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LIBRARY

Michigan Stan
University

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

'Life', 'Culture', and 'Higher Education'
in the Philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset

Date

presented by

Ivan L. Barrientos

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

(4% ,)

MajOr professor

November 8, 1965

 

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II IUUI

 

ABSTRACT

   
  
   
   
   
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  

'CULTURE', AND 'HIGHER EDUCATION' IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET

by lva'n Barrlentos

wh.‘ltekes only one of the major topics generally depicted
i . ”Elf "enistentlai philosophy", and explores its technical
ifédf 3h;woriglnal writings of a single thinker: the Spaniard
tf’lh: selected topic is "the significance of human life",
;:e :eneepts of 'eulture' and 'general education within

sum-a author.
u. On
!I Only supported statements on the basic assumptions made

.‘-

Qi7'. and on the need to study the foundational structure
iiilly-oriented theories. constitutes the introductory

I’D-er. .—. .
of three chapters. The essential problem that has led

“»?ysicai theories, thus creating antagonisms and over-simplified
~‘E‘l‘percel'itions. The’camn denominator of ”existentialism" is regard-
Igfjd'do on untenable classificational ambition, and the concept of 'pheno-
_ ' analogical orientation' is posited as a more feasible category. to be
also differentiated from mere subjective speculation for reasons that
the dissertation also discusses at some length.

A general overview of the main topics covered by Ortega's philosophy
leads into a closer examination of the concept of 'life', out of which

emerges a key-notion of 'vital reason' (i.e., the use of reason for life)

 

 

   
  

.)'

Vi‘EllT

    
  
   
 
 
  
   
  
   

-: to 'pure reason’ (i.e., the use of reason for its own sake).

rel concept is grounded on a metaphysical view, firstly discussed

Lille-other vitalistic positions.
.\
”alludings. and other najor technicalities are then applied to

“.?%3'f' for general education at the university level, and to

i“§ai‘éfia radical huean reality) and ‘science' (as a problem-
iigiélanai construct).

‘ijipf %5!”In activity capable of being performed for its

' f.lifidfithe 'professions' (the result of 'science' when
‘Iifvfl'lotiuportant, but not exhaustive aspects of 'life').

Vfl'i‘ {ii‘the problematic result of reason when applied

*tulture' and 'science'.

I'T 'Hhat universities do' (as a factual-environmental account)
and 'uhat the university really is' (as a corporate cultural
institution at the service of 'life').

'Hhat the university is' and 'what the university can be'
(as determined by the learning capacity of the average man).
'Hhat the university can be' and 'what the university ought-
to-be' (as determined by its 'reai-being', established in 6,

and by the ethical commitments to 'culture' and 'life' that

 

3

    
   
 
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
   
  

are derived from the axiologlcal extension of its foundational
_ _ ontology).

.-:>:C‘50enciusively, it is finally submitted, and duly supported, that:

-.§E 'hté) Ortega is an 'unsystematic'. but not necessarily an 'asystematic'
I I . (b) His metaphysical construction presents interesting problems
3"l-lnto certain logical difficulties that the dissertation discusses
‘1;,j’l. (c) His educational theory transcends the symptomatic level
Tether schemes of general education, thus frontally attacking
‘"'eeaminlng the more basic problems. (d) The actuality of his

(helm affected. but rather increased by the human acts and

\I'

,’ fission ls contemplated for Spanish-speaking cultures.
(,757i and contextually, the study also presents (i) a discussion
~Tgtechnicel weaknesses to be found in the position; (ii) a phe-
' l stance at work in the discussion of the concepts 'life'.

i‘o' 3 and 'higher education', (iii) essential distinctions to be
_ “. 9 some phenomenologically-oriented phllosophies',and (iv) a
¥i'i!orical background that presents, at least minimally, some of the
glntricate difficulties implied by a serious consideration of the more

general topic of “existentialism and education”.

 

  
 
  
    
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
   

3'; mill "ll“! EWTIUI' III THE PHILOSOPHY

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'-:;e~P“ " -‘ r

, A THESIS

W 'to the School for Advanced

. Studies of Michigan State University
"‘In 'partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
College of Education

l965

 

   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
     

AQNOWEOGHENTS

'E'iii character of an academic investigation, and in its

I. prement for the doctoral degree, this study owes

'jijicdent and final inspiration to significant persons
eiihilhidequate in his literary ability

‘ g”. t3 95s, Car} ii. Gross, and Frank

'T: t constant dialogue. cooperation, assistance,

‘ ‘él‘hfiln‘istrative. and financial aspects

ition is also herein expressed:

ad”. (at. whose suggestion, and with whose assist-

in

5': .
To the Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad de San Carlos de Gua-

 

l: l , and to the Organization of American States. both for an academic
. Background, and financial aid.
And to Adriana de Barrientos, who understood the reasans for enduring

a major cultural change, and encouraged her husband in the pursuit of an

important goal .

 

  
 
    
    
 
   

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PAGE

   

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.‘Aii‘o imuosoriiicsi. CONCLUSIONS . . . . l79

gilt. SONIA" on THE onrtcm THEORY or HIGHER

U I O O C O I O I I C I O O D C I U D I C i 22“

 

 
   
   
 
  

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It“. 1"E'xistentialism" is still a vague term in purely philosophical

7%. Aside from certain opaque concerns that it supposedly has. such

..-'{‘ It to become what one can become", there is really no cot-non

\ i
‘ ' :7 : “Mend sufficiently clear thought to be had in mind when

   

.7 . . ' h
V' “at appears to be there, and hence the term has become

'~.l.

.. . ,s'lonal' vocabulary. It is often said that such a

     
    
   
    
  
 

“fictitious imact in the contemporary world, especially

. -“'.:Lat'In Imerica and Asia... no "small" portions of tho
allege” that "existentiallsm" is here to stay, not only
%‘iwfi philosophy', but also in collateral fields such as
:fifichology, sociology, anthropology and education. Furthermore,
”Utmthe "existential" ideas can be traced-back to pre-Socratic and

' {oriental thought, and that such ideas deserve to be at the philosoph-

Yet, puzzling contradictions are bound to appear, especially when
a particular philosopher, or a given theory, are labeled as ”existential-
istic". Writers who supposedly _a_r£ "existentialists" firmly deny to be
such. The division of "m" vs. "b_ea_t_" existentialism also seems to
confuse the issue further, since it only suggests the possibility of maintain-

ing a distinction between a technical system, and a pgthological. second-

 

2

   
    
   
   
 
  
 
    
   
 

n“ ‘ w. misinterpretation of such a theoretical structure. Besides, upon
1,.“
f" ~ *"reflectlon, the question of authenticity _s. distortion in a given

.'q..l
”My, is one to be generalized to all philosophies, rather than res-

h L .-

t ' to uexistentialisat": to mention only one of the many instances of
:Mss‘vs. misinterpretation, it is said, for example, that the
Vet

;
\

"Nuance is not "the real spirit of pragnatism", and that the

‘v
.r

"1' “excesses" in education have nothing to do with "experlmentalism".

fora, to say that "beat" existentlaiism is not to be confused

O I
l‘-,—

retiring“ entails a tremendous responsibility, namely that such

am he. at least, described, In order to enable the interest-

3.5 Krone». Nevertheless such an asstmptlon, should be in-

7. thaproblamatic character of the present dissertation, whose

A

. rests upon it for the validational and justificational

l ‘. I

’- W the enterprise.

.‘ I“.- '

h“. In. sun. the initial problem could be compressed as follows: i_f it

.1,“

he that existentialism has had an impact on educational matters
*lally psychology and social science), and g there is no clarity,
not so much on the "meaning" of the term 'exlstentialism‘, but rather

on the philosophical movement which it Symbolizes, two tasks are necessary.
Firstly, the material aspects supposedly encompassed by the formal vague-
ness of the term 'existentialism', must be known or at least ”felt" or
"sensed" with sufficient clarity and force to be described. And second-
ly, the relationship between Such material aspects, and the discipline

generally known as the philosophy of education, should be established.

 

3

   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
      
   
 
  
   
   
  

I -, in spite of cosmendable efforts that have been already made, such an
lglz‘j” _. imlng enterprise also seems to presuppose a very ambitious coverage.
‘ Ls indeed not the matter for a single dissertation, or even a single
Z"'Jymlitne, but rather for a lifetime of studious dedication. it also

, Certain‘hmfltilinguallsm” that few people truly have, in addition

3"" ‘iosgshical degree of maturity only to be found in exceptionally

" "'_(,.chronologically sophisticated, and fully dedicated scholars.

"f . ., .gsstning of course that the suggested problem is of sincere

I. 'gtbeperson who thinks about it. a doctoral dissertation can

sang“ a, rather limited contribution. A historical bridge

.watfi,

m ,. of cult ure that have bred existentiallstic thought and

3-. £-
V

5‘ 'iiflltural situations. is a possibility. An isolated problem,

~:féfl'eghfifiame of the concept 'human life' to a given philosOpher
“if % h&:orientatlon. within the context of the so-called existent-
.;¢7aiekers. is another possibility. An effort to clarify similari-
:‘7heififleeences between a supposedly "existential" thinker, and other
_; Iallsts". is still another way to make a contribution.

:é {iihe execution of tasks such as the ones outlined in the above
‘fljxlph. should indeed be greatly assisted if certain delimiting or
;;Iflflflplementing factors are taken into account. in the first place it is
desirable to confine a study such as ”the significance of human life” to
only one thinker. Secondly, the errors of interpretation can be minimized
if the selected author is studied in his own language. And thirdly, the
conceptual connections between a given type of personal thought, and (i)
his historico-cultural background, or (ii) other theories that could be
classified as ”similar”, could also be rendered more intelligible if the

study is performed as multi-lingually as possible.

 

h

       
  
  
   
    
 

_. _ Due to the above reasons, the present dissertation has attacked the

I‘

»nbviousiy unpretentious, contribution to the larger question

limp and education. One of them is the consideration of

,féggbat has proved to be questionable with other movements as well.
%gub-topic is the distinction between 'existentiallsm' as a cultural
31.; , and a historical category to be called the 'philosophies of
‘E, whose dissimilarities with the more systematic efforts shall be
‘.fifi&1h mentioning. And lastly, a distinction between 'exlstentiailsm'
as a cultural movement, and 'phenomenoiogy' as an epistemological method
used by the former in varying degrees, has been found to be highly useful
and desirable. This last ramification will have certain importance, since
to the best knowledge of the present writer, no book on educational philosophy,
or on existentialism and education, has shown the connection between the
phenomenology of Edmond Husserl and a particular ”existentialistic” type of

thought, in spite of the fact that Husserl and Brentano are usually

 

      
 
    
 
      
     
      
      
     
 
 

” when dealing with such movements. This dissertation will then
"Times a method, and the Ortegen theories of 'life', 'culture',
#an , . .

do chbe literature" related to the problem would be, on
easiy lost within the maze of Continental European thought,
%..“?orary phenomenological research and, on the
aeanty publications strictly made in English on the
 §“. Ind education. A good part of the latter, especially

[W
end Harris. ere panoramic, though comendable efforts

_' .W' And regarding a minimal portion of the fonner,
‘j‘ykasset’s mug. Works, the reader is referred to
%Iappears at the endof the present dissertation, and
,‘Li‘n‘ibiiographical Appendix" on Ortega's English translations,
authend of Jos‘ Ferrater More's book, Ortegg y Gasset.
eiso contains a detailed index of the Complete WorksI and
"l sketch of Dr. Ortega. (l)

f*-§ should suffice, then, to indicate at this point that the books

for the present dissertation have been selected for their

some previous experience provided to him by a number of years devoted
to the study of ”pure philosophy" in an institution of phenomenological
and idealistic orientation. This background, added to a careful review of

Ortega's Complete Works, and to an equally careful examination of the better

 

(l) Ferrater Mora, Jose, Ortega y Gasset, An Outline of His Philosophy, Bowes
and Bowes, LondOn, 1956, pp. 65-69.

 

 

6

   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
   
  
  
  

cg-entaries on Ortega that have been written in Spanish, do constitute

r :eyellability of material", upon which this work has founded its develop-

' m &Wr to maintain this dissertation within the boundaries of a
"' "St {IEQQChri’Qn the general connections between phenomenology and
,;,gggouid be made in the fields of ethics, psychology, and
“in not be explored in detail. There seems to be little
».g§”cai methodology has affected value theories, such
ntL! German axiologlsts Scheler and Hartmann, and even
4;...eqtifiga‘i views: Moore, Ewing, Ross, Prichard, and Broad,
:dfitm £53k described as being strongly influenced by a Cartesian
‘ “Nasser! and Brentano.
. F‘éggpeggh of philosophical material dealing with this issue,
‘;:€,from many American philosophy departments, especially
, ’Cfia:9f joglcai analysis and neo-positivistic efforts of the
,jzgtg:gninkers like Feigl, or by followers of the Carnap-
‘23?! of thought.

,‘if on the one hand, the impact of phenomenological value theory

~ -‘ "fins, on the other, a new breach appears to be Opened in psychology,
viogy, and the so-calied “behavioral disciplines”. it should be
' recognized that the impact of person-centered, psychological theories of
seif-actualization are now affecting the realm of education, especially in
their connection with psychoanalytical views on the learning phenomena,
and with the study of perception and role-playing as key-concepts to be
considered in the theorization of socio-anthropological factors Supposedly
related to schooling and teaching. These trends do indeed continue a line

of thought, whose initial systematic treatment could be placed in the work

 

      
  
    
   
 
  
     
  
  
  

J

. 7
(i: 5t”~ in philosophers like the Carmen Wilhelm Dilthey, and whose connections
.i-dviteilam, phenomenology, and existentialism certainly deserve to be
f7gy~examined.

-\f'rofessionais in the field of education seem to be well acquainted

such as those of Piaget, Minkowski, Bacheiard, lngarden, Hay,

, and Naslow, but little effort has been made to elucidate the

“I 4. u
. - , ,-=_w .
. .

I

Titai assumptions upon which these "new" theories appear to rest.
I seems to be true in the case of social scientists like
it‘mP-‘Sorekin, and Hanheim, or even in the case of less known
|; 1 I, Ohm-oi; von Hiese and Freyer. Few people in the field

‘.1 f ale. that certain technical terminologies such as

‘e

, figdifldiseertation written in l89h by Hindelband, a German Neo-
%.f

  

W crate, the point is that the philosophical support which

.gy‘ffimenyie current view on disciplines that are collateral with that

4];;:§‘tion, are seldom examined. This type of study cannot be effected
:ft gradual or consecutively distributed efforts of concentration, and
_,i.’:i why the present thesis has preferred to delimit the dimensions of the
‘. r‘eiready discussed general problem, by taking only one aspect of its intricate

fabric of inter-connections.

The methodology to be followed in the ensuing chapters will be,
lin the first place, one of close historical fidelity to the original source,
in the measure that such an action is possible. The studied author's native

language will be, of course, preferred. In this aspect of the dissertation,

 

i ' 8

 
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  

"'stic conclseness will be sacrificed for the sake of precise, detail-

{',~ ring. ‘Host of the quotations taken from the Spanish will be translat-

” f»: 733‘d“nriter, unless otherwise indicated. Due attention will be given,
. . if “bie, to the subtleties and semantic variations usually lost

..L.fllllf9 trinslations. and, in this sense, correct English form,

5 ',_ ‘ ‘7 be’ Michal” sacrificed in order to preserve the Spanish

til it ' a

d‘ih.: “Iiin‘flnpoesible to eliminate the presence of lengthy and

‘QTIj-Y7a",-‘tle appearance of pedantic academiclsm. In fact

\fnfijii~Ii‘Ihere’very often, perhaps to the point of irritation,

-‘}

di¥’fil the framework of philosophies that share in varying
,i"fgfhiivproblem'to be studied. The reason for such an
fiiblbo ovoid loading the chapter with so many references
7 ‘ plainly unreadable. This does not mean that the
“3'chapter will be only paraphrastic; it will be rather a Syn-
fiairlfif.'to recapitulate in a few words a kind of philosophical report
;% $i§es previous analytical work.
" Gfirtain quoted passages will also be repeated in different chapters.
iéjl,¥tis due to the fact that they were chosen for their expressive felicity;
_' j‘ifiiitfie necessity of using them in different contexts;to the wealth of
interpretation that they offer; and to the pedagogical attempt of re-
steting certain concepts that fit a variational treatment, as occurs with
the‘main themes in a musical composition. As a resalt of this, many
quotations not necessarily restricted to the studied phiIOSOpher will be

repeated in their entirety whenever a new angle or variation could be

 

9

  
  
   
      
  
   

" Jto their content. This is especially true of Chapters iv and Vi,

'17., dh. mum. between Ortega's general and educational philosophies.

 

.. _ ', 3.". be constructed in an increasingly-encompassing manner.
M

.' {Minute the above is the fact‘that this dissertation will mostly

. ' , roe. "pun" philosophy, and with its history, as opposed to
‘. ' I
3 Nil _- 7 “of education” proper. No other alternative is possible when

. empreeisely known as a "philosopher of education" is

' .
.r’n

   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
    
   

.‘d'r: ”(of connecting his incidental educational remarks,
“Wsioel context. This circumstance is also due
0:” V‘ Gasset wrote on every imaginable topic, thus

:enerming obiiviousness to the compartmentallzation that

 

_'"eyet.etic" efforts within the "division of labor" that
I: ghr‘iwlicltiy accepted for the fields of philosophy or of
"Lubmxiogicaliy oriented schools. As a result of this,
tion will have a premeditated content of approximately
f_;philesoophy w thirty percent education". Yet, the

‘ of the work purports to be a contextual display of considerations

' Eeiso be remarked at this juncture that the essential purpose for
, -.-entertained the topic of the thesis is an "educational" one, in the
«ii. that it purports to interpret a Spanish mind for interested Anglo-
Semen readers.
The above has led into the consideration of another problem. How was
Ortega to be presented in English? On this aspect it was decided that precisely
because much of the Ortegen persuasive properties do reside in his use of

the Spanish language, such circunstance might paradoxically be viewed as an

advantage for the purposes of the thesis, since the problem then attains a

 

   
  
  
    
  
   
    
   
   
    

«’3' l0
.s‘Q’
1.}! , ‘ huge. The task becomes rather one of asking what is left of the

V . ..
- ".I'.‘ -'

mum framework, once the lingiiis tic charm has lost a sizeable

' 4 effectiveness. There were, of course, additional implications
.M'lefly mrized by pointing-out the general need for a unified
If Whole”. M factors have been of great help in this

@;}h
,‘;j, Mew! stence‘of previous studies of Ortega in the
. i"

. re 1‘ the valuable suggestions made by the members of the
V i ' W!!!“ the pretent writer.

e

__.A ’5‘

; W “wand w recognition must be herein presented

T , ,W‘outliee of the Ortegen philosophy. Such a task

r.’ \i .‘

- ‘-e

V [it harried-wit with the Anglo-Saxon reader in mind.

rap

I D l
wifittflfll «plain the manner in which Ferrater's findings

:‘ Sue of his terms and methodological resources were
pus-s were taken from Nostrand and Hey] (translators of
~e'r‘id still other words were especially coined, or

' writ-er. sanetimes at the suggestion of his Comittee

-. 'd be said, then, that the present study would have represented

.; Toffesearch had It not been by Ferrater‘s account, which was of extra-

: htility as a guideline in the examination of Ortega’s Complete

6;” "g This writer feels that the present introductory part would be

as ,

‘ uivimlete without the open recognition of the work of those scholars, who
‘ have devoted considerable effort to the study of one of the most outstanding
thinkers in the Spanish-speaking world.

Further details on the type of methodology to be followed by the present

dissertation will be contextually expanded and textually described in Chapters

ii and ill. in this Introduction, this writer considers it Sufficient to

 

 

 

liltlliil

A’-

    
 
  
  
   
    
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
      

.r (F

. l I

‘J'- ‘.

3"» , . e that the exposition to be used will be of a historico-speculative

- y

g I; “£..-for reasons whose detailed discussion will be also offered in
.‘I:
" '. ‘rmtloned chapeters. Thereafter it will be necessary to enter

7 ' ~Whinto Ortega's theory of higher education, and therefore

‘ j-aspects. whose conceptual presentation and historical
respectively need an inevitable series of technical excursions
"' ._ ’ Wei", philosophy. The same considerations will make
Maw-nu VII to the critical appraisal of Ortega as a
‘ _ "_, and to use Chapter VIII for a subsequent examination

u ,g
_; gill also be made in Chapter VII on the epistemological

-4"

.Mn theory, since many Anglo-Saxon readers seem to

. km as it relates to this basic philosophical position.

Q-Gptaoccupation for these matters.

. .mw the already-outlined manner of contributing to the
If‘f;;,_,lg pf ”existentialism and education", it is hoped that
it; aggdymill present other contributive aspects of some importance.
I Fiance, a study of the Ortegen works lends itself to the pursuit

1 lyiclear delimitati0n between schools of thought that are

‘- As implicit and contextual sense, It is hoped that this dissertation
constitute, in fact, a case against common denaninators. ”Existent-

Q ..

'L’illi’l", "idealism", ”phenomenology", and ”vitalism" will be the specific
i at

I instances to be illustrated in terms of conveying an awareness of differences

and similarities. The Ortegan material will be quite _a_d__h_9_g to exercise an
. ostensive exemplification of the undesirability to generalize on "schools"
and "trends".

The Ortegan writings also offer an excellent opportunity to establish

 

 

 

 
 
  
 

‘- "In: relationships seldom attempted, such as, e.g., a rather direct
than between Ortega's concept of life, and Husserl 's phenomenological

a

, , fl-Wi‘im‘ Likewise, a suggestion will be conveyed of the fact

  
 
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
   
  

'g’m hidily desirable to conduct a series of analytical explorat-

. I‘ Allfference, for example. between empirically sfmfld“ “new“
:i a, ‘ .l _ Ether concepts that appear to be strongly rooted 0P0"

"magical assuliptions. This writer is of the opinion

‘\ s,

' “ _. mm these issues should benefit the field of
. H“. ' _
' I , rifle. seiue of nonographlcaiiy-cantered studies also
"1"}: “Maul. in the educational realm. in this sense,
i; '96:” ha nails in order to have this study approach, in
“ways. a suggestive model of the type of investigation
A edit a "general philosopher" (as opposed to a
fll'fiduoatlo‘n") is studied with the purpose of exploring the
”Ligation of his philosophical generalities for the use of
"gym”. in the present case. such an effort lacks, of course,
;, tplretenslon of being necessarily normative and methodologically
This writer rather prefers to look at his work as an initial
, w. whose gem rai intention.which should be preserved in the future,
diode methodol09ical resources could be greatly improved upon the ac-
Q'mtifilfltion of further experiential wealth. Subsequent investigations to be
' .. performed by future candidates to the degree could contribute greatly to
the attainment of this goal. On this topic, the writer and his major adviser
have often discussed the possibility of a series of future dissertations

to be made with Such purposes, and obviously entailing serious study of the

impressive gallery of thinkers whose systems are not usually regarded as

 

l3

   
  
   
  
  
    
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  

t. «A;

:‘i‘ a-l‘iy “or directly related to the field. 0n the other hand, as in
'9'? Ortega, other philosophers have touched rather directly upon
l'ie‘pects, and should make the proposed task less difficult.

«We work. for aka-pie, appears to be waiting for this kind of

lngeif a multilingual study In philosophy could also
' M Mining direct sources, and provide a motivating
. fled decterai candidates in the field, who wish
#‘jfitiflcation for the controversial language require-
‘ m. flare the writer Is not confining the remark
Q'UVI.§IUC language. but rather to the utility of handling
amiss English. French, and German, which, in his case,
‘ . fl-h'edditien“, and which will be used in varying degrees
of this thesis.
’.V IV; ai'iqui’ck glimse must be offered of the basic controversy
.. .zieirwriter into the necessity of presenting the thought of
.‘_ g». %"as‘a part of the overwhelming and somewhat fictitious problem
i

{"71 been called an ”overwhelming” one because it_ demands the

tails. and education”. It has been already explained that this

Mien of too large a segllent of the Continental European mode of

_ - i‘phiiosophy. And the term ”fictitious" has been used because in a

,‘iiiflct sense, there is no such movement as "existentialism". at least
insofar as it purports to represent a unified school of systematic thought
that shows a sufficient conglomeration of mutually shared, basic philoso-
phical contentions.

What appears to be there is rather a recognition of the metaphysical

and epistemological problems created by a radical transplantation of

 

     
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
    

‘ In.
(31.;1‘nentlfied techniques (borrowed from the realm of natural science)
| re of tie so-called ”behavioral" disciplines. Since the death of
is" int of the strictly "idealistic" system-builders) the debate

-WI" and "cultural" scientific methodologies has undergone

, .‘..‘\

u. ‘31,!” The "exact sciences" had made great progress in their
{I , ml? ogspecializatlon, but at the cost of their internal
"‘j'm thezdifflculty, but his sacrifice of "nature"
A sqxgnlygdeprlved the exact natural sciences of a
n Jhat‘ they‘urgently needed.
' r._ flfl,¢’" the exact sciences continued showing a spectacular
i .‘ mich only contributed to the undesirable divide
. MWand the "physical" (or mathematical) forms of viewing
din-fl. Two opposed conceptions of the world culminated
$5! of "physico mathematical" formulations, and of the Neo-
"’-2I~tb subtract the problem from the metaphysical realm, in
.i‘l't exclusively from the vantage point of critical epistemology.
‘9.“ '7. “positivism", "biologism", "psychologism", "historicism", and
. air- then the opposing radical schools that led Husserl and
M;P1‘to the creation of modern phenomenology as an epistemological method.
.:’-T Plato used to demand that the dialectician should not be satisfied
\ in extreme conceptual distinctions. He recommended that the methodological

',‘23'ivldions of classes, kinds, and species, should not vulnerate their inter-
J

" ‘h; connected structure, and thus that the desired fragnentation should not
"tear the flesh but rather cut-across the natural articulations". In other
words, he noted then that the ancient equivalent of "science” in its concrete
task, does not always adjust itselr to the postulates of a given logical
system, but oftentimes appears to challenge them. Today, the situation

does not seem to have changed. Natural or "exact" science at times

 

 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  

l5

. ' g of cultural concapts and nothods. And. on the other hand,

Nulpllnaa arc frmntly aided by tho application of

' " 2%“: affort that could rasolvc such a non-
WM mum-n 1... philosophy, which

> mm“ Mamba one of culture.
1“ '_ will. Magical praoccupations,
.1. ‘ ,lc‘m‘ inharitcd by Ortega y
whoa-conflict. that ha constructs a

‘ .ianuuthought of a fundanantal theory

 

CHAPTER II

   
 
  
  
 
    
  
    
  
  
  
  
  

'OITEGA V GASSET: A CONTROVERSlAL THINKER

‘Isu i.-
In the ipenish speaking world, well known of the Continent.

fl"
5’ Tl)" Weed and the United States, Jose Ortega y Gasset

Is‘.'!:=l fienched its peak in the early thirties, and whose
, g, QDIIG strongly felt in the so-called "intellectual
o’{Qtfltln Iqerica. fllgiiy controversial, Ortega is a
flgliy, ,‘Iecauee he is the type of writer who has engender-
lmepi‘llse with blind following, or smug condemnation,

A} ,[Q lfl’fllsel. Some of his faithful followers show

‘”Iioe!0t,¢f-heving noticed anything questionable about
,3?!. I“
'I, . Chi sane of his critics seem to find absolutely no

if:

g“ Ski-ling through the 3SOO-odd pages of his complete works, we
find a staggering variety of writings; philosophical studies
articles on literary criticism, political essays and speeches,
landscape descriptions, and historical interpretations. If we
glance casually through the index of names appended to the col-
lection of his works, we are no less impressed by the author's
versatility; Renan and Einstein, Caesar and Husserl, Kant and
Goya, Proust and Abenkhaidun are Only some of the many men not
only occasionally mentioned or quoted but discussed at some
length... Ortega has written on the fountains in Nurenberq, on
the French language, on the Gioconda, on the Russian ballet, on
African ethnology, and, of course, on history, love and meta-
physics. In view of these facts, we may be inclined to believe
that Ortega's variety of topics is either a mark of frivolity
or an omen of superficiality. But the more carefully we look

      
 

'\

l6

 

l7

   
   
 

at the strokes of the brush, the more consistent and organized
appears to be the picture. (2)

Ortega y Gusset also wrote on education, and this topic provides the

firm d.“

of the present dissertation. The alphabetical index of listed

   
  
   
   
  
 
 
  
    
 
    
 
   
   

Tf, eolprlsed between Abd-el-Aziz, and Zurbarén, include Claparéde,

-- ‘C'J
'1'7“‘ Emerson, Froebel, Herbert, Pestalozzi, Montaigne, Rousseau, Sua-

"(13%... (3) And one of the numerous essays among the overwhelming

Sty of topics, of which some have been sketchily suggested above,

lane of MI 51195 of the University, in which he addresses the problem

' I1"
gflieatlon in the Spain of the late twenties, and early thirties. (h)
,-

.g me tin aere -erennlu , the Mission of the University (5)

 

dQQra. 1913.0r5e 93 y Gasset, An Outline of His Philosophy, Bowes
-.,‘ r s '9560 P. 9-

“fifliaet. Jase, Obras ngnletas, Tomo Vl (i9hi-l946) Cuarta Edi-
W“. de Occidente, Madrid, 1958. pp. 52l- -._538

-‘iook, (Biologia y Pedagogia, San Jose de Costa Rica; J. Gar-

l323) already shows the Ortegen concern for individual self-

‘ as the backbone of sound educational theory and practice.

f'translation of the Migsion of the University, (Princeton

I y'Press. N. J. l9h4, introduction, p. l2) makes a point indicat-

a distinction should be made between Ortega as a teacher,

7i theoretician of education: ”As a teacher, therefore, Ortega

“A quite the opposite of the mass-minded educator one might infer

obe from reading Mission of the Universit by itself....ln the

filer Biolo ia Peda o ia, on the contrary, Ortega appears as an

;, .“~ tor concerned primarily with the individual". Nostrand further
ileum—ends Domingo Casanovas' ”excellent brief summary of BiologI __1

' ’h“ggggggg (a 2n Educacion (Caracas, Venezuela, May-June l9h0, pp. 26-28)

“I! an interesting source for consultation on this point.

“‘75) Hereinafter referred to as ”The Mission", since SUCh an abbreviation
would serve its purpose in the English language. It should be interest-
ing to note, though, that the Argentinian ”Coleccion Austral" presents
the essay as a part of a book entitled El Libro g5 las Misigggg (”The
Book of Missions”), prefaced by Ortega himself, and which adds the
"Mission” of the librarian, and that of the translator, to the missiOn ,

   
     
   
 
 

 

    

of the university. ”Mission”, is defined in this context as the Soévekxfl
or Aristotelian ”for what”, with all the force of its teleological
direction, which Ortega deems as the ”...main one among the many

things that every human faculty, or 'human what-to-do' invite us to
undertake”. (El Libro de las Misiones, Espasa Calpe,Argentina,
Buenos Aires, l9h5, p. ll).

 

l8

  
  
  
   
 
  
 
  
   
 
   
   
  
   
   
  
   
  

fjfihcwaver an interesting meeting point for some of the most original
f'ldoas of the period, and also presents a rather clear anticipation
iggi' at developIent.
‘. as a thinker, is also a peculiar object of study because
1 its Vihalenca of the Spanish 'hfter-dinner chatterer" --essential—
1 L.iltrbng feeling rather than upon systematic seriousness-- and the
; '3? the Canaan scholar. in this sense, his language
. “W“‘clltura‘l color"-- is difficult to translate. it

. i i " ‘ ‘5' to ask what is left when the Ortegen thought is
iA";?T?hi§f§tlt chahI, but there is something of treason
. - w i.- rahsletim:
‘ghigi'COIsists of doing small erosions to that thing

I . _r', to the established lingfiistic usages, and to
V y fihiéh seems to issue the dominant norms of the language.

”(fi’f‘ of.perIanent rebellion against the social profile: a
v To write well implies a certain radical boldness.

trenilator --he who translates-- is usually a timid

. ,lt is precisely due to this bashfulness that he has
- such an occupation: a minimal one. He tries to comply
._'gthe demands of that overwhelming police machine constituted
” gfiifiIar, and the conventional usages of the language.

fi»it will he do with the rebellious text? is it not asking too
Inch of him to expect that he should also be a rebel with a foreign
'GIHSI?... But he will be overcome by his own meekness, and --instead
of disobeying the commands of the grammarian-- will proceed to

do just the opposite: he will imprison the translated writer,
confining him to the dungeons of the other normal language. And

by doing this he will betray him: traduttoreI traditore. (6)

Thus, it would seem also legitimate to conjecture upon the validity
of judging a body of statements, which precisely appear to convey so much

meaning because its nature is that of a work of art (and in this sense a

 

(6) Ortega y Gasset, Jose, ”Miseria y Esplendor de la Traduccion“, El
Libro de las Misiones, Austral, l939, p. 135. (Translated by the writer).

 

 
  
  
    
   
  
  

lay of "objectiveness" such as the one offered by literary, musical,
'2:: ’lastlcrproductions), rather than a sober, matter-of-fact, analytic

';.tha kind that seeIs to be so much» mvggug nowadays, especially
:" ‘“l}unup-Sewon philosophical writers. Therefore, it appears

5'ea clarify at this point that this study is initiated with the
a“. , .Iitlon that Ortega's work would be the epitome of ”meaning-

1ng the. analytic thinker, and that a person of such a persuasion
'I,I

   
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 

73;: drtega as a topic worthy of any attention in the realm

'f. ;eeueemnl.

ik‘ ewerclse, except perhaps in the case of needing good
-‘a

v:‘:

WAX—tn, ‘ ‘

I; . rsial agileluiahg, and anathemag, caused by the Ortegan
’f‘y do not find a middle ground, and_they tend to be either

carinreclsion.

.“‘|-"' I
.‘j‘CIOticflli involvement, as in the case of Julian Marias, (7)

9.,theological recrimlnation, as with Joaquin lriarte.(8)

‘agpi iers are likely to take for granted, and clarifies that:

..~As a result, interpretation will often be accompanied by mere
~tlnfomnation. 0n the other hand, certain questions intriguing to
the Spanish-speaking public cannot be discussed here. We shall
pay little attention, for example, to the problem of whether 0r-
tega's claims of having long since foreshadowed many later phi-

 

(7) Cf. Marias, Julién, Historia de la Filosofia, Ed. Revista de Occidahte,
Madrid, I956, pp. h28-hh8; Filosofia Actual y Existencialismo en Espa-
na (l955), Orte a tres anti odas El método historico de las enera-
clones (l9h9); and La estructura social (l9SSi.

(8) iriarte, Joaquin, La Ruta Mental de Ortega, Editorial Razdn y Fe, S.A.,
Madrid, l949.

 

 

 

losophical developments in contemporary thought can be substantiated....

20

 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
   
    
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  

‘ IsI' He shall also ignore the question of whether ideas not playing a
~‘~ - central role in Ortega' s philosophy are faulty... We are not
-se. saaearned with errors irrelevant to the central themes; some
distorted facts or some questionable reasonings may very well be
fefl'ed in an interesting and even sound philosOphy. He shall
tnduige in neither bickering nor applause, but try to keep close
ilk! spirit of a famous apophthegn: Neither bewaii nor rejoice,
'7 Wstand. (9)

wfiggflfiet, this purpose has led to Ferrater's highly competent

Mb-

. P...
_afledy. to which the writer feels greatly indebted, and is
y I‘V'.

J, fly minute preoccupations of the sort which, not exempted
" slalaleat. are reported at the end of his introductory chapter.

seen a letter of little importance for an IndepSpanish

I“
iIV, or Spanish scholar to ascertain if Ortega’s considerations

'X

'Io

c are contradicted by factual findings, (l0) or in
;}_‘filpiications suggested by the Ortegan interpretatl0n of

iThere must always be undemostrable mathematical truths‘. (ll)

,_ repent prefers to leave the environmental, and factual,
l-fccaiidation to those dedicated and patient scholars, endowed with
;'#;tions more typical of a different ethnic or cultural background.
3% seem, then, that Ortega‘s mode of thought has a rather abundant

- lent of lntultiveness, in the ordinary sense of the term, and the

 

(9) Ferrater Mora, Jose, op. cit., p. lb.

(i0) Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Obras Completes, ll, 236- #6, (l92l). The arabic
numerals in parentheses indicate the date of first publicatiOn, either
in periodical or in book form. Unless otherwise indicated, all referen-
ces to Ortegan material will follow the l9h6- -h7 edition of his complete
works (obras completes).

(ll) V, 528 (l94l); also £1. Concord and Liberty, w.w. Norton 8 Co., N.Y., l9h6.

p. 62, in which Ortega tries to show that logic, as a 'mask of thinking”

is not only pervaded by illogical elements but also loses its ”emphatic

aloofness from other forms of thinking”, and that there is no Such thing
as logical thinking, but only the idea of an imaginary, utopian form of
thought that misunderstands itself.

 

2i

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
    
 
  
  
 
 
  
   
   
  
  

“ hid add that such work presents a rather unique combination both
Win insights. which so successfully have asserted themselves
Uf’litaratm. and the arts; and of the Cemenic intuitionistic
'1‘ 5 Wyenough, have not only produced the aonuaental testimonies
“Wu“ Beethoven, but also seen to stand behind the craft-
MM“. Wm, the Swiss watches. the Mercedes-Benz
‘alfl tha‘flraculous optics of the "Wizards of Hetzlar”.
latit- ‘to'analyaa Ortega's educational theory without
”'m of his phlloaophlcal ”system". Hopefully it has been
7 '. W“ “in reason why such an operation becomes dif-
'1“ In. doubts could be raised concerning certain

,< :Ma’Mn if in the first place the Ortegan thought
W an 'educatlonal theory', and secondly, if
y'ftfl'ld be called indeed a 'system'. it has been already

~‘ reason for the difficulty in question is that the
on education are addressed primarily to the function
{Weirline in Spain, and that only by extension do they make
E'to'lnfer more general implications. The Mission is essentially
) 'l‘a'ade before Spanish university students. Therefore it does not
'li‘to constitute a treatise on educational philosophy. it should

. "i at this point, that (i) Ortega is addressing himself to Spanish,
W by extension, to European and Latin American universities, and (ii)
that Ortega is mostly talking about highly specialized institutions, either
without any provision for general education or with a minimal one, as in
the case of most Latin American universities, or of may other "vocationalist"
institutions that claim to be preparing their students for the ‘imediate

demands" of cultural life.

 

22

   
   
  
   
    
  
   
   
 
   
  
  
    

’ . thhewrlter also wishes to repeat here what was suggested earlier

‘ A; War, in the sense that, on the one hand, Ortega seems to have
the ”poorful idealistic and romantic German systems of thought,

. fiat”, he see—ed to he possessed by Spanish cultural traits,
in: ‘

1". [le developed through many years of inquisitorial procedure.

semltlvity and dopatlc stubborness which his

mung cross-cultural product which deserves to be
my“. . .
Mgflilofimlard with a German education produces a

.. a ‘ beame- his thought into 'ldeas' and 'feelings'.

' . 9‘, week w. -

V ‘ 3mm is intended for non-Spanish speaking readers,
A _ id“, ' ‘ as.

m that here we find the main obstacle posed by the

”hinge! cultural traits, which, according to a typical-

0 'lllv " o be full understood. if when

, lar-- problems, has become a truism.

Thus, the accustomed analysis of semantic connotations present in

‘l' "‘ y of judgnental statements will not be followed in the present dissertation.
0, ~ except perhaps to clarify bulky obscurities, or to elucidate the meaning of
O 9 some of the most importart Ortegan theses. But by no means shall such
an approach be made the central tool of the present investigation, not
because the task would not be appealing, but rather because it does not

seem to be the most adequate way to deal with the nature of the author

studied. To use a crude analogy it would seem proper to indicate that

 

23

   
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
  
  

same reasons that one does not apply mathematical formulae to the

. I" ' tIQne- and 'understandlng‘, if such a thing is possible -- of

I ' a; l display. it would be inadequate, and perhaps unfair, to indulge

v ”lively logical method to appreciate, and understand, the work
Mata Ferrater Nora smarizes this point in a rather

, ‘51:\.("v.

“In that Ortaga' s philosophy raises is the choice
table method of presentation. A nunber of methods are
._: ”became of them seems to be altogether satisfactory. If
attention is focused upon the unity of Ortega' s thOught,
" Welsh at loeing the flavour of its variety. If we
‘flf, Ito-ooh on the diversity of subjects, sight may be lost
" ' minibus stra- of thought running through all of them.
hIlele, however, has provided an answer to our problem.
I" .L «has the only way to approach the question of human
9 the narrative way. Accordingly, the right method of
g-Ortega' s philosophy would be the biographical one.
”aphlcal method' is an expression that must be given
running. it would be a mistake to interpret it in the
ion, as if it consisted of a mere enumeration of facts
a chronological order. in Ortega‘s sense of the word,
9 y" is almost a technical term. indicating the peculiar
Vic" structure of hunan life and hunan achievements.
a point of view, the use of a biographical method involves
‘0) under;tanding of the whole of that reality to which it
~l ad

I - i-wt'he above suggestion is made at the risk of falling into one
1.0" ‘ . . .
igperpiexing Vicious circles so frequent in non—formalistic philo-
is
z in order to understand a system of thought we must describe
(I ~. Various stages. but in order to understand each One of the stages we
' ,1,
gust have a certain idea, however vague, of the whole system. The
modern psychologist would hardly deny that this is, precisely, the line
of procedure followed by any attempt to understand the significance of a

given hunan life, and that he must look at its earlier stages in order to

understand the later ones. and vice-versa. Ferrater sharply notes that

 

(l2) Ferrater Mora, Jose, op. cit., Pp. ll-l2.

 

'4

2h

  

l

   
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
   
 
  
  

,I ‘ ”37 the two modes of explanation are not identical (since the first
‘ to he more concentrated on the cause-effect operation, and the
I I i to be more focused upon the whole-part relationship) they

,fW;,;a, . -‘?Iy, and it could be said that instead of being two

,-

"’3"? ,1 ' ’, 'dneyare siepiy parts of the same one.

i "nth-n. thiswork will be a historical one, and it

.9 .. v’tfilli'ts lever-all nature should perhaps be dissapoint-

I Won't" 'ecientiflcally concernad' reader, whose view

,_ fl “attic or perhaps even a contemptuous one.

at“ that such a "warning" has become almost

MW in any presentation of the so—calied 'exist-
‘0'" thouyit, but at this point, the writer sees no

I between this type of underlying remark, and the

"9; 'fiis‘ii a basic 'Iunl'verse of discourse' which is also invariably

”It serious anaiy‘tic or neo-positivistic 'works of science'.
I fffie's work, history plays a role as important as the one of
I vi‘éal'conslstency in an analytic study. Thus, a criticism aimed

1- of semantic predominance in a study of a historicist philosopher

as inappropriate as the want of historical monopoly in a logical

It. Ortega's thought is a different kind of philosophy, not at all

' to logical analysis, but of such a character that the exclusivity

fif such an approach would seem unilateral, and by implication, quite

trivial. A meeting of minds is a rule-following act, and perhaps one of

its basic provisions is to face the interlocutor -- or even the opponent--

on the same grounds. Even if the mental encounter is to have the character

of a duel, another rule would be the use of weapons capable of effective

interaction. Therefore, with Ortega, the exclusive use of semantic

 

25

  
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
      

. . would not render an adequate appraisal of his suggestive philo-
,' ‘C‘flNio, and possibly would only provide the reader with a nega-

. of the real caliber of the man. it would be like facing
inith'oloud. and lethal machine-gun.

mam that the same, unfair operation is also possible
gm thM conception of "fair play“ within a given
6"le one!” the main reasons why most Anglo-Saxon

_-
t .

fi-

we'aelll not on full-speaking terms. The
“Michal-or the positivists with failure in

. I i We!“ not propose to carry-out. And, on the
:HenflMity-minded' philosopher disdainfully refuses
I ‘ of thinkers like Ortega, on the grounds of

‘ ~la’sanass' or hopeless mysticism.

without any intention of erecting consensus as an
Stritarlon, this writer would like to point out the universal
I Iof the fact that Ortega y Gasset handles the Spanish language
«LtIIIrful skill, and that he has created a terminology and style,
’T:o‘re-unlquely his own. Most of his conceptual-ling'distic techniques
Fist of avoiding neologisms, and attempting to use ordinary language

"Icit'iiawhat he calls its 'authentic signification' by coining, or recoining,

the language. This operation is described by him, in a manner highly

reminiscent of the Heideggerian Denken, as a ”return to the originative

 

and authentic” meaning of the terms, although it should be pointed out
that, upon closer examination, the above mentioned technique seems to oppose

that of Heidegger, whose lingUistic intricacies have proved to be utterly

 

  
    

9?
1’5 ‘
.J'

",i ting to many a reader. in regard to Ortega, perhaps the most

26

        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
  
  
 
   
      

I'.;,T 'remerk to the analytic contribution would be his recurrent
' 7"that ”the courtesy of the philosopher is his clarity". (l3)
I:Ih.*§fllald'be also noted that most professional, scientific, and
‘;_}...of knowledge do have a highly developed technical
“like mathematical constructs borrowed, or adapted, by
arutha analytic schools. do constitute a 'meta-language' ,
legato the impatient uninitiated, as the Heideggerian
.tbp the academic tourist wishing to find neatly delineated,
. W in.)
_ .Iit was net the intention of this chapter to present
«mode Ortegen philosophy, a task which already has been

'= t by others. The intent has been to advance
i; for the purposes of this dissertation, would be sufficient
».r of the ensuing chapters intelligible enough. Instead

”*J7thrferrater‘s commendable account, the aim of the present

 

‘ gs, .Julla’n, Historia de la Filosofia, Ed. Revista de Occidente,
rid, i956, p. 30. HarIas here quotes Ortega as his former teacher,
~ ,lecking a specific reference to written sources, merely states
3hat Ortega' s "incomparable pedagogic merits as a classroom speaker,
;x_r chad a maximum of expository transparency”, and that the Ortegan
I beffort to be clear was often belabored to the point of inducing

'to believe that something understood without effort should not
require a further attempt at a more total understanding.

Such a reflection is by no means the writer's and it can be found,
oddly enough, in w. T. Harris‘ account of Montaigne’s educational
theory. Montaigne, Michel de, The Education of Childrgg, with 3
Prologue by w. T. Harris, 0. Appleton and Co., New York, 1899,
especially pp. 50-53. Language seems to worry Montaigne, and with
good reasons, since he argues (like the analyst today) that poor
communication leads to philosophic waste of time However (and

w. T. Harris specifically points this out) he attacked linguistic
pedantry by proceeding to construct another language which, at times,
is as pedantic and unreadable as the one being criticized.

 

27

  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
  
 
 
  
  
    
   
  
   
   

‘ji be to lead into a general exploration of the Ortegan concept of

, and to follow a relationship with the rest of the

chapter. than. has simply tried to suggest a sketchy
‘ Cifzilrtaga y iasset to the reader. The following chapters
All.” 22%: initial sketch, ‘...a will also try to
tallyportrait with firmer lines. and perhaps some
.. thlafiz will be necessary, In the first place, to
I.TLJ§3£%I main theses and subtheses of the present

fl": ia—pieiihg the opening remarks already anticipated.
I.r L. I: .

Can!
?:it Will be necessary to provide a more technical

firingln philosophy, by applying a particular historical

{
tial characteristics will also be explained in Chapter
:t‘r'

, .sl‘..-i .
57 iv, the ensuing chapters (Iv and V) will make use of the

l’;.J“;:chnical overview to present an expanded consideration of

74inn2ept of 'life', as it appears to stand before traditional

‘ 1.,lbnd to relate the Ortegan gensamiento with other philosophies

-‘ :;d whatever might be applicable of the movements generally
:TeTl' 'existentialism', and 'phenomenology' . At this point a detailed

{ ‘34'Sslon of the Ortegan theory of higher educatiOn will be presented in

:1 separate Chapter Vi.

And, fourthly, the last Chapters VII and VIII will attempt

a recapitulation of certain essential Ortegan tenets, as they relate

to education, and a critical summary of Urtega's acc0unt of university

education.

 

CHAPTER Iii

   
   
  
  
     
  
  
  
  
  
 
   
  
  
  
   
 
  

AN APPROACH TO ORTEGA'S THOUGHT:
THE IiOGIAPHiCAL HETHOD

“:f hm existence would seem to be as important In
I,“ .

