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LIBRARY

Michigan State l
University

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

The United States Diplomats' Response

To Rising Chinese Nationalism. 1900-1912

presented by

Linda Madeon Papageorge

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Mame in History

 

float/9 Q ' 2/411/

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Major professor

Date 36%, I975

0-7639

ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS' RESPONSE TO
RISING CHINESE NATIONALISM, 1900-1912

By

Linda Madson Papageorge

This study of the United States policy toward China was
inspired by several factors: the conclusions of recent scholarship
which pushed the birthdate of modern Chinese nationalism.back to the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; a desire to understand
better the love/hate relationship between the United States and China;.
the need to illuminate more clearly the diplomatic policy-making process.

Other studies have noted the effect of public opinion on the
United States foreign policy and have examined extensively the policy-
nmking roles played by individual American Presidents, Secretaries of
State, and members of the State Department and Congress. But no study
of the United States policy toward China during the decade that preceded
the national revolution of 1911 has concentrated on the influence the
diplomatic personnel in the field exerted on the development of policy.
An examination of the consuls' and diplomats' evaluations of and
response to the political situation in China provides answers to that
question and offers additional insights into the nature of Chinese
nationalism in this period as well as the nature and effect of the

United States response to that nationalism.

Linda Madson Papageorge

After surveying the background of the revolutionary situation
in twentieth-century China and considering briefly the differences
between traditional and modern Chinese nationalism, the study focuses
on the diplomats' evaluations and response to the Boxer uprising, to
the rights recovery movement with emphasis on the anti-American boycott
of 1905-1906, and to the various attempts at a peaceful modernization
of China's ancient institutions. Extensive use was made of the United
States Consular and Legations reports, some of which are in the PAPERS
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES volumes and
others in the Department of State Archives. In addition, an attempt
was made to determine the degree of correspondence between the diplo-
mats' reports on and recent studies of the political situation in
early twentieth-century China.

The diplomatic reports support the conclusions of recent
studies concerning the existence of modern nationalism in early
twentieth-century China. For the American consular personnel 1905,
the year of Japan's victory over Russia and of the anti-American boy-
cott, was the dividing line between traditional and modern China.
According to the Consular despatches, both the Manchu-Chinese dynasty
and the United States failed to respond adequately to the new reality
posited by emerging Chinese nationalism. The imperial government
refused to endorse any nationalist measures that seemed to threaten
its traditional prerogatives. Although the diplomatic reports noted
the implications of the Throne's inability to identify with modern
Chinese nationalism, the diplomats failed to affect appreciably the

attitude of the decision makers in the State Department who refused

Linda Madson Papageorge

to adjust the United States policy to the new situation. The United
States' attitude toward modern Chinese nationalism was an ambiguous
one. Although it favored the nationalists' objective of a strong,
modern China, the United States opposed any nationalist activities that
challenged the privileged position the unequal treaties gave the foreign
powers. Both the imperial government's and the United States' response
to modern Chinese nationalism subverted their respective objectives.

By ignoring and resisting its demands, they forced Chinese nationalism
into revolutionary channels and precluded the possibility that China's
transition to a modern, industrial state would be a peaceful one, con-
ducted by the Manchu.dynasty on terms more favorable to foreign

interests than those which ensued.

THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS' RESPONSE TO

RISING CHINESE NATIONALISM, 1900—1912

By

Linda Madson Papageorge

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1973

© Copyright by

LINDA MADSON PAPAGEORGE

1973

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Without the assistance of many marvelously generous people,
this dissertation would have been impossible. I owe special thanks
to Professor Paul A. Varg for his patience and understanding and for
his gentle guidance in my research and writing. I am also grateful
to the members of my committee for their invaluable suggestions. I
particularly want to thank my chairman of the History Department at
Georgia State University, Professor Joseph 0. Baylen, who cheered me
on to the finish. Thanks goes also to Dr. Arnold H. Price at the
Library of Congress, to Dr. Gayle Peters at the Federal Records Center
in Atlanta, Georgia, to Dr. Milton Gustafson and Dr. E. L. Weldon at
the National Archives, and to the many archivists and librarians who
gathered materials for me. Last, but certainly not least, I want to
thank my Mother-in-law, Mrs. E. T. Papageorge, who generously per-
formed many of my duties, my parents, Mr. and Mrs. E. A. Madson, who
assisted me whenever and in whatever way they could, and especially
my husband and son who sacrificed their claim to my time and without

whose support and encouragement I could not have completed my degree.

Linda Madson Papageorge
27 June 1973

Chapter

Ie

II.

III.

VI.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF CHINESE NATIONALISM. . . . . . . 1
Chinese Nationalism: Ideology And Program. . . . . . . 15
Reform Versus Revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1900: THE YEAR OF THE BOXERS . . . . . . ..... . . . 35

THE POST-BOXER REFORM MOVEMENT: THE FIRST

PHASE, 1901-1905. . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

CHINA CLOSES THE DOOR: THE ANTI-AMERICAN
BOYCOTT , 190 5-1906 e e e e e e e e e e e e e o e e e e e e 104

REFORM VERSUS REVOLUTION, 1905-1907 . . . . . . . . . . .150

THE PROVINCIAL DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES: EXPERIMENT
IN LIMITED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. . . . . . . . . . .195

THE TWELFTH HOUR: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY. . . . . .222

SOME REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . ...... . .248

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265

CHAPTER I
THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

In 1911 China experienced a political upheaval quite unlike
anything that had occurred in its long history. For it destroyed not
only the Manchu.dynasty but also the Dragon Throne which the Manchu
and a long succession of imperial dynasties had occupied. Imperial
China was now history; China was proclaimed a republic. It was a
revolution and nationalism was responsible.1

The nationalism that animated the revolution of 1911 and
distinguished twentieth-century China from its past originated in
China's traumatic defeat by Japan in 1895, in the impact on China of
the West and in the crisis these forces precipitated within the Chinese
civilization. The forces that produced Chinese nationalism also deter-

mined the shape it would assume. To understand and appreciate fully

 

1Historians continue to debate whether the events of 1911 were
revolutionary or a part of the traditional dynastic cycle. Chfizo
Ichiko has taken the latter position, "The Role of the Gentry: An
Hypothesis" in China In Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913, ed.
by Mary C. wright {New-Haven and London: YaIe University Press, 1968),
p. 308. For an opposite point of view see Mary C. Wright "Introduction:
The Rising Tide of Change," pp. 50-51; Michael‘Gasster, "China's Poli-
tical Modernization," p. 93;‘Marie-C1arie Bergere, "The Role of the
Bourgeoisie," pp. 294—295, all contained in China In Revolution. The
best approach to understanding the revolution Is, perhaps, that sug-
gested some time ago by Paul Linebarger who wrote: "China is in only
some respects comparable to the West, and . . . the ideas and methods
of the West loose the greater part of their relevance when applied to
the Chinese milieu," The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 19377} p. 52.

 

 

the content and thrust of twentieth-century Chinese nationalism, one
must consider the nature of and the relationship between the external
threat and the internal crisis from which nationalism emerged.

Given China's hostility to foreigners, the western approach
to China in the nineteenth century had assumed the character of
imperialism. The treaty system forced on China was the prime example;
it became the sing_qga_ngn_of relations between the Chinese Empire
and other nations. These treaties gave foreign nations special rights
and privileges in China. The right of extra-territoriality recognized
foreign rather than Chinese jurisdiction over the activities of their
respective nationals. The most—favored-nation clause gave all nations
the rights and privileges acquired by one of them. Foreign governments
obtained the right to limit China's tariff on imports to five per cent
ag_valorem. The treaties limited foreign residence to certain dis-
tricts within the treaty ports but gave foreigners virtual autonomy
within those districts. China had to tolerate Christianity and permit
missionaries to settle at will. In 1858 China extended treaty pro-
tection to American missionaries and their Chinese converts.2 These
were concessions that no sovereign nation would have given. Yet,
considering the state of the Chinese Empire in the nineteenth century,
3

relations were impossible without them.

A serious enough threat to Chinese territorial and administrative

 

2PaulA. Varg, The Maki of the Myth (East Lansing: Nfichigan
State University Press, I96 , pp.-9L1I.

31bid.

integrity in the nineteenth century, imperialism had greatly accelerated
after 1895. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 occupies a pivotal
position in the challenge of and in China's response to imperialism.
China's defeat by Japan set in motion a chain of events with far-
reaching effects on Chinese and world history. It inspired an
unsuccessful popular uprising in Canton in 1895. It led the foreign
powers to demand much greater concessions from.China than they already
possessed. This scramble for concessions initiated an intense policy
debate and struggle for power within China that precipitated the
unsuccessful radical reform movement of 1898 and the Boxer uprising

of 1900. The imperialism.that followed the Boxer uprising further
undermined the strength and prestige of the already failing Manchu
dynasty and, perhaps, hastened its collapse. Finally, it contributed
to the development of the revolutionary nationalism that has charac-
terized twentieth-century China.

China's defeat in 1895 occurred at a time when western nations
had reached an advanced stage of industrialization and had begun to
worry about the depressive effects on their economies of over-production.
With its 380 million people, China loomed as a vast market for the
absorption of America's surplus manufactures and capital.4 Japan's
victory completely dispelled what had remained of the myth of China's
military strength and stimulated the foreign powers' desires for
additional special privileges and territorial cessions.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, 17 April 1895, forced China to pay

 

4Ibid., pp. 14-15, 36-37.

Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels; China had to recognize
Korean independence and cede outright to Japan the Pescadores, Taiwan,
and the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan also forced China to open new ports
and gained the right to establish industries throughout China. These
last two concessions automatically went to those powers whose treaties
with China contained the most-favored-nation clause. The terms of
the treaty reconfirmed Japan's imperialistic objectives on the Asian
mainland and aroused Russian fears. With France and Germany cooperating,
Russia threatened Japan with war if it occupied the Liaotung Peninsula.
This Triple Intervention of 23 April 1895 launched the scramble
for concessions among the various nations. The prospect of war with
Russia, France, and Germany led Japan to sell the Liaotung Peninsula
back to China. Russia forced Japan to reduce the price from fifty to
thirty million taels and then offered the impoverished Manchu govern-
ment loans to meet its expenses. Because of its actions, Russian
stock in Peking greatly increased in value, paving the way for the
secret Sino-Russian Alliance of 1896 wherein Russia and China agreed
to defend each other and Korea against future Japanese attack. In
addition, Russia received the right to build and control a railroad
across Northern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria from.Chita to Vladi-
vostok. Determined not to be left out, Germany demanded a naval base
and when refused used the 1897 murder of two German missionaries in
Shantung Province to compel China to lease it Kiaochow Bay for ninety-
nine years and to grant Germany two railway concessions in Shantung.
Russia countered by seizing Dairen and Port Arthur on the Liaotung

Peninsula, in violation of the Sino-Russian Alliance; it also received

the right to build the South Manchuria Railway.

Great Britain, France, and Japan followed suit: Great Britain
leased Weihaiwei for twenty-five years, Kowloon for ninety-nine years,
and claimed the Yangtze valley as its sphere of influence; France leased
Kwangchow Bay for ninety-nine years and marked the provinces of Kwang-
tung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan as its sphere of influence; Japan selected
Fukien Province for penetration from its Taiwan base.

The United States would have liked to join in the
concessionairing and had its eye on Samsah Bay in Fukien. Amdy Consul
Anson Burlingame Johnson desired to reserve the "magnificant harbor"
for future American use. Consul John Fowler urged that the United
States secure a base in North China. Nfinister Edwin Conger wanted the
United States to take a base and Secretary of State John Hay confessed
that he favored a China port for America. Although Hay recognized
that adverse American public opinion presented a problem, he carefully
preserved his options.5 In the end the United States settled for the
Open Door Notes which it hoped would secure American interests in
China. The scramble for concessions halted in 1900 just short of
partitioning China. At this point the foreign nations confronted the
anti-foreign Boxer uprising.

The Boxer uprising is significant in the context of Chinese

history because it awakened Chinese to the nature of the imperialist

 

5Mari1yn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric 92 Empire (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 19685, pp. 98-106.

threat and stimulated the development of nationalism.6 Imperialism
at the turn of the century threatened not only China's territorial
and administrative integrity but also its economic autonomy. The
objective of the powers in opening China had expanded in the course
of the nineteenth century from promoting trade to developing industry.7
Under the western impact the Chinese economy had begun to develop a
modern sector beside its traditional agrarian and handicraft economy.
Foreign nations completely dominated the modern sector.8 Foreign
banks monopolized the financing of imports and exports in China and
even assumed such extraordinary roles as issuing their own bank notes
and acting as treasury agents for their respective governments.
Shipping on Chinese coastal and inland waters had become an extremely
competitive international industry, one which discriminated against
native shipping; for the unequal treaties allowed foreign firms to
monopolize shipping. Between 1880 and 1900 China's share in shipping
activities had declined from 30.4 per cent to 19.3 per cent.9

The foreign influence extended into other vital areas of
China's emerging modern economy. Foreign nations had rushed to take

advantage of the Shimonoseki Treaty provision that had opened China

 

6John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Nationalism (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 55-58, 250, 252-253; Wright,
PP- 3-4-

7Bergere, pp. 232-235.

8Albert Feuerworker, China's Ear Industrialization (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 19585, pp. , 245.

 

9Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York and
London: Oxford University Press, 195077'pp. 519-521.

to foreign industry and had acquired extensive mining and railroad
rights from the Manchu government. Foreign firms built, owned, and
operated a total of 2,356 miles of railroad in China in the early
twentieth century, which amounted to 41 per cent of the total railroad
mileage. Foreign capital had financed the remaining Chinese-built-
and-operated lines and therefore controlled them to a certain degree.
The imperial government derived no revenues from foreign railroad
properties and incomes since as concessions they were protected by
the treaty system and exempted from taxation.10 Imperialism greatly
handicapped China's economic growth. Yet, China's survival in the
modern world depended on its ability to make the transition to an
industrial society.11
Chinese nationalists realized the implications of China's
loss of control over its economic affairs and natural resources. They
characterized China as a sub-colony, a position they considered
inferior to that of a colony such as Annam or Korea. As Sun Yat—sen
explained, Annam and Korea had but one master, while China with many
had no one to look to for protection and was plundered by all of
them.12

Chinese responded to the imperialism that came in the wake of

the Boxer Rebellion in a completely unexpected manner. They met it

 

lOIbid., pp. 521-522.

11Feuerwerker, p. 8.

12Linebarger, p. 127.

with an outburst of nationalism.13 "China for the Chinese" was the
demand and it increased in volume as the decade progressed. Whether
reform—oriented or revolutionary-minded, Chinese nationalists blamed
China's troubles,--the degrading unequal treaties, the humiliating
military defeats, and the omnipresent threat of dismemberment and
receivership, on China's weakness. That weakness they attributed to
two sources: 1) China's decentralized political order and agrarian
economy which rendered it incapable of resisting the dynamic, more
efficiently organized, industrial nation-states of the West; 2) the
Manchu dynasty whose decadence and ineptitude had permitted the
imperialist victories. The radical reformers of 1898 wrote from exile
to impress upon the Court and the country the importance of thorough—
going reform if either were to survive the foreign threat. Other
even more radical Chinese began to organize a revolution to rid the
country of a government which in their opinion was corrupt beyond
redemption and to replace it with one capable of meeting the chal-
lenges of imperialism and the modern world.

The new spirit of nationalism appeared to have infected even

 

13Wright, pp. 4-5.

the imperial government.14 The Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi assumed

responsibility for the Boxer disaster, and when it returned to Peking
in 1902 the Manchu Court under her leadership seemed willing to under-
write a program of wholesale reform. In modernizing China the imperial
government faced formidable obstacles, chief among which were a well-
nigh impossible revenue problem, the opposition of the provincial
leaders to the centralization of power in Peking, and the scarcity

of honest, capable leaders.

The economic crisis China faced was the product of a serious
trade imbalance, the additional expenses brought on by the internal
rebellions and foreign invasions of the nineteenth century, and its
antiquated revenue system. The introduction of opium had altered
China's previously favorable balance of trade and had produced a

15 The

silver drain serious enough to upset China's fiscal system.
Taiping, Nien and.Moslem.rebellions, and the mushrooming revolutionary
uprisings of the decade preceding the revolution had forced the

imperial government to undertake expensive military campaigns.

 

14Because of the relation of the imperial government's reform
program and performance to the revolution of 1911 this is a hotly de-
bated issue. Feuerwerker concluded that the Manchus did not desire
reform, p. 246; so did Hsu, pp. 530—533; Disagreeing are Maribeth
Cameron in The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912 (Stanford University
Press, 0193177 __6—pp.5 -6"'"4, '201“'and‘WrI‘-“ght, p—‘2'p. 730". Richard 0. Howard,
ed., "Chinese Reform Mbvement: Introduction" in Journal of Asian
Studies, November, 1969, vol. XXIX, No. 1, p. 8, suggests-that the
Issue was not whether to reform or not to reform but, rather, what
kind of reform to pursue: a program reflecting the traditional Chinese
perception of world order or the new perception of the Chinese
nationalists.

l5Franz Michael, The Tai in Rebellion, V61. 1 (Seattle and
London: University of waERIngton Press, I966}, pp. 14-16.

10

Imperialism further drained the imperial treasury. The Sino-Japanese
War left a military bill of $58,389,000 plus the $168,130,000

indemnity to Japan. The Boxer Protocol saddled China with a huge
indemnity of 450 million taels ($330 million) to be paid in foreign
rather than Chinese currency over a thirty-nine year period at an

annual 4 per cent interest rate.16 The traditional sources of revenue,--
the tribute rice, land taxes, the likin, the salt gabelle, the customs
and import duties, and provincial contributions became inadequate for
meeting government expenses. The last time the imperial government
balanced its budget was in 1887. In 1894 the imperial government's

total revenues were estimated at approximately $65,043,649, hardly

enough to cover the interest on the foreign loans it had negotiated

to pay the expenses of the war with Japan.17 China's economic pro-

blems worsened steadily after the Boxer uprising under the pressure

to modernize China and develop its resources.

Regionalism compounded China's economic problems.18 This
phenomenon consisted in the transfer of power from the center to
the periphery. It occurred when the central government became
corrupt, inefficient, and too weak to look after its own interests,

creating thereby a power vacuum into which the provincial authorities

moved. The Taiping Rebellion provoked the regionalism of the Ch'ing

 

16Varg, p. 94; Hsu, pp. 485-486.
17Varg, pp. 93-94.

18Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth-Century China,"
introduction to Stanley Spector's Li EHEETCh and the Huai
(Seattle: University of WashingtoH_Press, )T'EpT'EiIZEIi , for
the material on which the following discussion is based.

11

period; politically and economically it was the turning point for the
Manchu.dynasty. Unable to defend itself against the Taipings, the
imperial government empowered the Chinese viceroys to raise armies
which they, not the imperial government, controlled. It even allowed
the viceroys to levy taxes for the support of their armies and came
paigns. The provincial governors and governors-general superceded
the provincial treasurer who was responsible to Peking for the taxes
collected by the local magistrates. These governors remitted to
Peking only about twenty per cent of the new revenues and effectively
resisted all demands to increase their annual remittances. Its loss
of control over the military and revenues seriously reduced the power
of the imperial government.

Regionalism in nineteenth-century China was therefore a
centrifugal force of great potency that constituted a real threat to
the continued existence of the Manchu dynasty. Coupled with imperial-
ism, it could prove fatal to China as well. There is ample evidence
supporting such conclusions. Regionalism intensified the antagonism
between the Manchus and Chinese, as Chinese eclipsed.Mhnchus in
positions of power and authority in the provinces. When Li Hung-Chang
became governor-general of Chihli and Superintendant of Trade in 1870,
the handling of foreign relations shifted from.the Tsungli Yamen in
Peking to Li's Yamen in Tientsin where it remained for the next
quarter century. Li's attempts to preserve traditional China often
found the provincial authorities siding with the powers rather than
the imperial government, particularly at the end of the century. On

the admonition of the powers who had favored the radical reforms of

12

1898, both Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung refused to support the
Empress Dowager in her attempt to dispose of Emperor Kuang Hsu after
the 2222.9L2323! a fact which greatly embarrassed and angered her.19
Then in 1900 these provinCial authorities refused to support the
imperial government when it inaugurated its pro-Boxer policy.20
This state of affairs severely handicapped the imperial government's
post-Boxer reform efforts. It could venture nothing on its own but

had to obtain the concurrence of the provincial authorities and the
permission of the powers, both more interested in securing their

own interests. But, most important, without a strong central authority
no effective reform, however strongly urged, was possible. Centri-
fugal forces by their very nature were incapable of formulating and
implementing national policies.

The spectacle of local forces assuming responsibilities
belonging properly to the central government undermined popular
confidence in the dynasty and contributed to its fall. The imperial
government's seeming inability to rise to the exigencies of the

situation led the revolutionaries to conclude that they had to sweep

the Manchus from power and assume the reins of government.

 

19Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1955), pp. 56-57T’

20See the author's unpublished master's thesis, "The Making
of the Circular Note: the United States in the Boxer Rebellion"
(East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1966), pp. 18-20, 24-28.
The Chinese viceroys in Central and South China formed an extra-
governmental organization, The Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance,
and negotiated directly with the powers to prevent the partition of
China and preserve their own interests.

13

The United States diplomatic personnel in China in the early
twentieth century formed a similarly low opinion of the leadership
within the imperial government. With the notable exceptions of Yuan
Shih-k'ai and Tuan-fang, they considered most of China's leaders to
be corrupt, poorly trained, inexperienced, incompetent, and unimagi-
native. But they found this condition to be as true of the revolu-
tionaries as of the imperial authorities. Students of China have
offered several explanations for China's failure to produce an adequate
leadership. The reasons given range from supposed inherent defects
in the prevailing philosophy of Confucius and/or the traditional
Confucian institutions, to the sheer magnitude of the problems China
faced and the compelling need to respond immediately, given the nature
of the imperialist threat.21

The external threat confronting China in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was unlike anything China had experienced in

its long history.22 Former invaders had admired the Chinese civiliza-

tion and often had adopted its Confucian philosophy and institutions

 

2lIMichael develops the theme that dynastic decline was the
fault of the Confucian imperial system. He found that the problem lay
in the system of controls a ruling house had to establish in order to
maintain the precarious balance of power between the state and society
which produced an inefficient administrative system and a stultifying
examination system, "Regionalism” pp. xxi-xliii. Other historians have
agreed with Michael's opinion of the examination system but have included
other factors. Wright has noted the adverse effect on initiative pro-
duced by overcrowded living conditions as well as the lack of time in
which to develop leaders, pp. 53-54; Cameron emphasized the scope of
China's problems, pp. 74-85.

22Linebarger discusses the effect the western impact had on
the Chinese perception of world order, pp. 47-52.

14

even before invading China, as was the case with the Manchus. Those
that had not were too weak to control all of China. The nations that
threatened China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were not
similarly weak. Science and technology had given them military strength
disproportionate to their numbers. More than fifty years of foreign
aggression and internal rebellion had greatly weakened China both
physically and psychologically and had produced at the turn of the
century a veritable national emergency.

Imperialism played the major role in creating a revolutionary
situation in China. It precipitated a crisis within the traditional
Confucian civilization and exacerbated that which the Manchu dynasty
was experiencing. Dynastic decay by itself was insufficient to pro-
duce nationalism. Historically it had invited internal rebellions
and external invasions, and it is possible that Manchu decadence would
have in time produced a successful anti-Manchu rebellion had it not
been for the unprecedented nature of the threat presented by the
external invasions which Manchu decadence had permitted. Some Chinese
nationalists believed that imperialism doomed their country, their
civilization, indeed, their race to extinction. They seriously ques-
tioned the ability of the ruling dynasty and the decentralized imperial
system to contain the threat. Survival in the face of western imperi-
alism demanded the reorganization of China on the principles of

nationalism.

15

Chinese Nationalism: Ideology and Program

Twentieth-century Chinese nationalism is a complex subject
because many features of classical China met the requirements of
nationalism, as defined by those who have studied the phenomenon.2
Yet, traditional China was not a modern nation-state; it was not
primarily a political unit. It was a civilization distinguished by its
ideographic system of writing, a dynamic system of thought known as
Confucianism, and a set of social, economic, political, and diplomatic
institutions and procedures that projected a unique perception of world
order.24 Traditional China possessed a cosmic and universalist world
view. This was expressed in its hierarchical organization of Chinese
society and of the outside world, wherein the emperor and his place of
residence, China, occupied a unique position relative to that of other
princes and other societies,--at the center of the earth serving as

the link between heaven and earth.25

China's geographic position and
its historical experience reinforced Chinese assumptions of the
superiority and centrality of China's civilization.26 The term "bar-
barian," which designated all non-Chinese, and the tribute system,

developed to regulate relations with barbarians in accordance with the

 

23Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York: Harcourt,
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1952), pp. 20, 22, 267.

24Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order,
Past and Present" in The Chinese World Order, ed. by John K. Fairbank
(Cambridge: Harvard Ufiiversity Press, 1968), pp. 276-288.

25Wolfgang Franke, China and the West, trans. by R. A. Wilson
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 22-27.

26mm.

16

Chinese perception of world order, reflected Chinese ethnocentrism
and complicated China's foreign relations in the nineteenth century.27
Traditional China did not possess genuine nationalism; its outlook is
perhaps best rendered by the terms "culturalism" and "transnation-
alism."

Imperialism challenged the Chinese outlook and provoked the
appearance of nationalism in China. But imperialism alone did not
determine the content of Chinese nationalism. Early Chinese nationalism
took its shape from the interaction between the forces of imperialism
and the internal crisis. From the beginning Chinese nationalism was
complex, many-faceted. Not only was it anti-imperialist; it was also
anti-anchu and anti-dynastic.

Even though Chinese nationalism began as a defensive reaction
to the threat of imperialism, it was a positive ideology. China's
semi-colonial status determined the highest value in the nationalist
ideology: the "survival of the Chinese people with their own civili-

29

zation." Thus, the first premise of Chinese nationalism was the

 

2'7John K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework" in The Chinese

28These are terms advanced by Franke and Schwartz respectively
and accepted by students of China, for example, John E. Schrecker in
Imperialism.and Nationalism, in comparing twentieth-century China with
traditional CHi'na.

 

 

29Linebarger, pp. 61, 85.

17

30

regeneration of China the race-nation. It was primarily a commitment
to restoring China to its former position of hegemony in Eastern Asia
by revivifying through modernization, not destroying, the traditional
order.31 Political and economic modernization would create a united,
sovereign, wealthy, and strong Chinese race-nation which would take its
place in the world as an equal of the other nation-states and make its
own unique contribution to the advancement of civilization. All other
aspects of Chinese nationalism, its anti-imperialism, anti-Manchuism,
anti-dynasticism, flowed automatically from this first principle.

Only a relative few in early twentieth-century China possessed
the feeling of nationalism. The young students, usually children of
the gentry who in their daily living and education had come into con-
tact with western ideas, became the spearhead of nationalism. The
United States consular reports of the decade preceding the revolution
suggested that the gentry class itself as well as many Chinese mer-
chants were also becoming nationalistic. At times the American
diplomatic officers even suspected the provincial officials of harboring
32

patriotic sentiments. Yet, these groups constituted only a small

part of China's total population.

 

3OAccording to Linebarger China the race-nation always came
first with Sun Yat-sen. Hao Chang in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual
Transition in China, 1890-1907, 64 Harvard East Asian Series (Cambridge:
HarvardUniversity Press, I971), presents the leader of the nationalist
reformers as concerned more with China the nation-state, with the em-
phasis on the state aspect, pp. 238-271.

 

31Linebarger added that this fact did not deny its revolutionary
character; for, despite his conservatism.Sun Yat-sen did give Confu-
cianism.some strange new twists, pp. 82-88.

32See below, pp. 132-135.

18

The educated elite of China saw in nationalism an instrument
for saving China.33 They proposed an ambitious program which they
felt confident would resolve the crisis that had enveloped China. The
nationalist program entailed political and economic modernization. It
demanded a foreign policy reorientation. Military reforms were impor-
tant items on the agenda. The program also included reform of basic
social institutions such as the educational system and the family.

One has only to consider the nationalist programs to determine the
content of nationalism. In the end nationalism would reorient not
only the Chinese civilization but also the Chinese man.

iModernization of the political system was the major concern of
Chinese nationalists in this first phase of the revolution because
they viewed all other reforms as dependent on a modern political order.
Both reformers and revolutionaries concluded that political moderniza-
tion required the creation of a modern nation-state, the centralization
of power in a central government based on law or some kind of consti-
tutional arrangement. For Chinese nationalists had attributed the
strength of the western nations to their political system of represen-
34

tative government and the equality of the individual before the law.

In advocating a constitutional government for China, the nationalists

 

33According to Shafer nationalism in the twentieth-century is
first used, and consciously so, as a tool to achieve certain defined
Objectives, such as political modernization, but especially industriali-
zation, pp. 11-12, 21, 273.

34Robert Scalapino, "Prelude to Marxism: The Chinese Student
Movement in Japan, 1900-1910" in A‘ roaches to Modern Chinese History,
ed. by Albert Feuerworker, et. a1. BE?E§1e§T'L5§'IfigéIes,1967),
pp. 196-198, 206.

 

19

maintained that they were not introducing democracy into China, but,
rather, were attempting to make Chinese democracy act in the interests
of the race-nation instead of the individual by giving it a modern
form. Sun Yat-sen's major complaint against the old order was that
it suffered from an excess of democracy. He characterized the Chinese
as "loose grains of sand."35 The traditional decentralized order had
given the individual much freedom, but it no longer served China's
best interests in the modern world of industrialized nation-states.
Western societies had devised a legal system to protect individual
liberty and restrict the power of government. Although sharply cur-
tailed, western governments still exercised more power than Confudianism
had permitted the imperial government, and within a constitutionally-
defined sphere western governments had achieved a terrific concentration
of political power.36
Interest in a constitutional government increased markedly
with the defeat of Russia (1904-1905) by Japan, an oriental nation
which had adopted a constitutional form of government and had achieved
modernization. While Chinese nationalists desired to follow the
Japanese course of action, they disagreed on the form a constitutional
government should take, an issue that figured prominently in the strug-
gle for power that preceded the revolution. The reformers, led by

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, vacillated on the issue but as the revolution drew

 

35Linebarger, pp. 59-60.

36Ibid., pp. 37, 53. Chinese nationalists, both reformers and
revolutionaries, agreed that China's political system was too decen-
tralized.

2O

nearer seemed to desire a constitutional monarchy patterned after that
of Japan rather than England.37 The revolutionaries under Sun Yat-sen's
leadership considered a republic absolutely essential to the realiza-
tion of nationalist objectives. Sun explained his position: in
traditional China the people were sovereign, but the right of revolution
bestowed by the Mandate of Heaven was a murderous, destructive process
which opened China to foreign invasion. Some kind of electoral process
would better achieve an expression of the popular will and effect an
orderly transfer of power.38
Whether referring to the reformers or revolutionaries, the
political modernization programs of the Chinese nationalists were
revolutionary, although with significant differences. Neither group
was hostile to Confucianism p33 §_e_, but only to the imperial system,
a political order which both had concluded no longer served China's
needs and therefore should be abolished. The revolutionaries were

primarily anti-dynastic and demanded the removal of the Manchus. In

their opinion the Manchus, an alien dynasty and ethnic group if not an

 

37According to Hao Chang, Liang was primarily concerned with
"reason of state," or China's survival in an age of imperialism. "En-
lightened absolutism," such as represented by Frederick the Great,
seemed to him the best political form for China, but how to guarantee
that the despot would govern in an enlightened manner was a problem
Liang never solved. Consequently, Liang remained committed to some
form of constitutional monarchism, pp. 255-258.

38Linebarger, pp. 171-175. Sun was more sanguine than Liang
regarding popular participation in government. The republican govern-
ment advocated by Sun was not to be a slavish imitation of the West.
Sun maintained that China's form of representative government had to
be based on Chinese democracy. He remained convinced that his Four
Rights and Five Power Constitution were original contributions to
political theory, Linebarger, pp. 214-227.

21

alien race, were a living symbol of China's subjugation by the
imperialist powers and therefore intolerable. The reformers wanted
to retain the Manchus but curtail their power with a constitution.
The reformers considered the revolutionaries' racism as dangerous to
national unity because China was after all multi-ethnic in compo-
sition.39

Chinese nationalists realized the need to modernize China's
economy. Sun Yat-sen's desire to introduce western physical science
into China constituted a departure from Confucianism, and, perhaps,
differentiated the revolutionaries' economic program from that of the

40

reformers. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao pointed out that agriculture dominated
the economies even of the industrial nations and pressured the central
government to initiate agricultural reform. For Sun Yat-sen industrial-
ization was a positive blessing. He actively promoted the development
of science, technology, and industry because he saw here the source of
the wealth and power of the western nations. In Sun's opinion China
would have to industrialize if it were to become strong and be able to
maintain its independence. Survival of the Chinese race depended on
the creation of a strong nation-state. Industrialization became the
way to realize the highest value of the nationalist ideology. These
nationalists wanted a central government that would promote industrial-

ization, establish its authority over the modern sector of the economy

that had begun to develop under the western impact, and recover the

 

39Chang, pp. 260-262.

4OLinebarger, pp. 78-82; Feuerwerker has analyzed the economic
programs of the reformers in chapter two, pp. 33-39-

22

Chinese domestic market. Modernization of the economy was intimately
involved with the "rights recovery" movement of the decade, the anti-
imperialist aspect of Chinese nationalism.

Chinese nationalism demanded a new posture in foreign affairs,
the assertion of sovereign rights on every front.41 The remarkable
nature of the nationalists' foreign policy reorientation becomes
apparent when one compares it with the foreign policy of the so—called
"self-strengthening" movement that had dominated the second half of

the nineteenth century.42

The self-strengtheners sought to conserve
Confucian China, to preserve the existing government and territory.
The Chinese perception of world order exerted the dominating influence
in the nineteenth century.43 Because the self-strengtheners, represented
by viceroy Li Hung-chang, did not possess a modern concept of China as
a sovereign state among other sovereign states, there was no concern
for the preservation and strengthening of national rights, no attempt
to have China accorded equal status with the other nations. The
self-strengthening policy attempted to minimize the foreign impact by
controlling foreigners' activities so that they did not endanger the
government and territory. In this they were quite successful until

1895. The self-strengtheners were also passivists. They attempted to

avoid violence at all times, not only because war represented diplomatic

 

41Wright, pp. 3-18.

42Schrecker has analyzed the foreign policy of the self-
strengtheners in his second and concluding chapters, pp. 43-58,
249-2590

43Schwartz, p. 285.

23

failure but also because in its weak physical condition China could
lose everything to the aggressors. Having concluded that only a policy
of accomodation and diplomacy could maintain China intact, self-
strengtheners had debated heatedly only whether to protect China by
balancing one barbarian against another or by making an alliance with
one of them.

Chinese nationalists refused to balance one barbarian against

another. New China would take on all of them.44

They determined not
only to resist further foreign encroachments against Chinese territory
but also to win back the territory China had lost during the nine-
teenth century. Even more than that, Chinese nationalists intended to
recover all China's sovereign rights. They attacked all western
investments in China, would recover all China's railroads, and would
redeem.China by paying off the national debt. Nationalism also chal-
lenged the unequal treaties and demanded that China be allowed to
establish consulates abroad to protect overseas Chinese. Chinese
nationalists possessed a modern concept of sovereignty.45 They
considered China an autonomous nation and viewed all foreign activity
of the past half-century as a violation of Chinese sovereignty. In
the early years of the twentieth century they were militantly anti-
imperialist. They determined to compel the foreign nations, by force

if necessary, to recognize and treat China as a sovereign state.

44Wright, pp. 4-18.

45Schrecker, pp. 45-48; Schwartz, pp. 284-286.

24

Educational reform.was probably the most potent force
in creating the new China and the new Chinese man.46 A modern,
industrialized nation-state such as envisioned by Chinese nationalists
necessitated drastic changes in the traditional education system.
Representative government demanded an educated populace. A.modern
curriculum.was essential to developing the skills on which an indus-
trial society depended. Involvement in international affairs as
sought by the nationalist foreign policy necessitated the study of
foreign languages, comparative political philosophies, and so forth.
The nationalists wanted to retain only those aspects of tradition that
would contribute to the creation of a new China. The modern education
system would also develop nationalism. Chinese nationalism required
Chinese to shift their allegiances. The new Chinese would be loyal
and action-oriented not to the dynasty or the family and their inter-
ests but rather to the nation-state, composed of 400 million Chinese,

and its goals.

Reform versus Revolution

 

No one has questioned the existence of a revolutionary situation
in early twentieth-century China. Observers have pointed out, however,
that a revolutionary situation does not inevitably terminate in a
violent political upheaval such as occurred in China in 1911, and that
often a revolution is not the best way to realize revolutionary objec-

tives. Reform was an alternative solution to the crisis in China, a

 

46Scalapino, pp. 201-203, 206-207, 209-210, 212; Linebarger,
pp 0 173—175 0

25

most promising one according to recent studies of the Manchu reform
efforts. The failure of the revolution to achieve much of a positive
character has raised the question of the wisdom and necessity of the
revolution and reminded us that Chinese nationalists argued violently
the same issue. Whether China's salvation lay in reform or revolution
was the primary question after the Boxer Rebellion. From this struggle
for the power to implement the nationalist program came the revolution
of 1911. Imperialism was the catalytic agent in this reaction: its
presence applied constant pressure on a government attempting to stave
off revolution through reform; imperialism created a sense of urgency
that forced Chinese nationalists away from gradual reform toward a
radical solution of China's problems.

Until the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion, the contest for
the political power to reorganize China was between the revolutionary
Revive China Society (Hsing Chung Hui), founded by Sun Yat-sen in
1895 and the Emperor Protection Society (Pao Huang Hui) of the consti-
tutional monarchical reformers led by K'ang Yu-wei and his disciple,
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Sun wrote in his autobiography that he had decided
to overthrow the imperial government as early as 1885. When Li Hung-
chang, governor-general of Chihli, refused to consider his reform
proposals in 1894, Sun turned to revolution as a means of achieving
his objective.47 After the failure of their radical reform program in

1898, K'ang and Liang joined Sun in exile in Japan and founded their

 

4'7Chien-nung Li, The Political Histo 93 China, 1849-1928, ed.
and trans. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls Princeton, Toronto, New
York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 145.

26

society for the purpose of destroying the reactionary Empress Dowager
Tzu Hsi and restoring Emperor Kuang Hsu to power. They expected the
Emperor to reinstate their reform.program and establish a constitutional
monarchical government for China.

By the end of 1900 the Revive China Society had sponsored two
abortive revolutionary uprisings. Revolution failed in this period

48

for several reasons. Sun's nationalism fell outside the mainstream
of Chinese nationalism of this period. Chinese nationalism between
the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War was primarily anti-
imperialist and only secondarily anti-Manchu, while Sun's nationalism
was predominantly anti-Manchu and hardly anti-imperialist at all. He
hoped for assistance, at the least benevolent neutrality, from the
powers during the anti-Manchu revolution. Revolution also failed
because the revolutionary spirit was not sufficiently widespread and
strong. Not until 1905 did Sun's nationalism coincide with the main-
stream nationalism, and not until 1911 did his theory of "responsive
revolution" materialize.

In the early years of the twentieth century the reform program
of the constitutional monarchists exerted the dominating influence
on mainland Chinese, on Chinese studying abroad, and on the overseas
Chinese community on which both reformers and revolutionaries depended

for financial support. A major reason for the popularity of the reform

program.was its radical tone. Despite the fact that he was a reformer,

 

48Harold Z. Schiffrin, "The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen" in China
ig_Revolution, discusses this theme, pp. 454, 467.

 

27

Liang's journalism greatly forwarded the revolutionary movement.
Actually, Liang equivocated regarding the merits of revolution. At
times he seemed to favor it, writing on one occasion "if the nation
is doomed, it would be better to have a revolution with the hope

that the nation may be saved from destruction."49

Because Liang so
often spoke disparagingly of the Manchu leadership, many accused him
of only masquerading as a reformer. Even Liang's mentor and titular
head of the reform group, K'ang Yu-wei, flirted openly with revolution
in this period.50 The similarity in their respective approaches led
to attempts to unite the two groups, but K'ang rejected an alliance with
the revolutionaries, citing the incompatibility of their respective
objectives.51
From 1900 to 1905 the reformers and revolutionaries competed
at the organizational level, in membership and fund-raising drives,
using the entire world as their arena. In this fund-raising drive, the
reformers were more successful than the revolutionaries. But, in 1905
Sun began to attract the students away from the constitutional reformers.
Most influential in this realignment of student loyalties was Liang's

new-found respect for foreign power and his subsequent abandonment of

militant anti-imperialism.52 His student followers therefore rearranged

 

49Li, pp. 189-190, 206.

5OErnest P. Young, "The Reformer As Conspirator: Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao and the 1911 Revolution" in Approaches tgiModern Chinese

Histogy, pp. 239-241.

 

51Joseph R. Levenson, Li Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind.2£ Modern
China (Cambridge: Harvard Univers ty Press, I959): p. 60.

 

52Schiffrin, pp. 454-458.

28

their priorities, substituting anti-Manchuism for their anti-imperialism.
But it was Sun Yat-sen, not Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who spoke in terms of

an anti-Manchu revolution. Sun assured the potential student supporters
that by conducting an orderly anti-Manchu revolution they could keep

the powers neutral.

At this point the competition between the reformers and the
revolutionaries intensified. The differences between the two groups
appeared fundamental and irreconcilable.53 Sun was anti-Manchu, Liang
was not. They disagreed on what political order would best serve
China's interests, with Liang favoring the Japanese constitutional
system and Sun insisting on a republic. Liang was pessimistic while
Sun was optimistic regarding popular participation in government.

Liang believed the Manchus capable of regeneration and felt they could
serve as a vehicle for political reform; Sun did not. Liang feared
foreigners would intervene in the event of a revolution; Sun expected
their support. Liang favored gradual reform from the top; Sun promoted
upheaval from below.

These differences between the reformers and revolutionaries
were important, but in the end they did not preclude cooperation to
overthrow the Manchu dynasty and establish a republic. After all, both
were Chinese nationalists and therefore primarily concerned with the

survival of China. In the short run, however, the contest between

 

53Ta-ling Lee, Foundations of the Chinese Revolution, 1905-1912
(Center of Asian Studies: St. JohnIE'Ufiiversity Press, 1970), discusses
the differences between the constitutional monarchical reformers and
the revolutionaries, pp. 72-99; See also Gasster, pp. 72-81, and
Schiffrin, pp. 79-80, 462-465.

 

29

the two was significant. It forced both groups to accelerate their
activities and expanded the gap between what they thought was possible
and what the objective reality would allow. This in turn produced the
"radicalism of impotence" which Michael Gasster has found characterized
the revolutionaries.54 That "Great Leap" mentality of the revolution-
aries was also a characteristic of the reformers and was perhaps their
unconscious contribution to revolution.55
Studies of the past decade have perhaps exaggerated the
significance of the differences between the revolutionaries and
reformers and, conversely, underestimated the importance of the dif-
ferences between the Chinese constitutional reformers and the Manchu
reformers. These recent works view the Manchu officialdom as concerned
with much more than the preservation of the dynasty. The picture they
have drawn is that of a rejuvenated Manchu dynasty, animated by an
anti-imperialist, centralizing nationalism, not only willing but also

capable of formulating and implementing a positive foreign policy and

domestic reform program.

 

54Gasster, p. 92.
55Wright, pp. 60-61.

