DISTRICT CGU‘JCILLORSHIP IN AN QP’R CA?- a -- R q“ I241. : 591.1%? :1 .3 Thesis for sake Bagree 05 1931. I. W'siiwn‘a STATE 3317332.}?333? Aivin Mama 1:65 THESIS “ i O~169 This is to certify that the thesis entitled District Councillorsnip in an African Society: A Study in Role and Conflict Resolution presented by Alvin Magid has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. Political Science degree in /z/ // %/ lb‘ajor professor M 412/ My / ! Date "- , 1 ./ J ABSTRACT DISTRICT COUNCILLORSHIP IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ROLE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION by Alvin Magid Role theory will earn a place with social science theory only when it sheds vestiges of conceptual ambiguity and embraces a corpus of testable and tested generalizations. The latter deficiency is eSpecially evident in studies of role conflict problems confronting African chieftaincy and local leadership. Students of African political behavior have tended merely to identify the "objective conflict situ- ation." The purpose of this research is to consider the pos- sibility that more intensive and theoretically significant analyses of role conflict problems might result from the ex- amination of such dimensions as legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution. The specific objectives of the study are (l) to examine diverse sources of, and the Idoma district councillors' perceptual responses to, potential conflict situations and (2) to analyZe relationships between dimensions noted above and the problem of conflict management confronting those officeholders. A semi-structured instrument was constructed to elicit both demographic and role data. The interview population ii Alvin Magid comprises seventy-one councillors in five districts of northern and central Idoma Division (Northern Nigeria). Major findings are summarized below: 1. Idoma is'a "culturally-mixed" dual society in which both alien and indigenous elements produce "bureaucratic~ debureauCratic" role conflict. Potential conflict situations reflecting both sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic ten- sion have been constructed for the analysis. 2. Fewer than the total number of councillors per~ ceived role conflict in each of the five objective or poten~ tial situations. Ambivalence or difficulty in choosing among given be-l havioral alternatives has been construed as subjectively- eXperienced role conflict. Fewer than the total number of councillors who perceived role conflict in each of the five potential situations eXperienced ambivalence. These findings suggest that previous observers may have exaggerated the extent to which African chiefs and local leaders (a) perceive bureaucratic-debureaucratic role con- flict and (b) eXperience ambivalence or subjective role conflict. 3. Greater ambivalence is eXperienced in conflict situations involving two legitimate and/or obligatory roles than in those involving a single legitimate and/or obliga-. tory role. Sets of legitimate roles and sets of obligatory roles contribute differentially to ambivalence. 4. The researcher has constructed a typology iii Alvin Magid of punitive-social sanctions based on two criteria: content and chronology. Four categories have been generated: mystical.customary; social customary~modern; moderngpolice- judicial; and modern political-administrative. The councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with identical permutations based on sanctional type eXperiences greater ambivalence than the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with different permutations. 5. A predictive model has been constructed to test the hypothesis that councillors confronting role conflict are more likely to select as the role to be fulfilled (i.e., the major role among given behavioral alternatives) that which is perceived as more legitimate and/or obligatory. A high prOportion of correct predictions have been made from legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined. In all cases, prediction is significantly beyond chance. Indicated also is a highly significant association between selection of the major role and degree of legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined. 6. Examination of the implications of multidimensional role for conflict resolution reveals a buffer structure in Case 1. Councillors and district heads operate as role buffers by absorbing the punitive sanctions of their most proximate audience[s]. Thus, role buffering mitigates role conflict by insulating these actors from the threat of hierarchically-organized inter-audience sanction. Both are iv Alvin Magid now able to conform to the eXpectation of proximate audi- ences more inclined to sanction their deviant behavior. At the same time, however, councillors are vulnerable to the sanctions of their most proximate audiences: frustrated vil~ lagers and conciliar-administrative colleagues. Centraliza- tion of authority in Idoma increases councillor vulnerability. DISTRICT COUNCILLORSHIP IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ROLE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION By Alvin Magid A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1965 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Professor William John Hanna, Chair- man of the Thesis Committee and friend, for his valuable guidance and advice. Professors Eugene Jacobson, Charles Adrian, Joseph Roberts, Charles Hughes, Lewis Edinger (Washington University), John Messenger (Indiana University), and Robert Armstrong (University of Ibadan, Western Nigeria) contributed useful suggestions and criticism during various phases of the research project. Lawrence Aleamoni, Robert Morgan, and Walter Watman of Michigan State University re- flected on the statistical analyses. I also wish to eXpress my appreciation to the staff of the Inter-Library Loan Di— vision of the Michigan State University Library for its ef- forts in assisting the researcher to compile his materials. The field operation was made possible by a generous Ford Foundation-Michigan State University Graduate Fellowship re- ceived from the International Programs Office, Michigan State University. In Nigeria, encouragement was received at var- ious times from officials in the Northern Region Government and administration, Ochflldoma (Idoma: "Chief of Idoma"), and officials of the Idoma’Native Authority. The greatest debt is owed to the many in Idoma who are notable only for their persistent co-Operation, hospitality, generosity, and patience. Mr. ngiji Ikongbeh of Oturkpo Town stands out even in this group of notables. I wish also to thank Clement Uwemedimo for his encouragement and assistance. Finally, I very gratefully acknowledge the encouragement, sympathy, forbearance, and typing skills of my wife and colleague-in- the-field, Sally Joy Magid. *h'vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv PART 1. THEORY AND THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA Chapter I. DUALITY, BUREAUCRATIZATION- DEBUREAUCRATIZATION, AND ROLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l Bureaucratization- Debureaucratization and the Dual Society . . . 1 Role and Bureaucratization Debureaucratiza— tion in African Dual Societies . . . . . . 6 The Role Concept in Theory . . . 13 The Role Concept in Political Science and African Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 II. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Position, Role, Audience Population . . . . 30 Multidimensional Role: Concepts and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Role Conflict: Definitions and Types . . . 40 Role Conflict, Ambivalence, Resolution . . . 46 PART II: RESEARCH FOCUS, PROCEDURES, AND PROBLEMS III. THE RESEARCH: FOCUS, FIELD PROCEDURES, AND PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 The Research Focus and Analytic Variables . 55 Field Procedures . . x . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Field Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 viii TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued Chapter Page PART III: ANTHRO-HISTORY IV. TRADITIONAL IDOMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Social Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Religion and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Polity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 V. COLONIAL AND POST- COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN IDOMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Indirect Rule and Indigenous Organization: Exercises in Normative—Institutional Engineering . . . . 98 Indirect Rule and Administration in Idoma . 101 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 PART IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES VI. ROLE PERCEPTION AND THE OBJECTIVE CONFLICT SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Case I: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization . . . . 141 Case II. Party Affiliation and Organi- zational Allegiance . . . . . 160 Case III: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function . . 169 Case IV: Clan Headship, District .Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession . . . . . . . 180 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 VII. ROLE CONFLICT: PERCEPTION, AMBIVALENCE, RESOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Objective and Perceived Role Conflict . . . 194 Perceived Role Conflict and Ambivalence . . 200 Conflict Resolution and Ambivalence . . . . 206 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 VIII. MULTIDIMENSIONALISM IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION . . 212 Legitimacy and Obligation . . . . 212 Legitimacy, Obligation, and Ambivalence . . 216 Sanction . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 Sanction and Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . 230 Legitimacy, Obligation, and Prediction of Role Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . 237 ix TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued Chapter Page A Note on Multidimensionalism and Role Buffering in Conflict Resolution . . . . . 244 PART V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Suggested Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27S LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Councillor Perceptions of Audience EXpectations: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization (Council Involvement in Dis- bursement of Funds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 2. Councillor Perceptions of Audience Expectations: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization (Councillor as Advisor) . . . . . 149 3. Councillor Perceptions of Audience EXpectations: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization (District Head as Signatory) . . . 153 4. Comparative Bureaucratic Role: Councillor and District Head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 5. Party Affiliation of the District Councillors . . 163 6. Councillor Perceptions of Audience Expectations: Party Affiliation and Organizational Alle- giance (Councillor as Campaigner) . . . . . . . 166 7. Councillor Perceptions of Audience Expectations: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function (Councillor as Participant) . . . . . 175 8. Councillor Perceptions of Audience EXpectations: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chief- taincy Succession (Councillor and District Headship) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 9. Councillor Perceptions of Audience EXpectations: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chief- taincy Succession (Councillor and Clan Headship) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 10. Councillors Who Perceived Objective Role ' Conflict Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 ll. Councillors Who Perceived Inter- and Intra- Audience Role Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 xi LIST OF TABLES--Continued Table Page 12. Councillors Who EXperienced Ambivalence in Perceived Role Conflict Situations . . . . . . 202 13. Mean Ambivalence Scores For Councillors in Role Conflict Situations . . . . . . . . . . . 204 14. Incidence of Perceived Role Conflict Situations Involving Bureaucratic and Debureaucratic Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 15. Degree of Ambivalence and Perceived Role Conflict Situations Resolved Bureaucratically and Debureaucratically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 16. Situational Correlates for Legitimacy and Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 17. Permutations of Legitimacy-Obligation and Mean Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 18. Single Legitimacy and/or Obligation, Dual Legitimacy and/or Obligation, and Mean Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 19. Single Legitimacy, Dual Legitimacy, and Mean Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 20. Single Obligation, Dual Obligation, and Mean Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 21. Distribution of Councillors and Sanctions in Perceived Conflict Situations . . . . . . . . . 225 22. Sanctional Distribution by Audience . . . . . . . 231 23. Permutations of Sanctional Type in Perceived Conflict Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234 24. Permutations of Sanctional Type and Degree of Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 25. Proportionate Incidence of Correct Predictions of Conflict Resolution (i.e., Major Role) from Legitimacy and Obligation, Singly and Combined 240 26. Correlates for Legitimacy and Obligation in Situations B and Q of Case I . . . . . . . . . 247 xii LIST OF TABLES--Continued Table 27. PrOportionate Incidence of Legitimacy— Obligation Permutations in Situations B and C of Case I . . 28. Incidence of Councillors Who Identified Audiences With Obligatory EXpectations in Perceived Conflict Situations B and C of Case I — — xiii Page 247 249 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure l. Typology in a Sanctional Universe 2. Map of the "Idoma- -Speaking PeOples” and "Idoma 'PrOper'" . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Obligation-Sanction and Direction of Conflict Resolution in Situations B and B of Case I xiv Page 38 75 249 APPENDIX Page Interview Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 XV PART I: THEORY AND THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA Chapter I: Duality, Bureaucratization-Debureaucratization, and Role Chapter II: Operational Definitions CHAPTER I DUALITY, BUREAUCRATIZATION~DEBUREAUCRATIZATION, AND ROLE Bureaucratization-Debureaucratization and the Dual Society Social scientists have adduced considerable evidence to confirm that Max Weber's rational-legal model1 neither fully explains nor adequately reflects Western or non-Western organizational behavior. One need only be reminded of his failure to incorporate such elements as informal behavior, partisanship, and the possible tension between organizational and societal values in order to be made aware of inadequacies in the model.2 Yet even as he was constructing a model 1A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds. and trans. Max Weber: The Theory of SOCial and Economic Or anization (New York: Oxford—University Press,’l947), pp. 28-340; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford UniverETTy Press, 1958), pp. 196-2047 2See Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bu- reaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), esp. Chaps.‘II, 12; Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, and Reformed," Paper delivered at 1961 Meeting of the American Political Science Associa- tion, St. Louis, Missouri, September 6-9, I961, pp. I8-20 (MST; Robert V. Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, v. 38 #2 (December 1959), pp. 103-109; Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian vs. Welfare Bureauc- racy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quar- terly, v. 6 #1 (June 1961), eSp. pp. 3-4, 24, Morroe Berger, -1- -2- overlooking non-rational affective phenomena, Weber recog- nized a dualism in modern bureaucracy. The latter arose from the persistence of customary (traditional) alongside con- ventional and enforceable elements.3 Traceable to Weber's seminal notion of coexistent ele- ments are various contemporary analyses of social and organ- izational dualism. Thus, fOr the economist Boeke the dual society is a relatively static one in which simultaneously two or more social systems appear, clearly distinct one from the other, afid each dom- 1nat[1ng] a part of the soc1ety. . . . One of these systems, always the most advanced, will have been imported from abroad and have gained its existence in the new envir- onment without being able to oust or assimilate the divergent social system that has grown up there, with "Patterns of Communication of Egyptian Civil Servants with the_Public," Public Opinion Quarterly, v. 20 (1956), pp. 296-298; JOSeph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureauc- racy and Political DeveIOpment," Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 3-34; J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development with Particular Ref- erence to Nigeria," in Bureaucracy and Political Develop- ment, ed. Joseph LaPalomEara, pp. 306¥307, observes that the post-independence Federal Civil Service has departed only very slightly from past bureaucratic performance; how— ever, in the same volume, Eisenstadt (p. 26ff.) and Riggs(p.9) note with some apprehension that public administrations in the new states have assumed political roles as instru- ments of social change. In Northern Nigeria, the Regional Government is on record as favoring the participation of Native Authority civil servants in party politics. (See Nigeria. Northern Region. House of Assembly. Debates. v. S #21 (August 5, 1958), pp. 766-767. 3Henderson and Parsons, eds. and trans., op. cit., p. 122. 4J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies: As Exemplifiedfiby_lndonesia (NewTYork: Insti- tute of Pacific'Relations, 1953), p. 3} -3- the result that neither of them become gene§a1 and characteristic for that society as a whole. While this coexistence frequently results from the penetra- tion of precapitalist agrarian societies by Western capital- ism, it is not limited to the sphere of economics: diverse systems of government, law, and social organization may also coexist.6 Indeed, it could be hypothesized that the achieve- ment of dualism in one Sphere is likely to produce similar consequences in another. Coexistence of imperial and extra- territorial juridical systems in China after 1842, the lat- ter an outgrowth of Western economic penetration, may be taken as a case in point. Contrastingly, Almond hypothesizes that all political [and presumably economic, etc.] systems-- the deve10ped Western ones as well as the less-devel- Oped non-Western ones-—are transitional systems, or systems in which cultural change is taking place. Accordingly, . certain kinds of political structure which we have usually considered to be peculiar to the primitive gre also to be found in modern pelitical systems. . . For Boeke, the inevitability of change--or exchange of values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns between the 5Ibid., p. 56. 6Ibid., p. 14. 7Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 24. 8Ibid., p. 20. -4- 9 Max- divergent systems—~15 of little or no consequence. imally, such systems may influence each other, but without assimilation or annihilation of one by the other.10 Almond, on the other hand, rejects the polar model in favor of a more inclusiVe, dynamic conceptualization. Instead of the Western and non-Western or modern and pre-modern society, there is only--and universally--the "culturally mixed” dual society. In such societies and their component sub-systems, antagon- istic tendencies are in a more-or-less dynamic interrela- tionship. Therein we may eXpect to encounter predisposi- tions to rational-legal behavior in administrative struc- tures not pre-eminently committed to the bureaucratic ethos. As a case in point, Riggs has drawn attention to a feudal- bureaucratic tension inherent in the imperial administrations of Ming (China) and Kamakura (Japan).ll Similarly, we may expect to encounter in contemporary bureaucracy those particularistic, affective, and diffuse elements alluded to 9For a criticism of Boeke's apparent inability to com- prehend the relationship between dualism and change, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of Political DeveIOp- ment in Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development and Culture Change, v. 5, #3 (April 1957), p. 302. 1OJ. H. Boeke, "Colonialism and Dualism," in Race Re- lations in Perspective, Andrew W. Lind, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955), p. 71. 11Fred W. Riggs, "The Ambivalence of Feudalism and Bu- reaucracy in Traditional Societies," Paper delivered at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Asso- ciation, Chicago, Illinois, September 1964 (MS). A provoca- tive attempt to refine the bipolar model may be found in Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theoryof Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton‘Mifflin, 1964f, esp. pp. 3-50. -5- 12 In this vein, Eisenstadt has identified earlier by Weber. antagonistic tendencies which, when juxtaposed in an organi- zational context, produce "bureaucratization-debureaucratiza- tion."13 Integrating rational-efficient and power themes pervading the literature on bureaucracy, he defines bureauc- ratization, on the one hand, as the extension of bureaucracy's Spheres of activities and power either in its own interest or those of some elite . . . tend[ing] toward growing regimentation of differ- ent areas of social life . . . and debureaucratization, on the other, as subversion of the goals and activities of the bureaucracy in the interest of different grOUPS with which it is in close intezaction [e.g., clients, patrons, interested parties].1 - It is a conceptual framework comprehending dualism as an admixture--"a consequence of Westernization, in many cases added on to an indigenous cultural heterogeneity"15"that facilitates examination of the role conflict problem engendered by bureaucratization-debureaucratization. Turning to recent research on the problem, we note immediately its cross- cultural character. In addition to Riggs' investigation of "ambivalence" in imperial China and Japan,16 there have been 12Almond and Coleman,efls., 0p. cit., p. 20ff. 138. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (December 1959), pp. 302—320. 14Ibid., p. 312. 15Gabriel Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, v. 52 #1 (March 1958), p. 276. 16Riggs, "The Ambivalence . . .," 0p. cit. -6— treatments largely descriptive of role conflicts confronting U. 8. Navy disbursement officers,l7 Israeli civil servants,18 and African Chieftaincy. The latter, having laid the ground- work for the present study of African local leadership, merit Special attention. What follows is a brief survey of the bureaucratic-debureaucratic role inquiries undertaken by Africanist anthropologists. Role and Bureaucratization-Debureaucratization in African Dual Societies Social scientists19 and administrators have long rec- ognized African Chieftaincy and village leadership as vital links between tradition-oriented local communities and novel Western-type governments. At the same time, they have been acutely sensitive to the pressures directed at occupants of nexus positions in these "culturally mixed" dual societies: on the one hand, Government and its allies seeking to mobil- ize local leadership in support of "bureaucratic" objectives; on the other, "debureaucratic" expectations for behavior ’ 17Ralph H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," American Sociological Review, v. 12 (1947), pp. 342-348, esp. p. 348. 18Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, ”Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 5 (1960-1961), pp. 113-133. 19For example, Audrey I. Richards, ed., East African Chiefs: A Study of Political DeveIOpment in Some Uganda and Tangapyika Tribes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 14; see also pp. 6-13 and 27-29 of this chapter. -7- rooted in incompatible--a1beit not necessarily indigenous-- value orientations.20 These incompatibilities are said to engender a role problem for those occupying local leadership positions. Facets of that problem are elucidated in cases from Nigeria and Uganda. Cohen21 reports that the British presence in Kanuri- land (Bornu Province, Northern Nigeria) had produced a con— frontation between two radically opposed value orientations: (1) an alien pattern incorporating such notions as public reSponsibility, personal integrity, Western-type education, gradual social and economic development, and eventual self- government; and (2) an indigenous pattern based on feudal organization and Islam (e.g., a conviction that the nature of society is determined by divine will). Consequences of the imposition of colonial Indirect Rule policy suggest, however, that the situation was not polar. For example, the goal of modernization tended to be 20By definition, members of the "culturally mixed" so- ciety are not oriented exclusively to either bureaucratic or debureaucratic values. Moreover, bureaucratic-debureau- cratic role conflict may invole alien and/or indigenous value orientations. ‘ For an example of conflicting value orientations gen- erating diverse eXpectations, albeit in an imaginary envir- onment, see the parable of the traditional chief and tran- sitional-empathic grocer of Balgat in Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the MiddI§_East (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19587,'Eh.‘1. 21This description of Kanuri Chieftaincy is a summary of an unpublished manuscript by Andrew G. Frank and Ronald Cohen, Organization and Chapge with Conflicting Standards: Russia and Africa (n.d., circa Tate 1950's), pp. 13:18. See also Ronald Cohen, Structure of Kanuri Society (unpublished -8- subverted by a commitment to rule thrOUgh traditional au- thorities. Similarly, while the Kanuri elite became com- mitted to political and economic deveIOpment, it emphasized progress within the framework of a traditional religio- political system. The implication of this orientational duality for bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict could be observed at all levels of the society: British administrator, Shehu (monarch), Afia (district head), Lawan (village area head), and Bulawa (hamlet head). Concentrating on the position of district head, the author reports many conflicting eXpecta- tions. For example, British administrators perceived the district head as a salaried civil servant and consequently deplored his unwillingness to refrain from collecting trib- ute; but the same administrators also eXpected him to under- take large displays for visiting dignitaries, the cost of “midicould not be borne by an official salary alone. More- over, the Shehu's demand that subordinates--including dis- trict heads-~deliver customary tribute tended to undermine the civil service norm. The question of political reform also generated con- flicting expectations. Insistence that district heads sup- port novel pOpularly-elected councils tended to contradict both traditional Kanuri relationships and British commitment to rule through native authorities. As a result, support Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology and AnthrOpol- ogy, University of Wisconsin, 1960), passim. -9- for this reform tended to be concentrated in a reformist op- position party chastized by the Kanuri elite as heretics against the Islamic cosmology. Turning to Uganda, we note Beattie's description of role conflict in "culturally mixed" Bunyoro.22 EurOpean ad- ministrators in Bunyoro eXpected the hierarchy of chiefs to handle administration, court affairs, and fiscal matters in an efficient manner; at the same time, more tradition- oriented tribesmen emphasized such particularistic values as dignified chief-subject relations, frequent visits between the two, and generosity.23 EXpectations based on these value orientations gave rise, in turn, to the following pattern of criticism: Europeans condemned deviations from Western standards of administration; older Banyoro deplored the im- personality often characteristic of civil service chiefs; and younger Banyoro educated in the EurOpean tradition com- pounded the problem of role conflict by protesting that chiefs failed to conform to both the norm of efficiency and 24 standards of modern democratic leadership. As a result of this confrontation of diverse value 22This description of the Banyoro situation is drawn from John Beattie, Bppyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,ii960), pp. 36147, esp. pp. 41- 47; similar material by the author may be found in Richards, ed., 0p. cit., pp. 98-127 and "Bunyoro Through the Looking Glass, ournal of African Administration, v. 12 #2 (April 1960), pp. 85-86. 23Generosity refers to the traditional practice of chiefs preparing meat feasts and beer parties for villagers. Most chiefs can no longer afford to maintain this tradition. 24Beattie, Bunyoro . . ., 0p. cit., p. 46. -10- orientations, Beattie concludes, attitudes and values apprOpriate to the older system still survive into, and even modify the new. The [Ba]nyoro political system is no longer the traditional one, but neither is it the impersonal civil service which it is sometimes thought to be; it contains elements of both, together with features which are in- consistent with each other.2 Analogues of both the Kanuri and Bunyoro cases may be found among the Basoga of Uganda.26 Alongside, and in com- petition with, the sacral-familial institution of patrilineal kinship there developed in traditional Busoga a secular hier- archy of chiefs based on the principle of clientship. Thus, superordinate-subordinate relationships at all levels of the hierarchy were defined in terms of personal fealty. Even after 1936, when tribute was formally abolished and all chiefs--except village headmen--became salaried civil ser- vants, clientship continued to flourish, albeit clandes- tinely. Both the kinship and chiefly structures rooted in a particularistic value system generated a bureaucratic- debureaucratic role problem. For example, while kinsman A exerted pressure on chief B for preferential treatment, he was likely simultaneously to insist that chief B ignore the pressures of competitor kinsman Q; similarly, while sub- county (gombolola) chief B invoked the client relationship 251bid., p. 47. 