,_ Q m epistemological and axiological preoccupations
is! eerielnty' . This work will attempt to indicate

a IC‘V.‘ '

., jest; nen._liis world has a 'way' of .mmmg

=2: ’H , knowledge, and value, which is worthy of

I“? nelnortent suggestions for educational theory
_ [oily am that certain concepts such as 'decislon
:authority', and 'power' have been revitalized as
am in educational theory. Ortega y Gasset's

_. Ii“, “'3; flier relevance for some of the prevalent policies

- 'm n‘ ‘illll'ediate vocational' colleges and universities,

.‘n

‘Eoraaon in Latin America. By extension some of the Ortegan
.1 d‘”be applied without any visible strain to all institutions
’1 Silt excessive emphasis on overstated 'speciaiization' , or distort-
" -« io‘nalism’, in terms of a possible concept of 'cultural reality',
j;gfi“i alleged grounds that an immediate kind of practicality either cons-
Y? Ehtes life, or a preparation for it.
Many thinkers, usually labeled as 'unsystematic', have at least
attempted to give some attention to the 'human side' of educational theory,
as a discipline worthy of serious consideration, thus supporting the thesis
that the problem of human existence, 'life', or 'experience', as related

to practical activities, are a matter of profound phil050phical concern.

26

 

29

  
   
   
  
     

.. logical defects or 'scientific’ limitations that could be found
.- . I?” of thought could also mean that (i) the attempt to base
L “l science upon models unconditionally traced from those so spec-
ful in the natural and physical sciences may also have
lione, or that (ii) some logical constructs have hypostasized
so hmn concern to such a degree that sight has been lost

“is‘ aim to describe and evaluate the human condition.
‘O, II ‘
jag". ‘ w ' '
' V 9:me should perhaps be an indication that human

 
 
 

overdthese matters could easily be predicted for the

 
 
  
  
   
   
 
 
   
    
   
 
   
  
 
 
  
  

Militia. areregaining the limelight of 'philosOphical'
vb M Kaplan' s words, it could hardly be denied

0
" 1.
‘ I
large parts of the earth's population feel that they are

_. I with a world they never made. a world too vast and complex
roohthan urging, and one which is indifferent --if not

- 'hOStlle -- to hunan aspiration... i simply mention these
tors so that from the outset we can put the existentialist
’1 a perspective which will do justice to them. Whatever

‘ ings we may find in these ideas when we view them in the

0“" their contribution to the philosophical problems to which

” address themselves, we must also recognize that to evoke such
filterested response on the part of so many people they must in

way or other bear on matters of very deep and widespread concern.
mind that is no small recamendation for an ~-hiiosoh :

II: a hiloso- her 5 eaks oni to other -hiloso hers it is seldom

‘ hgt mat he says is both philosophical and worth saying...(l5)

In the case of Ortega, as in the case alluded by Kaplan, we find
1 ~30 much a thinker concerned to be recognized, accepted, and praised

Qty the elite world of philosophic scholars, as one intensely preoccupied

 

by a 'misslon' that deserves the name of 'educational'. It has been

remarked that Ortega deliberately chose the form of newspaper articles,

 

(l5) Kaplan, Abraham, rhe New World of Philosophy, Random House, N.Y., 196l,
p.98. (italics added by the writer). Also Ej. The National Observer.

Nov. 9, p. 22.

 

30

 
  
  
  
    
 
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  

-_ I‘
n
e .

“tines l926, to achieve contact with the ”real public". (l6) Aside

I599!" subjective preference for the journalistic form, Ferrater
1.:
7- ‘bP’

gabegan writing, Spanish culture was still suffering

of? nineteenth-century intellectual indigence. The so-called

' 01! of 1898 had already revived Spain' 3 spiritual nerve but

Jam in particular philosophical ideas, seemed still to

talllty or rigour. Host of the current literary
ther pure literature «and often fine literature,

.noro .arudltlon. Exceptions to this rule might, of

. ,but even these had to breathe in a rather murky

"Where. The first one to try to clear it was

j But Unusuno, who left nothing to be desired

M" I of 9099000 and breadth of lnforwathn, cared

__ rigour....'l'ha fact that we acknowledge today in Una-

" mad deeds a great deal of what has become an
" _ ‘ port of European contemporary philosophy does not

" Jm shitting that his aims were quite different fron

' The latter aspired to inject into Spanish culture an

,1: Je. badly needed: thoughtfulness. in an intellectually

- atnosphera Ortega might have done what was being done

. ._,,.tiee by other European philosophers: Bergson, Husserl

.l‘," ' Russell. in other words. he might have limited

fozworiting out a core of philosophical intuitions and
has them to a restricted public by the usual means; papers

-. learned societies, contributi0ns to scholarly journals,
in universities. But what if learned societies are few,

1: ournals practically non-existent, universities dominated

.. t" he (17)

' 'I

“:t‘lonal theory at the present time still lacks a sufficient
of non-epistemologicaily oriented theories. In this sense
gr‘be Submitted that philosophical anthropology, existentialism,

. :‘t'lssl,and certain branches of phenomenological inquiry, do consider
“ ucatlon' --although it is granted that they do so in varying degrees--
‘ a3 a hullan activity worthy of philosophic consideration. An attempt is

made to go beyond sheer language analysis, scientific theories of learning,

 

(l6) Harias, Julian, Ortega y la idea de la razon vital, Santander-Madrid,
l9h8, pp. 13-2“. Also pointed out by Ferrater (og.cit.,p. l6) along

with a reference to Obras Completes, Vi, 353 (i932), and another con-
cerning an opinion about ”writing books“ as a 'falsifying activity'

ill, “47 (l927).
(l7) Ferrater Mora, José. op. cit.. DP. l6-l7.

 

,. on

, C

a
v

725 it

z';;ess

‘P"

aw \

3|

  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
   

;iegioal consideration of ethical terms, and to consider the problems
:5ho choice. freedom, authority, and commitments. Human life and

-f#-“Vl,'~ . are as important for the task as the abstracted formal

M'-

loosening and inductive observation, which so far have mono-

”:_: t exclusive attention of the epistemologically oriented
I _ II >.
fenegolng observation in no way claims to diminish the

.6! a. ...
'a ive and deductive methodological resources, without

. “w‘0i :30" g
1m c’eIIId be effected in the field, but would rather

‘IIIJI ,

~ 98Gb calmendabie ingt_g!gg§g_ technicalities should
_lHO~

    
  

and never as the end of educational theory. If a

   
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 

;;;?should be allowed on this matter, the point at issue

(red«to the relationship between instrumental utility
pg. r. ture of the object of knowledge. True, a high precision
“ ”igniter' photographs (if by better we mean increased
:oeobrded image), and all efforts to develop 'better'

IZiwabowe-mentioned sense, should be encouraged. But there

 

. 9"
i޴s=to-describe a better picture (some are intentionally blurred
”ax,~and this possibility opens an entirely new set of axiological

This is not the place to discuss the intrinsic worth of

 
   

‘.;‘ _hstions.
lgliggiet d’art, but whatever problems are involved in such a consideration,
f‘fiiy could not possibly be focused upon the development of technical instrument-
llity. Various 'philosophies of life' have established models for behavioral
science, other than those exhibited by the natural or physical environmental
disciplines. They have given a different meaning to the essential aim of
scientific activities such as psychology, history, and the so-called
'humanistic' preoccupations. These attempts (properly represented in ethical

and aesthetical theory) are now beginning to deliver important messages to

 

er rg

e .
-":e"

I

a)

’\

AIL

32

 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
    

l theory, by means of 'new‘ interpretations of certain concepts,
I ('- 'l
2:“ EQQEeeption', 'becoming‘, 'teaching', 'iearning', 'behaving',

“3"'leg'. The philosophical support of such theories can be traced

5‘;3!psyotelatlc philosoohies of life, and are beginning to present
_§ueions in the Anglo-Saxon world. These contributions, of
’.7{. slinisel. and formal value, are also beginning to make

K ‘ 'pethiods- other than the customary environIIIental-inductive
',"»§Iho¢flle valuable contributors of their complementary
’Idotietic. and experimental research. (l8) Jerome

.gmbboflae of intuitive thinking as one of the frontiers

.theory:

m "5‘“ much of school learning and student examining
leit formulations. upon the ability of the student
I . , verbal or numerical formulae. It is not clear, in
.i’v - of research, whether this emphasis is inimical to the
-d§velopment of good intuitive understanding -- indeed, it is
unclear what constitutes intuitive understanding. Yet we
istlnguish between inarticulate genius and articulate idiocy--
irst represented by the student who, by his operations and
, luslons, reveals a deep grasp of a subject but not much ability
.' o"say how it goes", in contrast to the student who is full of
,, seemingly appropriate words but has no matching ability to use
the ideas for which the words presumably stand. A careful exam-
ination of the nature of intuitive thinking might be of great aid
to those charged with curriculum construction and teaching.

One hears the most explicit talk about intuition in those fields
where the formal apparatus of deduction is most highly developed
-- in mathematics and physics. The use of the word 'intuitiOn'
by mathematicians and physicists may reflect their sense of
c0nfidence in the power and rigor of their disciplines. Others,
however, may use intuition as much or more....A comparison of
intuitive thinking in different fiedls of knowledge would, we
feel, be highly useful....

i
i

 

(l8) £1. Bruner, Jerome, The Process of Education, Harvard University Press.
Cambridge, l96l, pp. l6-32, and 5h-68 for a particularly lucid, if
concise, account both on the importance of 'structure' as a concept,
and the value of intuitive thinking in educational theory, both in
relation to analytic thinking, as well as in contrast to the customary
demand for the formal understanding of subject matter. The relationship

? between Bruner's account and the central tenets of phenomenological

-‘ theory is so obvious that no specific instances will be made by this

' dissertation.

v

”‘3‘- m

(1)

-i.

'\
‘ I-
1 -~ .
5-
1

\I

33

  
    
   
   
 
   
   
  
     
   
   
  

.- warm praise that scientists lavish on those of their colleagues
,‘ ' earn the label 'intuitive' is major evidence that intuition is
-' lpable connodlty in science and one we should endeavor to

. r in our students. The case for intuition in the arts and

",lgtudles is just as strong. (19

,""ff appear, then, that the value of 'intuitive thinking'
fki;hlflfl ‘!!‘ seemed to have been banned from educational
t'H“:L,¢;gqg§emio sln' -- is returning to the limelight even with
I Ifléwvsgealied 'exact sciences'. This fact (_c_fi. Bruner,
'4 Wulthout certain perplexity, because, on the other
I t 'Z-‘FL9F!PQE of educational researchers who base their
l-I‘,,n; inspired on those_of the ”exact sciences”, and
ji‘“ht glen' as a term synonymous with 'whim', 'arbitrary
.$W.mflfl'- in this sense, this dissertation will
'T;éflhgthnon-environmental techniques and empirical research

.9

~55 “'3'!” “cl u’i ".
.3; g indeed. a link between the so-called 'nOn-SYStematic

; ».l;.l fe', and other, highly systematic theories of being,
' V‘value, which have been grouped under the common designation
‘ fiallstic. The writer hopes that a consideration of the most

ts found in the'phllosophies of life' would render this link

 

,‘Bruner, Jerome, og.cit.,pp.55, 63, 66, 67. The notion of intuitive
understanding which Bruner considers worthy of exploration is not
limited to intuitiOn as an element of hypothesis-generation alone.
it also points at the possibility of making use of this peculiar kind
of understanding for the purposes of hypothesis-verification. Both
the concepts of 'vital reason', in Ortega, and 'Husseriian phenome-
nologx', as a method, will be developed in Chapters iv, V, and VII,
in order to show some of the major implications suggested by this
sub-topic. Due references in Chapter VII also mention certain
sources in which the reader may examine some formal systems

that use intuition as a method for apodictic cognitiOn.

 

a
., a .
.-u.€

 

_\ ... II .I l a .s
an. I be .. a. .C l- . I s t . c .
I . C
s \ h.! at. a: taw- . a. . . a... s s ad. .\
a. a w l. I» :- .c .3. .e i.\ .\a
. s O. . . .. . . I . b J. .C
. a a .v p e . a a s O A e
. I a I l. e I s

 
 

3‘0

  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
   

‘75 dient clarity, and that a realization of certain differences

'!

V7{V1n the existentialistlc theories would also show the improplety
A‘IfzaV'lnators which only add to the confusion. Yet, certain concerns
‘ t in these theories, which might be of some significance

V 'i g’fid‘e‘ducators'.

“was! that, if the terms "social' and 'human' are
”11i’31firdiliiitfc situatiOn faced by 'existentially' ground-
”i'fiiiflter'beoomes aetomatically important for educational

‘eiei -- toncarned with problems such as those

"Jifl “Wine""cholce', 'decision making', 'authority‘,

3 ..
'54 . ‘- ‘

. ;,1\j.“ie that some of the Anglo-Saxon commentators of the

J3{5”ilueatlon have proceeded rather hastily by branding

 

5 ti as a promoter of 'elite’ educational policies,

 

Iiififb' views. it is hoped that a closer look at the

,?{}:ga makes an honest effort to transcend the limitations of both
‘ _‘slcal idealism, and to overcome the ultra-subjectivistic orientation
,rliéttrlbuted -- rather hastily too -- to the Husseriian concept of 'pheno-

A menological reduction'. The study of Ortega's Obras Complete , in relation
to the Mission of the UHiY££§i£xI could reveal that, quite to the contrary
this thinker seems to be extremely critical of the Subjectivistic and

idealistic shortcomings. His attempt to develop a critique of 'vital

and historical reason', aimed at an explanation of trans-subjective concerns

 

l\.
e:

r\:

.211

9"?!

a|e
e

35

  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
  

n'g'thosa involved by theories of state, institutional life, and
“32$:th phenomena, which he regards as a part of htman behavior)
fan“. soiipsistic possibility.

.7 finger: 9f S22 ggiveggltx contains a series of statements
" ' y.clarifled in the liyit of the author's philosophical back-
-J‘f‘ higcultural characteristics, and some technical peculia-
* “-'sl_g,|;gnsues-. This study will be conducted with the
J“ i

“leg ti;stiy,,_.aseries of inferential relationships

"I? my“. Q, ontological, axiological , epistemological ,
l; mpf the Ortegan 'system'. The term 'system'

' xlugfglm_ n internally consistent, major structure, of

' (Ashe purpose of answering those questions generally

J-jztyipspphicel', (1‘3., on being, existence, knowledge,

.igilpd right raason). And the term ‘judgment' is to be

ijl”selent, usually axiological, made in absence of conclusive

3.1m shall seek to show a possible relatiOnship with a

x arias, which -- for the purposes of this dissertatiOn --
I

 

this concept I am indebted to Dr. Thomas F. Green with whom

.7 I discussed It at some length in his Seminar on theories of Learning

’ as Related to Education, (Ed. 982), Michigan State University, Fall,

° i963. Conclusive evidence, by this definition, does not generate
a 'Judgment', but rather a report or testimony. This is not the
place to enter into a discussion of the problematic nature of those
questions pertaining to the t0pic of evidential sufficiency, but it
should be noted that the intricacies of such an endeavor rather
reinforce than diminish the effectiveness of this operational defi-
nition of 'judgment'; most educational decisions are, in Our sense,
'judgmental‘.

 

H— —-

 

.K.

.1»

 
 

36

   
    
   
     

ly called 'philosophles of life', in the sense that the term
Li;iln*equlvelant seems to convey one of the key-concepts (or in
'Iighiy-concept) to be understood in order to gain fair access

f me. These "philosophies of llfe' will be studied,

’l;tf. a! least in those peak characteristics which allow

_. v megs. Their eainpoints of connection with the 0r-

;flIT'L,3piasensed in an overview of some of the underlying

. i ‘ifiéthe thought of Nietzsche, Bergson, Simmel,

Q Q ' ,‘Ilfie’; sue allowance will be attempted for their
e‘ 9:
_:4Q’g~bl-'life‘“enl"experienca’.

   
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  

,“Q' f‘IIIpt'Iiil ho node to show a possible relationship
'Q'Tthebry; the ’vltalistic' stances, and a conceivable
, to'ba defined as a philosophy not confined to the

\wf’ipon 'natural facts', as they appear to determine
:Q‘ibhtific reports" of empirical, experimental findings,
“ihans of utilizing inductive-deductive processes (as
--flirily used in experimental research) but rather as a philo-
fleisentlal concern consists of the attempt to develop a theory
Q ' skIStence. This ”human theory” stresses the fact and value
,inji¥h“-- or 'existence' -- as the most pressing reality with which
_;1‘ffphilosopher is confronted, and places epistemological, scientific,
:ihd logical concerns at the service of such a 'reality'.

Having indicated the main thesis and subtheses of this work in
abstract form, it would seem convenient to clarify that the 'biographical'
approach to the study of Ortega y Gasset will follow Ferrater Mora's

account with only minor changes, as follows: (2i)

 

(2i) Ferrater Mora, Jose, op.cit..pp.l2-l3.

 

37

   
 
   
    
   
     
   
   
 
    
 
 
  

IHOI-li‘i
"‘I Ewing Ferrater's tensinology, strictly as a mnemonic device

'V fie-,ldefining category', this first phase of Ortegan thought

I

n.
-a.
i

. 1mg of.his journalistic production, possibly chosen

- '_ ' lr“§“”“”“y ‘9 the sp.ni5h-sp¢.klng public. The so-
A‘ tan-erupt the. ones-n philo'whv an ”Md“ by ° "W"
l '9

3w. 'mu'b would be "mgr puzzling for those who label

Le

if?“ mix, At this point of his development, Ortega seems

4‘}
”f i ipiisat-lons of terms such as 'things' and

(mam given to hullan beings. He constantly
‘ M he designates as the ‘secret leprosy of
”muagainst the pressure of ‘personalism' in Spanish
. grill-known fact that 'personalism', L5” the tendency

I‘ ulmlized development with a particular person, seems
.- 3”
«.’
,1] iseiy the phenomenon to which Ortega reacts during his

-§-pta9e. Yet, 'Personalism' (with a capital 'P'); interpret-

Pfianlng -- which probably prompted later revisions, and which
_:. “,‘i ibly responsible for a footnote, which Ortega himself added to
expression 'secret leprosy of subjectivity', indicanting that such

» “an opinion was 'sheer blaSphemy‘. (23)

 

(22) I. “‘3 (1909): l. ““7 (1909); l. 87 ('908).

(23) Ferrater Mora, Jose’, og.cit..p.19. Also, c_f. I, l+l9-20 (l9l6) for the
appeal to a new subjectivism; l, 309-Li00 (l9lli) for the Meditaciones
del Quiiote. if. Castro, Américo, The Structure of Spanish History
for an account which Ferrater describes as "... a brilliant interpre-
tation of this deep meaning of personalism...", pointing out too
(og.cit., p. l9) that Unamuno had followed a similar process of
development .

 

5.13.“: CT t
.;a

f . a

:Srl ll:a-‘l"

{1265: Q1?

..' _‘ -

1' its ver.

1': . .
celi‘IJa‘

£.: ”I p;
awClfig

‘l‘h‘ ~'
'vr\|n‘,‘ ‘
D

38

   
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
  

§,,?'3’ implied by a constant.and limited review of a 'dead

4;.5? against tradition conceived in this sense. Ortega's
Lbfl'history consists precisely of the development of a critical
if: )Iuflfi‘hi“it becomes alivo in the prosent, and as it becomes
‘ if iUiufii." the cttempt to carry the present back to
QWl‘ititfi preserve the gnuihely historical meaning
Ital,” " ”My to deprive historical knowledge
' ‘v €m, W'ihibl'e men to develop the capacity

’ _m;m- This concept, which later became one

'hhdflffont"theles, could be germinally found as
"Ihfiega’s‘objections to traditionallsm pointed out
' infidel-eds not because the traditionalist is fond
' it Because by proceeding as indicated above, he had fail-
‘Qiditidn. (25) A study of the Mission of the University
'“Qilfeveai'many a connection with this period, whose basic

f '5'trk could be related to the contention that progress,
I'self-identity are not to be magically originated by simply

itforeign methods and techniques. The 'object' of change, study

 

(216) Translators vary in their versions of this expression, which literally
means "at the height of their time", or "at the height of times".

(25) |. 425-429 (1906). I. 363-365 09'“): ll. ‘43 (19”).

 

39

  
    
  
   
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
   
  

m a good many Spaniards of his time, Ortega was not dazzled
fit; the brilliant side of modern industrial revolution, and did not
Mum. believe that the mere introduction of Western European
Wignes would automatically heal all Spanish ills. He welcomed
, ’ .teebnitpes but warned that they were a by-product of some-
far more fundamental than technique: science, culture,

A . “nuisance-of a given reality. _i_,_g.. people, nation,

.ng Was true. identity by resorting to na‘ive conceptions
(WW3, are Me part of its essential character.

I 'e'mmprecedes essence' could be readily

“a“ 9m” thoud'it, especially when considering

“.mlsation' of Spain, and his contention

”f War...“ the philosophical production, 95

individual or social entity, are the root of real

Wilmim (27) This period also presents the first

’ Wotan ‘life' as a key-concept of great importance

”I 0m. ‘H M . A particular essay, Adam in Paradise (Adén

'his‘ndicates that 'life' is to be interpreted as the human

  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  

"aiaildavents. (28) 'Life' is,then, not strictly biological,
Hanan", and/or 'biographical': 'L_i_fe_' is a human reality.
‘vienistence we can be certain. This reality, which later he
”'is 9‘90ouliar' or 'strange reality' is as connected with "him who lives

", .as with the ”surrounding world” (used in a wider sense than the

 

(26) Ferrater Mora, Jose', op. cit., p. Zl.

(27) l, l02 (i908). Also cf. l, 107 (l908)for the 'europeization' of Spain,
and l, l38 (1910) for his warning on the inconveniences of naive
imitatiori in terms of the true achievement in a national community.

(28) I, #69-489 (l9l0).

 

llO

   
   
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
   

's, Ll...- not only to that surrounding world which is imediate.

" .v Mist we'll-ch is remote). (29) in other words, 'life' is connected
2; . physical. but also with the historical and 'spiritual'

F ,- ’ . gag-sen 'spir-itusl’ being used here in the sense of

H fl‘um'thenfiore-aerhepc inclusive of, but not limited

'3; fileamwm‘» can is the problem of life, and life
. .1. I

an.

‘.J

“lichen-mot quiteexplain, but is out-there,

“image, incomparable, and unique.

MtMMNs-context depicts life as 'individual',
- ire-indication to define it also as
”wwwas, and hence 'to iive', by de-
r'eouaive', and to 'co-ggigt'. Writing again about
smash“

‘ and nobody in particular: Adam is life.
,V radios? it does not matter: it is the ubiquitous scene
‘ ’aa-tragedy‘of living. (30)

",lii.l?‘aradise means "i in the world”. The Germanic

3M,» m.to appear at this conceptual point. perhaps

Qs‘lflaborate sophistication of the Heideggerian Dasein, but,

 

-y,~ with a sufficient indication of its haunting presence. It
my” noted that the Adamic world is not "one thing", nor is it a
of facts -- or things -- but a 'stage', because 'life' is the

A. .
, r“Teflon of a human drama. in a manner also reminiscent of the Deweyan

answer to the concept of experience, the Ortegan 'life' is a process,

igeg, something that man does, and also undergoes, under the effect of

 

(29) VI. 13. (19M).
(30) i, 489, (i910).

 

5d.

‘1 \
r u; l. u «c
v. ‘r O x . _ ‘5
b r n h
‘l I ' ' -l.

II

‘6'

   
  
  
  
  
  
  

munlent. The difference with the Deweyan scheme could be direct-

: ,to the historical connotation given to 'life and culture'

. Ihinher, who is trying to transcend a biologistic limitation.
j 3” none of the- historical factors that are constitutive

‘I. .Mhhs. social environment. More also than the ordinary
"1‘01” pared-icon,» close to modern liberalism, the

‘ 53 We; than...“ -- tom the indivorcibie com-

fine sew -
figfié'f  ..‘e.i

q. - v , “310' “.75.”, andnycircunstance". (3i)

-‘ u :5. qn.:4 e t -
‘ mid he that Ortega is trying to transcend the

 
  
 
 
 
  

Ono of tho most often quoted capsules of

      
   
 
  
  
   
  

I. [1” K

“Internal-puma, and also attempting to "get at the
L \3' 9'

g ”a part of the subject, perhaps showing his Neo-

.Mego'

if‘ The "re-absorption" of the circumstance is the concrete

liicaamtenpt, which aims at a theory of truth based upon
,7 ‘w - *
as .. at a conception of truth as "the uncovering of that

. I"""‘-‘“ g -
’»k file. (32) Perhaps one of the most lucid discussions of the object-

. "
‘ gflgfing capacity of man is to be found in Max Scheler's Man's Place in
.—- fl F

 

 

(31) I. 322-358, (1914).

(32) For a return to the ancient Greek concept of ”truth as aletheia” which
is pursued for the purposes of establishing the 'originative' nature
of being, or the ”elucidation of genuine Being”, cf. Martin Heidegger's

Einfuhrun in die Meta h sik, Tubingen, Niemeyer @139, 1953 (Intro-
duccion a la Metafisica, Transl. E. Estid, Ed. Nova, Buenos Aires,

I959) especially PP. 23h-239. I, 358 (l9l4). Also, Ej. El Libro de las
Misiones, Austral, Espasa Calpe, Argentina, S.A., Buenos Aires, 1945.

P. 75.

 

 

 

~--—-—

 

1'!

n
.u

102

 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
    
    

" 'r‘: “loll, using a different vocabulary, presents a notion similar

‘ tion of the circumstance", to show that the relationship

, l'hfland environment. must be reconsidered in the case of human
( .than the simple equation that applies to animals and
-t0:hpld any longer:

heft this new. and huan drama is this: Its behavior
, . , W' by a complex of sensations and ideas raised to the
"'2ut 'uhdsct..it. is. in principle, independent of the
. ’ I“! sensuous surfaces in the environment conditioned
‘ ‘ iIidhlueer.thet appear in the visual and auditory
accord act of the drama consists in the voluntary
,_ ’ aa~ahieasea~atia drive and of the corresponding
3’ ‘ihs third act consists of a final and intrinsic change
a, It Sh! objective nature of a thing. The course
7h:,' ' ler is 'world-openness'. and such behavior, once it
r”. Gauthierof unlimited expansion -- as far as the 'world'
things extends....Han, than, is a being that can
' amid-limited degree, behavior which is open to the world.
human is to acquire this openness to the world...

in:
,l has no 'object'. It lives, as it were, ecstatically
tin its environment which it carries along as a snail
,‘ as its shall. it cannot transform the environment into an
lit. It cannot perfonn the peculiar act of detachment and
distance by which man transforms an 'environment' into the 'world',
Iteer'into a symbol of the world. It cannot perform the act by which
mun transforms the centers of resistance determined by drives
3‘ ' and effects into ’objects'...,l might say the animal is involved
' too deeply in the actualities of life which correspond to its
organic needs and conditions ever to experience and grasp them
as objects....(33)

t

Thus, man as the I'only subject of objects”, has become one of
the most important concepts in philosophical anthropology, and in modern
phenomenologica psychology. The elaborate construct that the theory
has reached is not presented by the Ortegan Eensamiento. but the basic,

phenomenological motivation seems to be there.

 

(33) Scheler, Max, Man's Place in Nature (gig Stellung des Menschen im
Kosmos), Noonday Press, New York, l96l, pp. 38-39.

'II
a.-.

 
 

 

st.

‘l3

 
   
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
    
 
 

:fiich- Frome's works present one of the mcst widely known criticisms

tions of 'human nature' that has been presented to the

a fanatic: in the m, it is submitted that man is his
I ,Mr 1m human nature is often interpreted solely by analyzing
‘. a

I J m‘mions, usually that of 'human weekness'; that

1'.“ transforms the “Lt that affects him in the

t.

I

,mfim the total existence of man is the source

. _:mnew mi either healty or m, thus allowing
. “to that it potentially jg, in the process of

i—

«In __ -m lone such thing as nature common to all men,
lemme: corresponds to their needs, i___g., to
l . Circus-stantially, man is not to be

1 =1

by; A ‘

.J‘yinqgeene of his physiological status, because objectively
. ‘gste.

_"'_”3“besic psychic qualities, laws which govern their mental and

1"1»

:33"? fictions, and aims for the solution of the problem of human
stir.“ _.. fiw from Freedom also emphasizes the thesis that human nature

0
C.

neither a biologically fixed an innate sum total of drives, nor is

, “ 3:. lifeless shadow of cultural patterns to which man adapts smoothly;
it is rather the product of certain evolution, and needs basically to

(i) satisfy physiologically conditioned drives, and to (ii) avoid isolation

and moral aloneness, hence allowing for a concept of positive freedom to

be based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man. And Man for Him-

£11 completes this existential discussion by indicating that, as the animal

stage is abandoned, man is born, paradoxically becoming the most helpless

animal. His gain in mental, moral, and spiritual capacity is a loss

of defensive power before nature, and a disruption of the harmony of

animal existence ( f. Scheier, Supra). Thus, the necessity to find new

 

 

 

ea.
I

#4

solutions for the contradictions in man's existence, is the source of
all psychic forces. The understanding of man's ESyche must be based on
the analysis of man's needs, stemming from the conditions of his existence.
And, according to Fromm, this is the key to humanistic psychoanalysis.
The struggle between human and animal needs has to be balanced just for
the goal of achieving clinical (and not merely 'statistical') sanity.

it should be noted at this point that, in spite of the common
belief that Ortega followed Wilhelm Dilthey in his 'philosophy of life',
no Diltheyan overtones seem to be present in the objectivistic stage.
Lagical reasons, and puzzling similarities to the contrary notwithstanding,
Ortega himself has written repeatedly that his ”discovery of Dilthey” was

made late, and perhaps too late in his life. (34)

Perspectivistic Stage_jl§ih-l923).

Acknowledging the fact that the Ferraterian classification into
periods is not atomistic, and thus does not exclude overlapping conceptual
devel0pment, nor the p'esence of other theories within the period, the
perspectivistic phase seems to be inclusive enough to indicate with a
certain measure of safety the tone of Ortegan thought that pervaded over
the chronological span, comprised between l9lh and l923. In this period
of 'perspective' becomes a constitutive ingredient of that reality which
Ortega calls 'iife'. The definite being of the world is neither matter

nor soul, but a perspective, and hence an indeterminate series of varying

 

(3h) Ortega y Gasset, Jose, ”Dilthey y la idea de la Vida”, in KantigHegel,
Dilthey, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, l96l, p. lhl, in which
Ortega claims to have wasted (lost) ten years of historical Speculation,
had he known before about Dilthey (to whom he refers as the “greatest
philosopher of the XiXth. Century” (3).) Chapter V of this dissertation
expands this topic.

..SS

‘1

, \

I.
-s

‘

I
. n.-

“5

possibilities: ”The individual viewpoint is the only viewpoint from which
the true world can be looked at.” (35) And precisely because reality

is reality, posited beyond our individual minds, it cannot be squeeZed
into them unless it is broken down into myriads of facets. Each person,
existentially, and fatally, occupies a place in the universe, and must
have a viewpoint which is correlative in terms of the total picture.
Elsa, since reality cannot be pretended, the viewpoint cannot he invented
either. And this is precisely the teleOIOQical condition (ggg 'mission',

or dueneka) which provides the human raison d'etre: no other eye can take

 

the place of my own, and that which 'in reality' can be seen by my own

eye, does not, necessarily, have to be seen by another. A Neo-Kantian
reminiscence echoes this thought, especially concerning the finality of

the human being (Qua end). The perspectivistic condition renders it possible
for each man to become irreplaceable and necessary:

PerSpective is one of the components of reality. Instead of

deforming it, perSpective rather organizes reality. A reality

which would remain identical when looked at from different view-

points is an absurd concept....This way of thinking has to perform

a radical reform of philosophy, and is also reserved an even more

important task: a radical reform of our cosmic realization....

Each life is a viewpoint upon the universe. (36)

The already advanced ”circumstantial theory” matures at this stage,
since it seems to be stated that our perspective of the surrounding world,
which in turn affects our very own perspective -- gua ‘subjects' -- is
to be governed by the idiosyncratic prOperties of the mutual co-implication
of the self and the circumstance. Some critics believe that the influence

of the German philOSOpher and sociologist Georg Simmel could be detected

at this point of the Ortegan itinerary:

 

(35) l, 321 (l9lh). Also, 2:. ll, 15-20 (l9l6).
(36) Ill, pp. lag-200, (1923).

A6

Following a tendency that had been fostered by the German philso-

pher Georg Simmel and had increased through the years in some

sections of European philOSOphy, Ortega claimed that no reality,

however humble, and no question, however unusual, can be put aside

by a truly alert philosopher. At issue with the positivists'

flat universe, Ortega has often asserted that hierarchy permeates

reality (I, 3l9-32l-2 (l9lLl)). But this does not preclude the

fact that each reality has a depth of its own and that the

phil050pher's task is to penetrate its surface in order to peer

into his hidden nature. (37)

Perspectivism is, of course, a phil050phical view with a long
history. If individual perSpective is posited as the only way of meet-
ing reality, and of formulating universal truths, the classical problems
that are typical of the position will be found. However, it should be taken
into account that the Ortegan perspectivism seems to differ from monado-
logical realism, precisely because it is pluralistic. Some critics feel
that this is the essential difference, for example, between Ortega and
Leibniz. And, Chapter V of this dissertation will analyze the main
differences between Ortega, Nietzsche, and Simmel, concerning this issue.

At any rate, Ortega maintains that complete coincidence of two
views of reality cannot give but an abstraction, unless such a coincidence
were originated by hallucinations. (38) In other words, two views of the
same reality cannot coincide, in sensu stricto, and, at best, they could
be complementary.

if the difficulty of obtaining coincidental views is acknowledged,
Ortega‘s self-assurance of this issue has aroused several criticisms.
The problem of inter-subjectivity of individual statements is at stake, and

the present efforts of modern philosophy to Solve this puzzling controversy,

do not seem to have been regarded by Ortega as particularly torturing.

(37) Ferrater Mora, José,.gg:cit., p. 25.
(38) II, i8-20 (l9l6).

47

He seems to consider his efforts to discard solipsistic idealism, and
Subjectivistic assumptions, as a sufficient guarantee of the fact that
his perspectivism can be legitimized both as an ontological and psy-
chOIOgical answer.(39) In other words, he would claim that perspective
is not simply a 'subjective' act of perception, but is rather a constituent
part of reality itself. This is why, in connection with Leibniz, Nietzsche,
and Vaihinger, he claims that their perspectivism, while having aims similar
to those of his own philosophy, have started from different aSSumptiOns.
Thus, perspectives are held by Ortega to be ”... the concrete
sides of reality as perceived by concrete beings...” (#0) Such a metaphy-
sical assumption appears to have provided our author with the firm con-
viction that he maintains before the problem of solipsism vs. inter-
subjectivity:
...schools of philosophy differing as widely among themselves
as Husserlian phenomenOIOgistslamll09ical positivists have been
compelled to slice off extensive fragments of their theories because
of their failure to avoid solipsism after upholding a certain type of
perspectivism. To Such objections it is probable that Ortega would
remain unyielding. He would certainly argue that his own brand of
perSpectivism is free from these drawbacks, precisely because he
had previously got rid of subjectivistic or idealistic assumptions. (hi)
it is interesting to note too that a connection could be attempted
between the concept of ”discovery of hidden nature” and _lgth_i§ -- or
the type of 'ontolOgical truth‘ pursued by Heidegger and other phenomeno-

logists. On the other hand, there seem to be enough possibilities left

to conjecture that a similar reaction against the idealistic abstractions

 

(39) Chapter V will offer detailed expansion of this issoe.

(40) The reader is advised to consult the Modern ThQEE for expansion and
clarification of the perspectivistic Ortegan theory.

(4i) Ferrater, Oo.cit., p. 3), Also 5f. The Modern Theme, pp. 39 for the
manner in which Ortega purports to use his concept of 'perspectivism'
as the main supporter of his theory of knowledge. Again, here we find
a ”factual aSSumption” stating that subjective reality is an episte-
mological medium capable of selectively and accurately mirroring an

""‘""’T""" .
external and real' world.

 

 

ms

of the traditional philosophic problems was simultaneously taking place
elsewhere. The pragmatic attempts to categorize everyday problems as
philosophic ones, and the reaction exhibited by James, Dewey, and followers,
posit an interesting ground for comparison. To use a typically Ortegan
manner of looking at these problems, one could perhaps hypothesize that
these new reactions against metaphysical solipsism, and against the
aristocratic consideration of philosophy were a product of the times,

and therefore had an objectivity of their own, which could be attributed
to the Ortegan concept of 'historical reality'. it is hardly possible
that John Dewey and Jose Ortega knew much about each other, except per-
haps at the end of their careers, and, if 50, possibly through third
sources, but the similarity of their respective reactions against dualism
and transcendentalism is rather interesting. The Ortegan 'perspectivistic
stage' is full of problems which allow such a comparison, and which would
merit separate treatment or expansion. The promotion of the ’everyday
problem' to the status of ”being worthy of philosophic treatment”, not
because of its seeming triviality, but because of the fact that every
reality must be raised to the plenitude of its significance, and therefore

to a notion of truth as aletheia, seems to be one of the characteristics

 

of modern phil050phy:

This point deserves some attention. Since the advent of pheno-
menology and existentialism, we have fallen into the habit of
reading philosophical works encumbered with analyses of realities
that only thirty years ago would have been barred in academic
circles as irrelevant if not impertinent. We have been taught again
and again that no reality, however unacademic, is liable to escape
the cutting edge of philosophical clarification. This situation

has given cause for concern, and in some quarters the complaint

has been heard that at this rate philosophy will soon dissolve

into a hunting for minutiae or into high-sounding literature. But
such complaints become pointless as soon as we discover that in
many instances the elaborate analysis of unacademic themes has led
to the core of the deepest phil050phical questions. This open-door

49

policy in philosophy was preached by Ortega at the beginning of

his career and has since been consistently carried on by him

against wind and tide. The variety of his intellectual interests
appears thus in a new light. It is not a result of intellectual
instability, or at least, not solely, but also a consequence of

a philosophical attitude. (#2)

For the purposes of this dissertation, the above problem will be
defined as 'educational' in nature, since it seems to be sufficiently
clear that such a reaction shows a deep concern for the difficulties
involved in the 'lack of communication' between certain philosophers who
”talk to each other” from one fortified ivory tower to the next, and
whose ”teachings”, conducted at such a high level, hardly try to answer
certain questions of import to the common citizen. The pogulus is then
to ”tinker with such problems” rightly or wrongly, mostly confused,
sometimes misled, and usually unaided or ignored. Ortega attempted to
make a case for the ”phil050pher“, being of necessity a ”phil050pher of...3'

some vital concern, and therefore rejecting the common notion that the

”philosopher of...” is only a second-rate aficionado, whose attempts

 

to attach a predicate to the purity of ‘phil050phy' -- or to 'pure
philosophy'-- bear a relation to the ”real product” similar to the
axiologically derogatory relation often established between pure and

applied science, or between pure and applied art. Phil050phy of science
seems to be the more accepted one in these cases, but there are positions
which definitely reject philSOphy of education, phil050phy of art, or
political philosophy, as true 'phiIOSOphic' activities, until a clarification
is made of their basic universe of discourse. Perhaps this rejection is

lOgically, and even empirically grounded in many a case, granting the

‘
-—.-—

I ,
(“2) Ferrater Mora, Jose, 0p. cit., p. 20.

50

confusing multiplicity of possible views to be embraced by the ”philoso-
pher of...”, but the fact still remains that any attempt to remove phi-
losophical activity from the kind or proolem which Ortega names ‘vital
concern' is a fallacious one if the grounds for rejection are simply based
upon lack of proof, lack of definitional bases, or difficulty of the
problems involved. The fact that ”X is difficult”, or the contention that
”X is unclear” are hardly a basis to conclude that ”X is non-existent”
or that ”X is irrelevant”. The objection, at best, is perhaps made only
at methodological limitations, rather than at the necessity for treating
the problems involved. Thus, the circumstantial predicament involved
in the Ortegan perspectivism has, at least, one serious philOSOphic
motivation.

This is at least part of the explanation of the Ortegan maxim:

”I am myself and my circumstance” which later became a corner-stone of

 

his philosophy. (“3)

The phrase (i_am myself and my circumstance) may sound trivial.
in fact, it is not more trivial than most phil050phical sentences
are when we persist in taking them only at their face value. In
Ortega's formula a self is identified with himself and his cir-
cumstances, and therefore the thesis is maintained -- against
idealist philosophers -- that a self can never be postulated as
an ontologically independent being. Far from being a triv al
tautology, this phrase appears rather as an involved double
assumption according to which i cannot conceive of myself with-
out conceiving at the same time of my own circumstances and.
conversely, I cannot conceive of any circumstances without
conceiving of myself as their dynamic centre. (44)

 

 

As in Dilthey, or Dewey, Ortega seems to be indicating that the

'Subject-object' dichotomy is an arbitrary one, that there is no dualism

 

(“3) l. 322. (l9lh)

(an) Ferrater Mora, Jose gp.cit.,p. 27.

- -———-

 

..lb

pta
._-

between interiority and exteriority, and that the real problem does not
consist of ”how to join the two concepts”, but rather of “hOw to separate
them” for methodological purposes. The 'world-individual' schism is an
arbitrary one. The phil050pher may indulge in such a division for ana-
lytic purposes, like the musician who is willing to fracture the melodic
continuity of his composition, or the Bergsonian ggrég of his constant
musical movement, without for a moment believing that such an atomistic
division is to be hyposthatized in terms of two separate realities. (#5)

Reality, then, is posited as a continuous doing to, and undergoing from,

 

and has two firmly merged components: the 'doer', and his circumstances.
Man is very definitely a circumstantial being, i‘g., one whose doing to
always must be carried out in view of the circumstances. (#6) Otherwise
our ”real being” becomes a useless abstraction.

It has been shown that there are some problems involved in the
relativistic stance which seems to be entailed by the circumstantial
position, especially when considering the relation between concept and
perspective. And it has been indicated that Ortega seems to believe,
as a fact, that the individual perspective is the only way of formulating

universal truths, and of seizing reality. Therefore, he does not seem

 

(h5).For isolated illustrations, which simply point at a recurrent thesis
of their whole philosophic positions, to be constantly reinstated,
gj. W. Dilthey's ldeen uber eine Beschreibende und Zergliendernde
Psychologje (a rather 'old' forerunner of Gestaltian, Neo-Freudian,
and Existential psychologies, published in Spanish under the name
PsicologiayTeoria del Conocimiento, Ed. Fondo de Cultura Economica,
ngico, l9Sl) pp. l93-282; v. Dilthey‘s theories about the origin
and legitimacy of our belief in the reality of an external world
(same edition, pp. l33-l73); and J. Dewey's Demogracy and Education,
Macmillan Co., New York, l96l, pp. 29l-305 for the relation between
world and individual, and pp. 277-290 for a rejection of certain
dualisms inherent in naturalism and humanism.

 

 

 

(#6) Also, Si, Vl, 3A8 (i932) for a more developed reinstatement of tnis
view.

52
to be proclaiming such a statement without knowing that such a perspectivism
is an old-time honored view in the history of phil050phy.

Ortega's book, The Modern Theme contends that neither rationalism
nor relativism are satisfactory solutions to the circumstantial problem,
and that the “theme of our times” consists precisely of addressing the
difficulties raised by the factual coexistence of individual perspective
and historical circumstance. (#7) The 'modernity' of the Ortegan theme
is a twentieth century, rather than a traditional post-Cartesian modern-
ity. Neither pure reason nor pure biolOgical vitality are to be consider-
ed in lieu of the Ortegar philosophy of life, and in this sense The

Modern Theme is really a reaction against traditional 'modernity'.

 

Cultural values -- Egg subjective facts derived from vital functions --
do originate a body of ontological character which could be Subjected to
objective laws. The cultural function does transcend the merely biolOgical
notion of subjectivity. Hence the notion of 'transvitalism‘, as posited

by the Modern Theme. I'All cultural values are also subject to the laws

 

of life”. (#8) They transcend any possible dualism between vital
functions, and possible objective laws which govern cultural values.
Of course, the necessary premise is that the term 'life' ceases to
have a narrow biological connotation, in order to be interpreted in a

wider, biographical, light. it is therefore a ‘Spiritual' life, in the

 

(47).££- lV. “04. (1932); ll. 283. (l920l; Ill. '79. l6“. 159, (l923);
Vl, 3A8, 30L», 306, (I922); 3l2, (I923); also gj. The Mogej-flnrfgmg.

C. W. Daniel Company, London, l93l, especially pp, A], 60, 38, 7h_

(#8) The Modern Theme, pp. us-ua. Also Cf. ill, I69, (I923).

 

C.
a:

 

53

Continental European sense of the word. In a tone which is strongly
reminiscent of the Nietzschean protests, but not quite sharing the
basic irrationality of the Dionysian revolt, Ortega questions the
Socratic tendency to enforce ”the laws of reason” upon matters no less
important than reason itself, such as those of ‘life'. The belief that
'pure reason' was the real substance of the universe is a naive utOpia-
nism, completely and blindly obiivioustp the undeniable fact that reason
is nothing but ”a tiny island afloat on the sea of primeval vitality”. (M9)
IPerspectivism, then, seems to culminate in the conception that life
has to be liberated from the arbitrary dependence on pure reason, whkzh
the rationalist is trying to enforce: ”reason is merely a form and
function of life”.(SO) This concept is precisely the one referred to by

Ortega as vital reason.

 

Ratio-Vitalistic Stage. (l92h-l355).

The Modern Theme marks a transitional step between the phase we

 

have called 'perspectivistic', and Ortega's period of maturity, in which

his notion of vital reason reached full bloom. 'Vital Reason', as defined

 

above, is the leit motif of an essay published in I924, uncer the name of

 

”Neither Vitalism nor Rationalism”. While The Modern Theme points at

 

the serious difficulties posited by a strict rationalism, ”Neither Vi-
talism nor Rationalism” is a technically oriented account of the notion

of vital reason. The Specific difference between biological and philo-

 

(49) Ill, l76-l77, (I923); also 21. The Modern Theme, pp. 55-56 and Ill,
SAD-543 (I927). lhg_hodern Theme, DD. 57’53, lll, 177'l75. (l923)-

 

(50) lbid, p. 58.

5h

sophical Vitalism was attempted at this stage. (SI)

The Ortegan 'ratio-vitalism' is not of a ’bioIOgicaI’ type, nor is
it a philosophical kind of irrationalism, such as the one proposed by
some brands of intuitive thinking. The Ortegan thought does not exactly
run counter to the vital concerns of Bergson, Simmel, Spengler, or Dilthey,
and the expressions 'ratio-vitalism', 'vital reason', and 'historical
reason' -- as used by Ortega himself -- are rather convenient in the sense
that they seem to indicate a different tessitura of vitalistic import. (52)
From the Nietzschean violent condemnations of the Socratic 'spirit' through
the Bergsonian élan vital, seems to run an anti-rationalistic stream which
Ortega does not share. Ortega's explanation makes use of the fact that
his predecessors were identifying the term 'reason' with the more Specific
ones 'pure reason', 'abstract reason', etc., and, if on the one hand he
seems to agree with the contention that 'pure reason' was badly in need
of critical delimitations, on the other, he seems to contend that not all
the types of reason can be readily assimilated to that type. (53) In no
way could it be inferred that the ”failure of pure reason” necessarily
entails its total rejection from the philosophical or scientific realms.
Vital reason seems to have a teleological and ontological significance:
it seems to have the category of a reality, within a pluralistic collect-
ion of realities, and also the character of a factual presence which by

definition must have a sense of finality. It is a fact, he contends,

 

(SI) VI, I96, (l93h); where Ortega uses the expression 'ratio-vitalism'.
Also, cf. Concord and Liberty, w. w. Norton 5 Co. Inc., New York,
l9Q6, pp. lob ff.

 

(52) Ferrater Mora, Jose, 00. th., p.30.

6). Also, cf. Toward a Philosophy_of History, N, w. wortOn,
9‘” , p. Io3.

