TYPES 9F CERTAINTY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RENE DESCARTES Thesis In? IIN Degree of DI‘I. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY John R&.Rflomfis 171968 [hwy- V \a “‘w‘ This is to certify that the thesis entitled TYPES OF CERTAINTY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OE RENE DESCARTES presented bg John M. Morris has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D dafimgfilPhiIOSOphy Major professor {Mm June 7, 1968 0-169 ' l r. Y I" “.5. '.~. "-- hliLlly-fd‘i‘ ELK kc, ? - O i '~ . A-‘v ”I Loavemn _ o»-., F, H fi- m A-—..—v,_ v .. . .-._._. _,_‘,_.__._ _. -. -oa-H- on. V. .‘ ._‘ .:~ uh —. skw r. -~ 3. .2 L. .. E“ _.. 2.. I. .. . . t . .. . . . e .. C .: ._. e“ I ~.. .. .. v. .2 v. _. ~. 3 .2 ‘ : i I. A. . .3 .e .v .3 5‘ ‘1 .f v. C» 3‘ .2 I... A. 2. J. I. ‘ . n. .. .e‘ ‘2 I. A» . y .. .2 nun ‘ . .3 I‘ L .. n)... .. ‘ .».. .n ._ g : . is ‘t. .3 i» A: .3} I: ... A b .u.. .1 A» .. .. ... «I .v v” . s» .u. .g a u» N... H .. .u— .‘ p h. . ‘ “s. a s» i... C.» — a g . ... .h. -\~ .g .- p . M .-\ A. s s . s s. . .s- -. .\» .. ABSTRACT TYPES OF CERTAINTY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OP RENE DESCARTES By John M. Morris Several levels of certainty in the writings of Rerué Ikascartes may be distinguished. Each level depends upon those which precede it. At the level of greatest certainty are those truths which cannot be falsified by any sceptical hypothesis, SLu2F1.as the hypothesis of the evil genius. These include the axioms or common notions, which are recognized by the natural light. The natural light is not identical with reason or jJitLLition. It is the mind's power of recognizing truth gnqd_:falsehood, which is distinguished from the power of <:oru:eiving. Nothing which is recognized by the natural JJLgrrt can be subject to doubt. The common notions are said to be simple rela- -ticnuships among simple concepts. The most important of -th£fise are the causal principles upon which the proof of 'thfz existence and veracity of God is based. This proof is rmgt ‘JiCiOUSly circular, because it does not require prior knowledge of the existence of God. . -- _. -- r _Y 1' awn-‘-"'- .-— .- v—A . \ ‘..~. -~ 0"- , - D‘-r»~ -- ,. a! _,_ .nVu-u‘ - o .. a o P y».— ‘»‘..V- on .... ‘v. 4.... fl. '. ~.'. "v. ”I a <.._ tn U' n; (I) r ..- .— o u v- ,- v V'- .- .- Q A a»- v. x.- -- 5.. vi V" .... .u n -. ~Q -, ._ -‘. -. ‘s a v.. A y‘ .- “~— .. .. n " in v- John M. Morris 'The eternal truths constitute a second set of cerflxairrties, which depend upon knowledge that God exists tand.:is Idot a deceiver. These include the truths of mathematics and Cartesian physics, which must be shown to conform to their objects. Errors of judgment are the result of man's will, vfliicti cman act in the absence of complete information. For Descartes, a serious unsolved problem was that of absolving God from blame for man's errors. Moral certainties and probable knowledge constitute aruattuar level of certainty. Descartes gives two analyses ofr'ttuis level. In the earlier works, the method of enu- Ineruatixmn requires the listing of all combinations of SjJDPJJB entities, from which all but one are eliminated. III tlma later works, an artificial language is proposed, aJuj sscientific explanation is shown to consist in providing txwaruslations from ordinary language into statements which Luge <3nly clear and distinct concepts. There are historical precedents for Descartes' use (3f 53 somewhat idiosyncratic terminology. Raymond Lull, pjgarqwe d'Ailly, and Herbert of Cherbury are among those idhC) relied on the method of enumeration, the natural light, and common notions, respectively. A number of computer-generated indexes and concor— daluces were used in the preparation of the thesis. TYPES OF CERTAINTY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OE THE SCIENCES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RENE DESOARTES By .\. John MEVMorris A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of PhiloSOphy 1968 u.. . . .n I. Y c o : . L. I. v. .. v. 3- .1 L“ .u.. u.. ‘ . .V a. . c L. . u ~>Av ax» . v . v .: o . o . :c - .- , 0 am Ax. .— . .... A . .. I. .: Y. .. -— g e mi .an .: 2. a-- ,. a Z. .2 V. .II'v — ‘ P . .: w” ~\~ r‘l. .. ‘ _ a 2,. . .. . 3. 2.. p a I. L- L» .x- .vs . .2 .L ‘. \. .... vs a» is ya. _\- A.» a. 3. ~ \ so -% PREFACE One of the purposes of this thesis is to attempt to clarify Descartes' concepts of certainty and error, together with the theory of the mind with which they are associated. This has required a distinction among the various powers or faculties of the mind, to which I have attached English terms which are supposed to correspond fairly well to the Latin and French terms that Descartes used. Readers who are familiar with other translations may find that this procedure gives a strange sound to well-known passages in Descartes' works. For example, I It I have used power of recognizing,‘ rather than the more familiar “power of knowledge," to translate Descartes' "vis cognoscens” or "puissance de connaitre" both because it seems to me to come closer to Descartes' meaning, and because the English term is a cognate of the Latin and French terms. 'TTCognizing" would probably have come even closer, but I found the word both ugly and unfamiliar.) Any attempt to translate a technical vocabulary from one language into another requires some compromises, and I hope that mine are justified by my particular purposes. I have relied most heavily upon Ferdinand Alquie's modern French edition of Descartes' Oeuvres philosophiques (OP) together with a number of modern English and French ii .u . ...o. Ar.- ‘ ' y.---V¢A~ v- .A..-u..r o ,a— _. .I...v-.§ . I: . . ,—.o-,— >,, — — . ~b-- \- ul . ---~O~Ap- A.— n p ---‘~-uas ‘- -- . ‘T‘V‘evo- a... _. ‘""-'—.‘--_ "‘ 9.. _>. -\ , "" -v--. v ’ A - ( _Y‘_ . ..‘...,‘__ ‘ . - - _ I ‘ _ , 2““--I _ .. -- “ FY --‘..._"' n " \-.- ‘ -.. ‘u- ‘ -_ b -A - -.., V--V.- .- ‘A - . u l"- - ~ v b. Q ‘-'. -~V‘~ ‘ ‘I y. - _ . . ‘.I . 1“ .“ s ~. .‘ ‘ ‘ “-\ “u.— - -__- - I.. ‘Y- ‘H ‘3- h- . Q 'K‘ V ‘_A _ ._"' .- .‘ -. 'v A ~ A- ~:~Y-.. “‘ - I ~ -~_“ 'n‘\~ ‘5 ‘Is‘ _. § s v‘ . is ._, - a ‘. ‘A .‘ ‘ ‘v ‘- t," — . IA‘ 0 ' \“. a ‘1 _ ‘t‘hr ‘ 0‘ ‘ Q A .5 s . . v k- ‘s""\ y A eaiitions of various works. Pagination has been referred, ‘however, to the standard edition of Descartes' works edited by Adam and Tannery (AT) for convenience in citation and reference. A list of short titles of Descartes' works and of abbreviations is given as an appendix. Footnote references to Descartes' works are given as follows: Short title, chapter or major section (Roman numeral), subsection, if any (Arabic numeral), source (usually AT), volume number (Roman numeral), and page number (Arabic numeral). In addition to the members of my guidance committee, the following persons have made suggestions or criticisms of portions of the thesis: Willis Doney, Joseph Hanna, Gerald Massey, Phyllis Morris, George Nakhnikian, and Julius Weinberg. I want to acknowledge with thanks the computer time and programs made available by the MSU Computer Laboratory, the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, and the Learning Systems Institute, and the help of Beverly Louisell, John Hafterson, and Mary Rafter, for preparation of a number of indexes to the Discourse and the Meditations, and to my notes on the other writings. Thanks to Cherry Cushing for typing the final draft. And my special thanks to Dr. Charles Wrigley, Director of the Computer Institute for Social Science iii - _-.-y- u..."— AV-““- u. ..v _-,—-—— 4- o.-.—-...g. . iResearch, without whose encouragement and support this work might not even have begun. The thesis was completed with support from the Hinman Graduate Fellowship and Graduate Office Scholarship. iv -A ’1‘ .r "'*b .v. o - — ,._ " o..- -- ~. , -QC --.- --- - --__ ‘--I - v -.. '. -'. o..‘ ,. . I. -.. n- "o -.. ..-‘ - t 'b.. -‘. -.~“ ‘ I .“I - $., ’ .A -t. I -‘ . I, is 9.. -0 "‘ . I . |“. h s, i ‘ ‘l “s‘. _ .1. ““ I ‘ ‘- -‘§. -1 v “‘ l u. ‘U ‘.. ~ 'u, [ A IA’. ‘ “ '._\-.~ ‘ s- ‘ \“g I ‘.. \“‘ b5 ‘\ ‘ ~..~ . . -~\\‘ ~~~ . Chapter II. III. The The TABLE OF CONTENTS Cartesian Order Evil Genius Reason, Recognition and Conception Natural Light Polemical Arguments Common Notions Cartesian Circle Eternal Truths Problem of Error Will in the Later Letters Levels of Certainty in the Principles Moral Certainty The Method of Enumeration Probable Knowledge and Moral Certainty Summary and Conclusion IV. The V. The VI. The VII. The VIII. The TX. The X. The XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. APPENDIX I APPENDIX II SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 17 32 62 77 95 116 135 155 174 211 221 23% 257 263 266 275 ,A’ - V“ vc‘v-~ 97....A v.-. v. .2 I. l. v. 2‘ V. ;. .- .. r. A» <‘ “~34 .h» a: . . _c 2. :. .1 v. a. a. A» .- :. Q» ‘~ J‘ 1.: Y. .h. .c a. CHAPTER I THE CARTESIAN ORDER \ Sceptics of Descartes' time used an argument which says that there can be no such thing as rational certainty. In order to be certain, the rational person must have a criterion of certainty. But this criterion, as the Pyrrhonist sceptics pointed out, can itself be challenged: . in order to decide the diSpute which has arisen about the criterion we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to the form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them [the dogmatic philosOphers] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum.1 Michel de Montaigne, writing about 1580, just before Descartes' birth in 1596, applied a similar argument to sense perceptions: In order to judge the appearance which we receive from the subjects, we would have to have a judicatory instrument; in order to verify that instrument, we lSextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, R. G. Bury, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1939), Book II, Chap. iv., sec. 20, pp. 163-65. Quoted by Richard H. Popkin, The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: van Gorkum—Prakke 8 Prakke, 1960), p. 52. (Hereinafter referred to as Scepticism.) 1 \ Alh‘i. “- .nfwAv- .— av..~Vo-~ up. .‘I '- -. A ~\-» I- n a. o. - ‘9» ' Q I Y““"‘ - - .- oa-guntn- ' I §v~-;r. ‘v- "‘-vc -w.., A- - ’v- n 'V. by. «V— ».-.v. —\..... 00‘; n o. ‘ (U 1 I i (ID ) ‘-A A b \ ~ I“ ) ll I ~.__ V‘ I (l) I\ u I 2 must have a demonstration; in order to verify the demonstration, an instrument; and now we are in a circle (nous voila au rouet).2 The sceptical position appears to be very strong, if we are willing to accept its analysis of the process of rational justification. It says that, whenever anyone claims to be certain of something, then there must be some criterion, rule, procedure or method by which his certainty is to be justified. If there is no such criterion, then we may say that he is simply a dogmatist, who has no rational basis for his certainty. On the other hand, if he does offer a criterion, then we may ask how his certainty about, or reliance upon, the criterion is to be justified. Again, if he offers no criterion, he is simply a dogmatist, and if he does offer a criterion, it may be called into question. This process may be continued indefinitely. If he refuses to play the game, then he is a dogmatist. If he continues to produce new criteria, then he is caught in an endless regress. If he uses some earlier criterion to justify a later criterion, then he is arguing in a circle. Neither a regress nor a circle can be said to provide a rational basis for belief, and a dogmatist is nonrational by definition. At no point, then, can a person give a complete rational justification of his certainty. 2Michel de Montaigne, Apologie de Raimond Sebond, in Les Essais de Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Villey, ed. (PaFIs, 1922), II, 366. My translation. Quoted by Popkin, Scepticism, p. 52. ‘ -- .p-oo -v— :..Vft ...u u - .D-’ "f‘ 7‘. . EI-Ooouv v - Aq..—o ”I \ E .1. VII-..- - - o .“‘F"--~ ., fl own..-‘---.. ~ . n , .' ‘r- . .- -n---..; -_ u "“ra..- -' I ‘ .u--..~.‘_ ‘.. u . . ‘v—~ -. __ ._ .- “" "U‘yv ‘ C -- - _ ‘- ‘O u... -’.‘ A- ~ -‘-“_~- .u‘. 5‘...‘,‘ . .,,- . ~A"“._ _ ...: \ y. ~»~_ “‘ . ~~-" g- ' ._»-v.. ~‘A... s. . ‘- 5-‘ . \ :"--~~h . - A “'~s.. .— . ‘ .~‘»‘ . . ‘4 "‘“ ‘- i - F, c. R ‘u u... \ “I I V v. a. ‘_ “ Y . ._. ‘n - I “‘ “ u \ ‘ . s- _ v ‘-A ‘V. _ A- K._- \ i V». \ DAY . .i. .~-‘ A u. I-. ~.. . v.‘hnv'. . .. - A- . -‘\—Y‘\‘ ‘~"¢ s ‘ ‘\_ u L ‘ ~ - \_¥.._‘ ‘ o. ‘- .'~ ~\ ‘ ‘~ ~ ‘ c. 5" ~‘ ‘. ’c. -A ‘ ..". an“: “‘ V” “- -. l! . ‘ v- K \ ‘~ < V I" 3 In the Meditations, Descartes develops a position vfliich contrasts with that of the sceptics. He attempts to Show that we can attain to a rational certainty of some things. We can show, he claims, that the human mind or soul exists, that God exists, and that there are secure foundations for the sciences. We can show this without falling into a circular argument or infinite regress, and without an appeal to dogmatism, or what Descartes calls "prejudice” and ”precipitation.”3 If our criterion or "judicatory instrument" is such that cannot be doubted, then it would make no sense for the sceptic to require our justification for it, and it might serve as the basis for a rational certainty. For example, if there is some set of propositions, C, such that the sentence "I doubt that X" is strictly nonsense, for all X's which belong to C, then it will be impossible for the sceptic to call members of this set into question. For whenever he says the words ”I doubt that X," he is asserting nothing at all. Membership in C would then serve as a criterion of certainty. Descartes believes that he has found such an X in the affirmation of his own present existence. "I am," "I exist," is true, every time I utter it or think about it. 3Discourse, II, AT, VI, 15. r-A 'A' I]- - \nv-I [-0.1- s .- r " 2 -g . Kyu- ' .. “pm. 1'. AAA‘-‘F ‘ u -v .i. .u... . -1 .- -- " “F -y-~ w \ 4- V adv-s ‘.~u-. v . . __ ' ‘~w A- . v-‘-40- v- __ >wa.. 0“-” ..... r.-.“ -—-.. ‘ n \ :V‘ - . -.._.~. . H. . W o., A ~- — Y ~7- ."' V-‘v‘ " . “a. _ -v:.-, Put — :‘r..- “I- 'w n " “-.. ‘ \ _ ".,.‘-‘ -’.— —.H — _, ‘°-\- ‘ - ‘ ; A—a‘ \ \n ‘“.‘~ I ~. \ -.- an - ‘3 “I. a .A"v-._ ‘Vu.__ -. s- -. — - §-.‘-- “ ‘— E‘v- ‘--'.- v‘ ‘ v “s . ~. ‘- .1 "~. n- ‘-\-n S - ‘ ‘- ‘-'~. \ -_ v .‘ ‘ v.. ‘- s - \:u, . “"v --‘ .— u 5‘. ‘ .‘ ‘. . n‘a ‘ . ~V‘ \F- ‘ ~ ‘7'» \ a- bl - ‘ 5" . ‘ u ‘. 3 ~. ‘ ._y\‘- ‘.- ud‘- ‘5 V“ A ‘v >— s \\ h ‘I v s V‘ ' -‘V’" ‘. ~' W\ “ . ~‘ \ ‘ v . 'ls‘ . \‘~ I" \v ‘ \“ \.‘3 \\ ‘ ‘5 u \Mhen I doubt, this doubt requires my own existence. Thus it makes no sense for me to say, "I doubt that I exist." No sceptic could sincerely assert such a sentence. If we are to grant that Descartes, through some such argument as this, can undermine the most extreme claim of the sceptic, is there anything else that we can know with certainty? I want to attempt to trace Descartes' answer to this question in the order that Descartes calls the "order of knowing”: One of the essential precepts of the Cartesian logic is to “conduct" his thoughts "by order.” And everyone knows the Cartesian order, which is found in similar forms in the Discourse, in the Meditations, in the Principles: I doUEt, I know that I doubt and: as a consequence, that I think and am, I know that God is, and that he cannot be a deceiver, I can therefore found a science of the world upon clear ideas, and finally derive from that science the technical appli— cations which will make me master of Nature.5 Following the Cartesian order, we will begin with doubt and personal existence, the proofs of God, and of God's non-deceptive character, and the type of certainty 1+Cf. Meditations, II, AT, IX, 21. This is not to say that no sceptics have ever succeeded in raising doubts about the soundness of the cogito. Popkin's Scepticism, p. 20H, tells about some. See also A. J. Ayer, "I thThk, therefore I am," The Problem of Knowledge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956), pp. HS-SM; Bernard Williams, "The Certainty of the cogito," Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophie, No. IV: La philosophIe analytique (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1962), pp. 40-57, translated in Willis Doney, Descartes (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 88—107. 5Ferdinand Alquie, Descartes (Paris: Hatier- Boivin, 1956), p. 5. Cf. to Mersenne, Dec. 24, 1640, AT, III, p. 266. v0!- .- ".o-v-- ., .4.- . .- F. .m ”n. .. .3 r. a. -= .3 r“ .. v“ o» J. ‘ ... .3 .c L“ .2 .. Lu .. 1.. V. .- L“ .3 I. 2. o. as “i. .1 _ . . _ . . p. r h V. L. a -“ .. Q ‘ - _u .: . . .... . . _.. n. r. o v . .p: . a 2» .2 .3 Z. .3 .. . :. L. :2 L. .. r. .1. v.. a . .: 2. . . .3 5. 2‘ u.. . . ... . . ».. ... a . .3 . . ... . . . . . 5 upon which these proofs are based. We will then turn to the certainty of the physical sciences and the "eternal truths," in the peculiar sense in which Descartes uses this term. Finally, we will briefly discuss the ”moral certainty" of the empirical knowledge that we cannot gain without the help of the senses. My aim is to find the sort of things that will count as knowledge at each of these stages, and the sort of faculties, powers, or dISpositions that are required by the human being who can know these things. Knowledge, for Descartes, is an organic unity. In his earliest speculations about the dreams that he had on the night of November 10, 1619, he believes that they show that all the sciences can be brought together. At the other end of his career, in the Principles, he says: All philosophy is like a tree, whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches which come from this trunk are all the other sciences, which can be reduced to three principal ones, medicine, mechanics, and morals. 6Principles, Preface, AT, AT, IX2, In. For DescartesTTdream, see Olympica, AT, X, pp. 179-88. Cf. to Mersenne, Mar., 1636, AT, I, p. 339; Discourse, V, AT, VI, p. 57. For the historical sources of the tree image and the ideal of the unity of the sciences, see Paolo Rossi, "Studi su1 Lullismo e sull'arte della memoria nel Rinascimento. La memoria artificiale come sezione della logica: Ramo, Bacone, Cartesio," Rivista critica di §1221§_Q§11§_ii1959fi§s XV (1960), pp. 22-62, espeEIally pp. ue-ug. (Hereinafter referred to as "Memoria artificiale.") Cf. Rules, XIV, AT, X, pp. ”50—51. CHAPTER II THE EVIL GENIUS We begin, according to the Cartesian order, with doubt. For in overcoming the most powerful doubt we attain the firmest certainty, if certainty is to be attained. The personification of the source of doubt is the evil genius of the Meditations. He appears near the end of the first Meditation, where he proceeds to employ all his industry in deceiving the author: I will suppose, then, that there is, not a true God, who is the sovereign source of truth, but a certain evil genius, not less full of ruses and deceptions than powerful, who has employed all his industry in deceiving me. I will think that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all the external things which we see, are only illusions and deceptions, which he uses fraudulently to obtain my belief. I consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, as having no senses, but believing falsely that I have all these things.1 lMeditations, I, AT, IX, pp. 17—18. This may be the only time in the history of philos0phy when the evil genius appears in quite this form. He is, however, not quite without precedent. Popkin finds a similar genius in the writings of Montaigne, Scepticism, p. 182. I do find some connection between him and Protervus, the "insolent," who plays the role of devil's advocate in the writings of an Ockhamist phiIOSOpher, Pierre d'Ailly. I want to discuss d'Ailly's doctrines in an appendix. Bouwsma compares the genius with the devil of the Genesis story. 0. K. Bouwsma, ”Descartes' evil genius," Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949), pp. lul—Sl. But 6 . .. . ll. .. ,C . L. 2. ..... .2 .._ . . ... .1 _ -. t 1. a. . .. _: .. 3.: . :1 _ _ H.” ... ... ._ .2 .. .w. .1 .1 a. _ Z. l“ “w a: Y. .. .3 p“ ”u ..m- a . . .C .. a“ ,H .. .Z “a Aw .3 r . f. n a . a —p_ . u o. —.. Y. .. ~ w. .5 A—v . o . u...“ __ l .. — ~ 4 . .l‘ . . _~ 0 . ... -.\ Cs ~\ :5 \\~ , .. .. \ \\ 4‘ 7 Descartes' genius is different from the serpent of Eden: "This evil genius promised no good, promised no knowledge," in contrast with Eve's tempter. I suppose that the genius could be identified with the devil. The Faust legend was immensely pOpular in EurOpe around 1600, with travelling puppet shows retelling the story in every town. MephistOpheles tempts Faust with visual images of potential sins, just as the genius tempts Descartes with images of a non-existent external world. But Descartes' genius tempts men to believe in false ideas, rather than to engage in other sins. Plato's puppet-maker furnishes a better model. He appears in the Republic (myth of the cave, Slu), the Laws (as the crudest of the artist-imitators, 803), and in the So hist (as the eauuarono1os, 235B). The concluding definition of the sophist, who engages in "the art of contradiction—making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry . . . that presents a shadow—play of words . . .” (266CD, Cornford tr.) seems to apply to the genius. Oauuara could be either wonders or puppets. Aristotle exploits this ambiguity in the Metaphysics, where he says that philosophy beginsiin wonder and ends in understanding. In the same way, he says we wonder at puppets (Gauuata Tautéuata) but end by understanding their mechanism. As for Descartes: One of his early manuscripts was titled “Thaumantis Regia," or “wonders of the king,“ in which he speculated (according to Millet) "about ways of producing unusual effects by the resources of Optics and mechanics." His initial deception by the automated Neptune in one of the grottoes that were extremely pOpular in France during the late Sixteenth Century, and his many fascinated descriptions of such automata, from those in Le monde down to the uncompleted plan for the—9earch after truth (AT, X, p. 505) testify to this interest. In the Latin version of the Meditations (AT, VII, p. 325), he sees hats and coats but wonders whether they might not be automata. The answer is not given by the testimony of the senses but comes through the understanding. Here, as in the other instances, to be deceived means to be presented with images or ideas which lead to an incorrect judgment. Descartes may have referred to an ”evil genius” in his account of his dream of November 10, 1619. He may, however, only have written of an "evil spirit.” AT, X, pp. 185—86. Except for this possible reference, Descartes never Speaks of an evil genius except in the first and second Meditations, and in his discussions of these passages. up. ,- ‘. 'v-‘- ~Y"" ‘ V. ._ .1 .__ Lu .: . . .r. . . _~. i . 1.. ._c .. .1 L. »“ nuhv Y. o. a» .- w“ .3 _: w“ ... A. A: 2. .. ~m .x. ... .4‘ p v 3. .o . .. .N a v A u A v ‘\v c v n-n-o A . . -- 8 The supposition of an evil genius comes at a crucial point in the Meditations, because it is in over— coming the doubt that this supposition raises that Descartes finds the beginning of a solution to the problem of establishing ”something firm and constant in the sciences."2 In his encounter with the genius, Descartes finds that there is one thing that he can know to be true: . . I persuaded myself that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no sky, no earth, no minds, nor any bodies; was I not also persuaded that I was not? Not at all. I was, there was no doubt of that, if I was persuaded, or if I only thought something. But there is a deceiver, I don't know who, who is very powerful and full of ruses, who uses all his industry to deceive me continually. There is therefore no doubt that I am, if he deceives me; and let him deceive me as much as he wants to, he will never be able to make it so that I am nothing, as long as I think that I am something. So that, after having thought well about it, and having carefully examined all things, I must at last conclude, and take as constant the fact that that prOposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time that I 3 — pronounce it, or that I conceive it in my mind. This proposition (as Descartes says in a corre- sponding passage of the Discourse, concerning the cogito) "was so firm and so assured, that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were not capable of shaking it."” 2Meditations, I, AT, IX, p. 13. Sciences or scientiae are any fields of assured knowledge. 3Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 19. ”Discourse, IV, AT, VI, p. 32. I I .. .. 1 .. ... . ..;. .... ... .c....\ . ... .. . l . .. .1 r. .. I. .. .. I. Z..\ A. .2 .. r. W. i. .1 .: _.. :. .. ... l.. r. __. .: . ..-. I: . ._ .. .: l. .. ... .2 .t ... l. .: .1 .. .3 .2 ;. ;_ .. .. 3: ~... an ~u . a . .C I. .2 a. a. .u a. .t 1‘ .: .t .. .: ”J .c .. ... .t C .. :. i .4 .... .. .: :. l... v. 7.. S A. n. _. I. r. .C .2 r. “A .f .3 ... L.. . v I... ... .. .. “I. .v _.. .3 T. v. .y .2 »m r. .3 _‘ .2 g. . . .Z .3 . . I. .. . . «c I. .1 .. .2 .3 5‘ a. a. . c I. .2 .Z r. .5 n» .I . . ... . :. ...u s. 2. .1 .. .2 .m I. .Z . . r. .. L“ L. L“ L. C. I. .. v. .p.. . . .. ... .. .. .. ... I. L” .. a. .. .3 .u 9 Since the supposition of an evil genius is probably the most powerful of those extravagant suppositions, it deserves to be taken seriously. At the same time, the character of the genius is problematic. He is evil, because he tempts men to adopt false beliefs. But if he is very powerful, as Descartes assures us that he is, then his deception may be completely successful. And if it is completely successful, to the extent that there is no criterion by which anyone can tell that it is a deception, then we may wonder whether to call it a "deception" at all.5 A deceptive god (who is, we may assume, infinitely more powerful than the evil genius) could undermine all knowledge: for a long time I have had a certain opinion in my mind, that there is a God who is capable of all things, and by whom I was created and produced just as I am. But who could have assured me that that God could not have made it such that there is no earth, no sky, no extended body, no figure, no size, no place, and that nevertheless I had the sensations of all these things, and that all of them seemed to me to exist exactly as I see them? Still more, just as I sometimes judge that other peOple are mistaken, even in the things that they know with the greatest certainty, it could happen that this god has wished me to deceive myself every time that I add two and three, or that I count the sides of a square, or that I judge something easier, if anything can be imagined which is easier than that. 5This is the possibility that Bouwsma exploits. If there is no criterion by which we can ever determine whether any experience is deceptive or veridical, then we would seem to have deprived the word "deception" of all its meaning. At least this is what I take to be Bouwsma's view, in "Descartes' evil genius." 6Meditations, I, AT, IX, p. 16. v; . -,.-..o~nvn — .. uv-\r-"' ‘- O .u .. .,.- A~'-" .. uni. “fig‘V. .... ar- "y . -. ..-,. ~. — .- ad -n-.. ... ' l 1 ...—- . "l \ -----.Q .. .q—. .a,. ‘ '- \u— \. -v«-~ uva-_, - . w:r-..v_ — u»b.-.v - . a- .. -.,_~ . "~~-..L ' : u , v :. .. . V‘. u-.. - .‘~“v _— ‘..-- - iv.... o y, ‘ ‘ ‘\ ‘ ‘.. 'v YA». s. — . . «‘-‘ ~.. ~ .— ~_ 1 ‘ U . "‘ C ~u :~,~~‘ “ § VA, v- ‘~ ‘. r 10 Given sufficient power, an evil genius or a deceptive god could cause us to have sensations which do not differ in any detectable manner from the sensations which we have of the real world. And he might be able to do even more than this. The inference to "I am," "I exist,” from my immediate knowledge of my thoughts is, in some sense, a logical inference. Can this logical con— nective be falsified by the genius? If I am capable of doubting that two and three are five, or that a square has four sides, can I not also doubt the logical connective between "I think" and ”I am"? Perhaps it is just at this point that the most radical deception occurs, in the illusion that there is some ego, some substance, under- lying the collection of thoughts that I call mine.7 7In a well—known article, Jaakko Hintikka argues that the cogito is not an inference so much as a perfor— matory utterance. Jaakko Hintikka, "Cogito, ergo sum: inference or performance?," Philos0phical Review, LXXI (1962), pp. 3—32. In speaking of it as an inference, I have in mind the following passages: ”. . . I noticed that, while I thus wished to think that everything was false, it was necessarily true that I, who thought it, was something." Discourse, IV, AT, VI, p. 33. ”No, certainly, doubtless Ifwas, if I was persuaded, or only if I thought some- thing." Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 19. "And when I stated that this prOposition, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain which presents itself to those who philOSOphize in orderly fashion, I did not for all that deny that we must first of all know what is knowledge, what is existence, and what is certainty, and that in order to think we must be, and such like ... ." Principles, I, 10, AT, IX2, p. 29. In each of these passages, Descartes seems to wish to presuppose a logical principle of the general form given in the passage from the Principles. g \r- n .--a§- 'b'y -— s .A,. cut-non «nu .. E T. T. Z S .u .f E. .. T ... .......l... E C a. I E V. r .I y .o g .. E .c J‘ .. ‘ ..\ . . .2 .Z 1.: . . .3 z" e. .l..: .32....41 ....n.‘..‘.: ... a. . ‘3‘ Va a....‘ :2 \. fly ma .ph Q» fix ~\ 5... ‘ ~ a. ‘5. . Q A» ‘ ~ 5... .‘\ an» ~55» \ s .a‘ C. i z. T. ... .1 1. A ,. .1 i .. . ... . .. 3 A u .. .. «a > u. ss v .. ....4. L. ,s .. ~ \ u.. a» x « .. -7 I. i. .: v. H». \ a A: .. x . .. .f. ll Descartes must stOp somewhere short of this total scepticism, which would be a nihilism from which no one could return. He nevertheless often gives the impression of being ready and able to doubt everything: ". . . I will apply myself seriously and freely to the general destruction of all my former opinions." ". . . I proposed as false all that I previously held to be very true, for the sole reason that I noticed that one could doubt it in some way." "I doubt all things and am certain of nothing."8 While these passages may give the impression that Descartes is willing to doubt everything, he finds that he is not able to do so. Consider the last passage. It But the correct analysis of the cogito is not a simple matter, and I do not believe that Descartes was consistent in his characterization of it. In particular, in contrast with the analysis given in the Principles, he maintains that the cogito is not a syllogistic inference, and perhaps not an inference at all, but an immediate i intuition. Cf. Replies, II, AT, IX, p. 110. Descartes later attempts to reconcile these positions: "Before that conclusion: 'I think, therefore I am,’ one may have recognized the major: 'Everything that thinks, is,’ because in reality it is prior to my conclusion and because my conclusion is based upon it. And it is thus that in the Principles the author says that it precedes it, because implicitly it is always supposed and prior. But I do not always have an express and eXplicit recognition of that priority, and I nevertheless recognize my conclusion, because I pay attention only to what I experience in myself, knowing: 'I think, therefore I am,’ while I do not pay as much attention to that general notion: 'Everything that thinks, is'; actually, as I have warned, we do not separate these prOpositions from singular things, but we consider them in the things; it is in this sense that the words cited here ought to be compre— hended." Burman, AT, V, p. 1H7. 8Meditations, I, AT, IX, p. 13, Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. H7, Search, AT, X, pp. Elm-15. - . ~w- A- q..- \ —-ac.-~...... » o .: L. :3 .2 .3 .x. 2— .u- 12 is placed in the mouth of Polyander, a bright but unedu— cated character in the dialogue, The Search after Truth, who is about to be shown that he cannot doubt his own existence. He cannot really ”doubt all things.” Similarly, the first passage, at the beginning of the Meditations, represents an intention, which does not really succeed in 9 Only the second passage destroying all former Opinions. seems to say that all former Opinions were rejected, and here the phrasing is ambiguous. Probably only those Opinions which could be doubted were rejected.10 Whatever Descartes' intent in these and similar passages, it has been clear to many commentators that the evil genius left a large area of belief or Opinion untOuched by his deceptions. According to one of the most respected of these commentators, Octave Hamelin, "The evil genius is nothing other than a personification of the violence with which the nature of the universe, which is perhaps irrational, is perhaps forced to submit to the mind." He later 90f. Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 19. 10Descartes repeatedly maintains that he did not reject all Objects of belief. Cf. to Gibieuf, Jan. 19, 16H2, AT:_III, pp. u72-73, Replies, VII, AT, IX, pp. 959, 979, 970, 1060, et passim.; Meditations, II, AT, IX, pp. 18-19; ". . . I reject, as absolutely false, all that in which I could imagine the least doubt." Discourse, IV, AT, VI, p. 31, but he does not reject what he cannot doubt. . . .-.... ' p. .- -a-.-‘»..vy ... . .. .\ ‘~ ‘ .v A. .2 .2 _. M: .. I. r.. on :2 Z a. a? “M ‘ I. ;. ... J. A» .v ;. _.. ~.. cc. 1: .Z A” I. .. v.. I. l: 5‘ 3‘ . a .3 a. F“ .. J. .2 L. ..-. .. 2. v“ .. .a 2. .. .1 I. .. :3 .. .c 2. ... I. Y. v. r. ... J. I. .3 I. .3 a: L. z. 2. :3 i. .2 . . .. . .n :: ~m . . ... 4. I. .. . .__ ... i. .2 .3 .2 .3 L. :. _.. . i. I. w.” .. ... v. N L. .3 ... ... a . l3 simplifies this somewhat obscure characterization: ”The evil genius . . . is the personification of the irrational influences which are able to penetrate into thought."ll Jean Wahl further simplifies Hamelin: "The evil genius "12 was the symbol of irrationality. Similarly, Francois Misrachi paraphrases Hamelin: ”The 'evil genius' thus signifies the possible irrationality (at this point of the Meditations) of everything.”13 Hamelin calls attention to the fact that neither the genius nor the deceptive god can undermine the ratio- nality of human thought itself. In particular, Hamelin's rejection of the notion that the evil genius represents "an essential falsity of intelligence" will provide the beginning of an answer to our initial questions. At the same time, I think that we will find that it is less than helpful to use the terms ”rational? and "irrational," which never appear in the Meditations, unless we have a clear understanding of the way in which we are to translate these llOctave Hamelin, Le systeme de Descartes (Paris: Alcan, 1911), pp. 118, 1H3. The first passage is: "Le malin genie n'est autre chose qu'une personnification de la violence que fait peut-etre subir a l'espirit la nature peut-étre irrationelle de l'univers." Although this is perhaps the best—known French characterization of the genius, I am not at all sure that I have rendered it either comprehensibly or correctly in English. The additional quotations are to be taken as explications of it. 12Jean Wahl, Tableau de la philoSOphie francaise (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), p. 16. 