## VOTING SHIFTS IN A SUBURBAN COMMUNITY: A STUDY OF MIGRANTS FROM DETROIT, 1952-1956

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Roger H. Marz 1960 This is to certify that the

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# VOTING SHIFTS IN A SUBURBAN COMMUNITY:

## A STUDY OF MIGRANTS FROM DETROIT, 1952-1956

by

Roger H. Marz

### AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Study of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

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#### ABSTRACT

This study is based on interviews collected from an equal probability sample of people who moved from Detroit, Michigan to Livonia, Michigan, a suburb, between January 1, 1953 and January 1, 1956. Respondents were asked about integration into neighborhood social structures, political interest, party affiliation, voting, social and economic status and attitudes towards government control of labor and business.

In the course of collecting interviews with the migrants it was necessary to call on many homes whose inhabitants did not fit the criteria of the sample. These non-sample subjects were given a shorter schedule and the answers of the migrants were compared to those of the non-sample subjects and to gross voting and social and economic characteristics of the areas of Detroit from which the migrants came.

We were primarily interested in the possibility that migration to the suburbs was directly related to shift in voting towards Republican candidates as a result of pressure from suburban primary groups.

For the offices of Governor and President between 1952 and 1956 we found: (1) migrants were no more likely to change than non-migrants; (2) the number of migrants who changed in the direction of one particular party was not significantly higher than of non-migrants; (3) those who did change directionally among the migrants were more likely to shift towards Republican than Democratic voting; (4) those who changed directionally were not more likely to have been pressured into such voting by their neighbors, but they were significantly more likely to have been home owners in Detroit before their move. Migrants came from areas significantly more Republican than Detroit as a whole, and were more likely to vote for Eisenhower than the areas from which they came. They were also more likely to vote for Williams (the Democratic Governor) than the average of those areas.

The Republican share of the two-party vote for both offices increased in our sample between 1952 and 1956 but this was largely the result of people who had not voted in Detroit voting Republican in Livonia.

Split ticket voting was extremely common in the sample and we argue this is the result of weakening political party ties in suburbia. Voting is valued by suburban migrants, but political discussion and argument is not. This suppression of politics as a salient value may result in increased importance of the mass media in influencing voting.

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#### CHAPTER I

### THE GREAT TREK

The fastest growing areas in our country are the suburbs of our great metropolitan centers. All over the nation new communities spring up in the open fields of a decade ago. As people move in increasing numbers to these regions, there must be significant political effects on the national, state, and local levels.

Between 1940 and 1950 the national population grew 14.5 per cent, but the population of the Standard Metropolitan Areas, as defined by the U. S. Bureau of the Census, grew even faster, 21.8 per cent. Within these areas the central cities grew at somewhat less than the national rate, 13.9 per cent, while their surrounding suburbs increased their population by 39.7 per cent during this ten year period.<sup>1</sup> It seems certain that this trend toward suburbanization has continued and perhaps increased since 1950.

Within the Detroit Metropolitan Area, the location of our study, the Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission estimates that 50 per cent of the total population lives outside the central city at present, but by 1970 it predicts 60 per cent of the population will live there. In contrast, in 1930 only 25 per cent of the population of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>U. S., Bureau of the Census, <u>1950 Census Of Population:</u> Number <u>Of Inhabitants</u>, I, Parts 2-50, Table 6.

area lived outside Detroit.<sup>2</sup>

What are the salient effects of this differential growth on politics? Even if we assume that change in residence location does not affect the way people vote or the party they prefer, the boundaries of important political subdivisions, cities, counties, voting districts, and the like, do not shift as rapidly as does population. As a result, legislatures become unrepresentative and local government services are more difficult to provide, a situation which interests the political scientist who is concerned with metropolitan government, intergovernmental relations and reapportionment.<sup>3</sup>

## Review Of Suburban Research

Any realistic discussion of suburban migration and politics must, however, take into account the possibility that migration to the suburbs raises problems beyond those given above. As people move to new neighborhoods, and associate with new neighbors in new ways, it is possible that these changes in their pattern of social behavior will be accompanied by changes in voting, political interest and party preference. Not only will a new population need to be served by new communities, but this new population may conceivably vote differently, talk politics differently, and value different government programs in different ways than they did before coming to the suburbs. These changes in residence frequently cause people to drop old friends and acquaintances and gain new ones.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, Population Projections For 1970 and 1980.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>E. C. Banfield, "The Politics Of Metropolitan Area Organization," <u>Midwest</u> Journal of Political Science, (I, 1957), pp. 77-91.

Further, the suburban migrants are a selected sample of the urban population. Differing economic and ethnic sub-groups within the population move to the suburbs at different rates and, probably, to different locations. It has even been suggested that migrants to the suburbs differ in social and psychological characteristics such as the need to associate intimately with neighbors.<sup>4</sup>

The geography of the new suburbs may well produce new patterns of social interaction with neighbors which will in turn create variations in both the form and content of conversation and opinions. Research in the social patterns of student housing at Massachusetts Institute of Technology demonstrated that integration into the neighborhood group and the sharing of common opinion varied with the location of the housing unit with respect to traffic patterns,<sup>5</sup> and similar observations have been made in a study of Park Forest, Illinois.<sup>6</sup>

The MIT study, carefully done by social scientists, for social scientists, finds neighborhood-based opinion groups in a population quite homogeneous in age and status, the married students of that school. The Park Forest study, on the other hand, concerns itself with a population more nearly comparable to the one which we study, but is less carefully, or rather, less transparently done; so that we cannot have the same confidence in its results.

<sup>4</sup>S. F. Fava, "Suburbanism As A Way Of Life," <u>American Sociological</u> <u>Review</u>, (XXI, 1956), pp. 34-37.

<sup>5</sup>L. Festinger, S. Shacter, and K. Back, <u>Social Pressures In Informal</u> <u>Groups</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 79-86.

<sup>6</sup>W. H. Whyte, Jr., <u>The Organization Man</u> (Anchor Edition; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 365 ff.

Suburbanization may be expected to produce changes in the political aspects of society because: (1) displacement across political boundaries changes the balance of population in cities, villages, service districts and legislative districts, (2) migration to the suburbs is selective, different kinds of people move to different places at different rates, (3) the new physical and social environment must produce new patterns of social interaction which may result in changes in the quantity and quality of political participation. This study is designed to explore the second and third only of these results.

What can be found in present writings on these problems that will illuminate our research? Sociologists have demonstrated that suburbanites live differently from city dwellers, and this may well result from socialization into a distinct suburban subculture. Suburbanites differ in many ways from both the central city and rural residents. Fava, in two articles, has clearly shown that suburban residents in the New York area are more likely to engage in neighboring than their central city counterparts, and that the neighbors of the suburbs resemble one another more in social and economic characteristics than urban dwellers.<sup>7</sup> Higher birth rates, a higher rate of home ownership, and stronger family ties in the suburbs have been detected by Jaco and Belknap.<sup>8</sup> Studies in Canada<sup>9</sup> and pre-war Westchester County,

7S. F. Fava, <u>American Sociological Review</u>, (XXI, 1956), and "Contrasts In Neighboring: New York City And A Suburban County," in W. Dobriner (ed.), <u>The Suburban Community</u> (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), p. 122.

<sup>8</sup>E. Jaco and I. Belknap, "Is A New Family Form Emerging In The Urban Fringe?," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, (XVIII, 1953), pp. 551-557.

<sup>9</sup>J. R. Seeley, R. A. Sim, and E. W. Loosely, <u>Crestwood Heights</u> (New York: Basic Books, 1956). New York<sup>10</sup> indicate a style of life associated with suburban living markedly different from that of central cities from which the migrants come.

In an analysis of 1950 census reports Duncan and Reiss<sup>11</sup> find a variety of social characteristics including socio-economic status, income, and age on which suburban communities differ from central cities and rural areas, and which seem likely to be related to changes in behavior patterns. From this we can infer that the suburban communities do in fact produce ways of life distinct from the city and farm. The significant question for this research is, "do these changes in patterns of social interaction have detectable correlates in changed political values among suburban migrants?" If they do, the questions then arise, "what are these effects?" and, "what proportion of the suburban migrants show them, and to what degree?"

Whatever the effects of suburban migration on political values might be, we can hardly expect them to be universal. Some people will assuredly change some of their political practices when they move, but since some people in any group are likely to be changing at any given time, we cannot say that moving was the cause. Many others almost certainly will not change. Political scientists must be concerned with the people who do not change as well as with those who do. In particular, any study of suburban migration must focus on the selective aspects of moving. If some people do show changes in behavior associated, at least in time, with their moves to the suburbs while others do not, what

<sup>10</sup>G. A. Lundberg, M. Komarovsky, and M. A. McInerny, <u>Leisure: A</u> <u>Suburban Study</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>O. D. Duncan and A. J. Reiss, Jr., <u>Social Characteristics Of</u> <u>Urban And Rural Communities</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 131-132.

common characteristics do the changers share with each other which differentiate them from those whose political behavior is apparently unaffected? This is a particularly complicated question, for there are many possible characteristics which might be shared. Some might be status characteristics, such as race, religion, and income; others might be related to statuses the migrant held in the past, such as previous home ownership; or the changers might share similar experiences upon moving to the suburbs, moving to friendly or unfriendly neighborhoods. Some people will change and others will not, but, given the present state of theory in the field of voting behavior, we must look to many different kinds of variables in the hopes of finding those which will explain why some do and some don't.

A study of the change in political values and political behavior associated with suburban migration must necessarily include information which can be collected only through surveys of individual migrants. For example, Whyte observes that, "Figures rather clearly show that people from big urban Democratic wards tend to become Republican and if anything, more conservative than those whose outlook they are unconsciously adopting."<sup>12</sup> Whyte cites no figures. If he is referring to aggregate voting statistics, I see no way in which this conclusion can be fairly drawn. Nor, indeed, does he show that his respondents came from big urban Democratic wards, nor that they voted Democratic if they did come from such wards. In fact, much of <u>The Organization Man</u> is devoted to the proposition that Whyte's respondents come from suburbs, go to suburbs, and never leave suburbs. In particular, the analysis of gross election statistics cannot demonstrate any process of un-

<sup>12</sup>Whyte, <u>The Organization Man</u>, p. 332.

conscious adoption of outlooks or values. There are too many other possible explanations of differential voting between city and suburb to permit one to assume that conversion of Democrats to Republicans is the cause of the difference.

Let us take the case of one city and one suburb as a hypothetical example and see what the analysis of election results can and cannot do. How far can it take us and what can we use to supplement its results?

First, assume a city which consistently produces 70 per cent majorities for Democratic candidates in national and state elections. Second, assume a rural area which consistently produces 70 per cent Republican majorities. In a given election the total vote in the suburban area is 5,000, 3,500 Republican, 1,500 Democrat. Four years later the total vote is 10,000, 7,000 Republican, 3,000 Democrat. Can we assert from this that the migrants to the suburb from the central city have defected to Republican ranks? If this is asserted, two assumptions must be made, (1) all or most of the new votes are those of central city migrants, (2) the central city migrants are divided in political affiliation in proportion to the total population of the city. But migration to the suburbs is selective, and it selects on the basis of socio-economic factors which are known to be related to propensity to vote for a particular party.<sup>13</sup>

Can we assert that this "conversion," if any takes place, is a result of unconscious or conscious adoption of values held by the residents of the suburbs to which these people move? Might it not equally be the result of upward mobility? Or could it be that people

<sup>13</sup>B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, <u>Voting</u> (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 55-56.

who did not vote in the city now participate in elections? No matter how sophisticated the analysis, area election statistics cannot provide information on motives, values, and changes in motives and values in voters. For any existing set of election returns there are too many alternate and equally persuasive explanations possible.

The study of aggregate election returns can indeed suggest the extent to which <u>some</u> phenomenon exists, but it cannot describe the nature of the phenomenon nor firmly relate it to other variables in social and psychological behavior. It may, however, give us some clues in that direction.

To study the political aspects of migration to the suburbs, one must study individuals. If there are changes in voting, discussing or valuing politics associated with the move to suburbia they can take place only in people. Precincts, cities, and suburbs do not vote, although careless use of words often makes it appear that they do. Neither ethnic groups, socio-economic classes nor primary groups vote, although their effects upon individual voting decisions are perhaps more direct than are those of geographic area. The individual voting decision is the heart of the electoral process, and neither voters, journalists, nor political scientists understand much about the process by which people make up their minds.

If we are to understand the process of voting, which is part of political valuation, and its relation to suburban migration, data must be gathered on the changing patterns of response in individuals and among groups of individuals to the changed stimuli present in the suburban social environment. Survey research seems the most appropriate technique to provide such information. At any rate, it can be collected only by talking to and/or observing individuals. Survey research, a standard interview schedule administered to a carefully chosen sample, produces results in a form precise enough to admit of the full or piecemeal replication appropriate to social science. Where it is possible, it is for this reason superior to relying on individual informants, and conceivably to participant observation as well, by extending more widely than the range of the observer's vision.

Sample surveys are no longer rare in the social sciences in general, nor in political science in particular, but there have been relatively few attempts to apply the sample survey to the study of suburban political behavior. Lazerwitz<sup>14</sup> and Greenstein and Wolfinger<sup>15</sup> both used Survey Research Center data collected from national samples designed for a different purpose to attack this problem. Lazerwitz studied rates of change in Republican voting for President between 1952 and 1956. He concluded that no significant difference in propensity to change between urban and suburban residents could be detected. In other words, the larger Eisenhower vote in 1956 was not attributable to a disproportionate shift towards Eisenhower among suburbanites. The shift towards Eisenhower was just as great in the cities.<sup>16</sup>

Greenstein and Wolfinger adopted a somewhat different technique. They compared the urban and suburban respondents of the 1956 Survey

<sup>16</sup>Lazerwitz, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>B. Lazerwitz, "Some Characteristics Of Residential Belts In The Metropolitan Community, 1950-1956" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>F. Greenstein and R. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs And Shifting Party Loyalties," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, (XXII, 4, Jan. 1959), pp. 473-482.

Research Center election survey. They attempted to hold constant different social and economic factors and compared the votes of urban and suburban dwellers, controlling by age, education, income, race, and religion.

None of these factors accounted for all the variance between suburban and urban voting rates. Unfortunately, the size of the two samples did not permit them to hold all factors constant simultaneously. The authors conclude that differences between urban and suburban voters exist, that they are least likely to be present among new suburbanites, that suburbanites are more likely to know and talk with Republicans, and that there is therefore strong likelihood that conversion to Republican voting does take place in the suburbs.<sup>17</sup> Thus a different method of analysis applied to data from the same source lead to essentially opposite conclusions. This at least suggests that more work on the subject is desirable.

Two other survey studies of suburban migrants in selected areas have been reported in the literature. Manis and Stine<sup>18</sup> interviewed suburban residents in the Kalamazoo, Michigan area. They report conversion to Republican voting among somewhat less than 10 per cent of their sample of more than 700, but only one of these changed while in the suburb. The others switched earlier, while still central city residents. They attribute this low rate of change to the lack of

17 Greenstein and Wolfinger, <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, (XXII, 4, Jan. 1959), p. 482.

<sup>18</sup>J. G. Manis and L. C. Stine, "Suburban Residence And Political Behavior," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, (XXII, 4, Jan. 1959), pp. 483-89.

community-based relations in the suburb, asserting that residential ties are impermanent and that suburban residents have little stake in developing consensus with their neighbors.

Millet and Pittman<sup>19</sup> in a similar study of the suburbanites of Rochester, New York, reach conclusions much like those of Manis and Stine. They detect some shift in voting from Democratic to Republican candidates among their respondents who moved to a subdivision which was created after 1953. But, this shift occured before the move, rather than after, did not include a large proportion of the voters, and seemed more appropriately explained by changes in status and occupation than residence. In this study, more people announced an intention to vote for Eisenhower (78 per cent) than actually did vote for him on election day (65 per cent).

How And Where To Study Migration And Politics

One difficulty with both the Manis-Stine and Millet-Pittman studies is the areas which were chosen for study. In each case the central city itself regularly produces Republican majorities, although the suburbs produce proportionately bigger ones. Therefore the raw probability of conversion is reduced because there are smaller numbers of migrants capable of being converted. For, just as one must be dirty to become clean, one must be a Democrat to become Republican.

Since most of our large cities are now Democratic, the possibility which worries or delights students of the political correlates of suburban migration (depending on party preference) is the adoption by the

<sup>19</sup>J. H. Millet and D. Pittman, "The New Suburban Voter: A Case Study In Electoral Behavior," <u>Southwestern Social Science Quarterly</u>, (XXXIX, 1, June 1958), pp. 33-42.

migrants to suburban areas of the political pre-dispositions of those who are already there, for these old settlers are, in the main, more likely to be Republicans. Strategically speaking, the researcher is most likely to find this phenomenon of change to Republican voting in migrants coming from a city which has produced in the past large Democratic majorities and moving to a suburb whose older inhabitants have tended to vote Republican. In addition, it would be desirable if the suburb chosen attracted large numbers of migrants whose social status tended towards the lower middle class. If this were true, changes in voting pattern could be more reasonably attributed to suburban residence than to changes in social and economic status. Migrants to Westchester County, New York, Deerfield, Illinois and Grosse Pointe or Bloomfield Village, Michigan are more likely to be Republicans before they get there, and to have been Republicans for quite some time, perhaps their entire voting lives. One further point, this process (changing to Republican voting associated with suburban migration) is important to the American political system in direct ratio to its frequency. If it affects only a few people, relatively, it is politically insignificant, though still interesting to a social psychologist. But, if many people now living or soon to live in suburban communities who by virtue of social, economic and ethnic characteristics might be expected to favor the Democratic party vote disproportionately for Republican candidates, then this is a fact which should be studied, documented, and understood.

The social class structure in the United States is basically a pyramid, though most observers feel that the very lowest positions are

occupied by somewhat fewer people than those positions immediately above them. Therefore, given the fact that majorities are the <u>sine</u> <u>qua non</u> of political success in the United States, voting behavior trends in the lower social and economic status groups are intrinsically the most important, for there are more people in these groups. If suburbanization has important political consequences, these derive from its spread downward into the status scale. The large, rapidly growing, lower middle class suburbs are most important politically, because they are the biggest and, therefore, processes which occur within them affect the largest number of people.

The community we have chosen, Livonia, Michigan is such a suburb; it is fast growing, lower middle class, large, and located in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. Much, if not all, of the choice of site for social science research depends, at bottom, on the place of occupation of the researcher. Detroit might have been a logical choice for such research as this in any case, for it is a city which has produced in recent years consistently large Democratic majorities. Therefore, the people who move away from it are more likely to be Democrats, all other things being equal, than are those who move from Kalamazoo, Michigan or Rochester, New York. Livonia has a record of returning Republican majorities. Migrants from Detroit to Livonia, therefore, are likely to display changes in voting and party preference if any suburban migrants do. The following table gives Detroit and Livonia votes and percentages for Governor and President in 1948, 1952, and 1956.

DETROIT A	IND	LIVONIA	TOTAL	VOTES	FOR	GOVERNOR
AND	PRE	SIDENT,	1948,	1952,	1956	5.

Office	1948 Lee Number Per		1952 Number Per		195 Number	66 Per Cont
		Cent		Cent		
Detroit						
President						
Republican	243,653	38.2	319,712	39.5	300.366	38.2
Democrat	395,410	61.8	489,892	60.5	485,313	61.8
Governor						
Republican	227,032	34.5	287,828	34.9	232,786	29.9
Democrat	432,426	65.5	536,851	65.1	545,595	70.1
Livonia						
President						
Republican	2,700	56.1	5,640	64.9	11,674	62.5
Democrat	2,112	43.9	3,049	35.1	6,998	37.5
Governor						
Republican	2,244	54.3	5,205	57.4	9,223	49.7
Democrat	1,888	45.7	3,864	42.6	9,317	50.3

Livonia has slowly shifted towards Democratic voting on the gubernatorial level, and in 1956 Williams, the Democratic incumbent carried the city. Stevenson did better in 1956 than he had in 1952, but more poorly than Truman in 1948. The suburb still returns large majorities for the Republican presidential candidates. Detroit, on the other hand, is solidly Democratic, the only significant change being a five per cent increase in Williams's vote between 1952 and 1956.

There are other large, fast growing suburbs in the Detroit area which could have been used. One of these, Oak Park, turned out to be a favored location for Jews. It has been demonstrated by Fuchs that this ethnic group is exceptional in the United States in that for them upper-class membership does not appear to be related to Republican voting or the adoption of conservative political values.<sup>20</sup> The other large, fast growing suburb, St. Clair Shores, was farther away and harder to reach than Livonia and, being located in St. Clair County, while Detroit is in Wayne County, election statistics would have been more difficult to collect.

Detroit is certainly not a "typical" metropolis, nor is Livonia "typical", either as a suburb generally or as a suburb of Detroit. The city was formed in 1950, by the incorporation of an entire thirty-six square mile township in western Wayne County. Since no major traffic artery intersects this area it remained a rural township with some light industry until after World War II. In the post-war period this region provided the nearest undeveloped low cost acreage west of Detroit and homes popped up as fast as mushrooms after a rain. It remained, at the time of our study, a rather centerless community, though it had been a city for eight years. Still, its rate of growth was phenomenal, and showed no signs of slowing down.

#### Summary

In this study the focus is to be the process of change, in voting and other forms of political valuation, which is associated with suburban migration. At best, it will be possible to find whether such changes do or do not occur. No study of one suburb can be the basis for generalizations as to the magnitude of this change, in number of people affected, on the national scene. Our hope is to detect the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>L. H. Fuchs, "American Jews And The Presidential Vote," <u>American</u> <u>Political Science Review</u>, (XLIX, 2, June 1955), pp. 385-401.

phenomenon, learn something of its nature, and prepare the ground for more ambitious projects to come. This research is not "definitive," but rather, exploratory.

If a change to a new pattern of political response is associated with moving to suburbia, a study of Detroit migrants to Livonia ought to detect it. From there, the phenomenon having been detected, we should be able to conjecture on its relation to other social, economic, and psychological variables.

In Chapter II we shall discuss some theories of voting and political valuation in an attempt to define more clearly the research task. We shall also discuss some problems peculiar to the use of survey research in investigating political change. .

### CHAPTER II

### THEORY

#### Formal Theories Compared

To study the relation between suburban migration and voting behavior requires, first, a theory of voting behavior in general. If social, psychological, and economic variables are not associated in theory with the voting decision, then any study of the voting decision becomes void of meaning for political science. Even in an exploratory study the research must be based on some idea of what <u>ought</u> to be expected to happen to political attitudes and voting as a result of suburban migration.

There have been a variety of approaches to a theory of American voting behavior in recent years. None of these approaches has mustered enough conclusive evidence to have a prepotent position in the literature. Even beyond the <u>explicit</u> approaches to a theory of voting, we find in the writings of the political journalists a wide variety of <u>implicit</u> theories as to why people vote as they do. Sometimes these implicit assumptions can be readily deduced from the arguments presented, but more often these assumptions are vague or inconsistent and not susceptible to ordered presentation.

The real choice in American voting behavior research seems to be between two alternative systems. The first, associated with the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan emphasizes the attitudinal position of the individual voter on selected variables, quite specifically
related to politics. These are: (1) personal identification with one of the political parties; (2) concern with issues of national governmental policy (for national elections); (3) personal attraction to the presidential candidates (for presidential elections).<sup>1</sup> Other variables, among them the sense of the efficacy of the vote as political participation, the sense of the obligation to vote, and primary group membership, are also used but with no confidence as to their role in what this school believes to be the primary research task, <u>predicting</u> the specific content of the individual reported vote. It is particularly interesting to note the comment of the leaders of this school on the matter of primary group membership and voting.

> "The measurement used for primary group pressure proved the least satisfactory of the six measures proposed. Although it correlated highly with both turnout and party choice, it was so obviously <u>contaminated</u> by projection, selective perception, and other influences that it was not adequate to support conclusions regarding primary group pressure."<sup>2</sup>

This set on the part of the researchers with respect to the effect of **primary** groups on the voting decision will be discussed in more detail **below**.

There are two major obstacles to adopting this theory in our study. First, it is difficult to see what effect migration to the suburbs should have, in terms of this theory, on candidate orientation, issue orientation, or party commitment. If these three variables are the major determinants of voter choice, and if voters change their

<sup>1</sup>A. Campbell and D. E. Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes And The **Presidential Vote**," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (eds.), <u>American</u> **Voting Behavior** (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 354.

<sup>2</sup>A. Campbell and D. E. Stokes, <u>loc. cit.</u>, italics mine.

patterns of choice upon moving to the suburbs, then it would seem that suburban migration must be associated with changes in these variables either causally, or as an intervening variable. Why should it do so? What sorts of changes can we expect? The theory does not supply answers to these questions. It might be possible to supply supplementary assumptions which would make the theory applicable. By assuming, for example, that migrants to the suburb would more likely be candidate oriented, one could then predict on the basis of this theory the effect of mass migration to the suburbs on state and national elections. But, the theory as it stands contains no such assumptions, no hints of any sort as to why some people are oriented towards candidates, some towards party, and some towards issues. This is not to say that the theory is incorrect. It is merely inappropriate to this study. The second Objection is more basic than the first, but closely related to it. Assuming the differences in voter choice arise from differences in **candidate**, party, and issue orientation, what social processes produce these differences? Again the theory is silent. As Rossi says:

> "How useful explanations in terms of variables all on the same 'level' are is open to question. It helps us little to know that voters tend to select candidates of whom they have high opinions. Voting for a candidate and holding a favorable opinion of him may be regarded as alternative definitions of the same variable. The more interesting problems start where the author's analysis ends."

The earlier quotation from Campbell (page 18) is intriguing in this respect for it seems that the authors deliberately reject some of "the interesting questions" by their concern over the contamination

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>P. H. Rossi, "Four Landmarks In Voting Research," in Burdick Brodbeck (eds.), <u>American Voting Behavior</u>, p. 41.

of the results of their interviews by "projection, selective perception, and other influences." In this concern for precision and neatness in argument Campbell and his associates ignore the possibility that the effects of the primary group on individual values are precisely such things as selective perception and projection. When these are found, one could argue that primary group pressures are indeed at work. In <u>The Voter Decides</u>,<sup>4</sup> the Survey Research Center reports in Appendix C the data Campbell comments on in his article in <u>American Voting Behavior</u>.

The findings in these tables seem quite consistent with the general position of the Bureau of Applied Social Research approach discussed below. That is to say, respondents report voting very much in the same way they perceive their spouses, families, friends, and work associates voting. Further, it would appear that non-voting or political disinterest is fully as likely to be a shared pattern as is voting in a particular way.<sup>5</sup> The only data reported in Appendix C which appear to be so ambiguous as to warrant Campbell's harsh criticism are those which relate to the respondent's perception of whether or not the respondent was influenced in his vote by spouse, family, friends, or WOrk associates. These responses fit no reasonable pattern. The precise question which elicited them was, "Do you think any of (his) (her) (their) opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?" The authors discuss at length the weakness of this question and it is clear that the relation between primary group affiliations and political choice cannot be successfully studied through direct interrogation. At any rate, the Survey Research Center theory is not

<sup>4</sup> A. Campbell, G. Guerin, and W. E. Miller, <u>The Voter Decides</u> (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 201, Appendix C.

appropriate to our study, nor is it particularly exciting. Social scientists should strive to be able to predict, it is true, but they should also strive to understand social processes. The significant prediction is one in which a change of process produces a specified change in product. I do not see Survey Research Center voting theory leading us towards this kind of understanding, until it is elaborated to take into account the relations between voting and broader social variables.

The leading alternative to this theory is largely the work of Lazarsfeld and his associates at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. In this theory the "basic" social mechanism for "implementing" (in their words) the voting decision is the interaction pattern of the given individual.<sup>6</sup> Since most of the individual's interactions, or at least the most valued of his interactions take place in primary group situations, the primary group affiliations of any Eiven individual will be paramount in determining his vote. Further, since the primary groups of any given individual will tend to hold the same values they reinforce the decision for most respondents. The Eross social, economic, religious, and ethnic pre-dispositions which empirical research has found to be so closely related to voting choice may be inferred to be the result of the sharing of individuals of certain categories in a primary group life which produces consistent . **POlitical** values.<sup>7</sup> Protestants of upper-middle class social and economic **position** tend to be Republican because their most intimate associates

> 6 Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, <u>Voting</u>, p. 280 and p. 299. 7<u>Ibid</u>., p. 293.

are all likely to be Republicans and it is in interaction with them that political values are formed.

The intent of the original Columbia studies was, broadly, to link the mass media to the grass roots. That is to say, they hoped to find out how the messages of newspapers, magazines, radio, speeches and meetings were translated into voting decisions. Postulated is a process described later, in Personal Influence, as a two-step flow of communication. from the mass media to the opinion leader, and from the opinion leader to the other participants in the primary group situation.  $^{\circ}$  One of the important findings of research in this vein has been that selective perception of political and social experience takes place, making messages consistent with previously held values.<sup>9</sup> To this we must add the finding that the more interest in politics any given individual expresses, thus making him a potential opinion leader, the more likely **it** is that he will have made up his mind early--indicating strong **political values--and will be likely to vote in the way in which he** originally intended.<sup>10</sup> This being the case the theory does not provide  $\mathbf{a}$ reasonable explanation within itself of the phenomenon of political change. If primary groups "borrow" the political valuations of the **DL**nion leader, and these values are modified after coming from the mass media by the previous values of the opinion holder, then as long as the Social relations of a given individual remain stable his political values must remain so as well.

 <sup>8</sup> E. Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, <u>Personal Influence</u> (Glencoe, Ilinois: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 32-33.
 <sup>9</sup>Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, <u>Voting</u>, p. 285.
 <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 248.