 

(53) VI. 23 (I93
i

New York,

that reason is a part of human life, and therefore an intrinsic component
of man's existence. To Ortega ‘vital reason' is a reality; a self-
evident reality, so simple that it cannot possibly be denied. The fact
tfiat:life demands reason is expressed by the Ortegan expression ‘life as
reason', and becomes synonimous with the concept 'vital reason'. The
assumption here is that human life is not an entity that is ’endowed with
reason', but an entity that must, necessarily, use reason. Even in the
cases of seemingly unreasonable behavior, it becomes impossible to rule
out 'vital reason', although it appears to be much easier to indicate
that pure reason is absent. Human action is characterized by the necessity
of rational account. ”No matter how thoughtlessly a man acts, in some
way or other he will always account for what he does. The way he does
it is quite immaterial.” (Sh)

Ortega also seems to be saying that man, by nature, is a creature
of circumstance and therefore must deal with the world. His life, then,
becomes a necessary interaction with the world, and such an interaction
presupposes the rendering of an account of its circumstantial character.
Such an account, nevertheless, does not have to be purely intellectual
one, in spite of the fact that it often has acquired such a character,
eSpecially in our age. A teleological conception of knowledge seems to
be revealed at this juncture, since Ortega appears to be implying that
there is no need to hyposthatize the formal qualities of epistemological

inquiry, per se, because knowledge must always be for a particular task.iSS)

 

 

(5h) IV, 58, (I929); VI, lo, (I936); v, 351+, (l9314);13_waf_t1—.a Philosophy
of History, p. I70.

I - .t . I ~ . o
(55) v, 8:. (1:133). grabs:_¢.SJ.a:~>.¢_r..§._st-I§.3.22.3312; (6’0 if“: *5 w me.
upon what to rely for ourooses of action).

56

Perhaps the social sciences have provided a more concrete version of the
rationale which seems to concern Ortega y Basset, since the futility
of knowledge per se could be easily seen by simply reflecting upon its
existential importance in terms of strict human necessity, individually
or collectively. Robert Lynd, the American sociologist, reflects the same
type of preoccupation. He is concerned with the same existential import
of knowledge, which in terms of human life seems to produce the Ortegan
problem:

The knowledge which the sophisticated experts possess in our

culture is growing at a rate far more rapid than the rate at

which it is being institutionalized in the habits of thought and
action of the mass of our population....As a culture we are
accumulating our disabilities and the resulting strains incident
to daily living at a rate faster than social legislation, educat-
ion, and all the agencies for 'reform' are managing to harness
our new knowledge in the reduction of these dissabilities. We

are becoming culturally illiterate faster than all these agencies

are managing to make us literate in the use of the potentialities

of the culture. (56)

There is a sense, then, in which ”to know” means ”to know how to
act”, individually or institutionally. By implication, the danger of
'pure reason' becomes one of knowledge for its own sake. Ortega seems
to believe that this 'hypostatic knowledge‘, is trying to pass a formal
reality for the real_gflg, namely the 'vital reality' -- that reality
to which all other realities must be referred in order to make ‘human
sense'. The problem of our times, and, by extension, the problem of

institutional life, becomes one of reconciling reason with life, since

pure reason seems to be moving away from the only reality which makes it

 

(S6) Lynd, Robert, figowledge_for What? Princeton University Press, hew
Jersey, I939, pp. lUB-IOB. The same quote is used again in Chapter
IV for a direct application to the Ortegan meaning of the term
'culture‘.

S7

'alive'. Otherwise, rational activity, per se, becomes both deceiving
and humanly inauthentic. Again, it becomes rather clear that Ortega is
making a case for the 'phiIOSOpher of...', as against the 'pure philo-
SOpher', if by the latter we understand the one devoted to 'reason',
schismatically and dramatically separated from practical activity.
Epistemology, as the maid of honor of the philosophical scene, seems to
be reminded again that the preoccupation with knowledge could even be-
come a sterile attempt, if left at the stage of analysis or Speculation:
Man is not therefore a rational animal, if this definition is
understood in the sense that being an animal is the genusgproximum
and being rational the differentia_§pecifica. But he is a rational
animal if this definition is understood in the sense that reason
emerges from human life. Descartes' principle Cogjto ergg sum

('I think, therefore i am') must be replaced by a more basic
principle: Cogito quia vivo ('I think because I live'). (57)

 

Vital reason then becomes a methodological concern within the
Ortegan scheme. But is must be understood that the method of vital
reason does not consist of a simple application of categories to an
external world, which thus becomes 'ordered'. In vain would one search
for such a pattern in Ortega. His empirical notion of vital reason as

a method cannot be based upon rules established more geometrico, and

 

the whole question seems to be one of definitional concern, rather than
categorial correspondence. Our own life provides us with the tools

for its own explanation, Living produces a feeling of insecurity, by
means of the only 'human' tool at our disposal: vital reason, as opposed
to 'pure reason‘. Thus Ortega constantly repeats that reason must be

conceived as functional in human existence, and that there is a difference

 

(S7) Ferrater, og.cit., p.AO. Also, cf, IV, 58 (I929), IV, 1&3, (1950);

V. 307-303 (I939); V. 53‘J (lbhl .

58

between simply ”having reason to use it”, and ”having the necessity to
bring reason into existence”, thus being forced to use it. (58) Part of
the nature of man is his necessity to be 'vitally rational'; the use of
reason, then, being not a privilege of the 'phiIOSOphical', or the
'scientific' glad, but rather an obligation of every human being. It
should be noted that the same concept could be phrased in terms of
”thinking in view of the circumstances”, since, by extension, Ortega seems
to be saying that man needs to know himself, and therefore he needs a
knowledge of the circumstantial world, or of the circumstantial life

into which he has been thrown. Ortega's essay Ideas_y Creencias (ideas
and Beliefs) is devoted, almost in its entirety, to the elucidation of
vital reason as a reality, and as a method. (59) An idea is a thought,
either derived from unexamined prOpositions, or from a rigorous systematic
attempt. Ideas, hence, may have varying degrees of truth, but such a
difference is only in degree, since we 'arrive', rightly or wrongly, at
such propositions. But there is anothlr type of interpretation of the
world, at which we do not 'arrive'; a type of interpretation which rather
seems to be a part of our own existence, so to speak. These existential
”ideas”, which are ”a part of us” are called 'beliefs' by Ortega: we gig
our beliefs, and they constitute the substance of our life. Our beliefs,

are not ideas that we hold, but ”ideas that we are”. We, then, tend to

 

(58) VI. 35l (l93zli Vl. 39'. (1942). IV. '08. (1930). IV. l08. (l930);
V: 307-308; (l933‘l939).

(59) V, 38l-409, U934). Also, Ecord and Libertj (PD. l8-l9), and Tower};
a Philosophy of Histogy, p. I7h.

 

 

S9

confuse them with reality, and hence we do nothing with beliefs aside

 

from simply being in them.

 

If many 'simple and elementary' assumptions may be called 'beliefs‘,
and if, at least, part of the educational enterprise consists of inducing
or transmitting knowledge, our ‘being our own beliefs' becomes a concept
which demands consideration. Some people believe, for example, that there
is a certain regularity in natural phenomena and some others have believed
that there was no such regularity.

It is for such reason that we take our beliefs to be ‘real', jgghfl
to be 'reality' itself, and this is why Ortega claims that beliefs are
the foundation of our life. What he seems to be saying, really, is that
reality is not discovered by us, nor is it proven by us. It has, rather,
the characteristics of an encounter; we flag it, and we find ourselves in
it. Again, such a contention would seem to be consistent with the
famous Ortegan aphoriSm that life is that ”strange reality, of which the
first thing that it is convenient to say is that it is the radical
reality, in the sense that all other realities have to be referred to
it, since the other realities, whether effective or assumed, have to
appear, in one way or another within the reality of life...” (60)

The 'educational' message here seems to be that ideas may prove to
be extremely important to us, but they cannot be really ‘radical' (ng.,
rooted) in terms of life, unless they cease to be ideas, and become

thoughts of the type that Ortega calls ‘beliefs'.

 

(60) VI, l3, (l9hl-l9h6); also published in English as a part of the
volume Philosophy and History, Oxford University Press, 1935.

 

O‘\
(3

There seems to be, then, a certain measure of commitment, which is
precisely the efficient cause of making ideas functional, humanly speak-
ing. And perhaps this is one of the most important implications of
‘vital reason' as a method: the ability to change informative ideas,
ex datis, into fonmative beliefs, ex principiis, for the sake of ‘real‘
cultural awareness. The ensuing chapters will attempt to show the importance

of this conversion in terms of educational matters.

CHAPTER IV

ORTEGA'S UNIVERSITY: A 'VITAL' CONCERN

The Ortegan educational theory can be found in the gflgsion of

the University which is a collectIOn of notes for a lecture delivered

 

to Spanish university students in l930. Some parts of it are so sketchy
that the only clear suggestion about them seems to be the conjecture
that Ortega simply jotted them down as a reminder of an aspect which,
apparently, was to be verbally developed, or actually expanded, at the
time of delivering the Speech. (6I)

As pointed out in the preceding chapters, it is difficult to
analyze Ortega's educational theory without relating it to the reSt
of his phiIOSOphical system. The present chapter will make use of the

above mentioned essay, which as stated above, is essentially synOptic

 

(6|) Aside from BioIOQia y Pedagogia it has been pointed out previously
that the Ortegan educational theory can be found in a rather concise
essay which bears the name of fljssion of the University, and which,
for the purposes of this dissertation, was studied in three sources:
(i) volume IV of the Cgmplete Works (Obras Completes); pp. 3Il-353
(I930); (ii) second part of the ggpk of Missions (Libro de las Mi-
siones), pp. 6l-I30; and (iii) the English translation, published
in l9hh by Princeton University Press, with an introduction by Howard
Lee Nostrand (pp. 32-99). For the purposes of this dissertation,
the Spanish original was preferred, as it appears in El Libro de
las Misiones. However, when the English rendering was convenient,
i.e., when the conceptual body of certain references could be used
directly, without any need for further clarification, the Nostrand
translation was quoted by page number, according to the I9hh edition.
Thus, all references identified by the Spanish term 'Misidn' are
indicative of the fact that the writer is using his own translation
of the original, and all references to the Nostrand translation are
to be distinguished from the former by the use of the English term
‘Mission‘. References to the Obras Completes have been totally
unwitted, in order to avoid further complication.

 

 

 

 

 

 

62

and which therefore does not pretend to constitute a treatise on education-
al philosophy. Given this condition the author will attempt to make an
expanded analysis of the concept of 'life' as it relates to certain ideal-
istic and phneomenological positions, and to the underlying assumptions
which support the conceptual structure of the Mission. An initial reference
will also be made to group of philOSOphies which will be defined as 'phi-
losophies of life', to be discussed in Chapter V, and to be regarded by the
author as the main historical sources for the philosophical movements now
known as ”existentialistic”.

It should be repeated, then, beforehand, that (i) Ortega is address-
ing himself to Spanish, and, by extension to certain universities pattern-
ed after the European institutions of higher education, and (ii) that
Ortega mostly discusses highly specialized institutions, as is the case
with most Latin American colleges and universities. it should also be
noted, on the other hand, that the present paper will make no attempt

to repeat or summarize all of the ideas contained in the fljssion of the

 

University, but rather will try to relate such ideas with the outlined
presentation of the most outstanding views of Ortega on knowledge, reality,
and value.

The Ortegan case for higher education could loosely be called
a defense of general, or liberal education, in the customary sense of
those terms, 145., as they seem to be used, most generally, in the
”educational jargon”. Enough has been said in a multiplicity of sources,
good and bad, about the liberating effects of humanistic education, the
generalities, or universalities, of such an approach, the ”human need"l

for liberal instruction, and about the “who?n :nan'l both in oarticular and

63
in general. Therefore, this chapter will make no attempt to repeat these

concepts which already have been used and abused, ad nauseam. lts

 

purpose will be one of merely trying to show the connections between

general education and the Ortegan pgnsamiento.

 

Ortega initiates his study by making a series of interesting con-
siderations about 'change‘. A much battered-about notion in the education—
al world of today, 'change' seems to be an extremely vague concept which
is oftentimes carelessly applied to everything ‘educational', from learn-
ing theories to administrative strategies. With astonishing frequency one
hears about 'change' as applied to schools and their curricula, cultures
and subcultures, developmental and under-deveIOpmental situations, and
evolutionary schemes. Curriculum change is defined as social change;
confused devel0pmental and evolutionary notions are loosely applied to
schools, which in turn are supposed to ”focus on change”. The profes-
sional world seems to have been invaded by a multiplicity of legans, of
which perhaps learnirg as Ughaggg in behavior”, or the socio-scientific
view that the educational function is one in which the heritage is to
be maintained, and at the same time, Shanggg, are two of the most
outstanding. in the meantime few scholars have bothered to define what
they mean by ‘change', and as in any other field, it was to be expected
that a point would be reached in which the over-used tenn would become,
on the one hand, widely used, and, on the other, laden with all kinds of
preconceived, unexamined value.

If by 'change', on the contrary, we mean a completely neutral notion,
which implies nothing but a difference through time in the ObJCCt to

which it is applied, we may be ready to reflect upon Urtega's remarks. 15"
(62) Mac ivcr, Rm, 5C"$.L¢.’~ii Its Safestw 30.9..Cfi791‘1tsé. R- "Loon, “W"
Smith, New York, lSJi, On. BOB-“vb.

 

6h

One thing is the need to change, another is change itself. Contrary to
many misconceptions which see change itself as desirable, or laden with
value, or which would attempt to induce change without a sufficient exa-
mination of the complex of forces present from the first within a given
situation, Ortega claims that change in higher education cannot be reduced
to a simple correction of abuses. This is the difference between change
at the symptomatic level and other kinds of change, and this is precisely
the great mistake made by pseudo enlightened institutions trying to
induce change without the preceding distinction. Therefore 'change‘ is
not a simple (or complex) administrative problem; there is more to change
in a university than meets the eye. And the ”more” is precisely the subject-
matter of Ortega's first chapter in the Mission. If the notion of change
remains symptomatically isolated, i.e., reduced to a mere correction of
abuses, there is no recognition of other kinds of change, nor of the
real needs for such a change, aside from the superficial ones. Ortega
claims that a reform (as change) is always a creation of new usages:
The term 'abuse' always stands for a concept of little importance.
Because they are either 'abuses' in the more natural sense of the
word, i.e., isolated, and infrequent cases of misuse of the good
usages, or they are so frequent, persistent and tolerated 'abuses',
that they cease to be such. In the first case an automatic correct-
ion is inevitable, and in the second any attempt to correct them
would be a vain one, since their frequency and naturalness would
indicate that they are not anomalies, but rather the inevitable
result of the 'usages' which would be bad. (63)
It is, then, the notion of 'misuse', or that of the 'bad usage',

rather than the abuse, what needs to be looked at. A clear symptom '

which would seem to indicate the appropriateness of the constitutive

 

(63) Misio’n, p. 62.

05

uses in any institution is the fact that it can withstand a fairly intensive

amount of 'abuse', without breaking down, in the same manner in which

a healthy person withstands certain excesses. And the good usages can-

not be constituted in any corporate entity if its function or service

(mission) has not been determined with all rigor.
The root of the university reform resides in the accurate
determination of its function. All the changes, reforms, and
alterations, and all 'patching and touching-up', not really based
upon the prior, energetic, and clear revision... of the problem
of function... are simply useless lamentations of a defeated
amorous episode. (6h)

Ortega is not simply stating a truistic ”sense of purpose” as

the sine qua non of institutional phil050phy. His view is grounded

 

precisely on the 'vital‘ notions anticipated in the preceding chapter,
and reveals an account of 'life‘ which is essentially saturated with
philosophical anthropology, on the one hand, and deeply concerned with
the problem of human existence, on the other. in order to understand
the Ortegan conception of function, 'mission', or purpose (as ggengké)
it is necessary to expand the description of 'life' which appears in
Chapter ll, within the general context of idealism.

It should be noted at this point that Ortega‘s initiation as a
phil050pher was highly idealistic, and Neo-Kantian. The philOSOphico-
anthropological case made by Ortega in favor of vitally functional
”general education” seems to reveal that he gradually transformed pure
idealism, to the point of fully rejecting it at the climactic point of
his career. The Ortegan EEDEEWLEDEQ concedes merit to the idealistic
thesis that the Subject must be Submerged amidst a world of existential

objects, in order to be able to 'know' about them. In this sense, Ortega

_.—- ._----.—..

 

(6") 19.9. p.

(3\
w

66
seems to believe that man -- ua-subject -- is the mea5ure of all things,
because the only way of situating himself in any position of knowing,
feeling, and 'living', is by attempting to establish a reference to the
circumstantial world, in terms of egocentric consciousness. There is a
point in which everything that could be known, felt, or 'lived' in the
world, has to be resolved from an internal and hence 'subjective'
viewpoint. There is no denying that ”not being”, LLE., 'Cying', posits

a situation in which there is no more world for the subject which vitally

 

confronts the question. Life, for others, and 'existence', for other
entities, can proceed, but the l, gua subject confronted with the ine-
vitability of egocentric necessity, will be no more, and hence, as far

as the subject is concerned, the world is no more. Therefore, the

 

surrounding world -- at least in terms of what the subject can know,
feel, or sense, about it, and in terms of the meaningfulness of confronting
a possible external reality (which after all is only an arbitrary one,
since there is no dualistic ”inner and outer world” for Ortega) -- can-
not be independent of the self, ggg subject of consciousness or carrier
of cognitive capability.

Such a mode of thought, which Ortega calls a ”Cartesian tradition”,
the culmination of which he sees in an extreme and improper manner in
the work of Edmond Husserl, cannot be made the center of all experiential
relationships. If, on the one hand, the subject is incapable of establish-
ing meaningful references to the external world it should be realized
that it becomes also impossible to construct any meaningful relation in
terms of the “self apart from the world”, in this case 'world’ mean-
ing the surrounding complex of objects, forces, and relationships, as in

the German term umweit, The self, or subject, is never alone, but

67

always lg” £25, and with the world: doing something with it, and to it.

The subject becomes inseparable from the world, just as the world cannot
be, except artificially, detached from the Subject. This pathetic
circularity, about whose IOgical difficulties Ortega does not seem to

care, is a curious dialectic concept. On the one hand it is strongly
reminiscent of certain brands of pragmatic thought -- as in John Dewey--
and on the other, suggests a striking similarity to the notion of 'Man-
in-the-World' -- as Dasein -- which constitutes one of the main differences
between the Heideggerian Denken, and the pure Husserlian theory of

monadic egocentrism.

The Ortegan recognition that the subject needs the world, in
order to say that hg_i§ at all, seems to be the basis of his whole
'vital' construct. in this sense, the true and primordial reality is
that of the self with the world, and this is precisely the concept which
he calls 'radical reality'. He uses the term 'radical’ in its originary
sense of rootedness. Ortega, then, does not Seem to be restricted to a
dualistic conception of world and individual -- object and subject --
but rather seems to expand the 'vital' concern to a composite, integrat-
ed, and radical reality. 'Self' and 'world' are correlative terms which
mutually implicate each other, as a curved line is convex from one point
of view, and concave from another. The reality of subjective life and
its external world, the doing with and to the surrounding objects, and
the doing of those seemingly 'external objects' to the Subject is the
phenomenon which he calls ‘life'. What man does with the surrounding
objects is to live with them, and the 'radical reality' is an activity,

rather than a 'being' in the ”armenidean sense.

It can be seen, then, that according to Ortega, there is no priority
of an 'objectival' world, such as the one in which -- very loosely -- it
is Said that the realist believes in. On the other hand, there is no
priority of the subject in terms of the surrounding world. We find
thus a dynamic doing to, and undergoing from, a circumstantial world;
an essentially dialectic, or activistic, notion which embodies nothing
less than ”...that rooted reality which we call ’life'”. This is why,
when he is concerned with the difference between 'culture' and 'science',
as they relate with 'profession' and 'science', for university life,
Ortega maintains that culture is the system of vital ideas which each
age possesses; or even better yet: ”...the system of ideas by which the
age lives...U (65) The basis for his distinction between the applied
science of the professional and the 'science' of the scientist -- insofar
as he can be distinguished from his professional aspect -- becomes clearer
upon an examination of the Ortegan idea of 'life' as the ontological
backbone:

The reality we are wont to refer to as 'human life', your life

and the next fellow's, is something quite remote from biology,

the science of organisms. biology, like any other science, is

no more than one occupation truest meaning of the word life is

not biological but biographical, and that is the meaning it has

always had in the language of the peOple. It means the total-

ity of what we do and what we are -- that formidable business,

which every man must exercise on his own, of maintaining a course

among the beings of the world. 'To live' is, in fact, to have

dealings with thw world: to address oneself to it, exert oneself
in it, and occupy oneself with it. (on)

 

(65) Missigg, p. 8|.

(66) lbid. p. 52. To be expanded in Chapter Vi.

-—.—-

Perhaps the following passage is more familiar to what seems to
be the widely shared Anglo-Saxon image of 'exiStentialism‘ as a philo-
sophical school:

The whole difficulty of the matter is that life is not given

us ready made. Like it or not, we must go along from inStant to
instant, deciding for ourselves. At each moment it is necessary
to make up our minds what we are going to do next: the life of man
is an ever recurrent problem. in order to decide at one instant
what he is going to do or to be at the next, man is compelled

to form a plan of some sort, however simple or puerile it may be.
It is not that he ought to make a plan. There is simply no
possible life, sublime or mean, wise or stupid, which is not
essentially characterized by its proceeding with reference to

some plan. Even to abandon our life to chance, in a moment of des-
pair, is to make a plan. Every human being, perforce, picks his
way through life. (67)

It should be noted, though, that for Ortega, the vast majority
of the convictions, or ideas, which force man to make an intellectual
interpretation of the world around him and his conduct in it, are not
fabricated by the individual, but simply received by him from his historical
environment,,L;g., his ”times”. In this sense, he departs from the
generalized idea that an existential or 'vital' phiIOSOphy must contend
that the history of man can give no answers to the nature of his being,
because history is nothing but the sum total of individual decisions
of other people. His refutation of the solipsiStic predicament in
idealism ought to suffice to dismiss such an interpretation. Contrary
to the opinion that nothing about the past can conclusively guide for the
future, Ortega contends that:

Naturally, any age presents very diSparate systems of convictions.

Some are a drossy residue of other times. But there is always

a system of live ideas which represent the superior level of the

age, a system which is essentially characteristic of its times and
this system is the culture of the age. He who lives at a lower level

on archaic ideas, condemns himself to a lower life, more difficult,
toilsome, unrefined....ln our age, the cortent of culture ctmes

)

m--.--.—.‘ --_ - - -t .- a..- ‘ _. ._ _ - .‘ .. -. - -.- . —. “at-a h“

(67) lbid., p. 5:. To be repeated and discussec in ,napter

7O

largerly from science. But our discussion suffices to indicate

that culture is not science. The content of culture, though

it is being made in the field of science more than elsewhere,

is not scientific fact but rather a vital faith, a conviction

characteristic of our times. (68)

The difference between 'closed idealism' or 'subjectivism',
and the Ortegan philosophico-anthropological conception of man and
society, can be seen more clearly if our analysis of the 'vital' ontology
is pursued somewhat further. The point of departure for the Ortegan
metaphysics of vital reason is based upon the contention that realism
is more than a thesis; it is an attitude. In such an attitutde it is
assumed that true reality is to be found in things themselves, and
hence a 'real being' means a being by itself, intrinsically independent
of the egocentric notion of self. But this position -- which seems to
have haunted the philosophical realm during centuries of Speculative act-
ivity -- is not exempted from certain weaknesses, which could be reveal-
ed by critical examination. Ortega claims that from Descartes through
Husserl, philosophy has maintained a new thesis which has been cultivated
in opposition to 'realism', and which has the merit that l hope to have
shown.

In an extremely oversimplified form, it has been shown how Ortega
resolves the 'idealism-realism' conflict, and how he is led to the
contention that life is the only radical reality. Perhaps it becomes
necessary to expand the discussion into a further analysis of the most
refined forms of subjectivism, in order to see other main elements in

the Ortegan rejection. Specific reference is made here to the Husserlian

concept of 'pure phenomenology', since it typifies the culmination of

 

(66) Mission, pp. 83-8H. Repeated and diSCUSSed further in Chapter Jl.

7]

the trend which most people know as 'subiective idealism'.

 

Husserlian phenomenol0gy does not deal with experiences or ideas
of an ”empirical subject”, but rather claims to have found a solution
to the epistemOIOgical problems in the 'lived experiences' (erlebnis)
of pure consciousness. This step is precisely the one which Ortega
rejects, on the grounds that the Husserlian phenomenOIOgy avoids metaphysics
by resorting to a new type of speculation, umich is equally metaphysical,
and which resides mostly in the conception of 'consciousness'. Ortega
seems to equate the latter with'thought‘, and defines it as an entity
which not only receives what is given to it, but which also contributes
with an act of putting-forth a statement that claims to be true, and
also existent. The Husserlian phenomenOIOgy follows this ”contributing
act” by a second one, which consists of the famous epokhe, or 'pheno-
menOIOgical reduction', and which places the first act 'as enclosed
within brackets', supposedly ”laying bare” the object of c09nition,
and discarding at the same time all prior preconceptions about such an
object. (69) According to Ortega, this step is neither clear nor easy
to understand, because there is no consciousness when the act is 'lived'.
The subject faces nothing besides what is ”seen“, or ”thought” by him,
and therefore he does not meet the ”seeing”, or the ”thinking”. This
means that the experienced phenomenon is not identical with "consciousness”,

but rather constitutes an entity similar to a co-existential composite

 

(69) More detailed reference is made in Chapter Vll to phenomenology
as a method, and to the literature which thoroughly describes
its complexity. This notion is a ”must”, in order to understand
the underlying assumptions and general trends of the intricate
movement now known as 'existentialism', and of the psychological
schools which, in varying degrees, are just beginning to have
a great impact upon educational thought in the English-speaking
world.

72

of the subject with the object. Hence, the subject can only refer
to consciousness when he realizes that 'something' has been seen, in

the immediately preceeding moment, but not at the precise instant of

 

seeing it. (70) Therefore the consciousness of a lived experience

is not a ”pure presence” of life, but rather an object of reflection.
The reduction, or abstention, is practiced only upon an object which,
really, is nothing but the remembrance of a former vision. And the
phenomenological reduction is a “post-act”, which, in actuality, is
another act: the placing into brackets of that which was a former act.
And not even during this second act does the subject practice the
famous abstention: the act is simply ‘lived' and therefore is not
identical with ”consciousness”, Egg ulterior reflection about an ideal
object. Therefore, Ortega contends, the so-called phenomenOIOgical
reduction can only be practiced upon remembrances of acts, and not, in
a strict sense, upon lived acts. Pure consciousness is simply the
result of a mental operation performed by the subject, i¢£., an intellectual
operation or hypothesis, once all the necessary lived experiences (as
erlebnis) have been reduced. Ergg, pure consciousness is not reality;
the phenomenological reduction, ggg reality, is an impossible task,
because an act, to Ortega, means the exercise of actuality. When the

concept 'to be' is conceived, it has to be regarded as 'to be somethiflg'.

 

it must be referred to its actual significance, i.e., to the something
that it is now: and ergo as a pure presence. And since between the act
and the phenomenolOgical reduction of such an act, time has elapsed, a

new element -- i.e., 'time' -- has to be considered as coming into being. (7l)

 

w-——.

(70), (7i) gj. comparison between Ortega and bergson in Chapter iv.

73

This new element, or ”time” as ”the form of human life”, gives full meaning
to lived experience, and therefore, it could be said that the subject

does not meet pure consciousness, nor ”pure self”, nor I'reduced lived
experiences”, but that all those entities are nothing but the result of

a mental manipulation which the subject performs with his lived, past

acts. (72) Such a mental manipulation is precisely the opposite of what
Ortega kndws as 'reality'. To the essence of human acts simply correSponds
the action of "living them”, since a reflection upon them cannot be effect-
ed without presupposing the performance of another act, which is not pre-
cisely carried-out simultaneously with the lived experience. Ortega's

case here seems to be suggesting that the phenomenol09ical reductions

of the Husserlian kind are precisely based upon radically false inter-
pretations of what he calls the 'primary reality', and if he is going

to be called an existentialist phil050pher, he certainly cannot be a
Husserlian one, ontically Speaking. The epistemological implication
follows rather easily: the truth, Ortega seems to be thinking, is that

the subject lives the acts, and that these are 'intentional'; something

is seen, thought, or wanted in terms of a given object. Here he follows
Brentano, rather than Husserl, in spite of the fact that 'intentionality'
also seems to be a cardinal factor in the systematic approach of the
latter. The difference is that ”the sanething” which is found by the
Subject, and which is ”out there”, cannot be anything ideal in a formal
sense, but rathzr has to be SOmething real and effective, hence not

requiring any reduction or abstention. That ”something” is life.

 

(72) Ej. conparison between Ortega anc dergson in Chapter EV.

lll find myself in life”, Ortega repeats very often, thus implying
within the above context that, when thinking deeply about the phenome-
nological reduction, one cannot help discovering that the very idea of
‘pure consciousness‘ discloses its ultimate erroneous root by placing our
genuine reality beyond it. The 'truth', to Ortega, is that we are

installed, not in consciousness, since in stricto sensu there is no such

 

thing as consciousness, but in that ”radical reality which is life”.

These considerations, added to those discussed in Chapter ll,
ought to equip the reader to go back to the Ortegan account of the
mission of higher education.

Concerning the university, Ortega's radical change, or reform, must
begin with the subject, 1‘5., the ordinary student; the student is really
the nucleus of the institution. The university should offer only those
courses which a good, O'dinary student, can really learn. Ortega's

raison d'etre for the university becomes then transparent, and his themes

 

of life and perSpectivism are echoed by his teleological idea of higwer
education:

1. We must pick out that which appears as strictly necessary
for the life of the man who is now a student. Life, with
its inexorable requirements, is the criterion that should
guide this first stroke of the pruning knife.

2. What remains, having been judged strictly necessary, must be
further reduced to what the student can really learn with
thoroughness and understanding. (73)

Thus, by applying the above principles, Ortega prOposes that the
university should primarily consist, of the higher education which twe
ordinary man should receive. The basic idea is to make a 'cultured
person',_L;g:, a Subject brought up to the cultural demand of his tines.

__

(73) Mission, p. 72. This topic '9 awain discussed in Chapter J; hit

 

”-

directly applied to education.

In terms of an ”ordinary man”, this implies a general education. Besides,
the ordinary man should become a good professional, igg., a practitioner
of applied science, rather than a scientist proper, because science is not
ultimately reduced to laboratory practice, nor does it constitute by
itself the sole task of learning about cultural life. In its proper
and 'authentic' sense, science is research and investigation, and it
must be admitted that the ordinary practice of the professional is not
'investigation' in such an abstracted sense,_L;g., the problem solving
activity embodied by pure science.

In this manner, the relation between reason and life, to which
several allusions were made in Chapter III, enters the picture. The
main idea, of course, is that reason cannot, and must not, substitute
for life. Reason is only a form and a function of life, and pure
reason has to give grounds to vital reason, if we want to transcend
the limitations of the former, thus allowing for its location, mobility
and transformation. In other words, phiiOSOphy needs to discard its
utopian character, by avoiding the conversion of an horizon which should
and must be wide, into a stratified conception of the world. The
conversion of world into 'horizon' does not detract anything of reality
from the former; it simply refers it to the living Subject, whose world

does exist. This is the only way to provide the world with a vital

 

dimension, and such should be the task of the university, iégé, to have
the students formed, and not simply in-formed, in their functional dimen-
sion, as it is required by the ”theme of our times”. At this point it
Should be recalled that the modern theme could be summarized in terms

of a conversion of pure reason into vital reason, and thus phiIOSOphy

in general -- and also 'tne philosophy’ of the university -- snould be

the systematic realization of such a task. Here we have the theme of life
with a new variation: the 'radicainess' of life should not be interpreted
as exclusivity, nor even as the 'most important‘ task to be effected.
'Radical' is a term which Ortega uses in complete consistency with its
etymological significance. He is talking about a reality in which all

other possible realities, formal and material, haye to be rooted. The

 

reality of the surrounding world, or that of the subject, are to be
found in life, as moments of its continuous becoming. In his work History
as a System Ortega persistently maintains this thesis. Reality, as Such,

is constituted by the life of the subject, and to be real means, precisely,

 

to be rooted in life, Since such a concept is the obligatory point of

 

reference for any other conceivable realities, even if the Subject admits
that the 'real things' in themselves may transcend, in some way, his own
life. In other words, the theme of life returns here with full orchestral
force, by loudly and firmly restating that subjective life is the very
premise for any notion, of reality. 'Reality', whatever it Should mean,
becomes intelligible only by referring it to subjective life, and this
means that only within Such a kind of life can the term 'reai’ be compre.-

hended in all its radicalness and ultimate significance.

 

It should not be overlooked, though, that nay mention of 'some—
thing real“, and any derivation of a moment of reality from life, still
presupposes the solution of the problematic relation between liifihflflg
991353. In this sense, then, to say that the subject is an ingredient of
reality does not mean that he is a part of those real entities, but
rather that their participation in subjective life, and their rootedness
in it, are the only relations that can give meaning to their 'reality'.

'Reality', then, must also be understood, from the persoectiviStic view—

77

point of the subject, as a dimension and character of that which is
real. And even in the case that 'the real thing’ were to be posited

as prior, superior, or transcendental in terms of subjective life, or
even as the originative foundation of individual life; such conceptions
of 'the real' do not alter the fact that their reality proper has to be
rooted in subjective life. If those types of reality have been found in
subjective life, as far as the subject is concerned, they must be
'radically' referred to it.

It is hOped that the above considerations will render more
intelligible the following concepts, which are also basic for an under-
standing of the Ortegan university.

The contention that higher instruction Should consist primarily
of the teaching of learned professions, and scientific research, only
insofar as it will be devoted to prepare future investigators, seems to
be derived, not only from the already stated vitalistic concerns, but
also from certain historical circumstances. In effect, one of the first
startling ideas of the book is the Ortegan contempt for “...the notorious
lack of scientific callings and aptitude for research...? which ”marks his
race”. This view requires only a Slight amount of further clarification,
Since it is a well-known fact that, in the Opinion of many a scholarly
mind, Spain and Latin America have not excelled in philOSOphy and science,
however well as these ethnic and geographical areas seem to have done in
the fields of literature and the arts. The Ortegan opinion, though, should
not be interpreted as a dogmatic belief in such a lack of aptitude, in
terms of inherent ”human nature”, but rather as a socio-political
criticism which includes the place of the university within the cuitural

matrix. At the same tire, the criticism also seems to include the

78

emphasis on science and research which some institutions were only
beginning to Show in the early thirties. Ortega seems to be attempting

a transcendence of the Stage of professionalism and research. He suggests
that if the prOgrams of instruction are scrutinized more closely -—especial-

ly in Spanish and Latin American universities -- it would be discovered

that most universities nearly always require some kind of 'basic liberal

program” from their students:

...the student is nearly always required, apart from his
professional apprenticeship and his research, to take some
courses of a general character --philosophy, history....lt
takes no great acumen to reCOgnize in this requirement the last,
miserable residue of something more imposing and more meaningful.
The symptom that something is a residue -- whether in biology

or history -- is that we do not perceive why it is with us. In
its present form, it serves no end at all; one must trace it back
to some other age of its evolution in order to find whole and
active what exists today only as a residual stump. (7h)

Q

Ortega's main argument in favor of general education seems
to be a historical one. He contends that a revision of the medieval
university could clearly Show that the so-called 'liberal courses‘,
’general education courses', or 'general culture courses' —- as they
are generally called in Latin American universities, sometimes with
the variation: 'humanistic curriculum‘ -- are nothing but the meager,
humble remains of a universal activity, which in the Middle Ages
constituted the whole of higher education:

The medieval university did no research (which does not mean

to say that no research was done in the Middle Ages). It was

very little concerned with professions. Everything was rather
‘general culture‘ -- theology, philosophy, arts. (75)

 

(7h) flission, op. Sh-SS,

(7S) Hisi5n, p. 7%.

79

Ortega attacks the absurdity of the term ‘general culture‘ by
saying that the philistinism of such an expression reveals its lack of
sincerity, because ‘culture‘ -- as referred to the human mind, and 'not

to cattle or grain‘ -- cannot be anything but_general. A person cannot

 

be ’culta', lég., cultivated in the sense of being generally aware of his
individual and collective historical reality, or of his place within
the demand of the times, only in an isolated discipline. To be ‘culto‘
in a given profession means rather to be ”learned in a particular
discipline”, and when an expression such as 'general culture‘ is used,
the intention is declared of having the student receive some ornamental
and vaguely educative knowledge about his character and intelligence.
Ortega claims that for such a vague purpose, which only would have
meaning in terms of psychologistic learning theory, any discipline is
as good as another, therefore suggesting a possible differentiation
between learning and knowledge, when applied to the system of human
acts to be performed by the university.

At this point, the neo-Kantian beginnings of Ortega could per-
haps explain such a contention, since a similar differentiation between

learning and knowledge can be found In the_§[jtigue of Pure Reason:

 

I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition,
objectively considered, all COgnition is, from a subjective
point of view, either historical or rational. Historical
cognition is c09nitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex prin-
cipiis. Whatever may be the original source of COgnition,
it is, in relation to the person who possesses it, merely
historical, he knows only what has been given him from
another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated

by direct experience or by instruction.... ...thus the
person who has learned a system of phiIOSOphy...,although
he has perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions
and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the
divisions that have been made of the system, he possesses
really no more than a historical knowledge...,he knows

what has been told him, his judgments are only those which

 

80

he has received from his teachers....He has formed his
mind on another's; but the imitative faculty is not the
productive. Rational cognitions which are objective,

that is, which have their source in reason, can be so
termed from a subjective point of view, only when they
have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources
of reason, that is, from principles, it is in this way
alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has
been already learned, can Spring up in the mind. A
cognition may be objectively philosOphical and subjectively
historical -- as is the case with the majority of scholars
and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their sys-
tem, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their
lives. (76)

We seem to be, then, before a sharp distinction between the

ex datis dimension of subjective learning, and the ex principiis sig-

 

nificance of subjective knowledge. This is hardly the place to attempt
historico-causal connections regarding such a tenet, but the essential
content of the Kantian differentiation alluded to at least seems to
partake in the methodological division which has constituted a sizable
portion of the educational theories which we have inherited since the
times of Rousseau explicitly, and even from the pre-Socratic world
implicitly. Indeed, it seems to be clear that Emile was compelled to

learn by himself, to use his own reason and not that of others, and to

4-‘\-

avoid the use of ”... a memory overburdened with undigested knowledge.... l//}
Pestalozzi claims to have learned to know the natural relation in whkzh

real knowledge stands to book knowledge, and Herbart insists on the
contention that the work of his moral education is not by any means

to develop a certain external mode of action but rather the ex principiis

 

insight, together with the correSponding volition in the mind of the

 

(76) Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Transl., by J.MD. Meiklejohn,
Henry G. Bonn, York St., Covent Garden, London, l855.

 

(77) Rousseau, J. Jacques, Emile, Everyman's Library, London, l950, pp.
167, if.

81

pupil. (78) The 'digested knowledge' concept of education incorporated
into the active individual and social self has also been inherited and
further developed by Froebel and Dewey.

Whitehead's Ajms of Education also devotes a considerable number
of pages to the 'informative 3;. formative' distinction, and to show
that, in his view, the purpose of education is not a limited, immanent
concentration of subject matter, but the knowledge of all possible
things, not only for the sake of learning them, but rather in terms
of a formative capacity -- which he calls 'wisdom' -- for'life'.
Whitehead defines 'life' as a ”struggle for meaning”. in order to
get at this 'meaning', the priority of informative material has to be
eventually sacrificed for the sake of formative wisdom. Whitehead also
contends that the culture should primarily be interpreted as an entity
which stimulates an activity of mind, again with the purpose of inter-
preting the puzzling challenge of a surrounding -- or circumstantial --
world. The main aim of education seems to be a merciless war against
dead information, for the sake of a formative body of instrumental powers,
which, ex princlpjis, should be used to decipher a collection of facts
which must be understood, and which are ”out there” whether we like it
or not. This is why Whitehead contends that the specialized courses
utilize activity, and that education ought to include style, since
style is strictly our way of looking at life, and at the world. Maintain-
ing the Aristotelian notion that the art of life must be comprehended,

(78) Pestalozzi, J.H., How Gertrude Teaches her Children, G. Allen 8
Unwin, London, l9lS, pp. 26, If.
Herbart, K. J., Science of Education, D.C. Heath, Boston, l896,
pp. 109.31}

82

and the human potentiality must be aided so it can be expressed in terms
of agreement with the actual environment, Whitehead also contends that
extreme specialization, per se, is to be avoided. The world is an all-
embracing, manifold collection of diverse experiences. (79) Hence,

the essential need is for a cognitively grounded system of general
education. (80) in fact education -- like culture -- cannot be anything
but 'general', as Ortega puts it, because:

Life is a chaos, a wild jungle, a great confusion. Man

gets lost in it. But his mind reacts to such a ship-

wrecking sensation of loss: he works in order to find

ways and paths that would lead him out of the confusion

(this is why at the beginning of all cultures a term had

to be created as a conveyor of the concept of 'way', 'road'

or ‘path' -- the odos and methodos of the Greek mind; the

the tao and 52 of the Chinese; the 'path' and 'vehicle' of the
Hindus; these'ways' hopefully should lead into firm and

clear ideas about the universe, and to positive convictions
about the circumstantial world. The conjoint result, the
system of those convictions, is the sense of the term 'culture‘;
thus meaning something entirely different than ornamental
'education'. Culture is that entity which saves man from

a total wreck, it is the only resource which allows man to
live a life other than a senseless tragedy or a radical
debasement. (8i)

Conceivably, the above paragraph is using the expression 'totai
wreck' as synonymous with loss of identity, the term 'radical' in the
sense of rootedness, and 'debasement‘ as dehumanization, or retrOgression
in terms of the human condition. The 'cultural' signifcance of the air-
cumstantial moment is then historical in the Ortegan sense (and not in the

Kantian one that was used in the quoted paragraph).

 

(79) Whitehead, A.N., The films of Education, Mentor Books, New Fmeriran
Library, N.Y., 3963.

(80) This thesis should not be confused with the ”need to Specialize”
in a curriculum especially designed for a broad culture, wh ch is a
problem typical of Whitehead‘s aims.

 

(8i) flision, p. 75. gj. Chapter UI for further discussion and reinte-
gration into the Ortegan theory of higher education.

83

It has been described in Chapter III, that, co-substantially,
man belongs to a given generation, and every generation places itself, not
simply anywhere, but rather precisely upon the fonmer generation. This
means that each epoch makes it imperative to live at the ”height of the
times", and more specifically yet at the height of the ideas of the
times: (82)

Culture is the vital system of ideas pertaining to each

time. It does not matter if those ideas are not, either

fully or partially, scientific ideas. Culture is not

science. it is a characteristic of our present culture

that a great portion of its contents does come from the

sciences; but this was not the case with other cultures,

nor is it contended that ours must exhibit such a re-

lationship with the sciences in the same measure as now

appears to be the case....

The contemporary university has complicated enormously

its professional teachings if compared to those presented

by the medieval institutions of higher education, and

thus research has been added with an almost complete re-

moval of cultural learning and transmission. Obviously

this is an atrocity. (83)

Of course, Ortega is not advocating a return to the medieval
universities as such, but rather suggesting that the medieval university
perhaps had a juster conception of its mission, or function, in terms
of the 'height of its times', than our universities do today. it should
also be added that the notion that general education is of practical-
ly no use, so long as it is maintained with its character of a 'residual

stump', does not seem to be a naive conception either. Ortega is

simply saying that it is not necessary to investigate a great deal to

 

(82) As stated in the Modern Theme; which was formerly described as the
transition between 'perspectivism' and 'ratio-vitalism'.

(83) Hision, p. 75.

8h

discover that the 'general education' requirement in many modern
universities is nothing but the sad and last remnant of a greater and
much more important mission. The justification given today to such

a curricular precept is extremely vague, and, in most cases it seems

to be merely confined to the notion that it is convenient for a student
to be exposed to ”some general education”.

At this point it is perhaps convenient to perform a deeper ex-
ploration into the meaning of the Spanish word 'cultura'. in Spanish
the term 'cultura'often has a connotation in which the notion of 'being
cultivated' is brought to bear upon a formal notion of knowledgeable
attitude, as opposed to ornamental snobbishness. Thus, in opposition
to the factual implication that oftentimes this formal content does not
match, g§_principiis, a practical usage in the sense of ornamental learn-
ing, the cognitive root of the concept rather seems to imply a suggestion
of erudition and 'breeding', in the ordinary sense of ”being educated”.
'Cultura', in this sense, also conveys a suggestive concept of knowledge,
whose attempted relationship with 'culture', as the objective creation

of human activity, also has a connotation of sgyoir faire, which is often

 

absent in the socio-scientific or ”anthropological” interpretation of

the English term culture. Thus, when Ortega uses the term 'culture' he
does not only mean a qualitative improvement, refinement or devel0pment
by study, training and imtruction. He also implies the possibility of
a type of learning and knowledge which affects the training and refining
of the mind, emotions, manners, and tastes. Likewise it also means

the practical results of such a training; technical refinement of modes
of thought, emotion, etc., and by extension to this genetic meaning,

the term also entails the concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments.

85

and institutions, created or maintained by a given people in a given
period. Thus, 'culture' as cultivation, education, learning, and know-
ledge, also becomes equivalent to civilization, defined as the man-made
creations, or as the Hegelian notion of 'objectified spirlt', insofar
as it should affect the ”being of man", by comparison to his animal
stage. (8h)

Thus, what Ortega calls ”the catastrophic character of the
present situation” seems to be the fact that the so-called ordinary,
or average man lacks an awareness of his own culture. To be 'inculto',
simply means to lack the integrated, and all-embracing series of
qualities that are primordially needed to be 'at the height of the
times”. in other words, 'inculto' is the man who does not possess the
vital system of ideas that his own time is maintaining about the
complex relationship between man and the world. Thus the tragedy of
the "mass-man":

That average character is the new barbarian, who lives

behind the true composition of his own epoch, and who is

archaic and primitive in comparison with the terrible

actuality implied by the 'contemporariness' of his own

problems. This new barbarian is precisely the so-called

cultivated... the engineer, the physician, the lawyer, the
scientist....(85)

 

There is, then, the implication that certain findings of special-

ized science simply cannot induce change by merely legislating it, nor

 

(8%) For an extensive explanation of the general Germanic context within
which Ortega seems to be using the term 'culture', sf; Ernst Cassirer‘s
Zur Legik der Kulturwissenschaften (Spanish Ed., Fondo de Cultura
Economica, México, D.F., I955) in which the 'Sciences of Culture' are
sharply differentiated from the realm of ‘Physico-natural Sciences’,
in their relationship to what the Anglo-Saxon academic world generally
refers to as the 'Behavioral Sciences'.

(85) HisionI p. 76; also gj. La RebeliOn de las Masas, IV (l930), ill-3l0.

 

86

could change be obtained through the questionable use of applied disci-
plines (i.e., administrative considerations of ”university reform”, etc.)
for the simple reason that any reform cannot take place if aimed and
applied at the symptomatic level, in spite of all the good will in the
world. Within the cultural matrix of a given human society, all efforts
based upon pure reason, or ”science divorced from life” will not achieve
the only indispensable and sufficient condition for the full existence
of the individual and collective entities. The condition for university
reform is:

... to place it within the context of its truth, and

to give it its 'real authenticity', thus not attempt-

ing to make it be what it is not, ergo falsifying its

inexorable direction with the imposition of our

arbitrary desires....(86)

For the same reason, i.e., that the real being of a university
should be paradoxically tautologican: universally rooted in the life of
the peOple who must give it a vital meaning, change -- the incorporation
of new usages in lieu of a mere correction of abuses -- should not be
attempted by copying other universities. To imitate models of other
universities designed to serve purposes of other cultures is also a
symptomatic, and therefore an inauthentic, attempt:

i am not criticizing our being informed by looking at

exemplary neighbors; such an action has rather to be

performed, but in such a manner that it would allow us

to originally resolve our proper direction. By this

I do not mean to say that we must be nationalistic, and

'all that rubbish'. I am merely saying that, even in

the case of complete identity -- of countries and men --

imitation would be disastrous, because the imitative
activity loses sight of the creative effort derived

 

(86) Misio’n, p. 63.

