THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND POPULATION CONTROL:
THE REIATIONSHIP OF (moss REPRODUCTION f
RATE AND 33.5ch INDICATORS OT THE STATUS ,
OT woman III DEVELOPED AND DEVEIOPINO
COUNTRIES ~

Dissertation IOT the Degree Of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
II-IERESE LABIB BEWAIIY
19,74

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thesisentitled . . . a ‘G- ’ "
The Status of Women and Population Control:
The Relationship of Gross Reproduction Rate
and Selected Indicators of the Status of
Women in Developed and Developing

p92331'i23‘iasyI

Therese Labib Bedwany I

has been accepted towards fulfillment

of the requirements for ‘
Ph 0 D 5 degree in Family and
Child Sciences I

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ABSTRACT

THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND POPULATION CONTROL:
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE
AND SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE STATUS OF

WOMEN IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES
By

Therese Labib Bedwany

Populatiorl growth is a problem demanding the
attention of all nations. Too rapid population growth
hinders a nation's ability to progress and to satisfy the
SFOWing demands of its people for a better life. A diffused
aPproach to changing social structure might have a more
lasting impact on Fertility than the direct approach implied
in family planning. The role of women in social change is a
most important one and no nation can ignore it. Legal position
0f the woman in the family, her rights under private law, and
greater freedom from cultural and social constraints on her
Progress and deve10pment would tend to decrease fertility
because with such independence and assurance of position, a
woman is able to feel secure and satisfied with a small family.
Therefore, limitations on the rights and roles of women abridge

basic human liberties that might affect indirectly the

Therese Labib Bedwany
population growth.

Thi 5 study examined the relationships between levels
of fertility measured by the gross reproduction rate in ten
developing and developed countries, and various indicators
of the status of women. The indicators chosen were literacy,
employment,civil laws (age at marriage, preperty rights,
social security, polygamy and divorce), political rights
(voting and election), cultural values, religion, and social
factors that affect attitudes towards family size and the
roles and status of women in the family.

Sczales were deve10ped to classify the two variables
in this study: fertility, measured by gross reproduction
rate, and the status of women, measured by the indicators
selected. Graphic Distribution of the data was presented.
Some of the indicators were statistically analyzed, and
others qualitatively discussed. Correlation coefficients
were calculated. As a check on reliability and variability
of the correlation coefficients, Chi-Square and Standard
Errors were calculated.

High fertility and low fertility countries differed
greatly in every aspect of status of women represented by
the indicators. The statistical analyses supported the
existence of a relationship between status of women and
fertility when all countries were considered. Qualitative
differences were discussed. Recommendations for pepulation

programs and social policy were given.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND POPULATION CONTROL:
THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE
AND SELECTED INDICATORS OF THE STATUS OF
WOMEN IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES

By

Therese Labib Bedwany

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Family and Child Sciences

1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank most and foremost my major professor
and guidance committee chairman, Dr. Margaret Jacobson Bubolz,
for her unique insight in guidance, advice, help, encourage-
ment, and whole-hearted support throughout my graduate study.

Appreciation is also expressed to the other members
of the doctoral committee, Dr. J. Allan Beegle, Dr. Eileen
Earhart, and Dr. Carol Shaffer, for their advice and helpful
comments.

Special appreciation is extended to Miss Helen
Strow, International Education Specialist of the U.S.D.A.,
for her support and personal interest during the data
collection in Washington, D.C.

Special thanks and appreciation are due to Mr.

G. De Clercq who provided help, stimulation, and encouragement,
turning many frustrating events into learning experiences.

Many thanks go to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations, which sponsored the greatest
part of my study and stay in the United States. Appreciation
for scholarships is also extended to the College of Human
Ecology, Michigan State University, the AmeriCan Home Economics
Association, the P.E.O. International Peace Scholarship

Foundation, and the professional fraternity Phi Upsilon Omicron.

ii

Tlie financial assistance of these grants and the support of
all those who contributed in any way, are gratefully
acknowledged.

Last, but not least, I owe the greatest debt of
gratitude to my family. Without their understanding and

support this study would not have been started nor completed.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement of the Problem . 1
Assumptions . . . 2
Objectives 3
Definitions 4
Countries Selected and Sources of Data 6
Methodology 7
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 8
Population and Fertility Change . 8
Industrialization, Urbanization and Economic
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Family Allowances . . . . 14
Cultural Values, Attitudes and Behavior in
Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Women' 5 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Women' 5 Employment . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Civil Law and Status of Women . . . . . . . . 27
Age at Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Polygamy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Divorce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Political Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
III. FACTORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND
FERTILITY IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES . . . . 39
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Growth Patterns in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . 39
Status of Egyptian Women . . . . . . 40
Factors Affecting Fertility in Egypt . . . . 42
Civil Laws in Egypt . . . . 44
Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy in .Egypt. . . 45

iv

IV.

Education in Egypt
Employment in Egypt
Religion in Egypt
Ghana .
Fertility in Ghana
The Population Policy in Ghana
Factors Affecting Fertility in Ghana
Education in Ghana . . . . .
Employment in Ghana
Abortion in Ghana .
Civil Law in Ghana .
Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy .
Political Rights in Ghana . . .
Religion in Ghana .
India
Factors Affecting Fertility in India
Civil Rights in India . . . .
Age at Marriage, Polygamy, and Divorce in
India . . . . . . .
Education in India . .
Fertility Planning in India .
Employment in India . . . . .
Religion and Fertility in India . .
Brazil . .
Factors Affecting Fertility in Brazil .
Political Rights in Brazil . . . .
Education in Brazil .

Employment in Brazil . . . . . . . . .
Religion in Brazil . .
Taiwan

Fertility in Taiwan . .
Factors Affecting Fertility in Taiwan .
Education in Taiwan .

Civil Law in Taiwan . .
Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy .
Employment in Taiwan . . . . . . .
Political Rights in Taiwan

Religion and its Relation to Fertility in

Taiwan
Summary .

FACTORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND
FERTILITY IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Sweden . . .
Fertility in Sweden . .
Civil Law and Political Rights in Sweden
Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy
Abortion and Illegitimacy in Sweden .
Social Security and Medical Care System
Education in Sweden . . .
Employment in Sweden . .
Maternity Benefits and Child Allowances

in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . .
v

Japan . .
Factors Affecting Fertility in Japan
Women and Civil Law in Japan , ,
Marriage, Divorce, Abortion and Polygamy
Education in Japan .
Employment in Japan
Religion in Japan ,
Child Allowance Program in .Japan ,
France . . . . .
Fertility in France
Civil Law in France
Age at Marriage, Divorce and Abortion
Education in France
Employment in France
Family Allowances in France
United States of America .
Civil Law in USA . . . . . . . . . .
Age at Marriage, Divorce, Polygamy and
Abortion . . . . . . . .
Education in USA
Employment in USA . . .
Family Allowances in USA . . . .
Religion in USA . . . .
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Women and Civil Law in The Soviet Union
Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy
Abortion in the Soviet Union .
Women's Education in USSR
Women's Employment in USSR .
Family Allowances in USSR . .
Religion.in USA . . . . . . .
Summary . . .

V. PROCEDURE

Sample Selection . .
Methodological Issues and Limitations of the
Study . . .
Level of Education ,
Women' 5 Employment ,
Civil Rights , , ,
Political Rights ,
Other Indicators ,
Methods of Measurement , ,
Scale for Cross Reproduction Rate (GRR)
Scale for Indicators of Status of Women

VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Graphic Distribution Presentation
Distribution of Illiteracy by Level of
Fertility . . . . . . . .

vi

82
83
85
85

86
87
87
87
88
89
90
90
91
91
92

94

95

97

98

99
100
100
101
102
103
103
104
105
106
106

108
108

109
109
111
115
117
118
118
119
120

125‘

125
125

Distribution of Voting Percentages by
Level of Fertility . .

Distribution of Percentage Median Age
at Marriage by Level of Fertility ,

Distribution of Percentage of Women
Economically Active by Level of
Fertility .

Distribution of Second Level of Education

by Level of Fertility . .
Distribution of Third Level of Education

by Level of Fertility

Distribution of Average Percentages of All

the Indicators for All Developed and
Deve10ping Countries by Level of
Fertility .
Correlation of Indicators with Fertility
High and Low Status Women, and High and
Low Fertility Countries . . .
Status of Women and Fertility in
All Countries

Status of Women in High and Low Fertility

Countries

Variations of the Indicators Among Countries

Classified by Levels of Fertility

Other Factors Related to the Status of Women

and Fertility . . .
Interpretation of Findings in Relation to
Time Perspective
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary .
Conclusions
Recommendations for Population Programs and
Social Policy
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B

LIST OF REFERENCES

vii

127
128

129
131
132

134
137

137
138
138
140
143
146
148

148
148

149
159
164
165

Table

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

LIST OF TABLES

Demographic data for five developing countries
Demographic data for five deveIOped countries
Illiterate pepulation by age and sex

Percentage of female students by level of
education . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentage of female graduates by field of study

Economically active female population--total and
percentage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentage of female teaching staff by level of
education . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Legal and median age at marriage

Rate of divorce per 1,000 population
Percentage of eligible voters, voting
Percentage of Roman Catholics and Moslems

Levels and class limits of GRR and of indicators
of status of women .

Values of the GRR and of each indicator for each
of the countries included in the study .

Classification of each country by level of GRR
and indicators of status of women. . . . .

Coefficients of correlation, Standard Errors,
and Chi-Square values of each indicator with
gross reproduction rate in 2x2 contingency
tables and percentage confidence of r

Coefficients of correlation and Standard Errors
for gross reproduction rate and the indicators
of the status of women for all countries in 6x6
contingency tables and for high and low
fertility countries separately in 3x6
contingency tables

viii

74
107
112

112
113

114

115
116
116
117
118

122

123

124

139

164

17. Unweighted averages of the indicators of status
of women classified according to level of
fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

18. General data related to fertility . . . . . . . . 144

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1.

Distribution of countries by levels of
illiteracy and fertility .

Distribution of countries by levels of voting
.and fertility

Distribution of countries by median age at
marriage and level of fertility

Distribution of countries by % women
economically active and level of fertility .

Distribution of countries by enrollment in
second level of education and level of
fertility

Distribution of countries by enrollment in 3rd
level of education and level of fertility

Distribution of unweighted averages of each
indicator by averages of high and low
fertility (GRR) .

126

128

129

130

133

134

136

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

 

Today, no problem is more urgently important to the
well being of mankind than the limitation of pepulation
growth. It is a problem, the effects of which are worldwide,
demanding the attention of all nations, East and West, large
and small, deve10ped and developing. In most nations of the
deve10ping world, population growth consumes much of their
economic growth, condemning peeple to continuing poverty.

Too rapid pepulation growth hinders a nation's ability to
progress and to satisfy the growing demands of its people for
a better life.

The evaluation of long-term family planning programs
suggests that a broader, diffused approach to changing
social structure might have a more lasting impact on
fertility than the direct approach implied in family planning.
Women are particularly able to make major contribution in the
development of their communities since, normally, such
activity is compatible with the responsibilities that they
have in their families. It was not until the nineteenth
century that women, to any degree, began to question their
limited role in society. The early birth control movement

1

was part of the feminist protest against being chained to the
home by large families.

Acceptable nonfamilial substitute roles for women, to
supply the satisfactions that they find in motherhood must be
found. A world, faced with a pepulation crises, cannot permit
women to indulge their "child hunger." If women can be
deflected from traditional familial roles, they may be

satisfied with smaller families.

Assumptions

 

The role of women in a community is a most important
one and no nation can afford to ignore it.' A nation's growth
should not be dependent upon ignorance and misfortune of its
citizenry or upon the unequal status of some elements of its
people. The relationship of discrimination against women
needs to be explored for a high degree of discrimination
against women may increase fertility.

Voluntary family planning for women means controlling
their own fertility voluntarily and the mere ability of women
to control fertility can bring, when a couple has a wider
choice of life styles, an improvement in the status of women.

Improvement in the quality of life means for women,
greater access to education, progress in health and welfare,
greater access to technical and professional training, to
employment, and greater freedom from cultural and social
constraints on her progress and deveIOpment. Therefore,

limitations on the rights and roles of women abridge basic

-human liberties that might affect indirectly the pepulation
growth.

‘ A revision of marriage laws, preperty rights,
political rights, eduCational and employment, maintenance and
inheritance laws would tend to decrease fertility because
with such independence and assurance of position, a woman is
able to feel content with a small family. In societies where
a woman gains security through children on whom she can
depend for support, the birth rate can be reduced only when
other forms of security are assured and there are alternate

activities in which women can become engaged.

Objectives

 

This study deals with the need for family planning
assistance which not only will help women to utilize their
full potential, but enhance their position and their role in
society.

The specific purposes of this study are:

1. To examine the relationship between levels of
fertility as measured by the gross reproduction
rate in developing and developed countries and
various indicators of the Status of Women.

2. To develop a scale to test the correlation
between fertility and the indicators of the
Status of Women.

3. To assist country personnel with recommendations

to be implemented beyond family planning programs.

Definitions

 

The term status is defined by Linton as "a position
in a particular pattern. Each individual has many statuses
since each individual participates in the expression of a
number of patterns. The status of individual means the sum
total of all the statuses which he occupies. A status, as
distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is a collece
tion of rights and duties" [84:202-8].

The interpretation to be given the "Status of Women"
for the purpose of this study may be found in the Charter,
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Convenants on Human Rights, and especially in
the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1967 (see Appendix A). The following
indicators of the Status of Women have been selected for this
purpose:

1. Female literacy

2. Women's employment

3. Civil laws (age of marriage, property rights,

social security, polygamy and divorce)

4. Political rights (voting and election)

5. Traditions, cultural values and other social

factors that affect attitudes towards family
size and the roles and status of women in the

family.

"Family planning" should not be limited to

"contraceptive devices through health service programs,"

but for the purpose of this study, the concept of family

planning is to be understood as encompassing a variety of

measures aimed at enhancing the enjoyment of human rights

and the improvement of living conditions, such as:

a)

b)

C)

Adequate social, economic, legal and educational
conditions, and adequate social and medical
measures for the care and protection of mothers
and children, taking all apprOpriate national and
international measures to advance such deve10pment.
The availability of all necessary information,
advice and means permitting individuals to decide
freely on the number and spacing of their
children, taking into account the right of every
child to be a wanted child and the needs of the
community as a whole.

A proper education for young persons of both

sexes to prepare them for responsible parenthood.

The countries included in this study will be defined

as "Developed" or "Developing" based on the "level of

fertility" of each and measured by the Gross Reproduction

Rate (GRR).

The Gross Reporduction Rate (GRR) is defined as

the average number of daughters that would be born per woman _

surviving to the end of her reproductive period in accordance

with the prevailing age-specific fertility rates. According

"to the Population Division of the United Nations, "No other

criterion, be it per capita income, urbanization, literacy,
industrialization, etc., defines this dichotomy so sharply as
the level of fertility. With exceedingly few exceptions, it
can be said that where the gross reproduction rate is greater
than 2.0, the country is a ”developing” one, and where it is

less, the country is "deve10ped" [106:3].

Countries Selected and Sources of Data

 

The sources used to gather the data for this study
were: United Nations Statistical and Demographic Yearbooks,
United Nations Documents and Reports, Population Council and
Country Profile Reports, individual and team research studies,
national data reports, Embassies' documents, official and
scientific journals and national and international conferences
documents.

The selection of the countries was based on the
judgement of region representation, culture diversity,
population range in deve10ping as well as developed groups,
preper and better quality of available data and substantial
size of country. Other than that the countries have been
arbitrarily selected.

Countries selected and their GRR between 1960-1965:

 

 

DEVELOPING DEVELOPED
India 2.4 Japan 1.0
Taiwan 2.7 Sweden 1.1
Egypt 2.8 France 1.3
Brazil 3.0 U.S.S.R. 1.4
Ghana 3.0 U.S.A. 1.8

Methodology

Descriptive data on population, status of women and
fertility were summarized for each country selected in this
study (Chapter 3-4). Six level scales, for measuring
fertility and the status of women were developed. Graphic
presentation and correlations between fertility level and
the indicators of status of women were made (Chapter 5). A
comparative analysis of the status of women in deve10ping and

deve10ped countries and their GRR's was carried out

(Chapter 6).

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Population and Fertilitnghange

 

Population changes are but one element in an inter-
woven complex of various events. They are an integral part
of an entire process of socioeconomic changes. If one
factor changes others must change also [70: 509]. Pepulation
is treated quantitatively and qualitatively in terms of
educational levels, cultural values, marital customs, etc.
Interest is focused not merely on the increase or decrease
in the size of the society over time, but on the quality
of its human resources.

The desire to improve one's position in the social
scale has been stressed as an important motive for family
limitation. The argument is particularly associated with the
name of Dumont [143], who in the latter half of the nineteenth.
century devoted an extensive series of studies to this
phenomenon, which he termed "social capillarity" (capillarité
sociale). Just as a column of liquid must be thin in order
to rise under the\force of capillarity, so also must a
family be to rise in the social scale. Social mobility is
thus more feasible with one or two children than with a large
number. According to Hauser, "fertility behavior is in large_

measure dependent upon the social milieu, and that changes in

8

fertility behavior necessarily involve social change. Or,
put it in another way, knowledge of the person's attitudes,
values and motivation cannot be expected to account for
differences in fertility behavior out of their cultural
context; and, consequently, changes in fertility behavior
cannot be produced through efforts to change attitudes,
values or motivation except in the context of changes in the
social order' [62: 464-5]. Coale [26: 168] shares with

R. Freedman [46: 35-121], Podyachikh [104: 245-247], Sauvy
[122: 131-132], and many others the view that aspects of
modernization influencing fertility control include declining
mortality, the rising status of women, an increase in the
influence of secular rationality and a decline in the
motivating influence of customs and traditions, and the spread
of education and literacy. Bruce [18] suggests that legal
position of the women in the family and her rights under
private law will have an important effect on the part she can
play in society as a whole. Legislation guaranteeing women
equal political rights with men will mean little in

practice if the woman is treated as a second-class citizen

in her home. Moving beyond the concept of legal status
alone, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, demanded the eradication of prejudice against
women and the abolition of all customs, regulations and
practices in daily life that are based on the idea of the
inferiority of women or that serve to discriminate against

them [30]. These comprehensive goals are relevant not only

10

.to the expansion and protection of basic human rights but
to the analysis of the association between various aspects
of the status of women and demographic patterns of fertility,
mortality and migration. Fertility and the social processes
associated with it are of special importance in this regard.
The status of women may be seen as both a determinant and a
consequence of variations in reproductive behavior: woman's
health, educational opportunities, employment, political
rights and role in marriage and the family affect and in turn
are affected by the timing and number of her births and by
her knowledge of how to plan them. The impact of birth
planning on the individual woman's potential for personal
autonomy and participation in all sectors of public life is
clearly as important as the question of the impact on
fertility of improvements in her status, which may be of
greater interest from the demographic point of view.
According to some U.N. studies [143], in countries
where fertility has declined, changes in the status and role
of women have been advanced as a reason for the decrease in.
family size. Many changes are believed to be working against
women's acceptance of their traditional role as homemaker and
the bearer of chilren. Factors frequently mentioned as
contributing to the changing attitude among women are the
increased education and equality for women in many spheres of
public life, the emphasis Upon the woman's role as a
companion with equality in marriage, and the opportunity

for personal deve10pment and independence.

11

From the previous discussion it is concluded that the
practice of family planning becomes a woman's human right.
By making it possible for the woman to chooSe the time of
conception and the size of her family, it enables her not
only to protect her health and save her life, but also to
maintain her status as a person instead of being a biological
tool, a person who should be able to plan her life and shape
her destiny and to have the opportunity to develOp her
talents and to advance and perhaps also to contribute to the

cultural and economic life of her society.

Industrialization, Urbanization and Economic Development

The historical decline of fertility in the now
developed, low-fertility countries is generally attributed
to a complex of factors related to economic deve10pment and
industrialization or to what is vaguely described as the
process of modernization.

The Soviet scholars are critical of the opinions and
assessments of Western demographers as regards the situation
in the developing countries. The Soviet view is that ”it is
not correct to credit the difficulties of the former colonial
and underdevelOped nations to the uncontrolled growth of
their population. In particular Soviet scholars are scornful
of the opinion that efforts to modernize the economy of the
underdeveloped nations creates surplus of labor and
consequently overpOpulation, and that in order to prevent

unemployment and low standards of living in the underdeveloped

12

countries, the rate of their industrialization whould be
slowed down and more primitive forms and techniques of pro?
duction preserved. Soviet scholars claim that the purpose
of such teaching is to preserve the economic dependence of
the primitive countries on the industrial economy of the
former controlling nations and continued exploitation of
the former colonies by the more advanced nations" [59: 288].
Freedman [47: 41], Sauvy [121: 212-3], and others
stress that in a modern, industrialized society changes in
the structure and function of the family make the large family
a liability rather than an asset as it is regarded in many
traditional cultures. Podyachikh [104: 246] also notes the
effect of urbanization upon fertility through the influence
of that process on marriage age, the duration of formal
education and the changing function of the family. Freedman
has speculated that "family planning is unlikely to be widely
adoptedin any country until there has been a significant
mortality decline and until there has been enough social
and economic deve10pment to lessen dependence on local and
familial institutions and to make smaller families more
rewarding than larger families: [47: 45]. He proposes further,
that once the threshold stage of deve10pment is reached,
family planning programs could be successfully implemented
in high fertility countries. According to the "threshold"

hypothesis,

V

 

 

.- ('7'! V

. II “WP-V

 

 

13

. . . in a developing country when fertility is
initially high, improving economic and social
conditions are likely to have little, if any,
effect on fertility until a certain economic
level is achieved, fertility is likely to enter
a decided decline and to continue downward until
it again stabilizes on a much lower plane
(107: 143).

