

UTILIZATION OF AN EXECUTIVE  
DECISION GAME TO TEST BOWMAN'S  
MANAGERIAL COEFFICIENT THEORY


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## ABSTRACT

### UTILIZATION OF AN EXECUTIVE DECISION GAME TO TEST

### BOWMAN'S MANAGERIAL COEFFICIENT THEORY

By

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Bowman's managerial coefficient theory provides a conceptual framework to analyze repetitive decisions in a stable environment. According to Bowman the decision maker may be treated as a linear decision rule coefficient estimator. We can find the rule representing his behavior by performing a linear regression on a set of historical decision variables. According to this theory the decision maker's rule is unbiased relative to the optimal and heuristic rules, the latter are defined as concise empirical rules derived from a manager's behavior. Poor decision making is said to be characterized by large variances relative to optimal and heuristic rules. The theory has been extended to include learning effects (Carter, Jenicke and Remus).

A review of the literature reveals business gaming situations to be a valid laboratory for studying decision making. In this study three key decision variables in the Executive Game were analyzed over 8 periods of play in an undergraduate introduction to business course. The study reached the following conclusions:

1. Since linear decision rules had concurrent and predictive validity they may be used to represent the behavior of the subjects.
2. The heuristic rules were significantly different than rules which were allowed to contain all decision variables which entered at .05. The two sets of rules differed little in their ability to predict the decision maker's behavior.
3. The decision rules for the composite, best and worst decision makers had structurally different decision rules although each contained the same variables. The rules for the best subjects better explained their behavior than the composite or worst rules did for composite and worst subjects, respectively.
4. Evidence was found to support the hypothesis of learning occurring as play proceeded. This effect was manifest in terms of reduced bias over time.
5. Strong evidence was found that lower ranked subjects were more biased from heuristic rules.
6. Strong evidence was found that lower ranked subjects were more erratic decision makers than higher ranked subjects.

This study supports the general applicability of Bowman's theory to competitive simulation games such as the Executive Game. While it points to the necessity of including learning effects in the theory, it does not support Bowman's assertion of unbiased decision making and variance being the major source of economic inefficiencies.

This study demonstrates the value of games such as the Executive Game as a laboratory for exploring decision making behavior. The decision makers' behavior has been represented by linear decision rules which are heuristic rather than necessarily optimal. These rules provide a basis for further exploration of behavior patterns.



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By

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND NOMENCLATURE

LDR	Linear Decision Rule
$LDR_{d}^{s,m}$	A particular linear decision rule calculated from sample $s$ using method $m$ to predict decision variable $d$ .
MAD	Mean Absolute Deviations
MSD	Mean Signed Deviations
R & D	Research and Development
ROI	Return on Investment

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is the outcome of two relatively divergent interests. I have long been interested in business simulation games. As the following sections demonstrate there has been far from unanimous belief in the value of business games.

Decision making models also have been of great interest to me. Many decision models we advocate imply that managerial decision making is inadequate to the tasks to which the model is applied. It is rather as if the manager should hire a consultant to implement a technique and delegate the decision to him.

It was refreshing to encounter Bowman's theory given the above misgivings. Bowman's theory can loosely be construed to say the following things. First experienced managers making repetitive decisions are effective decision makers. They are able to gain an implicit if not explicit feel for the variables which are critical to their decision making; they are able to assign appropriate weights to the critical variables in order to make sound decisions. The decision rules a manager uses usually can be determined by regressing his decision on the set of decision variables.

The theory states that the decision rule derived from prior decisions is a useful and effective rule for future use in a stable



environment. In fact, in some situations the derived rule may be better than an optimal rule obtained from a simplified model. Thus, Bowman's theory, if correct, gives us faith in the effectiveness of manager's making repetitive decisions. Further the theory provides a way to quantify the manager's decision making approach so that it may be explicitly used in the future.

If one incorporates learning then the theory would seem to be applicable to any sort of repetitive decision making, even by inexperienced decision makers (Carter, Jenicke and Remus). In particular, decision making in business games such as the Executive Game by Henshaw and Jackson should be amenable to such analysis. This paper includes a review of the literature which strongly supports the use of a business game as a laboratory to study decision making.

Such a study will provide the answers to a number of important research questions. First, such a study would test the validity of using Bowman's theory in a competitive, unstable environment where decisions are made by inexperienced subjects. We could test and verify the premises of Bowman's theory such as where it is only higher variance rather than bias that determines poor economic performance. We would find whether linear decision rules characterize the behavior of successful teams as well as the unsuccessful teams. It would be interesting to find if the best and worst teams differed in the structure of their rules.

We could address ourselves to whether different industries are characterized by different patterns of behavior, bias and variance. The learning effects could be examined by testing reduction in bias

and increases in consistency over time. Lastly, we could test if teams of different rank had different rates of learning.

These questions will be discussed in great detail in the following sections of this paper.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH BACKGROUND

This chapter provides a necessary background to the study. First we will examine the literature on business gaming with the intent of demonstrating the appropriateness of using the gaming situation as a laboratory to study decision making. Then we will review the literature on Bowman's managerial coefficient theory. The third section describes the nature of the Executive Game. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of Bowman's theory when applied to Executive Game. The implications form the basis for the experimental design.

#### Review of the Literature on Decision Making in Business Games

Many claims have been made for the benefits of playing business games. A recent study (Schriesheim and Schriesheim) examined the claims for the benefits made by the authors of various business games. The ten major claims they found are presented in table 1. The authors then content analyzed the literature on gaming to find if practitioner opinion agreed with those claims. A random selection of the literature when content analyzed revealed strong support for claims one, three and four. The remaining claims were not supported. It is the first of those that we are concerned with.

Table 1

## Ten Most Commonly Made Claims About Business Games\*

- Claim: 1. They provide a vehicle for learning and practicing decision-making under risk and uncertainty.\*\*
2. They teach the importance of planning and forecasting and provide a vehicle for learning and practice.
3. They develop a recognition and appreciation of functional interrelationships and dependencies in business firms.
4. They produce high interest and motivation in participants.
5. They teach facts and provide a vehicle for the application of specific techniques.
6. They provide an opportunity for the learning of interpersonal skills.
7. They provide an opportunity for learning to bear decision consequences without actual loss to the participant.
8. They provide an opportunity for the development of organizing ability.
9. They aid in the development of communications skills.
10. They provide a means of introduction to the computer in a manner which maximizes appreciation and minimizes fear of it.

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\*Other claims are often made. For example, the claims that business games interest students in the study of business and that they teach business terminology are often made. These claims, however, do not have direct implications for managerial development and have thus been excluded from this listing.

\*\*Implied within the claim that games "provide" for learning or practice of some ability or skill is that this is done in an effective manner. Although claims of this nature are not explicitly stated, they must be interpreted in this manner if they are to be evaluated.

It is certainly encouraging to know that practitioners see business games as "a vehicle for learning and practicing decision making under risk and uncertainty". Arguments can easily be constructed to support that viewpoint. The empirical studies on that question, however, are not so unequivocal in their support.

While there have been many studies on business gaming, few of these studies were more than anecdotal. Of the remainder, few dealt with decision making. The empirical decision making studies tended to take up the question of whether playing the game improved the problem solving and decision making abilities of the participants. A study on the Carnegie Tech Management Game (Cangelosi) examined several managerial skills including problem solving using pre and post in-basket tests. His subjects and controls were graduate students. He found no support for improved problem solving skills due to the gaming experience. A similar study (Moffie and Levin) using graduate students for subjects used the Educational Testing Service's in-basket exercise. Included in the eighteen measures found in the in-basket exercise were measures of problem solving and decision making ability. Again no support was found for enhanced problem solving or decision making skills for the gaming group. In both studies the authors argued the inadequacy of their design or instruments may have obscured the effect they were looking for.

These two studies are the only studies which had an adequate experimental design. Both, however, were subject to a very significant error. In order to find learning the post measure must be such that the learning acquired by gaming must be easily transferred to it.

In both experiments the subjects learn group decision making skills; thus we may not find group learning showing up on a test of individual learning unless that learning is readily transferable. The two studies could possibly be interpreted under learning theory as finding group learning did not transfer to individual problem solving situations. Almost all experimentors studying group gaming seem to consistently make this mistake and thus leave their findings open to question.

Thus we find practitioner support for but no methodologically adequate studies to demonstrate improved decision making after the gaming experience.

Another series of experiments focused on the game environment as a decision making and/or behavior laboratory. The concern in these studies has not been to demonstrate the external validity of claims about the game but instead to study the mechanisms involved in various gaming situations. It is these mechanisms which are now of concern to us.

First we shall examine the literature about team decision making behavior during the play of the game (Norman):

1. Each team developed its own unique pattern of decision making.
2. Differences between teams' decision making behavior correspond with differences in their stated beliefs about the environment.
3. The team's focus was changed from the general goal of maximizing ROI to some more concise action objective around which it could model the game in meaningful terms.
4. Each team organized the elements of the game around their model of the game.

5. The team's model tended to persist even when partially contradicted; it was simply modified to reflect the new data.
6. Each team exhibited a style; e.g. ultraconservative, gamblers, etc. This style persisted.

An intriguing study by Philippatos and Moscato found that gaming subjects were able to learn the rules and objectives of games that they played given no information about the game. In other words, subjects were able to gain an intuitive if not explicit understanding of the games they played without any external guidance. This would imply that Norman's observations on team models of the game is accurate and the team decision models were useful and accurate.

Norman's findings are strongly bolstered by a series of studies on a aggregate production scheduling simulation game (Miller and Moskowitz, Carter and Hamner, Carter, Jenicke and Remus). Applying Bowman's managerial coefficient theory to the game they found stability in decision making and that their subjects derived decision rules as effective, if not more so, than the tractable optimal rules for the simulation. Significant learning effects were also found and measured as the simulation proceeded. These studies were made on individual rather than team decisions and will be examined in the next section.

Another significant finding was that game performance is, at least for certain games, related to subject matter knowledge (Rohrer, cited by Schriesheim and Schriesheim). While this may be obvious for certain special purpose games the finding that knowledge of marketing practices may enhance game success in a more general decision game is consistent with the behavioral findings to be cited in the coming paragraphs.

One area of mixed results in gaming is that of conservatism in decision making. One study suggests that student players become more risk prone as play proceeds (Lewin and Weber). Since a study by Moskowitz found students to be more risk conscious than managers when making initial gaming decision, we could argue that the gaming experience was a realistic developmental activity. A contrasting study (Babb, et. al.) found businessmen to make more conservative decisions than students when gaming; students behavior was characterized as erratic. The Slovic and Lichenstein review of the literature also arrived at no conclusion due to mixed results.

A reasonable explanation of the diversity of results on this issue is simply that subjects learn to play games well and understand intuitively what behavior is needed to win. They build simple but useful models of the game and use them to make decisions. This behavior is noted and measured in many studies (Miller and Moskowitz, Carter, Remus and Jenicke, Babb, et. al., Norman, Philippatos and Moscato, and more). It is not unreasonable to conclude that different gaming experiences elicit differing types of appropriate behavior once the learning effect has died out. This behavior may or may not be conservative depending on the nature of the game played. Thus Babb, et. al.'s assertion of businessmen being more conservative initially than students when playing the farm supply game may not be in conflict with Lewin and Weber's assertion to the contrary made for a different game. This point is made explicit by a study (Khera and Benson) that found the only differences in terms of decision making among businessmen and students was due to background. If the businessmen initially know more about a simulation of a given industry,



then the students rapidly acquire background by gaming which puts them on an equal basis with the businessmen (Babb, et. al.). Thus we would argue that gaming effectively teaches the players the appropriate behavior to do well on that model. This is not an assertion that this learning would be appropriate for or even transfer to the real world. Babb found that businessmen transfer their business methodology to the play of a parallel simulation. This transfer, however, did not necessarily lead to gaming success. Apparently his farm supply and dairy management simulations required different winning strategies than their unsimulated counterparts.

I have been arguing up to this point that game players effectively learn the strategies needed to do well in the simulation game and that different games elicit different strategies. If the players learn appropriate strategies for the game and the game models is a valid version of business then the strategies they learn will be useful outside the game. This is a restrictive way to view the use of games.

Often games are used in quantitative methods courses to provide students with experience in using the analytical techniques covered in the course. In this case we would require only that the students be able to practice the techniques on the game that they would use in the non-simulated situation. Hopefully the game would reward the use of the techniques by an improved performance. This is a more powerful use of gaming since the analytical techniques are useful in many varied situations. In this use of the game less restrictive requirements are made of the game model.

In either case the decision making behavior of the players should provide an excellent data source for empirical studies.

The nature of team behavior has elicited a fair amount of literature suggesting or using the game as a behavioral laboratory. One such study (Rowland and Gardner) measured the subjects on the Fiedler's Least Preferred Coworker scale and then selected MARKSIM teams to reflect different patterns of managerial behavior. No particular configuration was predictive of game success although each configuration may lead to different perceptions of the game. Fiedler's measure is a largely discredited measure of managerial behavior and thus may have obscured the desired effects.

More frequently the behavioral phenomenon integral to the game is studied without any particular prestructuring. The results of these studies suggest that team performance generally is unrelated to the subject's intellectual ability, aptitudes, tests and grades (Rowland and Gardner), although there is also evidence to the contrary (McKenney and Dill). In the cases when this does occur, the  $R^2$ 's are extremely small. Little relationship exists between the team performance and the four personality measures found on the Myer-Briggs test (Babb, Leslie, and Van Slyke) although they did find a relationship between game success and emotional stability and cautiousness. The latter affect was not particularly prominent.

Another study (Nash and Chentnik) attempted to predict success from the 16 psychological characteristics measured by the California Psychological Inventory. No coherent pattern of relationships emerged from the study.

Although research have been unable to predict overall performance, one study (Babb, et. al.) found microgame behavior to be correlated to psychological variables. For example, emotionally stable individuals showed less fluctuations in their pricing decision.

Let us summarize our findings:

1. We found practitioner support but no empirical support for improved decision making skills as a result of gaming.
2. We did find the gaming situation to be a good and popular laboratory for studying decision making behavior.
3. Many useful understandings about decision making behavior were available from the literature including the finding that players learned appropriate winning behavior for their particular model. This learning effect explains some apparent inconsistencies in the literature.
4. We found that if the game was a valid simulation of its real counterpart we could generalize our findings to the non-simulated situation.
5. We found games to be useful in providing practice in analytical techniques. This use made less restrictive requirements of the game model.

#### Review of the Literature on Bowman's Managerial Coefficient Theory

The managerial coefficient theory (Bowman) is a simple but effective approach to modeling decision making. The theory asserts that a decision maker's behavior may be modeled by a linear decision rule. That is, one can conceptualize the decision maker as a coefficient estimator for linear decision rules although he may not explicitly be involved in such an activity. We may visualize the decision maker as intuitively placing the right weights on the various decision variables available to him. The theory asserts that managers make good decisions implying that on the average appropriate weights

are assigned to the decision variables. This is a rather appealing notion since many decision making models appear to imply that managerial decisions are inadequate unless a specialist utilizes a sophisticated model on the manager's behalf.

By examining a manager's prior behavior we can find his decision rules. If we know the key decision variables or ask the manager which variables he uses we can use multiple regression on his history of decisions. Stepwise regression may be used to discover this decision rules where the key variables are not already known and the full set of potential decision variables is known.

The rule derived from the manager's behavior is, in general, a very good rule. This statement applies to an experienced manager who is no longer learning the nature of the process of which he is making decisions. Another implied assumption is that the rule has been derived from a set of variables which the manager uses for his decision making. An incomplete set would give an inadequate decision rule. Others suggest that a stable environment is also assumed. Certainly if the environment were stable the theory would apply. But if the rule contains variables which reflect critical environmental fluctuations then that assumption may be relaxed. If the environmental instability causes the coefficients of the rules to change, we may use the most recent observations to update our rule to reflect those changes (Kunreuther). Naturally, to get an adequate data set for analysis the decision must be recurrent.

The theory asserts that economic inefficiency has at its source the variance from the rule rather than bias. This can only occur if

the magnitude of the bias is small compared to the magnitude of the variance. Also the cost surfaces must be dish shaped. Convex cost functions such as the quadratic cost function are dish shaped.

Bowman defines bias and variance as follows:

Departures of the decision making behavior of management from the preferred results, in this sense can be divided or factored into two components, one which in the manner of a grand average departing from some preferred figure, we call bias (which causes a relatively small criteria loss due to the dish shaped bottom of the criteria surface), and one which represents individual occurrences of experiences departing from the grand average, we call variance (which causes larger criteria losses due to the individual occurrences up the sides of the criteria dish shaped surface). It is the latter and more important component which seems to offer the tempting possibility of elimination through the use of decision rules incorporating coefficients derived from management's own recurrent behavior.

Bowman here asserts that the erratic decision making relative to a manager's rule is the source of inefficiency. Erratic decision making is often prompted by cues from the business environment. Cues from the environment to the extent that they are not reflected in the predictor variables of the linear decision rule must be considered as irrelevant to the decision at hand. If they were relevant certainly we should have included them in the rule. Thus the rule should be more efficient than actual behavior as the erratic cues are eliminated.

Let  $X$  be a random variable representing the series of decisions made by a manager. Assume that the decision  $X$  is associated with the cost  $Y$  by the quadratic cost function:

$$Y = a + bX + cX^2$$

If we further assume that  $X$  is normally distributed around mean  $\mu$  with standard deviation  $\sigma$ , we find:

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y) &= a + bE(X) + cE(X^2) \\ &= a + b\mu + c(\sigma^2 + \mu^2) \end{aligned}$$

The minimum cost point is found:

$$dY/dX = b + 2cX = 0$$

$$X_{\min} = -b/2c$$

Then the minimum cost is:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{\min} &= a + b(-b/2c) + c(-b/2c)^2 \\ &= a - b^2/4c \end{aligned}$$

The cost attributable solely to bias is just the expected cost less the minimum cost with the variance zero:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{COST}_{\text{bias}} &= (E(Y) - Y_{\min})|_{\sigma = 0} \\ &= b\mu + c\mu^2 + b^2/4c \end{aligned}$$

The cost solely attributable to variance is the expected cost less the minimum cost with the bias at zero:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{COST}_{\text{variance}} &= (E(Y) - Y_{\min})|_{\text{bias} = 0} \\ &= (E(Y) - Y_{\min})|_{\mu = -b/2c} \\ &= (a + b\mu + c(\mu^2 + \sigma^2) - (a - b^2/4c))|_{\mu = -b/2c} \\ &= c\sigma^2 \end{aligned}$$

If Bowman's assertion that cost attributable to variance is greater than the cost attributable to bias may be stated:

$$b\mu + c\mu^2 + b^2/4c < c\sigma^2$$

If  $\Delta$  is defined as the difference between  $\bar{X}$  and  $X_{\min}$ :

$$\Delta = \mu + b/2c$$

or in terms of  $\mu$ :

$$\mu = \Delta - b/2c$$

Placing the latter equation in the equation representing Bowman's assumption, we find:

$$b\Delta - b^2/2c + c(\Delta - b/2c)^2 + b^2/4c < c\sigma^2$$

$$c\Delta^2 < c\sigma^2$$

$$\Delta < \sigma$$

Then Bowman's assumption that the cost attributable to variance is greater than the cost attributable to bias is true if and only if the bias in  $X$  is less than one standard deviation.

