


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District Councillorship in an African
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ABSTRACT

DISTRICT COUNCILLORSHIP IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ROLE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

by Alvin Magid

Role theory will earn a place with social science theory only when it sheds vestiges of conceptual ambiguity and embraces a corpus of testable and tested generalizations. The latter deficiency is especially evident in studies of role conflict problems confronting African chieftaincy and local leadership. Students of African political behavior have tended merely to identify the "objective conflict situation." The purpose of this research is to consider the possibility that more intensive and theoretically significant analyses of role conflict problems might result from the examination of such dimensions as legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution.

The specific objectives of the study are (1) to examine diverse sources of, and the Idoma district councillors' perceptual responses to, potential conflict situations and (2) to analyze relationships between dimensions noted above and the problem of conflict management confronting those officeholders.

A semi-structured instrument was constructed to elicit both demographic and role data. The interview population

comprises seventy-one councillors in five districts of northern and central Idoma Division (Northern Nigeria).

Major findings are summarized below:

1. Idoma is a "culturally-mixed" dual society in which both alien and indigenous elements produce "bureaucratic-debureaucratic" role conflict. Potential conflict situations reflecting both sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension have been constructed for the analysis.

2. Fewer than the total number of councillors perceived role conflict in each of the five objective or potential situations.

Ambivalence or difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives has been construed as subjectively-experienced role conflict. Fewer than the total number of councillors who perceived role conflict in each of the five potential situations experienced ambivalence.

These findings suggest that previous observers may have exaggerated the extent to which African chiefs and local leaders (a) perceive bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict and (b) experience ambivalence or subjective role conflict.

3. Greater ambivalence is experienced in conflict situations involving two legitimate and/or obligatory roles than in those involving a single legitimate and/or obligatory role. Sets of legitimate roles and sets of obligatory roles contribute differentially to ambivalence.

4. The researcher has constructed a typology

of punitive-social sanctions based on two criteria: content and chronology. Four categories have been generated: mystical customary; social customary-modern; modern police-judicial; and modern political-administrative.

The councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with identical permutations based on sanctional type experiences greater ambivalence than the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with different permutations.

5. A predictive model has been constructed to test the hypothesis that councillors confronting role conflict are more likely to select as the role to be fulfilled (i.e., the major role among given behavioral alternatives) that which is perceived as more legitimate and/or obligatory. A high proportion of correct predictions have been made from legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined. In all cases, prediction is significantly beyond chance. Indicated also is a highly significant association between selection of the major role and degree of legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined.

6. Examination of the implications of multidimensional role for conflict resolution reveals a buffer structure in Case I. Councillors and district heads operate as role buffers by absorbing the punitive sanctions of their most proximate audience[s]. Thus, role buffering mitigates role conflict by insulating these actors from the threat of hierarchically-organized inter-audience sanction. Both are

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now able to conform to the expectation of proximate audiences more inclined to sanction their deviant behavior. At the same time, however, councillors are vulnerable to the sanctions of their most proximate audiences: frustrated villagers and conciliar-administrative colleagues. Centralization of authority in Idoma increases councillor vulnerability.

DISTRICT COUNCILLORSHIP IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY:
A STUDY IN ROLE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By
Alvin Magid

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PART I: THEORY AND THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA

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and Role

Chapter II: Operational Definitions

CHAPTER I

DUALITY, BUREAUCRATIZATION-DEBUREAUCRATIZATION, AND ROLE

Bureaucratization-Debureaucratization and the Dual Society

Social scientists have adduced considerable evidence to confirm that Max Weber's rational-legal model¹ neither fully explains nor adequately reflects Western or non-Western organizational behavior. One need only be reminded of his failure to incorporate such elements as informal behavior, partisanship, and the possible tension between organizational and societal values in order to be made aware of inadequacies in the model.² Yet even as he was constructing a model

¹A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds. and trans. Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 328-340; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 196-204.

²See Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), esp. Chaps. II, 12; Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, and Reformed," Paper delivered at 1961 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September 6-9, 1961, pp. 18-20 (MS); Robert V. Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, v. 38 #2 (December 1959), pp. 103-109; Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian vs. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 6 #1 (June 1961), esp. pp. 3-4, 24; Morroe Berger,

overlooking non-rational affective phenomena, Weber recognized a dualism in modern bureaucracy. The latter arose from the persistence of customary (traditional) alongside conventional and enforceable elements.³

Traceable to Weber's seminal notion of coexistent elements are various contemporary analyses of social and organizational dualism. Thus, for the economist Boeke the dual society is a relatively static one in which

simultaneously two or more social systems appear, clearly distinct one from the other, and each dominant[ing] a part of the society. . . .⁴

One of these systems,

always the most advanced, will have been imported from abroad and have gained its existence in the new environment without being able to oust or assimilate the divergent social system that has grown up there, with

"Patterns of Communication of Egyptian Civil Servants with the Public," Public Opinion Quarterly, v. 20 (1956), pp. 296-298; Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 3-34; J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara, pp. 306-307, observes that the post-independence Federal Civil Service has departed only very slightly from past bureaucratic performance; however, in the same volume, Eisenstadt (p. 26ff.) and Riggs (p. 9) note with some apprehension that public administrations in the new states have assumed political roles as instruments of social change. In Northern Nigeria, the Regional Government is on record as favoring the participation of Native Authority civil servants in party politics. (See Nigeria. Northern Region. House of Assembly. Debates. v. 5 #21 (August 5, 1958), pp. 766-767.

³Henderson and Parsons, eds. and trans., op. cit., p. 122.

⁴J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies: As Exemplified by Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953), p. 3.

the result that neither of them become general and characteristic for that society as a whole.⁵

While this coexistence frequently results from the penetration of precapitalist agrarian societies by Western capitalism, it is not limited to the sphere of economics: diverse systems of government, law, and social organization may also coexist.⁶ Indeed, it could be hypothesized that the achievement of dualism in one sphere is likely to produce similar consequences in another. Coexistence of imperial and extra-territorial juridical systems in China after 1842, the latter an outgrowth of Western economic penetration, may be taken as a case in point.

Contrastingly, Almond hypothesizes that

all political [and presumably economic, etc.] systems--the developed Western ones as well as the less-developed non-Western ones--are transitional systems, or systems in which cultural change is taking place.⁷

Accordingly,

. . . certain kinds of political structure which we have usually considered to be peculiar to the primitive are also to be found in modern political systems. . . .⁸

For Boeke, the inevitability of change--or exchange of values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns between the

⁵Ibid., p. 56.

⁶Ibid., p. 14.

⁷Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 24.

⁸Ibid., p. 20.

divergent systems--is of little or no consequence.⁹ Maximally, such systems may influence each other, but without assimilation or annihilation of one by the other.¹⁰ Almond, on the other hand, rejects the polar model in favor of a more inclusive, dynamic conceptualization. Instead of the Western and non-Western or modern and pre-modern society, there is only--and universally--the "culturally mixed" dual society. In such societies and their component sub-systems, antagonistic tendencies are in a more-or-less dynamic interrelationship. Therein we may expect to encounter predispositions to rational-legal behavior in administrative structures not pre-eminently committed to the bureaucratic ethos. As a case in point, Riggs has drawn attention to a feudal-bureaucratic tension inherent in the imperial administrations of Ming (China) and Kamakura (Japan).¹¹ Similarly, we may expect to encounter in contemporary bureaucracy those particularistic, affective, and diffuse elements alluded to

⁹For a criticism of Boeke's apparent inability to comprehend the relationship between dualism and change, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Development and Culture Change, v. 5, #3 (April 1957), p. 302.

¹⁰J. H. Boeke, "Colonialism and Dualism," in Race Relations in Perspective, Andrew W. Lind, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955), p. 71.

¹¹Fred W. Riggs, "The Ambivalence of Feudalism and Bureaucracy in Traditional Societies," Paper delivered at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1964 (MS). A provocative attempt to refine the bipolar model may be found in Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), esp. pp. 3-50.

earlier by Weber.¹² In this vein, Eisenstadt has identified antagonistic tendencies which, when juxtaposed in an organizational context, produce "bureaucratization-debureaucratization."¹³ Integrating rational-efficient and power themes pervading the literature on bureaucracy, he defines bureaucratization, on the one hand, as

the extension of bureaucracy's spheres of activities and power either in its own interest or those of some elite . . . tend[ing] toward growing regimentation of different areas of social life . . .

and debureaucratization, on the other, as

subversion of the goals and activities of the bureaucracy in the interest of different groups with which it is in close interaction [e.g., clients, patrons, interested parties].¹⁴

It is a conceptual framework comprehending dualism as an admixture--"a consequence of Westernization, in many cases added on to an indigenous cultural heterogeneity"¹⁵--that facilitates examination of the role conflict problem engendered by bureaucratization-debureaucratization. Turning to recent research on the problem, we note immediately its cross-cultural character. In addition to Riggs' investigation of "ambivalence" in imperial China and Japan,¹⁶ there have been

¹²Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 20ff.

¹³S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (December 1959), pp. 302-320.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 312.

¹⁵Gabriel Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, v. 52 #1 (March 1958), p. 276.

¹⁶Riggs, "The Ambivalence . . .," op. cit.

treatments largely descriptive of role conflicts confronting U. S. Navy disbursement officers,¹⁷ Israeli civil servants,¹⁸ and African chieftaincy. The latter, having laid the groundwork for the present study of African local leadership, merit special attention. What follows is a brief survey of the bureaucratic-debureaucratic role inquiries undertaken by Africanist anthropologists.

Role and Bureaucratization-Debureaucratization
in African Dual Societies

Social scientists¹⁹ and administrators have long recognized African chieftaincy and village leadership as vital links between tradition-oriented local communities and novel Western-type governments. At the same time, they have been acutely sensitive to the pressures directed at occupants of nexus positions in these "culturally mixed" dual societies: on the one hand, Government and its allies seeking to mobilize local leadership in support of "bureaucratic" objectives; on the other, "debureaucratic" expectations for behavior

¹⁷Ralph H. Turner, "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat," American Sociological Review, v. 12 (1947), pp. 342-348, esp. p. 348.

¹⁸Elihu Katz and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 5 (1960-1961), pp. 113-133.

¹⁹For example, Audrey I. Richards, ed., East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 14; see also pp. 6-13 and 27-29 of this chapter.

rooted in incompatible--albeit not necessarily indigenous--value orientations.²⁰ These incompatibilities are said to engender a role problem for those occupying local leadership positions. Facets of that problem are elucidated in cases from Nigeria and Uganda.

Cohen²¹ reports that the British presence in Kanuri-land (Bornu Province, Northern Nigeria) had produced a confrontation between two radically opposed value orientations: (1) an alien pattern incorporating such notions as public responsibility, personal integrity, Western-type education, gradual social and economic development, and eventual self-government; and (2) an indigenous pattern based on feudal organization and Islam (e.g., a conviction that the nature of society is determined by divine will).

Consequences of the imposition of colonial Indirect Rule policy suggest, however, that the situation was not polar. For example, the goal of modernization tended to be

²⁰By definition, members of the "culturally mixed" society are not oriented exclusively to either bureaucratic or debureaucratic values. Moreover, bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict may involve alien and/or indigenous value orientations.

For an example of conflicting value orientations generating diverse expectations, albeit in an imaginary environment, see the parable of the traditional chief and transitional-empathic grocer of Balgat in Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), ch. 1.

²¹This description of Kanuri chieftaincy is a summary of an unpublished manuscript by Andrew G. Frank and Ronald Cohen, Organization and Change with Conflicting Standards: Russia and Africa (n.d., circa late 1950's), pp. 13-18. See also Ronald Cohen, Structure of Kanuri Society (unpublished

subverted by a commitment to rule through traditional authorities. Similarly, while the Kanuri elite became committed to political and economic development, it emphasized progress within the framework of a traditional religious-political system.

The implication of this orientational duality for bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict could be observed at all levels of the society: British administrator, Shehu (monarch), Afia (district head), Lawan (village area head), and Bulawa (hamlet head). Concentrating on the position of district head, the author reports many conflicting expectations. For example, British administrators perceived the district head as a salaried civil servant and consequently deplored his unwillingness to refrain from collecting tribute; but the same administrators also expected him to undertake large displays for visiting dignitaries, the cost of which could not be borne by an official salary alone. Moreover, the Shehu's demand that subordinates--including district heads--deliver customary tribute tended to undermine the civil service norm.

The question of political reform also generated conflicting expectations. Insistence that district heads support novel popularly-elected councils tended to contradict both traditional Kanuri relationships and British commitment to rule through native authorities. As a result, support

for this reform tended to be concentrated in a reformist opposition party chastized by the Kanuri elite as heretics against the Islamic cosmology.

Turning to Uganda, we note Beattie's description of role conflict in "culturally mixed" Bunyoro.²² European administrators in Bunyoro expected the hierarchy of chiefs to handle administration, court affairs, and fiscal matters in an efficient manner; at the same time, more tradition-oriented tribesmen emphasized such particularistic values as dignified chief-subject relations, frequent visits between the two, and generosity.²³ Expectations based on these value orientations gave rise, in turn, to the following pattern of criticism: Europeans condemned deviations from Western standards of administration; older Banyoro deplored the impersonality often characteristic of civil service chiefs; and younger Banyoro educated in the European tradition compounded the problem of role conflict by protesting that chiefs failed to conform to both the norm of efficiency and standards of modern democratic leadership.²⁴

As a result of this confrontation of diverse value

²²This description of the Banyoro situation is drawn from John Beattie, Bunyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), pp. 36-47, esp. pp. 41-47; similar material by the author may be found in Richards, ed., op. cit., pp. 98-127 and "Bunyoro Through the Looking Glass," Journal of African Administration, v. 12 #2 (April 1960), pp. 85-86.

²³Generosity refers to the traditional practice of chiefs preparing meat feasts and beer parties for villagers. Most chiefs can no longer afford to maintain this tradition.

²⁴Beattie, Bunyoro . . . , op. cit., p. 46.

orientations, Beattie concludes,

. . . attitudes and values appropriate to the older system still survive into, and even modify the new.
. . . The [Ba]nyoro political system is no longer the traditional one, but neither is it the impersonal civil service which it is sometimes thought to be; it contains elements of both, together with features which are inconsistent with each other.²⁵

Analogues of both the Kanuri and Bunyoro cases may be found among the Basoga of Uganda.²⁶ Alongside, and in competition with, the sacral-familial institution of patrilineal kinship there developed in traditional Busoga a secular hierarchy of chiefs based on the principle of clientship. Thus, superordinate-subordinate relationships at all levels of the hierarchy were defined in terms of personal fealty. Even after 1936, when tribute was formally abolished and all chiefs--except village headmen--became salaried civil servants, clientship continued to flourish, albeit clandestinely.

Both the kinship and chiefly structures rooted in a particularistic value system generated a bureaucratic-debureaucratic role problem. For example, while kinsman A exerted pressure on chief B for preferential treatment, he was likely simultaneously to insist that chief B ignore the pressures of competitor kinsman C; similarly, while sub-county (gombolola) chief X invoked the client relationship

²⁵Ibid., p. 47.

²⁶This description of the Basoga is a summary of Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern Chief: An Instance from Uganda," American Anthropologist, v. 57 (1955), p. 290ff.

in order to gain the support of county (saza) chief Y at promotion time, the former was likely to condemn chief Y for honoring a similar relationship with competitor sub-county chief Z.

Thus, the chief had to operate in a milieu in which kinship, client, and civil service relationships intermeshed. As a result, he tended to become trapped in the proverbial "damned if you do, damned if you don't" dilemma: the granting of particularistic demands of kinsmen threatened him with dismissal for nepotism, while refusal to accede to such pressures violated traditional kin obligations; similarly, the granting of particularistic demands of a superordinate in a client relationship undermined civil service norms, while refusal to honor the relationship might have been grounds for dismissal on a contrived charge of corruption.

In contrast to Bunyoro, the Basoga village headman²⁷ was not a member of the civil service hierarchy. Fearful that acceptance of a government salary would undermine their

²⁷This description of Basoga headmanship draws from Lloyd A Fallers, "Village Chiefs in Busoga," in East African Institute of Social Research, "The Present-day Position of Lower Chiefs," East African Conference on Colonial Administration (Kampala, Uganda: Makerere University College, June 1952), pp. 19-24.

For a brief summary of the findings of the Conference, see A. I. Richards, "East African Conference on Colonial Administration," Journal of African Administration, v. 5, #2 (April 1953), pp. 62-65.

Fallers' material may also be located in his Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, n.d.), passim; also in Richards, ed., East African Chiefs . . . , op. cit., pp. 78-97.

traditional hereditary power, headmen chose in 1936 to rely instead on fees gained from land transactions. For several reasons, however, that decision worked to their disadvantage. First, in order to exploit his remaining source of income, the headman was forced to engage in practices--encouragement of land-despoiling crowded tenancy and short-term loans to non-Basoga--that alienated fellow tribesmen. Second, refusal to enter the civil service did not prevent Government from insisting that headmen collect taxes, arrest criminals, and publicize economic reform measures. Consequently, the headman became trapped in a vicious cycle: refusal to enter the civil service for fear of losing traditional prerogatives did not prevent bureaucratization of his position; increasing uncompensated bureaucratization forced him to engage in unpopular land transactions which, in turn, undermined the very prestige and power which he had originally sought to protect.

It appears to be virtually ensured that similar role conflict problems will remain for some time in Uganda. Those problems are likely to be engendered by (1) traditional values and behavior and (2) Government's decision to mobilize chiefs as agents of democratized local councils and the more highly-bureaucratized central administration.²⁸

²⁸Uganda, Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961 (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1961), Chap. 15 (as cited in Journal of African Administration, v. 13, #4, October 1961, p. 250).

See Fred Burke, "The Role of the Chief in Uganda," Journal of African Administration, v. 10, #3 (July 1958), pp. 153-160.

In the present study, the focus will be on another African local leader, the district councillor among the Idoma of Northern Nigeria. The object will be to examine through multidimensional analysis the problem introduced above, i.e., the problem of conflict management. The examination will involve the analysis of relationships between legitimacy, obligation, and sanction, on the one hand, and perceived role conflict, ambivalence, and resolution, on the other. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a critical consideration of the operational concept around which the present study has been organized: role. It is the basic perception of role which will direct the analysis to bureaucratic-debureaucratic conflict and its ultimate resolution by the Idoma district councillor. Chapter II will provide further theoretical elaboration for the purpose of specifying the meaning of concepts central to the empirical research which is reported in the body of this manuscript.

The Role Concept in Theory

A survey of the literature on role²⁹ yields two conclusions: (1) Despite varying emphases, there tends to be

²⁹Published surveys of the literature on role include Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McLachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 3-94; Lionel J. Neiman and James W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role--A Re-Survey of the Literature," Social Forces, v. 30 (1951-1952), pp. 141-149. For a summary of the psychological literature on role theory, see Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey, v. 1 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 223-258.

general agreement on the interrelated socio-psychological and cultural nature of the concept.³⁰ (2) While most conceptualizations of role incorporate the notion "that individuals . . . in social locations . . . behave . . . with reference to expectations,"³¹ only limited consensus exists on specific meaning. One observes that most definitions tend to fall into at least one of three categories, normative cultural patterns, behavior of an individual, and orientation of the individual to a situation.³²

(1) Normative culture patterns- Perhaps the foremost exponent of what might be termed a cultural determinist approach to role theory was the anthropologist, Ralph Linton.

³⁰An early statement of this interrelationship appears in George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 1-336; more recent statements may be found in Clyde Kluckhohn and O. H. Mowrer, "Culture and Personality: A Conceptual Scheme," American Anthropologist, v. 6, #1 (January-March 1944), pp. 6, 8, 21-22; S. F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 20ff.; Daniel J. Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, v. 58 (1959), p. 170.

Theodore Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), pp. 329-330, 459, suggests that "role is strictly a sociological concept [that] . . . purposely ignores individual, psychological facts," However, he does recognize an interrelationship between sociological role and psychological motive and role patterns (the individual organization of performance-perception-thought affect).

³¹Neiman and Hughes, op. cit., pp. 144-149; Gross et al., op. cit., p. 17.

³²The categories used may be found generally in Gross et al., op. cit., Chap. 2; the classificatory scheme in Neiman and Hughes, op. cit., p. 144ff., is similar, except for the separate category on "Definitions in terms of the Dynamics of Personality Development", pp. 142-144.

In The Study of Man, Linton defines social systems as "systems of ideas" consisting of the "mutually ideal patterns according to which the attitudes and behavior of a society's members are organized."³³ Deriving from that definition are the concepts status and role. Status--the "collection of rights and duties"--and role--the "dynamic aspect of status"--are described by Linton as analytically distinct but functionally interrelated.³⁴ Role, as something "dynamic," suggests actual behavior.

Later, Linton identified role as

. . . the sum total of the culture patterns associated with a particular status. It thus includes the attitudes, values, and behavior ascribed by society to any and all persons occupying this status. It can even be extended to include the legitimate expectations of such persons with respect to the behavior toward them of persons in other statuses within the same system.³⁵

³³Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1936), pp. 253, 256.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 113-114. Here one encounters considerable disagreement. Some students of role have used the concept position rather than status. See Newcomb, op. cit., f.n. 16; and John W. Bennett and Melvin Tumin, Social Life: Structure and Function (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 97.

Others tend to perceive status as a synonym for prestige, esteem and skill. See for example, Victor A. Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 5 [March 1961], p. 488; Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 162.

Sarbin, op. cit., p. 225, perceives position, rather than role, "as a set of expectations or acquired anticipatory reactions."

³⁵Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945), p. 77; a similar emphasis on ideal culture patterns may be found in Newcomb, op. cit., pp. 280-281 and Bennett and Tumin, op. cit., p. 96.

Rather than actual behavior, Linton now construed role as those ideal patterns or expectations that presumably shape actual behavior. The notion that occupants of similar statuses are ascribed ideal standards by society led to what Gross and his colleagues have termed a "Postulate of Role Consensus."³⁶ While the notion of consensus did not originate with Linton,³⁷ there appears to be little doubt that his work enhanced its popularity.³⁸ More recently, however, theorists have begun to challenge the untested assumption of role consensus.³⁹

Finally, Linton's preoccupation with ideal social standards and role consensus led him to focus on "legitimate expectations." Failure to treat legitimacy as a variable appears to have caused him to overlook illegitimate expectations. As a result, Linton was not able to entertain the possibility of differential behavior by actors who perceive the same expectation as legitimate and illegitimate. Both sides of the legitimacy coin will be treated in this study.

(2) Behavior of an individual - While Linton was able in time to distinguish role as expectation from actual

³⁶Gross et al., op. cit., ch. 3.

³⁷See, for example, Mead, op. cit., p. 270.

³⁸Gross et al., op. cit., pp. 24-33.

³⁹For a discussion of variation and conflict among norms, see George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), p. 126; Samuel Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," American Sociological Review, v. 14, #6 (December 1949), pp. 707-708.

behavior, others have found it more difficult to do so. For example, Sarbin defines role as "a patterned sequence of learned actions or deeds performed by a person in an interaction situation."⁴⁰ However, subsequent passages appear to confuse that conceptualization. Thus, while "role enactment [as] . . . the overt performance of [a] person" is compatible with his definition of role, "role enactment embraces[ing] what may be called the mechanics of the role-taking process"⁴¹ poses a conceptual problem. Only by accepting Sarbin's original definition of role as actions or deeds performed is one able to construe role-taking as actual behavior; in doing so, however, one is forced to do considerable violence to the Meadian concept of role-taking as a covert, mental process.

In contrast, Newcomb reverts to Linton's distinction between role and actual behavior⁴² after having initially defined roles as

. . . ways of carrying out the functions for which positions [i.e., statuses] exist, ways which are generally agreed upon within whatever group recognizes any particular position and role.⁴³

(3) Orientation of the individual to a situation- A Parsonian definition may be placed in this category. Role

⁴⁰Sarbin, op. cit., p. 225.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 232.

⁴²Newcomb, op. cit., p. 281.

⁴³Ibid., p. 330. Newcomb appears now to have fully accepted the expectational definition of role. See Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse,

is

. . . that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process . . . involv[ing] a set of complementary expectations concerning his own actions and those of others with whom he interacts.⁴⁴

Interaction involves the reciprocal orientation of actors based on expectations for behavior.

It is most appropriate to conclude this examination of role with a reference to the conceptualizations of Talcott Parsons. For Parsons perhaps more than any other reflects confusion in the area of definition. His ability to represent role as orientational, normative cultural--

from the point of view of the actor his role is defined by the normative expectations of the members of the group as formulated in the social traditions⁴⁵

--and actual behavioral--

the status-role . . . [is] the organized sub-system of acts of the actor or actors occupying given reciprocal statuses and acting toward each other in terms of given reciprocal orientations⁴⁶

--underscores an appraisal of "the role concept . . . [as]

Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 8-9.

⁴⁴Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward A General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 23.

⁴⁵Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1945), p. 230.

⁴⁶Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), p. 26. In a more recent work, Parsons appears to have accepted an actual behavioral definition of role. See Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar Naegle, and Jesse Pitts, eds., Theories of Society, v. 1 (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), p. 42.

still rather vague, nebulous, and non-definitive."⁴⁷

The Role Concept in Political Science
and African Studies

As the political scientist retreats from the mound of theoretical literature on role into a storehouse of empirical research incorporating the concept, he observes that (1) such research is abundant and (2) his colleagues, the sociologist, psychologist, and anthropologist, have contributed most to the storehouse. He is also struck by the fact that, with the exception of occasional articles on elected officials⁴⁸ and employees of public bureaucracies and prisons⁴⁹--most of which, incidentally, have been prepared by sociologists and psychologists--the mass of empirical role research has centered on areas normally of little interest

⁴⁷Neiman and Hughes, op. cit., p. 149.

⁴⁸William C. Mitchell, "Occupational Role Strains: The American Elective Official," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 3 (1958-1959), pp. 210-228; John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, and LeRoy Ferguson, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," Journal of Politics, v. 22 (1960), pp. 203-227; John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 1-507.

⁴⁹Robert K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), Chap. 7; William J. McEwen, "Position Conflict and Professional Orientation in a Research Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 1 (1956), pp. 208-219; Leonard Reisman, "A Study of Role Conceptions in Bureaucracy," Social Forces, v. 27 (1948), pp. 305-310; Oscar Grusky, "Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 3 (1958-1959), pp. 453-467; Donald

to the political scientist: industrial organizations,⁵⁰ families,⁵¹ patient-physician relationships,⁵² mental institutions,⁵³ and private research organizations.⁵⁴

Recently, however, political scientists have begun to examine the utility of the role concept. Among those who have utilized role in studies of political behavior are Wahlke and his colleagues in a model of American state legislatures,⁵⁵ Almond in several provocative statements on

Cressey, "Contradictory Directives in Complex Organizations: The Case of the Prison," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (1959-1960), pp. 1-19.

⁵⁰Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte, "The Man in the Middle: Position and Problems of the Foreman," Applied Anthropology, v. 4, #2 (Spring 1945), p. 2ff.; Eugene Jacobson, W. W. Charters, Jr., and Seymour Lieberman, "The Use of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organizations," Journal of Social Issues, v. 7, #3 (1951), pp. 18-37.

⁵¹John Spiegel, "The Resolution of Conflict Within the Family," Psychiatry, v. 20, #1 (February 1957), pp. 1-16.

⁵²John Spiegel, "The Social Roles of Doctor and Patient in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy," Psychiatry, v. 17, #4 (November 1954), pp. 369-374.

⁵³Kai T. Erikson, "Patient Role and Social Uncertainty--A Dilemma of the Mentally Ill," Psychiatry, v. 20, #3 (August 1957), pp. 263-271.

⁵⁴Clovis Shepherd and Paula Brown, "Status, Prestige, and Esteem in a Research Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 1 (1956), pp. 342-360; Norman Kaplan, "The Role of the Research Administrator," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (1959-1960), pp. 23-42.

⁵⁵John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures," Paper delivered at 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September 4-6, 1958 (MS).

comparative analysis,⁵⁶ and Apter in a volume on the Gold Coast (now Ghana).⁵⁷

Wahlke and his colleagues perceive the legislature as both an institution and a sub-system of roles. The person named: "legislator" is the occupant of a status comprising multiple roles (lawmaker, representative, etc.) and role relationships (legislator-legislators, legislator-citizens, legislator-party leaders, legislator-governor, etc.).⁵⁸ Of special relevance for this study are several implications of the authors' attempt to justify use of the role concept.⁵⁹ First, a knowledge of the roles (expected behaviors) in a system and the probability of such behaviors being effected enables one to explore the functionality and dysfunctionality of various roles for systemic goals. Thus, the authors distinguish between actual behavior and role as expectation, implying that the two need not coincide. Second, awareness of role incompatibility enables one to determine the degree of systemic stability. Third, one may consider the legislator's perception of the public's expectation as a reference to what Mead called the

⁵⁶Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, v. 18 (1956), pp. 391-340; Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., pp. 3-64.

⁵⁷David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 3-355.

⁵⁸Wahlke et al., "The Role Concept . . .," op. cit., p. 7ff.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 5-7.

"generalized other."⁶⁰ In linking expectations of the public or "generalized other" with the legislator's behavioral responses, the authors have, in effect, focused upon the relationship between political and socio-psychological variables. Fourth, role theory is presented as complementary to several approaches to the study of political behavior, including class, group, and organization theory. Finally, representation of the legislative institution as a sub-system of roles synthesizes "institutionalist" and "behaviorist" orientations.⁶¹

In an article on "Comparative Political Systems," Almond suggests that

. . . the application of certain sociological and anthropological concepts may facilitate systematic comparison among the major types of political systems operative in the world today.⁶²

The author defines the political system as a "set of interacting [political] roles, or . . . a structure of [political] roles."⁶³ Almond appears to perceive role as fundamentally orientational and relevant to the mutual expectations of actors in a situation.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Mead, op. cit., p. 154.

⁶¹In this vein, the authors note that "the theoretical conceptions guiding . . . [their] research are behavioral, institutional (structural) and functional--not any one or the other." See John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, The Legislative System . . ., op. cit., p. 7.

⁶²Almond, "Comparative . . .," op. cit., p. 391.

⁶³Ibid., p. 441.

⁶⁴Almond, loc. cit.

However, confusion arises when Almond attempts to apply the concept to a typology of political systems. For example, in characterizing the preindustrial political system as one in which there is a "high degree of substitutability of roles"--such as when bureaucrats and armies preempt legislative and political parties policy-making functions⁶⁵--he appears to have moved toward a definition implying actual behavior. If so, he has inherited the definitional ambiguity of Parsons and overlooked the possibility--and consequences for the system--of actual political behavior not conforming to expectation.

In an introduction to The Politics of the Developing Areas, Almond once more proclaims the need "to turn to sociological and anthropological theory," including the (political) role concept.⁶⁶ Here, unfortunately, we encounter no precise definition of the concept. Rather, a political system is defined simply as

that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which perform the [input and output] functions of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other societies) by means of the employment or threat of employment of more or less legitimate compulsion. . . .⁶⁷

Emphasis on performance of functions--for example, the family, kinship, and lineage group in recruitment to

. ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 448.

⁶⁶Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., p. 4.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 7.

specialized political roles⁶⁸--inclines one to conclude that Almond had indeed intended role as actual behavior. However, in the section on political recruitment there is a reference to the "provi[sion] . . . [of] political cognitive maps, values, expectations, and affects" for those inducted into "specialized roles of the political system."⁶⁹ Thus, as in "Comparative Political Systems," conceptual ambiguity is encountered.

Apter's volume stands as the only full-length attempt by a political scientist to apply role theory to a study of political change.⁷⁰ While the concept is nowhere explicitly defined, an orientational-expectational bias is manifest.

Thus, in "A Note on Methodology," he reminds the reader that

the two [Gold Coast] systems, traditional and secular, as integrated role systems, were viewed as the sources of conflicting values, as the framework of concrete sociopolitical sub-groups and concrete membership groups, as the base of conflicting expectancy patterns, and the source of differing reference groups.⁷¹

Along with abundant scholarly and governmental materials, Apter has relied on interviews with traditional chiefs, elders, and occupants of secular political positions.⁷² Unfortunately, he has chosen not to elaborate on the manner in which role was operationalized for an interview schedule.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 32.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 31. [Italics mine.]

⁷⁰Apter, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 329. [Italics mine.]

⁷²Ibid., p. 333.

The study, while valuable both for its conceptualization of role as orientational-expectational and the light it throws on secularization processes, provides no useful guidelines for empirical role analysis. Role theory and structural-functional analysis have been utilized by Apter to establish a framework within which the working of a total political system could be described rather than as a tool for rigorous field investigation.

In addition to The Gold Coast in Transition and the wealth of descriptive anthropological literature on role conflict--a part of which was surveyed above--one encounters brief references to the role behavior of African political elites. Thus, Sutton explains that prior to independence, Africans underwent a psychological process-- "identification with the aggressor," "introjection of an authority figure," or "acceptance of a role model"--that enabled them to compete with the European and ultimately to achieve sovereignty.⁷³ The Smythes document this thesis in a post-independence study of The New Nigerian Elite:

. . . The British elite had not been responsible to the masses, except indirectly and in a very special sense; the new elite accepted the same remoteness from the popular will as their natural and popular role. . . . Thus they had to have each and every advantage--particularly those which could be seen and touched--formerly identified with status, or they might well be seen by the masses as only secondary to the British who remained and who had to be given those things if their skills

⁷³Francis X. Sutton, "Authority and Authoritarianism in the New Africa," Journal of International Affairs, v. 15, #1 (1961), p. 9.

were to be retained.⁷⁴

Conclusion

Studies cited in the preceding sections do not exhaust the cases where political scientists and Africanists have turned to role theory. Rather, they have been selected to throw light on its recent, infrequent, oftentimes confused, and generally restricted use. Thus, among the writings on Gold Coast political transformation, African local and nationalist elites, and comparative analysis of non-Western and legislative systems, only the latter explores the relevance of role for empirical studies of political behavior.⁷⁵

In sum, it may be said that only when role theory sheds the vestiges of conceptual ambiguity and embraces a corpus of testable and tested generalizations will it have earned a place with social science theory. Until then, it

⁷⁴Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 132-133. There may be some confusion between role as expected behavior and role as actual behavior. The Smythes are also using status to convey the notion of prestige or esteem rather than location.

⁷⁵In Wahlke et al., "American State Legislators . . .", op. cit., pp. 203-227, the authors draw upon the model in Wahlke et al., "The Role Concept . . .", op. cit., pp. 1-27. In the former, pressure groups represent a "generalized other" toward which legislators are found to be friendly (Facilitators), hostile (Resisters), or neither (Neutral). Limitation of the study to one set of role-relationships--legislator-pressure group--precludes assessment of the overall utility of the model. The study does represent one of the few attempts by political scientists to utilize an operationalized role concept. See also Wahlke et al., The Legislative System . . ., op. cit., p. lff.

must stand as something that, using the words of Eckstein in another context,

call[s] our attention to the 'real forces' in political processes and to the need for better definitions and operations for dealing with these forces.⁷⁶

The need for "better . . . operations" is especially evident in role studies of African chieftaincy and local leadership. Thus, if one is impressed with the degree of conceptual clarity achieved in the cases from Nigeria and Uganda--Cohen, Beattie, and Fallers appear to have consistently, if only implicitly, construed role and bureaucratic-debureaucratic dualism as expectations for behavior and "cultural mixture," respectively--one is at the same time struck by their limitation. Such research has failed to generate propositions beyond the one which appears to have initially stimulated this line of inquiry. That proposition may be traced to Max Gluckman writing in 1949:

The hypothesis on which we are basing our future work is that the delicacy of the [village] headman's position arises from conflicting principles. First, it arises from his position within the village group as such, even though the ties and obligations involved vary from

⁷⁶Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," Comparative Politics: A Reader, Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963 , p. 393.

American students have begun to undertake more rigorous, theory-oriented role investigations. In addition to Gross et al., op. cit., p. lff., there are studies by Howard J. Ehrlich, The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1959), p. lff., and Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. D. Snoek, and Robert A. Rosenthal Organizational Stress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. lff.

tribe to tribe. But the main source of the ambivalence of his situation is that he is the personality in whom the domestic-kinship and the political systems intersect.⁷⁷

Plethoric description of similar conflict in numerous African societies has followed.⁷⁸ Surveying these efforts, we may echo Gluckman: ". . . [what is] . . . need[ed] [is] a far more intensive analysis than has yet been made. . . ."⁷⁹

That need leads us to focus once more on role. Having explored generally the relevance of role and dualism to the problem of conflict management, we now turn specifically to dimensions of role and conflict analysis largely overlooked by students of African political behavior: legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution. When systematically examined, these dimensions may yield more intensive and theoretically significant analyses of the problems confronting African chieftaincy and local leadership. At the same time, the analyses may throw light on the actor as he attempts to cope with those problems. A major purpose of the present study will be to examine the relationship between dimensions noted above and the management of

⁷⁷Max Gluckman, J. C. Mitchell, and J. A. Barnes, "The Village Headman in British Central Africa," *Africa*, v. 19, #2 (April 1949), pp. 93-94. The proposition is presented by Gluckman in the introduction to the article.

⁷⁸For example, L. A. Fallers, ed., The King's Men: Leadership and Status in Buganda on the Eve of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), Chap. 5; P. C. Lloyd, "The Changing Role of the Yoruba Traditional Rulers," Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research (Ibadan, Nigeria: University College, 1956), pp. 57-65.

⁷⁹Gluckman et al., op. cit., p. 94.

of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict by Idoma district councillors.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine dimensions of role and conflict associated with Idoma district councillorship in potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic situations. Before introducing these dimensions (legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution), the meaning of the concepts position, role, and audience population, as used herein, is specified and illustrated.

Position, Role, Audience Population

A position is a specific, identifiable locus within a social system comprising two or more interdependent loci.¹ Thus, the office of district councillor may be construed as a position in the Idoma social and political systems. Other loci are the offices of district head, tax collector, and official in the Native Authority or local government establishment. In order to underscore a preoccupation with

¹Role analysts have utilized the concept status to denote what the researcher has termed position; the latter is preferred in order to avoid confusion between the former and such concepts as prestige and esteem. See, for example, Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century Company, 1936), pp. 113-114.

the office of district councillor, it shall be designated the focal position² within a universe of interdependent units. It is not intended, of course, that focal be interpreted as a measure of positional significance within the framework of Idoma social structure.