In Voting, there is some concern with explaining change within their model.<sup>11</sup> Borrowing heavily from Heberle<sup>12</sup> the authors postulate generational differences as the source of long term political change. The argument is that Americans become politically interested rather late in life, that they form primary group ties in which political values are absent or irrelevant, that as these people age "there must inevitably follow adjustments of conflicting belief, selections of compatible friends and the mutual influence of each member on the others, with respect now to politics (italics theirs) and other adult concerns...<sup>13</sup> This would produce discontinuity in the political tradition, and by inference, the cumulative effects of these discontinuities would be political change. Unless it could be demonstrated that people tended to continue voting in the same way as they voted in their first election, and I do not think such is the case, this would still fail to account for short run changes, from one election to the next.

For this particular study this theory would still be sufficient **since** change in political values could be explained as a result of the **shift** in residence location which is likely to produce, on the face of **it**, a change in some, though not all, of the primary group affiliations **of** the migrant.

There are some difficulties in adopting this view, for little is Norwn of the process whereby primary groups produce conformity on salient Values. The fact that such conformity does occur has been demonstrated

<sup>11</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 301-3.

<sup>12</sup>R. Heberle, <u>Social Movements</u> (New York: Appleton Century Croft, **Inc.**, 1951), pp. 120-127.

<sup>13</sup>Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Voting, pp. 302-3.

by Newcomb in a college population,<sup>14</sup> Festinger, Shacter, and Back in the residents of a housing project,<sup>15</sup> and Sherif in experimental situations.<sup>16</sup> Still, the exact nature of the process has not been studied. Luce asks:

> "Without denying that the data (of the Elmira study) establish conformity within many primary groups, we can question the nature of the mechanism effecting the conformity: Is the image of an interacting 'molecular' system tending toward equilibrium sufficient?"<sup>17</sup>

He suggests that it is not and further suggests that a more adequate model would include as a parameter the motivation level of the individual, and that highly motivated individuals (opinion leaders) would engage in a different process in making up their minds than those of low motivation level.

There is in fact no direct evidence as to the effect of primary groups on the process of voting decision. Such data as are available in <u>The Peoples Choice</u><sup>18</sup> and <u>Voting</u> are inferential at best. We know that those who knowingly associate with people of mixed political backgrounds (the cross-pressured) report a later voting decision on the average, are more likely not to vote, and are more likely to change votes. The leap from these data to the assertion that primary group **mem**bership has a controlling effect on political decision is a long

<sup>14</sup>T. M. Newcomb, <u>Personality and Social Change</u> (New York: Dryden Press, 1957), pp. 23-27.

<sup>15</sup>Festinger, Shacter, and Back, <u>Social Pressures In Informal</u> Groups, pp. 72-100.

<sup>16</sup>M. Sherif, <u>An Outline of Social Psychology</u> (New York: Harper Brothers, 1948), pp. 156-185.

17R. D. Luce, "Group Voting Patterns," in Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), <u>American Voting Behavior</u>, p. 334. (Parenthetical insert mine.)

18p. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, <u>The Peoples Choice</u> (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

one, and it must be made with no factual stepping stones in between. Not even Personal Influence, <sup>19</sup> which is the study most clearly designed to test the bewildering relations between opinion leaders, primary groups and choices of individuals, examines the process directly. The question of the relevance of politics to primary group affiliation is most important. It does not seem likely that all primary groups require political consensus as a prerequisite for participation in them. Although it is quite reasonable to assume that in any given group there will be some areas of opinion for which consensus is demanded (the minimum requirement being that the members agree to value continued participation in the group), there is no basis in experience for assuming that political opinion will be one of these essential areas for every group. Where politics is relevant average Americans would probably adopt the necessary political values. Politics counts for less than companionship in our society. But, if politics counts for **lit**tle, why should it ever be relevant?

This is a dilemma which cannot, I suggest, be resolved in theory. The most likely way out seems to be to look at the facts. But the "facts" of the relation between group affiliation and political decision are not easy to come by. For what the researcher wishes to how is unknown to the people from whom he wishes to learn it. It is, in fact, questionable whether any direct evidence for this process can be gathered from the survey interview of individuals. Some other form of controlled observation may be necessary to illuminate this problem.

The foregoing discussion is designed to stress the fact that this **study**, like most in the field of voting behavior begins from theoretically

<sup>19</sup>Katz and Lazarsfeld, <u>Personal Influence</u>.

shaky ground. Even though this is the base, it seems on balance that one must choose somewhat vague theories of Lazarsfeld, Berelson and associates over the alternative offerings at least as a point of departure. It does have advantages. First, it connects a political phenomenon-the vote--with broader social phenomena, primary group membership, reference group theory, social and economic status research and the broad concerns of social psychology. Second, it could explain the phenomenon we intend to investigate, while the Campbell-SRC theory could not. Third, least valid and most persuasive, it is appealing to one in the light of my own social and personal experience, for I have changed my political and other values as a result of changing social environment and have seen others do so.

# Suggestions From Allied Literature

Before spelling out precisely what this theory produces by way of a research design let us examine some other less clearly thought out explanations of the effect of suburban migration on voting.

In the <u>New York Times</u> there appeared, just before the election of 1956 a prediction of possible conversion of new suburbanites to Republican voting and an attendant explanation of this expected phenomenon. Two factors were mentioned as producing this result. First, the fact that many of the migrants were now homeowners for the first time was to make them conscious of the tax rates and more politically conservative on all levels of government. Second, the fact that the local governments of suburbia were overwhelmingly Republican was to suppress Democratic political activity for fear of retaliation in assessments and provision of government services and thus reduce Democratic chances.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup><u>The New York Times</u>, May 31, 1956, pp. 1 and 15.

A similar view of the effects of suburban residence on traditionally Democratic voters was put forth in <u>The Exurbanites</u>, an interpretative account of the more remote suburbs.

> "He (the Democrat) joins no Democratic committee, canvasses no voters, attends no Democratic rallies, and contributes Democratic dollars only by stealth. He must take on the protective coloration of like political opinions in order to survive without undue discomfort. He may, if he is stubborn and independently minded, vote the straight Democratic ticket once he is in the privacy of the voting booth but his influence in the community in persuading others to do likewise is necessarily extinguished."<sup>21</sup>

Other highly impressionistic studies like Keats's have reinforced these generalizations.<sup>22</sup> Although this view is probably, as a universal generalization, incorrect, it still provides some food for investigating exactly what does happen to the city Democrat transplanted to the suburb. The hypothesis regarding home-ownership, for example, is relatively easy to test, and it should be possible to get some idea of suppression of political activity if the individual moves to an environment where he perceives his political actions would be interpreted unfavorably.

Lubell's books<sup>23</sup> present a view of the voting decision which is consistent with, but more extreme than that of the Lazarsfeld school in its emphasis on external social factors as determining the political decision. For Lubell, however, the journalistic values of "impact" and force of presentation outweigh careful logical analysis and he appears

<sup>21</sup>A. C. Spectorsky, <u>The Exurbanites</u> (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955), p. 98.

<sup>22</sup>J. Keats, <u>The Crack In The Picture Window</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957).

<sup>23</sup>S. Lubell, <u>The Future Of American Politics</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), and <u>The Revolt Of The Moderates</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). to presume (1) that the social group ties, particularly religious and national origin ties of an individual, are permanent, unbreakable, and universal in their effects, and (2) that therefore the individual is a relatively unimportant unit of social behavior, of interest only as he stands for the presumably identical behaviors of all those who share his ethnic and economic position. Lubell would not, perhaps, accept so sweeping a generalization of his position, but his unit of analysis and explanation is always a group, class, or category. Catholics, Germans, Jews, middle-income groups, these are the subjects of almost all his declarative sentences and the generalizations are rarely qualified.<sup>24</sup>

On the positive side, although the theory presented by Lubell is too sketchy and overdrawn to be the basis for serious work, he does observe that the process of suburbanization serves to intensify social ties by a form of "ghettoization." The new neighborhoods of the suburbs, Lubell asserts, are frequently little more than the old neighborhood displaced in time and space, with no more heterogenity of religion, economic, and ethnic ties than was true in the city. This fact, if true, is worth noting and exploring in any research on political results of suburban migration.

#### Reference Group Theory

This research is primarily designed as an exploratory probe into the political behavior of migrants from the central city to the suburbs. Since the results of these actions are not yet clearly known, it is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Lubell denies that he has any theory, and he is certainly not interested in producing one. However I think the foregoing could be read into his books by any fair-minded student. It stands as an extrapolation, however, and not as his own argument.

impossible, or at least strategically unwise, to design the research in such a way as to commit the investigation to any one theory, no matter how broadly construed. On the other hand, if any pretense of disciplined research is to be maintained some focus is necessary, and this can only be provided by at least a tentative commitment to a specific theoretical point of view.

Reference group theory as applied to politics by Lazarsfeld and his associates provides that point of view. The basic focus of reference group theory is on the internalization of group norms by an individual as a result of his perceived identification with a particular grouping in the society.

The implications of reference group theory for explaining voting behavior of suburban migrants are succinctly stated by Kaplan:

> "... to what extent is there awareness on the part of a given individual that a given reference group is operating for him with respect to a given attitude? Secondly, to what extent must there be awareness of the norm or attitude which exists within a given group in order for such a group to be considered as a point of reference? And as a subordinate consideration, to what extent must such an awareness of a group's position be objectively correct?"<sup>25</sup>

It seems clear that an individual need not necessarily be aware that a particular group is his point of reference. In the narrow study of reference group effects on individual attitude we might feel that in order to "refer" to a group as the source of his value judgments an individual would of necessity be aware of the act of referring. It is, however, doubtful that even the most stringent definition of reference group phenomena would require this. The act of using a group as a

<sup>25</sup>N. Kaplan, "Reference Group Theory and Voting Behavior," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1955), p. 23. source for value decision need not be a calculated, conscious act, and to restrict the "reference group" relation to those where it was calculated and conscious would be arbitrarily to cut off from the ken of this theory an important sector of behavior.

An individual need not be "objectively" correct in adopting the values of a particular reference group as his own. One might, for example, use businessmen as a reference group and, imitating them, favor a high protective tariff, not realizing that many large firms favor reciprocal trade. What matters is not "objective" reality, but the values of the reference group as seen by the referrer. If the subject is an active participant in his reference group, then glaring misassessment of group values may have undesirable consequences for his successful interaction with group members. But, for nonmembership reference groups, and for those areas of group opinion which are not in fact salient, though they may be perceived as such by the subject, nothing in the theory of reference group effects requires accuracy of assessment of the group's value position.

The only logically necessary condition for a connection to exist between the values of the group and the values of the individual is that the individual has, in fact, some image of the group's values. It is not necessary that he realize this group is a point of reference for him, nor must his image be realistic. But, at least, there must be some concept of the values of a particular group on a particular topic if that group is to be said to have <u>any</u> effect on the attitudes of a given individual.

If one is to apply reference group theory to the relation between voting and suburban residence it is necessary to assume that the voter

will have <u>some</u> idea of his neighbor's political values. This idea need not be objectively accurate, nor is it necessary that the voter consciously adopt the values he believes his neighbors to possess. Still, if he has no estimate of their political position there can be no hope of explaining his decision in the language of reference group theory.

For the study of the effects of suburbanization on political values, reference group theory can lead in two directions, depending on the content of the phrase "reference group." The question must arise, "How real or abstract can a 'group' be and still be a reference group?" Let us first examine the use of "reference group" as an abstract category.

If we are to permit the use of very abstract social patterns, "rich people", "the workingman", "suburbanites" and so forth, as reference points, then there is no reason why we must **ev**en study suburbanites at all in order to determine the relation between migration to the suburbs and politics.

The argument in that case would be: (a) people who move to the suburbs have an image of suburban man, and this image has political components; (b) through anticipatory socialization they adopt, in advance, the political responses appropriate, in their image, to the status to which they aspire; (c) this tendency, if prevalent enough, acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy producing in the suburbs the image of suburban man which was characteristic of city dwellers.

To study this assumed phenomenon one would interview city dwellers who were potential suburbanites and determine their ideas of what suburbs and the people in them were like. If we separated the sample into those who intended to move to the suburbs and those who did not, we

should find that: (1) those who intended to move had a clearer image of what suburban life was like (not necessarily accurate--just clear) and, (2) those who intended to move more nearly resembled in their values, particularly their political values, the image which they held of the suburbanites.

This facet of reference group theory is not exploited in our study, first, because it does not give us information on the conduct of suburbanites after the move (Do these images persist? Are they accurate?), second, because it seems questionable whether people in the United States are interested enough in politics to change their voting preference in anticipation of a new environment. Merton's theory of anticipatory socialization was worked out in the analysis of behavior of soldiers.<sup>26</sup> The military environment differs significantly from civilian moving in at least two respects. Soldiers have a clearer idea of where they are going because their moves are bureaucratically determined, and they have a clearer idea of what they will be doing in whose company when they get there, again as a result of bureaucratic organization. This would, it seems, increase the capacity for adjusting in advance. Further, the individual would have some notion of what he would be expected to adjust to.

The general level of interest in politics as measured by the attention which it receives and the share of activity and money it attracts from the public at large in the United States has been well established. It is low.<sup>27</sup> The Detroit area, site of our research is

<sup>27</sup>Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, <u>Voting</u>, p. 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>R. K. Merton, <u>Social Theory and Social Structure</u> (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 385.

no exception to this general rule.<sup>28</sup> If we take this as given, it would appear on the face that political values should be rather easily changed or modified. Since politics itself is unimportant to most people, therefore, the particular political values possessed should be unimportant and resistance to change in this field should be minimal. This would be a correct analysis if we were dealing with a planned attempt to modify human values, but such is not the case in the suburban situation. Rather, it seems plausible that one might feel his political values. although weak, to be also irrelevant to the new status to which he **aspi**res. Since politics is not a prime concern to most Americans, why should a man change his political values in order to adapt to a new environment? The new values are not likely to ease his assimilation. nor would his old ones impede it. In addition, political values are, for most people, so far below the general level of awareness that they might not even occur to the individual in adopting the values of the new group to which he aspires.

## Primary Groups As Reference Groups

When "reference group" is held to mean membership groups with a high degree of interpersonal interaction, another approach drawn from this theory is possible. One could restrict the reference groups under consideration to those in which the individual actually participates. For the study of suburban migration these would be the new primary groups and formal organizations with which the migrant affiliates as a result of his move to the suburbs. To attack this problem one would,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>S. Eldersveld et al., <u>Political Affiliation In Metropolitan</u> <u>Detroit</u> (Ann Arbor, Michigan: <u>University of Michigan Press, 1957</u>), p. 150-151.

of course, be required to study actual migrants in the suburban situation. Here again, however, the perception of the individual as to the political values his new associates hold is more important than the "objective" reality of these value positions. While there seems to be no theoretical reason why the individual should consciously realize that he is using the new groups as a source of values, it is necessary that he have some image of the group's values.

Once again the problem of saliency of specific values for the maintenance of group affiliations is important, and once again the relatively low level of political interest in the United States is likely to act as a supressant of the phenomenon we should like to observe. If political events and opinions are perceived as unimportant and possibly annoying occurences in daily life, acculturation to the suburban milieu may slough over these values, leaving them relatively unchanged. More significant to the group might be the state of the new migrant's lawn and garden and the behavior of his children.

Still, the possible lack of saliency of political values in the suburban situation is less destructive to this use of reference group theory than to the one previously discussed. If political values are in fact unimportant to the suburban resident, it should be possible to detect, through interviewing, not merely the absence of political conversion, but also the extent of lack of interest in political matters among the suburban population. In the first formulation one might be able to check up on the city dwellers images of suburban life, but not the actual effect of suburban residence. If anticipatory socialization through identification with highly abstract reference group images did not take place, we would be left with nothing whatever to discuss.

The best way to approach the problem would be through a combination of both possible inference patterns in a modified panel-survey design. We could sample in the urban setting those areas which produced large numbers of suburban migrants and then follow through to re-interview those in the sample who did indeed move to the suburbs, to test first the effects of anticipatory socialization and then the effects of actual experiences resulting from suburban residence. In fact, however, limits on the resources for research do exist and the study sketched above must necessarily be carried out on such a scale as to make it impossible to undertake and excessively long in duration.

In the light of these restrictions the best real choice seems to be to neglect the possibility of anticipatory socialization and concentrate exclusively on the effects of suburban residence subsequent to the move. In doing this we can study almost as wide a range of political activity, and do so with more economy both in time and money, than any approach which would follow the migrant through the move. It is possible to complete our information requirements in one interview and the sample will not be as scattered as it would be if we waited for the respondent to move and then followed him whither he traveled. One can, however, think of two immediate drawbacks to this sort of study. First, the oneinterview technique depends heavily upon recall in order to determine the extent to which change in political values has taken place. Second, no measure of the effects of anticipatory socialization is possible.

The first of these is the most important, but unless one can design and support research which carries the study of the individual through the changes expected, there seems to be no way to avoid it. In addition, the studying of people through time, as in the panel technique,

produces in itself an imponderable problem in the possible effects of repeated reinterviewing on the attitudes of the respondent. The second problem is less overwhelming. If anticipatory socialization does take place, its effect on the study of change in political attitudes as a result of the suburban experience can be anticipated. There seem to be two logical possibilities. The individual adopting suburban political values in advance of his move will be either correct or incorrect in his estimate of these values. If correct, change in political attitudes will have taken place prior to the interview. If incorrect, and actual exposure to the values of suburban groups has an effect on an individual's values, the process of changing political values acquired by incorrect anticipatory socialization should be the same as the process of changing political values acquired through other forms of pre-suburban experience, and we should therefore be able to study it.

# Form Of The Study

Seven fields of data were collected through interviewing migrants to the suburb. They are:

 Political actions; specifically, reported votes in five elections.
 Attitudes towards politics in general; interest and efficacy before and after the move, and in various levels of government.

(3) Opinions on specific political questions; problems of the suburb, national questions like taxes, integration, control of business and unions, party preference, and party images.

(4) Images of neighbors political attitudes; party preferences, interest in politics, tolerance of political non-conformists.

(5) Measures of integration into the new neighborhood; satisfaction with neighborhood, interaction with neighbors, assessment of importance of

neighbors as friends.

(6) Social and economic position and recent history, and future prospects; past and present home ownership, past and present occupations, likelihood of new occupations, income, religion.

(7) Perceptions of shifts in formal group ties and friendship patterns as a result of the move.

Those who did not move to Livonia during the stipulated time, or who came from some place other than Detroit, were asked about voting behavior, political party preferences, assessment of neighbors' preferences, and present, recent past, and possible future social and economic status.

If conversion to a new pattern of political activity is associated with migration to the suburbs, our respondents should show it in their answers to the first two sets of questions, political activity and attitudes towards politics in general. The responses to the other data fields should give us some idea of the social processes associated with conversion, if it does occur.

Comparison of rates of change in political choices among migrants and old residents should give us another check on the existence of political conversion attendent upon migration, while the social and economic information will permit checking the extent to which selective migration is related to this phenomenon independently of other social and economic variables.

### CHAPTER III

## SAMPLE AND INSTRUMENT

# The Sample

Since this research was intended to study political change resulting from suburban experience, the sampling problem was rather difficult. We want to study migrants to the suburbs, and the only practical way to sample such a universe was to select people who were already living in the suburb and interview those who were recent migrants. This is a rather inefficient procedure, requiring the initiation of several interviews for each one completed.

Livonia, the suburb chosen, was a high-growth community and the predominant housing style was the owner-occupied single family dwelling. Through the co-operation of a public utility we were able to procure a one-in-twelve dwelling unit sample, geographically stratified by meter reading routes. The utility also provided us with information on the date service was started for the subscriber then residing in the dwelling unit, and from this we could eliminate many homes whose present occupant had come to the city before or after the critical period.

This period was from January 1, 1953 to January 1, 1956. Thus migrants who moved to Livonia during this time would have been eligible to vote in Detroit in the 1952 presidential election and eligible to vote in Livonia in 1956. Selecting the first of the year as a cut-off date made it easier to determine sample eligibility during the interview, and ensured that every sample subject would have been a Livonia resident for at least ten months prior to the second election. Therefore, I thought it would seem reasonable that all sample members would have been Livonians long enough for suburban residence to have had some effect, if it was to have any at all. A later terminal date might have included some people in the sample who had simply not lived in Livonia long enough to have experienced whatever changes come with suburban living, but who might have shown such changes had they been there longer.

Our potential sample was, in effect, enriched by containing more migrants than Livonia as a whole, as a result of this selective elimination. Unfortunately, service-start information was not available for the entire sample, so that we still had to find out through interviewing how long the respondents had lived in Livonia. I could think of no way to preselect potential respondents on the basis of their original residence, so the instrument also served as a device for finding those migrants who had come to Livonia from the central city.

Precisely defined, our universe consisted of migrants to Livonia, who moved there between January 1, 1953 and January 1, 1956, and whose last previous residence was inside the outer city limits of Detroit. Detroit contains two enclaves, Hamtramck and Highland Park, but migrants from these areas were considered central city residents for the purposes of this research.

I am reasonably confident that the 160 people interviewed were in fact fairly representative of this universe, but the peculiar nature of the universe made it impossible to check the representativeness of the sample through other means. No one, to my knowledge, knows how rich migrants are, how they vote, or what neighborhoods they come from.

If anyone did, the research would have been easier to do. If the representativeness of the sample is a serious problem, it is one for which no solution is now apparent, nor was one apparent at the time of the research. Livonia is not a "typical" suburb nor is Detroit a "typical" city, if there are such things. This sample is as good as one can hope for if there are no good reasons for suspecting that our migrants differ enough from other suburban migrants on the things that matter. These things are: participation in suburban social structures, participation in politics, and the interleaving of the two. Since respondents were chosen by dwelling units randomly selected from a geographically stratified list, there seems to me to be no reason to think that the sample would be unrepresentative of migrants to Livonia from Detroit between 1952 and 1956. One member of such migrant families had as near to an equal chance of being chosen as ingenuity could produce.

The interviewer did not know until the first few questions had been completed whether the individual whom he was interviewing was or was not a fit subject for the sample. A proper sample subject was one who had moved to Livonia from Detroit between January 1, 1953 and January 1, 1956. Therefore, a respondent could be excluded from the sample for any of three reasons: (1) he had lived in Livonia too long; (2) he had not lived in Livonia long enough; (3) though he had come there during the proper time span, he had come from some place other than the central city, Detroit, and its enclaves.

This study is not, properly speaking, an experimental design. There is no control group. An appropriate control group would have been a sample of those Detroit residents who could have moved to Livonia between 1952 and 1956 but didn't. Since not all subgroups in the population migrate to suburbs at the same rate, nor do they migrate to

the same suburbs, the only way to develop such a control group would be to sample Detroit and, after determining the age, income, and ethnic characteristics of the migrants to Livonia, use those in the Detroit sample who possessed the characteristics of the Livonia migrants as a control. This was beyond the means available for this study and, given the fact that we do not know what to expect from suburban migrants, it would probably have been unsound to attempt a rigidly controlled design even if it had been financially and technically feasable.

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Although those who did not fit the requirements of the sample were not a control group, it seemed desirable to ask them some questions to contrast their responses with those who were sample subjects. Nothing can be proved by such comparison, but much can be suggested. These nonsample subjects were therefore asked a shorter schedule of questions on voting, party affiliation, neighbor's party affiliation, and social and economic status. This schedule did not include questions on integration into community structures, formal organization memberships, party images, and the like. The non-sample subjects were, to the best of my knowledge, simply that -- non-sample subjects. They were not a control group, for reasons given above. They could not be assumed to be a sample of Livonians who did not fit the main sample. If sampling had begun with a complete list of Livonia dwelling units and each had therefore had an equal chance of being selected, then the non-sample subjects and sample subjects together would have been a close approximation of an equal-probability sample of adults in Livonia (neglecting sex of respondents and number of adults per household). But, the list from which the dwelling units were chosen was not a complete one. Many dwelling units were excluded because it appeared, from public utility billing records, that the respondents had not moved to Livonia during

the critical time period. Livonia was not a natural unit for old public utility records. The staff of the public utility was unwilling to check back on the dates on which service was initiated for those who lived in the western and southwestern areas of the city. Non-sample subjects living in these areas were more likely to be interviewed than those who lived in the eastern fringes of the suburb because those residents of the eastern portion who moved to Livonia before the sample period could be excluded from the sample on the basis of public utility records. Since Livonia is a collection of subdivisions whose houses and lots vary widely in age and price, the geographic distortion in the collection of non-sample subjects is likely to produce a social and economic bias of indeterminate size and direction. The non-sample subjects are not an equal-probability sample of anything in particular, and if they are representative of any universe, I do not know what it is.

As this research was directed towards the processes of social and political change associated with suburban migration, there was more concern with collecting interviews with sample subjects than non-sample subjects. Interviewers were therefore instructed not to take any more short interviews (with non-sample subjects) after we had collected about two-hundred (two-hundred and fourteen, to be exact), so that more of their time might be devoted to gathering long interviews with the migrants. This had no effects on the kinds of people represented by short interviews, because addresses were taken from the list in random order.

Later in this report the answers of sample subjects (migrants interviewed at length) and non-sample subjects (non-migrants, interviewed briefly) on several questions are compared. The non-sample

subjects were not deliberately chosen to represent any particular group of people. There is no intended bias in the composition of this group, but since they are not an equal-probability sample of Livonians the reader must realize the comparisons between non-sample subjects and sample subjects should not be considered rigorous proof of similarities or differences between two populations. These comparisons are suggestive, perhaps enlightening, but that is all. The care with which social science research ought to be conducted is designed, it seems to me, to allow the reader to decide the degree of credence to give to the results of the research. Those aspects of this report which depend upon comparison between sample and non-sample subjects deserve less confidence than they would have had they been done with absolute rigor, but, I think, more than if the respondents had been merely casually collected.

### The Instrument-Long Form

In pretesting the questions to be asked of sample subjects, it became apparent that shifts in social status associated with moving to Livonia were not common. From this it appeared that if shifts in voting pattern were to occur in any large proportion of the sample, they could not be the result of rising social and economic status. Therefore, although some questions in the extended interview were directed towards social and economic change and its relation to changes in voting pattern and other forms of political activity, the main objective of the schedule was to test the Lazarsfeld hypothesis that primary group affiliations are a major factor in political choice. Social status and economic position are well-established correlates of voting behavior in static situations, but little is known of the effects of changing social and economic status on political choice. This study, based on migrants to a relatively low income suburb, does not provide the most efficient situation in which to examine that important phenomenon, simply because it did not appear that very many of the migrants had risen very far.

Also, the determinants of social and economic position as social scientists use the term are far more precise than the self-image of social position in the American belief system. No one, to my knowledge, would argue that a person who rises in social and economic status thinks, "I have risen in social status to a position in which most people vote Republican, therefore I will vote Republican." As Krech and Crutchfield phrase it:

> "... to assert that the reason Arbuthnot goes to church is given in the observed correlation between churchgoing and the socio-economic level of which Arbuthnot is a member is an instance of attempting to answer a psychological question by reference to an institutional law."1

In designing this schedule, I therefore placed heavy emphasis on questions designed to elicit a relation between voting change and change in primary group interaction. The interview approached this problem in several different ways so that one or more might be successful. The problem of social and economic status change, though not ignored, was more perfunctorily treated.

The opening questions in the schedule determined whether the respondent was a sample subject or not. Following this came a series of recall questions about the move to the suburbs. How long did it take them to decide to move to Livonia? What were the advantages and drawbacks of living there? How long did it take to get acquainted? Did

<sup>1</sup>D. Krech and R. Crutchfield, <u>Theory And Problems Of Social</u> <u>Psychology</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948), p.24. the move result in seeing people they used to know less than before?<sup>2</sup>

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Then began a series of questions on the objective characteristics of their activities with neighbors. Do you ever drink coffee with the neighbors, how often? Chat with them, how often? Visit with them, how often? Go to parties with them, how often? Mixed in with this series were questions designed to get some idea of the respondent's satisfaction with his place in the neighborhood based social group. "Do you think the people around here are more interested in each other than the people in Detroit, less interested or about the same?" "Do you have as much privacy as you used to?" "Are you satisfied with the degree of friendliness in the neighborhood?" "Do you feel you see as much of the neighbors as you would like?"

Next came a series of questions on the degree to which the respondent valued his neighbors as important to him. "Do you feel closer to the people who live in the neighborhood than to friends elsewhere or less close?" "Do you think you know them better or not as well?" "Do you value their good opinion more or less than your other acquaintances?"

It was hoped that among these questions would be some which would provide an index of integration into the neighborhood and of changing friendship patterns which might be related to political change.

After this series, respondents were asked about their membership in formal organizations, their memories being jogged by a list of types of formal groups, and any shifts in organization memberships as a result of the move were inquired into. The interviewers also asked about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Throughout this chapter any questions set off by quotation marks are exactly as they appear in the schedule. Those not set off are paraphrased. The complete schedule appears in Appendix A.

topics of conversation in Livonia and Detroit.

Until this point, about halfway through the schedule, no political questions were asked. The respondent was led into political matters through a series of questions designed to elicit his level of political interaction. Do you ever discuss problems of local government with your friends? How often? Do you ever discuss politics in general? How often? "Would you say you were more interested, or less interested in local government than most of the people you know?"

Then began an attempt to estimate satisfaction with government and sense of political efficacy by asking first whether they thought they had a "say in government" in Livonia and then in Detroit and then whether these governments seemed "close to the average man's desires." This series finished with three questions on differential interest in state and national, as opposed to local political affairs.

Having been introduced to the topic of politics in general, the respondent was asked about partisan commitments and their meaning. He was asked to identify with a party, probes were devised to get at marginal identifications, and he was asked to estimate the political affiliation of "most of the people who live around here," and the "people back in Detroit where you used to live."

The first attempt to determine the saliency of political affiliation in the suburbs followed with the question, "How much attention do you think people around here pay to each other's political beliefs?", and a similar question on their Detroit neighbors.

After this the interviewers introduced the matter of political conversion, asking, "Have you changed your party preference in recent years?" If the answer was yes, respondents were asked, "When was that?" and "What were your reasons?"

The next step was to determine what allegiance or identification with one or the other of the political parties meant to the respondent. For this purpose we asked six questions:

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(1) "Do you think the government should do more to control big business?"
(2) "Do you think the government should do more to control labor unions?"
(3) "Do you think the federal government should provide financial aid to schools?"

