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.51.

at Constantinople. With the failure of the Menshikov
mission on May 20 and the consequent humiliation for the
St. Petersburg court, it became clear that further Russian
attempts to extend influence over Turkey were in the offing.
Bruck's instructions were thus phrased in defensive terms:
Turkish integrity was to be maintained. administrative
and religious reforms were to be encouraged in order to
remove the Tsar's pretexts for intervention and to increase
the Turks' power of resistance if such intervention should
nevertheless occur.83 But seen in the context of the
Leiningen mission and of the organizational modifications
carried out in April for the purpose of refocusing the
Austrian view of the Ottoman Empire as an object of polit-
ical expansion rather than of mere economic penetration,
Bruck‘s appointment was anything but a defensive measure.
Under the influence of Hess, the Emperor now pursued an
active policy, indeed far more active than Buol wished,
of forcing Austrian domination of the Ottoman Empire.
And in the process, he set in motion another mechanism——
the Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople——by which the
Foreign Ministry‘s authority was to be challenged over
the next two years.

When it became clear in late June that Russia planned
to occupy the Danubian Principalities as a "trust" while

awaiting the satisfaction of Menshikov's demands by the

 

83Ibid., pp. 88—89.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

455
all of the tendencies that had been developing

84

Porte,
over the preceding year in the governmental system and

in the formulation of Austrian foreign policy suddenly
crystallized for Buol into an immediate threat to the
Habsburg position in Europe. A full analysis of the
problems in which the threat was imbedded or of the war
in which the problems were revealed and resolved is a
task which lies well beyond the scope of this work.
Suffice it here to refer to the claim made in earlier
chapters that all Crimean.War policy calculations which
emerged from the Foreign Ministry and from Buol personally
had as their basis considerations of Austria's role in
Central Europe. An attempt to explain Buol's course by
using Metternich's policies as a standard is futile.85

All of the essential Central European conditions upon
which those standards were founded had changed since the
State Chancellor's retirement. Prussia was no longer
willing to accept a subordinate position in Germany.

Italy had repeatedly proved herself treacherous, and as
recently as February 6, 1853, a rebellion in Milan had

once again threatened the Habsburg claim to Lombardy and

8QFriedjung, Der Krimkrieg, p. 7.

 

85As does Schroeder, "Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute
over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853~1855," Journal of
Modern History, 40/2(1968):193-217.

 

 

 

 

 

 

86

Venetia. Applying so—called "European principles" in

settling the Crimean War was not a viable alternative
when the Central European fundaments on which Austria's
Great Power status had always been based were crumbling.
Buol's policy was not really one of re—establishing the
European balance of power for the sake of preserving
Austria's position in that revered system. The policy
did not go astray because Buol could not decide which
side needed the more balancing. It was first and foremost
a policy directed toward strengthening Austria in Central
Europe as a preliminary and as a precondition for main-
taining Austria's Great Power position within a stable
European system. And it went astray partly because Buol
miscalculated the depth of Prussian opposition, partly
because the conflicting influences of other agencies were
able to negate his policy, and partly because no policy
could have been entirely satisfactory for Austria once
the Crimean War had broken out.

Buol's concern with French and British reaction
to the Italian uprising of early 1853 prevented him from
cooperating with Paris and London in achieving a settlement
when Russia occupied the Danubian Principalities on July

2. 1853.87 He therefore ordered Bruck to encourage a

 

86Discussed in Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 his
1860, 2:225.

87Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrigg, pp. 88—89.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

457

bilateral settlement in Constantinople between Turkey

and Russia.88 Besides the threat from the Western Powers
to.Austria's position in Central Europe, Buol also saw
danger of revolution in Eastern Europe arising among the
Slavic Christians in response to Russia's advance into
Ottoman territory. ,Bruck, on the other hand, saw the
Russian advance both as a possible impediment to Austrian
expansionist interests and an opportunity, should it re—
sult in a Russo—Turkish conflict, to promote those interests.
He therefore had little enthusiasm for the rapid peaceful
settlement of the question.89 Whether because of Bruck's
attitudes or for reasons outside of Austrian control,

the attempt to induce direct negotiations failed in June
and July. BuOl thus felt compelled to seek the next

90 Perhaps his judgment

best alternative--Concert action.
was faulty here. Out of different motives, none of which
favored Austria, the French and the English governments
had both hoped to draw Buol into a mediatory role. The
Austrian position in Central Europe could be weakened

if Austria were joined to the two powers which were paying

lip service to mediation but were edging steadily closer

__

8Schroeder, Austria; Great Britain and the Crimean
BEE! P0 54-

89Schroeder, "Bruck versus BuOl," pp. 193—217.

90Schroeder, Austriai Great Britain and the Crimean
NEE: P- 57-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

458

to Turkey. If Austria were involved in a possible war
with Russia as a result, her chances of maintaining her
Italian provinces and her German hegemony would be sub-
stantially reduced. Buol probably would have done better
to ignore the threat of revolution in Eastern Europe arising
from the Russian occupation and to maintain strict neu—
trality by refusing mediation for the sake of Central
Europe. But in a climate pervaded since 1848 by fear
of revolution in Austria, this may have been too much
to expect.

With the decision by Austria to undertake mediation
by convening the Vienna Conferences for working out a
four-power note to St. Petersburg and Constantinople in
late July 1853, much of what was to happen to Austria
for the next two and a half years was predetermined.
Austria would not have found herself sucked into the

vortex of hostile English, French and Prussian ambitions

 

if she had succeeded in preventing the Conference and its
result, the Vienna Note of July 31.91 But to have pre-
vented this, she would have also had to prevent the Russian
occupation of the Principalities or to resolve the issue

in Constantinople. That she was unable to preclude the
oocupation.was the fault of the Russians. The Menshikov
mission, its failure and the consequent Russian aggressive—

ness would have occurred with or without the Leiningen

 

91Ibid., p. 59.

   

 

 

 

 

459

mission. But the Leiningen mission and the subsequent
shift of emphasis in.Austrian policy from a passive de-
sire to attain future economic goals to an active attempt
to extend her political authority in southeastern Europe
certainly reduced Buol's leverage in calling for a peace-
ful settlement between Turkey and Russia in mid—1853.
So too did the fact that an adherent to the aggressive
imperialist party, Bruck, was placed in a position of
responsibility for achieving the success of these nego—
tiations. It cannot be claimed that BuOl would have suc-
ceeded in settling the occupation issue peacefully even
if his position had not been largely neutralized by the
military and his ambassador to Turkey. But the chances
for its success would have been much greater if the Foreign
Ministry had maintained its authority over foreign policy
in the critical months during and following the Leiningen
mission. The fact that it was not able to do so was the
unfortunate legacy of the governmental system that Buol
had inherited.

One positive aspect of the Vienna Conferences of
July 1853 was that Buol regained for the next several
months full control over Austrian policy. International
conferences in Europe had been sufficiently institution—
alized during the earlier decades to render unthinkable
the participation in them of any state representative
who did not possess formal authority over foreign policy.

What emerged from these conferences was Buol's own best

 

 

 

460
effort to settle the Russo—Turkish quarrel peacefully,
without compromising either Austrian security in the south—
east or jeopardizing Austrian interests in Italy or Germany.
No influences from other sources within the Austrian govern—
ment seem to have challenged the Foreign Minister's au—
thority at this time. Even so, the Vienna Note which
the deliberations produced failed to solve the quarrel.
The two sides were in a fighting mood, and mediation
attempts were hopeless.92 This fact became more evident
by the failure of Buol's September Olmfitz conversations
with Nicholas to achieve a solution.93 Russia declared
war on Turkey on November 3, 1853. Despite the failures,
however, Buol was now involved in high politics on a f
multi-state basis and no one else in the Monarchy, least
of all Franz Joseph, was daring enough to challenge his
authority in this sphere. The pattern established in
mid-1852, whereby Buol sought in the notes and proposals
he addressed to the Emperor to convince Franz Joseph that
he was actively a part of the policy formulation process
which the Foreign Ministry in fact monopolized. resumed
during the second half of 1853.9”

Nothing fails like failure, however, and Buol's

 

92Ibid., pp. 60—69.

93Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, pp. 101—

102.

94Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,

461
inability to prevent the outbreak of the Russo—Turkish
War in late 1853 called forth new challenges to the Foreign
Ministry's authority. After numerous Habsburg mediatory
proposals had failed, due largely to the other European
powers' successful attempts to maneuver Austria out of
her neutrality and into an apparently anti—Russian stance,
the re—congregated participants in the July Vienna Con—
ferences finally decided on December 5 to send Off a weak
note to the two warring countries in an effort to force
direct bilateral negotiations.95 Stratford de Redcliffe,
the British ambassador to the Porte, knew that Palmerston
was not interested in seeing the war ended so quickly,
so he refused to present the note to the Turks. Bruck,
Who did not care what his foreign minister thought, re-
fused to present it because it did not accord with his
desire to see Austria make wartime gains in the Balkans.96
Despite his insubordination, Bruck was not recalled,
both because he still enjoyed Franz Joseph's support,97
and because BuOl had more important things to worry about
after news of the November 30 battle of Sinope arrived
in Vienna in mid—December. With this naval encounter

in which the Turkish fleet was annihilated, the Russian

 

95Schroeder, Austria) Great Britain and the Crimean
Mar. pp. 84—110.
96Schroeder, "Bruck versus BuOl," pp. 193—217,

97Heller, ed., Memoiren des Baron Bruck, p. 24.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

462

threat to the Balkans and the consequent danger of revol-
ution among the Christians against Turkish rule was im-
measurably increased. The predominance of Russian power
in southeastern Europe rendered futile any further attempts
by Austria to act from a position of neutrality as a
restorer of the peace. There were now some important
policy decisions to be made. The threat to Austrian
security, moreover, was now of such a magnitude that
BuOl felt it necessary to improve the means of policy
formulation in the event that decisive military action
became necessary.

There was no suggestion that the system of collective
leadership prevailing earlier be revived. Too many of
the conditions upon which that style of government depended
had been swept away in 1851 and 1852. But it was at the
very least necessary that information about the readiness
of the army, the state of the finances and the morale
of the population be drawn into consideration preparatory
to taking any decisive foreign political action which
might lead to war. Buol therefore requested on January
16, 1854, that Franz Joseph summon a conference of the
key official individuals responsible for these spheres
in order to exchange information and ideas.98 Ad hoc
conferences of this sort, called at either Buol's or

Franz Jose h's discretion, became the normal mechanisms
P

 

98Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,
Buol Proposal, Jan. 16. 1854-

 

 

 

463
for reaching the larger decisions for the duration of
the war. They were not analogous to the former Ministerrat
sessions, for the decisions reached carried no legal weight,
but, with one crucial exception, BuOl was better able
to make valid his own conceptions of Austrian policy in
the eyes of the Emperor than he had been before this con-
ference system.was introduced. In a January 23, 1854,
conference, Buol obtained recognition, despite Kfibeck's
doubts, of the extreme danger which would confront Austria
if Russia sought to maintain her hold on the Principalities
or cross the Danube.99 It was thus not difficult for
the Foreign Minister to prevail at a January 31 conference
at which the decision was unanimously taken to reject
the Russian proposal, presented by Count Orlov from St.
Petersburg, that Austria maintain strict neutrality in
return for Russian armed assistance. Orlov's offer was
rejected largely because he refused to give any assurances
that Russian troops would not cross the Danube. In carrying

through a decisive rejection, BuOl effectively suppressed

 

all voices among the 01d Conservatives calling for deference
to Russia at almost any price.100
Suppressing the voices of the imperialists, however,

proved less easy, and it was in a late March 1854 encounter

 

With Hess, who represented them, that Buol suffered his

h

99Ibid., Conference minutes of Jan. 23. 1854-

100

Ibid., Conference minutes of Jan. 31, 1854.

   

 

 

 

 

464
only major reverse in imposing the Foreign Ministry's
will within the framework of the conference system.
Unfortunately, this was the most critical occasion of
all, and his failure here doomed to relative unimportance
all of his later wartime achievements. The effects of
Sinope reached well beyond the threat of Russian—induced
revolution in the Balkans. It had excited French and
British public opinion to the point where the entry of
the two sea powers into the war became merely a matter
of time. On March 12, 1854, they became allies of Turkey,
and two weeks later they declared war against Russia.101
The rapidity of the transformation of a Russo-Turkish
conflict into a European war demonstrated the weakness
of Bruck's and Hess' calculations. Believing that the
war would remain localized, they foresaw illusory Austrian
gains in the Balkans by means of assuming a rather crude

predatory posture toward the Ottoman Empire. With the

 

invalidation of its initial assumption, the Austrian

imperialist party's doctrines became discredited. That,

 

however, was small consolation to BuOl, who now had to
contend with the threat of Balkan revolution incited by
a Great Power in the east as well as with the threat of
diplomatic isolation caused by the war declarations of
France and England in the west.

What rendered isolation so dangerous was the

101

Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 124.