Were there an optimal tractable solution to a given process we would expect that a regression analysis would give us a rule which would be about as efficient as the optimal, given the foregoing assumptions. Bowman does not assert that decision makers would end up with rules that are unbiased relative to the optimal nor does he assert that all managers will have the same insights and thus the

same decision rules for a given process. In fact on the first point he asserts that a decision rule may even be better than the optimal rule. However, it might be reasonable to find managers having similar insights and thus identical rules or that their rule might be the same as the optimal.

Once a rule has been determined from past behavior, Bowman asserts that the rule will outperform the actual decision maker, given the previous assumptions. The decision maker is subject to irrelevant cues and moods which cause him to be erratic in decision making. The rule is not effected and thus yields better results.

The reason why the rule from Bowman's analysis may be superior to an optimal rule found by traditional analysis may not be readily apparent. An optimal rule is derived from some mathematical, tractable model for a process. The real world process does not necessarily conform with that simplified model of the process and in these instances, the Bowman rule may be better.

Now to summarize the theory in Bowman's own words:

1. In their decision making behavior, managers and/or their organizations can be conceived of as decision rule coefficient estimators, (not that they explicitly are coefficient estimators).
2. It is the variance in decision making rather than the bias that hurts (more) due to dish shaped criteria surfaces.
3. A decision rule with mean coefficients estimated from management's behavior should be better than actual performance.
4. It may be better than a rule with coefficients supplied by traditional analysis.

The literature thus far has been quite favorable toward the theory. Bowman in his original paper presented support for his theory with studies on ice cream, chocolate, candy and paint plants in the



Boston area. A study (Kunreuther) at Recordette Company, a electronics firm in the Boston area, found support for the theory and also found certain advantages relative to traditional Operations Research techniques. The study indicated some to the assumptions of the theory may not hold in real world situations.

A very interesting study attempted to use linear decision rules distinguish the psychotic from neurotics given the MMPI profile and demographic data (Goldberg). He found the linear rule to be better at recognizing the distinction than the actual clinical judgements of 29 psychologists. The literature review of this study alludes to a separate but parallel lineage for a psychological coefficient theory. A major review in this area (Slovic and Lichtenstein) includes a review and analysis of the use of linear regression to find rules used for clinical judgements. In all reported situations the linear model did a fairly good job of predicting judgements and often performed better than the actual decision maker. The latter supports only one part of the theory and does not examine parts two through four.

Two major studies (Miller and Moskowitz, Carter, Jenicke and Remus) have reexamined Bowman's theory as applied to a gaming situation using quadratic costs (Holt, Modigliana, Muth and Simon). In the former case the study was done pencil and paper style using a graduate class in industrial administration as subjects. In the latter case the subjects were undergraduates in a required course on quantitative methods and the game was played via interactive timeshare terminals. Both studies demonstrated the appropriateness of a linear model to represent the subjects' decisions. The Miller and Moskowitz

study particularly addressed itself to the appropriateness of linear rules with various forecast horizons and degrees of error. The study found support for Bowman's assertion that the rule would yield better than actual performance and in some cases better than optimal performance. The first study, however, found that poor economic behavior was characterized by both bias and variance. A reanalysis of this data (Carter and Hamner) cross validated the rules demonstrating their appropriateness for future predictions and redemonstrated the finding that poor economic behavior was a function of both bias and variance.

The study by Carter, Jenicke and Remus addressed itself to the learning of linear decision rules when the cost coefficients were changed across various conditions of information. Their analysis of the data again demonstrated the usefulness of linear decision rules. Although not reported in that paper additional analysis revealed occasions of better than optimal performance using the derived rule and that the rule performance was better than actual performance. As in the analysis and reanalysis of the Miller and Moskowitz data, this study found rules manifesting both bias and variance. When the cost coefficients changed, in all cases, a learning effect occurred as the subjects reduced their variance and bias simultaneously. The question of whether variance is the sole determinant of poor economic performance was not explicitly addressed.

A number of interesting findings additionally arose from the latter study. The various treatment groups of subjects never acquired the optimal rule although they did both as well as and worse than the optimal performance. All treatment groups used the same rule in each of the three periods of the game, even though that

rule differed from period to period. The learning effect may be modeled as a linear decrease in bias and a linear increase in mean absolute deviations (MAD) of the actual from the predicted over time. The learning period for this study and the cross validation earlier referenced was less than 8 decision cycles. The degree of information about the coefficient change did not effect the decision rule used.

Both the undergraduates and the graduates in industrial administration made similar estimation errors when making decisions although the graduates were more predictable. That is, they had a higher  $R^2$ .

The major review in this area (Slovic and Lichenshtein) found support for the following theories for multiple cue learning in judgemental tasks:

1. Subjects can learn to use linear cues appropriately.
2. Learning of non-linear functions is slower and less effective than learning linear cues and is especially difficult if subjects are not forewarned of the nonlinearity.
3. Subjects can learn to detect changes in relative cue weights over time but do so slowly.
4. It is easier to discover when to use a cue than to discover a functional relationship.
5. Subjects can learn to use valid cues even when they are not perceived with perfect reliability.

The Carter, Jenicke, and Remus study is consistent with the preceeding findings 1, 3 and 5 but does not address 2 and 4.

We may summarize our review of the literature on Bowman's theory as follows:

1. There is unanimous support for the utility of linear decision rules in representing decision making. These rules have been found to have both concurrent and cross validity.

2. We found support for the assertion that a linear decision rules may perform better than the actual decisions made. We also found instances where the rule performed as the optimal rule.
3. We found support for attributing poor economic performance to variance from the rule, but we also found bias to effect economic performance.
4. The literature revealed the need to include in the theory the role of learning in reducing bias and increasing mean average deviations of the actual from the predicted over time.

In general, Bowman's theory is strongly supported.

#### The Executive Game

The Executive Game (Henshaw and Jackson) is an descendent of the UCLA Executive Game #2. This game allows up to 9 teams to compete for product sales within each industry. The industry is an oligopoly; thus purely competitive dynamics do not hold. This type of situation is realistic for many major American industries. The firms manufacture only one product.

Each period represents one quarter of actual time. The firms are required to make 8 decisions for each period; these are the starred variables shown in table 2. To make these decisions they have their results from prior periods of play, an example is in figure 1, and industry wide yearly reports. The latter reports show individual firms expenditures on marketing and R and'D, their net profit, their sales volume in units, and return on investment. Additionally this report shows for the end of the year the cash assets, inventory on finished goods and raw material, owner's equity and plant replacement value. General economic conditions, inflation, and tax situations affect play and decision making. To aid the decision makers

## EXECUTIVE GAME

MODEL 1 PERIOD 1 JAS PRICE INDEX 101.9 FORECAST, ANNUAL CHANGE 6.3 0/0  
 SEAS. INDEX 95 NEXT QTR. 115 ECON. INDEX 99 FORECAST, NEXT QTR. 94

	INFORMATION		ON	COMPETITORS	
	PRICE	DIVIDEND	SALES VOLUME	NET PROFIT	
FIRM 1	\$ 6.15	\$ 50000	466000	\$	118009
FIRM 2	\$ 6.25	\$ 53000	471573	\$	27966
FIRM 3	\$ 6.50	\$ 100000	350696	\$	-121412
FIRM 4	\$ 6.25	\$ 23000	464328	\$	30525
FIRM 5	\$ 6.00	\$ 65000	526122	\$	164746
FIRM 6	\$ 6.20	\$ 30000	451500	\$	81478
FIRM 7	\$ 6.22	\$ 65000	449757	\$	42738
FIRM 8	\$ 6.15	\$ 70000	646000	\$	149559
FIRM 9	\$ 6.25	\$ 48000	453497	\$	-21965

FIRM 11 2  
 OPERATING STATEMENTS

MARKET POTENTIAL	471573
SALES VOLUME	471573
PERCENT SHARE OF INDUSTRY SALES	11
PRODUCTION, THIS QUARTER	525000
INVENTORY, FINISHED GOODS	104427
PLANT CAPACITY, NEXT QUARTER	431889

## INCOME STATEMENT

RECEIPTS, SALES REVENUE	\$	2947333
EXPENSES, MARKETING	\$	325000
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT		160000
ADMINISTRATION		332800
MAINTENANCE		95000
LABOR (COST/UNIT EX. OVERTIME \$ 1.43)		830245
MATERIALS CONSUMED (COST/UNIT 1.57)		826436
REDUCTION, FINISHED GOODS INV.		-160280
DEPRECIATION (2.500 0/0)		207500
FINISHED GOODS CARRYING COSTS		52213
RAW MATERIALS CARRYING COSTS		60000
ORDERING COSTS		50000
SHIFTS CHANGE COSTS		0
PLANT INVESTMENT EXPENSES		33062
FINANCING CHARGES AND PENALTIES		0
SUNDRIES		84700
PROFIT BEFORE INCOME TAX		2896677
INCOME TAX (IN. TX. CR. 0 0/0, SURTAX 0 0/0)		50656
NET PROFIT AFTER INCOME TAX		22690
DIVIDENDS PAID		27966
ADDITION TO OWNERS EQUITY		53000
		-25034

## CASH FLOW

RECEIPTS, SALES REVENUE	\$	2947333
DISBURSEMENTS, CASH EXPENSE	\$	2023021
INCOME TAX		22690
DIVIDENDS PAID		53000
PLANT INVESTMENT		575000
MATERIALS PURCHASED		1300000
ADDITION TO CASH ASSETS		3973711
		-1026378

## FINANCIAL STATEMENT

NET ASSETS, CASH	\$	20622
INV. VALUE, FINISHED GOODS		313280
INVENTORY VALUE, MATERIALS		1673564
PLANT BOOK VALUE (REPLACE. VAL. \$ 9108566)		8667500
OWNERS EQUITY (ECONOMIC EQUITY 11116132)		10674966

Figure 1 Output of the Executive Game

the authors provide a pro forma balance sheet and explicit instructions for its use in determining what decisions to make.

One of the strongest features of the Executive Game is its underlying model. Over the years the game has been amended such that there remain few, if any, strategies for beating the game. The model manifests numerous effects that we would find in real world oligopolies and punishes erratic behavior. The manual for the game outlines some of the model's functioning explicitly and gives one the FORTRAN program so that the remainder of the model may be found. The model is much too elaborate to be discussed in detail in this paper. Players can find conditionally optimal rules to implement their game plan but the game does not have a full set of global and tractable optimal rules.

The Executive Game has been in use for many years and is easily implemented even on relatively small computers.

#### Applying Bowman's Theory to the Executive Game

Bowman's theory has been applied to simulation games prior to this study (Miller and Moskowitz; Carter and Hamner; Carter, Jenicke and Remus). The aggregate production simulation involved in the latter studies has the following properties:

1. Each subject plays the game independently; his outcomes are not determined by the play of other subjects.
2. All subjects were given identical production scheduling environments including identical sales forecasts.
3. The underlying scheduling model (Holt, Modigliana, Muth and Simon) had a set of tractable optimal decision rules to guage performance by.

The Executive Game does not have the above properties. The subjects are aggregated into industries; the subjects compete for the sales within the industry. This situation is a better analogue of situations to which we would ultimately wish to apply Bowman's theory. In his original paper Bowman cited competitive examples of the application of his theory, e.g. the ice cream company.

The Executive Game has no underlying tractable optimal rule although it is a mathematical model of a competitive environment. Thus we need to develop a heuristic model for the subject's decision making before further proceeding with the analysis. This is no barrier to testing the theory since many situations, including the ice cream example, to which we want to apply the theory may have no tractable solution. In fact this lack of need for an optimal rule is one of the advantages of the theory. The optimal rule does, however, provide a benchmark for evaluating a subject's decision making processes. Thus Bowman's theory would seem applicable to the Executive Game.

Now let's review the implications of the theory and frame them in terms of the game:

1. Each subject can be thought of as a decision rule coefficient estimator (not that they explicitly are coefficient estimators).
2. To the extent to which we can include the relevant variables upon which a subject makes his decision, we may find his decision model via multiple regression.
3. To the extent that the environment changes and we have inadequate predictor variables to represent the change, our decision rule will lack high predictive value. Note that to the extent that the set of excluded variables are independent from the included variables the rules based on included variables will be stable. Again the ice cream production scheduling is such an example.

4. It is the variance in the decision making rather than its bias from optimal that leads to lowered profits due to the dish shaped criteria surfaces.
5. Cues from the environment and measurements of other variables in the environment must either be irrelevant or at some stable level. If this is not true and they are not explicitly accounted for in the decision rule the performance of the rule will be reduced if the manager uses that cue or variable in his decision making. Multiple regression will remove to some extent the effects of managers using irrelevant cues and variables. When the decision was made these irrelevant cues and variables led to larger variances.
6. There is the implication that managers have good insight into their decisions. Thus Bowman would not predict differences among subsets of managers in their ability to intuit good rules. Further, the amount of bias should be zero for all groups of managers and the amount of variance should be the same for any set of managers.
7. Bowman's theory is said to apply to experienced managers implying that other phenomenon may occur in the case of inexperienced managers. Although not explicitly stated this leaves room within the theory for learning to take place. This is how inexperienced managers become experienced.

The purpose of this study is to explore the implications of the theory on the Executive Game and to examine some areas where the theory may need to be expanded. This includes the following research questions.

1. Can we find a set of heuristic rules which represent the behavior of the subjects?
2. Will these heuristic models represent equally well the behavior of the best teams, worst teams and overall sample?
3. Will the amount of bias be a function of team rank?
4. Will the best teams exhibit less variance than the worst teams?
5. Will there be any learning effects taking place as the game proceeds? If so, what is the nature of these effects?



6. Will there be an interaction between rank and time thus demonstrating differential learning?

The sixth question will find whether the rates of learning might explain the differing ranks.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS PLAN

This chapter presents the methodology and approach of this dissertation. The first section outlines the experimental environment in which the data was collected. The second section presents the general approach to analyzing the data and third section gives the details of the procedures used to derive models to represent the subject's behavior.

##### Description of the Experimental Environment

The data for this paper were collected from the students playing the Executive Game in the Michigan State University Introduction to Business course, Management 101. This course is an elective course open to students both inside and outside of the College of Business. The course is intended to be a survey of the topics involved in business administration and also to aid undergraduate students selecting their major area in the college. The data was taken during the Winter quarter of 1974 when the class consisted of 107 students. 29% of the class were female, 76% were freshman, 23% were sophomores, and 1% were juniors.

The instructor's intent in using the Executive Game was to provide a vicarious business simulation for the students. He tried to

relate the game situations to real business situations and discuss the interrelationships among the various aspects of the business.

All students were required to play the game and were given points toward their overall course grade based on their final rank in their respective industries. The game was no more than 10% of the overall grade.

It is relevant to discuss why each firm consisted of only one student rather than organizing them into teams. In the prior quarter the instructor had had difficulty when he organized the students into teams. They complained that other team members did not aid in decision making or even attend team meetings. Occasionally teams decided to have a different individual make the decision each week so as to reduce work. The instructor attributed the difficulty to the fact that some students were taking this course because it was an easy course to pass and so wanted to do as little as possible to pass. Thus when these people were forced to get involved they rebelled. The instructor felt that by making one man firms these intrateam conflicts would be eliminated and decision making responsibility placed firmly on the shoulders of each individual. Also, with this approach a more effective motivation system could be arrived at to gain student involvement.

Luckily, the latter occurred concurrently with my plan to investigate decision making and thus reinforced the instructor's approach. Since Bowman's managerial coefficient theory applies to individual decision makers this organization of the class was necessary also.

Early in the quarter the students received a lecture on the Executive Game and some of the considerations in making decisions for the game; this lecture was given by Dr. Richard Henshaw, a co-author of the Executive Game. The students were then divided into 13 industries of 9 firms each. Each firm consisted of one student. The students made one practice decision and output was received for that decision; then the game began in serious.

The cycle of the game went as follows; the students made their decision and punched the decision card before the Thursday meeting, they turned in their decision card at the Thursday meeting, and they received their output the following Tuesday. Figure 1 shows a typical Executive Game output. They then had 2 days in which to make their next decision.

All teams began the game at exactly the same financial and marketing position; in other words, their previous history as reflected in the Executive Game history cards was identical.

The students played a total of 8 periods of Executive Game following the practice period. The decisions for the seventh and eighth period were turned in at the same class meeting. This was done to try to eliminate the possibilities of "end of game tricks", i.e., so that firms could not shut down in that last period. Then the final ranking would represent standing of on-going firms.

When a student incorrectly punched a card, the graduate assistant made the necessary correction which the student had no right to contest. Should a student fail to input a decision he would be assigned a very poor decision to be used in the play of Executive

Game. All variables were poor choices; in particular the price was set to \$7.51 when the average price for all teams averaged \$6.25 with only a small dispersion.

Once the game had begun in earnest only one subject dropped the course; thus industry seventeen was reduced from nine to eight teams. Industry twenty-two consisted of mostly late admissions to the course. The late admissions had a very poor record of turning in decisions.

#### General Procedure of Data Analysis

The data analysis was performed on a set of thirty-three variables per decision per subject. These variables (explained in table 2) were punched into their decision cards each period, on the history cards which were used to make the transition from period to period, and from a program which output a special set of profit and financial parameters. For certain analyses the period 1 data was eliminated; since all subjects had the same period 1 history a regression looking for predictors from the historic variables could not yield meaningful results. In searching for decision rules often period 8 data was ignored since the subjects had no feedback from period seven prior to making decision eight. In all cases, all bogus \$7.51 decisions and associated variables were eliminated from the data set.

Three general groups of data were formed for the analysis procedures:

1. the composite data set consisting of all non-bogus observations

Table 2

## Variables Used in the Executive Game

- 1 Industry Number - subjects were divided into 12 nine man industries, only intraindustry competition occurred.
- 2 Team Number - each team in an industry was uniquely designated by a team number.
- 3 Period Number - each period of play was designated by a period number, each period represented a quarter of a fiscal year.
- 4 \*Price - subjects decision as to the price their products were to be sold for this period.
- 5 \*Marketing - the expenditure the subjects decided upon for this period.
- 6 \*R & D - the expenditure subjects made for research and development this period.
- 7 \*Maintenance - the expenditure subjects made for plant maintenance, including preventitive maintenance, this period.
- 8 \*Volume - the production volume in units that the subjects decided to schedule for this period.
- 9 \*Plant and Equipment - the expenditures to be made this period to compensate for the aging of equipment and to buy new equipment and plant capacity.
- 10 \*Materials - the dollar value of materials ordered from which to manufacture the product, this order will not be delivered until next period.
- 11 \*Dividend - the subjects declared dividend for this period. If paying the dividend reduces net assets below ten million dollars only the portion which leaves the ten million intact will be paid.
- 12 +Price Index - the subjects price for his product last period.
- 13 +Marketing Index - an exponentially smoothed measure of his past marketing expenditures.
- 14 +R & D Index - an exponentially smoothed measure of the subjects past R & D expenditures.
- 15 +Maintenance Index - an exponentially smoothed measure of the subject's past maintenance expenditures.

Table 2 (cont'd.)