(4) "Do you think the government should force schools to integrate racially?"

(5) "Do you think the government should increase services to people even if it means raising taxes?"

(6) "Do you think the government should cut taxes even if it means reducing its services to people?"

Not content with mere classification of the responses of Democrats and Republicans in our sample to these questions, respondents were also asked:

(1) "How do you think most Republicans would answer these questions?"
(2) "What about Democrats? How would most of them feel on these questions?"

(3) "What about most of the people around here? How do you think they would feel?"

(4) "What about the people where you used to live? How do you think they would feel about them?"

Next came the central point of the schedule, a series of questions on registration and voting in the 1952, 1954, and 1956 elections for the office of Governor, and, in 1952 and 1956 for President, followed by the question, "Do you vote a straight ticket or generally split your ballot?" To re-examine the possibility of neighborhood primary groups affecting political choice we then asked a series of projective questions. These appear in their entirety, with probes, in Appendix A, but the three basic questions were:

(1) "Many people have said in books and magazines that people who move to the suburbs are likely to become very much like their neighbors in political beliefs. Do you think that sort of thing happens around here?"

(2) "Do you think a person would feel out of place here if his politics were different from those of a lot of people in the neighborhood?"
(3) "Suppose a man lived around here who had very strong political beliefs that were different from his neighbors!? How do you think he would act when politics were discussed?"

The schedule ended with a series of control questions on occupations, past, present, or anticipated, income, and housing, past and present, including the owners estimate of his home's value.

As one can see, the instrument was designed to produce the most varied possible set of information on the relation between informal group membership and political conversion. There are two distinct measures of political change, party commitment, and voting pattern, plus other questions designed to examine changes in interest in government associated with the move. Since there was no way to be certain what sorts of questions would disclose change in informal group membership as a result of moving, several series of questions based on several different approaches were used. We were concerned in this instrument to detect change in political behavior and to link it, if possible, to some specific aspects of suburban experience. If political change were related to change in primary group structure we should have been able to get at it with this instrument. If not, we still have a rich mine of information on political interest, political party images, and neighborhood activities in the suburbs.

# The Short Schedule

Most of those respondents who were eliminated from membership in the main sample through the preliminary questions were asked a severely truncated form of the schedule. We asked for their party affiliation, voting record, party affiliation of neighbors, and the same information on social and economic status. This gives us enough information to compare rates of change between the groups and sub-sections of the nonsample group, but no way to study the effects of integration into the neighborhood on change in the non-migrants.

If the study were to be repeated the instrument could be improved by developing a technique of detecting changers early in the question period and concentrating our efforts upon them. In any instrument of this size there are, of course, some questions that do not work. Some did not work because we could not get enough people to answer them. Some because we could not understand the answers (the respondents having interpreted the questions differently). Many did not work in the sense that they provided what seem to be reliable data but did not discriminate between changers and non-changers. The first two deficiencies can be minimized, though not eliminated, by pre-testing, and we did the best we could here. The last can only be known after analysis of the results unless the researcher is engaged on a problem whose nature has been much better defined in existing theory than has ours.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### THE MIGRANT IN THE SUBURB

Political change among migrants could hardly occur as a result of new social relations in suburbia if the move to suburbia does not produce new patterns of social relations. One would certainly expect movers from the central city to suburbia to meet new people and to interact with them in new ways, but it seems desirable to find out just what changes did occur in the social lives of our sample as a result of the move, and how they reacted to those changes.

There is no discussion in this chapter of political change. We merely describe the motives for moving to suburbia, the satisfactions and dissatisfactions with the life there after the move, and the degree to which our respondents see themselves as developing new ties to different people as a result of the move. This is necessary because, if these new ties did not develop, there would be no possibility of explaining such political change as does occur in our sample as a correlate of social change. The argument here parallels that made in Chapter III, page 44 on the relation between upward social and economic mobility and voting change in our sample. There we argued that, since our sample did not show any great degree of upward social and economic mobility associated with their move to the suburbs, such pro-Republican political change as did occur could hardly be the result of upward mobility. Similarly, we must determine that change in primary group membership occurs in our sample before we can examine the relation between change in primary group membership and change in voting and party preference.

This is not a study of migration <u>per se</u>. Therefore we are not primarily interested in what makes people move. In Chapter II we discussed the possibility of anticipatory socialization occuring among those in the city who plan to move to the suburbs. This possible explanation is not one of the foci of the study, but we did collect information on the length of time people thought over their move which might illuminate this possibility. If anticipatory socialization occurs, it would seem that it could only take place among those who considered moving for some substantial period before the actual move.

#### Speed Of Decision To Move

Our respondents were asked how long they thought over their move, whether it was a quick decision or one they considered for a time before acting. This is an extremely subjective and tenuous measure of the speed of decision. It can be defended, of course, by assuming that the subjective speed of the decision is more interesting than the number of months the move was pondered. Six months might be undo haste for one family and six weeks an interminable delay for another. To get some idea of this phenomenon, however, the following question was asked, "About how long would you say you thought it over?" When we compare these two measures of speed of decision against each other, the following table results.

As one can see, the objective and subjective estimates of decision agree fairly well. More than 90 per cent of those who thought it over a month or less decided quickly, while more than 90 per cent of those who thought it over more than five months said they thought it over a

while before moving. Seventy and two-tenths per cent of the entire sample felt they contemplated the move to the suburbs for some time and, from our earlier argument, among these anticipatory socialization may have taken place.

#### TABLE II

# COMPARISON OF OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE ESTIMATES OF SPEED OF DECISION TO MOVE.\*

Objective	Subjective Estimate					
Estimate	Quick De Number	Per Cent	Thought Number	it over Per Cent	Tot Number	al Per Cent
One month or						
less	25	96.2	1	3.8	26	100.0
Two to four months	16	47.1	18	52.9	34	100.0
Five months or more	4	4.4	87	95.6	91	100.0
Total	45	29.8	106	70.2	151	100.0

\*Non-response eliminated.

It is difficult to determine, on the basis of our data whether our sample was "pushed" to Livonia or "pulled" there. Did they move to the suburbs because conditions in their Detroit neighborhoods became intolerable, or because the suburb environment looked better to them. Although we did not collect information on this point some hints are presented in the free responses stimulated by this question and noted verbatim by the interviewers.

### Motives For Moving

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These free responses were not, of course, forthcoming from every respondent, but enough are available to permit a reasonable estimate of the major impetus for fast moves to the suburbs. As one respondent put it, "There are no niggers out here. I woke up one morning in Detroit and found one living next door. Sold my house right away and lost a thousand bucks after I'd lived there less than one and a half years. I woke up and saw him washing windows and he said, 'I am your new neighbor.' He was a good neighbor but I can't live next to a nigger."

Though few of our respondents were as forthright in their motives for moving as this one, responses to other questions left little doubt as to a major reason for suburban migration. In talking of organizations to which they belonged in Detroit one respondent said, "The only one we joined was a civic association to do something about the negroes." Another, when asked about the degree of socializing in her Detroit neighborhood said, "...we had a close Irishwoman friend who moved about the same time we did. Later the neighborhood filled up with colored people and we both moved at that point." When asked their reason for moving **another** respondent replied, "Racial differences in our Detroit neighborhood."

For these people it does not seem to be stretching things much to see them as "pushed" to Livonia. What attracts them to the suburb are not its relatively low cost homes or its lower taxes, but the fact that it is lily-white and likely to remain so. Geographic segregation by race is a characteristic of the entire Detroit Metropolitan Area, but, except for the suburb of Dearborn, where it is the major political plank of the incumbent mayor, its political implications do not seem critical.
Neither of the national parties in Michigan makes any direct appeals to the anti-negro predilections of the voters. The cynic would argue that this results from the politician's lively appreciation of the large number of negroes registered to vote in Michigan. The idealist would attribute the absence of such appeals on the state level to the high principles of the leaders of both parties.

A conclusion which can be drawn, however, is that moving to the suburb of Livonia is not perceived by many of our respondents as a sign of advancing social status. It is rather a means of protecting the status they already had by seeking areas where they can continue to live in all-white surroundings in the face of the rapid movement of Negroes into previously white areas of Detroit.

There are, of course, other reasons for the move to Livonia than the escape from Negro neighbors. One of the most important is the price of housing in that city. Although development within this large suburb has taken place on a wide range of income levels, the lowest priced houses can be sold because buyers are easily convinced that these dwellings offer more new house for the money than one can get within Detroit. This motive comes to the fore when people tell how they happened to choose Livonia in particular as a place to live. As the quotations which follow clearly show, many and possibly most of the migrants to Livonia are buying a house, not a community. This is not surprising.

To sell Livonia as a community in 1958 when the interviewing was done, or between 1952 and 1956 when the migrants came there, would have been a difficult task. Livonia is of vast area for a suburb, thirtysix square miles. It was formed through the incorporation of an entire township in 1950. This move was designed to head off piecemeal incorporation which would have robbed the township of valuable industrial tax resources and disproportionately enriched those people living near the plants and the then-new race track. Much of the total area of the city, which made it the second largest in the state, was still farmland at the time of this study, and the city had no real downtown area or commercial center to pull it together. Shopping facilities were provided rather poorly in the opinion of many of our respondents, by several widely scattered shopping plazas near housing developments which were themselves isolated from each other in many cases.

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Scattered throughout the area were a smaller number of still more isolated single homes, some old, some new, and the northeast corner was largely dominated by the near slum of Clarenceville, homes in which tended to be small, run down, and older. Let us have some of our respondents speak for themselves on what brought them to Livonia in particular.

When asked to think back to the move to Livonia the respondents freely said such things as, "We were looking for a low priced house, whether it was Livonia or not made no difference." Another said, "We wanted an inexpensive place near the city--didn't choose Livonia actually."

There were no free responses which indicate an interest in Livonia as a community, nor does an interviewer get the impression that his subjects were seeking such an environment when they moved to this suburb. It would appear, on the contrary, that the target of migrants from the city was a home, or at most a subdivision, rather than a community. Of course the fact that Livonia was chosen as the site of the research might well have biased our findings in regard to the motives for moving. Anyone looking for a place to live in a well-established community with a

clear-cut "social-image" would be unlikely to select Livonia. It is as yet too new, and too spread-out to have developed one.

I would argue from this that the decision to neglect anticipatory socialization in the design of the research instrument was sound. For, if Livonia is not sought after, if it has no clear image in the minds of those who move there, it seems unlikely that they can adjust to it in advance.

#### Social Relations

Let us now turn to the social aspect of migration to the suburb. To what extent does the migrant participate in social activities with his new neighbors?

Respondents were first asked how long it took them to get acquainted in the neighborhood. This question led into a series designed to produce some estimate of their degree of integration with the new social structures. One hundred sixteen of them reported that they got acquainted "right away," while 43 said it "took a while."

One might have expected that those who took longer to get acquainted would be less likely to be well integrated into neighborhood social structures, but such does not seem to be the case. Frequently those who said it took a while volunteered reasons for this. One would assume from this that respondents felt that they <u>ought</u> to have gotten acquainted rapidly. The three most common voluntary explanations (we did <u>not</u> ask respondents to explain their answer to this question) were that everyone in the family worked, that the houses in that area were widely spaced when the respondent moved in, or that they moved in during the winter when the casual social life of Livonia is at its lowest ebb. This seasonal variation in socialization was noted by many respondents as quite characteristic. As one respondent put it, "We chat whenever we see each other--depends on the season, often in the summer, infrequently in the winter." Another reported talking with her neighbors once a day "maybe oftener but it depends on the season of the year."

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The next step was to ask <u>how</u> the neighbors were contacted. This too was a lead-in question, not particularly important in itself. Evidently the initial acquaintanceship patterns are determined almost entirely by proximity. Most of the respondents met the neighbors just because they <u>were</u> neighbors, not through introduction by other friends or some other pattern. The most commonly mentioned reason for acquaintance, other than proximity, was children, but this seems so likely to be related to geography as to be insignificantly different from it.

The first really important question in this series asked about the changes in social life as a result of the move. Our interviewers asked, "Since you moved here do you find you see less of the people you used to know in Detroit, or are you still keeping up your old contacts?" The importance of this question stems from our hypothesis on the relation between primary group patterns and voting behavior. Unless some fairly large proportion of the sample sees less of the people they once associated with in Detroit, it would be impossible to argue that they have replaced one set of associates with another. The new friendship patterns which resulted from suburban migration would merely have been grafted onto old roots.

Since 41.9 per cent of the sample <u>did</u> feel that they now saw less of their previous acquaintances, it could be possible that changes in social circles were related to changes in political behavior. For this to be true, the rate of political change among those who had drifted away from their Detroit friends would have to be significantly higher than

#### TABLE III

#### SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH DETROIT FRIENDS.

Subjective Appraisal of Frequency of Contact	Number Responding	Per Cent
See less of them	67	41.9
Still keeping up contact	90	56.2
No Response	3	1.9
Total	160	100.0

If the new social relations dominate past ones and are associated with political change, as they might if politics is salient, we should expect the migrants to assess these new social patterns as more intense, more intimate than those in which they participated prior to their move.

We asked the respondents whether they thought people were more, less, or about as interested in each other in Livonia as they had been in Detroit, and whether more, less or the same amount of visiting, chatting, and coffee drinking with neighbors went on as did in Detroit. The answers to these questions and our respondents comments on them clearly indicate that the migrants as a group perceive a significant difference in the degree of neighborhood interaction between the central city and the suburb.

The majority of the respondents felt that people in Livonia were more interested in each other than they had been in Detroit, and only six and three tenths per cent felt them to be less interested.

#### TABLE IV

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# RESPONDENT'S ESTIMATE OF PEOPLES' INTEREST IN EACH OTHER IN LIVONIA AS COMPARED WITH DETROIT.

Interest	Number Responding	Per Cent
More interested	93	58.2
Same	55	34.4
Less interested	10	6.3
No response	2	1.2
Total	160	100.1

## TABLE V

# RESPONDENT'S ESTIMATE OF THE SOCIAL ACTIVITY AMONG NEIGHBORS AS COMPARED WITH DETROIT.

Activity	Number Responding	Per Cent
More social activity	90	56.2
As much	31	19.4
Less	32	20.0
No response	7	4.4
Total	160	100.0

The responses to the question on the level of social activity in Livonia paralleled those on level of interest. Again more than half the sample thought there was more social activity, but 20 per cent of the sample felt there was less. On the balance however, it seems fair to say that most of the sample find Livonia to be a place where people socialize more and more intensely than in their former Detroit neighborhoods. The free responses to these questions are, in the main consistent with this interpretation. For example, our respondents said such things as, "When you need somebody here they are always around to help." "The neighbors are more interested in each other here for community purposes. In Detroit they were interested for gossip." Another respondent commented, "I'm no judge, I imagine there <u>were</u> people there that did it (chatted with neighbors), but I didn't know them." One woman commented, "In the apartment building I lived in most everyone worked and there were no children, so we weren't too social at all. Children beget friends, I think."

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Some, of course, are no more intimate with their neighbors in Livonia than they were in Detroit. Their free responses suggest some possible explanations of this. Livonia is, in many areas, still sparsely settled and respondents from these regions said such things as, "The houses are not as close together here, so there is less visiting," or, "We can't get to the neighbors' houses as often because of the distance." Others simply found Detroit more congenial and said, "Our old neighborhood was unusually friendly," and "We lived in an apartment and it was easier for people to visit back and forth."

Although the assessment of Livonia as a place with a high degree of social activity is clear, the response of our sample to the question, "Do you socialize as much as the other neighbors?", is not what one might suspect on first thought.

It would seem that though most of the respondents perceive a very active social life existing, most of them see themselves as less active than average in this respect. This may well be analagous to the collective misperceptions of politics and advertising described by Riesman in The Lonely Crowd.

"Just as the mass media persuade people that other people think politics is important, so they persuade people that everyone else cannot wait for his new refrigerator or car or suit of clothes. In neither case can the people believe that 'the others' are as apathetic as they feel themselves to be."<sup>1</sup>

I do not suggest that the mass media are the source of the disparity in our case, though it is possible that they are.

### TABLE VI

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# SELF-APPRAISAL OF DEGREE OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY COMPARED TO NEIGHBORS.

Degree of Socializing	Number Responding	Per Cent
More than other neighbors	10	6.3
As much as other neighbors	59	36.8
Less than other neighbors	84	52.5
No response	7	4.4
Total	160	100.0

This general disparity between the general level of activity and their own does not however seem to indicate any profound or deepseated dissatisfaction with the degree to which they are part of the neighborhood circle on the part of our respondents. At least it does not if we can take their responses to two questions on satisfaction with neighborhood life at face value. In answer to the question, "Do you feel you see as much of the neighbors as you would like to?", 149 respondents said yes, nine said no, and two did not answer. When asked

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>D. Riesman, <u>The Lonely Crowd</u> (Anchor Edition; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 264.

whether they were satisfied with the degree of friendliness in the neighborhood, 147 were satisfied, six wished people were friendlier, four would prefer less intimacy, and three did not respond.

Besides these subjective appraisals of the neighborhood, some questions were designed to classify respondents into those who saw a great deal of the neighbors and those who saw less of them. These were deemed important since presumably those most interested in and active with the neighbors should be those most affected by their neighbor's political values. The questions asked the frequency with which respondents, (1) had coffee with the neighbors, (2) chatted with them outdoors, (3) attended parties with them, and (4) dropped in on them to visit in the day or evening. The responses as to the frequencies were combined into an objective index of neighboring activity, and respondents were classified in four categories with respect to this index.

## TABLE VII

Frequency	Number of Respondents	Per Cent
High	27	16.9
Medium high	39	24.4
Medium low	80	50.0
Low	14	8.7
Total	160	100.0

#### FREQUENCY OF NEIGHBORING ACTIVITY.

An attempt was also made to assess the degree to which respondents valued their neighbor's assessment of them compared to other acquaintances. Three different questions probed this phenomenon, but none was really successful. Respondents told us, (1) whether they felt closer to their neighbors or to friends elsewhere, (2) whether they felt they knew their neighbors or their friends elsewhere better, and (3) whether they valued more highly the good opinion of their neighbors or their friends elsewhere.

## TABLE VIII

Neighbors vs. Other Friends	Closen Number	ess Per Cent	Know Be Number	tter Per Cent	Value G Number	ood Opinion Per Cent
Neighbors	23	14.4	18	11.3	12	7.5
Same	43	26.8	44	27.4	109	68.2
Other friends	93	58.2	96	60.0	35	21.9
No response	1	.6	2	1.2	4	2.5
Total	160	100.0	160	99.9	160	100.1

# THREE MEASURES OF INTIMACY WITH NEIGHBORS AS COMPARED TO OTHER FRIENDS.

The responses to these questions are rather less useful than one might wish. In two of the three categories, "closeness," and "know better," more than half the respondents felt that their relations with other friends were more intimate than those with their neighbors. In the third category, "value good opinion," the dominant response was "same" and it was usually explained by saying, "I want everyone to have a good opinion of me." I think the main problem was the use of the phrase "friends elsewhere" in asking the questions. It seems likely that the implications of this phrase for our respondents is that of close, intimate friends. Judging by these standards it does seem likely that one should feel closer to such friends and should feel one knows them better than one's neighbors. This should have been caught during pretesting and the phrase changed, perhaps to "other people you know," or "your other acquaintances."

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If one takes these responses at face value it would be necessary to conclude that the social system of our suburban neighborhoods, though producing a high level of activity is not correspondingly productive of a high degree of intensity or intimacy of social interaction. This may in fact be true. Whyte, in <u>The Organization Man<sup>2</sup></u> suggests this, but I should have more confidence in asserting this conclusion if the respondents had been more consistent in their responses to our questions. There did not seem to be any pattern to responses to these questions when tabulated against each other. Those who felt closer to their neighbors than to friends elsewhere were quite likely to feel they knew friends elsewhere better than they did their neighbors and vice versa.

## Sources Of Present Friends

If the suburbs were to provide the social interactions from which new political decisions were developed, we should expect that neighbors, who presumably are different now than they were in Detroit would provide

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Whyte, <u>The Organization Man</u>, p. 319. "The transients do hunger for deeper roots, but because they have sought so hard they have found something of what they are looking for...They are developing a <u>new</u> kind of roots. The roots are, to be sure, shallow--but like those of the redwood tree, even shallow roots, if there are enough of them, can give a great deal of support."

a large share of the people with whom the suburbanites interacted. Therefore, our respondents were asked, "How would you say you met most of the people you see socially these days?" Responses to this were somewhat forced, in that we presented them with the following alternatives: neighbors, fellow church members, fellow members of clubs or other organizations, people you or your husband-wife met at work, friends of relatives, other.

### TABLE IX

Source	Number	Per Cent
Neighbors	96 81	26.1
Fellow club members	52	14.1
Fellow church members Friends of relatives	50 39	13.6 10.6
"Other" Responses		
Old friends Children's friends	30 9	8.1 2.4
Relatives Friends of friends	8	2.2
Sports	ī	.3
Total	368	99•9

# SOURCE OF MIGRANT'S PRESENT ACQUAINTANCE.

Many people gave more than one source of "most" of the people they saw socially, but it seemed more reasonable to take their multiple responses rather than force them to make a single choice. Clearly neighbors and work associates provide the source of present acquaintances for our sample, with fellow members of clubs and churches somewhat less frequently cited.

#### Summary

What has the interviewing of this sample of migrants to Livonia revealed? First of all, there seems to be little likelihood that people came to Livonia for its own sake. Most of those who comment on their choice of residence suggest that "the suburbs" was their goal, and the price of homes within a particular development was the attraction of Livonia. The decision to move was a rapid one for a sizeable part of our sample, but more than half of them thought it over six months or more. Among those who moved quickly, twenty reported thinking over the move for less than a month; there is some hint that the move was almost a flight from a rapidly changing neighborhood, from undesirable neighbors, in short, from negroes. Parenthetically, no one in our sample was non-white and the two census tracts comprising Livonia in 1950 had no non-white residents.

Upon moving to the suburbs the migrant is likely to perceive his new neighborhood as a friendly place, markedly higher in social activity than was his old Detroit neighborhood. Somewhat more than a third of our respondents find that they see less of their former friends, and many of those who still see them report that they too have moved, often nearby.

Although the level of social activity in the neighborhood is typically seen as very high, relatively few of our migrants perceive themselves as being more active than their neighbors and more than half of them think themselves less active. It may be that no one is as active as everyone seems to be.

The information as to the intensity of social relations with neighbors among our sample was disappointing. To the extent that it

can be relied on at all it seems to indicate a relatively low degree of commitment to neighbors as compared to "other friends," but neighbors rank highest among all the sources of present acquaintances and are closely approached in number only by the category "people you (or your wife or husband) meet at work."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The beginnings of a theory of the integration of migrants into suburban social and political structures can be found in S. Greer, "The Social Structure And Political Process Of Suburbia," <u>American Sociological Review</u>, (XXV, 4, August 1960), pp. 514-526. It is Greer's contention that as the degree of urbanism decreases its inverse, familialism, increases, more adults in the suburb will participate in informal, formal, and political activities and they will do so more intensely.

## CHAPTER V

# SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS OF THE SAMPLE GROUPS

To study the changes in political affiliation patterns which are associated with suburban migration, we must first discuss the nature of political affiliation itself. Much of the confusion that presently exists in most discussions of American voting behavior stems from the vagueness and ambiguities present in this concept. For example, very few studies of voting in the United States have concerned themselves with more than one office in any given election, yet we know that split ticket voting is fairly common from observing the outcome of elections in states such as Michigan. Therefore in this chapter we shall present information on the party affiliation patterns and socio-economic characteristics of the sample groups.

The respondents may be divided into two major classifications, sample subjects and non-sample subjects (see Chapter III). The sample subjects were the 160 respondents who moved to Livonia from Detroit between January 1, 1953 and January 1, 1956. These respondents were administered extended interviews. Non-sample subjects did not fit the above criteria and were given shorter schedules. Non-sample subjects are not, however, a homogeneous group. There were three reasons why a person might not fit the criteria of the sample: first, he had lived in Livonia too long; second, he had come to Livonia from Detroit, but too recently; third, he had come to Livonia within the proper time period but not from Detroit. After some consideration it was decided to divide the non-sample subjects into two groups, "Old-timers," those who lived in Livonia before January 1, 1953, and "Newcomers," those who came after that time. The term "Migrants" refers to sample subjects, "Newcomers" to those who were not sample subjects for reasons two and three above. For the purposes of gross description it does not seem necessary to separate newcomers from Detroit from newcomers from other areas, though in the analysis of political change this will be done to some extent.

#### Sex

First, the sexual composition of the samples will be discussed.

## TABLE X

Sex	Migra	ants	0ld-t:	Lmers	Newcomers	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number Per Cent	
Male	37	23.2	38	28.8	22 26.8	
Female	123	76.8	94	71.2	60 73.2	
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82 100.0	

#### SEX BY SAMPLE TYPE.

Obviously, all three sample types heavily overrepresent women. This was expected, but not deliberate. Most of the interviewing was done during working hours when the at-home population of the suburb is largely female. The male respondents largely came from week-end and early evening interviews. The extra advantages of securing a sample in better sexual balance were not deemed worth the added expense this would entail. Primarily, I decided that women could be presumed to display the greatest effects from new neighborhood-based primary group relations, since a larger part of their lives would be involved in such groups. Also, I have little confidence in the argument that women respond to political appeals in a different way from men.<sup>1</sup> Political response was felt to be a phenomenon of the nuclear family. It might be argued that the rather low level of political interest and involvement was a result of the sexual bias in our sample, but in fact the men interviewed split about as the women do on this question (see Appendix B).

As was noted in Chapter III, migrants were interviewed far more exhaustively than non-sample subjects. Much interesting information on political affiliation and interest is not available for the non-sample subjects, and we know nothing of their participation in suburban social life generally. Still, enough <u>is</u> available to make for some interesting analysis.

## Age

The interviewers asked standard social and economic control questions of all the sample groups. One of the variables on which sharp differences in composition between the groups was apparent was age. The mean age of migrants, computed on exact ages, was 37.5 years, of newcomers 34.5 years, of old-timers 43.2 years. The F-ratio between these three groups was 20.15, degrees of freedom 2 and 367 (F for d.f. = 2, 200, 6.76 at the .01 level). Quite obviously then, there was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See W. Miller, "The Political Behavior Of The Electorate," in <u>American Government Annual</u>, 1960-61 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.) pp. 41-42 for a good brief discussion of this problem.

a significant difference in age distribution between the three groups. It is also interesting to note the difference in concentration of age between these sample types. The standard deviation of the migrants (sample subject) group was 11.3, of the newcomers, 8.8, and of the oldtimers, 12.9. Not only were those who had lived in Livonia before 1953 older, on the average, but they were far more dispersed in age than either of the other two sample types. The newcomers group, those who came to Livonia after 1953, but were non-sample subjects for other reasons, were the youngest and the most homogeneous in age.

## TABLE XI

Age	Migran Number	nts Per Cent	Old <b>-ti</b> Number	mers Per Cent	Newcom Number	ers Per Cent	
25 and under	11	6.9	5	3.8	8	9.8	
26-35	70	43.8	31	23.5	45	54.9	
36-45	56	35.0	41	31.1	20	24.4	
46 <b>-</b> 55	11	6.9	31	23.5	7	8.5	
56 and over	10	6.3	22	16.7	2	2.4	
No response	2	1.3	2	1.5	-	-	
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.0	

#### AGE BY SAMPLE TYPE.

#### Income

All respondents were asked to give their annual family income. The income categories used in the table following duplicate those used in asking the question. We are most interested in relative income ranges between the groups so the fact that precision is not likely with such a question is less important.

# TABLE XII

Income	Migra Number	nts Per Cent	Old-ti Number	mers Per Cent	Newcome Numbe <b>r</b>	rs Per Cent	
0-\$2,999	4	2.5	9	6.8	2	2.4	
3,000-4,999	10	6.3	20	15.2	11	13.4	
5,000-5,999	20	12.5	22	16.7	7	8.5	
6,000-6,999	26	16.3	19	14.4	12	14.6	
7,000-7,999	32	20.0	16	12.1	17	20.7	
8,000-8,999	15	9.4	9	6.8	6	7.3	
9,000-9,999	20	12.5	11	8.3	7	8.5	
Over \$10,000	25	15.6	16	12.1	14	17.1	
No response	8	5.0	10	7.6	6	7.3	
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.0	

ANNUAL FAMILY INCOME BY SAMPLE TYPE.

The midrange values were used in estimating mean income: \$0-2,999, 1,500; 3,000-4,999, 4,000; 5,000-5,999, 5,500, etc. for those reporting income over \$10,000, 11,500 was arbitrarily chosen as a value to be used in computing mean income.

## TABLE XIII

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MEAN INCOME AND PER CENT REPUBLICAN, OF THOSE EXPRESSING A PARTY PREFERENCE, FOR AGE GROUPS IN EACH SAMPLE TYPE.\*

Age Group	Migrants	Old-timers	Newcomers
30 or less Mean income Per cent Republican	7305 72.6	6687 61.7	7679 52.4
Number	41	23	28
31-40 Mean income Per cent Republican Number	7906 29.6 64	7523 54.5 39	7294 37.9 34
41-50 Mean income Per cent Republican Number	8097 43.3 31	6583 53•9 30	7286 33.3 7
51-60 Mean income Per cent Republican Number	8428 50.0 7	7500 41.2 19	7027 50.0 6
Over 60 Mean income Per cent Republican Number	5214 71.4 7	2500 60.0 9	5500 - 1
Total Mean income Per cent Republican Number	7683 45.5 150	6717 53.5 120	7395 42.6 <b>7</b> 6

\*Those reporting both age and income only.