26This description of the Basoga is a summary of Lloyd A. Fallers,"The Predicament of the Modern Chief: An Instance from Uganda," American Anthropologist, v. 57 (1955), p. 290ff. -11- in order to gain the support of county (£353) chief B at promotion time, the former was likely to condemn chief B for honoring a similar relationship with competitor sub-county chief B. Thus, the chief had to Operate in a milieu in which kinship, client, and civil service relationships intermeshed. As a result, he tended to become trapped in the proverbial "damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma: the granting of particularistic demands of kinsmen threatened him with dismissal for nepotism, while refusal to accede to such pres- sures violated traditional kin obligations; similarly, the Agranting of particularistic demands of a superordinate in a client relationship undermined civil service norms, while refusal to honor the relationship might have been grounds for dismissal on a contrived charge of corruption.3 In contrast to Bunyoro, the Basoga village headman27 was not a member of the civil service hierarchy. Fearful that acceptance of a government salary would undermine their 27Thisdescription of Basoga headmanship draws from Lloyd A Fallers, "Village Chiefs in Busoga," in East African Institute of Social Research, "The Present-day Position of Lower Chiefs," East African Conference on Colonial Adminis- tration (Kampala,Uganda: Makerere UniVersity College, June 1952), pp. 19-24. For a brief summary of the findings of the Conference, see A. I. Richards, "East African Conference on Colonial Administration," Journal of African Administration, v. S, #2 (April 1953), pp. 62-65. , Fallers' material may also be located in his Bantu Bureaucracyz‘ A Study of Integration and Conflict in the PolitiCal Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge: W. Heifer and SOns, n.d.), passim; also in RiCHards, ed., East African Chiefs . . ., Op. Cit., pp. 78-97. -12.. traditional hereditary power, headmen chose in 1936 to rely instead on fees gained from land transactions. For several reasons, however, that decision worked to their disadvantage. First, in order to eXplOit his remaining source of income, the headman was forced to engage in practices--encouragement of land-despoiling crowded tenancy and short-term loans to non-Basoga--that alienated fellow tribesmen. Second, refusal to enter the civil service did not prevent Government from insisting that headmen collect taxes, arrest criminals, and publicize economic reform measures. Consequently, the head- man becametrapped in a vicious cycle: refusal to enter the civil service for fear of losing traditional prerogatives did not prevent bureaucratization of his position; increasing uncompensated bureaucratization forced him to engage in un- pOpular land transactions which, in turn, undermined the very prestige and power which he had originally sought to protect. It appears to be virtually ensured that similar role conflict problems will remain for some time in Uganda. Those problems are likely to be engendered by (1) traditional val- ues and behavior and (2) Government's decision to mobilize chiefs as agents of democratized local councils and the more highly-bureaucratized central administration.28 28Uganda,pRe_port of the Uganda Relationships Commis- sion, 1961 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1961), Chap. I5’(as cited in Journal of African Administration, v. 13, #4, October l96l,_p..250). See Fred Burke, "The Role of the Chief in Uganda," Journal of African Administration, v. 10, #3 (July 1958), pp. 153-160} -13- In the present study, the focus will be on another African local leader, the district councillor among the Idoma of Northern Nigeria. The object will be to examine throngh multidimensional analysis the problem introduced above, i.e., the problem of conflict management. The examination will involve the analysis of relationships between legitimacy, obligation, and sanction, on the one hand, and perceived role conflict, ambivalence, and resolution, on the other. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a critical con- sideration of the operational concept around which the pres- ent study has been organized: role. It is the basic per- ception of role which will direct the analysis to bureau- cratic-debureaucratic conflict and its ultimate resolution by the Idoma district councillor. Chapter II will provide further theoretical elaboration for the purpose of speci- fying the meaning of concepts central to the empirical re-- search which is reported in the body of this manuscript. The Role Concept in Theory 29 A survey of the literature on role yields two con- clusions: (1) Despite varying emphases, there tends to be 29Published surveys of the literature on role include Neal Gross, Ward 8. Mason, and Alexander W. McLachern, Ex- plorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Supdi- intendency Role (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 3-94; Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role--A Re-Survey of the Literature,” Social Forces, v. 30 (1951-1952), pp. 141-149. For a summary of the psychological literature on role theory, see Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey, v. 1 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- Wesley Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 223-258. -14- general agreement on the interrelated socio-psychological and cultural nature of the concept.30 (2) While most con- ceptualizations of role incorporate the notion "that indi- viduals . . . in social locations . . . behave . . . with reference to eXpectations,"31 only limited consensus exists on specific meaning. One observes that most definitions tend to fall into at least one of three categories, norm- ative cultural patterns, behavior of an individual, and orientation of the individual to a situation.32 (l) Normative culture_patterns- Perhaps the foremost exponent of what might be termed a cultural determinist ap- proach to role theory was the anthropologist, Ralph Linton. 30An early statement of this interrelationship ap- pears in George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 19347, pp. 1-336; more recent statements may be found in Clyde Kluckhohn and O. H. Mowrer, "Culture and Personality: A Conceptual Scheme," American AnthrOpologist, v. 6, #l (January-March 1944), pp. 6, 8, ZI-ZZ; S} F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Struc- ture (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 20ff.; Daniel J. Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Struc- ture in the Organizational Setting," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, v. 58 (1959), p. 170. Theodore Newcomb, Social Ps cholo (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), pp. 329-330, 459, suggests that "role is strictly a sociological concept [that] . . . purposely ignores individual, psychological facts," However, he does recognize an interrelationship between sociological role and psychological motive and role patterns (the individual organization of performance-perception-thought affect). 31Neiman and Hughes, op. cit., pp. 144-149; Gross pp 31., op. cit., p. 17. 32The categories used may be found generally in Gross et a1., 0 . cit., Chap. 2; the classificatory scheme in Neiman anh Hughes, op. cit., p. l44ff., is similar, except for the separate category on ”Definitions in terms of the Dynamics of Personality Development", pp. 142-144. -15- In The Study of Man, Linton defines social systems as "sys- tems of ideas" consisting of the ”mutually ideal patterns according to which the attitudes and behavior of a society's members are organized."33 Deriving from that definition are the concepts status and £313. Status--the "collection of rights and duties”--and role--the "dynamic aSpect of status"-—are described by Linton as analytically distinct but functionally interrelated.34 Role, as something "dy- namic," suggests actual behavior. Later, Linton identified role as the sum total of the culture patterns associated with a particular status. It thus includes the atti- tudes, values, and behavior ascribed by society to any and all persons OCCUpying this status; It can even be extended to include the legitimate eXpectations of such persons with reSpect to the behavior toward them gfi persons in other statuses within the same system. 33Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton- Century Co., 1936), pp. 233, 256. 34Ibid., pp. 113-114. Here one encounters consider- able disagreement. Some students of role have used the con- cept osition rather than status. See Newcomb, o . cit. f.n. I6; and John W. Bennett and Melvin Tumin, Soc1aI Life: Structure and Function (New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, 1949), p. 97. Others tend to perceive status as a synonym for pres- tige, esteem and skill. See for example, Victor A. Thompson, ' ierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 5 [March 1961], p. 488; Muzafer Sherif'and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social Psy- chology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 162. Sarbin, op. cit., p. 225, perceives osition, rather than role, "as a set of eXpectations or acquired ant1c1pa- tory reactions.” 35Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945), p. 77; a similar emphasis on ideal culture patterns may be found in Newcomb, op. cit., pp. 280-281 and Bennett and Tumin, op. cit., p. 96. -16- Rather than actual behavior, Linton now construed role as those ideal patterns or eXpectations that presumably shape actual behavior. The notion that OCCUpants of similar statuses are ascribed ideal standards by society led to what Gross and his colleagues have termed a "Postulate of Role Consensus.”36 While the notion of consensus did not orig- inate with Linton,37 there appears to be little doubt that his work enhanced its popularity.38 More recently, however, theorists have begun to challenge the untested assumption of role consenSus.39 Finally, Linton's preoccupation with ideal social standards and role consensus led him to focus on "legitimate eXpectations." Failure to treat legitimacy as a variable appears to have caused him to overlook illegitimate eXpecta- tions. As a result, Linton was not able to entertain the possibility of differential behavior by actors who perceive the same expectation as legitimate and illegitimate. Both ysides of the legitimacy coin will be treated in this study. (2) Behavior of an individual - While Linton was able in time to distinguish role as eXpectation from actual 36Gross et al., 0p. cit., ch. 3. 37See, for example, Mead, 0p. cit., p. 270. 38Gross et al., 0p. cit., pp. 24-33. 39For a discussion of variation and conflict among norms, see George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 126; Samuel Stouffer, ”An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," American Soci- ological Review, v. 14, #6 (December 1949), pp. 707-708 -17- behavior, others have found it more difficult to do so. For example, Sarbin defines role as "a patterned sequence of learned actions or deeds performed by a person in an inter- action situation."4O However, subsequent passages appear to confuse that conceptualization. Thus, while "role enact- ment [as] . . . the overt performance of [a] person" is com- patible with his definitnn10f role, "role enactment em- brac[ing] what may be called the mechanics of the role-taking process"41 poses a conceptual problem. Only by accepting Sarbin's original definition of role as actions or deeds performed is one able to construe role-taking as actual be- havior; in doing so, however, one is forced to do consid- erable violence to the Meadian concept of role-taking as a covert, mental process. In contrast,Newcomb reverts to Linton's distinction between role and actual behavior42 after having initially defined roles as . ways of carrying out the functions for which po- sitions [i.e., statuses] exist, ways which are generally agreed Upon within whatevezsgroup recognizes any par- ticular position and role. (3) Orientation of the individual to a situation- A Parsonian definition may be placed in this category. Role 4OSarbin, op. cit., p. 225. 411bid., p. 232. 42Newcomb, 0p. cit., p. 281. 43Ibid._, p. 330. Newcomb appears now to have fully accepted the eXpectational definition of role. See Theo- dore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, -l8- is . that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process . . . involv[ing] a set of comple- mentary eXpectations concerning his own actions and those of others with whom he interacts.4 Interaction involves the reciprocal orientation of actors based on expectations for behavior. It is most apprOpriate to conclude this examination of role with a reference to the conceptualizations of Tal- cott Parsons. For Parsons perhaps more than any other re- flects confusion in the area of definition. His ability to represent role as orientational, normative cultural-- from the point of view of the actor his role is defined by the normative eXpectations of the members pf the ’group as formulated in the social traditions4 --and actual behavioral-- the status-role . . . [is] the organized sub—system of acts of the actor or actors occupying given reciprocal statuses and acting towagd each other in terms of given reciprocal,orientations4 --underscores an appraisal of ”the role concept . . . [as] Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 19657, pp. 8-9 44Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward A General Theopy of Action (Cambridge: Harvard Univer51ty Press, 19597} p. 23. 4STalcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, I945), p. 230. 46Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill- inois: The Free Press, 1951), p. 26. In a more recent work, Parsons appears to have accepted an actual behavioral definition of role. See Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar Naegele, and Jesse Pitts, eds., Theories of Society. v. 1 (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,il96l), p. 42: -19- still rather vague, nebulous, and non-definitive.”47 The Role Concept in Political Science and African Studies As the political scientist retreats from the mound of theoretical literature on role into a storehouse of empir- ical research incorporating the concept, he observes that (1) such research is abundant and (2) his colleagues, the sociologist, psychologist, and anthrOpologist, have contrib- uted most to the storehouse. He is also struck by the fact that, with the exception of occasional articles on elected 0ffiCial$48 and employees of public bureaucracies and pris- 0n549--most of which, incidentally, have been prepared by sociologists and psychologists--the mass of empirical role research has centered on areas normally of little interest 47Neiman and Hughes, 0p. cit., p. 149. 48William C. Mitchell, "Occupational Role Strains: The American Elective Official," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 3 (1958-1959), pp. 2l0-228; JOhn C. Wahlke, 1 lam uchanan, Heinz Eulau, and LeRoy Ferguson, "Amer- ican State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," Journal of Politics, v. 22 (1960), pp. 203-227; John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legis- lative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp.‘l-507. 49Robert K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Pub- lic Bureaucracy,” in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), Chap. 7; William J. McEwen, "Position Conflict and Professional Orientation in a Research Organization," Administrative Science Quar- terl , v. 1 (1956), pp. 208-219; Leonard Reisman, "A Study of Role Conceptions in Bureaucracy," Social Forces, v. 27 (1948), pp. 305-310; Oscar Grusky, "Rdle Conflict in Organ- ization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 3 (1958-1959), pp. 453-467; Donald -20- to the political scientist: industrial organizations,SO families,51 patient-physician relationships,52 mental in- stitutions,53 and private research organizations.54 Recently, however, political scientists have begun to examine the utility of the role concept. Among those who have utilized role in studies of political behavior are Wahlke and his colleagues in a model of American state leg- islatures,55 Almond in several provocative statements on Cressey, "Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the Prison," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (1959-1960), pp. 1-19. 50Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte, "The Man in the Middle: Position and Problems of the Foreman," Ap- plied Anthropology, v. 4, #2 (Spring 1945), p. 2ff.; Eugene Jacdbson, W} W. Charters, Jr., and Seymour Lieberman, "The Use of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organiza- tions," Journal of Social Issues, v. 7, #3 (1951), pp. 18- 37. SlJohn Spiegel, "The Resolution of Conflict Within the Family," Psychiatry, v. 20, #1 (February 1957), pp. l-l6. 52John Spiegel, "The Social Roles of Doctor and Patient in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy," Ppychiatry, v. 17, #4 (November 1954), pp. 369-374. 53Kai T. Erikson, "Patient Role and Social Uncer- tainty--A Dilemma of the Mentally Ill,” Psychiatry, v. 20, #3 (August 1957), pp. 263-271. S4Clovis Shepherd and Paula Brown, "Status, Prestige, and Esteem in a Research Organization," Administrative Sci- ence Quarterly, v. 1 (1956), pp. 342-360; Norman Kaplan, e o e o e Research Administrator," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (1959-1960), pp. 23-42. 55John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures,” Paper delivered at 1958 Annual 'Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. LouisTlMissouii, September 4-6, 1958 (MS). -21-. comparative analysis,56 and Apter in a volume on the Gold Coast (now Ghana).57 Wahlke and his colleagues perceive the legislature as both an institution and a sub-system of roles. The person named: "legislator" is the occupant of a status comprising multiple roles (lawmaker, representative, etc.) and role relationships (1egislator-legislaflnsd legislator-citizens, legislator-party leaders, legislator-governor, etc.).58 Of special relevance for this study are several implications of the authors' attempt to justify use of the role con- cept.59 First, a knowledge of the roles (eXpected behaviors) in a system and the probability of such behaviors being ef- fected enables one to eXplore the functionality and dys- functionality of various roles for systemic goals. Thus, the authors distinguish between actual behavior and role as eXpectation, implying that the two need not coincide. Sec- ond, awareness of role incompatibility enables one to de- termine the degree of systemic stability. Third, one may consider the legislator's perception of the public's ex- pectation as a reference to what Mead called the - 56Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, v. 18 (1956), pp. 391-340; Almond and Cdleman, edE}, op. cit., pp. 3-64. 57David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton UniVersity Press, 19557: pp. 3-355. 58Wahlke et al., "The Role Concept . . .," op. cit., p. 7ff. 59Ibid., pp. 5-7. -22- "generalized other.”60 In linking eXpectations of the pub- lic or "generalized other" with the legislator's behavioral responses, the authors have, in effect, focused upon the relationship between political and socio-psychological var- iables. Fourth, role theory is presented as complementary to several approaches to the study of political behavior, including class, group, and organization theory. Finally, representation of the legislative institution as a sub-sys- tem of roles synthesizes "institutionalist" and "behaviorist" orientations.61 In an article on "Comparative Political Systems," Almond suggests that I the application of certain sociological and an- thropological concepts may facilitate systematic com- parison among the major types 63f political systems Operative 1n the world today.6 The author defines the political system as a "set of inter- acting [political] roles, or . . . a structure of [political] roles."63 Almond appears to perceive role as fundamentally orientational and relevant to the mutual expectations of actors in a situation.64 6OMead, 0p. cit., p. 154. 61In this vein, the authors note that "the theoreti- cal conceptions guiding . . . [their] research are behav- ioral, institutional (structural) and functiona1--not any one or the other." See John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, Wil- liam Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Lpgislative Syp- ‘tem . . ., op. cit., p. 7. 62Almond, UComparative . . .," 0p. cit., p. 391. 631bid., p. 441. 64Almond, loc. cit. -23- However, confusion arises when Almond attempts to ap- ply the concept to a typology of political systems. For example, in characterizing the preindustrial political sys- tem as one in which there is a ”high degree of substituta- bility of roles"--such as when bureaucrats and armies pre- empt legislative and political parties policy-making func- tions65--he appears to have moved toward a definition im- plying actual behavior. If so, he has inherited the def- initional ambiguity of Parsons and overlooked the possibil- ity--and consequences for the system--of actual political behavior pp: conforming to eXpectation. In an introduction to The Politics of the Developing Areas, Almond once more proclaims the need "to turn to soci- ological and anthropological theory," including the (polit- ical) role concept.66 Here, unfortunately, we encounter no precise definition of the concept. Rather, a political sys- tem is defined simply as that pystem of interactions to be found in all inde- pendent societies which perform the [input and out- put] functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment or threat of Employment of more or less legitimate compulsion. . Emphasis on performance of functions--for example, the family, kinship, and lineage group in recruitment to « 651bid., p. 448. 66Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 4. 67Ibid., p. 7. -24- Specialized political role568--inclines one to conclude that Almond had indeed intended role as actual behavior. How- ever, in the section on political recruitment there is a reference to the "provi[sion] . . . [of] political cognitive maps, values, expectations, and affects" for those inducted into "specialized roles of the political system.”69 Thus, as in "Comparative Political Systems," conceptual ambiguity is encountered. Apter's volume stands as the only full-length attempt by a political scientist to apply role theory to a study of political‘change.70 While the concept is nowhere eXplicitly defined, an orientational-eXpectationa1 bias is manifest. Thus, in "A Note on Methodology," he reminds the reader that the two [Gold Coast] systems, traditional and secular, as integrated role systems, were viewed as the sources of conflicting values, as the framework of concrete: sociOpolitical sub-groups and concrete membership _groups, as the base of conflicting eXpectancy_patterns, and the source of differing reference groups.11 Along with abundant scholarly and governmental mater- ials, Apter has relied on interviews with traditional chiefs, elders, and occupants of secular political positions.72 Un- fortunately, he has chosen not to elaborate on the manner in which role was operationalized for an interview schedule. 631bid., p. 32. 69Ibid., p, 31. [Italics mine.] 70Apter, 02- Cit., pp. 9-10. 711219.. p. 329. [Italics mine.] 721b1d., p. 333. -25- The study, while valuable both for its conceptualization of role as orientational-expectationa1 and the light it throws on secularization processes, provides no useful guidelines for empirical role analysis. Role theory and structural- functional analysis have been utilized by Apter to establish a framework within which the working of a total political system could be described rather than as a tool for rigorous field investigation. In addition to The Gold Coast in Transition and the wealth of descriptive anthrOpologicaI literature on role conflict--a part of which was surveyed above-~one encoun- ters brief references to the role behavior of African po- litical elites. Thus, Sutton eXplainS that prior to inde- pendence, Africans underwent a psychological process-- "identification with the aggressor,” "introjection of an authority figure," or "acceptance of a role model”--that enabled them to compete with the EurOpean and ultimately to achieve sovereignty.73 The Smythes document this thesis in a post-independence study of The New Nigerian Elite: . . . The British elite had not been responsible to the masses, except indirectly and in a very Special sense; the new elite accepted the same remoteness from the pOpular will as their natural and popular role. Thus they had to have each and every advantage--partic- ularly thoSE’which could be seen and touched--formerly identified with status, or they might well be seen by the masses as only secondary to the British who remained and who had to be given those things if their skills 73Francis X. Sutton, "Authority and Authoritarianism in the New Africa," Journal of International Affairs, v. 15, #1 (1961), p. 9. —26- were to be retained.74 Conclusion Studies cited in the preceding sections do not exhaust the cases where political scientists and African- ists have turned to role theory. Rather, they have been selected to throw light on its recent, infrequent, oftimes confused, and generally restricted use. Thus, among the writings on Gold Coast political transformation, African local and nationalist elites, and comparative analysis of non-Western and legislative systems, only the latter ex- plores the relevance of role for empirical studies of polit- ical behavior.75 In sum, it may be said that only when role theory Sheds the vestiges of conceptual ambiguity and embraces a corpus of testable and tested generalizations will it have earned a place with social science theory. Until then, it 74Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Ni er- ian Elite (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960 , pp. 132Pl33. There may be some confusion between role as eXpected behavior and role as actual behavior. The Smythes are also using status to convey the notion of prestige or esteem rather than location. 7SIn Wahlke et al., "American State Legislators . . 0p. cit., pp. 203h227’ the authors draw upon the model in a e et al., "T e Role Conce t . . . " op. cit., . 1-27. In the former, pressure groupsprepresent a generaliged other" toward which legislators are found to be friendly (Facilitators), hostile (Resisters), or neither (Neutral). Limitation of the study to one set of role-relationshipS-- legislator-pressure group--precludes assessment of the over- all utility of the model. The study does represent one of the few attempts by political scientists to utilize an oper- ationalized role concept. See also Wahlke et al., The Leg- islative System . . ., op. cit., p. lff. -27- must stand as something that, using the words of Eckstein in another context, call[s] our attention to the 'real forces' in political processes and to the need for better defipitions and Operations for dealing With these forces. The need for "better . . . Operations” is especially evident in role studies Of African Chieftaincy and local leadership. Thus, if one is impressed with the degree of conceptual clarity achieved in the cases from Nigeria and Uganda-- Cohen, Beattie, and Fallers appear to have consistently, if only implicitly, construed role and bureaucratic-debureau- cratic dualism as expectations for behavior and "cultural mixture," respectively--one is at the same time struck by their limitation. Such research has failed to generate propositions beyond the one which appears to have initially stimulated this line Of inquiry. That prOpOSition may be traced to Max Gluckman writing in 1949: The hypothesis on which we are basing our future work is that the delicacy Of the [village] headman's position arises from conflicting principles. First, it arises from his position within the village group as such, even though the ties and obligations involved vary from 76Harry Eckstein, "GrOUp Theory and the Comparative Study Of Pressure Groups," Comparative Politics: A Reader, Harry Eckstein and Divid E. Apter, eds., (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963 , p. 393. American students have begun to undertake more rigor- ous, theory-oriented role investigations. In addition to Gross et al., 0 . cit., p. lff., there are studies by Howard J. Ehrlich, The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Or- _ganization: The Police (unpubliShed’Ph.D. dissertation in the Department Of Sociology and AnthrOpOlogy, Michigan State University, 1959), p. lff., and Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. D. Snoek, and Robert A. Rosenthal Organizational Stress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. lff. ~28- tribe to tribe. But the main source Of the ambivalence of his situation is that he is the personality in whom the damestic-kinship and the political systems inter- sect. ' Plethoric description of Similar conflict in numerous Afri- can societies has followed.78 Surveying these efforts, we may echo Gluckman: ". . . [what is] . . . need[ed] [is] a far more intensive analysis than has yet been made. ."79 That need leads us to focus once more on ypig. Having exPlored generally the relevance of role and dualism tO the problem of conflict management, we now turn specifically to dimensions of role and conflict analysis largely overlooked by students of African political behavior: legitimacy, Ob- ligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution. When sys- tematically examined, these dimensions may yield more in- tensive and theoretically Significant analyses Of the prob- lems confronting African Chieftaincy and local leadership. At the same time, the analyses may throw light on the actor as he attempts to COpe with those problems. A major pur; pose of the present study will be to examine the relation- ship between dimensions noted above and the management Of 77Max Gluckman, J. C. Mitchell, and J. A. Barnes, "The Village Headman in British Central Africa," Africa, v. 19, #2 (April 1949), pp. 93-94. The proposition is pre- sented by Gluckman in the introduction to the article. 78For example, L. A. Fallers, ed., The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve Of‘lndgpendence (London: lOXford’University Press, 1964), Chap. 5; P. C. Lloyd, "The Changing Role of the Yoruba Traditional Rulers," Proceedings Of the Third Annual Conference Of the West African Institute Of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan, Nigeria: PUhiversity College, l956), pp. 57:65. 79Gluckman et al., Op. cit., p. 94. -29- of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict by Idoma dis- trict councillors. CHAPTER II OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine di- mensions of role and conflict associated with Idoma district councillorship in potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic sit- uations. Before introducing these dimensions (legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution), the meaning of the concepts position, role, and audience popu- lation, as used herein, is Specified and illustrated. Positiony_ROle, Audience POpulation A position is a Specific, identifiable locus within a social system comprising two or more interdependent loci.1 Thus, the Office of district councillor may be construed as a position in the Idoma social and political systems. Other loci are the Offices of district head, tax collector, and Official in the Native Authority or local government establishment. In order to underscore a preoccupation with 1Role analysts have utilized the concept status to denote what the researcher has termed osition; the latter is preferred in order to avoid confusion Between the former and such concepts as prestige and esteem. See, for exam- ple, Ralph Linton, The Stu y of Man (New York: Appleton- Century Company, 1936), pp. ll3-ll4. -30- -31- the Office of district councillor, it shall be designated the focal EOSitiODZ within a universe of interdependent units. It is not intended, Of course, that £2531 be inter- preted as a measure Of positional significance within the framework Of Idoma social structure. Role denotes a behavioral pattern eXpected of the oc- cupant of a position. Essentially normative, role is dis- tinguished from an actual behavioral pattern which may or may not conform with eXpectationS. This analysis will omit systematic eXploration of an actual behavioral dimension; instead, it will focus on eXpectations associated with in— teracting occupants of focal and non-focal positions. Having distinguished conceptually role and actual be- havior, the researcher draws attention to a frequently ig- nored delineation within role itself. The latter involves a role-position, role-occupant dichotomy. In this vein, Jacobson et al. have identified social role and personal role. The former is a set Of eXpectations which others share of the behavior associated with a position, without respect to the char- teristics Of the person who occupies the position, the latter a set Of expectations which others have Of an individ- ual's behavigr in a position, without respect to the social role. 2Neal Gross, Ward 8. Mason, and Alexander McEachern, EXplorations in Role Analysis: Studies Of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley, 1958), pp. 51-55} 3Eugene Jacobson, W. W. Charters, Jr., and Seymour -32- An analogy may be found in Cottrell's cultural role and 4 unigue role. The researcher undertook initially to eXplore both. For example, questions and alternative role responses were composed as follows for a potential bureaucratic-debureau- cratic conflict Situation involving political party activity: Set I. Social Role (A) uestion: Could you tell me how the following peOple wou tend to feel about councillors being sup- porters Or members of the NPC (i.e., Nbrthern Peoples' Congress, Government party in the Northern Region Of Nigeria)? (B) ReSponse: (l) eXpect councillors to be sup- porters or members of the NPC; (2i expect councillors not to be supporters or members of the NPC; or (3T no expectation in this situation. Set II. Personal Role (A) uestion: Could you tell me how the following peOple wou. tend tO feel about you as a councillor being a supporter or member of the NPC?