87

from struggling with the problem, which makes us

understand the true meaning and the limits, or short-

comings, of that solution we are trying to imitate. (87)

There is a sense, then, in which Ortega seems to suspect a gap
between knowledge and institutionalization, and to be saying that all
the research in the world cannot induce change, unless the efficient
cause for Such a reform be found within the vital core of forces that
make the culture ”live”. It is again interesting to note that certain
social scientists,contemporary to Ortega, also seemed to be suspecting
similar dimensions within the problem. Lynd, the American sociologist
of the thirties could be again quoted at this point:

The knowledge which the s0phisticated experts possess

in our culture is growing at a rate far more rapid than

the rate at which it is being institutionalized in the

habits of thought and action of the mass of our popula-

tion... As a culture we are accumulating our disabilities

and the resulting strains incident to daily living at a

rate faster than social legislation, education, and all

the agencies for 'reform' are managing to harness our new

knowledge in the reduction of these disabilities. We

are becoming culturally illiterate faster than all these

agencies are managing to make us literate in the use of the

potentialities of the culture. (88)

But Ortega adds a new twist. He claims that it does not matter
if certain educational institutions arrive at the same conclusions, or
fonms which have been adOpted in other countries; the important
condition is that the arrival at such conclusions, or forms, be
achieved by means of indigenous cultural resources, i.e., after facing
the very substantive --'existential' -- question. There is a fallacy

in assuming that a nation is great because its schools are great; even

if the quality of those schools were perfect, such a perfection is not

 

(87) lbid., p. 6h.

(88) Lynd, Robert, Knowledgg_for What? Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
Press, l939, pp.108-l0§. Also £1. Chapter IV for Lynd's relevance

to the existential import of 'knowledge'

 

88

transferable, because the concept 'schools' is such that their methods
are only a portion of themselves. Their whole reality is the culture
which created and maintained such schools. The vital, and cultural,
Lgison d'Etre would be completely missing in the artificial imposition
entailed by naive imitation:

Because they are happy with imitating other institutions

and thus with avoiding the imperative of thinking and

re-thinking the questions themselves, our best professors

completely live a life whose spirit has been delayed in

fifteen or twenty years, even if they are completely up

to date in the formal, scientific details of their

respective disciplines. This is the pathetic back-

wardness of those who want to avoid the effort of au-

thenticity, and that of creating their own convictions.(89)

It can be easily seen, then, why Ortega launches such a merciless
attack upon the belief that 'research}, and research alone, is the
solution for a ”change in behavior”. For the reasons discussed in the
dichotomy 'reason-life', the deceiving ideas about the value of
'research', and unilaterally conceived 'cultural change', cannot
be accepted as a truly vital concern. Curriculum change should be
cultural -- in the sense of 'cultura' -- rather than 'social', in the
experimentalistic ”socio-scientific” sense. No ”illuminated foreigner”
can possibly be a true hero and savior of the situation: if he is blind
to the vital fabric of the culture in which he is attempting to have
his 'mores' incorporated, he is bound to pathetic failure. The real
depth of this question resides in the Opposed polarity of values as

'mores‘, and the universality of a value conceived as 'radical reality',

or 'material essence', of which the axiological pattern -- empirically

and existentially speaking -- is nothing but an embodiment subject to

 

(89) Ortega, op.cit., p. 6%.

89

perspectivistic modification. Thus, the true -- or ‘vital‘ -- being of

a culture is the conditio sine gua non for the ”real” change of its tem-

 

porary entities and institutions. (90)

Thus, the Ortegan notions of 'change‘, ‘culture‘, and ‘life‘

seem to have a character which the writer proposes to denominate

‘philosophico-anthrOpological‘, and which do constitute a ”philOSOphy

of life”, in the sense that ‘life‘ -- or an equivalent concept, becomes

 

(90)

For extensive information of the context within which

Ortega seems to be using his philos0phico-anthropOIOgical
notion of ‘cultural value' (which indeed differs from the
usual interpretation given by the Anglo-Saxon social
scientist to this term), gj. Max Scheler‘s Der Fonmalismus
in der Ethik und die materielle Werthethik, Franke, Bern,
l95h, and Wesen und Formen der Sympathle, Cohen, Bonn,

l93l, which lead easily into his other works. To the best
of the writer‘s knowledge, the only works by Scheler that have
been published in English are flgn‘s Place in Nature, “Forms
of knowledge and Culture”, ”Man in the Era of Adjustment”,
and ”Man and History”, as published by Noonday Press, N.Y.,
l962, and also in Phil050phical Perspectives, BostonzBeacon
Press, l958. Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge and Die Wis-
senformen und die Cessellschaft also are extremely important
sources. The acquisition of the projective background
necessary for a complete understanding of the Genmanic
context, within which the Ortegan concept of ‘culture‘

could be described, is an ‘education‘ by itself, pre-
supposing at least an acquaintance with socio-anthropo-
logical movements from Comte, Levy-Brfihl and Durkheim,
through the work of Simmel, Tonnies, Freyer, Von Wiese,
Gurvitz, Weber, and Manheim, among many others. The

work of W. Dilthey, and the subsequent ramifications of

his ideas into the fields of psychology and philosophical
anthropology of the type practised by E. Cassirer (essential-
ly in their differentiation between 'natural' and ‘spiritual',
‘cultural‘, or 'humanistic‘ sciences) would also render the
complexity of the concept of ‘cultura‘ far more complete
than this dissertation could ever hope to accomplish. This
wealthy background was indeed at the ‘height of the times‘,
when Ortega wrote his essay on higher education, and it
would be a titanic task to follow historically every single
one of its conceptual threads.

 

 

90

the ultimate ontOIOgical, epistemological, and axiol09ical preoccupation
for the conceptual construct. it is, of course, admitted that all
phiIOSOphies are, ”philosophies of life”, for a diversity of reasons, the
most common of which could perhaps be that the famous Socratic dictum
about the ”unexamined life” needs to be justified. There is, then,

a sense in which certain bodies of thought, either rationally or even
irrationally, have attempted to maintain ‘life‘ or a similar concept,

as the key-preoccupation for philosophical analysis or speculation. It is
in this sense, and in this sense alone, that the writer prOposes: to
classify the Ortegan ‘pensamiento‘ -- and rather loosely at that --

as one of several philOSOphical instances, which reasonably follow

a historical category called the ‘exaltation of life‘.

CHAPTER V

ORTEGA AND OTHER ‘PHILOSOPHIES 0F LlFE'

Speculative examinations of the 'real characteristics of human
life, or analytic characterizations of the human condition as an inevitable
mode of reality, are theoretical aims which have affected the philosOphic
realm since pre-Socratic times. Yet, in those times, speculation on
physical or biological matters had approximately the same degree of
difficulty presented by the speculation on the so-called ‘cultural‘,
‘human‘ or ‘spiritual‘ affairs, and therefore the difference of tangible
achievements between technology and humanism was not as dramatic as
it appears to be today. According to the German phil050pher Martin
Heidegger, the progress made in technological activities has overshadowed
a more legitimate form of inquiry on the topic of human existence, and
hence why he advocates a return to pre-Socratic times, in order to
recover an authenticity of approach which modern ‘behavioral science‘
appears to have lost. In other words,the question of human existence
is essentially a metaphysical one which must be asked from a broader
framework than that usually shown by current scientific assumptions,
and hence transcending the limitations posited by an intrinsic regard
for lingfiistic exercises, experimentation, mathematization, empirical
induction, and other techniques borrowed from physics and biology to
be applied within the realm of human ”behavioral science”. Mutatis
mutandis, the Heideggerian approach is shared or anticipated by other
European philosophers (among them Ortega y Basset) and aSSumes a basic

distinction between ‘human behavior‘ and other types of behavior.

9i

92

Basically, within these positions, there is no such thing as a behavioral
science of man, in the same sense that a behavioral science of non-human
objects could be conceived. insofar as human beings do not only ”behave”
in the manner usually attributed to the subjects of natural science
(143,, do not simply undergo certain events) but are rather faced with
the alternatives of limited or unlimited choice, it becomes possible
to differentiate types of human and non-human behaviors. Another way of
saying this would be to propose that human beings do not only ”behave”,
but also ”act”, the distinction here being between ”things that happen
to them”, and ”things that they make happen” either to themselves or
to something, or someone else.

The point is then that positivistic ”behavioral science” is based
upon a concept of experience which practically endows the techniques
of symbolic mathematization and subsequent inductive processes with the
privilege of being the only adequate means to achieve scientific ”object-
ivity”.

Ortega seems to believe that this trend has a long, and somehow
logical story, which can be explained by the ‘tangible'progress made
by technological disciplines, when compared with the gaps of knowledge
in the realm of the humanistic, or speculative ”sciences”, many of whose
internal problems are still a mystery. This phenomenon has threatened
the existence of formal metaphysics, ever since Bacon and Galileo
formulated the bases for modern technOIOgical inquiry, jgg., the mathe-
matically supported, formal models which have been essentially devised
for man‘s mastery over his natural, circumstantial world. Along with
Ortega, most philosophers ”of life” seem to agree on the fact that po-

sitivistic thinking has been blinding the world, and simultaneously

93

blinding itself, with the incandescent light of the newly discovered
physical laws, and the accelerated progress shown by the control of

”man over nature”. (9i) The introduction to Kant‘s ngtique of Pure

 

Reason reveals an alarmed concern in view of the fact that metaphysics,
his dignified ”Queen of the Sciences”, was on the verge of losing her
long held throne. The feats of Galileo and Newton were overwhelmingly
impressive when compared to the metaphysical efforts that offered hazy,
and often even logically contradictory solutions to the problem of real-
ity. An ‘empirical‘ vocabulary took over the authority of the idealistic
statements, and certain terms such as 'observation‘, ‘evolution‘,
‘experience‘, and ‘probabilistic laws‘ gradually invaded the realm of
humanistic endeavors, especially in the fields of psychology, the”social
sciences”, and education. Post-Cartesian mechanistic conceptions of the
world and the Spencerian way of presenting organicistic conceptions of
society also contributed to discourage the Heideggerian quest for reality,
in the ancient sense of metaphysical discovery.

Obviously, epistemol09y, and deductive or inductive logic became
the main philosOphical preoccupations, and therefore metaphysics, or
‘ontology‘ was overlooked, or even shunned with the charge of 'mystical‘,
for a great number of years. Thus, the Ortegan ”mass-man”, and even the

Ortegan ”man-of-science”, continued to witness an astonishing 'progress‘

 

(9i) Max Scheler's essay Kulturschaft und Wissenschaft (”Forms of Know-
ledge and Culture”), of which an English translation has appeared
in Philosophical Perspectives, trans. Oscar A. Haac, Boston: Beacon
Press, l958, presents an expanded discussion of this view, which
is also woven into a different context in the already mentioned
book by Ernst Cassirer: Zur tggik der Kulturwissenschaften, Chs.

I and ll.

94

in their mastery over nature, while the advances in ethical theory andlather
normative inquiries, either "degenerated" into scholastic argumentations
or, at best, became the subject for lofty technical exercises of little
vital importance when compared to the inquiries which conferred an
increased control of the physical universe. Ortega‘s vitalistic work, in
this sense, is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche among whose views the
most outstanding is perhaps a passionate and almost anguished insight

into the tragical, igg., ‘shipwrecking‘, meaning of human existence. (92)
Like Nietzsche, Ortega confronts such problems as herd conformity,
overemphasis on experimentation and formalization in the scientific world,
and mechanistic conceptions of society. Like Nietzsche, Ortega also seems
to be rather embittered by European society, by the increase of empirical
monopolizing approaches in behavioral science, by the tyranny of lOgiCal
approaches, and by the presence of false expressions in rigid artistic

forms. Unlike Nietzsche, Ortega does not refer to vital situations as

 

(92) ESpecially, gj. III (I923), lhl-ZAZ for the ”theme of our times”;
Ill (l925), 3Sl-h28 for the ”dehumanization of art”; IV (l93) for
the ”revolt of the masses”; V (l9h0) 377-289, for the difference
between “ideas”, and ”beliefs”. Also gj. ”Meditacion de la Técnica”,
lll-3l0, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, l96l, with four appendixes
on the ”vicissitudes of science”; the internal quarrel of modern
pysics, a prOIOgue on the distinction between cultural and natural
sciences of Heinrich Rickert, a prologue on the ideas for biological
conception of the world (J. von Uexkull), and considerations on the
non-Euclidean geometries. Of these sources, those qu0ted directly
from the Obras Completas have been translated into English: lg;
Modern Theme, London: C.W. Daniel, l9hl. New York” W. W. Norton,
l933; The Revolt of the Masses, London, Allen B Unwin, I923. New
York: W. W. Norton, l932; and_gggggrdgggg_gibggtyg New York: W. W.
Norton, l9h6.

 

 

 

95

'horrible‘, nor is he overwhelmed by the Dionysian or ‘Zarathustrian'
irrationalism. To Nietzsche, for example, the Greeks resorted to beauty
to disguise the tragic, monstrous and unnatural ways shown by the human
”psyche” as a result of the human situation; Eggg, Edipus killing his
father, and heterosexually loving his mother. It seems that the Nietzschean
scheme makes these ‘horrible‘ acts a part of life, thus representing a
tragic human problem, whether we like it or not. Nietzsche feels that
this crude part of reality was the one embellished by the Greek
tragedies, whih used the "spirit of Apollo” -- igg., rhythm, rhyme,
equilibrium, and aesthetical composition -- to combine it with the
‘real‘ human situation. In the language of Erich Fromm such a situation
is one which simultaneously could be described as a part of nature and
apart from nature. We have seen how Ortega would reject irrationalism by
admitting that the use of reason is also a part of life, but, on the
other hand, would accept the notion of life as a ”shipwrecking sensation”.
Thus, to Nietzsche, the creativity which is present in Apollonian ten-
dencies had to be balanced with another type of creativity. This new
creativity is the ability to satisfy a need for individual independence
and cosmic dependence. The creature state is transcended and yet the
need to have a frame of orientation is maintained. This need to explain
a great cosmic umwelt, is met by gaining the freedom to enjoy a return
to Nature (Dionysos or Zarathustra). Typical human freedom (Dionysian
element) is as much an intrinsic part of human nature as the need to
overcome its chaotic expression by means of aesthetic forms (Apollonian
import). Nietzsche‘s notion of vital creativity is then not limited

to a canon-obeying action, which actually is only a tool for human

expression. In this manner the true creator constructs, formally and

96

materially, an object which thus becomes a ”real” symbol of life, instead
of remaining at the level of a merely technical exercise. Such is the
language spoken by Nietzsche‘s subsequent, more sOphisticated, conception
of Zarathustra: the one who laughs, and leaps, and rejoices at the complete
awareness of the ”natural components” in his ‘real being‘.

We have seen that the Ortegan scheme is a much less fiery one,
and that he is willing to accept the Socratic pure reason -- or Apollonian
element -- as a worthy contribution.

Pure reason has to be limited within the realm of its possibilities,
but never fully subdued with the Nietzschean paroxysmal force. Yet, the
essential component, the main preoccupation and concern, namely, life
itself, remains in both Nietzsche and Ortega as the cardinal direction
for philosOphical activity. It must be necessary to develop an insight
into life, as an authentic reality directly related to the peculiarities
and possibilities of human existence. ‘Life‘, then is an immediate need
which becomes an inevitable measure of all things, and must be made a
process of discovery or search for ‘real‘ meanings. Nietzsche was
controversial in his time, has continued to be so, and it could be
reasonably suspected that he will be controversial forever. One thing
remains, howeVer, as the common thread by means of which the Nietzschean
quest for vital meaning could be woven into other systems of thought:
the ”idea of life”.

Nietzsche‘s work, like Ortega‘s, has been analyzed from many
angles, and could be regarded as a bold step, however unsystematic,
taken toward the return to a vital ontology.

Unlike Descartes, Nietzsche and Ortega question, in varying degrees,

the absolutistic powers given to pure reason. Both thinkers allow grounds

97

for mutual comparison if, historically speaking, the thesis is admitted
that part of the anti-rationalistic reaction has been to develop an
ontology of life.

Nietzsche shoved aside, rather harshly, the majesty of empirical
epistemology as the ”Prima-donna” of the philosophic stage, and along
with epistemology he also seemed to have pushed aside most of her maids
of honor: syllogisms, enthymemas, deduction, induction, observation and
sense experienCe (as the only possible methodological devices).

Ortega, on the other hand, only looks at empirical epistemology
with certain suspicion: not wishing to be overcome by her tempting charms,
he seems reluctant to "let her steal the show”. He only wants her to
speak the ‘language of life‘. Nietzsche is rather irrationalistic; Or-
tega talks about ‘vital reason‘, and does not perceive himself even
as an ‘anti-rationalist‘. (93) But, in both cases, essence and existence,
as related to human life, seem to have regained the spotlight.

As for the ”conventional rules of morality”, Ortega also allows
a comparison with Nietzsche:

The life of'a man is not, therefore, the operating of

the mechanisms with which Providence has graced him.

We must constantly ask in whose service these mechanisms

operate. The question, in short, is not what I am but

who I am.... Confronted with all these circumstances, man

is forced to make his own life and to make it, whenever

possible, in an authentic fashion. This is, incidentally,

the main reason why what we do in our life is not immate-

rial. In his essay on Goethe, Ortega has pointed out

that Goethe‘s celebrated sentence. ‘My actions are merely

symbolic‘, was but a way of concealing from himself the

decisive character of his behaviour. As a matter of fact
our actions are not symbolic; they are real. We cannot,

 

(93) Pure spontaneity, deprived Of cultivation, is a blind and senseless
force ”full of sound of fury, signifying nothing”. In order to give
it meaning it is neccessary to introduce ‘concepts'. £j., Ferrater,

02. cit., p. 28.

98

therefore, act ‘no matter how'. Human life has nothing

to do with ‘No matter‘, ‘Never mind‘ or ‘It is all one

to me‘. Neither can we act as we please. We have to act
as we must act‘ we have to do what we have to do. It is
unfortunate, of course, that upon reaching this deep stra-
tum of our existence the only statements we seem capable
of uttering are either tinged with morality or marred

by triviality. ‘To act as we must act‘ seems to be a
moral rule -- a kind of categorical imperative still more
formal and far less normative than the Kantian one. It

is nothing of the kind. It simply states that we must

bow to our purely individual call, even if it runs counter
to the conventional rules of morality. (9h)

 

It should be possible to attempt a comparison between Ortega and
Nietzsche, insofar as ‘life‘ seems to be presented in both thinkers, as
the cardinal value for philosophical Speculation. The Ortegan notion of
‘vital reason‘ is a key—concept which well deserves to be depicted as
the backbone of his theory of higher education.

The Nietzschean conciliation of the Apollonian spirit and the
Dionysian force -- 142., the interplay of a factor of measure and rhythm
(which could be interpreted as similar to the Ortegan notion of ‘pure
reason‘), and another factor which embodies the urge for a free expression
of cosmic feeling, offers us a tense result: his conception of vital
necessity. This resulting new force, which Nietzsche situates at the
point of vectorial convergence of its two components, and which he
makes move forward, within the creative realm of the human race, is
capable of resolving the dialectic inSufficiency of the theoretical man.
Human beings are lost in an immense and overwhelming cOgnitive ocean,
and will face a terrifying crisis of loneliness and impotence if ‘pure
reason‘ continues to rule their actions. Precisely at that moment, the

plaintive voice of Immanuel Kant, will be remembered, and a fatal

 

(99) gj., lerrater, Op.cit., DD. Bt-Sl; also Ef., ll, GQ-Qfi {13]}, on
‘authentic egn' as ’unbribable’ basis for l fe and if ‘

I I

99

conviction would be reached concerning the inaccessibility of the

noumenal world, and the defeat of an illusory confidence placed upon

systematic legical efforts, unworthy of absorbing so much human faith.
It has been shown that Ortega escapes the passionate and anguished

insight revealed by the Nietzschean Geburt der Trag5die. Nevertheless,

 

Ortega seems to share the Nietzschean preoccupation by recognizing a

”vital concern” as the crucial eit motif that somehow seems to be

 

forgotten by modern science.

For the purposes of higher education, Ortega, in effect, advocates
a casting away ”once and for all” of those vague notions commonly
referred to as ”enlightenment and culture”, which make them appear
as ”some sort of ornamental accesory for the life of leisure”.

There could not be a falser misrepresentation. Culture

is an indispensable element of life, a dimension of our
existence, as much a part of man as his hands. True,

there is such a thing as man without hands, but that

is no longer Simply man: it is man crippled. The same

is to be said of life without culture, only in a much

more fundamental sense. It is a life crippled, wrecked,
false. The man who fails to live at the height of his
times is living beneath what would constitute his right
life. Or, in other words, he is swindling himself out of
his own life.... We are passing at present, despite certain
appearances and presumptions, through an age of terrific
un-culture. Never perhaps has the ordinary man been so far
below his times and what they demand of him. Never has

the civilized world so abounded in falsified. cheated lives.
Almost nodoby is poised squarely upon his prOper and au-
thentic phase in life. (95)

It becomes necessary, then, to restore to the university its
function of ‘enlightenment‘ Ortega describes this function as the task
of imparting the ”full culture of the times”, and of presenting the

contemporary world ”with clarity and truthfulness”. Such an over-

 

(95) Mission, 0. 85.

lOO

whelming acquaintance with the contemporary world, must demand that the
life of the individual be articulated if it is to be ‘authentic‘ at all:

Personally, I should make a Faculty of Culture the nucleus

of the university and of the whole higher learning.... Each
(discipline to be studied] bears two names: for example ‘the
physical scheme of the world"x§. ‘physics‘. This dual de-
signation is intended to suggest the difference between a
cultural discipline, vitally related to life, and the corres-
ponding science by which it is nurtured. The Faculty of Culture
would not expound physics as the Science is presented to a
student intending to devote his life to physico-mathematical
research. The physics in culture is the rigorously derived
synthesis of ideas about the nature and functioning of the
physical research so far completed. In addition, this discipline
will analyze the means of acquiring knowledge, by which the
physicist has achieved his marvelous construction; it will
therefore be necessary to expound the principles of physics.
and to trace, briefly but scrupulously, the course of their
historical evolution. This last element of the course will
enable the student to visualize what the ‘world' was, in
which man lived a generation or a century, or a thousand
years ago; and by contrast, he will be able to realize and
appreciate the peculiarities of our ‘world‘ of today. (96)

In addition to the above, Ortega does not claim to be proposing
that each man Should be an expert in each discipline, but simply that
he Should be made aware of the general principles, and the Significance
involved in each cultural activity for the Specific task of living
at the ”height of his times”. He invites the reader to consider the
”tragedy without escape” which would confront humanity, if the view
demanding expertness in every field for the sake of understanding
circumstantial culture were a correct one:

Either everyone would be obliged to be a thorough physicist.

devoting himself, dedicating his life, to research in order

not to live inept and devoid, of insight in the world we live

in; or else most of us must resign ourselves to an existence

which, in one of its dimensions, is doomed to Stupidity....
The physicist would be for the man in the street like some

 

(96) Mission, pp. 86,87,88.

IOI

being endowed with a magical, hieratical knowledge. Both of

these solutions would be -- among other things -- ridiculous.(97)

Ortega claims that, luckily, such solutions are not imperative
ones. Firstly, because his doctrine implies, cautious, and extremely
careful analyses of the teaching methods to be used at all educational
levels. In fact he maintains that precisely because his theory under-
lines the differences between Sciences, it becomes possible to extract
their essential contents in order to make them more ”assimilable”:

The'principle of economy‘ in teaching is not limited to

the elimination of those disciplines which the student

cannot learn, but can also be extended to the ways to

teach what needs to be taught. Thus a double margin of

‘elbow room‘ is obtained in relation to the student‘s

capacity, so that he, ultimately, could be enabled to

learn more than he does today. (Precisely because savings

have taken place in teaching, a greater amount of effective

learning is obtained). (98)

Ortega supports this argument by pointing out that usually
mathematics exaggerate a bit the difficulties of their discipline.
He maintains that mathematics appears to be difficult because there is
a lack of apprOpriate methodology in order to Simplify the teaching of
it. This fact prompts him to enunciate ”with certain solemnity”, that
if such a type of intellectual work is not carried out, the future
of science itself would be disastrous. It is interesting to note that
the Ortegan argument would possibly be supported by some theorists who
now contend that:

The task should be... dedicated not so much to the

enumeration of science in the habitual sense of research,

but rather to Simplify its teaching and to produce within
it certain quintessential syntheses, without a loss of

 

(97) Mission, p. 88.

(98) £1. 'principle of economy in teaching‘, Chapter VI, also, Mision,
pp. ll7, ff.

l02

substance and quality.... (99)

It is then necessary to remedy the dispersion and present

complication of Scientific work. Provision must be made to compensate

for such a dispersion by means of another type of scientific work,

namely the concentration and simplification of knowledge. The need

is for the creation and refinement of a type of specifically synthesizing

talent Ortega makes Such a claim on the grounds that the very future

of science itself would depend upon it.

In the second place, Ortega argues that technical habituation,

or technical exercise, Ber se, are no necessary and sufficient guarantees

for the understanding of Science:

...I firmly deny that the fundamental ideas -- principles,
modes of knowledge, and ultimate conclusions -- of a real
science, whichever it may be, should necessarily require
a formal technical habituation in order to be understood.
The truth of the matter Seems to be just the Opposite:
within the context of a given science, and as soon as one
begins to arrive at certain ideas which necessarily do
demand technical habituation, such ideas begin to lose,

in the same measure, their fundamental character to be-
come infra-Scientific, lgg., instrumental, affairs.

(Actually mathematics integrally shares such an instrumental,

and non-fundamental, or real, character. This would also be
the case with a discipline devoted to a study of the micro-
scope). Mastery over the domain of higher mathematics is
necessary to do physics, 2g; not indispensable to understand
its human -- or cultural -- dimension. (lOO)

 

Having briefly Shown the Ortegan anticipation to an objection

which perhaps typifies the most common argument raised against most

 

(99)

Misidn, pp. ll7-ll8. Also, gj. J.S. Bruner's Process of Education,
Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, l96l, pp. l7-5h for an example

of similar considerations concerning the importance of Structure
and heuristic models, as they apply to the concept of readiness
for learning.

(IGJ) Misidn, pp. ll7-ll8.

l03

theories of general education, it should not be extremely difficult to
find the notion of ‘vital-reason‘supporting the above contentions.
There is, then, a sense in which the human situation in the world
is defined in terms of transcendence of limitations. This concept is
also reminiscent of other ‘phiIOSOphies of life‘, Such as the one
presented by Georg Simmel in his Lebens-philOSOphie.(lOl) Ortega would
possibly agree with the contention that each vital act implies the
existence, and also the possibility of transcending certain limitations,
but would not necessarily share the dualistic manner in which Simmel
SUpports the unity of his concept of life. Simmel‘s concept of life
is based upon a reflective analysis of the concept of time. ‘Actuality‘
is a non-extensive moment: it is not ‘time‘ in the same sense that
the point in Space is not space itself. Thus, Simmel seems to be arguing
that if the coincidence of past and future determines a phenomenon
which could be called ‘actuality‘, actuality itself is really not time.
Actuality, ggg ‘reality‘, is not temporal, because in actuality
the past -- which is really a dimension of time -- is not 'actuaily
existent‘ anymore, and because the future -- which again will be a
dimension of time -- is not yet actual. For a reason similar to Orte-
ga‘s argument against the Husserilian reduction, Simmel contends that
time does not exist in reality, and reality, in turn, is not itself
time.

Nevertheless, Simmel would perhaps grant to Ortega that a life,

 

(l0l) Ci. G. Simmel‘s Qie Problemg der GeschichtsphilosOphie; Grundprobleme
der Philosophie: and capecially Lebensanschauung.

 

 

 

 

low

when subjectively lived, is felt like something real within certain
temporal extension. However, ‘life' is the only ingredient of reality,
(it is ”really” past and future) and time becomes real only in terms

of its vital connotation. Time is a form of consciousness of something
whose immediate concretion cannot possibly be 'explained‘, or even
enunciated, but ”Simply lived”. Time is life, when an abstraction is
made of its particular contents. But Simmel maintains that actual life
transcends all that which is not its actuality. He argues too that such
a paradoxical characteristic is the essence of life, as a mode of
existence which does not reduce its reality to the present moment; hence
the meaning of history as a ‘vital' concept. Life is 'really' a mode

of existence which does not look at the past, or at the future, as
unreal, but rather possesses a peculiar continuity which is maintained
beyond tha arbitrary separation of verbal tenses.

Thus, there is a sense in which-the past really exists as an
element which penetrates the present. Similarly the present also £53111
exists by expanding itself into the future. According to Simmel, this
type of life is to be found only on an individual basis, and hence
the problem with which he is concerned: life is Simultaneously an un-
limited continuity and an egocentric, unique situation, which is
constantly predetermined by its own limitations. Vital transcendence is
paradoxically immanent in terms of life itself. Its auto-transcendence
is its primary phenomenon, and thus the Simmelian “relativity” is an
”absolute”, because there is a constant antinomy in the relation between
individual form (”life is everywhere individual”) and the continuity

of life.

lOS

Simmel relates this concept of life to Schopenhauer‘s idea of the
will to power, but he tries to synthesize both concepts. Simmel also
maintains that death resides beforehand in life, and also constitutes a
continuous transcendence of life over itself. In other words, the
transcendence of life is also present in the creation of its objects.

The ”egocentric predicament” is solved by Simmel by stating that
life constantly transcends subjective limitations, and invades that
realm which, prima facie, resides beyond life itself. Furthermore, life
also produces something beyond itself. But Simmel is quick to add that
such a characteristic of life does not mean a ”subjectivization of that
which is beyond life itself”, but rather reaffirms the concept of
transcendence. It has been suggested that this formula, jggg, the object-
ivity (or absoluteness) of another entity, which is more than life,
and which is posited by Simmel as the condition of life, is a way to
achieve unity by resorting to a dualistic system, which Ortega would be
likely to reject. (lOZ)

Yet the foregoing oversimplification of Simmel‘s ‘vitalism‘ does
seem to have connnexions both with the Ortegan philosophy, and also with
the tenets which nowadays are usually associated with ‘existentialism'
as a philosophical movement. For instance, the Similarity of these types
of 'vitalism' with certain kinds of irrationalistic intuitionism are
rather striking. Perhaps the first name that comes to mind is that of
Henri Bergson.

For the purposes of the present discussion, it should be perhaps

convenient to isolate the Bergsonian considerations on the concept of

 

(l02) Cf. Footnote (lOd) regarding Simmel, Ortega and Nietzsche.

lO6

time, which allow a sequence with the already discussed ”Nietzsche-ur-
tega-Simmel” complex. The Bergsonian concept of time will also indicate
some of the peak-points to be used as a justification for the attempted
grouping of these thinkers as 'phiIOSOpherS of life‘. (IO3)

Basically, Bergson rejects the Kantian way of dealing with time
and space on parallel grounds. He Opposes the two concepts. Space is
merely a conjunction of points, susceptible of an inter-relationship,
which can be made regardless of sequence or direction. Time, on the
contrary, is of an irreversible nature: it implies direction, and each
moment of its duration (ggggg), in terms of its relationship with the
”whole of elapsed duration”, is quite different from the relationship
between "spatial points” and the ”whole of space”. In effect, Bergson
maintains that each moment in time is irreplaceable. In this sense,
each vital moment is something like a ‘creation‘ to which time as
duration cannot really return. This conception of 'vital time‘, which
Bergson :alls a ‘concrete‘ account of 'real‘ time, is contrasted with
the spatial conception of time that iS used by the physical or mathema-
tical disciplines. (IDA)

The Bergsonian ‘duration‘ does not admit of any degree of quanti-

fication: it cannot be measured, or counted. This kind of time is the

 

e a ’ a \ 0
(I03) Cf., especnally, H. Bergson‘s Essa: sur les donnees immediates de
.__ o o o a 7 . . I
la conSCIence; Mattere et memOIre; Le rlre;‘Quree et Simultaneite;
L‘évolution créatrlge; his two essay-collections L'energie spir'-
tuelle._and La Bensee et le_mogyagt; and his last book, Les deux
seems; .d.e..l.a_a.9.r_e‘ 9.93.919... La. £.:-SLL91;

 

 

 

 

(lO ) 91.. B. Russell‘s Qgr Knowledge of the External World, New American
Library, New York, I960, pp. i7-32, for a legical-atomistic
criticism of the Bergsonian concept of time.

 

l07

one immediately presented to consciousness, and stands in sharp contrast
to the dimensional notion of space. For such reason, Bergson contends
that space and time are really like matter and memory: they respond to
mental modes, which are radically different, and even Opposed to each
other. Bergson relates thought and 'intuition‘ respectively to Space
and time, as the mental modes for their cognition. Conceptual thoughts
according to Bergson, are the methods of what is generally known as
‘sciences‘: they tend to develOp quantifications and spatializations.
These methods try to measure certain phenomena, but this Operation Of
measurement is, strictly Speaking, a Spatial one, Since it attempts to
reduce non-spatial concepts to a level in which, certain generalizations
would be allowed by means of inductive-deductive techniques.

Bergson then claims that the spatializing intellect tends to
find rigid, fixed concepts: in order to ‘explain‘ movement it proceeds to
”immobilize” it, and thus, by necessity. such a cognitive activity tends
to stop the dialectic -- or dynamic -- characteristics Of reality. These
conditions are different from those required for the apprehension of
‘real reality‘, since, concretely, ‘vital time‘ escapes the terms of
intellect. Real movement (or motion) -- as it is really perceived by
the Subject -- tends to be decomposed and dissected by ”the sciences”.
This is done in order to explain and generalize the nature of movement
and dynamic reality. But real movement is continuous, it does not
really consist of the series of fixed, motionless points which, mggg

geometrico, are used by 'science' -- namely physico-natural science --

 

to prepare the way for explain its laws. Hence, COgnitive activity
turns the reality of life into certain conceptual, diagrammatic

operations which in a strict sense, are not really 'alive'.

l08

It has been already pointed out that Ortega shares this view in
his rejection Of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction. Thus, in
order for reality to become a conceptual Object, the real mobility that
makes a vital phenomenon 'alive‘ must be subtracted.

Therefore, according to Bergson, only an intuition is capable of
apprehending the real duration, or its dialectical movement in its true
immediateness. And, of course, only an intuition would be capable of
apprehending the true nature of a dynamic process, in which lived time
(gggég) stands in contrast with conceptual petrification. Pure reason
finds its application in matter (or 'practical life‘, or 'control over
nature‘, or the ‘handling Of things'), but life itself, in its very
nature, has escaped the grip of this approach.

For such reasons, Bergson contends that the only way to cope with
dynamic reality is an intuitive capacity. He goes as far as describing
this capacity as a non-cognitive adaptation, Similar to the instinctive
animal capacity to cope with the problems that are a part of its life.
The startling result of Such a ‘philoscphy Of science' is the conclusion
that philosophy and science, which seemingly are ‘thought‘ within a
spatial framework, have neglected, or at best dealt only minimally
with ‘vital intuition‘. By operating with the categories of conceptual
thought, igg., with a strictly intellectual attempt to explain phenomena,
phiIOSOphy and Science, thus far, have used resources which are really
useless for the authentic apprehension of life, and of the ”stuff out of
which life is made”, namely 'duration'. ((l05) This is why Bergson

maintains that men have found a great difficulty when dealing with the

 

(lOS) Literally taken from the French expression: ”Duree est l’etoffe_§
quoi la vie est faite.”

 

 

l09

explanations of reality that are commonly known as metaphysics. Phi-
lOSOphers do not only lack the adequate instrumentality, but also have
not exercised the habit Of using their best tools.

The Bergsonian phiIOSOphy approaches the 'reality of life‘ with
an attitude which is radically different from the usual ”Socratic”
approach. It places itself within the very mobility that characterizes
life: not in the already effected process, but rather in the present
aspect of its realization. The Bergsonian intuition seems to be attempting
an immediate apprehension Of life from ”within itself”, and to be refusing
to ”kill life” as a prior step taken in order to reduce it to a ”spatial-
ized” conceptual scheme. The Bergsonian reality Of life seems to be

defined as something dynamic, a ‘vital impulse‘ (élan vital), which

 

determines an evolution in time. Such an evolution purports to be
creative, because reality is Supposed to acquire actuality in a vital
continuity. Reality, again, is not a series of ‘given elements‘, and
only after a real actuality has already “happened” could a COQnitive
enterprise attempt to reconstruct it, by means Of immobilized ideal
entities. This method proceeds in a manner Similar to the one followed
when a movement is broken down into a series of motionless points that
are fixed and sketched-out, as on a cinematic film.

It has been shown that Ortega follows a similar rationale. He
attempts, however, to go beyond a merely biological characterization
Of life, by acknowledging its historical character, without which the
most essential peculiarity of human life would not be fully understood.
Possibly Ortega would say that the Bergsonian system needs to be thus
completed in order to attain full acceptability.

It has been also suggested that another important difference between

llO

Ortega and most ‘vitalistic‘ Schools of thought, is the fact that he
is against their irrationality. (lO6) According to one of his favorite
disciples irrationalism would tend to ‘corrupt any intuition‘. (lO7)
Within the Ortegan scheme, on the other hand, philosophy has to be
described as rigorous knowledge, and therefore as rational. Since
reason needs to think the new Object that is life, in all Of its
fluidity and mobility, a new type of ‘reason‘ is thus needed. Altogether
different from the ”spatialized” pure reason used byiflwysico-natural
science, this new ”vital reason” is nevertheless a type Of reason. (lO8)
Yet, impressions are the inevitable prime source of existence
and spontaneous life. Therefore, Ortega believes that the dismissal

of impressions, as potential sources of error, is only a rationalistic,

 

(lO6),££. parallel between Ortega and Nietzsche, at the beginning of this
chapter.

(107) Marias, Julién, Historia de la Filosofia, p. 383.

(l08) To Ortega, concepts are not substitutes for the living
impressions of reality I, 3l8, (l9lh):‘”ln a statement
reminiscent of a celebrated sentence of Kant, Ortega seems
to imply that impressions without concepts are blind, and
concepts without impressions are shallow. Unlike Kant,
however, he couples impressions and concepts as if they
were two sides Of the same reality. Here lies, incidental-
ly, a source of difficulties for Ortega‘s philosophy; the
same difficulties that have perennially baffled philoso-
phers as soon as they have attempted to correlate Sense
impressions and ideas. Ortega does not overlook these dif-
ficulties, but he thinks he has found a clue to the solu-
tion by watering down both impressions and concepts, the
former being in his Opinion more than sense impressions
and the latter being less than formal schemata.... Ortega
wavers between a definition of concepts as ‘ideal schemata‘
and their characterization as pragmatic tools for grasping
reality. At all events, he seems to be quite convinced
tha without concepts we should be at a loss amidst the
whirlwind Of impressions.... Spontaneous life, however,
is never laid aside: it is always the beginning and the
end of our inquiryJ' (Ferrater, 9p. cit., pp. 28-29).

ill

or idealistic, subterfuge. Ferrater summarizes this view quite well:

Against mistrust of impressions and, in general, of vital
Spontaneity, Ortega proclaims the necessity of developing

and even of cultivating them. To act Otherwise is a fatal
error, or, still worse, sheer hypocrisy. Hence his insistence
upon the need for attending to a great many segments of life
usually disregarded by phiIOSOphers. In this respect Ortega
fully agrees with Nietzsche‘s demand -- and with Simmel‘s
recommendation -- to unfold the wings Of life to the utmost.
Science and justice, art and religion are not the sole
realities worthy of man's thought and sacrifice. It would be
highly desirable some day in the pantheon of illustrious men
to have not onlyla genius in physics like Newton and a
genius in phiIOSOphy like Kant but a ‘Newton of pleasures‘
and a ‘Kant of ambitions‘. Pleasures and ambitions must
therefore be given their full scope. Contrary to Nietzsche,
though, Ortega does not believe that the layer of spontaneity,
out of which impressions arise, is self-sufficient. It seems
to be unbounded; actually, it has many limitations: among others,
the fact that pure spontaneity, deprived of cultivation, is a
blind and senseless force .... (l09) '

It seems, then, that concepts are as necessary for vital awareness
as impressions. Perhaps the definition ‘vital concepts are the good
conductors of impressions‘, would not be too inaccurate a statement
of the Ortegan views on the subject. At any rate, Ortega does not seem
to Share the Bergsonian irrationalistic overtones. This distinction
is sometimes difficult to make, since it is generally recognized that

the Ortegan ‘pensamiento‘ has often shown a predilection for biological

 

analogies. It has been previously pointed-out that the ‘biologiSm‘
exhibited by Ortega is rather of a Germanic brand (namely Uexkull-
Driesch). However,there seem to be sufficient Ortegan indications to
conjecture that at times his thought is sympathetic to the consideration
of 'life' as a biological impulse, thus allowing a comparison with

tendencies Such as those of Nietzsche or Simmel. It also should be clear

 

(109) Ferrater, gagcit., p. 28; also Ortega‘s l, 32C (l9lh) and see
footnote (93) of this dissertation, on Nietzsche's irrationaliSm.

ll2

at this juncture that there seems to be an Ortegan attempt to describe
knowledge as a process aimed at biological utility. This posits a
problem which has not been ignored by his most serious critics:

These interpretations have, in short, denounced Ortega‘s

philosOphy as biolOgically oriented. This, of course,

would not be in the least vexatious for a positivistic-

minded philosopher, one who would dismiss as meaningless

talk not only Heidegger‘s contempt for a merely ‘ontical‘

view of life but also Dilthey‘s conception of life as a

historical reality. Ortega, however, is not a positivistic-

minded philosopher and consequently he has been rather

touchy on this issue. (llO)

Three interpretations could be offered in defense of Ortega on
this issue. The first One consists simply of conjecturing that the
philosopher is making use of biological comparisons and metaphors, since
he gave later indications of rejecting a merely biological interpretation
of knowledge.

A second possibility may imply that Ortega (when pressed with the
question of how to lay sufficient stress on life ”against the encroach-
ments Of reason”), could have decided to use biological examples. This
technique could have been adopted by him in view Of the fact that often
an analogy of this type is methodologically more effective than the
usual ontological or epistemological vocabulary.

A third possibility could be related to the period previously
referred to as ‘perspectivism‘ and could be based upon the circum-
stantial human condition that is typical of Ortega. Since perspectives
belong both to the subject and the object, they cannot be reduced to a
mere biological ”sifting Of impressions”.

Regardless of how justified such reasons are, and without entering

into the task of speculating on the possible Ortegan reaction to the

 

(llO) Ferrater, op.cit., p.32.

ll3

foregoing three interpretations, the introduction of ‘vital reason‘,
which took place soon after perspectivism, would Seem to indicate that
the philOSOpher‘s concern with historical perspective does transcend
a purely individualistic -- biological -- account Of ‘life as the only
reality‘. Ferrater says:
The philosopher must therefore foster all that iS living and
real, namely all that is authentic. Echoing Nietzsche, Bergson
and Simmel, Ortega seems now to overpraise the values of life
and, in particular, of human life. It would be too hasty, never-
theless, to reach such a conclusion. Sure, we often miss in Or-
tega‘s writings Of this period (perspectivism) in spite Of the
undeniable plasticity and incisiveness of his style, the sharp-
cut Outlines that should be the rule among philosophers ....
he makes so much of life at a bare biological level that we Often
find it difficult not to take his Statements in this respect at
their face value. A case in point is his flat assertion that
‘pure biology must be given preference to ethics when judging
the values of vitality‘. Another case in point is his contention
that culture consists in certain biological activities ‘neither
more nor less biological than digestion or locomotion'. (lll)
Some of the passages referred to by Ferrater have been also
mentioned in the foregoing chapters, and essentially do convey the
notion that life must not be understood in the traditional sense of
an autonomous, and independent substance. Ortega is quite clear
concerning this matter, and goes as far as writing that his case for
the spontaneity and authenticity of life is not to be confused with a
”Rousseaunian primitivism”. ”Attention must be paid to the spontaneous
and primitive life of the Spirit in order to secure and enrich culture

and civilization”. ( ll2) Thus, the so-called ‘natural life‘ would be

of no worth unless measured by its capacity to create cultural values.

 

(ill) Ferrater, QELEL£., pp. 33'3H. Also, gj. II, 293 (l9ZO), and Ill,
l66-7, (l923).

(ll2) II, 283, (l920); Ill, i79, (l923); Modern Theme, 0. 60.

 

llh

As pointed out before, human life is always to be understood as ’life
with....' jgth life with something or somebody. If life exists within
an environment, it seems to follow that other connotations could be
attributed to the term ‘environment‘, besides the usual biolOgical ones.
In this sense, there are social, political, and literary ”environments”.
This could also be reinforced since Ortega has repeatedly stated that
a purely biological account Of life is simply a fragment of a much
broader ‘biographical‘ concept, and therefore cannot be reduced to its
”somatic meaning”. (ll3)

Possibly, a thinker who also departs, like Ortega, from the question
'Does life make any sense?‘, is the Frenchman Maurice Blondel, whose
writings are permeated with a theistic and ‘existentialistic‘ tinge, which
Ortega either absolutely lacks, as in the case of religion, or does not
Show quite as clearly, as in the case of the existential, ontological,
accounts of death and nothingness. (llh) According to Blondel, man
proceeds practically without knowing what behavior really is. AS a
”doer of deeds”, action is the only answer that man can give to his
problem; he did not ask to be born, and he is condemned to life and
death. He must conquer nothingness, and feels frustrated because he
does not even know what nothingness is. It is almost impossible to

conceive of no-thing at all.

 

(113) 111, 164, (1923); 111, 189, (1923); Modern-Theme, P. 71+; v1, 398,
(l932); Ill, 270-280 (l924), to cite just a few instances Of an
all-pervading mode of describing life. The entire essay ”Ni
vitalismo ni racionalismo” purports to be a clarification of
this particular issue.

 

(ilk) M. Blondel‘s L'Action, essai d‘une critique de la vie et d‘une
éciewce de la pratigue; La Penéeg, L‘Etre et les étres.

 

 

ll5

Thus, action is the most significant, constant, and general fact
of life. Action is even more than a fact, it is necessity, since even
to commit suicide is to be regarded as a human act. Each human decision
amputates an infinitude of possible human acts. If man does not act,
something acts within himself, or even beyond himself. Conceivably
it could act against himself. Peace -- Blondel thinks -- is a defeating
experience; action does not tolerate any other postponement, except
death. Hence the reason why man cannot beahve with his ideas, because
finite intelligences are not capable of complete analyses. Human action
cannot tolerate delay: man cannot postpone action to a moment in which
he has conclusive evidence, and therefore the most pressing and frequent
choiceis to act without it, igg., to act upon incomplete evidence (llS)
Besides, a human decision Often goes beyond concepts or thoughts; as
acts go beyond intentions.

It is interesting to note, at this point, that analytic Anglo-Saxon
philosophers have also explored the elusive relationship between decision
and action, but, apparently, with a major difference. The analytic
Studies seem to stay within a framework Of logical necessity, whereas the
‘philosophers of life‘ often blur the lines that the Anglo-Saxon scholar
eagerly tries to maintain. (ll6) Possibly, for the latter, the 'philo-
SOphies Of life‘ of the type described suffer from the confusion of mixing

pSychological possibility with logical necessity. It should be noted,

 

ll5) Cf. Reference (20), p.35, concernin the definition of ‘jud-ement‘
... 9 s
as a statement made in absence of conclusive evidence.

(ll6) Cf., for example, R.S. Peters', The Concept of Motivation, l96h,
or Hampshire and Hart, ”Decision, Intention and Certainty”, Mind,
Vol. LXVII, No. 265, Jan., l958, p.2, for isolated examples of the
way in which analytic philOSOphers handle the i55ue.

 

ll6

though, that most Continental ‘philosophers of life‘ seem to disregard
Such a distinction as irrelevant. (ll7)To Blondel, for example, it is
necessary to constitute an ‘integral Science of action‘, because all
deliberate modes of thought and life do imply a complete solution to
the existential problem.

LOgical analysis, intellectualism, and recourse to faith are,
according to Blondel, incomplete accounts of life, not because they
typify an attitude which could be really non-emotional, but rather
because they fail to grasp the entire meaning Of 'action‘ -- not as a
‘gggd, but as a concept and a fact. This is probably the reason why

Blondel criticizes scholasticism: entities are what they do -- more

 

'than anything else. The implication here seems to be that phiIOSOphy
has to be practical in an existential way; it has to avoid cognitive
self-worship (pure reason), and it has to Show the insufficiency, and
normal subordination, of theoretical activities to life. The exigencies
and possibilities of action must be illuminated in the same way that

the ways of faith must be prepared and justified.

The themes of death and nothingness seem to bring Blondel closer
to the stereotyped idea usually held about existentialistic phiIOSOphy
than to the Ortegan scheme. However,it Should not take great effort
to identify the Blondelian tenets which prompted his ”classification“
as a ‘philosopher of life‘ within the present context. Death, in effect,
is a concept that does not seem to torture the Ortegan writings in the

same measure that it affects other ‘philosophies of life'.