However, we must consider that the high fertility of
low-income countries usually produces a large proportion of
children and a small proportion of adults in the economically
Imost productive ages. According to Coale (27: 126), the
developing countries have forty to forty-five percent of
their population under age fifteen, in contrast with a maximum

of twenty-five to thirty percent in the highly industrialized

countries. The age composition in developing countries,

therefore, is unfavorable to economic development. According

to Bourgeois-Pichat (17: 67-68), the nonproductive segment
of the population constitutes a greater burden in the
developing countries than in the developed ones. For every
100 productive adults in the developing countries there are
85 nonproductive persons (79 children and 6 aged persons),
the corresponding figure for the developed countries is only
57 (36 children and 21 aged persons). Because the nonproduc-
tive period is customarily exulhded to the age of twenty in
developed countries, it might be more accurate to put the
number of nonproductive persons at 76 (53 children and 23 aged
persons). "In either case, the unfavorable age composition
of the population of developing countries is apparent. This

is not a new phenomenon. It derives from the dichotomy

 

 

 

 

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14

between developing and deve10ped countries with respect to
fertility. This compounds the problems created by the rapid
rise in annual pepulation growth rates--a phenomenon of
recent decades" [17: 67-68].

The relationship between industrialization and
urbanization is complicated by the fact that there is not
necessarily a suitable, apprOpriate, or Optimum timing in the
rate of urbanization and the rate of industrialization, even

assuming that they proceed at equivalent levels. One of the

prime development questions is, when it may be possible for

industrialization, in terms of producing jobs, to catch up
with urbanization. In Egypt for example, the nature of
rapid urbanization, in relation to fertility and population
growth, shows a pattern which deviates from the experience
of industrialized countries. According to Abu-Lughod [3],
rural migrants move to the sections of the city where their
own country folk live, reinforcing their own traditional
outlooks, instead of absorbing new modern cultural values.
Rural families still foster favorable attitudes toward large

families.

Family Ailowances

 

Family allowances can by broadly defined as "systematic
payments made to families with dependent children; either
by employers or by the government for the primary purpose of ’
promoting welfare of such children" [147: 1]. As of early

1967, 64 countries had introduced family allowances Programs.

15

Theoretically, where family income and fertility are
known to be correlated, family allowance payments (as a form
of family income) should also be correlated with fertility
in the same way. Traditionally, higher income families have
been observed to have fewer children than lower income
families, although in many deve10ped countries there has
been a tendency over the past several decades for differenCes
in fertility by economic status to diminish [71: 59-75].
Some studies have reported evidence of a reversal of this
relatiOnship [45: 414-426]. According to results obtained
Afrom a regression analysis of data for over 100 countries,
the direction of the relationship between income and family
size varies with the level of development: it tends to be
positive in the more developed countries and negative in those
where economic progress has been much slower [51: 44]. Some
scholars have concluded that family allowances would
encourage smaller families by "creating the desire and
possibility for a better standard" [88: 5]. However, since
under a family allowance system gross family income
necessarily increases with family size, it is generally
believed that especially in deve10ped countries, family
allowances will reduce the incentive to limit family size in
order to achieve a better standard of living. ,According to
Sauvy [124: 508-509], it is believed that family allowances
have had their greatest effect in increasing the frequency

of births of second and third parity, since it is among

l6

middle-class families with only one or two children that the
economic constraint plays an important role in the decision
about family size. The view is held that the advent of

family allowances has not created the desire for more children,
it has, however, reduced the financial barriers against having
the number of children already desired. Allowances to non-
working wives are also believed to have increased fertility,

in that they have reduced the amount that the wife would

gain by going to work and have therefore reduced the costs

to her (in terms of lost opportunities) of raising a family.

Cultural Values, Attitudes and Behavior in Fertility

 

Considerable emphasis has been placed upon the
tenacity of the social structure and values in the face of
the introduction of fertility control. It is possible that
the stress laid upon the role of the family and other social
institutions as perpetuators of customs that regulate
attitudes and behavior with respect to family siZe may have
diverted attention from charges in these and other segments
of society. Hauser suggested that,

Another decade or two of the present type of family

planning programs may turn out to have relatively

little impact compared with other forces that are
accelerating social change in general and, as part
of such change, a change in attitudes, values and

behavior in respect to fertility control [61: 413].

The powers of procreation are held in different

degrees of restraint in the deve10ping countries by differences

in behavior pertaining to marriage, sexual relations, and

17

birth of children. Among the cultural traits which may be
important in this connection are not only specific customs
and behavioral norms (such as the moral disapproval of
"artificial" birth-control in Roman Catholic societies or the
traditional customs in many African societies of prolonging
lactation and suspending sexual intercourse during rather
long periods after child-birth), but also more general and
more fundamental characteristics of culture, relating to
such matters as the values attached to family life and
children as opposed to competing interests and activities,
the spirit of thrift, prudence, and self-discipline,
rationality, and the disposition to attempt control of one's
destiny.

While it may be true that men and women in the less
deve10ped regions of the world are generally motivated to
have numerous children, this does not mean that they
necessarily desire to have as many as they are able to produce,
nor that there are no important differences between countries
in attitudes and aspirations in this respect.

If we examine the patterns of attitudes and
behaviors in fertility, we can see that they are regulated
by complicated economic, social and cultural factors.
Possible obstacles impeding the adoption of family planning
are: (1) economic underdevelOpment with prevalence of
rudimentary agriculture, (2) low degree of urbanization,

(3) social system (joined or extended family or patriarchal

18

family system), (4) value system; traditionalism, lack of
ambition for higher social stratum, taboo attitude toward
sexual matters, lack of urban way of life, (5) lack of
education or illiteracy, (6) religious objection, (7)
unconsciousness of government, (8) unawareness Of the general
public, (9) inadequate spreading of information on family
planning, (10) lack of communication between husband and
wife on sexual matters and family planning, (11) lack of
effective transportation, (12) shortage of midwives and
nurses, (13) shortage of qualified leaders, (l4) difficulty
in getting contraceptives, (15) lack of proper housing
conditions (lack of privacy, water, shortage of facilities,
etc.).

According to the "cultural lag” [107: 143] theory of
fertility differentials in countries where fertility has
been declining, attitudes and practices conducive to
diminishing fertility have been adopted first by the better
educated, wealthier, and socially more favored groups of the
city population and transmitted in the course of time to
intermediate and lower status groups and to the rural
populations. The fertility of most highly educated groups
in the population may be dbnhfishai merely because so many of
their years of early adult life are spent in school and so
their marriage is delayed.

It is agreed that national fertility decreases in

response to an alternation of values relative to children

19.

and childbearing among a sufficiently large number of
couples capable of reproduction. There is also agreement
that such changes in values and supporting actions to restrict
the number of progeny occur in a milieu in which a certain
measure of economic and social deve10pment has been achieved.
Thus, the question becomes, in what circumstances will
individuals consciously control fertility? Noting the
difficulty of making valid and useful generalizations, Coale
points out that, although "the principal change responsible
for the deve10pment of controlled fertility has been a
change in attitude or motivation" [26: 168], the factor
influencing the motivation is not known. He notes that all
modernized societies have low fertility, but that none of
the indicators of modernization (urbanizatiOn, communiation,
education and patterns of employment) is self-evidently
related to controlled fertility. It is also held that shifts
in values with respect to children occur because in an urban
industrial society children become economically more of a
burden than an asset, child labor restrictions, compulsory

. education and higher legal minimum ages for marriage being
characteristic of such societies.

,The preceding discussion deals with factors that have
tended to render old values inappropriate or obsolete under
changing social and economic conditions. A related question
concerns the process whereby new values tend to become

effective in actual behavior and to result in the reduction

20

of fertility. Sauvy [121: 212-213] pointed out that this
process occurs in three stages. First,a positive desire for
many children exists, then, a desire to limit the number of
children but when the motivation is unsufficient. Later,
the motivation is strong to cause couples to limit the number
of children that they have. Davis points out, however, that
birth control was only one of the means whereby the people
of Japan and north-western Europe reduced fertility. In
what he has called the "theory of multiphasic response,"
Davis points out that these peeple reacted to the persistent
excess of births over deaths with virtually the entire range
of possible response. "Each industrializing nation tended
to postpone marriage, to increase celibacy, to resort to
abortion, to practice contraception in some form and to
emigrate overseas" [29: 350-2]. He maintains that "an
understanding of this process in population theory has been
hindered by a failure to see the multiphasic character of the
response and by an interpretation of demographic behavior as
a response either to absolute need or to some cultural
idiosyncrasy such as a particular "value system" or "custom"
[29: 350-2].

The question is often posed as to whether the
experimuxs of western developed countries and of Japan are
likely to be repeated within a reasonable time without
"interference" in countries where fertility is still high.

Since the factors underlying the decline in western countries

21

are not fully understood, and since the time element is
crucial, the question of immediate interest is whether small
family normative values and supportive action, in other

words, fertility regulations can be introduced into these
societies in the absence of some or all of the modernization
changes that preceded or accompanied fertility declines in the

new advanced nations.

Women's Education

 

It is usually believed that one of the reasons for
fertility decline in developed countries was the advance in
education for the general pepulation. Even at present,
as the level of education rises, fertility usually declines
in both economically developed and underdeveloped countries.
The ability to delay marriage or a first birth does become
salient as higher education for women becomes more generally
accepted and valued. But education itself may be the very
precondition necessary for motivated birth planning.

How can literacy and broad educational gains affect
fertility? One indirect way is by helping to reduce mortality
which will later reduce fertility. Obviously, literacy also
will facilitate the dissemination of information about the
idea and means of family limitation. With increased
education and literacy the pepulation becomes involved with
the ideas and institutions of a larger modern culture. It is
relevant that Taiwan, a high fertility country in which

significant fertility decline seems great, has a relatively

22

high literacy rate.

The author does not believe that education about
fertility and family planning alone, completely in advance
Of other changes in the society, can be very effective for
changing fertility norms and behavior. Such a single
specialized educational program alone does net affect
linkage of the local pepulation to the larger units in the
broad and continuing way which can lead to the essential
growing dependence on nonlocal familial institutions.

General education and literacy probably are required to do
this.

On the other side, education can deter early marriage
and childbearing or postpone it beyond the average age of
family formation as long as the woman stays in school. From
a demographic point of view the effect Of education on.
reproductive behavior is the more interesting aspect of the
association. Fertility is affected by factors related to
education such as Openness to new ideas, higher standard of
living, exposure to urban environment, and a greater range of
options and interests outside the home. Bogue [15] analyzed
childlessneSs_among all United States women over 15 years Of
age who had been married at least once. The analysis of
this more restricted category eliminated the factor of
childlessness due to spinsterhood. Comparing the percentages
of women who were childless at various educational attainment

levels, Bogue found that being childless was highly related

23

to education. For every age group, among Whites and non-
Whites, those women with the most education had a much
higher rate of childlessness than those at the lower
educational levels. While not conclusive evidence, this
consistent relationship between education and childlessness
suggested that not bearing children is Often a matter Of
choice, not infecundity. Nevertheless, most studies show
that the educational level of the wife is more strongly
correlated with a couple's fertility than the educational
level Of the husband, suggesting that however the causal
mechanism works, investment in female education may have
a greater impact on fertility than the same investment in
schooling for men.

The educational factor affects the labOr input. A
comparison of the percentages Of illiterate pepulation shows
that the percentage reaches 89 for developing countries while
it does not, as a rule, exceed 4 percent in the developed
ones [144]. There is a close interrelation between the
provisions laid down by labor laws for the protection of
children and young persons, on the one hand, and school
regulations providing for compulsory education on the other.
Without compulsory education laws, a minimum age for admission
to employment is difficult to enforce. At the same time,
without a minimum age for admission to employment parents may
be tempted to disregard compulsory education laws so as to

benefit from their children's earning power at an early age.

24

The existence of compulsory education laws, however, does not
ensure that all children within the stipulated age range will
be found in school. Develeping countries, caught between
scarce resources and a high birth rate, Often find it
difficult to provide free public education to all children
that are required by law to attend school. Even when school
facilities are available, poor transportation facilities,
inadequate enforcement of compulsory school attendance,

and other factors often make it difficult to ensure that

- children will make use of them [141]. But the main reason
for the failure of children to attend school is poverty.
Where children must work to support themselves or their
families, compulsory education imposes a severe cost on
parents even when provided free by the State [127: 7-8].
HOwever, if this barrier can be avoided, even the transition
from illiteracy to literacy resulting from very low levels of
schooling is shown to have some influence on family size in
many areas, unlike the situation in industrialized countries
where significant reduction in family size may not appear
until much higher levels of schooling are reached. Sauvy
[123: 111-113] emphasizes particularly the education of
_women as an aspect Of social development that is fundamental
to changes in reproductive behavior leading to lower
fertility, but maintains that an increase in the standard of.
living is a prerequisite to changes in values regarding

family size.

25

Women's Employment

 

. Various reasons have been suggested as to why an
increase in income alone should produce a decline of fertility.
One theory is that the balance between competing sources of
pleasure changes as wealth increases. Greater income makes
possible a wider selection of leisure-time activities.

Child care may be considered an interference with the
Satisfaction of other desires, and hence the incurring Of
SuCh responsibility may be limited.

Spencer argued that as societies develop and become
more complex, there is a natural decline in the fecundity Of
the population. The reduced capacity for reproduction,
according to Spencer, was directly attributable to the amount
of energy expended upon "mental labour carried to excess."
Spencer was particularly sensitive to the women of modern
society, about whom he wrote scoldingly, "the deficiency Of
reproduction power among them may be reasonably attributed
to the overtaxing of their brains, an overtaxing which produces
a serious reaction of the physique" [132: 485-486]. SO, for.
Spencer, the working woman, especially one who did mental
work, was diminishing her capacity to reproduce children.
Interestingly, it is true that there is a distinct tendency
for women who are employed, particularly in managerial or
professional occupations, to bear fewer children than women .
who are not employed, but this is likely to be due much more

to personal choice than to infecundity.

26

The findings of an Egyptian research group [14]
suggest that fertility patterns are the results and not the
cause of socio-economic structure. In particular, low
fertility is brought about by socioeconomic changes
resulting from industrialization and urbanization. Furthermore,
the involvement Of women in the labor force creates a conflict
between women's work and childbearing which Offers the
potential for the socioeconomic change that would alter
fertility patterns. The Growth of American Families
study [58] reveals that working wives, especially those in
their late thirties who have worked five years or more, expect
to have fewer children than most of the other wives.

In most developing countries the employment-fertility
relationship is less clear, although a distinction must be
made between urban and rural areas and between the modern and
traditional sectors of the society. In rural areas, paid
employment usually has little impact on fertility, partly
because the value of large numbers of children often remains
strong, and partly because the employment is likely to be
of an agricultural or marketing type in which a woman may
either keep her young children with her while she works or
leave them with other family members. In urban areas women's
paid employment is more likely to be incompatible with raising
a family if it takes her out of the home and if she has
difficulty in finding ways to care for her children. Some

studies in urban centers Of developing countries have shown

27

that women in the professions and in white-collar occupations
are more favorably disposed towards the use of centraceptives
and have fewer live births than skilled manual workers, who
in turn have smaller families than women in sales, trade or
the Service sector.

Conditions vary greatly from country to country
according to their culture, socioeconomic structure and level
of development. In general, however, one finds that women
are less likely to be gainfully employed outside the home than
are men, although they may be engaged in equally heavy unpaid
domestic or agricultural labor. Working women are mostly
concentrated in the lower status and lower paying jobs.
Child-care facilites in most countries are inadequate to
meet the needs of working parents. Therefore, high level
of education may not motivate a woman to want a smaller
family if her_training does not lead to the right active
participation in employment outside the home. Female
.employment itself may not influence fertility significantly
unless a woman's education has prepared her for other than
subsistence agricultural labor, unpaid work in a family

enterprise or low-status, low-paying jobs.

Civil Law and Status of Womgg
In many countries equality within the family has not
yet been recognized in civil law, and, upon marriage, women'
may be deprived of many rights such as the independent

ownership Of property or the right to work without their

28

husband's consent. But even in countries where legislation
favors equal rights, traditional cultural patterns of male.

dominance in private life are slow to change.

Age at Marriage

 

The United Nations [31] has declared that child
marriage and the betrothal of young girls before puberty is
to be prohibited and that women shall have the same right as
men to free choice of a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent. Minimum standards for
age at marriage are to be set in every country at not less
than 15 years, with all marriages being Officially registered.

What impact would the timing of marriage have on
spacing and limiting births and the exercise Of the woman's
rights at this crucial transition period in the life cycle?
Raising the average age at marriage will: a) place women
in a far better position to choose a husband and give time
for education; b) may be essential to effective communication
between husband and wife about family size desires; c)
decrease the reproductive period in a woman's life cycle;

d) delay the first birth; e) reduce the birth rate. However,
at any rate, raising the minimum from 12 to 14 years, or
from 14 to 16 may have no effect at all on the average age
of the woman at the time of her first birth. Indian studies
[4: 172] suggest that marriages would have to be pushed up-
over 19 or 20 years to have a significant demographic impact

in that country.

29

In most countries the average age at first marriage
for women tends to be higher among educated and employed
women and higher in urban than rural areas. Social pressures
to marry girls Off while they are very young remain strong
in many regions. An unmarried daughter past a certain age
may be considered a disgrace to the family. There are also
those situations in which a woman's status is defined almost
entirely by the number Of children she bears, or by the
number of her sons, so that the more fertile she is, the
greater is her authority. A woman's prestige in the eyes of
her husband, her relatives and the community at large may
depend solely on the number Of children she bears. In the
context of such beliefs it would be detrimental to the
status Of the woman to practice contraception as long as no
alternative roles were possible under existing economic

and social conditions.

Property Rights

 

How does the denial Of certain civil rights, such as
the right to own or inherit property affect a woman's desired
family size? Where only male children inherit preperty, does
fertility increase until a desired number of sons are born?
Is a woman who bears no children or who bears only one or
two, or only daughters, disadvantaged under some legal
systems more than others?

PrOperty rights, maintenance and inheritance laws

tend to decrease fertility because with such independence and

30

assurance of position, a woman is able to feel content with
a small family. In societies where a woman gains security
through children on whom she can depend for support, the
birth rate can be reduced only when other forms Of security
are assured and there are alternate activities in whiCh women-

can become engaged.

Social Security

 

Social security programs might be expected to have a
negative effect on fertility, the strength of the effect
varying with the scepe of the program and the size of the
benefits. With social insurance, parents no longer have to
rely solely on their children to provide for them in case of
sickness, unemployment or Old age. Therefore, some of the
motivation to have large families is reduced [64: 429-430].

Testing the effect of social security participation
on fertility, Friedlander and Silver [52: 429-430] found the
expected negative regression coefficient bordering on
statistical significance for all countries combined. It was
Observed that the association was negative for deve10ped
countries but positive for developing countries, and that
the former was clearly more significant than the latter. The
authors suggest that the effects of social security measures
upon fertility may be destroyed by the differences between
existence and effectiveness of established laws, particularly

in deve10ping countries.

31

P01 am

MOst countries do not permit plural marriages.
However, Islamic law permits a man to be married to a
maximum of four wives at any time [75: 137]. The laws of
Moslem countries seek to conform with the Koran's instruction
that four wives are permissible if they are treated equally,
but they may have different interpretations. Except in some
African regions and among Arab Bedouins, polygamy, however
legal, is not so widely practiced as previously, and in the
more progressive Moslem countries, it appears to be falling
into disrepute [78: 151].

Several studies comparing the fertility of monogamous
and polygamous marriages have found that polygamy reduced
fertility. ‘In a study of fertility among Bedouin women,
Muhsam [93: 11-16] concluded that women living in polygamous
marriage have fewer children than wives of monogamous husbands.
The depressing effect on fertility may result from lower
average frequency Of coitus for wives in polygamous marriages
than would occur under monogamy [107: 22].

However, despite its acknowledged effect on fertility,
polygamy is probably not sufficiently widespread in any
country to exert an appreciable effect on the overall birth
rate. In a society where an important number Of women would
not have the opportunity to marry under a monogamous system,
polygamy will increase the number Of married women. Therefore,

the effect Of reduced fertility per married woman on the

32

birth rate in a polygamous society might be counteracted to
some extent by the effect of an increased number of married

women .

Divorce

The right to divorce is not universally granted and
the permissible grounds for divorce vary among those countries
where it is legal. In EurOpean countries where divorce is
possible, it is generally permitted by judicial decision only
on the grounds of adultery, desertion, cruelty or imprisonment
[112: 16]. Divorce, easily Obtained under Moslem law, is
particularly common in cases of sterile marriages and unions
which produce only daughters [107: 19].