13Rene Descartes, Discours de la methode, Francois Misrachi, ed. (Paris: Union Générale d'Editions, 1963), p. 219. .- .ro --,-~«‘ .— " .u ‘- ._-. ---~—R-‘ _. - -' -_.'...:. -,.-- 0'- ‘ — V ...n. u-o- . u D _ . .~—- — - -‘r‘ -n---~A- .. §---/— . “_ -\.— -‘-V‘ "V- . . ‘V-’~ ck «. ._. V__ -.._\,-_.'-__ . ' I .~qr-—.-_ a‘ —--~~o‘_\v_h-, -. \ _ .'-‘r\ -,,_- \ _ --..u~ _--_‘ . -“A- ‘-___ _ unu‘ ‘- ""'~-‘. _ - p- . - -—A-_ -.. V ."~—v___ ’0 .‘ ~ ‘ - ‘r- -_ ~- \ ‘ V»- ‘~ . o -‘~_ " : " 2."- ‘V‘- ‘.._. -".~A- . I ”An.‘ _ . ~V... \ \. -. -~—‘ . - A. “ :“ -‘-- - "- -— “'“ ‘ ‘ _ c 'Y.“‘ “. _ ~‘ ‘5‘. 4- ‘- .-.A ‘0 t s‘ n.‘ - _ ~ ‘\.. \ . x. ‘ ‘ V‘H ~ - § ‘. ‘n . -A . ‘ -\ V ~ -‘ “ssh v._ V‘.'¥ V 5‘ ‘ ‘ Iv “A ‘ g \“\ - . .h V A ., -- .5 n‘ > - “‘ 5 ‘..— A ~— ~ \ h‘ . I‘ .— .,‘ ,5 u l ‘5 ~N‘ ‘~ . E Q ‘1 ~"\ A .‘ ~Yu - ~‘ ‘ ‘.H ‘ ‘4 ~.. ‘ I’. ~ . .' ‘ Y: “.~ ' v- s . ‘ ‘ ‘1 r n, _ ‘. ‘~.\ ‘ n . ~ -1 ‘. -\ H.‘A ‘n\‘\' q ".\ \ \- '\ “ 1U. terms into a Cartesian vocabulary. hamelin certainly attempts to give such a translation, but it is not clear that this carries over into Wahl's and Misrachi's popu- larizations. Henri Gouhier believes that Hamelin's view is not based upon Descartes: “What is annoying in that profound interpretation, is that Descartes never thought of it.“ Emphasizing the voluntarism of Descartes' theology, Gouhier finds that the charge of deception, directed against the deceptive god, is one that accuses him of a faulty will. The hypothesis of a deceptive god, he finds, "is born out of a scruple of the intelligence; it is by nature metaphy— sical” and thus must be sharply distinguished from the hypothesis of the evil genius, who is no more than an artifice, used once in an experiment and then discarded.lu I think that the only American author who has written at any length about the genius is O. K. Bouwsma, who finds him not only artificial, but also off on the wrong track. Bouwsma tells the following story: Planning to deceive a young man named Tom concerning the existence of the external world, the genius first turns everything, including Tom's own body, to paper. Tom readily detects the deception. Next, the genius falsifies the entire external world in such a way that Tom cannot tell the 1UrHenri Gouhier, Essais sur Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1949), pp. 171, 162—63. I want to return later to the question of voluntarism. . _ . .y w. u. .u .r“ ,—. .v L. r“ :.. r“ .. .. ... t. .C .3 S. L. . _. . . V. Au .3 r. g. r. I. .1 .: .. ”a .Z A, .1 at i . ... 2‘ ... . . .- v. ... .m .. J. r. L. 2. ... .. .C ... .. 5. .» ,... p . . A a Q. H.“ .1,“ n‘ .. ,- v- -’ .- ‘.. .C : L» .w . I... c a» o. u.. ~ ‘2 .um ‘» . . .A‘ .u .3 .. .. s. s. ‘ e L. b . .3 :~ 15 difference. This time, the genius is enraged to find that Tom doesn't really believe that he is being deceived, because he can not tell the difference.ls When Tom finds that he cannot perceive any difference between the genius' pseudo—world and the real world, the genius is forced, in the end, to maintain that he can tell because he has an additional kind of sensation, "cerpicio," through which he knows the difference between the false and the real. This is the only way in which anyone can tell the difference. But this is not the way in which real illusionists know. If we were to ask a ventriloquist how he knows that the dummy is not really talking, he might reply (if he were addicted to rather an old-fashioned phiIOSOphical terminology) in terms of his immediate intuition of his own volitions. He knows because he wills the dummy to talk. He knows this even if his pretense is so perfect that no one else can tell the difference. Suppose that two skilled ventriloquists, Smith and Jones, have a dummy seated between them. At a signal, the dummy says, "Hello!” We ask Smith and Jones, "Which of you said that?" When Jones answers, it may very possibly be true that there is no way whatever of finding out whether he is telling the% truth or attempting to deceive us. We would have to take his answer on faith, if we took it at all. That is, we 150. K. Bouwsma, "Descartes' evil genius." 16 would have to trust in whatever evidence we have that he is not a deceiver. This seems to me to be the sort of thing that Descartes was saying about God. :. .3 _: .. I. .. v. 1. .. .. .n I. r. .: .—.. I. .t 2‘ Y. A.- ..u.. _‘ : .c r. .1 .. .3 :- 1. :- pp» ... Y. \~. :- ._ u ~.. .\~ nan ‘. .. .2 T. a. a» i‘ I. .: ‘1. .~.. av v. .3 u CHAPTER III REASON, RECOGNITION AND CONCEPTION A few recent writers have attempted to show that Descartes believed that human reason could not be completely discredited by the machinations of the evil genius. Like the references to "irrationalism" in the French writers, the references to “reason” in the English- speaking authors raise a problem of interpretation when we discuss Descartes' Meditations. Let me phrase the question in rather an over-simple form, in order to illustrate this problem. Let me ask: Does Descartes, in the Meditations, regard the human faculty which he calls "reason" to be infallible, or can the sceptic cast doubt upon it? To answer the question in this form, we note that there are, in fact, only five references to "reason" as a faculty of the human mind, in the French Meditations.2 lNorman Kemp Smith, New studies in the philOSOphy of Descartes (New York: Russell 8 Russell, 1966), p. 62. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason," American PhiloSOphical Quarterly, II (1965), pp. lu9—66. John 0. Nelson, "In defence of Descartes: Squaring a reputed circle," Dialogue, III (1964), pp. 262—72. 2There are actually 59 uses of the term raison and its cognates. Most of these, however, do not refer to a 17 A -rF" FY” —‘ ‘n v ...v' c v .- - -'- fl - \I u..-o. A . ‘.-'~ ;-'-..L w . a . -rl‘ .F.... - -‘ ‘.-~o non-A “"r -A \ .c--¢...... ‘ . . . ""‘Av- - _ K —1‘ t~-~.. ‘- ‘ "v- -v-,~v.,. -\‘-»".- - I 1 AR AA‘ .— ‘ v.1..v' "-.- Y—~\“v- .5‘--.‘ ... .. ‘ o 3"» “- ‘."“ -~\ u p s_ I ' § “ 'V g. V “. _ - ‘1‘ “ \I— cm». s‘ ‘ “~fi K “. ‘ ‘n.—\ K. ~ ‘ ~‘- I \ A a. ‘~~ “.‘ '~ A s “ ‘y . -v. ‘ (I) (I; (h 18 They are as follows: (1) "But, inasmuch as reason persuades me already that I ought not to prevent myself less carefully from giving credence to things which are not entirely certain and indubitable . . ."3 (2) "I am, precisely speaking, only a thing which thinks, that is, a mind, an understanding, or a reason, which are terms of which the signification was previously unknown to me."” (3) "To be sure, these two ideas of the sun, which I conceive, cannot both be similar to the same sun; and reason makes me believe that that which comes immediately from its appearance is that which is the most dissimilar to it."5 (H) ”And because I remember also that I more often made use of sense than of reason ."6 (5) "For since nature seems to carry me to many things from which reason turns me away, I did not believe specific faculty of the mind at all. For example, "I cannot comprehend God's reason for doing this." AT, IX, p. nu. "And as for those reasons for doubting . . ." AT, IX, p. 61. And so on. None of the uses of the term would tend to contradict the indicated conclusions. 3AT, IX, 4 p 1H. AT, IX, p 21. 5AT, IX, p. 31. p 60. 6AT, IX, n... ‘. .V o.._- -A .,.-o ...~.‘- -—-- ..-‘- r. . I. .C .2 _. _: .: E . _ a. E I I. . . .: .. .t S C AL v. v. __ L r. .L .3 .1 .3 >.. A: .u i :. a. C .l : .. 2.. . . v. C. ... .L. v. L. . v 2» .2 .. a o v . ~m . ~ .. s h. 19 that I ought to have much faith in the teachings of that nature."7 Although each of these passages may raise inter- esting problems of interpretation, it is perfectly clear that in none of them does Descartes seem to be attempting to justify reason, to be doubting it, or in any way to be discussing its reliability. In the second passage, "reason” seems to be taken as an alternative term for "mind" and ”understanding." In the other four passages, "reason” is the name of a faculty which certainly appears reliable-—more reliable than sense (in (3) and (4)) and more reliable than natural inclination (in (5)).8 But this is scarcely the beginning of an answer. Although reason may never be doubted, explicitly, in the Meditations, we are not at all justified in supposing that Descartes believes it to be infallible. For, if "reason" is indeed to be taken as the equivalent of "mind" or ' Descartes would then be committed to the "understanding,' incredible view that men's minds are infallible. And if "reason" is not equivalent to ”mind," we are not told how it is different from it. But we may be able to get some help from Descrates' early unfinished Rules for the direction of the mind. In referring our questions to the Rules, however, we have to 7AT, IX, p. 61. 8Cf. Replies, III, AT, IX, p. 135. Au— .- .— . v-” " hp”..- .0»- p. ---v - ..A Y_, - nvgv ."n. - ‘A— a ‘douv —' ..I~"" . . A." H "" -_'_v . -.~A - 0v. _,. A- ~V' .- - x...» -r Y--- —\ o—‘v-‘ A- - v- - n u. -.. '5- ‘ ' ."‘p, N "V‘ "‘0v— _ - - . D~- - ‘ “-- n. - ‘ Y‘ -_ ‘_-~ _- -’-- I 1 _ v.—~_. "“gp: \ l “ _ --__. ‘ — " A_ _“.‘ \ '_. ‘~-.. — -. - r- I} ‘¢.: \-,' .- ~v . VII» V- - - . ~‘ ~“ I VV- ‘~ ~“‘~. > ‘ ~.. _: ‘ , ~ “~— ~L“-. ‘5...‘ u- -. . “ ‘u C.“._ I V‘A ~.. A a \\\ Y I ‘ ~~‘ ‘ Q ‘ .. ~A‘A N5 ~‘r ‘» ‘ n . an s,‘ I nu.- ~ ._ .A . “ ‘ A— \ . ‘~\\- ;_ "x.’ ~ . \— ‘~‘ .. “K ‘ .o ‘1 \‘ d- \. \I v‘~‘r- ~ ‘gx ~ 2O remember that the manuscript of the Rules was never completed, and that it was not published during Descartes' lifetime. I do not believe that Descartes makes any reference to the work in his correspondence, which, in contrast, contains repeated reference to another unpublished work of about the same period, Le monde. Thus we can scarcely say that Descartes was committed to any of the doctrines outlined in the Rules, since he may have aban- doned work on the Rules precisely because he found some of its doctrines untenable. However, as L. J. Beck has shown in detail, the method prOposed in the Rules does seem to underlie much of his later work. If this is so, then it may be that the analysis of the mind in the Rules may help us to under- stand some of the terms employed in the Meditations.g In the Rules we find that the faculty of intuition, the "power of knowing," or what I will call the "power of recognizing,‘ serves as a source of undoubted knowledge. As Beck describes it, The power of knowing, the vis cognoscens, is absolutely distinct from, and in no way directly dependent upon, the body or anything bodily: it is a spiritual power and it retains its spiritual char- acter, its self—identity in whatever field it is applied or whatever the knowledge in which it finally issues. . . . It is to be regarded as a "natural light," an "intellectual vision," a natural power 9Leslie J. Beck, The method of Descartes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). . 21 of discerning or discriminating the true from the false, and is variously described by Descartes as "human wisdom,” "good sense,” or the ”natural light of reason."10 We will also want to refer to the following passages in the twelfth Rule: First and last, it must be conceived that that force by which we know a thing [vis cognoscens], in the true sense of the word "know” [cognoscere], is purely spiritual, and that it is no less distinct from everything corpdreal than blood is from bone, or the hand from the eye. It is of a simple nature, which either receives shapes from the senses in common as does the imagination, or applies itself to those which are preserved in the memory, or forms new ones by which the imagination is so occupied that it is often unable, at the same time, to receive ideas from the senses in common, or passes them on to the motive force almost in the same way as by the control of the body alone. In all these cases this cognitive faculty is sometimes passive, sometimes active; some- times acting like the seal, sometimes like the wax. But the last must be understood only as an analogy, for in corporeal matters nothing is every found exactly like this. And it is one and the same force which, when it applies itself with imagination to the senses in common, is said ”to see, to feel,” and so forth, when it applies itself to the imagination alone as it contains various shapes, is said "to recollect"; when it applies itself to the imagination in order to create new ideas, is said "to imagine” or ”conceive"; and finally when it acts alone, is said "to understand.” I will eXplain later, in its prOper place, how this last is accomplished. For this reason this force is called, according to its various functions, either "pure intellect" or "imagination” or "memory" or "sensation"; but it is properly called "mind," whether it is forming new ideas in the imagination or is considering ideas already produced.11 , 10Beck, The method of Descartes, p. 15. Beck's reference here is Rules, I, AT, X, pp. 360—61, where the terms in question are humana sapientia, bona mens, lumen rationis naturale. llRules, XII, AT, X, pp. HIS—16. Translated by Laurence J. Lafleur. In René Descartes, Rules for the direction of the mind (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961). I... .‘ooi‘- v _- I ‘IAI‘Q- .— (I) .-o - “a-.-“ ~ ... n..~b-v-.- . -A-. \ - 'v-. 3““. -nv-AA :3" .. ,_. ~v.u-v.~\.\, .- (.\ "-Ay-v~ '-) v-. V‘A‘- on¢ny “A- - n..~ - “ onvu- -. ~. -. q- ‘ ~ 0. .— ug-‘ - u...“ bvg“... \— ‘.'l A . 5.4- t‘ ‘ a ‘ 4-0?” . ‘ “‘\| ‘ ‘ “ \ 2“: " ‘il..-\ . ”A‘ - A '-'v “N- V~~;' . s ~_..,,_‘-_‘ ~ ‘- -—V ‘ .. ‘m. — ~ ‘\ A o 5‘ ‘V‘ »‘ ‘..‘ ~_ c.‘ n” . ~ I v o '“b .,_\ ‘.‘ "‘ “-§ . a VA. ‘.‘ o.‘ u~ " t.“‘. ‘ A‘ w ‘- Q s, . ‘\ . \‘ .- .._~. ‘ ‘\~.‘ ‘ ‘ a. ‘k - A u \‘ “ ~‘¢.\ u.“ ‘\..z \ ~ 1. -“' ‘l'. ‘ u -. p-_\ ' -_ A 4 »‘\, V.- ‘- y‘ I . ~" . d «A \-‘ H' 22 This passage is of fundamental importance in under- standing the theory of the mind that Descartes advances in the Meditations. The vis cognoscens is said to have two functions. It is "sometimes like the seal, sometimes the wax,' sometimes active, sometimes passive. In the last sentence, these two functions are characterized as 1 (l) "forming new ideas,‘ the active function, and Y (2) "considering ideas already produced,‘ the passive 12 function. There is only one mind, but there are two functions of this mind. According to Beck, The "power of knowing" does not strictly include all forms of what are generally considered to be cognitive activities of the soul. In so far as it is purely "spiritual," it excludes sensating, imagining and remembering; in so far as it "knows" or "under- stands," it is said to act alone. The corporeal motions involved in sense-perception, imagining, and remembering can only be said to be cognitive in so far as they are accompanied, or completed, by an act of intellectual apprehension. The analysis of the mind in the Rules, then, is one in which the power of knowing, or "power of recog— nizing,' plays a central role, in which its characteristic function is "intuition," using the "natural light." 12Notice that "forming new ideas" seems to include sensing, recollecting, imagining, and understanding. In any case, I take the "active" function to mean all acts by which an idea is brought before the mind. 13Beck, The method of Descartes, p. 32. The "act of intellectual apprehension" is what I think Descartes calls "conceiving." w“ . . r. .3 ... .C a. .2 .2 ......... ....:;..... .. .. .5. a. 2 .: ... v. .. .o :. .: .2 .1 .: ... v. .2 .. .2 n) .3 I n. ... .. ... ......:.....: ......:......._...:... . . . . w u .. . ... .. . p h ... _. . A v . . . . . .. . m M u ... ... .. . . S. I. .2 .Z .. .3 r. .F. 5. .2 . . .2 .2 U‘ .5 ..H .1 .. .... ... .r w...“ .. .f r. .. n C. .l . . . t. L .. .2 . v. .r .. .V : . c. _~‘ ... ..‘ .N. .L. . e . o a N h“ N... \ ~ \ s .: Q; a» N “H .r s .h 4. ‘ \ . .2 .. . 23 ”active" and "passive" here is The meaning of purely analogical, and was, in fact, drOpped in the Meditations. There, the will is Said to be active, while the understanding, taken as a whole, is said to be passive, but neither of these terms plays an important role in the Meditations. A letter to Regius in 16ul suggests the difficulty that Descartes finds in applying terms like "active" and "passive” to the mind: I received your theses, and I send you my thanks for them: I didn't find anything in them which did not please me. What you say there about action and about passion does not seem to me to cause any difficulty, providing that you comprehend correctly what those words signify: that is, that in corpo— real things every action and passion consists only in local movement, and it is called action when that movement is considered in the mover, and passion when it is considered in the thing which is moved; from which it follows, then, that when these words are applied to immaterial things, something analogous to movement has to be considered in them, and it is necessary to call "action" that which is the role of the mover, such as is the will in the soul, and ”passion” that which is the role of the thing which is moved, such as intellect and vision in the same soul. As for those who believe that the name ”action” has to be given to concep— tion [percipio], they seem to take the word "action” for every real power, and that of passion only for the negation of power; for, as they believe that conception is an action, they do not have any difficulty with saying that the reception of movement in hard bodies, or the force by which they receive movement from other bodies, is an action, which can- not be said, because the passion which is correlative to that action would be in the mover, and the action in the thing which is moved. As for those who say that every action can be removed from the agent, they are not deceived, if by "action" they understand only the movement, without wishing to comprehend under the name "action" every force such as length, largeness, weight, and the force for receiving all kinds of A—' :v ~— ;‘ r. ... .3 u A. .: A. .: n“ ._. 3: 24 figures and movement; for these things cannot be removed from matter or from quantity any more than thought can be removed from the soul.l'1L I think that this letter to Regius shows that Descartes has here rejected the use of the terms "action” and "passion" as he used them in the Rules, to apply to the power to bring ideas before the mind, and the power to consider ideas. Nevertheless, it seems to me that he has retained an analysis of the understanding in which these two powers represent its two fundamental activities. To show this, we will have to look rather carefully at the Meditations. I want to trace Descartes' rather special use of the terms “power of recognizing" (or "power of knowing") and "natural light." The Latin cognitio and the French connaissance, which I will translate as ”recognition,” do not have a precise equivalent in English. In both modern and classic French, connaitre, to know by acquaintance, to recognize, is distinguished from savoir, to know by understanding. The correSponding noun, connaissance, may be translated either as ”recognition" or as "knowledge." (The noun corresponding to savoir is prOperly sapience, but this is rare, and Descartes never uses it. Science, I think, serves this purpose, and Descartes uses this term regularly to designate a body of knowledge.) The distinctive use lL*To Regius, Dec., 16Hl, AT, III, pp. usu—ss. .. . .‘3‘ .,:...\T\ F“ .T .‘ x. v...\ .r‘..\..\ .—v--. -‘~--v f. .. _... . .. E .2 . . . . . . . ..... E C E :. .. T i . E .. x. .: T. T ._ if... :. E .. I .5... .... C E .f .l .2 .2 . . E .2 T. ... n .. ... n: z‘ . ~ A» ~K~ «k 2» ~ \ u~ \ :\ T. .2 u C r. v. v . I. ....... \,. 3t w. E v. E y. .. a. a. .. T. .. ..: E .2 .C .: ... .2 .2 .2 .t e .. x .. . . \... .. .2 .. .. Ix \.. .. .. ... z. . . a. .1" .2 .1 I. ..~\ . _....\ 25 A that Descartes makes of the term connaitre is often 15 lost in English translations. I will use the work "recognize" to translate connaitre (Latin cognoscere) and "recognition" to trans— late connaissance (Latin cognitio). The effect is inclined to be somewhat stilted, and the reader may prefer to use "know" and "knowledge" where I have used these words. We encounter somewhat similar problems with another term. The French versions of Descartes' works generally use the term concevoir where the Latin versions use either of two words, percipere and intellegere. Many English versions seem to follow the Latin forms, using such terms as "perceive" and "intellect." To do so, I think, misses Descartes' meaning.16 15For example, on two consecutive pages of the standard Haldane and Ross translation of the Discourse, II (HR, I, pp. 92-93, AT, VI, pp. 18-19),Aat the statement of the four precepts of the method, connaitre and connaissance are rendered, in succession, "recognize," "knowledge," "cognizance,” ”apprehend," and "comprehend." While this variety of translations may be justified by the varying uses to which the term is put, they conceal from the English-speaking reader Descartes' characteristic use of the term. Equally impressive is the way in which a single term in English may represent a variety of terms in French and Latin. One particular horror is the English word "perceive," which HR uses to render percevoir, concevoir, apercevoir, and sentir. 16Later, Descartes will attempt to distinguish among intellection, conception, and imagination. It is not clear, however, that there is any such distinction between intellection and conception in the Meditations. The later distinction is this: "It is necessary here to distinguish with care among intellection, conception, and imagination: a distinction which is very useful; take, C. - Mu S. . — .hx .s .x . . . . E I. .: I I. S ... I C C T f. C C . . .... .L S .L C E i I T E S .C n t .4 T. .: E Y. L.. E :. .... X E .... E C n C r .. C E C .. T T E a... T e T E a . .. .2 E .1 r S .. T. C .c T. T v. S n... T .2 ._ .: .: C .: Z T. I E S C T .c .1 : .... C : .2 a... . ‘ v. : .4 2.1:. i a. . S .u .. T. .. T. u C .I .1- :. .. :. t .c I. ...,.. a. 26 In both French and English, there is a very consid- erable difference in meaning between "perception" and "conception." For one thing, in English, to "perceive" usually suggests a sense-perception, but to "conceive" never does. For another thing, to "perceive" means to perceive truly, but to "conceive” that something is the case does not mean that it is true.17 It would make sense to say, "I conceived that the hat was on the bear, but it was not." But it would not make sense to say, "I perceived that the hat was on the bear, but it was not." There is no doubt that "perceive" has acquired a good deal of its modern meaning after the time of Descartes, but it seems needlessly confusing to modern readers to continue to use "perceive" when, as we will see, "conceive" comes much closer to his meaning, and he himself usually chooses the French cognate of it when he is writing in French. Descartes uses these two terms, "conceive" (concevoir) and "reco nize” (connaitre) to refer to g functions of the understanding. I want to propose as a hypothesis that, in the Meditations, they refer to what he for example, the perfections of God: we do not imagine them, nor do we conceive them, but we have the intelligence of them: as for the manner in which God, in a unique act, has the intelligence of everything, the manner in which his decrees are one with him, we do not conceive these things, but we have intelligence of them, because we cannot, so to speak, represent them to ourselves. . . ." Burman, AT, v, p. 15a. 17In the chapter on "Eternal Truths," I want to try to characterize Descartes' use of the term "true." ,.A A- -\ " "at: V“-’ _ - .,‘,A-q Av -a A I H:- ‘0‘ UV‘ 1 0. ~- ~v bvvoo. . "A A r u .y- ..uv v. v.. n. - ' my. U) f K ( ) O n H) ‘to‘. (in “~ 01 g“. ‘ - l (D (l) ~. ¢ . \— ’. A H‘ . ‘v ‘. ‘a ~I ‘. . “ “ .— " k 27 has called, in the Rules, the "active" and the "passive" functions of the mind. To "conceive," then, is to bring an idea or concept before the mind, and to "recognize" is to identify ideas, most importantly to identify them as true or false. First, we have to show that conceiving and recog— nizing are functions of the understanding. In the fourth Meditation, Descartes explicitly identifies them in this way: ". . . the power of rec0gnizing which is in me .”18 ". the power of that is, my understanding understanding or of conceiving: for I do not conceive anything except by means of that power which God gave me ."19 ”. recognizing by the under- for conceiving standing always ought to precede the determination of the will."20 ". . . by the understanding alone . . . I conceive the ideas of things ."21 These passages (and many others) make it clear that Descartes uses the terms "conceive" and "recognize" to refer to functions of the understanding. We next have to show that it is the function called "conceiving" which is active. The last passage above shows this clearly. Throughout the Meditations, the process of lBMeditations, IV, AT, IX, p. us. lgMeditations, IV, AT, IX, p. MB. ZOMeditations, IV, AT, IX, p. H7. ZlMeditations, IV, AT, IX, p. us. I a- or” -.r , .,' -tnp. UO‘ A - u . ‘---~.~--. " H .““‘L-nnu ~ - v ‘S‘cvg — "- 9‘ v A ”V.v.‘,‘ s .. "- u-...~_ F "‘ c.’ s.. (I) "“~ . ~.,. ‘- '~‘- \ ‘1“- ‘ (I) ~ _. "w Iv.,‘ .‘ ,v . h‘f .: v ‘» Q;~:‘ s \. "s \‘ ‘ .nfl. U \ ~ ~ ~ . q '\ x‘ v \ ‘5 s r: a; . v a I? ‘ . . ‘V . ‘ ‘5‘ n t y. Mc' " ‘.A . 28 bringing ideas before the mind is called "conception" (Latin percipio, French usually conception, rarely perception.) Thus, when Descartes considers the wax, he says, ". its conception, or rather the action by which it is perceived (apercoit), is not a vision, nor a touch, nor an imagination, and never has been, however it seemed to be before, but only an inSpection of,the mind (mentis inspectio), which can be imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct, as it is at present, according to whether my attention is attracted more or less to the things which are in it, and of which it is composed."22 In this passage, "conception" is identified as an "action," which can be either confused, or clear and distinct. Obviously, the idea which is conceived need not be true. We are capable of conceiving a chimera, for example, although perhaps not clearly and distinctly.23 22Meditations, II, AT, IX, pp. 24—25. 23A study of all of the I38 uses of connaitre and its cognates, and of the 103 uses of concevoir (or percevoir) and its cognates, in the Meditations, further reinforces the hypothesis that these two terms serve to designate the passive and active functions of the mind as these were described in the Rules. Descartes obviously relies very heavily upon these two terms. A few further examples may help to clarify their meaning: ". . . I should not imagine that I fail to conceive the infinite by a true idea . . . I somehow have the notion of the infinite in me first . . ." Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 36. "If I want to think of_a chiliogon, I conceive well and truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides, as easily as I conceive that a triangle is a figure com— posed of three sides only . . ." Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 57. "For by the understanding alone I neither affirm nor deny anything, but I only conceive the ideas of things, . , _ . I . .__ . . .C .: r: ... C Y Z w. .: 3: .: .L C C C e . S a Z r .5 S C :. ._. .. . .2 S ... . . ... .... :. .4 S w)... .l .: T. . S a“ a. K J. a“ .2 a“ ... .. .5; a...“ .2...~. . .. . r. ..‘ .5 H. C I: C ... h. v. . . .... .2 E ..... .... i a. .. C. t: E .7. . a». 5. p“ C F“ I. E C ~ C.‘ .. .3... .2.... C r. C C C .: .. .C 2. .t .. ... ... .2 .. .: . . C a C a. Q C S .; C .: .... .3 .u L” .... ... .... . C .: .: _.. g. r. .2 a. ..-.. .: _. .. C C I. I. nu r. ”a .3 z. .. .. ... ...n a.... r. 7... ...~ .C... C... v. a. ‘.~: 29 When the understanding functions as the wax, it is passive, and is said to "recognize" its objects. When it functions as the seal, it is active, and is said to "conceive." Further, we will find that the ability to recognize the truth, the passive function of the mind, when it is freed from all bodily functions, like sen- sation, imagination, and memory, is called "intuition," and is recognition by the "natural light." The faculty of the understanding thus consists of two powers or faculties, the vis cognoscens, or power of recognizing, and the vis intelligendi, or power of conceiving.2L+ which I can affirm or deny." Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. H5. ". . . I do not know . . . if the ideas that I conceive of these qualities are actually ideas of some real things, or if they only represent chimeric beings to me, which cannot exist.” Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 3H. On the other hand, to "rec0gnize” does not mean to form an idea but to identify it, primarily to identify it as true or false. It is a "success" term, we do not recognize falsely. For example: "Thus I recognize that error, as such, is not something real . . ." Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 43. ". . . there are very few things that are recognized with certitude touching corporeal things, there are many more things which are recognized by us touching the human mind, and many more still touching God . . ." Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. #2. 2L‘For "puissance de connaitre," see Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. HS. Cf. "faculte de connaitre,” Meditations, IV, AT, IX, . H5; Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 63; "faculte qui connait," Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 57. For "puissance de concevoir," see Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 58. Cf. ”puissance d'entendre ou de’ concevoir," Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. H6; "facultes de vouloir, de sentir, de concevoir, etc.," Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 68; "faculte de concevoir," Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 29; Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. MS. The distinction between the vis intelligendi and the vis cognoscens seems closely related to a comparable distinction in Aristotle. Laporte discusses the 3O Aristotelian analysis, but does not make this particular application of it to Descartes: ". . . intelligible essences . . . are in the sensible world. But the are enveIOped in it, like gold in its ore. And the vous flOIhTIKOS draws them from it, by a mysterious Operation of transformation, in order to imprint them in the vous flaenTlKOS where they are perceived in a sort of intuition. EEfore the Operation, the vous flaenTlKOS contains them only in potentiality. . . .W“ Laporte, Rationalisme, p. x. This seems to be the analysis at AriStotle De anima 3.5. M30alO-25. Similarly, the figure of the seal and the wax appears in Aristotle De anima 2. l2. uZHalB-42Hb20, but it serves a purpose which is quite different from that of Descartes. In making the application to Descartes, we should notice that, for Descartes, ideas may be innate, in the sense that they are diSpositional characteristics of the mind. When the mind contains, e.g., the innate idea of God, this does not mean that the mind is a container, and the idea of God is somehow present in it, like a marble in a box. In the Notes, Descartes states his position with great care: "For I never wrote or concluded that the mind required innate ideas which were in some sort different from its faculty of thinking; but when I observed the existence in me of certain thoughts which proceeded, not from extraneous objects nor from the determination of my will, but solely from the faculty of thinking which is within me, then, that I might distinguish the ideas or notions (which are the forms of these thought) from other thoughts adventitious or factitious, I termed the former 'innate.'" Notes, XII, AT, VIIIZ, pp. 357-58. This act1ve process, by which thoughts are said to "proceed" from external objects or from the understanding itself, is what I take conceiving to be. When we conceive, e.g., of God, we bring the innate idea from potentiality into actuality. In this sense, we may be said to "form" innate ideas, as well as factitious ideas. The process which I am calling ”conceiving" is that which the third Meditation characterizes as repre— senting an idea to oneself: "Among my thoughts, some are like images of things, and it is to these alone that the name 'idea' prOperly belongs: as when I represent to myself a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God himself. Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 29. (I find, after stating that "conceiving" is "forming ideas," that the HR translation uses "formed" to translate finguntur in the third Meditation, in such a way as to suggest that only factitious ideas are "formed" by the mind. Meditations, III, AT, VII, p. 38; HR, I, p. 160. (There is no corresponding word in the French version, which speaks of hippogriffs and chimeras as "fictions and inventions of my mind.") When I speak of conceiving as ,- .- v a .v. nu..- “"V'"“‘Y‘ 31 the act of "forming ideas," I mean the process of which Descartes speaks in the paragraph from the third Meditation quoted above, and not the process that HR translates as "formed." In the Rules, the Latin is formare.) -00 - a V“ a n‘. 'V-‘V --. ,-_ "‘ ‘C .I'i' "Vu- \— H ‘ _ ._ -. ‘ - V‘- '°"“- u.‘ . “'v.- -v _ - C"“‘ n.. U a. ‘ A ,. ._ ...-.‘_‘ h . -. _ .— 0“.‘.“ .. - w-‘ .. _ .-..._Hl“‘ . I V‘ -A" , \ .. Vin. vy‘b “‘ ‘ .-‘ «,_, .H‘ .— ~..‘ - \ ~~AA‘ "K':\ ; ~c - ._ ._ . . Y“. *~ "~- " bx .