'LIFE', 'CULTURE' AND 'HIGHER EDUCATION' IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET

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

ABSTRACT

'LIFE', 'CULTURE', AND 'HIGHER EDUCATION' IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET

by Iván Barrientos

This study takes only one of the major topics generally depicted as representative of "existential philosophy", and explores its technical implications in the original writings of a single thinker: the Spaniard Ortega y Gasset. The selected topic is "the significance of human life", as it relates to the concepts of 'culture' and 'general education' within the context of the studied author.

A series of duly supported statements on the basic assumptions made by the dissertation, and on the need to study the foundational structure of phenomenologically-oriented theories, constitutes the introductory section, comprised of three chapters. The essential problem that has led into controversial and deceptive differences of method between "exact" (or 'natural') and "behavioral" (or 'cultural') sciences, is also presented in some detail. Such a methodological difference is submitted as one of the most crucial obstacles that have separated logico-empirical radicalism from metaphysical theories, thus creating antagonisms and over-simplified mutual perceptions. The common denominator of "existentialism" is regarded as an untenable classificational ambition, and the concept of 'phenomenological orientation' is posited as a more feasible category, to be also differentiated from mere subjective speculation for reasons that the dissertation also discusses at some length.

A general overview of the main topics covered by Ortega's philosophy leads into a closer examination of the concept of 'life', out of which emerges a key-notion of 'vital reason' (i.e., the use of reason for life)

as opposed to 'pure reason' (i.e., the use of reason for its own sake). This central concept is grounded on a metaphysical view, firstly discussed as a "basic form of experience", and then compared to other vitalistic stances, held by various European philosophers. This comparison yields a distinction between Ortega's 'vitalism' and the 'irrationalism' exhibited by most of the other vitalistic positions.

These findings, and other major technicalities are then applied to Ortega's basic case for general education at the university level, and to the following essential distinctions:

1 - 'Life' (as the radical human reality) and 'science' (as a problem-solving, rational construct).

2 - 'Science' (as an activity capable of being performed for its own sake) and the 'professions' (the result of 'science' when applied to important, but not exhaustive aspects of 'life').

3 - 'Culture' (as the problematic result of reason when applied to 'life') and the 'professions'.

4 - 'Culture' and 'life'.

5 - 'Culture' and 'science'.

6 - 'What universities do' (as a factual-environmental account) and 'what the university really is' (as a corporate cultural institution at the service of 'life').

7 - 'What the university is' and 'what the university can be' (as determined by the learning capacity of the average man).

8 - 'What the university can be' and 'what the university ought-to-be' (as determined by its 'real-being', established in 6, and by the ethical commitments to 'culture' and 'life' that

are derived from the axiological extension of its foundational ontology).

Conclusively, it is finally submitted, and duly supported, that: (a) Ortega is an 'unsystematic', but not necessarily an 'asystematic' philosopher. (b) His metaphysical construction presents interesting problems which lead into certain logical difficulties that the dissertation discusses in some detail. (c) His educational theory transcends the symptomatic level found in many other schemes of general education, thus frontally attacking and profoundly examining the more basic problems. (d) The actuality of his theses has not been affected, but rather increased by the human acts and events of the thirty-five year period that has elapsed since the publication of Ortega's thoughts on higher education. And (e) the Ortegan theory conveys an axiological trend to be seriously considered whenever an international venture in education is contemplated for Spanish-speaking cultures.

Textually and contextually, the study also presents (i) a discussion of the major technical weaknesses to be found in the position; (ii) a phenomenological stance at work in the discussion of the concepts 'life', 'culture', and 'higher education', (iii) essential distinctions to be made among some phenomenologically-oriented philosophies', and (iv) a historical background that presents, at least minimally, some of the intricate difficulties implied by a serious consideration of the more general topic of "existentialism and education".

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by

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A THESIS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Existentialism" is still a vague term in purely philosophical circles. Aside from certain opaque concerns that it supposedly has, such as the "significance of human existence", the "problem of choice", the "relationship between existence and essence", the "struggle for meaning", and the "effort to become what one can become", there is really no common body of generalized and sufficiently clear thought to be had in mind when talking about this puzzling movement as a whole. Yet, somehow, most people "feel" that a movement appears to be there, and hence the term has become a part of the 'professional' vocabulary. It is often said that such a movement has had a tremendous impact in the contemporary world, especially Continental Europe, Latin America and Asia... no "small" portions of the globe! It is also said that "existentialism" is here to stay, not only in the realm of 'pure philosophy', but also in collateral fields such as literature, psychology, sociology, anthropology and education. Furthermore, we hear that the "existential" ideas can be traced-back to pre-Socratic and ancient oriental thought, and that such ideas deserve to be at the philosophical core even more than the modern concern for the possibility of knowledge.

Yet, puzzling contradictions are bound to appear, especially when a particular philosopher, or a given theory, are labeled as "existentialistic". Writers who supposedly are "existentialists" firmly deny to be such. The division of "square" vs. "beat" existentialism also seems to confuse the issue further, since it only suggests the possibility of maintaining a distinction between a technical system, and a pathological, second-

handed, misinterpretation of such a theoretical structure. Besides, upon short reflection, the question of authenticity vs. distortion in a given philosophy, is one to be generalized to all philosophies, rather than restricted to "existentialism": to mention only one of the many instances of genuineness vs. misinterpretation, it is said, for example, that the Deweyian influence is not "the real spirit of pragmatism", and that the "progressive excesses" in education have nothing to do with "experimentalism".

Therefore, to say that "beat" existentialism is not to be confused with the "real thing" entails a tremendous responsibility, namely that such a "real thing" must be, at least, described, in order to enable the interested and especially the uninterested students to make the distinction. This remark assumes, of course, that interested students do have the time, the ability, and the willingness to consult direct sources, and to reach conclusions of their own. Nevertheless such an assumption, should be incorporated to the problematic character of the present dissertation, whose total structure rests upon it for the validational and justificational aspects of the enterprise.

In sum, the initial problem could be compressed as follows: if it is said that existentialism has had an impact on educational matters (especially psychology and social science), and if there is no clarity, not so much on the "meaning" of the term 'existentialism', but rather on the philosophical movement which it symbolizes, two tasks are necessary. Firstly, the material aspects supposedly encompassed by the formal vagueness of the term 'existentialism', must be known or at least "felt" or "sensed" with sufficient clarity and force to be described. And secondly, the relationship between such material aspects, and the discipline generally known as the philosophy of education, should be established.

But, in spite of commendable efforts that have been already made, such an overwhelming enterprise also seems to presuppose a very ambitious coverage. It is indeed not the matter for a single dissertation, or even a single lengthy volume, but rather for a lifetime of studious dedication. It also requires certain "multilingualism" that few people truly have, in addition to a philosophical degree of maturity only to be found in exceptionally intelligent, chronologically sophisticated, and fully dedicated scholars.

Thus, assuming of course that the suggested problem is of sincere interest to the person who thinks about it, a doctoral dissertation can only aspire to make a rather limited contribution. A historical bridge between the types of culture that have bred existentialistic thought and other kinds of cultural situations, is a possibility. An isolated problem, such as the significance of the concept 'human life' to a given philosopher of non-semantic orientation, within the context of the so-called existentialistic thinkers, is another possibility. An effort to clarify similarities and differences between a supposedly "existential" thinker, and other "existentialists", is still another way to make a contribution.

The execution of tasks such as the ones outlined in the above paragraph, should indeed be greatly assisted if certain delimiting or implementing factors are taken into account. In the first place it is desirable to confine a study such as "the significance of human life" to only one thinker. Secondly, the errors of interpretation can be minimized if the selected author is studied in his own language. And thirdly, the conceptual connections between a given type of personal thought, and (i) his historico-cultural background, or (ii) other theories that could be classified as "similar", could also be rendered more intelligible if the study is performed as multi-lingually as possible.

Due to the above reasons, the present dissertation has attacked the more general problem "existentialism and education" from a different, although more modest, angle. Instead of taking the question "What is the relationship between existentialism and education?" in all its overwhelming complexity, the present thesis has taken only one of its implications. It has discarded a totalitarian ambition and reduced one of its facets to the study of one of the so-called "existential thinkers" in his own language. The thinker is José Ortega y Gasset; the language is Spanish', and the methologically-delimited problem is the significance of a given concept of 'human life' in a given theory that relates 'culture' to 'higher education'.

Even delineated in such manner, the consideration of the above-mentioned problem still finds ramifications to be regarded as a rather indirect, and obviously unpretentious, contribution to the larger question of existentialism and education. One of them is the consideration of 'existentialism' as a philosophical movement whose essential trait is precisely its irreductibility to common denominators, thus avoiding a practice that has proved to be questionable with other movements as well. Another sub-topic is the distinction between 'existentialism' as a cultural phenomenon, and a historical category to be called the 'philosophies of life', whose dissimilarities with the more systematic efforts shall be worth mentioning. And lastly, a distinction between 'existentialism' as a cultural movement, and 'phenomenology' as an epistemological method used by the former in varying degrees, has been found to be highly useful and desirable. This last ramification will have certain importance, since to the best knowledge of the present writer, no book on educational philosophy, or on existentialism and education, has shown the connection between the phenomenology of Edmond Husserl and a particular "existentialistic" type of thought, in spite of the fact that Husserl and Brentano are usually

mentioned when dealing with such movements. This dissertation will then seek to show in addition certain similarities and differences between phenomenology as a method, and the Ortegan theories of 'life', 'culture', and 'higher education'.

A "review of the literature" related to the problem would be, on the one hand, endlessly lost within the maze of Continental European thought, from ancient Greece to contemporary phenomenological research and, on the other, limited to the scanty publications strictly made in English on the topic of existentialism and education. A good part of the latter, especially the work of Kneller and Morris, are panoramic, though commendable efforts to open an initial breach. And regarding a minimal portion of the former, which include Ortega y Gasset's Complete Works, the reader is referred to the bibliography that appears at the end of the present dissertation, and to the excellent "Bibliographical Appendix" on Ortega's English translations, which appears at the end of José Ferrater Mora's book, Ortega y Gasset. Ferrater's study also contains a detailed index of the Complete Works, and a biographical sketch of Dr. Ortega. (1)

It should suffice, then, to indicate at this point that the books consulted for the present dissertation have been selected for their relevance to the subject-matter, and that the validating criteria for such a choice should be connected to the fact that this writer made use of some previous experience provided to him by a number of years devoted to the study of "pure philosophy" in an institution of phenomenological and idealistic orientation. This background, added to a careful review of Ortega's Complete Works, and to an equally careful examination of the better

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(1) Ferrater Mora, José, Ortega y Gasset; An Outline of His Philosophy, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1956, pp. 65-69.

known commentaries on Ortega that have been written in Spanish, do constitute the "availability of material", upon which this work has founded its development.

In order to maintain this dissertation within the boundaries of a manageable enterprise, the general connections between phenomenology and education, that could be made in the fields of ethics, psychology, and social science will not be explored in detail. There seems to be little doubt that phenomenological methodology has affected value theories, such as the ones held by the German axiologists Scheler and Hartmann, and even some Anglo-Saxon ethical views: Moore, Ewing, Ross, Prichard, and Broad, for example, have been described as being strongly influenced by a Cartesian tradition renewed by Husserl and Brentano.

There is a wealth of philosophical material dealing with this issue, now largely discarded from many American philosophy departments, especially due to the pressure of logical analysis and neo-positivistic efforts of the type influenced by thinkers like Feigl, or by followers of the Carnap-Wittgenstein types of thought.

But, if on the one hand, the impact of phenomenological value theory on education has been minimized by the influence of the semanticists and logicians, on the other, a new breach appears to be opened in psychology, anthropology, and the so-called "behavioral disciplines". It should be recognized that the impact of person-centered, psychological theories of self-actualization are now affecting the realm of education, especially in their connection with psychoanalytical views on the learning phenomena, and with the study of perception and role-playing as key-concepts to be considered in the theorization of socio-anthropological factors supposedly related to schooling and teaching. These trends do indeed continue a line of thought, whose initial systematic treatment could be placed in the work

of certain philosophers like the German Wilhelm Dilthey, and whose connections with vitalism, phenomenology, and existentialism certainly deserve to be closely examined.

Professionals in the field of education seem to be well acquainted with names such as those of Piaget, Minkowski, Bachelard, Ingarden, May, Rogers, Fromm, and Maslow, but little effort has been made to elucidate the philosophical assumptions upon which these "new" theories appear to rest. The same phenomenon seems to be true in the case of social scientists like Weber, Durkhein, Sorokin, and Manheim, or even in the case of less known ones like Tonnies, Simmel, von Wiese and Freyer. Few people in the field seem to know, for example, that certain technical terminologies such as the 'idiographic' and 'nomothetic' dimensions which appear in a well-known theory of educational administration, have been inherited from the vocabulary of a dissertation written in 1894 by Windelband, a German Neo-Kantian who tried to clarify a supposedly deceiving epistemological antithesis between the methodology of natural science and that of history.

At any rate, the point is that the philosophical support which underlies many a current view on disciplines that are collateral with that of education, are seldom examined. This type of study cannot be effected without gradual or consecutively distributed efforts of concentration, and hence why the present thesis has preferred to delimit the dimensions of the already discussed general problem, by taking only one aspect of its intricate fabric of inter-connections.

The methodology to be followed in the ensuing chapters will be, in the first place, one of close historical fidelity to the original source, in the measure that such an action is possible. The studied author's native language will be, of course, preferred. In this aspect of the dissertation,

paraphrastic conciseness will be sacrificed for the sake of precise, detailed rendering. Most of the quotations taken from the Spanish will be translated by this writer, unless otherwise indicated. Due attention will be given, whenever possible, to the subtleties and semantic variations usually lost in the customary translations, and, in this sense, correct English form, or flavor, will be occassionally sacrificed in order to preserve the Spanish "feeling".

It will be thus impossible to eliminate the presence of lengthy and frequent footnotes, and the appearance of pedantic academicism. In fact the footnotes will be there very often, perhaps to the point of irritation, and the only exception taken to the concern for precise referential location will appear on Chapter V, where this writer will attempt to place the Ortegan thought within the framework of philosophies that share in varying degrees the essential problem to be studied. The reason for such an exception is simply to avoid loading the chapter with so many references that it could become plainly unreadable. This does not mean that the work of such a chapter will be only paraphrastic; it will be rather a synthetic effort to recapitulate in a few words a kind of philosophical report that involves previous analytical work.

Certain quoted passages will also be repeated in different chapters. This is due to the fact that they were chosen for their expressive felicity; to the necessity of using them in different contexts;to the wealth of interpretation that they offer; and to the pedagogical attempt of restating certain concepts that fit a variational treatment, as occurs with the main themes in a musical composition. As a result of this, many quotations not necessarily restricted to the studied philosopher will be repeated in their entirety whenever a new angle or variation could be

applied to their content. This is especially true of Chapters IV and VI, since the connection between Ortega's general and educational philosophies, purports to be constructed in an increasingly-encompassing manner.

Related to the above is the fact that this dissertation will mostly deal with general or "pure" philosophy, and with its history, as opposed to the "philosophy of education" proper. No other alternative is possible when a thinker who is not precisely known as a "philosopher of education" is studied with the purpose of connecting his incidental educational remarks, with the rest of his metaphysical context. This circumstance is also due to the fact that Ortega y Gasset wrote on every imaginable topic, thus presenting a rather charming obliviousness to the compartmentalization that characterizes most "systematic" efforts within the "division of labor" that appears to have been implicitly accepted for the fields of philosophy or of science, as viewed by logically oriented schools. As a result of this, the present dissertation will have a premeditated content of approximately "seventy percent philosoophy versus thirty percent education". Yet, the overall body of the work purports to be a contextual display of considerations worthy of being characterized as pertinent to the "philosophy of education". It should also be remarked at this juncture that the essential purpose for having entertained the topic of the thesis is an "educational" one, in the sense that it purports to interpret a Spanish mind for interested Anglo-Saxon readers.

The above has led into the consideration of another problem. How was Ortega to be presented in English? On this aspect it was decided that precisely because much of the Ortegan persuasive properties do reside in his use of the Spanish language, such circumstance might paradoxically be viewed as an advantage for the purposes of the thesis, since the problem then attains a

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new challenge. The task becomes rather one of asking what is left of the Ortegan conceptual framework, once the linguïstic charm has lost a sizeable portion of its effectiveness. There were, of course, additional implications which can be briefly summarized by pointing-out the general need for a unified and appropriate terminology. Two factors have been of great help in this facet of the work: the existence of previous studies of Ortega in the English language, and the valuable suggestions made by the members of the Doctoral Guidance Committee of the present writer.

Among the former, due and open recognition must be herein presented to Dr. Ferrater's excellent outline of the Ortegan philosophy. Such a task has been successfully carried-out with the Anglo—Saxon reader in mind. Chapters II and III will explain the manner in which Ferrater's findings were used in this work. Some of his terms and methodological resources were preserved; other terms were taken from Nostrand and Weyl (translators of Ortega into English); and still other words were especially coined, or recoined, by this writer, sometimes at the suggestion of his Committee members.

It could be said, then, that the present study would have represented years of research had it not been by Ferrater's account, which was of extraordinary utility as a guideline in the examination of Ortega's Complete Works. This writer feels that the present introductory part would be incomplete without the open recognition of the work of those scholars, who have devoted considerable effort to the study of one of the most outstanding thinkers in the Spanish-speaking world.

Further details on the type of methodology to be followed by the present dissertation will be contextually expanded and textually described in Chapters II and III. In this Introduction, this writer considers it sufficient to

indicate that the exposition to be used will be of a historico-speculative character, for reasons whose detailed discussion will be also offered in the above mentioned chapeters. Thereafter it will be necessary to enter quite gradually into Ortega's theory of higher education, and therefore to educational aspects, whose conceptual presentation and historical location will respectively need an inevitable series of technical excursions to the realm of "general" philosophy. The same considerations will make it necessary to devote Chapter VII to the critical appraisal of Ortega as a "general theorizer", and to use Chapter VIII for a subsequent examination of his educational scheme as it relates to this basic philosophical position. Special emphasis will also be made in Chapter VII on the epistemological problems of the Ortegan theory, since many Anglo-Saxon readers seem to have inherited a preoccupation for these matters.

In addition to the already-outlined manner of contributing to the more general problem of "existentialism and education", it is hoped that the present study will present other contributive aspects of some importance. In the first place, a study of the Ortegan works lends itself to the pursuit of a reasonably clear delimitation between schools of thought that are often confused, or grouped under the common denominator of 'existentialism'. In this implicit and contextual sense, it is hoped that this dissertation would constitute, in fact, a case against common denominators. "Existentialism", "idealism", "phenomenology", and "vitalism" will be the specific instances to be illustrated in terms of conveying an awareness of differences and similarities. The Ortegan material will be quite ad hoc to exercise an ostensive exemplification of the undesirability to generalize on "schools" and "trends".

The Ortegan writings also offer an excellent opportunity to establish

certain relationships seldom attempted, such as, e.g., a rather direct confrontation between Ortega's concept of life, and Husserl's phenomenological method of cognition. Likewise, a suggestion will be conveyed of the fact that it appears highly desirable to conduct a series of analytical explorations on the difference, for example, between empirically grounded concepts of experience, and other concepts that appear to be strongly rooted upon idealistic or phenomenological assumptions. This writer is of the opinion that due clarification of these issues should benefit the field of education.

The contributive value of monographically-centered studies also appears to be highly desirable in the educational realm. In this sense, a modest attempt will be made in order to have this study approach, in the best possible way, a suggestive model of the type of investigation that could be conducted if a "general philosopher" (as opposed to a "philosopher of education") is studied with the purpose of exploring the conceivable implications of his philosophical generalities for the use of educational theory. In the present case, such an effort lacks, of course, the arrogant pretension of being necessarily normative and methodologically faultless. This writer rather prefers to look at his work as an initial attempt, whose general intention, which should be preserved in the future, and whose methodological resources could be greatly improved upon the acquisition of further experiential wealth. Subsequent investigations to be performed by future candidates to the degree could contribute greatly to the attainment of this goal. On this topic, the writer and his major adviser have often discussed the possibility of a series of future dissertations to be made with such purposes, and obviously entailing serious study of the impressive gallery of thinkers whose systems are not usually regarded as

materially or directly related to the field. On the other hand, as in the case of Ortega, other philosophers have touched rather directly upon educational aspects, and should make the proposed task less difficult. Immanuel Kant's work, for example, appears to be waiting for this kind of investigation.

The undertaking of a multilingual study in philosophy could also exemplify the value of examining direct sources, and provide a motivating rationale for those qualified doctoral candidates in the field, who wish to have a "practical" justification for the controversial language requirements in a graduate program. Here the writer is not confining the remark to the use of his native language, but rather to the utility of handling other languages such as English, French, and German, which, in his case, have been learned "in addition", and which will be used in varying degrees for the documentation of this thesis.

And finally, a quick glimpse must be offered of the basic controversy that has led this writer into the necessity of presenting the thought of Ortega y Gasset, as a part of the overwhelming and somewhat fictitious problem of "existentialism and education". It has been already explained that this problem has been called an "overwhelming" one because it demands the examination of too large a segment of the Continental European mode of doing philosophy. And the term "fictitious" has been used because in a strict sense, there is no such movement as "existentialism", at least insofar as it purports to represent a unified school of systematic thought that shows a sufficient conglomeration of mutually shared, basic philosophical contentions.

What appears to be there is rather a recognition of the metaphysical and epistemological problems created by a radical transplantation of

certain quantified techniques (borrowed from the realm of natural science) to the sphere of the so-called "behavioral" disciplines. Since the death of Hegel (the last of the strictly "idealistic" system-builders) the debate between "natural" and "cultural" scientific methodologies has undergone a continued crisis. The "exact sciences" had made great progress in their particular fields of specialization, but at the cost of their internal unity. Hegel perceived the difficulty, but his sacrifice of "nature" to the "absolute idea" only deprived the exact natural sciences of a philosophical support that they urgently needed.

As a result of this, the exact sciences continued showing a spectacular but atomistic progress which only contributed to the undesirable divide between the "cultural" and the "physical" (or mathematical) forms of viewing the phenomenon of man. Two opposed conceptions of the world culminated in extreme versions of "physico mathematical" formulations, and of the Neo-Kantian attempts to subtract the problem from the metaphysical realm, in order to view it exclusively from the vantage point of critical epistemology. "Naturalism", "positivism", "biologism", "psychologism", "historicism", and "logicism" were then the opposing radical schools that led Husserl and Brentano to the creation of modern phenomenology as an epistemological method.

Plato used to demand that the dialectician should not be satisfied with extreme conceptual distinctions. He recommended that the methodological dividions of classes, kinds, and species, should not vulnerate their interconnected structure, and thus that the desired fragmentation should not "tear the flesh but rather cut-across the natural articulations". In other words, he noted then that the ancient equivalent of "science" in its concrete task, does not always adjust itself to the postulates of a given logical system, but oftentimes appears to challenge them. Today, the situation does not seem to have changed. Natural or "exact" science at times

necessitates of cultural concepts and methods. And, on the other hand, the cultural disciplines are frequently aided by the application of quantified techniques.

The search for a synthetic effort that could resolve such a non-dualistic combination of generals and particulars in a philosophy, which should include a theory of man, one of science, and another one of culture, seems to be at least one of the essential phenomenological preoccupations, and also seems to be the basic problematic quandary inherited by Ortega y Gasset. It is precisely in view of these conflicts that he constructs a theory of human life, within which he also thought of a fundamental theory of higher education.

CHAPTER II

ORTEGA Y GASSET: A CONTROVERSIAL THINKER

Famous in the Spanish speaking world, well known of the Continent, and not unknown in England and the United States, José Ortega y Gasset is a thinker whose fame reached its peak in the early thirties, and whose influence continues to be strongly felt in the so-called "intellectual circles" of Spain and Latin America. Highly controversial, Ortega is a difficult man to study, because he is the type of writer who has engendered either unconditional praise with blind following, or smug condemnation, with or without analytic appraisal. Some of his faithful followers show no indication whatsoever of having noticed anything questionable about his boldest remarks, and some of his critics seem to find absolutely no worth in whatever they might have seen of the reams of paper which, after his death in 1955, Ortega left filled with his scribbled reactions to the problematic questions of man, society, and the world. At this point, the writer will let one of the most serious students of Ortegan thought speak for himself:

> Skimming through the 3500-odd pages of his complete works, we find a staggering variety of writings; philosophical studies, articles on literary criticism, political essays and speeches, landscape descriptions, and historical interpretations. If we glance casually through the index of names appended to the collection of his works, we are no less impressed by the author's versatility; Renan and Einstein, Caesar and Husserl, Kant and Goya, Proust and Abenkhaldun are only some of the many men not only occasionally mentioned or quoted but discussed at some length... Ortega has written on the fountains in Nurenberg, on the French language, on the Gioconda, on the Russian ballet, on African ethnology, and, of course, on history, love and metaphysics. In view of these facts, we may be inclined to believe that Ortega's variety of topics is either a mark of frivolity or an omen of superficiality. But the more carefully we look

at the strokes of the brush, the more consistent and organized appears to be the picture. (2)

Ortega y Gasset also wrote on education, and this topic provides the raison d'être of the present dissertation. The alphabetical index of listed names comprised between Abd-el-Aziz, and Zurbarán, include Claparède, Durkheim, Emerson, Froebel, Herbart, Pestalozzi, Montaigne, Rousseau, Suárez and Vives. (3) And one of the numerous essays among the overwhelming multiplicity of topics, of which some have been sketchily suggested above, bears the name of Mission of the University, in which he addresses the problem of higher education in the Spain of the late twenties, and early thirties.(4) Hardly his monumentum aere perennius, the Mission of the University (5)

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(2) Ferrater Mora, José, Ortega y Gasset, An Outline of His Philosophy, Bowes & Bowes, London, 1956, p.9.

(3) Ortega y Gasset, José, Obras Completas, Tomo VI (1941-1946) Cuarta Edición, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1958, pp.521-538.

(4) An earlier book, (Biología y Pedagogía, San José de Costa Rica; J. García Monge, 1923) already shows the Ortegan concern for individual self-development as the backbone of sound educational theory and practice. Nostrand's translation of the Mission of the University, (Princeton University Press, N.J. 1944, Introduction, p. 12) makes a point indicating that a distinction should be made between Ortega as a teacher, and as a theoretician of education: "As a teacher, therefore, Ortega has been quite the opposite of the mass-minded educator one might infer him to be from reading Mission of the University by itself....In the earlier Biología y Pedagogía, on the contrary, Ortega appears as an educator concerned primarily with the individual". Nostrand further recommends Domingo Casanovas' "excellent brief summary of Biología y Pedagogía en Educación (Caracas, Venezuela, May-June 1940, pp.26-28) "as an interesting source for consultation on this point.

(5) Hereinafter referred to as "The Mission", since such an abbreviation would serve its purpose in the English language. It should be interesting to note, though, that the Argentinian "Colección Austral" presents the essay as a part of a book entitled El Libro de las Misiones ("The Book of Missions"), prefaced by Ortega himself, and which adds the "Mission" of the librarian, and that of the translator, to the mission of the university. "Mission", is defined in this context as the ὅυεγεκα or Aristotelian "for what", with all the force of its teleological direction, which Ortega deems as the "...main one among the many things that every human faculty, or 'human what-to-do' invite us to undertake". (El Libro de las Misiones, Espasa Calpe,Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1945, p. 11).

offers however an interesting meeting point for some of the most original Ortegan ideas of the period, and also presents a rather clear anticipation of his later development.

Ortega, as a thinker, is also a peculiar object of study because he combines the vehemence of the Spanish "after-dinner chatterer" --essentially based upon strong feeling rather than upon systematic seriousness-- and the stunning erudition of the German scholar. In this sense, his language --so full of Spanish "cultural color"-- is difficult to translate. It should be interesting to ask what is left when the Ortegan thought is stripped of his lingüistic charm, but there is something of treason involved in every translation:

> To write well consists of doing small erosions to that thing called 'grammar', to the established lingüistic usages, and to that entity which seems to issue the dominant norms of the language. It is an act of permanent rebellion against the social profile: a subversion. To write well implies a certain radical boldness.
>
> Now, the translator --he who translates-- is usually a timid character. It is precisely due to this bashfulness that he has chosen such an occupation: a minimal one. He tries to comply with the demands of that overwhelming police machine constituted by grammar, and the conventional usages of the language.
>
> What will he do with the rebellious text? Is it not asking too much of him to expect that he should also be a rebel with a foreign cause?... But he will be overcome by his own meekness, and --instead of disobeying the commands of the grammarian-- will proceed to do just the opposite: he will imprison the translated writer, confining him to the dungeons of the other normal language. And by doing this he will betray him: traduttore, traditore. (6)

Thus, it would seem also legitimate to conjecture upon the validity of judging a body of statements, which precisely appear to convey so much meaning because its nature is that of a work of art (and in this sense a

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(6) Ortega y Gasset, José, "Miseria y Esplendor de la Traducción", El Libro de las Misiones, Austral, 1939, p. 135. (Translated by the writer).

display of "objectiveness" such as the one offered by literary, musical, or plastic productions), rather than a sober, matter-of-fact, analytic monument of the kind that seems to be so much en vogue nowadays, especially among some Anglo-Saxon philosophical writers. Therefore, it appears convenient to clarify at this point that this study is initiated with the specific recognition that Ortega's work would be the epitome of "meaninglessness" to the analytic thinker, and that a person of such a persuasion would hardly choose Ortega as a topic worthy of any attention in the realm of philosophic exercise, except perhaps in the case of needing good examples of logical imprecision.

The controversial hallelujahs, and anathemas, caused by the Ortegan writings obviously do not find a middle ground, and they tend to be either items laden with emotional involvement, as in the case of Julián Marías, (7) or saturated with theological recrimination, as with Joaquín Iriarte.(8) And again, in this sense, I wish to endorse wholeheartedly the manifest intent of José Ferrater Mora, who, writing for a non-Spanish-speaking public, recognizes the impossibility of avoiding the mention of a few facts that Spanish readers are likely to take for granted, and clarifies that:

> As a result, interpretation will often be accompanied by mere information. On the other hand, certain questions intriguing to the Spanish-speaking public cannot be discussed here. We shall pay little attention, for example, to the problem of whether Ortega's claims of having long since foreshadowed many later philosophical developments in contemporary thought can be substantiated....

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(7) Cf. Marías, Julián, Historia de la Filosofía, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1956, pp. 428-448; Filosofía Actual y Existencialismo en España (1955), Ortega y tres antípodas, El método histórico de las generaciones (1949); and La estructura social (1955).

(8) Iriarte, Joaquín, La Ruta Mental de Ortega, Editorial Razón y Fe, S.A., Madrid, 1949.

> We shall also ignore the question of whether ideas not playing a central role in Ortega's philosophy are faulty... We are not concerned with errors irrelevant to the central themes; some distorted facts or some questionable reasonings may very well be lodged in an interesting and even sound philosophy. We shall indulge in neither bickering nor applause, but try to keep close to the spirit of a famous apophthegm: Neither bewail nor rejoice, but understand . (9)

In effect, this purpose has led to Ferrater's highly competent and concise study, to which the writer feels greatly indebted, and is hardly affected by minute preoccupations of the sort which, not exempted from certain amusement, are reported at the end of his introductory chapter. Indeed it would seem a matter of little importance for an Indo-Spanish Spanish-American, or Spanish scholar to ascertain if Ortega's considerations of Debussy's music are contradicted by factual findings, (10) or in exhausting the implications suggested by the Ortegan interpretation of Quine's statement, 'There must always be undemostrable mathematical truths'. (11) It would not seem to be a bold assertion to indicate that due to certain cultural traits whose origin is "not so mysterious", the Spanish or Spanish-American temperament prefers to leave the environmental, and factual, methods of validation to those dedicated and patient scholars, endowed with preoccupations more typical of a different ethnic or cultural background. It would seem, then, that Ortega's mode of thought has a rather abundant ingredient of intultiveness, in the ordinary sense of the term, and the

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(9) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., p. 14.

(10) Ortega y Gasset, José, Obras Completas, II, 236-46, (1921). The arabic numerals in parentheses indicate the date of first publication, either in periodical or in book form. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Ortegan material will follow the 1946-47 edition of his complete works (obras completas).

(11) V, 528 (1941); also cf. Concord and Liberty, W.W. Norton & Co., N.Y., 1946, p. 62, in which Ortega tries to show that logic, as a "mask of thinking" is not only pervaded by illogical elements but also loses its "emphatic aloofness from other forms of thinking", and that there is no such thing as logical thinking, but only the idea of an imaginary, utopian form of thought that misunderstands itself.

writer would add that such work presents a rather unique combination both of the Iberian insights, which so successfully have asserted themselves in the fields of literature, and the arts; and of the Germanic intuitionistic feats, which, oddly enough, have not only produced the monumental testimonies of Goethe, Schiller, and Beethoven, but also seem to stand behind the craftiness of Grünewald, Holbein, Dürer, the Swiss watches, the Mercedes-Benz automotive achievements, and the miraculous optics of the "Wizards of Wetzlar".

It is indeed difficult to analyze Ortega's educational theory without relating it to the rest of his philosophical "system". Hopefully it has been made clear that perhaps the main reason why such an operation becomes difficult is simply because some doubts could be raised concerning certain questions of terminology, e.g., if in the first place the Ortegan thought on education is in sensu stricto an 'educational theory', and secondly, if his general thought could be called indeed a 'system'. It has been already mentioned that another reason for the difficulty in question is that the Ortegan writings on education are addressed primarily to the function of such a discipline in Spain, and that only by extension do they make it possible to infer more general implications. The Mission is essentially a speech made before Spanish university students. Therefore it does not pretend to constitute a treatise on educational philosophy. It should be noted at this point, that (i) Ortega is addressing himself to Spanish, and by extension, to European and Latin American universities, and (ii) that Ortega is mostly talking about highly specialized institutions, either without any provision for general education or with a minimal one, as in the case of most Latin American universities, or of may other "vocationalist" institutions that claim to be preparing their students for the "immediate demands" of cultural life.

The writer also wishes to repeat here what was suggested earlier in this chapter, in the sense that, on the one hand, Ortega seems to have inherited the powerful idealistic and romantic German systems of thought, while, on the other, he seemed to be possessed by Spanish cultural traits, such as certain fiery sensitivity and dogmatic stubborness which his country-mates probably developed through many years of inquisitorial procedure. This makes him an interesting cross-cultural product which deserves to be examined closely: an emotive Spaniard with a German education produces a reluctant resistance to divide his thought into 'ideas' and 'feelings'. And, since this dissertation is intended for non-Spanish speaking readers, the writer would suggest that here we find the main obstacle posed by the Ortegan thought: a mélange of cultural traits, which, according to a typically Ortegan statement have to be "lived" to be fully understood. If when examining a value system, nurture stands in the way of nature, it is important that an empathic appraisal of idiosyncratic "Latin" traits be developed before judging such a foreign manifestation of concern for the very same problems which puzzle philosophers from all nationalities and schools. The fact that people learn to live differently even when facing the same --or similar-- problems, has become a truism.

Thus, the accustomed analysis of semantic connotations present in a body of judgmental statements will not be followed in the present dissertation, except perhaps to clarify bulky obscurities, or to elucidate the meaning of some of the most important Ortegan theses. But by no means shall such an approach be made the central tool of the present investigation, not because the task would not be appealing, but rather because it does not seem to be the most adequate way to deal with the nature of the author studied. To use a crude analogy it would seem proper to indicate that

for the same reasons that one does not apply mathematical formulae to the appreciation -- and 'understanding', if such a thing is possible -- of a pictorial display, it would be inadequate, and perhaps unfair, to indulge in an exclusively logical method to appreciate, and understand, the work of Ortega y Gasset. Ferrater Mora summarizes this point in a rather fortunate way:

> The first problem that Ortega's philosophy raises is the choice of a suitable method of presentation. A number of methods are available, but none of them seems to be altogether satisfactory. If too much attention is focused upon the unity of Ortega's thought, we incur the risk of losing the flavour of its variety. If we insist too much on the diversity of subjects, sight may be lost of the one continuous stream of thought running through all of them. Ortega himself, however, has provided an answer to our problem. He has said that the only way to approach the question of human reality is the narrative way. Accordingly, the right method of explaining Ortega's philosophy would be the biographical one. Now, 'biographical method' is an expression that must be given a precise meaning. It would be a mistake to interpret it in the usual fashion, as if it consisted of a mere enumeration of facts arranged in chronological order. In Ortega's sense of the word, 'biography' is almost a technical term, indicating the peculiar 'systematic' structure of human life and human achievements. From this point of view, the use of a biographical method involves a certain understanding of the whole of that reality to which it is applied. (12)

But the above suggestion is made at the risk of falling into one of the perplexing vicious circles so frequent in non-formalistic philosophies: in order to understand a system of thought we must describe its various stages, but in order to understand each one of the stages we must have a certain idea, however vague, of the whole system. The modern psychologist would hardly deny that this is, precisely, the line of procedure followed by any attempt to understand the significance of a given human life, and that he must look at its earlier stages in order to understand the later ones, and vice-versa. Ferrater sharply notes that

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(12) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

although the two modes of explanation are not identical (since the first one seems to be more concentrated on the cause-effect operation, and the second seems to be more focused upon the whole-part relationship) they are used simultaneously, and it could be said that instead of being two separate methods, they are simply parts of the same one.

In this sense, then, this work will be a historical one, and it could be anticipated that its over-all nature should perhaps be dissapointing for the 'philosophic' or 'scientifically concerned' reader, whose view of history might be an euphemistic or perhaps even a contemptuous one. It could be conceivably argued that such a "warning" has become almost a cliché, invariably present in any presentation of the so-called 'existentialistic' brands of thought, but at this point, the writer sees no significant difference between this type of underlying remark, and the attempt to establish a basic 'universe of discourse' which is also invariably present in the most serious analytic or neo-positivistic 'works of science'.

In Ortega's work, history plays a role as important as the one of internal logical consistency in an analytic study. Thus, a criticism aimed at the lack of semantic predominance in a study of a historicist philosopher would be as inappropriate as the want of historical monopoly in a logical document. Ortega's thought is a different kind of philosophy, not at all closed to logical analysis, but of such a character that the exclusivity of such an approach would seem unilateral, and by implication, quite trivial. A meeting of minds is a rule-following act, and perhaps one of its basic provisions is to face the interlocutor -- or even the opponent-- on the same grounds. Even if the mental encounter is to have the character of a duel, another rule would be the use of weapons capable of effective interaction. Therefore, with Ortega, the exclusive use of semantic

techniques would not render an adequate appraisal of his suggestive philosophical skills, and possibly would only provide the reader with a negativistic image of the real caliber of the man. It would be like facing a good gladiator with a loud, and lethal machine-gun.

It should be noted that the same, unfair operation is also possible in reverse. To ignore this conception of "fair play" within a given dialectical camp is possibly one of the main reasons why most Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophers are still not on full-speaking terms. The existentialist charges the logician or the positivists with failure in certain tasks that the latter do not propose to carry-out. And, on the other hand, the 'scientifically-minded' philosopher disdainfully refuses to entertain the reading of thinkers like Ortega, on the grounds of 'insufferable meaninglessness' or hopeless mysticism.

Perhaps, then, the most satisfactory classification for all possible sides would be to indicate that Ortega, indeed, is a writer of undeniable merit. Without any intention of erecting consensus as an axiological criterion, this writer would like to point out the universal recognition of the fact that Ortega y Gasset handles the Spanish language with masterful skill, and that he has created a terminology and style, which are uniquely his own. Most of his conceptual-lingüistic techniques consist of avoiding neologisms, and attempting to use ordinary language in what he calls its 'authentic signification' by coining, or recoining, the language. This operation is described by him, in a manner highly reminiscent of the Heideggerian Denken, as a "return to the originative and authentic" meaning of the terms, although it should be pointed out that, upon closer examination, the above mentioned technique seems to oppose that of Heidegger, whose lingüistic intricacies have proved to be utterly

irritating to many a reader. In regard to Ortega, perhaps the most flattering remark to the analytic contribution would be his recurrent statement that "the courtesy of the philosopher is his clarity". (13)

It should be also noted that most professional, scientific, and philosophic bodies of knowledge do have a highly developed technical language, and that the mathematical constructs borrowed, or adapted, by neo-positivism or the analytic schools, do constitute a 'meta-language', which is as puzzling to the impatient uninitiated, as the Heideggerian Denken would be to the academic tourist wishing to find neatly delineated, types of propositions more geometrico. (14)

Nevertheless, it was not the intention of this chapter to present an outline of the whole Ortegan philosophy, a task which already has been successfully carried-out by others. The intent has been to advance a context which, for the purposes of this dissertation, would be sufficient to render the matter of the ensuing chapters intelligible enough. Instead of competing with Ferrater's commendable account, the aim of the present

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(13) Marías, Julián, Historia de la Filosofía, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1956, p.430. Marías here quotes Ortega as his former teacher, and, lacking a specific reference to written sources, merely states that Ortega's "incomparable pedagogic merits as a classroom speaker, reached a maximum of expository transparency", and that the Ortegan effort to be clear was often belabored to the point of inducing to believe that something understood without effort should not require a further attempt at a more total understanding.

(14) Such a reflection is by no means the writer's and it can be found, oddly enough, in W. T. Harris' account of Montaigne's educational theory. Montaigne, Michel de, The Education of Children, with a Prologue by W. T. Harris, D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1899, especially pp. 50-53. Language seems to worry Montaigne, and with good reasons, since he argues (like the analyst today) that poor communication leads to philosophic waste of time. However (and W. T. Harris specifically points this out) he attacked linguistic pedantry by proceeding to construct another language which, at times, is as pedantic and unreadable as the one being criticized.

work will be to lead into a general exploration of the Ortegan concept of educational theory, and to follow a relationship with the rest of the "system".

This chapter, then, has simply tried to suggest a sketchy introduction of Ortega y Gasset to the reader. The following chapters will attempt a return to this initial sketch, and will also try to change it into a more solid portrait with firmer lines, and perhaps some color. In order to do this it will be necessary, in the first place, to set up, in Chapter III, the main theses and subtheses of the present dissertation, therefore completing the opening remarks already anticipated.

Secondly, it will be necessary to provide a more technical overview of the Ortegan philosophy, by applying a particular historical method, whose essential characteristics will also be explained in Chapter III.

Thirdly, the ensuing chapters (IV and V) will make use of the aforementioned technical overview to present an expanded consideration of the Ortegan concept of 'life', as it appears to stand before traditional philosophy, and to relate the Ortegan pensamiento with other philosophies of life, and whatever might be applicable of the movements generally known as 'existentialism', and 'phenomenology'. At this point a detailed discussion of the Ortegan theory of higher education will be presented in a separate Chapter VI.

And, fourthly, the last Chapters VII and VIII will attempt a recapitulation of certain essential Ortegan tenets, as they relate to education, and a critical summary of Ortega's account of university education.

CHAPTER III

AN APPROACH TO ORTEGA'S THOUGHT: THE BIOGRAPHICAL METHOD

The problem of human existence would seem to be as important in educational theory as the epistemological and axiological preoccupations entailing the 'quest for certainty'. This work will attempt to indicate Ortega's manner of looking at man. His world has a 'way' of answering the challenge of existence, knowledge, and value, which is worthy of attention, and contains important suggestions for educational theory and practice, especially now that certain concepts such as 'decision making', 'freedom', 'authority', and 'power' have been revitalized as being of utmost importance in educational theory. Ortega y Gasset's case acquires particular relevance for some of the prevalent policies followed by certain 'immediate vocational' colleges and universities, such as those common in Latin America. By extension some of the Ortegan insights bould be applied without any visible strain to all institutions which exhibit excessive emphasis on overstated 'specialization', or distorted 'vocationalism', in terms of a possible concept of 'cultural reality', on the alleged grounds that an immediate kind of practicality either constitutes life, or a preparation for it.

