GREAT BRiTAm, HONG KONG, AND CANTON: *'
THE CANIOMONG. KONG 3mm ‘
AND BOYCOTI 03:1925‘25

' ' Thesis far theDegree cf PS1. D.
macmmsmmmvmsm‘ ,

EARL mm M012
: 1m .

 

LIL. ‘ARY

MlChfé’rn State
~ Univ crafty

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

GREAT BRITAIN, HONG KONG, AND CANTON:
THE CANTON-HUNG KONG STRIKE
AND BOYCOTT OF 1925-26

presented by

Earl John Motz

has been accepted towards fulfillment
0f the requirements for

PhD degree in History

 

 

WM44’17 ‘

WWW
DateMfisw/fz)?

0-7639

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ABSTRACT
GREAT BRITAIN, HONG KONG, AND CANTON:
THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE
AND BOYCOTT 0F 1925-26
By

Earl John Motz

The Canton-Hang Kong Strike and Boycott of 1925-26 marks a
major turning point in the history of the Nationalist Revolution, a mile-
stone in the development of the Chinese labor movement, and a crisis of
massive proportions in the formulation of British policy toward the Kuo-
mintang. Although, in general terms, Great Britain's China policy in
the decade of the 1920's is now fairly well known, no study has succeeded
in accurately delineating the full impact of this strike and boycott upon
those British officials who found it an urgent necessity to deal with the
followers of Sun Yat-sen. The attitudes of British observers perched
on the southern rim of the Asian subcontinent at Hong Kong frequently
found expression as official British policy. That policy was to have a
decisive influence not only in China, but also upon each nation with
interests in that troubled country.

The studies that have attempted to make Britain's China policy in
the 1920's intelligible have too often defined that policy in the actions of
the British Foreign Office and its representatives in Asia. The contri-

bution of the Colonial Office and its officials in China is either discounted

Earl John Motz

or ignored. Moreover, these studies frequently have suffered from the
inaccessibility of official British sources. Unable to make use of
Foreign and Colonial Office records, these studies reveal much of what
British policymakers were saying to their foreign counterparts without
the disclosure of what they were saying to each other. While useful in
describing Great Britain's China policy as an accomplished fact, they
fail to fully illuminate the method and motivation that led to its creation.
This study attempts to accurately describe the Canton-Hang Kong
Strike and Boycott of 1925-26 and assess its impact upon the formulation
of British policy toward the Kuomintang. Where possible, it also
attempts to clarify important KMT positions regarding the anti-imperial-
ist struggle. Throughout this study the author has been concerned with
British perceptions of Chinese realities; for among officials charged
with the awesome task of determining and implementing a successful
China policy, it was not reality but the perception of reality that proved
decisive. The study is heavily reliant upon British archival material
recently opened to scholarly investigation. In addition to the records of
the British Foreign and Colonial Offices for the period here examined,
the study has utilized a large collection of documents printed for confi-
dential circulation within the British Cabinet. Efforts to determine
specific regional and economic facets of public opinion have led the
author to the use of a number of Chinese and Western newspapers and

periodicals.

Earl John Motz

The study uncovers a radical alteration of British attitudes toward
Canton and the Kuomintang in response to a devastating attack upon
Hong Kong's interests. In the course of the Canton-Hang Kong strike
and boycott, the initial British reaction of antagonism and hostility is
shown to have been transformed to one of conciliation and support.
Moreover, beginning in 1926, the search for a solution to the crisis at
Hong Kong is identified as the dominant element in Britain's China

policy.

GREAT BRITAIN, HONG KONG, AND CANTON:

THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE

AND BOYCOTT OF 1925-26

By

Earl John Motz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1972

©Copyright by
IEAdIL.flDHmlhflDTZL

1972

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE O O O O O I O O O O O O O I O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 iv

Chapter
I. CANTON AND HONG KONG}. THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT . 1

Development of the Canton- Hong Kong Relationship

Political Environment of the Canton-Hang Kong
Relationship

Canton and the Chinese Labor Movement

The Hong Kong Seamen's Strike of 1922: Guidelines
to Confrontation '

Canton Politics and the Kuomintang First Party Congress

The Merchant Corps Incident and the Strike Against
Shameen 9

The Death of Sun Yat-sen -

The May Thirtieth Incident: A Call to Battle

II. THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT OF
1925-1926: THEOPENINGPHASEs ssssssss sss 38

"Down Tools ! " The Struggle Begins

The Canton Strike Committee

Hong Kong and Shameen:. 'Girding for Battle

The Shameen Incident--June 23, 1925

The Impact of June 23rd

Government Reorganization and the Canton Strike
Committee: To Whom the Power? '

A Spreading Boycott-~But Against Whom?

The Strike and Boycott Defined: Strike Committee
Regulations

The Assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai: The Moderates
Rut real

ii

Chapter
III. THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT OF

1925-1926: THE STRUGGLE GROWS . . . . . . . . . .

Canton and Hong Kong, August, 1925: A Time of
Hape and Desperation

The Shadow of the Washington Conference, 1921-1922:

A British Dilemma _
Canton in September, 1925: The Financial Crisis
The September Negotiations of 1925
The Defeat of Ch'en Chiung-ming: October-
November, 1925

Hong Kong in November, 1925: A New Face Views an

Old Problem

Canton and Hong Kong, December, 1925: An Economic

Appraisal

IV. THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT OF
1925-1926: THE STRUGGLE FRAGMENTED. . . . . . .

The Kuomintang Second Party Congress, January, 1926
Great Britain and the KMT: The Continued Search for

a Forward Policy

Great Britain and the Tariff Conference at Peking: A

New View of the KMT
The Customs Seizure Incident, February, 1926
The Wang Ching-wei Negotiations: March, 1926
Great Britain and "The March 20th Incident"
May 15, 1926: The Beginning of the End

V. THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT OF
1925-1926: THE FINAL PHASEs s s s s s s s s s s s s s

The June—July, 1926, Negotiations

The Boycott Revival of August, 1926, and the British
Response

The British Diplomatic Offensive of September, 1926

Page

77

110

148

October 10, 1926: Defeat in Victory or Victory in Defeat?

VI. THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT OF
1925‘1926: CONCLUSIONs s s s s s s s s s s .....

GLOSSARY...............................

BIBLIOGRAPHYsssssssssss'sssssssssos .....

iii

176

193

PREFACE

The Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott of 1925-26 marks a major
turning point in the history of the Nationalist Revolution, a milestone in
the development of the Chinese labor movement, and a crisis of massive
proportions inythe formulation of British policy toward the Kuomintang.
Because there existed a paucity of sources, Hong Kong's struggle with
Canton has not become the subject of an objective Western study. Although,
in general terms, Great Britain's China policy in the decade of the 1920's
is now fairly well known, no study has succeeded in accurately delineating
the full impact of this strike and boycott upon those British officials who
found it an urgent necessity to deal with the followers of Sun Yat-sen.

The attitudes of British observers perched on the southern rim of the
Asian subcontinent at Hong Kong frequently found expression as official
British policy. That policy was to have a decisive impact not only in
China, but also upon each nation with interests in that troubled country.

Those studies that have attempted to make Britain's China policy
in the 1920's intelligible have too often defined that policy in the actions
of the British Foreign Office and its representatives in Asia. The
contribution of the Colonial Office and its officials is either discounted
or ignored. Moreover, such studies frequently have suffered from the

inaccessibility of official British sources. Unable to make use of

iv

Foreign and Colonial Office Records, these studies reveal much of what
British policymakers were saying to their foreign counterparts without

the disclosure of what they were saying to each other. While useful in
describing Great Britain's China policy as an accomplished fact, these
studies fail to illuminate the method and motivation that led to its creation.
Finally, it is apparent that studies of Britain's China policy remain for
the most part either blind or indifferent to Chinese aspirations.

This dissertation will describe the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and
Boycott of 1925-26 and attempt to measure its impact upon the formulation
of British policy toward the Kuomintang. Where possible, it will also
attempt to clarify important KMT positions regarding the anti-imperialist
struggle. Throughout this study the author will remain concerned with
British perceptions of Chinese realities; for among British officials
charged with the awesome task of determining and implementing a success-
ful China policy, it was not reality but the perception of reality that proved
decisive.

The author has benefited in this study from the assistance and
encouragement provided by a number of institutions and individuals to
whom be here gives thanks. Research in the British Public Record
Office, the Harvard- Yenching Library, the Hoover Institution Archives
and Library, the Toyo Bunko in Tokyo, the collections of the Historical
Archives Commission of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, the Library of the

University of Hong Kong, the Probate Court Library and the Univers-1

V

 

.9.

“a

 

’Tl

n.

Service Center in Hong Kong, and the Library of Michigan State Univer-
sity was facilitated in all instances by a staff that gave generously of its
time and energies. The Woodrow Wilson Fellowship Foundation and

the Ford Foundation through the Asian Studies Center and the Center for
International Programs of Michigan State University were equally generous
with their funds. The author owes a special debt of gratitude to Professors
Paul A. Varg, Warren 1. Cohen, and Kwan-wai So of Michigan State
University. , Their encouragement and criticism at various stages of

this study is greatly appreciated. Throughout the preparation of this
study the author remained blessed with a patient, understanding, and
loving wife. Finally, the author wishes to acknowledge the efforts of
Professor Walter E. Gourlay. As major professor and dissertation
adviser, he remained an inspiring teacher, a perceptive guide, and an
unfailing friend. The shortcomings of this study remain those of its

autho r .

A Note Regarding Sources

 

This study is heavily reliant upon British archival material recently
opened to scholarly investigation. These materials include the records
of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices and documents printed for
confidential circulation within the British Cabinet. While the bibliography

provides information suitable for identification of these sources, it would

be impractical to attempt to provide full information on all documents
examined or upon each of the 44 volumes in which they are contained for
the period 1925-1927. These materials may be broken down into the

following categories:

Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Political (F0 371).

Messages exchanged between the Office and its diplomatic and consular
officials in China.

Internal correspondence among members of the Office.

Messages exchanged between the Office and other branches of government
or commercial and other interested groups.

Throughout this study these materials will be cited as F0 371/ followed

by the number of each specific document.

Foreign OfficeLEmbassy and Consular Archives, Correspondence
Series I LFO 228)

 

The more important classes of diplomatic correspondence among the
archives of British missions and consular establishments in China.

These materials will most often be cited as part of the following class

of documents among which most are included.

Foreign Office, Confidential Prints (F0 405)

Papers from all branches of government for distribution within the
Cabinet.

Throughout this study these materials will be cited as F0 405/ followed

by the number of each specific document. -

Colonial Office, General Correspondence, Political (CO 129)

vii

Messages exchanged between the Office and its representatives in China.
Internal correspondence among members of the Office.

Messages exchanged between the Office and other branches of govern-
ment or commercial and other interested groups.

Throughout this study these materials will be cited as CO 129/ followed

by the number of each specific document.

viii

CHAPTER I
CANTON AND HONG KONG: THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT

Development of the Canton-Hang Kong Relationship

By the terms of the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 which ended the Opium
War (for China the first in a series of costly and humiliating lessons on
the superiority of Western naval firepower), Hong Kong was ceded in per-
petuity to a victorious England. This rocky island off the south China
coast, then uninhabited but for a few small fishing villages, encompassed
an area of about thirty square miles. Between it and the mainland penin-
sula of Kowloon lays one of the world's best and most beautiful natural
deep harbors. By the end of the nineteenth century, this tiny outpost of
the British empire, from whose warehouses goods could be carried either
ninety miles westward to Canton or up the coast to other Chinese markets,
had become the chief port of call for ships of those nations seeking a share
in the rapidly expanding China trade. 1

Canton, a prisoner of its own geography, remained barred from
direct competition in this trade. This oldest center of China's western
contact was situated on the delta created by the Pearl River from which,
by twisting courses around the islands and sand bars which dotted it, a

shallow and often dangerously narrow channel opened on the great bay

.v

. v

 

.I.‘

\‘\ ink

forty-three miles below the city. Only shipping of the shallowe st draft
could venture up this channel, and not without peril. Alluvial deposits
and hidden shoals posed a constant challenge to wary Chinese and foreign
pilots. Yet it was here at Canton that formerly all of the Celestial
Empire's western trade had been concentrated.

In its long history as China's sole outlet to a trade-hungry west,
Canton had acquired important advantages over potential rivals. Through
it alone could access be gained to the markets and producing regions of
the Chinese interior. Canton's citizens had through long acquaintance
learned something of the ways of the foreigner. A labor force possess—
ing the somewhat specialized skills required of a commercial port was
always available. Manual labor, possessed by Canton in abundance,
was swelled still further during periods of slack in the agricultural
countryside. Despite all this, Canton, without a deep water harbor,
could not take her rightful place in the expanded trade which characterized
western relations with nineteenth century China. 1

Hong Kong, had it remained isolated from Canton, might well have

become a scenic but forgotten island off the vast Asian subcontinent.

Without access to the advantages which initially only Canton enjoyed, its

 

1A survey of Canton's early relations with the west may be found
in Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transfor-
mation (Boston: 1965), chap. 2. Development of the Canton system of
trade as an extension of the older Chinese "tribute system" is described
in Chou Ku-ch'eng, Chung- kuo t'ung-shih (Shanghai: 1939), Vol. I.

 

u...

 
 

 

“J.

‘1

u

nnm

 

38

31"

splendid harbor would have remained of little consequence. The colony's
merchant community if left to itself, confronted with the difficulties of
language, local custom, and the latent hostility of a people who felt them-
selves the victims of foreignexplotitation, ,would in all probability have
departed for other greener pasturesof commercial endeavor. So,
through nature's oversightand the early. recognition in Canton and Hong
Kong that each could not do without the other was created a relationship
of mutual dependence.

If this relationshipiswseen‘as a productive but not altogether happy
marriage, the matchmakerI or marriageibroker, was most certainly the
comprador. Originally he was aCantonese merchant who, under con-
tract to western firms,__.handled all aspects, of: the Chinese'si‘de .of his
new employer's business. . 39.1111799- and fired allChinese employees". _
under his own personal guaranteeirandwith his knowledge of the market, ' ‘
he bought and sold for his firmin the Chinese community. As his
employer's exclusive agent in the China interior, he was often able to
amass a fortune and take his, place with otherslike himself in the grow-
ing Chinese business class ofthe treaty ports. Frequently, he adopted
western dress and manners; and, if to his advantage, western citizenship.

In instances where he performed.,some service of special benefit to the _

 

2For an excellent if somewhat technical discussion of such relation-
ships see Bert F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities, " in Economic
Development and Cultural Changg, ;Vol. III, 1954, p. 278-294. ‘

foreign community, he might even aspire to important western rank and
privileges.

With the Cantonese comprador used as an entering wedge, the
western merchants of Hong Kong pushed wide the door of commercial
opportunity in Canton. So successful were they that by the end of the
nineteenth century, Hong Kong emerged completely dominant in the south
China trade. The relationship between Hong Kong and Canton by then
had become one in which the British colony's enormous profits were, in
large measure, being obtained at Canton's expense. This may in part be
explained by Hong Kong's role in the south China trade.

Originally the Hong Kong merchants served as commission agents
who obtained Chinese goods for clients in Europe and America. Carried
in shallow draft vessels from Canton or other southern ports, these goods
were collected in the colony's warehouses and ultimately shipped by ocean
steamer to the world's major ports. Western goods arriving in Hong
Kong were transshipped aboard coastal steamers to their Chinese markets.
Increasingly, the Hong Kong merchants assumed control of the distribution
of these goods by acquiring interests in the coastal shipping trade. As
Hong Kong grew as a shipping center, its service industries flourished.

The dockyards, where skilled Chinese workers outfitted and maintained

 

3The late Mary C. Wright aptly described the Cantonese compradors
as the Chinese shock troops of western expansion. See her The Last
Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874
(New York: 1966), p. 242-243.

the carriers of the colony's prope rity under the watchful eye of their
western superiors, were rarely idle.

As the trade of Canton became funneled to Hong Kong, the colony's
firms moved to assume its complete control. The commercial houses
of Hong Kong absorbed the soundest of the Canton banks and organized
others as branches. Those less stable they drove out of business. So
dominant did these banks become that, within a short period of time in
Canton and throughout Kwangtung, the preferred currencies were either
Hong Kong dollars or local issues tied to that dollar. 4 By 1911, the
Canton-Kowloon railway in which Great Britain held a dominant interest
was completed. The Chinese section of ninety miles together with the
British section of twenty-two miles forged still another strong link
between Canton and Hong Kong. Goods and passengers from Canton,
denied access to Hankow because the Canton-Hankow railway remained

incomplete, were drawn instead to Hong Kong.

 

4The position of the Hong Kong banks in the eConomy of Canton and
much of south China is discussed in The Chinese Economic Bulletin,
Vol. VIII, No. 254, January 2, 1926, p. 8-9. See also Chi-ming Hou,
"External Trade, Foreign Investment, and Domestic Development; The
Chinese Experience, 1840-1937, " in Economic Develgpment and Cultural
Change, Vol. X, October, 1961, p. 21-41. An account of China's
monetary difficulties as a result of foreign pressures is Chin Kuo-pao,
Chung-kuo pi-chih wen-t'i (Shanghai: 1928).

5The Canton-Hankow railway in which foreign investors maintained
a heavy commitment was begun in 1904. Important sections remained
incomplete until 1937 in consequence of which Hong Kong was able to
further control and profit on the Canton trade. See Chang Kia-ngau,
China's Strtgglj for Railroad Development (New York: 1953). See also
Sun, E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898-1911 (New
York: 1954).

0
Hong Kong's dominance of Canton may also in part be explained by

what some writers concerned with the process of empire building have
termed ”cultural imperialism. " The comprador class previously
described may be cited as one case in point. Another is the Canton
merchant who, finding his livelihood determined largely by the whim of
the Hong Kong commercial class, moved to establish closer ties with

his foreign counterparts. His children, as were those of most wealthy
Cantonese, were sent to be educated in Hong Kong. In time of domestic
disturbance his capital and, if the situation warranted it, he himself
might be detected fleeing to the safety of the British colony. It should
not, therefore, be surprising that the Canton merchant frequently placed
the interests of Hong Kong above those of his place of birth. In the first
decades of the twentieth century when China (and particularly Canton) was
being swept by the aroused passions of anti-imperialism, the Canton
merchant frequently became a party to the combative political schemes

then being formulated in Hong Kong.

Political Environment of the Canton-Hang Kong Relationship

 

While geography, the nature of the south China trade, and the per-
sonal relationships developed between inhabitants of the two places, go
far in explaining Hong Kong's dominance over Canton, the fundamental
cause is found in what for China was a much wider disorder. That dis-
order was created by the pattern of events involving China and the West

which had become apparent during the development of the Hong Kong- Canton

relationship. In the period encompassed by the last half of the nineteenth
century and the first two decades of the twentieth, China, despite momen-
tous attempts at change, continued to fall prostrate before each successive
drive undertaken by a commercially aggressive West.

Each Western campaign, backed by the power of foreign gunboats,
ended with the wresting from China of additional economic and political
concessions. These concessions, shared in equally by Vlkstern nations
as a result of "most favored nation clauses, " were obtained in a group of
documents which taken together the Chinese have, with justice, termed
the "unequal treaties. " Through them, China lost the right in many
important areas to manage her own affairs.

Initially, China was forced to open five coastal ports to Western
commerce. These "treaty ports" within the period of about twenty years
after 1842 were greatly expanded in both size and number. In them
Western consular jurisdiction was established by which foreigners could
escape all forms of Chinese regulation. Extraterritoriality, the‘term '
given this privilege, applied not only to the foreigner and his property,
but frequently to his Chinese staff and assistants as well. The trade for

which the treaty ports had been created was facilitated by the fixing of

 

6There are many standard texts in Chinese and English which dis-
cuss the unequal treaties. An excellent investigation into their origins
is John K. Fairbank's Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The
Opening of the'Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge, Mass. :f 1953): A
useful Chinese study describing their impact is Ch'en Kung- -lu, Chun un-g -kuo
chin-tai shih (Shanghai: 1935).

the Chinese tariff on foreign goods at a level much lower than any pre-
vailing in the West. Collection of this tariff was entrusted to the Chinese
Imperial Maritime Customs Service which functioned under the adminis-
tration of Westerners nominally in the employ of the Peking Government.
In practice, the Customs Service frequently became yet another foreign
policy instrument for Western nations, particularly useful to Great Britain
whose nationals dominated it.

In the last half of the nineteenth century, the We stern nations pursued
a dual policy toward a powerless China. On the one hand, they propped
up and maintained the crumbling Ch'ing administration, while on the other
they continued to extract concessions from it. In the first decades of the
twentieth century, however, this policy became progressively less work-
able. The growing dynamism of that strain of Chinese nationalism
symbolized by Sun Yat-sen and his followers at Canton proved menacing.
Sun, after repeated failures, finally saw the Ch'ing dynasty ended by the
Revolution of 1911. Discouraged from participation in the new republic
by the seemingly endless contests waged for its control by Chinese mili-
tarists, Sun withdrew his support and'established a rival government at
Canton in 1917. While not opposed to aid from the Western nations for
the development of China; after 1924, Sun increasingly identified them as
the exploitative allies of China's warlords. He then became convinced
that his nation's weakness could only be overcome when both the Chinese

militarists and the influence of their foreign sponsors was eliminated.

Despite these later convictions, Sun, without military forces of his own,
remained a hostage to various militarists through much of the period
from 1917 to 1925. During this period his Canton Government led a
precarious existence which more than once was temporarily interrupted. 7
For Hong Kong, the presence of Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang
(KMT) adherents in Canton, first viewed as a minor inconvenience,
became the cause for increasing alarm. Sun's alternate postures, of
friendship and hostility toward the British colony became, after mid-1923,
consistent and centered on the latter. 8 The schemes put forward by Sun
for development of a deep-water harbor for Canton, which would free it
from dependence upon Hong Kong, served to heighten apprehension among
British and Hong Kong Chinese commercial groups. However, it was
the Kuomintang leader's connections with the new breed of militant labor
organizers then active in the southern capitol that created the greatest

threat to Hong Kong's continued enjoyment of profit at Canton's expense.

Canton and the Chinese Labor Movement
The Chinese labor movement at the start of the twentieth century

remained with few exceptions tied to the guild traditions of the past. The

 

7Sun Yat-sen's dependence on militarists for the maintenance of
his Canton Government, and the fortunes of that government are dis-
cussed in Li Chien-nung, (trans. Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy lngalls) _'_I‘_h_e_
Political History of China, 1840-1928 (Stanford: 1956), p. 375-377, and
p. 384-388. This is a translation of Li's Chung-kuo chin pai-nien cheng:
chih shih (Taipei, Taiwan: 1957).

 

8An excellent discussion of Sun's relations with Hong Kong may be

10

patriotic explosion of resentment against continued economic and political
penetration of China by Japan, which in part characterized the May Fourth
movement of 1919, stimulated a major change in this form of labor
organization. Increasingly, China's commercial centers witnessed the
birth of trade and industrial unions prepared to battle any new foreign
encroachrnents on Chinese soil. Canton, although less influenced than
other major cities by the May Fourth movement, was no exception. 9
Foremost among the labor organizations of Canton was the Mechan-
ics' Union (Kuang-tung chi-ch'i kung-jen) (frequently identified in both
the Chinese and Western press as "The Canton Machinists"). This
organization, with roots in the Ch'ing dynasty, was changed in 1921 from
a union of skilled workers and their employers to one in which only the
workers were represented. Successful in a strike against British firms
in Hong Kong in 1920, the union in 1921 obtained yet another increase in

wages by striking against Chinese employers in Canton. After adopting

 

found in Walter E. Gourlay. "The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang
Kai-shek, 1920-1924" (unpublished thesis, Dept. of History, Harvard
University, 1967), p. 56-60 and 167-171.

9The history and transformation of China's guilds is analyzed in
Ch'uan Han- sheng, Chung-kuo hang;hui chih-tu shih (Shanghai: 1934);
Stewart J. Burgess, The Guilds of Peking (New York: 1928); and H. B.
Morse, Gilds of China (London: 1901). An important study of the May
Fourth movement and its impact is Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth
Movement, Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass. :
1960). For the impact of May Fourth on the labor movement, see
Ma Ch'ao-chun, Chung-kuo lao-kung mn-tung shih (Taipei, Taiwan: 1958),
Vol. I, p. 127-130.

 

11

the new name The Kwangtung, Mechanics' Maintenance Society (Kuang-
tung chi-ch'i kung-jen wei-ch'ih hui), this union absorbed the skilled
workers in the mechanical workshops of Kwangtung, the arsenals of the
provincial government, the railways of the province, and the British
firms of Hong Kong. Conservative in nature, the union through its
leader Huang Huan-t'ing developed strong ties to Sun Yat-sen and the
Kuomintang. 10

The Canton printers, unlike the mechanics whose organization was
along craft union lines, represented one of the first industrial unions in
Canton. Its membership consisted of compositors, printers, binders,
and type-carvers. In 1921, it, too, launched a short but successful
strike against Hong Kong for higher wages. 11

Among the most radical of the Canton labor organizations was the
Seamen's Union (Hai-yuan hui). Its president, Ch'en Ping- sheng, was a
friend of Sun Yat-sen since the days of that forerunner of the Kuomintang,
the T'ung-meng hui. Other important members such as Su Chao- cheng and
Lin Wei-min were to become members of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) and would open the union still further to that party's influence. The

 

loLi Po-yuan, Kwangtung chi-ch'i kungL-jen-hui tou- shih (Peking:
1955), p. 57-64; and Lao-kuriyun-tuanhih, Vol. I, p. 143-145. See
also, Lowe Chuan-hua, Facing Labor Issues in China (London: 1934),
ps 60'6ls

llJean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927
(Stanford, Calif.: 1968), p. 165. '

12

Seamen's Union could trace its history back to 1909 when, under a
different name and possessing a looser organization, its members served
as couriers for the revolutionary messages of Sun Yat-sen. 12
The mechanics, printers, and seamen all shared important char-
acteristics in their organizational structures which served to strengthen
them during periods of strike. Each had established branch unions in
the other cities of south China which had experienced significant industrial
or commercial development. Consequently, any attempt by uncompromis-
ing employers to recruit strike-breakers could be disrupted. In addition,
each (with the exception of the Seamen's Union which maintained head-
quarters there) had a strong branch in Hong Kong. Of the more than one-
hundred unions in Canton in 1920, at least one-third had counterparts in
the British colony with whom some form of communication was maintained.
While this reaffirmed the relationship of dependence upon Hong Kong which
beset Canton, it also provided important advantages. In periods of con-
flict with the colony, agitators on the scene could point to Canton as a

safe sanctuary for those workers fearing the powers of the Hong Kong

Government. If necessary, they could also intimidate the Chinese

 

12For a history of the Seamen's Union, the activities of its members,
and its ties to Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist
Party, see Lao-kung yun-tuanhih, Vol. I, p. 97-98, and p. 149-150;
Teng Chung-hsia, Chung-kuo chih-kung mn-tung chien- shih (Peking: 1949),
p. 46; Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement (New York: 1945), p.
209. See also William Ayers, "The Hongkong Strikes, 1920-1926, "
Harvard Papers on China, Vol. IV, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 105-
106. '

 

 

 

l3

laborers of the British colony by making hostages of their relatives who
often continued to reside in the interior of Kwangtung.

In a period when labor organizations throughout much of China had
to maintain a clandestine existence for fear that militarists who viewed
their actions with suspicion might move to crush them, Canton provided
what must have seemed an exhilarating environment. There labor unions
not only had the freedom to function openly, but were inspired to do so
by the government. This was largely because labor provided support
for Sun Yat-sen and his followers. Events in Canton during the years 1919-
1921 afford one example of the nature of this support.

Following the withdrawal of Sun from Canton in 1919, as a result
of differences with leaders of the Kwangsi militarist faction who then con-
trolled the city, Wu T'ing-fang, one of Sun's followers and a Cantonese,
was nominated as civil-governor of Kwangtung. The Kwangsi group wished
the post to go to one of its appointees despite, and in the face of, strong
merchant and labor support for Wu. In protest the merchants, the
Mechanics' Union, workers‘in the electric power plant, telephone employees,
and the railwaymen, all went out on strike. The militarists responded by
arresting Huang Huan-t'ing, executing a number of workers, and forcing
other leaders of the movement such as Hsieh Ying-po (a militant Kuomintang
labor organizer) to flee the city. Wu T'ing-fang, seeking to avoid further

bloodshed in a lost cause, withdrew his name from nomination. l3

 

l3Ma Ch'ao-chun in Lao-kung Ign-tung shih, Vol. I, p. 133-134
credits members of the Mechanics' Union with raising the slogan "Canton

14

Despite such repression at the hands of the Kwangsi militarists,
the mechanics, printers, and railwaymen again struck in October, 1920.
This action hampered the movements of the Kwangsi troops then engaged
in a struggle for control of Kwangtung with a Cantonese army led by Ch'en
Chiung-ming. Frequently depicted by Westerners in Hong Kong as a
model governor, Chen, although a member of the Kuomintang, remained
a champion of localism. He repeatedly stressed the importance of pro-
vincial reform over his party's goals of national revolution. Ch'en's
victory over the Kwangsi forces, however, enabled Sun Yat-sen to return
to Canton and re-establish his southern government in May, 1921. 14

The Hong KonLSeamen's Strike of 1922:
Guidelines to Confrontation

The growing sense of cohesiveness experienced by China's workers
in these years first found clear expression in the Hong Kong Seamen's
Strike of 1922. Had those in Hong Kong against whom it was directed
possessed powers of foresight, they would have seen this action as but

the first in a series of increasingly menacing anti-foreign confrontations

 

for the Cantonese!" during this incident. The slogan was later used by
Ch'en Chiung-rning in his drive against the Kwangsi militarists in October,
1920. For a discussion of the causes of Sun's split with the Kwangsi
faction in 1918, see Li Chien-nung, op. cit. , p. 385-388. Li discusses
the Wu T'ing-fang incident on p. 397-398. See also, Li Shou-kung,

Chun -kuo tsui-chin ssu-shih-nien shih (Taipei, Taiwan: 1954).

14Jean Chesneaux, op. cit. , p. 166. Sun's gratitude to the workers
was demonstrated during May Day celebrations and on May 5th (the date
of his inauguration as president of the southern government). See Lao-kung

yun-tung shih, Vol. I, p. 161.

15

yet to come. For it was this strike which established the precedents
that. with such devastating effect, would be employed by Canton in its
all-out struggle with the British colony in 1925-26.

After repeated failures in attempts to open negotiations with the
British firms of Hong Kong in the last months of 1921 (a period used by
the Seamen's Union to strengthen its organization for the ensuing struggle),
the workers of the colony's shipping concerns declared a strike. At
issue were economic demands involving higher wages, , shorter hours,
improved conditions of work, and the abolition of the contract labor (PE-.0.“
l_<_u_ng_) system. The latter referred to the system by which a Chinese
labor contractor in the employ of British firms hired and compensated
Chinese employees. In exchange for granting a worker employment, the
contractor frequently retained up to eighty percent of his salary.

Beginning January 13, 1922, the striking seamen abandoned Hong
Kong and sought refuge in Canton where sympathetic labor unions and a
tolerant government awaited them. Once the re, the strikers were pro-
vided with housing and funds with which to carry on their struggle. The
latter took the form either of grants from the Canton Government (these
were termed loans), or voluntary contributions from friendly unions in
Canton and throughout China. A corps of pickets recruited from among
the strikers greeted each ship as it docked, and ushered its Chinese crew
to strike headquarters in Canton for registration. When, on February

26th, Chinese workers in Hong Kong declared a general strike in support

16

of the seamen, the situation there assumed crisis proportions. By the
beginning of March, as the strike approached its end, the number of
Chinese who had left the colony reached 120, 000.

At the height of the strike, ocean shipping to or from Hong Kong
was severely disrupted, while the colony's coastal trade was brought to
a complete halt. The costs of food and other needed provisions doubled,
and ships dispatched to coastal ports to obtain supplies were greeted by
a partial Chinese boycott. British firms tried unsuccessfully to hire
substitute labor with which to break the strike by sending agents to
Shanghai and other coastal ports. Their efforts, still to no avail, led
them ultimately to the East Indies and the Philippines. 15

The Hong Kong Government's response to the seamen's strike was
a declaration of martial law. The Hong Kong Seamen's Union, together

with others the government found troublesome, was declared illegal; and

 

15A Communist account of the strike is I Pin, Hsiarg-kang hai-yuan
ta- pa-kurfi (Shanghai: 1955); an account by a Kuomintang labor activist
in Canton is in Lao-kungyun-tung shih, Vol. I, p. 177-195. For the
activities of the labor contractors, see Ayers, op. cit. , p. 103. Support
provided the strikers in Canton, and the nature of their economic demands
is discussed in Chih-kundg yun-tungchien- shih, p. 47-48, and Jean
Chesneaux, op. cit., p. 181. The economic costs, the numbers involved,
and the impact of the strike on Hong Kong shipping are presented in H. D.
Fong, "China's Industrialization, A Statistical Survey, " in Data Papers
on China (Shanghai: 1931), p. 11-15. This work was largely based on
Chen Ta's search of the following: The Canton Times, The South China
Morning Post, The China Press, The Industrial Monthly, Shun pao,
Labor News, and the Kuowen News Excha_ng__. For the activities of
British firms attempting to break the strike, see Chih-kung mn-tung
chien- shih, p. 55, and The North China Herald, Shanghai, January 28,
and February 4, 1922.

 

 

 

 

 

 

17

after raids leading to the arrest of anyone found on the property, the
union offices were boarded up and their equipment removed. Upon
declaration of the general strike, the Hong Kong Government intensified
its efforts to stem the flow of Chinese from the colony. These efforts,
implemented by the colony's police, proved ultimately to be the govern-
ment's undoing.

Shortly after the Hong Kong Gove rnment's closure of the Canton-
Kowloon railway (for large numbers of Chinese, the main route of exit
from the colony), a group of about 2, 000 strikers set out on foot for
points of embarkation to Canton. At Sha-t'ien, in the New Territories,
the strikers were confronted by British police demanding the permits
necessary for entering or leaving the colony while under martial law.
After breaking through the police cordon and ignoring warning shots
aimed in their direction, the Chinese came under fire. The three
fatalities and eight wounded suffered by the strikers in that instant trans-
formed the seamen's strike into a political struggle against what many
Chinese viewed as the arrogant excesses that typified Hong Kong's
treatment of its Chinese community. Fears among the colony's authorities
that this incident would result in still greater economic losses and severe
strains on Hong Kong's political stability led to a capitulation before the
demands of the strikers. On March 5th, an agreement was signed between
the strikers' representatives and the Hong Kong Government by which:

(a) salaries were to be increased in a range from fifteen to thirty percent,

18

(b) promises were given to abolish the use of labor contractors, (c) the
Seamen's Union together with other outlawed transport unions was to be
reopened, (d) imprisoned strikers were to be released, and (e) the
. strikers would enjoy reinstatement with back pay. 16
-As an economic victory over the dominant foreign firms of Hong
Kong, the Hong Kong Seamen's Strike of 1922 provided a great stimulus
to further development of the Chinese labor movement. However, the
significance of that struggle rested most importantly not in its economic
or political consequences, but on its psychological impact. For Hong
Kong, it demonstrated the bankruptcy of continued reliance upon notions
that Chinese labor could be manipulated without regard to Chinese interests.
No more could the colony rely upon the disunity and seeming lack of resolve
which in the past had characterized its Chinese dependents. If the
colony was to continue in the enjoyment of that prosperity obtained through
its privileged status, it would have to prepare for other Chinese challenges
directed toward modification of that status. The Canton-Hang Kong Strike
and Boycott of 1925-26 would illustrate the means through which the British
colony met this new challenge.

For Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang, the seamen's victory brought

a new awareness of labor's revolutionary potential; however, that potential

 

16For the steps taken by the HongKong Government to combat the

strike and the final demands put forward by the strikers, see Chih-kung
yun-tung chien-shgh, p. 48-51. The incident at Sha-t'ien and conditions
by which the strike was settled are described in The South China Marni—11g
Post, Hong Kong, March 3 and 5, 1922; and in The North China Herald,
Shanghai, March 11, 1922. See also, Hsiang-kang hai-yuan ta-pa-kung,
p. 19-21. ' ~-

 

19

remained relatively untapped. Although Sun moved to erase the anti-
labor legislation inherited from the early Republic, he remained content
to seek labor's support through the leaders of the Canton labor unions
who enjoyed his friendship. There was, at this time, no concerted
effort by the Kuomintang to organize and control a mass labor movement
as its revolutionary ally. Sun Yat-sen, even on the eve of his departure
from Canton in June, 1922 (a departure necessitated by differences with
Ch'en Chiung-ming on the issue of a northern expedition to unify China),
held to notions that labor required no separate class consciousness. The
interests of labor, in Sun's view, could best be served through a policy
of c00peration with all elements (including the merchant community),
which shared his party's goals for China. Sun's friend Hsieh Ying-po
had established the Laborer's Mutual Benefit Society in 1921 which, open
only to Kuomintang members, sought to counteract the growing Communist
appeal to labor on a class basis.

The Chinese Communist Party, then still in its infancy, found in
the Hong Kong seamen's strike an important opportunity for extension of

its influence into the Canton labor movement. From the date of its formal

 

17-For the annulment of Article 224 of Yuan Shih-kai's criminal code

and repeal of legislation suppressing strikes, see Chih-kung yun-tung
ghien- shih, p. 67. For Sun's attitudes regarding cooperation between
labor and the commercial interests in 1922, attitudes adopted earlier

and geared to making class warfare in China unnecessary, I refer to my
notes of an interview with Mr. Ma Ch'ao-chun on December 13, 1970, in
Taipei. Hsieh Ying-po's mutual benefit society is described in Lao-kung

yun-tung diih, Vol. I, p. 158.

20

founding in Shanghai in July, 1921, that party, having accepted the

' Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, saw itself as the
champion of the Chinese labor movement. The small Communist group
then active in Canton had, however, frequently failed in its efforts to
penetrate the moderate labor unions tied to the Kuomintang.