- 16 +Raw Materials Inventory - dollar value of the raw material inventory at the end of the prior period.
- 17 +Plant Capacity - measured in units of output capacity at the end of the prior period.
- 18 +Stock of Finished Goods - remaining at the end of the prior period, in units of product.
- 19 +Market Potential - the potential units of sales in this firm's market at the end of the prior period.
- 20 +Sales Volume - firm's actual sales in units for the prior period.
- 21 +Cash on Hand - at the end of the prior period.
- 22 +Raw Materials Inventory Deflated - as 16 only value is deflated.
- 23 +Book Value - the value of the plant after assets have been allowed to depreciate.
- 24 +Standard Cost for a Unit of Product - prior period.
- 25 Profit - the dollar value of the firm's net profit in this quarter.
- 26 Inventory of Finished Goods - in dollars at the end of this period.
- 27 True Dividend - the dividend actually paid out this period.
- 28 Return on Investment - calculated for this period.
- 29 Rank - firm rank in the industry based on ROI, this period.
- 30 Annual Change - forecast for the annual inflation rate for this period.
- 31 Next Seasonal Index - seasonal index forecast for this period.
- 32 Next Economic Index - economic index forecast for this period.

2. the best data set consisting only of those subjects who finished first in their respective industry
3. the worst data set consisting only of those subjects who finished last in their respective industry without the bogus decisions

The worst group did incur a fair amount of bogus decisions. Only 51 of 72 decisions on the worst teams from period 2 through 7 were made by the subjects.

Once the data sets had been prepared the data analysis consists of the following steps:

1. Using the composite data a heuristic model was found which described the subjects behavior for key decisions.
2. Alternative models were found using a stepwise regression computer program to make the best possible prediction. This was done by allowing the computer to do the whole task and also by beginning with the heuristic model and allowing the computer to add variables which significantly improve its predictive ability. This step was performed across the composite, best and worst sets of data.
3. The key decision rules were cross validated on the composite data set.
4. The LDR's thus found were compared across data sets and methods of determination.
5. The bias and variance across time, rank and industry were examined particularly looking for linear effects.
6. The effect of the interaction of rank and time on measures of variance and bias were examined.

This study uses Bowman's definitions for variance and bias.

Bias is defined as the signed difference between the preferred and actual value for a variable. When taken across a data set we would expect the sum of the signed differences to equal zero if the rule is unbiased.



Variance is defined as the departures of the actual from the mean decision. In this study mean absolute deviations (MAD) of the actual from the predicted shall be used to examine the propositions about variance and learning.

Analysis of variance is used for all of the bias and variance testing. The design appears to be fixed effects model when we are blocking on industry. When we block on rank, or time, the fixed effects is appropriate. We will convert the first case to a random effects analysis of variance by using the Cornfield-Tukey bridge argument.

Our testing applies to Michigan State University students taking Management 101, Introduction to Business in Winter of 1974. 76% were freshmen, 23% were sophomores, and 1% were juniors. 29% of the class were female. The course was a 4 credit elective.

Now generalize the testing to a hypothetical population of similar subjects and assume this population is infinite. The latter population is rather restrictive when we try to generalize our results. The restrictions on class level and sex could be safely relaxed to allow us to generalize to business undergraduates. We have now random effects model when we block on industry.

This preceding brief listing of steps will be greatly elaborated in the sections of the paper dealing with each particular topic.

#### Finding the Heuristic Models

In many gaming situations the underlying mathematical model may be solved for an optimal solution. In the case of the Executive Game no global solution has been found, although some conditionally optimal

rules exist. To perform the hypothesis testing that this paper undertakes it is essential to have some baseline if not optimal solution. This heuristic model then may be used as a basis of intergroup comparisons.

There are a number of approaches to finding this model. I have used the following:

1. Choose the set of criterion variables to be examined.
2. For each criterion variable choose a subset of independent variables which could possibly be thought of as inducing fluctuations in the criterion variables.
3. Use stepwise regression to regress that set of criterion variable on the independent variables at an alpha of .05.
4. Examine the included variables for the amount of variation explained by each. Eliminate those which only explain less than 2% of variation.
5. Regress the variables from step 4 and find if the total explained variation is of a reasonable order relative to step 3. If not, add back variables and repeat this step.

The derived heuristic rules should, concisely characterize the rule used by the decision maker; the heuristic rule should have face validity also.

To choose the criterion variables to be examined, I used these guidelines:

1. The variable must be one that the subjects actually control.
2. The variables should explain more variation in Executive Game profit or ROI than variables not included.
3. The better these criterion variables are explained by allowable independent variables the more useful the results of this paper will be.

Guideline 1 limits my choice to the following variables; price, marketing, R & D, maintenance, production volume, dividend, price,

plant and equipment expenditures, and materials expenditures. Guideline 2 was examined by performing a stepwise regression to find which variables best explained profit and ROI. Thirteen variables were used to predict ROI including volume, price, R & D and marketing index (an exponentially smoothed marketing expenditure variable). The twelve variables used to predict profit included volume, price, dividend, marketing index, and R & D.

This analysis yields the following:

1. Winning the Executive Game requires the subject to give attention to all aspects of his firm.
2. The variables (both decision variables and variables internal to the firm) explain 84% of the variation in ROI, the long term profitability of the firm.
3. The variables (both decision variables and variables internal to the firm) explain 48% of the variation in profit in the current period.
4. The Executive Game decisions (with their subsequent impact on the internal variables) are quite predictive of long term profit. Each period's profit has a much greater unexplained variation.
5. Short term profit varies:
  - a. directly with cash on hand, material inventories, stock of finished goods, the expenditure level for the maintenance program, production volume, and price
  - b. inversely with the expenditures on the marketing program.
  - c. directly with R & D this period but inversely with the R & D overall expenditure program
 when all variables are considered simultaneously.
6. ROI varies:
  - a. directly with cash on hand, production volume, material inventory, book value of plant and equipment, stock of finished goods, dividends paid, price, and dollar volume of sales
  - b. inversely with standard cost per unit, plant capacity, R & D expenditures, and expenditures on the marketing program
 when all the variables are considered simultaneously.

The preceding findings demonstrate that Executive Game is a reasonable and integrative business simulation; simplistic explanations of profit and ROI, had they occurred, would have indicated to the contrary.

Guideline 2 reduces the set of criterion variables from the original to price, marketing, production volume, and R & D. Maintenance is not included in this subset as it is predictive only of short term profit and even then, the maintenance expenditure does not have an immediate impact on the profits. Dividend paid is "predictive" of only ROI and then it is more likely that it is simply symptomatic of good profits rather than "predictive". Thus it is excluded from consideration. Plant and equipment expenditures are not directly predictive of short term profit or ROI although they do reflect themselves in plant capacity and book value which are predictive of ROI. Even then there are many other factors influencing book value and capacity. Thus it is also excluded from consideration. Material expenditures are not directly predictive of profit or ROI although it effects the level of material inventory which, in turn, predicts profit and ROI. Also material inventory levels is probably more symptomatic of good profits than predictive.

Guideline 3 eliminates R & D expenditures from further consideration since the explained variance is low (9%). Also the only predictor variable for current R & D is the exponentially smoothed average of previous R & D expenditures called R & D index. The fact that this decision was not characterized well by a linear rule may question the universality of Bowman's Theory.

The variables to be used as criterion variables in the rest of the analyses are price, marketing, and production volume. I then preceded to use the 5 steps listed earlier to find the heuristic models.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

This chapter is composed of 13 sections. Each section addresses itself to a particular portion of the analysis. It is divided into two broad segments. The first segment demonstrates the utility and interrelationships of the linear decision rules. The second section examines the issues of bias, variance and learning. The implications of these findings are explicated in the next chapter.

#### Interrelationships Among the Heuristic Price LDR's

The heuristic price LDR uses the price index and the forecast of the next economic index as predictor variables. Regressions were made for price forcing the latter two variables to be the only variables in the equation; this was done for the best, worst, and composite data. The results are reported in table 3.

Before beginning to use the LDR's we should evaluate whether the betas found by this least squares analysis are unbiased estimates of the true betas. In particular, when autocorrelation occurs and there is a lagged variable, the betas may be overestimated (Malinvaud).

Table 4 contains the tests for the autocorrelation effect. Our preference here is for the Durbin test for a lagged variable (Johnson, p. 313) if the required conditions are met, as this LDR has a lagged variable. If that test is not available then the Von Neumann ratio

Table 3

## Linear Decision Rules for the Price Decision

Composite Rule       $n=600$        $\bar{R} = .3084$

$$\text{Price} = 2.71465396 + .0175611 (\text{Next Econ. Index}) \\ + .29882493 (\text{Price Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	2.71465396	.23063603	(2.33, 3.09)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.01756110	.00108810	( 0 , .035)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.29882493	.02459381	(.258, .339)

Best Rule       $n=72$        $\bar{R} = .5574$

$$\text{Price} = -.05403077 + .02767492 (\text{Next Econ. Index}) \\ + .59488454 (\text{Price Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	-.05403077	.81995670	(-1.40, 1.29)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.02767492	.00297038	(.0228, .0325)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.59488454	.09263832	(-.442, .747)

Worst Rule       $n=51$        $\bar{R} = .2637$

$$\text{Price} = 4.04612529 + .00941562 (\text{Next Econ. Index}) \\ + .20677078 (\text{Price Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	4.04612529	.50036453	(3.22, 4.87)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.00941562	.00304465	(.004, .014)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.20677078	.04971813	(.125, .288)

(Thiel, p. 199) may be applicable under restricted circumstance. The table reveals that the price LDR on the composite sample does have statistically significant positive autocorrelation. The LDR's on the best and worst samples do not have statistically significant autocorrelation at the 5%.

Even though for the best and worst sample price LDR's we can accept the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation, the fact that lagged variables exist in the LDR means that the betas will slightly underestimate the true betas (Johnson, p. 306). The bias is  $-2/n\%$ , where  $n$  is the sample size. Thus the betas are underestimated by 4% in the worst sample and 3% in the best sample. In both cases the correction is so small that it may be ignored.

The composite price LDR has statistically significant autocorrelation. There is no easy way to deal with this as it implies the possibility of underestimation of the calculated autocorrelation coefficient, .1385 in this case, and an equally large overestimation of the beta of the lagged variable, .0246 for this case.

In each table describing a linear decision rule I have reported the  $\bar{R}^2$  for that rule. Since  $\bar{R}^2$  may be plagued with measurement and independence problems, the value is reported for descriptive and informational purposes only.

Hypothesis 1: Having checked the appropriateness of the LDR's as calculated by least squares, we need now to examine if the LDR's for the best, worst and composite sample are statistically equivalent.

$$H_0^{(1)}: LDR_p^{c,1} = LDR_p^{b,1} = LDR_p^{w,1}$$



Table 4

Tests for Autocorrelation in the Price LDR's

 $H_0$ : zero autocorrelation $H_1$ : non-zero autocorrelationComposite Rule  $n=600$   $\alpha = .05$ 

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$$r = .1385 \quad \text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2) = .0246^2$$

$$H = .1385 \sqrt{\frac{600}{1+600(.0246)^2}} = 4.25$$

Reject  $H_0$  since 4.25 is greater than 1.86Best Rule  $n=72$   $\alpha = .05$ 

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$$r = .1 \quad \text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2) = .0926^2$$

$$H = .1 \sqrt{\frac{72}{1+72(.0926)^2}} = 1.37$$

Do not reject  $H_0$  since 1.37 is less than 1.86Worst Rule  $n=51$   $\alpha = .05$ 

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$$r = .16 \quad \text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_2) = .0497^2$$

$$H = .16 \sqrt{\frac{51}{1+51(.0497)^2}} = 1.222$$

Do not reject  $H_0$  since 1.222 is less than 1.86

Results: This hypothesis was tested by a test of structural equivalence (Huang, p. 108); this tests the equivalence of the three families of betas. The hypothesis is rejected indicating at least one of the three is different than the other LDR's. To find the nature of this difference table 5 also contains the results of bounding the betas of the composite rule to find if the betas of the worst and best rules fall in that range. The table demonstrates that both best and worst rules are different than the composite.

Hypothesis 2: The previous test does not tell us if the LDR's for the best and worst sample are structurally equivalent. Thus we test the following hypothesis on the period 1 through 7 composite data.

$$H_0^{(2)}: LDR_p^{b,1} = LDR_p^{w,1}$$

Results: This hypothesis is also rejected indicating the non-equivalence of the coefficients of the best and worst LDR's tested as a family. This test is the test of pairwise structural equivalence (Huang, p. 108). The test is contained in table 5.

#### Interrelationships among the Heuristic Marketing LDR's

The heuristic marketing LDR uses the marketing index (an exponentially smoothed marketing expenditure average) and marketing potential as predictor variables. Regressions were made for marketing forcing these two variables into the equation; this was done on the best, worst and composite data sets. The results are reported in table 6.

At this point we again address ourselves to the issue of autocorrelation. In table 7 the Durbin test for lagged variables, the

Table 5

## Equivalence of the Coefficients of the Price LDR's

The Family Test at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: LDR_p^{c,1} = LDR_p^{b,1} = LDR_p^{w,1}$$

$$Q_1=.962 \quad Q_2=.754 \quad Q_3=.208 \quad n=123 \quad K=3 \quad J=2$$

$$F = \frac{.208/4}{.754/115} = 7.6$$

Reject  $H_0$  since 7.6 is greater than  $.95F_{4,115}=2.45$ 

## Individual Coefficient Tests using Confidence Intervals

for the Composite Rule at  $\alpha=.10$ 

Composite Rule

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$
Best Rule Betas	Outside	Within	Outside
Worst Rule Betas	Outside	Within	Outside

The Family Test for the Equivalence of the Worst and Best Price LDR's

on the Composite Sample from Periods 1 thru 5 at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: LDR_p^{b,1} = LDR_p^{w,1}$$

$$Q_1=37.558 \quad Q_2=10.042 \quad Q_3=27.516 \quad n=702 \quad K=3$$

$$F = \frac{27.516/8}{10.042/694} = 237.7$$

Reject  $H_0$  as 237.7 is greater than  $.95F_{8,694}=1.94$

Table 6

## Linear Decision Rule for the Marketing Decision

Composite Rule     $n=600$      $\bar{R}^2=.5024$

$$\text{Marketing} = .77532008 + 1.005355 (\text{Marketing Index}) \\ - .07496595 (\text{Market Potential})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	.77532008	.11912130	(.579, .97)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.005355	.04438912	(.932, 1.078)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	-.07496595	.01707401	(-.103, -.04)

Best Rule     $n=72$      $\bar{R}^2=.7501$

$$\text{Marketing} = .71053198 + 1.18925394 (\text{Marketing Index}) \\ - .15391043 (\text{Market Potential})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	.71053198	.26166915	(.28, 1.14)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.18925394	.08362376	(1.05, 1.327)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	-.15391043	.03584165	(-.213, -.095)

Worst Rule     $n=51$      $\bar{R}^2=.5911$

$$\text{Marketing} = .17672373 + 1.03799056 (\text{Marketing Index}) \\ + .01757419 (\text{Market Potential})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	.17672373	.34378036	(-.39, .74)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.03799056	.15221942	(.787, 1.288)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.01757419	.04216553	(-.05, .087)

Table 7

Tests for Autocorrelation in the Marketing LDR's

$H_0$ : zero autocorrelation

$H_1$ : non-zero autocorrelation

Composite Rule     $n=600$      $\alpha=.05$

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$n\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_1)=1.182$  thus this test is not applicable

Von Neumann Ratio Test

$VNR=1.842$      $K=3$

Do not reject  $H_0$  as VNR is within the range of 1.84 to 2.16

Durbin Watson Test

$d=1.66$  since tables are not available for  $n=600$ ,

this test cannot be utilized

Best Rule     $n=72$      $\alpha=.05$

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$r=.095$      $\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_1)=.0836^2$

$H=.095 \sqrt{\frac{72}{1+72(.0836)^2}} = 1.14$

Do not reject  $H_0$  since 1.14 is less than 1.86

Worst Rule     $n=51$      $\alpha=.05$

Durbin Test for Lagged Variables

$n\text{Var}(\hat{\beta}_1)=1.181$  thus this test is not applicable

Von Neumann Ratio Test

$VNR=1.841$      $K=3$

Do not reject  $H_0$  as VNR is within the range 1.525 to 2.475

Table 7 (continued)

Tests for Autocorrelation in the Marketing LDR's

Durbin Watson Test

$d=2.03$      $K=3$      $d_u=1.63$

Do not reject  $H_0$  as  $d$  is less than  $4-d_u$  but greater than  $d_u$

Von Neumann ratio, and Durbin-Watson statistic are reported. Recall that for LDR's with lagged variables the first test is most appropriate if available and the latter two useful under certain restrictive assumptions. We find in all cases that the available tests accept the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. Recall that the betas are slightly underestimated. The amount of underestimation is .4%, 3%, and 4% respectively for the composite, best and worst marketing LDR's. The correction factor will be ignored as it is quite small.

Returning to table 6, we again note a significantly higher  $\bar{R}^2$  for the best sample rule. This again indicates that an LDR with the hypothesized variables is most predictive of the behavior of the first place teams in each industry.

Hypothesis 3: Having checked the appropriateness of the LDR's we again examine the structural equivalence of the LDR's evaluated on the best, worst and composite samples.

$$H_0^{(3)}: LDR_m^{c,1} = LDR_m^{b,1} = LDR_m^{w,1}$$

Results: As in the case of the price LDR's we reject the null hypothesis at alpha of .05. Thus at least one of the three LDR's is significantly different than the others. Table 8 which shows the results of that test also contains the results of bounding the betas on the composite rule. We find some betas from both best and worst rules to be outside the confidence interval; both best and worst LDR's are different than the composite LDR.

Hypothesis 4: There remains the possibility that the best and worst rules may be structurally equivalent. We then test on following hypothesis on the period 1 through 7 composite data set:

Table 8

## Equivalence of the Coefficients of the Marketing LDR

The Family Test at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: \text{LDR}_m^{\text{C},1} = \text{LDR}_m^{\text{b},1} = \text{LDR}_m^{\text{w},1}$$

$$Q_1=36.35 \quad Q_2=32.21 \quad Q_3=4.14 \quad n=123 \quad J=2 \quad K=3$$

$$F = \frac{4.14/4}{32.21/115} = 3.7$$

Reject  $H_0$  since 3.7 is greater than  $.95F_{4,115}=2.43$

## Individual Coefficient Tests using Confidence Intervals

for the Composite Rule at  $\alpha=.10$ 

## Composite Rule

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$
Best Rule Betas	Within	Outside	Outside
Worst Rule Betas	Outside	Within	Outside

The Family Test for the Equivalence of the Worst and Best Marketing

LDR's on the Composite Sample from Periods ] thru 7 at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: \text{LDR}_m^{\text{b},1} = \text{LDR}_m^{\text{w},1}$$

$$Q_1=384.77 \quad Q_2=366.4 \quad Q_3=18.37 \quad K=3 \quad n=702$$

$$F = \frac{18.37/8}{366.4/694} = 4.35$$

Reject  $H_0$  as 4.35 is greater than  $.95F_{8,694}=1.94$



$$H_0^{(4)}: \text{LDR}_m^{b,1} = \text{LDR}_m^{w,1}$$

Results: This test is also rejected indicating the nonequivalence of the best and worst sample marketing LDR's when tested as a family. The test may be found in table 8.

#### Interrelationships among the Heuristic Volume LDR's

The heuristic production volume LDR uses the market potential, current marketing expenditure and R & D index (an exponentially smoothed R & D average) as predictor variables. Regressions were made for the volume forcing the latter three variables into the equation and allowing no others to enter. This was done on the best, worst and composite samples. The results are reported in table 9.