Many thinkers, usually labeled as 'unsystematic', have at least attempted to give some attention to the 'human side' of educational theory, as a discipline worthy of serious consideration, thus supporting the thesis that the problem of human existence, 'life', or 'experience', as related to practical activities, are a matter of profound philosophical concern.

The methodological defects or 'scientific' limitations that could be found in this type of thought could also mean that (i) the attempt to base behavioral science upon models unconditionally traced from those so spectacularly successful in the natural and physical sciences may also have serious limitations, or that (ii) some logical constructs have hypostasized matters related to human concern to such a degree that sight has been lost of a more 'realistic' aim to describe and evaluate the human condition. An increasing concern over these matters could easily be predicted for the immediate future, and this should perhaps be an indication that human existence, and human life, are regaining the limelight of 'philosophical' preoccupation. In Abraham Kaplan's words, it could hardly be denied that:

> ...today large parts of the earth's population feel that they are confronted with a world they never made, a world too vast and complex to yield to human urging, and one which is indifferent --if not downright hostile -- to human aspiration... I simply mention these social factors so that from the outset we can put the existentialist ideas in a perspective which will do justice to them. Whatever shortcomings we may find in these ideas when we view them in the light of their contribution to the philosophical problems to which they address themselves, we must also recognize that to evoke such an interested response on the part of so many people they must in some way or other bear on matters of very deep and widespread concern. To my mind, that is no small recommendation for any philosophy: When a philosopher speaks only to other philosophers, it is seldom that what he says is both philosophical and worth saying...(15)

In the case of Ortega, as in the case alluded by Kaplan, we find not so much a thinker concerned to be recognized, accepted, and praised by the élite world of philosophic scholars, as one intensely preoccupied by a 'mission' that deserves the name of 'educational'. It has been remarked that Ortega deliberately chose the form of newspaper articles,

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(15) Kaplan, Abraham, The New World of Philosophy, Random House, N.Y., 1961, p.98. (Italics added by the writer). Also Cf. The National Observer, Nov. 9, p. 22.

as early as 1926, to achieve contact with the "real public". (16) Aside from Ortega's subjective preference for the journalistic form, Ferrater adds:

> When Ortega began writing, Spanish culture was still suffering from nineteenth-century intellectual indigence. The so-called generation of 1898 had already revived Spain's spiritual nerve but ideas, and in particular philosophical ideas, seemed still to lack either actuality or rigour. Most of the current literary output was either pure literature --and often fine literature, indeed-- or mere erudition. Exceptions to this rule might, of course, be found, but even these had to breathe in a rather murky ideological atmosphere. The first one to try to clear it was Miguel de Unamuno. But Unamuno, who left nothing to be desired as to seriousness of purpose and breadth of information, cared little for rigour....The fact that we acknowledge today in Unamuno's works and deeds a great deal of what has become an essential part of European contemporary philosophy does not prevent us from admitting that his aims were quite different from Ortega's. The latter aspired to inject into Spanish culture an ingredient it badly needed: thoughtfulness. In an intellectually enlightened atmosphere Ortega might have done what was being done at the same time by other European philosophers: Bergson, Husserl or Bertrand Russell. In other words, he might have limited himself to working out a core of philosophical intuitions and delivering them to a restricted public by the usual means; papers read before learned societies, contributions to scholarly journals, lectures in universities. But what if learned societies are few, scholarly journals practically non-existent, universities dominated by routine? (17)

Educational theory at the present time still lacks a sufficient team-effort of non-epistemologically oriented theories. In this sense it will be submitted that philosophical anthropology, existentialism, pragmatism, and certain branches of phenomenological inquiry, do consider 'education' --although it is granted that they do so in varying degrees-- as a human activity worthy of philosophic consideration. An attempt is made to go beyond sheer language analysis, scientific theories of learning,

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(16) Marías, Julián, Ortega y la idea de la razón vital, Santander-Madrid, 1948, pp. 13-24. Also pointed out by Ferrater (op.cit.,p. 16) along with a reference to Obras Completas, VI, 353 (1932), and another concerning an opinion about "writing books" as a 'falsifying activity' III, 447 (1927).

(17) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

or the logical consideration of ethical terms, and to consider the problems posited by choice, freedom, authority, and commitments. Human life and human existence, are as important for the task as the abstracted formal processes of reasoning and inductive observation, which so far have monopolized the almost exclusive attention of the epistemologically oriented philosopher. The foregoing observation in no way claims to diminish the importance of inductive and deductive methodological resources, without which no possible advance could be effected in the field, but would rather dare to suggest that such commendable instrumental technicalities should be maintained as means, and never as the end of educational theory. If a rather crude analogy should be allowed on this matter, the point at issue could perhaps be compared to the relationship between instrumental utility and the intrinsic nature of the object of knowledge. True, a high precision instrument takes 'better' photographs (if by better we mean increased definition in the recorded image), and all efforts to develop 'better' cameras, in the above-mentioned sense, should be encouraged. But there are other ways to describe a better picture (some are intentionally blurred to be better), and this possibility opens an entirely new set of axiological considerations. This is not the place to discuss the intrinsic worth of the objet d'art, but whatever problems are involved in such a consideration, they could not possibly be focused upon the development of technical instrumentality. Various 'philosophies of life' have established models for behavioral science, other than those exhibited by the natural or physical environmental disciplines. They have given a different meaning to the essential aim of scientific activities such as psychology, history, and the so-called 'humanistic' preoccupations. These attempts (properly represented in ethical and aesthetical theory) are now beginning to deliver important messages to

educational theory, by means of 'new' interpretations of certain concepts, such as 'perception', 'becoming', 'teaching', 'learning', 'behaving', and 'developing'. The philosophical support of such theories can be traced back to the unsystematic philosophies of life, and are beginning to present certain contributions in the Anglo-Saxon world. These contributions, of great heuristic, clinical, and formal value, are also beginning to make profitable use of methods other than the customary environmental-inductive approaches, and could become valuable contributors of their complementary counterparts in behavioristic, and experimental research. (18) Jerome Bruner recognizes the mysteries of intuitive thinking as one of the frontiers in modern educational theory:

> The emphasis in much of school learning and student examining is upon explicit formulations, upon the ability of the student to reproduce verbal or numerical formulae. It is not clear, in the absence of research, whether this emphasis is inimical to the later development of good intuitive understanding -- indeed, it is even unclear what constitutes intuitive understanding. Yet we can distinguish between inarticulate genius and articulate idiocy--the first represented by the student who, by his operations and conclusions, reveals a deep grasp of a subject but not much ability to "say how it goes", in contrast to the student who is full of seemingly appropriate words but has no matching ability to use the ideas for which the words presumably stand. A careful examination of the nature of intuitive thinking might be of great aid to those charged with curriculum construction and teaching.
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> One hears the most explicit talk about intuition in those fields where the formal apparatus of deduction is most highly developed -- in mathematics and physics. The use of the word 'intuition' by mathematicians and physicists may reflect their sense of confidence in the power and rigor of their disciplines. Others, however, may use intuition as much or more....A comparison of intuitive thinking in different fiedls of knowledge would, we feel, be highly useful....

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(18) Cf. Bruner, Jerome, The Process of Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961, pp. 16-32, and 54-68 for a particularly lucid, if concise, account both on the importance of 'structure' as a concept, and the value of intuitive thinking in educational theory, both in relation to analytic thinking, as well as in contrast to the customary demand for the formal understanding of subject matter. The relationship between Bruner's account and the central tenets of phenomenological theory is so obvious that no specific instances will be made by this dissertation.

> The warm praise that scientists lavish on those of their colleagues who earn the label 'intuitive' is major evidence that intuition is a valuable commodity in science and one we should endeavor to foster in our students. The case for intuition in the arts and social studies is just as strong. (19)

It would appear, then, that the value of 'intuitive thinking' --which for a long time seemed to have been banned from educational 'research' as an 'academic sin' -- is returning to the limelight even with the full support of the so-called 'exact sciences'. This fact (cf. Bruner, supra) can not be noticed without certain perplexity, because, on the other hand, there is still a number of educational researchers who base their methodology upon models inspired on those of the "exact sciences", and still look upon 'intuition' as a term synonymous with 'whim', 'arbitrary assertion', or 'emotive caprice'. In this sense, this dissertation will attempt to show that non-environmental techniques and empirical research should not be mutually exclusive.

There is, indeed, a link between the so-called 'non-systematic philosophies of life', and other, highly systematic theories of being, knowledge, and value, which have been grouped under the common designation of existentialistic. The writer hopes that a consideration of the most common tenets found in the'philosophies of life' would render this link

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(19) Bruner, Jerome, op.cit.,pp.55, 63, 66, 67. The notion of intuitive understanding which Bruner considers worthy of exploration is not limited to intuition as an element of hypothesis-generation alone. It also points at the possibility of making use of this peculiar kind of understanding for the purposes of hypothesis-verification. Both the concepts of 'vital reason', in Ortega, and 'Husserlian phenomenology', as a method, will be developed in Chapters IV, V, and VII, in order to show some of the major implications suggested by this sub-topic. Due references in Chapter VII also mention certain sources in which the reader may examine some formal systems that use intuition as a method for apodictic cognition.

with sufficient clarity, and that a realization of certain differences present within the existentialistic theories would also show the impropiety of common denominators which only add to the confusion. Yet, certain concerns appear to be present in these theories, which might be of some significance for education, and 'educators'.

It should be obvious that, if the terms 'social' and 'human' are used to describe the problematic situation faced by 'existentially' grounded philosophies, the matter becomes automatically important for educational theory, today --more than ever -- concerned with problems such as those depicted by expressions like 'choice', 'decision making', 'authority', 'equality', and 'freedom'.

Lastly, it seems that some of the Anglo-Saxon commentators of the Ortegan theory of education have proceeded rather hastily by branding Ortega, rather loosely as a promoter of '*élite*' educational policies, based upon 'idealistic' views. It is hoped that a closer look at the totality of the Ortegan system will reveal that he is neither proposing education for a selected '*élite*', nor is he limited by solipsistic, subjectivistic, or highly individualistic presuppositions concerning education. In fact, an attempt will be made to present, at least, logical evidence that Ortega makes an honest effort to transcend the limitations of both classical idealism, and to overcome the ultra-subjectivistic orientation attributed -- rather hastily too -- to the Husserlian concept of 'phenomenological reduction'. The study of Ortega's *Obras Completas*, in relation to the *Mission of the University*, could reveal that, quite to the contrary this thinker seems to be extremely critical of the subjectivistic and idealistic shortcomings. His attempt to develop a critique of 'vital and historical reason', aimed at an explanation of trans-subjective concerns

(such as those involved by theories of state, institutional life, and socio-collective phenomena, which he regards as a part of human behavior) should discard the solipsistic possibility.

The essay Mission of the University contains a series of statements that need to be clarified in the light of the author's philosophical background, some of his cultural characteristics, and some technical peculiarities of the Spanish language. This study will be conducted with the purpose of establishing firstly, a series of inferential relationships of a philosophic nature, (i.e., ontological, axiological, epistemological, and logical) with the rest of the Ortegan 'system'. The term 'system' is to be defined here as an internally consistent, major structure, of 'judgments' made with the purpose of answering those questions generally referred to as 'philosophical', (i.e., on being, existence, knowledge, experience, value, and right reason). And the term 'judgment' is to be defined as a statement, usually axiological, made in absence of conclusive evidence. (20)

Secondly, we shall seek to show a possible relationship with a group of theories, which -- for the purposes of this dissertation --

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(20) For this concept I am indebted to Dr. Thomas F. Green, with whom I discussed it at some length in his Seminar on theories of Learning as Related to Education, (Ed. 982), Michigan State University, Fall, 1963. Conclusive evidence, by this definition, does not generate a 'judgment', but rather a report or testimony. This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the problematic nature of those questions pertaining to the topic of evidential sufficiency, but it should be noted that the intricacies of such an endeavor rather reinforce than diminish the effectiveness of this operational definition of 'judgment'; most educational decisions are, in our sense, 'judgmental'.

could be loosely called 'philosophies of life', in the sense that the term 'life', or an equivalent seems to convey one of the key-concepts (or in most cases the key-concept) to be understood in order to gain fair access to the whole system. These 'philosophies of life' will be studied, mutatis mutandis, at least in those peak characteristics which allow a comparison with Ortega. Their main points of connection with the Ortegan theory will be presented in an overview of some of the underlying conceptual statements in the thought of Nietzsche, Bergson, Simmel, Blondel, Unamuno and Dilthey. Due allowance will be attempted for their varying conceptions of 'life' and 'experience'.

Thirdly, an attempt will be made to show a possible relationship between the Ortegan theory, the 'vitalistic' stances, and a conceivable 'existential' stance, to be defined as a philosophy not confined to the ordinary dependence upon 'natural facts', as they appear to determine the so-called "scientific reports" of empirical, experimental findings, nor to the usual means of utilizing inductive-deductive processes (as they are ordinarily used in experimental research) but rather as a philosophy whose essential concern consists of the attempt to develop a theory of human existence. This "human theory" stresses the fact and value of 'life' -- or 'existence' -- as the most pressing reality with which the philosopher is confronted, and places epistemological, scientific, and logical concerns at the service of such a 'reality'.

Having indicated the main thesis and subtheses of this work in abstract form, it would seem convenient to clarify that the 'biographical' approach to the study of Ortega y Gasset will follow Ferrater Mora's account with only minor changes, as follows: (21)

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(21) Ferrater Mora, José, op.cit.,pp.12-13.

Objectivistic Stage (1902-1914)

Following Ferrater's terminology, strictly as a mnemonic device rather than a 'defining category', this first phase of Ortegan thought deals with the debut of his journalistic production, possibly chosen for the reason of accessibility to the Spanish-speaking public. The so-called 'formative years' of the Ortegan philosophy are pervaded by a theme which, if taken atomistically, would be rather puzzling for those who label him as an 'existentialist'. At this point of his development, Ortega seems preoccupied by the conceptual implications of terms such as 'things' and 'ideas', as opposed to the concern given to human beings. He constantly refers to the phenomenon which he designates as the 'secret leprosy of subjectivity', and reacts against the pressure of 'personalism' in Spanish life. (22) It is a well-known fact that 'personalism', i.e., the tendency to identify institutionalized development with a particular person, seems to be a pervading trait in Spanish and Latin American social issues, and this is precisely the phenomenon to which Ortega reacts during his objectivistic stage. Yet, 'Personalism' (with a capital 'P'); interpreted in terms of 'person as the highest value in the universe', is a second meaning -- which probably prompted later revisions, and which is possibly responsible for a footnote, which Ortega himself added to the expression 'secret leprosy of subjectivity', indicanting that such an opinion was 'sheer blasphemy'. (23)

(22) I, 443 (1909); I, 447 (1909); I, 87 (1908).

(23) Ferrater Mora, José, op.cit.,p.19. Also, cf. I, 419-20 (1916) for the appeal to a new subjectivism; I, 309-400 (1914) for the Meditaciones del Quijote. Cf. Castro, Américo, The Structure of Spanish History for an account which Ferrater describes as "... a brilliant interpretation of this deep meaning of personalism...", pointing out too (op.cit., p. 19) that Unamuno had followed a similar process of development.

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Objectivism in sum, can be described as a reaction against the nostalgic personalism implied by a constant and limited review of a 'dead past', and therefore against tradition conceived in this sense. Ortega's 'new meaning' of history consists precisely of the development of a critical account of the past, as it becomes alive in the present, and as it becomes significant for the future. The attempt to carry the present back to the past entails the inability to preserve the genuinely historical meaning of tradition, and a detracting tendency to deprive historical knowledge of its very signifcance, i.e., to enable man to develop the capacity 'to be abreast of his times'. (24) This concept, which later became one of the typically Ortegan recurrent themes, could be germinally found as early as 1906, when Ortega's objections to traditionalism pointed out that such a criticism was made not because the traditionalist is fond of tradition, but because by proceeding as indicated above, he had failed to preserve tradition. (25) A study of the Mission of the University will hopefully reveal many a connection with this period, whose basic conceptual framework could be related to the contention that progress, and national self-identity are not to be magically originated by simply importing foreign methods and techniques. The 'object' of change, study and development, has an identity of its own, which renders artificial attachments inauthentic, and spurious:

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(24) Translators vary in their versions of this expression, which literally means "at the height of their time", or "at the height of times".

(25) I, 425-429 (1906), I, 363-365 (1914); II, 43 (1911).

> Unlike a good many Spaniards of his time, Ortega was not dazzled by the brilliant side of modern industrial revolution, and did not for a moment believe that the mere introduction of Western European techniques would automatically heal all Spanish ills. He welcomed modern techniques but warned that they were a by-product of something far more fundamental than technique: science, culture, education. (26)

Thus, the existence of a given reality, i.e., people, nation, community, is not to acquire true identity by resorting to naïve conceptions of imitation, which, really, are not a part of its essential character. The existential cliché 'existence precedes essence' could be readily applied to this aspect of the Ortegan thought, especially when considering his reflections upon the 'europeanization' of Spain, and his contention that pure science in particular, and the philosophical production, ex principiis, of a given individual or social entity, are the root of real culture, and real civilization. (27) This period also presents the first Ortegan usages of the term 'life' as a key-concept of great importance for his later development. A particular essay, Adam in Paradise (Adán en el Paraíso) indicates that 'life' is to be interpreted as the human course of acts and events. (28) 'Life' is,then, not strictly biological, but mostly 'human', and/or 'biographical': 'Life' is a human reality, of whose existence we can be certain. This reality, which later he calls 'peculiar' or 'strange reality' is as connected with "him who lives it", as with the "surrounding world" (used in a wider sense than the

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(26) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., p. 21.

(27) I, 102 (1908). Also cf. I, 107 (1908)for the 'europeization' of Spain, and I, 138 (1910) for his warning on the inconveniences of naïve imitation in terms of the true achievement in a national community.

(28) I, 469-489 (1910).

German 'umwelt', i.e., not only to that surrounding world which is immediate, but also to that which is remote). (29) In other words, 'life' is connected not only with the physical, but also with the historical and 'spiritual' 'circumambient', the term 'spiritual' being used here in the sense of "life of the mind", and therefore perhaps inclusive of, but not limited to religion. In this context, then, man is the problem of life, and life is that puzzling reality, which we cannot quite explain, but is out-there, to use Ortega's words, as something concrete, incomparable, and unique. However, in spite of the fact that this context depicts life as 'individual', there is enough of a trans-subjective indication to define it also as 'coexistence', i.e., change of substances, and hence 'to live', by definition, also means to 'co-live', and to 'co-exist'. Writing again about Adam in Paradise, Ortega asks:

> Who is Adam? Anybody and nobody in particular: Adam is life. Where is Paradise? It does not matter: it is the ubiquitous scene for the immense tragedy of living. (30)

Thus, Adam in Paradise means "I in the world". The Germanic existential flavor seems to appear at this conceptual point, perhaps without the elaborate sophistication of the Heideggerian Dasein, but, undoubtedly, with a sufficient indication of its haunting presence. It should be noted that the Adamic world is not "one thing", nor is it a collection of facts -- or things -- but a 'stage', because 'life' is the action of a human drama. In a manner also reminiscent of the Deweyan answer to the concept of experience, the Ortegan 'life' is a process, i.e., something that man does, and also undergoes, under the effect of

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(29) VI, 13, (1941).
(30) I, 489, (1910).

the environment. The difference with the Deweyan scheme could be directly attributed to the historical connotation given to 'life and culture' by the Spanish thinker, who is trying to transcend a biologistic limitation, and makes so much more of the historical factors that are constitutive of man's reaction to his social environment. More also than the ordinary German umwelt, and also paradoxically close to modern liberalism, the surrounding reality -- or circumambient -- forms the indivorcible complement of the human person. One of the most often quoted capsules of Ortegan thought is the maxim: "I am myself, and my circumstance". (31) A possible interpretation would be that Ortega is trying to transcend the idealistic and realistic assumptions, and also attempting to "get at the object", which he makes a part of the subject, perhaps showing his Neo-Kantian beginnings. The "re-absorption" of the circumstance is the concrete pathos of man, his 'what-to-do-with-life', and also the key-meaning to the non-solipsistic attempt, which aims at a theory of truth based upon 'discovery', i.e., at a conception of truth as "the uncovering of that which appears to be covered" (aletheia), and a conception of 'culture' as the system of live ideas that make us aware of the demand of the times, and in this sense 'culture as security', since to meet that demand is to survive. (32) Perhaps one of the most lucid discussions of the objectifying capacity of man is to be found in Max Scheler's Man's Place in

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(31) I, 322-358, (1914).

(32) For a return to the ancient Greek concept of "truth as aletheia" which is pursued for the purposes of establishing the 'originative' nature of being, or the "elucidation of genuine Being", cf. Martin Heidegger's Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, Tubingen, Niemeyer Verlag, 1953 (Introduccion a la Metafísica, Transl. E. Estiú, Ed. Nova, Buenos Aires, 1959) especially pp. 234-239. I, 358 (1914). Also, Cf. El Libro de las Misiones, Austral, Espasa Calpe, Argentina, S.A., Buenos Aires, 1945, p. 75.

Nature, which, using a different vocabulary, presents a notion similar to the "reabsorption of the circumstance", to show that the relationship between organism and environment, must be reconsidered in the case of human existence, because then the simple equation that applies to animals and plants does not seem to hold any longer:

> The first act of this new and human drama is this: Its behavior is 'motivated' by a complex of sensations and ideas raised to the status of an object. It is, in principle, independent of the drives and the sensuous surfaces in the environment conditioned by the system of drives that appear in the visual and auditory fields. The second act of the drama consists in the voluntary inhibition, or release, of a drive and of the corresponding reaction. The third act consists of a final and intrinsic change with regard to the objective nature of a thing. The course of such behavior is 'world-openness', and such behavior, once it appears, is capable of unlimited expansion -- as far as the 'world' of existing things extends....Man, then, is a being that can exhibit, to an unlimited degree, behavior which is open to the world. To become human is to acquire this openness to the world...
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> The animal has no 'object'. It lives, as it were, ecstatically immersed in its environment which it carries along as a snail carries its shell. It cannot transform the environment into an object. It cannot perform the peculiar act of detachment and distance by which man transforms an 'environment' into the 'world', or into a symbol of the world. It cannot perform the act by which man transforms the centers of resistance determined by drives and affects into 'objects'....I might say the animal is involved too deeply in the actualities of life which correspond to its organic needs and conditions ever to experience and grasp them as objects....(33)

Thus, man as the "only subject of objects", has become one of the most important concepts in philosophical anthropology, and in modern phenomenologica psychology. The elaborate construct that the theory has reached is not presented by the Ortegan pensamiento, but the basic, phenomenological motivation seems to be there.

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(33) Scheler, Max, Man's Place in Nature (Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos), Noonday Press, New York, 1961, pp. 38-39.

Erich Fromm's works present one of the most widely known criticisms of the misconceptions of 'human nature' that has been presented to the Anglo-Saxon world. In the Sane Society, it is submitted that man is his own creation; that human nature is often interpreted solely by analyzing one of its many manifestations, usually that of 'human weakness'; that man is transformed as he transforms the umwelt that affects him in the process of history; and that the total existence of man is the source of energetic drives which make him either healty or ill, thus allowing the human race to develop into what it potentially is, in the process of history. Therefore, there is no such thing as nature common to all men, and a sane society is that which corresponds to their needs, i.e., to what human needs are objectively. Circum-stantially, man is not to be defined only in terms of his physiological status, because objectively all men share basic psychic qualities, laws which govern their mental and emotional functions, and aims for the solution of the problem of human existence. Escape from Freedom also emphasizes the thesis that human nature is neither a biologically fixed an innate sum total of drives, nor is it a lifeless shadow of cultural patterns to which man adapts smoothly; it is rather the product of certain evolution, and needs basically to (i) satisfy physiologically conditioned drives, and to (ii) avoid isolation and moral aloneness, hence allowing for a concept of positive freedom to be based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man. And Man for Himself completes this existential discussion by indicating that, as the animal stage is abandoned, man is born, paradoxically becoming the most helpless animal. His gain in mental, moral, and spiritual capacity is a loss of defensive power before nature, and a disruption of the harmony of animal existence (cf. Scheler, supra). Thus, the necessity to find new

solutions for the contradictions in man's existence, is the source of all psychic forces. The understanding of man's psyche must be based on the analysis of man's needs, stemming from the conditions of his existence. And, according to Fromm, this is the key to humanistic psychoanalysis. The struggle between human and animal needs has to be balanced just for the goal of achieving clinical (and not merely 'statistical') sanity.

It should be noted at this point that, in spite of the common belief that Ortega followed Wilhelm Dilthey in his 'philosophy of life', no Diltheyan overtones seem to be present in the objectivistic stage. Logical reasons, and puzzling similarities to the contrary notwithstanding, Ortega himself has written repeatedly that his "discovery of Dilthey" was made late, and perhaps too late in his life. (34)

Perspectivistic Stage (1914-1923).

Acknowledging the fact that the Ferraterian classification into periods is not atomistic, and thus does not exclude overlapping conceptual development, nor the presence of other theories within the period, the perspectivistic phase seems to be inclusive enough to indicate with a certain measure of safety the tone of Ortegan thought that pervaded over the chronological span, comprised between 1914 and 1923. In this period of 'perspective' becomes a constitutive ingredient of that reality which Ortega calls 'life'. The definite being of the world is neither matter nor soul, but a perspective, and hence an indeterminate series of varying

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(34) Ortega y Gasset, José, "Dilthey y la idea de la vida", in Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1961, p. 141, in which Ortega claims to have wasted (lost) ten years of historical speculation, had he known before about Dilthey (to whom he refers as the "greatest philosopher of the XIXth. Century" (!).) Chapter V of this dissertation expands this topic.

possibilities: "The individual viewpoint is the only viewpoint from which the true world can be looked at." (35) And precisely because reality is reality, posited beyond our individual minds, it cannot be squeezed into them unless it is broken down into myriads of facets. Each person, existentially, and fatally, occupies a place in the universe, and must have a viewpoint which is correlative in terms of the total picture. Ergo, since reality cannot be pretended, the viewpoint cannot be invented either. And this is precisely the teleological condition (qua 'mission', or dueneka) which provides the human raison d'etre: no other eye can take the place of my own, and that which 'in reality' can be seen by my own eye, does not, necessarily, have to be seen by another. A Neo-Kantian reminiscence echoes this thought, especially concerning the finality of the human being (qua end). The perspectivistic condition renders it possible for each man to become irreplaceable and necessary:

> Perspective is one of the components of reality. Instead of deforming it, perspective rather organizes reality. A reality which would remain identical when looked at from different viewpoints is an absurd concept....This way of thinking has to perform a radical reform of philosophy, and is also reserved an even more important task: a radical reform of our cosmic realization.... Each life is a viewpoint upon the universe. (36)

The already advanced "circumstantial theory" matures at this stage, since it seems to be stated that our perspective of the surrounding world, which in turn affects our very own perspective -- qua 'subjects' -- is to be governed by the idiosyncratic properties of the mutual co-implication of the self and the circumstance. Some critics believe that the influence of the German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel could be detected at this point of the Ortegan itinerary:

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(35) I, 321 (1914). Also, cf. II, 15-20 (1916).
(36) III, pp. 199-200, (1923).

> Following a tendency that had been fostered by the German philsopher Georg Simmel and had increased through the years in some sections of European philosophy, Ortega claimed that no reality, however humble, and no question, however unusual, can be put aside by a truly alert philosopher. At issue with the positivists' flat universe, Ortega has often asserted that hierarchy permeates reality [I, 319-321-2 (1914)]. But this does not preclude the fact that each reality has a depth of its own and that the philosopher's task is to penetrate its surface in order to peer into his hidden nature. (37)

Perspectivism is, of course, a philosophical view with a long history. If individual perspective is posited as the only way of meeting reality, and of formulating universal truths, the classical problems that are typical of the position will be found. However, it should be taken into account that the Ortegan perspectivism seems to differ from monadological realism, precisely because it is pluralistic. Some critics feel that this is the essential difference, for example, between Ortega and Leibniz. And, Chapter V of this dissertation will analyze the main differences between Ortega, Nietzsche, and Simmel, concerning this issue.

At any rate, Ortega maintains that complete coincidence of two views of reality cannot give but an abstraction, unless such a coincidence were originated by hallucinations. (38) In other words, two views of the same reality cannot coincide, in sensu stricto, and, at best, they could be complementary.

If the difficulty of obtaining coincidental views is acknowledged, Ortega's self-assurance of this issue has aroused several criticisms. The problem of inter-subjectivity of individual statements is at stake, and the present efforts of modern philosophy to solve this puzzling controversy, do not seem to have been regarded by Ortega as particularly torturing.

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(37) Ferrater Mora, José, op.cit., p. 25.

(38) II, 18-20 (1916).

He seems to consider his efforts to discard solipsistic idealism, and subjectivistic assumptions, as a sufficient guarantee of the fact that his perspectivism can be legitimized both as an ontological and psychological answer.(39) In other words, he would claim that perspective is not simply a 'subjective' act of perception, but is rather a constituent part of reality itself. This is why, in connection with Leibniz, Nietzsche, and Vaihinger, he claims that their perspectivism, while having aims similar to those of his own philosophy, have started from different assumptions.

Thus, perspectives are held by Ortega to be "... the concrete sides of reality as perceived by concrete beings..." (40) Such a metaphysical assumption appears to have provided our author with the firm conviction that he maintains before the problem of solipsism vs. intersubjectivity:

> ...schools of philosophy differing as widely among themselves as Husserlian phenomenologists and logical positivists have been compelled to slice off extensive fragments of their theories because of their failure to avoid solipsism after upholding a certain type of perspectivism. To such objections it is probable that Ortega would remain unyielding. He would certainly argue that his own brand of perspectivism is free from these drawbacks, precisely because he had previously got rid of subjectivistic or idealistic assumptions. (41)

It is interesting to note too that a connection could be attempted between the concept of "discovery of hidden nature" and aletheia -- or the type of 'ontological truth' pursued by Heidegger and other phenomenologists. On the other hand, there seem to be enough possibilities left to conjecture that a similar reaction against the idealistic abstractions

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(39) Chapter V will offer detailed expansion of this issue.

(40) The reader is advised to consult the Modern Theme for expansion and clarification of the perspectivistic Ortegan theory.

(41) Ferrater, op.cit., p. 31, Also cf. The Modern Theme, pp. 89 for the manner in which Ortega purports to use his concept of 'perspectivism' as the main supporter of his theory of knowledge. Again, here we find a "factual assumption" stating that subjective reality is an epistemological medium capable of selectively and accurately mirroring an external and 'real' world.

of the traditional philosophic problems was simultaneously taking place elsewhere. The pragmatic attempts to categorize everyday problems as philosophic ones, and the reaction exhibited by James, Dewey, and followers, posit an interesting ground for comparison. To use a typically Ortegan manner of looking at these problems, one could perhaps hypothesize that these new reactions against metaphysical solipsism, and against the aristocratic consideration of philosophy were a product of the times, and therefore had an objectivity of their own, which could be attributed to the Ortegan concept of 'historical reality'. It is hardly possible that John Dewey and José Ortega knew much about each other, except perhaps at the end of their careers, and, if so, possibly through third sources, but the similarity of their respective reactions against dualism and transcendentalism is rather interesting. The Ortegan 'perspectivistic stage' is full of problems which allow such a comparison, and which would merit separate treatment or expansion. The promotion of the 'everyday problem' to the status of "being worthy of philosophic treatment", not because of its seeming triviality, but because of the fact that every reality must be raised to the plenitude of its significance, and therefore to a notion of <u>truth as aletheia</u>, seems to be one of the characteristics of modern philosophy:

> This point deserves some attention. Since the advent of phenomenology and existentialism, we have fallen into the habit of reading philosophical works encumbered with analyses of realities that only thirty years ago would have been barred in academic circles as irrelevant if not impertinent. We have been taught again and again that no reality, however unacademic, is liable to escape the cutting edge of philosophical clarification. This situation has given cause for concern, and in some quarters the complaint has been heard that at this rate philosophy will soon dissolve into a hunting for minutiae or into high-sounding literature. But such complaints become pointless as soon as we discover that in many instances the elaborate analysis of unacademic themes has led to the core of the deepest philosophical questions. This open-door

> policy in philosophy was preached by Ortega at the beginning of his career and has since been consistently carried on by him against wind and tide. The variety of his intellectual interests appears thus in a new light. It is not a result of intellectual instability, or at least, not solely, but also a consequence of a philosophical attitude. (42)

For the purposes of this dissertation, the above problem will be defined as 'educational' in nature, since it seems to be sufficiently clear that such a reaction shows a deep concern for the difficulties involved in the 'lack of communication' between certain philosophers who "talk to each other" from one fortified ivory tower to the next, and whose "teachings", conducted at such a high level, hardly try to answer certain questions of import to the common citizen. The populus is then to "tinker with such problems" rightly or wrongly, mostly confused, sometimes misled, and usually unaided or ignored. Ortega attempted to make a case for the "philosopher", being of necessity a "philosopher of...." some vital concern, and therefore rejecting the common notion that the "philosopher of..." is only a second-rate aficionado, whose attempts to attach a predicate to the purity of 'philosophy' -- or to 'pure philosophy'-- bear a relation to the "real product" similar to the axiologically derogatory relation often established between pure and applied science, or between pure and applied art. Philosophy of science seems to be the more accepted one in these cases, but there are positions which definitely reject philsophy of education, philosophy of art, or political philosophy, as true 'philosophic' activities, until a clarification is made of their basic universe of discourse. Perhaps this rejection is logically, and even empirically grounded in many a case, granting the

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(42) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., p. 26.

confusing multiplicity of possible views to be embraced by the "philosopher of...", but the fact still remains that any attempt to remove philosophical activity from the kind of problem which Ortega names 'vital concern' is a fallacious one if the grounds for rejection are simply based upon lack of proof, lack of definitional bases, or difficulty of the problems involved. The fact that "X is difficult", or the contention that "X is unclear" are hardly a basis to conclude that "X is non-existent" or that "X is irrelevant". The objection, at best, is perhaps made only at methodological limitations, rather than at the necessity for treating the problems involved. Thus, the circumstantial predicament involved in the Ortegan perspectivism has, at least, one serious philosophic motivation.

This is at least part of the explanation of the Ortegan maxim: "I am myself and my circumstance" which later became a corner-stone of his philosophy. (43)

> The phrase (I am myself and my circumstance) may sound trivial. In fact, it is not more trivial than most philosophical sentences are when we persist in taking them only at their face value. In Ortega's formula a self is identified with himself and his circumstances, and therefore the thesis is maintained -- against idealist philosophers -- that a self can never be postulated as an ontologically independent being. Far from being a trivial tautology, this phrase appears rather as an involved double assumption according to which I cannot conceive of myself without conceiving at the same time of my own circumstances and, conversely, I cannot conceive of any circumstances without conceiving of myself as their dynamic centre. (44)

As in Dilthey, or Dewey, Ortega seems to be indicating that the 'subject-object' dichotomy is an arbitrary one, that there is no dualism

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(43) I, 322, (1914)

(44) Ferrater Mora, José op.cit.,p. 27.

between interiority and exteriority, and that the real problem does not consist of "how to join the two concepts", but rather of "how to separate them" for methodological purposes. The 'world-individual' schism is an arbitrary one. The philosopher may indulge in such a division for analytic purposes, like the musician who is willing to fracture the melodic continuity of his composition, or the Bergsonian durée of his constant musical movement, without for a moment believing that such an atomistic division is to be hyposthatized in terms of two separate realities. (45) Reality, then, is posited as a continuous doing to, and undergoing from, and has two firmly merged components: the 'doer', and his circumstances. Man is very definitely a circumstantial being, i.e., one whose doing to always must be carried out in view of the circumstances. (46) Otherwise our "real being" becomes a useless abstraction.

It has been shown that there are some problems involved in the relativistic stance which seems to be entailed by the circumstantial position, especially when considering the relation between concept and perspective. And it has been indicated that Ortega seems to believe, as a fact, that the individual perspective is the only way of formulating universal truths, and of seizing reality. Therefore, he does not seem

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(45). For isolated illustrations, which simply point at a recurrent thesis of their whole philosophic positions, to be constantly reinstated, cf. W. Dilthey's Ideen uber eine Beschreibende und Zergliendernde Psychologie (a rather 'old' forerunner of Gestaltian, Neo-Freudian, and Existential psychologies, published in Spanish under the name Psicología y Teoría del Conocimiento, Ed. Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1951) pp. 193-282; W. Dilthey's theories about the origin and legitimacy of our belief in the reality of an external world (same edition, pp. 133-173); and J. Dewey's Democracy and Education, Macmillan Co., New York, 1961, pp. 291-305 for the relation between world and individual, and pp. 277-290 for a rejection of certain dualisms inherent in naturalism and humanism.

(46) Also, cf. VI, 348 (1932) for a more developed reinstatement of this view.

to be proclaiming such a statement without knowing that such a perspectivism is an old-time honored view in the history of philosophy.

Ortega's book, The Modern Theme contends that neither rationalism nor relativism are satisfactory solutions to the circumstantial problem, and that the "theme of our times" consists precisely of addressing the difficulties raised by the factual coexistence of individual perspective and historical circumstance. (47) The 'modernity' of the Ortegan theme is a twentieth century, rather than a traditional post-Cartesian modernity. Neither pure reason nor pure biological vitality are to be considered in lieu of the Ortegar philosophy of life, and in this sense The Modern Theme is really a reaction against traditional 'modernity'.

Cultural values -- qua subjective facts derived from vital functions -- do originate a body of ontological character which could be subjected to objective laws. The cultural function does transcend the merely biological notion of subjectivity. Hence the notion of 'transvitalism', as posited by the Modern Theme. "All cultural values are also subject to the laws of life". (48) They transcend any possible dualism between vital functions, and possible objective laws which govern cultural values. Of course, the necessary premise is that the term 'life' ceases to have a narrow biological connotation, in order to be interpreted in a wider, biographical, light. It is therefore a 'spiritual' life, in the

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(47) Cf. IV, 404, (1932); II, 283, (1920); III, 179, 164, 189, (1923); VI, 348, 304, 306, (1922); 312, (1923); also cf. The Modern Theme, C. W. Daniel Company, London, 1931, especially pp. 41, 60, 38, 74.

(48) The Modern Theme, pp. 45-46. Also Cf. III, 169, (1923).

Continental European sense of the word. In a tone which is strongly reminiscent of the Nietzschean protests, but not quite sharing the basic irrationality of the Dionysian revolt, Ortega questions the Socratic tendency to enforce "the laws of reason" upon matters no less important than reason itself, such as those of 'life'. The belief that 'pure reason' was the real substance of the universe is a naïve utopianism, completely and blindly oblivious to the undeniable fact that reason is nothing but "a tiny island afloat on the sea of primeval vitality". (49)

Perspectivism, then, seems to culminate in the conception that life has to be liberated from the arbitrary dependence on pure reason, which the rationalist is trying to enforce: "reason is merely a form and function of life".(50) This concept is precisely the one referred to by Ortega as vital reason.

Ratio-Vitalistic Stage. (1924-1955).

The Modern Theme marks a transitional step between the phase we have called 'perspectivistic', and Ortega's period of maturity, in which his notion of vital reason reached full bloom. 'Vital Reason', as defined above, is the leit motif of an essay published in 1924, under the name of "Neither Vitalism nor Rationalism". While The Modern Theme points at the serious difficulties posited by a strict rationalism, "Neither Vitalism nor Rationalism" is a technically oriented account of the notion of vital reason. The specific difference between biological and philo-

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(49) III, 176-177, (1923); also cf. The Modern Theme, pp. 55-56 and III, 540-543 (1927). The Modern Theme, pp. 57-58, III, 177-178, (1923).

(50) Ibid, p. 58.

sophical vitalism was attempted at this stage. (51)

The Ortegan 'ratio-vitalism' is not of a 'biological' type, nor is it a philosophical kind of irrationalism, such as the one proposed by some brands of intuitive thinking. The Ortegan thought does not exactly run counter to the vital concerns of Bergson, Simmel, Spengler, or Dilthey, and the expressions 'ratio-vitalism', 'vital reason', and 'historical reason' -- as used by Ortega himself -- are rather convenient in the sense that they seem to indicate a different tessitura of vitalistic import. (52) From the Nietzschean violent condemnations of the Socratic 'spirit' through the Bergsonian élan vital, seems to run an anti-rationalistic stream which Ortega does not share. Ortega's explanation makes use of the fact that his predecessors were identifying the term 'reason' with the more specific ones 'pure reason', 'abstract reason', etc., and, if on the one hand he seems to agree with the contention that 'pure reason' was badly in need of critical delimitations, on the other, he seems to contend that not all the types of reason can be readily assimilated to that type. (53) In no way could it be inferred that the "failure of pure reason" necessarily entails its total rejection from the philosophical or scientific realms. Vital reason seems to have a teleological and ontological significance: it seems to have the category of a reality, within a pluralistic collection of realities, and also the character of a factual presence which by definition must have a sense of finality. It is a fact, he contends,

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(51) VI, 196, (1934); where Ortega uses the expression 'ratio-vitalism'. Also, cf. Concord and Liberty, W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., New York, 1946, pp. 164 ff.

(52) Ferrater Mora, José, op. cit., p.30.

(53) VI, 23 (1936). Also, cf. Toward a Philosophy of History, W. W. Norton, New York, 1941, p. 183.

that reason is a part of human life, and therefore an intrinsic component of man's existence. To Ortega 'vital reason' is a reality; a self-evident reality, so simple that it cannot possibly be denied. The fact that life demands reason is expressed by the Ortegan expression 'life as reason', and becomes synonimous with the concept 'vital reason'. The assumption here is that human life is not an entity that is 'endowed with reason', but an entity that must, necessarily, use reason. Even in the cases of seemingly unreasonable behavior, it becomes impossible to rule out 'vital reason', although it appears to be much easier to indicate that pure reason is absent. Human action is characterized by the necessity of rational account. "No matter how thoughtlessly a man acts, in some way or other he will always account for what he does. The way he does it is quite immaterial." (54)

Ortega also seems to be saying that man, by nature, is a creature of circumstance and therefore must deal with the world. His life, then, becomes a necessary interaction with the world, and such an interaction presupposes the rendering of an account of its circumstantial character. Such an account, nevertheless, does not have to be purely intellectual one, in spite of the fact that it often has acquired such a character, especially in our age. A teleological conception of knowledge seems to be revealed at this juncture, since Ortega appears to be implying that there is no need to hyposthatize the formal qualities of epistemological inquiry, per se, because knowledge must always be for a particular task.(55)

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(54) IV, 58, (1929); VI, 16, (1936); V, 384, (1934); Toward a Philosophy of History, p. 170.

(55) V, 85, (1933). Saber es saber a qué atenerse (To know is to know upon what to rely for purposes of action).

Perhaps the social sciences have provided a more concrete version of the rationale which seems to concern Ortega y Gasset, since the futility of knowledge per se could be easily seen by simply reflecting upon its existential importance in terms of strict human necessity, individually or collectively. Robert Lynd, the American sociologist, reflects the same type of preoccupation. He is concerned with the same existential import of knowledge, which in terms of human life seems to produce the Ortegan problem:

> The knowledge which the sophisticated experts possess in our culture is growing at a rate far more rapid than the rate at which it is being institutionalized in the habits of thought and action of the mass of our population....As a culture we are accumulating our disabilities and the resulting strains incident to daily living at a rate faster than social legislation, education, and all the agencies for 'reform' are managing to harness our new knowledge in the reduction of these dissabilities. We are becoming culturally illiterate faster than all these agencies are managing to make us literate in the use of the potentialities of the culture. (56)

There is a sense, then, in which "to know" means "to know how to act", individually or institutionally. By implication, the danger of 'pure reason' becomes one of knowledge for its own sake. Ortega seems to believe that this 'hypostatic knowledge', is trying to pass a formal reality for the real one, namely the 'vital reality' -- that reality to which all other realities must be referred in order to make 'human sense'. The problem of our times, and, by extension, the problem of institutional life, becomes one of reconciling reason with life, since pure reason seems to be moving away from the only reality which makes it

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(56) Lynd, Robert, Knowledge for What? Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1939, pp. 108-109. The same quote is used again in Chapter IV for a direct application to the Ortegan meaning of the term 'culture'.