The Chinese Labor Organizations Secretariat, an organ of the
Chinese Communist Party created to organize strike agitation and en-
courage union development, continued to enjoy its greatest successes in
Shanghai where it was conceived. “The outbreak of the Hong Kong Sea-
men's Strike in 1922 enabled the Labor Secretariat to broaden the scope
of its activities. With assistance from the Communist group in Canton,
the Labor Secretariat disseminated propaganda calling for support of the
striking seamen. This propaganda, meant to stimulate a national sense
of labor solidarity, met with limited success. The schemes of the large
British firms seeking to recruit strikebreakers in Shanghai and the smaller
south China ports were defeated through the cooperative efforts of the
Labor Secretariat and local branches of the Seamen's Union. These
efforts in turn afforded a greater influence to Chinese Communists among

the various seamen's organizations. 18

 

18For the impact of Marxism in China before 1921 and creation of
the Chinese Communist Party as a vehicle of proletarian aspirations, see
Wang Shih, Chug;kuo kung- ch'an-tang_1i- shih chien-mien (Shanghai: 1959);
Hu Hua, Chung-kuo ko-ming shih chianfl (Peking: 1959); and Benjamin
1. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass. :
1951). The failure of communist attempts to penetrate the Canton labor

21

In Canton, militants in the Seamen's Union such as Su Chao- cheng
and Lin Wei-min gained valuable experience in organizing and directing
the activities of the strikers. Their inclinations toward communism,
which led them ultimately to party membership at a time when they
headed the Seamen's Union, provided the Chinese Communist Party with
skilled labor organizers in the Canton area. The influence of such men
would later become the cause of much apprehension among moderates in
the Kuomintang who had grown accustomed to labor's exclusive support.
In 1922, however, while the propaganda efforts of the Chinese Communist
Party had gained much notoriety, their attempts to gain an important
place in the Canton labor movement continued to be repulsed. When, in
May, the Chinese Communist Party's Labor Secretariat convened an "All-
China Labor Congress" in Canton, it saw the chairmanship go to that
staunch Kuomintang adherent Hsieh Ying-po. Rather than finding itself
confirmed as leader of a revolutionary, country-wide coalition of union
organizations, the Secretariat was relegated to the position of a coordinat-
ing body until such time as a proper and more truly representative organi-

zation could be created. This defeat was further underlined when the

 

movement is seen in the ejection of Party members T'an P'ing-shan and
Feng Chu-p'o from the Kwangtung Mechanics' Union, and the failure of
the Labor Secretariat's attempt to create a rival federation to counter

the moderate unions. See Lao-kung yun-tung shih, Vol. I, p. 198-201;
and Chih-kung yun-tung chien- shih, p. 41. For the organization and
activities of the Labor Secretariat, see Ko-m-ing shih Chiang-i, p. 53-54;
and Jean Chesneaux, op. ci .,, ,p. 177-180. An example of the communist
propaganda circulated in Canton is discussed in The North China Herald,
February 11, 1922. ‘

22

Kwangtung General Labor Union (a Provincial federation which repre-
sented the more traditional handicraft unions formed in 1921-22) voted

to limit its actions to issues of a purely economic nature. 19

Canton Politics and the Kuomintang
First Party Congess

 

 

For Sun Yat- sen, the year 1922 was one of repeated failure. An
alliance of convenience with the northern warlord Chang Tso-lin not only
failed to gain power for Sun in Peking, but also turned some of his
Cantonese allies against him. The hostility of Ch'en Chiung-ming toward
a northern expedition which Sun undertook in 1922 as part of his obligation
in the northern alliance led to a Canton coup by Ch'en in June, forcing
Sun once more into exile in Shanghai. The Canton labor unions had

rallied to Sun's support, but their actions were quickly nullified by Ch'en's
Cantonese troops. The Canton merchants, already heavily taxed in

support of Sun's northern adventure, came out openly for Ch'en Chiung-

ming. Once in power in Canton, Ch'en courted Hong Kong and succeeded

in negotiating a sizeable loan. Although the loan was not approved until

after Ch'en was ousted from the city, his success must have been particu-
larly galling to Sun whose efforts to that end had always met with either
inaction or sharp rejection.

Despite such severe setbacks, Sun again launched plans for a vic-

torious return. His brief exile in Shanghai was spent in casting about

 

19For the activities of Sn Chao-cheng and Lin Wei-min in the Hong
Kong Seamen's Strike, see Hsiankkan hai- uan ta-pa-kun p. 16. Nym
Wales, 0 . cit. , p. 209, maintains that Su C ao-cheng (Su hao-jen)
joined tEeE-C'Einese Communist Party in 1925. The All-China Labor Con-
gress held in Canton on May 1-4, 1922, is discussed in Chih-kurglun-
tung chien- shih, p. 69-73. For the background and activities of the

Kwangtung General Labor Union, see Lao-kung yun-tung'shih, Vol. I,
p. 201-202.

 

 

 

once more for means with which to recapture his lost revolutionary base.
These efforts were twice blessed, for, in addition to obtaining the support
of Kwangsi and Yunnanese militarists which enabled him to recover Canton
in February, 1923, Sun met in Shanghai with Adolf Joffe; from his Soviet
sponsors the Kuomintang would ultimately derive massive support. 20

The activities of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang in 1923 are of
such complexity that they will only be briefly summarized here. In that
year, after failing in efforts to attract other Western support, Sun wel-
comed the arrival in Canton of Michael Borodin as the forerunner of a
Soviet political and military mission. Somewhat earlier, at the end of
1922, Sun had decided to admit members of the Chinese Communist Party
into the ranks of the Kuomintang. The decision that they could enter
only as individuals, but without renouncing other party memberships, did
little to dispel opposition among important elements in either party. In
1923, Sun continued the preparations which he had discussed earlier with

party leaders for reorganization of the Kuomintang. 21

 

20A survey of Sun's political fortunes in 1922-1923 is presented in
Li Chien-nung, op. cit., p. 417-419, and p. 425-428. Canton labor's
role in these events is analyzed in Jean Chesneaux, op. cit. , p. 202-203.
The Hong Kong loan to Ch'en Chiung-ming is discussed in The China
Weekly Review, October 28, 1922. For Sun's meeting with Joffe, see
Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: 1953),
p. 201-204. ‘

 

 

 

21Sun's actions in seeking Western support after his meeting with
J offe, and the activities of the Kuomintang in 1923 are subjected to careful
analysis in Walter Gourlay. op. cit. , p. 136 and p. 167. See also, :11:
North China Herald, January 26, 1923, p. 215; and March 24, 1923, p.
787.

24

In January, 1924, the Kuomintang held its First National Party
Congress. From that gathering in Canton emerged a reorganized and
vastly strengthened Nationalist Party. The resolutions adopted by the
Congress reaffirmed decisions reached in the previous year. The
alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the Chinese Communists,
and increased support for the Chinese workers and peasants were
emphasized. In addition, Sun Yat-sen's "Three Peoples' Principles"
(San min chu-i) took on new meaning as China's disunity was laid squarely
before the door of the imperialists and their militarist accomplices.

Sun's "Nationalism" became synonymous with anti-imperialism, and, for
those in Canton who had long suffered foreign abuse, anti-imperialism
increasingly came to mean hostility toward the dominant foreign interests
in south China--those of Great Britain. After January, 1924, there

could be little further question as to whom the Kuomintang saw as its
enemies. 22

In an attempt to overcome the military weakness which had plagued
Sun and his followers since 1911, the Kuomintang issued directives which
led to the founding of Whampoa Military Academy in May, 1924. With
assistance provided by Russian advisers and material aid supplied from
the Soviet Union, Whampoa, under its Commandant,Chiang Kai-shek, set

out to train an officer corps for the Kuomintang's armies of revolution. 23

 

22For the resolutions adopted at the First National Party Congress
together with the Kuomintang "Manifesto of 1923, " see Li Chien-nung,

Op. cit., p. 444- 458.

”mm. , p. 461-462.

25

The Merchant Cogps Incident and the Strike Against Shameen

While the accomplishments of the First Kuomintang Party Congress
must have encouraged those who shared that party's revolutionary aspira-
tions, they also energized the hostilities of those Cantonese to whom the
Kuomintang's new orientation seemed to portend disaster. Foremost
among the latter group were the Canton merchants. Already depressed
as a result of the earlier demands on their financial resources made by
Sun Yat-sen, the merchants now saw their economic security further
threatened. The precarious base upon which the Canton government
rested continued to consist, for the most part, of support by non—Cantonese
militarists whose dominant concerns were centered on gathering the riches
of the city into their own pockets. When, at the First Party Congress,
the Kuomintang announced with renewed vigor its intention to pursue the
goal of national revolution, those within its councils who had championed
the localist aims of provincial reform saw their influence eclipsed. De-
prived of a strong voice within the party and angered by Sun Yat-sen's
continued reliance on Kwangsi and Yunnanese militarist "guests, " the
Canton merchants in the spring of 1924 prepared to safeguard their own
interests.

In the Merchant Corps of Canton (Kuang-chou shang-t'uan), the com-

 

mercial interests of the city had a powerful force for defense against those

 

24For a description of the events leading up to the Merchant Corps
Incident, see Li Chien-nung, op. cit., p. 464; and Jean Chesneaux, pp.
Cite, P. 248‘250.

26

who would prey upon them. This organization could trace its history
back to the late Ch'ing period when, in emulation of a volunteer group in
Shanghai, it had organized in Canton to protect merchant interests from
criminal elements. In the period 1915-1924, under the leadership of
Ch'en Lien-p0 (the chief comprador in Canton of the powerful Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation), the Canton Merchant Corps had
experienced an impressive growth. Its troops, each having undergone

a six-month period of military training, by the end of 1923 numbered in
excess of 13, 000. Already an important factor in Canton, the Merchant
Corps also maintained a loose affiliation with other similar organizations

which had sprung up throughout Kwangtung province.

The Canton Merchant Corps had met its first serious challenge
successfully when, in 1922, it took the field against subordinates of Ch'en
Chiung-ming who, in the course of driving Sun Yat-sen out of Canton, had
begun looting the rich shops of the city. The following year, the Corps
had also withstood Kuomintang attempts to curb its influence. In the
first months of 1924, the Merchant Corps again came to the aid of those
shopkeepers who refused to accept the worthless currencies of Sun Yat-sen

pressed upon them by Sun's militarist allies. 26

 

25A most useful account of the Merchant Corps Incident of 1924 in
which the background of the Canton organization is described is Robert
B. Oxnam, "The Kuomintang and the Merchant Corps Affair, " (an un-
published paper, Dept. of History, Yale University, 1967).

26For the activities of the Canton Merchant Corps in 1922, see The
China Weekll Review, October 28, 1922, p. 320. Merchant Corps actions
in 1923 and 1924 are discussed in Oxnam, op. cit. , p. 27-28.

27

In an attempt to lessen the financial burdens which plagued his
government, Sun Yat-sen in 1924 continued with his policy of increased
taxation begun the year before and directed toward the Canton citizenry.
In response, the merchant community launched a series of strikes which
forced withdrawal of the hated taxes. Apprehensive that the Kuomintang
might turn to the use of force to obtain needed revenues, the Canton
merchant community, in May, 1924, organized the United Headquarters
of the Kwangtung All-Province Merchant Corps (Kuang-ttflch'uan-sheng
shapggt'uan-chun lien-fapgtsunflu). This organization, intended to
establish a firm link between the many local merchant volunteer groups
in the province and the Canton Merchant Corps, was to be formally
established on August 13, 1924. With troops numbering in excess of
100, 000, this expanded Merchant Corps posed a strong check on the con-
tinued financial exactions of the Kuomintang levied against Canton's
commercial interests.

When, in May, 1924, the government announced a new tax for muni-
cipal improvements, the Canton Merchant Corps called a general commer-
cial strike and mobilized its volunteers to thwart governmental interference.
As a result, the new tax was withdrawn and the strike rapidly came to an
end. In July, the Merchant Corps again came out in opposition to a 50
percent sales tax on all land transfers, and again the tax was rescinded.
In an attempt to curb the growing influence of this strong Cantonese

merchant coalition, the Kuomintang turned its efforts to bringing the

28

Merchant Corps under direct party control. When these efforts failed,
Liao Chung-k'ai, as governor of Kwangtung province, issued a decree
barring the planned inauguration of the United Headquarters of the Mer-
chant Corps scheduled to take place on August 13. The merchants of
Canton, in defiance of such authority, continued to insist that they were
entitled to a self-defense force free of government interference.

The growing hostility of the Canton merchants and the Kuomintang
government came to a moment of crisis in August, 1924. On August
10, a large shipment of arms arrived at Canton aboard the Norwegian
steamer _I-_1_a_v. Although these arms were purchased by the Merchant
Corps under a permit issued by the War Ministry of the Canton Govern-
ment, they were not scheduled to be received until early November.
Their arrival less than one week after the permit was issued roused
Kuomintang suspicions and forced the party leadership to move against
what was perceived as a serious threat to its position. On August 10,
under orders of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Wu T'ieh-ch'eng
(Canton Commissioner of Police) detained the £11 and confiscated its
entire cargo of weapons. The arms were then moved to Whampoa
Military Academy aboard the KMT gunboat Yung-feng. De spite this
damaging blow, the Canton merchants ignored the earlier warnings of
Liao Chung-k'ai and proceeded on August 13 with the inauguration of the

United Headquarters of the Merchant Corps at Watermelon Garden

 

2708113111., 02s Cits, ps 32'34s

29

(Hsi-kua yuan). Then, in the days that followed, the merchants re-

 

peatedly pressed the Canton Government to release the weapons and

recognize the United Headquarters. Still fearful that the Merchant

Corps was plotting the overthrow of his government, Sun Yat-sen refused

to consider their demands. 28
On August 19, Sun branded the leader of the Canton Merchant Corps

Ch'en Lien-p0 an outlaw and demanded his arrest. After making it

clear to merchant leaders that the KMT intended to monitor the actions

of the Corps very carefully, Sun agreed to return the seized weapons

only on the condition that the merchants would pay an additional Ch. $600, 000

for their release. The merchant response made on August 23 was an

ultimatum to the Canton Government that, unless their demands were met,

another commercial strike would be instituted. When Sun ignored the

ultimatum, the merchants struck, and despite Sun's threat on the 26th that

he would bombard Hsi-kuan (the wealthy commercial and residential

district in the heart of Canton), they refused to re-open their shops to

business. While failing to cow the merchants into submission, Sun's

threat brought an immediate and hostile foreign reaction. A joint reso-

lution drafted by the respective consuls of the powers in Canton warned

that any harm inflicted on foreigners or their properties would bring

retaliation. The British Consul-General went even further by announcing

 

28Ibid. ,1 p. 35-37; and Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, The Search
for a New Order in the Far East: 1921-1931 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1965),
p. 49-50. See also, Li Chien-nung, pp. cit., p. 464-466.

30

that, should Chinese authorities fire upon the city, they would face the
punishing salvos of the British naval forces assembled before Canton.

Sun responded with a ringing indictment of British imperialism; but

after withdrawing his threat, he turned his efforts to resolving the strike
through negotiation. In what amounted to a surrender of the Merchant
Corps to governmental control, the Canton merchants agreed to call off
the strike with the understanding that, upon receipt of a substantial cash
payment, the Canton Government would surrender the confiscated arms. 29

In September, Sun, despite opposition within the ranks of the KMT,
quit Canton and at Shao-kuan gathered his forces for a northern expedi-
tion. Party leaders in Canton, meanwhile, continued to drag their feet
on return to the merchants of the _I-_«I_a_\_r weapons. The threat of another
commercial strike finally gained forthe merchants the return of a portion
of the arms; however, dissatisfaction with both the quality and the quantity
of the weapons and ammunition delivered on October 11 led to the calling
of a second great commercial strike.

Sun Yat-sen's reaction to this latest merchant agitation, coupled
with rumors that the forces of Ch'en Ch'iung-ming were about to attack
Canton, led him to urge his followers to join him at Shao-kuan. When
he met sharp opposition from Chiang Kai-shek, Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Hu

Han-min and other party leaders on the issue of abandoning Canton as a

 

'290xnam, op. ci . , p. 39-43. The text of the British Consul-
General's note to the Canton authorities is in The South China Morning
Post, September 5, 1924. See also, Iriye, op. ci ., p. 49-50.

31

revolutionary base, he relented and agreed to suppression of the com-
mercial strike by force of arms. On October 15, 1924, a combined

government force made up of units of the Kwangtung Army (Yueh-chun),

 

the Whampoa cadets, the Labor Corps (Kung-t'uan-chg), the Peasant

 

Self-Defense Militia (NunLtzu -wei chun), and garrison troops under
the command of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, attacked the merchants then assembled
at Hsi-kuan. By the evening of the next day, the combined KMT army
emerged victorious and the power of the Cantonese merchant community
was shattered. Deprived of both their arms and their unified organiza-
tion, the merchants again fell victim to the demands of the Canton Govern-
ment for additional money and supplies. 30
In June, 1924, while the incident involving the ”Merchant Volunteers"
was occupying the attentions of the Canton Government, another event
occurred which was to test the anti-imperialistic stance adopted by the
Kuomintang earlier that year. On this occasion the setting was Shameen,
a small island housing the foreign concessions in Canton, which had been
reclaimed from the Pearl River in 1859. The French Governor-General
of Indochina, pausing there on his return from Tokyo, was wounded
by a Vietnamese nationalist. Mediately afterward, a new set of
police regulations geared to the careful screening of Chinese entering

or leaving the island were put into effect. In protest, all Chinese

 

3oOxnam, pp. cit., p. 59-62; Iriye, op. cit., p. 49-50; and Li
Chien-nung, op. cit., p. 466.

32

employees on Shameen, including Chinese policemen, went out on strike
on June 16. The strikers left the island for refuge in Canton, and once
there, demanded withdrawal of the new regulations together with apologies
from the foreign consuls. An organization created to manage the strike
assigned pickets to police the routes of access to Shameen and received
subscriptions from the Chinese in Canton for maintenance of the strikers.
In August, 1924, Sun Yat-sen intervened to bring the strike against
Shameen to an end. Although sympathetic to the strikers' aims as ex-
pressed in slogans denouncing the concessions on Shameen as a base for
foreign imperialism, Sun, in the face of renewed merchant hostility after
the _Iia_v incident, felt compelled to end the strike in the interests of
saving his endangered government. 31
The significance of the Shameen Strike of 1924 was accurately
gauged by the American Consul-General in Canton who at the time, in
a dispatch to Washington, said:

There is a general feeling here in Canton that this is merely the
beginning of more not only here but possibly in Hong Kong, Shanghai,
and elsewhere to embarrass the foreigners and secure political
advantages for China. The strike is well managed. . . . If the
Chinese succeed in this strike it seems reasonable to predict that

there will soon be other strikes of a similar pgture, not only here
in Canton, but elsewhere in the treaty ports.

 

31For an excellent discussion of the Shameen Strike of 1924, see
C. Martin Wilbur, "Forging the Weapons," an unpublished manuscript.
See also Jean Chesneaux, pp. cit., p. 247-248.

32Decimal Files, Department of State, Washington, 893. 5045/45,
Consul-General Jenkins to Schurman, Canton, August 2, 1924. C. Martin
Wilbur has appropriately referred to the Shameen Strike of 1924 as a

33

The Death of Sun Yat-sen

 

When Sun Yat-sen, in response to an invitation of China's most
powerful northern warlords (Tuan Ch'i-jui and Chang 'I‘so-lin), left Canton
for Peking in November, 1924, he did so on the assumption that his pres-
ence there would facilitate the creation of a unified nation in which his
Kuomintang would obtain an important place. Behind him in Canton, he
left a party still struggling to make secure its revolutionary base. The
Kuomintang, as it entered 1925, continued to rule in Canton under the
threat of powerful enemies. The British interests of south China, which
had come to such domination there that they were seen as an almost exclu-
sive incarnation of foreign imperialism, continued in their hostility toward
the followers of Sun Yat-sen. This hostility was further fueled by the
attachments of the Kuomintang to Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist
Party. Ch'en Chiung-ming and other Chinese militarists, in control of
much of Kwangtung province, continued in their efforts to dislodge the
Canton regime. In Canton, members of the merchant community and
other dissidents (some within the party itself) continued their opposition
to the Kuomintang's political program and its methods.

Despite this potent combination of forces bent upon its destruction,
the Kuomintang entered 1925 with a revolutionary potential unmatched in
its previous history. The assistance provided by the Soviet Union en-

abled the Whampoa Military Academy to become an important military

 

'dreas rehearsal" for the Canton-Hang Kong Strike and Boycott of 1925-
26. See op. cit., 42-44.

34

asset. The Academy's cadets, in 1925, would find important oppor-
tunities to prove their worth against the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming.

° The individual members of the Chinese Communist Party recruited
under the Kuomintang's banners would find 1925 a year filled with
opportunities for inducing others to join the revolutionary cause. The
Canton labor movement, after experiencing an unprecedented growth as
a result of its recent economic victories over the British in south China,
would, in 1925, increasingly use its new-found influence to support the
political aims of its protector--the Kuomintang.

In the spring of 1925, the Kuomintang launched its first Eastern
Expedition against the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming, and through it
succeeded in temporarily thwarting that militarist's ambitions to retake
Canton. In March, Sun Yat-sen, his dreams for China still unfulfilled,
died in Peking. Alive, Sun, through the force of his personality and
great revolutionary prestige, had succeeded in maintaining discipline
among the many contentious elements which made up the Kuomintang.
With his passing came the eruption of an intense struggle for leadership
and power among those who considered themselves his revolutionary

heirs.

The May Thirtieth Incident: A Call to Battle
Even as Sun lay dying, the agitation of Chinese workers in the treaty
ports took on a new vitality. Already, in February, 1925, the death of

a Chinese child laborer in a Japanese textile mill in Shanghai had led to

35

a strike. When, in April, the management of a Japanese mill in Tsingtao
refused to recognize a Chinese labor union, the workers staged a walk-
out. When these workers defied the company's representatives by
occupying its factories, the Governor of Shantung, on May 28, arrested
their leaders and disbanded their organization. In Shanghai, another
strike begun in early May against Japanese mills gained prominence
when, on the 15th, concession police killed a Chinese laborer. 33
The arrest of a number of students found to be circulating hand-
bills protesting the killing, further inflamed Chinese passions in the
following weeks. When on lVIay 30 several hundred Chinese demonstrators
Inarched on the Louza police station demanding the release of students
imprisoned there, the moment of crisis arrived. The British inspector.
fearing for his life and those of his men, ordered them to fire into the
ranks of the advancing Chinese. Nine students and workers were killed
and more than twenty were seriously wounded. On June 1, 100, 000
Chinese workers in Shanghai went out on strike. To meet this emergency,
more than twenty foreign warships entered the Whangpoo River. In addi-
tion, foreign troops were landed to reinforce those already assigned to

the protection of Western commercial interests. The May Thirtieth

incident quickly found an echo throughout China as clashes pitting Chinese

 

33A comprehensive study which explores events leading up to the
May Thirtieth incident, the incident itself, and its immediate consequences
is Hsieh-hua et. a1. , Wu-sa yun-tppg (Peking: 1956). For the role of
Chinese workers in this incident, see Chesneaux, op. cit. , p. 262-289.
See also, Iriye, op. cit., p. 57-60.

 

aga

- u)
“-

,fll

36

against Japanese and British residents and soldiers became common-
place in cities such as Shanghai, Nanking, Wuhu, Kiukiang, Hankow,
Changsha, and Chungking. Beginning in late June, 1925, boycotts were
directed against both Japanese and British goods; and, it was then that
a loosely coordinated national movement aimed at eliminating foreign
control became widespread. For the Western powers, the May Thirtieth
incident marked a major turning point in relations with China. Thrown
on the defensive, the powers found themselves doggedly defending the
century-old prerogatives enjoyed in that country against the inevitable
day of their extinction. 34
For the government at Peking, the May Thirtieth incident posed a
dilemma. All too quickly it became apparent that the movement sparked
by that incident was as much directed against China's warlords as it was
against continued foreign imperialism. If the Peking Government we re
to give its enthusiastic support to the demands being voiced by the Chinese,
it would risk losing foreign (particularly Japanese) support. On the
other hand, accommodation to the foreign interests would most certainly
strengthen that government's domestic enemies. A solution was found
in the dual policy of posing as the chammon of Chinese anti- imperialism
and demanding revision of the unequal treaties. The first of these en-

abled the Peking Government to divert attention from the Japanese and

concentrate Chinese economic‘attacks almost exclusively upon the British.

 

34Iriye, op. cit., p. 60-62.

37

The second made it possible to retain Chinese support while attempting
to further enhance its own position. While the first of these policies
proved successful, the second was ultimately to fail. 35

' In part, the failure of the Peking Government to achieve treaty
revision was due to the actions of the Kuomintang and its allies at Canton.
There the May Thirtieth incident was to spark a struggle of such intensity

that, at its height, it threatened total eradication of all British influence

in south China and the bastion of that influence--Hong Kong.

 

35mm.

CHAPTER II

THE CANTON-HONG KONT STRIKE AND BOYCOTT

OF 1925-1926: THE OPENING PHASE

"Down Tools!" The Strtggle Begi_n_s

In Canton, although sympathetic meetings of protest had occurred
as early as June 2nd, the news of tragic events in Shanghai remained a
secondary concern in the first weeks of June, 1925. There the Kuomin-
tang was preoccupied with yet another struggle against its domestic
enemies. In May of that year, party leaders, convinced that the Kwangsi
and Yunnanese militarists Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan were plotting
their overthrow, turned on their former benefactors by planning a military
campaign designed to rid the city of their parasitic influence. When, on
June 13th, Kuomintang forces succeeded in eliminating the threat of the
"guest armies" at Canton, attention shifted dramatically to the plight of

those Chinese who had fallen before imperialist bullets in Shanghai. 1
In meetings held throughout Canton in the days which followed,

students, labor leaders, and many Kuomintang members urged a political

 

1For a discussion of the KMT campaign against the forces of Yang
Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan in May and June, 1925, see Tungfang tsa-chih,
Vol. XXII, No. 13, July 10, 1925, p. 4-5. See also, Lao-kung yun-tung
shih, Vol. II, p. 401. For an official British view of this conflict together
with a discussion of the attempts of the Kwangsi and Yunnanese militarists
to secure aid from Hong Kong, see F0 371/10421, Jamieson to Palairet,
Canton, May 22, 1925.

 

38

39

strike against the strongholds of foreign influence in south China. A
political strike against Hong Kong, Shameen, and Macao, they argued,
could best give expression to the indignation and outrage felt by most
Cantonese over the recent tragedy in Shanghai. Hong Kong and Shameen
must have seemed particularly attractive targets--for the actions of
recent years had shown both to be extremely vulnerable when confronted
by a Chinese work stoppage. In the streets of Canton, agitators, antici-
pating a favorable Kuomintang response, recounted the "Shanghai butchery"
and urged their listeners to prepare for action.

Foreigners in Hong Kong and on Shameen, given over to rumors
and nervous speculation concerning Chinese intentions, became daily
more apprehensive. Many of their worst fears were soon realized. On
the morning of June 18th, in an action which symbolized the beginnings
of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and Boycott, the senior students of
Queen's College, Hong Kong (numbering about 700) abandoned their
dormitories and departed for Canton. Joining them were large numbers
of household servants and other Chinese unnerved by the inflammatory
contents of the pamphlets and handbills then circulating in the British
colony. That day also, the Hong Kong Seamen's Union called out its
membership, and again as in 1922 foreign firms in the colony found them-

selves in conflict with their most formidable adversary.

 

2386 RUG-17811 m June 21, 1925; and Lao-kung yun-tung
shih, Vol. II, p. 401. Representative of Hong Kong newspapers which
devoted much space to the activities of agitators in Canton is The Hong
KoiTeleiraph, June 15, and 17, 1925.

 

40

As the Chinese crews of both ocean-going and coastal steamers
fled Hong Kong, they were accompanied by newspaper compositors, pork
butchers, and the drivers and conductors of the Electric Tramway Com-
pany. On June 20th, when the cargo-carrying coolies began leaving,

J ardine , Mathe son and Company, that powerful British firm with a history
in China predating the Opium War, received word that its stevedores
would go out the next day. As the exodus of Chinese workers to Canton
continued to swell, many westerners in Hong Kong began to suspect what
the events of June 23rd opposite the Shameen were to ensure—-that this
was to become a political struggle aimed at the very life of the British
colony.

On Shameen, a strike began June 20th when Chinese servants left
their foreign masters and crossed over into Canton. The following day,
they were joined by the Chinese office employees on the island together
with virtually all of the comprador staff. By June 22nd, all Chinese,
with the exception of a few who continued to serve as part of an
unarmed Chinese police force, had left Shameen. The suspension of
all steamer traffic from Hong Kong on the let only served to heighten

the sense of isolation always felt by the island's nervous foreign residents.

 

3The anxieties of foreign residents in Hong Kong and on Shameen
before the strike began is reflected in the three English newspapers--T_l_1_e
South China Morning Post, The Hong Kong Daily_Press, and The Hong
KogLTelegraph. See each for the period June 15-18, 1925. The begin-
nings of the Canton-Hang Kong Strike and Boycott are described in Chih-
k_ung yun-tunichien-shih, p. 196-200, Lao-kung m-tung diih, Vol. II,
p. 401-403,. and Shun 2°! June 22, 23, and 27, 1925. For the views of

 

41

The Canton Strike Committee

As strikers fleeing Hong Kong and Shameen arrived in Canton,
they were met by representatives of a powerful body charged with the
task of providing organization and leadership in the workers' struggle
against those two citadels of foreign domination. This body was the
Canton Strike Committee. At the onset of the Chinese walkout in Hong
Kong, a "Strike Congress" was organized in Canton with a membership
consisting of one representative from among each group of 50 strikers.
This Congress in turn elected 13 of its more than 800 members to the
Canton Strike Committee. The Committee, as the workers' highest
executive organ, faced a number of difficult tasks in its management
of strike related activities. As a result, a number of subcommittees
with responsibilities for finance, picket organization, propaganda, and
strike administration were created. Others of lesser importance were
charged with tasks in communication, recreation, or education. Once
met by representatives of the Canton Strike Committee, Chinese workers
who had fled Hong Kong or Shameen were taken to either Strike Head-
quarters in Tung-yuan (Eastern Garden), or to one of eight district offices
created in various parts of Canton for purposes of registration. The re

the strikers were provided with the means for obtaining food, lodging,

 

British officials in south China on the origins of the strike and boycott,
see F0 405/248, "Extracts From Hong Kong Monthly Intelligence
Summary No. 7, 1925, " p. 300-301; and F0 371/10943, Jamieson to
Palairet, Canton, June 22, 1925.

42

and a small daily allowance for the duration of their struggle.

Although the Canton Strike Committee initially reflected the will
of the Kuomintang which served as its protector, it quickly came to be
dominated by Chinese Communists who had joined the party of Sun
Yat-sen. Beginning in 1924 with the tacit consent of Liao Chung-k'ai,
the Kuomintang leader entrusted with guiding that party's labor affairs,
the Canton Communists began a concerted drive aimed at wresting con-
trol of the Canton labor movement from the hands of those stalwart
organizers Ma Ch'ao-chun and Hsieh Ying-po. The strength of the latte r,
despite numerous Communist attempts to penetrate its ranks, remained
concentrated in the Kwangtung Mechanics Union-~without question the
most powerful labor organization in the province. By the summer of
1925, the Canton Communists had, however, achieved some important
gains.

Their most impressive victory was among the Cantonese seamen.
When in 1922, Ch'en Ping-shan, that friend of Sun Yat-sen and leader
of the Hong Kong Seamen's Union, had been banished from the British
colony as a criminal following the murder of his wife, leadership of his

unionpassed into the hands of younger and more radical members.

 

4The organization and activities of The Canton Strike Committee
and The Strike Congress are described in Lao-kung m-tmfihm, Vol.
II, p. 411; Chi-ch'i higgL-jen-hui tou-shih, p. 104-105; and The South
China Morning Post, December 31, 1925. The Canton Strike Committee
is also described by TengChung-hsia, one of its Communist members,
in Chih-kun -tun chien-shih, p. 227.

 

 

43

Among these young firebrands was Su Chao-cheng, who, having emerged
as leader of the seamen, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925.
When, at the start of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike, the Kwangtung
Mechanics demonstrated a reluctance to participate or lend support, Su
Chao-cheng, with the backing of Liao Chung-k'ai and others in the Kuo-
mintang, became the leader of the Canton Strike Committee. Other
Communists such as Teng Chung-hsia, Lo Teng-hsien, and Ch'en Ch'uan

became its dominant figures.

Hong Kong and Shameen: Girdingor Battle

In Hong Kong, attempts to combat the strike were initiated on June
let, when the Governor, Sir R. E. Stubbs, declared a state of emer-
gency. Hoping to curb acts of terrorism and dispel the panic which had
gripped many Chinese in the colony, the Governor ordered immediate
reinstitution of the "Peace Preservation Ordinance of 1886" and the
"Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1922. " In an effort to prevent
incidents of bomb-throwing or sabotage, the "Hong Kong Volunteers,"
a force first organized during the Seamen's Strike in 1922 and patterned
after the western militia of the foreign concessions in S hanghai, was
mobilized for immediate action. Guards were posted in the Electric

Light Works, the Water Works, and other vital points throughout the

 

5For the assistance provided by Liao Chung-k'ai to the Canton
Comrnunists'in 1924, see Gourlay, op. cit., p. 204. The rise of Su
Chao-cheng to prominence in the Hong Kong Seamen's Union is discussed

in Lao-kung .m-tung gih, Vol. I, p. 140; and in Wales, 22.5.1.9: p. 209.

'h

44

colony. In the electrical installations and dockyards, naval ratings
we re charged with performing all essential services. Together with
civilian volunteers, naval ratings also manned harbor launches and
maintained an abbreviated schedule of harbor crossings on the ”Star"
ferries.

- Emergency regulations, introduced ostensibly to safeguard food
supplies, placed a ban on the export of rice, flour, tinned and preserved
foodstuffs, and currency to Canton. When, due to the non-arrival of
Japanese ships, the price of coal in Canton jumped from $8 to $28 per
ton, Governor Stubbs revealed the true purpose of these measures by
forbidding the export of coal to Canton except under special license from
the Colonial Secretary. 7

Fearing a violent Chinese reaction, the Governor wisely chose not
to commandeer labor as he had during other earlier labor disputes.
Instead, he appointed a Labor Controller who sought to recruit substitutes
from among Hong Kong's large pool of unskilled Chinese. Controllers
for Food and Transport were also appointed; they encountered little

difficulty in finding Westerners in the colony eager to provide voluntary

 

6These initial attempts to combat the strike were for the most part
defensive and reflected a good deal of uncertainty with regard to the
strikers ultimate aims. See FO 405/248, F 3668/194/10, Enclosure,
Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, June 26, 1925; and F0 405/248, "Extracts
From Hong Kong Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 7, 1925, " p. 300- 301.
7Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information, The Chinese
Economic Bulletin, Peking, January 2, 1926, p. 4, and The Hong Kong
Telegraph, July 6,1925.

 

45

assistance. A Censor, charged with screening Chinese letters, tele-
grams, and newspapers, succeeded in enticing a few wealthy Chinese to
assist in his tasks.

Attempts to counter unfavorable propaganda and halt the intimida-
tion of Chinese workers ‘led the police department to publication of the
following:

Whereas certain evil-disposed persons are endeavoring by speeches
and pamphlets to disturb the peace and good order of the colony, and
the Government is determined to take severe measures against such
malefactors, it is hereby notified that a reward of $250 will be paid
for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any person so
offending. The Government further undertakes to keep silent the
identity of the informer.

Despite the assurance of anonimity, few Chinese came forward to make
accusations, and the Government began casting about for stronger
measures. A new notification was issued indicating that any person in
Hong Kongfound to be without regular employment would be arrested and
deported. Remembering well the catastrophic consequences of his
attempt in 1922 to restrict the movement of Chinese from the colony,
Governor Stubbs made no move to restrict their new exodus. 10

Beginning in 1923, Hong Kong had experienced a dramatic building

boom. As a result, heavy overspeculation in both real estate and the

 

8Fo 405/248, F 3668/194/10, Enclosure No. 51, Stubbs to Amery,
Hong Kong, June 26, 1925.

9The Hong Kong Telegraph, June 22, 1925; and The South China
MM. June 23. 1925.

10CO 129/488, C 36829, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, July 10,
1925; and Hong Kong Government, Government Gazette Extraordinary,
Hong Kong, July 6, 1925.

46

shares issued by local firms had seriously weakened the market When
the strike against Hong Kong began in June 1925, the market collapsed,
and the Governor was forced to close the Stock Exchange and grant a
moratorium to Chinese banks in the colony. 11
On Shameen, the strike created fears among the small foreign
enclave which were far different in nature from those expressed in Hong
Kong. Separated only by a canal less than 100 feet across from the un-
friendly inhabitants of Canton, Shameen's inhabitants nervously remem-
bered the wave of anti-foreign resentment which had erupted throughout
China in the wake of the May Thirtieth incident. Resentment such as
that which surfaced at Hankow on June 12th when an angry Chinese mob,
seemingly intent on slaughter, advanced against a British armory only
to be repulsed by foreign bullets. In the first weeks of June, Shameen's
defenders redoubled their efforts in military preparation. By mid-
month, the tiny island had taken on the appearance of an armed camp.
Barricades and barbed-wire defenses guarded the French and British
bridges which served as routes of access from Canton. From windows
and rooftops, sandbagged machine- gun emplacements faced out toward
the Chinese city. Anchored nearby, ever-present foreign gunboats lay
ready for action. When the last group of Chinese strikers left the island

on June 22nd, for many Westerners there, news of a Chinese march of

 

llGovernor Stubbs' efforts to avert a financial panic are reported
in CO 129/489, C 40885, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 8, 1925.

47

protest past Shameen scheduled for the next day took on an ominous

12

significance.
Already, the French Consul, reacting to warnings from the com-

prador of the Bank lndustriale that the concession would be looted during

the march, had ordered all valuables transferred to a waiting gunboat.

An agitated Sir James W. Jamieson, the British Consul-General, sent

a note to Canton officials stressing the need for strenuous Chinese efforts

to preserve the peace. After repeating the rumor that students of the

University of Kwangtung drawn by lot would be the first to storm Shameen's

bridges, Jamieson concluded by warning--”any attempt to penetrate on

to the British concession on Shameen will be resisted by force of arms. "13

The Shameen Incident-~June 23J 1925
At 11 a. m. on the morning of June 23, 1925, members of the
Political Bureau of the Kuomintang together with the Soviet adviser Borodin

addressed a large crowd assembled on the Eastern Parade Ground in

12The strike against Shameen is described in ng-fwflsa-chih,
Vol. XXII, No. 14, July 25, 1925, p. 4-5; Shun E0! June 22, 1925; and
in F0 371/10943, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, June 22, 1925. A re-
port on the island's defenses before June 23rd is in F0 405/248, ”Ex-
tracts From Monthly Intelligence Report, " Scott to Commodore, p. 301-
304. A somewhat critical view of the Shameen defenses was expressed
by James M. Henry, then president of Canton Christian College, in a
letter to a colleague. See Lingnan Records (Canton Christian College),
July-December, 1925, Box 44, Henry to Grant, Canton, July 15, 1925.
These records are available in the Harvard-Yenching Library.

l3Jamie‘son's warning to the Canton Minister for Foreign Affairs
is in F0 405/248, F 4118/194/10, Enclosure No. 4, Jamieson to C. C.
Wu, Canton, June 23, 1925. For the precautionary actions of the French
Consul prior to June 23rd, see FO 405/248, F 3473/194/10, Enclosure
No. 5, Jamieson to Hu Han-min, Canton, June 24, 1925.

48

Canton. Those in attendance heard once again of the abusive practices
of foreign imperialists in China. Wang Ching-wei launched, as he had
before a student audience a few days earlier, a heated attack against
the unequaltreaties; he concluded again with the demand that they be
eliminated. Following this and other stirring exercises in oratory, a
protest march formed and began winding its way through the city.