‘ (B) Response: (1) eXpect me as a councillor to be a supporter or member of the NPC; (27 eXpect me as a councillor not to be a supporter or membgr Of the NPC; or (3) no eXpectation in this situation. Lieberman, "The Use Of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organizations," Journal Of Social Issues, v. 7, #3 (1951), p. 19. 4Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "The Adjustment Of the Individual to his Age and Sex Roles," American Sociological Review, v. 7 (1942), p. 617; an analogous diStinction’he- fween subjective and Objective role may be found in M. McMullan, ”A Theory of Corruption: Based on a Considera- tion Of Corruption in the Public Services and Governments Of British Colonies and ex-Colonies in West Africa,” Soci- ological Review, v. 9 (1961), section on "The Subjective Element." 5The content of this potential conflict situation was subsequently modified to focus on party campaigning rather than membership or support. See pp. 165, 271-272. -33- A tendency on the part of subjects to fuse Sets I and II engendered an insolvable problem during a pre-test of the questionnaire; BREE social and personal role questions and responses in this and other potential conflict situations tended to be interpreted "ypp as a councillor--mg as a councillor.” Consequently, the questionnaire was revised to include only the Set 11 role format. After noting one Series Of responses to the revised instrument, however, future investigators may be encouraged to Operationalize the analytical distinction between social and personal role. Four councillors indicated that even as the Native Authority (NA)—-local government agency of the Regional Government6--expected councillors per se to cam-. paign for the NPC, it held the Opposite eXpectation for themselves; the latter perceived eXpectation, a personal role, was attributed to their publicly-acknowledged associ- ation with Opposition parties. In light of the above, one may note the potential theoretical Significance of investi- ,gations focusing on social-personal role congruency and its implications for conflict resolution and systemic stability. In this research Setting, however, orientation to district councillorship was uniformly personal; the four exceptions represent only 1% Of the perceptual responses in five 6The Idoma Native Authority in Northern Nigeria is responsible through a Divisional Officer and Benue Provin- cial authorities in Makurdi to the Regional Minister for Local Government in Kaduna. -34- conflict situations.7 Audience pOpulationS are those "by whom the [focal] actor sees his role performance Observed and evaluated, and [to whose] . . . evaluations and expectations [he attends]."8 Audiences may include a Single individual and/or group Of individuals occupying non-focal positions. This study will encompass such single and plural member audiences as dis- trict head and elders. While audiences may be present to articulate eXpectations and/or Observe actual behavior, physical proximity is not a prerequisite for meaningful in- teraction.9 An Idoma district councillor may, for example, effect role relationships with one or more Of the following audience populations: an individual or group that is (l) physical-proximate (fellow councillors); (2) physical-non- proximate (members Of the central NA in Oturkpo Town); or (3) non-physicaILproximate (symbolic interaction with ances- tral overseers). Symbolic interaction with ancestors in- volves a relationship between "living" past and present. Reinforcement Of the relationship is achieved by the 7Seventy-one district councillors presented with five potential conflict situations involving the councillor as focal actor yield a total Of 355 perceptual responses. The four exceptionS--in a Single conflict situation--represent 1% of that total. See pp. 160-169. 8Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, #4 (January 1956), p. 328. 9Ibid., pp. 316-326. -35- periodic intercession Of an elder-priest who may, in turn, be classified as physical-proximate or physical-non-proxi- mate. Adherence to a cult predicated on the assumption Of ancestral omnipresence precludes by definition role inter- action of a non-physical-non-proximate character.10 Multidimensional Role: Concepts and Definitions The focus on ppig as a normative construct has been accompanied by a tendency to overlook or acknowledge solely by implication those elements which Shape its multidimen- sional character, notably legitimacy, Obligation, and sanc- tion. One may note, for example, Merton's11 exclusion of legitimacy from a discussion of role structuring and Linton's12 failure to examine implications Of that concept's variability. Similarly, both Parsons and students of Afri- can chieftaincy and local leadership assume negative sanc— tion in the event Of deviant behavior.13 A tendency to 10See pp. 80-87, 222-237. 11Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Struc- ture (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 370-379. 12Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Person- ality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945), p. 77. 13Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill- inois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 280; Andrew G. Frank and Ronald Cohen, Organization and Change with Conflicting Standards: Russia and Africa‘_TUHpubliShed—manuscript, circa late l9SOTST,pp. 12-183 John Beattie, Bunyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 36ff.; Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Predicament Of the Modern African Chief: An Instance from Uganda,” American Anthro OlO ist, v. 57 (1955), p. 290ff.; Lloyd A. Fallers, "Village Chiefs in Busoga," in East African Institute of Social Research, "The Present-day Position of Lower Chiefs," -36- overlook or Obscure the multidimensional concept has ren- dered more difficult the analysis of role and conflict reso- lution, on the one hand, and relationships between eXpected and actual behavior, on the other.14 Recently, however, empiricists have engaged in useful eXplorations of these dimensions.15 Implications Of multidimensionalism for role and conflict resolution will be considered after its com- ponent elements have been defined. Legitimacy may be defined, after Dahl, as belief in the rightness or prOpriety of decisions or decision-making processes.16 The concept will be operationalized in this study to convey a notion of belief in the rightness or pro- 17 priety of a specific eXpectation. EXpectationS which the district councillor feels an audience population has a right to entertain will be construed as legitimate; conversely, illpgitimate eXpectations are those which an occupant Of the focal position feels an audience population does not have ‘East African Conference on Colonial Administration (Kam- pala, Uganda:_MakerereUniversity College, June l952), pp. 19-24. 14Howard J. Ehrlich, The Analysis Of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police (unpublished Ph}D. diSsertatiOn in the Department of Sociology and Anthro- pology, Michigan State University, 1959), p. 7. 15For example Gross et a1 0 cit pp 64-66 ., p. . . , 249-250, passim; J.’P. Sutcliffe an M. a erman, "Factors Influencing ~Oice in Role Conflict Situations," American Sociological Review, v. 21, #6 (December 1956), pp. 695- 703. 16Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theopy (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 46 Afln. 13, 138. 17See pp. 212, 238-239. -37- a right to entertain. Relevant to the question of means intended to maximize conformance between role and actual behavior--thereby con- tributing to the stable integration Of systems at both a personal and social 1evel--are the concepts sanction and Obligation. A sanction is role-related behavior of an es- l8 sentially punitive (P) and/or remunerative (R) character. Taking into account the levels at which both types may be Operative--the personal (originating in and directed toward ego) and social (originating in alter(s) and directed toward. egO)--we note the potential complexity of any sanctional universe. Thus, a tentative typology for such a universe would include the permutations presented diagrammatically on page 38. Cognizant that punitive-personal, remunerative-per- sonal, and remunerative-social sanctions are less readily identifiable than the punitive-social, the researcher has chosen to focus on the last. The study encompasses pply the social dimension of permutations (d), (e), (f), and (g), that is, punitive sanctions originating in audience pOpulations and directed toward occupants Of the councillor position. Implications Of the more inclusive typology for future research will be considered in a concluding chapter.19 18See Gross et a1. Op. cit. pp. 249-250 for an analogous treatment of deprivational-gratificationa1 sanc- tions. 19866 pp. 264-265. -38- m-m.fiev Hmfipom ems-pace meg m-m--m-m . Amy m--m-m may a--m-m mew m-m--m fixv m-a--a “no a--m Amy m11m may m--m new d--a mp- Hmfloom--amcomuom Hmfiuom1HHGOmhom woaflnsou mmv m may m-m ABS a flew a flow a may Hegempom Spa-peou mmv Hsfipom p-meflm “NV Assam-mm p-meflmyfifiv. ”mum mumpuoa map kn Emhmmflp can He woucomoummu Ohm mcofiumuSEuom mqflzoaaom onH "Opoz O a E H o>Human3Eom c- 8.5 n O x n H : o>HumnOcOEOm O O -3323- m. m 0-1 1 u m u p e o>fipfiesm O n m :Ofiuonmm Hmwuom Oz o>mumhoc350m, O>HpmeOGSEOM1opwpwesm o>wuwcsm :Ofipuamm :Ofiuocmm Hmcomnom Hmcompom Oz Omho>flcz Hmcowuucmm m CH AMOHOQxH11H .mwm -39- Integrating the concepts role and sanction, the re- searcher will define as obligatoryany eXpectation which, when unfulfilled in actual behavior, is eXpected to result in the levying Of punitive-social sanction[s] on the deviant councillor; behavioral conformance with role logically pre- cludes imposition of such sanction[s]. Conversely, an Optional eXpectation is one which, regardless of conformance or non-conformance in actual behavior, is not eXpected to result in sanction[s] Of a punitive-social character. It ought to be noted in passing that interpretation of Optional expectation as prima facie evidence of apathy may be falla- cious. For example, refusal to retaliate against deviant councillor behavior in Idoma may be eXplained in terms Of (1) the specific situation; (2) affinal and consanguineal ties between actors; (3) a councillor's previous record of role performance; or (4) such indicators Of audience alien- ation as powerlessness and meaninglessness.20 Various sub- jects indicated that elders would be more prone to sanction a deviant councillor punitively in the situation involving political party campaigning.21 One councillor, the father- in-law Of a fellow councillor, reported that he would not punitively sanction the latter's deviant behavior in any Situation; another made the same report for a half-brother on the council. Various subjects recently elected to a 20Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, Rinehart and“winston, 1960), pp. 62-630 218ee pp. 160-169. -40- first term indicated that village audiences (elders, non- elders, tax collectors) would withhold punitive sanction in a situation involving construction of a council hall;22 these councillors did note, however, that subsequent deviant behavior in similar situations would be punished by "refusal to re-elect."23 Finally, several elected councillors re- ported that the Native Authority audience would be powerless to sanction their deviant behavior punitively; a group Of NA-nominated councillors reported that village audiences, lacking control over their appointment, would withhold "useless" (meaningless) punitive sanction in the situation involving political party campaigning.24 Role Conflict: Definitions and Types A. Definitions A survey of the literature on role conflict reveals broad agreement on (1) the multidimensional character of the role construct and (2) the definition of its basic di- mension, i.e., role as expected rather than actual behavior. Beyond that, however, there appears to be (a) considerable disagreement over the manner in which a multidimensional role construct onght to be dealt with in analyses and (b) confusion as to the meaning of conflict itself. Both prob- lems will be considered before presenting the operational 22See pp. 141-159. 23See pp. 224-230. 24See pp. 165-169. -41- definition Of role conflict that has been utilized in this study. a. Multidimensionality and Variability While students Of role conflict have tended to utilize a multidimensional approach, it is evident that not all have examined implications of its variability. For example, Parsons defines role conflict as . . . the exposure Of the actor to conflicting sets of legitimized role eXpectationS such that complete ful- fillment of both is realistically impossible. The fact that both Sides of the conflicting expecta- tions are institutionalized means that there is ths basis for a claim to legitimagy for both patterns. 5 Failure to consider the possibility of role conflict situ- ations involving illegitimate-illegitimate or legitimate- illegitimate expectations may have led him to assume puni- tive sanction as a necessary consequence Of deviant behav- ior.26 Moreover, the focus on sanction (and, implicitly, obligation) appears to have caused Parsons to overlook Op- tional eXpectationS and their implications for systemic sta- bility. In their empirical analysis of role conflict and resolution, Getzels and Guba27 appear to assume a Similar invariable legitimacy dimension. Others, however, have be- gun to study role conflict without focusing on situations 25Parsons, op. cit., pp. 280, 282. 26Ibid., p. 280. 27J. W. Getzels and E. G. Guba, "Role, Role Con- flict, and Effectiveness," American Sociological Review, v. 19 (1954), p. 165. -42- necessarily involving legitimate eXpectationS.28 Significantly, a tendency to interpret role conflict in legitimate terms has not failed to influence students of African political behavior. For example, after noting an- tagonistic norms Operative among the Basoga of Uganda, Fallers typically ". . . emphasize[s] that BppB [indigenous and European] value systems are institutionalized in Soga society . . . and both are accepted by most Basoga as, in a sense, legitimate."29 Thus, Fallers Observes two legiti- mate systems evolving by virtue Of, to quote Getzels and Guba, "mutual acceptance”30 Of diverse value orientations. What follows, logically, is a narrow—-and perhaps mis- leading--focus on role conflict as between two legitimate eXpectational patterns. b. The Logic of Conflict In the relevant literature there is an ambiguous and somewhat confusing array of terms intended to define con- flict.31 For example, Burchard,32 Spiegel,33 Jacobson et 28Jacobson et al., Op. cit., p. 22; Melvin Seeman, "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," American Sociological Review, v. 18 #4 (August 1953), p. 373; Gross et al., op. cit., passim; Ehrlich, Op. cit., passim. 29Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief . . .," Op. cit., p. 303. 30Getzels and Guba, loc. cit. , 31Leon Festinger, A Theory Of Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Row, Peterson andICOmpany, 19577, p. 38. The author construes role conflict and conflict resolution as "cognitive dissonance“ and’“diSsonance reduction," respec- tiVely. In a later study, however, he suggests that -43- al.,34 and Getzels and Cuba35 perceive the role conflict Situation as involving antithetical, incompatible, dis- crepant, and inconsistent eXpectationS, respectively. While on the surface these terms appear to be synonymous, careful scrutiny reveals a significant contrast. That con- trast may be eXpressed as one between exclusive and incluw giyg categories. While antithesis in formal logic denotes prOpOSitional Opposition alone, neither incompatibility, discrepancy, nor inconsistency presupposes terms in Opposi- tion; according to the lexicon, all three may subsume con- flict of an antithetical or non-antithetical character. Clearly, then, definition of the conflict Situation by any of the three inclusive terms requires Specification of oppositional or non-Oppositional roles. Unfortunately, specification is ordinarily excluded from conceptual dis- cussion. AS a result, the reader must seek clues in role conflict instruments. Here one generally encounters a "dissonance reduction" commences only after conflict reso- lution or the choice between alternatives. See Leon Festinger, ed., Conflict, Decisiony and Dissonance (Palo Alto: Stanford Uhiversity Press, 1964), p. 32. 32Waldo W. Burchard, "Role Conflicts of Military Chap- lains," American Sociological Review, v. 19, #5 (October 1954), p.7528. 33John P. Spiegel, "The Resolution of Role Conflict Within the Family," Psychiatrist, v. 20, #1 (February 1957), p. 2 f.n. 34Jacobson et al., Op. cit., pp. 22-23. 35Getzels and Guba, loc. cit. The authors do, how- ever, note (without definingi a distinction between incon- sistent and contradictory expectations in role conflict situations. -44_ notion of conflict analogous to Opposition (i.e., anti- thesis) in formal logic. Focusing on antithesis, it is noted that opposition manifests an internally inclusive character. It may in formal logic subsume contradiction (where g is false, B must be true) and contrariety (where A and B can be false, but never true together).36 Translating these terms into the language of role analysis, the following analogue is noted: contradictory and contrary role Situations are those in which Opposing eXpectations cannot be performed together. Their dissimilarity may be identified by invoking Ehrlich's distinction betWeen role conflict and role dilemma;37 in the former, a contradictory Situation, pp expectations can be ignored; in the latter, a contrary situation, Ell ex- pectations can be ignored and yet another behavioral alter- native selected. Consequently, while sets Of contradictory and contrary expectations can be legitimate and/or illegit- imate and Obligatory and/or Optional, greater behavioral freedom will ordinarily accompany role dilemma. Of course, sets of incompatible, discrepant, or inconsistent eXpecta- tions of a non-antithetical character can also be legitimate and/or illegitimate and obligatory and/or Optional. This study will focus on role conflict (i.e., role contradiction) involving obligatory, Optional, legitimate, 36Ralph M. Eaton, General Logic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), pp. 83785. 37Ehrlich, op. cit., pp. 6-7. -45- and illegitimate eXpectations. B. Types While it is possible to construct role conflict typ- ologies onthe basis of numerous criteria, only two appear to be directly relevant to this study: social location and T016 content.38 Focusing on the former, it is noted that role conflict may arise within or between audience pOpula- tions. Conflict of either type may be engendered by (l) consensus on a Single, inherently incompatible role pattern or (2) dissensus involving multiple role patterns. In the former case, for example, an audience may unanimously eXpect the unsalaried district councillor to be honest and gener- ous; in the latter, one audience may expect him to be gen- erous, another parsimonious. On the basis of participant observation and diScussionS, it was determined that role conflict confronting Idoma councillors was essentially of the multiple, inter-audience type. Hence, the decision to incorporate into the instrument only that type. The researcher's concern with role content parallels Seeman's preoccupation with "the institutional dimension"39 of role conflict. Seeman focuses on Parsons' universalistic- particularistic criteria for social action, the researcher on bureaucratic—debureaucratic role patterns. Potential con- flict situations constructed for the present study involve . . 38Alternative criteria might be adOpted from the le- gitimacy, Obligation, and sanction variables. 39Seeman, Op. cit., p. 375. ~46— contradictory roles intended, on the one hand, to facilitate and, on the other, to subvert tendencies toward organiza- tional growth and social regimentation.40 By treating role conflict in varied Situations41 as bureaucratic-debureau- cratic, we may begin to eXplore problems of stability and change confronting, among others, the Idoma of Northern Nigeria.42 In sum,this study will focus on various audiences (social location) identified with potential bureaucratic- debureaucratic conflict (role content). Role Conflicty Ambivalence; Resolution A. Role Conflict and Ambivalence: From Objectivity to Subjectivity Having examined role conflict definitionally and typo- logically, it remains to consider ambivalence and resolution as dimensions Of the analysis. Before defining ambivalence, however, attention is called to the following elements of _roleconflict: (1) the objective conflict Situation; (2) 408. N. Eisenstadt, ”Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (December 1959), p. 3l2i 41Emphasis has been placed on constructing realistic potential conflict Situations. For a discussion of the need to focus on such Situations, see Jerome Laulicht, "Role Con- flict, The Pattern Variable Theory, and Scalogram Analysis," Social Forces, v. 33 (1954-1955), p. 253; also communication between George Korber and Samuel Stouffer-Jackson Toby, American Journal of Sociology, LVII, #1 (July 1951), pp. 48- 49, relevant to Samuel’Stouffer and Jackson Toby, "Role Con- flict and Personality," American Journal of Sociology, v. 56, #5 (March 1951), pp.—395-406. 42For a discussion of this point, see pp. 98-101, 159, 252. -47- pgrception Of the objgctive conflict situation; and (3) subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence.43 An analogue of the distinction between the latter two may be found in Parsons' conceptualization of cognitive orientation and cathectic response.44 Focusing on the perceptual and subjective variables, it is noted that the occupant of a focal position--for example, the Idoma district councillor-- may fail to perceive the existence or extent of an objective conflict Situation. His ability to perceive such a situation would constitute a necessary rather than a sufficient condi— tion for subjectively-eXperienced role conflict;45 the latter‘ need not accompany the former. Their coincidence would, how- ever, indicate ambivalence, that is, ". . . the fact that the actor eXperiences difficulty . . . [in choosing his] per- formance . . . [among] given role alternatives."46 Failure to treat these analytic variables points up the sterility Of role research on African Chieftaincy and local leadership. Emphasis on description of role conflict in numerous African societies represents little more than rediscovery of the Objective conflict Situation. Clearly, a priori assumption or empirical location of such situations 43Getzels and Cuba Op. cit. p. 166; Seeman Op. cit. p. 373; Robert L. Kahn, Dona . Wolfe, Robert P.,Quinn, J. D. Snoek and Robert A. Rosenthal, Organizational Stress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. l2. 44Parsons, Op. cit., p. 7ff. 4SSee f.n. 43. 46Seeman, op. cit., p. 373. -48- ought to constitute a point of departure for, not the object of, role conflict analysis. B. Perceived Role Conflict and Ambivalence: Resolution Before considering techniques for conflict resolution, a distinction between focal and audience resolution ought to be made. Important here is the aforementioned distinction between objective conflict on the one hand, and perceived role conflict and ambivalence, on the other. It has already been established that experience of the latter presupposes perception of the former. Resolution of perceived role con- flict and ambivalence does not, however, presume commensurate consequences for the objective conflict Situation. While the occupant of a £2223 position may have succeeded in reso- lution even to the extent of no longer perceiving an Objec- tive conflict situation, the latter may persist. This is not to suggest, of course, that an actor eXposed to contra- dictory eXpectations need confine his efforts to the level of personal resolution; he may, for example, attempt to pre- sent the fact of objective conflict to an audience pOpula- tion in the hope that the latter will, in turn, undertake resolution.47 In that event, however, the Bppal actor Oper- ating at the objective level may only seek to inform and per- suade. At that level, resolution could be effected only within or between audience populations, depending on the 47Merton, op. cit., pp. 376-377; Festinger, Op. cit., p. 182. -49- type of conflict involved. Thus, Several Idoma councillors reported having in the past apprised elders of the existence of a role conflict Situation involving the latter and the district head; none encountered sympathy on the part of the elders.48 This study will encompass resolution at the focal level only. Turning to techniques for the resolution of perceived role conflict and ambivalence, we note the wide range of al- ternatives potentially available to an actor: psychological adjustment in the form of aggression, withdrawal (symbolic or physical), regression, and accommodative behavior (mental or physical), including role substitution and role reversal; rationalization; role segregation or compartmentalization; ritualistic response; compromise; stalling; role redefinition; feigned illness; appeal for support from occupants of similar and/or different positions (for example, the attempt to per- suade an audience population to resolve the objective con- flict situation); and selection of the major role.49 (In a 48See pp. 244-252. 49Discussion of the major role technique may be found in Getzels and Guba, o . cit., pp. 173-175; discussion of the other techniques may he found in John Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale UniverSity Press, 19457, pp. 1-l90; Walter I. Wardwell, "The Reduction of Strain in a Marginal Social Role," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, #1 (July 1955), pp. 16-25; Spiegel, O . cit., p. 4ff.; Jackson Toby, "Some Variables in Role Conflict Analysis," Social Forces, v. 30 #3 (March 1952), p. 324ff. An empirical case involving selection of the major role may be found in Burchard, op. cit., p. 535. For a useful discussion of the relationship between -50- situation involving two Or more contradictory expectations, the major role is that eXpectation which the actor chooses to fulfill.) Idoma district councillors consistently indi- cated preference for the major role technique.50 This in- triguing datum engenders the following questions: Why the preference for that technique? What determines selection of the major role from among given behavioral alternatives? Merton51 has suggested three factors in the structural relationship between focal actor and audience which independ- ently or interdependently have consequences for perception of objective role conflict, eXperienced ambivalence, and se- lection of the major role: (1) Involvement (the extent to whfljiaudiences are perceived to be concerned with an actor's role behavior); (2) Power (the extent to which audiences are perceived to be able to prevail upon an actor to do something he would not otherwise do);52 and (3) Observability (the extent to which audiences are perceived to be able to view an actor's role behavior). Focusing on the latter for pure poses of illustration, it is hypothesized that where the role Segregation and theatrical performance, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Edin- burgh: UniVersity of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Center, 1956), p. 83. Goffman appears to construe role as actual rather than eXpected behavior (pp. 9, 90). 500ther techniques did accompany selection of the major role; for example, verbal aggression in the form of denun- ciation and epithet. 51Merton, op. cit., pp. 371-376. 52This definition is adapted from Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, v. 2 #3 (July 1957), pp. 202-203. _51- ability of audiences to observe an actor's role behavior is undifferentiated, then (a) extent of ambivalence will vary with perceived extent of Observability and (b) Observability will cease to be an important factor in selection of the major role. The converse of (b) is hypothesized where abil— ity of audiences to Observe an actor's role behavior is dif- ferentiated. These hypotheses can, of course, be constructed to include both involvement and power.53 In the latter case, however, it is important to distinguish two variables, pp:- session of power and utilization ofypower.54 Thus, there is evidence that elders possessing a virtual monopoly over the most potent punitive sanction in Idoma, the curse, are gen- erally disinclined to invoke it.55 Others have suggested the relevance of personality structure to the resolution of role conflict. For example, Ackerman hypothesizes that the actor will select as the 53See Ehrlich, Op. cit., p. 24. Power hypotheses an- alogous to (ii) and its converse appear to be confirmed by Gross et al., Op. cit., p. 298ff. 54Elements of the distinction are analogous to that between pptential for control and potential for unity found in Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of fheRulingEliteModel," American Political Science Review, v. 52 (June 1958), p. 465. 55While all subjects acknowledged the potency and vir- tual monopolization of this sanction, most dismissed its utility on one or more of the following grounds: (1) non- conformance with an elder's eXpectationS in these potential role conflict situations was not sufficient Offense to merit being cursed; (2) invocatiOn of that sanction would have dis- ruptive effects on the community; and (3) elders would not want to assume responsibility for inevitable consequences of cursing. For a discussion of the long-range implications of point (3), see pp. 80-87, 229-230. -52- expectation to be fulfilled that which is most compatible with his personality needs.56 In this vein, Parsons exam- ines the relationship between role and the ”need diSposi- tion" to "conformity-alienation."S7 In The Social System, he suggests that one central aSpect of the general and especially the cathectic [gratificational-deprivationa1] orienta- tion of the actor is his set of need diSpositions toward the fulfillment of role eXpectations, in the first place those of other significant actors but also his own. There is, in the personality structure of the individual actor a 'conformity-alienation' dimension in the sense of a disposition to conform with the eXpectationS of others or to be alienated from them. When these rele- vant eXpectationS are those relative to the fulfillment of role-obligations, this conformity-alienation balance, in general or in particular role contexts, becomes a central focus of the articulation of the motivational system of the personality with the structure of the social system. 