It is unclear in what ways divorce may affect
fertility. One consequence Of divorce may be that a
childless marriage is replaced by a marriage which results in
children.' On the other hand, divorce may not be followed by
another marriage at all. Alternatively, it could be said
that the relaxation of divorce laws may encourage the
disposition to marry while at the same time reducing the
stability of marriage [36: 18-26]. In societies where the
husband has unilateral power to divorce his wife and take
another, the fear Of repudiation can motivate women to have
many children as a form of protective insurance. Thus where
sterility or the absence of sons is frequently used to ‘
justify divorce, the women with the most children may feel

the safest in her marriage. Eliminating the husband's

33

power to divorce his wife at will could lighten the pressure

on a wife to reproduce many children.

Political Rights

 

The United Nations has declared the right of women to
participate in public life and political decision-making on
equal terms with men, specifically the right to vote in all
elections, to be eligible for all publicly elected bodies,
to hold public Office and to exercise all public functions.

Women involved in public life, national activities or
political areas find themselves taken out Of the home and into
a world of wider interests and rewards. Therefore, they may
desire to have smaller families to reduce their domestic
responsibilities and to be free for such participation.

Such women can be a powerful force toward changing attitudes
regarding female roles and responsibilities. Even the simple
act Of voting is symbolic in manifesting a belief in women's
capabilities of independent thought and action. The exercise
Of civic responsibilities in this area would convince women
about their active rather than passive participation in the
life of their communities. As women acquire greater
awareness of and confidence in their ability to make
autonomous decisions, such exercise could be carried on into

their private life.

34

Religion

A program to reduce births cannot appeal to the masses
unless it gains support from the religious institution.
Lorimer [86: 183] has pointed out that the history of
religious followers as a social group may affect that
religion's position on fertility and its readiness for social
change.

Religious Opinions differ widely on the fertility
subject. The two religions, often quoted as encouraging
natality, are Islam and Roman Catholic.

Kirk [79] maintains that the Islamic religion
partakes of the pro-natalist social forces that exist
generally in peasant and pastoral societies. High mortality
rates, especially Of infants and children, have in the past
called for unrestricted reproduction. Sons are valued for
many purposes: for continuity of family line and land-
ownership; for contribution to agricultural labor; to
strengthen family numbers in village rivalry and strife; for
support in old age; for religious intervention at and after
death. Freedman [48] pointed out that emphasis in the
religious system on the importance of a male heir for ritual
purposes probably produces pressures over time in a high
mortality society for at least two sons to guarantee the
survival of at least one. This means that on the average
each family will want at least four children.

Moslem doctrine does not prohibit the voluntary

35

restriction of births, though as militant religion Islam.
' historically put pressure on men to produce numerous
children and especially sons. Nevertheless there are clear
authoritative statements, for example by the highly respected
medieval theologian Al-Ghazzali, that would permit the
practice Of birth control (coitus interruptus) under certain
conditions [76]. The conviction that a large family is
encouraged by the Islamic religion is supported by verses of
the Koran such as: "Wealth and sons are the allurements of
the life of this world" [6]. However, Sheik Sharabasy
[129: 122-3] maintains in his interpretation of the Koran
that the word "Wealth" precedes "sons" and is therefore a
precondition to it. It is those who can afford raising them
who may have as many children as they desire. Another
Koranic verse Often quoted as encouraging fertility is:
"Multiply and get married because I will boast by thee over
other nations in the Day of Resurrection" [6]. Sheik
Sharabasy asserts that the time factor has to be taken in
consideration. It was essential, at the time Of the prOphet,
to encourage population growth to promote Islam. .But that
was proclaimed fourteen centuries ago when the total number
of Moslems did not exceed 10,000. As the number of Moslems
throughout the world is now approximately 600 million, growth
is no longer necessary to propagate Islam.

The Islamic religion forbids abortion after the

creation of the soul. However, according to El Kammash

36

[38: 313] most Of the Moslem jurists agree_that the soul is.
created in 120 days after conception. Therefore, Sheik
Ibrahim clarified that abortion is sanctioned within the
first hundred and twenty days before the child is gifted
with a soul [68: 67-86].

The institution of polygamy has been justified in the
Islamic religion under the following Koranic verse: "If ye
fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans,
marry women Of your choice, two, or three or four. But if ye
fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly, then only one,
or that your right hands possess" [38: 315]. El Kammash
maintains therefore that polygamy is conditioned on the
ability of the husband to treat the various wives equally in
all respects--which is impossible--as well as avoid the
consequence of poverty. Ungor [142] explains that the woman
in Islamic religion is to be the equal of man as a human
being. And, since this principle of spiritual equality is
basic, the discrimination against women in the Islamic
family structure can only be explained by the customs and
social conditions of the community.

The Christian religion shares with other religions
injunctions to marry and multiply. The Catholic Church in
particular forbids contraception. Pope Paul's Encyclical
Humanae Vitae Of July 1968, had a great influence upon the
Catholics. All contraceptive devices, except the rhythm

method, were prohibited. At the same time, however, there

37

are contervailing forces at work, even within the Church
hierarchy, which make a final assessment of the Papal
Encyclical difficult. One Of the documents Opposing the
Encyclical was an Open letter dispatched by a group of
Catholic laymen. [They criticized the following points:

1. The rejection of contraception is in contradiction
to the general doctrine Of the Church which sets
as a norm the respect of the human person and of
the values of the conjugal community.

2. If each individual sexual act must, according to
the Encyclical, respect the double significance
of sexuality, namely conjugal unity and.
procreation, methods of birth control considered
moral by the Church, such as the rhythm method,
must be condemned.

3. Any technical advance may be used for good or
evil. If the practice of contraception brings
risks of licentiousness all methods including
the so-called natural ones, as soon as they obtain
the efficiency the Encyclical explicitly wishes,
present the.same risks.

4. Moral integrity is not a question of meticulous
differentiation between one contraceptive method
and another, the true problems are at a deeper
level.

5. Finally, whoever takes seriously responsible
paternity and the value of conjugal intimacy will
not be able to do so without the efficient
birth control devices [100].

From all the above, it appears that the faithful

Openly assert the right to think for themselves and to discuss
the teachings of the religions. It seems clear that formal
religious considerations are of greater importance to the
elite than to the masses. Major studies in Latin America,

have concluded that Catholic belief is not a substantial

barrier to the use of modern contraception. "We may

38

conclude . . . that (the Catholic) religion is no real
impediment to realization of low-fertility ideals" [65: 202].
Also, most experts believe that Moslem fertility is based
less on theological dostrine than on the traditional
subordination of women in Moslem culture [80: 561-79].
Similarly, any inhibition to family planning among Hindus

in India is probably attributable more to philosophical

fatalism than to religious doctrine.

Summary

Change in fertility behavior necessarily involves
social change. Attitudes, cultural values and behavior are
forces accelerating social change in general. Industrializa-
tion, urbanization and economic deve10pment have an effect
upon fertility through the influence of that process on the
size Of the family. Women's education and employment, on the
other hand, tend to decrease fertility. _The excercise Of
women's civil rights concerning age at marriage, preperty
rights and social security is important in controlling
fertility. It is unclear in what way polygamy and divorce
affect fertility. ‘Women's involvement in political activities
might create the desire for smaller families in order to be
free for such participation. Religious institutions have

variable influences in supporting family planning programs.

CHAPTER III

FACTORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND FERTILITY

IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This chapter includes descriptive data on pepulation,
status Of women and fertility for each of the five developing
countries selected for this study. However, some data were

not available in certain cases.

Egypt

Egypt is located in the northeast corner of the
African continent and its total area is 386,000 square miles.
Only 3.5 percent of the land is inhabited, and 2.5 percent
is capable of producing creps. The population of Egypt has
doubled in the last thirty years [21: 3]. By August 1971
it had grown to an estimated 34,900,000. The population

density of the inhabited area is almost 2,400 per square mile.

Growth Patterns in Egypt

 

The recorded crude birth rate* has fluctuated
between 39.3 and 44 per 1,000 over the past 60 years, with
44 the estimated rate for 1971. During the same period the
death rate dropped, almost steadily, from 26 to 14.3 with

a corresponding increase in the growth rate from 17 to 25.4

\

*Number Of live births per 1,000 total pepulation.

39

40

per thousand [20: 7]. This was due mainly to the expansion
of free medical services. The government figure for
population growth is 2.8 percent but it is likely that the
actuaI growth rate is closer to 3.0 percent (there is still
a high percentage Of under-registration Of births which is
most acute in villages located far from the city or from
Health Bureau areas). Egypt fits into Dorn's description Of
a country with a medieval birth rate and a twentieth century
death rate [34: 18]. It is hoped that the rate can be
reduced to 1.7 percent by 1975. The life expectancy at
birth for men rose from 35.65 in 1936-38 to 51.6 in 1960;

for women it rose from 41.48 to 53.8 [145: 708].

Status Of Egyptian Women

 

Like many developing societies, Egypt has inherited
a tradition of male domination in society. Education for
girls was initiated by missionaries about 1840 but it was
not until after the first World War (1917) that women gained
the right to university study and began to enter the world
of work [32: 159].

In 1919, for the first time in the history Of modern
Egypt, a women's political committee was organized. "Women
veiled and unveiled participated in the revolt of 1919 and
four lost their lives. Girl students joined the nationalists"
[13 207]. Several women's organizations have been established.
Their activities dealt primarily with the improvement of

Women's education, laws of marriage and divorce, and

41

unveiling. "The veil and seclusion of women are said to

have been introduced from Byzantium. The veil was used to
differentiate the free woman from the slave girl who was
exposed in the market for public scrutiny. Men believed

they were honoring slave girls who were moving in and out
among them. Hence, the veil, contrary to western reaction to
it, became the mark Of respectability. With the abolition Of
slavery and with the changing values of the world, the veil
had no raison d'Otre" [66]. In 1922 the society of the
"goutte de lait" was established. Its main activity was

the instruction Of their mothers in child care [138: 71].

In 1952, the jurists of Al-Azhar issued a judicial
promulgation (fetwa) which formally condemned the granting Of
political right to women. In the same year, after the
revolution, the Official Studies Commission decided to grant
the vote to every woman capable Of reading and writing. But
the law did not pass and in 1954 a group Of women under the
leadership Of Doreya Shafiq went on a hunger strike
demanding the right to vote. The vote was granted in 1956.
and the Constitution, issued the same year, recognized
women's rights to employment and charged the State to assure
to the woman the "harmony between her role in society and
her duties in the bosom Of her family” [140: 38-39].

At the time, Temiche analyzed the status of Egyptian

women noting:

42

The largest body Of women in Egypt belong to

the peasantry: 4,000,000 in number, but largely
unorganized, uneducated and neglected. A 1956
decree fixed the daily wage of a male agricultural
worker at 180 millimes, and that of a female
worker at 100 millimes. Thus the peasant woman is
discriminated against by law. True she has been
given the right to vote, but as most peasant women
are illiterate and thus are ineligible to vote,
this right is a very limited one [140: 43].

However, the espousal of "Arab Socialism" by the Revolutionary
government has implied an ideological commitment to equality
for women. The emphasis on equality takes explicit form in
the National Charter 1962, a document that forms the basic
statement of principle for the nation and is widely studied
in the schools:

Woman must be regarded as equal to man and she

must therefore shed the remaining shackles that

impede her free movement, so that she may play a

constructive and a profoundly important part in

shaping the life of the country [35: 159].

A small number of women are members of the National

Assembly. The first woman minister was appointed in 1962.

Factors Affecting Fertility in Egypt

 

Shultz [128: 31] pointed out that urbanization alone
may not have as direct effect upon fertility as two other
variables. He finds that Egypt's fertility varies directly
With infant and child mortality and inversely with level of
education. Nearly 60 percent of all deaths annually
registered occur in the range 0-5 years. As in many other ~
countries where the male offspring are more highly prized

than the female, infant mortality afflicts girls

43

disproportionately. The rural family needs to have a large
number of children to insure the survival of more than one
male child into adulthood. Thus families will wait until

a large number Of children have survived beyond the earlier
precarious years before the notion of family planning can
be entertained.

Rural communities in Egypt foster a high fertility
culture. The importance of early marriage and the building
Of a family is an important factor to a young male peasant.
The peasant's family is mainly a working group, and it needs
children to work the soil. The wife is a valuable asset as
a helper inall activities necessary for Obtaining a
livelihood.' Children are important for providing extra
hands and, when they can be hired out, extra cash. The more
children, the more free labor and the less chance that the
high mortality rate will result in tOO few hands [10: 126].
Children also relieve their parents from part of the hard
work and make it possible for them to enjoy some leisure
time and to participate in the social life of the village.
As boys are particularly important in helping their fathers
in the field, girls are important in taking care of younger
children. Both boys and girls start carrying work
reSponsibilities very early. A very small boy walking
behind a loaded donkey or attending the water wheel or a
tiny girl carrying a newborn infant are familiar sights in

rural Egypt. In his region Of research, Ammar [7: 56]

44

demonstrated that a 13 year Old boy is capable of performing
two-thirds Of the tasks involved in the cultivation of creps.

That Shows that at a very young age the child produces more

than he consumes. A son is also the main security for his

parents, and even his sisters, in illness and old age.

Early marriage and divorce are factors Often

considered in relation to high fertility in Egypt. The

virginity of the girls and their morality are highly

esteemed. The family therefore, encourages early marriage of

the daughter saving her honor [95]. Childlessness, has been
a reason for divOrce or the taking Of a second wife among
The presence Of children acts as a

This fact may

Moslem Egyptians.
Cheterrent and prevents divorce in many cases.

TKJt occur when the wife has achieved high educational status

aruj is no longer judged primarily in terms of her fecundity.

EELELil Laws in Egypt
The Egyptian woman has the right to possess preperty

aIICI to dispose of it freely, without the intermediary of

hUSband or male guardian. She also has the right to become

a gguardian over minors. She is allowed to keep her family

nsinne after marriage and establish her independent legal

IPSSI?SOnality. "She is permitted to work in trade and in

pr”Ofessions and has the right to sue others in court without

having first to secure her husband's approval" [67: 3].

45

Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy in Egypt
Early marriage is discouraged in Egypt by some
legislation which fixed the marriage age at 16 for women and

18 for men. But in the country and certainly in the poor

districts of the big cities this law has been widely violated.

The "loss” of birth certificates is a common reason given

in those cases. Birth registration has been compulsory in

Egypt since 1912, and birth certificates are required for

many purposes, including school enrollment, army service and

employment. Nevertheless, some births escape registration.

Although there is the tendency to disregard the marriage law
now, there is a decline in marriage ratio which might be
attributed.to postponement of marriage among the educated.

There has been some interest in social change as a

meztns of lowering the growth rate and a new marriage law

"as; drafted to raise the minimum age for marriage from 18 to

21- :for men and from 16 to 18 for women. This law has not

pas sed yet. The marriage law in Egypt should go side by

Sitieendth a change in social and traditional behaviors which

Ileéici to its violation. It is suggested that this violation

W111 be corrected, especially in the rural area, only when:
(1-) daughters no longer run the risk of bringing shame to
t11€3 family by loss of virginity out of wedlock, (2) when the
Cost of additional children outweighs the labor income they-
lnéty' bring into the family at an early age, (3) when women

e o o n .
r1tel: the labor force and cease to be an econom1c 11ab111ty

46

to the family, (4) and when mothers-in-law are banished from

their role of family manager and advisor on how best to hold

a husband (give him sons).

In 1929, a family law was passed in Egypt. It

rectified the glaring abuses of polygamy and divorce and gave
the state control over more or less equalized divorce rights

However, marriage and divorce rates in Egypt

[2: 208].
Islam

are high relative to mere developed countries.

facilitates the first by permitting polygamy and makes the

second easy through simple divorce procedures. Anderson

pointed out that "It was far from uncommon in most of these
Countries (Islamic), moreover, for a husband who wished to
didscourage his wife, let us say, from buying anymore jewelry

11) pronounce a suspended divorce should she do so, and the

di\rorce would at once become valid" [8: 227]. According

to the new reforms this type of divorce is no longer valid

ill Egypt and should only be granted by a judge who tries

fisr‘st to reconcile the couple. However, the divorce procedure

ifS considered to be an easy one compared to other countries.
Changing conceptions Of marriage on the one hand and
eC1C>nomic constraints on the other have held the overwhelming

bllldk of Egyptian husbands to one wife at a time. Namiq

[5965: 29] pointed out that despite the permissibility of

:95319ygamy, 96.8 percent of all Egyptian marriages were

moIlogamous, 2.92 percent of Egyptian husbands had two wives,

0"17 percent had three and 0.2 percent had four. The small.

47

number involved in polygamy is mostly from the rural area

where traditions behito support more than one wife. Serial

polygamy is more common in Egypt. A man may take several

wives successively in his lifetime. The easy divorce

procedures encourage this practice.

Education in Egypt
In Egypt there has been improvement in the educational

level, but the pace of progress has been slow. Girls go to

school about half as frequently as boys and once in school
their drOpout rate tends to be much higher than for boys
[5]. Education was made compulsory for all children between

the ages of 6 and 12 in 1933; primary education was made free

i1121944, secondary and technical education in 1950. There

are; 8 universities in Egypt, Cairo University founded in 1908

.15 the largest. Teachers' training colleges in 1964-65

lulnfbered 71 with 41,259 students, including 17,732 wOmen.
Although education is free at all stages and compulsory from

ag¢3 6 to 12, the school drOpout in rural areas is high.

E]-~II(ammash [37: 130] points out that the educational structure

SIlcrws marked regional and sex differentials. He maintains

tllélt "this difference occurs largely for the generally
aCCepted hypothesis that the level of income is considerably

1°Wer in rural areas, and schools are fewer than in the cities

These variables go together. Moreover, villages in rural

areas are scattered, and roads are lacking, a fact making it

ci' . .
1fflcult to attend school 1n an area where a school may be

48

located."

Schultz [128: 31], Rizk [114: 70-71], and Zikri
[151: 194-6] in three different studies reported a clear

pattern of inverse relation between the level of education

and fertility performance. The later age of marriage among

the university and secondary school educated women and the

practice of family limitation were direct causes contributing.

to the Observed fertility differential. On the basis of the

1960 UAR census, Schultz determined that a woman with a
secondary education had "on the average, 3.1 births in urban
and 3.4 births in rural areas after 20-29 years of marriage.
Illiterate women on the other hand, reported 7.4 and 6.7
Irirths, on the average, with the same years Of marriage in
U11)an and rural areas Of Egypt respectively."

The Egyptian woman acquires education for several

reaisons. First of all she gains a degree of freedom and

jllclependence and holds the prestigious status of an educated

“KDHIan while maintaining her traditional dependence on her

fétnlily for moral and financial support. Secondly, she can

“5563 her education as a tool to enter the labor market.
Thirdly, her education may be used as a source of security

1511Zer in life in case she is divorced or is widowed.

Eilflllloyment in Egypt
Women wage-earners in Egypt represented only 2 percent

111 1960. But in general the working-woman is found in

Steardily increasing numbers in office and factory with the

49

gradual spread Of industrialization and growth Of the modern

sectors of the economy [69: 13]. Her welfare is, in a

measure, safeguarded by modern national and international

labor laws [2: 209].
Studies suggest that the involvement Of women in the

labor force creates a conflict between women's work and

childbearing which would alter fertility patterns. Hatata

[60:2] ascertained in his study Of Egyptian women working in
a pharmaceutical industry, that the average number Of
children per married woman Of fertility age was 2.8 whereas

among a sample of nonworking wives of industrial laborers,

the average was 5.9 children.

The female worker in Egypt may have pre- and post-
Turtal leave of 50 days and receive 70 percent Of her wages

Prwovided she has completed 7 consecutive months in the

Senrvice at the time she starts her leave of absence. Marriage

EUICl child allowances are given to income earners in Egypt in

tiles form Of tax exemption. The largest exemption is given

fC>I? the first child with no additional exemption for any

Children after the third [39: 365]. Social insurance enacted

111 1955 covers employment injuries, Old age and disability

benefits.

.Bfiilgigion in Egypt
In Egypt there are no legal or religions barriers to
1mDIEde couples in planning their families. Contraceptives of

£1]“1- kind are available at reasonable cost. Abortion is legal

50

if the mother's life might be endangered through continued

pregnancy and if approved by a team of doctors. However,

records of two university hospitals show that there is one

abortion for every two births [39: 365].

The Islamic authorities Of Egypt have come out in

principle for family planning. They gave evidence from the

Koran and the Hadith that God wants Moslems to have happy
healthy families, above all else, and if numbers get in the

way of happiness and health, the numbers should be held in

check.
In two different studies comparing fertility between

Ahlslems and Christians in Egypt (91 percent Moslems and 8
INarcent Christians) Zikri [151: 194-6] and Rizk [113: 48-
1136] showed that the total fertility of Christians is

maJekedly below the Moslems in urban areas but differential

is absent in rural areas. Tharattributed the differences to

liit:er age Of marriage, a higher socioeconomic level, and

P1?£1ctice of birth control among the Christian women. Rizk

aiicied that a higher divorce rate among the Moslem women could

be? a factor. Since Moslem and Christian women showed no

differential fertility in rural communities, Rizk could not

a<ZCZOunt for the differential fertility by religion alone.

Ghana

Ghana lies in the hot, moist lowlands of West AfriCa.