The various contingents, each carrying flags, posters, or anti-foreign
banners, were separated by a few yards and consisted of middle-school
and college students, boy scouts, members of peasant associations,
members of labor unions, soldiers, and the cadets of Whampoa Military
Academy. Including stragglers picked up on the line of march, the
procession numbered approximately 20, 000 persons.

At 2:30 in the afternoon, the marchers turned on to Shakee Road
and began moving down the bund which faced Shameen across the narrow
and then swollen canal. As they moved past the French bridge at one
end of the island toward the British bridge at the other, each group of
demonstrators hurled angry insults toward the Shameen spectators. On
Shameen, amid increasing feelings of unease, the nervous military and
civilian defenders with weapons ready watched from the shelter of their
fortifications. Shortly after 3 p. m. , much of the procession having
already passed the British sector without incident, a sudden commotion
broke out among those marchers directly opposite the island. When

rifle shots rang out, many of the panicked marchers stumbled over their

49

comrades as they hurridly sought cover in the already spectator-clogged
narrow alleys which emptied onto Shakee Road. The Chinese soldiers
and military cadets quickly knelt, loaded their weapons, and began firing
toward Shameen. On the island, their discipline shattered, the defend-
ers poured a murderous and indiscriminate hail of machine-gun, rifle,
and small-arms fire into the Chinese struggling to flee the bund. Nearby,
a French gunboat firing two or three blank shells further contributed to
the Chinese panic. Within ten minutes, all firing but that of a few per-
sistent snipers had ceased. On the Shakee side lay 52 Chinese dead and
117 wounded. On Shameen, one noncombatant (a French merchant) was
killed, and a few spectators and defenders were wounded. 14

Immediately, each side began accusing the other of having premedi-
tated the tragedy. Chinese in Canton insisted that foreigners had will-
fully fired upon peaceable marchers without provocation. The British

and French Consuls countered by arguing that it was the Chinese who

 

14Among the most useful accounts of the Shameen Incident (also
termed the Shameen Affair or the Shakee Maccacre) found in the records
of the Historical Archives Commission of the Kuomintang, Ts'ao-t'un,
Taiwan, are Sha-mien shih-chien ti chien- shih (Canton: n. d. ): Sha-mien
ts'an- sha an-chien (Canton: 1925); and Sha-ki ts'an- sha shih (Canton:
1925). Newspaper accounts of this incident are Shun pao, July 4, 7,
and 13, 1925; and Kuo-wen chou-pao, July 5, 1925. See also, "Sha-
rnien shih-chien, " in Tung—fangtsa-chih, Vol. XXII, No. 14, July 25,
1925, p. 4-5. For official British accounts, see FO 405/248, F 3473/
194/10, Enclosure No. l, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, June 25, 1925;
and Enclosure No. 5, Jamieson to Hu Han-min, Canton, June 24, 1925.
The report of the British Commander on Shameen is in F0 405/248,
"Extracts From Monthly Intelligence Report, " Scott to Commodore, p.
303-304.

50

fired first, and that British and French efforts to repulse the "attack
upon Shameen" required no further justification. While tensions re-
mained high, each side began gathering evidence from witnesses whose
testimony could improve their case. The changing views of witnesses
subjected to strong political pressures only served to heighten the

controversy. 15

 

15The Chinese claim that the British and French were prepared

at the height of the incident to open the gates guarding the island's bridges
and attack Canton appears unsound. It would have been foolhardy in the
extreme for Shameen's defenders to expose themselves when they were
so heavily outnumbered. The further claim that Shameen's defenders
used soft-nosed bullets was proven false by the American doctor in Canton
Hospital who treated Chinese casualties. Given the seriousness of
wounds inflicted by machine-gun bullets fired at a range of less than 100
yards, however, to many Chinese observers this claim could easily have
seemed true. See FO 405/250, F 4367/194/10, Annex VIII, Enclosure
No. 1, Thompson to Jenkins, Canton, August 31, 1925; and Enclosure
No. 2, Thompson to Lei Ying-lam, Canton, August 31, 1925. The issue
of soft—nosed or "dumdum" bullets did not end here, for at a later date,
the Governor of Hong Kong accused Chinese strike pickets of employing
them against British police in the New Territories. The British and
French use of the term "attack upon Shameen" seems highly inappropriate
since no Chinese attempted to penetrate the concessions. The British
claim that the firing was begun by Russian snipers concealed on rooftops
in Canton, lacks supporting evidence. Authorities in Canton found many
Chinese witnesses prepared to testify that Shameen had fired first. In
addition, they found a number of westerners to support their case. A
declaration of 17 American staff members (actually the re we re only 15)
of Lingnan (Canton Christian College) stated that the Shameen defenders
had fired first. Their declaration was based, however, on reports given
them by their students. See Lingnan Records, "Resolutions issued by 17
American Staff Members, " Box 44, June 24, 1925. A German merchant
in Canton, who took it upon himself to speak for his nation's commercial
community, also denounced the actions of Shameen. See FO 405/248,

F 3747/194/10, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, June 30, 1925. When the
British vice-president of Lingnan was confronted with the American dec-
laration in Hong Kong, he maintained that he had signed it under duress
and repudiated its contents. Actually, he had signed another document
composed by the Chinese staff at Lingnan. See W Baxter

51

In its formal note of protest to each of the diplomatic representa-

tives on Shameen, the Canton Government concluded:

Inasmuch as the recent massacre of Chinese subjects constitutes
a complete abrogation of all the laws of humanity and cannot by
universal law be tolerated, we make the following demands:--

(1) Apologies will be made by High Commissioners appointed by the
Powers’interested to the Government of Canton.

(2) The senior officers responsible shall be punished.

(3) With the exception of two dispatch vessels, all naval units of the
Powers interested shall be withdrawn.

(4) Shameen shall be returned to the Government of Kwangtung and
placed under the administration thereof.

(5) The victims and their families shall be compensated. 16’

The British and French Consuls responded by rejecting all Chinese de-
mands. Under instruction from their ministries in Peking, each
countered with a demand for indemnity to cover casualties and the costs

of repair to concession properties. In addition, each insisted that the

 

to Henry, Box 44, June 28, 1925. Some members of the American staff,
on leave in Hong Kong, were subjected to harassment and continued abuse
and, in consequence, altered their earlier views. See Lingnan Records,
Graybill to Baxter, and Duncan to Baxter, Box 44, July 15, 1925. Consul-
General Jamie son on Shameen stood by his own eye-witness account and
that of a few other foreign observers. See F0 405/ 248, F 3473/194/10,
Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, June 25, 1925; and Enclosure No. 5,
Jamieson to Hu Han-min, Canton, June 24, 1925. See also, FO 371/10948,
"Statement of Four Witnesses of the Attack on Shameen, " Canton, 'June

23, 1925. Following meetings of a Chinese Commission of Investigation
called by Hu Hanomin, and described in Shun 230, July 13, 1925, the

KMT published its official account of the Shameen tragedy. See June
Twenty-third (Canton: 1925). The British responded with June 23rd--
The True Facts (Hong Kong: 1925). Both documents were geared y“
primarily to obtaining foreign support. ‘ ‘ '

l6See F0 405/248, r 3743/194/10, Enclosure No. 2, Fu P’ing-
ch'ang to British Consul-General and French Consul, Kwangtung, June
26, 1925.

52

Chinese increase their efforts to safeguard the lives of foreigners in and
around Canton. 17

While passions remained inflamed because of the events of June
23rd, among the Soviet advisers to the Kuomintang in Canton, a minority
favored an immediate armed attack against Shameen. Others, convinced
that the British would soon launch a major attack, argued in favor of a
raid upon Hong Kong and joined with Chiang Kai-shek in advocating a
declaration of war against Great Britain. Aware of the probability, once
hostilities began, that the Kuomintang would lose Canton as its revolution-
ary base, those who favored war kept faith in the belief that a new and
greater revolutionary movement would emerge in the hinterland. While
the view of men who favored a resort to arms failed to gain acceptance
witlnn the inner councils of the Kuomintang, many there shared in the
belief that a British attack upon Canton was imminent. As a result,
efforts were made to strengthen the forts guarding the approaches to the
city. In the event a British flotilla left the harbor at Hong Kong, heavy
stones and other bulky obstacles were to be sunk in the channel leading to

Canton. 18

 

l7See ro 405/248, r 3743/194/10, Enclosure No. 5, Jamieson to
Hu Han-min, Canton, June 24, 1925; and Enclosure No. 6, Leurquin to
Hu Han-lnin, Canton, June 23, 1925. See also, FO 405/248, F 3914/194/
10, Palairet to Chamberlain, Peking, July 5, 1925.

18See C. Martin Wilbur and Julie L. Y. How, Documents on Com-
munism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, New
York, 1956, p. 160-161, and 176. See also, The South China Mornigg
2235, January 26, 1926.

53

The Impact of June 23rd

 

For the Canton Strike Committee, the "Shakee Massacre" occurred
during a crucial period in its existence. Prior to the institution of the
strike against Hong Kong and Shameen, influential groups in Canton had
lobbied against such a work stoppage. Among the Prince Clique (a
Western-educated group within the Kuomintang whose interests centered
upon local reform), there were some like Wu T'ieh-ch'eng the Canton
Commissioner of Public Safety (Chief of Police) who initially opposed all
strike action.I Other leaders of this group, men like Sun Fo (Sun K'o)
the son of Sun Yat-sen, C. C. Wu (Wu Chao-chu) the Mayor and Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and Fu P'ing-ch'ang the Provincial Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs, had urged, while enroute from Swatow to Canton in
June, 1925, that a strike be limited to a political demonstration of three
days. A conservative bloc within the Kuomintang (later known as the
Western Hills Group) remained unreconciled to the policies which had
opened their party to Soviet assistance and the participation of Chinese
Communists. For them the Canton Strike Committee seemed to represent

a most dangerous ally, and at a later date they subjected it to bitter

attacks. 19

Most Cantonese merchants, then still recovering from disruptions

to business incurred during the campaign to oust the Kwangsi and

 

19For the views on the strike expressed by Sun Fo, C. C. Wu, and’
Fu P'ing- ch'ang in Hong Kong (while enroute to Canton in June, 1925),
see FO 405/248, F 3668/194/10, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, June 26,
1925. British assessments of opposition to the strike in Canton are in
CO 129/489, C 45193, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, September 4, 1925;

54

Yunnanese militarists from the city, had also looked with disfavor on the

institution of a strike. Among labor unions in Canton, a number of leaders
insisted that, without direct financial assistance from the government, a
strike would remain unsustainable. The costs of the Hong Kong Seamen's

Strike of 1922 together with those which attended the Shameen Strike of
1924 had, they argued, left their unions with depleted strike funds. 20

When the strike against Hong Kong and Shameen commenced on
June 18, 1925, these groups began to coalesce in opposition. Before
they could act, however, the tragedy of June 23rd occurred; and their
influence was defused if not extinguished. The Shameen incident, by
galvanizing the anti-imperialistic sentiments of Chinese in Canton, led
not only to an extension of the strike; but also to the institution of an
anti-British (at first anti-foreign) boycott.

Even before the incident opposite Shameen, the Canton Strike
Corrunittee had made some tentative steps toward the implementation of
an anti-Western boycott. Most important among these was the organiza-
tion of a picket corps. From the ranks of the many strikers in Canton
pickets were recruited, armed, drilled, and formed into squads, com-
panies, platoons, and regiments. Eventually they would total more than

2, 000 members. Their primary function was to sever all contact between

Canton and Hong Kong, Shameen, and Macao; and to prevent the landing

 

and The Hong Kong Telegraph, June 18 and 19. 1925. For the term
"Princes' Clique" as well as much background regarding the actions of
this group, I am indebted to Prof. Walter Gourlay, Michigan State Univ.
For the actions of this group before 1925, see Gourlay, op. cit. . p. 63-5.

20Chih-kung mn-tung chien-shih, p. 199-200-

55

of Western goods in the areas under their control. 21

By the end of June, 1925, the picket corps (easily distinguished
because of their blue uniforms with red armbands) were seen everywhere
in the Canton area successfully carrying out their tasks. They examined
all merchandise entering or leaving the city by whatever means, and
monitered the movements of all persons arriving or departing Canton.
Those found in violation of the strike and boycott regulations issued by
the Canton Strike Conunittee were arrested, paraded through the streets,
and tried before a special court established by the Committee. If found
guilty, and most were, they were forced to pay heavy fines or face
imprisonment in the jail created by the Strike Committee at its head-
quarters. All goods entering Canton from Hong Kong, regardless of
their country of origin, were ordered confiscated and sold at public
auction. 22

On Shameen, the days immediately following June 23rd remained

suspenseful. The island's weary defenders continued to anticipate an

 

fi—

21For the organization of strike pickets in Canton, see Lao-kung
Yun-tung ‘1th Vol. II, p. 411; and Chih-kung yun-tung chien-shih, p.
230. See also, Chen Ta, The Chinese Economic Journal, Vol. I, No. 11,
November, 1927, p. 951.

22For the activities of the strike pickets, see J. C. Huston, notes
dated July 28, August 6, and September 17, 1925, in the Huston Collection;
and George Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton, " The North China
Herald, May 1, 1926, p. 230-231. and May 8, 1926, p. 280. A'Eetailed
account of the effectiveness of strike pickets in Canton and on the frontier
of the New Territories is provided by Sir C. Clementi (the successor to
Sir R. E. Stubbs as Governor of Hong Kong) in F0 405/251, F 1775/1/10,
Enclosures Nos. 2 and 3, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, February 18,
1926.

 

56

all-out Chinese attack at any moment. On the 25th, they welcomed a
battalion of Indian troops dispatched from Hong Kong to reinforce their
positions. All women and children were evacuated to the British colony,
and British subjects in the vicinity of Canton were advised to limit their
movements. With the arrival of two French warships and the French
Commander-in-Chief, British Consul-General Jamieson advised London
on the 29th that he saw no need for additional B’ritish ships or men. The
Adrn'ralty, aware of Chinese military preparations in the Bogue forts,
nevertheless ordered the aircraft carrier Hermes to Hong Kong. Her
arrival August 10th came well after the initial crisis had passed. When
in July, 1925, rumors reached Hong Kong that suggested a Chinese gas
attack using airplanes was about to be launched against Shameen, British
authorities responded by sending a supply of gas-masks to the isolated
British concession. 23

For the commercial community in Hong Kong, news of the Shameen
incident created a deepening despair. In its initial phase, the strike

against them had reflected few local grievances. The demands voiced

in Canton had merely mirrored those expressed in Shanghai in the course

 

Z3Precautionary measures taken on Shameen after June 23rd are
reported in F0 405/248, 1? 3474/194/10, Enclosure No. 3, Jamieson to
Palairet, Canton, June 25, 1925; and Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton,
June 29, 1925. An account emphasizing the physical deterioration of
Shameen during this period is Lewis Gannett, "Why Canton is Radical
Center of Asia," The China Weekly Review, June 12, 1926, p. 30. The
rumored gas attack and the dispatch of gas-masks to Shameen are dis-
cussed in F0 405/248, F 4258/2/10, Enclosure No. l, Jamieson to
Palairet, Canton, July 24, 1925.

57

of the May Thirtieth incident. The 17 Shanghai demands, in addition to
expressing usual labor concerns such as the right to strike, to form
trade unions, to adapt the eight-hour day, and to abolish the contract
labor (pao-kung) system, had also aimed at achieving a greater involve-
ment for Chinese in treaty port affairs. Prominent among the political
demands were those for freedom of speech, assembly, and publication
for Chinese in the International Settlement. In addition, the Shanghai
strikers had insisted upon the withdrawal of foreign troops, the abolition
of extraterritoriality, and an end to consular jurisdiction in the foreign
concessions. Before June 23rd, many of Hong Kong's merchants had
become convinced that the political demands first voiced in Shanghai
lacked local relevance for strikers in Canton. They remained optimistic
that by granting those economic demands found least objectionable they
could rapidly settle the strike against them, then less than a week old.
When, immediately after June 23rd, the Canton strikers made the
political demands of the Canton Government their own, that optimism

dissolved. 24

 

24A full list of the 17 demands of the Shanghai strikers is presented
in Liu Li-k'ai and Wang Cheng, 1919-1927 Nien ti chung-lcuo kung-jen yun
tung (Peking: 1957) p. 37-38. See also, Chih-kung yun-tung chien-shih,
p. 197-198. For the view that the decision in Canton to launch an anti-
foreign strike and boycott followed and closely paralleled that reached in
Shanghai where the Chinese Communists dominated the labor movement,
see Chung-ho kung-jen yun-tu_ng, p. 43. See also, FO 405/248, F 4118/
194/10, Enclosure No. 3, Jamieson to C. C. Wu, Canton, June 22, 1925.
Some of the early Optimism displayed by Hong Kong merchants is discussed
in F0 405/248, F 3668/194/10, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, June 26,
1925.

 

58

Many Chinese in Hong Kong who had at first opposed the strike, as
a result of the events of June 23rd, became its adherents. Among the
unskilled particularly, large nmnbers had refused to join in the initial
surge of strikers to Canton. They had remained fearful that once the
strike ended their former employers would ignore their pleas for rein-
statement. Because there were always many unemployed Chinese in
the colony, the services of the unskilled were never at a premium. Of
the skilled workers in Hong Kong, most had gone out when the strike was
first declared. One notable exception was the Chinese Engineers and
Mechanics Union. Like the Kwangtung Mechanics Union in Canton, with
which it maintained close ties, the Chinese Engineers and Mechanics
Union in Hong Kong had remained staunchly opposed to the strike. After
June 23rd, its leaders continued their attempts to restrain the member-
ship. When it became evident on July 5th that a majority of its members

had disregarded instructions to stay on; it, too, joined in the struggle

against Hong Kong. So powerful was the impact of the Shameen incident

in Hong Kong, that by the end of June more than 50, 000 workers had

downed tools and sought sanctuary in Canton. Ultimately their number

WOuld swell to more than 200, 000. 25

M

. 2""The role of the Chinese Engineers and Mechanics Union and its
he 8 to the Kwangtung Mechanics is discussed in Hsiang-kafl ta pa-kgg
(Peking: 1956), p. 4- 5. Attempts to keep the members of this union
from joining the strike are also discussed in F0 405/248, F 3668/194/10,
Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, June 26, 1925. For the decision to join
it: sStrike on July 5th, see Hong Kong Government Administrative Reports,

59

For the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir R. E. Stubbs, the turn of

events sparked by the incident at Shameen necessitated a renewed

interest in extraordinary measures to combat the strike and boycott.

An ex-pirate and former general in the armies of Ch'en Chiung-ming
was found in the colony, and, for a price, he organized some of his
former soldiers and clansmen into a corps of 100 special police and 50
detectives. Acting under his personal control, this corps was ordered
"26

to arrest all Chinese guilty of intimidation or other "political activities.

In an effort to present its actions in a more favorable light, the

Hong Kong Government exerted pressure upon a hastily organized
Chinese committee to edit and publish favorable propaganda. Printed
in the jail or in the foreign missions which had lent their presses for

that purpose, this mate rial was meant to reflect a spontaneous Chinese

groundswell of support for the colony's political and economic masters. 27

Further attempts to minimize acts of terrorism or intimidation
against Chinese in Hong Kong included periodic marches which displayed
the forces available for the colony's protection. In these marches,

Police pickets, naval units, army troops, and the "Volunteers" together

With their armored car were each given a prominent place.

\—

2600 129/488, C 38894, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, July 24,
11:25; and CO 129/489, C 40885, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 8,
25.

27F0 405/248, F 3668/194/10, Enclosure in No. 51, Stubbs to
Ame :ry, Hong Kong, June 26, 1925.

60

The month of June, 1925, when strikers in Hong Kong were most
active in persuading or coercing other Chinese to join their ranks, wit-
nessed no street riots and few incidents of strike-related crime. Re-
ported crime included one instance of bomb-throwing (the target was a
Chinese home which suffered little damage) and two murders tentatively
attributed to strike agitators. This very low level of violence, while
surprising, may perhaps best be explained by the large number of
strikers who had fled Hong Kong. By the end of June, in consequence
of the regulation making those without regular employment liable to
arrest and deportation, government authorities had been able to round
up only about 100 Chinese. 28

In July, 1925, Governor Stubbs announced that Chinese guilty of
violence, threats, or sedition would be flogged; and although flogging
was not applied in practice, this decision brought wide-spread criticism
outside Hong Kong and embarrassment to the Foreign and Colonial Offices
in London. 29

While such efforts undertaken by Governor Stubbs to maintain
essential services and provide internal security proved effective, his

attempts to combat the anti- British boycott and revive the dwindling

 

2300 129/488, 0 36829, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, July 10, 1925.

29mm. . and co 129/488, 0 36829, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong,
July 10, 1925. See also, Heng Kong Government, Government Gazette
Extraordinary, July 6, 1925. London's embarrassment over the issue
of flogging is evident in CO 129/488, C 34202, blinute by A. E. Collins,
Colonial Office, July 30, 1925.

 

In!“

61

trade of Hong Kong either met with failure or became counterproductive.
The ban on the export from Hong Kong of rice, flour, tinned and pre-
served foodstuffs, coal, and petroleum products which had been instituted
in the hope of inflicting hardship upon Canton, instead further disrupted
the trade of the British colony. Rice valued at $6, 000, 000 which nor-
mally went to Canton was deteriorating in Hong Kong's warehouses while
fresh supplies remained unavailable. When the embargo on this and
other prohibited items was lifted, and attempts to re-open trade in
exchange for foodstuffs were initiated, it was discovered that Canton

had adopted other methods for obtaining these commodities. Merchants
there organized The Association for Grain Supply and placed large rice
orders with the Kang Yuan Sheng Company in Thailand and with many
smaller firms in Indochina. The rice crop available in Kwangtung in
1925, considered by. many the best in ten years, further eased Canton's
reliance upon Hong Kong for grain imports. 3O

Flour formerly obtained in Hong Kong was shipped directly to Canton

from Shanghai aboard shallow-draft vessels. Although Canton could not
accommodate ocean-going ships, it could receive vessels which drew less
than 10-12 feet of water. As a result of the Canton Government's
embargo on food exports, a surplus of fruits and vegetables (always
available locally in large quantities) created a sharp reduction in prices.

Coal, despite periodic interruptions in supply, continued to be obtained

 

3°See CO 129/489, C 40885, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August
8, 1925; The Chinese Economic Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 254, January 2,
1926, p. 3-5; and F0 405/248, F 4058/194/10, Jamieson to Palairet,
Canton, July 14, 1925.

62

either from Japan or Indochina. Prior to the start of the strike and
boycott, the American Standard Oil Company together with the British
Asiatic Petroleum Company had instituted an embargo on petroleum and
petroleum products at Canton in protest to the levying of a special
stamp duty on kerosene. Canton countered by importing large quantities
of Russian oil and selling it at fixed prices under government monopoly.
This practice was continued until June, 1926, when, no longer able to
secure adequate supplies of oil, the Canton Government abolished its
monopoly in favor of a tax of two dollars per ten gallons. The substan-
tial profits which then accrued to the American Standard Oil Company
were largely at the expense of the British Asiatic Petroleum Company
whose trade was being displaced while the company remained under
boycott. 3 l

Goods bound for Canton in July, 1925, were carried in Russian,
Norwegian, German, Dutch, and American ships whose captains had
found favor with the Canton Strike Committee by avoiding contact with
Hong Kong. When the censorship of telegrams in Hong Kong (Canton
lacked suitable facilities) provided information concerning the movements

of these ships and the financing of their cargoes, such telegrams were

stopped in order to hamper this trade.

 

31See The Chinese Economic Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 246, November
7, 1925, p. 271; G. Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton, " _'I‘_h_e_
North China Herald, May 1, 1926, p. 231; and F0 405/252A, No. 62,
Brenan to Macleay, Canton, June 30, 1926.

32C0 129/489, C 40885, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 8,

 

63

In consequence of the moratorium granted to Chinese banks in
Hong Kong at the start of the strike by Governor Stubbs, foreign banks
in the colony suddenly began restricting credit. In July, many firms
because of the boycott found themselves unable either to convert their
imports into cash or to obtain exports for shipment to distant ports.
Denied assistance from the financial institutions in Hong Kong, many
were driven to bankruptcy. In its telegram to the China Association
in London, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong provided
this rather bleak assessment of the impact of the boycott in July, 1925:
. . . Canton—created blockade and boycott of entire trade between
Hong Kong and South China still relentlessly continues, all steamship
communication between Canton and Hong Kong being cut off and result-
ing loss from such blockade to Chinese and foreign business and ship-
ping is enormous. The consequences must prove disastrous to
Lancashire and Yorkshire export trade while in addition there is com-
plete paralysis of very valuable raw silk trade and other exports
from Canton in which British firms are largely interested. . . . (The
Boycott is) increasing financial exhaustion and seriously threatens the
continued existence of many old established firms and businesses in
the Colony both British and Chinese.
So desperate was Governor Stubbs to end the unprecedented dislo-
cations of Hong Kong's trade in July, 1925, that he sought London's

approval for the expenditure of $1, 000, 000 of the 'colony's money to

finance a scheme put forward by wealthy Hong Kong Chinese to end the

 

1925; and The Chinese Economic Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 254, January 2,
1926, p. 3-5.

3300 129/489, (3 36962, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 3,
1925. That the Governor concurred in this assessment of the impact of
the boycott is evident in CO 129/489, C 38894, Stubbs to Amery, Hong
Kong, July 24, 1925.

64

strike and boycott against them. Negotiations were then in progress
with certain unnamed "anti- Bolsheviks" in Canton who, if properly com-
pensated, were said to be prepared to eliminate the Communists and
their supporters and resume normal relations with Hong Kong. The
British Foreign Office when informed of this scheme became convinced
that it could not succeed, and desPite the best persuasive efforts of
Colonial Office members and influential British merchants, quickly
rejected it. When further pleas for reconsideration from Governor
Stubbs and Hong Kong's Unofficial Members of Council failed to alter

this Foreign Office conviction, the scheme was shelved. 34

Governmental Regganization and the Canton Strike Committee:
To Whom the Power?

 

In Canton at the beginning of July, following the decision reached
in a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee (Chung:ang_chih—
hsing wei-yuan-hui) of the Kuomintang, a reorganized "Nationalist Govern-
ment" was inaugurated. With the institution of a committee system based
upon the Soviet model, the post of Acting-Generalissimo held by Hu Han-
min since Sun Yat- sen's northern departure in 1924 was abolished. Hu
instead became the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hsu Ch'ung chih, who

continued to control a large Cantonese army, was appointed Minister of

 

3“1This scheme was first mentioned in CO 129/488, Stubbs to Amery,
Hong Kong, July 27, 1925. For the views of the Foreign Office together
with Colonial Office reaction, see CO 129/489, C 38168, Minutes on "The
Situation in Canton, " A. E. Collins, Colonial Office, August 21, 1925.
The discontent of Governor Stubbs with the decision reached in London is
apparent in CO 129/489, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 20, 1925.

65

War. The post of Minister of Finance went to Liao Chung-k'ai who re-
tained direction of the KMT's labor activities. The Municipal Govern-
ment of Canton remained in the hands of members of the Prince Clique;
however, now their actions were to be subject to increased supervision
by both the KMT and its Russian advisers.

In its inaugural declaration, the Canton Municipal Government
adhered to the positions of the "National" and Provincial Govermnents
which on July 1st and 3rd respectively had denounced the unequal treaties
once again and promised their abolition. Arguing that the city remained
under the economic and political domination of Hong Kong, leaders of
the Prince Clique set as their paramount task the elevation of Canton
to complete economic independence. To achieve this, they urged the
city's citizens to construct harbors, railways, and roads so as to facili-
tate industrial development. While withholding specific mention of
support to the strike and boycott, the declaration concluded by pledging
to reduce taxes and remove all troops from the city. This last point
had long been a major concern in the local reform program of Sun Fo.
Despite the continued erosion of its influence, the Prince Clique was
looked to by Hong Kong authorities, until the end of August, 1925, as

their best hope for a strike and boycott settlement. 35

 

35The governmental reorganization in Canton in the fir st week of
July, 1925, is discussed in a voluntary report by J. C. Huston entitled
"The Economic and Political Future of China, " in the Huston Collection;

66

Although ultimate authority continued to reside in the innercouncils
of the Kuomintang, the existence in Canton of a "National" government,
a provincial government, and a municipal administration, each with
important functions often duplicated by the others, led to frequent con-
fusion among those western powers seeking a settlement of the strike
and boycott. The creation of the Canton Strike Committee, specifically
charged with the direction and control of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike
and Boycott and seemingly accountable only to the KMT, further compli-
cated an already complex distribution of authority. 36

Assisted in its tasks by Michael Borodin and his corps of Russian
labor advisers, maintaining ties to the Comintern, and most impor-
tantly, enjoying the support of powerful personalities in the KMT such
as Liao Chung-k'ai, Wang Ching-wei, and (initially at least) Chiang
Kai-shek, the Canton Strike Committee first defined its powers by en-
croaching upon those of the municipal administration. The creation of

strike courts, a jail in Strike Headquarters, strike pickets, a strikers'

treasury, and the publication of strike and boycott regulations were all

 

see also, FO 405/250, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum respecting Canton, "

by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926. The inaugural
declaration of the Canton Municipal Government was published in The
Canton Gazette, July 8, 1925, which is available in the records of-T-he
Historical Archives Commission of the Kuomintang, Ts'ao-t'un, Taiwan.

36The confusion experienced by westerners attempting to deal with
the appropriate government in Canton in order to bring about a strike
and boycott settlement is discussed in F0 405/250, F 513/1/10, "Memo-
randum respecting Canton, " by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office,
February 3, 1926.

 

67

at the latter's expense. When, beginning in July and August, 1925, the
strike and boycott spread into other areas of Kwangtung under KMT con-
trol, the Strike Committee began assuming powers nominally belonging
to the Provincial government. Ultimately, in the course of the Canton-
Hong Kong Strike and Boycott, the Strike Committee would challenge
even the authority of the Kuomintang--its sponsor and protector.
Foreigners would come to regard the Canton Strike Committee as " a
government within a government" and, none of their policies would be

formulated without due regard to its influence. 37

A Spreading Bmott--BuLA__ga_inst Whom?

With the boycott firmly established in Canton, the Strike Committee
began in July, 1925, to advertise the need for its extension to those
other regions of Kwangtung under Kuomintang control. The press in
Canton published many articles which outlined the preparations then
underway to effect a thorough boycott of all British, Japanese, and French
goods throughout the province. In the second week of that month, organ-
izers were sent to all the important commercial centers of Kwangtung,
and working with the local unions they attempted to duplicate the success

achieved at Canton. In Wuchow, the boycott became so complete that

 

37See Chih-kung m-tung chien-shih, p. 227; and notes dated July
28, August 6 and 7, and September 17, 1925, in the Huston Collection.
See also, Vera Vladimirovna Vishnyakova-Akimova, (trans. S. Levine),
Two Years in Revolutionary China: 1925-1927, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1971),
p. 231-232. This was first published as Dva Goda v Vosstavshem Kitae,
1925-1927 in Moscow, 1965.

68

on July 20th the British, unable even to maintain an adequate food supply,
had to be evacuated. The foreign staff of the Asiatic Petroleum Com-
pany returned to Wuchow only after arrangements had been made by
naval authorities in Hong Kong to dispatch a tug periodically with needed
supplies. This return was based not on any false hopes regarding the
revival of the extinguished trade there, but simply to protect company
facilities from theft or destruction. 38
In Kongmoon and Tanshui, the foreign customs staff found them-
selves subjetted to the same treatment which had been afforded their
colleagues at Shameen between June 22nd and June 29th. The Chinese
employees deserted them, and they were forced to rely upon Hong Kong
for food and other basic necessities. So effective was the boycott at

Kongmoon that the Customs Report for 1925 revealed a decline in revenue

of 56 percent when compared with the previous year. 39

 

38See in particular Min-kuo jih-pao, July 14, 1925; and The Canton
Gazette, August 17, 1925. For British reaction to these articles, see
FO 405/248, F 5564/194/10, "Memorandum Respecting the Boycott of
British and Japanese Goods in Canton District, " Palairet to Chamberlain,
Peking, September 30, 1925. German firms had been established in
Canton after World War I when that nation‘lost its special privileges in
China; and with minor interruptions, the business of those firms flourished
throughout the period of the strike and boycott. See FO 405/248, F 3745/
194/10, Enclosure No. l, Jamiesonto Palairet, Canton, June 29, 1925,
and G. Sokolsky, ”A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton, " The North China
Herald, April 24, 1926, p. 181-183. For the impact of the Boycott at
Wuchow, see FO 405/248, F 4258/2/10, Enclosure No. l, Jamieson to
Palairet, Canton, July 24, 1925.

39See FO 371/10924, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, September 21,
1925. The Kongmoon Customs Reports, 1925, are cited in The Chinese
Economic Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 281, July 10, 1926, p. 374; and are

 

69

At Swatow, a strike and boycott ‘began on July 2, 1925, and rapidly
brought all British commerce there to an abrupt end. Chinese in the
employ of British subjects either struck voluntarily or were coerced
into doing so. Theft from and destruction to British prOperties became
common, and the local food supplies usually available to the British
community were completely cut off. The pickets who patrolled the bund
seized British merchandise as it arrived and imposed heavy fees on all
ships (including Chinese) which attempted either to enter or leave port. 40

As July, 1925, came to an end, most foreigners with commercial
interests in south China remained understandably confused as to the
true nature of the Chinese strike and boycott which confronted them.

To some it appeared that the boycott was aimed solely at British ship-
ping; at Amoy, all British ships were boycotted while those of other
nations, even if they had called at Hong Kong or intended to do so, were
free to trade. To others, particularly those in Swatow, Nanning,
Kongmoon, and Wuchow, it seemed apparent that the boycott was of a
more general nature. There students and armed pickets enforced a
strict boycott of all British ships, British goods, and the ships and goods

of any nation whose vessels included Hong Kong as a port of call. Finally,

to those with interests at Canton and Pakhoi, the boycott appeared to

 

reproduced in F0 405/250, F 1393/296/10, Enclosure No. 2, Jamieson
to Chamberlain, Canton, February 22, 1926.

40See FO 405/250, F 110/1/10, Annex XIII, Swatow; and The South
China Morning Post, August 14, 1925.

70

have three clearly discernable targets. The re all British ships and
goods, all ships and goods which had touched Hong Kong or intended to

do so, and many Japanese ships and goods were singled out for attack. 41

T1§;§trike and Boycott Defined:
Strike Committee Rggulations
Confusion among foreigners attempting to determine the exact
nature of the economic struggle being waged in south China was largely
due to their inability to distinguish among their antagonists. In the
coastal ports outside Kwangtung, where, in 1925, Kuomintang influence
was still weak, the anti-British boycott born of the May Thirtieth move-
ment continued despite gradually diminishing effectiveness. In those
regions of Kwangtung where the Kuomintang was firmly entrenched, how-
ever, a loosely allied but radically different struggle was daily gaining
in strength. At Canton, the strike and boycott begun in mid-June also
took British imperialism as its target; but, from the first, that target
was limited to British imperialism as expressed through Hong Kong. If
they could isolate Hong Kong by denying it both foreign and Chinese con-
tact, strike and boycott leaders remained confident that British impe ri-
alism in south China would suffer a death blow.
As early as June 30, Hu Han-min, then Civil-Governor of Kwangtung,

met with the, Japanese Consul in an attempt to bring about a divorce by

 

41A useful analysis of the boycotts arising out of the May Thirtieth
movement and a less successful attempt to describe the boycott against
Hong Kong is C. F. Remer, A Study of Chinese BoycottsL With Special
Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness (Baltimore: 1933), p. ’97-108.

7.1

that nation from British interests in south China. On July 12, 1925, a
delegation of Chinese students returned from France met the French
Consul on Shameen in a similar but equally unsuccessful attempt. In
the second week of August, the Canton Strike Committee issued a notifi-
cation which allowed non-British firms to open offices in Canton pro-
vided they registered with the Committee and agreed to rehire all former
Chinese employees. The "New Navigation Rules" published by the
Canton Strike Committee on August 12 declared:
l. Steamers of any nationality except British and Japanese are
allowed to ply between various ports provided they do not call at

Hong Kong.

2. On entering ports, all vessels must be subject to inspection of
labor pickets of the anti-Irnperialist Union.

3. Export of foodstuffs and raw materials prohibited. 42'
Not until August 16, 1925, when additional regulations were published,

did mention of Japan become conspicuous by its absence. In these regu-

lations, a system of special permits was created which allowed entry into

Canton "for any non-British goods which do not come by British steamers

or via Hong Kong or Macao." The Strike Committee provided for travel

 

42The meeting of Hu Han-min with the Japanese Consul is reported
in F0 405/248, F 3747/194/10, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, June 30,
1925. Not only did the Japanese Consul inform his British counterpart
of that meeting; but, as Akira Iriye has indicated, the Tokyo Government
responded to a British request to prohibit the export of coal to Canton by
giving consideration to the launching of an embargo against Canton. See
Iriye, op. cit. , p. 67. For Jamieson's views on the meeting beWeen
Chinese students and the French Consul, see F0 405/248, F 4058/194/10,
Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, July 14, 1925. The "New Navigation Rules"
issued by the Strike Committee are in The Canton Gazette, August 12,
1925.

to Hong Kong or Macao by creating special travel permits. These
could be obtained only under a personal and monetary guarantee, and
were only valid for seven days. 43

Although the August regulations of the Canton Strike Committee
proved effective in denying Hong Kong contact with some Western ship-
ping, these regulations also proved disruptive to the CantOn trade.
Many of the non-British firms seeking to do business there viewed the
system of "special permits" as a form of blackmail. Rather than
comply, they chose not to trade. Inthe months that followed, the
increasing agitation of Cantonese merchants disgruntled by their losses
convinced members of the Strike Committee that the August regulations
were in need of revision. When, in October, an Open meeting of the
Strikers' Congress was convened, its members, by formal vote, abolished
the system of "special permits." On October 22, 1925, over the seals
of The All-China General Labor Union, The Canton-Hang Kong Strike
Committee, The Canton General Chamber of Commerce, The Associated
Chambers of Commerce of All-Kwangtung, The Canton Municipal Chamber
of Commerce, and.The Canton Mercantile Co-operative Association, the
following new regulations were adopted:

1. Goods via Hong Kong or Macao, of whatever country, shall not

be permitted to come to Kwangtung; and goods exported from Kwangtung

to whatever country consigned, shall not be allowed to go to Hong Kong
or Macao.

 

4'3The system of "special permits" begun on August 16, 1925, is

discussed in CO 129/489, C 45193, Enclosure No. 6, Stubbs to Amery,
Hong Kong, September 4, 1925.

73

2. Any British vessel, and vessels of any country passing through
Hong Kong or Macao, shall not be allowed intercourse with inland
Kwangtung for discharge of cargo.

3. All non-British merchandise and non-British vessels which do
not pass through Hong Kong or Macao shall have freedom to unload.

4. Within the borders of Kwangtung, provided neither goods nor
vessels are British, all equally shall have freedom of trade and
intercourse.