Role denotes a behavioral pattern expected of the occupant of a position. Essentially normative, role is distinguished from an actual behavioral pattern which may or may not conform with expectations. This analysis will omit systematic exploration of an actual behavioral dimension; instead, it will focus on expectations associated with interacting occupants of focal and non-focal positions.

Having distinguished conceptually role and actual behavior, the researcher draws attention to a frequently ignored delineation within role itself. The latter involves a role-position, role-occupant dichotomy. In this vein, Jacobson et al. have identified social role and personal role. The former is

a set of expectations which others share of the behavior associated with a position, without respect to the characteristics of the person who occupies the position,

the latter

a set of expectations which others have of an individual's behavior in a position, without respect to the social role.³

²Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John Wiley, 1958), pp. 51-55.

³Eugene Jacobson, W. W. Charters, Jr., and Seymour

An analogy may be found in Cottrell's cultural role and unique role.⁴

The researcher undertook initially to explore both. For example, questions and alternative role responses were composed as follows for a potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic conflict situation involving political party activity:

Set I. Social Role

(A) Question: Could you tell me how the following people would tend to feel about councillors being supporters or members of the NPC (i.e., Northern Peoples' Congress, Government party in the Northern Region of Nigeria)?

(B) Response: (1) expect councillors to be supporters or members of the NPC; (2) expect councillors not to be supporters or members of the NPC; or (3) no expectation in this situation.

Set II. Personal Role

(A) Question: Could you tell me how the following people would tend to feel about you as a councillor being a supporter or member of the NPC?

(B) Response: (1) expect me as a councillor to be a supporter or member of the NPC; (2) expect me as a councillor not to be a supporter or member of the NPC; or (3) no expectation in this situation.⁵

Lieberman, "The Use of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organizations," Journal of Social Issues, v. 7, #3 (1951), p. 19.

⁴Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "The Adjustment of the Individual to his Age and Sex Roles," American Sociological Review, v. 7 (1942), p. 617; an analogous distinction between subjective and objective role may be found in M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption: Based on a Consideration of Corruption in the Public Services and Governments of British Colonies and ex-Colonies in West Africa," Sociological Review, v. 9 (1961), section on "The Subjective Element."

⁵The content of this potential conflict situation was subsequently modified to focus on party campaigning rather than membership or support. See pp. 165, 271-272.

A tendency on the part of subjects to fuse Sets I and II engendered an insolvable problem during a pre-test of the questionnaire; both social and personal role questions and responses in this and other potential conflict situations tended to be interpreted "you as a councillor--me as a councillor." Consequently, the questionnaire was revised to include only the Set II role format.

After noting one series of responses to the revised instrument, however, future investigators may be encouraged to operationalize the analytical distinction between social and personal role. Four councillors indicated that even as the Native Authority (NA)--local government agency of the Regional Government⁶--expected councillors per se to campaign for the NPC, it held the opposite expectation for themselves; the latter perceived expectation, a personal role, was attributed to their publicly-acknowledged association with opposition parties. In light of the above, one may note the potential theoretical significance of investigations focusing on social-personal role congruency and its implications for conflict resolution and systemic stability. In this research setting, however, orientation to district councillorship was uniformly personal; the four exceptions represent only 1% of the perceptual responses in five

⁶The Idoma Native Authority in Northern Nigeria is responsible through a Divisional Officer and Benue Provincial authorities in Makurdi to the Regional Minister for Local Government in Kaduna.

conflict situations.⁷

Audience populations are those "by whom the [focal] actor sees his role performance observed and evaluated, and [to whose] . . . evaluations and expectations [he attends]."⁸ Audiences may include a single individual and/or group of individuals occupying non-focal positions. This study will encompass such single and plural member audiences as district head and elders. While audiences may be present to articulate expectations and/or observe actual behavior, physical proximity is not a prerequisite for meaningful interaction.⁹ An Idoma district councillor may, for example, effect role relationships with one or more of the following audience populations: an individual or group that is (1) physical-proximate (fellow councillors); (2) physical-non-proximate (members of the central NA in Oturkpo Town); or (3) non-physical-proximate (symbolic interaction with ancestral overseers). Symbolic interaction with ancestors involves a relationship between "living" past and present. Reinforcement of the relationship is achieved by the

⁷Seventy-one district councillors presented with five potential conflict situations involving the councillor as focal actor yield a total of 355 perceptual responses. The four exceptions--in a single conflict situation--represent 1% of that total. See pp. 160-169.

⁸Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, #4 (January 1956), p. 328.

⁹Ibid., pp. 316-326.

periodic intercession of an elder-priest who may, in turn, be classified as physical-proximate or physical-non-proximate. Adherence to a cult predicated on the assumption of ancestral omnipresence precludes by definition role interaction of a non-physical-non-proximate character.¹⁰

Multidimensional Role: Concepts and Definitions

The focus on role as a normative construct has been accompanied by a tendency to overlook or acknowledge solely by implication those elements which shape its multidimensional character, notably legitimacy, obligation, and sanction. One may note, for example, Merton's¹¹ exclusion of legitimacy from a discussion of role structuring and Linton's¹² failure to examine implications of that concept's variability. Similarly, both Parsons and students of African chieftaincy and local leadership assume negative sanction in the event of deviant behavior.¹³ A tendency to

¹⁰See pp. 80-87, 222-237.

¹¹Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 370-379.

¹²Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945), p. 77.

¹³Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 280; Andrew G. Frank and Ronald Cohen, Organization and Change with Conflicting Standards: Russia and Africa (unpublished manuscript, circa late 1950's), pp. 12-18; John Beattie, Bunyoro: An African Kingdom (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 36ff.; Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief: An Instance from Uganda," American Anthropologist, v. 57 (1955), p. 290ff.; Lloyd A. Fallers, "Village Chiefs in Busoga," in East African Institute of Social Research, "The Present-day Position of Lower Chiefs,"

overlook or obscure the multidimensional concept has rendered more difficult the analysis of role and conflict resolution, on the one hand, and relationships between expected and actual behavior, on the other.¹⁴ Recently, however, empiricists have engaged in useful explorations of these dimensions.¹⁵ Implications of multidimensionalism for role and conflict resolution will be considered after its component elements have been defined.

Legitimacy may be defined, after Dahl, as belief in the rightness or propriety of decisions or decision-making processes.¹⁶ The concept will be operationalized in this study to convey a notion of belief in the rightness or propriety of a specific expectation.¹⁷ Expectations which the district councillor feels an audience population has a right to entertain will be construed as legitimate; conversely, illegitimate expectations are those which an occupant of the focal position feels an audience population does not have

East African Conference on Colonial Administration (Kampala, Uganda: Makerere University College, June 1952), pp. 19-24.

¹⁴Howard J. Ehrlich, The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1959), p. 7.

¹⁵For example, Gross et al., op. cit., pp. 64-66, 249-250, passim; J. P. Sutcliffe and M. Haberman, "Factors Influencing Choice in Role Conflict Situations," American Sociological Review, v. 21, #6 (December 1956), pp. 695-703.

¹⁶Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 46 f.n. 13, 138.

¹⁷See pp. 212, 238-239.

a right to entertain.

Relevant to the question of means intended to maximize conformance between role and actual behavior--thereby contributing to the stable integration of systems at both a personal and social level--are the concepts sanction and obligation. A sanction is role-related behavior of an essentially punitive (P) and/or remunerative (R) character.¹⁸ Taking into account the levels at which both types may be operative--the personal (originating in and directed toward ego) and social (originating in alter(s) and directed toward ego)--we note the potential complexity of any sanctional universe. Thus, a tentative typology for such a universe would include the permutations presented diagrammatically on page 38.

Cognizant that punitive-personal, remunerative-personal, and remunerative-social sanctions are less readily identifiable than the punitive-social, the researcher has chosen to focus on the last. The study encompasses only the social dimension of permutations (d), (e), (f), and (g), that is, punitive sanctions originating in audience populations and directed toward occupants of the councillor position. Implications of the more inclusive typology for future research will be considered in a concluding chapter.¹⁹

¹⁸See Gross et al., op. cit., pp. 249-250, for an analogous treatment of deprivational-gratificational sanctions.

¹⁹See pp. 264-265.

Fig. 1--Typology in a Sanctional Universe

	No personal sanction	Personal sanction		
		Punitive	Punitive-Remunerative	Remunerative
No social sanction		a	b	c
Punitive	d	e	f	g
Punitive- Remunerative	h	i	j	k
Remunerative	l	m	n	o

Note: The following permutations are represented in the diagram by the letters a-o:

(1) Single Personal (2) Single Social (3) Combined Personal (4) Combined Social

(a) P
(c) R

(d) P
(l) R

(b) P-R

(h) P-R

(5) Combined Personal-Social

Personal--Social

(e) P--P
(o) R--R
(m) P--R
(g) R--P
(i) P--P-R
(k) R--P-R
(f) P-R--P
(n) P-R--R
(j) P-R--P-R

Integrating the concepts role and sanction, the researcher will define as obligatory any expectation which, when unfulfilled in actual behavior, is expected to result in the levying of punitive-social sanction[s] on the deviant councillor; behavioral conformance with role logically precludes imposition of such sanction[s]. Conversely, an optional expectation is one which, regardless of conformance or non-conformance in actual behavior, is not expected to result in sanction[s] of a punitive-social character. It ought to be noted in passing that interpretation of optional expectation as prima facie evidence of apathy may be fallacious. For example, refusal to retaliate against deviant councillor behavior in Idoma may be explained in terms of (1) the specific situation; (2) affinal and consanguineal ties between actors; (3) a councillor's previous record of role performance; or (4) such indicators of audience alienation as powerlessness and meaninglessness.²⁰ Various subjects indicated that elders would be more prone to sanction a deviant councillor punitively in the situation involving political party campaigning.²¹ One councillor, the father-in-law of a fellow councillor, reported that he would not punitively sanction the latter's deviant behavior in any situation; another made the same report for a half-brother on the council. Various subjects recently elected to a

²⁰Murray B. Levin, The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 62-63.

²¹See pp. 160-169.

first term indicated that village audiences (elders, non-elders, tax collectors) would withhold punitive sanction in a situation involving construction of a council hall;²² these councillors did note, however, that subsequent deviant behavior in similar situations would be punished by "refusal to re-elect."²³ Finally, several elected councillors reported that the Native Authority audience would be powerless to sanction their deviant behavior punitively; a group of NA-nominated councillors reported that village audiences, lacking control over their appointment, would withhold "useless" (meaningless) punitive sanction in the situation involving political party campaigning.²⁴

Role Conflict: Definitions and Types

A. Definitions

A survey of the literature on role conflict reveals broad agreement on (1) the multidimensional character of the role construct and (2) the definition of its basic dimension, i.e., role as expected rather than actual behavior. Beyond that, however, there appears to be (a) considerable disagreement over the manner in which a multidimensional role construct ought to be dealt with in analyses and (b) confusion as to the meaning of conflict itself. Both problems will be considered before presenting the operational

²²See pp. 141-159.

²³See pp. 224-230.

²⁴See pp. 165-169.

definition of role conflict that has been utilized in this study.

a. Multidimensionality and Variability

While students of role conflict have tended to utilize a multidimensional approach, it is evident that not all have examined implications of its variability. For example, Parsons defines role conflict as

. . . the exposure of the actor to conflicting sets of legitimized role expectations such that complete fulfillment of both is realistically impossible. . . .

The fact that both sides of the conflicting expectations are institutionalized means that there is the basis for a claim to legitimacy for both patterns.²⁵

Failure to consider the possibility of role conflict situations involving illegitimate-illegitimate or legitimate-illegitimate expectations may have led him to assume punitive sanction as a necessary consequence of deviant behavior.²⁶ Moreover, the focus on sanction (and, implicitly, obligation) appears to have caused Parsons to overlook optional expectations and their implications for systemic stability. In their empirical analysis of role conflict and resolution, Getzels and Guba²⁷ appear to assume a similar invariable legitimacy dimension. Others, however, have begun to study role conflict without focusing on situations

²⁵Parsons, op. cit., pp. 280, 282.

²⁶Ibid., p. 280.

²⁷J. W. Getzels and E. G. Guba, "Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness," American Sociological Review, v. 19 (1954), p. 165.

necessarily involving legitimate expectations.²⁸

Significantly, a tendency to interpret role conflict in legitimate terms has not failed to influence students of African political behavior. For example, after noting antagonistic norms operative among the Basoga of Uganda, Fallers typically ". . . emphasize[s] that both [indigenous and European] value systems are institutionalized in Soga society . . . and both are accepted by most Basoga as, in a sense, legitimate."²⁹ Thus, Fallers observes two legitimate systems evolving by virtue of, to quote Getzels and Guba, "mutual acceptance"³⁰ of diverse value orientations. What follows, logically, is a narrow--and perhaps misleading--focus on role conflict as between two legitimate expectational patterns.

b. The Logic of Conflict

In the relevant literature there is an ambiguous and somewhat confusing array of terms intended to define conflict.³¹ For example, Burchard,³² Spiegel,³³ Jacobson et

²⁸Jacobson et al., op. cit., p. 22; Melvin Seeman, "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," American Sociological Review, v. 18 #4 (August 1953), p. 373; Gross et al., op. cit., passim; Ehrlich, op. cit., passim.

²⁹Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief . . .," op. cit., p. 303.

³⁰Getzels and Guba, loc. cit.

³¹Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 38. The author construes role conflict and conflict resolution as "cognitive dissonance" and "dissonance reduction," respectively. In a later study, however, he suggests that

al.,³⁴ and Getzels and Guba³⁵ perceive the role conflict situation as involving antithetical, incompatible, discrepant, and inconsistent expectations, respectively.

While on the surface these terms appear to be synonymous, careful scrutiny reveals a significant contrast. That contrast may be expressed as one between exclusive and inclusive categories. While antithesis in formal logic denotes propositional opposition alone, neither incompatibility, discrepancy, nor inconsistency presupposes terms in opposition; according to the lexicon, all three may subsume conflict of an antithetical or non-antithetical character.

Clearly, then, definition of the conflict situation by any of the three inclusive terms requires specification of oppositional or non-oppositional roles. Unfortunately, specification is ordinarily excluded from conceptual discussion. As a result, the reader must seek clues in role conflict instruments. Here one generally encounters a

"dissonance reduction" commences only after conflict resolution or the choice between alternatives. See Leon Festinger, ed., Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 32.

³²Waldo W. Burchard, "Role Conflicts of Military Chaplains," American Sociological Review, v. 19, #5 (October 1954), p. 528.

³³John P. Spiegel, "The Resolution of Role Conflict Within the Family," Psychiatrist, v. 20, #1 (February 1957), p. 2 f.n.

³⁴Jacobson et al., op. cit., pp. 22-23.

³⁵Getzels and Guba, loc. cit. The authors do, however, note (without defining) a distinction between inconsistent and contradictory expectations in role conflict situations.

notion of conflict analogous to opposition (i.e., antithesis) in formal logic.

Focusing on antithesis, it is noted that opposition manifests an internally inclusive character. It may in formal logic subsume contradiction (where A is false, B must be true) and contrariety (where A and B can be false, but never true together).³⁶ Translating these terms into the language of role analysis, the following analogue is noted: contradictory and contrary role situations are those in which opposing expectations cannot be performed together. Their dissimilarity may be identified by invoking Ehrlich's distinction between role conflict and role dilemma;³⁷ in the former, a contradictory situation, no expectations can be ignored; in the latter, a contrary situation, all expectations can be ignored and yet another behavioral alternative selected. Consequently, while sets of contradictory and contrary expectations can be legitimate and/or illegitimate and obligatory and/or optional, greater behavioral freedom will ordinarily accompany role dilemma. Of course, sets of incompatible, discrepant, or inconsistent expectations of a non-antithetical character can also be legitimate and/or illegitimate and obligatory and/or optional.

This study will focus on role conflict (i.e., role contradiction) involving obligatory, optional, legitimate,

³⁶Ralph M. Eaton, General Logic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), pp. 83-85.

³⁷Ehrlich, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

and illegitimate expectations.

B. Types

While it is possible to construct role conflict typologies on the basis of numerous criteria, only two appear to be directly relevant to this study: social location and role content.³⁸ Focusing on the former, it is noted that role conflict may arise within or between audience populations. Conflict of either type may be engendered by (1) consensus on a single, inherently incompatible role pattern or (2) dissensus involving multiple role patterns. In the former case, for example, an audience may unanimously expect the unsalaried district councillor to be honest and generous; in the latter, one audience may expect him to be generous, another parsimonious. On the basis of participant observation and discussions, it was determined that role conflict confronting Idoma councillors was essentially of the multiple, inter-audience type. Hence, the decision to incorporate into the instrument only that type.

The researcher's concern with role content parallels Seeman's preoccupation with "the institutional dimension"³⁹ of role conflict. Seeman focuses on Parsons' universalistic-particularistic criteria for social action, the researcher on bureaucratic-debureaucratic role patterns. Potential conflict situations constructed for the present study involve

³⁸Alternative criteria might be adopted from the legitimacy, obligation, and sanction variables.

³⁹Seeman, op. cit., p. 375.

contradictory roles intended, on the one hand, to facilitate and, on the other, to subvert tendencies toward organizational growth and social regimentation.⁴⁰ By treating role conflict in varied situations⁴¹ as bureaucratic-debureaucratic, we may begin to explore problems of stability and change confronting, among others, the Idoma of Northern Nigeria.⁴² In sum, this study will focus on various audiences (social location) identified with potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic conflict (role content).

Role Conflict, Ambivalence, Resolution

A. Role Conflict and Ambivalence: From Objectivity to Subjectivity

Having examined role conflict definitionally and typologically, it remains to consider ambivalence and resolution as dimensions of the analysis. Before defining ambivalence, however, attention is called to the following elements of role conflict: (1) the objective conflict situation; (2)

⁴⁰S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (December 1959), p. 312.

⁴¹Emphasis has been placed on constructing realistic potential conflict situations. For a discussion of the need to focus on such situations, see Jerome Laulicht, "Role Conflict, The Pattern Variable Theory, and Scalogram Analysis," Social Forces, v. 33 (1954-1955), p. 253; also communication between George Korber and Samuel Stouffer-Jackson Toby, American Journal of Sociology, LVII, #1 (July 1951), pp. 48-49, relevant to Samuel Stouffer and Jackson Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality," American Journal of Sociology, v. 56, #5 (March 1951), pp. 395-406.

⁴²For a discussion of this point, see pp. 98-101, 159, 252.

perception of the objective conflict situation; and (3) subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence.⁴³

An analogue of the distinction between the latter two may be found in Parsons' conceptualization of cognitive orientation and cathectic response.⁴⁴ Focusing on the perceptual and subjective variables, it is noted that the occupant of a focal position--for example, the Idoma district councillor--may fail to perceive the existence or extent of an objective conflict situation. His ability to perceive such a situation would constitute a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for subjectively-experienced role conflict;⁴⁵ the latter need not accompany the former. Their coincidence would, however, indicate ambivalence, that is, ". . . the fact that the actor experiences difficulty . . . [in choosing his] performance . . . [among] given role alternatives."⁴⁶

Failure to treat these analytic variables points up the sterility of role research on African chieftaincy and local leadership. Emphasis on description of role conflict in numerous African societies represents little more than rediscovery of the objective conflict situation. Clearly, a priori assumption or empirical location of such situations

⁴³Getzels and Guba, op. cit., p. 166; Seeman, op. cit., p. 373; Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. D. Snoek and Robert A. Rosenthal, Organizational Stress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 12.

⁴⁴Parsons, op. cit., p. 7ff.

⁴⁵See f.n. 43.

⁴⁶Seeman, op. cit., p. 373.

ought to constitute a point of departure for, not the object of, role conflict analysis.

B. Perceived Role Conflict and
Ambivalence: Resolution

Before considering techniques for conflict resolution, a distinction between focal and audience resolution ought to be made. Important here is the aforementioned distinction between objective conflict on the one hand, and perceived role conflict and ambivalence, on the other. It has already been established that experience of the latter presupposes perception of the former. Resolution of perceived role conflict and ambivalence does not, however, presume commensurate consequences for the objective conflict situation. While the occupant of a focal position may have succeeded in resolution even to the extent of no longer perceiving an objective conflict situation, the latter may persist. This is not to suggest, of course, that an actor exposed to contradictory expectations need confine his efforts to the level of personal resolution; he may, for example, attempt to present the fact of objective conflict to an audience population in the hope that the latter will, in turn, undertake resolution.⁴⁷ In that event, however, the focal actor operating at the objective level may only seek to inform and persuade. At that level, resolution could be effected only within or between audience populations, depending on the

⁴⁷Merton, op. cit., pp. 376-377; Festinger, op. cit., p. 182.

type of conflict involved. Thus, several Idoma councillors reported having in the past apprised elders of the existence of a role conflict situation involving the latter and the district head; none encountered sympathy on the part of the elders.⁴⁸ This study will encompass resolution at the focal level only.

Turning to techniques for the resolution of perceived role conflict and ambivalence, we note the wide range of alternatives potentially available to an actor: psychological adjustment in the form of aggression, withdrawal (symbolic or physical), regression, and accommodative behavior (mental or physical), including role substitution and role reversal; rationalization; role segregation or compartmentalization; ritualistic response; compromise; stalling; role redefinition; feigned illness; appeal for support from occupants of similar and/or different positions (for example, the attempt to persuade an audience population to resolve the objective conflict situation); and selection of the major role.⁴⁹ (In a

⁴⁸See pp. 244-252.

⁴⁹Discussion of the major role technique may be found in Getzels and Guba, op. cit., pp. 173-175; discussion of the other techniques may be found in John Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), pp. 1-190; Walter I. Wardwell, "The Reduction of Strain in a Marginal Social Role," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, #1 (July 1955), pp. 16-25; Spiegel, op. cit., p. 4ff.; Jackson Toby, "Some Variables in Role Conflict Analysis," Social Forces, v. 30 #3 (March 1952), p. 324ff.

An empirical case involving selection of the major role may be found in Burchard, op. cit., p. 535.

For a useful discussion of the relationship between

situation involving two or more contradictory expectations, the major role is that expectation which the actor chooses to fulfill.) Idoma district councillors consistently indicated preference for the major role technique.⁵⁰ This intriguing datum engenders the following questions: Why the preference for that technique? What determines selection of the major role from among given behavioral alternatives?

Merton⁵¹ has suggested three factors in the structural relationship between focal actor and audience which independently or interdependently have consequences for perception of objective role conflict, experienced ambivalence, and selection of the major role: (1) Involvement (the extent to which audiences are perceived to be concerned with an actor's role behavior); (2) Power (the extent to which audiences are perceived to be able to prevail upon an actor to do something he would not otherwise do);⁵² and (3) Observability (the extent to which audiences are perceived to be able to view an actor's role behavior). Focusing on the latter for purposes of illustration, it is hypothesized that where the

role segregation and theatrical performance, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Center, 1956), p. 83. Goffman appears to construe role as actual rather than expected behavior (pp. 9, 90).

⁵⁰Other techniques did accompany selection of the major role; for example, verbal aggression in the form of denunciation and epithet.

⁵¹Merton, op. cit., pp. 371-376.

⁵²This definition is adapted from Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, v. 2 #3 (July 1957), pp. 202-203.

ability of audiences to observe an actor's role behavior is undifferentiated, then (a) extent of ambivalence will vary with perceived extent of observability and (b) observability will cease to be an important factor in selection of the major role. The converse of (b) is hypothesized where ability of audiences to observe an actor's role behavior is differentiated. These hypotheses can, of course, be constructed to include both involvement and power.⁵³ In the latter case, however, it is important to distinguish two variables, possession of power and utilization of power.⁵⁴ Thus, there is evidence that elders possessing a virtual monopoly over the most potent punitive sanction in Idoma, the curse, are generally disinclined to invoke it.⁵⁵

Others have suggested the relevance of personality structure to the resolution of role conflict. For example, Ackerman hypothesizes that the actor will select as the

⁵³See Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 24. Power hypotheses analogous to (ii) and its converse appear to be confirmed by Gross et al., op. cit., p. 298ff.

⁵⁴Elements of the distinction are analogous to that between potential for control and potential for unity found in Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, v. 52 (June 1958), p. 465.

⁵⁵While all subjects acknowledged the potency and virtual monopolization of this sanction, most dismissed its utility on one or more of the following grounds: (1) non-conformance with an elder's expectations in these potential role conflict situations was not sufficient offense to merit being cursed; (2) invocation of that sanction would have disruptive effects on the community; and (3) elders would not want to assume responsibility for inevitable consequences of cursing. For a discussion of the long-range implications of point (3), see pp. 80-87, 229-230.

expectation to be fulfilled that which is most compatible with his personality needs.⁵⁶ In this vein, Parsons examines the relationship between role and the "need disposition" to "conformity-alienation."⁵⁷ In The Social System, he suggests that

. . . one central aspect of the general and especially the cathectic [gratificational-deprivational] orientation of the actor is his set of need dispositions toward the fulfillment of role expectations, in the first place those of other significant actors but also his own. There is, in the personality structure of the individual actor a 'conformity-alienation' dimension in the sense of a disposition to conform with the expectations of others or to be alienated from them. When these relevant expectations are those relative to the fulfillment of role-obligations, this conformity-alienation balance, in general or in particular role contexts, becomes a central focus of the articulation of the motivational system of the personality with the structure of the social system.⁵⁸

Potentially relevant to the relationship between conflict resolution, personality, and social structural factors introduced above is the legitimacy dimension of role. Thus, it can be hypothesized that the actor confronting role conflict will have a need disposition to fulfill the expectation which he construes as more legitimate.⁵⁹ Moreover, we note that the legitimacy dimension cuts across involvement, power, and observability. It is assumed that audiences perceived

⁵⁶Nathan Ackerman, "Social Role and Total Personality," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, v. 21 (January 1951), pp. 1-17; also Kahn et al., op. cit., p. 233ff.

⁵⁷Parsons, op. cit., p. 32.

⁵⁸Parsons, loc. cit.

⁵⁹Getzels and Guba, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

as holding legitimate expectations for the Idoma district councillor will have some involvement in, power over, and observability of his role behavior. In light of the above, legitimacy may be useful in indicating both origin of ambivalence and direction of resolution.

However, its limitations ought to be noted. First, a need disposition to fulfill the more legitimate expectation may be either absent or of only secondary importance. In the former case, actual behavior may be causally-related to factors other than personality structure; in the latter, the need disposition to avoid punitive-social sanction may better indicate origin of ambivalence and direction of resolution.⁶⁰ For example, the actor's need disposition to avoid such sanction may eventuate in behavioral conformance with an expectation perceived as illegitimate and obligatory. Second, neither involvement, power, nor observability presupposes legitimacy. These may be cut across by illegitimacy. Consequently, the value of legitimacy needs to be assessed situationally. While its utility would exist in conflict situations involving legitimate and illegitimate expectations, the converse would hold in situations involving legitimate or illegitimate expectations.⁶¹ In the latter cases, greater

⁶⁰See pp. 230-237.

⁶¹An exception to the converse may be obtained in conflict situations involving only legitimate expectations. Thus, operationally-defining "degree of legitimacy" as the total number of times in a conflict situation that a district councillor evaluates an audience expectation as legitimate, it is possible to have a "more legitimate" expectation. See pp. 238-239.

benefit would derive from utilization of differential power measured by the relative potency of sanctions.⁶² Limitations on the use of the sanctional variable ought also to be noted, however. Its value would be largely nullified in conflict situations involving optional expectations or obligatory expectations accompanied by sanctions of undifferentiated potency or type.⁶³ Hence, it is possible to conceive of situations in which neither legitimacy nor obligation-sanction will have significant consequences for the resolution of role conflict. The relative utility of both for Idoma district councillors confronting role conflict will be analyzed in this study.

⁶²Sutcliffe and Haberman, op. cit., pp. 695-703.

⁶³This study will be concerned with differential sanctional type rather than differential sanctional potency. See pp. 233-237.

PART II: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND FIELD INVESTIGATION

Chapter III: The Research: Focus, Field Procedures, and Problems

CHAPTER III

THE RESEARCH: FOCUS, FIELD PROCEDURES, AND PROBLEMS

The purpose of this chapter will be (1) to identify the objectives and analytic variables around which the study has been organized; (2) to identify the field procedures utilized in collecting data; and (3) to examine problems encountered during the field operation.

The Research Focus and Analytic Variables

The three-fold objective of this study is (1) to locate sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension in "culturally mixed" Idoma; (2) to ascertain the degree of consensus among Idoma district councillors on roles associated with that tension; and (3) to examine the problem of conflict management confronting that officeholder. The latter objective involves analysis of the relationship between legitimacy, obligation, and sanction, on the one hand, and perceived role conflict, ambivalence, and resolution, on the other.

Focusing on potential rather than actual role and conflict, the analysis embraces the following variables: (1) expectations perceived to be held by audiences; (2)

perceived role conflict; (3) perceived legitimacy of expectations; (4) perceived obligatoriness of expectations; (5) anticipated punitive-social sanction in the event of non-conformance with obligatory expectations; (6) degree of ambivalence experienced in perceived conflict situations; and (7) choice of the major role in resolving conflict. Variables were operationalized as part of a semi-structured interview schedule.¹

Field Procedures

Length of complete schedule, preference for compartmentalized collection of demographic and role data, and time needed to establish rapport with villagers unfamiliar with research methods and objectives² led the researcher to undertake a two-phase field operation. Phase I involved initial efforts to establish rapport, selection of the interview population, collection of demographic data, and ascertainment of potential role conflict situations. It was inaugurated by six weeks of intensive participant observation and discussion in diverse contexts: Divisional (i.e., Regional Ministry of Local Government) and Idoma Native Authority headquarters in Oturkpo Town; district council, clan, and village ojiras or meetings in areas from which the

¹See pp. 267-274.

²This appears to have been Idoma's initial contact with a political scientist. Previous field researchers included colonial anthropological officers and an American anthropologist, Dr. Robert Armstrong, of the University of Ibadan in Western Nigeria. Prominent among the former were the late R. C. Abraham and C. K. Meek.

interview population would be drawn; social and commercial establishments in villages and Oturkpo Town. Collection of demographic data through interviews commenced at the close of the introductory period in Phase I.

The researcher chose to focus on district councillorship in areas with a tradition of priest-kingship, i.e., a chieftaincy institution which combines secular and spiritual functions.³ The interview population included the 89 councillors in five districts of northern and central Idoma Divisions. Of the 89, all but two were met in village compounds; the remainder were queried in Town residences. Six councillors communicated in English, 82 in Idoma, and one in Tiv. The assistance of a multilingual interpreter-informant was required in the confrontation with speakers of Idoma and Tiv. English-speaking councillors were interviewed by the researcher in the presence of the interpreter-informant. Phase I interviews averaging 1½ hours were conducted over a period of three months.

Phase II involved the collection of data on campaigning in district council elections,⁴ role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution. An instrument was constructed on the basis of (1) documentary materials; (2) discussions with councillors and informants; and (3) behavior observed during the earlier phase. It was subjected to a pre-test and

³See pp. 91-95.

⁴The data on council elections encompass issue-personality orientation, strategies, and "generosity."

revised. The instrument was then administered to the councillors as follows:

After listening to a brief description of the first conflict situation, each subject was presented with role (bureaucratic, debureaucratic) and no expectation alternatives. Each was asked to indicate verbally the alternative[s] he felt an audience would hold. Those indicating any alternative[s] other than "no expectation in this situation" were subsequently probed for perceived legitimacy and obligatoriness of expectations ("Do they have a right to expect you to ____?" and "Would they insist that you do as expected?," respectively). Those who indicated obligatoriness were probed for anticipated punitive-social sanction in the event of non-conformance ("What would they do if you did not behave as expected?"). The procedure was repeated for each audience population. Each subject was then asked to reaffirm his perception of role conflict or role consensus among audience populations. Subjects who perceived intra- and/or inter-audience role conflict were then probed for existence and extent of ambivalence ("Would this situation trouble you?" Follow-up: "That is, would you have difficulty in deciding what to do?" If yes: "How much? Some? Very much?"). Finally, all subjects who had initially perceived role conflict were probed for resolution technique ("What would you do in this situation?"). The entire procedure was repeated for each of the other four potential role conflict situations involving the district

councillor as focal actor. District councillors were not probed for ambivalence in two situations involving the district head as focal actor.⁵

Due to circumstances beyond the control of the researcher, this phase of the field operation was terminated two weeks prior to the scheduled date. As a result, it was necessary to reduce the interview population to 71. The 18 councillors not interviewed in Phase II constitute 55% and 7% of the membership of two district councils. The analysis will encompass only the 71 councillors interviewed in both phases; that group represents 80% of the original interview population.⁶ Fifty councillors were queried in village and Town compounds, 21 in the researcher's residence.⁷ Phase II interviews averaging 2½ hours were conducted over a period of five months.⁸

⁵Since the study focuses on the councillor's difficulty in choosing among behavioral alternatives, he was not probed on ambivalence experienced by the district head. The two situations involving the latter as focal actor were constructed in order to facilitate analysis of the relationship between councillor, district head, and Native Authority. See pp. 143-148, 152-159, 244-252.

⁶The units in which 55% and 7% of the councillors were not interviewed are Districts 2 and 4, respectively, in the tables in Chapter VI. Also see map on p. 75. Analyses do not appear to be biased by the need to reduce the original interview population. The 45% interviewed in District 2 represent all the clans and areas in that administrative unit and approximate the proportion of elected and nominated members of the full council.

⁷The researcher's base was Oturkpo Town.

⁸Archival work in Divisional and Native Authority headquarters and participant observation and discussion in contexts noted cut across both phases of the field operation.

The analyses to be presented do not focus on the interview population per se. Therefore, in order to orient the reader to the demographic environment within which this study was executed, the typical Idoma district councillor will be described. He is (1) a new member of the council; (2) of middle age (mean age: 49.2); (3) a believer in traditional cults or one who has recently acquired a Christian veneer; (4) with little or no education; (5) illiterate; (6) a subsistence or not-too-prosperous farmer; (7) without title or office in the traditional system; (8) an active member of a secret society and/or dance group; (9) an experienced minor employee of Government or the Native Authority; (10) an inexperienced contender for public office; (11) a nominal, non-officeholding member of a political party; and (12) oblivious of the social, economic, and political world beyond Idoma.

Field Problems

Interrelated problems of an interpersonal and technical nature were encountered in the field. For the most part they involved (1) the researcher's effort to establish a professional identity; (2) the use of an interpreter-informant; and (3) the instrument and interview situation. Facets of those problems will be briefly commented upon.

(1) Professional Identity--Arriving in Idoma under the auspices of an American university and with permission granted by the Premier's Office (Northern Region), the researcher engaged the services of an interpreter-informant. Thus

commenced the introductory period in Phase I. After several trips through central and northern Idoma, the decision was made to focus on five districts in that area. Both the European Divisional Officer (representative of the Regional Ministry of Local Government) and Och'Idoma (Chief of Idoma and head of the Native Authority) concurred. Shortly after, the researcher and interpreter-informant delivered letters of introduction addressed by Och'Idoma to the five district heads. On that occasion, arrangements were made to meet with each of the district councils.

Upon meeting each council for the first time, greetings were exchanged and a traditional gift (one goat and beer) presented to the members. The researcher then apprised the council of his professional identity and reason for being in Idoma: a university lecturer sent to learn about the ways and government of an African people in order that students in America might become better informed. Although regional and divisional authorities were aware of the researcher's professional identity (i.e., political scientist), a deliberate effort was made to publicize an association with higher education and scholarship generally rather than a discipline focusing on political behavior specifically. That decision was taken for the following reasons: (1) to dispel possible suspicion of partisanship in a volatile political environment; (2) to enhance the prestige of Idoma informants by emphasizing the importance of this relatively small tribe within the Federation of Nigeria; and (3) to build upon the

Idoma's keen interest in, and undeniably strong commitment to, formal education. Success was manifestly greater with the second and third objectives.

Most district councillors were determined to establish a more concrete identity for the inquisitive mbeke (Idoma: "white man") in their midst. By the end of Phase I, the researcher was widely recognized as "the anthropologist." Benefits accrued from that appellation. Upon favorably recalling past experiences with anthropologists, many councillors and other Idoma informants were undoubtedly encouraged to share information with the researcher.⁹ At the same time, however, the appellation did engender suspicion in some quarters. During Phase II, for example, eleven councillors commented upon the curious fact of an anthropologist inquiring about political and administrative matters rather than Idoma song, dance, and language. Five in the group suspected that mbeke was either a Native Authority (NA) spy or Superintendent of Nigeria Police come to investigate NA corruption.¹⁰ The incredulous had to be reassured of the researcher's university association and scholarly motives.

Councillor curiosity and suspicion tended to be aroused by specific questions. Those involving religious affiliation, secret society and dance group membership, and campaigns for a council seat aroused the greatest anxiety.

⁹See f.n. 2.

¹⁰Distrust of the Idoma Native Authority was evident throughout the investigation. See, for example, pp. 144, 147, 151-152, 155-158, 164-165, 244-252.

Intensive probing and reassurances enabled the researcher to elicit much useful data on religious, secret society, and dance group activities. Curiosity and suspicion did, however, negatively affect the collection of data on campaigns. Sixty-five percent of the councillors refused to communicate information on omichi (Idoma: "generosity"), an important dimension of the campaign for council office. Contrastingly, councillors were relaxed and communicative when questioned on role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution. Manifest threat was absent during that portion of the interview. That contrast leads the researcher to conclude that collection of data relevant to the present analysis was not significantly affected by councillor reactions elsewhere. To minimize the possibility of spill-over, subjects were probed on campaigning after their responses on role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution had been recorded; data on religious, secret society, and dance group activities were, of course, collected during Phase I of the field operation.

(2) Use of an Interpreter-Informant--The political scientist who undertakes field research in Idoma is likely to confront the problem of engaging an interpreter and/or informant. If he has mastered the language, the former may be unnecessary; this researcher had not acquired facility in the Idoma tongue. In any event, operating in political Idoma requires more than the language competence of a researcher or interpreter. While such competence is desirable, it

cannot ipso facto generate the rapport which is essential in a successful field operation. Recognizing this, the researcher sought as an interpreter a person who had already established rapport with political actors in central and northern Idoma. The object, then, was to locate a political actor who could introduce the alien researcher into a system of on-going social and political relationships.¹¹ Upon the recommendation of knowledgeable in Oturkpo Town and a previous investigator in Idoma,¹² Audu was engaged.