‘~~ U “ ‘ — ~‘:.C -‘ A A» ‘~ in 5‘ ,M‘. ‘ ‘d x 3 q“ ‘y 1., - CHAPTER IV THE NATURAL LIGHT I want to discuss the function of the natural light in some detail, because it plays a peculiar and important role in the central arguments of the Meditations. Like the character of the evil genius, it appears quite suddenly in the Meditations. Although we may find the expression "natural light" in some of the earlier writings, it is not given any very crucial job to do until the third Meditation. There, however, the axioms in the proofs of the existence and veracity of God are said to be manifested to us by the natural light, and thus, somehow, to be beyond doubt. Since mathematics and physics depend upon the metaphysical proofs, our science could have no foundations without the axioms that the natural light reveals. The important role of the natural light is suggested by the number of references to it in Descartes' writings. The Index Scolastico—Cartesien lists some sixty page references to it, which seems surprising for so unusual a term.1 lEtienne Gilson, Index Scolastico-Cartesien (New York: Burt Franklin, 1965; reprint of Paris, 1912). 32 an .I Q»! o.- . Iv - -A , vv v I 0 (r) v..~ --‘...~ _ . ‘9- b-Y“, .. v ~ 33 Certain passages from Aquinas illustrate the Scholastic use of the term "natural light”: One angel illumines another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light [lumen naturale, natural light] is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Ephesians V: 13: “All that is made manifest is light.” Hence to illumine means nothing else than to communicate to others the manifestation of known truth. We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason requires two things: images derived from the sensible things, and a natural intelligible light enabling us to abstract intelligible conceptions from these. Aquinas' use of the term "natural light," how- ever, is not the only one that was available to Descartes. In an appendix, I attempt to show that Descartes shares a number of his views With the Ockhamist legal philosopher of the fourteenth century, Pierre d'Ailly. The views that they share are distinctive enough to suggest that Descartes was familiar with the work of d'Ailly, or of someone with very similar doctrines. D'Ailly's use of the term "nat— ural light" is quite different from that of Aquinas. For d'Ailly, the natural light is not a source of natural reason. On the contrary, the natural light is contrasted with natural reason. The philOSOpher must keep them separate: 2St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, I, q. CVI, 1, q. XII, 13. Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 19u5), vol. I, pp. 983, 110. ' IIA'. A... :nC- -.-. A F. o .- .AO'V i-” ' V - "h ‘ A “"‘u y.., ‘ 0-,, __ A y.— ‘Q- "‘5_ . O A. “ ~,_ v; -‘ -.. H.‘ A __ fl \_ \‘-‘ ‘ . C. ‘—_ ll _. U. ‘..v H'l ‘s ‘u: p. s' - - g'y .‘ \ ..|~ . . ‘~ ' ‘H v. ‘ '» \“ - q‘ a " \Qv,‘ \u“: -'\ '0 “‘3 . \{~ ‘ 3 '9‘ I u .‘ ‘3‘, \ ’A ~. ‘4'. \ ‘v 3H . . By “natural light," d'Ailly designates every form of recognition which is absolutely indu- bitable in itself and under every hypothesis. If the philOSOpher forgets this condition, if he af— firms as evident "by the natural light" prOpositions which hold only under a certain hypothesis, he will find himself without reply when faced by the ob— jections of Protervus [the devil's advocate]. But if he takes care to distinguish, in every circum- stance, knowledge which is "without error" from knowledge which is ”apparent,” all his demonstrations will again find a positive value; not only those which are absolutely evident, but those also which are in the domain of natural reason alone, and which do not, as a consequence, have more than a relative evidence.3 As we will see, Descartes' use of the term is much closer to d'Ailly's than to that of Aquinas. For all three writers, however, the general characterization of it in the first passage, as a “manifestation of truth,” would seem to apply.” Descartes gives a clear statement of the meaning of the "natural light” in the Principles: 3M. Patronnier de Gandillac, "Usage et valeur des arguments probables chez Pierre d'Ailly," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du ngen Age, VIII (1933), p. H7, summariiing Pierre d'Ailly, guaestiones Super I, II, III et IV Sententiarum (Lyon: Nicolaus Wolff, 1500), I, qu. 1, art 1, fol. 36F, I, qu. 3, art. 3, fol. 82a. Herinafter referred to as Sent. ”Descartes' rejection of the natural light as that which enables us "to abstract intelligible concep— tions" would clearly follow from his doctrine that intelligible conceptions are not abstracted from images of sensible things, but are innate. Cf. e.g. Rules, VI, AT, IX, pp. 383-8“; to Mersenne, May 15, 1630, AT, I, pp. 105-06; Discourse, V, AT, VI, p. Ml; Search, AT, X, p. #96. I. . .1. ._ .. . . . _. . C .3 L. I. ... Y. .‘ H. C r. c. H. 5.. .. .ru .2 .. i .: C i. .3 E... C L” E .3 H." .. .3 r. C. u C .ErL 5...: Tn .. v... . v. .: .. :. h. .3 :C “a C .2 .... .. .. . . .. C. ... 3: r .: 2. C .1 .: .... .. . .3 .n 2. r. .u _ . .. . . .3. 35 the faculty of rec0gnizing which God has given us, which we call natural light, never perceives [apercoit] any object which is not true when it perceives it, that is, when it recognizes clearly and distinctly; because we would have to believe that God would be a deceiver if he had given it to us such that we took the false for the true when we use it well.5 At this point, Descartes seems to be equating the natural light to the power of recognizing (vis cognoscens) as a whole, rather than restricting it to the narrower role that it plays in the Meditations. If we give the natural light this broader scope, however, we find that Descartes is in rather serious trouble. If we combine this passage from the Principles with passages from the Meditations, and if we assume that the meaning of "natural light" remains constant, then Descartes is caught in a particularly vicious circle. In the Meditations, the natural light is the source of the principles of causality, upon which the proof of God's existence depends, and of the principle of God's veracity.6 In the Principles, Descartes regards it as possible that God could deceive us in our use of the natural light. If he can do so, then it SPrinciples, I, 30, AT, 1x2, p. 38. 6"Now, it is a thing which is manifest by the natural light, that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. it is quite evident that he [God] cannot be a deceiver, since the natural light teaches us that deception necessarily depends upon some fault." Meditations, III, AT, IX, pp. 33, Ml. Y. r. I. ... .C Y. r” nu. A: a. C. .1 ...-U a. ... I wt . . . _ o . .ro .. .3 . . . C .: .... .2 s. a. .4 . r. a. .w .7 C .4 z. . ... f. .. C . . S C C .: a. .2 p. C C i .. .C .. .. .. v. .1 C r. .2 a. .r. .C .fl C .1 .: .... . . C .: r. ... . .. .: . i .m ... .p. w. “A ~... I. _.. C .4 .: 4 u . . 5 S C v. C C C .: ... .2 I . ... .t C .L 2. C .1 S v. i. C a. v. a. .3 C ... .... ...‘ .5 . \ AC . .. v. I. .I ..-.. .. v. “C. . C r... 2‘ 5‘ ‘. .u ..sx.~ 36 is entirely possible that we are deceived when we apply the principle of causality to the idea of God in the Meditations. The vicious circle, then, would go something like this. We know, with certainty, that God is not a deceiver, because we are taught this by the natural light. But we can know that the natural light is reliable only if we know that God is not a deceiver. This is precisely the form to which the sceptics attempted to reduce every rationalist argument. The criterion, the natural light, is valid only if another criterion, God's veracity, is proved. But God's veracity cannot be proved until we know that the natural light is valid. It does not seem to me that Descartes could have avoided this disastrous result, if we are permitted to combine the passage in the Principles with the argument in the Meditations. Let us assume, however, that in the Meditations Descartes does not wish to say that the assertion of the natural light's reliability requires that we know, in advance, that God is not a deceiver. I think that we will find nothing in the Meditations which contradicts this assumption. Descartes would then agree with d'Ailly, that the natural light teaches us a principle which God cannot 7 violate. For d'Ailly, this principle was simply the 7A more precise statement of Descartes' position is given in the discussion of the letters to Mesland and Elisabeth, in a later chapter. 37 principle of contradiction. But, as Descartes will later point out in The search after truth, the principle of contradiction is not enough to found a system upon.8 D'Ailly could construct nothing stronger than a proof that God probably exists. Descartes wants more than this, and he finds that he must assume some additional principles, if he is going to prove the existence of God and of the external world with certainty. These additional principles, I or "axioms,' are made manifest to us by the natural light.9 What is the natural light? Norman Kemp Smith's discussion of the faculties, as they are described in the Rules, gives one possible analysis. According to Kemp Smith, Descartes is committed to the far reaching conclusion that sense, imagi- nation, memory and understanding are not really separate cognitive faculties, but merely alternative titles given to the "natural light of reason," marking off the main types of object upon which it can be directed. This, which is one of Descartes’ most distinctive doctrines, is central in his teaching This equating of cognitive awareness with the natural light of reason, consistently held to by Descartes in all his writings, both early and late, was, it would seem, so unquestioned in his own personal thinking, that he was unduly neglectful of the need to enlighten his readers in regard to it.1 8Search, AT, X, p. 522. 9Replies, II (Proofs of the existence of God), AT, IX, pp. 127-29. 10Norman Kemp Smith, New studies in the philosophy of Descartes: Descartes as pioneer (New York: Russell 8 Russell, 1936, reprint of 1953 edition), pp. 73—7u. vac o-v- (D '1 (I) (h (U U! ) ("I 38 I have already said that I do not believe that Descartes is really committed to the doctrines of the Rules, because he did not finish them and did not publish them or otherwise circulate them. What is more important, however, is that Kemp Smith's claim here is much too strong. "Understanding," "mind," and "reason" are probably alter- native names for the same entity, but "natural light" does not seem to be equivalent to these. That is, it does not seem that the natural light is "equated to" reason, but only to one very Specialized function of reason. The correct analysis seems to be this. The soul has two major powers, active and passive. The active power is called ”will." We will want to return to this term later. The passive power is the understanding or reason. Depending upon its object, it functions as sense, imagination, or memory. It may also have the understanding itself as its object. (We might call it the "pure under- standing” when it is directed toward itself alone.) The understanding can itself be regarded in an active and a passive sense. Actively, it brings concepts or ideas into consciousness. It is then called the "power of conceiving." We can conceive nonexistent objects (such as a unicorn or a chimera), and we can conceive false prOpo— ll sitions. We can also form concepts or ideas of an llDescartes holds that ideas are materially false when they give occasion for error. Cold, for example, seems to us to be a real object or prOperty, but it is A .. a“! .-'~- ~'~.“' K nay-vi U ..-.- A‘ a 8““: U. a - ‘F- hh‘ ~ ' . Qua. woo... —. , c ..'-,-,— _ :- otov fignu~ I - :-. -..'. . FAA _ v,_ 1.... OVvv~..-- V 0 ~ .V“ ‘v-q fl i ._ c. -u..,_- v _ .. ‘“ h4...: :ri ‘v- - i.. .‘ ‘- n -,. .. - . ““~Q- F“ . 39 extremely important sort, which are called "clear and distinct." These are, par excellence, the "eternal truths" of geometry and pure mathematics, certain of the laws of pure physics, and perhaps some other truisms. The last chapters of this thesis will be concerned with them. 'The understanding also functions in a passive sense. The .ability to function in this way is called the "power of :recognizing" (or "power of knowing"). We recognize a ‘triangle or a square when we are reminded by a sketch of (one. More importantly, we are able to recognize truth and .falsehood. An important kind of knowledge can thus be <3btained directly, simply by recognizing that certain things «are true. For this last function, and this function (exclusively, Descartes uses the term "natural light." The Inatural light is a faculty of the pure understanding which (:annot be doubted. Justification of this analysis will require (detailed discussion of each of the terms involved, and twill not be complete until the thesis itself is nearly .innished. At the present moment, our specific concern is ‘Ewith what Descartes calls the "natural light." I have characterized it as a passive function, 'ESpecifically as a power of recognizing, rather than a power \ Jrinerely the privation of a prOperty. Descartes finds that =ESuérez also uses the term "materially" in this way. ijEReplies, IV, AT, IX, p. 182. Cf. the later discussion of eternal truths." . .. . . . . .. ,2 r. ._ L . ., ,c 3: ... _... .. L. p» .7. . no .. a. 2.. .c W: Y. .. a. a. .2 VA Ce .2 .. n. . .. A» a» .u .3 .G .5 n. .. a». Zn .. .t ... .. v. Av .4 .. ... ... ... C .fn “1:. u.. .7. . w. r. r. I. 3: no .. T. .. r“ C: . . .. 1 . a . “a in a. u y. - . .. r. .9 A v we “a e .2 x . C. . . r. .3 C» c.» A y 3: .. ...n a: 2. .» ... . . 3 .r.- . . o. g P.» an.‘ AV h.” ‘4‘ at. .—u A u ‘v ufh :- -M -‘ v is A T. ... .3. .. at r. .L t. ..u . -. .1... .n MD of conceiving. It does not form ideas. Instead, it regularly appears in eXpressions like "I recognize by the natural light. Thus, if the understanding is an active power of conceiving, and a passive power of recognizing, the natural light would appear to be connected with the passive power. The natural light, is, moreover, the ability to :recognize truth and falsehood. Descartes distinguishes 'this power from the ”natural inclination to believe” as follows: When I say that it seems that it is taught to me by nature, I understand by the word ”nature" only a certain inclination which leads me to believe that thing, and not a natural light which makes me recog— nize that it is true. But these two things differ greatly between themselves; for I would not be able to cast doubt upon anything ofhwhat the natural light makes me see to be true [voir etre vrai], as it has just made me see that, from the fact that I doubted, I was able to conclude that I was. And I do not have in me any other faculty, or power, for distinguishing the true from the false, which could teach me that what that light shows me to be true is not true, and which I could trust more than it.1 12In the Meditations, these phrases are: ” “to recognize by the natural light . . ." AT, IX, p. 38; ". . . the natural light makes me recognize . . ." AT, :IX, pp. 33, 35, ". . . I recognize by the natural light - . ." AT, IX, p. 65. Expressions like these do not appear :in anything Descartes writes before the Meditations. I :lnave not found any exceptions to this general rule in the -:1ater writings. Descartes never uses an expression like "I conceive by the natural light." 13Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 30. Notice that the 3tnatural light is here represented almost as external, some— ‘flthing that "makes me see," "shows me," and perhaps "teaches 33fime." When he speaks in this way, Descartes makes it — ‘~ \‘ '- u M8 Descartes regularly rejects universal consent as a rule of truth. His arguments here seem decisive: Many persons can consent to the same errors, and there are truths which have not yet been discovered. In neither case would an appeal to the consensus yield the truth.27 In the second passage, he identifies the natural light with "intuition of the mind." But we are not entirely sure, at this point, of the meaning of that term. We will have to ask what "intuition" means in Descartes' writings. He does include a definition of "intuition" in the Rules: By "intuition“ I understand, not the fluctuating faith in the senses, nor the false judgment of badly constructed imaginings, but the conception of the pure and attentive mind which is so simple and distinct that we can have no further doubt as to what we understand; or, what amounts to the same thing, an indubitable conception of the unclouded and attentive mind which arises from the light of reason alone, and is more certain than deduction itself, even though we have noted above that human beings cannot make errors in deduction. Thus everyone can intuit in his mind that he exists, that he thinks, that a triangle is bounded by three lines, that a sphere has only one surface, and other similar things, of which there are many more than most people notice because they disdain to consider such simple matters. For the rest, lest anyone should be disturbed by this new usage of the word "intuition” and of other words which I am similarly forced to use in an uncommon sense in the following pages, I give notice that in general I pay no attention to the manner in which words are made use of in these recent times 27Cf. Discourse, II, AT, VI, p. 16; Rules, III, AT, x, p. 367. — I ._ _.. ._ T .. .. .i . .1 .. n S... I. . J. .2 L. . .... r. .... .n. .a. u. a. .n r. .2 .f .2 .. H. .. .. I. L. ... a. .h .. r” . . I . n. .. . . . . . 2. 2. 5. .. Au .3 ... 2. Y. ... r. ... ... w“ ... w“ L” .. .s. —.. . vv' . ‘ .. .... .2 A. .2 ~ L. .. .. ... . . .r. ~... in A: .. . 2. ‘. c. .u.. ~... 2. ‘ .2 ... w.. y. .C . . .x. C. 2. .5. .. . . . .~‘ -\u .\~ \ s. ‘ h sh. H9 in the schools, because it would be very difficult to use the same meanings when the inner conception is so different.28 When Descartes identifies "natural light" with 'Vintuition of the mind" in the letter to Mersenne, it is rust clear that he is thereby identifying it with this cieafinition of "intuition" in the Rules. The Rules were Iieever published, and there is no evidence that Mersenne lléid seen them.29 In addition, the word "intuition" cilropped out of Descartes' vocabulary after the time of the IQLJles. He does not use it at all in the Discourse or the I?1?ench Meditations, and only very rarely elsewhere. And he does not seem to have substituted the term "Ijatural light" for the term "intuition” in the Meditations.30 iflfie two words have different meanings. In the Rules, the 28Rules, III, AT, x, pp. 368-69. 29The Rules were found in manuscript form among Ilescartes'papers after his death in 1650. They were Eassembled by Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden, and Ssent to Clerselier, Descartes' friend and translator. He sent them to Arnauld and Nicole, to Nicolas Poisson, jperhaps to Malebranche, then to J. B. Legrand, who loaned ‘them to Baillet, Descartes' biographer. Portions of the lRules appear in the second edition of the Port—Royal Logic, 1n l664, but not in the first edition (1662Y. The Rules ‘were finally published in 1701. The evidence thus strongly suggests that the Rules were not known, even to Descartes' friends, until after hlS death. See 0L, pp. 35-36 and OP, pp. 69—71. 30Laporte, however, believes that "natural light" is the term which Descartes uses in later wrtings to replace "intuition.” Laporte, Rationalisme, p. 6. . H A V' .— LVOV ”A’AA- vsotvbb -. 0A.: ~;- uv- gs... .-\Ar- -‘muv. .— o ”‘Avuo.-. {—3 ,_ D van.» .. v ‘:Y~ H'— -‘v. ..‘ c; op, . 50 rxole of intuition is described as "conception" (Latin cxonceptio), but the role of the natural light is always Again, the intuition is said, 'Erecognition" (cognitio). ild the Rules, to be a conception which "arises from" the J_ight of reason, which would suggest that the intuition is rust identical to the light itself. Finally, and most ianortant for our purposes, we are said to be able to ":intuit" our existence, our present thinking, and certain geometrical truths. As we have seen, neither the £fifieditations nor any other writing of Descartes uses the 1toint, and that we cannot use the definition of "intuition" iJ1 the Rules to explain the meaning of "natural light" in ‘the later writings. Although Descartes did not often use the term “intuition" in his later writings, he was asked a question in 16u8 by an unknown correspondent, probably the Marquis of Newcastle, which gave him the occasion to explain what it might mean to him. He was asked to explain the sort of knowledge we will have from God in the next life. Descartes explains that this knowledge will be intuitive: ‘ Intuitive recognition [connaissance] is an eluci— dation [illustration] of the mind, by which it sees, in ._. .. 1. .. .. . .. _ .. ._ ». I. ,.. _ L. . _..... ‘. .u . . Y§ T. L» .—q :5 s. . >o. .U .. . L. a. .. r“ Y. F“ A. p“ x. a. .. .. ... .. ;. . .ru A. .1 a. .H .. . .. . . r. L. n.. .2 a .o . . A. I r. r. ... .. .r . . C Hr. .. . . 5. .3 .3 :. .. .6" .: Z. .fl. .3 .1 .. .. .: . v. .. ... .. .. IK‘ ‘ H ~.A~.. § 51 the divine light, the things which it pleases God to disclose to it by a direct impression of the divine light [clarte] upon our understanding, which in that respect 18 not considered as active, but solely as receiving the rays of divinity. But all the recog— nitions which we can have from God, without miracle, in this life, descend from reasoning, from the progress of our discourse, which deduces them from the principles of the faith, which is obscure, or come from natural ideas and notions which are in us, which, however clear they may be, are only crude and confused upon such a high subject [divine blessedness]. To the extent that what knowledge we have or acquire by the route that our reason takes has, first, the obscurity of the principles from which it is drawn, and moreover, the uncertainty which we experience in all our reasonings. Compare, now, these two sorts of knowledge, and see if there is anything similar, in that troubled and doubtful perception, which cost us so much work and which we enjoy only for a moment after we have acquired it, to a pure, constant, clear, certain, painless, and ever—present light. But can you doubt that our mind, when it is detached from the body or when this body is glorified and no longer acts as an impediment to it, is not able to receive such direct elucidations and recog- nitions when, in this body itself, the senses give it corporeal and sensible things, and that our soul has already some of them from the beneficience of its Creator, without which it would be incapable of reasoning? I avow that they are somewhat obscured by the mixture of mind and body; but still these eluci- dations give us a primary, gratuitous, certain recog— nition, which touches us in the mind with more confidence that we give to the testimony of our eyes. Would you not admit to me that you are less assured of the presence of the objects which you see, than of the truth of the proposition: "I think, therefore I am"? But that recognition is not a work of our reasoning, nor an instruction which your masters have given you, your mind sees it, senses it, and touches it [la manie]; and while your imagination, which is mixed intrusively in your thoughts, diminishes the clarity of them, wishing to clothe them in its figures, it is nevertheless a proof of the capacity of our souls to receive an intuitive recognition from God. 3lTo the Marquis of Newcastle (?), Mar. or Apr., 1.6H8, AT, V, pp. 136-38. - A A” wovv u ~ .- \ u .. b. ‘ _ .7. f. F .5: \r-u. O --~~ . pr; usu.u-. ‘- ‘ A1: - 1" p..- ‘I- but . . C c~ u... “_ v;. ‘7‘“ .- .n“.. ‘- fl-. V~."‘re . H‘.' Rm n‘.‘. ~‘. s - A— .u—\ ”V- w. . 7". ‘ .- -O.““ . . A \“H~ _ ~v “5".V‘ ‘V -. a. .D I *q_ ~\ “.‘ ...~ I. “‘.‘ "‘; H- .- ~‘ u.“ as, ’_ . ... ‘_“‘ ‘V“'~I~ s . “‘ g . : ‘~-. I \ ‘ ‘ ‘~u':\ \— a»--. K". n: . it 52 The characterization of intuition here seems to be closer to that of the natural light in the Meditations than is that of the Rules. If we consider only intuition as it occurs in normal existence, not in the after—life, we find that it is an elucidation (illustration had this sense in classical French) of the mind by God giving "primary, gratuitous, certain recognition." The cogito is given as arlexample of such knowledge, while in the Meditations, the <20gito was said to result from the operation of the natural light.32 And, quite unlike the Rules, these passages from ‘the letter to Newcastle do not claim that mathematics and Ilautral reasoning are certain. On the contrary, they are c>bscure, uncertain, troubled and doubtful, in comparison vvith pure intuition. Descartes, then, has given two characterizations of "intuition,” one in the Rules, and the other in the letter ‘tro Newcastle. Since Mersenne probably had not seen the Iallles and could not have seen the letter, we should be 1"leesitant about basing any argument upon the assumption ‘tihat "intuition of the mind" in the letter to Mersenne is 6Equivalent to “intuition" in either of the other writings. In the letter to Mersenne, Descartes also distin- Egliishes two types of instinct, one bodily and the other 1Tlental. The "natural tendency to believe” depends in part I 32Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 30. 53 upon the body, but the "natural light" is a purely mental instinct. This is an important passage for our study of the nature of certainty in Descartes. There is a whole series of mind—body counterparts, in which an operation or power of the mind is said to be comparable to an Operation of the body. For example, there is a corporeal memory, consisting of patterns impressed upon the brain, which has its counterpart in the purely intellectual memory in the mind.33 Sensations, in the form of movements and vibrations <>f the animal spirits, and of tuggings on the ends of Ilerve fibers, have their counterpart in the mental process 1Ihat accompanies sensation. The passions, which are hxodily, have their counterparts in the emotions, which are fluental. Similarly, we find, implicitly in the Meditations éixmd explicitly in this letter to Mersenne, that there are ztwwo sorts of instincts, bodily and mental, which are the "]natural tendency to believe" and the "natural light." vqee can characterize the natural light, then, as a mental jthtinct. If we consider only our present thoughts, there is Tic: error. The sensation of pain, as a pure sensation, is riteither true nor false. It is when we judge that the pain \ 33L'homme, AT, XI, p. 174; Discourse, V, AT, VI, I31). 55—56; to Mersenne, Nov., 1632, AT, I, p. 263; to 1VIersenne, April 1, 1640, AT, III, p. H8; to Mersenne, June 11, lane, AT, III, pp. 8u-85, to Mersenne, Aug. 6, lane, AT, III, p. IRS; to Huygens, Oct. 10, 1642, AT, III, ID. 580. o c . I . ... . . . a I o - ss— 14 I .. . . 3c ... .. a. r. r. . . .. C; v. ; . .3 _ . . .1 Q. .t : .v. .2 A. .2 P. .2 . . A: r. ”n k. 5. A: .C .3 .3 Q I. C. 33...: . , . H . Q» h. 2‘ 4‘ QQ “C l . . . . . . . u“ u\‘ «\V p .1 ix” “ ~ § , . . . .. .3 e C ... T . ... 2. 1. . C a. .. . .C E E .... T E .2 S .b . . . . . ,. . . . , ., .5 .w my v“ e * a. ... av. . A. ... 3 . Q . 3 3 «\V A\ Q... Q.» Q.» 7* C O T a a. a S .5. C . . 3 . . E r. a... .I .I r .1 .Ji. 3 .2 F A. .l 3 .. a. .2 T. S a. ... . . I... E. .. C .. i C C .2 E. .... .q r .i . . .. .. E 2. C E . .l ... .C .5“ . . w“ . . 2. T. 2. ., .. E : . .. . Q. C . .... T. . .. C C ..... a. 2. .. .. a S .1. x... S \L t. r. C t X C a. ... a. . 3 S .7. ... T C .... 2.. .L Q. S .C .. a. 5 x: S .... .: fin... 7.. J. 1.. . . .9. .... n-.. . . .... .... . . . a. .. . a. v. a. L. ... w. L... c. a. v... .. . .. .... .1 ... 51...... .4 2. . 3 :r. t. .r . 20 : .: ... . . L. z. .z. .. .. .n- x: r. .. n... .1. .. 7.. .5 .. . .. .. . . .. a. I. :. .2 s. ... \ . s. 2. .1. ..-.. 54 is in a leg or an arm that we may make an error. Errors, particularly the errors that we carry with us from child- hood, seem to be due to the close connection of our mind 3” If error is usually associated with the with our body. mixture of soul and body, rather than with the pure soul alone, then we have part of the theoretical justification of the inerrancy of the natural light. We would say that the natural light is a power of the pure mind, uncorrupted by association with the body.35 auprinciples, I, 71, AT, 1x2, pp. 58—59. 35”. . . things which belong only to the mind alone . . . which I recognize by the natural light, without the aid of the body . . .” Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 65. Cf. to Regius, May, lBHI, AT, III, p. 375; Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 70; to Mersenne, Feb. 27, 1637, AT, I, p. 350. Descartes attempts to clarify his position in response to a question from Burman, who raises an objection to the following passage from the third Meditation: "If I considered ideas only as certain modes or fashions of my thought, without wishing to connect them to some other, exterior thing, they could scarcely give me occasion for failing.” Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 29. Burman objects: "But, as every error in the ideas comes from their relation and their application to exterior things, it seems that there would be no material for error if one did not connect them with exterior things." Descartes replies: "There is nevertheless material for error, even if I do not connect them to anything outside myself, because I might be deceived in their nature itself, for example, if I considered the idea of color and if I were to say that it is a thing, a quality, or rather that the color itself which was represented by that idea is something similar to it: for example, if I were to say that white is a quality, even if I did not connect that idea to anything outside myself, and if I said or supposed that there was no white object, I would neverthe- less be deceived with reference to an abstraction, the whiteness itself and its nature, or its idea." Burman, ATS V, p. 152. ———__— ‘3. r\ a: A: 3. h L d-ra -0» .".A.. .gn‘v " .. ;..~ v. 2‘ .t V‘ C. n. M. r. 5.. .. M... c. .p.. ‘\5 .3 C» C» L .. .3 . a. «Q .. .. s . “s 55 Descartes’ use of the term "natural light" in the Meditations led to a number of discussions of its supposed revelations in Descartes' correspondence and in the Objections and Replies. He often uses the term, in these later writings, to refer to secular knowledge, as distinguished from that of faith. For example, he tells Mersenne that we cannot know the Trinity by means of secular reasonings: As for the mystery of the Trinity, I judge, with St. Thomas, that it is purely a matter of faith, and cannot be recognized by the natural light. But I do not deny that there are things in God which we do not understand, just as even in a triangle there are many properties which no mathematician will ever know, even though that does not prevent our knowing what a triangle is.36 There are a fairly large number of references to the natural light of this general sort, using the term to distinguish secular reasoning from the light of faith or revelation, from tradition, from Scholastic instruction, and so on. This is probably the meaning of the subtitle to The search after truth by the natural light. That is, the search is to be conducted without an appeal to traditional learning or revelation.37 In this passage, then, Descartes says that we can be deceived in the judgments that we make concerning our ideas. Thus, although the body may be a primary source of error, it is not the only source of error. 35To Mersenne, Dec. 31, 16u0, AT, III, p. 274. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 32, l. 37Search, AT, x, pp. ugs—ugs, u98—u99. ...e..r .2 I .. . r. a a z. E C ... ..... S .. . .. .2 T. ... ... C ... E .. ..: .. . C c. E 1. .2 L“ .C 2. A. . T. .. .. .. 2c .. C t u. w. .2 .t L. _.. x .2 S 3 :. ... C E 2. C. C .1... f a. E T. i I a. a... I i . .. E C... .2 i .1 n .. n... ... .. ... C C 2.... C S r .. 3 ..... E E. 2. C S .v. E C E I . . a .. .... a E T. S .... S... ... T. .. E. T. S S .1... C... S a e .t .C . . .2 Lu . . r. e e a. . . Q, E :4 C C A“ C 3 VJ a... 4‘ e .r. .u n c r. T .2 T. . . .. a C .2 C .C ... 5 .F. T. .... L... . r .l n... i r .: ... 3 A. a. .. .. :...T ....... .. 3.. .. C .. 7.... 3 ......... Ska .1 .. 2“. w.“ ax. .. Lu 3... ~ 2. .3 .. C a. c. .. h. .... c. r .2 2. 2 S 3 \. C. \. S .. ”.v. {H “S ”y. .: . . .. l»... i. ... v. z.“ a: c. .2 ... v. .t a. .... .. . .... c. .a ..‘Q . a . .. \ v... .v a. . .. s..... \.. . .2. .. —. C. T; n L. .. ... a. ‘. L~ a. 4— .2 .r. .f. 4‘ ...n .7. >.. .. 56 For religious reasons, Descartes believes that the light of faith is the source of a knowledge which is, in some sense, superior to that of the natural light. Thus, the Catholic will ”prefer the light of grace to that of nature."38 The term "natural light," then, is sometimes used simply to contrast natural knowledge with that derived from other sources. But the typical, technical use of the term in the Meditations and in the Objections and Replies is as 38To *** (”Hyperaspistes”), Aug., 1691, AT, III. p. H26. Cf. Rules, III, AT, x, p. 371, to ***, Aug., 1638, AT, II, p. 347, to Mersenne, Dec. 31, lBHO, AT, III, p. 27H, Meditations, Summary, AT, IX, p. 11, to Mersenne, Mar. 18, 16ul, AT, III, pp. 33M—35, Re lies, II, AT, IX, p. 116; Search, AT, X, p. 506; HR I, p. 323. The relationship between faith and natural reason troubled Descartes intensely, from the time of the condem— nation of Galileo to the end of his career, as his corre- spondence with Mersenne concerning Le monde testifies. See, especially, to Mersenne, Dec., IBMO, AT, III, p. 259: "Believing very firmly in the infallibility of the Church, but also not doubting my reasons, I cannot fear that one truth is contrary to the other." A later Opinion is this: ". . . we ought to demonstrate that the truths of theology are not opposed to the truths of philosophy, but we ought not to criticize them in any manner. It is thus that the monks have given birth to all the sects and to all the heresies, by their theology, that is, by their scholastic, which ought to be destroyed before anything else. And what need is there of such a great effort, when we see simple persons and rustics able to gain heaven as well as we. . . ." Burman, AT, V, p. 176. If I understand this outburst correctly, it says that (l) the truths of theology do not conflict with those of philos0phy, (2) philosophers should refrain from discussion of theological problems, and (3) faith does not require reason for its support. Such views bring Descartes very close to Pascal. The difficulty comes, of course, when faith and reason both deal with the same subject matter, as they do in connection with the Genesis story. Descartes admits that he does not understand the meaning of Genesis, which r. 3V .a . C T w. E. v. by . _ S a .2 a. .. a . .3 v. _ r. .: ;. . .._ .7. . T. C ._ C . . ... Z :. t :. H. 3 E .2 l. i .: ... C T. S .2 av .r« w“ “u C. ..n x». A. Q. A: a. «b .v A“ ‘. .C I .... . ‘ c. .. s. .1 Q. .t .2 %§ .