8 Potentially relevant to the relationship between con- flict resolution, personality, and social structural factors introduced above is the legitimacy dimension of role. Thus, it can be hypothesized that the actor confronting role con- flict will have a need disposition to fulfill the eXpectation which he construes as more legitimate.59 Moreover, we note that the legitimacy dimension cuts across involvement, power, and Observability. It is assumed that audiences perceived 56Nathan Ackerman, "Social Role and Total Personality," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, v. 21 (January 1951), pp. 1-17; alSO Kahn et al., Op. cit., p. 233ff. 57Parsons, op. cit., p. 32. 58Parsons, loc. cit. 59Getzels and Guba, Op. cit., pp. 174-175. -53- aS holding legitimate eXpectations for the Idoma district councillor will have ppm: involvement in, power over, and Observability of his role behavior. In light of the above, legitimacy may be useful in indicating both origin of ambiv— alence and direction of resolution. However, its limitations ought to be noted. First, a need diSposition to fulfill the more legitimate eXpectation may be either absent or of only secondary importance. In the former case, actual behavior may be causally-related to factors other than personality structure; in the latter, the need diSposition to avoid punitive-social sanction may better- indicate origin of ambivalence and direction of resolution.60 For example, the actor's need diSposition to avoid such sanc- tion may eventuate in behavioral conformance with an eXpecta- tion perceived as illegitimate 22E obligatory. Second, nei- ther involvement, power, nor Observability presupposes legit- imacy. These may be cut across by illegitimacy. Conse- quently, the value of legitimacy needs to be assessed situ- ationally. While its utility would exist in conflict situ- ations involving legitimate 229 illegitimate eXpectations, the converse would hold in situations involving legitimate pp illegitimate eXpectationS.61 In the latter cases,greater 6OSee pp. 230-237. 61An exception to the converse may be obtained in con- flict Situations involving only legitimate eXpectations. Thus, Operationally-defining "degree Of legitimacy" as the total number of times in a conflict situation that a district councillor evaluates an audience expectation as legitimate, it is possible to have a "more legitimate" eXpectation. See pp. 238-239. -54- benefit would derive from utilization of differential power measured by the relative potency of sanctions.62 Limitations on the use of the sanctional variable ought also to be noted, however. Its value would be largely nullified in conflict situations involving Optional expectations pp obligatory ex- pectations accompanied by sanctions of undifferentiated po- tency or type.63 Hence, it is possible to conceive of Situ- ations in which neither legitimacy nor Obligation-sanction will have Significant consequences for the resolution of role conflict. The relative utility of both for Idoma district councillors confronting role conflict will be analyzed in this study. 62Sutcliffe and Haberman, Op. cit., pp. 695-703. 63This study will be concerned with differential sanctional type rather than differential sanctional potency. See pp. 233-237. PART II: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND FIELD INVESTIGATION Chapter III: The Research: Focus, Field Procedures, and Problems CHAPTER III THE RESEARCH: FOCUS, FIELD PROCEDURES, AND PROBLEMS The purpose of this chapter will be (1) to identify the objectives and analytic variables around which the study has been organized; (2) to identify the field procedures utilized in collecting data; and (3) to examine problems encountered during the field Operation. The Research Focus and Analytic Variables The three-fold objective of this study is (l) to lo- cate sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension in ”cul- turally mixed" Idoma; (2) to ascertain the degree of con- sensus among Idoma district councillors on roles associated with that tension; and (3) to examine the problem of con- flict management confronting that Officeholder. The latter objective involves analysis of the relationship between 1e- _gitimacy, obligation, and sanction, on the one hand, and perceived role conflict, ambivalence, and resolution, on the other. Focusing on potential rather than actual role and conflict, the analysis embraces the following variables: (1) eXpectationS perceived to be held by audiences; (2) -55- -56- perceived role conflict; (3) perceived legitimacy of expecta- tions; (4) perceived obligatoriness of eXpectations; (5) anticipated punitive-social sanction in the event of non- conformance with obligatory expectations; (6) degree of am- bivalence eXperienced in perceived conflict Situations; and (7) choice of the major role in resolving conflict. Vari- ables were operationalized as part of a semi-structured in- terview schedule.l Field Procedures Length of complete schedule, preference for compart- mentalized collection of demographic and role data, and time needed to establish rapport with villagers unfamiliar with research methods and objectives2 led the researcher to under- take a two-phase field Operation. Phase I involved initial efforts to establish rapport, selection of the interview pOpulation, collection of demographic data, and ascertainment of potential role conflict Situations. It was inaugurated by six weeks of intensive participant observation and dis- cussion in diverse contexts: Divisional (i.e., Regional Ministry of Local Government) and Idoma Native Authority headquarters in Oturkpo Town; district council, clan, and village ojiras or meetings in areas from which the 1See pp. 267-274. 2This appears to have been Idoma's initial contact with a political scientist. Previous field researchers included colonial anthropological officers and an American anthrOpOl- ogist, Dr. Robert Armstrong, of the University Of Ibadan in Western Nigeria. Prominent among the former were the late R. C. Abraham and C. K. Meek. -57- interview pOpulation would be drawn; social and commercial establishments in villages and Oturkpo Town. Collection of demographic data through interviews commenced at the close of the introductory period in Phase I. The researcher chose to focus on district councillor- ship in areas with a tradition of priest-kingship, i.e., a Chieftaincy institution which combines secular and spiritual functions.3 The interview population included the 89 coun- cillors in five districts of northern and central Idoma Divi- sions. Of the 89, all but two were met in village compounds; the remainder were queried in Town residences. Six council- lors communicated in English, 82 in Idoma, and one in Tiv. The assistance of a multilingual interpreter-informant was required in the confrontation with speakers of Idoma and Tiv. English-Speaking councillors were interviewed by the re- searcher in the presence of the interpreter-informant. Phase I interviews averaging 18 hours were conducted over a period of three months. Phase II involved the collection of data on campaigning in district council elections,4 role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution. An instrument was constructed on the basis Of (1) documentary materials; (2) discussions with councillors and informants; and (3) behavior Observed during the earlier phase. It was subjected to a pre-test and 3566 pp. 91-95. . 4The data on council elections encompass issue-person- ality orientation, strategies, and "generosity." -58- revised. The instrument was then administered to the coun- cillors as follows: After listening to a brief description of the first conflict situation, each subject was presented with 32;: (bureaucratic, debureaucratic) and no SXpectation alterna- tives. Each was asked to indicate verbally the alterna- tive[s] he felt an audience would hold. Those indicating any alternative[s] other than "no eXpectation in this Situ- ation” were subsequently probed for perceived legitimacy and obligatoriness of eXpectations ("DO they have a right to expect you to ____?" and "Would they insist that you do as eXpected?," respectively). Those who indicated Obligator- iness were probed for anticipated punitive-social sanction in the event of non-conformance (”What would they do if you did not behave as eXpected?"). The procedure was repeated for each audience population. Each subject was then asked to reaffirm his perceppion of role conflict or role con- sensus among audience populations. Subjects who perceived intra- and/or inter-audience role conflict were then probed for existence and extent of ambivalence ("Would this situ- ation trouble you?" Follow-pp: "That is, would you have difficulty in deciding what to do?" If yes: "How much? Some? Very much?"). Finally, Ell subjects who had initi- ally perceived role conflict were probed for resolution technique ("What would you do in this situation?"). The entire procedure was repeated for each of the other four po- tential role conflict situations involving the district -59- councillor as £2231 actor. District councillors were ppp probed for ambivalence in two situations involving the dis- trict head as Bpgal actor.S Due to circumstances beyond the control of the re- searcher, this phase Of the field Operation was terminated two weeks prior to the scheduled date. AS a result, it was necessary to reduce the interview population to 71. The 18 'councillors not interviewed in Phase II constitute 55% and 7% of the membership of two district councils. The analysis will encompass only the 71 councillors interviewed in both phases; that group represents 80% of the original interview pOpulation.6 Fifty councillors were queried in village and Town compounds, 21 in the researcher's residence.7 Phase II interviews averaging 2% hours were conducted over a period of five months.8 5Since the study focuses on the councillor's diffi- culty in choosing among behavioral alternatives,ihe was not probed on ambivalence experienced by the district head. The two situations involving the latter as focal actor were con- structed in order to facilitate analysis of the relationship between councillor, district head, and Native Authority. See pp. 143-148, 152-159, 244-252. 6The units in which 55% and 7% of the councillors were not interviewed are Districts 2 and 4, res ectively, in the tables in Chapter VI. Also see map on p. g5. Analyses do not appear to be biased by the need to reduce the original interV1ew pOpulation. The 45% interviewed in District 2 represent all the clans and areas in that administrative unit and approximate the proportion of elected and nominated mem- bers of the full council. 7The researcher's base was Oturkpo Town. 8Archival work in Divisional and Native Authority head- quarters and participant Observation and discussion in con- texts noted cut across both phases of the field operation. -60- The analyses to be presented do not focus on the in- terview pOpulation per se. Therefore, in order to orient the reader to the demographic environment within which this study was executed, the typical Idoma district councillor will be described. He is (l) a new member of the council; (2) of middle age (mean age: 49.2); (3) a believer in tra- ditional cults or one who has recently acquired a Christian veneer; (4) with little or no education; (5) illiterate; (6) a subsistence or not-too-prOSperous farmer; (7) without title or office in the traditional system; (8) an active member of a secret society and/or dance group; (9) an eXperienced minor employee of Government or the Native Authority; (10) an inex- perienced contender for public office; (11) a nominal, non- officeholding member of a political party; and (12) oblivi- ous of the social, economic, and political world beyond Idoma. Field Problems Interrelated problems of an interpersonal and technical nature were encountered in the field. For the most part they involved (1) the researcher's effort to establish a profes- sional identity; (2) the use of an interpreter-informant; and (3) the instrument and interview situation. Facets of those problems will be briefly commented upon. (1) Professional Identity--Arriving in Idoma under the auspices of an American university and with permission granted by the Premier's Office (Northern Region), the researcher engaged the services of an interpreter-informant. Thus -6l- commenced the introductory period in Phase I. After several trips through central and northern Idoma, the decision was made to focus on five districts in that area. Both the Eur- Opean Divisional Officer (representative of the Regional Ministry of Local Government) and Och'Idoma (Chief of Idoma and head of the Native Authority) concurred. Shortly after, the researcher and interpreter-informant delivered letters of introduction addressed by Och'Idoma to the five district heads. On that occasion, arrangements were made to meet with each of the district councils. Upon meeting each council for the first time, greetings were exchanged and a traditional gift (one goat and beer) presented to the members. The researcher then apprised the council of his professional identity and reason for being in Idoma: a university lecturer sent to learn about the ways and government of an African people in order that students in America might become better informed. Although regional and divisional authorities were aware of the researcher's professional identity (i.e., political scientist), a delib- erate effort was made to publicize an association with higher education and scholarship generally rather than a discipline focusing on political behavior specifically. That decision was taken for the following reasons: (1) to dispel possible suspicion of partisanship in a volatile political environ- ment; (2) to enhance the prestige of Idoma informants by emphasizing the importance of this relatively small tribe within the Federation of Nigeria; and (3) to build upon the -62- Idoma's keen interest in, and undeniably strong commitment to, formal education. Success was manifestly greater with the second and third objectives. Most district councillors were determined to establish a more concrete identity for the inquisitive mBng (Idoma: "white man") in their midst. By the end of Phase I, the re- searcher was widely recognized as "the anthropologist." Benefits accrued from that appellation. Upon favorably re- calling paSt eXperiences with anthrOpologistS, many coun- cillors and other Idoma informants were undoubtedly encour- aged tO share information with the researcher.9 At the same time, however, the appellation did engender suspicion in some quarters. During Phase II, for example, eleven councillors commented upon the curious fact of an anthrOpologist in- quiring about political and administrative matters rather than Idoma song, dance, and language. Five in the group sus- pected that pBng was either a Native Authority (NA) spy or Superintendent of Nigeria Police come to investigate NA cor- ruption.10 The incredulous had to be reassured of the re- searcher's university association and scholarly motives. Councillor curiosity and suspicion tended to be aroused by specific questions. Those involving religious affiliation, secret society and dance group membership, and campaigns for a council seat aroused the greatest anxiety. 9See f.n. 2. 10Distrust of the Idoma Native Authority was evident throughout the investigation. See, for example, pp. 144, 147, 151-152, 155-158, 164-165, 244-252. -63- Intensive probing and reassurances enabled the researcher to elicit much useful data on religious, secret society, and dance group activities. Curiosity' and suspicion did, however, negatively affect the collection of data on cam- paigns. Sixty-five percent of the councillors refused to communicate information on omichi (Idoma: "generosity"), an important dimension of the campaign for council office. Contrastingly, councillors were relaxed and communicative when questioned on role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution. Manifest threat was absent during that portion of the interview. That contrast leads the researcher to anclude that collection of data relevant to the present an- alysis was not significantly affected by councillor reactions elsewhere. To minimize the possibility of spill-over, sub- jects were probed on campaigning E3323 their responses on role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution had been recorded; data on religious, secret society, and dance . group activities were, of course, collected during Phase I of the field operation. (2) Use of an Interpreter-Informant--The political scientist who undertakes field research in Idoma is likely to confront the problem of engaging an interpreter and/or informant. If he has mastered the language, the former may be unnecessary; this researcher had not acquired facility in the Idoma tongue. In any event, Operating in political Idoma requires more than the language competence of a researcher or interpreter. While such competence is desirable, it -64- cannot ipso facto generate the rapport which is essential in a successful field operation. Recognizing this, the re- searcher sought as an interpreter a person who had already established rapport with political actors in central and northern Idoma. The object, then, was to locate a political actor who could introduce the alien researcher into a system of on-going social and political relationships.11 Upon the recommendation of knowledgeables in Oturkpo Town and a pre- vious investigator in Idoma,12 Audu was engaged. Audu is a thirty-nine year old farmer and occasional petty trader. His sophistication belies both occupational achievement and Standard V training at the Methodist Central School in Oturkpo Town. Literate and fully conversant in five languages (Idoma, Tiv, Hausa, Ibo, and English), he has been a periodic consultant on Idoma to anthropologists at the University of Ibadan in Western Nigeria. Audu reads three newspapers, listens to at least one news broadcast daily, and is a student of Nehru. A Town dweller Since the late 1930's, he has not yet abandoned an aversion to Euro- pean attire and monogamy; he is husband to three wives. Audu ‘is at once a believer and disbeliever in both alekwu (Idoma: 11For a similar approach, see the discussion of "Doc" in William F. Whyte, "The Slum: On the Evolution of Street- corner Society,” in Reflections on Community Studies, Arthur J. Vidich, Joseph—Bensman, and Maurice R. Stein, eds. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), esp. pp. 13-15. 12The researcher, Dr. Robert Armstrong, had come to know Audu during the course of his own field investigations in Idoma. ~65- "ancestral cult") and Christianity. If Audu resembles Park's "marginal man,"13 he is also ”14 Between remarkably akin to Shils' ”Opposition mentality. the end of World War II and the mid-1950's, he was succes- sively a member of the Nigeria Police, an employee Of the Idoma Native Authority, and President of the Town Court. During the same period, he was in the vanguard of youths in the Idoma HOpe Rising Union who were Speaking out against the Native Authority.15 By 1958, Audu was secretary-general of the Union and leader of the Opposition Action Group (AG) party in the Division. One year later, he was the unsuc- cessful AG candidate for a seat in the Northern House of Assembly. Since May 1962, Audu has represented a peri—urban village constituency on one of the five councils studied. 13Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," American Journal of Sociology, v. 33, #6 (May 1928), pp. 887-892; alSo Everett V. Stonequist, "The Problem of the Marginal Man,” American Journal of Sociology, v. XLI, #1 (July 1935), pp.—3:l2. For critical analyses of the concept, see (1) David I. Golovensky, "The Marginal Man Concept: An Analysis and Critique," Social Forces, v. 30, #3 (March 1952), pp. 333- 339; (2) Milton M. Goldberg, "A Qualification of the Mar- ginal Man Theory," American Sociological Review, v. 6, #1 (February 1941), pp. 52-58; and7(37 Arnold W. Green, "A Re-examination Of the Marginal Man Concept," Social Forces, v. 26, #2 (December 1947), pp. 168-171. 14Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the DeveIOpment of the New States," World Politics, v. 12, #9 (April 1960), pp. 329-368. While Ahdu is not the trained intellectual about whom Shils writes, his behavior does indicate an "Op- position mentality." 155ee pp. 126-128, 160-162. -66- His verbal assaults upon the Idoma Native Authority continue unabated. In light of the above, NA and Divisional Office aver- sion to Audu's employment is understandable. Och'Idoma eXpressed the fear that Audu would campaign sub rosa for the 1964 federal elections. Having already received assurances to the contrary, the researcher dissented. Audu served as interpreter-informant throughout the field operation. During that period, there was no evidence to support the fear ex- pressed by Och'Idoma.16 In order to sustain the image of a ”neutral," the researcher interacted intensively with po- litical actors representing all Shades of opinion. That in- teraction cut across Town and village, professional and social Spheres of activity. Audu's effectiveness in integrating the researcher into a system of on-going social and political relationships may be gleaned from the reSponseS on "generosity" in cam- paigns for a council seat. Fearful that such a probe would alienate the district councillors, he attempted to persuade the researcher to reconsider. The latter suggested that the value of a probe for "generosity" might be assessed in a pre-test of the instrument. Among the three subjects to 16Refusal to be persuaded did not affect the progress of the field Operation until two weeks prior to its sched- uled termination. At that time, the Idoma Native Authority declared Audu to be persona non grata in the five districts when in the company of the researEher. Since the link with on-going social and political relationships had been sev- ered, collection of data was terminated. -67- whom the pre-test was administered, only one communicated information. None, however, exhibited hostility to the probe per se. Accordingly, the probe was written into the revised instrument.17 As noted above, 65% simply refused to communicate any information. Of the remaining twenty- five councillors, only five responded without hesitation. Allaying fears that mbeke would break confidence, Audu was able to persuade twenty councillors to describe their cam- paigns. In all cases, subjects outlined campaign strate- gies, including the distribution of gifts in cash and kind. Notwithstanding inability to elicit data from 65% of the subjects, the researcher has for several reasons inter- preted this eXperience as a measure of Audu's effectiveness. First, the forty-six councillors who had refused to commun- icate did so by merely denying involvement in such activ- ity. N933 articulated hostility to the researcher, inter- preter-informant, or probe per se. Second, a 35% response on the delicate question of "generosity" enabled the re- searcher to gain valuable insight into an important dimen- sion Of Idoma political activity. In this instance, the value of both the data and the agent who obtained it cannot be measured by percentage alone. At the same time, however, the researcher was sensi- tive to the possibility that role reSponseS involving the 17While the present analysis focuses on the potential role conflict situation, the researcher obtained role data~ on other contexts as well. Role behavior in the interac- tional campaign situation will be examined in a forthcoming manuscript. -68- Native Authority audience might be biased by a hostile in- terpreter-informant. The possibility of this occurring was greatest in the conflict situations involving construction of a council hall (Case I) and campaigning for the gov- erning Northern PeOples' Congress (Case 11).18 Participant Observation and access to English-speaking informants were useful checks on responses in the two cases. Thus, the re- searcher's personal knowledge of an actual Situation anal- ogous to that in Case I was compared with councillor per- ceptions. BOth tend to associate the NA audience with a bureaucratic expectation for councillor and district head behaViOT-lg Moreover, the tendency of councillors to iden- tify the NA with a bureaucratic eXpectation in Case II is paralleled by both official pronouncements and the testimony of reliable Idoma informants.20 In sum, while Audu's bias was undoubtedly Operative throughout the field operation, it is pbssible to affirm a high degree of confidence in both .his integrity and objectivity. A previous investigator in Idoma had already eXpressed similar confidence.21 (3) The Instrument and Interview Situation—-For most of the seventy-one councillors and their constituents, 18366 99- 141-169. 19868 99- 148-160, 244-252. 20Citations for the Official pronouncements may be found on p. 165 f.n. 41. Idoma informants include members and supporters of the governing Northern Peoples' Congress. Also see p. 165. 21See f.n. 12. -69- face-to-face contact with a white man is a rare occurrence. Such contact has generally been limited to brief meetings with missionaries and former colonial officers on tour. Not surprisingly, then, direct confrontation with the researcher produced an admixture of responses.22 The prestige of a district councillor was undoubtedly enhanced by the researcher's visit. An entire community could gaze upon the arrival of "Big white man." During the rainy season, that arrival was frequently facilitated by communal labor mobilized to clear a path to the village. A holiday Spirit pervaded the community on interview day. Upon arriving in the councillor's compound, the re- searcher exchanged greetings with elders, tax collectors, the teacher, and perhaps the clan head. He would then be invited to "chOp" (eat) with prominent men in the community. Villagers laughed and joked while meBp "chOpped" fp;£p (pounded yam), palm wine, and buruktu (domestic beer). Others stared in disbelief! All seemed very pleased. Researcher, interpreter-informant, and councillor would then retire to the business at hand. Some councillors were now notably distressed by the need to do business with their guest. For example, there were those who eXpressed fear of the ”Superintendent of Nigeria Police" in their midst. Others insisted that they had already paid the an— nual poll tax. Another group did not feel prepared for the 22Interviews were scheduled at meetings of the full council. -70- researcher's "school examination.” On such occasions, Audu would Offer sympathetic assurances and at the same time note his own familiarity with the questions.23 Then the re- searcher would reiterate his professional identity and scholarly motives. For most of the apprehensive, such as- surances would suffice. Others remained dubious. Questions in both phases of the field operation evoked mixed reactions. Those designed to elicit genealogical data produced the most effusive replies, Since Idoma councillors exult in the Opportunity to recall real and imagined ances- tors. As indicated above, questions on religious affilia- tion generated some anxiety. Forty—five councillors (63%) described themselves as "Christian.” A dubious researcher probed that group with the question, ”DO you sacrifice to your ancestors?" Forty reSponded in the affirmative. Both the researcher and interpreter-informant now doubted the veracity of the other five. Audu noted that they may have framed a response to please their white (and presumably Christian) interrogator. Probes failed to confirm that suspicion. When queried on secret society and dance group activ- ity, most subjects indicated that they were members of such associations. Others reported that they were not members. On one such occasion, the interpreter-informant recognized an ornament of the secret Onyonkpo society on a wall. 23Audu translated the instrument into Idoma. More- over, a member Of one of the five councils studied, he had already been interviewed by the researcher. -71- Probes revealed that the councillor was in fact chairman of the local Onyonkpo, formerly a head-hunting society. His denial was based on fear of arrest. Audu assured him that the researcher had come only to learn. During Phase II, councillors were probed on strategies in the campaign for a council seat. Most eXplicated de- vices, alliances, clandestine campaigning, and so forth. When probed on "generosity," however, denials generally burst forth. One councillor was now convinced that the re- searcher was in fact a ”Superintendent of Nigeria Police." Sixty-five percent Of the councillors underscored the 11- legality of such behavior. Assured of the researcher's trustworthiness, twenty-five councillors admitted the need to be "generous": ten Shillings to the elders, wine and meat to one lineage, buruktu to an important sublineage. Among those prepared to communicate information, eighteen emphasized the difference between omichi (Idoma: "gener- osity”) and tobacco ("graft"). Four councillors construed fifteen shillings to the elders as tobacco; three described as omichi forty Shillings to the elders. The researcher has tentatively concluded that the two concepts defy pre- Cise definition. Personal motives of the dispenser and recipient probably determine what is omichi and tobacco. Questions involving {pie generated some semantic dif— ficulty. .The pre-test instrument had been constructed to Elicit data on personal role, social role, and audience Preference. Two of the three subjects to whom it had been .-72- administered became confused by the three concepts. Ac- cordingly, only a personal role format was included in the revised instrument.24 Seventy-one councillors were then asked in the first conflict case, "DO the elders exPect you as a councillor to advise the district head to Sign a pay- ment voucher?"25 Fourteen percent indicated that "the elders prefer that I advise the district head not to Sign a payment voucher.” The researcher and interpreter-inform- ant resorted to definition and illustration in an effort to distinguish between eXpected and preferred behavior. In order to ensure comprehension, councillors who did not reg- ister confusion were nevertheless questioned on the dis- 3 tinction. That problem was virtually non-existent in sub- sequent conflict cases. Questions involving legitimacy, Obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution did not appear to generate an analogous problem. In sum, two types of problems arose in the interview situation. The first involved councillors who were at once flattered by the attention of a white man and yet appre- hensive about the need to interact with him. Others were threatened by Specific questions. Undoubtedly the most threatening questions were those involving religious affil- iation, secret society and dance group activity, and ”gen- erosity" in the campaign for a council seat. Interestingly, 24See pp. 31-34. 