 

(ll7) A distinction between ‘phiIOSOphies of life‘, as used in this
context, ‘phenomenology‘ as a method, and ‘existentialism‘ as a
movement, must be made here. Husserl‘s ‘phenomenological reduction‘,
for instance, seems to carefully maintain differences between logical
necessity and pshycological possibility.

ll7

The same consideration applies to the concept of nothingness, whose
relation to a re-affirmation Of being has been made an extremely
important part of recent existentialistic ontologies.

Curiously enough, one ‘philOSOpher of life‘ who does exhibit such
a concern is Ortega‘s own countryman,the Spaniard Miguel de Unamuno, whose
writings, again, Show that ‘life‘ is the essential phiIOSOphical problem.(ll8)
Unamuno vividly feels the problematic nature of life, as an immediate
existential preoccupation, and gives his individual twist to such a
problem. The personal ‘immortality‘ of man, as an entity who lives,
dies, and does not want to die completely, is his central question. Due
to reasons that Ortega would call ‘historical‘, Unamuno also partakes
of the ‘irrationalistic‘ tradition which permeates the problem Of life,
and calls pure reason into question.

Mutatis mutandis, as in Kierkegaard, Bergson, or even William
James, Unamuno thinks that reason iS perhaps a necessary, but not a
Sufficient condition to ”know about life”. When reason tries to apprehend
life by reducing its dynamic duration to fixed and rigid concepts, it
deprives life of its temporal ”stream” or ”fluidity”. Hence reason
kills life. Unamuno also criticizes pure, or physico-mathematical ”reason”,
but contrary to Ortega, he reccomends ‘imagination‘ as a more ”substantial
faculty". Since vital reality cannot be totally grasped by reason,
Unamuno tries an imaginative approach, which challenges death by preserving
a narrative testimony of ‘lived‘ experiences. Precisely because human

life is something that is ‘lived through action‘, it could be only

 

(ll8) Ej. M. Unamuno's Egsayos, Vida de Don Quijote_y Sancho, gel Sen-
timiento tragjco de la vida, La agonia del C’iéfiiiflifiT9-

 

 

ll8

described or narrated and never explained. In this manner, life becomes
‘history‘ in a paradoxical ‘aesthetic‘ approach which includes the or-
dinary concept of fiction as a method of knowledge. In this manner,
through fiction, Unamuno attempts to grasp the immediateness Of human
reality, insufficiently, no doubt, as he himself repeatedly states, but
leaving ground for what Marias calls ”the possibility of a rigorous
metaphysical system”, which others have developed (e.g., Heidegger)

but which Unamuno himself does not attempt to design.(ll9)

Ortega‘s objectivistic period has sufficient sources to show that
Unamuno‘s irrationalism was insufferable to him; ”obscurantism which
introduced nothing but confusion”. (IZO) Ferrater says:

...Unamuno used a method that was closer to paradox than

to reasoning. He declared, among other things, that if

it was impossible for the same nation to bring forth

Descartes and Saint John Of the Cross, he would rather

retain the latter. This must be understood, of course,

in the light of Unamuno‘s deep sense of personaliSm,

and is in tune with his later proclamation that Saint

Theresa‘s deed are at least as worthy as any European

institution or any Critique of Pure Reason. Now Orte-

ga could not accept, and in his objectivistic period

not even endure, such irritating paradoxes. (l2l)

Ortega actually thought that there cannot be anything but confusion
in the above contentions, since without Descartes -- the key figure in

European modern phiIOSOphy, according to him -- it would be impossible

to understand even the value of Saint John: ”...we would remain in the

 

(ll9) Marias, Julian, Historia de la Filosofia, Ed. Revista de Occidente,
Madrid, I956, p. 336. Also J. Marias, Miguel de Unamuno, Espasa
Calpe, Madrid, l9H3, and Filosofia actual y existencialismo en Es-
pafia, Emecé, Buenos Aires, I953.

 

 

(120) 1, 125 -32 (1909).

(l2l) Ferrater, QRJcit., 0.22. Also, V, 264-65 (1937) for an Ortegan recpgn-
ition of the great value of Unamuno among the Spanish irtellicentsia,
and l, 115 (laud) for an Ortegan description of One n'v as ”one or the
last bastions of Spanish hope".

ll9

dark and become incapable of understanding anything, including the
‘brown sackcloth‘ of Juan de Yepes....” -- the worldly name of the
Spanish mystic. (l22)

If the Ortegan outlook is ‘vitalistic‘ on the one hand, on the
other it seems to affirm along every step of its conceptual itinerary,
that knowledge must necessarily be rational. The essential epistemolo-
gical task should be (more than anything else) the investigation of the
Significance of ‘life‘ as the central philosophical issue. This also
seems to be a Sufficiently clear difference between the Ortegan Egfléé:
miento (as a ‘philosophy of life‘) and most other 'phiIOSOphies of life‘.
The same consideration applies to differences between the Ortegan ‘vital-
ism' and the usual tenets attributed to ‘existentialism‘.

Soren Kierkegaard is perhaps an author whose thought shOws a
series of concepts which could well constitute a bridge between the
‘phiIOSOphieS of life‘, as defined, and ‘existentialism'. Life, indeed,
is the point of departure for Kierkegaard, but he adds certain considera-
tions which would make the enterprise move into a realm of thought that
nowadays might be considered more typical of Sartre, and Heidegger,
among other ”existentialists”. Following a basic consideration of life

which, mutatis mutandis, could be assimilated to the foregoing remarks,

 

Kierkegaard appealed to Christianity and to a type of Protestant theology
which purports to understand the meaning of human life. He insisted
particularly on a concept of anxiety -- or EQBEE -- which prompted him

to build a type of philosophical-anthropology that seems to share a great

 

(l22) Ferrater, op.th., no.22-23.

IZO

deal of the irrationality rejected by Ortega. Essentially, the key
concept in Kierdegaard seems to be a rejection of the Hegelian idea of

‘eternization‘ on the grounds that sub sgecie aeternitatis abstractions

 

ignore the idea of existence. This concept is herein understood as a

manner of ”being in the world” (Heideggerian Dasein) that is typical

 

of the human situation.

Life, at this point, would seem to consist of an affirmation of
man as a concrete entity which is affected by time and chronological
change. In this sense human beings are situated in a peculiar manner of
being which might be called ‘existence‘, and which, according to a very
unique situation (”placed at the crossroads of the temporary and the
eternal"), remains submerged in a state of continued anxiety. It is
interesting to note that Kierkegaard again reaffirms that human existence
essentially presupposes a notion of movement which is annulled, or
killed, by quantified approaches to ”behavioral Science”. Kierkegaard
avoids dealing with expressions such as ‘man in general‘, and prefers
to think about human reality as a rigorously individual and personal
enterprise.

Ortega would probably say that the Kierkegaardian most forceful
contribution to a philosophy of life was unfortunately Spoiled by his
irrationalism, and that he was wrong when stating that existence and
movement could not be ‘thought‘, because if 'thought‘ they would be
immobilized, eternized, and g£g9 abolished. It has been already shown
that Ortega had a high regard for Descartes, and therefore that an
affirmation of existence does not necessarily imply a denial of reason.

To Ortega the Cartesian formula is basically sound.

IZI

Nevertheless, the ‘philOSOphy of life‘ to which Ortega would seem
most sympathetic is the one supported by Wilhelm Dilthey, a conious
German writer, who worked from I882 through l9ll at the University of
Berlin, as the successor of the famed Lotze.

Very little known in the English-speaking world, Dilthey is ex-
tensively Studied in the Continental EurOpean and Spanish-speaking
universities, and is usually credited with a great influence in modern
phenomenology and existentialism. Some critics would go as far as
considering Dilthey a forerunner of modern,non-experimentalistic
psychologies -- including the Gestalt movement -- and of the other
trend which is only beginning to be generally recognized as ”existential
psychology”. Others have found historical reasons to support the fact
that Dilthey is in the process of being re-discovered, and even recognize
a ”need to know about Dilthey”, when studying Ortega:

Ortega‘s closest spiritual forebear is Wilhelm Dilthey....
whom Ortega has called 'the mOSt impa’tant German thinker

in the second half of the nineteen century‘ (£j.,”HiStory

as a System”, Toward a Philosgphy_of History, W.W. Norton,
l94l, P. 2l6) to the conspicuous neglect of Nietzsche, who
is much better known in our country as well as in the Nazi
Germany he helped to inspire. It is interesting to see

that our American historians of ideas are coming to join Or-
tega in regarding Dilthey as One of the greatest figures in
this field of knowledge....

The long eclipse of Dilthey can be accounted for by a
conSpiracy of three circumstances. He was chronically
unable to finish a project, for the same reason as Pascal:
his insatiable imagination was forever pushing ahead to

new reaches of his problem, and his ideas seemed out of date
in his own mind before he could get them into books....

Then, Dilthey was unfortunate in a second generation of
interpreters, like Windelband and Rickert and Troeltsch,
who lacked the master‘s acute penetration.... Dilthey‘s
third misfortune was that he was born into a peculiar
climate of Opinion which somewhat warped the growth

of his phiIOSOphy of phiIOSOphies, in his own mind, and
in the mind of his great Spanish interpreter. Most

I22

phiIOSOphers of natural science in the latter nineteenth
century were following the trend of positivism, first

to the position of disclaiming any connection between
science and values, and then to the still remoter extreme
of declining even to have any reference to a real world
at all. This Simple isolation of the natural sciences
appealed to the natural scientists of the period because
it seemed to dispense with metaphysics. Rather than
avow any metaphysical position they preferred to assume
that their science was nothing more than a game of des-
cribing and arranging sense perceptions. (I23)

Nostrand also remarks that such a positivistic approach has since
lost considerable ground under the attacks of Whitehead and several
other thinkers of various schools, and adds further that some of the
positivists themselves, when pressed by an exploration of their own
position, have rendered it more difficult to maintain. Some positivists,
in effect, affirm that, even if we know nothing but sense data, we can
still make predictions as though we knew we were dealing with a real
world. Nostrand then reflects upon the problems raised by a possible
questioning Of Such an assumption ”... for obviously we do use our know-
ledge of the physical world effectively for predictive purposes, and
consequently the theory comes into conflict with common sense."(l2h)
Today any position regarding science as a mere game of arranging sense
impressions seems hardly tenable:

Yet Dilthey and many of his contemporaries accepted

it as the least extravagant assumption available, and

Ortega reaffirms the position as late as about I932

in such terms as these: ‘Today we are beginning to

see that physics is a mental combination and nothing
more‘(”History as a System”, Igwgrd a Philosophy of

 

(I23) Mission, l'Introduction" by H.L. Nostrand, pp. l5-I6.

(12(1) Ibid, p. 16.

I23

HistoryI W.W. Norton, ISAI p. 228) ‘Physics brings us

into contact with no transcendence‘ (Ibid, p. 229)

‘What is real in it -- and not mere idea -- is only its
utility. That is why we have lost our fear of physics,
and with Our fear our respect, and with reSpect, our
enthusiasm‘ (Ibid., p. 229). This climate of Opinion

led Dilthey, and Ortega after him, to try to rescue some
practical knowledge from the absurd predicament of the
sciences. For obviously, if all our knowledge and reason-
ing should be proved in the same way to be just as remote
from reality as physics appeared to be, then we should have
to make the adjustment Ortega has made to his view of phy-
sics, and abandon our respect and enthusiasm for all
knowledge and all rational method. Knowledge would cease
to be power, and man would cease trying to be a rational
animal. Humanity would yield to a new power and a new
animal, just at the threshold of the new world Of plenty
and well being that might have been,thanks to a million
years or more of piled up, sifted down knowledge. (l25)

Dilthey tried to overcome this reduction to the absurd by means
of a distinction between the type of approach followed by the natural
Sciences, and another method which leads into a different kind of knowledge,
which some still call ‘the humanistic sciences‘ (‘knowledge related to
the human Spirit‘: die Geisteswissenschaften).

Dilthey's point of departure was man regarded as a nucleus of
active forces and drives which are thrown toward the surrounding world,
and by clashing with its objects originate an extremely complex network
of teleological adjustments, and thus a ‘unity' of exteriority and inte-

riority, which cannot be possibly explained, but only described and

 

gggjyggd, ’Hence the name of his ”descriptive” psychology. Dilthey
therefore rejected experimental psychology as an insufficient way of
explaining certain phenomena, and went into a series of considerations
concerning the qualitative nature of the psychic processes, as Opposed
to the measurable, quantitative character of most physical and natural

phenomena, as seen by ”the sciences”. Dilthey was preoccupied by the

 

--- - .———-—...-—-——.—-.-

(I25) lbid, p. I7.

IZA

“true nature” of man‘s situation in this world: part animal and part
creative. He also rebelled at the attempts of quantifying life: 'Life'
is really the essential part of psychic activity, and so Dilthey pre-
sented one of the first instances in which the expression ”psychic life”
was used to describe a peculiar human process. In his notion of ‘life'
some important traits can be observed to establish similarities and
differences with the animal way of reacting to the umwelt. (l26)
Dilthey also concluded that man was the only living being capable

of regarding himself as a ”Subject of objects”, jgg.. Of achieving a
sense of identity, and of transcending a ‘creature state‘ by ceasing to be
encrusted within the umwelt. Man is the only ‘creature‘ capable of
perceiving himself as a part Of the Surrounding world, since non-
objectifying entities only relate to it and to other entities through
simplified utilitarian means to satisfy instinctive ends. (l27) The
human life is not only 'nature' to be explained, iyg., not only the
Object matter of natural science, but something to be understood for

and from itself. For this reason, instead of using causal explanations

 

(the method of natural science) Dilthey talks about descrigtive COOEthen~

 

(I26) Cf., especially, ldeen uber eine Beschreibende und Zergliendernde
Psychologje, (Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytical
Psychology), in which Dilthey attempts to base a complete phi-
losophical system upon two disciplines: (i) a descriptive and
analytical psychology, centered around the idea of erlebnis, i.e.,
assimilated and intellectualized experience of total repercussion
in the psychic complex; and (ii) a historical conception of man,
in the sense that his present is a result of the past, and is full
of potentialities to become what he can become, as determined by
(i). Dilthey distinguished his descriptive and analytical
psychoIOQy as being a ‘science of the Spirit‘, as Opposed to a
‘natural science‘, and reasoned that both the ideas Of ‘exterioritv'
and ‘interiority‘ are so closely interconnected, that the main
philOSOphical problem does not consist of examining the possibility
of joining the surrounding world with psychic activity, but rather
of considering how should they be EEBEIEEEH for methological pur—
poses.

 

(I27) See Ref. (33). p. 92, Ch. III for Max Sthcier's view on the same Question

IZS

sions(the method of the sciences of the Spirit). The structure of human
I ife is a 'unitarian totality‘, determined by the ‘sameness of the person‘

e~rho undergoes a series of experiences that join exteriority and interiority
..a'ithin a context of subjective continuity. Every psychic stage is a
partial process, a part of ‘life‘ itself (which is the permanent con-

13; inuity and within which all processes are given) and yet the integrat-

‘5 mg element is the ‘sameness of the person‘. These processes evolve

a s in the experience of a person in a moving vehicle: he sees how those
objects which recently were in front of him, pass by, and soon are
behind him, while the totality of the surrounding landscape continues
t:¢:> be seemingly unaltered for a long tile. In other words the primary
reality is a “unity of living“, within which ‘things‘ and ‘objects‘
a re perceived simultaneously with ‘processes‘ and activities. Such a
fundamental connection has a fi_r1_a_l_ (teleological) character: human life

5 :5. an originative and transcending unity, ggt a composite of elements.

' t s unity allows a differentiation of psychic functions which reamin
cOnstantly and complementarily joined to that reality in their connection.
1.*1 i’s fact, and its highest expression in the unity of consciousness
(or the unity of the ‘person‘), is something which posits a psychic
world, per se. 0n the other hand, this unity is given within a certain
e"imaironment, and thus "life“ is made of a reciprocal action with the
ex ternal world.

‘Life‘ is described by Dilthey as a process which reacts according
t9 external or internal stimuli. It also modifies them or adjusts itself
‘:‘:> them, by means of a teleological series of acts and events. The

.‘t—‘3Hality of man” then becomes a nucleus of drives and instinctive forces

on the one hand, and a concept of existence provided with certain basic

l26

needs -- typically human -- and thus transcending a merely biological
stage, on the other. Therefore, man as ”a psycho-bio-socio-historical
being” has to be considered in the description of his ‘true‘ reality.
before any generalization concerning his ”behavior” is attempted.

Dilthey, in sum, presents an essentially metaphysical problem,
which mutatis mutandis constitutes the point of departure for many
modern existential schools, since it pr0poses a return to the task of
”discovering“ man‘s real nature (aletheia) in a world which he has to
face, and in which he exists whether he likes it or not. To Dilthey and
Ortega, man has no ”real nature” as such, but a ”history”. (I28)

Needless to say, Ortega is a great admirer of Wilhelm Dilthey.(129)
The opening lines of his study on Dilthey and the idea of life are the
following:

As the name of Wilhelm Dilthey is likely to meet with

small response except in German circles, we may begin

these pages with informing the reader that Dilthey

is a phiIOSOpher; moreover, that he is the most impor-

tant phiIOSOpher in the second half of the nineteenth

century. So great a discrepancy between the rank of a

man and the ring of a name, though not uncommon in

history, always implies a certain abnormality. Indeed

that Dilthey should have remained comparatively unknown

outside the German intellectual sphere is due to the

fact that even within it considerable time elapsed be-

fore his stature emerged with a distinctness concordant
with the actual value of his work. (I30)

 

(l28) The real ‘substance‘ of man is precisely his variation, that which
is historical about him, Ej. History as a System, p. I65, also
Kant, Hegel,_pilthey, Ed. Rev. Occidente, Madrid, I96l, 0. IS],
and Concord, p. lh8.

(l29) Concord and Liberty. DP. Iji-ldz, for a more expanded comparison
between Ortega‘s own philosophy, and that of Dilthey, especially
concerning the notion of ‘historical reason‘, which this chapter
has not explored, since Such a source is available in the English
language.

(I30) Ibid., p. 131.

 

l27
Later, he regrets not having been exposed to Dilthey‘s ideas

before:

I became acquainted with Dilthey‘s work as late as I929,
and it took me four years before I knew it sufficiently
well. This ignorance, I do not hesitate to maintain,
has caused me to lose about ten years of my life -- ten
years, in the first place, of intellectual development,
but that, of course, means an equal loss in all other
dimensions of life....

...When at last I became acquainted with Dilthey's
philosophical work I was struck by a strange and dis-
concerting parallelism between his ideas and the problems
and positions, of a strictly and decisively philosophical
character, set forth in my own writings. From my first
book Meditaciones del Quiiote (l9lh) to La Rebelidn de

las Masas (”The Revolt of the Masses”, 1914) this
parallelism manifests itself with Arcadian candor.... (l3l)

The essential difference between Ortega and Dilthey seems to reside
in the concept of ‘vital reason‘, which the former tries to maintain
at a level supposedly higher than the concept of ‘historical reason‘
”... at which Dilthey came to a halt....” (l32) This is why Ortega

emphatically claims that:

The fact is that there are in my work hardly any ideas
that coincide with or even presuppose Dilthey‘s. Exact-
ly that is what I deplore. That is what made me lose ten
years. Moreover, my problems and positions belong, from
the first, to a stage in the evolution of the idea of
life beyond that of Dilthey.

And the parallelism? Parallelism precise excludes coincidence;
it signifies exact correspondence. Parallels do not touch each
other, because they start at different points. Their converg-
ing in the infinite expresses the contradiction that they are
at once the same and most different. Only two parallel lines

 

(l3l) Ibid., pp. I36, and lhl, respectively.

(I32) Ibid., p. 1142.

l28

of thinking can be certain never to coincide materially,

for they are separated by a most radical difference, that

of a distinct starting point. (I33)

At any rate, Ortega reCOgnizes in Dilthey a great achievement.
He maintains that Dilthey is distinguished by the ”...erudition and
workmanship characteristic of one who has fallen heir to a magnificent
philosophical tradition...."(l3h)

However, he seems to indicate that Dilthey really does not have
much that could have actually been used for his notion of living reason.
Yet, he claims, to have gone through the Diltheyan discipline would
have meant the avoidance of many perplexities and fruitless attempts,
and his idea of vital reason would have found excellent support ”at
the right moment”: ”For to feed on what will, in the end, be discharged
is one of the fundamental laws of life”. (I35)

The ‘parallelisms‘ or similarities between Dilthey and Ortega
could be again related to the problem of ‘pure‘ versus ‘vital‘ reason.
Both Ortega and Dilthey would maintain that the irrationality of the
principles of knowledge, which sooner or later constitutes one of the
most difficult problems faced by rationalism, is due to the fact that
reason is interpreted as ‘pure reason‘. For both Dilthey and Ortega,
phiIOSOphy has to become anthropOIOgical: there is no other cognition
that experience, but experience consists both of sense perception and
introspection. Perception and the logical operations of comparing,

identifying, inferring, etc., are regarded connonly as ‘intellectual

 

(I33) Ibid., p. IAI.
(13A) Ibid., p. IAZ.

(:35) Ibid , p. aqz.

 

l29

activities' or ‘cognitive consciousness‘. And intellectual activities

must necessarily have a previous generic constitution consisting in the

general conditions of their exercise, but going beyond the Kantian task:

Why did Kant‘s predecessors fail to find the reason

for those principles, and why did Kant himself resort to
looking for it in something hypothetical -- that is, in the
nowhere, in utOpia? Because of a blindness born of a most
inveterate prejudice. Because of the belief that cognition
forms a zone of our consciousness which, beginning and
ending in itself, is shut off from the rest like a water-
tight compartment. I call this prejudice ‘intellectualism‘.

Dilthey's decisive discovery consists in the realization
that the facts of consciousness must be taken as they
are and present themselves, any attempt to jump beyond
our consciousness making no sense whatever. No reality
exists that could be set over consciousness, and no
chinks open in consciousness through which to espy what
'in reality‘ happens behind it. (I36)

The structural quality of facts of consciousness should be evident

and obvious, both for Ortega and Dilthey. The term Zusammenhang, as

used by Dilthey and reinterpreted by Ortega, purports to indicate

the connectedness, interdependence, and general context of the ‘fact

of consciousness‘. The far-fetched implication of this theory, which

many an analyst would find shocking, is precisely its pSychologistic

tinge; consciousness is a compound, all ingredients of which are

interconnected:

It is therefore erroneous to assume that the facts

of cognitive consciousness are impermeable to those of
desiring and feeling consciousness and that these

latter may not intervene as constitutive factors in the
intellectual process. Or more exactly it is an error

to assume that a desire or a feeling cannot act as
motive, ground, or sufficient reason for a belief.
Indeed, cognition depends on will and feeling as these
depend on it. The fundamental ideas or convictions have
no motive, ground, or‘reason' in other convictions

 

U36)

Concord pp. l60-l6l.

m4

l3u

because they are grounded in volitions and sentiments.

in other words, cognition cannot be explained by itself

but only as a member of the integral human consciousness. (l37)

If epistemology is defined by implication as the search for the
motives of the fundamental concepts through the ”whole organism of our
mind”, and its functioning, it becomes clear that the psychologistic
trend leads into the historicistic one. When the Kantian question about
the possibility for all sciences, natural and historical, is asked again,
the necessity of another discipline which must investigate the conditions
of human consciousness becomes imperative. Such a science -- which
Dilthey and Ortega consider ‘fundamental‘ -- is essentially psychological,
but -- according to both thinkers -- must be a psychology planned in a
way to illuminate the ”general structure of consciousness and the
generic system of its functioning, in short, the reality of living
consciousness in its typical articulation”. (I38) This is Dilthey‘s
problem in his essay on descriptive and analytic psychology, and also
the prior step to a technique which he later called Selbstbesinnung;
or autOgnosis (the reflection of the cognitive subject upon himself;
not to be confused with the ordinary notion of introspection).

Philosophy, as shown by an Ortegan re-definltion of the Diltheyan
scheme, becomes a ”...discipline, which is concerned with the general
and invariable structure of human consciousness and therefore presents
itself at first in the form of psychol09y....” The task of phiIOSOphy
”... is to hold, in respect of the bulk of historical facts, the same

position which, in classical physics, mechanics holds in respect of

 

(I37) Concord, p. l6l. When this concept is applied to the Diltheyan theories,
Ortega maintains that it also constitutes a major difference between
Dilthey and Kant: ”...with this idea, which is his exclusively, Dilthey
stands alone among his contemporaries, differing not only frun Kant
but from the entire philosophical tradition which was intellectualis3L54;

(l38) Concord, p. l62.

 

A

I3!
observed and observable physical facts....” (I39) This general theory
of man, which some Genmans have called ‘spiritual anthropology‘ purports
to reveal three activities: the whole of ”human nature” as it could be
known from experience, philology and history. ‘Experience‘, in this
context, is defined as ”the psychology of oneself and one‘s contemporaries”.
The mutual co-implication of psychOIOgy and history is succinctly des-
cribed by Ortega‘s study of Dilthey: "What philology and history teach us
about past man is contrasted with what psychology discloses about present
man, and vice-versa”. (lhO)

When judging Dilthey, Ortega does not ignore the fact that a pe-
culiar getitio underlies his ”pet-theory“:

Which is to triumph in the end, psychology over history

or history over psychoIOgy? Both are empirical; no hierar-

chy seems to assign a place to one above the other. But

such equality of right between psychology and history

produces a vicious circle. The science of history must

be grounded in a thorough knowledge of man; but knowledge

of man must in its turn, at least partly, proceed from

history. (Dilthey later gave careful consideration to this

vicious circle which persists, however, even in the purest

form of his philosophy and which he regards as essentially

inherent in cognition.) (lhl)

And, of course, Ortega claims that the only way out should be
provided by the concept of ‘vital reason‘. When ‘pure reason‘ is sub-
ordinated to the totality of living reason, Ortega feels that the

irrationalism to which ”proud reason” sees itself condemned dissolves

”... and turns into clear and ironical rationalism”:

 

(l39) Kant,_Hegel, Dilthey, p. I72.

 

(lhO) Ibid., p, I72.

(MI) Ibid., p. 61+.

I32

For many years I have therefore described my own
phiIOSOphical standpoint as a ratio-Vitalism. My

book El tema de nuestro tiempo (”The Modern Theme”),
Madrid, I923, presents the issue of embedding pure
reason in living reason as the theme of our times. It
was this that Dilthey wished to express and wished

to think and in the end failed to lay hands on. Now
after the posthumous publication of his papers, which
came considerably later than the first edition of my
aforementioned book, we are able to see what was hover-
ing before his mind. In his Collected Writings, vol.
VIII, p. I77 (l93l), I find a remark which he was far
indeed from commiting to print during his lifetime and
which could have stood in an old article of mine ”Ni
vitalismo ni racionalismo” (”Neither Vitalism Nor Ra-
tionalism”), Revista de Occidentg, l92h:‘What is pre-
sented to us (das uns Gebotene) is actually irrational;
the elements by means of which we perceive are irre-
ducible to one another‘. The remark is aimed at Hegel. (1&2)

Ortega also adds here that in l92h, no one in Germany, nor he
from Spain, could have anticipated that such a direction was the ”future
meaning” with which Dilthey‘s phiIOSOphy would pass on to the history
of ideas. Irrationalism, then, seems to be again the Ortegan point of
disagreement with Dilthey, and Ortega thinks that the simple truth is
that during the first quarter of the twentieth century, a few thinkers
like himself were independently evolving the idea “... in the light of
which Dilthey‘s work was to acquire fruitful meaning”. That is why
Ortega believes that ‘living reason‘ means something much more important

than Dilthey could have suspected:

 

(lh2) Ibid., p. l6h. The Spanish version of this footnote is also
preceded by a series of ironic remarks to the effect that Spain
has also had ‘phil050phic originality', and at the fact that
only when these ideas were read in German they became suddenly
important. Concretely he addresses a series of lectures on
Dilthey, in which the Argentinian professor Francisco Romero
”discovered” certain connection between the German philosooher
and the Spanish ”writer”. Due perhaps to their ”griping personal
nature”, the English translation omits this interesting se-
quence of five paragraphs.

The truth is that Dilthey was unable to free himself from

the idea of vital irrationalism as contrasted with in-

tellectual rationalism and did not yet discover the

new rationality of life. That explains why, toward the

end of his life, he could still write a sentence like

this: ‘In all comprehension of life, there is an element

of irrationality, since life itself is irrational‘

(Dilthey, Collected Writings, vol. VII, p. 2l8). (l43)

Thus, the expression ‘ratio-vitalism‘ has been shown to be
different from biolOgical vitalism, and therefore with a purpose which
attempts to go beyond the contention that reason is a biological process
governed by biological laws. (lhh) ‘Ratio-vitalism‘ also denies the
Bergsonian contention that reason is epistemologically insufficient,
and must be replaced by intuitive or semi-instictive insights based upon
irrationalistic perceptions of life. And laStly, 'ratio-vitalism‘ seems
to contend that knowledge is a necessary condition for life, that it
must also be necessarily rational, and that it must always subordinate
the imperatives of pure reason to the vital preoccupation. 'Life', thus,
must remain as the central phiIOSOphical issue, but necessitates the use
of a type of reason, whose essential task consists of exploring the vital
significances of the ‘circumstantial‘ complex.

The writer hOpes to have at least shown some of the essential dif-

ferences and similarities between the Ortegan position, and other ‘phi-

 

(Ik3) Ibid., p. I64.

(lhk) This Ortegan criticism also applies to pragmatic biologism, and
to the trends known as ‘empirio—criticisms‘, so well known in
the Anglo-Saxon world. In this sense ‘ratio-vitalism' could be
interpreted as a method of knowledge which stands in sharp
contrast against the notion of the ‘scientific-method‘ supported
by pragmatism. Otherwise, pragmatism seems to have many points
of contact with the Ortegan scheme. Hardly the topic of this
chapter, an interesting investigation could also be attempted
by comparing pragmatic theories of the Peirce-James-Dewey type
with ‘ratio-vitalism‘.

I34

losophies of life‘. (IHS) At this juncture, it is also honed that

the reader already possesses a sufficient background to examine the

following chapter on the 'Mission of the University‘, strictly within

the Ortegan framework.

As a last remark, it must be taken into account that the Or-

tegan new type of reason, is not a ”new theory about reason”, but a

simple recOgnition of a fact. Such a fact, according to Ortega, is

that ”... whatever man thinks of reason, it is always rooted in his

(l46)

 

(th) Regarding the interesting connection between Ortegan historicism

and that of Dilthey, no paraphrasis could possibly do justice

to the direct consultation of Ortega‘ s own remarks on this tonic
The reader is advised to follow such remarks in the book Concord
and Liberty, a chapter from the History of Ideas -- Wilhelm Dilthey
and the idea of Life”, pp. IOZ-ISO; l65-l62; translated into
English by Helene Weyl.

(1&6) VI, #6, (I936); Toward a Philosophy of History, p. 226.

 

CHAPTER VI
THE MISSION OF THE UNIVERSITY

The types of activity embodied by the concepts 'teacher‘ and
'student' represent kinds of human existence, both respectively and
conjointly. These types of human existence are oaviously to be found
in universities, and Ortega conceives of them as the backbone of a
‘Faculty of Culture'.(l47) The ‘Faculty of Culture‘ is precisely that
kind of educational institution that places ‘culture‘ -- as previously
defined -- at the service of the students, so that they keep abreast
of ”the times”. Ortega would fully agree with the Deweyan prOposition
that ”education is life”, since the culture of the times is nothing
else but that radical reality which has to be solved, deciphered, and
interpreted by means of 'vital reason‘. The university should not be
devoted exclusively to the cultivation of pure reason, because pure
reason is not life.

Ortega feels that reason has been understood during centuries,
as something which apprehends that which does not change, or as the
logos that captures the eternal essence of ‘existing objects‘. Under

this conception, those objects have been considered sub specie aeternitatis.

 

 

(lh7) The term ‘Fa ulty‘ is not to be confused with a corporate group
of instructors and professors, as it would be suggested by the
ordinary meaning of the word in the English language. ‘Faculty'
as the equivalent of the Spanish term 'Facultad‘ rather means
‘college', ‘department‘, or ‘division‘ of the university.
Within the Ortegan scheme it means a corporate institution
of higher education, Consisting primarily of students, and
also complementary 0f Subject-ma11er to be taught teachers,

instructors, professors, administration, and start, almost

in that order.

I36

and hence beyond time. The rejection of this view has been already
discussed, and explains the Ortegan concern with 'our times', and
with the norm that the student should become aware of the historico-
chronOIOgical factors that are the strongest components of his culture.
It should be recalled that Ortega claims that the lggos type
of reason reaches its climax with the rationalistic philosophers of the
XVII Century, and hence at a time which witnessed an astounding
development of natural science. The Kantian concept of ‘pure reason‘
also shares this view; but following Dilthey, Ortega contends that this
type of mathematical reason, which has been so successful for the
purposes of controlling natural objects, jggg, those objects with a fixed
or ‘pre-fabricated‘ being, has not been equally successful when deal-
ing with human affairs. The sciences of ”that which is human” -- socio-
I09y, politics, history -- show a strange ”imperfection” which frustrates
the geometrically-minded scholar, especially when the achievements of
humanistic science are contrasted with the spectacular feats of natural
science, and its corresponding techniques. It has been shown that Ortega
shares a philosophical tradition that seems quite convinced of the fact
that mathematical reason is not capable of thinking about the shifting,
changing, and temporary reality of human life. And, according to Or-

tega, here it becomes impossible to think syp specie aeterni. The

 

imperative demand is to think within the realm of ‘the times‘ as a
historical dimension of human beings.

It has also been shown in preceding chapters that this line of
reasoning is similar to that which seems to have prompted the 'irraticnal-
istic‘ reaction of the XlXth. Century.

The Ortegan answer should be, by now, familiar:

l37

To me, reason and theory are synonimous.... My ideology

is not aimed at reason, since it does not accept any

other way of theoretical knowledge. It would be more

precise to say that my criticisms are aimed against

'rationalism'. (1&8)

Since the most authentic significance of reason consists of
'giving reasons’, it may be possible that 'rationalism' is unaware of
the irrationality in those materials handled by reason. Therefore the
rationalist believes that 'things‘ do behave like our ideas. According
to Ortega, this mistake distorts the real significance of reason, and
reduces it to something partial and secondary:

All definitions of reason, which made its essential

part consist of certain particular modes of operation

with the intellect, could be accused of something more

harsh than 'narrow-mindedness'. in fact, those definitions

have sterilized reason, amputating, and hypnotizing its

decisive dimension. To me, reason, in its true and rigor-

ours sense, is any intellectual action which places us in

contact with reality, and hence an action by means of

which we find that which is transcendental. (lh9)

Mathematical reason, or pure reason, is nothing but a particular
species or a particular form of reason. To understand pure reason as
the reason is to mistake a part for the whole, and therefore to incur
in a falsified analysis of reason. Along \Nlth the mathematical and
'eternal' reasons, and beyond them, a type of reason could be found
which might be called 'historical'. This reason is no less of a reason

than any other. It rather becomes a rigorous reason, capable of

apprehending the temporal realities of human life. 'Vital reason' is

 

(lh8) Ni Vitalismo ni Racionalismo, III, (l92h), p. 273.

(lb9) Histgria Como Sistema, VI, p. #6.

 

 

"\

I30

£2319, Ilgggs, and also a human concept. It becomes ”one and the same
thing with life”. Thus, life itself is vital reason, because ”...
to live is not to have any other alternative, but to reason before an
inexorable circumstance ....” (ISO)

”To live”, in this context, becomes to understand, and the
primary and radical form of intellection is the vital, human 'doing'.
To understand means to refer something to the totality of “my moving
life”, which is the same thing as saying ”my life on the make”, and
hence, to understand refers the object to ”living as an act”. Life
itself is the element which places anything upon a certain perspective,
thus inserting it within its own context, and making it intelligible
”for me”, once the object is made to function in the realm of my own
life. Therefore, life becomes the very organ for comprehension, and this
is why -- for Ortega -- it is possible to say that reason is human life.
A human reality becomes intelligible only within the framework of his
own life, when such a life is referred to that totality within which it
is rooted. Only when life itself functions as reason are we enabled

to understand human acts and events.

 

But, since the horizon of human life is a historical one, man is
defined by the historical level upon which he happened ”to be living”,
what man has been is an essential component of what he is. What he is
today is precisely due to his having been something else in the past.
This seems to be Ortega's case to say that the realm of human life
includes history: the life that functions as reason is a historical

one, by virtue of its very substance, and history is present in every

 

(ISO) En Torno a Galileoi V, p. 67.

 

'39

act of real intellection. Thus, vital reason is, constitutively,
”historical reason”:

The real task is to find in history itself its original

and indigenous reason. This is why the expression 'histo-
rical reason' must be understood rigorously and fully. I

am not talking about an extra-historical reason, which seems
to be fulfilled in history, but rather of a reason which
literally is that which has happened to man, and which, there-
fore, constitutes a substantial reason, i.e., the display of

a reality which transcends the theories of man, and which
represents that which he is; precisely, the reason that
underlies his theories. .. Historical reason does not accept
anything as a mere fact, instead of doing this, it incorpora-
tes all facts within the fieri in which they have been ori-
ginated. Historical reason sees how the fact is constructed. (lSl)

 

Such a theory, of course, presupposes the construction of a
series of categories and mental forms, capable of apprehending the
historical reality, which obviously becomes vital reality as well.
Ortega believes that the habit of mind, concerned with thinking objects
-- or 'substances' in the 'Eleatic' sense -- has made it extremely
difficult to reach the concept of an entity which is not 'a thing'
or 'an object', but rather a ”making” of temporal life, In this sense,
Ortega is against 'substantialism' or 'Eleatism' in all its forms, and

favors a concept of reality in which such a reality makes itself:

 

In order to talk about 'man-as-being' we must construct

a non-Eleatic concept of being, in a fashion similar to
that in which the non-Euclidean geometry was constructed.
The time has come to look for the full harvest of the
Heracleitian seeds. (I52)

 

(ISI) Historia como Sistema, 0C, VI, pp. 49-50.

 

(152) 0c., VI, p. 56.

1110

And since that which is vital is always particular and unique, and
is also determined by a given circumstance, those concepts which appre-

hend life have to be 'ocassional', such as is the character depicted

by tenns such as 'you', 'thou', 'myself', 'this’, ‘that', 'there', 'now',
and especially 'life', when Such a term is applied to 'each and every-
one'. In other words, Ortega suggests that we must deal with concepts

which do not always mean the same thing, but are rather constituted by

entities whose sense always depends, in sensu stricto upon a given 'cir-

 

cum-stantia'. And here, historical reason becomes especially narrative.
It also presupposes an abstract theorization of life, in order to achieve
a condition which would make this concept a universal and valid element
for any life, which only in each particular case could become full of
'circumstantial concreteness'.

For the above reasons, Ortega contends that the university
should be devoted to life and culture, rather than to science. Science
is perhaps the greatest human achievement, but ”above and beyond science”,
Ortega maintains that there is the human life which makes it possible.
Hence, a crime that the universities have perpetrated against the
elementary vital conditions, and contemporary demands of their cultures,
cannot be compensated by a scientific deveIOpment. At this point Ortega
is probably thinking of 'natural' science, as previously defined, and
as opposed to his admired, Diltheyan notion of Geisteswissenschaften;

How is it possible to talk to the learned man about life,

if he is a prisoner of his own science; science not being

life?. (l53)

Obviously, society needs good professionals -- judges, physicians,

engineers -- and this is the reason why the university is there with its

 

(I53) Misidn, p. 77.

lhl

professional training. But the university also needs to fulfill a
mission of priority: the assurance of competency in the field of

function as_profession. (ISA) Ortega is well aware of the fact that there
are always ”types” of leaders in every society, and he defines leader-
ship ”... not so much the juridical exercise of authority, but rather

the extended influence upon the body social....” (ISS) He remarks that

the bourgueois classes seem to be the leaders in modern societies, and

 

that most of these 'leaders' are professionally over reason”. It should
be very important, for the societies, that these professionals become
capable of living, and also vitally influencing a communal structure, so
that it keeps abreast of the times. This task, Ortega claims, is
something entirely different from the so-called professional and spe-
cialized competence in the ordinary sense attributed to those terms.
And such is the reason inevitable, to re-establish a teaching of the
culture, if culture is to mean a system of living ideas within a given
chronol0gical period. ”This is what the university must be, both
before and after ”being” anything else”. (l56)

Ortega is not Opposed to an equally necessary awareness of the
findings in natural science. He is rather enthusiastic about the course
of modern physics and similar disciplines, but the significance that

they acquire in his scheme of things, is always a 'cultural' one in

 

(ISA) The reader is advised to consult the concept of 'function as
purpose', as opposed to the ordinary meaning of 'function’ as
used by Anglo-Saxon social-science. £1. R.H. Tawney's I32
Acquisitive Society, Harcourt, Brace 8 World, Inc., N.Y., l96l,
PD. 8, bl-QZ, ISO, in which 'function' appears to be equated with
”Social purpose”, or with the usual socio-scientific concept of
”intended function".

('55) $3.535”. .0. 77.

(156) Misicfn, o. 77.

 

th

his own sense. It has been remarked before that he considers physics
and its mental mode as one of the great achievements of contemporary
times. To Ortega, physics constitutes the meeting point of four centuries
of intellectual training, and the 'physical doctrine' does have a
relationship with all of the remaining essential preoccupations of a
man who needs to be ”up to date”. One may not be aware of the develop-
ments of physics as a science, but this ignorance could ”... hardly
be posited as an indignity....”, eSpecially in the case of a rather
secluded or alienated person, such as the manual worker ensalved by the
machine.

But the man who calls himself a doctor, or a magistrate,

or a general,or a philologist, or a bishop; namely the man

who belongs to the leading social classes, is a perfect

barbarian if he does not know what the physical cosmos should

mean to the ... human being, regardless of how much he knows

about his laws, his concoctions, or his holy fathers. And

I would say the same thing of the person lacking a reasonable

ordered image of the great historical changes that brought

mankind to the contemporary crossroads.... And the same

thing could be said of the man who lacks a rather precise

idea of the manner in which the phiIOSOphical maind meets

the present with its perpetual attempt to design a scheme

for the universe, or a description of the manner in which

general biology tries to interpret the fundamental facts

of organic life. (l5?)

For such reason, Ortega contends that physical, historical,
and biolOgical 'ideas' of the world are necessary for the ggltgigg man.
To lack the physical idea (not physical science itself, but “the vital
idea of the world as created by physics”) is a fault of the same caliber
as to lack the historical, and the biolOgical ideas of the contemporary

world. If such a man is not compensated by exceptional, spontaneous

gifts, it would be very difficult to accept his competency beyond the

 

(157) Misiée. p. 79.

M3

limited ”vocational” meaning of the expressions 'good' physician, or
judge, or technician. In other words, the functional meaning of the term
'good professional' should be posited only in terms of a vital context.
Otherwise, it would be a sure result that the remaining acts in the life
of the 'professional' would be ”deplorable ones”, as Ortega chooses to
call them. Whatever action that transcends the realm of a strict vocat-
ional trade, even within the sphere of the so-called professional ideas,
would be condemned to cultural failure:

There is no alternative: in order to successfully move

within the jungle of life, one must be 'cultivated in the

culture', one must know its topography, and its ways or

methods. It becomes necessary to have an idea of space

and time as related to 'the times' in which life is con-

ducted: an actual culture. As a result of this fact, such

a culture must be either received or invented. And he

who has enough courage to invent it himself (i.e., to attempt

the construction of that which has been achieved in thirty

centuries of human existence) would be the only person with

an earned right to negate the need that the university must

meet by the teaching of the culture. But, unfortunately,

such a unique being who justifiably could oppose my thesis

would be an insane person. (lS8)

Failure of the Ortegan 'mission' would seem to indicate that
both professionalism and specialization, when not duly compensated
by the cultural demand, do break the unity of man into several pieces.
Some colleges teach 'humanities', and also ’phil050phy' as one more
of several specialized 'careers', thus trying to pass the fragment for
the whole. As a consequence of this, general education becomes the
only possible education. Unity is achieved not so much through singular-

ity of purpose, but rather by an attempt to achieve the wholeness of

what Ortega calls 'human reality':

(158) Misidn, p. 80.

lhh

Engineering could be found in the engineer, but the engineer

is only a piece and a fragmentary dimension of the man. Man

is an integrum, a totality, which cannot be found in the
fragment 'engineer‘....

The great immediate task has something of a gigantic puzzle....
By using the disperse pieces -- disiecta membra -- of the vital
unity of man... it must be reconstructed. It is necessary

to achieve the result of having each individual, or -- if
utopianism is to be avoided -- of having many individuals
become, each one for himself, that kind of a whole man. Who
else can do this, if not the university? (lS9)

The theme of 'vital reason‘ returns again, and this time it
seems to be tinged with the existentialistic quest for totality as an
ontological preoccupation. A simple transplantation of the same
argument suggests the existential rejection of logic and 'pure reason’:
the fragnentation of phiIOSOphy has led into ilegitimate claim, for

example, that the logician is the philosoPher. PhiIOSOphy can be found

 

in the logician, but the logician is only a fragmentary dimension of
phiIOSOphy. In this sense, all of phiIOSOphy, cannot be possibly found
in the logician, or in the ”scientist”, or in the ”specialized pro-
fessional“.

The implication seems to be that the university has the moral
obligation to meet the cultural demand, and that, at the point in time
in which Ortega addressed the Spanish students, the university was

only meeting such a demand in a very partial way. What universiti_§_

 

g9 in no way whouid be interpreted as a logical, and mostly a 'cultural'

proof of what the university is. Teaching at most universities appears

 

to be integrated by three activities:
(a) - The 'transmission of the culture', interpreted as

'maintenance of traditions‘.

—_

 

“59) Mision p. ol.

.__—.__...1.

IQS

(b) - The teaching of the 'professions', interpreted as a res-
ponse to false notions of cultural demand, which often
have degenerated into a search for social mobility, and
hence into motivations with a good share of acquisitiveness
(LL§., increase of means to the end of financial flflgflé
vivendi.). And,

(c) - Scientific research, or education of new men of science.
This activity often implies the exercise of 'pure reaSon'
either for its own sake or for the sake of ”life adjust-

ment”, interpreted as adjustment to activities (a) and/or (b).

Ortega could have added in (c) that in some cases ”research

activities” also serve the maintenance of tradition, and the drive for
acquisitiveness (or prestige), not only on the part of the student,
but also on that of the teacher. This seems to be especially true
today, since hardly anybody would deny that in some universities a
”trend for research” could be observed. Such a trend seems to consider
”research” as a formal activity of intrinsic worth, which is often
regarded as the highest criterion for the evaluation of a faculty
member. The Anglo-Saxon reader is familiarized enough with the almost
”totemic” significance of ”research”, within the so-called ’function'
of the university, and there seems to be hardly any need to belabor
this topic. At this point, Ortega asks the following question:

Have we answered with the above considerations the question

of what is the mission of the university? Hardly at all.

The only thing that we have done consists simply of a gather-

ing in an inorganic pile all of what the university now believes

it should be doing, plus something that, in our judgment, it
does not do but must do. Thus, the foregoing analysis has

only prepared the question, and nothing else. (lbd)

16o) hisidn, o. 82.

w-.- _

 

 

lh6

There is still another problem, namely that of the extent of
knowledge to be offered. Even if higher education should become reduced
to professionalism and research alone, the whole enterprise would be
nothing but a fabulous mass of studying activities. It is impossible
that the average student could, by a long shot, truly learn what the
university attempts to teach him. Urtega's premise in order to answer

such a question consists of stating that institutions do exist, i.e.,

 

are necessary and do have meaning, because the average man does exist
also. If the world consisted only of exceptional creatures, even the
existence of educational and public institutions could be questioned:
Anarchy is logical when it propugnates uselessness, because
it is based upon the assumption that every man is a nativate

exceptional-good, discreet, intelligent, and just. It becomes
necessary to refer every institution to the average man. (l6l)

 

The mission of the university consists, then, of making the
cultural faculty available to the average man. Since it is impossible
that the average man could really and truly learn ”everything” that
must be taught to him, many universities often have admitted this
failure without doing anything else but to incorporate it as a cons-
titutive part of university life. In other words, a paradoxical
Situation has originated in which the effective norm consists of anti-
cipating the very purpose of the university as something unreal. Or-
tega feels that in this manner the falsity of institutional life be-
comes admitted, with the regrettable consequence that such a falsifi-
cation could easily be trarsformed in the essence of the institution.
Existential overtones seem to underlie the Ortegan criticism:

.__

. .I at
(lbl) MISLQQ, footnwte, D. up.

lh7

This is the root of all evil -- as it is in ”real life”, be it
individual or collective. The 'original sin' consists precisely
of the anomaly of not being -- authentically -- what one is.