— .. .c . . a. a. . 4. .C x... .9 t. _ 57 the source of detailed, unquestioned recognition of the causal principle as it applies to God and our ideas. For example, in the first Reply, Descartes relies heavily upon the natural light for a more detailed description of the causal process: the natural light does not tell us that the efficient cause must precede its effect in time But the natural light certainly tells us that there is nothing about which it cannot be asked, why it exists. . . . it is very manifest, by the natural light, that that which can exist by its own force, exists always . . .39 In the replies to Arnauld, Descartes refers to the natural light as the source of our knowledge of certain causal principles. Descartes appears to have taken Arnauld's criticisms seriously, and his replies are careful and detailed. Concerning the claim that God is the cause of himself, Descartes says: the natural light makes us recognize that the thing of which the essence is so immense that it does not have need of an efficient cause for being, does not also have need for one in order to have all the perfections of which it has the ideas, and that its own essence gives it eminently all that which we are able to imagine to be given to other things by the efficient cause. Descartes goes on to describe the causal process in some detail. What is important for our purposes here he finds as difficult to interpret as the Song of Songs or Revelation, and which he tentatively regards as metaphorical. For his curious exegesis see Burman, AT, V, pp. 168-69. 39Replies, I, AT, IX, pp. 86, en. ”OReplies, IV, AT, IX, p. 186. . . . . .C ... V. .. T .. T .f T i 6 _: C T :. F. c. .. i .F. t .. .3 v. ..... .... .: .2 : C C. Y. *L Av A: r. ~m .v A. L... ... I. F” a» a: ..= H .1. «C Y. e .C “u 3 .. .... a. c. ‘. .3 «my I. .v .... ...n .r. 3 C. a ... V .l .2 .3 .2 ...n r. S r .L .. E S . . C .»V Cu pH» . . FA. 4 a J“ . § Q.» ~\~ ..y.. 4. X E S a .. . S C. c. a. O 5 my .5 T. 3 . l H“ a: . . .D I. C. a . v. .2 .g “u my 3% ..i o C .3 C .C e C L“ J. T. a. r. J. .l r. r. .. E ... .5“ .5 C T“ .. .3 H. .r K I. .. ... ... ... v... a. . t .c . v ... 3. C. 5 . . ... .t. .1. n... .9. . . . “I i C 3 C. .. . z A \ .. .~ .C .1" ”v. .”u ..—H mm ”W W? w“. .\u H: W. L. n .» .. f. . ~ . e a v .x» .u. 58 is to notice that the knowledge or recognition which is revealed to us by the natural light is never subjected to the hyperbolic doubt of the Meditations. And its reve— lations are not particularly simple or obvious. I find it much easier to believe that two and three make five, than to believe the complex, detailed description of the causal process in the fourth Reply. But it is the causal principle, and not the arithmetic theorem, which is revealed by the natural light. In particular, the natural light is said to show us precisely those principles which are required to establish the existence and veracity of God. We have seen a number of passages in which Descartes has used the term ”natural light." I think that it will help to make his rather special use of this term clearer if we also consider two passages in which the French and Latin versions differ in their use of the term. Consider this passage from the French edition of Objections and Replies, VII. Descartes seems to say that it has been his aim to "set forth what had occurred earlier to myself, and that which ordinarily occurred to others, letting the natural light be the guide, whether those "”1 Apparently, Descartes is opinions were true or false. saying here that the natural light is the source of "opinions," and that these Opinions can be either true or false. If this is what he actually said, then the "natural ”lReplies, VII, OP, II, p. 983. 59 light" may be the source of uncertain beliefs. Actually, however, this passage occurs in that part of the Objections and Replies which was translated by Clerselier without Descartes' approval and published against his will. The term "natural light" does not appear in the Latin original, which was the only version that Descartes ever saw. On the other hand, the Latin version of the Principles contains this passage: ”. . . we must keep in mind what has been said, that we must trust to the natural light only so long as nothing contrary to it is revealed by God Himself."42 In the French version, however, which Descartes himself extensively revised, this is rephrased, the reference to the natural light is eliminated, and the passage is completely reworked: ”. . . we will be assured, by those of his attributes of which he has wished us to have some recognition, that that which we will have once clearly and distinctly conceived to belong to the nature of these things, has the perfection of being true." What— ever may have been Descartes' motive in rewriting this section, it is clear that he has eliminated all suggestion that the natural light might reveal something contrary to divine revelation and therefore false. I believe that these passages are the only places in the entire corpus of Descartes' work in which it is said uzPrinciples, I, 28, HR, I, p. 231. 7*. b J . . .: ... .: C ... f. T. .... R. C . v. I. xx) .. T \1. .. C .. .r I. T \J .. .v .5 ..Q r. c —. av . . . . .v .9 . g .2 .2 C. a; Ha I. 3.. A; .t .3 .. C (\ ... :. r\ v. v. T E a E (x r .. . . I C 7. . . . . .t .t .: .... S 3 a. .l : . 5 av A: .3 .. I. J. g. .m... A. *. .. .... r. . ‘ Ab 3‘ .3 .n“ r S T. .u T. C T. 3. a. :c .5 5 X A: o.» u ‘ C c: -C ”a u 7 M.“ A: .C a: w .. a » V. 5? A: S t. .1. C C n . . C ... C J. .4 . .n. a . . C C ..w a: .. .. . .. 2.. . 7.. mt .... n... kc... .3 “.w n. 0 .HJ m” w... ....L. W.. ... .. .......u. .Aw ....... r... n . T... 3: \ . .. .. 60 that the natural light might be the source of a possible falsehood. In the Meditations, the Objections and Replies,. and the correspondence related to them, then, the term "natural light“ seems to have the following character— istics: (I) It is a faculty or power which leads to recognition (connaissance) or knowledge in the sense of recognition. (2) As the vis cognoscens, it is a function of the understanding. It contrasts with the vis intelligens, or "power of conceiving," which is another function of the understanding. The natural light recognizes ideas, while the power of conceiving typically forms ideas or concepts, including those which derive ultimately from the senses, as well as those which are innate. (3) More Specifically, it is the power of recog— nizing truth and falsehood. We may thereby obtain "recognition of the truth” (connaissance de la vérité), a phrase which is often repeated in the Discourse and the Meditations.”3 .. (H) Of the truths which are recognized by the natural light, none are more frequently mentioned than a group of causal principles which are used in establishing the existence and veracity of God. ”3Discourse, AT, VI, pp. 27, 30, 67, 70, 78; Meditations, AT, IX, pp. l7, 18, 29, 50. S a. . . v- ‘u-A. 61 Descartes seems to have found, in the faculty or power which he calls the ”natural light," a source of knowledge which will meet the arguments of the sceptics. The knowledge that comes through rec0gnizing by the natural light does not require some further justification. It functions as an ultimate source of our recognition of the truth.LW Ur”I understand that a discussion of the natural light which is similar to that developed in this chapter appears in Anthony Kenny, Descartes: a study of his philosoPhy (New York: Random House, 1968). CHAPTER V THE POLEMICAL ARGUMENTS We will want to ask whether Descartes really succeeded in the job of refuting the sceptics. As we will see, some of his critics have maintained that he argued in a vicious circle, and that he did not therefore have an effective reply to a determined sceptic. I want to return to this question in more detail in a later discussion of the so—called "Cartesian circle." For the present, I want to continue to trace the use of the term "natural light" from the time of the Meditations to the final, puzzling doctrine of the Principles, and then to suggest several polemic purposes that the doctrine serves. As we turn now to the Principles, we find that Descartes, even more eXplicitly than in the Meditations, maintains that the demonstrations of mathematics may be called into doubt: Why one may also doubt the demonstrations of mathematics. We will also doubt all the other things which have previously seemed to us to be very certain, even the demonstrations of mathematics and its principles, even though in themselves they are quite manifest, because there are men who do not deign to reason about such matters; but principally because we have heard it said that God, who has created us, can do every— thing that he wishes, and that we still do not know 62 63 if perhaps he has not wanted to make us such that we are always deceived, even in the things which we think that we recognize best; for, since he might have permitted us to be deceived sometimes, as has already been noted, why could he not permit us to be deceived always? 1 If the principles of mathematics are open to doubt, are the principles of causality also open to doubt? If we can be deceived about the things that we think we know best, can we also be deceived about the revelations of the natural light? Is the natural light also subject to the distortions of the machinations of an evil genius? Unfortunately, yes. Or yes and no. The Principles do not seem to give a consistent answer to these questions. On the one hand, in the Principle which follows the one we have just seen, we are assured: That we have a free will such that we can abstain from believing doubtful things, and thus keep our- selves from being deceived. But while he who has created us is all—powerful, and even though he might take pleasure in deceiving us, we nevertheless experience in ourselves a freedom which is such that, every time that we want to, we can abstain from believing the things which we do not recognize in the prOper manner [bien, well], and thus keep ourselves from every being deceived.2 On the other hand, we may be deceived in those matters that we believe ourselves to know best. If this is the case, then there is no way whatever to avoid the possibility of deception. Or, rather, we can avoid deception if and only if we refrain from giving our assent lPrinciples, I, 5, AT, IX2, pp. 26-27. 2Principles, I, 6, AT, 1X2, p. 27. r p \ .q 7"“- 0...... ~72 ..-~.‘ - “Fe oi»; 4 a T. V U s n- '3 u J..." ‘1». bV ¢ ‘ .—~ L» o. .m. r» —\s w. L» . m~¢ . ‘ .... . u. .. .r. i t .. .. . s . 3.: :m .. r .: . . 3: v. .3 :. . V E ... S . .7 . . C :. .. E .7. ..... .C C a. ... m. .C T v. C :. t a. :. .-. .. .. .. a. .l 3 r. C n. E . . T. 3. C. 7. C .3 .C E .L 3R E ...n a i : . F“ .H.. ... Q. wk. L.“ .—u \w. w.“ u.‘ A» s, ‘ a» E rm .3 E .. C .. . . ... . . I :. E .1.. . . .u C S .c .4 E ..l. a. 2. . . .7. : . . . a. .. . a. E 2. .u »» .... . . A. an. 2‘ .t v . .: .Yvu Z . .. g Lu #3 .a. a. ‘. H. n! ‘ ~ ‘5. V. S: 64 to any matter whatever. But this is scepticism pure and simple, precisely the position which Descartes is attempting to undermine. Since it is not at all likely that Descartes is attempting to justify a kind of ultimate scepticism here, we will have to re—read these passages with some care, to find out what he is trying to do.3 In the first passage, we have heard that we can be deceived even about the things which we think that we know best, including the demonstrations of mathematics. In the second, we should believe only the things that we recognize in the right way. Apparently, then, an all—powerful God could no: deceive us about the things that we recognize in the proper way. If this is so, then the word "think" in "think that we know" would have the meaning of ”only think," "believe imprOperly." Thus, the first passage would mean that we would have to say that God might deceive us about those things that we think (incorrectly) that we know, but which we do not recognize or know prOperly (i.e. with knowledge of God's veracity). These would include mathe— matical demonstrations, but they would not include the revelations of the natural light, such as the causal principles.L+ 3On Descartes' anti-sceptical motives, see, e.g., Re lies, VII, AT, VII, pp. sun—50. See also POpkin, History of Scepticism, ch. 9. uCf. the fifth Meditation: "Will someone say to me that previously I have held many things as true and : I .. x ; ...__. : _: a. a p. .. a i ;. .5 3 AV A—v qH. A Y. ~5 Q C. . a» ‘. r. C» A .F. v r A ,o by —. o , fl“ Y. a \ ¢ ‘ ‘ 0—‘ hi ~ ‘ . . L. r. . . w. .c C . . .c z. .. ... .3 .c L. .. :. ... T Mo. ..,. .... S C .2 p. . . .. L i E . CW 5 V. .7. .:C . f: A: ”l C.» 0 My... « r Kly a pa. .5“ .fi. .* .‘ w. ‘. .~.. G» n. ~.u m. L . A& In AV L t .1 I +. a” . .... ... .. .. .T.. In. . C .3 :e C. t 3 fly . . \.. ~\~ C.» n. r‘ :t A.» «My v “a A “.6 C» cw ..... Na .3 2.. c . .... Ln Lu 2. 3 N . .C... r. ...v . I. a f . A .C ..L. .5...” .Wu FA‘ 4“! P “ A Y . 65 I think that the text of the Principles can be interpreted in this way, at this point, but such an inter- pretation is plausible only if we know that Descartes was not advocating scepticism. I am unable, however, to offer any interpretation of the following passage in the Principles which will avoid the possibility of a sceptical outcome: And that as a consequence everything is true which we recognize clearly to be true, and this delivers us from the doubts which were proposed above. From which it follows that the faculty of recog— nizing which he has given us, which we call natural light, never perceives any object which is not true in so far as it perceives it, that is, in so far as it clearly and distinctly recognizes it; because we might otherwise believe that God was a deceiver, if he had given it to us such that we took the false for the true when we used it correctly. . . . The argument has gone something like this, both in the Meditations and in the Principles: The natural light shows me that the more perfect cannot come from the less perfect. I have an idea of a perfect God, and I know that I, and my ideas, exist. Such an idea could come only from a perfect being, and therefore such a being exists. By the natural light, error and deception cannot come from a perfect being. Therefore error and deception do not come from God. The natural light is given to us by God. And certain, which I have afterward recognized to be false? But I have not recognized clearly or distinctly any of those things . . ." Meditations, V, AT, IX, p. 56; Cf. Re lies, v, u, u, AT, VII, pp. §78—79; Replies, VII, 2, ng‘VTT, pp. u72—73. 5Principles, I, 30, AT, 1x2, p. 38. "Perceives" here translates apercoit. LL: ox — a :: .5. . .I _ . x. a” 4: L. 4. ‘e .. .L S w. .x t: C t .4 4.. 3: E r a. E C C . . . :4 T. T. :. :4 . .5 .1 .4 .2 i .4 .. c S T. .3 a. I. . I. C» .n.. C. v. *L Pd 4.. by ‘e ‘4. Va . : I .4 .2 S E r. .L .4 :4 .4 t 4: L... T. c . S S a C .c a. kw 4.: :x I. ‘L O A4 T a .4 e r. E .l .i .7. .C 4.. . i S S t r .i C C .4 .C I e C. .. .. 4.. E :4 X. S E .l a r .C + . .c r. Lu J. A. .G CO .» A: 6 ha Au ‘nu .. ... a :4 C E S .. . e . a C : x a . .5 5 a” e TV. 2 4“ : . .. . 9 . . .2 E E r. .C 4: .Q .1... .: I. v; :4 :4 ..,.. r a. at 2e T. .C r.“ L“ r. s. a . x V n. .. .. .L :‘ av cc .. .. a. .. ~ .. . . ”A a: 5: . a A: A: “L. . a «y hm L... \. n .y 66 therefore the natural light, or the faculty of recognizing, can never disclose to us anything which is not true, because God would otherwise be a deceiver. And therefore we are assured that the causal principles are true. But let us assume that our faculty of recognizing, or natural light, is faulty, in such a way that we sometimes take the false for the true, even when we use it correctly. In particular, let us assume that Descartes is mistaken when he thinks that he recognizes the truth of the causal principles. Then it may be that Descartes' idea of a perfect being does not require a perfect being as its cause. It is therefore possible to assume that there is no true God, and that all our supposed knowledge is the work of an evil genius. There is nothing left of the primary meta— physical argument of the Meditations. But we can scarcely leave Descartes at this point. It seems to me that the Principles were altogether a careless and hasty piece of work, and that Descartes gave no more thought to the details of his argument here than he did to the implausible and incoherent laws of motion in the third part of that work. (We will discuss those "eternal truths" and ”moral certainties" in later sections.) If Descartes' argument is not to lead to a disastrous scepticism, then there must be some criterion which does not require a further criterion for its support. If we can exclude the single passage from the Principles E “4 E 4: I T. .l o . a .4“ Tu '.,.-¢- —‘ n-‘b 4.. C A: .,.. .2 C. ~v C. 4: a. . a . .n. 4.. 3 .3 A» $ . :‘ h .5.- ~.. 7. E 2. a... S .u. ... \. A: 7. 0“ Cu 3 * Q» «\y :\ A \ 67 which seems to indicate that we can be mistaken even when we use our natural light correctly, then this faculty would seem to be exempt from doubt. But a faculty is not a criterion. We must know what it means to use this faculty “correctly" or "well." Descartes is far from clear in his explanation of what it means to use the understanding "correctly." His arguments sometimes seem to rely on the polemical claim that his Opponents do not really doubt what they pretend to doubt. On the other hand, one or two lines of attack seem to have more than merely polemical value. It seems to me that there are four principal ways in which Descartes has attempted to locate an area of certainty, which the sceptic cannot or will not doubt. (l) The first two ways are related. Essentially, they are not so much attempts to locate a positive ground of certainty, but arguments to show that criticism has no ground to stand on. The first of these is directed against the atheist. It says something like this: We know that an effect cannot have more perfection than its cause. But the atheist claims that the cause of his existence is not God. Therefore, the cause of his existence is something less than infinite perfection. To the extent that his cause is imperfect, to that extent the atheist's reasoning may be imperfect. C. ‘5‘ q I ,— o ._..uuA- A_AF“‘"“ . omz‘ ..u. . e.g.. 4—v ... .4“ .7. v. .. a» w“ w“ .i. ..h av a“ 3..“ 4.. .1 a» :FAQ-‘FAV‘ “NV-.611- ~Au.~._ ‘V‘~ 5 in in L“ .4 L y 68 Descartes states this argument as follows: And if we want to pretend that an all— powerful God is not the author of our being, and that we subsist by ourselves or by some other means, of which we will suppose the author less powerful, we will always have so much the more reason for believing that we are not so perfect that we could not be continually deceived. Thus an atheist is unable to avoid the suspicion that he may be deceived. In the second Reply, Descartes says that an atheist can know nothing with certainty, . because every form of knowledge which can be rendered doubtful ought not to be called science; and since he is supposed to be an atheist, he cannot be certain of not being deceived in the things which seem to him to be very evident, as I have already shown above; and even though that doubt does not ever come into his thoughts, it can nevertheless come into them if he examines them, oF_If it is proposed to him by another, and he will never be out of the dan er of doubt, if he does not first recognize a God. A letter to Regius emphasizes this position: You say in the second objection that "the truth of axioms that are understood clearly and distinctly is manifest in itself." I agree also, for all the time that they are clearly and distinctly comprehended, because our soul is of such a nature that it cannot refuse to agree to that which it comprehends distinctly; but because we often remember conclusions which we have derived from such premisses, without paying attention to the premisses themselves, I say that then, without the knowledge of God, we can pretend that they are uncertain, even though we remember that we have derived them from principles that are clear. Actually, our nature is such that we are deceived in these things which are most evident, and as a conse- quence that we do not have a true science, but a simple 6Principles, I, 5, AT, 1x2, p. 27. 7 Replies, II, AT, IX, p. 111. 69 persuasion, even at the moment when we have derived them from these principles, I use this to make a distinction between persuasion and science. This is rather an important text in opposition to the claim, advanced by Willis Doney and others, that Descartes held that only memory was subject to the deceptions of the evil genius.9 Plainly, here, he is saying that it is not only memory but also "those things which are most evident" which are subject to deception. For our present purposes, however, it is important to notice that the form of these arguments is polemical. If someone attempts to maintain an atheistic position, Descartes is saying, then he will be able to know nothing with certainty. Such an argument as this will not affect an agnostic sceptic, who might well be willing to consider all knowledge as doubtful.lO (2) A second argument against scepticism is also polemical in form. It says that the sceptic must assume the truth of certain principles if the sceptical position is to carry any weight. If the truth of these principles 8T0 Regius, May 2A, lane, AT, III, pp. eu—ss. 9Doney's position is considered in the chapter on the Cartesian circle. 10For further discussion of the position of the atheist, cf. Replies, II, AT, IX, p. 110; Re lies, III, AT, IX, p. 152, Meditations, v, AT, IX, ppf‘gsfssg Discourse, IV, AT, VI, pp. 38-39; Meditations, I, AT, IX, pp. 16-17; Replies, VI, H, AT, IX, p. 230. can u..- ai 70 may be assumed, then the Cartesian argument for the existence of God will hold. This, I think, is the purpose of a passage in the Meditations to which I have already referred. Speaking of natural light, Descartes contends that: I do not have any other faculty, or power, in me for distinguishing the true from the false, which would be able to teach me that what that light showed me as true was not true, and in which I could trust more than in it.ll In other words, if the natural light could be called into doubt, then there would be nothing in which anyone, even the sceptic, could trust. Again, in the seventh set of Replies, Descartes points out that the sceptics do have a practical belief in some things: all those who are sceptics today do not doubt, when it comes to practice, that they have a head, and that two joined with three makes five, and similar things; but they say only that they make use of them as if they were true things, because they seem to them to be true; but that they do not believe them to be certainly true, because they are not completely persuaded and convinced by certain and invincible reasons.l2 Even the sceptic, then, requires a kind of practical, everyday knowledge. Descartes' argument against such sceptics is most clearly stated in the second set of Replies: llMeditations, III, AT, IX, p. 30. l2Objections and Replies, VII, AT, VII, p. 5V9. [ID .H.‘ fl) (ID ‘1 * u 71 But, among these things [which the mind conceives clearly and distinctly], there are some which are so clear and at the same time so simple, that it is impossible for us to think of them without believing them to be true: for example, that I exist whenever I think; that things which have once been done cannot not have been done, and other similar things, of which it is manifest that one has a perfect certainty. For we cannot doubt those things without thinking of them, but we cannot ever think of them without believing that they are true, as I have just said; therefore, we cannot doubt them without believing that they are true; that is, we cannot ever doubt them. A hardened sceptic, I think, might be able to with- stand this argument, if he is willing to claim that even these apparent truisms can be doubted. Such a sceptic might wish to claim that human reason is so fallible that the most obvious tautologies can be false. By forcing the sceptic to this extreme position, Descartes might score a polemical point, but he would not have proved the ultimate sceptic wrong. (3) In accusing Descartes of arguing in a vicious circle, many of his critics seem to have misunderstood another of his arguments against the sceptical position. Laporte finds Descartes using the following method to escape from the accusation of circularity in the theory Of knowledge: But nature does not justify these first Precepts, which she gives us, because she could be deceptive. Their justification "depends" upon the \— 1 13122928., 11. 1+. M“. Ix, p. 11L», cf. Replies, v11, 3 AT, VII, p. H64; Burman, AT, V, p. lus. 72 idea that we have of the human understanding and of its functioning. If that idea itself cannot be obtained except at the price of a "diligent," "industrious,” and "exact" investigation, aren't we turning in a circle?-—Descartes certainly saw the circle, and indicates to us the means of getting out of it. He invites us to form certain conceptions about what, in us or in the object, concerns the recognition of things, without bothering ourselves for the moment to find out if they correspond to the reality: it is enough that these "assumptions" are useful to his design. Thus the method, taken all together, and with all that it requires, can be proposed at first, but solely as a hypothesis: the hypothesis will then be legitimated by its success, that is, by the same truths which it serves to discover and to demonstrate.lL+ Laporte's discussion here is based primarily upon the eighth and twelfth Rules. As Beck has shown in detail, many of the methods described in the Rules are used in the metaphysical arguments of the Meditations.ls It may be, then, that the hypothetical method, which Laporte describes, is also used in the Meditations. In particular, it may be that the various causal principles are recognized as true by the natural light. These serve to prgye that God exists, and that he is not a deceiver. Knowing this, we are able to eXElain why the causal principles are indubitable, which indeed they are, for Descartes. The existence and veracity Of God, then, do not prove that the revelations of the natural light are true, but, knowing them, we understand HEX theyare true. The atheist may have lingering doubts \ P 1L‘Jean Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: £93868 Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 2-3. THerein— a ter referred to as Rationalisme.) 15L. J. Beck, The method of Descartes, ch. 18. (7' x a»... . ufih‘ ..- .. 11.. Re- ii "A V\ v. 73 about the foundations of his knowledge. He cannot escape the suspicion that he is the victim of continuous deception. But the believer knows why his beliefs are true. Such a move as this will not be much of a defense against a hardened sceptic. In the Discourse, Descartes was able to escape from the accusation of circularity by pointing out that some things~—the observed results of experiments—-were accepted as given. These known results could be shown to be entailed by a set of general principles or laws, which are assumed as hypotheses. Since the obser- vational data can be inferred from the laws, the laws are thereby confirmed. In the metaphysical derivations, however, the causal principles cannot be taken simply as hypotheses. They must be known to be true. We cannot take their consequences as known, because it is precisely these consequences that we are attempting to validate——namely, the existence and veracity of God, the existence of the external world, and the validity or truth of our clear and distinct conceptions. To avoid a circular argument in the igfififlfigigns, then, we cannot take the consequences as given, Rather, it is our first principles which must be given. But I think that a hardened sceptic might well Claim‘that he doubts these first principles, and if he can do 30, then the proof fails. What is required, then, is a Set of first principles which cannot be doubted. 7n (4) Descartes' metaphysical method might better be described as one in which universal doubt is assumed hypothetically, rather than hypothetical first principles or laws. Laporte characterizes this ”provisional doubt" or "methodic doubt” as follows: This doubt is surely the first fruit Of the method, because it is the application of the first rule, prescribing that nothing must be "received for true" except that which can "never be called into doubt," thus to "reject" everything which can be, for any reason whatever, doubted; then, moreover, in order to motivate this, it was necessary to examine in order the diverse "foundations" of our cognitions, according to the procedures of "division" and of "enumeration" prescribed by the second and the fourth Rules. But this radical and universal doubt is not limited,like the enoXe of Husserl, to a suspension Of judgment: it goes so far as to ”deny" all the Opinions previously taken as true. It is comprised Of two moments: first, "to doubt all the things where we find the least suspicion Of uncertainty,” second, "to consider as false all those where we can imagine the least doubt."16 Descartes describes his initial rejection of PPEVious beliefs as follows: ”I thought that it would be necessary tO reject as absolutely false everything in Vhich I could imagine the least doubt,” "It will be enougkl‘bo reject all, if I can find in any some reason to doubt,nl7 \ I 16Laporte, Rationalisme, p. lH. Cf. Husserl, .JEEEE. sec. 32; Principles, I, l-2, AT, 1x2, p. 25. AT 17Discourse, IV: AT, VI, p. 31; Meditations, I, t 2 IX, p. l”. Discartes does not always acknowledge hls positive rejection of all doubtful Opinions. In the ;. 75 In the seventh set Of Replies, Descartes compares his procedure to that Of someone who wishes to eliminate the rotten apples from a basket full Of them. One of the best ways Of doing this will be to empty the basket, and then to place only the sound ones back in it.18 The method Of the Meditations, then, resembles that Of the Rules and Discourse in that we take an initial hypothesis and then attempt to derive its consequences. From these consequences, we can determine the truth Of the initial hypothesis. We take, then, as an initial hypothesis, the extreme claim of the sceptic, that all our beliefs are false. From the hypothesis, "I am doubting," we are able to derive "I am." From ”I am doubting that I am,” we can similarly derive ”I am." There is therefore something which I cannot doubt, namely my own existence, since to doubt my existence entails my existence. This suffices to refute the initial sceptical hypothesis, because it shows that there is something which is known with certainty. \ Replies to Bourdin, he claims that some truths are retained, JJKflJMiing those that are clear and distinct. The others are not, he says, rejected as false, but are simply taken :5 dSUhWTUI. Cf. Replies, VII, passim., e.g., AT: VII: p' 80—61. th, . l8Replies, VII, AT, VII, p. 481. Alquié finds that thls 18 a poor analogy. The cogito is a conclusion from e Process Of doubt itself. ”It is therefore a new truth, and 0f another order." OP, II, p. 982. 76 But this leaves us with a form of scepticism which is hardly more attractive than the ultimate scepticism with which we began. It is a kind of solipsism in which I regard all things, other than my own present thoughts, as false. We therefore require some additional truths, which must be known with certainty, if we are to escape from scepticism. CHAPTER VI THE COMMON MOTIONS From the first to the last, Descartes maintains a class Of Objects and prOpositions which are known with certainty. In the Rules, they are called ”simple” things, and in the Principles, ”simple notions" or "first things,” which are "Objects of our conceptions.”l Of these simple things or Objects, I want to single out for particular attention those which he calls "common notions." These are the truths, revealed to us by the natural light, which are immune tO the doubts of the sceptic, and which therefore may serve as what Descartes calls the "axioms” Of his system.2 The expression "common notions" is a distinctively StOlC term, KOIVQI svv01a1.3 \ lRules, XII, AT, x, p. ulg, Principles, I, u7—u8, AT: 1X2, pp. HH—HS. 2Replies, II, AT, IX, p. I27. 3Cf. Gerard Watson, The Stoic theory Of knowledge (Balfast: The Queen's University, 1966), pp. 24-25. Watson finds this expression in Diogenes Laertius and SeXtuS Empiricus. The question Of Descartes' relation to the Stoics has been treated before, generally in terms Of his ethics. See, e.g., Antoinette Virieux—Reymond, La logique et 77 78 l'epistémologie des Stoiciens (Chambery: Editions "Lire", 195077, p. 291: "The Stoic elements were integrated [in the system Of Descartes] in an original synthesis, where the essential theses of Christian metaphysics are found. Descartes can be considered as the termination Of neO— Stoicism, which is far from being Stoicism properly speaking." Commenting on the Cartesian ideal Of self- develOpment and the ”provisional morality" Of the Discourse (sec. III), the author continues: ”This same [StoicT influence is not less visible in the Cartesian theory Of cognition, as Serrus justly remarks, the Cartesian theory Of error rests upon a Stoic doctrine.ZUVKaI&66015, clearly has a connection with the ”will” Of Descartes. @avraOIa for the Stoics, as for Descartes, is clear or obscure in itself (in the first case, it is davtaofa KaIaAsNTIKs), But it is that only in itself, and it is necessary for the mind to give its assent to it.” Some further parallels in the theory of knowledge are noted, but there is no direct evidence that Descartes was familiar with any Of the Greek Stoics. Alquié points out that, in the Discourse, it was the Stoic virtues that he was condemning when he declared that some moral principles were no more than "insensibility, pride, deSpair, or parricide." Discourse, I, AT, VI, p. 8; cf. Laporte, Rationalisme, p. MHO. Laporte cites Descartes' correspondence with Balzac, in 1627—28, now lost, in which Descartes prOposed certain anti—Stoic theses. Also note Zeno's admission that not even cannibalism, incest, or homosexuality are wrong in them— selves. Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Fragp, I, pp. 59-60, cited in Frederick Copleston, A history of philOSOphy (8 vols.; Garden City, N. Y.: Image BOOks, l9u6—63), vol. I, pt. 2, p. luO. I am unable to find any major points Of resemblance, other than the use Of the term ”common notions," between Descartes' writings and the logic described in Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University Of California Press, 1953). This suggests that Descartes did not read, at least not with any sympathy, the Greek sources that Mates cites. Descartes would have been familiar with Seneca and Zeno, whom he discusses in his correspondence with Elisabeth, July 21 to Aug. 18, l6u5. Laporte suggests that he might be reproducing Epictetus or Seneca when he urges us tO limit our desires to ”those things which depend on us," in the Discourse. Laporte continues, "As for the 'things which do not depend on us,‘ the counsel Of the Stoics in regard to them, as\ we know, is to remove them from our desires: avexofi Kat anexofi, and this is approximately the counsel Of Descartes." (The Stoic advice might be roughly translated: "Tune in, drOp out.") Laporte, Rationalisme, p. #39. 79 The expression "common notions” plays a very prominent role in the work Of Herbert Of Cherbury, a contemporary Of Descartes. Cherbury's major work, De Veritate, was published in Paris in 162”, before most Of Descartes' work was written. Descartes says that he read the work in Latin, about 1638, and he seems to have leafed through the first half—dozen pages Of a French translation, probably by Mersenne, in 1639.L‘L ””1 have not yet received the bOOk De veritate; but I read it in Latin, more than a year ago, and I wrote what I thought about it then to M. Eding, who had‘sent it tO me." TO Mersenne, June 19, 1639, AT, II, p. 566. The letter to Eding may be that Of Aug., 1638?, AT, II, pp. ans—us, but it is more likely that this letter has been lost. Cf. AT, II, pp. 6u7—u9, OP, II, p. 80. Two Latin editions were published: Paris, 1624, and London, 1633, these were followed by a French edition, n. p., 1639. There is an English translation: Edward ’ Herbert, Baron Of Cherbury, De veritate, Meyrick H. Carre, tr. (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1937). Descartes' remarks, in his letter to Mersenne Of Oct. 16, 1639, clearly refer to passages in the first few pages (pp. 75, 77, 78—79, and 81 Of the English version). Descartes did not borrow the term ”common notions'l from Cherbury, because he uses it in his own Rules, some ten years before he read De veritate. Rules, XI, AT, X, p. ”19. A more likely source Of the term would be ’ Cherbury's own source, the writings of Cicero. See Carre's introduction to De veritate, p. 42. The quotations that Carré gives, however make it clear that Cicero's common notions are quite unlike Descartes': "Omnium consensus est naturae vox” and ”Nulla gens tem fera, nemO omnium tam sit immani cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum Opinio." Tusc. Disp. 1. 13, 30, 35. On the other hand, because nearly all of Descartes' references to "common notions” appear after his reading Of De veritate, we may assume that Descartes' use Of the term could have been affected by that Of Cherbury. But: "I have certainly noticed that M. Herbert takes many things for common notions which are not; and it is certain that one ought to receive as a notion only what cannot be denied by anyone." TO Mersenne, Dec. 25, 1639, AT, II, p. 629. 80 As Descartes makes clear in his letter tO Mersenne, he understands "common notions“ very differently from Cherbury. He is quite unwilling to accept universal consent as a rule of truth. Although the natural light is available to all men, only a few know how to use it cor— rectly. Thus the common notions are "common" only in the sense that they are available tO all persons. Cherbury, on the other hand, believes that consent is actually universal, at least among rational and civilized adult persons.5 Nevertheless, Descartes does agree with Cherbury that there must be some source Of knowledge which is independent Of experience, and that the content Of this knowledge is available to all. In this, they both appear tO be quite different from the classical Greek Stoics, who saw the common notions as "an idea-forming hexis" which works upon the presentations of the senses, which are built up from individual presentations into general images. What are the "common notions" for Descartes? I want to show that what Descartes calls ”common notions" are the simple connectives between simple ideas or concepts, which can function as undoubted and undoubtable principles in his metaphysics. Connecting ideas together, 5Cf. Discourse, II, AT, VI, p. 16. 6Cf. Watson, Stoic Theory Of Knowledge, p. 2H. 81 they are somewhat like the axioms in a system Of formal logic. Descartes rejected the Scholastic logic, based upon the syllogism, as sterile, useful at best as a rhetorical device, but incapable of adding to our knowl— edge.7 Against this futile system, he prOposed another form Of logic, based upon the very successful results that he had Obtained in algebra and geometry. Beginning with simple ideas, which were intuitively clear, this method proceeded on a step—by-step basis, in which each step was "seen” or "intuited" to follow from those which preceded it. This immediate intuition of the necessity of each step was, ultimately, the source by which it was validated. Nevertheless, certain generalizations could be advanced concerning these steps. They were no substitute for the immediate intuitions. Descartes did not want to fall into the error Of the Scholastics, who established sophistries by appealing tO plausible—sounding rules: . I was alert to the fact that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority Of its other instruc— tions serve rather to explain to another person the things that one already knows, or even, like the art Of Lull, to Speak, without judgment, about the things that one does not know, rather than for learning any— thing.8 7Rules, x, AT, x, pp. noseuoe, Rules, XIV, AT, X, p. HMO, Principles, Preface, AT, IX2, pp. lB—lH; Search, AT, X, p. 521, cf. OP, II, p. 1027. 8Discourse, II, AT, VI, p. 17. In describing the logic Of Descartes, Alquie notes that in order for the conclusion to be true, actually, it is not enough that the 82 There is never a complete list of the common notions. Descartes is not like either the traditional logician or the modern logician who gives a complete list Of valid forms and a mechanical method for determining the acceptibility Of an inference or formula. Descartes explains the expression ”common notions" in the twelfth Rule. In relation to our intellect, he tells us,certain things are "simple." These are of four reasoning to be formally correct. It is also necessary that the premisses be materially true. OP, I. p. 130. It is curious to see the rejection Of Lull coupled with the rejection of the syllogism. Lull himself had turned from the Scholastic logic to what he called a material logic. By forming combinations of selected terms, the Lullian could exhibit possible prOpositions and determine their material truth for himself. Cf. Armand Llinares, Raymond Lulle: philosophe de l'action (Paris: Presses UniverSTtaires de France, 1963), p. 220. Descartes' rejection Of the formal logic of the Schools, like Lull's, seems to have been motivated by the apparent fact that it was less than helpful in reasoning. If an argument fitted the formal pattern and was valid, its validity could be seen intuitively. If it was not intuitively clear, how- ever, adherence tO the formal rules would not guarantee that it was valid. Cf. Laporte, Rationalisme, pp. 22—23. This is one point at which Descartes agrees with the Stoic logicians: "One should Observe that there is a dialectical theorem handed down for the analysis Of syllogisms, namely, 'Whenever we have premisses which yield a conclusion, we have in effect also this conclusion among the premisses, even if it is not explicitly stated.'" Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. VIII, 223, quoted by Mates, Stoic Logic, p. 1027 One Of the Stoic examples Of logical fallacy that Mates reproduces may help to clarify Descartes' position: Whatever you say goes through your mouth. You say wagon. Therefore a wagon goes through your mouth. An argument like this is clearly fallacious, even though it seems to fit the traditional forms. A person who applied the tra- ditional forms for the syllogism would be more likely to be taken in by this fallacy than the person who had no training at all in logic, and who simply relied on his native intuition. 83 kinds. The first kind is purely intellectual, and includes thinking, doubt, ignorance, volition, and so on. The second kind is purely material and includes figure, extension, motion, and so on. The third kind includes those things which can be either mental or material, such as existence, unity, duration, and so on. Finally, the "common notions" are like certain chains joining other simple natures together, and on the basis Of which rests whatever we conclude by reasoning, as for example: that those things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other, or that things which cannot be related tO the same third thing have some difference between them, and so forth.9 The common notions, then, are simple entities which serve to link other simple entities together. They seem to correspond to the axioms in a logical system, since "whatever we conclude by reasoning" is based upon them. And, as Descartes soon points out, these simple natures are all self—evident, and never contain any falsity. This is easily demon— strated if we distinguish that faculty Of the intellect by means Of which it intuits and recognizes Objects from that by which it judges by affirming or denying, for it could happen that we think we are ignorant of those things which we really know, as when we suspect that they contain something unknown to us beyond that which we intuit, or which we learn by thought, and when this suspicion of ours is false. For this reason it is evident that we err if we think that the whole Of one Of these simple natures is not known to us, for if we can conceive it in the very slightest degree, which is certainly necessary since we are supposed to have made some judgment about it, it must, for this very reason, be concluded that we know it all, for 9Rules, XII, AT, X, pp. ulg—20. 8H otherwise it could not be said to be simple, but com- posed Of that which we perceive in it and Of that which we judge we do not know.:LO It is important to see that the common notions are among the simple entities which are intuited and recognized by the intellect, and which are known perfectly if they are known at all. We thus do not seem to have the freedom tO deny them. We simply recognize the common notions. Writing to Mersenne in 1638, Descartes describes the method by which we may come to recognize a common notion: I do not know any other method for judging the notions which can be taken for principles, if not that it is necessary to prepare the mind, in getting rid Of all the Opinions with which one is preoccupied, and rejecting as doubtful all that can be doubtful. It is certainly a common notion to think that, if an intel— ligent nature is independent, it is God This passage is important in seeing how Descartes avoids circularity in determining the criterion of truth. When we have rejected all doubtful Opinions, our mind is prepared to recognize the common notions. There is a passage in the Meditations which appears to correSpond to the passage in the Rules which charac— terizes the common notions. The analysis, however, is somewhat different: 10Rules, XII, AT, X, pp. u2o—2l. Cf. the very similar analySIs Of Aristotle's De anima: "The thinking then Of the simple Objects Of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of Objects Of thought in a quasi-unity." Aristotle De anima III. 6. 430a26—28. (McKeon, ed.) llTO Mersenne, Nov. 15, 1638, AT, II, p. H75. 85 . I must define precisely what I properly understand when I say that nature teaches me something. For I take nature here in a more restricted signif- ication than when I call it an assemblage or a complex Of all the things which God has given me. Inasmuch as that assemblage or complex includes many things which belong to the mind alone, of which I do not intend to speak here; as, for example, my notion Of the truth that what has once been done cannot be undone, and an infinite number of others similar to this, which I recognize by the natural light, without the aid Of the body; and inasmuch as that assemblage includes many others also which belong only to the body alone, and are not here included under the name of nature, like the quality that a thing has to be heavy, and many others which are similar, Of which I do not Speak either, but only those things which God has given me, as a being which is composed Of mind and body.12 Here the common notion, "What has been done cannot be undone,” is assigned “to the mind alone." The meaning here is puzzling, because the object Of that notion, ”What ' sure is not limited to mental events. As has been done,‘ the next phrase indicates, Descartes seems to want tO say that we recognize the truth of this notion "without the aid Of the body," by means Of the natural light. According tO the earlier scheme Of the Rules, we recognize the truth Of common notions immediately, by the vis cognoscens or natural light alone, without judgment, and thus without the aid of the will. Now, according to the new analysis Of the Meditations, the common notions are recognized by the mind alone. We thus have the natural light as a faculty or power Of the pure understanding, one function of which is to recognize certain common notions. lZMeditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 65. 86 Neither the will nor the other faculties—-sensation, imag- ination, memory-—enter in, and thus there is no possibility Of error due to the interference Of body. A proof, in the style of geometric proofs, Of the existence Of God is appended to the second set Of Objections and Replies. Here, the "Axioms, or Common Notions" are ten postulates which are used in subsequent proofs of the existence Of God and the distinction between mind and body. The common notions listed here include the causal principles, together with postulates concerning time, the will, and the nature Of ideas or concepts.13 In the letter to Clerselier which replies to criticisms Of Gassendi and forms part Of the French edition Of the Objections and Replies, Descartes produces still another reason for exempting the common notions from hyper- bolic doubt. They are not prejudices. The will has never had the Opportunity tO pronounce upon them, because they have been immediately recognized as true: the word prejudice does not extend to all the notions which are in our mind, and I admit that it is impossible to discard all Of them, but only to all the Opinions which the judgments that we have previ— ously made have left in our belief; and, because it is an action Of the will to judge or not to judge, as I have explained in its proper place, it is evident that it is in our power; for finally, to rid oneself Of all sorts Of prejudices, no other thing is necessary but to resolve to affirm or deny nothing Of all that one has affirmed or denied previously, except after having examined it anew, so that one will not retain by that all the same notions in one's memory. l3Objections and Replies, II, AT, IX, pp. 127-28. 87 when I say, "I think, therefore I am," the author Of the Instances [Gassendi] believes that I suppose this major: ”He who thinks is," and thus that I have already espoused a prejudice. In this he is misusing again the word "prejudice": for, even though one can give that name to the proposition when one considers it without attention, and when one believes that it is true simply because one remembers having judged in this way before, one cannot say then that it is a prejudice when one examines it, because it appears so evident to the understanding that he cannot be prevented from believing it, even though that is perhaps the first time in his life that he thinks about it,land so as a consequence he has no prejudice about it. L+ There are some notions, then, which are so evident that we recognize their truth at once. It seems to me that the most important Of the common notions are those which play a role in the proofs of the third Meditation, and which I have called the "causal principles." For the purposes Of eXposition, it :is convenient to refer to all these principles as different “Eiys Of expressing a single common notion, "Nothing comes .frnom nothing.” In this simple form, it appears in many Of tTle:classic philOSOphers.ls 11+Objections and Replies, V, AT, IX, pp. 203-04. 15Aristotle's discussion and use Of this principle a1T‘every similar to those of Descartes: "The theory Of rlaxagoras that the principles are infinite in multitude was probably due to his acceptance Of the common Opinion (Df- the physicists that nothing comes into being from not— eiiing." Aristotle Physics i. H. l87a28—29 (McKeon, .). Descartes regularly uses nullus for "nothing" W1:}enhe is writing in Latin. In French, however, he uses TNEant, which derives from nec entem, and would perhaps ENJggest "non-being." This would bring it close tO 88 In Descartes' usage, the clearest expression Of this simple form is in the claim that an effect cannot have more perfection than its cause. ”For if we suppose that something is found in the idea which is not in the cause, it is then necessary that it takes it from nothing.’' But nothing can come from nothing, and therefore if some- thing is in the effect it must necessarily be in the cause.16 A second causal principle is the axiom that error cannot come from a perfect being. If nothing comes from nothing, then error must come from nothing, since error results from our judging when there is a lack or gap in our knowledge. Of his ideas, Descartes says, "if they are .false, that is, if they represent things which are not, Ikyistotle's term at the end of the passage just quoted, un OVTOS. If he is to use the causal principle in the JPIVOOf of the existence Of God, Descartes must not only CJuaim that ”nothing comes from nothing" (or perhaps that "rub being comes from non—being") but he must also show t'hatideas are beings, or things to which the causal IPITinciple can legitimately be applied. If they are con— E.Sidered only as modes, states, or prOperties of the mind, 15t is not at all clear that they are subject to the causal Ixrfiinciple. Descartes therefore must assert that ideas have a dual existence: (1) they are modes of the mind— SIlbstance, and (2) they can be considered as existences tllemnselves, which must have causes to which the causal principle can be applied. Descartes' own discussion Of this problem, which aJPIpears tO be a very serious one, is contained in Medi— ‘tertions, Preface; Meditations, Summary, AT, IX, p.“II? __‘~_T___. , Pisggltations, III, AT, IX, p. 29, Re lies, I, AT, IX, PI). 81:82; Replies, III, 5, AT, IX, p. 141. lBMeditations, III, AT, IX, p. 33. 89 the natural light makes me recognize that they proceed from nothing."17 Finally, even the common notion which underlies the cogito may be regarded as a form Of ”Nothing comes from nothing." For if thoughts are modes, they must be modes Of some substance. And if the thoughts actually exist, then they cannot come from nothing: " it is manifest, by a light which is naturally in our souls, that nothingness has no qualities nor prOperties which are attributed tO it, and that when we perceive some [thoughts] there must be found a thing or substance upon which they n18 depend. If the cogito can be said to depend upon this l7Meditations, III, AT, IX, p. 35; cf. Discourse, IV, AT, VI, pp. 38-39. 18Rrinoiples, I, 11, AT, IX2, p. 29. Note that one example Of what it means to say that one thing has "more reality" than another is when we say that a substance has more reality than its modes. Replies, III, 9, AT, IX, p. Inn. This example serves to link the third form Of the causal principle to the first form, which said that something with more reality could not come from something with less reality. This is not to say, however, that Descartes has proved that ideas are modes. I do not find that he has even raised this question. On the contrary, what seems to have caused trouble for his contemporaries was his treatment Of ideas as realities which require causes. Objections, I, AT, IX, p. 74. Cf. Robert McRae, ”Idea' as a philsosphical term in the seventeenth century," Journal Of the History Of Ideas, XXVI (1965), p. 175. The form Of the argument seems to be: Given that ideas are modes or properities, then there must be some substance in which they inhere. In this form, the argument seems no more than a tautology, since ”being a mode" would have, as part of its definition, "inhering in a substance." 90 reasoning, then it seems to be based upon the same common notion as the causal principles. This similarity among some of the crucial common notions seems to have been a characteristic of Descartes' way Of thinking, which has proved particularly annoying to some modern philOSOphers, Bergson in particular. Descartes simply could not conceive that Objects might pop into existence out Of nowhere, or that unconnected thoughts might exist without a mind to think them.19 We turn now to the Principles, where there is still another analysis Of the Objects of our understanding, again called "simple,“ as in the Rules, but differently assigned to mind and body. According to the Principles, there are two broad classes Of things about which we have some notion. ". . . the first contains all the things which have some existence, and the other all the truths [or truisms] which are nothing outside Of our thought."2O lgHenri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Modern Library, lguu), pp. 375—76. 20Principles, I, A3, AT, IX2, p. as (French version). Descartes has made what appears to be an error in the earlier Latin version Of the Principles, which is corrected in the French version. In that earlier version, he has referred to the common notions as "eternal‘truths," which, as we will see, was Mersenne's term, which Descartes adOpted, as one Of his idiosyncratic technical terms, for the universal prOpositions Of mathematics and physics. In the French version, the word "eternal" has been sup- pressed. (The Haldane—Ross translation incorrectly inserts "eternal" into the line at the bottom Of HR, I, p. 238.) In the Interview with Burman, Descartes states, when questioned about this passage, that by "eternal truths" - . ..\ ..C .. .. . a: r» a: is e 4. .- .. .. . .d .n. 91 Among the things which exist, according to this section Of the Principles,are (1) those which pertain to the mind, (2) those which pertain to the body, and (3) those which pertain tO the union Of mind and body, such as passions, emotions, and sensations.21 The common notions, which do not exist outside the mind, form the other class of Objects Of recognition: Up to this point, I have enumerated all of what we recognize as things; it remains to speak Of what we recognize as truths [or truisms]. For example, when we think that something cannot be made from nothing, we dO not believe that this prOposition is a thing which exists, or is the property Of something, but we take it for a certain eternal truth which has its seat in our thought, and which is called a common notion or a maxim: in the same way, when it is said that it is impossible that the same thing is, and is not, at the same time, that that which has been done cannot be undone, that whoever thinks cannot fail tO be or to exist as long as he thinks, and many other similar things, these are only truths [or truisms], and there is such a great number like this that it would be difficult to enumerate them; but, as a matter Of fact, that is not necessary, because we could not fail to recognize them when the occasion presented itself to think Of them, and if we did not have prejudices which blinded us.22 Some of our thoughts refer to Objects which are different from our present thoughts. These include mental he here understands ”those which are called common notions, for example, 'It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.'” Burman, AT, V, p. 167. "Eternal truth" is never used elsewhere In this sense, although presumably Descartes regards the common notions as eternally true. 21Descartes had come at this point to regard the union Of mind and body almost as a distinct substance. Cf. Laporte, Rationalisme, Livre 11, ch. 3, pp. 220—5”. 22Principles, I, 99, AT, IX2, p. us. 92 Objects, bodily Objects, and Objects in which mind and body interact. Another class of Objects have to do with relations between our thoughts themselves. As long as we are stating simple relationships between simple concepts, which are presently before the mind, then there is nothing which 333 be falsified.23 I think that what Descartes means here is something like this. As long as we talk merely about what we mean 1 by "thing," ”being,‘ and the other concepts involved, we can say that ”A thing cannot both be, and not be, at the same time." Again, if we talk merely about the concepts "done” and ”undone," we can say, "What has been done cannot be undone." The common notions are irrefutable, since their truth depends only on the concepts which they relate, not on external Objects. This, I think, is Descartes' way Of answering the sceptic. We can know some things, and we can know them with certainty. We can state the simple, intuitively recognized relationships among simple con— ceptions which are presently before the mind, and these 23Asked if there can be an idea Of nothing [nihil], Descartes replies: "That idea is only negative, and can hardly be called an idea. But here [in the third Medi— tation], the author takes 'idea' in the proper and strict sense. There are also ideas Of common notions which are not ideas Of things, prOperly speaking; but then 'idea' is taken in a larger sense." Burman, AT, V, p. 153. Common notions, then, are ideas (in some extended sense), but they are not ideas of things. If there are no "things" to which they must conform, then the conformity— relationship cannot be falsified. This, at least, seems to be Descartes' implied analysis. 93 cannot be falsified or doubted in any way. There is an indefinite number of common notions, but we ”cannot fail to recognize them" whenever we think of them, and when we have cleared away the prejudices which might Obscure the natural light. But this, unfortunately, is not enough to provide an adequate ground for the causal principles. Although the common notions may only state relations among concepts, those concepts themselves d9 refer to external Objects—— that is, Objects which exist outside my present thoughts. When I say that an effect cannot be greater than its cause, I am referring to effects and causes, not merely to thoughts about effects and causes. It may be impossible for me to conceive Of an event without a cause, but this does not make it inconceivable that an evil genius has tricked me into believing a falsehood. Perhaps some events don't have causes. And similarly for the other common notions. Although it may be impossible for anyone, even the sceptic, to avoid believing them, it does not therefore follow that an evil genius might not have destroyed our ability tO recognize the truth. I do not believe, then, that Descartes has any real reply tO a sceptic who is willing to question the causal principles. His only way Of answering is to say that he, Descartes, finds it impossible to doubt the common notions. And if this foundation is all that he can ' 94 provide, then it seems apprOpriate to classify Descartes among the dogmatists. CHAPTER VII THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE One Of the most frequent criticisms of the Cartesian system has been the claim that it contains an argument which is viciously circular. It would be sur— prising if Descartes actually does argue in a circle, because he is fully aware Of the dangers Of such a fallacy, and he discusses it often.1 Does Descartes actually argue in a circle? To answer this question, let me try first to characterize a "vicious circle.” A philosophical argument would be circular if each step Of the argument is derived from other steps Of the same argument. We would say that an argument is viciously circular if some Of the steps which are required for the conclusion are said to be warranted only by the conclusion Of this same argument. If we call such an argument “vicious," it is because it appears to prove something when it really does not. At best, it can show only that certain propositions can be derived from certain lObjections and Replies, V, Letter to Clerselier, AT, IX, p. 213, Replies, V, 5, 2, AT, VII, p. 383; Meditations, Intro., AT, IX, pp. 4-5; Letter to Morin, July 13, 1638, AT, II, pp. 197-98. 95 96 other prOpositions. It cannot show that any Of them are true. Like a castle built in the air, it may all hang together, but it doesn't rest anywhere. Descartes is able to reply to possible criticism Of his physical theories by pointing out that they d2 rest somewhere: If some Of the things about which I have spoken, at the beginning Of the Optics and the Meteorology are shocking at first, because I call them suppositions, and because I do not seem to want to prove them, you should have the patience to read the whole with attention, and I hope that you will be satisfied with it. For it seems to me that the reasons given there follow from one another in such a way that, as the last are demonstrated by the first, which are their causes, these first are demonstrated by the last, which are their effects. And it ought not to be imagined that I am committing here the fault which the logicians call a circle; for since experiment [eXpérience] renders most of these effects very certain, the causes from which I deduce them do not serve so much to prove them as to explicate them; but, con— versely, it is the causes which are proved by the effects.2 In a similar way, Descartes replies to criticisms Of Morin: You also say that "to prove the effects by a <§ause, then to prove that cause by the same effects, 1&5 a logical circle,“ which I admit; but I do not adntit that it would be a circle to explain the effects tfi’ a cause, then to prove the cause by the effects: f0I‘there is a great difference between proving and eXpllaining. In addition, I say that one can use the WOIWj "demonstrate” to signify both the one and the Otfller, at least if it is taken according to the common uscage, and not in the particular signification which thfii philOSOphers have given it. I also add that it is not: a circle to prove a cause by many effects which are \ 2Discourse, VI, AT, VI, p. 76. 97 known from elsewhere, then, reciprocally, to prove several other effects by that cause. We may wish to question whether, in fact, the cause can be proved by the effects, or whether it is simply confirmed or rendered more probable by them. But this is not the point at issue here. The point is that Descartes is quite willing to admit the internal circularity, in the sense Of interdependence, in his physics. But this is not, he claims, a fault. Some of the members Of the set Of assertions that constitute the physics (e.g., the precise angles at which various colors are observed in the rainbow) are known independently, by experiment. Thus their truth is not dependent wholly upon their derivation within the system. It is not against the physics, however, but against the metaphysics, that the charge Of circularity has been most frequently made.“ The charge is clearly stated by Arnauld, in the fourth set of Objections: 3To Morin, July 13, 1638, AT, II, pp. 197—93. , _ ”There is also the possibility Of circularity W}thlrl the ethics, insofar as Descartes advances what mlght lbe called an ethical system. Roughly, such a charge would 13e that Descartes argues as follows: God has greateC1‘the ethical laws. The ethical laws are good ticauSEE God, who is good, has created them. But we know Suat chj is good because we judge him by the ethical laws. t Cb a-charge against Descartes, together w1th hlS reply 0 1t: ‘WOuld, I think, parallel the criticism Of the metaphysics, and the reply. 98 I have only one further scruple, which is to know how he can defend himself against committing a circle, since he says that "we are not assured that the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true, except because God is, or exists." For we cannot be assured that God is, except because we conceive that very clearly and very dis— tinctly; therefore, being assured of the existence Of God, we ought to be assured that all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are all true. To this, Descartes replies: I have already shown quite clearly in the replies to the second Objections, numbers 3 and 4, that I did not fall into the fault which is called a circle, when I said that we are assured that the things which we conceive quite clearly and quite distinctly are all true, only because God is or exists, and that we are assured that God is or exists only because we conceive that quite clearly and quite distinctly: in making a distinction between the things which we presently conceive quite clearly, and those which we remember having conceived quite clearly in the past. For, first, we are assured that God exists, because we give our attention to the reasons which prove his existence to us; but after that, it is enough that we remember having conceived a thing clearly, in order to be assured that it is true: that would not be enough, if we did not know that God exists and that he cannot be a deceiver.6 In the earlier replies, to which he refers here, Descalrtes has said: \ 5Objections, IV, AT, IX, p. 167. I don't think that Aunnauld is really being fair tO Descartes argument here. .As he represents it, Descartes' says something like: N All SfiLear and distinct conceptions are true. I clearly and dlEStinctly conceive that God exists. Therefore, God 331553 «and is not a deceiver. Therefore, all clear and igstlncrt conceptions are true." This omits a step which ,eSSENHtial to Descartes' argument, which is actually gilte Ciifferent from this. The omitted step in Arnauld's atenmtnt of it is that which invokes the principle that my ldfifii Of God cannot be more perfect than its cause. 