Audu is a thirty-nine year old farmer and occasional petty trader. His sophistication belies both occupational achievement and Standard V training at the Methodist Central School in Oturkpo Town. Literate and fully conversant in five languages (Idoma, Tiv, Hausa, Ibo, and English), he has been a periodic consultant on Idoma to anthropologists at the University of Ibadan in Western Nigeria. Audu reads three newspapers, listens to at least one news broadcast daily, and is a student of Nehru. A Town dweller since the late 1930's, he has not yet abandoned an aversion to European attire and monogamy; he is husband to three wives. Audu is at once a believer and disbeliever in both alekwu (Idoma:

¹¹For a similar approach, see the discussion of "Doc" in William F. Whyte, "The Slum: On the Evolution of Street-corner Society," in Reflections on Community Studies, Arthur J. Vidich, Joseph Bensman, and Maurice R. Stein, eds. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), esp. pp. 13-15.

¹²The researcher, Dr. Robert Armstrong, had come to know Audu during the course of his own field investigations in Idoma.

"ancestral cult") and Christianity.

If Audu resembles Park's "marginal man,"¹³ he is also remarkably akin to Shils' "opposition mentality."¹⁴ Between the end of World War II and the mid-1950's, he was successively a member of the Nigeria Police, an employee of the Idoma Native Authority, and President of the Town Court. During the same period, he was in the vanguard of youths in the Idoma Hope Rising Union who were speaking out against the Native Authority.¹⁵ By 1958, Audu was secretary-general of the Union and leader of the opposition Action Group (AG) party in the Division. One year later, he was the unsuccessful AG candidate for a seat in the Northern House of Assembly. Since May 1962, Audu has represented a peri-urban village constituency on one of the five councils studied.

¹³Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," American Journal of Sociology, v. 33, #6 (May 1928), pp. 887-892; also Everett V. Stonequist, "The Problem of the Marginal Man," American Journal of Sociology, v. XLI, #1 (July 1935), pp. 3-12.

For critical analyses of the concept, see (1) David I. Golovensky, "The Marginal Man Concept: An Analysis and Critique," Social Forces, v. 30, #3 (March 1952), pp. 333-339; (2) Milton M. Goldberg, "A Qualification of the Marginal Man Theory," American Sociological Review, v. 6, #1 (February 1941), pp. 52-58; and (3) Arnold W. Green, "A Re-examination of the Marginal Man Concept," Social Forces, v. 26, #2 (December 1947), pp. 168-171.

¹⁴Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Development of the New States," World Politics, v. 12, #9 (April 1960), pp. 329-368. While Audu is not the trained intellectual about whom Shils writes, his behavior does indicate an "opposition mentality."

¹⁵See pp. 126-128, 160-162.

His verbal assaults upon the Idoma Native Authority continue unabated.

In light of the above, NA and Divisional Office aversion to Audu's employment is understandable. Och'Idoma expressed the fear that Audu would campaign sub rosa for the 1964 federal elections. Having already received assurances to the contrary, the researcher dissented. Audu served as interpreter-informant throughout the field operation. During that period, there was no evidence to support the fear expressed by Och'Idoma.¹⁶ In order to sustain the image of a "neutral," the researcher interacted intensively with political actors representing all shades of opinion. That interaction cut across Town and village, professional and social spheres of activity.

Audu's effectiveness in integrating the researcher into a system of on-going social and political relationships may be gleaned from the responses on "generosity" in campaigns for a council seat. Fearful that such a probe would alienate the district councillors, he attempted to persuade the researcher to reconsider. The latter suggested that the value of a probe for "generosity" might be assessed in a pre-test of the instrument. Among the three subjects to

¹⁶Refusal to be persuaded did not affect the progress of the field operation until two weeks prior to its scheduled termination. At that time, the Idoma Native Authority declared Audu to be persona non grata in the five districts when in the company of the researcher. Since the link with on-going social and political relationships had been severed, collection of data was terminated.

whom the pre-test was administered, only one communicated information. None, however, exhibited hostility to the probe per se. Accordingly, the probe was written into the revised instrument.¹⁷ As noted above, 65% simply refused to communicate any information. Of the remaining twenty-five councillors, only five responded without hesitation. Allaying fears that mbeke would break confidence, Audu was able to persuade twenty councillors to describe their campaigns. In all cases, subjects outlined campaign strategies, including the distribution of gifts in cash and kind. Notwithstanding inability to elicit data from 65% of the subjects, the researcher has for several reasons interpreted this experience as a measure of Audu's effectiveness. First, the forty-six councillors who had refused to communicate did so by merely denying involvement in such activity. None articulated hostility to the researcher, interpreter-informant, or probe per se. Second, a 35% response on the delicate question of "generosity" enabled the researcher to gain valuable insight into an important dimension of Idoma political activity. In this instance, the value of both the data and the agent who obtained it cannot be measured by percentage alone.

At the same time, however, the researcher was sensitive to the possibility that role responses involving the

¹⁷While the present analysis focuses on the potential role conflict situation, the researcher obtained role data on other contexts as well. Role behavior in the interactional campaign situation will be examined in a forthcoming manuscript.

Native Authority audience might be biased by a hostile interpreter-informant. The possibility of this occurring was greatest in the conflict situations involving construction of a council hall (Case I) and campaigning for the governing Northern Peoples' Congress (Case II).¹⁸ Participant observation and access to English-speaking informants were useful checks on responses in the two cases. Thus, the researcher's personal knowledge of an actual situation analogous to that in Case I was compared with councillor perceptions. Both tend to associate the NA audience with a bureaucratic expectation for councillor and district head behavior.¹⁹ Moreover, the tendency of councillors to identify the NA with a bureaucratic expectation in Case II is paralleled by both official pronouncements and the testimony of reliable Idoma informants.²⁰ In sum, while Audu's bias was undoubtedly operative throughout the field operation, it is possible to affirm a high degree of confidence in both his integrity and objectivity. A previous investigator in Idoma had already expressed similar confidence.²¹

(3) The Instrument and Interview Situation--For most of the seventy-one councillors and their constituents,

¹⁸See pp. 141-169.

¹⁹See pp. 148-160, 244-252.

²⁰Citations for the official pronouncements may be found on p. 165 f.n. 41. Idoma informants include members and supporters of the governing Northern Peoples' Congress. Also see p. 165.

²¹See f.n. 12.

face-to-face contact with a white man is a rare occurrence. Such contact has generally been limited to brief meetings with missionaries and former colonial officers on tour. Not surprisingly, then, direct confrontation with the researcher produced an admixture of responses.²²

The prestige of a district councillor was undoubtedly enhanced by the researcher's visit. An entire community could gaze upon the arrival of "his white man." During the rainy season, that arrival was frequently facilitated by communal labor mobilized to clear a path to the village. A holiday spirit pervaded the community on interview day.

Upon arriving in the councillor's compound, the researcher exchanged greetings with elders, tax collectors, the teacher, and perhaps the clan head. He would then be invited to "chop" (eat) with prominent men in the community. Villagers laughed and joked while mbeke "chopped" fu-fu (pounded yam), palm wine, and buruktu (domestic beer). Others stared in disbelief! All seemed very pleased.

Researcher, interpreter-informant, and councillor would then retire to the business at hand. Some councillors were now notably distressed by the need to do business with their guest. For example, there were those who expressed fear of the "Superintendent of Nigeria Police" in their midst. Others insisted that they had already paid the annual poll tax. Another group did not feel prepared for the

²²Interviews were scheduled at meetings of the full council.

researcher's "school examination." On such occasions, Audu would offer sympathetic assurances and at the same time note his own familiarity with the questions.²³ Then the researcher would reiterate his professional identity and scholarly motives. For most of the apprehensive, such assurances would suffice. Others remained dubious.

Questions in both phases of the field operation evoked mixed reactions. Those designed to elicit genealogical data produced the most effusive replies, since Idoma councillors exult in the opportunity to recall real and imagined ancestors. As indicated above, questions on religious affiliation generated some anxiety. Forty-five councillors (63%) described themselves as "Christian." A dubious researcher probed that group with the question, "Do you sacrifice to your ancestors?" Forty responded in the affirmative. Both the researcher and interpreter-informant now doubted the veracity of the other five. Audu noted that they may have framed a response to please their white (and presumably Christian) interrogator. Probes failed to confirm that suspicion.

When queried on secret society and dance group activity, most subjects indicated that they were members of such associations. Others reported that they were not members. On one such occasion, the interpreter-informant recognized an ornament of the secret Onyonkpo society on a wall.

²³Audu translated the instrument into Idoma. Moreover, a member of one of the five councils studied, he had already been interviewed by the researcher.

Probes revealed that the councillor was in fact chairman of the local Onyonkpo, formerly a head-hunting society. His denial was based on fear of arrest. Audu assured him that the researcher had come only to learn.

During Phase II, councillors were probed on strategies in the campaign for a council seat. Most explicated devices, alliances, clandestine campaigning, and so forth. When probed on "generosity," however, denials generally burst forth. One councillor was now convinced that the researcher was in fact a "Superintendent of Nigeria Police." Sixty-five percent of the councillors underscored the illegality of such behavior. Assured of the researcher's trustworthiness, twenty-five councillors admitted the need to be "generous": ten shillings to the elders, wine and meat to one lineage, buruktu to an important sublineage. Among those prepared to communicate information, eighteen emphasized the difference between omichi (Idoma: "generosity") and tobacco ("graft"). Four councillors construed fifteen shillings to the elders as tobacco; three described as omichi forty shillings to the elders. The researcher has tentatively concluded that the two concepts defy precise definition. Personal motives of the dispenser and recipient probably determine what is omichi and tobacco.

Questions involving role generated some semantic difficulty. The pre-test instrument had been constructed to elicit data on personal role, social role, and audience preference. Two of the three subjects to whom it had been

administered became confused by the three concepts. Accordingly, only a personal role format was included in the revised instrument.²⁴ Seventy-one councillors were then asked in the first conflict case, "Do the elders expect you as a councillor to advise the district head to sign a payment voucher?"²⁵ Fourteen percent indicated that "the elders prefer that I advise the district head not to sign a payment voucher." The researcher and interpreter-informant resorted to definition and illustration in an effort to distinguish between expected and preferred behavior. In order to ensure comprehension, councillors who did not register confusion were nevertheless questioned on the distinction. That problem was virtually non-existent in subsequent conflict cases. Questions involving legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution did not appear to generate an analogous problem.

In sum, two types of problems arose in the interview situation. The first involved councillors who were at once flattered by the attention of a white man and yet apprehensive about the need to interact with him. Others were threatened by specific questions. Undoubtedly the most threatening questions were those involving religious affiliation, secret society and dance group activity, and "generosity" in the campaign for a council seat. Interestingly,

²⁴See pp. 31-34.

²⁵See pp. 148, 269.

while direct, prolonged interaction was an enervating experience for some councillors, most appeared to thrive on the interview situation. In this vein, six uneducated, illiterate councillors expressed gratitude for the opportunity to "tell iticha (Idoma: "teacher") about the ways of Idoma."

The second problem involved semantic clarity. Considerable energy was expended in an effort to dispel the confusion between expected and preferred behavior. Questions were repeated and analyzed for the seven councillors who had initially experienced difficulty in making the distinction. Others were probed for comprehension.

In the final analysis, the researcher's ability to cope with both problems was enhanced by (1) the informal, unhurried manner in which interviews were conducted; (2) the restraint and sympathetic patience generally exercised by participants in the interview situation; and (3) the subjects' confidence in the personal integrity of the interpreter-informant.

PART III: ANTHRO-HISTORY

Chapter IV: Traditional Idoma

Chapter V: Colonial and Post-Colonial Administration in
Idoma

CHAPTER IV


TRADITIONAL IDOMA

The purpose of Part III will be to establish an anthro-historical framework for the analysis of role problems confronting Idoma district councillors. Chapter IV will focus on traditional society and polity, Chapter V on the evolution of administrative policy in colonial and post-colonial Idoma.

Before examining aspects of traditional social structure, religion, and polity, it would be well to distinguish between what has been termed the "Idoma-speaking peoples" and the "Idoma 'proper.'" (See map on page 75.) The "Idoma-speaking peoples" reside in a crescent-shaped area between the towns of Keana and Doma (Benue Province, Northern Nigeria) and a point just north of Ogoja Town (Ogoja Province, Eastern Nigeria); this group coalesces linguistically and, to some extent, culturally. Inhabiting a sector of the crescent bordered by the Benue River (north), Tiv Division-Benue Province (east), Igala Division-Kabba Province (west), and Enugu, Abakaliki, and Ogoja Provinces of Eastern Nigeria (south) are the so-called "Idoma 'proper.'"¹ Numbering approximately 225,000, the "Idoma

¹Robert G. Armstrong, "The Idoma-Speaking Peoples,"

NORTH.



NOTE: Administrative center at Oturkpo Town (4)

'proper'" reside in the twenty-two administrative districts of Idoma Division (Benue Province, Northern Nigeria).² The present study focuses on districts (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) in northern and central Idoma Division.

Social Structure

Idoma social organization is ostensibly a replica of the familiar African pattern. Its essential elements, in ascending order, are (1) the family compound (Idoma: ole); (2) the sublineage (Idoma: ipooma, "those of one birth"); (3) the lineage (Idoma: ipoopu, "those of one playground or council ground"); and (4) the clan (Idoma: aje or ipaaje, "Land"). In at least one important aspect, however, Idoma diverges from the pattern. Contrary to a principle of clan organization, the "Land" is not an exogamous unit.³ According to Shaw,⁴ Idoma clans are generally defined by

in Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Western Africa, Part X), Daryll Forde, ed. (London: International African Institute, 1955), pp. 94-95.

²The approximate figure of 225,000 was obtained by subtracting the population of seven largely non-Idoma districts (numbers 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 on the map) from the official total for the Division. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Census and Tax Assessment, 1962-1963 (unpublished document). The total in that period was 327,000.

³For a discussion of the principles of clan organization, see Meyer Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi: Being the First Part of an Analysis of the Social Structure of a Trans-Volta Tribe (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 62.

⁴J. H. Shaw, Reorganization Report for Ochekwu District (unpublished manuscript, 1934); also D. B. Wright, Anthropological Investigations in Oglewu District (unpublished manuscript, 1939).

the following criteria: (a) possession of an identifiable, autonomous territorial base; (b) acknowledgment of a common ancestor from whom descent is patrilineally reckoned; (c) possession of a common aje or earth shrine to which offerings are made; and (d) acknowledgment of an oche or clan head as father of the unit and embodiment of tradition.

Yet the putative clan may fail to meet even these criteria. For example, the Oglewu clan is unable to identify a common ancestor.⁵ In sum, while these units have been recognized as clans by both colonial and contemporary governmental authorities, they are not clans in the accepted anthropological sense.

Many putative clans have established important relationships with collateral uterine groups, i.e., descendants of a female member married to a non-member. For example, the AiArobi (Idoma: "sons of Arobi") are related to the Yangedde clan. According to tradition, a Muslim Hausa married Arobi, great granddaughter of the Attah (King) of Igala. Descendants of that marriage--AiArobi--reside on Yangedde clan land near the famous Abakpa market (Idoma: Abakpa denotes "Hausa").⁶

⁵Anon., Western Area Old District Notebooks: Oglewu (unpublished manuscript, n.d.); also Wright, op. cit.

⁶S.A.S. Leslie, Reorganization Report for Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript, 1936); A. B. Mathews, Report on Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript, 1939); Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Northern Area Old District Notebooks: Yangedde (unpublished manuscript, n.d.).

Traditional law denies to uterine descendants the right to occupy the position of oche or clan head; in contemporary Idoma, the ban extends to the secular district headship in districts with a combined chieftaincy institution.⁷ Nevertheless, uterine descendants did occupy an important position within the pre-colonial system. Only they could legitimately place the beaded insignia of office on the wrist of a new oche. As a result, members of a uterine group were frequently in a position to arbitrate disputes over the succession. In contemporary Idoma, too, there is evidence of exceptional influence and achievement among these "strangers."⁸ Some are important members of village ojiras⁹ and district councils; in 1955, one was elected Administrative Councillor for Local Government in the Idoma Native Authority and Member of the Federal House of Representatives in Lagos. Notwithstanding, councillor responses

⁷A combined chieftaincy institution may be found in such single clan districts as (1) and (4) on the map. See pp. 91-95, 180-191.

⁸The concept of the "stranger" in African societies has generally been applied to cases involving members of different tribes. For a discussion of the "stranger" so defined, see Elliott P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African Societies," *Africa*, v. XXXIII, #4 (October, 1963), pp. 307-320. Among the Idoma, however, the appellation "stranger" is not limited to non-Idoma. "Stranger elements" include (1) those who are descended from the marriage of an Idoma female and a non-Idoma (as in the case of AiArobi) and (2) the offspring of Idoma parents of different clans. The offspring of such a marriage would be considered a "stranger" in the mother's clan.

⁹For a discussion on the ojira or "mass meeting," see pp. 88-90.

indicate considerable tension between these elements and the larger clan community. For example, councillors representing Akpachi and Emichi lineages vehemently denied "stranger" relationship to the Boju clan;¹⁰ similarly, the councillor representing Akpachi lineage in the Oturkpo clan denied "stranger" status. Moreover, several councillors alleged that "stranger" colleagues were more inclined than others to support strong chieftaincy and central authority in Idoma.¹¹

Another divergence between Idoma and the familiar African pattern of social organization involves the "village" concept. The colonial power introduced the "village" unit into Idoma for purposes of administrative convenience. Colonial officials construed it as a clearly-defined area composed of several families (of the same or different lineages or sublineages) living in close proximity.¹²

The Idoma language has no word to denote "village." Consequently, when the researcher sought to ascertain the name and size of district council constituencies, questions

¹⁰Hugh Elliott, Reorganization Report for Boju District (unpublished manuscript, 1937), Appendix J.

¹¹The researcher found no evidence to support that allegation. However, the testimony does throw light on the tension existing between councillors, district heads, and the Idoma Native Authority. Bases for that tension are examined on pp. 144, 147, 151-152, 155-158, 164-165, 244-252.

¹²In a conversation with the researcher, Professor Robert G. Armstrong of the University of Ibadan (Western Nigeria) suggested that the typical settlement pattern in central and northern Idoma resembled a "neighborhood" rather than a "village."

had to be constructed without reference to a "village" unit per se. In both cases, the words k'ipole and ipole (Idoma: "at least two family compounds") were utilized. Thus, councillors were asked, (1) Ikansulu k'ipole nya na wea? (English: Of what "village" are you the councillor?) and (2) Ipole emla ya ip'aje k'ukansulu kuwoa? (English: How many "villages" make up your council area") Ip'aje k'ukansulu (Idoma: "council land or area") signifies a group of family compounds already recognized as an administrative "village" unit. The newer unit designated "council area" is represented by a member of the district council. Where a "council area" corresponds with a single "village", the former takes the name of the latter; where several "villages" comprise a single constituency, the latter remains nameless. Named and unnamed constituencies are represented on all district councils in Idoma Division.

Religion and Society

The Idoma weltanschauung may be construed as a system containing three significant elements: (1) a creative supernatural force; (2) a sustaining earth; and (3) a guiding ancestral spirit. This triad defines the spiritual content of Idoma existence and gives rise, directly and indirectly, to three principles regulating the politico-governmental life of the society: democracy, gerontocracy, and chieftaincy.¹³

¹³The three principles are examined on pp. 87-97.

Owoicho, the impersonal god above, is perceived as the prime mover. Idoma believe that after creating the universe Owoicho chose to govern it through an intermediary, Enyangu. Unable to communicate directly with Owoicho, mortals must alternatively approach Enyangu when divine assistance is desired. Shrines for the latter can be observed in most Idoma households. Notwithstanding supplications to the intermediary, the cult of Owoicho is predicated on the belief that a supreme force is omnipresent and active. The notion of an intermediary divorced from a functioning power is alien to the Idoma mind.¹⁴

The force of Owoicho may be transmitted through diverse media. Thus, the Idoma believe that charms, mounds, and other material objects can receive the energy of their god. Perhaps even more important media in daily life are the concepts earth and ancestors embodied in the aje and alekwu cults, respectively. In order to ensure bountiful harvests and hunts, the Idoma is obliged to make supplications to his aje or earth shrine. On a day fixed annually by the clan head (generally when the hunting season is to commence) special prayers and sacrifices are offered at the aje shrines by elders who are priests of the cult. A population hopeful that Owoicho will bless the aje then engages in joyous feasting and beer drinking. On less propitious occasions, however, modification of the pattern of

¹⁴Armstrong in Forde, ed., op. cit., p. 100; Wright, op. cit., Appendix G.

annual supplication may be required. For example, Elliott reports that an outbreak of smallpox forced the Boju people to postpone the ceremonies in 1937. He also notes that such natural disasters as drought and locust invasion may require special appeals to the aje. In sum, while the rule of annual celebration is generally adhered to, a certain degree of flexibility is permitted and even encouraged.¹⁵

It has been suggested above that relationships with Owoicho and the aje operate in different spheres. Thus, while the relationship with a supreme power and its agent is individual and private, that with the aje is collective and public. Elder-priests of the aje cult represent a larger community. In contrast, the cult of Owoicho

is always a personal and never a group affair. Owo is symbolized by a white silk-cotton tree in Oturkpo and by a species of fig tree in other districts. Such a tree is personal and planted for the individual.¹⁶

Operating in both spheres of Idoma life is the alekwu cult. For the individual Idoma the alekwu represents an historical and spiritual bond with the past. In order to strengthen that bond, he must choose propitious occasions on which to make offerings to the ancestors.¹⁷ Most

¹⁵Elliott, op. cit., Appendix I; also Armstrong in Forde, ed., loc. cit.; Wright, loc. cit.

¹⁶Armstrong in Forde, ed., loc. cit.

¹⁷R. C. Abraham, Reorganization Report for Agala District (unpublished manuscript, circa 1935); J. C. Monckton, "Burial Ceremonies of the Attah of Igala," Journal of the African Society, v. XXVII (January, 1928), pp. 165-166; C. K. Meek, Anthropological Notes on the Idoma (unpublished manuscript, 1925); Elliott, op. cit., Appendix I; Wright, op. cit., Appendix G.

commentators have suggested that in the communion with alekwu, the ancestors are essentially objects of worship.¹⁸ Contrastingly, Wright draws attention to a distinction between the social and religious character of the cult.¹⁹ His analysis raises several points of fundamental significance for both traditional and contemporary Idoma. First, the individual Idoma is in communion with ancestors who are, paradoxically, "alive." Death in the corporeal sense has not removed them from clan membership or positions of importance. On the contrary, the ancestors are perceived as vital and functional members of Idoma society. Hence, the Idoma addressing his alekwu is, for practical purposes, communicating with "active" members of a flourishing corporate community. Stated otherwise, the ancestors constitute a non-physical-proximate audience in contemporary Idoma.²⁰

Second, as members of such a community, the ancestors appear to occupy much the same position as elders resident in a compound. They are not revered, but deferred to as sages. As members, elders and ancestors are endowed with rights and responsibilities. Both have a right to the food and drink which symbolize deference to those with superior wisdom gained from experience. The individual Idoma is, in turn, able to seek assistance from both elders and ancestors.

¹⁸For example, Abraham, op. cit. and Elliott, op. cit.

¹⁹Wright, op. cit., Appendix G.

²⁰See pp. 34-35.

Such assistance is anticipated, of course, in a society in which all members are obliged to promote its continuity and welfare.

Third, the appeal to alekwu represents communion with the power of Owoicho. A sympathetic response from the ancestors renders the Idoma beneficiary to the benevolent energy of his god; an outraged alekwu threatens him with the malevolence of Owoicho.

Insight into the relationship between contemporary and ancestral Idoma may be gleaned from responses to questions in the interview schedule. For example, seventy-one district councillors were asked, "Could you tell me how the elders in your council area would feel about you as a councillor taking part in the selection of the next Clan Head?"²¹ One group indicated that the more sagacious elders would expect them not to take part in the selection process. Responses to follow-up questions revealed that these councillors perceived the elders' expectations as both legitimate (i.e., elders had a right to hold the expectation) and obligatory (i.e., elders would insist on conformance).²² A fourth question elicited punitive-social sanction anticipated in the event of nonconformance. Twenty-eight responses involved the expectation that elders would curse

²¹Other questions in the instrument elicited similar responses. See pp. 268, 270, 271, 272, 273.

²²Another group perceived the same legitimate expectation, but evaluated it as optional (i.e., not backed by punitive-social sanction).

in order to invoke the ancestors' wrath against a deviant councillor.²³

Probes were made for evaluations of that sanction. All in this group described the curse as sui generis in content and consequence.²⁴ Eighteen who had anticipated that another sanction would accompany the curse emphasized that the latter alone was awesome. The remainder explained that elders need only invoke this sanction in order to ensure effective punishment of an intransigent councillor. Further probing led the researcher to conclude that the anticipated effect of the curse was of a dual character. Minimally, subjects anticipated loss of life in the corporeal sense; thus, eight councillors explained that both political oblivion (i.e., failure to be re-elected) and ostracism within their council areas were more desirable than being "killed by the curse."²⁵ Twenty described what might be termed the "long-range" or maximal effect. Reflecting that evaluation is the statement of one councillor: "I would be lost!"

The maximal consequence suggests a link between Wright's analysis of the alekwu cult and Mannoni's theory

²³See pp. 222-237.

²⁴Seventy-one councillors described the curse as sui generis. For various reasons, however, fewer than the total anticipated its application. See pp. 225-227.

²⁵For a discussion of ostracism as a potent communal sanction, see Shaw, op. cit.

of psychological dependence.²⁶ Examining the relationship between Malagasy tribesmen and their ancestral cult, Mannoni reports that it

would be no exaggeration to say that the dead and their images form the highest moral authority in the mind of the 'dependent' Malagasy, and that for him they play the part filled for the European by the moral conscience, reason, God, King, or party . . .²⁷

In that circumstance, actual or even threatened abandonment is likely to have dysfunctional consequences for the "dependent personality."²⁸ An analogue is suggested in the case of Idoma. The Idoma believes that he is unequipped to master the environment without assistance from the ancestors. Abandoned by alekwu, he is, in effect, bereft of a sustaining "sense." Moreover, this loss extends beyond the cult to the power of Owoicho. His god, through the medium of alekwu, may now have abandoned him. Finally, isolation from the spiritual community is likely to be accompanied by ostracism within the contemporary community. In sum, until death has overtaken him, the accursed Idoma is confined to an earthly solitude; and death in the corporeal sense is not an escape, but rather, the extension of his isolation to a kind of spiritual limbo.

Relationships between role conflict resolution and

²⁶O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 39-97.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 55-56.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 61-88.

punitive-social sanction (including the curse) will be examined subsequently.²⁹

Polity

Transition from an individual-private to a collective-public sphere in the relationship between ancestors and descendants may be taken as a point of departure for the discussion of traditional polity. While democratic, gerontocratic, and chieftaincy principles have secular content, their significance for traditional political organization cannot be fully comprehended without reference to the Idoma weltanschauung. For Idoma constitutionalism is, in the final analysis, an admixture of secular and spiritual elements.

Political organization in traditional Idoma appears to have included the following loci of authority and influence: (1) ojira (Idoma: "mass meeting"); (2) oche (Idoma: "clan head"); (3) aiigabo (Idoma: titled "clan spokesmen"); (4) okpoju (Idoma: "market master"); (5) aioga-aiuta (Idoma: "host of the market master"); (6) oteyi (Idoma: "hamlet head"); and (7) aiowa and aaije (Idoma: "secret societies" and "dance groups"). All but the latter two will be considered in this section; the politico-governmental functions of secret societies and dance groups will be examined in a subsequent chapter.³⁰

²⁹See pp. 230, 233-237.

³⁰See pp. 169-174.

A. Ojira: Elite and Mass

The ojira may be construed both physically and behaviorally. On the one hand, it is the ground around which several sublineages or ipooma reside; on the other, it is the actual meeting of adult men for the purpose of dealing with daily affairs.³¹ While its origin is a locus among the sublineage units, the behavioral dimension confines it to neither a prescribed meeting place nor affairs of the ipooma. Thus, the researcher has attended joint clan, individual clan, and lineage ojiras on diverse sites. On one occasion, an ojira convened alongside a disputed yam field for the purpose of determining the right of usufruct. Present, in addition to the researcher, were a district councillor acting as mediator,³² the two claimants, and two witnesses. The group was later joined by three interested villagers, one of whom became an active participant in the discussions. An ojira may include age groups (Idoma: aiego), dance groups, and secret societies as well as clan, lineage, and sublineage units.

Attempts to specify the composition of this fluid institution have produced disagreement. Some observers have discerned in it an analogue of the "democratic" New England town meeting. For example, Smith suggests that the question

³¹Armstrong in Forde, ed., op. cit., p. 95.

³²For a discussion of the councillor's mediator function, see pp. 173-174.

'who are the members of the Ojira and how are they chosen or elected?' . . . shows a misconception of the nature of the Ojira.

He prefers to describe it as

essentially a mass meeting of all the men of the unit.³³

Contrastingly, Macleod perceives it as an elite "council of elders."³⁴ Smith's evaluation tends to be supported by the testimony of Idoma informants--including elders--and the researcher's observations. The evidence suggests that recruitment to the ojira was made on the basis of two ascriptive criteria: sex and adulthood. While elder-priests of the aje and alekwu cults were undoubtedly influential in the ojira, they appear to have acted more in accordance with the rule of primus inter pares than gerontocracy per se.

Notwithstanding acceptance of Smith's evaluation, the following caveat ought to be observed: While the ojira of adult men was theoretically and potentially a "mass" meeting in the quantitative sense, in fact this was often not the case. An ojira could be held with any number of eligible personnel from the relevant social unit[s]. Consequently,

³³J. Noel Smith, Idoma Tribal and Social Organization (unpublished memorandum, 8/31/31); also Armstrong in Forde, ed., op. cit., p. 107; Elliott, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.; G. D. C. Money, Notes on Procedure in Idoma Division (unpublished manuscript, circa 1935).

³⁴T. M. Macleod, Report on the Western Areas of Okwoga Division (unpublished manuscript, n.d.); also Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report on Okwoga Division of Munshi Province (unpublished manuscript, n.d.).

the concept "mass" may be meaningful only in contradistinction to the notion of recruitment based on elite criteria. Thus, the probability that elder status, wealth, personality, intelligence, or prestige enhanced the influence of certain members does not in itself support a thesis of intended elite recruitment. On the contrary, it could be hypothesized that that institution was designed not merely as a consensual instrument for the management of daily affairs, but also as a constitutional check on the ambitions of an aspirant elite--elder and/or non-elder--within the community.

Finally, it is noted that Macleod's evaluation of the ojira as a conciliar body attributes to it a compact form and stable composition that were probably never achieved in traditional Idoma. Neither formal convention nor prearranged agenda were prescribed. Under some circumstances, meetings could be held in strict conformance with a representative principle. But they were also convened in mixed fashion, as in the hypothetical case of sublineages a, b, and c of lineage P gathering with the representatives of sublineages x, y, and z of lineage Q. Significantly, this fluid and ephemeral quality ultimately rendered colonial administration through the ojira impractical; implications of that quality for the decision to strengthen chieftaincy and centralize authority will be examined in the next chapter.³⁵

³⁵See pp. 114-115, 120-123, 134-138.

B. Oche and Aigabo: Chieftaincy Within the Triad

The student of chieftaincy in Idoma is struck by an incongruity between the historical development of that institution and an ideology traditionally associated with it. While investigators report its largely moribund condition upon arrival of the British, the ideology posits a tradition of proud and vigorous chieftaincy.³⁶ In light of that historical datum, it may be appropriate to suggest that the ideology reflects what Lasswell has termed "political symbolization,"³⁷ i.e., emotional commitment to a political institution which, while real, manifested only symbolic greatness.³⁸

Commitment to chieftaincy appears to have increased as the Idoma made contact with such politically-developed peoples as the invading Fulani and neighboring Igala and Jukun.³⁹ For the most part, however, they were unable to

³⁶Armstrong in Forde, ed., op. cit., pp. 95-96. Shaw reports that aigabo titles were filled in only two of the fourteen clans in Ochekwu District. Shaw, op. cit.

³⁷Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 195.

³⁸For a discussion of the political implications of emotional commitment to symbols, see Murray Edelman, "Symbols and Political Quiescence," American Political Science Review, v. LIV, #3 (September, 1960), pp. 695-704, esp. pp. 699-701.

³⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Pembleton's Commentary on the Shaw Reorganization Report for Ochekwu District Sent to Secretary, Northern Provinces (unpublished memorandum, 1/18/35); Hugh Elliott, Reorganization Report for Agatu District (unpublished manuscript, 1937).

reproduce sophisticated state and chieftaincy institutions.⁴⁰ Only among the Agala in southern Idoma and certain clans in central and northern Idoma is there evidence of articulated state and kingship structures.

Abraham⁴¹ reports that Agala clan organization was the nearest approximation to a state system in Idoma. The clan comprises three major sub-groups. One of these, the "royal" Usiligama, provides the oche or clan head. A chief priest for Agala is nominated by a ward in the Idogogbo sub-group; assistant priests are, in turn, appointed by wards in the Idogogbo and Utsugbo sub-groups. In addition, Abraham encountered two occupied sets of hierarchially-ordered civil and military titles. These had been distributed among the commoner sub-groups and their wards.

Without positing the existence of a state system, Elliott⁴² suggests that the office of oche represented a strong priest-kingship in clans residing near the Benue River. In this vein, Mathews offers the controversial opinion that

. . . the clan head [among the Yangedde, Awume, Agadagba, Boju, and Oturkpo peoples in central Idoma] is not primus inter pares. He is the clan head, a [secular] monarch (in the literal sense of a single ruler)

⁴⁰Idoma political organization resembles generally the Group "B" type described in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 5-23.

⁴¹Abraham, op. cit.

⁴²Elliott, Reorganization Report for Agatu District, op. cit.

limited by public opinion voiced in the Ojira . . . he is the head of the clan and . . . the . . . Alekwu and Aje cults.⁴³

Turning to the question of specific functions associated with Idoma chieftaincy, it is noted that investigators have tended to emphasize the spiritual responsibilities of the oche. Meek⁴⁴ alone has attempted to throw more than passing light on the nature of his secular authority. He posits that the "Chief had a good deal of power" beyond that focusing on mastery of magic and presidency of the cults. For example, in addition to bestowing aiigabo titles upon clan spokesmen, the oche

appointed the 'Uta' (or market and judicial authorities), received a share of fines imposed (by the market authority) . . . was a court of appeal in inter-family disputes, [and] took action in bringing murderers to justice.⁴⁵

Meek concludes, however, that day-to-day exercise of secular authority depended at least as much on the character of the incumbent as on rules formally prescribed. Thus, great secular power might accrue to the oche endowed with a strong personality and supported by a large and influential family.⁴⁶

That the Idoma were acutely sensitive to the

⁴³Mathews, op. cit.; also Shaw, op. cit. For the thesis that both the putative priest-king and his appointees, the aiigabo, were politically insignificant, see Mac Bride's comments appended to Leslie, op. cit.

⁴⁴Meek, op. cit.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

possibility of autocratic chieftaincy is evidenced by the elaborate measures taken to prevent it. Thus, even in those central and northern Idoma clans with a putative priest-king, behavior was regulated by three constitutional devices: (1) a relationship with the ojira, including elders; (2) rituals surrounding the office of oche; and (3) succession based on principles of rotation and seniority. First, the authority of the oche tended to be circumscribed by public opinion articulated in the ojira. For example, the ojira had to approve a declaration of war by the oche. Moreover, his power to appoint aiigabo or clan spokesmen was not unlimited. Shaw⁴⁷ reports that the clan head frequently appointed as aiigabo men who had already been nominated by the ojira.

Second, ritualized behavior worked to immobilize an oche. Thus, the head of the Akpa clan was forbidden to leave his compound during the two-year period after accession to office. The Agadagba clan sought to check the political power of its oche by prohibiting him from entering the market on commercial days.⁴⁸

Finally, application of the principle of lineage rotation prevented the concentration of chiefly power in a single unit. The principle of seniority often ensured that

⁴⁷Shaw, op. cit.

⁴⁸Meek, op. cit.; Elliott notes that the oche, considered to have divine attributes, seldom appeared in public. Elliott, Reorganization Report for Agatu District, op. cit.

the new oche would be too old and infirm to participate actively in the politico-governmental life of the clan. In those clans of central and northern Idoma where chieftaincy combined secular and spiritual authority, an aged oche often preferred to delegate the former to more efficient young men. Having delegated secular authority, he could now concentrate on the duties of chief priest.⁴⁹

In sum, autocracy in traditional Idoma signified a temporary disruption of the constitutional equilibrium rooted in principles of chieftaincy, gerontocracy, and democracy in the ojira. During the colonial period, as we shall see, a more permanent disequilibrium paved the way for strong chieftaincy and centralized authority. The present study examines one consequence of that development: bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict surrounding district councillorship in contemporary Idoma.⁵⁰

C. Okpoju, Oteyi, Aioga-Aiuta: Administration, Order, and Inter-Generational Discord

Undoubtedly, the most important recipients of delegated secular authority were the okpoju (Idoma: "market master") and his assistants, the aioga or aiuta (Idoma:

⁴⁹Most commentators agree that only secular authority could be delegated. In contrast, Mathews contends that the clan head of Boju could delegate spiritual authority as well. A. B. Mathews, Anthropological Investigations in Oturkpo District (unpublished manuscript, 1933). For a critique of that thesis, see the notes of R. C. Abraham in the Mathews report.

⁵⁰See pp. 141-169, 244-252.

"constabulary"). The constabulary was composed of individual oteyi (Idoma: "hamlet head") and members of dance groups and secret societies.⁵¹ While there tends to be some dissensus over the question of how these officials were recruited,⁵² there is general agreement on the boundaries within which their authority was to be asserted. The okpoju was expected to administer the community marketplace and settle disputes arising within it. Similarly, the individual oteyi was to serve as an administrator and law enforcement officer within the unit in which he resided. Okpoju and oteyi of hamlets attending the market were expected to come together solely as a court empowered to govern that site.⁵³ However, what appears to have been a well-defined delegation of fused administrative-judicial power at times gave way to unauthorized hegemony over wider clan and even inter-clan areas.⁵⁴

In sum, while legitimate spiritual and secular authority was located in elders and a clan head responsible to the ojira, de facto exercise of broad secular power devolved upon younger agents. Having been encouraged to

⁵¹For a discussion of the politico-governmental functions of dance groups and secret societies, see pp. 169-174.

⁵² While Meek posits that the oche appointed market authorities, Wright holds that the clan ojira selected such personnel. See Meek's comments in Macleod, op. cit. and Wright, op. cit.