5. All goods stored in Canton, provided they are not British and
not British-owned, shall equally be available for sale. (This regu-
lation does not apply to Government monOpolies and contraband
articles.)

6. This regulation has been signed and promulgated by the four
Chambers of Commerce, in association with the Canton-Hong Kong
Strike Committee. From the date of publication until the Canton-
Hong Kong Strike Committee is vested with official authority to
blockade, anything which infringes the preceeding regulations will
uniformly and entirely be confiscated. (Confiscation can be carried
out only after being sanctioned by a strike committee.)

7. In the matter of chartering vessels to come to Canton, the
charterer must first arrange, as supplementary item in the agree-
ment, that when cargo has been discharged and she leaves port the
vessel must not anchor either at Hong Kong or at Macao. Further,
he must report to the Chamber of Commerce and to the Strike
Committee for purpose of record. . . .44

These regulations, with some minor alterations, were to remain in effect
until the Canton-Hang Kong Strike and Boycott came to a formal end on

October 10, 1926.

 

44For merchant reaction to the issuance of the "special permits,"
see The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 17, 1925. A full
translation of the regulations issued October 22, 1925 is contained in
F0 405/248, F 5914/194/10, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton, November
2, 1925.

74

The Assassination of Liao Chunkk'ai:
The Moderates Retreat

 

On August 20, 1925, as he was leaving his car to enter Kuomintang
Headquarters in Canton, Liao Chung-k'ai, the Kuomintang's Minister
of Finance and Director of Labor Activities, was shot by a group of
Chinese assassins. He died while enroute to a hospital. This event
was to have a dramatic effect upon the struggle for dominance within the
Kuomintang which had begun immediately after the death of that party's
revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen in March, 1925. It was also to have
a significant influence on the future of the Canton-Hong Kong Strike and
Boycott. Although Liao Chung-k'ai's murder was never actually solved,
the investigation into his death launched by the Kuomintang was used to

further incite Canton's hostility toward the British in Hong Kong. Amid
reports which implicated Hu Han-min through the actions of his relatives,
rumors gained currency which cast suspicion upon a number of Kuomintang
notables. One maintained that two generals in the army of Hsu Ch'ung-
chih had confessed to promises of $2, 000, 000 from wealthy Hong Kong
merchants for the liquidation of Liao, Wang Ching-wei, and Chiang

Kai- shek. Another held that one of the accomplices in the assassina-
tion had admitted receiving $20, 000 from Chiang Kai- shek for the

murder. Still another saw Sun F0 and members of his clique supported

by. overseas Chinese as the culprits. 45

 

455mm pao, August 22, 1925, p. 7; Ch'en pao (Peking, August 23,
1925, p. 3; and Mg-hmsa-mm, Vol. XXII, No. 18, September 25,
1.925, p. 4-5. See also, a voluntary report entitled "The Economic and
Political Future of China, " and notes dated August 21 and September 4,
1925, in the Huston Collection.

 

75

A number of labor organizations in Canton we re also rumored to
be responsible for Liao Chung-k'ai's death. Many had Openly expressed
dissatisfaction with the recent activities of Liao and his subordinates;
activities which had stimulated the creation of rival organizations under
the domination of Chinese Communists. Particularly incensed in this
regard was the Kwangtung Mechanics Union which saw its attempts to
further control railway workers threatened. 46

The consequences of the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai were
that those elements in Canton considered most moderate by observers
in Hong Kong we re discredited and forced into retreat. Following the
expulsion of Hu Han-min, ostensibly sent on a mission to Moscow,
effective control of the Kuomintang was lodged in an emergency council
consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hsu Ch'ung-chih,
and assisted by Borodin and his corps of Soviet advisers. In September,
1925, the troops of Hsu Ch'ung-chih were suddenly disarmed by the
Whampoa cadets acting on the orders of Chiang Kai-shek; and Han,
relieved of his duties, was exiled to Shanghai. As these events occurred,
the civil administration of Canton helplessly observed the continued

erosion of its authority at the hands of the Canton Strike Committee. 47

 

46See Shun pao, August 30, 1925, p. 10; and The North China
Herald, August 29, 1925, p. 238. A view hostile to the Kwangtung
Mechanics Union and common among the Soviet advisers is expressed
in Vishnyakova-Akomova, op. cit., p. 233, who, however, does not
accuse them of Liao's murder.

47F0405/248, r 4922/194/10. Jamieson to Palairet, Canton,
August 31, 1925; F0 371/10924, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, September

76

 

21 and 27, 1925; and A. Khmeloff, a report entitled "Journey to Canton
in October 1925, " p. 27-30, in the Huston Collection. See also,
Kuowen chou:pap, October 4, 1925, p. 21.

CHAPTER III

THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT
0F 1925-26: THE STRUGGLE GROWS
Canton and HongKong, My 1925:
A Time of Hgie and Desperation
As a result of their efforts in launching an intensive anti-British
campaign in the Canton press in mid-July, strike leaders became confi-
dent that, in the months to come, their struggle would acquire still
greater effectiveness by spreading rapidly throughout the province of
Kwangtung. In Hong Kong, August, 1925, opened with a series of bomb-
ing incidents on the tramline and in the Taikoo Dockyards. However,
authorities there had become so confident in their ability to protect the
safety of the colony's inhabitants, that on the 5th the "Hong Kong Volun-
teers" were cOmpletely demobilized. 0n the 10th, the special police
first recruited when the strike and boycott began were also excused from
further duty. Although the policy of street searches for Chinese engaged
in political agitation continued until September, such searches brought
few new arrests. Only the increasing incidence of conflict between strike
pickets and Hong Kong police along the frontiers of the New Territories
seemed to require additional precautions. Strike pickets dispatched

from Canton frequently mounted small raids across the border in search

77

78 . “a
f
of food and live stock. On occasion, they also engaged in the kidnapping
of Chinese and the seizure of foreign goods.
As panic among Chinese villagers close to the frontier mounted
at the beginning of August, the Hong Kong Government responded by send-
ing two platoons of Punjabi troops to assist the local police. On the 20th,
permission to fire across the border was granted in hopes of discouraging
further Chinese attacks on the police launches patrolling the area. Earlier,
the Hong Kong Government had withheld such permission for fear that
another outrage such as that which occurred at Shameen might be provoked.
Despite the added attention to safety along the colony's frontiers, the
number of Chinese raids continued to increase throughout the winter of
1925. By mid-December, the Governor of Hong Kong would become so
concerned that he contemplated sending air patrols over the borders of
the New Territories on a regular basis.1
While frontier incidents and mounting effectiveness of the Chinese
boycott against Hong Kong in August continued to trouble the colony's
inhabitants, they found comfort in the sudden collapse of the Chinese
strike which became apparent by mid-month. Despite rigorous efforts

by the Canton Strike Committee to bar their passage, strikers fleeing

either impressment into the Kuomintang's armies or forced labor in the

 

1CO 129/ 489, C 40885, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August 8,
1925; C 42959, August 21, 1925; and C 45193, September 4, 1925. See
also, C0 129/489, C 56041, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, December
9, 1925; and F0 405/251, F 1775/1/10, Enclosures 2 and 3, Colonial
Office to Foreign Office, London, April 27, 1926.

79

interests of municipal improvement began making their way back to Hong
Kong. On August 21, Governor Stubbs was pleased to inform London
that the Chinese strike, with the exception of that against shipping, was
practically at an end. Americans of long residence shared in this view.
When, earlier that month, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce had called
a meeting of merchant groups and labor organizations (attended by both
the Engineers' Institute and the W0 Yee Kok Seamen's Guild), it concluded
by expressing the optimistic view that the colony's troubles might well
be resolved without further attention to the wishes of strike leaders in
Canton. 2

Despite this optimism, which increased as a result of disturbances
in Canton, by the end of August it was obvious that the boycott still within
the firm control of the Canton Strike Committee was gradually strangling
the economic interests of Hong Kong. When compared with the financial
losses of previous months, those for August, 1925, proved far greater.
Government revenues continued to decrease at the rate of $500, 000 per
month, and drastic measures were adopted to reduce spending.
The suspension of public works in progress brought some relief because
it resulted inthe reduction of staff within the Public Works Department;

but, it was still found necessary to dismiss many teachers in the Hong

 

2See C0 129/489, C 42959, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August
21, 1925; and, United States Decimal File, 893. 5045/189, J. V.A. Mac-
Murray to Kellogg, Peking, August 24, 1925. The meeting which brought
together merchant and labor representatives in early August was reported
in The South China Mggnipg P031, August 17, 1925.

80

Kong Government's schools. Land values in the colony had continued to
drop throughout August, often by 40 and in some cases even 60 percent.
Investors anxious to cut further losses strongly supported the clamor of
the colony's newspapers for re-opening of the Stock Exchange. Governor
Stubbs, however, stood by his decision which had closed the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange in mid-June. As business firms continued to fall into
bankruptcy, he sought to alleviate the colony's economic distress by peti-
tioning London for a loan of E3, 000, 000. 3

At the start of the strike and boycott, the commercial interests of
Hong Kong had openly proclaimed their view that the struggle against them
was doomed to a short life. They remained confident that the dislocations
in the Canton trade created by the avoidance of the British colony would
compel their adversaries to sue for peace. Such views took on added
validity when measured against the performance of the Canton silk industry
in July, 1925. Measured by both volume and value, the manufacture and

sale of silk had long been Canton's most important industry. In July, 1925,

one picul (133 1/3 pounds) of raw silk could be purchased there for $900.

 

3For the impact of the boycott in August together with reported
attempts to reduce governmental expenditures, see CO 129/489, C 45193,
Stubbs to Amery, September 4, 192 5. The rapid fall in Hong Kong's
land values is described in Chih-kunLyun—tungrchien-shih, p. 232; and,
in Lewis S. Gannett, "Why Canton is Radical Center of Asia, " The China
Weekly Review, June 12, 1926, p. 30. Displeasure over the refusal to
re-open the Stock Exchange is evident in The Hong Kong Telegraph,
August 18, and September 2, 1925. The request for a loan of E3, 000, 000
was granted, and an appreciative Governor Stubbs reported the immediate
reaction among the colony's commercial interests in C0 129/489, C 49489,
Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, October 2, 192 5.

81

Before the strike and boycott, however, that same quantity would have
brought at least $1, 400. Of the more than 100 piece-goods shops in
Canton, most had accumulated large stocks; and, in late July, they con-
tinued to lack a distribution outlet. A picul of mulberry leaves, which
had formerly sold for $4. 00, could then be had for 80 cents. In the
important producing districts of Namhoi, Heungshan, Shunteh, and Saichiu,
between 80 and 90 percent of the silk filatures had been forced to temp-
porarily suspend ope rations.

In August, 1925, as a result of arrangements concluded between
the Canton Government, the Strike Committee, the silk merchants, and
representatives of the China Merchants Navigation Company, which
transferred the distribution center to Shanghai, the Canton silk trade
experienced a sharp revival. The Strike Committee issued regulations
which facilitated the granting of export licenses for silk, and the Canton
Government,‘ in an effort to further promote that trade, made plans for
the creation of a special silk bank. That same month, other products of
Kwangtung destined for European or American markets were sent for
transshipment to either Keelung (Taiwan) or to Manila. 5

For Chinese firms long accustomed to a marginal share of the

Canton market because they could not compete with foreign firms that

 

4See The Chinese Economic Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 254, January
2, 1926, p. 3-4; and The Hong Kong Telegraph, July 21, 1925.

5F0 405/248, F 4922/194/10, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, August
31, 1925; F 6227/194/10, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton, November 23, 1925;

82

enjoyed superior means of communication and financial support, the

Chinese strike and boycott provided an excellent opportunity to shift the

balance. In August, 1925, one such firm, the Nangyang Brothers

Tobacco Company, moved quickly to absorb a dominant share of the

Canton market by supplanting the trade of its major Shanghai rival the

British-American Tobacco Company. Because Chinese firms were not

subject to the 40 percent tax imposed on non-British companies to support

the boycott, they also enjoyed an advantage over their Japanese, American,

and other foreign rivals. In the course of the strike and boycott against

Hong Kong, many Cantonese would, by founding Chinese firms to engage

in the coastal trade, open the way to a new and greater prosperity. 6
Like their parent institutions in Hong Kong, the commercial houses

of Canton were severely affected by the economic dislocations created by

the strike and boycott. Unlike their British counterparts, however, they

were gradually able to adjust to the new conditions of trade; and during

much of the period encompassed by the strike and boycott, the notes of

the Canton banks were accepted at par or even at a premium while the

currency of Hong Kong remained depreciated. Some of Canton's com-

me rcial institutions were openly political as in the case of the Hsing

 

and The Hong Kong Telegraph, February 9, 1926. See also, G. Sokolsky,
"A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton," The North China Herald, May 8, 1926,
p. 280.

6F0 405/248, F 5564/194/10, "Memorandum Respecting the
Boycott of British and Japanese Goods in Canton District, " Palairet to
Chamberlain, Peking, September 30, 1925; and G. Sokolsky, "A Visit
to Hong Kong and Canton," The North China Herald, May 1, 1926, p. 281.

83

Chung Commercial and Savings Bank which found its fortunes tied directly
to its founder Sun Fo.

As the trade of Canton continued to expand in August and the months
which followed (there was a particularly sizeable increase after the system
of special permits was abolished in October), the commercial and politi-
cal interests in Hong K0118 became increasingly alarmed. They
looked to the British Government to forcibly reassert the fading domi-
nance of Hong Kong over Canton.

The Shadow of the Washingtpn Conference, 1921-1922:
A British Dilemma

In August, 1925, the British Foreign Office found itself confronted
from many sides with pleas for some type of forceful action in China.

Soon after publication by the Strike Committee of the "New Navigation
Rules, " the British Consul-General on Shameen, Sir James W. Jamieson,
telegraphed his strong recommendation urging the institution of a blockade
against Canton by the offended treaty powers. On August 16th, the
Commodore at Hong Kong, largely in reaction to local opinion, seconded
Jamieson's proposal. In his view, a blockade could stem the flow to

Canton of munitions from the Soviet Union which, in turn, might lead to

 

7See G. Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton," The North
China Herald, May 15, 1926, p. 327; and The Chinese Economic Bulletin,
Vol. VIII, No. 254, January 2, 1926, p. 8-9. Inthe course of the
strike and boycott, the political fortunes of some Kuomintang leaders
were strongly influenced by their ability to secure an independent financial
base. Hsu Ch'ung-chih, shortly before his ouster from Canton, apparently
attempted to implement a banking scheme similar to that created by Sun

Fo. See The Hong Kong Telegraph, September 19, 1925.

84

the overthrow of the "Bolshevik elements" there. In London, commer-
cial organizations with large interests in China, such as The Imperial
Merchant Service Guild and the China Association, also pressed for
forceful action at Canton. 8
From the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office received a resolution,
passed by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong and supported
by the leading British commercial houses, which requested an immediate
ultimatum to be followed by military action at Canton. To lend urgency
to this plea, the Colonial Office also passed along letters and telegrams
from British and Chinese firms in Hong Kong, including a report from
the Governor, which emphasized the point that the colony faced immediate

ruin. On the 22nd, at the urging of Governor Stubbs, the Colonial Office

went so far as to request reconsideration of the earlier scheme calling

 

8F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton" by
F Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926. Jamieson's pro-
posal involving an international blockade at Canton became widely discussed
in London. His Majesty King George V, having read the proposal, wished
to know what objections to its implementation existed in either the Colonial
Office or the Foreign Office. See CO 129/489, C 37625, Stamfordham
to Amery, Balmoral Castle, August 20, 1925. For a discussion between
the Admiralty and the Foreign Office centered on the Commodore's plans
in Hong Kong, see FO 371/10947, F 4085, Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin,
Foreign Office, August 22, 1925. The views of commercial bodies such
as The China Association and The Imperial Merchant Service Guild coin-
cided initially with those of Chinese commercial groups in Hong Kong;
however, after discussions with members of the Foreign Office they
favored the dispatch to Peking of a special envoy charged with the task
of settling the anti-British boycotts in north China. See CO 129/489.
Wilcox to Colonial Office, London, August 17, 1925; and F0 371/10947,
F 4053, Landale to Foreign Office, London, August 18, 1925.

85

for the expenditure of $1,000, 000 in support of "anti-Bolshevik parties
in Canton. "9
From the British Admiralty, the Foreign Office learned that the
Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong favored an ultimatum to the Canton
Government to be followed, if necessary, by bombardment and destruc-
tion of both the Whampoa and Bocca Tigris forts and the Whampoa Mili-
tary Academy. By August 19, having been assured that the Canton
Government was not a party to the issuance of the "New Navigation
Rules," Consul-Gene ral Jamieson tempered his earlier views to include
only the seizure of all vessels which conformed to the wishes'of the
Canton Strike Committee. The following day, British Charge d'Affaires
at Peking, Michael Palairet, sought Jamie son's advice on a plan by which
British difficulties at Canton would be placed before the League of

Nations. 10

 

9 For the resolution of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong, see CO 129/489, C 36962, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, August
8, 1925. Members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, fearing re-
prisals against their relatives in Kwangtung, asked that their resolutions
not be made public. Unfortunately, a leak to Reuters resulted in full
V publication in The Times (London). See CO 129/489, C 36962, Enclo-
sure No. 5, Chow and Kotewall to Severn, Hong Kong, August 10, 1925.
Attempts by the Colonial Office to convince the Foreign Office to take
some form of action at Canton are discussed in CO 129/489, Minute by
A. E. Collins, August 18, 1925, and Minute by S. Wilson, August 19.
1925. For Governor Stubbs' plea for reconsideration of his scheme to
finance anti-Bolshevik elements in Canton, see CO 129/489, Stubbs to
Amery, Hong Kong, August 20, 1925. The Colonial Office enlisted
support for the scheme by advocating it to British merchants known to
have the ear of certain members of the Foreign Office. See CO 129/ 489,
C 38168, Minute by A. E. Collins, Colonial Office, August 21, 1925.,

10F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton"

86

Although the British Foreign Office was to give each of the propo-
sals described above its careful consideration, Foreign Office members,
since well before the strike and boycott, recognized the serious diffi-
culties which would attend any unilateral action by Great Britain in China.
By both the terms and spirit of the treaties which had emerged from the
Washington Conference of 1921-1922, they felt compelled to maintain a
commitment to cooperative efforts with the other powers which had
interests in China. To abandon such a commitment would be to risk
both foreign and Chinese isolation of the sizeable economic interests of
Great Britain in East Asia. 11

When, following an exchange of notes with other interested powers
in July, 192 5, the British Foreign Office determined that "any assistance
from other foreign powers would be at best halfhearted, " its members
concluded that any plans for military actions at Canton must be abandoned.
For the British Colonial Office charged with insuring the well-being of
Hong Kong, and for British and Chinese interests which had much at
stake the re, the views of the Foreign Office appeared to represent the

acceptance of a policy of inaction. The continued pressure exerted by

the Colonial Office upon Foreign Office members would ultimately breed

 

by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 5.

11For a discussion of the treaties which emerged from the Washing-
ton Conference of 1921-1922 and the limitations which they presented for
action in the Far East, see Akira Iriye, op. cit., p. 13-22. See also,
Warren 1. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History
of Sino-American Relations (New York: 1971), p. 104- 107.

87

dissension. In August, 1925, Cel‘onial Office pleas for British action

met with the following response:

Mr. Chamberlain (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) doubts
whether a blockade would do more than provide anti-British propaganda
in Canton and the rest of China, but any more drastic action than a
blockade he is certain would have a most unfortunate reaction. It
must be remembered too, that we are bound by the Washington China
Treaty to full and friendly communication with other powers concerned
before taking any steps affecting the sovereignty and independence of
China. Any independent step, therefore, which His Majesty's Govern-
ment may take at Canton will at once affect not only the rest of China
but our relations with other Powers having interests in the Far East.
The provocative attitude of the group of Extremists now in control at
Canton may be deliberately calculated to provoke retaliatory measures
whereby they hope to gain in popularity in their own country and to
single out Great Britain as the oppressor of China. . . . Mr.
Chamberlain will not hesitate to recommend strong action if and when
it is considered that the situation would be permanently improved
thereby. But he would prefer to take such action in concert with the
other Powers whose treaty rights are equally at stake, and whom, as
explained above, we are under an obligation to consult. He would be
most reluctant to act alone except in circumstances where it would be
clear to unprejudiced opinion that he had no reasonable alternative. 12

The August proposals which involved either an ultimatum to Canton
to be followed by a bombing expedition or the interception of vessels
complying with the regulations of the Canton Strike Committee were found
to be objectionable on the same grounds as those which ruled out a block—
ade. The Foreign Office also rejected the idea of British recourse to
the League of Nations. While it was felt that such an act might well

succeed in determining that Canton was in violation of existing treaties,

 

lzDiscussion within the Foreign Office of the July notes and the
response directed to the Colonial Office on September 5, 1925, are pre-
sented in F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, ‘ "Memorandum Respecting Canton"
by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 3, and 5-6.

88

as Consul-General Jamieson had pointed out, only the complete abrogation
of such treaties could satisfy the Kuonlintang in Canton and bring the
strike and boycott to an end. Finally, with some irritation, the Foreign
Office again dismissed the scheme of Governor Stubbs whereby funds
would be provided to anti- Bolshevik groups in Canton. Although the
Foreign Office labled this scheme an llnwarrcntcd intrusion into Chinese
domestic politics which held little promise of success, its irritation, as
later revealed, was not that such a scaeme had been contemplated, but
that it had been put forward in a manner requiring official sanction. 13
The irritation of the British Foreign Office over the Stubbs' scheme
and the disappointment of those in Hang-Kong who learned that it had been
discarded were, no ioubt, related to the political changes in Canton
which occurred in tie turbulent period following the assassination of
Lino Chung-k'ai. Many in bothLondOn and Hong Kong fully expected to
see the more moderate elements in Canton emerge victorious; and, as
in all likelihood the moderates would expel the Russian advisers and their
supporters, this could bring about the speedy settlement of the boycott
against Hong Kong. By the end of the first week of September, it was

dramatically clear that the expectations of London and Hong Kong had

 

13I_b__i§_. , p. 6-7. As revealed in an interview of late December,
1925, conducted by members of the Colonial Office, The Foreign Office
view had consistently been that if Hon-g Kong truly believed that matters
could be handled through the use of money they should do so without ask-
ing for official sanction. See '30 129/491, "Note of Interview with Mr.
Moss F.O.," S. H. Wilson, T.A. Clutterbuck, and G. Grindle,
Colonial Office, December 19, 1925.

89

been misplaced. On September 6, Consul-General Jamieson despondently
reported:

The city is in the hands of cadets, labour and strike unions, and
Russians, and is controlled by a Chinese triumvirate, whom it would
be difficult to dislodge. A saner Chinese element would appreciate
intervention, but I personally deprecate it as it would leave a legacy
of hatred for the future. On the other hand, continuance of present
state of things will bankrupt Hong Kong. 14

On September 12, Governor Stubbs, aware of British diplomatic

efforts undertaken at Peking in hopes of creating a reduction of anti-
British activities in north China, again attempted to enlist the support

of the Foreign Office in the salvation of Hong Kong. Editorials published
in the Hong Kong newspapers in late August decried Foreign Office actions
which involved negotiations with the Peking Government in order to alter
events at Canton. Many in Hong Kong continued to believe that, despite
their best persuasive efforts, the Foreign Office still viewed their
struggle with Canton as but a part of the country-wide disorders which
plagued British interests. They wished it understood that the struggle
of Canton against Hong Kong was serious, separate from the rest of
China, and outside the effective reach of the Peking Government.

Governor Stubbs wished to extend the reach of that government. 15

 

l‘I'FO 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton, "
by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 7.

15For an editorial which provides an excellent review of earlier
efforts to alter Foreign Office thinking and is itself a part of that effort,
see "Why is Hongkong Always Ignored, " in The Hong Kong Daily Press,
September 23, 192 5.

90

In this instance, the Governor advocated the use of the Peking
Government as a veil for British action against Canton. He first pro-
posed that Chinese authorities at Peking be held fully responsible for
Kuomintang activities in the south. To fortify their resolve, he suggested
that they be supplied with money and materiel which could be made avail-
able by a generous use of the British share of Boxer Indemnity funds.
Noting the preparations then in progress by Ch'en Chiung-ming and other
KMT opponents for a military campaign in Kwangtung, Governor Stubbs
then further proposed that the Peking Government be induced to prohibit
the importation of arms and ammunition except by its nominees. Ch'en,
of course, would be one of them. To prevent the passage of Russian
ships carrying arms to Canton, the Governor advocated that Peking be
given the use of Hong Kong as a naval base from which British armed
launches flying the flag of the northern government could be dispatched.
Finally, twice rebuffed by the Foreign'Office for schemes which would
have provided monetary help to anti-Bolshevik groups in Canton, Governor
Stubbs asked that acportion of Hong Kong's munitions supply be made
available to Ch'en Chiung-ming. 16

Before responding to the imaginative proposals of Governor Stubbs,
the British Foreign Office requested the advice of its representatives in

Canton and Peking. Consul-General J amieson remained opposed to

financial assistance for Peking, felt that interference with Russian ships

 

16See ro 371/10949, F 40600, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong,
September 12, 1925.

91

could be equated with a declaration of war, and doubted the wisdom of
efforts meant to prevent the movement of Chinese vessels in and around
Canton. British Charge d'Affairs Palairet attacked the Stubbs proposals
on the grounds that the Peking Government could not possibly accept

such actions. Any attempt to move against Canton with British support
would, he argued, cost the Peking authorities what little popularity they
still possessed. Convinced that the northern government would not risk
open hostilities against Canton, Palairet, nevertheless, believed them

to be secretly subsidizing the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming. These views
coincided with those held by members of the Foreign Office in London,
and once again the Colonial Office found itself burdened with the sad duty

of informing Governor Stubbs that his proposals were unacceptable. 17

Canton in September, 1925: The Financial Crisis
When, on September 28, Consul-General Jamie son reported that a

meeting had been held a few days earlier between Kuomintang leaders

 

17see so 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton,"
by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 8. Dis-
cussion of this proposal in the Foreign Office revealed a growing hostility
toward Governor Stubbs. Again, as he had on numerous other occasions,
the Governor had put forward a scheme affecting British interests through-
out China without first consulting with either Consul-General Jamieson in
Canton or Charge d'Affaires Palairet in Peking. See F0 371/110949,
F 4582/194/10, S. P. Waterlow to S. Wilson, Foreign Office, October 5,
1925. The animosity which had developed between Stubbs and Jamie son
was well known in both the Foreign and Colonial Offices. The two men
had not met since well before the strike began in June, 1925. See F0
371/110949, Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, September 15,
1925. Consul-General Jamieson was made the subject of an editorial
attack for inaction in "Sir James Jamieson, " The Hong Kong Daily Press,
August 14, 1925.

92

and Strike Committee representatives to outline terms for a strike

settlement, the ready optimism which typified the reaction of Hong Kong

residents to any of Canton's misfortunes again became evident. News-

papers in the colony engaged in a lively competition designed to deter-

mine which could outdistance its rivals by depicting the greatest number

of Cantonese calamities. Following the expulsion of Hsu Ch'ung-chih

and the assimilation of his troops into other KMT armies, the Kuomintang

continued with military preparations needed to meet the threat of Ch'en

Chiung-ming and his allies it; the East River District of Kwangtung. These

preparations provided additional strains on constricted party coffers.

Rumors quickly began circulating in Hong Kong which suggested that the

monthly allowance provided by the Kuomintang to the strikers would be

withdrawn. It was also rumored that party leaders were incensed

because strike funds were being misused. 18
From the onset of the strike and boycott against Hong Kong, it had

been apparent that if such a struggle was to be prolonged it could succeed

only if adequately funded. As a result, contributions were solicited from

 

18For Jamieson's report on the meeting between KMT leaders and
strikers' representatives, see FO 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum
Respecting Canton, " by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February
3, 1926, p. 8. Typical of the coverage provided by the Hong Kong news-
papers reporting that meeting is "Is the Boycott Near its End? " The Hong
Kong Daily Press, September 28, 1925. Events surrounding the expulsion
of Hsu Ch'ung-chih are described in Shun 2o, September 23, 1925, p. 6;
and F0 371/10924, Jamieson to Palairet, September 21, 1925. For the
rumor in Hong Kong which held that the KMT would withdraw its strike
allowance because of misappropriations, see The Hong Kong Telegraph,
September 29, 1925.

93

among a wide variety of sources. From labor organizations and wealthy
Chinese outside Kwangtung, the Strike Committee had or would receive
$200, 000; from overseas Chinese $1, 300, 000; from selling confiscated
goods $400, 000; from fines to strike and boycott violators $200, 000;
from local gentry and merchants $20, 000; from miscellaneous sources
$200, 000; and most important, from the Kuomintang Government
$2, 800, 000. Throughout the greater part of the strike and boycott, the
funds administered by the Strike Committee would total more than
$5,000,000.19

Although the Canton Strike Committee did on occasion find itself
hard-pressed for funds and had to resort to unusual schemes to raise
additional revenues, there is little to suggest that such was the case in
September, 1925. There were, however, persistent rumors which
questioned the Committee's allocation of funds. Many of those strikers
fearful of a forced draft into the armies of the Kuomintang had either

returned to Hong Kong or had fled to their village homes in Kwangtung.

 

19See Chih-kung yun-tung chien- shih, p. 272; Chen Ta, The Chinese
Economic Journal, Vol. I, No. 11, November, 1927, p. 951; F0 405/248,
F 6227/194/10, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton, November 23, 1925; and
F0 371/11624, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton, March 15, 1926. The
figures of Chen Ta in Chung-kuo lao-tung wen-t'i, Shanghai, 1949, as
cited in J. A Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927, p. 293,
also accord more or less with the above. Lewis Gannett, in The China
Weekly Review, June 12, 1926, Omitted the contribution of the Canton
Government, placed the amount received from overseas Chinese at
$400, 000, and presented a total closer to $1, 000, 000. The dollar unit
in general use throughout China during this period was the Yuan, the
exchange value of which was subject to much fluctuation but usually equaled
approximately U. S. $0. 50.

 

94

However, their names, and those of less fortunate comrades who had
begun military duties, continued to appear on the rosters of the Canton
Strike Committee-~rosters which determined KMT monthly allocations
for support of the strike and boycott. Rumors circulating in both Canton
and Hong Kong held that some funds acquired by this means were being
pocketed by strike leaders. That there was some corruption seems
certain, but that it reached the proportions suggested by many in Hong
Kong is doubtful. 20
The apparent wealth of the Canton Strike Committee in September,
1925, provided a sharp contrast to the plight of that city's merchant
community. Although the resurgence of trade begun the preceding month
had brought some relief, Cantonese merchants continued to labor under
the depressive influence of the system of special permits then still in
effect. Accustomed to seeing more than 90 percent of their trade flow
to Hong Kong in what we re considered normal times, many Cantonese
merchants began working toward a boycott settlement. Through an

exchange of letters with interested parties in Hong Kong, they hoped to

bring about the start of informal negotiations.

 

20See The Hong Kong Telegraph, August 31, and September 29,
1925; The South China MorninLPopt, October 19, 1925; The Hong Kong
DaiLgPress, October 20, 1925. Consul-General Jamieson later indi-
cated that a Chinese whose judgment he valued remained convinced that
the strikers had more money than the government. J amieson reported
the strike fund as being $1, 500, 000 and maintained that a picket leader
received $700 per month. He later revised the earlier figure to $150, 000.
See F0 405/ 248, F 5996/ 194/ 10, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton,November
9, 1925.

 

95

In Hong Kong, rumors were also widespread which suggested that
certain Kuomintang leaders were prepared to see the strike and boycott
come to an end. Chiang Kai-shek was said to be concerned over the
activities of Kuomintang elements in Shanghai and Peking which were
being encouraged and abetted by Sun F0 and other Canton anti-Bolsheviks.
Chiang's friction with, and inability to control, the Canton Strike Com-
mittee was taken in Hong Kong as clear evidence that he, too, favored
a settlement. In the meeting of September 24, reported on by Consul-
General Jamieson, Chiang argued in favor of negotiations prolonged
until after the defeat of Ch'en Chiung-ming. In his view, such a course
would prevent merchants in Hong Kong from financing the military
activities of Ch'en, and would open the way to settlement terms which

could be made far more drastic. 21

The September Negptiations of 1925
Chinese merchant organizations in Hong Kong had begun their
efforts at finding a strike and boycott settlement by initiating correspond-
ence with the Canton Strike Committee in the first weeks of September,
1925. Upon receiving a favorable reply dated September 11, but reach-
ing Hong Kong much later, plans were completed for dispatching a dele-
gation to. Canton. When that Chinese merchant delegation arrived on

September 28, it was presented with the following terms:

 

21See Hsiang-kanLta pa-kuntg, p. 34; Shun 22°! September 26,

1925; Soviet Intrigues in China, p. 25; and The Hong Kong Telegraph,
September 30, 1925.

96

Shameen Strikers' Conditions

1. Chinese laborers on Shameen shall have full rights to convene
meetings, &c.

2. All former employees shall be reinstated.
. Eight hours a day.
. Only Chinese police be employed.
East and West Gates to be closed at 12 a. m.
. Chinese be allowed to walk and sit on the Bund.
. Intercourse be allowed between representatives of the laborers
and the foreign officials.

8. The British and French Municipal Council shall abrogate all
ill-treatment against Chinese.

domino»

Hong Kong Strikers' Conditions

1. Chinese in Hong Kong shall have full rights to convene meetings,
&c.

2. Chinese in Hong Kong shall enjoy the same treatment as the
foreigners. Deportation and criminal laws on Chinese shall be
abrogated.

3. Chinese shall have the right of voting and of being voted in the
Legislative Council.

4. Eight hours' day, favorable wages, abrogation of foreman
system, reformation of woman and child labor system, &c.

5. Reinstatement of former employees.

6. Issue of back pay.

7. Release of those arrested during the strike. Freedom to those
deported Shilll be restored.

8. Compensation of tenants who lost their belongings by auction
by the Gove rnment or landlord on account of non-payment of rental
during the strike.

9. New rental regulations of the lst July, 1925, shall be abrogated.
Effective decrease of 25 per cent of rental.

10. Intercourse be allowed between representatives of the laborers
and the foreign officials.

11. Restoration of right of license, certification, &c. , granted to
Chinese prior to the strike.

12. Equal terms to Chinese employees of steamers, factories,
companies, &c.

13. Licenses and certificates shall be issued to all, irrespective
of their nationalities (e. g. , Chinese should have the right to take out
license or certification for commanders, mates, &c. , on board
passenger boats).

 

22F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton, "

97

The Hong Kong delegation, which carried with it no powers from its
government to effect a settlement, had arrived in Canton in the expecta-
tion of opening friendly talks. Presented with the strikers' demands,

it informed the Strike Committee representatives that such terms would
require referral to the Hong Kong Government. The delegation then
suggested that pending a reply, and prior to further discussions, the
boycott be lifted. This the Strike Committee flatly rejected, and negoti-
ations were immediately suspended. When interviewed shortly there-
after, Su Chao-cheng, the chairman of the Canton Strike Committee,
accused the Hong Kong delegation of employing delaying tactics meant to
assist Ch'en Chiung-ming. Su concluded by indicating that negotiations

would not be resumed until after Ch'en's defeat. 23

The Defeat of Ch'en ChiunL-ming:
October-NovemberLl925

In September, 1925, when the forces of Ch'en Chiung-ming captured
Swatow, the local strike committee there had to suspend its operations.
Under the control of Ch'en, Swatow experienced a mild trade revival as

the boycott restrictions in force since July were relaxed. Despite the

 

by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 8-9. It
is noteworthy that settlement of the Shameen incident was left to the
Peking Government at this time. See FO 371/10924, Jamieson to
Palairet, Canton, September 27, 1925.

23Ibid., and CO 129/489, C 53914, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong,
October 30, 1925. For the interview with Su Chao-cheng, see The
South China Morning Post, October 16, 1925.

98

closing of many unions and the arrest of their leaders, the Swatow Sea-
men's Union, however, continued to interfere with British shipping.
Its efforts proved so successful that those British firms seeking to main-
tain restricted and unprofitable contact along the coast had to employ
scratch crews made up of "white Russians. " Throughout September,
Ch'en Chiung-ming used Swatow as a rallying point from which forces
under his leadership would launch an expedition designed to wrest control
of Canton from the hands of the Kuomintang. 24
Among Chinese commercialgroups in Hong Kong there was much
sentiment for Ch'en; if he proved victorious at Canton, the anti-British
boycott would, they predicted, quickly come to an end. In an effort to
assist the anti-KMT forces gathering at Swatow, these groups approached
the Hong Kong Government to seek its approval of sizeable loans to Ch'en
Chiung-ming. Governor Stubbs informed London to that effect whe re-
upon he was instructed to indicate that such loans were of no concern to
His Majesty's Government. When three cruisers nominally belonging
to the Peking Government under the command of an "Admiral Li" appeared

at Hong Kong, Governor Stubbs petitioned London for permission to assist

his efforts in curtailing the shipment of arms to Canton. Despite the

 

24Chih-kuni yun-tung chien-shih, p. 277; ro 405/248, F 5830/2/10,
Palairet to Chamberlain, Peking, October 18, 1925; and The South China
Morning Post, September 14, 1925. For the observations of the British
Consul in Swatow, see FO 405/250, F 405/1/10, Enclosure No. l, Kirke
to Macleay, Swatow, November 15, 1925. See also, CO 129/489,

C. 49489, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, October 2, 1925.

 

 

 

99

lobbying for this prOposal undertaken by members of the Colonial Office,
the British Foreign Office rejected it also. Stubbs, without seeking
further approval, provided "Admiral Li" with intelligence reports on
those ships suspected of carrying munitions to the Kuomintang. Although
no ships were actually interfered with, Canton countered by mining the
passages into the Pearl River. 25

In late September, Ch'en Chiung-ming, having recently acquired
5, 000 rifles from Shanghai, completed his plans for action against
Canton. His treasury contained $2, 000, 000 which he hoped to more than
double as a result of promised loans from Chinese merchants in Hong
Kong and pledges from the Peking Government. The campaign against
Canton called for military attack by 8, 000 men from the direction of the
East River, and 5, 000 men (mostly Hunanese) from the North River.
These were to be coordinated with attacks from Kongmoon and from the
West River above Sanshui. Almost from the first, Ch'en's campaign went
badly. The fall of Waichow before Kuomintang troops commanded by Chiang
Kai-shek on October 11 found his armies beating a hasty retreat. Enjoying
superiority in discipline, armament, tactics, and morale, the forces of the
KMT's Second Eastern Campaign continued to press forward while those of

Ch'en fell back toward Swatow. Despite the arrival of reinforcements

 

25For the loan scheme to assist Ch'en Chiung-ming, see CO 129/
489, C 43724, Stubbs to Amery, Hong Kong, September 26, 1925; and
CO 129/491, C 45200, Amery to Stubbs, Colonial Office, October 9,
1925. The attempt to capitalize on the appearance of "Admiral Li" (Li
Ching-hsi) at Hong Kong is discussed in CO 129/489, C 51869, Stubbs to
Amery, October 16, 1925.