56Revisionist studies have appeared during the past decade to
challenge earlier, negative evaluations of the Confucian institutions
and of the imperial government's performance in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Michael Gasster's theme is that China's
traditional institutions were suited or could be adapted to the modern
world, pp. 81-90. John Schrecker has concluded in Impegialism and
Nationalism that the imperial government had successfully contaIHEd
Germany in Shantung Province by 1900. According to Mary C. Wright the
imperial government sought not only to contain imperialism but also
to recover China's lost territories, to reclaim its sovereign rights,

 

30

The United States Consular and Legation reports of the decade
preceding the revolution presented quite a different picture of the
imperial government, of its reform programs, and of the relationship
between the Chinese and Manchu reformers. They revealed the imperial
government's foreign policy, and the policies of the powers as well,
to be at odds with that desired by the Chinese nationalists, both
reformers and revolutionaries. The drive for concessions continued,
often successfully, and foreigners insisted that the imperial govern-
ment uphold the treaty system. The imperial government continued to
extract money from the provinces to meet the indemnity payments. To
centralize power in Peking and develop China's resources the imperial
government negotiated foreign loans which increased the tax burden.
Chinese peasants and gentry may have felt that China was continuing
to lose ground to the imperialists, and that the imperial government
was to blame. The Hukuang Loan Agreement of May, 1911, which tipped
the scales toward revolution, is a good example. To proceed with its
nationalization of the railroads policy, the near-bankrupt Court
borrowed from the foreign banking group. This was a course of action
that rising Chinese nationalism, even if expressed in terms of pro-

vincial interests, would find difficult if not impossible to tolerate.

 

and to organize a modern, centralized nation-state, objectives toward
which, in her opinion, it had moved with considerable success before
its collapse in 1912, pp. 4-19, 24-29. Many of the revisionists have
concluded that the Manchu dynasty was not too debilitated to serve
China and therefore have cast around for other causes of the 1911
revolution. One revisionist, P'eng-yfian Chang, disagreed with these
evaluations of the Manchu program.and leadership, "The Constitution-
alists," in China In Revolution, pp. 143, 154.

 

31

To Chinese the loan agreement may well have smacked of more imperialism
with the central government collaborating with, not resisting, the
hated foreigners.

The diplomatic despatches concerning the reform movement
suggested not a two-way but a three-way struggle for power. The
contest was between the reformers and revolutionaries on the one hand
and on the other hand between the Manchu and Chinese reformers within
the administrative system. In general the diplomats considered the
Manchu reforms conservative, those advocated by the Chinese officials
progressive. They pictured the two groups as engaged in a bitter
struggle, particularly after the deaths in late 1908 of the Emperor
and Empress Dowager, over who would dominate the reform movement. The
reports expressed an awareness of the origin, nature and implications
of the division within the reform group. They therefore answered the
burning question of day concerning the probability of an imminent
revolution in China in the affirmative. But hardly anyone was willing

to accept so pessimistic a conclusion.

China at the turn of the century was in a period of transition
from a traditional, pre-capitalist, agrarian civilization to a modern,
capitalist, industrial society. The western impact of the nineteenth
century forced modernization on China, but a once brilliant now debili-
tated.Manchu.dynasty proved unable to cope with the crises. These
two forces, imperialism.and internal decay, unleashed a revolutionary

nationalism which precipitated a three-way struggle for power among

32

conservative officials, reformers, and revolutionaries. The imperialist
threat resolved that contest. According to Mary C. Wright in her
study of the nature of the changes that had occurred in the decade
preceding the revolution, the foreign influence on Chinese politics
was pervasive; it forced a reform-oriented nationalism into a radical,
that is revolutionary, conclusion, but because the revolution threatened
foreign interests the powers prevented it from running its full course.57
The United States was one of the foreign powers which felt that
it had a vital stake in twentieth-century China. Events of this period
therefore concerned Americans, particularly those involved in missionary
and commercial activities and especially the foreign service personnel
who were responsible for them. The primary objective of the United
States China policy was to protect the lives and property interests
of its nationals. Until 1895 this was relatively easy as the economic
objectives of the United States were identical to those of the other
foreign powers, with all interested chiefly in trading freely through-
out China. The treaty system developed in the nineteenth century
expressed that "open door" objective. But, around 1895 the foreign
powers altered their objectives. Controlling and developing China's
resources supplanted trade in importance. A conflict of interests
developed between the other powers and the United States whose chief
concern continued to be the China market and, therefore, the preserva-
tion of the nineteenth-century treaty system. To achieve that objective

the United States abandoned its 'hitchhiking' policy and announced to

 

5'7Wright, pp. 54-57.

33

a hostile world that it desired an Open Door policy in China. The

Open Door Notes of 1899 sought to neutralize the forces threatening

to partition China so that America, which could not take a port, would
not find the door to the vast China market closed to its citizens.

When the Boxer uprising of 1900 created a situation that again threatened
China with partition, the United States responded with the Circular

Note which committed America to seeking a means "to guarantee the
territorial and administrative integrity of the Chinese Empire."

Despite its exalted rhetoric, the Circular Note had not
altered the United States commitment. America did not intend to
defend China against aggression. It did hope to strengthen China's
imperial government so that it could uphold the treaty system, ends
which would have been contradictory anywhere except in imperial China.
The United States also sought to limit those activities of the other
powers that threatened American interests. American methods remained
those established in the nineteenth century: unilateral action when-
eveI‘possible; concerted action if necessary; but no entangling
alliances.

The United States policy commitments in China at the turn of
the century were minimal. Yet, the Open Door Policy, like the treaty
system it sought to preserve, was an anachronism shortly after its
formulation, and this for at least two reasons. First, with the possi-
ble exception of Japan and Russia, the other powers did not desire to
partition China after perhaps 1900 and certainly not after 1905.
Economic control of China was far more practical, effective, less

expensive and bothersome than would be the occupation and policing of

34

China that its partition would entail. Second, the Open Door policy
and the treaty system on which it rested were solutions to a problem
which after the Boxer uprising was rapidly disappearing. Chinese
nationalism was altering the circumstances which had evoked the
nineteenth-century unequal treaties. A united, strong, and sovereign
China would open and close its own doors to whomever it pleased.
Evidence of Chinese nationalism was everywhere,--in the
anti-foreignism of the Boxers, in the attacks on the foreign and native
missionaries and Christians, in the rights recovery objectives of the
nationalist foreign policy which the United States experienced first-
hand in the form of the anti-American boycott, in the programs for
economic, military, educational, and political reform, in the revolu-
tionary activity of the decade. But did United States diplomats
perceive this activity for what it was? How did they assess the
objectives and strength of Chinese nationalism? These are factors
which would play a decisive role in determining the United States
response to twentieth-century China's revolutionary nationalism and

in setting the tone for future Sino-American relations.

CHAPTER II
1900: THE YEAR OF THE BOXERS

The year of 1900 was indeed a "watershed",1 not only in China's
history but also in the history of Sino-American relations. The
Boxer summer had as great an impact on the foreign powers as on China,
particularly the United States which moved from passive to active
participation, including military involvement, in Chinese politics.
The uprising, which climaxed in a dramatic twelfth-hour allied military
mission to Peking to rescue their besieged nationals, had revived the
threat to partition China that the Open Door Notes of the preceding fall
sought to prevent. Because it had publicly repudiated territorial
objectives, the United States was of all the nations in China the only
one in a position to act positively to resolve the crisis without
arousing the fears of China and the other powers. And act it did,
even though American diplomats did not fully understand the nature and
meaning of the uprising.

Secretary of State John Hay and William W. Rockhill, his friend
and advisor, moved cautiously during the Boxer disburbance to advance

the objective of an American-defined-and-dominated balance of power in

 

1Wright, "Introduction," p. l.

35

36

East Asia.2 Their attempts to influence the other powers to respect
China's integrity achieved a high degree of success, however short-
lived. From the crisis came the multilateral and conditional June 26
Agreement to respect the autonomy of the Yangtze Valley which the
United States attempted to expand to cover the entire empire in its
July Third Circular. For almost two months the United States and the
other powers adhered to the limited objective of protecting the lives
and property of their nationals rather than seeking territorial aggran-
dizement.3 Yet, American attempts to make the Circular the basis of
the Boxer peace settlement failed, and it remained a unilateral declara-
tion that committed the United States to nothing more than seeking "a
solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China,
(and) preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity."4 After
the immediate crisis had passed and the United States withdrew its
troops from Peking, American influence on the powers, admittedly never
dominating, began to wane.

Nevertheless, the United States' response in 1900 was a wide
departure from the passivity that had characterized its nineteenth-

century China policy.5 Its participation in the Boxer crisis marked

 

2Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York:
Kennikat Press, Inc., c1933),-Chapter XXV, pp. 297-307; Marilyn B.
Young, The Rhetoric of Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968), EET'I30-I3I, 3180 chapter 7, pp. 137-171.

3Dennett, p. 307.

Relations o£_the United States 1900 (Was 1 rnment Pr nt ng
OTTIce), p. 294. Hereafter c ted as USFR.

4Hay to Herdliska, 3 July 1900, Pa ers Relating to the Forei
Hington: ve

5Young, p. 170.

37

the highpoint of American influence in early twentieth-century China.6

Several factors led the United States to accept the leading role in
resolving the crisis. The steps taken in 1899 had prepared.America
psychologically for a more active role in China. The force of cir-
cumstances and personalities did the rest. The exigencies of the
situation in China, the international power configuration, Admiral
Kempff's decision to abstain from the allied attack on the Taku forts,
the able diplomacy of the American Consul General at Shanghai, John
Goodnow, and the far-sighted policy of leading Chinese statesmen

7 America's readiness to involve itself

facilitated America's success.
coincided with the equally vital decision of leading Chinese authorities
to allow it. Chinese viceroys in Central and South China had recog-
nized an identity of interests in China's and America's aversion to

the partition of China. After taking charge of China's foreign policy,
they deliberately directed it toward the United States, encouraging

it to play the leading role.

The Boxer uprising surprised and shocked the world with its
suddenness and the heinous character of the attacks against the
foreigners. For two suspense-filled months the world waited for news
of the fate of the diplomats, missionaries, and their families living
in Peking and the North China interior. Everyone feared that the

Boxers had massacred the entire foreign community. The violent anti-

foreignism that swept the northern provinces of Chihli, Shantung,

 

6Dennett, p. 306; Young, pp. 163-164.

7The author's MTA. thesis, pp. 44-65.

38

and Shansi and threatened to engulf the entire country in the spring
and summer of 1900 caught Americans, indeed all the foreigners,
completely unprepared. The powers had settled, somewhat uncomfortably,
into the tenuous 92932 vivendi that followed the threatened partition
of 1898. The United States was attempting to persuade the other
powers to respect China's integrity and trying to convince the Manchu
government to do its part to maintain the status quo by honoring the

8 Various

treaties and reforming its anachronistic institutions.
missionary organizations in America were arousing the public's interest
with their glowing reports of the progress in China during 1899 and
predictions of more of the same for the coming years.9 All seemed
possessed by an ostrich-like unconcern for the rapidly developing

Boxer movement.

In retrospect, there was little reason for such general
unpreparedness, or even for the astonishment with which foreigners
greeted the Boxer uprising. One has only to read the index to the
United States diplomatic records, or to scan randomly the contents, to
become aware of the frequency and widespread character of native attacks
against foreigners. The Boxer uprising capped a decade of such inci-
dents and differed from.earlier ones only in the unparalleled destruction
of property and loss of lives, both native and foreign. The important

point was, however, that the Boxer uprising was not an isolated event

but, rather, a part of the discontent prevalent in China at the turn

 

8Young, pp. 138-142.

91bid.

39

of the century. These uprisings had their anti-dynastic aspect as well,
and all were therefore evidence of the deep and pervasive unrest in
China produced by the decline of its traditional institutions and the
intrusion of the West into what was a self-contained civilization.lo
Whether the United States perceived the nature of the forces
operating behind the anti-foreign outbursts and grasped the intricacies
of the political situation in China was crucial to the development of
an effective policy. For its understanding of China and the actual
handling of situations there, the State Department depended greatly
on the American consular personnel. The Department established the
policy guidelines, but allowed the consular personnel much latitude in
implementing policy. It could hardly have done otherwise in a world
not yet reduced in size by television, communications satellites, and
the C5-A. Consequently, the United States at the turn of the century
had policy goals but no policy toward China. Secretary Hay said as
much when he defined the objectives of American diplomacy for the
Nfinister to China, Edwin H. Conger: "we have no policy in China
except to protect with energy American interests and especially American
citizens and the Legation."ll The only restrictions Hay put on the
diplomats was that in protecting American interests they should "act
independently . . . where practicable, and concurrently with represen-

tative of other Powers if necessary."12 Above all, there must be no

 

10See above, pp. 2-7, 13-14.
11Hay to Conger, 10 June 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 143.

12Hay to Conger, 18 January 1900, USFR, 1900, pp. 89-90.

4O

alliances committing the United States to future action.13

Secretary Hay had therefore established a broad framework
within which American diplomatic personnel could operate, leaving
the actual determination of policy during the Boxer crisis to NHnister
Conger and Consul General John Goodnow. When evaluating America's
policy toward China at this time, it is therefore necessary to look
immediately toward the diplomats at the scene of the action. In the
final analysis the nature and quality of America's response depended
on their understanding of the situation.

To evaluate the American consular officers' response to the
Boxer uprising, it is necessary to understand the nature of the
movement. This is not an easy task; for the Boxer society, or I-ho
Ch'uan (Boxers of Right and Harmony), had a complicated historical
development. Historians have differed radically as regards its origins,
nature, and objectives. Their diverse conclusions parallel the con-
fusion and contradiction of facts conveyed in the consular reports.
The debate in 1900, and thereafter, centered primarily on two issues:
1. whether the society was an authorized militia group or an illegal
secret brotherhood; 2. whether it was primarily and essentially anti-
Christian, anti-foreign, or anti-dynastic. These distinctions were a
matter of importance on which the proper interpretation of and response
to the movement depended.

Until Victor Purcell's definitive work,l4 studies of the Boxer

 

”rm to Conger, 8 June 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 143.

14Victor Purcell, The Boxer U risin : A;Background Study
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).

41

society generally took the position represented by either Lao Nai-hsuan

15 and therefore reflect their biases and contra-

or George Nye Steiger
dictions. A Chinese magistrate in Chihli province, Lao Nai-hsuan's
pamphlet "Study on the Origin of the Boxer Sect," published in 1899,
was the first such study and became the basis of most subsequent
interpretations of the movement. Lao emphasized the anti-dynastic
aspect of the organization, concluding that the Boxers were a heretical
and rebellious sect intimately associated with the secret societies.16
Its organization, rules, ritual, and a Taoist element that took the
form of physical and spiritual exercises known as "boxing", which
gave the society its name, identified the I-ho Ch'uan as a secret
society.17
In outlining its genesis, historians have described it as a
conglomeration of secret sects, including the Red Fist Society, the
Eight Diagram Sect, and the Big Sword Society, which related ultimately
to the heretical White Lotus Society. Founded in 1133 by the monk
Mao Tzu-yuan, the White Lotus Society emerged as a distinct political
organization in 1349 when it associated with the "Red Turban" Rebellion

18

to overthrow the Mongol Yuan dynasty. After that it maintained an

obscure existence, practicing its magical rites in secret and making

 

15George Nye Steiger, The Origin and Development of the Boxer
Movement (New Haven: Yale University Pr ress, 1927).

16Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York. Columbia
University Press, 1955), p. 30.

17

 

Tan, pp. 38-39; Purcell, pp. 162—163.

l8Purcell, p. 148.

42

only sporadic appearances in the subsequent years, until it re-emerged
in the late nineteenth century as the I-ho Ch'uan.

Foreign diplomats did not record the existence of the Boxer
society until early 1899,19 although it had appeared in the provinces
of Shantung and Chihli in 1896 and had already come to the Court's
attention by the summer of 1898.20 In July 1898 Chang Ju—mei, then
Governor of Shantung, had informed the Throne of the existence of a
society whose members were practicing "boxing" in self-defense against
the Christians. After further investigation, Chang had identified the

21 The mis-

organization as the secret I-ho Ch'uan (Boxer) society.
sionaries were naturally the first foreigners to observe the Boxers.
Perhaps the earliest recorded observation of the sect was that of the
French Jesuit P. Remy Isore in a letter dated 25 October 1898.22 On
13 January 1899 Dr. H. D. Porter, an American missionary in Shantung,
wrote the Secretary of the American Board about the Boxers which he
also identified as a secret society. In a letter the following day
Dr. Porter linked the sect to the I-ho Ch'uan in the earliest recorded
use of the term by foreigners. Minister Conger kept the State

Department appraised of anti-foreign activities, and he, too, accepted

 

19Purcell, p. 180.

202nm, pp. 45, 52; Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 64, Places the date as early as
1898.

21Purcell, pp. 194, 196.

22Steiger has investigated this issue of the foreign awareness
of the Boxers, pp. 131—133.

43

the designation of the Boxers as a secret society. But he did not
explain its meaning or consider the policy implications of this
fact.23

To appreciate fully the characterization of the I-ho Ch'uan
as a secret society, it is necessary to understand the role such
societies have played in Chinese history. Secret sects were an
inherent part of Chinese society and were the Chinese peasants'
traditional means of direct political action. Moved by economic,
political, and social disorder, the peasants prepared in secret for
open rebellion to bring about a change of dynasty.24

Robert ML McWade was the only American consul to note the
anti-dynastic character of the Boxers. This was remarkable because
Mbwade had Just commenced his duties as consul at Canton on 25 MHy
1900 and had not had much time to develop an understanding of the
situation. Yet, when he reported that Boxer emissaries had entered
the Canton district to stir up anti-foreign activity, he identified
the group as a secret society and noted that both officials and
private citizens feared the Boxers. For, not only were they anti-

foreign; they were also revolutionary, that is, anti-dynastic.25

 

2300nger to Hay, 7 December 1899, USFR, 1899, p. 77.

24Franz Michael has examined the role the secret societies have
played in anti- dynastic rebellions, The Taiping Rebellion, pp. 12-13.
As Mary C. Wright has pointed out, the-e are enormous gaps in our know-
ledge of the activities, organization, and role of the secret societies
in the life of the Chinese peasant, "Introduction: The Rising Tide
of Change," p. 47.

25Mewade to Assistant Secretary of State, 26 June 1900, U. s.
Department of State, COnsular Despatches, U. S. Consulate, Canton.
Hereafter cited as USED- 5 mto .

44

Perhaps the other consuls assumed the anti-dynastic aspect
of the movement and felt no need to direct the attention of the
Department to its policy implications. Certainly the Department was,
or should have been, aware of the nature of the secret societies. For,
during the riots at Wuhu in 1891.Nflnister Charles Denby had informed
it of their dual character. Attributing the riots to the secret
societies, Denby noted ". . . they are uniformly hostile to foreigners
[and] . . . a terror no less to the officials. . . . their original
aims are political and [they] look to the overthrow of this dynasty
and the putting of a Chinese on the throne. . . ."26 That American
consuls had concluded that such facts were common knowledge and that
it was therefore unnecessary to reiterate them is possible but hardly
probable. For the consular despatches and American policy expressed
no appreciation of the anti-dynastic aspect of the society's character.
With the noted exception of.MeWade, American diplomatic personnel in
China adopted the position toward the Boxer movement that historian
George Nye Steiger later developed.

Steiger's interpretation of the Boxer movement was the polar
opposite of Lao's.27 He denied its anti-dynastic character. In his
opinion it was exclusively anti-foreign and supported by the Throne.
Steiger based his interpretation on the meaning of the phrase "I-ho

Ch'uan" which, however, be rendered "I-ho Tuan." The term 'tuan' means

 

26Denby to Blaine, 22 may 1891, USFR, 1891, pp. 395-396.

2'7See Steiger, Chapter VII, pp. 128-146, for the material on
which this discussion is based.

45

militia, and according to Steiger the Boxers were a volunteer militia
group recruited in response to the Empress Dowager's decree of 5
November 1898 ordering the reorganization of the army on a decentra-
lized basis. He concluded that the Boxer society was neither heretical
nor revolutionary but, rather, a legitimate, loyal organ of the Manchu
government. It fed on the widespread anti-foreign sentiment that
Steiger attributed to foreigners' activities, particularly the obnoxious
behavior of the missionaries. Stieger blamed the Boxer crisis itself
directly on the policy of the powers, asserting that diplomatic
pressure and military activity turned a potential anti-foreign uprising
into a reality.28

What conclusions, then, should one reach as regards the origin,
nature, and objectives of the Boxers? Actually, both studies reveal
important aspects of its character. For, as Purcell has demonstrated,
the movement was both anti-dynastic and anti-foreign.29 Steiger's
greatest contributions to understanding the movement were, perhaps,
his conception of the role played by the powers in precipitating it and
his insight that interpretations of it corresponded to the interests
of specific political groups within the imperial government.

Subsequent research has confirmed the existence of violent
controversy among officials over policy orientation toward the Boxers

and the foreigners, a contest which reflected a power struggle between

 

28Steiger, pp. 233-234.

29Purcell, pp. 17, 265-266.

46

the central and provincial governments, between Manchus and Chinese.30
Conservatives favored expelling all foreigners from China by force and
viewed the Boxers as a potential instrument. On the other side,
moderate officials feared the consequences of Boxer fanaticism and
advised the Court to suppress the society.

Placed in its proper context, the Boxer movement threatened
the interests both of the foreign nations and of the Manchu dynasty.
Moreover, Manchu and Chinese officials recognized the society for
what it was. It played an important role in the struggle for power
between the moderate and conservative factions in the central and
provincial governments. While moderate officials repudiated the
Boxers, the conservatives utilized the society to obtain political
power by molding it into a movement to "cherish the dynasty; exter-
minate the foreigners."31 Their opportunity to strike an alliance
with the Boxers came in autumn of 1899. .A clash between government
troops and Boxers at P'ingyuan ended in a disaster for the Boxers
and led the society to alter its "destroy the Ch'ing; restore the Ming"
Objective. Believing it to be their only chance for success, the
surviving Boxers pushed the anti-dynastic White Lotus faction to the
background and adopted a pro-Manchu policy. They pledged their
loyalty to the government and proclaimed their sole object to be the

destruction of the foreigners and Christianity. Their plot to destroy

 

v

30Schrecker discusses this issue in his second chapter, "The
Chinese Response," pp. 43-58.

31H. F. MacNair and D. F. Lach,.M0dern Far Eastern International
Relations (2nd ed.; Toronto: D. van Nostrand Co., 19555, p. 242.

47

32

the dynasty became a secret known only to a few principal leaders.

By 1900 the Boxer movement had become primarily, if not
essentially, anti-foreign. Boxer hostility to Christianity, the
foreign missionaries, and their Chinese converts, was part of the
general anti-foreign sentiment harbored by Chinese. This development
has given the uprising, and the numerous anti-foreign riots that
preceeded it, a new dimension. The Boxer uprising became an expression
of and an important force in the development of Chinese nationalism.
But neither the American consular personnel in China nor the diplomats
in washington regarded the Boxer uprising as an expression of
nationalism.

In considering the cause of the Boxer uprising, L. S. Wilcox,
the Consul at Hankow, distinguished between underlying and immediate
factors: Behind the trouble was the "Chinese dislike of the foreigner,
because he is a foreigner."33 Yet, Wilcox did not interpret Chinese
anti-foreignism as evidence of Chinese nationalism. For he remarked
that Chinese disliked their own nationals from other provinces as much
as they disliked Europeans. Wilcox noted that Chinese vented their
antagonism mainly toward the missionary, particularly the Catholic,
and he suggested this was because the missionaries disregarded local
laws and customs and interfered in disputes involving their converts.

Here, then, was the fuel to propel an anti-foreign uprising. As to

 

32Purcell, p. 210.

33L. s. Wilcox to David J. Hill, 4 October 1900, U. s. Department
of State, Consular Despatches, U. S. Consulate, Hankow, Hereafter cited
as USCDvHankow. The following analysis is based on this despatch.

48

what ignited it, Wilcox cited two agents: 1) the officials; 2) the
inadequate policy of the powers. He traced official support of the
Boxers to the coup d'etat of fall 1898, that had destroyed the radical
reform movement, and the policy subsequently initiated by the Empress
Dowager. Yet, ultimately Wilcox blamed the uprising on the "weak
policy of the Legations in dealing with the Tsungli Yamen." In
Wilcox's opinion the only thing Chinese understood and respected was
a "club", thereby implying that a tough policy on the part of the
powers could have prevented the Boxer uprising.

A fire in 1904 destroyed the American consulate at Amoy in
Fukien and with it most of the consular records, making it difficult
to assess Consul Anson Burlingame Johnson's understanding of the
Boxer movement. Yet, on the basis of one of the remaining reports it
is possible to make some, admittedly tentative, conclusions.34 Although
in this particular report Johnson did not specifically consider the
Boxer disturbance but, rather, concentrated on the existence of anti-
foreignism in his district, it is still possible to apply his obser-
vations to the uprising. For Johnson remarked that his conversations
with other consuls had verified many of his conclusions. On the
evidence presented in this report, Johnson only partially understood
the situation in China, and his understanding was more superficial than
that of Consul Wilcox. Johnson denied the existence of opposition

among Chinese to things foreign. On the contrary, he found Chinese,

 

34A. B. Johnson to Assistant Secretary of State, 24 August 1900,
U.S. Department of State,'Consular'Despatches, gf§3Consulate, Amoy.
Hereafter cited as USCDeAmoy. The following analysis is based on this
report.

 

49

at least the gentry, anxious to open mines and build railroads, even
welcoming foreign assistance. In Johnson's opinion the Chinese were
not anti-foreign £13333 , nor even anti-Christian. He translated
Chinese anti-foreignism into hatred for the missionary, for the same
reasons Wilcox had cited: "It is well-known here that the ill-feeling
toward the foreigners in this province is entirely confined to the
missionaries. . . . As near as I have been able to ascertain this is
not on account of the introduction of a new religion, so much as on
account of the . . . meddling of missionaries in secular matters."35
To improve the situation in China, Johnson prescribed opening more
cities and ports to foreign trade and restricting missionary activities
to the spiritual realm.

Consuls MbWade, Wilcox, and Johnson all inveighed against the

36

missionary activities with good reason. As noted earlier, the
western impact had created a multi-faceted crisis within China. Perhaps
the most disturbing of the western influences was the Christian ideology

and the activities of the Christian missionaries who constituted the

 

35Ibid.

36McWacie to State Department, 31 May 1900, USCD-Canton; Wilcox
to Hill, 4 October 1900, USCDbHankow; Johnson to Assistant Secretary
of State, 24 August 1900, USCDbAmoy.

5O

37

greatest proportion of the foreign population in China. Christianity
demanded total allegiance to God; it had ruled ancestor worship
idolatrous and attacked the position of the Emperor. The missionaries
prohibited their Chinese converts from participating in and paying
taxes to support the community festivals and ceremonies. They often
interfered in disputes involving their converts, forcing the officials
to favor native Christians. Missionaries distinguished themselves in
numerous other ways. Besides maintaining their own customs, dress,
food, and manners, they lived apart from the people in their own
compounds which often occupied the best land. The missionaries
performed many valuable services for the Chinese, but this did not
invalidate the fact that they and Christianity also disrupted the
public order. They threatened the vital family institution and the
position of the officials. Officials who lost control over the taxes
and public affairs lost the respect of the people and invited the
censure of the Court. Non-Christian Chinese regarded their Christian
neighbors as tax evaders and viewed the missionaries with suspicion.
Missionary aggressiveness which utilized its governmental representa-
tives to force open the Empire for evangelization led Chinese to

suspect that the missionaries were really political agents of the

 

37Paul A. varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 33-41, disgusses this issue;
Paul A. Cohen discusses the nature of the foreign missionary activities
and the relationship between them.and the increase in Chinese anti-
foreignism at all levels after 1860. He then notes the effect that
these two forces had in decreasing the authority of the imperial
government, China and Christianity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press
1963), pp. 6"‘73-10 ,‘1'2'7-145, 262-273.

 

 

51

foreign government.

While the Boxers held Minister Conger incommunicado in Peking,
the responsibility for the conduct of American relations with China
devolved on the Consul General at Shanghai. Given the important role
played by the United States during these tense months, John Goodnow's
perception of events was particularly significant. Postponing a
scheduled and long overdue leave of absence, Goodnow was on duty during
the months preceding and following the summer crisis and therefore
had an overview of the entire movement.

With the increase in Boxer activities in the North, Goodnow
began to watch the political situation in Central and South China.

A report in late April contained a clipping from.the NORTH CHINA DAILY
NEWS which he felt accurately represented the opinions of the foreign
community.38 The article predicted that a great conflagration would
result from the present disturbances which it blamed on the officials.
Significantly, the author had divided China into two parts, labelling
one the "China of the mandarins" and the other the "China of the
Chinese people." Contradicting Consul Johnson's opinion, the author
found that officials hated foreigners and all things foreign. They
were behind all the anti-foreign activities. On the other hand, he
characterized the Chinese people as loving foreigners and all foreign
things. He noted particularly that the Chinese reformers, whom he

labelled "progressives," were friendly to foreigners and that an identity

 

38Goodnow to Cridler, 28 April 1900, U.S. Department of State,
Consular Despatches, Uk§3 Consulate General, Shanghai. Hereafter cited
as USDC-Shanghai.

52

of interests existed between the two groups. Like Consul Wilcox, the
author traced the present troubles to the failure of the radical reform
movement of 1898 and the dethronement of Emperor Kuang Hsu. The
author blamed this on the powers, whom he apparently believed omni-
potent, writing, "a protest from us at the time of the coup d'etat would
probably have changed the whole course of events."39 The author also
criticized the practice of holding local officials responsible for
anti-foreign activities. He suggested a root-and-branch solution to
China's problems,--get rid of the Manchu dynasty: "When the water
in the cistern is polluted, it is not sufficient to plug a tap in this
room or that: it should be cut off at the main."40

Consul General Goodnow presented this newspaper article to the
Department as authored by an anonymous foreign resident of Hankow.
Chinese reformers could easily have written it, for its viewpoint
harmonized with theirs. The issue is insignificant; as Goodnow noted,
regardless of its origin, the article reflected the mind of the foreign
community. What was in the foreign mind was far more important.
Foreigners viewed the Manchu government with contempt, but no consul
openly advocated its overthrow. Yet, they were not adverse to reor-
ganizing the government along lines beneficial to both China and the
powers. Goodnow sent the Department a plan developed by the missionary

Dr. Timothy Richards which he felt merited the Department's

 

391bid.

401bid.

53

41 Richards thought that since China now lacked a

consideration.
central government the powers should establish a Joint Cabinet,
composed of one-half foreigners and one-half Chinese, to rule China.
The majority of the foreigners in China apparently believed that anti-
foreignism began and ended with the ruling class.

Two weeks before the siege of the Peking Legations began,
Goodnow reconfirmed the absence of anti-foreign sentiment in Kiang-su
and Chekiang, noting that "the people are pro-foreign and are kind

s."42 The reason

and courteous and polite in every way to foreigner
he gave was indicative of Goodnow's understanding, or his lack of it,
regarding the origin of the Boxer troubles. Unlike Chinese in North
China, the people in his area were prosperous because crops were
abundant and new machines had not yet produced widespread unemployment.
The implication was that northern inhabitants were not really anti-
foreign either, but that foreigners were merely the scapegoats for
superficial and remediable grievances.

After the Boxer crisis had passed and Goodnow had had time to
reflect on matters, he wrote a lengthy report, sending a copy to
Senator Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, in which he elaborated on but did not substantially modify

his earlier opinions regarding the cause and nature of the uprising.43

 

41Goodnow to Hay, 18 July 1900, USCD-Shanghai.

42Goodnow to Cridler, 8 June 1900, USCD—Shanghai. The following
analysis is based on this report.

43Goodnow to Davis, 29 September 1900, USCDbShanghai; Goodnow
to Cridler, 7 August 1900, USCD—Shanghai. The following discussion is
based on these two despatches.

54

A rebellion of the magnitude of the Boxer uprising rarely stemmed from
a single cause, and Goodnow noted the missionary role. But he
considered it minor, particularly so in the case of American mission-
aries. In Goodnow's opinion economic factors were chiefly responsible.
He again cited the disturbing influence of new machines to which he
added the methods and greed of the foreign merchants and concessions
hunters. Although he spoke of the episode as a "popular and official"
uprising, Goodnow never thought of the Chinese people as anything more
than the tools of the ruling classes. In Goodnow's opinion that group
had instigated the Boxer uprising. It was to these Court politicians
that Goodnow attributed the slogan "China for the Chinese." But
Goodnow appeared unimpressed with the slogan; for he labelled it a
"political catchword."44 It was many months later before he began to
recognize the nationalistic implications of Chinese activities.
Minister Conger likewise failed to grasp the full meaning of
the Boxer movement. Like the consuls, he also attributed the rebellion
to the forces of reaction and believed that the Manchu government was
sympathetic to the Boxers. "There can be no doubt," Conger wrote Hay,
"that it receives its first impetus from the influential advisors of
the Empress Dowager, Kang-i and Hsu T'ung, who are known to be malig-
nantly hostile to all foreigners or foreign ideas."45
Most Americans failed to perceive the nature of the forces

operating behind the Boxer uprising and to grasp the intricacies of

 

44Goodnow to Davis, ibid.

45Conger to Hay, 8 May 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 120.

55

the political situation in China. The consular despatches revealed
that lack of understanding, as well as an absence of unanimity among
the consular personnel regarding the causes, nature, and objectives
of the movement. Only Robert Mbwade at Canton had commented on its
anti-dynastic, that is, revolutionary nature. The remaining consuls
considered it exclusively anti-foreign with its primary objective the
expulsion of all foreigners from China. But they disagreed on the
extent and cause of the anti—foreignism, and no one regarded it as
nationalistic in any sense. Consuls Wilcox, Johnson, and.meade
blamed it on the missionaries. While MeWade and Johnson limited it
to the lower strata of society, Wilcox believed that anti-foreignism
permeated all levels of society and that officials in high government
positions had instigated the uprising. In Consul General Goodnow's
opinion, economic factors, not the missionaries, played the major
role in creating hostility toward foreigners which he believed was real
only among the officials. Both Goodnow and Minister Conger concluded
that leading officials had engineered the Boxer movement.

Since the State Department depended heavily on the consular
personnel for much of its understanding of China and the development
of policy, American policy reflected the inadequate assessment of the
field personnel. The consular personnel and State Department regarded
the uprising as they had earlier anti-foreign riots, as an isolated
incident with clearly recognizable and remediable causes. In their
despatches the consuls expressed a sense of omnipotence concerning the
ability of their government to control the situation. With both the

American Minister and the Consul General believing that the ruling

56

classes had instigated the uprising, American policy would probably
reflect that attitude. Because American diplomats had misjudged the
Boxer movement, the United States' response, indeed the entire foreign
reaction, to the movement in its infancy actually worsened the
situation.

American policy, in fact the policy of all the powers, in the
early months of 1900 did indeed arise from the conviction that the
ruling classes were responsible for the anti-foreign sentiment and
activities and the belief that the imperial government could control
the situation if it so desired. Assistant Secretary of State W. W.
Rockhill, who minimized the importance of the movement, expressed this
attitude most succinctly:

I cannot believe that the "Boxer Movement" will be very

longlived or cause any serious complications. The day the

Chinese authorities choose to put an end to it they can

easily do so--I thing they have now realized that they must

act, and they will.4
This was the same assumption that underlay American policy in the
previous decade. In 1896 MHnister Denby had written Secretary of State
Richard Olney:

Anti-foreign riots are not sudden local uprisings of
ignorant and malicious persons as has sometimes been claimed,
but all the proof shows that anti-foreign rioting, pillage, and
massacre are often arranged beforehand, without much, if any,
effort at concealment, and it is difficult to avoid the belief
that local officials are cognizant of and at least tacitly

approve of the felonious designs which are concocted within
their immediate jurisdictions. . 7

 

46Quoted by Young, p. 142.

47Enclosure in Olney to Denby, 25 November 1896, approving
Denby's draft to the Tsungli Yamen, USFR, 1896, pp. 61—64.

57

Denby strongly believed the central government could quell such
disturbances; for, he noted the alacrity with which it responded to
uprisings against its authority: "Incipient conspiracies are unearthed
and instantly suppressed. . . . the utmost vigilance, forethought, and
strength are shown in dealing with the offenders."48 That the Depart-
ment had reached the same conclusions was apparent in its instructions
to the Legation. Acting Secretary Rockhill wrote Charge Charles
Denby, Jr.:
It can not be expected that the uprisings of irresponsible
and ignorant mobs can be definitely prevented in China any more
than in any other country, but it is confidently believed that a
formal and categorical recognition on the part of the Chinese
Government of the residential rights of American citizens in the
Empire and of their determination to hold responsible and punish
local officials upon the occurrence of a riot must certainly pro-
duce a far-reaching and beneficial effect.49
By making the local officials responsible for the activities within
their districts and by holding the imperial government strictly account-
able for the actions of the local officials, the United States hoped to
prevent anti-foreign riots.
Nfinister Conger was therefore true to the spirit, if not the
procedure, of established policy when he joined the other powers on
21 January 1900 in issuing an identic note to the Tsungli Yamen pro-

50

testing the Boxer violations of the treaties. The United States'

policy throughout the Boxer uprising was a moderate one. Diplomacy

 

48Ibid.

 

49Rockhi11 to Charles Denby, Jr., 28 Jury 1896, USFR, 1896,
pp. 57-58.

5OSee above, pp. 39-40.

58

overshadowed the military as the prime instrument for securing American
interests, particularly in the second phase.51 Yet, there were in-
stances of American military pressure on the imperial government.
Before the siege of the Legations, the United States partially invoked
the old gunboat policy. Even though America did not take part in the
allied attack on the forts at Taku, it participated in and, in fact,
helped instigate, Admiral Seymour's expedition to Peking.

As the situation worsened, Conger increasingly resorted to
military pressure to coerce what appeared to him to be a recalcitrant
imperial government into complying with American demands to suppress
the Boxers. In late January Conger suggested that the United States
appear with British and German war ships along the China coast "in order
to emphasize our demands and to frighten the Chinese into compliance
with them."52 By 9 March Conger felt that the situation warranted a
naval demonstration by the combined powers in the North China waters.53
In late spring Conger joined the other powers in a complete implemen—
tation of the gunboat policy which culminated in full scale hostilities
between the Boxers and the foreign soldiers and led to the siege of
the Legations. On 9 June what appeared as a crisis situation provoked
an impulsive response from Conger and the British Minister Sir Claude
MacDonald. Without consulting the other ministers, the two telegraphed

Tientsin and requested that an expedition be sent to Peking immediately.

 

51Dennett, p. 307.
52Conger to Hay, 29 January 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 94.

”Conger to Hay, 9 March 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 102.

59

The crisis had passed by the next day and they rescinded the order, but
it was too late. Admiral Seymour had left for Peking with an inter-
national force of approximately 2,400 soldiers, 100 of which were
American marines.54

Allied military activity against the Boxers had the opposite
effect of what the powers had expected. It pushed China over the
precipice into an uprising that threatened to annihilate foreigners,
to destroy foreign investments in China, and to end in the partition
of the Chinese Empire. The uprising was evidence that foreign assump-
tions regarding the political situation in China were erroneous. They
had overestimated the efficacy of military measures and the capability
of the imperial government to control the situation because they had
underestimated the extent and force of popular antipathy toward the
foreigner and anyone who appeared allied with him.

For the Chinese, allied military activity had raised the spector
of the partition of China. It galvanized popular support in North China
behind the Boxers and strengthened the position of the conservatives
within the government. They succeeded finally in inducing the govern-

55 Even though the Court conservatives

ment to adopt a pro-Boxer policy.
had assumed leadership of the Boxer movement in the fall of 1899, the
government had not at that time adopted a pro-Boxer policy. It had
walked the tightrope between the demands of the people, who were

becoming increasingly intolerant of foreign activities, and those of

 

’7

54Steiger, pp. 280-2813 Young, p. 146.

55For an account of this struggle see the author's MQA. thesis,
pp. 14-28.

60

the foreign governments, which seemed oblivious to popular sentiment.

The increased strength of the Boxers and the foreign military
activity put the imperial government in a bind. Aware of the political
objectives of the secret societies, it risked destruction if it ignored
popular opinion. When the powers attacked the government forts at
Taku on 17 June, the Court considered that they had declared war on
China. The Boxer triumph over Admiral Seymour on 18 June resolved the
debate within the government in favor of enlisting the Boxers against
the foreigners. The Boxer victory had raised a hope that the uprising
might achieve its objective. The Manchu dynasty reasoned that in sup-
porting the Boxers it could kill two birds with one stone: it could
rid the Empire of the hated foreigner; it could neutralize anti-
Manchu sentiment. After prolonged and bitter agonizing, the Court
endorsed the Boxers. On 22 June l900,with the blessing of the imperial
government, the Boxers began the siege and bombardment of the Peking
Legations.

The political situation in China need not have degenerated
into a mass uprising against foreigners. Governor Yuan Shih-k'ai had
successfully suppressed the Boxers in Shantung province, and they were
not particularly effective elsewhere until allied military maneuvers,
following so closely on the heels of the scramble for concessions,
convinced Chinese and the imperial government that the powers really
intended to partition China.

The powers might not have over-reacted had they understood the
political situation in China; that is, had they perceived the true

nature of the Boxer society, the depth of popular hostility towards

61

foreigners, and the implications of the power struggle within the
imperial government. For they would have realized the magnitude of
the problems the imperial government faced. It could not openly sup-
press the Boxers as that course of action would only increase their
anti-dynastic fervor.

Events of the preceding months had clearly revealed the
predicament of the imperial government. It had to satisfy both the
conservatives and the moderates within the government. When the govern-
ment replaced Yfi-hsien, the pro—Boxer governor of Shantung, with
reformeminded Yfian Shih-k'ai, it pleased the powers, who had demanded
it, as well as the moderate officials; but it angered the conservatives.
To pacify the conservatives, the government did not degrade Yfi-hsien,
but instead reappointed him governor of Shansi and designated Yfian only
"acting" governor. This infuriated the powers and upset the moderates.

American consular personnel had informed the Department of the
conflict over policy among officials which they had dated to the radical
reform movement of 1898. Yet, America, indeed all the powers, failed
to apply this knowledge to the situation at hand. Conger never could
decide Whether the imperial government was encouraging or discouraging
the Boxers. The powers therefore failed to develop a policy based on
the realities of the political situation in China, and their actions
served to strengthen the anti-foreign sentiment and the hand of the
conservatives at Court. It was the Boxer crisis of late June that
led the United States to redirect its policy toward strengthening the
position of moderates within the government. The situation in China

demanded it and the voluntary cooperation of moderate Chinese officials

62

contributed to its success.56

The Boxer uprising presented a two-fold threat to American
interests in China. On the one hand, the Boxers themselves threatened
immediately the lives and property interests of Americans. 0n the
other hand, it jeopardized the recently established Open Door policy.
For it created a chaotic situation that demanded foreign military
intervention which could easily end in the partition of China which
the United States opposed. Should partition result it was unlikely
that the United States would share in the spoils.

With the siege of the Legations the first stage of the
American involvement in the Boxer uprising ended and the second began.
In late June the United States embarked on an independent course of
action. It assumed the lead in promoting a united front and in main-
taining a policy of concerted action by the powers during the Boxer
crisis. During the crisis the United States followed two courses of
action. In the North it cooperated with the other powers in military
operations to rescue their respective nationals besieged in Peking.