'alive'. Otherwise, rational activity, per se, becomes both deceiving and humanly inauthentic. Again, it becomes rather clear that Ortega is making a case for the 'philosopher of...', as against the 'pure philosopher', if by the latter we understand the one devoted to 'reason', schismatically and dramatically separated from practical activity. Epistemology, as the maid of honor of the philosophical scene, seems to be reminded again that the preoccupation with knowledge could even become a sterile attempt, if left at the stage of analysis or speculation:

> Man is not therefore a rational animal, if this definition is understood in the sense that being an animal is the genus proximum and being rational the differentia specifica. But he is a rational animal if this definition is understood in the sense that reason emerges from human life. Descartes' principle Cogito ergo sum ('I think, therefore I am') must be replaced by a more basic principle: Cogito quia vivo ('I think because I live'). (57)

Vital reason then becomes a methodological concern within the Ortegan scheme. But is must be understood that the method of vital reason does not consist of a simple application of categories to an external world, which thus becomes 'ordered'. In vain would one search for such a pattern in Ortega. His empirical notion of vital reason as a method cannot be based upon rules established more geometrico, and the whole question seems to be one of definitional concern, rather than categorial correspondence. Our own life provides us with the tools for its own explanation. Living produces a feeling of insecurity, by means of the only 'human' tool at our disposal: vital reason, as opposed to 'pure reason'. Thus Ortega constantly repeats that reason must be conceived as functional in human existence, and that there is a difference

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(57) Ferrater, op.cit., p.40. Also, cf. IV, 58 (1929), IV, 108, (1930); V, 307-308 (1939); V, 530 (1941).

between simply "having reason to use it", and "having the necessity to bring reason into existence", thus being forced to use it. (58) Part of the nature of man is his necessity to be 'vitally rational'; the use of reason, then, being not a privilege of the 'philosophical', or the 'scientific' mind, but rather an obligation of every human being. It should be noted that the same concept could be phrased in terms of "thinking in view of the circumstances", since, by extension, Ortega seems to be saying that man needs to know himself, and therefore he needs a knowledge of the circumstantial world, or of the circumstantial life into which he has been thrown. Ortega's essay Ideas y Creencias (Ideas and Beliefs) is devoted, almost in its entirety, to the elucidation of vital reason as a reality, and as a method. (59) An idea is a thought, either derived from unexamined propositions, or from a rigorous systematic attempt. Ideas, hence, may have varying degrees of truth, but such a difference is only in degree, since we 'arrive', rightly or wrongly, at such propositions. But there is another type of interpretation of the world, at which we do not 'arrive'; a type of interpretation which rather seems to be a part of our own existence, so to speak. These existential "ideas", which are "a part of us" are called 'beliefs' by Ortega: we are our beliefs, and they constitute the substance of our life. Our beliefs, are not ideas that we hold, but "ideas that we are". We, then, tend to

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(58) VI, 351 (1932); VI, 391, (1942). IV, 108, (1930). IV, 108, (1930); V, 307-308, (1933-1939).

(59) V, 381-409, (1934). Also, Concord and Liberty (pp. 18-19), and Toward a Philosophy of History, p. 174.

confuse them with reality, and hence we do nothing with beliefs aside from simply being in them.

If many 'simple and elementary' assumptions may be called 'beliefs', and if, at least, part of the educational enterprise consists of inducing or transmitting knowledge, our 'being our own beliefs' becomes a concept which demands consideration. Some people believe, for example, that there is a certain regularity in natural phenomena and some others have believed that there was no such regularity.

It is for such reason that we take our beliefs to be 'real', i.e., to be 'reality' itself, and this is why Ortega claims that beliefs are the foundation of our life. What he seems to be saying, really, is that reality is not discovered by us, nor is it proven by us. It has, rather, the characteristics of an encounter; we find it, and we find ourselves in it. Again, such a contention would seem to be consistent with the famous Ortegan aphorism that life is that "strange reality, of which the first thing that it is convenient to say is that it is the radical reality, in the sense that all other realities have to be referred to it, since the other realities, whether effective or assumed, have to appear, in one way or another within the reality of life..." (60)

The 'educational' message here seems to be that ideas may prove to be extremely important to us, but they cannot be really 'radical' (i.e., rooted) in terms of life, unless they cease to be ideas, and become thoughts of the type that Ortega calls 'beliefs'.

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(60) VI, 13, (1941-1946); also published in English as a part of the volume Philosophy and History, Oxford University Press, 1935.

There seems to be, then, a certain measure of commitment, which is precisely the efficient cause of making ideas functional, humanly speaking. And perhaps this is one of the most important implications of 'vital reason' as a method: the ability to change informative ideas, ex datis, into formative beliefs, ex principiis, for the sake of 'real' cultural awareness. The ensuing chapters will attempt to show the importance of this conversion in terms of educational matters.

CHAPTER IV

ORTEGA'S UNIVERSITY: A 'VITAL' CONCERN

The Ortegan educational theory can be found in the Mission of the University which is a collection of notes for a lecture delivered to Spanish university students in 1930. Some parts of it are so sketchy that the only clear suggestion about them seems to be the conjecture that Ortega simply jotted them down as a reminder of an aspect which, apparently, was to be verbally developed, or actually expanded, at the time of delivering the speech. (61)

As pointed out in the preceding chapters, it is difficult to analyze Ortega's educational theory without relating it to the rest of his philosophical system. The present chapter will make use of the above mentioned essay, which as stated above, is essentially synoptic

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(61) Aside from Biología y Pedagogía it has been pointed out previously that the Ortegan educational theory can be found in a rather concise essay which bears the name of Mission of the University, and which, for the purposes of this dissertation, was studied in three sources: (i) volume IV of the Complete Works (Obras Completas); pp. 311-353 (1930); (ii) second part of the Book of Missions (Libro de las Misiones), pp. 61-130; and (iii) the English translation, published in 1944 by Princeton University Press, with an introduction by Howard Lee Nostrand (pp. 32-99). For the purposes of this dissertation, the Spanish original was preferred, as it appears in El Libro de las Misiones. However, when the English rendering was convenient, i.e., when the conceptual body of certain references could be used directly, without any need for further clarification, the Nostrand translation was quoted by page number, according to the 1944 edition. Thus, all references identified by the Spanish term 'Misión' are indicative of the fact that the writer is using his own translation of the original, and all references to the Nostrand translation are to be distinguished from the former by the use of the English term 'Mission'. References to the Obras Completas have been totally omitted, in order to avoid further complication.

and which therefore does not pretend to constitute a treatise on educational philosophy. Given this condition the author will attempt to make an expanded analysis of the concept of 'life' as it relates to certain idealistic and phneomenological positions, and to the underlying assumptions which support the conceptual structure of the Mission. An initial reference will also be made to group of philosophies which will be defined as 'philosophies of life', to be discussed in Chapter V, and to be regarded by the author as the main historical sources for the philosophical movements now known as "existentialistic".

It should be repeated, then, beforehand, that (i) Ortega is addressing himself to Spanish, and, by extension to certain universities patterned after the European institutions of higher education, and (ii) that Ortega mostly discusses highly specialized institutions, as is the case with most Latin American colleges and universities. It should also be noted, on the other hand, that the present paper will make no attempt to repeat or summarize all of the ideas contained in the Mission of the University, but rather will try to relate such ideas with the outlined presentation of the most outstanding views of Ortega on knowledge, reality, and value.

The Ortegan case for higher education could loosely be called a defense of general, or liberal education, in the customary sense of those terms, i.e., as they seem to be used, most generally, in the "educational jargon". Enough has been said in a multiplicity of sources, good and bad, about the liberating effects of humanistic education, the generalities, or universalities, of such an approach, the "human need" for liberal instruction, and about the "whole man" both in particular and

in general. Therefore, this chapter will make no attempt to repeat these concepts which already have been used and abused, ad nauseam. Its purpose will be one of merely trying to show the connections between general education and the Ortegan pensamiento.

Ortega initiates his study by making a series of interesting considerations about 'change'. A much battered-about notion in the educational world of today, 'change' seems to be an extremely vague concept which is oftentimes carelessly applied to everything 'educational', from learning theories to administrative strategies. With astonishing frequency one hears about 'change' as applied to schools and their curricula, cultures and subcultures, developmental and under-developmental situations, and evolutionary schemes. Curriculum change is defined as social change; confused developmental and evolutionary notions are loosely applied to schools, which in turn are supposed to "focus on change". The professional world seems to have been invaded by a multiplicity of slogans, of which perhaps learning as "change in behavior", or the socio-scientific view that the educational function is one in which the heritage is to be maintained, and at the same time, changed, are two of the most outstanding. In the meantime few scholars have bothered to define what they mean by 'change', and as in any other field, it was to be expected that a point would be reached in which the over-used term would become, on the one hand, widely used, and, on the other, laden with all kinds of preconceived, unexamined value.

If by 'change', on the contrary, we mean a completely neutral notion, which implies nothing but a difference through time in the object to which it is applied, we may be ready to reflect upon Ortega's remarks. (62)

(62) Mac Iver, R.M., Society: Its Structure and Changes, R. Long, and R.R. Smith, New York, 1931, pp. 399-400.

One thing is the need to change, another is change itself. Contrary to many misconceptions which see change itself as desirable, or laden with value, or which would attempt to induce change without a sufficient examination of the complex of forces present from the first within a given situation, Ortega claims that change in higher education cannot be reduced to a simple correction of abuses. This is the difference between change at the symptomatic level and other kinds of change, and this is precisely the great mistake made by pseudo enlightened institutions trying to induce change without the preceding distinction. Therefore 'change' is not a simple (or complex) administrative problem; there is more to change in a university than meets the eye. And the "more" is precisely the subject-matter of Ortega's first chapter in the Mission. If the notion of change remains symptomatically isolated, i.e., reduced to a mere correction of abuses, there is no recognition of other kinds of change, nor of the real needs for such a change, aside from the superficial ones. Ortega claims that a reform (as change) is always a creation of new usages:

> The term 'abuse' always stands for a concept of little importance. Because they are either 'abuses' in the more natural sense of the word, i.e., isolated, and infrequent cases of misuse of the good usages, or they are so frequent, persistent and tolerated 'abuses', that they cease to be such. In the first case an automatic correction is inevitable, and in the second any attempt to correct them would be a vain one, since their frequency and naturalness would indicate that they are not anomalies, but rather the inevitable result of the 'usages' which would be bad. (63)

It is, then, the notion of 'misuse', or that of the 'bad usage', rather than the abuse, what needs to be looked at. A clear symptom which would seem to indicate the appropriateness of the constitutive

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(63) Misión, p. 62.

uses in any institution is the fact that it can withstand a fairly intensive amount of 'abuse', without breaking down, in the same manner in which a healthy person withstands certain excesses. And the good usages cannot be constituted in any corporate entity if its function or service (mission) has not been determined with all rigor.

> The root of the university reform resides in the accurate determination of its function. All the changes, reforms, and alterations, and all 'patching and touching-up', not really based upon the prior, energetic, and clear revision... of the problem of function... are simply useless lamentations of a defeated amorous episode. (64)

Ortega is not simply stating a truistic "sense of purpose" as the sine qua non of institutional philosophy. His view is grounded precisely on the 'vital' notions anticipated in the preceding chapter, and reveals an account of 'life' which is essentially saturated with philosophical anthropology, on the one hand, and deeply concerned with the problem of human existence, on the other. In order to understand the Ortegan conception of function, 'mission', or purpose (as dueneká) it is necessary to expand the description of 'life' which appears in Chapter II, within the general context of idealism.

It should be noted at this point that Ortega's initiation as a philosopher was highly idealistic, and Neo-Kantian. The philosophico-anthropological case made by Ortega in favor of vitally functional "general education" seems to reveal that he gradually transformed pure idealism, to the point of fully rejecting it at the climactic point of his career. The Ortegan pensamiento concedes merit to the idealistic thesis that the subject must be submerged amidst a world of existential objects, in order to be able to 'know' about them. In this sense, Ortega

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(64) Ibid, p. 63.

seems to believe that man --qua-subject -- is the measure of all things, because the only way of situating himself in any position of knowing, feeling, and 'living', is by attempting to establish a reference to the circumstantial world, in terms of egocentric consciousness. There is a point in which everything that could be known, felt, or 'lived' in the world, has to be resolved from an internal and hence 'subjective' viewpoint. There is no denying that "not being", i.e., 'dying', posits a situation in which there is no more world for the subject which vitally confronts the question. Life, for others, and 'existence', for other entities, can proceed, but the I, qua subject confronted with the inevitability of egocentric necessity, will be no more, and hence, as far as the subject is concerned, the world is no more. Therefore, the surrounding world -- at least in terms of what the subject can know, feel, or sense, about it, and in terms of the meaningfulness of confronting a possible external reality (which after all is only an arbitrary one, since there is no dualistic "inner and outer world" for Ortega) -- cannot be independent of the self, qua subject of consciousness or carrier of cognitive capability.

Such a mode of thought, which Ortega calls a "Cartesian tradition", the culmination of which he sees in an extreme and improper manner in the work of Edmond Husserl, cannot be made the center of all experiential relationships. If, on the one hand, the subject is incapable of establishing meaningful references to the external world it should be realized that it becomes also impossible to construct any meaningful relation in terms of the "self apart from the world", in this case 'world' meaning the surrounding complex of objects, forces, and relationships, as in the German term umwelt. The self, or subject, is never alone, but

always in, for, and with the world: doing something with it, and to it. The subject becomes inseparable from the world, just as the world cannot be, except artificially, detached from the subject. This pathetic circularity, about whose logical difficulties Ortega does not seem to care, is a curious dialectic concept. On the one hand it is strongly reminiscent of certain brands of pragmatic thought -- as in John Dewey-- and on the other, suggests a striking similarity to the notion of 'Man-in-the-World' -- as Dasein -- which constitutes one of the main differences between the Heideggerian Denken, and the pure Husserlian theory of monadic egocentrism.

The Ortegan recognition that the subject needs the world, in order to say that he is at all, seems to be the basis of his whole 'vital' construct. In this sense, the true and primordial reality is that of the self with the world, and this is precisely the concept which he calls 'radical reality'. He uses the term 'radical' in its originary sense of rootedness. Ortega, then, does not seem to be restricted to a dualistic conception of world and individual -- object and subject -- but rather seems to expand the 'vital' concern to a composite, integrated, and radical reality. 'Self' and 'world' are correlative terms which mutually implicate each other, as a curved line is convex from one point of view, and concave from another. The reality of subjective life and its external world, the doing with and to the surrounding objects, and the doing of those seemingly 'external objects' to the subject is the phenomenon which he calls 'life'. What man does with the surrounding objects is to live with them, and the 'radical reality' is an activity, rather than a 'being' in the Parmenidean sense.

It can be seen, then, that according to Ortega, there is no priority of an 'objectival' world, such as the one in which -- very loosely -- it is said that the realist believes in. On the other hand, there is no priority of the subject in terms of the surrounding world. We find thus a dynamic doing to, and undergoing from, a circumstantial world; an essentially dialectic, or activistic, notion which embodies nothing less than "...that rooted reality which we call 'life'". This is why, when he is concerned with the difference between 'culture' and 'science', as they relate with 'profession' and 'science', for university life, Ortega maintains that culture is the system of vital ideas which each age possesses; or even better yet: "...the system of ideas by which the age lives..." (65) The basis for his distinction between the applied science of the professional and the 'science' of the scientist -- insofar as he can be distinguished from his professional aspect -- becomes clearer upon an examination of the Ortegan idea of 'life' as the ontological backbone:

> The reality we are wont to refer to as 'human life', your life and the next fellow's, is something quite remote from biology, the science of organisms. Biology, like any other science, is no more than one occupation truest meaning of the word life is not biological but biographical, and that is the meaning it has always had in the language of the people. It means the totality of what we do and what we are -- that formidable business, which every man must exercise on his own, of maintaining a course among the beings of the world. 'To live' is, in fact, to have dealings with thw world: to address oneself to it, exert oneself in it, and occupy oneself with it. (66)

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(65) Mission, p. 81.

(66) Ibid. p. 82. To be expanded in Chapter VI.

Perhaps the following passage is more familiar to what seems to be the widely shared Anglo-Saxon image of 'existentialism' as a philosophical school:

> The whole difficulty of the matter is that life is not given us ready made. Like it or not, we must go along from instant to instant, deciding for ourselves. At each moment it is necessary to make up our minds what we are going to do next: the life of man is an ever recurrent problem. In order to decide at one instant what he is going to do or to be at the next, man is compelled to form a plan of some sort, however simple or puerile it may be. It is not that he ought to make a plan. There is simply no possible life, sublime or mean, wise or stupid, which is not essentially characterized by its proceeding with reference to some plan. Even to abandon our life to chance, in a moment of despair, is to make a plan. Every human being, perforce, picks his way through life. (67)

It should be noted, though, that for Ortega, the vast majority of the convictions, or ideas, which force man to make an intellectual interpretation of the world around him and his conduct in it, are not fabricated by the individual, but simply received by him from his historical environment, i.e., his "times". In this sense, he departs from the generalized idea that an existential or 'vital' philosophy must contend that the history of man can give no answers to the nature of his being, because history is nothing but the sum total of individual decisions of other people. His refutation of the solipsistic predicament in idealism ought to suffice to dismiss such an interpretation. Contrary to the opinion that nothing about the past can conclusively guide for the future, Ortega contends that:

> Naturally, any age presents very disparate systems of convictions. Some are a drossy residue of other times. But there is always a system of live ideas which represent the superior level of the age, a system which is essentially characteristic of its times and this system is the culture of the age. He who lives at a lower level, on archaic ideas, condemns himself to a lower life, more difficult, toilsome, unrefined.... In our age, the content of culture comes

(67) Ibid., p. 82. To be repeated and discussed in Chapter V.

> largerly from science. But our discussion suffices to indicate that culture is not science. The content of culture, though it is being made in the field of science more than elsewhere, is not scientific fact but rather a vital faith, a conviction characteristic of our times. (68)

The difference between 'closed idealism' or 'subjectivism', and the Ortegan philosophico-anthropological conception of man and society, can be seen more clearly if our analysis of the 'vital' ontology is pursued somewhat further. The point of departure for the Ortegan metaphysics of vital reason is based upon the contention that realism is more than a thesis; it is an attitude. In such an attitutde it is assumed that true reality is to be found in things themselves, and hence a 'real being' means a being by itself, intrinsically independent of the egocentric notion of self. But this position -- which seems to have haunted the philosophical realm during centuries of speculative activity -- is not exempted from certain weaknesses, which could be revealed by critical examination. Ortega claims that from Descartes through Husserl, philosophy has maintained a new thesis which has been cultivated in opposition to 'realism', and which has the merit that I hope to have shown.

In an extremely oversimplified form, it has been shown how Ortega resolves the 'idealism-realism' conflict, and how he is led to the contention that life is the only radical reality. Perhaps it becomes necessary to expand the discussion into a further analysis of the most refined forms of subjectivism, in order to see other main elements in the Ortegan rejection. Specific reference is made here to the Husserlian concept of 'pure phenomenology', since it typifies the culmination of

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(68) Mission, pp. 83-84. Repeated and discussed further in Chapter VI.

the trend which most people know as 'subjective idealism'.

Husserlian phenomenology does not deal with experiences or ideas of an "empirical subject", but rather claims to have found a solution to the epistemological problems in the 'lived experiences' (erlebnis) of pure consciousness. This step is precisely the one which Ortega rejects, on the grounds that the Husserlian phenomenology avoids metaphysics by resorting to a new type of speculation, which is equally metaphysical, and which resides mostly in the conception of 'consciousness'. Ortega seems to equate the latter with'thought', and defines it as an entity which not only receives what is given to it, but which also contributes with an act of putting-forth a statement that claims to be true, and also existent. The Husserlian phenomenology follows this "contributing act" by a second one, which consists of the famous epokhé, or 'phenomenological reduction', and which places the first act 'as enclosed within brackets', supposedly "laying bare" the object of cognition, and discarding at the same time all prior preconceptions about such an object. (69) According to Ortega, this step is neither clear nor easy to understand, because there is no consciousness when the act is 'lived'. The subject faces nothing besides what is "seen", or "thought" by him, and therefore he does not meet the "seeing", or the "thinking". This means that the experienced phenomenon is not identical with "consciousness", but rather constitutes an entity similar to a co-existential composite

(69) More detailed reference is made in Chapter VII to phenomenology as a method, and to the literature which thoroughly describes its complexity. This notion is a "must", in order to understand the underlying assumptions and general trends of the intricate movement now known as 'existentialism', and of the psychological schools which, in varying degrees, are just beginning to have a great impact upon educational thought in the English-speaking world.

of the subject with the object. Hence, the subject can only refer to consciousness when he realizes that 'something' has been seen, in the immediately preceeding moment, but not at the precise instant of seeing it. (70) Therefore the consciousness of a lived experience is not a "pure presence" of life, but rather an object of reflection. The reduction, or abstention, is practiced only upon an object which, really, is nothing but the remembrance of a former vision. And the phenomenological reduction is a "post-act", which, in actuality, is another act: the placing into brackets of that which was a former act. And not even during this second act does the subject practice the famous abstention: the act is simply 'lived' and therefore is not identical with "consciousness", qua ulterior reflection about an ideal object. Therefore, Ortega contends, the so-called phenomenological reduction can only be practiced upon remembrances of acts, and not, in a strict sense, upon lived acts. Pure consciousness is simply the result of a mental operation performed by the subject, i.e., an intellectual operation or hypothesis, once all the necessary lived experiences (as erlebnis) have been reduced. Ergo, pure consciousness is not reality; the phenomenological reduction, qua reality, is an impossible task, because an act, to Ortega, means the exercise of actuality. When the concept 'to be' is conceived, it has to be regarded as 'to be something'. It must be referred to its actual significance, i.e., to the something that it is now: and ergo as a pure presence. And since between the act and the phenomenological reduction of such an act, time has elapsed, a new element -- i.e., 'time' -- has to be considered as coming into being. (71)

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(70), (71) Cf. comparison between Ortega and Bergson in Chapter IV.

This new element, or "time" as "the form of human life", gives full meaning to lived experience, and therefore, it could be said that the subject does not meet pure consciousness, nor "pure self", nor "reduced lived experiences", but that all those entities are nothing but the result of a mental manipulation which the subject performs with his lived, past acts. (72) Such a mental manipulation is precisely the opposite of what Ortega knows as 'reality'. To the essence of human acts simply corresponds the action of "living them", since a reflection upon them cannot be effected without presupposing the performance of another act, which is not precisely carried-out simultaneously with the lived experience. Ortega's case here seems to be suggesting that the phenomenological reductions of the Husserlian kind are precisely based upon radically false interpretations of what he calls the 'primary reality', and if he is going to be called an existentialist philosopher, he certainly cannot be a Husserlian one, ontically speaking. The epistemological implication follows rather easily: the truth, Ortega seems to be thinking, is that the subject lives the acts, and that these are 'intentional'; something is seen, thought, or wanted in terms of a given object. Here he follows Brentano, rather than Husserl, in spite of the fact that 'intentionality' also seems to be a cardinal factor in the systematic approach of the latter. The difference is that "the something" which is found by the subject, and which is "out there", cannot be anything ideal in a formal sense, but rather has to be something real and effective, hence not requiring any reduction or abstention. That "something" is life.

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(72) Cf. comparison between Ortega and Bergson in Chapter IV.

"I find myself in life", Ortega repeats very often, thus implying within the above context that, when thinking deeply about the phenomenological reduction, one cannot help discovering that the very idea of 'pure consciousness' discloses its ultimate erroneous root by placing our genuine reality beyond it. The 'truth', to Ortega, is that we are installed, not in consciousness, since in stricto sensu there is no such thing as consciousness, but in that "radical reality which is life".

These considerations, added to those discussed in Chapter II, ought to equip the reader to go back to the Ortegan account of the mission of higher education.

Concerning the university, Ortega's radical change, or reform, must begin with the subject, i.e., the ordinary student; the student is really the nucleus of the institution. The university should offer only those courses which a good, ordinary student, can really learn. Ortega's raison d'être for the university becomes then transparent, and his themes of life and perspectivism are echoed by his teleological idea of higher education:

> 1. We must pick out that which appears as strictly necessary for the life of the man who is now a student. Life, with its inexorable requirements, is the criterion that should guide this first stroke of the pruning knife.
> 2. What remains, having been judged strictly necessary, must be further reduced to what the student can really learn with thoroughness and understanding. (73)

Thus, by applying the above principles, Ortega proposes that the university should primarily consist, of the higher education which the ordinary man should receive. The basic idea is to make a 'cultured person', i.e., a subject brought up to the cultural demand of his times.

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(73) Mission, p. 72. This topic is again discussed in Chapter VI, but directly applied to education.

In terms of an "ordinary man", this implies a general education. Besides, the ordinary man should become a good professional, i.e., a practitioner of applied science, rather than a scientist proper, because science is not ultimately reduced to laboratory practice, nor does it constitute by itself the sole task of learning about cultural life. In its proper and 'authentic' sense, science is research and investigation, and it must be admitted that the ordinary practice of the professional is not 'investigation' in such an abstracted sense, i.e., the problem solving activity embodied by pure science.

In this manner, the relation between reason and life, to which several allusions were made in Chapter III, enters the picture. The main idea, of course, is that reason cannot, and must not, substitute for life. Reason is only a form and a function of life, and pure reason has to give grounds to vital reason, if we want to transcend the limitations of the former, thus allowing for its location, mobility and transformation. In other words, philosophy needs to discard its utopian character, by avoiding the conversion of an horizon which should and must be wide, into a stratified conception of the world. The conversion of world into 'horizon' does not detract anything of reality from the former; it simply refers it to the living subject, whose world does exist. This is the only way to provide the world with a vital dimension, and such should be the task of the university, i.e., to have the students formed, and not simply in-formed, in their functional dimension, as it is required by the "theme of our times". At this point it should be recalled that the modern theme could be summarized in terms of a conversion of pure reason into vital reason, and thus philosophy in general -- and also 'the philosophy' of the university -- should be

the systematic realization of such a task. Here we have the theme of life with a new variation: the 'radicalness' of life should not be interpreted as exclusivity, nor even as the 'most important' task to be effected. 'Radical' is a term which Ortega uses in complete consistency with its etymological significance. He is talking about a reality in which all other possible realities, formal and material, have to be rooted. The reality of the surrounding world, or that of the subject, are to be found in life, as moments of its continuous becoming. In his work History as a System Ortega persistently maintains this thesis. Reality, as such, is constituted by the life of the subject, and to be real means, precisely, to be rooted in life, since such a concept is the obligatory point of reference for any other conceivable realities, even if the subject admits that the 'real things' in themselves may transcend, in some way, his own life. In other words, the theme of life returns here with full orchestral force, by loudly and firmly restating that subjective life is the very premise for any notion, of reality. 'Reality', whatever it should mean, becomes intelligible only by referring it to subjective life, and this means that only within such a kind of life can the term 'real' be comprehended in all its radicalness and ultimate significance.

It should not be overlooked, though, that nay mention of 'something real', and any derivation of a moment of reality from life, still presupposes the solution of the problematic relation between life and object. In this sense, then, to say that the subject is an ingredient of reality does not mean that he is a part of those real entities, but rather that their participation in subjective life, and their rootedness in it, are the only relations that can give meaning to their 'reality'. 'Reality', then, must also be understood, from the perspectivistic view-

point of the subject, as a dimension and character of that which is real. And even in the case that 'the real thing' were to be posited as prior, superior, or transcendental in terms of subjective life, or even as the originative foundation of individual life; such conceptions of 'the real' do not alter the fact that their reality proper has to be rooted in subjective life. If those types of reality have been found in subjective life, as far as the subject is concerned, they must be 'radically' referred to it.

It is hoped that the above considerations will render more intelligible the following concepts, which are also basic for an understanding of the Ortegan university.

The contention that higher instruction should consist primarily of the teaching of learned professions, and scientific research, only insofar as it will be devoted to prepare future investigators, seems to be derived, not only from the already stated vitalistic concerns, but also from certain historical circumstances. In effect, one of the first startling ideas of the book is the Ortegan contempt for "...the notorious lack of scientific callings and aptitude for research..." which "marks his race". This view requires only a slight amount of further clarification, since it is a well-known fact that, in the opinion of many a scholarly mind, Spain and Latin America have not excelled in philosophy and science, however well as these ethnic and geographical areas seem to have done in the fields of literature and the arts. The Ortegan opinion, though, should not be interpreted as a dogmatic belief in such a lack of aptitude, in terms of inherent "human nature", but rather as a socio-political criticism which includes the place of the university within the cultural matrix. At the same time, the criticism also seems to include the

emphasis on science and research which some institutions were only beginning to show in the early thirties. Ortega seems to be attempting a transcendence of the stage of professionalism and research. He suggests that if the programs of instruction are scrutinized more closely --especially in Spanish and Latin American universities -- it would be discovered that most universities nearly always require some kind of 'basic liberal program' from their students:

> ...the student is nearly always required, apart from his professional apprenticeship and his research, to take some courses of a general character --philosophy, history.... It takes no great acumen to recognize in this requirement the last, miserable residue of something more imposing and more meaningful. The symptom that something is a residue -- whether in biology or history -- is that we do not perceive why it is with us. In its present form, it serves no end at all; one must trace it back to some other age of its evolution in order to find whole and active what exists today only as a residual stump. (74)

Ortega's main argument in favor of general education seems to be a historical one. He contends that a revision of the medieval university could clearly show that the so-called 'liberal courses', 'general education courses', or 'general culture courses' -- as they are generally called in Latin American universities, sometimes with the variation: 'humanistic curriculum' -- are nothing but the meager, humble remains of a universal activity, which in the Middle Ages constituted the whole of higher education:

> The medieval university did no research (which does not mean to say that no research was done in the Middle Ages). It was very little concerned with professions. Everything was rather 'general culture' -- theology, philosophy, arts. (75)

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(74) Mission, pp. 54-55.

(75) Misión, p. 74.

Ortega attacks the absurdity of the term 'general culture' by saying that the philistinism of such an expression reveals its lack of sincerity, because 'culture' -- as referred to the human mind, and 'not to cattle or grain' -- cannot be anything but general. A person cannot be 'culta', i.e., cultivated in the sense of being generally aware of his individual and collective historical reality, or of his place within the demand of the times, only in an isolated discipline. To be 'culto' in a given profession means rather to be "learned in a particular discipline", and when an expression such as 'general culture' is used, the intention is declared of having the student receive some ornamental and vaguely educative knowledge about his character and intelligence. Ortega claims that for such a vague purpose, which only would have meaning in terms of psychologistic learning theory, any discipline is as good as another, therefore suggesting a possible differentiation between learning and knowledge, when applied to the system of human acts to be performed by the university.

At this point, the neo-Kantian beginnings of Ortega could perhaps explain such a contention, since a similar differentiation between learning and knowledge can be found in the Critique of Pure Reason:

> I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either historical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the original source of cognition, it is, in relation to the person who possesses it, merely historical, he knows only what has been given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience or by instruction.... ...thus the person who has learned a system of philosophy...,although he has perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, he possesses really no more than a historical knowledge...,he knows what has been told him, his judgments are only those which

> he has received from his teachers....He has formed his mind on another's; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles, it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical -- as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their lives. (76)

We seem to be, then, before a sharp distinction between the ex datis dimension of subjective learning, and the ex principiis significance of subjective knowledge. This is hardly the place to attempt historico-causal connections regarding such a tenet, but the essential content of the Kantian differentiation alluded to at least seems to partake in the methodological division which has constituted a sizable portion of the educational theories which we have inherited since the times of Rousseau explicitly, and even from the pre-Socratic world implicitly. Indeed, it seems to be clear that Emile was compelled to learn by himself, to use his own reason and not that of others, and to avoid the use of "... a memory overburdened with undigested knowledge.... (77) Pestalozzi claims to have learned to know the natural relation in which real knowledge stands to book knowledge, and Herbart insists on the contention that the work of his moral education is not by any means to develop a certain external mode of action but rather the ex principiis insight, together with the corresponding volition in the mind of the

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(76) Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Transl., by J.MD. Meiklejohn, Henry G. Bonn, York St., Covent Garden, London, 1855.

(77) Rousseau, J. Jacques, Emile, Everyman's Library, London, 1950, pp. 167, ff.

pupil. (78) The 'digested knowledge' concept of education incorporated into the active individual and social self has also been inherited and further developed by Froebel and Dewey.

Whitehead's Aims of Education also devotes a considerable number of pages to the 'informative vs. formative' distinction, and to show that, in his view, the purpose of education is not a limited, immanent concentration of subject matter, but the knowledge of all possible things, not only for the sake of learning them, but rather in terms of a formative capacity -- which he calls 'wisdom' -- for 'life'. Whitehead defines 'life' as a "struggle for meaning". In order to get at this 'meaning', the priority of informative material has to be eventually sacrificed for the sake of formative wisdom. Whitehead also contends that the culture should primarily be interpreted as an entity which stimulates an activity of mind, again with the purpose of interpreting the puzzling challenge of a surrounding -- or circumstantial -- world. The main aim of education seems to be a merciless war against dead information, for the sake of a formative body of instrumental powers, which, ex principiis, should be used to decipher a collection of facts which must be understood, and which are "out there" whether we like it or not. This is why Whitehead contends that the specialized courses utilize activity, and that education ought to include style, since style is strictly our way of looking at life, and at the world. Maintaining the Aristotelian notion that the art of life must be comprehended,

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(78) Pestalozzi, J.H., How Gertrude Teaches her Children, G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1915, pp. 26, ff.
Herbart, K. J., Science of Education, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1896, pp. 109, ff.

and the human potentiality must be aided so it can be expressed in terms of agreement with the actual environment, Whitehead also contends that extreme specialization, per se, is to be avoided. The world is an all-embracing, manifold collection of diverse experiences. (79) Hence, the essential need is for a cognitively grounded system of general education. (80) In fact education -- like culture -- cannot be anything but 'general', as Ortega puts it, because:

> Life is a chaos, a wild jungle, a great confusion. Man gets lost in it. But his mind reacts to such a ship-wrecking sensation of loss: he works in order to find ways and paths that would lead him out of the confusion (this is why at the beginning of all cultures a term had to be created as a conveyor of the concept of 'way', 'road' or 'path' -- the odos and methodos of the Greek mind; the the tao and te of the Chinese; the 'path' and 'vehicle' of the Hindu); these'ways' hopefully should lead into firm and clear ideas about the universe, and to positive convictions about the circumstantial world. The conjoint result, the system of those convictions, is the sense of the term 'culture'; thus meaning something entirely different than ornamental 'education'. Culture is that entity which saves man from a total wreck, it is the only resource which allows man to live a life other than a senseless tragedy or a radical debasement. (81)

Conceivably, the above paragraph is using the expression 'total wreck' as synonymous with loss of identity, the term 'radical' in the sense of rootedness, and 'debasement' as dehumanization, or retrogression in terms of the human condition. The 'cultural' signifcance of the circumstantial moment is then historical in the Ortegan sense (and not in the Kantian one that was used in the quoted paragraph).

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(79) Whitehead, A.N., The Aims of Education, Mentor Books, New American Library, N.Y., 1963.

(80) This thesis should not be confused with the "need to specialize" in a curriculum especially designed for a broad culture, which is a problem typical of Whitehead's aims.

(81) Mision, p. 75. Cf. Chapter VI for further discussion and reintegration into the Ortegan theory of higher education.

It has been described in Chapter III, that, co-substantially, man belongs to a given generation, and every generation places itself, not simply anywhere, but rather precisely upon the former generation. This means that each epoch makes it imperative to live at the "height of the times", and more specifically yet at the height of the ideas of the times: (82)

> Culture is the vital system of ideas pertaining to each time. It does not matter if those ideas are not, either fully or partially, scientific ideas. Culture is not science. It is a characteristic of our present culture that a great portion of its contents does come from the sciences; but this was not the case with other cultures, nor is it contended that ours must exhibit such a relationship with the sciences in the same measure as now appears to be the case....
>
> The contemporary university has complicated enormously its professional teachings if compared to those presented by the medieval institutions of higher education, and thus research has been added with an almost complete removal of cultural learning and transmission. Obviously this is an atrocity. (83)

Of course, Ortega is not advocating a return to the medieval universities as such, but rather suggesting that the medieval university perhaps had a juster conception of its mission, or function, in terms of the 'height of its times', than our universities do today. It should also be added that the notion that general education is of practically no use, so long as it is maintained with its character of a 'residual stump', does not seem to be a naïve conception either. Ortega is simply saying that it is not necessary to investigate a great deal to

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(82) As stated in the Modern Theme; which was formerly described as the transition between 'perspectivism' and 'ratio-vitalism'.

(83) Mision, p. 75.

discover that the 'general education' requirement in many modern universities is nothing but the sad and last remnant of a greater and much more important mission. The justification given today to such a curricular precept is extremely vague, and, in most cases it seems to be merely confined to the notion that it is convenient for a student to be exposed to "some general education".

At this point it is perhaps convenient to perform a deeper exploration into the meaning of the Spanish word 'cultura'. In Spanish the term 'cultura' often has a connotation in which the notion of 'being cultivated' is brought to bear upon a formal notion of knowledgeable attitude, as opposed to ornamental snobbishness. Thus, in opposition to the factual implication that oftentimes this formal content does not match, ex principiis, a practical usage in the sense of ornamental learning, the cognitive root of the concept rather seems to imply a suggestion of erudition and 'breeding', in the ordinary sense of "being educated". 'Cultura', in this sense, also conveys a suggestive concept of knowledge, whose attempted relationship with 'culture', as the objective creation of human activity, also has a connotation of savoir faire, which is often absent in the socio-scientific or "anthropological" interpretation of the English term culture. Thus, when Ortega uses the term 'culture' he does not only mean a qualitative improvement, refinement or development by study, training and instruction. He also implies the possibility of a type of learning and knowledge which affects the training and refining of the mind, emotions, manners, and tastes. Likewise it also means the practical results of such a training; technical refinement of modes of thought, emotion, etc., and by extension to this genetic meaning, the term also entails the concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments,

and institutions, created or maintained by a given people in a given period. Thus, 'culture' as cultivation, education, learning, and knowledge, also becomes equivalent to civilization, defined as the man-made creations, or as the Hegelian notion of 'objectified spirit', insofar as it should affect the "being of man", by comparison to his animal stage. (84)

Thus, what Ortega calls "the catastrophic character of the present situation" seems to be the fact that the so-called ordinary, or average man lacks an awareness of his own culture. To be 'inculto', simply means to lack the integrated, and all-embracing series of qualities that are primordially needed to be 'at the height of the times". In other words, 'inculto' is the man who does not possess the vital system of ideas that his own time is maintaining about the complex relationship between man and the world. Thus the tragedy of the 'mass-man":

> That average character is the new barbarian, who lives behind the true composition of his own epoch, and who is archaic and primitive in comparison with the terrible actuality implied by the 'contemporariness' of his own problems. This new barbarian is precisely the so-called cultivated... the engineer, the physician, the lawyer, the scientist....(85)

There is, then, the implication that certain findings of specialized science simply cannot induce change by merely legislating it, nor

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(84) For an extensive explanation of the general Germanic context within which Ortega seems to be using the term 'culture', cf. Ernst Cassirer's Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften (Spanish Ed., Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, D.F., 1955) in which the 'Sciences of Culture' are sharply differentiated from the realm of 'Physico-natural Sciences', in their relationship to what the Anglo-Saxon academic world generally refers to as the 'Behavioral Sciences'.

(85) Mision, p. 76; also cf. La Rebelion de las Masas, IV (1930), 111-310.

could change be obtained through the questionable use of applied disciplines (i.e., administrative considerations of "university reform", etc.) for the simple reason that any reform cannot take place if aimed and applied at the symptomatic level, in spite of all the good will in the world. Within the cultural matrix of a given human society, all efforts based upon pure reason, or "science divorced from life" will not achieve the only indispensable and sufficient condition for the full existence of the individual and collective entities. The condition for university reform is:

> ... to place it within the context of its truth, and to give it its 'real authenticity', thus not attempting to make it be what it is not, ergo falsifying its inexorable direction with the imposition of our arbitrary desires....(86)

For the same reason, i.e., that the real being of a university should be paradoxically tautological: universally rooted in the life of the people who must give it a vital meaning, change -- the incorporation of new usages in lieu of a mere correction of abuses -- should not be attempted by copying other universities. To imitate models of other universities designed to serve purposes of other cultures is also a symptomatic, and therefore an inauthentic, attempt:

> I am not criticizing our being informed by looking at exemplary neighbors; such an action has rather to be performed, but in such a manner that it would allow us to originally resolve our proper direction. By this I do not mean to say that we must be nationalistic, and 'all that rubbish'. I am merely saying that, even in the case of complete identity -- of countries and men -- imitation would be disastrous, because the imitative activity loses sight of the creative effort derived

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(86) Misión, p. 63.

> from struggling with the problem, which makes us understand the true meaning and the limits, or shortcomings, of that solution we are trying to imitate. (87)

There is a sense, then, in which Ortega seems to suspect a gap between knowledge and institutionalization, and to be saying that all the research in the world cannot induce change, unless the efficient cause for such a reform be found within the vital core of forces that make the culture "live". It is again interesting to note that certain social scientists,contemporary to Ortega, also seemed to be suspecting similar dimensions within the problem. Lynd, the American sociologist of the thirties could be again quoted at this point:

> The knowledge which the sophisticated experts possess in our culture is growing at a rate far more rapid than the rate at which it is being institutionalized in the habits of thought and action of the mass of our population... As a culture we are accumulating our disabilities and the resulting strains incident to daily living at a rate faster than social legislation, education, and all the agencies for 'reform' are managing to harness our new knowledge in the reduction of these disabilities. We are becoming culturally illiterate faster than all these agencies are managing to make us literate in the use of the potentialities of the culture. (88)

But Ortega adds a new twist. He claims that it does not matter if certain educational institutions arrive at the same conclusions, or forms which have been adopted in other countries; the important condition is that the arrival at such conclusions, or forms, be achieved by means of indigenous cultural resources, i.e., after facing the very substantive --'existential' -- question. There is a fallacy in assuming that a nation is great because its schools are great; even if the quality of those schools were perfect, such a perfection is not

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(87) Ibid., p. 64.