 

 

 

 

 

 

465
possibility that Central European parties unfriendly to
Austria would utilize the circumstances to seize hegemony
in Germany and Italy. Austria's material resources were
simply not adequate to protect her security in the south—
east while maintaining her dominance in Central Europe.
Yet, for Buol, by virtue of his background and of the
influences exerted on him from within the Foreign Office,
the protection of the one and the maintenance of the other
were fundamental to Austria's continued existence as a
Great Power. If ever positive action was required by a
Great Power in protecting its interests, March 1854 was
that point for Austria. The only way to preserve her
position in both Eastern and Central Europe was to seize
the initiative by offering openly to cooperate with the
Western Powers in resisting Russian revolutionary activity
in the Balkans. By following that course, she could pro-
vide herself with sufficient assistance to assure Russian
expulsion from the Principalities, thus securing her
southeastern frontiers; she could eliminate any legitimate
reason for French or English meddling in Central Europe;
and, most importantly, she could demonstrate to every
German that Austria remained the leading power in decisions
that affected the lands constituting the traditional

102

sphere of Habsburg primacy. Buol was unquestionably

 

102Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,
Mar. 21, 1854, Buol Proposal to the Emperor, and Conference
minutes of Mar. 22, 1854 (printed in Schroeder, "A Turning
Point in Austrian Policy," pp. 176—189). Particularly in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

466

correct in his calculations. Unpleasant as the prospect
of being drawn into a war from which Austria could gain
no concrete benefits may have been, an unhesitating and
decisive policy of allying with the Western Powers was
the only possible way to protect both of her vital interests.

The key to the whole policy was that it be initiated
unhesitatingly and decisively. If hesitation or inde-
cisiveness were shown, Russia would be less inclined to
yield to the Austrian demand that her southeastern borders
be safeguarded, and the effect on Germany of a display
of Habsburg leadership would be lost. Yet it was precisely
that unhesitating and decisive character that was lacking.
Just as the fault for Buol's failure to initiate a bilateral
Russo-Turkish settlement in June 1853 must fall to the
earlier actions of the imperialist party represented by
Hess, so too must the blame fall to Hess for Buol's failure
to implement the only viable policy option available to
Austria in late March 1854. Undaunted by the vivid demon-
stration of his earlier error in judgment as to the gains

he thought Austria could make in the Balkans, Hess blithely

 

the March 22 conference, Buol continually made reference
to the Austrian example of 1813: "When Austria spoke the
decisive word in a similar political crisis forty years
ago, most of the German princes were not only not on her
side but were in the enemy camp. Austria's exam 1e
gradually drew all of them over. In his [Buol's opinion,
a decisive step today would have the same success. The
traditional mission of His Majesty is to give the impulse
and to show the direction to the German princes and their
policies, not to receive the latter from them."

 

 

 

467

shifted his energies to attacking Buol's conception of
Austria's political role in Germany. Like Bruck a
visionary who saw Austria's future in a vast voluntary
union of Central European peoples, Hess feared above all
a policy which might divide.Austria from Germany. Con-
fusing the means with the ends, he reasoned that Buol's
policy rested on the assumption of unity with Germany,
and especially with Prussia. That unity, he felt, had
to be attained prior to casting Austria's lot with the
Western Powers against Russia. He based his calculations
on strategic considerations, fearing that Russia would
fight if Austria and Prussia did not present a common
front, and that Austria's northern flank would thereby
be exposed.103

Hessmissed the entire point of Buol's policy,
which was to create Central European unity by the force-
ful application of the Habsburgs' traditional leadership
role and by confronting Russia with an overwhelming dis-
play of solidarity from the west in an effort to force
the Tsar's abandonment of his revolutionary course.
Buol's policy might not have worked, for he consistently
underestimated the strength of Prussian hostility. But
the Confederation at Frankfurt might have adhered, thus
leaving Prussia isolated and forced to adhere against

her will. It was a gamble; but it was also the only

 

103Ibid., Conference minutes of March 22. 1854.

 

 

 

 

 

468
option. Hess' rationale was far less realistic, for he
completely misunderstood the weakness of the Austrian
position vis—a—vis Prussia, underestimated the dangers
for Central Europe of Austrian isolation from the Western
Powers, and ignored the Russian threat to Austrian security
in the Balkans. The differences between the two conceptions
were absolutely fundamental to Austria's most basic interests.
Yet incredibly, Franz Joseph could find little to separate
the positions taken by the two men. Superficially rea-
soning that consultations between the two German powers
would be better than the presentation of a fait accompli
by one, he ordered Hess to undertake a mission to Berlin
in order to reach a common position on the question of

10” With

forcing Russia to evacuate the Principalities.
that, Austria's last good chance to emerge unscathed in
both Eastern and Central Europe was lost. It made no
difference that Franz Joseph accepted Buol's advice during
most of the war. What followed the March 1854 conferences
was a series of efforts to salvage what was salvageable
from a ruined policy.

It is only possible to guess what the outcome might
have been had there existed in its 1849 form the corpor—
ative Ministerrat which included within it a Minister

Of War holding real authority over the military. Perhaps

the majority of ministers would have found the argument

—_

lo”Ibis.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

469

put forth by Buol unconvincing and the result would have
been the same. But as clearly as that Ministerrat had
perceived the character and the importance for Austria
of the German question, this is unlikely. One thing is
certain: an inexperienced emperor would not have held
the final real authority over the decision reached. The
Foreign Ministry, represented by its chief, would very
probably have carried through its policy.

In negotiating the Austro—Prussian alliance of
April 20, 1854, Hess compounded his March errors by leaving
out the condition specified in his instructions that a
Russian refusal to evacuate the Principalities would
constitute a casus belli.lo5 Back in Vienna at the end
of April, he indiscretely assured a Russian representative
that the tsarist troops would not be required to evacuate

the Principalities by the terms of the treaty.106 Both

 

acts were in direct contradiction to Buol's policy.
Infuriated at having his authority circumvented, Buol
lost his composure and his standing with Franz Joseph
in April and May.10,7 But by the conference meeting of

May 29, 1854, Buol had regained control. He read a draft

 

loBSchroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean
Ear. p. 166. Buol nevertheless accepted the pact because
he was still interested in taking a rapid and decisive
Step against Russia.

lO6Ibid., p. 167.

18 4 107Hfibners Neun Jahre, 1:138—141, entry of May 14.
5 .

 

 

 

 

470

ultimatum demanding from Russia the evacuation of the
Principalities, then opened the discussion for possible
revisions of its text. Hess objected to the whole scheme

on the ostensible grounds that Russia might be induced

to retreat peacefully if Austria would conciliate by Offering
a truce whereby the western allies would withdraw their

fleets from the Black Sea.108

Given the British and
French attitudes, this was no more than a dream, and one
suspects that Hess was really interested in preserving

a shred of respectability for the agreement he had broken
his instructions to conclude in Berlin. Hess had failed,
as was inevitable, to incorporate into the pact any guar—
antee by Prussia of Austrian interests in the southeast,
except in the highly unlikely event that Russia launched
an attack on Austrian troops. An Austrian ultimatum to
Russia could only antagonize the Prussian leaders, who
would then fear an Austrian attempt to use the treaty

to draw them into hostilities. And antagonism was pre-
cisely what Hess had hoped to avoid in negotiating the
treaty. Angered at having to repeat the entire rationale
of his policy, BuOl impatiently destroyed Hess' arguments
by pointing out that Austria could hardly offer a truce
in the name of the Western Powers with whom she, because
of Hess' objections in March, was not even allied. This

time, Franz Joseph backed his Foreign Minister to the

 

108Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,
Conference minutes of May 29. 1854-

 

 

 

471

last syllable.109 The ultimatum was dispatched on June
3, 1854, and the Russian troops began to withdraw from
the Principalities on June 23.

Buol meanwhile sought to salvage what he could of
his policy of showing decisive leadership to Central
Europe by concluding on June 14 an agreement with the
Turks on the question of occupying the Principalities
after the Russian departure. In so doing, he did not
consult the Berlin cabinet. Although not technically
a violation of the April 20 treaty, this omission never—
theless gave Berlin a pretext for withdrawing the assur—
ances of support she had given in the event that Russia
should have resisted evacuating. Giving Prussia that
opportunity to escape was a serious error on Buol's part.
By June, his March policy as it related to Central Europe
had been so effectively negated by Austrian hesitation
that his stubborn perseverance now appeared to be a
manifestation of hostility toward Germany rather than
a demonstration of leadership, as he had intended.
Prussia, it is true, was incorrigible, but certain key
middle states might have responded favorably to a more
conciliatory tone from BuOl. Instead, his haughty bearing
caused them to decide in June at a conference in Bamberg
to maintain their freedom of action during the Austro—

Russian dispute, a measure which induced Werner to accuse

 

lo91bid.

 

 

 

1
I

 

472

them of desiring to resurrect the abominable Rhine Con—
federation of 1806.110

But if BuOl committed an error in Germany, the
large contingent of Russophiles in Vienna committed a
greater one in the Principalities by its vocal opposition
to humiliating Russia. The Russian representatives in
Vienna were able to use to St. Petersburg's benefit the
division between BuOl and those who demanded friendly
relations with Russia. They convinced Franz Joseph that
Austria should leave Russia a shred of honor by not de-
manding that the Principalities be given over to Austrian
protection, but rather that they be simply abandoned.
Still refusing to comprehend Buol's reasoning, the Emperor
agreed, thus leaving open the Principalities not only
to Turkish occupation, but, by virtue of the Turks'

111 In one of

alliances, to the Western Powers as well.
her most important areas of concern, therefore, Austria's
interests were partly sacrificed to the ambitions of the
Western Powers. The inconsistency in Austrian policy

was compounded by the revival of the Hess-Bruck brand

of Austrian imperialism in the summer of 1854. Unauthorized

by Buol, Bruck had attempted unsuccessfully in June to

attach provisions to the Austro—Turkish agreement on the

 

 

11011311, K 277L, BuOl Nachlass, Werner to BuOl,
June 10, 1854.

lllFriedjung, Der Krimkrieg, p. 66; Unckel, Osterreich
und der Krimkrieg, pp. 13 —l39.

 

 

 

473
Principalities occupation whereby Montenegro and Herzegovina
would also have come under Austrian influence.112 Much

more serious was the highly impolitic way in which Hess
carried out the Austrian occupation of the Principalities.
If the General had been denied success in forging a Central
European union by meddling in foreign policy earlier in

the year, he could at least claim for his and Austria's
glory the acquisition of some territory on the lower
Danube. Accordingly, he raced his army into the Prin—
cipalities after the Russians had left and sought system—
atically to exclude the Turkish civilian government, which
still had rightful claim to the area's rulership, from
exerting any authority over the population.113

Buol composed a memorandum for Franz Joseph on

 

September 26, 1854, in which he portrayed the deleterious
effects of Hess' imperialistic activity on relations with
the Turks and, by logical extension. with France and
England. ‘By giving the impression that Austria sought

to incorporate Balkan territory into her own sphere of
influence, Hess raised the danger of the isolation of
Austria from the Western Powers. The result would have
been Austria's exclusion from any settlement of the Balkan
issue at the end of the war. With all of the mistrust

which Austria had sown abroad, he felt, it was now time

 

112Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg, p. 64.

113Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 151.

 

 

 

 

 

474
for her to declare herself on one side or the other,
rather than perpetuating the appearance of pursuing an
opportunistic policy. For obvious reasons, alliance with
Russia or neutrality in combination with Germany were
out of the question. Neither of these alternatives could
assure Austria's security in the southeast. Alliance
with the Western Powers was the only remaining alter-

native.llu

The time was now long past when pursuing such
a course could have worked to Austria's benefit in seizing
the leadership of Central Europe. But once again, some—
thing had to be salvaged, and such an alliance might at
least protect Habsburg interests in Eastern Europe.

From this point until the conclusion of the Austro—Franco—

English alliance of December 2, 1854, Buol continued to

 

hold dominant influence over Franz Joseph.

But continuing challenges to the Foreign Ministry's
policy—making authority reduced considerably the value
of this December alliance, just as similar challenges
had reduced the effectiveness of Buol's occupation policy
in the Principalities. Bruck sent an imperious letter
in October condemning the conciliatory stand taken by
BuOl toward the members of the Western Alliance in his

occupation policy.115 This was in support of Hess, and

 

llI‘J'Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,
Buol PrOposal to the Emperor, Sept. 26, 1854.

ll5Schroeder, "Bruck versus BuOl," pp. 193—217,

 

475
both men, in perceiving the Balkan question only in terms
of what land could be stolen from Turkey, completely
disregarded the much larger question of Austrian security
in the east. The contest continued with Buol prevailing
on October 22 in carrying through the principle of
mobilization against Russia, despite the howls of dis—

116 Buol still

approval by the entire military command.
held ascendancy at the conferences in which the practical
aspects of mobilization were discussed in the latter half
of November. But on November 21, Franz Joseph, under
pressure from Bruck and Hess, excluded the possibility
of mobilization, so that the alliance project itself
threatened to collapse. But the Anglo—French threat to
recall the respective countries' ambassadors from Vienna
once more delivered authority into Buol's hands.117
Nevertheless, Austria‘s new allies had sufficient cause
to wonder who controlled Austrian policy, and that doubt
rendered the alliance something less than iron-clad.
Despite the success of the alliance negotiations,
Buol's policy of March 1854 had been thoroughly vitiated
on all three sides (Russia, Central Europe and the Western
Powers). There was, of course, hope that the December 2
alliance could preserve Austria's position in the east

by forcing Russia to retreat on the basis of the Four

 

116Friedjung, Der Krimkrieg, pp. 96-97.

ll7Friedjung, Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 2:237—

 

238.

 

 

 

476
Points without requiring Austria to expend her resources
on a military campaign. There was also hope that the
December 22 convention with France over the preservation
of peace in Italy would satisfy at least part of Austria‘s

118 But Prussia let it be

Central European objectives.
known immediately, despite Buol's best efforts, that
Austria's indecisive policy had cost her the Central
European leadership role she had fervently wished to
assume.119 Moreover, the Western Powers, and especially
England, seemed to be less interested in peace on the
basis of the Four Points than in drawing Austria into
the war by means of a rather perverse interpretation

given by London to the Four Points.120

Even the gains
Buol thought he had made in Italy appeared threatened

by the January 26, 1855, Anglo—Franco-Sardinian treaty
121

 

of alliance. On February 8, 1855, the final blow was
delivered to Buol's policy of pulling Germany along in
the wake of her former imperial capital by the Bundestag's

122

declaration of refusal to participate in a war against
Russia.