The problem of autocorrelation arises again but since lagged variables are not present we have less to contend with. The appropriate tests here are either the Von Neumann ratio or the Durbin-Watson statistic. We find, as shown in table 10, that all tests retain the hypothesis of a zero autocorrelation. If autocorrelation did exist we would still have unbiased estimates of the betas, however, the standard deviation of the errors would be underestimated (Johnson, p. 246). Even though the tests did not support the hypothesis of autocorrelation the correction factors for the standard deviation of the betas were computed. In no case was the value given in table 9 for each variable more than .1% from the true value.

Again the LDR from the best sample has the highest  $\bar{R}^2$ . This rule is most appropriate for the first placed teams in each industry.

Hypothesis 5: Since the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation was not rejected we can now test the structural equivalence of the LDR's

Table 9

## Linear Decision Rules for the Volume Decision

Composite Rule     $n=600$      $\overline{R}^2=.4467$

$$\text{Volume} = 1.51751553 + .39804395 (\text{Marketing}) \\ + .25942319 (\text{Market Potential}) + .55468906 (\text{R and D Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	1.51751553	.20982065	(1.17, 1.86)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.39804395	.04121948	(.33, .466)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.25942319	.02365509	(.22, .298)
$\hat{\beta}_3$	.55468906	.10468355	(.382, .727)

Best Rule     $n=72$      $\overline{R}^2=.7150$

$$\text{Volume} = 1.65821861 + .32567365 (\text{Marketing}) \\ + .27161655 (\text{Market Potential}) + .69930199 (\text{R and D Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	1.65821861	.38175701	(1.03, 2.288)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.32567365	.06760973	(.215, .436)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.27161655	.04597963	(.196, .347)
$\hat{\beta}_3$	.69930199	.19419633	(.38, 1.019)

Table 9 (continued)

## Linear Decision Rules for the Volume Decision

Worst Rule  $n=51$   $\bar{R}^2=.3236$

$$\text{Volume} = 2.18782496 - .32567365 (\text{Marketing}) \\ + .24345501 (\text{Market Potential}) + .97220350 (\text{R and D Index})$$

	Coefficients	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 90%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	2.18782496	.65973499	(1.10 , 3.27 )
$\hat{\beta}_1$	-.14096602	.24921883	(-.55 , .269)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.24345501	.08408995	( .105, .38 )
$\hat{\beta}_3$	.97220350	.41486383	( .85 , 1.13 )

Table 10

## Tests for Autocorrelation in the Volume LDR's

 $H_0$ : zero autocorrelation $H_1$ : non-zero autocorrelationComposite Rule     $n=600$      $\alpha = .05$ 

Von Neumann Ratio Test

VNR=1.96     $K=4$ Do not reject  $H_0$  since VNR is within the range of 1.84 to 2.16

Durbin Watson Test

 $d=1.77$  since  $n=600$  no tables are availableBest Rule     $n=72$      $\alpha=.05$ 

Von Neumann Ratio Test

VNR=1.946     $K=4$ Do not reject  $H_0$  since VNR lies in the range of 1.525 to 2.475

Durbin Watson Test

 $d=1.91$      $K=4$      $d_u=1.70$ Do not reject  $H_0$  since  $d$  lies within the range of  $d_u$  to  $4-d_u$ Worst Rule     $n=51$      $\alpha=.05$ 

Von Neumann Ratio Test

VNR=2.012     $K=4$ Do not reject  $H_0$  since VNR lies in the range of 1.515 to 2.485

Durbin Watson Test

 $d=1.96$      $K=4$      $d_u=1.67$ Do not reject  $H_0$  as  $d$  lies within the range of  $d_u$  to  $4-d_u$

as determined on the best, worst and composite samples.

$$H_0^{(5)}: \text{LDR}_V^{c,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{b,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{w,1}$$

Results: As was found in the case of the price and marketing LDR's, we find we must reject this hypothesis in favor of the assertion that at least one of the LDR's is different than the others. Table 11 contains that test and the results of bounding the betas on the composite LDR. We find some of the betas the best and worst rules are outside the confidence interval, thus both the best and worst sample LDR are different than the composite sample LDR.

Hypothesis 6: Once again we check the possibility of the worst and best LDR's being structurally equivalent.

$$H_0^{(6)}: \text{LDR}_V^{b,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{w,1}$$

Results: For the third time we reject the structural equivalence of the best and worst sample LDR's as tested on period 1 through 7 composite sample data; this result is shown in table 11.

#### Cross Validation of the Heuristic LDR's

The appropriateness of heuristic models for the price, marketing, and volume decisions may be evaluated in yet another way. The technique of cross validation (Hamner) segments time series data and finds appropriate LDR's for that segment of data which was collected earlier in time. Then the derived LDR's are evaluated on the remaining observations. The  $\bar{R}^2$  for both segments should be statistically equal if the rule is equally predictive of behavior in both periods. However, some shrinkage would not be unexpected. The cross validation should demonstrate the validity of the heuristic models.

Table 11

## Equivalence of the Coefficients of the Volume LDR's

The Family Test at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0; \text{LDR}_V^{c,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{b,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{w,1}$$

$$Q_1=95.5 \quad Q_2=79.25 \quad Q_3=15.75 \quad n=123 \quad J=2 \quad K=4$$

$$F = \frac{15.75/5}{79.25/113} = 4.49$$

Reject  $H_0$  since 4.49 is greater than  $.95F_{5,113}=2.29$ 

Individual Coefficient Tests using the Confidence Intervals

for the Composite Rule at  $\alpha=.10$ 

Composite Rule

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$	$\hat{\beta}_3$
Best Rule Betas	Within	Outside	Within	Within
Worst Rule Betas	Outside	Outside	Within	Outside

The Family Test for the Equivalence of the Worst and Best Volume

LDR's on the Composite Sample from Periods 1 thru 7 at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: \text{LDR}_V^{b,1} = \text{LDR}_V^{w,1}$$

$$Q_1=974.906 \quad Q_2=710.724 \quad Q_3=264.182 \quad n=702 \quad K=4$$

$$F = \frac{264.182/10}{710.724/692} = 25.72$$

Reject  $H_0$  since 25.72 is greater than  $.95F_{10,692}=1.83$

Table 12 shows the LDR for price derived on period 2 through 4 observations on the composite sample. The LDR has an R of .4886. The table also indicates that the betas of the period 2 through 4 LDR are not outside the confidence intervals of the composite LDR for all periods. When this price LDR is used on period 5 through 7 observations we find a R of .4862. A test utilizing Fisher's r to z and pooling the variances finds no significant differences between the R's. Recall that we earlier found autocorrelation for this LDR, however, the weight of the evidence supports the cross validation of the price LDR in spite of the autocorrelation.

The numerator of the Fisher's r to z contains the sum of the reciprocals of the degrees of freedom for the two correlation coefficients. Should there be a lack of independence in estimating the correlation coefficients we would want to adjust downward the degrees of freedom. This would reduce the size of the test statistic and make acceptance of the null hypothesis more likely. Since I have not adjusted the degrees of freedom, the tests are more conservative than would be necessary should dependence be a problem.

Table 13 shows the LDR for marketing derived on period 2 through 4 observations on the composite sample while allowing only the heuristic variables to enter into the regression. The LDR has a R of .7469. The table also indicates that the betas of the period 2 through 4 are outside the confidence interval of the composite LDR for all periods for marketing. When this LDR is used on period 5 through 7 observations we find a R of .6803. The test utilizing Fisher's r to z and pooling the variances finds no significant

Table 12

## Cross Validation of the Price LDR

Composite Rule    n=305    Periods 2 thru 4    R=.4886

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Price} = & 2.12401974 + .01988191 (\text{Next Econ. Index}) \\ & + .35990635 (\text{Price Index}) \end{aligned}$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 95%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	2.12401974	.53233557	(1.08 , 3.17 )
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.01988191	.00434644	( .011, .028)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.35990635	.03736443	( .286, .433)

Comparison of the Period 2 thru 4 LDR and the Composite LDR  
using the Confidence Intervals on the Composite LDR

	Composite Rule			$\alpha = .10$
	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$	
Period 2 thru 4 Betas	Within	Within	Within	

Correlation of the Predictions and the Actual Price in Periods 5 thru 7

R=.4862

Testing the Equivalence of the R's using Fisher's r to z and

Pooling the Variances at  $\alpha=.05$

$$H_0: \rho_1 = \rho_2$$

$$H_1: \rho_1 \neq \rho_2$$

$$z = \frac{(.5343 - .5314)}{\sqrt{(1/302) + (1/292)}} = .0354$$

$$\sqrt{(1/302) + (1/292)}$$

Do not reject since z is less than 1.86



Table 13

## Cross Validation of the Marketing LDR

Composite Rule n=305 Periods 2 thru 4 R=.7469

$$\text{Marketing} = .44218993 + 1.34129482 (\text{Marketing Index}) \\ - .20485693 (\text{Market Potential})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 95%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	.44218993	.21021730	(.0284, .856)
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.34129482	.08891652	(1.17, 1.51)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	-.20485693	.06204873	(-.326, -.08)

Comparison of the Period 2 thru 4 LDR and the Composite LDR  
using Confidence Intervals on the Composite LDR

Composite Rule  $\alpha = .10$ 

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$
Period 2 thru 4			
Betas	Outside	Outside	Outside

Correlation of the Predictions and the Actual Marketing

in Periods 5 thru 7 R=.68032

Testing the Equivalence of the R's using Fisher's r to z and

Pooling the Variances at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: \rho_1 = \rho_2$$

$$H_1: \rho_1 \neq \rho_2$$

$$z = \frac{(.966 - .829)}{\sqrt{(1/302) + (1/292)}} = 1.6748$$

Do not reject  $H_0$  since z is less than 1.86

differences between the R's at alpha equals .05. The two preceding results may appear contradictory. The marketing LDR meets the definitional requirements for being cross validated at .05. The confidence intervals are three tests each with an alpha of .10 or a combined probability of a type I error of .30. In order to make the comparison meaningful they must be at the same alpha level. Thus performing confidence intervals at .02 might be much more suitable; the combined alpha is .06. In this case, all betas would fall within the confidence interval on the composite marketing rule. There remains no contradiction.

Lastly we test the volume LDR. The period 2 through 4 normative rule of volume is given in table 14; it has an R of .5747. The betas for this rule are entirely inside the confidence intervals for the composite volume LDR. When this rule is used on period 5 through 7 observations we find an R of .6194. Again Fisher's r to z test with pooled variances finds no significant difference in the R's.

#### Summary of the Interrelationships among Heuristic LDR's

Thus far we have found:

1. The LDR's for each decision variable had statistically different betas in each of the three data samples they were calculated for.
2. The heuristic LDR's always had the highest  $\bar{R}^2$  on best team data sample suggesting the best teams were more consistent.
3. In 8 of 9 cases the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation could be accepted at the .05 level. When corrections to the betas were made for the lagged variables the correction was less than 4%.
4. All three rules cross validate.

Table 14

## Cross Validation of the Volume LDR

Composite Rule  $n=305$  Periods 2 thru 4  $R=.5747$ 

$$\text{Volume} = 1.70101805 + .32858938 (\text{Marketing}) \\ + .27581115 (\text{Market Potential}) + .47962004 (\text{R and D Index})$$

	Coefficient	Standard Error	Confidence Interval at 95%
$\hat{\beta}_0$	1.70101805	.31600816	(1.08 ,2.32 )
$\hat{\beta}_1$	.32858938	.05269466	( .225, .432)
$\hat{\beta}_2$	.27581115	.06006159	( .158, .393)
$\hat{\beta}_3$	.47962004	.16210260	( .162, .797)

Comparison of the Period 2 thru 4 LDR and the Composite LDR  
using Confidence Intervals on the Composite LDR

Composite Rule  $\alpha = .10$ 

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	$\hat{\beta}_2$	$\hat{\beta}_3$
Period 2 thru 4 Betas	Within	Within	Within	Within

Correlations of the Predictions and the Actual Volume

in Periods 5 thru 7  $R=.61949$ 

Testing the Equivalence of the R's using Fisher's r to z and

Pooling the Variances at  $\alpha=.05$ 

$$H_0: \rho_1 = \rho_2 \quad z = \frac{(.724 - .655)}{\sqrt{(1/302) + (1/292)}} = .8435$$

$$H_1: \rho_1 \neq \rho_2$$

Do not reject  $H_0$  since z is less than 1.86

### Analysis of the Equivalence of Method 2 and 3 LDR's

The research design utilized the development of LDR's by 3 methods. These were:

- Method 1: Construct a heuristic decision model and then fit those variables to the data.
- Method 2: Begin with the method 1 variables but allow other variables to enter the equation through the stepwise regression technique.
- Method 3: Instruct the stepwise regression to program select the variables to be entered and the order in which to enter them.

We would expect method 2 and 3 LDR's to be very close, if not identical. The stepwise regression program will construct only a locally optimal LDR; hence, different starting points may yield different LDR's. Table 15 summarizes the comparisons between method 2 and 3 LDR's. We conclude:

1. In 5 of 9 cases the LDR's are identical.
2. In 3 of the remaining 4 cases the LDR's are not significantly different in terms of their coefficient of determination. Since this test (Burr) is also a test for finding variables to enter into regression equations we can confidently assert no improvement could be gained from changing from one form of the LDR to the other.
3. In the case of the marketing decision in the worst sample the two LDR's are significantly different, hence the LDR from method 3 is preferable to the method 2 LDR.

The tests thus summarized indicate the statistical equivalence in 8 of the 9 cases under consideration. Then by comparing method 1 and method 3 LDR's we adequately compare method 2 LDR's also.

### Analysis of the Equivalence of Method 1 and 3 LDR's

Now we are prepared to compare method 1 and 3 LDR's; we will proceed with a series of tests which will demonstrate that many of the

Table 15

Comparison of Method 2 and 3 Linear Decision Rules

	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Composite Data Set	No significant Difference $F=.62 < .95F_{1,590}=3.84$	Identical LDR's	Identical LDR's
Best Data Set	Identical LDR's	Identical LDR's	Identical LDR's
Worst Data Set	No Significant Difference $F=2.243 < .95F_{1,45}=4.08$	A Significant Difference $F=7.6 > .95F_{2,44}=3.23$	No Significant Difference $F=.868 < .95F_{1,44}=4.08$

LDR pairs are statistically different. Then we shall then argue that these statistical differences are of no practical significance.

First recall that method 2 LDR's are the heuristic variables plus other variables in a LDR. Since in all cases variables were added to the heuristic set we can immediately assert that there is a difference in terms of  $\bar{R}^2$  between method 1 and 2 LDR's. This is because improvement in LDR  $R^2$  is the criterion for the admission of a new variable.

Now let's turn to the criteria of adding significantly to the sum squared explained by the regression. In a test analogous to testing for linear and quadratic components in an ANOVA table we test the contribution of the additional variables. These tests are summarized in table 16. In all cases a significant contribution is made to the explained variance of the regression by the new variables.

Another test of the differences between method 1 and 3 LDR's is the test of structural equivalence, a family test on the betas of the two LDR's (Huang, p. 108). All the extra variables in the method 3 LDR are assumed to be in the method 1 LDR only at a zero level. The results of these tests are summarized in table 17. Note the method 1 and method 3 LDR's are not structurally different when evaluated on the best and worst samples. The composite sample method 1 and method 3 LDR's are, however, significantly different. The results of this test and the previous tests on the best and worst sample are not conflicting since they test different aspects of the relationship between the LDR's. Hence, LDR's from the same structural family may induce significant differences in the explained sum squares or  $R^2$ .

Table 16

Comparison of Method 1 and 3 LDR's on Contribution to Sum Squares

	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Composite Data Set	F=22.2 which is greater than $.95F_{7,590}=2.01$	F=17.3 which is greater than $.95F_{9,588}=1.88$	F=10.8 which is greater than $.95F_{8,588}=1.94$
Best Data Set	F=7.9 which is greater than $.95F_{4,65}=2.53$	F=9.12 which is greater than $.95F_{4,65}=2.53$	F=22.9 which is greater than $.95F_{2,65}=3.15$
Worst Data Set	F=6.86 which is greater than $.95F_{2,46}=3.22$	F=5.878 which is greater than $.95F_{1,47}=4.07$	F=7.172 which is greater than $.95F_{2,45}=3.22$

A Significant Difference was Found in all Tests

Table 17

Structural Equivalence of Method 1 and 3 LDR's

	Price Rule	Marketing Rule	Volume Rule
Composite Data Set	Significant Difference $F=1.635 >$ $.95F_{24,576}=1.52$	Significant Difference $F=2.76 >$ $.95F_{24,576}=1.52$	Significant Difference $F=2.91 >$ $.95F_{20,580}=1.57$
Best Data Set	No Significant Difference $F=1.407 <$ $.95F_{12,60}=1.83$	No Significant Difference $F=1.17 <$ $.95F_{14,58}=1.84$	No Significant Difference $F=.735 <$ $.95F_{14,58}=1.84$
Worst Data Set	No Significant Difference $F=.51 <$ $.95F_{10,41}=2.08$	No Significant Difference $F=.7 <$ $.95F_{12,39}=2.00$	No Significant Difference $F=.49 <$ $.95F_{8,43}=2.18$



Having found some evidence of statistical differences among rules, it will be necessary to examine the value of these differences when predicting the criterion. Tables 18 through 20 contain the confidence intervals on the predictions for  $Y$  at the grand mean  $\bar{Y}$  and the grand mean  $\bar{Y}$  at the grand mean  $\bar{Y}$ .

At this point we can argue whether these differences are of a practical value. The best way to approach this point is to think of the LDR's in terms of predicting the future. Then we could examine the degree of improvement of method 3 over method 1 LDR's. This approach is embodied in table 21. If we were to predict the future using method 1 LDR we can find a confidence interval within which we would expect the true value of the criterion to be 95% of the time. Now if we were to predict using method 3 LDR's we would have a slightly smaller interval. The latter table contains the degree of confidence that the true value would lie outside the method 3 interval but inside the method 1 LDR. In other words this is the degree of confidence that method 3 interval would give us useful information above and beyond that of the method 1 LDR's. This is done by using the significance level on the heuristic distribution of the limits of the method 3 confidence interval.

Table 21 then tells us that method 3 LDR's give us, at best, a rule which would be more useful than the method 1 rule 7.8% of the time. In the average case method 3 is more useful only about 4.4% of the time. That small amount of improvement is not of much practical value except in the most critical of circumstances. Further, the cost of getting the additional information might be relatively large as information on three times as many variables is needed.