In the South it employed diplomacy as an instrument to secure American
interests. America's policy led to a Sino-American rapproachement that
culminated on 3 July 1900 in the Circular Note which completed Ameri—
ca's Open Door policy and marked the zenith of American influence

during the Boxer uprising.57

 

56Dennett, pp. 305-306.

57For an account of the events leading up to the Circular Note
see the author's M.A. thesis, pp. 44-65.

63

Whether America understood the intricacies of the Boxer
movement mattered little once the uprising had reached crisis propor-
tions. Crucial to the development of an effective policy during the
siege was America's understanding of the immediate situation and its
relation to the international power configuration. The key figure
during this phase of the uprising was John Goodnow who for all prac-
tical purposes was the American Minister to China during the Boxer
crisis. His position as Consul General at Shanghai placed him second
in authority among the American consular personnel in China, and while
the Boxers besieged the Legations Goodnow performed Conger's duties.
The important position he occupied during the crisis offered Goodnow
an opportunity to play an important role in formulating American policy.
Despite his other undeniably reprehensible activities for which the
Department later dismissed him,58 Goodnow served his government well
during the Boxer crisis. Goodnow's understanding of the situation that
had developed in late June was vital to American policy. His grasp of
the power struggle emerging at Shanghai, of the forces operating in it,
and of their effect on America's position in China were of immediate
relevance to the decisions he made and the course of action the United

States pursued.

 

58In 1904 Assistant Secretary of State, H. H. D. Pierce,
responded to complaints against the consular service with a tour of the
various posts. His investigation uncovered irregularities which led to
the dishonorable discharge both of John Goodnow and of Robert MbWade.
Among the charges levelled against the two was their violation of
America's immigration policy for personal profit. Jessie Miller has
considered this issue in his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "China
in American Policy and Opinion, 1906-1909" (Clark University, 1940).

64

John Goodnow may have understood neither the crisis within
the Chinese civilization nor the meaning of the Boxer uprising, but he
had thoroughly grasped the nature of the danger it presented to the
recently established Open Door policy concerning which he had already
developed definite opinions. In fact, Goodnow's reaction to events in
China stemmed primarily from his personal opinions and feelings
regarding the Open Door policy. Excepting William.Rockhill, Alfred
Hippisley, and John Hay, a more ardent devotee of the Open Door would
have been difficult to find among the diplomatic personnel. His
enthusiasm for the policy certainly exceeded that of Minister Conger
who had urged the United States to enter the railway and territorial
concessions competition.59 Goodnow firmly believed that the future of
American trade in China depended on the maintenance of the Open Door
policy.60

Goodnow's enthusiasm for the Open Door derived from his
conviction that the China trade was vital to the well-being of
America's economy and society. So convinced of this was he that he
wrote a lengthy paper for the American Association of China that stands
as a definitive expression of the American China market dream. In it
he linked the Open Door policy and the projected Isthmian Canal to the
American China trade which for Goodnow almost assumed the proportions

of a panacea for all of America's ills. Noting that cotton piece

 

59Conger to Hay, quoted by A. Whitney Griswold, The Far
Eastern Polic of the United States (New Haven and London: Yale
UKIVGrSiEY Press, c1933), P- 5§~ Hereafter cited Far Eastern Policy.

 

60Goodnow to Hill, 23 December 1899, USCD-Shanghai.

65

goods constituted America's most important single export and that 70
per cent came from the southern states, Goodnow speculated about the
consequences of losing the China trade. Either the southern mill would
cease operating or they would have to compete with the other mills for
the domestic market and in the process would glut the economy. Regard-
ing the China trade, Goodnow therefore concluded:

It is everything. The prosperity of the cotton mill business

in South Carolina depends . . . upon the China trade. . . .

The coal is there--the labour is there, and I believe that in

the increase of mines and manufactures in the South is the

solution of the labour and racial problems which have so long

vexed that section and us all. If only our tranquility at home

is to be considered we must safeguard these interests. The

conclusion then, is not only the 'open door' in China or as

President MeKinley puts it 'the maintenance of our vested

interests and an equal and untrammeled right with all others in

China;' but also implies the shortest and best route . . . to

this essential market. 1
Goodnow remarked that America had captured the cotton trade in North
China and could keep it, provided the ports remained open and free of
discrimination. But he noted that this trade constituted very little
of the China trade, and he reminded the Association of "the enormous
demand of the Yangtze Valley and Southern China . . . ."62 Goodnow
firmly believed America could also penetrate the British sphere of
influence in the Yangtze valley through the Open Door.

Goodnow's faith in the Open Door policy made it impossible for

him to treat lightly the Russian and British maneuvers in the Yangtze

Valley in mid-June which threatened to erupt into an international

 

611bid.

62Ibid.

66

conflict that could only lead to the partition of China.63 His
response to this crisis revealed that Goodnow understood well the
international situation at the turn of the century. A Russian tea
boat with approximately 150 Russian soldiers aboard had approached
Hankow, but England had forced it to retreat. Goodnow requested the
Navy Department to despatch two American cruisers to the Shanghai

area, asserting that it would help the situation, "not make trouble."64
At the time an unsufficient number of British ships patrolled the
river, but increasing them.was unthinkable. For both Chinese authori-
ties and the other powers were jealous of what appeared to be England's
claim to the Yangtze valley. Moreover, should any one of the powers
attempt to isolate the Yangtze Valley, the others would follow and
claim their share of the spoils.65 In Goodnow's opinion, only the
United States with its formal disavowal of territorial objectives

could act in the Yangtze Valley without creating an international
crisis.

The Russian-British maneuvers in mid-June set off a chain
reaction that led to the multilateral June 26 Agreement, the prelude
to the Circular Note. America and China recognized in their mutual
aversion to the partition of China a basis on which to cooperate to
neutralize the effects of the rebellion and preserve China's

integrity.

 

63Goodnow to Hay, 24 June 1900, USCD-Shanghai.
64Goodnow to Hay, 17 July 1900, USCD-Shanghai.

65Ibid.

67

The Russian threat led the English consul at Hankow to propose
to Viceroy Chang Chih-tung that England send warships into the interior
to protect the Yangtze valley. Chang refused, maintaining that he and
Viceroy Liu K'un-yi could provide adequate protection. The episode
thoroughly alarmed Chang and the moderate officials who met to consider
what to do. These men had formed the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance
to protest the conservatives' pro-Boxer policy.66 After the crisis
developed, they maintained their coalition and worked to preserve the
Southeast from the consequences of the Boxer disturbance.

The Southeastern Alliance had other objectives as well. It
hoped to win the powers to the view that the Boxer uprising was really
the work of a few criminals who had captured the Empress Dowager and
Emperor. Ideally, the Chinese viceroys hoped to convince the powers
to allow them to suppress the Boxers. If they failed to achieve that
objective, they would attempt to confine foreign military operations
to the North and to obtain a pledge from the powers to withdraw as
soon as they had freed their nationals. The prime objective of the
Southeastern Alliance was to preserve China's integrity. To achieve
it, the members agreed they would have to stabilize relations with the
powers and relieve the foreign nations' anxieties concerning the lives
and property of their respective nationals in the Southeast.67

Mbmbers of the Southeastern Alliance concluded that

cooperation with the United States offered them the best chance for

 

66The author's MLA. thesis, pp. 20-21.

67Ibid., pp. 46-54.

68

success. America, they noted, had repudiated territorial designs and

had not participated in the attacks at Taku.68

Although personal
considerations underlay Admiral Kempff's decision not to attack a
government with which his nation was not at war, the act proved pro-

vidential.69

At first disapproving, Hay soon realized that Kempff's
action provided the principle on which America could limit allied
military operations to "police action" and hopefully prevent the
partition of China.'70 He was therefore ready to cooperate when the
Southern viceroys directed China's Minister to the United States, Wu
Ting-fang, to assure the United States that they would protect the
Yangtze Valley and to request that America therefore refrain from
sending warships into the area and convince the other powers to do
likewise.71

John Goodnow on the scene in Shanghai was also receptive to
the friendly overtures of the Southeastern Alliance. His belief in
the importance of the China trade and the necessity of maintaining
the Open Door policy, his understanding of the international power
configuration, and, finally, his fear,--fear for his own life and the
lives of all foreigners in South China, predisposed Goodnow to favor
an active American policy during the Boxer crisis. Only the United

States, he realized, could act without creating suspicion. Goodnow

 

681bid., p. 48.
69Young, pp. 151-152.
70Dennett, p. 300.

71The author's MQA. thesis, pp. 48-49.

69

understood that foreign_military activity in.the Yangtze Valley would
unite all China against the foreigners.'72 When Russian-British
hostilities worsened, he cooperated with the Southern viceroys in
arranging a meeting of members of the Southeastern Alliance and the
Diplomatic Corps in Shanghai. This conference produced the multi-
lateral June 26 Agreement between China and the powers whereby the
powers agreed to respect the integrity of the Yangtze Valley, condi-
tional on the Southern viceroys' ability to protect the lives and
property interests of all foreigners residing there.

Goodnow informed Hay of the agreement the same day and Hay's
pg§t_£agtg authorization to consult with the viceroys, instead of
the central government, and take measures for the protection of
American interests in effect recognized Goodnow's "fait accompli."73
Under Goodnow's direction the United States had moved beyond its
original position and entered into a multilateral agreement for the
preservation of the Yangtze valley. Events in China would soon lead
it to make a unilateral declaration regarding the disposition of the
entire Chinese Empire.

As the situation in the North deteriorated, distrust between
the foreign community and the Southern viceroys increased. The
foreigners had just learned of the murder of the German minister, and
they feared Boxer successes would induce the viceroys to abandon the

Agreement. The viceroys feared that a prolonged crisis in the North

 

'721hid., p. 42.

73mm. , p. 56.

70

would lead the foreign nations to change their mind and intervene.
Russia, they noted, had already revealed its designs on.Manchuria. On
the pretext of protecting its nationals Russia had taken control of
the customs house at Newchwang. Both sides therefore recognized the
need to reaffirm the June 26 Agreement.74

Under the direction of Goodnow the United States took the
initiative. The viceroys' response to the Agreement had convinced
Goodnow of their sincerity. Consequently, on 1 July Goodnow reassured
Chang and Liu that the United States would not attack the Central and
Southern provinces as long as they maintained order and protected
the foreigners. The other powers followed suit. Hay honored Goodnow's
promise by making it official policy and by informing the other powers
of America's purposes. Consequently, Goodnow could inform the viceroys
that "all nations are acting together.”5 American initiative had
stabilized a volatile situation in Southeastern China.

Encouraged by the policy the United States had pursued throughout
the crisis to date, particularly within the last few days, the Southern
viceroys attempted to achieve their ultimate objective, an extension
of the Agreement to cover the entire empire, through a direct appeal to
the United States. On 3 July Minister Wu notified Secretary Hay of the
viceroys' desire to reach a "clear understanding" between China and the
powers. That same day Goodnow forwarded a dramatic personal appeal

from Liu K'un-yi urging President MeKinley to accept the leading role

 

74min. , pp. 57-60.

'75Ihid., p. 62.

71

in the Boxer drama because China's only hope in its moment of crisis
was the United States, if it were willing to abandon "selfish schemes"
and make a settlement.76 In the afternoon of 3 July Hay issued the
Circular Note.

It is tempting to credit the completion of America's Open
Door policy to the efforts of the Chinese viceroys but that would
distort the picture. While important, their efforts were not decisive.
What was decisive was America's willingness and the fact that this
course of action represented the United States policy goals toward
China. In a conversation with Secretary Hay on 1 July 1900 John
Bassett Moore had argued for the United States adopting as its "guiding
principle . . . the preservation of the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese Empire and to endeavor to secure the express

77 Rockhill had wanted a statement on the

assent of the Powers to it."
integrity of the empire included in the notes of 1899, but all con-
cerned had felt that it was premature.78 Moreover, Secretary Hay had
acted on the principle contained in the Circular at least once before
its issuance. On 22 March 1900 when instructing Minister Conger to
inform the imperial government of the importance of suppressing the
Boxers, he also ordered him

To impress upon it that this [American] Government, by the recent

assurances which it has obtained from the various great Powers
holding leased territory or areas of influence in China, concerning

 

76Ibid., pp. 62-64.
77Quoted by Varg in The Making 22 the Myth, p. 25.

78Young, pp. 130-131.

72

freedom of trade in said regions and the maintenance therein
of China's rights_ of sovereignty has obtained dthereby a renewed
assurance —of the olicy of the Treat Powers not to interfere
with the inte rit of the _Chin nese ire.7g
Early July was the propitious moment for publicizing America's
concern for China's integrity. The Boxer crisis gave it real meaning.
In addition, there existed a chance that the crisis would induce the

other powers to adopt it as a policy goal. That hope never materialized

and it remained a declaration of America's policy regarding the Chinese

Empire.

Throughout the Boxer crisis the United States had followed a
moderate policy toward China and would continue to do so, despite the
demands of China-based missionaries and the desires of some American

80 America's

consuls that it adopt a hard-line attitude and policy.
policy goals dictated a moderate policy. Enjoying its full treaty
rights and expanding American trade and influence remained the primary

United States' objectives in China. But the international power

 

79Hay to Conger, 22 March 1900, USFR, 1900, p. 111. Emphasis
mine.

8OConger was not alone in desiring a tough policy. Wilcox
wanted such a policy, as did.MeWade and consul Rounseville Wildman at
Hongkong who hoped his country would "take a firm stand in dealing with
China." In Wildman's opinion "China . . . [was] rotten from end to end,
and . . . growing worse every day . . . ." The Powers must not allow
the Empress Dowager to resume control. "By international agreement the
Powers are now in a position to establish a well-balanced Board of
Control having for its object the reconstruction of the whole Imperial
fabric of China upon a new basis, . . ." (Rounseville Wildman to David
J. Hill, 4 September 1900, U.S. Department of State, Consular Despatches,
E.._S_ Consulate, Hongkong. Hereafter cited USCD-Hongkong.)

73

configuration that developed after the Sino-Japanese war necessitated
the addition of a new policy goal and the adoption of a new approach.
The United States now favored a balance of power in East Asia in order
to prevent any one power from dominating and depriving America of its
treaty rights. It also had to abandon its policy of "inactive coopera-
tion" with the other powers whose objectives now conflicted with
America's and instead become actively involved in China.81
The United States could attain its goals only if China remained
intact. The State Department realized that maintaining China's
integrity depended ultimately on removing the "dangerous sources of
international irritation"82 that would lead to invervention and possibly
the partition of the empire. China would have to modernize. Inducing
the imperial government to undertake administrative reforms was in
America's opinion the "solution" that would bring "permanent safety and
peace to China, and preserve Chinese territorial and administrative
entity" and, incidentally, maintain China as an "open market for the
commerce of the world, . . ."83 Since achieving its objectives in
China demanded working with, not against the imperial government, Hay
could not allow Conger's and the other consuls' desires for revenge to

dominate America's China policy.

 

81Young, pp. 130-131, 228.

82A subordinate clause contained only in the Open Door Note to
England, 6 September 1900, quoted by Young, p. 131.

83Ibid. Hay also had to consider domestic politics and because
of adverse-Kmarican public opinion was not free to pursue a bolder
course.

'74

That a modernized China might reject the role the powers had
assigned it occurred to no one. In early spring of 1901 John Goodnow
was paying more attention to the implications of the increasingly
powerful public opinion developing among the middle classes.84 By
late summer of 1902 he had written: "There is no question in my mind
but that in a very few years the middle class public opinion," which
he attributed to the patriotism being developed by the newspapers and
new methods of communications, "will be a factor with which we must
all reckon as we do in other countries."85 But in the fall of 1900 no
such thoughts existed to dampen the optimism with which he and other
Americans contemplated the future of the Open Door policy. In Goodnow's
opinion its objectives were attainable if the United States gets a
clear understanding of its interests and the situation, and keeps the
leadership of the Nations in this matter, determinedly and wisely, and
on the lines of its policy as manifested to the first of
September . . ."86

American diplomats never considered that China might be the
one to obstruct a dominating American role in Chinese politics. In 1900
they considered Chinese devoid of any national spirit, utterly lacking
in patriotism. This was the result of their failure to understand
completely the origin, nature, and objectives of the Boxer movement.

They had attributed it to reactionary officials and viewed it as

 

84Goodnow to Cridler, 25 March 1901, USCD—Shanghai.
85Goodnow to H. H. D. Pierce, 1 August 1902, USCD-Shanghai.

86Goodnow to Senator Davis, 19 September 1900, USCDbShanghai.

75

backward looking. In some respects this was correct but not entirely
so, and the issue therefore requires further consideration.

Accounts of the Boxer uprising have varied greatly with regard
to the problem of what motivated the Boxers. A noted Chinese-American
historian, Jerome Ch'en, has accepted C. F. Remer's interpretation of
the uprising as "the first popular expression of Chinese nationalism."87
Chinese communist historians have interpreted it as part of the peoples'
war against imperialism. In his study of the I'ho Ch'uan, Robert
Sheeks viewed it and other spontaneous outbursts against foreigners
as the "stirrings of nationalism."88 Yet, other interpretations have
argued against such an understanding.89 A leading example is the
conclusion of Marius B. Jansen that ". . . it is far more accurate to
regard it as the last spastic gasp of an anachronistic xenophobia."90

Interpretations of Boxer anti-foreignism depend ultimately on

the interpreter's concept of nationalism. Nationalism is a complex

sentiment, one that escapes precise definition.91 It is correct that

 

87Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai (Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1961), p. 64.

88Robert B. Sheeks, "A Re—examination of the I'ho Ch'uan and
its Role in the Boxer Movement," vol. 1, Pa ers on China (Harvard
University Center for East Asian Studies, 1 4 , P. 111.

89Lloyd Eastman, "The Kwantung Anti-Foreign Disturbance During
the Sino-French War," vol. 13, Papers on China, 1959, p. 23; Edward
J. M; Rhoads, "Nationalism.And Xenophobia In Kwantung (1905-1906): The
Canton Anti-American Boycott And The Lienchow Anti-Missionary Uprising,"
vol. 16, Papers 22 China, 1962, pp. 183-184.

goQuoted by Rhoads, p. 184.

91See above, pp. 15—17.

76

modern nationalism, defined as a collective consciousness of and
loyalty to the nation-state, understood as the supreme and all-inclusive
group, was absent in traditional China. The sentiment expressed by
Chinese during the Boxer rebellion is perhaps best rendered by the term
'culturalism.' Yet, it is a grievous oversight to ignore the element

of nationalism inherent to culturalism. And it is erroneous to regard
nationalism as an exclusively western phenomenon which emerges in

92 When Chinese

underdeveloped countries once they decide to modernize.
attempted to reject the West, as they did in so many non-violent as
well as violent ways during the nineteenth century, they did so on
the basis of the value judgment that China had, indeed was, the best
of all possible civilizations. The conservatives who presented them-
selves as leaders of the Boxer movement in the late 1890's may have
lacked the concept of sovereignty essential to modern nationalism, but
as John Schrecker has written ". . . the spirit and even the content of
Chinese nationalism may have owed . . . much to extreme and militant
culturalism . . . . For a militant commitment to Chinese culture,
existing in perfection within China, needs only a subtle substitution
of goals to become a fervent devotion to Chinese sovereignty."93
The Boxer uprising taught America, indeed all the powers, a
valuable lesson. They learned, what earlier they may have suspected,

that they could not partition China proper without risking severe

losses in lives and property. The Boxer horrors haunted foreigners

 

92Shafer, pp. 8-9, 13, 262, 265, 267.

93Schrecker, p. 57.

77

whenever anti-foreign activity occurred, and consequently the uprising
influenced policy toward China in the subsequent years. An interesting
sidelight which became important during the revolution of 1911 was

the impression Yuan Shih-k'ai made on the powers. They credited him
both with containing the Boxers in Shantung and with preventing them
from destroying the Peking Legations. It is no exaggeration that

Yuan became America's favorite Chinese. The Boxer summer had made

a permanent impression on the Western mind.

The Boxer episode had an even greater impact on China. The
spectacle of the allied march from Tientsin to Peking and the
occupation and pillage of the imperial city horrified Chinese and
awakened in them.an awareness of how precarious was their continued
existence. Instead of destroying their morale, however, it aroused in
a sufficient number of Chinese a sense of national pride and a deter-
ndnation to take charge of China's destiny. In the wake of the Boxer
defeat came a second revolutionary attempt at Canton, aimed at
destroying the Manchu dynasty, which Sun Yat-sen had again instigated.
Others, both Manchu and Chinese, rejected revolution and instead began

to find merit in the idea of reforming China's traditional institutions.

CHAPTER III

THE POST-BOXER REFORM MOVEMENT: THE

FIRST PHASE, 1901-1905

The allied occupation and pillage of Peking during the Boxer
Summer of 1900 and the ignominious flight of China's rulers trauma-
tized the imperial house. Rumors abounded that the Manchu dynasty
had lost its Mandate of Heaven and that the foreign powers were about
to partition China. From exile in Sian a chastized Empress Dowager
proclaimed her conversion to reform. With this announcement the
imperial government launched a twelfth-hour modernization program
which it hoped would save the dynasty and China from destruction.

China's post-Boxer reform movement developed in several
stages over the ten-year period and was exceedingly complex in nature.
What distinguished the 1901-1905 phase of the movement from others was
its rate and emphasis. In its early years the reform movement was
limited in objective and phlegmatic in temperament. Until 1905 the
imperial government concentrated almost exclusively on modernizing
the education system, the army, and the navy, making only a slight
attempt at improving the financial and administrative systems. The
movement's tempo increased noticeably in 1904, but not entirely at
the volition of the imperial government. At this time its objectives

began expanding to include a foreign policy reorientation.

78

79

The United States Legation and Consular reports revealed the
American diplomats' understanding of the nature of the imperial
government's post-Boxer reform program and of the political situation
in China at the time the measures were being instituted. It was
during the first phase of the modernization movement that American
diplomats became aware of the existence of Chinese nationalism, and
their reports offered revealing insights into its complex nature.

The diplomats also noted the implications of Chinese nationalism

for the future of the imperial government's reform movement and the
United States China policy. According to the despatches, the gentry
in South China, not the imperial government, had initiated the demand
for foreign policy reorientation. The diplomatic reports indicated
that the imperial government was in danger of losing control of the
reform movement and they offered an explanation for this turn of
events. The diplomats' evaluation of the movement in these years
suggested that the imperial government was applying its nineteenth-
century reform formula to twentieth—century China's problems. The
problems may not have changed significantly in nature, but the setting
in which they existed was in the process of being altered considerably.
The despatches revealed that a new kind of nationalism was challenging

the traditional conservative outlook.

Skepticism greeted the Empress Dowager's reform proclamation.
Recent history was responsible for that response. T'zu—hsi's anta-

gonism toward the radical reformers and her support of the Boxers

80

had conditioned many to view the ruling house as unenlightened.l Yet,
despite the ruthless suppression of the radical reformers in 1898,
neither the Empress Dowager nor her so—called 'reactionary' supporters
at court opposed reform. The imperial government had initiated the
rejuvenation programs that had followed the Taiping Rebellion, and
even though its subsequent support of the programs was lackadaisical
the imperial government was sincere in its desire for reform.2 This
was true of the decade that preceded the revolution as well, as the
considerable amount of reform activity on the part of the imperial
government testified. The primary questions with regard to reform
were how much and what kind to pursue. The answers given depended

on what kind of society one desired China to be. Therefore, the

chief difficulty in evaluating the imperial government's post-

Boxer modernization efforts has been the problem of determining its
motives and/or objectives, a problem one should approach with caution.3

The imperial government's primary reform goals were two:

the survival of the dynasty and the survival of China. To achieve

 

lCameron, Reform.Mbvement, p. 62.

aMary C. wright has dealt with this complex issue in The Last
Stand 2: Chinese Conservatism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,

3There is no concensus of opinion concerning the nature of the
imperial government's twentieth-century reform program. In her pioneer
study Maribeth Cameron found that it was in essence an endorsement of
the radical reform program of 1898. Richard C. Howard disagreed, con—
sidering it a return to the earlier 'self-strengthening' movement, the
guiding principles of which Mary C. Wright illustrated in ibid. ,
"Introduction" in "The Chinese Reform Movement of the 1890's: A
Symposium," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIX, November, 1969, p. 8.

81

these objectives the imperial government endorsed measures which
it thought would enable it to regstablish its authority in the
provinces. Only then would it be in a position to increase its
revenues and resolve the financial crisis that had enveloped China
after the Sino-Japanese War and that grew more serious each day. The
imperial government felt that it could achieve these objectives if it
modernized the education system, the army, and the navy and if it
centralized control of these vital institutions in Peking.4 These
reforms, the imperial government hoped, would give the Throne the
services of an efficient, creative, moral, and loyal officialdom.
At any rate, these were the objectives stated by the Throne in its
reform proclamation of 8 January 1901: "The things we chiefly need
are a constant supply of men of talent, a sound basis of national
finance, and an efficient army. . . ."5
The content of the imperial government's reform program in
the years immediately following the Boxer uprising therefore suggested
it was conservative in character, intimated that by the survival of
China the imperial government meant 'traditional' China. Moreover,
just as vital to understanding the nature of the movement as were
the reforms the Throne initiated were those it did not consider. If
with the educational and military improvement measures the imperial
government succeeded in regstablishing its authority, reform need go

no farther. There need be no adventuresome administrative and

 

4Cameron, pp. 68-69, 89-90.

5Quoted by Cameron, p. 58.

82

political experimentation, no second, third, or fourth phases of
reform.

The reform edict had located the root of China's troubles in
its administrative system which it described as weighted down by
tradition, hamstrung by inefficiency, and clogged with corruption.6
Then, in the traditional manner, the imperial government immediately
launched a talent search for 'superior' men to formulate and implement
the required policies.7 Tests were devised to determine proficiency
in western studies, and edicts liberalized the civil examinations
by abolishing the eight-legged essay that had tripped so many
aspiring officials. With these measures the imperial government
hoped to utilize the skills of those who had received western educa-
tions. But the imperial government, it should be noted, retained
the civil examinations. Not until 1904 did it decide to abolish
them and even then the imperial government planned to phase out the
examinations gradually. The ruling house also appointed officials
with reputations as reformers. Among these was Chang Po-hsi who
received the important position of President of the Board of Censors,
a powerful government organ which disciplined officials and determined
which memorials would reach the Throne. The appointment was calculated
to win the support of both the Chinese and the foreign powers. For

Chang was Chinese and known among foreigners as a man of "moderately

 

6Cameron, pp. 57-69.

7Cameron is the source for details regarding the government's
early twentieth-century reform efforts.

83

liberal ideas" and "pro-foreign" as well.

Between 1901 and 1904 the imperial government established a
national education system that included a university at Peking, a
college in each province, a middle school in every prefecture and
department, and elementary schools in every district.9 It ordered
the provincial officials to install a modern curriculum, which meant
the establishment of courses of study in the political science and
the history both of China and of the foreign nations and in the natural
sciences. But it retained the traditional Confucian studies and
ordered the public schools to venerate Confucius, measures amenable
to various interpretations.

The imperial government's attempts to control the education
system were in keeping with the conservative nature of its nationalism.
To minimize foreign influence the imperial government ordered the
dismissal of all foreign missionary members of the public school

faculties.lO

Chang Po-hsi who became Chancellor of the University of
Peking in 1902 and who in the opinion of Canton Consul Robert MbWade
was "pro-foreign with a decided leaning toward our nation and its
representatives, . . ."11 then removed the university's American

president, W. A. P. Martin. The imperial government also refused to

recognize the private missionary schools or to accept their graduates

 

8McWade to Hill, 30 January 1901. USCD—Canton.
lOIbid., pp. 84-85.

llIbid., p. 69; McWade to Hill, 30 January 1901. USCD-Canton.

84

until these schools conformed to the government's national education
policy, which entailed the veneration of Confucious.l2

Military reform interested the Empress Dowager for two reasons.
A modern army, loyal to the Throne, would be able to protect China
from the imperialist nations and the dynasty from the Chinese revolu-
tionary nationalists. Edicts during 1901 and 1902 ordered the
modernization of the provincial armies, the liberalization of the
military examinations, and the establishment of military schools.
During 1902 Yuan Shih-k'ai, then Viceroy of Chihli province, pro-
posed comprehensive schemes for military modernization and for
centralizing in Peking the control of the autonomous provincial
armies. For some unknown reason the Throne rejected the proposal
at this time.13 Yet, it should be noted that at least one provincial
official, a Chinese, was committed to reform, was unopposed to the
centralization of power, and was willing to cooperate with the ruling
house to strengthen China. When in Autumn of 1904 the imperial
government endorsed Yflan's proposals, it put a Manchu in charge of
the program.

The Throne also attempted other much-needed reforms in this
period.14 It ordered the establishment of a police force on the
Japanese model. To ease the increasingly strained relations between

the Manchus and Chinese, an edict in 1902 removed the 250 year

 

12Cameron, pp. 84—85.
l3Ibid., pp. 89-90.

14Ibid., pp. 62—64.

85

prohibition against intermarriage between the two peoples. Another
encouraged the Chinese to abolish the crippling practice of binding
the feet of their female children. Attempts at economic reform and
centralization included the nationalization of the telegraph and
steamship companies and the establishment in 1903 of a Board of
Commerce. The only attempt at administrative reform in this period
was an edict on 28 February 1902 eleminating sinecures. Another
edict abolishing the eunuch system was stillborn.

In 1904, quite independent of the imperial government and, one
might add, to its consternation, reform acquired a new objective.
Chinese in South and Central China began to demand foreign policy
reform, a reorientation of China's foreign policy to recover China's
sovereign rights. American diplomats reported that the gentry at
Huchow were contesting the missionaries' land titles and that the
officials were obstructing the foreigners' treaty right to purchase
land. The gentry in Hunan were attempting to cancel the American
Canton-Hankow railroad concession. In Chekiang the gentry were
Obstructing the American attempts to acquire a railroad concession.
Foreigners construed the rights recovery activities as deliberate
violations of the treaties. The movement therefore placed the imperial
government in an embarrassing and difficult position with the foreign

nations.

86

Of all the foreign nations in China the United States was
probably the most genuinely interested in the success of the post-
Boxer reform movement. The United States' concern for the preser—
vation of the 'open door' in China and its experience with the Boxer
uprising in 1900 had prompted a policy reorientation.15 The new
policy found the United States supporting moderate officials within
the central administration and actively encouraging the imperial
government to undertake a program of massive, gradual reform.

America viewed reform as an instrument for securing the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Chinese Empire,--or for obstruct—
ing the objectives of the other powers. Reform.would strengthen
China and thereby remove the sources of irritation which produced
uprisings and invited the foreign intervention that always threatened
to end in the partition of the empire.

That China desparately needed to reform was obvious to
American consular officers reporting on the situation in China during
the Boxer uprising. Consul General Rounseville Wildman wrote emo-
tionally from Hong Kong of the "fiction" of a central governing
authority in China:

. . . After the outrages at Peking and all over Northern China,
the powers can no longer delude themselves with the fiction that
China is 'Governed,‘ in the loosest use of the word, by the so
called Central Authority in Peking. China is rotten from end

to end, and has been growing worse every day during my last

three years on this coast. Chinese pirates boldly ply their
trade up to the very wharves of Canton, and Governors and Viceroys

both accept and pay tribute to them. Baron van Kettler said a
short time before his murder 'It is utterly useless either to

 

15See above, pp. 72-73.

87

expect the Chinese Government to do anything effective, or to

take any action ourselves--such as bringing up guards--based

on the belief that the Government can remain stable, or onéthe

desire to assist in propping up its crumbling structure.’
Consul Robert waade at Canton detailed some of China's ills. He
commented negatively on the integrity of Chinese officials:

. . . It is confidently asserted in business circles and I

have not heard of a single attempt at denial of the accuracy

of the assertion-~that 'they can't speak or act the truth and

this characteristic should always be bourne in mind when

dealing with them.'17
MbWade placed the responsibility for the unrest following the Boxer
uprising squarely on the shoulders of the local officials who, he
charged, refused to deal with the problems of poverty and unemploy-
ment and who continued the 'squeeze.' MbWade concluded that therefore
"the merchants, manufacturers, farmers, and tradesmen generally are
more than disgusted and consequently only too easy converts to the
alleged propaganda of Sun Yat-sen and Kang Yu—wei."l8

The United States consular officers responded to the imperial

government's reform program in the early years of the twentieth
century in diverse ways. His vision colored by his Boxer experiences,
Shanghai Consul General John Goodnow viewed the imperial government's
reform activity with deep suspicion. He regarded the nationalization
of the Telegraph Company and of the China Merchants Steam Navigation

Company as a reactionary measure, an attempt to control the news

 

16w11dman to Hill, 4 September 1900. USCD-HongKong.

l7MoWade to Hill, 5 August 1900. USCD—Canton.

18MbWade to Hill, 8 November 1900. USCD-Canton.

88

entering and leaving China. Goodnow feared that in the event of
another anti-foreign uprising the central government would deny the

powers the use of the telegraph.19

The Chinese merchant Sheng
Hsuan—huai who had lost control of both companies due to the new
policy encouraged this line of thinking. Sheng reported that the
imperial government intended to punish those who had worked with
the powers in 1900 and to consolidate power in Peking for another
attempt to expel the barbarians.2O
There was no evidence of paranoia in the reports of Consul
McWade who instead appeared enthusiastic about reform. In 1902 he
reported that educational reform in Kwantung was progressing
favorably.21 The previous year he had noted that the viceroy of the
two Kwangs was reform-minded but had received no encouragement from
the central government.22 Now, however, Kwantung had a new college
with a modern curriculum that included, along with the traditional
studies, courses in government, history, geography, Chinese and foreign
languages, elementary mathematics, physics, agriculture and mining,
and physical education.23 The following year McWade reported that

the central government was apparently sincere in its attempts to

reform China. For it had reversed its policy and had replaced the

 

19Goodnow to Pierce, 14 February 1903. USCDbShanghai.

2OIbid.

 

2¥Mewade to Hill, 16 July 1902. USCDbCanton.
22MoWade to Hill, 10 may 1901. USCD-Canton.

23MbWade to Hill, 16 July 1902. USCD-Canton.

89

old and feeble Viceroy Tak Sou with the young, vigorous Shun Chan-yuen
who was a native of Kwangsi, a "terror to all officials who fail to
do their duty or who are guilty of 'squeezing,‘ and a strong advocate
of 'Western' civilizing methods of education . . . and intensely
patriotic."24
Minister Edwin Conger was pessimistic regarding the future
of the imperial government's reforms. He suggested that the Chinese
were asserting the superiority of their own institutions and depre-
cating western knowledge with reforms which assumed that a few months
was sufficient time to acquire the essentials of modern science. In
Conger's opinion "this cheap estimate of any knowledge which the West
can give them.has vitiated all the educational reforms that have been
projected by the Chinese in the past."25 Conger criticized the
appointment of Chang Po-hsi to the position of Chancellor of the
University of Peking because Chang's education was thoroughly Chinese
and he lacked the knowledge of western science and educational methods

26 The dismissal of W. A. P.

which Conger felt his position required.
Martin and other foreigners on the university faculty led Conger to
make a gloomy prediction regarding the educational reform program:

. . . ; and so long as the Chinese show an entire unwillingness
to trust the entire management of their schools for a time to

 

24MoWade to Loomis, 21 April 1903. USCD-Canton.
25Conger to Hay, 16 January 1902. USFR, 1902, p. 181.

26Ibid.

90
capable foreign educators they will fail, as they have in the
past, to make these schools anything more than a sham.27
In Conger's opinion American participation in China's post-Boxer reform
movement was essential to its success.

E. T. Williams, Chinese Secretary to the American Legation
during much of the post-Boxer reform.movement, has greatly influenced
interpretations of the movement. For that reason his evaluation and
attitude toward the movement merit close consideration. It was Williams
who may have inadvertantly given the reform movement its unwarranted
'radical' reputation. Williams wrote of the Boxer uprising:

It failed of its purpose; but the attempt made shook the state
to its foundations, and the walls 9_f_' conservatifl fell with _a_
crash. Since that time there has been an unwavering determina-
tIEH-on the part of the government to modernize all its
institutions.28
A correct understanding of Williams' remarks depended on two
considerations: 1) what he meant by the term "conservatism;" 2) what
to him constituted 'modernization.'

By Chinese "conservatism" Williams meant the reactionary and
anti-foreign attitude and policy of the imperial government and the
Chinese people that he prevailed after the radical reform movement
of 1898 and that had produced the Boxer uprising.29 He therefore

viewed the Empress Dowager, who had suppressed the reformers and who

was now in power, as anti-reform. Consequently, Williams interpreted

 

271bid.

28w1111ama to Rockhill, 22 December 1905, inclosure in Rockhill
to the Secretary of State, 26 December 1905. USFR, 1905, pp. 197-198.
Emphasis mine.

29Ibid.

91

any attempt at reform by T'zu—hsi and her supporters as an abandonment
of conservatism. The term as employed by Williams clearly did not
refer to the nature of the reform movement.

Williams' assessment of the role Japan was playing in China's
reform movement revealed what he believed the 'modernization' of
China's institutions entailed and what in his opinion was the objective
or nature of China's post-Boxer reform movement. Williams heartily
approved of the Japanese influence for practical and ideological
reasons: Practically speaking, "Her schools are easily accessible
and her teachers can be brought to China at small expense and engaged
at much smaller salaries than Europeans orAmericans."30 Ideological
factors outweighed the practical, however, and here Williams re-
vealed his understanding of the nature of the reform movement.

Even more important, however, is the spiritual kinship of the
two nations. The Japanese understand the Chinese. They have
but recently passed through the great change to which China is
being subjected. . . . Their own social, political, and
religious institutions are similar to those of China. They

can, therefore, enter into close sympathy with the Chinese, wear
Chinese dress, live upon Chinese food, dwell in Chinese houses,
adapt themselves easily and heartily to the Chinese environment,
and avoid giving offense to Chinese prejudices. Their thorough
understanding of the old and the new will enable them to graft
the modern 3 stem upon the rootstock of the ancient witfiout
HEEtroying t e atter. -THe transformatisfi_wiII_tfifie 5e natural
and the contifiuity with the past reserved. All that is of
value—in the ancient institutions of Ch na wiII_be conEErVEd,
tHoughItheyfwill be modified to meET'the requirements of modern
conditions.31

 

 

 

301bid.

31Ibid. Emphasis mine.

92

It would be difficult to find a more faithful rendering of the
nineteenth-century conservative reform formula: "Chinese learning

"32 Likewise,

as the basis; Western learning for practical use.
Williams revealed his understanding of the nature of the post—Boxer
reform movement in its early years and his favorable disposition toward
its objectives.

Considered collectively, the consular reports indicated that
the imperial government failed to make substantial progress with its
reform program during the initial years. Consul William Martin at
Hankow suggested that its attempts to secure men of ability had
failed miserably. For Martin in 1906 described China's government
and officials in the same manner as had Wildman and.MeWade almost six
years earlier:

I regard it today as absolutely degenerate, existing only for
the benefit of the official class. . . . from the highest to
the lowest it is graft; that is the most important thought they
all have, how much cagBI squeeze out of this office. The people
are never con31dered.
E. T. Williams was more charitable in his assessment of the reform
programs. Unlike Martin, Williams considered the imperial government
sincere in its reform efforts and concluded that its achievements were

reasonable, given the monumental problems it faced.34 The most

telling indictment against the imperial government's reform efforts

 

32Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, p. 1.

 

33Martin to Bacon, 7 March 1906. USCDbHankow.

34Williams to Rockhill, 22 December 1905, inclosure in Rockhill
to the Secretary of State, 26 December 1905. USFR, 1905, pp. 198—199.

93

before 1905 appeared in the relative infrequency of the consular
reports on reform, suggesting that in general the government's reform
activities in this early period were unimpressive. In amount and
length the consular reports on the reform movement between 1901
and 1905 were a mere trickle as compared to the veritable flood of
reports that inundated the Department from 1906 until the revolution.
The consular reports offered several explanations for China's
inability to reform successfully. Consuls MeWade, F. D. Cheshire,
S. L. Gracey and his son W. T. Gracey, and Vice Consul P. S.
Heintzleman blamed the failure to achieve reform on the opposition
from the officials and the people which they attributed to varying
reasons. MbWade reported that the silk merchants and gentry in the
Canton area, where the entire production process was manual, wanted
to use foreign machinery and designs but that the people "view with
extreme disfavor any and all attempts to introduce machinery, labor-
saving or otherwise."35 Heintzleman described the people as
"ignorant and conservative and as such opposed to reformers and
foreigners alike."36 Both Martin and S. L. Gracey revealed that the
officials and the literati felt threatened by the reforms. "All
these changes," wrote Gracey, "pressed at Peking, and most reluc-
tantly accepted by the Throne, are obnoxious. They interfere with

personal 'graft' and their own peculiar methods of collecting revenue,

 

35McWade to Hill, 4 January 1901. USCD-Canton.

36Heintzleman to Bacon, 6 December 1905. USCD—Canton.

94

"37 The literati, expectant

imposing taxes, and paying officials.
officials whose education was in the Confucian classics and who had
passed the old style examinations and were anxiously awaiting an
official position, were opposing the educational reforms, reported
Martin, because "lately their hopes [of an official appointment] have
received a fresh eclipse for western learning is to be required in
all public examinations in the future."38
Such reports suggested that the people and officials were
reactionary in their attitudes and motivated solely by self-interest.
Yet, the consuls offered other, more reasonable, explanations for
their intransigence. Consul Martin also attributed popular opposi-
tion to reform to the peoples' belief that the new taxes the officials
had levied to pay for reform were really just another squeeze.39
F. D. Cheshire blamed the opposition on the inept methods the
government had employed in implementing the reforms. The edicts
which had ordered the abolishment of the examinations and the
establishment of schools for western studies had contained no finan-
cial provisions for effecting the reforms. Consequently, the local

officials had, to the horror of the people, siezed many of the local

temples, razed them, and constructed western-style school buildings

 

3'7Gracey to Bacon, 6 December 1905. U.S. Department of State.
Consular Despatches, H3§3 Consulate, Fuchow. Hereinafter cited
uc ow.
38Martin to Bacon, 7 March 1906. USCD—Hankow.

39Ibid.

 

95

in their places.40 Vice Consul Wilbur T. Gracey suggested that the
Chinese officials in the provinces opposed army reform.which would
centralize power in Peking because they feared centralization would
benefit the Manchus only. According to the native newspaper in
Shanghai, the purpose of Tieh-liang's 1904 mission was threefold:
first, to curtail the power of the provincial authorities by depriving
them of their control of the revenues and the armies; secondly,
that accomplished, to repress further the Chinese people; thirdly,
to prepare for war with Japan which the imperial government believed
favored the Chinese over the Manchus.41

The inept policy of the imperial government had placed
the Manchu, Tieh—liang, in charge of collecting money to pay the
costs of the army reforms. Had the imperial government appointed
Yfian Shih-k'ai to that position, it would perhaps have neutralized
Chinese opposition to the reforms. Instead, the imperial government
antagonized the local and provincial officials who interpreted the
reforms as an attempt to enhance the power of the Manchu.dynasty at
the expense of the Chinese.

The consuls agreed on the effects the reforms were having
throughout the country. They were stimulating anti-dynastic and

anti-foreign sentiments. W. T. Gracey regarded the opposition to

 

4OReverend H. O. T. Burkewell to Cheshire, 3 January 1906,
inclosure E in confidential, Cheshire to Bacon, 6 January 1906.
USCD-Canton.

41Confidential, Gracey to Pierce, 7 November 1904. U.S.
Department of State. Consular Despatches, E,§. Consulate, Nanking.
Hereinafter cited USCDCNEEEIEE.