We are interested in income as a preliminary to the investigation of political behavior. Voting records indicate a decreasing proportion of Republican voters in Livonia, at least for state offices. If, on interviewing, more old residents are found to be Republican than is true among the other groups, it would be appropriate to learn the extent to which this can be attributed to higher economic status among the old residents. Clearly, from Table XII, the old residents are <u>not</u> significantly better off than the migrant sample subjects or newcomers (nonsample subjects). Since the old residents have a high average age and wider range of ages, merely comparing average incomes would not give us this information, for older people tend to earn less as a result of retirement.<sup>2</sup> In Table XIII, however, we see mean incomes compared by ten year age groups. Old residents in similar age groups report incomes averaging from \$387 to \$2,714 below migrants and in no age group is the average income higher than that of the migrants. The relation between newcomers (non-sample subjects) and migrants (sample subjects) and old-timers is not so clear. In the youngest age group newcomers have the highest income. In the 31-40 group, they have the lowest. In the other age groups the newcomers have a very low cell N which makes comparison difficult.

The old-timers therefore are more Republican than newcomers or migrants, not because the old-timers are wealthier, nor because they are older, but basically because there are far more Republicans among the old-timers in the 31 to 40 and 41 to 50 age groups, those which are the most Democratic in the newcomer and migrant samples.

## Home Ownership And Value

Another index of economic status is the respondent's estimate of the value of his home.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In Table XII the differences between the three groups are significant at below .001 level, H = 16.43. H is the statistic produced by a Kruskal-Wallace one way analysis of variance, by ranks, and is distributed like chi-square.

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Housing Type	Migr Number	Migrants Number Per Cent		imers Per Cent	Newcomers Number Per Cent		
Own or buying home	151	94.3	122	92.5	69	84.1	
Rent	2	1.3	4	3.0	9	11.0	
Not ascertained	7	4.4	6	4.5	4	4.9	
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.0	

# LIVONIA HOUSING BY SAMPLE TYPE.

We asked respondents if they owned or were buying a home, or if they rented. Six of the migrants refused to answer this, yet told the interviewer the value of the home they occupied. These were classified as owning or buying a home. Five newcomers and eight old-timers similarly responded and were similarly classified.

As Table XIV shows, the lowest proportion of homeowners is, as might be expected, among the newcomers. Even in this group only nine, 11.0 per cent are renters. Only one and three tenths per cent of the migrants are renters and only three per cent of the old-timers.

Home values were obtained by asking the respondents, "How much do you think your house is worth right now?"

The reported value of homes among the three groups reinforces our judgments as to the character of our respondents and the community itself. The median estimated value of the home was \$17,400 among migrant homeowners answering the question. The newcomers median estimate was \$17,200, while for the old-timers the median estimated value was only \$15,882.

#### TABLE XV

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Estimated Value	Migr Number	ants Per Cont	Old-t: Number	imers Per	Newcom Number	ers Per
<del></del>		cent		Cent		Cent
Under \$9,999	5	3.3	16	13.1	4	5.8
10,000-11,999	5	3.3	10	8.2	2	2.9
12,000-13,999	ú	2.6	14	11.5	8	11.6
14,000-15,999	25	16.6	17	13.9	5	7.2
16,000-17,999	50	33.1	18	14.8	25	36.2
18,000-19,999	22	14.6	11	9.0	11	15.9
20,000-29,999	31	20.5	16	13.1	12	17.4
30,000 and over	6	4.0	9	7.4	1	1.4
No response	3	2.0	11	9.0	1	1.4
Total	151	100.0	122	100.0	69	99.8

## RESPONDENT'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF HOME BY SAMPLE TYPE.

On the basis of reported income, it appeared that old-timers were certainly no better off financially than migrants (sample subjects) or newcomers (non-sample subjects). The figures on reported home values are certainly consistent with that judgment. Once again, as with age, the value of the old-timers homes spread over a wider range than either migrants or newcomers. There are more old-timers with very low value homes, under \$9,999, and more with very high value homes, over \$30,000. The estimates of home value would be, of themselves alone, very tenuous data on which to base generalizations about old-timers income or economic position, for this self-appraisal is undoubtedly affected by the age of the home itself. Though we have no data on age of homes, it seems likely that the houses of the old-timers are older on the average than those of the other two groups. An older home's value would be adversely affected by depreciation, but enhanced by the increase in land values characteristic of an expanding suburb. What is perhaps more important, the old-timers were probably less likely to have been in the real estate market recently and therefore their self-estimate of the value of their homes may well reflect the real estate market of several years past. This would be consistent with the greater frequency of non-response to this question among old-timers (9.0 per cent) than among migrants (2.0 per cent) or newcomers (1.4 per cent). Despite this inherent unreliability there is no reason to qualify the judgment that the old-timers are not significantly richer than the migrants (sample subjects), nor that they are a less homogeneous group than either the newcomers (non-sample subjects) or migrants.

### Previous Housing

One of the presumed differences between city and suburban life is precisely that high concentration of owner occupied dwellings which we found characteristic of our interviewees. Owner occupation could presumably be related, either directly or indirectly to political beliefs, particularly since homeowners pay direct taxes to local government. If this factor is important in explaining change in political values, however, we must be able to say that this is the first experience in owning a home for a substantial proportion of the political changers. I can think of no reason why owning a home in Livonia should produce a change in political values if one has already owned one in Detroit.

The only group for which this set of data is really satisfactory is the migrant group. Here we can see that 103 of the 160 respondents, 64.5 per cent (renters and no previous household) did not own homes before. One hundred fifty-one, 94.3 per cent of the migrants (sample subjects), now own or are buying their homes (see Table XIV).

Previous Housing	Migr Number	ants Per Cent	Old-t Number	imers Per Cent	Newcon Number	ners Per Cent
Own or buying home	55	34.4	43	32.6	20	24.4
Rent	92	57.6	40	30.4	21	25.6
No previous house- hold	11	6.9	11	8.3	3	3.7
Not ascertained	2	1.2	38	28.8	38	46.3
Total	160	100.1	132	100.1	82	100.0

# PREVIOUS HOUSING BY SAMPLE TYPE.

If first experience in home-owning <u>is</u> related to change in political values, analysis of migrant's responses should be able to show it.

The migrants were asked where they came from in order to identify their position in the sample. For the migrants we got the most nearly precise information about their former Detroit residence that was possible, an address or a nearby major intersection if the respondent seemed reluctant to give an address. It was not appropriate to be too insistent on this question, since it was one of the first in the schedule and could not be pushed for fear of destroying rapport so much as to endanger replies to later, more important items.

# Occupation

Another clue to social status differences within the groups and between them are the occupations of the breadwinners in the dwelling units in which interviews were taken.

Occupation	Migr Number	rants Per Cent	Old-t: Number	imers Per Cent	Newcom Number	ers Per Cent
Professional, man- ager, self-em- ployed	38	23.8	23	17.4	19	23.2
White collar inc- luding teacher	37	23.1	22	16.7	19	23.2
Manual worker inc- luding foreman	75	46.9	79	59.8	38	46.4
Unemployed	4	2.5	-	-	-	-
Not ascertained	6	3.7	8	6.1	6	7.3
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.1

# OCCUPATIONS BY SAMPLE TYPE.

Here again the difference between the old-timers and newcomers and migrants combined is apparent.<sup>3</sup> Only 34.1 per cent of those giving an occupation in the old-timers group are professionals, managers, or white collar workers, while 59.8 per cent are manual workers of varying skill levels. But 46.9 per cent and 46.4 per cent of the migrants and newcomers fall into the white collar group and precisely equal proportions are manual workers.

It seems fair to conclude that the three groups this research design has produced may be described as follows: Migrants (sample subjects) and newcomers (non-sample subjects) are very similar, being, on the average, younger, and of higher income, living in more expensive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Chi-square <u>-</u> 6.091, significant at below the .001 level under a one-tailed test.

houses and more likely to be professionals, managers, or white collar workers than the old-timers. If political choice is directly related to social status we should find more Democrats among the old-timers, and more Republicans or converts to Republicans among the newcomers. Home ownership is high among all groups, but for most of the migrants and at least half of the newcomers it is a new experience.

The old-timers are the least homogeneous population with respect to age, income and value of homes. The picture one gets is an area of low population density and relatively wide spread of various social and economic classes rapidly being submerged by new residents, all relatively young and relatively well off.

#### Politics

In this chapter we do not plan any detailed analysis of political <u>change</u> but it is nevertheless important to sketch the dominant patterns of political affiliation and voting of **our** respondents.

There are two ways to assess political commitment in the American population. The first, and most direct, is simply to ask the party of the respondent's choice. This we did, asking, "Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or what?" Although this topic had been gradually introduced through questions on political interest and political discussion, there is still enough resistance to such blatant self-labeling that a series of probes were needed to coerce respondents into some sort of political identification if possible. If the respondent replied, "I am independent" or "I consider myself non-partisan" or some such variation he was then asked, "Which party do you normally favor?" If he replied to either question or probe with , "I always vote for the best man," we countered with, "Which party seems to have the most good men in it?"

#### TABLE XVIII

Subjective Party Affiliation	Migra: Number	nts Per	Old-ti Number	mers Per	Newcon Number	ners Per
		Cent		Cent		
Professed Democrats	62	38.8	36	27.2	27	33.0
Lean to Democrats	18	11.2	12	9.1	8	9.8
Neutral	19	11.9	16	12.1	17	20.7
Lean to Republicans	18	11.2	7	5.3	11	13.4
Professed Republicans	38	23.8	53	40.0	17	20.7
No response	5	3.1	8	6.1	2	2.4
Total	160	100.0	132	99.8	82	100.0

# SUBJECTIVE PARTY AFFILIATION BY SAMPLE TYPE.

Respondents who freely answered the original question are called "Professed" Democrats or Republicans. Those whose party commitment was elicited by either of the probes were classified as "Lean to" Democrats or Republicans, while those who resisted all our wiles were "Neutrals." The shortcoming of this classification system and indeed this whole approach are obvious and, in the main, unavoidable. We do not know that calling oneself a Republican or Democrat immediately means anything different from calling oneself a Republican or Democrat eventually. Indeed, we do not know that it makes any difference <u>what</u> one calls himself since there is no generally held, unambiguous image of what party commitment in the United States means as a status or what actions it entails as a role. The ambiguity and vagueness inherent in this concept are the heart of the problem for political scientists studying American voting behavior, and since these are uncertainties of the system, rather than the science which seeks to describe the system, no amount of investigative or theoretical rigor can remove them. They must be lived with.

Much of the confusion in writing and thinking on the effects of suburban migration and political behavior stems from this ambiguity. The statement, "As people move to the suburbs they become Republicans," is confusing simply because "become Republican" can mean so many different things.

We will discuss a little further on some attempts to clarify these points through another series of questions, but for now let us take up briefly the main alternative to party affiliation as an index of commitment.

An alternative measure of commitment to a political party in the American system is simply the record of votes of a given individual either in a given election for a group of offices, or in a series of elections for a particular office, or in a series of elections for a number of offices. The record of votes is, of course, unavailable, since we use the secret ballot, but we can ask the respondent how he voted. If this question is extended through time, "How did you vote in 1956?", "How about 1954?", "1952?" and through a number of offices, "For whom did you vote for President in 1956, for Governor, for Congressman?", a series of precise definitions of voting patterns can be constructed. Some of these voting patterns should, if the political world makes any sense at all, bear some relation to party affiliation.

The advantages of this sort of measure are mainly precision and intelligibility. Its main disadvantages are that no one knows how far one can trust the veracity and memory of the respondents. These disadvantages are inescapable but they are characteristic of any information collected by interview which is incapable of being collected in any other

way. The answers to these questions are significant, whether or not they are objectively true, and deceit is probably less of a problem than a tendency to rearrange a memory of the past to fit the present status and preference of the respondent. It is probably psychologically satisfying to remember having voted for a winner, whether one did or not. It would not seem likely that a person of strong commitments to a particular party or candidate would forget having voted for him no matter how convenient the rewards of voting for a winner might be. Similarly, a person who has recently revised his political beliefs might attempt to achieve a sense of consistency by altering those memories of past votes that are inconsistent with his present position.

If one assumes that these patterns of distortion are the ones most likely to occur, what does this mean for our use of reported voting records as a base of classification for political affiliation? First, a man who reports voting entirely for Democratic candidates, through several elections and offices, may be considered fairly well committed to that party. The same is true of Republican loyalty. With respect to more complex patterns, the analysis would depend on the size of the electoral space for which votes are recorded. In this study the space is four years long and two offices (President and Governor) deep. This is probably not enough information to be worthy of exhaustive analysis, though quite enough, considering it includes five elections (two presidential, three gubernatorial) to create serious problems. Perhaps it would be better to present the data collected to preclude discussion in a vacuum.

In Table XVIII, 38.8 per cent of the migrants and 33 per cent of the newcomers considered themselves Democrats without being probed or prodded, as compared to only 27.2 per cent of the old-timers. Conversely,

only 23.8 per cent of the migrants and 20.7 per cent of the newcomers willingly called themselves Republicans, contrasted to 40 per cent of the old-timers. As one would have expected from the voting results of Livonia in the 1952 election,<sup>4</sup> the old-timers as a group are much more Republican, though this is <u>not</u> a result of superior social and economic status.<sup>5</sup> Eliminating non-respondents and collapsing the "professed" and "lean to" categories of party affiliation, which is defensible assuming that party affiliation in the United States is fairly weak even at its strongest, produces the results shown in Table XIX.

#### TABLE XIX

SUBJECTIVE PARTY AFFILIATION BY SAMPLE TYPE, CONDENSED.

Subjective Party Affiliation	Mig Number	rants Per Cent	Old-ti Number	imers Per Cent	Newcom Number	ers Per Cent
Democrat	80	51.7	48	38.7	35	43.8
Neutral	19	12.3	16	12.9	17	21.2
Republican	56	36.0	60	48.4	28	35.0
Total	155	100.0	124	100.0	80	100.0

If party affiliation were a solid measure of voting behavior and Livonia were typical in this respect, the suburbs would be almost certain to become overwhelmingly Democratic in time, for 51.7 per cent of the migrants and 43.8 per cent of the newcomers consider themselves Democrats while only 36 per cent of the migrants and 35 per cent of the newcomers think of themselves as favoring the Republican party.

<sup>4</sup>See Chapter I, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup>See this chapter, preceding. Tables XII, XIII, and XV.

It is, however, interesting to note the somewhat higher proportion of party non-commitment among the newcomers as compared with the other two groups. Twenty-one and two tenths per cent of the newcomers are neutral in party affiliation, at least insofar as they refused to respond to our probes. However, only 12.3 per cent of the migrants and 12.9 per cent of the old-timers resisted committing themselves to a particular party. If we turn back for a moment to the first party affiliation table (Table XVIII) to get a closer look at willingness to express party commitment it appears that newcomers are also slightly more likely to resist party commitment to the extent that probing was needed. Twenty-three and two tenths per cent of the newcomers needed probing before they would admit to favoring a particular party. Only 14.4 per cent of the old-timers resisted giving their party affiliation to that extent, but 22.4 per cent of the migrants did so. It seems safe to say that newcomers are more reluctant to admit party affiliation than either migrants or old-timers. When they do admit it, they are as likely to be Democrats as are the migrants, while old-timers are, as a group, strongly Republican. This reluctance to admit party affiliation does not appear to stem from a reluctance to be interviewed at all. Only two of the newcomers, 2.4 per cent, refused to answer. The refusal rate for migrants was 3.1 per cent, five of them refusing, and among old-timers it was the highest of all, 6.1 per cent, eight of them refusing to respond.

#### Affiliation And Voting Pattern

Next, however, the relation between party affiliation and actual voting must be considered. This is not likely to be a one-to-one correspondence, for party affiliation in the United States is not, for

most people, a deep or important personal commitment. After all, there is little in the American political party system which would stimulate deep commitment.

The five elections for which we asked respondents to tell us their votes (if any) were the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956, and the Michigan gubernatorial elections of 1952, 1954, and 1956. A deeper election space, that is one in which more offices were involved, would be in the abstract more desirable. However, problems of recall are probably more likely to occur and the present amount of data gives one plenty to work with. If we consider the possibility of non-voting in one or more elections, there are, in fact, 243 different possible patterns of voting. Any increase through time or through number of offices considered increases the number of possible patterns geometrically. We can simplify analysis, however, by defining certain important pattern types.

The three most obvious are the straight voting types; (1) votes for Democratic candidates in all elections in which a vote is reported, (2) votes for Republican candidates in all elections in which a vote is reported, (3) never reports a vote in any election. An additional important type is mixed voting; votes for Republican candidates at one level and Democratic at the other. Empirically, the most significant example of this sort of voting in our study was (4) consistent support of Eisenhower for President coupled with consistent support of Williams for Governor. Voting patterns through time could also indicate a directional change, shifting from support for Democratic candidates at one time to support for Republicans at another (5), or vice versa (6), at either or both levels of office. It should be noted, however, that the definition of directional change is very broad. If a person reported voting for Eisenhower and Williams in 1952, but for Eisenhower and Cobo (Williams's opponent) in 1956, he was classified as having changed directionally towards the Republicans, even though he had not been a straight Democratic voter in the first place. This phenomenon is more properly the topic of later chapters, (Chapters VII and VIII) and will be discussed in detail there. Finally, there were patterns fitting none of these categories, which comprised the residual category, hereafter called Residuals, (7). Table XX gives the voting pattern distribution of the three sample types.

## TABLE XX

Voting Pattern	Migrar Number	nts Per Cent	Old-t: Number	lmers Per Cent	Newcom Number	ers Per Cent
Straight Democrat	35	21.9	21	15.9	17	20.8
Straight Republican	35	21.9	39	29.6	24	29.2
Changed to Democrat	4	2.5	4	3.0	-	-
Changed to Repub- lican	13	8.1	4	3.0	5	6.1
Eisenhower-Williams	40	25.0	36	27.2	18	22.0
Residuals	11	6.9	8	6.1	2	2.4
No vote reported (refused and non- voters)	22	13.7	20	15 <b>.1</b>	16	19.5
Total	160	100.0	132	99•9	82	100.0

VOTING PATTERN TYPE BY SAMPLE TYPE. \*

\*See Table XLIII and tables in Appendix B for exact voting patterns.

Inspection of Table XX and its comparison with Table XVIII immediately shows the difference between party affiliation and voting in Livonia and, likely, in the United States at large. Although 62 of the migrants readily professed being Democrats (see Table XVIII) only 35 reported voting for a Democratic candidate in every election covered by this study in which they voted at all. The Republicans did almost as badly. Among the old-timers there were 53 people who readily professed being Republicans (see Table XVIII), but only 39 straight Republican voters. The best way to present the relationship between party affiliation and voting pattern in the sample groups is shown in Tables XXI, XXII, and XXIII.

A useful index of the extent of agreement between party affiliation and reported voting is the proportion of the total response that falls into the boxed cells in the following three tables. We would expect to find people who readily profess being Democrats or Republicans to vote regularly for Democratic or Republican candidates. Neutrals might be expected to split their votes. Voters whose patterns indicate a directional change might either lean towards their new party or profess it, and conversely, voters who lean towards a party might either vote straight or be changed to it. TABLE XXI

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MIGRANTS: AFFILIATION BY VOTING PATTERN.\*

Stri Affiliation Demo	aight Iocrat	Changed to Democrat	Votiné Eisenhower- Williams F	g Pattern Changed to kepublican	Straight Republican	Residuals	Total
Professed Democrat	29/	E]	16	н	٣	9	58
Lean to Democrat 1	Ð	[]	5	5	6	Ч	16
Neutral	ч	1	[8]	5	6	I	5
Lean to Republican	I	I	Ч	[9]	<u>(8</u> )	Ч	J6
Professed Republican	Ч	I	10	[2]		6	33
Total	35	t1	0†	13	34	11	137

\*Excluding non-voters and those who would not give party affiliation.
TABLE XXII

OLD-TIMERS: AFFILIATION BY VOTING PATTERN.\*

20 3 36 4 <i>37</i> 0 100

\*Excluding non-voters and those who would not give party affiliation.

TABLE XXIII

NEWCOMERS: AFFILIATION BY VOTING PATTERN.\*

Affiliation	Stra1ght Democrat	Changed to Democrat	Voting Eisenhower- Williams	Pattern Changed to Republica	Straight Republican n	Residuals	Total
Professed Democrat	(HZ)	-	2	Ч	2	г	21
Lean to Democrat	[2]	[-]	0	I	ч	ч	9
Neutral	Ч	ı		1	5	ı	13
Lean to Republican	I	ı	4	[2]	[]]	ı	6
Professed Republican	ו ג	ı	r	[2]		I	16
Total	Lτ	ı	18	Ŀ	23	5	65

\*Excluding non-voters and those who would not give party affiliation.

Of the 126 voting, responding migrants, excluding residuals, only 78 (62.0 per cent) do what one might logically expect. Among old-timers, 100 of whom responded and voted in an unambiguous manner, 55 (55 per cent) fit this logical pattern. For newcomers, out of 63 who respond and report voting in a non-residual pattern, 41 (65.0 per cent) show a consistent pattern between expressed belief and reported action.

Of the eleven residuals in the migrant (sample subject) group, six shifted from straight Democratic voting in 1952 to Eisenhower-Williams voting in 1956. Among non-sample subjects (old-timers and newcomers), there were ten residuals of whom three shifted from straight Democratic voting to Eisenhower-Williams voting and one from straight Republican voting to Eisenhower-Williams voting.

One must remember that this is a discrepancy between <u>reported</u> political affiliation and <u>reported</u> voting. As such it cannot be explained by assuming the respondents have misled us either wilfully or unwittingly. Particularly in the case of such weak allegiances as political commitment in our country, one might expect unconscious distortion of recall to complicate analysis. What seems to be the case, however, is that the psychological structures of political commitment are so weak, so tangential to the self, that inconsistency among them is not seen as a threat to the self image.

To put it another way, party allegiance as measured by the response to, "Do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or what?" does not imply constant support at the polls for the candidates of the party of a voter's choice. In either case, if we are to concern ourselves with the political correlates of suburban migration it seems necessary to learn more about what <u>is</u> implied by party affiliation in our political system.

For one of our sample types, data which help explain the relationship between party affiliation and reported vote are available. Unfortunately, only the migrants were asked this question series, because the discrepancy was not expected. Before reporting on this material, however, it would be better to look once again at Tables XXI, XXII, and XXIII in somewhat more detail. Clearly the major source of inconsistent behavior is the group of Eisenhower-Williams voters. These are respondents who report only Eisenhower votes in the presidential elections in which they participated, only Williams votes in the gubernatorial elections. In the migrant group this is the largest single voting pattern, and it is a major voting pattern in all groups.

Of the 40 migrants who are Eisenhower-Williams voters, only eight call themselves neutrals. This might be explained because we forced party affiliation upon our respondents through probing, but still 26 of the 40 readily admitted considering themselves adherents of one or the other parties.

Among the old-timers there were only two neutrals among 36 Eisenhower-Williams voters, 29 of whom were readily willing to admit a party allegiance. Newcomers, who were most nearly consistent in their responses, were also more nearly consistent in this Eisenhower-Williams category. Seven of the 18 Eisenhower-Williams voters were neutral and only five were ready to identify with a particular party at first asking.

The only other column in the table that produces nearly so large a proportion of inconsistent responses is the group of straight Republican voters. Seventeen of the 34 straight Republican voting migrants did not readily admit being Republicans, though 25 eventually did. Old-timers were more consistent. Only 10 of 37 did not readily profess being Republican and only seven did not do so under probing. Twelve of 23 newcomers did not easily admit being Republican even though they voted for nothing but Republican presidential and gubernatorial candidates; nine of them even refused to identify with the party after probing.

Perhaps the following table will make clearer the patterns of inconsistency for various political beliefs and voting patterns.

## TABLE XXIV

Political Affiliation	Mig Con.	rants Incon.	Old-t Con.	imers Incon.	Newco Con.	mers Incon.	
Professed Democrat	32	20	18	12	14	6	
Lean to Democrat	5	10	2	6	2	3	
Neutral	8	6	2	8	7	6	
Lean to Republican	14	1	3	2	5	4	
Professed Republican	19	11	30	17	13	3	
Voting Pattern							
Straight Democrat	33	2	17	3	16	1	
Changed to Democrat	4	-	3	-	-	-	
Eisenhower-Williams	8	32	2	34	7	11	
Changed to Republican	8	5	3	1	4	1	
Straight Republican	25	9	30	7	14	9	

CONSISTENT AND INCONSISTENT RESPONSES IN PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN BY SAMPLE TYPE.\*

\*Excluding residuals, non-voters, and those who would not give party affiliation.

In the classification of political belief patterns, those who leaned towards the Democratic party were most likely to vote inconsistently with their party affiliations. This is true in spite of the fact that there were two possible voting patterns scored as consistent for this group. They could either vote straight Democratic or changed to Democratic. Neutrals, those who would not commit themselves to a party even after probing, were about as inconsistent. In absolute numbers, in fact, more neutrals voted inconsistently than did leaning Democrats, though not as high a percentage. Eisenhower-Williams voters were the least likely of all the voting pattern classifications to report a consistent political belief, and straight Democratic voters were the most likely to do so.

In the next chapter we are going to discuss the phenomenon of political change and the problem faces us, change as measured by what? Neither political affiliation nor reported voting seems to be intrinsically superior as a measure of "real" change. And, as we have seen, neither is particularly well related to the other. In later chapters we finally settle on voting pattern as the most satisfactory measure in this research, partly because the question used in the schedule to determine change in party affiliation proved to be faulty and partly because the way a man votes has more effect on the choice of politicians and programs in the American society than the party he says he belongs to.

In our sample split ticket voting was exceedingly common, and the Eisenhower-Williams voters showed a high degree of inconsistency between affiliation and voting, since most of them felt themselves to be "Republicans" or "Democrats" regardless of their failure to support all the major candidates of the party they favored. One could say that these

men who attracted so much support from members of the opposite party were "charismatic," and that the elections in which they ran were, on that account, atypical. On sober thought, however, the term "charisma" hardly seems applicable. True, these men evidently attract support because of their personal qualities, but not because of the forceful, prophetic dedication which they display. Their attraction might better be called likeable-ness, or charm.

One might have preferred to study a series of elections in which men of such great political charm were not the candidates, but the politician of our time is likely to be charming. It is his stock in trade.

Attitudes Towards Government Control Of Business

We asked our migrants a series of questions on ideology, some of which proved extremely useful in ordering the relation between party preference and reported vote. Their responses to two of these questions are reported in this chapter. The first is, "Should the federal government do more to control big business?", the second, "Should the government do more to control labor unions?"

After asking these directly we then requested the respondents to do a little role-playing by first asking, "How do you think most Republicans would answer these questions?", and then, "How would most Democrats answer them?"

On a common-sense basis one might expect that Democrats would favor more government control of big business while Republicans oppose it. Republicans, on the other hand, might be expected to favor more government control of unions, with the Democrats in opposition. Table XXV gives the responses of our sample to the question on big business, cross classified by voting pattern and affiliation groups. TABLE XXV

SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL BIG BUSINESS BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN, MIGRANTS ONLY.\*

Affiliation	Stra Dem Yes	Light locr: No	t DK NA	Chang to Yes N	ğed Dem Vo	DK DK NA	Eise Wil Yes	nhot lian No	Vot Ver ns DK NA	cing Chan to to	Patt ged o Re No	cern p. DK NA	Stra Repul Yes 1	Lght blic No	an DK NA	Sub- T Yes]	otal No	s NA NA	Total
Professed Democrat	20	9	ñ	2	1	н	ۍ	5	н	н	1	L I	5	н	1	30	17	с Г	52
Lean to Democrat	2	ч	Ч	I	ч	I	2	ξ	I	ı	2	t	Ч	5	ı	5	6		15
Neutral and no response	Ч	ı	ı	I	1	I	9	Ч	ч	н	Ч	I	ξ	Ч	I	11	ξ	Ч	15
Lean to Repub- lican	1	ı	1	I	I	I	ч	ı	1	2	4	ı	2	4	2	5	ω	2	15
Professed Re- publican	Ч	I	I	I	I	ı	7	ξ	I	N	ı	I	н	[]	ξ	II	16	r	30
Sub-totals	24	7	4	2	Ч	Ч	21	17	2	9	2	ı	6	51	5	62	53	12	127
Totals		35			4			40		••	13			35		Ä	27		

\*Residuals and non-voters excluded.

Though Table XXV neatly summarizes a mass of complex data in a relatively compact form, for that very reason it is difficult to discuss. To aid in presenting the argument I shall use the data of that table to generate a family of bar graphs, and the discussion will follow from them. The first of these, Figure 1, gives the percentages of those responding who answered "yes" to the question on government control of big business by affiliation group; Figure 2 by voting pattern group.

Using common sense, one might expect each of these two sets of bars to form a set of descending steps, since they are arranged in order of descending "Democraticness" and the Democratic party is popularly supposed to be against big business. In fact, however, only the voting pattern types form such a pattern, the affiliation groups being irregular in the extreme. The group which most favors government control of big business is the party neutral group, those who would not admit to favoring either party even after probing. Professed Democrats are the next most likely to approve government control of big business and professed Republicans, leaning Republicans and leaning Democrats are all very close in their responses to this question. Since these are the responses of the same group of people arranged in different ways, this buttresses the argument that voting pattern and affiliation are two separate attitudinal dimensions. It also gives added weight to our decision to use changing voting pattern as the major determinant of voting change, for the voting pattern groups fit the commonly accepted notion of Republican and Democratic values on this question perfectly.

Perhaps the most surprising result is the nigh proportion of party neutrals who favor increased government control of big business. Let us break down this group by voting pattern and see the results. In Figure 3 the responses of the neutral group are presented, in absolute





> Per cent <del>ار</del> 100







Responses of Eisenhower-Williams voters to "Should government do more to control big business?" by affiliation group.



numbers this time because the N's are so small. Notice that only one • of the non-residual, voting neutrals voted either straight Democratic or changed to Democratic pattern. This suggests that refusal to give a party identification is more characteristic of those likely to vote Republican than of those likely to vote Democratic. Notice also that the greatest contribution to the large proportion of "yes" responses of the neutrals is from neutrals who vote for Eisenhower and Williams. Perhaps Eisenhower-Williams voters are, in the main, liberal Republicans, "liberal" in the sense that they favor expanded government control of business.