⁵³Shaw, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit. and other reorganization reports.

⁵⁴Shaw, op. cit.

establish control over individual hamlets and important market areas, these agents were in a position to challenge what Eisenstadt has termed "the basic asymmetry of power and authority,"⁵⁵ i.e., the notion that younger members of the community ought to defer to the leadership and authority of their seniors. In this vein, Shaw reports that at least one aiuta became ". . . so powerful as to threaten the existence of traditional authorities"⁵⁶ on whose behalf it was presumably operating. Thus, political discord between generational groups was the unintended consequence of a division of labor designed to strengthen the constitutional system. At the same time, that development reflected the tension inherent in a system governed by three essentially antagonistic principles: democracy, gerontocracy, and chieftaincy. Evidence of the basic tension and inter-generational discord may be found in contemporary Idoma as well; implications of both for bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict will be examined subsequently.⁵⁷

⁵⁵S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1964), p. 30.

⁵⁶Shaw, op. cit.

⁵⁷See pp. 159, 199-200, 244-252.

CHAPTER V

COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN IDOMA

Colonial administrative policy in Idoma may be construed as (1) an attempt to implement Indirect Rule under extremely unfavorable conditions and (2) a reaction to that generally unsuccessful effort. What finally emerged was an alien hybrid only partially consistent with Idoma traditions and the objectives of Indirect Rule: a simulated Emirate structure supported in theory, and to a lesser extent in fact, by Western bureaucratic and democratic values.

The evolution of administrative policy in Idoma will be examined in this chapter. Before turning to that problem, however, it would be well to consider the implications of Indirect Rule and indigenous organization for "normative-institutional engineering."

Indirect Rule and Indigenous Organization: Exercises in Normative-Institutional Engineering

The researcher has already noted problems of Indirect Rule in societies governed for the most part by debureaucratic norms.¹ Notwithstanding, early theorists of Indirect Rule continued to envisage a relationship between (1) the

¹See pp. 6-12.

ultimate success of colonial administration and (2) a high degree of political development among, for example, the Fulani (Northern Nigeria), Kanuri, Basoga, and Banyoro.²

Another consequence of contact with relatively well-articulated administrative structures was a tendency to define colonial responsibility largely in terms of "normative engineering." For example, given the "intelligence and powers of the Fulani caste," the primary objective appears to have been the introduction of a catalytic agent into the Emirate system: the presumed wisdom of a "higher civilization."³ In theory, the colonial presence represented an exercise analogous to plant maintenance and accretion: a well-constructed engine (the indigenous hierarchy, including Emir, district and village heads, and alkali or Islamic courts) would be incorporated virtually intact into a still wider politico-governmental context (including a bureaucratic engine with European administrative, judicial, and technical components). Together they would constitute, in the words of M. G. Smith, a "contraposition of co-ordinate units."⁴ This bifurcated scheme predicated that normative

²F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1923), p. 1ff.; Donald Cameron, The Principles of Native Administration and their Application (Lagos, Nigeria: Government Printer, 1934), p. 1ff.

For a discussion of Cameron's contribution to Indirect Rule, see Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), ch. 20.

³Cameron, op. cit., pp. 4, 5.

⁴M. G. Smith, "On Segmentary Lineage Systems," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain

prescriptions in the latter would govern behavior in the former. Moreover, it projected the expansion of the indigenous machinery to include "modern" treasury, education, and technical components; these were also to be lubricated by alien norms.

Turning to Idoma, it is noted that nineteenth century European travellers had recognized the organizational contrast between tribes south of the Benue River and Emirates to the north.⁵ Of even greater significance, however, was a portentous allusion to difficulties encountered in contact with inadequately articulated administrative structures. Thus, Mockler-Ferryman observed in 1892 that

. . . the Mitshi [i.e., Munshi or Tiv] are a difficult people to deal with, since they acknowledge no one as head of the whole tribe, and live in independent families.⁶

The history of colonial administration among the contiguous Idoma, to which we now turn, throws light on difficulties encountered and measures employed to alleviate

and Ireland, v. 86, Part 2 (July-December 1956), p. 63.

⁵Macgregor Laird and R. A. K. Oldfield, Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa by the Niger River . . . 1832, 1833, 1834, v. 1 (London: Richard Bentley, 1837), p. 442ff.; Samuel Crowther, Journey of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda Rivers in 1854 (London: Church Missionary Society, 1855), p. 53ff.; Adolphe Burdo, The Niger and the Benueh: Travels in Central Africa (London: Richard Bentley, 1880), p. 239ff.; A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger: A Narrative of Major Claude MacDonald's Mission to the Niger and Benue Rivers, West Africa (London: George Philip and Son, 1892), p. 72ff., pp. 132-134.

⁶Mockler-Ferryman, op. cit., p. 76.

them. Reflected in the latter is a shift of emphasis in the definition of colonial responsibility. While "normative engineering" or the grafting of a "higher civilization" remained a long-range objective, "institutional engineering" assumed the highest short-range priority.⁷ That priority was destined to be pursued until termination of the colonial presence in Nigeria.

Indirect Rule and Administration in Idoma

Colonial administrative policy in Idoma has evolved through three important phases: (1) 1908-1930: occupation, pacification, boundary adjustment, and the quest for an indigenous leadership; (2) 1931-1945: systematic implementation of, and subsequent retreat from, the policy of Indirect Rule; and (3) Post-World War II: centralization and "democratization" of the Idoma Native Authority or local government establishment.⁸

1. 1908-1930

a. Occupation and Boundary Adjustment

Occupation of the area comprising present-day Idoma Division commenced in 1908-09 with the movement of two military forces, the Niger-Cross River and Ankpa Expeditions,

⁷Perham notes that administrative officers tended to emphasize "institutional engineering" based on the Fulani model rather than Lugard's "primarily educative" or "normative engineering" function. Perham, op. cit., ch. 10; Lugard, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

⁸This historical survey of administration in Idoma focuses on the five districts in which the field investigation was executed. Similar developments may be documented throughout Idoma.

into southern and northern Idoma, respectively.⁹

Early boundary adjustments involving Idoma were part of a larger scheme concerned with demarcation of the border between the Southern and Northern Provinces of Nigeria. Southern Idoma was incorporated into the former, northern Idoma into the latter. In 1918, both became components of a new Munshi Province in Northern Nigeria. Hence, by 1918, the southwestern limits of present-day Idoma Division formed the boundary between the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria. It remained for a third military force, the Egede Escort, to complete demarcation of the southeastern boundary in 1922. One year later, northern Idoma was constituted Idoma Division. An administrative center was established at Oturkpo in 1924. "Modern" Idoma Division came into existence in 1928 when southern and northern Idoma became an administrative subdivision of the new Benue Province.¹⁰

b. Pacification

Throughout the period 1908-1930 administrative

⁹Less systematic penetrations of the area had been made as early as 1899. See Northern Nigeria, Bassa Province, Note on General and Political Developments in the Area of Bassa Province (unpublished manuscript, circa 1910); also Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report on Okwoga Division (unpublished manuscript, circa 1925).

¹⁰Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report . . ., op. cit.; Robert G. Armstrong, "The Idoma-Speaking Peoples," in Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, ed. Daryll Forde (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Western Africa, Part X) (London: International African Institute, 1955), p. 98 f.n. 15. The Egede Escort continued its pacification operations until 1928.

officers concentrated on eliminating such practices as slave-dealing, headhunting, and homicide.¹¹ While the first two were virtually suppressed by the close of this period, attempts to eliminate internecine and especially inter-tribal murders met with considerably less success. In the boundary area separating Idoma and Iboland, for example, the impulse for members of one group to encroach upon, raid, and murder those of the other could be controlled only temporarily. Incidents recur even in present-day Idoma.¹²

Administrative activities designed to impose the pax britannica were not confined to suppression of these objectionable practices. Equally vigorous was the attempt at "political pacification," i.e., diminution of an endemic instability produced by disputes over chieftaincy succession.¹³ That attempt was undermined to a great extent, however, by the decision to apply the policy of Indirect Rule. Thus, one consequence of that decision was injection of a new reward into the traditional "game" of succession: power and prestige deriving from association with the Crown's paramount authority. As competition for positions of och'mbeke

¹¹Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report No. 1 on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending June 30, 1919," Annual Reports, 1919-1925 (unpublished).

¹²A serious outbreak in April 1963 resulted in the murder of at least twenty-one persons. See Daily Express (Nigeria), April 10, 1963, p. 5.

¹³Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report No. 1 on Okwoga District . . .," op. cit.

(Idoma: "chief of the white man")¹⁴ became more intense, political instability increased. This convulsive phenomenon may be observed in present-day Idoma as well.

c. Quest for an Indigenous Leadership

Lugard's early writing on Indirect Rule reflects the sharp contrast between Emirate and pagan structures. Thus, after noting the utility of a Fulani elite in the scheme based on Indirect Rule, he emphasized that

among the wholly uncivilized pagan tribes, who owe no allegiance to a paramount chief, it is often difficult to apply these principles of rule . . .

In such cases, he added, it would be necessary for

. . . the political [i.e., European administrative] officers to undertake a more direct responsibility.¹⁵

In a report to the House of Commons in 1920, Lugard again observed that

. . . this system [of Indirect Rule] is clearly adopted only in its fullest application to communities under the centralized rule of a Paramount Chief with some administrative machinery at his disposal and finds its best expression in the Moslem communities in the North.¹⁶

Notwithstanding the contrasts between Fulani and pagan

¹⁴Och'mbeke refers generally to any Administration-appointed "chief" or headman. Since World War II, it has been applied to district heads and combined clan-district heads. The word mbeke is a corruption of the name "Becker"; Dr. Becker was an early European (white) traveller in the area.

¹⁵Northern Nigeria, Annual Reports, 1900-1911, p. 26 (cited in Perham, op. cit., pp. 37-38).

¹⁶F. D. Lugard, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and Administration, 1912-1919 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920), p. 22. [*Italics mine.*]

structures, those policy statements convey a notion that the nature of indigenous organization affected only the degree to which Indirect Rule would be applied. In Northern Nigeria, then, the contrast was not one between Indirect and Direct Rule systems. Rather, it involved the differential extent to which indigenous authorities might be reasonably and usefully incorporated into the administrative establishment.

In Idoma, it had been apparent that a small number of European officers could not maintain political control if required at the same time to collect tax, maintain law and order, and so forth.¹⁷ Accordingly, in the period 1908-1919 the Administration undertook to mobilize an indigenous leadership to be responsible for such functions.

i. Village Administration. Administrative units known as "village areas" were created at the base of Idoma society; each of these was placed under the official control of a local headman.¹⁸ Villagers were encouraged to select headmen in accordance with native law and custom (i.e., Idoma rotatory and seniority principles). However, interminable wrangling among candidates often resulted in actual choices being made by European officers.¹⁹ Sometimes a

¹⁷Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1919," Annual Reports, 1919-1925 (unpublished).

¹⁸Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, General and Assessment Report on Okwoga Division, op. cit. See pp. 79-80.

¹⁹Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1919," op. cit.;

traditional oteyi (Idoma: "hamlet head") was nominated by villagers (or elders) and/or the Administration.²⁰

Utilization of oteyi as village area heads and tax collectors did not involve the wholesale incorporation of the aiuta constabulary per se. It is probable that the aiuta system had largely decayed prior to arrival of the European in Idoma. Equally probable was European reluctance to resuscitate organizations which had in the past proven to be intransigent administrative agents. As a result, only individual okpoju (Idoma: "market master") and oteyi were utilized for administrative purposes, the former within market and the latter within village areas.

ii. District Administration. The creation and staffing of administrative units at the base was accompanied by consolidation at a higher level. The latter involved creation of single- and multi-clan (i.e., federated) district units. Prior to 1914, districts had been governed with the assistance of non-Idoma personnel. By 1919, however, that policy had been largely abandoned in favor of one further designed to incorporate Idoma personnel and institutions into the Administration.²¹ After World War I,

Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division," Annual Report, 1920 (unpublished).

²⁰On occasion, the oteyi sat on native courts in the districts.

²¹This policy appears to have been abandoned for two reasons: (1) Idoma hostility toward "stranger chiefs" and (2) the Administration's generally hostile attitude toward the "Warrant Chief" policy adopted in the Southern Provinces.

the process of "Idoma-ization" was accelerated.

As in the case of village area heads, Idoma encouraged to accept district headships were not necessarily traditional officeholders. That the Administration was prepared again to utilize such elements is understandable in light of (1) the perceived need to "Idoma-ize" local administration and (2) the largely moribund condition of Idoma chieftaincy. Two factors did, however, eventually endow many of the novel district headships with a degree of traditional legitimacy. First, European resuscitation of oche (Idoma: "clan head") and aigabo (Idoma: "clan spokesmen") titles produced a coterie of traditional officeholders who might simultaneously occupy secular chieftaincy positions. Thus, in such single-clan districts as Boju and Oturkpo, the Administration generally recognized the oche as combined clan-district head. Second, secular appointees in the federated units often enhanced the legitimacy of their positions by later securing the title of oche. An alliance between European officialdom and the district head frequently ensured the latter's appointment to a traditional office.

Having constructed a rudimentary administrative apparatus in the districts, the Administration then undertook to organize an efficient judicial organ within each of these units. As early as 1910, clan heads in northern Idoma had been encouraged to participate actively in newly-formed Native Courts.²² These officeholders were "assur[ed] . . .

²²Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Resident of Bassa Province to Mr. A. R. Woodhouse, Assistant

that . . . their authority [would be upheld] in every possible way."²³ Notwithstanding, they lacked real power. As a result, many of the Native Courts convened only sporadically and were for the most part ineffectual in the period 1910-1919.²⁴

After World War I, the Administration sought to strengthen the incipient judicial system. Native Courts resembling the traditional ojira were created in older and newly-formed districts. Under this scheme, each salaried district head served as president of a court or ojira composed of lineage and sublineage representatives. By 1925, thirteen were operating more-or-less regularly throughout Idoma. Twenty-one district courts had been established by 1941.²⁵

On the surface, creation of a judicial system along traditional lines appears to have represented a move in the direction of Indirect Rule. In this vein, one European officer noted in 1922 that

no doubt absolutely 'direct' Government in this Division would be the easiest and quite possibly for the

District Officer, Bassa Province (unpublished, April 4, 1910).

²³Ibid.

²⁴Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report No. 1 on Okwoga District . . .," op. cit.; Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga District . . .," op. cit.

²⁵D. F. Heath, Notes on Idoma Division (unpublished manuscript, 1941). A twenty-second native court was established in 1952 when a new district--Worku--was carved out of the Egede section of southeastern Idoma Division.

immediate moment the most effective form of rule: but believing as we do that 'self-government' is the goal for which we must aim and seeing as we do daily the undoubted and indeed almost pathetically powerful appeal which self-government makes to the Okpotos [i.e., Idoma], there can be not the slightest doubt that the re-creation of the Okpoto system of native rule is worth any exertion.²⁶

A more complete "re-creation" would, of course, require a restoration of the equilibrium between "democracy" in the mass meeting and chieftaincy strengthened under European auspices. That intention was communicated by another officer in 1923:

It is now the policy of this Division to make the indigen-
ous Ojila the authority and do away with the system
of rule through 'made' chiefs and I have been doing all
I can to work on these lines which are obviously right.²⁷

Yet only six months later another officer wrote despairingly that

the Native Administration is still in embryo and gives little help to political officers. The Ojila, . . . from which it was once hoped that a native administration would spring have proved, I think, a barren seed. . . .²⁸

In order to comprehend the Administration's early disillusionment with an experiment based on principles of Indirect Rule, it is necessary to re-examine briefly the nature

²⁶Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division for Half-Year Ending December 31, 1922," Annual Reports, 1919-1925 (unpublished).

²⁷Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division for Quarter Ending June 30, 1923," Annual Reports, 1919-1925 (unpublished).

²⁸Northern Nigeria, Munshi Province, "Report on Okwoga Division," Annual Report, 1923 (unpublished).

of the ojira institution in traditional Idoma. It has already been noted that different commentators have construed the ojira as a council of elders and/or mass meeting of adult males.²⁹ Despite dissensus as to composition, however, there tends to be considerable agreement as to its non-administrative-executive, non-judicial character. The traditional mass meeting was essentially a forum in which public opinion was crystallized and articulated. While that opinion could sanction individual or collective vengeance against wrongdoers, the ojira per se was not a coercive instrument.³⁰

In traditional Idoma, what might loosely be termed "administrative-executive-judicial functions" had devolved for the most part on the aiuta constabulary. Reluctant to revive that institution, yet determined to govern through indigenous institutions, the Administration turned alternatively to the traditional ojira; the latter was perceived as the fulcrum upon which future district administration and adjudication would rest. This crucial exercise in "institutional engineering" represented an attempt ". . . to create [a machine that] had no real counterpart in the indigenous social structure."³¹ In view of the above, "failure" of the exercise was inevitable. While Native Courts established on the basis of the ojira continued to operate, the

²⁹See pp. 88-90.

³⁰Heath, op. cit.

³¹Ibid.

notion of the mass meeting as a fulcrum was, at least for the time being, abandoned.³²

iii. Divisional Administration. Aware that maintenance of a relationship with an acephalous group would be difficult, the Administration undertook in the decade after World War I to seek a remedy. In another exercise based on principles of Indirect Rule, it formed an Idoma Central Council or Ojira of district heads. The Central Ojira was constituted the superior Native Authority.³³ Its primary purpose was to act as ". . . a central administration to consult together [on such matters as food supply, undesirable settlers, road policy] and advise the District Officer for the benefit of the whole Division."³⁴ At the same time, the Central Ojira was expected to serve as an appellate court for the Division.³⁵

It can be argued on several grounds that that body was neither a superior Native Authority (NA) nor an ojira properly understood. First, the Administration had earlier recognized Emirs in the Moslem north as superior native authorities. At the same time, such traditional officeholders as

³²The fluid ojira as a basis for the judiciary was superseded in the early 1950's by a system in which specific persons represented kindred-based constituencies. See pp. 128, 133-134.

³³G. D. C. Money, Notes on Procedure in Idoma Division (unpublished manuscript, 1935); Heath, op. cit.

³⁴Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1930 (unpublished).

³⁵Ibid.

district and village area heads had been recognized as subordinate NA's. Evident in traditionally acephalous Idoma is the absence of an analogous hierarchy. In light of the above, application to Idoma of alien administrative distinctions led to the following structural inconsistency: each district head was simultaneously a superior and subordinate NA, the former as permanent member of the Central Ojira, the latter as administrator of a district. In that circumstance, hierarchical administration was rendered inoperable.

Second, Lugard had directed the expatriate officer posted to an Emirate to "act as sympathetic advisor and counsellor to the native chief."³⁶ The latter was recognized in the first instance as an officeholder in the traditional administrative hierarchy. In Idoma, where all district heads were essentially creatures of the Administration, the opposite was unequivocally prescribed: district heads in the Central Ojira were expected to assume an advisory function vis-a-vis European officers. While the Emir as superior NA assumed direct, overall responsibility for administration, the Idoma district heads as superior NA met only infrequently (i.e., quarter-annually) and without real executive authority.³⁷ Executive powers possessed by an individual district

³⁶Lugard, The Dual Mandate . . ., op. cit.

³⁷Money, op. cit.; Heath, op. cit.; for a vivid description of the Ojira, see W. R. Crocker, Nigeria: Critique of British Colonial Administration (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1936), pp. 66-67.

head could be exercised only within a single district. As a result, the Central Ojira as nominal superior NA tended to focus on its judicial function.

Bent on removing vestiges of Direct Rule, the Administration persistently admonished the Central Ojira to assume greater administrative initiative.³⁸ Yet even as European officers exhorted the district heads to act more in accordance with Indirect Rule, the former continued to operate anomalously as a de facto superior NA. De facto Direct Rule at the apex of the administrative hierarchy in Idoma Division rendered functionally inconsistent the distinction between superior and subordinate native authorities.

Finally, while the superior NA possessed attributes of an ojira, notably adult male membership and a "mass" quality when members of the populace attended, other characteristics distinguished it from the traditional institution. For example, its generally compact form, prescribed membership, and regular meetings were only infrequent attributes of the traditional ojira. More important, however, is the fact that the Central Ojira operated at a politico-administrative level that did not exist in traditional Idoma. It was, in the final analysis, an organ of the Administration rather than a genuine representative of the Idoma people. As such, it reinforced a centralizing tendency that was not compatible with Idoma constitutionalism.

³⁸Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1930, op. cit.

Conclusion

The student of colonial rule in Idoma is struck by the extent to which European behavior in the period 1908-1930 had been influenced by the Fulani administrative model. Thus, one observes the Administration working during the early years to create village area and district units paralleling those in the Emirates. Acceptance of the Fulani model of chieftaincy and hierarchically-organized local government is further evidenced by the Administration's reaction to failure at the district level. Unable to reconcile administrative needs with either the "democratic" or gerontocratic principles, it turned alternatively to the third principle of Idoma constitutionalism: chieftaincy. The Administration hoped to construct a disciplined and efficient--in a word, bureaucratic--Native Authority apparatus by strengthening chieftaincy at district and divisional levels; that objective was actually achieved at the district level only. Yet as early as 1927 the Central Ojira had been construed as the precursor of a divisional chieftaincy.³⁹ It is significant that the Administration had already envisaged as the culmination of its "institutional engineering" in Idoma a paramountcy modelled after the Fulani Emirship.

Before turning to the second phase in a history of administration in Idoma, it would be well to summarize the effect on Idoma constitutionalism of developments examined

³⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1927 (unpublished); Money, op. cit.; Heath, op. cit.

above. It has already been suggested that clan heads in traditional Idoma had periodically accrued considerable power vis-a-vis elders and/or adult members of the ojira. Indeed, in some cases the extent of aggrandizement had been such as to enable an oche to act as a virtual autocrat. Notwithstanding, there is no evidence that even de facto autocracy represented a permanent challenge to the ultimate legitimacy of the constitutional system. In the final analysis, therefore, chiefly usurpation appears to have been extra- if not unconstitutional behavior.

In contrast, the Administration's recourse to strong chieftaincy contributed substantially to subversion of that legitimacy. Failure to arrange concomitantly for the participation of elders and ojira in district administration had the practical effect of repudiating the control mechanism inherent in Idoma constitutionalism. This is not to suggest, of course, that a district head was now removed from the arena of traditional control. He was in theory subject to sanctions of the traditional system. Rather, it is to posit that the competitive legitimacy of an imposed authority system enabled him in fact to achieve a high degree of insulation against operation of the mechanism. The district agent of this paramount European authority was destined to move from a position of primus inter pares to one of undisputed first! The empirical analysis of role and conflict resolution suggests that this may have already occurred.⁴⁰

⁴⁰See pp. 141-169, 244-252.

2. 1931-1940

a. Toward Indirect Rule

During the early 1930's, both officials and scholars were engaged in a critical re-examination of the assumptions and edifices of colonial administration in British Africa.⁴¹ Undoubtedly the most influential critic of the period was Miss Margery Perham, student of colonial administration, apologist for the policy of Indirect Rule, and later Lugard's biographer.⁴² Perham lamented the damage inflicted on Indirect Rule by the fallacious assumption that that policy dictated cultivation of autocratic chieftaincy. She argued contrarily that progress in tribal societies could be facilitated only by restoring traditional conciliar democracy. In effect, Perham had urged that the African territories be administered more in accord with "pure" Lugardian principles.⁴³

Turning to Idoma, we note the Administration moving to redress the disequilibrium produced by recourse to strong

⁴¹Crocker, op. cit., pp. 5-277, passim; Cameron, op. cit., passim.

⁴²Perham, op. cit., passim; Margery Perham, "The System of Native Administration in Tanganyika," Africa, v. 4, #3 (July 1931), pp. 310-311; Margery Perham, "A Restatement of Indirect Rule," Africa, v. 7, #3 (July 1934), pp. 321-334; Margery Perham, Lugard, 2 vols. (London: Collins, 1956, 1960), passim.

⁴³Margery Perham, "Problems of Indirect Rule," East Africa (April 12, 1934), p. 622 (cited in Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Secretary, Northern Provinces, to Benue Province Resident and Idoma Divisional Officer (unpublished, May 11, 1934)).

chieftaincy. Perhaps the earliest indication of intention to adhere more closely to principles of Indirect Rule may be found in a policy statement prepared for the Resident of Benue Province by the Idoma Divisional Officer. The latter wrote in late 1931 that the policy in single-clan districts was

to organize (but not to over-organize and to reduce to the lifeless formality of the average parliament or conference) the mass meetings of the clan (where even in the past only the leaders and men of influence had any real say) into District Ojiras of Village Heads and leading men, who in their turn choose the Oche or chief who becomes the District Head.⁴⁴

The Divisional Officer also reported that smaller clans were being welded into federated districts. Heads of these units were to be selected by an ojira of village area heads in accordance, where feasible, with the principle of clan rotation.

While considerable emphasis was placed on the ojira, in fact the policy enunciated in 1931 did not depart significantly from that pursued after 1923. The Administration was still operating through contrived village area and district units. Moreover, officialdom working "to organize" a system of more vital mass meetings was not yet prepared to enumerate functions other than that involving selection of the district head. Notwithstanding, the statement committing the Administration to renaissance of the ojira institution

⁴⁴Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident on Idoma Tribal and Social Organization (unpublished, August 31, 1931).

did augur developments shortly to come.

In February 1933, the Resident requested that European officers in Idoma undertake anthropological investigations. These were to produce outlines of traditional and contemporary organization, assessments of the degree to which the two coincided, and "recommendations as to reorganization required to make possible development and evolution on traditional lines."⁴⁵ Without awaiting completion of the investigations, the Divisional Officer informed his superior that the ojira had in fact controlled all actions of the oche in traditional Idoma. Consequently, he added, colonial success in Idoma was contingent on strengthening of the constitutional system.⁴⁶

The Native Authority apparatus was subsequently reorganized. A conciliar administrative system replaced that based on village area and district units.⁴⁷ "Chief-in-Council" organs were gazetted as superior native authorities

⁴⁵Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Benue Province Resident to Idoma Divisional Officer (unpublished, February 15, 1933).

⁴⁶Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident (unpublished, November 11, 1933).

⁴⁷Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Secretary, Northern Provinces, to Benue Province Resident (unpublished, November 16, 1933); also Perham, op. cit., p. 142.

An objection to abolition of the district system may be found in Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident (unpublished, December 6, 1933).

in the former single-clan districts. The oche in each was designated lifetime president of an ojira comprising oteyi, kindred heads, and elders. In the former federated units, each clan ojira, including the oche, was constituted a subordinate native authority. Subordinate NA's were empowered to collect taxes, maintain law and order, and so forth. Clan ojiras or their representatives constituted a federal council or superior NA in those areas. The federal council was given over-all responsibility for law enforcement, supervision of markets, and disbursement of funds. It, in turn, chose a lifetime president in accordance with the principle of clan rotation.⁴⁸

Some measure of financial responsibility was granted the superior NA's by virtue of their receiving and disbursing a fixed proportion of tax revenues. Revenues were utilized to compensate scribes, messengers, dogarai (Idoma: "police"), okpoju and, in the federated units, subordinate NA's.⁴⁹

Superior NA's also sat as unremunerated native courts. These courts were granted Grade "D" authority to imprison

⁴⁸S. A. S. Leslie, Reorganization Report for Yangedde District (unpublished manuscript, 1936); G. D. C. Money, Reorganization Report for Oturkpo District (unpublished manuscript, 1935); Hugh Elliott, Reorganization Report for Boju District (unpublished manuscript, 1937); D. B. Wright, Reorganization Report for Oglewu District (unpublished manuscript, 1939); J. H. Shaw, Reorganization Report for Ochekwu District (unpublished manuscript, 1934).

⁴⁹Leslie, op. cit.; Elliott, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.; Shaw, op. cit. European officers in the Division in fact exercised control over the appointment and dismissal of scribes, dogarai, and most of the other employees.

persons convicted of praedial larceny for a maximum term of nine months.⁵⁰ Finally, the Central Ojira was formally constituted an advisory body in 1935. European officers served as a central NA from 1935 until 1947, when an Idoma chieftaincy was inaugurated. The Central Ojira retained its judicial function until 1937, when Regional Appellate Courts were established for Northern, Southern, Western, and Eastern Idoma.⁵¹

b. The Retreat from Indirect Rule

Reorganization of the Idoma Native Authority was ostensibly in strict conformance with the letter and spirit of Indirect Rule. Indeed, abandonment of the Fulani administrative model in favor of the three principles of Idoma constitutionalism suggested a meticulous application of "pure" Lugardian principles. Yet there is considerable evidence to support a contrary thesis. For example, we note (1) the Administration's equivocal reaction to the Perham plea for reform and (2) the influence that reaction appears to have had ultimately on reorganization in Idoma.

The Secretary of the Northern Provinces noted that, while his superior, the Chief Commissioner,

. . . agrees with the views expressed in theory [by Perham], . . . the difficulty is that the people themselves do not want councils but prefer chiefs since they have been taught the Moslem system of District

⁵⁰Leslie, op. cit.; Elliott, op. cit.; Wright, op. cit.; Shaw, op. cit.; Money, op. cit.

⁵¹Heath, op. cit. These later became known as "Intermediate Area Courts."

Heads by Administrative Officers. In one case His Honor was told by the people that their original organization was democratic, by council, but that they now know better and had progressed into having a chief.⁵²

A retreat from the recent strong commitment to Indirect Rule had been signalled. It commenced shortly thereafter in Idoma. Officers submitting reports for Oturkpo (1935) and Boju (1937) noted that formal abolition of the Fulani district system would not fundamentally alter the status quo;⁵³ the author of the Boju report conceded that introduction of conciliar administration had involved little more than redistribution of salaries.⁵⁴ Both affirmed, of course, that popular sentiment had dictated minimal change.⁵⁵ The Divisional Officer reported in 1937 that, despite efforts to reorganize along conciliar lines, the people of Yangedde were already clamoring for restoration of the more efficient and dynamic district head system.⁵⁶ One year later, another officer noted a tendency in Yangedde and other units "to revert to the District Head system, the District Head now appearing under the guise of oche or clan representative."⁵⁷

⁵²Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Memorandum from Secretary, Northern Provinces to Benue Province Resident and Idoma Divisional Officer (unpublished, May 11, 1934).

⁵³Money, op. cit.; Elliott, op. cit.

⁵⁴Elliott, op. cit.

⁵⁵Money, op. cit.; Elliott, op. cit.

⁵⁶D. F. Heath, Progress Report on Yangedde District Reorganization (unpublished, 1937; appended to Leslie, op. cit.).

⁵⁷Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from District Officer to Idoma

Significantly, the officer proceeded to assail the Perham thesis that traditional political organization was essentially conciliar. Pointing to both the precedent of autocratic chieftaincy in traditional Idoma and public opinion favoring the restoration of district headships, he urged that the system of district administration be formally re-instituted.⁵⁸

Conclusion

Even as Indirect Rule was being subverted in the name of "democracy," most officers continued to express the Administration's predilection for reorganization based on Idoma constitutionalism. For example, a Divisional Officer who had recently written of the clamor in Yangedde for restoration of the district head system could posit as late as 1939 that the only alternative to it was "the Idoma . . . [being] left to himself, with tactful guidance and encouragement, to work out his own democratic salvation."⁵⁹ That the Idoma had not yet attained "his own democratic salvation" was attested to when the same Divisional Officer apprised his subordinates of the fact that, notwithstanding reorganization recently completed, ". . . here we are dealing with a more or less artificial creation of our own

Divisional Officer (unpublished, August 22, 1938).

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1939 (unpublished), p. 54.

and not with the reform of an old established system as in the [Moslem] North."⁶⁰

3. Post-World War II: Centralization
and "Democratization"

The Administration culminated its exercises in "institutional engineering" by moving first to centralize and then to "democratize" the Idoma Native Authority. Plural native authorities created in the 1930's were superseded by a central administration and judiciary designed to unify the Division and promote efficient operation of the NA system.⁶¹ The focal point of the new apparatus was an Idoma chieftaincy created in 1947. Ogiri Oko, combined clan-district head of Adoka, was elected by his colleagues on the Central Ojira to serve for life as the first Och'Idoma (Idoma: "Chief of Idoma").⁶² A five-man advisory council was established to assist him in the administration of the Division. In 1948, the Chief and his council were gazetted as a Central (Grade

⁶⁰Heath, Notes on Idoma Division, op. cit.

⁶¹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1948 (unpublished).

⁶²Upon his appointment, Ogiri Oko renounced the district headship but kept the beads of oche or clan head. His brother returned from military service to take up the post of district head. In 1960, when Oko died, his successor as oche claimed the occupied district headship. Since then, the matter has been under litigation. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, High Court, Suit No. MD/15/1962. For some indication of the precedent likely to be established and the probable outcome of the Adoka case, see Northern Nigeria, Kabba Province, High Court, Suit Nos. MD/18/1962 and MD/8/1962; also Western Nigeria, High Court (Akure), Ayi vs. Joshua et al. (March 30, 1963).

"B") Court. That body was empowered to hear appeals passing from native courts in the districts through four Intermediate Area Courts.⁶³

Turning to the "democratic" aspect of administration in Idoma, we note that district and clan ojiras ceased to be recognized as superior and subordinate NA's after 1947. Their administrative responsibilities were for the most part absorbed by departments in the central NA. They did, however, retain judicial powers until 1950. With the exception of that function, the district ojira had only to serve as the base in a new multi-tiered electoral system. Each district ojira elected a representative to one of four Intermediate Area Councils in the Division. Members of each Council, in turn, elected one representative to the central administration of the NA. Och'Idoma's advisory council was composed of the four representatives elected by the Intermediate Area Councils plus a co-opted scribe. Significantly, the first advisory council included three elderly clan heads and a district head--all four illiterate.⁶⁴

In order to comprehend the implications of that election, it is necessary once more to throw light on forces operating in a wider context. In the aftermath of World War II, educated elements throughout British Africa were agitating for a larger share in the political and economic life

⁶³Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1948 (unpublished); also f.n. 25 and 51.

⁶⁴Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1950 (unpublished).

of their territories. Nationalists among them were especially vocal in demanding greater participation in government and administration as a prelude to independence.⁶⁵

Focusing on Nigeria, it is noted that many in basic sympathy with these aspirations were at the same time strongly committed to a gradual approach. According to Perham, for example, "democratization" of the Native Authority system was more desirable than either (1) the immediate recruitment of Africans into upper echelons of the civil service or (2) expansion of powers in the Legislative Council.⁶⁶ Official acceptance of a gradual approach was reflected in post-war constitutional developments. In March 1945, Governor Sir Arthur Richards presented the Legislative Council with a plan for constitutional revision; the nucleus of that plan was to be embodied in the so-called "Richards Constitution" that governed Nigeria until 1951.⁶⁷ Undoubtedly the most significant portions of the document were those

⁶⁵See, for example, James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), Part 4; David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), esp. p. 141ff.; David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), esp. p. 181ff.

I have drawn from Coleman (pp. 271-295) for the discussion of developments in Nigeria.

⁶⁶Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 362. Perham did, however, warn colonial officers as early as 1937 to be "prepared for unexpected developments . . ."

⁶⁷Proposals for the Revision of the Constitution of Nigeria, Cmd. 6599 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1945) (cited in Coleman, op. cit., p. 271).

to the organization of a Nigerian state and the
within it of a Native Authority system. A series of
ses between contending federalists and separatists
a state divided into three Regions (East, West, and
Each was to have an administrative service and a
Assembly empowered to prepare a regional budget and
legislation. Native authorities in each were to nom-
bers of the Regional Assembly which would, in turn,
ive representatives to sit on a Legislative Council
enter. By establishing a hierarchy of indirectly-
councils connecting apex and base, the colonial power
to perpetuate a Native Authority system as the basis
l administration. Not surprisingly, many Africans
the conservative bent of Government and Constitution.
position to official conservatism was not, however,
to a single sphere in the Nigerian political system.
Azikiwe, Awolowo, and others worked at the center
ge, lesser lights engaged in parallel activities
ne periphery. For example, literate younger elements
were already agitating for greater participation in
ve Authority.⁶⁸ The nomination of four illiterates,
g three traditional officeholders, to the advisory

Many of the younger men, including literates in the
pe Rising Union, supported centralization under a
al chieftaincy in order to break the political stran-
of traditionalist district and clan heads. By 1949,
many IHRU members opposed formal inauguration of an
conservative and corrupt Och'Idoma. See Northern
Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division,
ublished); also see pp. 160-163.

in 1948 provoked even more vehement demands for ac-
the local government establishment.
e Administration and central NA were prepared to
me recognition to the dissidents. Accordingly, the
ere permitted to attend the 1950 Provincial Confer-
elections and local government reform.⁶⁹ Still dis-
d, they agitated on their return for immediate doub-
Intermediate Area Council representation on
a's advisory council.⁷⁰ The Administration countered
y acknowledging the possibility of these elements
ing on Intermediate Area Councils as "unofficials"
participating at the center ". . . in the form of
committees."⁷¹ Predictably, the dissidents re-
possible concession auguring domination by illiter-
traditionalists at the intermediate and central
f the NA.
e dissidents moved to force the issue. In prepara-
indirect elections to the Northern House of Assembly
they managed to gain control of electoral colleges
istrict and divisional levels. They had now maneu-
to a position from which demands for NA reform could
effectively articulated. Agitation continued un-
the appointment of two ex-district scribes to

Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for
vision, 1950 (unpublished).

Ibid.

Ibid.

combined clan-district headships only provoked demands for greater reform.

Finally, in 1952, the Administration relented on several fronts. First, the advisory council was expanded to include a scribe and two members nominated by each of the Intermediate Area Councils for three year terms. With six literates averaging 35-40 years in age, the advisory council had been transformed, in the words of one European officer, into a ". . . useful blend of traditional officeholders and educated progressives."⁷² Second, each district ojira was authorized to nominate one person to sit with the district head on the Intermediate Area Council. Third, the system of district courts based on the fluid ojira was abolished. It was replaced by a court system in which specific individuals were designated members from officially-recognized, kindred-based constituencies.⁷³

In retrospect, however, it appears that the Administration's actions were influenced only in part by local pressures for reform. Of perhaps greater import were developments at the regional level. In 1950, a commission had been established in response to a Northern House of Assembly motion calling for an inquiry into the state of local administration.⁷⁴ The commission report, released during that

⁷²Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Annual Report for Idoma Division, 1952 (unpublished).