6Replies, IV, AT, IX, pp. 189—90. I. 1" in}. .A ‘1 99 when I said "that we cannot know anything certainly, if we do not first recognize that God exists," I said, in express terms, that I spoke only Of the knowledge of those conclusions "of which the memory can return to our minds, when we do not think any more about the reasons from which they have been derived.“ For the recognition Of first principles or axioms is not ordinarily called "knowledge" [science] by the dialecticians. But when we perceive that we are things which think, it is a first notion which is not drawn from any syllogism; and when someone says: "I think, therefore I am, or I exist," he does not conclude his existence from his thought as by the force of some syllogism, but as a thing which is known Of itself; he sees it by a simple inspection Of the mind. As it appears from the fact that, if he deduces it from the syllogism, he would have to have previously recognized this major: “All that which thinks, is or exists.“ But, on the contrary, it is taught to him by the fact that he senses in himself that it could not happen that he thinks, if he did not exist. For it is the property Of our mind to form general prOpositions from the recognition of particulars. . in our very clear and very exact judgments, which, if they were false, could not be corrected by any others which are clearer, nor by the aid Of any other natural faculty, I maintain confidently that we cannot be deceived. For, since God is the sovereign being, it is necessarily true that he is also the sovereign good and the sovereign truth, and thus it is contradictory to say that something comes from him which tends posi— tively to falsehood. But since there can be nothing in us which is real which has not been given by him, as VHS demonstrated in proving his existence, and since 9W3 have in us a real faculty for recognizing the true arui distinguishing it from the false (as can be proved frrnn the sole fact that we have ideas in us Of the true aruj of the false), if that faculty did not tend tO the truie, at least as long as we use it properly (that is, Wtuen we give our consent only to the things which we CCniceive clearly and distinctly, for no one can pretend ttuat there is another proper use Of that faculty), it WCnild not be without reason that God, who has given it ‘to us, would be taken for a deceiver. \ 7Rep1ies, II, AT, IX, pp. 110—11, 113. 100 Descartes' reply to Arnauld is not complete in itself, but, taken together with these earlier replies to Mersenne, it constitutes Descartes' answer to the charge of circularity in the Meditations. First, to Arnauld, he points out that there is no room for doubt in the proof of God, because we ”give our attention” to the proof. This would be the act of recog- nition or intuition, which Descartes has never doubted. Given this proof, we are able to rely upon our memory of previous clear and distinct conceptions. This is not the whole of Descartes' reply, but it is an important part of it. In his earlier writings, he was greatly concerned with the problem of memory. As Rossi has pointed out, the Rules and even the Discourse are full Of notational devices and other means of assuring the validity of long proofs, in which earlier steps might be remembered incorrectly.8 The problem, roughly, was this. Given ttmt today I prove a certain geometrical theorem. What Ifiight have I, tomorrow, to use this same theorem in provirug some further prOposition? Since I know that my memor3r is fallible, I have no right to assume the same deErEEfi of certainty in my conclusions, as I would if I did “Qt haA/e to rely upon memory. As we have seen, d'Ailly \ R 8Rossi, "Memoria artificiale," pp. 56-61. Cf. tuless.XVI, AT, x, pp. Luau—56; Rules, XII, AT, x, p. 417, ° eglus, May 2n, 161m, AT, III—_, p. eu. 101 and the Ockhamists proposed a series of descending levels of certainty, as the proofs grew longer and longer. Descartes refused to accept this scheme, which would render mathematics itself uncertain. For the purpose of reducing the reliance upon memory to a minimum, Descartes developed an abbreviated notation for use in mathematical proofs.9 Although memory may be fallible, the proof of the existence of God does not depend on memory, but upon an immediate recognition. God's existence can, therefore, be used to justify our reliance upon memory in other proofs. In the next passage, from the second set of Replies, Descartes points out that it is possible to doubt only those conclusions "of which the memory can return to our minds, when we do not think any more about the reasons from which they have been derived."l0 If we think about the conclusion of an argument, without thinking about the proof from which it is derived, we can indeed doubt its truth. But the common notions are those which are so evident in themselves that we cannot doubt them. They do 9Rules, XVI, AT, X, pp. ASH-66, Discourse, II, AT, VI, pp. 17, 20; Rules, XII, AT, X, p. #17. For Descartes' discussions of the nature of memory, see Meditations, V, AT, Ix, pp. 55—56, letter to ***, Aug., 1641, AT, III, pp. H33-3H, to Regius, May 2%, lBHO, AT, III, p. 6%; Rules, VII, AT, X, p. #17. For d'Ailly, see Appendix II. 10Alquié, commenting on this passage, emphasizes the "can return." It is not the validity of memory which is at_§take in this passage, but the possibility of doubting conclusions which are not immediately evident in themselves. Alquie, op, II, pp. 563-64. 102 not depend upon other reasons. Descartes even says that ' perhaps because a science will they are not "science,' presuppose the recognition of these first principles. The cogito is not derived from a train of reasoning but is recognized immediately. Finally, Descartes maintains that we cannot be deceived in our immediate recognitions of truth and false— hood. I find in this passage the same trouble that I found in Principles, I, 30: that the argument will not stand against a sceptic who wishes to maintain that our immediate recognitions can be false, and that we are not justified in trusting to the natural light. But there is no doubt that Descartes wants to maintain here that there is a type of knowledge which is not subject to doubt. Such knowledge, or recognition, revealed by the natural light, consists of the common notions, which are taken as the axioms of the system. Because these axioms are not subject to doubt, Descartes claims, they need not be proved, and they there— fore permit the Cartesian system to avoid a vicious circularity. Descartes does point out that the reliability of the natural light, which permits us to recognize the first principles, is a logical consequence of the proof of the non-deceptive character of God. If it were not reliable, we would not be able to tell truth from falsehood. But we can tell truth from falsehood, and the eXplanation of our ability to do so is simply that God is not a deceiver. 103 Although we have explained this ability, the axioms do not depend upon this explanation, and the system is therefore not viciously circular. A number of recent commentators have discussed the accusation that Descartes nevertheless failed to see what appears to certain critics to be an obvious and serious error. I want to turn now to several of these recent studies. Alan Gewirtz, in ”The Cartesian Circle," attempts to show that there are "certain fundamental factors" in Descartes' phiIOSOphy which remove the circularity and contradiction which the critics have found in it. "These factors consist ultimately in two closely related dis- tinctions: (1) between the methodological and metaphysical moments of Descartes' doctrine of knowledge, and (2) between the analytic and synthetic methods of demonstra- tion."11 By carefully distinguishing these "moments" and methods, Gewirtz maintains, Descartes has avoided a viciously circular argument. The doubt and the certainty of the methodological level are confused, by Descartes’ critics, with the doubt and the certainty of the meta— physical level. Gewirtz' exposition requires, in addition, the distinction between two meanings of "idea": llAlan Gewirtz, "The Cartesian circle," Philos- Ophical Review, L (1941), p. 369. 10% Ideas . . . have a double status: on the one hand, they are themselves existents, "formal essences," modes of thought, on the other hand, they are significances, ”objective essences," purporting to be representative of things other than themselves. In order that ideas be susceptible of truth, they must be viewed not in the first way, or "materially," but in the second way, or "informally."12 Clearness and distinctness, for the mind which apprehends the ideas, become the logical criteria of coherence or consistency. On the metaphysical level, however, the criterion of truth means conformity between the idea and its object. (After the proof of the existence of God, Clearness and distinctness may be used as criteria of truth.) At the psychological level, we may doubt the existence of the objects of our ideas, but we cannot doubt the coherence of those ideas which we clearly and dis— tinctly conceive. This merely psychological certainty, however, is challenged by a metaphysical doubt. "The full sc0pe of the doubt becomes apparent in his doctrine of God's omnipotence, which extends even to the 'eternal truths' and the law of contradiction.”13 But this doubt is not extended in such a way as to assert that consistent l2Ibid., pp. 369—70. 13Ibid., p. 373. I am not convinced that Gewirtz can document this his claim that Descartes believes that God can explicitly repeal the law of contradiction. Descartes certainly seems to say the Opposite in Meditations, VI, AT, IX, pp. 57, 62, to Regius, June, 16u2, AT, III, p. 567, to ***, Mar., 1642, AT, V, p. sun. But Descartes may be inconsistent about this. I want to discuss this question in the chapter on the will. 105 ideas may really be inconsistent. Doubt extends only to the objects of these ideas, according to Gewirtz. Many of the allegations of circularity made against Descartes' metaphysics, Gewirtz believes, come from those that assume that Descartes followed what he calls the ”synthetic” method, an argument from supposedly self- evident axioms to conclusions which are known with certainty. On the contrary, he followed what he termed the "analytic" method in the metaphysics, as well as in the physical treatises. Such a method requires that the con— clusion be known with greater certainty than the premisses from which it is derived. In particular, it proceeds in the Meditations from a merely psychological certainty to certainty which is metaphysical; that is, from belief to knowledge. Thus the central importance of the cogito, which is the step at which we go from mere certainty to metaphysical truth. We are able to conclude, then, that "Descartes' argument is not circular, for, while it is by the psycho— logical certainty of clear and distinct perceptions that God's existence is proved, what God guarantees is the meta- physical certainty of such perceptions."1” Thus, by sharply distinguishing the "moments" or levels within Descartes' argument, we avoid the charge of 11+Gewirtz, "The Cartesian Circle," p. 386. 106 circularity. I think that we may wonder, nevertheless, whether this is what Descartes himself thinks that he is doing. Gewirtz claims, for example, that the natural light itself is subject to doubt: Now the natural light is the "faculty of recog- nizing the true and distinguishing it from the false," and its act is the act of intuition, which the meta- physical moment has declared subject to the hyper- bolic doubt; later Descartes is to state that the natural light has been given to the mind by God, and that it comes under the divine guarantee, so that its employment to demonstrate God's existence incurs all the wonted charges of the Cartesian circle.l While most of Gewirtz' argument is very amply documented, the thread of documentation underlying this passage is thin indeed. I have already discussed the difficulty that we have in linking the natural light with "intuition.” The central contention, that the natural light might be deceptive if God were a deceiver, is supported only by a passage in the Principles (I, 30), but by nothing in the Meditations. In this case, we may wonder what it would mean to doubt the truth of the natural light, since, as the third Meditation has told us, the natural light is that which makes me see that a thing is true. ”And I do not have any other faculty or power in me to distinguish the true from the false, which could teach me that what the light shows me to be true, is not true, and in which I could have faith, other than it."16 The natural light, lSIbid., p. 387. lsMeditations, III, AT, IX, p. 30. 107 as the power to distinguish the true from the false, is indeed given to man by God, as are all his powers. But Descartes does not indicate that the natural light is subject to possible error (except at Principles, I, 30) and never explains what it would mean to recognize that it is false. If psychological certainty is always subject to a metaphysical doubt—~if it is possible to doubt the proofs of God's existence and veracity--then we can never be certain of anything. We cannot, without falling into inescapable circularity, base our metaphysical certainty upon our psychological certainty, and then base our psycho— logical certainty upon the metaphysical certainty. Distinguishing these two levels of certainty, then, does not save Descartes from circularity. Gewirtz has also dealt very sketchily with the ro role that God plays in guaranteeing, or otherwise upholding, memory. This underemphasis is more than amply compensated for in an article by Willis Doney.l7 Doney finds Descartes' whole answer to the charge of circularity in the distinction between present percep— tions and those which are remembered. In responding to the criticisms of Arnauld, "Descartes' reply was to dis— tinguish two senses" of the statement, "What we clearly and distinctly perceive is true." l7Willis Doney, "The Cartesian circle," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (1955), pp. 324—38. 108 . One, it might mean: what in fact he at present clearly and distinctly perceived was true. Or, two, it might mean: what he recalled having clearly and distinctly perceived was true. . . . Present clear and distinct perceptions were never subject to doubt. Anything so perceived did not depend on God as guarantor of its truth. In the second sense, however, ”memory being fallible, God must vindicate its use."18 Descartes' reply to Arnauld, then, becomes a satis— factory and complete reply to the charge of circularity. "In answering the objection in this way, Descartes reaf— firmed what he had stated in considerable detail in the Rules: reason, properly conducted, was infallible; errors in reasoning were to be charged to memory."19 Doney attempts to show that the Cartesian doubt, as applied to reasoning, was wholly a doubt of the veracity of memory. This requires rather extensive reinterpretation of Descartes' writings. Thus, when Descartes asks, "How do I know that I am not deceived every time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined?" these doubts are taken to be doubts of processes which involve memory, since counting the sides of a square requires time, and thus memory.2O lSIbid., pp. 325—26. lgIbid., p. 362. 2OIbid., p. 330. Cf. Meditations, I, AT, IX, p. 16. 109 While it is certain that memory is subjected to the hyperbolic doubt of the second Meditation,21 it is not clear that memory is involved in the addition of two and three, in a way in which memory is not involved in the proofs of the existence of God. In point of fact, the proofs of God are considerably longer than simple arithmetic processes, and thus more subject to the errors which a faulty memory might introduce. It also seems to me to be a mistake, when Doney says that “Present clear and distinct perceptions were never subject to doubt." It seems to me that the purpose of the fourth Meditation was to prove that clear and distinct conceptions, or perceptions, are true, and that it was precisely these conceptions which were subject to they hyperbolic doubt of the first Meditation. Such "eternal truths” or clear and distinct conceptions will be our concern in a later section. Harry G. Frankfurt, in a recent paper, has shown 22 Among the apparent Doney's view to be quite untenable. weaknesses in this position, Frankfurt finds: (1) "It commits Descartes to the absurd doctrine that memory is 21Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 19, Meditations, v, AT, IX, p. 55; to *WT ("Hyperaspistes"), Aug., 1691, AT, III, p. 434, to Regius, May 24, 1640, AT, III, pp. 64—65. 22Harry G. Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian circle," Philosophical Review, LXXI (1962), pp. 504-511. 110 infallible, at least in cases when that memory reports that something was clearly and distinctly perceived. Indeed, it is easy to show that after Descartes has proven God's existence and veracity he still did not take the reports of memory as guaranteed.”23 (2) If the doctrine is weakened to permit errors in memory, then we no longer have an absolute guarantee that clear and distinct percep- tions are true, since we must rely on our memory of our proof of God's existence. (3) Finally, ". . . in fact Doney offers no direct evidence in behalf of this inter- pretation.”2L‘L It seems to me that Frankfurt has shown, once and for all, that Descartes was not primarily attempting to validate memory in his proof that God exists and is not a deceiver.25 23Ibid., pp. 506-07; cf. Principles, I, 44, AT, IX2, pp. 43—94. 2L+Ibid., p. 509. 25Laporte, in Rationalisme, advances much the same view as Doney: ”It is against these fluctuations [of vague and inconstant opinions] that the knowledge of God and of his veracity is going to protect me, in raising past evidence to the level of present evidence. But, to be sure, it would not be able to fill such an office except if it were itself the beneficiary of present evi— dence." P. 157. The balance of this passage in Laporte is very similar to parallel passages in Doney. Frankfurt's more positive views are set forth . in another recent article. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Descartes' validation of reason," American PhilOSOphical Quarterly, II (1965), pp. 149-56. The objections which Frankfurt has raised to Doney's claims can, I believe, also be applied to the much 111 I will not attempt to discuss Frankfurt's argument in detail, since, as Frankfurt points out, it is heavily dependent on Gewirtz' article. It seems to me to be weakened by stating the problem as that of the "validation of reason," since it is not at all clear that the faculty to which Descartes refers as ”reason” is identical with what he calls ”intuition" or ”natural light." Stating the problem in this way makes a faulty solution almost inevi— table. Frankfurt attempts to show that Descartes avoids circularity by distinguishing sharply between the certainty and the truth of a statement. Thus I can be certain of the sum of two numbers, but I can still suspect that I am deceived as to the truth. It is difficult, however, to find this distinction consistently observed in Descartes. Finally, Frankfurt has failed to eliminate circularity from Descartes' argument: "Given that reason leads to the conclusion that reason is reliable because a veracious God exists, may it not also lead to the conclusion that earlier article of Stout's, which Doney includes in his recent anthology of critical essays on Descartes. Stout asks, "What part, then, does the knowledge of God play? It is needed to guarantee the accuracy of my memory, not the principle that what I have clearly and distinctly perceived is true." A. K. Stout, "The basis of knowledge in Descartes," Mind, NS, XXXVIII (1929), pp. 330-42, 458— 72. Reprinted (abridged) in Willis Doney, Descartes: a collection of critical essays, (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1967), pp. 169—91. 112 there is an omnipotent demon whose existence renders reason unreliable?"26 It is difficult, then, to see that Frankfurt has provided a solution which rescues Descartes' argument, although it may be that no solution is possible.27 The accusation of circularity has not been confined to systems like Descartes', which are said to use "reason to justify reason."28 Indeed, one criticism of empiricist systems has been that they, too, are viciously circular, using an empirical justification of empiricism.29 The problem of the system-builder is rather like that of the dictionary-maker. If someone wants to write a dictionary, 26Harry G. Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,” reprinted in Doney, Descartes, p. 224, note 22. 27Two more recent articles may be mentioned, simply to show that the problem is not regarded as settled. John O. Nelson, "In defence of Descartes: squaring a reputed circle," Dialogue, III (1964), pp. 262-272, crit— icizes Frankfurt but, in the end, adopts a position much like his. George Nakhnikian, "The Cartesian circle re— visited," American PhilOSOphical Quarterly, IV (1967), pp. 1-5, argues that Descartes sometimes advances an "aberrant view” which holds that "even the most clearly and distinctly intuited propositions are not really known to be true except by those who know that God exists and that He cannot be a deceiver." By eliminating this aberrant View from Descartes' work, we eliminate the vicious circularity of Descartes' argument. Nakhnikian does not explain why Descartes persists in repeating the aberrant view, if it is not an essential part of his system of thought. 28Nelson, "In defence of Descartes," p. 262. 29Cf. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 64. 113 then either he must define every word in terms of other words in the same dictionary, or he must include some undefined words among his definitions. If all the words are defined in terms of other words in the dictionary, then his definitions are eventually all circular. If he assumes some words as undefined, then his readers may accuse him of introducing them without warrant. Similarly, the system—builder must either base every part of his system upon some other part of the same system, or include some parts which are not based wholly on other parts of that system. It is very difficult to imagine how anyone would avoid taking one or the other of these two alter— natives. What is puzzling about the work of Descartes is that he seems intent upon taking pppp alternatives, even though they are clearly incompatible. That is, it appears to nearly all commentators that there is some class of entities which Descartes wishes to establish as indubitable, or true, without proof—-that is, as the basis upon which all proof will rest-—and that he also wishes to prove that some very obvious things are true. It is this latter aim that gives his work the appearance of vicious circularity, and the former aim which saves him from it. Descartes himself is certainly to blame for at least part of this misunderstanding of his work. In the Replies and in the Principles, as we have seen, he speaks as though God might have created man with a natural light which fails to recognize truth and falsehood, even when it 114 is properly used. But this would mean that truth could be known only to God and the angels, and Descartes refuses 30 to discuss this possibility. In the Meditations, and generally throughout Descartes' writings, the natural light cannot be a source of error, because it is the natural light itself which would have to be used to detect such error. How, then, does Descartes avoid a circular argument? It does not seem to me that Descartes' reasoning, in the Meditations, is viciously circular. An argument is not circular if there are some steps in it which do not depend on other steps in the same argument. Descartes wishes to provide an argument which will validate the set of all clear and distinct conceptions, including the theorems of mathematics and physics, for which the meta- physics provides a foundation. The premisses are the set of common notions, which are made manifest to us by the natural light, including the various forms of the causal principle. Let my present thoughts be given. Expressed as propositions, these would be "I am thinking,” "I am thinking of a perfect being," "I am doubting," and any other present thoughts. 30Replies, 11, AT, IX, pp. 113—14. 115 With this interpretation, we can construct an argument which is not circular. For example, given "I am ! thinking,’ together with "In order to think I must be," and we have, "I must be, I am, I exist."31 Similarly, the first proof of the existence of God depends on axioms or common notions which are revealed by the natural light. Whatever the structural flaws and other difficulties that we may find in this argument, it is hard to see it as a vicious circle. 31The "must'' in this conclusion is, of course, contingent on my present thoughts being given. I do not have necessary existence, and if all my thoughts ceased to exist, I would cease to exist. It is important also to notice that it does some injustice to Descartes' method to cast it into a deductive mold like this. We have an immediate, intu— itive recognition that "I am, I exist," before we recog— nize the truth that "In order to think I must exist." Replies, II, AT, IX, p. 110. But Descartes also regards the cogito as a deduction. Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 26; Principles, I, 10—11; Principles, 1, 49; Medi- tations, II, AT, IX, p. 19; Discourse, IV, AT, V1, p. 33. CHAPTER VIII THE ETERNAL TRUTHS We have, by this time, considered in some detail one type of knowledge which Descartes found to be abso- lutely certain. This type included what he called the "common notions." The criterion by which they were vali— dated was simply our immediate recognition of them by means of the "natural light." We turn now to another type of knowledge, which is also regarded as certain, but which has a derivative kind of certainty. We cannot know that it is certain until we know the existence of God. The principles of geometry belong to this class, and Descartes frequently maintains that our knowledge of geometry is less certain than our knowledge of the existence of God.1 But geometry is certain, Descartes tells us, and we can know that it is certain if we know that God exists and is not a deceiver. lMeditations, Synopsis, AT, IX, p. 11; to Mersenne, February 27, 1637, AT, I, pp. 350—51; to Mersenne, Nov. 25, 1630, AT, 1, pp..l8l-82; Discourse, IV, AT, VI, pp. 36-39; Discourse, V, AT, V1, p. 41. 116 117 The person who believes in God has a kind of certainty that the atheist can never achieve.2 The best way of comparing these two levels of certainty is to arrange, in parallel columns, the terms that Descartes uses in connection with each level of certainty, with some examples of the types of knowledge assigned to each of the levels. Common notions, simple Eternal truths, clear natures, are recog— ideas, are judged true nized. by the will. Concepts, in themselves, are neither affirmed nor denied by the under- standing. Examples: cogito, causal Geometry, arithmetic, laws principle, laws of of physics. thought. "Equals added to equals "There is no mountain with- are equal.“ ”What has out a valley." "Two been done cannot be joined with three are undone." "He who five." “God exists.” thinks must exist while he thinks.” Cannot be doubted. To Created by God. Subject think of them is to to hyperbolic doubt. affirm them. Could be falsified by a deceptive god. From the time of Le monde through the time of the Objections and Replies, Descartes never confuses these two 2Re lies, II, AT, IX, p. 110, Meditations, v, AT, IX, pp. 55-56; Discourse, IV, AT, VI, pp. 38-39; Medi— tations, 1, AT, IX, pp. 16-17. 118 levels of certainty. The terms and concepts on the left are never confused with those on the right.3 The purpose of this section will be to see how Descartes manages to overcome a hyperbolic doubt that threatens even the eternal truths. In doing so, however, he raises a major problem, that of proving too much. For, once his doubt has been overcome, he must then go on to show how there can be error. If our understanding or reason is essentially reliable, how can it happen that it is not always reliable? This is the problem of error for Descartes. To understand what Descartes means by an "eternal truth," we should first understand what he means by "truth." Descartes repeatedly objects to the Scholastic method of definition, which seems to him often to substi- tute obscure and difficult terms for those that are already clear.” In particular, he finds that elaborate definitions of the meaning of the word ”truth” would only obscure the meaning that we all recognize at once: 3Alquie points out that, in the Rules, all truths are at the same level of certainty. Alquie, Descartes, pp. 106—06. By the time of the Discourse, however, the two levels are clearly distinguished. Discourse, IV, AT, VI, pp. 36-39. ”Le monde, VII, AT, XI, p. 39, Rules, XII, AT, X, p. 426; Rules, XIII, AT, X, p. 433; Rules, XIV, AT, X, pp. 442—43; Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 20; to Mersenne, Oct. 16, 1639, AT, II, p. 597. S 119 as for me, I have never wondered about it, because it seems to me that it is a notion which is so transcendentally clear, that it is impossible not to be aware of it . . . For, what reason would we have to consent to that which we apprehend, if we did not know that it was true, that is, if we did not recognize the truth? Thus one could certainly explain what the word means [quid nominis] to those who do not understand the language, and tell them that this word "truth" [verité], in its prOper signification, denotes the conformity of the thought with the object, but that, when one attributes it to things which are out- side of thought, it only signifies that these things can serve as objects of true thoughts, either thoughts of ours, or those of God; but no logical definition can be given which helps us to recognize its nature.5 "Truth" is here characterized as a relationship between thought and object, a relationship which Descartes calls "conformity,' which is not further analyzed. He gives it a secondary meaning, as applied to an object which is not a thought, which will permit him to say that the idea of a chimera or of a unicorn is not true. Such a characterization of ”truth” seems to be presupposed in Descartes' discussion in the third Medi- tation: Now, as for that which concerns the ideas, if they are considered only in themselves, and they are not connected to some other thing, they cannot, properly Speaking, be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine one, than that I imagine the other. But the principal error, and the one which is most ordinarily encountered, comes when I judge that the ideas which are in me are similar, or conform to, the things which are outside of me; for certainly, if 5To Mersenne, Oct. 16, 1639, AT, II, pp. 596—97. Cf. Replies, Iv, AT, IX, p. 179. 120 I consider the ideas only as certain modes or fashions of my thought, without wishing to connect them to some other thing outside, they can hardly give me occasion for errlng. As Descartes points out in the passage which follows, the true idea of the sun resembles the real sun more closely than does the false idea.7 Given this characterization of truth, we find it easy to see why the common notions cannot be falsified. If the common notions are no more than the connectives between ideas or concepts, then they have no objects outside the mind to which they conform, or which they resemble. Their objects are simply the concepts themselves, and they cannot fail to conform to themselves. The most striking example is the cogito itself. When I say, "I exist," the object of my thought is the thinking thing itself. Since it is identical with its object, it cannot possibly fail to conform to its object. Thus it cannot possibly be false. What, then, is an eternal truth? As with so many of his terms, Descartes uses this expression in his own peculiar way. I think that we might have preferred to call them "universal” truths, or perhaps ”necessary" truths, because Descartes' use of them more nearly resembles these modalities. They differ from the common notions, in 6Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 29. 7Meditations, II, AT, IX, p. 31. 121 Descartes' scheme, in that they do have objects which are different from themselves. There are objects to which d2 conform. We can call them universal, I think, because Descartes says that they are true in all possible worlds. We can also call them necessary, because Descartes believes that we cannot conceive their Opposite.8 Tracing down the sources of some of Descartes' other Special terms has sometimes proved difficult and lengthy. There is no such trouble in finding the source of the expression ”eternal truth." It appears for the first time in Descartes' writings in a series of letters to Mersenne in 1630, and Descartes suggests that he is borrowing the term from him. I will not fail to touch, in my Physics, upon many metaphysical questions, and particularly this: That the mathematical truths, which you call eternal, have been established by God and depend on him entirely, as do all the rest of the creatures. Actually, to say that these truths are independent of him, is to speak of God as of a Jupiter or Saturn, and to subject him to Styx and the Fates. Do not fear, I pray you, to affirm and to publish anywhere that it is God who has established these laws in nature, just as a king establishes laws in his kingdom.9 In a letter to Mersenne during the next month, Descartes returns to this tOpic: 8Le monde, VII, AT, XI, p. 47; Discourse, V, AT, VI, pp. 41—43, 45; Principles, IV, 206, AT, IX2, p. 324. 9To Mersenne, Apr. 15, 1630, AT, I, p. 145. This is not to say, however, that Mersenne invented the term "eternal truth," or that Descartes had never heard it before. 