Figure 4 gives the breakdown by party affiliation of Eisenhower-Williams voters and their responses to this question. Again, these are expressed in absolute numbers. Twenty-one of the Eisenhower-Williams voters are professed or leaning Democrats; eleven are professed or leaning Republicans; eight are neutrals. The surprising thing is the different pattern of professed and leaning Democrats on the one hand, and neutrals and professed and leaning Republicans on the other. Although professed Democrats on the whole favor increased government control of big business, and professed Republicans oppose it, among Eisenhower-Williams voters these patterns are exactly reversed. Professed Democrats in this voting group oppose expanded government control two to one, professed Republicans favor it, better than two to one. The responses of the party neutrals to this question serves to buttress the suggestion made above that party neutrals are shy Republicans, for their responses are very similar to Eisenhower-Williams professed Republicans. If they are reluctant to commit themselves, party neutrals are also far more liberal than open Republicans, for while their responses to the

big business question closely resemble Eisenhower-Williams voters among the Republicans, they do not resemble Republican affiliates at large.

The distinction between Eisenhower-Williams "Democrats" and Eisenhower-Williams "Republicans" cannot be stressed too strongly. Voting for Eisenhower by a Democrat seems to be related to a strong conservative bent, voting for Williams by a Republican is related to a liberal predilection. In a metaphoric sense, however, these two groups pass each other in flight, for the Williams voting Republicans tend to favor government control of big business and the Eisenhower voting Democrats oppose it.

### Images Of Parties

We have spoken of the common sense view that Democrats favor control of big business and Republicans oppose it. Is this a view which is shared by our respondents? And, more important, what is the opinion of the various voting pattern and affiliation groups? What values do they impute to the two parties on this question.

As a political scientist I would be hard put to defend the proposition, "The Democratic party favors increased government control of big business; the Republican party opposes it." Fortunately we need not concern ourselves with the accuracy of this assessment. The point is the extent to which it is shared in the sample. If it is shared, that is good evidence that the split voting pattern is an expression of ideological disaffection.

When we asked, "How do you think most Republicans would answer this question?", and "How do you think most Democrats would answer it?", the number of "don't know" responses rose, since many people are evidently unwilling or unable to play the role of abstract party members. They cannot be blamed for this, it is, indeed, an ill-defined role.

TABLE XXVI

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HOW WOULD MOST REPUBLICANS ANSWER SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL BIG BUSINESS BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN.\*

																				- 11
Affiliation	Str Dei Yes	algh mocr No	at DK	Char tc Yes	Dem No	•DK	Eise Wil Yes	Vot: nhowe liams No l	ing H er C oK Y	atte hang to to	ern ged Nel	OK 100	Stra Sepul (es ]	ight blic No	an DK	Sub- T Yes	otal No	DK	Total	
Professed Democrat	m	14	12		н	2	m	л Л	ω	н	1	1	1	2	н	2	22	23	52	
Lean to Democrat	1	t	4	I	н	I	н	ξ	Ч	Ч	I	ч	ı	3	I	2	7	9	15	
Neutral and no response	1	Ч	I	I	I	ı	2	ξ	Μ	ı	Ч	н		Ч	2	ξ	9	9	15	
Lean to Repub- llcan	I	T	I	I	I	ı	1	Ч	T	н	+	н	1	5	ξ	Ч	10	4	15	
Professed Re- publican	I	I	н	1	1	ı	I	7	ξ	ı	Ч	ч	1	10	7	ı	18	12	30	
Sub-totals	m	15	17	1	2	2	9	19	15	Μ	9	4	н	51	13	13	63	51	127	
Totals		35			4			01			[]			35		ы	27			

\*Residuals and non-voters excluded.

TABLE XXVII

HOW WOULD MOST DEMOCRATS ANSWER SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL BIG BUSINESS BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN.\*

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Affiliation	Str: Dei Yes	algh nocr No	t at DK	Chan to Yes	bem Dem No	DK	Eise Wil Yes	Votj inhov 11an No	Lng H Jer 1S DK	atte Chan t Yes	rn ged o Re	• be	Stra Repu	ight blic No	an DK	Sub- T Yes	ota] No	Ls DK	Total	
Professed Democrat	15	m	Ħ	~	ı	ы	t	4	ω	I	н	1	N	1	н	23	ω	21	52	
Lean to Democrat	I	I	+ +	I	I	Ч	ξ	2	I	Ч	1	Ч	2	ч	1	9	ξ	9	15	
Neutral and no response	н	I	I	l	I	I	4	ı	t	Ч	ı	ч	1	Ч	Μ	9	Ч	ω	15	
Lean to Repub- lican	1	I	I	1	1	1	Ч	ı	ı	5	I	Ч	4	1	4	10	I	5	15	
Professed Re- publican	I	ı	Ч	ł	I	ı	9	ı	t	I	Ч	ч	5	9	9	H	7	12	30	
Sub-totals	16	ξ	16	2	I	2	18	9	16	7	5	4	5	ω	14	56	19	52	127	
Totals		35			4			140			13		r)	10		12	7			

\*Residuals and non-voters excluded.

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Per cent of those responding who predict most Democrats favor government control of business, by affiliation group.



Per cent of those responding who predict most Democrats favor government control of business, by voting pattern group. Per cent

Once again the summary tables are used to produce a family of graphs to which the discussion is directed. Figure 5 gives the percentage of those responding who impute to the Republicans an anti- big business attitude, classified by party affiliation; Figure 6, by voting pattern. Figure 7 gives the percentage of those who attribute such an attitude to most Democrats, classified by party affiliation; Figure 8, by voting pattern. In each case the respondents are classified by voting pattern and affiliation groups. The shorter the bars in Figures 5 and 6 and the longer the bars in Figures 7 and 8 the more nearly unanimous is that particular group of respondents in feeling that Republicans oppose control of big business and Democrats favor it.

Our sample, as a whole, adopts the common sense view. Most of them assign to the Republicans the attitude of opposing government control of business and to the Democrats the attitude of favoring it. Only thirteen, 17.1 per cent, feel that Republicans favor government control, and only nineteen, 26.3 per cent, feel that most Democrats oppose it.

Solid Republicans, that is professed Republicans who voted straight Republican, were least unanimous in predicting Democratic response to the question, and professed Democrats who voted for Eisenhower and Williams (and who themselves tended to oppose government control) were next least unanimous.

Eisenhower-Williams neutrals and straight Republican neutrals were the least unanimous in predicting Republican response. If, as we argued earlier, most neutrals are crypto-Republicans, then three of the four least unanimous groups were those who tended to disagree with most of the members of their own party in answering these questions. (See

Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4). It may be that some of the members of these groups minimize the difference between their own opinion on these questions and that generally attributed to the party which they support by holding images of their party dissimilar from those in common use, or perhaps they project their own attitudes upon all other members of their party. Either mechanism would result in a reduction of inner conflict by harmonizing one's party allegiances and political opinions.

Eisenhower-Williams voters disagreed with most of the members of their own party on this question, whether Republican or Democratic. Further, Eisenhower-Williams Republicans were more likely to favor government control of big business than were Eisenhower-Williams Democrats, even though Democrats as a whole favored it and Republicans as a whole opposed (See Figures 9 and 10). Now the question is, "Is this characteristic of all those whose party affiliation and voting pattern were inconsistent, or only of Eisenhower-Williams voters?" The following table gives the answers to the government control of business question of all those who favored one party but voted at least once for the candidate of the other, as compared with those whose voting and affiliation patterns were consistent. A man whose voting pattern indicated a shift towards Democratic voting and who felt himself to be a Democrat was called a "Democrat" who voted for Democrats. A man whose voting pattern indicated a shift towards Republican voting, but who felt himself to be a Democrat was called a "Democrat" who voted for Republicans.

Respondents who displayed other types of inconsistencies between belief and voting pattern do not display so clear a structure on the big business question as did Eisenhower-Williams voters. Professed Democrats who vote for Republicans are not so likely to deny that government should do more to control big business as are professed Democrats



Do Republicans favor government control of business? Eisenhower-Williams voters, by affiliation group.



Do Democrats favor government control of business? Eisenhower-Williams voters, by affiliation group.

who vote Eisenhower-Williams, while there are so few professed Republicans who vote for Democrats, other than the Eisenhower-Williams pattern that it seems inappropriate to say anything about them on the basis of these data. However, "Democrats" who vote for Republicans <u>are</u> less likely to approve of extended government control of big business than are "Democrats" who vote for only Democratic candidates.

### TABLE XXVIII

# SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL BIG BUSINESS? INCLUDING RESIDUALS BUT EXCLUDING EISENHOWER-WILLIAMS VOTERS.

Affiliation-Voting Category	Yes	No	No Answer Don't Know	Total
"Democrats" who vote for Democrats	24	8	5	37
"Democrats" who vote for Republicans	7	6	3	16
"Republicans" who vote for Democrats	2	l	2	5
"Republicans" who vote for Republicans	7	21	5	33
Total	40	36	15	91

Attitudes Towards Government Control Of Labor

An individual's attitude towards government control of big business can reasonably be inferred to be related to his party affiliation and voting pattern. There is a popular image of the Republican party being "for" business and the Democratic party being "against." Closely related to this image is that of labor unions and politics. Here, it seems safe to say, the roles of the parties are reversed, the Republicans being seen as "against" labor unions, the Democrats as "for." We have seen that an examination of attitudes towards government control of business and of images of party stands on this matter helps us structure the relation between voting pattern and party affiliation. The same thing should, in theory, be true of an examination of individual attitudes towards unions and their images of party stands on union activity.

Accordingly, respondents were asked, "Should the government do more to control labor unions?" The results of this question, classified by party affiliation and voting pattern, are shown in Table XXIX. Once again, this table is too complex to be easily discussed. Therefore, the bar graph technique will be used to help spell out its implications. Figures 11 and 12 show the percentage of those in each affiliation and voting pattern group (except residuals) who answer "yes" to the question, "Should the government do more to control labor unions?"

The well marked differences between groups which were characteristic of responses to the question on government control of big business are not present here. First, obviously, the general level is higher. More than 64 per cent of every group favors more government control of unions. We might expect the same step pattern as was found in the voting pattern group on the big business question (see Figure 2) only, of course, an ascending pattern with Republicans favoring expanded control of unions the most and Democrats the least, but neither affiliation nor voting pattern groups show such an array. It is, however, interesting that the affiliation and voting pattern classifications still respond differently. This is still further proof that reported voting and Party preference are different dimensions of political behavior. Also, as in Figure 1, the neutrals are the highest of all affiliation groups TABLE XXIX

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"SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL LABOR UNIONS?" BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN, MIGRANTS ONLY.\*

Affiliation	Str Dem Yes	aight ocrat No	рК	Chan to Yes	ged Dem No	K	Eise Wil Yes	nhow 11am No	Vot er- S DK	:ing Chan to Yes	Patt ged Rep No	ern DK	Stra Repu Yes	ight blic No	an DK	Sub- 7 Yes	otal No	S. DK	Total
Professed Democrat	17	10	5	5	B	н	6	9	Ч	н	I	I	5	н	t	31	17	t	52
Lean to Democrat	2	2	I	ч	1	ı	Μ	27	1	2	1	I	ξ	I	ŧ	11	4	T	15
Neutral and no response	Ч	I	I	ı	1	ı	ω	1	1	Ч	Ч	I.	4	ı	ı	14	Ч	ı	15
Lean to Republican	ı	I	I	I	I	t	t	н	1	9	ı	t	9	20	ı	12	n	I	15
Professed Republican	Ч	ł	I	I	I	I	6	н	I	Ч	н	T	6	4	4	20	9	4	30
Sub-total	21	12	0	б	ı	Ч	29	10	Ч	ΙI	2	I	24	7	4	88	31	8	127
Total		35			4			140			13		ñ	5			.27		

\*Excluding residuals and non-voters.



Per cent of those responding who approve government control of labor unions, by affiliation group.



Per cent of those responding who approve government control of labor unions, by voting pattern group.

Per cent



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Responses of party neutrals to "Should government do more to control labor unions?" by voting pattern group.



Responses of Eisenhower-Williams voters to "Should government do more to control labor unions?" by affiliation group.

in favoring expanded government control, this time of unions rather than business. If neutral affiliates are sorted out by voting pattern. Figure 13 results. We can see a similarity between the two distributions, for Figure 13 on unions is very much like Figure 3 on big business. The major contribution to high neutral approval of government control of big business is from Eisenhower-Williams neutrals. In Figure 14 Eisenhower-Williams voters answers to the union question are classified by affiliation. The pattern which results is also somewhat similar to the comparable Figure 4 on big business. Once again Eisenhower-Williams Republicans are more likely to favor control than are Eisenhower-Williams Democrats, and Eisenhower-Williams neutrals are the most likely to favor government control. If the conventional wisdom were sound we should expect the bar graph pairs of Figures 3 and 13, and Figures 4 and 14 to be opposites. It seems reasonable that a person who favors government control of big business would oppose government control of labor unions and vice versa. Figure 15 makes it clear that this similarity where we would expect difference is true of the entire group of respondents, not just Eisenhower-Williams voters and neutrals. Although the magnitudes shift greatly, reflecting the fact that these are percentages computed on small N's, the general shape of the two curves is practically identical.

It would appear that party affiliation is less well related to voting pattern than are the respondents' attitudes towards government control of labor and business. If people wish to see the government control that which they fear, then Eisenhower-Williams voters who do not commit themselves to a party and Eisenhower-Williams Republicans fear both labor and business far more than any other group in our sample.



Even though our sample shares the view that Democrats favor labor and oppose business, while Republicans favor business and oppose labor. the largest single voting response in our sample was to vote consistently for Eisenhower and Williams, evidently in the hopes that neither business nor labor would be favored as a result. We began this study with the intention of determining if people became Republicans upon moving to suburbia. Or rather, we hoped to get some reliable information on this generalization which had so frequently been made. Judging from the results reported so far, "Republican" and "Democrat" seem to have lost whatever meaning they ever had for many of our respondents. Party determinants of political choice seem less important than candidates. I would argue that this is not because American parties do not stand for something. In the area of government control of labor and business our respondents think the parties do stand for something. Perhaps these split ticket voters do not like the alternatives which the parties present. If this analysis is correct, the party that nominated candidates who assured the voters they would be protected against hard choices would do well in suburbia.

Eisenhower-Williams Democrats do not follow this pattern. They rank below other Democrats in demand for government control of both business and unions. Perhaps these are vestiges of "Jeffersonian" Democrats who oppose big government on principle.

# Images Of Parties

The partisan voters, grouped by affiliation and by voting pattern, have images of the parties' views on labor unions which are as simple as their own views on these matters are complicated. Tables XXX and XXXI summarize the responses of our migrant sample to the questions, How would most Republicans (Table XXX) and Democrats (Table XXXI) answer the question, "Should the government do more to control labor unions?" Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 present part of this information in clearer form. Views of the response of "most Republicans" are quite homogeneous. Leaning Democrats, the least homogeneous affiliation group, split two to one in attributing to Republicans more control of unions. Eisenhower-Williams voters, the least homogeneous voting pattern group split four to one, imputing to Republicans a feeling that unions should be controlled, and in six of the ten affiliation and voting groups 100 per cent of those answering predict that Republicans favor government control of unions. Views of the Democratic party are somewhat less uniform. The least homogeneous voting pattern group was the change to Democratic voters, only two of whom responded.

Since party neutrals and Eisenhower-Williams voters responded differently from the other groups when asked how the parties felt about control of big business, we might well investigate the responses of the groups which are least homogeneous in predicting the party positions on government control of labor unions. The only group it seems worth while to work with to probe this hypothesis are leaning Democrats. These are least unanimous in predicting the responses of "most" Democrats (Figure 18). Do they also split more heavily in favor of increased control of labor unions in Figure 11? The answer is no. We are left therefore with no single hypothesis with which to explain the differences between the various affiliation and voting groups in their prediction of Democratic and Republican responses towards government control of labor and business.
TABLE XXX

HOW WOULD MOST REPUBLICANS ANSWER SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL LABOR UNIONS BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN.\*

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St Affiliation De																		
Τe	sraigh mocre s No	nt at DK	Char t Yes	uged to Der No ]	DK.	Eisel W1: Yes 1	ν nhow llia No	otin er ms DK	g Pa Chan t Yes ]	tter ged o ReI No I	K.	Stra Repu Yes	ight blic No	an DK	Sub- T Yes	ota] No	Ls DK	Total
Professed Democrat 17		12	ч		~	2	2	7	н		1	5	1	ч	28	5	22	52
Lean to Democrat -	1	4	Ч	I	1	ч	ξ	Ч	н	I	н	ξ	I	I	9	ξ	9	15
Neutral and no response l	1	I	I	I	ı	4	1	4	н	I	ч	2	1	2	ω	I	7	15
Lean to Republican -	I	1	I	I	I	г	ı	1	5	I	н	2ı	I	r	11	I	4	15
Professed Republican -	1	Ч	I	I	I	7	1	m	н	I	Ч	7	M	7	15	ξ	12	30
Sub-total 18	1 ~~~	17	0	ı	2	20	5	15	6	ı	4	19	m	13	68	ω	51	127
Total	35			4		1	9			13			35		Ч	27		

\*Residuals and non-voters excluded.

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TABLE XXXI

HOW WOULD MOST DEMOCRATS ANSWER SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DO MORE TO CONTROL LABOR UNIONS BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING PATTERN.\*

Affiliation	Str Dem Yes	aigh ocra No	DK DK	Chan t Yes	kged No De	л. DK	Eise W1 Yes	Vot nhow 111a No	:ing rer ms DK	Patt Chan to Yes	ern ged Rep No	DK.	Stra Repu Yes	1ght blic No	an DK	Sub- T Yes	otal No	s DK	Total
Professed Democrat	9	13	10	н		н	N	5	6	I	н	I	ı	2	н	6	22	21	52
Lean to Democrat	ı	I	4	ı	1	ч	б	2	1	н	1	Ч	Ч	2	ı	5	4	9	15
Neutral and no response	I	-1	I	ı	1	1	Ч	4	ξ	I	Ч	~	Ч	1	ξ	5	9	7	15
Lean to Republican	I	1	I	ı	ı	1	1	Ч	1	Μ	2	н	ı	4	4	ξ	L	Ŀ	15
Professed Republican	I	1	н	I	1	I	ξ	ξ	4	I	Ч	ч	5	9	9	ω	10	12	30
Sub-total	9	14	15	Ч	Ч	2	6	15	16	4	5	4	7	14	14	27	49	51	127
Total		35			4			łt0			13			35		Ч	27		

\*Residuals and non-voters excluded.

Per cent of those responding who predict most Republicans favor government control of labor unions, by affiliation group.



Per cent of those responding who predict most Republicans favor government control of labor unions, by voting pattern group.







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Evidently several diverse processes are involved in creating a party image. Certainly it is more than projection of one's own attitudes upon other members of one's own party and attribution of the opposite attitudes to affiliates of the opposite party.

What does come through quite clearly, however, is that collective images are not necessarily correct. Most of those who responded, almost two-thirds of them, felt that most Democrats would oppose expanded government control of labor unions (Table XXXI). In fact, however, two-thirds of the professed and leaning Democrats among the migrants who answered favored increased government control of these organizations.

It may be that Democrats among our migrants are far more likely to favor increased control than Democrats at large. In other words the guesses of the migrants are right and the sample is in this respect unrepresentative. But it might also be that this misperception is general, the result of collective misunderstanding of how most Democrats feel, each privately favoring stricter control of unions but none thinking many of his fellows do. On no sound factual grounds, I favor the second interpretation.

#### TABLE XXXII

DEMOCRATS ESTIMATE OF "DEMOCRATS" OPINION ON EXTENDED GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF LABOR UNIONS COMPARED WITH THEIR OWN OPINION BY CONSISTENCY OF VOTING PATTERN, MIGRANTS ONLY.\*

Self Opinion and Prediction	Con	sist ocra	ent ts	Inco Demo	onsi ocra	sten ts	t S To	Sub- otal	s	
	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Totals
Own opinion	22	12	3	25	10	2	47	22	5	74
"Most Democrats"	7	14	16	10	13	14	17	27	30	74

\*Including residuals.

Although the large number refusing to answer the question, "How would most Democrats feel about this?" makes analysis difficult, it would appear from Table XXXII that Democrats holding a contrary opinion to that which they imagine is held by most of the party are aware of the discrepancy. The large proportion of those who refuse to answer might in itself be interpreted as a reluctance to admit a divergency, but the number is in fact no larger than on the big business question where the party image was consistent with the opinions of the respondents, so this interpretation of refusal to answer will not stand up.

### Summary

Our three sample groups, old-timers, migrants, and newcomers, differ markedly from one another on a number of measures. The greatest difference is between old-timers and those more recent arrivals to Livonia, the migrants and newcomers. Old-timers were older, had lower incomes, lived in houses which they estimated to be less valuable, and were less likely to be managerial or professional workers than were the newer arrivals. In spite of the fact that they were not higher in social status, however, the old-timers had a larger proportion of Republicans than either of the other groups. This suggests that in the suburban situation one must look to other clues, outside social and economic status, to find the determinants of party affiliation.

The concept, "party affiliation" is itself ambiguous, but this ambiguity stems from the political system and not from sloppy thinking. There is in fact no commonly accepted idea of what it means to be a Republican or a Democrat. In this study two separate measures of political affiliation were adopted. The first was merely announced attachment to a political party, either readily or under repeated questioning. The

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second was voting pattern, extracted from the reported votes of the  $\sim$  respondents in two presidential and three gubernatorial elections.

These two measures did not produce exactly the same results, though they were clearly related to each other. In our three samples it is not enough to know a man's political party attachment if we wish to predict his votes in the elections from 1952 through 1956. For the major offices of President and Governor, our respondents in all sample groups are fairly likely to recall voting on one level or the other for candidates of a political party other than the one they themselves espouse. Of course, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that for lower offices where the personality characteristics of the candidates are less well known and therefore not likely to impinge on the political decision, that political affiliation is more closely related to remembered voting.

Fifty per cent of the migrants, 42.8 per cent of the newcomers, and 36.3 per cent of the old-timers favored the Democratic party, while 45.3 per cent of the old-timers, 34.1 per cent of the newcomers, and 35.0 per cent of the migrants favored the Republican party. (See Table XVIII). Voting patterns displayed a much different distribution of party loyalty. Among the migrants there were as many straight Republicans as straight Democratic voters, and more changed to Republicans than changed to Democratic voters. Among newcomers and old-timers as well, Republican voting was more common than Republican commitment. This was not a function of professed Democrats being less likely to vote, the explanation which is often used to explain lower than anticipated Democratic voting on the national scene. It is true that the social and economic classes which contribute most to the Democratic party's voting strength are less likely to turn out to vote than are Republicans.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Campbell, Guerin, and Miller, <u>The Voter Decides</u>, pp. 70-74.

But, in our samples the professed Democrats were <u>not</u> less likely to vote than the other affiliation groups, they were simply less likely to vote for Democratic candidates. More precisely they were less likely than one would otherwise expect to vote for Stevenson against Eisenhower in 1952 and/or 1956.

This is, of course, an extremely knotty phenomenon to explain. The facile explanation, which may be correct, is that the Eisenhower candidacy attracted many voters who nonetheless considered themselves Democrats and who would return to Democratic voting if the Republicans put up someone of less personal charm. On the other hand one might accept the Maccoby thesis that upwardly mobile voters are likely to change their voting behavior but preserve their ideological commitments, while downwardly mobile voters change ideological commitment but maintain older voting patterns.<sup>7</sup> This would fit if affiliation were considered equivalent to ideological commitment and our suburbanites, at least the migrant and newcomer groups, were considered upward mobiles.

The fact is, however, that these data cannot of themselves tell us much of the phenomenon of change in political commitment, except perhaps that fewer people are committed to parties. One must go further into the relations of migrants in the suburbs, and particularly of those who do change in voting pattern before a profitable discussion of change is possible. The facts as presented thus far are susceptible of too many persuasive explanations. One conclusion about the phenomenon of political change will be made. The phenomenon of commitment to a party is disparate enough from that of reported voting, and vague enough in logic of our

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>E. E. Maccoby, R. E. Matthews, and A. S. Morton, "Youth And Political Change," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u>, (XVIII, 1954), pp. 23-29.

discipline and of our political system that changes in expressed commitment are not an appropriate measure of changes in behavior. In this study the patterns of reported voting will be used as the sole indicators of change in party adherence. These patterns, being constructed from reported votes of respondents, are artificial and not perfectly reliable. It may be that some of the people deliberately or unintentionally misremember for whom they vote. It does seem, however, that the patterns constructed from remembered votes are more closely related to actual voting than are political affiliations.

At bottom, political change within an individual, change in opinion, allegiance, or taste, is important if and only if it is connected with a change in political action. The only political action engaged in by most of our respondents, and most American adults for that matter, is voting. A change in voting pattern is the crux of the study of the effect of suburban residence on American politics, and if this change does not occur, the political effects of suburbanization will be much less important than if it does. Voting pattern will be the index of political stability and change in this study. It is rather a pity that this pattern must depend for each respondent on the accuracy of his memory and his willingness to respond to interviewing, but that is the price political scientists pay for living in a country which uses the Australian ballot.

## CHAPTER VI

## SELECTIVE MIGRATION AND DIFFERENTIAL MOBILIZATION

Although Livonia is becoming less Republican, at least on the gubernatorial level, it is not shifting as much as one might expect, if one assumed that the migrants from Detroit were representative of that city in their voting habits. Since migration to the suburbs is selective on social and economic characteristics, and these characteristics are related to political choice, it may well be that suburban migrants differ politically from those voters who remain in Detroit.

This study was not designed as a controlled experiment, and so we do not have interview data from any group which could serve as a standard by which to judge the degree of political change in our sample. By comparing the election returns from those areas of Detroit from which our sample came, however, we can determine how well our migrants represent those areas in two measures. First, do they represent the way those areas voted in 1952, and, second, do they represent the degree to which these areas shifted between 1952 and 1956? If the migrants shifted no more than the areas of Detroit from which they came between 1952 and 1956, we could argue that suburban living had little or no effect on voting insofar as mass election statistics are concerned.

Nationally, the Democratic share of the two-party vote for President decreased between 1952 and 1956, but Detroit was an exception to this trend. Stevenson got 60.5 per cent of the two-party vote for President in Detroit in 1952, 61.8 per cent in 1956. In both elections he trailed the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Williams, who won 65.1 per cent of the two-party vote in 1952, and increased his margin to 70.1 per cent in 1956.

# Sources Of Migrants

The Detroit homes of our sample subjects were not distributed evenly about the city. Some parts of Detroit provided far more of the migrant sample than did others. It would certainly not be appropriate to compare the votes of our migrants with those of all Detroit. A better measure, though still not wholly adequate, is the weighted average vote of those parts of the city from which the migrants came. This is still not wholly adequate as an index of change because the areas from which our sample came may have changed in character between 1952 and 1956. But, it is the nearest thing to a control which it is possible to adopt in this study.

The weighted average referred to above was computed as follows: of Detroit's 22 wards and two enclaves, only nineteen wards and one enclave were the homes of our migrant sample, and one of them, the twenty-second ward, provided 57 of the 146 members of our sample who could be traced back to a specific Detroit ward. Each ward contributed to the weighted average an amount equal to its proportion of the members of our sample who came from it. This proportion was then multiplied by the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for President and Governor, the two sets of figures were summed, producing a weighted average for Governor and President. This process was repeated for the 1956 election, thus giving four such averages. For example, the twentysecond ward, which contributed the largest number of sample members, 57, was also the most Republican ward in the city, giving Stevenson only 43.6 per cent of the two-party vote in 1952. The twenty-second ward's contribution to the weighted average for presidential voting in 1952 would therefore be 57/146 times 43.6.

Computed in this manner, the weighted average serves as a standard with which to compare the reported votes of our sample in 1952 and 1956. One can see not only how those areas of Detroit from which the migrants came differed from Detroit as a whole, but also the direction and degree of change in those areas between 1952 and 1956, thus permitting us to assess the degree to which the rate of change might be different among the migrants from those who remained in Detroit.

## Voting In Detroit

Since Williams's share of the two-party vote was consistently greater than Stevenson's, and the members of our sample display a high propensity to split their ticket between the presidential and gubernatorial levels, (see Chapter V) it seemed appropriate to compute weighted averages for the Detroit areas which were the homes of our sample separately for the two electoral races, and to make comparisons accordingly. Table XXXIII gives the Detroit vote, the weighted averages, and the reported votes of our sample for the 1952 and 1956 elections.

First, note that the weighted average vote for the wards from which our sample came is lower, that is to say more Republican, than the total Detroit vote in every election. This suggests that the members of our sample came from areas of Detroit which were less likely to be inhabited by Democratic voters than is the city as a whole. Is this difference in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote significant?

#### TABLE XXXIII

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES' SHARE OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE FOR GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT, 1952 AND 1956, ALL DETROIT, WEIGHTED AVERAGES OF MIGRANTS' WARDS, AND REPORTED VOTES OF SAMPLE.

Office	Detroit	Weighted Average Migrant's Wards	Migrant's Reported Votes
1952			
President	60.5	55.4	33.0
Governor	65.1	60.3	76.6
1956			
President	61.8	58.1	26.7
Governor	70.1	66.3	62.9

Let us test the proposition that the relation between having a low percentage Democratic vote in a ward and having a large number of migrants from that ward in our sample was due to chance. For the presidential election of 1952 the product-moment correlation, r, between these two variables is, r = -.457, N = 23. There are less than 2.5 chances out of 100 of getting so small a value if there were no relation between the Democratic share of the two-party vote and the number of migrants coming from the ward. In other words, we can be quite confident that our migrants came from areas of Detroit more Republican than the Detroit average.

On the gubernatorial level, the correlation between Democratic voting and number of migrants which the ward supplied to our sample was somewhat smaller, r = -.381, N = 23. There are, however, less than five chances in one hundred that such a small figure would be due to chance. We can clearly argue that the members of our sample were

likely to come to Livonia from the more Republican areas of Detroit.