96

Tieh—liang's activities as an indication of the ". . . growing distrust
between the Manchus and the subject race . . . ," a situation he
considered fraught with the threat of another Boxer—like uprising.42
For the consuls reported that the people and provincial officials
were blaming the reforms and the taxes they had generated on the
foreigners, and, the consular reports suggested, they were rising
against the imperial government not because of its failure to reform
but because of its inability to resist foreign demands for reform.43
Samuel L. Gracey described the situation most expressively:
They always have, and do now, resent the coming into the country
of these meddlesome foreigners, who demoralize their 'old
customs,‘ methods of doing business, administering their
government Etc; all of which have hitherto worked to their
satisfaction, and which they still regard as infinitely superior
to anyZhing the benighted foreigner has to suggest as a substi-
tute.

The consular reports indicated that popular opposition.and
official reluctance to reform in the early twentieth century stemmed
from many factors, and that the absence of nationalism was not among
them. Rather, it was the particular nature of Chinese nationalism
in this period that mitigated against reform. The consular reports

revealed the existence of a strong sense of nationalism of the strain

defined by John Schrecker, that was a "militant culturalism," an

 

42mm.

 

43Cheshire to Bacon, 6 January 1906. USCDbCanton; Lay to
Bacon, 5 March 1906. USCDbCanton; Heintzleman to Bacon, 6 December
1905. USCD~Canton; Martin to Bacon, 7 March 1906. USCD-Hankow;
Goodnow to Pierce, 14 February 1903. USCDbShanghai.

44Gracey to Bacon, 7 December 1905. USCD-Fuchow.

97

inward-looking nationalism that found China's civilization vastly
superior to all others and that therefore refused to entertain any
suggestions of reform, that considered them, as S. L. Gracey wrote,
". . . an impertinance, and resented as such."45

But Chinese attitudes toward reform were changing because
the nature of Chinese nationalism was changing. The Chinese were
becoming more receptive to the idea of reform, even radical reform.
According to the consular despatches, nationalism was responsible.
The diplomatic reports of 1904 and thereafter revealed that Chinese
nationalism was becoming more complex in character. Modern, nation-
state nationalism was challenging China's traditional "culturalism."
The rights recovery movement, spearheaded by the Chinese gentry
class, both reflected the alteration in the nature of Chinese nation-
alism and further stimulated the development of modern nationalism.
The consular despatches revealed that modern Chinese nationalism
posed problems both for the imperial government's reform ideology
and program and for the United States China policy, its assumptions
and objectives.

The consular reports testified that the Chinese were becoming
patriotic and that modern Chinese nationalism harbored ill-feelings
toward foreign interests in China. Frederick D. Cloud, Vice Consul

at Hangchow in 1904, reported that a dispute had erupted between the

 

45Schrecker, p. 57; Gracey to Bacon, 7 December 1905.
USCD-Fuchow.

98

Southern.Methodist Mission and the localgentry.46 The mission
society had purchased a large tract of land which the gentry main—
tained was temple property and therefore unsaleable. They had
refused to sanction the sale and were demanding that the local
officials recover the land titles. The Consular Court had upheld
the mission's treaty right to purchase the land, but the gentry had
repudiated its promise to accept the Court's ruling. Cloud reported
that the Huchow land case was having an adverse effect on the American-
owned China Investment and Development Company's attempts to acquire
a railroad concession in the coastal province of Chekiang. In
retaliation at the Court's ruling, the gentry were effectively re-
sisting Mr. Bash's attempt to gain railroad privileges. Cloud
personally felt that since the mission had won its case it could
easily afford to yield some of its extensive holdings and thereby
permit the gentry to save face and serve American railroad interests
as well as its own missionary objectives. Cloud initially had attri—
buted the gentry's opposition to the mission's land holdings and to
the American railroad concession to its nationalism. But by 1905 he
was wondering if Japanese influence rather than patriotism was
responsible. Yet, whether inspired by nationalism or not, the Huchow
land controversy certainly stimulated its development.

No one doubted that nationalism was responsible for Chinese

attempts to cancel foreign railroad concessions in Hunan and Kwantung.

 

46The following consular reports tell the story of the dispute:
Cloud to Conger, 16 March 1905; Cloud to Rockhill, 17 November 1905;
Cloud to Loomis, 15 June 1905. USCD-Hankow; Rodgers to Bacon, 31
March 1906. USCD-Shanghai.

99

In Autumn of 1904 Vice Consul F. D. Cheshire reported that the gentry
of Hunan were leading the merchants and people in the agitation
demanding the repurchase of the American Canton—Hankow railroad
concession. The Chinese desired to construct the railroad with
Chinese capital to be raised not by taxation but by popular sub-
scription.47 Canton Consul General Julius Lay deplored the rights
recovery movement because he believed it would retard China's rail-
road development. In Lay's opinion the people did not understand
what the enterprise entailed and therefore would be unable to wait
patiently the many years required before their shares would produce
revenue.48 Just as Minister Conger had felt that foreign partici-
pation was essential to the success of China's educational reform,
so, too, did Lay believe that the development of China's resources
required foreign participation.

Shanghai Consul General James L. Rodgers also acknowledged
the existence of modern Chinese nationalism and identified it as the
animating force in the rights recovery movement. Rodgers reported
that the Chinese gentry in Kiangsu were discussing cancelling the
British Shanghai-Nanking railroad concession and taking over the
line on the ground that the "Chinese out of patriotism, cannot

patronize the road if it is under the practical domination of

 

4'7Cheshire to Loomis, 20 October and 26 October 1904.
USCD-Canton.

48Lay to Bacon, 5 November 1906. USCD-Canton.

100

foreign interests."49

Chinese nationalism, at least in its new form which the
rights recovery movement was expressing, was challenging the basic
assumptions that underlay the United States Open Door policy. The
United States expected to participate in strengthening China to
withstand the dual threat of rebellion and partition. Indeed, the
United States assumed that American participation was essential to
the success of China's reform programs on which the entire future
of the 'open door' rested.

The imperial government's reform program, despite its
conservative nature, likewise challenged the assumptions and objec-
tives of American interest groups, particularly those of the
missionary educators. In.March of 1904 the imperial government also
threatened the interests of American financiers by imposing restric-
tions on foreign mining activities which Minister Conger protested,
arguing that they violated Article VII of the 1903 commercial treaty
between the United States and China. The article had required China
to "recast its present mining regulations in such a way as, while
promoting the interests of Chinese subjects and while not injuring
in anyway the sovereign rights of China, will offer no impediment
to the attraction of foreign capital nor place foreign capitalists

at a greater disadvantage than they would be under generalky accepted

 

49Rodgers to Loomis, 17 November 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

101

50 Yet, the threat to foreign interests which

foreign regulation."
the imperial government presented was minor compared to that of the
Chinese nationalists. For the treaty system constrained the imperial
government. Its refusal to honor the treaties would bring foreign
intervention and all would be lost. The extra—governmental position,
or non-official status, of the Chinese nationalists allowed them a
much greater degree of freedom in their activities.

It was the understanding of the American diplomats that the
rights recovery movement also threatened the imperial government.
Vice Consul Cheshire reported that during the meetings on the Canton-
Hankow railway issue the "Chinese Government was berated in no
measured terms and charged with relinquishing its authority and
partitioning the country without the slightest emotion of any kind."51
Here was a direct assault on the nature and objectives of the imperial
government's reform program. The rights recovery movement suggested
that in the opinion of some Chinese the imperial government's reform
program was too restricted in its objectives, that China's regeneration
required more extensive, perhaps radical, reform measures. Chinese
nationalists were demanding more of the imperial government in the
area of foreign policy. The rights recovery movement challenged
the imperial government's traditional diplomatic objectives and

procedures. The imperial government had committed itself to working

 

50Quoted in Minister Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, inclosure in
Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 24 November 1905. USFR, 1905,
p0 2340

5lcheshire to Loomis, 26 October 1904. USCD-Canton.

102

within the framework of the treaty system. It had realized long

ago that the treaties offered China a way to restrict the activities
of the foreign nations which were too strong to repel and whose
demands China therefore had to accomodate.52 But Chinese nationalists
were demanding that China take control of its own destiny and were
challenging the treaty system which they considered an affront to
Chinese sovereignty.53 Somehow the imperial government would have to
accomodate its reform ideology and objectives to these increasingly
vocal demands and expanding objectives of Chinese nationalism.

The United States Legation and Consular reports concerning
reform in China between 1901 and 1905 revealed the diplomats'
understanding of the nature and objectives of the imperial govern-
ment's reform.program and of the conflict situation in which the
reforms were being instituted. The diplomatic reports suggested
that the imperial government's reform ideology and objectives were
basically conservative in nature and that this approach was supported
by the conservative nationalism, or "militant culturalism," of the
majority of the Chinese people. But in 1904 and 1905 the diplomats
perceived that an astounding change was occurring in the nature of
Chinese nationalism. An inward—looking nationalism was yielding to
nationalism in its modern, nation-state form. The consular des-
patches suggested that the Chinese gentry class which had initiated

the rights recovery movement was responsible for the development of

 

52Wright, The Last Stand.2£_Chinese Conservatism, pp. 13-14.

 

53Schrecker, pp. 46-48.

103

modern Chinese nationalism. Given the important position the gentry
occupied as the keystone in the imperial system, its challenge to
the imperial government's reform ideology and program pressaged
trouble ahead for the ruling dynasty.

The consular despatches also revealed the diplomats' attitude
toward reform in China. The American diplomats favored reform, in
fact endorsed it with enthusiasm, as long as it was conducted on
terms favorable to American interests in China. The diplomats
opposed any reforms that challenged United States policy assumptions
and objectives, whether attempted by the imperial government or the
Chinese nationalists. The diplomatic reports suggested that the
Chinese nationalists constituted the more serious threat, not only
to American interests but to those of the imperial government as well.
How serious a threat modern Chinese nationalism posed both for the
imperial government and the United States policy in China became
apparent in 1905 when the Chinese nationalists launched the boycott
against the United States.

Foreign intervention in the Boxer uprising had taught the
Chinese a valuable lesson. They realized the need to find a
non-violent instrument for expressing their nationalism, one which,
hopefully, would also keep the powers from again uniting against China.
They found just such an instrument in the economic boycott applied

against one nation at a time.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA CLOSES THE DOOR: THE ANTI-AMERICAN

BOYCOTT, 1905-1906

In late July 1905 China instituted a boycott against America
that lasted until Spring 1906, with rumors of its revival persisting
into 1907. The boycott surprised the United States. For years
America had glowed.with pride over its virtuous China policy. The
United States had congratulated itself that it was the only nation
among the big powers that had refused to appropriate Chinese territory.
And had not America attempted to prevent the other powers from taking
undue advantage of China during the Boxer uprising? Americans also
believed their missionaries and merchants to be less meddlesome, less
greedy, and, therefore, less obnoxious to the Chinese than those of
other nations. To such virtues America had attributed the remarkably
amicable relations existing between the United States and China.
Closer scrutiny would have revealed the shaky foundations on which
this view rested, but distinguishing between fact and fiction did not
interest America. And should America's confidence in its actions
falter, there were the numerous expressions of gratitude from Chinese
officials to restore it. Certainly a sense of friendship betrayed

partially explained America's reaction to the boycott. But, perhaps

104

105

more to the point was America's feeling that a boycott was totalky
uncharacteristic of the submissive, unpatriotic Chinese.

The rising spirit of Chinese nationalism inspired the boycott.
Its anti—American character derived from conditions prevailing in both
China and the United States at the time. America had failed to re-
concile its domestic social and economic policies with its foreign
policy. Consequently, the United States China policy contained
disharmonious elements. On the one hand were the interests of
American merchants, manufacturers, and missionaries, as reflected in
the principles and objectives of the Open Door policy. On the other
side stood the demands of American labor as revealed in America's
determination to exclude Chinese laborers, skilled and unskilled,
from the United States and the manner in which it implemented this
exclusion policy. Not only did the United States immigration policy
collide with its Open Door policy; it also crashed head on with
Chinese nationalism which since China's defeat by Japan in 1894 had
been steadily increasing in scope and strength.

This was the situation that produced the anti-American boycott
of 1905-1906 and constituted one of the most serious threats Sino-
American friendship and the Open Door had yet faced. China set the
stage for the drama to be enacted when, according to treaty provisions,
the imperial government notified the government of the United States
in Summer 1904 that China would not renew its treaty with America
until the latter modified its immigration policy. The United States
provided the issue when Congress refused to meet these demands of

Chinese nationalism. For Chinese the boycott was primarily a weapon

106

with which they hoped to coerce the United States to amend its
discriminatory exclusion policy.1 Yet, the consular despatches
suggested that the boycotters had other important objectives. For
Chinese merchants there was foremost the desire for profit. Chinese
nationalists viewed the boycott primarily as an instrument for
developing Chinese nationalism.2

Once the boycott began the State Department's immediate
problem was determining a course of action compatible with the
objectives of America's China policy. As in 1900, the Department
depended greatly on its diplomatic personnel in China for its under-
standing of the situation. How the foreign service personnel assessed
the movement would affect that great variable in foreign policy,--the
methods of implementation.

As during the Boxer uprising, consular opinions and
recommendations regarding the boycott movement varied. In general,
consuls with less experience and knowledge of Chinese affairs were
more alarmist in their reports and favored a more militant policy
than the seasoned diplomatic personnel. But Minister William W.
Rockhill's opinions usually prevailed, and the United States policy
during the incident was a moderate one. Admittedly, the Department

at times appeared ready to lapse into the old gunboat policy, and

 

1Minister Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 6 July 1905.
USFR, p. 206.

2The "nationalizing of public opinion" is an indispensable
element of modernity and this political goal was the primary objective
of the boycotters according to Akira Iriye, "Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy: The Case of Late Ch'ing China," in.Approaches to Modern
Chinese History, pp. 218, 223-224. -_'

 

107

there were instances of military pressure on Chinese officials,
particularly after the Lienchow Massacre of November, 1905, and
the riot in the International City of Shanghai the following December.
Nevertheless, diplomacy overshadowed the military as the United States

worked to resolve this unprecedented crisis in Sino-American relations.

Knowledge of the position the boycott has occupied in Chinese
history will facilitate understanding the problems America faced and
aid in evaluating its response to the anti-American boycott.3 A
product of the Confucian philosophy on which traditional China's
civilization rested, the boycott served two purposes: 1) it was a
time-honored weapon of the Chinese people for resisting official
oppression; 2) it was also the most powerful instrument groups such
as the family and guilds possessed for enforcing the group solidarity
on which depended the success of their undertakings. Boycotters
sought to attain policy goals by inflicting economic rather than
physical injury. A boycott usually took the form of a local or
general strike, or in the case of an individual, ostracization until
he conformed to group expectations.

Such passive aggression when undertaken by the Chinese peasants
for the purpose of forcing a change in government policy was serious

business. It was an indication that officials had failed to meet the

 

3The following discussion is based on C. F. Remer's and W.
Palmer's pioneer work, A_Stu of Chinese Bo cotts (Baltimore, 1933),
pp. 1-21. Hereinafter cited hifiese Bo cotts.

108

responsibilities imposed on their position by Confucianism, and
officials recognized it as such. Attempts to suppress a boycott
through violent means constituted evidence of the justice of the cause
and served to strengthen the sense of righteousness that animated the
movement. Consequently, astute officials ignored a boycott while

they moved as unobtrusively as possible to remove its cause, lest
accumulated grievances spark a rebellion and lead to the loss of the
Mandate of Heaven.

Certain features of Chinese boycotts in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries distinguished them from their prototypes. As
before, the boycott was an instrument belonging to the people, not
the government; but nineteenth- and twentieth—century Chinese aimed
it at‘a new target,-—the foreigner. Yet, even an anti-foreign boy-
cott served notice that the government was failing the people, and a
boycott could therefore easily assume an anti-dynastic character.
Nineteenth-century anti-foreign boycotts were local in nature, usually
directed by Chinese merchants against objectionable practices of
foreign merchants in a treaty port. In the twentieth century the
boycott greatly expanded in nature and scope: it assumed an inter-
national character, that is, transcended not only local but also
national boundaries; it now challenged the policy and practices not
of a select group but of an entire nation; its objectives were
national rather than local in character; therefore, it elicited the
support not just of the Chinese merchants, but also of the gentry,
literati, students, peasants, overseas Chinese communities, and,

some suspected, even of the imperial government.

109

The boycott against America was the first time Chinese
utilized that particular form of non-violent coercion as a vehicle
for expressing their nationalism and as an instrument for achieving
national objectives. The United States policy toward Chinese entering
and residing in America had offended China's infant nationalism and
was therefore primarily responsible for the boycott. A brief review
of the United States immigration policy will reveal the nature of the
practices to which the Chinese objected and provide the backdrop
against which the boycott occurred.

Chinese had immigrated to the United States on a large scale
after the discovery of gold in 1848, settling mainly on the Pacific
coast. The local inhabitants initially welcomed and praised them
for their industry and frugality. But friendliness yielded to
hostility under the competitive force of the Irish immigration and
the rapid increase of the Chinese population. Local practices and
legislation began to discriminate against Chinese immigrants, with
California actually prohibiting their entrance in 1858. The United
States Supreme Court ruled such legislation unconstitutional, claiming
that immigration regulation belonged to the realm of foreign commerce
and was, therefore, the responsibility of the federal government.

The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 established federal policy
on the Chinese immigration issue. Post-Civil War, industrializing
America needed laborers, particularly in railroad construction. To
encourage Chinese workers to migrate to America the federal government
negotiated a treaty with China that permitted unrestricted Chinese

immigration.

110

Opposition to this businessman's policy organized quickly.

In the Immigration Treaty of 1880 China reluctantly recognized the
United States right to regulate the immigration of Chinese laborers.
Still, the treaty extended the most-favored-nation rights and privi-
leges to the non-laboring classes of Chinese.

During the ensuing two decades America's exclusion policy
took shape. The Restriction Act of 1882 barred skilled and unskilled
Chinese laborers for ten years. The Scott Act of 1888 inhibited the
return to the United States of Chinese travelling abroad, and the
Geary Law of 1892 required the registration of all Chinese living
in America. The Treaty of 1894 with China summarized the exclusion
policy: it barred skilled and unskilled Chinese laborers for a ten
year period but gave the resident laborers the right to travel across
the United States; it required all resident Chinese laborers to
register within one year or face deportation; it limited Chinese
immigration and visitors to America to merchants, travellers, students,
teachers, and government officials.

By 1904 the United States had completely repudiated the
Burlingame policy. The Law of 1902 reanacted previous exclusion
legislation without term and extended the exclusion laws to United
States island territories, where existing treaty obligations permitted.
In 1904 the imperial government of China, which had consistently
protested this discriminatory immigration policy, notified the United
States government that China would not renew the Treaty of 1894 unless
the United States modified its policy. Congress responded with the

Act of 1904 which amended the Law of 1902 by removing the reference

111

to treaty obligations. With the term laborer broadly defined,
excluding Chinese from the United States had become by 1904 a part
of America's China policy.

Chinese objected not only to the provisions of the laws but
also to the manner in which the immigration authorities enforced them.
In fact, as George E. Anderson, the Consul at Amoy in Fukien Province,
observed, ". . . there is less resentment against the restrictions
of our emigration laws than there is for the treatment accorded
Chinese in enforcing such laws at the time of entrance and after such
Chinese have properly been entered in American territory. . . ."4
The burden of proving membership in the exempted classes fell on the
Chinese, and he stood trial at both the ports of departure and entry
where his fate often rested on the authorities' arbitrary interpre-
tations of the immigration laws. Immigration officials separated
Chinese from the other nationals entering the United States and herded
them into filthy sheds where they endured humiliating physical
examinations and suffered various other indignities. Even the exempted
classes experienced such treatment. After being treated so shabbily,
several Chinese merchants invited to participate in the 1904 World's

Fair at St. Louis angrily refused and returned to China. Resident

 

4Anderson to the Department of State, "Memorandum on Chinese
Exclusion Legislation," 10 October 1905. USCD-Amoy. Hereinafter
cited "Mbmorandum."

112

Chinese suffered other abuses, one of the most infamous occurring
in Boston in October, 1902.5

The extension of the exclusion laws to the United States
island territories was another sore spot with the Chinese. The Laws
of 1902 and 1904 particularly angered the inhabitants of South China
and the coastal cities who had found Hawaii and the Philippines both
attractive and convenient lands of opportunity. "The feeling in Amoy
over the exclusion treaty situation is exceedingly bitter. . . ,"
noted Consul Anderson. "The commercial relations between Amoy and
the Philippines have always been very close and Chinese merchants
going to Manila have had great trouble, in many cases being treated
outrageously."6

Corruption within the foreign service complicated
administering the immigration laws. American consular personnel
issued the certificates which permitted Chinese to embark for America.
Occasionally, as in the cases of Consuls General John Goodnow at
Shanghai and Robert ML McWade at Canton, the consular officers issued
certificates to non-exempt Chinese for substantial fees which they

pocketed.7 The inadequate salaries paid the consular personnel may

have explained their actions, but, as Samuel Gracey, the American

 

5Federal officers looking for Chinese illegally residing in
the United States raided the Chinese section of Boston, arrested and
detained overnight under deplorable conditions approximately 200
Chinese. Jessie A" Mflller, "China in American Policy and Opinion,
1906-1909," pp. 44-45.

6Anderson to the Department of State, 25 July 1905.
USCDbAmoy.

7See above, p. 63.

113

Baptist missionary who served as Consul at Fuchow, wrote, it did not

8 This illicit activity certainly contributed

condone their behavior.
to the ill-feeling and tension existing between the United States
and China. Mbny Chinese wasted their life savings on fraudulent

certificates in order to come to America only to be jailed upon their

arrival and eventually returned, bankrupt, to China.

Energized by the activities of both the reformers and
revolutionaries, twentieth-century China was becoming increasingly
intolerant of anything that ignored its interests and offended its
sensibilities. The imperial government had on many occasions issued
formal protests against the United States immigration policy which
had singled out Chinese for discriminatory treatment. Chinese
nationalist writers warned that China would strike back one day.

Then, on 10 May 1905 a large group of Shanghai merchants
met to consider the feasibility of a boycott against America to protest
its immigration policy. They suggested a total boycott: it would
include American manufactures, American transport vessels, American
owned or operated schools; Chinese would also refuse to work for any
American firm, business or government, as well as American families.
The Shanghai merchants approved the boycott proposal but postponed

its inception to 20 July 1905, perhaps to allow the United States

 

8Gracey to H. H. D. Pierce, confidential, 4 November 1904.
USCD—Fuchow.

114

sufficient time to meet China's demands for a modification of
America's immigration policy.9 The merchant guilds of Canton, Peking,
Fukien, and Soochow endorsed the actions of the Shanghai merchants as
did Chinese students and overseas Chinese communities, particularly
those in America.

American commercial interests responded immediately to the
boycott threat with letters and petitions to the State Department
pleading for an amendment of the United States immigration policy

that would satisfy Chinese demands.10

Although the press initially
treated the boycott proposal lightly, it considered the Chinese
actions justified and even recognized the incompatibility between

11 The

the United States Open Door policy and its immigration policy.
executive branch of the government hurriedly investigated the issue
and found merit in China's position. President Theodore Roosevelt
used Secretary of War William H. Taft as an instrument for revealing
the executive's position which the President hoped Congress would
translate into federal policy. In a speech on 15 June 1905 Taft
supported the exclusion of all Chinese labor but endorsed a guarantee
of the most-favored-nation rights and privileges to all the exempt
classes and resident Chinese. President Roosevelt intervened per-

sonally, ordering immigration officials to treat Chinese entering

America on the same basis as other foreigners, except in cases of

 

9Miller, p. 51.
10Miller, pp. 53-57.

llMiller, pp. 57-58.

115

Obvious fraud, while the State Department moved to reform the consular
service.

Obviously, America in 1905 was more aware of and responsive
to Chinese nationalism than it had been five years earlier. But, then,
Chinese nationalism had taken giant strides forward after the Boxer
Rebellion. Consular reports in those intervening years painted a
picture of a turbulent, changing China. Rebellious uprisings existed
at all times in some part of the empire. There were also the tactics
of passive aggression of which the Chinese were masters. Consuls
wrote despairingly of the subtle ways in which Chinese obstructed
the objectives of American, indeed all foreign, merchants and mis-
sionaries.12 While he was Consul General at Shanghai, John Goodnow
had called the Department's attention to the developing patriotism
which he attributed largely to the growth of newspapers and the new
methods of communication between the various parts of the Empire.13
William W. Rockhill, the new American Minister to China, concurred
with Goodnow, informing President Roosevelt:

There is now coming into existence in China a public opinion

and a native press; both crude and misinformed, but nevertheless
it is a public opinion and the Government knows it and recognizes

 

12A favorite device of the authorities was to change local
officials on the eve of settling an issue which necessitated a new
beginning. In addition, people began refusing to sell land, while
officials challenged the legality of foreign-held land titles.
See above ,

13Goodnow to Cridler, 25 March 1901; Goodnow to H. H. D. Pierce,
1 August 1902. USCDbShanghai.

116

that it must be counted with. This public opinion and
press are at least developing a national spirit in China.

14
Given the position Rockhill occupied in rationalizing and
formulating the Open Door policy and his conception of the role China
must play in maintaining it, the American.Minister probably welcomed
the advent of patriotism in China.15 Yet, approving the development
of Chinese nationalism and acquiescing in its application against
American interests were two different matters. Thomas Sammons, the
United States Consul General at Newchwang, expressed the dilemma:
Generally speaking a strong China is advocated but as
much can not be reported as reflecting a unanimous foreign
public opinion when it is a question of having it 'too strong.‘
'A strong6China, yes; but not too strong', is the composite
verdict.
Two facts complicated the issue for America. One was its image of
itself as China's best friend and ally in the competition among the
powers to control China. It had led the United States to encourage
China to reform.which in turn stimulated Chinese nationalism. The
second problem was the United States' ethnocentric immigration policy
which affronted emerging Chinese nationalism. The United States'

main problem in formulating policy was how to encourage the Chinese

nationalism that would remove the European threat, however erroneously

 

14Rockhill to President Roosevelt, 7 July 1905. Roosevelt
Papers. Quoted in Miller, p. 15.

15See above, pp. 71-73.

16Thomas Sammons, "Regeneration and Reorganization in China,"
Sammons to Colonel John A. Sleicher, editor of Leslies Week , via
Francis B. Loomis, 21 September 1905. U.S. Department 0 ate,
Consular Despatches, U.S. Consulate General, Newchwang. Hereinafter
cited USCD-Newchwang.

 

117

conceived, and still keep that nationalism friendly to American
interests.

The development of an effective policy would depend on the
State Department's assessment of the situation in China. Yet, it
was the diplomatic personnel in the field who educated the Department
in things Chinese. Understanding and evaluating the United States
China policy during the anti-American boycott requires, therefore,

a consideration of consular opinions regarding the movement. What
did the consuls perceive to be the boycott's driving force? What
role did they ascribe to the imperial government? What role to the
provincial officials? Who supported the movement, and how widespread
was that support? In the consuls' opinion, what was the nature of
the threat the boycott posed to American interests? Answers given

to these and related questions influenced the United States policy
toward China throughout 1905 and 1906.

The consuls realized that America's immigration policy was a
significant cause of China's anti-American activities. Those who
expressed an opinion on the subject were sympathetic to the Chinese
viewpoint and, therefore, favored modifying the policy. Consul
Samuel L. Gracey confessed:

. . . I do not share the opinion of many of my nationals,

that we would be over run with Chinese laborers if all restric-
tions were removed. The Chinaman does not like to go far away
from the home of his ancestors--He loves his home and his home
festivals, religious services, his ancestral worship, and re-
gards it as a great calamity to be buried, . . . remote from

his relatives, who would be prevented from offering sacrifices
at his grave, upon which his future happiness so greatly depends.

I am of the impression that the Artizan class might be . . .
admitted. After a residence of nearly nine years among this

118

people, I could say very much in their praise, and in favor
of their having an equal chance to the advantages, and privileges
of our civilization in America. If house servants could be
admitted, it would go far toward solving one of the most per-
plexing domestic questions in our home life. They make the best
domestic servants to be found on earth.
Although Chinese would probably have chafed at Gracey's chauvinism and
condescendence, they might also have recognized the generous spirit
that underlaid his opinions. Consul Anderson's thinking paralleled
that of Gracey:
. . . I do not believe that the removal of all restrictions as
to Chinese immigration . . . would result in the flood of coolies
generally anticipated. Only the Chinese of the Amoy and Canton
districts with a few Foochow Chinese are disposed to emigrate.
The northern district Chinese would come to the United States
only under exceptional circumstances if at all.
Consequently, in his memorandum to the Department George Anderson had
recommended new legislation and a change in the methods of examination
and certification of Chinese seeking to enter America.

The existence of contradictory facts made it difficult for
the consular personnel to determine who or what group was actually
responsible for the boycott. Minister Rockhill scotched reports that
the Japanese government was encouraging the anti-American movement:
"The conduct of the Japanese Government has been not only friendly
throughout, but their foreign office has done all in its power to

arrest the movement and control the Japanese controlled papers

published in China."19 The most absurd account of the boycott's

 

17Gracey to H. H. D. Pierce, 24 March 1903. USCD-Fuchow.
18Anderson, "Memorandum."

19Rockhill to Root, 17 August 1905. USFR, pp. 212-216.

119

origin came from an American engaged in business in Tientsin and
Shanghai, J. H. Brown. Brown charged that the boycott had origi-
nated with former Consul General John Goodnow who sought revenge for
his dishonorable discharge from the consular service.20 Far more
serious was the explanation given by F. D. Cheshire, Consul General—
at-large, whom the Department had authorized in November, 1905, to
investigate the boycott movement at Canton. Cheshire's investigation
revealed that the movement had perhaps originated with Chinese in

San Francisco under the inspiration and direct guidance of the
Chinese Mfinister to the United States. Apparently the minister

felt beleaguered; pressured by both the imperial government and
Chinese nationalists to perform, he perhaps hoped that a boycott threat
would enhance his bargaining position with the obdurate American Con-
gress.22 Cheshire's information suggesting the imperial government's
complicity in the boycott movement would certainly influence the

Department's response to the incident.

 

20Brown made his accusation against Goodnow in August, 1905,
and Rodgers became interested when the Washington Post printed Brown's
story and Senator Fuller, Oregon, gained Brown an Interview with
President Roosevelt. Because the issue threatened to assume out-
landish proportions and perhaps distort the meaning of the boycott
movement, Rodgers felt it necessary to set the record straight. In
Rodgers' opinion, Brown was the vindictive one. Brown hated Goodnow
because the latter had closed the "Alhambra," a house of prostitution
which Brown owned. Rodgers to Robert Bacon, 6 January 1906. USCD-
Shanghai.

21Telegram from Secretary Root to F. D. Cheshire, 10 November
1905. USCDbCanton.

22Confidential despatch from F. D. Cheshire to Bacon, 6
January 1906. USCD_Canton.

120

Actually, Cheshire's findings corroborated the Department's
suspicions regarding the role of the imperial government. During the
agitation stage of the movement Minister Rockhill reported that his
negotiations with Prince Ch'ing, head of the Foreign Office, ".
tends to strengthen my belief that the movement was with official
approval, if not actually at official suggestion."23 On 3 June
Prince Ch'ing had verbally promised Rockhill to stop the boycott
agitation. Because it continued, Rockhill wrote the Prince a note
which went unanswered for a week. The American Minister's conclusion
came after Prince Ch'ing's reply to his second note:

My board finds upon investigation, that this movement has not
been inaugurated without some reason, for the restrictions against
Chinese entering America are too strong and American exclusion
laws are extremely inconvenient to the Chinese. . . . but if
the restrictions can be lightened by your Government and a treaty
drawn up in a friengiy manner then this agitation will of its
own accord die out.
While the episode did not prove the imperial government was responsible
for initiating the movement, it left the Department and Minister
Rockhill suspicious of its role and dubious of its intentions to
squelch it.

James L. Rodgers, Consul General at Shanghai where the
boycott began, had also informed the Department of reports that the
boycott had originated in the United States. But Rodgers cited the

Chinese Six Companies of San Francisco which stood to profit by

 

23Rockhill to Root, 6 July 1905. USFR, p. 206.

24Prince Ch'ing to Rockhill, 4 July 1905, inclosure 3 in
ibid.

121

sponsoring a trade in Chinese coolie labor.25 Rodgers also noted
other opinions concerning the boycott's origin. Some native Chinese
had suggested a power struggle within the imperial court, reminiscent
of the Boxer days, with the reactionary faction responsible for the
boycott movement.26 Also credible to Rodgers was the idea that
Chinese reformers under the leadership of K'ang Yurwei had sponsored
the movement with the objective of arousing anti-dynastic sentiment
and thereby stimulating demands for reform.27
The consular personnel never resolved the issue of the origin
of the boycott. Yet, whether the consuls felt that it had originated
abroad or was an indigenous movement, those at places where the boy-
cott was strongest ascribed the leading role in kicking it off that
summer to the Chinese merchants. Indeed, merchant participation,
they perceived, was essential to the success of the boycott. Julius G.
Lay, the Consul General at Canton where the boycott lasted the longest,
found the Canton Chamber of Commerce behind it.28 Dr. S. K. Lupton,
Vice Consul-in-charge at Amoy from 19 August 1905 to 22 January 1906,
wrote Minister Rockhill that the concensus of opinion in his district

was that the local Chinese Chamber of Commerce was behind the entire

 

25Roc1gers to Loomis, 24 August 1905. USCD—Shanghai.

26Ibid. Consul Gracey suggested the same idea. S. L.
Gracey to Loomis, 18 August 1905. USCD-Fuchow.

27Rodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

28Lay to Loomis, 26 May 1905. USCD-Canton. Lay had come from
a post in Barcelona, Spain, and took over the Canton Consulate General
office on 14 February 1905 to direct the reform of the consular ser-
vice at that port.

122

movement. Lupton also implicated the imperial government, noting
that the group had the support of the Secretary of the Board of
Commerce, Wong Ching Miuh.29 From Consul General Rodgers came the
most revealing reports concerning the Chinese merchants' role in the
boycott. Rodgers' despatches also offered valuable insights into

the nature and strength of Chinese nationalism in the early twentieth
century.

Rodgers reported that the merchants who met at Shanghai in
early May of 1905 viewed the boycott proposal with suspicion. They
considered it detrimental to their economic interests and therefore
initially refused to endorse it. To enlist merchant participation
it was necessary to prove that they would profit by a boycott against
America at that time. A few Chinese piece-goods merchants, excited
by the economic potential of a boycott, took charge and called in
economists who apparently proved the proposition to the satisfaction
of a majority of the merchants.30

Merchant participation in the anti-American boycott was most
intelligible in terms of the effect the Russo-Japanese War was then
having on the Chinese market. Anticipating a greatly expanded
Manchurian market because of the war, foreign businessmen in China,
Americans included, had increased their imports in the early months

of 1905. But the Manchurian market had failed to materialize. The

 

29Lupton to Rockhill, 4 September 1905. USCD-Amoy.

30Rodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

123

unavailability of ships for commercial use, the dangers of
blockade-running, and the high insurance rates attending the blockade
had mitigated against its expansion.31 The end result was an over-
stocked Chinese market and a cessation of trade.32

The depressed condition of the market made Summer of 1905 an
ideal time for an anti-American boycott. For Chinese merchants it
offered an opportunity to demonstrate their patriotism without risking
economic loss. In fact, the larger merchants could reasonably anti-
cipate huge profits; for, the situation afforded them a chance to
corner the market. With business slow due to the war and their
warehouses filled to capacity, the foreigners had begun to unload
their goods at competitive prices.33 The Chinese merchants could buy
cheaply and hold for the Manchurian market which would open with the
restoration of peace, already rumored in the making. A boycott
against America until the end of the war would increase the prices
of American goods and therefore enrich those Chinese merchants who
had large contracts.34 Postponing the boycott to 20 July was, perhaps,
not only to give the United States an opportunity to amend its immi—
gration policy, but also to allow Chinese merchants time to negotiate

additional contracts with American agents.35

 

31Rodgers to Loomis, 21 August 1905. USCD-Shanghai.
32Rodgers to Loomis, 12 August 1905. USCDeShanghai.
33Rodgers to Bacon, 1 February 1906. USCD-Shanghai.
34Rodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905. USCD—Shanghai.

35Ibid.

124

For the smaller Chinese merchants, that is the local
shopkeepers, the boycott presented a different kind of economic
opportunity,--a chance to avoid the economic losses they expected
to result from the depressed market conditions. Claiming patriotism,
they could repudiate the contracts they had with the Chinese distri-
butors of American goods and thereby at least decrease the amount of
goods which because of the war they could not sell and for which
they therefore could not pay.36

The anti-American boycott--was it for profit or patria? The
merchant role raised questions concerning the degree of patriotism
and the strength of nationalism in early twentieth-century China.

As events demonstrated, profit considerations motivated the Chinese
merchants. While they expected economic gain, they actively parti-
cipated in the boycott movement. They quickly became disenchanted
with the whole affair when their elaborate plans failed to materialize.
On 5 August 1905 Rodgers telegraphed Secretary of State Elihu Root:
Chinese Chamber of Commerce Shanghai very anxious to stop
boycott. Inguring trade generally. Students responsible for
contlnuance.
Rodgers later explained merchant disaffection. The ardent boycotters
had forced them to cancel their pre-boycott contracts with American

businessmen. Following suit, native shopkeepers repudiated their

contracts and debts with Chinese merchants and returned American goods.

 

36Rodgers to Bacon, 1 February 1906. USCD-Shanghai.

37Rodgers to Root, 5 August 1905. USCDbShanghai.

125

The merchants faced ruin, or so they thought.38 Consequently, the
merchants continued to support the anti-American boycott only reluc-
tantly, that is under duress.39 When the Manchurian market opened
their patriotism evaporated completely.4O Although the immigration
issue remained unresolved, Chinese merchants now pressured the local
officials to restrain the boycott.41

The consular despatches therefore revealed certain limitations
to nationalism in early twentieth-century China. The spirit of
nationalism had failed to capture the minds and hearts of all Chinese.
This uneven development of nationalism presented problems. With
unity of purpose absent, concerted action proved difficult. Because
the merchants and students started from different premises, the
relationship between them.was strained from the beginning, and
merchant-student cooperation in the boycott movement was unavoidably
brief. Consular awareness of the weakness of nationalism within the
Chinese merchant class did not, however, lead the consuls to minimize
the strength of nationalism. They were fully aware of the nationalist
orientation of the students and of its implications. This was apparent

in the consular reports concerning the activities and objectives of

 

38Bodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905. USCD-Shanghai. Settling
days went well for the Chinese merchants after all. See below, p. 142.

39Lay to Loomis, 16 August 1905. USCD-Canton. Lay reported
anonymous letters threatening Chinese merchants with death if they
continued to deal in American goods.

4ORodgers to Bacon, 31 March 1906. USCD-Shanghai.

Alsee below, pp. 138-139.

126

the students before whom everyone,--merchants, officials, and people,
appeared powerless.

Regardless of what group had actually started the boycott,
Minister Rockhill believed that the whole idea originated with the
nationalist-oriented Chinese students.42 Reports from the other
consuls substantiated the Nfinister's conclusion. William Martin,
the Consul at Hankow, reported that the students from non-official
families educated abroad, especially those associated with American
educational enterprises, were the ". . . most vehement advocates of
the American boycott. . . ."43 Although Consul Gracey considered
the Shanghai merchants responsible for starting the boycott, he found
that in Fuchow the students were its backbone.44 To further confuse
the issue, the 10 May meeting at Shanghai to consider the boycott
proposal, while dominated by merchants, had also included students
and literati. Finally, even if the students had not conceived the
boycott, they assumed control of it at an early date and championed
the cause long after the Chinese merchants had abandoned it.

The despatches from American consular officers suggested that
for the students resolving the immigration issue was but incidental
to the far more important objective of awakening China. Consul

General Julius G. Lay at Canton reported: "Many of the agitators . .

 

42Paul A. Varg, gen Door Diplomat: The Life 9_f_'_ W. W.
Rockhill (University of Ill nois Press, 1952), p. 60. Hereinafter
cited Open Door Diplomat.

43Martin to Bacon, 7 March 1906. USCDbHankow.

44cracey to Loomis, 18 August 1905. USCD-Fuchow.

127

are using the boycott as a cloak for political reasons."45 Rodgers'
reports were quite specific regarding the nature of the students'
political objectives. Identifying the students as followers of

K'ang Yuewei and Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, Rodgers noted that initially they
had expressed little respect for the boycott idea which they had
viewed as for the benefit primarily of the coolie labor class. But
when they had recognized its potential as a propaganda instrument,
they embraced it, then seized control and manipulated it to serve
their cause. For the students the boycott was primarily an instru-
ment for creating nationalism and promoting united action among the
Chinese people, for instilling in them confidence in their ability
and a desire to control and mold their own destiny. When nationalism
had become strong enough to stimulate the people to demand reforms,
Rodgers expected the students to abandon the boycott and proceed with
their anti-foreign, anti-dynastic reform.program.46 Consul Gracey
held a similar opinion, noting the widespread encouragement being
given anti-foreign activity ". . . in order that 'China for the
Chinese' may become a national and popular sentiment-—. . . thus to

put a stop to the Foreign concessions, foreign investment and retain

 

45Lay to Loomis, 28 September 1905. USCD—Canton.

46Rodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905; Rodgers to Bacon, 8
February 1906. USCD—Shanghai. In Iriye's opinion, the boycott was
important chiefly for the opportunity it gave the people to partici-
pate in politics which would politicize them, or "nationalize public
opinion," pp. 224-226.

128

in their own hands the great mineral and other resources of the
country."47
In its early days, when the merchants appeared as the chief
agitators, the boycott failed to alarm the American consular personnel
greatly. They refused to take the merchants seriously and confidently
predicted the boycott would end as soon as it adversely affected
merchant profits. Mfinister Rockhill assured Secretary Root: "I
fancy the movement will stop the day the boycotters begin to lose
anything by the movement; until then there will be much talking and
agitation."48 Lay at Canton had reached a similarly optimistic
verdict:
It is the opinion of some that if the boycott is really
started American trade may suffer to a certain extent in the
beginning, but the fact must not be lost sight of that the China-
man is a keen trader, and he is loath to miss a chance of turning
over a dollar, and he will be in the cheapest and best market
everytime in spite of promised unity of action; and I apprehend
that the American merchants need not have any great alarm as to
the boycott lasting for any considerable length of time: Time
alone will tell the result.
Time favored the boycott, particularly in Canton. In the
days immediately following the inception of the boycott, the consuls
worried primarily about its economic effect. All agreed that it would
inflict inestimable damage to America's China trade. Consul General
Rodgers noted that the news of the boycott was slowly penetrating

and taking root in the interior. The news of its end would travel

 

47Gracey to Bacon, 20 March 1906. USCD-Fuchow.
48Rockhill to Root, 26 July 1905. USFR, p. 211.

49Lay to Loomis, 10 July 1905. USCDbCanton.