25See pp. 148, 269. -73- while direct, prolonged interaction was an enervating eXper- ience for some councillors, most appeared to thrive on the interview situation. In this vein, Six uneducated, illit- erate councillors expressed gratitude for the Opportunity to "tell iticha (Idoma: "teacher") about the ways Of Idoma." The second problem involved semantic clarity. Con— siderable energy was expended in an effort to dispel the confusion between expected and preferred behavior. Ques- tions were repeated and analyzed for the seven councillors who had initially experienced difficulty in making the dis- tinction. Others were probed for comprehension. In the final analysis, the researcher's ability to COpe with both problems was enhanced by (l) the informal, unhurried manner in which interviews were conducted; (2) the restraint and sympathetic patience generally exercised by participants in the interview situation; and (3) the subjects' confidence in the personal integrity of the interpreter-informant. PART III: ANTHRO-HISTORY Chapter IV: Traditional Idoma Chapter V: Colonial and Post-Colonial Administration in Idoma CHAPTER IV TRADITIONAL IDOMA The purpose of PartIII will be to establish an anthro-historical framework for the analysis of role prob- lems confronting Idoma district councillors. Chapter IV will focus on traditional society and polity, Chapter V on the evolution of administrative policy in colonial and post- colonial Idoma. Before examining aSpects of traditional social struc- ture, religion, and polity, it would be well to distinguish between what has been termed the "Idoma-Speaking peOples" and the "Idoma 'prOper.'" (See map on page 75.) The "Idoma- Speaking peOples" reside in a crescent-Shaped area between the towns of Keana and Doma (Benue Province, Northern Nigeria) and a point just north of Ogoja Town (Ogoja Province, Eastern Nigeria); this group coalesces linguis- tically and, to some extent, culturally. Inhabiting a sec- tor of the crescent bordered by the Benue River (north), Tiv Division-Benue Province (east), Igala Division-Kabba Province (west), and Enugu, Abakaliki, and Ogoja Provinces 0f Eastern Nigeria (south) are the so-called "Idoma 'pro- per.'"1 Numbering approximately 225,000, the "Idoma 1Robert G. Armstrong, "The Idoma-Speaking PeOples," -74- -75- Fig. Z.—-Map of The "Idoma-Speaking PeOples" and ”Idoma 'PrOper'" NORTH. J Doma Benue River ' ‘“‘*»u--_-uap _-‘H., (Benue Keana ~. ‘7‘~“‘--\ Province) 6 ..\. Benue River Igala Division 2 (Kabba Province) Tiv ‘fDiviSion \(Benue 'rovince) Enugu Abakaliki Ogoja . Province Province Province Ogoja Town E A.S T E R N N IJG E R I A NOTE: Administrative center at Oturkpo Town (4) —76- 'prOper'" reside in the twenty-two administrative districts of Idoma Division (Benue Province, Northern Nigeria).2 The present study focuses on districts (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) in northern and central Idoma Division. Social Structure Idoma social organization is ostensibly a replica of the familiar African pattern. Its essential elements, in ascending order, are (1) the family compound (Idoma: Ole); (2) the sublineage (Idoma: ipooma, ”those of one birth"); (3) the lineage (Idoma: ipOOpu, "those of one playground or council ground"); and (4) the Slap (Idoma: ale or ipaaje, "Land"). In at least one important aSpect, however, Idoma diverges from the pattern. Contrary to a principle of clan organization, the "Land" is ppp an exogamous unit.3 According to Shaw,4 Idoma clans are generally defined by in Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence (Ethnographic Sur- vey oflAfrica, Western Africa, Part X), Daryll Forde, ed. (London: International African Institute, 1955), pp. 94-95. 2The approximate figure Of 225,000 was obtained by subtracting the pOpulation of seven largely non-Idoma dis- tricts (numbers 10, ll, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 on the map) from the official total for the Division. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Census and Tax As- sessment, 1962-1963 (unpublished document). The total in that peiiOd was 327,000. 3For a discussion of the principles of clan organiza- tion, see Meyer Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi: Being the First Part of an Analysis of the Social Structure of a’Trans-Volta Tribe (London: OxfOrd—University Press, 19457: p. 62. 4J. H. Shaw, Reorganization Report for Ochekwu Dis- trict (unpublished manuscript, 1934); also D. B. Wright, AnthrOpOlogical Investigations in Oglewu District (unpub- lished manuscript, 19397. -77- the following criteria: (a) possession Of an identifiable, autonomous territorial base; (b) acknowledgment of a common ancestor from whom descent is patrilineally reckoned; (c) possession of a common gig or earth shrine to which offer- ings are made; and (d) acknowledgment of an SEES or clan head as father Of the unit and embodiment of tradition. Yet the putative clan may fail to meet even these criteria. For example, the Oglewu clan is unable to identify a common ancestor.5 In sum, while these units have been recognized as clans by both colonial and contemporary governmental au- thorities, they are p25 clans in the accepted anthropologi~ cal sense. Many putative clans have established important rela- tionships with collateral uterine groups, i.e., descendants of a female member married to a non-member. For example, the AiArobi (Idoma: "sons of Arobi") are related to the Yangedde clan. According to tradition, a Muslim Hausa mar- ried Arobi, great granddaughter Of the Attah (King) of Igala. Descendants of that marriage--A1Arobi--reside on Yangedde clan land near the famous Abakpa market (Idoma: Abakpa denotes "Hausa").6 5Anon., Western Area Old District Notebooks: Oglewu (unpublished manuscript, n.d.,7i also Wright, op. cit. 6S.A.S. Leslie, Reorganization Report for Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript,7l936); A: B. Mathews, Report on Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript, 1939); Northern Nigeria,Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Northern Area Old District Notebooks: Yangedde (unpub- lished manuscript, n.d.7. -78- Traditional law denies to uterine descendants the right to occupy the position of BEES or clan head; in con- temporary Idoma, the ban extends to the secular district headship in districts with a combined Chieftaincy institu- tion.7 Nevertheless, uterine descendants did occupy an im- portant position within the pre-colonial system. Only they could legitimately place the beaded insignia of office on the wrist of a new oche. As a result,members of a uterine [group were frequently in a position to arbitrate disputes over the succession. In contemporary Idoma, too, there is evidence of exceptional influence and achievement among these "strangers."8 Some are important members of village 9 and district councils; in 1955, one was elected Ad- Ojiras ministrative Councillor for Local Government in the Idoma Native Authority and Member of the Federal House of Repre- sentatives in Lagos. Notwithstanding, councillor reSponseS 7A combined Chieftaincy institution may be found in such single clan districts as (1) and (4) on the map. See pp. 91-95, 180-191. 8The concept of the ”stranger” in African societies has generally been applied to cases involving members of different tribes. For a discussion of the "stranger” so defined, see Elliott P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African Societies," Africa, v. XXXIII, #4 (October, 1963), pp. 307- 320. Among the Idoma, however, the appellation "stranger" is not limtied to non-Idoma. "Stranger elements" include (1) those who are descended from the marriage of an Idoma female and a non-Idoma (as in the case of AiArobi) and (2) the offspring of Idoma parents Of different clans. The Off- Spring of such a marriage would be considered a "stranger" in the mother's clan. 9For a discussion on the ojira or "mass meeting," see PP- 88-90. -79- indicate considerable tension between these elements and the larger clan community. For example, councillors repre- senting Akpachi and Emichi lineages vehemently denied "stranger" relationship to the Boju clan;10 Similarly, the councillor representing Akpachi lineage in the Oturkpo clan denied "stranger" status. Moreover, several councillors alleged that "stranger" colleagues were more inclined than others to support strong Chieftaincy and central authority in Idoma.11 Another divergence between Idoma and the familiar Af— rican pattern of social organization involves the "village" concept. The colonial power introduced the "village” unit into Idoma for purposes Of administrative convenience. Col- onial officials construed it as a clearly-defined area com- posed Of several families (of the same or different lineages or sublineages) living in close proximity.12 The Idoma language has no word to denote ”village." Consequently, when the researcher sought to ascertain the name and size of district council constituencies, questions 10Hugh Elliott, Reopganization Report for Boju Dis— trict (unpublished manuscript, 1937),7Appendix J. 11The researcher found no evidence to support that allegation. However, the testimony does throw light on the tension existing between councillors, district heads, and the Idoma Native Authority. Bases for that tension are examined on pp. 144, 147, 151-152, 155-158, 164-165, 244-252. 12In a conversation with the researcher, Professor Robert G. Armstrong of the University of Ibadan (Western Nigeria) suggested that the typical settlement pattern in central and northern Idoma resembled a "neighborhood” ra- ther than a "village." -80- had to be constructed without reference to a "village" unit per se. In both cases, the words k'ipole and iEElE (Idoma: "at least two family compounds”) were utilized. Thus, coun- cillors were asked, (1) Ikansulu k'ipole nya na wea? (English: Of what "village" are you the councillor?) and (2) Ipole emla ya ip'aje k'ukansulu kuwoa? (English: How many "villages" make up your council area") Ipfaje k'ukan- gplp (Idoma: "council land or area") signifies a group of family compounds already recognized as an administrative "village" unit. The newer unit designated "council area" is represented by a member of the district council. Where a "council area" correSpondS with a single "village", the former takes the name of the latter; where several ”villages" comprise a Single constituency, the latter remains nameless. Named and unnamed constituences are represented on all dis- trict councils in Idoma Division. Religion and Society The Idoma weltanschauung may be construed as a system cnntaining three significant elements: (1) a creative super- natural force; (2) a sustaining earth; and (3) a guiding ancestral spirit. This triad defines the spiritual content Of Idoma existence and gives rise, directly and indirectly, to three principles regulating the politico-governmental life of the society: democracy, gerontocracy, and chief- taincy.13 13The three principles are examined on pp. 87-97. -81- Owoicho, the impersonal god above, is perceived as the prime mover. Idoma believe that after creating the uni- verse Owoicho chose to govern it through an intermediary, Enyangu. Unable to communicate directly with Owoicho, mor- tals must alternatively approach Enyangu when divine assist- ance is desired. Shrines for the latter can be observed in most Idoma households. Notwithstanding supplications to the intermediary, the cult of Owoicho is predicated on the be- lief that a supreme force is omnipresent and active. The notion of an intermediary divorced from a functioning power is alien to the Idoma mind.14 The force of Owoicho may be transmitted through di- verse media. Thus, the Idoma believe that charms, mounds, and other material Objects can receive the energy of their god. Perhaps even more important media in daily life are the concepts earth and ancestorship embodied in the aje and alekwu cults, respectively. In order to ensure bountiful harvests and hunts, the Idoma is obliged to make supplica- tions to his ale or earth shrine. On a day fixed annually by the clan head (generally when the hunting season is to commence) Special prayers and sacrifices are offered at the pig shrines by elders who are priests of the cult. A pOp- ulation hopeful that Owoicho will bless the ale then en- ,gages in joyous feasting and beer drinking. On less pro- pitious occasions, however, modification of the pattern of l4Armstrong in Forde, ed., Op. cit., p. 100; Wright, op. cit., Appendix G. -82- annual supplication may be required. For example, Elliott reports that an outbreak of smallpox forced the Boju people to postpone the ceremonies in 1937. He also notes that such natural disasters as drought and locust invasion may require special appeals to the pig. In sum, while the rule of an- nual celebration is generally adhered to, a certain degree of flexibility is permitted and even encouraged.15 It has been suggested above that relationships with Owoicho and the ale Operate in different spheres. Thus, while the relationship with a supreme power and its agent is individual and private, that with the ale is collective and public. Elder-priests of the pie cult represent a lar- pger community. In contrast, the cult of Owoicho is always a personal and never a group affair. Owo is symbolized by a white Silk-cotton tree in Oturkp5_and Eye: :pecies oflfigdtrie in other districts. SUE? a persona an p anted for the ind1v1dua1. Operating in pppp Spheres of Idoma life is the alekwu cult. For the individual Idoma the alekwu represents an historical and Spiritual bond with the past. In order to strengthen that bond, he must choose prOpitious occasions on which to make Offerings to the ancestors.17 Most J —v lsElliott Op Cit A d' I- 1 ° . . ppen ix , a so Armstrong in Forde, ed., 10c: Cit.; right, loc. cit. l6Armstrong in Forde, ed., loc. cit. 17R. C. Abraham, Reorganization Report for Agala Dis- trict (unpublished manuscript, circa 1935); J. C. Monckton, 'Eurial Ceremonies of the Attah of Igala," Journal of the African Society, v. XXVII (January, 1928), pp.l65-166; C. K. Meek, AnthrOpOlogical Notes on the Idoma (unpublished manuscript, l925); Elliott, Op. cit., Appendix I; Wright, Op. cit., Appendix G. -33- commentators have suggested that in the communion with alekwu, the ancestors are essentially objects of worship.18 Contrastingly, Wright draws attention to a distinction be— tween the social and religious character of the cult.19 His analysis raises several points Of fundamental Signif- icance for both traditional and contemporary Idoma. First, the individual Idoma is in communion with ancestors who are, paradoxically, "alive." Death in the corporeal sense has not removed them from clan membership or positions of impor- tance. On the contrary, the ancestors are perceived as vital and functional members of Idoma society. Hence, the Idoma addressing his alekwu is, for practical purposes, com— municating with ”active” members Of a flourishing corporate community. Stated otherwise, the ancestors constitute a non;physica1-proximate audience in contemporary Idoma.20 Second, as members of such a community, the ancestors appear to occupy much the same position as elders resident in a compound. They are not revered, but deferred to as sages. AS members, elders and ancestors are endowed with rights and responsibilities. Both have a right to the food and drink which symbolize deference to those with superior wisdom gained from eXperience. The individual Idoma is, in turn, able to seek assistance from both elders and ancestors. 18For example, Abraham, Op. cit. and Elliott, Op. cit. 19Wright, Op. cit., Appendix G. 20See pp. 34-35. -84- Such assistance is anticipated, of course, in a society in which all members are obliged to promote its continuity and welfare. Third, the appeal to alekwu represents communion with the power of Owoicho. A sympathetic response from the an- cestors renders the Idoma beneficiary to the benevolent en- ergy of his god; an outraged alekwu threatens him with the malevolence of Owoicho. Insight into the relationship between contemporary and ancestral Idoma may be gleaned from responses to questions in the interview schedule. For example, seventy-one dis- trict councillors were asked, "Could you tell me how the elders in your council area would feel about you as a coun- cillor taking part in the selection of the next Clan Head?”21 One group indicated that the more sagacious elders would eXpect them not to take part in the selection process. Responses to follow-up questions revealed that these coun- cillors perceived the elders' exPectations as both legiti- ipape (i.e., elders had a right to hold the expectation) and obligatory (i.e., elders would insist on conformance).22 A fourth question elicited punitive-social sanction anti- cipated in the event of nonconformance. Twenty-eight re- sponses involved the expectation that elders would curse 21Other questions in the instrument elicited similar responses. See pp. 268, 270, 271, 272, 273. 22Another group perceived the same legitimate eXpec- tation, but evaluated it as Optional (i.e., not backed by punitive-social sanction). -85- in order to invoke the ancestors' wrath against a deviant councillor.23 Probes were made for evaluations of that sanction. All in this group described the curse as sui generis in content and consequence.24 Eighteen who had anticipated that another sanction would accompany the curse emphasized that the latter alone was awesome. The remainder eXplained that elders need only invoke this sanction in order to en- sure effective punishment Of an intransigent councillor. Further probing led the researcher to conclude that the an- ticipated effect of the curse was of a dual character. Min- imally, subjects anticipated loss of life in the corporeal sense; thus, eight councillors eXplained that both political Oblivion (i.e., failure to be re-elected) and ostracism within their council areas were more desirable than being ”killed by the curse."25 Twenty described what might be termed the "long-range" or maximal effect. Reflecting that evaluation is the statement of one councillor: "I would be lost!" I The maximal consequence suggests a link between Wright's analysis of the alekwu cult and Mannoni's theory 23See pp. 222-237. 24Seventy-one councillors described the curse as sui . eneris. For various reasons, however, fewer than the total anticipated its application. See pp. 225-227. 25For a discussion of ostracism as a potent communal sanction, see Shaw, Op. cit. —86- of psychological dependence.26 Examining the relationship between Malagasy tribesmen and their ancestral cult, Mannoni reports that it would be no exaggeration to say that the dead and their images form the highest moral authority in the mind of the 'dependent' Malagasy, and that for him they play the part filled for the European by the moral conscience, reason, God, King, or party 2 In that circumstance, actual or even threatened abandonment is likely to have dysfunctional consequences for the "de- pendent personality."28 An analogue is suggested in the case of Idoma. The Idoma believes that he is unequipped to master the environment without assistance from the ancestors. Abandoned by alekwu, he is, in effect, bereft of a sus- taining ”sense." Moreover, this loss extends beyond the cult to the power of Owoicho. His god, through the medium of alekwu, may now have abandoned him. Finally, isolation from the spiritual community is likely to be accompanied by ostracism within the contemporary community. In sum, until death has overtaken him, the accursed Idoma is confined to an earthly solitude; and death in the corporeal sense is not an escape, but rather, the extension of his isolation to a kind of Spiritual limbo. Relationships between role conflict resolution and 26O. Mannoni, PrOSpero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New’Ybrk: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 39-97. 27Ibid., pp. 55-56. 281bid., pp. 61-88. -87- punitive-social sanction (including the curse) will be ex- amined subsequently.29 m Transition from an individual-private to a collective- public sphere in the relationship between ancestors and de- scendants may be taken as a point of departure for the dis- cussion of traditional polity. While democratic, gerontoc~ ratic, and Chieftaincy principles have secular content, their significance for traditional political organization cannot be fully comprehended without reference to the Idoma weltanschauung. For Idoma constitutionalism is, in the final analysis, an admixture of secular and Spiritual ele- ments. Political organization in traditional Idoma appears to have included the following loci of authority and in- fluence: (l) 311:3 (Idoma: "mass meeting"); (2) gghe (Idoma: "clan head"); (3) aiigabo (Idoma: titled "clan spokesmen"); (4) okpoju (Idoma: "market master"); (5) aioga-aiuta (Idoma: '"host of the market master"); (6) oteyi (Idoma: "hamlet head"); and (7) aigwa and aiilg (Idoma: "secret societies" and "dance groups"). All but the latter two will be considered in this section; the po- litico-governmental functions of secret societies and dance _gIOUps will be examined in a subsequent chapter.30 29See pp. 230, 233-237. 305ee pp. 169-174. -88~ A. Ojira: Elite and Mass The gjira may be construed both physically and be- haviorally. On the one hand, it is the ground around which several sublineages or ipooma reside; on the other, it is the actual meeting of adult men for the purpose of dealing with daily affairs.31 While its origin is a locus among the sublineage units, the behavioral dimension confines it to neither a prescribed meeting place nor affairs of the ipooma. Thus, the researcher has attended joint clan, in- dividual clan, and lineage ojiras on diverse sites. On one occasion, an 9131a convened alongside a disputed yam field for the purpose of determining the right of usufruct. Present, in addition to the researcher, were a district councillor acting as mediator,32 the two claimants, and two witnesses. The grOUp was later joined by three interested villagers, one of whom became an active participant in the discussions. An 911:3 may include age groups (Idoma: giggg , dancegroups, and secret societies as well as clan, lineage, and sublineage units. Attempts to specify the composition of this fluid in- stitution have produced disagreement. Some observers have discerned in it an analogue of the "democratic" New England town meeting. For example, Smith suggests that the question 31Armstrong in Forde, ed., 0p. cit., p. 95. . 32For a discussion of the councillor's mediator func- tion, see pp. 173-174. -39- 'who are the members of the Ojira and how are they chosen or elected?’ . . . shows a misconception of the nature of the Ojira. He prefers to describe it as essent§a11y a mass meeting of all the men of the unit.3 Contrastingly, Macleod perceives it as an elite "council of elders."34 Smith's evaluation tends to be supported by the testimony of Idoma informants--including elders--and the researcher's observations. The evidence suggests that recruitment to the gjira was made on the basis of two as- criptive criteria: sex and adulthood. While elder-priests of the gig and alekwu cults were undoubtedly influential in the 91133, they appear to have acted more in accordance with the rule of primus inter pares than gerontocracy per £3. Notwithstanding acceptance of Smith's evaluation, the following caveat ought to be observed: While the ojira of adult men was theoretically and potentially a "mass” meeting in the quantitative sense, in fact this was often not the case. An_ojira could be held with any number of eligible personnel from the relevant social unit[s]. Consequently, 33J. Noel Smith, Idoma Tribal and Social Organization (unpublished memorandum, 8/31/31); also Armstrong in Forde, ed., 0 . cit., p. 107; Elliott o . cit.; Wright, 0 . cit.; G. D. E. Money, Notes on Procedure in Idoma Division (un- published manuscript, circa 1935). 34T. M. Macleod, Report on the Western Areas of Okwoga Division (unpublished manuscript, n.d.); also Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report on Okwoga Division of Munshi’Province (unpublished manu- script, n.d.). -90.. the concept "mass" may be meaningful only in contradistinc- tion to the notion of recruitment based on elite criteria. Thus, the probability that elder status, wealth, personal- ity, intelligence, or prestige enhanced the influence of certain members does not in itself support a thesis of in- tended elite recruitment. On the contrary, it could be hy- pothesized that that institution was designed not merely as a consensual instrument for the management of daily affairs, but also as a constitutional check on the ambitions of an aspirant elite--elder and/or non-elder--within the community. Finally, it is noted that Macleod's evaluation of the ojira as a conciliar body attributes to it a compact form and stable composition that were probably never achieved in traditional Idoma. Neither formal convention nor prear- ranged agenda were prescribed. Under some circumstances, meetings could be held in strict conformance with a repre- sentative principle. But they were also convened in mixed fashion, as in the hypothetical case of sublineages a, b, and g of lineage 2 gathering with the representatives of sublineages x, y, and z of lineage g. Significantly, this fluid and ephemeral quality ultimately rendered colonial administration thrOUgh the ojira_impractica1; implications of that quality for the decision to strengthen Chieftaincy and centralize authority will be examined in the next chapter.35 35$ee pp. 114-115, 120-123, 134-138. -91- B. Oche and Aiigabo: Chieftaincy Within the Triad The student of Chieftaincy in Idoma is struck by an incongruity between the historical development of that in- stitution and an hkmdogy traditionally associated with it. While investigators report its largely moribund condition upon arrival of the British, the ideology posits a tradi- tion of proud and vigorous Chieftaincy.36 In light of that historical datum, it may be apprOpriate to suggest that the ideology reflects what Lasswell has termed "political sym- bolization,"37 i.e., emotional commitment to a political institution which, while real, manifested only symbolic ‘greatness.38 Commitment to Chieftaincy appears to have increased as the Idoma made contact with such politically-deve10ped peOples as the invading Fulani and neighboring Igala and Jukun.39 For the most part, however, they were unable to 36Armstrong in Forde, ed., 0 . cit., pp. 95-96. Shaw reports that aii abo titles were filled in only two Of the fourteen clans 1n Ochekwu District. Shaw, Op. cit. 37Harold D. Lasswell, Ps cho atholo y and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, §§SU§, p. 155. 38For a discussion of the political implications of emotional commitment to symbols, see Murray Edelman, "sym- bols and Political Quiescence," American Political Science Reviewi v. LIV, #3 (September, 1960), pp. 695-7UI] esp. pp. 39Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Pembletonls Com- mentary on the Shaw Reorganization Report for OChekwu‘Dis- trict Sent tOISecretary, Northern Provinces (unpublished memorandum, 1/18/35); Hugh Elliott,’Reorganization Report for Agatu District (unpublished manuscript, 1937). -92- reproduce SOphisticated state and Chieftaincy institu- tions.40 Only among the Agala in southern Idoma and certain clans in central and nOrthern Idoma is there evidence Of articulated state and kingship structures. Abraham41 reports that Agala clan organization was the nearest approximation to a state system in Idoma. The clan comprises three major sub-groups. One of these, the "royal" Usiligama, provides the SEES or clan head. A chief priest for Agala is nominated by a ward in the Idogogbo sub- group; assistant priests are, in turn, appointed by wards in the Idogogbo and Utsugbo sub—groups. In addition, Abra- ham encountered two occupied sets of hierarchially-ordered civil and military titles. These had been distributed among the commoner sub-groups and their wards. Without positing the existence of a state system, Elliott42 suggests that the Office of pghg represented a strong priest-kingship in clans residing near the Benue River. In this vein, Mathews Offers the controversial Opin- ion that . . the clan head [among the Yangedde, Awume, Aga- dagba, Boju, and Oturkpo peOples in central Idoma] is not primus inter pares. He is the clan head, a [sec- ular] monarCh (in the literal sense of a single ruler) 4OIdoma political organization resembles generally the Group "B” type described in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans- Pritchard,eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pp. 5-23. 41Abraham, Op. cit. 42Elliott, Reorganization Report for Agatu District, Op. cit. -93- limited by public Opinion voiced in the Ojira . . . he is the head of the clan and . . . the . . . Alekwu and Aje cults.43 Turning to the question of Specific functions asso- ciated with Idoma Chieftaincy, it is noted that investiga- tors have tended tO emphasize the spiritual responsibilities of the oche. Meek44 alone has attempted to throw more than passing light on the nature of his secular authority. He posits that the "Chief had a good deal of power" beyond that focusing on mastery of magic and presidency of the cults. For example, in addition to bestowing aiigabo titles upon clan Spokesmen, the oche appointed the 'Uta' (or market and judicial authori- ties), received a share of fines imposed (by the mar- ket authority) . . . was a court of appeal in inter~ family disputes4 [and] took action in bringing murder- ers to justice. 5 Meek concludes, however, that day-to-day exercise Of secu- lar authority depended at least as much on the character of the incumbent as on rules formally prescribed. Thus, great secular power might accrue to the oche endowed with a strong personality and supported by a large and influential fam- ily.46 That the Idoma were acutely sensitive to the 43Mathews o cit ° also Shaw 0 cit For the , p. ., p. . thesis that both t e putative priestiklng an his appointr ees, the aiigabo, were politically insignificant, see Mac Bride's comments appended to Leslie, Op. cit. 44Meek, Op. cit. 451bid. 461bid. -94- possibility of autocratic Chieftaincy is evidenced by the elaborate measures taken to prevent it. Thus, even in those central and northern Idoma clans with a putative priest- king, behavior was regulated by three constitutional de- vices: (l) a relationship with the 91132, including el- ders; (2) rituals surrounding the Office of pghg; and (3) succession based on principles Of rOtation and seniority. First, the authority of the pghg_tended to be circumscribed by public Opinion articulated in the Sii£E° For example, the 91133 had to approve a declaration Of war by the pghg. Moreover, his power to appoint aiigabo or clan spokesmen was not unlimited. Shaw47 reports that the clan head fre— quently appointed as aiigabo men who had already been nom- inated by the 9113a. Second, ritualized behavior worked to immobilize an oche. Thus, the head of the Akpa clan was forbidden to leave his compound during the two-year period after acces- sion to Office. The Agadagba clan sought to check the po- litical power of its p£h§_by prohibiting him from entering the market on commercial days.48 Finally, application of the principle of lineage ro- tation prevented the concentration Of chiefly power in a single unit. The principle of seniority Often ensured that 47Shaw, Op. cit. _ 48Meek, Op. cit.; Elliott notes that the oche, con- sidered to have alV1ne attributes, seldom appeared in pub— lic. Elliott, Reorganization Report for Agatu District, Op. cit. -95- the new pghg_would be too Old and infirm to participate ac- tively in the politico-governmental life of the clan. In those clans of central and northern Idoma where Chieftaincy combined secular and spiritual authority, an aged pghg_often preferred to delegate the former to more efficient young men. Having delegated secular authority, he could now con- centrate on the duties of chief priest.49 In sum, autocracy in traditional Idoma signified a temporary disruption of the constitutional equilibrium rooted in principles of Chieftaincy, gerontocracy, and de- mocracy in the pjipa. During the colonial period, as we Shall see, a more permanent disequilibrium paved the way for strong Chieftaincy and centralized authority. The present study examines one consequence Of that develOpment: bureau- cratic-debureaucnfljt:role conflict surrounding district councillorship in contemporary Idoma.50 C. Okpoju, Oteyi, AiogafAiuta: Administration, Order, and Inter-Generational Discord Undoubtedly, the most important recipients of dele- .gated secular authority were the Okpoju (Idoma: ”market lmaster”) and his assistants, the aioga or aiuta (Idoma: 49Most commentators agree that onl secular author- ity could be delegated. In contrast, at ews contends that the clan head of Boju could delegate Spiritual authority as well. A. B. Mathews, AnthrOpOlO ical Investi ations in Oturkpo District (unpublished manuscript, I933). For a critique of that thesis, see the notes of R. C. Abraham in the Mathews report. 