122 As for the eternal truths, I say again that "they are true or possible solely because God recognizes them as true or possible; but, on the other hand, I do not say that they are recognized by God as true like truths existing independently of him." And if men understood the sense of the words correctly, they would not be able to say without blas- phemy that the truth of something precedes the recog- nition that God has of it, for in God, to will and to recognize are only one thing; in such a way that "from the fact that he wills something, he recognizes that thing by it, and by it only such a thing is true." No one should therefore say, "if God did not exist, these truths would not be less true"; for the existence of God is the first and the most eternal of the truths which can be, and the only truth from which all the others come.10 Again, in a letter later that month, Descartes maintains that: it is certain that he is the author of the essence as well as of the existence of the creatures: that the essence is nothing other than these eternal truths; which I do not conceive as emanating from God as the rays from the sun, but I know that God is author of all things, and that these truths are some- thing, and as a consequence he is the author of them. Descartes' position can be characterized as vol— untarist, in that he holds that the eternal truths are willed by God. It is a position which he shares, perhaps, with the Ockhamist, Pierre d'Ailly. And it is, incidentally, one of the points at which he disagrees with Suarez, who held with Aquinas, that truth and goodness must not be wholly dependent upon God's will.12 The doctrine of the 10To Mersenne, May 6, 1630, AT, 1, pp. 149—50. The eXpressions in quotation marks are in Latin in the original. llTo Mersenne, May 27, 1630, AT, I, p. 152. 12Cf. Alquié, OP, I, p. 559, and Descartes, pp. 47-48. 123 creation of the eternal truths does not appear in Descartes' published writings other than the Objections and Replies. But he discusses it frankly in many of his d.13 letters from 1630 onwar To say, as Descartes does, that God has created the essences of things as well as their existence would appear to mean, in part, that God has established the laws according to which they act. Le monde, which was probably the physical treatise to which Descartes refers in the first of the passages above, was completed or abandoned about 1633, three years after the letters to Mersenne. In the work he frankly avoids the "metaphysical" question that he had proposed to Mersenne, although it is clear that he does not repudiate it: when they [the particles of matter] began to move, they began also to change and to diversify their movements by their collisions with one another: in such a way that, if God conserves them afterward in the same fashion that he created them, he does not conserve them in the same state: that is, since God always acts in the same way, and as a consequence always produces the same effect in substances, there is found, as if by accident, many diversities in that effect. And it is easy to believe that God, who, as everyone ought to know, is immutable, acts always in 13Replies, VI, AT, IX, p. 236; letter to ’ VillebreSSIue, Summer, 1631, AT, 1, p. 212. ’Cf. Alquie, Descartes, p. 47-48; Alquie, La decouverte metgphysique de 1'homme chez Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), ch. 5; Jacques Maritain,’Le songe de Descartes (Paris: Corréa, 1932); Emile Brehier, "The creation of the eternal truths in Descartes' system," Revue PhilosoPhique de la France et de l'Etranger, CXIII (1937), tr. and reprinted in Doney, Descartes, pp. 192—208. 124 the same fashion. But, without engaging further in these metaphysical considerations, I will put down here two or three of the principal rules, following which it is necessary to believe that God has made Nature act in this new World, and which will suffice, I believe, to make you recognize all the others.l” Descartes then announces three laws of motion, which he calls ”eternal truths." He says that they "follow manifestly from the sole fact that God is immutable, and the fact that, because he always acts in the same way, he always produces the same effect."15 The creation of the eternal truths involves, then, the creation of the essences of extended things, such that they obey the laws of nature, which are expressed as eternal truths. But there is also a second act of creation which God performs. He must place within us the ability to recognize that these laws are true: . I will be content to point out to you that, beyond the three laws which I have explained, I do not want to suppose any other laws besides those which follow infallibly from these eternal truths, upon which the mathematicians are accustomed to found their most certain and most evident demonstrations: these truths, I say, following which God himself has taught us that he has diSposed everything in number, in weight and in measure; and of which the recognition is so natural to our souls, that we could not fail to judge them infallible, when we conceive them distinctly, nor doubt that, if God had created many worlds, they would be as true in all of them as they are in this world. So that those who will be able to examine the consequences of these truths and of our rules suffi- lL*Le monde, VII, AT, XI, pp. 37—38. 15Le monde, VII, AT, XI, pp. 38, 41, 43_44, 43. The laws themselves are reproduced in a later chapter of this thesis, "Levels of Certainty." 125 ciently will be able to recognize the effects by their causes; and, to express myself in the terms of the School, will be able to have a priori demonstrations of everything which can be produced in this new world. Similarly, in the Discourse, Descartes tells us that ". . . I have noticed certain laws, which God has eatablished in nature, and of which he has imprinted notions in our souls, such that after having reflected upon them enough we would not be able to doubt that they are exactly observed in all that is, or is done, in the world."17 Descartes does not state the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths any more clearly than this in his published writings, until the fifth set of Replies. In replying to the objections of Gassendi, Descartes remarks: I do not think that the essence of things, and those mathematical truths which may be known about them are independent of God; yet I think that because God so wished it and brought it to pass, they are immutable and eternal. you suppose the nature of things to be such that these essences cannot be conformable to it. But, unless you also maintain that the whole of geometry is a fiction, you cannot deny that many truths are demonstrated concerning them, which, being always the same, are rightly styled immutable and eternal. . they are, nevertheless, conformable certainly with the real nature of things which has been established by the true God. 18 16Le monde, VII, AT, XI, p. 47. 17 Discourse, V, AT, VI, p. 41. 183221322, V. 5, 1, AT, VII, pp. 380—81. 126 The eternal truths of mathematics, like the essences, or true and immutable natures, of mathematical objects, are established by God. Their truth consists in their conformity or correspondence with the "real nature of things." Our concepts are not abstracted, in some empirical fashion, from our sensations of external objects. On the contrary, we recognize the essences of things, when we look at representations of them, in the same way that we recognize a face when we see a caricature drawn on paper: . because we already possess within us the idea of a true triangle, and it can be more easily conceived by our mind than the more complex figure of the triangle drawn on paper, we, therefore, when we see that composite figure, apprehend not it itself, but rather the authentic triangle. This is exactly the same as when we look at a piece of paper on which little strokes have been drawn with ink to represent a man's face; for the idea produced in us in this way is not so much that of the lines of the sketch as of the man.19 The ”power of recognizing" here has a function which we have not previously discussed. In addition to recognizing the common notions and other simple notions, it also recognizes the true and immutable nature of the triangle, when it is reminded of it by the crudely—drawn representation that we see.20 It is important to remember lgobjeotions, V, 6, 1, AT, VII, p. 382. Cf. L'homme, AT, XI, p. 179, Rules, XII, AT, X, p. 417. 20The passage concludes: "So certainly we should not be able to recognize the Geometrical triangle by looking at that which is drawn on paper, unless our mind 127 that innate ideas, for Descartes, are not objects somehow existing within the mind, but rather the habit or ability to recognize certain ideas when they are presented to us. L'homme develops an elaborate mechanical model for this process. Briefly, we might think of it as comparing the mind to a piece of cloth. If the cloth is repeatedly creased along a giVEn line3-then, even though we may see no trace of the line in the flattened cloth, it will re—Crease much more readily along that line when we attempt to fold it. Similarly, an innate idea is not an object existing somewhere, but the ability of the mind to recognize a true and immutable nature when it is reminded of it.21 By establishing a relationship between essence and existence, such that our sensory experience simply reminds us of the essence, and thus of the eternal truths, which a are recognized by the vis cognoscens, Descartes lays the groundwork for a theory of error. The sensation is incom- plete. It does not conform to its object precisely. The possessed an idea of it derived from other sources." Re lies, V, 5, 1, AT, VII, p. 382. The expression which HR translates as "we should not be able to recognize" is agnoscere non possemus. It seems reasonable to assume that agnoscere would be a function of the vis cogposcens, rather than of the vis intelligendi. 21L'homme, AT, XI, p. 176. Cf., for innate ideas, especially letter to *** ("Hyperaspistos"), Aug., 1641, .AT, III, pp. 424, 430—31, to Mersenne, Apr. 15, 1630, AT, I, p. 145, to Mersenne, July 22, 1641, AT, III, p. 418; .Rules, VI, AT, X, pp. 383-84; Discourse, V, AT, VI, p. 41; Search, AT, X, p. 496. 128 caricature contains only part of the data that we need to identify the object. Nevertheless, we judge, on the basis of this incomplete data, that the image or concept is that of a triangle, or a round tower, or Maurice Chevalier. But we are mistaken. Gathering additional data, filling in the gaps, we find that the supposed triangle is a rhombus, that the tower is square, that the sketch is Will Rogers. Ultimately, since some data will always be missing from our sensory information, there will always be some room for error in judgments based upon sensation. If our collection of data is complete, however, we have a “clear and distinct" concept or idea, which can become the basis for an eternal truth. For example, we have a clear and distinct idea of a triangle, and on the basis of a chain of reasoning assert that the sum of the angles of this triangle are equal to two right angles. This conclusion would appear to be an eternal truth. But our clear and distinct conception of it is not enough to guarantee that it is true: In order to be true, there must be a conformity between the idea and its object. This conformity might not hold. No matter how clear and distinct our idpg of the triangle, it might happen that the objects themselves, triangles, don't really have their angles equal to two right angles. We need some guarantee that the object will conform to our clear and distinct <2onception of it. 129 Descartes states his position most clearly in the sixth set of Replies: When one attentively considers the immensity of God, one sees that it is manifestly impossible that there is anything which does not depend upon him, not only what subsists, but also one sees that there is no order in it, no law, no reason of goodness and of truth which does not depend upon him; . . . in other words, he would not have been completely free [indifferent] to create the things that he has cre— ated. For if some reason or appearance of good had preceded his preordination, it would doubtless have determined him to do that which would have been better. But on the contrary, because he determined himself to do the things which are in the world, for that reason, as it is said in Genesis, "they are very good," that is, that the reason for their goodness depends upon his having wished to do them. And there is no need to ask concerning that goodness, or any of the other truths, mathematical as well as metaphysical, by what kind of cause it depends upon God; for, since the kinds of cause have been established by those who perhaps never thought about that explanation of cau- sality, there would be no place for astonishment, when they would not have given it a name; but never- theless they have given it one, for it could be called the efficient cause, in the same way that the will of the king can be called the efficient cause of the law, even though the law is not a natural being, but only (as they say in the School) a moral being. It is thus useless to ask how God could have been able to make it so, from all eternity, that two times 4 was not 8, etc., for I say that we are not able to comprehend that, but, since on the other hand I comprehend very well that nothing can exist, in any kind of being that might be, that does not depend upon God, and that it would be very easy for him to order certain things in such a way that men could not comprehend that they could be otherwise than they are, it would be something completely contrary to reason to doubt the things that we comprehend very well, because of some others that we do not comprehend at all, and that we do not see that we ought to comprehend. Therefore it is not to be thought that ”the eternal truths depend upon the human understanding, or upon the existence of things," but only on the will of God, who, as a sovereign 130 legislator, has ordained and established them from all eternity.22 Since all truth depends upon God's will, it is possible for him to have ordered the world in such a way that we could not comprehend it. In particular, it would have been possible for a God to have ordained that two times four is not eight, even though we do not know how he could do so, or what it would mean to live in such a world. It is at this point that a hyperbolic doubt can enter. In the seventh set of Replies, Descartes points out, concerning Bourdin, that "We must note too that throughout he treats doubtfulness and certainty not as 22Replies, VI, 8, AT, IX, pp. 235-36. What is probably Descartes' last word on this subject appears in a letter to Arnauld: "In any case it seems to me that one ought not to say of any thing that it cannot be done by God; being given that every kind of true and good depends on his omnipotence, I would not ever dare to say that God could not make it so that a mountain is without a valley, or that one and two do not make three; but I say only that he has given me a mind of such a nature that I would not be able to conceive a mountain without a valley or a sum of one and two which would not be three, etc., and that such things imply a contradiction in my conception. I believe that it would be necessary to say the same thing of a space which would be entirely void, of a nothingness which would be extended, of a universe which would be limited, because one would not be able to imagine any limit to the world beyond which I would not be able to conceive extension; and I am not able to conceive a wine jar which was so empty that there was no extension inside it, that there was not, in consequence, any body, since wherever there is extension there also necessarily is body." To Arnauld, July 29, 1648, AT, V, pp. 223-24. 131 relations of our thought to objects, but as properties of the objects and as inhering in them eternally."23 Since truth and falsehood are properties of the relationship between a thought and its object, namely, the success or failure of the relationship which Descartes 1 has called “conformity,' doubt and certainty must be applied to this relationship. Bourdin had treated it as a prOperty of the objects alone, Descartes maintains. Finally, in a letter to Father Mesland, with whom Descartes discussed some of the most important of his later metaphysical views, Descartes attempts to clarify the manner in which we might be deceived (if we were not sure of the veracity of God) by a failure of the eternal truths to correSpond to existing reality: As for the difficulty of conceiving how it was free and indifferent for God to have made it untrue that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, or generally that contradictories could be [or exist] together, one can easily overcome this difficulty by considering that the power of God cannot have any limits; then, also, while considering that our mind is finite, and created of such a nature that it can conceive as possible the things which God really wanted to be possible, but not of such a nature that it could conceive as possible those things which God would have been able to render possible, but which he nevertheless wanted to render impossible. For the first consideration makes us recognize that God could not have been determined to cause it to be true, that the contradictories could not exist to- gether, and that, as a consequence, he could have done the contrary; then the other assures us that, even though that might be true, we ought not to try to 23Replies, VII, 2, 1, AT, VII, p. 472. 132 comprehend it, because our nature is not capable of it.2” Descartes here seems to be saying that it is within God's power to create contradictories. As we have noticed, the voluntarist tradition of Pierre d'Ailly said that God could not create contradictories. In the Meditations, Descartes seems to agree with the voluntarist tradition: ". . . I have never judged that it would be impossible for him to do anything, except when I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it." Like the Ockhamist volun— tarists, Descartes had to deal with a number of questions 2L'To Mesland, May 2, 1644?, AT, IV, p. 118. Note that this could cause serious trouble if we interpret the cogito as a deduction which depends upon the principle of contradiction. Then we would have something like this: Everything which thinks must exist while it thinks. I am thinking. Therefore I exist. But God can create contra- dictories. Therefore, it is possible that "I exist" and "I do not exist" are both true. Therefore, it is possible that I do not exist. I think that Descartes attempts to avoid this sort of counter-argument by insisting that the co ito is not a deduction by an immediate intuition: "But when we perceive that we are thinking things, it is a first notion which is not derived from any syllogism; and when someone says: 'I think, therefore I am, or I exist,' he does not conclude his existence from his thought by the force of some syllogism, but as a thing which is recognized of it- self; he sees it by a simple inspection of the mind." Replies, 11, AT, IX, p. 110. The knowledge of our own eXIStence, which we "see" or intuit, thus precedes our knowledge that God can create contradictories. I think that it might still be argued that this latter knowledge can undermine the former. But it is difficult to say whether such an argument, which attacks the foundations of validity, is or is not valid. If it is valid, then it carries no weight, having destroyed its own foundations. Prof. George Nakhnikian and Prof. Willis Doney both pointed out to me the serious problems raised by this passage. 133 concerning God's powers. Is it within God's power to destroy himself? It is "contradictory" to say that he can. Is there anything that God cannot do? Only that which implies a contradiction in its idea, that is, which is not "intelligible."25 Descartes' doctrine seems to me to have been consistent through all his writings, after his initial announcement to Mersenne that God created the eternal truths. But it is difficult to state. He seems to have been saying something like this. God is all-powerful, and he has created all things. He has created the eternal truths, both as mathematical and physical laws, and as innate ideas in our minds. Although we have the ability to form clear and distinct concepts, and although we can- not conceive the contrary of these concepts, we have no guarantee that the objects of those concepts conform to or resemble them. There is thus the possibility of a doubt concerning this conformity. This is precisely the radical doubt of the first and second Meditations. Given the pos— sibility of such a doubt, it may be extended to the laws of physics, the theorems of mathematics, and even to the principles of contradiction. God, as omnipotent, has the power to do anything whatever. 25Meditations, VI, AT, IX, p. 57, to ***, Mar., 1642, AT, V, p. 544; to Regius, Oct. 6, 1642, AT, V, p. 547; to Mersenne, Apr. 21, 1641, AT, III, pp. 359-60. 134 But can God destroy himself? Such a question makes no sense. The "power“ to destroy oneself is not a power at all, but a weakness. A god who had such a "power" would not be God the almighty, but some other creature. And similarly for the other stock objections: Can God create a stone which he cannot lift? Can God create another om- nipotent God? And so on. A god who could do these things would not be God. The final and most important question for Descartes is this: Could God deceive men, concerning the conformity of their clear and distinct ideas with their objects? Is God a deceiver? Again, the answer would seem to be that a god who would deceive men would not be God, but some creature who was less than perfect, and thus not God at all.26 26Since questions like these were an almost inev— itable outcome of the voluntarist position, they were widely discussed. For a modern discussion, see C. Wade Savage, "The paradox of the stone," Philosophical Review, LXXVI, (1967), pp. 74-79. DescartesT position is dis- cussed by Harry G. Frankfurt, "The logic of omnipotence," Bhilosophical Review, LXXIII (1964), pp. 262-63. CHAPTER IX THE PROBLEM OF ERROR Descartes' proof, in the third Meditation, of the existence and veracity of God, leads to the problem of error. The purpose of the fourth Meditation is, in part, to provide a solution to this problem. In the earlier Meditations, we found a faculty or power which was beyond the reach of the evil genius. This is the power of recognizing, or power of knowing, when it recognizes truth and falsehood. When it is applied only to simple concepts, it is called the "natural light," and its revelations are always true. The proof that God is not a deceiver, however, has led to a problem. We know that we sometimes make mistakes. How can we avoid attributing these errors to God? Given that our cognitive faculties are essentially reliable, how does it happen that they often fail? Because the fourth Meditation is rather abstract, I want to propose an example of the sort of problem Descartes seems to have been considering. This will help us in our reading of the Meditation. 135 136 For this purpose, the problem of Pappus, the tri- umphant solution to which is prOposed in the Geometry, would be ideal.1 It is, however, much more complicated that anything we will need here. Consider, instead, the following simple problem in algebra, which is very much like the problems in geometry and algebra of the Geometry and the Rules. We wish to find values for the unknown quantities x and y. We are given the following pair of equations: (a) 3x + 2y = 10 (b) 4x + 7y = 22 The problem has a unique solution: x = 2 and y = 2. Now let us suppose that we have not been given all the data that are required for the solution. In particular, suppose that we have been given only equation (a), and not equation (b). There will now be an infinite number of pairs of values for x and y which will satisfy equation (a). If we choose one particular pair of values, it will only be an accident if it is the true solution which is also true for (b).2 lGeometry, 1, AT, VI, pp. 377—78. Cf. Laporte, Rationalisme, pp. 4—5. 2A contemporary distinction corresponding to that proposed here is that between "complete" and "incomplete" sequential machines. Cf. Seymour Ginsburg, An introduction :9_mathematical machine theory (Reading, Mass.: Addison— Wesley, 1962), p. 43. 137 We can now turn to the fourth Meditation. It begins by recalling the discovery, in the preceding Medi— tations, that we know very little with certainty about corporeal things, much more about the human mind, and still more about God. This Meditation, we learn, is to be concerned only with purely intelligible things, not with sensible or imaginable things. But the solution pro- posed here will provide the basis for an explanation of error in our sensing and imagining also. After recapitulating the proofs of the third Meditation, Descartes turns to the central problem of this section. The argument is this. The will to deceive (as distinct from the ability to deceive) is a sign of weakness or malice. Fraud and deception are imperfections. God, who is perfect, cannot be the source of imperfection, and therefore God cannot deceive me. I experience a power or faculty of judging, which, like all things, is received from God. Since God is the source of this power, then I should never be deceived when I use it prOperly. But I know by experience that I am subject to an infinitude of errors, even though this proof seems to show that I should never err. We must, therefore, reconcile the fact of error with the result of our proof that God could not be a deceiver. What, then, is the cause of our errors? On the one hand, there is "a real and positive idea of God, or rather of a supremely perfect being," but 138 on the other hand there is, "so to speak, a certain neg— ative idea of nothingness, that is, of that which is infinitely separated from every sort of perfection."3 I am a kind of mean between God and nothingness, or a mixture of being and nonbeing. On the basis of the causal prin— ciple, we may say that the being comes from God, but that the nothingness cannot come from God, since nothing comes from nothing. Thus, "I find myself exposed to an infinity of faults" (manquements, privations, lacks, imperfections). To be human, then, is to participate in nothingness. "Thus I know that error, insofar as it is error, is not something real which depends upon God, but that it is only a lack" (défaut, fault, imperfection). This I do not need a Special "faculty for error." It is only necessary that "the power which God has given me to discriminate the true from the false is not infinite in me.”” I think that it will help to clarify the meaning of this very abstract passage (for we have no idea of how to interpret these lacks and privations), if we return to the example that I suggested at the beginning of this section. Given a very large number of unknown quantities to be determined, we are also given a finite number of simultaneous equations which constitute the data that we have, with which to determine the unknown quantities. We _ 3Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 43. ”Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 43. 139 find that we do not have enough data to determine all of the unknowns, and we are therefore unable to assign correct values to some of them. These turn out to be in error. God has not deceived us, because all of the data which have been provided have been accurate. If God had given us some false equations, some faulty data, we could justly accuse him of deception. But he has not. Some of the equations are lacking, but these gaps in our knowledge are nothing. Man's understanding is like this incomplete set of data, a kind of mixture of being and nothingness. We might add that in Descartes' physics, there is no void, and that by extension, we may say that these gaps in man's understanding do not exist in any sense. Man's under— standing simply contains a finite set of data. But this solution, for Descartes, is not adequate. There are, in fact, real gaps in the data, "for error is not a pure negation, that is, is not the simple defect or lack of some perfection to which I have no right, but is rather a privation of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess."5 Apparently, God, who certainly knows what data I require in order to arrive at a correct solution of my problems, has actually acted in such a way as to withhold these data. It is as though we were given a textbook in a foreign language, in which we were asked to translate a ‘ 5Meditations, Iv, AT, IX, pp. 43—44. 140 given passage, but have found that the book's vocabulary omitted some of the required words. The vocabulary need not be infinite, but in a prOper textbook, it Should be adequate. Descartes' illustration is that of a craftsman, whose work need not be infinite, but who could at least make each piece perfect of its kind. Why, then, am I imperfect? Descartes gives two answers, both of which are very puzzling. First, the idea occurs to him that ”I ought not to be astonished, if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God does what he does, and that thus I have no more reason to doubt his existence than when it happens that I see many other things, with- out being able to comprehend for what reason, or how, God has produced them."6 Descartes argues that it will be necessary to exclude final causes, which are of no use in physics or the natural sciences, "because it does not seem to me that I can, without being presumptuous, search out and attempt to discover the impenetrable ends of God."7 Second, “one ought not to consider a Single cre— ature separately, when one inquires whether the works of God are perfect, but generally all the creatures n8 together. Regarded, instead, as part of the total 6Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 44. 7Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 44. 8Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 44. 141 universe, the individual may be found to contribute to the perfection of the total pattern. The second argument adds nothing to the first, Since at this point Descartes does not yet know of the existence of other creatures in the universe, but only that God "could have produced them, in such a way that I exist and am placed in the world, making part of the uni- versality of all the beings."9 This agnosticism regarding God's final causes, is puzzling, because it seems to undercut the principal argument of the Meditations as a whole. If God's purposes are ultimately beyond my knowing, then there is nothing whatever to justify my belief that God is not a deceiver. It may very well be part of the universal plan that I, alone, am subjected to total deception, perhaps providing entertainment for the rest of the inhabitants of the uni— verse. This continual deception may thus fulfill some glorious purpose of God which I, as finite, will never be able to comprehend. Since it is unlikely that Descartes really wanted this kind of an outcome, we ought to try to reconcile the argument of the fourth Meditation with that of the third. Let us say that God has provided Descartes with a large mass of data, in the form of innate ideas. These are dispositional prOperties of his mind such that he will 9Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 44. 142 recognize certain things when he is presented with them. In our example, these would be a large but finite set of Simultaneous equations. We know that God could not have introduced errors into the data. Each item is known to be true insofar as it is clearly and distinctly conceived. The proof of the third Meditation is intended to demon- strate that these data are correct. By the natural light, we know that God does not deceive. Thus by means of our power of recognition, we can know that 2 + 3 = 5, or that there can be no mountain without a valley, or that the sum of the squares on the legs of a right triangle equals the square on the hypotenuse. We know these things, because we know that God is no deceiver. And we know that my personal deception cannot fulfill some “higher purpose" of God. It is simply self- contradictory to say that God could deceive, for the same reason that it is self-contradictory to say that God can destroy himself. God would not be God if he deceived people. Descartes states this point more clearly in the Principles: That God is not the cause of our errors. And the first of his attributes which seemingly ought to be considered here, consists in that he is very truthful and the source of all light, in such a way that it is not possible that he deceives us, that is that he is directly the cause of the errors to which we are subject, and which we experience in our- selves; for even though the skill to be able to deceive seems to be a mark of subtlety of mind among men, nevertheless the will to deceive never comes 143 except from malice or fear or weakness and as a con- sequence cannot be attributed to God.l6 When we say that God cannot deceive, we are not saying that there is some power which he lacks. On the contrary, to say that he could deceive would be to say that there was some weakness or lack of power in him. For this reason, no sceptic can make the assertion that God is a deceiver, Since such a supposed assertion contradicts itself. On the other hand, when we say that we do not comprehend God's purposes, we simply mean that we do not comprehend the particular motives or goals (all of what are admirable, by definition) that God had in giving me the finite set of truths that he did. Why has God pro— vided me with this particular set of data, and not with some other set? In the total picture of the universe, why as I cut to this particular Shape, and not some other? Questions like these simply cannot be answered. They would require that we have access to all the data of the universe, an infinite set, when, by assumption, we have access only to a finite set. We do not have adequate knowledge of anything, if we use "adequate" in the sense in which Descartes used it, to mean all that could be known about anything. 10Principles, 1, 29, AT, IX2, pp. 37-38. 