129

just as slowly, and by the time former trade conditions had returned
the small merchant would have taken his business elsewhere. Rodgers
therefore concluded ". . . the great damage the movement has done will
be felt by all American firms for months and perhaps years after all
is settled at the treaty ports."5O He estimated the boycott's effect
on the total value of all foreign goods at Shanghai alone "conser-
vatively" at twenty-five million dollars gold.51 A similar condition
prevailed at Canton where Lay estimated ". . . American trade is
suffering half a million dollars gold, a month, . . . and furthermore
it will be difficult to dislodge our competitors who are steadily
gaining a firm foothold."52
Consular concern with the effects of the boycott increased in
intensity as the movement gained momentum and the merchants relin-
quished control to the students. The political implications of the
boycott were spine-chilling, particularly for those who had experienced
the Boxer days. Anti-American activity was especially bitter in
Fukien Province. Consul Anderson felt that the boycott propaganda
seriously threatened the personal safety of Americans in his region.53
Consul Gracey reported "the Anti-foreign element of the Chinese people

are using the Boycott movement . . . to bring out their hatred of

 

5OBodgers to Loomis, 27 July 1905. USCD-Shanghai.
51Rodgers to Loomis, 12 August 1905. USCD-Shanghai.
52Lay to Loomis, 12 September 1905. USCDbCanton.

53Anderson to the Department of State, 25 July 1905. USCD-

130

the foreigner."54 In a lengthy report on the nature, strength, and
implications of the movement, Gracey pooh-poohed those who regarded
it as a mere spasm. Regarding the effectiveness of the boycott
propaganda, he concluded:

Although the officials may try to stop such performances,

. . . they can not stop the spread of the spirit of hate which

has already been sown to the four winds of heaven and no power

can recall them. They will find reception in a soil already

prepared in the universal dislike of all foreigners, everywhere

prevalent. The damage done to American trade, and the unfriendly

feeling engendered against Americans especially, can not be

estimated, and this is sure to increase for some time to come.

. . . No amount of official influence in proclamations can turn

this tide back again. . . .55
Lay reported that the anti-American movement in the Canton region had
quickly acquired a general anti-foreign character, and he feared it
would lead to attacks on the missionaries in the interior.56 Rodgers
seconded Lay's observation, adding that it had become anti-dynastic
as well.57

Other foreign residents of China echoed the opinions of the

American consuls. The British NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS wrote that the
boycott, now under student control, ". . . from.being anti-American,
is becoming anti-foreign and anti—dynastic." All agreed with the
editor's opinion that ". . . Peking must be made to realise the

gravity of the movement, . . . , that the Central Government, through

 

54Gracey to Loomis, 18 July 1905. USCD-Fuchow.
55Gracey to Bacon, 29 November 1905. USCD—Fuchow.

56Lay to Loomis, 22 July 1905; Lay to Loomis, 24 July 1905.
USCD-Canton.

57Rodgers to Loomis, 21 August 1905. USCD—Shanghai.

131

the provincial authorities, must put it down."

From the beginning of the boycott movement the United States
had adopted a firm policy in dealing with the imperial government.
When he arrived in China in mid-May 1905, Minister Rockhill had
attempted to persuade the Shanghai merchants of the folly and law-
lessness of their proposed boycott. Upon arriving in Peking he had
urged and then pressured the imperial government to suppress the
movement before it became uncontrollable. As noted earlier, the
failure of the imperial government to respond adequately led Rockhill
and the Department to suspect it of duplicity as well as complicity
in the movement. subsequent events in America reinforced their
suspicions. J. S. Gardner, an immigration authority and Chinese
interpreter saw posted in the Chinese Consulate at San Francisco a
proclamation from the imperial government which read ". . . the said
boycott this department [Foreign Office] has never at anytime pro-
hibited or obstructed. . . ."59 Subsequently, Minister Rockhill
suggested to the Department that the United States pursue a stronger
policy. Within a few days the Department instructed Rockhill to

proceed with his plan "to notify the Chinese government that under

 

581nclosure 2 in Rodgers to Loomis, 17 August 1905. USCD-
Shanghai. Iriye has taken the opposite view, maintaining that the
boycotters were supporting the imperial government in its negotiations
with the powers. Iriye's position also differs from the traditional
interpretation regarding the role boycotts have played in Chinese
history, pp. 224-225.

59Subinclosure in A. A. Adee to Root, 26 July 1905. USFR,
pp. 209-210.

132

the provision of Article 15 of the treaty of 1858 it will be held
responsible for any loss sustained by the American trade on account
of any failure on the part of China to stop the present organized
movement against the United States. In addition, Rockhill refused
to discuss the pending immigration treaty until the boycott had
ended. He also demanded that the central government punish taot'ai
Tseng Shao-ching, the coordinator of the boycott effort at Shanghai,
by depriving him of his rank.60

In response the imperial government again notified Rockhill
that it had admonished the provincial authorities to suppress the
movement with haste. But the boycott continued, increased in strength,
and spread throughout the Yangtze Valley, raising the question whether
the central government was in fact able to control provincial affairs.

The consuls, too, had attributed the success of the boycott
to the failure of the officials to suppress the movement. The offi-
cials, they observed, had consistently ignored the imperial edicts.
Rodgers reported that ". . . owing to the inactivity and opposition
[to the Throne] of the Chinese officials" the boycott agitation had
spread from Shanghai up the Yangtze Valley where "posters and
placards representing grossly exaggerated American treatment of
Chinese are being displayed, and notices published warning the people

61

against Americans." Lay cabled the Department that Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan,

 

6OAdee to Rockhill, 5 August 1905. USFR, p. 212; Varg,
Open Door Diplomat, pp. 64-65.

61Rodgers to Loomis, 27 July 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

133

Viceroy of the Liang-Kwang Provinces, had issued an "insufficient
Proclamation," and, consequently, "the agitation[ was:]spreading."
The degree of the boycott's success was such, he observed, that a
sampan woman had refused a box because it contained American goods,
and several Chinese boys had withdrawn from the Christian college
because it was an.American institution.62
Consular explanations of the officials' reaction to the
boycott varied. While some consuls considered them too weak to
restrain it, others felt that they sympathized with the movement.
Consul Gracey noted that boycott placards in the Fuchow region had
official sanction.63 Consul Anderson reported that the officials
in Amoy sympathized with the boycott, noting, however, ". . . they
have not the physical or moral stamina to oppose it if they were not
in sympathy with it.64 A riot in connection with a crooked lottery
led Anderson to conclude "local officials here are powerless, .
to prevent the most open and continued disorder." Should the boycott
develop a popular phase, he warned Minister Rockhill, "there would
be no protection for the property of Americans, or indeed for that
of foreigners generally."65 Lay was certain that the officials in

Canton were sympathizing with the boycotters. In fact, he considered

 

62Lay to Root, 16 August 1905. USCD-Canton.
63Gracey to Loomis, 18 August 1905. USCD-Fuchow.

64Anderson to the Department of State, 25 July 1905. USCD-
Amoy.

65Anderson to Rockhill, 16 August 1905. USCD-Amoy.

134

Viceroy Ts'en to be "the chief agitator."66 In the early days of the
movement, Lay had reported "the best evidence of . . . [official]
connivance . . . [was their] neglect . . . to do the utmost to stop

this dangerous boycott. . . ." Lay's cablegram to Secretary Root,
"68
. 1

". . . the Viceroy could [suppress] entire movement .

suggested that Lay believed Viceroy Ts'en to be stronger than Chinese
nationalism.
Other members of the diplomatic corps attributed official
intransigence to their weakness; they simply were powerless to
challenge the popular will. Percival S. Heintzleman, Vice Consul
General at Canton, therefore disagreed with his superior officer.
Noting that the boycott was thriving in Kwantung Province, Heintzle-
man reported:
I was given to understand that at this particular time when
there is an undercurrent of feeling and the anti-government
party especially in South is exhibiting unusual signs of
unrest and of growing discontent with the reigning Dynasty,
it is well nigh impossible for the Viceroy to exert more than
a mere semblagge of power and cater to the inclination of the
people, . . .

Although Consul General Rodgers noted the existence of "official

sympathy" with the boycott, all his reports conveyed the feeling

that the officials could not have restrained the popular movement

even had they opposed. In his opinion the central government was

 

66Lay to Bacon, 3 January 1906. USCD-Canton.
67Lay to Loomis, 9 August 1905. USCD-Canton.
68Lay to Root, 16 August, 1905. USCD-Canton.

69Heintzleman's report to Lay, 28 September 1905, inclosure
in Lay to Loomis, 28 September 1905. USCD—Canton.

135

powerless to control the Yangtze officials who despised its authority.
Rodgers warned the Department against retaliatory measures, suggesting
that even rumors of such action could provoke a recurrence of the
Boxer horror in the outlying districts.'70

The opinions of Consuls Anderson, Heintzleman, and Rodgers
coincided with those of the American.Mfinister. Although he could
openly admit it to no one, Rockhill based the United States policy
during the anti-American boycott on the premises that the provincial
officials actually had little control over the people and that these
same authorities were autonomous. The role Rockhill expected the
central government to play in preserving China's integrity forced
him, however, to maintain the fiction of its sovereignty. Given
this Situation and the nature of American objectives in China, the
methods Rockhill could employ in implementing America's China policy
quickly cancelled out to one: diplomatic pressure,--firmly but
carefully applied. It was imperative to avoid threats of military
intervention. Mfilitary pressure could transform the anti-American
boycott into a wholesale anti-foreign, anti-dynastic movement that
would endanger foreign lives and property and probably topple the
Manchu dynasty.

Rockhill's experiences during the Boxer Rebellion had taught
him a valuable lesson. Understandably, then, he became almost

apoplectic with rage when Consul General Lay panicked in mid-September

 

q ‘—

70Rodgers to Loomis, 24 August 1905; Rodgers to Loomis, 16
September 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

136

and requested the Department to send the U.S.S. Monadneck to aid
the U.S.S. Callao in protecting the lives and property interests

71 Rockhill immediately cabled Lay: "Make

of Americans in Canton.
no threats Viceroy in principle. I am strongly opposed calling for
the navy when not absolutely necessary, the protection of life and
property."72 Rockhill then severely reprimanded lay:

I am astonished that you should cable directly to the
Department of State for a war vessel without ascertaining whether
this Legation approves of your action. Nothing in either your
telegrams or your despatches indicate any more than the likeli-
hood of disturbances, and the presence of the U.S.S. "Callao"
seems quite sufficient for all such contingencies as may occur.
It is absolutely impossible to imagine that the boycott movement
will end abruptly in a day or so, especially in a locality like
Canton. . . . 3

The United States, Rockhill informed Lay, would rely on diplomacy

in seeking its objectives. When Viceroy Ts'en excused his lenient
approach to the boycott in the Canton consulate district with the
statement: "If more hasty measures were to be taken they would stir
up revolution, and it would be more difficult than ever to ward off
calamity,”4 Rockhill continued his firm posture toward the imperial
government. The Nfinister notified Prince Ch'ing:

. . . The Government of the United States cannot for a moment
admit that the Emperor's representative in the Liang Kiang

 

71Lay's telegram to Root, 12 September 1905. USCDbCanton.

72Rockhill to Lay, 15 September 1905, inclosure in Lay to
Loomis, 28 September 1905. USCD-Canton.

73Ibid.

 

74Viceroy Ts'en to Prince Ch'ing, undated. Quoted by Rockhill
in Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, 3 October 1905, inclosure in Rockhill
to Root, 4 October 1905. USFR, pp. 229-230.

137

Provinces is unable to suppress the agitation, and any delay on

his part to do so will inevitably be understood by my government

as a flagrant manifestation of hostility by an agent of your

government, for whose shortcomings the Imperial Government must

be held responsible.75

The Department of State either had failed to learn the lesson

of the Boxer Rebellion, or it had forgotten it. For, by early 1906
it had lapsed into the "gunboat" policy to support United States
diplomatic representations to the imperial government. Several
factors conspired to lead the Department to reject Rockhill's
approach. The Lienchow Massacre on 1 November 1905, the riot in the
International City of Shanghai on 18 December 1905, and an increase
in anti-foreign sentiment aroused the fear that a Boxer-type uprising
was developing. Although Rockhill pointed out that the massacre at
Lienchow was the product of purely local causes, some of the consuls,
American businessmen, and missionaries led the Department to suspect
that consular predictions that the boycott would lead to just such
an outrage had come true. So it was with the Shanghai riot, even
though Rockhill and Rodgers both informed the Department that the
episode grew out of British attempts to transform the International
City of Shanghai into an independent republic on Chinese soil,

76

dominated by England. The Department, advised by former Minister

 

—rv V.

75Rockhill to Prince Ch'ing, 3 October 1905, inclosure in ibid.

76Rodgers to Bacon, 8 January 1906. USCD-Shanghai; Varg,
Open Door Di lomat, pp. 66-68. For a different view of the Lienchow
massacre see E. . Rhoads' study "Nationalism and Xenophobia in
Kwangtung (1905-06); the Canton Anti-American Boycott and the Lien
Chow antiéMissionary Uprising," vol. 16, Pa ers On China (Harvard
University: East Asian Research Center, 1922). -—'

138

to China Charles Denby, overruled.Minister Rockhill and took England's
position that the Imperial government was responsible for the riot

77 These two

and the minor losses suffered by American interests.
incidents plus reports from the consuls during the remainder of 1905
detailing the development of anti-foreign sentiment throughout China
aroused the Department's concern. The Department ignored Rockhill's
protestations that Chinese anti-foreignism was unlikely to take a
violent form. Even Consul General Rodgers failed to support Rockhill
adequately. After vacillating between the two positions, Rodgers

78 The

finally requested the addition of war vessals at Shanghai.
government complied and also sent additional troops to the Philip-
pines and formulated plans for operations against Canton in the event
of hostilities with China.79

Military operations against China proved unnecessary. By
Spring 1906 the worst of the anti-American boycott had passed.
Although threats to renew it continued, the boycott in Shanghai had
for all practical purposes ceased to be effective in early September,
1905. Rockhill's diplomacy and the Imperial Edict of 31 August
probably played a part, but it was doubtful that they were decisive

in destroying the movement. Rockhill himself attributed its demise

 

77Miller, p. 67.

78Rodgers' previous despatches suggest that he requested
additional vessels not so much because he feared hostilities but also
because he firmly believed they would contribute to United States
prestige in China and would therefore help promote American trade,
one of Rodgers' pet projects.

79Miller, p. 67. For American newspaper reaction to military
measures, generally hostile, see pp. 68-76.

139

to the action of the Shanghai merchants, and Consul General Rodgers
agreed with the AmericanMinister.8O Thoroughly alarmed by the
prospect of huge losses, the Shanghai merchants had cabled Viceroy
Yfian Shih—k'ai in Chihli Province, requesting him to suppress the
movement in North China and thereby provide them with an outlet for
their goods. Yiian had actually moved against the boycott in its
earliest stages and, consequently, attempts of the boycotters to
expand the movement beyond the Yangtze Valley had failed. Yuan's
actions further enhanced his already favorable reputation with the
American consuls. Indicative of consular opinion and prophetic of
later developments was Consul General Rodgers' statement: "A strong
man is wanted here to do what H. E. Yfian Shih-k'ai has done in the
north."81 When the Manchurian market opened, the Shanghai merchants
turned against the boycott, a course of action which perhaps
encouraged the imperial edict.

Although the boycott had subsided in Shanghai, it continued
unabated in Canton and actually increased its strength in the sub-
sequent months. This development was easy to explain. The majority

of Chinese immigrants to America came from the Canton region.

 

80Varg, en Door Di lomat, p. 65. Rodgers to Loomis, 6
September 1905. S ShangHaI. Rodgers also noted the chastening
effect of the recent typhoon and resultant flood which damaged the
goods being held in the warehouses. Rodgers commented: ". . . to
a suspicious mind such an event as the flood with its great damage
and its loss of human lives, is easily connected with the popular
cause; and far-fetched as the assumption may seem, it has had a
numbing effect on the so-called patriotism which was expressed in
the boycott procedures."

81Rodgers to Loomis, 17 November 1905. USCDbShanghai.

140

Therefore, the United States immigration policy had outraged the
Cantonese more than it had the Chinese of other provinces, and the
people in Kuantung were able to force the merchants and local offi-
cials to respect the boycott.

Two developments finally destroyed the boycott in Canton.
Early in 1906 the boycott leadership split into two opposing factions,
one willing to accept a modified treaty while the other demanded that
Chinese be admitted to America on the same basis as the people of
other nations.82 A dispute between the viceroy and the gentry,
the latter supported by the people, regarding railroad construction
administered the final blow. Having cancelled the American Canton-
Hankow Railroad concession, Viceroy Ts'en proposed to construct the
road by taxation. Led by the gentry, the people protested and won
the right to build it by popular subscription. Lay doubted regret-
fully that the project would succeed, but noted "this agitation, . . .
has diverted almost entirely the attention of the gentry from the
boycott, so that for the present Chinese exclusion is forgotten,

. ."83 Despite threats to renew it, the anti-American boycott had

finally ended.

Considering its major objectives, the boycott was hardly a

success. It failed to achieve a substantial change in the United

 

82Lay to Bacon, 3 January 1906. USCD—Canton.

83Lay to Bacon, 5 March 1906. USCD-Canton.

141

States immigration policy. The Foster Bill which would have excluded
specifically only Chinese skilled and unskilled labor, failed to

pass. Yet, the most flagrant abuses in administering the policy
ended, and there were modifications in the manner in which the
authorities enforced the restriction. Non-laboring classes of Chinese
found that the officials treated them with much more respect than
previously.

The failure of the boycott to effect a change in America's
immigration policy was perhaps attributable to its relative ineffec-
tiveness. As C. F. Remer and W. Palmer have noted, the prospects of
a boycott's success related directly to the question of its effec-
tiveness as determined by the boycotters' success in reducing imports
from the boycotted country.84 Because China did not keep records of
monthly imports, it is difficult to measure the boycott's effective-
ness. Only tentative conclusions are possible. Yet, the evidence did
indicate a dislocation in America's China trade, at least temporarily.
American exports to China in 1905 had doubled over the previous
year. The monthly value of American exports had reached U.S. $8
million in April, 1905 but had fallen to U.S. $3.75 million by October,

1905.85

Whether this decline was due to the boycott remains undeter-
ndnable. American consular personnel did not think so. They

attributed it chiefly to the effects on the Chinese market of the

 

84Remer and Palmer, Chinese Boycotts, pp. 23-28.

85Ibid.

142

86 Finally, American businessmen failed to suffer

Russo-Japanese war.
the losses everyone had predicted. Nor, for that matter, did the
Chinese merchants.87 A boycott which inflicted little damage could
hardly hope to achieve its objectives.

A.number of factors probably contributed to the ineffectiveness
of the boycott. It had no organizational structure and lacked
effective leadership.88 Only at Amoy and Shanghai did an individual
emerge and attempt to coordinate the movement on a national level, but
unsuccessfully. No one emerged to take charge at Canton, although
Feng Hsia-wei, who had committed suicide on 16 July near the American
Consulate in Shanghai, was cannonized the "boycott martyr" and became
the focus of loyalty for the Cantonese.

Certainly the uneven development of Chinese nationalism
undermined the boycott effort. With their interests tightly tied to
foreign interests, merchant support of the movement was weak; the
merchants in Newchwang absolutely refused to support the movement.
Unmoved by modern nationalism, the imperial government played a
passive role. It could hardly have initiated, or energetically
supported, an activity which historically had challenged the ruling

dynasty. Nor could the central government have actively suppressed

 

86Rodgers to Bacon, 1 February 1906; Rodgers to Bacon, 8
February 1906. USCDbShanghai.

8'7Rodgers to Bacon, 23 February 1906. USCD—Shanghai.
88For a discussion of this subject see Margaret Field's study,

"The Chinese Boycott of 1905," Pa‘erS‘O§;China, vol. 11 (Harvard
University: East Asian ResearcH Benter, I957), section 4:a, b.

143

the boycott, not without running the risk of transforming it into

an anti—dynastic movement. The failure of the boycott to attract
widespread support greatly reduced its effectiveness and, therefore,
its potential for success. When the Foster Bill came before Congress
in 1906, the boycott effort had disintegrated to a point where it no
longer threatened American interests.

China's failure to sustain the boycott handicapped the
American merchants, manufacturers, and missionaries who hoped to
persuade Congress to modify the United States immigration policy.

In addition, the China market was more a myth than a reality. Conse-
quently, American business interests were less powerful than the
better organized and more influential labor forces who successfully
opposed any meaningful modification of the United States immigration
policy toward China.89

The boycott had served admirably, however, as an instrument
for strengthening Chinese nationalism and for developing a sense of
solidarity among the Chinese people. American consular despatches
were full of comments on the nature and implications of the notable
changes that had occurred during the boycott in the attitudes of the
Chinese people both toward foreigners and themselves. Many of the
foreign contacts on whom Consul General Rodgers depended for news
reported ". . . that at no time in the past have they seen the masses

of the Chinese so given to comparative independence and a belief in

 

89Miller, p. 103.

144

."90 Rodgers himself believed that Chinese

their ability. . .
nationalists would not revive the boycott because it had served its
purpose ". . . of teaching the Chinese generally that there can be
some unity among the people."91 Consul Gracey wrote that the boycott
affair marked ". . . an awakening of a new China. . . ."92 After
noting the "perfunctory way" in which officials attempted to apprehend
robbers of foreigners, Consul General Lay at Canton commented:
"Even thieves seem to have become infected with the new spirit of
nationalism and apparently do not consider that they run a greater
risk in robbing a foreigner than a native. . ."93
All the consuls found the people of 'new China' intolerant of
foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Gracey wrote: ".
Obstructions to foreign operations of all kinds are rife: not only
are new concessions being refused, but efforts are being made to
cancel concessions already granted. . . ."94 From William Martin
at Hankow came the observation: ". . . there is a different spirit
abroad from any ever experienced by foreigners. . . . They [Chinese]

have determined if possible to prevent foreigners from having any

 

90Rodgers to Loomis, 15 November 1905. USCD—Shanghai.
91Rodgers to Bacon, 8 February 1906. USCD-Shanghai.
92Gracey to Bacon, 29 November 1905. USCD-Fuchow.

93Lay to Bacon, 12 April 1906. USCD—Canton.

94Gracey to Bacon, 19 November 1905. USCD—Fuchow. Gracey

noted that the Chinese had been greatly encouraged by the cancellation
of the American Canton—Hankow Railroad concession.

145

. ."95 The

interest in mining, railways, or anything else. .
foreigners with whom Consul General Rodgers spoke insisted that

". . . dealing with the Chinese in a business way is much more
difficult than in the past, . . ."96 Rodgers detailed for the
Department's knowledge the ways in which Chinese were asserting their
independence of foreigners. The Chinese officials at Hangchow had
broken their agreement to accept Consul F. D. Cloud's decision in the
vexacious Huchow Land Case. ". . . The real protest," revealed
Rodgers, "is against any foreigner owning land and by hook or crook
the Chinese now seem determined to prevent it."97 There were also
the Chinese attempts to maintain their treaty rights as to the Mixed
Court.98 Rodgers noted, too, the discussions between the gentry in
Kiangsu and the officials of Shanghai about ousting British capital
and cancelling the Shanghai and Nanking Railroad concession. Rodgers

viewed the issue as ". . . only another illustration of the prevailing

sentiment in China against foreign participation in affairs Chinese."99

 

95Martin to Bacon, 8 February 1906. USCD-Hankow.
96Rodgers to Bacon, 10 February 1906. USCD-Shanghai.

97Rodgers to Bacon, 31 March 1906. USCD-Shanghai. Earlier
Rodgers had noted: "Heretofore there has been no question of the
right of Americans to trade at treaty ports; to own land there; and
to live there. Now, apparently, such right is being questioned daily."
Rodgers to Loomis, 15 November 1905. USCD—Shanghai.

98Rodgers to Loomis, 9 February 1906. USCDbShanghai. The
Chinese had appointed former American Consul General John Goodnow to
assist them in this matter. Goodnow's attempts while Consul General
to oppose British objectives in the International City of Shanghai
prompted this move by the Chinese.

99Rodgers to Loomis, 17 November 1905. USCD—Shanghai.

146

Incredible though it may appear, considering their
observations regarding its effects and implications, the consuls'
boycott experience did not lead them to consider modifying the Open
Door policy in the light of rising Chinese nationalism. Instead,
the consular personnel in China reaffirmed its objectives. The
boycott had hardly started to subside in Shanghai before Rodgers was
identifying foreign competition as the chief threat to American
objectives in China and suggesting ways to counter it. Rodgers'
approach to the problem of foreign influence was based, however, on
a correct understanding of the nature of the threat it presented.

The consular personnel therefore responded to rising Chinese nationalism
by advocating business as usual, although for varying reasons.

Some American consuls little feared, even somewhat respected,
Chinese nationalism; others little respected and greatly feared it.
Consuls Cheshire, Martin, and Gracey were among those who feared but
had little respect for the new patriotism. F. D. Cheshire made a
gloomy prediction:

. . . It is not a patriotism which will be content to sit
quietly at home and evolve schemes for industrial improvement
and development to make China more self-supporting, or to
steadily plod at a general elevation of the moral national tone
so as to make her people respected. But it is a sort of
patriotism which seeks some plausible outlet and excuse for a
prejudice and angered ignorance which is continuelly [sic]
itching to find expression. . . .100
William Martin feared the agitation would not ". . . end until another

outbreak spends itself, and a new form of government . . . is

...................

 

100Confidential report, Cheshire to Bacon, 6 January 1906.
USCD-Canton.

147

established. . . ." Such a movement would be "fraught with carnage
and bloodshed. . . ." He therefore suggested that the United States
". . . be in a position to compel with power, ample protection."101
Samuel Gracey, whose predictions have been noted, thought it
"probable that some International steps may be necessary to check
this matter [cancelling of concessions]."102 Those who feared but
little respected Chinese nationalism suggested coming to terms with
it not by accomodating its objectives as they themselves had defined
them.but by a determination to resist or suppress it.

Other members of the diplomatic corps seemed to have less
fear of the consequences of Chinese nationalism. Consuls Heintzleman
and Rodgers fell into this category, as did Minister Rockhill.
Although he found South China ". . . seething in discontentment,"
anti-dynastic sentiment increasing, and anti-foreignism.intensifying,
Vice Consul General Heintzleman did not think a general uprising was
probable.103 Nor did Consul General Rodgers who believed with
Minister Rockhill that the emphasis in 1906 would be on reforming
China.104

In reality, Rodgers feared the consequences of foreign

competition, especially Japanese, more than he feared Chinese

 

101Martin to Bacon, 8 February 1906. USCD-Hankow.
102Gracey to Bacon, 29 November 1905. USCD-FUChOW-
103Heintzleman to Bacon, 5 December 1905. USCDBCanton.
104Rodgers to Loomis, 8 February 1906. USCD-Shanghai-

Rockhill to Root, 26 February 1906. The Department of State Archives.
Quoted in.Mi11er, pp. 15-16.

148

nationalism. While the boycott was subsiding in Shanghai, Rodgers
reported that all the foreign nations were doing their best to
obtain a stronger foothold in China, and he criticized America's

"seeming indifference" and haphazard operations.105

He suspected
the Japanese of using the boycott and the popularity they had gained
by the war to improve their position with the Chinese to the detri—
ment of other nations.106 By January, 1906, Rodgers had concluded
not that Chinese nationalism constituted a threat to American
objectives but rather that "the Japanese commercial conquest of the

."107

Orient is the real bugbear now. . . To combat this threat

which he had correctly identified as economic in nature, Rodgers
advised the United States to adopt the same approach. It should
systematize its commercial operations and Should establish a com-
mercial department at every important Asiatic consulate or America's
future in China would be dimindeed.108
Not only did Rodgers not fear Chinese nationalism, but he
emerged as positively sympathetic to it:
. . . There is, in my opinion, much respect to be given to the
common sense of the view of an advanced Chinese who said . . .
that 'China's attitude towards the world can only be construed
now as anti-foreign by those who suffer from her independence.‘

If this rule is applied generally no one can iamplain of the
spirit although they may suffer from the act.

 

105Rodgers to Loomis, 14 September 1905. USCDbShanghai.
106Rodgers to Bacon, 15 December 1905. USCDbShanghai.
107Rodgers to Bacon, 22 January 1906. USCD-Shanghai-
108Rodgers to Loomis, 14 September 1905. USCD.Shanghai-

109Rodgers to Bacon, 15 December 1905. USCDbShanghai.

149

There was a Simple explanation for Rodgers' attitude. Despite the
intransigence of the Chinese people and officials, Rodgers considered
a political upheaval ". . . entirely improbable. . . . 'China for the
Chinese' is indeed the popular cry," he wrote, "but that does not
necessarily mean absolute antagonism and antipathy toward those of
other races."110
Minister Rockhill had also concluded that nationalism need
not lead to revolution. While he recognized the anti-foreign aspect
of the movement, Rockhill did not think it ". . . of a nature which
will lead to open, organized, violent hostility to foreigners."111
Rockhill revealed the reasons behind his opinion. The imperial
government, he noted, had committed itself to a progressive reform
program the success of which in Rockhill's opinion depended on
maintaining peace with the foreign nations.112 Moreover, both
Rockhill and Rodgers had been carefully observing the nature and
objectives of the student nationalist activities over the past
months. Their observations led both to conclude that at least in
1906 Chinese patriots would channel their nationalism not into
rebellion but into reform. Rodgers, too, but especially Minister

Rockhill felt that the United States had nothing to lose and every-

thing to gain from a thoroughgoing reform of China.

 

llORodgers to Loomis, 14 September 1905; Rodgers to Bacon,
15 December 1905. USCD-Shanghai.

111
Archives.

Rockhill to Root, 2 March 1906. The Department of State

112Rockhill to Root, 26 February 1906. The Department of State
Archives. The text of the despatch is quoted in Miller, p. 16.

CHAPTER V
REFORM VERSUS REVOLUTION, 1905-1907

Early in 1906 the United States Nfinister to China, William W.
Rockhill, presented Secretary of State Elihu Root with a succinct,
perceptive evaluation of the political situation in China:

The Chinese Government is now irrevocably committed to a vast
scheme of national progressive reform. lpg.zgpy_existence
titlifa‘ioinafifiiiaihli 3.2332312? 3:813”? “it?“ in the idmin’
pmen o e coun ry.
Minister Rockhill thus established for the Department the relationship
between the reform and revolutionary movements in twentieth-century
China. Should the imperial government fail to achieve substantial
reform, and that quickly, revolution seemed inevitable.

Two features of the situation in China in particular had
prompted the minister's report: 1) the increasingly threatening
anti—dynastic and anti-foreign activities of the Chinese nationalists,
whose wrath the United States had recently felt; 2) a sudden burst
of reform energy on the part of the imperial government. In mid-
summer of 1905 the imperial government expanded its educational

reform program and announced ambitious plans for administrative and

political reform. In addition, the imperial government hinted at a

 

1Rockhill to Root, 26 February 1906. The Department of State
Archives. Quoted in Miller, "China in American Policy and Opinion,
1906-1909," p. 16. Emphasis mine.

150

151

new approach to foreign affairs with measures that suggested an
intention to recover China's sovereign rights.

Behind the flurry of activity lay a rapidly developing
patriotism. The rising spirit of Chinese nationalism that had
animated the anti-American boycott was expressing itself in demands
for fundamental institutional reform as well as for reform of China's
foreign policy. The pressure had increased noticeably in 1905 as a
result of modernized Japan's inspirational victory over Russia.
Chinese editorial drawings significantly portrayed defeated Russia
as a predatory bear, suggesting that a growing number of Chinese had
concluded that China's salvation from the imperialist threat lay in
thorough-going modernization of its social, economic, military and
political institutions. The big question of the hour was how to
achieve such modernization,—-by reform or by revolution?

The imperial government's increased interest in reform in
1905 and thereafter reflected its concern with the rapidly developing
revolutionary sentiment in the provinces, with China's steadily
deteriorating financial condition, and with the implications of these
developments for the future of the Manchu dynasty. By 1905 revolution
loomed as an attractive solution to China's problems. Such anti-
foreign activities as the recent boycott against the United States
promoted the revolutionary cause. Extra-governmental and beyond
official control,the boycott had cast the imperial government in a
bad light in the view of the Chinese people and the powers. It
threatened to become a dangerous precedent that could easily degener-

ate into an anti-dynastic uprising. Consequently, the imperial

152

government recognized the necessity of expanding its reform program
if it were ever going to regain the allegiance of its subjects and
reéstablish its authority over the provinces. The centralization of
power in Peking was absolutely essential if the imperial government
was to undertake the tax and budget reforms on which depended the
modernization of China's institutions and the development of China's
resources.

Rather than permit political power to go by default to the
revolutionaries, the imperial government took the only option open
to it and expanded its reform program. It hoped thereby to neutralize
the appeal of a revolutionary nationalism. To prevent revolution and
perpetuate the Manchu dynasty's control over the administration of
China, it was imperative that the imperial government demonstrate
that it could provide the leadership and develop the programs that
modern Chinese nationalism was demanding.

The American diplomatic personnel in China approved the
expansion of the imperial government's reform program that occurred
in 1905. For, the United States China policy was predicated on the
development of a strong and modern China. The diplomats agreed that
Japan's victory over Russia had inspired Chinese nationalism and that
the rights recovery movement was the primary indicator of the nature
of the changes that were occurring in China as well as the chief
vehicle for the expression of modern Chinese nationalism. The
diplomats fervently hoped, however, that Chinese nationalism would
focus its energy less on rights recovery activities and more on

reforming China's anachronistic institutions. They were therefore

153

enthusiastic at what appeared in 1905 to be a new reform departure.

In their feelings concerning the imperial government's
chances of achieving real and permanent reforms, the diplomats
vacillated between optimism and pessimism, between hope, frustration,
and despair. The diplomatic reports discussed the obstacles to
reform that the imperial government faced, and in so doing they
offered insights both into the nature of the imperial government's
reform movement and the nature and strength of Chinese nationalism in
this period. The diplomats noted the provincial officials' opposition
to reform but attributed it less to provincialism than to the existence
of a Chinese patriotism that feared and distrusted, even hated,the
Manchu rulers and that opposed any centralization under the auspices
of the ruling house. The diplomats deplored the absence of talented
men within the administration as well as the imperial government's
inept methods of implementing its reform programs. The diplomatic
reports also questioned the imperial government's desire for reform,
suggesting that its primary objective was to preserve the Manchu
dynasty without relinquishing any of its traditional prerogatives.
The despatches therefore suggested that although the imperial govern-
ment had expanded its reform program following the Russo-Japanese
War, it had retained its conservative reform ideology and therefore
had failed to identify with modern Chinese nationalism. The despatches
also revealed the role that the United States, with the other powers,
played in inhibiting the reform movement and in contributing to the

development of revolutionary nationalism.

154

Confronted in the summer of 1905 with the Japanese triumph
and the increased activities of the Chinese nationalists, the imperial
government announced that it would investigate the subject of a
constitutional government for China.2 It then created a Constitutional
Commission, composed of Manchus and Chinese, and ordered it to visit
Japan and the principal states of Europe and America to study their
forms of representative government and to report to the Throne those
features that seemed suitable for China. AS the commission prepared
to leave Peking by train in September, 1905, a bomb exploded as part
of the revolutionary nationalists' attempt to destroy the mission,
postponing its departure for several months.3 The Constitutional
Commission departed finally in December, 1905, and returned to China
in late summer of 1906.

An edict of 26 August 1906 created a special commission to
study the reports of the Constitutional Commission and to make
recommendations to the Throne.4 Soon the Throne issued two important
edicts. On 1 September 1906 it announced that it would establish a

constitutional government when the people were educated to assume

 

2Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1905. USFR,
1905, pp. 178-179.

3E. T. Williams, "The Reorganization of the Peking Government,"
inclosure in John Gardner Coolidge to Elihu Root, 16 November 1906.
The Department of State Archives. Hereinafter cited "Government
Reorganization."

4Rockhill to Root, 29 August 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

155

their responsibilities.5 The second edict committed the Throne to
governmental reorganization, and the following day it established a
commission to develop programs for reforming the administration of
the empire as the first step toward a constitutional government.6

At the same time the imperial government indicated its
willingness to consider political reform, it accelerated its educa-
tional reform program. An edict on 14 July 1905 conferred civil
service degrees on fourteen Chinese educated abroad and appointed
them to responsible positions.7 On September 1 the Throne issued
an edict encouraging Chinese students to study abroad. Another
edict on September 2 abolished the traditional courses of study,
including the civil service examinations, and installed a modern
educational system in its place.8

November of 1906 brought a flood of edicts ordering extensive

9 A most

administrative reforms within the central government.
Significant reform was that which aimed at "one man, one office."

It abolished overlapping offices and the practice of appointing two,

 

5Williams, "Government Reorganization."

6Ibid.

7Rockhi11 to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1905. USFR,
1905, pp. 179-180.

8Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 4 September 1905. USFR,
1905, pp. 180-182. For details on the new educational system see
Cameron, Reform.Movement, pp. 71-87, and E. T. Williams' report to
Rockhill, 22 DacemEer, I905, inclosure in Rockhill to the Secretary
of State, 26 December 1905. USFR, 1905, pp. 197-203.

9The following material is contained in Williams, "Government
Reorganization."

156

sometimes three, presidents to each board, whereby a Manchu, a
Chinese, and a Mongol watch-dogged one another. Theoretically, it
also ordained that an official could occupy only one office at a
time. Moreoever, in appointing officials there were to be no dis-
tinctions between Manchus and Chinese. The imperial government also
established two new councils: l) a Council to Assist in Government,
which was to determine and represent public opinion; 2) a General
Auditing Office, which was to achieve economy in government. The
economizing objective had political implications; it led the imperial
government to incorporate obsolete institutions into related boards,
thereby abolishing sinecures. In addition, the imperial government
ordered the presidents and vice-presidents of the remaining boards
to formulate regulations governing the conduct of business and to
dismiss any personnel not absolutely required in accomplishing the
work.

The administrative reforms of November, 1906, included two
other important innovations.10 First was the creation of a new Board
of Communications to control the postal and telegraph services, the
railroads and steamships. The imperial government also established
a High Court of Justice as a prelude to the establishment of an
independent judicial system. Both measures were in response to the
nationalistic rights recovery movement which was demanding that China
extend the jurisdiction of Chinese law over foreigners residing in

China.

 

101bid.

157

The imperial government also made attempts during this
period to adjust its foreign policy to the demands of the Chinese
nationalists. On 27 November 1905 it ordered Chinese to sell their
mining lands only to natives of their districts.11 On 22 October
1906 it issued extensive regulations restricting the mining activi-
ties of the foreign powers.12 After the conclusion of the Russo-
Japanese war in 1905, the imperial government introduced reforms
into Manchuria to re§stablish Chinese sovereignty in that region.13
For the first time in the history of the Manchu reign the imperial
government appointed a Chinese, Chao Erh-hsun, instead of a Manchu,
to the position of Tartar General of Manchuria. Chao began to
modernize the educational system and the army and to introduce
Chinese industry into Manchuria. The American Consul General at
Newchwang, Thomas Sammons, reported that the Chinese were planning
to build their own railroads and attempting to establish native
control of the mining concessions by requiring the foreign companies
to establish schools of mining engineering to train Chinese to manage
these enterprises.14 Willard Straight, who had just taken charge of

the American Consulate General at Mukden, reported in mid-November

 

11Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 24 November 1905. USFR,
1905, p. 234.

12Fletcher to the Secretary of State, 29 November 1907. USFR,
1908, pp. 152-1760 '

13Sammons to Colonel John Sleicher, editor of Leslies Week§y,
to be forwarded through Francis B. Loomis, 22 September 1905. -
Newchwang.

1'Z'Ibid.

158

of 1906 that the Chinese official had introduced radical changes in
the collection of internal revenues and was encouraging agricultural
development, was building roads, was reorganizing the police force
as well as establishing a judiciary system, and was attempting to
resist all foreign interference.l5

Even more radical rights recovery activities were occurring
independent of the imperial government in 1906. Changes taking place
in Shanghai offered a good example.16 Since the Shanghai riot of
December, 1905, the Chinese there had been insisting on the full
measure of China's sovereign rights. Chinese nationalists began to
compete with the Shanghai Municipal Council to supervise the growth
of Shanghai: there were plans to raze the walls around the native
city; there were road improvement and sanitation projects; there
were proposals to create a modern volunteer army; there were attempts
to gain jurisdiction over the Chinese criminal class in the foreign
settlement not to levy squeezes but to "'teach a respect for the
law.'"

Also indicative of the nature of the imperial government's
reform program.during 1906 were the reforms it refused to enact}.7

The imperial government retained several obsolete institutions,

namely the Censorate, the Imperial College of Surgeons and the

 

15Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 18 November 1906.
U.S. Department of State. 'Consular'DespatChes.' O,§3'COnsulate'General,
Mukden. Hereinafter cited USCD-Mukden. [——

16Rodgers to Bacon, 28 May 1906. USCD-Shanghai.

17The following material is contained in Williams, "Government
Reorganization."

159

Imperial College of Astronomy. The Throne also refused to consolidate
the Council of Customs Affairs with the new Board of Finance, a
rights recovery measure which would have involved it in disputes
with the foreign powers. .Moreover, the imperial government retained
most of the old-style officials; no new progressive Chinese nor any
with a foreign education received an important position. The Throne
also rejected some of the special commission's political reform
recommendations. In the opinion of the Throne the time was not ripe
for a parliament. But it also rejected the scheme of a cabinet that
would have given the president of each board a voice in the govern-
ment, thereby opening the imperial government to charges either of
insincerity or of excessive conservatism.

After decreeing the reorganization of the central administrative
system, the imperial government turned to the problem of reorganizing
the civil service in the provinces. In early December, 1906, the
imperial government unveiled its proposed provincial administrative
reforms, the essential features of which were as follows.18 The
Throne proposed dividing each province into three parts; a prefecture,
a department, and a district. The reforms intended to make the
officials,--the prefect, the department and the district magistrates,
independent of one another with each one fully responsible for
financial, educational, agricultural, and industrial affairs within

his jurisdiction. The proposed reforms would also establish an

 

18Rockhill to Root, 14 December 1906. The Department of
State Archives.

160

independent judicial system: in each province there would be a High
Court of Justice; under it would be a Court of Justice in each
prefect, department, and district city; the prefects, departments,
and districts were further divided into sections, each with a minor
Court. The reform commission also consolidated the official resi-
dences of the viceroy, provincial treasurer, and judge into one
general office, the Provincial Government Office, with control
centralized in the viceroy. The last, but hardly the least, of the
provincial reforms called for the establishment of local chambers,
with the members popularly elected, which were to discuss local
affairs and prepare the people for constitutional government.

The imperial government proposed; the provincial authorities
refused to dispose. A wave of reaction swept the country and the
imperial government abandoned its provincial reorganization schemes
until Spring of 1907. The proposed provincial reorganization measures
threatened the autonomy of the provincial authorities. By mid-
January, 1907, most of the leading provincial officials had revealed
their attitude toward the proposed reforms. Many of them approved
the proposals; but the Viceroy of Turkestan, Viceroy Chang Chih-tung,
and Wu Chung-hsi, Governor of Kiangsi, strongly opposed reform,
giving as their reasons the uneducated condition of the people,

insufficient funds, and the absence of trained officials to implement
19

the programs.

 

”Rockhill to Root, 14 December 1906; NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS,
"The Fate of the Reform.Mbvement," 16 January 1907, inclosure in
Rockhill to Root, 29 January 1906. The Department of State Archives.

161

The opposition triumphed. For the moment, anyway, reform in
China was dead. An edict on 30 December 1906 deified Confucius and
another on 1 January 1907 reinstated the Chinese classics and State
literature as the foundation of education.20 On 13 January 1907
the imperial government issued an edict attacking the progressive
Chinese officials Chang po-hsi and Tang Shao-yi, both closely asso-
ciated with the reforming Viceroy of Chihli, Yfian Shih—k'ai. It
therefore hinted at the dismissal from office not only of Yuan but
of all reform-minded officials.21 These retrograde edicts raised
questions concerning the imperial government's commitment and/or
ability to reform.