Table 18

## Confidence Intervals on Price LDR Predictions

	Method 1	Method 2	Method 3
Composite Data Set	$SSE=.1018, K=3$ $\bar{Y} \pm .20, \bar{Y} \pm .008$	$SSE=.0925, K=11$ $\bar{Y} \pm .18, \bar{Y} \pm .007$	$SSE=.0925, K=10$ $\bar{Y} \pm .18, \bar{Y} \pm .007$
Best Data Set	$SSE=.069, K=3$ $\bar{Y} \pm .136, \bar{Y} \pm .016$	$SSE=.0586, K=7$ $\bar{Y} \pm .116, \bar{Y} \pm .013$	$SSE=.0586, K=7$ $\bar{Y} \pm .116, \bar{Y} \pm .013$
Worst Data Set	$SSE=.0939, K=3$ $\bar{Y} \pm .188, \bar{Y} \pm .026$	$SSE=.084, K=5$ $\bar{Y} \pm .169, \bar{Y} \pm .024$	$SSE=.086, K=4$ $\bar{Y} \pm .172, \bar{Y} \pm .024$

Average Price is 6.255

## KEY

SSE = Standard Error of the Estimate

K = Number of Structural Coefficients

 $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE} = \text{Interval on } Y \text{ at } \bar{Y}$  $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE}/\sqrt{n} = \text{Interval on } \bar{Y} \text{ at } \bar{Y}$

Table 19

## Confidence Intervals on Marketing LDR Predictions

	Method 1	Method 2	Method 3
Composite Data Set	$SSE=.732, K=3$ $\bar{Y}+1.43, \bar{Y}+.057$	$SSE=.6567, K=12$ $\bar{Y}+1.287, \bar{Y}+.051$	$SSE=.6567, K=12$ $\bar{Y}+1.287, \bar{Y}+.051$
Best Data Set	$SSE=.5137, K=3$ $\bar{Y}+1.017, \bar{Y}+.12$	$SSE=.4004, K=7$ $\bar{Y}+.79, \bar{Y}+.09$	$SSE=.4004, K=7$ $\bar{Y}+.79, \bar{Y}+.09$
Worst Data Set	$SSE=.539, K=3$ $\bar{Y}+1.08, \bar{Y}+.152$	$SSE=.514, K=4$ $\bar{Y}+1.03, \bar{Y}+.146$	$SSE=.4434, K=6$ $\bar{Y}+.89, \bar{Y}+.125$

Average Marketing was 3.25 (in hundred thousands)

## KEY

SSE = Standard Error of the Estimate

K = Number of Structural Coefficient

$\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE}$  = Interval on Y at  $\bar{Y}$

$\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE}/\sqrt{n}$  = Interval on  $\bar{Y}$  at  $\bar{Y}$

Table 20

Confidence Intervals on the Volume LDR Predictions

	Method 1	Method 2	Method 3
Composite Data Set	$\text{SSE}=1.003, K=4$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96, \bar{Y} \pm .079$	$\text{SSE}=.937, K=12$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.84, \bar{Y} \pm .074$	$\text{SSE}=.937, K=12$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.84, \bar{Y} \pm .074$
Best Data Set	$\text{SSE}=.569, K=4$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.126, \bar{Y} \pm .13$	$\text{SSE}=.4444, K=6$ $\bar{Y} \pm .876, \bar{Y} \pm .103$	$\text{SSE}=.4444, K=6$ $\bar{Y} \pm .876, \bar{Y} \pm .103$
Worst Data Set	$\text{SSE}=1.1, K=4$ $\bar{Y} \pm 2.2, \bar{Y} \pm .31$	$\text{SSE}=.981, K=6$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.97, \bar{Y} \pm .277$	$\text{SSE}=.978, K=5$ $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96, \bar{Y} \pm .277$

Average Volume is 5.35 (in hundreds of thousands)

## KEY

SSE = Standard Error of the Estimate

K = Number of Structural Coefficients

 $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE} = \text{Interval on } Y \text{ at } \bar{Y}$  $\bar{Y} \pm 1.96 \text{ SSE}/\sqrt{n} = \text{Interval on } \bar{Y} \text{ at } \bar{Y}$

Table 21

Improvement in the Degree of Confidence of Method 3 over Method 1 LDR's

	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Composite Data Set	.045	.03	.0158
Best Data Set	.043	.078	.0786
Worst Data Set	.0218	.0512	.0318

When we consider the predictions on the grand mean  $\bar{Y}$  at  $\bar{Y}$ , the percent of the time when method 3 is more useful than method 1 LDR's is identical with  $Y$  at  $\bar{Y}$  which we just discussed. However if we return to the confidence intervals contained in tables 18 through 21, we find that the value of that difference in intervals is very small. For example, the difference for the composite price LDR's is .2¢. On the marketing LDR it is \$1200 and on the volume LDR it is 1000 units. These are all quite small when considered in terms of the magnitude of the mean of these variables. Thus for predicting the grand mean  $Y$  we can additionally argue that the magnitude of the gain in reliability is relatively small.

Our findings in comparing method 1 and 3 LDR's are:

1. There are statistically significant differences in the  $R^2$ 's and additions to the sums squared explained variance.
2. In the best and worst samples the LDR's are from the same structural family; the LDR's on the composite sample are significantly different.
3. Even though the differences are statistically significant the practical differences are not apparent in terms of improvement in our predictions.

Thus we conclude that the heuristic models can be statistically improved upon, however, little practical value can be gained from such an inclusion of new variables.

Realizing that my argument for a lack of practical difference among the various methods to obtain LDR's might not be completely accepted the subsequent hypotheses examining bias, variance, and learning were examined for both method 1 and method 3 LDR's.

In fact, given the statistically significant differences of the method 1 and 3 rules, we could be criticized if we did not test both.

One could argue if bias or variance was demonstrated across rank, time or industry for the method 1 LDR's it was simply because these heuristic rules were inadequate representatives of the subject's behavior. This point could be strengthened by pointing to the statistically significant differences in method 1 and 3 LDR's. However, if we test method 3 LDR's we test the best possible rule by all criteria including that of statistical significance. Then no criticism such as the foregoing is available. As we will see the bias and variance effects across time, rank and industry are, if anything, even stronger for the method 3 LDR's. Or looked at another way, the method 1 LDR's may obscure the outcome of the tests. The difference in the outcome of these tests for method 1 and 3 LDR's could result from random effects rather than true differences in the method 1 and 3 rules. However, no test is available to demonstrate that assertion.

It is important to note that method 1 LDR's should be tested also since we desire to have our results applicable to rules calculated by both method 1 and 3 procedures.

#### Bias in Decision Making among Teams of Different Rank

In an earlier discussion we examined Bowman's assertion that due to dish shaped cost surfaces the variance rather than bias was the major source of economic inefficiency. We found that given further assumptions on the model his assertion would hold. Bias must be measured relative to some preferred rule. The optimal rules would certainly be appropriate, however, they do not exist for the price, marketing and volume rules in the Executive Game. The most appropriate available standard would be the rules used by the best team in each industry.

If bias is not a determinant of team performance then we would not expect bias to fluctuate across team standings. The latter hypothesis is tested and the results shown in table 22.

The first three tests are on the heuristic best price, marketing and volume rules. Only in the case of the volume do we find significant fluctuations in bias across rank. A linear equation is a significant predictor at .05 of those fluctuations; however, it is not clear from the equation that the best teams are more unbiased than the worst teams.

The next three tests all show significant fluctuations in bias relative to the method 3 best rules. In all three cases a linear trend based on team rank is apparent at .05. These equations predict that the worse the team the more highly biased it will be to the best team's decision rule. Apparently simplifying the method 3 to the heuristic rule obscured this effect.

The conclusions based on the method 3 rules point to the need to re-evaluate the role of bias in Bowman's theory.

#### Variance in Decision Making among Teams of Different Rank

Bowman has asserted that variance is the major source of economic inefficiency. Thus we would expect that variance would discriminate the levels of team performance. In particular we would hypothesize that variance should be a direct linear function of final team rank.

As earlier discussed, the mean average deviation of the actual from the predicted value was used to measure the variance. This measure would show the degree to which teams consistently used a decision rule. Thus it is a measure of erratic behavior which



Table 22

Significance Levels for the Tests on Bias across Final Team Rank

Heuristic LDR's	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Best Rules on the Composite Data Set	.242	.621	.009 with linear effects equation 1

## Method 3 LDR's

Best Rules on the Composite Data Set	.033 with linear effects equation 2	.106 with linear effects equation 3	.003 with linear effects equation 4
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Equation 1: Mean Volume =  $.173 - .041 (\text{Rank})$ Equation 2: Mean Price =  $.033 - .009 (\text{Rank})$ Equation 3: Mean Marketing =  $.0677 - .03 (\text{Rank})$ Equation 4: Mean Volume =  $.196 + .064 (\text{Rank})$

Bowman thinks is the underlying cause of inefficiency. The standards of performance we shall use to calculate the MAD are the best rules.

These results parallel those on bias. The MAD for the best heuristic volume rule has significant fluctuations across rank. These fluctuations are fit at .05 by a linear equation. The equation shows MAD to be a function of rank such that the lower ranked teams had larger MAD's.

All method 3 MAD's had significant fluctuations across time which were fitted by a linear equation. Again the lower the rank the larger the MAD. Table 23 summarizes these findings.

The results support the contention that variance (as measured by MAD) discriminates the levels of team performance. This finding lends support to Bowman's assertion that variance is a source of economic inefficiency.

### Learning

An earlier study (Carter, Jenicke, and Remus) had indicated the need for including in the theory learning effects. This paper will examine two interrelated measures of learning.

In the preceding section we introduced MAD of the actual from the predicted decision as a measure of erratic decision making. In this case however, we used the composite rules which characterize aggregate behavior as the preferred rule. This was done to find how the subjects learned their own rules rather than the optimal rules. If learning were to take place we would hypothesize that the MAD would decrease over time.

Table 23

Significance Level for the Tests on MAD Across Rank

Heuristic LDR's	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Best Rules on the Composite Data Set	.745	.051	.0005 with linear effects equation 1

## Method 3 LDR's

Best Rules on the Composite Data Set	.033 with linear effects equation 2	.0005 with linear effects equation 3	.0005 with linear effects equation 4
---	---	--	--

Equation 1: Volume MAD =  $.453 + .05$  (Rank)Equation 2: Price MAD =  $.10 + .01$  (Rank)Equation 3: Marketing MAD =  $.36 + .03$  (Rank)Equation 4: Volume MAD =  $.515 + .083$  (Rank)

Another measure of interest evaluates the average propensity to use a LDR. A decision maker could be behaving erratically while, on the average, be using the composite LDR. The measure is the mean signed deviations (MSD) of the actual from the predicted decision. We would hypothesize that if learning occurred as time progressed, the decision makers would get closer to the rule characterizing their aggregate behavior, thus reducing the MSD.

Table 24 contains the results of the tests of learning using MSD. Both the heuristic price and volume LDR's yield linear trends in MSD over time. As predicted, MSD is reduced as play proceeds. This table also shows that all three method 3 LDR's manifested linear trends to their MSD. Again, MSD was reduced as time progressed.

Table 25 contains the results of the tests of learning using MAD. These results are mixed. We find the heuristic price and volume LDR's have significant fluctuations in MAD over time. The MAD for the price LDR is reduced as time proceeds, however, the volume LDR shows the opposite effect. The linear trend in the latter case explains only 9% of the variance in all means. This may be a type II error.

The method 3 price and volume rules also show significant fluctuations in MAD's. The price rule, as in the heuristic rule, has a linear trend in the predicted direction. The volume rule shows no linear trend again suggesting that the heuristic volume rule trend was a type II error.

We conclude that the learning effect has been demonstrated in terms of mean signed deviations of the actual from the predicted decisions. The learning effect in mean absolute deviations was only

Table 24

Significance Levels for the Tests on MSD across Time Periods

Heuristic LDR's	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Composite Rules on the Composite Data Set	.0005 with linear effects equation 1	.777	.0005 with linear effects equation 2

## Method 3 LDR's

Composite Rules on the Composite Data Set	.0005 with linear effects equation 3	.037 with linear effects equation 4	.0005 with linear effects equation 5
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Equation 1: Mean Price =  $.174 - .0332$  (Period Number)Equation 2: Mean Volume =  $.173 - .041$  (Period Number)Equation 3: Mean Price =  $-.26 + .049$  (Period Number)Equation 4: Mean Marketing =  $.14 - .02$  (Period Number)Equation 5: Mean Volume =  $.59 - .112$  (Period Number)

Table 25

Significance Levels for the Tests on MAD across Time Periods

Heuristic LDR's	Price LDR	Marketing LDR	Volume LDR
Composite Rules on the Composite Data Set	.0005 with linear effects equation 1	.322	.0005 with linear effects equation 2

## Method 3 LDR's

Composite Rules on the Composite Data Set	.0005 with linear effects equation 3	.920	.0005 with no linear effects
---	--------------------------------------	------	------------------------------

Equation 1: Price MAD =  $.10 - .022 (\text{Period Number})$ Equation 2: Volume MAD =  $.384 + .066 (\text{Period Number})$ Equation 3: Price MAD =  $.28 - .04 (\text{Period Number})$

manifest in 1 of 3 cases and therefore not well supported. Both of these learning effects relative to the optimal rule were found by Carter, Jenicke, and Remus. We interpret these results as indicating an increased propensity to use the composite rules and weak support for a reduction of erratic behavior as play proceeds.

#### Summary of the Effects of Rank and Time

The findings of our tests in the preceding three sections are:

1. We found that bias relative to the best rule was a linear function of rank. The lowest ranked teams had the largest bias.
2. We found that variance (defined in terms of MAD) relative to the best rule was a linear function of rank. The lowest ranked teams had the largest variance.
3. The degree of support for the findings on bias and variance were equally strong.
4. Learning was manifest as play proceeded by an increased average propensity to use the linear decision rule characterizing aggregate behavior.
5. Weak support was found for reduced erratic behavior relative to composite rules as play progressed.

## CHAPTER V

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the prior chapter we evaluated a number of significant research questions. It is the intent of this chapter to integrate those results into existing theoretical frameworks. This includes restating Bowman's theory in the light of this and other studies. This chapter also includes a plan for research projects which will expand and elaborate this area of study.

#### Conclusions

The results of this study have implications for Bowman's managerial coefficient theory.

Even in competitive business simulation games we can conceptualize the decision maker as a decision rule coefficient estimator. The heuristic models found have concurrent and cross validity. Once a heuristic model is found according to the guidelines, little practical improvement seems to be gained from the addition of more variable.

Significant levels of bias occurred over the ranks of the teams. It often had a linear trend such that we can assert that the poorer ranked teams were more biased relative to the best rules than the better teams. So we could argue that, at least with environments in which the manager is not fully experienced in decision making, we can distinguish the better firms from the poorer firms on the degree



of bias they have from industry leaders. Thus, using the industry leaders as a bench mark to examine a firms decisions seems to be a good idea.

Thus we note that, with the exception of fully experienced managers in stable environments decision making may be biased relative to industry leaders. In particular, Bowman's theory should include stipulations as to poorer teams being more biased than better teams at least while learning is going on.

The variance is asserted to be the cause of the poorer economic performance of some firms since the cost surface is postulated to be dish shaped. We found that the degree of variance (as measured by MAD) did distinguish the better from the poorer teams. The degree of support for both bias and variance discriminating team performance is equally strong. Thus variance may not be the major source of inefficiency.

We examined learning in terms of increased propensity to use the composite rules and reduced erratic behavior relative to the composite LDR's. Strong support was found for the former indicating that the subjects in the aggregate tend to get closer to the composite rules as play proceeds. Weaker support was found for the reduction of aggregate erratic behavior over time relative to the composite rules.

Thus we would suggest the following additions to Bowman's theory:

1. Linear decision rules may be appropriate for unstable, competitive environments. They have both concurrent and cross validity.
2. The linear decision rules used by the best, worst and the aggregate industry may be significantly different. That is, different managers may have different insights into similar decision making situations.

3. Bias from the first place teams' rule discriminates levels of team performance. The lower the rank the larger the bias.
4. Variance (as measured by MAD) discriminates the levels of team performance. The lower rank teams have a larger MAD relative to the best teams' rules.
5. Both of the preceding effects are equally strong. Thus economic inefficiency may not be solely attributable to variance.
6. Learning was manifest as both increased propensity to use the composite rules and reduced erratic behavior relative to the composite rule as play progresses.

All of the foregoing must be qualified by the obvious fact that the data from which the conclusions were drawn came from inexperience young decision makers. The results are also confounded by the fact that all subjects had the same classroom influences while they were playing this game; this is a business game rather than the business world. We might point out in support of the preceding that the learning effects also appeared in an earlier piece of empirical research (Carter, Jenicke and Remus) done with a aggregate production scheduling game. The other questions were not addressed by the latter study.

#### Need for Further Study

This section reliably appears in all dissertation and alludes to studies that need to be performed but seldom are performed. For a change of pace I shall use this section to outline my direction for future study in this topic area.

It is now clear that the Executive Game being played singly by inexperienced decision makers, yields results which are consistent with the literature and which allow us to examine new and interesting

hypotheses. Further this source of data is readily available in quite large quantities, at a low price. In Management 101 this source of data is fully institutionalized.

The first need is to replicate the major findings of this study on the data generated by play in the Spring of 1974. Particularly of concern is that these derived rules may have been idiosyncratic to the winter version of Management 101. The autocorrelation on the price LDR needs further examination and perhaps even a non-lagged rule selected.

Then I will be able to return to the data which has been used for this study. There are many questions which can be asked of these data not examined in the hundred plus tests in this paper. Extension of this analysis to other variables in the Executive Game could aid us to understand the mechanisms which lead to game success. I need to examine the interrelationship of bias and variance in each industry to see if idiosyncratic patterns of covariation occur within each industry. The game play then could be selectively replicated using the linear decision rules to assert that rules in this competitive environment give better results than actual behavior. Ultimately we could devise a linear model based on our derived rules which would actually compete with live decision makers period by period.

An analysis of the individual decision rules has yet to be made. I can then address myself to the equivalence of various individual rules to the composite and examine the effects of non-composite rule behavior.

Data has been collected on student grades and national test scores. Also a questionnaire has been filled out by all participants which examines the decision making behavior and their opinions about the benefits of the game and the real managerial world. The latter data can be used to try to develop behavioral and attitudinal correlates of decision making parameters such as bias and variance, learning effects, and the variance not examined by the decision rules.

Bowman claims his theory applies also to group decision making. Fortunately all the hypothesis of this paper are amenable to the data from Executive Game when played by teams in Management 409 and 833. This is virgin territory.

These studies are bootstrapped into the Carter, Jenicke and Remus studies on aggregate production scheduling which is now institutionalized in Management 306. Thus cross fertilization will undoubtedly occur.

The aim of my future work will be to add more rigor to the field.

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**APPENDIX COMPUTER PRINTOUTS**

The following nine computer printouts are the outputs for LDR's found on the composite data set. The first three are the heuristic price, marketing and volume rules. The three method 2 rules then follow in the latter order. The method 3 rules for price, marketing and volume are the last three printouts in this section.