:P(3FNJlation eStimate for 1970 is 9.5 million. Ghana's crude

bj~I‘th rate is estimated to be between 47 and 52 per 1,000, as

51

compared with 15 to 25 in the more developed areas. The

crude death rate and infant mortality rate were estimated at
23 per 1,000 and 160 per 1,000 live births respectively in
1960. This rate has been declining rapidly as a result of

the widespread application Of preventive and curative

medicine. Preliminary data from a national fertility survey

completed in 1970 suggest that by 1968 the crude death rate
had fallen to about 17 per 1,000 representing an average

decline Of flure-quarters Of a point each year since

1960 [53: 1]. Mortality is likely to continue to decline,

particularly in rural areas where preventive health measures

are being introduced as quickly as facilities and personnel

become available.

Efirtility in Ghana

Ghanian women, on the average, produce between six and
Serven children during their reproductive years, and there are
S<Drne estimates that place the number at even higher than

SSeven. This ranks the Ghanian female as among the most

1fertile in the world. The number of daughters born is

(Drlough to average more than two for every woman completing

11C>r childbearing period. This fact, even with high infant

andchild mortality, assures for the next generation at

least twice as many potential mothers [54: 5].

The basis Of concern about Ghana's population is not

tlléit the country is presently over-populated but that the

grOwth rate is so high that it is already retarding economic

52

progress thus frustrating national deve10pment aspirations
and prOducing a demographic situation that could have

serious social, economic, and perhaps political consequences.

The Population Policy in Ghana

On Human Rights Day in 1967, Ghana became the first
sub-Sahara African nation to sign the World Leaders Declaration
on Pepulation and to join 30 other nations in affirming these

convictions:

. that the pepulation problem must be
recognized as a principal element in long-range
national planning if governments are to achieve
their economic goals and fulfill the aspirations

of their peeple;
. that the great majority of parents desire

to have the knowledge and the means to plan their
families; that the Opportunity to decide the number
and spacing Of children is a basic human right;

. . that the objective of family planning is
the enrichment Of human life, not its restriction;
that family planning by assuring greater Opportunity
to each person, frees man to attain his individual
dignity and reach his full potential [53: 5].

But it was not until January 1970 that the Ghanian
8<>\rernment gave its approval to the establishment Of the
férnlily planning program and the cabinet authorized the

nfiaczessary funds to finance it.

EEEggpors AffectingFertility in Ghana

Certain African tribal societies are much concerned
with the spacing Of births. After confinement, women are
not permitted to have sexual relations until the infant is.
able to walk, or is weaned. Observance of this prohibition

Inéi)’ be facilitated by the institution Of polygamy where it is

53

prevalent. Prolongation of lactation seems to be a common
practice in many parts of Africa, possibly made necessary by
lack of fit food for infants, other than the mother's milk,

and this is concerned to have the effect of lengthening the

intervals between pregnancies. In still other areas,

tribal traditions impose no such restrictions on sexual

intercourse following childbirth and there is no disapproval

of pregnancies occuring at short intervals. The Ashanti Of

Ghana are an example of the latter case-~a tribe which has
been found to have uniformly high fertility [86: ‘72] .

Generalizing for rural areas of Southern Ashanti, it was

observed: "To be childless is the greatest personal tragedy

and humiliation for both men and women and the larger the
family the prouder is the parent. In Southern Ashanti a
Public ceremony of congratulation is performed for a couple
who have 10 living children. . . Ashanti wives say they
expect to have a pregnancy every two or three years" [41: 265].
In the Opinion of some experts, ill health and the
life of hard labor which is the case for most African women,
are the principal factors limiting fertility in this part of
the world [77: 35-51]. Malnutrition due to dietary
deficiencies and seasonal or year-round under-nourishment may
dePI‘IEBSS fecundity. Diseases such as malaria, influenza,
tuberCilllosis may have the same effect. Venereal diseases,

“ide‘spread in large parts of Africa, have a still more

direct effect on fecundity.

54

Education in Ghana
Ghana's educational establishment has expanded at a

spectacular rate, more rapidly than the economy and at great

cost. Literacy rates are above 50 percent in the major towns,

about 253 percent in the rural South, and less than 10 percent

in the bknthd The population in the South is better educated,

subject to lower mortality, more likely to live in towns,
moreellikely to know about contraception, and less likely to

be prwuiominantly concerned with the growing of subsistence

crops,. than the pOpulation in the North.
In 1960, 21 percent of the population over ten years

of agee had been to school. In 1966—67 school year, only

about; 60 percent of the children of apprOpriate age were

attencLing school. Male school enrollments and literacy rates

are alyout twice those of females but fall to under one-and—a~

1131f tzimes the female rates in the youngest age groups

[53:2].
Compulsory, fee-free primary and middle school

€3ducatxion was introduced in 1961. Secondary and technical

€3ducatxion became free in 1965. But from 1967 pupils began

1:0 PaY' an annual nominal fee for the supply of textbooks and
Sc11°01 Inaterials. Ghana has 3 universities which had a
Combined enrollment of 4,729 in 1970-71, and 71 teacher—

‘1Tainirug colleges with 18,814 trainees [102: 311].

55

Employment in Ghana

In 1960, 83 percent of the males and 54 percent of

the females over 15 years of age were working. Of the

employed, 64 percent of the males and 58 percent of the

females were in agriculture or fishing.

In 1969, to discourage the unrestricted growth of

familixys, the government has decided to modify employment

policies as follows:

1.

Paid maternity leave will be granted only when
the applicant has served for not less than one

year.

The number of paid maternity leaves will be
limited to three during the entire working life'
of those affected and no payment will be made in
respect to any number of leaves beyond this
limit.

Child allowances paid to Government officers
will be limited to three only, and this will
apply to all officers irrespective of whether
they reside in or out Ghana.

The Government's responsibility for payment of
traveling expenses of officer's children will

be limited to three [54: 6].

The annual per capita income in 1972 was $272.

{322323123 in Ghana

 

As in other countries, abortion is still the most

‘Vid31Y’jpracticed form of fertility limitation around the

Vvorld.

Ghanian women frequently resort to abortion which is

IIOt difficult to obtain, particularly in the urban centers.

()ppositrion to it is principally moral rather than technical.

The Ghanian abortion law states that "any act which

56

"is done, in good faith and without negligence, for the
purpose of medical or surgical treatment of a pregnant
woman is justifiable, although it causes or is intended to

cause abortion or miscarriage, or premature delivery, or

the death of the'child" [53: 8]. In 1969, the abortion crime

was reduced from first degree felony with a minimum of 10

years prison sentence to ad‘second degree felony with a fine

or an indeterminate sentence not to exceed ten years.

Civil Law in Ghana

Women in Ghana have limited rights under civil laws.
A surviving widow and her children do not have inheritance
rights and they are expected to live in the late husband's

home that is maintained by his successor who is usually

a member of his kinship group. The wife is expected to marry

one of her late husband's relatives. Women's property is

ordinarily passed on to daughters, sister, sisters' daughter

01' daughters-in-law. If women own cattle and land, these

pOSsessions are usually passed onto their sons.

ige\at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy

Girls in Ghana marry when they attain nubility or
ShOrtly after. Divorce is frequent, either the husband or
the wife can initiate the divorce, but the husband usually
does so. Divorce is made final by a decree of a court.
Polygamous marriage is permitted, but in response to economic

pressure, polygamy in urban areas has declined since 1960.

57

Political Rights in Ghana

Any Ghanian citizen having reached 21 years of age
and able to Speak and read English with a degree of proficiency
is eligible for election to public office. All citizens are
guaranteed the right to vote at age 21. Because many
qualified voters cannot read or write, pictorial symbols or

colors are used to denote candidates [73: 114-229].

Re lig ion in Ghana

There are three main religions in Ghana, indigenous,
Moslem, and Christian. It is strongly believed by the
illiterate in the traditional society of Ghana that there is
an intimate relationship between supernatural powers and
the daily life of the individual, therefore, the belief that

high fertility is "God's will," prevails.

£221.22

India's pOpulation constitutes about 14 percent of
the total world population. Every year 13 million persons
are added to the population. With its population number of
515 million in 1969, India ranks second in the world,
Mainland China t0ps the list. India has only 2.4 percent of
the world land area and about 1.5 percent of the world income.
The high growth rate of this large pepulation poses tremendous
S()Cioeconomic developmental problems not only for maintenance
of minimal standards of living but also for raising them.

The persons who seek to put across massive programs of

58

development are faced with gigantic barriers that include
wide-spread illiteracy,’inadequate transportation, diversity
of cultures, and languages, and a frustrating lack‘of channels

of mass communication to the rural areas where 80 percent

of the p0pulation lives [12]. The manifold expansion of

employment, housing, educational and other facilities has
been almost entirely swallowed by the fast growing population
[97]. Despite twenty years of planned development, India

still faces distressing shortages and serious economic and

social shortcomings. Some 10 million people whose labor

could contribute to the rapid build-up of a deve10ping

economy are out of jobs. Per capita food counsumption has

decreased. In spite of ambitious housing programs, India is

Still short of about 750,000 houses.

1351\Ctors Affecting Fertility in India

Children form an essential part of recreation in the

Ind ian family life. Indian people have a strong and natural

10Ve for children and believe that their presence makes the

home happier. In joint families, parents are not solely
responsible for the care and maintenance of their children,
rat-her there is a large number of relatives who indiscrimi-
nately look after all the family children [115: 55].

In the Mysore [139] study, it was found that wanting
thI‘ee or four living children in a high mortality country is

cluite consistent with the much higher average number of

births. Even if mortality is declining, the peasant who has

59

learned from his culture to depend on his children for labor
on the farm, for old-age security, and for other essentials
cannot be expected to extrapolate declining mortality with
the demographer and to calculate a long-range need for fewer
children. Significantly, several studies indicate that
favorable attitudes to the practice of family limitation are
much more common among those who already have three or four
living children. This is consistent with the view that the
availability of means for birth control is largely irrelevant
until what is regarded as the essential minimum number of
children is secure.

On the other hand, India is considered to have a
Irelatively moderate level of fertility. However, it has the
highest percentage of females married in the age group 15-19.
Widowhood has a lowering effect on fertility when the widow is
of childbearing age and does not remarry promptly. This
fEmltor has been considered to be especially important in
India because the high mortality rates are still prevailing
and the traditional disapproval of widows' remarriage in
Hindu society still exists. The possible increase in fertility
in India might be a consequence of decreased mortality of men
and therefore less frequent widowhood. Life expectancy has
risen from 32 years in 1950 to 50 in 1966. Other customs
aleCounting for the relatively moderate level of fertility -
in(Zlude prolonged lactation, avoidance of sexual relations

for a period after childbirth and departure of the mother

60

with a new-born child on a lengthy visit to the home of her
parents. Other explanations indicate that in the Hindu

customs the young wife is absent from her husband's home-for

considerable periods of time during the early years of

marriage and the first birth has been found to be relatively

long in the case of girls marrying at a very early age. Also,

frequent adolescent sterility is linked with poor living

conditions and ill health [110: 273-4].

Civil Rights in India

The right to vote is granted to every citizen who is

not less than 21 years of age on a fixed date and is not

otherwise disqualified .

Since 1971, many changes have resulted from the

1egislature's efforts to guarantee equal rights to women, in

Conformity with the Indian Constitution. Male and female

heirs are treated as equal and without distinction. Marriage
as an Indian institution, has undergone great. changes:

intercaste marriages, the abolition of the dowry system in‘
Certain states, the remarriage of widows, the enactment of

di\force laws. But these changes are all essentially formal.

They have had no substantial impact upon the traditional

Indian attitudes towards marriage and the prOpagation of

Children.

61

Age at Marriage, Polygamy, and Divorce in India

Children are the central purpose of the Indian
marriage. In the beginning of the present century, marriage
of children between the ages of 8 and 12 was very common
among all castes and in all parts of India [90: 143]. Over
the last few decades the legislature has acted twice to
prohibit the child marriages. But, for one reason or another,
the law could not be enforced strictly and so it failed to
achieve its purpose. Consequently, early marriage is still
widely practiced in India. About 87 percent of the women in
the age group 15-44 are married. According to 1961 census,
the average age of brides at marriage was only 16. The
National Sample Survey indicates that more than 8 percent of
the girls aged fourteen and below are married. Legal minimum
age for Hindu marriage is 18 for boys and 15 for girls. There
is no provision for requiring the registration of marriages
and if there was, it would be impossible to enforce in the
560,000 villages where neither vital statistics nor the memory
of the parents is reliable enough to prove the ages of young
Couples.

There are proposals for raising the minimum age of
maTriage from 15 years to 18 in the case of girls and from
18 to 21 years in the case of boys. This measure is under
active consideration in consultation with the State govern-
ments [97: 12]. Agarwala calculated that raising the age

at marriage of females in India to 19 would yield a 29.2

62

percent decrease in the birth rate over the course of 30
years [4: 173].

Prior to its codification, the Hindu Law of marriage
permitted polygamy. By the middle of the present century,
however, the practice of polygamy was disappearing from Hindu
society. There is an apparent conflict between the Hindu
Marriage Act and the Moslem Personal Law which permits
polygamy.

Divorce is not favored or encouraged, hence not
available by consent. Even though no statistical evidence
is available, the rate of marriage dissolution in India

appears to be comparatively low [130: 116] .

Education in India

 

In 1971, 29.34 percent of the pOpulation aged five
and above were literate in the sense of being both able to
read and write with understanding [24: 9-10] . Primary educa-
tion is compulsory and free but compulsion is not enforced.
School attendance is more often ensured by incentives.
Nearly 63 million children of school age are out of school.
Serious problems have arisen from the rapid extension of
E"'ducational facilities, overcrowding and school drOpouts.

In spite of the efforts to increase adult education the

maj ority of the adult pOpulation remains illiterate [126: 217].

63

.Ftertility Planning in India

 

In 1930, the Mysore Government opened the first
g<3vernment-0perated birth control clinic in the world.
'Tlirough the next two decades, a number of social welfare and
jp()litica1 organizations as well as numerous Indian intellec-
ttlals and reformers favored and widely fostered the planning
nuovement [23: 39]. Narain [97: 2] pointed out that although
tile Indian Government was the first in the world to adOpt a
cnomprehensive national family planning policy as an integral
puart of its developmental plans in 1952, the program gathered
rweal momentum only from 1965 onwards.

Since passage in the summer of 1971 by the Indian
Pharliament of a liberalized abortion law, the Indian
chvernment has taken steps to make abortion services
:Ivailable in its medical facilities. India's budget
Etllocations for family planning have increased considerably,
from less than $2 million equivalent in fiscal 1964 to $80

million equivalent in fiscal 1972.

Efljlloyment in India

 

Labor legislation has a constitutional and statutory
baScis of equality such as equal pay for the same work for
both men and women, minimum age requirements, and decent wage
and, working conditions. High unemployment is a consequence
0f Slack of correlation between educational training and job
OP'Portunities [126: 581]. This is also related to other

factors including the very large population.

64

Realigion and Fertility in India
Studies in India have shown the Moslems in India to
bee more fertile than the Hindus, but the Catholics in India,
.313 least in Mysore State have been found to have lower
feertility than the Hindus. Buddhism, with its emphasis on
nuonastic celibacy, might be thought to have a lowering

taffect on fertility [150: 144].

Brazil

Brazil is the largest country in the Latin American
rwegion.‘ Estimated population for 1972 was 93,204,379. The
Ilrazilian population is an ethnically diverse one, but
fiertility differences among the various ethnic groups do
Irot appear very great. The lowest rate was found in the
llrbanized Federal District, where there is a high proportion
(xf single women and marriage is at a later age. Also family
limitation is practiced in Federal District by contraception

ennong the well~to-do people and by induced abortion among the

INDorer classes [86: 499].

Efggtors Affecting Fertility in Brazil

1 Legal policy in Brazil is pronatalist. Brazil's
response to population growth has always been conditioned by
awwireness that the areas of the country are lightly pOpulated
anli there is an urging desire to fill them by a larger
Population and incorporate them to the rest of the country.

There is a desire to promote the use of natural resources and

65

t() guarantee the national security.

According to Sanders [118: 84], the women in Brazil
cc>ntinue to have high rates of fertility despite modernizing
prrocesses that might be expected to lead to reductions.
Itlthough Brazil is rapidly urbanizing, women in the cities
Iyroduce about two-thirds as many children as those in rural
areas.

Very high fertility within marriage and relatively
liigh fertility of women not legally married are factors which
chmbine to produce the high birth rate in Brazil [92: 287-96].
Idle comparatively low rate for Negro women is believed to
be: due partly to some restrictions of their Opportunities for
rnaamdage and to high mortality among the Negroes, which causes

a. comparatively high incidence of widowhood.

Ihalitical Rights in Brazil
Voting is compulsory for men and women between the
ages of 18 and 65 and Optional for persons over 65. Enlisted

men.and illiterates (who comprise 40% of the adult pOpulation)

ma)r not vote [102: 779].

_Ifluxcation in Brazil

According to the 1972 census, literacy in Brazil was
67 19ercent. But Sanders points out that a problem of self-
defimfition exists in literacy, which is politically important
1H’Hzause only literates can vote. "In Brazil the criterion

for literacy is ability to write one's name. Although by

66

this standard illiteracy has steadily declined with each
decade to less than 40 percent of the population, this does
not accurately define the capacity of the population to read
and interpret the world around them. Educated peOple are
clearly a minority concentrated in urban cities" [118: 85].
However, the educational level is improving, and there'seems
to be a clear inverse correlation between years of education
and fertility. Elementary education is compulsory in Brazil.
The government undertakes to provide, in part, for higher
education or university instruction, but some institutions are
maintained by the states and some by private associations.
There were 44 official universities with a total of 561,397

students in 1971 [102: 781].

Employment in Brazil

Women in Brazil represent a substantial manpower
potential. In the late 1960's, the inflation forced most
0f the lower class women into the labor force to increase
ffilmily income. Liberal attitudes toward working women allowed
many middle and upper class women to seek employment.
International Labor Organization data indicate that the female
Portion of the working population was 18 percent in 1960
[149: 288]. Per capita income in Brazil is between $350 and
$400 a year. Since the government is encouraging p0pu1ation
increase, the Ministry of Labor gives a supplement to families
With more than six children. Federal and state governments,

as well as the National Social Security Institute, give

()7

(employee bonuses for each new birth. Abortion and propaganda
for contraception are illegal, but the prevalence of abortion
Inakes the law unenforceable. Only medical schools and
IJniversities in Brazil have been supporting, sponsoring or
establishing private birth control associations or "associa~

tions for the protection of the family" [103z-180-3].

asllgion in Brazil

 

The Catholic church to which about 90 percent of
Brazilians belong is ambivalent. The official position of
the hierarchyis the SUpport of the norms outlined in Humanae
Vitae, hut in practice the Brazilian church is probably the
Inost open to family planning among churches in any Latin
.American country. Theologians criticized the Pope's position
and justified the idea of Spacing and limiting the number
of children as a personal decision. The moral teaching of the
Church influence only a minority of Brazilians attending mass

in churches acquainted with the official positions [119].

Taiwaa
lkliwzui is :1 snuill islaiul ahcnlt EH] mi les ()ff 1110
SOuthoast coast of the mainland China. The island has one of
tile highest population densities in the world; about 970
Pearsons per square mile in a 14,000 square mile area. Half
t}1e island is mountainous with few inhabitants, the other

half, to the west, is fertile with more than 2,000 people per

Square mile. The estimated population in 1972 was 15,159,000.

68

The family structure is changing in favor of smaller
feimilies, especially in cities, which are under the pressure
cxf'modernization. The average family is larger in the rural
aJreas. A sample survey in 1965-1966 indicated that family
ssize was 4.8 in the cities, 5.9 in the rural townships, and
(5.3 in the aboriginal townships [74: l].

The economic growth in Taiwan during the past two
ciecades has been most remarkable. Since 1952 per capita

iJicome has risen by 85 percent to nearly $210.

Fert'ili_ty in Taiwan

Taiwan has a history of high birth rates. In
axldition, the post-World War 11 "baby boom" has produced a
\rery large number of young persons, and there will be a
Ilarge increase of population in the 20-34 age group in the
Irext few decades. The rapid pOpulation growth in Taiwan has
‘resulted in an unfavorable age composition, with a high I
<h3pendency burden. In 1968 the population under 15 years of
age was 42 percent.

The fertility rate began to decline in 1952. In terms
of ‘the total fertility rate, the reduction from 1963 to 1968
"3&5 19 percent. Taiwan's birth rate fell from 42 in 1958 to
23 in 1968. In the same period the net reproduction rate fell
fI‘Om over 2.6 to 2.0 [9]. In 1967 the infant mortality rate
Waéi 22.6. The family planning program began on a significant
sCale only in 1962. Induced abortion, which, although illegal,

has long been widely and openly practiced.

69

_Taiwan is one of the healthiest areas in Asia: the

]_ife expectancy at birth is 65.1 years for males and 69.8 for

females.

I=actors Affecting Fertility in Taiwan

A study carried out in the early 1950's led to the
(zonclusion that, to bring about a decline of fertility through
'the economic and social developments then present, it would
l>e necessary to overcome strong Chinese traditions. Those
'traditions favor the maintenance of high fertility reinforced
lay the organization of economic enterprises in small family
llnits where child labor could be used with profit and
(encouraged by the practice of early schooling of children
ivithin the home [11: 3—10]. However, the birth registration
statistics since 1956 have shown a declining trend of the
‘birth rate, which was the beginning of a transition to low
fertility.