100

on October 26, Ch'en's military position deteriorated still further, and
as the month came to an end it was apparent that the end was near. On
October 31, Hong Kong provided assistance in the form of an airplane
sent to Swatow aboard a British steamer; but in view of the hopeless
situation there, it was returned the following day. When a few hundred
KMT soldiers reached Swatow on November 5, Ch'en's armies, their
leaders safe in Hong Kong, fled in complete disarray to Fukien. Z6
Amid the uncertainty which gripped Canton during the initial stages
of the Kuomintang's Second Eastern Campaign, the boycott against Hong
Kong became noticably weakened. On October 22, as previously noted,
the Canton Strike Committee abolished its system of special permits.
On the 26th, however, when it was apparent that the KMT's most power-

ful antagonists were in retreat, new settlement demands presented to

Hong Kong reflected a renewed confidence among strikers in Canton.

 

26For the assessment of the British Charge d'Affaires that the
Peking Government was subsidizing Ch'en Chiung-ming, see F0 371/ 10949.
F 4711, Palairet to Chamberlain, Peking, September 24, 1925. Ch'en's
military resources and plans are described in F0 371/10924, Jamieson
to Palairet, September 27, 1925. See also Kuo-wen chou-pao, September
27, 1925, p. 24-25. For the military struggle between Ch'en and the
forces of the Kuomintang, see Hsiang- kaita pa-ku_ng, p. 30-32; Chih-
kunLWn-tgg chien-shih, p. 277; and Tun ung-fagg tsa-chih, Vol. XXII,
No. 22, November 25, 1925, p. 4-5. See also, Shun go, October 1,
1925, p. 10; and Kuo-wen Chou-jao, p. 21. Teng Chung-hsia maintains
that Hong Kong provided substantial aid to Ch'en in Chih-kung 'm-tung
chien-shih, p. 276. The unofficial support provided to Ch'en by Hong
Kong's naval forces is discussed in F0 405/248, F 5830/2/10, Palairet
to Chamberlain, October 18, 1925. Consul Kirke acknowledges the
arrival of the airplane from Hong Kong in Enclosure No. 1,Kirke to
Palairet, Swatow, November 7, 1925, in F0 405/250, F 198/10/10,
Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, December 2,1925.

 

 

101

In addition to a provision by which labor representatives would be
appointed to the Hong Kong Legislative Council, the new demands in-
sisted on the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality. Once again it
was dwmazided that the island of Shameen be returned to Chinese juris-
diction. This last demand, first enunciated in the aftermath of the
Shameen incident of June 23, 1925, had not been heard in more than two
months. In Swatow, Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech commemorating the
EMT victory there, further increased the severity of the new settlement
demands. Chiang insisted that his party would settle for nothing less
than abolition of the unequal treaties and the return of Chinese control
over the Maritime Customs. 27
The entry of Kuomintang armies into Swatow on November 5 and
6 soon revived the boycott against Hong Kong which Ch'en Chiung-ming
had attempted to destroy. The few goods of British manufacture which
had appeared there in September and October were immediately confis-
cated. Domestic servants who had defied the local strike committee and
returned to work during that period were either kidnapped by strike pic-
kets or simply disappeared. As the boycott against British shipping

achieved its former effectiveness, the trade of the British-American

Tobacco Company and The Asiatic Petroleum Company were again

 

Z7FO 371/11621, F 513/1/10, "Memorandum Respecting Canton, "
by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, February 3, 1926, p. 9. For
the speech by Chiang Kai-shek, see Enclosure No. 2, in F0 405/250,

F 622/1/10, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, December 17, 1925.

102

extinguished. The. appointment of Ch‘en Ko-niin, one of the principal
organizers of the boycott in late June and early July, 1925, as mayor
of Swatow left no doubt in the minds of British observers as to the domi-

28

nant position enjoyed by the strikers in that City.

Hong Kong in November, 1925:
A New Face Views an Old Problem

 

 

As October came to an end in Hong Kong, so did the tenure of
Governor Sir R. E. Stubbs. He had been scheduled to leave the colony
at the end of June, 1925; but in View of the emergency created by the
Chinese strike and boycott against Hong Kong, he had been asked to
stay on. Within both the British Foreign and Colonial Offices the re
were some who had come to regret that decision. The new Governor,
Sir C. Clementi, on taking office at the beginning of November, 1925, ‘
found the usual channels of communication among British officials dis-
rupted. Consul-General Jamieson, fearing assassination if he were to
venture into Canton, remained a virtual prisoner on Shameen. His
sources of information on Kuomintang activities were the other foreign
Consuls and the reports of his own subordinates. Although Jamieson

maintained contact with both the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking and

28Enclosure No. l, Consul Kirke to Palairet, Swatow, November
7, 1925, in F0 405/250, F 198/10/10, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking,
December 2, 1925. For a detailed account of the activities of the strikers
in Swatow after the arrival of the Kuomintang armies, see Enclosure No.
3, "Extracts from Recent Issues of the Swatow Native Press, ” in F0
405/250, F 408/1/10, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, December 7,
1925.

103

the Foreign Office in London, the animosity which had developed between
him and former Governor Stubbs had prevented an exchange of information
between Hong Kong and Shameen almost from the start of the Chinese
strike and boycott. Governor Stubbs, apparently believing it unnecessary
to ascertain the views of other British officials in China, had contented
himself by cominunicating only with the Colonial Office in London. 29

Soon after assuming office, Governor Clementi invited Jamieson
to Hong Kong in hopes of finding, between themselves, a means of moving
the stalled negotiations with Canton. When, in December, a delegation
of Cantonese merchants made a friendly visit to Hong Kong, Governor
Clementi told them of his willingness to appoint "a strong deputation of
merchants to visit Canton and to negotiate a settlement. " Clementi made
his offer on the condition that the Canton Government would appoint repre-
sentatives. of equal importance to meet them. Subsequently informed
that the Canton delegation would consist of three members of the Strike
Committee together with the chairman of the Canton General Chamber of

Commerce, the Governor withdrew his appointment. 3O

 

29See FO 371/11621, r 513/1/10, Annex XVI, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, December 23, 1925. As early as July, 1925, Stubbs had
become the subject of criticism within the Colonial Office. One assess-
ment of his then current proposal for intervention concluded: "In view
of Stubbs' past attempts to interfere in Cantonese affairs present pro-
posal regarded with some suspicion. Governor's language toward the
end is so strong that he seems to have lost his sense of proportion. "
See CO 129/489, Minute by J. J. Paskin and A. E. Collins, Colonial
Office, July 27, 1925.

30F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, Annex XVI, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, December 23, 1925.

104

After additional correspondence between Clementi and Wang
Ching—wei, Fu P'ing-chang, and C. C. Wu in which the issue remained
one of selecting proper delegates (Canton insisted that Hong Kong appoint
plenipotentiary delegates while _mernbers of the Canton Government would
serve as mediators only), T. V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen) the Minister of
Finance arrived in the colony for. settlement discussions. In meetings
on December 19 with the Governor, the Colonial Secretary, A. G. M.
Fletcher, the Attorney-General, J. H. Kemp, the Secretary of Chinese
Affairs, E. R. Hallifax, and D. W. Tratman, Soong put forward the
political demands outlined by the strikers at the end of September. In
addition, he emphasized that without guarantees that substitutes would
be dismissed and the strikers reinstated, and that compensation would
be provided for the period of the strike and boycott, no settlement would
be possible. 31

On his return to Canton, Soong was accompanied by Colonial Secre-
tary Fletcher, who, vested with full powers, met for further discussions
with Soong, Wang Ching-wei, C. C. Wu, and FuP'ing-chang. In the
course of those discussions the political demands of the strikers were

shelved, and the issue became clearly one of compensation. Fletcher

maintained that while the Hong Kong Government could not negotiate on

31F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10, Enclosure in Annex XVI, "Record

of an Interview between His Excellency the Governor and Mr. T. V.
Soong Finance Commissioner to the Canton National Government at
Government House on Saturday, December 19, 1925. "

105

such an issue, it would have no objection to a delegation made up of
Hong Kong Chinese merchants doing so. The Canton representatives
then agreed to exercise restraints on the strikers with regard to politi-
cal demands provided the compensation question could be resolved. 32

On December 26, a delegation made up of eight Chinese merchants
departed Hong Kong for Canton. On arrival, they were confronted by
C. C. Wu, who, the previous agreement with Colonial Secretary Fletcher
notwithstanding, informed them that the political demands remained
paramount, and that they could only be resolved through direct negoti-
ations between the Hong' Kong Government and the strikers. As
Governor Clementi later reported, "Wu defines the matter as not a
bargain for compensation, but a political and patriotic contest with
Great Britain in general and Hong Ko mg in particular. "33

On January b, 1925, T. V. Soong again went to Hong Kong osten-
sibly to meet his sister, the widow of Sun‘ Yat-sen, then enroute to Canton.
While in the colony, he again met with the Governor and, apprised of
C. C. Wu's role in the recent negotiations impasse, expressed surprise
that such an attitude had been adopted. Governor Clementi then proposed

that they consider a settlement by which, in exchange for a resumption

 

3z‘Colonial Secretary A. G. M. Fletcher, "Diary of a Visit to Canton,
December 20 to 23. 1925, " Enclosure in F0 371/11621, F 513/1/10,
Annex XVI; and CO 129/489. C 58043, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong,
December 24, 1925.

33F0 405/250, F 822/1/10, Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, January 7, 1926.

106

of normal relations, the Hong Kong Government would finance a trans-
portation scheme beneficial to both governments. This scheme would
involve the construction of a loopline railway at Canton to connect the
Canton-Kowloon and Canton—Hankow Railways, the completion of the
Canton-Hankow Railway, and the construction of a branch line from
Fanling via Sha-tau-kok, Mirs Bay and Bias Bay to Wai Chau. In the
absence of a favorable response to this» latest Hong Kong initiative,

negotiations were once again suspended. 34

Canton and HMLEEL December, 1925:
An Economic Appraisal
As 1925 drew to a close, it had become increasingly apparent that
the strike and boycott launched against Hong Kong in June of that year
had not only done serious damage to the economic interests of Great
Britain in south China, but that it had also dramatically improved the
position of an economically independent Canton. The statistics of the
Canton Maritime Customs demonstrate the remarkable recovery made
since the months of June and July when the old pattern of trade was

shattered.

 

3‘l’llbid. , and Enclosure No. 3, Clementi to Amery. HOBB K038:
January 13, 1926. '

107

REVENUE COLLECTION: CANTON MARITIME CUSTOMS“

1924 Hk. taels 1925 Hk. taels

January . . . . . . 370,061,919 January. . . . . . 257,541,199
February . . . . . 276,990,604 February . . . . . 285,852,166
March. . . . . . . 395,107,614 March. . . . . . . 309,847,574
April . ..... . 319,758,261 April . . . . . . . 251,959,454
May. . . . . . . . 401,217,818 May. . . . . . . .274,832,372
June. . . . . . . . 322,488,074 June. . . . . . . . 173,616,699
July ........ 229,523,129 July. . . . . . . . 70,711,026
August . . . . . . 281,816,088 August. . . . . . . 150,180,026
September. . . . . 289,632,629 September . . . . 232,407,822
October ...... 242,078,625 October . . . . . . 306,125,853
November. . . . . 319,835,595 November. . . . . 362,605,223
December. . . . . 292,564,013 December. . . . . 333,297,604

 

 

1926
January . . . . . . 463,162,749

 

*PRO, Confidential Prints (F0 405/250), F 1393/296/10, Enclosure No.
2, in Consul-General Jamie son to Chamberlain, Canton, February 22,

1926.

 

The enthusiasm generated in Canton by the issuance of new schemes
for the dredging of harbors and waterways, and for the development of
Whampoa as an ocean port created alarm in Hong Kong. In London,
where memories of similar schemes announced by Sun Yat-sen remained
vivid, assurances that such plans we re either impractical or beyond
Chinese capabilities brought lively debate. Articles in British and
American periodicals, after questioning the basis of the economic relation--
ship which had existed between Hong Kong and Kwangtung, concluded that
Hong Kong's past prosperity was won at Canton's expense. In January,
1926, as he watched the large number of shipsanchored in the Pearl
River awaiting the discharge of their cargoes, (Consul-General Jamieson

reported to London that it appeared that Canton could carry on without

108

Hong Kong indefinitely. 35

British shipping to‘Canton in the last five months of 1925 was re-
duced from the 2, 252, 279 tons of the same period in 1924 to 266, 930
tons. This last figure represents the commandeered river steamer

1331an sent from Hong Kong to maintain supplies for Shameen's few
remaining inhabitants. The value of foreign goods shipped from Hong
Kong to all Chinese ports in 1925 was reduced by 28 percent when com-
pared with the previous year. Chinese goods from Hong Kong were
diminished by more than 35 percent over the same period. The number
of ships entering and clearing at Hong Kong in 1925 was 379,177 vessels,
52 percent fewer than those of the previous year. A comparison of
statistics for these two years also indicates a 45. 4 percent reduction
in the number of foreign river steamers and a 43 percent reduction in
the number of British river steamers touching at Hong Kong. While
these figures indicate the magnitude of Hong Kong's shipping losses in
the first five months of the strike and boycott, they do not measure

losses due to the failure of banks and other businesses, lost wages and

 

35The figures provided by G. Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and
Canton, " in The North China Herald, May 8, 1926, p. 280, also taken
from the Maritime Customs Reports are unreliable. Not only are the
last three digits of revenue figures for each month omitted, but also,
misprints such as ”October-1925-26 -- 806,125" instead of October-
1925-26 -- 306,125, 853 appear throughout. For discussion of Canton's
harbor improvement schemes, see FO 371/10957, F 5210, Minutes on
Hong Kong and Canton, Foreign Office, October 26, 1925. See also,
The New Leader, London, August 28, 1925; and The New Republic, New
York, September 9, 1925. For the views of Consul-General Jamieson
regarding Canton's prosperity in January, 1926, see FO 405/250, F758/
1/10, Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton, January 18, 1926.

 

 

 

 

109

working days, and the ruinous drop in the value of land and shares.
Estimates have indicated that throughout the most severe periods of
the strike and boycott Hong Kong suffered losses amounting to $2, 000, 000
Chinese currency (approximately U. S. $1, 000, 000) per day. When inter-
viewed on January 14, 1926, L. N. Leefe, Chairman of the China Associ-
ation and a Director in Jardine, Matheson and Company, had this to say:
British prestige and British trade in Southern China are going to
be ruined unless the boycott is brought to an end. Trade in Hong
Kong had been brought to an absolute standstill. British shipping
companies are not trading with Canton and Swatow, and they will

have to go out of business altogether unless the British Government
does something about it.

 

36The economic losses of Hong Kong are discussed in Lewis S.
Gannett, ”Why Canton is Radical Center of Asia, " The China Weekly
Review, June 12, 1926, p. 30; CO 129/488, C 38894, Stubbs to Amery,
Hong Kong, July 24, 1925; and Chen Ta, The Chinese Economic Journal,
Vol. I, No. 11, November, 1927, p. 951. For statistics less depend-
ent on the Chinese Maritime Customs than those of Chen Ta, see 1133
Hong Kong Telegraph, January 21, 1926; and G. Sokolsky, "A Visit to
Hong Kong and Canton, " in The North China Herald, May 15, 1926,

p. 327. Hong Kong's losses were often expressed in Haikwan taels, a
term for an uncoined weight of silver utilized by the Chinese Maritime
Customs in its collections and statistics. The Hk Tael was 583. 3 grains
of silver 1. 000 fine and equaled $1. 50 Chinese currency. For a listing
of the principal Taels then current in China, and the rates of exchange
prevailing in Shanghai in December, 1925, see The Chinese Economic
Bulletin, Vol. VIII, No. 254, January 2, 1926, p. 12. For the inter-
view with L. N. Leefe, see The Morning Post (London), January 14, 1926.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER IV

THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT

OF 1925-26: THE STRUGGLE FRAGMENTED

The Kuomintang Second Party Congess, Januail. 1926

 

In the last weeks of December, 1925. as delegates to the Kuomin-
tang's Second Party Congress began arriving in Canton, Hong Kong
observers remained preoccupied with fears generated by the enhanced
position of political power and influence acquired by the Canton Strike
Committee. Since the onset of the strike and boycott, these observers
had viewed with mounting distress the efforts of some individuals in
Canton to bolster their own political fortunes by association with and
concessions to the many strikers' organizations. The unsuccessful
attempts to curb the activities of strike pickets in November and Decem-
ber, undertaken by those Chinese in Canton who had come to view the
Strike Committee as a growing menace, further undermined the confi-
dence of British officials in Hong Kong. By the end of the year Governor
Clementi, whose assessment brought concurrence among other foreign
officials, began terming the Strike Comrr ittee the de facto government

in Canton. 1

 

1Jay C. Huston noted the assistancta rendered the Strike Committee
by Chiang Kai- shek which took the form of arming and training strike
pickets under the leadership of Whampoa cadets. See notes dated August

110

111

The influence of Chinese Communist members upon the Canton
Strike Committee, the Committee's reliance on Russian advisers and its
attachments to the Comintern had aroused an early hostility among that
group within the Kuomintang which remained bitterly opposed to its party's
”Soviet orientation. " In the turmoil which surrounded the assassination
of Liao Chung-k'ai in August, 1925, however, many members of this
group found the political climate at Canton unhealthy; some fled hastily
to Shanghai and Peking. In November they met outside Peking at the
tomb of Sun Yat-sen where, after swearing loyalty to his principles, the
Western Hills Group (as they were thereafter known) pledged themselves
to purification of the Kuomintang. Their political philosophy remained
that expressed by Tai Chi-t'ao at Canton in August, 1925--an anti-com-
munistic nationalism wedded to the memory of Sun Yat- sen. Disturbed
by political developments in Canton since their departure, the Western
Hills Group, on the eve of the second KMT Congress, called for the ouster

of Wang Ching-wei and support for Chiang Kai- shek. Wary of the reception

 

6 and 7, and September 17, 1925, in the Huston Collection. See also,

F0 371/10924, Jamieson to Palairet, Canton, September 21, 1925. Among
the attempts to limit the power of the Strike Committee was that of Wu
T'ieh-ch'eng in November, 1925. Wu as Chief of Police and Garrison
Commander in Canton had become increasingly displeased by the actions

of pickets engaged in making many non- strike related arrests. His un-
successful attempt to disarm the pickets may well have contributed to an
early departure for Shanghai in order to attend to his mother's funeral
arrangements. See The South China Morniggost, November 25, 1925.
For the efforts of Wu to control the actions of the Strike Committee after
his return to Canton, see Lao-kung zun-tung shih2 Vol. II, p. 513-514.
For the views of Governor Clementi and others on the Strike Committee,
see 129/488, C 58043, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, November 20, 1925;

 

112

they might receive, they ignored the urging of those in Canton who sum-
moned them to resolve outstanding political differences. Instead, the
Western Hills Group convened a separate congress in Shanghai. 2

The resolutions passed by the 176 delegates to the Kuomintang
Second Party Congress convened at Canton reflected the strength of those
elements within the party which foreign observers had come to call the
"Leftists. ” The platform adopted in 1924 which emphasized the accept-
ance of Soviet assistance and the participation of Chinese Communists
and Russian advisers in party affairs was re-affirmed once again. In
addition, the Kuomintang pledged its continued support to labor's struggle
against Hong Kong and renewed its support for the leadership of Wang
Ching-wei. Although the Western Hills Group was rebuked by denial of
participation or membership on all Kuomintang committees, Tai Chi-t'ao,
first elected in 1924, was returned to the Central Executive Committee

(C. E. C. ). Sun Fo, like Tai, while not a member of the Western Hills

 

and Fletcher, "Diary of a Visit to Canton, December 20 to 23, 1925, " in
F0 405/250, F 439/1/10, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, February 3,
19260

2For the views of Tai Chi-t'ao, regarded by many as the spiritual
leader of the Western Hills Group, see his Chuntkuo tu-li yun-turiti
chi-tien (Canton: 1925.) Of the many articles devoted to the subject in
the Chinese press of early January, 1926, most maintained that differences
between the Western Hills faction and the Kuomintang in Canton were not
of philosophy but of method. See, for example, Chung-kuo kuo~min,
January 1, 1926, p. 2. For unsuccessful attempts to maintain party
unity and discourage the Shanghai meeting, see Wang Ching-wei, "How
Should We Use Our Efforts, " in Chung-kuo kuo-min, January 7, 1926,
p. 1-3; and Wah-tsz yat-po (Hua-tzu jih-pao), January 15, 1926, p. 3.

 

 

113

faction, had frequently expressed that group's sentiments. In January,
1926, as he returned from north China, Sun was met at Shanghai by

Ch'en Tu- hsiui and other Communists intent on preventing a KMT split.
They insisted that they had no desire to dominate events at Canton.
When he arrived there, Sun found that he, too, had been elected to the
CEC of the Kuomintang. 3

For those in Hong Kong aware of the dissensions which existed
among Kuomintang members in Canton and Shanghai, the second KMT
Congress came as a great disappointment. Officials in the British
colony had hoped that the rightists in Canton and Shanghai would succeed
to power and end the struggle against Hong Kong. Not only had the
rightists failed, but as it was becoming increasingly apparent, those in
Canton who desired a resumption of normal relations with Hong Kong,
regardless of their political persuasion, could only bring the struggle to

an end by promising a great strikers' victory. Anything less would

jeopardize their own political positions.

 

3For the activities of the KMT Second Party Congress, see Hsian -
kang ta pa-kung, p. 34-35; Chung-kuo kuo-min, January 10, 1926, p. 4,
and January 22, 1926, p. 4; Kuo-wen chou-pao, January 10, 1926, p. 34,
and January 17, 1926, p. 23; Shun pao, January 10, 1926, p. 9; and Wah-
tsz at- 0, January 12, 1926, p. 3. Teng Chung-hsia, in his discussion
of Elie KfiT Second Party Congress, maintains that Hong Kong was actively
pursuing a policy at this time of using the rightists in Canton against those
who continued to support the boycott against Hong Kong. See Chih-kun
yun-tung chien- shih, p. 278-279. Sun Fo's return to Canton is discussed
in Shun so January 8, 1926, p. 13. For a background on Sun's return
and His meeting with members of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai,
see Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Par 1921-1927,
Lawrence, Kansas, 1971, p. 463-465. A speech givenby un' o to a
group of overseas Chinese in which he supports the strike and boycott
against Hong Kong appears in The Canton Gazette, January 13, 1926. For
Sun Fo's meeting with Governor Clementi while enroute to Canton, see
F0 405/250, F 758/1/10, Enclosure No. 2, Clementi to Amery, Hong
Kong, January 8, 1926.

 

 

 

 

114

Great Britain and the KMT:
The Continued Search for a Forward Policy

 

The failure of the December negotiations to bring about a settle-
ment of the boycott against Hong Kong and the decisions reached at the
second KMT Congress in January, 1926, created an atmosphere in which,
for the first time, British officials began to place their interest in the
political affairs of the Kuomintang above their interests in the rest of
China. On January 10, Consul~Gencra1 Jamieson, believing that the
KMT was prepared to end the struggle against Hong Kong if the foreign
powers would recognize it as the Central government of China, suggested
that the Foreign Office give serious c )nsideration to the recognition
question. In the interim, Jamieson could see no hope for a boycott settle-
ment unless the foreign powers with the concurrence of the government at
Peking agreed to institute a blockade at Canton. In the view of members
of the British Foreign Office there could be no question of recognition for
Canton. Although recent events in north China had once again involved
contests for control of Peking, the Foreign Office felt compelled by their
agreement at the Washington Conference to continue the fiction that there
was only one government in China, ruling at that capital. Recourse to a
blockade against Canton was once again rejected. The inability of British
officials to secure the participation of other powers for such action during
the previous summer was recalled; and it was agreed that, because foreign
ships and merchants were realizing substantial profits at Canton, interna-

tional participation in a blockade against that city in January, 1926, remained

115

impossible. Anticipating the possibility, that: when Parliament convened
in February it might be charged with either negligence or weakness, the

Foreign Office requested suggestions for action at Canton that would

pad
t

Cs
.1

r

\ ._..li;u_frcnce o: the British lnlinister in Peking, the Governor of
Hong hang", and Consul~Gcnerai Jamieson at Canton. 4
Correspondence between Governor Clementi and the British

blimster in Peking, Sir R. Macleay, undertaken in the first weeks of
January, 1926, provided the Foreign Office with clear evidence that both
rel-mained strongly opposed to any war-like action against Canton.
Jamieson shared this view but recognized that, in the absence of other
successful initiatives for a settlement, the use of force might still be
necessary as a last resort. On January 13, Governor Clementi convened
a conference the purpose of which was to discuss the recent political
activities in Canton. In attendance were Consul—General Jamieson,
General Luard, the Military Commander of Hong Kong, Admiral Sir E.
Sinclair the British Naval Commander-in-chief, and the Governor together
with immediate Inembers of his staff.

At the onset, it was agreed that the possibility of any Chinese force

outside Kwangtung launching an attack against the Kuomintang remained

remote. The only threat to the Canton Government appeared to be the

 

4Consul-Genera1 Jamieson's views are presented in F0 371/11620,
F 95/1/10, Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton, January 10, 1926. For
discussion of these views within the Foreign Office, see F0 371/11620,
F 95/1/10, Minutes by G.S. Moss, F. Ashton—Gwatkin, and G. Mounsey,
Foreign Office, January 11, 1926.

 

116

disruptive forces within the ranks of the KMT. While these were seen
as posing no serious menace to the continued existence of that govern-
ment, it was hoped that dissensions in Canton would lead to the expulsion
of the Russians and the dismantling of the Strike Committee. Of partic-
ular int..rest were the attitudes of Sun F0 and Chiang Kai-shek. Sun,
despite his recent antinBritish speech to overseas Chinese while enroute
to Canton, was believed to be working for the expulsion of the Russians
and the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang, on the other hand,
supposedly unaware of a revolt alleged to be planned by large numbers
of officers within his army, was believed in Hong Kong to be ready to
move against the anti—communist members of the Canton Government. 5
The conference in Hong Kong of January 13 concluded with a dis-
cussion of a possible blockade against Canton undertaken either inter-
nationally or by Great Britain acting alone. Once again there was com-
plete agreement that such action could not bring a satisfactory end to
Hong Kong's problems. The suggestion was then made that, with the
assurance of a positive attitude on the part of Chinese leaders in Peking,

the British difficulties at Canton might be brought before the League of

 

For the views of British officials in China opposed to military
action at Canton, see FO 371/11623, Clementi to Macleay, Hong Kong,
January 11, 1926. The conference of January 13, is described in F0
405/250, F 758/1/10, Enclosure No. 7, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong,
January 14, 192.6. The view in Hong Kong regarding Sun F0 and Chiang
Kai-shek was based largely on a confidential report submitted by a
Chinese who identified himself as the brother-inalaw of Sun F0. Accord-
ing to this report, Sun's activities included convincing many of Chiang's
officers to revolt. The report concluded, not surprisingly, with a request

117

Nations. As in the previous summer when this proposal had first been
put forward, there was no hope that a League censure would bring a stop
to the boycott, but it might prove a moral blow to the government in
Canton. When the conference ended, its participants were agreed that
there was no practical means of defeating the boycott beyond holding out
until the leaders at Canton were overthrown through internal dissension.
At the suggestion of the British Foreign Office, the arrival in
Hong Kong 0f Owen O'Malley, the newly appointed counsellor to the British
Legation at Peking, became the occasion of another conference at Govern-
ment House. Aware of the desire within the Foreign Office to have ready
a policy of action with which to rebut parliamentary critics, the partici—
pants at this conference on January 25, 1926 could do no more than to
put forward a plan whose component parts were already subject to grave
doubt. The plan called for a censure of the Canton Government by the
League of Nations which would almost certainly be ignored. The British
Government would then be expected to obtain the cooperation of the major
powers for a blockade against Canton until the boycott was terminated.

Because the Soviet Union in all likelihood would refuse to cooperate, the

 

for financial assistance in the amount of $1, 000, 000. See F0 405/250,
F 758/1/10, Enclosure No. 9, Clementi to Amery, January 15, 1926.

6Apart from the difficulties anticipated in any further attempts to
secure international cooperation, a blockade of Canton was opposed on the
grounds that it would spread anti-British sentiment throughout China, and
would leave a legacy of hatred which could prove devastating to Hong
Kong. See, F0 405/250, F 758/1/10, Enclosure No. 7, Clementi to
Amery, Hong Kong, January 14, 1926.

118

Chinese navy would be required to prevent the passage of Russian and
Chinese ships to Canton. The agreement among those at the conference
that the principal cause of the boycott was the presence of Soviet advisers
in Canton led to the final component of the plan--action by British repre-
sentatives at Moscow geared to obtaining the recall of Borodin and his
Russian comrades. 7

The sponsors of this plan were well aware of the objections it
would raise in Londc n, objections they themselves shared; but short of
an actual declaration of war against Canton, they could envision no other
active policy. They concluded their deliberations by putting forth the
same views which had emerged from the conference of January 13, views
which implied a passive policy of waiting for some Chinese leader to
alter the composition of the Canton Government.

As pressure mounted in the British press and among influential

business leaders for some form of action at Canton, the Foreign Office

 

7See r0 405/250, 1‘ 1024/1/10, Enclosures Nos. 1-3, Colonial
Office to Foreign Office, Marcth, 1926.

8I‘D—id. Of the objections raised to the various components of this
plan, those surrounding the first two were aired at the conference of
January 13. The involvement of the Chinese navy, a few vessels opera-
ting off the south China coast without regard to the wishes of Peking, would
have required British assistance. This the Foreign Office could not pro-
vide unless it was willing to disregard the restraints imposed at the
Washington Conference which forbade interference with Chinese domestic
politics. Action at Moscow could not go beyond the threat to withdraw
the British mission; an act which held little prospect for success. See
FO 405/250, F 242/1/10, Annex XVIII, Sir W. Tyrrell to Macleay,
Foreign Office, January 29, 1926; and F0 405/250, F 1191/1/10, Enclo-
sure No. l, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, February 2, 1926. See also,
FO 405/250, F 439/1/10, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, February 17,
1926.

119

hurriedly sought the advice of the British Minister at Peking. Sir Ronald
Macleay, unfortunately, could not improve upon the suggestions offered
earlier at Hong Kong. Macleay clung to the unwarranted and somewhat
"may? 7, V..---‘.:"..l belief that either Wu P'ei-fu or Sun Ch'uan-fang would soon
launch a major military expedition against Canton that would eliminate

the last vestiges of Bolshevik intrigue and influence in Kwangtung. Assum-
ing that such a campaign would require foreign support, Macleay suggested
that the Foreign Office reconsider its policy of non—involvement in Chinese
internal affairs. In the interim, he joined the chorus of other official
voices in advocating a policy of inaction.

When Parliament convened beginning February 2, the British
Foreign Office had just completed an assessment of the desirability of
offering recognition to the Canton Government in return for an end to the
boycott against Hong Kong. Some members felt that the time had either
come or was fast approaching when the Foreign Office would have to give
up the fiction of one government at Peking nominally in control of all
China. They held that such action would pose no conflict with Article I
of the treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, by which the
powers agreed ”to respect the soverignty, the independence and the terri-

torial and administrative integrity of China. " Opponents of granting

 

95ee FO 405/250, r 242/1/10, Sir w. Tyrrell to Macleay, Foreign
Office, January 26, 1926; and Enclosures (C-E), Macleay to Chamberlain,
January 30 and February 1, 1926. See also, FO 405/250, F 1191/1/10,
Enclosure No. l, Clementi to Amery, February 2, 1926.

120

recognition to Canton agreed that it was most difficult to respect some-
thing that no longer existed because of China‘s internal weakness, but
they noted that Article I also pledged them ”to provide the fullest and
inert unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for
hersetf an effective and stable government. " Although the question of
recognition to Canton, first raised by Consul-General Jamieson in
January, 1926, did not then attract important support, it was to remain
a major topic of discussion among policy makers in London anxious to
come to terms with the Kuomintang. 10

On February 10, 1926, British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain, faced the critics of a continued policy
of inaction in the House of Commons. In response to questions requiring
a justification of the Foreign Office's failure to adopt forceful initiatives
in China, Chamberlain, in language which had been suggested by Sir
Ronald Macleay, reviewed the unsuccessful settlement negotiations
between Hong Kong and Canton that had taken place in December, 1925.
He expressed satisfaction with the reduction of anti-British sentiment
and the revival of trade that had occurred in the Yangtze Valley, and in-
sisted that it had been won through a British policy of patience and moder-
ation. Perhaps unduly influenced by the views of Macleay, Chamberlain

maintained that Chinese feeling against the extremist faction at Canton

 

loSee FO 405/250, F 364/364/10, "Note respecting attitude of
His Majesty's Government towards Canton Government, " F. Ashton-
Gwatkin, H. W. Malkin, and M. W. Lampson, Foreign Office, January
28-30, 1926.

121

was spreading and that, in the absence of British interference which
could only serve to unite all China against the foreign aggressor, the
Chinese themselves might move to extinguish the power of those who
clung to Russian influence. Thus, in the first months of 1926, after
which the boycott against Hong Kong would continue for yet another eight
months, British policy was essentially what it had been at the start of

the struggle with Canton. 11

Great Britain and the Tariff Conference at Peking:
A New View of the KMT

 

 

Although British policy in south China had undergone no formal
change since the troubled days of June, 1925, attitudes toward the Kuo-
mintang in Canton at the beginning of 1926 were being. gradually trans-
formed. The suggestion by Sir James W. Jamieson that the Foreign
Office consider the experiment of offering Canton some form of jurisdic-
tional recognition is indicative of that transformation. The Kuomintang
had always regarded Jamieson as an implacable foe, and Sir James
accepted and even relished that posture. Yet, impressed by the efforts
of the KMT at local reform, and convinced that its tenure in Kwangtung
was secure, Jamieson had suggested a form of conciliation.

When, as a result of agreements reached at the Washington

Conference of 1921-1922, a conference was convened at Peking on October

 

11For the questions asked of Sir Austen Chamberlain, some of

which were motivated by little more than partisan politics, and his re-
sponses, see FO 405/250, F 561/1/10, "Questions asked in the House
of Commons, February 10, 1926. "

122

26, 1925, to consider the question of the Chinese tariff, Great Britain

stood ready to go beyond those agreements by favoring a grant of com-

plete tariff autonomy to be acquired by stages. With the Conference

less than one month old, the assembled powers agreed that on January

1, 1929 a Chinese national tariff law would become effective. They

could not agree, however, on the rates to be allowed in the interim.

British representatives favored an increase of up to 12. 5 percent which

proved most unsatisfactory to the Japanese. Attempts to find an accept-

able formula for an increase in the Chinese tariff continued until late

December when the Conference recessed. Throughout these deliberations,

the British delegation had ignored the opposition of the Kuomintang to the

Tariff Conference. 12
Kuomintang opposition to the Tariff Conference convened at Peking

rested on the assumption that any increase in customs collections would

go to the Central Government whose treasury would quickly become subject

to the raids of various northern warlords seeking to enlarge their own

war chests. In December, 1925, the British Foreign Office moved to

meet this objection. It instructed Macleay to announce to his foreign

colleagues that the British Government could acquiesce no longer in a

policy by which the customs revenues collected throughout China reached

 

12For the activities of the British, American, and Japanese dele-
gates at the tariff conference together with the response of the Chinese
delegates appointed by the Peking Government, see Iriye, op. cit. , p. 63-
80. For American attitudes toward the conference, see Cohen, op. cit. ,
113-116.

123

the hands of the Peking Government only because the. foreign powers
were prepared to use force to that end. Instead, the British Minister
was to indicate that his government was prepared to see the customs
revenues collected at each port turned over to local Chinese commissioners.
Such a policy would mean automatic provincial allocation. If those in
power at Peking wished the situation otherwise, they would have to con-
clude their own arrangements without the usual recourse to the power of

. 13
foreign gunboats.

But in the view of Sir Ronald Macleay, "the best Chinese opinion"
favored not only maintenance but even a strengthening of the customs
administration under foreign control. In addition, the British Minister
appeared convinced that the new Foreign Office proposal could not possibly
be meant to apply to Canton. It remained for the British Foreign Office
to inform him that the entire proposal had been inspired precisely because
Canton's boycott of Hong Kong threatened to ruin the shipping trade and
foreshadowed similar occurrences elsewhere in China. In its telegram
to Macleay the Foreign Office replied:

We are not convinced that Canton is merely Bolshevik and therefore
alien to the rest of China and not amenable to the same treatment.
Though boycott is prompted by Bolsheviks does its root not lie rather
in past refusal to allot due shares of customs to Canton? Would not
concession in matter of customs revenues tend to promote settlement
by strengthening hand of Right or even Left Kuomintang who are uneasy

under Soviet domination? And if Conference persists in present
course is there not real danger of ultimate seizure of customs revenues

 

l3see co 129/495, F 17/2/10, Foreign Office to Macleay, London,
December 31, 1925.

124

or establishment of rival local custom house at Canton and reproduc-
tion of Canton situation elsewhere? Present policy of Conference
seems to us to be direct descendant of policy of interference that has
been largely responsible for present position at Canton. . . .
Nor could the Foreign Office resist an attempt to correct the myopia which
seemed to affect Macleay's assessments of internal Chinese politics. Its
telegram concluded:
. Now how far is "best Chinese opinion" really representative of
China or how far merely of Peking? How far is it qualified to speak
for and guarantee the acquiescence of nationalists and provinces?
Viewed from this end we seem to be face to face with a strong wide-
spread and growing nationalist movement, not confined to a few stu-
dents but embracing Chinese of diverse classes and opinions, and
aiming at total elimination of foreign interference. It has every
appearance of being the real force of the future in China. Do we
overestimate its influence? 14
Although the Tariff Conference was to reconvene in February,
1926, continued warfare among the northern militarists seeking to occupy
Peking and the inability of the representatives of foreign powers to find
further agreement doomed it to failure. Formal meetings continued

until April after which the commissioners met infrequently until the Con-

ference withered and died in July.

The Customs Seizure Incident, February, 1926
The power of the Canton Strike Committee to influence Kuomintang
politics reached its zenith at the second KMT Congress; thereafter, its
inability to command sufficient revenues and its involvement in activities

that threatened KMT security in Kwangtung led to a rapidly accelerating

 

14sec (:0 129/495, F 52/10/10, Foreign Office to Macleay, London,
January 13, 1926.