REV 8-20-72

FORM 0-10-100

PRICE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

ADV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	2.79267231	2	1.39633616	134.5221	<0.0005
ERROR	6.19661502	597	.01037959		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	8.98928733	599			

CASES

600

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.10188027

INSTANT VAP. 32  
ICE INDE 12  
NEXT E. 32

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
2.71465395  
.23942493  
.01755111

BETA  
WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
.52148  
.59135

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00003  
.04284  
.04284

TB  
11.7703  
12.1504  
16.1393

FB  
138.5390  
147.6326  
260.4762

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFS  
.43399  
.44527  
.55115

R2  
DELETES  
.15070  
.14020  
.00990

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
325.83625610	2	162.91812805	303.4495	<0.0005
320.52158027	597	.53688707		
646.35783637	599			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)  
ERROR  
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES  
600

R2 .5041  
R .7100  
MULTIPLE CORR COEFS  
K 3  
R2 .5024

R .949  
.7088  
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S .73272578

INSTANT VAR  
9  
13  
19  
INDEX  
POTENT

REGRESSIONS  
COEFFICIENTS  
.77532008  
1.00535500  
-.07436595

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.11912130  
.34438912  
.01707401

BEIGHTS  
WEIGHTS  
2.000000  
.78219  
-.15163

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00000  
.03454  
.03454

TB  
6.5087  
22.6487  
-4.3906

FB  
42.3627  
512.9628  
19.2778

SIG  
<0.0005  
<0.0005  
<0.0005

PARTIALS  
CORR COEFS  
.25741  
.67981  
-.17686

DELETES  
.46892  
.07803  
.48810

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8) VOLUME

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
490.26482059	3	163.42160686	162.1881	<0.0005
603.53272160	596	1.00760524		
1093.79754219	599			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)

ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

600

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
1.00379542

MULTIPLE CORP COEFS  
R BAR .4467  
R .6683

INSTANT	VAP	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA WEIGHTS	TB	FB	SIG	CORR COEFS	PARTIALS	R2 DELETES
0	0	1.51751553	.20982365	0.00000	0.00000	7.2324	52.3082	<0.0005	.2405	.40114	
5	5	.39801395	.04121348	.30640	.03173	9.6557	93.2518	<0.0005	.26782	.36332	
14	14	.25062396	.01464355	.18809	.03550	5.2917	28.0765	<0.0005	.21211	.42352	
19	19	.25942313	.02365509	.43393	.03683	10.9669	120.2731	<0.0005	.40977	.33836	



DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	392.78851720	11	35.70804702	82.8031	<0.0005
ERROR	253.56931917	598	.43124034		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	646.35783637	599			

CASES	500
P2	.6377
R	.7795
R BAR	.7748
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE	.65668892

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFS	BETAS	HEIGHTS	SID. ERRORS OF BETAS	TS	FR	SIG	PARR CORR COEFS	R2 DELETES
INSTANT	-.503189421	.29746516	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	-2.5164	6.6996	.010	-.10606	.60323
TG INDEX	-.94331827	.04654348	.03022	.03022	.73170	.03022	-20.2038	408.1948	<0.0005	-.64012	.33335
T POTENTIAL	-.05431827	.02429142	.04913	.04913	.11796	.04913	-22.4008	405.1948	.017	-.09852	.60335
VOLUME	-.08605202	.02683247	.03759	.03759	.24488	.03759	-7.0509	49.0703	<0.0005	-.27752	.57496
LES VOLUME	-.32643111	.03438751	.02858	.02858	.09588	.02858	-11.5502	15.6339	<0.0005	-.10678	.60335
TENANCIALS	-.01373803	.00678324	.01629	.01629	.11094	.01629	-3.0569	15.6339	.040	-.19452	.59428
ATF PRICE	1.05239021	.22093248	.04538	.04538	.21816	.04538	-4.8373	23.1101	<0.0005	-.15452	.59428
STN COST	-1.03333371	.27774018	.03275	.03275	.16458	.03275	-4.7924	14.3333	<0.0005	-.14977	.59428
STN PAD	.12855658	.55456447	.04178	.04178	.11245	.04178	-3.3578	12.3333	<0.0005	-.14324	.59428
AD INDEX	-.27281180	.08421064	.03710	.03710	.12017	.03710	-3.2396	10.4352	.001	-.13242	.60069





DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(9) VOLUME

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	11	52.05287046	59.0624	<0.0005
ERROR	599	.88131967		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	599			

CASES	600	R	.7184	STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE	.93878628
		R <sup>2</sup>	.5249		
		R	.7245		

INSTANT	VAP	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA HEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA HEIGHTS	TB	F	SIG	PARTIAL CORR	R <sup>2</sup>	DELETES
AD INDEX	14	.58923079	.55133330	.000000	0	.2309	.0533	.617	.00952		.52488
T POTENTIAL	13	.36222039	.14543304	.03511	.03511	3.3633	.3153	.001	.33535		.51578
AT P	12	.16711299	.04062639	.03127	.03127	8.8472	11.6348	<0.0005	.19682		.46059
PSIC	11	.02873715	.03370953	.02144	.02144	4.9723	19.4351	<0.0005	.12167		.50516
SOL	10	.03232640	.01954840	.03045	.03045	2.9375	23.4355	<0.0005	.19953		.50522
LES	9	.01327324	.03277154	.03533	.03533	-4.1606	24.8324	<0.0005	.16911		.50523
ICE	8	.01084507	.07220069	.03334	.03334	-4.6041	27.3168	<0.0005	.18624		.50779
IN	7	.01084507	.03897724	.03922	.03922	4.7732	21.1680	.006	.11828		.51871
CASH	6	.01115530	.00452636	.03475	.03475	-2.6413	6.9762	.008	.10828		.51972
	5			.07920	.03123	-2.5362	6.4323	.011	.10402		

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

ANO FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	3.93864869	9	.43762763	51.1223	<0.0005
ERROR	5.05063864	590	.00956040		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	8.98928733	599			

CASES

600

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.09252245

MULTIPLE CORR COEFS  
R  
.6619  
R BAR 2  
.4295  
R BAR  
.6554

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA WEIGHTS	PARTIAL CORR COEFS	SIG	R2 DELETES
CONSTANT	-.914423211	1.81116918	0.30000	0.00000	-.19803	<0.0005	.41522
ANNUAL CHY	.149330722	.032518957	1.76600	.35947	.3947	<0.0005	.41522
PRICE INDEX	.106332072	.02024957	1.76722	.04924	24.02201	<0.0005	.21510
SALES VOLUME	.02131873	.00499035	.19929	.04385	234.6528	<0.0005	.41848
SALES VOLUME	.019335745	.00791353	.21336	.04213	20.6551	<0.0005	.41373
KTG INDEX	.042274745	.009554403	.28070	.05125	229.84519	<0.0005	.40991
STN COEFF	.374144405	.053771225	.19286	.04711	16.6322	<0.0005	.42211
NEXT S	.0331427	.003364285	.25477	.03321	49.67752	<0.0005	.39088
					53.7752	<0.0005	.38694

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
392.89856536	11	35.71805137	82.8623	<0.0005
253.45927131	599	.43105318		
646.35783637	599			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)

ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

600

R2	MULTIPLE CORR COEFFS	R BAR	STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE
.6079	R .7797	.7749	.65654641

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETAS	TB	FR	SIG	CORR COEFFS	PARTIAL COEFFS	DELTA TSS
CONSTANT	.77776011	1.62702247	.00000	0	.4780	.2285	.633	.01971	.01971	.601751
13	.02880995	.04610930	.72341	.03547	20.1653	.26410	<0.0005	.63940	.63940	.601751
12	.02214091	.04404569	.22431	.04019	4.8568	23.5489	<0.0005	.19639	.19639	.392133
5	.18833831	.02630918	.24428	.03343	7.0140	49.1955	<0.0005	.27786	.27786	.575166
4	.10492927	.02653329	.12374	.04305	3.7944	13.7670	<0.0005	.15125	.15125	.598888
3	-.12391280	.03251529	-.15973	.04811	-3.7115	4.2912	<0.0005	-.08512	-.08512	.605000
14	-.04327393	.02378649	-.09992	.02819	-3.9133	15.3142	<0.0005	-.19932	-.19932	.603998
2	.32347367	.02642445	.09160	.03795	2.9308	15.4329	.038	-.08549	-.08549	.599622
11	-.11394993	.03659395	-.05692	.02735	-2.0308	4.3362	<0.0005	-.13740	-.13740	.600032
10	.12976969	.03040243	.11137	.03167	3.5166	12.3362	<0.0005	.13740	.13740	.600032
1	.23376969	.04436065	-.12510	.03716	-3.5363	11.3314	.001			

## DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(M) VOLUME

## AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	11	52.05287046	59.0624	<0.0005
ERROR	598	.88131967		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	599			

CASES  
500

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
.93878628

MULTIPLE CORR COEFFS  
R<sup>2</sup> .5249  
R<sup>2</sup> ADJ .5163  
R BAR .7184

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA'S	TB	F3	SIG	PARTIAL CORR COEFFS	R <sup>2</sup> TESTS
CONSTANT	.5891929079	.0000000	.0000000	.2372	.0533	.817	.0952	.52448
MARKT	.160132041	.0000000	.0000000	.8473	.0531	<0.0005	.1965	.52594
PAD	.24323993	.0000000	.0000000	.4873	.0531	<0.0005	.1374	.46059
NEXT	.06779715	.0000000	.0000000	.3351	.0531	<0.0005	.1374	.50578
MATERIALS	.02979715	.0000000	.0000000	.0490	.0531	<0.0005	.1216	.51778
PRICE	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1991	.50522
SALES	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
SOLD	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
YIN	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
IN	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
PICT	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
NEXT	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093
CASH	.033322718	.0000000	.0000000	.0355	.0531	<0.0005	.1695	.51093

The following nine computer printouts are the outputs for LDR's found on the best data set. The first three are the heuristic price, marketing and volume rules. The next three are the method 2 price, marketing and volume rules. The last three are the method 3 price, marketing and volume rules.



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DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
56.78494705	2	28.39247352	107.5807	<0.0005
18.21033507	69	.26391790		
74.99528212	71			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)

ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

72

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
.51372940

CONSTANT  
KMG INDEX  
KT POTENT

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
1.115391343  
1.18925394  
1.1353198

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.035534165  
.08362376  
.26166315

WEIGHTS  
1.000000  
.99633  
-.29782

BETA  
R  
-.29782  
.99633  
.00000

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETA  
.00000  
.06935  
.06935

TB  
2.7154  
14.2215  
-4.2942

FB  
7.3733  
202.2506  
18.4400

SIG  
.008  
<0.0005  
<0.0005

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFS  
.31071  
.86349  
-.45922

R2  
DELETES  
.73123  
.04543  
.69229



## DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8)

VOLUME

## AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	58.82030703	3	19.60676901	60.3773	<0.0005
ERROR	22.08214267	68	.32473739		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	80.90244969	71			

CASES

72

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.56985734REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
1.65823361  
.32567363  
.27161555  
.59933193STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.38475794  
.064765973  
.24527353  
.19419533BETA  
WEIGHTS  
0.50959  
.31358  
.51604  
.30222MULTIPLE CORR COEFS  
R  
R BAR  
R BAR 2  
.7150R BAR  
.8456STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00000  
.06559  
.08566  
.08393TB  
4.3436  
4.8170  
5.9073  
3.6010FB  
18.8673  
23.2031  
34.0965  
12.9672SIG  
<0.0005  
<0.0005  
<0.0005  
.001PARTIAL  
CORR COEFS  
.48694  
.50439  
.58236  
.40019R2  
DELETES  
.653392  
.653392  
.58698  
.67500VAR  
CONSTANT  
G  
HKTG  
HKT POTENT  
RAD INDEX

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	.54629351	6	.09104892	26.5040	<0.0005
ERROR	.22329399	65	.00343529		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	.76958750	71			

CASES

72

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
.05861136

VAR	CONSTANT	INDE	PRICE	RAD	VOLUME	CASH
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	-.32739361	.65833122	-.14213927	.07138163	.03338163	-.00264577
STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	.00279830	.00377850	.00277308	.01127308	.01138137	.00113813
BETA HEIGHTS	1.000000	1.27462	-.094214	-.294002	.316071	-.16071
STD. ERRORS OF BETA HEIGHTS	.000000	.13018	.12488	.07815	.11554	.17801
TB	.4558	9.7909	7.8645	-3.7624	-3.0011	-2.0601
FB	.2077	.8620	.618505	.141559	.126150	.07706
SIG	.050	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005	.001	.043
CORR COEFFS	-.07196	.69827	-.42289	.43194	-.27757	
PARTIAL CORR COEFFS						
DELETES	.28194	.43376	.64666	.65354	.60336	.60331
R2	.28194	.43376	.64666	.65354	.60336	.60331

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
64.57245767	6	10.76207628	67.1157	<0.0005
10.42282444	65	.16035115		
74.99528212	71			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)

ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

72

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.40043869

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
1.36672918  
-.98081183  
-.24351151  
-.75556596  
-.68509363  
-.01297127  
.57017225

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.56119747  
.08126555  
.04272882  
.18144385  
.14356685  
.00504328  
.23027441

BETA  
WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
-.81345  
-.47120  
-.30752  
-.12551  
.16058

MULTIPLE CORP COEFS  
R  
.9279  
R BAR  
.8482

R BAR  
.9210

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETA  
0.00000  
.06740  
.08133  
.08324  
.06472  
.06485

TB  
2.4354  
12.0692  
-5.7939  
5.6718  
-4.7718  
-2.5761  
2.4761

FB  
145.56661  
5.9311  
33.5698  
32.7715  
22.6142  
6.1309

SIG  
.018  
<0.0005  
<0.0005  
<0.0005  
<0.012  
.016

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFS  
.28917  
.83154  
-.58358  
-.57535  
-.30391  
.29358

DELETES  
R2  
.84834  
.54956  
.78924  
.81233  
.81688  
.84791

VAR  
CONSTANT  
INDEX  
POTENTIAL  
MKT VOLUME  
RAD INDEX  
NEXT S I  
MAINTENANC

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(9) VOLUME

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DCG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
67.07523091	5	13.57504610	60.7755	<0.0005
13.02721070	66	.19730210		
80.90244969	71			

CASES  
72

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.44427706

MULTIPLE CORR COEFFS  
R  
.9160

R BAR  
.9093

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETAS	TB	FB	SIG	PARTIAL CORR COEFFS	R2 DELETES
-5.141147113	1.499644798	0.00000	0.00000	-3.4350	11.0046	.001	-.30951	.01018
.64117413	.15166675	.27710	.06555	4.2275	17.0719	<0.0005	.46161	.79517
.46801312	.05737189	.45060	.05524	8.1575	66.5454	<0.0005	.70356	.67692
.12171112	.047714352	.22675	.06783	2.5817	6.6653	.012	.30289	.82271
.03221989	.01699599	.41849	.07577	5.5231	30.5151	<0.0005	.56223	.76455
-2.13819324	.48672168	-.23658	.05385	-4.3930	19.2988	<0.0005	-.47566	.79189





DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5)					MKTG	
AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION						
SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG		
64.57245767	6	10.76207628	67.1157	<0.0005		
10.42282444	65	.16035115				
74.99528212	71					
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)						
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)						
ERROR						
CASES						
72						
R2						
.8510						
MULTIPLE CORR COEFS						
R						
.9279						
R BAR 2						
.8492						
R BAR						
.9210						
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE						
.40043869						
R2						
.8510						
BETA						
WEIGHTS						
0.00000						
.81345						
.30752						
.47213						
.47120						
.12531						
.16058						
STD. ERRORS						
OF COEFFICIENTS						
.55119747						
.08120555						
.14326683						
.18311443						
.04232328						
.00204328						
.23027441						
STD. ERRORS						
OF BETAS						
.00000						
.06444						
.06444						
.08324						
.04133						
.04132						
.06443						
STD. ERRORS						
OF REGRESSION						
1.346972918						
.989811183						
.695037093						
.455565093						
.243351151						
.012970037						
.07117226						
CONSTANT						
13						
14						
14						
19						
31						
31						
PARTIAL						
CORR COEFS						
.26917						
.83154						
.50935						
.57538						
.58358						
.30391						
.29358						
SIG						
.018						
<0.0005						
<0.0005						
<0.0005						
<0.0005						
.012						
.016						
FB						
5.9311						
145.6561						
22.7715						
32.1598						
33.5595						
6.6142						
6.1309						
TB						
2.4354						
12.6692						
-4.7718						
-5.6718						
-5.7934						
-2.5718						
2.4761						
R2 DELETES						
.84834						
.54956						
.81233						
.79234						
.78934						
.84688						
.84791						





The following nine computer printouts are the outputs for LDR's found on the worst data set. The first three are the heuristic price, marketing and volume rules. The next three are the method 2 price, marketing and volume rules. The last three are the method 3 price, marketing and volume rules.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	.17552949	2	.08776475	9.9535	<0.0005
ERROR	.42323913	48	.00881748		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	.59876863	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.09390145

CONSTANT	VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETAS	TB	FB	SIG	CORR COEFFS	PARTIAL	R2	DELETES
1	2	.20677373	.004971813	.54684	.13149	4.1589	17.2961	<0.0005	.51467		.03845	
2	3	.00941562	.003334465	.40663	.13149	3.0925	19.5636	<0.003	.40760		.15232	
3	4	.004612523	.003334465	.00000	.13149	0.0000	65.3891	<0.005	.75939		.66977	



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DEPENDENT VARIABLE---X(5) MKTG

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	21.64293825	2	10.82146912	37.1331	<0.0005
ERROR	13.98834509	48	.29142306		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	35.63128333	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.53983668

CONSTANT  
VARIABLE  
INDEX  
POTENTIAL

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
1.1767373  
1.53797256  
.01757413

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.34378138  
.15221342  
.04216553

BETA  
WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
.75214  
.04597

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00000  
.11030  
.11030

TB  
.5141  
6.8190  
.4168

FB  
.2643  
46.4993  
.1737

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFFS  
.07359  
.70147  
.06005

R2  
DELETES  
.60535  
.22210  
.60599



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DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8) VOLUME

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	34.58369753	3	11.52789918	9.4808	<0.0005
ERROR	57.14855724	47	1.21592675		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	91.73225477	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
1.10269069

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
2.18782495  
-.14095502  
-.24345501  
.97220353

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.65973499  
.24921483  
.68404995  
.41486383

BETA  
HEIGHTS  
WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
-.08786  
.39681  
.37129

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00000  
.15532  
.13709  
.15844

TB  
3.3162  
-.5656  
2.8952  
2.3434

FB  
10.9973  
8.3199  
8.3820  
5.4917

PARTIAL  
CORR. COEFS  
-.43545  
-.03223  
.38904  
.32345

R2  
DELETES  
.23124  
.37277  
.26590  
.30421

CONSTANT  
VAR 0  
MKTG 19  
MKT POTENT 19  
R&D INDEX 14



ELAPSED 70.263 70.000000

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES		DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)		4	.06819160	9.6221	<0.0005
ERROR		46	.00708701		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)		50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.08418435

MULTIPLE CORF COEFFS  
R  
.4082

R BAR  
.6389

F2  
.4555

VAR  
CONSTANT 1 32  
NEXT INDE 12  
PRICE INDE 14  
PAD INDE 11  
DIVIDEND 11

ST. COEFFICIENTS  
OF REGRESSION  
4.23967332  
-1.035471428  
-1.22087163  
-1.07803245  
-1.13744103

BETA WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
-.23339  
-.58413  
-.36910  
-.29734

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETA  
0.00000  
.12761  
.12775  
.12278  
.11701

TB  
8.6910  
1.8289  
4.5724  
3.0062  
-2.5411

FB  
75.5328  
3.3450  
20.9072  
9.0374  
6.4570

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFFS  
.78835  
.28036  
.55900  
.40522  
-.35084

R2  
DELETES  
-.43848  
-.41595  
-.20809  
-.34858  
-.37912





DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	23.19792283	3	7.73264094	29.2306	<0.0005
ERROR	12.43336050	47	.26453959		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	35.63128333	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.51433412