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴L. Gray Cowan, Local Government in West Africa

year, noted the existence of a wide variety of largely ineffective local councils, committees, and conferences. Its findings did, however, confirm a trend toward conciliar administration at the local level.⁷⁵

Apprised of the report and no doubt sensitive to "democratization" of local administration in the other Regions, the Northern House of Assembly moved that conciliar organs be strengthened forthwith.⁷⁶ Sole Native Authorities (i.e., Emirships and chieftaincies without formal responsibility to councils) were progressively abolished. By 1954, all Sole NA's had been replaced by gazetted "Chief-in-Council" or "Chief-and-Council" organs.⁷⁷ A second measure involved the enactment of the Native Authority Law of 1954.⁷⁸ While that Law was essentially a codification of existing legislation, several aspects indicated a somewhat broader scope. First, the document included an outline of the formal relationship between councils and the Native Authority system. Abolition of the Sole NA's was recognized in Section 2 of the Law. Second, all informal village, district, town, and

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 79.

I have drawn from Cowan (pp. 79-83) for the discussion of developments in the Northern Region of Nigeria.

⁷⁵K. P. Maddocks and D. A. Pott, Local Government in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1951), pp. 1-35.

⁷⁶Cowan, op. cit., p. 79.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 80.

⁷⁸Northern Nigeria, Native Authority Law of 1954 (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1961), pp. 1-71.

"outer" councils operative as of July 1954 were rendered statutory bodies. Finally, while the Law did not establish any new councils, it did provide that

. . . a native authority may, and shall if so directed by the Minister [for Local Government] by instrument [i.e., with formal designation of composition and functions] establish a local council for any district, town, village, area, ward, or other administrative sub-area . . . (Section 55)

The North's formal commitment to "democratization" of the Native Authority system was embodied in the proviso that local councils be composed of elected majorities (Section 59).

In sum, reforms in Idoma were impelled by a convergence of forces operating within and outside the Division: (1) agitation by a clamant minority and (2) the Administration's post-war commitment to gradual, controlled change at the base. That approach, forming the thread with which both the "Richards Constitution" and the Native Authority Law of 1954 had been woven, guided future developments in Idoma.

In accordance with Section 55 of the Native Authority Law, the Idoma NA proceeded to establish a district council system. Councils were composed of NA-appointed minorities and majorities elected from kindred-based constituencies. These bodies were empowered to serve as agent of the Native Authority and representative of the district population. Bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict originating in that dual mandate will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.⁷⁹

The first elections under the new plan were held in

⁷⁹See pp. 141-159, 244-252.

1955. One year later, district councils were formally issued Standing Orders by the NA.⁸⁰ In 1958, the Northern Minister for Local Government gazetted Instruments recognizing the councils as statutory bodies in the Idoma Native Authority;⁸¹ in that year, the second triennial elections were held. Three years later, kindred-based constituencies were abolished in favor of a system of consolidated territorial constituencies.⁸² New elections were held in 1962.

Having established a council system from base to apex, the Administration turned to the problem of "normative engineering." It now sought to reconcile "democratization" with the objective of an efficient Native Authority. In 1954, the advisory council was replaced by a policy-making Executive Council consisting of Och'Idoma (president), four literate Administrative Councillors, and Intermediate Area Councillors sitting in rotation. Elected for a three year term by an Intermediate Area Council, each Administrative Councillor was also the head of a department in the NA.⁸³ The four Intermediate Area Councils were replaced in 1958

⁸⁰Standing Orders prescribe method of election, rules of procedure, committee organization and functions, and so forth.

⁸¹Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, The Idoma Native Authority District Councils Instruments, 1958 (Kaduna: Government Printer, March 3, 1958).

⁸²Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, "The Idoma Native Authority District Councils Instruments, 1962," Gazette, v. 11, #22, Supplement E (April 19, 1962).

⁸³The four main departments are Finance, Local Government, Police-Judiciary, and Works.

by a single Representative Council linking district and divisional levels. Sixteen of the twenty-two districts elected one person to a three year term on the Representative Council; councils of the six most populous districts each elected two Representative Councillors. Representative Councillors in each Intermediate Area of the Division, in turn, elected one person to serve as an Administrative Councillor. Och'Idoma, four Administrative Councillors, and Representative Councillors chosen in rotation sat as the Executive Council of the Native Authority.⁸⁴

In time, however, the combination of burdensome responsibility and intrigue among rivalrous members of the Executive Council was to have a deleterious effect on over-all administration.⁸⁵ Consequently, the Executive Council was abolished in late 1958. It was replaced by a General Purposes Committee consisting of Och'Idoma (president), two Administrative Councillors elected by the Representative Councillors from each of the Intermediate Areas, and Representative Councillors chosen in rotation.⁸⁶ Two years later, the unwieldy General Purposes Committee was overhauled. The eight Administrative Councillors were replaced by four

⁸⁴Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of a Special Executive Meeting (unpublished, April 15, 1958).

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, August 20, 1958).

Portfolio Councillors elected in the same manner and assigned similar functions.⁸⁷

The Administration's final exercise in "normative-institutional engineering" involved the judiciary. Administration and judiciary were separated in 1957, presumably as a means of enhancing NA efficiency at the divisional and district levels. Och'Idoma and the district heads were replaced as court presidents.⁸⁸ The four Intermediate Area Courts were abolished one year later.⁸⁹ In 1961, the district and central courts were replaced by six "professional"⁹⁰ (Grade "B") circuit courts of first instance. Civil

⁸⁷Technically, the Portfolio Councillor is merely a consultant in contrast to the Administrative Councillor who is an executive. In Idoma, the distinction is a meaningless one. See Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, Duties of Councillors (unpublished circular No. MLG. 42/82, September 12, 1962).

⁸⁸Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, June 6, 1957).

⁸⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, January 22, 1958). The Administration subsequently registered displeasure with this sudden move by the Idoma NA. The former finally acquiesced. See Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of a Special Executive Meeting (unpublished, February 7, 1958).

⁹⁰In order to prepare for the newly-adopted penal code, the six court presidents and several court members were despatched to the Legal Branch, Institute of Administration (Zaria). There they received intensive training in substantive law and court procedure.

A similar attempt to "professionalize" the district councils was made in 1963, when the Ford Foundation and Institute of Administration jointly sponsored two instructors in Idoma. While both instructors and a number of councillors were enthusiastic about the project, on the whole it appears

and criminal sections in each convened separately under a single president. Appeals from both sections have since 1961 passed directly to the Provincial Court at Makurdi.

Conclusion

An examination of colonial administrative policy in Idoma reveals a pendular course of development. On the one hand, a tendency toward strong chieftaincy and centralization based on the Fulani model; on the other, "democratization" rooted first in traditional constitutionalism and finally in Western notions of majoritarian local government. Those alternating movements throw light on dilemmas confronting the colonial power in Idoma. How to reconcile a persistent, even if varyingly intense, commitment to Indirect Rule with a perceived need for substantial "institutional engineering"? How to reconcile a synthesis of the two with the elusive long-range objective of "normative engineering," i.e., the grafting of a "higher civilization," including such alien notions as "progress" and "administrative efficiency"?⁹¹

Irreconcilability of long-range objectives with the mandate of Indirect Rule had been evident as early as 1923. In that year, Indirect Rule based on Idoma constitutionalism waxed and almost immediately waned. Yet it survived as an influential myth for nearly two decades. The myth was

to have had very little impact on councillor attitudes and performances.

⁹¹Lugard, The Dual Mandate . . ., op. cit., p. 1ff.

finally laid to rest by a Divisional Officer's candid contrast between artificiality in Idoma and reform in the Emirates.

Having abandoned all pretense of Indirect Rule in Idoma, the Administration undertook to create that which had been envisaged twenty years earlier. In 1947, the Native Authority was centralized under a divisional chieftaincy. However, concessions to those agitating for conciliar "democratization" augured a Pyrrhic victory for the Administration in Idoma. One could hardly expect councils hastily formed to contribute any more to the viability of the NA than had the ojira earlier. Indeed, prophets of doom discerned in "democratization" (1) a reverse trend toward decentralization and (2) a harbinger of the disorderliness, if not outright chaos, characteristic of the NA prior to World War II.⁹²

What of the prophecy? The evidence points overwhelmingly to the contrary. Indeed, it could be argued on several grounds that "democratization" facilitated the trend toward centralization under an even stronger Idoma chieftaincy. First, Och'Idoma consolidated his position vis-a-vis the district heads by appearing to act simultaneously on behalf of young literates clamoring for "democracy" (i.e., participation) and the Administration insistent on

⁹²Disorderliness and chaos, often described euphemistically as "inefficiency," is a theme running through many administrative and intelligence reports of the period. For some frank observations by an administrative officer posted to Idoma, see Crocker, op. cit., pp. 65-95, passim.

efficiency. District heads were systematically excluded from both the Representative and Executive Councils and the General Purposes Committee. This "reform" had the practical effect of circumscribing the district heads' ability to exert direct influence at Oturkpo Town, seat of the central NA and venue for meetings of the new bodies. Predictably, they protested, but to no avail.⁹³ Second, separation of administration and judiciary had the effect of engendering competition for power, prestige, and income between district heads and court presidents appointed by the central NA. The district heads again protested in vain.⁹⁴ At the same time, Och'Idoma maintained control of the upper judiciary by appointing a brother to the presidency of the Central Court. Third, abolition of the Intermediate Area Courts, on which district heads sat, eliminated four strategic points around which opposition might organize. Fourth, the ability of district councils to rival the center was checked by their isolation, limited powers, and continued dependence on goodwill in Oturkpo Town. Fifth, as president of the Executive Council and later the General Purposes Committee, Och'Idoma

⁹³Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, August 26-28, 1957).

⁹⁴Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of a Special Meeting (unpublished, April 28, 1958). The NA did, however, warn court presidents to refrain from having traditional drums beat on their behalf, adding that court presidents and other citizens of the districts were still subordinate to district heads. Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of Executive Meetings (unpublished, September 17-19, 1959).

was able to wield influence within these bodies and the NA departments. It ought to be noted, however, that his ability to control the Representative and Administrative (later Portfolio) Councillors was not unlimited. These indirectly-elected officeholders were often beholden to political patrons among the district heads.

In sum, changes wrought in Idoma between 1947 and 1960 were most beneficial to the center. Combining institutional change, prestige of chiefly office, and consummate skill as a political practitioner, Ogiri Oko was able to keep potential and actual opponents off-balance and in a state of perpetual conflict. By 1960, when Oko died and the colonial power departed from Nigeria, it could fairly be said that the Administration's culminating exercises in "institutional engineering" had been successful. Politically and administratively, Idoma was centralized as never before. That it had yet to experience the efficiency which might have resulted from long-range "normative engineering" does not detract from the achievement.⁹⁵ Implications of that

⁹⁵Sensitivity to the need for "normative engineering" on the eve of independence may be gleaned from the following exchange between officials in the Administration: When the Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry for Local Government (Northern Region), registered some concern over power gravitating to General Purposes Committees, the Idoma Divisional Officer noted that "the only way to achieve [expeditious conduct of Native Authority business] is to have a small, powerful, and efficient committee of capable men who can be relied on to get positively on with the job. Any method which can be suggested of keeping such an organization in check would be most welcome but may be found only at the expense of efficiency." Northern Nigeria, Ministry for Local Government, Memorandum from Acting Permanent Secretary to Residents,

achievement for role and Idoma district councillorship will be examined in Part IV.

District Officers, and Principal of Institute of Administration, Zaria (unpublished, No. MIG 542/vol. 11/69, August 12, 1958); Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Memorandum from Idoma Divisional Officer to Benue Province Resident (unpublished, Divisional Office No. G/COU.1/3, September 5, 1958).

PART IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Chapter VI: Role Perception and the Objective Conflict
Situation

Chapter VII: Role Conflict: Perception, Ambivalence,
Resolution

Chapter VIII: Multidimensionalism in Conflict Resolution

CHAPTER VI

ROLE PERCEPTION AND THE OBJECTIVE CONFLICT SITUATION

It has been indicated that in "culturally mixed" dual societies, "bureaucratization-debureaucratization" presupposes neither commitment to the Weberian model nor intrusion of an alien value system; in such societies, sources of conflicting attitudes toward organizational growth and social regimentation may be found in (1) an indigenous heterogeneity and/or (2) an imposed value system.¹ Both sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict are examined in cases from Idoma.

Cases I and II involve financial and political party activities generated by the colonial presence. Contrastingly, Case III focuses on role conflict produced by traditional tension between the larger community and such associations as secret societies and dance groups. Finally, the two conflict situations in Case IV reflect confused indigenous and alien developments surrounding the Idoma chieftaincy institution.

Objectives of the chapter may now be specified. The

¹See pp. 1-6, esp. p. 5.

two-fold purpose will be (1) to examine diverse sources of, and (2) to analyze descriptively the councillors' perceptual responses to, potential (i.e., objective) role conflict situations. Situational analyses will encompass both audience and district variables. An examination of relationships between the district variable and the councillors' perceptual responses will focus on differences in (a) chieftaincy institutions; (b) the clan composition of districts; and (c) the proximity of districts to administrative centers.²

Before pursuing those objectives, attention is called to the relevant audience populations. During Phase I of the field operation, the researcher ascertained bases for the potential conflict situations noted above. At the same time, he sought to identify the audiences with whom Idoma district councillors effect role relationships. Intensive participant observation and discussion revealed that those relationships are pyramidally-structured. At the base, councillors interact with three village audiences: elders, non-elders, and tax collectors. Ascending the pyramid, role relationships are effected with such conciliar-administrative audiences as elected councillors, nominated councillors, representative councillors, and the district head. Finally, district councillors interact at the apex with the central

²Execution of a chi-square test on situational role alternatives in rotated district pairings revealed statistically-significant differences; hence, exploration of the district variable.

administration of the Native Authority.³

Case I: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical
Organization

Implications of terminal colonial policy for centralized authority in Idoma have already been examined;⁴ at the same time, however, a countervailing tendency may be found in conciliar "democratization" of the Native Authority (NA) after World War II. Reflecting the tension between centralization and "democratization" is a potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict in the plan for district council reform.⁵ On the one hand, there is the authority delegated under the Native Authority Law of 1954 to district councils as agents of the NA. These subordinate bodies are empowered (1) to recommend to the NA appointment of district heads and tax collectors;⁶ (2) to apportion tax to village units and recommend for tax increases such persons as affluent traders and farmers; (3) to authorize district council fund expenditure with NA approval; (4) to supervise

³Participant observation and discussion indicated that district councillors effected role relationships with secret society and dance group members in situations involving those associations. Hence, the decision to include both audiences in the conflict situation in Case III.

⁴See pp. 134-137.

⁵Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Guide for District Councils, Idoma Division, Benue Province (Zaria, Northern Nigeria: Gaskiya Corporation, May 1955), p. 2; also see pp. 130-131.

⁶In fact, tax collectors are nominated by the district heads and formally appointed by the Native Authority.

Government and NA works in the district when required to do so; (5) to transmit village recommendations to the NA; (6) to supervise the use of NA-approved communal labor; (7) to maintain law and order within the district; (8) to appoint Committees for Works, Markets, Road, Finance, and General Purposes; and (9) to carry out duties delegated by the NA. On the other hand, there is the vaguely-defined expectation that councils composed of elected majorities will ". . . faithfully represent . . . the people of the various Districts."⁷

Case I reflects a conflict between agent and representational functions. Specifically, the case involves contradictory expectations relevant to the disbursement of district council funds.⁸ The following hypothetical incident (focusing on another Native Authority in Benue Province) was presented to each subject:

Several weeks ago, I received a letter from my friend in Wukari Division. He told me about a problem involving a district council in Wukari Division. After telling me the problem, he asked how the district councillors and people of Idoma Division would have dealt with it. I wrote to him that I did not know, but that I would be willing to ask the Idoma district councillors how they would have dealt with such a problem in their own districts.

The Wukari NA had entered into an agreement with a contractor who was to build a district council hall. The contractor had agreed to build the hall for ₦450

⁷Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Guide for District Councils . . ., op. cit., p. 1.

⁸District councils receive a percentage of per capita tax collected annually. Funds may be disbursed, with Native Authority approval, for district development.

and was paid the L450 immediately from the district council fund. After completing the building, except for the roof and plastering, the contractor realized that he had incorrectly estimated the cost involved. He now reported to the Wukari NA and the district council that what he had so far built had cost him L500. He told the NA that unless the district council agreed to pay him L50 for work already completed, plus another L100 for the roof and plastering, he would not complete the building. In other words, he wanted L600 to build the council hall rather than his original estimate of L450, which he had already been paid.

When the district council told the district head not to sign the payment voucher for L150, the NA insisted that the voucher must be signed by the district head, who is a salaried agent of the NA. I have just received another letter from my friend telling me that the payment voucher for L150 has not yet been signed.

In order to analyze more closely the role relationship between district councillor, district head (i.e., permanent council chairman), and the NA, the broader agent-representative conflict was articulated in three discrete situations. Implications of this mode of articulation for an analysis of conflict resolution will be examined in a subsequent chapter.⁹

The first conflict situation focuses on the question of council involvement in the disbursement of funds. Interest centers on the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following expectations: (1) that the district head ask the council for advice on whether to sign a payment voucher; (2) that the district head not ask the council for advice on whether to sign a payment voucher; (3) no expectation in this situation. (Included in all situational tables in Chapter VI is the

⁹See pp. 244-252.

proportionate incidence of perceived intra-audience role conflict, as in the case of conflict between members of the elected councillor audience. That report is represented in each table by the slashed (/) alternative.) The data presented in Table 1 indicate perceived widespread expectation of council involvement in the disbursement of funds. Ninety-one percent of the subjects reported all audiences as holding the expectation that council advice be solicited by the district head.

Five elected councillors in Districts 4 and 5 did, however, perceive NA-appointed colleagues as holding the opposite expectation;¹⁰ that expectation was also reported for the representative councillor and NA by elected members in District 5 and Districts 4-5, respectively. Probes elicited bases for the assignment of that expectation to audiences beyond the electoral control of village constituents. Four subjects in Districts 4 and 5 reported that all nominated colleagues expected their district head and NA benefactors to circumvent an "unreliable council"; another in District 4 indicated that one nominated colleague, first cousin of the district head, expected by-passing of the "hostile council." A similar response was elicited from an elected member for the representative councillor in District 5; the latter is the senior son of the district head. Finally,

¹⁰In fact, NA-appointed district councillors are nominated by the district heads and formally appointed by the Native Authority. Such councillors constitute a minority on all district councils.

Table 1

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
AGENCY AND REPRESENTATION IN HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION
(COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT IN DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS)
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	14	43	20	--	--	15
	To seek advice	86	57	80	100	100	85
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to seek advice Number of councillors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)	-- (71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	4	43	10	--	--	11
	To seek advice	96	57	90	100	100	89
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to seek advice Number of councillors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)	-- (71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	4	36	10	--	--	10
	To seek advice	96	64	90	100	100	90
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to seek advice Number of councillors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)	-- (71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To seek advice	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to seek advice Number of councillors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)	-- (71)

TABLE 1--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District				
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five Total
Nominated Councilors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--
	To seek advice	100	100	100	84	75 93
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	8	25 6
	To/not to seek advice	--	--	--	8	-- 1
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12) (71)
Representative Councilors	No expectation	--	7	--	--	1
	To seek advice	100	93	100	100	92 97
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	8 2
	To/not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	-- --
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12) (71)
Native Authority	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--
	To seek advice	100	100	100	77	92 94
	Not to seek advice	--	--	--	23	8 6
	To/not to seek advice	--	--	--	--	-- --
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12) (71)

four elected councillors in Districts 4 and 5 explicated "collusion to cheat taxpayers" as a basis for the Native Authority expectation. While the six councillors in this group represented only a small percentage of the subjects, their responses did point to a frequent observation of the researcher: intense suspicion pervading the relationship between district councillors, district heads, and the Native Authority. Implications of this suspicion for Case I will be examined in the other two conflict situations; implications for role buffering and conflict resolution will be considered in a subsequent chapter.¹¹

Indicating perceived widespread involvement of audiences in this situation is the generally low incidence of "no expectation" responses. The report for four districts encompasses a range of 0%-14%; a comparatively high incidence in District 2 may be attributed (1) to ignorance produced by the physical remoteness of many inhabitants from divisional and district headquarters¹² and (2) to uncertainty as to the behavior of an autocratic district head at the apex of the district administrative pyramid. Focusing on Districts 1, 2, and 3, it is noted that maximal "no expectation" responses for elders is accompanied by slight proportionate

¹¹See pp. 244-252.

¹²See map of Idoma on p.75 . Data collected on intra-divisional mobility indicate that councillors in District 2 visit Oturkpo Town less frequently than those in the other districts. During rainy season, few are able to travel even to district headquarters.

decreases among non-elder and tax collector groups; with the exception of the representative councillor audience in District 2, Table 1 shows the total perceived involvement of conciliar-administrative and NA audiences. An analogous patterning of "no expectation" responses in other situations suggests a relationship between audience and situational type;¹³ the pattern and its implications will be examined as other tables in the chapter are explicated.

Having ascertained the extent to which subjects perceived audiences as expecting council involvement, the researcher turned to the question of individual councillor behavior in disbursing funds. Reported in Table 2 is the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic-agent and debureaucratic-representative expectations, respectively: (1) that the councillor advise the district head to sign a payment voucher; (2) that the councillor advise the district head not to sign a payment voucher; (3) no expectation in this situation. Evident in Table 2 is a relationship between the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role and location of audiences on the administrative pyramid. The total proportionate incidence of bureaucratic role increases in the ascent from village base (elders, 13%; non-elders, 13%; tax collectors, 28%) through intermediate conciliar-administrative levels (elected councillors, 30%; nominated councillors, 43%; representative councillors, 45%; district head, 55%) to

¹³See pp. 152, 158-159.

TABLE 2
COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
AGENCY AND REPRESENTATION IN HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION
(COUNCILLOR AS ADVISOR) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District				Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five
Elders	No expectation	18	43	20	--	--
	Advise to sign	23	--	10	--	25
	Advise not to sign	50	7	10	85	33
	Advise to/not to sign	9	50	60	15	42
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)
Non- Elders	No expectation	9	43	10	--	--
	Advise to sign	14	7	10	--	33
	Advise not to sign	50	--	10	85	33
	Advise to/not to sign	27	50	70	15	33
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	9	36	10	--	--
	Advise to sign	27	36	30	--	50
	Advise not to sign	50	--	10	85	42
	Advise to/not to sign	14	28	50	15	8
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--
	Advise to sign	32	57	20	--	33
	Advise not to sign	59	21	10	46	50
	Advise to/not to sign	9	21	70	54	17
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)

the Native Authority pinnacle (94%).

Indicating sources of widely-perceived role conflict is the near-polar report on bureaucratic role for village and Native Authority audiences.¹⁴ However, a comparatively high incidence of perceived role conflict within village and district council audiences is evident; 31%, 36%, and 29% of the subjects reported elders, non-elders, and elected councillors, respectively, as holding both bureaucratic and de-bureaucratic expectations. To quote one harassed councillor: "Not only is the NA against me. Some elders are also against me in such matters." In Districts 1, 2, 3, and 5, the elected members' attitudes toward tax collectors and nominated councillors explain (1) the sharp decrease in perceived intra-audience conflict and (2) the comparatively high incidence of perceived bureaucratic role. Appointed by the Native Authority upon recommendation of the district head, those officeholders tend to be identified with superordinate administrative rather than peer village and council audiences. For example, when the elected members in five districts were asked, "Why do you think that nominated members of your council were nominated?", 67% responded, "to serve the interests of the district head and/or NA." Seven of the nine elected members in District 4 explained that nominated colleagues were appointed on the sole condition that they support the district head's candidate for representative

¹⁴Implications of this finding for conflict resolution are examined on pp. 244-252.

councillor. This contrasts with the minority in District 4 and those in Districts 1, 2, 3, and 5 who described nominated members as "spies," agents provocateur (Idoma: "oche awanda," "men who bring big trouble"), and so forth. Thus, data presented in Table 2 point again to fundamental distrust between elected members, on the one hand, and administrative superordinates and their appointees, on the other.¹⁵

Finally, the perceptual responses on "no expectation" reflect the following analogues of Table 1: generally low incidence indicating high involvement of audiences; a higher proportionate incidence for elders among village audiences; a range of 0%-20% cutting across four districts; a contrast between village and conciliar-administrative audiences.¹⁶

Two objectives generated the third potential conflict situation: (1) analysis of perceived expectations for district heads involved in the disbursement process and (2) identification of the extent of, and bases for, councillor inefficacy vis-a-vis district heads. Table 3 presents the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic-agent and debureaucratic-representative expectations, respectively: (1) that the district head sign a payment voucher; (2) that the district head not sign a payment voucher; (3) no expectation

¹⁵See pp. 144, 147, 155-157, 244-252.

¹⁶Conciliar-administrative audiences include elected, nominated, and representative councillors, district heads, and the Native Authority.

TABLE 3

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
AGENCY AND REPRESENTATION IN HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION
(DISTRICT HEAD AS SIGNATORY) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	9	43	10	--	--	13
	To sign	32	28	50	--	33	28
	Not to sign	50	--	--	54	17	28
	To/not to sign	9	28	40	46	50	31
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	--	43	10	--	--	10
	To sign	32	28	50	--	33	28
	Not to sign	50	--	--	54	17	28
	To/not to sign	18	28	40	46	50	34
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	--	36	10	--	--	8
	To sign	45	43	80	8	58	45
	Not to sign	50	--	--	54	17	28
	To/not to sign	5	21	10	38	25	19
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To sign	27	79	90	--	33	42
	Not to sign	59	7	--	54	58	39
	To/not to sign	14	14	10	46	8	18
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

in this situation. Excepting the elected councillor audience, a parallel with Table 2 is noted in the relationship between (a) proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role and (b) location of audiences on the administrative pyramid. There are disparities, however, in the extent to which subjects perceived audiences overall as holding bureaucratic expectations for councillors and district heads; the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role increased among all audiences in the situation involving district heads (Table 3). An average 12% more subjects perceived audiences as holding a bureaucratic role for the district head.¹⁷ The scope of that increase is reflected in Table 4.

Evident in Table 4 is the persistent identification of district heads with a "higher proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role"; 74% of the items in the table reflect the expectation that behavior of district heads be more bureaucratic than that of district councillors. The implication of that datum for one facet of the efficacy problem confronting district councillors may be summarized as follows: while expected to solicit the advice of councillors in administering districts, more bureaucratized¹⁸ district

¹⁷That percentage was obtained by computing the mean difference for seven audiences represented in Tables 2 and 3: elders, non-elders, tax collectors, elected, nominated, and representative councillors, and the NA.

¹⁸While salaried, pensionable district heads are appointed for life, both elected and nominated councillors are paid sitting fees of 5/- during a three-year term of office; promotional opportunities are ordinarily limited

TABLE 4
COMPARATIVE BUREAUCRATIC ROLE: COUNCILLOR AND DISTRICT HEAD

Audience	District			
	One Coun. Head	Two Coun. Head	Three Coun. Head	Four Coun. Head
	Dist. Head	Dist. Head	Dist. Head	Dist. Head
				Five Coun. Head
Elders	+	+	+	=
Non-Elders	+	+	+	=
Tax Collectors	+	+	+	+
Elected Councillors	+	+	+	=
Nominated Councillors	+	+	+	=
Representa- tive Coun- cillors	=	+	+	+
Native Authority	+	+	+	+

NOTE: (+) denotes higher proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role; (=) denotes equal proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role; (Coun.) denotes Councillor; (Dist. Head) denotes District Head.

heads may be expected at the same time to reject advice which contravenes Native Authority directives. The probability that district heads will defer to the NA audience engenders councillor inefficacy and frustration. Bases for the predictability of district head behavior will be examined in a subsequent chapter.¹⁹

A concentration of "equal bureaucratic role" in peri-urban District 4 may be attributed to the conviction that an aged and illiterate district head ought to be especially responsive to educated and politically-sophisticated councillors.²⁰

The uniform report on bureaucratic role cutting across seven audiences in Districts 2 and 3 reflects popular attitudes toward contrasting chieftaincy institutions in central and northern Idoma. On the one hand, there are chiefs who simultaneously occupy secular district head and allegedly customary clan head positions (Districts 1, 4, 5); on the other, there are those with authority deriving from the district headship alone (Districts 2, 3).²¹ Notwithstanding a

for both. For a discussion of the bureaucrat, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), p. 196ff.

¹⁹See pp. 244-252.

²⁰Six (43%) of the fourteen councillors in District 4 are English-speakers. Seven (50%) have had at least seven years of political experience as members of the opposition Action Group party. See pp. 160-162.

²¹See pp. 91-95, 107, 180-191.

strong ideology associated with chieftaincy generally,²² the Idoma prefer to reinforce the distinction. For example, combined secular-customary officeholders are greeted in a manner prescribed by native law and custom, including repeated outcries of obande, odu, and ude in the districts under discussion; secular chiefs are acknowledged less ceremoniously as ijachi (Idoma: "tax collector").²³ Table 4 reflects a popular, if somewhat inaccurate, view of the latter officeholder as suspect och'ubeke (Idoma: "chief of the white man" and his creature, the Native Authority).²⁴

Turning again to Table 3, it is noted that perceptual responses on "no expectation" suggest the following analogues of Tables 1 and 2: generally low incidence; a higher proportionate incidence for elders among village audiences; an even narrower range cutting across four districts (0%-10%); a contrast between village and conciliar-administrative audiences. In sum, the persistent low incidence of "no expectation" among village audiences indicates a high degree of perceived involvement in situations of an essentially non-customary and supra-village character. Yet an equally

²²For a discussion of the institution and ideology, see pp. 91-93, esp. p. 91.

²³That secular district heads are resentful of the distinction is indicated by one officeholder's insistence that he be acknowledged as AGABAIDU (Idoma: "lion"); that greeting is reserved for Och'Idoma.

²⁴Idoma informants tended to perceive combined officeholders as being more responsive to popular than Native Authority will. Observed behavior of, and prolonged discussion with, secular and secular-customary chiefs does not, however, support that thesis.

persistent contrast between village and conciliar-administrative audiences suggests the following proposition and corollaries: (1) The proportionate incidence of perceived "no expectation" among the two types of audiences is related to the degree of customariness of a conflict situation. (2) (a) Its report for village audiences will increase in less customary and decrease in more customary situations. (b) The converse will hold for conciliar-administrative audiences. Assuming the appropriateness of these propositions,²⁵ fundamental changes in councillor role orientation can be anticipated as a consequence of secularization in Idoma. Increasing attenuation of role relationships with village groups will be accompanied by a strengthening of those with conciliar-administrative audiences. Already corroborative evidence can be found in an eroding diadic relationship between councillor and elder.²⁶ This is not to aver, of course, that with role re-orientation councillors and audiences will abandon debureaucratic predispositions. "Cultural mixture" in the dual society precludes that eventuality. Rather, it is to posit that together with strengthened chieftaincy, secularization and councillor role re-orientation will assault the remnants of traditional gerontocratic authority.

²⁵See pp. 169, 179-180.

²⁶The researcher attended numerous ojira sessions in which elders deplored the weakening of gerontocratic authority. Much of their hostility was directed toward councillors allegedly competing for leadership in the council area.

Case II: Party Affiliation and
Organizational Allegiance

The potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic situation in Case II draws upon conflicting attitudes toward political party campaigning at the local level. Bases for these attitudes may be gleaned from (1) the history of organized political activity in Idoma and (2) the relationship between governing party and local administration in Northern Nigeria.

Organized political activity commenced during World War II when young, literate Idoma founded the Hope Rising Union. Largely moribund during the war years, the Union re-emerged to agitate for the creation of an Idoma chieftaincy, participation in a reformed Native Authority organization, educational and hygienic improvement in the Division, and eventual independence for Nigeria.²⁷ Alleging lack of progress and corruption in the Native Authority, it undertook political agitation against Och'Idoma and his administration as early as 1949;²⁸ opposition to the NA and its instrument, the Idoma State Union, waxed and waned until 1959. Already weakened by internecine rivalries, the Union became irreparably divided in 1959 over the question of a Middle Belt Region. In that year, a Government-sponsored Minorities Commission issued a report hostile to regional fragmentation.

²⁷Idoma Hope Rising Union (Northern Nigeria), Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Idoma Hope Rising Union (unpublished, December 15, 1952).

²⁸See pp. 126-128.

Unable to reconcile factions supporting and opposing the report, the Union finally lapsed.²⁹

Excepting a brief period when the Hope Rising Union held organizational membership in the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), an Ibo-dominated independence movement,³⁰ the former avoided affiliation with any of the nationalist parties. Ironically, pressures destined to shatter the Union were generated by the decision to insulate it from potentially disruptive party currents. Withdrawal from the NCNC in 1954 merely encouraged individual members to align with, and attempt to impose upon the Union policies of, one or another of the three major political parties in Nigeria: the NCNC, the Yoruba-dominated Action Group (AG), or the Moslem-controlled Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC). By 1957, Union leadership passed to a president-general and secretary-general strongly committed to irreconcilable NPC and AG interests, respectively. Their identification with factions contending over the Middle Belt question in part precipitated the organization's demise two years later.³¹

²⁹Idoma Hope Rising Union (Northern Nigeria), Minutes of the Idoma Hope Rising Union Executive Meeting (unpublished, February 15, 1958); Idoma Hope Rising Union (Northern Nigeria), Correspondence of the Idoma Hope Rising Union (unpublished, February 17, 1958, March 10, 1958, March 17, 1958); Idoma Hope Rising Union (Northern Nigeria), Report of the Secretary-General of the Idoma Hope Rising Union (unpublished, 1958).

³⁰Nnamdi Azikiwe, The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria (London: Office of the Commissioner in the United Kingdom for the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1957), p. 22.

³¹See f.n. 29; also Idoma Hope Rising Union (Northern

Turning to the interview population, it is noted that only seven of the seventy-one district councillors were associated with a political party before 1959; all seven, including three in the Hope Rising Union, were--and remain--members of the opposition AG. Impelled by local pressures originating in the federal parliamentary campaign of that year, most of the others have since identified with the NPC, governing party in Northern Nigeria.³² That party's strength in Idoma Division may be gleaned from the report on councillor affiliation in Table 5.³³

Notwithstanding the extent of party affiliation, 83%, party competition per se is absent in local elections.³⁴ Thus, it is not unusual to encounter the following behavioral pattern: (1) a non-partisan contest between AG and NPC members vying for a seat on the district council; (2) direct election of the former who will, in turn, (3) vote for an NCNC member as representative councillor in order that the

Nigeria), Letter from President of the Idoma Hope Rising Union to the Branches (unpublished, February 21, 1959).

³²Most supported the regular NPC candidate and Och' Idoma against the incumbent, candidate of the NPC Youth Association. For a brief insight into the conflict, see K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 274.

³³For data on NPC strength in Idoma Division during the federal election of 1959, see Ibid., Appendix C.

³⁴While one successful aspirant to a seat on an Idoma district council campaigned in 1961 with the aid of an NCNC van and salaried party professionals, he did not stand as a party candidate. This contrasts sharply with the party competition characteristic of local elections in Eastern and Western Nigeria.

NCNC member may then (4) vote for an NPC man as portfolio councillor.³⁵ Cementing the bond between elector and candidate at all levels are considerations of personality and/or remuneration rather than party, issue or ideology.³⁶

TABLE 5
PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE DISTRICT COUNCILLORS
(n=71)

Party Affiliation	n	Pct.
<u>NPC</u>		
Member	42	59
Supporter	6	8
<u>NCNC</u>		
Member	1	1
Supporter	--	--
<u>AG</u>		
Member	10	14
Supporter	--	--
<u>Non-Member, Non-Supporter</u>	12	17
Total	71	99

NOTE: Member (party card); Supporter (no party card)

If considerations of personality and/or remuneration underlie electoral preference in local elections, they do

³⁵Rarely will an NCNC or AG member gain a portfolio councillorship. The highest echelons of the Idoma NA are monopolized by NPC members or supporters.

³⁶In most cases, passage of money ("dash") is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for election. The researcher is familiar with instances in which the most generous candidate eventually lost.

not, however, fully explain the absence of party competition. A satisfactory explanation of the latter must also encompass attitudes toward political party activity widely-held in Idoma. These attitudes were elicited by asking district councillors, "Do you think that candidates for seats on the district council should campaign as members or supporters of political parties?" Ninety-nine percent of the subjects--including the eleven members of opposition parties--responded emphatically in the negative. When asked, "Why?", all pointed to "spoiling of the Land" as an inevitable consequence of party politicization at the local level;³⁷ forty-five councillors emphasized the magnitude of anticipated disruption by describing it as awanda (Idoma: "big trouble"). Only fifteen councillors could imagine a time when candidates for seats on the district council would campaign as members or supporters of political parties.³⁸ These responses parallel Hope Rising Union aversion to party involvement.

If officials in both the Northern Region and Idoma Division have not encouraged party campaigning for local offices, the converse has been true for regional and federal elections. In this vein, Post³⁹ and Sklar⁴⁰ call attention

³⁷"Spoiling of the Land" refers to permanent friction, bitterness and disunity in the family and/or council area and/or council.

³⁸The reference was to remote future in all cases.

³⁹Post, op. cit., pp. 43, 51-52, 130, 139, 183, 281, 294-295.

⁴⁰Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 323, 370.

to NPC reliance on Native Authority personnel in political recruitment and campaigning; that reliance has produced a virtual fusion of party and local administration in Northern Nigeria. Evidence of fusion and NA insistence that subordinates be active locally during regional and federal elections may be found in Idoma.⁴¹ Informants--including NPC members and supporters--report that popular enmity is oftentimes aroused by such activity. Hence, the following potential bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict situation presented to each subject:

People in Idoma Division have told me that the district councillor should openly campaign for the governing NPC party during regional and federal elections. Others have said that district councillors should not campaign because parties make trouble in Idoma.

Table 6 presents the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic and debureaucratic expectations, respectively: (1) that the councillor campaign locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections; (2) that the councillor not campaign locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections; (3) no expectation in this situation. Paralleling the second conflict situation in Case I (see Table 2) is a relationship between the proportionate

⁴¹Idoma informants pointed to pressure on tax collectors and councillors by district heads and other NA officials. While the Regional Government does not openly insist on active support, it does support the right of NA personnel to actively engage in partisan politics during campaigns; this is, of course, translated into support of the governing NPC. See Northern Nigeria, House of Assembly, Debates, v. 5, #21, August 1958, pp. 766-767 and v. 5, #23, December 10, 1958, Col. 877.