(88) Lynd, Robert, Knowledge for What? Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1939, pp.108-109. Also Cf. Chapter IV for Lynd's relevance to the existential import of 'knowledge'.

transferable, because the concept 'schools' is such that their methods are only a portion of themselves. Their whole reality is the culture which created and maintained such schools. The vital, and cultural, raison d'être would be completely missing in the artificial imposition entailed by naïve imitation:

> Because they are happy with imitating other institutions and thus with avoiding the imperative of thinking and re-thinking the questions themselves, our best professors completely live a life whose spirit has been delayed in fifteen or twenty years, even if they are completely up to date in the formal, scientific details of their respective disciplines. This is the pathetic backwardness of those who want to avoid the effort of authenticity, and that of creating their own convictions.(89)

It can be easily seen, then, why Ortega launches such a merciless attack upon the belief that 'research', and research alone, is the solution for a "change in behavior". For the reasons discussed in the dichotomy 'reason-life', the deceiving ideas about the value of 'research', and unilaterally conceived 'cultural change', cannot be accepted as a truly vital concern. Curriculum change should be cultural -- in the sense of 'cultura' -- rather than 'social', in the experimentalistic "socio-scientific" sense. No "illuminated foreigner" can possibly be a true hero and savior of the situation: if he is blind to the vital fabric of the culture in which he is attempting to have his 'mores' incorporated, he is bound to pathetic failure. The real depth of this question resides in the opposed polarity of values as 'mores', and the universality of a value conceived as 'radical reality', or 'material essence', of which the axiological pattern -- empirically and existentially speaking -- is nothing but an embodiment subject to

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(89) Ortega, op.cit., p. 64.

perspectivistic modification. Thus, the true -- or 'vital' -- being of a culture is the conditio sine qua non for the "real" change of its temporary entities and institutions. (90)

Thus, the Ortegan notions of 'change', 'culture', and 'life' seem to have a character which the writer proposes to denominate 'philosophico-anthropological', and which do constitute a "philosophy of life", in the sense that 'life' -- or an equivalent concept, becomes

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(90) For extensive information of the context within which Ortega seems to be using his philosophico-anthropological notion of 'cultural value' (which indeed differs from the usual interpretation given by the Anglo-Saxon social scientist to this term), cf. Max Scheler's Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Werthethik, Franke, Bern, 1954, and Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Cohen, Bonn, 1931, which lead easily into his other works. To the best of the writer's knowledge, the only works by Scheler that have been published in English are Man's Place in Nature, "Forms of knowledge and Culture", "Man in the Era of Adjustment", and "Man and History", as published by Noonday Press, N.Y., 1962, and also in Philosophical Perspectives, Boston:Beacon Press, 1958. Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge and Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft also are extremely important sources. The acquisition of the projective background necessary for a complete understanding of the Germanic context, within which the Ortegan concept of 'culture' could be described, is an 'education' by itself, presupposing at least an acquaintance with socio-anthropological movements from Comte, Levy-Brühl and Durkheim, through the work of Simmel, Tönnies, Freyer, Von Wiese, Gurvitz, Weber, and Manheim, among many others. The work of W. Dilthey, and the subsequent ramifications of his ideas into the fields of psychology and philosophical anthropology of the type practised by E. Cassirer (essentially in their differentiation between 'natural' and 'spiritual', 'cultural', or 'humanistic' sciences) would also render the complexity of the concept of 'cultura' far more complete than this dissertation could ever hope to accomplish. This wealthy background was indeed at the 'height of the times', when Ortega wrote his essay on higher education, and it would be a titanic task to follow historically every single one of its conceptual threads.

the ultimate ontological, epistemological, and axiological preoccupation for the conceptual construct. It is, of course, admitted that all philosophies are, "philosophies of life", for a diversity of reasons, the most common of which could perhaps be that the famous Socratic dictum about the "unexamined life" needs to be justified. There is, then, a sense in which certain bodies of thought, either rationally or even irrationally, have attempted to maintain 'life' or a similar concept, as the key-preoccupation for philosophical analysis or speculation. It is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that the writer proposes: to classify the Ortegan 'pensamiento' -- and rather loosely at that -- as one of several philosophical instances, which reasonably follow a historical category called the 'exaltation of life'.

CHAPTER V

ORTEGA AND OTHER 'PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE'

Speculative examinations of the 'real characteristics of human life, or analytic characterizations of the human condition as an inevitable mode of reality, are theoretical aims which have affected the philosophic realm since pre-Socratic times. Yet, in those times, speculation on physical or biological matters had approximately the same degree of difficulty presented by the speculation on the so-called 'cultural', 'human' or 'spiritual' affairs, and therefore the difference of tangible achievements between technology and humanism was not as dramatic as it appears to be today. According to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, the progress made in technological activities has overshadowed a more legitimate form of inquiry on the topic of human existence, and hence why he advocates a return to pre-Socratic times, in order to recover an authenticity of approach which modern 'behavioral science' appears to have lost. In other words, the question of human existence is essentially a metaphysical one which must be asked from a broader framework than that usually shown by current scientific assumptions, and hence transcending the limitations posited by an intrinsic regard for lingüistic exercises, experimentation, mathematization, empirical induction, and other techniques borrowed from physics and biology to be applied within the realm of human "behavioral science". Mutatis mutandis, the Heideggerian approach is shared or anticipated by other European philosophers (among them Ortega y Gasset) and assumes a basic distinction between 'human behavior' and other types of behavior.

Basically, within these positions, there is no such thing as a behavioral science of man, in the same sense that a behavioral science of non-human objects could be conceived. Insofar as human beings do not only "behave" in the manner usually attributed to the subjects of natural science (i.e., do not simply undergo certain events) but are rather faced with the alternatives of limited or unlimited choice, it becomes possible to differentiate types of human and non-human behaviors. Another way of saying this would be to propose that human beings do not only "behave", but also "act", the distinction here being between "things that happen to them", and "things that they make happen" either to themselves or to something, or someone else.

The point is then that positivistic "behavioral science" is based upon a concept of experience which practically endows the techniques of symbolic mathematization and subsequent inductive processes with the privilege of being the only adequate means to achieve scientific "objectivity".

Ortega seems to believe that this trend has a long, and somehow logical story, which can be explained by the 'tangible' progress made by technological disciplines, when compared with the gaps of knowledge in the realm of the humanistic, or speculative "sciences", many of whose internal problems are still a mystery. This phenomenon has threatened the existence of formal metaphysics, ever since Bacon and Galileo formulated the bases for modern technological inquiry, i.e., the mathematically supported, formal models which have been essentially devised for man's mastery over his natural, circumstantial world. Along with Ortega, most philosophers "of life" seem to agree on the fact that positivistic thinking has been blinding the world, and simultaneously

blinding itself, with the incandescent light of the newly discovered physical laws, and the accelerated progress shown by the control of "man over nature". (91) The introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason reveals an alarmed concern in view of the fact that metaphysics, his dignified "Queen of the Sciences", was on the verge of losing her long held throne. The feats of Galileo and Newton were overwhelmingly impressive when compared to the metaphysical efforts that offered hazy, and often even logically contradictory solutions to the problem of reality. An 'empirical' vocabulary took over the authority of the idealistic statements, and certain terms such as 'observation', 'evolution', 'experience', and 'probabilistic laws' gradually invaded the realm of humanistic endeavors, especially in the fields of psychology, the"social sciences", and education. Post-Cartesian mechanistic conceptions of the world and the Spencerian way of presenting organicistic conceptions of society also contributed to discourage the Heideggerian quest for reality, in the ancient sense of metaphysical discovery.

Obviously, epistemology, and deductive or inductive logic became the main philosophical preoccupations, and therefore metaphysics, or 'ontology' was overlooked, or even shunned with the charge of 'mystical', for a great number of years. Thus, the Ortegan "mass-man", and even the Ortegan "man-of-science", continued to witness an astonishing 'progress'

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(91) Max Scheler's essay Kulturschaft und Wissenschaft ("Forms of Knowledge and Culture"), of which an English translation has appeared in Philosophical Perspectives, trans. Oscar A. Haac, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, presents an expanded discussion of this view, which is also woven into a different context in the already mentioned book by Ernst Cassirer: Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften, Chs. I and II.

in their mastery over nature, while the advances in ethical theory and other normative inquiries, either "degenerated" into scholastic argumentations or, at best, became the subject for lofty technical exercises of little vital importance when compared to the inquiries which conferred an increased control of the physical universe. Ortega's vitalistic work, in this sense, is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche among whose views the most outstanding is perhaps a passionate and almost anguished insight into the tragical, i.e., 'shipwrecking', meaning of human existence. (92) Like Nietzsche, Ortega confronts such problems as herd conformity, overemphasis on experimentation and formalization in the scientific world, and mechanistic conceptions of society. Like Nietzsche, Ortega also seems to be rather embittered by European society, by the increase of empirical monopolizing approaches in behavioral science, by the tyranny of logical approaches, and by the presence of false expressions in rigid artistic forms. Unlike Nietzsche, Ortega does not refer to vital situations as

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(92) Especially, cf. III (1923), 141-242 for the "theme of our times"; III (1925), 351-428 for the "dehumanization of art"; IV (193) for the "revolt of the masses"; V (1940) 377-289, for the difference between "ideas", and "beliefs". Also cf. "Meditación de la Técnica", 111-310, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1961, with four appendixes on the "vicissitudes of science"; the internal quarrel of modern pysics, a prologue on the distinction between cultural and natural sciences of Heinrich Rickert, a prologue on the ideas for biological conception of the world (J. von Uexkull), and considerations on the non-Euclidean geometries. Of these sources, those quoted directly from the Obras Completas have been translated into English: The Modern Theme, London: C.W. Daniel, 1941. New York" W. W. Norton, 1933; The Revolt of the Masses, London, Allen & Unwin, 1923. New York: W. W. Norton, 1932; and Concord and Liberty, New York: W. W. Norton, 1946.

'horrible', nor is he overwhelmed by the Dionysian or 'Zarathustrian' irrationalism. To Nietzsche, for example, the Greeks resorted to beauty to disguise the tragic, monstrous and unnatural ways shown by the human "psyche" as a result of the human situation; e.g., Edipus killing his father, and heterosexually loving his mother. It seems that the Nietzschean scheme makes these 'horrible' acts a part of life, thus representing a tragic human problem, whether we like it or not. Nietzsche feels that this crude part of reality was the one embellished by the Greek tragedies, whih used the "spirit of Apollo" -- i.e., rhythm, rhyme, equilibrium, and aesthetical composition -- to combine it with the 'real' human situation. In the language of Erich Fromm such a situation is one which simultaneously could be described as a part of nature and apart from nature. We have seen how Ortega would reject irrationalism by admitting that the use of reason is also a part of life, but, on the other hand, would accept the notion of life as a "shipwrecking sensation". Thus, to Nietzsche, the creativity which is present in Apollonian tendencies had to be balanced with another type of creativity. This new creativity is the ability to satisfy a need for individual independence and cosmic dependence. The creature state is transcended and yet the need to have a frame of orientation is maintained. This need to explain a great cosmic umwelt, is met by gaining the freedom to enjoy a return to Nature (Dionysos or Zarathustra). Typical human freedom (Dionysian element) is as much an intrinsic part of human nature as the need to overcome its chaotic expression by means of aesthetic forms (Apollonian import). Nietzsche's notion of vital creativity is then not limited to a canon-obeying action, which actually is only a tool for human expression. In this manner the true creator constructs, formally and

materially, an object which thus becomes a "real" symbol of life, instead of remaining at the level of a merely technical exercise. Such is the language spoken by Nietzsche's subsequent, more sophisticated, conception of Zarathustra: the one who laughs, and leaps, and rejoices at the complete awareness of the "natural components" in his 'real being'.

We have seen that the Ortegan scheme is a much less fiery one, and that he is willing to accept the Socratic pure reason -- or Apollonian element -- as a worthy contribution.

Pure reason has to be limited within the realm of its possibilities, but never fully subdued with the Nietzschean paroxysmal force. Yet, the essential component, the main preoccupation and concern, namely, life itself, remains in both Nietzsche and Ortega as the cardinal direction for philosophical activity. It must be necessary to develop an insight into life, as an authentic reality directly related to the peculiarities and possibilities of human existence. 'Life', then is an immediate need which becomes an inevitable measure of all things, and must be made a process of discovery or search for 'real' meanings. Nietzsche was controversial in his time, has continued to be so, and it could be reasonably suspected that he will be controversial forever. One thing remains, however, as the common thread by means of which the Nietzschean quest for vital meaning could be woven into other systems of thought: the "idea of life".

Nietzsche's work, like Ortega's, has been analyzed from many angles, and could be regarded as a bold step, however unsystematic, taken toward the return to a vital ontology.

Unlike Descartes, Nietzsche and Ortega question, in varying degrees, the absolutistic powers given to pure reason. Both thinkers allow grounds

for mutual comparison if, historically speaking, the thesis is admitted that part of the anti-rationalistic reaction has been to develop an ontology of life.

Nietzsche shoved aside, rather harshly, the majesty of empirical epistemology as the "Prima-donna" of the philosophic stage, and along with epistemology he also seemed to have pushed aside most of her maids of honor: syllogisms, enthymemas, deduction, induction, observation and sense experience (as the only possible methodological devices).

Ortega, on the other hand, only looks at empirical epistemology with certain suspicion: not wishing to be overcome by her tempting charms, he seems reluctant to "let her steal the show". He only wants her to speak the 'language of life'. Nietzsche is rather irrationalistic; Ortega talks about 'vital reason', and does not perceive himself even as an 'anti-rationalist'. (93) But, in both cases, essence and existence, as related to human life, seem to have regained the spotlight.

As for the "conventional rules of morality", Ortega also allows a comparison with Nietzsche:

> The life of a man is not, therefore, the operating of the mechanisms with which Providence has graced him. We must constantly ask in <u>whose</u> service these mechanisms operate. The question, in short, is not what I am but <u>who</u> I am.... Confronted with <u>all</u> these circumstances, man is forced to make his own life and to make it, whenever possible, in an authentic fashion. This is, incidentally, the main reason why what we do in our life is <u>not</u> immaterial. In his essay on Goethe, Ortega has pointed out that Goethe's celebrated sentence. 'My actions are merely symbolic', was but a way of concealing from himself the <u>decisive</u> character of his behaviour. As a matter of fact our actions are not symbolic; they are real. We cannot,

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(93) Pure spontaneity, deprived of cultivation, is a blind and senseless force "full of sound of fury, signifying nothing". In order to give it meaning it is neccessary to introduce 'concepts'. <u>Cf</u>., Ferrater, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 28.

> therefore, act 'no matter how'. Human life has nothing to do with 'No matter', 'Never mind' or 'It is all one to me'. Neither can we act as we please. We have to act as we must act' we have to do what we have to do. It is unfortunate, of course, that upon reaching this deep stratum of our existence the only statements we seem capable of uttering are either tinged with morality or marred by triviality. 'To act as we must act' seems to be a moral rule -- a kind of categorical imperative still more formal and far less normative than the Kantian one. It is nothing of the kind. It simply states that we must bow to our purely individual call, even if it runs counter to the conventional rules of morality. (94)

It should be possible to attempt a comparison between Ortega and Nietzsche, insofar as 'life' seems to be presented in both thinkers, as the cardinal value for philosophical speculation. The Ortegan notion of 'vital reason' is a key-concept which well deserves to be depicted as the backbone of his theory of higher education.

The Nietzschean conciliation of the Apollonian spirit and the Dionysian force -- i.e., the interplay of a factor of measure and rhythm (which could be interpreted as similar to the Ortegan notion of 'pure reason'), and another factor which embodies the urge for a free expression of cosmic feeling, offers us a tense result: his conception of vital necessity. This resulting new force, which Nietzsche situates at the point of vectorial convergence of its two components, and which he makes move forward, within the creative realm of the human race, is capable of resolving the dialectic insufficiency of the theoretical man. Human beings are lost in an immense and overwhelming cognitive ocean, and will face a terrifying crisis of loneliness and impotence if 'pure reason' continues to rule their actions. Precisely at that moment, the plaintive voice of Immanuel Kant, will be remembered, and a fatal

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(94) Cf., Ferrater, op.cit., pp. 50-51; also cf., I, 64-65 (1916, on 'authentic ego' as 'unbribable' basis for life, and IV, 406 (1932).

conviction would be reached concerning the inaccessibility of the noumenal world, and the defeat of an illusory confidence placed upon systematic logical efforts, unworthy of absorbing so much human faith.

It has been shown that Ortega escapes the passionate and anguished insight revealed by the Nietzschean Geburt der Tragödie. Nevertheless, Ortega seems to share the Nietzschean preoccupation by recognizing a "vital concern" as the crucial leit motif that somehow seems to be forgotten by modern science.

For the purposes of higher education, Ortega, in effect, advocates a casting away "once and for all" of those vague notions commonly referred to as "enlightenment and culture", which make them appear as "some sort of ornamental accesory for the life of leisure".

> There could not be a falser misrepresentation. Culture is an indispensable element of life, a dimension of our existence, as much a part of man as his hands. True, there is such a thing as man without hands, but that is no longer simply man: it is man crippled. The same is to be said of life without culture, only in a much more fundamental sense. It is a life crippled, wrecked, false. The man who fails to live at the height of his times is living beneath what would constitute his right life. Or, in other words, he is swindling himself out of his own life.... We are passing at present, despite certain appearances and presumptions, through an age of terrific un-culture. Never perhaps has the ordinary man been so far below his times and what they demand of him. Never has the civilized world so abounded in falsified, cheated lives. Almost nodoby is poised squarely upon his proper and authentic phase in life. (95)

It becomes necessary, then, to restore to the university its function of 'enlightenment' Ortega describes this function as the task of imparting the "full culture of the times", and of presenting the contemporary world "with clarity and truthfulness". Such an over-

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(95) Mission, p. 85.

whelming acquaintance with the contemporary world, must demand that the life of the individual be articulated if it is to be 'authentic' at all:

> Personally, I should make a Faculty of Culture the nucleus of the university and of the whole higher learning.... Each [discipline to be studied] bears two names: for example 'the physical scheme of the world' vs. 'physics'. This dual designation is intended to suggest the difference between a cultural discipline, vitally related to life, and the corresponding science by which it is nurtured. The Faculty of Culture would not expound physics as the science is presented to a student intending to devote his life to physico-mathematical research. The physics in culture is the rigorously derived synthesis of ideas about the nature and functioning of the physical research so far completed. In addition, this discipline will analyze the means of acquiring knowledge, by which the physicist has achieved his marvelous construction; it will therefore be necessary to expound the principles of physics, and to trace, briefly but scrupulously, the course of their historical evolution. This last element of the course will enable the student to visualize what the 'world' was, in which man lived a generation or a century, or a thousand years ago; and by contrast, he will be able to realize and appreciate the peculiarities of our 'world' of today. (96)

In addition to the above, Ortega does not claim to be proposing that each man should be an expert in each discipline, but simply that he should be made aware of the general principles, and the significance involved in each cultural activity for the specific task of living at the "height of his times". He invites the reader to consider the "tragedy without escape" which would confront humanity, if the view demanding expertness in every field for the sake of understanding circumstantial culture were a correct one:

> Either everyone would be obliged to be a thorough physicist, devoting himself, dedicating his life, to research in order not to live inept and devoid, of insight in the world we live in; or else most of us must resign ourselves to an existence which, in one of its dimensions, is doomed to stupidity.... The physicist would be for the man in the street like some

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(96) Mission, pp. 86,87,88.

> being endowed with a magical, hieratical knowledge. Both of these solutions would be -- among other things -- ridiculous.(97)

Ortega claims that, luckily, such solutions are not imperative ones. Firstly, because his doctrine implies, cautious, and extremely careful analyses of the teaching methods to be used at all educational levels. In fact he maintains that precisely because his theory underlines the differences between sciences, it becomes possible to extract their essential contents in order to make them more "assimilable":

> The 'principle of economy' in teaching is not limited to the elimination of those disciplines which the student cannot learn, but can also be extended to the ways to teach what needs to be taught. Thus a double margin of 'elbow room' is obtained in relation to the student's capacity, so that he, ultimately, could be enabled to learn more than he does today. (Precisely because savings have taken place in teaching, a greater amount of effective learning is obtained). (98)

Ortega supports this argument by pointing out that usually mathematics exaggerate a bit the difficulties of their discipline. He maintains that mathematics appears to be difficult because there is a lack of appropriate methodology in order to simplify the teaching of it. This fact prompts him to enunciate "with certain solemnity", that if such a type of intellectual work is not carried out, the future of science itself would be disastrous. It is interesting to note that the Ortegan argument would possibly be supported by some theorists who now contend that:

> The task shcuild be... dedicated not so much to the enumeration of science in the habitual sense of research, but rather to simplify its teaching and to produce within it certain quintessential syntheses, without a loss of

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(97) Mission, p. 88.

(98) Cf. 'principle of economy in teaching', Chapter VI, also, Misión, pp. 117, ff.

substance and quality.... (99)

It is then necessary to remedy the dispersion and present complication of scientific work. Provision must be made to compensate for such a dispersion by means of another type of scientific work, namely the concentration and simplification of knowledge. The need is for the creation and refinement of a type of specifically synthesizing talent Ortega makes such a claim on the grounds that the very future of science itself would depend upon it.

In the second place, Ortega argues that technical habituation, or technical exercise, per se, are no necessary and sufficient guarantees for the understanding of science:

> ...I firmly deny that the fundamental ideas -- principles, modes of knowledge, and ultimate conclusions -- of a real science, whichever it may be, should necessarily require a formal technical habituation in order to be understood. The truth of the matter seems to be just the opposite: within the context of a given science, and as soon as one begins to arrive at certain ideas which necessarily do demand technical habituation, such ideas begin to lose, in the same measure, their fundamental character to become infra-scientific, i.e., instrumental, affairs. (Actually mathematics integrally shares such an instrumental, and non-fundamental, or real, character. This would also be the case with a discipline devoted to a study of the microscope). Mastery over the domain of higher mathematics is necessary to do physics, but not indispensable to understand its human -- or cultural -- dimension. (100)

Having briefly shown the Ortegan anticipation to an objection which perhaps typifies the most common argument raised against most

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(99) Misión, pp. 117-118. Also, cf. J.S. Bruner's Process of Education, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1961, pp. 17-54 for an example of similar considerations concerning the importance of structure and heuristic models, as they apply to the concept of readiness for learning.

(100) Misión, pp. 117-118.

theories of general education, it should not be extremely difficult to find the notion of 'vital-reason'supporting the above contentions.

There is, then, a sense in which the human situation in the world is defined in terms of transcendence of limitations. This concept is also reminiscent of other 'philosophies of life', such as the one presented by Georg Simmel in his Lebens-philosophie.(101) Ortega would possibly agree with the contention that each vital act implies the existence, and also the possibility of transcending certain limitations, but would not necessarily share the dualistic manner in which Simmel supports the unity of his concept of life. Simmel's concept of life is based upon a reflective analysis of the concept of time. 'Actuality' is a non-extensive moment: it is not 'time' in the same sense that the point in space is not space itself. Thus, Simmel seems to be arguing that if the coincidence of past and future determines a phenomenon which could be called 'actuality', actuality itself is really not time.

Actuality, qua 'reality', is not temporal, because in actuality the past -- which is really a dimension of time -- is not 'actually existent' anymore, and because the future -- which again will be a dimension of time -- is not yet actual. For a reason similar to Ortega's argument against the Husserilian reduction, Simmel contends that time does not exist in reality, and reality, in turn, is not itself time.

Nevertheless, Simmel would perhaps grant to Ortega that a life,

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(101) Cf. G. Simmel's Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie; Grundprobleme der Philosophie: and especially Lebensanschauung.

when subjectively lived, is felt like something real within certain temporal extension. However, 'life' is the only ingredient of reality, (it is "really" past and future) and time becomes real only in terms of its vital connotation. Time is a form of consciousness of something whose immediate concretion cannot possibly be 'explained', or even enunciated, but "simply lived". Time is life, when an abstraction is made of its particular contents. But Simmel maintains that actual life transcends all that which is not its actuality. He argues too that such a paradoxical characteristic is the essence of life, as a mode of existence which does not reduce its reality to the present moment; hence the meaning of history as a 'vital' concept. Life is 'really' a mode of existence which does not look at the past, or at the future, as unreal, but rather possesses a peculiar continuity which is maintained beyond tha arbitrary separation of verbal tenses.

Thus, there is a sense in which the past really exists as an element which penetrates the present. Similarly the present also really exists by expanding itself into the future. According to Simmel, this type of life is to be found only on an individual basis, and hence the problem with which he is concerned: life is simultaneously an unlimited continuity and an egocentric, unique situation, which is constantly predetermined by its own limitations. Vital transcendence is paradoxically immanent in terms of life itself. Its auto-transcendence is its primary phenomenon, and thus the Simmelian "relativity" is an "absolute", because there is a constant antinomy in the relation between individual form ("life is everywhere individual") and the continuity of life.

Simmel relates this concept of life to Schopenhauer's idea of the will to power, but he tries to synthesize both concepts. Simmel also maintains that death resides beforehand in life, and also constitutes a continuous transcendence of life over itself. In other words, the transcendence of life is also present in the creation of its objects.

The "egocentric predicament" is solved by Simmel by stating that life constantly transcends subjective limitations, and invades that realm which, prima facie, resides beyond life itself. Furthermore, life also produces something beyond itself. But Simmel is quick to add that such a characteristic of life does not mean a "subjectivization of that which is beyond life itself", but rather reaffirms the concept of transcendence. It has been suggested that this formula, i.e., the objectivity (or absoluteness) of another entity, which is more than life, and which is posited by Simmel as the condition of life, is a way to achieve unity by resorting to a dualistic system, which Ortega would be likely to reject. (102)

Yet the foregoing oversimplification of Simmel's 'vitalism' does seem to have connnexions both with the Ortegan philosophy, and also with the tenets which nowadays are usually associated with 'existentialism' as a philosophical movement. For instance, the similarity of these types of 'vitalism' with certain kinds of irrationalistic intuitionism are rather striking. Perhaps the first name that comes to mind is that of Henri Bergson.

For the purposes of the present discussion, it should be perhaps convenient to isolate the Bergsonian considerations on the concept of

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(102) Cf. Footnote (103) regarding Simmel, Ortega and Nietzsche.

time, which allow a sequence with the already discussed "Nietzsche-ur-tega-Simmel" complex. The Bergsonian concept of time will also indicate some of the peak-points to be used as a justification for the attempted grouping of these thinkers as 'philosophers of life'. (103)

Basically, Bergson rejects the Kantian way of dealing with time and space on parallel grounds. He opposes the two concepts. Space is merely a conjunction of points, susceptible of an inter-relationship, which can be made regardless of sequence or direction. Time, on the contrary, is of an irreversible nature: it implies direction, and each moment of its duration (durée), in terms of its relationship with the "whole of elapsed duration", is quite different from the relationship between "spatial points" and the "whole of space". In effect, Bergson maintains that each moment in time is irreplaceable. In this sense, each vital moment is something like a 'creation' to which time as duration cannot really return. This conception of 'vital time', which Bergson calls a 'concrete' account of 'real' time, is contrasted with the spatial conception of time that is used by the physical or mathematical disciplines. (104)

The Bergsonian 'duration' does not admit of any degree of quantification: it cannot be measured, or counted. This kind of time is the

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(103) Cf., especially, H. Bergson's Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience; Matière et memoire; Le rire; Duree et simultaneité; L'évolution créatrice; his two essay-collections L'energie spirituelle, and La pensée et le mouvant; and his last book, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.

(104) Cf., B. Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World, New American Library, New York, 1960, pp. 17-32, for a logical-atomistic criticism of the Bergsonian concept of time.

one immediately presented to consciousness, and stands in sharp contrast to the dimensional notion of space. For such reason, Bergson contends that space and time are really like matter and memory: they respond to mental modes, which are radically different, and even opposed to each other. Bergson relates thought and 'intuition' respectively to space and time, as the mental modes for their cognition. Conceptual thoughts according to Bergson, are the methods of what is generally known as 'sciences': they tend to develop quantifications and spatializations. These methods try to measure certain phenomena, but this operation of measurement is, strictly speaking, a spatial one, since it attempts to reduce non-spatial concepts to a level in which, certain generalizations would be allowed by means of inductive-deductive techniques.

Bergson then claims that the spatializing intellect tends to find rigid, fixed concepts: in order to 'explain' movement it proceeds to "immobilize" it, and thus, by necessity, such a cognitive activity tends to stop the dialectic -- or dynamic -- characteristics of reality. These conditions are different from those required for the apprehension of 'real reality', since, concretely, 'vital time' escapes the terms of intellect. Real movement (or motion) -- as it is <u>really</u> perceived by the subject -- tends to be decomposed and dissected by "the sciences". This is done in order to explain and generalize the nature of movement and dynamic reality. But real movement is continuous, it does not really consist of the series of fixed, motionless points which, <u>more geometrico</u>, are used by 'science' -- namely physico-natural science -- to prepare the way for explain its laws. Hence, cognitive activity turns the reality of life into certain conceptual, diagrammatic operations which in a strict sense, are not really 'alive'.

It has been already pointed out that Ortega shares this view in his rejection of the Husserlian phenomenological reduction. Thus, in order for reality to become a conceptual object, the real mobility that makes a vital phenomenon 'alive' must be subtracted.

Therefore, according to Bergson, only an intuition is capable of apprehending the real duration, or its dialectical movement in its true immediateness. And, of course, only an intuition would be capable of apprehending the true nature of a dynamic process, in which lived time (durée) stands in contrast with conceptual petrification. Pure reason finds its application in matter (or 'practical life', or 'control over nature', or the 'handling of things'), but life itself, in its very nature, has escaped the grip of this approach.

For such reasons, Bergson contends that the only way to cope with dynamic reality is an intuitive capacity. He goes as far as describing this capacity as a non-cognitive adaptation, similar to the instinctive animal capacity to cope with the problems that are a part of its life. The startling result of such a 'philoscphy of science' is the conclusion that philosophy and science, which seemingly are 'thought' within a spatial framework, have neglected, or at best dealt only minimally with 'vital intuition'. By operating with the categories of conceptual thought, i.e., with a strictly intellectual attempt to explain phenomena, philosophy and science, thus far, have used resources which are really useless for the authentic apprehension of life, and of the "stuff out of which life is made", namely 'duration'. ((105) This is why Bergson maintains that men have found a great difficulty when dealing with the

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(105) Literally taken from the French expression: "Durée est l'êtoffe à quoi la vie est faite."

explanations of reality that are commonly known as metaphysics. Philosophers do not only lack the adequate instrumentality, but also have not exercised the habit of using their best tools.

The Bergsonian philosophy approaches the 'reality of life' with an attitude which is radically different from the usual "Socratic" approach. It places itself within the very mobility that characterizes life: not in the already effected process, but rather in the present aspect of its realization. The Bergsonian intuition seems to be attempting an immediate apprehension of life from "within itself", and to be refusing to "kill life" as a prior step taken in order to reduce it to a "spatialized" conceptual scheme. The Bergsonian reality of life seems to be defined as something dynamic, a 'vital impulse' (élan vital), which determines an evolution in time. Such an evolution purports to be creative, because reality is supposed to acquire actuality in a vital continuity. Reality, again, is not a series of 'given elements', and only after a real actuality has already "happened" could a cognitive enterprise attempt to reconstruct it, by means of immobilized ideal entities. This method proceeds in a manner similar to the one followed when a movement is broken down into a series of motionless points that are fixed and sketched-out, as on a cinematic film.

It has been shown that Ortega follows a similar rationale. He attempts, however, to go beyond a merely biological characterization of life, by acknowledging its historical character, without which the most essential peculiarity of human life would not be fully understood. Possibly Ortega would say that the Bergsonian system needs to be thus completed in order to attain full acceptability.

It has been also suggested that another important difference between

Ortega and most 'vitalistic' schools of thought, is the fact that he is against their irrationality. (106) According to one of his favorite disciples irrationalism would tend to 'corrupt any intuition'. (107) Within the Ortegan scheme, on the other hand, philosophy has to be described as rigorous knowledge, and therefore as rational. Since reason needs to think the new object that is life, in all of its fluidity and mobility, a new type of 'reason' is thus needed. Altogether different from the "spatialized" pure reason used by physico-natural science, this new "vital reason" is nevertheless a type of reason. (108)

Yet, impressions are the inevitable prime source of existence and spontaneous life. Therefore, Ortega believes that the dismissal of impressions, as potential sources of error, is only a rationalistic,

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(106) Cf. parallel between Ortega and Nietzsche, at the beginning of this chapter.

(107) Marías, Julián, Historia de la Filosofía, p. 383.

(108) To Ortega, concepts are not substitutes for the living impressions of reality I, 318, (1914): "In a statement reminiscent of a celebrated sentence of Kant, Ortega seems to imply that impressions without concepts are blind, and concepts without impressions are shallow. Unlike Kant, however, he couples impressions and concepts as if they were two sides of the same reality. Here lies, incidentally, a source of difficulties for Ortega's philosophy; the same difficulties that have perennially baffled philosophers as soon as they have attempted to correlate sense impressions and ideas. Ortega does not overlook these difficulties, but he thinks he has found a clue to the solution by watering down both impressions and concepts, the former being in his opinion more than sense impressions and the latter being less than formal schemata.... Ortega wavers between a definition of concepts as 'ideal schemata' and their characterization as pragmatic tools for grasping reality. At all events, he seems to be quite convinced tha without concepts we should be at a loss amidst the whirlwind of impressions.... Spontaneous life, however, is never laid aside: it is always the beginning and the end of our inquiry." (Ferrater, op. cit., pp. 28-29).

or idealistic, subterfuge. Ferrater summarizes this view quite well:

> Against mistrust of impressions and, in general, of vital spontaneity, Ortega proclaims the necessity of developing and even of cultivating them. To act otherwise is a fatal error, or, still worse, sheer hypocrisy. Hence his insistence upon the need for attending to a great many segments of life usually disregarded by philosophers. In this respect Ortega fully agrees with Nietzsche's demand -- and with Simmel's recommendation -- to unfold the wings of life to the utmost. Science and justice, art and religion are not the sole realities worthy of man's thought and sacrifice. It would be highly desirable some day in the pantheon of illustrious men to have not only a genius in physics like Newton and a genius in philosophy like Kant but a 'Newton of pleasures' and a 'Kant of ambitions'. Pleasures and ambitions must therefore be given their full scope. Contrary to Nietzsche, though, Ortega does not believe that the layer of spontaneity, out of which impressions arise, is self-sufficient. It seems to be unbounded; actually, it has many limitations: among others, the fact that pure spontaneity, deprived of cultivation, is a blind and senseless force .... (109)

It seems, then, that concepts are as necessary for vital awareness as impressions. Perhaps the definition 'vital concepts are the good conductors of impressions', would not be too inaccurate a statement of the Ortegan views on the subject. At any rate, Ortega does not seem to share the Bergsonian irrationalistic overtones. This distinction is sometimes difficult to make, since it is generally recognized that the Ortegan 'pensamiento' has often shown a predilection for biological analogies. It has been previously pointed-out that the 'biologism' exhibited by Ortega is rather of a Germanic brand (namely Uexkull-Driesch). However, there seem to be sufficient Ortegan indications to conjecture that at times his thought is sympathetic to the consideration of 'life' as a biological impulse, thus allowing a comparison with tendencies such as those of Nietzsche or Simmel. It also should be clear

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(109) Ferrater, op.cit., p. 28; also Ortega's I, 320 (1914) and see footnote (93) of this dissertation, on Nietzsche's irrationalism.

at this juncture that there seems to be an Ortegan attempt to describe knowledge as a process aimed at biological utility. This posits a problem which has not been ignored by his most serious critics:

> These interpretations have, in short, denounced Ortega's philosophy as biologically oriented. This, of course, would not be in the least vexatious for a positivistic-minded philosopher, one who would dismiss as meaningless talk not only Heidegger's contempt for a merely 'ontical' view of life but also Dilthey's conception of life as a historical reality. Ortega, however, is not a positivistic-minded philosopher and consequently he has been rather touchy on this issue. (110)

Three interpretations could be offered in defense of Ortega on this issue. The first one consists simply of conjecturing that the philosopher is making use of biological comparisons and metaphors, since he gave later indications of rejecting a merely biological interpretation of knowledge.

A second possibility may imply that Ortega (when pressed with the question of how to lay sufficient stress on life "against the encroachments of reason"), could have decided to use biological examples. This technique could have been adopted by him in view of the fact that often an analogy of this type is methodologically more effective than the usual ontological or epistemological vocabulary.

A third possibility could be related to the period previously referred to as 'perspectivism' and could be based upon the circumstantial human condition that is typical of Ortega. Since perspectives belong both to the subject and the object, they cannot be reduced to a mere biological "sifting of impressions".

Regardless of how justified such reasons are, and without entering into the task of speculating on the possible Ortegan reaction to the

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(110) Ferrater, op.cit., p.32.

foregoing three interpretations, the introduction of 'vital reason', which took place soon after perspectivism, would seem to indicate that the philosopher's concern with historical perspective does transcend a purely individualistic -- biological -- account of 'life as the only reality'. Ferrater says:

> The philosopher must therefore foster all that is living and real, namely all that is authentic. Echoing Nietzsche, Bergson and Simmel, Ortega seems now to overpraise the values of life and, in particular, of human life. It would be too hasty, nevertheless, to reach such a conclusion. Sure, we often miss in Ortega's writings of this period (perspectivism) in spite of the undeniable plasticity and incisiveness of his style, the sharp-cut outlines that should be the rule among philosophers .... he makes so much of life at a bare biological level that we often find it difficult not to take his statements in this respect at their face value. A case in point is his flat assertion that 'pure biology must be given preference to ethics when judging the values of vitality'. Another case in point is his contention that culture consists in certain biological activities 'neither more nor less biological than digestion or locomotion'. (111)

Some of the passages referred to by Ferrater have been also mentioned in the foregoing chapters, and essentially do convey the notion that life must not be understood in the traditional sense of an autonomous, and independent substance. Ortega is quite clear concerning this matter, and goes as far as writing that his case for the spontaneity and authenticity of life is not to be confused with a "Rousseaunian primitivism". "Attention must be paid to the spontaneous and primitive life of the spirit in order to secure and enrich culture and civilization". (112) Thus, the so-called 'natural life' would be of no worth unless measured by its capacity to create cultural values.

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(111) Ferrater, op.cit., pp. 33-34. Also, cf. II, 293 (1920), and III, 166-7, (1923).

(112) II, 283, (1920); III, 179, (1923); Modern Theme, p. 60.

As pointed out before, human life is always to be understood as 'life with....' i.e., life with something or somebody. If life exists within an environment, it seems to follow that other connotations could be attributed to the term 'environment', besides the usual biological ones. In this sense, there are social, political, and literary "environments". This could also be reinforced since Ortega has repeatedly stated that a purely biological account of life is simply a fragment of a much broader 'biographical' concept, and therefore cannot be reduced to its "somatic meaning". (113)

Possibly, a thinker who also departs, like Ortega, from the question 'Does life make any sense?', is the Frenchman Maurice Blondel, whose writings are permeated with a theistic and 'existentialistic' tinge, which Ortega either absolutely lacks, as in the case of religion, or does not show quite as clearly, as in the case of the existential, ontological, accounts of death and nothingness. (114) According to Blondel, man proceeds practically without knowing what behavior really is. As a "doer of deeds", action is the only answer that man can give to his problem; he did not ask to be born, and he is condemned to life and death. He must conquer nothingness, and feels frustrated because he does not even know what nothingness is. It is almost impossible to conceive of no-thing at all.

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(113) III, 164, (1923); III, 189, (1923); Modern Theme, P. 74; VI, 348, (1932); III, 270-280 (1924), to cite just a few instances of an all-pervading mode of describing life. The entire essay "Ni vitalismo ni racionalismo" purports to be a clarification of this particular issue.

(114) M. Blondel's L'Action, essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique; La Pensée, L'Être et les êtres.

Thus, action is the most significant, constant, and general fact of life. Action is even more than a fact, it is necessity, since even to commit suicide is to be regarded as a human act. Each human decision amputates an infinitude of possible human acts. If man does not act, something acts within himself, or even beyond himself. Conceivably it could act against himself. Peace -- Blondel thinks -- is a defeating experience; action does not tolerate any other postponement, except death. Hence the reason why man cannot beahve with his ideas, because finite intelligences are not capable of complete analyses. Human action cannot tolerate delay: man cannot postpone action to a moment in which he has conclusive evidence, and therefore the most pressing and frequent choice is to act without it, i.e., to act upon incomplete evidence (115) Besides, a human decision often goes beyond concepts or thoughts; as acts go beyond intentions.

It is interesting to note, at this point, that analytic Anglo-Saxon philosophers have also explored the elusive relationship between decision and action, but, apparently, with a major difference. The analytic studies seem to stay within a framework of logical necessity, whereas the 'philosophers of life' often blur the lines that the Anglo-Saxon scholar eagerly tries to maintain. (116) Possibly, for the latter, the 'philosophies of life' of the type described suffer from the confusion of mixing psychological possibility with logical necessity. It should be noted,

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(115) Cf. Reference (20), p.35, concerning the definition of 'judgement' as a statement made in absence of conclusive evidence.

(116) Cf., for example, R.S. Peters', The Concept of Motivation, 1964, or Hampshire and Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty", Mind, Vol. LXVII, No. 265, Jan., 1958, p.2, for isolated examples of the way in which analytic philosophers handle the issue.

though, that most Continental 'philosophers of life' seem to disregard such a distinction as irrelevant. (117)To Blondel, for example, it is necessary to constitute an 'integral science of action', because all deliberate modes of thought and life do imply a complete solution to the existential problem.

Logical analysis, intellectualism, and recourse to faith are, according to Blondel, incomplete accounts of life, not because they typify an attitude which could be really non-emotional, but rather because they fail to grasp the entire meaning of 'action' -- not as a word, but as a concept and a fact. This is probably the reason why Blondel criticizes scholasticism: entities are what they do -- more than anything else. The implication here seems to be that philosophy has to be practical in an existential way; it has to avoid cognitive self-worship (pure reason), and it has to show the insufficiency, and normal subordination, of theoretical activities to life. The exigencies and possibilities of action must be illuminated in the same way that the ways of faith must be prepared and justified.

The themes of death and nothingness seem to bring Blondel closer to the stereotyped idea usually held about existentialistic philosophy than to the Ortegan scheme. However, it should not take great effort to identify the Blondelian tenets which prompted his "classification" as a 'philosopher of life' within the present context. Death, in effect, is a concept that does not seem to torture the Ortegan writings in the same measure that it affects other 'philosophies of life'.

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(117) A distinction between 'philosophies of life', as used in this context, 'phenomenology' as a method, and 'existentialism' as a movement, must be made here. Husserl's 'phenomenological reduction', for instance, seems to carefully maintain differences between logical necessity and pshycological possibility.

The same consideration applies to the concept of nothingness, whose relation to a re-affirmation of being has been made an extremely important part of recent existentialistic ontologies.

Curiously enough, one 'philosopher of life' who does exhibit such a concern is Ortega's own countryman,the Spaniard Miguel de Unamuno, whose writings, again, show that 'life' is the essential philosophical problem.(118) Unamuno vividly feels the problematic nature of life, as an immediate existential preoccupation, and gives his individual twist to such a problem. The personal 'immortality' of man, as an entity who lives, dies, and does not want to die completely, is his central question. Due to reasons that Ortega would call 'historical', Unamuno also partakes of the 'irrationalistic' tradition which permeates the problem of life, and calls pure reason into question.