The imperial government renewed its attempts at provincial
administrative reform in early Spring of 1907. Based on the recom-
mendations contained in a joint memorial of Prince Ch'ing and Sun

22 The

Chia-nai, the new provincial reforms were limited in scale.
memorial had argued against introducing the changes throughout the
empire at once because of the varying local customs, the uneven

and low educational level of the people, and the expense they would
ential. It had suggested that the imperial government introduce
the provincial reforms first into the three Manchurian provinces,

where local governments were just being established, and into the

 

2OIbid.

21Ibid.

22"Memorial of the Reorganization of the Provincial Governments
of China," translated from.the Peki Gazette, 10 July 1907, inclosure
in Rockhill to Root, 24 July 19 5. e Department of State Archives.

162

provinces of Chihli and Kiangsi, where relations with foreigners

had proved relatively easy and where innovations had already occurred.
It should then extend the reforms throughout the empire, moving
gradually from the easiest to the more difficult provinces. sub-
sequent edicts indicated that the Throne had adopted the policy
recommended in the memorial.

In April, 1907, the imperial government issued an edict,
based on the recommendations of a special commission that it had
ordered to investigate conditions in.Manchuria, reorganizing the
three Manchurain provinces of Fengtien,Kirin, and Heilungchiang into
one viceroyalty.23 Instead of a tartar general, each province would
have a governor, with all three governors controlled by a single
viceroy.24 The Throne staffed the new positions with Chinese rather
than Manchus, a move calculated, perhaps, to achieve two objectives:
on the one hand, it should silence Chinese nationalist accusations
that the Manchus discriminated against the Chinese in making official
appointments; on the other hand, Should the reforms fail, the Chinese
could be held responsible. Hsfi Shih-chang became the new viceroy
replacing Tartar General Chao Erh-hsun whom the Throne had accused
of unduly antagonizing the Japanese. Tang Shao-yi, Chu Chia-pao, and
Tuan Chih-huei, all proteges of Yfian Shih-k'ai, became governors-

designate of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungchiang respectively and

 

23Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 7 February 1907.
USCD—Mukden .

24Ragsdale to Assistant Secretary of State, 22 April 1907.
U.S. Department of State. ‘COnsular DespatChes.' U.§,‘Consu1ate
‘General, Tientsin. Hereinafter cited USCDbTientsin.

163

responsible for introducing reforms into the Manchurian provinces.25

The Throne also liberalized the memorial system at this time.
It invited the people to memorialize the Throne by proceeding through
certain official channels.26
Reforming the administrative system in Manchuria would prove
a more difficult task than the memorials suggested. For Manchurian
reform was more than a domestic issue; it also raised important
questions regarding foreign policy. A primary objective of the
reforms was the reéstablishment of Chinese sovereignty over'anchuria,
dominated after the Russo-Japanese War by Russia in the North and in
the South by Japan. The natives of Manchuria might readily accept the
reforms, but certainly those two powers would oppose any measures
that denied them the rights and privileges obtained in the treaties
or that threatened to deprive them of the fruits of their military
activities. Japan had already forced the imperial government to
allow Japanese citizens the rights of "promiscuous residence" and
property privileges on the same basis as Chinese citizens.27 Yet,
the imperial government had no choice but to attempt to dislodge
Russia and Japan and to Obstruct the objectives of the other powers.
Chinese nationalism.was demanding the recovery of China's sovereign

rights, and Chinese nationalists were accusing the imperial

 

25Ibid.

 

26Rockhill to Root, 18 July 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

27Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, 24 December 1906.
USCD—Newchwang.

164

government of being more interested in furthering dynastic concerns
than in promoting the interests of China. Manchuria therefore
offered the imperial government an opportunity to prove the nationa-
lists wrong, a chance to become the leader of the rights recovery
movement and thereby demonstrate that it would and, if successful,
could serve Chinese nationalism.

The imperial government issued some of its most exciting
reform edicts in the Summer and Autumn of 1907. On 13 August 1907
it established a Commission of Constitutional Reform to assist the
Throne in the formulation of a political reform program. In
September and October the Throne issued edicts decreeing the formation
of a Constitutional Assembly and the immediate establishment of

28 An increase in anti-dynastic

Provincial Deliberative Assemblies.
activity on the part of Chinese nationalists was responsible for
the acceleration of political reform.

In July of 1907 Chinese nationalists had assassinated the
reactionary Manchu Governor of Anhwei, En—ming.29 This event so
alarmed the imperial government that it hastily expanded its political
reform program and issued edicts aiming at improving the relations

between the Manchus and Chinese. Answering Chinese accusations that

an undue number of Manchus received official appointments, the imperial

 

28Rockhill to Root, 18 September 1907; Rockhill to Root,
28 August 1908. The Department of State Archives.

29For an account of the assassination of En-ming see W. B.
Hull to the Assistant Secretary of State, 29 July 1907. USCDbHankow.

165

government ordered that no preference be shown Manchus in civil

30 It also elevated Viceroy Chang Chih-tung

service appointments.
to a position on the Grand Council.31 The Throne abolished the
Manchu Banner Corps and committed itself to paying the bannermen

a fixed retirement pension at the time of disbandment. In addition,
Manchuria was opened to colonization by the Chinese.32 In October
of 1907 the imperial government decreed that Chinese and Manchus
should observe the same mourning customs, that Chinese officials
should be given the same rank as Manchu officials of the same grade,
and that punishment for Chinese convicted of crimes should be identi-

cal to that meted out to Manchus.33

The United States Legation and Consular reports on the
post-Boxer reform movement and political situation in China revealed
that for American diplomatic personnel in the field 1905 was the
watershed year, the dividing line between traditional and modern
China. In September of 1905 William Martin, Consul at Hankow, wrote

that China was nearer the fork in the road ". . . between things

 

30Rockhi11 to Root, 28 September 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

31Rockhill to Root, 23 September 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

32Rockhill to Root, 28 September 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

33Thomas Haskins, "Memorandum," inclosure in Fletcher to Root,
12 October 1907. The Department of State Archives.

166

ancient and modern, than her best friends ever dreamed she would be
at this date."34 In.May, 1906, Shanghai Consul General James L.
Rodgers wrote: "There is unification of the Chinese people as it

has never existed before in the memory of the present generation

at least."35 Rodgers considered China's new unity responsible for
the great changes that had occurred in Shanghai during the past six
months. For him.the "Significant illustration" of a new China lay in
the "attitude of official China in the prosecution of national

"36 Chinese officials in Shanghai were demanding the full

affairs.
measure of China's sovereign rights. In Rodgers' opinion "the day
of passive acceptance and continuance of time honored methods has
passed. . . ."37
The consuls' reports left little doubt as to what they thought

was responsible for China's sudden metamorphosis. It was Japan's
recent victory over Russia and, as observed earlier, China's own
experience with the anti-American boycott.38 ‘Minister Rockhill noted
the effect of the Japanese victory:

. . . speakers [at a boycott meeting] exhorted everyone present

to maintain a firm foot to show to the world that in this instance,

at any rate, there is a united China. . . . Other speakers showed
how little Japan by her unity and determination had beaten her

 

34Martin to Loomis, 15 September 1905. USCD-Hankow.
35Rodgers to Bacon, 28 may 1906. USCDeShanghai.
36Ibid.

37Ibid.

 

38See above, pp. 143-145.

167

huge opponent Russia, showing the world what Asiatics are
able to do when thoroughly aroused. . . .39

Martin, too, emphasized the impact of the Russo-Japanese War:

The fact that a great modern war has been fought on Chinese

territory at the very door of their capital cannot fail

to have impressed upon those who have the strengthening and

perpetuating of the Chinese Empire under their care, the

absolute importance of bringing her, both in Government and

business, more in accord with western methods.

Japan offered China a model of successful reform. It

served as an example of what a united people with a modernized state
could do. The boycott against the United States afforded China an
opportunity to test the validity of the Japanese model for China.
It worked sufficiently well to accelerate the process of politicizing
the Chinese people. By late 1905 nationalism had developed to the
point that many of the merchants and gentry, the young students, and
even some literati began to demand the modernization of China's
ancient institutions, particularly its form of government. Many
educated Chinese wanted a modern, constitutional government with the
political power divided, checked, and balanced. The students and a
new gentry-merchant class wanted a government concerned with and
powerful enough to promote their interests. They also desired a role
in developing China's domestic and foreign policies. Most important
was the objective of reform,--the recovery and maintenance of Chinese

sovereignty. The treaty provisions notwithstanding, Chinese nationa-

lists were insisting that China, not the foreign powers, develop

 

39Rockhill to Root, 26 July 1905. USFR, 1905, p. 211.

4OMartin to Loomis, 15 September 1905. USCD-Hankow.

168

China's resources.

Regardless of whether nationalism animated China's rulers,
they could ignore its demands only at a great risk to the continued
existence of the Manchu dynasty. Minister Rockhill had perceived
this reality and had informed Secretary of State Elihu Root that the
Manchu dynasty would continue to reign only if the imperial govern-
ment modernized the administration and developed the resources of

the country.41

In his report of November, 1906, Chinese Secretary
E. T. Williams emphasized Rockhill's conclusion. In Williams'
opinion the dynasty's life depended on strengthening its hold on the
masses of the people.42
American diplomats in China responded to the expansion of
the imperial government's reform program with enthusiasm, The
United States China policy objectives dictated that response. The
United States greatly feared revolution. Revolutionary disorder
would promote anti-foreign activities and perhaps lead to foreign
intervention which could easily end in the partition of the Chinese
Empire. The United States had nothing to gain from the partition
of China. American diplomats therefore encouraged the strengthening
and modernization of China along western lines in order to remove

the "sources of irritation" that encouraged internal rebellion and

foreign intervention.43

 

41Rockhill to Root, 26 February 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

42Williams, "Government Reorganization."

43See above, pp. 72-73.

169

The expansion of the imperial government's reform program
was encouraging to the diplomatic personnel. Minister Rockhill and
E. T. Williams noted the depressing effect on the development of a
modern education system of the centuries-old civil service examinations

44

based on the Chinese classics. As long as the traditional courses
of study remained the chief path to official preferrment, Chinese
students would shun the modern schools and China would lack leaders
trained to handle the tasks of modernizing China and developing its
resources. In Rockhill's opinion the abolition of the civil service
examination system was therefore a measure "capable of shaking Chinese
society to its very foundations."45
American missionary educators in China were critical of the
imperial government's refusal to treat the Chinese graduates of the
missionary schools on the same basis as the graduates of the public
schools. Missionary school graduates were ineligible for the govern-
ment's study abroad programs and barred from holding any office.
The imperial government's price for its recognition of the missionary
school graduates was that the missions conform their educational

policies to that established by the government, which meant that they

would have to venerate Confucius.46 The imperial government had

 

44Roc1chill to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1905. USFR,
1905, pp. 179-180; E. T. Williams to Rockhill, 22 December 1905,
inclosure in Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 26 December 1905.
USFR, 1905, pp. 197-203.

45Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 1 August 1905. USFR,
1905 , pp . 179-180 .

46See above, pp. 83-84.

170

determined to control China's education system; the foreign missions
desired to remain autonomous. The missionaries argued that their
schools cost the government nothing, that the mission schools were

not in competition with the government schools since the missions
charged tuition while the public schools were free, and that the
mission schools were superior and could therefore furnish the govern-
ment with leaders trained to perform the very functions that China

so desparately needed. In the opinion of the American missionaries the
imperial government ought to treat the graduates of the public and

the mission schools equally and its refusal to do so was a denial of

47 The missionaries therefore requested Minister

religious freedom.
Rockhill to defend their position.

Mfinister Rockhill favored the missionaries' objectives, up to
a point. Rockhill desired to improve relations between the missionaries
and the imperial government and therefore hoped to see the mission
colleges placed on an equal footing with the government institutions/'8
But the Minister suggested to the missionaries that they compromise
their objectives. In Rockhill's opinion the imperial government was
not ready for so drastic a step as complete religious freedom. But he

felt that the missionaries could achieve their goal of equal consi-

deration of their colleges and graduates if the missionaries were

 

47D. L. Anderson, Soochow, to Minister Rockhill, 20 September
1905; Young J. Allen to Minister Rockhill, 12 December 1905, inclosures
l and 2 respectively in Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 20 March
1906. USFR, 1906, I, pp. 341-344.

48Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 20 March 1906. USFR,
1906, I, pp. 341-342.

171

willing to establish courses of study to prepare their students for
the new government examinations and submit these programs to govern-
ment inspection.49 E. T. Williams shared Rockhill's sentiments and,
in fact, thought that the primary purpose of the mission colleges
should be to prepare "men and women for the service of the church."50
The diplomats were less willing, however, to compromise the
mining interests of American investors. On 23 December 1905 Minister
Rockhill protested to Prince Ch'ing that the imperial government's
order to sell mining lands only to Chinese citizens violated the
commercial treaty of 1903 between China and the United States.51
The diplomats took the same position with regard to the imperial
government's revised mining restrictions, consisting of seventy-six
regulations and seventy-three sub-regulations, that would become
effective in.March, 1908.52 In the opinion of Charge d'affaires,
Henry P. Fletcher, the regulations were illiberal and "if put into
operation in their present form, [would] handicap, if not entirely
prevent, the employment of foreign capital and foreign participation

53

in the development of China's mineral resources." Sir John Jordan

 

49Rockhill to Young J. Allen, 3 January 1906, inclosure 3,
ibid., pp. 344-345.

50Williams to Rockhill, 22 December 1905, inclosure in Rockhill
to the Secretary of State, 26 December 1905. USFR, 1905, pp. 197, 203.

51Rockhill to the Secretary of State, 24 November 1905. USFR,

52Fletcher to the Secretary of State, 29 November 1907. USFR,
1908, pp. 152-176.

53Ibid.

172

had already protested to Prince Ch'ing, and Fletcher expected France
and Germany to follow suit. After studying the new mining regulations,
the Department instructed Fletcher to protest them "on lines followed
by the British Minister. . . ."54 The United States favored the
modernization and strengthening of China that modern Chinese nationa-
lism.was demanding, but it insisted that China conduct its reform
programs on terms favorable to United States interests. The United
States, like the other powers, expected to participate in the develop-
ment of China's mineral resources.

Minister Rockhill hoped that the imperial government would be
able to reform China's political system'but, noting the mediocrity of
the officials the Throne had appointed in August, 1906, to the special
commission to study the reports of the returned Constitutional Commis-
sion, he doubted that anything worthwhile would be forthcoming.55
The Minister therefore was pleasantly surprised by the edicts of
1 September 1906 promising a constitutional government when the educa-
tional level of the people could support it and pledging the imperial
government to undertake administrative reform. But, even though
Rockhill found the proposed administrative reform "most gratifying

. ," he still confessed that he was pessimistic regarding its
chances of being carried out or of being permanent. In Rockhill's

opinion, the obstacles to reform were the poor caliber of the

 

54Acting Secretary of State Roger Bacon to Charge Fletcher,
3 February 1908. USFR, 1908, p. 173.

55Rockhill to Root, 29 August 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

173

officials entrusted with the task, a too ambitious timetable for
reform, and the conservative character of the gentry and officials.56
Events challenged Rockhill's predictions. For, a flood of
edicts in November, 1906, ordered extensive administrative reforms
within the central government. An invaluable report by E. T. Williams
described and evaluated the reforms for the Department. Williams
was most impressed with the reform that aimed at "one man, one office"
which in Williams' opinion abolished the "useless multiplication of

offices."57

The Chinese Secretary also approved of the economizing
measures. For they would "put hundreds of men out of office entirely
. hangers-on drawing pay . . . , most of whom were super-
numeraries."58
Both Williams and J. G. Coolidge, Charge d'affaires in
Rockhill's absence, reported widespread criticism of the imperial
government's administrative reform.program.59 They noted that
foreigners in China as well as young progressive Chinese regarded
the central government's reforms as "mere empty verbiage." Foreigners
ridiculed the retention of the Censorate, of the Imperial College of
Surgeons, and of the Imperial College of Astronomy. They regarded

other alterations as changes in name only. Progressive Chinese,

 

56Rockhill to Root, 4 September 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

57Williams, "Government Reorganization."

58Ibid.

 

59Ibid.; Collidge to Root, 16 November 1906. The Department
of State Archives.

174

mostly Cantonese, charged that the reforms were meaningless because
the Throne had filled the positions with reactionary officials.
Williams admitted that most of the old-style officials had remained.
Yet, Williams countered that none of the officials was "violently
reactionary, and the proportion in any case can not be considered

large."60

He termed unjust the accusation that Manchus had secured

too many positions. For, he observed that the government had appointed

fourteen Manchus, one Mongol and fifteen Chinese to office, capping

the observation with "it must be remembered that after all it is a

Manchu dynasty that rules China," a remark the Throne must have

found gratifying.61
In Williams' opinion, however, the imperial government was

still conservative in its reform ideology. The Chinese Secretary

had reported a division within the committee to draft reform pro-

posals that cut across race lines, with one group intent on establishing

as liberal a government as possible and the other determined to adhere

to tradition. Which group the Throne favored was evident in the fact

that even though the committee's proposals were compromises the Throne

had rejected some of the most important of its suggestions. 'Most

revealing of the Throne's conservatism was its rejection of the pro—

posal to establish a cabinet which would have given the president of

each board a voice in the government.62

 

60Williams, "Government Reorganization."

61Ibid.

62Ibid.

175

Williams' explanation of the Throne's conservatism in refusing
to consolidate the Council of Customs Affairs with the new Board
of Finance revealed the inhibiting effect that the powers were having
on the reform movement: "Perhaps it was felt that so much opposition
had been encountered already from the foreign Powers because of
interference with the administration of the customs that it was better
not to stir up further discussion of the subject."63

Williams appeared in late 1906 to have altered his earlier
attitude toward the conservative nature of the imperial government's
reform ideology and objectives. In 1905 Williams had hoped that in
reforming its institutions China would be able "to graft the modern
system upon the rootstock of the ancient without destroying the
latter."64 In 1906 the Chinese Secretary concluded that the greatest
obstacle to reform in China was its "worship of the past."65 Williams
apparently desired more radical reforms than the imperial government
was pursuing.

Yet, all things considered, both Williams and Collidge reacted
favorably to the reforms. The Chargé d'affaires wrote: "If they
represented the full measure of reform aimed at they would indeed be
lamentably deficient, but as the first step on the long road toward

giving China an enlightened form of constitutional government they

 

63Ibid.
64See above, pp. 90-93.

65Williams, "Government Reorganization."

176

are far from being unimportant or unwise."66 Coolidge was echoing
Williams' opinion. The Chinese Secretary considered the educational
level in China too low to permit popular participation in government.
He therefore agreed with the imperial government's decisions to
establish the Council to Assist in Government, rather than a parlia-
ment, and to retain the Censorate to control the journalists.
Williams never doubted the sincerity and patriotic motives of the
imperial government and felt that it deserved congratulations rather
than condemnation:
On the whole the Edicts forwarded . . . must be regarded

as marking one of the most important epochs in the history of,

China, and while the sanguine will undoubtedly be disappointed

in the results, there seems no reason to doubt that the desire

of the Throne and of many patriotic officials for reform is most

sincere, and that some measure of improvement will follow. We

may hope, at least, that the changes now being inaugurated will

prove to be but the beginning of a movement which will bring
China into line with the most progressive nations of the world.

67
In Williams' opinion the reforms of November, 1906, were only
a "first installment." As evidence, he noted that the Throne had
retained the commission and had directed it to concentrate on reorga-
nizing the civil service in the provinces. Minister Rockhill
reported to the Department concerning the essential features of the
proposed provincial administrative reforms in mid-December, 1906,

reforms that never left the paper on which they were proposed.68 A

 

66Coolidge to Root, 16 November 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

67Williams, "Government Reorganization."

68Rockhill to Root, 14 December 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

177

wave of reaction swept the country and the government abandoned its
provincial reorganization schemes until Summer of 1907.

E. T. Williams had predicted trouble. In his opinion
provincial reform was "a greater task than the one just completed.
The provincial official comes more closely in touch with the life of
the common people and is correspondingly of more importance to

them."69

MHnister Rockhill's December report had also noted the lack
of cooperation among the viceroys.7O Then in January, 1907, Rockhill
informed the Department that "at the present moment the imperial
government is passing through a period of conservatism, and . . . is
much less in love with Western innovations than it was six months

71 It had reversed its educational reforms and had attacked the

ago."
reform-minded officials, including America's favorite, Yfian Shih-k'ai.
The Legation reports in the subsequent months provided
insights into the nature of, the reasons for, and the implications of
this negative reaction to administrative reorganization. As before,
there was no simple explanation for the suspension of the reform
movement. Rockhill initially attributed it to a power struggle

between liberal and conservative officials.'72 The Minister based the

division on geographical rather than racial lines. He found that the

 

69Williams, "Government Reorganization."

70Rockhill to Root, 14 December 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

71

Archives.

Rockhill to Root, 17 January 1907. The Department of State

721bid.

178

southerners favored liberal reforms and that the northerners sought
to retain their traditional powers. Rockhill suggested that Yfian's
difficulties might stem from a debate over foreign policy. Although
humiliated by Japan, Russia was to many Manchu-Chinese officials
still surprisingly strong and a more immediate threat to China than
Japan. Perhaps Yfian's pro-Japanese tendencies had alarmed those who
sought an accomodation with Russia. Although Rockhill regretted both
the halt in the reform movement and Yfian's apparent demise, he
considered them temporary and even good for China in the long run.
For, in his opinion the imperial government was attempting to do too
much, too fast.'73 ‘

Consul General James Ragsdale at Tientsin disagreed with
Rockhill's optimistic conclusion. The removal from office of pro-
gressive Chinese was stimulating political unrest: "Unless some
counteracting force intervenes to save the situation, national progress
and reform will only exist as past memories by next Spring. . . . We
may see a repetition of a Similar state of affairs to what existed
prior to the Boxer outbreak in 1900.",74

In the following months, however, Minister Rockhill reversed
his initial conclusions. A clipping from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS
which Rockhill had forwarded to the Department was indicative of the

Minister's new conclusions. The article cautioned against reducing

 

73Ibid.

 

74Ragsdale to Assistant Secretary of State, 13 February 1907.
USCD—Tientsin.

179

the reform problems to a struggle between the forces of progress
and reaction: "Behind the personalities of the protagonists we may
see the old enmity between.Mbnchu and Chinese, while principles of
government, such as centralization as against decentralization, are
also represented."75 The Minister's reports between March and July
of 1907 confirmed the writer's observations.

Rockhill's evaluation of the proposed administrative
reorganization measures revealed a complex, politically explosive
situation. The reforms would greatly reduce the power of the depart—
ment and district magistrates whom the Throne had earlier accused of
promoting corruption and oppressing the people.76 The reforms
introduced the concept of official accountability: they would
eliminate overlapping functions; they would clearly delineate
official responsibilities; they would establish independent courts to
administer justice. Rockhill approved. For, in his opinion the main
obstacle to reform in China was its incompetent and incorrigible
officialdom. Yet, as Rockhill noted, these reforms tended to con-
centrate power in the hands of the viceroys and governors whom the
central government could more easily control.77 The reforms had

attacked vested interests and, consequently, the local officials would

probably oppose them.

 

75"The Situation in China," 21 January 1907, inclosure in
Rockhill to Root, 29 January 1907. The Department of State Archives.

76Williams, "Government Reorganization."

77Rockhill to Root, 28 March 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

180

The Legation reports suggested, however, that behind provincial
opposition to the reforms was the imperial government's inept methods
of implementing its policies. Minister Rockhill offered an explanation,
other than a desire for personal aggrandizement, for the provincial
officials' apparent particularism. As portrayed by Rockhill, the
imperial government was acting in a manner that could lead Chinese
both to question its sincerity regarding reform and to fear that the
centralization of power would be detrimental to their interests.

First, it had begun to reverse its earlier reforms, a course of action
which Rockhill interpreted as "additional evidence of the absolute
inability of the Government to adhere for even a short time to the

"78 ‘Most serious in Rockhill's

laws and orders it is daily publishing.
estimation, however, was the government's wholesale dismissal of
progressive officials and its appointment of reactionaries, such as
the vindictive Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, the Viceroy at Canton during the
anti-American boycott. Rockhill reported that the government's actions
were unnerving the public. To the American Minister it indicated "a
complete absence of any well-defined policy and showed that the
Government is floundering along without any clear purpose or confidence
in itself."'79

The situation in China as of mid-1907 led Rockhill to despair

of its ever reforming itself. Although the Minister did not directly

 

78Rockhill to Root, 7 May 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

79Rockhill to Root, 20 May 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

181

question the sincerity of the government's desire to reform, his
reports revealed that he considered it totally unable to institute
permanent reforms:

Under such conditions it seems impossible that any great
reform can be undertaken in China,--1et alone carried out;
sporadic attempts at reform will continue to be made, without
a doubt, and many of them will be partially successful within
limited areas governed (as is now this province) by strong,
powerful officials; but beyoga that I can see absolutely no
liklihood of general change.

Consul General Ragsdale emphasized the implications of the
imperial government's failure to achieve reform. It was stimulating
revolutionary activity throughout China‘ Many Chinese nationalists
had concluded that "the reform fiasco at Peking signifies nothing but
a make-believe and no efficient constitutional regime can ever be
expected from the Manchu rulers."81

But, a wave of optimism dissipated Minister Rockhill's
frustration and despair, momentarily anyway. In late July, 1907,
Rockhill found new reason to hope that China might be able to achieve
reform after all. The imperial government had renewed its attempts
at provincial administrative reform. But, on the suggestions of Prince
Ch'ing and Sun Chia-nai, it decided on gradual reform beginning with
Manchuria and the more malleable provinces of Chihli and Kiangsi.82

The Throne had also liberalized the memorial system. Rockhill doubted

 

80Rockhill to Root, 7 May 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

81Ragsdale to Bacon, 11 May 1907. USCD-Tientsin.

82See above, pp. 161-162.

182

the latter measure would have much practical value, but still the
Minister regarded the new departure with optimism: "It shows that
the Government's schemes of reform are maturing and taking shape and
that they are being carefully planned to give a fair share to popular
representation, while greatly strengthening and centralizing the
control and power of the state over the provinces.83

The imperial government's Manchurian reforms were controversial
from the beginning. For they challenged the policy assumptions and
objectives of the powers, particularly Russia, Japan, and the United
States which at this time was more active in Manchuria than in any
part of the Chinese Empire. When in 1905 the imperial government had
appointed the Chinese Chao Erh-hsun, instead of a Manchu, to the
position of tartar general and had ordered Chao to introduce Chinese
industry and modernize the education system, Consul General Thomas
Sammons had written the Department: "Important and highly significant,
indeed somewhat radical changes are in progress."84 In Sammons'
opinion the reform.measures suggested an intention to assert Chinese
sovereignty over Manchuria and were the imperial government's response
to the challenge presented it by the rights recovery activities of
the Chinese gentry and merchants in South China.85 The tartar general's

activities throughout 1906 had dispelled any doubts that may have

 

83Rockhill to Root, 24 July 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

84Sammons to Colonel John Sleicher, via Francis B. Loomis,
22 September 1905. USCD—Newchwang.

8'5Ibid.

 

183

persisted among foreigners in Manchuria concerning China's intentions
to assert its sovereignty over Manchuria.

At this time Japan presented a greater threat to China's
integrity than did Russia. Russian merchants were absent from Northern
Manchuria and therefore Chinese merchants there were free to conduct
their business as usual, whereas Japanese merchants had overrun South
Manchuria and were obstructing the business activities of the Chinese
in every way possible. The Japanese had simply moved into buildings
formerly occupied illegally by Russia. In addition, they were siezing
land, were refusing to pay the taxes that local Chinese merchants
paid and were demanding the rights of "promiscuous residence" and
property on the same basis as Chinese citizens. Japanese demands
challenged the Chinese interpretation of the treaties, as least as
regarded all Manchurian cities except Newchwang, and would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for the Chinese officials to control the
foreigners.86

In the opinion of Consuls-General Sammons and Straight and of
Minister Rockhill in 1906, both Japan's aggressive tactics and China's
rights recovery movement threatened American interests in Manchuria.
Japan had forbidden foreigners, other than Japanese, to travel in
Japanese-occupied Manchuria on the grounds that Japan had not yet
pacified the area but would still be held responsible for any loss of
life or destruction of property. Japan had also bought all the land

suitable for foreign settlement. Japanese goods were being given

 

86Ibid.; Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 18 November
1906 . USCD—Mukden.

184

preferential transportation rates, and Japan was denying Americans
and Europeans both warehouse and docking facilities. In short, Japan
was doing everything possible to achieve a dominant position in
Manchuria before the termination of the occupation period in Spring,
1907.87 For its part, China was refusing to fulfill the terms of the
commercial treaty of 1903 with the United States, specifically those
terms which required China to open the ports of Mukden and Antung
to foreign trade and residence, to permit foreigners to lease land in
perpetuity, and to encourage foreign investment to develop China's
resources.

Yet, the American diplomats disagreed on whether China or
Japan constituted the most serious threat to American interests and
on how the United States should handle the problem. In 1906
Minister Rockhill seemed to regard China as the greater threat. For,
he had written Secretary Root in mid-summer that the United States
would experience "no difficulty in having the cordial cooperation of
the Japanese" in maintaining the open door in Manchuria. In Rockhill's
opinion ". . . the difficulties will all come from the Chinese who
are, . . . endeavoring to restrict at the treaty ports named the
undoubted rights and privileges we have acquired in Chinese treaty
ports, and to assert in this matter as in every other that comes up

their 'rights recovery policy.'"89

 

8'7Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, ibid.

88Sammons to Rockhill, 15 October 1906. USCD-Newchwang.

89Rockhill to Root, 31 July 1906. The Department of State
Archives.

185

Thomas Sammons, however, appeared pro-Chinese in his sentiments.
He recognized that nationalism was behind the rights recovery movement
and, in fact, even considered its demands as legitimate. Sammons saw no
necessary conflict between China's desire to exercise sovereignty over
Manchuria and America's insistance on its treaty rights, provided that
the United States interpret broadly and generously enforce the terms
of the treaty. By that Sammons meant from the Chinese point of view.
He noted that Japan, with full British support, would insist on the
rights of promiscuous residence and property privileges, but he felt
that foreigners should reside on leased territory in international
settlements which, however, the foreigners controlled. Yet, Sammons
also pointed out that as the Chinese brought their institutions to
conform with those of the West the foreigners might have to readjust
their attitudes toward China even to the point of abolishing extra-
territoriality.90

Willard Straight viewed China and Japan as equal threats to
the open door. Straight reported that the "Chinese manifest no
inclination to acquiesce in the terms which have been suggested as
acceptably defining the conditions under which Manchurian cities
shall be opened to foreign trade and residence."91 The Chinese were

maintaining that Mukden was a "self-opened" port and that therefore

foreign merchants must reside outside the city walls and that

 

90Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, 24 December 1906.
USCD-Newchwang.

91Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 18 November 1906.
USCD-Mukden.

186

foreigners could lease but not own land.92

The Japanese had grabbed
the preferred land and were entrenching themselves in advantageous
positions before the end of the occupation period.

Straight's prescription for resolving the problem that
China's rights recovery movement and Japanese objectives presented
to the realization of American objectives contained all the contra-
dications of the United States China policy. In the same breath
Straight suggested that the United States both obstruct and support
China's rights recovery program. If the United States were to secure
equality of opportunity in the face of Chinese intransigence, Straight
felt that it "might be necessary to quote as precedents certain pri-
vileges which, assumed under the aegis of military occupation, are
now enjoyed by the Japanese in defiance of Chinese officials, who
are impotent in the face of such aggression."93 Yet, after detailing
Japan's Obstructions to the open door Straight suggested ".
cooperating with China in defining the rights of foreigners in
Manchuria to restrict irregular Japanese activity and to relieve the
general apprehension of the American and European commercial
communities."94

China lost the first round in its fight to assert unrestrained

sovereignty in.Manchuria. In a conversation between Sammons and the

Chinese Minister to the United States the latter had indicated that

 

92Ibid.
93Ibid.

94Ibid.

187

". . . Japan would not be bound by China's policy of attempting to
restrict foreigners to Foreign Settlements in Treaty ports. . . ."95
But, Sammons also noted that the Minister remained confident that
China would either expel or absorb the intruders. One might there-
fore reasonably expect at least another round.

It began in 1907 and took the shape of administrative
reorganization of the three Manchurian provinces. This time around
both.Mfinister Rockhill and Consul General Straight welcomed the
imperial government's reforms, despite their rights recovery objec-
tives. With undisguised surprise both men remarked that Japan was
extremely suspicious of and was strongly resisting the imperial
government's policy. In fact, Minister Rockhill reported that the
Japanese regarded it as "hostile to all foreigners and to all foreign

interests. Japan's response bewildered Rockhill because he had

found that China's attempts to recover or save valuable rights were

97 Straight's

generally futile or achieved only at enormous expense.
surprise stemmed from.his expectation that the policies of the new
Manchurian officials would reflect their sponsor Yfian Shih-k'ai's

pro-Japanese sentiments and that consequently the Japanese would

warmly welcome the new officials.98 Yet, the consular reports also

 

95Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, 24 December 1906.
USCD-Newchwang.

96Rockhill to Root, 31 May 1907. The Department of State
Archives.

97Ibid.

98Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 19 June 1907.
USCD-Mukden.

188

suggested that China might attempt to pit the powers against one
another. It would neutralize Russia with the threat of a Sino-
Japanese alliance. It would meet the Japanese threat with a policy
of procrastination and by encouraging the other powers to invest
in.Manchuria,99 a course of action which the rights recovery
nationalists would find completely unacceptable.

By Summer of 1907 neither Rockhill nor Straight still
regarded China's rights recovery policy as detrimental to American
interests. Japan was the greater threat. Terming the Japanese
demands on China "unjustifiable," Minister Rockhill wrote Secretary
Root: "China's efforts to put her house in order deserve our sym-
pathetic support and I sincerely hope and believe that she will get
it and that we will not believe in the reported dangers of the
rights recovery policy and anti-foreignism."100

Willard Straight believed that the United States could eat
its cake and still have it. Straight suggested to the Department
that the United States policy toward China should be one of "insisting
upon a full recognition by the Chinese authorities of our treaty
rights and resisting any curtailment thereof, [and] to welcome and
to encourage the consolidation of Chinese authority as constituting

the strongest guarantee of the equality of opportunity in Manchuria."lOl

 

99Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, 24 December 1906.
USCD-Newchwang.

10031 may 1907. The Department of State Archives.

101Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 19 June 1907-
USCD-thden.

189

Within a few months Straight would make explicit suggestions
regarding how the United States could strengthen Chinese authority
in Manchuria in a despatch that contained all the elements of his
"dollar diplomacy."

To American consular officials observing China's political
scene in the Fall of 1907, it appeared as if the imperial govern-
ment's Manchurian reform program was travelling the same road as
had the other attempts at reform. In late September the Throne
recalled Viceroy Hsfi Shih-chang, largely at the request of the
Viceroy himself and of Yfian Shih-k'ai, who was still influential at
Peking. Willard Straight readily apprehended the reasons behind the
action.102 He attributed it neither to governmental insincerity,
inability, or official intransigence but rather to the Manchurian
circumstances. The imperial government had assigned Viceroy Hsu
and the other Chinese officials in Manchuria a Sisyphean task. They
were to conciliate the Japanese and dissipate the animosity generated
by Chao Erh-hsun while at the same time contain Japanese demands
within the limits set by Chinese nationalism in order to prevent an
anti-dynastic outbreak in South and Central China. Viceroy Hsu's
predicament illustrated the impossible position the imperial government
occupied in its last years. It had to serve two masters, imperialism
and modern Chinese nationalism. In the end it succeeded in satisfying

neither.

 

102Straight to Assistant Secretary of State, 28 September 1907.
USCD-Mukden.

190

But meanwhile, Willard Straight believed that he had found
the solution both to China's and to the United States' Japanese
problem. American capital should unite with European capital to
challenge that of Japan. He therefore hoped the Department would
find it expedient to interest American capitalists to establish
banks, acquire mines, and build railroads in Manchuria. For in this
manner Americans could exercise great influence, ". . . an influence
that would be beneficial to China and profitable to themselves."103
Straight explained how it would work:

By identifying us more closely with the development of the
country the possession of such interests would greatly
increase our business. By entering the field now, moreover,
and by allying ourselves, at the outset, with the officials
who, now in control in Manchuria, represent the most pro-
gressive and, at the present time, most influential party in
China, we would aid them in this trying time, and later from
Manchuria as a starting point, still cooperating with these
officials, whose power seems likely to increase rather than
wane, might exiagd our influence and activity to other portions
of the Empire.
Through "dollar diplomacy," as the cooperative policy became known,
the United States would help China keep open the door to equal
economic opportunity in Manchuria and at the same time contribute
to the maintenance of China's territorial and administrative integrity;
the grateful Chinese would reciprocate by facilitating the entry of
American capital into China proper. For the dollar diplomats
Manchuria became the threshold to all China.

Straight's proposals disregarded both the international power

 

103lbid.

104Ibid.

191

configuration and Chinese nationalism. His reports revealed what
factors had led him to formulate such a policy and had made him so
confident of its success. Several forces converged to influence
Straight's thinking: Chinese officials in Manchuria, using tactics
similar to those employed by the Southeastern.Mutual Defense Alliance
in 1900, had assured Straight that they would welcome American capital
into Manchuria because it did not carry with it the threat of poli-

105 a European syndicate which included French and

tical domination;
English businessmen, whose Manchurian interests their governments
had already declined to promote, assured Straight of their one
hundred per cent cooperation in a policy to Obstruct Japan;106 the
final ingredient was perhaps Straight's own nationalism and naiveté
which predisposed him to receive the Chinese and European overtures
and to ignore blithely the lack of support from the major European
governments as well as the problem presented by the rising spirit

of Chinese nationalism which was demanding that China, not the
powers, develop China's resources. All Straight's policy needed was
official endorsement. That President Roosevelt and Secretary of
State Root, who had written off both Korea and Manchuria to Japan,
refused to give. But their successors William Howard Taft and

Philander C. Knox would wholeheartedly endorse the policy with, as

recorded elsewhere, disasterous results to United States prestige

 

105Ibid.

106Ibid.

192

and influence and for China's security, menaced anew in 1910 by
the Russo-Japanese Alliance.107

Despite the optimism with which Rockhill and Straight
regarded the prospects of the United States cooperating with the
imperial government in the development of Manchuria, all was not
well with the imperial government's reform program in 1907. The
assassination of the Manchu Governor of Anhwei emphasized the exis-
tence of widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling dynasty and its
policies. The imperial government had responded with edicts designed
to reduce the tension between the Manchus and Chinese and by appointing
the well-known Chang Chih-tung to the Grand Council. Minister
Rockhill approved the Throne's efforts to reduce the ethnic tensions,
but he was critical of Chang's appointment. He noted that Chang
Chih-tung was pro-Japanese and "imbued with the superiority of old

108 In Rockhill's opinion

Chinese education and modes of thought."
the cause of modern education in China, with America exercising
influence, would suffer with the elevation of conservative officials
to office.

The imperial government's lack of progress in reforming
China's political system was also discouraging to Minister Rockhill.
He reported that the Throne had acted upon a suggestion of Yfian
Shih-k'ai and had sent the Constitutional Commission abroad for

further study of representative forms of government. Rockhill noted

 

107Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, pp. 133-175.

108Rockhill to Root, 23 September 1907. The Department Of

State Archives.

193

that the imperial government sent men of "no known ability or
prominence" and he therefore concluded:

I take it that these comparatively useless measures are
simply decided upon so that the country may have patience while
the government is trying to form an opinion on the question of
representative government in general and the comparative value
of the different methods followed in the countries which have
adopted it.10

The imperial government had promised a constitutional government for
China, had decreed the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly and
the immediate convocation of Provincial Deliberate Assemblies, but in
the opinion of Minister Rockhill it still had not developed a coherent
political reform.policy as of Fall, 1907. Rockhill pictured the
Throne as extremely nervous, "being swept away in the stream of
memorials and deluge of recommendations for reforming the adminis-
tration and strengthening the State. . . . The Government seems to
be catching at every straw thrown it by the men it still considers

as having some strength and clear-sightedness."110

According to the United States Legation and Consular reports
between 1905 and 1907, the imperial government had initially responded
with vigor to the threat to the dynasty's and China's existence by
greatly expanding its reform program. The imperial government had
promised its subjects a constitutional form of government and in

preparation had expanded its educational reform program and had

 

110Ibid.

194

undertaken extensive administrative reforms within the central and
provincial governments. The imperial government had also attempted
to stem the imperialist tide in Manchuria and to regain some of
China's sovereign rights. The imperial government hoped that with
this response the dynasty would become identified with modern
Chinese nationalism.

The diplomatic reports revealed that the imperial government
had failed to achieve substantial reform and,therefore, to identify
with Chinese nationalism. The reports suggested reasons for the
failure of reform between 1905 and 1907. They revealed the inhibiting
effect on reform of the foreign presence and the deficiencies of the
imperial government's reform.policies.

By 1907 it was apparent that modern Chinese nationalism was
growing stronger and that it was becoming more hostile to the ruling
dynasty. The imperial government, the despatches reported, realized
this and had responded with edicts aimed at diminishing the tension
between.Mbnchus and Chinese. It had also accelerated the political
reform program, calling for the establishment of a Constitutional
Assembly and for the immediate convocation of Provincial Deliberative
Assemblies. The provincial assemblies would occupy center stage

during 1908 and 1909.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROVINCIAL DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES: EXPERIMENT

IN LIMHTED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Unquestionably the most momentuous event in the imperial
government's post-Boxer reform movement was the creation of the
Provincial Deliberative Assemblies. The establishment of the pro-
vincial assemblies, coming on the heels of the abolition of the civil
examination system, radically transformed the nature of China's
local power structure, a development which made the political up-
heaval of 1911 something more than a dynastic fall.l It goes without
saying that the imperial government had not foreseen the position
that the provincial assemblies would occupy, that the role the imperial
government had assigned the assemblies and the role these institutions
actually played were entirely different in character.

The establishment of Provincial Deliberative Assemblies was
another attempt by the imperial government to increase its authority
over the local power structures, dominated since the Taiping Rebellion

by powerful military leaders, the governors and governors-general, in

 

lJohn Fincher has demonstrated the critical role the Provincial
Deliberative Assemblies played in China's political crisis, "Political
Provincialism and the National Revolution," in China In Revolution,
pp. 189-220. "" "' ‘——""

195

196

the provinces.2 The assemblies were to supplement the central
administration where it was ineffective and, by circumventing the
local authorities, enable the Throne to mObilize the human and
economic resources which, due to the abolition of the civil exami-
nations and because of the imperial government's restricted power

3 The plan backfired and something

to tax, were beyond its control.
quite different from what the imperial government intended occurred.
Instead of a force for reviving the traditional political
system, the provincial assemblies became a most effective instrument
for stimulating Chinese nationalism, an important force for self-
government, and an influential organ of the rights recovery movement.
When the provincial assemblies convened in Autumn of 1909, China's
constitutional and rights recovery movements merged, united in a new
kind of gentry class which was demanding that the imperial and
provincial governments promote its interests, interests defined by
the requirements of modern Chinese nationalism, and which saw in the
assemblies, under gentry control, a powerful instrument for achieving

their objectives.4

Members of the Chinese gentry class became, therefore, leading

 

2See above, pp, 10-12,

3Fincher, pp. 186, 190, 198, 201, 218-219; The Throne's share
in the total tax revenues declined sharply in the late Ch'ing period.
Yeh-chien wang, "The Fiscal Importance of the Land Tax During the
Ch'ing Period," Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXX, No. 4, August,
1971, pp. 837-8422""'" _—' " " ' "

1' t " 4Finiigrifipp. 209-217; P'eng-yUan Chang, "The Constitutiona-
18 S, pp. - 0

197

advocates of constitutional government. Whether the gentry class
would exercise as much influence on the imperial government's
political reform program as it was exerting on foreign policy remained
to be seen. Given the critical position the gentry occupied within
the imperial system, the central government had to satisfy gentry
demands. This, at any rate, was the conclusion reached by senior
members of the United States Foreign Service personnel who deplored
what they considered a too conservative reform ideology and who
predicted that revolution in China would occur not because of foreign
aggression but because the imperial government failed to honor its
promise to give China a constitutional government.