 

118Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 48,
Buol Proposal, Dec. 29, 1854.

119Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean
War, pp. 239—240.

1201bid., p. 235.

121Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 195.

lZZIbid., pp. 193—194.

 

477

Failure once again plagued Buol and the pendulum
of influence on foreign policy consequently swung away
from the Foreign Ministry toward the military in early
1855.123 As before, however, the convening of an inter—
national conference in Vienna strengthened the hand of
the Foreign Minister in his ability to formulate policy.
Opening on March 15, 1855, the Vienna Conferences con-
stituted an attempt to put an end to the tiresome war,

now that Nicholas I was dead, the military operations

were stalemated and the opposing armies were becoming

infested with disease. During the course of the nego—

tiations, which centered on the Four Points, Buol seems i
to have been in full control of Franz Joseph and Austrian

foreign policy. The discussions failed by early May be—

cause the British were more interested in drawing Austria

into the war as a means to end it than in settling the

conflict on the basis of sincere peace proposals.12u
With the formal end of the conferences on June 4, the
opposition to Buol gained ascendancy in an ever more
virulent form, for Bruck, who had finally been recalled
from Constantinople in January 1855 for his constant
polemical outbursts against Buol's desire for settlement
of the crisis on the basis of the Four Points, now applied

his talents to foiling the Foreign Ministry from the

 

123Hubner, Neun Jahre, 1:185.

124

Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, p. 217.

 

 

 

478

proximity of the Finance Ministry. Appointed chief of
this ministry in March, Bruck held little influence until
the Vienna Conferences were over, but the fact that a
diplomat recalled for insubordination was promoted to a
very high post only two months after having been punished
as a diplomat demonstrates the lack of control which
Buol had over the government. The imperialist party of
Hess was now materially strengthened by the adherence to
it of the agency which controlled the purse strings of
the Monarchy.

What followed during the remainder of the war was
one final, vivid demonstration of the two basic faults
of the absolutistic system in terms of foreign policy.
On the one hand, no conference meetings at which all of
the authorities immediately concerned with foreign policy
were held between January 9, 1855, when Buol and Bach
formed a coalition to condemn in the strongest terms
the army's treatment of the population in the occupied
Principalities, and February 11, 1856, when the instruc—
tions for Austria's representatives to the Paris Peace
Congress were discussed.125 In the interval, Austria
continued to be faced by the problem of forcing Russia
to cease fighting, just as she had been in 1853 and 1854.

Once the Vienna Conferences had failed by mid—1855. the

 

125Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 49,
Conference minutes of Jan. 9, 1855, and Feb. 11, 1856.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

479
logical move for Buol, if he was to abide by the terms
of the alliance with France and England and thus hope
to protect Austrian interests in Central Europe, was to
declare war on Russia. Angered by British bad faith and
fearing the effect war operations in the east would have
on Central Europe, he preferred to approach war gradually
by mobilizing an ever—increasing number of troops. This
threat, he hoped, would exert enough pressure on Russia
to force her to agree to the allied demands before an
Austro—Russian war actually erupted. In pursuing this
policy throughout the first half of 1855, he lacked all
means of knowing whether this was a realistic course from
the standpoint of popular morale, state finances or
military readiness. Without an effective Ministerkonferenz
(foreign affairs had not been mentioned since June 1854)
and without even irregularly called conferences of the
top leaders, Buol made policy in a vacuum, basing it solely
on determinants which he derived from his own and his
Foreign Office advisers' perceptions of the international
situation.

Because the Foreign Ministry was isolated, other
agencies headed by persons who had amply demonstrated
their hostility to Buol were able to counteract his policy
Without fearing any effective checks from the Ballhaus—
platz. This was the second fault of the system. Just
at the point at which it was logical for Buol to declare

war or at least accelerate his preparations for it in

 

 

 

 

 

480

June 1855, Bruck convinced the Emperor that the state's
finances could not withstand the prolonged maintenance
of a large army on a war footing.126 While it is true
that Austria had to sell half of its railway network to
France for revenue and had difficulty selling bonds to
support the mobilization effort, this was no time to be
sabotaging the state's international position for finan—
cial reasons. The Western Powers found reinforced their
suspicions of Austrian perfidy and the Russians were
encouraged to hold out for better peace terms. Bruck
certainly realized that. Transfixed by an unrealistic
hope of promoting Austrian imperialistic aims in Central 1
and Eastern Europe, he, like Hess, now probably sought

to neutralize Buol's policy because it did not take into

account those aims. The imperialistic aims could not

have been achieved even if their proponents had held

full control of foreign policy, for these aims were

formulated on the basis of an ideal that excluded all

states outside of Central Europe, i.e., the international

system in its entirety, as determining factors in Austrian

policy formulation. The imperialist party never had

full control of policy. But the important point is that

its chief members were heads of agencies which were power—

ful enough within the disunited governmental system to

obstruct the implementation of any alternative policy

 

126

Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrieg, pp. 224-225.

 

 

 

 

 

481
which might have worked.

Ultimately, however, as with any absolutistic system,
the blame for policy failure must go to the head of that
system. Franz Joseph was able to make foreign policy
with BuOl, military policy with Hess and financial policy
with Bruck, without seeing any contradiction for Austria's
international position in what he did.127 Austrian policy
thus continued to lurch unsteadily toward the end of the
war and the peace conferences. Bruck persuaded the Emperor
to refrain from remobilizing the army after the September

1855 fall of Sebastopol.128

Consequently, the Tsar's
representatives were encouraged to play on the sentiments
of the pro—Russian party in Vienna in hopes of forestalling
a common Austrian front desirous of a harsh armistice

and peace.129 BuOl, meanwhile, continued to advocate
decisive action, including mobilization, in order to drag
Russia to the conference table. He was still foolishly
h0ping that Germany would be suitably impressed by a
display of Austrian leadership to submit docilely to

130

Austrian supremacy. That hope was forlorn already

in early 1854, and Buol should have recognized it. In

 

1271bid.

128Ibid., pp. 232—236.

129Hubner, Neun Jahre, 1:218.

 

130 Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 49,
BuOl Proposal to the Emperor, Nov. 9,155.

 

 

 

 

482
prevailing on Franz Joseph in December to issue an ultimatum
to St. Petersburg without prior consultations with Prussia,
with whom the April 20, 1854, treaty was still in effect,
Buol had simply deepened the antagonism. He was determined

to go to war if Russia rejected the ultimatum,131

although

it is difficult to see how that determination was much

of a threat to Russia when Franz Joseph was simultaneously

following Bruck's advice not to mobilize. Tsar Alexander

saved the Austrian government from displaying again to

the world its inability to act by submitting to the terms

of the ultimatum on January 18, 1856, and the Crimean

War therewith came to an end.132
For Austria, the Peace Congress that followed in

February and March was anti—climactic, although all of

the Austrian leaders, and especially Franz Joseph, succeeded

in convincing themselves that the state's interests had

been better served by the results of the Congress than

was actually the case. The basis for this self—deception

consisted of some illusory gains assumed to have been made

in the Balkans, the nursery of Austrian delusions since

1852. Influenced by memoranda composed by members of the

military command, the Emperor seized the initiative at

a conference of February 11, 1856, for the purpose of

 

131Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean
_er. Pp- 330-331-

132Ibid., p. 338.

~—-—.—

 

 

 

 

 

483

inserting certain revisions into the instructions which

his Foreign Minister had drawn up for use at Paris.

Each revision raised the demands Austria was to place

in facilitating the extension of her economic influence

down the Danube and in preventing the Balkans from becoming

a hotbed of revolutionary activity.133 The Emperor's

total misapprehension of Austria's weakness at the bargaining

table was convincingly demonstrated at the very beginning

of the Paris Congress, when all of the parties to it

flatly refused to give guarantees for the maintenance

of a governmental system in the Principalities which

would be acceptable to Vienna. Enraged by such presump— i

tuousness, Grfinne and his conservative friends prevailed

on Franz Joseph to instruct Buol to insist on the ful—

fillment of the February 11 conditions. Such an intrusion

by the military on the Foreign Minister's authority

severely limited his room for maneuver at Paris.13u
Buol did what he could to comply, but compromise

was inevitable. The problem remained what it had been

since l854——no one trusted Austria. As a solution, BuOl

Proposed withdrawing Austrian troops from the Principal—

ities at the same time that the local governors (hospodars)

were building new armies. By that, anarchy could be

 

 

133Austria, HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 49,
Conference minutes of Feb. 11, 185 .

 

l3“Unckel, Osterreich und der Krimkrigg, pp. 250—

 

254.

 

 

 

484
prevented and enough western good will might be won to
support a stable government in the regions south of the
.Austrian border. The obstacle to such a course, as BuOl
recognized clearly, was the military:
The impression which our occupation has summoned forth
is not a favorable one. The blame for that falls
in no way on the military bearing of our army, but
rather partly on the unfortunate preference of our
generals for making policy, for which they lacked
the correct viewpoint. General Hess had misunderstood
his position from the first; the views of Graf
Coronini are of a dreadful one-sidedness; nor was
Graf Paar successful in this area.135
Buol triumphed with this parting shot at the military
command. Compromise was achieved by the establishment
of an international commission to determine the future
status of the Principalities, and the Paris Congress
ended.

Within a year, it is true, the Principalities defied,
with Louis Napoleon's support, the decisions of the com—
mission by forming what amounted to a united state poten-
tially hostile and dangerous to Austria. There was little
the.Austrian leaders could have done about that, just as
there had been little they could have done to change the
course of the war out of which Rumania was to be formed.
Once the Crimean War began, Buol's task was simply to
make the most of a very bad situation. But the active

imperialistic policy advocated by the military and certain

members of the diplomatic corps since late 1852 seriously

135Austria. HHStA, PA 40, Interna, Vortrage, K 49.
BuOl note to Franz Joseph, Apr. 6, 1856.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

485
weakened all of Buol's efforts to prevent an imperialistic
war from breaking out in the first place. It also assured
him of losing a desperate gamble to preserve Austria's
security in the southeast, and a chance to advance her
position in Central Europe in 1854. And repeatedly there—
after, it cost him the international trust necessary to
prevent the forfeiture of Austrian interests in both
Central and Eastern Europe. This is not to say that
Buol's peacekeeping efforts, his desperate gamble or his
attempts to preserve Austria's Vital interests abroad i
would have succeeded with a unified policy. He certainly
made errors in judgment, especially with regard to Germany. f
But his chances would have been much better if Habsburg
policy had been less fraught with apparent duplicity.
Part of this was Buol's own fault. He should have re—
called Bruck from Constantinople much earlier and should
have challenged more vigorously Franz Joseph's intrusion
into affairs about which he was ignorant. But mostly,
the governmental system was at fault. Lacking a unified
system of policy formulation, Buol could never be sure
that his policy was based on a realistic appraisal of
Austria's resources. That uncertainty inevitably caused
his reluctance to challenge other strong personalities
in the government and forced him to rely more heavily
on the advice he received from the Foreign Office. At
least with regard to Germany, this advice was predicated

on conceptions very different from what was normal in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

486
mid—nineteenth century Austria. Finally, the lack of
a unified system reflects on the Emperor himself. If
unity was to exist in an absolutistic form of government,
the ruler had to provide it. Young, impressionable and
stubborn, Franz Joseph left himself open to changing in-
fluences and sanctioned contradictory policy measures
without recognizing the contradictions. He could not
provide unity. No one could. The problem with Austrian
foreign policy after 1850 was not so much that the Foreign

Ministry lacked authority to formulate and implement

 

decisions based on its evaluation of international con—
ditions; it was rather that neither the Foreign Ministry

nor anyone else had an effective way of preventing another

 

agency from formulating or implementing foreign policy
on the basis of whatever evaluations it chose. And for
that, the responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders

of Franz Joseph.

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

Austrian foreign policy in the years 1848—1856 was
a product of two quite separate formulation processes.
The first of these was the interaction, through the
operational routine and organizational structure estab-
lished in early 1849, among all of those persons who made

up the staff of the Foreign Ministry. In a philosophical,

 

social, religious and political sense, these individuals

constituted an agency which was quite different from the

 

rest of the Austrian bureaucracy and society. The grad—
ually increasing influence which this group exerted on
the foreign ministers between early 1849 and the Crimean
War years was thus distinctive in its tone and content.
Very specific, and at times sharply contrasting, concep-
tions of Central Europe formed the basis of and driving
force behind the influence emanating from this group of
advisers. During the months of Schwarzenberg's physical
and political decline, and of Buol's initiation into high
Viennese politics, the influence wielded by their senior
advisers on their policies became powerful, contradictory,
and sometimes unrealistic.

But no modern state's foreign policy is purely a

result of what emerges from its foreign ministry. There

487

 

 

488
is a second process of policy formulation at a level
above that which is lodged in the agency formally charged
with matters of foreign relations. Taking place in Austria's
case among the other ministers, the military command, the
ruler and the important members of the diplomatic corps,
this additional process could reinforce, negate or simply
neutralize the foreign policy worked out at the level
of the Foreign Ministry. At the higher level, more often
than not, policy determinants were of a sort altogether

different from those chiefly international factors evalu—

 

ated in the Foreign Ministry. Even when that difference
was not particularly evident, i.e., when a policy was

determined at both levels primarily on the basis of an

 

evaluation of international factors, foreign policy alter-
natives that were rejected or ignored in the Foreign
Ministry by some rather unique Beamten with some rather
uncharacteristic ideas were accepted at the higher level
of policy formulation.