Mutatis mutandis, as in Kierkegaard, Bergson, or even William James, Unamuno thinks that reason is perhaps a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to "know about life". When reason tries to apprehend life by reducing its dynamic duration to fixed and rigid concepts, it deprives life of its temporal "stream" or "fluidity". Hence reason kills life. Unamuno also criticizes pure, or physico-mathematical "reason", but contrary to Ortega, he reccomends 'imagination' as a more "substantial faculty". Since vital reality cannot be totally grasped by reason, Unamuno tries an imaginative approach, which challenges death by preserving a narrative testimony of 'lived' experiences. Precisely because human life is something that is 'lived through action', it could be only

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(118) Cf. M. Unamuno's Ensayos, Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, Del Sentimiento trágico de la vida, La agonía del cristianismo.

described or narrated and never explained. In this manner, life becomes 'history' in a paradoxical 'aesthetic' approach which includes the ordinary concept of fiction as a method of knowledge. In this manner, through fiction, Unamuno attempts to grasp the immediateness of human reality, insufficiently, no doubt, as he himself repeatedly states, but leaving ground for what Marías calls "the possibility of a rigorous metaphysical system", which others have developed (e.g., Heidegger) but which Unamuno himself does not attempt to design.(119)

Ortega's objectivistic period has sufficient sources to show that Unamuno's irrationalism was insufferable to him; "obscurantism which introduced nothing but confusion". (120) Ferrater says:

> ...Unamuno used a method that was closer to paradox than to reasoning. He declared, among other things, that if it was impossible for the same nation to bring forth Descartes and Saint John of the Cross, he would rather retain the latter. This must be understood, of course, in the light of Unamuno's deep sense of personalism, and is in tune with his later proclamation that Saint Theresa's deed are at least as worthy as any European institution or any Critique of Pure Reason. Now Ortega could not accept, and in his objectivistic period not even endure, such irritating paradoxes. (121)

Ortega actually thought that there cannot be anything but confusion in the above contentions, since without Descartes -- the key figure in European modern philosophy, according to him -- it would be impossible to understand even the value of Saint John: "...we would remain in the

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(119) Marías, Julián, Historia de la Filosofía, Ed. Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1956, p. 336. Also J. Marías, Miguel de Unamuno, Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1943, and Filosofía actual y existencialismo en España, Emecé, Buenos Aires, 1953.

(120) I, 128 -32 (1909).

(121) Ferrater, op.cit., p.22. Also, V, 264-65 (1937) for an Ortegan recognition of the great value of Unamuno among the Spanish intelligentsia, and I, 116 (1906) for an Ortegan description of Unamuno as "one of the last bastions of Spanish hope".

dark and become incapable of understanding anything, including the 'brown sackcloth' of Juan de Yepes...." -- the worldly name of the Spanish mystic. (122)

If the Ortegan outlook is 'vitalistic' on the one hand, on the other it seems to affirm along every step of its conceptual itinerary, that knowledge must necessarily be rational. The essential epistemological task should be (more than anything else) the investigation of the significance of 'life' as the central philosophical issue. This also seems to be a sufficiently clear difference between the Ortegan pensamiento (as a 'philosophy of life') and most other 'philosophies of life'. The same consideration applies to differences between the Ortegan 'vitalism' and the usual tenets attributed to 'existentialism'.

Soren Kierkegaard is perhaps an author whose thought shows a series of concepts which could well constitute a bridge between the 'philosophies of life', as defined, and 'existentialism'. Life, indeed, is the point of departure for Kierkegaard, but he adds certain considerations which would make the enterprise move into a realm of thought that nowadays might be considered more typical of Sartre, and Heidegger, among other "existentialists". Following a basic consideration of life which, mutatis mutandis, could be assimilated to the foregoing remarks, Kierkegaard appealed to Christianity and to a type of Protestant theology which purports to understand the meaning of human life. He insisted particularly on a concept of anxiety -- or angst -- which prompted him to build a type of philosophical-anthropology that seems to share a great

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(122) Ferrater, op.cit., pp.22-23.

deal of the irrationality rejected by Ortega. Essentially, the key concept in Kierdegaard seems to be a rejection of the Hegelian idea of 'eternization' on the grounds that sub specie aeternitatis abstractions ignore the idea of existence. This concept is herein understood as a manner of "being in the world" (Heideggerian Dasein) that is typical of the human situation.

Life, at this point, would seem to consist of an affirmation of man as a concrete entity which is affected by time and chronological change. In this sense human beings are situated in a peculiar manner of being which might be called 'existence', and which, according to a very unique situation ("placed at the crossroads of the temporary and the eternal"), remains submerged in a state of continued anxiety. It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard again reaffirms that human existence essentially presupposes a notion of movement which is annulled, or killed, by quantified approaches to "behavioral science". Kierkegaard avoids dealing with expressions such as 'man in general', and prefers to think about human reality as a rigorously individual and personal enterprise.

Ortega would probably say that the Kierkegaardian most forceful contribution to a philosophy of life was unfortunately spoiled by his irrationalism, and that he was wrong when stating that existence and movement could not be 'thought', because if 'thought' they would be immobilized, eternized, and ergo abolished. It has been already shown that Ortega had a high regard for Descartes, and therefore that an affirmation of existence does not necessarily imply a denial of reason. To Ortega the Cartesian formula is basically sound.

Nevertheless, the 'philosophy of life' to which Ortega would seem most sympathetic is the one supported by Wilhelm Dilthey, a copious German writer, who worked from 1882 through 1911 at the University of Berlin, as the successor of the famed Lotze.

Very little known in the English-speaking world, Dilthey is extensively studied in the Continental European and Spanish-speaking universities, and is usually credited with a great influence in modern phenomenology and existentialism. Some critics would go as far as considering Dilthey a forerunner of modern,non-experimentalistic psychologies -- including the Gestalt movement -- and of the other trend which is only beginning to be generally recognized as "existential psychology". Others have found historical reasons to support the fact that Dilthey is in the process of being re-discovered, and even recognize a "need to know about Dilthey", when studying Ortega:

> Ortega's closest spiritual forebear is Wilhelm Dilthey.... whom Ortega has called 'the most important German thinker in the second half of the nineteen century' (cf.,"History as a System", Toward a Philosophy of History, W.W. Norton, 1941, p. 216) to the conspicuous neglect of Nietzsche, who is much better known in our country as well as in the Nazi Germany he helped to inspire. It is interesting to see that our American historians of ideas are coming to join Ortega in regarding Dilthey as one of the greatest figures in this field of knowledge....
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> The long eclipse of Dilthey can be accounted for by a conspiracy of three circumstances. He was chronically unable to finish a project, for the same reason as Pascal: his insatiable imagination was forever pushing ahead to new reaches of his problem, and his ideas seemed out of date in his own mind before he could get them into books....
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> Then, Dilthey was unfortunate in a second generation of interpreters, like Windelband and Rickert and Troeltsch, who lacked the master's acute penetration.... Dilthey's third misfortune was that he was born into a peculiar climate of opinion which somewhat warped the growth of his philosophy of philosophies, in his own mind, and in the mind of his great Spanish interpreter. Most

> philosophers of natural science in the latter nineteenth century were following the trend of positivism, first to the position of disclaiming any connection between science and values, and then to the still remoter extreme of declining even to have any reference to a real world at all. This simple isolation of the natural sciences appealed to the natural scientists of the period because it seemed to dispense with metaphysics. Rather than avow any metaphysical position they preferred to assume that their science was nothing more than a game of describing and arranging sense perceptions. (123)

Nostrand also remarks that such a positivistic approach has since lost considerable ground under the attacks of Whitehead and several other thinkers of various schools, and adds further that some of the positivists themselves, when pressed by an exploration of their own position, have rendered it more difficult to maintain. Some positivists, in effect, affirm that, even if we know nothing but sense data, we can still make predictions as though we knew we were dealing with a real world. Nostrand then reflects upon the problems raised by a possible questioning of such an assumption "... for obviously we do use our knowledge of the physical world effectively for predictive purposes, and consequently the theory comes into conflict with common sense." (124) Today any position regarding science as a mere game of arranging sense impressions seems hardly tenable:

> Yet Dilthey and many of his contemporaries accepted it as the least extravagant assumption available, and Ortega reaffirms the position as late as about 1932 in such terms as these: 'Today we are beginning to see that physics is a mental combination and nothing more'("History as a System", Toward a Philosophy of

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(123) Mission, "Introduction" by H.L. Nostrand, pp. 15-16.

(124) Ibid, p. 16.

> History, W.W. Norton, 1941 p. 228) 'Physics brings us into contact with no transcendence' (Ibid, p. 229) 'What is real in it -- and not mere idea -- is only its utility. That is why we have lost our fear of physics, and with our fear our respect, and with respect, our enthusiasm' (Ibid., p. 229). This climate of opinion led Dilthey, and Ortega after him, to try to rescue some practical knowledge from the absurd predicament of the sciences. For obviously, if all our knowledge and reasoning should be proved in the same way to be just as remote from reality as physics appeared to be, then we should have to make the adjustment Ortega has made to his view of physics, and abandon our respect and enthusiasm for all knowledge and all rational method. Knowledge would cease to be power, and man would cease trying to be a rational animal. Humanity would yield to a new power and a new animal, just at the threshold of the new world of plenty and well being that might have been,thanks to a million years or more of piled up, sifted down knowledge. (125)

Dilthey tried to overcome this reduction to the absurd by means of a distinction between the type of approach followed by the natural sciences, and another method which leads into a different kind of knowledge, which some still call 'the humanistic sciences' ('knowledge related to the human spirit': die Geisteswissenschaften).

Dilthey's point of departure was man regarded as a nucleus of active forces and drives which are thrown toward the surrounding world, and by clashing with its objects originate an extremely complex network of teleological adjustments, and thus a 'unity' of exteriority and interiority, which cannot be possibly explained, but only described and analyzed. Hence the name of his "descriptive" psychology. Dilthey therefore rejected experimental psychology as an insufficient way of explaining certain phenomena, and went into a series of considerations concerning the qualitative nature of the psychic processes, as opposed to the measurable, quantitative character of most physical and natural phenomena, as seen by "the sciences". Dilthey was preoccupied by the

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(125) Ibid, p. 17.

"true nature" of man's situation in this world: part animal and part creative. He also rebelled at the attempts of quantifying life: 'Life' is really the essential part of psychic activity, and so Dilthey presented one of the first instances in which the expression "psychic life" was used to describe a peculiar human process. In his notion of 'life' some important traits can be observed to establish similarities and differences with the animal way of reacting to the umwelt. (126) Dilthey also concluded that man was the only living being capable of regarding himself as a "subject of objects", i.e., of achieving a sense of identity, and of transcending a 'creature state' by ceasing to be encrusted within the umwelt. Man is the only 'creature' capable of perceiving himself as a part of the surrounding world, since non-objectifying entities only relate to it and to other entities through simplified utilitarian means to satisfy instinctive ends. (127) The human life is not only 'nature' to be explained, i.e., not only the object matter of natural science, but something to be understood for and from itself. For this reason, instead of using causal explanations (the method of natural science) Dilthey talks about descriptive comprehen-

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(126) Cf., especially, Ideen uber eine Beschreibende und Zergliedernde Psychologie, (Ideas concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology), in which Dilthey attempts to base a complete philosophical system upon two disciplines: (i) a descriptive and analytical psychology, centered around the idea of erlebnis, i.e., assimilated and intellectualized experience of total repercussion in the psychic complex; and (ii) a historical conception of man, in the sense that his present is a result of the past, and is full of potentialities to become what he can become, as determined by (i). Dilthey distinguished his descriptive and analytical psychology as being a 'science of the spirit', as opposed to a 'natural science', and reasoned that both the ideas of 'exteriority' and 'interiority' are so closely interconnected, that the main philosophical problem does not consist of examining the possibility of joining the surrounding world with psychic activity, but rather of considering how should they be separated for methological purposes.

(127) See Ref. (33), p. 42, Ch. III for Max Scheler's view on the same question.

sions(the method of the sciences of the spirit). The structure of human life is a 'unitarian totality', determined by the 'sameness of the person' who undergoes a series of experiences that join exteriority and interiority within a context of subjective continuity. Every psychic stage is a partial process, a part of 'life' itself (which is the permanent continuity and within which all processes are given) and yet the integrating element is the 'sameness of the person'. These processes evolve as in the experience of a person in a moving vehicle: he sees how those objects which recently were in front of him, pass by, and soon are behind him, while the totality of the surrounding landscape continues to be seemingly unaltered for a long time. In other words the primary reality is a "unity of living", within which 'things' and 'objects' are perceived simultaneously with 'processes' and activities. Such a fundamental connection has a final (teleological) character: human life is an originative and transcending unity, not a composite of elements. Its unity allows a differentiation of psychic functions which reamin constantly and complementarily joined to that reality in their connection. This fact, and its highest expression in the unity of consciousness (or the unity of the 'person'), is something which posits a psychic world, per se. On the other hand, this unity is given within a certain environment, and thus "life" is made of a reciprocal action with the external world.

'Life' is described by Dilthey as a process which reacts according to external or internal stimuli. It also modifies them or adjusts itself to them, by means of a teleological series of acts and events. The "reality of man" then becomes a nucleus of drives and instinctive forces on the one hand, and a concept of existence provided with certain basic

needs -- typically human -- and thus transcending a merely biological stage, on the other. Therefore, man as "a psycho-bio-socio-historical being" has to be considered in the description of his 'true' reality, before any generalization concerning his "behavior" is attempted.

Dilthey, in sum, presents an essentially metaphysical problem, which mutatis mutandis constitutes the point of departure for many modern existential schools, since it proposes a return to the task of "discovering" man's real nature (aletheia) in a world which he has to face, and in which he exists whether he likes it or not. To Dilthey and Ortega, man has no "real nature" as such, but a "history". (128)

Needless to say, Ortega is a great admirer of Wilhelm Dilthey.(129) The opening lines of his study on Dilthey and the idea of life are the following:

> As the name of Wilhelm Dilthey is likely to meet with small response except in German circles, we may begin these pages with informing the reader that Dilthey is a philosopher; moreover, that he is the most important philosopher in the second half of the nineteenth century. So great a discrepancy between the rank of a man and the ring of a name, though not uncommon in history, always implies a certain abnormality. Indeed that Dilthey should have remained comparatively unknown outside the German intellectual sphere is due to the fact that even within it considerable time elapsed before his stature emerged with a distinctness concordant with the actual value of his work. (130)

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(128) The real 'substance' of man is precisely his variation, that which is historical about him, Cf. History as a System, p. 165, also Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Ed. Rev. Occidente, Madrid, 1961, p. 151, and Concord, p. 148.

(129) Concord and Liberty, pp. 131-182, for a more expanded comparison between Ortega's own philosophy, and that of Dilthey, especially concerning the notion of 'historical reason', which this chapter has not explored, since such a source is available in the English language.

(130) Ibid., p. 131.

Later, he regrets not having been exposed to Dilthey's ideas before:

> I became acquainted with Dilthey's work as late as 1929, and it took me four years before I knew it sufficiently well. This ignorance, I do not hesitate to maintain, has caused me to lose about ten years of my life -- ten years, in the first place, of intellectual development, but that, of course, means an equal loss in all other dimensions of life....
>
> ...When at last I became acquainted with Dilthey's philosophical work I was struck by a strange and disconcerting parallelism between his ideas and the problems and positions, of a strictly and decisively philosophical character, set forth in my own writings. From my first book Meditaciones del Quijote (1914) to La Rebelión de las Masas ("The Revolt of the Masses", 1914) this parallelism manifests itself with Arcadian candor.... (131)

The essential difference between Ortega and Dilthey seems to reside in the concept of 'vital reason', which the former tries to maintain at a level supposedly higher than the concept of 'historical reason' "... at which Dilthey came to a halt...." (132) This is why Ortega emphatically claims that:

> The fact is that there are in my work hardly any ideas that coincide with or even presuppose Dilthey's. Exactly that is what I deplore. That is what made me lose ten years. Moreover, my problems and positions belong, from the first, to a stage in the evolution of the idea of life beyond that of Dilthey.
>
> And the parallelism? Parallelism precise excludes coincidence; it signifies exact correspondence. Parallels do not touch each other, because they start at different points. Their converging in the infinite expresses the contradiction that they are at once the same and most different. Only two parallel lines

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(131) Ibid., pp. 136, and 141, respectively.

(132) Ibid., p. 142.

> of thinking can be certain never to coincide materially, for they are separated by a most radical difference, that of a distinct starting point. (133)

At any rate, Ortega recognizes in Dilthey a great achievement. He maintains that Dilthey is distinguished by the "...erudition and workmanship characteristic of one who has fallen heir to a magnificent philosophical tradition...." (134)

However, he seems to indicate that Dilthey really does not have much that could have actually been used for his notion of living reason. Yet, he claims, to have gone through the Diltheyan discipline would have meant the avoidance of many perplexities and fruitless attempts, and his idea of vital reason would have found excellent support "at the right moment": "For to feed on what will, in the end, be discharged is one of the fundamental laws of life". (135)

The 'parallelisms' or similarities between Dilthey and Ortega could be again related to the problem of 'pure' versus 'vital' reason. Both Ortega and Dilthey would maintain that the irrationality of the principles of knowledge, which sooner or later constitutes one of the most difficult problems faced by rationalism, is due to the fact that reason is interpreted as 'pure reason'. For both Dilthey and Ortega, philosophy has to become anthropological: there is no other cognition that experience, but experience consists both of sense perception and introspection. Perception and the logical operations of comparing, identifying, inferring, etc., are regarded commonly as 'intellectual

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(133) Ibid., p. 141.

(134) Ibid., p. 142.

(135) Ibid., p. 142.

activities' or 'cognitive consciousness'. And intellectual activities must necessarily have a previous generic constitution consisting in the general conditions of their exercise, but going beyond the Kantian task:

> Why did Kant's predecessors fail to find the reason for those principles, and why did Kant himself resort to looking for it in something hypothetical -- that is, in the nowhere, in utopia? Because of a blindness born of a most inveterate prejudice. Because of the belief that cognition forms a zone of our consciousness which, beginning and ending in itself, is shut off from the rest like a water-tight compartment. I call this prejudice 'intellectualism'.
>
> Dilthey's decisive discovery consists in the realization that the facts of consciousness must be taken as they are and present themselves, any attempt to jump beyond our consciousness making no sense whatever. No reality exists that could be set over consciousness, and no chinks open in consciousness through which to espy what 'in reality' happens behind it. (136)

The structural quality of facts of consciousness should be evident and obvious, both for Ortega and Dilthey. The term Zusammenhang, as used by Dilthey and reinterpreted by Ortega, purports to indicate the connectedness, interdependence, and general context of the 'fact of consciousness'. The far-fetched implication of this theory, which many an analyst would find shocking, is precisely its psychologistic tinge; consciousness is a compound, all ingredients of which are interconnected:

> It is therefore erroneous to assume that the facts of cognitive consciousness are impermeable to those of desiring and feeling consciousness and that these latter may not intervene as constitutive factors in the intellectual process. Or more exactly it is an error to assume that a desire or a feeling cannot act as motive, ground, or sufficient reason for a belief. Indeed, cognition depends on will and feeling as these depend on it. The fundamental ideas or convictions have no motive, ground, or'reason' in other convictions

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(136) Concord, pp. 160-161.

> because they are grounded in volitions and sentiments. in other words, cognition cannot be explained by itself but only as a member of the integral human consciousness. (137)

If epistemology is defined by implication as the search for the motives of the fundamental concepts through the "whole organism of our mind", and its functioning, it becomes clear that the psychologistic trend leads into the historicistic one. When the Kantian question about the possibility for all sciences, natural and historical, is asked again, the necessity of another discipline which must investigate the conditions of human consciousness becomes imperative. Such a science -- which Dilthey and Ortega consider 'fundamental' -- is essentially psychological, but -- according to both thinkers -- must be a psychology planned in a way to illuminate the "general structure of consciousness and the generic system of its functioning, in short, the reality of living consciousness in its typical articulation". (138) This is Dilthey's problem in his essay on descriptive and analytic psychology, and also the prior step to a technique which he later called Selbstbesinnung; or autognosis (the reflection of the cognitive subject upon himself; not to be confused with the ordinary notion of introspection).

Philosophy, as shown by an Ortegan re-definition of the Diltheyan scheme, becomes a "...discipline, which is concerned with the general and invariable structure of human consciousness and therefore presents itself at first in the form of psychology...." The task of philosophy "... is to hold, in respect of the bulk of historical facts, the same position which, in classical physics, mechanics holds in respect of

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(137) Concord, p. 161. When this concept is applied to the Diltheyan theories, Ortega maintains that it also constitutes a major difference between Dilthey and Kant: "...with this idea, which is his exclusively, Dilthey stands alone among his contemporaries, differing not only from Kant but from the entire philosophical tradition which was intellectualistic".

(138) Concord, p. 162.

observed and observable physical facts...." (139) This general theory of man, which some Germans have called 'spiritual anthropology' purports to reveal three activities: the whole of "human nature" as it could be known from experience, philology and history. 'Experience', in this context, is defined as "the psychology of oneself and one's contemporaries". The mutual co-implication of psychology and history is succinctly described by Ortega's study of Dilthey: "What philology and history teach us about past man is contrasted with what psychology discloses about present man, and vice-versa". (140)

When judging Dilthey, Ortega does not ignore the fact that a peculiar petitio underlies his "pet-theory":

> Which is to triumph in the end, psychology over history or history over psychology? Both are empirical; no hierarchy seems to assign a place to one above the other. But such equality of right between psychology and history produces a vicious circle. The science of history must be grounded in a thorough knowledge of man; but knowledge of man must in its turn, at least partly, proceed from history. (Dilthey later gave careful consideration to this vicious circle which persists, however, even in the purest form of his philosophy and which he regards as essentially inherent in cognition.) (141)

And, of course, Ortega claims that the only way out should be provided by the concept of 'vital reason'. When 'pure reason' is subordinated to the totality of living reason, Ortega feels that the irrationalism to which "proud reason" sees itself condemned dissolves "... and turns into clear and ironical rationalism":

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(139) Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, p. 172.

(140) Ibid., p. 172.

(141) Ibid., p. 64.

> For many years I have therefore described my own philosophical standpoint as a ratio-vitalism. My book El tema de nuestro tiempo ("The Modern Theme"), Madrid, 1923, presents the issue of embedding pure reason in living reason as the theme of our times. It was this that Dilthey wished to express and wished to think and in the end failed to lay hands on. Now after the posthumous publication of his papers, which came considerably later than the first edition of my aforementioned book, we are able to see what was hovering before his mind. In his Collected Writings, vol. VIII, p. 177 (1931), I find a remark which he was far indeed from commiting to print during his lifetime and which could have stood in an old article of mine "Ni vitalismo ni racionalismo" ("Neither Vitalism Nor Rationalism"), Revista de Occidente, 1924:'What is presented to us (das uns Gebotene) is actually irrational; the elements by means of which we perceive are irreducible to one another'. The remark is aimed at Hegel. (142)

Ortega also adds here that in 1924, no one in Germany, nor he from Spain, could have anticipated that such a direction was the "future meaning" with which Dilthey's philosophy would pass on to the history of ideas. Irrationalism, then, seems to be again the Ortegan point of disagreement with Dilthey, and Ortega thinks that the simple truth is that during the first quarter of the twentieth century, a few thinkers like himself were independently evolving the idea "... in the light of which Dilthey's work was to acquire fruitful meaning". That is why Ortega believes that 'living reason' means something much more important than Dilthey could have suspected:

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(142) Ibid., p. 164. The Spanish version of this footnote is also preceded by a series of ironic remarks to the effect that Spain has also had 'philosophic originality', and at the fact that only when these ideas were read in German they became suddenly important. Concretely he addresses a series of lectures on Dilthey, in which the Argentinian professor Francisco Romero "discovered" certain connection between the German philosopher and the Spanish "writer". Due perhaps to their "griping personal nature", the English translation omits this interesting sequence of five paragraphs.

> The truth is that Dilthey was unable to free himself from the idea of vital irrationalism as contrasted with intellectual rationalism and did not yet discover the new rationality of life. That explains why, toward the end of his life, he could still write a sentence like this: 'In all comprehension of life, there is an element of irrationality, since life itself is irrational' (Dilthey, Collected Writings, vol. VII, p. 218). (143)

Thus, the expression 'ratio-vitalism' has been shown to be different from biological vitalism, and therefore with a purpose which attempts to go beyond the contention that reason is a biological process governed by biological laws. (144) 'Ratio-vitalism' also denies the Bergsonian contention that reason is epistemologically insufficient, and must be replaced by intuitive or semi-instictive insights based upon irrationalistic perceptions of life. And lastly, 'ratio-vitalism' seems to contend that knowledge is a necessary condition for life, that it must also be necessarily rational, and that it must always subordinate the imperatives of pure reason to the vital preoccupation. 'Life', thus, must remain as the central philosophical issue, but necessitates the use of a type of reason, whose essential task consists of exploring the vital significances of the 'circumstantial' complex.

The writer hopes to have at least shown some of the essential differences and similarities between the Ortegan position, and other 'phi-

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(143) Ibid., p. 164.

(144) This Ortegan criticism also applies to pragmatic biologism, and to the trends known as 'empirio-criticisms', so well known in the Anglo-Saxon world. In this sense 'ratio-vitalism' could be interpreted as a method of knowledge which stands in sharp contrast against the notion of the 'scientific-method' supported by pragmatism. Otherwise, pragmatism seems to have many points of contact with the Ortegan scheme. Hardly the topic of this chapter, an interesting investigation could also be attempted by comparing pragmatic theories of the Peirce-James-Dewey type with 'ratio-vitalism'.

losophies of life'. (145) At this juncture, it is also hoped that the reader already possesses a sufficient background to examine the following chapter on the 'Mission of the University', strictly within the Ortegan framework.

As a last remark, it must be taken into account that the Ortegan new type of reason, is not a "new theory about reason", but a simple recognition of a fact. Such a fact, according to Ortega, is that "... whatever man thinks of reason, it is always rooted in his life". (146)

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(145) Regarding the interesting connection between Ortegan historicism and that of Dilthey, no paraphrasis could possibly do justice to the direct consultation of Ortega's own remarks on this topic. The reader is advised to follow such remarks in the book Concord and Liberty, a chapter from the History of Ideas -- Wilhelm Dilthey and the idea of Life", pp. 142-150; 165-182; translated into English by Helene Weyl.

(146) VI, 46, (1936); Toward a Philosophy of History, p. 226.

CHAPTER VI

THE MISSION OF THE UNIVERSITY

The types of activity embodied by the concepts 'teacher' and 'student' represent kinds of human existence, both respectively and conjointly. These types of human existence are obviously to be found in universities, and Ortega conceives of them as the backbone of a 'Faculty of Culture'.(147) The 'Faculty of Culture' is precisely that kind of educational institution that places 'culture' -- as previously defined -- at the service of the students, so that they keep abreast of "the times". Ortega would fully agree with the Deweyan proposition that "education is life", since the culture of the times is nothing else but that radical reality which has to be solved, deciphered, and interpreted by means of 'vital reason'. The university should not be devoted exclusively to the cultivation of pure reason, because pure reason is not life.

Ortega feels that reason has been understood during centuries, as something which apprehends that which does not change, or as the logos that captures the eternal essence of 'existing objects'. Under this conception, those objects have been considered sub specie aeternitatis.

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(147) The term 'Faculty' is not to be confused with a corporate group of instructors and professors, as it would be suggested by the ordinary meaning of the word in the English language. 'Faculty' as the equivalent of the Spanish term 'Facultad' rather means 'college', 'department', or 'division' of the university. Within the Ortegan scheme it means a corporate institution of higher education, consisting primarily of students, and also complementary of subject-matter to be taught, teachers, instructors, professors, administration, and staff, almost in that order.

and hence beyond time. The rejection of this view has been already discussed, and explains the Ortegan concern with 'our times', and with the norm that the student should become aware of the historico-chronological factors that are the strongest components of his culture.

It should be recalled that Ortega claims that the logos type of reason reaches its climax with the rationalistic philosophers of the XVII Century, and hence at a time which witnessed an astounding development of natural science. The Kantian concept of 'pure reason' also shares this view; but following Dilthey, Ortega contends that this type of mathematical reason, which has been so successful for the purposes of controlling natural objects, i.e., those objects with a fixed or 'pre-fabricated' being, has not been equally successful when dealing with human affairs. The sciences of "that which is human" -- sociology, politics, history -- show a strange "imperfection" which frustrates the geometrically-minded scholar, especially when the achievements of humanistic science are contrasted with the spectacular feats of natural science, and its corresponding techniques. It has been shown that Ortega shares a philosophical tradition that seems quite convinced of the fact that mathematical reason is not capable of thinking about the shifting, changing, and temporary reality of human life. And, according to Ortega, here it becomes impossible to think sub specie aeterni. The imperative demand is to think within the realm of 'the times' as a historical dimension of human beings.

It has also been shown in preceding chapters that this line of reasoning is similar to that which seems to have prompted the 'irrationalistic' reaction of the XIXth. Century.

The Ortegan answer should be, by now, familiar:

> To me, reason and theory are synonimous.... My ideology is not aimed at reason, since it does not accept any other way of theoretical knowledge. It would be more precise to say that my criticisms are aimed against 'rationalism'. (148)

Since the most authentic significance of reason consists of 'giving reasons', it may be possible that 'rationalism' is unaware of the irrationality in those materials handled by reason. Therefore the rationalist believes that 'things' do behave like our ideas. According to Ortega, this mistake distorts the real significance of reason, and reduces it to something partial and secondary:

> All definitions of reason, which made its essential part consist of certain particular modes of operation with the intellect, could be accused of something more harsh than 'narrow-mindedness'. In fact, those definitions have sterilized reason, amputating, and hypnotizing its decisive dimension. To me, reason, in its true and rigorours sense, is any intellectual action which places us in contact with reality, and hence an action by means of which we find that which is transcendental. (149)

Mathematical reason, or pure reason, is nothing but a particular species or a particular form of reason. To understand pure reason as the reason is to mistake a part for the whole, and therefore to incur in a falsified analysis of reason. Along with the mathematical and 'eternal' reasons, and beyond them, a type of reason could be found which might be called 'historical'. This reason is no less of a reason than any other. It rather becomes a rigorous reason, capable of apprehending the temporal realities of human life. 'Vital reason' is

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(148) Ni Vitalismo ni Racionalismo, III, (1924), p. 273.

(149) Historia Como Sistema, VI, p. 46.

ratio, logos, and also a human concept. It becomes "one and the same thing with life". Thus, life itself is vital reason, because "... to live is not to have any other alternative, but to reason before an inexorable circumstance ...." (150)

"To live", in this context, becomes to understand, and the primary and radical form of intellection is the vital, human 'doing'. To understand means to refer something to the totality of "my moving life", which is the same thing as saying "my life on the make", and hence, to understand refers the object to "living as an act". Life itself is the element which places anything upon a certain perspective, thus inserting it within its own context, and making it intelligible "for me", once the object is made to function in the realm of my own life. Therefore, life becomes the very organ for comprehension, and this is why -- for Ortega -- it is possible to say that reason is human life. A human reality becomes intelligible only within the framework of his own life, when such a life is referred to that totality within which it is rooted. Only when life itself functions as reason are we enabled to understand human acts and events.

But, since the horizon of human life is a historical one, man is defined by the historical level upon which he happened "to be living", what man has been is an essential component of what he is. What he is today is precisely due to his having been something else in the past. This seems to be Ortega's case to say that the realm of human life includes history: the life that functions as reason is a historical one, by virtue of its very substance, and history is present in every

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(150) En Torno a Galileo, V, p. 67.

act of real intellection. Thus, vital reason is, constitutively, "historical reason":

> The real task is to find in history itself its original and indigenous reason. This is why the expression 'historical reason' must be understood rigorously and fully. I am not talking about an extra-historical reason, which seems to be fulfilled in history, but rather of a reason which literally is that which has happened to man, and which, therefore, constitutes a substantial reason, i.e., the display of a reality which transcends the theories of man, and which represents that which he is; precisely, the reason that underlies his theories.... Historical reason does not accept anything as a mere fact, instead of doing this, it incorporates all facts within the fieri in which they have been originated. Historical reason sees how the fact is constructed. (151)

Such a theory, of course, presupposes the construction of a series of categories and mental forms, capable of apprehending the historical reality, which obviously becomes vital reality as well. Ortega believes that the habit of mind, concerned with thinking objects -- or 'substances' in the 'Eleatic' sense -- has made it extremely difficult to reach the concept of an entity which is not 'a thing' or 'an object', but rather a "making" of temporal life. In this sense, Ortega is against 'substantialism' or 'Eleatism' in all its forms, and favors a concept of reality in which such a reality makes itself:

> In order to talk about 'man-as-being' we must construct a non-Eleatic concept of being, in a fashion similar to that in which the non-Euclidean geometry was constructed. The time has come to look for the full harvest of the Heracleitian seeds. (152)

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(151) Historia como Sistema, OC, VI, pp. 49-50.

(152) OC., VI, p. 56.

And since that which is vital is always particular and unique, and is also determined by a given circumstance, those concepts which apprehend life have to be 'ocassional', such as is the character depicted by terms such as 'you', 'thou', 'myself', 'this', 'that', 'there', 'now', and especially 'life', when such a term is applied to 'each and everyone'. In other words, Ortega suggests that we must deal with concepts which do not always mean the same thing, but are rather constituted by entities whose sense always depends, in sensu stricto upon a given 'circum-stantia'. And here, historical reason becomes especially narrative. It also presupposes an abstract theorization of life, in order to achieve a condition which would make this concept a universal and valid element for any life, which only in each particular case could become full of 'circumstantial concreteness'.

For the above reasons, Ortega contends that the university should be devoted to life and culture, rather than to science. Science is perhaps the greatest human achievement, but "above and beyond science", Ortega maintains that there is the human life which makes it possible. Hence, a crime that the universities have perpetrated against the elementary vital conditions, and contemporary demands of their cultures, cannot be compensated by a scientific development. At this point Ortega is probably thinking of 'natural' science, as previously defined, and as opposed to his admired, Diltheyan notion of Geisteswissenschaften:

> How is it possible to talk to the learned man about life, if he is a prisoner of his own science; science not being life?. (153)

Obviously, society needs good professionals -- judges, physicians, engineers -- and this is the reason why the university is there with its

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(153) Misión, p. 77.

professional training. But the university also needs to fulfill a mission of priority: the assurance of competency in the field of function as profession. (154) Ortega is well aware of the fact that there are always "types" of leaders in every society, and he defines leadership "... not so much the juridical exercise of authority, but rather the extended influence upon the body social...." (155) He remarks that the bourgueois classes seem to be the leaders in modern societies, and that most of these 'leaders' are professionally over reason". It should be very important, for the societies, that these professionals become capable of living, and also vitally influencing a communal structure, so that it keeps abreast of the times. This task, Ortega claims, is something entirely different from the so-called professional and specialized competence in the ordinary sense attributed to those terms. And such is the reason inevitable, to re-establish a teaching of the culture, if culture is to mean a system of living ideas within a given chronological period. "This is what the university must be, both before and after "being" anything else". (156)

Ortega is not opposed to an equally necessary awareness of the findings in natural science. He is rather enthusiastic about the course of modern physics and similar disciplines, but the significance that they acquire in his scheme of things, is always a 'cultural' one in

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(154) The reader is advised to consult the concept of 'function as purpose', as opposed to the ordinary meaning of 'function' as used by Anglo-Saxon social-science. Cf. R.H. Tawney's The Acquisitive Society, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., N.Y., 1961, pp. 8, 41-42, 180, in which 'function' appears to be equated with "social purpose", or with the usual socio-scientific concept of "intended function".

(155) Misión, p. 77.

(156) Misión, p. 77.

his own sense. It has been remarked before that he considers physics and its mental mode as one of the great achievements of contemporary times. To Ortega, physics constitutes the meeting point of four centuries of intellectual training, and the 'physical doctrine' does have a relationship with all of the remaining essential preoccupations of a man who needs to be "up to date". One may not be aware of the developments of physics as a science, but this ignorance could "... hardly be posited as an indignity....", especially in the case of a rather secluded or alienated person, such as the manual worker ensalved by the machine.

> But the man who calls himself a doctor, or a magistrate, or a general,or a philologist, or a bishop; namely the man who belongs to the leading social classes, is a perfect barbarian if he does not know what the physical cosmos should mean to the ... human being, regardless of how much he knows about his laws, his concoctions, or his holy fathers. And I would say the same thing of the person lacking a reasonable ordered image of the great historical changes that brought mankind to the contemporary crossroads.... And the same thing could be said of the man who lacks a rather precise idea of the manner in which the philosophical maind meets the present with its perpetual attempt to design a scheme for the universe, or a description of the manner in which general biology tries to interpret the fundamental facts of organic life. (157)

For such reason, Ortega contends that physical, historical, and biological 'ideas' of the world are necessary for the cultured man. To lack the physical idea (not physical science itself, but "the vital idea of the world as created by physics") is a fault of the same caliber as to lack the historical, and the biological ideas of the contemporary world. If such a man is not compensated by exceptional, spontaneous gifts, it would be very difficult to accept his competency beyond the

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(157) Misión, p. 79.

limited "vocational" meaning of the expressions 'good' physician, or judge, or technician. In other words, the functional meaning of the term 'good professional' should be posited only in terms of a vital context. Otherwise, it would be a sure result that the remaining acts in the life of the 'professional' would be "deplorable ones", as Ortega chooses to call them. Whatever action that transcends the realm of a strict vocational trade, even within the sphere of the so-called professional ideas, would be condemned to cultural failure:

> There is no alternative: in order to successfully move within the jungle of life, one must be 'cultivated in the culture', one must know its topography, and its ways or methods. It becomes necessary to have an idea of space and time as related to 'the times' in which life is conducted: an actual culture. As a result of this fact, such a culture must be either received or invented. And he who has enough courage to invent it himself (i.e., to attempt the construction of that which has been achieved in thirty centuries of human existence) would be the only person with an earned right to negate the need that the university must meet by the teaching of the culture. But, unfortunately, such a unique being who justifiably could oppose my thesis would be an insane person. (158)

Failure of the Ortegan 'mission' would seem to indicate that both professionalism and specialization, when not duly compensated by the cultural demand, do break the unity of man into several pieces. Some colleges teach 'humanities', and also 'philosophy' as one more of several specialized 'careers', thus trying to pass the fragment for the whole. As a consequence of this, general education becomes the only possible education. Unity is achieved not so much through singularity of purpose, but rather by an attempt to achieve the wholeness of what Ortega calls 'human reality':

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(158) Misión, p. 80.

> Engineering could be found in the engineer, but the engineer is only a piece and a fragmentary dimension of the man. Man is an integrum, a totality, which cannot be found in the fragment 'engineer'....
> The great immediate task has something of a gigantic puzzle.... By using the disperse pieces -- disiecta membra -- of the vital unity of man... it must be reconstructed. It is necessary to achieve the result of having each individual, or -- if utopianism is to be avoided -- of having many individuals become, each one for himself, that kind of a whole man. Who else can do this, if not the university? (159)

The theme of 'vital reason' returns again, and this time it seems to be tinged with the existentialistic quest for totality as an ontological preoccupation. A simple transplantation of the same argument suggests the existential rejection of logic and 'pure reason': the fragmentation of philosophy has led into ilegitimate claim, for example, that the logician is the philosopher. Philosophy can be found in the logician, but the logician is only a fragmentary dimension of philosophy. In this sense, all of philosophy, cannot be possibly found in the logician, or in the "scientist", or in the "specialized professional".

The implication seems to be that the university has the moral obligation to meet the cultural demand, and that, at the point in time in which Ortega addressed the Spanish students, the university was only meeting such a demand in a very partial way. What universities do in no way whould be interpreted as a logical, and mostly a 'cultural' proof of what the university is. Teaching at most universities appears to be integrated by three activities:

(a) - The 'transmission of the culture', interpreted as 'maintenance of traditions'.

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(159) Misión, p. 61.

(b) - The teaching of the 'professions', interpreted as a response to false notions of cultural demand, which often have degenerated into a search for social mobility, and hence into motivations with a good share of acquisitiveness (i.e., increase of means to the end of financial modus vivendi.). And,

(c) - Scientific research, or education of new men of science. This activity often implies the exercise of 'pure reason' either for its own sake or for the sake of "life adjustment", interpreted as adjustment to activities (a) and/or (b).

Ortega could have added in (c) that in some cases "research activities" also serve the maintenance of tradition, and the drive for acquisitiveness (or prestige), not only on the part of the student, but also on that of the teacher. This seems to be especially true today, since hardly anybody would deny that in some universities a "trend for research" could be observed. Such a trend seems to consider "research" as a formal activity of intrinsic worth, which is often regarded as the highest criterion for the evaluation of a faculty member. The Anglo-Saxon reader is familiarized enough with the almost "totemic" significance of "research", within the so-called 'function' of the university, and there seems to be hardly any need to belabor this topic. At this point, Ortega asks the following question:

> Have we answered with the above considerations the question of what is the mission of the university? Hardly at all. The only thing that we have done consists simply of a gathering in an inorganic pile all of what the university now believes it should be doing, plus something that, in our judgment, it does not do but must do. Thus, the foregoing analysis has only prepared the question, and nothing else. (160)

(160) Misión, p. 82.

There is still another problem, namely that of the extent of knowledge to be offered. Even if higher education should become reduced to professionalism and research alone, the whole enterprise would be nothing but a fabulous mass of studying activities. It is impossible that the average student could, by a long shot, truly learn what the university attempts to teach him. Ortega's premise in order to answer such a question consists of stating that institutions do exist, i.e., are necessary and do have meaning, because the average man does exist also. If the world consisted only of exceptional creatures, even the existence of educational and public institutions could be questioned:

> Anarchy is logical when it propugnates uselessness, because it is based upon the assumption that every man is a nativate exceptional-good, discreet, intelligent, and just. It becomes necessary to refer every institution to the average man. (161)

The mission of the university consists, then, of making the cultural faculty available to the average man. Since it is impossible that the average man could really and truly learn "everything" that must be taught to him, many universities often have admitted this failure without doing anything else but to incorporate it as a constitutive part of university life. In other words, a paradoxical situation has originated in which the effective norm consists of anticipating the very purpose of the university as something unreal. Ortega feels that in this manner the falsity of institutional life becomes admitted, with the regrettable consequence that such a falsification could easily be transformed in the essence of the institution. Existential overtones seem to underlie the Ortegan criticism:

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(161) Misión, footnote, p. 83.

> This is the root of all evil -- as it is in "real life", be it individual or collective. The 'original sin' consists precisely of the anomaly of not being -- authentically -- what one is. We can aspire to be anything we are not; but it is not legitimate to pretend that we are what we are not, i.e., to consent in swindling ourselves, or to become accustomed to a substantial lie. When the normal regime of a man, or an institution, is a fictitious one, an omnifarious demoralization emanates from it. At the end debasement does occur, because it is not possible to accommodate to self-falsification without having lost respect for oneself. (162)

According to Ortega, the above is the reason why Da Vinci used to say Chi non puo quel che vuol, quel che puo voglia ('He who cannot be what the wants should wan what he can be').

> Such a Leonardesque imperative has to be the radical direction of all university reform. Only the passionate resolution of being what something strictly is, can be truly creative. Not only university life, but all contemporary life has to be made with a fabric whose name is authenticity. (163)

The above paragraph combines a paradox of Bergsonian flavor (Durée est l'êtoffe à quoi la vie est faite) and Heideggerian terminology, with a pragmatic conclusion which, by now, should not amaze the reader:

> This is why I believe that it becomes inevitable to turn the university inside out, or rather to radically reform it by using as a basis the converse principle of that one upon which it now stands. Instead of teaching that which, according to utopian wishfull thinking, should be taught, it must be taught only what it can be taught, i.e., to aim the operation to that which can be learned. (164)

This principle, which Ortega describes as one of "amazing simplicity", is precisely the key-concept behind the most revolutionary educational step ever taken in the whole history of education. The

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(162) Misión, p. 84.

(163) Misión, p. 85.

(164) Ibid., p. 85.

Mission of the University refers to such phenomenon as the "formidable change of direction" inspired by Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and the representatives of Germanic idealism, who dared to formally state a fact which thus far was a ridiculous thing to say: "The student is as important as the teacher, and perhaps more important than subject matter". And the deceivingly trivial result of the educational revolution was to state that the student, or learner, was not a pedagogic principle per se. Ortega is amazed at the fact that the pre-Rousseaunian theories and practices held, "with an almost unbelievably tenacity", that teaching had to be rooted upon subject matter, and upon the teacher as an agent for the "transmission of knowledge". Thus, the Rousseaunian innovation, and that of his successors, consisted simply of shifting the very foundations of "educational science", from subject matter and teacher, to the student, thus recognizing that the latter, and his peculiar cultural conditions, are perhaps the only guiding factor for the construction of an organic ensemble within the realm of an activity called 'education'. Scientific activity, and the so-called 'knowledge' purports to be taught. And thus, the pedagogic principle is one entirely different from the principle of culture, and that of science per se.