As the constitutional movement progressed the vital question
became whether the gentry would accept the imperial government's
definition of constitutionalism. The imperial government had decided
to establish a constitutional monarchy like that of Japan wherein
the Throne retained its traditional prerogatives.5 But the provincial
assemblies refused to function as rubber-stamp institutions. Neither
did they become the tools of the provincial governors. The assemblies
became autonomous bodies, sometimes aligning themselves with the
Throne against the provincial governors and at other times joining
with the governors to circumscribe the power of the Throne.6 In
time, and a rather short time at that, the provincial assemblies

became the legitimizers of political power. With their members

 

5Cameron, Reform Mbvement, pp. 113-114.

6Fincher, pp. 205—206.

198

popularly elected rather than appointed, the provincial assemblies
began to view themselves, rather than the Emperor, as the true
representatives of the people.7 When that happened any governing
force that acted contrary to the wishes of the assemblies was in

serious trouble.

The imperial government had committed itself to establishing
a constitutional government in September of 1906. But until mid-
summer of 1908 it had taken an indirect approach to the problem of
forming a constitutional system. Between 1906 and 1908 the imperial
government had concentrated primarily on educational reform and on
administrative reform in the central and provincial governments.
Improving relations between.Manchus and Chinese also occupied a
priority position, especially after the assassination of the Manchu
Governor of Anhwei, En-ming. The political murder and other signs
of popular unrest had spurred the imperial government to action, and
on 13 August 1907 it had created a Commission of Constitutional Reform
to assist it in the formulation of a political reform program. Edicts
in September and October of 1907 decreed the formation of a Constitu-
tional Assembly and the immediate establishment Provincial Deliberative
Assemblies. Yet, according to Minister Rockhill, the provincial
authorities had accomplished nothing toward that latter objective as

of late August, 1908. The reason for this in Rockhill's opinion was

 

7Ibid., pp. 189-199, 201.

199

that the imperial government was still searching for a coherent
political philosophy.8

By Summer of 1908 it appeared as if the imperial government
had formulated a definite opinion regarding constitutional reform
in China. On 22 July 1908 the Throne issued an important edict
ordering the Provincial Deliberative Assemblies to convene within
the next year and setting forth regulations which defined the respon-
sibilities of the provincial assemblies, which established the
requirements for membership and for voting, and which governed the
election process. The imperial government also ordered the Bureau
for the Collation of Administrative Reforms and the Constitutional
Commission to prepare a report concerning the principles to be
embodied in the constitution, the procedures for electing members to
the Constitutional (National) Assembly, and the powers to be vested
in the National Parliament, scheduled to open in 1916. lastly, the
edict directed the Constitutional Commission to formulate a compre-
hensive reform program that would insure the successful operation of
the National Parliament.9

Based on the reports of the Bureau and the Commission, the
imperial government issued another edict on 27 August 1908 in which
it outlined the constitution and detailed the reforms the imperial
and provincial governments had to implement during the nine-year

preparatory period prior to the opening of Parliament. The

 

8See above, pp. 192-193.

9Rockhill to Root, 12 September 1908. The Department of State
Archives.

200

constitution defined the powers and responsibilities of the Sovereign,
the Parliament, and the Provincial Assemblies respectively. Minister
Rockhill divided the ambitious reform measures into five major cate-
gories: l) representative assemblies; 2) financial reforms; 3) judicial
reform; 4) educational reform; 5) administrative reform. The year
1916 would see the selection of a premier, the establishment of a
national budget, and the promulgation of the constitution. The entire
reform program would culminate in 1916 with the major reform objective
of the period,--the convening of the National Parliament.10
A comprehensive report by the Chinese Secretary to the
American Legation, Charles D. Tenney, educated the Department on the
details pertaining to the provincial assemblies, such as the size of
each assembly, the requirements for membership therein, the length
of the members' terms, the qualifications of the voters, and the
organization, responsibilities, and powers of the assemblies.11 The
imperial government based the size of the first provincial assemblies
on the number of qualified voters in each district as determined from
the tax roles and the old civil examination rosters. But it would
reconsider the question upon the completion of the new census then
underway. The size of the first assemblies varied greatly; the

Manchurian provinces of Kirin and Heilungchiang were the smallest

 

logpigr; See also E. T. Williams to Assistant Secretary of
State, 5 September 1908. USCD-Tientsin.

11The following paragraphs concerning details pertaining to
the provincial assemblies are based on material contained in Tenney's
Memorandum.of 15 January 1910, inclosure in Fletcher to Knox, 21
January 1910. The Department of State Archives.

201

with thirty members each, while Chihli was the largest with 140
members, Kiangsu second with 121 members, and Chekiang third with
114 members. The remaining provincial assemblies varied in size
from approximately forty to 100 members.

A member of the provincial assembly had to be at least thirty
years old and be either a native or resident for ten years of the
province in which he served. The edict of 22 July 1908 excluded
certain types of people from serving in the provincial assemblies:
it barred anyone convicted of crime, anyone engaged in disreputable
business, or even suspected of business irregularities, and anyone
whose family members were so involved; opium users, insane and illi-
terate persons could not qualify; nor could office holders, soldiers,
policemen, priests--Taoist, Buddhist, or otherwise, students enrolled
in any school and, finally, primary school teachers.

Members to the provincial assemblies would be indirectly
elected. Qualified voters would choose electors who would then elect
the assembly members. To qualify to vote one had to be an adult male
of at least twenty-five years and meet the same residency requirements
as for serving in the assembly. Those ineligible to serve in the
assemblies were also ineligible to vote, with the exception of primary
school teachers. The edict limited the franchise to those employed
for three years either in teaching or in some other socially desirable
occupation, to those with degrees from a Chinese or foreign Middle
School or the equivalent, to those with the old literary degree of
Senior Licentiate or above, to those who had held an official post at

the seventh civil rank or the fifth military rank, and to those who

202

had any business capitalized at 5000 yfian.

The edict also determined the organization and functions of
the provincial assemblies. It provided each assembly with a chairman,
a vice-chairman, and a permanent committee elected by the members of
the assembly, all to hold office for three years. The remaining
members would serve for one year and for no more than two consecutive
terms. The provincial assemblies would convene annually for a forty
day session with an additional ten days permitted to complete
unfinished business. The provincial authorities controlled the
assemblies to a certain degree. The imperial government had empowered
the viceroys or governors to determine the subjects the provincial
assemblies would discuss. But these authorities were unable to
prohibit the assembly from discussing any issue it chose. Yet, the
provincial assemblies were conceived as purely deliberative and
consultative bodies without legislative powers. The edict had vested
that authority in the viceroys or governors who were free to accept
or reject bills passed by the assembly.

Before preparations for the provincial and national assemblies
could proceed very far, however, there occurred two almost simultaneous
events which drastically altered the complexion of the reform movement.
On 14 November 1908 Emperor Kuang-hsfi died; the Empress Dowager T'zu-
hsi, his aunt and the real power behind the Dragon Throne, died on
the following day. The two deaths had a disasterous effect on the
imperial government's constitutional reform.program. Kuang—hsfiis heir,
Prince Pu-yi, was just three years old. Therefore, his father Prince

Chun, the inexperienced and incompetent brother of the deceased

203

Emperor, would serve as Prince Regent during Pu-hi's minority.
Apparently T'zu-hsi had realized Prince Chun's deficiencies when she
had resolved the succession problem, but because She had expected to
outlive the Emperor for more than twenty-four hours she had considered
them of little consequence. Of the two deaths, that of T'zu-hsi was
the most serious. While the Empress Dowager was at the helm, the
Manchu ship of state had managed to navigate the turbulent waters.
But now, with the captain gone and an inexperienced crew aboard,
storm winds hurled it against one rocky reef after another until
finally, irreparably damaged, it sank beneath the waves.

T'zu—hsi's death marked the beginning of the end for the
Manchu dynasty. The Prince Regent lacked sufficient training and
experience to handle the crisis that was creeping up on the imperial
government. His inexperience went uncompensated for by native
ability. Prince Chun lacked such qualities as prudence, constancy,
magnanimity, political sensitivity, and just plain common sense. In
appointing officials, Prince Chun was inept and unstatesmanlike,
advancing the old-style, often reactionary officials instead of those
who were liberal and reform-minded and favoring Manchus over Chinese.
He was imprudent in selecting his advisors, surrounding himself with
friendly incompetents. Toward those who had displeased him, Prince
Chun was vindictive and often allowed personal feelings rather than
the public, or even dynastic, interests to determine his policies, as
evidenced in the removal of Yfian Shih-k'ai. In formulating policy he
temporized and then was inconsistent in implementing it. Prince

Chun's difficulties stemmed in part from a failure to consolidate

204

his power. Consequently, an internecine struggle for power had
erupted between the Regent and the new Empress Dowager, the wife of
the deceased Emperor, who desired to emulate T'zu—hsi. The sacrifice
this time was the Manchu reformer, Tuan-fang. Instead of stabilizing
China's political situation, Prince Chun's regency further stimulated
the political unrest. Whether the imperial government could have
controlled the provincial assemblies had T'zu-hsi lived is an impos-
sible question to answer. Yet, the consular despatches conveyed the
distinct impression that China after 1908, under the regency of
Prince Chun, was moving toward revolution at a greatly accelerated
pace.

The first casualty of Prince Chun's regency was the Chinese
Viceroy Yfian Shih-k'ai whose dishonorable discharge from public
service on 2 January 1909 provoked a minor crisis in relations
between the United States and China. Ostensibly the Throne had
dismissed Yfian because the viceroy was suffering from an incapaci-
tating illness, "rheumatism" of the leg to be specific. Minister
Rockhill informed the Department of the 'real' reasons the Regent
had purged YUan. Rockhill attributed it to the Regent's personal
dislike of Yfian because the latter had supported the Empress Dowager
in the coup d'etat of 1898 in which the Emperor had fallen with the
reform movement and also to the antagonism of Manchus whose pensions
and secular privileges Yfian's reform policies had destroyed.12

Yfian's dismissal alarmed Rockhill, as well as the other foreign

 

l2Rockhill to Root, 16 January 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

205

ministers, because he feared it signalled the end of the reform
movement and a return to the reactionary policy of 1900, which could
jeopardize foreign interests in China.13 Reports on what had tran-
spired in the meeting of the Grand Council confirmed the Minister's
fears. For Rockhill learned that Prince Chun had explained to those
who had opposed Yfian's removal that, first, Yfian's power threatened
the Throne, and, second, that Yfian was responsible for the constitu-
tional movement.14 This was the first indication the powers had
received that the Prince Regent might reverse the reform program
inaugurated by the preceding reign.

The foreign ministers met in the afternoon of 2 January 1909
at the American Legation in Peking to discuss the reasons for and
implications of Yfian's dismissal. The ministers agreed that Yfian's
removal seemed to be the first step in a policy of reaction. Rockhill
reported that Prince Chun's apparent zpl32'£2£g_regarding reform had
shocked everyone:

The Regent, much to the surprise of those who, like myself,
have known him for years, is showing himself impulsive, self-
willed, intolerant of any advice from.his authorized councillors,
listenipg only to those who lend themselves to his views and
wishes.

Rockhill saw in Prince Chun's retention for future consideration of a

memorial from the Manchu censors which had urged that in the future

 

13Two telegrams, Rockhill to Root, 2 January 1906. The
Department of State Archives.

14Rockhill to Root, 16 January 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

l5Ibid.

206

the Prince Regent appoint only Manchus to the Grand Council or as
Presidents of Boards evidence of a reactionary attitude.16 If
followed, this course of action would constitute a departure from
the traditional Manchu policy of neutralizing Chinese opposition to
Manchu rule by including Chinese in the government, and it would
exacerbate the enmity, already strong, between the two ethnic groups.
Before adjourning, the foreign ministers considered the

problem of how the powers should respond to the imperial government's
apparent change in policy. Pending the approval of their respective
governments, the ministers decided to protest separately Yfian's
removal on the ground that it jeopardized the reform.program which
the powers considered essential to foreign interests in China as well
as to China's strength and independence.17 In the end, however, only
the United States and England formally expressed disapproval of the
Prince Regent's action. Rockhill and his British colleague Sir
John Jordan had concluded that failure to protest might have disas-
trous consequences for reform and foreign interests:

. . . if the Regent should find that he was able to remove,

without raising a word of protest from the foreign Powers, the

man who has been the most influential and prominent exponent

of a policy of order and progress, he would not stop there but

would follow it up as the impulse of the moment and his personal

likes or dislikes might move him and arrest, . . . the progress
of the last few years and bring back the troubles, uncertainties

 

16Ibid. See also Cameron, pp. 119-120.

17Te1egram, Rockhill to Root, 2 January 1909, P.M. The
Department of State Archives.

207

and perplexities of ten years ago, complicated with an impaired
financial credit and a vastly increased burden of national
expense.
The policy of concurrent representation broke down when Russia
and Japan failed to cooperate because, as Rockhill explained, they
saw in Yfian's absence an opportunity to advance their positions in
Manchuria. The European system of alliances meant that Germany, France,
and Austria would remain silent, too.19
The United States and Great Britain applied pressure on the
imperial government, not on behalf of Yfian Shih-k'ai, but in the
interests of the reform program, Mfinisters Rockhill and Jordan secured
an interview with Prince Ch'ing, the head of the Foreign Office, on
15 January 1909. Rockhill informed the Prince that the United States'
concern was not with the particulars of Yfian Shih-k'ai's dismissal but
solely with the policy Yfian represented.2O Prince Ch'ing, who had
opposed Yfian's removal, expressed hope that he would soon return to
power and then assured the two ministers that regardless of what
happened the imperial government had pledged itself to the "policy
of reform and progress initiated in the last few years of the preceding

reign and that nothing would be allowed to interfere with or arrest

it."21 Rockhill thanked Prince Ch'ing for this assurance and then

 

18Rockhill to Root, 16 January 1909; telegram, Rockhill to

Root, 9 January 1909. The Department of State Archives.

19Ibid.

 

20Te1egram, Rockhill to Root, 15 January 1909. The Department
of State Archives.

21Rockhill to Root, 16 January 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

208

confided to Secretary Root that the Throne's big problem now was "to
allay the apprehension this hasty action has caused throughout the

official world in China."22

As subsequent consular reports would
reveal, the imperial government failed to convince Chinese that it
was Sincere in its desire for political reform.

It was in this atmosphere of political intrigue, of uncertain
policies, and of undefined political power that China's first provincial
elections occurred and that the provincial assemblies opened. The
political climate was certain to affect the election proceedings and
the manner in which the provincial assemblies would function. The
nature of its influence became apparent in the Consular and Legation
reports of late 1909.

The foreign service personnel kept the Department well-informed
on the progress of the constitutional movement with detailed reports
on the nature, implications, and effects of the political reforms. The
reports revealed the diplomatic corps' opinion of the reform activities
both of the central government and of the provincial assemblies. In
addition, they suggested answers to the question of whether the imperial
government's constitutionalism.coincided or clashed with that of the
moderate reformers throughout the empire. The consular reports revealed
sharp differences between the imperial government's handling of
foreign policy and its approach to internal political reform. Although

the imperial government had included Chinese in formulating and

implementing its foreign policy, it sought to retain control of the

 

22Ibid.

209

constitutional program completely in its own hands. According to

the diplomatic despatches the imperial government's political reform
ideology and Objectives were essentially conservative in nature and
were resisting the demands of modern Chinese nationalism. IMOst
significant, the diplomatic personnel testified that the provincial
assemblies had moved into the power vacuum created by the weakness

of the imperial government.23 The United States Legation and Consular
reports therefore offered insights into the problems of the cause

and nature of the revolution of 1911.

The American diplomats expressed disappointment at what they
considered the conservative character of the imperial government's
emerging constitutionalism. As Canton Consul General Leo Bergholz
pointed out, the edict had not established universal manhood suffrage.
Bergholz attributed the exclusion of the common man from.participation
in the electoral process to his lack of education. While not promoting
universal manhood suffrage, Bergholz still felt that the imperial
government would profit by further extending the franchise. Yet, he
conceded that at least it had made a beginning.24 Although Minister
Rockhill felt that the provincial assemblies had ample power and that
their members possessed sufficient guarantees of personal liberty to
make them "valuable aids to the Government in enlightening it on the
wants of and conditions of the Provinces," he deplored the fact that

the edict had given the viceroys and governors absolute control over

 

23Fincher, pp. 188-189.

24Bergholz to Assistant Secretary of State, 20 December 1909.
USCD-Canton. 893.00/3512.

210

the assemblies and their discussion subjects; for, he feared it would
"check free discussion and.make them subservient instruments of the
Government for years to come."2

Mfinister Rockhill deplored what he believed was a conservative
reform ideology. In Rockhill's opinion the sole concern of the Consti-
tutional Commission was "to preserve undiminished the autocratic
powers of the sovereign, while bringing him in closer relation with
the people through the medium of the provincial assemblies and the
Imperial Parliament, which are to be purely consultative bodies, . ."26
NHnister Rockhill therefore concluded that the main objective of the
reform movement appeared to be "no other than the perpetuation of the
existing system under a thin veil of constitutional guarantee."27

The consular despatches suggested that the foreign service
personnel favored more radical political reform measures than the
imperial government was sponsoring. Despite their criticism of the
constitutional program, members of the diplomatic corps continued to
hope, and at times predicted, that more meaningful reforms would be
forthcoming. Consul General Bergholz had concluded his report on
just such an optimistic note:

. . . if those who now exercise the franchise for the first

time in the history of the Empire show that they appreciate
the privilege, and the members selected acquit themselves in

 

25Rockhill to Root, 12 September 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

26Ibid.

27Ibid.

211
a worthy manner, there can be little dougg that the scope of
the experiment will be enlarged, . . . .
Nor was Bergholz as upset as was Rockhill by the restrictions placed
on the provincial assemblies. In fact, Bergholz recognized the element
of popular sovereignty contained in the popularly-elected assemblies
and the power that this conferred on these bodies:
The members, however, are not altogether without powers as
will have all the influence which comes from figopular
e thectlons,an ma standlng as the represent mative he eo 1e

they will be enabled to secure the requiSite deference 230 their
wishes which is, perhaps, not apparent on the surface.

 

 

Yet, regardless of the limitations placed on the provincial
assemblies, Rockhill still considered them and the encouragement being
given to popular discussion of important political issues as events
unprecedented in the history of imperial China and as likely to have
far-reaching consequences. Rockhill prophesied that by the time the
Imperial Parliament convened the Throne might discover "that the people
are no longer content with the rights granted them, and that they will
try to wrench from the Throne additional and more real powers for
themselves and their representatives."30 Consequently, the United
States diplomats anxiously awaited the opening of the provincial
assemblies, wondering if China's first representative institutions

would accept the imperial government's brand of constitutionalism.

 

28893.00/351a.
2?;pgg, Emphasis mine. See also Fincher, pp. 188-189, 194.

30Rockhill to Root, 12 September 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

212

Spring and Summer of 1909 were taken up with the election of
the members to the assemblies which were scheduled to open on 14
OctOber. Henry P. Fletcher, who was in charge of the United States
Legation until the arrival of the new.American.Minister, instructed
the consuls to report on all matters pertaining to the provincial

31

assemblies in their respective districts. Secretary Tenney summarized

the consuls' findings and opinions in a comprehensive report to the
Department.32
Consular opinions of the election proceedings and of the quality
of the men elected to the provincial assemblies varied. The consuls
reported strong official influence in the elections, with the offi-
cials in the Manchurian provinces actually appointing the members to
the provincial assemblies. Corruption prevailed in many cases, with
Consul General Bergholz reporting that in the Canton vicinity electors
sold their votes for between forty and two hundred dollars. But in
other districts of Kwantung Province honesty prevailed.33 Other
consuls reported similar variances in the election proceedings in their
districts. The quality of the men elected to the assemblies also

varied considerably from.province to province and within a province,

with some members highly qualified and others poorly equipped for

 

31Fletcher to Knox, 16 October 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

32Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion on the elections
and the provincial assemblies is based on Tenney's Memorandum of
15 January 1910, inclosure in Fletcher to Knox, 21 January 1910. The
Department of State Archives.

33893.00/35141.

213

the position. In general, the consuls found it impossible to make
a blanket statement regarding the election procedures and the quality
of the men elected to the provincial assemblies. According to Chang
P'eng-yuan's recent study, however, the voters elected men of the
gentry class who held civil service degrees, and, therefore, the
gentry controlled the provincial assemblies.34
All the consuls reported "popular indifference" to China's
first elections. They suggested that voter apathy stemmed from
popular ignorance regarding the nature of the assemblies. Some
consuls reported that many Chinese with sufficient property to qualify
to vote had hidden the fact because they distrusted the imperial
government and feared the census was for the purpose of levying new
and higher taxes. The fact that only a small percentage of those
who qualified to vote had actually cast ballots perhaps owed to the
weakness of nationalism and a sense of futility. There was piteously
little in the imperial government's reform performance to date to
inspire confidence in its policies.

Despite their disappointment with the election proceedings,

China's first provincial assemblies favorably impressed the American

 

34Chang, "The Constitutionalists," found that 89 per cent were
degree holders with 50 per cent from the upper level gentry and 39.5
per cent from the lower level gentry. However, Chang studied only
the five provinces of Fengtien, Shangtung, Shensi, Hupeh, and Szechuan.
Cameron disagrees, p. 122, maintaining that the gentry had no taste
for politics and that therefore the candidates were often from the
returned student class who were professional politicians. She derived
her facts from J. O. P. Bland, Recent Events and Present Policies in
China (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott CompanyT—l9l2), p. I25. Eifizher
described the new political class, pp. 209-217, 220-223.

214

diplomats. Tenney reported that "without exception" the different
assemblies had conducted their business "with decorum and dignity."
The consular corps concluded that the members of the assemblies had
revealed "great aptitude in learning methods of parliamentary
procedure . . . [and that] they give every promise of making very
efficient . . . debators."35 The consuls breathed a sigh of relief
that with only two or three exceptions the first provincial assemblies
had acted moderately and with dignity and had not attempted to assert
themselves too strongly. For, they felt that turbulence in the
assemblies might frighten the imperial government and retard the
progress of the constitutional movement. There was no doubting that
the American diplomatic personnel favored the establishment of a
constitutional government in China.

One feature of the assemblies' first sessions in particular
disappointed the consuls. They had found the Chinese people as
indifferent to the proceedings of the assemblies as they had been to
the elections. Tenney's own experience of being the sole occupant of
the spectators' gallery on the day he visited the Chihli Assembly
verified the consular reports. Tenney suggested that popular indif—
ference stemmed, first, from the "academic and perfunctory" nature of
the subjects deliberated and, secondly, from the fact that the
viceroys and governors had determined the discussion subjects which
had led the people to view the assemblies as representing official

interests rather than those of the people. Although disappointed at

 

35Tenney's Memorandum, 15 January 1910.

215

the lack of popular enthusiasm for the political innovations, the
consuls were still sanguine regarding the future of representative
institutions in China, as was evident in Tenney's conclusion:

On the whole, although the Assemblies have accomplished
nothing very stirring and have not, as yet, aroused much
enthusiasm among the people, the country is to be congratulated
upon the success of this first step in Constitutional reform.
Experience has been gained in the forms of parliamentary pro-
cedure. . . . The possibilities of the Assemblies in expressing
the will of the people will be better understood by the people
year by year, and a greater interest will be shown in the elec-
tions than has been the case this year. There is a strong
spirit of democracy among the people with which the nominally
despotic Government has always had to reckon and that spirit
will invariably cause the people to make good use of the new
parliamagtary machinery when they come to understand it
better.

Some of the provincial assemblies, however, had manifested
just such a spirit of independence as the consular corps sometimes
favored and at other times feared. Charge Fletcher reported that the
Chihli Assembly was attempting to secure a greater role in govern-
ment.37 It had nullified decrees from the Throne pertaining to the
levy and the collection of the stamp taxes, and it was demanding a
voice in the selection of officials. Fletcher regarded the Chihli
Assembly as the voice of the gentry. He reported that the local
gentry was rejecting the newly appointed viceroy of Chihli, whom it
considered inept and of low character, as a protest against the Throne's

sudden dismissal of the reform-minded Viceroy of Chihli, Tuan-fang.

Foreigners in China were as upset as the local gentry by

 

36Ibid.

 

37Fletcher to Knox, 3 December 1909. The Department of
State Archives.

216

Tuan-fang's removal. The Throne had given three reasons for removing
the viceroy: he had taken photographs of the Empress Dowager's
funeral procession; he had moved about in his sedan chair with

undue freedom; he had used the trees near the Imperial Mausolea as
telegraph poles. To foreign observers none of the charges warranted
impeachment, and they therefore interpreted Tuan-fang's removal as
evidence that the Court reactionaries were again in the saddle.

The NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS castigated China's central government:

After Yfian Shih-kai Tuan Fang. .A ruler has need to be both
wise and capable when he is as prodigal of his statesmen as the
Prince Regent. But the position in Peking to-day argues no such
genius of government for Prince Chun. If some sacred traditions
had been grieviously outraged, criticism.might stay its voice,
but only in dismay at the hopelessness of an administration that
can find no alternative to dismissing a highly placed and able
offical because some workmen fasten a telegraph wire to a tree.
When, however, we look round upon the present condition of things
in China there can be little inclination to make allowance for
the Government. Complete inability even to take advantage of
opportunities given it, stupendous apathy in grappling adequately
with any one of the numerous problems that confront it, a blind
adherence to a stereotyped.policy_ of what is well described as

SEIftIn Opportunism, character ze the Chinese Administration

tod and must, unless arrested, --1eag% the countgy mpidly
dowEEill to polit tIcal dlsinteggation.k

 

 

 

Mbst significant, however, was Fletcher's observation, based
on the consular reports, that the spirit of independence shown by
the Chihli Assembly was spreading throughout the empire. The Hunan
Assembly had attempted to bring the viceroy under its control by
passing a resolution ordering him to account for public receipts and
expenditures. Of course, the assembly had no authority so to compel

the viceroy, but its action was indicative of its new, independent

38"The Dismissal of H. E. Tuan Fang," 25 November 1909,
inclosure in ibid. Emphasis mine.

217

mood. The Chekiang Assembly had voted to extend its session twenty
days to complete unfinished business, and the members had agreed to
serve the additional time without pay.39 Some of the assemblies
were taking their responsibilities most seriously.

The provincial assemblies were demanding not only a bigger
role in local government, but, contrary to orders from.the Throne
and to consular consternation, they were also interfering with
foreign affairs. The Throne's failure to delimit the Macao boundary
had led the Canton Self—Government Society to raise a volunteer

40

defense corps. Consul Julean Arnold reported from Amoy that the
Fukien Provincial Assembly was obstructing foreign business and
missionary interests. It had passed resolutions to adopt strict
measures with regard to the acquisition by foreigners of land in
non-treaty ports and to demand that the Standard Oil Company return
to Chinese jurisdiction the land it had purchased for tank installa-
tions. The assembly felt that the tanks endangered the lives of the
people and therefore wanted them dismantled. The assembly had also
restricted foreign sign posts to treaty ports. It had ruled that
Chinese who had obtained foreign citizenship could not enjoy the
rights and privileges of Chinese citizenship in non-treaty ports, and
it had ordered the arrest of all foreigners travelling in the interior
with improper passports. Finally, the assembly had ruled that before

the mission societies could erect buildings on lands they had

 

39Fletcher to Knox, ibid.

40mm.

218

purchased, the local officials must first investigate the title
deeds, and the local self-government society must grant its
permission.

Consular reports on the activities of other provincial
assemblies told a similar story. The provincial assemblies of Honan
and Hupei were emphatically opposing the proposed foreign [Hukuang]

railway loan.42

Herbert G. Baugh, Vice-Consul General in charge at
Hankow, reported that the Hunan Provincial Assembly was interfering
with the enforcement of the treaty system. The assembly had passed
resolutions to place the railroads under native control and to
prohibit the use of foreign capital in constructing them; it had
barred foreigners from purchasing any more land, and had also pro-
hibited the employment of foreigners in the Imperial Post Office.43
In the opinion of the foreign service personnel the Chinese
gentry were responsible for the imperial government's foreign affairs
problems. The gentry class was obviously hostile to foreign
investments in China. Its opposition, noted Fletcher, "has forced
the Government unwisely to buy back whenever possible, industrial,

railway and mining rights and concessions heretofore granted to

foreigners, with the result that the development of the country has

 

41Arnold to Knox, 16 January 1910. USCD-Amoy. 893.00/3'75.
42Tenney's Memorandum, 15 January 1910.

43Baugh to Assistant Secretary of State, 25 January 1910.
USCD-Hankow. 893.00/358.

219

been practically arrested."44 The diplomats welcomed the arrival
of representative government in China, but they preferred that the
assemblymen confine their activities to domestic matters and leave
foreign affairs to the imperial government.

The gentry class was leading the rights recovery movement
and to the diplomats' discomfiture was successfully dictating policy
to the imperial government. Secretary Tenney explained the source of
the gentry's power over the Throne. Historically the local literati
and gentry were the natural leaders of the people, and as long as
the imperial government retained gentry support there could be no
successful anti-dynastic uprising. Therefore, the central government
was bending over backward to please the gentry even though gentry
demands jeopardized China's relations with the foreign powers.45
Whatever the gentry's motives, be they economic or patriotic consi-
derations, the activities of the Chinese gentry were contributing
to the development of Chinese nationalism.

I The consular reports testified that the activities of the
provincial assemblies and self-government societies were having a
disturbing effect on the political situation in China. The rights
recovery activities had placed the imperial government in an embar-
rassing position with the foreign powers and were weakening its

authority in the provinces, all which served to stimulate revolutionary

 

44Fletcher to Knox, 5 March 1910. The Department of State
Archives. 893.00/369.

45Tenney's Memorandum, 15 January 1910.

220

46 Charge Fletcher summed up the general diplomatic

nationalism.
opinion:

The Central Government is very weak and does not feel in a

position to take issue with the provinces on any issue in

which local sentiment is aroused, and the various self-

government societies . . . , as well as the native press, by

making appeal to prejudice and the new found sentiment of

Chinese nationality continue to complicate international

issues and embarrass the central government.

mebers of the consular corps saw trouble ahead for the

imperial government, particularly if it hedged at all on its promised
political reforms. Secretary Tenney prepared the Department for
future political unrest:

. . . expect to see the beginning of the conflict between

absolutism and freedom which has usually accompanied con-

stitutional reform in other countries . . . after the people

. . . realize the possibilities of the new form of Government
as a means of asserting their rights and resisting oppression.

48

As revealed by the diplomatic despatches, some of the people,
specifically the gentry, had already perceived the potential of the
provincial assemblies. Mbreover, the imperial government, as portrayed
by the American diplomats, was pursuing policies that were alienating
the members of the provincial assemblies and their supporters. The
activities of the provincial assemblies suggested that their members

had rejected the imperial government's definition of constitutionalism.

Soon the provincial assemblies, with the aid of the provincial

 

46P. S. Heintzleman to Assistant Secretary of State, 23 August
1909. USCDbShanghai; Fletcher to Knox, 28 August 1909. The Department
of State Archives.

4'7Fletcher to Knox, 2 July 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

48Tenney's Memorandum, 15 January 1910.

221

governors, would attempt to force the imperial government to accept
a more truly representative constitutional order. IMembers of the
provincial assemblies, who constituted one-half of the National
(Constitutional) Assembly that convened in Peking in October, 1910,
dominated that body and concentrated its energies on forcing the
imperial government to convene the National Parliament and to

establish a responsible cabinet immediately.

CHAPTER VII

THE TWELFTH HOUR: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY

The year 1910 was the critical year in the imperial
government's constitutional program. The Constitutional Assembly
was scheduled to open that Autumn, and the imperial government's
attitude toward and treatment of that body would determine whether
China's political modernization would be peaceful or violent. The
imperial government's constitutional program could never win the
support of China's revolutionary nationalists. That group blamed
China's weak condition on the Manchu dynasty and nothing short of
the dynasty's destruction would have satisfied them. Yet, pleasing
the revolutionary minority was hardly the imperial government's
major problem. It just had to neutralize the appeal of the revolu-
tionaries' program and thereby render them ineffective. This objective
was within its grasp. By pursuing a policy that appealed to the far
more numerous and strategically located gentry class and the provincial
assemblies through which they were operating, the imperial government
would attract the support of the natural leaders of the people.
Winning the allegiance of the gentry, whose political complexion was
that of moderate constitutional reformers, was for the Manchu dynasty

a matter of life and death.

222

223

To stave off revolution the imperial government had to
establish a constitutional government. This was the conclusion of
American diplomats in China at the time. In the opinions of Charles
Tenney, the Chinese Secretary to the American Legation, Henry Fletcher,
the Charge d'affaires, and William Calhoun, the American Minister
to China, nothing that happened in China, neither internal uprisings
nor foreign aggression, could undermine the authority of the imperial
government as effectively as its own equivocation regarding the
constitutional reform program. Yet, the Legation and Consular reports
regarding the provincial and constitutional assemblies revealed that
the imperial government was pursuing precisely that kind of policy.
According to the diplomatic reports, the imperial government's
constitutional reform program, despite all its unprecedented inno-
vations, was essentially conservative in nature, designed to preserve
the imperial system with the traditional prerogatives of the dynasty
intact. As such, the imperial government's reform ideology was on
a collision course with that of modern Chinese nationalism.

Unfortunately, however, the American diplomats' evaluation
of the political situation in China failed to alter substantially the
policy the United States was pursuing in China. Several factors were
responsible for this. Despite their critical evaluations of the
imperial government's reform policy, the American diplomats did not
believe revolution in China was imminent. They failed to perceive
the real and permanent breach between the Throne and the provincial
assemblies' delegates to the Constitutional Assembly that had occurred

in November of 1910. Then, the diplomats concluded that the

224

revolutionary forces lacked strength, discipline, and leadership
and therefore could not unite the widespread discontent into a
general anti-dynastic uprising. This assessment of the political
situation in China led the United States, with the other powers, to
pursue in essence the same policy that in 1900 had precipitated the

full-scale Boxer uprising,--with precisely the same results.

The imperial edict of 27 August 1908, containing the detailed
provisions for the Provincial Deliberative Assemblies, had also
provided for a Constitutional Assembly. Not until August of 1909,
however, did the imperial government announce the regulations
governing its formation and activities. The Constitutional Assembly
was actually a copy of the provincial assemblies, but it would
function at the national level. It, too, was to serve as a school for
educating the people in constitutional government, preparatory to the
opening of the National Parliament in 1916. The Constitutional
Assembly was solely a deliberative and advisory body; like the pro-
vincial assemblies it had no legislative or judicial powers. The
central government retained complete control over its activities.

The assembly would consist of two hundred members, with one hundred
appointed by the Throne and one hundred chosen by the provincial

assemblies, subject, however, to the approval of the provincial

225

authorities.1

The provincial assemblies' delegates to the Constitutional
Assembly were in a rebellious mood. Before adjourning on 23 November
1909, the provincial assemblies had inaugurated measures to establish
their own brand of constitutionalism, a more representative form of
government. The provincial assemblies of Chihli, Shensi, Shansi,
Honan, Hunan, Kansu, Kiansu, and Chinese Turkestan voted to send
delegates to an extra-official meeting at Shanghai in December, 1909.
The purpose of the meeting was to draft a memorial urging upon the
Throne the necessity of convening the National Parliament earlier
than the 1916 scheduled date.2 Thus, the idea to accelerate the
constitutional reform program, which became the dominating concern
of the Constitutional Assembly when it opened in October of 1910,
actually originated in the provincial assemblies.

The diplomatic personnel at the American Legation perceived
the significance of the Shanghai meeting. In Charge Fletcher's
opinion it illustrated the "rapid growth of the movement toward repre-
sentative government."3 Fletcher also sent the Department an article

from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS which expressed the Legation's

 

l"Memorandumon the Chinese Constitutional Assembly by the
Chinese Secretary," inclosure in Calhoun to the Secretary of State,
25 May 1910. The Department of State Archives. 893.00/405.

2Fletcher to Knox, 21 December 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

BIbid.

226

understanding of the political situation in China at the time.4 The
author predicted that the proposed acceleration of the constitutional
program would rupture relations between the provincial assemblies and
the central government which in late 1909 still seemed as uncertain
of its political reform objectives as American diplomats had pre-
viously found it. Like the American diplomatic personnel, the writer
considered such an event undesirable, "as the country is in need of a
slower process of evolution than is to be anticipated from an open
breach between the Provincial Assemblies and the Government."5 The
writer came to the same conclusion that American diplomats had reached
so often over the past several years. Everyone agreed that the
imperial government had to convince the members of the provincial
assemblies that it was sincere in its reform efforts. Failure to do
so meant revolution:
. . . s_o_ Z_L_o_n_g_ as the members of the provincial parliaments are
encouraged in their_belief that, whatever Edicts may preach to
the contrary, the reg]; authorities in M _h_a_\_r_e_ no intention
of allowing constitutional ggvernment to encroach u on the time-
honored privileges of the 33.1.1225 £13333, Wegatesr—wir

‘t_3_e_ tempted to accelerate evolution by revolutionary methods.
The Central Government may have yet to learn that neither secret

societies nor forei 'aggression' cal-n- undermine the authority
it has so often abused ageffectively as the constitutional

forces Eeated by itse f.U

 

 

 

 

As if deliberately working to insure the veracity of the consular

reports, the imperial government issued an edict on 30 January 1910

 

4"Shanghai and the Provinces ," 14 December 1909: inclosure in
ibid.

 

51bid.

61bid. Emphasis mine.

227

flatly rejecting the Shanghai delegates' petition on the ground that
the time was not yet ripe for the National parliament.7 Undaunted,
the petitioners sent another memorial in June, 1910, again demanding
the early establishment of parliament. An imperial edict on 27 June
emphatically refused the demand, affirmed the Throne's intention to
adhere faithfully to the original reform program, and forbade any
further memorials on the subject.8 Consequently, the provincial
delegates decided to use the Constitutional Assembly as an instrument
to force the imperial government to yield to their demands for
greater participation in the policy making processes of government.
Apparently the regulations concerning the Constitutional
Assembly somewhat disappointed the foreign service personnel. For,
William J. Calhoun, Rockhill's long-awaited successor who had arrived
at his post in Spring of 1910, sent the Department a clipping from
the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS which emphasized some defects in the
program. The author noted that the Throne had postponed consideration
of the vital issue of the national budget until the seventh year, or
1913, and that neither the provincial assemblies, nor the Constitu-
tional Assembly, nor the Parliament had any control over the appointment

or conduct of officials.9

 

7Fletcher to Knox, 1 February 1910. The Department of State
Archives. 893.00/359.

8Tenney's Memorandum, 15 November 1910, inclosure in Calhoun
to Knox, 21 November 1910. The Department of State Archives.
893.00/482.

9"China's Senate," 12 May 1910, inclosure in Calhoun to the
Secretary of State, 25 May 1910. The Department of State Archives.
893.00/406.

228

The Legation reports portrayed the imperial government as
Obsessed by a fear of losing control of the Constitutional Assembly
to the reformers. Charge Fletcher worried that the means it was
adopting to preserve itself would prove disasterous. He referred
specifically to the fact that the imperial government had concentrated
power in the hands of Manchu officials.10 Mfinister Calhoun reported
that the imperial government's chief criterion in choosing members to
the assembly was that they be subservient to the Throne. It had
selected a relatively unknown personality, the Manchu Prince P'u-lun,
as the presiding officer of the assembly with, in Calhoun's opinion,

11 After reviewing the list of

"a view to minimizing its importance."
the Throne's appointees, Secretary Tenney replied: ". . . mediocrity
is to be the chief characteristic of the members of the Constitutional
Assembly. It is evident that the Government is determined to have a
docile and submissive Assembly."12 Minister Calhoun seconded Tenney's
evaluation of the members: "While there is, at the present time, a
conspicuous dearth in China of men of authority and force, it would
yet seem as if the Throne had been careful to eliminate even the few

13

who might have been available." The Minister severely criticized

the Throne's policy:

 

lOFletcher to Knox. 893.00/369.

llCalhoun to the Secretary of State. 893.00/405. It was a plan
which, according to Calhoun, backfired. Calhoun to Knox. 893.00/482.

12Tenney's Memorandum. 893.00/482.

13Calhoun to Knox. 893.00/482.

229

It_i§_this half-hearted suppert 2§_reform.and_the a arent
determination tg_strip it_2£.all'practical'sigfiificance which
would seem to render ominOuS‘thg future of thiS'Empire, even
If’othei'oafises"did-not"eiist. Without Either—the W111 to
enforce, or the strength to repress, it can hardly be hoped
that the transition which China i§_noiprEEifiE‘throngHTJETI

E3 affected without vioIence.IH

 

 

The preparations for the opening of the Constitutional
Assembly occurred in the midst of widespread native uprisings and
revolutionary activities. Predictions of a general anti-dynastic
rebellion were commonplace in China during 1910 and 1911. Edward S.
Little, an American employed by a British manufacturing firm in
Shanghai, noted the political implications of the effect that Halley's
Comet was having on the Chinese people: "In China a Comet is uni—
versally regarded as portending disturbances and disasters."15
According to Vice-Consul Albert W. Pontius at Nanking, it suggested,
among other things, the collapse of the dynasty.16 Dr. J. C. Ferguson,
a long-time American resident of China and confidant of Chinese
leaders, confessed that he had never known a more ominous outlook.l7

Missionary reports and newspaper articles echoed these comments

which had accompanied such disturbing facts as a mutiny among the

 

14Ibid. Emphasis mine.

l‘5Memorandum.written by Edward S. Little to Messrs. Brunner,
Kond & Co. Ltd.; Norwich, England; 16 January 1910, inclosure in
Fletcher to the Secretary of State, 5 March 1910. The Department of
State Archives. 893.00/369.

16Pontius to Assistant Secretary of State, 1 April 1910.
The Department of State Archives. 893.00/374.

17A conversation between Ferguson and Consul General Amos P.
Wilder. Wilder to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1910. The Department
of State Archives. 893.00/408.

230

Canton viceroy's troops in mid—February of 1910, a rice riot that
had begun the following March at Changsha, and the April mutiny of
the government troops at Tsingkiangsu in Kiangsu Province. Summer
of 1910 saw famine riots in the Suchien area of Kiangsu and uprisings
in Shangtung. Autumn and Winter brought rioting at Samkwong and
lien Chow near Canton. Minister Calhoun concluded that with the
exception of North China a "general seething exists which, . . .
seems ready at slight provocation to burst into sudden violence."l8

According to the consular despatches the widespread unrest
was having a sobering effect on the imperial government. Shanghai
Consul General Amos P. Wilder reported ". . . the Chinese Government
is getting pretty badly scared and is trying to strengthen the

governing bodies."19

It had appointed progressive Chinese, Wu
Ting-fang, Tang Shao—yi, and Hsu Shih-chang, to the Grand Council.
Both Calhoun and Wilder, indeed foreigners in general, hoped that
Tang's appointment pressaged the return to office of Yfian Shih-k'ai,
and.Minister Calhoun anticipated an early settlement of the railway
loan issue.20

Neither man appeared convinced, however, that the imperial

government's appointments, made on the eve of the convening of the

Constitutional Assembly, meant a real change in its policy. Wilder

 

l8Calhoun to the Secretary of State, 5 July 1910. The
Department of State Archives. 893.00/ 422.