Used properly, the two formulation processes, even
with their differences, complemented each other. Used
improperly, they paralyzed or rendered inconsistent Aus-
tria's foreign policy. The period during which the Minis-
terrat constituted the supreme governing institution in
Austria is an excellent example of the proper utilization
of the two processes. The period of neo—absolutism is
a good example of the opposite. In the preceding pages,

the attempt has been made to describe as precisely as

 

 

489
possible the two processes of policy formulation and the
effects of each on Austria's foreign relations. In those
very few pages which follow, it remains only necessary
to summarize the combined effect of the two over the
time span with which this study has dealt. It may not
even then be possible to identify definitively the exact
motivations and mechanisms behind every international
move Austria made over this period, for this study con—
cerns only the position of the Foreign Ministry with respect
to those moves. But it should at least be possible to
identify what agencies, persons or institutions were in~
volved in Habsburg foreign policy at any specific point.
To that extent these closing remarks can serve as a road
map for finding the points where the critical decisions
were made in the formulation of any single policy.

During the first twelve months of the period under
consideration, i.e., between the outbreak of revolution
in Vienna in March 1848 and the permanent resettlement
of the Foreign Ministry in the Empire's capital city in
March 1849, policy formulation occurred almost exclusively
at the broad governmental level. The Foreign Office,
‘when it existed at all, exerted no influence and provided
no input. For more than eight of those twelve months,
the foreign ministers were physically separated from
What should have been their chief advisers. For over
five of those months, Hfibner alone personified the Foreign

Office in its capacity as advisory agency. The virtual

 

 

 

 

490
non-existence of the Foreign Office prior to late 1848
had an important effect on the broad governmental process
of policy formulation. By default, the Ministerrat ini—
tially became the prime foreign policy—maker; but it was
forced to perform that task without any sort of input in
terms of advice or even information from the Foreign
Ministry. Decisions were taken rashly and totally on the
basis of seemingly overriding domestic determinants,
until the basic faultiness of these decisions at the height
of the Italian crisis brought the Monarchy to unknown
depths of international influence.

At that point, the policy—making function shifted
to the military command in Italy. That was a perfectly
reasonable place for it to shift, for the state's exis-
tence as a Great Power then depended predominantly on the
success of military action. But once the military had
completed its task by reconquering Italy in early August
1848, a strange interlude set in. The Foreign Ministry
remained dormant, and the Ministerrat was still incapac—
itated by its dismal showing earlier in the year. Just
prior to the renewed outbreak of revolution in Vienna
in early October, Schwarzenberg returned from Milan to
fill the vacuum. The new violence in many ways simplified
his task, for all remnants of the old governing structure
were thereby swept away. He, along with Hubner, created
a de facto dictatorship in foreign affairs during the

Period of the court's exile in Olmfitz. Schwarzenberg

 

 

 

 

 

 

491
personally was completely responsible for the reversal
of'Wessenberg's policy toward France, Britain, Germany
and Italy.

But the Schwarzenberg dictatorship too was short-
lived, and the evidence suggests that its existence was
intentionally curtailed by the Foreign Minister himself.
Having revived the Ministerrat as soon as was possible
after its earlier dispersal, Schwarzenberg entrusted to
its deliberations in December the decision about basic
policy in the area of Austria's most fundamental interests—
Germany. During the subsequent weeks, while the Ministerrat
struggled with the drafting of a constitution upon which
all of Austria's future foreign relations would have to
depend, Schwarzenberg continued to defer to the principle
of collective leadership in the sphere of foreign affairs.
The formulation of policy toward Germany, Hungary and
Italy was thus held in abeyance in these weeks and was
fully submitted to the Ministerrat, where all policy
determinants could be collected and evaluated, only after
the constitution of March 4, 1849, had been completed.
0n the broad governmental level, the process of foreign
policy formulation was to remain virtually the sole
prerogative of the Ministerrat for the next twenty months.

Just at the point that the Ministerrat assumed
permanent authority over foreign policy formulation, the
Foreign Ministry began to undergo a transformation which

was shortly to introduce the other level of policy

 

 

 

492

formulation into the picture. During the initial stages
of the reorganization, very little discernible influence
on Schwarzenberg by his senior Foreign Office advisers

was in evidence. It is nevertheless clear that Schwarzen—
berg depended heavily for his information, especially in
German affairs, on those advisers. Schwarzenberg, more—
over, held at that time an extraordinary amount of authority
by virtue of the fact that he had personally and nearly
single—handedly reconstructed the government. As a result,
his viewpoint usually carried great weight in the Minister—
rat. To the extent that this viewpoint was shaped by

what Werner and Thierry were able to impart to him about

the German Confederal institutions, with which they had

 

both long been intimately involved, and by what Meysenbug
could tell him about Louis Napoleon's supposed pro—Austrian
intentions, the Foreign Office, with its newly streamlined
structure and its highly unusual personnel composition,
could directly guide foreign policy. Because of the
unusual viewpoints represented there, and because of the
unrealistic character of the policies advocated as a
result, the prominence of the Foreign Office in policy
formulation was not necessarily advantageous. That was
especially true in Germany where no permanent solution
was ever achieved. But at least the reassertion by the
Foreign Ministry of its authority at the broad govern—
mental level, embodied then in the Ministerrat, provided

for the policy formulation process a crucial source Of

 

 

 

 

493

input that had been lacking in the mid—1848 version of
the Ministerrat. The government therefore acquired in
the eyes of foreign states a legitimacy that dramatically
reversed the trend toward impotence which had prevailed
in 1848. Even the Hungarian crisis, and the necessity
to summon Russian aid to solve it, did not turn Austria
into a supplicant state.

But the key point is that the complementary relation—
ship between Foreign Ministry and Ministerrat, healthy
as it was, did not serve to resolve the German question.
Schwarzenberg himself, as the man most immediately
responsible for foreign affairs, was not very imaginative.
The reorganization of the Foreign Office, while improving
the operational system and organizational structure, did
not replace with outsiders and a fresh perspective the
veteran Beamten and fossilized ideas remaining from
Metternich's day. As a result, no imaginative proposals
were forthcoming from that quarter. Yet, as that agency
most directly charged with providing rational and imagin—
ative evaluations of the international system, the Foreign
Office was the most likely and reasonable source from
which such policy proposals should have emanated. It is
thus most certainly to the Foreign Office that the primary
blame must fall for the unhealthy tendency for Austria
to revert, in the face of heavy German opposition, to
the forms and customs of the outmoded 1815 Confederation

as a solution to the German question.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_~ __.___._ ..p>_—-a—-—-—1 »— ,_‘____,__i 17'

 

 

 

494

At the time, however, the Foreign Ministry escaped
blame. As the rivalries in Germany became more and more
bitter, and as Austrian objectives there seemingly slipped
farther and farther from attainment, the quality of ruler—
ship by the Ministerrat, the source Of all final govern—
mental authority, gradually came to be called into question
by certain powerful forces in Vienna. As early as March
1850, there were isolated cases of doubt eXpressed by
key military and civilian officials as to whether
Schwarzenberg as Minister—President had the capacity to
conduct the affairs of the Austrian state. By late 1850,
Emperor Franz Joseph was actively involved in dismantling
the system of collective leadership as a means of rulership.
He and Kfibeck, it is true, were at that time only con-
cerned with establishing new agencies capable of exerting
a disabling influence on the Ministerrat and were not
yet directly involved in foreign policy—making. For all
of 1850, therefore, the two complementary processes of
foreign policy formulation remained operative. The Interim
at Frankfurt came to an end, the old pre-1848 Bundestag
was reconvened, and the Prussians at Olmfitz were forced
temporarily to recognize Austrian supremacy in the Con—
federation. But lasting success was no more attainable
then than in 1849. Apart from achieving these doubtful
victories, not a single positive move was made in Vienna
to place the Habsburg position in Germany on a constructive

footing. The central responsibility for that omission

 

 

 

 

495

in the decision—making apparatus existing in 1850 continued

 

to fall to Schwarzenberg and his advisers in the Foreign
Office.

After mid-January 1851, credit and blame for the
course of Austrian foreign policy is not so easily assessed.
The initiation of the process of setting absolutist instit-
utions into motion created a constitutional crisis which
resembled the situation prevailing in early 1849 and which
had to be resolved before the policy formulation procedures
at the broad governmental level could be re-established.

In the course of the resolution of this constitutional

question, which remained open for two full years, foreign

 

policy formulation fell nearly exclusively to the Foreign

 

Ministry. More specifically, since Schwarzenberg was an
unhealthy and a preoccupied man, it fell for more than

one of those years to his senior advisers on the Ball—
hausplatz. The hostility among them, engendered by con-
flicting principles concerning Austria's role in Central
Europe, fostered a damaging inability to formulate a

viable policy vis—a-vis the German or any other question.
That paralysis, which persisted until Buol took charge,

was reflected in the Austrian failure at the Dresden
Conferences and the inconsistent stance (in view of earlier

practice) taken toward Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat.

 

Buol's accession to power in April 1852 did not at
first result in any changes in the dominant position held

by the Foreign Ministry in the policy formulation process.

 

 

 

 

 

 

496

What it did change was the character of policy, at least
toward Central Europe, which emerged from the Ballhaus-
platz. Buol brought with him a View of the political
world which was much more in consonance with that of the
German-Imperial clique than was Schwarzenberg's view.
As a consequence, a very perceptible reaction against the
policy maintained by Austria toward Germany during the
Schwarzenberg era took place. By mid-1852, the results
of this reaction had been manifested in the more concil-
iatory Austrian attitude on the necessity for immediate
entry into the Customs Union. Undersecretary Werner's
influence on.this issue was particularly evident.

At the broad governmental level, however, the vacuum
that had existed since the abdication in January 1851
by the Ministerrat of its foreign policy responsibilities
was not filled until late 1852. For a period of twenty-
two months, policy formulation had occurred solely within
the confines of the Foreign Ministry. It occurred, more—
over, solely on the basis of an analysis of external
determinants, for which an agency for foreign affairs
should rightfully have been responsible, but which should
also have been only one of several factors shaping the
state's foreign policy. It can be argued that even on
the basis of those external determinants-~the attitudes
of other German states toward Austrian leadership, for

example-~the Foreign Ministry made judgments which re-

 

sulted in bad policy during these months. But it could

 

 

 

 

 

 

497
scarcely have been expected, even admitting good judgments,
to have made good policy, for all of the internal deter—
minants which normally go into foreign policy-making-—
considerations of the state's finances, military readiness,
the morale of the population——failed to reach on a regular
basis the actual policy-makers in.the Foreign Office.
The reason for that omission was Franz Joseph's drive
to create an absolutistic system in.which he became the
decision—maker. He thus destroyed the mechanisms through
which a balanced input had previously conditioned the

policy formulation process, and a twenty-two month period

 

of vacuum elapsed before he was ready to replace that

mechanism with a new and vastly inferior one-—himself.

 

Buol, it was true, was normally able to control the
Emperor's activities as foreign policy formulator. But
in the process, there occurred several critical mistakes
in timing. That problem immediately became clear during
Franz Joseph's first foray into foreign policy in late
1852: none of the antagonism generated toward Austria in
Paris and St. Petersburg would have occurred if Franz
Joseph had not persisted for so long in trying to deny
the newly proclaimed Emperor Napoleon the traditional
form of address. A different kind of problem emerged
with the decision to dispatch the Leiningen Mission in
early 1853. The military command, a member of the diplo—
matic corps, and the Emperor joined forces in this instance

not to provide the kind of information necessary to

 

 

 

498

complement consideration of those external determinants
which are normally the province of the Foreign Ministry,
but to provide and to base policy on an evaluation of
those determinants which ran directly counter to the
evaluations of the Foreign Ministry. It was in effect
a usurpation of the Foreign Ministry's functions. Policy-
making in early 1853 must thus be studied from the per-
spective rather of the extra—ministerial persons and
agencies of the government than of the Foreign Ministry.

By the time of Russia's occupation of the Danubian
Principalities in mid—1853, Buol's Foreign Ministry had
reasserted itself as a policy—making agency. Unlike the
military and the Emperor, neither Buol nor any of his
chief advisers had an imperialistic instinct in the
Balkans. Rather than utilizing the Russian move into
Turkish territory as an excuse for a seizure of land by
Austria, the Foreign Ministry sought a peaceful solution,
first bilaterally between Constantinople and St. Peters—
burg, then multilaterally through the Vienna Conferences.
Neither attempt succeeded. War broke out in October 1853,
promising, after Sinope, to spread by early 1854 to the
rest of the European powers. Having witnessed the steadily
increasing degree of Austrian involvement in the conflict,
BuOl decided, despite the Emperor's distaste for anything
infringing on his own powers, to hazard the suggestion
that a form of collective leadership be reinstituted

Preparatory to possible Austrian entanglement in

 

 

 

 

 

499
hostilities. The Emperor agreed, but the new institutional
form that was developed, consisting of irregularly called
conferences to discuss specific issues at the governmental
level, in no way replaced the complementary relationship
which had earlier existed between Foreign Ministry and
Ministerrat. Corporative leadership was not to reappear
during the Crimean War era.