The Ortegan "principle of scarcity applied to education" seems to have been inspired by the Swedish economist Gustaf Cassel, to whom Ortega makes specific reference. (165) He also quotes Einstein as having written 'If we had perpetual motion there would be no physics', thus

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(165) In 1921, Cassel's Theorestische Sozialoekonomie (pp. 3, ff.) proposed a return to certain aspects of classic economics, by stating that scarcity is the principle of economic activity. The context of this chapter shows how Ortega used Cassel's theory, and applied it to education.

stating for science the same phenomenon which, according to Ortega, is also true of education:

> I find that something similar occurs with education. Why do we have educational activities? Why is education an occupation, and also a preoccupation for man? For these questions, the Romanticists had the most lucid, touching, and transcendental answers.... But we ... are simply satisfied with the fact that things are, for the time being, what they are, and nothing else; we love their nakedness. We do not care about the cold, and the elements. We know that life is hard, and most of all that it is going to be hard. We accept its rigor, and do not try to sophisticate its fate.... We want cleanliness in our dealings with things. This is why we strip them, and once they are stripped, we wash them by looking hard at them, seeing what they are in puris naturalibus.
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> Man becomes occupied and preocuppied with education for a reason which is as simple as it is dry, and as dry as it is deplorable: in order to live with certain firmness, freedom and righteousness, it is necessary to know an enormous amount of things. The child, the youth, have an extremely limited capacity to learn. This is the reason. If childhood and youth would each last one hundred years, or if the child or the young man only had memory, intelligence and attention in unlimited amounts, the educational activity would be non-existent.... (166)

Such is the basis for the Ortegan contention that scarcity, and limitation in the learning capacity, are the principles of instruction. The exact preoccupation of teaching has to be based precisely upon the measure in which it is impossible to learn. And only after this fact has been recognized in all its puzzling, undeniable, and deceiving simplicity it becomes possible to talk meaningfully about the increase of knowledge in modern times. Indeed, after this, we can reflect upon repeated clichés. In the new capitalistic eras, life becomes terribly complicated, and demands a meticulous knowledge of specialized techniques. Innovation also demands the knowledge of many skills posited largely beyond a particularized capacity for learning. Ortega contrasts this

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(166) Misión, pp. 89-90.

situation with the other one represented by primitive life. Primitive life practically had no teaching -- as we know of it -- because anyone would be enabled to learn. A different phenomenon takes place: secret and hidden knowledge. Primitive teachings, insofar as they cover the learning of specialized skills, were esoteric and secret, but there is no right to maintain the essential structure, and the cultural significance of their contemporary equivalents hidden away from modern man. Such would be the way to dangerous cultural alienation.

For the above reasons, Ortega describes most of his contemporary, and connational, universities as a "tropical bramble-bush of teachings". If to this enormous task it should be added that universities are the only entities to be trusted with the teaching of the culture, it is no wonder -- Ortega feels -- that the bramble bush has grown to cover the horizon.

It is also no wonder that students have developed a high degree of suspicion and revolt at the prima facie, intuitive level. After all they somehow sense that in the organization of higher education, and in the construction of a university, the point of departure has to be the student, and not the subject matter or the professor. The university is described by Ortega as the institutional projection of the student, whose two essential dimensions are: first, what he is (scarcity of cumulative faculties in terms of learning) and second, what he needs to know in order to live (in the Ortegan sense of 'living').

On the subject of "student-revolts", so common in Continental European or Latin American countries, and just beginning to be known in the United States, Ortega reveals both penetrating anticipation and analytic skill. He finds three important factors behind the so-

called "student-revolts". The first one he calls the 'agitation of the national substance', i.e., the political situation of the nation, while a second one is related to the almost inevitable series of concrete abuses committed by some professors and administrators. And the third one -- which he calls the 'most important and decisive' factor -- acts upon the students, probably with no clear or explicit relationship. It simply consists of the fact that neither the students, nor anyone in particular, but rather "the times" (the present situation of education all over the world) force the universities to be again centered around the student. The university should become essentially concerned about the student, and not centered around the professor. According to what "...higher education centers were in their most authentic hour....", the necessity of contemporary culture operates inevitably, even when those men affected by such forces may not be aware of their clear and definite effects:

> It becomes necessary that the students do eliminate the clumsy ingredients of their rebellion, in order to accentuate these other ingredients by virtue of which they are completely right, especially the latter. (167)

A lenghty footnote in the same page should render the matter acceptably clear:

> The concept that the university is the student is to be carried out even to the point of affecting its material organization. It is absurd to consider the university, as it has been considered hitherto, the professor's house in which he receives pupils. Rather the contrary: put the students in charge of the house, and let the student body constitute the torso of the institution, complemented by the faculties of professors. The maintenance of discipline through beadles gives rise to shameful squabbles, and organizes the students into a rebellious horde. The students are not to blame, but the institution, which is badly planned. The students themselves, properly organized

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(167) Misión, p. 93.

> for the purpose, should direct the internal ordering of the university, determine the decorum of usages and manners, impose disciplinary measures, and feel responsible for the morale. (168)

Needless to say, certain professors from Spain, Latin-America, and perhaps other nations as well, are still shocked upon reading the above remarks. It has been insinuated by some that the Ortegan ideology is to be blamed, at least partially, for the rebelliousness, and "utter lack of discipline" exhibited by some Spanish-speaking students. Others think that the presence of Ortega in the República Argentina of the early thirties, and the Córdoba student-movement (in which university students literally effected a coup d'êtat by forcefully taking, closing, and demanding a reorganization of the University of Córdoba) are two events not to be regarded as completely disconnected. At any rate, for praise or blame, the name of Ortega y Gasset is anything but foreign to Spanish-speaking students and professors, and his thoughts on 'university reform' are still often quoted by many a fiery orador estudiantil of the countless demonstrations and squabbles that constantly take place in Latin-American university life. It is rather easy and expedient to ignore or dimiss student complaints on the grounds of 'psychological maladjustment', 'political agitation', and 'lack of orientation', supposedly suffered by insignificant minorities, but the fact still remains that universities still have a problem with the relationship between an entity called "immature human being", and another entity loosely referred to as "life". This problem, as many "guidance committees" would attest, is many times a 'quiet one' also, and its relation to the question of self-identity is only beginning to be investigated.

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(168) Mission, footnote, p. 71.

However lyrically, Ortega tried to bridge this gap for all parties concerned. It should also be useful, at this point, to reflect upon the flexible meaning of the term 'beadle', which does not have to be necessarily restricted to its "old fashioned" connotation. Many contemporary universities have developed euphemistic substitutions for the traditional 'beadle', either pedagogically or administratively speaking.

Thus, the average student, regarded as the raison d'être of the university as an institution, should determine the quantity of disciplines to be taught. And such an amount should consist exclusively of those disciplines whose demand could be both feasible and justified. Ortega describes them as "...those teachings which the good average student can truly learn....".

A double selection has to be made of the "fabulous mass of 'knowledges'" in order to determine the basic teachings that ought to constitute the torso or minimum of the university. In the first place, only those 'knowledges' considered as strictly necessary for the life of the man "who now is a student" should be kept: effective life and its inevitable urgencies constitute the first viewpoint to be regarded as important for this "first stroke of the clipping-shears". Secondly, a further synthesis still has to be effected on this first residuum; the strictly necessary disciplines will have to be reduced even more upon consideration of that which, de facto, can be fully and comfortably learned by the student:

> It is not enough to consider something as necessary. Conceivably something necessary could still be posited practically beyond the possibilities of the student, and it would be unreal to make a big fuss over its character of alleged inevitability. One must teach only that which can be truly

> learned. One must be inexorable, and proceed firmly on this issue. (169)

The English translation has the following version of the above:

> How are we to determine the body of subjects which are to constitute the torso or minimum of the curriculum? By submitting the present conglomeration to two tests: (1) We must pick out that which appears as strictly necessary for the life of the man who is now a student. Life, with its inexorable requirements, is the criterion that should guide this first stroke of the pruning knife. (2) What remains, having been judged strictly necessary, must be further reduced to what the student can really learn with thoroughness and understanding.
>
> It is not enough that this or that is necessary. When we least expect, the necessary suddenly passes beyond the capabilities of the student. It should be fantastic on our part to rant and rave that it is necessary. (170)

At any rate, it should be clear that the Ortegan university consists essentially of the higher education which the ordinary man should and would be able to receive. A second premise establishes the necessity to make of this ordinary man a "cultured person", i.e., a person who is 'up to date' with the cultural wealth of his times. Although Ortega hardly writes as an "educator", and, of course, never uses the educational vocabulary that is typical of "researchers" in the field, he broadly hints a curricular sequence:

> It follows then, that the primary function of the university is to teach the great cultural disciplines, namely:
> 1.- The physical scheme of the world (Physics).
> 2.- The fundamental themes of organic life (Biology).
> 3.- The historical process of the human species (History).
> 4.- The structure and functioning of social life (Sociology).
> 5.- The plan of the universe (Philosophy). (171)

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(169) Misión, p. 95.

(170) Mission, p. 72.

(171) Mission, p. 73-74.

Besides the above, Ortega repeats that it is necessary to make the ordinary man a "good professional", in his already discussed own sense. With the prior establishment of an "apprenticeship to culture", the university ought to teach the common man, by the "most economical, direct and efficacious procedures the intellect can devise" how to be a good doctor, a good judge, a good teacher of mathematics or of history. And, consistent with the Diltheyan tradition of differentiating types of science, Ortega also contends that there is no cogent reason why the ordinary man needs or ought to be a scientist:

> Scandalous consequence: science in the true sense, i.e., scientific investigation, does not belong in any direct, constituent capacity among the primary functions of the universtiy. It is something independent.(172)

Ortega devotes an entire chapter to the differentiation between 'profession' and 'science', which he advances as a necessary premise for the understanding of the above contention. The following direct quotation should be sufficiently clear to understand why he is opposed to 'science' as the cardinal orientation of the university:

> Science is not just whatever you will. Obviously, it is not science to buy yourself a microscope or to throw together a laboratory. But neither is it science to expound, or learn, the content of a science. In its proper and authentic sense, science is exclusively investigation: the setting up of problems, working at them, and arriving at their solution. From the moment a solution is reached, all that may subsequently be done with the solution is not science. [Footnote: Except to question it afresh, to convert it back to a problem by criticizing it, and hence to repeat the cycle of scientific investigation]. (173)

Further justification for the "scandalous consequence" is then the contention that the learning or teaching of a science is not science itself. Nor is it the application of a science. By the same

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(172) Mission, p. 74.

(173) Ibid., p. 75.

token, although it might be desirable to entrust the teaching of a science to a scientist proper, it does not necessarily follow that this practice should be adopted with normative rigor. As a matter of fact, Ortega contends that there have been and are "prodigious teachers of the sciences" who are not themselves investigators or 'scientists':

> It is sufficient that they know their science. But to know [about a science] is not to investigate (to do research). To investigate is to discover a truth, or inversely, to demonstrate an error. To know means to assimilate a truth into one's consciousness, to possess a fact after it has been attained and secured....
> Science is one of the most sublime pursuits and achievements of mankind: more sublime than the university itself, conceived as an educational institution. For science is creation, and teaching aims only to convey what has been created, to digest it and to induce learners to digest it. Science is carried on upon so high a plane that it is necessarily an extremely delicate process. Whether we like it or not, <u>science excludes the ordinary man</u>. It involves a calling most infrequent, and remote from the ordinary run of the human species. <u>The scientist is the monk of modern times</u>. (174)

Possibly the above reasoning is the essential factor that has led Ortega's critics to maintain that he is an '<u>élite</u> educator'. Yet the charge seems unjustified once the premises are reflected upon. If science is considered as an intrinsic activity of great formal worth to pretend that the normal, ordinary student should be a scientist would be "... at once a ridiculous pretension....", as Ortega himself calls it. In fact he further adds that pretensions are contracted, like colds and other inflammations, and that possibly such a ridiculous pretension was contracted from the "vice of utopianism", which he describes as the bane of the generation just preceding ours.

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(173) Ibid., pp. 73-76. Italics by the writer.

It should also be clear that the charge of "anti-scientific", that some critics have made concerning Ortega y Gasset, is also a gross misreading. Both pragmatic and existential overtones could be found in his judgment of the issue:

> But furthermore it is not desirable, even under ideal circumstances, that the ordinary man should be a scientist. If science is one of the highest of human pursuits, it is not the only one. There are others of equal dignity, and there is no reason to sacrifice these, dedicating all humanity to science. The sublimity, moreover, belongs to science itself and not to the man of science. His career is a mode of existence quite as limited and narrow as another; in fact more so than some you could imagine. (176)

The point Ortega wishes to make is, of course, obvious. Conceived as serious modes of existence, and as meaningful activities, the teaching of the professions and the search for truth must be pragmatically separated. It is important that both in the minds of professors and students, the distinction must be clearly maintained. Actually, Ortega claims, not to maintain the distinction is an impediment both to the advancement of science, and of education. He is not ignoring, of course, the fact that learning a profession includes sometimes the mastery of the systematized content of certain sciences, but his answer is that this content is the end result of research, and not research itself:

> As a general principle, the normal student is not an apprentice to science. The physician is learning to effect cures, and as a physician he need not go beyond that. For his purpose, he needs to know the system of physiology current in his day, but he need not be, and in fact cannot be expected to be a trained physiologist. Why do we persist in expecting the impossible? I cannot understand. I am only disgusted by this itching to delude oneself.... this everlasting delusion of grandeur, this

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(176) Mission, p. 75.

> die-hard utopianism of persuading ourselves that we are achieving what we are not. Utopianism results in a pedagogy of self-abuse. (177)

If the virtue of the child is to think in terms of wishes, and his role is that of "making believe", Ortega feels that the virtue of the grown man is to will, and his role is to really do and achieve. The foregoing chapter discussed the way in which some philosophies of life look at action, and Ortega y Gasset complements it:

> Now we can achieve things only by concentrating our energy: by limiting ourselves. And in this limiting of ourselves lies the truth and the authenticity of our life. Indeed, all life is destiny: if our existence were unlimited in duration and in the forms it could assume, there would be no 'destiny'.... The authentic life, young people, consists in cheerfully accepting an inexorable destiny -- a limitation we cannot alter. It is this state of mind which the mystics, following a profound intuition, used to call 'the state of grace'. He who has once honestly accepted his destiny, his own limitations, is imperturbable. Impavidum ferient ruinae. (178)

It should be noted at this point -- and Nostrand perceived the difficulty -- that the Ortegan term 'destino' has certain Aristotelian connotations. Again the biologism of Ortega appears to dictate statements such as the above. The human organism seems to be conceived as being endowed with a type of potentiality, whose fruition seems to constitute "the organism's proper life". Aside from destination, and fate, the Spanish term 'destino' also means adequate direction, as a realistic awareness of possible achievement. This notion is also similar to the Deweyan conception of freedom as intelligent and effective choice, i.e., the awareness of achievement that can, or cannot, be obtained, and hence the power to do certain things. Most existential conceptions of freedom are also based upon the possibility

(177) Ibid., p. 76.

(178) Ibid., p. 77.

to overcome inevitable limitations interpreted as the 'human condition', and man as 'being-in-the-world'.

The conclusive result of the Ortegan dichotomy between 'profession' and 'science' is a severe criticism of those universities whose curricular trend has been dominated by 'inquiry' or 'research'. "Disastrous" is the term used by Ortega when he discusses the issue; such a trend, he maintains, has led to the elimination of the prime concern, i.e., 'culture', and has deflected attention from the problem of how best to train future professionals for their so-called "professions":

> Pedantry and the want of reflection have been large causes in bringing on the 'scientism' which afflict the university. In Spain, both these deplorable forces are coming to be a serious nuisance. Any nincompoop that has been six months in a school or a laboratory in Germany or North America, any parrot that has made a third rate scientific discovery, comes back a nouveau riche of science. Without having reflected a quarter of an hour on the mission of the university, he propounds the most pedantic and ridiculous reforms. Moreover he is incapable of teaching his own courses, for he has no grasp of the discipline as a whole. (179)

Needless to say, the geographic specificity of the quote does not necessarily have to limit the scope of the criticism: it could be applied to countless self-appointed "cultural experts", who believe that quantified research alone entails social change. It could also be applied to many a program of intensive scientific training, which purports to "expertize" a member of a culture foreign to that within which the "training" takes place in six months or slightly more, so that, once an expert, the professional goes back to his native land, in order to exercise scientific change. And it could also be applied to most of the cross-cultural misunderstandings and "project-failures",

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(179) Ibid., pp. 76-77.

which have based their performance strictly upon a "scientific" appraisal of facts, often disconnected from the total cultural plexus to be studied, and even more frequently supported by quantified data that Ortega would describe as being completely divorced from the body of cultural and vital forces that make the "facts" meaningful. Thus, science must be differentiated both from 'professional activity' and also from 'culture':

> Let us make no mistake about it. Science, upon entering into a profession, must be detached from its place in pure science, to be organized upon a new center and a new principle, as professional technics. And if this is true, it must certainly have an effect on the teaching of the professions. Something similar is to be said of the relations between culture and science. (180)

It has been remarked that Ortega defines culture, essentially, as the system of vital ideas by which the age lives, since it is a factum that man lives according to some definite ideas which constitute the very foundation of his way of life. It has also been shown that Ortega calls these ideas 'vital', since they are the components of the life of an age. Ortega further describes these ideas as "no more nor less than the repertory of our active convictions as to the nature of our world and our fellow creatures.... convictions as to the hierarchy of the values of things, i.e., which are more to be esteemed, and which less...." (181) The Modern Theme also refers to 'vital ideas' as the components of culture, and defines culture as "... a special direction which we give to the cultivation of our animal potencies...." (182)

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(180) Ibid., p. 81.

(181) Ibid., p. 81.

(182) Modern Theme, p. 76.

The connection with 'life', as interpreted by Ortega, should be by now clear. It should be remembered that, to Ortega, the basic meaning of the word 'life' is not biological but biographical. It should be also convenient to recollect that Ortega maintains this meaning as the one it has always had in the language of the people. The Mission returns to the same theme; at this point in the development of his thesis Ortega contends that life means the totality of what mand does, and what man is:

> ...that formidable business, which every man must exercise on his own, of maintaining a place in the scheme of things and steering a course among the beings of the world: 'To live' is, in fact, to have dealing with the world: to address oneself to it, exert oneself in it, and occupy oneself with it....
> If these actions and occupations which compose our living were produced in us mechanically, the result would not be human life. The automaton does not live. The whole difficulty of the matter is that life is not given us ready made. Like it or not, we must go along from instant to instant, deciding for ourselves. At each moment it is necessary to make up our minds what we are going to do next: the life of man is an ever recurrent problem. In order to decide at one instant what he is going to do or to be at the next, man is compelled to form a plan of some sort, however simple or puerile it may be. It is not that he ought to make a plan. There is simply no possible life, sublime or mean, wise or stupid, which is not essentially characterized by its proceeding with reference to some plan. (The sublimity or meanness of a life, its wisdom or stupidity is precisely, its plan. Obviously our plan does not remain the same for life; it may vary continually. The essential fact is that life and plan are inseparable).(183)

The implication often referred to as "typically existential" complements the issue: even the abandonment of life to chance, or the intentional suppression of it is "to make a plan" in the sense of choice. No paraphrasing exercise could render the matter in a way less prone to misinterpretation than, again, Ortega's own words:

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(183) Ibid., p. 83.

> Every human being, perforce, picks his way through life. Or what comes to the same, as he decides upon each act he performs, he does so because that act 'seems best', given the circumstances. This tantamount to saying that every life is obliged, willy-nilly, to justify itself in its own eyes. Self-justification is a constituent part of our life. We refer to one and the same fact, whether we say that 'to live is to conduct oneself according to a plan', or that 'life is a continuous justification to oneself'. But this plan or justification implies that we have acquired some 'idea' of the world and the things in it, and also of reacting to his environment with some rudimentary concept of it. He is forced to make an intellectual interpretation of the world about him, and of his conduct in it. This interpretation is the repertory of ideas or convictions to which I have referred, and which, as it is now perfectly evident, cannot be lacking in any human life whatsoever. (184)

The problem of self-justification is further described by Ortega as 'fundamental', and he considers it obvious that a failure or irregularity in the functioning of such an important element of life should be ensued by a "grave ailment". (185)

The core preoccupation with this issue seems to be the Ortegan 'historicism'. Most of his works carefully point out that the vast majority of human convictions are not made by the individual, i.e., not "...fabricated by the individual, Crusoe-wise....", but rather received by him from what he calls the 'historical environment'. It has been previously indicated that such a notion is equivalent to the Ortegan expression 'the times', and hence why he contends that there is always a system of live ideas which represents the current conceptual level of the age, i.e., "... a system which is essentially characteristic of its times; and this system is the culture of the

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(184) Ibid., pp. 82-83.

(185) The Revolt of the Masses, according to the analyzed author, portrays such a 'disease' in the so-called 'mass-man' of the twentieth century. Ortega clarifies that the first edition of his book was 'incomplete', and planned to add a third part to the study "... analyzing more in detail this formidable problem of 'justification'".

age". (186) Therefore, in spite of the fact that any given age shows disparate systems of convictions, some of which are a 'drossy residue' of other times, there is always a typical historical orientation contained in the contemporary culture of the times. Hence the tremendous responsibility for higher education:

> He who lives at a lower level, on archaic ideas, condemns himself to a lower life, more difficult, toilsome, unrefined. This is the plight of backward peoples -- or backward individuals. They ride through life in an ox-cart while others speed by them in automobiles. Their concept of the world wants truth, it wants richness, and it wants acumen. The man who lives on a plane beneath the enlightened level of his time is condemned, relatively, to the life of an infra-man. (187)

The difference between 'science' and 'culture' should become clear at this juncture. It just so happens that in our age a large part of the components of culture comes from science. But the vitalistic preoccupation of Ortega should render it comprehensible that culture should not be equated to science. The content of culture is much more of a vital faith than it is a scientific fact. Although the content of culture is both reconstructed, and also made in the field of science more than anywhere else, the convictions characteristic of our times --and of any other 'times' similar to ours -- become a matter of vital faith:

> Five hundred years ago, faith was reposed in ecclesiastical councils, and the content of culture emanated in large part from them. Culture does with science, therefore, the same thing the profession does. It borrows from science what is vitally necessary for the interpretation of our existence.

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(186) Mission, p. 83.

(187) Ibid., p. 84.

> There are entire portions of science which are not culture, but pure scientific technique. And vice-versa, culture requires that we possess a complete concept of the world and of man; it is not for culture to stop, with science, at the point where the methods of absolute theoretical rigor happen to end. (188)

The result of the above reflections reveals the vitalistic stance already discussed. Life simply cannot wait until the sciences may have explained the universe 'scientifically sepaking'. At this point Ortega again returns with the vitalistic responso: "We cannot put off living until we are ready. The most salient characteristic of life is its coerciveness: it is always urgent, 'here and now' without any possible postponement". (189)

The merciless characteristic of life is that "... it is fired at us point-blank...." Therefore, culture, which is nothing but the interpretation of life, cannot wait any longer than could life itself. The university should not be entirely devoted to the preparation of a man of science; it should be much more appropriate if it helped to develop a science of man. The former task risks the production of contemporary 'barbarians'. The latter could, at least, be changed into a systematic effort at the service of the average person, and, of course, be extended to cover truly human scientists, as well.

At this point in the development of his views on higher education, Ortega makes a series of remarks on German science, which could well apply to similar situations, and especially to the already

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(188) Mission, p. 84.

(189) Ibid., p. 84.

mentioned totemic or awesome regard for research and experimentation. Historical allowance will have, of course, to be made, but the essential content underlying the dangers of over-emphatic 'research' could still be deduced from the Ortegan criticism:

> It happens, at once luckily and unluckily, that the nation which stands gloriously and indisputably in the van of science is Germany.The German, in addition to his prodigious talent and inclination for science, has congenital weakness which it would be extremely hard to extirpate: he is a nativitate pedantic and impervious of mind. This fact has brought it about that not a few sides of our present day science are not really science, but only pedantic detail, all too easily and credulously gathered together. One of the tasks Europe needs to perform with dispatch is to rid contemporary science of its purely German excrescences, its rituals and mere whims, in order to save its essential parts uncontaminated. (190)

Unfortunately, the philosophers who perceived the trend for 'pedantic detail', and, simultaneously with Ortega took seriously the task of eliminating the German 'excrescences', were not able to avoid a variety of the same disease which still affects many universities. Reference has already been made to the voluminous mass of useless pedantry that gets published under the name of 'research', in many cases with the full support of foundations, government-agencies, and universities. A quantifying trend has tended to substitute for the Germanic 'pedantic detail', but the rituals and mere whims still seem to contaminate both the educational and scientific exercise. And Ortega's plea for the purification of the essential scientific parts still seems to apply in full force to the contemporary scene. Other nations are now making a claim to stand "gloriously and indisputably in the van of science", and the "imperviousness of mind" has acquired the character

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(190) Ibid., p. 89.

of a mutual accusation. It could still be said, then, that it happens, "at once luckily and unluckily", that "not a few sides of our present day science" are not yet really science, in the Ortegan sense. To use Whitehead's terms, education for knowledge still seems to have indisputable priority over education for wisdom. Or, in Max Scheler's words, an over-emphasis on the technological knowledge designed for man's mastery over nature has obscured and slighted an educational concern both of the knowledge proper of 'human formation', and of the 'knowledge of salvation'.

Consequently, Ortega's conclusion still applies:

> There is need to humanize the scientist, who rebelled about the middle of the last century, and to his shame let himself be contaminated by the gospel of insubordination which has been thenceforth the great vulgarity and the great falsity of the age. The man of science can no longer afford to be what he now is with lamentable frequency -- a barbarian knowing much of one thing. (191)

The above quotation is followed by an optimistic statement about "the principal figures" of the present generation of scientists, that this writer would wish to modify. Ortega claims that fortunately those principal figures have felt impelled by the internal necessities of their sciences to balance their specialization with a symmetrical culture, and seems to be confident that the rest will follow in their steps "as sheep follow the leading ram". But this prediction does not seem to have been fulfilled as Ortega would have wished. The fact seems to be that, while leading scientists continue to be truly concerned about the cultural and ethical implications of their discoveries, there is a great number of secondary figures who easily forget the cautious episte-

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(191) Ibid., p. 90.

mological and ethical warnings of their leaders, and soon indulge in absolutistic misinterpretations, or in dogmatic generalizations about the generalizing principles that they continue to pursue, either in teaching or research activities. Thus radical interpretations or imperviousness to new possibilities still continue to impede the advancement of science. The same phenomenon also seems to be true of teaching activities, wherein theories of probability or careful hypothetical techniques are often regarded as absolutistic, ad baculum decrees. Unfortunately, then, Ortega was wrong, and "the rest" -- especially a significant number of secondary figures -- have not followed the steps of their predecessors "... as sheep follow the leading ram."

At any rate, Ortega's theory contends that if science has brought order into life, it becomes imperative to put science in order: "... to organize it -- seeing that it is impossible to regiment science -- for the sake of its healthy perpetuation...." (192)

This could be made possible by means of a 'vitalization of science", i.e., by the provision of a scientific form compatible with the human life "... by which and for which it was made in the first place...." For this purpose Ortega constructed a series of written statements of extraordinary conciseness and felicity:

> And so you see that by thinking over what is the mission of the university, by seeking to discover the consequent character of its cultural disciplines (viz. systematic and synthetic), we come out upon a vast horizon that spreads quite beyond the field of pedagogy, and engages us to see in the institution of higher learning an agent for the salvation of science itself. The need to create sound syntheses and systematizations of knowledge, to be taught in the 'Faculty of Culture' will call

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(192) Ibid., p. 91.

> out a kind of scientific genius which hitherto has existed only as an aberration: the genius for integration. Of necessity this means specialization, as all creative effort inevitably does; but this time, the man will be specializing in the construction of a whole. The momentum which impels investigation to dissociate indefinitely into particular problems, the pulverization of research, makes necessary a compensative control -- as in any healthy organism -- which is to be furnished by a force pulling in the opposite direction constraining centrifugal science in a wholesome organization. (193)

But who are the men to be entrusted with such a task? Ortega's answer is as prima facie trivial as it is sensible: the men endowed with this genius come closer to being good professors than good researchers. The task is one for well-rewarded, superbly-trained teachers. The synthesized knowledge must be transmitted and made understood for the production of a general image of the culture in the mind and experience of the student. And such an activity of synthetic, structural laconism, (to be maintained as such in view of the already discussed principle of scarcity) is more likely to be well-performed by a person entirely devoted to it, than by an individual who spends most of his time submerged in his research.

Again Ortega's words should evoke familiar, contemporary situations:

> One of the evils attending the confusion of the university with science has been the awarding of professorships, in keeping with the mania of the times, to research workers who are nearly always very poor professors, and regard their teaching as time stolen away from their work in the laboratory or the archives. (194)

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(193) Mission, p. 92.

(194) Ibid., p. 92.

Ortega's first five parts of the Mission are devoted to a topic which he himself calls "what the university must be in the first place". A recapitulation of the essential sub-topics in the first five chapters initiates the sixth one, and is also quite convenient at this point. Granting that the "principle of economy" should stand as the pragmatic basis for the primary mission of the university, Ortega rephrases his prior considerations in the following manner:

> 1.- University, in the strict sense, is to mean that institution which teaches the ordinary student to be a cultured person and a good member of a profession.
>
> 2.- The university will not tolerate in its program any false pretense: it will profess to require of the student only what actually can be required of him.
>
> 3.- It will consequently avoid causing the ordinary student to waste part of his time in pretending that he is going to be a scientist. To this end, scientific investigation proper is to be eliminated from the core or minimum of the university.
>
> 4.- The cultural disciplines and the professional studies will be offered in a rationalized form based on the best pedagogy -- systematic, synthetic, and complete -- and not in the form which science would prefer, if it were left to itself: special problems, 'samples' of science, and experimentation.
>
> 5.- The selection of professors will depend not on their rank as investigators but on their talent for synthesis and their gift for teaching.
>
> 6.- When the student's apprenticeship has been reduced to the minimum, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the university will be inflexible in its requirement of him. (195)

Remarkable insistence on practicality can be observed again and again as the justifying basis for the above plan. Ortega seems to be obsessed with the fear of utopianism, and hence never ceases to recommend an "ascetic frugality of pretensions", and a "severe

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(195) Mission, p. 93.

loyalty in recognizing the limits of the attainable", in order to meet the university's most fundamental need. And this need, of course, is described as the adequate correspondence between the functions and limits of the university, and its institutional life. The typical Ortegan terms 'authenticity' and 'sincerity' are also repeated at this point, so that the university does not pretend to be what it is not: this is the classical existential preoccupation.

But the university cannot be limited to the Ortegan succinct program already outlined. Ortega recognizes that science has a proper place within the confines of the university, and to this task he devotes his chapter on the consideration of all that the university should be "in addition":

> And now is the proper time for us to recognize, in all its breadth and depth, the role science must play in the physiology of the university, or rather let us say its psychology for the university is better to be compared with a spirit rather than a body.
> In the first place, we have seen that culture and profession are not science, but are largely nourished by science. Without science, the destiny of the European man would be an impossibility. The European man represents, in the panorama of history, the being resolved to live according to his intellect, and science is but intellect 'in form' .... The university <u>is</u> the intellect, it is science, erected into an institution.... (196)

Indeed, it should be surprising if Ortega would support an isolation of "culture and the professions" in the university, as two separate kinds of activity completely divorced from the contributions of science and research. It would not be long, Ortega concedes, before those university activities would be overtaken by the creeping paralysis of scholasticism. But instead of constituting the center of the univer-

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(196) <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 94.

sity, the sciences must 'pitch their camps' (laboratories, seminars, and discussion centers) around that central part. Before turning into centrifugal effect, the scientific contribution should play a centripetal role. The radial roots of the university must seek a peripheral source of consultation.

> All normal university students will come and go between the university and these outlying camps of the sciences, where they will find courses conceived from an exclusively scientific point of view, on all things human and divine. Of the professors, those who are more amply gifted will be investigators as well, and the others, who are purely teachers, will work none the less in closest contact with science, under its criticism and the influence of its ferment and stimulation. What is inadmissible is the confusion of the central portion of the university with the zone of research surrounding its borders. The university and the laboratory are distinct, correlative organs in a complete physiology. The essential difference between them is that only the university proper is to be characterized as an institution. Science is an activity too sublime and subtle to be organized in an institution. Science is neither to be coerced nor regimented. Hence it is harmful, both for the higher learning and for investigation, to attempt to fuse them into one instead of letting them work hand in hand in exchange of influence as free and spontaneous as it is intense. (197)

The university is then distinct from science, while at the same time it is inseparable from it. To continue using Ortega's biological vocabulary, the relationship between science and the university is like a symbiotic connection between two separate and distinct organisms. This is why he writes: "I should say myself 'The university is science in addition'." Yet, such an 'addition' should not be one of mere physical proximity to the institution:

> Quite the contrary. And now we may make the point without fear of misunderstanding. The university must be science before it can be a university. An atmosphere charged with enthusiasm, the exertion of science, is the presupposition

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(197) Ibid., pp. 95-96.

> at the base of the university's existence. Precisely because the institution cannot be composed of science -- the unrestricted creation of exact knowledge -- it requires the spirit of science to animate its institutional life. Unless this spirit is presupposed, all that has been said in the present essay has no sense. Science is the dignity of the university -- and more, for life is possible without dignity: it is the soul of the institution, the principle which gives it the breath of life and saves it from being an automaton. That is the sense in which the university 'is science, in addition'. (198)

If one is reminded of the Ortegan theory of historical reason, the implications of the above should be clear. The university should not only maintain constant relationships with science, but, of course, with public life, as a part of what Ortega calls the 'historical reality', in which the present offers a character of totality, "... not after amputations ad usum Delphini." To continue using the Ortegan terminology: the university of necessity must be open to the whole reality of its time. It must be in the midst of 'real life', as previously defined, to the point of complete saturation.

At this juncture only by implication does Ortega touch on the ethical question dealing with the role of the university in public life. In a hardly visible footnote he only offers a hasty explanation: he claims that in order to devote undivided attention to the problem of intellectual content he has deliberately refrained in the Mission from even naming the topic of moral education in the university. Yet his subsequent paragraphs cannot evade the problem, since he feels compelled to mention the role of the press. Granting that the university must be in the midst of real life, not only because it suits its purpose to live in the quickening atmosphere of historical reality, Ortega states that

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(198) Ibid., p. 96.

conversely as well, the life of the people needs acutely to have the university participate, as the university, in its affairs:

> On this point there is much I should like to say. But to be brief, let me simply allude to the fact that in the collective life of society today there is no other 'spiritual power' than the press. The corporate life, which is the real life of history, needs always to be directed, whether we like the idea or not. Of itself it has no form, no eyes to see with, no guiding sense of direction. Now then, in our times, the ancient 'spiritual powers' have dissapeared: the Church because it has abandoned the present (whereas the life of the people is ever a decidedly current affair); and the state because with the triumph of democracy, it has given up governing the life of the people to be governed instead by their opinion. In this situation, the public life has devolved into the hands of the only spiritual force which necessarily concerns itself with current affairs -- the press. (199)

Recognizing that he may not be more than a journalist himself, Ortega quickly adds that he should not wish to throw too many stones as the journalists. Yet, he seems to imply that the axiological implications cannot be avoided. The so-called 'spiritual realities', a term which he uses in loyal Germanic tradition, do differ in worth, and do compose a hierarchy of values, whose factual organization cannot be ignored. It just so happens, Ortega notices, that in such an axiological herarchy journalism seems to have a rather inferior place. His own words, again, should describe the situation better than paraphrastic effort or officious reiteration:

> It has come to pass that today no pressure and no authority make themselves felt in the public consciousness, save on the very low spiritual plane adopted by the emanations of the press. So low a plane it is that not infrequently the press falls quite short of being a spiritual power, and is rather the opposite force. By the default of others powers, the responsibility for nourishing and guiding the public soul has fallen to the journalist, who not only is one of the least cultured types in contemporary society but who moreover -- for reasons I hope may prove to have been merely transito-

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(199) Mission, p. 97.

> ry -- admits into his profession the frustrated pseudo-intellectuals, full of resentment and hatred toward what is truly spiritual. Furthermore the journalist's profession leads him to understand by the reality of the times that which creates a passing sensation, regardless of what it is, without any need for perspective or architecture. (200)

Some of the Ortegan terms have now become taboo in certain academic circles. The term 'spiritual', for example, is regarded with suspicion, if not misinterpreted or rejected on the basis of a hasty equation with religious matters. Yet, if the explanation offered in the foregoing chapter is taken into account, and if, for example, another term is substituted for 'spiritual', e.g., 'scientific reliability', 'academic quality', etc., the Ortegan criticism seems to still stand as tenable. Indeed it could not be denied that life takes place in a present tense, but the Ortegan criticism seems to imply that such a truism is either distorted or taken advantage of, when the journalist reduces the present to the 'momentary', and even the 'momentary' to the sensational, or the entertaining, or the marketable character of the factual information to be offered. Ortega could have added that sometimes nativistic loyalties or ethnocentricities, or even the sloganish remarks pitched at public popularity, do make of journalism a dangerous activity for the'mission of the university'. Little modification seems to be called forth in the following attack:

> The result is that, in the public consciousness today, the image of the world appears exactly upside down. The space devoted to people and affairs in the press is inversely proportionate to their substantial and enduring importance; what stands out in the columns of the newspapers and maga-

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(200) Ibid., p. 98.

> zines is what will be a 'success' and bring notoriety. Were the periodicals to be freed from motives that are often unspeakable; were the dailies kept chastely aloof from any influence of money in their opinions -- the press would still, of itself, forsake its proper mission and paint the world inside out. Not a little of the grotesque and general upset of our age -- (for Europe has been going along for some time now with her head on the ground and her plebeian feet waving in the air) -- is the result of this unchallenged sway of the press as the sole 'spiritual power'." (201)

The situation indeed has not changed much for now radio, television, the cinema, and other of the so-called 'mass communication media' could be added to the journalistic category that Ortega criticizes. The geographical expression 'Europe' could also be expanded to include vast areas of the western and non-western worlds, "free, non-free, and otherwise". It appears, then, to be still valid that it is a question of life and death for the world to put this ridiculous situation to rights. According to Ortega if this is to be done the university must intervene, as a university, in current affairs. It is, no doubt, one of the best candidates to present unbiased points of view that are 'culturally', 'professionally', and 'scientifically' qualified -- to use Ortega's own terms.

Any misinterpretation that could have been induced by the Ortegan concern for students, or any accusation that could be made against him on the grounds of "anarchical agitation", may be dismissed now as he relates that point with the 'additional' role of the university:

> Thus it will not be an institution exclusively for students, a retreat ad usum Delphini. In the thick of life's urgencies and its passions, the university must assert itself as a major 'spiritual power', higher than the press, standing for serenity in the midst of frenzy, for seriousness and the grasp of intellect in the face of frivolity and unashamed stupidity.

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(201) Mission, pp. 98-99.

> Then the university, once again, will come to be what it was in its grand hour: an uplifting principle in the history of the western world. (202)

It is hoped that with the above discussion the complete 'mission' of the university has been essentially discussed in its two facets: what the university is, primarily, and what the university should be "in addition".

The final remarks will consist of a succint reminder of the basic assumptions upon which Ortega constructs his higher educational theory. The nuances of its development have been already discussed in some detail. But the skeletal groundwork needs perhaps to be reinstated: man always lives within a historical context. His life is made of a peculiar and almost indescriptible substance which could be referred to as 'his times', or 'the times'. While the non-human living entity is always a 'first entity' in the sense that its particular life is nothing but the debut of being a living entity, man has inherited an undeniable past and hence -- as a successor of a series of past human experiences -- there is a significant portion of his being and possibilities that cannot be avoided. In this sense his range of choice is limited, and such is the way in which Ortega uses the term 'destiny'. Man has been a series of phenomenal factii, and there is a constructive sense in which he cannot continue to exhaust his possibilities, and rather has to determine another series of elements concerning "what he has to be". The university must realize that individual life is already essentially historical, and its historicity belongs precisely to the life of each

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(202) Ibid., p. 99.

person. This is why "... in order to understand that which is human, personal or collective, it is necessary to tell a story...." (203) Men and nations do certain things because, as a part of a historically given cultural matrix they must combine those forces and elements with the range of possibilities which, as an individual, are allowed by the human condition. By the same token, the human individual is not the debut of mankind. Within his circumstantial plexus of culture, he finds other men and the society which is produced, by for, and among themselves. Hence, this humanity, i.e., the one that begins to be developed within himself as an individual, follows another humanity that already has been developed and perhaps culminated. In sum, individual humanity receives the accumulation of a mode of existential being that has already been forged, and that ergo is not there for him to invent, but simply to receive as the site of his own placement. (204) And such is the assumption upon which the university must be built; the 'human destiny' to which Ortega constantly makes reference. The other task of the university is, of course, to provide as much as possible the needed security for existence, since man is always forced 'to do something' in order to find meaning in his life. The provision of an understanding of my human condition, of my own being, and that of my life with myself, and with

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(203) In Spanish "to tell a story" is synonimous of "to tell a history", if the term historia is used -- as in the present instance -- instead of cuento (short story). Therefore, the story told by a human person has a twofold implication: in a sense such a story is predetermined as a 'historical reality'; in another, the story reflects a range of choices and possibilities related both to organic potential and cultural awareness. In this manner, the egocentric predicament is avoided, and the human condition becomes 'socio-historical' rather than historical per se, in a strictly solipsistic sense.

(204) "Historia como sistema," Obras Completas, VI (1932), pp. 40-43.

others, is the task for the university, whose ideal attitude to the professions, to culture, and to science has been already explaned.

In sum, the mission of the university presupposes the priority of preparing a science of man over the preparation of a man of science. Man is a circumstantial being, and science -- as pure reason -- is only a part, however important, of his circumstantial complex. To invert the equation is only to falsify the raison d'être of higher education.

CHAPTER VII

RECAPITULATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will attempt to make an evaluation of Ortega y Gasset as a general philosopher. In many respects it will simply elaborate on statements already made, and its general intention is one of providing a conclusive tone to the topics and subtopics encountered during the development of the investigation. Strictly with the purpose of becoming aware of the types of problems to be found with a type of 'doing philosophy' which in more ways than one could be considered as 'foreign' to the customary Anglo-Saxon mind, the foregoing discussion of the Ortegan concepts more closely related to education seems to yield at least one solid result: José Ortega y Gasset is not a systematic philosopher in the most widely accepted sense of the expression. Such a finding seems to agree with other findings. If we are to believe in the testimony of scholars generally described as competent, and who have studied the man for a number of years, there seems to be sufficient agreement to the thesis that Ortega is not a systematic philosopher, if by 'systematic' we understand the type of thinker who builds a coherent, highly detailed account of the traditional 'philosophic' problems, such as 'being', 'existence', 'knowledge', and 'value'. Ortega does not seem to rank with the category of thinker usually pictured when, for example the names of Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl -- and many others -- are recalled.

On the other hand, however, the tremendous scope of the Ortegan writings posits an almost unsurmountable difficulty that becomes

literally physical once serious study is attempted. One is never sure, or absolutely certain, of the desired answers, and the doubt always seems to haunt the mind that perhaps the explanations sought after could be found in some hidden little article, or in more transparent notes for a lecture that was never delivered, or in his oral conversational classroom discussions -- which unfortunately were never recorded, or preserved in some other way.