144 Descartes returns now to his analysis of intel- lectual errors: I find that they depend upon the concurrence of two causes, namely, the power of recognizing which is in me, and the power of choosing, or rather my free- will; that is, my understanding together with my will. For by the understanding alone I neither affirm nor deny anything, but I conceive only the ideas of things, which I may affirm or deny.ll Thus, in itself, the understanding is free of error, simply because it asserts nothing. (As we will see, however, when something is clearly and distinctly conceived by the understanding, the will is logically obliged to affirm it. If clear and distinct conceptions were not true, then the understanding might be responsible for error.) "And even though there may perhaps be an infinity of things in the world, of which I have no idea in my understanding, one cannot say for that reason that he is deprived of these ideas, as of something which iS right— fully due to his nature, but simply that he does not have them."12 Thus we do not have the right to complain. llMeditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 45. The earlier Latin version uses facultate where the French has puissance or "power." It is important to recall here the earlier analysis in which we found that the understanding, for Descartes, consists of a passive power of recognizing (vis cognoscens, or power of knowing), and a quasi—active power of conceiving (vis intelligens). 12Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 45. Descartes' use of the word "infinite" here (une infinité de choses) seems to violate his careful distinction between "infinite" and "indefinite," which reserves the former term for God alone. Cf. Re lies, I, AT, IX, pp. 89-90; Principles, II, 21, AT, IX2, p. 74. The earlier Latin version uses the term ‘innumerae. AT, VII, p. 56. Q 145 On the other hand, the will is infinite, in the sense that I feel no outside force which constrains me to make one choice or another. The will ”consists solely in that we can do a thing, or not do it (that is, affirm or deny, approach or shun), or rather only in that, in order to affirm or deny, approach or Shun the thing which the understanding proposes to us, we act in such a way that we do not sense that any exterior force constrains us."l3 Yet the will is not able to deny what the under— standing conceives clearly and distinctly, or what God reveals directly. We might think that this is a limit upon the freedom of will, but Descartes does not. To the extent that the will is determined by my own understanding (or by God), so much the more freely does it choose. AS Actually, in the French version of the fourth Meditation, Descartes repeatedly uses the term "infinite" without observing such a distinction. For example, I am said to be subject to "an infinity of errors." AT, IX, p. 43. In the earlier Latin version, however, this is innumeris erroribus. AT, VII, p. 54. Both Latin and French versions use the term "infinite" in connection with God's understanding. AT, IX, p. 46, AT, VII, p. 57. I do not know why Descartes permits the word "infinite" to lose its unique application to God. As Boyce Gibson points out, Descartes seems to have introduced the distinction between "infinite" and "indefinite" in order to avoid the church's condemnation of the view that the universe is infinite. His use of the term "infinite“ in the French Meditations certainly seems to Show that he did not take the distinction seriously. Alexander Boyce Gibson, The philOSOphy of Descartes (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967; reissue of 1932 edition). l3Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 46. 146 we will see, this characterization of "freedom" causes trouble for Descartes. The will is not something which somehow operates independently of the human as an entity. The will is simply the human's ability to choose, as a dispositional characteristic of the mind. It is a "power . . . which consists solely in that we are able to do a thing, or not do it.”l” Thus it makes no sense to speak of the under— standing "constraining" the will, since these are not separable entities. It is only when some exterior force (other than God) forces us to act that we are unfree. In this sense, our will is never unfree.ls Descartes was not satisfied with this solution, as his later letters to Mesland and to Elisabeth make clear. In particular, he was not satisfied with the discussion of indifference here. In the fourth Meditation, indifference is seen as the lowest form of freedom. This is when we have no data at all upon which to form a judgment, and we select some response at random, as when someone says "Guess what!” to us, and eXpectS an answer. This is seen to be lL'"Une puissance . . . elle consiste seulement en ce que nous pouvons faire une chose, ou ne 1a faire pas." Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 46. ". . . quod idem, vel facere vel non facere . . . possimus." Meditations, IV, AT, VII, p. 77. Descartes' wording seems consciously to be avoiding the temptation to make the will into a thing. 15The letter to Mesland of Feb. 9, 1645, clarifies this point. The relevant passage is reproduced in the next chapter. 147 less perfect than when God reveals the truth to us directly, or when we understand a thing clearly and distinctly. Considered merely in itself, everything that I conceive, or of which I have an idea, is simply what it is, and thus not in error. When I conceive a thing, I simply hold it before my mind. I do not necessarily recognize that it is true, add I do not necessarily judge that it is true. I Simply consider it. Thus I might consider that "x equals 4," substituting this value in the equations that constitute my data. But this does not mean that I judge that x is 4, any more than my thinking about unicorns means that I think unicorns exist. A judgment is something added to the idea.16 There is no error in simply consid- ering a thing. Error occurs when we assert, affirm, or approach a thing, or when we shun or deny it. But I can assert or deny anything whatever, if I can conceive it at all, to any extent. Thus I can assert or deny something which I do not fully understand.17 I am able to assert lBCf. Geometry, I, AT, VI, p. 372: "If, then, we wish to solve any problem, we first suppose the solution already effected, and give names to all the lines that seem needful for its construction,-—to those that are unknown as well as to those that are known." 17The French version clarifies a distinction here which seems terribly confusing in the Haldane translation of the Latin version. According to the French version, I can affirm or deny whatever I can conceive. This means that I can affirm or deny something which I do not under— stand. Meditations, IV, AT, VII, p. 58; AT, IX, p. 46; HR, I, pp. 175-76. Haldane uses "understand" in both cases to translate "intelligo." 148 things which are indifferent or undetermined in themselves. I am able to say, "x dppp equal 5," even though I do not have sufficient data to justify this assertion. The examples which Descartes gives indicate that a clear understanding seems to entail a positive judgment. Thus, first, when I found that my existence followed very certainly (évidemment) from the mere fact that I was con- sidering the question, "I could not prevent myself from judging that a thing which I conceived so clearly was true, not that I found myself forced to it by any exterior cause, but only because, from a great Clearness [clarte, light] which was in my understanding, followed a great inclination in my will."18 On the other hand, there were things which I 332 able to doubt, for example, whether I am identical with a corporeal body, or different from it. Given the possi— bility of doubting, I could deny, affirm, or withhold judgment. Even when there is some evidence for one side or the other, such that a given thing is probable, I can still choose to affirm or deny it, or to withhold judgment. We come now to a passage which will be crucial to our understanding of Descartes' theory of error. He begins with a restatement of his method: If I abstain from giving my judgment upon a thing, whenever I do not conceive it with enough clarity and l8Meditations, IV, AT, IX, pp. 46—47. 149 distinctness, it is evident that I use my judgment well, and that I am not deceived; but if I determine myself to deny it, or affirm it, then I do not use my free will as I ought to; and if I affirm that which is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself, even also, when I judge according to the truth, that does not happen except by accident, and I fail all the same, and use my free will badly; for the natural light teaches uS that recognition by the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will, and it is in this misuse of the free will that the privation is found, which constitutes the form of error.lg The form of error is privation. This privation is associated with a misuse of the free will. The passage has a strongly Platonic sound in its use of the term "form." And the misuse of the free will would be like "mere opinion” for the Platonist. Still, there is the under- lying mechanism of the Cartesian scheme that is not at all Platonic. The modern Jesuit author, P. H. J. Hoenen, describes this "mechanicist" element in Descartes as follows: . . It is clear that the new Mechanicism [i.e. Descartes'] is also established in an a priori way. Descartes accepts it for the following metaphysical reason: if intrinsic mutability were granted, then the new form that emerges in such a change must be supposed—-falsely, however-—to be ens quod and created therefore from nothing. The causal principle requires that I cannot create an.idea which contains more reality than its source. I ‘ lgMeditations, IV, AT, IX, pp. 47—48; cf. Replies, VI, 6, AT, IX, p. 230. . 20F. H. J. Hoenen, "Descartes' Mechanicism," in his Cosmologia (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1949), t1‘. and reprifited in Doney, Descartes, p. 367. 150 cannot add to the data which I have in the form of innate, adventitious, or factitious ideas. ". . . the natural light makes be recognize with certainty [évidemment] that the ideas are in me like pictures, or images, which cer— tainly can easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which they have been derived, but which can never contain anything greater or more perfect."21 If I choose to add something to an idea which I have, this addition has no reality of its own, but is simply a kind of random groping, as when a dull student in an arithmetic class simply guesses at the answers. Even if he happens to be correct, it is no more than an accident. And when error does occur, it is because of this random, groping addition that we make to the infor- mation that we have. Gilbert Ryle has characterized Cartesian dualism in such a way that it seems to require an act of the will before the will can take effect. In this particular case, it appears that we must will that our will should follow our understanding. Descartes seems, at this point, to be making precisely the error of which Ryle accuses him. He seems to be saying that we must will to will to will and so on, in an infinite series.22 2lMeditations, III, AT, IX, p. 33. 22Gilbert Ryle, The concept of mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 67. 151 The appeal to the natural light at this point may be the way in which Descartes avoids falling into an infinite regress, but at the cost of the kind of mechanism of which Hoenen accuses him. The natural light underwrites the principle that the will Should follow the understanding. What has been taught by the natural light cannot be doubted, once it is clearly seen, so that the will is automatically determined by it. There is no need for a further act of the will, and thus no infinite series. As we will see in the correspondence with Mesland and with Elisabeth, this solution posed a dilemma for Descartes. Let me simply state it here. If we are deter— mined, by the teachings of the natural light, never to determine our will before recognition in the understanding-- that is, before we have a clear and distinct idea or con- ception——then we fall into a kind of determinism or mechanism, since all our affirmations and denials are fully determined. On the other hand, if we are ppp deter- mined in this way, then we must determine ourselves, through the use of the will. Here we fall into Ryle's trap, since each determination of the will requires a prior determination of the will before it can take effect. I do not think that Descartes was able to escape from this dilemma, and I think that the later correspondence will Show how difficult it was for him. 152 Whatever we Should do, there is no doubt that, in fact, we do give our assent to things which are not clearly and distinctly conceived: For, actually, it is not an imperfection in God to have given me the freedom to give my judgment, or not to give it, upon certain things of which he has not given a clear and distinct knowledge in my under- standing; but doubtless it is an imperfection in me, when I fail to use it well, and when I give my judg— ment precipitately, on things which I conceive only with obscurity and confusion.23 Although the natural light teaches us that knowl— edge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will, and although we may not thus be able to doubt the truth of this maxim, we may nevertheless disobey it. This gives a result which was to be repeated later and with emphasis in the correspondence with Father Mesland. Man is uniquely human and most Similar to God in that he can affirm or deny anything whatever. But his understanding is limited. He can therefore affirm or deny a thing in the absence of clear and distinct under- standing. Thus man's greatest perfection, his free will, can lead to sin and error I see nevertheless that it would be easy for God to do things in such a way that I might not ever deceive myself, even though I remained free, and of a limited knowledge [connaissance], in the following way: by giving to my understanding clear and distinct information concerning all the things about which I ought ever to deliberate, or even if he had so deeply engraved in my memory the resolution never to judge 23Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 48. 153 anythin without conceiving it clearly and distinctly, so that I might not be able to forget it.2” Once again, the solution offered is agnosticism concerning the final causes of the universe, and a reaf— firmation of man's finitude. It is said to be, somehow, a greater perfection in the universe to have some parts incomplete, than to have all parts identically perfect. But I can avoid error-—Descartes is too much of a Renais— sance man to end on a note of despair about man's fini— tude--by refraining from judgment when my information is incomplete. By "acquiring in this way the habit of not failing," I acquire "the greatest and principal perfection of.man." I cannot be deceived, ”because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something real and positive, and thus cannot take its origin from nothingness, but must necessarily have God for its author, God, I say, who, being supremely perfect, cannot be cause of any error; and as a consequence it is necessary to conclude that such a conception or such a judgment is true."25 2L'Meditations, IV, AT, IX, pp. 48—49. "Infor— mation" here, in the French version, is intelligence rather than the Latin version's perceptionem. In classical French, intelligence suggested occult knowledge or secrets. Descartes is saying that God might have let him in on all the secrets of the universe. This passage and the earlier appeal to man's ignorance of the purposes of God might be compared to Job 38:4 — 42:6. 25Meditations, IV, AT, IX, pp. 49—50. 154 In this reading of the fourth Meditation, one central problem has appeared. Descartes appears to be trying desperately to save room for man's free will, at the cost of making a key term, "perfection," ambiguous in the extreme: ”And finally I ought not to complain, either, in saying that God concurs with me in order to form the acts of the will, that is, the judgments in which I deceive myself . . . and there is, in some way, more perfection in my nature, in that I am able to form them, than if I could not." Such a principle is scarcely self- evident.26 As Descartes himself has pointed out, it is possible to imagine a universe in which humans were immune from error, either because they had full information about all questions that they would face, or because they never passed judgment when information was lacking. It does not seem to me that Descartes has given any argument in favor of the view that it is a "greater perfection" to have a free will which can lead to error. 26Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 48. See, for (example, B. F. Skinner's arguments in favor of a society .in which free choice is reduced to a minimum, in order to Imaximize the happiness of the inhabitants. B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the control of men," American Scholar, XXV (1955-56), p. 63. CHAPTER X THE WILL IN THE LATER LETTERS We have seen that the doctrine of the will plays a critical role in the solution to the problem of error proposed in the Meditations. Man's will is such that he can form judgments concerning anything whatever, including those things which he does not conceive clearly or dis— tinctly. When he does so, it is possible for him to make errors. Thus man, and not God, is responsible for man's errors. Such a solution requires that the will be free. If man were not reSponSible for his judgments, then some other source of error would have to be found, and it might not be possible to acquit God of the charge of having deceived man. The consequences for ethics would be even more serious than those for epistemology. For if no one was responsible for his own moral acts, then no one could be justly punished for his misdeeds. On the basis of our earlier discussion of the will and the understanding, we can see clearly the extreme difficulty that Descartes' theory of mind has caused. The understanding, in its "passive" role, recog— nizes the truth or falsehood of certain things, such as 155 156 the common notions. But, in addition, the will, through the power of judgment, is given the right to affirm or dppy the truth of anything whatsoever. Descartes has therefore established two quite different faculties of the mind, pppp of which can pronounce upon the truth or falsehood of certain objects. The problem, then, is whether it is possible for the will to deny the truth of something which is recognized as true by the understanding. The power of recognizing is quasi—passive, recog- nizing the simple natures, the common notions, the clear and distinct concepts, and perhaps other objects. The will, however, is active, and if it is to be free and infinite, as Descartes claims that it is, then perhaps it must be granted the right to affirm or deny anything what— ever. This would seem to mean that it has the right to deny the truth of the common notions, and of the clear and distinct ideas. But this would mean disaster for the Cartesian system. It would mean that the sceptic could meaningfully deny the truth of the cogito, and of the proof of the existence and veracity of God. On the other hand, if the will is pp: free, then the line of argument of the fourth Meditation is threat- ened, although it is not destroyed. It can be saved if we give the understanding dominance over the will, so that whenever the power of recognizing calls something true, then the will is compelled to affirm it. In this 157 way, the sceptic cannot doubt the truth of certain things, but the will can still affirm or deny an infinite number of other things--specifically, those ideas which can be present to the mind but which are not clear and distinct. But this solution is not a happy one. The will is forced to give its assent to certain things-—simp1e natures, common notions, clear and distinct conceptions. But these, according to the Cartesian method, are the pply things to which it should give its consent. To affirm or deny anything else may lead to error. Why, then, do we have a will at all? If God iS not a deceiver, why did he not construct man in such a way that he had no will which was not wholly dependent on the understanding? It seems to me that this problem becomes partic- ularly acute in the period following publication of the Meditations and the Principles. We can trace this devel- opment with painful clarity in Descartes' later letters. Before about 1644, Descartes seems to have main- tained consistently that the will always chooses whatever the understanding represents as good or true: ". . . our will is not disposed to follow nor to flee anything, except according as our understanding represents it to it 1 H as good or bad." Similarly, . . . if the understanding lDiscourse, III, AT, V1, p. 28. 158 represents anything to the will as good, whenever it is good, then the will can not fail in its choice."2 Again, it is a common notion or axiom that "The will is carried voluntarily, and freely (for that is of its essence), but nevertheless infallibly, to the good which is clearly recognized by it."3 In the set of Replies to Hobbes, Descartes seems to claim that it would involve a logical contradiction to say that we "fail to will” a thing and that, at the same time, we "give our credence" to it, and he also seems to say that we give our credence to everything that we con- ceive clearly: But, when it is said here that, "whether we will, or fail to will, we give our credence to things which we conceive clearly," it is the same as if one said that, "given that we will, or that we fail to will, we will and desire the good things, when they are clearly recognized by us"; for that manner of Speaking, “whether we fail to will," has no place in such occasions, because there is a contradiction in willing and not willing the same thing. Is it possible for a person to recognize a thing to be wholly evident and simultaneously to refuse to admit it? In the letters to Princess Elisabeth and Father Mesland during the years 1644 and 1645, we will see Descartes 2To Mersenne, April 27, 1637?, AT, I, p. 366. 3Replies, II, Proofs of the existence of God, Axiom VII, AT, IX, p. 128. ”Replies, III, 13, AT, IX, p. 150. 159 apparently maintaining contradictory Opinions on this question. It is difficult to suppose that Descartes had any good reason for dissembling his views to either of these correspondents. He told the Princess that she had the most noble soul he had ever known.5 She had been deposed from the throne in Bohemia, and she was living in extreme poverty with other members of her ill—fated family in Holland. She therefore has little political power. And, as a Protestant, She was not likely to betray any of Descartes' unorthodoxies to the Jesuits. While her troubles gave Descartes an excuse to preach the Stoic virtues, it is unlikely that he would have been insincere in his correspondence with her. Father Mesland, too, was a devoted disciple, who in 1646 was exiled to Canada, apparently for his advocacy of Cartesian opinions. There is little reason to think that Descartes would attempt to deceive him, either.6 There are five letters to Mesland, dating from May 2, 1644, to some time in late 1645 or in 1646, the last being Descartes' response to Mesland's "adieu for- ever," as the priest leaves for exile. 5To Elisabeth, May 18, 1645, AT, IV, p. 203. 6Alquie believes that the letters to Mesland are of the greatest importance, as illustrations of a radical change in the doctrine of the will, which carries Descartes even further from Scholasticism. Alquie, OP, I, 698, II, 693, II, 626; Alquie, Descartes, pp. 146-47. I II I I I I a a w. I. _ a x I. i. ./ ._ ._ r. l. I. ‘1 v. .F . v) 1. a . . C a“ it a it .7. a“ LL .1.1 to a .f. .f. C v. 5 r. .1 i . ..,..J 1.. a: i r .C S r. S .c .4. ”v. .1 t a C S .Q .1 W r." “A m Cl .3 a n.“ .1 .Q .1... t e n 8 AU C e .I 1 an n. .. V a 1.1 S e A A, o e .45 I ”N S e . a ,u I. s LI. . . ... C» Wu .3 D: .l a .. a . a . v.0 [ TH AU 160 In the first of these letters, Descartes gives a very striking and unequivocal picture of the under- standing as passive. It is no longer as it was in the Rules, sometimes the wax and sometimes the seal. Now, it is only the wax: I do not find any other difference between the soul and its ideas than that between a piece of wax and the various figures that it may receive. And as it is not prOperly an action, but a passion of the wax, to receive various figures, it seems to me that it is also a passion in the soul to receive this or that idea, and that only its volitions are actions; and that its ideas are placed in it, partly by the objects which touch the senses, partly by the impres- sions which are in the brain, and partly also by the dispositions which have previously been in the soul itself, and by the movements of the will; just as the wax receives its figures, partly from other bodies which press it, partly from figures or other qualities which are already in it, as from the fact that it is more or less heavy or soft, etc., and partly also from its movement, when, having been acted upon, it has in itself the force to continue to move itself. In his earliest writings, the Rules and L'homme, Descartes used wax as an analogue of certain functions of the mind or brain.8 But I believe that this is the first time that he has tried to represent the understanding as wholly passive. If we combine this representation with the advice of the Meditations, we have a curious result. We are told there that recognition by the understanding ought always to precede determination by the will.9 This 7To Mesland, May 2, 1644, AT, IV, pp. 113—14. 8Rules, XII, AT, X, p. 415; L'homme, AT, XI, p. 171. 9Meditations, IV, AT, IX, p. 47. . _ _ . . . . . _ ,3 7. CC 6 he .C C. ..,.J 43 5.. Fe .. . ._ . r. E .. 1 v. s u E .C C C C .a .. ..... S E O S V : . r... F. E a c 1 3 Lu to S .3 . . a r is .5: 1 V V 1 C S 1 . a: :1 m.“ I .1 e . C E C S Bil e t t. .1 :1 .».u "W _ n» w “ P9 a X S e a e n :u A: L“ «L Q n o u c A 6?“ Wily . a .\u a «5‘ 161 leads to a strangely passive picture of the human mind, in which the only role of the will is to affirm what the wax-like understanding has recognized as good or true. This seems to be the sort of position that Descartes is proposing in this letter when he considers the reasons that the will might fail to follow the under— standing: it is, it seems to me, certain that "from a great light in the understanding follows a great inclination in the will"; to the extent that, seeing very clearly that one thing is prOper for us, it is very difficult, and even, as I believe, impossible, as long as one remains in that thought, to arrest the course of our desire. But, because the nature of the soul is to be almost only for a moment attentive to the same thing, so quickly is our attention turned away from reasons which make us know that that thing is prOper for us, and that we retain only in our memory what has appeared desirable to us, we are able to represent to our mind some other reason which makes us doubt it, and thus to suspend our judgment, and even also perhaps to form a contrary to it. . . . I do not believe that, to do evil, there is need of seeing clearly that what we do is evil; it is enough to see it confusedly, or only to remember that one has judged earlier that it was evil, without seeing it in any fashion, that is to say, without paying attention to the reasons which proved it; for, if we saw it clearly, it would be impossible for us to Sin, during the time that we see it in thatpway, that is why it is said that "every sinner is Go by ignorance.”10 It is the letter to Mesland of Feb. 9, 1645, that is of central importance in understanding Descartes' later doctrine of the will. For this reason, I want to reproduce a long fragment of the letter in its entirety: 10To Mesland, May 2, 1644, AT, IV, pp. 115—17. The passages in quotation marks are in Latin in the original. I _. .. . . . a] I» v. .: _: v. w” .“ .f. E C r. .1 .c E T. r“ C i .1 I. E 1 E C 1: A E .1 1.. C C .1 1 E E C a .. I .1 I a I .C c. E O f .C W .1 v. a V m.“ C a T T. i. T C a-.. C. S .2 C I Ya Ate Au Fe .2 E E r .3 I, 1Q I S C .1 .4 L; C: .Q run 5 C A: 6.7 a ‘ L9 ZR A; v N!“ 162 As for the free will, I agree entirely with what the Rev. Father [Petau?] has written about it. And, in order to set forth my opinion more completely, I would want to note, on this subject, that "indif- ference" seems to me prOperly to signify the state of the will when it is not impelled to one Side or the other by the perception of the true or of the good; and it is in this sense that I took it when I wrote that the lowest degree of freedom is that at which we determine ourselves to things to which we are indif— ferent. But perhaps others understand by "indiffer— ence" a positive faculty for determining oneself to one or the other of two contraries, that is, to following or fleeing, to affirming or denying. I have not denied that this positive faculty is in the will. Even more, I hold that it is there, not only in those acts in which it is not impelled by evident reasons toward one side rather than the other, but also in all the other acts; to the point that, when a very evident reason moves us to one Side, even though, morally speaking, we can hardly bring ourselves to oppose it, nevertheless, absolutely Speaking, we can do so. Actually, it is always possible for us to refrain from following a good which is clearly recog- nized, or from admitting an evident truth, provided that we think that it is good to testify, by doing so, to our free will. Moreover, it ought to be noted that freedom can be considered in the actions of the will before they take place, or while they are taking place. When we consider these actions before they take place, they involve indifference taken in the second sense, and not in the first. And even though we might be able to say, when we oppose our own judgment to the commands of others, that we are more free to do the things which have not been prohibited, and in which we are permitted to follow our own judgment, than to do what we are forbidden to do, we cannot say in the same way, when we oppose some of our judgments or our cognitions to one another, that we are more free to do the things which do not seem to us to be either good or bad, or in which we see as much good as bad, than to do those where we see a great deal more good than bad. A greater freedom really consists either in a greater facility to determine oneself, or in a greater use of that positive power which we have to follow the worse, even though we see the better. If we take the Side in which we see the greater good, we determine ourselves more easily; if we follow the contrary side, we use more of that positive power; thus, we are always able to act more freely in the things where we see more good than bad, than in those things which we call EI . _ _ v . v . rs .C .C a... . .c I E v. .f. .i .f. U .1 C I. a 3 r“ ale .2 F. a S C «C a I t T. t. .un C t. C C 5 u to i. E 1,. S E .C S .. 1 E .r.. L... 1 _ . . ‘IA A: \ e AC who a ‘ ‘ 9‘ I; Ag G; x e a ‘ a .t 4: ab _ a: Vi ‘ s e .. C E D. .5 4d be. Sb 2» at Axe 3 .r‘ ;\ ‘. ~ C; LJ a z. 163 a610¢opa, or indifferent. It that sense one can even say that the things which are commanded of us by others, and which we would not do by ourselves without being commanded, we do less freely than those which are not commanded of us; because the judgment that they are difficult to do is Opposed to the judgment that it is good to do that which is commanded, and, the more that these two judgments move us equally, the more they make us indifferent in the first sense. Considering freedom now in the actions of the will, while they are taking place: this freedom does not imply any indifference, whether it is taken in the first or in the second sense; because what is done cannot remain undone, given that it is done. But it consists only in the facility with which it is executed, and thus, ”free,“ "spontaneous,” and "voluntary" simply mean the same thing. It is in this sense that I wrote that I am carried all the more freely toward some- thing when I am impelled by more reasons, because it is certain that our will is then moved more easily and with greater impetus.ll In this fragment, Descartes comes very close to reversing his earlier position, because he seems to assign nearly total dominance to the will. Alquie claims that ". . . Descartes goes to the point of declaring that in this sense we give proof of a greater freedom when, seeing the better, we choose the worse. There is therefore a possibility of refusing the true and the good in full clarity, which constitutes the tragic essence of human freedom."12 llTo Mesland, Feb. 9, 1640, AT, IV, pp. 173—74. The text appears in three forms: A French version, trans- lated from the Latin by Clerselier and identified by him as a letter to Mersenne, AT, III, pp. 378—82; a Latin re- translation of this; and a Latin version, identified as a fragment from a letter to Mesland. My translation is based on this last, and on the modern French version of OL, pp. 1177—78. l2Alquie, Descartes, p. 146. Ill . , __ .. c. .. .2 I. 5‘ hm Q» . . , . .. v. a“ .C T. 3 a... . . .._ TL 7.... E c a r. S “I .Q T. .2 J a Co 3: E .a C .C . a L .. .. . v. .. .L i .f. .l e E E a . a . .. nu .1“ AU C S C. by i . .K .1 C w... ‘L a . C v . a . . a . .. a . :I‘ a; 0 AC .b C. .3) N; .f. a» ..,v, r... S a .. e p... .C . \ en rd — u an... G e : . .7. a at r. .. a 7 . .Q J i ti 5 C .5. . a E .C c. C s .. .t .. . . . «v. C I“ Tn ..-n .L l A.» r. .. Li. C .. C .. C r. d a . g . a leu Descartes' position is certainly extreme, even though he claims that it is ”morally impossible” to refuse the good and the true. Speaking absolutely, it is possible to deny an evident truth. It is not clear to me that Descartes means to assert that we can believe the contrary of something which is revealed to us by the natural light. His deveIOpment of his position seems to hedge, in two ways. First, he speaks in terms of outward behavior only. We can refrain from following a good, or from admitting a truth, but this does not mean that we can refrain from judging that something is good or true when we see it clearly. We cannot, then claim that he has said that we may judge a thing to be false when we clearly and dis- tinctly conceive it, and recognize that it is true. Second, he makes the behavior itself depend upon an additional act of the will, in that ”we think that it is a good thing to testify" to our freedom. Descartes does not commit himself concerning the nature of this additional judgment, but there is no reason to believe that it violates the prin- ciples laid down in the earlier works. There is thus no real reason to suppose that the earlier view has not been maintained intact. Lacking further evidence, we may tentatively conclude, then, that Descartes maintains the