50$ee pp. 141-169, 244-252. —96~ ”constabulary"). The constabulary was composed Of indi- vidual ppgyi (Idoma: "hamlet head”) and members Of dance groups and secret societies.Sl While there tends to be some dissensus over the question of how these Officials were re- cruited,52 there is general agreement on the boundaries within which their authority was to be asserted. The Okpoju was expected to administer the community marketplace and settle disputes arising within it. Similarly, the individ- ual ppgyi was to serve as an administrator and law enforce- ment Officer within the unit in which he resided. Okpoju and ptgyi of hamlets attending the market were eXpected to come together solely as a court empowered to govern that site.53 However, what appears to have been a well-defined delegation of fused administrativesjudicial power at times gave way to unauthorized hegemony over wider clan and even inter-clan areas.54 In sum, while legitimate Spiritual and secular au- thority was located in elders and a clan head responsible to the 2113a, de facto exercise of broad secular power de— volved upon younger agents. Having been encouraged to 51For a discussion of the politico-governmental func- tions of dance groups and secret societies, see pp. 169-174. 52 While Meek posits that the oche appointed market authorities, Wright holds that the clan O'ira selected such personnel. See Meek's comments in Macleod, Op. cit. and Wright, Op. cit. . 53Shaw, 92;_El£°3 Wright, Op. Cit. and other reor- ganlzation reports. 54Shaw, Op. cit. -97- establish control over individual hamlets and important market areas, these agents were in a position to challenge what Eisenstadt has termed "the basic asymmetry Of power and authority,"55 i.e., the notion that younger members of the community ought to defer to the leadership and author- ity of their seniors. In this vein, Shaw reports that at least one 3123a became ". . . so powerful as to threaten the existence of traditional authorities"56 on whose behalf it was presumably Operating. Thus, political discord be- tween generational groups was the unintended consequence of a division of labor daflgned to strengthen the constitutional system. At the same time, that development reflected the tension inherent in a system governed by three essentially antagonistic principles: democracy, gerontocracy, and Chieftaincy. Evidence of the basic tension and inter-gen- erational discord may be found in contemporary Idoma as well; implications of both for bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict will be examined subsequently.S7 55S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: A e Groups and Social Structure (Glencoe, IllinOis: The ree Press, 1964), p. 30. 568haw, Op. cit. 57See pp. 159, 199-200, 244-252. CHAPTER V COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN IDOMA Colonial administrative policy in Idoma may be con- strued as (1) an attempt to implement Indirect Rule under extremely unfavorable conditions and (2) a reaction to that generally unsuccessful effort. What finally emerged was an alien hybrid only partially consistent with Idoma tradi~ tions and the objectives Of Indirect Rule: a simulated Emirate structure supported in theory, and to a lesser ex~ tent in fact, by Western bureaucratic and democratic values. The evolution of administrative policy in Idoma will be examined in this chapter. Before turning to that prob- lem, however, it would be well to consider the implications of Indirect Rule and indigenous organization for "normative- institutional engineering." Indirect Rule and Indigenous Organization: Exercises in Normative—Institutional Engineering The researcher has already noted problems Of Indirect Rule in societies governed for the most part by debureau- cratic norms.1 Notwithstanding, early theorists of Indirect Rule continued to envisage a relationship between (1) the lsee pp. 6-12. -98- -99.. ultimate success of colonial administration and (2) a high degree of political development among, for example, the Fulani (Northern Nigeria), Kanuri, Basoga, and Banyoro.2 Another consequence of contact with relatively well- articulated administrative structures was a tendency tO de- fine colonial reSpOnsibility largely in terms of "normative engineering.” For example, given the "intelligence and powers of the Fulani caste,” the primary Objective appears to have been the introduction of a catalytic agent into the Emirate system: the presumed wisdom of a ”higher civiliza- tion.”3 In theory, the colonial presence represented an exercise analogous to plant maintenance and accretion: a well-constructed engine (the indigenous hierarchy, including Emir, district and village heads, and alkali or Islamic courts) would be incorporated virtually intact into a still wider politico-governmental context (including a bureau- cratic engine with EurOpean administrative, judicial, and technical components). Together they would constitute, in the words of M. G. Smith, a "contraposition of co-ordinate units."4 This bifurcated scheme predicated that normative 2F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British TrOpical Africa (London: William Blackwood and SOns, 1923), p. lff.; Donald Cameron, The Principles of Native Administra- tion and their ApplicatiOn (Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printer, 1934), p. lff. For a discussion of Cameron's contribution to Indi- direct Rule, see Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), ch. 20. 3Cameron, Op. cit., pp. 4, S. 4M. G. Smith, "On Segmentary Lineage Systems," Jour- nal of the ngal AnthrOpOlogical Institute Of Great Britain —lOO- prescriptions in the latter would govern behavior in the former. Moreover, it projected the eXpansion Of the in- digenous machinery to include "modern" treasury, education, and technical components; these were also to be lubricated by alien norms. Turning to Idoma, it is noted that nineteenth century EurOpean travellers had recognized the organizational con— trast between tribes south of the Benue River and Emirates to the north.5 Of even greater significance, however, was a portentous allusion to difficulties encountered in con- tact with inadequately articulated administrative structures. Thus, Mockler-Ferryman Observed in 1892 that the Mitshi [i.e., Munshi or Tiv] are a difficult peOple to deal with, since they acknowledge no one as head of the whole tribe, and live in independent fam— ilies. The history Of colonial administration among the con— tiguous Idoma, to which we now turn, throws light on difo ficulties encountered and measures employed to alleviate and Ireland, v. 86, Part 2 (July-December 1956), p. 63. SMacgregor Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, Narrative of an EXpedition into the Interior Of Africa by the Niger RiVer . . . 1832, 1833, 1834, v. 1 (Londbn: ’Richard Bent- ley, I837), p. 442ff.; samuel Crowther, Journey of an Ex- pedition pp the Niger and Tshadda Rivers in IBEX—(LOndon: Church Missionary Society, 1855), p. 53ff.; Adolphe Burdo, The Niger and the Benueh: Travels in Central Africa (Lon- don: RiCHard‘Bentley, 1888), p. 239ff.; A. F: Mockler- Ferryman, Up the Niger: A Narrative of Major Claude Mac- donald's Mission to the Niger and Benue Rivers,’West Africa (London: George Philip andISOn, I897), p. 72ff., pp. I32-134. 6Mockler-Ferryman, Op. cit., p. 76. -101- them. Reflected in the latter is a shift of emphasis in the definition of colonial responsibility. While "norma- tive engineering" or the gnfiking of a "higher civilization" remained a long-range Objective, ”institutional engineer- ing" assumed the highest short-range priority.7 That pri- ority was destined to be pursued until termination of the colonial presence in Nigeria. Indirect Rule and Administration in Idoma Colonial administrative policy in Idoma has evolved through three important phases: (1) 1908-1930: occupation, pacification, boundary adjustment, and the quest for an in- digenous leadership; (2) 1931-1945: systematic implementa~ tion of, and subsequent retreat from, the policy of Indirect Rule; and (3) Post-World War II: centralization and "de- mocratization” of the Idoma Native Authority or local gov- ernment establishment.8 1. 1908-1930 a. Occupation and Boundary Adjustment Occupation of the area comprising present-day Idoma Division commenced in 1908-09 with the movement of two mil- itary forces, the Niger-Cross River and Ankpa EXpeditions, 7Perham notes that administrative Officers tended to emphasize "institutional engineering" based on the Fulani model rather than Lugard's "primarily educative" or "norm- ative engineering" function. Perham, Op. cit., ch. 10; Lugard, Op. cit., pp. 228-229. 8This historical survey of administration in Idoma focuses on the five districts in which the field investigation was executed. Similar developments may be documented throughout Idoma. -102- into southern and northern Idoma, respectively.9 Early boundary adjustments involving Idoma were part of a larger scheme concerned with demarcation of the border between the Southern and Northern Provinces Of Nigeria. Southern Idoma was incorporated into the former, northern Idoma into the latter. In 1918, both became components Of a new Munshi Province in Northern Nigeria. Hence, by 1918, the southwestern limits Of present-day Idoma Division formed the boundary between the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria. It remained for a third military force, the Egede Escort, to complete demarcation of the southeastern boundary in 1922. One year later, northern Idoma was constituted Idoma Division. An administrative center was established at Oturkpo in 1924. "Modern” Idoma Division came into ex- istence in 1928 when southern and northern Idoma became an administrative subdivision of the new Benue Province.10 b. Pacification Throughout the period 1908-1930 administrative 9Less systematic penetrations of the area had been made as early as 1899. See Northern Nigeria, Bassa Prov— ince, Note on General and Political Develppments in the Area Of Bassa Province (unpubTiShed manuscript, circa 1910); also NortherniNigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report on Okwoga Division (unpubliShEHImanu- script, circa 1925). 10Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and As- sessment Rgport . . ., o . cit.; Robert G. Armstrong, "The Idoma-Speaking_Peoples,” 1n Pepples of the NigersBenue Con- fluence, ed. Daryll Forde (Eihnographic Survey OfiAfrica, Western Africa, Part X) (London: International African In- stitute, 1955), p. 98 f.n. 15. The Egede Escort continued its pacification Operations until 1928. -103- officers concentrated on eliminating such practices as slave-dealing, headhunting, and homicide.ll While the first two were virtually suppressed by the close of this period, attempts to eliminate internecine and especially inter- tribal murders met with considerably less success. In the boundary area separating Idoma and Iboland, for example, the impulse for members Of one group to encroach upon, raid, and murder those Of the other could be controlled only tem- porarily. Incidents recur even in present—day Idoma.12 Administrative activities designed to impose the pax britannica were not confined to suppression Of these Objec- tionable practices. Equally vigorous was the attempt at "political pacification," i.e., diminution Of an endemic instability produced by disputes over Chieftaincy succes- sion.13 That attempt was undermined to a great extent, how- ever, by the decision tO apply the policy of Indirect Rule. Thus, one consequence Of that decision was injection of a new reward into the traditional "game” of succession: power and prestige deriving from association with the Crown's par- amount authority. As competition for positions of och'mbeke 11Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report NO. l on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending June 30, 1919," Annual Reports, 1919-1925 (unpublished). 12A serious outbreak in April 1963 resulted in the murder of at least twenty—one persons. See Daily EXpress (Nigeria), April 10, 1963, p. S. 13Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report NO. 1 on Okwoga District . . .," Op. cit. -104- (Idoma: "chief of the white man”)14 became more intense, political instability increased. This convulsive phenomenon may be Observed in present-day Idoma as well. c. Quest for an Indigenous Leadership Lugard's early writing on Indirect Rule reflects the sharp contrast between Emirate and pagan structures. Thus, after noting the utility of a Fulani elite in the scheme based on Indirect Rule, he emphasized that among the wholly uncivilized pagan tribes, who owe no allegiance to a paramount chief, it is often difficult to apply these principles of rule . . In such cases, he added, it would be necessary for the political [i. e. , EurOpean administrative; of- ficers to undertake a more direct responsibility. In a report to the House of Commons in 1920, Lugard again Observed that this system [of Indirect Rule] is clearly adppted only in its fuIIest application to communities under the centralized rule Of’a Paramount Chief with some ad- ministrative machinery at his disposal and finds its best expression in the Moslem communities in the North;1 Notwithstanding the contrasts between Fulani and pagan l4Och'mbeke refers generally to any Administration- appointed ”chlef" or headman. Since World War II, it has been applied to district heads and combined clan- district heads. The word mbeke is a corruption of the name "Becker"; Dr. Becker was an earIy EurOpean (white) traveller in the area. 15Northern Nigeria, Annual Reports, 1900-1911, p. 26 (cited in Perham, Op. cit., pp. 37-38), 16F. D. Lugard, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeriay_and Administration, 1912-1919 (LOndon: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920), p. 22. [ItaIics mine.] -105- structures, those policy statements convey a notion that the nature Of indigenous organization affected only the degree to which Indirect Rule would be applied. In Northern Nigeria, then, the contrast was not one between Indirect and Direct Rule systems. Rather, it involved the differ- ential extent to which indigenous authorities might be rea- sonably and usefully incorporated into the administrative establishment. In Idoma, it had been apparent that a small number Of European Officers could not maintain political control if required at the same time to collect tax, maintain law and order, and so forth.17 Accordingly, in the period 1908- 1919 the Administration undertook to mobilize an indige- nous leadership tO be reSponsible for such functions. 1. Village Administration. Administrative units known as "village areas" were created at the base Of Idoma society; each of these was placed under the Official control Of a local headman.18 Villagers were encouraged to select headmen in accordance with native law and custom (i.e., Idoma rotatory and seniority principles). However, inter- minable wrangling among candidates Often resulted in actual choices being made by EurOpean Officers.19 Sometimes a 17Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1919," Annual Reportsiy19l9-1925 (unpublished). 18Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and AS- sessment Report on Okwoga Division, Op. cit. See pp. 79-80. 19Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1919," Op. cit.; -106- traditional ppgyi (Idoma: "hamlet head")vms nominated by villagers (or elders) and/or the Administration.20 Utilization of ppgyi as village area heads and tax collectors did not involve the wholesale incorporation of the aiuta constabulary per se. It is probable that the E1232 system had largely decayed prior to arrival of the EurOpean in Idoma. Equally probable was EurOpean reluctance to resuscitate organizations which had in the past proven to be intransigent administrative agents. As a result, only individual Okpoju (Idoma: "market master") and ppgyi'were utilized for administrative purposes, the former within market and the latter within village areas. ii. District Administration. The creation and staffing Of administrative units at the base was accompanied by consolidation at a higher level. The latter involved creation of single- and multi-clan (i.e., federated) dis- trict units. Prior to 1914, districts had been governed with the assistance of non-Idoma personnel. By 1919, how- ever, that policy had been largely abandoned in favor of one further designed to incorporate Idoma personnel and in- stitutions into the Administration.21 After World War I, Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Divi- sion," Annual Repprt, 1920 (unpublished). 20On occasion, the oteyi sat on native courts in the districts. 21This policy appears to have been abandoned for two reasons: (1) Idoma hostility toward "stranger chiefs" and (2) the Administration's generally hostile attitude toward the "Warrant Chief” policy adopted in the Southern Prov- inces. -107- the process of ”Idoma-ization" was accelerated. As in the case of village area heads, Idoma encouraged to accept district headships were not necessarily tradi- tional officeholders. That the Administration was prepared again to utilize such elements is understandable in light of (l) the perceived need to "Idoma-ize" local administra- tion and (2) the largely moribund condition of Idoma chief- taincy. Two factors did, however, eventually endow many of the novel district headships with a degree of traditional legitimacy. First, EurOpean resuscitation of BEES (Idoma: "clan head”)and aiigabo (Idoma: "clan spokesmen") titles produced a coterie of traditional officeholders who might Simultaneously occupy secular chieftaincy positions. Thus, in such single-clan districts as Boju and Oturkpo, the Ad- ministration generally recognized the pghg_as combined clan- district head. Second, secular appointees in the federated units often enhanced the legitimacy of their positions by later securing the title of pghg. An.alliance between Eur- Opean officialdom and the district head frequently ensured the latter's appointment to a traditional Office. Having constructed a rudimentary administrative appar- atus in the districts, the Administration then undertook to organize an efficient judicial organ within each of these units. As early as 1910, clan heads in northern Idoma had been encouraged to participate actively in newly-formed Native Courts.22 These officeholders were "assur[ed] . . . 22Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Resident of Bassa Province to Mr. A. R. Woodhouse, Assistant -108- that . . . their authority [would be upheld] in every pos- Sible way.”23 Notwithstanding, they lacked real power. As a result, many of the Native Courts convened only Sporadi- cally and were for the most part ineffectual in the period 1910-1919.24 After World War I, the Administration sought to strengthen the incipient judicial system. Native Courts re- sembling the traditional 21113 were created in older and newly-formed districts. Under this scheme, each salaried district head served as president of a court or plira com- posed of lineage and_sublineage representatives. By 1925, thirteen were Operating more-or-less regularly throughout Idoma. Twenty-one district courts had been established by 1941.25 On the surface, creation of a judicial system along traditional lines appears to have represented a move in the direction of Indirect Rule. In this vein, one EurOpean of- ficer noted in 1922 that no doubt absolutely 'direct' Government in this Division would be the easiest and quite possibly for the District Officer, Bassa Province (unpublished, April 4, 1910), 23Ibid. 24Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, ”Report NO. l on Okwoga District . . .,” O . cit.; Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District . . .,” Op. cit. 25D. F. Heath, Notes on Idoma Division (unpublished manuscript, 1941). A twenty-second native court was estab- lished in 1952 when a new district--Worku--was carved out of the Egede section of southeastern Idoma Division. -109- immediate moment the most effective form of rule: but believing as we do that 'Self-government' is the goal for which we must aim and seeing as we do daily the un- doubted and indeed almost pathetically powerful appeal which self-government makes to the Okpotos [i.e., Idoma], there can be not the slightest doubt that the re-creation 05 the Okpoto system of native rule is worth any exertion. 6 A more complete "re-creation" would, of course, require a restoration of the equilibrium between ”democracy" in the mass meeting and chieftaincy strengthened under EurOpean aus- pices. That intention was communicated by another Officer in 1923: It is now the policy of this Division to make the indig- enous 911%3 the authority and do away with the system of rule t rough 'made' chiefs and I have been doing all I can to work on these lines which are Obviously right.27 Yet only six months later another officer wrote des- pairingly'that the Native Administration is still in embryo and gives little help to political officers. The O'ila, . from which it was once hOped that a native administra- tion would ipring have proved, I think, a barren seed. . . . In order to comprehend the Administration's early dis- illusionment with an eXperiment based on principles of In- direct Rule, it is necessary to re-examine briefly the nature 26Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1922," Annual Re- ports, 1919-1925 (unpublished). 27Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division for Quarter Ending June 30, 1923," Annual Rgports, 1919-1925 (unpublished). 28Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division," Annual ReportL71923 (unpublished). .. 110 .- of the Ojira institution in traditional Idoma. It has al- ready been noted that different commentators have construed the Ojira as a council of elders and/or mass meeting of adult males.29 Despite dissensus as to composition, however, there tends to be considerable agreement as to its non- administrative—executive, non-judicial character. The tra- ditional mass meeting was essentially a forum in which pub- lic Opinion was crystallized and articulated. While that Opinion could sanction individual or collective vengeance against wrongdoers, the Ojira per se was not a cOercive in- strument.30 In traditional Idoma, what might loosely be termed "administrative-executwe-judicial functions” had devolved for the most part on the aiuta constabulary. Reluctant to revive that institution, yet determined to govern through indigenous institutions, the Administration turned alterna- tively to the traditional 91112; the latter was perceived as the fulcrum upon which future district administration and adjudication would rest. This crucial exercise in "insti- tutional engineering" represented an attempt ". . . to cre- ate [a machine that] had no real counterpart in the indige- nous social structure."31 In view of the above, "failure" of the exercise was inevitable. While Native Courts estab- lished on the basis of the Ojira continued to Operate, the 29See pp. 88-90. 30Heath, Op. cit. 311bid. -1ll- notion of the mass meeting as a fulcrum was, at least for the time being, abandoned.32 iii. Divisional Administration. Aware that maintenance of a relationship with an acephalous group would be difficult, the Administration undertook in the decade af- ter World War I to seek a remedy. In another exercise based on principles of Indirect Rule, it formed an Idoma Central Council or Ojira of district heads. The Central Ojira was constituted the superior Native Authority.33 Its primary pur- pose was tO act as ". . . a central administration to con- sult together [on such matters as food supply, undesirable settlers, road policy] and advise the District Officer for the benefit of the whole Division.”34 At the same time, the Central Ojira was eXpected to serve as an appellate court for the Division.35 It can be argued on several grounds that that body was neither a superior Native Authority (NA) nor an pjira prOp- erly understood. First, the Administration had earlier rec- ognized Emirs in the Moslem north as superior native author- ities. At the same time, such traditional officeholders as 32The fluid O ira as a basis for the judiciary was superseded in the earIy 1950's by a system in which specific persons represented kindred-based constituencies. See pp. 128, 133-134. 33G. D. C. Money, Notes on Procedure in Idoma Division (unpublished manuscript, I935); Heath, Op. cit. 34Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1930 (unpublished). 351bid. -112- district and village area heads had been recognized as sub- ordinate NA's. Evident in traditionally acephalous Idoma is the absence of an analogous hierarchy. In light of the above, application to Idoma of alien administrative dis- tinctions led to the following structural inconsistency: each district head was simultaneously a superior and subor- dinate NA, the former as permanent member of the Central gllpa, the latter as administrator of a district. In that circumstance, hierarchical administration was rendered in- Operable. Second, Lugard had directed the expatriate Officer posted to an Emirate to "act as sympathetic advisor and coun- sellor to the native chief."36 The latter was recognized in the first instance as an Officeholder in the traditional administrative hierarchy. In Idoma, where all district heads were essentially creatures of the Administration, the Oppo- site was unequivocably prescribed: district heads in the Central Oil 3 were eXpected to assume an advisory function vis-a-vis EurOpean officers. While the Emir as superior NA assumed direct, overall responsibility for administration, the Idoma district heads as superior NA met only infrequently (i.e., quarter-annually) and without real executive author- ity.37 Executive powers possessed by an individual district 36Lugard, The Dual Mandate . . ., op. cit. 37Money, op. cit.; Heath, 0 . cit.; for a vivid de- scription of the Oiira, see W. R. Crocker, Nigeria: Critique of British ColonidI Administration (London: GEOrge Allen add UnwiniLtd., 1936), pp. 66-67. -113- head could be exercised only within a single district. As a result, the Central lepa as nominal superior NA tended to focus on its judicial function. Bent on removing vestiges of Direct Rule, the Admin- istration persistently admonished the Central lepg to as- sume greater administrative initiative.38 Yet even as Eur- Opean officers exhorted the district heads to act more in accordance with Indirect Rule, the former continued to Oper- ate anomalously as a de facto superior NA. De facto Direct Rule at the apex of the administrative hierharchy in Idoma Division rendered functionally inconsistent the distinction between superior and subordinate native authorities. Finally, while the superior NA possessed attributes of an pjlpa, notably adult male membership and a "mass" quality when members of the pOpulace attended, other characteristics distinguished it from the traditional institution. For exam— ple, its generally compact form, prescribed membership, and regular meetings were only infrequent attributes of the tra- ditional pjlpa. More important, however, is the fact that the Central lepa Operated at a politico-administrative level that did not exist in traditional Idoma. It was, in the final analysis, an organ of the Administration rather than a genuine representative of the Idoma peOple. As such, it reinforced a centralizing tendency that was not compatible with Idoma constitutionalism. f a: 38Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1930, Op. cit. ~114- Conclusion The student of colonial rule in Idoma is struck by the extent to which EurOpean behavior in the period 1908-1930 had been influenced by the Fulani administrative model. Thus, one observes the Administration working during the early years to create village area and district units par- alleling those in the Emirates. Acceptance of the Fulani model of chieftaincy and hierarchically-organized local gov- ernment is further evidenced by the Administration's reaction to failure at the district level. Unable to reconcile ad- ministrative needs with either the "democratic" or geron- tocratic principles, it turned alternatively to the third principle of Idoma constitutionalism: chieftaingy. The Administration hOped to construct a disciplined and effi- cient—-in a word, bureaucratic--Native Authority apparatus by strengthening chieftaincy at district and divisional lev- els; that Objective was actually achieved at the district level only. Yet as early as 1927 the Central 91132 had been construed as the precursor of a divisional chieftaincy.39 It is significant that the Administration had already envis- aged as the culmination of its "institutional engineering" inIdoma a paramountcy modelled after the Fulani Emirship. Before turning to the second phase in a history of ad- ministration in Idoma, it would be well to summarize the ef- fect on Idoma constitutionalism of developments examined 39Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Rgport for Idoma Division, 1927 (unpublished); Money, Op. cit.; Heath: op. cit. -115- above. It has already been suggested that clan heads in traditional Idoma had periodically accrued considerable power vis-a-vis elders and/or adult members of the pjlra. Indeed, in some cases the extent of aggrandizement had been such as to enable an 9223 to act as a virtual autocrat. Notwithstanding, there is no evidence that even de facto autocracy represented a permanent challenge to the ultimate legitimacy of the constitutional system. In the final anal- ysis, therefore, chiefly usurpation appears to have been extra- if'not unconstitutional behavior. In contrast, the Administration's recourse to strong chieftaincy contributed substantially to subversion of that legitimacy. Failure to arrange concomitantly for the par- ticipation of elders and pjlpa in district administration had the practical effect of repudiating the control mechanism inherent in Idoma constitutionalism. This is not to suggest, of course, that a district head was now removed from the arena of traditional control. He was in theory subject to sanctions of the traditional system. Rather, it is to posit that the competitive legitimacy of an imposed authority sys- tem enabled him in fact to achieve a high degree of insula- tion against Operation of the mechanism. The district agent of this paramount EurOpean authority was destined to move from a position of primus inter pares to one of undisputed first! The empirical analysis of role and conflict resolu- tion suggests that this may have already occurred.40 40589 pp. 141-169, 244-252. —ll6- 2. 1931-1940 a. Toward Indirect Rule During the early 1930's, both officials and scholars were engaged in a critical re-examination of the assumptions and edifices of colonial administration in British Africa.41 Undoubtedly the most influential critic of the period was Miss Margery Perham, student of colonial administration, apologist for the policy Of Indirect Rule, and later Lugard's biographer.42 Perham lamented the damage inflicted on Indi- rect Rule by the fallacious assumption that that policy dic- tated cultivation of autocratic chieftaincy. She argued con- trarily that progress in tribal societies could be facili- tated only by restoring traditional conciliar democracy. In effect, Perham had urged that the African territories be administered more in accord with "pure" Lugardian princi- ples.43 Turning to Idoma, we note the Administration moving to .redress the disequilibrium produced by recourse to strong 41Crocker, Op. cit., pp. 5-277, passim; Cameron, pp. cit., passim. 