We can aspire to be anything we are not; but it is not legi-
timate to pretend that we are what we are not, 142., to consent
in swindling ourselves, or to become accustomed to a substantial
lie. When the normal regime of a man, or an institution, is a
fictitious one, an omnifarious demoralization emanates from it.
At the end debasement does occur, because it is not possible

to accommodate to self-falsification without having lost res-
pect for oneself. (l62)

According to Ortega, the above is the reason why Oa Vinci used
to say Chi non puo ggel che vuol,,quel che puo vogjia ('He who cannot
be what the wants should wan what he can be').

Such a Leonardesque imperative has to be the radical direction
of all university reform. Only the passionate resolution of
being what something strictly is, can be truly creative. Not
only university life, but all contemporary life has to be made
with a fabric whose name is authenticity. (I63)

The above paragraph combines a paradox of Bergsonian flavor
(Ouree est l'etoffe a quoi la vie est faite) and Heideggerian termino-
logy, with a pragmatic conclusion which, by now, should not amaze the

reader:

This is why I believe that it becomes inevitable to turn

the university inside out, or rather to radically reform it by
using as a basis the converse principle of that one upon which
it now stands. Instead of teaching that which, according to
utOpian wishfull thinking, should be taught, it must be taught
only what it can be taught, i.e., to aim the Operation to that
which Eflfl_Pe learned. (léh)

 

This principle, which Ortega describes as one of ”amazing Simoli-
city”, is precisely the key-concept behind the most revolutionary

educational step ever taken in the whole history of educatiOn, The

—

,4

(I92) Misi_o_g, p. 5314.
(l63) :gjggfig, D. 3;.

(16%) ‘Did.’ '57-): L11“.

lad

Mission of the University refers to such phenomenon as the ”formidable
change of direction‘l inspired by Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and the
representatives of Germanic idealism, who dared to formally state a
fact which thus far was a ridiculous thing to say: ”The student is as
important as the teacher, and perhaps more important than subject matter”.
And the deceivingly trivial result of the educational revolution was to
state that the student, or learner, was not a pedagogic principle gggg
32; Ortega is amazed at the fact that the pre-Rousseaunian theories
and practices held, ”with an almost unbelievably tenacity”, that teach-
ing had to be rooted upon subject matter, and upon the teacher as an
agent for the ”transmission of knowledge”. Thus, the Rousseaunian
innovation, and that of his successors, consisted simply of shifting
the very foundations of I‘educational science”, from subject matter and
teacher, to the student, thus recognizing that the latter, and his
peculiar cultural conditions, are perhaps the only guiding factor
for the construction of an organic ensemble within the realm of an activity
called 'education’. Scientific activity, and the so-called 'knowledge'
purports to be taught. And thus, the pedagogic principle is one entirely
different from the principle of culture, and that of science pg; fig.

The Ortegan ”principle of scarcity applied to education” seems
to have been inspired by the Swedish economist Gustaf Cassel, to whom
Ortega makes specific reference. (IOS) He also quotes Einstein as having
written 'If we had perpetual motion there would be no physics', thus

*

(le) ln l92l, Cassel's Theorestische Sozialoekcnunie (pp. 3, 11.)
proposed a return to certain aspects of classic economics, by
stating that scarcity is the principle of economic activity.
The context of this chapter shows how Ortega used Cassel's
theory, and applied it to education.

 

lb9

stating for science the same phenomenon which, according to Ortega,
is also true of education:

I find that something similar occurs with education. Why

do we have educational activities? Why is education an
occupation, and also a preoccupation for man? For these
questions, the Romanticists had the most lucid, touching,

and transcendental answers.... But we ... are simply satisfied
with the fact that things are, for the time being, what they
are, and nothing else; we love their nakedness. We do not

care about the cold, and the elements. We know that life is
hard, and most of all that it is going to be hard. We accept
its rigor, and do not try to SOphisticate its fate.... We want
cleanliness in our dealings with things. This is why we strip
them, and once they are stripped, we wash them by looking hard
at them, seeing what they are in puris naturalibus.

 

Man becomes occupied and preocuppied with education for a
reason which is as simple as it is dry, and as dry as it is
deplorable: in order to live with certain finmness, freedom
and righteousness, it is necessary to know an enormous
amount of things. The child, the youth, have an extremely
limited capacity to learn. This is the reason. If childhood
and youth would each last one hundred years, or if the child
or the young man only had memory, intelligence and attention
in unlimited amounts, the educational activity would be non-
existent.... (l66)

Such is the basis for the Ortegan contention that scarcity, and
limitation in the learning capacity, are the principles of instruction.
The exact preoccupation of teaching has to be based precisely upon the
measure in which it is impossible to learn. And only after this fact
has been recognized in all its puzzling, undeniable, and deceiving

simplicity it becomes possible to talk meaningfully about the increase

of knowledge in modern times. Indeed, after this, we can reflect upon
. I . . . . .
repeated cliches. In the new capitalistic eras, life becomes terribly

complicated, and demands a meticulous knowledge of specialized techniques.
Innovation also demands the knowledge of many skills posited largely

beyond a particularized capacity for learning. Ortega contrasts this

 

h. .— ——-. ...-

(l66) Misién, op. b9'9C,

situation with the other one represented by primitive life. Primitive
life practically had no teaching -- as we know of it -- because anyone
would be enabled to learn. A different phenomenon takes place: secret
and hidden knowledge. Primitive teachings, insofar as they cover the
learning of specialized skills, were esoteric and secret, but there is
no right to maintain the essential structure, and the cultural signifi-
cance of their contemporary equivalents hidden away from modern man.
Such would be the way to dangerous cultural alienation.

For the above reasons, Ortega describes most of his contemporary,
and connational, universities as a ”trOpical bramble-bush of teachings”.
If to this enormous task it should be added that universities are the
only entities to be trusted with the teaching of the culture, it is
no wonder -- Ortega feels -- that the bramble bush has grown to cover
the horizon.

It is also no wonder that students have developed a high degree
of su5picion and revolt at the prima fagjgg intuitive level. After all
they somehow sense that in the organization of higher education, and
in the construction of a university, the point of departure has to be
the student, and not the subject matter or the professor. The university
is described by Ortega as the institutional projection of the student,

whose two essential dimensions are: first, what he is (scarcity of

 

cumulative faculties in terms of learning) and second, what he needs
to know in order to live (in the Ortegan sense of 'living'l.

On the subject of ”student-revolts", so cannon in Continental
European or Latin American countries, and just beginning to be known
in the United States, Ortega reveals both penetrating anticipation

and analytic skill. He finds three important factors behind the so-

called ”student-revolts”. The first one he calls the 'agitation of
the national substance', i.e., the political situation of the nation,
while a second one is related to the almost inevitable series of
concrete abuses committed by some professors and administrators. find
the third one -- which he calls the 'most important and decisive' fac-
tor -- acts upon the students, probably with no clear or explicit re-
lationship. it simply consists of the fact that neither the students,
nor anyone in particular, but rather ”the times” (the present situation
of education all over the world) force the universities to be again
centered around the student. The university should become essentially
concerned about the student, and not centered around the professor.
According to what ”...higher education centers were in their most
authentic hour....”, the necessity of contemporary culture Operates
inevitably, even when those men affected by such forces may not be
aware of their clear and definite effects:

It becomes necessary that the students do eliminate the clumSy

ingredients of their rebellion, in order to accentuate these

other ingredients by virtue of which they are completely right,

especially the latter. (167)

A lenghty footnote in the same page should render the matter
acceptably clear:

The concept that the university is the student is to be carried

out even to the point of affecting its material organization.

It is absurd to consider the university, as it has been consi-

dered hitherto, the professor's house in which he receives

pupils. Rather the contrary: put the students in charge of

the house, and let the student body constitute the torso of

the institution, complemented by the faculties of professors.
The maintenance of disciplima through beadles gives rise to

shameful squabbles, and organizes the Students into a rebellious
horde. 'he students are not to blame, but the institution, whicn
is badly planned. The students themselves, properly organized

—-.—- ... -..- -..—..--..” ...- _ v» - -.v —o..

 

\fi
A}

for the purpose, should direct the internal ordering of the
university, determine the decorum of usages and manners, impose

r/‘\

disciplinary measures, and feel responsible for the morale. (loo;

Needless to say, certain profeSSors from Spain, Latin-America,
and perhaps other nations as well, are still shocked upon reading the
above remarks. It has been insinuated by some that the Ortegan ideology
is to be blamed, at least partially, for the rebelliousness, and ”utter
lack of discipline” exhibited by some Spanish-speaking students. Others
think that the presence of Ortega in the figpéblicg firqentiga of the
early thirties, and the Cordoba student-movement (in which university
students literally effected a EEEELiUéE§_.bY forcefully taking, closing,
and demanding a reorganization of the University of Cordoba) are two
events not to be regarded as completely disconnected. At any rate, for
praise or blame, the name of Ortega y Gasset is anything but foreign
to Spanish-speaking students and profCSSors, and his thoUghts on 'uni-

versity reform' are still often quoted by many a fiery orador estudiantil

 

of the countless demonstrations and squabbles that constantly take place
in Latin-American university life. it is rather easy and expedient to
ignore or dimiss student cunplaints on the grounds of IpsycholOgical
maladjustment', 'political agitation', and 'lacx of orientation',

fact still

Supposedly suffered by insignificant minorities, but the
remains that universities still have a problem with the relationship
tzetween an entity called ”immature human being”, and another entity
loosely referred to as ”life". This problem, as many ”guidance camnit-
tees” would attest, is many times a 'quiet one' also, and its relation

to the question of self-identity is only beginning to be in/eszigated.

 

-. w.- ‘. 'b---

 

153

However lyrically, Ortega tried to bridge this gap for all parties
concerned. It should also be useful, at this point, to reflect upon
the flexible meaning of the term 'beadle', which does not have to be
necessarily restricted to its ”old fashioned” connotation. Many con-
temporary universities have developed euphemistic substitutions for the
traditional ‘beadle', either pedagogically or administratively speak-
ing.

Thus, the average student, regarded as the raison_§J§3£g of the
university as an institution, should determine the quantity of disciplines
to be taught. And such an amount should consist exclusively of those
disciplines whose demand could be both feasible and justified. Ortega
describes them as ”...those teachings which the good average student
can truly learn....”.

A double selection has to be made of the ”fabulous mass of ‘know-
ledges'” in order to determine the basic teachings that Ought to cons-
titute the torso or minimum of the university. in the first place, only
'those 'knowledges' considered as strictly necessary for the life of
the man ”who now is a student” should be kept: effective life and its
inevitable urgencies constitute the first viewpoint to be regarded as

important for this ”first stroke of the clipping-shears”. Secondly,

a further synthesis still has to be effected on this first _g§jdgyn;
tine strictly necessary disciplines will have to be reduced even more
Luaon consideration of that which, gerjggtg, can be fully and comfortably

learned by the student:

It is not enough to consider something as necessary. Cen-
ceivably something necessary could still be posited practi-
cally beyond the possibilities of the student, and it would
be unreal to make a big fuss over its character of alleged
inevitability. One must teach only that which can be truly

lSL

learned. One must be inexorable, and proceed firmly on this

issue. (I69)

The English translation has the following version of the above:

How are we to determine the body of subjects which are to
constitute the torso or minimum of the curriculum? By sub-
mitting the present conglomeration to two tests: (i) We must
pick out that which appears as strictly necessary for the life
of the man who is now a student. Life, with its inexorable
requirements, is the criterion that should guide this first
stroke of the pruning knife. (2) What remains, having been
judged strictly necessary, must be further reduced to what

the student can really learn with thoroughness and understand-

ing.

It is not enough that this or that is necessary. When we least
expect, the necessary suddenly passes beyond the capabilities
of the student. it should be fantastic on our part to rant
and rave that it is necessary. (l70)

At any rate, it should be clear that the Ortegan university

consists essentially of the higher education which the ordinary man

should and would be able to receive. A second premise establishes the

necessity to make of this ordinary man a ”cultured person”, i.e., a

person who is 'up to date' with the cultural wealth of his times.

Although Ortega hardly writes as an ”educator”, and, of course, never

uses the educational vocabulary that is typical of ”researchers” in

the field, he broadly hints a curricular sequence:

(’69)
(I70)
(171)

It follows then, that the primary function of the university
is to teach the great cultural disciplines, namely:
- The physical scheme of the world (Physics).
- The fundamental themes of organic life (Biology).
- The historical process of the human species (History).
- The structure and functioning of Social life (Sociology).

l.
2.
3.
H.
S.- The plan of the universe (PhiloSOphy). (l7l)

Hisldh, p. 95.
15.51.29.0- 72.

Misggggi, p. 73-74.

Besides the above, Ortega repeats that it is necessary to make
the ordinary man a ”good professional”, in his already discussed own
sense. With the prior establishment of an ”apprenticeship to culture”,
the university ought to teach the common man, by the ”most economical,
direct and efficacious procedures the intellect can devise” how to be
a good doctor, a good judge, a good teacher of mathematics or of
history. And, consistent with the Diltheyan tradition of differentiat—
ing types of science, Ortega also contends that there is no cogent
reason why the ordinary man needs or ought to be a scientist:

Scandalous consequence: science in the true sense, i.e.,

scientific investigation, does not belong in any direct,

constituent capacity among the primary functions of the
universtiy. It is something independent.(l72)

Urtega devotes an entire chapter to the differentiation
between 'profession' and 'science', which he advances as a necessary
premise for the understanding of the above contention. The following
direct quotation should be sufficiently clear to understand why he is
Opposed to 'science' as the cardinal orientation of the university:

Science is not just whatever you will. Obviously, it is not

science to buy yourself a microsc0pe or to throw tOgether a

laboratory, But neither is it science to expound, or learn,

the content of a SCience. in its proper and authentic sense,
science is exclusively investigation: the setting up of pro-
blems, working at them, and arriving at their Solution. From
the moment a solution is reached, all that may subsequently

be done with the solution is not science. (Footnote: Except

to question it afresh, to convert it back to a problem by

criticizing it, and hence to repeat the cycle of scientific
investigation]. (I73)

Further justification for the “scandalous consequence” is then

the contention that the learning or teaching of a science is not

science itself.lku‘is it the application of a science. By the same

 

 

('72) Mission, 0. 7h.
(’73) 19151:.» .0. 75.

token, although it might be desirable to entrust the teaching of a
science to a scientist proper, it does not necessarily follow that

this practice should be adOpted with normative rigor. As a matter of
fact, Ortega contends that there have been and are ”prodigious teachers
of the sciences” who are not themselves investigators or 'scientists':

It is sufficient that they know their science. But to know
[about a science] is not to investigate (to do research).
To investigate is to discover a truth, or inversely, to de-

‘ monstrate an error. To know means to assimilate a truth
into one's consciousness, to possess a fact after it has been
attained and secured....
Science is one of the most sublime pursuits and achhevements
of mankind: more sublime than the university itself, conceived
as an educational institution. For science is creation, and
teaching aims only to convey what has been created, to digest
it and to induce learners to digest it. Science is carried on
upon so high a plane that it is necessarily an extremely deli-
cate process.Whether we like it or not, science excludes the
ordinary man. It involves a calling most infrequent, and re-
mote from the ordinary run of the human Species. lbfi.§£i§fi£lé£
is the monk of modern tires. (l7h)

 

Possibly the above reasoning is the essential factor that has

led Ortega's critics to maintain that he is an'éflj£g_educator'. Yet

the charge seems unjustified once the prenises are reflected upon.

If science is considered as an intrinsic activity of great formal worth
to pretend that the normal, ordinary student should be a scientist
\NOUlG be ”... at once a ridiculous pretension....”, as Ortega himself
calls it. In fact he further adds that pretensions are contracted,

like colds and other inflannmtions, and that possibly such a ridiCulous
paretension was contracted fran the "vice of utopianism”, which he

(jeescribes as the bane of the generation just preceding ours.

 

(1 7S) lbid., '70. 7f-7b. italics by the writer.

It should also be clear that the charge of ”anti-scientific”,
that some critics have made concerning Ortega y Gasser, is also a gross
misreading. Both pragmatic and existential overtones could be found
in his judgment of the issue:

But furthermore it is not desirable, even under ideal circums-

tances, that the ordinary man should be a scientist. if science

is one of the highest of human pursuits, it is not the Only one.

There are others of equal dignity, and there is no reason to

sacrifice these, dedicating all humanity to science. The

sublimity, moreover, belongs to science itself and not to the
man of science. His carer:r is a mode of existence quite as
limited and narrow as another; in fact more so than sane you
could imagine. (l76)

The point Ortega wishes to make is, of course, obvious. Con-
ceived as serious modes of existence, and as meaningful activities,
the teaching of the professions and the search for truth must be
pragmatically separated. it is important that both in the minds of
professors and students, the distinction must be clearly maintained.
Actually, Urtega claims, not to maintain the distinction is an impe-
diment both to the advancement of science, and of education. He is not
ignoring, of course, the fact that learning a profession includes some~
times the mastery of the systematized content of certain sciences, but
his answer is that this content is the end result of research, and not
research itself:

As a general principle, the normal student is not an apprentice

to science. The physician is learning to effect cures, and as

a physician he need not go beyond that. For his purpose, he

needs to know the system of physiology current in his day, but

he need not be, and in fact cannot be expected to be a trained
physiolOgist. Why do we persist in expecting the impossible?

I cannot understand. l am only oisgusted by this itching to
delude oneself.... this everlasting delusion of grandeur, this

 

- ~'—-.--.--.o———..

\J
K, I
-

(l76) Mission, 9.

——.~

l3}

die-hard utopianism of persuading ourselves that we are acniev-

ing what we are not. Ut0pianism results in a pedagogy of self—

abuse. (177)

if the virtue of the child is to think in terms of wishes, and
his role is that of ”making believe”, Ortega feels that the virtue of
the grown man is to will, and his role is to really do and achieve.
The foregoing chapter discussed the way in which some philosophies
of life look at action, and Urtega y Gasset complements it:

how we can achieve things only by concentrating Our energy:

by limiting ourselves. And in this limiting of ourselves lies

the truth and the authenticity of our life. indeed, all life

is destiny: if our existence were unlimited in duration and

in the forms it could assume, there would be no 'destiny‘....

The authentic life, young people, consists in cheerfully

accepting an inexorable destiny -- a limitation we cannot alter.

It is this state of mind which the mystics, following a pro-

found intuition, used to call 'the state of grace'. He who

has once honestly accepted his destiny, his own limitations, is

imperturbable. Impavidum ferient ruinae. (l78)

It should be noted at this point -- and Nostrand perceived the
difficulty -- that the Ortegan term 'destino' has certain Aristotelian
connotations. Again the biologism of Ortega appears to dictate sta-
tements such as the above. The human organism seems to be conceived
as being endowed with a type of potentiality, whose fruition seems to
constitute ”the organism's proper life”. Aside from destination, and
fate, the Spanish term 'destigg' also means adequate direction, as
a realistic awareness of possible achievement. This notion is also
similar to the Deweyan conception of freedon as intelligent and
effective choice, i.e., the awareness of achievement that can, or
cannot,he obtained, and hence the power to do certain things. Most

existential conceptions of freedom are also based upon the possibility

 

(:77l lbid., a». 76.

 

to overcome inevitable limitations interpreted as the 'human condition',
and man as ‘being-in-the-world'.

The conclusive result of the Ortegan dichotomy between 'profes-
sion' and 'science' is a severe criticism of those universities whose
curricular trend has been dominated by 'inquiry' or 'research'.
”Disastrous” is the tenm used by Ortega when he discusses the issue;
such a trend, he maintains, has led to the elimination of the prime
concern, i.e., 'culture', and has deflected attention from the problem
of how best to train future professionals for their so-called
”professions”:

Pedantry and the want of reflection have been large causes

in bringing on the ’scientism' which afflict the university.

In Spain, both these deplorable forces are coming to be a serious

nuisance. Any nincompoop that has been six months in a school

or a laboratory in Germany or North America, any parrot that

has made a third rate scientific discovery, comes back a nouveau

riche of science. Without having reflected a quarter of an

hour on the mission of the university, he propounds the most

pedantic and ridiculous reforms. Moreover he is incapable of

teaching his own courses, for he has no graSp of the discipline

as a whole. (179)

Needless to say, the geographic specificity of the quote does
not necessarily have to limit the scepe of the criticism: it could be
applied to countless self-appointed ”cultural experts", who believe
that quantified research alone entails social change. It could also
be applied to many a program of intensive scientific training, which
purports to ”expertize” a member of a culture foreign to that within
which the ”training” takes place in six months or slightly more, so
that, once an expert, the professional goes back to his native land,
in order to exercise scientific change. Ana it could also be applied

l

to most of the cross—cultural misunderstandings and ”urolect-failures ,

 

. -w~‘-'m

 

('75) lbld. or), 7U-7

C\
C.

which have based their performance strictly upon a ”scientific”
'appraisal of facts, often disconnected fron the total cultural plexus
to be studied, and even more frequently Supported by quantified data
that Ortega would describe as being completely divorced frun the body
of cultural and vital forces that make the ”facts” meaningful. Thus,
science must be differentiated both from 'professional activity' and also
from 'culture‘:

Let us make no mistake about it. Science, upon entering

into a profession, must be detached from its place in pure

science, to be organized upon a new center and a new prin-

ciple, as professional technics. And if this is true, it

must certainly have an effect on the teaching of the profes-

sions. Something similar is to be said of the relations be-

tween culture and science. (l80)

It has been remarked that Ortega defines culture, essentially,
as the system of vital ideas by which the age lives, since it is a
factum that man lives according to some definite ideas which constitute
the very foundation of his way of life. it has also been shown that
Ortega calls these ideas 'vital', since they are the components of
the life of an age. Ortega further describes these ideas as ”no more
nor less than the repertory of our active convictions as to the nature
of our world and our fellow creatures.... convictions as to the hierar-

chy of the values of things, i.e., which are more to be esteemed, and

which less....” (18l) ‘Ihe Modern Theme also refers to 'vital ideas'

 

as the components of culture, and defines culture as ”... a special

direction which we give to the cultivation of our animal potencies....” (loll

 

(ldo) lbid., p. Si.

(1.31) Ibid., p. 8!.

 

(ld2) Modern Theme, p. 76.

 

l6l

The connection with 'life', as interpreted by Ortega, should be
by now clear. it should be remembered that, to Ortega, the basic mean-
ing of the word 'life‘ is not biological but biographical. it should
be also convenient to recollect that Ortega maintains this meaning as
the one it has always had in the language of the people. The Mission
returns to the same theme; at this point in the deveIOpment of his
thesis Ortega contends that life means the totality of what mand does,
and what man is:

...that formidable business, which every man must exercise

on his own, of maintaining a place in the scheme of things

and steering a course among the beings of the world: 'To

live' is, in fact, to have dealing with the world: to address
oneself to it, exert oneself in it, and occupy oneself with
it....

if these actions and occupations which compose our living
were produced in us mechanically, the result would not be
human life. The automaton does not live. The whole difficulty
of the matter is that life is not given us ready made. Like it
or not, we must go along from instant to instant, deciding

for ourselves. At each moment it is necessary to make up our
minds what we are going to do next: the life of man is an ever
recurrent problem. in order to decide at one instant what he
is going to do or to be at the next, man is compelled to form
a plan of some sort, however simple or puerile it may be. It
is not that he ought to make a plan. There is simply no possible
life, sublime or mean, wise or stupid, which is not essentially
characterized by its proceeding with reference to some plan.
(The sublimity or meanness of a life, its wisdom or stupidity
is precisely, its plan. Obviously our plan does not remain the
same for life; it may vary continually. The essential fact is
that life and plan are inseparable).(l83)

The implication often referred to as ”typically existential”
complements the issue: even the abandonment of life to chance, or the
intentional suppression of it is ”to make a plan” in the sense of choice.
No paraphrasing exercise could render the matter in a way less prone to

misinterpretation than, again, Ortega's own words:

 

(l83) Ibid., p. 83.

l62

Every human being, perforce, picks his way through life.

Or what comes to the same, as he decides upon each act he per-
forms, he does so because that act 'seems best', given the
circumstances. This tantamount to saying that every life is
obliged, willy-nilly, to justify itself in its own eyes. Self-
justificatlon is a constituent part of our life. We refer

to one and the same fact, whether we say that 'to live is to
conduct oneself according to a plan', or that 'life is a con-
tinuous justification to oneself'. But this plan or justifi-
cation implies that we have acquired some 'idea' of the world
and the things in it, and also of reacting to his environment
with some rudimentary concept of it. He is forced to make an
intellectual interpretation of the world about him, and of
his conduct in it. This interpretation is the repertory of
ideas or convictions to which I have referred, and which, as
it is now perfectly evident, cannot be lacking in any human
life whatsoever. (l84)

The problem of self-justification is further described by Orte-
ga as 'fundamental', and he considers it obvious that a failure or
irregularity in the functioning of Such an important element of life
should be ensued by a ”grave ailment”. (l85)

The core preoccupation with this issue seems to be the Ortegan
'historicism'. Most of his works carefully point out that the vast
majority of human convictions are not made by the individual, 1‘2,,
not ”...fabricated by the individual, Crusoe-wise....”, but rather
received by him from what he calls the 'historical environment'. It
has been previously indicated that such a notion is equivalent to
the Ortegan expression ‘the times', and hence why he contends that
there is always a system of live ideas which represents the current
conceptual level of the age, lggé, ”... a system which is essentially

characteriStic of its times; and this system is the culture of the

 

(l8h) lbid., pp. 82—83.

(lBS) l§g_§eygl£w : the 533323: according to the analyzed author,
portrays such a 'disease' in the so-called ’mass-man‘ of the
twentieth century. ortega clarifies that the f rst edition uf
his book was 'incomplete', and planned to add a third part to
the study ”... analyzing more in detail this formidable problem
of 'justificeiian'”.

l63

age”. (l86) Therefore, in Spite of the fact that any given age
shows disparate systems of convictions, some of which are a ‘drossy
residue' of other times, there is always a typical historical orien-
tation contained in the contemporary culture of the times. Hence
the tremendous responsibility for higher education:
He who lives at a lower level, on archaic ideas, condemns
himself to a lower life, more difficult, toilsome, unrefined.
This is the plight of backward peoples -- or backward individuals.
They ride through life in an ox-cart while others speed by them
in automobiles. Their concept of the world wants truth, it wants
richness, and it wants acumen. The man who lives on a plane
beneath the enlightened level of his time is condemned, rela-
tively, to the life of an infra-man. (I87)
The difference between 'science' and 'culture' should become
clear at this juncture. It just so happens that in our age a large
part of the components of culture comes from science. But the vital-
istic preoccupation of Ortega should render it comprehensible that
culture should not be equated to science. The content of culture is much
more of a vital faith than it is a scientific fact. Although the content
of culture is both reconstructed, and also made in the field of science
more than anywhere else, the convictions characteristic of our times
--and of any other 'times' similar to ours -- become a matter of vital
faith:
Five hundred years ago, faith was reposed in ecclesiastical
councils, and the content of culture emanated in large part
from them. Culture does with science, therefore, the same

thing the profession does. It borrows from science what is
vitally necessary for the interpretation of our existence.

 

(l86) Mission, p. 83.

(l87) Ibid., p. 84.

l6h

There are entire portions of science which are not culture,
but pure scientific technique. And vice-versa, culture
requires that we possess a complete concept of the world and
of man; it is not for culture to Stop, with science, at the
point where the methods of absolute theoretical rigor happen
to end. (l88)

The result of the above reflections reveals the vitalistic
stance already discussed. Life simply cannot wait until the sciences
may have explained the universe 'scientifically sepaking'. At this
point Ortega again returns with the vitalistic response: "We cannot
put off living until we are ready. The most salient characteristic of
life is its coerciveness: it is always urgent, 'here and now' without
any possible postponement”. (l89)

The merciless characteristic of life is that ”... it is fired
at us point-blank....” Therefore, culture, which is nothing but the
interpretation of life, cannot wait any longer than could life itself.
The university should not be entirely devoted to the preparation of a
man of science; it should be much more appropriate if it helped to
develop a science of man. The former task risks the production of
contemporary 'barbarians'. The latter could, at least, be changed
into a systematic effort at the service of the average person, and, of
course, be extended to cover truly human scientists, as well.

At this point in the development of his views on higher educa-

tion, Ortega makes a series of remarks on German science, which could

well apply to similar situations, and especially to the already

 

(l88) Mission, p. 8k.

(189) lbid.. p. 81+.

I65

mentioned totemic or awesome regard for research and experimentation.
Historical allowance will have, of course, to be made, but the
essential content underlying the dangers of over-emphatic 'research'
could still be deduced from the Ortegan criticism:
It happens, at once luckily and unluckily, that the nation
which stands gloriously and indisputably in the van of science
is Germany.The German, in addition to his prodigious talent
and inclination for science, has congenital weakness which it
would be extremely hard to extirpate: he is a nativitate pe-
dantic and impervious of mind. This fact has brought it about
that not a few sides of our present day science are not really
science, but only pedantic detail, all too easily and credu-
lously gathered together. One of the tasks Europe needs to
perform with dispatch is to rid contemporary science of its
purely German excrescences, its rituals and mere whims, in
order to save its essential parts uncontaminated. (l90)
Unfortunately, the phiIOSOphers who perceived the trend for
'pedantic detail', and, simultaneously with Ortega took seriously the
task of eliminating the German ‘excrescences', were not able to avoid
a variety of the same disease which still affects many universities.
Reference has already been made to the voluminous mass of useless
pedantry that gets published under the name of 'research', in many cases
with the full support of foundations, government-agencies, and univer-
sities. A quantifying trend has tended to substitute for the Genmanic
'pedantic detail', but the rituals and mere whims still seem to
contaminate both the educational and scientific exercise. And Ortega's
plea for the purification of the essential scientific parts still
seems to apply in full force to the contemporary scene. Other nations

are now making a claim to stand ”gloriously and indisputably in the van

of science”, and the ”imperviousness of mind” has acquired the character

 

(l90)lbid., p. 89.

 

l66

of a mutual accusation. it could still be said, then, that it happens,
”at once luckily and unluckily”, that ”not a few sides of our present
day science” are not yet really science, in the Ortegan sense. To use
whitehead's terms, education for knowledge still seems to have indis-
putable priority over education for wisdom. Or, in Max Scheler's words,
an over-emphasis on the technological knowledge designed for man's
mastery over nature has obscured and slighted an educational concern
both of the knowledge proper of 'human formation', and of the 'know-
ledge of salvation'.

Consequently, Ortega's conclusion still applies:

There is need to humanize the scientist, who rebelled about

the middle of the last century, and to his shame let himself

be contaminated by the gOSpel of insubordination which has

been thenceforth the great vulgarity and the great falsity

of the age. The man of science can no longer afford to be

what he now is with lamentable frequency -- a barbarian know-

ing much of one thing. (l9l)

The above quotation is followed by an optimistic statement
about ”the principal figures” of the present generation of scientists,
that this writer would wish to modify. Ortega claims that fortunately
those principal figures have felt impelled by the internal necessities
of their sciences to balance their specialization with a symmetrical
culture, and seems to be confident that the rest will follow in their
steps ”as sheep follow the leading ram”. But this prediction does not
seem to have been fulfilled as Ortega would have wished. The fact seems
to be that, while leading scientists continue to be truly concerned about

the cultural and ethical implications of their discoveries, there is a

great number of secondary figures who easily forget the cautious episte-

 

(l9l) lbid., p. 90.

I67

mological and ethical warnings of their leaders, and soon indulge in
absolutistic misinterpretations, or in dogmatic generalizations about

the generalizing principles that they continue to pursue, either in
teaching or research activities. Thus radical interpretations or imper-
viousness to new possibilities still continue to impede the advancement
of science. The same phenomenon also seems to be true of teaching
activities, wherein theories of probability or careful hypothetical tech-
niques are often regarded as absolutistic, ad baculum decrees. Unfor-
tunately, then, Ortega was wrong, and "the rest” -- especially a significant
number of secondary figures -- have not followed the steps of their
predecessors ”... as sheep follow the leading ram.”

At any rate, Ortega's theory contends that if science has brought
order into life, it becomes imperative to put science in order: ”... to
organize it -- seeing that it is impossible to regiment science -- for
the sake of its healthy perpetuation....” (l92)

This could be made possible by means of a 'vitalization of science”,
i‘g., by the provision of a scientific form compatible with the human
life "... by which and for which it was made in the first place....”

For this purpose Ortega constructed a series of written statements of
extraordinary conciseness and felicity:

And so you see that by thinking over what is the mission of

the university, by seeking to discover the consequent character

of its cultural disciplines (115. systematic and synthetic),

we come out upon a vast horizon that Spreads quite beyond the

field of pedagogy, and engages us to see in the institution

of higher learning an agent for the salvation of science itself.

The need to create sound syntheses and systematizations of
knowledge, to be taught in the 'Faculty of Culture’ will call

 

(192) Ibid., 9. 9|.

l68

out a kind of scientific genius which hitherto has existed only

as an aberration: the genius for integration. Of necessity

this means specialization, as all creative effort inevitably
does; but this time, the man will be Specializing in the cons-
truction of a whole. The momentum which impels investigation

to dissociate indefinitely into particular problems, the pulver-

ization of research, makes necessary a compensative control

-- as in any healthy organism -- which is to be furnished by a

force pulling in the opposite direction constraining centrifugal

science in a wholesome organization. (l93)

But who are the men to be entrusted with such a task? Ortega's
answer is as primaiiggie trivial as it is sensible: the men endowed
with this genius come closer to being good professors than good
researchers. The task is one for well-rewarded, superbly-trained
teachers. The synthesized knowledge must be transmitted and made under-
stood for the production of a general image of the culture in the mind
and experience of the student. And such an activity of synthetic,
Structural laconism, (to be maintained as such in view of the already
discussed principle of scarcity) is more likely to be well-performed
by a person entirely devoted to it, than by an individual who Spends most
of his time submerged in his research.

Again Ortega's words should evoke familiar, contemporary situa-
tions:

One of the evils attending the confusion of the university

with science has been the awarding of professorships, in

keeping with the mania of the times, to research workers who

are nearly always very poor professors, and regard their teach-

ing as time stolen away from their work in the laboratory or the
archives. (l9k)

.k

(l93) Mission, p. 92.

(l9h) lbid., p. 92.

l69

Ortega's first five parts of the Mission are devoted to a t0pic

which he himself calls ”what the university must be in the first

place”. A recapitulation of the essential sub-tapics in the first five

chapters initiates the sixth one, and is also quite convenient at this

point. Granting that the ”principle of economy” should stand as the

pragmatic basis for the primary mission of the university, Ortega rephrases

his prior considerations in the following manner:

University, in the Strict sense, is to mean that institution
which teaches the ordinary Student to be a cultured person
and a good member of a profession.

The university will not tolerate in its program any false
pretense: it will profess to require of the student only
what actually can be required of him.

It will consequently avoid causing the ordinary student

to waste part of his time in pretending that he is going to
be a scientist. To this end, scientific investigation proper
is to be eliminated from the core or minimum of the universi-

ty.

The cultural disciplines and the professional studies will
be offered in a rationalized form based on the best pedagogy
-- systematic, synthetic, and complete -- and not in the
form which science would prefer, if it were left to itself:
special problems, 'samples' of science, and experimentation.

The selection of professors will depend not on their rank
as investigators but on their talent for synthesis and
their gift for teaching.

When the student's apprenticeship has been reduced to the
minimum, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the uni-
versity will be inflexible in its requirement of him. (l95)

Remarkable insistence on practicality can be observed again

and again as the justifying basis for the above plan. Ortega seems

to be obsessed with the fear of utOpianism, and hence never ceases

to recommend an ”ascetic frugality of pretensions”, and a ”severe

 

(I95) Mission, p. 93,

I70

loyalty in recognizing the limits of the attainable”, in order to meet
the university's most fundamental need. And this need, of course, is
described as the adequate correspondence between the functions and
limits of the university, and its institutional life. The typical Or—
tegan terms 'authenticity' and 'slncerity' are also repeated at this
point, so that the university does not pretend to be what it is not:
this is the classical existential preoccupation.

But the university cannot be limited to the Ortegan succinct
program already outlined. Ortega recognizes that science has a proper
place within the confines of the university, and to this task he devotes
his chapter on the consideration of all that the university should be
”in addition”:

And now is the prOper time for us to recognize, in all its

breadth and depth, the role science must play in the phy-

siology of the university, or rather let us say its psycholOgy
for the university is better to be compared with a spirit
rather than a body.

in the first place, we have seen that culture and profession

are not science, but are largely nourished by science. Without

science, the destiny of the EurOpean man would be an impossibi-
lity. The EurOpean man represents, in the panorama of history,
the being resolved to live according to his intellect, and
science is but intellect 'in fonm' .... The university is the
intellect, it is science, erected into an institution.... (l96)

Indeed, it should be surprising if Ortega would support an
isolation of ”culture and the professions” in the university, as two
separate kinds of activity completely divorced from the contributions
of science and research. It would not be long, Ortega concedes, before

those university activities would be overtaken by the creeping paralysis

of scholasticism. But instead of constituting the center of the univer-

(196) Ibid., 9. 91+.

l7l

sity, the sciences must 'pitch their camps' (laboratories, seminars,
and discussion centers) around that centralgpart. Before turning
into centrifugal effect, the scientific contribution should play a
centripetal role. The radial roots of the university must seek a
peripheral source of consultation.

All normal university students will come and go between the
university and these outlying camps of the sciences, where they
will find courses conceived from an exclusively scientific
point of view, on all things human and divine. Of the profess-
ors, those who are more amply gifted will be investigators

as well, and the others, who are purely teachers, will work
none the less in closest contact with science, under its
criticism and the influence of its ferment and Stimulation.
What is inadmissible is the confusion of the central portion

of the university with the zone of research surrounding its
borders. The university and the laboratory are distinct,
correlative organs in a complete physiology. The essential
difference between them is that only the university proper is
to be characterized as an institution. Science is an activity
too sublime and subtle to be organized in an institution. Scien-
ce is neither to be coerced nor regimented. Hence it is harm-
ful, both for the higher learning and for investigation, to
attempt to fuse them into one instead of letting them work

hand in hand in exchange of influence as free and spontaneous
as it is intense. (l97)

The university is then distinct from science, while at the same
time it is inseparable from it. To continue using Ortega's biolOgical
vocabulary, the relationship between science and the university is
like a symbiotic connection between two separate and distinct organisms.
This is why he writes: ”I should say myself 'The university is science
in addition'.“ Yet, such an 'addition' should not be one of mere
physical proximity to the institution:

Quite the contrary. And now we may make the point without

fear of misunderstanding. The university must be science

before it can be a university. An atmosphere charged with
enthusiasm, the exertion of science, is the presupposition

 

(197) lbid., pp. 95-96.

l72

at the base of the university's existence. Precisely be-

cause the institution cannot be composed of science -- the

unrestricted creation of exact knowledge -- it requires the

Spirit of science to animate its institutional life. Unless

this Spirit is presupposed, all that has been said in the

present assay has no sense. Science is the dignity of the

university -- and more, for life is possible without dignity: it

is the soul of the institution, the principle which gives it

the breath of life and saves it from being an automaton. That

is the sense in which the university 'is science, in addition'. (l98)

if one is reminded of the Ortegan theory of historical reason,
the implications of the above should be clear. The university should
not only maintain constant relationships with science, but, of course,
with public life, as a part of what Ortega calls the 'historical reality',
in which the present offers a character of totality, ”... not after
amputations gg_usum Delphini.” To continue using the Ortegan terminology:
the university of necessity must be Open to the whole reality of its
time. It must be in the midst of 'real life', as previously defined, to
the point of complete saturation.

At this juncture only by implication does Ortega touch on the
ethical question dealing with the role of the university in public
life. in a hardly visible footnote he only offers a hasty explanation:
he claims that in order to devote undivided attention to the problem of
intellectual content he has deliberately refrained in the Mission from
even naming the topic of moral education in the university. Yet his
Subsequent paragraphs cannot evade the problem, since he feels compelled
to mention the role of the press. Granting that the university must be

in the midst of real life, not only because it suits its purpose to live

in the quickening atmOSphere of historical reality, Ortega states that

 

(l98) Ibid., p. 96.

l73

conversely as well, the life of the pe0ple geeds acutely to have the

 

university participate, as the university, in its affairs:

On this point there is much I should like to say. But to be
brief, let me simply allude to the fact that in the collective
life of society today there is no other 'spiritual power' than
the press. The corporate life, which is the real life of
history, needs always to be directed, whether we like the idea
or not. Of itself it has no form, no eyes to see with, no
guiding sense of direction. Now then, in our times, the
ancient 'spiritual powers' have dissapeared: the Church be-
cause it has abandoned the present (whereas the life of the
people is ever a decidedly current affair); and the state be-
cause with the triumph of democracy, it has given up governing
the life of the people to be governed instead by their opinion.
in this Situation, the public life has devolved into the hands
of the only spiritual force which necessarily concerns itself
with current affairs -- the press. (l99)

Recognizing that he may not be more than a journalist himself,
Ortega quickly adds that he should not wish to throw too many stones
as the journalists. Yet, he seems to imply that the axiOIOgical impli-
cations cannot be avoided. The so-called 'spiritual realities', a term
which he uses in loyal Germanic tradition, do differ in worth, and do
compose a hierarchy of values, whose factual organization cannot be ignored.
It just so happens, Ortega notices, that in such an axiological herarchy
journalism seems to have a rather inferior place. His own words, again,
should describe the situation better than paraphrastic effort or officious
reiteration:

it has come to pass that today no pressure and no authority

make themselves felt in the public consciousness, save on the

very low Spiritual plane adopted by the emanations of the press.

50 low a plane it is that not infrequently the press falls

quite short of being a spiritual power, and is rather the

opposite force. By the default of others powers, the

responsibility for nourishing and guiding the public soul

has fallen to the journalist, who not only is one of the

least cultured types in contemporary society but who more-
over -- for reasons i hope may prove to have been merely transito-

 

(199) Mission. p. 97.

l7h

ry -- admits into his profession the frustrated pseudo-intellect-

uals, full of resentment and hatred toward what is truly spiritual.

Furthermore the journalist's profession leads him to understand

by the reality of the times that which creates a passing sensation,

regardless of what it is, without any need for perspective or

architecture. (200)

Some of the Ortegan terms have now become taboo in certain aca-
demic circles. The term 'spiritual', for example, is regarded with
suSpicion, if not misinterpreted or rejected on the basis of a hasty
equation with religious matters. Yet, if the explanation offered in
the foregoing chapter is taken into account, and if, for example,
another tenm is substituted for ‘spiritual', e,g., 'scientific re-
liabiiity', 'academic quality', etc., the Ortegan criticism seems
to still stand as tenable. Indeed it could not be denied that life
takes place in a present tense, but the Ortegan criticism seems to
imply that such a truism is either distorted or taken advantage of,
when the journalist reduces the present to the 'momentary', and even
the 'momentary' to the sensational, or the entertaining, or thelnarket-
able character of the factual information to be offered. Ortega
could have added that sometimes nativistic loyalties or ethnocentri-
cities, or even the sloganish remarks pitched at public popularity,
do make of journalism a dangerous activity for the'mission of the
university'. Little modification seems to be called forth in the
following attack:

The result is that, in the public consciousness today, the

image of the world appears exactly upside down. The space

devoted to people and affairs in the press is inversely pro-

portionate to their substantial and enduring importance;
what stands out in the columns of the newspapers and maga-

 

(200) lbid., p. 98.

I75

zines is what will be a 'success' and bring notoriety. Were

the periodicals to be freed from motives that are often unspeak-

able; were the dailies kept chastely aloof from any influence

of money in their opinions -- the press would Still, of itself,

forsake its proper mission and paint the world inside out. Not

a little of the grotesque and general upset of our age -- (for

EurOpe has been going along for some time now with her head on

the ground and her plebeian feet waving in the air) -- is the

result of this unchallenged sway of the press as the sole 'spirit-

ual power'.” (ZOl)

The situation indeed has not changed much for now radio, television,
the cinema, and other of the so-cailed 'mass communication media' could be
added to the journalistic category that Ortega criticizes. The geographical
expression 'Europe' could also be expanded to include vast areas of the
western and non-western worlds, ”free, non-free, and otherwise”. It appears,
then, to be still valid that it is a question of life and death for the
world to put this ridiculous situation to rights. According to Ortega
if this is to be done the university must intervene, as a university, in
current affairs. It is, no doubt, one of the best candidates to present
unbiased points of view that are 'culturally', 'professionally', and
'scientifically' qualified -- to use Ortega's own terms.

Any misinterpretation that could have been induced by the Ortegan
concern for students, or any accusation that could be made against him
on the grounds of ”anarchical agitation”, may be dismissed now as he
relates that point with the 'additional' role of the university:

Thus it will not be an institution exclusively for students,

a retreat ad usum Delphini. in the thick of life's urgencies

and its passions, the university must assert itself as a major

'Spiritual power', higher than the press, standing for serenity

in the midst of frenzy, for seriousness and the grasp of in-
tellect in the face of frivolity and unashamed stupidity.

 

(20l) Mission, pp. 98-99.

l76

Then the university, once again, will come to be what it

was in its grand hour: an uplifting principle in the history

of the western world. (202)

It is hoped that with the above discussion the complete 'mission'
of the university has been essentially discussed in its two facets:
what the university is, primarily, and what the university should be
”in addition".

The final remarks will consist of a succint reminder of the basic
assumptions upon which Ortega constructs his higher educational theory.
The nuances of its development have been already discussed in some
detail. But the skeletal groundwork needs perhaps to be reinstated:
man always lives within a historical context. His life is made of a pe-
culiar and almost indescriptiblc substance which could be referred to as
'his times', or 'the times'. While the non-human living entity is always
a 'first entity' in the sense that its particular life is nothing but
the ggbgt of being a living entity, man has inherited an undeniable past
and hence -- as a successor of a series of past human experiences --
there is a significant portion of his being and possibilities that
cannot be avoided. in this sense his range of choice is limited, and
such is the way in which Ortega uses the term 'destiny'. Man has been
a series of phenomenal factii, and there is a constructive sense in which
he cannot continue to exhaust his possibilities, and rather has to
determine another series of elements concerning ”what he has to be”.
The university must realize that individual life is already essentially

historical, and its historicity belongs precisely to the life of each

 

(202) lbid., p. 99.

'77

person. This is why ”... in order to understand that which is human,
personal or collective, it is necessary to tell a story....” (203)

Men and nations do certain things because, as a part of a historically
given cultural matrix they must combine those forces and elements

with the range of possibilities which, as an individual, are allowed

by the human condition. By the same token, the human individual is

not the debut of mankind. Within his circumstantial plexus of culture,

he finds other men and the society which is produced, by for, and among
themselves. Hence, this humanity, i‘g., the one that begins to be develop-
ed within himself as an individual, follows another humanity that already
has been developed and perhaps culminated. In sum, individual humanity
receives the accumulation of a mode of existential being that has already
been forged, and that 5532 is not there for him to invent, but simply to
receive as the site of his own placement. (204) And such is the
assumption upon which the university must be built; the 'human destiny'
to which Ortega constantly makes reference. The other task of the uni-
versity is, of course, to provide as much as possible the needed security
for existence, since man is always forced 'to do something' in order to
find meaning in his life. The provision of an understanding of my human

condition, of my own being, and that of my life with myself, and with

 

(203) In Spanish ”to tell a story” is synonimous of ”to tell a history”,
if the term historia is used -- as in the present instance --
instead of cuento (short story). Therefore, the story told by
a human person has a twofold implication: in a sense such a story
is predetermined as a 'historical reality'; in another, the story
reflects a range of choices and possibilities related both to
organic potential and cultural awareness. In this manner, the ego-
centric predicament is avoided, and the human condition becomes
'socio-historical' rather than historical per se, in a strictly
solipsistic sense.

(20h)"Historia como sistemaT Obras Completas, VI (I932), pp. hO-h3.

 

l78

others. is the task for the university, whose ideal attitude to the
professions, to culture, and to science has been already explaned.