Two relatively secure facts could be invoked at this point: in the first place most of the serious minded scholars who attended the different universities in which Ortega taught do seem to agree on the fact that he was a clearer speaker than an explicit writer. This phenomenon is possibly due to his conscious effort to keep a written stylistic reputation. Spanish is a language whose tonal gradations and rhythmic euphony are zealuously kept by most writers using it to express themselves. Even orally enunciated, such values are often placed by a professional orator well over informality, clarity, and casualness, although more license is usually allowed in classroom conversation. In this sense, English -- and especially American English -- seems to be more aloof to lyrical euphony which in many a case is completely sacrificed to an alleged search for pedagogic clarity. Such a cultural trait will always seemingly stand between Spanish and English, and hence why the Anglo-Saxon complains about the Latin immolation of explicitness to beauty, as often as the Spanish-speaker considers the opposite operation an unmentionable crime. As a result of this, what the Latin often regards as the proper way to convey academic material often becomes an intolerable mannerism to the Anglo-Sacon counterpart. Ortega seems to be carried-away by such an "objectionable preoccupation", and in this sense

a difference could perhaps be established between his conversational, and his literary 'languages'. Without the intention of being scientifically hypothetical, in the Anglo-Saxon sense, the writer submits such a consideration in the way of an explanation for many cultural misunderstandings that prove to be almost hopelessly puzzling for both sides. Brazilia, as a beautiful capital city whose administrative inhabitants had to 'commute' for hundreds of miles, due to lack of practical facilities for survival; and some of the aesthetically stunning buildings in the campus of the National University of Mexico, which later were found with serious functional defects, are two examples that could be offered in the way of an illustration of these two opposing vital values.

The peculiar practicality of esthetic appeal is then a factor that appears to be in the way of "good, sound, Anglo-Saxon analysis", especially with philosophers like Ortega y Gasset. Yet, many a case has been made for the vital utility of artistic objects, and this is not the place to prove it for the skeptical logician or radical pragmatist. The explanation is simply offered as an indication of cultural divergence, and as a possible interpretation of the difficulties faced by the analytic mind when facing the Ortegan pensamiento. In this sense, then, it is reiterated that most of the Ortegan writings do have a powerful esthetic element, and should also be regarded as a display of objectiveness, such as the one offered by works of art.

The other factor to be considered is that, as in a good work of art, there seems to be a coherence to the overall picture of the Ortegan complete works. The essential themes of such a total quality have been discussed in some detail throughout the foregoing chapters, and should speak for themselves at this point. What the writer wishes to reinstate

is the integrated quality of the themes of existence, life, and culture. The Ferraterian comment quoted in Chapter II could be repeated now: "... the more carefully we look at the strokes of the brush, the more consistent and organized appears to be the picture ...." In this sense of the term, Ortega indeed constructed a system, but if by 'system' we mean a well-organized, carefully constructed opus which exhausts, one by one, all or most of the logical implications suggested by each metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological issue, there is no system in the Ortegan quest for vital reason.

On the other hand too, the writer wonders how fair it would be to demand the customary and traditional systematic approach of a man who, by definition and pre-established intent, did not wish to be a systematic thinker in the classical manner. Instances have been given of the fact that Ortega did not want to write in the highly structured way usually followed by the pure philosopher, and at times he reveals a distaste for the classical method of philosophizing. If one remains respectful of the assumptions that underlie the Ortegan construct, the demand for a tremendous definitional treatise, followed by deductive and formally organized steps, in the usual way, does not appear to be entirely just. Ortega, indeed, was not the man to complete a task similar to the transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, and he appears to have thought that his calling was a different one.

In effect, Ortega deliberately chose to write in newspapers because "... it was necessary to perform certain lyrical seduction towards philosophical problems in a non-philosophical manner...." This task of seduction appears to be carried out with entire success, since -- as mentioned in earlier chapters -- the Ortegan influence has been great,

especially among his language brothers. And, as one of Ortega's lingüistic compatriots, the writer agrees with the strategy. With people who feel little inclination, behavioral and otherwise, to be 'philosophical' in the ordinary systematic sense, a literary trick might be necessary.

Thus, in this manner, Ortega tried to have Spanish-speaking people read "philosophy" without being aware that they were doing so. And here he was much more true to his existential aim than many other philosophers who have received the same classification. Such a task is also one to which the prgamatist would feel sympathetic, since both he and the existentialist seem to share the assumption that philosophy is of little human importance if restricted to isolated, élite-reaching exercises. Although analysts, positivists, and some rationalists would doubtlessly differ among themselves, it would appear that, aside from granting to ordinary language the category of philosophical criterion, the technicalities proper of formal-logic and other epistemological tools would still be reserved to a selected few. The argument here appears to be that a philosophy considered useful by popular demand would be as "impure" as popular physics, or applied mechnics in terms of their "pure" counterparts. The role of the 'philosopher' is perceived as similar to that of the pure physicist, or the theoretical maethematician, who need the engineer in order to have their findings useful. But the fact still remains that there is a difference between 'popularizing philosophy' by decreasing its technical importance, and making philosophy useful for behavioral or axiological improvement. Ortega's task seems to have been the latter, rather than the former, and the confusion needs to be elucidated as he purported to have it.

In this regard he appears to have an extremely persuasive justi-

fication, as well as a convincing criticism of the epistemologically oriented philosophies. If analysts, for example, see themselves as purifiers of the cognitive enterprise, as clarifiers of equivocal and "multivocal" language, and as non-subjective directors of axiological behavior, their essential task is then one of translation. Most of their "translations", though, have in turn to be translated to the average scientist and the average artist, not to mention the average man. We seem to be in a desperate need to have these second-rated translators, since the very sins condemned by the "first translators" are bound to be increasingly multiplied, as the average scientist, or artist, decides to philosophize on the problems of his own discipline, in absence of the "second translation". Example: the fields of literature, psychology, and sociology, wherein self-appointed "philosophers" have showered both the academic, and lay worlds with countless "conclusions" on Shakespeare, juvenile-delinquency, and sex-drives, all in the name of research. Empirical observation, factual gathering, statistics, and induction, seem to have been exalted as the only possible media for knowledge. On the other hand, certain terms like "spiritual", "intuition", and "opinion" appear to be carefully avoided, and banned from the "learned world", while other expressions like "academic reliability", "insight", and "hypothesis" (which in many cases do seem to have the same meaning as the forbidden ones) are widely used in the current, scientific literature.

The appalling conclusion seems to be that many modern philosophers (mostly the secondary figures) spend a great deal of time writing for each other, and competing as to the number of articles that are finally published by the generally respected specialized journals. The translations that these secondary philosophers make of the most important ones

are not readable by the average scientist, or artist, and thus a lifetime of undeniable dedication and work is usually devoted to graduate class-work, and several short essays that go to specialized journals, to be read by specialized people. An occasional book or two, with few exceptions, also follow the above course. They criticize each other in true dialectic fashion, observing all the rules of the game. In most cases the articles are refutations, or modifications of argumentative theses, often expressed in semi-mathematical form. And so the formal machine continues its uninterrupted exercise, indulging in the activities that are pleasing to its participants, or "fulfill their vital needs" as an esoteric minority group. Often the pure philosophers voice and open distaste for their 'applied' counterparts, by sumgly remarking that a former colleague "went into social science", or "... if now in education", as if he had not proven capable of following the customary, expected behavior. Such is the routine that Ortega defied, by trying to maintain the seriousness of his problems while, at the same time, attempting to be read by his compatriots. The writer contends as a conclusive stance that such a course of action was revolutionary, original, and truly 'educational' in aim and effect. In support of such a contention the fact might be adduced that Ortega's intellectual capacity and perceptive judgment -- as shown in his writings -- was of a sufficient caliber to have allowed him to pursue the customary career of teaching, and writing, esoteric material. Whatever criticism is made of his supposedly truistic contention that life is the most immediate reality, he indeed talks about this reality much more often than he talks about "talk of reality". The same factual finding could be presented in his talk about knowledge, and his talk about value. Otherwise, the circularity implied in the activity of

translators, who, in turn, need other translators, could dangerously be perpetuated ad nauseam, and the phenomenon of 'talk about talk' becomes a lofty exercise of a nature entirely different from the relationship between pure and applied science. There is no denying to the fact that the gap between pure and applied science has been adequately filled in the technological world, whereas it continues to be a critical void between pure analytic philosophy, and the philosophies 'of' behavioral science, education, and the humanistic enterprises.

The writer, then, wishes to support the basic Ortegan thesis, as interpreted in the foregoing chapters. Man is a living entity, and not everything in his life is purely rational. Two overwhelming tools are at his disposal: his rationality and his vital energy. The former has produced a spectacular display of physico-natural or technological progress, while the other appears to be present in most of his artistic and esthetic manifestations, not to mention his religious inclination. It seems sensible that unilateral emphasis on either one of the two forces is undesirable. If the human objectified form is going to deserve the name 'human', both pure reason, and vital drives appear to be worthy of such a name. The Sistine Chapte1, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or the literature derived from ecstatic 'holiness', appear to be as magnificently human as the arrival to flawless logical argument, computers that design other computers, quantum physics, and semantic analyses.

Obviously the difficulties posited by the systematization of a philosophy that recognizes the inclusion of the above differentiation as an enterprise which is also 'philosophical', are enormous. But there seems to be a great deal of expediency to the relegation of these problems to the realm of psychology on the grounds that they have little cognitive

worth. And, precisely, a logical consideration of the problem appears to reveal that the dismissal of propositions of the type "X is difficult", and their consideration as if they were equivalent to propositions of the kind "X is irrelevant", are faulty inferences. Their lack of proof -- in the ordinary sense of empirical evidence -- also appears to be faulty ground for the dismissal of difficulties of this type. If this is done, the whole question is erroneously resolved by resorting to one of the simplest ad ignorantiam fallacies: e.g., "Since the vitalistic philosophers have been unable to prove their point, and since no one, thus far, has been able to prove it, therefore the question must be either false or irrelevant". It is for the above reason that the writer wishes to support the serious study of vitalistic, existential, and phenomenological theories, since many of the problems treated by them are of 'human importance', as defined, and do not necessarily posit mutual exclusiveness in terms of the cognitive preoccupations that seem to be typical of most contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophies.

In the judgement of this writer, the Ortegan answer has undeniable merit. Since non-cognitive manifestations cannot be placed -- as 'human' -- on a mutually exclusive basis, reason needs the vital impulses, and these, in turn, need reason. He envisioned a new type of reason, in which he tried to maintain that the powers of pure reason would not be as sharply divided or separated from the vital concerns, as the present situation appears to be. There seems to be little refutation of the implications of his main stance: through an exclusive use of 'pure reason' man has developed certain highly refined tools that could lead to his own destruction. And the gap between the mastery of man's natural resources (the physical environment) and the mastery of his own destiny (as defined in

Chapter VI) seems to be an appalling one. Man is now almost the master of his immediately physical environment, and yet in his political or social life, for example, he still behaves with an unmatching, and pathetic "immaturity". Specialized scientists have acquired unsuspected physical power, while strong and influential nations behave like quarreling youths. Pure reason has failed to place itself at the service of 'life', i.e., of social, political, ethical, and economic leadership, not only for the sake of a consistent unity of concrete values, but also for the sake of mere physical survival. Physico-natural science has succeeded in prolonging human life, while education, and other institutions now subdued to power structures mostly based upon sheer physical and economic power, are bluntly pushed to solve certain problems that have been precisely created by the unrestricted exercise of 'pure reason', at least in good part. Population explosions, ignorance, mediocrity, inequality, human exploitation, and constant violations of human dignity or freedom, are among these problems.

In the above sense, a concept which Ortega named 'vital reason' -- its inception and development -- truly appears to be the "problem of our times". To use Ortegan terms, the development of this tool has to constitute the bridge between life at the service of pure reason, and a reasonable use of reason at the service of life. It appears that, without this bridge, and without the development of a new way of looking at the uncontrolled explosion of technologically applied knowledge, mankind seems to be doomed. Such a "reasonable reason" has the possibility of making us culturally literate, as opposed to the 'cultural illiteracy' -- lack of vital reason -- which has paralyzed entire portions of the world's population.

To think that the progress made by technological science is a

a good insurance policy is to have excessive confidence in the purely rational powers behind its formal structure. In this sense, the writer concurs with Ortega, and wishes to express that such purely rational wealth is not a sufficient guarantee. Unless we learn to apply the uneven development of pure reason, as defined, we could be compared to children playing with dynamite. Such a 'learning' is perceived by the writer strictly as an educational task, which must be performed, lest the whole world be blown-up, hence disturbing the quiet work of researchers and formal logicians. This is the great value of pragmatically oriented philosophies: if the results of research are not "learned to be applied", the great achievements of knowledge in our hands, would again allow us to be compared with children playing with dynamite. The paradoxical exclusivity of pure reason in technology and life may well resemble a perfectly well constructed tractor that has been let loose in a chinaware shop: no fault of the machine, it could be perfectly constructed from a scientific and technical viewpoint, but other man-made things could be destroyed. Such as the objects in a china shop (many of them not too scientific, or logical, some of them perhaps rather frail and easily destructible) many human creations may suffer as a consequence of the misuse, or abuse, of the very achievements of scientific reason.

Regardless of the Ortegan success or failure in his task of discussing vital reason, it cannot be denied that we need to become universally and humanly "reasonable", with a different kind of reason. We seem to need a "logic of life", as badly as we need one of syllogistic, formal perfection. Ortega seems to have been aware of the fact that we need a logic of the heart, similar to the Pascalian <u>logique du coeur</u>, but wihtou the post-card sentimentality. In this logic, which he tried

to display through his writings, he attempted to show an ingredient of cultural awareness, i.e., of consciousness of our own human situation, which joins physical dimension to social obligation, culture to science, and what men do to what man is, vitally speaking. It has been shown that the Ortegan notion of culture tries to fuse both the socio-scientific, and the Germanic objectifying sense of the term. He also adds a human necessity to be aware of what man has done, as a powerful determining factor of what he is.

It should be obvious that this is the type of awareness that must be cultivated by the educational enterprise. Lacking a detailed program, which evidently was left to teachers and specialized researchers, Ortega placed education at the service of cultural awareness, while on the other hand, placed scientific knowledge at the service of education, instead of vice-versa.

Speaking of knowledge, it should be obvious that this is the philosophical area where the Ortegan scheme presents its most difficult problem. Since his whole theory of higher education appears to be conditioned by his epistemological stance, and since such an aspect seems to be the most important one for his Anglo-Saxon readers it is convenient to reach conclusive findings at this point.

When most Anglo-Saxon readers, face the Ortegan construct, the first bothering factor is precisely the self-sufficiency of the claim. How does Ortega so surely know that his answer is the true one? Wherein does reside the justification for the emphatic use of final expressions such as 'genuine', 'true', 'real', as opposed to the firm manner in which he rejects certain concepts as being 'false', 'inauthentic', and 'unreal'? The technicalities of the problem must be, then, faced again,

before any conclusive stance could be offered in terms of his merit as a philosopher of education.

A scrutiny of the essay Ni Vitalismo ni Racionalismo reveals perhaps the most "systematic" of the Ortegan efforts to explain in what sense his philosophy was vitalistic, and in what other sense it was not rationalistic. (205). It has been shown that the Ortegan scheme does not have the intention of being vitalistic in the Bergsonian sense, nor does it have the purpose of becoming rationalistic in the sense that it charges the use of reason with the quality of being irrational. Ortega denies that knowledge could be assimilated to a biological process to be understood by means of general organic laws. Biological intuitionism is also rejected on the Kantian basis that there is no such thing as a strictly intellectual or theoretical intuition. Knowledge necessarily implies judgment, and (according to Ortega) it is absolutely irrefutable that reality must be approached from a conceptual framework, if we expect to find any theoretical significance about it.

It has been already shown that the reasons for the rejection of vitalism were anticipated in El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo, where Ortega hoped to prove that human thought can be studied both from a biological and a cognitive viewpoints, without necessarily implying that the adequate concepts for its logical evaluation should be reduced to a biological question. (206) To place the issue within an analytic framework, Ortega is simply saying that thought finds its justification in subjective life, not in the sense that true thoughts are those that have a vital utility,

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(205) III, (1924), pp. 270, ff.

(206) III, (1923), pp. 164, ff.

but rather in the sense that it is only in subjective life that such a justification may take place. Other students of Ortega seem to agree with such a finding:

> My life is the center of everything that has significance for me; it is only insofar as something is given within my life, that it becomes meaningful to me. To say, therefore, that thought finds its justification in my life does not mean that every person justifies his thought in terms of vital necessities, although it is a fact that thought is originated as a vital necessity. I justify my affirmations by appealing to the nature of things, but such a justification, by itself, does occur and does have a meaning only within the scope of my life. Utterance of the above remarks could be equated to saying that the process of giving reasons, that constitutes the justification of a given thought, is a process by means of which I hope to show that my thought is adjusted to an objective reality, but such a process is given in my life, or in human life. (207)

Ortega himself provides the occassion to conjecture that the above interpretation is a correct one, since the whole question appears to be succintly focused in one of his many hidden footnotes:

> ... on loosing its exclusive ascription to somatic meanings, the science of life, the logos of bios becomes a fundamental knowledge in terms of which all the other knowledges are dependent, including logics, and, of course, physics and traditional biology, i.e., the science of organized bodies. (208)

There seems to be, then, no question that philosophy must be the logos of bios, and that this basic task should not lead into believing that philosophy must become biology in the ordinary "scientific" sense. Human life must be the subject-matter of philosophical reflection, and only in this sense it appears legitimate to 'biologize' the philosophical activities. Therefore, it is only by implication that we must

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(207) Juárez-Paz, Rigoberto, "Una Nota sobre el Vitalismo de Ortega y Gasset", Revista Humanidades, Vol. III, N. 10, Imprenta Universitaria, Guatemala, 1963, p. 3 (Translation by the writer).

(208) III (1923), p. 167.

consider the rest of the Ortegan writings as his own method to add substance to the skeletal task. Otherwise we would be forced to wait in vain for a more detailed characterization of human life. Ortega never gave it in an explicit, manual-like manner. His unorganized, non-systematic, approach, seems to reveal that the expected task always left him unconcerned. While negativistic criticism appears easy to find, there have been attempts that suggest an explanation of such an attitutde, as well as an element of justification. One of the most recent commentaries reads as follows:

> Those of us who feel inclined to judge conceptions of the philosophic task, based rather on the results of such conceptions, must remember that a conception of the philosophic task may already include important philosophical notions. What I am suggesting is not precisely that the attempt to clarify the nature of philosophy is in itself a philosophical task, but rather that a philosophical conception may well be the consequence of philosophical convictions that are important in themselves. In a certain sense, a sizeable portion of the philosophical works of Ortega are respective attempts for a self-clarification of why our contemporary philosophers must be vitalistic, i.e., of why is it that they must reflect upon the nature of human life, rather than, for example, upon the posibility of knowledge.
> But, of course, even those who agree to the contention that philosophy must be devoted to the study of human life may wish to ask: What have you D. Jose Ortega y Gasset found about it? Where is your logos of bios? Yet, there are good reasons to think that Ortega would have not considered such a demand as one being entirely just. (209)

The "good reasons" appear to be of a metaphysical, rather than an epistemological character. A general characterization of human life is approached by Ortega only sporadically, and always with the implication that such a task is not as important as the one of proving that the study of human existence is an imperative one. This is possibly the reason

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(209) Cf., Juárez Paz, op.cit., p.4.

why Julián Marías finds more Spanish "existentialism" in Unamuno than Ortega. (210) Conclusively, then, the writer submits that Ortega coincides with some philosophers of existence in those sporadic attempts, which appear to be dealt with only in passing, and with a lack of systematic effort. (211) This finding is an important one, because it allows to take a conclusive stance regarding the 'existential' elements in Ortega. He definitely appears to think that existential philosophy is important, not because of the characterization that existential philosophers have given of life, but rather because of the philosophical considerations that make a necessity out of the study of human life.

The metaphysical orientation of Ortega is evident. A study of one of his posthumous works reveals, again in a footnote, such a trend. Very often Ortega's footnotes contain the systematization of undeveloped theses, whose schematic treatment one in vain seeks throughout the textual body:

> In 1925 I expressed my theme -- and some of my disciples should be able to remember it --by literally saying that: (1) the traditional problem of being (metaphysics) must be radically renewed; (2) this is to be done by means of the phenomenological method to the extent, and only to the extent, that such

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(210) Marías, Julián, El Existencialismo en España, Bogotá, 1953.

(211) This thesis appears to be hinted in many passages of Ortega's work. A classical example may be found in VI (1941), pp. 32-35: "Historia como Sistema", wherein he likens life to a present, rather than a past participle: "... life's mode of being is not a concluded already been, not even as a simple existence, since the only thing that is given to us, and that appears to be there when there is human life, is to have to make it, each one his own. Life is a gerundio (present participle) and not a past participle: a faciendum and not a factum.... Human life, therefore, is not an entity that accidentaly changes, but rather on the contrary, the 'substance' of it is precisely change, which means that life cannot be Eleatically thought of, as a substance...."

> a method could be interpreted as a synthetic or intuitive thought, and not merely conceptual-abstract, such as the traditional logical mode of thought; (3) but the phenomenological method must be integrated by the acquisition of a dimension of systematic thought that it appears to be lacking, as it is already known; (4) and lastly, in order to achieve the possibility of thinking a systematic phenomenological thought, it is necessary to use, as a point of departure, a phenomenon that constitutes a system in itself. Such a systematic phenomenon is human life, and one must begin with its intuition and analysis. (212)

It should be noted as paradoxically peculiar that Ortega precisely finds a system where the analytical scholar does not see it. This is why the writer wishes to clarify that his conclusive remarks concerning the asystematic character of the Ortegan speculation should be valid only insofar as the definition of 'system' is maintained within the limits already established. But the important aspect of the above quote is Ortega's allusion to the phenomenological method, which is precisely regarded by Husserl as a highly systematic attempt for apodictic cognition. This is a noteworthy deviation of the Ortegan scheme from the classical sources that supposedly nourish existential thought, and that are generally attributed to the Cartesian modes of speculative reasoning, as modified by Brentano and Husserl. (213)

An article entitled in English: "Crisis of the Intellectual and

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(212) Ortega y Gasset, José, La Idea de Principio en Leibniz, p. 332, as quoted by Juárez-Paz in op.cit., p. 5.

(213) This is not the place to indulge in a lengthy explanation of phenomenology as a method. Extensive sources are now available in the English language to be consulted by the interested reader who wishes to become involved in the highly technical implications of this approach, commonly held as still directly responsible for a methodology that has greatly influenced Continental European literature, philosophy, and humanistic science, especially sociology and psychology. Such a task is well beyond the scope of the present dissertation, and could constitute a lifetime program. An initial breach could be opened by a careful exploration of A.T.

Crisis of the Intellect", in a part bearing the subtitle of 'Historical Character of Cognition' provides a rather clear and concise account of Ortega's possition in this issue. (214) In this essay, especially its appendix, Ortega offers his refutation of phenomenology as a method, a task about which a succinct advance was made in Chapter IV of this thesis. He calls a philosophy 'naïve or unjustified' when it leaves outside its doctrinal body the very motives from which it springs, and accuses Husserlian phenomenology of making such a mistake. According to Ortega, Husserl failed to recognize as a constitutive part of his philosophy the facts that prompted its creation. The refutation is interesting

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(213) Tymieniecka's Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought, (Noonday Press, N.Y., 1962), and a much more satisfactory coverage would be possible by studying M. Farber's The Foundation of Phenomenology (Paine-Whitman, N.Y., 1962) or books such as T. Langan's The Meaning of Heidegger,(Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y., 1961). Of very recent translation into English, phenomenological and existential works are only beginning to be examined by interested Anglo-Saxon scholars, and systematic studies and translations are now being published. Among others, the Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) series, is worth mentioning. Husserl's Logical Investigations, and the Ideas (General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, (Cromwell-Collier Publishing, Co., 1962) ought to provide at least an awareness of the problems involved in the topic. The reader is advised to see pages 205-208 for a schematic description of Husserl's method. And, of course, the reader of German and French would have the undeniable advantage of being able to consult direct sources; of these the ones published by the following printers are particularly recommmended: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther Holzboog) Gegrundet 1727, Stuttgart Bad Cannstatt, and Universitatsbuchhandlung; Max Hueber, 8000 Munchen 13, Amalienstr. 75/79; and Editore Boringhieri, Torino, Casella postale 225. The writer has also obtained interesting information from Mario Casalini Ltd., 1519 Pine Avenue West, Montreal 25, P.Q.

(214) Concord and Liberty (English translation of Del imperio romano) W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., N.Y., 1946, pp. 63-82.

because in the process of the criticism, Ortega reveals the openly metaphysical character of his own thought. His thesis is that most philosophies are wont to begin abruptly as a series of theses on reality or on the principles of truth, without explaining philosophically why it should be needful to make such statements. This necessity has the character of a first principle, and to state it in Ortegan terms: "What impels man to philosophize forms part of the philosophical theory itself". (215) Philosophy, as an occupation that demands self-justification, must of necessity include it within the very structure of its exposition:

> Else its claim would remain a mere arrogant, impotent gesture, and it would be but another form of sleepwalking. Only if men cannot help making philosophy and being philosophers can the existence of both be borne with. And, I repeat, not for reasons of social intercourse, not in order to assert itsefl against the hostile opinion of other people, but because otherwise it would be meaningless to itself, must philosophy include in its own anatomy the organs of its own justification. (216)

The evidence offered by Ortega in support of the above contentions is one of factual-historical character. Contrary to specialized sciences, philosophy has always been demanded of human beings, both as a differentiating factor from animal life, and as the most-inclusive discipline. Even men of science -- as opposed to specialized sciences themselves -- have not been able to evade the norm. Regardless of how euphemistically the matter is dealt with, such has been the case for the last twenty six centuries:

> Philosophy carries inside itself an inalienable violence which stands in marked contrast to the peaceful disposition developed by the philosophical guild after their first steps

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(215) Op. cit., p. 78.

(216) Ibid., p. 77.

> in history.... The existence of philosophy in the world signifies, tacitly or blatantly, that a living being who has none is little better than a brute.... After the heroic age of philosophy in Ionia and Magna Graecia, in Miletus and Elea, philosophers contrived to sugar-coat the insult. In the Apology Socrates says: 'A life without philosophy is not livable for man'. And in Aristotle we read: 'All the other sciences which are not philosophy are more necessary, but none is more important than philosophy'. Deduct the euphemism, and you are left with the insult. (217)

Locke's remark that our task in this world is not to know all things but only to know those relevant to our conduct is used by Ortega to show the difference between limitative, and self-inclusive justification. The declaration that only what concerns conduct must be regarded as knowledge proper guarantees nothing; is a vague indication of an alienated statement; and "leaves philosophy in a situation worse than that of chose other sciences (physics and mathematics).... " (218) It appears to Ortega that Locke is satisfied with the stark enunciation of such a proposition, neither founding nor analyzing it. The Spanish thinker seems to believe that if we remain at such a level, no transcendence has been effected beyond the realm of mere opinion. But if such a contention is taken seriously, along with the inevitable sequel of proving its validity, we can see that the statement acquires sudden, vital meaning:

> Ipso facto Locke's limp phrase therewith acquires vigor and urgency and reveals that its philosophical significance lies in its positive rather than in its negative meaning. Now, to Locke himself his assertion, as he actually depended on it for making his philosophy, possessed in fact this positive meaning. What traditionally bore the name philosophy did not satisfy him. He did not formulate his opinion as a thesis but he practiced it as such. (219)

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(217) Ibid., p. 77.

(218) Ibid., p. 79.

(219) Ibid., pp. 79-80.

Thus, knowledge is not something substantive in its own right but a function of human life. An it has been already said that life is a task. The conclusive schema, as applied to the example of the Lockean prolegomenon shows the dependence that knowledge has, in terms of life, within the Ortegan philosophy. As shown by his notes on thinking, the conclusive process is as follows:

(1) - Human existence in the world is a task, it has no indication of Parmenidean given, its course consists of a faciendum... not a factum: an Eleatic premise.

(2) - The task consists not so much of cognizing, i.e., gathering factual evidence, and exercising logical formulations, but rather it consists of 'conducting ourselves' (behaving and acting).

(3) - Therefore, knowledge becomes a necessary task only insofar as it is required by 'conduct'. Only in this light does the Lockean statement acquire philosophical significance beyond the exercise of 'pure reason', for its own sake:

> Those are three fundamental philosophical principles which Locke's philosophy was unaware of but which, operating inside it, were instrumental in its creation. And in this implied philosophy that was left standing before the door, the official Lockean doctrine would, to boot, have found its justification. (220)

Obviously, Ortega implies that the vital significance of a given philosophy must be made a part if its systematic structure, thus avoiding the hypostatic belief in cognitive activity or formal exercise,

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(220) Concord., p. 80.

as an enterprise of intrinsic worth. It is hoped that the foregoing discussion suffices as a conclusive presentation of the form in which a vitalistic philosophy, such as the Ortegan one, views the problem of knowledge.

The other task proposed by this dissertation, i.e., the distinction between Ortegan vitalism, and phenomenology, can be resumed now, hopefully with added clarity. To Ortega, Husserl's weakness resides in the fact that phenomenology soon became a formal, independent activity (knowledge for its own sake) and not an activity linked with its nondoctrinal origin, on which it depended. Husserl failed to see that any formal doctrine is inseparable from its nondoctrinal beginnings. Philosophy is made for the sake of pre-tehoretical and "a-theoretical needs and conveniences". These non-systematic beginnings are not vague because of their a-theoretical character, but rather vivid, precise, and existent. Hence why the must condition "... most determinately the intellectual exercise called reason...." (221) If Locke practically posits knowledge as a'function of life, Husserl presents reason as a 'function of humanity', humanity being defined as the totality of human beings, past and present. (222)

But Ortega implies that neither Locke, nor the German philosopher

(221) Ibid., p. 80.

(222) Ortega specifically alludes to a passage of Husserl's Formale und Transzcendentale Logik(Max Niemeyer Halle, 1929), pp. 4,5, in which the alienation of modern man is attributed to the fact that sciences have lost faith in themselves, and their absolute meaning. Very clearly, Husserl notes here that modern man of our day in contrast with the man of the Englihtment Era, does not anymore conceive of science and civilization as the self-objectivation of human reason, nor as the universal function created before the need for a more satisfactory individual and social life directed by practical reason. Husserl also calls this faith the Great Faith, and describes it as the belief that science leads to wisdom, and specifically indicates that this loss of faith is responsible for man's baffled hesitation before a world in which people strive in

made this point with the emphatic seriousness it deserves.

It should be obvious, then, that to Ortega phenomenology as the method for apodictic knowledge, devised by Husserl, transcended the needed preoccupation about human life that constitutes the justification of philosophy. It is necessary to state this point technically and conclusively, thus completing the already advanced remarks on this subtopic.

The analysis and characterization of reason made by Husserl in his "Formal and Transcendental Logic" posit is as an extrinsic activity in terms of humanity, of life, and of the functional character in the use of reason. Ortega's vitalistic stance does not accept Husserl's realm of pure experiences, and rather declares that the Reine Erlebnisse have nothing to do with life, being just the opposite. The supporting argumentation of the point is brief enough to be quoted in its entirety:

> Husserl, like all idealistic philosophers of whom he is the last representative, begins with affirming as the basic fact of maximum evidence that reality constitutes itself in consciousness of reality -- for instance, in consciousness of (the real world) which consists principally in the conscious acts called perceptions. The actual reality of this world is relative -- namely, relative to this consciousness of it that I have. But as reality precluded relativity, this means that the reality of the

(222) vain to find the purpose and meaning of their doing, that were once so clearly known and fully acknowledged by intellect and will. He also implies that such a faith was 'great' because once it even took the place of religious faith. Ortega, in turn, declared that reading about these phenomena, especially in Husserl, had deeply moved him: first because of the catastrophic future they foretell; secondly, because Husserl (a great mathematician and logician) is an 'extreme rationalist', whose philosophy is unrivaled as the quintessence of formal exercise; thirdly because a man like Husserl would never dare to say something he had not 'seen'; fourthly because the Husserlian remarks are a fact that transcends and encompasses science proper; and lastly because such a factual situation must have been so obvious and pressing that even Husserl in his seclusion became bothered by it, and could not help seeing it.

> world, being relative to consciousness of it, is problematic and only my consciousness of (the reality of the world) has absolute reality. The reality of my consciousness of something is relative to itself for according to Husserl's and all idealisms, consciousness is conscious of itself, or in other words, it is immediate to itself. (For all this, cf. the article by León Dujovne, "Ortega y Gasset y la Razón Histórica", La Nacion, Diciembre, 1940, in which an excellent summary is given of my fundamental criticism of idealism as I expounded it in a course of lectures in Buenos Aires). But to be relative to oneself is tantamount to being absolute.
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> Now, if consciousness of is the absolute reality and as such the starting point of philosophy, philosophy would start from a reality in which the subject -- I -- exists enclosed within itself, within its mental acts and states. But such existence in the form of being enclosed in oneself is the opposite of what we call living. Living means reaching out of oneself, devoted, ontologically, to what is other -- be it called world or circumstances.
>
> To start from life as the primary and absolute fact is to recognize that consciousness of is solely an idea, a more or less justified and plausible one, but no more than an idea which we have discovered or invented in the starts from no idea and hence is not idealism.
>
> Husserl proposes to arrive at the roots (we are promised 'radical reflection') of knowledge by way of phenomenological analysis. He anticipates -- how can he help it? -- that these roots are pre-theoretical, let us vaguely say 'vital'. But since he comes upon all this in the process of philosophizing and making phenomenology, and since phenomenology has not justified and founded itself, the whole consideration remains hanging in the air. (223)

This writer suspects, however, that the Husserlian posthumous works on 'genetic phenomenology' do provide at least a program to cover the relationship that Ortega finds wanting. Therefore, the issue has been exhausted insofar as the Ortegan position concerning the differences between phenomenology and his critique of vital reason, but not necessarily on the conceptual totality of the question. (224) Nevertheless, to have

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(223) Concord., pp. 81-82.

(224) Husserlian 'genetic phenomenology' is precisely the attempt to systematize a relationship between the formal construct, and

found a conclusive statement on the 'existentialism', and phenomenology of the Ortegan writings, appears to constitute a sufficient result within the scope of the present dissertation: the Ortegan epistemology modifies the phenomenological method by reinstating the assumption that the initiating phenomenon must be his concept of human life, thus overcoming the limitation of phenomenological reduction strictly conceived as a conceptual-abstracting operation. Thus, a synthetic and intuitive type of thought can be gained only by transcending the formal limitations of the reduction. According to Ortega, such operation constitutes a truly systematic mode of thought, and the only way to acquire legitimate access to an inevitable metaphysical construct.

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(224) "... the pre-theoretical reality which is 'life' ...." Ortega himself became presently aware of this attempt, which is only a minimal part of the Formale und Transzcendentale Logik, and thus is described by the Spanish thinker as a "summary program". Yet, he acknowledges that in 1935 Husserl contemplated the problem in a series of lectures given at the University of Prague under the title "Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", one of which was published in Philosophia, vol. I, 1936, Belgrade. Ortega sees this effort firstly as a non-Husserlian piece of writing, since the lecture notes were gathered and integrated by one of his students; secondly as a flattering event: "... I am much gratified by this leap of phenomenological doctrine which means nothing less than a recourse to 'historical reason'...." (Concord, p. 82); and thirdly as a possible contender to the chronological priority of his own ideas on the topic, since -- quite defensibly -- he hastens to point out that his essay "History as a System", published in 1935, preceded not only the article in Philosophia but also its sequel of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Brussels, 1939, where the expression Vernunft in der Geschichte (reason in history) is specifically used by the Husserlian followers. At any rate, this writer would like to suggest that Husserl himself was well aware of the problem, and must have left an abundant profusion of notes to that effect. It should be remembered that the Husserlian Archives have not been researched yet in their entirety, and that a post-second World War effort is being continued by German scholars, who constantly publish new material, and new interpretations, from the unbelievable wealth of production left by the famous philosopher.

What is, then, 'knowledge' to Ortega y Gasset? This writer has concluded that the Spanish philosopher answers such a question only from a metaphysical viewpoint, i.e., only in terms of the nature of knowledge, and quite contextually at that. The facets that seem to be of tremendous importance for the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, i.e., the aspects of the possibility of knowledge and of its formal validity, seem to have been left almost untouched by our author, who simply criticizes some of the results of their monopolistic "absorption" in the philosophical realm. If the question 'what is knowledge?' receives an ontological consideration of the term 'is', it appears to be considered by Ortega as certainty that is acquired through all possible means, especially those conditioned by a direct intuition of the phenomenon of life. Sr. Ortega also seems to credit tested and untested intuition as attempts of equal possibility, since -- aside from the above-mentioned condition -- he does not reject the Husserlian or Kantian characterizations of intuition as the immediate grasp of a cognitive phenomenon. Knowledge also appears to include those operational techniques that appear more credible to empirical-minded investigators: deduction, induction, and 'research' -- in all possible forms -- but he adds esthetic information, and esthetic formation. He seems to be quite convinced, though -- and this writer conclusively agrees with him -- that in many cases the equation between 'credibility' and 'credulity' could be equally attributed to both 'intuitionists' and 'anti-intuitionists', therefore being much easier for the intuitionist to include non-intuitionistic techniques within his scheme.

It could be reasonably held that the non-intuitionist constantly intuits his assertions or negations, even the findings of his empirical

research. The intuitionist, on the other hand, recognizes the open nature of his operational cognitive basis, and may even include the data of a 'proven experiment' without needing to resort to confusing dualisms. In other words, the non-intuitionist is constantly forced to explain when is he 'philosophizing', and when he is not doing so, i.e., when is he making use of intuitive, or unexamined hunches, always subject to later verification. But it is practically and logically possible to distinguish certain types of 'intuition' from those directly comparable to 'hunches' or 'whimsical visions', and therefore to distinguish systematic from non-systematic intuitions. It should be obvious that Ortega did not, at all times, make use of the Husserilain methods; in fact it is quite likely that he merely acknowledged them as an epistemological point of departure, and proceeded with subjective vehemence in most instances, but there are some points to be made both in his defense, and in that of more systematic students of the intuitive phenomenon. Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, for example, introduce an elaborate notion of essential intuition, crudely described for the purposes of this reference as a receptive operation that grasps the essential, formal structure of the objects of cognition. To perform this operation, two correlated elements are considered: firstly a specific type of conscious act which makes cognition possible, presupposing, of course, a complete theory of consciousness; and secondly a theory of objects, which tries to prove that they possess an essential structure, capable of being grasped. Husserl also maintains that there is a strict correlation between the object of cognition and the act of consciousness, and culminates his foundational theory by a lengthy discussion attempting to show that his systematic intuition is an instituting act, by means of

which all objects of true predication can be apodictically known. The theory differs from a Cartesian or Spinozian approach by maintaining the thesis that there is more than one certain, evident, and immediately given object of cognition, and that therefore the cogito monopolizes a rather common characteristic of the surrounding world. Without rejecting a demand for deductive procedures, Husserl however maintains that his method is sufficient, and even far more precise than a criterion of evidence modified as to mean that a cognition is merely verifiable. Husserl also uses a concept of empirical intuition, i.e., perception, as his point of departure, and follows Brentano quite closely by stating that every possible object of cognition (logically speaking: every subject of possible true predication) has a particular manner of revealing its cognitive significance. Such an "objectival" quality is apt to generate an immediate cognitive instance of a nature entirely different from the whimsical, undependable sensory "intuition", because it must follow a systematized series of careful steps. Although Husserl pursues them with meticulous detail such steps can be briefly summarized here as a series of operations performed with the purpose of overcoming perceptual prejudice: the preconception of factual existence; the unexamined belief that the object necessarily belongs to an existing categorial realm vaguely known as the natural world; the mistake of assuming that the cognition of an object results from an oversimplified stimulus-response relationship; the preconceptions derived from previous uncritical assumptions on human nature and the character of experience; amd the prejudices that originate on the psycho-bio-physiological explanations of the perceptive phenomenon. Husserl holds that it is possible to maintain an object in the field of perception, even after having discarded the

above obstacles, and contends that once the changes of character relative to the empirical conditions of experience have been critically considered, it is quite feasible to cognize the essentially rational structure of such an object. The whole process, in sum, consists of a passage from natural consideration to a reflexive attitude, thus obtaining a phenomenon, or pure object of cognition, capable of immediately displaying itself to consciousness. Such an operation, by means of which the empirical or sensory character of perception is reduced to a purely rational presentation of the objects of knowledge is the famous 'phenomenological' reduction', which Ortega criticizes of excessive formality. And the refined, systematized intuition that results from the above-sketched process is called by Husserl 'categorial perception'. When applied to the specific nature of a phenomenon -- in his own sense -- he calls his mode of knowledge an 'eidetic insight' or an 'eidetic intuition', an operation based upon sensory data, but subject to the subsequent refinement of reduction (epoché). (225)

It is interesting to observe that a Kantian interpretation could be applied to deductive processes, and that -- if it is accepted that the steps in such a process have to be 'intuited', i.e., directly assimilated or immediately received by the cognitive 'faculties' -- the final result of such chain of intuitions is also an intuition. The process, then, becomes one of moving from initial to conclusive intuitions, and this

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(225) Cf. the minimal references provided in (213) for further expansion on the highly technical aspects of the phenomenological method.

is precisely the place wherein psychology has not been quite "weaned" from the philosophical context of some existential and phenomenological schools. It has been remarked, for example, that Ortega criticizes the Husserlian transition from the psychological aspects of perception to a purely formal realm of absolute cognitive import.

It should be also interesting to conduct an "empirical" study on the validational merit of intuitive speculation versus "non-intuitive" experimentation, since some hypothetical suggestions cautiously made by empirical findings are really no different from an intuitionistic, speculative thesis, except perhaps in the fact that the former have an euphemistic formal appearance, and try to leave an open possibility for later correction. Such a disguised similarity of both kinds of philosophical or scientific exercise could perhaps be further supported by pointing out that intuitive specualtion might well include future corrigibility by either (i) the inclusion of an euphemistic vocabulary, or (ii) the mere conditioning of speculative remarks in view of a priori factors of logical necessity. As a result of the above considerations, this writer wishes to state conclusively that a priori, systematic, and intuitive speculation, is of a significance not to be regarded as mutually exclusive when compared to environmental, deductive, techniques. This thesis also seems to be supported by better logicians, and should be considered truistic, were it not for the circumstance that the academic world appears to be heavily populated by researchers who think otherwise, and confuse a customary experimental format with the subject-matter of proper philosphical investigation on the problem of the possibility of knowledge. In this area of philosophy, it could also be said that no empirical

evidence to the contrary has been made available, and if the comparative study of intuition versus verification were made possible, this writer would dare to predict that the results would be puzzling ones. On the other hand, the ad-ignorantiam contention that intuition is a better method than empirical verification, because no evidence to the contrary has been made available, would indeed be a dangerous statement, since it would simply reverse the charge made by certain analysts to some of the favorite topics of existential philosophy, and such a charge has been already rejected on the grounds that it is a faulty conclusion even by logico-formal standards.