Let us then compare the votes which the members of our sample report for these elections with the votes of the areas of Detroit from which they came. On the presidential level those migrants who reported a vote in 1952 were much less likely to report voting for Stevenson than were the wards from which they came. The probability that the migrants were a random sample of those wards in this respect can be estimated by using the statistic, z. For the presidential election of 1952, z = 4.89. That means there is less than one chance in ten thousand that the migrants were a random sample of the wards from which they came with respect to voting for Stevenson in that year. We can infer from this that those who voted for Eisenhower in those wards in 1952 were more likely to move than those who voted for Stevenson. In 1956 the discrepancy between the reported votes of our migrants and the votes of those areas of Detroit from which they came was even greater. While voters in Detroit as a whole, and in the areas from which our sample came, were giving Stevenson a greater share of the two-party vote than he earned in 1952, our sample gave him an even smaller vote. The probability that a group which voted as our sample did could have been drawn from the wards from which our sample came on a chance basis in 1956 is extremely low, z = 8.24. When z = 3.72 the probability is less than .0001.

If we were to stop here in our analysis the effects of suburban migration and American politics would seem fairly clear. The migrants come from areas which vote more Republican than the city as a whole; they themselves vote more Republican than the areas they came from; they shift even more towards Republican voting after living in the suburbs. The task of the political analyst is simple, and the Democratic party is losing ground.

Things get more complicated, however, when we take a look at the reported votes for Governor in our sample in 1952 and 1956. The areas of Detroit from which our sample came gave a somewhat smaller share of their total vote to Williams in 1952, but the members of our sample who report voting in 1952 were very likely to say they voted for the Democratic candidate. In fact, 76.6 per cent (see Table XXXIII) of them say they voted for Williams in that year. There is less than one chance in ten thousand that our sample could have been chosen randomly from their Detroit wards with respect to voting for Williams. (z = 3.73) but the direction of difference is exactly the opposite from that on the presidential level. The members of our sample deviated just about as far from the average of their wards in voting for Williams in 1952 as they did in voting for Eisenhower at that time. There is some consistency between the reported votes on the two levels, for there is a shift towards Republican voting for the office of Governor between 1952 and 1956. Williams still gets a majority of our sample vote, but a much smaller majority than he did in 1952. While Williams's share of the two-party vote was increasing in Detroit, (and in Livonia, see Table I) it decreased more than Stevenson's among our sample. As a result the reported votes of our sample in 1956 is very close to the average vote in the areas from which they come. The chances of drawing a sample in 1956 from the wards from which our migrants came that voted in the same way our sample did in 1956 are quite good, about one in four, z = .98.

It would appear that there is indeed a phenomenon to be studied. Migrants in our sample came from the more Republican areas of Detroit, and were more likely to vote Republican on the presidential level than the areas from which they came. But, they also shifted, on the whole, towards more Republican voting on both the presidential and gubernatorial levels more than did their home Detroit areas.

One way to test the significance of this shift would be to see how likely it was that a sample of the size we used could have been drawn randomly from those areas of Detroit and still change so differently between 1952 and 1956. On the presidential level the weighted average Democratic percentage of the two-party vote went up 2.7 per cent. The migrants reported a drop in the Democratic share of the two-party vote of 6.3 per cent. The difference between the two groups is therefore 9.0 per cent. The standard error of the 1952 migrants sample was 4.6 per cent. There are slightly better than five chances in one hundred of getting such a large difference due to chance. For Governor, the weighted average shift was towards the Democrats. 6.0 per cent. The sample, however, shifted towards the Republicans, 13.7 per cent. The standard error of the 1952 sample was 4.4 per cent. (The difference is due to the differing number of migrants who reported voting for Governor and President in 1952). There is less than one chance in ten thousand of getting such a large shift due to chance.

## Gains And Losses In The Sample

In the aggregate, suburban migrants shifted towards Republican candidates for President and Governor more than those who remained in Detroit. This does not mean that Democrats move to the suburbs and become Republicans, for, as was demonstrated in Chapter V, party affiliation and voting are distinct characteristics without one-to-one correspondence. It does not even mean that any large proportion of the sample voted for Democratic candidates in 1952 and for Republicans in

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1956. A man who voted for Stevenson in 1952 and did not vote in 1956, contributes to the size of Eisenhower's majority just as surely, though only half as much, as one who shifted from Stevenson to Eisenhower. In order to find out what happens to individuals in Livonia, as opposed to the aggregate of individual voting behavior which has been presented so far, it is necessary to examine the voting patterns of the individual members of our sample in detail.

Voting patterns were classified into seven categories. The first two were the patterns of straight voters, those who report voting for Democrats or Republicans only in those elections for which they report a vote. Of the 35 straight Democratic voters, only 23, 65.7 per cent voted in both presidential elections. Three of the remainder voted in 1952 but not in 1956 and nine in 1956 but not in 1952. Between these years Stevenson picked up six votes among straight Democratic voters. Among the straight Republican voters, 22 of the 35 voted in both elections, 62.9 per cent. Of the remainder three voted in 1952 but not in 1956 and ten in 1956 but not in 1952. Eisenhower therefore gained seven votes. A third major voting pattern category was that of Eisenhower-Williams voters. These were respondents who reported voting only for the Republican presidential candidate and the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in each election for which they reported a vote. Of these 40 Eisenhower-Williams voters, 22, 55 per cent, voted in both presidential elections. five voted in 1952 but not in 1956 and 13 voted in 1956 but not in 1952. Among Eisenhower-Williams voters, therefore, Eisenhower gained eight votes.

Thirteen respondents were classified as having changed towards Republican voting. To be included in this category a respondent had to begin by voting for at least one Democratic candidate and end by voting straight Republican. Of these thirteen, all of whom voted in both elections, only one ever voted for Stevenson. In this category therefore, Eisenhower gained one, and Stevenson lost one. Changed to Democratic voters, four in number, were those who began by voting for at least one Republican and ended by voting solidly for the Democrats. All of these voted in both presidential elections, and three switched from Eisenhower to Stevenson. Stevenson therefore gained three votes and Eisenhower lost three.

The last category of voters (non-voters comprised the seventh category) were residual patterns. Eleven members of the sample had patterns which did not fit any of the preceding definitions. Of these, six shifted from Stevenson to Eisenhower, six gained for the Republican, six lost for the Democrat. Two voted for Eisenhower in both elections, no gain, no loss. One voted for Stevenson in 1952 but not in 1956, one lost for Stevenson. Two voted for Eisenhower in 1952 but did not vote in 1956, two lost for Eisenhower. Table XXXIV gives the number of votes gained or lost by each presidential candidate in each voting pattern category.

When we look at this compilation it is apparent that, though Eisenhower gained 17 votes in our sample between 1952 and 1956, only one of these came from people who could be classified as changing to "Republican" voting.

A similar analysis is possible for the shift in vote for Governor between 1952 and 1956. Of the 35 straight Democratic voters, 22, 62.9 per cent voted for Williams in both 1952 and 1956. (We omit the 1954 election in this analysis because some of the sample members still lived in Detroit at this time.) Of the remaining thirteen, three voted for Williams in 1952 but not 1956, seven voted for him in 1956 but not 1952, and three in neither election. Among straight Democratic voters, Williams gained four votes during the period covered by this study.

#### TABLE XXXIV

# NET GAINS AND LOSSES FOR STEVENSON AND EISENHOWER IN VOTING PATTERN GROUPS, 1952 TO 1956.

Candidate	Straight Democrat	Straight Rep.	Eisenhower Williams	Changed to Dem.	Changed to Rep.	Residual	Total
Eisenhower	-	+ 7	+ 8	- 3	+ 1	+ 4	+ 17
St <b>eve</b> n <b>so</b> n	+ 6	-	-	+ 3	- 1	- 7	+ 1

Seventeen, 46.3 per cent of the 35 straight Republican voters voted for Williams's opponents in both elections. One voted in 1952 but not 1956, twelve voted in 1956 but not 1952, five did not vote in either election. This gives the Republican gubernatorial candidates a net gain of eleven votes during this period. Eisenhower-Williams voters, of whom there were 40, changed as follows. Twenty, 50 per cent, voted for Williams in both elections, five in 1952 but not 1956, fourteen in 1956 but not 1952, one in neither (voted for Williams in 1954). In this category Williams gained nine votes. Among the four voters who changed towards the Democrats, Williams gained one vote and his Republican opponents lost one. The other three voted for Williams in all elections. Among those who changed to Republican voting, thirteen in all, all of them voted for Williams in 1952, and all of them voted for his opponent in 1956, a loss of thirteen for Williams and a corresponding gain for the Republicans. The eleven sample members with residual voting patterns gave Williams no gain and no loss. Six voted for him in both elections,

three in neither election, one in 1952 but not 1956, and one in 1956 but not 1952. His opponents lost two votes in this category. Nine people did not vote for the Republican candidates in either of the two elections, but two voted for the Republican in 1952 but not in 1956. The compilation of net vote gains and losses by voting pattern types is in Table XXXV.

## TABLE XXXV

# NET GAINS AND LOSSES FOR WILLIAMS AND HIS REPUBLICAN OPPONENTS IN VOTING PATTERN GROUPS, 1952 AND 1956.

Candidate	Straight Democrat	Straight Rep.	Eisenhower Williams	Changed to Dem.	Changed to Rep.	Residual	Total
Williams	<del>†</del> 4	-	+ 9	<del> </del> 1	- 13	-	+ 1
Republican opponent	s -	<del> </del> 11	-	- 1	+ 13	- 2	+ 21

Williams, the Democrat, got one more vote from our sample in 1956, when they lived in Livonia than in 1952, when they lived in Detroit. During this time, however, his majority decreased by twenty votes. These new votes came from two sources, increased turnout by Republicans, and loss of voters to the Republicans who had once supported him.

## Differential Mobilization

The decreasing Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for both offices among the members of our sample between 1952 and 1956 is clearly <u>not</u> the result of shift from Democratic voting in 1952 to Republican voting in 1956. On the presidential level, only one vote of Eisenhower's net gain of 17 was the result of this phenomenon. On the gubernatorial level, however, those who changed towards Republican voting contributed substantially to the increase in the Republican's share of the two-party vote. Looking at it in another way, very few of the suburban migrants, only one out of the one hundred-sixty, began as straight voting Democrats and ended as straight voting Republicans. Using this extremely narrow definition of political conversion, the Democratic party has little to worry about with respect to changes in the affiliation of dedicated Democrats upon migration to suburbia.

The apparent increase in Republican voting in our suburb stems from two causes. First, more Eisenhower voters than Stevenson voters moved to Livonia between 1952 and 1956. Second, the Republicans pick up more votes from those who did not cast ballots in 1952 than do the Democrats. Of the total of seventeen directional changers, using a very broad definition of directional change, sixteen were split ticket voters in 1952. Further, among the eleven respondents with residual voting patterns all of them, by definition voted for candidates of both parties at one time or another and seven of them voted for Eisenhower and Williams in 1956. Of our 138 respondents who reported votes, 65, 47.1 per cent, report splitting their votes between the presidential and gubernatorial levels in at least one election.

If we had collected the reported votes of our sample over a longer period, it might be true that voters in shifting from one party to the other use split ticket voting as an intermediate state. All those whom we classified as directional changers, with one exception, began as split ticket voters, and seven of the respondents with residual voting patterns ended **as** split ticket voters. Since we have no information on how the directional changers began nor on how those of residual voting pattern will end, this can be no more than a hunch. And, in

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considering the fact that both Eisenhower and Williams attracted votes from respondents who felt themselves to be members of the opposite party, this hunch is one which we should not lean on too heavily, given the absence of information on the votes of our sample before 1952 and after 1956.

Given the fact that shift from straight party voting for the Democrats to straight party voting for the Republicans was rare, if we are to discuss the social correlates of directional changing in suburbia it seems best to adopt a rather broad definition of what directional change is. In the following chapter we use the definition given on page 144. Since we cannot be sure what those who shifted to split voting will do in the future, it seems best to leave these respondents in the residual category. They may be on the way to voting for the other party, but the large number of Eisenhower-Williams voters suggests that split voting is a stable, or at least an enduring pattern. In the next chapter we discuss the responses of our sample to a series of questions on political interest, social and economic change, and integration into neighborhood based primary groups in an attempt to find social and psychological characteristics which are associated with a propensity to change.

#### Summary

The members of our sample came from more Republican areas of Detroit, and were more likely to report voting for Eisenhower and Williams than the average of the areas from which they came. They shifted towards Republican voting significantly more than did the areas of Detroit from which they came, when this shift was measured by percentages of the total two-party vote. But, an analysis of individual voting patterns showed that only one member of the sample actually moved from straight Democratic to straight Republican voting. The apparent change was largely the result of people voting Republican in Livonia who had not voted in Detroit, a function, in other words, of differential mobilization rather than conversion.

## CHAPTER VII

## CHANGE IN INTEREST AND CHANGE IN VOTE

The most intriguing possibility in the area of political change and suburbanization is that migrants to suburbia will change in political affiliation upon coming to the suburbs and therefore change the party that they support at the polls. As we saw in Chapter V, the two variables of party affiliation and voting are to a large degree independent in our sample, with many professed Democrats voting for Republicans and a high proportion of our sample voting split tickets at one or more elections. Three hypotheses have been suggested to explain the change in voting which is presumed to occur in many migrants to the suburbs from the central city. First, that people change in the suburbs because they participate in new locality-based primary groups whose political values are salient prerequisites for acceptance and group participation, these values being different from those held by the new suburbanite before his move. Second, that migration to the suburbs varies with upward social and economic mobility and that political change does as well, both being dependent on this underlying variable. Third, that suburban living places the migrant in a new role, homeowner, and that this situation pre-disposes him to conservative political values and leads him to vote Republican.

On the basis of this study none of these hypotheses hold true. In Chapter IV data were presented which strongly supported the conclusion that migrants did in fact experience a change in social circumstances as a result of the move. They were aware of a difference in the frequency and manner of social interaction upon coming to the suburb, and for the most part they preferred this style of life to the one which they had left behind in Detroit. Further, the literature reviewed in Chapter I indicated that these perceived differences were in no sense idiosyncratic to the Detroit Metropolitan region in general or Livonia in particular.

Are there political correlates to this change in social behavior? In particular, is there any shift in the intensity or focus of political interest in the migrants to the suburban environment? Do politics matter in suburbia, is so what politics, and how much? To answer these questions our sample was asked to appraise their own political interest and that of their neighbors in a number of different ways.

', It would seem important to distinguish between various levels of government in probing the political interests in suburbia. One might plausibly argue that an increase in interest in local politics might occur, but that it would not necessarily produce a similar interest in state or national politics. As a general rule political interest seems to follow a pattern of "the more, the more," but in Michigan the prevalent form of local election, shared by both Detroit and Livonia, is non-partisan, and as Adrian and Williams have pointed out this does seem to insulate local politics from the higher levels.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon is Detroit, where a politically

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>C. Adrian and O. Williams, "The Insulation Of Local Politics Under The Non-Partisan Ballot," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, (LIII, 4, Dec. 1959), pp. 1052-1063.

successful mayor could turn out to be a Republican, even though the city is overwhelmingly Democratic in state and national elections.

# Political Interest

A first perspective on the level of political interest in suburban migrants may be gained from the responses to an open-ended question on the topics of conversation in the two cities. Respondents were asked, "We would like to get an idea of the sorts of things people talk about. What do you think are the main topics of conversation around here?" This question was followed by, "Thinking back to when you lived in Detroit, what were the main topics of conversation with your Detroit neighbors?" In coding the responses we used a wide range of subject matter categories, but for our purposes the only interesting breakdown is "Politics and Governmental Affairs" compared to all other topics combined.

## TABLE XXXVI

Livonia Rate of Discussion	Discu Numbe	ss r Per Cent	Detro Don <b>'</b> t Dis Numbe	it cuss r Per Cent	NR, L Don <sup>1</sup> t to Neig Numbe	oK, Talk hbors r Per Cent	Tota: Numbe	l er Per Cent
Discuss	15	9.4	19	11.9	19	11.9	53	33.1
Don't discuss	3	1.9	53	33.1	43	26.9	99	61.9
No response, don't know, don't talk to neighbors	1	•6	2	1.2	5	3.0	8	5.0
Total	19	11.9	74	46.3	67	41.8	160	100.0

# NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS WHO REPORT DISCUSSING "POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT" IN DETROIT AND LIVONIA.

Considering only those ninety respondents who told us what they talked about in both Detroit and Livonia, there are considerably less than five chances in ten thousand that the difference in talking of politics in the two cities could be due to chance (chi-square = 31.73). We can say with some confidence therefore that those who say they discussed politics and government in Detroit are likely to discuss politics and government in Livonia. It is apparent, however, that the reverse is not true, for of the 53 respondents who say they sometimes discuss politics and government in Livonia, 19 do not mention discussing them in Detroit and an equal number either didn't answer, didn't remember, or didn't talk to their neighbors then.

Politics and government are hardly of overwhelming interest in either setting; most respondents who answered didn't discuss it at all. It seems clear, therefore, that many respondents see an increase in the discussion of politics and governmental affairs among their neighbors upon moving to the suburbs.<sup>2</sup>

Since our sample was chosen from migrants from Detroit to Livonia, it cannot be said to be representative of the population of either community. Therefore one could not generalize on the basis of Table XXXVI that Livonians talk about politics more than Detroiters.

Following the open-end questions on topics of conversation in general, we asked our respondents specifically whether they discussed problems of local government and politics in general, and if so, how often. The frequency responses were structured by presenting to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>It may be that politics, being less salient to our respondents, was the first topic to be dropped when they were asked essentially the same question twice in a row, once about Livonia, then about Detroit. There is no basis beyond personal preference for choosing between these two interpretations. I prefer the former.

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respondents the following alternatives: once a week or more, more than once a month, only during election campaigns, very seldom.

## TABLE XXXVII

Frequency of	Politics	In General	Local Go	overnment Problems
Discussing	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Never Very seldom Only during campaigns More than once a	63 28 42	39.3 17.5 26.2	57 25 42	35.6 15.6 26.2
month	13	8.1	21	13.1
Once a week or more	11	6.9	14	8.7
No response	3	1.9	1	.6
Total	160	99•9	160	99.8

# FREQUENCY OF DISCUSSING POLITICS IN GENERAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS.

Before discussing Table XXXVII in general I should like to note that of all the cell groups in Table XXXVI, those who named politics as a topic of conversation in Detroit and Livonia were the most likely to mention discussing politics in general more than once a month or once a week or more. Six of the fifteen respondents in that cell did so. The probability that so small a number of the total sample should have contributed such a large share of those who frequently discuss politics in general is .02.

For the table as a whole, I would argue that the difference between the responses to the questions in Table XXXVI are more important than the responses to either separately. Separately, these questions indicate only that, if the migrants are more interested in politics now than they were in Detroit, then they must have been very disinterested indeed before they moved. More than half of them, 51.2 per cent, never or very seldom discuss politics in general. At the other end of the scale, local government problems are discussed more than once a month by 21.8 per cent of the migrants, while politics in general is discussed that frequently by only 15.0 per cent. This would seem to indicate that our sample is more likely to be interested in local political matters than those of broader concern.

This interpretation is confirmed by the response to the questions, "Would you say most of the people who live around here are more interested in local or in state and national government?", and "How about you? Which are you more interested in?"

### TABLE XXXVIII

Area of Interest	S Number	elf Per Cent	Neigh Number	bors Per Cent
Local	59	36.9	89	55.6
About the same	61	38.1	29	18.1
State and national	37	23.1	17	10.6
No response	3	1.9	25	15.6
Total	160	100.0	160	99•9

# NEIGHBORS AND SELF INTEREST IN LOCAL OR STATE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

The respondents themselves are more likely to be interested in local government and much more likely to think that their neighbors are interested in local government over state and national. Only 23.1 per cent of them are more interested in state and national affairs, while 36.9 per cent are more interested in local politics. Only 10.6 per cent think their neighbors are more interested in state and national politics while 55.6 per cent of the migrant sample guess their neighbors to be more interested in local affairs.

There is additional confirmation of the judgment that interest in politics, though low as measured by topics of conversation and frequency of discussion, has in fact increased since the move, and that the increase is greater with respect to local politics than state and national. Respondents were asked, "Do you find yourself more interested or less interested in problems of local government than you were when you lived in Detroit?", and further in the schedule, "Do you think you are more interested or less interested in state and national government since you moved here?"

#### Table XXXIX

Level of Interest	Loca Number	l Per Cent	State and Number	National Per Cent
More interest	118	73.9	74	46.4
About the same	35	21.9	71	44.4
Less interest	6	3.7	13	8.1
No response	1	.6	2	1.2
Total	160	100.1	160	100.1

SELF APPRAISAL OF CHANGE OF INTEREST SINCE THE MOVE IN LOCAL AND STATE AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

We find that 73.9 per cent of the respondents report an increase in interest in local government while only 46.4 per cent report being more interested in state and national affairs. Similarly only 3.7 per cent report a decrease in interest in local politics and 8.1 per cent a decrease in interest in state and national politics. I would not argue that these responses can be taken at face value to the extent that they express interest in these levels. Once again we must note that the migrants talk politics very little in Livonia, but the difference between the responses to nearly identical questions on local and state and national affairs seem reliable, especially as they are consistent with other assessments of this variable.

#### Efficacy

Another important aspect of interest in politics is what has been called at varying times "efficacy," "Sense of political self-confidence," and, in reverse, "sense of political futility" and "alienation from government." The concept is important as a facet of change in political attitudes as a result of suburban experience. What is important here is not the level of belief in political effectiveness as such, but to determine, first whether the level appears to have changed as a result of migration, and second, whether this aspect of political interest is related to a change in voting. This last seems possible in the light of the study by Kornhauser and associates of labor voting, where anomics tended to be more likely to deviate from group voting norms.<sup>3</sup>

In this study four questions were used to assess the sense of political effectiveness. The first two were individual, the second pair more broadly social in their implication. The particular questions were, "How much of a say do you feel you have in the way the government of Livonia is run?", and "How about Detroit. How much of a say did you feel you had when you lived there?" Responses to both questions were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>A. Kornhauser, A. J. Mayer, and H. Sheppard, <u>When Labor Votes</u>, A Study Of Auto Workers (New York: University Books, 1956), p. 193.

forced into the categories much, some, little, very little, none. To tap the extent to which this sense of effectiveness was projected onto the population at large, respondents were asked, "How close do you think Livonia's government comes to doing what the average citizen wants it to do?", and "How close did you feel the Detroit government came to doing what the average man wanted it to do?" For these two questions the response categories were very close, pretty close, depends on time and issues, rarely close, not close at all.

#### Table XL

How Much Say In Government	Detroit	Livonia	Livonia-Detroit
Much	3	26	+ 23
Some	28	58	+ 30
Little	21	26	+ 5
Very little	53	31	- 22
None	46	12	<b>-</b> 34
No response	9	7	- 2
Total	160	160	

# POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS-HOW MUCH SAY IN GOVERNMENT, LIVONIA AND DETROIT.

Plainly, in their new setting the migrants are much more likely to perceive themselves as politically effective than they were in Detroit. Each of the four questions on political effectiveness was followed by an open-end probe in which respondents were asked their reasons for answering as they did. The most frequent explanation given was the size of the community. This explanation was used both to explain low sense of effectiveness in Detroit, and increased sense of effectiveness in Livonia. This finding directly contradicts Lane's interpretation
of the material on political efficacy presented in <u>The Voter Decides</u>. Lane notes that size of community is directly related to a sense of political efficacy, the larger the place the more likely are its inhabitants to consider themselves politically effective.<sup>4</sup>

## TABLE XLI

## POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS-GOVERNMENT CLOSE TO AVERAGE MAN'S DESIRES, LIVONIA AND DETROIT.

Degree Of Closeness	Detroit	Livonia	Livonia-Detroit
Verv close	7	14	+ 7
Pretty close	54	90	+ 36
Depends on issue	38	29	- 9
Rarely close	17	10	- 7
Not close at all	12	7	<b>-</b> 5
No response	32	10	- 22
Total	160	160	

The information collected by this research would lead me to suggest that size of community does not control efficacy in the manner described above, at least insofar as the citizens' sense of efficacy in local affairs is concerned. Perhaps the efficacy in local affairs is separate from that in government in general. Or it might be that the urban setting and the social interactions based on it are the significant variable and that within a metropolitan setting efficacy is inversely rather than directly related to size of community.

A sense of political effectiveness is not the same as an interest in government, but one might logically expect them to be related to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>R. Lane, <u>Political Life</u> (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 151, citing Campbell, Guerin, and Miller, <u>The Voter Decides</u>, p. 191.

each other. Persons with high efficacy scores would probably be more likely to describe themselves as interested in local government than those with a low sense of political effectiveness. All respondents who thought they had much or some say in government in Livonia and thought Livonia came pretty close or very close to meeting the average man's desires were classified as having a high efficacy score. Those who felt they had little or no say in government and felt that the government rarely came close to the average man's desires or was not at all close to them were classified as having a low sense of effectiveness. All middle range responders to either question and those who scored high on one question and low on the other (a quite small group) were described as medium in this regard. The following table classifies high, medium, and low "effectives" with respect to their response to the question, "Do you think you are more interested or less interested in local government as compared to your neighbors?" Those who did not respond to any one of three questions involved are excluded from the table.

The relationship between these two variables is <u>not</u> as clear as one might expect. Although the direction of the relation is as predicted, the magnitude is not great. Almost as many people of those people with a strong sense of political effectiveness are less interested, by their own account, than their neighbors as are more interested. On the other hand, only one of the 20 respondents with a low efficacy score felt himself to be more interested. The extent to which responses to the level of interest question differ from those which produced the effectiveness scores leads me to conclude that the two sets of questions do in fact approach different aspects of political interest.

### Table XLII

SENSE OF LOCAL POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS BY SELF-APPRAISAL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST AS COMPARED TO NEIGHBORS.

Interest In Govern- ment Compared To Neighbors	Sense High Number Per Cent	Of Effective Medium Number Per Cent	ness Low Number Per Cent	Total Number Per Cent
More	14 22.6	13 21.3	1 5.0	28 19.6
Same	36 58 <b>.</b> 1	34 55.8	13 65.0	83 58.0
Less	12 19.3	14 22.9	6 30.0	32 22.4
Total	62 100.0	61 100.0	20 100.0	143 100.0

Clearly then, there are some changes in political characteristics of migrants which are associated with the move to the suburb. It is true that our information on these changes is less conclusive than one might wish, since it is collected through interviews administered entirely after the move. However, it does not seem to be inappropriate to accept such information in the absence of any other, and considering that other information would be prohibitively expensive to collect.

The changes which can be deduced from the data presented thur far may be summarized as follows. Migration to the suburbs was associated with an increase in political interest and in self concept of political effectiveness in local government. The increase in political interest was greater in local government than in state and national affairs, and the data on political conversation confirm this distinction between the Detroit and Livonia setting and between local and statenational government.

## Change In Voting

The major purpose of this research was to investigate changes in voting pattern associated with moving to the suburbs. First it must be determined whether changes in voting pattern do exist in our sample; second, whether the frequency of these changes is great enough to warrant assuming that they are associated with suburban migration; third, assuming the first two questions can be answered in the affirmative, what patterns of social behavior or social-psychological attributes are associated with changed voting patterns so that the process leading to such change may be better understood.

On the first of these questions the answer is clearly and directly affirmative. Using the classification of voting pattern outlined in Chapter V, 17 of our respondents, somewhat more than 10 per cent of the total sample, reported voting in such a way as to permit the inference that a directional change in party preference had taken place. Four of these shifted towards Democratic candidates, thirteen towards Republican. In addition, 11 of our respondents reported voting patterns which shifted between major party candidates, but in such a way that the direction of their shift could not be deduced. These were called residual voters, or residuals.<sup>5</sup>

A corollary to the first question is whether the tendency to shift directionally among our migrants favored one party over the other to the extent that it could be considered significant. Although the number involved, 17 in all, is small, there exists a non-parametric test, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The exact voting patterns of the directional changers in the migrant sample are given in Table XLIII. The exact patterns of the residuals in the migrant sample, and the directional changers and residuals among the non-sample subjects are given in Appendix B, Tables LXXVII, LVVIX, and LXXX.

## DIRECTIONAL CHANGE PATTERNS AMONG THE MIGRANTS.

Description	1952	Year 1954	1956	Frequency
Pro-Republican				
President Governor	Stevenson Williams	Williams	Eisenhower Cobo	1
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Leonard	Eisenhower Cobo	3
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Williams	Eisenhower Cobo	6
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	No vote	Eisenhower Cobo	3
Sub-total				13
Pro-Democratic				
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Williams	Stevenson Williams	3
President Governor	Stevenson Alger	No vote	Stevenson Williams	1
Sub-total				4
Total				17

McNemar Sign Change Test, which permits us to reject the null-hypothesis that migrants to our suburbs who changed directionally were equally likely to shift in either direction.<sup>6</sup> Our respondents were more likely to become Republican.

The respondents in all groups of our sample--migrants, old-timers, and newcomers were asked to tell us how they voted in five elections, the presidential elections of 1952 and 1956 and the gubernatorial elections of 1952, 1954, and 1956. If we exclude the possibility of minor party voting (no member of the sample reported voting for a candidate of a minor party in any of the elections) but include the possibility of not voting in one or more contests, there are 243 different possible patterns of voting. Of these, 138 or 57 per cent are change patterns and 105 or 43 per cent are not. In this interpretation steady voting for the candidate of one party for president and the other for governor was considered a non-change pattern. Only twenty-four of the change patterns were defined as directional. These comprise 10 per cent of the total possible number of patterns and 17 per cent of the total change patterns.

<sup>6</sup>In applying this test, described in S. Siegel, <u>Non-Parametric</u> <u>Statistics For The Behavioral Sciences</u> (New York: McGraw Hill Book <u>Co., 1956</u>), we used only those members of the sample who voted straight Republican, straight Democratic, changed to Republican, or changed to Democratic. The table on which the test was based looked like this.