Instead, there existed an adversary relationship
between the Foreign Ministry and other agencies, predom—
inantly the military, which not merely provided a positive
balance between external and internal determinants in the
Policy-making process, but also challenged on crucial
occasions the very right of the Ministry to propound a
view based on its own legitimate functions. The first
and most critical example of this occurred in late March
1854 when the policy of the Foreign Ministry was effec-
tively overridden by the military. By that time, it is
clear, the forces in the Foreign Ministry which propounded
a policy of close cooperation with France as a means to
achieving the ultimate goal of Austrian predominance in
Central Europe were ascendant. Buol, both by natural
inclination and by persuasion, was in total accord with
these forces, personified by Werner and Meysenbug. Yet
the Foreign Ministry's policy was overruled at the broad
governmental level by the ability of Hess and Bruck to
gain the ear of the Emperor. The consequent delay,

lasting until December 1854, in the Austrian decision

 

 

 

500
to make a positive move vis-a-vis the warring powers
destroyed any possibility for Vienna to demonstrate
leadership in Central Europe. The Bamberg declaration of
non-support for Austria (June 1854) and the constant
Prussian refusal to interpret flexibly the April 20 treaty
‘with Austria showed the extent to which the key part of
the Foreign Ministry's policy had been desiccated.

The remainder of the year was spent by the Foreign
Ministry in trying to re—establish its claim to policy-
making functions. The conclusion of the December 2 treaty
with the Western powers and the December 22 treaty over
Italy with France showed that it had succeeded in this
quest. But it succeeded only at considerable cost to
the quality of the policy pursued. The chance to demon-
strate striking leadership in Central Europe had vanished
with Franz Joseph's decision in March to send Hess to
Berlin to reach a common Austro-Prussian position on the
war. The continued stubborn insistence by the Foreign
Ministry on the adoption of a policy of Central European
leadership, due both to the ingrained attitudes prevalent
on the Ballhausplatz and to the desire by Buol to reassert
his personal position before the other state agencies,
could only result in the appearance of Austrian abrasive-
ness with respect to her German neighbors. In antagonizing
Germany, one of the major objectives of the policy of
alliance with the Western powers was defeated.

The institutional relationships reflected in this

 

 

 

 

 

 

—_—--—T—— " ~ me ~—-— .i-_1_._..__-. ——~ - ~ -» -

501
‘mode of policy formulation remained basically unchanged
for the duration of the Crimean War. Buol's Foreign
Ministry, guided mostly by the attitudes of Werner and
Biegeleben with regard to Germany and Meysenbug with
regard to France, Italy and Russia, consistently advo—
cated alliance with the west for the sake of Austrian
interests in Central and Eastern Europe. .Although the
opposition from the military, and the pliancy shown by
Franz Joseph toward this opposition, had done most of
the damage to this policy in 1854, sporadic instances of
ascendancy by the army, the Emperor and certain members
of the diplomatic corps over the Foreign Ministry in policy
formulation and implementation continued to inject in-
consistencies into Austria's Crimean War position.in 1855
and 1856. The most outstanding examples of such incursions
occurred when Hess sought, after the Russian evacuation,
to exclude the Turks from any role in governing the
Principalities, and in the insertion by Franz Joseph of
unrealistic conditions into Buol's instructions for the
Paris peace talks.

After the beginning of 1853, therefore, the two
processes of foreign policy formulation, one at the
Foreign Ministry level and one at the broad governmental
level, worked at cross purposes. The constructive con-
flict inherent in the interaction between the two processes
in the Ministerrat during 1849 and 1850 was lacking en~

tirely. The consistent, if fundamentally flawed, policy

 

 

 

 

502
pursued in 1851 and 1852 when the Foreign Ministry was
the sole agency concerned with international affairs,
was also nowhere in evidence. Despite the implementation
in early 1854 of a conference system as a means of co-
ordinating policy among the various interested agencies,
the lack of a corporative institution responsible for
policy decisions created an environment in which hostility
and conflict prevailed. In general, to be sure, Buol
maintained foreign policy-making as a sole prerogative
of the Foreign Ministry. Given the highly unusual and
often unrealistic political views represented in the
Foreign Ministry, that situation did not always conduce

to good foreign policy. Worse yet were those few occasions

 

on which Buol lost control of the formulation process,
for it seemed to happen at the most crucial points. When
incursions from other quarters occurred, there was no
institution, system or person capable of directing policy
onto a compromise or coordinated course. That was the
basic fault of the system. More than any other single
element, that inability to utilize effectively the two
processes of foreign policy formulation caused Austria's
essential failure in the international system of the
Post—1850 years. Under the neo-absolutistic government
established by Franz Joseph the Emperor was the only
point from which an effective utilization of those pro—

cesses could have emanated. He was not up to the task.

 

 

 

APPENDICES

 

....“— _—.u -- -- -. -

 

 

APPENDIX B

 

... “A—_—.—-...___ .

APPENDIX A

THE FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION, JANUARY 1, 1850

Joseph von Werner

M

Undersecretary of State

Policy Branch

Political Section

I. Adolf von Thierry

II. Otto von Meysenbug

III. Wilhelm von Pflfigl

IV. Anton von Hammer

V. Ignatz von Liehmann

Prussia, the other German
states, Denmark, Holland
and Switzerland.

France, England and the
Italian states.

Russia, Sweden, Belgium,
Spain, Portugal and the
transatlantic countries.
The Orient.

Police Affairs.

Administrative Section

AB. Franz von Mensshengen

Chancellery Direction in
both Sections;

Personnel affairs of all
Beamten belonging to the
Ministry, the embassies
and the state archives;

Affairs relating to the
conditions of foreign
embassies accredited to
the Imperial-Royal Court;

Affairs of the nobility
and of imperial orders;

Passes and authentications;

Press and military affairs;

503

 

 

Ernst Niebauer

B-l. Wilhelm von Pflfigl

0. Johann von Vesque

D. Ignatz von Liehmann

_—~_u- __'__‘_;. _ _— __ "he _ ...ls . .

504

Supervision of the Oriental
Academy;

Court ceremony, including
all notifications;

Affairs of the German Order;

Archival affairs;

Supervision of the State
Chancellery Library;

Affairs of Austrian subjects
in the German Confederal
states, Switzerland, Den-
mark and Holland, to the
extent that they are not
subsumed under any of the
above or any of the fol—
lowing rubrics.

Affairs pertaining to the
Imperial House and the
All-Highest Family.

Legal drafts;

Affairs of civil, criminal
and administrative justice;

Questions of jurisdiction;

Border negotiations;

Affairs of foundations;
Freedom of travel, emigration,
immigration, citizenship;

Cartels;

Currency liquidations with
foreign states;

Collection of tax arrears;

Affairs of Austrian subjects,
in the above-mentioned
degree, in France, England,
Belgium, the Italian states,
Spain and Portugal.

All affairs relating to
trade, customs, and excise
taxes;

All affairs relating to
steamshipping and railways;

All affairs relating to
agriculture and industry;

Postal affairs;

Bank affairs;

Patents for inventions;

Slave trade;

The consular system;

 

 

 

508

Postal affairs;

Bank affairs;

Patents for inventions;
Slave trade;

The consular system.

 

D-l. Anton von Hammer

All affairs which relate
to the Orient, insofar
as they are handled in
the Administrative Section;
Discipline and personnel
affairs in the levantine
consulates.

 

E. Otto von Meysenbug

All church affairs;
Affairs of the Maltese Order.

 

Mechanical Services Branch

Political Section

 

Copying Office Director Ludwig von Reymond
Adjutant Franz Neilreich
Registry and Director Clemens von Pilat
Incoming Corres— Adjutant Joseph von Schweiger
pondence Registry
Administrative Section
Incoming Corres- Director Joseph Mahler
pondence Registry
Co ' Off'ce Director Dominik Protiwenski
pying l Adjutant Adolf Ascher
Director Karl von Kesaer

Registry

Adjutant Felix Miessl

 

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C

SPHERE OF COMPETENCE SCHEMA FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, 18481

Competence sphere of the Ministry of House and Foreign
.Affairs. To this belong the following affairs:

§3O Correspondence with foreign courts, foreign ministers
and legates accredited to Our Court in all matters having
to do with the various ministries: §31 The employment and
instruction of Austrian representatives to foreign coun-
tries; §32 The negotiation, conclusion and maintenance

of all treaties with foreign countries: §33 The affairs
of the German Confederation; §34 All active and passive
claims on the Austrian state, in cooperation with the
Ministry of Finance; §35 All affairs which concern Our
prerogatives outside of Austria; §36 The right to approve
all instructions to the Supreme District Authorities which
are decreed by the various ministries, insofar as they
affect relations with neighboring states; §37 Border
affairs and border differences with neighborin states,
in cooperation with the pertinent ministries; €38 Pro-
tection and representation of the affairs of Our subjects
in foreign lands, to which belong especially dispensations
of all sorts sought from the PaPaCYS §39 Matters dealing
with imperial orders; §40 Affairs concerning Imperial

Family pacts and the private princely rights of Our House;

§4l The property rights of the throne, in cooperation

with the Ministry of Finance; §42 The bestowal of titles
h strict observation of the

of nobility of all ranks, wit . .
stipulations of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitutional

Charter; §43 The direct management of affairs formerly
1 Herold's Office, as designated

pertaining to the Imperia . .
in the Organic Edict of September 1, 1808, Title 11, With
observation of the basicprovisions noted in the preceding
paragraph; §44 The proposals to be submitted to Us in the
the bestowal of the rights

convened Council of State over . .
of citizenship, in cooperation with the Ministry of the

 

lAustria, HHStA, Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Organ:
isierung, Fasz. 3, undated fragment, probably written in

mid-1848.
509

 

 

510

Interior; §45 Supervision and supreme leadership of the
House and State Archives; §46 The certification of all
documents which are to hold validity in forei countries;
§47 Issuance of passes in foreign countries; $48 The
pronouncement of Our approvals for the acceptance of for-
eign honors and other such designations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX D

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX D

SPHERE 0F COMPETENCE SCHEMA FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY, 18521

Special area of competence of the Imperial-Royal Ministry
of the Imperial House:

§1 The mission of the Minister of the House includes all
affairs which pertain to the legal position of the reigning
dynasty and of the entire Imperial House, as well as to

the statutory relationship of the All-Highest Family and
its members.

§2 The Minister of the House is obligated to protect and
to represent the rights of the Imperial House and All—
Highest family and to intervene in inner family affairs

in accordance with laws now existing or yet to be decreed
in order to uphold the provisions over mutual rights and
duties of the members of the Imperial House as determined
by the Family Statute of 1839.

§3 In particular, the Minister of the Imperial House is
Obligated: to present suggestions for means of maintaining
or increasing the principal of the Imperial Family's
maintenance fund and of the Imperial Family's entail;

and to provide for the liquidity of the appanages, dowries,
widows' jointures, equipage funds and other such tributes
to be remitted to the members of the Imperial House out

of the State Treasury.

§4 On the occasion of the marriage of the Most High Arch—
dukes and Archduchesses, cooperation in the drafting of
marriage pacts with respect to the upholding of the Family
Statute as well as to considerations of state protocol,

decorum, titulars, etc.
On the occasion of marriage with foreign princes and

 

1The following, found in Austria, ggspg, Adminis-
trative Registratur, F 4, K 399. Organisierung Wirkungs—
kreis, underwent several drafts between late 1851 and
January 9, 1852, when it was presented as part of the
common Proposal by Schwarzenberg to Franz Joseph. It
is also printed in.Walter, ed., Die Geschichte der Minis—
tgrien Kolowrats: Aktenstficke, pp. 156-158} The Emperor
approved it on April 12, 1852.

511

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

512

princesses, the drafting of authorizations for the com—
missioners for engagement, conveyance and acceptance;
and of the acts of renunciation of the Most High Arch-
duchesses; and of the requests for the granting by the
Holy See of possibly necessary marriage dispensations.
§5 The procurement of notarizations for charters to be
issued by members of the Imperial House in family or state
affairs, as well as the drafting of the charters, the
certification of the signatures and the deposit of the
charters in the House Archive.

§6 The control of records concerning those holding the
title "wirkliche geheimen Rathe," the issuance of the
appointment decrees and the administration of the oath
to said persons.

Special area of competence of the Imperial—Royal Ministry
of Foreign Affairs:
§1 The representation of the rights and interests of the
Empire or of its various parts toward foreign states. 1
§2 The representation of the rights and interests of .
individual Austrian citizens in foreign lands, insofar ,
as such might warrant diplomatic intervention.
§3 Correspondence with the foreign missions which are
accredited at the Imperial Court, and intercession in the
intercourse between these missions and domestic Imperial
authorities.
§4 The conveyance or support of wishes and affairs dealing
with measures of foreign missions accredited to the Im—
perial Court or of Imperial missions in foreign lands
which are to be presented to His Majesty or to the domestic
authorities by foreign governments or their citizens.
§5 The drafting of Imperial letters to foreign sovereigns
and representatives of the supreme governing authorities
in the republics, as well as of the customary notifications
of marriages, births, deaths, etc., which occur in the
circle of the Imperial Family.

The imparting of instructions to Imperial legates and
diplomatic agents, as well as to the consuls (insofar
as orders to them are necessary) which belong to the
Ministry's area of competence. (The control of the ad—
ministration of justice over Austrian subjects, which
belongs to the Imperial consulates in Turkish regions is
to be undertaken in common with the Justice Ministry.)*
§7 The negotiation and conclusion of all state treaties
and other agreements with foreign states, conditional
upon acquisition of All—Highest approval, and, in adminis—
trative matters, in conjunction with those ministries in
whose area of competence the affair belongs; in the latter
case, the acquisition of All—Highest ratification of the

 

*Added by decision of January 18, 1853.