42Perham, Op. cit., assim; Margery Perham, "The Sys- tem of Native Administration in Tanganyika," Africa, v. 4, #3 (July 1931), pp. 310-311; Margery Perham, "A Restatemen of Indirect Rule," Africa, v. 7, #3 (July 1934), pp. 321- 334; Margery Perham, Lugard, 2 vols. (London: Collins, 1956, 1960), passim. 43Margery Perham, "Problems of Indirect Rule," East Africa (April 12, 1934), p. 622 (cited in Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Segretary, Northern Prov- inces,lto Benue Province Resident and Iddma Divisional Of- ficer Tunpfiblished, May 11, 1934). -117- chieftaincy. Perhaps the earliest indication of intention to adhere more closely to principles of Indirect Rule may be found in a policy statement prepared for the Resident of Benue Province by the Idoma Divisional Officer. The latter wrote in late 1931 that the policy in single-clan districts was to organize (but not to over-organize and to reduce to the lifeless formality of the average parliament or con- ference) the mass meetings of the clan (where even in the past only the leaders and men of influence had any real say) into District Ojiras of Village Heads and leading men, who in their turn Ehoose the Oche or chief who becomes the District Head.4 The Divisional Officer also reported that smaller clans were being welded into federated districts. Heads of these units were to be selected by an pjlpa of village area heads in ac- cordance, where feasible, with the principle of clan rota- tion. While considerable emphasis was placed on the pjlpa, in fact the policy enunciated in 1931 did not depart signif- icantly from that pursued after 1923. The Administration was still operating through contrived village area and dis- trict units. Moreover, officialdom working "to organize" a system of more vital mass meetings was not yet prepared to enumerate functions other than that involving selection of the district head. Notwithstanding, the statement committing the Administration to renascence of the Ojira institution 44Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident on Idoma Tribal and Social Organization (unpubliShed, August 31, 1931). -ll8- did augur develOpments shortly to come. (In February 1933, the Resident requested that EurOpean officers in Idoma undertake anthropological investigations. These were to produce outlines of traditional and contem- porary organization, assessments of the degree to which the two coincided, and ”recommendations as to reorganization re- quired to make possible develOpment and evolution on tradi- tional lines."45 Without awaiting completion of the inves- tigations, the Divisional Officer informed his superior that the pjlra had in fact controlled all actions of the papa in traditional Idoma. Consequently, he added, colonial success in Idoma was contingent on strengthening of the constitu- tional system.46 The Native Authority apparatus was subsequently reor- .ganized. A conciliar administrative system replaced that based on village area and district unitS.4-7 "Chief-in- Council" organs were_gazetted as superior native authorities 4SNorthern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from ‘Benue Province Resident to Idoma Divisional Officer (unpub- 1iSfied,‘Fe5ruary I5,’1933). 46Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident (unpubliShed, NOvember 11, I933). 47Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Secretary, Northern Provinces, to Benue Province Resident (un ubliShed November I6 1933); also Perham Op. cit. p. I42. ~ ~’ ’ ’ ’ An objection to abolition of the district system may be found in Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident (unpfiblished, December 6, 1933). -ll9~ in the former single-clan districts. The ash: in each was designated lifetime president of an pjlpa comprising 933212 kindred heads, and elders. In the former federated units, each clan Ojira, including the papa, was constituted a sub- ordinate native authority. Subordinate NA's were empowered to collect taxes, maintain law and order, and so forth. Clan Ojiras or their representatives constituted a federal council or superior NA in those areas. The federal council was given over-all responsibility for law enforcement, super- vision of markets, and disbursement of funds. It, in turn, chose a lifetime president in accordance with the principle of clan rotation.48 Some measure of financial responsibility was granted the superior NA'S by virtue of their receiving and dis- bursing a fixed prOportion of tax revenues. Revenues were utilized to compensate scribes, messengers, dogarai (Idoma: "police"), okpoju and, in the federated units, subordinate NA'S.49 ' (Superior NA'S also sat as unremunerated native courts. These courts were granted Grade "D" authority to imprison 48$. A. S. Leslie, Reorganization Report for Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript, 1936); G. D. C. Money, Reor anization Report for Oturkpo District (unpublished man- uscript, 1935)? Hugh Elliott, Reor anization Report for Boju District (unpubliShed manuscript, I937); D. B.Iwright,IRe- alganlzation Report for Oglewu District (unpublished madd- script, 1939); J. H. Shaw, Reorganization Raport for Ochekwu District (unpublished manuscript, I934). 49Leslie 0 cit - Elliott o cit - Wri ht 9 E- ., o E- ., 8 2 22; cit.; Shaw, Op. cit. urOpean officers in the Division in fact exercise control over the appointment and dismissal of scribes, dogarai, and most of the other employees. -120- persons convicted of praedial larceny for a maximum term of nine months.50 Finally, the Central le£a_was formally con- stituted an advisory body in 1935. EurOpean Officers served as a central NA from 1935 until 1947, when an Idoma chief- taincy was inaugurated. The Central gjlpa retained its ju- dicial function until 1937, when Regional Appellate Courts were established for Northern, Southern, Western, and Eastern Idoma.51 b. The Retreat from Indirect Rule Reorganization of the Idoma Native Authority was os- tensibly in strict conformance with the letter and Spirit of Indirect Rule. Indeed, abandonment of the Fulani admin- istrative model in favor of the three principles of Idoma constitutionalism suggested a meticulous application of ”pure" Lugardian principles. Yet there is considerable evi- dence to support a contrary thesis. For example, we note (1) the Administration's equivocal reaction to the Perham plea for reform and (2) the influence that reaction appears to have had ultimately on reorganization in Idoma. The Secretary of the Northern Provinces noted that, while his superior, the Chief Commissioner, . . . agrees with the views expressed in theory [by Perham], . . . the difficulty is that the people them- selves do not want councils but prefer chiefs since they have been taught the Moslem system of District 50Leslie, Op. cit.; Elliott, Op. cit.; Wright, pp. cit.; Shaw, Op. c1 .; oney, Op. cit. 51Heath, o . cit. These later became known as "Inter- mediate Area Cour s. -121- Heads by Administrative Officers. In one case His Honor was told by the peOple that their original organization was democratic, by council, but that they now know better and had progressed into having a chief.5 A retreat from the recent strong commitment to Indirect Rule had been signalled. It commenced shortly thereafter in Idoma. Officers submitting reports for Oturkpo (1935) and Boju (1937) noted that formal abolition of the Fulani dis- trict system would not fundamentally alter the status quo;53 the author of the Boju report conceded that introduction of conciliar administration had involved little more than re- distribution of salaries.54 Both affirmed, of course, that pOpular sentiment had dictated minimal change.55 The Divi- sional Officer reported in 1937 that, despite efforts to re- organize along conciliar lines, the people of Yangedde were already clamoring for restoration of the more efficient and dynamic district head system.56 One year later, another of- ficer noted a tendency in Yangedde and other units "to re- vert to the District Head system, the District Head now ap- pearing under the guise of oche or clan representative."57 52Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Secretar , Northern Provinces to Benue Province Resident and Idoma Divisional Officer (unpubliShed, May 11, 1934)) 53Money, op. cit.; Elliott, Op. cit. 54Elliott, op. cit. 55Money, Opa cit.; Elliott, op. cit. 56D. F. Heath, Progress Report on Yangedde District Reor anization (unpublished, 1937; appended tOILeSIiE, pp, Cit o '.' 57Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Memorandum from District Officer to Idoma -122- Significantly, the officer proceeded to assail the Perham thesis that traditional political organization was essen- tially conciliar. Pointing to both the precedent of auto- cratic chieftaincy in traditional Idoma and public Opinion favoring the restoration of district headships, he urged that the system of district administration be formally re- instituted.58 Conclusion Even as Indirect Rule was being subverted in the name of "democracy," most officers continued to express the Admin- istration's predilection for reorganization based on Idoma constitutionalism. For example, a Divisional Officer who had recently written of the clamor in Yangedde for restor- ation of the district head system could posit as late as 1939 that the only alternative to it was "the Idoma . . . [being] left to himself, with tactful guidance and encour- agement, to work out his own democratic salvation."59 That the Idoma had not yet attained "his own democraticsalva- tion" was attested to when the same Divisional Officer ap- prised his subordinates of the fact that, notwithstanding reorganization recently completed, ”. . . here we are dealing with a more or less artificial creation of our own Divisional Officer (unpublished, August 22, 1938). 531bid. 59Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Divisionlll939 (unpublished), p. 54. ~123- and not with the reform of an old established system as in the [Moslem] North."60 3. Post-World War II: Centralization and "Democratization" The Administration culminated its exercises in "insti- tutional engineering" by moving first to centralize and then to "democratize" the Idoma Native Authority. Plural native authorities created in the 1930's were superseded by a cen- tral administration and judiciary designed to unify the Di- vision and promote efficient operation of the NA system.61 The focal point of the new apparatus was an Idoma chieftaincy created in 1947. Ogiri Oko, combined clan-district head of Adoka, was elected by his colleagues on the Central gllpa to serve for life as the first Och'Idoma (Idoma: "Chief of Idoma").62 A five-man advisory council was established to assist him in the administration of the Division. In 1948, the Chief and his council were gazetted as a Central (Grade 60Heath, Notes on Idoma Division, Op. cit. 61Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1948 (unpublished). 62Upon his appointment, Ogiri Oko renounced the dis- trict headship but kept the beads of oche or clan head. His brother returned from military service to take up the post of district head. In 1960, when Oko died, his successor as oche claimed the occupied district headship. Since then, ffie matter has been under litigation. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, High Court, Suit No. MD/15/1962. For some indication of the precedent likely to be estainshed and the probable outcome of the Adoka case, see Northern Nigeria, Kabba Province, High Court, Suit Nos. MD/18/1962 and MD/8/ 1962; also Western Nigeria, High Conrt'(Akure), Ayi vs. Joshua et a1. (March 30, 1963). -124- "B") Court. That body was empowered to hear appeals passing from native courts in the districts through four Intermediate Area Courts.63 Turning to the "democratic" aSpect of administration in Idoma, we note that district and clan ojiras ceased to be recognized as superior and subordinate NA'S after 1947. Their administrative responsibilities were for the most part absorbed by departments in the central NA. They did, however, retain judicial powers until 1950. With the exception of that function, the district pjlpa had only to serve as the base in a new multi-tiered electoral system. Each.district ajlpa elected a representative to one of four Intermediate Area Councils in the Division. Members of each Council, in turn, elected one representative to the central administra- tion Of the NA. Och'Idoma's advisory council was composed of the four representatives elected by the Intermediate Area Councils plus a co-Opted scribe. Significantly, the first advisory council included three elderly clan heads and a dis- trict head--all four illiterate.64 In order to comprehend the implications of that elec- tion, it is necessary once more to throw light on forces op- erating in a wider context. In the aftermath of World War II, educated elements throughout British Africa were agita- ting for a larger share in the political and economic life 63Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1948 (unpublished); also f.n. 25’and 51. 64Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1950 (unpublished). -125- of their territories. Nationalists among them were espe- cially vocal in demanding greater participation in govern- ment and administration as a prelude to independence.65 Focusing on Nigeria, it is noted that many in basic sympathy with these aspirations were at the same time strong- ly committed to a gradual approach. According to Perham, h‘rh- for example, "democratization" of the Native Authority sys- tem was more desirable than either (1) the immediate re- cruitment of Africans into upper echelons of the civil ser- vice or (Z) eXpanSion of powers in the Legislative Coun- 3"] cil.66 Official acceptance of a gradual approach was re- flected in post-war constitutional develOpments. In March 1945, Governor Sir Arthur Richards presented the Legislative Council with a plan for constitutional revision; the nucleus of that plan was to be embodied in the so-called "Richards Constitution" that governed Nigeria until 1951.67 Undoubt- edly the most significant portions of the document were those 65See, for example, James S. Coleman, ngeria: Back- ,ground to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Ange es: UniVer- sity of California Piess, 1958), Part 4; David E. Apter, lha Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), esp. p. l4lff.; David E. Apter, The Political Kin dom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic NatiOnalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), esp. p. l81ff. I have drawn from Coleman (pp. 271-295) for the dis- cussion of developments in Nigeria. 66Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 362. Perham did, however, warn colonial officers as early as 1937 to be "prepared for uneXpected develOpments . . ." 67PrOposals for the Revision of the Constitution of Ni eria, Gmd. 6599 (London: H. M. StatiOnery Office, 1945) (Cited in Coleman, Op. cit., p. 271). -126- to the organization of a Nigerian state and the thin it of a Native Authority system. A series of ses between contending federalists and separatists a state divided into three Regions (East, West, and Each was to have an administrative service and a Assembly empowered to prepare a regional budget and legislation. Native authorities in each were to nom- nbers of the Regional Assembly which would, in turn, ive representatives to sit on a Legislative Council enter. By establishing a hierarchy of indirectly- :Ouncils connecting apex and base, the colonial power to perpetuate a Native Authority system as the basis 1 administration. Not surprisingly, many Africans the conservative bent of Government and Constitution. position to official conservatism was not, however, to a single Sphere in the Nigerian political system. \zikiwe, Awolowo, and others worked at the center ge, lesser lights engaged in parallel activities 1e periphery. For example, literate younger elements were already agitating for greater participation in 16 Authority.68 The nomination of four illiterates, ; three traditional officeholders, to the advisory dany of the younger men, including literates in the 1e Rising Union, supported centralization under a ll Chieftaincy in order to break the political stran- )f traditionalist district and clan heads. By 1949, many IHRU members Opposed formal inauguration of an r conservative and corrupt Och'Idoma. See Northern Benue Province, Annual Report fer Idoma Division, >ublished); also see pp. 160-163, -127- in 1948 provoked even more vehement demands for ac- the local government establishment. e Administration and central NA were prepared to me recognition to the dissidents. Accordingly, the ’ere permitted to attend the 1950 Provincial Confer- elections and local government reform.69 Still dis- d, they agitated on their return for immediate doub- Intermediate Area Council representation on ;§'5 advisory council.70 The Administration countered y acknowledging the possibility of these elements ing on Intermediate Area Councils as "unofficials" participating at the center ". . . in the form of ‘ committees."71 Predictably, the dissidents re- _ possible concession auguring domination by illiter- . traditionalists at the intermediate and central f the NA. e dissidents moved to force the issue. In prepara- ‘ indirect elections to the Northern House of Assembly they managed to gain control of electoral colleges .istrict and divisional levels. They had now maneu- ,to a position from which demands for NA reform could effectively articulated. Agitation continued un- the appointment of two ex-district scribes to Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for yision, 1950 (unpublished). Ibid. Ibid. E; An" " 'vl -128- combined clan-district headships only provoked demands for greater reform. Finally, in 1952, the Administration relented on sev- eral fronts. First, the advisory council was expanded to include a scribe and two members nominated by each of the Intermediate Area Councils for three year terms. With six F“5‘* literates averaging 35-40 years in age, the advisory council I had been transformed, in the words of one European officer, into a ". . . useful blend of traditional officeholders and educated progressives."72 Second, each district Ojira was i authorized to nominate one person to sit with the district head on the Intermediate Area Council. Third, the system of district courts based on the fluid ajlpa was abolished. It was replaced by a court system in which Specific individuals were designated members from officially-recognized, kindred- based constituencies.73 In retrospect, however, it appears that the Adminis- tration's actions were influenced only in part by local pressures for reform. Of perhaps greater import were devel- Opments at the regional level. In 1950, a commission had been established in response to a Northern House Of Assembly motion calling for an inquiry into the state of local admin- istration.74 The commission report, released during that 7?Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1952 (unpublished). 73Ibid. 74L.Gray Cowan, Local Government in West Africa -129- year, noted the existence of a wide variety of largely in- effective local councils, committees, and conferences. Its findings did, however, confirm a trend toward conciliar administration at the local level.75 Apprised of the report and no doubt sensitive to "de- mocratization" of local administration in the other Regions, the Northern House of Assembly moved that conciliar organs be strengthened forthwith.76 Sole Native Authorities (i.e., Emirships and chieftaincies without formal responsibility to councils) were progressively abolished. By 1954, all Sole NA's had been replaced by gazetted "Chief-in-Council" or "Chief—and-Council” organs.77 A second measure involved the enactment of the Native Authority Law of 1954.78 While that Law was essentially a codification of existing legislation, several aSpects indicated a somewhat broader SCOpe. First, the document included an outline of the formal relationship between councils and the Native Authority system. Aboli— tion of the Sole NA'S was reCOgnized in Section 2 of the Law. Second, all informal village, district, town, and (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 79. I have drawn from Cowan (pp. 79-83) for the discussion of develOpments in the Northern Region of Nigeria. 75K. P. Maddocks and D. A. Pott, Local Government in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1951), pp. 1-35. 76Cowan, Op. cit., p. 79. 77Ibid., p. 80. 73Northern Nigeria, Native Authority Law of 1954 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1961), pp. I171. -130- "outer" councils Operative as of July 1954 were rendered statutory bodies. Finally, while the Law did not establish any new councils, it did provide that . a native authority may, and shall if so directed by the Minister [for Local Government] by instrument [1. e. , with formal de51gnation of composition and func- tions] establish a local council for any district, town, village, area, ward, or other administrative sub-area E?“ . . (Section 55) The North's formal commitment to "democratization” of the Native Authority system was embodied in the proviso that 10- cal councils be composed of elected majorities (Section 59). Illfl' em- I In sum, reforms in Idoma were impelled by a convergence of forces Operating within and outside the Division: (1) agitation by a clamant minority and (2) the Administration's post-war commitment to gradual, controlled change at the base. That approach, forming the thread with which both the "Richards Constitution" and the Native Authority Law of 1954 had been woven, guided future develOpments in Idoma. In accordance with Section 55 of the Native Authority Law, the Idoma NA proceeded to establish a district council system. Councils were composed of NA-appointed minorities and majorities elected from kindred-based constituencies. These bodies were empowered to serve as agent of the Native Authority and representative of the district pOpulation. Bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict originating in that dual mandate will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.79 The first elections under the new plan were held in 79See pp. 141-159, 244-252. ~131- 1955. One year later, district councils were formally is- sued Standing Orders by the NA.80 In 1958, the Northern Minister for Local Government gazetted Instruments recog- nizing the councils as statutory bodies in the Idoma Native Authority;81 in that year, the second triennial elections were held. Three years later, kindred-based constituencies ere: were abolished in favor of a system of consolidated terri- torial constituencies.82 New elections were held in 1962. Having established a council system from base to apex, the Administration turned to the problem of "normative en- t gineering." It now sought to reconcile ”democratization" with the Objective of an efficient Native Authority. In 1954, the advisory council was replaced by a policy-making Executive Council consisting of Och'Idoma (president), four literate Administrative Councillors, and Intermediate Area Councillors sitting in rotation. Elected for a three year term by an Intermediate Area Council, each Administrative Councillor was also the head of a department in the NA.83 The four Intermediate Area Councils were replaced in 1958 80Standing Orders prescribe method of election, rules of procedure, committee organization and functions, and so forth. 81Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, The Idoma Native Authority District Councils Instruments, 1958 (Kaduna: Government Printer, MarEH'3, 1958). 82Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, "The Idoma Native Authority District Councils Instruments, 1962," Gazette, v. 11, #22, Supplement E (April 19, 1962). 83The four main departments are Finance, Local Gov- ernment, Police-Judiciary, and Works. -132- by a single Representative Council linking district and di- visional levels. Sixteen of the twenty-two districts elected one person to a three year term on the Representative Coun- cil; councils of the six most pOpulous districts each elected two Representative Councillors. Representative Councillors in each Intermediate Area of the Division, in turn, elected rm“- one person to serve as an Administrative Councillor. Och'Idoma, four Administrative Councillors, and Representa- tive Councillors chosen in rotation sat as the Executive Council of the Native Authority.84 In time, however, the combination of burdensome respon- sibility and intrigue among rivalrous members of the Exec- utive Council was to have a deleterious effect on over-all administration.85 Consequently, the Executive Council was abolished in late 1958. It was replaced by a General Pur- poses Committee consisting of Och'Idoma (president), two Administrative Councillors elected by the Representative Councillors from each of the Intermediate Areas, and Repre- sentative Councillors chosen in rotation.86 Two years later, the unwieldy General Purposes Committee was overhauled. The eight Administrative Councillors were replaced by four 84Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of a Special Executive Meetiagfi(unpub- lished,. April 15, 1958). 851bid. 86Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of Executive Meeting: (unpublished, August 20, 1958). ~133- Portfolio Councillors elected in the same manner and assigned similar functions.87 The Administration's final exercise in "normative-in- stitutional engineering” involved the judiciary. Adminis- tration and judiciary were separated in 1957, presumably as a means of enhancing NA efficiency at the divisional and 5*iun district levels. Och'Idoma and the district heads were re- é placed as court presidents.88 The four Intermediate Area Courts were abolished one year later.89 In 1961, the dis- trict and central courts were replaced by six "profession- J 31"90 (Grade "B") circuit courts of first instance. Civil 87Technically, the Portfolio Councillor is merely a consultant in contrast to the Administrative Councillor who is an executive. In Idoma, the distinction is a meaningless one. See Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, Duties of Councillors (unpublished circular No. MLG. 42/82, September 12, I962). 88Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, June 6, 1957). 89Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, Jan- uary 22, 1958). The Administration subsequently registered displeasure with this sudden move by the Idoma NA. The former finally acquiesced. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of a Special Ex- ecutive Meeting (unpublished, February 7,4I958). 90In order to prepare for the newly-adOpted penal code, the six court presidents and several court members were des- patched to the Legal Branch, Institute of Administration (Zaria). There they received intensive training in sub- stantive law and court procedure. A similar attempt to "professionalize" the district Councils was made in 1963, when the Ford Foundation and In- stitute of Administration jointly Sponsored two instructors in Idoma. While both instructors and a number of councillors were enthusiastic about the project, on the whole it appears -134- and criminal sections in each convened separately under a single president. Appeals from both sections have since 1961 passed directly to the Provincial Court at Makurdi. Conclusion An examination of colonial administrative policy in ' Pris... Idoma reveals a pendular course of develOpment. On the one '_ “I“. hand, a tendency toward strong chieftaincy and centraliza- tion based on the Fulani model; on the other, "democratiza- tion" rooted first in traditional constitutionalism and n1 ‘ finally in Western notions of majoritarian local government. ti; Those alternating movements throw light on dilemmas con- . fronting the colonial power in Idoma. How to reconcile a persistent, even if varyingly intense, commitment to Indirect Rule with a perceived need for substantial ”institutional engineering"? How to reconcile a synthesis of the two with the elusive long-range objective of "normative engineering," i.e., the grafting of a ”higher civilization,” including such alien notions as "progress" and "administrative effici- ciency"?91 Irreconcilability of long-range objectives with the mandate of Indirect Rule had been evident as early as 1923. In that year, Indirect Rule based on Idoma constitutional- ism waxed and almost immediately waned. Yet it survived as an influential myth for nearly two decades. The myth was to have had very little impact on councillor attitudes and performances. 91Lugard, The Dual Mandate . . ., Op. cit., p. lff. ~135- finally laid to rest by a Divisional Officer's candid con- trast between artificiality in Idoma and reform in the Emirates. Having abandoned all pretense of Indirect Rule in Idoma, the Administration undertook to create that which had been envisaged twenty years earlier. In 1947, the Native Authority was centralized under a divisional chieftaincy. However, concessions to those agitating for conciliar "de- mocratization" augured a Pyrrhic victory for the Administra- tion in Idoma. One could hardly expect councils hastily formed to contribute any more to the viability of the NA than had the Bilii earlier. Indeed, prOphetS of doom dis- cerned in "democratization” (l) a reverse trend toward de- centralization and (2) a harbinger of the disorderliness, if not outright chaos, characteristic of the NA prior to World War II.92 What of the prophecy? The evidence points overwhelm— ingly to the contrary. Indeed, it could be argued on sev- eral grounds that "democratization" facilitated the trend toward centralization under an even stronger Idoma chief- taincy. First, Och'Idoma consolidated his position vis-a— vis the district heads by appearing to act simultaneously on behalf of young literates clamoring for "democracy" (i.e., participation) and the Administration insistent on 92Disorderliness and chaos, often described euphemis- tically as ”inefficiency," is a theme running through many administrative and intelligence reports of the period. For some frank observations by an administrative officer posted to Idoma, see Crocker, Op. cit., pp. 65-95, passim. i‘f‘.‘ -l36- efficiency. District heads were systematically excluded from both the Representative and Executive Councils and the General Purposes Committee. This "reform" had the practical effect of circumscribing the district heads' ability to ex- ert direct influence at Oturkpo Town, seat of the central NA and venue for meetings of the new bodies. Predictably, they protested, but to no avail.93 Second, separation of administration and judiciary had the effect of engendering competition for power, prestige, and income between district heads and court presidents appointed by the central NA. The district heads again protested in vain.94 At the same time, Och'Idoma maintained cOntrol of the upper judiciary by ap- pointing a brother to the presidency of the Central Court. Third, abolition of the Intermediate Area Courts, on which district heads sat, eliminated four strategic points around which Opposition might organize. Fourth, the ability of district councils to rival the center was checked by their isolation, limited powers, and continued dependence on good- will in Oturkpo Town. Fifth, as president of the Executive 'Council and later the General Purposes Committee, Och'Idoma _ 93Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, Aug- ust 26-28, 1957). g4Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Minutes of a Special Meetlag (unpublished, April 28, 1958). The—NA did,’however, warn court presidents to refrain from having traditional drums beat on their behalf, adding that court presidents and other citizens of the dis- tricts were still subordinate to district heads. Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetiaga (unpublished, September 17-19, 1959). -137- was able to wield influence within these bodies and the NA departments. It ought to be noted, however, that his ability to control the Representative and Administrative (later Port— folio) Chuncillors was not unlimited. These indirectly- elected officeholders were often beholden to political pa- trons among the district heads. f‘:~» In sum, changes wrought in Idoma between 1947 and 1960 were most beneficial to the center. Combining institutional change, prestige of chiefly office, and consummate skill as a political practitioner, Ogiri Oko was able to keep poten- ‘ fl tial and actual Opponents off-balance and in a state of per- I" petual conflict. By 1960, when Oko died and the colonial power departed from Nigeria, it could fairly be said that the Administration's culminating exercises in "institutional engineering" had been successful. Politically and adminis- tratively, Idoma was centralized as never before. That it had yet to experience the efficiency which might have re- sulted from long-range "normative engineering" does not de- tract from the achievement.95 Implications of that 95Sensitivity to the need for "normative engineering" on the eve of independence may be gleaned from the following exchange between officials in the Administration: When the Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry for Local Government (Northern Region), registered some concern over power gravi- tating to General Purposes Committees, the Idoma Divisional Officer noted that "the only way to achieve [expeditious con- duct of Native Authority business] is to have a small, power- ful, and efficient committee of capable men who can be re- lied on to get positively on with the job. Any method which can be suggested of keeping such an organization in check would be most welcome but may be found only at the eXpense of efficiency." Northern Nigeria,Ministry for Local Govern- ment, Memorandum from Acting Permanent Secretary_to Residents, -138- achievement for role and Idoma district councillorship will be examined in Part IV. District Officers, and Princlpal of Institute of Administra- tion Zaria (unpubliShed, NO. MIG 542/vol. 11/69, August 12, I958); Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province RESident (unpublished, DiVisionaI Office No. , eptem er 5, 1958). PART IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 1.! 1' .1. Chapter VI: Role Perception and the Objective Conflict Situation Chapter VII: Role Conflict: Perception, Ambivalence, Resolution Chapter VIII: Multidimensionalism in Conflict Resolution CHAPTER VI ROLE PERCEPTION AND THE OBJECTIVE CONFLICT SITUATION It has been indicated that in "culturally mixed" dual * societies, "bureaucratization-debureaucratization" presup- poses neither commitment to the Weberian model nor intrusion of an alien value system; in such societies, sources of con- flicting attitudes toward organizational growth and social regimentation may be found in (1) an indigenous heterogeneity and/or (2) an imposed value system.1 Both sources of bureau- cratic-debureaucratic role conflict are examined in cases from Idoma. Cases I'and II involve financial and political party activities generated by the colonial presence. Contrast- ingly, Case 111 focuses on role conflict produced by tra- ditional tension between the larger community and such asso- ciations as secret societies and dance groups. Finally, the two conflict Situations in Case IV reflect confused in- digenous and alien develOpments surrounding the Idoma chieftaincy institution. Objectives of the chapter may now be specified. The 1See pp. 1-6, esp. p. 5. -139- -140- two-fold purpose will be (1) to examine diverse sources of, and (2) to analyze descriptively the councillors' perceptual responses to, potential (i.e., objective) role conflict sit- uations. Situational analyses will encompass both audience and district variables. An examination of relationships be- tween the district variable and the councillors' perceptual responses will focus on differences in (a) chieftaincy in- stitutions; (b) the clan composition of districts; and (c) the proximity of districts to administrative centers.2 Before pursuing those objectives, attention is called to the relevant audience populations. During Phase I of the field operation, the researcher ascertained bases for the potential conflict situations noted above. At the same time, he sought to identify the audiences with whom Idoma district councillors effect role relationships. Intensive participant observation and discussion revealed that those relationships are pyramidally-structured. At the base, councillors inter- act with three village audiences: elders, non-elders, and tax collectors. Ascending the pyramid, role relationships are effected with such conciliar-administrative audiences as elected councillors, nominated councillors, representa- tive councillors, and the district head. Finally, district councillors interact at the apex with the central 2Execution of a chi-square test on situational role alternatives in rotated district pairings revealed statis- tically-significant differences; hence, exploration of the district variable. -l4l- administration of the Native Authority.3 Case 1: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization Implications of terminal colonial policy for central- ized authority in Idoma have already been examined;4 at the same time, however, a countervailing tendency may be found in conciliar "democratization” of the Native Authority (NA) after World War II. Reflecting the tension between central- ization and "democratization” is a potential bureaucratic- debureaucratic role conflict in the plan for district coun- cil reform.5 On the one hand, there is the authority dele- .gated under the Native Authority Law of 1954 to district councils as agents of the NA. These subordinate bodies are empowered (l) to recommend to the NA appointment of district heads and taxcollectors;6 (2) to apportion tax to village units and recommend for tax increases such persons as afflu- ent traders and farmers; (3) to authorize district council fund eXpenditure with NA approval; (4) to supervise 3Participant observation and discussion indicated that district councillors effected role relationships with secret society and dance group members in situations involving those associations. Hence, the decision to include both au- diences in the conflict Situation in Case 111. 4See pp. 134-137. SNorthern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Au- thority, Guide for District Councils, Idoma DivisionlyBenue Province (zaria, NOrthern Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation;IMay , p. 2; also see pp. 130-131. 6In fact, tax collectors are nominated by the district heads and formally appointed by the Native Authority. -l42- Government and NA works in the district when required to do so; (5) to transmit village recommendations to the NA; (6) to supervise the use of NA-approved communal labor; (7) to maintain law and order within the district; (8) to appoint Committees for Works, Markets, Road, Finance, and General Purposes; and (9) to carry out duties delegated by the NA. On the other hand, there is the vaguely-defined eXpectation that councils composed of elected majorities will ". faithfully represent . . . the people of the various Dis- tricts."7 Case I reflects a conflict between agent and repre- sentational functions. Specifically, the case involves con- tradictory expectations relevant to the disbursement of district council funds.8 The following hypothetical incident (focusing on another Native Authority in Benue Province) was presented to each subject: Several weeks ago, I received a letter from my friend in Wukari Division. He told me about a problem in- volving a district council in Wukari Division. After telling me the problem, he asked how the district coun- cillors and peOple of Idoma Division would have dealt with it. I wrote to him that I did not know, but that I would be willing to ask the Idoma district councillors how they would have dealt with such a problem in their own districts. The Wukari NA had entered into an agreement with a contractor who was to build a district council hall. The contractor had agreed to build the hall for L450 7Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Guide for District Councils . . ., op. cit., p. l. 8District councils receive a percentage of per cap- ita tax collected annually. Funds may be disbursed, with Native Authority approval, for district development. -143- and Was paid the L450 immediately from the district coun- cil fund. After completing the building, except for the roof and plastering, the contractor realized that he had incorrectly estimated the cost involved. He now re- ported to the Wukari NA and the district Council that what he had so far built had cost him E500. He told the NA that unless the district council agreed to pay him L50 for work already completed, plus another L100 for the roof and plastering, he would not complete the building. In other words, he wanted L600 to build the council hall rather than his original estimate of L450, which he had already been paid. When the district council told the district head not to Sign the payment voucher for £150, the NA insisted that the voucher must be signed by the district head, who is a salaried agent of the NA. I have just received another letter from my friend telling me that the pay- ment voucher for L150 has not yet been Signed. In order to analyze more closely the role relationship be- tween district councillor, district head (i.e., permanent council chairman),and the NA, the broader agent-representa- tive conflict was articulated in three discrete situations. Implications of this mode of articulation for an analysis of conflict resolution will be examined in a subsequent chap- ter.9 The first conflict Situation focuses on the question of council involvement in the disbursement of funds. Inter- est centers on the prOportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following eXpectations: (1) that the district head ask the council for advice on whether to sign a payment voucher; (2) that the district head not ask the council for advice on whether to sign a payment voucher; (3) no expectation in this Situation. (Included in all situational tables in Chapter V1 is the 9See pp. 244-252. -l44- prOportionate incidence of perceived intra-audience role conflict, as in the case of conflict between members of the elected councillor audience. That report is represented in each table by the slashed (/) alternative.) The data pre- sented in Table 1 indicate perceived wideSpread eXpectation of council involvement in the disbursement of funds. Ninety- <1ne percent of the subjects reported all audiences as holding the expectation that council advice be solicited by the district head. Five elected councillors in Districts 4 and 5 did, however, perceive NA-appointed colleagues as holding the Op- posite eXpectation;10 that eXpectation was also reported for the representative councillor and NA by elected members in District 5 and Districts 4-5, reSpectively. Probes elicited bases for the assignment of that eXpectation to audiences beyond the electoral control of village constituents. Four subjects in Districts 4 and 5 reported that all nominated colleagues eXpected their district head and NA benefactors to circumvent an ”unreliable council"; another in District 4 indicated that one nominated colleague, first cousin of the district head, expected by-passing of the "hostile coun- cil.” A similar reSponse was elicited from an elected mem- ber for the representative councillor in District 5; the latter is the senior son of the district head. Finally, 10In fact, NA-appointed district councillors are nom- inated by the district heads and formally appointed by the Native Authority. Such councillors constitute a minority on all district councils. ~145- ow om mHOHHfioqsoo mo honeaz oofl>wm xoom Op poc\oe oofl>wm Meow Op uoz oua>wm xoom OH :Ofiumuoomxo oz muoaafiocsou mo Monasz OOH>wm Meow Op poc\oe oofl>wm xoom Op #02 OOH>vm Meow OH :Oflumuoomxo oz whoaafioasoo mo Honesz OOH>vm Meow Op uoa\OH OOH>wm Meow Op uoz oua>wm Meow OH coaumuoome oz mHOHHflOasoo mo Honesz oufl>wm Meow Op no:\oe OOM>©m zoom Op uoz OOH>©w xoom OH coapmuoome Oz muoaafiuqsou eooooam muouoofiaou xme mnoeam -coz mcoeam Locos o>aa used wouaw ooaaemam Odo :Ofipmuuomxm mo:0fiw:< ’1 Ammoao>zH qHuzaoov ZOHHOm Hoom Ou HOO\OH O O mm -- -- -- OOH>OO Hoom Op uoz so No an OOH OOH OOH ooH>ee soon oH SOHnocos< -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHumuoomxo Oz O>Hpmz HHHM HNHH AMHM HOHM HNHM HNNM mHOHHHOGOOO HO Honesz -- -- -- -- -- -- OOH>OO Hoom Op HOO\OH N O -- a- -- -- OOH>Om Hoom Op qu mHOHHHucsou NO NO OOH OOH mm OOH OOH>OO Hoom OH o>Hu H -- -x -: m -- coHpmuuomxo oz -mucomoymom HHHM HNHM HMHU HOHM HHHM HNNM mHOHHHO=SOO mo Honssz H -- w -- -- -- OOH>Om Hoom OH poc\oe O mN O -- -- -- OOH>Om Hoom Op uoz mm mu «m OOH OOH OOH OOH>Om Hoom OH mHOHHHOcSOu -- -- -- ;- a- -- :OHpmuoomxo Oz wouwcHEOz Hmuoh O>Hw. Meow OOHHH 039 Oco OOHumpoomxm OOOOHOO< uoHuumHm eoscHocoO--H mqmO< HO Om OO OH HN Om emHm on no: omH>O< om mm -- ON Om mm cmHm OH OmH>O< mHOHHHOcsoo -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHumuoomxo Oz OOHOOHm ngw ANHM AMHM “OHM AHHV Hmmw mHOHHHOOOOO mo Honssz NH O OH Om ON OH emHm oo Hoc\oo omH>O< Om NO mm OH -- om :mHm Op Ho: OmH>O< ON Om -- OH OH NH cmHn on omH>e< HH -- -- OH om O :OHHmpooaxo Oz mHOHOOHHOu xmh HHOH HNHH HMHH HOHH HHHp HNNH ecoHHHocsoo Ho nonesz Om OH OH OH Om HN emHm oo ooc\oo omH>O< mm mm mm OH -- Om :me op Ho: omH>O< mH mm -- OH O OH OMHm Op omH>O< mHOOHm mH .. -- OH me O :OHumuuomxo Oz -coz AHHH ANHM AMHM AOHM HHHM mwhp mHOHHHOOOOO HO HOOEOZ Hm HO OH OO OO O cmHm OH Hoe\op omH>O< Om mm mm OH O Om :mHm Op Ho: OmH>w< OH OH -- OH -- mm emHn oo omH>e< OH -- -- ON mq OH :OHumpuome Oz mHOOHm HmHOH O>Hm Hoom mouse 03H Oco :OHumuoomxm OOOOHO3< HOHHumHQ HmmoO< m< OOHHHOZOOOO onHO< O AH -- -- A m emHm oo oo: omH>e< HO NO OOH OOH NO mO emHo oo omH>e< AOHHoeos< -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHueuuomxo Oz o>Hpmz HHAM HNHU HMHU HOHH ONHH Hmmw mHOHHHOOOOO mo Honesz -- -- -- a- -- -- cmHm OH poc\ou OmH>O< OH NO Hm ON NO Om OOHm on Hoe omH>O< mm NO OO OO Am HO emHn on onH>e< Owo: -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHHOHOOOxO Oz HOHHHOHQ Hth HNHM HMHM “OHM AHHH ANNM mHOHHHocsoo mo Honesz -- -- -- -- -- -- OOHm Op Ho:\ou OmH>O< mm Ne OOH OO HN Om cme OH Ho: OmH>O< mHOHHHoasou me Om -- OO OA HO cmHm on omH>O< o>Ho H w -- -- -- -- :OHpmpooaxo Oz -mucomOHmOm HHAV HNHH HMHV HOHO HHHO Hhhp mHOHHHOcOOO mo Honesz HH -- Om ON A m emHm on ooc\oo omH>O< 44 OO Om ON HN Om emHm oo oo: omH>e< me OO O OO HA Om emHm oo omH>O< muoHHHocsoO -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHHOHOOOKO Oz OoumcHEOz HmuOH O>Hm Anon] OOHOH 03H Oco :OHumauomxm OOOOHO3< HOHHumHo OOOGHOOOU--N mqmHm H30» mouse 039] one aOHumuoomxm OOOOHOO< HOHHHOHQ AmmoHHmz HHAO HNHH HMHO OOHV HOHH HNNH mHOHHHOOQOO mo HOOEOZ -- -- -- -- -- -- OOHO OH HOO\OH OO OO OOH OH A OO OOHO oo Hoz OHoHHHoesoO OO AO -- OO OO HO OOHO oH o>HH -- -- -- -- r- -- :OHHmHOomxo Oz -chomOHmom HHAH HNHU HMHM HOHO HOHU Hhhp mHOHHHOODOO mo Honesz OH -- OO OH A O OOHO oo HoOAoH OO OO Om -- A OO OOHO oH Hoz NO AO O OO OO NO cOHO oH OHoHHHoesoO -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHHmHoomxo Oz OOHOOHEOZ HmHOH O>Hm Hsom. OOHHP. 03F Ono :OHHmHuomxm OOHOHO3< HoHHHOHO eoscHHeoO--O mHmHOOHOO mo OOOOOHOOH OHOOOHHHOQOHQ HO: O mOHOOOO Hu_uU MOHOH OHHOHOOOOHOO Oo>HOOHOm HO OOOOOHOOH OHOQOHHHOOOHQ Hong: OOHOOOO H+O Hmhoz + u u + + + AHHHoOH:<. o>HHmz + H H + + N H WHOHHHU -csou o>HH -mHaomOHmOm + n u + + + mHOHHHuczou OOHOOHEOZ _ 1|. H H H + + + WHOHHWUCDOU % OOHOOHm l _ + + + + + mHoHUOHHOU xme u u u u + + + mHOOHm-:Oz + u u + + + mHOOHm Owo: . Owo: . Owo: . Owo: . Owo: . .HOHO, csoO .HOHO coou .HOme esoO .HOHOI esou .HOHO esou oocoHO3< o>Hm Hsom] OOHHH 039 oco HOHHHOHQ OHHHm Hsom OOHHH 039 Ono :OHHmHuomxm OOOOHO3< HoHHHOHO HmmoHHmz OOo: HoHHHOHO mHOHHHOcsou O>HH -OHOOOOHQOO OHOHHHOOOOU OOHOHHEOZ HOHoH HOOK OOHMH HoHHHOHO Ono :OHHmHuomxm OOGOHOO< OoseHHeoO--O mHmHHOm OHOEOH OH HOO\OH O -- O -- -- O o>HHom :HmEOH OH Hoz OHOOEOZ OO OO OO OO OO OO o>HHom OHOEOH oH AHOHooO O O -- -- -- m :OHHmHoomxo Oz HOHOOO AHAM ANHM HMHM HOHM HOHM Hhhp OHOHHHOOOOO mo Honesz OO NO ON OH OO HO o>HHoO eHOeOH oH HoOAoH O -- O -- A O O>HHom :HmEOH OH HOz mm Om HO OO ON mm o>HHom OHOEOH OH O.HOHOOHHOU O O O -- -- m OOHHOHOOQxO Oz me HHAH HNHO HMHH HOOP HOOP HOOP OHoHHHoesoo Ho HOOesz OO AO HO OO HA OO osHHom cHOEoH oH HoOAoH O -- O -- -- O o>HHom OHOEOH OH HOz OO ON HO OO ON OO O>HHOO :HmEOH OH OHOOHm O O -- -- -- m :OHHOHOOQXO Oz .:02 “HAM hNHw HOHM Hpr HHHP HNNP mHOHHHoczou mo HOHEOZ Om OO HO OO OA Om O>HHom OHOEOH OH HOO\OH m -- O -- -- O O>HHOO :HOEOH OH Hoz Om NO ON Om HN HO O>HHOm OHOEOH OH O O O OH -- O :OHHmHuomxo Oz OHOOHm HmHOH O>Hm. Hsom OOHHH. Ozb. Oco OOHHmHoomxm OOGOHO3< HOHHHOHQ HOOOOHZOOOOO zHO HHZOOHOHHOOO O< OOHHHOzOOOO onHOZOO O>HHHHom OHOEOH OH HOO\OH O -- -- -- -- O O>HHOO :HOEOH OH HOz mHOHHHOOOOU OH ON HO -- -- OH o>HHom OHOEOH OH o>HH NO OA OO OOH OOH OA eoHHOHoOOxn oz -OHOOOOHOOO HHAO HNHV HOHO HOHO HOHO HNNO OHOHHHOOOOO HO HOOEOZ -- -- -- -- -- -- o>HHom OHOEOH OH Ho:\OH O -- O -- -- O o>HHOO OHOEOH OH HOz ON ON OO ON -- OH O>HHOO :HmEOH OH O.HOHHHOHHHHOO OA OA OO OO OOH AA eoHHOHonOxO oz OOHOOHEoz AHAM ANHM AMHM thw HOHH ANNH mHOHHHoasou mo Honesz -- -- -- -- -- .. O>HHum :HOEOH OH HOO\OH O -- O -- -- O o>HHOm :HOEOH OH HOz HN ON OO OO -- OH o>HHom OHOEOH OH OHOHHHOcsou OA OA OO OA OOH AA HHOHHOHOOHHOAO Oz OOHOOHm AHAM .NH~ AMHM Hpr HHHP HNMP OHOHHHuasou mo Honesz O O -- -- OH OH OHOOoHHOOO Hoz OO OO ON OO OO AN o>HHoO OHOEOH oH HoOAoH O - O -- -- O o>HHom :HmEOH OH Hoz OHOOEOZ OO ON OO OO OO OO o>HHom cHOeOH oH OOoHO O O -- -- -- O :OHHmHoomxo Oz momma HOHOH o>Hm Hsom OOHHH 03H Ono :OHHOHOOOxm ooOOHOO< HOHHHOHQ OOSHHHGOU--A mHmHHOO :HmEOH OH HOO\OH O -- O -- -- O m>HHum :HOEOH OH HOz A AH OH -- -- O O>HHOO :HmEOH OH OHHHOHHO< OO OO AA OOH OOH HO :oHHmHOOOxO oz o>HHOz AHAH ANHH AOHM AOHM HOHO HNNM OHOHHHOGOOO mo HOOEOZ -- s- -- -- u- -- o>HHum GHOEOH OH Ho:\Ob O -- O -- -- O o>HHOm chEOH OH HOz HN OO OO -- -- OH o>HHOm :HmEOH OH Owo: OA NO OO OOH OOH AA eoHHOHOOOxO oz HoHHHOHO HOHOO o>HM Hsoml OOHHH, 039 one OOHHmHOOmxm OOOOHO3< HOHHHOHQ wosaHHcou--A mHmMO Hoop OOHHH 03H Odo OOHHOHOOmxm oocoHO3< HOHHHOHQ ZOHmmmUUDw >UZHHHmz HHAO HNHM HOHV HOMO HHHP Hhhp OHOHHHOOOOO mo HOOEOZ -- -- -- z- -- -- HHmm oMmH OH HOO\OH O -- -- -- -- O HHm OHOH OH HOz OHOHHHOOOOU AO OOH OOH OOH OOH HO HHOO OHOH oH O>HH -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHHOHOOQXO Oz -OHOOOOHmom HHAM HNHP HMHM HOHM HOHO wap mHOHHHOOOOO mo Honssz H -- -- OH -- -- HHOQ OHOH OH Ho:\oe O -- -- -- -- O HHmm OHOH OH HOz OO OOH OOH OO OOH HO HHOO OOOH oH OHoHHHocOoO -- -- -- -- -- -- :OHHOHOOQKO Oz OOHOHHEOZ HmHOH o>HMI Hsom OOHHH 039 one :OHHwHuomxm monOHOH< HOHHHOHQ voscHHdoo--O mHmHm Haom OOHcP 039 Ono OOHHmHuomxm. mu:OHO:< HOHHHOHQ ZOHOOOOOOO HOzHOHOmHOO Oz< .OHOOOOOO.HOHOHOHO .OHOOOOHO zHHmz HHAM HNHH HOHM HOHM HOHM Hhhp OHOHHHOOOOO mo Honesz OO ON OOH -- -- OOH OHOOoHHOOO Hoz -- -- -- -- a- -- HHOQ onH OH Ho:\OH OO AO -- OO HA -- HHOO oxOH oH Hoz HH O -- OO HN -- HHOO oHOH oH OOoO H -- -- -- A -- :OHHOHOOQXO Oz HOHHHOHQ AHAO HNHP AMHH Hpr HOHO Hth OHOHHHOOOOO HO HOOEOZ -- -- -- -- a- -- HHOQ OHOH OH Hoc\OH HO OO NO OO HA O HHOOH OHOH oH Hoz O.HoHHHonoO OO AH OO OO HN HO HHOO OHOH oH o>HH H -- -- -- A -- OOHHOHOOQXO Oz -mHOOOOHmOO AHAM HNHM HOHM HOHM HOHO HNNM OHOHHHOOOOO mo Honesz O s- -- OH A -- HHmm Ome OH HOO\OH OO OO NO OO OO O HHOO OOOH oH Hoz OO AH OO OO HN HO HHOO OHOH oH mHoHHHonoO H -- -- -- A -- OOHHmHuOmxo Oz OOHOOHEOZ HOHOH o>Hm H30» OOHHH. 039 0:0 OOHHmHoomxm OOOOHOO< HOHHHOHO OOOOHHOOU--O mHm.20).3 In sum, significant dif- ferences in the proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict are limited to the Situational variable. Accord- ingly, the role conflict situation has been accepted as an independent variable in this context; the analysis will en- compass that variable alone. Objective and Perceived Role Conflict In eXplicating a conceptual schema, the researcher noted that the existence of an objective role conflict situ- ation does not predicate its recognition by an actor in the social system; the actor may be ignorant of its existence or 3PrOportionate incidence of role conflict was computed for five Situations in each of the five districts. Twenty- five proportions were then ranked from 25-1. The situational hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with situational columns and district rows. (H=l3.84, corrected for ties; df=4). The district hypothesis was tested by con- structing a table of ranks with district columns and situa- tional rows. (H=S.07, corrected for ties; df=4, significant at less than .20). The unranked district and situational prOportionS are reported in Table 10. For a statement of the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test, see Sidney Siegel, Non-Parametric Statis- tics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hili, 1956), pp. I84-194. -l95- HHAV ANHM HOHH HOHH AOH~ ANN“ mHOHHHocsoo HO Honesz NO ON OO OA OO OO oHOOOOOO HOHHHOHO Ocm HOHHHOQDOU .n NA OO OO OOH OO OO OHOOOOOO emHo OOO HoHHHoOsoO .O :OHOOOOOOO OOOHOHHOHOU Ocm .mHanmoz HOHHHOHQ .QHanmo: cmHu H>H Ommu OHOH HOHH HOMO Opww HHHH ANNA O.HoHHHoesoo Ho HOOEOZ OO OA NO OA OO OO HOOOHOHHHOO OO HoHHHoesoO :OHHOOOO m>HHmHOOz OOH Ocm .cOHHmHOOmm< .OHHOOEEOU ”HHH Ommu AHAM ANHM HMHN HOHM AOHM HNNM OHOHHHOOOOO mo HOOEOZ OO OO OO OO OO ON HOOOHOOEOO Om HoHHHocOoO mocmHOOHH< HOOOHHONHOOOHQ OeO eoHHOHHHHHO AHHOO ”HH OOOO AHA” ANHH AOHH HOHH HOHM ANNH OHOHHHOOOOO mo Honesz AO OA OOH OOH OO NO HOOH>Om mm HOHHHOOOOU OOHHONHOOOHO_HOOOOHHOHOHziaH OOHHOHOOOOHQOO_qu Audom< ”H ommu HmHOO O>wm, HOOO OOHHH OzH Oco :OHHOOHHO HOHHHOOU HOHHHOHQ Ocm Ommu HOmoHHumhmO Qm>HmUmmm OE: mmOHHHUZDOU OH mHmH Ommu OOH -- AO HammHOHHHmm mm HOHHHOHSOU OOHHOcsm o>HHmHOOz OOH Oam .OOHHmHoomm< .OHHOOEEOU HHHH Ommu .& OO O AN HOHOHOQEOO mm HOHHHOODOU 9 . 4 OOOOHOOHH< HOOOHHONHOOOHO OeO eoHHOHHHOOO AHHOO ”HH OOOO OO OO NO HOOH>OO mm HOHHHOcsou :OHHONHOOOHO HOOHHOHOHOHm OH :OHH -chOOOHQOm Ocm Aocom< AH ommu OOOOHOO< oocoHO3< OOOHHOOHHO -mHHOH -HOHOH HOHHMOOU OHOm HOHHHOOU OHOm mo OQAH OO>HOOHOO mo HOOEOZ OOHHOOHHO HOHHchU Ocm Ommu mmm0Hmummm or: mmOHHHUZDOU HH MHm.50).15 Significant differences are again limited to the situational variable. Accordingly, the role conflict situation has been accepted as an independent variable in the analysis Of ambivalence. Table 12 reports the percentage of Idoma councillors who experienced aay_degree of ambivalence in perceived role conflict Situations. Reflected in the total column is less than universal eXperience of ambivalence in each of the situ- ations. Total incidence of ambivalence--107-~represents 48% of the 224 perceived role conflict Situations. 15PrOportionate incidence of ambivalence was computed for five situations in each of the five districts. Twenty- five proportions were then ranked from 25-1. The situa- tional hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with situational columns and district rows. (H=l3.04, cor- rected for ties; df=4, Significant at a level between .02 and .01). The district hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with district columns and situational rows. (H=3.58, corrected for ties; df=4, significant at a level between .50 and .30). The unranked district and situational proportions are reported in Table 13. TABLE 12 -202- COUNCILLORS WHO EXPERIENCED AMBIVALENCE IN PERCEIVED ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS (IN PERCENTAGES) Case and Conflict Situation District _L One Two Three Four Five Total Case 1: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organ- ization Councillor as advisor Number of councillors Case 11: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance Councillor as cannigner Number of councillors Case III: Community, .Association, and the Mediative Function Councillor as participant Number of councillors Case IV: Clan Head- ship, District Head- ship, and Chief- taincy Succession a. Councillor and clan headship Number of councillors b. Councillor and district head- ship Number of councillors 39 TH?) 20 W) 7 3 III) 73 HT) 73 III) 42 1‘17) 29 T7) 50 IT?) 31 T17) 86 T7) 50 ITU) 33 II?) 71 30 T19) 31 20 T?) 63 IT) 57 TV) 33 T9) 44 25 W) 78 r-g) 10 40 26 [27) 66 39 65 -203- Another view of the extent of incongruence between perceived role conflict and ambivalence may be gleaned from the following: seventeen (24%) of the 70 councillors who perceived at least one role conflict situation eXperienced pp difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives. Sixty-two (89%) eXperienced ambivalence in fewer than their total number of perceived role conflict Situations. Only eight councillors (11%) indicated commensurate perceived role conflict and ambivalence. Having ascertained the incidence of ambivalence, we next examine the degree of ambivalence experienced by Idoma district councillors. Of the 107 instances of difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives, 73% involve some ambivalence; only 27% indicate very much ambivalence. The responses on some and very much ambivalence represent 35% and 13% respectively, of the 224 perceived role conflict Situations. Mean ambivalence scores in Table 13 present yet another view of the degree of ambivalence eXperienced by district councillors. In pp instance does a score surpass 2.00, the level indicating some ambivalence. In sum, mean ambivalence scoresindicate consistent placement within the lower range of the three-point scale. Finally, comparing the last columns in Tables 10 and 13, it is noted that the conflict situation in Case 11 man- ifests the lowest proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict app the lowest mean ambivalence score. This finding suggested a possible correlation between the two variables. -204- TABLE 13 MEAN AMBIVALENCE SCORES FOR COUNCILLORS IN ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS Case and District Conflict Situation One Two Three Four Five Situational Means Case 1: Agency and Representa- tion in Hierarch- ical Organization Councillor as advisor 1.55 1.67 1.70 1.38 1.44 1.55 Case 11: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance Councillor as campaigner 1.20 1.45 1.33 1.20 1.25 1.29 Case 111: Com- munity, Associ- ation, and the Mediative Function Councillor as participant 1.73 1.67 2.00 1.88 1.89 1.80 Case IV: Clan Headship, Dis- trict Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession a. Councillor.and clan headship 2.00 1.46 1.50 1.57 1.30 1.57 b. Councillor and district headship 2.00 1.57 1.71 1.67 1.33 1.73 District Means 1.73 1.56 1.65 1.54 1.48 NOTE: 1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence; 3.00 = very much ambivalence. -205- In order to ascertain the extent Of association between pro- portionate incidence of perceived role conflict and mean ambivalence, a Spearman rank correlation coefficient was com- puted from the last columns in Tables 10 and 13. Indicating a low correlation between the two variables is an Obtained rho of .3, not Significant at the .05 level. However, focusing on the three situations for which customariness has been assessed (Cases 1, II, III), we note the following association between that variable and mean ambivalence score: party campaigning (least customary) is associated with least ambivalence, dance group-secret society participation (most customary) with the converse. That re- lationship has several important implications for district councillorship and an evolving secular society. Notwith- standing "institutional engineering,” secularization under colonial auspices magnified the importance of traditional structures in contemporary Idoma. Evidence of that paradox may be found in the tendency of informants to exaggerate the relationship between district council and traditional Ojira; others identify the former as successor to the aiuta con- stabulary, albeit weaker.16 Such magnification can be ex- pected temporarily to engender ambivalence in more customary role conflict situations. Over a period of time, however, the erosion of traditional structures (i.e., normative and institutional bases for such situations) can be eXpected to alleviate the problem of ambivalence. One consequence of 16See pp. 88-90, 95-97. -206- relief from customary sources of ambivalence is likely to be councillor role re-orientation toward conciliar-administra- tive audiences; role re-orientation can be eXpected to con- tribute, in turn, to the assault on remnants of traditional structure . l7 Conflict Resolution and Ambivalence In order to ascertain resolution technique, subjects who perceived role conflict were asked, "What would you do in this situation?" Responses in 224 perceived conflict situations indicated uniform preference for the technique 18 Fifty-four percent involving selection of a major role. of those responses involve the choice of debureaucratic roles. The scope of debureaucratic resolution may be gleaned from the situational distribution presented in Table 14. Debureaucratic resolution predominates in all but the situation involving district councillor participation in the selection of a district head (Case IV a). Majorities of varying size indicate the councillor's debureaucratic in- tention (l) to advise the district head not to Sign a pay- ment voucher (Case I); (2) not to campaign locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections (Case 11); (3) to remain active in the secret society or dance group (Case 111); and (4) not to participate in the selection of a clan head (Case-IV b). Especially striking are the 17See p. 159. 1886e pp. 49-50. -207- OO OO ONN OO OO NO HA HO OO OO OO ON HO AO AO AN NO HOHoH .OHOOOOOO eeHo OH HcoaO>Ho>cH HOHHHoasou .n .OHOO -OOOO HoHHHOHO :H Hcoeo>Ho>cH HOHHHOOOOU .m A>H Ommu HammHOHHHmm mm HOHHHOOOOU "HHH OOOO HOHOHOQEOO Om HOHHHOcOOU ”HH ommu HOmH>Om mm HOHHHOOOOU AH Ommu OHHOHOOOOHSHOm OHWOHOOOOHOO OOHHOHOOOO mo OOHHOOHHQ chHHmsHHO HOHHmcou OHOO Oo>HOOHOO HO Honesz OOHHOOHHO HOHHHOOU cam Ommo HOmoHO>zH OZOHHOOHHO HOHHOZOO OHOO.OO>HOOOHO Oo muszHOzH OH OHOOH -208- reports for Cases I and II. Together they indicate consid— erable unwillingness to conform to eXpectations associated with the SUperordinate Native Authority audience. That datum reflects an observed widespread hostility to the local gov- ernment authority in Oturkpo Town.19 Not uneXpectedly, 95% of the subjects indicated bureau- cratic intention to participate in the selection of the most important district Officeholder (Case IV a). That resolu- tion reflects the councillors' immediate political interest in leadership succession as well as a desire to conform to audience eXpectations.20 Having ascertained the direction of resolution in five situations, we turn to the question of the relationship be- tween ambivalence and conflict resolution. Presented in Table 15 are distributions for the two variables. Set A indicates a tendency for the proportionate incidence of bu- reaucratic resolution to increase significantly with the degree of ambivalence. The prOportionate incidence of bu- reaucratic resolution is lowest in the case of no ambiva- lence, highest in the case of very much ambivalence. A striking similarity between the proportionate incidence in cases of some and very much ambivalence generated the anal- ysis in Set g. 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