TABLE 6

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
PARTY AFFILIATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL ALLEGIANCE
(COUNCILLOR AS CAMPAIGNER) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	45	29	40	69	17	41
	To campaign	41	71	40	8	67	45
	Not to campaign	--	--	10	--	8	3
	To/not to campaign	14	--	10	23	8	11
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	23	7	10	54	17	23
	To campaign	59	43	40	15	58	45
	Not to campaign	--	--	10	--	--	1
	To/not to campaign	18	50	40	31	25	31
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	23	7	10	46	--	18
	To campaign	73	93	90	46	83	76
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign	4	--	--	8	17	6
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	18	--	--	62	--	17
	To campaign	82	100	100	38	92	82
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign	--	--	--	--	8	1
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

TABLE 6--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District				
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five
Nominated Councilors	No expectation	18	--	--	69	--
	To campaign	82	100	100	31	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
Representative Councilors	No expectation	23	--	--	62	--
	To campaign	77	100	100	38	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
District Head	No expectation	5	--	--	69	--
	To campaign	95	100	100	31	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
Native Authority	No expectation	5	--	--	--	--
	To campaign	95	100	100	100	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
	No expectation	18	--	--	69	--
	To campaign	82	100	100	31	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
	No expectation	23	--	--	62	--
	To campaign	77	100	100	38	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
	No expectation	5	--	--	69	--
	To campaign	95	100	100	31	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (22)	-- (14)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)
	No expectation	1	--	--	--	--
	To campaign	99	100	100	100	100
	Not to campaign	--	--	--	--	--
	To/not to campaign Number of councilors	-- (71)	-- (12)	-- (10)	-- (13)	-- (12)

incidence of perceived bureaucratic role and location of audiences on the administrative pyramid. The total proportionate incidence of bureaucratic role increases in the ascent from village base (elders, 45%; non-elders, 45%; tax collectors, 76%) through intermediate conciliar-administrative levels (elected councillors, 82%; nominated councillors, 82%; representative councillors, 82%; district head, 86%) to the Native Authority pinnacle (99%). Striking contrasts are evident however, in (1) the extent of perceived bureaucratic role congruence between village and NA audiences (the range is 13%-94% and 45%-99% in Tables 2 and 6, respectively) and (2) the considerably higher proportionate incidence reported for audiences in Table 6. To the extent that council deliberation is perceived by many as the application of a traditional "democratic principle," it may be considered an even more customary activity than party campaigning.⁴² Having ordered the two, it can be hypothesized that the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role will vary inversely with the degree of customariness of the conflict situation.

Evident in Table 6 is an extremely low incidence of debureaucratic role. The range for eight audiences is only 0%-3%, with a maximum 10% indicated for elders and non-elders in District 3. This contrasts sharply with the report on

⁴²See pp. 88-90 for a discussion of the distinction between mass meeting and council. Notwithstanding, Idoma informants tended to parallel contemporary council deliberation and "democracy" operative in the ojira.

debureaucratic role in Table 2. It is interesting to note, however, that a somewhat wider range is introduced into Table 6 with the report on perceived intra-audience conflict. Not surprisingly, the proportionate incidence of intra-audience conflict is highest among non-elders. It is among non-elders that we may expect to encounter elements in opposition to the governing party.⁴³

Finally, a higher proportionate incidence of "no expectation" responses is indicated for elders among village audiences. Moreover, perceptual responses on "no expectation" again point up the contrast between village and conciliar-administrative audiences; the contrast is blurred somewhat, however, by overlapping tax collector, nominated councillor, and representative councillor groups. In sum, the data in Table 6 indicate a generally higher proportionate incidence of perceived "no expectation" for village audiences in the less customary situation involving political party activity. That finding tends to support hypotheses (2) (a) (b) on page 159.

Case III: Community, Association,
and the Mediative Function

The bureaucratic-debureaucratic conflict situation in Case III focuses on structures and activities which antedate the European presence in Idoma. It involves the district

⁴³The mean age for eleven councillors identified with opposition parties is thirty-nine. Seven AG members in District 4 are supported for the most part by members of their own and more junior age-groups.

councillor's responsibility for alleviating community tension engendered by a secret society or dance group in which he is an active member. Sources of tension and bases for the role conflict situation may be gleaned from a discussion of secret societies and dance groups in traditional, colonial, and contemporary Idoma.

Describing the traditional polity, the researcher noted that a fused administrative-judicial function had been virtually monopolized by young men in the aiuta constabulary.⁴⁴ Frequently overlapping the constabulary organization were associations in the form of secret societies and dance groups. Thus, Abraham reports that Oglinye dancers constituted the aiuta in what is today Akpa District.⁴⁵

Many associations were of a multifunctional character.⁴⁶ For example, in addition to apprehending and punishing thieves, adjudicating disputes, and generally administering community affairs, Odumu and Akpantla served as important social and recreational agencies. Others--including Ichahoho, Ogbe, Oglinye, and Ogun--executed a rite de passage for young males; upon taking a human head, the neophyte was rewarded with the prestigious ogbu title and a right to claim

⁴⁴See pp. 95-97.

⁴⁵Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Akpa Reorganization Report #286 (unpublished, circa 1934), p. 32.

⁴⁶Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, File on Dance Guilds and Secret Societies (unpublished, 1917-circa 1950), passim.

manhood, courage, and female affection.⁴⁷

While the aiuta institution per se probably decayed prior to arrival of the colonial power, these associations continued to flourish. Aided by youthful energy and a popular belief in their mystical powers, secret societies and dance groups often held sway over the entire community. Arriving in Idoma, colonial officers confronted their power.

In an effort to impose the pax britannica, headhunting societies were proscribed and eventually suppressed.⁴⁸ However, other associations continued to thrive. Still exercising an administrative-judicial function, they constituted a threat to the Administration attempting to construct judicial and strengthen chieftaincy institutions.⁴⁹ By 1936, district heads in the Central Ojira were openly demanding that secret society and dance group activities be confined to "legitimate games and social amusements."⁵⁰

On the eve of World War II, however, the Administration effected a volte face:

. . . these [secret societies and dance groups] are really all-powerful in the social life of the people which goes on under the superficial veneer of our imposed rule and until we can obtain a real understanding of them and see our way clear to incorporating them

⁴⁷Ibid., passim.

⁴⁸Ibid., passim. Headhunting was for all practical purposes suppressed by the mid-1930's.

⁴⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Report on Akpantla in Yangedde District (unpublished, 1936), section 13; also see pp. 105-113.

⁵⁰Ibid., section 13.

somehow--shorn of their undesirable features--within the framework of our administration we are not going to get very far in enlisting the willing co-operation of the Native Authorities.⁵¹

. . . try and induce the Native Courts and Authorities to utilize these ready-made weapons for legitimate purposes and . . . endeavor to bring them out within the open as part and parcel of the administrative makeup instead of driving them underground to act subversively as a cancer in the body politic.⁵²

Administrative officers in Idoma Division were instructed to undertake intensive investigations of the associations.

These produced a number of schemes; one included the imaginative proposal that Odumu be employed on a salaried basis to assist in making arrests, conveying litigants to court, and detecting offenses.⁵³ All such schemes were soon abandoned as impractical.

Associations in contemporary Idoma are weakening under the combined impact of missionary teaching, Western-type education, migration, and extension of the Native Authority apparatus to district and village levels.⁵⁴ Yet many continue to exercise an important--albeit clandestine--

⁵¹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Letter from Divisional Officer to Resident of Benue Province on Akpantla Guild in Igumale (unpublished, March 11, 1939), section 2.

⁵²Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Annual Report, 1939 (unpublished, 1939), section 34.

⁵³Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Notes (unpublished, March 25, 1940), sections 11-16.

⁵⁴A more effective court system has combined with increasing NA Police surveillance in the districts to circumscribe the associations' adjudicative and law enforcement activities. See pp. 133-134.

administrative-judicial function. For example, dance groups frequently assist in the collection of tax, settlement of local disputes, and apprehension of criminal offenders.⁵⁵ Notwithstanding official disclaimers, both district heads and district councillors appear to encourage the associations' vigilante activities.⁵⁶

Associational activity is not without its disruptive consequences, however. Secret societies and dance groups have been known to engage in such antisocial behavior as rowdyism, intimidation, and thievery. Moreover, attempts by secret societies and dance groups to wield inordinate authority have periodically generated hostility within the larger community; these attempts have included the levying of excessive extra-legal fines against villagers suspected of misbehavior.⁵⁷ Expected by the NA and villagers to maintain peace, the district councillor perforce emerges on such

⁵⁵Collection of tax has been facilitated by ingenious recourse to the threat of mystical sanction. Thus, placement of a masked dance group or secret society official in the compound of a defaulter is generally sufficient to induce payment. On such occasions, wives fearing barrenness as a consequence of inadvertently viewing the mask will implore the husband to remove it with payment of tax.

⁵⁶The researcher attended numerous ojira sessions in which district heads supported extralegal vigilante and fining activities. On one occasion, a district head publicly interpreted a higher incidence of thievery in the council area as a consequence of associational inactivity.

⁵⁷More often than not the objection is to excessiveness rather than the fine per se. The researcher is familiar with only one instance in which a villager objected to such fines in principle; community pressure dissuaded him from pursuing the matter with the NA.

occasions to mediate the conflict between community and association.⁵⁸

That the district councillor may experience difficulty executing the "peacemaker" role was ascertained in responses to the question, "Why are you no longer an active member of your secret society or dance group?" Eighteen of the 25 councillors in this group explained that they had found it difficult (1) to behave impartially and/or (2) to convince village audiences of their impartiality.⁵⁹ The conflict situation in Case III explores alternative roles perceived held for the active member experiencing (1) and/or (2).⁶⁰ The following bureaucratic-debureaucratic conflict situation was presented to each subject:

People in Idoma have told me that the district councillor who is an active member of a secret society or dance group may find it difficult to be an impartial peacemaker and/or to convince others that he is an impartial peacemaker in quarrels between members and others in the Council Area. Some say that such a councillor ought to become inactive in the group or resign. Others say that he should remain an active member.

Table 7 presents the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic and debureaucratic expectations, respectively: that

⁵⁸See p. 142. Subjects probed for bases of support during council elections consistently indicated village confidence in their ability to serve as "peacemaker." Moreover, forty-five (64%) identified "peacemaking" as their most important function.

⁵⁹Responses for the remaining seven include old age, distance, and cessation of associational activities.

⁶⁰The potential conflict situation does not discriminate between active membership in secret societies and dance groups.

TABLE 7

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
COMMUNITY, ASSOCIATION, AND THE MEDIATIVE FUNCTION
(COUNCILLOR AS PARTICIPANT) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	4	--	10	8	8	6
	To remain active	41	21	50	23	42	35
	Not to remain active	4	--	--	8	--	3
	To/not to remain active	50	79	40	61	50	56
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	5	--	--	--	8	3
	To remain active	50	29	50	61	25	44
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	36	71	50	31	67	49
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	5	--	--	8	8	4
	To remain active	55	29	90	61	50	55
	Not to remain active	9	7	--	8	--	6
	To/not to remain active	31	64	10	23	42	35
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Secret Society Members	No expectation	5	--	--	--	8	3
	To remain active	45	36	50	69	33	46
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	32	43	40	23	58	38
	Not applicable	9	21	10	--	--	8
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

TABLE 7--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Dance Group Members	No expectation	5	--	--	--	8	3
	To remain active	45	43	50	69	25	46
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	27	43	50	23	58	38
	Not applicable	14	14	--	--	8	8
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	77	100	70	46	75	75
	To remain active	14	--	30	46	25	21
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Nominated Councillors	No expectation	77	100	80	46	75	76
	To remain active	14	--	20	46	25	20
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Representative Councillors	No expectation	73	100	100	69	75	82
	To remain active	18	--	--	31	25	15
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	--	--	3
	To/not to remain active	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

TABLE 7--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
District Head	No expectation	77	100	100	54	42	75
	To remain active	14	--	--	38	58	21
	Not to remain active	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to remain active	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Native Authority	No expectation	91	100	100	77	83	90
	To remain active	4	--	--	15	17	7
	Not to remain active	4	--	--	8	--	3
	To/not to remain active	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

NOTE: The Not applicable category indicates absence of a secret society or dance group from the council area.

the councillor-active member who found it difficult to behave impartially and/or convince others of his impartiality (1) not remain active in the association (i.e., become inactive or resign); (2) remain active in the association; (3) no expectation in this situation.⁶¹ Evident in Table 7 is the low proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role, i.e., the expectation that a councillor handicapped by active membership seek to enhance his peacemaking capability by becoming inactive in, or resigning from, the association. The range for that role is only 3%-6%, with a maximum indicated for the tax collector audience. The uniformly low incidence of perceived bureaucratic role is explained by widely-held attitudes on the relationship between district councillor, community, and association. Many Idoma are of the opinion that, regardless of personal difficulties, the councillor as a community leader ought to remain active in order simultaneously to vitalize and moderate associational activity.⁶² To quote one subject: "My people say that only the councillor who is an active member will prevent trouble from arising." According to another, "elders think that as an

⁶¹Probes made during Phase I of the field operation and the pre-test in Phase II revealed that resignation from council office is not a meaningful behavioral alternative. It was not possible to ascertain the number of councillors who might have been discouraged from seeking re-election as a result of past experience with role conflict.

⁶²Where the councillor is an important functionary in the association--for example, drummer, singer, flutist, dance leader, etc.--his presence is essential to the group's existence. According to informants, such functionaries will be under considerable pressure to remain active.

active member I will prevent trouble and strengthen my position as a just 'peacemaker.'"

At the same time, however, there is a comparatively high incidence of bureaucratic role in the report on perceived intra-audience conflict. Thus, excepting tax collectors in District 3, the report for elder, non-elder, tax collector, secret society, and dance group audiences in the five districts ranges from 23%-79%. In this situation, many councillors identify village and associational audiences with heterogeneous roles. To quote one councillor commenting rhetorically: "My people disagree. Some favor the secret society, others peace. Will I be able to favor both?"

Comparing party campaigning (Case II), council deliberation (Case I), and associational activity (Case II), the more customary character of the latter is noted. In light of the hypothesis that the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role will vary inversely with the degree of customariness (page 168), the lowest report may be anticipated in Case III. Comparison of Tables 2, 6, and 7 reveals this to be the case.⁶³

Finally, the report on "no expectation," again indicates a contrast between village and conciliar-administrative audiences. However, comparison of Tables 2, 6, and 7

⁶³The cross-cutting hypotheses in this chapter refer only to situations involving the district councillor as focal actor. Situations involving the district head as focal actor (Tables 1 and 3 in Case I) are excluded.

reveals a reverse tendency in the latter; Table 7 alone indicates the highest proportionate incidence of "no expectation" among conciliar-administrative audiences. In sum, perceptual responses in the most customary situation (Case III) support hypotheses (2) (a) (b) on page 159.

Case IV: Clan Headship, District Headship,
and Chieftaincy Succession

The two bureaucratic-debureaucratic situations in Case IV focus on the question of councillor involvement in chieftaincy succession. That question is, in turn, related to a confused history of "institutional engineering" in colonial Idoma. Sources of the confusion and implications for bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict are examined below.

Describing colonial "institutional engineering," the researcher noted that allegedly traditional clan headships had been resuscitated and secular district headships created. Noted also was periodic occupancy of the two chieftaincy positions by a single person.⁶⁴

Significantly, "institutional engineering" did not cease with the establishment of chieftaincy. Viewing that institution as a cornerstone of effective local government, the Administration continued to exert considerable influence in the recruitment of officeholders; a successful aspirant, nominally the appointee of an eligible clan or kindred, was more apt to be the candidate of an administrative officer. Since 1947, aspirants have tended increasingly to look upon

⁶⁴See pp. 106-107.

Och'Idoma and the central Native Authority in Oturkpo Town as dispensers of chiefly patronage.

While support of the Divisonal Office and/or Native Authority ordinarily sufficed to ensure formal acceptance by a clan ojira, the latter did at times resist the imposition of an "official" candidate. On most of these occasions, however, intimidation, bribery, "packing" of the ojira, or judicial fiat were effective in overcoming opposition.⁶⁵

Administrative manipulation also extended to the retirement of officeholders. Thus, unsatisfactory performance--often vaguely defined--was cause for summary dismissal of the district head; in some cases involving combined chieftaincy, dismissal from the secular position was accompanied by extralegal removal of the insignia of clan headship.⁶⁶

In the mid-1950's, this arbitrary recruitment process came under attack by advocates of local government reform along "democratic" conciliar lines.⁶⁷ Finally, in an apparent move to regularize chieftaincy succession, the Native Authority laid down the following formula for all districts in Idoma Division:

⁶⁵A case involving judicial fiat may be found in Northern Nigeria, High Court (Makurdi), Oko vs. Idoma NA and Oko (Suit #MD/15/1962) based on the precedent established in Western Nigeria, High Court (Akure), Ayi vs. Joshua (March 30, 1963).

⁶⁶See the chieftaincy case involving Yangedde District in Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Division, Northern Area Notes, 1935-1950 (unpublished, 1935-1950).

⁶⁷See pp. 126-128.

(a) In any District where a vacancy for District . . . President [i.e., district head] occurs, it is the duty of the District concerned (that is to say the full Ojira) to say what clan in the District should furnish holder, and the Clan concerned should in turn decide what Kindred amongst itself have the right in order of rotation over the Chieftaincy. It then becomes the duty of the Kindred to produce a person without any discussions with or interference of other kindreds in the Clan.

(b) The District Councillor of the Clan or kindred concerned should take part in the vote or nomination.

(c) Appointment must be based on order of rotation both in Clans and kindreds and under no circumstances however small they are should be ignored [sic].

(d) The Administrative Councillor [now portfolio councillor] should go to witness appointments of District Presidents and to be accompanied upon such journeys by Administrative Councillor in charge of the area and one member of Executive Council. . . . Under no circumstances only one Administrative Councillor should witness appointment of District . . . President.

. . . (f) All appointments as recommended by Ojira and witnessed by two Administrative Councillors are subject to approval of the NA and the Resident [of Benue Province].⁶⁸

Ironically, a formula intended to dispel confusion over chieftaincy succession for several reasons merely perpetuated it. First, the removal of Och'Idoma from proceedings of the district ojira--a decision hailed as "a good step towards democracy"⁶⁹--did not diminish his influence. Operating through administrative councillors (now portfolio

⁶⁸Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Formula for Appointment of District and Court Presidents (unpublished, circa 1957); also Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of the Executive Meeting, August 29, 1957.

⁶⁹Northern Nigeria, Benue Province, Idoma Native Authority, Minutes of the Executive Meeting, November 7, 1957.

councillors) and other agents in the ojira, he continued to maintain a high degree of de facto control. Second, insistence that eligible units nominate a successor without interference only exacerbated clan and kindred rivalries in the district; Och'Idoma was--and remains--prepared, of course, to mediate inter-group conflict on such occasions. Third, the formula appears to have overlooked such characteristic differences between districts as (1) single and multi-clan composition and (2) single and combined chieftaincy. In both single and multi-clan districts, councillor participation in the vote or nomination represented a potential threat to gerontocratic authority. In effect, generally younger district councillors in single-clan units had been instructed to participate simultaneously in the nomination of a clan head. That prerogative normally devolved upon elder-priests of the alekwu cult.⁷⁰ Moreover, there may have been the implication that secular councillors ought to do the same in multi-clan units with separate district and clan chieftaincies.

Probes of district councillors and other Idoma informants in the five districts revealed considerable disagreement over the question of councillor involvement in chieftaincy succession. This disagreement, traceable to the confusion produced by the move to regularize chieftaincy succession, generated the two potential situations in Case IV. The following bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict

⁷⁰See pp. 82-87.

situations were presented to each subject:

District Headship. A district head in southern Idoma has told me that councillors in his district are expected not to take part in the selection of district heads. Another district head in western Idoma says that councillors in his own district will take part in selection of the next district head.

Clan Headship. A clan head in southern Idoma has told me that councillors in his clan are expected not to take part in the selection of clan heads. Another clan head in western Idoma says that councillors in his own clan will take part in selection of the next clan head.

Table 8 presents the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic and debureaucratic expectations, respectively: (1) that the councillor take part in the selection of a district head; (2) that the councillor not take part in the selection of a district head; (3) no expectation in this situation. The data on bureaucratic role indicate perceived widespread expectation that the councillor participate in succession proceedings for the district headship. Reported in Table 8 is an initially high and steadily increasing proportionate incidence of bureaucratic role in the ascent from village base to Native Authority pinnacle: elders, 52%; non-elders, 73%; tax collectors, 87%; elected councillors, 90%; nominated councillors, 96%; representative councillors, 97%; Native Authority, 99%. One is tempted to interpret this report on a presumably novel, secular institution as supporting the hypothesis that proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role will vary inversely with the degree of customariness of the conflict situation (page 168). However, measurement of the degree of customariness in Idoma chieftaincy

TABLE 8

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
CLAN HEADSHIP, DISTRICT HEADSHIP, AND CHIEFTAINCY SUCCESSION
(COUNCILLOR AND DISTRICT HEADSHIP) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	5	--	--	8	8	4
	To take part	45	64	50	23	83	52
	Not to take part	9	--	--	8	--	4
	To/not to take part	41	36	50	61	8	39
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	4	--	--	8	8	4
	To take part	59	100	60	61	92	73
	Not to take part	4	--	--	--	--	1
	To/not to take part	32	--	40	31	--	21
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	4	--	--	8	8	4
	To take part	82	100	90	77	92	87
	Not to take part	9	--	--	--	--	3
	To/not to take part	4	--	10	15	--	6
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To take part	91	86	90	100	100	90
	Not to take part	9	--	--	--	--	3
	To/not to take part	--	14	10	--	--	7
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

TABLE 8--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Nominated Councilors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To take part	91	100	90	100	100	96
	Not to take part	9	--	--	--	--	3
	To/not to take part	--	--	10	--	--	1
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Representa- tive Councilors	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To take part	91	100	100	100	100	97
	Not to take part	9	--	--	--	--	3
	To/not to take part	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Native Authority	No expectation	--	--	--	--	--	--
	To take part	95	100	100	100	100	99
	Not to take part	5	--	--	--	--	1
	To/not to take part	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councilors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

is rendered problematic by (1) the combined chieftaincy institution in Districts 1 and 4 and (2) incomplete data on the traditional polity. Consequently, measurement must await more intensive investigation of pre-colonial institutions and patterns of authority.

Evident also in Table 8 is a relatively high proportionate incidence of perceived intra-audience conflict among elder and non-elder groups. This report indicates inter- and intra-generational conflict over the involvement of comparatively youthful councillors in succession proceedings.⁷¹

Finally, the low proportionate incidence of "no expectation" indicates a high degree of perceived audience involvement. That involvement may be attributed to strong ideological commitment to, as well as immediate political interest in, chieftaincy succession.⁷²

Table 9 presents the proportion of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding the following bureaucratic and debureaucratic expectations, respectively: (1) that the councillor take part in the selection of a clan head; (2) that the councillor not take part in the selection of a clan head; (3) no expectation in this situation. Comparing Tables 8 and 9, we note the lower proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role in the latter, i.e.,

⁷¹The mean age of the seventy-one subjects is 49 years. Only five in the group may be said to have attained elder status.

⁷²As in the case of bureaucratic role, confusion over customariness of the chieftaincy institution precludes discussion of the hypotheses on p. 159; also see p. 91.

TABLE 9

COUNCILLOR PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIENCE EXPECTATIONS:
CLAN HEADSHIP, DISTRICT HEADSHIP, AND CHIEFTAINCY SUCCESSION
(COUNCILLOR AND CLAN HEADSHIP) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Elders	No expectation	5	--	--	--	--	1
	To take part	45	--	--	8	--	16
	Not to take part	9	79	60	54	83	51
	To/not to take part	41	21	40	38	17	32
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Non- Elders	No expectation	4	--	--	--	--	1
	To take part	59	21	--	23	--	27
	Not to take part	4	7	--	54	17	16
	To/not to take part	32	71	100	23	83	56
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Tax Collectors	No expectation	4	--	--	--	--	1
	To take part	82	21	10	38	--	38
	Not to take part	9	43	40	62	83	42
	To/not to take part	4	36	50	17	17	18
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Elected Councillors	No expectation	--	7	--	--	--	1
	To take part	91	21	30	38	17	46
	Not to take part	9	64	50	54	83	46
	To/not to take part	--	7	20	8	--	6
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

TABLE 9--Continued

Audience	Expectation	District					Total
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Nominated Councillors	No expectation	--	7	--	--	--	1
	To take part	91	21	40	38	17	48
	Not to take part	9	64	50	62	83	48
	To/not to take part	--	7	10	--	--	3
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Representa- tive Councillors	No expectation	--	7	--	--	--	1
	To take part	91	21	40	38	17	48
	Not to take part	9	71	60	62	83	51
	To/not to take part	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
District Head	No expectation	--	7	--	--	--	1
	To take part	--	21	40	--	8	11
	Not to take part	--	71	60	--	67	34
	To/not to take part	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Not applicable	100	--	--	100	25	53
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)
Native Authority	No expectation	--	7	--	--	--	1
	To take part	95	21	40	38	17	49
	Not to take part	5	71	60	62	83	49
	To/not to take part	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Number of councillors	(22)	(14)	(10)	(13)	(12)	(71)

NOTE: The Not applicable category indicates combined chieftaincy; a combined officeholder would not constitute an audience in this situation.

in the situation involving clan headship. The lower incidence of bureaucratic role cutting across all audiences in four districts is, however, in marked contrast to the cross-tabular constancy indicated for District 1. That contrast points up the confusion surrounding chieftaincy succession in Idoma. Focusing on Table 9, it is noted that Districts 1 and 4 diverge in both the proportionate incidence and range of perceived bureaucratic role. Notwithstanding single-clan composition and combined chieftaincy institutions in Districts 1 and 4, the ranges are 45%-95% and 8%-38%, respectively. A perceptual contrast between the two districts is underscored by (1) the virtual absence from both of "no expectation" responses and (2) the less-divergent range for intra-audience conflict. Probes revealed that only subjects in District 1 construed selection of clan head and district head as a single, integrated process; all in District 4 explicated distinct processes for the two offices. While the two groups were able to comprehend distinct processes in the multi-clan units with separate chieftaincies (Districts 2, 3, and 5),⁷³ each expressed incredulity when informed of the other's mode of recruitment. Interestingly, explication of selection processes did not dispel the confusion over councillor involvement.

That the confusion may exist within as well as between

⁷³While these are multi-clan units, only Districts 2 and 3 have separate clan and district heads. The secular officeholder in District 5 is at the same time head of one of the four constituent clans.

districts is suggested by the total proportionate incidence of perceived intra-audience conflict within the village: elders, 32%; non-elders, 56%; tax collectors, 18%. The relatively high proportionate incidence of role conflict among non-elders may, however, reflect other causes as well; e.g., intra- and inter-group conflict over the question of leadership. Conflict of the latter type points up a traditional political competitiveness between generational groups in Idoma.⁷⁴

Summary

The objective of this chapter has been (1) to identify sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension in "culturally mixed" Idoma and (2) to analyze descriptively the councilors' perceptual responses to conflict situations potentially deriving from those sources. The researcher identified role conflict originating in schemes for local government reform (Cases I and IV), attitudes toward political party activity at the local level (Case II), and community tension generated by secret societies and dance groups (Case III). Differential incidence of, and bases for, bureaucratic, debureaucratic, bureaucratic/debureaucratic, and "no expectation" responses were examined. A relationship was identified in Cases I, II, and IV between the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role and location of audiences on the administrative pyramid. The proportionate incidence of that

⁷⁴See pp. 95-97.

role increased in the ascent from village base (elders, non-elders, tax collectors) through intermediate conciliar-administrative levels (elected councillors, nominated councillors, representative councillors, district head) to the pinnacle (Native Authority). Finally, relationships between incidence of bureaucratic role, incidence of "no expectation," and customariness of the conflict situation were examined (Cases I, II, and III). It was found that (1) the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role varies inversely with the degree of customariness of the conflict situation and (2) the proportionate incidence of "no expectation" among village and conciliar-administrative audiences is related to the degree of customariness of a conflict situation. (a) The report for village audiences increases in less customary and decreases in more customary situations. (b) The converse holds for conciliar-administrative audiences.

In the next chapter, the researcher will (1) identify the extent to which responses indicated perception of the objective conflict situation and (2) examine the relationship between perceived role conflict, ambivalence, and conflict resolution.

CHAPTER VII

ROLE CONFLICT: PERCEPTION, AMBIVALENCE, RESOLUTION

Having analyzed role perception in potential conflict situations, we turn to the focal problem of the investigation: management of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict by Idoma district councillors. It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine two sets of relationships: (1) objective and perceived role conflict and (2) perceived role conflict, subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence, and resolution. The relevance of the concepts legitimacy, obligation, and sanction to the focal problem will be considered in Chapter VIII.¹

In Chapter VI, the researcher examined significant differences between situations and districts in the proportionate incidence of bureaucratic, debureaucratic, bureaucratic/debureaucratic, and "no expectation" responses.² Before beginning the analysis, therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationship between proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict and the situational and district variables. In order to assess the relative significance of the

¹See pp. 216-222, 233-243.

²See p. 140 f.n. 2.

situational and district variables for perceived role conflict, the following null hypotheses were subjected to a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (or H) test:

(1) there is no difference between situations in the proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict and (2) there is no difference between districts in the proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict. Utilizing a .05 level of significance, the first hypothesis is rejected ($p < .01$); the second is accepted ($p > .20$).³ In sum, significant differences in the proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict are limited to the situational variable. Accordingly, the role conflict situation has been accepted as an independent variable in this context; the analysis will encompass that variable alone.

Objective and Perceived Role Conflict

In explicating a conceptual schema, the researcher noted that the existence of an objective role conflict situation does not predicate its recognition by an actor in the social system; the actor may be ignorant of its existence or

³Proportionate incidence of role conflict was computed for five situations in each of the five districts. Twenty-five proportions were then ranked from 25-1. The situational hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with situational columns and district rows. ($H=13.84$, corrected for ties; $df=4$). The district hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with district columns and situational rows. ($H=5.07$, corrected for ties; $df=4$, significant at less than .20). The unranked district and situational proportions are reported in Table 10.

For a statement of the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test, see Sidney Siegel, Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 184-194.

TABLE 10
COUNCILLORS WHO PERCEIVED OBJECTIVE ROLE CONFLICT
SITUATIONS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Case and Conflict Situation	District					Total
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Case I: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization						
Councillor as advisor Number of councillors	82 (22)	86 (14)	100 (10)	100 (13)	75 (12)	87 (71)
Case II: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance						
Councillor as campaigner Number of councillors	23 (22)	50 (14)	60 (10)	38 (13)	33 (12)	38 (71)
Case III: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function						
Councillor as participant Number of councillors	50 (22)	86 (14)	70 (10)	62 (13)	75 (12)	66 (71)
Case IV: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession						
a. Councillor and clan headship	50	93	100	54	83	72
b. Councillor and district headship Number of councillors	50 (22)	50 (14)	70 (10)	69 (13)	25 (12)	52 (71)

extent.⁴ The initial analysis involves determination of the extent to which Idoma district councillors perceived the existence of objective role conflict situations. The procedure adopted to ascertain the extent to which subjects perceived such situations was as follows: After being presented with a potential (i.e., objective) conflict situation, the subject was probed on individual audiences for role perception, legitimacy, obligation (and, where relevant, sanction). He was then asked to reaffirm his perception of role conflict or role consensus.⁵

Table 10 reports the percentage of district councillors who perceived audiences as holding contradictory expectations in the five objective conflict situations. Reflected in the total column is less than universal perception of role conflict in each of the situations. Total incidence of perceived role conflict--two hundred and twenty-four--represents 63% of the perceptual universe.⁶

Another view of the extent of incongruence between objective and perceived role conflict may be gleaned from the following: while only one councillor (1%) perceived role consensus in all situations, only four (6%) indicated pervasive role conflict. Councillors perceiving role conflict

⁴See pp. 46-47.

⁵See pp. 58-59.

⁶The perceptual universe includes 355 observations (71 councillors x 5 situations). The two conflict situations involving the district head as focal actor (Case I) have been excluded from the analysis; these two were intended to serve a specific purpose in Case I. See pp. 141-159, 244-252.

in one, two, three, and four situations totalled seven (10%), thirteen (18%), thirteen (18%), and thirty-three (46%), respectively.

Evident also is the extent of variability between total situational responses. As few as 38% of the subjects perceived audiences as holding contradictory expectations in Case II. A comparatively high incidence of role consensus in the situation involving party campaigning at the local level contrasts sharply with the report for Case I; in the latter, 87% of the subjects indicated perception of role conflict. Moreover, the two reports on chieftaincy (Case IV) point up considerable variability even between related situations.

Examined next is the incidence of perceived role conflict by type. According to the conceptual schema, a typology based on social location subsumes role conflict arising both within and between audience populations.⁷ Evident in Table 11 is a uniformly high incidence of the former type, i.e., intra-audience role conflict. Eighty-nine percent of the responses indicating perceived role conflict involve intra-audience conflict.⁸ Interestingly, none of these pertain to the Native Authority audience. For example, no subject

⁷See pp. 45-46.

⁸It ought to be noted that the intra-audience conflict reported in this study necessarily involves role conflict of the inter-audience type. For example, contradictory expectations associated with elders or non-elders involve inter-audience conflict within the universe of audience populations.

TABLE 11
COUNCILLORS WHO PERCEIVED INTER- AND INTRA-
AUDIENCE ROLE CONFLICT (IN PERCENTAGES)

Case and Conflict Situation	Number of Perceived Role Conflict Situations	Type of Role Conflict	
		Inter- Audience	Intra- Audience
Case I: Agency and Representa- tion in Hierarchical Organization			
Councillor as advisor	62	34	66
Case II: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance			
Councillor as campaigner	27	4	96
Case III: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function			
Councillor as participant	47	--	100
Case IV: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession			
a. Councillor and clan headship	51	2	98
b. Councillor and district headship	37	5	95
Total	224	11	89

perceived Och'Idoma and one or more portfolio councillors as holding contradictory expectations for district councillor behavior. Both the interview data and participant observation suggest widespread perception of a monolithic local government authority in the administrative center of Idoma Division.⁹

Significantly, the opposite perception is associated with village audiences. Thus, 85% of the responses indicating intra-audience role conflict cut across two groups: elders and non-elders. This striking datum draws attention to observed intra- and inter-generational conflict in the ojira.¹⁰ While such conflict is reported to have characterized relations between generational groups in traditional Idoma,¹¹ informants explicated its virulent increase with "the coming of ubeke (Idoma: "white man")." For example, one elder noted that "young men who return from the white man's town fail to respect the elders." In a similar vein, two Idoma with Standard VI school certificates emphasized that "only the educated young men could make changes in the village." An illiterate youth, in turn, deplored his educated brethren "who follow only the ways of ubeke and ignore alekwu (Idoma: "ancestral cult" or ways of the ancestors).

⁹References of Idoma councillors and other informants were generally to the central NA per se rather than specific officials within it. Implications of this perception for role buffering may be found on pp. 250-252.

¹⁰See pp. 159, 191.

¹¹See pp. 95-97.

In sum, there is evidence that considerable strain is being placed upon a consensual "democratic" principle intended to harmonize relationships in the ojira. Implications of that development for secularization, councillor role re-orientation, and gerontocratic authority have been examined;¹² meriting future investigation are its implications for bureaucratization.

Perceived Role Conflict and Ambivalence

According to the conceptual schema, perception of the objective conflict situation constitutes a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence. Ambivalence (i.e., difficulty in selecting among given behavioral alternatives) need not accompany perception of the objective situation.¹³ In order to ascertain whether awareness of role conflict did in fact generate ambivalence, subjects who perceived role conflict were asked, "Would this situation trouble you? That is, would you have difficulty in deciding what to do?" Subjects indicated the presence or absence of ambivalence with yes and no responses, respectively. Those who responded in the affirmative were then probed for the extent of difficulty in selecting among given behavioral alternatives: "How much? Some? Very much?"¹⁴ A three-point ambivalence scale

¹²See p. 159.

¹³See pp. 46-47.

¹⁴See pp. 58-59.

was constructed for alternative no, yes-some, and yes-very much responses.

Before analyzing the responses, however, it is necessary to examine the relationship between degree of ambivalence and the situational and district variables. In order to assess the relative significance of the situational and district variables for degree of ambivalence, the following null hypotheses were subjected to the H-test: (1) there is no difference between situations in the proportionate incidence of ambivalence and (2) there is no difference between districts in the proportionate incidence of ambivalence. The first hypothesis is rejected ($p < .02$); the second is accepted ($p > .50$).¹⁵ Significant differences are again limited to the situational variable. Accordingly, the role conflict situation has been accepted as an independent variable in the analysis of ambivalence.

Table 12 reports the percentage of Idoma councillors who experienced any degree of ambivalence in perceived role conflict situations. Reflected in the total column is less than universal experience of ambivalence in each of the situations. Total incidence of ambivalence--107--represents 48% of the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

¹⁵Proportionate incidence of ambivalence was computed for five situations in each of the five districts. Twenty-five proportions were then ranked from 25-1. The situational hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with situational columns and district rows. ($H=13.04$, corrected for ties; $df=4$, significant at a level between .02 and .01). The district hypothesis was tested by constructing a table of ranks with district columns and situational rows. ($H=3.58$, corrected for ties; $df=4$, significant at a level between .50 and .30). The unranked district and situational proportions are reported in Table 13.

TABLE 12

COUNCILLORS WHO EXPERIENCED AMBIVALENCE IN PERCEIVED
ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS (IN PERCENTAGES)

Case and Conflict Situation	District					Total
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
Case I: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization						
Councillor as advisor	39	42	50	31	44	40
Number of councillors	(18)	(12)	(10)	(13)	(9)	(62)
Case II: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance						
Councillor as campaigner	20	29	33	20	25	26
Number of councillors	(5)	(7)	(6)	(5)	(4)	(27)
Case III: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function						
Councillor as participant	73	50	71	63	78	66
Number of councillors	(11)	(12)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(47)
Case IV: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession						
a. Councillor and clan headship	73	31	30	57	10	39
Number of councillors	(11)	(13)	(10)	(7)	(10)	(51)
b. Councillor and district headship	73	86	71	33	67	65
Number of councillors	(11)	(7)	(7)	(9)	(3)	(37)

Another view of the extent of incongruence between perceived role conflict and ambivalence may be gleaned from the following: seventeen (24%) of the 70 councillors who perceived at least one role conflict situation experienced no difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives. Sixty-two (89%) experienced ambivalence in fewer than their total number of perceived role conflict situations. Only eight councillors (11%) indicated commensurate perceived role conflict and ambivalence.