In sum, the mission of the university presupposes the priority
of preparing a science of man over the preparation of a man of science.
Man is a circumstantial being, and Science -- as pure reason -- is only
a part, however important, of his circumstantial complex. To invert

the equation is only to falsify the raison d'etre of higher education.

CHAPTER Vll
RECAPITULATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will attempt to make an evaluation of Ortega y
Gasset as a general phiIOSOpher. In many respects it will simply ela-
borate on statements already made, and its general intention is one
of providing a conclusive tone to the topics and subtopics encountered
during the development of the investigation. Strictly with the purpose
of becoming aware of the types of problems to be found with a type of
'doing philosophy' which in more ways than one could be considered as
'foreign' to the customary Anglo-Saxon mind, the foregoing discussion
of the Ortegan concepts more closely related to education seems to yield
at least one solid result: Jose Ortega y Gasset is not a systematic
philosopher in the most widely accepted sense of the expression. Such a
finding seems to agree with other findings. If we are to believe in the
testimony of scholars generally described as competent, and who have
studied the man for a number of years, there seems to be sufficient
agreement to the thesis that Ortega is not a systematic phiIOSOpher,
if by 'systematic' we understand the type of thinker who builds a coherent,
Iwighly detailed account of the traditional 'philosophic' problems, such
las 'being', 'existence', 'knowledge', and 'value'. Ortega does not seem
to rank.with the category of thinker usually pictured when, for example
the names of Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl -- and
many others -- are recalled.

On the other hand, however, the tremendous scope of the Ortegan

turitings posits an almost unsurmountable difficulty that becomes

I79

l80

literally physical once serious study is attempted. One is never sure,
or absolutely certain, of the desired answers, and the doubt always
seems to haunt the mind that perhaps the explanations sought after could
be found in some hidden little article, or in more transparent notes

for a lecture that was never delivered, or in his oral conversational
classroom discussions -- which unfortunately were never recorded, or
preserved in some other way.

Two relatively secure facts could be invoked at this point: in
the first place most of the serious minded scholars who attended the
different universities in which Ortega taught do seem to agree on the
fact that he was a clearer speaker than an explicit writer. This phe-
nomenon is possibly due to his conscious effort to keep a written sty-
listic reputation. Spanish is a language whose tonal gradations and
rhythmic euphony are zealuously kept by most writers using it to express
themselves. Even orally enunciated, such values are often placed by a
professional orator well over informality, clarity, and casualness,
although more license is usually allowed in classroom conversation. In
this sense, English -- and eSpecially American English -- seems to be
more aloof to lyrical euphony which in many a case is completely sa-
crificed to an alleged search for pedagogic clarity. Such a cultural
trait will always seemingly stand between Spanish and English, and hence
why the Anglo-Saxon complains about the Latin immolation of explicitness
to beauty, as often as the Spanish-speaker considers the Opposite opera-
tion an unmentionable crime. As a result of this, what the Latin often
regards as the proper way to convey academic material often becomes an
intolerable mannerism to the Anglo-Sacon counterpart. Ortega seems to be

carried-away by such an ”objectionable preoccupation”, and in this sense

l8l

a difference could perhaps be established between his conversational, and
his literary 'languages'. Without the intention of being scientifically
hypothetical, in the Anglo-Saxon sense, the writer submits such a consi-
deration in the way of an explanation for many cultural misunderstandings
that prove to be almost hopelessly puzzling for both sides. Brazilia,

as a beautiful capital city whose administrative inhabitants had to
'commute' for hundreds of miles, due to lack of practical facilities for
Survival; and some of the aesthetically Stunning buildings in the campus
of the National University of Mexico, which later were found with serious
functional defects, are two examples that could be offered in the way of
an illustration of these two opposing vital values.

The peculiar practicality of esthetic appeal is then a factor
that appears to be in the way of ”good, sound, Anglo-Saxon analysis”,
especially with phiIOSOphers like Ortega y Gasset. Yet, many a case has
been made for the vital utility of artistic objects, and this is not
the place to prove it for the skeptical lagician or radical pragmatist.
The explanation is simply offered as an indication of cultural divergence,
and as a possible interpretation of the difficulties faced by the analytic
mind when facing the Ortegan pensamiento. In this sense, then, it is rei-
terated that most of the Ortegan writings do have a powerful esthetic
element, and should also be regarded as a diSplay of objectiveness, such
as the one offered by works of art.

The other factor to be considered is that, as in a good work of
art, there seems to be a coherence to the overall picture of the Ortegan
complete works. The essential themes of such a total quality have been
discussed in some detail throughout the foregoing chapters, and should

Speak for themselves at this point. What the writer wiShes to reinstate

I82

is the integrated quality of the themes of existence, life, and culture.
The Ferraterian comment quoted in Chapter II could be repeated now:

”... the more carefully we look at the strokes of the brush, the more
consistent and organized appears to be the picture ....” In this sense
of the term, Ortega indeed constructed a system, but if by 'system' we
mean a well-organized, carefully constructed gags which exhausts, one
by one, all or most of the logical implications suggested by each meta-
physical, epistemological, or axiological issue, there is no system in
the Ortegan quest for vital reason.

On the other hand too, the writer wonders how fair it would be
to demand the customary and traditional systematic approach of a man who,
by definition and pre-established intent, did not wish to be a systematic
thinker in the classical manner. Instances have been given of the fact
that Ortega did not want to write in the highly structured way usually
followed by the pure phiIOSOpher, and at times he reveals a distaste
for the classical method of philosophizing. If one remains respectful
of the assumptions that underlie the Ortegan construct, the demand for
a tremendous definitional treatise, followed by deductive and formally
organized steps, in the usual way, does not appear to be entirely just.
Ortega, indeed, was not the man to complete a task similar to the
transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason,
and he appears to have thought that his calling was a different one.

In effect, Ortega deliberately chose to write in newspapers
because ”... it was necessary to perform certain lyrical seduction towards
phiIOSOphical problems in a non-philosophical manner....” This task of
seduction appears to be carried out with entire success, since -- as

mentioned in earlier chapters -- the Ortegan influence has been great,

l83

especially among his language brothers. And, as one of Ortega's lingfiis-
tic compatriots, the writer agrees with the strategy. With people who
feel little inclination, behavioral and otherwise, to be 'philosophical'
in the ordinary systematic sense, a literary trick might be necessary.
Thus, in this manner, Ortega tried to have Spanish-Speaking people
read ”phiIOSOphy” without being aware that they were doing so. And here
he was much more true to his existential aim than many other philosophers
who have received the same classification. Such a task is also one to
which the prgamatist would feel sympathetic, since both he and the exist-
entialist seem to share the assumption that philosophy is of little human
importance if restricted to isolated, elite-reaching exercises. Although
analysts, positivists, and some rationalists would doubtiessly differ
among themselves, it would appear that, aside from granting to ordinary
language the category of philosophical criterion, the technicalities
proper of formal-logic and other epistemological tools would still be
reserved to a selected few. The argument here appears to be that a
phiIOSOphy considered useful by papular demand would be as ”impure” as
popular physics, or applied mechnics in terms of their “pure” counterparts.
The role of the 'phil050pher' is perceived as similar to that of the
pure physicist, or the theoretical maethematician, who need the engineer
in order to have their findings useful. But the fact still remains that
there is a difference between 'popularizing philosophy' by decreasing its
technical importance, and making phiIOSOphy useful for behavioral or
axiological improvement. Ortega's task seems to have been the latter,
rather than the former, and the confusion needs to be elucidated as he
purported to have it.

In this regard he appears to have an extremely persuasive justi-

l8h

fication, as well as a convincing criticism of the epiStemoIogically
oriented philosophies. If analysts, for example, see themselves as
purifiers of the cOgnitive enterprise, as clarifiers of equivocal and
”multivocal” language, and as non-subjective directors of axiological
behavior, their essential task is then one of translation. Most of their
I'translations“, though, have in turn to be translated to the average
scientist and the average artist, not to mention the average man. We
seem to be in a desperate need to have these second-rated translators,
since the very sins condemned by the ”first translators” are bound to be
increasingly multiplied, as the average scientist, or artist, decides
to phiIOSOphize on the problems of his own discipline, in absence of the
”second translation”. Example: the fields of literature, psychOIOgy, and
sociology, wherein self-appointed ”philosophers” have showered both the
academic, and lay worlds with countless ''conclusions” on Shakespeare,
juvenile-delinquency, and sex-drives, all in the name of research. Em-
pirical observation, factual gathering, statistics, and induction, seem
to have been exalted as the only possible media for knowledge. On the
other hand, certain terms like ”spiritual”, ”intuition”, and ”opinion”
appear to be carefully avoided, and banned from the ”learned world”,
while other expressions like ”academic reliability”, ”insight”, and
”hypothesis” (which in many cases do seem to have the same meaning as the
forbidden ones) are widely used in the current, scientific literature.
The appalling conclusion seems to be that many modern philosoohers
(mostly the secondary figures) Spend a great deal of time writing for
each other, and competing as to the number of articles that are finally
published by the generally respected specialized journals. The transla-

tions that these secOndary phiIOSOphers make of the most important ones

l85

are not readable by the average scientist, or artist, and thus a lifetime
of undeniable dedication and work is usually devoted to graduate class-
work, and several short essays that go to specialized journals, to be

read by specialized pe0ple. An occasional_book or two, with few exceptions.
also follow the above course. They criticize each other in true dialectic
fashion, observing all the rules of the game. In most cases the articles
are refutations, or modifications of argumentative theses, often expressed
in semi-mathematical form. And so the formal machine continues its
uninterrupted exercise, indulging in the activities that are pleasing to
its participants, or ”fulfill their vital needs” as an esoteric minority
group. Often the pure phiIOSOphers voice and open distaste for their
'applied' counterparts, by sumgly remarking that a former colleague

”went into Social science”, or “... if now in education”, as if he had

not proven capable of following the customary, expected behavior. Such

is the routine that Ortega defied, by trying to maintain the seriousness
of his problems while, at the same time, attempting to be read by his

compatriots. The writer contends as a conclusive stance that such a

 

course of action was revolutionary, original, and truly 'educational'

in aim and effect. In support of such a contention the fact might be
adduced that Ortega's intellectual capacity and perceptive judgment -- as
shown in his writings -- was of a sufficient caliber to have allowed

him to pursue the customary career of teaching, and writing, esoteric
material. Whatever criticism is made of his supposedly truistic contention
that life is the most immediate reality, he indeed talks about this
reality much more often than he talks about ”talk of reality”. The same
factual finding could be presented in his talk.abont inuwlgdje, .nc his

talk about value. Otherwise, the circularity implied in the activity of

l86

translators, who, in turn, need other translators, could dangerously

be perpetuated ad nauseam, and the phenomenon of'talk about talk' becomes

 

a lofty exercise of a nature entirely different from the relationship
between pure and applied science. There is no denying to the fact that
the gap between pure and applied science has been adequately filled in the
technological world, whereas it continues to be a critical void between
pure analytic philosophy, and the philosophies 'of' behavioral science,
education, and the humanistic enterprises.

The writer, then, wishes to support the basic Ortegan thesis,
as interpreted in the foregoing chapters. Man is a living entity, and
not everything in his life is purely rational. Two overwhelming tools
are at his disposal: his rationality and his vital energy. The former
has produced a spectacular display of physico-natural or technological
progress, while the other appears to be present in most of his artistic
and esthetic manifestations, not to mention his religious inclination.

It seems sensible that unilateral emphasis on either one of the two forces
is undesirable. If the human objectified form is going to deserve the
name 'human', both pure reason, and vital drives appear to be worthy

of such a name. The Sistine Chaptel, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or the
literature derived from ecstatic 'holiness', appear to be as magnifi-
cently human as the arrival to flawless logical argument, computers that
design other computers, quantum physics, and semantic analyses.

Obviously the difficulties posited by the systematization of a
philosophy that recognizes the inclusion of the above differentiation as
an enterprise which is also 'phiIOSOphical', are enormous. But there
seems to be a great deal of expediency to the relegation of these problems

to the realm of psychology on the grounds that they have little cognitive

l87

worth. And, precisely, a logical consideration of the problem appears

to reveal that the dismissal of propositions of the type ”X is difficult”,
and their consideration as if they were equivalent to propositions of
the kind ”X is irrelevant”, are faulty inferences. Their lack of proof
-- in the ordinary sense of empirical evidence -- also appears to be
faulty ground for the dismissal of difficulties of this type. If this is
done, the whole question is erroneously resolved by resorting to one

of the Simplest adfiiggorantjggLfallacies:‘gggj, ”Since the vitalistic
philosophers have been unable to prove their point, and since no one,
thus far, has been able to prove it, therefore the question must be
either false or irrelevant”. It is for the above reason that the writer
wishes to support the serious study of vitalistic, existential, and
phenomenological theories, since many of the problems treated by them
are of 'human importance', as defined, and do not necessarily poSit
mutual exclusiveness in terms of the cOgnitive preoccupations that

seem to be typical of most contemporary Anglo-Saxon phiIOSOphies.

In the judgement of this writer, the Ortegan answer has undeniable
merit. Since non-cognitive manifestations cannot be placed -- as 'human‘ --
on a mutually exclusive basis, reason needs the vital impulses, and these,
in turn, need reason. He envisioned a new type of reason, in which he
tried to maintain that the powers of pure reason would not be as sharply
divided or separated from the vital concerns, as the present situation
appears to be. There seems to be little refutation of the implications
of his main stance: through an exclusive use of ‘pure reason' man has
developed certain highly refined tools that could lead to his own destruct-
ion. And the gap between the mastery of man's natural resources (the

physical environment) and the mastery of his own destiny (as defined in

Chapter VI) seems to be an appalling one. Man is now almost the master
of his immediately physical environment, and yet in his political or social
life, for example,he still behaves with an unmatching, and pathetic
”immaturity”. Specialized scientists have acquired unsu5pected physical
power, while strong and influential nations behave like quarreling youths.
Pure reason has failed to place itself at the service of 'life', igg.,
of social, political, ethical, and economic leadership, not only for the
sake of a consistent unity of concrete values, but also for the sake of
mere physical survival. Physico-natural science has succeeded in prolonging
human life, while education, and other institutions now subdued to power
structures mostly based upon sheer physical and economic power, are bluntly
pushed to solve certain problems that have been precisely created by the
unrestricted exercise of 'pure reason', at least in good part. Population
explosions, ignorance, mediocrity, inequality, human exploitation, and
constant violations of human dignity or freedom, are among these problems.
In the above sense, a concept which Ortega named 'vital reason'
-- its inception and development -- truly appears to be the ”problem
of our times”. To use Ortegan terms, the deveIOpment of this tool has to
constitute the bridge between life at the service of pure reason, and a
reasonable use of reason at the service of life. It appears that, without
this bridge, and without the development of a new way of looking at the
uncontrolled explosion of technologically applied knowledge, mankind
seems to be doomed. Such a ”reasonable reason” has the possibility of
making us culturally literate, as Opposed to the 'cultural illiteracy'
-- lack of vital reason -- which has paralyzed entire portions of the
world's population.

To think that the prOgress made by technological science is a

l89

a good insurance policy is to have excessive confidence in the purely
rational powers behind its formal structure. In this sense, the writer
concurs with Ortega, and wishes to express that such purely rational wealth
is not a sufficient guarantee. Unless we learn to apply the uneven develop-
ment of pure reason, as defined, we could be compared to children playing
with dynamite. Such a 'learning' is perceived by the writer strictly as an
educational task, which must be perfonmed, lest the whole world be blown-
up, hence disturbing the quiet work of researchers and formal logicians.
This is the great value of pragmatically oriented philosophies: if the
results of research are not ”learned to be applied”, the great achievements
of knowledge in our hands, would again allow us to be compared with children
playing with dynamite. The paradoxical exclusivity of pure reason in
technology and life may well resemble a perfectly well constructed tractor
that has been let loose in a chinaware shop: no fault of the machine,

it could be perfectly constructed from a scientific and technical view-
point, but other man-made things could be destroyed. Such as the objects

in a china shop (many of them not too scientific, or logical, some of

them perhaps rather frail and easily destructible) many human creations
may suffer as a consequence of the misuse, or abuse, of the very
achievements of scientific reason.

Regardless of the Ortegan success or failure in his task of
discussing vital reason, it cannot be denied that we need to become
universally and humanly ”reasonable”, with a different kind of reason.

We seem to need a ”logic of life”, as badly as we need one of syllogistic,
formal perfection. Ortega seems to have been aware of the fact that we
need a logic of the heart, similar to the Pascalian legique du coeur,

but wihtou the post-card sentimentality. In this logic, which he tried

I90

to display through his writings, he attempted to show an ingredient Of
cultural awareness, i‘e., of consciousness Of our own human situation,
which joins physical dimension to social obligation, culture to science,
and what men do to what man is, vitally speaking. It has been shown that
the Ortegan notion of culture tries to fuse both the socio-scientific,
and the Germanic objectifying sense of the term. He also adds a human
necessity to be aware of what man has done, as a powerful determining
factor Of what he is.

It should be obvious that this is the type of awareness that must
be cultivated by the educational enterprise. Lacking a detailed program,
which evidently was left to teachers and specialized researchers, Orte-
ga placed education at the service of cultural awareness, while on the
other hand, placed scientific knowledge at the service of education,
instead of vice-verse.

Speaking of knowledge, it should be obvious that this is the
philosophical area where the Ortegan scheme presents its most difficult
problem. Since his whole theory of higher education appears to be
conditioned by his epistemOlOgical stance, and since such an aSpect
seems to be the most important one for his Anglo-Saxon readers it is
convenient to reach conclusive findings at this point.

When most Anglo-Saxon readers, face the Ortegan construct, the
first bothering factor is precisely the self-sufficiency Of the claim.
How does Ortega so surely know that his answer is the true one? Wherein
does reside the justification for the emphatic use of final expressions
such as 'genuine', 'true', 'real', as Opposed to the firm manner in
which he rejects certain concepts as being 'false', 'inauthentic', and

'unreal'? The technicalities of the problem must be, then, faced again,

l9l

before any conclusive stance could be offered in tenns of his merit as
a philosOpher of education.

A scrutiny of the essay Ni Vitalismo ni Racionalismo reveals
perhaps the most ”systematic” Of the Ortegan efforts to explain in what
Sense his philosophy was vitalistic, and in what Other sense it was not
rationalistic. (205). It has been shown that the Ortegan scheme does
not have the intention of being vitalistic in the Bergsonian sense, nor
does it have the purpose of becoming rationalistic in the sense that it
charges the use Of reason with the quality of being irrational. Ortega
denies that knowledge could be assimilated to a biological process to
be understood by means of general organic laws. Biological intuitionism
is also rejected on the Kantian basis that there is no such thing as
a Strictly intellectual or theoretical intuition. Knowledge necessarily
implies judgment, and (according to Ortega) it is absolutely irrefutable
that reality must be approached from a conceptual framework, if we expect
to find any theoretical significance about it.

It has been already shown that the reasons for the rejection of
vitalism were anticipated in El Tema de Nuestro Tiempp, where Ortega
hoped to prove that human thought can be studied both from a HinT.g;ca£
and a COgnitive viewpoints, without necessarily implying that the adequate
concepts for its logical evaluation should be reduced to a biolOgical
question. (206) To place the issue within an analytic framework, Ortega
is simply saying that thought finds its justification in subjective life,

not in the sense that true thoughts are those that have a vital utility,

 

(205) III. (1929). pp. 270. ff.

(206) III, (I923), pp. 16h, ff.

'92

but rather in the sense that it is only in subjective life that such a
justification may take place. Other students Of Ortega seem to agree with
Such a finding:

My life is the center of everything that has significance

for me; it is only insofar as something is given within

my life, that it becomes meaningful to me. TO say, there-
fore, that thought finds its justification in my life does
not mean that every person justifies his thought in terms

of vital necessities, although it is a fact that thought

is originated as a vital necessity. I justify my affirma-
tions by appealing to the nature of things, but such a jus-
tification, by itself, does occur and does have a meaning
only within the scope of my life. Utterance of the above
remarks could be equated to saying that the process of giving
reasons, that constitutes the justification Of a given thought,
is a process by means of which I hope to show that my thought
is adjusted to an Objective reality, but such a process is
given in my life, or in human life. (207)

Ortega himself provides the occassion to conjecture that the
above interpretation is a correct one, since the whole question appears
to be succintly focused in one of his many hidden footnotes:

... on loosing its exclusive ascription to somatic meanings,

the science of life, the loggs of bios becomes a fundamental

knowledge in terms of which all the other knovledges are de-

pendent, including logics, and, of course, physics and tra-

ditional biology, i.e., the science of organized bodies. (208)

There seems to be, then, nO question that phiIOSOphy must be
the logos Of bios, and that this basic task should not lead into believ-
ing that phiIOSOphy must become biolOgy in the ordinary ”scientific”
sense. Human life must be the subject-matter of philosophical reflection.

and only in this sense it appears legitimate to 'biologize'I the philo-

SOphical activities. Therefore, it is only by implication that we must

 

(207) Juarez-Paz, Rigoberto, ”Una Nota sobre el Vitalismo de Ortega y Gasset”,
Revista Humanidades, Vol. III, N. lO, Imprenta Universitaria, Guate-
mala, l963, p. 3 (Translation by the writer).

 

(208) Ill (I923), p. l67.

l93

consider the rest Of the Ortegan writings as his own method to add
substance tO the skeletal task. Otherwise we would be forced to wait in
vain for a more detailed characterization of human life. Ortega never
gave it in an explicit, manual-like manner. His unorganized, non-system-
atic, approach, seems to reveal that the expected task always left him
unconcerned. While negativistic criticism appears easy to find, there
have been attempts that suggest an explanation of such an attitutde, as
well as an element Of justification. One of the most recent commentaries
reads as follows:

Those Of us who feel inclined to judge conceptions of the phi-
losophic task, based rather on the results Of such conceptions,
must remember that a conception Of the phi IOSOphic task may
already include important phiIOSOphical notions. What I am
suggesting is not precisely that the attempt to clarify the
nature of philosophy is in itself a philosophical task, but
rather that a phiIOSOphical conception may well be the conse-
quence of philosophical convictions that are important in
themselves. In a certain sense, a sizeable portion of the
phiIOSOphical works of Ortega are respective attempts for a
self-clarification of why our contemporary phiIOSOphers must
be vitalistic, i.e., of why is it that they must reflect upon
the nature of human life, rather than, for example, upon the
posibility of knowledge.

But, Of course, even those who agree to the contention that
phiIOSOphy must be devoted to the study of human life may
wish to ask: What have you D. Jose Ortega y Gasset found

about it? Where is your IOgOs Of bios? Yet, there are good
reasons to think that Ortega would have not considered such

a demand as one being entirely just. (209)

The ”good reasons” appear to be Of a metaphysical, rather than
an epistemological character. A general characterization Of human life
is approached by Ortega only sporadically, and always with the implica-
tion that such a task is not as important as the one Of proving that the

study Of human existence is an imperative one. This is possibly the reason

 

/ . .1
(209) Cf., Juarez Paz, Op.Cit., p.4.

l9Q

why Julian Marias finds more Spanish ”existentialism” in Unamuno than
Ortega. (2lO) Conclusively, then, the writer submits that Ortega coin-
cides with some philosophers of existence in those sporadic attempts,
which appear to be dealt with only in passing, and with a lack of system-
atic effort. (le) This finding is an important one, because it allows
to take a conclusive stance regarding the 'existential' elements in
Ortega. He definitely appears to think that existential philosophy is
important, not because of the characterization that existential philoso-
phers have given of life, but rather because of the philosophical consi-
derations that make a necessity out of the study of human life.

The metaphysical orientation of Ortega is evident. A study of one
of his posthumous works reveals, again in a footnote, such a trend. Very
often Ortega's footnotes contain the systematization of undeveIOped
theses, whose schematic treatment one in vain seeks throughout the
textual body:

In l925 I expressed my theme -- and some of my disciples should

be able to remember it --by literally saying that: (l) the tra-

ditional problem of being (metaphysics) must be radically

renewed; (2) this is to be done by means of the phenomenolo-
gical method to the extent, and only to the extent, that such

 

(2lO) Marias, Julian, El Existencialismo en Espafia, Bogota, I953.

(2ll) This thesis appears to be hinted in many passages of Ortega's
work. A classical example may be found in Vl (l9hl), pp. 32-35:
”Historia como Sistema”, wherein he likens life to a present,
rather than a past participle: ”... life's mode of being is not
a concluded already been, not even as a simple existence, since
the only thing that is given to us, and that appears to be there
when there is human life, is to have to make it, each one his
own. Life is a gerundio (present participle) and not a past
participle: a faciendum and not a jggtgm.... Human life, there-
fore, is not an entity that accidentaly changes, but rather
on the contrary, the 'substance' of it is precisely change,
which means that life cannot be Eleatically thought of, as a
substance....H

 

l95

a method could be interpreted as a synthetic or intuitive

thought, and not merely conceptual-abstract, such as the tra-

ditional logical mode of thought; (3) but the phenomenological

method must be integrated by the acquisition of a dimension

of systematic thought that it appears to be lacking, as it is

already known; (h) and lastly, in order to achieve the possi-

bility of thinking a systematic phenomenological thought, it

is necessary to use, as a point of departure, a phenomenon

that constitutes a system in itself. Such a systematic phe-

nomenon is human life, and one must begin with its intuition

and analysis. (2l2)

it should be noted as paradoxically peculiar that Ortega preci-
sely finds a system where the analytical scholar does not see it. This
is why the writer wishes to clarify that his conclusive remarks concern-
ing the asystematic character of the Ortegan speculation should be valid
only insofar as the definition of 'system' is maintained within the
limits already established. But the important aspect of the above quote
is Ortega's allusion to the phenomenological method, which is precisely
regarded by Husserl as a highly systematic attempt for apodictic cognition.
This is a noteworthy deviation of the Ortegan scheme from the classical
sources that supposedly nourish existential thought, and that are
generally attributed to the Cartesian modes of speculative reasoning,

as modified by Brentano and Husserl. (213)

An article entitled in English: ”Crisis of the Intellectual and

 

(2l2) Ortega y Gasset, Jose, La ldea de Principio en Leibniz, p. 332, as
quoted by Juarez-Paz in og.cit., p. S.

(2l3) This is not the place to indulge in a lengthy explanation of
phenomenology as a method. Extensive sources are now available
in the English language to be consulted by the interested reader
who wishes to become involved in the highly technical implications
of this approach, commonly held as still directly responsible for
a methodology that has greatly influenced Continental EurOpean
literature, phiIOSOphy, and humanistic science, especially sociology
and psychology. Such a task is well beyond the sc0pe of the present
dissertation, and could constitute a lifetime program. An initial
breach could be Opened by a careful exploration of A.T.

l96

Crisis of the Intellect”, in a part bearing the subtitle of 'Historical
Character of Cognition' provides a rather clear and concise account of
Ortega's possition in this issue. (Zlh) In this essay, especially its
appendix, Ortega offers his refutation of phenomenolOgy as a method,

a task about which a succinct advance was made in Chapter IV of this
thesis. He calls a philOSOphy 'naive or unjustified' when it leaves out-
side its doctrinal body the very motives from which it springs, and
accuses Husserlian phenomenology of making such a mistake. According to
Ortega, Husserl failed to reCOgnize as a constitutive part of his philoso-

phy the facts that prompted its creation. The refutation is interesting

 

(2l3) Tymieniecka's Phenomenologygand Science in Contemporary European
Thought, (Noonday Press, N.Y., l962), and a much more satisfactory
coverage would be possible by studying M. Farber's The Foundation
of Phenomenology (Paine-Whitman, N.Y., 1962) or books such as T.
Langan's The Meaning of Heidegger,(Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y.,
l96l). Of very recent translation into English, phenomenological
and existential works are only beginning to be examined by interest-
ed Anglo-Saxon scholars, and systematic studies and translations '
are now being published. Among others, the Northwestern University
Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Phil050phy (SPEP) series,
is worth mentioning. Husserl's ngical Investigations, and the
Ideas (General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, (Cromwell-
Collier Publishing, Co., l962) ought_to provide at least an aware-
ness of the problems involved in the tOpic. The reader is advised
to see pages 205-208 for a schematic description of Husserl's
method. And, of course, the reader of German and French would have
the undeniable advantage of being able to con5ult direct sources;
of these the ones published by the following printers are particular-
ly recommmended: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther Holzboog)
Gegrundet l727, Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt, and Universitatsbuchhand-
lung; Max Hueber, 8000 Munchen l3, Amalienstr. 75/79; and Editore
Boringhieri, Torino, Casella postaie 225. The writer has also obtained
interesting information from Mario Casalini Ltd., l5l9 Pine Avenue
West, Montreal 25, P.Q.

(Zlh) Concord and Liberty (English translation of Del imperio romano)
W. W. Norton 5 Co., Inc., N.Y., l9h6, pp. 63-82.

 

'97

because in the process of the criticism, Ortega reveals the openly meta-
physical character of his own thought. His thesis is that most philoso-
phies are wont to begin abruptly as a series of theses on reality or on

the principles of truth, without explaining phil050phically why it

should be needfui to make Such statements. This necessity has the character
of a first principle, and to state it in Ortegan terms: ”What impels man

to philosOphize forms part of the philosophical theory itself”. (ZlS)
Philosophy, as an occupation that demands self-justification, must of
necessity include it within the very structure of its exposition:

Else its claim would remain a mere arrogant, impotent ges-

ture, and it would be but another form of sleepwalking.

Only if men cannot help making philosophy and being philo-

SOphers can the existence of both be borne with. And, I

repeat, not for reasons of social intercourse, not in order

to assert itsefl against the hostile opinion of other people,

but because otherwise it would be meaningless to itself, must

philOSOphy include in its own anatomy the organs of its own

justification. (2l6)

The evidence offered by Ortega in support of the above conten-
tions is one of factual-historical character. Contrary to specialized
sciences, philosOphy has always been demanded of human beings, both as
a differentiating factor from animal life, and as the most-inclusive
discipline. Even men of science -- as Opposed to Specialized sciences
themselves -- have not been able to evade the norm. Regardless of how
euphemistically the matter is dealt with, such has been the case for
the last twenty six centuries:

PhiIOSOphy carries inside itself an inalienable violence

which stands in marked contrast to the peaceful diSposition
deveIOped by the phiIOSOphical guild after their first steps

 

(2l5)09. cit., p. 78.
(2l6)Ibid., p. 77.

I98

in history.... The existence of philosophy in the world sig-
nifies, tacitly or blatantly, that a living being who has none
is little better than a brute.... After the heroic age of phi-
lOSOphy in Ionia and Hagna Graecia, in Miletus and Elea, phi-
IOSOphers contrived to sugar-coat the insult. In the Apology
Socrates says: 'A life without phiIOSOphy is not livable for
man'. And in Aristotle we read: 'All the other sciences

which are not phiIOSOphy are more necessary, but none is more
important than phiIOSOphy'. Deduct the euphemism, and you

are left with the insult. (2l7)

Locke's remark that our task in this world is not to know all
things but only to know those relevant to our conduct is used by Ortega
to show the difference between limitative, and self-inclusive justifica-
tion. The declaration that only what concerns conduct must be regarded
as knowledge proper guarantees nothing; is a vague indication of an
alienated statement; and ”leaves phiIOSOphy in a situation worse than
that of chose other sciences (physics and mathematics).... ” (2l8)
It appears to Ortega that Locke is satisfied with the stark enunciation Of
Such a prOpOSition, neither founding nor analyzing it. The Spanish thinker
seems to believe that if we remain at such a level, no transcendence has
been effected beyond the realm of mere Opinion. But if such a contention
is taken seriously, along with the inevitable sequel of proving its
validity, we can see that the statement acquires sudden, vital meaning:
Ipso facto Locke's limp phrase therewith acquires vigor and
urgency and reveals that its phiIOSOphical significance lies
in its positive rather than in its negative meaning. Now,
to Locke himself his assertion, as he actually depended on it
for making his philosophy, possessed in fact this Positive mean-
ing. What traditionally bore the name philosophy did not satis-

fy him. He did not formulate his Opinion as a thesis but he
practiced it as Such. (2l9)

 

 

(2l7) lbid., P. 77.
(2l8) Ibid., p. 79.

(2l9) lbid., pp. 79-80.

'99

Thus, knowledge is not something substantive in its own right
but a function of human life. An it has been already said that life
is a task. The conclusive schema, as applied to the example of the
Lockean prolegomenon shows the dependence that knowledge has, in terms
of life, within the Ortegan philosophy. As shown by his notes on thinking,
the conclusive process is as follows:

(i) - Human existence in the world is a task, it has no in-
dication of Parmenidean given, its course consists of a
faciendum... not a factum: an Eleatic premise.

(2) - The task consists not so much of cognizing, iggg, ga-
thering factual evidence, and exercising logical for-
mulations, but rather it consists Of 'conducting our-
selves' (behaving and acting).

(3) - Therefore, knowledge becomes a necessary task only inso-
far as it is required by 'conduct'. Only in this light
does the Lockean statement acquire phiIOSOphical signi-
ficance beyond the exercise of 'pure reason', for its own
sake:

Those are three fundamental phiIOSOphical principles which Locke‘s

philosophy was unaware of but which, operating inside it, were

instrumental in its creation. And in this implied philosophy
that was left standing before the door, the Official Lockean

doctrine would, to boot, have found its justification. (220)

Obviously, Ortega implies that the vital Significance of a

given philosophy must be made a part if its systematic Structure, thus

avoiding the hypostatic belief in cognitive activity or formal exercise,

 

(220) Concord., p. 80.

200

as an enterprise of intrinsic worth. It is hoped that the foregoing
discussion suffices as a conclusive presentation of the form in which
a vitalistic philosophy, such as the Ortegan one, views the problem of
knowledge.

The other task prOposed by this dissertation, jgghg the distinction
between Ortegan vitalism, and phenomenology, can be resumed now, hopefully
with added clarity. To Ortega, Husserl's weakness_resides in the fact
that phenomenology soon became a formal, independent activity (knowledge
for its own sake) and not an activity linked with its nondoctrinal origin,
on which it depended. Husserl failed to see that any formal doctrine is
inseparable from its nondoctrinal beginnings. PhiIOSOphy is made for the
sake of pre-tehoretical and ”a-theoretical needs and conveniences”. These
non-systematic beginnings are not vague because of their a-theoretical
character, but rather vivid, precise, and existent. Hence why the must
condition ”... most determinately the intellectual exercise called
reason....'I (22l) If Locke practically posits knowledge as a'function

of life, Husserl presents reason as a 'function of humanity', humanity

k
u
I.

being defined as the totality of human beings, past and present. (222,

I

But Ortega implies that neither Locke, nor the German philosOpher

 

(22]) Ibid., p. 80.

(222) Ortega specifically alludes to a passage of Husserl's Formale und
Transzcendentale Logik(Max Niemeyer Halle, l929), pp. Q,S, in
which the alienation of modern man is attributed to the fact that
sciences have lost faith in themselves, and their absolute meaning.
Very clearly, Husserl notes here that modern man of our day in
contrast with the man of the Englihtment Era, does not anymore
conceive of science and civilization as the self-objectivation of
human reason, nor as the universal function created before the need
for a more satisfactory individual and social life directed by
practical reason. Husserl also calls this faith the Great Faith,
and describes it as the belief that science leads to wisdom, and
Specifically indicates that this loss of faith is responsible for
man's baffled hesitation before a world in which people strive in

20l

made this point with the emphatic seriousness it deserves.

It should be obvious, then, that to Ortega phenomenology as the
method for apodictic knowledge, devised by Husserl, transcended the needed
preoccupation about human life that constitutes the justification of
philosophy. It is necessary to state this point technically and conclusively,
thus completing the already advanced remarks on this subtopic.

The analysis and characterization of reason made by Husserl in
his ”Fonmal and Transcendental Logic” posit is as an extrinsic activity
in terms of humanity, of life, and of the functional character in the
use of reason. Ortega's vitalistic stance does not accept Husserl's realm

of pure experiences, and rather declares that the Reine Erlebnisse have

 

nothing to do with life, being just the opposite. The supporting argument-
ation of the point is brief enough to be quoted in its entirety:

Husserl, like all idealistic phiIOSOphers of whom he is the last
representative, begins with affirming as the basic fact of
maximum evidence that reality constitutes itself in consciousness
21 reality -- for instance, in consciousness of (the real world)
which consists principally in the conscious acts called percep-
tions. The actual reality of this world is relative -- namely,
relative to this consciousness of it that I have. But as rea-
lity precluded relativity, this means that the reality of the

 

 

(222) vain to find the purpose and meaning of their doing, that were
once so clearly known and fully acknowledged by intellect and
will. He also implies that such a faith was 'great' because once
it even took the place of religious faith. Ortega, in turn, declared
that reading about these phenomena, especially in Husserl, had
deeply moved him: first because of the catastrophic future they
foretell; secondly, because Husserl (a great mathematician and
logician) is an 'extreme rationalist', whose phiIOSOphy is un-
rivaled as the quintessence of formal exercise; thirdly because a
man like Husserl would never dare to say something he had not
'seen'; fourthly because the Husserlian remarks are a fact that
transcends and encompasses science proper; and lastly because such
a factual situation must have been so obvious and pressing that even
Husserl in his seclusion became bothered by it, and could not help
seeing it.

202

world, being relative to consciousness of it, is problematic
and only my consciousness of (the reality of the world) has
absolute reality. The reality of my consciousness of

something is relative to itself for according to Husserl's and
all idealisms, consciousness is conscious of itself, or in other
words, it is'immediate to itself. (For all this,,gj. the ar-
ticle by Leon Dujovne, ”Ortega y Gasset y la Razon HistOrica”,
La Nacion, Diciembre, l940, in which an excellent summary is
given of my fundamental criticism of idealism as I expounded
it in a course of lectures in Buenos Aires). But to be rela-
tive to oneself is tantamount to being absolute.

Now, if consciousness of is the absolute reality and as such

the starting point of philOSOphy, philosophy would start from a
reality in which the Subject -- I -- exists enclosed within it-
self, within its mental acts and states. But such existence

in the form of being enclosed in oneself is the Opposite of what
we call living. Living means reaching out of oneself, devoted,
ontologically, to what is other -- be it called world or cir-
cumstances.

To start from life as the primary and absolute fact is to re-
cognize that consciousness of is solely an idea, a more or less
justified and plausible one, but no more than an idea which we
have discovered or invented in the starts from no idea and hence
is not idealism.

Husserl prOposes to arrive at the roots (we are promised 'ra-
dical reflection') of knowledge by way of phenomenological ana-
lysis. He anticipates -- how can he help it? -- that these roots
are pre-theoretical, let us vaguely say 'vital'. But since

he comes upon all this in the process of philOSOphizing and ma-

king phenomenology, and Since phenomenology has not justified

and founded itself, the whole consideration remains hanging in

the air. (223)

This writer SUSpectS, however, that the Husserlian posthumous
works on 'genetic phenomenology' do provide at least a program to cover
the relationship that Ortega finds wanting. Therefore, the issue has
been exhausted insofar as the Ortegan position concerning the differences

between phenomenology and his critique of vital reason, but not necessarily

on the conceptual totality of the question. (22h) Nevertheless, to have

 

(223) Concord., pp. 8l-82.

(22A) Husserlian ’genetic phenomenology' is precisely the attempt to
systematize a relationship between the formal construct, and

203

found a conclusive statement on the 'existentialism', and phenomenology

of the Ortegan writings, appears to constitute a sufficient result within
the sc0pe of the present dissertation: the Ortegan epistemology modifies

the phenomenological method by reinstating the assumption that the initiat-
ing phenomenon must be his concept of human life, thus overcoming the
limitation of phenomenological reduction strictly conceived as a conceptual-
abstracting operation. Thus, a synthetic and intuitive type of thought

can be gained only by transcending the formal limitations of the reduction.
According to Ortega, such Operation constitutes a truly systematic mode of
thought, and the only way to acquire legitimate access to an inevitable

metaphysical construct.

 

(22h) ”... the pre-theoretical reality which is 'life' ....”
Ortega himself became presently aware of this attempt, which
is only a minimal part of the Formale und Transzcendentale
Logik, and thus is described by the Spanish thinker as a
”summary program”. Yet, he acknowledges that in l935 Husserl
contemplated the problem in a Series of lectures given at
the University of Prague under the title ”Crisis of the Euro-
pean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, one of which
was published in Philosophia, vol. I, l936, Belgrade. Ortega
sees this effort firstly as a non-Husserlian piece of writing,
since the lecture notes were gathered and integrated by one of
his students; secondly as a flattering event: ”... I am much
gratified by this leap of phenomenological doctrine which means
nothing less than a recourse to 'historical reason'....”
(Concord. P. 82); and thirdly as a possible contender to the
chronological priority of his own ideas on the tOpic, since
-- quite defensibly -- he hastens to point out that his essay
”History as a System”, published in l935, preceded not only
the article in Philosophia but also its sequel of the Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, Brussels, l939, where the
expression Vernunft in der Geschichte (reason in history)
is Specifically used by the Husserlian followers. At any
rate, this writer would like to suggest that Husserl himself was
well aware of the problem, and must have left an abundant profu-
sion of notes to that effect. It should be remembered that the
Husserlian Archives have not been researched yet in their entirety,
and that a post~second World War effort is being continued by
German scholars, who constantly publish new material, and new
interpretations, from the unbelievable wealth of production left
by the famous philOSOpher.

 

 

204

What is, then, 'knowledge' to Ortega y Gasset? This writer has
concluded that the Spanish philOSOpher answers such a question only
from a metaphysical viewpoint, 143;, only in terms of the nature of
knowledge, and quite contextually at that. The facets that seem to be of
tremendous importance for the Anglo-Saxon philOSOpher, 143,. the aSpects
of the possibility of knowledge and of its formal validity, seem to
have been left almost untouched by our author, who simply criticizes
some of the results of their monopolistic ”absorption” in the philoso-
phical realm. If the question 'what‘ig knowledge?‘ receives an ontolo-
gical consideration of the term 'is', it appears to be considered by
Ortega as certainty that is acquired through all possible means, espe-
cially those conditioned by a direct intuition of the phenomenon of
life. Sr. Ortega also seems to credit tested and untested intuition
as attempts of equal possibility, since -- aside from the above-mentioned
condition -- he does not reject the Husserlian or Kantian characterizations
of intuition as the inmediate grasp of a cognitive phenomenon. Knowledge
also appears to include those operational techniques that appear more
credible to empirical-minded investigators: deduction, induction, and
'research' -- in all possible forms -- but he adds esthetic information,
and esthetic formation. He seems to be quite convinced, though -- and this
writer conclusively agrees with him -- that in many cases the equation be-
tween 'credibiiity' and 'credulity' could be equally attributed to both
'intuitionists' and 'anti-intuitionists', therefore being much easier for
the intuitionist to include non-intuitionistic techniques within his
scheme.

It could be reasonably held that the non-intuitionist constantly

intuits his assertions or negations, even the findings of his emvirical

205

research. The intuitionist, on the other hand, recognizes the Open

nature of his Operational cognitive basis, and may even include the

data of a 'proven experiment' without needing to resort to confusing
dualisms. In other words, the non-intuitionist is constantly forced

to explain when is he 'philOSOphizing', and when he is not doing so,

iygy, when is he making use of intuitive, or unexamined hunches, always
subject to later verification. But it is practically and logically possible
to distinguish certain types of 'intuition' from those directly comparable
to 'hunches' or 'whimsical visions', and therefore to distinguish system-
atic from non-systematic intuitions. it should be obvious that Ortega

did not, at all times, make use of the Husserilain methods; in fact

it is quite likely that he merely acknowledged them as an epistemological
point of departure, and proceeded with subjective vehemence in most
instances, but there are some points to be made both in his defense,

and in that of more systematic students of the intuitive phenomenon.
Husserl's ngjsche Untersuchunggn, for example, introduce an elaborate
notion of essential intuition, crudely described for the purposes

of this reference as a receptive operation that grasps the essential,
formal Structure of the objects of c0gnition. To perform this operation,
two correlated elements are considered: firstly a specific type of
conscious act which makes cognition possible, presupposing, of course,

a complete theory of consciousness; and secondly a theory of Objects,
which tries to prove that they possess an essential structure, capable

of being grasped. Husserl also maintains that there is a strict correlation
between the object of COgnition and the act of consciousness, and cul-
minates his foundational theory by a lengthy discussion attempting to

Show that his systematic intuition is an instituting act, by means of

206

which all objects of true predication can be apodictically known. The
theory differs from a Cartesian or Spinozian approach by maintaining

the thesis that there is more than one certain, evident, and immediately
given object of cognition, and that therefore the COgito monopolizes

a rather common characteristic of the surrounding world. Without reject-
ing a demand for deductive procedures, Husserl however maintains that

his method is sufficient, and even far more precise than a criterion of
evidence modified as to mean that a cognition is merely verifiable.
Husserl also uses a concept of empirical intuition, 1‘24, perception,

as his point of departure, and follows Brentano quite closely by stating
that every possible object of cognition (logically speaking: every subject
of posSible true predication) has a particular manner of revealing its
cognitive significance. Such an ”objectival” quality is apt to generate
an immediate cognitive instance of a nature entirely different from the
whimsical, undependable sensory ”intuition”, because it must follow a
systematized series of careful steps. Although Husserl pursues them with
meticulous detail such steps can be briefly summarized here as a series
of operations performed with the purpose of overcoming perceptual
prejudice: the preconception of factual existence; the unexamined

belief that the object necessarily belongs to an existing categorial

realm vaguely known as the natural world; the mistake of assuming that
the cagnition of an object results from an oversimplified stimulus-
response relationship; the preconceptions derived from previous uncritical
assumptions on human nature and the character of experience; amd the
prejudices that originate on the psycho-bio-physiological explanations

of the perceptive phenomenon. Husserl holds that it is possible to maintain

an object in the field of perception, even after having discarded the

207

above obstacles, and contends that once the changes of character relative
to the empirical conditions of experience have been critically considered,
it is quite feasible to cognize the essentially rational structure of

such an object. The whole process, in sum, consists of a passage from
natural consideration to a reflexive attitude, thus obtaining a phenomenon,
or pure object of cognition, capable of immediately displaying itself

to consciousness. Such an operation, by means of which the empirical or
sensory character of perception is reduced to a purely rational presenta-
tion of the objects of knowledge is the famous 'phenomenological' reduction’,
which Ortega criticizes of excessive formality. And the refined, system-
atized intuition that results from the above-sketched process is called

by Husserl 'categorial perception'. When applied to the Specific nature
of a phenomenon -- in his own sense -- he calls his mode of knowledge

an 'eidetic insight' or an 'eidetic intuition', an operation based upon
Sensory data, but subject to the subsequent refinement of reduction
(egoche). (225)

It is interesting to observe that a Kantian interpretation could be
applied to deductive processes, and that -- if it is accepted that the
steps in such a process have to be 'intuited', 143., directly assimilated
or immediately received by the cognitive 'faculties' -- the final result
of such chain of intuitions is also an intuition. The process, then,

becomes one of moving from initial to conclusive intuitions, and this

 

(225) CI. the minimal references provided in (2l3) for further expansion
on the highly technical aspects of the phenomenological method.

208

is precisely the place wherein psychology has not been quite ”weaned”
from the philOSOphical context of some existential and phenomenological
schools. It has been remarked, for example, that Ortega criticizes the
Husserlian transition from the psychological aspects of perception to a
purely formal realm of absolute cognitive import.

It should be also interesting to conduct an ”empirical” study on
the validational merit of intuitive speculation versus ”non-intuitive”
experimentation, since some hypothetical suggestions cautiously made by
empirical findings are really no different from an intuitionistic,
Speculative thesis, except perhaps in the fact that the former have
an euphemistic formal appearance, and try to leave an Open possibility for
later correction. Such a disguised similarity of both kinds of philoso-
phical or scientific exercise could perhaps be further supported by point-
ing out that intuitive specualtion might well include future corrigibility
by either (i) the inclusion of an euphemistic vocabulary, or (ii) the
mere conditioning of Speculative remarks in view of a priori factors of
lOgical necessity. As a result of the above considerations, this writer
wishes to State conclusively that a priori, systematic, and intuitive
Speculation, is of a significance not to be regarded as mutually exclusive
when compared to environmental, deductive, techniques. This thesis also
Seems to be SUpported by better lOgicians, and should be considered
truistic, were it not for the circumstance that the academic world appears
to be heavily pOpulated by researchers who think otherwise, and confuse
a customary experimental format with the subject-matter of proper phi-
lOSphical investigatio: on the problem of the possibility of knowledge.