125

decline. In January, 1926, amid reports of sharp increases in the price
of kerosene and luxury items in Canton, rumors gained currency in Hong
Kong which suggested that the boycott would be relaxed during Chinese
New Year so that merchants could settle outstanding accounts. British
authorities in Hong Kong noted, however, that among Chinese commercial
interests in the colony vigorous attempts were being made to forestall
financial settlements that could only lead to bankruptcy. On January 16,
Consul-General Jamieson observed that the Strike Committee had laid
to rest this and other rumors concerning a relaxation of the boycott by
publishing its intention to dispatch 400 additional pickets for frontier
duty. 15
The visit to Canton in January of 280 self-proclaimed Chinese mer-
chants from Hong Kong resulted in many of them joining the Kuomintang,
and their return later that same month made Governor Clementi appre-
hensive. The Governor's fears, which proved to be valid, were that the
"fraternity party, " as this group was termed, would be used to incite
disturbances during Chinese New Year (the week surrounding February 13);

a period set aside by the Canton Strike Committee for attempts to launch

another general strike in Hong Kong. The strike, despite careful preparations,

 

15Fo 405/250, F 758/1/10, Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton,
January 18, 1926. Typical of the rumors regarding a boycott relaxation
are those found in The Hong Kong Telegraph, January 7, 1926, andlhf
Hong Kong Daily Press, January 9, 1926.

 

 

126

failed to attract many adherents and proved damaging to Strike Committee
prestige. Undoubtedly, the widespread belief among Chinese in Hong
Kong that the Committee's strike fund was being rapidly depleted dissuaded
many whose sympathies were with Canton from again downing tools. 16
While the financial distress of the Canton Strike Committee in
late January and early February was real, it was not yet acute. Although
many of the sources from which large sums had been gathered earlier
were no longer available, the Kuomintang continued its regular, if some-
what reduced, monthly contribution to the strikers. A circular telegram
sent by the KMT and intercepted in Hong Kong revealed that efforts had
not been abandoned to re-stimulate overseas Chinese support to the
strikers in Canton. When the Strike Committee in February threatened
to extend the boycott to include the goods of Japan, merchants of that
nation fulfilled its expectations by contributing $250, 000. Throughout

the month of February interference with foreign shipping and the seizure

. 17
of some vessels for ransom continued.

 

16See FO 405/250, F 758/1/10, Enclosure No. 3, Clementi to
Amery, Hong Kong, January 13, 1926; and F0 405/251, F 1757/1/10,
Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, February 23, 1926.
See also, Wah- tsz yat-m, December 29, 1925 .

 

17For a British translation of the intercepted KMT telegram which
bore the signatures of Wang Ching-wei, C. C. Wu, and Sun Fo among
others, see F0 405/250, F 1766/1/10, Enclosure No. 2, "Translation
of Circular Telegram from Canton, dated February 22, 1926. " The date
of this telegram is interesting in that it coincides with the beginning of
the customs seizure incident. The contribution of Japanese Merchants
to avert a boycott and the continued interference of the Strike Committee
with foreign shipping are discussed in F0 405/250, F 1246/1/10, Enclosure

127

When strike pickets in search of additional funds began seizing
cargoes and either selling them or holding them for ransom before their
examination by the Maritime Customs authorities, they precipitated a
major crisis. The Canton Commissioner of Customs, F. Haley Bell,
responded to these acts by refusing any further clearance of cargoes
until those confiscated were returned. From February 22, 1926, until
the 26th when this incident was settled, the customs house, although
open, suspended operations and the ports at Canton and Whampoa remained
in effect blockaded. Initially, British authorities were divided in their
suggestion of methods by which the "customs seizure" incident might be
resolved. Governor Clementi saw in the incident an excellent opportunity
not only to uphold the sanctity of the customs administration but also to
defeat the Chinese boycott against Hong Kong. He urged that British
pressure be brought to bear on the other foreign powers involved to keep
the issue open until the Strike Committee and its boycott organizations
were disbanded. In Peking, Sir Macleay noted that while American lvfinister
MacMurray believed the United States Government ready to support the
customs against attacks by the Canton Strike Committee, it would strongly
object to any attempt that would lead to American involvement in the anti-
British boycott. The British Foreign Office clearly recognized the sus-

picions of those powers that feared a plot to embroil them in the boycott.

 

No. l, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton, February 15, 1926. See 3180, F0
405/250, F 527/71/10, "Weekly Summary of Events in China. "

128

As a result, the two issues were separated for fear that, in the absence
of international support, the customs would be. overthrown. 18
When it became apparent to the Canton Government that the sup-
port anticipated by Commissioner of Customs Bell might endanger its
struggle against Hong Kong, it moved quickly by issuing and enforcing
a proclamation requiring rigorous compliance with all customs formal-
ities. By so doing, it dispelled the convictions held by many in Hong
Kong that the Canton Government was powerless to control the Strike
Committee. Immediately after the settlement of this incident a
steamer left Hong Kong for Canton to test the effectiveness of the anti-
British boycott. Although she was allowed to carry away Chinese
passengers who had acceded to demands for payment by strike pickets,
the steamer could neither land nor secure cargo. As they had before
this incident, strike pickets in Canton resumed their examination of cargo

after it had passed through the customs. On February 23, shortly after

the start of the customs crisis, Wang Ching-wei, apparently unnerved

 

18For the actions of Commissioner F. Haley Bell, see F0 405/250,
F 1392/1/10, Enclosures Nos. 2 and 3, Bell to Jamieson, February 20,
1926. The suggestions of Governor Clementi are in F0 371/11622,
Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, February 26, 1926. The attitudes of
American Minister MacMurray as expressed to the British Minister at
Peking are in F0 371/11622, F 801/1/10, Macleay to Chamberlain,
Peking, February 25, 1926. British fears that the Chinese might ignore
the Canton customs administration and establish their own collections
are expressed in F0 371/11621, F 418/1/10, Macleay to Chamberlain,
Peking, February 19, 1926; and F0 405/250, F 857/71/10, "Weekly
Summary of Events in China, " Foreign Office, February 26, 1926.

129

by this event, wrote to the two Chinese members of the, Hong Kong Legis-
lative Council and offered to re-open the negotiations for a boycott

t.19

settlemen

The Wang Ching-wei Negotiations: March, 1926

In response to the letter of Wang Ching-wei of February 23, the
Hong Kong Government sent the two Chinese Members of Legislative
Council, Sir Shou-son Chow and Dr. R. H. Kotewall to Macao, where,
meeting with the Kwangtung Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Fu P'ing-
ch'ang, they were to initiate unofficial talks meant to lead to formal
negotiations for an end to the anti-British boycott. This meeting. which
lasted from March 2-4, revolved around two central issues--the question
of compensation by Hong Kong to the strikers and the attitude of the
Canton Government concerning its own role in future negotiations. The

issue of "strike pay" had been met by a delegation of Chinese merchants

 

19For the actions of the Canton Government and the attitude of
Hong Kong authorities to that action, see F0 371/11622, Clementi to
Amery, Hong Kong, February 26, 1926. Wang Ching-wei's letter is
presented in F0 405/251, F 1758/1/10, Enclosure No. 4, "Translation
of Letter from Mr. Wong Ching Wai to the two Chinese Members of
Legislative Council, ” February 23, 1926. According to Consul-General
Jamieson, Chiang Kai- shek's anger over the capitulation to the British
during the customs seizure incident led to his retirement to Whampoa.
See F0 371/11624, F 1563/1/10, Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton,
March 8, 1926. The dismissal of T. V. Soong as Commissioner of Com-
merce (he continued as Minister of Finance) and the departure of Sun F0
from Canton on March 4, 1926, may also have been related to the customs
incident. American Consul Jenkins had noted in early February that
Soong's eagerness to end the boycott was well known, and that he did not
agree with the views of C. C. Wu. See U.S. Decimal File, 893. 5045/315,
Jenkins to MacMurray, Canton, February 9, 1926.

130

from Hong Kong to Canton in late 1925 with an offer of $300, 000. Reject-
ing this, the Strike Committee pressed claims for $14, 000, 000 to be
paid as a lump sum. At Macao, on March 2, Fu P'ing-ch'ang
observed that in light of the distance between these two figures further
discussion would be impossible were it not for the fact that his govern-
ment was prepared to make large concessions. He recalled the earlier
offer of the Hong Kong Government to make available loans to Canton for
the construction of railways and noted that, if the offer were renewed and
a portion of such funds could be used to pay off the strikers, the issue of
compensation might be resolved. The Hong Kong representatives agreed
that their government might again offer loans, but it would probably re.
quire rigid conditions affecting their disposition. 20

The attitude of the Canton Government since the start of the strike
and boycott had been that, because the struggle with Hong Kong Was a
patriotic contest between workers there and in Canton against the govern-
ment of that colony, any settlement would require negotiations between
the strikers and British authorities. In the interests of peace and justice,
however, the Canton Government stood ready to offer its services as a
mediator. The Hong Kong Govetnrrient, with equal consistency, had

insisted from the first that the initial step in any formal negotiations

 

“The meeting at Macao is described by the mo participants from
Hong Kong in F0 405/251, F 1758/1/10, Enclosure No. 5, Chat» and
Kotewall to Hallifax, Hong Kong, March 5, 1926, p. 61-69. See also,
Enclosure No. 3, Clementi to Arnery, Hong Kong, March 8, 1926‘

131

would require the Canton Government to appoint delegates to meet with
its own nominees. At Macao, Fu P'ing-ch'ang, lacking definite instru-
ctions on this issue, ascribed the intransigeant attitude of the Canton
Government to the influence of C. C. Wu and intimated that here, too,
his government was presently disposed to making an important conces-
sion. It was agreed that a meeting of Fu P'ing- ch'ang with the Governor
at Hong Kong and one of Chow and Kotewall with Wang Ching-Wei would
help to clarify these outstanding issues. After further agreeing that
such an exchange of visits would be suggested to each government, the
conference at Macao was terminated.

Governor Clementi, informed of the discussions at Macao, saw
no need for further informal conversations and requested Canton to

immediately appoint official delegates to begin settlement negotiations.
While awaiting a reply, he renewed his preposal to the Foreign Office,
first made in December, 1925, that it approve loans to Canton for
railway development. Recalling British consortium obligations with
respect to completion of the Canton-Hankow Railway, the necessity of
obtaining the consent of the Peking Government for railway construction
in Kwangtung, and the dependence of bondholders upon Peking for service

of the Canton-Kowloon Railway loans, the Foreign Office urged upon
Governor Clementi a policy of delay. Within the Foreign Office, however,
it was agreed that "Hong Kong must give Canton something, and that must

involve a certain amount of free money, i. e. , a subsidy. " So anxious

 

7- libid.

132

was the Foreign Office to lure Canton away from Russian influence and
achieve a revival of British trade in south China that it accepted this
"further step towards recognition of the independence of Canton" despite
the protests of Peking which were certain to follow. 22
Wang Ching-wei initially attempted to confine the settlement dis-
cussions to private talks between himself and the two Chinese members
of the Legislative Council, but was thwarted by Governor Clementi's
insistence that formal delegates be appointed prior to any further semi-
official exchanges. The appearance in Hong Kong of a Chinese merchant,
who maintained that C. C. Wu wished a private meeting with Governor
Clementi in Macao before the start of formal negotiations, created im-
mediate confusion. In Canton this same merchant informed C. C. Wu
that such a meeting was at the Governor's request. From Consul-
General Jamieson on March 16, Governor Clementi received the following:
Strike leaders have let me know through a third party that they
are prepared to give in, if sufficiently remunerated. Can you please
send up capable Chinese negotiator to conduct conversations? He

should have authority to pay 2, 000 dollars down and go to a limit of
300, 000 dollars for the final settlement? A11 demands will then be

 

zzFor Clementi's insistence that Canton appoint delegates before
undertaking further talks, see F0 405/251, F 1897/1/10, Enclosure No.
l, Clementi to Chamberlain, Hong Kong, March 24, 1926. Clementi's
proposal for loans to the Canton Government for railway development is
outlined in F0 371/11622, F 1051/1/10, Foreign Office to Macleay,
London, March 20, 1926. For Foreign Office views on the loan proposal,
see F0 371/11623, F 1051/1/10, Foreign Office to Macleay, London,
March 20, 1926. The willingness of the Foreign Office to arrange a boy-
cott settlement by offering Canton a cash subsidy is stated in F0 371/11623,
F 1312/1/10, Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, March 27,
1926.

133

abandoned. They are acting quite. independently from the Govern~
ment. The political situation is ,most obscure and there are signs
of a break up of the Government.

Consul-General Jamieson had also observed that since the begin-
ning of March the Canton Strike Committee had allowed large numbers of
strikers to return to Hong Kong. He interpreted this as a clear evidence
that it anticipated the rapid approach of a boycott settlement. When the
misunderstandings related to the various proposed meetings in advance
of formal negotiations were finally cleared away, and as both govern-
ments prepared to announce their choice of official delegates, attention

shifted dramatically to an explosion of political and military activity in

Canton.

 

Z3Wang Ching-wei's wish that the Chinese representatives meet

with him in Canton is expressed in Fu P'ing-ch'ang's letter to them after
his return from Macao. See F0 405/251, F 1758/1/10, Enclosure No.

8, "Mr. Foo Ping-sheung to Sir Shou-son Chow and Mr. Kotewall, "
Canton, March 12, 1926. The incident of the Chinese merchant lobbying
for a meeting between Governor Clementi and C. C. Wu in Macao is dis-
cussed in F0 405/251, F 1958/1/10, Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, March 27, 1926. Consul-General Jamieson's message to
Clementi is repeated in F0 405/251, F 1758/1/10, Enclosure No. 7,
Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, March 18, 1926.

24For Jamieson's observations on strikers returning to Hong Kong
in mid-March, see F0 371/11624, F 4670/1/10, Jamieson to Macleay,
Canton, March 15, 1926. Following his expulsion as Provincial Minister
for Foreign Affairs at the end of May, 1926, Fu P'ing-ch'ang, enroute to
Shanghai, paused in Hong Kong and had a candid conversation with Dr. R.
H. Kotewall. Commenting on the attempts to reach a settlement initiated
by Wang Ching-wei in late February, Fu maintained that this was part of
a plot by Wang, the Chinese Communists, and the Russian advisers to
overthrow Chiang Kai- shek. He insisted that Sun Fo's return to Canton
in January was motivated by the desire to end the boycott. Sun's attempt,
according to Fu, to gain the confidence of the strikers by direct appeals
which ignored their leadership was detected by the Russians who advised

134

Great Britain and "The March 20th Incident"
When, during the period March 18-22, Chiang Kai- shek took

for c: eful action to destroy what some observers saw as a threat to his
po 8 ition in Canton, British officials became convinced that the political
composition of the Kuomintang would soon undergo important changes
that would lead to a speedy settlement of the boycott against Hong Kong.
Ac cording to one theory widely accepted at the time, the unauthorized
movements of the KMT gunboat Chung-shan from Whampoa to Canton
apparently confirmed suspicions harbored by Chiang that certain
Russian advisers, Chinese Communists, officers and soldiers of his
Own army, and labor units including the leaders of the Canton Strike

Committee planned to kidnap him and assume political and military con-

trol in the city. Chiang reacted quickly by disarming the Chung: shan,

 

surr ounding the headquarters of the Strike Committee, and arresting

”108 e he believed to be implicated. Subsequently, a number of those

arrested were released and Chiang claimed that the entire affair had

been created by misunderstandings. To many observers, both then and

now, this incident was seen as a deliberate and bold attempt by Chiang

to Stage a military "coup" (cheng-pien) against the Chinese Communists

al'ld their allies the Russian advisers together with the Canton Strike

\

Wang Ching-wei to open negotiations in an effort to undermine the position
0f Sun F0. Fu's proposed visit to Hong Kong following the meeting at

acao was sabotaged by C. C. Wu who, because he was being carefully
vi'atched by the Russians, feared that an attempt at boycott settlement
V"Ould cost him his own position. See F0 405/252A, F 2992/1/10, Enclo-
8“re No. 2, "Memorandum, " by R. H. Kotewall, June 4, 1926.

135

Committee. The "coup, " according to this view, made Chiang the
unrivaled political and military power within the Kuomintang. 25

The initial reaction of Consul-General Jamieson to the “March
20th Incident" was one of confusion and incomprehensibility. On March
22, he observed:

The air in the city continued to be full of suppressed excitement
and rumors, there are movements of troops and gunboats here and
at Whampoa, but no one has an inkling of what is happening. My
American and French colleagues who have lately seen C. C. Wu and
Fu P'ing-ch'ang can get nothing out of them. The French Bishop
and usually well-informed Chinese are equally ignorant. What is
certain is that C. C. Wu's family left for Hong Kong yesterday morn-
ing. As strike headquarters were in the forenoon surrounded by
troops, it would seem likely that a story to the effect that the Govern-
ment were demanding the handing over of their books and accounts for
inspection is true. By the afternoon all on the surface was quiet
again . . .

With what was to become an important piece of information to British
policy-makers, Jamieson concluded:

I learn very confidentially that last evening C. C. Wu, Wu T'ieh-
ch'eng and Fu P'ing-ch'ang despatched an urgent telegram to Sun F0 at
Shanghai, stating that it is imperative, in the interests of the party,
that he return to Canton by the first available steamer. 26

 

 

25For KMT versions of the ”March 20th Incident, " see Kuo-wen
chou-pao, March 28, 1926, p. 36; and April 4, 1926, p. 31. See also,
Shen Yu, "Canton Political Turmoil, " in Kuo-wen chou-pao, April 11,
1926, p. 7-9. For newspaper accounts which viewed Chiang's actions
as a ”coup," see Shun ao, March 24, 1926, p. 5; March 25, 1926, p.
6; March 28, 1926, p. 6; and Chen pao, April 8, 1926, p. 5. Among
the Chinese Communist sources w 1c depict Chiang's actions as a ”coup"
are Hsiang-kang ta pa-kung, p. 35-36; and Chih-kun yun-tunlchien-
shih, p. 280. See also, Hsiagg—tao, Vol. IV, No. l 6, August 6, 1926,
p. 1658. For Western accounts, see Wu Tien-wei's "Chiang Kai-shek's
March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926, " in The Journal of Asian Studies,
Vol. XXVII, No. 3, May, 1968, p. 585-602; and Wilbur and How, op. cit.,
p. 218-219. See also, Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 494.

 

 

 

 

 

26See F0 405/251, F 1764/1/10, Jamieson to Macleay, Canton,
March 22, 1926.

136

On March 23, Consul-General Jamieson pieced together what evi-
dence he could obtain and sent to London what was to become the official
British version of the "March 20th Incident. " According to Jamieson,
certain Russian advisers and Chinese Communists in Canton had plotted
to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, but Chiang had learned of their plans and
struck first. As a result, he would, Jamieson maintained, soon attract
a majority of those generals and politicians who wished to see the Russians
and Chinese Communists eliminated from Canton by force. When that
happened, Jamieson believed that the strike and boycott against Hong
Kong would quickly come to an end. In Hong Kong, Governor Clementi,
whose information regarding Canton was largely that provided by Jamieson,
quite naturally came to the same conclusion. He informed London that
the incident in Canton presented an unparalleled opportunity to rescue
Hong Kong, provided that an immediate and determined effort was made to
settle the boycott and substitute British for Russian influence in Canton. 27

When, on March 29. Sun F0, enroute to Canton, conferred with

Governor Clementi in Hong Kong, British hopes for a boycott settlement

 

27For Jamieson's interpretation of the ”March 20th Incident, " see
CO 129/496, Jamieson to Chamberlain, Canton, March 23, 1926. When
questioned concerning this incident on March 29, Sir Austen Chamberlain,
in the House of Commons, reiterated the Jamieson version. See F0 371/
11624, F 1370/1/10, "Parliamentary Question, March 29. 1926. " Clementi
reported that Chiang Kai- shek first became suspicious when he learned
from Hu Han-min, then in Moscow, that 60, 000 rifles had recently been
shipped to Whampoa. Able to account for only 20, 000 of these weapons,
Chiang moved against his enemies and found the remainder secreted
aboard gunboats, hidden at strike headquarters, or in the hands of strike
Pickets and rebellious soldiers. See F0 405/251, F 1897/1/10, Enclosure
No, 1 , Clementi to Chamberlain, Hong Kong, March 24, 1926.

137

Sun Fo professed his opposition to the policy

were further heightened.
of employing Russian advisers at Canton and his conviction that the

Strike Committee posed a serious threat to the Canton Government.

Although he pledged his efforts toward finding a means to end the boycott,

Sun reminded Clementi that it would prove most difficult to disband the
Clementi

many strike pickets in the city together with their organizations.
responded by indicating that the Hong Kong Government would under no
circumstances enter into negotiations with the Strike Committee; nor

would it honor any claims on the part of Canton for compensation in the
The Governor did concede, however, that his

form of “strike pay. "
government stood ready to assist the Canton Government in any project

for local development that would provide employment to the large number
When the conversation turned to a discussion

of idle workers in the city.
seemed to plague Kwangtung, Sun Fo

of the state of lawlessness that

reiterated his opposition to the plan of a northern expedition to militarily
Sun con-

unify China that had been ratified at the second KMT Congress.

cluded his visit with Clementi by emphasizing that it was his aim to give

Kwangtung good government, and to make it, by its prosperity, "an object

lesson to the rest of China. "28

28Among many British observers, it was believed that Sun Fo's
return to Canton meant that he would assume the political leadership of
the Kuomintang which had been vacated when, in the course of the "March
20th Incident, " Wang Ching-wei had contracted a "diplomatic illness"
Which forced him to step down. See F0 371/11623, F 1312/1/10, Minute
by F'- Ashton-Gwatkin, Foreign Office, March 27, 1926. For Sun Fo's
meeting with Clementi, see F0 405/251, F 1958/1/10, Enclosure No. 4,
'.'Memorandum of a Conversation with Mr. Sun Fo at Government House, "
S” C- Clementi, Hong Kong, March 29, 1926.

138

The efforts of Wang Ching-wei to open negotiations with Hong
Kong, interrupted by the events of the "March 20th Incident, " were re-
vived on April 2, 1926, when the Kwangtung Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs, Fu P'ing-ch'ang, informed Hong Kong that the Canton Government
was prepared to announce the appointment of delegates to a boycott settle-
ment conference. Whereas Wang Ching-wei had wished to appoint C. C.
Wu, T. V. Soong, and Fu P'ing-ch'ang to represent Canton, in April
Governor Clementi was informed that the former two were to be joined
by Ch'en Kung-po. Ch'en then held the post of director of Kuomintang
labor affairs that had been occupied by Liao Chung-k'ai up to his death.
The Kuomintang through Fu P'ing-ch'ang again informed Hong Kong that
it desired informal conversations at Canton prior to the opening of
negotiations, but now C. C. Wu rather than Wang Ching-wei was to
host the Hong Kong representative dispatched for those talks. 29

Upon arrival in Canton on April 7, Hong Kong's Attorney-General,
J. H. Kemp, visited Consul-General Jamieson on Shameen from whom
he learned that his wish to see Chiang Kai-shek would be frustrated.
Chiang, it seems, had withdrawn to Whampoa and was seeing no one.

The following day, Kemp accompanied by vice-Consul Fitzmaurice, met

 

295% F0 405/251, F 2097/1/10, Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to
Amery, Hong Kong, April 6, 1926; and Enclosure No. 2, ”Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs, Canton, to His Majesty's Consul-General, " Canton,
April 2, 1926. Observers in Hong Kong noted that Wang Ching-wei, after
the "March 20th Incident, “ was a "spent political force. " Wang departed
Canton for Paris on May 9, 1926. See FO 405/252A, F 2992/1/10,
Enclosure No. l, Clementi to Amery, June 8, 1926.

139

C. C. Wu and began boycott settlement discussions. At the onset, Wu
brought up the strikers' terms and suggested that, while he was prepared
to discuss them, his government would accept no responsibility for the
actions against Hong Kong. Again, as he had in December, 1925, Wu
insisted that the Canton Government would only enter negotiations as a
mediator. With this point unresolved, Kemp proceeded to the issue of
"strike pay" only to discover that here there was even less chance of
agreement. Hong Kong, according to Kemp, would neither provide com-
pensation to the strikers or the Canton Government, nor would it allow
others in the colony to do so. Wu insisted that without some form of
payment by Hong Kong the boycott could not be settled. After further
discussion concerning the size and scope of proposed loans to the Canton
Government for railway development, which were facilitated by Kemp's
avoidance of any mention of safeguards or conditions, the meetings
adjourned, with each side expecting the other to make a concession

enabling the talks to be reopened. 30

 

30The inaccessibility of Chiang Kai-shek suggests what only one
British observer saw as possible. F. Ashton-Gwatkin, whose views
carried great weight within the Foreign Office, had earlier noted: "The
position at Canton is rather disappointing. Either General Chiang Kai-
shek is too weak or otherwise reluctant to take strong measures against
the extremists or the Canton Government realizing that the boycott is
their strongest bargaining counter in dealing with Hong Kong have no
intention of stopping it as yet. " See F0 371/11623, Minute by F. Ashton-
Gwatkin, Foreign Office, March 29, 1926. For Kemp's meetings with
C. C. Wu in Canton, see F0 405/251, F 2097/1/10, Enclosure No. 7,
”Memorandum of certain Informal Conversations at Canton between C. C.
Wu and J. H. Kemp, on April 8 and 9, 1926, " Hong Kong, April 10,
1926.

140

When it became apparent to the Colonial Office that Governor
Clementi had closed the door to a boycott solution by refusing to spend
either British or Hong Kong Chinese money, there was much displeasure.
In his message to Clementi on April 13, Colonial Secretary Amery noted
that it had been previously agreed that some form of compensation to
Canton would probably be required to reach a settlement. Referring to
Clementi's apparent change of policy, undertaken without the prior knowl-
edge of the Colonial Office, Amery concluded:

It would appear however from the statement now made to the

Canton Government that the door has been finally barred to a settle-
ment by payment of compensation and if so I should be glad to receive
an explanation of this change of view and further information as to

the tactics which you now consider could most advantageously be
employed in negotiations with Canton.

Governor Clementi, after reviewing his, own consistent opposition
to any form of payment to Canton, (an opposition not shared by all major
interests in Hong Kong) attempted to justify his current stance on the
compensation issue. He noted that Sun Fo, since his return to Canton
in January, had worked continuously for the elimination of the communist
elements within the Kuomintang. Sun's departure for Shanghai, scheduled
for the following day (April 16) was, Clementi maintained, for the purpose
of convincing the leaders of the Western Hills Group to return to Canton

to assist in that task. Clementi then characterized the "coup" of Chiang

Kai-shek as weakening the position of the Canton Strike Committee, the

 

3lSee F0 371/11624, c 7990, Amery to Clementi, Colonial. Office,
April 13, 1926.

141

Chinese Communists, and the Russian advisers. He believed Chiang to
be preparing to expel the Russians, suppress the Strike Committee, and
drive the Chinese Communists out of the party; actions he said that Chiang
would have taken in late March but for the opposition of leaders such as
Wang Ching-wei. Clementi concluded that the next great struggle between
the Communists and anti-Communists in the Kuomintang would take place
in mid-May at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee. Antici-
pating a victory for the "Rightists, " Clementi argued that the Strike
Committee would cease to exist and the boycott would thus be ended. As

a result of these views, the Governor proposed to stall negotiations until

after May 15. 32

May 15, 1926: The Beginning of the End

 

The approaching meeting of the Central Executive Committee of
the Kuomintang scheduled to convene on May 15, 1926, gave British
officials in south China a renewed optimism that their troubles would
soon end. Newspapers in Hong Kong had noticed a dramatic rise
in the number of arrests carried out by strike pickets in Canton since
the start of the year. They were pleased to note that, beginning in late

April and continuing into May, authorities in the city were carrying out

 

32Governor Clementi also noted that, according to Consul-General
J arnieson, leaders of the Strike Committee (including Su Chao-cheng and
Teng Chung-hsia) were so certain that the boycott would soon end that on
March 20 they proposed to call it off if paid 2, 000 dollars each. See F0
405/251, F 2097/1/10, Enclosure No. 9. Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong,
April 15, 1926.

142

a policy of disarming strike pickets who engaged in illegal arrests.
Soon after he replaced Consul-General Jamieson in mid-April, J. F.
Brenan visited Canton Chief of Police Wu T'ieh-ch'eng who remained
unalterably opposed to the continuance of the boycott against Hong Kong.
Wu told Brenan that the dominant sentiment in Canton regarding a settle-
ment was that Hong Kong would have to offer some form of compensation.
Subsequent visits with T. V. Soong and C. C. Wu convinced Brenan that
Wu T'ieh- ch'eng had correctly assessed the mood of Canton. While
Soong had proven most hospitable, Brenan found C. C. Wu enraged at
Hong Kong. newspaper accounts stating that the colony would offer the
Strike Committee no compensation. Wu insisted that the question of
payment was still open to negotiation. From the evidence gathered in
the course of these visits, Brenan concluded that, although the Canton
Government wished the boycott to end, authorities would not allow the
strikers to be dispersed empty handed. 33

The efforts of authorities in Canton to curb the activities of the
strike pickets in late April brought a Spirited response from the Canton
Strike Committee. When it was discovered that some Chinese fishermen

had once again begun supplying fresh-water fish for the Hong Kong market,

 

33For an example of the attention paid by Hong Kong's newspapers
to the illegal arrests conducted by strike pickets in Canton. see The South
China Morningfiost, April 16, 1926. Their sense of pleasure over the
apparent policy of disarming the pickets is revealed in The South China
Morning Post, April 27 and May 15, 1926. For a report of Brenan's
visits with Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, T. V. Soong, and C. C. Wu, see F0 405/251,
F 2175/1/10, Enclosure No. l, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, April 19.
1926. '

 

 

143

armed strike picket boats intensified their river patrols. On April 22,

the crew of a Japanese steamer was persuaded to go out on strike; and,

when a new crew recruited in Hong Kong arrived, it was arrested

by the strike pickets. That same day, as the Canton Commissioner of

Customs, Colonel F. Haley Bell. returned to Shameen from his office in

the city, he was physically assaulted by strike pickets patrolling near

the entrance to the island's bridges. As labor unrest continued to mount

in Canton various foreign controlled institutions such as hospitals, schools,

and the post office were also subjected to attack. While most were left

to deal with the strikers without assistance, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng did dis-

patch a police squad to prevent a shut down of the post office. On April

24, without notifying C. C. Wu who continued to serve as Mayor of Canton,

Chiang Kai- shek forced Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to resign. 34
When a minor official of the Canton Government arrived in Hong

Kong on April 26 for pre-negotiation discus sions, officials in the colony

saw if as little more than a test of their posture on the compensation

issue. Representatives of the Hong Kong Government insisted that

the colony would not alter its position on the question of a payment to the

strikers and, that it was still expected that Canton would appoint delegates

to take part in any negotiations as principals. As in the case of Brenan's

 

34For the activities of strike pickets in Canton in late April and
the dismissal of Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, see F0 405/251, F 2246/1/10, Brenan
to Macleay, Canton, April 26, 1926. See also. F0 405/251, F 2385/1/10,
Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to Amery. Hong Kong. April 29. 1926.

144

talks with C. ,C. Wu in Canton earlier that month, the issues remained
unresolved and the talks were terminated. On April 29 observers in
Hong Kong noted that Sun Fo had returned to Canton from Shanghai. His
return coincided with that of Hu Han-min from Moscow and that of Michael
Borodin who had left Canton for Peking in early February. 35

As the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT
opened on May 15, observers in Hong Kong and on Shameen became con-
vinced that its outcome would be determined by the attitudes of
Chiang Kai-shek. Several days before the first meeting, Chiang had
reacted to rumors of labor disturbances and of attempts by the Chinese
Communists to seize control of the city by bringing soldiers from out-
lying districts to patrol the streets of Canton. 0n the day of the first:
BOBBiOD. these soldiers lined the main thoroughfares which were dotted
with machine-gun posts. In that meeting, Chiang Kai- shek proposed‘ -.
resolutions which were adopted, severely limiting the freedom of action of
the Chinese Communists within the Kuomintang. The Communist Party
was required to register all members who had joined the KMT, was denied
leadership in the central departments of the party, and was instructed-to

submit for approval before a joint party council all orders or directives

 

35Canton's attempt to discover any change in the attitudes of Hong
Kong regarding a boycott settlement is described in F0 405/251. 1“ 2385/1]
10, Enclosure No. 1, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, April 29, 1926; '
For Clementi's observations on the return to Canton of Sun Fo, Hu Hanna
min, and Borodin, see F0 405/251, F 2385/1/10, Enclosure No. 5,‘ .. ‘
Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, May 3, 1926. See also, F0 371/11626,
F 2439, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, May 3, 1926.

145

issued by it or the Comintern to members affiliated with the KMT. 0n

the second day of the meetings of the CEC, an additional resolution was
adopted which limited Communist members of the Kuomintang to one-

third membership in all higher organizations of the party. At their con-
ClJSion on May 22, Acting Consul-General Brenan greeted the accomplish-
ments of these meetings with much less enthusiasm than did his country-
men in Hong Kong. Brenan concluded that the blow suffered by the Chinese
Communists, while serious, would not prove fat 11. He believed they would
await a more favorable time and then attempt to reassert their considerable
influence. A ; the same time, the CEC of the KMT had passed resolutions
to advance pl ms for a northern expedition; these meant, according to
Brenan, that :he Kuomintang would not be able to relax its reliance upon
Russian help .n the form of money and munitions of war. 36

British observers ’woio were encouraged by the apparent victory

of the "Righti its" at Canton in mid- May became convinced by the end of

 

36The movement of troops into Canton at the time of the meetings
of the CEC of the KMT is described in Shun pao, May 15, 1926, p. 6; and
in F0 405/251, F 2555/1/10, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, May 17, 1926.
Labor unrest in Canton at this time was largely due to the gathering of
workers in the city, beginning in April, in order to attend the Third Labor
Congress and the meetings of those labor organizations opposed to the
unions which supported it. See Chesneaux, op. cit. , p. 306. On Labor
Day (May 1) and other holidays celebrated in early May such as the anni-
versary of the birth of Karl Mar}: (May 5), there were a number of pro-
cessions and demonstrations org mized by unions in Canton. For the
resolutions adopted at the meetings of the CEC of the KMT between May
15-22, see Kuo-wen chou-pao, May 23, 1926, p. 29-30; and May 30, 1926,
p. 22. The meetings were also reported in Ellen pao, May 18, 1926, p.
2; and Shun pao, May 22, 1926, p. 9. Brenan's attitudes concerning the
probable outcome of these meetings is revealed in F0 405/251, F 2634/
1/10, Enclosure No. l, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, May 24, 1926.

 

146

that month that power had gravitated back into the hands of those least
sympathetic to a boycott settlement. They were surprised to find, there-
fore, that, at the end of the month, with the "Rightists" seemingly in

full retreat, the Kuomintang wished to enter into settlement negotiations.
Gradually, these observers learned that, for party leaders in Canton,

the boycott against Hong Kong was no longer a primary concern. Instead,
KMT leaders were devoting their attentions to the proposed northern
expedition through which they hoped to re-unite China. As a result of
what was described by some as a bargain between Borodin and Chiang
Kai- shek, Borodin agreed to support a northern expedition with Russian
arms and advice if Chiang would deprive the “Rightists” in Canton of

their newly found powers. The bargain between Borodin and Chiang
Kai-shek become known in Hong Kong through Fu P'ing-ch'ang. Fu
paused there enroute to Shanghai and discussed the recent political
changes which had taken place in Canton with Dr. R. H. Kotewall. Fu's
contention that C. C. Wu had been accused by the Russians of preparing
to take a bribe from Hong Kong is most interesting. In December, 1925,
an interview conducted by the members of the British Colonial Office with
a Foreign Office official revealed that, in preparation for the negotiations
which were then contemplated, a fund of $500, 000 had been subscribed in
Hong Kong to bribe useful officials in Canton. C. C. Wu's name had
been specifically mentioned in this regard. On May 30, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng,

who had already lost his post as Chief of Police, was arrested by order

147

of Chiang Kai-shek. C. C. Wu and Fu P'ing-ch'ang, also deprived of
their positions, fled Canton for Shanghai in the first days of June. Hu
Han-min, who was perhaps the first to sense the direction of events at
Canton, haddeparted even before the meetings of the CEC begun on
May 15. On May 28, the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang ordered
the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist
Government at Canton, Eugene Ch'en (Ch'en Yu-jen) to reopen negotia-

tions with Hong Kong for a boycott settlement. 37

 

37For Fu P'ing-ch'ang's views expressed in Hong Kong, see F0
405/252A, F 2992/1/10, Enclosure No. 2, "Memorandum, " by Kotewall,
Hong Kong, June 4, 1926. For discussions between the Fbreign and
Colonial offices concerning a bribe to C. C Wu, see C0 129/491, "Note
of Interview with Mr. Moss F. 0. , " S. H. Wilson, T. A. Clutterbuck,
and G. Grindle, Colonial Office, December 19. 192-5. The arrest of
Wu T'ieh-ch'eng and the flight of C. C. Wu and Fu P'ing-ch'ang from
Canton are discussed in F0 405/252A, F 2992/1/10, Enclosure No. 1'.
Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, June 8, 1926; and F0 371/11626, F
2258, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, June 3, 1926. In an effort to create
an atmosphere favorable to a settlement, the KMT sponsored the forma-
tion of what Brenan described as a “Cooperative Union of Peasants,
Workers, Merchants and Students, " which broadcast a demand in Canton
that negotiations be immediately started with Hong Kong. See F0 371/
11628, F 2307, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, June 19. 1926. The KMT's
order to Eugene Ch'en to open negotiations together with its proclamation
favoring a settlement is reported in Shun pao, June 9. 1926, p. 10.