		After	1956
		Dem.	Rep.
Before	Rep.	4	35
1952	Dem.	35	13

This test produces an approximation of chi-square, corrected for continuity, of 5.9 when applied to our data. This is significant at between the .02 and .01 level. The distribution of change and non-change voting in the various samples is described in the table below.

### TABLE XLIV

Pattern	Migra Number	nts Per Cent	Old-ti Number	imers Per Cent	Newco Numbe	mers r Per Cent	Total Numbe	r Per Cent
Change voting	28	17.5	16	12.1	7	8.5	51	13.6
Non-change voting	132	82.5	116	87.9	75	91.5	323	86.4
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.0	374	100.0

PROPENSITY TO CHANGE BY SAMPLE TYPE.

If the hypothesis that suburban migration unsettles political values is true, one should expect to find the migrants more likely to change than the old-timers. When we apply the chi-square test to these data, however, we find that chi-square = 1.63. This is not significant at the five per cent level even though we can use chi-square as a one-tail test since we have predicted the direction of difference. There is slightly more than one chance out of ten that the differences between the old-timers and migrants could be due to chance.

The difference between old-timers and newcomers was small enough to be likely to be due to change (chi-square = .66, probability between .50 and .30 under a two-tailed test). The greatest difference in propensity to change is between the newcomers and migrants. This is most unexpected, since these two groups resembled one another most closely in social characteristics <u>and</u> shared the experience of a recent move to suburbia. For these two groups chi-square = 3.54, which is not quite the five per cent level under a two-tail chi-square test. (Chi-square must be equal to or greater than 3.84 to be significant at five per cent.) As I could not suggest which of these two groups I would have expected to show the highest rate of moving, the two-tail test is appropriate here.

## Summary

Political interest, though low, increased among the migrants after they came to Livonia, as did their sense of political effectiveness, with the greatest change coming as a result of increased interest in local government. Such directional change as occurred among the migrants was significantly more likely to be towards Republican than Democratic voting, but the migrants were not significantly more likely to exhibit change voting patterns than were the old-timers. Both the migrants and the old-timers, however, were significantly more likely to change than were the newcomers.

## CHAPTER VIII

## DIRECTIONAL CHANGE

In this chapter we shall examine the propensity of the three groups to change <u>directionally</u> and the characteristics of the directional changers as compared to other types in the migrant group. For this purpose it would seem appropriate to divide each sample into three classes, those who changed directionally, those who voted but did not change directionally, and those who did not vote. I argue that this division would provide a more sensitive measure of a more precise and more important phenomenon. That is, the likelihood of shifting voting from one party to another, and that persistent non-voters should therefore be classified separately and excluded from the computation.

## TABLE XLV

PROPENSITY TO CHANGE DIRECTIONALLY BY SAMPLE TYPE.

Propensity To Change	Migr Numbe	ants r Per Cent	Old-t Numbe	imers r Per Cent	Newco Numbe	mers r Per Cent	Total Numbe	r Per Cent	
Directional change	17	10.6	8	6.0	5	6.1	26	6.8	
No directional change but voted	121	75.6	104	78.8	61	74.4	290	77•7	
No reported votes	22	13.8	20	15.2	16	19.5	58	15.5	
Total	160	100.0	132	100.0	82	100.0	374	100.0	

Perhaps the most precise method of testing this pattern is to compare the proportion of directional change patterns among all change patterns.

## TABLE XLVI

DIRECTIONAL CHANGERS AND RESIDUALS BY SAMPLE TYPE.

Change Pattern	Migrants	Old-timers	Newcomers	Total
	Number Per	Number Per	Number Per	Number Per
	Cent	Cent	Cent	Cent
Directional changers	s 17 60 <b>.</b> 7	8 50.0	5 71.5	26 51.0
Residuals	11 39.3	8 50.0	2 28.5	25 49.0
Total	28 100.0	16 100.0	7 100.0	51 100.0

Although we would expect the migrants to be more likely to change directionally than the old-timers, the chi-square of 1.17 computed from Table XLVI is not significant even though the one-tailed test can be used. Applying the Fisher test to the proportions of old-timers and newcomers who changed directionally, one finds that the differences are not significant at that level. The number of newcomers showing a non-directional change would have to be one or zero to be significant. Clearly, however, directional change in our sample is <u>not</u> more likely to occur among the migrants than among the old-timers, just as change itself is not. (See Chapter VII.) Perhaps the newcomers are in the process of change and the proportion of change voting among them will increase in time.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>In Appendix B the exact patterns of voting of the directional changers and residuals among the non-sample subjects and residuals among the migrants are given.

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As I pointed out in Chapter VI, directional change must be broadly defined if we are to have a reasonable number of respondents to discuss. Only one member of the sample went from straight Democratic to straight Republican voting during the period studied.

There is another reason for adopting this broad a definition. Prior to beginning this research I felt that it was unlikely there would be many changers among the migrants. I wished therefore to minimize the chances of adding to the strength of this argument. The best way to do so was to adopt a definition of directional change broad enough to include every conceivable type of voting pattern which would imply a shift from one party to the other.

Let us now turn to the ways directional changers among the migrants differ from the rest of that group, for only the migrants were asked the questions which provide us with data to examine this question more closely.

## Directional Changing And The Migrants-The Primary Group Hypothesis

A major hypothesis of this study was that, if party oriented changes in voting behavior occured, they would occur among those who moved to neighborhoods in which: (1) neighborhood based friendship groups existed, (2) political values were salient to the group, (3) these values were different from those previously held by the migrant, and, (4) the migrant had sought and achieved or was seeking entrance into the groups.

Empirically one should expect the directional changers to exhibit the following characteristics if this hypothesis is sound. First they would shift in the direction of neighbor's perceived party affiliation. This is the sine qua non of the hypothesis. In addition one would expect them to cluster in the high range when assessing the degree of interest in political opinions among neighbors, be more likely to say they have seen less of their old Detroit friends, and, perhaps indicate some awareness of the effect of holding divergent political opinion on neighborhood social relations when asked the question directly. Let us take these tests of the hypothesis in order.

After being asked their own party affiliations, each migrant was asked, "What about most of the people who live around here, do you think they are mostly Republicans or Democrats?" Responses to this question were less valuable than they should have been ideally since such a large proportion of the migrants refused to commit themselves as to the party affiliation of "most" of their neighbors. For the sample as a whole, only 61 respondents would guess their neighbor's party attachments, 97 said they didn't know or guessed that they were split 50-50, and two refused to answer. Perhaps it would have been wiser, considering the importance of the question, to probe more vigorously for a definite answer, but several equally important questions on actual voting followed this one in the schedule and it was deemed too risky to push hard on this.

The number of respondents who evaded the question makes it unwise to rely heavily on it. Those directional changers who did answer did not unanimously feel that their neighbors favored the party towards which they themselves shifted. Five shifted in the direction of their neighbor's preferences; three shifted the other way.

It might be possible to argue that those who were affected by neighborhood pressure would be likely to respond by withdrawing from this sensitive area by refusing to guess their neighbor's affiliation. Let

TABLE XLVII

NEIGHBOR'S POLITICAL BELIEFS BY STABLE VOTING PATTERNS, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Most Netzhbors	Stralch	ى <b>ب</b> ا	Etsen	St: Dower	able V Straf	oting . cht	Pattern Non-		Tota1	Stable	0	
Are	Democra	t Per ent	Numbe	lams r Per Cent	Repub Numbe	lican r Per Cent	Vot Number	cers r Per Cent	Vot	ers r Per Cent	Total Numbe	Sample r Per Cent
Republicans	7 2	0•0	6	22.4	10	28.6	Ч	4.5	27	20.4	33	20.6
Democrats	8	2.8	7	17.5	5	14.2	1	1	20	15.2	28	17.5
Don't know or 50-50	20 5	7.2	24	60.0	20	57.2	19	86.4	83	62.9	97	60.6
No response	I	I	I	I	1	T	5	9.1	2	1.5	2	1.2
Total	35 10	0.0	40	99.9	35	100.0	22	100.0	132	100.0	160	9.9

TABLE XLVIII

## NEIGHBOR'S POLITICAL BELIEFS BY CHANGE VOTING PATTERNS, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Most Neighbors Are	Pro- Democr	atic	lhange Pro- Repub	Votin 11can	g Patt Resid Patte	ern ual rns	Total Vot	. Chang	e Total	Sample	
	Number	Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent	
Republicans	Ч	25.0	4	30.8	Ч	9.1	9	21.4	33	20.6	
Democrats	Ч	25.0	2	15.4	5	45.5	8	28.6	28	17.5	
Don <sup>1</sup> t know or 50-50	2	50.0	7	53.8	Ŝ	45.5	14	50.0	97	60.6	
No response	1	1	ı	1	I	I	I	I	2	<b>1.</b> 2	
Total	4 T	0.00	13	100.0	11	100.1	28	100.0	160	6•66	

TABLE XLIX

## WILLINGNESS TO GUESS NEIGHBOR'S PARTY PREFERENCE BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Willingness	Stable Vot	ers Per Cent	Stabl Non-V Numbe:	e oters r Per Cent	Voting Direc Chang Numbe	Patte: tional ers r Per Cent	rn Resid Numbe	luals :r Per Cent	Total Numbe	s r Per Cent	
Guess	911	4 <b>1.</b> 8	н	4.5	8	0°L4	9	54.5	61	38.1	
No guess	<del>1</del> 19	58.2	19	86.4	6	53.0	5	45.5	76	60.6	
No response	I	t	2	9.1	I	I	1	ı	2	1.2	
Total	I OII	00.00	22	100.0	17	0.001	11	100.0	160	<b>99</b> •9	

us then examine the relative numbers of voters, non-voters, directional changers and residuals who were willing to estimate their neighbor's party preferences.

By inspection we can see this interpretation is not viable. Changers as a whole, and directional changers as well, were about as likely to estimate their neighbor's preferences as were either stable voters or stable non-voters. The difference between changers and stable voters is not statistically significant, and clearly the changers as a whole and directional changers in particular are not more reluctant to guess their neighbor's party affiliations.

As was pointed out in an earlier section<sup>2</sup> the party preferences of our migrant sample are not wholly consistent with their voting patterns. It is worth looking into the estimate of neighbor's preferences as compared to the subjective party attachments of the migrants.

The professed Republicans are much more likely and the professed Democrats are slightly more likely to see their neighbors as mostly sharing their political views (see Table L). Those who lean towards either party, but do not profess to support it on first questioning are slightly more likely to see their neighbors, in the main, favoring the opposite party. Neutrals, as might be expected, refuse to estimate neighbor's party affiliations in the largest proportions. This table suggests two questions that can be raised. First, are those of weak party commitment significantly less likely to refuse to guess their neighbor's affiliations than those whose commitments to the party are strong? Second, are those who lean towards the party but do not profess it significantly <u>more</u> likely to guess that most of their neighbors

<sup>2</sup>See Chapter V, p. 89.

TABLE L

NEIGHBOR'S PARTY AFFILIATION BY PARTY PREFERENCES, MIGRANTS ONLY.

	Professed	Lean to	Neut	Party ral	Prefer Lean	ences to	Of Mig Profe	rants ssed	No		Total	
Most Neighbors Are	kepublican Number Per Cent	kepublics Number Pe Cer	ir Numb It	er Per Cent	Numbe	rat r Per Cent	Democ Numbe	rat r Per Cent	Respo Numbe	nse r Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent
Republicans	12 31.6	4 22.	2 2	10.5	ñ	16.7	12	19.4	1	1	33	20.6
Democrats	5 13.2	5 27.	8	5.3	2	11.1	15	24.2	I	ı	28	17.5
Don <sup>1</sup> t know c 50-50	r 21 55 <b>.</b> 2	9 50.	0 10	84.2	13	72.2	35	56.5	ξ	<b>60 .</b> 0	97	60.6
No response	1	I	I	1	I	I	ı	I	2	40.0	2	1.2
Total	38 100.0	18 100.	0 19	100.0	18	100.0	62	100.1	ſ	100.0	160	6•66

favor the opposite party? To test this we can compute chi-square from Tables LI and LII below, both derived from Table L.

## TABLE LI

	Strong	Party	Weak Pa	rty	Tot	al
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Guess neighbor's affiliation	44	44.0	14	38.8	58	43.5
Refuse to guess	56	56.0	22	61.2	78	56.5
Total	100	100.0	36	100.0	136	100.0

## PROPENSITY TO GUESS NEIGHBORS' AFFILIATION BY STRENGTH OF PARTY COMMITMENT.

## TABLE LII

PROPENSITY TO GUESS NEIGHBORS & AS AGREEING WITH SELF BY STRENGTH OF PARTY COMMITMENT.

	Strong	Party	Weak Pa Commitm	rty ent	Tota	1
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Neighbor's agree with own preference	27	61.4	6	42.8	33	56.9
Neighbor's disagree with own preference	17	38.6	8	57.2	25	43.1
Total	44	100.0	14	100.0	58	100.0

In neither of these two tables is chi-square significant at any meaningful level. The direction of the relation, it is true, is what might have been expected. Those of weak party preference are somewhat less likely to be willing to guess their neighbor's politics, and if they <u>do</u> guess they are slightly more likely to guess it as different from their own. But, the difference between strong and weak party preferers is small enough that it could easily be the result of chance.

This major test of the main hypothesis having failed with respect to the migrants, let us see what can be done with explaining directional change in the other two groups of our sample in this respect. Did those members of the old-timers and newcomers group that changed, change in the direction of their neighbor's perceived party preferences?

The non-migrants in our sample were interviewed more briefly. with the use of a somewhat different schedule. One of the questions which differed was that on neighbor's party preferences. For these nonmigrants the question on their own party preference was followed by. "Do you think most of the people around here agree or disagree with your political beliefs?" Though different in form, this question can supply the same factual data as the one asked the migrants. The number of directional changers among the non-migrants was small. Only eight oldtimers (those who had lived more than five years in Livonia) changed directionally, and only five newcomers (those who had lived less than five years there). None of the non-migrants felt that their neighbors disagreed with their political beliefs. The only two who were willing to answer the question were old-timers who had changed towards the Democratic party in voting, who perceived themselves as Democrats and who felt most of their neighbors were Democrats. Thirty-one of the old-timers felt most of their neighbors agreed with their political beliefs, 18 thought they disagreed, 83 didn't know or refused to answer.

Thirteen of the newcomers felt the neighbors agreed with their own political beliefs, seven felt they disagreed, 62 didn't know or refused to answer. A chi-square computed on these figures shows the newcomers significantly less likely to be willing to guess their neighbor's beliefs than the old-timers. (Chi-square = 4.07. Probability less than .05 under a two-tailed test.) Among those who did answer, however, the newcomers are no more likely to report their neighbors agreeing with them than are the old-timers. The relative unwillingness of newcomers to estimate their neighbor's political beliefs may well be a result of simply not knowing the neighbors well enough. At any rate data are not available to support any more subtle explanation.

In the first discussion of directional changing several collateral tests of the major hypothesis were suggested. Although the main test has failed to support the hypothesis (Directional changers are <u>not</u> significantly likely to change in the direction of their neighbor's perceived affiliation), it might be well to pursue these collateral tests. If they worked out in support of the hypothesis, one might be inclined to attribute the failure of the major test to a defect in the way the question was presented.

To refresh the readers memory, these collateral tests were: (1) directional changers should attribute higher interest in political opinions to neighbors than do those who do not change directionally; (2) they should be more likely to see less of their old Detroit contacts; (3) they should, perhaps, be more likely to indicate that holding divergent political beliefs harms neighborhood social relations.

We asked our respondents, "How much attention do you think people around here pay to each other's political beliefs?"

TABLE LIII

# ASSESSMENT OF NEIGHBOR'S INTEREST IN EACH OTHER'S POLITICS BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

D1r Nef¢hhorls Tnterest (Tha	rect	1onal rs	V( Stal Vote	oting Fa ble brs	ttern 1 Residu Voting	lype al	Non- Vo	tens	Tot:	al
	mber	Cent	Numbel	r Per Cent	Number	r Per Cent	Numbe	r Per Cent	Numbe:	r Per Cent
Much	1		ω	7.3	ı		г	4 <b>.</b> 6	6	5.6
Some	ω	47 <b>.</b> 1	30	27.3	4	36.4	9	27.2	48	30.0
None	7	41.1	61	55.4	9	54.5	ω	36.4	82	51.3
No response or don <sup>1</sup> t know	2	11.8	II	10.0	Ч	9.1	7	31.8	21	13.1
Total 1	17	100.0	110	100.0	TT	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.0

180

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	•	•	•	•	•			

. . . . . . .

	•	•	•			
•						

Since non-voters frequently show lower involvement and therefore lower likelihood of giving a positive answer to these questions on the level of political interest, it seems proper to separate them from the rest of the voters who did not change directionally in order to get the most precise possible test of this question. To apply the chi-square test to this table the much and some categories must be combined. Although directional changers among the migrants are somewhat more likely to feel their neighbors pay much or some attention to political beliefs the difference in proportion between them and stable voters is <u>not</u> statistically significant. At any rate, the tendency to believe neighbors are more interested in each other's political beliefs is not marked enough to support the original hypothesis since we earlier found that directional changers do not particularly shift in the direction of their perception of neighbor's political stand.

Did directional changers detach themselves from their old friends in Detroit more frequently than those who did not change? The following table shows the responses to the question, "Since you moved here do you find you see less of the people you used to know in Detroit, or are you still keeping up old contacts?"

Considering only those who answered in Table LIV, the difference between directional changers and stable voters is not statistically significant, even though the directional changers were slightly more likely to indicate detachment from Detroit. Compared to the rest of the sample as a whole, directional changers look more different, but the chi-square for directional changers against all others in response to this question is 1.94, and there are better than five chances out of 100 of getting such a chi-square, using a one-tail test.

TABLE LIV

SEE LESS OF DETROIT FRIENDS BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Frequency of Changers Contact Number	l ana l	Stal	Votin£ ble	g Patte Resid	trn Type mals	e Non-		T TO	רמ
Ō	ers Per Cent	Vote Number	ers Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Vo Number	ters Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
See less of them 9 5	52.9	48	43.7	4	36.4	9	27.3	67	4 <b>1.</b> 8
Keeping up old contacts $7$ 4.	4 <b>1.</b> 2	60	54.5	7	63.6	16	72.7	90	56.3
No response l	5.9	5	<b>1.</b> 8	I	I	I	I	ς	1.9
Total 17 10	100.0	OTT	100.0	11	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.0

Once again the directional changers differ from stable voters in a manner consistent with the original hypothesis, but the size of the difference is not great enough to permit us to entertain the hypothesis as a compelling one.

The final collateral test is the respondent's answers to the question, "Many people have said in books and magazines that people who move to the suburbs are likely to become very much like their neighbors in their political beliefs. Do you think that sort of thing happens around here?" The results are shown in Table LV below.

One cannot, it would seem, escape the conclusion that directional changing among migrants to suburbia is not explainable as a function of changing primary group patterns as a result of the move. Although the collateral measures of these hypotheses vary consistently in the proper direction except for Table LI, the magnitude of difference on any one measure is not great enough to permit rejection of the null hypothesis, that the primary group memberships of the changers would <u>not</u> be different from those who did not change. The data can charitably be interpreted as hinting at this interpretation, but if it is a factor, it is clearly not a central or overriding one. Therefore, the first hypothesis, that such changes in voting pattern as do occur result from participation in new primary groups which hold as salient political values different from those the migrant held in the city, cannot be said to have been confirmed.

## The Social-Economic Change Hypothesis

Where else might the answer, or some clues to the answer lie? The second possibility given in Chapter VII, p. 151, is that the move to suburbia is not significant in itself, but that it reflects a change

TABLE LV

DO PEOPLE CHANGE POLITICALLY IN LIVONIA BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Change	Direct	lonal	Stable	Voting	f Patte Resi	rn Type duals	Non-		Tota		
)	umber Number	rs Fer Cent	Voter	Fer Cent	Number	Per Cent	vo Number	rers Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
											ł
Yes	Ч	5.9	13	11.8	1	ı	I	1	14	8.7	
No	12	70.6	91	82.7	6	81.8	15	68.2	127	4 <b>.</b> 97	
Don't know and no response	t	23.5	9	5.5	5	18 <b>.</b> 2	7	31.8	19	11.9	
Total	17	0.001	011	100.0	ΤT	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.0	

in social and economic status which led in turn to a change in political behavior. If this were true one must still consider that an upward change in social and economic status is not self-operative. The mere fact that a man improves his social and economic position does not in itself produce a change in his values. In present sociological theory there are two possible mechanisms for producing such a change. The first is the possibility that an upward shift in status would result in new primary group contacts which effect changes in the values of the upward mobile. But, it has already been shown that the neighborhoodbased primary groups can not be related to directional changing. It is, of course, possible that the upward mobile directional changers have acquired other non-neighborhood primary groups which this study has not detected. The second possibility is that a reference group mechanism is operating, that the upward mobile identifies with the rich and wellborn and alters his political opinions to agree with what he imagines these people to believe. The data collected in this interview do not permit the testing of this explanation either, but one can form some estimate of the degree to which upward mobility was a characteristic of the migrants and whether it was more characteristic of the directional changers than of the sample as a whole.

The data appropriate to this problem are the answers to the questions, "Has your (your husband's) job or your (your husband's) employer changed in recent years?" and, if yes, "What were these changes?"

When directional changers are compared to stable voters, the difference between the two groups is not great enough to assume that changing jobs or employers is related to propensity to change directionally. But, when all changers are compared to non-changers (residuals

TABLE LVI

JOB CHANGE IN RECENT YEARS BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

	Direct	ional	Sta	Voting ble	g Patte Resi	rn Type duals	s Non-		Tot	al
Job Change	Change Number	rs Per Cent	Vote Number	ers Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Vo Number	ters Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Yes	9	35.3	26	23.6	ъ	45.5	2	9.1	39	24.4
No	11	C•49	- 22	70 <b>.</b> 0	9	54.5	16	72.7	OLL	68.7
No response	ł	I	7	<b>6.</b> 4	ı	I	4	18.2	11	6.9
Total	17	100.0	OLL	100.0	11	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.0

and directional changers on one hand, stable voters and non-voters on the other), the differences between the two groups of those who answer produce a chi-square value of 3.12. Since one would predict that changers in politics are more likely to be changers in jobs or employers, the one-tailed test can be used and differences between the groups are significant at below the five per cent level. This could mean no more than a relation between political and economic instability, an interesting finding, but not very relevant to the question under discussion. It does lead us to examine the followup question in which the type of change was elicited if a change indeed took place.

Changes in jobs and employer were grouped into the fivefold classification given in Table LVII.

Even if one makes the charitable assumption that a shift to a new type of work was invariably a shift upward in status, only three of the six directional changers were upwardly mobile and only eight of the twenty-six stable voters. None of the residuals were upwardly mobile.

This particular line of attack, the relationship between social mobility and changing voting in suburbia, can be pursued just one step further with information which the schedule produced. Perhaps a controlling factor in relation of upward mobility to directional change is not the change in occupation itself but the anticipation of such a change. If this were true the individual who expects to move upward in the social scale might adopt values he feels appropriate to the new status which he expects. If such a process were occuring among the migrants it should be detectable in their pattern of response to the questions, "Do you think you (your husband) will stick with this job in the future or are you (is he) likely to get promoted or change jobs?" and, if change, "What kind of change do you expect?" TABLE LVII

## TYPE OF CHANGE IN JOB FOR THOSE WHO CHANGED JOBS BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

5	Direct	tonal	Stab	Votin le	g Patte Residu	rn Type uals	e Non-		Tota]	
type or Job change	Unange Number	rrs Per Cent	vote Number	rs Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Vor Number	ers Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Promotion	Ч	2.6	I	I	I	I	Ч	2.6	5	5.1
Shift to new type of work	N	5.1	œ	20.3	ı	I	н	2.6	11	28.2
Same job-new employer	٤	7.7	ΤŢ	43.6	Ъ	12.8	ı	I	25	64.1
Reaffirms that a change took place	I	I	Ч	2.6	I	I	ı	ı	Ч	2.6
Total	9	15.4	26	66.7	Ŋ	12.8	2	5.1	39	100 • 0

TABLE LVIII

# EXPECT TO STICK WITH PRESENT JOB OR CHANGE BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Duesent Toh Chenne?	Direct	tional rs	Stab	Votin <sub>(</sub> le	g Patte Resid	ern Type luals	e Non- Vo	tone	Tota	
	Number	r Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	. Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Stick with present job	16	9 <b>.</b> .9	75	68.2	6	81.8	13	59.1	113	70.6
Change	Ч	6.0	25	22.7	0	18.2	4	18.2	32	20.0
No response of don't know	I	I	10	9.1	ı	I	5	22.7	15	9.4
Total	17	100.0	011	100.0	11	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.0

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Directional changers are not more, but less likely to expect a change in job than stable voters. In fact, using stable voters as a standard there is a probability of less than .05 that so few directional changers would expect to change jobs. So much for the theory of anticipatory socialization in this study. For all changers, directional and residuals alike, compared to stable voters and non-voters together the value of chi-square for the differences between them is 4.01. There is a probability of less than .05 of getting this large a chi-square under the two-tailed test, which is necessary since we did not predict the direction of difference.

This disposes of the hypothesis that upward mobility is the essential factor in suburban political change. Though it may be a factor in some cases, upward occupational mobility is not characteristic of any large number of those who changed directionally, even using the broadest possible definition of "upward".

## Pre-Suburban Experiences

These findings suggest to me an entirely different line of investigation for explaining the behavior of directional changers. It would seem the source of their changing is not to be found in their suburban experience, nor is it in any large measure the result of actual or anticipated upward-mobility. What is left? Only the pre-suburban experiences of the migrants. These would include their Detroit experiences as adults and their family and peer group experience which is perhaps basic to their personality patterns. Could it be that the suburban move will be related to a change in voting only in those individuals who have been pre-conditioned by personality (which I would assume is the result of experience largely, but not entirely early

experience) or recent experience? Perhaps the suburban move is not related at all but these people would have changed even if they had remained in Detroit, although our data on differential rates of changing between migrants, newcomers, and old-timers suggests that the move is at least a contributing factor.

Since this explanation was not anticipated in the design of the study, any analysis of its possible occurence is <u>post hoc</u> and makeshift. Had it been anticipated, the schedule could have been adapted to include questions designed to collect direct information. As it was not, I shall have to make do with the information available.

The first scrap of information to support this interpretation is the migrant's responses to the question, "Did you own or were you buying a house in Detroit, or did you rent?" This question was included in the schedule to test what seemed to me the unlikely proposition that, since most migrants to the suburbs were owning homes for the first time, and therefore paying local taxes directly, they would be more sensitive to the costs of government and become more conservative.

If this were true, one would expect the directional changers to have a high proportion of new homeowners, since thirteen of them shifted towards Republican voting. Table LIX below presents data on this subject.

Comparing directional changers with stable voters we find the directional changers significantly <u>more</u> likely to have owned a home previously. (Chi-square = 7.74. Probability less than .01.) This disposes of the third hypothesis, since if that were true, directional changers should have been significantly <u>less</u> likely to have owned or been buying a home in Detroit. Perhaps an examination of the Detroit experiences of the directional changers might provide some insight TABLE LIX

OWNED OR RENTED IN DETROIT BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

	+000 FU		404D	Voting	f Patte	rn Type	Now		0 + 0 E		
Type of Detroit	Change	LS	Vote1	rs Ls	ntsau	STRN	-UON-	ters	TOUR	-1	
Housing	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
											1
Owned or buying	12	70.6	35	31.8	4	36.4	4	18.2	55	34.4	
Rented	5	29.4	99	60.0	7	63.6	14	63.6	92	57.5	
No previous household	I	ı	6	8.2	I	1	2	9.1	11	6 <b>•</b> 9	
No response	1	1	1	I	I	I	2	9.1	2	1.3	
Total	L	100.0	OII	100.0	11	100.0	52	100.0	160	100.1	
											•
TABLE LX

CONCENTRATION OF HOME OWNERSHIP IN DETROIT CENSUS TRACT, FOR THOSE WHO OWNED A HOME IN DETROIT, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Percentage Of Owner Occupied Dwelling	Direct	ional	Stab]	Voting Le	g Patte Resid	rn Type uals	Non-		Tota		
units in perroit Census Tract	umber	Per Cent	Votei Number	rs Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	vo Number	cers Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
											l
0-25	ı	I	ξ	8.6	ı	1	ı	ı	ξ	5.5	
26-50	Ч	8.3	2	5.4	I	ı	Ч	25.0	4	7.3	
51-75	6	24.9	6	25.8	Ч	25.0	Ч	25.0	14	25.5	
76-100	7	58.5	18	51.6	б	75.0	2	50.0	30	54.5	
Not ascertained	н	8.3	3	8 <b>.</b> 6	ı	ı	I	I	4	7.3	
Total	12	100.0	35 1	100.0	4	100.0	4	100.0	55	100.1	
											I

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# CONCENTRATION OF HOME OWNERSHIP IN DETROIT CENSUS TRACT, FOR THOSE WHO RENTED IN DETROIT, BY VOTING TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Percentage Of Owner Occupied Dwelling Units	Direc	tional	Stab 11040	Votin le	g Patte Residu	ern Typ Ials	e Non-	5	Tota	1	
Tract	Numbe	r Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	r Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
											ł
0-25	I	I	15	22.7	ı	ı	ı	ı	15	16.3	
26-50	2	0*0†	6	13.6	б	42.9	2	14.3	16	17.44	
51-75	I	I	15	22.7	2	28.6	Ŀ	35.7	22	23.9	
76-100	ξ	<b>60</b> •0	17	25.8	Ч	14.3	ß	35.7	26	28.3	
Not ascertained	I	ł	10	15.2	Ч	14.3	0	14.3	13	14.1	
Total	Ŝ	100.0	99	100.0	7	1001	14	100.0	92	100.0	

into the reasons why they changed when others did not. This schedule provides little of such information but though the experience of the directional changers cannot be investigated, some of the circumstances surrounding their Detroit sojourn can be.