CONSTANT	VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	MULTIPLE CORF COEFS	R	R BAR	STD. ERRORS OF BETA	TB	F	SIG	CORR COEFS	PARTIAL	R2	DELETES
1	0	1.97713712	1.97713712	0.000000	0.6288	.7930		0.000000	-2.3016	5.2973	.026	-.31827		.61193	
1	13	1.15023270	.15223574	.83346	.6288	.7930		.11031	-7.5555	57.0851	<0.0005	.74057		.22723	
1	19	-.16923360	.05393307	-.18126	.6288	.7930		.14081	-1.2873	1.6571	.204	-.18454		.63875	
1	32	.05075327	.02933372	.28414	.6288	.7930		.11719	2.4245	5.8781	.019	.33341		.60741	



DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8) VOLUME

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
48.39698254	5	9.67939651	10.0512	<0.0005
43.33527223	45	.96300605		
91.73225477	50			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)  
ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.98132872

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETA WEIGHTS	TB	FB	SIG	CORR COEFFS	PARTIAL CORR	R2
CONSTANT	1.97343523	.59842420	0.00000	.00000	.00000	3.2908	10.8293	.002	.44042	.44042	.44042
RAD INDEX	.35678553	.41533578	.13626	.15499	.15719	.8791	1.7729	.384	.12994	.12994	.12994
MKTG	.27403341	.25221572	.17077	.15719	.12925	1.0854	1.1803	.283	.15987	.15987	.15987
MKT POTENT	.15551315	.07927383	.25517	.12925	.12713	1.9742	3.4974	.055	.28232	.28232	.28232
CASH	.63163317	.01971351	.41444	.10958	.10958	-3.2639	10.6333	.102	-.43719	-.43719	-.43719
DIVIDEND	1.81175317	.62691286	.31769	.10958	.10958	2.8992	8.4054	.006	.39672	.39672	.39672

DELETED  
R2  
.44042  
.12994  
.15987  
.28232  
.43719  
.39672

ELAPSED ---2.348 03729774

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	.24906058	3	.08302023	11.1577	<0.0005
ERROR	.34970795	47	.00744359		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	.59876853	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.08625888

VAR	CONSTANT	ADJUSTED R <sup>2</sup>	INDEX	AD INDEX	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	HEIGHTS	RETA	MULTIPLE R	CORR	COEFFS	R BAR	STD. ERROR OF ESTIMATE	PARTIAL CORR	COEFFS	SIG	FB	DELETES
1	4.9339252795	.31021162	1	1	.31021162	.000000	0.000000	0.000000	.4160	.5449	.3797	.6154	.08625888	.91848	.91848	<0.0005	253.5171	-2.73457
2	-.17331573	.05227087	2	2	-.17331573	.000000	-.36846	-.36846						-.42926	-.42926	<0.0005	19.6167	.28403
3	.19072284	.04652419	3	3	.19072284	.000000	.50440	.50440						.51321	.51321	<0.0005	16.8154	.20712
4	.08912594	.02588440	4	4	.08912594	.000000	.42130	.42130						.44882	.44882	.001	11.8558	.26863



ELAPSED 3.643 03/29/74

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5) MKTG

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	26.78279915	5	5.35655983	27.2414	<0.0005
ERROR	8.84848419	45	.19663298		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	35.63128333	50			

CASES  
51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
.44343318

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	BETA WEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF BETAS	TR	FB	SIG	PARTIAL CORR COEFFS	R2 DELETES
INSTANT INDEX	-8.59213458	.208576187	.346600	0.0000	-3.0087	9.0523	.004	-.40324	.70171
INST INDEX	1.02231339	.13100725	.27730	.09493	3.0035	60.8944	<0.0005	.75852	.41362
INST INDEX	.04323237	.11440655	.27730	.09116	3.4168	11.8748	.001	.45837	.68724
PRICE	.89950005	.28488349	.23984	.09737	2.4556	16.0300	.018	.34375	.71839
INTENANC	.254333955	.07925431	.27629	.09315	3.3226	11.0386	.002	.44384	.69074
	-.98032249	.42773785	-.18492	.09064	-2.2930	5.2501	.027	-.32345	.72265

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8) VOLUME

ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	47.65269068	4	11.91317267	12.4322	<0.0005
ERROR	44.07956409	46	.95825139		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	91.73225477	50			

CASES

51

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
.97890316

R2  
.5195

MULTIPLE CORR COEFS  
R BAR .4777

R BAR  
.6912

VAR	REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS	STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS	HEIGHTS	STD. ERRORS OF HEIGHTS	TB	F	SIG	PARTIAL CORR COEFS	R2
INSTANT	2.13311275	.56859356	0.00010	0.00000	3.7604	14.1405	<0.0005	.48490	.57176
POTENT	.16492336	.07850306	.26888	.12739	2.1008	4.4132	.041	.29587	.47337
CASH	-.03511719	.00898347	-.45921	.11616	-3.9531	15.6269	<0.0005	-.50356	.35623
INVEN	1.94751932	.60772725	.34040	.10522	3.2046	10.2694	.002	.42721	.41220
MKTG	.41273469	.19629551	.25721	.12234	2.1025	4.4203	.041	.29609	.47330



The following three computer printouts are the outputs for LDR's found on the period 2 through 4 portion of the composite data set. They are the heuristic price, marketing and volume rules.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(4) PRICE

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
.74915394	2	.37457697	47.3471	<0.0005
2.38921070	302	.00791129		
3.13836433	304			

REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)

ERROR

TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)

CASES

375

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.08894544

INSTANT VAR  
NEXT E I 32  
TCF INDE 12

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
2.12411974  
.01383191  
.35590635

BETA  
WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
.24420  
.51423

STD. ERRORS  
OF BETAS  
0.00000  
.05339  
.05339

TB  
3.9900  
4.5743  
9.6323

F3  
15.9201  
20.9242  
92.7517

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFS  
.2378  
.25455  
.48479

R2  
DELETES  
.19858  
.18596  
.00482

MARKT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(5)

AOV FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

SUM OF SQUARES		DEG OF FREEDOM		MEAN SQUARE		F		SIG	
175.73328714		2		87.86664357		190.5100		<0.0005	
139.28721841		302		.46121595					
315.02050554		304							
TOTAL (ADJUST MEAN)									
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)									
ERROR									
CASES									
335									

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.67912802

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS		STD. ERRORS OF COEFFICIENTS		BETA WEIGHTS		STD. ERRORS OF BETA WEIGHTS		R		MULTIPLE CORR COEFFS		R BAR		TR		F9		SIG		CORP COEFS		PARTIAL		R2		DELETES	
.44218993		.21021730		0.00000		0.00000		.00000		.5578		.7469		2.1135		4.4247		.036		.12017		.12017		.55137		.22469	
1.34123492		.08891652		.84213		.05944		.05944		.5578		.7469		15.0349		227.5535		<0.0005		.65552		.65552		.22469		.54189	
-.204335633		.06214873		-.19307		.05944		.05944		.5578		.7469		-3.3015		10.9302		.001		-.18664		-.18664		.22469		.54189	

## DEPENDENT VARIABLE--X(8) VOLUME

## ANOVA FOR OVERALL REGRESSION

	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIG
REGRESSION (ABOUT MEAN)	99.42771719	3	33.14257240	49.4808	<0.0005
ERROR	201.61149790	301	.66980697		
TOTAL (ABOUT MEAN)	301.03921508	304			

## CASES

305

STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
S  
.81841736

REGRESSION  
COEFFICIENTS  
1.70121833  
.32151938  
.27591115  
.47962034

STD. ERRORS  
OF COEFFICIENTS  
.31600418  
.05269466  
.06036159  
.18210260

WEIGHTS  
0.00000  
.33613  
.26501  
.15142

STD. ERRORS  
OF REGRESSION  
0.00000  
.05390  
.03730  
.05118

TB  
5.3928  
6.2357  
4.5921  
2.9587

F3  
28.9749  
36.8443  
21.0177  
8.7542

PARTIAL  
CORR COEFFS  
.29633  
.33824  
.25588  
.16811

DELETES  
.26581  
.24376  
.24376  
.31080

CONSTANT  
VAR  
WKTG  
WKTY  
POTENT  
INDX

The following three printouts show the analysis of variance on bias relative to the best heuristic LDR's across team final rank.

They are as follows:

1. Best price LDR on the composite sample
2. Best marketing LDR on the composite sample
3. Best volume LDR on the composite sample

The next three printouts cover in the same order the three analysis of variances for bias relative to the best method 3 LDR's across final team rank.

## STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS	X( 39)	BP
CATEGORY	X( 51)	FRANK
1	1	1
2	1	1
3	1	1
4	1	1
5	1	1
6	1	1
7	1	1
8	1	1
9	1	1
10	1	1
11	1	1
12	1	1
13	1	1
14	1	1
15	1	1
16	1	1
17	1	1
18	1	1
19	1	1
20	1	1
21	1	1
22	1	1
23	1	1
24	1	1
25	1	1
26	1	1
27	1	1
28	1	1
29	1	1
30	1	1
31	1	1
32	1	1
33	1	1
34	1	1
35	1	1
36	1	1
37	1	1
38	1	1
39	1	1
40	1	1
41	1	1
42	1	1
43	1	1
44	1	1
45	1	1
46	1	1
47	1	1
48	1	1
49	1	1
50	1	1
51	1	1
52	1	1
53	1	1
54	1	1
55	1	1
56	1	1
57	1	1
58	1	1
59	1	1
60	1	1
61	1	1
62	1	1
63	1	1
64	1	1
65	1	1
66	1	1
67	1	1
68	1	1
69	1	1
70	1	1
71	1	1
72	1	1
73	1	1
74	1	1
75	1	1
76	1	1
77	1	1
78	1	1
79	1	1
80	1	1
81	1	1
82	1	1
83	1	1
84	1	1
85	1	1
86	1	1
87	1	1
88	1	1
89	1	1
90	1	1
91	1	1
92	1	1
93	1	1
94	1	1
95	1	1
96	1	1
97	1	1
98	1	1
99	1	1
100	1	1

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE-	- .617757	MAXIMUM VALUE-	.8172	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	PEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1	67.542261	701	.09635130		37.5562638	.21061305	31.050499
2	6.394838	84	.075253188	-.0211119	7.043386	.1972844	3.240916
3	6.314838	84	.08255159	-.0337194	3.9816899	.2067944	3.240916
4	6.229697	82	.063715819	-.032593	3.87815615	.2044158	3.240916
5	6.729697	83	.09312888	-.0033222	3.8033946	.1938893	3.240916
6	6.593431	83	.081767259	-.0124645	4.4733546	.2022690	3.240916
7	10.448185	77	.14164673	.045285	5.633622	.2333111	3.240916
8	17.438335	77	.09360175	.003253	4.129352	.2316463	3.240916
9	8.028776	55	.14560138	.0049590	4.193371	.2344848	3.240916

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	IS X( 39)	FRANK RP
CATEGORY	IS X( 51)	

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. CF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	45843085	8	5730386	1.29623	.242
WITHIN CATEGORIES	30.5926824	692	.0420819		
TOTAL	31.05049910	700			

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>) = .121507  
ETA SQUARED = .014764



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 CONFIDENTIAL  
 SECRET

# STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

(OVERALL)	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 41)		RM		SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	CATEGORY	MAXIMUM VALUE-	FRANK			
	-4.149578			3.8129			
	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	-3.277713	701	-.00467577		366.3934278	.72346202	366.378102
CATEGORY							
1.000000	-3.632201	84	-.04324049	-.038565	28.0339785	.57953991	27.8769220
2.000000	-2.513644	82	-.03140701	-.030943	25.3012238	.55148539	25.2432771
3.000000	-2.513637	82	-.03140701	-.030943	40.2795837	.70446284	40.197699
4.000000	6.453634	83	.07782692	.082503	45.7276486	.74264619	45.224915
5.000000	6.679188	79	.03140701	.085148	65.2047165	.88804545	64.6672284
6.000000	-4.094571	79	-.05183138	-.047156	45.7336955	.76394265	45.5521454
7.000000	-10.907553	77	-.14555004	-.143839	64.6858157	.92937033	63.052300
8.000000	.267236	77	.00347059	.008146	38.6859152	.71345147	38.684588
9.000000	2.400588	55	.04375014	.048432	12.7418543	.48374632	12.636551

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 41)		RM		F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	CATEGORY	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE		
BETWEEN CATEGORIES		3.2727758	8	.40909698	.77965	.621
WITHIN CATEGORIES		363.10532609	692	.52471868		
TOTAL		366.37810197	700			

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
 $R^2 = .094513$   
 $\eta^2 = .001933$



STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

CATEGORY	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 43)		3V FRANK		SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT			
(OVERALL)	-9.011512	5.6904			710.7235007	.97525564	665.786497
1.000000	177.484758	701	.25318796		34.6103567	.54291525	24.464918
2.000000	3.495258	84	.04161021	-.211578	34.9951062	.64290784	34.306430
3.000000	7.633839	84	.04354570	-.162642	63.2448053	.84729903	58.151167
4.000000	25.430819	82	.24322950	-.033058	62.9463321	.85520918	59.973385
5.000000	15.753425	83	.13925814	-.063399	158.1333626	1.37549819	158.066207
6.000000	15.753425	83	.13925814	-.063399	135.1071509	1.16978377	135.066207
7.000000	21.844773	79	.27652477	.023741	84.45931309	1.03785034	78.652253
8.000000	20.763918	74	.28162051	.037433	124.5635217	1.11598533	94.652253
9.000000	44.173480	77	.62435701	.371169	52.5538836	.88466630	42.262031
TOTAL	23.793770	55	.43270537	.179517			

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 43)		3V FRANK		MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT			
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	14.03424903	19	2.39195031		2.55970		.009
LINEAR	5.10135349	1	14.93424903		15.01949		<.0005
OTHER			.72876478		.77987		.604
WITHIN CATEGORIES	645.65089472	692	.93446661				
TOTAL	355.73649724	700					

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R2) = ETA  
.169533 .029741

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, (Y(43) = .01581934 + .05632420 \* X(51))

CONSTANT	VAR	SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT		REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
		COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	COEFFICIENT	F	
51	51	-.01391834	.01451788	14.03424903	15.0516	<.0005
51	51	.05632420				





STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 57)  
CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 51)

LBY  
FRANK

(OVERALL) MINIMUM VALUE- -8.771779 MAXIMUM VALUE- 7.4691  
SUM 352.914123 FREQ 731 MEAN .50344383 SUM OF SQUARES 1209.4067227 STANDARD DEVIATION 1.21404535 SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN 1031.734286

CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1.000000	20.895464	84	.24876742	-.254676	50.9556148	.74249056	45.757255
2.000000	24.555583	84	.34114937	-.162294	64.33733938	.81104720	54.597197
3.000000	43.520223	82	.52856132	.026117	91.1087222	.91711365	69.114036
4.000000	39.521259	83	.47214716	.027297	11.5360758	1.01542517	83.718540
5.000000	36.744599	83	.44222216	-.061322	187.54300863	1.01533558	171.311570
6.000000	32.973333	79	.41754851	-.124895	183.4550321	1.49415705	174.135413
7.000000	32.973333	74	.44558087	-.127863	232.0475852	1.72553527	217.355454
8.000000	77.761767	77	1.01989309	.506449	189.7983797	1.20997667	171.267309
9.000000	43.572307	55	.793315285	.279689	155.5868377	1.153554124	171.855499

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 57)  
CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 51)

LBY  
FRANK

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
TWEEN CATEGORIES	18.3187124	1	18.3187124	2.91380	.033
LINEAR	15.32003357	7	2.18857710	12.68885	<.0005
OTHER				1.51736	.158
THIN CATEGORIES	998.11237480	692	1.44235892		
TOTAL	1031.73428575	700			

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  $\sqrt{R^2} = .180521$   
SQUARED  $R^2 = .032588$

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $X(57) = .06432032 * X(51)$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED  $R^2$  .1332

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES  
18.3187128

CONSTANT	VAR	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	TB	FB	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
FRANK	51	.06432032	.01810336	3.5529	12.6234	<.0005

The following three printouts show the analysis of variance on MAD relative to the best heuristic LDR's across final team rank.

The order is:

1. Best price LDR on the composite data set
2. Best marketing LDR on the composite data set
3. Best volume LDR on the composite data set

The next three printouts cover in the same order the three analysis of variances for MAD relative to the best method 3 LDR's across final team rank.

# STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 40)		ABP FRANK		SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT			
(OVERALL)	98.304238	99.00092	14023429	.8172	37.5582838	.18428494	23.772659
CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1. J00000	10.262455	84	12217209	-.018062	3.7204386	.17239116	2.466653
2. J00000	10.474938	84	12470164	-.015533	3.9816899	.17953917	2.675448
3. J00000	11.154456	82	13602995	-.004204	3.8731567	.17054078	2.355817
4. J00000	10.902625	83	13135693	-.009877	3.8025615	.17002246	2.370426
5. J00000	11.318130	83	13636302	-.003871	4.1459946	.17915519	2.602620
6. J00000	11.121449	79	14077783	.000544	4.1473540	.18193055	2.589101
7. J00000	12.293036	74	16612211	.025919	5.16312462	.22173355	3.589101
8. J00000	11.157769	77	14430609	.004672	4.1229052	.18158935	2.506077
9. J00000	9.619330	55	17489782	.034664	4.1329371	.21302619	2.450529

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 40)		ABP FRANK		F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC		
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	.17428794	8	.02178599	.63885	.745	
WITHIN CATEGORIES	23.59837071	692	.03410169			
TOTAL	23.77265865	700				

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
R SQUARED (R2) = ETA  
.085624 .007331



# STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE-	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARES DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	.001268				4.1496			
		346.569558	701	.49439309		366.3934278	.52786880	195.051832
CATEGORY								
1.000000	34.683698		84	.41291307	-.081480	28.0339785	.40645712	13.7122214
2.000000	32.663567		84	.38885198	-.105541	25.3012288	.38962349	12.599336
3.000000	42.263536		82	.51540898	.021016	40.2795837	.47784983	18.495577
4.000000	41.015144		83	.49415831	-.003235	45.7276486	.55721078	25.459676
5.000000	50.501320		79	.60844964	.114057	65.2047165	.64842434	34.477206
6.000000	52.175722		77	.53387028	.039477	45.7336955	.54558021	23.217306
7.000000	43.548837		77	.58849848	.094105	64.6859157	.73145976	39.057362
8.000000	39.433669		55	.51216442	-.017771	38.6859152	.49321530	18.487861
9.000000	20.279997			.30872722	-.125666	12.7419543	.31222224	5.264067

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 42)	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
TWTFN CATEGORIES		4.28062663	8	.53507833	1.94093	.051
THTN CATEGORIES		190.77120569	692	.27568093		
TOTAL		195.05183231	700			
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R <sup>2</sup> ) = ETA <sup>2</sup>						.021946
						.148142





STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 64)		ALBP FRANK		SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
CATEGORY	MINIMUM VALUE-	0.00032	MAXIMUM VALUE-			
(OVERALL)	102.119687	701	102.119687	35.7957270	.17287163	20.919221
CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT		
1.000000	8.843913	94	.13534408	-.040333	2.9690701	2.036891
2.000000	10.833117	84	.12892934	-.016747	3.5580350	2.161770
3.000000	11.351417	82	.13841372	-.037257	3.4017945	1.829673
4.000000	10.183754	83	.12269583	-.022981	3.1705267	1.920793
5.000000	11.337703	93	.13659890	-.009078	3.8640065	2.121808
6.000000	11.491393	79	.14546826	-.030229	3.8640065	2.192286
7.000000	11.441464	77	.13164681	-.035574	6.1808064	2.659135
8.000000	13.711317	77	.17418074	.032604	4.6802037	2.251585
9.000000	10.915117	55	.19845485	.052778	4.3659198	2.199782