Having ascertained the incidence of ambivalence, we next examine the degree of ambivalence experienced by Idoma district councillors. Of the 107 instances of difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives, 73% involve some ambivalence; only 27% indicate very much ambivalence. The responses on some and very much ambivalence represent 35% and 13% respectively, of the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

Mean ambivalence scores in Table 13 present yet another view of the degree of ambivalence experienced by district councillors. In no instance does a score surpass 2.00, the level indicating some ambivalence. In sum, mean ambivalence scores indicate consistent placement within the lower range of the three-point scale.

Finally, comparing the last columns in Tables 10 and 13, it is noted that the conflict situation in Case II manifests the lowest proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict and the lowest mean ambivalence score. This finding suggested a possible correlation between the two variables.

TABLE 13

MEAN AMBIVALENCE SCORES FOR COUNCILLORS IN
ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Case and Conflict Situation	District					Situational Means
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	
<hr/>						
Case I: Agency and Representa- tion in Hierarch- ical Organization						
Councillor as advisor	1.55	1.67	1.70	1.38	1.44	1.55
Case II: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance						
Councillor as campaigner	1.20	1.45	1.33	1.20	1.25	1.29
Case III: Com- munity, Associ- ation, and the Mediative Function						
Councillor as participant	1.73	1.67	2.00	1.88	1.89	1.80
Case IV: Clan Headship, Dis- trict Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession						
a. Councillor and clan headship	2.00	1.46	1.50	1.57	1.30	1.57
b. Councillor and district headship	2.00	1.57	1.71	1.67	1.33	1.73
<hr/>						
District Means	1.73	1.56	1.65	1.54	1.48	

NOTE: 1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence;
3.00 = very much ambivalence.

In order to ascertain the extent of association between proportionate incidence of perceived role conflict and mean ambivalence, a Spearman rank correlation coefficient was computed from the last columns in Tables 10 and 13. Indicating a low correlation between the two variables is an obtained rho of .3, not significant at the .05 level.

However, focusing on the three situations for which customariness has been assessed (Cases I, II, III), we note the following association between that variable and mean ambivalence score: party campaigning (least customary) is associated with least ambivalence, dance group-secret society participation (most customary) with the converse. That relationship has several important implications for district councillorship and an evolving secular society. Notwithstanding "institutional engineering," secularization under colonial auspices magnified the importance of traditional structures in contemporary Idoma. Evidence of that paradox may be found in the tendency of informants to exaggerate the relationship between district council and traditional ojira; others identify the former as successor to the aiuta constabulary, albeit weaker.¹⁶ Such magnification can be expected temporarily to engender ambivalence in more customary role conflict situations. Over a period of time, however, the erosion of traditional structures (i.e., normative and institutional bases for such situations) can be expected to alleviate the problem of ambivalence. One consequence of

¹⁶See pp. 88-90, 95-97.

relief from customary sources of ambivalence is likely to be councillor role re-orientation toward conciliar-administrative audiences; role re-orientation can be expected to contribute, in turn, to the assault on remnants of traditional structure.¹⁷

Conflict Resolution and Ambivalence

In order to ascertain resolution technique, subjects who perceived role conflict were asked, "What would you do in this situation?" Responses in 224 perceived conflict situations indicated uniform preference for the technique involving selection of a major role.¹⁸ Fifty-four percent of those responses involve the choice of debureaucratic roles. The scope of debureaucratic resolution may be gleaned from the situational distribution presented in Table 14. Debureaucratic resolution predominates in all but the situation involving district councillor participation in the selection of a district head (Case IV a). Majorities of varying size indicate the councillor's debureaucratic intention (1) to advise the district head not to sign a payment voucher (Case I); (2) not to campaign locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections (Case II); (3) to remain active in the secret society or dance group (Case III); and (4) not to participate in the selection of a clan head (Case IV b). Especially striking are the

¹⁷See p. 159.

¹⁸See pp. 49-50.

TABLE 14
INCIDENCE OF PERCEIVED ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS INVOLVING
BUREAUCRATIC AND DEBUREAUCRATIC RESOLUTION
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Case and Conflict Situation	Number of Perceived Role Conflict Situations	Direction of Resolution	
		Bureaucratic	Debureaucratic
Case I: Councillor as advisor	62	29	71
Case II: Councillor as campaigner	27	48	52
Case III: Councillor as participant	47	36	64
Case IV: a. Councillor involvement in district headship	37	95	5
b. Councillor involvement in clan headship	51	41	59
Total	224	46	54

reports for Cases I and II. Together they indicate considerable unwillingness to conform to expectations associated with the superordinate Native Authority audience. That datum reflects an observed widespread hostility to the local government authority in Oturkpo Town.¹⁹

Not unexpectedly, 95% of the subjects indicated bureaucratic intention to participate in the selection of the most important district officeholder (Case IV a). That resolution reflects the councillors' immediate political interest in leadership succession as well as a desire to conform to audience expectations.²⁰

Having ascertained the direction of resolution in five situations, we turn to the question of the relationship between ambivalence and conflict resolution. Presented in Table 15 are distributions for the two variables. Set A indicates a tendency for the proportionate incidence of bureaucratic resolution to increase significantly with the degree of ambivalence. The proportionate incidence of bureaucratic resolution is lowest in the case of no ambivalence, highest in the case of very much ambivalence. A striking similarity between the proportionate incidence in cases of some and very much ambivalence generated the analysis in Set B. Noted therein is a decidedly non-significant relationship between the tendency toward bureaucratic resolution and differential responses involving some and very

¹⁹See pp. 144, 147, 151-152, 155-157, 244-252.

²⁰See pp. 91, 187.

TABLE 15
DEGREE OF AMBIVALENCE AND PERCEIVED ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS
RESOLVED BUREAUCRATICALLY AND DEBUREAUCRATICALLY
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Degree of Ambivalence	Number of Perceived Conflict Situations	Direction of Resolution		Significance Level
		Bureaucratic	Debureaucratic	
A. None	117	37	63	p<.005
Some	78	59	41	
Very Much	29	62	38	

B. Some	78	59	41	p>.95
Very Much	29	62	38	

C. None	117	37	63	p<.005
Some	78	59	41	

much ambivalence. Contrastingly, Set C indicates a highly significant relationship between that direction of resolution and differential responses involving no and some ambivalence. In sum, the data in Table 15 point to a more significant relationship between bureaucratic direction of resolution and degree of intensity within the lower range of the ambivalence scale; in the context of this study, degree of intensity within the upper range of the scale is less significantly related to that direction of resolution.

Summary

The objective of this chapter has been to analyze several facets of the focal problem: management of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict by Idoma district councillors. Examined were relationships between (1) objective and perceived role conflict and (2) perceived role conflict, subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence, and resolution.

Fewer than the total number of councillors perceived each of the five potential or objective conflict situations. Evident in the responses indicating perceived role conflict was a distinction between two types: inter-audience and intra-audience conflict. A higher incidence of the latter was encountered. Finally, ambivalence was experienced by fewer than the total number of councillors who perceived role conflict. Among responses indicating ambivalence, nearly three-fourths involved only minimal (i.e., some)

difficulty in resolving subjectively-experienced role conflict. These findings lend empirical support to the conceptual schema.

Evident also was a relationship between customariness of the conflict situation and degree of ambivalence in Cases I, II, and III; greater mean ambivalence was associated with greater customariness. Implications of this finding for Idoma district councillorship were examined.

A tendency toward debureaucratic resolution was identified in four of the five conflict situations. At the same time, the researcher noted a relationship between direction of resolution and degree of ambivalence; greater ambivalence was significantly associated with a higher proportionate incidence of bureaucratic resolution. Moreover, the data pointed to a more significant relationship between bureaucratic direction of resolution and degree of intensity within the lower range of the ambivalence scale. Degree of intensity within the upper range was less significantly related to that direction of resolution.

Other facets of the focal problem will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

MULTIDIMENSIONALISM IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Continuing the empirical analysis, we turn to the question of the relationship between three dimensions of role (legitimacy, obligation, sanction) and the focal problem, management of bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict by Idoma district councillors. It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine relationships between multidimensional role, subjectively-experienced role conflict or ambivalence, and conflict resolution.

Legitimacy and Obligation

Legitimacy and obligation have been operationalized to convey the following notions, respectively: (1) belief in the rightness or propriety of a specific role and (2) means intended to maximize conformance between expected and actual behavior. Accordingly, a role which the councillor feels an audience has a right to entertain is construed as legitimate; conversely, a role which he feels an audience does not have a right to entertain is construed as illegitimate. An obligatory role is one which, when unfulfilled in actual behavior, is expected to result in the levying of punitive-social sanction on the deviant. An optional role is one

which, regardless of conformance or nonconformance in actual behavior, is not expected to result in the levying of such sanctions.¹ Evaluations of the legitimacy and obligatoriness of perceived roles were elicited with the following questions, respectively: "Do they (i.e., the audience) have a right to expect you to ____?" and "Would they insist that you do as expected?"²

Councillor responses for audiences in perceived conflict and consensual situations totalled 2,865;³ 452 indicating "no expectation in this situation" are, of course, excluded from the analysis. The remaining 2,413 encompass the six possible permutations for any bureaucratic or de-bureaucratic expectation perceived held by an audience: (1) legitimate-obligatory; (2) legitimate-optional; (3) illegitimate-obligatory; (4) illegitimate-optional; (5) legitimate-obligatory-optional; or (6) illegitimate-obligatory-optional. Councillor perceptions of individual audiences were recorded in these six categories. In order to ascertain the extent of association between legitimacy and obligation, it was necessary to exclude permutations (5) and (6) from the analysis. Only responses in categories (1), (2), (3), and (4)

¹See pp. 36-39.

²See p. 58.

³A larger n is obtained by focusing on responses in both conflict and consensual situations.

The total of 2,865 was obtained by multiplying the number of audiences in each of the five conflict situations by 71 councillors.

have been included; these account for 79% of the total, excluding "no expectation in this situation." The phi-coefficient has been utilized as a measure of the association between legitimacy and obligation.

Table 16 includes phi-coefficients representing the extent of association between legitimacy and obligation. Reported in the table are relatively uniform, highly significant correlations between the two. These indicate a persistent tendency toward grouping of legitimate-obligatory and illegitimate-optional expectations. Stated otherwise, Idoma district councillors are clearly more prone to anticipate punitive-social sanction in the event of nonconformance with perceived legitimate than perceived illegitimate expectations. Moreover, widespread perception of punitive-social sanction in councillor-audience role relationships is indicated by (1) the coefficients in Table 16 and (2) the proportionate incidence among categories analyzed: legitimate-obligatory, 67%; legitimate-optional, 19%; illegitimate-obligatory, 3%; illegitimate-optional, 11%. Thus, 70% of the responses involve obligatory roles which, when unfulfilled in actual behavior, are expected to result in the levying of such sanctions on the deviant.⁴ Councillor preoccupation with punishment, reflected in this datum, is examined in the section on Multidimensionalism and Role

⁴The focus here is upon punitive-social sanction. Other types of sanction may, of course, be operative simultaneously. For an elaboration of this point, see pp. 37-38, 264-265.

TABLE 16

SITUATIONAL CORRELATES FOR LEGITIMACY AND OBLIGATION

Case and Conflict Situation	n ^a	Observed phi ^b	Maximal phi	Significance level
Case I: Agency and Representation in Hierarchical Organization				
Councillor as advisor	432	.419	.657	p<.001
Case II: Party Affiliation and Organizational Allegiance				
Councillor as campaigner	401	.471	.657	p<.001
Case III: Community, Association, and the Mediative Function				
Councillor as participant	256	.453	.628	p<.001
Case IV: Clan Headship, District Headship, and Chieftaincy Succession				
a. Councillor and clan headship	416	.316	.545	p<.001
b. Councillor and district headship	410	.372	.507	p<.001
Total	1915	.477	.622	p<.001

^an refers to the number of legitimate-obligatory, legitimate-optional, illegitimate-obligatory, and illegitimate-optional responses for audiences in perceived conflict and consensual situations.

^bAn elaboration of the phi coefficient measure of

Buffering in Conflict Resolution.⁵

Legitimacy, Obligation, and Ambivalence

Having examined the association between legitimacy and obligation, we turn to the question of the relationship between those dimensions of role and councillor ambivalence. In the previous section, the analysis focused on four permutations in perceived consensual and conflict situations. In contrast, analysis of the relationship between legitimacy, obligation, and ambivalence requires the articulation of a more extensive permutational universe based on perceived conflict situations alone. Thus, beginning with the six possible permutations for a single bureaucratic or debureaucratic expectation (legitimate-obligatory, legitimate-optional, illegitimate-obligatory, illegitimate-optional, legitimate-obligatory-optional, illegitimate-obligatory-optional) we are able to construct a universe of thirty-seven potential permutations for any set of contradictory expectations. Included in Table 17 are the thirty-seven permutations, their distribution, and relationship to ambivalence experienced by Idoma district councillors.

Evident in the table is a diffuse distribution of councillor responses; these encompass 69% of the permutational

association may be found in J. P. Guilford, Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1956), p. 311ff. Interpretation of the observed phi is relative to the maximal phi computed from marginal sums in the contingency table.

⁵See pp. 244-252.

TABLE 17
PERMUTATIONS OF LEGITIMACY-OBLIGATION AND MEAN AMBIVALENCE
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Permutation ^a		n ^b	Pct. of Total n	No. of situations involving report of permutation	Mean ^c Ambivalence
	Bureaucratic Expectation	Debureaucratic Expectation				
1)	L-Ob	L-Ob	13	5.8	5	1.16
2)	L-Ob	L-Opt	3	1.3	2	1.33
3)	L-Ob	I-Ob	16	7.2	4	2.19
4)	L-Ob	I-Opt	4	1.8	2	1.50
5)	I-Opt	L-Ob	21	9.4	4	1.19
6)	I-Ob	L-Ob	12	5.3	3	2.00
7)	L-Opt	L-Ob	1	0.4	1	2.00
8)	L-Opt	L-Opt	1	0.4	1	1.00
9)	L-Opt	I-Ob	--	--	--	--
10)	L-Opt	I-Opt	3	1.3	1	2.00
11)	I-Opt	L-Opt	11	4.9	4	1.18
12)	I-Ob	L-Opt	--	--	--	--
13)	I-Opt	I-Ob	--	--	--	--
14)	I-Ob	I-Opt	--	--	--	--
15)	I-Opt	I-Ob	--	--	--	--
16)	I-Opt	I-Opt	--	--	--	--
17)	I-Ob	I-Ob	--	--	--	--
18)	L-Ob-Opt	L-Ob	19	8.5	4	1.68
19)	L-Ob-Opt	L-Opt	9	4.0	3	1.11
20)	L-Ob-Opt	I-Ob	19	8.5	3	2.10
21)	L-Ob-Opt	I-Opt	9	4.0	5	1.00
22)	I-Ob-Opt	L-Ob	7	3.1	3	2.14
23)	I-Ob-Opt	L-Opt	4	1.8	2	1.00
24)	I-Ob-Opt	I-Ob	--	--	--	--

TABLE 17--Continued

Permutation ^a		nb	Pct. of Total n	No. of situations involving report of permutation	MeanC Ambivalence
Bureaucratic Expectation	Debureaucratic Expectation				
25) I-Ob-Opt	I-Opt	--	--	--	--
26) L-Ob	L-Ob-Opt	5	2.2	3	1.00
27) L-Opt	L-Ob-Opt	1	0.4	1	1.00
28) I-Ob	L-Ob-Opt	7	3.1	3	1.43
29) I-Opt	L-Ob-Opt	25	11.1	4	1.12
30) L-Ob	I-Ob-Opt	2	0.9	1	1.00
31) L-Opt	I-Ob-Opt	1	0.4	1	1.00
32) I-Ob	I-Ob-Opt	--	--	--	--
33) I-Opt	I-Ob-Opt	--	--	--	--
34) L-Ob-Opt	L-Ob-Opt	8	3.6	4	2.00
35) L-Ob-Opt	I-Ob-Opt	5	2.2	3	2.40
36) I-Ob-Opt	L-Ob-Opt	18	8.0	3	2.05
37) I-Ob-Opt	I-Ob-Opt	--	--	--	--

^aL = legitimate; I = illegitimate; Ob = obligatory; Opt = optional

^b_n refers to the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

C1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence; 3.00 = very much ambivalence

universe. With the exception of number 29, frequencies do not exceed 10% of the incidence of perceived role conflict. Moreover, 64% of the permutations identified by councillors involve at least three situations; only 20% encompass a single conflict situation. In sum, the distribution suggests that councillors who perceive bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict do not associate it with a dominant permutation or group of permutations based on legitimacy and obligation.

Focusing on the relationship between degree of ambivalence and permutations based on legitimacy and obligation, the following is hypothesized: councillor ambivalence or difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives will be greater in conflict situations involving two legitimate and/or obligatory expectations than in those involving a single legitimate and/or obligatory expectation.⁶ Stated otherwise, greater ambivalence is anticipated in conflict situations involving permutations 1-2-3-6-7-8-18-19-20-22-26-27-28-30-34-35-36 than in those involving 4-5-10-11-21-23-29-31. Mean ambivalence scores reported in Table 18 support the hypothesis.

That sets of legitimate roles and sets of obligatory roles may, however, contribute differentially to ambivalence ought to be noted. Reported in Tables 19 and 20 are

⁶The hypothesis is limited to obligation per se, i.e., to the perception of an expectation whose fulfillment the subject feels an audience would insist upon. In this study, insistence predicates punitive-social sanction. Notwithstanding, the researcher is not concerned here with the sanctional dimension of obligation.

differences between the two. Especially striking is an anomaly in the relationships between single and dual legitimacy, on the one hand, and single and dual obligation, on the other. Contrary to the hypothesis, duality is associated with greater ambivalence in the case of obligation alone (Table 20). In view of the narrow differential between scores presented in Table 19, future testing of the hypothesis seems appropriate. At this time, it is possible only to report the anomaly without further explication.

TABLE 18

SINGLE LEGITIMACY AND/OR OBLIGATION, DUAL LEGITIMACY
AND/OR OBLIGATION, AND MEAN AMBIVALENCE

Permutations	n ^a	Mean Ambivalence ^b
Single Legitimacy and/or Obligation: 4-5-10-11- 21-23-29-31	78	1.18
Dual Legitimacy and/or Obligation: 1-2-3-6-7- 8-18-19-20-22-26-27-28- 30-34-35-36	146	1.83

^an refers to the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

^b1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence;
3.00 = very much ambivalence.

TABLE 19

SINGLE LEGITIMACY, DUAL LEGITIMACY, AND
MEAN AMBIVALENCE

Permutations	n ^a	Mean Ambivalence ^b
Single Legitimacy: 3-4- 5-6-10-11-20-21-22-23-28- 29-30-31-35-36	164	1.62
Dual Legitimacy: 1-2-7- 8-18-19-26-27-34	60	1.55

^an refers to the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

^b1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence;
3.00 = very much ambivalence.

TABLE 20

SINGLE OBLIGATION, DUAL OBLIGATION, AND
MEAN AMBIVALENCE

Permutations	n ^a	Mean Ambivalence ^b
Single Obligation: 2-4- 5-8-10-11-19-21-23-29-31	86	1.17
Dual Obligation: 1-3-6- 7-18-20-22-26-27-28-30- 34-35-36	138	1.74

^an refers to the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

^b1.00 = no ambivalence; 2.00 = some ambivalence;
3.00 = very much ambivalence.

Comparing the two tables for dual legitimacy and dual obligation, it is noted that Idoma district councillors are less troubled by the need to choose between contradictory roles of a legitimate than those of an obligatory character. This is understandable, given (1) widespread perception of punitive-social sanction in councillor-audience role relationships and (2) councillor reliance on the resolution technique involving selection of a major role. Having to choose more frequently between audiences identified with obligatory expectations, the district councillor tends to look upon punitive-social sanction as a concomitant of choice. That tendency is reflected in the comments of councillors: " I want to please oche (Idoma: "chief" or district head) and my people in the village. I cannot. Each rebukes me for trying to please the other." Especially distressing is perceived obligatory role conflict at the village level. In such circumstances, fulfillment of either expectation virtually ensures both punishment of the councillor and alienation of elements in the community: "When elders and young men argue over my work, I cannot please both. When I support one, I am rebuked and ostracized by the other. I suffer too much as a councillor." Not unexpectedly, then, greater ambivalence is likely to be associated with a felt need to mitigate the effects of inevitable punishment.

Sanction

Heretofore, obligation has been examined without systematic reference to its adjunct, punitive-social sanction.

This section will focus on the content and distribution of the latter; the relationship between sanction and ambivalence will be examined in the next section.

More than three decades ago, the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown noted a relationship between paucity of comparative research and the embryonic state of sanctional typology.⁷ Since then, impressive augmentation of the former has not generated commensurate development of the latter. Consequently, the present effort is intended in part to contribute to the development of a typology of punitive-social sanctions based on two criteria: content and chronology.

Twenty-five sanctions differentially associated with perceived role conflict have been identified. (See Tables 21 and 22.) Mystical customary sanctions are those of a supernatural character originating exclusively in pre-colonial Idoma. Belief in "powers of the curse and the alekwu (ancestral) cult" have been discussed elsewhere.⁸ To be "warned of the consequences" is a threat intended to dissuade the prospective deviant; forbidden to articulate the group sanction, four perceptibly anguished councillors did, however, allude to personal misfortune as an inevitable consequence of unauthorized withdrawal from the Echi dance group. A single councillor anticipated wifely barrenness as a consequence of falsely swearing the oath of honesty.

⁷A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), p. 206.

⁸See pp. 80-87.

Social customary-modern sanctions are regulatory devices originating in neither pre-colonial, colonial, nor contemporary Idoma exclusively. "Rebuke" may take many forms, including ridicule, insult, expression of disapproval, derisive laughter, and jest. "Ostracism" in contemporary Idoma is likely to involve refusal to converse or drink beer with the offending party; prior to the pax britannica, it could eventuate in exile, wandering, and death at the hands of an inhospitable stranger community. To be "driven away" from the site of proceedings involving clan and/or district head succession is to be ignominiously denied a voice in the matter of leadership recruitment.

Modern police-judicial and modern political-administrative sanctions are those originating exclusively in values and structures introduced into Idoma by the colonial power; their content is self-explanatory.

Reported in Table 21 are sanctional frequencies in perceived role conflict situations. Each situational category includes the total number of anticipated sanctions (n), typological and individual frequencies, and the number of subjects identified with each sanction. The distributional pattern reflects a tendency toward association of individual sanctions with specific conflict situations. While five sanctions ("rebuke" "ostracism," "refusal to re-elect," "refusal to renominate," and "campaign against re-election") cut across at least four situations, seventeen others recur in fewer than three; ten of the latter are associated with

TABLE 21

DISTRIBUTION OF COUNCILLORS AND SANCTIONS IN PERCEIVED CONFLICT SITUATIONS (CASES I, II, AND III) (IN PERCENTAGES)

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Case I: Councillor as advisor (n=548) a	Pct. No. of of n Councillors ^b	Case II: Councillor as campaigner (n=310)	Pct. No. of of n Councillors	Case III: Councillor as participant (n=400)	Pct. No. of of n Councillors
A. Mystical Customary						
-Appease alekwu by levying fine in kind against me	-1.0	1				
-Warn me of con- sequences	1.0	3	1.0	1		
-Make me take oath of honesty	2.0	14	-1.0	1	3.0	4
-Advise elders to curse me	3.0		1.0			
-Curse me						
Total					3.0	
B. Social Customary- Modern						
-Rebuke me	54.0	58	59.0	27	78.0	44
-Ostracize me	8.0	17	1.0	2	9.0	12
-Drive me away						
Total	62.0		60.0		87.0	
C. Modern Police- Judicial						
-Report me to NA Court						
-President for dis- ciplining			1.0	1		
-Report me to NA Police for disciplining	-1.0	2				
-Sue me to Court	2.0	9				
-Frameup charges to victimize me in Court	-1.0	2	8.0	12		
-Arrest me	2.0					
Total			9.0			

TABLE 21--Continued (Cases I, II, and III Continued)

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Case I: Councillor as advisor (n=548) a	Case II: Councillor as campaigner (n=310)	Case III: Councillor as participant (n=400)
	Pct. No. of of n Councillors b	Pct. No. of of n Councillors	Pct. No. of of n Councillors
D. Modern Political--			
Administrative			
-Advise district head		2.0	3
-Report me to district head for disciplining		1.0	1
-Report me to NA for disciplining	1	-1.0	1
-Advise Council to report me to NA for disciplining		1.0	2
-Refuse to elect me to any office	3.0		
-Refuse to re-elect me	18.0	2.0	4
-Refuse to renominate me	3.0	7.0	12
-Refuse to support my motions in Council	1.0		
-Campaign against my re-election	6.0	12.0	12
-Levy administrative fine against me	-1.0		
-Dismiss me from Council	1.0	4.0	6
-Dismiss me from NA job		-1.0	1
Total	32.0	29.0	10.0

TABLE 21--Continued (Case IV(A), IV(B), and Total)

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Case IV:				TOTAL (n=2410) Pct. of n
	A. Councillor and Clan Headship (n=584)		B. Councillor and District Headship (n=568)		
	Pct. of n	No. of Councillors	Pct. of n	No. of Councillors	
A. Mystical Customary					
-Appease alekwu by levying fine in kind against me	-1.0	2			-1.0
-Warn me of con- sequences					-1.0
-Make me take oath of honesty					-1.0
-Advise elders to curse me	2.0	5	1.0	4	1.0
-Curse me	5.0	28	1.0	8	2.0
Total	7.0		2.0		3.0
B. Social Customary- Modern					
-Rebuke me	63.0	52	56.0	44	61.0
-Ostracize me	10.0	16	8.0	13	8.0
-Drive me away	2.0	12	1.0	2	1.0
Total	75.0		65.0		70.0
C. Modern Police- Judicial					
-Report me to NA Court President for dis- ciplining					-1.0
-Report me to NA Police for disciplining	1.0	7	3.0	9	1.0
-Sue me to Court	4.0	12			1.0
-Frameup charges to victimize me in Court					1.0
-Arrest me					-1.0
Total	5.0		3.0		3.0

TABLE 21--Continued (Case IV(A), IV(B), and Total--Continued)

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Case IV:				TOTAL (n=2410) Pct. of n
	A. Councillor and Clan Headship (n=584)		B. Councillor and District Headship (n=568)		
	Pct. of n	No. of Councillors	Pct. of n	No. of Councillors	
D. Modern Political- Administrative					
-Advise district head not to renominate me					-1.0
-Report me to district head for disciplining	1.0	3			-1.0
-Report me to NA for disciplining	1.0	1			-1.0
-Advise Council to report me to NA for disciplining					-1.0
-Refuse to elect me to any office	1.0	4	2.0	7	1.0
-Refuse to re-elect me	6.0	28	23.0	51	14.0
-Refuse to renominate me	1.0	4	1.0	4	2.0
-Refuse to support my motions in Council			-1.0	1	-1.0
-Campaign against my re-election	2.0	7	2.0	5	5.0
-Levy administrative fine against me					-1.0
-Dismiss me from Council			1.0	3	1.0
-Dismiss me from NA job					-1.0
Total	12.0		29.0		23.0

an refers to total number of sanctions anticipated in each situation.

^bNumber of councillors who anticipated each sanction (note: 62, 27, 47, 51, and 37 councillors perceived role conflict in Cases I, II, III, IV(A), and IV(B), respectively).

only one conflict situation. Interestingly, Idoma district councillors do not perceive customariness as an important factor in the application of sanction to specific situations. Thus, they identify the "curse" and "oath-taking" with the two least customary situations (Cases I and II). "Refusal to re-elect" is anticipated even in the most customary situation (Case III). Not unexpectedly, "rebuke" and "ostracism" cut across all situations whose customariness has been assessed.

Finally, it is noted that a single punitive-social sanction ("rebuke") accounts for 61% of the total. Discernible in the report on "rebuke" and "ostracism" is widespread anticipation of social customary-modern sanction in the event of deviant behavior. At the same time, there is only minimal recognition of the threat of mystical customary sanction. This intriguing finding supports the earlier observation that elders possessing a monopoly over the most potent punitive-social sanction in Idoma, the "curse," are generally disinclined to invoke it.⁹ Councillor comments reflect that conclusion. Thus, one group explained that deviant behavior in the five conflict situations was not sufficiently important to warrant invocation of that disastrous sanction: "Ubeke (Idoma: "white man") speaks only of small matters. The curse is for alekwu (Idoma: "ancestral matters")." Others emphasized its disruptive consequences for the entire community: "My people suffer fear when the elders

⁹See p. 51.

curse. The elders know that too much suffering is bad for all my people."

Examined next is the question of perceived audience involvement in punitive-social sanctioning. Reported in Table 22 is a summary of the sanctional distribution by audience. "Rebuke" and "ostracism" cut across nearly all audiences. To quote one facetious councillor: "Rebuke never ends. The Idoma man was born to rebuke." Of the other sanctions recurring in at least four situations, only "campaign against re-election" is identified with nearly as many audiences; "refusal to re-elect" and "refusal to renominate" are, of course, limited to village and district head-Native Authority audiences, respectively; other sanctions identified with district heads and the NA include campaigning against the re-election of a deviant councillor, his dismissal, arrest, or prosecution.¹⁰ Finally, three mystical customary sanctions are firmly in the hands of elders; a fourth, "advise the elders to curse," affirms the extent of gerontocratic control over the spiritual life of the community.

Sanction and Ambivalence

Analyzed in this section is the relationship between sanction and ambivalence experienced by Idoma district councillors. Before turning to the analysis, however, it is

¹⁰According to the Standing Orders, members of Idoma district councils may only be dismissed for persistent unwarranted absence from meetings. Many councillors are of the opinion that a hostile district head and/or NA can circumvent that rule by resorting to arrest and prosecution on false charges.

TABLE 22

SANCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY AUDIENCE

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Audience ^a									
	E	NE	TC	DGM	SSM	EC	NC	RC	DH	NA
A. <u>Mystical Customary</u>										
-Appease <u>alekwu</u> by levying fine in kind against me	X			X						
-Warn me of consequences		X			X					
-Make me take oath of honesty	X									
-Advise elders to curse me		X		X						
-Curse me	X									
B. <u>Social Customary-Modern</u>										
-Rebuke me	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
-Ostracize me	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
-Drive me away	X									
C. <u>Modern Police-Judicial</u>										
-Report me to NA Court President for disciplining	X	X	X							
-Report me to NA Police for disciplining		X	X							
-Sue me to Court	X	X	X						X	X
-Frameup charges to victimize me in Court									X	X
-Arrest me									X	X

TABLE 22--Continued

Sanction (Type and Individual)	Audience ^a									
	E	NE	TC	DGM	SSM	EC	NC	RC	DH	NA
D. Modern Political-Administrative										
-Advise district head not to renominate me					X		X	X		
-Report me to district head for disciplining			X			X	X	X		
-Report me to NA for disciplining	X	X	X			X	X	X		
-Advise Council to report me to NA for disciplining				X						
-Refuse to elect me to any office	X	X	X							
-Refuse to re-elect me	X	X	X							
-Refuse to renominate me	X	X	X							
-Refuse to support my motions in Council									X	X
-Campaign against my re-election					X					
-Levy administrative fine against me	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
-Dismiss me from Council									X	X
-Dismiss me from NA job										X

^aAudience letters denote the following: E (elders); NE (non-elders); TC (tax collectors); DGM (dance group members); SSM (secret society members); EC (elected councillors); NC (nominated councillors); RC (representative councillors); DH (district heads); NA (Native Authority).

necessary to explicate the manner in which the sanctional variable has been handled.

Beginning with the four basic sanctional types (numbers 1-4 below), it is possible to construct a universe comprising the following potential permutations:

- (1) mystical customary;
- (2) social customary-modern;
- (3) modern police-judicial;
- (4) modern political-administrative;
- (5) mystical customary, social customary-modern;
- (6) mystical customary, modern police-judicial;
- (7) mystical customary, modern political-administrative;
- (8) mystical customary, modern police-judicial, modern political-administrative;
- (9) mystical customary, social customary-modern, modern police-judicial;
- (10) mystical customary, social customary-modern, modern political-administrative;
- (11) mystical customary, social customary-modern, modern police-judicial, modern political-administrative;
- (12) social customary-modern, modern police-judicial;
- (13) social customary-modern, modern political-administrative;
- (14) social customary-modern, modern police-judicial, modern political-administrative;
- (15) modern police-judicial, modern political-administrative

By definition, perceived role conflict situations involve either (a) two identical permutations (denoting two obligatory roles); (b) two different permutations (denoting two obligatory roles); (c) one permutation (denoting one obligatory and one optional role); or (d) no permutations (denoting two optional roles). Presented in Table 23 is the distribution of categories (a), (b), (c), and (d) among 224 perceived role conflict situations. (Only permutations reported for those situations are included in the table. For example, the absence of identical permutations 15-15 indicates that no district councillor perceived a conflict situation in

TABLE 23

PERMUTATIONS OF SANCTIONAL TYPE IN PERCEIVED
CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Permutation	n ^a	Number of Situations
(a) <u>Two identical</u>		
2-2	33	5
4-4	2	2
13-13	23	4
(b) <u>Two different</u>		
2-5	6	2
2-10	4	1
2-11	1	1
2-12	4	3
2-13	23	4
2-14	4	3
2-15	1	1
4-10	1	1
4-13	1	1
13-10	16	3
13-11	2	2
13-14	5	3
(c) <u>One</u>		
1-# ^b	1	1
2-#	22	4
3-#	1	1
5-#	3	1
10-#	17	3
11-#	3	1
12-#	4	3
13-#	28	5
14-#	4	2
(d) <u>None</u>		
#-#	15	4

^an refers to the 224 perceived role conflict situations.

^b# indicates the presence of one optional role in the perceived conflict situation; ## indicates the presence of two optional roles in the perceived conflict situation.

which two obligatory roles were associated with modern police-judicial and modern political-administrative sanctions.)

Analysis of the relationship between sanction and ambivalence is based on categories (a) and (b), i.e., on situations involving two obligatory roles associated with either identical or different sanctional permutations.¹¹ Assuming a relationship in such situations between degree of ambivalence and the ability to discriminate between permutations based on sanctional type, the following is hypothesized: the district councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with two identical permutations will experience greater ambivalence than the district councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with two different permutations. For example, it is expected that the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with modern political-administrative sanctions (4-4) will experience greater ambivalence than the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with modern political-administrative and modern police-judicial sanctions (3-4). Stated otherwise, greater ambivalence is anticipated in situations involving permutations 2-2, 4-4 and 13-13 than in those involving 2-5, 2-10, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 4-10,

¹¹An analysis of the relationship between sanction and ambivalence could, of course, focus on differential potency in punitive-social sanction. It was not possible, however, for the researcher to obtain a systematic ranking of sanctions based on potency. Hence, the decision to utilize the alternative approach in this study.

4-13, 13-10, 13-11, and 13-14. Mean ambivalence scores presented in Table 24 (B) support the hypothesis.¹²

TABLE 24
PERMUTATIONS OF SANCTIONAL TYPE AND
DEGREE OF AMBIVALENCE
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Degree of Ambivalence	Permutation			
	(a) Two identical 2-2, 4-4, 13-13	(b) Two different 2-5, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 4-10, 4-13, 13-10, 13-11, 13-14		
	(n=58) ^a		(n=68)	
	n	Pct.	n	Pct.
A.				
Very Much	16	28	10	15
Some	31	53	26	38
None	11	19	32	47
B.				
Mean Ambivalence ^b	2.08		1.67	

^an refers to the number of perceived role conflict situations in categories (a) and (b).

^bAmbivalence scale includes 1.00 (no ambivalence); 2.00 (some ambivalence); 3.00 (very much ambivalence)

A more discriminating view of the relationship between differential sanctional permutation and degree of ambivalence

¹²Not unexpectedly, mean ambivalence scores for (c) and (d) are lower than those for (a) and (b): (a) 2.08; (b) 1.67; (c) 1.27; and (d) 1.33. Greater ambivalence is anticipated in situations involving choice among obligatory (i.e., sanctionable) behavioral alternatives.

may be gleaned from Table 24 (A). (Differences are significant at $p < .005$).¹³ In sum, the ability to discriminate between permutations based on sanctional type is directly related to the degree of ambivalence engendered by the perceived conflict situation. Councillors who perceive conflict between roles associated with identical permutations based on sanctional type experience greater ambivalence than councillors who perceive conflict between roles associated with different permutations.

Legitimacy, Obligation, and Prediction
of Role Conflict Resolution

Factors potentially relevant to the resolution of role conflict were examined in Chapter II.¹⁴ As a case in point, it was hypothesized that the actor confronting role conflict will have a need disposition to fulfill the expectation which he evaluates as more legitimate.¹⁵ Having in this study focused upon two dimensions of role (legitimacy and obligation), it remains to examine their relationship to conflict resolution.¹⁶ It is hypothesized that the district councillor confronting a conflict situation is more likely to select

¹³A 3 x 2 contingency table was constructed with the data in Table 24 (A). A chi-square statistic was then computed.

¹⁴See pp. 50-52.

¹⁵See p. 52.

¹⁶The analysis is again limited to obligation per se; it is not intended to encompass the sanctional dimension of obligation.

as the major role to be fulfilled that which he perceives as more legitimate and/or obligatory.

The analysis of the relationship between legitimacy, obligation, and resolution is based upon the following operational definitions: "degree of legitimacy and/or obligation" is represented by the total number of times in a conflict situation that a district councillor evaluates an audience expectation as legitimate and/or obligatory. For example, the bureaucratic role in Case I ("expect me to advise the district head to sign a payment voucher") will be construed as more legitimate if a district councillor has indicated that more audiences rightfully hold it than the alternative debureaucratic role ("expect me to advise the district head not to sign a payment voucher"); analogously, the bureaucratic role in Case I will be construed as more obligatory if a district councillor has indicated that more audiences would insist on fulfillment of it than the alternative debureaucratic role. More legitimate and more obligatory roles need not, of course, coincide.