In this area of philosophy, it could also be said that no empirical

209

evidence to the contrary has been made available, and if the comparative
study of intuition versus verification were made possible, this writer
would dare to predict that the results would be puzzling ones. On the
other hand, the gg-ignorantiam contention that intuition is a better
method than empirical verification, because no evidence to the contrary
has been made available, would indeed be a dangerous statement, since
it would simply reverse the charge made by certain analysts to some of the
favorite topics of existential philosophy, and such a charge has been
already rejected on the grounds that it is a faulty conclusion even by
logico-formal standards.

It would seem, then, that Ortega has a broader notion of 'scien-
tific method', and that this notion follows a phenomenological trend.
Many scientific methods could be conceived, and all of them appear to
have Ortega's blessing providing that they become incorporated to the
human existential concerns. All mutually exclusive distinctions are to
be ruled out, and epistemology, then, would be simply the attempt to
achieve the certainty that possesses a dependability of verification or
method. In Ortega's particular case all epistemologies that offer
candidate solutions for the problem of vital concern would be acceptable,
and this condition should be made pressing even for the most Specialized
logician. If intuition provides a meaningful perspective for vital cOncern,
it would be acceptable, and the same could be said for deduction, induction,
experimentation and testability. The Ortegan objection to a particular
kind of epistemology would not be its method, but its intent; if the
latter excludes life as the central concern, it is to be discarded as
non-philOSOphically integrated -- a mere technical exercise. This is

tantamount to say that an epistemology which even unintentionally

2w.

cultivates the use of pure reason for its own sake would be objectionable,
because pure reason is not a separate reality, nor is it the main human
activity, but simply constitutes a tool to be used in our desperate search
for vital meaning. The hypostatic cult of reason kills the human aSpect
that must be a part of all philOSOphies. Hence the belief, for example,
that human relations have to be logical -- in the sense of 'formal logic'--
is not a vitally reasonable one. It just so happens, and Ortega states
it as a fact, that mot ”human relations” are quite illogical. Whether
this is an educational failure or not is, at this point, irrelevant; before
any change is attempted such a fact must be admitted, and its change is
possible only by allowing reason to become vital. The alternative would
be to force humans to be logical, and this obviously would mean that
life has been adjusted or sacrificed to pure reason. This horrible choice
would depend upon the kind of answer that we give to the problem of our
times: the disparity between reason and life, and the need for reason
to do something about a kind of human life to be conceived beyond physical
welfare and its financial implications.

This writer finds consequences of undeniable merit in the Ortegan
account of life versus pure reason. To state it simply knowledge has to
be for something, and human life appears to constitute a worthy candidate
for such a teleological interpretation. Knowledge for its own sake, or
for the sake of answering only one of the human vital questions, iyg.,
the mastery of the surrounding natural, or physical world, is either the
lack of application, or merely a partial application of its powers. Real
knowledge could described in this sense, as ”impure”. It would have to
be contaminated by its application to all of the dimensions of life:

physical, biological, biographical, emotional, spiritual, lyrical, and

2ll

irrational. The same could be said for the intrOSpective and extrOSpective
dimensions of human life. Thus, a syllogism in life acquires its other
complementary portion by receiving the challenge of its worth in human
terms. Otherwise, in terms of vital reason, syllogistic perfection

becomes as unreasonable as any other type of abstract exercise, performed
for its own sake, like a formally flawless pianistic execution lacking
qualitative musicality. If knowledge is the necessity that systematically
conveys man's longing for a radical certitude, it must be capable of being
transposed to the realm of human conditions upon which the ”knowers”

want to be rooted.

The examination of this issue within the Ortegan thought has left
a metaphysical residue, which also deserves to be explored. It is this
writer's contention that the problem can be clarified by a series of
reflections made upon a broadminded account of epistemOIOgy as a phi-
losophical discipline. In this sense, most of the problems presented to
others by the phiIOSOphy of Ortega are due to almost subconscious assumption,
or presupposition, that the entire field Of epistemology is exhausted
by due consideration of the questions dealing with the possibility or
formal validity of knowledge. But there seems to be more to epistemology
than the otherwise commendable attempts to clarify the conditions that
make knowledge possible, and to elucidate the formal systems of correct
reasoning.

This writer considers epistemology as a theory of “true thinking”,
which obviously should include a subordinate ”theory of correct thinking”.
The first connotation is of a material nature, in the Aristotelian sense,
whereas the latter constitutes a formal systematization. While the

IOgical activity seeks to show a formal validity of the thinking processes,

2l2

L‘g., with the problems of external consistency and concordance with

the object of knowledge. Only in this manner it could be said that philo-
sophy is impossible to conceive without the contributions of epistemOIOgy,
since Such a discipline thus becomes integrally considered, jygy, aimed
at the maximum scope of its diverse problems and solutions.

Therefore it would seem imprOper to oversimplify the integrated
epistemological problems, and it does not seem plausible to reduce those
problems to the search for normative formal laws intended to prove the
validity of an inferential chain that moves from stage A to Stage 8.

It is also necessary to show by all possible means that equations of the
type ”A is B” are 5533 indications of a relationship that Eggly constitutes
a cognitive fact. The “A is B” phenomenon presents, epistemologically
Speaking, several courses of speculative action, related to characteristics
that transcend its merely formal qualities of abstraction. It is possible,
in the first place, at least to investigate if A is truly B, from the
viewpoint generally recognized as the essence of knowledge, iyg., the
search for its objective or authentic nature. Secondly, it is also possible
to speculate on the validity of a fact of consciousness, in the sense of
finding out if Such a fact constitutes an effective COgnitive relationship,
,ng., to deal with the problem of the possibility of knowledge. Thirdly,

it is feasible to ponder the effectiveness of the sensorial and strictly
rational contributions to the cognitive phenomenon, and in such a case

we would be exploring the problem of “genetic epistemology”, also called
the ”origin of knowledge”. And lastly, it would Still be possible to
Speculate on the types or forms of knowledge, or on the means at hand

that could be used to prove the objectivity of a supposed knovledge, in

which case the problem of ”criteria for truth” would appear with its

213

difficult implications. In sum, what this writer is attempting to conclude
is that an analysis of epistemology does not reveal one single problem,

and it appears more adequate to characterize such a philOSOphical discipline
as one that presents several difficulties, rather than an all-encompassing
one. Four problems have been suggested above. To others, gygy, Hans Hessen,
the number of general problems could be augmented to five; and still to
others the problems could be presented as more than five or less than

four. (226) But in any case, this writer believes that even those who
contend that there is only one problem involved (gygy, the question of
”possibility of knowledge”, both formally and materially) would be

hesitant to maintain also that it is simple, or to deny that it is a
complex one.

In sum, Ortega devotes the already discussed attention to the ma-
terial aspect of the problem of possibility of knowledge, and practically
bypasses the formal Side. He could be criticized for such an omission,
especially when he announces his new type of reason. Even granting that
the nature of the problems that concerned him was strictly metaphysical,
it appears legitimate to expect a more organized characterization of the
place that the above-mentioned issue should have in his account of human
life. Only by implication does he suggest that the attention devoted
to the intricacies of pure reason, or to validational criteria in
epistemology, should be accepted if they do not lose sight of life as

the essential philOSOphical preoccupation. But he never spelled-Out the

 

(226) Hessen, H., Teoria del Conocimiento, Octava Edicidn, (Espasa-
Calpe, Argentina, S.A.), Buenos Aires, I956.

 

 

 

 

PLEASE NOTE:

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2lS

exact place of these activities, nor did he indicate the precise re-
lational point in which they cease to haveimportance. Furthermore,

if his semi-journalistic mode of expression was adopted because of educat-
ional motivations, it seems legitimate to expect that his mission be ful-
filled as completely as possible. He criticizes Husserl for not being
explicit on the problem of the ”genesis of reason”, therefore indicating
that he expected the German philOSOpher to do so.

Based on a reciprocal expectation, Ortega could also be criticized
for not showing a clear stance on the methodological tools that he used
in order to make possible the firmness of his claim. This weakness can only
be increased when reflecting on the fact that he wanted to teach philosophy
to people who lacked an inclination for such an activity, since the
problems of the possibility of knowledge, and of its formal validational
procedures, are among the first ones to be encountered by the interested
student, regardless of his degree of SOphistication.

The already alluded metaphysical residue in the Ortegan epistemOIOgy
also has a major weakness that could be connected to the above-mentioned
one. It has been shown that Ortega considers life as the fundamental
reality, which he calls 'radical' because ”all other realities” appear
to be rooted upon it. Ortega also claims that this is the reason why
philOSOphical reflection must start by the ”intuition and analysis” of
Such a radical reality, and States that the phenomenon ”... to be conscious
of...” is not a pure description, but already an hypothesis, because
if the act of ”being conscious of...” is real, and its object is only
intentional, suchlan intentionaiity becomes unreal.Hence a description
rigorously consistent with its phenomenon must be one that depicts

perception as a coexistence of Subject and object:

2l6

Thus, what appears in the 'fact' of perception is: on the

one hand the subject, Opened to the perceived Object, and

on the other, the object, simultaneously Opened to the sub-
ject. In other words: there is no such thing as agpheno-

menon to be called 'consciousness of...” as a general form

of the mind. What is there is the reality that I am, opening
to and undergoing from another reality presented by the sur-
rounding world. Thus the so-called description of the phe-
nomenon of 'consciOUSness' may be resolved by a description of
the phenonmenon 'real human life', as a coexistence of the sub-
ject with the surrounding Objects....

Such a doctrine ... includes the greatest statement that

was made in phiIOSOphy between I900 and l925, namely: that

there is no such thing as consciousness, conceived as a pri-

mary form of relationship between the so-called 'subject'

and the so-called 'objects’; what is there is man being to

things, and things being to man; i,e., human living. The

young people of Montmartre, who now play by ear the guitar

of existentialism are still starkly unaware of this factual

assertion, without which it is impossible to gain access

to the high seas of metaphysics. (227)

The above paragraph summarizes two statements. One contends
that a perceptive Situation presents a co-existential participation of
perceiving subject, and perceived object, both being real. The other
assertion is that the fundamental datum of philosophy is human life,
conceived as an integrating reality, which precisely consists of a co-
existential relationship between Subject and objects. In other words,
there is no basis for saying that the act of consciousness is real,
while the object is not. Or, expressed differently, nothing can be
“thought of” as real or unreal, if such assertions or negations are not
radically referred to a primary reality, which is an integrated Zusammen-
hang, briefly described by the expression 'l-with-the-world'. Such an

integrated relational reality should constitute the basic preoccupation

of the true philosopher.

 

(227)_£a_ldea de pringjpio en LeibhiZ, DD. 332-3h.

217

But the interesting aspect of this basic intricacy is that it
appears to constitute the Ortegan basic attempt to reject subjectivistic
idealism, iggy, the evasion of an ”egocentric predicament”. This is
precisely the reason why some critics label Ortega as a 'realist-Kantian',
Since the Spanish thinker appeared to be preoccupied by the idealistic
interpretations made of his German mentor. Ortega repeatedly stated that
the Kantian system, in its deepest Stratum, could be liberated from ideal-
istic misinterpretations. The concept 'l-with-the-world', as a basic form
of experience, is expressed in Ortegan terms as 'I am myself and my
circumstance', an assertion which entails co-existence of the subject
and the real objects. Basically, such an idea has been clearly foreshadowed
by Kant.

The Critique Of Pure Reason contains a self-sufficient refutation
of subjective idealism. (228) The consciousness of subjective existence
appears to be determined in Time, as an a priori form of intuition, and
Such a detennination pre-supposes something permanent in the character
of perception, which is possible only insofar as the existence of external
phenomena is granted. Simple consciousness, and subjective existence
could be posited as proof of the existence of spatial objects, because
the perception of permanence is made possible only by something that
exists outside of the subject, and not simply by a representation of an
external object. Therefore, Kant argues that the determination of my own
eixstence within the realm of Time is made possible only by the existence

of real objects, that I perceive outside of my strictly subjective Sphere.

 

(228) Especially the metaphysical expositions of the conceptions of
time and space that are included as a part of the ”Transcendental
Aesthetic”, Critiqge of Pure Reason, pp. OI, ff.

2l8

Furthermore, as consciousness within the realm Of time is necessarily
connected with the existence of external objects, as well as with the
condition of determination of Time. In other words, the consciousness of
my own existence is simultaneously an immediate consciousness of the
existence of external objects.

But Kant, obviously, went further than Ortega, and proceeded to
move from the Aesthetic to his Logic, his Analytic, his Dialectic, and
his Transcendental Doctrine of Method. For the purposes of the present
problem, it should be sufficient to summarize that Kant integrated a
composite concept which joins self-consciousness with the consciousness
of an external world, while Ortega tried to do the same thing by affinning
that the content of world consciousness is a co-existential implication
between subject and objects, therefore both being real. The metaphysical
orientation of the Spanish thinker compelled him to use such a vocabulary,
which simply expresses that such an inter-relationship constitutes the
foundational datum fOr experience. Yet, no one seems to have denied that,
in such a sense, life is a radical reality, and, therefore his contention
is rather tautological. To the best of this writer's knowledge, Ortega
did not submit a further development of the Kantian initial assertion.

The above discussed weakness may have been due to a failure in
distinguishing the analytical import of stating that a surrounding
world is meaningless if due credit is not given to thinking subjects,
from the idealistic thesis that denies existence to the surrounding
world, if it is conceived as independent from the existence of thinking
Subjects. In this sense Ortega did not only fail to save Kant from a
charge that was clearly anticipated by the German philosopher, but also

lacked a sufficiently clear exposition on the manner in which life was

2l9

to be in turn saved from the dangers of pure reason. Conclusively,

then, the Ortegan intent is to be commended, but his subsequent procedure
appears to be incomplete. In this writer's Opinion, Ortega asked a
pertinent, and fascinatingly interesting question, without supplying a
reasonable theoretical develOpment that would enable his sympathizers

to find the answer.

His other weaknesses quickly Spring from the above-mentioned,
basic one. Perspectivism, for example, seems to be based upon the
subjective side of his integrated metaphysical co-existence, but on the
other hand appears to have been used as a justidication of an extremely
Opinionated use of dogmatic ephitets. It has been shown how Ortega .
falls into the old problem of inter-subjective viewpoints, which is
common to all attempts thus far made to rule out absolutes and dualistic
solutions. On this issue, it is submitted that most eclectic attempts
to overcome the dualism of exteriority and interiority are bound to be
vague in regard to the inter-subjective prOposition. John Dewey, whose
experiential scheme is also similar, also offers some of these problems,
and the suggestion is made at this point that -- lacking the Kantian
acrobatics -- most antidualistic solutions have been thus far unable to
explain, or describe, the precise nature of the elusive relationship
between the formal and the material aspects of the knowledge of reality.
Therefore, Ortega's strength in presenting us with a colorful angle
(that seemingly was vital to him, but may fail in being clearly vital to
many others) becomes a problem when an all-inclusive logical frame of
reference is sought after the acceptance of life as the central, and
real, philosophical concern.

The above criticism leads into another one related to methoiogy.

220

Ortega appears to be a very good painter of the existential concern, but
this writer finds him to be a poor draftsman. Of course, one could say
of existentialism in general that impressionistic modes of expression
are deliberate, and that at times they seem to be even more appealing
than the neatly-delineated renderings, and one could also say that the
latter are cold and lack expression, but the fact still remains that

the quest for truth continues to be one of desired precision. (229)

At times the literary felicity of Ortega greatly succeeds in the display
of pathetic seriousness which affects many a philOSOphical problem, but
those thinkers interested in precision could perhaps enjoy even more the

subdued tones, and a multiplicity of shades, if the overall leit motif

 

appears to be manageable within a reasonable length of exposition.

If the writer may use an analogy from the musical world, the
point could be illustrated by saying that Beethoven, for example, presents
a masterful balance of form and content, which allows the listener to
enjoy even more the subtleties of variation, Since the dominating themes
have been structured with unequivocal clarity. In the field of philosophy,
Immanuel Kant is perhaps the typical case wherein secondary obscurities,
or additional digressions, seldom deviate the reader from the powerful,
and complete, essence of the conceptual body. In cases such as the above
mentioned ones, the general program has been neatly outlined, and it
becomes only a matter of studious time to reach a point wherein several

basic alternatives of interpretation become possible. But Ortega y Gasser

 

(229) The point is made in Chapter III, but only in terms Of esthetics.

22l

often tends to change the utterance of an otherwise main theme into
mannerisms or repetitious assertions that possess a disturbing sloganish
character. lnsufferably dogmatic at times, the alluded methodological
faults appear to be generally scattered in all his written works. It
Should be remembered at this point that this dissertation has offered
only a selection of his most felicitous remarks, and that, therefore,
it has not even attempted to convey the overall effect produced in the
reader by an organized study of the original and abundant Ortegan sources.
There are, then, many logical problems involved in the study of the
Ortegan philosophy -- especially when answers, rather than questions, are
pursued. Including the ones already dealt with in this chapter, the most
important of these problems, are (i) the issue of perspectivism ys.
objectivism, (of which an account was given in Chapter II); (ii) analytic
ways to propose synthetical issues (such as the importance of 'life'
vis-a-vis an insufficient methodological characterization of it); (iii)
and undeveIOped, truistic assertions (such as the basic statement of
co-existence of cognitive Subject and object, without further logical
exploration). To this it should be added that the Ortegan writings often
do have vague ways of saying ”let us be clear about this”, where only
good intention appears to have the desired clarity. The writings also
indulge frequently in factual affirmations that later have appeared to
be insufficiently examined (such as the criticism of Husserl on the subject
of the pretheoretical significance of human life). The Ortegan writings
also abound in sketchy impasses that sometimes come at a moment when the
conceptual material is becoming extremely interesting, and a clear, lengthy
description is urgently needed. At times, also, Sr. Ortega becomes poetic

when the philOSOphically-minded reader wants him to be transparently

222

explicit, or becomes too technically involved (to the point of repeating
truisms) when a typically Ortegan poetic-parenthesis would be welcome.

It should be remarked at this point that such a characteristic is pro-
bably responsible for a projection of its repetitive nature in this
dissertation. Such a fault has been carefully minimized by the present
writer, but the lack of success in its complete elimination is possibly
due to the fact that Ortega deals with variations of the same technical
Subject in a variety of contexts, whose complete integration is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

There is a Spanish pOpular saying that applies quite properly to the
Ortegan manner of philOSOphizing: ”El gge mucho abarca poco aprieta”.
Quite crudely translated it means ”He who wants the most, grips the least”.
For those who are acquainted with the subtleties of the vernacular, the
proverb conveys with an unsurpassed, graphic economy of words that
”He who forces his hand to be open with exaggerated strain -- as in
the act of extending its coverage to a degree of impossibility --
naturally cannot close it with a firm and uniform grip”. Paradoxically,
in the case of Ortega, a Serious eagerness of intent forces him to be weak
on particular technicalities. On the one hand his Rennaissance erudition
makes him an extremely interesting essayist, but on the other, this very
quality forces him to be rather boring to the reader with a specialized
interest, once he recognizes the challenge of some appealing Ortegan view,
and wants to examine its implications quite closely. Yet, this criticism
is seldom made by his Spanish-Speaking students, whereas it constitutes,
most surely, one of the first weaknesses detected by Anglo-Saxon scholars.

Paradoxically too, such characteristics are also the very factors

that make Ortega interesting. To ask interesting questions is no meager

223

gain in philosophy, and even if the Ortegan answers are unclear, or not
systematized with great rigor or logical precision, many -- if not most --
of his questions appear to have succeeded in passing through the maze

of possible misinterpretations. So, for those who think that philosophy

is an activity mainly devoted to the asking of humanly pertinent questions,
Ortega should receive no objection to being ranked as a philosopher. For
the most part his Spanish style is also extremely appealing. The philoso-
phical material is indeed there, and precisely due to the fact that a sys-
tematization 'more geometrico' is not his essential preoccupation, many

of his problems are presented with a charming spontaneity often absent in
most of the semantically obsessed studies. Like Emerson, Nietzsche or
Tolstoi, the ”horticultors of phiIOSOphy”, Ortega has a beautiful way of
conveying impressions, and of asking human questions. There is a force

to the Ortegan thought that seems to be missing in the more systematic,

or analytic, philOSOphical treatises. Thorough examination of a philosophic
journal would presently reveal what this writer has in mind: uniform

style, stereotyped vocabulary, manner of presentation, polemic etiquette,
and pages of symbolic formulations. Ortega’s conviction that this type Of
philosophic dialogue does not really become a part of the total cultural
plexus, and therefore is not very educational, except perhaps to the

parties involved, seems to be a strong argument.

CHAPTER VIII
CRITICAL SUMMARY ON THE ORTEGAN THEORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

An overall appraisal of the mutual consistency between the philo-
SOphy of vital reason and its application to education is indeed flatter-
ing to Ortega y Gasset. This writer has already indicated in Chapter VI
his points of agreement, and in both Chapters VI and VII his areas of
disagreement with the basic philoscphical core of the Ortegan scheme.
Yet in his educational theory the favorable points seem to outweight
the weak or underdeveloped conceptual areas. Ortega appears to be cone
sistent with the type of education he would prOpose: he seems to be well
aware of the scientific advance of his times; of his own historical
background as a Spaniard and a European; of the types of problems which
were challenging the western mind when he wrote his essay; and further-
more of the kinds of difficulties that still have to be met. Indications
have been given in the preceding chapters of the fact that most of his
predictions were accurate, and of the unfortunate circumstance that he
seemed to be wrong only in those aspects of his thought that revealed
confident optimism. Many ”professionistic institutions”, and contem-
porary scientists, for example, Still Show signs of the unawareness which
Ortega calls the ”danger of over-specialized education”.

Thus, while Ortega appeared to be quite ”up to date” thirty five
years ago, it appears that the world is still populated by some “modern
barbarians” who have not understood the pathetic quandary of the ”modern
theme”. In I930 Ortega revealed an amazing awareness of his times, of

the Spanish limitations, and advanced an authoritative prediction of the

225

future European and westernized cultural circles. Without any claim

to credit Ortega with the hazy categories of “originality” or ”creative-
ness”, this writer would like to point out that the restless Spanish
writer showed frequent concern for socio-cultural phenomena, such as
population explosion, the mass-man, the increase of mediocrity, the
misuse of scientific warfare, and the compelling necessity of an ethical
assessment of the so-called 'contributions' of technological progress.

The issues of nuclear power, and germ-warfare are Simply two instances
that illustrate the necessity of university intervention, as a university,
in public and human affairs. Likewise, the urgent need that the average
man should become aware of ”the real truth” behind these social phenomena,
igg., of the essential philOSOphlc issues that make such a problem transcend
the Shortsighted limitations of nativistic loyalties, and pseudo-patriotic
commitments, still continues to be felt. It is even unnecessary to relate
in detail the import of these concerns with higher education, and this
writer contends that such is the reason why some scholars feel that if

we could solve the problem of general education, we could confidently
strike any third world war off the calendar.

General education at university level seems to be the only way to
perform -- at a point of 'readiness' -- a scanning and essential consider-
ation of the most compelling human problems, especially when the role
of the press has been swayed by acquisitiveness even to a greater degree
than it was in the thirties. It has been remarked that Ortega did not
live long enough to see what certain agencies, like television, have now
done to the ”brainwashing” and ”indoctrinating” techniques that build the
modern barbarian. And, although he did not use the customary terminology

of the educational field, he was indeed thinking of the same phenomena.

226

There is a strange and paradoxical quality of positive import in Or-
tega's main weakness; it is true that the scope of subject matter covered
by his educational writings acts as a limiting device when he states a
solution. But this very trait prevents him from becoming submerged in an
isolated, specialized endeavor, thus making his thesis consistent with the
synthetic ability he demands in education. By trying to be generally aware
of the things he does not know, he himself becomes immune to the ”profes-
sionistic” moncpoly he criticizes in most specialized educational attempts.
He is, then, a good example of the general education advocated by his
.fli§§1293 and this writer is of the opinion that, regardless of the obvious
shortcomings, a world full of Ortegan men would be better than the increased
production of Specialized, or acquisitive ”barbarians”. The ramifications
in collateral areas that keep appearing at every theoretical turn Ortega
makes, Show at least the intuitive awareness that they are there: an
attitude that Specialized researchers could use, even to their Own advantage,
not to mention that of the general welfare. Even though Ortega is not always
as explicit as one would wish when the unexpected implications disturb
one's mind, the suggestive value of such Surprising twists possesses more
potential enrichment than possible educational damage. In this sense his
short educational essays (Such as the.fll§§l§fl) have a tremendous suggestive
value that no one in his right mind would dare to deny. Even in the case
of generating sharp disagreement, this writer feels that the readers of
Ortega could always use their points of disaccord for further exploration
of the problems that appear to be there. In this sense, it is contended
that Ortega is one of those thinkers whose insight -- or lack of insight--
<:<>uld be used for the purposes of widened knowledge. And this writer is
.a I sc>sure of the fact that, even after the performance of a considerable

a’T’CDLJnt of definitional cleaning-woik Or analytic study, there would be

227

enough left of the Ortegan material to construct interesting hypotheses,
whether to be tested or merely maintained with the aid of a priori,
logical support.

Educationally speaking, one of Ortega's greater qualities is that he
provides the ”non-Latin” reader with a particular, and real, manner of
thought. Such a speculative manner of reacting to certain problems shows
the general pattern which, rightly or wrongly -- and this is yet to be
decided -- many Spaniards and Latin Americans do follow when facing the
so-called philosophical issues. An intelligible value structure is revealed,
and such an attitudinal finding should be of immeasurable use for the ”cross-
cultural”, educational studies, so much eguvoggg nowadays.

Ortega's obliviousness to certain analytic preoccupations, definition-
al concerns, or logical issues, is rather typical of the Spanish-speaking
educators, or ”men of letters”, many of them as intelligent and capable
of synthetic coverage as our studied author, or as their ”non-Latin”
counterparts. It is interesting to observe that his educational theory does
not reveal the ”work-ethic”, nor the factors of economical necessity in
the structure of the university, nor the importance of administration both
for theory of state, or university government. Physical conceptions of
'progress', 'achievement', 'growth', 'greatness', 'bigness', and 'self-
made tradition‘, are also absent in the Ortegan university. His ‘cultural‘
concern is not one to be interpreted from the predominant values shared
by some technOIOgically-oriented, non-Spanish-speaking universities,
although it may be eventually conceived as one that, in time, could be
brought to include such traits. Ortega talks, then, about the ideal
university of his language brothers, and therefore the cross-cultural

dialogue would be impossible without a previous realization of such a

228

factual 'given'. Any attempt to convey the axiological goals of a Protes-
tant, business-oriented, institution, in the midst of such a cultural
framework would be condemned to pathetic failure, both theoretically

and pragmatically speaking. By the same token, any attempt to change an
institution,whose ideology for I‘reform" follows, rightly or wrongly, a
particularized interpretation or an implicit influence of the Ortegan
theory of higher education, would also have difficult problems, at least
in its inception, and especially if the proposed modification happens

to be based upon a conscious, or sub-conscious, transplantation of values
that have been taken from economically well-developed, technol09ically
oriented societies.The writer believes that this is a point of great
importance, which not only gives renewed actuality to the old philoso-
phical problem of cultural relativity versus universality in values, but
also would save time, effort, and money, if prOperly and priorly
considered.

Contrary to many an Opinion, this writer finds a democratic orien-
tation in the Ortegan university; due consideration of the average man,
and the principle of economy in education, should be self-sufficient
to prove this point. His only requirement of a Land-Grant university would
be the appropriate inclusion of a well-balanced, effective program of
synthetic education, in order to produce cultured professionals. As a
result of this, he would perhaps emphasize the importance of a carefully
planned, and optimally taught basic program, would encourage humanistic
dialogue on a one-to-one basis, and would implement such a plan by an
equalitarian recognition of teaching ability, on a par with the research
customary rewards.

It should be interesting, though, to note that the empiricism behind

229

the Ortegan theory of education is one of apeculiar and‘existential
character. It is also deeply and consistently rooted upon his general
philosOphic views. The facts must be taken since there is no choice,
but the fact-gatherers, and fact-theorizers should not be led into
believing that factual concern alone should be the only factor to be
considered in science, education, or life. Since the preoccupation for
pure science is different from the educational concern, and since edu-
cation -- as in Dewey -- is practically equated with 'life', the Orte-
gan sense of something 'practical' is different from that of a radical
empiricism, as interpreted by many researchers. Being practical rather
means being aware of the possibilities and limitations of modern life,
and such an educational task should be made in as wide a dimension as
possible. lit is then, agg_gglyuthenw(i,g., when the prior awareness
has been induced) that the human being must take action. Thus, when
Ortega recommends to be practical about higher education, he does not
mean action in the manner usually fostered, rightly or wrongly, by the
so-called ”Protestant ethic”. His sense of the practical excludes
action for bigger and better things without due consideration of what
is meant by the term 'better'. It is also because of this that his
scheme of higher education lacks economic notions of development, under-
devlopment, or ultra-development, and his concept of growth completely
excludes financial acquisitiveness or physical expansion for its own
sake.

Of the many books written on general education the Ortegan short
essay seems to be one of the very few that are supported by a deep sub;
stratum of social, political, and historical philOSOphy, It is also one of

the few that reveal a previous background of well-digested metaphysical

23c

conviction. If, on the one hand Ortega could be criticized for not
presenting a detailed, pragmatic program of implementation, it could
hardly be denied that he succeeded in presenting a skeletal framework
of firmly held directional contentions. This basic core of teleological
foundations could be found to be lacking in many an educational book
that simply enumerates strategic techniques, or accepts certain assertions
about human-nature, social reality, and communal concern, without a deep
exploration of their validational and justificational support. The same
thing appears to be true of certain notions, such as 'development',
'behavior', 'becoming', and some other terms borrowed from the phenome-
nological or existential vocabulary, but simply accepted as 'given'
without philOSOphical support. in this sense Ortega appears to be a much
more explicit bearer of the existential message to education, and the
basic language of his Mission appears to contain a clearer educational
meaning in terms of his general philOSOphic tenets.

0n the subject of the ideal university, it should be pointed out
that the Ortegan theory not only reflects a Germanic influence, but also
that most Spanish-speaking universities do combine that influence with
other traditions directly derived from Continental EurOpean values on
higher education. This is tantamount to state that their axiology has
been constructed upon the same philosophical tenets that inspired Ortega,
and therefore to suggest that such a tradition, added to the use of Spanish
as the conveying ideological vehicle, explains the influence of Ortega's
thought. Cultural traits which, after all, still reflect the impact of
Spanish idiosyncracy, must be added both to the receptiveness of the
Ortegan ideas and to the rejection of different philOSOphical or entations.

Yet, Curiously enough, a generalization could be suggeSLed in the

sense that the basic content a? the formal structure of the axiomatic

23l

assumptions upon which most educative theories are constructed, does
appear to be approximately equivalent in all known cultures. In other
words, there is formal, prOgrammatic, and nominal agreement on the fact
that education must serve ”the culture”. But the problem is rather one of
deciding how shggld the culture 22, and its difficulties are of such a
nature that they persist even after having reached an Operational solution
of what do peOple X mean when they make use of the term culture, or even
after operational agreement has been reached upon the thorny question of
what ”the culture” is to most people. The first problem is indeed one
that the existentialist considers crucial; the second and third tasks

are precisely the essential preoccupation of the logical analyst, and

of the empirical investigator, respectively. This writer contends that,
even granting certain priority to the semantic and validational concerns,
there is a tremendously metaphysical residue that deserves serious
consideration. Such a 'lef-over', which remains "real'I beyond the struggle
for IOglcal meaning, and the quest for epistemol09ical truth (i;3., beyond
the ”talk about talk”, and the ”talk about an object to be known”) is
precisely the struggle for non-logical meaning, and the attempt to elucidate
what is the metaphysical nature of the object being known. Furthermore,
only after a clarification of the metaphysical significance of entities
such as 'culture' and 'education' -- which must go beyond inductive
considerations on ”what does X mean when he says 'culture'?” as opposed

to ”what do most philOSOphers mean when they say 'culture'?”; and which
also must transcend the specialized questions ”how do we know that 'culture'
is what we say it is?” or ”how does X know...?”, etc. -- it becomes
feasible to move from the EDE£HL§ to the WERLNLEWOUQhK tg_b§ types of

proposition. Most phenomenOIOgical analyses contend that the ontological,

232

epistemological, and axiological facets of a given entity to be studied,
e.g., 'education’, do present themselves simultaneously, but that the
vitally meaningful significance of knowledge and value can only be fully
understood when the metaphysical question is properly stated. Hence why
most of them make such an important issue d: the ”return to ontology”,
and why some of their Continental EurOpean representatives have devoted
a lifetime to the proper manner of asking a metaphysical question. The
foregoing consideration is offered in the way of an interpretative jus-
tification of why Ortega is more concerned about the propositions ”what
the university iéfl, and ”what the university should be in_agditignfl,
rather than the attempt to provide detailed or strategic plans for a
change to be made on unexamined assumptions about cultural welfare,
growth, progress, and effectiveness.

The conclusion, then, is that Ortega at least tries to go beyond
Symptomatic cures and strategic prescriptions. He is not satisfied with
merely accepting the contention that higher education must preserve and
simultaneously change the cultural tradition. He does not accept nominal
or programmatic agreement. If education must serve a cultural cause, the
'real' problems of what the culture is, and what the 'good'cuiture ought
to be, must be attacked frontally. And, of course, the same concern
is applied to ‘science', the 'professions‘, and the 'university', so it
becomes possible to talk about 'culture and science', 'science and the

professions', etc tera. His answer appears to be mostly a persuasive

”-__—

 

one for persons Such as the present writer, who was born and partially
raised in a Spanish-speaking country. If the problem becomes one of inquiring
how should the culture be, it is inevitably linked to ethical, and

political preoccupations, whose biased or unexamined perception Seems to

233

underlie most divergences on the questions of public welfare, democracy,
and human commitment. At this point the ”cross-cultural” problem with
education becomes one strongly tinged with political and social philosOphy,
and therefore makes it imperative to examine what are the metaphysical
foundations upon which the application of epistemology to culture and
education is going to be built. Ortega's answer to the problem of the
university's mode of existence tries to do precisely that. His theory

of higher education satisifies the essential concerns revealed by most
definitions of the role of the university. It also fits practically all

of the traits included in the description of 'general education' that
appear in most professional works on the Subject. It presents a tenable
discussion of the meaning of many value-laden terms that have invaded

the educational literature with a profusion that, unfortunately, is not
directly prOportionate to the vagueness now exhibited by such expressions.
Ortega gggggibgs his conceptions of 'whole man', 'life-purposes‘, and

'the place of occupational training in liberal education'. Furthermore he

emphasizes that his version of concepts Such as the 'whole development of

 

the individual’, his 'occupational training', the 'civilizing of his life
purposes', the 'refining of his emotional reactions', and the 'maturation
of human understanding on the nature of things', are tasks to be performed
according to the optimal knowledge of contemporary times. He has a clear,
and well-grounded conception of each and everyone of these terms, plus a
basic theory of individual development in general education to which
contemporary research has added very little, if anything at all. In fact,
Ortega says what he means by ’develooment', 'action', ’behavior', and

many other expressions which in some cases now appear to be simply shuffled-

about with no concern about their significance within the metaphysical

23b

foundations or assumptions of a given theory of science, or a given
phiIOSOphy of man.

Obviously, the responsibility that the places upon the shoulders of
higher education, and the demand for its aggressiveness as a social insti-
tution, are overwhelming ones. The implication of his theory is that
general education constitutes perhaps the most fundamental problem of
contemporary society.

It should be remarked at this point -- and Dr. Nostrand, Ortega's
translator into English, is quite well-aware of such a phenomenon --
that certain problems like international understanding, democratic control,
economic cooperation, and world-peace, can be implemented within a demo-
cratic framework, only insofar as their essential intricacies, and human
implications, are understood and supported by mo§t_peoplg in most nations.
Nostrand still adds to Similar considerations, that such a task acquires a
frightful and urgent character particularly in countries like the United
States, which wields a threatening power for good or evil. Whether he
was also Specifically thinking of the Soviet Union or not is difficult to
ascertain, but the educational concern certainly applies in that case too.

Such a necessity directly points to another one. A synthetic pano-
rama, which at the same time would be clear on the teleological use of the
abundant secondary techniques in the field of education, is also urgently
needed. Symptomatic strategies are of no use for a so-called remedy of
vaguely defined human, and social ills. In this sense, this writer has
concluded that Ortega y Gasset succeeded in the succinct description of
Such ills, and of the remedies to cure them. His insights seem to be
developed within the core of the question, rather than lost within a myOpic

maze of symptons or an undiscriminated collection of strategic recipes.

23S

dogmatically listed in a manual-like manner. The fact that Ortega does not
use the customary and current ”educational vocabulary” has a paradoxical
freshness, since his conceptual body becomes thus more easily accessible
because the terminol09y he uses is not yet confused by the hustle and
bustle of unexamined and empty repetition. In spite of his frequent and
sometimes irritating digressions, it can be safely concluded that he
states his assumptions clearly, and that he supports his contentions with
a voluminous wealth of previous investigation. This trait, in addition to
what he calls his ”non-Eleatic metaphysical inclination” are similar to the
qualities of the famous American philOSOpher John Dewey. In fact, the
concept of Ortegan 'life' and the Deweyan account of 'experience' do have
points of contact that cannot have escaped the perceptive powers of the
reader. Furthermore, the spontaneous and constant flow of conceptual ramifi-
cations, the strength of conviction, the synthetic capacity of appraisal,
and the accuracy of certain predictions, are characteristics that have

an amazing similarity when both the Deweyan and Ortegan manners of thought
are considered. Stylistically, of course, the sentimentality and literary
elegance of the Spanish writer stands in sharp contrast with the stark
”matter-of-factness” of the American philosopher, but the richness of
conceptual implications, and even their common ”unfavorable” traits

-- Such as the lack of schematic sobriety -- do have two characteristics
worth mentioning for the purposes of this chapter. Firstly they are
examples of two Similar, great minds, at work. And secondly, such a Si-
milarity could be offered as a tenable explanation of the attention,

and undeniable impact, that Dewey has had in Latin America, even in spite
of the non-pragmatic inclinations of this geographical area of the world.

Surprisingly enough, and contrary to many an interpretation, the

conclusion of the present investigation is that Ortega y Gasset is a
mass-minded educator who also values the individual. No Other type would

fit his considerations on the necessity of general education for the sake

of keeping abreast with the times. No other kind of education would respond
to the pressing need to eliminate the modern barbarian by means of an
inevitably common awareness of the essential problems in contemporary
civilization, according to the best knowledge of our time. Possibly

what has happened in the case of those who call Ortega an élltg, idealistic
educator, is that they were unable to distinguish the teleological differences
between culture and science, the professions and culture, and science and the
professions. As a result of this analytic inability, those critics probably
saw a ”two-track” system in the Ortegan scheme, and loudly exclaimed:
”Aristocratic dualism!”

But if it is accepted that the basic Ortegan thesis is that the
essential intrincacies and human implications of certain problems like
cross-cultural understanding, democracy, world-finance, peace, freedom,
authority, power, and equality EH§£H9¢_EOQELEEQQE.EX"E05t people in most
nations; if it si accepted that such problem has been originated by a
lack Of parallelism between pure reason and vital reason, how could it
be denied that the underlying assumption here is one of basic and equal
human dignity? It must be recalled that Ortega does not blame human
beings as such, nor their ”natural potentialities” for.certain kinds of
callings, when he talks about the modern problem. He never says that
certain people are exclusively fit to do certain more dignified things,
nor does he suggest that certain activities are loftier than other ones.
Such reasoning -- which is basically the underlying assumption supporting

most of the ”two track” educational systems -- should be sharply different-

237

lated from the considerations on the methodology of pure yersus applied
science, art or philosophy. Therefore, what Ortega blames are certain
abstract, corporate entities that have lost their connections with the

vital elements that justify their existence, namely with the human beings
who have a right to demand of the university what the university must give
them. Ortega criticizes the institutions, and never the basic potentialities
of the human mind, nor their economic capacity to become educated. To

say that a doctor is not a scientist proper, and should not be prepared

in the same manner that a scientist should be prepared, is not to say

that a doctor is better or worse than a pure scientist.

By the same token, the establishment Of a difference between the
ontological characters of certain callings is not equivalent to the establish-
ment of basic, axiological differences between such callings. Failure
in distinguishing ontological from axiological propositions leads into
believing that the former logically entail the latter. The false argu-
mentation that supports such a contention is blind to the analytical
quality of certain prOpositionS. In this Sense, it should be remembered
-- however trivial it may sound -- that a prOposition of the type ”What
X.L§” is not yet equivalent to a proposition of the kind ”What X ggght
to be” , and that both types of Statement are entirely different from
judgements of the kind “What X can be”. It is therefore contended that
Ortega's theory of education begins by examining the first prOposition,
142;, the metaphysical foundations, and then moves into the third one,
143;” the assertion of factual possibility, in order to establish a thesis
on thesecond task,which is the axiological concern. Furthermore, he
appears to consider other aspects: in the first place he recOgnizes that

university and culture are what they are, because to a significant extent

238

they have been determined by what they used to be; and secondly he uses

the already discussed conception of 'destiny', by stating that the metaphy-
sical consideration of concepts, and realities, Such as 'culture' and
'university' do have a teleological quality of inevitable necessity,

which is precisely the distinguishing factor between utopianism and
feasibility. Thus, the criticism of the Ortegan theory on the grounds

of a programmatic ”two-track” loftiness, seems to be unfounded, and blind
to the above-mem:ioned logical or analytic distinctions.

Some think that Ortega's idea of the good university is far more
”dated” than his idea of a good society. Again Nostrand, in his Intro-
duction to the English translation of the_flission Of the University,
thinks that this is so because the idea of a good society takes its cue
from the persistent needs and wants of mankind, while the idea of a
university is proposed as a remedy for specific weaknesses in the
structure of contemporary society. The argument here is that Ortega
is not to be considered one of those nostalgic medievalists who want a
return to the university of the thirteenth century on the assumption
that such a change would reStore the cultural unity usually associated
with that period, because he is “...too thorOugh a scholar to overlook
the fact that in the heyday of the medieval universities the teaching
of the classics was at a low ebb, and less than half the universities
had a faculty of theology to teach first principles, while they all had

their law School and most of them a school of medicine.” (230)

 

(230) Mission, p. 26.

239

And the implication, of course, is that the fiiggigg really purports to be
a workable model of university, whose validity could be applied regardless
of chronological epoch, rather than an evocative lyriciSm praising the
beauty of past and better ages. It has been pointed out that Ortega's
weakest predictions are those that, sadly enough, reveal an exaggerated
optimism that seems to belie his distrust in the classical contention
that knowledge is virtue. It should be noted, at this juncture, that in
spite of Dewey's fears, also voiced in the late twenties and early
thirties, a major debacle had unfortunately to take place before his
contentions -- and the Ortegan ones -- acquired a posteriori support.
Fifteen years after the Mission was published in Spanish, and twelve
years before Sputnik, Nostrand still remarked that:

Our general-education movement in the United States stands out

for its advances in pedagogical techniques, guidance, survey courses,

and even general curricula, which however belie one another's

claim to any comprehensive integration. We have been developing

these techniques in a Spirit of unrealistic optimism despite all

our protestations to the contrary. It took a blow that shattered

our faith in automatic progress to make us buckle down to the basic

questions that worried Ortega a decade and a half ago. Thus for

a second time the hardy, practical minded pioneers of our country,

as they push back one of the great frontiers of history, find stretch-

ing on before them the trail of an imaginative Spanish explorer, :231)

Yet, unless the Ortegan Optimistic assumption that men are sufficient y
rational to reject questionable ideas is made, there is no sens in positing
higher education as one of the main conveyors of enlightened thought to the
general public, Unfortunately, the only alternative is that it may take
even longer to vitalize our reason, and consequen;ly the; It may ‘ake more
waiting before ”impure knowledge“ catcheS'up with Sewey and .riega Tn this
area of crucial concern.

“-__ — ‘— .—.-._.~~_-‘-_. nan... M.‘ w»-

(23l) Missiog, p. h.

ZQO

It should be remared that the same Optimistic assumption is the
basic cornerstone for our beliefs in democracy, freedom, and mutual
understanding. Thus, things being as they are, Ortega's optimistic
assumptions seem to be the only avenue for cultural salvation. Other
alternatives are, of course, possible -- and some existentialists or
materialists seem to possess a sufficient degree of despair to have
accepted them -- but one tends to resist such notions as oligarchy, dictator-
ship, and fatalistlc conclusions on human nature. Therefore, since g2
,figggg these problems appear to be difficult, the modified contention
that vital reason is virtue does not seem quite inappropriate. Hence,
the matter becomes a de iure question of cultural survival.

It should be remembered that the synthetic presentation of modern
knowledge that Ortega advocates for the teaching tasks in higher educat-
ion is not simply a descriptive account that merely would have the
character of enumerative digest. The teaching responsibility is rather
one of a dynamic synthesis involving both a personal realization of the
real problem, and a sufficient degree of institutional support for the
execution of such a task. In other words, the essential problem is one
of selection and organization of knowledge in terms of conduct, viewed as
a concept which joins both behavior and action, as previously defined.

This writer wishes to close the present dissertation by presenting
some rather interesting quotations taken from the work of one of the most
outstanding philosophers of education. Also written in l929-30, and using
non-technical language, the simlarity between pragmatic, modern liberal
mind, and the Ortegan vitalism should be self explanatory:

Quantification, mechanization and Standardization: these are then

the marks of the AmericanizatiOH that is conquering the world.
They have their good s'ie. external conditions and the standard

Zhl

of living are undoubtedly improved. But their effects are not
limited to these matters; they have invaded mind and character,

and subdued the soul to their own dye. The criticism is familiar;

it is so much the burden of our own critics that one is never quite
sure how much of the picture of foreign critics is drawn from direct
observation and how much from native novels and essays that are

not complacent with the American scene. This fact does not detract
from the force of the indictment; it rather adds to it, and raises
the more insistently the question of what our life means.... (232)

The problem of constructing a new individuality consonant with the
objective conditions under which we live is the deepest problem
of our times. (233)

The first step in further definition of this problem is realization
of the collective age which we have already entered. When that is
apprehended, the issue will define itself as utilization of the
realities of a corporate civilization to validate and embody the
distinctive moral element in the American version of individualism:
Equality and freedom expressed not merely externally and politically
but through personal participation in the develOpment of a shared
culture. (23h)

If one is to accept the Ortegan contention that certain ideas acquire
a type of embodiment which possesses astounding clarity to perceptive
minds, and which is also a particular concern d: those who “keep abreast
with the times”, it should not be surprising to see that the above
quotations follow such a trend of thought. in the realm of education,
Dewey also wrote in l929 that:

... the distinguishing trait of the American student body in our

higher schools is a kind of intellectual immaturity. This

immaturity is mainly due to their enforced mental seclusion; there

is, in their schooling, little free and disinterested concern with

the underlying social problems of our civilization. Other typical

evidence is found in the training of engineers. Thorstein Veblen
-- and many others have since repeated his idea -- pointed out

 

(232) Dewey, John, individualism Old and New, Capricorn Books, New York,
1962, 00.24-25.

 

(233) lbid., P. 32.

(23h) lbid., pp. 33-3k.

ZQZ

the strategic position occupied by the engineer in our
industrial and technological activity. Engineering schools give
excellent technical training. Where is the school that pays
systematic attention to the potential social function of the
engineering profession? (235)

Obviously, in addition to the rejection of dualistic immanences,
the contemporary versions of liberal thought also add the pragmatic
dimension that Ortega wished to consider within the real of his vital-
istic scheme. The metaphysical and cognitive differences have been already
discussed, but the concern for human life remains practically unaltered.
As a final remark, this writer believes that Ortega y Gasset would have
gladly signed his name to the following consideration:

it is indeed foolish to assume that an industrial civilization
will somehow automatically, from its own inner impetus, produce

a new culture. But it is a lazy abdication of responsibility

which assumes that a genuine culture can be achieved except first
by an active and alert intellectual recognition of the realities
of an industrial age, and then by planning to use them in behalf
of a significantly human life. To charge that those who urge
intellectual acknowledgement or acceptance as the first necessary
step stop at this point, and thus end with an Optimistic ration-
alization of the present as if it were final, is a misconstruction
that indicates a desire to shirk reSponsibility for undertaking
the task of reconstruction and direction. Or else it waits upon a
miracle to beget the culture which is desired by all serious minds, (236)

 

(23S) Dewey, op.cit., p. l28.

(236) Ibid., pp. lkk-lks.

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