 

 

 

 

 

513

concluded treaty is also required.
§8 Negotiations with the Holy See over church affairs,
particularly over inquiries by the Ministry of Cults
about the hierarchical ranking of the clergy.
§9 The supervision over and representation of the rights
of the German Order of Knights (according to §17 of the
All—Highest Patent of June 28, 1840).
§10 The acquisition of All—Highest permission to accept
and to wear orders and honorary distinctions bestowed
by foreign sovereigns on Imperial Austrian subjects, in
certain cases in cooperation with the concerned ministries;
the presentation of proposals for bestowal of Imperial-
Royal Orders on foreign citizens.
§ll Legalizations of charters issued in Austria but in-
tended for foreign countries and of those issued in for-
eign countries but to be applied in Austria.
§12 The issuance of State Chancellery passes according
to the existing applicable regulations.
§l3 The regulation and control of the offices and instit-
utions subordinated to this Ministry, namely:

A) The House, Court and State Archives;

B) The Coding and Translation Bureau;

C) The Paymaster's Office; and

D) The Oriental Academy, excepting those matters

reserved for All-Highest approval.

§l4 The Most Humble proposals for the filling of endowed
chairs in the Oriental Academy.
§15 Participation in appointing consul-generals, consuls
and consular personnel.
§16 The positions of archivist in the House, Court and
State Archives, of Legationssekretar and of Legation-
Attaché belong to those service ranks in the Foreign
Ministry the filling of which is reserved to the Emperor
in accordance with paragraph 3 of the regulations on the
general area of competence of the ministries.

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX E

REMARKS ABOUT THE MINISTERIAL AGENDA CONCERNING
THE IMPERIAL HOUSEl

Documents concerning the Imperial House have been
indiscriminately mixed with those of the Foreign Ministry
until recently; they have been separated and catalogued
only lately, as a result of which a separate archive for
them has been established.

Among these documents are to be found no particles
of information or instructions which would give a
clarification about the nature and the range of matters
'which those in All-Highest authority deign to include
under the designation "Affairs of the Imperial House"
and the management of which has been entrusted to the
Foreign Ministry.

Since 1742 the "Secret House Affairs" have remained
assigned to the Chief of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Prior to that, the First Court Chancellor was the head
of all branches of administration and managed domestic
as well as foreign affairs.

In that year, a separate State Chancellery for the
foreign affairs of state and for the Secret House Affairs
was established and Count Uhlfeld was named to Court and
State ChancellOr for these affairs. In 1750, Prince
Kaunitz received the same title of Court and State Chan-
cellor for Foreign State and Secret House Affairs.

Since that time the State Chancellery has usually,
but not always, appeared as the "Secret House, Court and
State Chancellery," although the Chiefs (Baron Thugut,
Cobenzl, Count Stadion, Count Metternich) have held only
the title of Directing Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the decree of 1821 naming Prince Metternich House,
Court and State Chancellor, and in the accompanying

 

1The following is to be found with Schwarzenberg's
collective Proposal of January 9, 1852, in Austria, HHStA,
Ministerkonferenz—Kanzlei, K 1, MR/77 ex 1852. Written
by Schwarzenberg, it appears also in.Walter, ed., 212
Geschichte der Ministerien Kolowrats: Aktenstficke, pp.
152—156.

514

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

515

public pronouncement, no special mention is made of the
affairs of the Imperial House whereby one could conclude
that these affairs were considered definitively connected
with foreign affairs.

Lacking positive norms and criteria for judging the
question of what objects are actually to be regarded as
those Imperial House affairs which devolve upon the For-
eign Ministry, it will suffice provisionally to accept
the present usages, contested by none, as the guiding
principle.

The solution to the problem thus lies in the answer
to the double question:

First, in what sense has the designation "Imperial House"
been construed when the assignment of an affair relating

to it has been at issue?

Second, what affairs have heretofore actually been handled
in the Foreign Ministry in its capacity of a House Ministry
and within what limits has the conduct of such affairs
moved?

The designation "Imperial House" can be understood
in a broad and a narrow sense.

In the broad sense would be included not only the
ruling family and the affairs pertaining to it, but also
the material existence of the Court and the Household
budget.

In fact, we see subordinated to the Minister of the
House at some courts all branches which are responsible
for the glimmering outward appearance of the sovereign,
for his and his family's property, for the orderly manage—
ment of income, for an adequate budget, etc.

But in Austria, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs have
conceived the designation "Imperial House" in a narrower
sense as a standard for delimiting their responsibilities.
They have understood by it the ruling All-Highest Family,
to the extent that its members are subordinated on the
basis of the House Statute to a common chief and to the
extent that they stand among themselves in certain personal
and proprietary relationships vis—a—vis the state and
foreign courts.

The Minister of the House has the obligation and the
duty, in the capacity of executor of the will of the head
of the dynasty and as his adviser, to intervene in most
of these relationships and the transactions pertaining
to them. That he will not refuse, indeed that he will
consider himself obligated to be available in word and
deed to the other members of the Imperial House is self—
evident; yet in such instances he may consider himself
as acting with the authority of the chief of the Family.
One can, moreover, view both the actual importance and
the appearance of the latter from two standpoints: as it
is applied domestically, namely toward the members of
the dynasty subordinated to him, or as it is applied

outwardly, namely toward the state and toward foreign

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

516
ruling houses.

I. In reference to the first, the Family Statute of 1839
determines the mutual rights and duties.

The Minister of the House is obligated to hold in
evidence this statute, to make it the guiding principle
of his actions and to assist the Sovereign as chief of
the Family in the execution of his important rights.
Among others, these obligations are:

a) the highest supervision of all facets of the ducal
house, namely, whatever concerns tutelage, guardianship,
upbringing, marriage, selection of rank, and travels of
.Archdukes and Archduchesses; b) supreme jurisdiction in
disagreements between them; c) supreme supervision and
control of the administration of common family property
and the determination of the quotas which are to be assigned
each branch when the annual surplus of rent is distributed,
as well as the approval of extraordinary financial assis—
tance from the same common property. In cases not foreseen
by the Family Statute, the Emperor determines the endow-
ment of a family member and decides to what extent it
should be provided by the common support fund or by the
state. He approves or denies the request of an Archduke
to dispose of his property lying in the Family fund in

a manner not in accordance with the Family Statute, as

'was the case with the Archdukes Johann and Joseph; d) the
Emperor determines the titles and coats of arms to be
borne by the members of the All—Highest Family; e) He
determines in questionable cases, such as occurred with
reference to the Duke of Reichstadt, their ranks; f) the
testament of a deceased member of the Family is handed

to the Emperor, opened by him and its publication ordered
or forbidden by him; g) even before the secondary and
tertiary lines of Toscana and Modena, the Emperor stands
as the common chief, although in a limited degree.

 

 

II. In intervening in matters concerning the position

of the Chief of the reigning dynasty toward foreign states,
the Ministry of the House must ensure that the interests
of the Imperial Archdukes and Archduchesses are adequately
protected in matters of decorum, titles, dowries, support,
estates, etc., when marriage pacts are drafted, and that
the obligations incumbent on the Imperial Archdukes and
Archduchesses as a result of the Family Statute are ob—
served on such occasions. Marriage compacts, author—
izations for the Imperial commissioners for engagement,
conveyance and acceptance, the acts of renunciation Of
the Archduchesses, and so forth, are also drafted in the
Ministry of the Imperial House; marriage dispensations

at the papal court are acquired, presents for the for-
eigners who are involved in the process are solicited,
dispatch of appropriate notifications to foreign courts
over marriages, births, deaths, etc., within the Imperial

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

517

Family is undertaken. If members of the Imperial Family
die in foreign countries, the HOuse Ministry has the
responsibility of guaranteeing the claims of their Austrian
relatives as heirs and legatees.

On the other side and with respect to the Austrian
state administration, the sphere of competence of the
House Ministry includes by the terms of the Family Statute
the obligation to ensure the liquidity of the appanages,
dowries, support payments, widow's jointures, equipage
funds and other tributes, and to represent in general
the rights and interests of the Imperial Family toward
the state finances.

The importance of collecting and protecting from loss
and ruin all originals of statutes and organic regulations,
treaties, marriage contracts, testaments, maintenance
records, etc., which relate to the Imperial Family probably
need not be emphasized.

To the essential duties of the House Ministry belong
further, therefore, the responsibilities for producing
these charters and depositing them in the Imperial House,
Court and State Archives, which must in turn oversee their
maintenance as legally valid documents and their careful

preservation.

October 1851

 

B IBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

1. Primary Sources
A. Unpublished
From a historiographical standpoint, one of the

major purposes of this study was to exploit in a
systematic way the resources, located in the Vienna State
Archives, of the Foreign Ministry's Administrative Regis—
tratur and the old State Chancellery's Interiora division.
Both of these collections are the product of the Adminis—

trative Section of the Austrian Foreign Office in the

nineteenth century. Roughly between 1830 and 1860, the

official paper produced by the Administrative Section
was deposited in a completely arbitrary manner into either

the Administrative Registratur or the older Staatskanzlei,

 

.Interiora. Within each collection, the personnel files

 

of the Foreign Office Beamten, while not always the most

interesting, proved the most useful for this study.

 

These records are much more complete in the Administrative
Registratur, Each 4, where there are 392 cartons, as opposed
to only twenty-three in Staatskanzlei, Interiora, Per—

sonalia. Nearly as important for this project were the

organizational files, Faszikel 3:8, in the Staatskanzlei,

 

Interiora. and cartons 399 and 401 in the Administrative

 

518

 

 

 

 

519
Registratur, Fach 4. Also in the latter collection,

 

carton 402, are located the administrative proposals
(Vortrage) to the emperor, from which much useful information
on personnel and organizational matters was obtained.
Similar proposals are found combined with their political
counterparts in a special section (also Vortrage) of the
Staatskanzlei division.

The other major source of unpublished documents
used for this study was the collection of Ministerrats-
protokolle for the years 1848—1856. Located in the section j
of the Vienna State Archives housing all documents addressed
to or originating with the emperor and his personal
cabinet (called the Kabinettsarchiv), the Ministerrats—
protokolle themselves constitute a small but important
subdivision which is currently in the initial stages of
publication for the period 1848—1918, under the joint
auspices of an Austrian (for 1848-1867) and a Hungarian
(for 1868—1918) commission.l For the present work, a
systematic study of the Ministerratsprotokolle for the
years 1848—1856 was undertaken only insofar as the latter
related to the process of foreign policy—making, a pro-
cedure chosen out of the conviction that the authority
formulate policy could be at

of the Foreign Ministry to

least partially determined by an examination of its

activities within the ministerial structure of which

 

1See below, p. 536.

 

 

520

it was a part. Also in the Kabinettsarchiv is a collection
of papers known as the "Schwarzenberg Nachlass." These
records have been fairly well exploited by historians
but are particularly instructive with regard to the
Minister—President's relations with Windischgratz, Hfibner
and others in 1848 and 1849.

Since the present study focused on the processes
by which decisions were made rather than on the decisions
themselves, the Foreign Ministry's Political Archives
received less attention than is normally true with
diplomatic histories. Divided into forty sections and
covering the period 1848—1918, the records of this division,
produced by the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry,
consist mostly of ambassadorial reports and ministerial
instructions. Beyond these, which were largely bypassed,

the Rechberg Nachlass in Abteilung l: Generalia proved

 

 

particularly useful for the correspondence it contains
between.Rechberg and various high Beamten in the Foreign

Office. The Buol Nachlass in Abteilung_40: Interna was

 

 

indispensable for similar correspondence and for the ex—
changes between Buol and Franz Joseph which it contains.
Also in the Interna are to be found the minutes of the
important conferences convened by the Emperor during the
Crimean War period. This collection (Vortrage, cartons
45149) further includes important proposals made by Buol
and his subordinates to the Emperor. Finally, the

Wessenberg Nachlass, containing numerous letters from

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

521

Wessenberg to Werner, and the Hammer-Nemesbany Nachlass,

 

including three handwritten volumes of the Oriental Desk
Chief's memoirs and a separate volume of remarks about
his chiefs and colleagues, must be mentioned. Both sets
of papers were extremely useful for drawing a picture

of the decision—making process inside the Foreign Office.

B. Published

Very few published collections of documents exist
for Austrian foreign relations during the period 1848—
1856. For the purposes of determining the personnel of
the Foreign Ministry, the annual Hof— und Staatshandbuch
des Osterreichischen Kaiserthums (Vienna: Aus der k.k.
Hof— und Staats-Aerarial—Druckerey) is useful, but it
suffered a lapse in publication between early 1848 (before
the revolution) and 1856, when it was resumed. Friedrich

Walter, in the second and fourth volumes of Die Oster—

 

reichische Zentralverwaltung, Abt. III (Graz: B6hlau,
1964 and 1970), has published some documents which are
extremely useful for tracing the constitutional changes

2

which occurred in the post—1848 era, but no collection

exists which illuminates systematically the Foreign

 

Ministry's role in the Austrian governmental system.
Documents concerning Austria's relations to other countries

do exist in print, but except for Johann von Rantzau, ed.,

 

2

See below, pp. 533~534.

 

 

 

 

 

 

—l—'——- -..___-_ liqii. . _,,.-._._-__i-_i_,i,l , A... _. ._ .

 

522

Europaische Quellen zur Schleswig-Holstein Geschichte

 

im 19. Jahrhundert, 2 vols. (Breslau: Hirt, 1834), they

 

are confined to appendices of secondary works which will
be discussed presently.