At this juncture, a caveat ought to be observed: operational definitions predicate distinction between audiences in the majority and those in the minority. The analysis does not encompass number and/or size of audiences in either. Thus, the majority in Case I could range from (1) five audiences (elders--non-elders--tax collectors--elected councillors--nominated councillors versus a representative councillor--district head--Native Authority minority) to (2)

seven audiences (elders--non-elders--tax collectors--elected councillors--nominated councillors--representative councillors--district head versus a Native Authority minority). Moreover, "degree of obligation" is not synonymous with number and/or type and/or potency of sanctions anticipated in the event of deviant behavior. To cite an example: the Native Authority audience identified with the bureaucratic role in Case I may constitute a minority vis-a-vis village and conciliar-administrative groups identified with the debureaucratic role. A district councillor may perceive both roles as legitimate (rightful) and obligatory (backed by punitive-social sanction). In that event, the councillor may opt to fulfill the role of a more threatening Native Authority minority.¹⁷ Notwithstanding, the predictive model is based on the assumption that behavior of the focal actor in a conflict situation is related to his ability to discriminate between majority and minority audiences when both are identified with obligation per se.

Reported situationally in Table 25 are (1) the proportionate incidence of correct predictions of conflict resolution (i.e., major role) from legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined; (2) the proportionate incidence expected by chance alone; (3) the level of association (measured by the phi coefficient) between major role selected and

¹⁷In such circumstances, feelings of threat could be engendered by fear of particular punitive-social sanctions, persistence of the audience, and so forth.

TABLE 25

PROPORTIONATE INCIDENCE OF CORRECT PREDICTIONS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (i.e., MAJOR ROLE) FROM LEGITIMACY AND
OBLIGATION, SINGLY AND COMBINED

Bases for Prediction	Case and Conflict Situation						TOTAL
	Case I: Councilor as advisor	Case II: Councilor as cam- paigner	Case III: Councilor as partic- ipant	Case IV: Council- lor and clan headship	B. Council- lor and district headship		
<u>Legitimacy</u>							
-n	59	24	41	51	37		212
-Proportion predicted correctly	.983	.875	.975	.902	.892		.934
-Chance expectancy	.583	.516	.556	.506	.800		.501
-Observed phi	.918	.770	.946	.767	.543		.876
-Significance level	p<.001	p<.001	p<.005	p<.001	p<.03	p<.001	p<.001
<u>Obligation</u>							
-n	58	19	35	49	36		197
-Proportion predicted correctly	.965	.842	1.000	.979	1.000		.969
-Chance expectancy	.558	.631	.558	.510	.894		.499

TABLE 25--Continued

Bases for Prediction	Case and Conflict Situation					
	Case I: Councillor as advisor	Case II: Councillor as cam- paigner	Case III: Councillor as partic- ipant	Case IV: A. Council- lor and clan headship	B. Council- lor and district headship	TOTAL
-Observed phi	.810	.639	1.000	.870	1.000	.930
-Significance level	p<.001	p<.03	p<.001	p<.001	p<.005	p<.001
<u>Legitimacy- Obligation</u>						
-n	55	17	30	45	33	180
-Proportion predicted correctly	.982	.941	1.000	.978	1.000	.983
-Chance expectancy Observed phi	.502	.670	.606	.502	.885	.500
-Significance level	.957	.829	1.000	.909	1.000	.956
	p<.005	p<.03	p<.001	p<.001	p<.005	p<.001

an refers to the number of predictions made on the basis of differential legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined; the three total n's in the table (212, 197, and 180) represent 95%, 88%, and 80%, respectively, of the 224 perceived conflict situations.

degree of legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined; and (4) the level of significance for the phi coefficients.¹⁸

Evident in Table 25 is a uniformly high proportion of correct predictions of role conflict resolution from legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined. The proportion of correct predictions is in all cases significantly beyond chance expectancy. Finally, observed phi coefficients indicate highly significant levels of association between selection of the major role and degree of legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined.¹⁹

¹⁸A 2 x 2 contingency table was generated for Actual Bureaucratic and Debureaucratic Resolution and Predicted Bureaucratic and Debureaucratic Resolution.

		<u>Predicted Resolution</u>		
		<u>Debureaucratic</u>	<u>Bureaucratic</u>	
Actual Resolution	Debureau- cratic	A	B	A+B
	Bureau- cratic	C	D	C+D
		A+C	B+D	n=E

The proportion of correct predictions was obtained by computing $\frac{A+D}{E}$; the proportion expected by chance was obtained

by computing
$$\frac{\frac{A+B}{E} \times \frac{A+C}{E} + \frac{C+D}{E} \times \frac{B+D}{E}}{E}$$

¹⁹By merely inspecting the observed phi-coefficients it is possible to evaluate the high levels of association. Hence, the decision to omit comparison with maximal phi-coefficients.

In sum, a model based on operationalized dimensions of role has in this study facilitated the prediction of conflict resolution by Idoma district councillors. A more definitive evaluation of its predictive utility must, however, await subsequent cross-validation.²⁰ Suffice it merely to indicate that, notwithstanding significant relationships between legitimacy, obligation, and resolution, the utility of the model is stringently limited by its assumption of (1) differences in the degree of legitimacy and/or obligation and (2) selection of the major role as exclusive resolution technique; the predictive model has not been constructed for situations involving contradictory legitimate and/or obligatory roles associated with an equal number of audiences. Neither is it equipped to treat resolution involving techniques other than fulfillment of a given behavioral alternative. Necessitating a more comprehensive model are predictions from equal legitimacy and/or obligation to, for example, conflict resolution involving withdrawal or compromise.²¹

²⁰Partial validation of the model may be found in Howard J. Ehrlich, The Analysis of Role Conflicts in Complex Organization: The Police (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1959), p. 53ff.

²¹A predictive model that is more sensitive to those behavioral alternatives may be found in Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency (New York: John Wiley, 1958), p. 281ff.

A Note on Multidimensionalism and Role Buffering
in Conflict Resolution

Probes of the interview population during Phase I of the field operation elicited the following typical comments on relationships between district councillor, district head, and village and Native Authority audiences:

A chief (i.e., district head) is a father. Does a father cheat his children?

The NA steals from the people. The chief is an 'NA man.'
We are elected to tell the chief. He does not hear us.

Our chief hears only the white man and his Native Authority.

My people fear the chief. My people blame me when it is och'ubeke (Idoma: "chief of the white man" or district head) who does not hear them.

Is it right that I should suffer when the chief hears only the white man (i.e., central NA) in Oturkpo?

An intriguing buffer structure in councillor-audience role relationships was suggested by (1) the incompatible behavioral norms established under the Native Authority Law of 1954²² and (2) the widespread protest against chiefly power, NA centralization, and councillor deprivation. To facilitate analysis of that structure, a multi-situational approach was adopted for Case I.²³

Comparing responses in the three situations, differences are noted in the extent to which district councillors perceived themselves and district heads as confronting

²²See pp. 141-142.

²³See pp. 141-159.

contradictory expectations. Only seven councillors (10%) perceived their district head as confronting role conflict in situation A (involving role alternatives "to or not to ask the council for advice on whether to sign a payment voucher"). All subjects anticipated district head fulfillment of the former role. This datum further indicates perceived widespread expectation of council involvement in the disbursement of district funds.²⁴

Turning to situation B (involving role alternatives "to advise the district head to or not to sign a payment voucher"), it is noted that sixty-two councillors (87%) perceived themselves as confronting role conflict. In contrast, only forty-five councillors (63%) perceived their district head as confronting role conflict in situation C (involving role alternatives "to or not to sign a payment voucher"). In sum, Idoma district councillors were more inclined in Case I to associate bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict with their own focal position than that of the district head. Moreover, occupants of the district head position were more closely identified with NA-prescribed bureaucratic behavior. Among the forty-five councillors who perceived role conflict in situation C, 78% anticipated district head fulfillment of the bureaucratic role; only 29% of the sixty-two councillors who perceived role conflict in situation B were prepared to advise such behavior. Bases for the tendency to associate district heads with

²⁴See pp. 143-148.

bureaucratic behavior may be gleaned from the following comparative analysis of legitimacy and obligation in situations B and C.

Table 26 includes phi-coefficients representing the extent of association between legitimacy and obligation in situations B and C. Reported in the table are relatively inconstant, highly significant correlations between the two dimensions of role. These indicate a greater tendency toward grouping of legitimate-obligatory and illegitimate-optional expectations in situation B. Stated otherwise, in perceived conflict and consensual situations involving legitimate expectations, Idoma district councillors are more prone to anticipate punitive-social sanctioning of their own deviant behavior than that of the district head. That observation is underscored by the situational distribution of legitimacy-obligation permutations in Table 27. Legitimate-obligatory expectations comprise 67% of the total perceived held by audiences in the situation involving councillor behavior (B); in contrast, legitimate-obligatory expectations comprise only 23% of the total perceived held by audiences in the situation involving district head behavior (C). Evident also in Table 27 is an overall disparity in the distribution of obligatory (i.e., punitively-sanctionable) expectations between the two situations. Thus, 70% and 33% of the total in situations B and C, respectively, indicate roles backed by punitive-social sanction. To recapitulate, vis-a-vis district heads Idoma councillors are more inclined to perceive themselves as threatened by punishment in the event of deviant behavior.

TABLE 26

CORRELATES FOR LEGITIMACY AND OBLIGATION
IN SITUATIONS B AND C OF CASE I

Situation	n ^a	Observed phi	Maximal phi	Significance level
<u>B</u> . Councillor as advisor	432	.419	.657	p<.001
<u>C</u> . District Head as signatory	343	.162	.703	p<.001

^an refers to the number of legitimate-obligatory, legitimate-optional, illegitimate-obligatory, and illegitimate-optional responses for audiences in perceived conflict and consensual situations.

TABLE 27

PROPORTIONATE INCIDENCE OF LEGITIMACY-OBLIGATION
PERMUTATIONS IN SITUATIONS B AND C OF CASE I
(IN PERCENTAGES)

Situation	n ^a	Legiti- mate-Ob- ligatory	Legiti- mate- Optional	Illegiti- mate-Ob- ligatory	Illegiti- mate- Optional
<u>B</u> . Councillor as advisor	432	67	19	3	11
<u>C</u> . District Head as signatory	343	23	55	10	11

^an refers to the number of legitimate-obligatory, legitimate-optional, illegitimate-obligatory, and illegitimate-optional responses for audiences in perceived conflict and consensual situations.

The analyses have so far focused on a general tendency of councillors to associate punishment with their own deviant behavior. A more intensive analysis is provided by a report on obligatory roles perceived held by specific audiences in situations B and C. The extent to which individual audiences are identified with sanctionable roles in the two perceived conflict situations may be seen in Table 28. Noted in the table is a tendency toward polar distribution of obligatory expectations. On the one hand, obligatory roles are associated with village and conciliar-administrative audiences by at least three-fourths of the councillors in situation B; on the other, obligatory roles are associated with those audiences by fewer than one-third of the councillors in situation C. It is evident that councillors analyzed are more prone to anticipate village and conciliar-administrative sanctioning of their own deviant behavior than that of the district head. At the same time, councillors tend to perceive the Native Authority audience as peculiarly less inclined to sanction the district councillor for deviant behavior than the district head.

Implications of the foregoing analyses for role buffering may be gleaned from the diagrammatic summary in Figure 2.


TABLE 28

INCIDENCE OF COUNCILLORS WHO IDENTIFIED AUDIENCES
WITH OBLIGATORY EXPECTATIONS IN PERCEIVED CONFLICT
SITUATIONS B AND C OF CASE I (IN PERCENTAGES)

Audience	<u>B. Councillor</u> <u>as advisor</u>		<u>C. District Head</u> <u>as signatory</u>	
	n ^a	Pct.	n	Pct.
Elders	29	100	29	17
Non-Elders	30	87	28	18
Tax Collectors	39	86	35	9
Elected Councillors	33	100	29	31
Nominated Councillors	51	80	33	27
Representative Councillors	61	75	45	31
Native Authority	60	33	45	80

^an refers to the number of councillors who identified audiences with bureaucratic or debureaucratic roles in the two perceived conflict situations; perceived "no expectation" and intra-audience conflict (bureaucratic/debureaucratic) are not presented in the table.

Fig. 3.--Obligation-Sanction and Direction of Conflict Resolution in Situations B and C of Case I.



NOTE: "more" (+); "less" (-); bureaucratic (B); debureaucratic (D).

Focusing on direction of conflict resolution at the right, it is noted that district heads and district councillors are perceived as inclining more toward bureaucratic and debureaucratic behavior, respectively. At the left, obligation-sanction traverses identical paths, albeit in opposite directions. Thus, both actors tend to be perceived as responding to audiences more inclined to sanction their deviant behavior: district head-to-Native Authority, district councillor-to-village and conciliar-administrative audiences. Significantly, reciprocal orientation of actor and audience[s] is in both cases spatially-defined; each actor tends to be more sensitive to his most proximate audience and vice versa.²⁵ As a result, each tends to stand between the other and the latter's least proximate audience: district head between Native Authority and district councillor, district councillor between district head and village and conciliar-administrative audiences. Both district councillors and district heads now operate as protective role buffers in the following manner: By absorbing the sanctions of their most proximate audience, district heads insulate district councillors from the Native Authority. Similarly, district councillors absorb the sanctions which village and conciliar-administrative audiences might otherwise direct to occupants of the chiefly position. In sum, role buffering

²⁵An analogue of the most proximate audience may be found in the discussion of observability in Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961), p. 374ff.

mitigates role conflict by insulating both actors from the threat of hierarchically-organized inter-audience sanction.²⁶ Relieved of that threat, councillors and district heads are able to conform to the expectation of audiences more inclined to sanction their deviant behavior.

Ironically, it is the role buffer palliative which generates councillor outcry against chiefly power, Native Authority centralization, and personal deprivation. By executing agent roles on behalf of the NA, bureaucratically-responsive district heads identify more closely with the local government establishment in Idoma Division; at the same time, superordinates in the NA identify with these district officeholders. To quote one district head addressing a belligerent council: "I am oche (Idoma: "chief"). You who do not like me, take me to the NA!" Thus, a consequence of this symbiosis has been the growth of chiefly power and centralized authority at the expense of generally outraged but frustrated district councillors. One source of that frustration is reflected in the report on conflict resolution in Case I: 78% of the forty-five councillors who would advise the district head not to sign a payment voucher (situation B) indicate that the latter would nevertheless sign

²⁶Notwithstanding obvious inter-positional structuring, the researcher has termed the phenomenon "role buffering." The decision was taken in order to emphasize the sanctional dimension of buffering. Sanction is, of course, a dimension of role rather than position in the social structure.

(situation C).²⁷ Further evidence of village and conciliar inefficacy vis-a-vis chiefly power is reflected in the analysis of obligation in situation C (Table 28).

Consequences of "institutional engineering" for Idoma constitutionalism have been examined elsewhere.²⁸ What, however, of the consequences for councillors protected by a role buffer? If one dimension of their personal deprivation is inefficacy vis-a-vis district heads and the NA,²⁹ another is the omnipresent threat of village and conciliar-administrative sanction. Already there is evidence of that threat having been translated into action against councillors identified with district head and NA interests.³⁰ Should those frustrated audiences--especially elders apprehensive of councillor role re-orientation³¹--continue to displace their hostility upon equally inefficacious district councillors, we may expect to hear from the latter more of the rhetorical lament, "Is it right that I should suffer when the chief hears only the white man in Oturkpo?"

²⁷Not unexpectedly, articulation of hostility to the growth of chiefly power and centralized authority was most evident in this group.

²⁸See pp. 114-115, 122-123, 134-138.

²⁹See pp. 155, 157, 244.

³⁰"Stranger" and NA-nominated councillors have on occasion been rebuked and even ostracized for alleged identification with district head and NA interests. See pp. 79, 144, 147.

³¹See pp. 159, 205-206.

PART V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Chapter IX: Summary and Conclusions

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In an earlier chapter,¹ the researcher concluded that role theory will earn a place with social science theory only when it sheds vestiges of conceptual ambiguity and embraces a corpus of testable and tested generalizations. The latter deficiency has been evident in studies of role conflict problems confronting African chieftaincy and local leadership. Students of African political behavior have tended merely to identify what this researcher has termed the "objective conflict situation." The purpose of this research has been to consider the possibility that more intensive and theoretically significant analyses of role conflict problems might result from the examination of such dimensions as legitimacy, obligation, sanction, ambivalence, and resolution.

The specific objectives of the study have been (1) to examine diverse sources of, and the Idoma district councillors' perceptual responses to, potential conflict situations and (2) to analyze relationships between dimensions noted above and the problem of conflict management confronting those officeholders.

¹See pp. 26-29.

A semi-structured instrument was constructed to elicit both demographic and role data. The field operation was executed in two phases. During Phase I, demographic data was collected from the eighty-nine councillors in five districts of northern and central Idoma Division (Benue Province, Northern Nigeria). Phase II involved the collection of data on campaigning in district council elections, role perception, ambivalence, and conflict resolution. Because of circumstances beyond the control of the researcher, this phase of the field operation was terminated prior to the scheduled date. As a result, it was necessary to reduce the interview population to seventy-one. The analysis is based on role data collected from the seventy-one councillors interviewed in both phases. Findings of the study are summarized below. Suggestions for future research follow that summary.

Research Findings

In the "culturally mixed"² dual society, antagonistic forces are in a state of dynamic interrelationship. Predispositions to rational-legal behavior may be found in structures not pre-eminently committed to the bureaucratic ethos. Similarly, non-bureaucratic behavior is encountered in structures committed to that ethos. One manifestation of antagonistic tendencies in an organizational context is

²Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 20-25.

"bureaucratization-debureaucratization."³ On the one hand, there is the extension of bureaucracy's activity and power in the direction of greater social regimentation and, on the other, resistance to that development.

It is possible to construe Idoma as a "culturally mixed" dual society in which both alien and indigenous elements produce bureaucratic-debureaucratic role conflict. Potential conflict situations reflecting both sources of bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension have been utilized in the analysis. These situations originated in schemes for local government reform (Cases I and IV), attitudes toward political party activity at the local level (Case II), and community tension generated by secret societies and dance groups (Case III).

I. Role Perception and the Objective Conflict Situation.

A. The Idoma district councillor interacts with audiences which form the following administrative pyramid: village base (elders, non-elders, tax collectors); intermediate conciliar-administrative levels (elected councillors, nominated councillors, representative councillors, district head); and pinnacle (Native Authority or local government establishment in Idoma Division).

B. Cases I, II, and IV reveal a relationship between the proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role

³S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, v. 4 (December 1959), p. 312.

and location of audiences on the administrative pyramid. The proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role increases in the ascent from base to pinnacle.

C. Potential conflict situations in Cases I, II, and III have been ordered for customariness. The least customary situation is that involving political party activity at the local level (Case III), the most customary that involving secret society and dance group activity (Case II).

D. The proportionate incidence of perceived bureaucratic role varies inversely with the degree of customariness of the conflict situation.

E. The proportionate incidence of perceived "no expectation" among village and conciliar-administrative audiences is related to the degree of customariness of the conflict situation. (1) Its report for village audiences increases in less customary and decreases in more customary situations. (2) The converse holds for conciliar-administrative audiences.

II. Role Conflict: Perception, Ambivalence, Resolution.

F. Analyses of the proportionate incidence of role conflict and ambivalence revealed significant differences between situations, not districts. Accordingly, the situation was utilized as an independent variable in analyses of role conflict and ambivalence.

G. Fewer than the total number of district councillors perceived role conflict in each of the five objective or potential conflict situations. Sixty-three percent of the

observations indicated perception of role conflict, which suggests that previous observers may have exaggerated the extent to which African chiefs and local leaders are aware of objective role conflict.

H. A higher proportionate incidence of intra- than inter-audience role conflict has been noted. That finding reflects considerable bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension within as well as between audiences. This is especially the case at the village level in Idoma.

I. Ambivalence or difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives has been construed as subjectively-experienced role conflict. Fewer than the total number of district councillors who perceived conflict in each of the five potential situations experienced ambivalence. Only 48% of the 107 observations indicating perceived role conflict involved difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives. A three-point scale indicating no, some, and very much ambivalence was constructed. Seventy-three percent of the responses indicating ambivalence involved only some difficulty in choosing a behavioral alternative. These findings suggest that previous observers may have exaggerated the degree to which African chiefs and local leaders experience role conflict.

J. An association between customariness of the conflict situation and differential ambivalence was found in Cases I, II, and III. Greater mean ambivalence was associated with greater customariness of the conflict situation.

K. A tendency toward debureaucratic resolution was noted in four conflict situations. An exception in the situation involving selection of a district head (Case IV) reflects the councillor's immediate political interest in leadership succession at the district level.

L. At the same time, a significant relationship between direction of resolution and degree of ambivalence was manifest. Greater ambivalence was associated with a higher proportionate incidence of bureaucratic resolution.

M. There is a more significant relationship between bureaucratic direction of resolution and degree of intensity within the lower range (no-some ambivalence) of the three-point scale. Differential intensity within the upper range (some-very much ambivalence) was less significantly related to that direction of resolution.

III. Multidimensionalism in Conflict Resolution.

N. Analysis of the responses on legitimacy and obligation revealed a relatively uniform, highly significant relationship between the two. This finding indicates a persistent tendency toward grouping of legitimate-obligatory and illegitimate-optional expectations. The data suggest that Idoma district councillors are more inclined to anticipate punitive-social sanction in the event of non-conformance with perceived legitimate than perceived illegitimate expectations. Moreover, the data reflect widespread perception of punitive-social sanction in councillor-audience role relationships.

O. District councillors experience greater ambivalence in conflict situations involving two legitimate and/or obligatory expectations than in those involving a single legitimate and/or obligatory expectation.

P. However, sets of legitimate roles and sets of obligatory roles contribute differentially to ambivalence. The researcher noted a striking anomaly in the relationships between single and dual legitimacy, on the one hand, and single and dual obligation, on the other. Contrary to the hypothesis, duality was associated with greater ambivalence in the case of obligation alone. The available data did not provide an explanation for the anomaly. The narrow differential between mean ambivalence scores for single and dual legitimacy indicated a need to re-test the hypothesis.

Q. District councillors are less troubled by the need to choose between contradictory roles of a legitimate than those of an obligatory character. This finding was attributed (1) to widespread perception of punitive-social sanction in councillor-audience role relationships and (2) to councillor reliance on the resolution technique involving selection of a major role. Reliance on that technique virtually ensures punishment of the deviant councillor. In that circumstance, greater ambivalence is likely to be associated with a need to mitigate the effects of inevitable punishment.

R. The researcher constructed a tentative typology of punitive-social sanctions based on two criteria: content

and chronology. Four categories were generated: (1) mystical customary; (2) social customary-modern; (3) modern police-judicial; and (4) modern political-administrative. Twenty-five sanctions associated with perceived role conflict were identified.

S. There is no correlation between customariness of the conflict situation and sanctional type. Sanctions in the four categories cut across situations which vary in customariness. For example, the "curse" and "oath-taking" (mystical customary) have been identified with the two least customary situations (Cases I and II). "Refusal to re-elect" (modern political-administrative) is anticipated even in the most customary situation (Case III). "Rebuke" and "ostracism" (social customary-modern) cut across all situations whose customariness has been assessed.

T. While some sanctions are associated with specific audiences, others cut across audiences. For example, the "curse" is monopolized by the elders. In contrast, all audiences are identified with "rebuke."

U. The councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with identical permutations based on sanctional type experiences greater ambivalence than the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with different permutations. For example, the councillor who perceives conflict between roles associated with mystical customary sanctions is likely to experience greater difficulty in choosing among given behavioral alternatives than the one who

perceives conflict between roles associated with mystical customary and social customary-modern sanctions.

V. It was hypothesized that the district councillor confronting a conflict situation is more likely to select as the role to be fulfilled that which he perceives as more legitimate and/or obligatory. A predictive model was constructed to test the hypothesis. A high proportion of correct predictions of conflict resolution (i.e., major role) was made from legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined. In all cases, prediction was significantly beyond chance. Moreover, the researcher noted a highly significant association between selection of the major role and degree of legitimacy and obligation, singly and combined.

W. However, the following assumptions placed stringent limitations on the utility of the predictive model: (1) differential legitimacy and/or obligation and (2) selection of the major role as exclusive resolution technique. Necessitating a more refined model are predictions from equal legitimacy and/or obligation to, for example, conflict resolution involving techniques such as withdrawal or compromise.

X. Examination of the implications of multidimensional role for conflict resolution revealed a buffer structure in Case I. District heads and councillors are perceived as responding to their most proximate audiences: the former bureaucratically to the Native Authority, the latter debureaucratically to village and conciliar-administrative audiences. The two actors operate as role buffers by absorbing

the sanctions of their most proximate audience[s]. Thus, role buffering mitigates role conflict by insulating the district head and councillor from the threat of hierarchically-organized inter-audience sanction. The two are now able to conform to the expectation of proximate audiences more inclined to sanction their deviant behavior.

Y. At the same time, the role buffer generates councillor outcry against chiefly power, Native Authority centralization, and councillor deprivation. Growth of chiefly power and centralization is traceable to the colonial "institutional engineering" that subverted bases of Idoma constitutionalism. Councillors are outraged but inefficacious vis-a-vis district heads and the NA. There is evidence that similarly outraged and inefficacious village and conciliar-administrative audiences displace their hostility on the district councillor. Protected from the NA by a role buffer, the councillor is at the same time vulnerable to the sanctions of frustrated village and conciliar-administrative audiences.

Suggested Research

Idoma has undergone nearly five decades of institutional change in the direction of strong chieftaincy and centralized authority. The analysis of role buffering indicated that considerable bureaucratic-debureaucratic tension has accompanied that change even in contemporary Idoma. This tension reflects, in turn, the lag between institutional

and normative change since early in the colonial era.⁴

"Culturally mixed" dual societies such as Idoma afford an opportunity to study the on-going process of institutional-normative adjustment. Its examination may be facilitated by longitudinal analyses of role, conflict, and resolution. For example, longitudinal research in Idoma may produce evidence of an increasing incidence of bureaucratic role perception and conflict resolution. Such data could be utilized in the construction of indices designed to measure (1) the rate at which traditional structures (i.e., bases for more customary role conflict) erode and (2) the rate at which institutional-normative change in the direction of bureaucratic centralization and social regimentation occurs.

The role analyst is committed to the development of what Almond has termed "a probabilistic theory of the polity."⁵ Development of such theory requires greater refinement in empirical research. That need is especially evident in the construction of predictive models. The researcher has already examined limitations of a model that measures "degree of legitimacy and/or obligation" by the total number of times in a conflict situation that an actor evaluates an audience expectation as legitimate and/or obligatory. By treating the two dimensions dichotomously (legitimate-illegitimate, obligatory-optional), he has courted the

⁴See pp. 98-101, 137-138.

⁵Almond and Coleman, eds., op. cit., pp. 58-64.

dilemma of equal legitimacy and/or obligation. Can more refined models be constructed and the risk of that dilemma be lessened? A polychotomous approach analogous to that adopted in the ambivalence scale commends itself. Auguring greater refinement and predictability are continuous variable responses to the questions, "How much right do the elders have to expect you to ____?" and "How much would the elders insist that you do as expected?" Other potentially useful models may be based on (1) punitive-social sanctions ranked for potency and (2) audiences more frequently associated with behavioral alternatives selected by actors who perceive role conflict.

This study focuses on the more readily identifiable punitive sanctions originating in audience populations and directed toward occupants of the councillor position. The following are excluded from the analysis: (1) punitive-personal sanctions originating in and directed toward ego; (2) remunerative-personal sanctions originating in and directed toward ego; and (3) remunerative-social sanctions originating in alter[s] and directed toward ego. The following comments of Idoma district councillors indicate that those sanctions are operative: "I must follow the elders. Could I sleep well if I disobeyed the elders?" (punitive-personal) "Oche (Idoma: "district head") is a bad man. I know that I am a good man when I obey only my people." (remunerative-personal) "The NA steals from my people. My people respect me for hearing them and not the NA." (remunerative-social)

While the relative importance of those sanctions cannot be assessed in this study, their presence does raise several intriguing questions. To what extent do remunerative sanctions account for orientation to the most proximate audience[s] in role buffer situations? Do types of remunerative sanctions originate in particular audiences? Are least proximate audiences able to transmit remunerative sanctions? Do types of remunerative sanctions correlate with customariness of the conflict situation? Do punitive-social and punitive-personal sanctions operate independently? Or do the former engender the latter? Answers to these questions await empirical investigation of the more inclusive sanctional typology.

Perhaps the most theoretically significant finding of the study was role buffering in conflict resolution. Buffering has been identified in a single conflict case (I) manifesting a comparatively high degree of customariness. That finding generates many questions. Does it cut across conflict situations varying in customariness? Are members of one audience more likely than those of another to absorb sanctions which might otherwise be directed at the councillor? Is the insulating agent necessarily animate? Might the "living" ancestors operate as a buffer? To what extent does role buffering operate within audiences? There is evidence, for example, that individual elders absorb the sanctions of other elders in order to protect district councillors. To quote one relieved subject: "My uncle, the senior elder,

has often protected me from angry elders when I supported the district head. They rebuke my uncle, but they still esteem him. They will re-elect me because he supports me." Future researchers may ascertain the boundaries within which role buffering operates to mitigate role conflict.

Finally, it would be useful to extend role investigations to audiences interacting with occupants of the focal position; the time factor precluded such extension to this study. By interviewing members of audience populations it is possible to ascertain the extent of agreement on role, legitimacy, obligation, and sanction in a given community. A low degree of consensus would suggest a highly unstable, malintegrated social system; the converse would be suggested by a high degree of consensus. Intensive longitudinal analysis of focal and audience responses would facilitate evaluation of factors contributing to, and/or subverting, the stable integration of local African systems.

These questions represent an attempt to "call our attention to the 'real forces' in political processes."⁶ Future researchers may develop the instruments to facilitate intensive analysis of those forces in Africa and elsewhere. When such analysis is undertaken, role will be tested as a component of scientific theory.

⁶Harry Eckstein, "Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups," Comparative Politics: A Reader Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), p. 393.

APPENDIX

Interview Schedule

Phase I

Questions:

- 1-
122. These questions were designed to elicit data on age, genealogy, religion, education, literacy, exposure to mass media (radio and press), travel, occupational experience, and political and governmental experience.
123. Do you think that candidates for seats on the Council should campaign as members or supporters of political parties?
- Yes___ No___ Why?
124. Do you think the time will come when candidates for seats on the Council will campaign as members or supporters of political parties?
- Yes___ When?___ No___ Don't know___
125. Of which of the following political parties are you a member or supporter?
- NPC___ AG___ NCNC___ UMBC___ Other___ None___
- Supporter___ Member___
126. Are you now or have you ever been an officer in that party?
- Now___ Office___ Salaried___ Unsalariated___
- Before___ Office___ Salaried___ Unsalariated___
- Never an officer___
- Never a member___

Phase II

CASE I: COUNCIL HALL

Several weeks ago, I received a letter from my friend in Wukari Division. He told me about a problem involving a District Council in Wukari Division. After telling me the problem, he asked how the District Councillors and people of Idoma Division would have dealt with it. I wrote to him that I did not know, but that I would be willing to ask the Idoma District Councillors how they would have dealt with such a problem in their own Districts.

The Wukari NA had entered into an agreement with a contractor who was to build a District Council Hall. The contractor had agreed to build the Hall for £450 and was paid the £450 immediately from the District Council Fund. After completing the building, except for the roof and plastering, the contractor realized that he had incorrectly estimated the cost involved. He now reported to the Wukari NA and the District Council involved that what he had so far built had cost him £500. He told the NA that unless the District Council agreed to pay him £50 for work already completed, plus another £100 for the roof and plastering, that he would not complete the building. In other words, he wanted £600 to build the Council Hall rather than his original estimate of £450, which he had already been paid.

When the District Council told the District Head (DH) that he must not sign the payment voucher for £150, the NA insisted that the voucher must be signed by the District Head, who is a salaried agent of the NA.

I have just recieved another letter from my friend telling me that the payment voucher for £150 has not yet been signed.

Could you tell me how the following people would have felt about this problem had your Council been involved?

Audiences: Elders, Non-Elders, Tax Collectors, Elected Councillors, Nominated Councillors, Representative Councillors, Native Authority

Council Involvement in Disbursement of Funds

Questions:

127. Expect DH to ask the Council for advice on whether to sign the payment voucher;

Expect DH not to ask the Council for advice on whether to sign the payment voucher;

No expectation in this situation.

Questions:

128. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect the DH (to) (not to) ask the Council for advice on whether to sign the payment voucher?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

129. Would the _____ insist that the DH (ask the council for advice) (not ask the council for advice) on whether to sign a payment voucher?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

130. What would the _____ do if the DH did not behave as expected?

131. If this problem had arisen in your District, do you think that your DH would have asked the Council for advice on whether to sign the payment voucher?

Yes _____ No _____ Why? _____ Don't know _____

Councillor as Advisor

132. Expect you as a Councillor to advise the DH to sign the payment voucher;

Expect you as a Councillor to advise the DH not to sign the payment voucher;

No expectation in this situation.

133. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect you as a Councillor to advise the DH (to) (not to) sign the payment voucher?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

134. Would the _____ insist that you as a Councillor advise the DH (to) (not to) sign the payment voucher?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

NOTE: Add District Head audience to this situation.

For perceivers of role conflict:

135. Would this conflict trouble you?

Yes _____ How much? Very Much _____ Some _____ No _____

136. What would you do in this situation?

Questions:

137. How many members of your Council do you think would have advised your DH to sign the payment voucher?

All _____ Majority _____ Minority _____ Why? _____
None _____

District Head as Signatory

138. Expect the DH to sign the payment voucher;

Expect the DH not to sign the payment voucher;

No expectation in this situation.

139. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect the DH (to) (not to) sign the payment voucher?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

140. Would the _____ insist that the DH (sign) (not sign) the payment voucher?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

141. What would _____ do if the DH did not behave as expected?

142. If this problem had arisen in your District, do you think that your DH would have signed the payment voucher?

Yes _____ No _____ Why? _____

Don't know _____

Case II: POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITY

Councillor as Campaigner

People in Idoma Division have told me that the District Councillor should campaign locally for the governing NPC party during regional and federal elections; others have said that the District Councillor should not campaign because parties make trouble in Idoma.

Could you tell me how the following people feel about you as a Councillor campaigning locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections?

Audiences: Elders, Non-Elders, Tax Collectors, Elected Councillors, Nominated Councillors, Representative Councillors, District Head, Native Authority.

Questions:

143. Expect you as a Councillor to campaign locally during regional and federal elections;

Expect you as a Councillor not to campaign locally during regional and federal elections;

No expectation in this situation.

144. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect you as a Councillor (to) (not to) campaign locally for the governing party during regional and federal elections?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

145. Would the _____ insist that you as a Councillor (campaign locally) (not campaign locally) for the governing party during regional and federal elections?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

For perceivers of role conflict:

146. Would this conflict trouble you?

Yes _____ How much? Very much _____ Some _____ No _____

147. What would you do in this situation?

Case III: DANCE GROUP-SECRET SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

Councillor as Participant

Several people in Idoma have told me that the District Councillor who is an active member of a secret society or dance group often finds it difficult to be an impartial peacemaker in disputes between members and others in the Council Area and/or finds it difficult to convince others of his impartiality.

Could you tell me which course of action the following people would expect you as a Councillor and active member of a secret society or dance group to take if you had that difficulty?

Audiences: Elders, Non-Elders, Tax Collectors, Secret Society Members, Dance Group Members, Elected Councillors, Nominated Councillors, Representative Councillors, District Head, Native Authority

Questions:

148. Expect you as a Councillor to remain active in the group or society;

Expect you as a Councillor to become inactive or resign from the group or society;

No expectation in this situation.

149. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect you as a Councillor (to remain active in) (to become inactive in or resign from) the dance group or secret society?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

150. Would the _____ insist that you as a Councillor (remain active in) (become inactive in or resign from) the dance group or secret society?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

For perceivers of role conflict:

151. Would this conflict trouble you?

Yes _____ How much? Very much _____ Some _____ No _____

152. What would you do in this situation?

CASE IV: CLAN HEAD SUCCESSION AND DISTRICT HEAD SUCCESSION

Councillor and Clan Headship

A Clan Head in southern Idoma told me that Councillors in his District are expected not to take part in the selection of Clan Heads; another in western Idoma says that Councillors in his own District will take part in the selection of the next Clan Head.

Could you tell me how the following people would feel about you as a Councillor taking part in the selection of the next Clan Head?

Audiences: Elders, Non-Elders, Tax Collectors, Elected Councillors, Nominated Councillors, Representative Councillors, Native Authority.

Questions:

153. Expect you as a Councillor to take part in the selection of the next Clan Head;

Expect you as a Councillor not to take part in the selection of the next Clan Head;

Questions:

No expectation in this situation.

154. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect you (to) (not to) take part in the selection of the next Clan Head?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

155. Would the _____ insist that you as a Councillor (take part in) (not take part in) the selection of the next Clan Head?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

For perceivers of role conflict:

156. Would this conflict trouble you?

Yes _____ How much? Very much _____ Some _____ No _____

157. What would you do in this situation?

For all councillors:

158. Could you tell me how the Clan Head will be selected? Who will take part?

Councillor and District Headship

A District Head in southern Idoma has told me that Councillors in his District are expected not to take part in the selection of the District Head; another District Head in western Idoma says that Councillors in his own District will take part in the selection of the next District Head.

Could you tell me how the following people would feel about you as a Councillor taking part in the selection of the next District Head?

Audiences: Elders, Non-Elders, Tax Collectors, Elected Councillors, Nominated Councillors, Representative Councillors, District Head (except where DH is Clan Head), Native Authority.

159. Expect you as a Councillor to take part in the selection of the next DH;

Expect you as a Councillor not to take part in the selection of the next DH;

Questions:

No expectation in this situation.

160. Do you think that _____ have a right to expect you (to) (not to) take part in the selection of the next DH?

Yes (legitimate) _____ No (illegitimate) _____

161. Would the _____ insist that you as a Councillor (take part in) (not take part in) the selection of the next DH?

Yes (obligatory) _____ No (optional) _____

For perceivers of role conflict:

162. Would this conflict trouble you?

Yes _____ How much? Very much _____ Some _____ No _____

163. What would you do in this situation?

For all councillors:

164. Could you tell me how the DH will be selected? Who will take part?

165-

177. These questions were designed to elicit data on "generosity" and campaigning for the district council.

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