Although Taiwan's birth rate has already fallen
COnsiderably and its family planning program is among the
"HDSt successful in the world, drawing upon their experiences
irl Taiwan, Freedman and Takeshita maintain that family
lilanning programs should aim to reach those who want no more
Cilildren, rather than to try to change values about family
size. They state, moreover, that "it is very unlikely that
anyverbal messages or education programs on the part of the

fanfily planning programs would be successful in changing

70

values regarding family size. This requires structural
changes in the roles of the family, of women, and of children
that are desirable but are outside of the purpose of the
family planning programs in their health contexts"

[49: 364].

Education in Taiwan

 

Education has been free since 1968. The literacy
rate in Taiwan is one of the highest in Asia. In 1968-69
the school population accounted for 26 percent of the total
population. About 85 percent of the male population and 60 '
percent of the female population over twelve years of age
are. literate and 97.5 percent of the children of primary
school age were enrolled in the 1967-68 classes. Compulsory
education was extended from six to nine years at the beginning
of the 1968 school year [25: 35].

In Taiwan, data for 1965 showed that, among younger
women, the proportion of married women is negatively
Correlated with educational attainment. Among women aged
20~24 who graduated from senior high schools, 26.4 percent
Were married, whereas 72.3 percent of illiterates in this age
group were reported as married. [50: 15] . The eagerness for
education is perhaps generating an awareness that large

family size may be a handicap to obtaining such education.

71

Civil Law in Taiwan

 

Women in Taiwan have equal rights of inheritance.
Female status has increased for urban and rural educated
women. Due to low socioeconomic environment, the traditional

status of poor farm women remains unchanged [22: 11].

Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy

 

Women in Taiwan are marrying later than previously.
In 1940 the average age at marriage was 19.0; in 1967
statistics indicated that average age at marriage was 22.6
years.

From 1959 to 1965 the proportions of women aged 15 to
19 and 20 to 24 who were married decreased from 12.4 to 9.2
and from 63.5 to 58.3 percent respectively [50: 5].

Marriage is often delayed because of financial
problems or conscription into military service. Divorce is
not a serious problem in Taiwan; second marriages for women
are looked down upon because of the old value attached to

chastity. Monogamous marriage is now the rule [22: 79].

Employment in Taiwan

 

About one-third of all girls and women 12 years of
age and older are economically active in Taiwan. This
includes half of all unmarried girls and 30 percent of
married women. Together, they form one-fourth of the active
labor force in Taiwan. Eight out of ten working women are

illiterate or have completed only six years of primary

72

school or less. Wages for women are roughly one-half of

those paid to men [22: 311].

Political Rights:hi'Taiwan

 

Any citizen over 20 years of age has the right to
vote, and any citizen over 23 years of age has the right

to be elected to office [22: 176].

Religion and its Relation to Fertility in Taiwan

 

It is difficult to identify religious denominations
in Taiwan. Most peOple believe in a mixture of Buddhism,
Taoism and Confusianism, including ancestor worship. Although
Confusian teaching values a larger family, with at least
one son, it has no specific doctrine against family planning.
In general, religious Opposition to family planning is

slight in Taiwan.

Summary

Geographical location for each of the five selected
developing countries was described. Cultural behavior, social
and economic deve10pment are factors affecting fertility in
each country. Larger family size tends to be related to
women's illiteracy or lower level of education and non-
participation in the labor force on their part. The exercise
of civil laws and political rights of women is very limited
inthe developing countries where the communities are

predominantly male oriented. In general, people in deve10ping

73

countries practice their religion closely and the interpreta-
tion of high fertility is believed to be a part of "God's
will." Table 1 summarizes demographic data about the five

deve10ping countries.

74

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CHAPTER IV

FACTORS RELATED TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND FERTILITY
IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
This chapter includes descriptive data on population,
status of women and fertility for each of the five developed

countries selected for this study.

Sweden

Sweden experienced some fifty years ago a poverty level
comparable to that existing in the deve10ping countries today.
That was the motivation for starting the family planning
movement in the early thirties. The facts that Sweden has
had peace since 1914 and that emigration provided an outlet
for the population pressure that had been built up by about
1850 may explain the peaceful nature of the transition to an
industrial society. Today, contrary to the situation obtained
in most countries, the pepulation crisis in Sweden is marked
by too slow, rather than too rapid, a pOpulation increase.
Now, there is no official pOpulation policy as such in Sweden,
but the government makes it economically possible for those
who want children to have them, and it helps those who want
to limit their families to learn how to do so. Modern
family planning is the social adaptation to the psychological

well-being of the individual within the framework of his

75

76

membership in his family and nation. Policy is based on

social and humanitarian rather than demographic grounds.

Fertility in Sweden

 

Sweden has the highest life expectancy at birth in
the world: 71.85 for men and 76.54 for women in 1967. It
also has the lowest infant mortality in the world: only
11.7 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1969 [134].

There is a large percentage of unmarried women in
Sweden. One reason is that Swedish women marry relatively
late. The marriage rate exhibited a sharp decline: in 1965
it was 7.75 percent and in 1971, 4.94 percent. "The low
marriage rate and the high out-of-wedlock birth rate are
probably in part related in that a large and increasing number
of young peOple do not register their relationships in the
form of marriage" [134: 3].

In the late 19305 and middle 19405 the parliament
'repealed the prohibition against dissemination of contracep-
tive information, liberalized the abortion law and introduced
sex education into schools. While some programs, such as
child allowance and maternity benefits, may have a pronatalist
effect, Others, emphasize the principle of voluntary parent-
hood. The abolition of legal bars to the sale of contracep-
tion [55: 188], the requirement that all pharmacies stock
contraceptives (1946), the liberalization of abortion and the
introduction of sex education in the school system, have an

antinatalist character, but, they are not promoted on

77

.demographic grounds.

Civil Law and Political Rights in Sweden

 

In 1919 women in Sweden were given the right to vote.
Women's participation in general election is almost as high
as men's. In the municipal elective bodies, the proportion
of women is relatively high in the bodies concerned with
child care, social welfare and educational questions, low
in bodies dealing with town planning, housing administration
and roads. The smaller prOportion of women who stand for
election in government authorities and in party politics can
be due to traditional attitudes among men and women [133].
In 1920, women were given economic rights and responsibilities
equal to their husbands. In 1938 women employed in the
government Obtained equal pay, and in 1965 the same principle
was established for the general labor market. Even if full
equality has not been achieved, Sweden should be among the

furthest among the countries in this respect.

Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy

Under the marriage code, 1920, the minimum marriage
age was 21 for men and 18 for women. As of July 1969,
however, the minimum marriage age for both sexes was set
at 18. Dispensation to marry before 18 can be granted by
the county authorities. Yet Swedish men and women still-
marry late by world standards. In 1968 the average age at

first marriage was 25.9 for males and 23.6 for females [13k 3].

78

Marriages are dissolved by courts of law; in practice
divorce petitions are seldom rejected. Polygamy is prohibited

in Sweden.

Abortion and Illegitimagy in Sweden

 

A liberal abortion law was adopted in 1938 with
subsequent amendments in 1946 and 1963. The main purpose of
this law was to reduce the number of illegal abortions. The
number of abortions has grown steadily from 2,800 in 1960 to
16,000 in 1970 which equals 145 per 1,000 live births‘ I
[134: 13]. A recent trend, in public discussion about
abortion, has been to allow women, with their increased
freedom, to decide for themselves whether their pregnancies
should be interrupted or not.

In Sweden there is an increasing number of young
peeple who do not register their relationship in the form
of marriage. But even if the parents do not wed, the child
is given legally the same rights as a wedlock child. "The
word illegitimate was removed from the statutes in 1917, and
in 1970 the last legal obstacle to equality was overcome
when the right of an out-of—wedlock child to inherit the
property of the father and his family gained legal force"
[134: 3]. The fact of having an out-of-wedlock child does
not carry as great a stigma as it does in other countries.

and hence, does not lower the status of women.

79

Social Security and Medical Care System

 

The traditional role of the large family as an
insurance against old age, sickness and unemployment has been
replaced by the State. Thus, the State Compulsory Pension
System has provided economic independence for the aged.
Parents do not need to rely on their children during their
declining years.

The Swedish system for social insurance is based on
compulsory national insurance covering sickness, childbirth,
disablement, Old age and loss of breadwinner. The pensionable
age for male and female workers employed by the State is 65
and 67 for both sexes [133]. The pension system guarantees
the security of the woman in the event of her husband's
death.

Health and medical care in Sweden are financed
mainly by the county councils from taxes, funds from state-
subsidies and supplementary contributions provided by the
national compulsory health insurance. HOSpital stays are free

as are medicines provided to an inpatient in a hospital.

Education in Sweden

 

According to the 1930 census, 99.9 percent of persons
over 15 years of age were literate. In recent years with an
estimated few thousand illiterate immigrants the present.
literacy is probably not as high, but there is no inclusion
about literacy in the censuses since 1930.

In 1960 a nine year compulsory school system was

80

established throughout the country. School starts at age
seven. Three out of four students continue their studies
beyond the ninth year.

Primary and secondary schooling, college and
universities are free of charge. In the compulsory Schools,
students are provided with free textbooks and school materials
as well as free meals. In many cases the young leave their
homes to build their own families while going to school
[135: 180].

Sweden is the first and so far the only country to
have compulsory sex education in public schools. It was
introduced into the curriculum in 1944 and made compulsory in
1956.

In secondary schools a few more men than women are'
enrolled but in universities men outnumber women two to one.

In 1971-72, Sweden had six state universities.

Employment in Sweden

 

There is an increasing number of married women
becoming wage earners in Sweden. For the total population
in 1970 for peOple aged 15 to 64, it was estimated that 85.7
percent of the men, 62.3 of the unmarried women and 54.8 of
the married women were in the labor force [134: 8]. About_
55 percent of all women between 15 and 64 are today employed,
although many work only a few hours a week. i
t The objectives of labor market policy are the same for

male and female labor. But "typically male jobs are better

81

paid than the typically female ones, regardless of whether
the latter require the same degree of education. Not until
men and women are employed on the same tasks within the same
sector does it become possible to give real weight to the
demand for equal pay" [133]. Although at present the
differences in salaries and wages between men and women

are decreasing, the gap existing is due to the concentration
of women in low paid jobs where their chances of promotion
are much smaller.

Legislation in Sweden protects the working married
woman. She cannot be dismissed from her job for pregnancy
or childbirth reasons. She is given the right to six months'
leave of absence at the time of delivery and she is paid by
the national insurance out of a supplementary sickness
benefit. In order to facilitate and encourage married
women to enter the labor market, day nurseries and youth
centers were built, and income tax rates were revised.

Studies have shown that working wives have fewer
children than housewives. Labor force participation and
the average working hours are declining with the number of
children.

In 1969, Sweden had a per capita national product Of
$3,510, the third highest in the world. It was exceeded only

by Kuwait and the United States.

82

Maternity Benefits and Child Allowancesin Sweden

 

Confinement and treatment given by midwives are
free of charge at maternity hospitals. Cost of transportation
to the nearest hospital is fully refunded. If confinement
takes place at home with the requirement of a doctor's help,
three-quarters of the expenditure are refunded. Every woman
is entitled to a maternity allowance of $216 paid by the
national insurance for her first child, then $108 for each
additional child.

Each child under 16 is entitled to an allowance of
$240 per year given to his mother or guardian. Children Of
preschool and school age are given free medical checkups as
well as preventive medicines and vaccinations. In order to
decrease the economic burden of large families, students are
given free school meals to ensure that each child receives

at least one nutritious meal a day.

Japan

Japan is composed of four main islands, with many
smaller adjacent islands off the each coast of Asia. The
pOpulation density is quite high, 719 persons per square mile.
The rapid spread of industrialization in this century brought
Japan from the status of developing country to that of a
developed one. In 1969, the population of Japan was
102,648,000. The average life expectancy in 1968 was 69 for

men and 74 for women.

83

Factors Affecting Fertility in Japan

 

The population problem in relation to feed supply
and standard of living motivated the Japanese peOple to
limit their own family size. Japan's gross reproduction rate
was cut in half in eight years, falling from 2.1 in 1949 to
21.0 in 1957. The death rate is about 7 per 1,000 pepulation
and the rate of natural increase is one percent per year.

Japan has no official government policy on population
growth.‘ However, the government facilitated family limitation
practice by the Eugenic Protection Law passed in 1948
permitting abortion and the establishment of a national
family planning program in 1952 [94: 10].

Nevertheless, Rettie maintains that the Japanese for
over 100 years had resorted to illegal abortion and even
infanticide as a means for limiting their family size, as
no contraceptives were available [111]. Farthermore, the.
author Concludes that what the Japanese government did in
1948 was a revision of the law to bring under medical care
the many abortions already taking place, and starting, at the
same time, a campaign for contraception.

The traditions of Japanese culture should also be
taken into account. Taeuber cautioned that the resort to
abortion would not, in her view, have been so widespread
without a cultural base in which "post-conception limitation
of fertility was accepted and practiced" [136: 278].

Japanese fertility had been relatively moderate in comparison

84

with some other Asian countries, for at least a century and
perhaps for many centuries before the drastic reduction
began in the 19505 [91: 36-56]. Lee pointed out that
"Abortion and infanticide were regarded as parents' self
inflicted punishment rather than a sin against God or a
crime against humanity. In ancient Japan after delivering
babies of poor families, midwives would ask the families
whether to let the infant remain or have them returned. In
the latter event, the midwives would manage the death of
those for whom there was no room" [82: 29]. Traditional
attitudes and behavior in this respect may have been adapted
in the course of centuries by the pressure of population in
a crowded island country with severely restricted land
resources.

One of the main factors which brought about the
fertility decline in Japan was the change in the value system
since World War II. The pre-war stem family system shifted
to nuclear families. Dependence on children in Old age
became very rare. The attitude of having numerous children
to inherit or continue the family line has disappeared.
Pressure of educational expenses and inadequacy of housing
conditions increased the tendency to raise the living standard
of the family rather than raising a large number of

children [72].

85

Women and Civil Law in Japan

 

In 1947 the Civil Code was revised based on the 1946
Constitution. The new legislation provided women with preper-
ty rights, parental rights, right of marriage and divorce,
and inheritance rights. All the lineal descendants of a
deceased person became successors. The descent of preperty
is not limited to male heirs [137].

Japanese women of 20 years of age and above were
first granted the right to vote in 1956. But they exercised
their right to vote for the first time in April 1946. From
the total number, 60 to 70 percent of eligible women voted.
After the war the Election Law for Public Offices granted
women of 25 years of age and above the right to be elected

in all elections [137].

Marriage, Divorce, Abortion and Polygamy

Under Japanese law, the minimum marriage age is 18
for a man and 16 for a woman. But in 1965, the average age
at first marriage was 27.2 and 24.5, respectively, which
indiCates that,in general, Japanese peOple marry late [94: 1].

In Japan there is the "Judicial Divorce" permitted by
court and ”Divorce by Agreement" under which a divorce can
be obtained when notification of mutual agreement of both
parties is formally brought to the registrar. In 1967 there
were 0.83 cases per 1,000 pOpulation.

Abortion became legal in Japan in 1948. The law was

presented as being for eugenic and medical rather than for

86

demographic purposes. Under Japanese law, polygamy is

prohibited.

Education in Japan

 

As far as ordinary reading and writing skills are
concerned, the degree of literacy in Japan is nearly 100
percent. More than 99.8 percent of the 6-15 years old
population are enrolled in elementary and lower secondary
schools [85]. Since 1947 compulsory education in Japan is
extended to nine years. After the first nine years, without
discrimination as to sex, every child is entitled to advanced
education according to his or her ability. About 80 percent
move up to the high school with a slightly higher percentage
of girls than boys attending. Twenty three percent of the
high school graduates proceed to university education. Com-
pulsory education is provided free in publicly maintained

schools [137].

Employment in Japan

 

In 1968, 64 percent of the pepulation aged 15 and
over were economically active. This percentage represents
81.7 percent Of the males and 47.5 percent of the females
[94: 3-7]. The per capita national income of the same year
was $1,155.

Female workers get a pension provided by the govern-
ment on attaining the age of 55 while male workers can get

it at 60 years of age.

87

 

Religion in Jppan

' 2 The three essential religions in Japan are Shintoism,
Buddhism and Christianity (both Roman Catholic and Protestant).
Among the different classes in Japan, religion is more often
a matter of tradition of the family or the community to

which the individual belongs rather than a matter of deep
cOnCern. One must consider these traditional attitudes
toward religion in order to understand the fertility control
behavior among the Japanese peOple, particularly the question'
of induced abortion [94: 3—7]. In general, religious
attitudes on the glories of the large family seem to have

been surmounted in Japan.

Child Allowance Program in Japan

 

A child allowance program in Japan has been under
discussion for about ten years. In 1971 the government
considered providing each family with a child allowance of
$83 per month for their third child and every child there-
after. From the government point of view it is entirely

a welfare measure [94: 3-7].

France
France is the largest country in Western Europe.
According to the 1971 official estimates, France had a
population slightly more than 51 million inhabitants. The
Population density is roughly 92.5 persons per square

kilometer.

88

Although, at the present time, France is liberalizing
the laws that restrict the use and dissemination of contra-
ceptive methods, from a demographic view, the social policy
of France is characterized by being pronatalist, protecting
and encouraging large families [16: l].

The first French organization, the Ligue de la
Regeneration Humaine was set up in 1896. But early phases
of this birth control movement were concerned primarily
with prOpaganda through meetings and pamphlets [56]. By
the eve of World War 11 France had a birth rate of 16 per
thousand per year. The continuing decline in its birth rate
caused a concern about the population size. In response,
France strengthened its pronatalist family policy and the
Government explicitly stressed the demographic crisis and
proclaimed its determination to halt declining fertility,
notably by means of its new family allowance scheme [148:
46-73]. Although the sale and distribution of contraceptives
was finally legalized in 1967 in reSponse to public demand,
the law specifically continued the prohibition of anti-
natalist propaganda and commercial advertising of cOntracep-
tion [44: 12849]. Subsequently, in 1969, a revised family
allowance scheme giving further support to large families

was approved [43: 5197].

Fertility in France

 

In 1971, the crude birth rate in France was 17.3 per

thousand, death rate 10.6 and population growth rate 6.7.

89

The life expectancy at birth in 1970 was 68.9 years for men
and 75.2 for women. The average family has three children
which is regarded as the ideal by most families.

Although the sale and advertising of artificial birth
control methods was illegal until 1967, the sale Of condoms
has always been authorized in France as a health measure and
oral contraceptives have also been sold for health reasons.

In 1950, a female doctor created an association which offered
consultation on family planning [16: 10].

The pattern of generally inverse relationships between
fertility and social-economic status in low fertility
countries has not always been found to be entirely consistent.
In France, about the turn of the twentieth century, while
fertility was, in general, related inversely to income,

families in the highest income brackets were found to have

more children than those in somewhat lower brackets [42: 9—46].

Civil Law in France

 

Traditionally there were many legal restrictions on
French women, but in practice they were ignored. This is
shown by the fact that in the majority of French homes it is
the wife who controls the family budget and even gives the
husband his pocket money. Only in 1965 did a married woman
[obtain the power to Open a bank account without her husband's
permission and had complete freedom over her personal 4

property [19]. French citizens vote at the age of 21.

90

Age at Mgrriage, Divorce and Abortion

 

In 1969, the average age at first marriage was
24.5 for males and 22.4 for females. Later data reflect a
tendency toward earlier marriage. French males usually get
married after the military service is fulfilled.

Each year in France there is an average of one divorce
for every ten marriages.

In 1920, the French Parliament passed a law prohibi-
ting promotion and practice of induced abortion. This law
reamined untouched by the 1967 law which legalized contracep-
tion. Although rules on prohibiting abortion are very severe,
in practice, punishment for infraction of the law is rare.
Many French peOple anticipate the replacement Of the 19205

abortion law [16: 11].

Education in France

In urban areas, most French children enter the
"école maternelle" or nursery school at the end of their
second year. Enacted in 1882, compulsory education is from
6 to 14 years of age. The upper age limit was raised to
16 years in the scholastic year 1967-68. University education
is free of charge, except for low entrance and examination
fees [19]. The statistics for higher education are less
precise because there are duplications and part-time students.
"Advanced students" formed in 1968-69 were 12.5 percent of

those aged 18-24.

91

Employment in France

 

One-third of the French working population are women.
The 6.5 million working women are roughly distributed in~
equal proportions between all kind of jobs, from agriculture
to high posts. Women are in the majority in teaching and
textiles but they are equal with men in the fields of
.banking and commerce. Between 1954 and 1962 the number Of
women in teaching and higher executive posts rose by sixty
percent, which was double the rate for men [19].

France was one of the first countries to call for
equal pay for men and women for similar work. The country
urged this right by signing the international convention in
1963. Today France claims, although having a gap of ten
percent in equal payment, it is one of the best in Europe.

Health and maternity insurance are extended to members
Of worker's families, and old-age pensions are extended to
spouses of workers.

In per capita gross national product, France
remained during the last decade among the ten richest

countries of the world.