CHAPTER V

THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT

OF 1925-26: THE FINAL PHASE

The June-July, 1926, Negotiations

When the Kuomintang's new foreign minister Eugene Ch'en pro-
posed to reopen negotiations for a boycott settlement in June, 1926, British
officials in both London and China found it necessary to re-examine their
posture regarding recognition of the Canton Government. Ch'en's letter
to Acting COnsul-General Brenan of June 4 made it clear that the Kwang-
tung Bureau for Foreign Affairs had been abolished; and that in its place,
he, as a representative of the "Nationalist Government at Canton, " would
conduct all future official exchanges with British representatives in south
China. Brenan's response to Ch'en was delayed until June 16 while
members of the British Foreign Office debated its proper form. British
Minister Macleay at Peking, who incidentally regarded Eugene Ch'en as
"a dangerous and unscrupulous adventurer, " cautioned against any British
move which might be interpreted by its opponents as recognizing the Canton
Government's independence. Macleay continued to champion the cause
of Wu P'ei-fu who, in his view, would soon suppress the supporters of
Feng Yu-hsiang and establish a conservative and "anti- Bolshevik" govern-

ment at Peking. Fearing the implications that might be drawn if Brenan
148 ' ’

149

took part in negotiations between Canton and Hong Kong, Macleay further
urged that the Acting Consul-General's role be confined to acting as a
medium of exchange between Chinese and British negotiators. 1
Within the British Foreign Office the views of Macleay were‘once
again discounted. Its members continued to view the role of the Kuoniin-
tang in the future of China as far outweighing that of Wu P'ei-fu. More-
over, a settlement with Canton over the issue of the boycott against British
interests in south China had, since the beginning of 1926, become the
dominant concern of British foreign policy in that country. The Kuomin-
tang was already privately acknowledged as the de facto government in
Kwangtung, and there was a. growing sentiment to offer it regional recog-
nition de jure. Because the anti- British boycott at Canton involved issues
outside the diplomatic jurisdiction of Hong Kong, the Foreign Office con-
cluded that Acting Consul-General Brenan should take an active role in
settlement negotiations. While awaiting Brenan's response, Eugene
Ch'en wrote directly to Governor Clementi offering to open negotiations
with the Hong Kong Government. Clementi replied through Brenan
that he welcomed this Chinese initiative. On June 16, Brenan informed
Ch'en that he had been instructed to participate in negotiations as part of
the Hong Kong delegation, but that he would also be empowered to represent

Imperial interests. Throughout the remainder of the month in what appears

 

lCh'en's letter to Brenan is reported in F0 405/252A, F 2790/1/10,
Enclosure No. 4, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, June 7, 1926; and
Enclosure No. 5, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, June 6, 1925. For
Macleay's views, see Enclosure No. 6, Macleay to Chamberlain. Peking,
June 7, 1926. '

150

to have been little more than diplomatic sparring, Ch'en was assured that
Clementi's reply through Brenan was not meant as an affront, and
Brenan was assured that the Kuomintang Government at Canton desired
no change in the matter of recognition. The date for the opening of for-
mal negotiations was set at July 15, 1926. 2

When it had become apparent that obstacles to negotiation had been
cleared away and that those negotiations would be held in Canton, British
Minister Macleay at Peking came forward with new objections. Macleay
feared that Hong Kong, in its anxiety to find a boycott settlement, would
make loans available to Canton which would be used to pay off the strikers
and partially finance an anticipated military expedition against the north.
He argued that such an act would overturn the British policy of non-
interference in China's domestic squabbles, and that it could only benefit
"a group of bolshevised extremists who throughout the past year have
treated His Majesty's Government and colony of Hong Kong with the most
violent hostility. ” Although there were some in the British Foreign

Office who shared Macleay's fears, a continued boycott by Canton

 

2The attitudes expressed in the British Foreign Office and its
directives to Macleay and Brenan are in F0 371/11626, Minutes by M.
Patrick, Foreign Office, June 8, 1926; by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, June 9.
1926; and by G. Mounsey, June 9. 1926. For Ch'en's letter to Clementi
and the latter's response, see F0 405/252A, F 2790/1/10, Enclosure No.
8, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, June 10, 1926; and Enclosure No. 9.
Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, June 10, 1926. Brenan's response to
Ch'en on June 16 is in F0 405/252A, F 3049/1/10, Enclosure No. 3,
Brenan to Ch'en, Canton, June 16, 1926. For the exchange of corres-
pondence throughout the remainder of June, see F0 405/252A. F 3128/1/10,
Enclosures Nos. 1-8, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, August 3, 1926.

151

presented even greater fears. Macleay was informed that, in spite of
his objections, if the boycott could be ended by promising Canton loans,
the British Foreign Office would agree to such a procedure.” Inf-long r
Kong, Governor, Clementi, seeking to accommodate rather than-antagonize
the Kuomintang, put forth the view that Canton should be offered regional
recognition; and that, in an effort to displace Russian influence, it should
also be promised assistance in the form of British advisers and war
materiel. For the British Foreign Office in late June, 1926, this would.-
require a radical shift from earlier policies-ma shift it was not then
prepared to endorse. 3
When, on July 15, Attorney-General Kemp and Secretary for
Chinese Affairs Hallifax joined Acting Consul-General Brenan for negoti-
ations with Canton, they were met by Eugene Ch'en, Minister of Finance
T. V. Soong, and Ku Meng-yu. Ku, first elected to the CEC of the
Kuomintang in January, 1926, was a replacement for Ch'en Kung-po who
had just resigned as Director of KMT Labor Affairs. “The initial meetings
were dominated by Eugene Ch'en who read speechesadvertising the aspira-

tions of the Kuomintang and outlining the Chinese view on the origins of

the anti-British boycott. The British representatives responded with

 

3For Macleay's objection regarding loans to Canton and the Foreign
Office response to these objections, see F0 405/252A, F 2790/1/10,
Enclosure No. 15, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, June 13, 1926; and
Enclosure No. 16, Chamberlain to Macleay, Foreign Office, June 17,
1926. ForClementi's proposal involving regional recognition and the
supply of British advisers and arms to Canton, see F0 405/252A, F 3179/
10/10, Enclosures Nos. 1 and 2, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong. June
27 and 28, 1926.

152

their own assessment of the boycott's origins. On July 19. ‘ Ch'en in A
private talks with Brenan indicated once more that a settlement without
compensation to the strikers would prove most difficult. Brenan charac-
terized compensation as a form of blackmail which Hong Kong would
refuse to pay under any circumstances. As a means for saving the
"face" of the Canton Government and assisting in the development of
Kwangtung, he then proposed a loan in the amount of 10 million dollars
for construction of the port of Whampoa and a loop line connecting the
Canton-Hankow and Canton-Kowloon Railways. Although Ch'en made no
concession on the compensation issue, he was, according to Brenan,
impressed with the British loan proposal. In meetings on July 21, Ch'en
caught the British delegates completely off guard with the demand that a
conunission of inquiry be established to look into the Shameen Incident of
June 23, 1925. As a result, the negotiations were suspended so that Ch'en
could consult with his government regarding the loan proposals while

Brenan and the Hong Kong delegates sought London's advice on an investi-

gation into the events that had occurred at Shameen. 4

 

4For a description of the two delegations, their initial statements
of position, and a discussion of the subsequent negotiations, see Hsiang-
kang ta pa kung, p. 37; and F0 405/252A, F 3473/1/10, Enclosures Nos.
1-4, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, July 20, 1926. See also. CO 129/
493, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, July 26, 1926. The resignation of
Ch'en Kung-po is discussed in The South China Morningi’ogt, July 10,
1926. For the instructions of the Colonial Office to the Hong Kong dele-
gation on the issue of loans to Canton for railway development and a port
at Whampoa, see CO 129/492, Amery to Clementi, London, July 23, 1926.
The immediate reactions within the Foreign Office to Ch'en's proposal for
a commission of inquiry into the Shameen Incident are presented in no
371/11628, F 2999, Minute by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, July 26, 1926.

153

Governor Clementi, convinced that a. commission of inquiry into
the Shameen Incident could bring no boycott settlement, and that such a
commission might further damage British prestige, urged London .to, offer
counter proposals to Canton. He. suggested that, in return for a complete
cessation of the boycott, Great Britain could offer a grant from the Boxer
Indemnity funds for railway construction and the development of a port
at Whampoa. In addition, Clementi favored the offer of de facto and de
jure recognition to the Canton Government in the areas where it actually
exercised undisputed control. He noted that recognition of regional
governments in China had received overwhelming support among repre-
sentatives of major British commercial interests throughout the country
who had met to discuss such a proposal in Shanghai during the last week
of June. 5 6

After. much deliberation within the British Foreign-Office, it was.
agreed that a refusal to endorse a commission of inquiry into the Shameen
affair would create a strong impression of guilt. Therefore, it was con-
sidered better tactics to accept the inquiry on the following conditions:

1. The boycott to be first removed.

2. The French Government to participate (the French own a part

of the Shameen Concession and have troops stationed there who
took part in the firing). .

 

5Clementi's views on a commission of inquiry into the Shameen
Incident and his proposal for counter offers including recognition to the
Canton Government are in C0 129/493, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong,
July 26, 1926. For evidence that Clementi's recognition proposal was
in part a response to fears that the Kuomintang's northern military
campaign might make a boycott settlement still more difficult, see CO
129/493, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, July 31, 1926.

154

‘Adequate precautions to be taken for complete impartiality.

The presiding judge to be a national of a Power not represented

at Canton. -

5. Full facilities to be given by foreign Governments to enable
their nationals to give evidence. ' ' ‘

6. The inquiry to be confined solely to ascertaining all the facts

of the Shameen incident, and to be conducted under terms of

reference strictly drawn up for this purpose.

:p-u

While this approach proved acceptable to Macleay at Peking, Brenan at
Canton, and Governor Clementi, it was further agreed that the response
to Canton be delayed pending clarification of the military situation in south
China. In the view of Macleay and a few of his supporters within the
Foreign Office, it was possible that Canton's campaign against the north
might fail; in which case, the Canton Government. would prove more
conciliatory. 6

Despite the difference of Opinion regarding recognition to Canton
that had been evident within the Foreign Office in late June, Clementi's
recognition proposal of July 26 failed to attract supporters. Members
of the Foreign Office were then willing to concede that in dealing with '
Canton they had already practically accorded that government de facto
recognition. De jure recognition, however, required prior consultation
with both Peking and the Washington Treaty powers; an act almost certain
to bring criticism from the latter and raise further suspicions in the

former. The Peking Government had already questioned British intentions

toward Canton regarding recognition. Apparently, because a growing

 

6See FO 405/252A, F 4326/1/10, "The Canton Boycott, " a record
of events between July lS-October 13, 1926, by W. Strang, Foreign Office,
October 13, 1926.

155

sense of exasperation could be detected in Clementi's messages to London,
he was cautioned to take no action affecting British interests without first
obtaining the consent of Colonial Secretary Amery. In Canton, Acting
Consul-General Brenan reflected on the recent negotiations impasse.

He perceptively concluded that because Canton had been denied a cash
payment it had deliberately adopted the idea of an inquiry in order to

delay further discussions. With the settlement talks delayed, it was no
doubt anticipated that the military successes of the Kuomintang in Hunan
coupled with the promise of speedy victories elsewhere would enhance

the Canton Government‘s negotiative position. 7

The Boycott Revival of August, 1926,
and the British Response

 

 

When Eugene Ch'en had offered to open settlement negotiations in
June, 1926, British observers were convinced thatChiang Kai- shek, the
Russian advisers, and moderate elements in Canton such as Sun Fo, all
favored a rapid boycott settlement. Following the announcement launch-

ing the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition (Pei-fa) in the first week of

 

7F0r discussion of recognition to Canton within the Foreign Office
in late June, 1926, see FO 371/11626, F 2502, Minutes by M. Patrick,
F Ashton-Gwatkin, and G. Mounsey, Foreign Office, June 26, 1926; and
F0 371/11626, F 2577, Minutes by M. Patrick, F. Ashton-Gwatkin, and
G. Mounsey, Foreign Office, June 30, 1926. For discussions in July,
see FO 37l/ll627, F 2836, Minutes by M. Patrick, J.T. Pratt, H. W.
Malkin, G. Mounsey, and F. Ashton—Gwatkin, Foreign Office, July 22-
28, 1926. Rejection of Clementi's proposals and Amery's words of
caution are in F0 405/252A, F 3228/1/10, Amery to Clementi, Colonial
Office, August 4, 1926. For Brenan's observations on Canton's reasons
for suspending negotiations, see FO 405/252A, F 4326, "The Canton
Boycott, " W. Strang, Foreign Office, October 13, I926.

156

July and the suspension of settlement discussions on the 24th, these same
obsorvors concludod that the opportunity to bring the boycott to an ond
had slipped by. Again it had become apparent that political leaders in
Canton, regardless of their ideological position, shared the view that
the boycott could not be terminated without a cash payment to the strikers.
With the KMT's armies moving northward and the departure of
Chiang Kai- shek for the front at the end of the month, the Canton Strike
Committee began to reassert its influence. Early in August, it recruited,
armed, and drilled 2, 000 new strike pickets and turned them loose on the
city. Immediately the number of illegal arrests in Canton began to climb.
In their effort to obtain funds to take the place of those formerly available
through the Kuomintang, the strike pickets launched a new campaign of
harassment and intimidation upon Canton's boycott weary citizens. Ships
and goods that had enjoyed a limited freedom of movement during the July
negotiations were again subjected to heavy fines or were held for ransom.
In addition, the Strike Committee levied a tax of $15 on every bale of

silk exported from the city. 8

 

8For discussion of the Northern Expedition and the formal announce-
ment that launched it in early July, see Shun pao, July 11, 1926, p. 9;
Min-kuo jih-pao, July 12, 1926, p. 2-3; and The South China Morning
Post, July 9, 1926. For Chiang's views on the Northern Expedition
before his departure on July 27, see Chen pao, August 9, 1926, p. 5.
For the observations of Acting Consul-General Brenan on the activities
of the Strike Committee in August, see FO 405/252A, F 3932/1/10,
Enclosure No. l, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, August 16, 1926; and PO
371/11629, F 3508, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, August 26, 1926.
The Kuomintang in preparation for the Northern Expedition cut off its

 

157

Attempts by the Canton Strike Committee to arouse public support
began on August 7 when it published a ringing denunciation: of vthezflritish
role in the recent settlement. negotiations. The followingweekndespite
the absence of British ships calling at Canton other thanuthe two daily-s
passenger; boats from Hong Kong, the Strike Committee issued haw
regulations. calling for the confiscation of British ships: and goodszand
punishment for their owners. It also designated the lastweek of. August
as "strike support week" ..(Pa-kung yung-hu hsing-ch'i); a ‘period in: n.
which it organized speeches, processions, a sale of strike.bndgesrmnd
other demonstrations of support for the boycott against Hong Kong-1‘9“

British irritation and concern over the Kuomintang's interference
with the Canton-Kowloon, Railway begun in June, 1926,; and hora-that the
customs adrninistration in Canton mighbbe overthrown ledto, acrssurrection
by Governor Clementi of, his, July recognition proposals. ;;.-Thos.e proposals

.had apparently been infectious: because, in early Augustmhctingyfionsul-

 

—r Y fin

monthly allocation to the strikers, and converted the daily expropriation
of $1, 000' taken from the profits of the Canton-Kowloon Railway into a
military tax. See CO 129/493, C 17965, Clementi to Amery, .Honngong,
August16, 1.926 ;, . _ . -.,\.. ‘
nub .“~ -‘ .«r.1.m

.9For the Strike Committee's denunciation of the British and their
position during the July negotiations, see The Canton Gazette, .Augustx‘l,
1926.? The Strike Committee' .s new regulations are discussed! in: F30
405/ZSZA, F 3932/1/10, Enclosure No. l. Brenan to Macleeymhnpst
16,1926” For the activities undertaken by the Strike. Committeetduring
"strike.support week}! .,,see F0 405125211. .F 4211/1/10... Enclosure No.
l. .Brenanto Macleay,; Canton, August'29. 1926.; For a .Chlnesa’Canh
munist view. oftthe‘ July negotiations and..the.activities of-the Strike Com.
mittee in August, see Hsiang-tao, Vol. 11],. No. 166, August 6, 1936101)."
1659-1660. .- See. also, -Hsi§9_g—-tao, .Vol.; IV, No.“ 167:,vAugust315. 1986.
p. 1683-1684. ‘

158

General Brenan began advocating a formal offer of de facto recognition
to Canton. Clementi persisted in his advocacy of both de facto and de
jure recognition not only for Canton; but also for those regions, such as
the provinces dominated by Sun Ch'uan-fang, where one warlord main-
tained seemingly effective control. By mid-August, Clementi had
succeeded in obtaining the support of Brenan for a proposal by which
Great Britain was to seek the consent of the United States, Japan, and
France for joint action leading to regional recognition in China. On the
16th, Foreign Secretary Chamberlain moved to eliminate further pro-
posals of this type. In his telegram to Brenan, who was instructed to
so inform Clementi, Chamberlain noted that there could be no offer of
recognition to Canton until that government requested some change in
its status. He concluded by pointing out that such a request, if made,
would require international agreement involving much deliberation and
delay; and that such agreement, if obtained, could not come in time to

assist Hong Kong in its negotiations with the Kuomintang. 10

 

10For Foreign Office discussion of the KMT's interference with the
Canton-Kowloon Railway, see F0 371/11643, F 3235, Minutes by W.
Strang, and G. Mounsey, Foreign Office, August 12, 1926. Brenan
favored a grant of de facto recognition to Canton in a private letter to
his personal friend O'Malley who continued to serve as counselor to the
British legation at Peking. See FO 371/11631, Brenan to O'Malley,
Canton, August 3, 1926. Clementi's proposal, supported by Brenan,
for both de facto and de jure regional recognition throughout China is
presented in CO 129/493, Clementi to Arnery, Hong Kong, August 9,
1926. This same proposal is repeated more forcefully in CO 129/493,
C 17965, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, August 16, 1926. For
Chamberlain's somewhat caustic response to this proposal, see F0 405/
252A, Chamberlain to Brenan, Foreign Office, August 16, 1926. The

159

Rebuffed in his efforts to find suboycetti settlement through an'offer
_of recognition.r.Gorernnr ‘xGlementLb'egan, rainlate"August",1 toafavor‘béllig-
erent activities'atCanton .reminiscext ofthe actions that had freQuen‘tl‘y‘
been put forward 1 y hisharried predecessor Sir R. E. Stubbs. After '
calling a conferen: e of naval and miiitary‘authorities- at Hong Kong,
Clementi dispatched officers to Canton to<report on the feasibility of
naval warfare against picket boats in the harbor and a combined 'naval
and military assault against Strike Headquarters in Canton. Following -
their return, these officers drew up 1 list of alternate plans of action
that included:
(a.) Seize all strike picket .boats and boatsused by strikers and
disable them.
(1)..) Place gunboats alongside strike examination-statiOn-and'
strikers' headquarters and entirely prevent them functioning.
(c. ) Close the port to Chinese shipping and stop all purely Chinese
business on the harbour, allowing foreign business to continue.
(d. ) Land; an armed force‘and wreck' strike headquarters. '
(e. ) Blockade Canton.
The first two plans were viewed as most attractive by their naval and
military authors, Governor Clementi, and Acting Consul-General Brenan.
All agreed that, at the first sign of serious disturbances created by the
strike pickets, ,theseplans should beput into operation. It was further
agreed that the other. threeplans should be held in reserve because they

would require the prior evacuation of Shameen. 11

 

Colonial Office also responded negatively and with severe language to -
Governor Clementi‘s proposal. HSee CO 129/494, C 15649, Amery t'o
Clementi, Colonial Office, August 16 1926. ‘

tl‘tt't’:.- lllt'ttl‘ "

llBrenan reported thesetactivities of Governor Clearenti with

l :03 ."
:1T1_tt‘ 1.1 ..\.

160

Acting Consul-General Brenan, who described the increasing
number of labor disturbances in Canton as "organized brigandage, "
soon matched and then surpassed the new attitudes of belligerence ex-
pounded by Governor Clementi. In the Foreign Office, labor's "reign
of terror" at Canton in late August was viewed as the logical result of
the departure of Chiang Kai-shek and his troops from the city. These
London observers concluded that the Canton Strike Committee, aware
of an impending boycott end, was having its last fling; a fling likely to
result in the murder of Westerners and followed by foreign intervention.
In Canton, Brenan, who remained impatient for some form of militant
action against the pickets, attempted to force events. He argued that
British action at Canton, if clearly identified as an attack upon the
Strike Committee and not the government, would find favor with the
Cantonese merchants, would bring no involvement with other foreign
powers, and would run little risk of anti-British repercussions elsewhere
in China. He proposed that the owners of British coastal steamers be
induced to send one or two of their vessels to Canton with the avowed

purpose of seeking trade. Convinced that the Strike Committee, in view

 

which he agreed in F0 405/252A, F 3932/1/10, Enclosure No. l, Brenan
to Macleay, Canton, August 16, 1926. For the list of alternate plans

of action contemplated against Canton, see FO 405/252A, F 3932/1/10,
Enclosure No. 3, Commander J. U. P. Fitzgerald, Senior Naval Officer,
West River, to the Commodore at Hong Kong, Canton, August 13, 1926.
For a detailed plan involving an attack on strike headquarters, see

CO 129/493, C 7969, Enclosure, "An Examination of the Proposal to
send a detachment of troops from Hong Kong to attack and destroy Strike-
Picket Headquarters, in Canton, " General Staff, China Command,
August 16, 1926.

161

of its recent anti- British regulations, would either send pickets to board
these vessels or would condone firing on them, Brenan concluded that
such an "incident" would justify British reprisals. 12
When, on August 28, strike pickets fired upon an American andsa
British subject engaged in the business of transporting Chinese passengers
by motorboat to the Hong Kong steamers, Brenan and his supporters had
their "incident. " With the motorboat forced to return to the customs
wharf in Canton, the Britisher made good his escape to Shameen under
gunfire. The less fortunate American was arrested and taken to Strike
headquarters. . On September 4, 1926, following the unsuccessful efforts
of Brenan and Macleay to secure American participation, the British;
West River Flotilla proceeded down the Pearl River under instructions
to seize and disable all strike picket boats, place armed launches before
picket. stations on the river front, anchor gunboats alongside British

wharves, and eject all strike pickets active on Canton's.waterways..o:~.M..

Swatow, similar actions were carried out by the British warship Magnolia.

 

12Brenan's description of strikers' activities as ”organized brig-
andage" is presented in F0 371/11629, F 3508, Brenan to Macleay,-w. .
Canton, August 26, 1926. For the views on Canton expressed in the
Foreign Office in late August, see F0 371/ 11629, Minute by F. Ashton-
Gwatkin, Foreign Office, August 27, 1926. Brenan's attempt to provoke
an incident at Canton is put forward in F0 405/252A, F 3932/1/1‘0,”
Enclosure No. 1,. Brenan to Macleay, Canton, August 16, 1926.: zlnzhis
private conversations with Eugene Ch'en in late August, Brenan'relponded
to the suggestion that KMT victories might lead to a spreading boycott,
with a threat of British naval action at Canton. Ch'en indicated that his
government was attempting to curb the activities of the strike pickets in
order to avoid any serious incidents. See FO 405/252A, F 4211/1/10.--
Enclosure No. l, Brenan to Clementi, Canton, August 29, l926.~ ,

162

Of particular concern to the Canton Strike Committee was the British
action of anchoring an armed launch before its boycott examination shed
which adjoined the Customs House property in Canton. This act denied
access to all shipping seeking to put in there and created serious disrup-
tion of the cargo inspection procedures normally carried out by strike
pickets. Following protests registered by Canton's Acting Foreign
Minister Eugene Ch'en, British forces were withdrawn and the Canton
Government assumed the duties of policing the wharves and preventing
any further strike picket interference. In what must have been a particu-
larly damaging blow to its prestige, the Canton Strike Committee was
forced to remove its pickets from the entrances of the French and British
bridges to Shameen--a post they had manned since the events of June 23,
1925.13
L1; British Diplomatic Offensive of
September, 1926
The success achieved through naval action against the strike pickets

at Canton andFSwatow in September, 1926, convinced many British

 

7 13For the incident involving the firing by strike pickets upon the
American and the British subject, see F0 405/252A, F 4257/1/10, Brenan
to Macleay, Canton, August 31, 1926; and Enclosure No. 2, Brenan to
Ch'en, Canton, August 28, 1926. For discussion of proposed British
action in this incident, see F0 371/11630, F 13607, Minutes by J. T.

Pratt and W. Strang, Foreign Office, September 3,1926. British actions
at Canton and Swatow are reported in F0 371/11630, F 13656, Brenan to
Chamberlain, Canton, September 6, 1926; and F0 405/252A, F 4399/1/10,
Brenan to Macleay, Canton, September 9, 1926. For Eugene Ch'en's
protest and British observations on the removal of strike pickets from the
entrances to the bridges leading to Shameen, see F0 405 IZSZA, F 4399/
1/10, Enclosure No. 3, Cn'en to Brenan, Canton, September 7, 1926;

163

observers that, at last, they were in a position to force an end of the 15-
month old strike and boycott that had crippled their economic; interests
in south China. Among these observers, however, the accumulated
frustrations brought about by earlier failures to make Canton come to
terms led to sharp differences concerning the adoption of a proper course
of action. When Acting Consul-General Brenan reported onSeptember- .
12 that Eugene Ch'en had hastily offered to re-open settlement negotiations,
Governor Clementi, convinced of Ch'en's insincerity, insisted that the
offer was a thinly disguised attempt to forestall further British action.
Clementi shared the concern of other British authorities over what
appeared to be the increasingly belligerent attitudes of the Kuomintang.
In Canton, the speeches of Sun F0 in the first weeks of September
had called for renewed support to the strikers and a comrnitrnent to. , . ,,
spread the anti- British boycott along the paths opened by KMT victories
in the Northern Expedition. While Sun's attitude is somewhat puzzlinga.
(he had long been a consistent opponent of the anti- British boycott), it: ..
may be that he had grown accustomed to the large pool of free labor for
municipal improvement provided by strikers in Canton. Early in their.
struggle with Hong Kong, these strikers had begun work on a dirtlroadh
from Canton to Whampoa named in honor of Sun Yat-sen. Their labors

had also been profitably utilized in projects to widen Canton's

I ‘ "

 

O V

F0 371/11630‘, F 13767, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, September, 12,
1926; and F0 371/11631, F 4023, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, .
September 25, 1926.

164

thoroughfares, to repair houses and shops, and to improve Whampoa's
port facilities. 14

To Governor Clementi, a cause for alarm even greater than that
created by the speeches of Sun F0 was, what he described as, "the
indiscriminate firing by Kuomintang forces upon British vessels on the
Yangtze. " There, both above and below Hankow, the KMT had estab-'
lished war zones and had cautioned foreign shipping to avoid such areas.
British officers chose, however, to ignore the struggles being waged on
the river and disregarded the repeated Kuomintang warnings. In their
efforts to maintain the treaty rights of free access on China's inland
waterways, these officers frequently sailed into the line of fire laid down
by KMT rifles and artillery. On September 10, under the instructions
of British Minister Macleay, Acting Consul-General Brenan sent a note
to the Canton Government requesting it to order a halt to the firing upon
foreign vessels on the Yangtze. That same day, at the request of Governor
Clementi, Brenan sent a second note to Eugene Ch'en that questioned
whether the attitudes expressed in the recent speeches of Sun Fo were

shared by the Canton Government. 15

 

l4Brenan's report on Ch'en's prOposal to resume negotiations is in
F0 371/11630, F 13767, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, September 12,
1926. Governor Clementi's reaction to this proposal is in CO 129/494,
Clementi to Arnery, Hong Kong, September 13, 1926. Sun Fo's speeches
in favor of continuing and spreading the anti-British boycott met with
opposition by Chiang Kai- shek, Eugene Ch'en, and Soviet adviser Borodin.
See Wah-tsz lat-p0, September 25, 1926. For the observations of Hong
Kong newspapers on the municipal improvement projects undertaken by
strikers in Canton, see The South China Morning Pos , March 23, l926,p. 5.

15 For the assessment of Governor Clementi concerning KMT actions

165

Because he saw in these events a unique opportunity to bring about
a rapid boycott termination by independent warlike action, Governor
Clementi proposed that, in the absence of an immediate reply to the two
notes of Brenan, the British Government present an ultimatum to Canton.
Said Clementi:

We should demand within twenty-four hours an undertaking that all
British ships on the Yangtze and elsewhere would be respected by
Cantonese troops, and that all anti-British manifestations on terri-
tory controlled by the Cantonese Government should cease forthwith;
failing which we should take such action as might seem to us proper.

Clementi remained convinced that the threat implied in such an ultimatum
would be enough to force an immediate capitulation; but if it failed to bring
. Hong Kong’s enemies to terms, he advocated closing the ports of Canton
and Swatow by British naval action. 16

At Peking, British Minister Macleay had anxiously noted the speed

with which the forces of the KMT’s Northern Expedition had reached the

Yangtze. His concern was heightened by the seeming reluctance of Sun

Ch'uan-fang to take the field against his enemies. By endorsing the

 

on the Yangtze together with his views on Brenan's two notes to the Canton
Government, see CO 129/494, Clementi to AJnery, Hong Kong, September
13, 1926. The attitude of British officers on the Yangtze is well typified
by that of Sir Ronald Macleay. 0n learning that the Kuomintang had
issued subsequent warnings to foreign vessels to avoid anchoring in the
vicinity of the war zone at Wuhan, Macleay observed, "1 have not so far
received any information, confirmation or comments on this impertinent
message from British Commander-in-chief, but presume it will merely

be ignored. " See F0 405/252A, Telegram No. 138, Macleay to Chamber-
lain, Peking, September 22, 1926.

16See CO 129/494, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, September 13,
1926. .

166

warlike actions at Canton implied.in..C1ementi's ultimatum proposal,
Macleay saw an opportunity to stiffen Sun's resolve. Convinced of the
urgent need for Great-Britain to ally itself with the forces hostile to the
Kuomintang, the British Minister reverted to advocating policies he had
first suggested in January, 1926. He urged the Foreign Office to modify
its policy of non-intervention in Chinese internal affairs to one of as sist-
ance for the "anti-Bolshevik" coalition he then saw forming in the north.
Specifically, Macleay desired a suspension of the arms embargo in that
coalition's favor, and a generous grant of British arms, ammunition, and
money. 17

In London, following a careful examination of each of these proposals,
members of both the Foreign and Colonial Offices concluded that they could
not be adopted. The opposition to military actions at Canton that had
emerged in a conference between the Foreign Office and the Committee
of Imperial Defense in March, 1926, remained the dominant sentMent.
Moreover, the suggestion of assistance to Sun Ch'uan-fang was viewed as
exposing the interests of Great Britain to foolish risks. Not only would
such assistance overturn long- standing British policy and bring foreign
criticism; but even more important, there was no assurance that aid to
Sun Ch'uan-fang or any other KMT foe would bring victory. The Foreign

Office also observed that the objections uponwhich Governor Clementi's

 

l“(Macleay attempted to justify this policy by pointed references to
the continued Soviet support in both arms and advisers that had strength-
ened the south. See FO 405/252A,_Telegram No. 135, Macleay to
Chamberlain, Peking, September 20, 1926.

167

proposed ultimatum rested were no longer valid. Acting Consul-General
Brenan had reported that Eugene Ch'en, despite the use of inflammatory
language, had. responded satisfactorily to the two British notes of September
10. In an attempt to placate those British representatives in China who
continued to favor warlike action, the Foreign Office closed its messages
to them with the assurance that military experts in London would continue
to study the feasibility of actions short of a blockade at Canton and
Swatow. 18 A
On September 18, Acting Consul-General Brenan reported from
Canton that Eugene Ch'en had announced a date for the boycott's termina-
tion. For British officials who had suffered through a seemingly endless
barrage of shattered settlement hopes since June, 1925, Ch’en's announce-
ment that the boycott would end on October 10, 1926, arrived with numbing
impact. The initial reaction was widespread disbelief. In Hong Kong,

Governor Clementi quickly became convinced that Canton was about to

practice a new deceit. In Peking, Sir Ronald Macleay independently

 

18Clementi's ultimatum proposals repeated to London on September
16 were supported by the British Senior Naval Officer, West River. See
CO 129/494, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, September 16, 1926; and
CO 129/494, No. 716, Commodore to Admiralty, Hong Kong, September
13, 1926. The initial enthusiasm of Colonial Secretary Amery and
members of the Colonial Office for a blockade was overcome when the
Foreign Office view received the support of the Admiralty. See CO 129/
494, Minute by G. Grindle addressed to Amery, Colonial Office, September
17, 1926; and CO 129/494, Minutes by G. Grandle' and T. A. Clutterbuck,
Colonial Office, September 16, 1926. See'also, CO 129/494, Copy of a
draft telegram (sent September 20), Foreign Office to Macleay, London,
September 16, 1926; and F0 405/252A, F 4326/1/10, "The Canton
Boycott, " by W. Strang, Foreign Office, October'l3, 1926.

168

came to the same conclusion. 19
October 10, 1926: Defeat in Victory or
Victory in Defeat?

Governor Clementi, suspicious of Ch'en's message to Acting Consul-
General Brenan, continued to press London in late September for military
action at Canton. His belief that Ho ng Kong's struggle with the Kuomin-
tang could only end under the punishing fire of British gunboats was
enthusiastically endorsed by the colony's military leaders. They insisted
that the Admiralty, in supporting the recent Foreign Office position, had
misunderstood their military intentions and overestimated the potential
strength of Chinese resistance. At Peking, Sir Ronald Macleay, who
seemed intent on linking British fortunes to those of Sun Ch'uan-fang and
Chang Tso-lin, remained sympatheti: to Hong Kong's call to arms.

Among British officials in China, only Brenan seemed to take Eugene
Ch'en's pronouncements seriously. He urged the Foreign Office to hold
military action in reserve while waiting for Canton to carry out its stated

intentions . 20

 

19For Brenan's report of Eugene Ch'en's announcement, see F0 405/
252A, Telegram No. 125, Brenan to Chamberlain, Canton, September 18,
1926. Clementi's suspicion of Canton's intentions is apparent in F0 405/
252A, Telegram No. 128, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong, September 20,
1926. The views of Sir Ronald Macleay are in F0 405/252A, Telegrasn
No. 138, Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, September 22, 1926.

20For the views of Governor Clementi and military authorities in
south China, see FO 405/252A, Telegram No. 129, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, Septernbt r 20, 1926. Macleay, who continued to hope for a
smashing KMT defeat, presented his views in F0 405/252A, Telegram

l

169

Among members of the Foreign Office in September, 1926, the
views of Acting Consul-General Brenan carried great weight. His skill-
ful activities at Canton were seen as largely responsible for the Chinese
decision to end the boycott. However, Colonial Secretary Amery's
suspicions, which mirrored those of Governor Clementi, meant that
Hong Kong's views could not be ignored. Despite misgivings concerning
independent British military action, the Foreign Office conceded that, in
the event the boycott continued after October 10, it would prepare its
support to warlike actions at Canton. The Admiralty held to its convic-
tion that forceful action beyond that which had been carried out against
strike pickets on September 4, would prove most dangerous. In the past
it had consistently noted that any large-scale action in south China would
require the prior evacuation of British interests at Swatow and Shameen.
In September. 1926, however, it accepted the view of those who pointed
out the difficulties anticipated in any attempt to restore British concessions

once they had been abandoned. 21

 

No. 138, 'Macleay to Chamberlain, Peking, September 22, 1926. For
the attitudes of Brenan, see FO 405/252A, Telegram No. 125, Brenan
to Chamberlain, Canton, September 18, 1926. ‘

ZlThe high regard within the Foreign Office for the actions and ,
Opinions of Acting Consul-General Brenan is apparent in F0 371/11630,
F 13896, Minutes by J .T. Pratt, W. Shearman, G. Mounsey, and W.
Tyrrell, Foreign Office, September 21-22, 1926. For the views of
Colonial Secretary Amery as expressed in a message to Clementi which
committed the Foreign Office to action after October 10, see CO 129/494.
Amery to Clementi, Colonial Office, September 22, 1926. The Admiralty
views were based on those which had emerged from two conferences of
the British Service Departments held on September 20 and October 4,

 

 

 

170

The belligerent attitudes of Governor Clementi and Sir Ronald
Macleay toward Canton in September were partially motivated by the
news that the Kuomintang was not prepared to end the boycott without
exacting a significant concession from the British Government. In his
message to Brenan of September 18, Acting Minister for Foreign'Affairs
Eugene Ch'en had made it clear that the KMT was preparing to institute
an important set of new taxes. These would include a special consump-
tion tax of 2 1/2 percent on ordinary imports and 5 percent on luxuries
together with a special production tax of 2 1/2 percent on exports. The
taxes were to be levied on the goods of all nations; but in return for ending
the boycott, the British were expected to acquiesce without protest. In
addition, Ch'en made it clear that the assistance of the Maritime Customs
Administration in the collection of these taxes was expected. To Governor
Clementi this scheme suggested that the Kuomintang planned, under the
cover of thin disguise, to force Hong Kong to provide a cash payrhent to '
the Canton strikers. Although other nations would also have to pay,
Clementi remained convinced that the loss of prestige to Hong Kong and

Great Britain would be enormous. 22

 

1926. See F0 405/252A, F 4326, ”The Canton Boycott," by W. Strang,
Foreign Office, October 13, 1926. ‘ '

22For a discussion of the taxation proposal made by Ch'en to Brenan,
see F0 405/252A, F 4326/1/10, "The Canton Boycott, " by W. Strung, ‘
Foreign Office, October 13, 1926. The reaction of Governor Clementi
to this scheme is in F0 405/252A, Telegram No. 137, Clementi to Amery,
Hong Kong, September 22, 1926.

171

The objections of Sir Ronald Macleay to acceptance of the taxation
scheme outlined by Eugene Ch'en, although shrouded in the rhetoric of
preserving essential elements of British policy, were motivated by his
intense displeasure with the growing power of the Kuomintang. I mcleay
noted that British acquiescence to Canton's new taxes would probably lead
to provincial or regional tariff autonomy. As an important member of
the British delegation to the Tariff Conference at Peking which had
withered away in July, 1926, he was well aware, however, of the official
view in London which had favored provincial or regional tariff collections
in China since December of the previous year. Macleay was, no doubt,
also aware that the Foreign Office stood ready to abandon its insistence
upon Chinese removal of the likin transit tax if, by so doing, it could
obtain relief from the boycott at Canton. The British Minister at Peking
presented a much stronger argument when he noted that acceptance of
_ the Canton taxes would appear to the other foreign powers as a British
bargain with the Kuomintang at the expense of their rights and obligations
under the-Washington treaties. Macleay's greatest fear, one shared
with Governor Clementi, was that the KMT, which already posed a major
threat to the north, would divert the new revenues collected at Canton
directly into its war chest. 23

In the Foreign Office, where it was observed that Canton's proposed

 

Z3Sir Ronald Macleay's objections to Canton's taxation scheme are
in F0 371/11631, F 4068, Macleay to Tyrrell, Peking, September 27,
1926.

 

 

‘. / in...

 

172

taxes bore a strong resemblence to the surtaxes agreed to in principle

at the Washington Conference of 1921-22, a consensus favoring British
acceptance emerged. Foreign Office sentiments were accurately re-
flected in the view of one member who said ”it is obvious that we ought
to jump at this offer. " Subsequent discussions centered on the adoption
of a method by which any charge that Great Britain had made a deal with
the KMT might be answered. It was anticipated that Japan, which had
consistently opposed the granting of the Washington surtaxes without
conditions, could prove particularly troublesome. As a result, the
Foreign Office instructed Acting Consul-General Brenan to restrict his
formal reply to Eugene Ch'en to an expression of satisfaction with the
news that the boycott would be terminated. In the event that he could
arrange a private meeting with Ch'en, however, Brenan was instructed

to give verbal assurances that Great Britain would accept Canton's new
taxes without protest; provided these taxes were applied equally to all
nations, and providei the boycott would at last come to an end. Foreign
Office instructions 10 Brenan concluded by cautioning him to bear in mind
that "the one overriding consideration is that we 311.122 get the boycott

called off and that v e are willing to pay the price asked. ”24

 

24For discus: ions within the Foreign Office concerning Canton's
new taxes and the instructions sent to Brenan, see FO 371/11630, F 3896,
Minutes by J. T. Pratt, W. Shearman, G. Mounsey and W. Tyrrell,
Foreign Office, Sepzember 21-22, 1926. See also, F0 371/11631,
F 4005, Minutes by J. T. Pratt and G. Mounsey, Foreign Office, September
24, 1926; and F0 4( 5/252A, F 4437/1/10, "Memorandum respecting the
Tariff Conference and the Canton Taxation Proposals, " by J. T. Pratt,
Foreign Office, October 18, 1926.