It would seem, then, that Ortega has a broader notion of 'scientific method', and that this notion follows a phenomenological trend. Many scientific methods could be conceived, and all of them appear to have Ortega's blessing providing that they become incorporated to the human existential concerns. All mutually exclusive distinctions are to be ruled out, and epistemology, then, would be simply the attempt to achieve the certainty that possesses a dependability of verification or method. In Ortega's particular case all epistemologies that offer candidate solutions for the problem of vital concern would be acceptable, and this condition should be made pressing even for the most specialized logician. If intuition provides a meaningful perspective for vital concern, it would be acceptable, and the same could be said for deduction, induction, experimentation and testability. The Ortegan objection to a particular kind of epistemology would not be its method, but its intent; if the latter excludes life as the central concern, it is to be discarded as non-philosophically integrated -- a mere technical exercise. This is tantamount to say that an epistemology which even unintentionally

cultivates the use of pure reason for its own sake would be objectionable, because pure reason is not a separate reality, nor is it the main human activity, but simply constitutes a tool to be used in our desperate search for vital meaning. The hypostatic cult of reason kills the human aspect that must be a part of all philosophies. Hence the belief, for example, that human relations have to be logical -- in the sense of 'formal logic'-- is not a vitally reasonable one. It just so happens, and Ortega states it as a fact, that mot "human relations" are quite illogical. Whether this is an educational failure or not is, at this point, irrelevant; before any change is attempted such a fact must be admitted, and its change is possible only by allowing reason to become vital. The alternative would be to force humans to be logical, and this obviously would mean that life has been adjusted or sacrificed to pure reason. This horrible choice would depend upon the kind of answer that we give to the problem of our times: the disparity between reason and life, and the need for reason to do something about a kind of human life to be conceived beyond physical welfare and its financial implications.

This writer finds consequences of undeniable merit in the Ortegan account of life <u>versus</u> pure reason. To state it simply knowledge has to be for something, and human life appears to constitute a worthy candidate for such a teleological interpretation. Knowledge for its own sake, or for the sake of answering only one of the human vital questions, <u>i.e.</u>, the mastery of the surrounding natural, or physical world, is either the lack of application, or merely a partial application of its powers. Real knowledge could described in this sense, as "impure". It would have to be contaminated by its application to all of the dimensions of life: physical, biological, biographical, emotional, spiritual, lyrical, and

irrational. The same could be said for the introspective and extrospective dimensions of human life. Thus, a syllogism in life acquires its other complementary portion by receiving the challenge of its worth in human terms. Otherwise, in terms of vital reason, syllogistic perfection becomes as unreasonable as any other type of abstract exercise, performed for its own sake, like a formally flawless pianistic execution lacking qualitative musicality. If knowledge is the necessity that systematically conveys man's longing for a radical certitude, it must be capable of being transposed to the realm of human conditions upon which the "knowers" want to be rooted.

The examination of this issue within the Ortegan thought has left a metaphysical residue, which also deserves to be explored. It is this writer's contention that the problem can be clarified by a series of reflections made upon a broadminded account of epistemology as a philosophical discipline. In this sense, most of the problems presented to others by the philosophy of Ortega are due to almost subconscious assumption, or presupposition, that the entire field of epistemology is exhausted by due consideration of the questions dealing with the possibility or formal validity of knowledge. But there seems to be more to epistemology than the otherwise commendable attempts to clarify the conditions that make knowledge possible, and to elucidate the formal systems of correct reasoning.

This writer considers epistemology as a theory of "true thinking", which obviously should include a subordinate "theory of correct thinking". The first connotation is of a material nature, in the Aristotelian sense, whereas the latter constitutes a formal systematization. While the logical activity seeks to show a formal validity of the thinking processes,

i.e., with the problems of external consistency and concordance with the object of knowledge. Only in this manner it could be said that philosophy is impossible to conceive without the contributions of epistemology, since such a discipline thus becomes integrally considered, i.e., aimed at the maximum scope of its diverse problems and solutions.

Therefore it would seem improper to oversimplify the integrated epistemological problems, and it does not seem plausible to reduce those problems to the search for normative formal laws intended to prove the validity of an inferential chain that moves from stage A to stage B. It is also necessary to show by all possible means that equations of the type "A is B" are true indications of a relationship that truly constitutes a cognitive fact. The "A is B" phenomenon presents, epistemologically speaking, several courses of speculative action, related to characteristics that transcend its merely formal qualities of abstraction. It is possible, in the first place, at least to investigate if A is truly B, from the viewpoint generally recognized as the essence of knowledge, i.e., the search for its objective or authentic nature. Secondly, it is also possible to speculate on the validity of a fact of consciousness, in the sense of finding out if such a fact constitutes an effective cognitive relationship, i.e., to deal with the problem of the possibility of knowledge. Thirdly, it is feasible to ponder the effectiveness of the sensorial and strictly rational contributions to the cognitive phenomenon, and in such a case we would be exploring the problem of "genetic epistemology", also called the "origin of knowledge". And lastly, it would still be possible to speculate on the types or forms of knowledge, or on the means at hand that could be used to prove the objectivity of a supposed knowledge, in which case the problem of "criteria for truth" would appear with its

difficult implications. In sum, what this writer is attempting to conclude is that an analysis of epistemology does not reveal one single problem, and it appears more acequate to characterize such a philosophical discipline as one that presents several difficulties, rather than an all-encompassing one. Four problems have been suggested above. To others, e.g., Hans Hessen, the number of general problems could be augmented to five; and still to others the problems could be presented as more than five or less than four. (226) But in any case, this writer believes that even those who contend that there is only one problem involved (e.g., the question of "possibility of knowledge", both formally and materially) would be hesitant to maintain also that it is simple, or to deny that it is a complex one.

In sum, Ortega devotes the already discussed attention to the material aspect of the problem of possibility of knowledge, and practically bypasses the formal side. He could be criticized for such an omission, especially when he announces his new type of reason. Even granting that the nature of the problems that concerned him was strictly metaphysical, it appears legitimate to expect a more organized characterization of the place that the above-mentioned issue should have in his account of human life. Only by implication does he suggest that the attention devoted to the intricacies of pure reason, or to validational criteria in epistemology, should be accepted if they do not lose sight of life as the essential philosophical preoccupation. But he never spelled-out the

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(226) Hessen, H., Teoría del Conocimiento, Octava Edición, (Espasa-Calpe, Argentina, S.A.), Buenos Aires, 1956.

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exact place of these activities, nor did he indicate the precise relational point in which they cease to haveimportance. Furthermore, if his semi-journalistic mode of expression was adopted because of educational motivations, it seems legitimate to expect that his mission be fulfilled as completely as possible. He criticizes Husserl for not being explicit on the problem of the "genesis of reason", therefore indicating that he expected the German philosopher to do so.

Based on a reciprocal expectation, Ortega could also be criticized for not showing a clear stance on the methodological tools that he used in order to make possible the firmness of his claim. This weakness can only be increased when reflecting on the fact that he wanted to teach philosophy to people who lacked an inclination for such an activity, since the problems of the possibility of knowledge, and of its formal validational procedures, are among the first ones to be encountered by the interested student, regardless of his degree of sophistication.

The already alluded metaphysical residue in the Ortegan epistemology also has a major weakness that could be connected to the above-mentioned one. It has been shown that Ortega considers life as the fundamental reality, which he calls 'radical' because "all other realities" appear to be rooted upon it. Ortega also claims that this is the reason why philosophical reflection must start by the "intuition and analysis" of such a radical reality, and states that the phenomenon "... to be conscious of..." is not a pure description, but already an hypothesis, because if the act of "being conscious of..." is real, and its object is only intentional, such an intentionality becomes unreal. Hence a description rigorously consistent with its phenomenon must be one that depicts perception as a <u>coexistence of subject and object</u>:

> Thus, what appears in the 'fact' of perception is: on the one hand the subject, opened to the perceived object, and on the other, the object, simultaneously opened to the subject. In other words: there is no such thing as a phenomenon to be called 'consciousness of..." as a general form of the mind. What is there is the reality that I am, opening to and undergoing from another reality presented by the surrounding world. Thus the so-called description of the phenomenon of 'consciousness' may be resolved by a description of the phenonmenon 'real human life', as a coexistence of the subject with the surrounding objects....
>
> Such a doctrine ... includes the greatest statement that was made in philosophy between 1900 and 1925, namely: that there is no such thing as consciousness, conceived as a primary form of relationship between the so-called 'subject' and the so-called 'objects'; what is there is man being to things, and things being to man; i.e., human living. The young people of Montmartre, who now play by ear the guitar of existentialism are still starkly unaware of this factual assertion, without which it is impossible to gain access to the high seas of metaphysics. (227)

The above paragraph summarizes two statements. One contends that a perceptive situation presents a co-existential participation of perceiving subject, and perceived object, both being real. The other assertion is that the fundamental datum of philosophy is human life, conceived as an integrating reality, which precisely consists of a co-existential relationship between subject and objects. In other words, there is no basis for saying that the act of consciousness is real, while the object is not. Or, expressed differently, nothing can be "thought of" as real or unreal, if such assertions or negations are not radically referred to a primary reality, which is an integrated Zusammenhang, briefly described by the expression 'I-with-the-world'. Such an integrated relational reality should constitute the basic preoccupation of the true philosopher.

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(227) La Idea de principio en Leibniz, pp. 332-34.

But the interesting aspect of this basic intricacy is that it appears to constitute the Ortegan basic attempt to reject subjectivistic idealism, i.e., the evasion of an "egocentric predicament". This is precisely the reason why some critics label Ortega as a 'realist-Kantian', since the Spanish thinker appeared to be preoccupied by the idealistic interpretations made of his German mentor. Ortega repeatedly stated that the Kantian system, in its deepest stratum, could be liberated from idealistic misinterpretations. The concept 'I-with-the-world', as a basic form of experience, is expressed in Ortegan terms as 'I am myself and my circumstance', an assertion which entails co-existence of the subject and the real objects. Basically, such an idea has been clearly foreshadowed by Kant.

The Critique of Pure Reason contains a self-sufficient refutation of subjective idealism. (228) The consciousness of subjective existence appears to be determined in Time, as an a priori form of intuition, and such a determination pre-supposes something permanent in the character of perception, which is possible only insofar as the existence of external phenomena is granted. Simple consciousness, and subjective existence could be posited as proof of the existence of spatial objects, because the perception of permanence is made possible only by something that exists outside of the subject, and not simply by a representation of an external object. Therefore, Kant argues that the determination of my own eixstence within the realm of Time is made possible only by the existence of real objects, that I perceive outside of my strictly subjective sphere.

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(228) Especially the metaphysical expositions of the conceptions of time and space that are included as a part of the "Transcendental Aesthetic", Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 41, ff.

Furthermore, as consciousness within the realm of time is necessarily connected with the existence of external objects, as well as with the condition of determination of Time. In other words, the consciousness of my own existence is simultaneously an immediate consciousness of the existence of external objects.

But Kant, obviously, went further than Ortega, and proceeded to move from the Aesthetic to his Logic, his Analytic, his Dialectic, and his Transcendental Doctrine of Method. For the purposes of the present problem, it should be sufficient to summarize that Kant integrated a composite concept which joins self-conscicusness with the consciousness of an external world, while Ortega tried to do the same thing by affirming that the content of world consciousness is a co-existential implication between subject and objects, therefore both being real. The metaphysical orientation of the Spanish thinker compelled him to use such a vocabulary, which simply expresses that such an inter-relationship constitutes the foundational datum for experience. Yet, no one seems to have denied that, in such a sense, life is a radical reality, and, therefore his contention is rather tautological. To the best of this writer's knowledge, Ortega did not submit a further development of the Kantian initial assertion.

The above discussed weakness may have been due to a failure in distinguishing the analytical import of stating that a surrounding world is meaningless if due credit is not given to thinking subjects, from the idealistic thesis that denies existence to the surrounding world, if it is conceived as independent from the existence of thinking subjects. In this sense Ortega did not only fail to save Kant from a charge that was clearly anticipated by the German philosopher, but also lacked a sufficiently clear exposition on the manner in which life was

to be in turn saved from the dangers of pure reason. Conclusively, then, the Ortegan intent is to be commended, but his subsequent procedure appears to be incomplete. In this writer's opinion, Ortega asked a pertinent, and fascinatingly interesting question, without supplying a reasonable theoretical development that would enable his sympathizers to find the answer.

His other weaknesses quickly spring from the above-mentioned, basic one. Perspectivism, for example, seems to be based upon the subjective side of his integrated metaphysical co-existence, but on the other hand appears to have been used as a justidication of an extremely opinionated use of dogmatic ephitets. It has been shown how Ortega falls into the old problem of inter-subjective viewpoints, which is common to all attempts thus far made to rule out absolutes and dualistic solutions. On this issue, it is submitted that most eclectic attempts to overcome the dualism of exteriority and interiority are bound to be vague in regard to the inter-subjective proposition. John Dewey, whose experiential scheme is also similar, also offers some of these problems, and the suggestion is made at this point that -- lacking the Kantian acrobatics -- most antidualistic solutions have been thus far unable to explain, or describe, the precise nature of the elusive relationship between the formal and the material aspects of the knowledge of reality. Therefore, Ortega's strength in presenting us with a colorful angle (that seemingly was vital to him, but may fail in being clearly vital to many others) becomes a problem when an all-inclusive logical frame of reference is sought after the acceptance of life as the central, and real, philosophical concern.

The above criticism leads into another one related to methology.

Ortega appears to be a very good painter of the existential concern, but this writer finds him to be a poor draftsman. Of course, one could say of existentialism in general that impressionistic modes of expression are deliberate, and that at times they seem to be even more appealing than the neatly-delineated renderings, and one could also say that the latter are cold and lack expression, but the fact still remains that the quest for truth continues to be one of desired precision. (229) At times the literary felicity of Ortega greatly succeeds in the display of pathetic seriousness which affects many a philosophical problem, but those thinkers interested in precision could perhaps enjoy even more the subdued tones, and a multiplicity of shades, if the overall leit motif appears to be manageable within a reasonable length of exposition.

If the writer may use an analogy from the musical world, the point could be illustrated by saying that Beethoven, for example, presents a masterful balance of form and content, which allows the listener to enjoy even more the subtleties of variation, since the dominating themes have been structured with unequivocal clarity. In the field of philosophy, Immanuel Kant is perhaps the typical case wherein secondary obscurities, or additional digressions, seldom deviate the reader from the powerful, and complete, essence of the conceptual body. In cases such as the above mentioned ones, the general program has been neatly outlined, and it becomes only a matter of studious time to reach a point wherein several basic alternatives of interpretation become possible. But Ortega y Gasset

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(229) The point is made in Chapter III, but only in terms of esthetics.

often tends to change the utterance of an otherwise main theme into mannerisms or repetitious assertions that possess a disturbing sloganish character. Insufferably dogmatic at times, the alluded methodological faults appear to be generally scattered in all his written works. It should be remembered at this point that this dissertation has offered only a selection of his most felicitous remarks, and that, therefore, it has not even attempted to convey the overall effect produced in the reader by an organized study of the original and abundant Ortegan sources.

There are, then, many logical problems involved in the study of the Ortegan philosophy -- especially when answers, rather than questions, are pursued. Including the ones already dealt with in this chapter, the most important of these problems, are (i) the issue of perspectivism vs. objectivism, (of which an account was given in Chapter II); (ii) analytic ways to propose synthetical issues (such as the importance of 'life' vis-à-vis an insufficient methodological characterization of it); (iii) and undeveloped, truistic assertions (such as the basic statement of co-existence of cognitive subject and object, without further logical exploration). To this it should be added that the Ortegan writings often do have vague ways of saying "let us be clear about this", where only good intention appears to have the desired clarity. The writings also indulge frequently in factual affirmations that later have appeared to be insufficiently examined (such as the criticism of Husserl on the subject of the pretheoretical significance of human life). The Ortegan writings also abound in sketchy impasses that sometimes come at a moment when the conceptual material is becoming extremely interesting, and a clear, lengthy description is urgently needed. At times, also, Sr. Ortega becomes poetic when the philosophically-minded reader wants him to be transparently

explicit, or becomes too technically involved (to the point of repeating truisms) when a typically Ortegan poetic-parenthesis would be welcome. It should be remarked at this point that such a characteristic is probably responsible for a projection of its repetitive nature in this dissertation. Such a fault has been carefully minimized by the present writer, but the lack of success in its complete elimination is possibly due to the fact that Ortega deals with variations of the same technical subject in a variety of contexts, whose complete integration is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

There is a Spanish popular saying that applies quite properly to the Ortegan manner of philosophizing: "El que mucho abarca poco aprieta". Quite crudely translated it means "He who wants the most, grips the least". For those who are acquainted with the subtleties of the vernacular, the proverb conveys with an unsurpassed, graphic economy of words that "He who forces his hand to be open with exaggerated strain -- as in the act of extending its coverage to a degree of impossibility -- naturally cannot close it with a firm and uniform grip". Paradoxically, in the case of Ortega, a serious eagerness of intent forces him to be weak on particular technicalities. On the one hand his Rennaissance erudition makes him an extremely interesting essayist, but on the other, this very quality forces him to be rather boring to the reader with a specialized interest, once he recognizes the challenge of some appealing Ortegan view, and wants to examine its implications quite closely. Yet, this criticism is seldom made by his Spanish-speaking students, whereas it constitutes, most surely, one of the first weaknesses detected by Anglo-Saxon scholars.

Paradoxically too, such characteristics are also the very factors that make Ortega interesting. To ask interesting questions is no meager

gain in philosophy, and even if the Ortegan answers are unclear, or not systematized with great rigor or logical precision, many -- if not most -- of his questions appear to have succeeded in passing through the maze of possible misinterpretations. So, for those who think that philosophy is an activity mainly devoted to the asking of humanly pertinent questions, Ortega should receive no objection to being ranked as a philosopher. For the most part his Spanish style is also extremely appealing. The philosophical material is indeed there, and precisely due to the fact that a systematization '*more geometrico*' is not his essential preoccupation, many of his problems are presented with a charming spontaneity often absent in most of the semantically obsessed studies. Like Emerson, Nietzsche or Tolstoi, the "horticultors of philosophy", Ortega has a beautiful way of conveying impressions, and of asking human questions. There is a force to the Ortegan thought that seems to be missing in the more systematic, or analytic, philosophical treatises. Thorough examination of a philosophic journal would presently reveal what this writer has in mind: uniform style, stereotyped vocabulary, manner of presentation, polemic *etiquette*, and pages of symbolic formulations. Ortega's conviction that this type of philosophic dialogue does not really become a part of the total cultural plexus, and therefore is not very educational, except perhaps to the parties involved, seems to be a strong argument.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICAL SUMMARY ON THE ORTEGAN THEORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

An overall appraisal of the mutual consistency between the philosophy of vital reason and its application to education is indeed flattering to Ortega y Gasset. This writer has already indicated in Chapter VI his points of agreement, and in both Chapters VI and VII his areas of disagreement with the basic philosophical core of the Ortegan scheme. Yet in his educational theory the favorable points seem to outweight the weak or underdeveloped conceptual areas. Ortega appears to be consistent with the type of education he would propose: he seems to be well aware of the scientific advance of his times; of his own historical background as a Spaniard and a European; of the types of problems which were challenging the western mind when he wrote his essay; and furthermore of the kinds of difficulties that still have to be met. Indications have been given in the preceding chapters of the fact that most of his predictions were accurate, and of the unfortunate circumstance that he seemed to be wrong only in those aspects of his thought that revealed confident optimism. Many "professionistic institutions", and contemporary scientists, for example, still show signs of the unawareness which Ortega calls the "danger of over-specialized education".

Thus, while Ortega appeared to be quite "up to date" thirty five years ago, it appears that the world is still populated by some "modern barbarians" who have not understood the pathetic quandary of the "modern theme". In 1930 Ortega revealed an amazing awareness of his times, of the Spanish limitations, and advanced an authoritative prediction of the

future European and westernized cultural circles. Without any claim to credit Ortega with the hazy categories of "originality" or "creativeness", this writer would like to point out that the restless Spanish writer showed frequent concern for socio-cultural phenomena, such as population explosion, the mass-man, the increase of mediocrity, the misuse of scientific warfare, and the compelling necessity of an ethical assessment of the so-called 'contributions' of technological progress. The issues of nuclear power, and germ-warfare are simply two instances that illustrate the necessity of university intervention, as a university, in public and human affairs. Likewise, the urgent need that the average man should become aware of "the real truth" behind these social phenomena, i.e., of the essential philosophic issues that make such a problem transcend the shortsighted limitations of nativistic loyalties, and pseudo-patriotic commitments, still continues to be felt. It is even unnecessary to relate in detail the import of these concerns with higher education, and this writer contends that such is the reason why some scholars feel that if we could solve the problem of general education, we could confidently strike any third world war off the calendar.

General education at university level seems to be the only way to perform -- at a point of 'readiness' -- a scanning and essential consideration of the most compelling human problems, especially when the role of the press has been swayed by acquisitiveness even to a greater degree than it was in the thirties. It has been remarked that Ortega did not live long enough to see what certain agencies, like television, have now done to the "brainwashing" and "indoctrinating" techniques that build the modern barbarian. And, although he did not use the customary terminology of the educational field, he was indeed thinking of the same phenomena.

There is a strange and paradoxical quality of positive import in Ortega's main weakness; it is true that the scope of subject matter covered by his educational writings acts as a limiting device when he states a solution. But this very trait prevents him from becoming submerged in an isolated, specialized endeavor, thus making his thesis consistent with the synthetic ability he demands in education. By trying to be generally aware of the things he does not know, he himself becomes immune to the "professionistic" monopoly he criticizes in most specialized educational attempts. He is, then, a good example of the general education advocated by his Mission, and this writer is of the opinion that, regardless of the obvious shortcomings, a world full of Ortegan men would be better than the increased production of specialized, or acquisitive "barbarians". The ramifications in collateral areas that keep appearing at every theoretical turn Ortega makes, show at least the intuitive awareness that they are there: an attitude that specialized researchers could use, even to their own advantage, not to mention that of the general welfare. Even though Ortega is not always as explicit as one would wish when the unexpected implications disturb one's mind, the suggestive value of such surprising twists possesses more potential enrichment than possible educational damage. In this sense his short educational essays (such as the Mission) have a tremendous suggestive value that no one in his right mind would dare to deny. Even in the case of generating sharp disagreement, this writer feels that the readers of Ortega could always use their points of disaccord for further exploration of the problems that appear to be there. In this sense, it is contended that Ortega is one of those thinkers whose insight -- or lack of insight-- could be used for the purposes of widened knowledge. And this writer is also sure of the fact that, even after the performance of a considerable amount of definitional cleaning-work or analytic study, there would be

enough left of the Ortegan material to construct interesting hypotheses, whether to be tested or merely maintained with the aid of *a priori*, logical support.

Educationally speaking, one of Ortega's greater qualities is that he provides the "non-Latin" reader with a particular, and real, manner of thought. Such a speculative manner of reacting to certain problems shows the general pattern which, rightly or wrongly -- and this is yet to be decided -- many Spaniards and Latin Americans do follow when facing the so-called philosophical issues. An intelligible value structure is revealed, and such an attitudinal finding should be of immeasurable use for the "cross-cultural", educational studies, so much *en vogue* nowadays.

Ortega's obliviousness to certain analytic preoccupations, definitional concerns, or logical issues, is rather typical of the Spanish-speaking educators, or "men of letters", many of them as intelligent and capable of synthetic coverage as our studied author, or as their "non-Latin" counterparts. It is interesting to observe that his educational theory does not reveal the "work-ethic", nor the factors of economical necessity in the structure of the university, nor the importance of administration both for theory of state, or university government. Physical conceptions of 'progress', 'achievement', 'growth', 'greatness', 'bigness', and 'self-made tradition', are also absent in the Ortegan university. His 'cultural' concern is not one to be interpreted from the predominant values shared by some technologically-oriented, non-Spanish-speaking universities, although it may be eventually conceived as one that, in time, could be brought to include such traits. Ortega talks, then, about the ideal university of his language brothers, and therefore the cross-cultural dialogue would be impossible without a previous realization of such a

factual 'given'. Any attempt to convey the axiological goals of a Protestant, business-oriented, institution, in the midst of such a cultural framework would be condemned to pathetic failure, both theoretically and pragmatically speaking. By the same token, any attempt to change an institution,whose ideology for "reform" follows, rightly or wrongly, a particularized interpretation or an implicit influence of the Ortegan theory of higher education, would also have difficult problems, at least in its inception, and especially if the proposed modification happens to be based upon a conscious, or sub-conscious, transplantation of values that have been taken from economically well-developed, technologically oriented societies.The writer believes that this is a point of great importance, which not only gives renewed actuality to the old philosophical problem of cultural relativity versus universality in values, but also would save time, effort, and money, if properly and priorly considered.

Contrary to many an opinion, this writer finds a democratic orientation in the Ortegan university; due consideration of the average man, and the principle of economy in education, should be self-sufficient to prove this point. His only requirement of a Land-Grant university would be the appropriate inclusion of a well-balanced, effective program of synthetic education, in order to produce cultured professionals. As a result of this, he would perhaps emphasize the importance of a carefully planned, and optimally taught basic program, would encourage humanistic dialogue on a one-to-one basis, and would implement such a plan by an equalitarian recognition of teaching ability, on a par with the research customary rewards.

It should be interesting, though, to note that the empiricism behind

the Ortegan theory of education is one of apeculiar and existential character. It is also deeply and consistently rooted upon his general philosophic views. The facts must be taken since there is no choice, but the fact-gatherers, and fact-theorizers should not be led into believing that factual concern alone should be the only factor to be considered in science, education, or life. Since the preoccupation for pure science is different from the educational concern, and since education -- as in Dewey -- is practically equated with 'life', the Ortegan sense of something 'practical' is different from that of a radical empiricism, as interpreted by many researchers. Being practical rather means being aware of the possibilities and limitations of modern life, and such an educational task should be made in as wide a dimension as possible. Iit is then, and only then (i.e., when the prior awareness has been induced) that the human being must take action. Thus, when Ortega recommends to be practical about higher education, he does not mean action in the manner usually fostered, rightly or wrongly, by the so-called "Protestant ethic". His sense of the practical excludes action for bigger and better things without due consideration of what is meant by the term 'better'. It is also because of this that his scheme of higher education lacks economic notions of development, underdevlopment, or ultra-development, and his concept of growth completely excludes financial acquisitiveness or physical expansion for its own sake.

Of the many books written on general education the Ortegan short essay seems to be one of the very few that are supported by a deep substratum of social, political, and historical philosophy. It is also one of the few that reveal a previous background of well-digested metaphysical

conviction. If, on the one hand Ortega could be criticized for not presenting a detailed, pragmatic program of implementation, it could hardly be denied that he succeeded in presenting a skeletal framework of firmly held directional contentions. This basic core of teleological foundations could be found to be lacking in many an educational book that simply enumerates strategic techniques, or accepts certain assertions about human-nature, social reality, and communal concern, without a deep exploration of their validational and justificational support. The same thing appears to be true of certain notions, such as 'development', 'behavior', 'becoming', and some other terms borrowed from the phenomenological or existential vocabulary, but simply accepted as 'given' without philosophical support. In this sense Ortega appears to be a much more explicit bearer of the existential message to education, and the basic language of his Mission appears to contain a clearer educational meaning in terms of his general philosophic tenets.

On the subject of the ideal university, it should be pointed out that the Ortegan theory not only reflects a Germanic influence, but also that most Spanish-speaking universities do combine that influence with other traditions directly derived from Continental European values on higher education. This is tantamount to state that their axiology has been constructed upon the same philosophical tenets that inspired Ortega, and therefore to suggest that such a tradition, added to the use of Spanish as the conveying ideological vehicle, explains the influence of Ortega's thought. Cultural traits which, after all, still reflect the impact of Spanish idiosyncracy, must be added both to the receptiveness of the Ortegan ideas and to the rejection of different philosophical orientations.

Yet, curiously enough, a generalization could be suggested in the sense that the basic content of the formal structure of the axiomatic

assumptions upon which most educative theories are constructed, does appear to be approximately equivalent in all known cultures. In other words, there is formal, programmatic, and nominal agreement on the fact that education must serve "the culture". But the problem is rather one of deciding how should the culture be, and its difficulties are of such a nature that they persist even after having reached an operational solution of what do people X mean when they make use of the term culture, or even after operational agreement has been reached upon the thorny question of what "the culture" is to most people. The first problem is indeed one that the existentialist considers crucial; the second and third tasks are precisely the essential preoccupation of the logical analyst, and of the empirical investigator, respectively. This writer contends that, even granting certain priority to the semantic and validational concerns, there is a tremendously metaphysical residue that deserves serious consideration. Such a 'lef-over', which remains "real" beyond the struggle for logical meaning, and the quest for epistemological truth (i.e., beyond the "talk about talk", and the "talk about an object to be known") is precisely the struggle for non-logical meaning, and the attempt to elucidate what is the metaphysical nature of the object being known. Furthermore, only after a clarification of the metaphysical significance of entities such as 'culture' and 'education' -- which must go beyond inductive considerations on "what does X mean when he says 'culture'?" as opposed to "what do most philosophers mean when they say 'culture'?"; and which also must transcend the specialized questions "how do we know that 'culture' is what we say it is?" or "how does X know...?", etc. -- it becomes feasible to move from the what is to the what it ought to be types of proposition. Most phenomenological analyses contend that the ontological,

epistemological, and axiological facets of a given entity to be studied, e.g., 'education', do present themselves simultaneously, but that the vitally meaningful significance of knowledge and value can only be fully understood when the metaphysical question is properly stated. Hence why most of them make such an important issue of the "return to ontology", and why some of their Continental European representatives have devoted a lifetime to the proper manner of asking a metaphysical question. The foregoing consideration is offered in the way of an interpretative justification of why Ortega is more concerned about the propositions "what the university _is_", and "what the university should be _in addition_", rather than the attempt to provide detailed or strategic plans for a change to be made on unexamined assumptions about cultural welfare, growth, progress, and effectiveness.

The conclusion, then, is that Ortega at least tries to go beyond symptomatic cures and strategic prescriptions. He is not satisfied with merely accepting the contention that higher education must preserve and simultaneously change the cultural tradition. He does not accept nominal or programmatic agreement. If education must serve a cultural cause, the 'real' problems of what the culture is, and what the 'good'culture ought to be, must be attacked frontally. And, of course, the same concern is applied to 'science', the 'professions', and the 'university', so it becomes possible to talk about 'culture and science', 'science and the professions', _etcetera_. His answer appears to be mostly a persuasive one for persons such as the present writer, who was born and partially raised in a Spanish-speaking country. If the problem becomes one of inquiring how should the culture be, it is inevitably linked to ethical, and political preoccupations, whose biased or unexamined perception seems to

underlie most divergences on the questions of public welfare, democracy, and human commitment. At this point the "cross-cultural" problem with education becomes one strongly tinged with political and social philosophy, and therefore makes it imperative to examine what are the metaphysical foundations upon which the application of epistemology to culture and education is going to be built. Ortega's answer to the problem of the university's mode of existence tries to do precisely that. His theory of higher education satisifies the essential concerns revealed by most definitions of the role of the university. It also fits practically all of the traits included in the description of 'general education' that appear in most professional works on the subject. It presents a tenable discussion of the meaning of many value-laden terms that have invaded the educational literature with a profusion that, unfortunately, is not directly proportionate to the vagueness now exhibited by such expressions. Ortega describes his conceptions of 'whole man', 'life-purposes', and 'the place of occupational training in liberal education'. Furthermore he emphasizes that his version of concepts such as the 'whole development of the individual', his 'occupational training', the 'civilizing of his life purposes', the 'refining of his emotional reactions', and the 'maturation of human understanding on the nature of things', are tasks to be performed according to the optimal knowledge of contemporary times. He has a clear, and well-grounded conception of each and everyone of these terms, plus a basic theory of individual development in general education to which contemporary research has added very little, if anything at all. In fact, Ortega says what he means by 'development', 'action', 'behavior', and many other expressions which in some cases now appear to be simply shuffled-about with no concern about their significance within the metaphysical

foundations or assumptions of a given theory of science, or a given philosophy of man.

Obviously, the responsibility that the places upon the shoulders of higher education, and the demand for its aggressiveness as a social institution, are overwhelming ones. The implication of his theory is that general education constitutes perhaps the most fundamental problem of contemporary society.

It should be remarked at this point -- and Dr. Nostrand, Ortega's translator into English, is quite well-aware of such a phenomenon -- that certain problems like international understanding, democratic control, economic cooperation, and world-peace, can be implemented within a democratic framework, only insofar as their essential intricacies, and human implications, are understood and supported by most people in most nations. Nostrand still adds to similar considerations, that such a task acquires a frightful and urgent character particularly in countries like the United States, which wields a threatening power for good or evil. Whether he was also specifically thinking of the Soviet Union or not is difficult to ascertain, but the educational concern certainly applies in that case too.

Such a necessity directly points to another one. A synthetic panorama, which at the same time would be clear on the teleological use of the abundant secondary techniques in the field of education, is also urgently needed. Symptomatic strategies are of no use for a so-called remedy of vaguely defined human, and social ills. In this sense, this writer has concluded that Ortega y Gasset succeeded in the succinct description of such ills, and of the remedies to cure them. His insights seem to be developed within the core of the question, rather than lost within a myopic maze of symptoms or an undiscriminated collection of strategic recipes.

dogmatically listed in a manual-like manner. The fact that Ortega does not use the customary and current "educational vocabulary" has a paradoxical freshness, since his conceptual body becomes thus more easily accessible because the terminology he uses is not yet confused by the hustle and bustle of unexamined and empty repetition. In spite of his frequent and sometimes irritating digressions, it can be safely concluded that he states his assumptions clearly, and that he supports his contentions with a voluminous wealth of previous investigation. This trait, in addition to what he calls his "non-Eleatic metaphysical inclination" are similar to the qualities of the famous American philosopher John Dewey. In fact, the concept of Ortegan 'life' and the Deweyan account of 'experience' do have points of contact that cannot have escaped the perceptive powers of the reader. Furthermore, the spontaneous and constant flow of conceptual ramifications, the strength of conviction, the synthetic capacity of appraisal, and the accuracy of certain predictions, are characteristics that have an amazing similarity when both the Deweyan and Ortegan manners of thought are considered. Stylistically, of course, the sentimentality and literary elegance of the Spanish writer stands in sharp contrast with the stark "matter-of-factness" of the American philosopher, but the richness of conceptual implications, and even their common "unfavorable" traits -- such as the lack of schematic sobriety -- do have two characteristics worth mentioning for the purposes of this chapter. Firstly they are examples of two similar, great minds, at work. And secondly, such a similarity could be offered as a tenable explanation of the attention, and undeniable impact, that Dewey has had in Latin America, even in spite of the non-pragmatic inclinations of this geographical area of the world.

Surprisingly enough, and contrary to many an interpretation, the

conclusion of the present investigation is that Ortega y Gasset is a mass-minded educator who also values the individual. No other type would fit his considerations on the necessity of general education for the sake of keeping abreast with the times. No other kind of education would respond to the pressing need to eliminate the modern barbarian by means of an inevitably common awareness of the essential problems in contemporary civilization, according to the best knowledge of our time. Possibly what has happened in the case of those who call Ortega an élite, idealistic educator, is that they were unable to distinguish the teleological differences between culture and science, the professions and culture, and science and the professions. As a result of this analytic inability, those critics probably saw a "two-track" system in the Ortegan scheme, and loudly exclaimed: "Aristocratic dualism!"

But if it is accepted that the basic Ortegan thesis is that the essential intrincacies and human implications of certain problems like cross-cultural understanding, democracy, world-finance, peace, freedom, authority, power, and equality must be understood by most people in most nations; if it si accepted that such problem has been originated by a lack of parallelism between pure reason and vital reason, how could it be denied that the underlying assumption here is one of basic and equal human dignity? It must be recalled that Ortega does not blame human beings as such, nor their "natural potentialities" for certain kinds of callings, when he talks about the modern problem. He never says that certain people are exclusively fit to do certain more dignified things, nor does he suggest that certain activities are loftier than other ones. Such reasoning -- which is basically the underlying assumption supporting most of the "two track" educational systems -- should be sharply different-

iated from the considerations on the methodology of pure versus applied science, art or philosophy. Therefore, what Ortega blames are certain abstract, corporate entities that have lost their connections with the vital elements that justify their existence, namely with the human beings who have a right to demand of the university what the university must give them. Ortega criticizes the institutions, and never the basic potentialities of the human mind, nor their economic capacity to become educated. To say that a doctor is not a scientist proper, and should not be prepared in the same manner that a scientist should be prepared, is not to say that a doctor is better or worse than a pure scientist.

By the same token, the establishment of a difference between the ontological characters of certain callings is not equivalent to the establishment of basic, axiological differences between such callings. Failure in distinguishing ontological from axiological propositions leads into believing that the former logically entail the latter. The false argumentation that supports such a contention is blind to the analytical quality of certain propositions. In this sense, it should be remembered -- however trivial it may sound -- that a proposition of the type "What X is" is not yet equivalent to a proposition of the kind "What X ought to be" , and that both types of statement are entirely different from judgements of the kind "What X can be". It is therefore contended that Ortega's theory of education begins by examining the first proposition, i.e., the metaphysical foundations, and then moves into the third one, i.e., the assertion of factual possibility, in order to establish a thesis on the second task, which is the axiological concern. Furthermore, he appears to consider other aspects: in the first place he recognizes that university and culture are what they are, because to a significant extent

they have been determined by what they used to be; and secondly he uses the already discussed conception of 'destiny', by stating that the metaphysical consideration of concepts, and realities, such as 'culture' and 'university' do have a teleological quality of inevitable necessity, which is precisely the distinguishing factor between utopianism and feasibility. Thus, the criticism of the Ortegan theory on the grounds of a programmatic "two-track" loftiness, seems to be unfounded, and blind to the above-mentioned logical or analytic distinctions.

Some think that Ortega's idea of the good university is far more "dated" than his idea of a good society. Again Nostrand, in his Introduction to the English translation of the Mission of the University, thinks that this is so because the idea of a good society takes its cue from the persistent needs and wants of mankind, while the idea of a university is proposed as a remedy for specific weaknesses in the structure of contemporary society. The argument here is that Ortega is not to be considered one of those nostalgic medievalists who want a return to the university of the thirteenth century on the assumption that such a change would restore the cultural unity usually associated with that period, because he is "...too thorough a scholar to overlook the fact that in the heyday of the medieval universities the teaching of the classics was at a low ebb, and less than half the universities had a faculty of theology to teach first principles, while they all had their law school and most of them a school of medicine." (230)

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(230) Mission, p. 26.

And the implication, of course, is that the Mission really purports to be a workable model of university, whose validity could be applied regardless of chronological epoch, rather than an evocative lyricism praising the beauty of past and better ages. It has been pointed out that Ortega's weakest predictions are those that, sadly enough, reveal an exaggerated optimism that seems to belie his distrust in the classical contention that knowledge is virtue. It should be noted, at this juncture, that in spite of Dewey's fears, also voiced in the late twenties and early thirties, a major debacle had unfortunately to take place before his contentions -- and the Ortegan ones -- acquired a posteriori support. Fifteen years after the Mission was published in Spanish, and twelve years before Sputnik, Nostrand still remarked that:

> Our general-education movement in the United States stands out for its advances in pedagogical techniques, guidance, survey courses, and even general curricula, which however belie one another's claim to any comprehensive integration. We have been developing these techniques in a spirit of unrealistic optimism despite all our protestations to the contrary. It took a blow that shattered our faith in automatic progress to make us buckle down to the basic questions that worried Ortega a decade and a half ago. Thus for a second time the hardy, practical minded pioneers of our country, as they push back one of the great frontiers of history, find stretching on before them the trail of an imaginative Spanish explorer. (231)

Yet, unless the Ortegan optimistic assumption that men are sufficiently rational to reject questionable ideas is made, there is no sense in positing higher education as one of the main conveyors of enlightened thought to the general public. Unfortunately, the only alternative is that it may take even longer to vitalize our reason, and consequently that it may take more waiting before "impure knowledge" catches-up with Dewey and Ortega in this area of crucial concern.

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(231) Mission, p. 4.

It should be remared that the same optimistic assumption is the basic cornerstone for our beliefs in democracy, freedom, and mutual understanding. Thus, things being as they are, Ortega's optimistic assumptions seem to be the only avenue for cultural salvation. Other alternatives are, of course, possible -- and some existentialists or materialists seem to possess a sufficient degree of despair to have accepted them -- but one tends to resist such notions as oligarchy, dictatorship, and fatalistic conclusions on human nature. Therefore, since de facto these problems appear to be difficult, the modified contention that vital reason is virtue does not seem quite inappropriate. Hence, the matter becomes a de iure question of cultural survival.

It should be remembered that the synthetic presentation of modern knowledge that Ortega advocates for the teaching tasks in higher education is not simply a descriptive account that merely would have the character of enumerative digest. The teaching responsibility is rather one of a dynamic synthesis involving both a personal realization of the real problem, and a sufficient degree of institutional support for the execution of such a task. In other words, the essential problem is one of selection and organization of knowledge in terms of conduct, viewed as a concept which joins both behavior and action, as previously defined.

This writer wishes to close the present dissertation by presenting some rather interesting quotations taken from the work of one of the most outstanding philosophers of education. Also written in 1929-30, and using non-technical language, the simlarity between pragmatic, modern liberal mind, and the Ortegan vitalism should be self explanatory:

> Quantification, mechanization and standardization: these are then the marks of the Americanization that is conquering the world. They have their good side, external conditions and the standard

> of living are undoubtedly improved. But their effects are not limited to these matters; they have invaded mind and character, and subdued the soul to their own dye. The criticism is familiar; it is so much the burden of our own critics that one is never quite sure how much of the picture of foreign critics is drawn from direct observation and how much from native novels and essays that are not complacent with the American scene. This fact does not detract from the force of the indictment; it rather adds to it, and raises the more insistently the question of what our life means.... (232)
>
> The problem of constructing a new individuality consonant with the objective conditions under which we live is the deepest problem of our times. (233)
>
> The first step in further definition of this problem is realization of the collective age which we have already entered. When that is apprehended, the issue will define itself as utilization of the realities of a corporate civilization to validate and embody the distinctive moral element in the American version of individualism: Equality and freedom expressed not merely externally and politically but through personal participation in the development of a shared culture. (234)

If one is to accept the Ortegan contention that certain ideas acquire a type of embodiment which possesses astounding clarity to perceptive minds, and which is also a particular concern of those who "keep abreast with the times", it should not be surprising to see that the above quotations follow such a trend of thought. In the realm of education, Dewey also wrote in 1929 that:

> ... the distinguishing trait of the American student body in our higher schools is a kind of intellectual immaturity. This immaturity is mainly due to their enforced mental seclusion; there is, in their schooling, little free and disinterested concern with the underlying social problems of our civilization. Other typical evidence is found in the training of engineers. Thorstein Veblen -- and many others have since repeated his idea -- pointed out

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(232) Dewey, John, Individualism Old and New, Capricorn Books, New York, 1962, 00.24-25.

(233) Ibid., p. 32.

(234) Ibid., pp. 33-34.

> the strategic position occupied by the engineer in our industrial and technological activity. Engineering schools give excellent technical training. Where is the school that pays systematic attention to the potential social function of the engineering profession? (235)

Obviously, in addition to the rejection of dualistic immanences, the contemporary versions of liberal thought also add the pragmatic dimension that Ortega wished to consider within the real of his vitalistic scheme. The metaphysical and cognitive differences have been already discussed, but the concern for human life remains practically unaltered. As a final remark, this writer believes that Ortega y Gasset would have gladly signed his name to the following consideration:

> It is indeed foolish to assume that an industrial civilization will somehow automatically, from its own inner impetus, produce a new culture. But it is a lazy abdication of responsibility which assumes that a genuine culture can be achieved except first by an active and alert intellectual recognition of the realities of an industrial age, and then by planning to use them in behalf of a significantly human life. To charge that those who urge intellectual acknowledgement or acceptance as the first necessary step stop at this point, and thus end with an optimistic rationalization of the present as if it were final, is a misconstruction that indicates a desire to shirk responsibility for undertaking the task of reconstruction and direction. Or else it waits upon a miracle to beget the culture which is desired by all serious minds. (236)

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(235) Dewey, op.cit., p. 128.

(236) Ibid., pp. 144-145.

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