Family Allowances in France

 

Family allowances are relatively large in France and
are part of an extensive family program, giving support in
many wayst The value of the allowances has been increased
progressively over the years, creating the impression among

the people that children are welcomed by society [125: 138—9].

92

France's allowance program has been accused of having
definite pronatalist intent. French demographers, while
recognizing that other factors played an important part in
fertility, hold that such measures have had a positive
effect on the birth rate in France since the Second World
Was [40: 58].

Family allowances are grouped under the social
security code and have been extended since 1945 to every-
body, including the self—employed. French family allowances
are divided as follows.

1. Pro-natal allowances for which all pregnant

women are eligible. $14.5 a month for nine
- months.,

2. Maternity allowances payable after birth of
$132 plus pay during the twelve weeks permitted
absence from work (for wage earners).

3. Children's allowances are calculated at
22% of the basic salary for the second child
and 33% for the third and subsequent children.

4. The allowance for a nonworking mother is
calculated on a basic monthly salary of about
$41 and amounts to 20% for one child, 40% for

two and 50% for three or more children.

5. Housing allowance calculated according to rent,
size of family and salary.

6. In 1963 a special allowance was introduced to

help pay for the specialized education required
for handicapped children.[19].

United States of America

 

The United States of America is compoSed of fifty
States with a population Of 205 million in 1970. Today, it

is characterized by low pOpulation density and a declining

93

birth rate but that does not eliminate the concern about the
population in the sense of achieving a prOper balance
between size, growth and distribution on one hand and the
quality of life on the other. The annual rate of growth
dropped from 1.9 percent during the fifties to 1.1 percent
in 1972. The American family has an average of 2.3 children
which is moving closely toward the replacement level of
2.11 in the U.S., but infant mortality is higher than that of
'Uwflve other nations. Despite their higher fertility rates,
minorities contribute less to pOpulation growth than does
the rest of the pOpulation. In 1969, the Spanish-speaking,
Indians and blacks together contributed 30 percent of the
childbearing in excess Of replacement needs, while the
non-Spanish-speaking white majority contributed 70 percent
[105: 82].

Family planning was introduced in the United
States largely through the efforts of Margaret Sanger, a
practicing nurse in New York. Mrs. Sanger Opened the first
U.S. birth control clinic in 1916 and formed the National
Birth Control League in 1921. Her statements of thoughts
could have been spoken today in terms Of their relevance
to contemporary feminists. ”We know that there never can be
a free humanity until woman is freed from ignorance, and we
know too, that woman can never call herself free until she
is mistress of her own body" [120]. She maintained

furthermore, that "Birth control is the first important step

94

women must take toward the goal of her freedom. It is the
first step she must take to be man's equal. It is the first
'step they must take together toward human emancipation" [120].

It was not until March 1970, at the request of the
President, that the Congress of the United States passed
an Act to establish a Commission on Population Growth and
the American Future, and directed this body to conduct an
inquiry into several aspects of pOpulation growth and its
foreseeable consequences. At the same session Congress also
enacted the Family Planning Services and Population Research
Act of 1970 [99].

As of June 1965, the sale of contraceptives became
legal in all states of the United States following a ruling
of the Supreme Court [57: 479-531]. However, it was reported
that "approximately 22 states prohibit the sale of all or
some contraceptives; but all states, either by statute
or common law, allow exceptions for doctors, pharmacists,

or other licensed firms or individuals" [105: 86].

Civil Law in USA

 

The first organized meeting of women to demand
equal rights in the States was held in New York in 1848.
It took 72 years for the Nation to acknowledge that women
had the right to vote and hold public Office (1920).
Legislation preposing an equal rights amendment to the U.S.
Constitution has been introduced in every Congress since

1923. However, equal rights and responsibilities are

95

still denied to women in many ways in the legal system
[105: 85]. '

Equal Opportunities for employment, equal pay and
conditions of work started to advance through the remOval
of some discrimination existing in legal codes. In the
19605 as a result of the political pressure of women, the
Congress of the United States enacted a series of laws
designed to assure women the right to engage in the
economic life of the nation. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission set forth the basic principle that sex may not be
taken into consideration in employment or in conditions
relating to employment. In December 1971, the U.S.
Department Of Labor issued a directive which went into
effect April 1972 requiring prime federal government contrac-
tors and sub-contractors with fifty or more employees and
government contracts of $50,000 or more to set specific
goals and timetables for moving qualified women into all
levels of their work forces. It further requires them to
recruit, hire and train women and minorities for those job
classifications where they have been found to be under

utilized [146: 27].

Age at Marriage, Divorce, Polygamy and Abortion

With ratification of the 26th Constitutional
Amendment in June 1971, the age at which the parties may
marry without parental consent has been reduced to 18 years

in several states. Almost all states have permitted women

96

to marry at 18 without parental consent. However, in some
states of the United States, 16 is the minimum for males and
14 for females [28: 1011]. On the other hand, the U.S.
Census Bureau Report (February, 1972) indicated that the
average age of marriage among women rose from 20.3 to 20.9
years between 1960-1971. The median age at first marriage
for men rose from 22.5 to 23.2. The proportion of women
who are single at ages 20 to 24 jumped from 28 to 37 percent
during the same period of time. This may indicate an
inclination on the part of young women to delay marriage.

There is a high divorce rate in the U.S. In cases of
dissolution of marriage, the husband generally remains
responsible for the support of the children. In many
states, children born out of wedlock do not have the same
rights to child support or inheritance as children born to
married women. In some instances, when a man has a wife
and children born in wedlock, there are legal limits on the
amount that a father may will to a child born out of wedlock.
In 1970, out-Of-wedlock births among young people aged
15 to 19 rose to 180,000. It has been estimated that while
three-quarters of divorced men remarry, only two-thirds of
divorced women ever do. Polygamy is illegal in the
United States.

On January 22, 1973 in a historic resolution on-
the controversial abortion issue, the United States Supreme

Court by a vote of 7 to 2 overrulled all state laws that

97

prohibit or restrict women's right to obtain an abortion
during the first 3 months of pregnancy. Only during the

final 10 weeks when the fetus is judged to be capable of
surviving if born, may state laws prohibit abortion altoge-
ther. The resolution did not abolish restrictions completely,
any state may prohibit abortions, except where they may be
necessary to preserve the life or the health of the mother.
Rather, the justices emphasized that a pregnant woman enjoys

a constitutional right of privacy that extends to the right

of terminating a pregnancy [98].

Education in USA

 

Each of the fifty states has a system Of free public
schools, established by law, with courses covering 12 years.
Every state has compulsory school attendence laws. Most
of the nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are
affiliated with religious denominations. The number of
teachers in public elementary secondary schools in 1972 was
estimated to 2.1 million. The average annual salary of the
public school teachers was about $9,615 in 1971-72.

There is a disparity regarding education Obtained.
by women based on personal and family economic circumstances.
Many scholarships are available and in specific instances a
public welfare agency assists an individual to secure
secondary and higher education. However, for the women
who assume full responsibility for children and the care of

the home and for whom child care facilities and services

98

are not available, educational pursuits are very limited
even if they have access to education and training.

One study disclosed that in the whole U.S. (1957),
children born per married women aged 15—44, classified
according to six educational status groups varied, regularly
from 3.12 for women with less than 8 years of education to
1.59 for those with four or more years of college training
[81: 105].

Pregnancy is the number one cause for school drop-
out among females in the United States. The psychological
effects of adolescent pregnancy are indicated by a recent
study that estimated that teenage mothers have a suicide
attempt rate tentimes that of the general population. A
number of states have passed legislation in support of sex

education in public schools.

Employmentin USA

 

In the United States, women are classified as being
in the labor force if they do any work for pay or profit,
or if they work without pay for at least 15 hours a week on
a family farm or in a family-operated business [146: 21].
About 43 percent of all American women are in the
labor force. Employment outside the home seems to be
both the reason and the effect of the lower fertility rates
Of working women. However, in 1970, almost 25 million
children under 18 had mothers who worked at least part time,

over 5.8 million of these children were under age six

99

[105: 84]. Large numbers of these working mothers were the
only support of their families or supplemented incomes
near the poverty level. 1

American women and especially minority women have
experienced and continue to suffer discrimination and
deprivation in the labor market. 'Often, they are paid less
than men for the same work and they have less chance for
advancement.

Child care arrangement for working mothers are
Often inadequate. Only a small percentage of children are
enrolled in nursery schools or day-care centers; about one
million American children receive no supervision and

remain at home alone [105: 84].

Family Allowances in USA

 

The United States has no program of family allowances
with benefits granted strictly according to the number of
children. However, there are public assistance programs or
welfare programs to aid persons in needs. Insurance programs,
vocational rehabilitation programs, Medicare and Medicaid
programs, and retirement insurance programs promote the wel-
fare of the people and lessen the need for children to
‘support them in their old age. All citizens, regardless
of whether or not they have children, pay for the public
costs of children. Tax exemptions are given for each
dependent child, however, the tax policies are not

instituted with the expressed intention of encouraging

100

childbearing in view of the fact that the costs of bearing

and rearing children far exceed the savings in taxes.‘

Religion in USA>

 

Although there is a great diversity Of religions in
the U.S., the two dominating ones are the Protestant and
the Catholic. Catholicism and several fundamentalistic
Protestant groups as well as some ethinc groups still hold
to the ideal of procreation. Ideal, desired and expected
'family size for Catholic women are consistently higher than
for non-Catholics. However, the proportion of Catholic

women using contraceptive methods is steadily increasing.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The level of Soviet fertility during the 1920's and
earlier was quite high. It appears to have dipped sharply in.
the early 19305, and to have partly recovered in the middle
and later years of this decade. This country seems to have
come out of the war period with a distinctly lower fertility
[which—declined somewhat further during the early 195053
The level to which the birth rate apparently recovered, and
from which it later subsided again, indicates that the long
term trend towards smaller family size was asserting itself
over a period of time during which large strides were made in
industrialization, urbanization, popular education and the
rising status of women and diversification of their roles.

The Soviet Union officially favors the continued

101

growth of its population [59: 269]. In 1959, the Soviet
population consisted of forty-five percent men and fifty—five
percent women. Figures show that there were 20 milliOn more
women that men in the Soviet Union. However, women are now
free to determine themselves the number of children they wish
to have. The sale of contraceptive appliances both male

and female has never been prohibited in the Soviet Union. In
the political field, neo-Malthusians believed that the small
family system was the answer to all social problems of
modern society. Estimated population in 1972 was 246.3

million.

Women and Civil Law in The Soviet Union

 

The Russian women started their revolution in 1904
and formed their first political organization called the
"League of Equal Right for Women." The Constitution of the
Russian Federation 1918, established the equality of
political and civil rights of men and women. Working women
were allowed to participate freely in the social life of the
country. However, "the Soviet Government did not confine
itself to establishing the equality of men and women before
the law, but took all steps necessary to guarantee
opportunities for women to participate equally with men in
social and industrial activity and in the administration
of the state" [13]. The Constitution also granted women the
right to elect and be elected to all state's organs.

However, "the right to vote and participate in elections is

102

a duty not easily evaded by the ordinary citizen. Passivity
of the voter in an election campaign is interpreted as
Opposition. It is difficult for a citizen not to participate
in the electoral process. The registration of all voters

in thelEBR is the responsibility of the state, the

individual voter has no choice in this matter. With complete
registration, the authorities are in good position to know
who does not vote. The regime appears determined that every
citizen shall make use of his right to vote, whether he

- wants to or not. Thus, some provision of the Constitution
appears to facilitate pressure upon individual citizens in
order to achieve a desired pattern of behavior" [108: 108].
Candidates for election to the Supreme Soviets of USSR

must be 23 years of age, and to the Supreme Soviets of the
Union Republics and Autonomous Republics 21, for all regional
and other local authorities the minimum age for candidates

is 18.

Age at Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy

 

The Decree on Civil Marriages, enacted in 1917,
established full equality of husbands and wives in family
and marriage relations. In the USSR, a new marriage and
family law was ratified in June 1968 which introduced a
minimum age of 18 for both males and females, giving
individual republics the right to lower it, but by no
more than two years [131]. Marriages with persons under age

is a crime punishable by imprisonment not to exceed two

103

years or by correctional labor for a term not exceeding one
year.

Early in 1917, divorce was granted by a decree on
the request of both or one of the spouses, the decree
required no statement or reasons for divorce. But in 1944,. .
divorce was granted by the courts on grounds deemed
justifiable by the courts. Polygamy is prohibited and

constitutes a crime.

Abortion in the Soviet Union

 

In the USSR, where abortions have been legalized
for health reasons and to advance the emancipation of women,
the demographic consequences of legalized abortion have
caused some Governments to invoke pronatalist measures. Thus,
the legalized abortion of 1920 was revoked by law in 1936
[87: 126-30]. But in recognition of the fact that many
illegal abortions were taking place and that, basically,
women should have the right to regulate the size of their
families when other methods have failed, the law legalizing
abortion at the women's request was again adopted in 1955

[63: 531].

Women's Education in USSR

 

Education is free of charge and compulsory from 7
to 15 years of age. Coeducation was reinforced in all-schools
in 1954. There are 58 universities, in 1972 there were

1,002,900 scientific workers in places of higher education,

104

research institutes and Academies of Sciences [102: 1400].
Fertility and illiteracy declined together in Russia.
Literacy and mass education appeared to deserve Special
attention in relation to changing fertility, along with the
more frequently stressed urbanization and industrialization.
In 1919, the Soviet Government issued a decree on
the liquidation of illiteracy among the pOpulation. Every-
body from the age of eight to fifty was obliged to study in
the schools for the elimination of illiteracy. In the Russian
Federation of the seventeen million persons given priority in
the schools, fourteen million were women. At present, fifty
percent of the many thousands of students at the Moscow -

university are women.

Women's Employmentin USSR

 

Soviet women are encouraged to participate in the
labor force [109: 258]. Women constitute almost half of
the workers in all branches of the national economy. There
were about 10 million more women than men Of working age in
1970. Reliance upon the female labor reserve was far more
important in terms of annual growth of the labor force than
reliance upon male workers [33: 8—14]. Nearly 26 percent
of the Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
elected in 1954 are women; more than half a million women
are Deputies to the local Soviets [13]. The Soviet women
have the right to equal pay for equal work.

The pension law, 1956, affords women the right to

105

receive a pension five years earlier than men while having
fewer years of service. Furthermore, the State Pensions
Act provided that "mothers of five or more children who have
reared them to eight years of age have the right to full
pension after eaching the age of fifty. The only
condition is that they must have worked for at least
fifteen years previous to that age" [59: 274-6].

Social insurance is administered by the trade unions.
In 1971, 10.6 million people were sent to sanatoria or rest
homes by the unions. There were Over 42 million pensioners
in 1972. Twelve million collective farmers were receiving

state-aided pensions [102: 1402].

Family Allowances in USSR

In the USSR a pre-natal grant and a birth grant
are paid to aid a woman with the increased expenses on the
arrival of a new child. Mothers with two children, after
the birth of a third, and for each subsequent child, receive
a money grant; both the outright maternity grant and the
supplementary monthly allowance increase progressively with
the birth of each subsequent child. Maternity insurance
and maternity benefits for employed women are provided to
cover the loss of income of mothers who can no longer work
and also to enable mothers to procure necessary medical and
child care services. The USSR also awards prizes to V

mothers of extremely large families [101: 21].

106

Religion in USSR

.With the Revolution, the Orthodox Church lost its
position as the dominant one and all religiOns were
placed on an equal footing. Since most Of the Russians
are not practicing any religion, the latter does not have

an effect on family planning programs.

Summary

In general, the five deve10ped countries are
characterized by smaller family size. A high percentage
of women participate in the labor force and have a consider-
able amount of education. Consequently, marriage is
delayed voluntarily in many cases to fulfill the previous
purposes. Although limited in certain cases, women in
developed countries may exercise freely their civil and
political rights. Religious attitudes toward family
size are not an obstacle in most of these countries.
Demographic data about the five developed countries are

summarized in Table 2.

107

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CHAPTER V

PROCEDURE

This chapter includes the sample selection, methodo-
logical issues and limitations of the study, and statistical
data on population, fertility and indicators of the status
of women. In virtually all cases, United Nations Census
data were used, however, U.N. data were not available in
certain cases and some figures were estimates. For the sake
of consistency, U.N. data were utilized primarily and other

sources were used only when necessary.

Sample Selection

 

The selection of the ten countries in this study was
based on the decisions to have region representation.

West Africa, the Middle East, North and South America, North-
East and Mid Asia, East, West and North Europe were
represented. Culture and religious diversity were considered
in the sample. Size of country and the population range in
deve10ping as well as deve10ped countries had to be large
enough to be representative.

For many countries data of the nature required were
not available or complete. Therefore, countries were
selected for which preliminary search had indicated sufficient
reliable data might be available. Other than that the

108

109

countries have been arbitrarily selected.

Classification of the countries as developing or
developed was based on the level of fertility of each,
measured by the Gross Reproduction Rate. Where the GRR
between 1960-65 was greater than 2.0, the country was
considered developing, and where it was less than 2.0, the
country was considered a developed one (see definitions in

Chapter 1).

Methodological Issues and Limitations of the Study

 

The indicators of the status of women were
selected with the hypothesis in mind that they would have

a correlation with women's fertility.

Level of Education

 

The relationship between the percentage of women
by level of education and the level of fertility was examined.
Reliability on the literacy issue completely depended on
the validity of available statistics. According to Linder,
”the status of demography as a science depends on the type
and quality of data available for the objective study of
population, as well as upon the theoretical structure with
which these facts can be classified, interrelated and
interpreted" [83: 321]. Illiteracy might be underestimated
if it is omitted from official censuses of slum and rural
population, especially in developing countries, where the

illiteracy rate for women is frequently very high. On the

110

other hand overestimation was reported in cases of newly
independent countries where the official language is

English or French. Whoever does not read or write that
language is considered illiterate. In Algeria, for

example, many girls are sent to small religious schools where
they learn only the local language (Arabic) and not the
official one (French), "still they cannot be considered
illiterates more than non-French speaking American women

can" [117:4].

Statistical data must be used with caution especially
in cross—cultural comparisons. For the purpose of this study,
the author used all the U.N. demographic and statistical
sources. However, for the same census year, two different
data were reported in two different U.N. sources. For
example, percentage of female illiteracy 15 years and over
in Egypt 1960 was reported to be 91.4 in "U.N. Compendium of
Social Statistics 1967” while it was reported to be 87.6 in
"U.N. Demographic Yearbook 1970."

To compare status of women by their college education,
statistics should be broken down by field of study. Subjects
as social work, nursing, home economics and elementary
school teaching are college specialities and considered as
professional fields in countries like the United States, while
are considered sub-professional and are taught in special
training schools of 1-3 years duration in most European

countries as well as in nations on other continents [lhfi 234W].

111

Therefore, the same percentage of women enrolled in such
subjects would indicate a different status of women in

these societies. The same could be said if we compare the
status of women in the same country or between countries by

the percentage enrolled in fields such as engineering,

medicine or business and the percentage enrolled in branches
of the social sciences. Censuses by educational field are

not available for many countries. However, this study will not
be affected directly since the relationship examined is the
correlation between fertility and level of education in

general (see Tables 3, 4, and 5).

Women's Employment

 

The relationship between percentage of employed
women and their level of fertility was examined. For the
accuracy of the employment issue as an indicator of the
status of women, the following classifications should be
considered: full-time working women, employment by
occupation, marital status, percentage of working married
women with children under 3 years of age. These classifi-
cations would reflect a different status of women in
different countries if we compare the importance and
the prestigious status of 1) part-time versus full-time
jobs, 2) secretarial and sub-professional occupations versus
medical, law, engineering and business occupations. 4).
working women with children under 3 years of age. This

is considered a sensitive indicator of women's status

112

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3: Illiterate population by age and sex.
Country Census year Age éiifitiéiéijgfiiiiti°2e$21§
Japan 1960 15 plus 2.2 1.0 3.3
Sweden 1950 15 plus 1.5 a‘ --- ---
France 1946 14 plus 3.6 .3 .8
USSR 1959 9 - 49 1.5 .7 .2
USA 1959 14 plus 2.2 [.5 .8
India 1961 15 plus 72.2 58.5 86.8
Taiwan 1966 15 plus 46.1 29.9 42.0 b
Egypt 1960 15 plus 80.5 68.1 '87.6 b
Brazil 1960 10 plus 39.3 35.6 42.8 b
Ghana 1950 15 plus 79.5 a --- —--
Source: U.N. Compendium of Social Stratistics 1967.
a Source: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,
Yale University Press, 1967.

b Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1970.
Table 4: Percentage of female students by levelof education.
Country Census year lst 1evel* 2nd level* 3rd level*
Japan 1969 49 49 28
Sweden 1969 49 51 37
France 1969- 49 51 38 a
USSR 1969 48 a 55 a 48'
USA 1969 49 a 51 a 41
India 1965 34 24 21
Taiwan 1969 48 41 35
Egypt 1969 38 32 26
Brazil 1969 50 50 37
Ghana 1968 43 3O 12
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1971. Percentages calculated.

_ a Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1966.

*1st, 2nd, and 3rd level are respectively elementary, secondary and
university level.