173

To British observers it was apparent that, since the action against
strike pickets at Canton and Swatow on September 4, there had been
mounting apprehension within the Kuomintang concerning their intentions.
It was believed that party leaders were convinced that any further inci-
dents created by the strikers would lead to an all- out British attack upon
the revolutionary base at Canton. Such an attack could seriously
jeopardize the success of the Northern Expedition. The anxieties of
Eugene Ch'en, which had been heightened by the threatening language of
Acting Consul-General Brenan in the first two weeks of September, may
have been further inflated by a leak in official British communications.
Governor Clementi had adopted the habitof reading unparaphrased tele-
grams of British authorities in China and London to his Executive Council
in Hong Kong. Among those with whom the Governor shared such infor-
mation was the head of Jardine, Matheson and Company in Hong Kong,

a Mr. Bernard. In addition to serving as an unofficial member of the
Executive Council in Hong Kong, Bernard represented the colony's com-
mercial leadership on the Shanghai China Committee--a prominent
British merchant interest in south China. It was most probably through
this organization that "'British official opinion in China" became the
property of the Kuomintang. It is certainly conceivable that through
this channel Governor Clementi may have deliberately made public the
discussions between British Minister Macleay and the Foreign Office

concerning assistance to the northern warlords and an ultimatum to Canton.

 

 

 

 

174

Although members of the British Foreign Office deplored Clementi‘s
actions, deliberate or otherwise, they had to concede that the leak had
had a beneficial effect. 7-5

On October 6, in a report to the municipal departments of the
Kuomintang in Canton, Sun Fo observed that the strike pickets in the
city were expected to suspend their activities on October 10. He insisted
that the KMT was not abandoning the economic struggle and that it would
not do so until imperialism was overthrown and the unequal treaties
were abolished. The change of policy which required a relaxation of
boycott activities at Canton was described by Sun as the first step in an
attempt to carry the battle into other parts of China. He acknowledged
that the boycott against Hong Kong had not‘been fully supported in Canton
and that, as a result, it had been necessary to force compliance. Sun
argued that in the future, the people, as a part of the patriotic movement,
would be expected to control the economic struggle by themselves. Sun
Fo concluded by indicating that Canton's new taxes would be employed to
relieve the strikers, to facilitate the opening of Whampoa as a commercial
port, and to facilitate completion of the Canton-Hankow Railway. On
October 10, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, in a
declaration addressed to-the strikers in Canton, unilaterally announced

that the strike and boycott were at an end. The CEC justified its decision

 

25For a discussion and report on this leak of "British official opinion
in China" within the Foreign Office, see FO 371/11632, F 4354/1/10,
Minute by W. Strang, Foreign Office, November 15, 1926.

175

with reference to Ks angtung by declaring:

. . . If it keeps on advancing against the enemy, while the rest of
the country is not yet in a position to advance, then we shall find
ourselves in armed conflict with the imperialists, with the danger
of being cut off and destroyed. 26

Although sharply reduced anti- British boycott activities without the

official sanction of the Kuomintang were to continue until the end of the
year; in‘Hong Kong, where for the first time since 1911 Chinese could

celebrate ”double-ten" as a legal holiday, the Canton-Hong Kong Strike

and Boycott came to a formal end at noon on October 10, 1926. 27

 

26For the speech of Sun Fo of October 6, 1926, see Min-kuo jih-
pgg, October 6, 1926, p. 11. The declaration of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuomintang is in The Canton Gazette, October 10, 1926.
Also on October 10, the Canton Strike Committee, its power and disci-
pline shattered, published its own announcement declaring the strike and
boycott at an end. See Min-kuo jih-pao, October 10, 1926, p. 3. For
a message of congratulations to thestrikers in Canton from the Chinese
Communist Party, see Min-kuojih-pao, October 10, 19.26, p. 5.

 

 

27An excellent description of the level and effectiveness of un-
official boycott activities in Canton after October 10 is provided in F0 .
405/252A, F 5505/1/10, Brenan to Macleay, Canton, November 6, 1926.
For observations by British officials in Hong Kong on the end of the
boycott there, see CO 129/494, C 19473, Clementi to Amery, Hong Kong,
October 16, 1926. See also, Remer, op. cit. , p. 109.

CHAPTER VI

THE CANTON-HONG KONG STRIKE AND BOYCOTT

OF 192 5- 26: CONCLUSION

The immediate re3ponse of British observers in south China to

rm...

the strike begun by Chinese workers in firing Kong on June 18, 1925,
differed little from that with which they had greeted earlier Chinese
work stoppages. They assumed, despite the rhetoric linking that
action to the events of May Thirtieth in Shanghai, that the strike could
be ended quickly by the granting of a few minor economic concessions.
Although these observers remembered well the impact of the Hong
Kong Seamen's Strike of 1922 and recognized the importance of Canton
as a strikers' sanctuary, they failed to understand the threat posed
to their interests by the assertive nationalism expressed by the Kuo-
mintang. The two dominant British personalities in south China,
Consul-General at Canton Sir James W. Jamieson and Governor of
Hong Kong Sir R. E. Stubbs, remained committed to the maintenance
of British prestige regardless of cost.

At Canton, where the followers of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 continued

their attempts to secure the Kuomintang's precarious revolutionary

176

177

base, the strike against Hong Kong generated little initial enthusiasm.
Cantonese merchants, overtaxed and financially exhausted by the
KMT's recent military campaign against the Kwangsi and Yunnanese
militarists in their midst, desired a return to peaceful commercial
conditions. Among the labor unions in Canton there was no strong
sentiment for the strike. Even within the ranks of the Kuomintang,
there were many who opposed this action against Hong Kong. Never-
theless, in an attempt to service the anti-imperialist and anti-
militarist position adopted at the First Party Congress in 1924, the
Kuomintang, capably assisted by the individual members of the Chinese
Communist Party admitted into its ranks, launched the strike against
Hong Kong as a political protest over British actions in Shanghai.

Hong Kong, because it was linked to Canton by bonds of economic
interdependence, was particularly vulnerable to the influence of events
in Kwangtung. Its position of dominance over the commercial interests
at Canton, built up during more than three quarters of a century, had
alienated many Chinese. The strike begun at Hong Kong in the third
week of June, 1925, however, had been launched with little assurance
of success. Even the future of its sponsor the Kuomintang remained
open to question. Obviously, the contention of Kuomintang and Com-

munist leaders that the strike against Hong Kong was initiated as

178

part of a life or death struggle with British imperialism came after
the fact.

The single most crucial element in the Canton- Hong Kong strike
and boycott of 1925-26 was the Shameen Incident of June 23, 1925.
Although this event did not begin the strike and boycott against Hong
Kong, had it not occurred, the strike would most probably have been
disipated and the boycott ended even before it had begun. It has not
been the author's purpose in this study to attempt to determine respon-
sibility for the tragedy at Shameen, but rather to assess its impact.
Readers desirous of an objective account of this incident might wish to
consult Thurston Griggs, ”The Anti-Imperialist Theme in Chinese
Nationalism, 1919-1926, " an unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Harvard University, 1952. Griggs finds the evidence on the question
of who fired first inconclusive. To this author it seems apparent
that British actions, whether initiated or provoked, were excessive.
As a result, they inflamed Cantonese opposition and provided a sharp
stimulus to the intensification of Canton's anti-imperialist struggle.

Among British officials in south China, the Shameen Incident
revived an earlier cause for alarm. Following the arrival in Canton,
late in 1923, of Michael Borodin as the forerunner of a Soviet military
and political mission, British observers became convinced that

Kwangtung was about to be "bolshevized. " Consequently, by 1925,

fi‘r: n

179

all but a few official voices decried the Soviet domination of Canton.
The Shameen Incident was seen as a Soviet plot meant to capitalize
upon Canton's anti—British hostility. In late June and early July,
1925, British commercial interests in south China appeared intent
on surpassing the assessments of British officials regarding the
Russian role in events at Canton. In both official reports and news—
paper accounts that voiced the sentiments of commercial leaders,

it was not uncommon to find KMT notables such as Liao Chung-k'ai,
W'ang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai—shek, and Hu Han-min all labeled as
communists. Within the Foreign Office, the few voices of dissent
were stilled and the characterization of the Kuomintang as a haven
for bolsheviks became the dominant element in policy considerations.
While this British view of Russian influence in KMT affairs was
greatly distorted, it was not without some basis in fact. The view
that KMT leaders were communists may, of course, be dismissed.
The belief that the incident at Shameen formed part of a Soviet plot,
while understandable, lacks all but the flimsiest sort of evidence.
The contention that Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Kuomintang
was part of a deliberate policy meant to discredit the British is not
to be discounted. In its attempt to combat the cooperative “spirit of
the Washington Conference, " the Soviet Union adopted a China policy

that emphasized attacks on British interests coupled with the avoidance

180

of conflict with Japan. This no doubt reflected fears of a renewed
Anglo-Japanese Alliance or, even worse, one expanded to include the
United States. In this regard, it is well to note that the KMT decision
in August and September, 1925, to concentrate the strike and boycott
against the British alone was not without Soviet influence.

The intensification and extension throughout much of Kwangtung
of the strike and boycott against Hong Kong in July and August, 1925,
brought a slowly growing awareness among; British observers of the
power of the Canton Strike Committee. Although the assessment of
its influence came rather late, in the view of this author, the British
contention that the Canton Strike Committee was a "government within
a government" appears to be valid. Despite its role in launching the
struggle against Hong Kong, the Kuomintang initially remained content
with the management of the strike and boycott firmly in the hands of
the Strike Committee dominated by the Chinese Communists. The
Committee rapidly usurped a number of important powers of the
Canton Municipal and Kwangtung Provincial Governments, and ulti-
mately challenged even the authority of the Kuomintang. Its Com-
munist members on occasion also demonstrated contempt for the
authority of their own party leaders in Shanghai.

In the first three months of the Canton- Hong Kong strike and

boycott, it seems clear that leaders in London remained unable to

181

distinguish between the threat posed to their interests by the Kuomin-
tang and that created by the wave of anti-British strike and boycott
agitation in other parts of China that had come in the wake of the May
Thirtieth Incident. Despite the continued plea raised in Hong Kong
that the struggle with Canton was separate and far more serious, the
Foreign Office continued to subordinate the interests of the British

colony to its own larger interests throughout China. When the Tariff

 

Conference was convened at Peking on July 26, 1925, the Foreign '1
Office ignored the hostile protests of the Kuomintang that saw the
conference as damaging to Canton's interests.

The contention has been made by some with an interest in Britain's
China policy that, because it was no longer effective, Great Britain
abandoned, at the beginning of 1925, the spirit of accord that had
emerged at the Washington Conference. This author believes that
the present study demonstrates otherwise. Throughout the last half
of 1925, as it struggled to defeat the strike and boycott against Hong
Kong, Great Britain adhered faithfully, if without profit, to both the
letter and the spirit of the Washington Conference treaties. The in-
ability of British officials to gain acceptance among the other
Washington powers for a policy of cooPerative action against Canton

led the Foreign Office to a rejection of attempts at military solution.

182

Although its position was strongly supported by the Admiralty, the
Foreign Office was not without influential critics. I The advocacy of
a blockade at Canton or some other form of forceful action to be
undertaken by the British Empire acting alone was first put forward
by Governor Stubbs. His proposals, which gained the endorsement
of the Colonial Office, led to mounting friction among British officials
in London. The personal antagonism between Stubbs and Consul-
Ceneral Jamieson that lasted until Stubbs was replaced in November,
1925, did little to assist officials in London who continued to wrestle
with the problem confronting Hong Kong.

Until the end of August, 1925, Hong Kong continued to look to
Sun F0 and those in Canton who shared his sentiments for a solution
to the problem of the strike and boycott. Although Sun and his
supporters continued to oppose the struggle against Hong Kong, their
waning influence was further damaged by the assassination of Liao
Chung-k'ai. Responsibility for Liao's death, still a mystery today,
was never determined, but in the wake of a Kuomintang investigation
at the time many moderates and rightists in the KMT fled Canton for

Shanghai or Peking. Their departure further enhanced the influence

of the Strike Committee and its supporters in Canton.

183

As 1925 came to an end, British officials began an important
reappraisal of their policy toward the Kuomintang. This reappraisal
reflected both the changing conditions and the modified attitudes of
British officials who responded to those new conditions in China.
Although the instability of the Peking Government had long been
chronic, at the end of 1925, it appeared acute. Among British q
observers in London, the appearance of each new warlord at Peking If
served to further confirm the view that China would soon, at best,
become a loosely federated collection of independent or semi-

independent provinces. The tarnished appeal of the fiction that one
government ruled in China; and that that government resided at
Peking, was about to be rejected. British officials in south China,
and particularly Sir James W. Jamieson, had begun to accept the
view that the Kuomintang was something more than merely a vehicle
for Soviet aspirations. Jamieson, who was certainly no friend of
the KMT, was so impressed by Canton's efforts at local reform that,
in December, 1925, he urged the Foreign Office to adopt the experi-
ment of offering the Kuomintang regional recognition. In the view
of this author, Jamieson's proposal was inspired more by Hong Kong's
distress and the danger to British interests there than by Canton's

improvements in municipal and provincial administration.

 

-l
L—VJA

 

 

184

Within the Foreign Office at the end of 1925, the efforts of Hong
Kong officials and their supporters in London finally bore fruit. At
last, the Foreign Office had acknowledged that Hong Kong's struggle
with Canton was indeed separate from, and far more serious, than
other anti-British manifestations in China. The Foreign Office
assessment of the strike and boycott in December, 1925, was that
it had done perhaps irreparable damage to British interests in south
China and that, if it were to continue, Hong Kong would be lost.

In the first months of 1926, although British policy was slow to
change, the coming of change was apparent. In London, it was agreed
that for China the Kuomintang was the wave of the future. British
policy toward it began moving away from a position of antagonism and
hostility toward one of conciliation and support. ' The Canton- Hong
Kong strike and boycott was seen as expressive of the Kuomintang's
revolutionary aims and, as such, that struggle became the primary
and dominant consideration in Britain's China policy.

At the Tariff Conference reconvened at Peking in February, 1926,
the British delegation was instructed to continue with earlier efforts
designed to bring about a regional or provincial allocation of China's
customs revenues. It was hoped that by offering Canton a share in

these funds, formerly enjoyed exclusively by Peking, the strike and

185

boycott against Hong Kong might be brought to an end. When it be-
came apparent that the Kuomintang remained opposed to regional
allocation, because it anticipated obtaining all of China's customs
revenues upon completion of its campaign against the north, the British
delegation adopted obstructionist tactics that furthered the disintegra-
tion of the Tariff Conference. Although its actions aroused the
suspicions of the other foreign powers, the Foreign Office then had

no desire to further antagonize the Kuomintang.

The Customs Seizure incident at Canton in February, 1926,
demonstrated with finality the bankruptcy of continued British reliance
upon the "cooperative spirit" of the Washington Conference powers.
Although this incident was not truly a customs seizure, but rather an
interference by strike pickets with goods before they had cleared the
customs, the other foreign powers were reluctant to lodge even a
protest. They correctly shared the belief that British interests wished
to involve them in the struggle between Canton and Hong Kong.

Throughout the abortive negotiations that formed a part of the
Canton-Hong Kong strike and boycott, the Kuomintang insisted that it
could serve only as a mediator between the strikers and the govern-
ment of \Hong Kong. The British position as expressed through

Governor Clementi was that any settlement negotiations would require

 

186

the appointment of representatives empowered to speak for the govern-
ment of Canton. Clearly, at issue was the question of responsibility
for the actions of the strikers. The Kuomintang characterized its
involvement in the strike and boycott against Hong Kong as one of
sympathy for, and interest in, the welfare of Chinese workers who

had launched a patriotic struggle against the outrageous abuses of

 

British imperialism. The Hong Kong Government countered with the
argument that the strike and boycott had been artifically induced, that
the strike had been over since August, 1925, and that the boycott con-
tinued only through the coercion practiced by the Strike Committee
for which the Canton Government bore full responsibility. The role
of the Kuomintang in launching this struggle has been discussed; its
actions in ending it require further comment. With the beginning of
the Northern Expedition in July, 1926, the KMT began its own efforts
toward a boycott settlement. It abandoned the fiction of non-respon-
sibility for the strikers in Canton and attempted to negotiate a settle-
ment with the government of Hong Kong. When these efforts failed
and it saw a serious British threat to the revolutionary base at Canton,
the Kuomintang unilaterally ended the struggle. This action made it
obvious that the Canton-Hong Kong strike and boycott was a KMT

re sponsibility.

187

The issue of compensation to the strikers is particularly re-
vealing with regard to the policies of Great Britain, Hong Kong, and
Canton. Throughout the first three months of 1926, the Foreign
Office, in its anxiety to reach a settlement, stood ready to make a
sizable payment to Canton. When it learned that Governor Clementi
had disregarded its wishes and those of the Colonial Office by reject-
ing such an overture, the Foreign Office expressed its considerable
displeasure. At Hong Kong, Clementi attempted to justify his stance
against a payment to Canton by pointing to an imagined resurgence
of influence among the rightists there. However, not only did those
in Canton who opposed the strike and boycott fail to take power but,
more important, they joined their opponents in demanding compensa-
tion from Hong Kong.

A resumption of negotiations in March, 1926, re-introduced
the compensation issue in another form. Hong Kong was then pre-
pared to offer Canton substantial railway and port development loans.
In Canton, it was assumed that a large portion of those loans would
be used to pay off the strikers. When Hong Kong insisted on rigid
conditions that would prevent any such allocation, the negotiations

were suspended and another important opportunity to end the strike

and boycott was lost. By September 18, 1926, when the Kuomintang's

188

Minister for Foreign Affairs Eugene Ch'en announced a date for the
boycott's termination, the compensation issue had assumed its final
form. That same day, Ch'en informed Acting Consul-General Brenan
that the Kuomintang would institute new production and consumption
taxes. Although the Foreign Office officially viewed Canton's new
levies as the Washington surtaxes, its members privately acknowl-
edged that the Kuomintang had succeeded in forcing Hong Kong to
compensate the strikers. If one were to accept the rather narrow
view that the important political issues that provided content to the
Canton-Hong Kong strike and boycott were ultimately reduced to a
battle over the issue of compensation, it would be a simple matter
to conclude that the Kuomintang had achieved an important economic
victory. There were, however, other important issues at stake in
this struggle.

The question of recognition to the Kuomintang has occupied
an important place in this study. It will be recalled that Sir James
W. Jamieson had first raised this issue in December, 1925. In
the first months of 1926, as British officials searched for a means
with which to supplant the Russian influence at Canton, a growing
sentiment emerged in both the Foreign and Colonial Offices that

favored regional recognition to the Kuomintang. In London, it was

189

acknowledged that in practice de facto recognition had already been
accorded to Canton. Although proposals to offer 51133.19 recognition
were then defeated, they subsequently reappeared with notable regu-
larity. Only the British Minister at Peking, the conservative Sir
Ronald Macleay, remained consistently opposed to any form of recog-
nition being offered the KMT. Why, then, were these proposals not
implemented? The position of the Kuomintang on the question of
recognition had long been consistent. it sought to be recognized as
the legitimate and sole national government of China. Although an
offer of regional recognition might strengthen its authority in the
south, such an offer would also strengthen the KMT‘s enemies. Thus,
throughout the negotiations with Hong Kong in mid-1926, the Kuomin-
tang adhered to its earlier position. As the boycott against Hong
Kong neared its end and the forces of the Northern Expedition occupied
positions along the Yangtze, the sentiment in favor of national recog-
nition for the KMT grew among British officials. Although Great
Britain was not to grant formal recognitirzu to the Kuomintang until

the armies of the latter occupied Peking in mid- 1928, in the autumn
of 1926 it was privately acknowledged in London that the Foreign
Office was preparing to do so. A number of powers, including Japan

and the United States, had come to the realization that Great Britain

190

in 1926 had begun an independent policy aimed at the establishment

of friendship with the KMT. In December of that year, a "Christmas

Memorandum" presented by Sir Austen Chamberlain formally acknowl-
edged the new policy, then almost one year old, of British conciliation
toward the Kuomintang.

Although Great Britain's attitude toward Canton emphasized the
prevention of any new antagonism, in September, 1926, the policy of
conciliation was briefly modified by one of force. DeSpite the con-
tinued urging of British officials in south China that the Foreign
Office reconsider proposals for military action against Canton that
had been rejected in 1925, officials in London exercised restraint.
The departure of KMT troops from Canton in July, 1926, when the
Northern Expedition began, placed the security of that city as a
revolutionary base once more in jeopardy. The Foreign Office
recognized, however, that military action resulting in serious damage
at Canton might bring a resurgence of anti-British boycott activities.
The fear expressed in London that attacks upon British interests and
prestige would accompany the KMT's Northern Expedition was justi-
fied. It will be recalled that the settlement negotiations of June and
July, 1926, were suspended following Canton's demand for an inquiry

into the incident at Shameen. Dissatisfied with the inflexible position

‘1 4.. n! Frihfluv

 

 

 

191

of Hong Kong during those negotiations, Canton introduced the inquiry
demand as a stalling tactic. It believed that spreading boycott activi-
ties against the British in the wake of the Northern Expedition would
quickly make Hong Kong more reasonable. When the Foreign Office
decided to test the self-assurance of both. the government and the
Strike Committee by sanctioning the dispatch of naval units against
strike pickets at Canton and Swatow, it did so most cautiously. Never-
theless, this action, as previously noted, created a deep sense of alarm
within the Kuomintang and led ultimately to the unilateral termination
of the Canton-Hong Kong strike and boycott of 1925-26.

Another important cause for alarm on the part of the KMT has
not been illuminated in this study. Thrm‘ghout the course of the
Canton-Iiong Kong strike and boycott, the labor movement in Canton
was beset by serious internal strife. The: continued friction between
unions that gave their allegiance to the Kuomintang and those organized
under the auspices of the Chinese Conununist Party was intensified as
the strike and boycott approached an end. A sharp increase in the
number of armed battles between unions in Canton in August, 1926,
was celebrated in the newspapers of the British colony. The impact
of the struggle that dominated the labor movement in Canton upon the

strike and boycott and upon the politics of the Kuomintang forms an

192

important subject for future scholarly inquiry. Finally, the role of
the Kuomintang in the Canton-Bong Kong Strike and Boycott of 1925-26
has only been intimated in this study. It, too, requires careful future

inve stigation.

GLOSSARY

Chang Tso-lin
Ch'en Chiung-ming
Ch'en Ch'uan
Ch'en Ko-niin
Ch'en Kung-po
Ch'en Lien-p0

Ch'en Ping- sheng

 

 

GLOSSARY

at it 5:
Pi it?) 9%

Ft 5 K
it 4:: ii?
91. )3; «a

at 9
Pi}; Milt.

Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Ch'en) P: R 1:...
cheng-chih [EX 5%“
cheng—pien it {E

+9»
Chiang Kai-shek(Chiang Chieh—shih) as «T E

Ch'ing

, .i. "% A357
Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ‘6‘? Q ’73: f7 “ti-L

Chung-sham

 

fan ti-kuo- chu- i

 

Feng Chu—p'o
Feng Yu—hsiang
Fu P'ing-ch‘ang
Fukien

hat-yuan

it

5..-

\\§

tfi‘fi'

m
$53] at};

is 1;] 5 l5;
3%., 1 it?
is e
as ‘i

 

194

 

 

Hankow 3 i ‘3
hsi-kua yuan 6'13 flk lg
Hsi—kuan v33 3%
Hsiang kang 7% 3%
Hsieh Ying-po 3% 3i {(3
hsin-kung ¥(l ' I.

Hsu Ch'ung-chih 4:- .99,

e
21:33:

Hu Han-min $fi

l;
)8 in
it’s 2'“

Huang Huan-t'ing I}?
k'o-chun g 1?

Ku Meng-yu ii i I???

Kuang-choushang-tvuan 33; +4 Te 1%]

Kuang-tung chi-ch'ikung-jen ,} 1 $533 a: 1 A fit: 3% 4‘;

wei-ch'ih- hui

if.

lien- fang tsung— pu

fill mgr
It?

Kuang-tung Ch'uan-Sheng shang-t'uan-chun & i {1‘ )E % la a I???
it
D

Kuangchou

kung—hui

 

kung-t'uan- chun l {E 3:
Kuomintang {if} ii) r;
\§7

Kwangsi

Liao Chung-k'ai

Lin Wei-min

Li Ching-hsi i
I
3*

\a
Liu Chen-huan 95‘} R Vi

Lo Teng-hsien

Ma Ch'ao-chun

«is um $6
A
m

mai— 2 an

Nan-yang hsiung-ti VT?) 5? >11 g,

nungtzu-wei chun if? E] 4:3 3’4

 

pa-kung yung-hu hsing—ch'i ED

 

 

,- , \27
R54 1 it” 1*; )3; 3R
pang-k'ou g 0
ao—kun ’
2mg [EL 1
Pei-fa fit, {’52,
San-min-chu—i 3'. Ii, 3: EX“
Sha—t'ien 3.] E)

Shaokuan (Ix 3;}
Su Chao—cheng g1 :jK ,3;
Sun Ch'uan—fang 3%; 4? (‘7?

Sun Fo (Sun K'o) 3%: ,J’blf
Sun Yat-sen (Sun Chung-shan) 3%; if}: 400 {3%, ‘1’ Lb >

Sung Tzu—wen (T. V. Soong) Vi 3‘ SI"
Swatow 3 ‘11 ii

Tai Chi-t'ao

7km-

T'ai-tzu pai

T'an P'ing-shan

é >+
4a 4*! H“
\H

m
N’%
W
7st
[PE-
.315

on

Tuan Ch'i-jui
T'ung-meng-hui

Tung-yuan

we
3

Teng Chung—hsia )3 ,

Wang Ching-Wei
Whampoa

Wu Chao-- shu (C. C. Wu)
VVu P“ei—fu

Wu T'ieh—ch'eng

Wu T'ing—fang

Yang Hsi-niin
Yueh—chun

Yung-feng

 

Yunnan

\ u
HI

fi%§9‘°l®§i3 B >l=m>l¢0 p} flu?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayers, William. "The Hongkong Strikes, 1920—1926, " in Harvard
Papers on China 4:94-130 (1950).

 

Brandt, Conrad. Stalin's Failure in China, 1924—1927. Cambridge,
Mass. , Harvard University Press, 1958.

 

Burgess, Stewart J. The Guilds of pt’lxlii. New York, Columbia
University Press, 1242.8.

 

"Cantonese in Control of Labor Movement in Shanghai, " in The China
W'eekly Review, January 2, 1932.

 

 

Chang Kia-ngau. China's Struggle for Railroad Development. New
York, John Day, 1943.

 

 

Chang Kuo-t'ao. The Rise of The Chinese Communist Party 1921-
1927, Volume One of the Autobiogrgphy of Chang Kuo-t'ao.
Lawrence, Kansas, The University Press of Kansas, 1971.

 

 

 

Ch'en Kung-lufilrbfi‘ Chung—kilo chin-tai sl‘iihi’filfiki (Modern history of
China). Shanghai, 1935.

 

ChIen pao g iii (The morning paper). Peking, 1925-1926.

Ch'en Ta. "The Labor L'iovement in China, " in International Labor
Review 15, 3:339-363 (March, 1927).

 

Ch'en Ta. An Untitled Article in The Chinese Economic Journal
(Peking), I, 11: 951 (1927).

 

Ch'en Ta F? ii Chung-km) lao-kung wen-ti. ‘P l3 5% 1. Pas] {a (China's

4......

labor problems). Shanghai, 1929.

 

Ch'en Ta. "Fundamentals of the Chinese. Labor Movement, " in Annals.
of the AmericanvAciademy of Political and Social Sciences.' (Special
China Number) November, 1930, p. 196-205.

 

 

 

Chesneaux, Jean. The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927. Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 1968.

 

197

198

Chih Chung 1%? fl "Kuang- chou shih-pien chih yen-chin” l; 4'1 ggiliffi.
( :A study of the Canton coup d'etat") in Hsiang-tao chou-k'an
3,5 3:3 311 43 (The guide weekly). 4, 148:1379-1383 (1926).

 

Chin Kuo-pao ’3‘, (fl '? Chung-kuo pi- chih wen-t'i 4: (g) W M m 3
(China's currency problems). Shanghai, 1928.

China Weekly Review. (Shanghai) 1924-1927. First called Millard's
Review of the Far East, and after 1921, Weekly Review.

 

 

Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information. "The Kongmoon
Customs Reports, 1925, " in The Chinese Economic Bulletin
(Peking). 8,281:374 (1926).

 

 

Chou Ku-ch'eng l5] ,3 15¢ Chung-kuo t'ung-shih “(7 )fl 1211.1 (General
history of China). Shanghai, 1939.

Chow Tse-tsung. The May Fourth Movement, Intellectual Revolution
in Modern China. Cambridge, Mass. , Harvard University Press,

 

 

 

1960.

Chu Hsin-fan 'i tfi' % Chung-kuo ko-ming yu Chung-kuo she-hui ko
chien- chi 47m ;§;£§ x1. (g3 jiégfifikflhe Chinese
revolution and the various classes of Chinese society). Shanghai,
1930.

Ch'uan Han-sheng & 31x ChungL-kuo hang-hui chih-tu shih 47 E f)?“
[i Q (History of the guild system in China). Shanghai, 1934.

 

Cohen, Warren 1. America's Regponse to China: An Interpretive
History of Sino-American Relations. New York, John Wiley and
Sons, 1971.

 

 

Davis, S. G. Hong Kong in its Geographical Setting. London, Collins,
1949.

 

Endacott, G. B. A History of HonLKong. London, Oxford University
Press, 1964.

"Extracts from a Report of General Gallin, " in The Jay_C. Huston
Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 20,
1925.

 

Fairbank, John K. Trade and Diglomacy on the China Coast: The
Qpeninflf the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854. 2 vols. Cambridge,
Mass. , Harvard University Press, 1953.

 

 

199

Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. East
Asia: The Modern Transformation. Boston, Houghton Nfifflin,
1965.

 

Fang Fu- an. "Kuomintang and Labor, " in The China Weekly Review,
October S, 1929.

 

Fong, H. D. "China's Industrialization, A Statistical Survey, " in Data
Papers on China. Shanghai, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931.

 

Gannett, Lewis. "Why Canton is Radical Center of Asia, " in The China
Weekly Review (Shanghai), June 12, 1926.

 

 

Gourlay, Walter E. "The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai- shek:
I920- I924. " Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1967.

Great Britain. Public Record Office. Colonial Office, General
Correspondence, Political (CO 129) 484-87 (1924), 488-91 (1925),
492-98 (1926), and 499-505 (1927).

 

 

Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, Confidential
Prints (F0 405) 247-251, 252A, and 252B (1924-1927).

 

Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, Embassy and
Consular Archives, Corresgmdence Series I (F0 228) 2050-56
(1924), 2058-63 (1925), 2064-70 (1926), and 2071-75 (1927).

 

 

Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, General
Correspondence, Political (F0 371) 10915-57 (1925), 11620-97
(1926), and 12397-12514 (1926).

 

 

Hong Kong Daily Press. 1925- 1927.

 

Hong Kong Government. Administrative Reports, 1925.

 

Hong Kong Government. Government Gazette Extraordinary. July,
1925.

 

Hong Kong Telegraph. 1925-1927.

 

Hoselitz, Bert F. "Generative and Parasitic Cities, " in Economic
Development and Cultural Change 3:278-294 (1954).

 

 

201

Kimeloff, A. "Journey to Canton in October, 1925. " Unpublished
report in The Jay C. Huston Collection, Hoover Institution,
Stanford University, n. d.

 

Kirby, Stuart E. Introduction to the Economic History of China.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1954.

 

K'uang Hsiao-an &? ii "Hsiang-kang tsui-chin chih kuan—ch'a, "
S $ fill. i if, g— ("Latest observations on Hong Kong") in
Kuo-wen chou-pao [-3] Ff] {fl fl (Kuowen Weekly) 2, 48:5-8
December 13, 1925.

 

Kuo-wen cthpao @ ffllflfi (Kuowen Weekly). Canton, 1925-1926.

Lee B. Y. "Some Aspects of the Labor Situation in Canton, " in The
China Weekly Review, January 28, 1928.

 

Li Chien-nung. The Political History of China, 1840-1928, tr. Ssu-yu
Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1956.

 

Li Po-yuan gig is Kuangtung chi-ch'i kurijgn- hui tou- shih ‘ 1 A 1
1 k g H { (History of the struggles of the Kwangtung mechanics
union). Peking, 1955.

Li Shou-kung i ‘i m Chungituo tsui-chin ssu- shih-nien shih ‘f a ‘31
ED '1' fi- { (Chinese history of the last forty years), Taipei,
1954.

Lingnan Records (Canton Christian College) Box 44, July-December,
1925. Harvard-Yenching Library.

 

Liu Li-k'ai 5H t gmand Wang Cheng 1 3 1919-192? nien ti Chung-km

kung-jen jun-tung HH- 111‘! fi- 69 q: (a 1 gm *1, (The Chinese workers'
movement of 1919—1927). Peking, 1957.

Lowe Chuan-hua. Facing Labor Issues in China, London, George Allen
and Unwin, 1934.

 

Ma Ch'ao- chun E 33 492 Chung-kuo lao-kung yun-tung shih Q’ a $3-
3.2 H 1 (History of the Chinese labor movement). 5 vols. Taipei,
1958.

 

Min-kuo jih-pao R. )2 a #9. (Republican Daily). Shanghai, 1925-1926.

Morning Post. (London) 1925.

202

Morse, H. B. Gilds of China. London, Longmans Green, 1901.

 

Murphey, Rhoads. Shanghai, Key to Modern China. Cambridge, Mass. ,
Harvard University Press, 1953.

 

Murphey, Rhoads. ”Traditionalism and Colonialism: Changing Urban
Roles in Asia, ” in The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 29, November,
1969, p. 67-84.

New Leader. (London) 1925.

 

"New Navigation Rules, " in The Canton Gazette, August 12, I925.

 

North China Herald. (Shanghai) 1925-1926.

 

Oxnam, Robert B. "The Kuomintang and the Merchant Corps Affair, "
unpublished paper, Yale University, 1967.

Publicity Bureau for South China (Hong Kong). Soviet Intrigues in China.
Hong Kong, n. d.

 

Redfield, Robert and Milton B. Singer. "The Cultural Role of Cities, "
in Economic Development and Cultural Change 3:53-73 (1954).

Remer, C. F. A Study of Chinese Boycotts, with Special Reference to
Their Economic Effectiveness. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press,
1933.

 

Schwartz, Benjamin 1. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao.
Cambridge, Mass. , Harvard University Press, 1951.

 

Sha-ki ts'an- sha shih 5" £ 1% $9; { (History of the Shakee massacre).
Canton, I925.

 

"Sha-mien Ashih-chien, " 57 ‘5 § ‘4 (The Shameen Incident), in Tung-
fang tsa-chih i «3 n :g‘ (Eastern Miscellany). 22, 14:4-5 (1925).

Sha-mien shih- chien ti chien- shih 575 § ‘4' $9 a 1 (Short history of
the Shameen incident). Canton, n. d.

Sha-mien ts' an- sha an-chien :7 b 13 a* 4‘) (Case of the cruel
Shameen massacre). Canton, 1925.

Shun pao (Shen pao) * a (The Whangpoo daily). I925- 1926.

"Sir James Jamieson, " in The Hong Kong Daily Press, August 14, 1925.

203

Smith, C. A. Middleton. The British in China and Far Eastern Trade.
London, Constable and Company, '1920.

Sokolsky, George. "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton, "' in The North
China Herald (Shanghai), May I and May 8, 1926.

 

South China Morning Post. (Hong Kong) 1925-1927.

 

Stremski, Richard. “Britain's China Policy 1920-1928, " Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968.

Su Chao-cheng. "Delegates' Reports on the Labor Movement in their
Respective Countries, Report on China, " in Bulletin of Proceedings,
Pan—Pacific Trade Union Conference. (Hankow) 3A:l-l3 (May 24,
1927).

 

 

Sun E-tu Zen. Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898-1911. New
York, Columbia University Press, 1954.
S " ‘ .
"Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Views on Labor and Capital, " in The WeeleReview
23, 2:45-46 (December 9, 1922).

 

Tai Chi-“80 i: i (’51 Cppmkuo tu-li yun-tuggti chi-tien (p (a 1% 1
s! in 59 :8. ,{ (Foundations of the Chinese independence movement).
Canton, 1925.

Tang Leang-li. China in Revolt. London, Noel Douglas, 1927.

 

Tang Leang-li. The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution. London,
George Routeledge and Sons, 1930.

Tawney, R. H. Land and Labor in China. New York, Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1932.

Teng Chung-hsia m Y i Chung-kuo chih-kung yun-tung chien-shih
a» (g m .1. 1!. ‘1, a i (Short history of the Chinese labor
movement). Peking, 1949.

Times. (London) 1925-1926.

Tong, Hollington K. "China's Labor Problems Coming to the Fore, "
in The China Weekly Review, July 10, I920.

 

 

Tung-fang tea-chih i 3 31:1,. (EaStern Miscellany). 1925-1926.

U. S. Decimal File. Records of the Department of State Relating t;-
the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929. (Microfilm) Nati: .-.al
Archives and Records Service, Washington, 1960. (1925-1926).

204

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Ch'en Ta.
"Labor Unrest in China, " in Monthly Labor Review (Washington),
August, 1921.

Vinacke, H. M. Problems of Industrial Development in China.
Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1926.

Vishnyakova-Akimova, Vera V. Two Years in Revolutionary China:
1925-1927, tr. S. Levine. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1971.

 

Wah-tsz yat—po (Hua-tzu jih-pao) i ‘3'- 3 *K (The Chinese times).

 

Hong Kong, 1925-1926.

Wales, Nym. The Chinese Labor Movement. New York, John Day,
1945.

 

Wang Ch'ing-pin i 5% Hi? compiler. Ti-i-t'zu Chung-kuo lac-tung
nien-chien ; - ”K W a :9 it Q. fig. (Chinese labor yearbook
no. 1) Institute of Social Research, Peking, I928.

 

Wang Ching-Wei Si Q m "Wo-men ying-kai tsen-yang ti nu-li" a}; {73
'1‘- fi t 3.3.. 69 '3 it (How should we use our efforts?) in Chung-kuo
kuo-min q: IQ @ & January 7, 1926.

 

Wang Shih 1 i Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tanj li-shih chien-pien ‘l’ Q-fi fi
‘ . )fi 1 a (1 (Short history of the Chinese communist party).
hanghai, 1959.

 

Whiting, Allen s. Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1954.

Wilbur, C. Martin and Julie L. Y. How. Documents on Communism,
Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1956.

 

Wilbur, C. Martin. Professor of History, ,Colurnbia University. "Forging
the Weapons, " an unpublished manuscript, 1966.

Wright, Mary C. The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-
chih Restoration, 1862- 1874. .Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1957.

 

Wu Tien-wei. "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 39” I. "
in The Journal of Asian Studies 27:585-607. (1968).