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 64)		ALBP FRANK		MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
CATEGORY	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE			
TWEEN CATEGORIES	.46379338	1	.46379338	2.31601	.019	
LINEAR	.08170339	7	.1167191	15.75296	<.0005	
OTHER				.39844	.915	
THIN CATEGORIES	20.37372244	692	.02944180			
TOTAL	20.91922121	700				
				MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2) = ETA SQUARED		
				.161492		

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $IX(64) = + .09677466 + .01023914 * X(51)$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2)		REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES	
.1483		.46379538	
CONSTANT	VAR	STANDARD ERROR	FB
FRANK	51	.00257197	15.8488
		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.	
		<.00005	



S T A T I S T I C S   F O R   E A C H   C A T E G O R Y									
		DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 66)		ALSV		FRANK			
		CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 51)							
(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE-	.033617	MAXIMUM VALUE-	9.7718					
	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN		
	638.659301	701	.91106890		1209.4667227	.94683238	627.544095		
CATEGORY									
1.	4.32266	84	.54386031	-.370209	50.9555148	.56379849	26.383105		
2.	5.74033	84	.62387044	-.257198	64.3233888	.59350407	28.459478		
3.	6.03358	82	.43359179	-.084777	91.1097222	.65329199	34.539340		
4.	6.03362	83	.73466224	-.117366	102.5436759	.78259353	50.203956		
5.	4.08296	83	.93666224	.075563	187.540863	1.14393865	106.742398		
6.	4.18953	79	1.13899783	.157926	185.4563321	1.13464555	95.178774		
7.	4.73357	77	1.13328449	.203266	232.5473852	1.32917531	128.961790		
8.	4.93347	77	1.13843357	.247333	189.7933737	1.06686791	89.471313		
9.	6.14135	55	1.11655653	.205488	105.5869377	.82796521	37.018425		

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)									
SOURCE OF VARIANCE		DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 66)		ALSV		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.			
		CATEGORY	VARIABLE IS X( 51)	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC				
BETWEEN CATEGORIES		33.57791634	8	4.19723957	4.88999	<0.0005			
LINEAR		30.40947566	1	30.40947566	35.42455	<0.0005			
OTHER		3.16843958	7	.45263424	.52734	.814			
WITHIN CATEGORIES		593.96617828	692	.85833263					
TOTAL		627.54409462	700						

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, [X(66)] = + .51508974 + .08290961 \* X(51)

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2)		.2201		.0485	
REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES		30.40947566			
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2) = ETA		.231316			
CONSTANT		VAR			
FRANK		51			
COEFFICIENT		STANDARD ERROR			
.51508974		.01389626			
.04896361		5.9663			
FB		35.5970			
APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.		<0.0005			

The following three printouts show the analysis of variance for MSD from the heuristic LDR's across time periods. In each case it is evaluated on the composite data set. They are in the order composite price, marketing and volume LDR's.

The subsequent three printouts show the analysis of variance for MSD from the method 3 composite LDR's across time periods. They are evaluated on the composite data set and have the same order as the preceding tests.

## STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X(	33)	CP
CATEGORY	X(	PERIOD

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE-	- .567925	MAXIMUM VALUE-	.5789	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	STANDARD DEVIATION
	29.734310	701	.04241699	15.7624619	.14393065
					14.501222

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### ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	IS X(	33)
CATEGORY	IS X(	3)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	D.F.	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
Between groups	10.00	2	5.00	1.00	0.40
Within groups	18.00	18	1.00		
Total	28.00	20			

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, (X(33)=+ .17418442- .03319043\*X(3))

$r_p$  = -0.4614  
 SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
 SQUARED ( $r^2$ ) = 0.2123

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES  
3.08710496

	VAR	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	TB	FB	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
CONSTANT	J	17.418443				
PERIOD	3	-0.6319043	.00241390	-13.7497	189.0542	<0.0005

-4614

## STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

[illegible]

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEP. VARIABLE IS X( 35) CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 3)	CH PERIOD	DEGS. CF FREEDOM	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
MEAN CATEGORIES	1.64383711		6		.27397285	.54106	.777
HTN CATEGORIES	351.41562155		694		.50636257		
RESIDUAL	353.05945867		700				
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2) = ETA R							.064235 .004656

STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

CATEGORY	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 37)		CV PERIOD		SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	
(OVERALL)	-9.226249	5.6773		561.513217	661.435590
	SUM	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION
1.000000	7.370500	701	.01152282	561.513217	.97206378
2.000000	7.376513	101	.07303478	60.9810901	.77742291
3.000000	-11.705611	103	-11364671	55.2936785	.72729258
4.000000	37.873333	103	75797334	72.3403248	.75677815
5.000000	1.421357	99	.01435583	77.3293526	.83162876
6.000000	9.397832	97	.03694409	51.9703372	.72930571
7.000000	-23.224527	100	-23224527	1+5.1765106	1.19825354
8.000000	-17.755455	98	-17755455	197.8314579	1.42112456

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 37)		CV PERIOD		F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC		
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	23.9700642	6	3.9950107	4.34933	<0.005	
LINEAR	4.62374225	1	4.62374225	5.11001	.024	
OTHER	19.27626517	5	3.85225323	4.19716	.001	
WITHIN CATEGORIES	637.46558370	594	.91953831			
TOTAL	661.43559012	700				

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  $R^2 = .0366$   
SQUARED (R2) = .036239

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $X(37) = + .1729983 - .04092576 * X(3)$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2)		REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES	
.0071		4.69374025	
CONSTANT PERIOD	VAP	STANDARD ERROR	T3
	3	.01831372	-2.2351
COEFFICIENT		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.	
.1729983		FB	
-.04092576		4.9959	
		.026	





## PHASE-III COMPOSITE ANALYSIS

## STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT CATEGORY	VARIABLE IS X(	53)
	VARIABLE IS X(	3)

LCM  
PERIOD

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE:-	MAXIMUM VALUE:-
		-3.293729

CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1	24.859372	701	.03546216		292.7459533	.64571599	291.864401
2	24.859372	101	.24612858	.210666	39.2866820	.57591810	33.160175
3	24.859372	103	.02875112	-.064231	46.5070146	.67462315	46.218722
4	24.859372	103	.02875112	-.064231	46.5070146	.67462315	46.218722
5	24.859372	97	.03069050	.003711	44.0116736	.57935273	34.0295377
6	24.859372	97	.03069050	.003711	44.0116736	.57935273	34.0295377
7	24.859372	100	.03069050	-.062363	39.5229314	.62322931	46.2274063
8	24.859372	108	.03069050	-.037544	43.7777617	.67126014	38.4553063
9	24.859372	108	.03069050	-.037544	43.7777617	.67126014	38.4553063

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT CATEGORY	VARIABLE IS X(	53)
	VARIABLE IS X(	3)

PERIOD LCM

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
LINEAR	1.95179372	6	9.2529396	2.25273	.037
OTHER	3.62396433	5	1.95179372	4.73141	.030
				1.75699	.120

# WHIN CATEGORIES

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R2) = ETA  
P  
.138217  
.J19104

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, [X(53)=+ .14023531- .02639094\*X(3)]

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>)  
- .0313      • 0707

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES  
1.95179972

	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	T3	FB	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
VAP?					
CONSTANT	.14023531				
PERIOD	-.02659194	.01216556	-2.1693	4.7059	.030

TIME 17.07.02  
ELAPSED 13.967

PHASE III COMPOSITE ANALYSIS

04/09/74

STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 54)  
CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 3)

LCV  
PERIOD

(OVERALL) MINIMUM VALUE- -9.061031 MAXIMUM VALUE- 6.7544

SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
132.574442	701	.14532588		581.5545377	.97581120	666.545242

CATEGORY	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1.000000	102.574382	101	1.01558794	.069282	163.3335706	.76919861	59.165265
2.000000	-1.933371	103	-0.1843418	-0.154813	46.35119946	.67385926	46.316803
3.000000	7.881610	103	0.77052019	-0.139805	56.13748476	.77087835	54.501743
4.000000	-16.375351	97	-0.16837324	-0.328239	78.5310715	.87337464	74.752759
5.000000	16.375351	97	0.16837321	0.322497	49.5176932	.69733944	46.750069
6.000000	4.373122	100	.08378122	-0.062545	113.3736755	1.06684537	112.677746
7.000000	-12.716303	198	-0.12975819	-0.275024	175.8336854	1.34534016	174.183641

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 54)  
CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 3)

LCV  
PERIOD

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
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BETWEEN CATEGORIES	33.12514518	6	16.35620256	19.98449	<0.0005
LINEAR	53.37217326	5	35.1250559	42.89053	<0.0005
OTHER			12.61443435	15.40327	<0.0005

WITHIN CATEGORIES	568.34802677	694	.81894528		
TOTAL	666.54524210	700			

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2) = ETA  
.383826  
.147323

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, IX(54)=+ .59079422- .11195555\*X(3)

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R2)  
.3527  
-.2295

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES  
35.12504508

APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.

F8

38.8844

-6.2357

.01795386

STANDARD ERROR

VAR

CONSTANT PERIOD 3

3

3

The following three printouts show the analysis of variance for MAD relative to heuristic LDR's taken across time. In each case it is evaluated on the composite data set. The order is composite price, marketing and volume LDR's.

The subsequent three printouts show the analysis of variance for MAD relative to the method 3 composite LDR's across time. They are evaluated on the composite data set and have the same order as the preceding tests.

## STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS	X(34)
CATEGORY	X(3)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS	X(34)
CATEGORY	X(3)

CATEGORY	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
1. 000000	73.603427	73.603427	73.603427	0.000000	15.7624619	0.10713741	8.034897
2. 000000	29.734735	29.734735	29.734735	0.000000	9.5658469	0.09011632	81.2095
3. 000000	59.985473	59.985473	59.985473	0.000000	0.8732305	0.06221027	3933484
4. 000000	7.075136	7.075136	7.075136	0.000000	0.8558269	0.05469164	305167
5. 000000	7.075136	7.075136	7.075136	0.000000	7.6558304	0.02206575	265663
6. 000000	6.511544	6.511544	6.511544	0.000000	7.403319	0.07668933	319479
7. 000000	7.903941	7.903941	7.903941	0.000000	1.7107350	0.07732281	591904
8. 000000	7.903941	7.903941	7.903941	0.000000	1.7271714	0.05666436	1.083001

[illegible]

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	IS X(34)
CATEGORY	IS X(3)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	IS X(34)
CATEGORY	IS X(3)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
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BETWEEN CATEGORIES

1. 32190987  
2. 3219454

1. 32190987  
2. 3219454

WITHIN CATEGORIES

3.77:79295 604

3.77:79295 604

TOTAL

MULTIPLE R SQUARED (R2) = .728490  
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT = .530698

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $(X(34)) = + .19121849 - .02171891 * X(3)$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>)  
- .4055  
• 1645

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES  
1.32190980

VAR	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	T3	F3	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
CONSTANT	.13121649				
SECTION	-.02171891	.00185121	-11.7323	137.6459	<0.0005

CONSTANT DEFICIT  
VAR 0 3

CONSTANT DEFICIT  
VAR 0 3

# STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE-	.000454	MAXIMUM VALUE-	4.3331	SUM OF SQUARES	STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	SUM	FREQ	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	353.0800138	.52693543	194.362665
CATEGORY							
1.000000	35.651078	101	.35298097	-.122851	32.5584336	.44692596	19.974282
2.000000	50.784715	103	.49305539	-.017224	51.6503050	.51077251	26.610633
3.000000	48.700663	103	.47282217	-.003009	45.4878494	.48926190	22.446107
4.000000	49.750111	99	.50252637	.026695	49.5899102	.51090904	24.589167
5.000000	50.448119	97	.52042391	.004592	56.2676674	.55888053	29.986086
6.000000	48.144915	100	.48144910	.005618	58.2514466	.59520070	35.073123
7.000000	50.044527	99	.51066610	.0034835	59.2744017	.58958290	33.717975

## ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 36)		ACM PERIOD	
CATEGORY		ACM PERIOD	
SOURCE OF VARIANCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	1.94131219	6	.32355203
WITHIN CATEGORIES	192.42135326	694	.2726420
TOTAL	194.36266545	700	
MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R <sup>2</sup> ) = ETA			.099940
APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.			.322

STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

CATEGORY	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 18)		ACV PERIOD		SUM OF SQUARES		STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	SUM OF SQUARES	PERIOD		
(OVERALL)	0.002963	9.2262			661.5132117		.72444979	367.378237
1. 000000	454.079958	701	.64776030		60.9804901		.60995547	37.204567
2. 000000		103	.48319571	-.122575	55.2836785		.51283234	26.825694
3. 000000		103	.52563400	-.122126	72.3409249		.58503970	34.911688
4. 000000		99	.61281812	-.024972	77.9293626		.63589735	39.627813
5. 000000		97	.57371327	-.125761	51.9713972		.49702994	23.715712
6. 000000		100	.87353073	-.129467	143.1765106		.83135988	68.424766
7. 000000		98	.80039133	.243131	197.8314579		1.11248814	120.050096

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 38)		ACV PERIOD		MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	SUM OF SQUARES	DEG. OF FREEDOM	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT			
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	12.3060586	16.61790090	1	5	2.76355008	5.47992	<0.0005
LINEAR	4.31094464	1			12.3060586	24.35004	<0.0005
OTHER					.86218893	1.70589	.131
WITHIN CATEGORIES	350.76033665	694			.50541835		
TOTAL	367.37823715	700					

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
R SQUARED (R2) = ETA  
.212692 .045234

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $X(38) = + .38466826 + .06526932 * X(3)$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT		REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.	
VAR	COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR	T9	F9	
CONSTANT	.33466826				
PERIOD	.06526932	.01346345	4.9222	24.2277	<0.0005

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	IS X( 61)
CATEGORY	IS X( 3)
1	1
2	1
3	1
4	1
5	1
6	1
7	1
8	1
9	1
10	1
11	1
12	1
13	1
14	1
15	1
16	1
17	1
18	1
19	1
20	1
21	1
22	1
23	1
24	1
25	1
26	1
27	1
28	1
29	1
30	1
31	1
32	1
33	1
34	1
35	1
36	1
37	1
38	1
39	1
40	1
41	1
42	1
43	1
44	1
45	1
46	1
47	1
48	1
49	1
50	1
51	1
52	1
53	1
54	1
55	1
56	1
57	1
58	1
59	1
60	1
61	1
62	1
63	1
64	1
65	1
66	1
67	1
68	1
69	1
70	1
71	1
72	1
73	1
74	1
75	1
76	1
77	1
78	1
79	1
80	1
81	1
82	1
83	1
84	1
85	1
86	1
87	1
88	1
89	1
90	1
91	1
92	1
93	1
94	1
95	1
96	1
97	1
98	1
99	1
100	1

ALCP  
PERIOD

(OVERALL)	MINIMUM VALUE=	MAXIMUM VALUE=
		.000158

STANDARD DEVIATION	SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
.15492605	16.801456

OF SQUARES  
27.3247854

	SUM	FREQ	MEAN
	95.803612	701	.12252298

CATEGORY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Y	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

45.654933	101	•45143498
6.975652	103	•05772478
1.252233	105	•25946692
5.152153	95	•05618387
2.453353	97	•33679300
7.945254	106	•07364264
4.775915	98	•07631199

- 08769267
- 05686779
- 04395050
- 04355505
- 04335107
- 07221410
- 09716459
- 769000
- 329062
- 238892
- 236746
- 104600
- 155229
- 515773

• 769000  
• 329862  
• 238892  
• 236746  
• 184600  
• 515229  
• 915773

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 61)  
CATEGORY VARIABLE IS X( 3)

ALCP  
PEPID

SOURCE OF VARIANCE

SUM OF SQUARES

MEAN SQUARE

STATISTIC

APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE  
PROBABILITY OF F STAT.

WEEN CATEGORIES  
LINEAR  
OTHER

4. 62012697  
9. 99122574  
13. 61135361  
15

תחולת  
 המכ"ם  
 (הכ"מ)  
 המכ"ם  
 • • •  
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 ו ו ו

# ALPHANUMERIC CATEGORIES

3.19010265	694
16.80145626	763

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT  
SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>) = .810129  
• 903072

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY,  $[X(61) = .29372087 - .0460356 * X(3)]$

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>)  
- .524  
 .275

REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES 4.62012687

CONSTANT	PERIOD	VAR 3 3
----------	--------	---------

COEFFICIENT	STANDARD ERROR
• 23372587	• 00249371
- • 14166356	

FB	F8
2824	265.11

FB  
265.1163  
APPROX  
PROBABILI

APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE  
PROBABILITY OF F STAT.

**<C.0005**



STATISTICS FOR EACH CATEGORY

CATEGORY	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 62)		ALCM PERIOD		SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN
	MINIMUM VALUE-	MAXIMUM VALUE-	MEAN	MEAN INCREMENT	
(OVERALL)	310.691070	0.02733	0.44320380	3.2937	155.045070
1.000000	47.725284		0.42752756	0.029318	16.735170
2.000000	44.045500		0.42752722	-0.015583	27.671915
3.000000	41.063382		0.33887944	-0.044230	18.013382
4.000000	46.082313		0.33887944	0.022354	22.568441
5.000000	42.034372		0.33887944	0.013359	26.045451
6.000000	42.034372		0.42433470	-0.018825	26.045451
7.000000	44.099144		0.45913517	0.015376	23.005316
SUM	310.691070	0.02733	0.44320380	3.2937	155.045070
FREQ	701				
MEAN	0.44320380				
MEAN INCREMENT					
SUM OF SQUARES	292.7459533				
STANDARD DEVIATION	0.47063138				
SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS FROM THE MEAN					

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE (ALLOWS A SEPARATE MEAN FOR EACH CATEGORY)

SOURCE OF VARIANCE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS X( 62)		ALCM PERIOD		APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.
	SUM OF SQUARES	DEGS. OF FREEDOM	MEAN SQUARE	F STATISTIC	
BETWEEN CATEGORIES	0.00048349	1	0.00048349	0.3229	0.920
WITHIN CATEGORIES	154.60093323	694	0.00022319	0.39831	0.953
TOTAL	155.04506993	700	0.00022319	0.39831	0.953

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R<sup>2</sup>) = ETA<sup>2</sup> = 0.053522

IF RESTRICTED TO A LINEAR TERM ONLY, (X(62)=+ .44155228+ .00041751\*X(3))

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT SQUARED (R <sup>2</sup> ) = 0.000		REGRESSION SUM OF SQUARES = 0.0048849	
CONSTANT	0.00041751	FB	0.0022
PERIOD	0.00889666	FB	0.963
STANDARD ERROR	0.00889666	FB	0.963
COEFFICIENT	0.00041751	FB	0.963
APPROX. SIGNIFICANCE PROBABILITY OF F STAT.		FB	0.963



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