113

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114

because it indicates the extent to which this important_
Option for work advancement is Open to women [117; 8-13].
These classifications would give a more accurate and more
'sensitive measure of status, however they were unavailable.
The present purpose is to find out whether or not the
employment of women in general (involvement away from home)

could have an effect on fertility (see Tables 6 and 7).

Table 6: Economically active female pOpulation*--
total and percentage.

 

 

 

‘ % Females
Total female economically

Country Census year pOpulation active
Japan 1960 47,540,899 36.2
Sweden 1960 3,756,434 25.7
France 1962 23,898,985 27.9
USSR 1959 114,776,347 41.5
USA 1960 90,991,681 24.6
India 1961 212,713,821 28.0
Taiwan 1960 5,267,140 13.7
-Egypt 1960 12,848,753 4.8
Brazil 1960 35,108,354 11.5
Ghana 1960 3,326,545 31.3

 

 

 

 

Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1970.

*Females active in the labor force and those who are
looking for jobs.

 

115

Table 7: Percentage of female teaching staff by level of
education.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Country Census year lst level* 2nd level* 3rd level*
Japan . 1969 50 22 12
Sweden 1969 83 46 --
France 1969 56 39 --
USSR 1969 71 68 a --
USA 1969 88 a 51 a 19 a
India 1965 17 a 23 a 13 a
Taiwan 1969 41 31 16
Egypt 1969 51 23 14 a
Brazil 1968 94 a 53 21
Ghana 1968 23 30 a 12 a
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1971.

a Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1966.

*lst, 2nd, and 3rd level are respectively elementary,
secondary and university level.

Civil Rights

 

Relationships between average age of marriage, and
the divorce rate and the level of fertility were examined
(see Tables 8 and 9). Age at first marriage is discussed
separately, since marriage underage was not officially
reported in the census of many countries. PrOperty rights
and social security system were also discussed as women's
civil right which might have an effect on their fertility

level.

116

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 8: Legal and median age at marriage.

Census Legal are a 1 Median age b
Country year bridegroom bride bridegroom bride
Japan 1960 18 16 27.0 24.3
Sweden 1960 21 18 25.5 22.2
France 1962 18 15 25.1 21.6
USSR 1926 18 -- 22.4 20.4
USA 1965 16 16 22.3 20.9
India 1961 -- -- 18.9 17.2
Taiwan 1956 l8 16 23.0 20.3
Egypt 1960 18 16 24.7 19.2
Brazil -- -- —- -- 5-
Ghana -- -- -— -- --
Sources: a U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1965.

b Donald Bogue, "Principles of Demography,”
(New York, 1969)

c U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1967.
calculated

d U.S.A. Census Bureau, February 1972.

Median

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 9: Rate of divorce per 1,000
pOpulation.

Country Census year Rate of divorce

Japan 1965 0.78

Sweden 1964 1.20

France 1964 0.69

USSR 1964 1.50

USA 1963 2.27

India -— --

Taiwan 1964 0.38

Egypt 1965 2.20

Brazil -- --

Ghana —- --

Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1965.

117

Political Rights

 

'Existence of the right to vote and to be elected
indicated the women's political right and whether the women
had lower levels of fertility when they were politically
active (see Table 10). Today, there are only seven countries
in the world which have not yet granted women equal political
rights with men. In two of these countries, Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, neither men or women have the right to vote. The
five countries in which women do not vote are Jordan, Kuwait,
Liechtenstein, Northern Nigeria and Switzerland. (In
Switzerland women have the right to vote in cantonal elections
only in the Cantons of Geneva, Vand, Neuchatel and Bern.)
Women have the right to vote in all the countries in this
study, however, the grant of political rights in itself
means very little unless it is implemented. This is
discussed later.

Table 10: Percentage of eligible
voters, voting.

 

 

 

Country Census year % Voting
Japan 1960 71.2
Sweden 1960 83.1
France 1962 89.4
USSR 1958 99.6
USA 1960 64.4
India 1962 52.6
Taiwan -- --
Egypt -- --
Brazil 1960 34.4
Ghana 1957 43.9

 

 

 

Source: Bruce M. Russet, World Hand-
book of Political and Social Indicators,"
Yale University Press, 1967.

118

Other Indicators

 

Cultural values, religion (see Table 11) and other
social factors which affect attitudes toward family size, the
role and the status of women in the family are discussed

separately in relation to fertility.

Table 11: Percentage of Roman Catholics and Moslems.

 

 

 

Country Census year Roman Catholics Moslems
Japan' 1956 0.3 0.0
Sweden 1940 0.3 0.0
France . 1960 83.0 0.8
USSR 1959 5.1 12.0 a
USA 1959 20.6 0.0
India 1961 1.4 10.0
Taiwan 1962 1.1 0.4
Egypt 1961 0.8 92.0
Brazil 1950 93.0 0.0
Ghana 1961 10.0 14.0

 

 

 

 

Source: Bruce M. Russet, "World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators," Yale University Press,
1967.

a Source: El Kammash M., "Islamic Countries in Population
and Law," L. Lee 8 A. Larson (ed.), Rule of
Law Press, North Carolina, 1971.

Methods of Measurement

 

Scales were developed to classify the two variables
in this study: fertility, measured by gross reproduction
rate, and the status of women, measured by the six indicators
selected. These are described below.

To examine the relationships between fertility,

measured by the gross reproduction rate and each indicator of

119

the status of women, graphic distributions were presented,
and correlation techniques were used. The use of more
refined methods of analysis was precluded by the small size
of the sample and inaccuracy of measurements. An a priori
level of confidence indicating a significant difference was
not appropriate in this analysis because of the small sample
size and the exploratory nature of the study. Each indicator
suffers from its own defects, including varying degrees of
inaccuracy and noncomparability of the data. The effects

of such defects tend to be reduced when data are combined in
groups so that errors are partly merged and compensated in
the group averages. As a check on reliability and variability
of the correlation coefficients, Chi-Square values and

Standard Errors were calculated respectively.

Scale for Gross Reproduction Rate (GRR)

The corelation coefficient is directly related
to the range of the two correlated variables. To minimize
the influence of minor variations which may easily be due
to errors of measurement or estimation and in order to
secure some degree of comparability in the scales used, the
values of the gross reproduction rate and the indicators

were classified into six levels.

The GRR range 2.01 and above was divided into three

equal intervals* so that the highest GRR in the sample

 

3.00 - 2.00 _
5

*GRR interval = 2 X 0.40

 

120

countries (3.0) would be the mid-point of the highest level
interval. The low GRR range 2.00 and below was divided in
the same way with the lowest GRR (1.0) as the mid-point of
the lowest level interval. This method secured an equal
distribution of countries by levels within the high and low
fertility ranges.

The six levels of the gross reproduction rate were
consequently defined as follows:

Low GRR group:

Level I . . . . . . . . .81 to 1.20
Level II . . . . . . . 1.21 to 1.60
Level III . . . . . . . 1.61 to 2.00

High GRR group:
Level IV . . . . . . . 2.01 to 2.40
Level V . . . . . . . 2.41 to 2.80
Level VI . . . . . . . 2.81 to 3.20

Scale for Indicators of Status of Women

The indicators of the status of women were also
divided into six levels. The following standards were
adopted for the choice of the class limits:

1. For each indicator except illiteracy, Level I
was taken for the highest and Level VI for
the lowest value in order to obtain positive
correlations. For illiteracy, Level VI was
the highest and I the lowest.

2. For each indicator except illiteracy, the

121

highest score value in the sample countries
was taken as the score limit between Level I
and Level II. The lowest score value was
taken as the score limit between Level V and
VI. The range between the highest and lowest
score values was divided into four equal
intervals; as a result the six determined
class limits were obtained. Inversely

for illiteracy, the lowest score value was
taken as the score limit between Level I and
II and the highest score was taken as the
limit between Level V and VI. Illiteracy

was considered a negative indicator.

Consequently the six levels of the indicators of status of

women were defined as shown in Table 12.

Table 13 shows the values of the gross reproduction

rate and each indicator for each of the countries included

in the study.

Table 14 gives the classification of each country by

level of GRR and each indicator of the status of women.

122

 

 

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' CHAPTER VI

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter includes the graphic presentation,
results of the statistical analysis and the discussion of the
findings. Tables on population, fertility, indicators of

status of women, and statistical findings are given.

Graphic Distribution Presentation

 

Distribution of Illiteracy by Level of Fertility

 

In comparing developing and deve10ped countries,
Figure 1 shows that the percentage of illiterate women are
very different in the two groups, with all of the low
fertility countries having a low level of illiteracy, and
all of the high fertility countries falling into a relatively
higher level of illiteracy. This comparison supports the
basic hypotheses of this study.

In general, within the developed countries, all the
sample countries fall into a low level of illiteracy.
However, Figure 1 shows a tendency toward a slight negative
relationship between illiteracy and level of fertility. The
lower rate of illiteracy for USA and USSR might be due to
the strict law enforcement for compulsory education. ‘Also
Japan has decreased fertility at a very rapid rate in recent

years, apparently faster than increasing the rate of literacy.
125

126

Within the developing countries, Figure 1 shows
that no consistent relationship exists betWeen high
fertility and illiteracy. Although they all fall into a
high level of illiteracy, the sample countries were scattered
into two groups with India and Egypt falling into the highest
level of illiteracy, and Taiwan and Brazil in the lowest.
From this distribution, although the sample is very small,
it can be concluded that in countries like India and Egypt
where over half the pOpulation is rural and dependent on
child labor for agricultural work, illiteracy is very high.
On the other hand, this increase in illiteracy could be

related to the fact that compulsory education is not enforced.

 

90. I E J = Japan
‘ i F = France
80 ‘ H
\ :‘ A = America (USA)
370‘ X -- R = Russia (USSR)
2 \ {fl I = India
£3 60 “ : l T = Taiwan
3 \I i E = Egypt
H50. " , B - B -
69 l - ra211
\J \
40- T B _____ Developed
2 countries
'5‘ F ----- Developing
4[ countries
3* J/k
2-
1. R A

 

 

o 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fertility
Figure 1: Distribution of countries by levels of
illiteracy and fertility.
Note: Data were not available for Sweden and Ghana.

127

Distribution of Voting Percentages by
Level of Fertility

 

 

Although voting does not seem to be a predominant
factor affecting fertility within deve10ping and developed
countries, in general higher percentages of women are voting
in low fertility countries than in ones with high fertility.

Within the developed countries Figure 2 shows that
except for the USA there is a positive relationship between
percentage voting and level of fertility. The more women
who vote, the greater the birth rate for developed countries.
However, the high percentage of voting women in the USSR may
be due to their compulsory voting system. It is interesting
to notice the existence of a negative relationship in the
case of the USA, the lower the percentage of.voting women,
the higher is the level of fertility.

Within developing countries, Figure 2 shows
that there may be a negative relationship between percentage
voting and level of fertility. However, the sample is very
small and data for two of the sample countries were not
. available. It is interesting to notice that percentage of
voting women in Ghana is higher than in Brazil. This is
.mainly due to the guaranteed right to vote to all Ghanian
citizens in spite of being literate or illiterate. Because
many qualified voters cannot read or write, pictorial symbols
or colors are used to denote candidates in Ghana. On the
other hand, although voting is compulsory in Brazil

illiterates may not vote.

 

128

 

100, R J = Japan
I S = Sweden
F F = France
80 S R = Russia MSSR)
A = America (USA)
J I - India
B = Brazil
60* A G = Ghana
no I
.5 \ Developed
“ \ countries
g \ [G .
40- \ | ----- Deve10p1ng
6“ ' countries
‘V
B
20.
o 0.5 1.0 1.5 20 2.5 3.0
Fertility
Figure 2: Distribution of countries by levels of
voting and fertility.
Note: Data for Taiwan and Egypt were not available.

Distribution of Percentage Median Age at Marriage

by Level of Fertility

 

In general, Figure 3 shows that there is a

tendency for low fertility countries to fall in a higher

percentage of age at marriage than high fertility countries

do.

It seems logical that increasing the age at marriage

would decrease the reproduction period in a woman's life

cycle during marriage which could lead to smaller family

size.

129

Within the developed countries Figure 3 shows that

a slight negative relationship exists between median age

at marriage and level of fertility with lower reproduction

rate in countries with a greater proportion of women marrying

later.

countries represented no interpretation can be

the graph.

40[ J =
2:. s =
0
-H F =
t ,
ggso. R '
:2 A =
Q) J I -

20} F /”\B E =
a: R I,

.,...
v0
.2
4.

Within deve10ping countries with only

 

 

o 0.5 1:0 Ifs 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fertility

three

made from

Japan

Sweden
France

Russia (USSR)
America (USA)
India

Taiwan

Egypt

Developed
countries

Developing
countries

Figure 3: Distribution of countries by median age

at marriage and level of fertility.

Note: Data for Ghana and Brazil were not available.

Distribution of Percentage of Women Economically
ActiVe by Level of Fertility

 

respect to economic activity of women

In comparing low and high fertility countries with

(without including

the USA), Figure 4 shows that a curvilinear shape is present

130

in both groups. Level of fertility may be related to
economic activity with a very high population rate reflecting
the greater need to join the labor force for survival support
of the family. While at another level, economic activity may
help reduce.the size of families in order to have a higher
quality of life.

Within the deve10ped countries, Figure 4 shows that
at one perspective except for Sweden and USSR (which provides
child care), there is a negative relationship between economic
activity and level of fertility. As women join the labor
force there is a lower birth rate. It should be noticed

that in the case of the USA, women are joining the labor

I{,/’A (1972)

40 = Japan
= Sweden

= France

= Russia (USSR)
America (USA)
= India

= Taiwan

= Egypt

= Brazil

N w
o o
/
GUJLTJ—JH>:U'TJCDC0
II

= Ghana

H
O

Developed
countries

L \

Economically active

\
I ----- Deve10p1ng
E countries

 

 

0 0T5 1:0 1:5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fertility

Figure 4: Distribution of countries by % women
economically active and level of fertility.

131

force at a rapid rate. If recent data were used [89: 157],~
percentage of women economically active in the USA would be
43.9 and would fall as is shown dotted in Figure 4. With the
new distribution a positive relationship exists between
percentage of women economically active and level of
fertility.

Within deve10ping countries there is no consistent
relationship between level of fertility and economic activity.
However, except for Ghana and Brazil, there is a negative
relationship between level of fertility and economic activity.
The more women involved in the labor force, the lower is the
fertility rate. India and Ghana show a higher level of econo-
mically active women, that could be due to the extended family
system which helps in taking care of the children while the
mother is at work.

Distribution of Second Level of Education
bvaevel of Fertility

 

When comparing both groups of countries, Figure 5
shows that, except for Brazil, all high fertility countries
fall into a lower level of education than do the low fertility
countries. Therefore, a higher level of secondary education
is associated with a lower level of fertility.

Within developed countries, Figure 5 shows that
when excluding USSR, there is no consistent relationship
between level of fertility and second level of education.
However, when including USSR and excluding USA, a slight

positive relationship develops. More countries need to be

132

included in order to verify any relationship.

Within deve10ping countries, Figure 5 shows no
consistent relationship between second level of education
and level of fertility.

Distribution of Third Level of Education
by Level of Fertility

 

 

In comparing both low and high fertility countries,
Figure 6 shows an overlapping distribution which makes it
difficult to see the effect of college education on the
level of fertility.

Within deve10ped countries, Figure 6 shows a slight
positive relationship between college education and level of
fertility with the highest in the USA and USSR. Again this
might be due to the advanced child care system available in
those two countries or to the higher per capita income in the
USA and family allowances in the USSR. Also the fact that the
pOpulation of women in the USSR was higher than the pOpulation
of men after the war, women were pushed to take higher posi-
tion jobs, hence, higher education. Japan has decreased
fertility at a rapid rate apparently faster than increasing
the rate of education.

Within developing countries, Figure 6 shows no
consistent relationship between college education and level
of fertility. However, when comparing Figure 6 with Figure
5, high fertility countries show a larger proportion with

secondary education level than with college education. These

 

133

figures indicate that in deve10ping countries, percentage of

secondary level of education for women may be a very

important factor related to fertility.

Figure 5:

Enrollment in second level of education

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

 

0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fertility

mourn—30>w'0mc0
ll

Japan
Sweden

France

Russia (USSR)
America (USA)
India

Taiwan

Egypt

Brazil

Ghana
Deve10ped
countrIes

Developing
countries

Distribution of countries by enrollment in
second level of education and level of

fertility.

60

50L

40,

30»

20.

10»

Enrollment in third level of education

 

Figure 6:

134

.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.

Fertility

Distribution of countries
in 3rd level of education
of fertility.

= Japan

= Sweden

= France

= Russia (USSR)
America (USA)
= India

# Taiwan

= Egypt

= Brazil

GUJFUHH>w71CD>L4
II

= Ghana

Developed
countries

Deve10ping
countries

by enrollment
and level

Distribution of Average Percentages of All the Indicators for
All Developed and Developing Countries

by Level of Fertility.

When comparing high and low fertility countries on

each average of the indicators, Figure 7 shows that the two

groups of countries differ greatly in every aspect of status

of women represented by the indicators.

Higher values of

135

indicators generally prevail in low fertility countries
than in those of high fertility. As would be expected,
the Opposite is true for illiteracy.

Illiteracy shows the greatest difference with a
lower rate in low fertility countries and a higher rate in
high fertility countries. This fact is supported by the two
indicators, second and third level of education; the higher
the rate of education, the lower is fertility. Therefore, it
can be concluded that education is an especially important
factor contributing to lowering the level of fertility
and may be the very precondition necessary for motivated
birth planning. On the other hand, education can deter
early marriage and childbearing or postpone it beyond the
average age as long as the woman stays in school. At the
same time a higher level of education expands the probability
for women's employment.

Percentage of women economically active is much
higher in low fertility countries. This supports the
hypothesis that women who are in the labor force may be
inclined toward small family size, and that when they have
smaller families they are more free to enter the labor
force.

Age at marriage although only sluyniy higher in
low fertility countries as indicated in Figure 7, is very
relevant for the purpose of this study. Data were not

available for two of the deve10ping countries and if they

136

Averages for each indicators

 

90
I
80; L
A.
70. o,
9.
$0
‘ H
60.
L 3
50. <
00,
{00’
- L = Average for
H low fertility
40. L H = Average for
high fertility
' H
L 6‘
30, Q%L
.0 H
6 .
¥
L 1’6
20,
Age marriage
H
A
o
i?
10. 32
H
N
N
N,
L

 

O 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Fertility

Figure 7: Distribution of unweighted averages of each
indicator by averages of high and low
fertility (GRR).

Note: Averages are reported in Table 17.

 

137

had been, might have added to strengthening the relationship
between marriage age and fertility. The later the age at
marriage, the lower is the fertility.

Percentage of women voting is much higher in low
fertility countries. Although other factors such as compul-
sion or not being able to vote because of illiteracy, are
involved, still voting is a symbol of women's capabilities
of independent thought and action which could be carried on
into their private life. In order to participate in political
activites, women may also desire to have smaller families
to be free for such participation.

It should be realized that the transition to low
fertility and improvement of status of women are interacting
processes. It is unlikely that the level reached in any one
indicator would determine the movement of fertility. The
initiation of a shift from high to low fertility would

probably depend on the interaction of several indicators.

Correlation of Indicators with Fertility

 

High and Low Status Women, and High and Low
Fertility Countries

 

 

Correlation coefficients were calculated on the
basis of(2x2)contingency tables combining levels I to III
and IV to VI of fertility and each indicator of the status
of women. In addition Chi Square values* were calculated to

indicate the degree of assurance (percent confidence) that

 

. *values were calculated with Yates' correction for small
frequenc1es. ‘

138

the correlation is not due to chance. As a Check on
variability, standard errors were calculated. As was
indicated in the scale development, data were arranged in
order to obtain positive correlations.

The results shown in Table 15 support the existence
of a correlation between fertility and indicators of status
of women when high and low fertility countries are considered.

With consideration to the methods of measurement
for this study, the coefficients are relatively higher for
percentage of voting women (r = 0.77); percentage of females
economically active (r = 0.66); and percentage of females in
second level of education (r = 0.66). They are relatively
lower for percentage of female illiteracy (r = 0.58);

and percentage of females in third level of education(r =(L4l).

Status of Women and Fertility in All Countries

 

Correlation coefficients (r) were also calculated
from (6x6) contingency tables showing the combinations of the
six levels of fertility with the six levels of each indicator
of the status of women for all countries. Because of the
small sample size, the results are not reliable (see Table
16 in Appendix B) but the same technique could be used for

a similar study with a larger sample size.

Status of Women in High and Low Fertility Countries

 

Correlation coefficients were calculated for the

groups of high and low fertility countries separately from

139

Table 15: Coefficients of correlation, Standard
Errors, and Chi-Square values of each
indicator with gross reproduction rate
in 2x2 contingency tables and percentage
confidence of r.

 

 

 

 

All countries
2x2
0 2 o
r r x (l-a) 6
Indicators confid.
Percentage of
female illiteracy 0.58 0.39 0.67 60
Percentage voting 0.77 0.16 2.14 85
Female median age
at marriage 0.77 0.16 2.14 85
Percentage of female
economically active 0.66 0.19 1.90 83
Percentage of female
in 2nd level of
education 0.66 0.19 1.90 83
Percentage of female
in 3rd level of
education 0.41 0.27 0.42 50

 

 

 

 

 

(3x6) contingency tables. Those tables combined the three
levels of high fertility and the three levels of low

fertility with the six levels of each indicator. Again
because of the small sample size, the results are not reliable,
(see Table 16, Appendix B). The same technique could be

used for a similar study with a larger sample size.