19Wilder to Knox, 22 August 1910. The Department of State
Archives. 893.00/443.

201bid.; Calhoun to Knox, 23 August 1910. The Department of
State Archives. 893.00/439.

231

recognized the action as a ". . . familiar device of the Peking
government when hard pressed to seek foreign confidence by putting

to the fore men who have prestige as progressives, . . ." and he
therefore adopted a wait~and-see attitude. He hoped the imperial
government could "retrieve something" but feared it was "too late in
waking up to the situation."21' NHnister Calhoun presented the Throne
as "out of touch with the people as much mentally as it is geogra-
phically, cooped up in its Manchu stronghold in the northeastern
confines of the Empire."22 A confidential report by Tenney in mid-
September revealed a "growing dissatisfaction with the weakness and
vacillation of the Prince Regent . . . ." on the part of progressive
members of the Court. Rumors abounded that this party, led by Duke
Tsai-tse, was planning a coup d'etat to establish the Empress Dowager
as the nominal Regent and to recall Yuan Shih-k'ai from retirement.23
There was little doubt that such a coup would have pleased the United
States representatives.

In this atmosphere of political intrigue, widespread
revolutionary uprisings, and foreign pressure on the imperial government
to accept the Hukuang railroad loan the second sessions of the provin-
cial assemblies began and China's first Constitutional Assembly convened

in Peking. If Consul General Bergholz's reports regarding the Kwantung

 

21893.00/443.
22893.00/439.

23Confidential report by Dr. Tenney, inclosure in Calhoun to
Knox, l7 Octdber 1910. The Department of State Archives. 893.00/464.

232

Provincial Assembly were representative of the others, then the
provincial assemblies were in a rebellious mood. The Kwangtung
Assembly was demanding that the central government submit the pro-
posed annual budget to the assemblies for their approval.24 In
Bergholz‘s opinion China was approaching a crisis:

The Imperial Government has given birth to a body which,
unless it can be brought into harmony with the National and
Provincial Governments, may, in time, become too powerfully
successful to contend against. The idea of deliberative
bodies of the people, responsible to the people, and working in
the interests of the people, is strongly taking hold of the
masses. A great social movement is about to seize upon the
public mind to transform it and to hurry it towards an unknown
future. The Assemblies will be the indefatigable instruments
of the new spirit, . . .

The United States consular despatches pinpointed the year 1910

as the critical one in the imperial government's constitutional

reform program. IMoreover, the reports on the Constitutional Assembly's
activities suggested that the imperial government's political reform
policy had radicalized the Chinese gentry who dominated the provincial
assemblies and thereby sealed the fate of the Manchu.dynasty. The
provincial delegates to the Constitutional Assembly, most of whom
belonged to the gentry class, concluded from the imperial government's
actions that the Throne intended to yield none of its traditional
powers and privileges. Consequently, after the Assembly adjourned

many of the delegates returned to their respective provinces and

joined forces with the local revolutionary societies. Others did

 

24Bergholz to Knox, 17 October 1910. USCD-Canton. 893.00/469.

25lzhid.

233

nothing to obstruct the revolutionary activities, and when the
revolution began in 1911 they gave it their support, thus insuring
the collapse of the dynasty.26
After observing the opening day proceedings of the
Constitutional Assembly, Minister Calhoun confided to Secretary Knox:
". . . it may not be going too far to state that the seeds of a
revolution, peaceable or otherwise, are now being planted."27 Consul
General Wilder agreed: "No one can see this Peking Senate in session
without a conviction that old China is dead."28 Prompting these
remarks was the fact that, despite the imperial government's pre-
cautionary measures, the Constitutional Assembly was asserting its
independence. The provincial delegates had easily cowed the Court
appointees and the Assembly had voted unanimously to memorialize
the Throne a third time for an early convening of Parliament and the
establishment of a responsible cabinet.29
iMinister Calhoun doubted that the imperial government would
again refuse an earlier convocation of the National Parliament. He did
not, however, believe that such a course of action was a prescription

for a peaceful China, for two reasons. He noted that the parliament,

to perform responsibly, would have to attack every vested interest in

 

26Chang traced the stages of alienation through which the
constitutional reform delegates moved, "The Constitutionalists,"
pp. 143-183.

2.725 October 1910. The Department of State Archives.
893.00/461.

28Wilder to Knox, 10 November 1910. USCD-Shanghai. 893.00/472.

29893.00/461; Tenney's Memorandum. 893.00/482.

234

the empire. Most astute were Calhoun's observation that reform.in
China had developed unevenly and his understanding of the implications
of that fact. The Minister pointed out that the reform spirit had
seized the educated and merchant minorities while the masses had
remained indifferent, and that the reforms had taken hold in the
Central and Southeastern provinces and in those areas in the North
near foreign settlements but had left distant provinces, such as
Kansu, relatively unaffected. In Calhoun's opinion ". . . a situation
might be created where the different elements in China were likely to
pull in opposite directions. . . ." leading the vested interests into
an alliance with the "retrograde" elements against the progressives.30
Yet, although Calhoun did not enthusiastically applaud the Assembly's
action, neither did he disapprove of it.

Minister Calhoun warned the Department that the proceedings
of the Constitutional Assembly would probably affect foreign interests
in China. For, the members were talking about instituting financial
reforms, investigating into the methods of collecting and spending
public revenue, and, most significantly, inquiring into the terms and
application of the foreign loans. Such close scrutiny of the activities
of the members of the Finance Board and the Foreign Office, who were
negotiating the Hukuang loan, would make them timid. Calhoun advised
that "this new development be taken into consideration by the Department

31

and the American group."

 

30893.00/461.

31Telegram, Calhoun to Knox, 25 October 1910. The Department
of State Archives. 893.00/449.

235

The diplomatic personnel recognized that patriotism rather
than blind anti-foreignism underlay Chinese opposition to foreign
enterprise, at least in South China. Charge Fletcher defined the
difference between the earlier and present spirit of anti-foreignism
in China: "The distinction is rather a fine one, but I mean that such
anti-foreign feeling as exists there is engendered by specific cases
of what is considered an infringement of China's sovereign rights,
and is more or less limited to the foreign nations involved in the
disputes--. . . ."32

As expected, the imperial government yielded to the
Constitutional Assembly's demands for an early convocation of Parliament
and the establishment of a cabinet. An edict on 4 November 1910 set
the year 1913 for the opening of Parliament, promised to establish a
cabinet before that date, and then ordered no further petitions and
the end of all agitation on the subject.33 Instead of propitiating
the Assembly, the edict outraged its progressive members who wanted
the National Parliament convened in 1911 and a responsible cabinet
established immediately.34 But, relations between the imperial
government and the Constitutional Assembly did not at this time reach
the breaking point.

The provincial delegates to the Constitutional Assembly

 

32893.00/369.

33Telegram, Calhoun to Knox, 4 November 1910. The Department
of State Archives. 893.00/452.

34Tenney's Memorandum. 893.00/482.

236

became actively hostile to the imperial government in late November,
1910.35 Secretary Tenney's memorandum suggested that the Assembly
had interpreted the imperial government's response to several issues
as an indication that the Throne intended to relinquish none of its
traditional powers. The Prince Regent had referred the questions of
the salt tax in Yunnan and the school regulations in Kwangsi to the
Boards of Finance and of the Interior respectively instead of to the
Assembly which claimed jurisdiction. Although the central government
yielded to the Assembly's demands, it failed to satisfy that body
which decided to impeach the members of the Grand Council whose
existence the progressives considered incompatible with the princi-
ples of representative government. The Prince Regent then rebuked the
Assembly for overstepping its authority, but the Assembly rejected the
reprimand and for the first time began criticizing the Prince Regent
and attacking the Throne.36
The events of November, 1910, therefore precipitated a
political crisis. While the members of the Assembly debated resigning
in protest, the Prince Regent considered dissolving the Assembly. In
Tenney's opinion, the only choice the Throne had was that of picking
its poison. If the Prince Regent yielded to the Assembly's demands,
it "will be so convinced of his weakness that it will assume a still

more dictatorial attitude." Yet, if the Prince Regent dissolved the

 

35Chang, "The Constitutionalists," p. 166.

36Tenney's Memorandum of 21 December 1910, inclosure in Calhoun
to Knox, 26 December 1910. The Department of State Archives.
893.00/492.

237

Assembly, continued Tenney, "there will be a great danger of a
revolution against the Manchu government, commencing in the Southern
provinces."37
The foreign service personnel did not, however, agree on the
implications of the crisis. iMinister Calhoun flatly rejected Secretary
Tenney's evaluation of the situation. First of all, he doubted that
the imperial government would be so stupid as to dissolve the Consti-
tutional Assembly when the session was about to terminate naturally.
But even if it did, Calhoun did not believe revolution would result
because he now disputed Tenney's conclusion as to what would likely
cause a revolution in China. In so doing Calhoun reversed his earlier
conclusions. "If, as is not unlikely, it does break out, it will be
brought about more by the pinch of poverty and starvation than by the

"38 Calhoun reached this con-

desire for parliamentary institutions.
clusion despite his knowledge of the widespread agitation for the
immediate convening of the National Parliament.39

In actuality, Minister Calhoun thought a revolution in China
highly improbable at this time. This opinion derived from the consul's

reports regarding both the reasons behind the local disturbances and

the strength of the nationalist revolutionary forces. The consuls had

 

37Ibid.

 

38Calhoun to Knox, 893.00/492. For Calhoun's earlier opinion
see above, pp. 228-229.

39Miukden Consul General Fred D. Fisher reported to Knox on the
demonstrations for the early convening of parliament: 6 December 1910.
893.00/487; 24 December 1910. 893.00/490; 28 December 1910. 893.00/
494. USCD-Mukden.

238

not found nationalism behind the widespread disturbances. They had
attributed the various uprisings to purely local conditions such as
famine, floods, excessive taxation, and corrupt officials, causes
which they considered too varied and therefore insufficient to unite

the people in a general rebellion.40

The diplomatic officers never
regarded the nationalist revolutionaries as a potential unifying
force. According to Shanghai Consul General Wilder, they lacked the
machinery to transform the local outbreaks into a revolution.41 Minis-
ter Calhoun regarded the various outbreaks as uncoordinated and
concluded that a widely organized revolutionary movement was non-
existent.42
Another factor which led.NHnister Calhoun to conclude that a
revolution in the immediate future was unlikely was the imperial
government's actions in late December of 1910. On 24 December the
imperial government issued an edict rejecting the memorials demanding
the immediate convening of Parliament and asserting its intention to
adhere to the 1913 schedule.43 If Secretary Tenney's description of

the Constitutional Assembly as "dictatorial" was indicative of his

 

40A. W. Pontius (Nanking) to Assistant Secretary of State,
1 April 1910. 893.00/374; Amos Wilder (Shanghai) to the Secretary of
State, 26 April 1910. 893.00/381; J. C. NbNally (Tsingtao) to Calhoun,
15 July 1910. 392.00/425; Leo Bergholz (Canton) to Knox, 7 November
1910. 893.00/471; Calhoun to the Secretary of State, 28 May 1910.
893.00/410. The Department of State Archives.

41893.00/408.
42893.00/410.

43Calhoun to Knox, 10 January 1911. The Department of State
Archives. 893.00/496.

239

attitude toward its actions, he probably welcomed the edict.44

Minister Calhoun definitely approved of the Throne's action which he
described as a "firm and reasonable" way of dealing with "irrespon-
sible interference from the outside." In Calhoun's opinion:
A strong guiding hand is needed here at this moment and the
edict may be accepted as an indication that this need is
realized by the high officials. It is hoped that the officials
are impressed with the fact that any attempt to hurry the evo-
lutionary process in the difficult path of constitutional reform
can only result in a revolutionary failure.
Minister Calhoun had concluded that the imperial government had found
its backbone at last and had firmly established its control over the
constitutional reform program. He failed to perceive that quite the
opposite had happened. A permanent rupture between the Throne and
the moderate reformers in the provinces had occurred, and the imperial
government was by the end of 1910 politically isolated.

Despite their constant criticism of the imperial government's
too conservative reform policies, the American diplomats' attitude
toward political reform in China was basically a conservative one, and
therefore the diplomats continued to favor the imperial government
over the provincial reformers. There is no doubt that the diplomats
sincerely desired political reform, but they wanted it to be delibera-
tive, gradual, and non-violent. Minister Calhoun expressed this
attitude: "At the present time it is necessary for the Central Govern-
ment to hasten slowly, and those best able to judge and to put into

articulate form real reforms are not clamoring for the immediate

 

44See above, p, 236,

45893.00/496.

240

."46 Calhoun had earlier forwarded

convocation of a parliament, .
to the Department an article from the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS which
had expounded a realistic attitude toward the political reform
program:
. . . by nothing short of a miracle could we expect to find a
constitution spring, . . . into full working order after the
manner of European constitutions, at the end of the prescribed
nine years. The framework may be there, but the tradition of
too many centuries has first to be overcome before life and
reality can be breathed into it; the prevalent mistake both of
China and foreigners appears to lie in expecting that every
reform can be instituted as soon as imagined.
No one today looking back on China's twentieth-century experience
would challenge the writer's analysis or dispute the correctness of
the conservative approach to reform. Yet, it failed to consider the
sense of urgency that imperialism had aroused in the Chinese nationa-
lists, if not in the imperial government.

The American diplomats' conservative attitude toward China's
political reform program is easy to explain. As observed, it rested
in part on their appraisal of the nature and rate of reform that
China's tradition, present problems, and resources would tolerate.
Equally influential in determining the diplomats' attitude was their
concern for United States objectives in China which the Chinese
nationalists, both reformers and revolutionaries, threatened much

more seriously than did the imperial government.

In the United States' opinion, American present and future

 

46Calhoun to Knox, 11 January 1911. The Department of State
Archives. 893.00/497.

47"China's Senate," inclosure in 893.00/406.

241

interests in China rested on maintaining an open door to equal
commercial opportunity there. It had also concluded that preserving
the open door depended on modernizing and strengthening China. The
United States expected to participate in strengthening China, indeed
assumed that foreign assistance was essential to the successful
development of China's resources. At one time or another most of

the diplomats had expressed the opinion that China was unable to
finance its own industrialization. In the opinion of James C.
NbNally, Consul at Nanking, "this so called awakening of China involves
the expenditure of great sums of money, the raising of which must tax
her every resource and . . . that must eventually call for outside
assistance."48 Secretary Tenney pointed out in mid—1909 that China's
foreign debt was a heavy burden and that the imperial government had
not yet tackled the enormous problem of financial reform. iMoreover,
it was too weak to do so and consequently was approaching bank-
ruptcy.49 Charge Fletcher had concluded that foreign financial assis-
tance and technical knowledge was essential to the development of
Chinese resources because the Chinese "lacked confidence in themselves
and their officials."50 The consular despatches all reached the same
conclusion. China lacked the desire, the technical knowledge, the

administrative experience and ability, and the financial means to

 

48MoNally to Assistant Secretary of State, 11 March 1908.
USCD-Nanking.

49Tenney's Memorandum, 22 June, inclosure in Fletcher to Knox,
2 July 1909. The Department of State Archives.

50Fletcher to Knox. 893.00/369.

242

develop its own resources.

Yet, the diplomatic personnel was unable to deny that
Chinese nationalism was rejecting foreign economic assistance. NbNally
reported that the people of Chekiang had refused the British railroad
loan and had pledged fourteen million dollars to replace it. NbNally
concluded "it is quite evident that China herself is determined to
personally direct these reforms or improvements and to enjoy whatever
credit or emolument that may be thereto attached."5l Charge Fletcher
confided to the Department that even if China lacked the financial
and technical resources to industrialize, which he felt they did,
the Chinese "prefer that their country should lie fallow until such
time as China can develop it herself, rather than that it should be
exploited by foreigners."52

In August, 1909, before the opening of the provincial assemblies
which had shown a disposition to challenge the unequal treaties,
Fletcher had felt "China should be permitted to work out her own
salvation untrammeled by foreign political intervention; humanity

53

demands it; our own interests support it." International rivalry
refused China this luxury. The foreign powers had concluded that

China could not develop its own resources and must allow, even

 

51McNally to Assistant Secretary of State, 11 March 1908.
USCD-Nanking.

52Fletcher to Knox. 893.00/369.

”Fletcher to Knox, 28 August 1909. The Department of State
Archives.

243

encourage, foreign assistance. As noted, the American diplomats

had also concluded that the imperial government was firmly in control
of the political reform situation and that the nationalist revolu-
tionaries were insufficiently strong to organize a revolution.

The Legation and Consular evaluations of the political situation
in China influenced the State Department's attitude and affected the
United States policy toward China. This fact became apparent in the
fall of 1910. In late July of 1910 Rear Admiral John Hubbard,
Commander—in-chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet, inquired of
the Navy Department concerning the United States policy in the event
of a revolution in China. Hubbard reported that all the essential
ingredients of a revolution existed and required only a leader and
organization.54 Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson replied
to the Navy Department's inquiry that it was most unlikely that the
revolutionary situation would acquire those essential ingredients.
Wilson pointed out that the situation to which Admiral Hubbard
referred had existed for the past twenty years and that the Department
had no indication that it had altered appreciably: ". . . there are
so many different secret societies preaching revolution, each jealous
of the others, and there is such utter lack of organization and
cooperation that all uprisings that have hitherto occurred have been

55

quite easily suppressed." Wilson concluded that therefore the State

 

54Hubbard to the Secretary of the Navy, 26 July 1910. The
Department of State Archives. 893.00/432.

5515 September 1910. The Department of State Archives.
893.00/432.

244

Department "does not anticipate any serious uprising in China in the
near future."56

The State Department maintained that attitude until the
outbreak of the revolution, despite the riot at Hankow in January,
1911, the assassination of the Acting Tartar General of Canton,
Furch'i, an attack at Fatshan, and an attack on the Canton Viceroy's
Yamen, all which occurred in Spring of 1911. Again, the Legation and
Consular reports influenced the Department's attitude. Canton Vice
and Deputy Consul General Hamilton Butler had investigated the revolu-
tionary movement in the Canton vicinity and had reported that there
was no relationship between the assassination of the tartar general,
the attack at Fatshan, and that on the Canton Viceroy's Yamen. He
had identified at least two competing revolutionary organizations in
the field,--one following Huang Hsing and the other loyal to Sun
Yat-sen, not to overlook the numerous unaffiliated secret societies.
In Butler's opinion successful revolution necessitated a change in
revolutionary tactics. The revolutionaries would have to unite,
enlist popular support, and establish internal discipline. Butler
believed that this would take months, maybe years, and that meanwhile
the imperial government had ample opportunity to prepare its defense.57

Despite its knowledge of the existence of widespread

disenchantment with the imperial government and of anti-imperialist

nationalism, the United States had concluded that a nationalist-inspired

 

56Ibid.

57Hamilton Butler's Memorandum, 25 May 1911, inclosure in
Calhoun to Knox, 5 June 1911. USCD—Canton. 893.00/530.

245

revolution in China was highly improbable. Although understandable,
the conclusion was an unfortunate one. It permitted the United
States, with the other powers, to pursue a policy which challenged
modern Chinese nationalism and which put the imperial government in
a bad light in the view of the Chinese nationalists. The powers
continued to insist that China fulfill the terms of the unequal
treaties which Chinese nationalists, reformers as well as revolu-
tionaries, found so offensive.

Correspondence between the Mukden Consulate General office
and the State Department in mid-1910 hinted at an abandonment of
dollar diplomacy, but in deference to Japanese and Russian interests
rather than to Chinese nationalism. Consul General Fred D. Fisher
blamed the failure to arrest Japanese advances on the Chinese, on the
"incompetence," the "evasive and equivocal methods, . . . the
corruption and lack of ability among the present provincial officials,
together with the weakness of the Chinese Central Government."58
Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr's reply suggested a change
in the United States policy in Manchuria:

. . . the chief questions in Manchuria are such that their
solution depends primarily 92 m M. . . . Bym
FESEEEEing vested rights, already guaranteed by treaty, and
by resisting the temptations of the extreme 'rights recovery'
movement, while at the same time quietly and steadily refusing

to Submit to any encroachments, it is believed that China would
be able so to command the sympathy and respect of the treaty

 

58Confidential, Fisher to Assistant Secretary of State, 27 May
1910. USCDéMukden. 893.00/412.

246

powers . . . . The Chinese Government must know that this
Government will not gga§g_to‘giye_0hina_ its hea3%y_mor§;;§upport
in the orderly —development of the Manchurian pro nces.
But President Taft and Secretary Knox desired the United States to
contribute more than moral support to the development of China. Despite
the failure of the neutralization of the Manchurian railroads scheme
and its awareness of Chinese opposition to foreign economic control,
the Taft administration talked the American Banking Group into extending
China a $50,000,000 loan for currency reform and the development of
Manchuria.60
The United States insistence that the imperial government
enforce the unequal treaties furnished the Chinese nationalists, if
not with a sufficient cause, then with an occasion for revolution.
The Taft administration demanded, and, in late Spring of 1910, achieved
the admission of the American Banking Group to the European banking
consortium that was in the process of negotiating a loan with the
imperial government for the development of the Hukuang railroad
system. That the proposed loan was extremely unpopular with the
Chinese people, merchants, and gentry, the United States was well
aware at the time. The consular despatches had reported these facts
often during the several years preceding the revolution. And Minister
Calhoun had advised that American investors consider this fact. The
reports also revealed that the United States understood fully the

implications of gentry opposition to imperial policies. Yet, when

 

59Confidential, Carr to Fisher, 18 July 1910. The Department
of State Archives. 893.00/412. Emphasis mine.

60Varg,gp_ en Door Diplom mt, pp. 109-112.

247

the imperial government, fearing revolution, rejected the agreement,
the United States Joined the other consortium powers in forcing it
to accept the loan.61 Finally, on 20 May 1911, the imperial govern-
ment signed the Hukuang Loan Agreement, precipitating the anti-
dynastic, anti-imperialist, national revolution that erupted in the
Fall of 1911. The China policy of the powers precluded any possi-
bility that the "revolution" which the American diplomats had
observed was taking place in the provincial and the constitutional

assemblies would be a peaceful one.

 

61Griswold,'Far‘Eas'tern'POIicy, p. 163.

CHAPTER VIII
SOME REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Chinese nationalism is older than the May 4th Movement, older
even than the national revolution of 1911. Observers of modern China
have placed its birth at various dates. American diplomats in China
during the decade preceding the revolution put its birth in 1904 and
1905 when Japan's triumph over Russia inspired the nationalistic rights
recovery movement which the United States experienced first—hand in
the anti-American boycott. A recent study has viewed the 1900 Boxer
uprising as the birthdate of Chinese nationalism,1 while another has
placed it in the 1890's when a small group of radical reformers
attempted to free Chinese thought and institutions from China's
universalist perception of world order and cast them in a nationalist
mold.2 One casual American observer travelling in China in 1879, former

president Ulysses S. Grant, had seen nationalism animating the so-called

Self-Strengthening movement.3

 

lMary C. Wright, "Introduction," in China In_Revolution, pp. 1-3.

2John Schrecker, Imperialism.And Nationalism, pp. 52-58.

 

3"Their leading men thoroughly appreciate their weakness, . . .
Their idea seems to be to gradually educate a sufficient number of
their own people to fill all places in the development of railroads,
manufactories, telegraphs, . . . . Thus, with their own men, and
capital, to commence a serious advancement." Grant to General, 7 June
1879. Peking, China. John Russell Young Collection. Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.

248

249

Conclusions concerning the birthdate of Chinese nationalism
depend ultimately on one's definition of nationalism. Nationalism is
a complex, dynamic sentiment. It varies in nature and intensity
according to time, place, and the changing conditions and attitudes
of the people who express it.

The existence of such differences of opinion concerning the
birth of Chinese nationalism are evidence of the complex nature of
nationalism in twentieth-century China. The United States Legation
and Consular reports identified two distinct strains, and variations
thereof, of nationalism in China during the decade that preceded the
revolution. One was an inward-looking nationalism, or "militant
culturalism," that considered China's civilization vastly superior to
all others and that was determined to resist any alien forces of
change. The second brand, playing the role of the challenger, was
modern, nation-state nationalism which had lost confidence in the
traditional universalist outlook and which desired to replace it
with a nation-state, composed of four hundred million Chinese, as the
all inclusive group and focus of loyalty.

Several factors determined who was likely to belong to the
"militant culturalist" group and who to the modern nationalist group.
Basically, they were age, ethnic group, education, and occupation.
The imperial government, composed of old and long—established Manchus
and Chinese who were educated in the Confucian classics and confident
of the superiority of China's civilization and whose official positions
gave them a vested interest in the preservation of the traditional

order, expressed inward-looking nationalism. So, too, did the

250

majority of the Chinese people who were illiterate and who hated the
changes occurring in their lives under the western impact. A small,
but vocal and strategically located, minority expressed modern,
nation-state nationalism. This group consisted, usually, of younger
generation Chinese, a few Manchus, and a new kind of gentry-merchant
class that had blended traditional and modern ways in its education
and careers. For the most part, the modern Chinese nationalists were
born after 1860 and had lived their entire lives under the humiliating
and threatening cloud of imperialism, a condition that had influenced
their intellectual orientation. The younger generation lacked the
confidence of the elder statesmen in the superiority of China's tradi-
tional institutions. When Japan defeated China in 1894, these aspiring
statesmen challenged the conservative reform formula of the Self-
Strengtheners. They were willing, indeed anxious, to experiment with
institutional innovations. Unlike their elders, the younger generation
saw no incompatibility between western institutions and the Confucian
way of life, at least not initially. For Sun Yat-sen industrialization
was the way to revivify the traditional civilization. Modern Chinese
nationalists also had a vested interest in the emerging modern economic
order. With the establishment of the provincial assemblies in 1909,
they acquired the political power to achieve their objective of a
political order responsive to their needs.

Modern Chinese nationalists divided into two main camps,--
reformers and revolutionaries. They shared in common the objective
of broadening the base of political power, but they differed in the

methods they employed. The larger force was the moderate,

251

constitutional reformers who were willing to work with the Manchu
establishment to modernize China's institutions. The other group was
composed of nationalist revolutionaries who considered reform under
the Manchus impossible and who concentrated therefore on destroying
the Manchu dynasty. Because of the enmity between the Manchus and
Chinese, the nationalist revolutionaries had a sympathetic following
among the Chinese peasant class, despite the latter's "culturalist"
orientation.

Nationalism in early twentieth-century China was therefore a
complex sentiment. It was also a divisive sentiment. Twentieth-
century China lacked the ideological unity that had characterized
earlier periods and this feature greatly complicated China's efforts
to revive its institutions and to withstand the imperialist threat.
Instead of the cooperative spirit that had characterized so recent a
reform effort as that of the T'ung—chih period, a three—way struggle
for power erupted. IMOdern, nation-state nationalism was challenging
the inward-looking nationalism of the establishment. Nationalist
reformers and nationalist revolutionaries were competing for the
leadership of modern Chinese nationalism. Whether China's transition
from a traditional to a modern society would be peaceful or violent
depended on the outcome of this power struggle. The 1911 revolution
was evidence that the reform solution had failed.

The colonial context in which reform and revolution occurred
has added a new dimension to these issues. What role, if any, did
the powers play in the failure of the reform.movement or in precipita-

ting revolution? The United States was one of the powers involved in

252

China during this period, and its activities were representative of
the others. American diplomats occupied ideal positions for viewing
Chinese nationalism in operation. The diplomatic despatches offered
revealing insights both into the nature and strength of Chinese
nationalism and into the diplomats' attitudes and the United States'
response to Chinese nationalism in this period. While the United
States Legation and Consular reports could not provide definitive
explanations for the failure of the post-Boxer reform.movement or
the cause of the 1911 revolution, they did offer insights into both
issues. In addition, the diplomatic reports revealed the nature of
the influence the foreign powers exercised on the political situation
in China.

The consular despatches concerning the Boxer movement revealed
that in 1900 the American diplomats were unaware of the existence of
Chinese nationalism in any form. Although there was no real concensus
of opinion concerning the cause of the uprising, in general the consuls
considered the Chinese people friendly to foreigners and receptive
to foreign ideas and goods. Those who found the Chinese anti-foreign
considered them in reality only anti-Christian, and they attributed
this attitude to the missionaries' meddling ways. For the most part,
American diplomats believed that Chinese anti-foreignism.began and
ended with the official class, and they based their policy on this
opinion. Admiral Seymour's march on Tientsin was to intimidate the
Throne and force it to take action against the recalcitrant officials
who the powers believed were responsible for the Boxer attacks against

the foreigners and the native Christians. Military pressure on the

253

imperial government had the opposite effect of what the powers had
expected. It resolved the power struggle between the progressive
and conservative members of the Court in favor of the conservatives,
and it precipitated the Boxer siege of the foreign Legations which
was relieved only by an allied expedition against Peking.

The Boxer uprising taught all of the parties involved a
valuable lesson. The powers realized the intensity and pervasiveness
of anti-foreign sentiment in China. They also understood the impor-
tance of avoiding even the threat of military pressure on the imperial
government which only served to strengthen the forces of reaction.

The United States adopted a policy of supporting the moderates within
the imperial government and of encouraging them to initiate reform.
The imperial government was blamed for the Boxer debacle. To make
matters worse, the Boxer Protocol increased China's indebtedness to
the foreign powers which stimulated anti-dynastic and anti-foreign
nationalism. The imperial government realized the necessity of reform
to preserve the Manchu dynasty. Finally, foreign intervention in the
Boxer uprising taught many Chinese nationalists that they must employ
non-violent methods for achieving their objectives and keep the powers
from ever again uniting against China.

The diplomatic reports on the political situation in China
revealed that the nature of Chinese nationalism was changing radically
in the decade that preceded the 1911 revolution. According to the
diplomats, an inward-looking nationalism dominated the first phase of
the post—Boxer reform.movement, and they considered it responsible for

China's failure to make substantial progress in reforming its

254

institutions. Yet, in 1904 and 1905, the diplomats perceived that
"militant culturalism" was yielding to modern, nation-state
nationalism.

This fact was brought home to American diplomats by the
rights recovery movement which the United States experienced first-
hand in the form.of the anti-American boycott. The boycott was the
result of disharmonious elements in the United States China policy
due to a failure to reconcile the interests of American labor with
those of American merchants and missionaries. The United States
sought on the one hand to keep China's door open to Christianity
and American manufactures and on the other hand to close the American
door to Chinese immigration. Although the consular despatches
suggested several motives for the boycott, ranging from.profit to
patriotism, they agreed that the boycott was stimulating the develop-
ment of modern Chinese nationalism. The despatches also revealed that
in the diplomats' opinion the Chinese gentry class in South and Central
China was playing the leading role in organizing the rights recovery
activities.

For American diplomats 1905 was a "watershed" year, the
dividing line between traditional and modern China. In 1902 and
1903 Shanghai Consul General John Goodnow had recognized the role
popular journalism was playing in developing a public opinion in China.
But, for the diplomatic staff as a whole, acknowledgment of the presence
of modern Chinese nationalism came in 1905 and was forced by such rights
recovery activities as the attempts to cancel foreign railroad and

mining concessions, the Huchow land controversy, and the anti-American

255

boycott.

The rights recovery movement was one of the chief vehicles
for the expression of modern Chinese nationalism. It was therefore
indicative of the form nationalism was assuming. IModern Chinese
nationalists were demanding that China develop its own resources
without foreign assistance. They desired to reclaim foreign land
titles, to exercise greater control over foreign concessions, and to
extend the jurisdiction of Chinese law over all foreigners residing
in China, which meant the abolishment of extraterritoriality. Chinese
nationalists were attacking the "unequal" treaty structure which they
considered incompatible with sovereignty. Modern Chinese nationalism
was therefore challenging the policy assumptions and objectives of
the United States as well as the foreign policy procedures of the
imperial government.

The constitutional movement was the other vehicle for the
expression of modern Chinese nationalism, but the two were inter-
dependent. The nationalists believed that a modern political system
would enable China to manage its own destiny. This conviction grew
stronger after 1905 because of modernized Japan's victory over Russia.
But the nationalists' desire to broaden the base of political power
threatened the position of the imperial government.

American diplomats realized the challenge to the United States
China policy implied in the rights recovery movement. But in 1905 and
1906 the diplomats concluded that Japanese aggression was a greater
threat to American interests than was Chinese nationalism. They

concluded that Chinese nationalism did not necessarily have to be

256

anti-foreign. It could, and should, channel its energy into internal
institutional reform. Therefore, American interest in the imperial
government's reform program.increased noticeably in 1906 and there-
after. In the diplomats' opinion successful reform would counter the
challenge of anti-dynastic and anti-foreign nationalism.

Emerging modern Chinese nationalism alarmed the imperial
government. It responded to the threat to its existence by expanding
its reform.program. In 1906 it announced that China would be given
a constitutional form of government. But the imperial government did
little directly connected with constitutionalism until late summer of
1907. Instead the Throne expanded the army, navy, and educational
reforms of the first phase of its post-Boxer reform program and also
attempted to reform the central and provincial administrative systems.
A sharp increase in anti—Manchu activity in 1907 led the imperial
government to accelerate its political reform.program. It announced
a nine-year constitutional program which was to culminate in 1916
with the establishment of a National Parliament. Two immediate steps
in that direction were the creation of Provincial Deliberative Asseme
blies and a Constitutional Assembly to educate the people in the
methods of constitutional government.

Although unintended and unforeseen, the provincial assemblies
had revolutionary implications. Their members came from.the newly
emergent nationalist reform group, which was predominantly gentry in
make-up, and they turned the assemblies into an instrument of modern
Chinese nationalism. Popularly elected, rather than appointed, the

members of these assemblies came to consider themselves, rather than

257

the emperor, as the representatives of the people. As the consular
and Legation reports revealed, the assemblies quickly became a force
for self-government and an influential organ of the rights recovery
movement. These provincial delegates comprised one-half the member-
ship of the Constitutional Assembly that convened in October, 1911.

The proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly precipitated
a political crisis in China in late 1910. The provincial delegates
overwhelmed the Throne appointees to the assembly and turned that
body into an instrument for forcing the imperial government to
accelerate its constitutional program. The provincial delegates
demanded the immediate establishment of the National Parliament and
of a cabinet responsible to Parliament. Because the Throne refused
to convene the National Parliament any earlier than 1913 and also
failed to recognize the assembly's jurisdiction over tax and budget
matters, the assembly impeached the members of the Grand Council,
charging that the existence of the Grand Council was incompatible
with the principles of constitutional government. As the Prince
Regent considered dissolving the runaway assembly, its members began
attacking the Throne and the Regent himself. A permanent rupture
between the imperial government and the provincial assemblies had
occurred. The constitutional reformers who returned to their pro-
vinces after the assembly adjourned were more revolutionary in their
nationalism. They had rejected the imperial government's definition
of constitutionalism, and the imperial government had lost its gentry
mainstay.

'Successful reform, no revolution,‘ is a simple equation for

258

expressing the political situation in China in the early twentieth
century. This fact has placed the imperial government's post-Boxer
reform movement in a position of central importance within China's
twentieth-century revolutionary experience. Conclusions regarding the
reason reform failed have varied considerably. For, there is a lack
of agreement concerning the nature of the post-Boxer reform.movement.
In the earliest study of the Manchu dynasty's last reform efforts,
Mbribeth Cameron concluded that the reform program was radical in its
ideology and objectives, that the imperial government had endorsed the
program of the radical reformers of 1898.4 Richard C. Howard in his
Introduction to the Journal 2£_A§ian Studies 1969 Symposium on the
subject disagreed with Cameron, concluding that the imperial govern-
ment had instead returned to its earlier, conservative, and unsuccessful
"self-strengthening" solution.5 By illustrating the "traditional"
element contained in K'ang Yuewei's proposal to extend the privilege
to memorialize, John Fincher has perhaps raised the question of just
how radical was the 1898 reform program.6 John Schrecker has
demonstrated the radical character of the reformers' approach to
foreign policy issues.7 IMbre such comparative studies are perhaps

required in order to understand better the nature of the 1898 reform

 

4Cameron, pp. 56-57.

5Richard C. Howard, "Introduction," in "The Chinese Reform
Movement of the 1890's: A Symposium," Journal of Asian Studies, XXIX,
No. 1, November, 1969, p. 8.

6Fincher, "Political Provincialism and the National
Revolution," pp. 213-214.

71mperialism.and Nationalism, pp. 52-58.

 

259

program and its influence on and relation to that which followed
the Boxer uprising.

While the United States Legation and Consular reports could
not provide definitive explanations, they did offer revealing insights
into the reason for the failure of the imperial government's post-
Boxer reform movement. Unlike Maribeth Cameron, the American diplomats
pictured the program as essentially conservative in its ideology and
Objectives, and they attributed its failure to this conservative
character. According to the despatches, although the content of the
reform program expanded in the decade that preceded the revolution,
its conservative nature remained unaltered. Whether the imperial
government was modernizing the army, the navy, the education system
or the central and provincial administrative systems, the objective
always was to preserve the Manchu dynasty with its traditional powers
intact. The same considerations motivated the establishment of the
provincial and constitutional assemblies. Although the diplomats
sometimes wondered, in general they considered the imperial government
sincere in its reform intentions. And, doubtless it was,—-within the
limits set by its conservative ideology. Yet, the American diplomats
also understood that modern Chinese nationalism was challenging the
assumptions that underlay the conservative program and that the
imperial government would have to accomodate its program to the
nationalist demands if it were to survive.

The imperial government failed to identify with modern
Chinese nationalism. As described by the American diplomats, its

reform policy was one of shifting opportunism. The diplomats remarked

260

often on the absence of a coherent reform policy. They noted that

the Throne appeared willing to try almost anything it thought might
strengthen the dynasty. The despatches revealed that the measures

the Throne had adopted to preserve itself had the opposite effect,
especially after the death of the Empress Dowager and Emperor in

1908. The new Regent, Prince Chun, moved to consolidate Manchu power
by removing progressive Chinese, and Manchus as well, from office and
by replacing them with conservative Manchus. Yet, this had been a
feature of the preceding reign, too. The despatches suggested that
the Chinese officials and gentry were not opposed to the centralization
of power per §g_but only to centralization under the auspices of the
Manchu dynasty. According to the diplomats' reports, the imperial
government's opportunistic reform policy had alienated and radicalized
the Chinese gentry who occupied the new positions of political power
in the provincial assemblies and who feared the imperial government
was attempting to enhance the power of the Manchus at the expense of
the Chinese.

The imperial government's reform policy thoroughly exasperated
the American diplomats. Its reforms were not progressive enough for
the diplomats, and its methods of implementing those it actually
attempted were inept. Yet, despite their criticism of the Throne's
reform policies and their knowledge of the existence both of widespread
disenchantment with the imperial government and of anti-foreign
nationalism, the American diplomats favored the imperial government
over the nationalist reformers and, of course, over the nationalist

revolutionaries. There were several reasons for this pro-Manchu

261

position.

The United States China policy, assumptions and objectives,
dictated that it support the imperial government and encourage it to
inaugurate fundamental changes in China's political order. American
interests in China, most of which were projected in the future,
depended on maintaining an open door to equal commercial opportunity
there. To achieve that objective, it was necessary to remove all
causes for foreign intervention, which in the opinion of the United
States entailed strengthening and modernizing China. The United
States expected to participate in developing China, indeed assumed
that American economic, technical, and administrative assistance was
essential to the success of China's modernization program on which
the open door depended. The United States also expected that Americans
would occupy a privileged position in the new China. Modern Chinese
nationalism was challenging the United States policy assumptions and
objectives. The imperial government was a much lesser threat. The
imperial government recognized that foreign assistance offered it an
opportunity to increase its power and strengthen its hold on
legitimacy.

The United States therefore was as paternalistic and
opportunistic in its policy as was the imperial government. Practical,
rather than philosophical, considerations determined the diplomats'
attitude toward nationalism in China. The diplomats' personal opinions
regarding representative government in China were inconsequential in
determining the United States China policy. A strong, modern China

need not be a democratic China. But the Chinese nationalists were

262

demanding political reform and they were a potentially disruptive
force, particularly if they tampered with foreign treaty rights. In
the opinion of the American diplomats, if the imperial government
would meet the nationalists' demands for political reform it would
minimize the appeal of the rights recovery movement and reduce the
chances both of revolution and foreign intervention. But, to the
imperial government conceding the demands of the nationalist consti-
tutional reformers was tantamount to committing suicide.

Two other factors contributed to the United States decision
to continue to pursue its decade-old policy of supporting the imperial
government and encouraging it to reform China's anachronistic insti-
tutions, to develop China's resources, and to honor its treaty
commitments. First, although the diplomats had predicted a rupture
in relations between the imperial government and the provincial
assemblies if the imperial government persisted in its opportunistic
political reform policy, they failed to perceive that the breach had
actually occurred and that the Throne was politically isolated.
Secondly, the diplomats did not think that nationalism was sufficiently
widespread and strong or that the revolutionary nationalists had the
leadership, discipline, or organization to engineer a general uprising.
And the diplomats believed that the imperial government could easily
suppress anything less than a general uprising. In the opinion of
the American diplomats and of the State Department, modern Chinese
nationalism did not warrant a policy reorientation.

This unfortunate conclusion led the United States, with the

other powers, to pursue a policy identical in spirit to that which

263

precipitated the Boxer uprising in 1900. Diplomatic pressure on the
imperial government replaced military pressure, to be sure, but by
1911 Chinese nationalism had changed drastically and refused to
tolerate such disregard for China's sovereign rights. Whether the
revolution that had already begun in the provincial and constitutional
assemblies would have been non-violent is an impossible question to
answer. But the policy of the foreign powers in late 1910 and early

1911 precluded a peaceful resolution of China's political crisis.

The United States Legation and Consular reports suggested that
the American diplomats' response to the imperial government's reform
program and to the Chinese nationalism that had evoked it contained
some deep-rooted contradictions. The American diplomats had greeted
the expansion of the reform program because they believed it would
develop and strengthen China, and the United States China policy was
predicated on a strong, modern China. But the United States expected,
and was prepared to insist, that reform in China be conducted on
terms favorable to American interests. The United States favored
progressive reform measures, but it, indeed all the powers, drew the
line at the rights recovery movement. The United States expected
to participate in developing China, assumed its assistance was essential,
and believed that a grateful China should reward Americans by insuring
them access to the China market. American objectives conflicted with
those of modern Chinese nationalism, and the United States insistence

that the imperial government uphold the unequal treaties made it more

264

difficult for the ruling dynasty to identify with that nationalism.
Yet, the diplomatic reports also revealed that the imperial
government's fundamental problems were of its own making. The
diplomats criticized the imperial government's conservative reform
ideology and objectives and its inept methods of implementing its
reforms which, they concluded, had alienated provincial leaders who
questioned the Throne's reform commitment. The diplomats noted
particularly the lack of talented and capable administrators within
the imperial government and deplored the fact that Prince Chun had
eliminated the one man, Yfian Shih-k'ai, capable of achieving reform.
As portrayed by the American diplomats, the Manchu dynasty was
unwilling to yield an ounce of its traditional powers, and the imperial
government's reform ideology was therefore on a collision course with
modern Chinese nationalism. Taken gn_ma§§g, the United States Legation
and Consular reports between 1900 and 1911 painted a picture of China

moving ineluctably toward revolution.

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