.By far the most important of the primary published
sources are the memoirs and diaries left by participants
in and observers of the policy-making apparatus. The

best of these are the accounts left by Hubner, Ein Jahr

 

meines Lebensil848-l849 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1891), and
Neun Jahre der Erinnerungen eines Osterreichischen
Botschafters in Paris 1851—1859, 2 vols. (Berlin: Gebr.
Patel, 1904). Particularly in the former can be found

a reasonably clear picture of foreign policy formulation
just prior to Schwarzenberg's accession and during the
first months of his ministry in Olmutz. The dearth of
written evidence for this period makes Hfibner’s memoirs
indispensable. Not quite so crucial are his thoughts on
Austrian policy during his period in Paris when his con—
clusions were often wrong, particularly concerning Buol's
position and the motivations behind the Minister's policy.
Nearly as useful as Hfibner's Observations are those of
Alfred Arneth, Aus meinem Leben, 2 vols. (Vienna: Holz—
hausen, 1891—1892). As a lower Beamte in the Foreign
Office from 1841 until 1860, he, like Hammer, had direct
contact with the persons and processes involved in

decision-making, although he was not himself involved in

it.

 

 

 

 

 

 

523
Nor was Carl Kfibeck von Kubau a regular participant
in foreign policy—making, but his diaries, first published

by his son, Max Kubeck, under the title Tagebficher des

 

Carl Friedrich Freiherrn Kubeck von Kfibau, 2 vols. (Vienna:
Gerold, 1909), later in a far more complete version by
Friedrich Walter, ed., Aus dem Nachlasse des Freiherrn
Carl Friedrich Kfibeck von Kfibau; Tagebficher, Briefe,
.Aktenstficke_(l84l-1855) (Graz: BOhlau, 1960), are never—
theless very enlightening for Schwarzenberg's conduct
of foreign policy and for the period of transition from
constitutionalism to absolutism. Some of the clearest
examples of the relationships between various governmental
institutions during the early 1850s emerge from Kfibeck's
Observations. Also instructive on personal relationships
within.the Foreign Office as well as on institutional
relations between it and other agencies is Johann von
Kempen's diary, Das Tagpbuch des Polizeiministers Kempen
.ypn 1848 bis 1859 (Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag,
1931), edited by Joseph K. Mayr. Given Kempen's close
connection to the military, his observations are especially
helpful in the realm of relations between the ministers,
the army command and the Emperor. But he was also acquainted
with several of the higher Beamten in the Foreign Office,
and his diary entries offer occasional bits of information
on their personalities.

The remaining collections of memoirs are only

marginally useful for a study of the institutions involved

 

 

 

 

 

 

524
in foreign policy-making. Karl Ludwig von Bruck's
Memoiren aus der Zeit des Krimkrieges (Vienna: Hartleben,
1877) is a brief account of his activities while assigned
to the Constantinople post. It is more interesting for
the admittedly biased introductory anecdotes about Buol
and Klezl offered by Bruck's secretary, Isidor Heller,
than for Bruck's own remarks. Prokesch's private letters
to Schwarzenberg and BuOl, published by his son under

the title Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osten,

 

1849—1855 (Vienna: Gerold, 1896) demonstrate the influences
exerted on the Ministers from Berlin and Frankfurt.

The book also contains occasional excerpts of letters

from Schwarzenberg and Buol to their foremost ambassador

in Germany. But the collection does not reveal much about
how decisions were reached. Ficquelmont's brief justi—
fication of his activities as foreign minister, entitled
Aufklarungen fiber die Zeit vom 20. Marz bis zum 4. Mai
.l§4§ (Leipzig: Barth, 1850), demonstrates the paralysis
with which Austria's foreign policy apparatus was stricken
during the first weeks after the revolution, but is devoted
mostly to separating Ficquelmont's ideas and actions from
those of Pillersdorf, whom he detested. Other works pro—
vide chance references to personalities within.the Foreign
Office: the Erlebnisse des Bernhard Ritter von Meyer,

2 vols. (Vienna: Sartori, 1875), provides a vivid des—
cription of Werner by the author and subject, a Swiss

reform Catholic emigre; other memoirs, such as Rudolf

 

 

525
von Delbrfick's Lebenserinnerungen 1817—1867, 2 vols.
CLeipzig: Duncker, 1905), Hermann Huffer's Lebens-
erinnerungen (Berlin: Reimer, 1912), and Anton Edmund
'Wollheim.da.Fonseca's Neue Indiskretionen (Berlin: Hempel,
1884), each offers bits of information about the famous

"triumvirate" of Meysenbug, Biegeleben and Gagern.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Bibliographical

In a work that depends predominantly on primary

sources, the most useful of secondary sources are those
which guide the researcher to the pertinent unpublished
material. First among these, despite theobsolescence
of some of its references, is the Gesamtinventar des
Wiener Haus—, Hof- und Staatsarchivs, 5 vols. (Vienna:
Holzhausen Nachfolger, 1936—1940), edited by Lothar Gross
and Ludwig Bittner. A more recent work which takes into
account the changes in the archival collections pertaining
to the diplomatic documents of the Foreign Ministry is
Robert Stropp's "Die Akten des k.u.k. Ministeriums des
Aussern, 1848-1918," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen
Staatsarchivs, 20(1967):389—506. A complete catalogue
Of the holdings of the Political Archives, this article
is rendered more useful by the inclusion in the introduction
Of a general schema of the Desks and Departments in the
Foreign Office during the years 1848—1918. Arthur J.

May, "The Vienna Archives," in the Guide to the Diplomatic

 

 

 

 

 

 

526
.Archives of Western Europe (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1959), pp. 3~20, edited by Lynn M.
Case and Daniel H. Thomas, and Rudolf Neck, "The Haus-,
Hof- und Staatsarchiv: Its History, Holdings and Use,"
in the Austrian History Yearbook, 6—7(1970-l97l):3-l6,
both offer brief overviews of the archives for the uniniti-

ated. The above—mentioned volume of the Austrian History

 

Yearbook also includes similar descriptions of the four
other major state archives located in Vienna.3 There
are no recent, thorough bibliographical accounts of the
secondary literature on Austrian foreign policy after
Metternich, although many of the works cited below con—
tain excellent source listings for their particular sub—

1,

jects.

B. Biographical
Several of the higher Beamten in the Foreign Office
attained a status sufficient to warrant their inclusion
in some or all of the massive biographical encyclopedias
published in the German language. The most thorough and

yet the most undependable of these is the Biographisches

 

Lsxikon des Kaiserthums Osterreich, 6O vols. (Vienna:

3The Verwaltungsarchiv, the Kriegsarchiv, the Finanz—
_und Hofkammerarchiv, and the Verkehrsarchiv.

 

 

XRichard Charmatz, Wegweiser durch die Literatur

 

der Osterreichischen Geschichte (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1912),
is thin and very obsolete.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

527
Holzhausen, 1836-1891), edited by Constantin Wurzbach.
The Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 56 vols. (Leipzig:
Barth, 1875—1912), edited by R. von Liliencron and F. X.
von Wegele, is very similar to its Austrian counterpart
and includes among the brief sketches of personalities
and careers a great deal about Austrian state servants.
The Neue Deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Historische Kom—
mission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft,
1952 ff.) has heretofore covered only the first part of
the alphabet, but promises to be far superior in quality
to either of its predecessors. The Osterreichisches
biographisches Lexikon, 1815-1950 (Graz: BOhlau, 1957 ff.)
is likewise in its initial stages and not yet very useful.
Dealing chiefly with those persons who occupied a political
position above that of bureaucratic functionary, the
Neue osterreichische Biographie ab 1815: Grosse Osterreicher
(Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag, 1923 ff.) is useful for concise
sketches of the lives of such men as Schwarzenberg, Kempen,
Kfibeck, Bach and Bruck.

Although several biographies of the Emperor Franz
Joseph have been written, none of them can be considered
definitive by any standard. The best is Joseph Redlich's
Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria (New York: Macmillan,
1929), but, at least for the early years of the reign,
it is badly outdated. Others used for this study were
Eugene S. Bagger's Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria,

King of Hungary (New York: Putnam's, 1927). Karl

 

 

 

Tschuppik's The Reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph,
1848-1916 (London: George Bell, 1930), translated by

C. J. S. Sprigge, and Eduard Heller's essay "Aus den
ersten zwei Jahrzehnten der Regierung Franz Josephs,"

in Erinnerungen an Franz Joseph I (Berlin: Verlag ffir
Kulturpolitik, 1931), edited by Eduard Ritter von
Steinitz. Each of these, as well as others, contains
valuable information on the Emperor's background and per—
sonality, but none makes a sober evaluation of his political
role generally or, much less, of his foreign policy role
in particular. If any single European ruler of the
nineteenth century now demands a solid biography, it is
Franz Joseph of Austria.

Although Metternich's activities are not a central
part of this study, a general knowledge of his methods
of operation and of his policies are necessary for the
purpose of comparison with the post-1848 years. To this
end, there is available no better book than Guillaume
Bertier de Sauvigny's Metternich and his Timgs (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1962), translated by Peter
Ryde. Among Metternich's immediate successors, only
Ficquelmont lacks a biography, and his own account of
his six—week term in office must serve as a rather poor
substitute for one. Alfred von Arneth, a Foreign Office
subaltern from 1841 until 1860, then Director of the
ngg:, Hof— und Staatsarchiv. wrote a two—volume biography

of Ficquelmont's successor, entitled Johann Freiherr

 

 

529

von Wessenberg: Ein Osterreichischer Staatsmann des

 

nuunzchntcn Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. (Vienna: Holzhausen,
1898). For the few months during which Wessenberg held
power, this book is sound, if not very enlightening.
Schwarzenberg has been the subject of several biographies,
the best of which is Rudolf Kiszling's Ffirst Felix zu
Schwarzenberg (Vienna: Bdhlau, 1952). More superficial
is the treatment by Adolf Schwarzenberg, entitled Prince
Felix zu Schwarzenberg, Prime Minister of Augtria, 1848—
1852 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946). None
of Schwarzenberg's biographers see him as anything but
an absolutist who played a double game from 1848 until
1851, indulging the constitutionalists' desires in form,
but all the while seeking to undermine their position and
attain dictatorial power over policy. More recently,
historians writing on related topics have recognized this
fallacy and have begun to reevaluate formerly current,
overly favorable judgments of Schwarzenberg's ability
and success.5 Like Franz Joseph, this important char—
acter needs a new biography.

Prior to Waltraud Heindl's book, Graf Buol—
Schauenstein in St. Petersburg und London (1848—1852);

zur Genesis des Antagonismus zwischen Osterreich und
Russland (Vienna, Cologne, Graz: B6hlau, 1970), nothing

 

 

5Helmut Rumpler, Bernhard Unckel and Paul Schroeder,
most motably. See below for a discussion of their respec—
tive works.

 

 

 

 

 

530

resembling a biography of the man who, in spite of the
challenges, held the greatest influence on Austrian for-
eign policy during the 1850s had been.writtent Heindl's
book is a good start, limited as it is in its scope.

But much more work must be done on Buol's German policy,
‘which, though crucial, has been largely ignored in favor
of his Crimean War policy generally. The biographers of
the major Foreign Office Beamten, on the other hand, have
concentrated largely on the German policies of their sub-
jects. Rfidiger von Biegeleben's biography of his father,
Ludwig Freiherr von Biegeleben; Ein Vorkampfer des gross—

deutschen Gedankens (Vienna: Amalthea, 1930), is a book

 

about a man whose importance was considerable in the
1850s and decisive in the 1860s. Thirty-five years ago,
Srbik, in recognition of this fact, hoped for a less
superficial treatment of Biegeleben's career.6 He would
still be hoping. Ludwig von Pastor's Leben des Freiherrn
Max von Gagern, 1810—1889 (Munich: deel, 1912) is even
worse than Biegeleben's biography, ignoring entirely
Gagern's motivations in shifting from a pro—Prussian to

a proeAustrian position and in espousing the grossdeutsch
program. Neither Meysenbug nor Werner have received any
biographical attention whatever. Of all the Foreign
Office personnel, Hammer—Nemesbany, despite his relatively

unimportant position, has been given the best attention

 

6Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, 3:142.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

531

in Srbik's article "Aus den.Erinnerungen eines alten
Osterreichischen Beamten," Archiv fur Osterreichische

Geschichte, ll,7/1(1944):37-100. Within the diplomatic

 

corps, two leading individuals have received brief but
interesting biographies from FriedrichEngel—Janosi:

Der Freiherr von Hubner, 1811—1892, eine Gestalt aus dem
Osterreich Kaiser Franz Josephs (Innsbruck: Universitats—
Verlag Wagner, 1933), and Graf Rechberg, Vier Kapital

zu seiner und Osterreichs Geschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1927). Heinrich Friedjung also sketches Rechberg's life
in his Historische Aufsatze (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1919).
Each of these is instructive, but Hfibner's diaries and
Rechberg's unpublished correspondence proved far more

useful for the purposes of this study.

C. General

Although this work was not intended to focus on the
international diplomatic events of the years 1848-1856,
the possession of a fairly exact knowledge of the character
of Austria's foreign relations was necessary in order
to judge the performance of the Foreign Ministry, both
on its own merits and relative to other governmental
agencies. For that general purpose, Heinrich Friedjung's
Osterreich von 1848 bis 1860, 4th ed.; 2 vols. (Stuttgart:
Cotta, 1912-1918), is fundamental. Because Friedjung

lacked many of the most important sources, among them

 

 

 

 

 

532

the Ministerratsprotokolle, this work has numerous
deficiencies. But it is still the best general history
of Austrian political life for the period. An exhaustive
critique of Friedjung's volumes, partly valid, partly,
one suspects, a product of professional jealousy, is to
be found in Karl Hugelmann's article "Osterreich vom

Jahre 1848 bis 1860," in Historisch-Politische Studien

 

(Vienna: Koller, 1915), pp. 72-156. A much more recent
but less thorough treatment of Austrian history in the

1850s is located in Carlile A. Macartney's The Habsburg

 

Empire, 1790—1918 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).
His essay on Austria from 1848 until 1867 in the tenth
volume of the New Cambridge Modern History provides a
good overview of Austria's basic problems. Richard
Charmatz' Geschichte der auswartigen Politik Osterreichs
im 19. Jahrhundert, 2d ed.; 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner,
1918), is brief, but it provides a useful chronology for
Austria's foreign relations during the period. A thought-
ful interpretive piece by Enno E. Kraehe, "Foreign Policy
and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy,
1800-1867," in the Austrian History Yearbook, 3/3(1967):
3-36, identifies the most basic problem with which each
Austrian leader after 1848 had to contend in his foreign
policy calculations.