140

Variations of the Indicators Among Countries
Classified'by Levels of Fertility

Table 17 shows the unweighted averages of the indicators
of the status of women classified according to level of
fertility. This table indicates that high fertility and low
fertility countries differ greatly in every aSpect of status
of women represented by the indicators. Within each of
these groups, higher values of indicators generally prevail
in low fertility countries than in those of high fertility.
As would be expected, the opposite is true for illiteracy.
The only exception is percentage of women economically active
in third and fourth level of fertility where it is lower in
the former and higher in the latter.

On the average, the low fertility countries have about
one-and-a-half times as many educated women in second and
third levels of education, twice as many females economically
active, two times as many voting women*, while the high
fertility countries have an illiteracy rate over twenty
times greater than the low fertility countries.

The differences between the group averages of
indicators for high and low fertility countries indicate
that it can be considered virtually certain that they are
not due to chance. The existence of some association between
fertility and the indicators is suggested by the data in

Table 17. Such association is implied by the general

 

*Voting data by sex are not available. It is assumed
in this study that women are representing 50% of the voters
in all the sample countries since they have officially the
right to vote.

141

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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142

consistency of the patterns of variation of the indicator
averages from one level of fertility to another. It is
unlikely that chance variations would produce the observed
averages for all the indicators. According to the consistency
of these findings, in countries where fertility is initially
high, improving the indicators of status of women are

likely to have some effect on fertility. One reservation
should be made here. It is unlikely that the level reached
in any one indicator would determine the movement of
fertility.2 The initiation of a shift from high to low
fertility would probably depend on the levels of several
indicators. The present distribution of countries by levels
of fertility would be interpreted under this hypothesis as

a result of one group of countries having attained a low
level of fertility while the other group did not.

Data in Table 13 show that education, employment and
age at marriage are higher in low fertility countries and
vice versa. Such association suggests that the improvement
of status of women represented by these indicators will lead
to lower fertility. But under different circumstances in
deve10ping countries where women must move from the rural
areas and find an employment Opportunity, does that always
mean an independence and advancement for them or would it
represent an isolation from a formerly supportive environment?
Can a gainful employment always be a sign of emancipation or

does it substitute one form of exploitation for another?

143

Age at marriage is also associated with fertility.
Higher age at marriage shows a negative effect on fertility
and vice versa. In many countries although there is a
required minimum age at marriage, the law is not enforced
and marriages are still being contracted out-side the legal
age. Those marriages are not shown in many censuses since
they are illegal and not reported or because birth certifi-i
cates have been reissued to meet the required legal age and
consequently they are subscribed under different ages.

Table 13 shows that the voter percentage is higher
in low fertility countries, however, we should not neglect
the fact that in some deve10ped countries, voting is compulsory
and the individual has no choice in this matter since
passivity is interpreted as Opposition. In this case higher
number of voters is not important if the grant of this
political right in itself means very little and is not
implemented as it should. On the other hand we find lower
percentage of voters in high fertility countries. It should
also be emphasized that in many developing countries while
women have the right to vote the same law prohibits this
right to illiterates who form 40 to 70 percent of the pOpu-
lation, most of whom are women.

Other Factors Related to the Status
of Women and Fertility

 

 

Divorce was considered an indicator of women's civil
rights in this study. Figures in Table 18 show the rate of

divorce for each country, however, correlation between divorce

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144

 

 

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145

rate and fertility could not be calculated for the purpose
of this study. Although divorce rate might have a direct
effect on fertility, it is not possible to classify it as an
indicator of higher status of women. This hypothesis would
not be valid for developing countries where divorced women
are subject to social pressure in their communities, hence,
have low status. On the other hand, if high divorce rate is
considered as an indicator of low status of women, it should be
eliminated from women's civil rights. Consequently divorce
rate could not be used as an indicator of status although it
is an important factor in the women's civil right.

i As indicated previously in the literature review,
religion is a factor affecting the attitude of women toward
family size, however, the data in Table 18 do not reflect it
with the exception of the high percentage of Moslems and
Roman Catholics in Egypt and Brazil respectively. While the
two latter countries fall in the high fertility group, France
on the other hand has a high percentage of Roman Catholics
and falls in the low fertility group. Therefore, religion
seems not to be a predominant factor affecting fertility. In
general, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu and Islamic attitudes on
the glories of the large family seem to have been surmounted
in Japan, Taiwan, Egypt and India.

Other factors related to fertility but not-
considered as indicators of status of women are per capita
income, life expectancy at birth and infant mortality (see

Table 18). The two first factors are higher in low fertility

146

countries and lower in high fertilitycountries. Infant
mortality is low in low fertility countries and vice versa.

It should be realized that the transition to low
fertility and the improvement of status of women are
interacting processes and that other factors may play an
important part in determining the result oftheir interaction.
Factors such as national culture and value system should be
Iemphasized. It is clear from the course of this study that
the high fertility and low fertility countries in the world
are characterized by important differences in culture as
well as the status of women. Therefore, the wide differences
in fertility levels might not be due only to one group of
countries having reached a higher level of social and economic
development (Table 18) but also at least partly to cultural
circumstances affecting the interactions between fertility
and social changes.

Interpretation of Findings in Relation
to Time Perspective

 

The data configuration of fertility levels and
their associations with the_indicators of status of women
represents a picture which changes in the course of time.
If the same study were to be repeated within ten or twenty
years, different results will be obtained for the same
countries; the evidence that the group of low fertility
countries has been formed by a process of transition over a

period Of several decades. More recent GRR statistics*

 

*GRR for recent years was not available for all the
sample countries during the time of this study.

147

than the ones used in this study show the continuous

decrease in some of the low fertility countries; for example,
USA 1968, GRR = 1.2; Sweden 1970, GRR = 0.9. Recent statis—
tics also show the launching of new countries from high to
low fertility as is the case in Taiwan, GRR = 1.9 in 1970.
According to this level of fertility Taiwan should be
considered as a low fertility country in future research

studies.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary

In every society there are norms of behavior which
affect fertility, and every legal structure contains
regulations which encourage or discourage childbearing.

This study has indicated that there are correlations
between fertility and the status of women when all high and
low fertility countries are compared. High fertility and
low fertility countries differ greatly in every aspect of
status of women represented by its indicators. Indicators-
such as age at marriage, voting, employment and second level
of education appear to be highly correlated. The statistical

analyses supported the existence of these relationship.

Conclusions

 

POpulation policy is not an end in itself, but a
means to facilitate the achievement of social goals desirable
in their own rights. The aim of any pOpulation policy must
be the enrichment of human life not its restriction. The
pOpulation problem can and should be based on voluntary
action determined by the individual dignity and reach his
full potential. The universal human rights aspects of birth

planning and the status of women must be affirmed. Constraints

148

149

on the exercise of the right to decide whether, and when,

to bear children affect the exercise of other rights in
-marriage and the family, education, employment and public
life.

I To achieve a significant change in a society

we should make a change in the status and role of women and
hence in the structuring of family life. Included among

such changes would be greater educational opportunities

and the attainment of high levels of literacy, greater female
participation in the labor force, and more equitable divorce
and inheritance laws. It is also necessary to reduce infant
mortality and to make systematic provisions for the aged.
There are reasons to believe that variations in fecundity
among peOple living in different conditions are more power-
fully influenced by social and psychological rather than
purely biological factors. Religious communities which
formed minorities in composite societies often maintained
high fertility because of the resistance created by

their religious faith against the assimilation of culture
patterns developed in other communities. However, a culturally
conditioned trend towards lower fertility could occur rapidly
in a closely knit community, if the sociocultural leaderships
of the community were in favor of such a trend.

Recommendations for Population Programs
and Social Policy

 

 

One of the objectives of this study was to develop

recommendations to assist personnel in the various countries

150

in the formulation and design of population programs and
social policy. It has been a central thesis of this study
- that such programs go far beyond traditional family planning
programs, and must change the social structure in order for
population growth to be significantly altered.

The recommendations which follow are based on both
the qualitative and quantitative findings of this study,
and are founded on a value for human dignity.
l. Compulsory education is becoming a reality in all
countries of the world. The shool system touches every child
and fosters the growth of intellectual knowledge and skill, it
also influences values and goals. Population growth is one of
the world's most pressing problems, and all persons should be
aware of the consequences of unrestricted pOpulation growth.
Therefore, to better prepare present and future generations
to meet the challenges arising from population change, well-
planned population education programs should be established in
the school Systems.
2. Decisions and actions regarding the conception of a new
life, and about the number of children desired are made, in
most cases, within the intimate relationship of the family.
Sexual behavior is a fundamental aspect of family life. It
is essential that people have an understanding of the nature
of human sexuality, biologically, psychologically and emotion-
ally, and its implications of sex for family life. Many

peOple have not been well informed about human sexuality,

151

nor have they had education related to family life and family
planning.

To maximize information and knowledge about human sexuality
and its implication for the family, we should make Sex educa-
tion available through responsible community organizations, the
media, and especially the schools. Educational institutions
may be identified as the place of instruction in such matters
as sex education, family living and the population dynamics
of the society. Teachers can then, presumably, play important
roles by inculcating into young people the attitudes and values
favorable to the achievement of lower fertility. Instruction
about family planning programs should be included, therefore,
in the curricula of schools and universities, where teachers,
social workers and various other professionals who work in
family planning are trained. Similarly we should seek to
improve the quality of education for parenthood throughout
the society.

3. Education of women appears to be one of the strongest
factors affecting fertility. On one hand, the mother plays
a crucial role in the formative years of her child's life;
therefore, the mother should be educated and free from any
inferiority complex based upon ignorance, and also free

from anxieties that she might pass on to her children. The
image of the mother in the eyes of her children is important
in preparing them better for life ahead. In addition,

education is the precondition necessary for family planning,

152

for postponement of marriage, for a higher level of employ-
ment and greater independence of action. Therefore,
education for women should be a necessity for the well-
being of future generations.
4. Today it is widely believed that in industrialized
societies, wOmen avoid childbearing or restrict their
number of children in order to maintain jobs outside the
home. Therefore, we should encourage the participation of
women in gainful employment as an alternative to the
bearing and rearing of children. Attention should be
devoted not only to employment itself but to the type of
employment in which women engage as a factor tending to
reduce family size.
5. In some cultures, because of high infant mortality,
a child is not considered completely human until enough time
has elapsed for its survival to be assured. Little emotional
or material investment is therefore, made in its early
months--a fact which lowers even further the child's chances
of survival, and high infant mortality leads to uncontrolled
fertility. If the day care center programs for the mothers
include an element of family planning education, they may
even be more successful channels for influencing attitudes
than maternal and child health centers.

The child care system should be greatly expanded so
that working mothers will have a place where their children

can receive beneficial care. The child care centers should

153

be the places where the health, recreational, educational,
'and psychological needs of the child will receive full
attention. This is women's right, human right, and population
control too.

6. . Early age at marriage tends to be generally related to
fertility. In some countries girls under the age of ten
years are given away in marriage and are forced to marry men
not of their choice. Consent of the woman to marriage is

not required provided the consent of her parents is obtained.
Marriage registration does not exist in many countries and
there we find men who marry as many women as they like. The
legal minimum age at marriage should be raised to 18 for«
women. Consent of the woman to marriage as well as marriage
registration should be legally required. In order to obtain
practical consequences on fertility, legislation providing
for marriage law should be enforced by the government Where
marriages are still being contracted outside the legal
rights. Delayed marriages, on the other hand, might foster
the accomplishment of a higher level of education for women
and might also permit practical training for employment.

7. In a number Of countries where women legally have full
personal rights, there is often a gap between the laws and
the actual situation. In the rural areas, this gap is due to
the isolation of women and the minimal contact they have
with the national decision-making centers. In the

urban areas, the nonexercise of these rights is related to

154

the woman's low educational level and her low socioeconomic
position. Implementing legislation is important to

eliminate discrimination against women as well as it is
necessary to create conditions to guarantee their
implementation.

8. In some countries women are excluded from inheritance of
their parent's prOperty and wealth which is inherited

only by the sons. In certain cases the widow is obliged to
marry the husband's brother in order for the property to
remain in the family. Such provisions tend to encourage
parents to have larger families to ensure that enough

sons would be born and survive to benefit from the laws in
question. To rectify such a system, inheritance and property
laws should be changed.

9. A child labor prohibition law and the enforcement of

a compulsory education law should have a depressing effect

on fertility, if the respective minimum and maximum ages are
made to correspond. In this case children will represent
definite high costs for their families even when education is
free, and at the same time will deprive them of additional
income. This hypothesis while significant among pOpulations
where voluntary parenthood is well established, may not apply
among peOple who do not deliberately make family size
decisions.

10. In seeking changes in traditional societies, we should

bear in mind the cultural emphasis on the duties of women

155

that society prescribes. Local leaders in such societies
must be chosen among those who are considered open-minded in
promoting changes of attitude. The traditional midwife'

as well as the social worker could have a positive role.
The position of the village head should not be underestimated.
If he is a man motivated to family planning, the advancement
of women's programs should go through him.

11. 'Since the family is the most significant social unit

of a community, the relative attribution of males and
females power is of the greatest real importance. Men are
too often forgotten in programs related to family planning,
although their role in responsible parenthood is quiteras
important as that of women. To get to the real cause of

the population problem, we will need elimination of the
childbearing bias of a society which seeks to impose home
life on women by social indoctrination. Family life
education courses could be given to young men in high school,
vocational training, and youth organizations in rural and
urban areas. Men can be reached through different channels
such as rural and urban development, industry, labor unions,
and the armed forces.

12. From a population control standpoint, it makes

more sense to prevent pregnancy than to seek its termination
but the right of termination must exist as a human choice.
For many, the very need for abortion is evidence of a

social and personal failure in the provision and use of

156

birth control. Restrictive statutes violate social justice,
for when abortion is prohibited, medically safe abortions have
always been available to the wealthy, to those who could
afford the high costs of physicians and trips abroad; but

the poor woman has been forced to risk her life and health
with folk remedies and disreputable practioners. We believe
that abortion should not be considered a substitute for

birth control, but rather as one element in a comprehensive
system of maternal and infant health carer

13. The poor of the world are restrained by ignorance

not only of contraceptive practice but of the consequences of
high fertility for themselves, their children and their
countries. In order to enable all people regardless of age
or income, to avoid unwanted birth and to enhance their
capacity to realize their own preferences in childbearing and
family size we should extend subsidized family planning
programs, include information on the necessity of spacing
births for the health of the mother, and improve the delivery
of health services related to Fertility through public and
private financing mechanisms.

Voluntary fertility should be made universal, allowing
the greatest freedom for each to work out his own destiny.
For those who favor the incentive programs, especially for
sterilization, they must realize that such a policy will
put the whole matter of family planning in a grossly

commercial light. To the poor, the very need of financial

157

inducements will completely restrict their freedom of choice.
Professionals in the human field shOuld realize that such
success, if there is any, will be due to a temporary factor
and will disappear by its elimination. Can we realize how
great would be the differential effect by social class to
the disadvantage of the poor? How much should we pay before
the practice calls for a moral restraint? How much in values
should we be willing to forego for the solution of a great
social problem? Does effective freedom lie with an incentive
system of payment or with a program of social benefits and
penalties geared to the desired result?

Preoccupation with population growth should not serve
to justify measures more dangerous or of higher social cost
than pOpulation growth itself. Individuals should control
fertility as a result of an independent decision. In
order to establish a deeply ingrained pattern of behavior
affecting such a fundamental area as human reproduction,
the rationality of doing so should be prOperly communicated
to them. The role of communication is therefore to help
in making the population favorably disposed to the idea and

to the acceptance of a method of family planning.

Suggestions for Further Research
As has been pointed out, this study was limited by
the nature of the data available, as well as by the small
sample size. These precluded the use of refined statistical

technique to examine relationships. There is great need for

158

more accurate, and consistent data. For example, to obtain
more valuable and reliable information on the status of

women, more sensitive indicators must be made available in

the National Censuses and in the U.N. Censuses. Such
indicators as numbers of full-time and part-time working women,
employment by occupation, number of working women with
children under three years of age, and university education'

by field of study would make possible more discriminating
scales to describe and differentiate the status of women.

Further research studies on other countries are
suggested. -The scales developed to indicate the status of
women, and to classify the countries according to GRR, and
the statistical techniques used could be applied to larger
samples. This would yield more valid findings.

Further studies in relation to the time perspective
are indicated. These would yield important information on
changes over time and would help in identifying the most
significant factors related to fertility control. They
would also help predict future trends. The indicators
used in this study were apprOpriate at this point in time.

However, more apprOpriate indicators may emerge in the future.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN*

In the preamble to the charter the peOples of the United
Nations reaffirmed their faith "in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal
rights of men and women.” Article 2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights lays down the principal that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set

forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other Opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status." Article I of the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against women states that "Discrimina-
tion against women, denying or limiting as it does their
equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and
constitutes an offence against human dignity." The substan-
tive articles of the Declaration which appear to have particu-
lar relevance in considering the status of women and family
planning are: article 4 dealing with political rights;
article 6 dealing with civil law; article 9 dealing with

education; and article 10 dealing with employment.

 

*United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IV, No. 11,
December, 1967, pp. 113- 7.

 

159

160

Article 4
All apprOpriate measures shall be taken to ensure to
women on equal terms with men, without any discrimination:
a. The right to vote in all elections and be eligible for
election to all publicly elected bodies;
b. The right to vote in all public referenda;
c. The right to hold public office and to exercise all
public function. Such rights shall be guaranteed by

legislation.

. Article 6

Without prejudice to the safeguarding of the unity and

the harmony of the family, which remains the basic unit

of any society, all apprOpriate measures, particularly
legislative measures, shall be taken to ensure to women,
married or unmarried, equal rights with men in the field
of civil law, and in particular:

a. The right to acquire, administer, enjoy, dispose of
and inherit property, including property acquired
during marriage;

b. The right to equality in legal capacity and the
exercise thereof;

c. The same rights as men with regard to the law on the
movement of persons.

All apprOpriate measures shall be taken to ensure the

principle of equality of status of the husband and wife,

and in particular:

161

a. Women shall have the same rights as men to free
choice of a spouse and to enter into marriage only
with their free and full consent;

b. Womenshall have equal right with men during
marriage and at its dissolution. In all cases the
interest of the children shall be paramount;

c. Parents shall have equal rights and duties in
matters relating to their children. In all cases the
interest of the children shall by paramount.

Child marriage and the betrothal of young girls before

puberty shall be prohibited, and effective action, including

legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age and

to make the registration of marriages in an official

registry compulsory.

Article 9

All apprOpriate measures shall be taken to ensure to

girls and women, married or unmarried, equal rights with

men in education at all levels, and in particular:

a. Equal conditions of access to, and study in, educa-
tional insitutions of all types, including universities
and vocational, technical and professional schools;

b. The same choice Of curricula, the same examinations,
teaching staff with qualifications of the same
standard, and school premises and equipment of the
same standard, and quality, whether the institutions

are co-educational or not;

162

Equal opportunities to benefit from scholarships
and other study grants;

Equal Opportunities for access to programs of
continuing education, including adult literacy
programs;

Access to educational information to help in

ensuring the health and well-being of families.

Article 10

All appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure to

women, married or unmarried, equal rights with men in

the field of economic and social life, and in particular:

a.

The right, without discrimination on grounds of
marital status or any other grounds, to receive
vocational training, to work, to free choice of
profession and employment, and to professional

and vocational advancement;

The right to equal remuneration with men and to
equality of treatment in respect of work of equal
value;

The right to leave with pay, retirement privileges
and provisions for security in respect of unemployment,
sickness, old age or other incapacity to work;

The right to receive family allowances on equal

terms with men.

In order to prevent discrimination against women on

account of marriage or maternity and to ensure their

163

effective right to work, measures shall be taken to
prevent their dismissal in the'event of marriage or
maternity and to provide paid maternity leave, with

the grarantee of returning to former employment, and

to provide the necessary social services, including

child care facilities.

Measures taken to protect women in certain types of work,
for reasons inherent in their physical nature, shall

not be regarded as discriminatory.

APPENDIX B

Table 16:

APPENDIX B

Coefficients of correlation and Standard Errors for
gross reproduction rate and the indicators of the

status of women for all countries in 6x6 contingency
tables and for high and low fertility countries
separately in 3x6 contingency tables.

 

 

All countries

Low fertility

High fertility

 

 

6x6 countries countries
3x6 ~ 3x6
r 0r r or r 0r

Percentage of female 0.57 0.39 ‘-0.81 0.20 -0.53 0.42
illiteracy
Percentage voting 0.81 0.13 0.16 0.49 0.86 0.19
Female median age .
at marriage 0.65 0.22 0.49 0.38 -l 0
Percentage of female
economically
active 0.68 0.18 0.13 0.49 0.13 0.49
Percentage of female
in 2nd level of
education 0.55 0.23 -0.13 -.49 -0.57 0.34
Percentage of female
in 3rd level of
education 0.44 0.27 -0.63 0.30 -0.05 0.50

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

164

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