Precisely because the nationality problem was so
inextricably bound up with Austrian foreign policy, a

study dealing with the processes of formulating that policy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

533

must take into account works which treat the constitutional
question at some length. Of these, the best is Friedrich
Walter's four-volume series for the post-1848 period

in the great Austrian constitutional history, 2;;

Osterreichische Zentralverwaltung, published by the Kom—

 

mission ffir neuere Geschichte Osterreichs. The first
volume, Die Geschichte der Ministerien KolowratL_Ficqpel-
mont,,Pillersdorf, Wessenberg-Doblhoff und Schwarzenberg
(Vienna: BOhlaus, 1964), is the product of a thorough
examination of the Ministerratsprotokolle, Reichsrat
documents and pertinent Proposals found in the Kabinetts—
kanzlei archives for the period 1848—1852. The third

volume, Die Geschichte der Ministerien vom Durchbruch des

 

Absolutismus bis zum Ausgleich mit Ungarn und zur
Kpnstitutionalisierung der Osterreichischen.Lander von
1852 bis 1867 (Vienna: BOhlaus, 1970), covers the suc-
ceeding period in the same manner. Volumes two and four
consist of collections of particularly important documents
which supplement the texts of their preceding tomes.
Although published in a frightfully monotonous form (the
first volume consists of one 580 page chapter without
any sort of subdivision), the series delineates in a most
convincing manner the stages in the evolution of the
governmental system. Walter avoids, seemingly at all
costs, drawing any conclusions about foreign policy or
drawing the correct ones about Schwarzenberg's political

attitudes, but all of the information is present for

 

 

 

534
the reader to form his own judgments in these areas.
For a briefer version of the main points contained in
these four volumes, Walter's Osterreichische Verfassungs—
und Verwaltupgsgeschichte von 1590—1955 (Vienna: BOhlaus,
1972), published posthumously by Adam Wandruszka, can
prove useful.

There are many other works which demonstrate the
intimacy of Austria's constitutional problem and foreign
policy, most of which, however, do not explicitly make
the connection. Among them are Louis Eisenmann's classic,
Le compromis austro—hongrois de 1867, etude sur le dualisme
(Paris, 1904), which, despite the title, deals pre-
dominantly with the pre-history of the compromise.

Joseph Redlich's two—volume work, Das Osterreichische
Staats- und Reichsproblem (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag,
1920—1927), is likewise a standard work. It includes a
separate volume with a valuable set of references, among
which can be found many of the most important Ministerrats-
protokolle and constitutional documents. Also with a

good set of references, but of a very indifferent textual
quality is Karl and Mathilde Uhlirz' Handbuch der Geschichte
Osterreichs und seiner Nachbarlander BOhmen und Ungarn,

4 vols. (Graz, Leipzig, Vienna: BOhlau, 1927-1944).
Robert A- Kann's The Multinational Empire; Nationalism
and National Reform in the Habsburg_Monarchy 1848—1918,

2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950),

has nothing to do with foreign policy but displays in

 

 

 

 

 

535
exhaustive detail the exact character of the national
question. In his work The Dissolution of the Habsburg
Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961),
Oscar Jaszi examines in broader terms the supports for

Habsburg power and the flaws in those supports.

 

D. Organizational Studies
Since nothing has previously been written on the
Foreign Ministry as an institution in the 1850s, Joseph
K. Mayr's Geschichte der Osterreichischen Staatskanzlei
im Zeitalter des Ffirsteangtternich (Vienna: Haus—, Hof~
und Staatsarchiv. 1935) proved invaluable for the back—

ground information it imparted on the Foreign Office prior

 

to 1848. Although not done very systematically and while
containing inaccuracies in some respects, the book never—
theless provides a basic picture of the bureaucratic
features of Metternich‘s State Chancellery. It contains
excellent material for comparison with the later period.
Friedrich Engel-Janosi in his collection Geschichte auf
dem Ballhausplatz; essays zur Osterreichischen Au§§§p—
pplitik, 1830-1945 (Graz: Styria, 1963), includes an essay
entitled "Der Ballhausplatz, 1848—1918," which, rather
than providing answers, asks most of the important questions
about the role of the Foreign Office and its members in
policy formulation. An article by Ludwig Bittner,

"Das Osterreichisch—ungarische Ministerium des Aussern,

seine Geschichte und seine Organisation," in the Berliner

 

 

536
Monatshefte, l5/2(July-December 1937):8l9-843, traces the
evolution of foreign policy-making institutions under the
Habsburgs from the earliest times until 1918. It is
particularly useful for determining the legal position
of the Foreign Ministry in the mid—nineteenth century.
Complementary, in a restricted sense, is Rudolf Wieder—
mayer's essay about the operational routine of the Foreign
Office, entitled "Geschaftsgang des k.u.k. Ministerium
des Aussern, 1908—1918," in Archivalische Zeitschrift, l
40(l931):131—l52, although it obviously deals with a later I;
period. A
Finally, Helmut Rumpler's introductory volume to
the first series of Die Ministerratsprotokolle Osterreichs
und der 6sterreichisch—ungarischen Monarchie, 1848—1918
(Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag), while not dealing
directly with the Foreign Ministry, outlines for the early
period the relationships between the Ministerrat and its
constituent parts. Rumpler's volume, Ministerrat und
Ministerratsprotokolle 1848—1862: BehOrdengeschichtliche
und aktenkundliche Analyse (1970), covers in summary form
that part of the Ministerratsprotokolle which is being
published by the Austrians. The Hungarians are publishing
the documents for the period 1868—1918. TO date, only
three volumes of documents have appeared from the Austrian
side. Unfortunately for this study, the publication began
with 1867 and is progressing backwards toward 1848.

When the series is completed, it will be a valuable

 

537
addition to the primary sources published for the 1848—
1856 period. Already, however, Rumpler has drawn what
appears to be the correct conclusion about the Ministerrat
and Schwarzenberg as bastions of constitutionalism against

the absolutist crown.

E. Foreign Policy Questions

In addition to the general works named earlier,
there are many books and articles dealing with more specific
aspects of Austrian foreign policy after 1848. The util—
ization of these was necessary and beneficial for arriving
at interpretations of Austrian state interests during
the period under consideration, since a thorough exploit—
ation of the ambassadorial instructions, notes and reports
for these nine years would have involved additional months
and years of research in the Political Archives. Much
work remains to be done on many of the international
questions arising from the 1848 revolutions, but a great
deal of excellent diplomatic history has been written
with respect to the subsequent period. Joseph A.Helfert‘s
Geschichte Osterreichs vom Ausgange des Wiener Oktober—
aufstandes 1848, 4 vols. (Prague: Tempsky, 1869—1886),
is a very thorough examination of all aspects of Austrian
history for the months surrounding the October revolution,
and the author includes helpful summaries of the main
foreign issues of the period. In the appendices to volume

I and to parts I and III of volume IV, Helfert has

 

 

 

538
published a number of important diplomatic dispatches,
letters and memoranda. Friedrich Walter, while again
studiously avoiding foreign policy, offers a clear picture
of the environment in which foreign issues were treated
during the Emperor Ferdinand's voluntary exile in Inns—
bruck in the summer of 1848. Walter's study, "Die 1
Innsbrucker Mission des Handelsministers Anton Freiherrn
von Doblhoff—Dier," in the Mitteilungen des Instituts
fur Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 58(1960):506—

528, was subsequently incorporated into his great work

on the Austrian central administration. For the course
of the major foreign crisis of 1848 in Italy, William L.
Langer's Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969) offers an excellent summary,
and A. J. P. Taylor, The Italian Problem in European
Diplomacy, 1842—1849 (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1934), provides some insight into the Austrian
leaders' motivations. Each was used as a supplement to
the Ministerratsprotokolle on the subject.

Likewise supplementary were three articles on the
Hungarian problem in 1848—1849. The best of these is
Kenneth W. Rock's "Schwarzenberg versus Nicholas 1, Round
One: The Negotiation of the Habsburg—Romanov Alliance

Against Hungary in 1849,“ Austrian History Yearbook,

 

6—7(l970—l97l):lO9—l4l. Schwarzenberg‘s resentment at
having to summon outside aid and Nicholas' perfect aware-

ness of this resentment are displayed in this piece,

 

 

 

539
and it helps to explode the myth of Russian shock at the

so-called Austrian "betrayal" in 1853—1854. Eugene Horvath,

"Russia and the Hungarian Revolution," Slavonic Review,

 

XII(1954):628—649, presents a good chronology but is bitterly
hostile to the Austrian leadership. Also good for the
aftermath of the Hungarian revolution is Otto Lohmann's

"Der Konflikt der Turkei mit Osterreich und Russland

wegen.der ungarischen Flfichtlinge von 1849," Zeitschrift

 

fur Internationales Recht, 22(1912):228-250.

Tremendous volumes of material have been written
on the German question of the mid—nineteenth century,
and the best from the Austrian side is Heinrich von Srbik's
Deutsche Einheit; Idee und Wirklichkeit von Heiligen
Reich bis KOniggratz, 4 vols. (Munich: Bruckmann, l936~
1942). Although definitely possessed of a pro-Austrian
bias, Srbik was unsurpassed in his vast knowledge of
the conditions in Germany before 1866 and of the literature
on the subject. In the third volume, there is an in-
triguing chapter on several of the chief members of the
Foreign Office and on their activities during the 1860s.
For that reason, and because the German question.which
Srbik treats was so critical in Austrian foreign policy

calculations, Deutsche Einheit proved fundamental to the

 

completion of the present study. Other treatments of
various topics related to the German question are
Friedrich Engel-Janosi's "A Struggle for Austria in Berlin

and Frankfort, 1849—1855," Journal of Central European

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

540
Affairs, III/l-2(April—July l942):34—48 and 190—202:
Enno E. Kraehe, "Austria and the Problem of Reform in the

German Confederation, 1851-63," American Historical Review,

 

56/2(January l95l):276—294; and Heinrich Friedjung,
"Mitteleuropaische Zollunionsplane, 1849-1853," in
Historische Aufsatze (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1919). The latter
three, once again, were utilized as supplements to the
Ministerratsprotokolle.

Finally, the literature on Austria's role in the

Crimean War is considerable and of a high quality. For

 

the purposes of this work, Bernhard Unckel‘s Osterreich

und der Krimkrieg; Studien zur Politik der Donaumonarchie

 

in den Jahren 1852—1856 (Lubeck: Matthiesen, 1969) was
incontestably the most useful. Beginning with the jus-
tifiable assumption that Austria's Crimean War policy

was a failure, Unckel attempts to explain the lack of
success by analyzing the effects of domestic political
developments on foreign policy in general and the effects
of Franz Joseph's influence in particular. While he seems
to overestimate the latter, the book is otherwise an out—
standing piece of historical scholarship, and the present
study owes it a great deal. Heinrich Friedjung's 2gp
Krimkrieg und die Osterreichische Politik, 2d ed. (Stuttgart:
Cotta, 1911), like so many of his works, was considered
standard for many years, despite the unavailability to him
of the most important sources. His assessment of Buol

as a warmonger, although totally wrong, gave the Foreign

 

 

541
Minister a bad name from.which he is just now recovering
by virtue of Heindl's, Unckel's and Paul Schroeder's
research.

Schroeder's book, Austriai Great Britain and the
Crimean War; the Destruction of the European.Concert
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), is traditional,
well-documented diplomatic history. It finds the reasons
for Austria's failure during the war in a conscious and
malicious effort on the part of the British statesmen,
notably Palmerston, to reduce the Habsburg Monarchy to
the status of a second-class power. This contention,
logically following Werner E. Mosse's claim in The European
Powers and the German Question, 1848—1871 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958) that British and Austrian
interests were fundamentally Opposed, is most likely valid.
Not so certain is the validity of the assertion, made
also in Schroeder's article "Bruck versus BuOl: The Dispute
over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-1855," Journal of
Modern History, 40/2(June 1968):l93—217, that Buol pursued

 

throughout this period a European policy reminiscent of
Metternich rather than the Austro—centered course struck
by Schwarzenberg. The fact that Bruck's hysterical
"Mitteleuropa" policy was unworkable, as Schroeder recog—
nizes, does not mean that Buol, who opposed Bruck, also
opposed a concentration on Central Europe in favor of

a more broadly European "Concert" policy. More work,

as noted, must be done on Buol's German policy, but it

 

 

 

 

 

542
was probably of more importance to him than has heretofore
been recognized. Schroeder's other two articles, "Austria
and the Danubian Principalities, 1853-1856," Central
European History, II/3(September 1969):216—236, and "A
Turning Point in Austrian Policy in the Crimean War: The
Conferences of March 1854," Austrian History Yearbook,
IV(1968):159—202, are fascinating pieces and are sounder
than "Bruck versus Buol." The author has published the
Conference minutes of March 22, 1854, and Hess' instructions
of March 25, 1854, in "A Turning Point," in which he
specifically identified for the first time the crucial
importance for Austrian policy of the contest between

Buol and the military.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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