A large proportion of the directional changers were home owners in Detroit. In what part of the city did they own their homes? Tables LX and LXI show the concentration of home ownership in the Detroit census tract for those who owned a home and those who rented in Detroit.

If the homeowners in Detroit are classified into two categories, those who owned homes in census tracts where more than half the dwelling units were owner-occupied, and those who owned homes in census tracts where less than half were owner-occupied, and the renters are similarly classified by the dominant ownership or renting of dwelling units in their Detroit census tracts, Table LXII results.

Although the changers are somewhat more likely than those who did not change to have come from areas where their pattern of occupancy was consistent with that of the rest of their neighbors, the differences between the groups could well be due to chance. The only voting pattern type which departs markedly from this general tendency is the non-voters. Comparing them with all others we find that the chi-square produced by such a division is 5.29. This is significant at very near the two per cent level. Although it is interesting that non-voters were significantly more likely to come from census tracts in which they differed from most of their neighbors in their style of home occupancy, it takes one little further in understanding the directional changers in particular, or changers in general.

TABLE LXII

CONSISTENCY OF MODE OF OCCUPANCY WITH DOMINANT MODE IN DETROIT CENSUS TRACT, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

Consistency	Direct	ional rs	Stab Vote	Voting le rs	g Patte Resid	rn Typ uals	e Non-	ters	Tota		1
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	1
											1
Mat <b>c</b> h occupancy pattern	12	75.0	51	58.0	7	70.0	ъ	31.3	75	57.7	
Do not match occupancy pattern	4	25.0	37	42.0	Μ	30.0	ΙΙ	68.8	55	42.3	
Total	16	100.0	88	100.0	10	100.0	16	100.1	130	100.0	
											1

One of the characteristics of the central city whence our migrants came is the expansion of the negro population and attending flight to suburbia of white occupants. Did the directional changers differ from those who voted in other patterns in this characteristic? Just as it was possible to determine the extent to which directional changers were similar to their Detroit neighbors by determining their former census tracts and looking up the concentration of home ownership there, so we can also check the extent of non-white occupancy of those tracts in 1950. The date of the census seems to me to be more important when degree of non-white occupancy is discussed than it is in the case of home ownership. In Detroit a neighborhood can shift from low to high concentration of non-white occupancy with great speed. Also, as is true for most northern cities, many census tracts which have few or no non-whites are still close to negro neighborhoods and there may be some moving away from such areas in advance of any actual non-white inmigration.

In classifying the degree of non-white occupancy of census tracts, therefore, I adopted a quasi-geometric scale for degree of non-white occupancy rather than a linear scale. It seems to me that this scale more closely approximates the psychic effect of negro proximity than would a simple 0-25, 26-50, 51-75, 76-100 per cent classification.

When those who came from census tracts with no non-whites in 1950 are classified by voting pattern, the resulting curve is almost flat, 29.4 per cent, 29.1 per cent, 27.3 per cent, and 27.3 per cent for directional changers, stable voters, residuals, and non-voters respectively. Changers are more likely than non-changers to come from fringe districts (those with less than one per cent non-white occupants, but more than none), but the difference is not big enough to be statistically TABLE LXIII

# PER CENT OF DWELLING UNITS IN DETROIT CENSUS TRACT OCCUPIED BY NON-WHITES, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS ONLY.

											1
Per Cent Dwelling	Direc	tional	Stable	Voting	f Patte Resid	rn Type uals	Non-		Tota		ı
Tract	Numbe	r Per Cent	Number	er Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	
											1
0	5	29.4	32	29.1	Μ	27.3	9	27.3	94	28.8	
Less than 1	6	53.0	45	40.9	9	54.5	10	45.5	70	43.7	
l to 50	2	11.8	14	12.7	Ч	9.1	4	18.2	21	13.1	
More than 50	1	ł	4	3.6	I	1	I	ı	4	2.5	
Not ascertained	Ч	5.9	15	<b>13.</b> 6	Ч	9.1	0	9.1	19	11.9	
Total	17	100.1	011	99.9	11	100.0	52	100.1	160	100.0	

significant. Changers are less likely than non-changers to have come from districts of more than one per cent non-white occupancy, but again the differences are too small to be statistically significant. Although the differences between the changers and non-changers are small, their direction seems to me to be interesting. Changers are more likely to have come from fringe districts, that is from areas where there were some non-whites but very few, less than one per cent, but less likely to have come from areas where the negro population in 1950 was more than one per cent. This could be a clue to a difference between changers and non-changers, i.e., the changers were faster to leave in the face of "threatening" negro occupancy. Unfortunately, this sample, not being designed to test this question, is not large enough to permit one to assert this, but it might be classed as a "helpful hint" for further research. What I am suggesting is that propensity to change as a result of moving may be related to the likelihood of "fearfulness" in general, not fear of negro neighbors in particular. I cannot assert this to be true, but I think it might be a good place to look if the topic were to be studied again.

### Directional Changers Summarized

The fruits of all our labors, with respect to directional changers can be summed up as follows: (1) Directional change occurs more frequently than chance alone would have it. (2) It does not occur more frequently among migrants than among non-sample subjects. (3) It is more likely to be change in the direction of Republican than Democratic voting, though both occur. (4) It does not appear to be related to integration into suburban primary groups, nor does it appear to be related to perception of neighbor's party affiliation. (5) It is

inversely related to first experience in home owning, those who owned homes before moving to the suburbs contributing a high proportion of the changers. (6) it is not clearly related to upward social mobility as measured by recent change in employment, nor to anticipated changes in employment status. In fact it is inversely related to anticipated changes in employment. (7) Directional changers were not less likely to be home owners in renting areas, or renters in home owning areas than were other voting pattern types. (8) They were not more likely to come from areas with non-white residents, although there is some hint that they were likely to leave earlier than stable voters at the threat of non-white occupancy.

If further research is to be done on the matter of directional political change among suburban migrants, these findings would point in the following direction: (1) Some method must be devised to oversample directional changers. (2) More attention should be paid to personality variables in explaining the phenomenon, particularly neuroticism indices, alienation scales, and questions regarding family political background, since social and economic status and integration into suburban neighborhood based peer groups do not explain the differences between those who change and those who stay put politically. (3) With a larger sample of directional changers, multivariate analysis would be possible and it seems likely that it will be needed to explain the phenomenon.

### CHAPTER IX

# VOTING IN LIVONIA

Although the study of election statistics cannot give us direct information on individual voting decisions, there should be some congruence between the responses of our migrant sample and the behavior of the total electorate as recorded in the election returns.

The comparison of these two measures should give us some basis from which to evaluate the responses of the migrants on their past votes, just as the analysis of voting in the Detroit wards from which the migrants came provided a standard by which we could judge the degree of change in the migrant sample.

Although Livonia was redistricted between 1952 and 1956, the newer precincts were created by dividing old ones, thus it is still possible to report voting in 1956 by the 1952 precincts. The following table gives the votes for Governor and President in 1952 and 1956 by 1952 precincts. By analyzing the patterns of change in Livonia precincts and comparing with these patterns the responses of the members of our sample who moved to these precincts we can get some idea of the shortrun political trends in Livonia which may prove valuable in determining the degree of confidence which the reader can place in the findings of this research.

# TABLE LXIV

LIVONIA VOTES FOR GOVERNOR, 1952 AND 1956, BY 1952 PRECINCTS.

		1952		1	956	
Precinct	Republican	Democrat	Total	Republican	Democrat	Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	808 1,184 806 640 554 487 726	663 526 488 492 516 535 644	1,471 1,710 1,294 1,132 1,070 1,022 1,370	1,091 2,484 1,396 1,150 523 2,020 559	1,060 1,932 1,214 1,263 751 2,425 672	2,151 4,416 2,610 2,413 1,274 4,445 1,231
Total	5,205	3,864	9,069	9,223	9,317	18,540

## TABLE LXV

LIVONIA VOTES FOR PRESIDENT, 1952 AND 1956, BY 1952 PRECINCTS.

		1952		1	956	
Precinct	Republican	Democrat	Total	Republican	Democrat	Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7 Total	1,011 1,240 845 669 567 534 774 5,640	505 421 359 389 421 449 504 3,048	1,516 1,661 1,204 1,058 988 983 1,278 8,688	1,359 3,023 1,769 1,506 700 2,594 732 11,683	814 1,417 870 931 595 1,864 507 6,998	2,173 4,440 2,639 2,437 1,295 4,458 1,239 18,681

Like most presentations of mass voting statistics, the tables above obscure their interrelations in a mass of figures. The most that can be garnered on first impression is that voting on the presidential and gubernatorial levels shifted in opposite directions between 1952 and 1956. President Elsenhower and Governor Williams both possessed strong personal political appeal and both gained in Livonia between 1952 and 1956 despite being from separate parties. To go more deeply into the patterns of gross voting in Livonia it is obviously necessary first, to separate gubernatorial from presidential voting, and second, to express the shifts between 1952 and 1956 in a form that can be more easily understood. From the tables above, however, one can at least assert that Livonia as a suburb is becoming more Republican if and only if the observer restricts his view to presidential voting. If one is not blind to the fact that voting takes place at many levels, the picture is more confused. I for one would argue that the simplicity gained by ignoring voting for lower offices is not useful for the political scientist. If the world is confusing it is better to know it. Table LXVI is derives from Tables LXIV and LXV, but presents that data in a condensed form, more useful to our purposes.

Before going into the analysis of this table in detail it is well to note that the offices of Governor and President were not related to each other in the same way in 1952 as in 1956. The Michigan legislature, Republican dominated as a result of malapportionment, had separated balloting for President and Governor during the Roosevelt era, to shrink the coat-tails of that strong vote-getter. In 1952 this system was still in effect; a voter could not cast his ballot for the candidates of one party for Governor and President in one action. Only from Governor on down could one vote a straight ticket with little effort.

By 1956, however, the coat-tails were Eisenhower's and the legislature, still Republican, still malapportioned, replaced the President at the head of the ballot and, no doubt, hoped the voters would be as lazy as possible. Straight ticket voting from President down was

### TABLE LXVI

# CHANGES IN TOTAL VOTE RELATED TO GAIN OR LOSS IN REPUBLICAN MARGIN, 1952-1956, BY 1952 PRECINCTS.

	Gove	rnor	Presi	.dent
Precinct	Change In	Gain Or Loss	Change In	Gain Or Loss
	Total Vote	In Rep. Margin	Total Vote	In Rep. Margin
1	+ 680	- 114	+ 657	+ 39
2	+ 2,706	- 106	+ 2,779	+ 787
3	+ 1,316	- 136	+ 1,435	+ 413
4	+ 1,281	- 261*	+ 1,379	+ 295
5	+ 204	- 266*	+ 307	- 41
6	+ 3,423	- 357**	+ 3,475	+ 645
7	- 139	- 195*-	- 39	- 45
Total	+ 9,471	- 1,435	+ 9,993	+ 2,093

\*Democrats carried precinct in 1956 for Governor. \*\*Democrats carried precinct in 1952 and 1956 for Governor.

Eisenhower and Williams both gained votes in those precincts with the greatest added population, precincts 2, 3, 4, and 6, Eisenhower gaining more than Williams in each one. Williams, however, gained in every precinct, while Eisenhower's margin declined in precincts 5 and 7, and in 7 dropped more than the drop in total voting. Williams carried Livonia for the first time in 1956.

### The Gain-Change Index

What interests us here is the effect of added population on suburban voting. In interpreting election results it seems inevitable that one must make contrary-to-fact assumptions of the "all other things being equal" sort. In this analysis the assumption is that changes in the majorities of the candidates was a function of added voters alone. In other words, that the people who voted in Livonia in 1952 voted the same way in 1956, and that the same number voted. This is <u>not</u> true. A glance at the figures for precinct 5 in Table LXVI shows that Williams's majority increased <u>more</u> than the total change in precinct population.

The data in Table LXVI can be cast into still more useful form if one makes the above assumption. It is possible to compute for each precinct the number of added votes necessary to produce a one vote change in the Republican majority. This is done by dividing the change in total vote by the gain or loss in Republican majority. This I shall call the <u>gain-change</u> index of the precinct. Precinct 7 is omitted since there was a loss in total vote on both electoral levels and since it was the smallest of the precincts its loss does no great harm.

### TABLE LXVII

Precinct	Governor	President	
1 2 3 4 5 6	- 6.0 - 25.2 - 9.7 - 4.9 76 - 9.6	+ 16.8 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 4.7 - 7.5 + 5.4	
Livonia	- 6.6	+ 4.8	

### GAIN-CHANGE INDEX FOR GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT BY 1952 PRECINCTS, OMITTING PRECINCT SEVEN.

A negative index number indicates a gain for Democrats (loss of Republican majority), and an index number less than one indicates a gain greater than the number of additional votes in the election. The closer

the number to a positive or negative 1, the more the Republicans or Democrats gained from new migration. If the index were one, then the increase in Republican majority would exactly equal the increase in total vote for the office. Under our assumption that the old residents voted as in 1952, every new voter would have to have been Republican to produce such a result. The precincts not only differ from each other in Table IXVII, the same precincts have different indices for gubernatorial and presidential voting. By inspecting the table it is apparent that precinct five was indeed exceptional. It was the only precinct in which Eisenhower's majority decreased despite a rise in total vote, and the precinct which produced the greatest gain in Williams's majority relative to its change in population. Going back to Table LXIV, one can see that it is also the only precinct Williams carried in 1952. Precinct two, on the other hand, gave Williams the smallest gain in 1956 related to size of population, and it was tied for first in giving Eisenhower the largest gain, again in relation to population growth. The gain-change indices are different, but surely related to each other. In manipulating them, however, it is probably wise to remember the tenuous ground upon which they are based. Perhaps the best way to compensate for the contrary-to-fact assumption implicit in the index is to convert the index scores into ranks for each precinct and compare ranks. If the index is flawed, and it is, it is probably flawed in the same way for each area, and the ranks produced by it may still be sound.

The third index in Table LXVIII below is the rank of the average value of homes reported by migrants in our sample to that precinct. The values given in response to the question, "How much do you think it (your home) is worth right now?" were coded to the nearest hundred dollars. This index was used because response was better than on the income question, and because the home is a display of economic status which is probably more closely related to position in society than income alone. In computing the figure used for the economic index, migrants to precinct two reported home values averaging \$18,400 and those to precinct four \$18,600. I considered these so close as to be a virtual tie.

### TABLE LXVIII

GAIN-CHANGE RANK FOR EACH PRECINCT FOR GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT, 1952 TO 1956 BY PRECINCT RANK ON ECONOMIC LEVEL OF MIGRANTS TO THE PRECINCT, OMITTING PRECINCT SEVEN.

Precinct	Governor Gain-Change Rank (Lowest Williams Support To Highest)	President Gain-Change Rank (Highest Eisen- hower Support To Lowest)	Economic Rank Of Migrants (Highest To Lowest)
1	4	5	4
2	1	1.5	2.5
3	2.5	1.5	1
4	5	3	2.5
5	6	6	6
6	2.5	4	5

The Spearman rank correlations for the above table vary widely. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the two gain-change indices is .76. The correlation between presidential gain-change ranking and economic rank of migrants to the precinct is .90, very high, but the correlation between the gubernatorial gain-change rank and the economic index is comparatively low, only .51.

Eisenhower's gains in these precincts appear to have been highest in those areas whose in-migrants had the highest economic position. Where Eisenhower gained most, Williams was somewhat likely to have gained least, though this is not true for each precinct. Williams, it follows, did not gain least in those areas with the richest in-migrants, or rather, the relation between economic rank of in-migrants and Williams's gains was not as clear as that between economic rank of in-migrants and Eisenhower's gain. This might suggest that Williams's appeal to the voters in 1956 was actually broader, more truly charismatic, less connected to existing social structures than was Eisenhower's.

Since the precincts to which the migrants came have been identified and their votes in 1956 are known, it is possible actually to compare the voting patterns in the sample to the Livonia pattern by precinct. This can be done by computing a gain-change index for the reported votes of the migrants to each precinct. For each of the precincts the migrants in our sample, which is representative of those who came there from Detroit between the two elections, added a certain number of votes to total voting, and the way in which they split added or subtracted a certain number of votes to Eisenhower's or Williams's majority in the precinct. How well does the way our migrants report behaving correspond to what has been predicted about their behavior from the gain-change indices of gross voting? Tables LXIX and LXX below present this **data**.

For Livonia as a whole, both Williams and Eisenhower gained among the sample to a greater degree than one would have predicted on the basis of total voting. In addition, the rankings of precincts of Williams's and Eisenhower's gains as a result of change in total vote are not particularly close to those based on what these men should have gained on the basis of the sample's behavior. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient when precincts are ranked by the reported behavior

of the sample compared to their ranking by total vote patterns are, for Governor .33, and for President .53. Here, I think, the intrinsic difficulty arises from the size of the sample. Only for precinct six are there enough new voters entering the precinct in our sample to permit confidence in the assertion that they represent a sample of all Detroit migrants to this Livonia precinct.

## TABLE LXIX

Precinct	Number	Sample	Total Vote	Ran Sample	k Total
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 omitted-or	10 19 15 12 9 48 nly three	- 3.8 + 15 - 6 - 1.8 - 2.7 migrants	- 6.0 - 25.2 - 9.7 - 4.9 76 - 9.6 moved to pre	2 4 3 6 5 cinct 7.	4 1 2.5 5 6 2.5
Livonia	116	- 4.1	- 6.6		

GAIN-CHANGE INDICES FOR SAMPLE AND TOTAL VOTE, GOVERNOR, 1952-1956.

There may be a way to combine categories which, though it provides less information, might still be useful. Precincts can be clustered into those which gave a better gain-change rating to Eisenhower than the average for all Livonia, and those which did worse than the average. This can be done for Williams as well. Then it is possible to compare migrants to those areas which shifted more towards Eisenhower with those who moved to areas which shifted less in his favor. The same is true of Williams. This is shown in Table LXXI below.

### TABLE LXX

Precinct	Number	Sample	Total Vote	Rank Sample	: Total	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 omitted-o	11 20 16 13 9 52 nly three	+ 2.2 + 2.5 + 1.6 + 1.9 + 3 + 3.2 migrants + 2 $\mu$	+ 16.8 + 3.5 + 3.5 + 4.7 - 7.5 + 5.4 moved to pro	3 4 1 2 5 6 ecinct 7.	5 1.5 1.5 3 6 4	

# GAIN-CHANGE INDICES FOR SAMPLE AND TOTAL VOTE, PRESIDENT, 1952-1956.

### TABLE LXXI

SAMPLE GAIN-CHANGE INDEX FOR HIGH AND LOW GAIN-CHANGE PRECINCTS, GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT, 1952 AND 1956.

	Governor Pct. No. Sample Gain- Change Ratio		President Pct. No. Sample Gain- Change Ratio	
Areas shifting most towards Rep. or least towards Dem. in total vote	2,3,6	- 3.7	2,3,4	+ 2.0
Areas shifting least towards Rep. or mo towards Dem. in total vote	ost 1,4,5	- 4.4	1,5,6	+ 3.0

When this combination of categories is carried out, as in Table LXXI, the results are still inconsistent with voting patterns in Livonia insofar as Governor Williams is concerned. For each 3.7 votes added in · · · · ·

precincts 2, 3, and 6, Williams's majority increased by one in our sample, but it took 4.4 votes added in precincts 1, 4, and 5 to increase Williams's majority by one vote. This is exactly the opposite of what one would expect, for precincts 2, 3, and 6 were those in which Williams's majority increased least relative to an increase in population, and precincts 1, 4, and 5 were the ones where he made the greatest gain.

Again, however, the results on the presidential level are consistent. The precincts in which Eisenhower showed his greatest gains between 1952 and 1956 relative to the population increase were 2, 3, and 4. The migrants into these precincts in our sample split 3 to 1 for Eisenhower. The precincts in which he showed the least gain were 1, 5, and 6. The migrants to these areas favored Eisenhower by a 2 to 1 ratio.

### Discrepancies Explored

There would seem to be three possible sources of this discrepancy. First, it might be that the respondents either consciously or unconsciously lied in telling us for whom they voted. If this were true, however, it is hard to understand why the results of comparing reported votes to gross voting statistics should be different on the presidential and gubernatorial level. Further, if there were a tendency to mis-respond in this regard, one would expect it to be in the direction of reported voting for the candidate who won when the vote, if cast, was actually for a losing candidate. This might be true of our respondents, since the winners gained more votes among the migrants than they did in the election, but if it were true, one should expect the phenomenon to be uniform for all categories. However, we find that, in the case of Williams voters, those who moved to the areas which shifted the most towards Williams reported voting for him less frequently than those who moved to the areas which shifted least in his favor. This, it seems to me, is inexplicable under the assumption that misreporting of votes accounts for the discrepancies.

Second, there is the possibility that the voters already in the precinct shifted enough between 1952 and 1956 to cancel out some of the gains made by the winners as a result of migration from Detroit. Since our old-timers group is not a sample of the total population there is no way to test this assumption.

Third, there is the possibility that those who moved to Livonia from elsewhere than Detroit in the period studied were numerous enough, and different enough in behavior to account for the discrepancies. Once again the fact that our newcomers group is not a sample makes it impossible to test this.

The most destructive assumption is the first. Though I do not think it is true, it would be well to consider what the effects on the interpretation of the data would be if it were. Assuming that the misrepresentation, deliberate or unconscious, did occur it also seems reasonable to assume that it would be in the direction of reporting voting for a winner, when in fact the respondent voted the other way. First, it seems appropriate to point out that Williams and Eisenhower did in fact both win in Livonia in 1956 even as they won in their larger constituencies. Second, the voters who reported casting ballots consistently for Williams and Eisenhower differed in several respects from the rest of the sample, most markedly in their responses to the ideological questions reported in Chapter V. If our respondents told us the truth, these are characteristics which discriminate between Eisenhower-Williams voters and other stable voting types. If they did

<u>not</u> these are characteristics which discriminate between Eisenhower-Williams voters and those who wished to think they voted for them on the one hand, and those who did not on the other. There is no solid basis for discriminating between these two possibilities in the data, but the fact that the reported Eisenhower-Williams voters differed from those who did not so report stands relatively unaffected by the possibility of misreporting of voting by the respondents.

Third, what of the effect of possible misreporting on the phenomenon of directional change? If a person reported voting for Stevenson and Williams in 1952, for example, and reported voting for Eisenhower and Cobo in 1956, he was classified as having changed directionally in the direction of Republican voting. If he did not in fact vote for Eisenhower and Cobo in 1956 this would be a misclassification. But, if obstinacy or selective altering of memory changed his report of how he voted in 1956, why not in 1952, the memories of which were presumably weaker and easier to suppress or distort? It seems reasonable to assume that the older a memory the more likely it is to be inaccurate, through chance or conscious or unconscious design. If this is true, then the major effect of misreporting on the assessment of directional change would be to suppress rather than exaggerate its frequency in the sample. A person who actually voted for Stevenson and Williams in 1952 and actually voted for Eisenhower and Cobo in 1956 would be, in this view, the most likely to alter his report of how he voted, and this alteration would be to bring his 1952 memories in line with his later, presumably present, proclivities. To do this he would report having voted for Eisenhower and Williams's opponent in 1952 as well.

Of course, interim stages are possible in this sort of misreporting. A respondent might wish to suppress having voted for Stevenson,

but is willing to admit to himself and the interviewer a vote for Williams, the winner. In any case, I would argue that misrepresentation, whether deliberate or unconscious has a structure, that it is not mere caprice which motivates a person to misrepresent himself to an interviewer. Further, the style of misrepresentation one can most likely expect in this study would serve to suppress evidence of political change rather than exaggerate it. From this I would conclude that the directional changers detected by this research were in fact changers, and that the generalizations made and rejected about the similarities and differences between the changers uncovered by this study and those who, according to this information, did not change are reliable. What would perhaps be unreliable are generalizations concerning the frequency of directional changing in Livonia. This, however, is the least important aspect of the research, for Livonia is an unrepresentative suburb of an unrepresentative city, unrepresentative because it is only one suburb of one city. What is argued is that, though the frequencies and intensities of various processes may differ from city to city and suburb to suburb, the processes will be more stable, present to a greater or lesser degree in all of them.

One such process is that of selective migration into suburbia, discussed more completely in Chapter VI. It is apparent that the members of all social, economic, and ethnic groups and categories do not move to the suburbs at equal rates. It is also well established that membership in social, economic and ethnic groups and categories is related to political predisposition and political behavior. The question implied by these two known conditions are simply these. Are the people who move to the suburbs pre-disposed to act politically in certain ways? Do they

act in those ways? What are those ways?

In this study some of these questions are answered, again in Chapter VI. There we found that selective migration favoring Republicans for President and Democrats for Governor did take place.

Moreover, of the 95 respondents who reported voting in 1952, only 29, 30.6 per cent, said they voted for Stevenson, while 66, or 69.4 per cent, said they had voted for Eisenhower in that election. It is possible that this extreme departure from the Detroit average is a result of over-reporting voting for a winner, but since our respondents came from the more Republican areas within the city it does seem likely that not all of the discrepancy is due to that fact.

Once again there is a significant difference between the pattern of presidential voting and that on the gubernatorial level. Williams won in Detroit in 1952, 536,851 to 287,828 for his Republican opponent. He took 66 per cent of the two party vote. The wards from which our migrants came were somewhat below the total Detroit average (see Chapter VI). In the case of Williams, however, our respondents reported voting for him in 1952 at a higher rate than his average in Detroit. Eighty-four people report a vote for Governor in 1952 of whom 64 say they voted for Williams and only 20 for Alger. This is 76 per cent of the sample who report a vote.

What one wishes to make of these figures depends on the confidence he places in interview responses of this sort. I find enough patterning and internal consistency in the voting pattern analyses to persuade me that the migrants to Livonia were in fact an unusual group and that possibly this is true of suburban migrants in general. The fact that Eisenhower-Williams voters responded differently from straight party voters on the ideology questions and that party affiliation and voting pattern could be related to each other through these questions persuades me that the reported voting of the migrants was near to reality.

For the person to whom these arguments are not conclusive or persuasive however, there is an alternative. Respondents in large measure report voting for the man who won regardless of whom they actually supported. I do not assume that this never takes place, I do not feel that it accounts for all the differences between these migrants and the universe from which they came and the universe which they entered. I cannot deny that it could. In speaking of physics, Albert Einstein said, "God is mysterious, but he isn't malicious." I subscribe to this view of respondents to sample surveys. Unless one were to interview a very special universe it does not seem likely that the responses to interviews like this one would be deliberately distorted. The general level of interest in politics in the United States is too low for anyone to have much at stake in having supported a winning candidate in time past.

### CHAPTER X

# CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Like many essays at exploratory research, some of the most interesting findings of this study were unanticipated, and some of the anticipated findings were uninteresting, or non-existent.

In its original intent, the research was to look into the extent and direction of changes in voting behavior associated with migration to the suburbs, and to probe for the processes through which these changes came about. On the first of these points the findings seem fairly clear, on the second rather obscure, although we can form some impressions. Relatively few of the migrants to suburbia changed their voting patterns directionally, but of those who did change, a significantly larger number moved towards Republican voting as opposed to Democratic.

## Conclusions

Three separate processes which might have underlain changes in voting were entertained as hypothetical explanations of the shift, but none of them proved to be useful explanations in that they did not seem to be at work more among the changers than the non-changers. The first of these, and the one in which, prior to the research, I placed the most credence, was the notion drawn from the Bureau of Applied Social Research studies in voting and consumer decision. In this view, decisions are the result of primary group affiliations. (This overstates the theory but not, I think, too baldly.) Therefore, one would expect voting patterns to change in the direction of the perceived political affiliations of the new primary groups in which an individual participated as a result of moving to the suburbs. Those individuals who were most closely tied to their new group affiliations should have had the greatest propensity to change, provided that the new groups with which they associated held as salient values political ideals in conflict with those possessed by the migrants. Clearly, this process did not operate in the suburb studied here. At least it did not operate to the extent that one would be satisfied to single it out as the most important source of political party change in suburbia.

In the second of the three processes mentioned above, suburbanization is no more than a symptom of upward social mobility. Those migrants who changed in jobs or in income to the extent that they no longer felt themselves a part of the working class, would deliberately or unwittingly adopt "middle-class" values which would presumably lead them into Republican voting. Setting aside for the moment the manner in which these values would be adopted, whether through reference group initiation or primary group contact, the fact is, in our sample few migrants showed upward mobility in occupation during the period studied, and the directional changers were no more likely to show it than those who did not. Further, those who changed were no more likely to expect an advance in future job status than those who did not, ruling out anticipatory socialization as a possible explanation.

A third possible explanation, in which I had little hope, was that the suburban move meant for most migrants the acquisition of a new status, home owner. And, that the role associated with this status would be one of political conservatism which might lead to Republican voting. The first half of the argument was correct. Home owning was indeed a new experience for most of the sample. But, most of the directional changers <u>had</u> owned homes in the recent past. The facts, therefore, were not merely inconsistent with this hypothesis, they directly contradicted it.

Although none of the prior hypotheses proved to be an efficient explanation of changing voting in the suburbs, some tentative explanations can still be put forth. Political change <u>does</u> exist, and it is in a Republican direction.

Of course, one must remember that our measure of directional change was rather artificial. Only one member of the sample changed from straight Republican to straight Democratic voting. The other sixteen directional changers began as split ticket voters in 1952. Further, among those eleven who are classified as having residual voting patterns, six shifted to Eisenhower-Williams voting in 1956. Of the total of twenty-eight migrants whose voting pattern indicated change of some sort, twenty-two shifted into or out of split ticket voting, beginning or ending as straight party voters. When we add to these the forty Eisenhower-Williams voters and the five other respondents with residual patterns, who split from time to time, we find that **six**ty-seven members of the sample casts ballots for the candidates of both parties at one time or another.

Since twenty-two of our respondents did not report a vote, this means that 41.3 per cent of the voters in our sample scattered their votes between the two parties.

Party loyalty cannot, therefore, be very important to them. But, there is no way to predict how long this situation has existed or will continue to exist. Exactly 50 per cent of the sample favored the Democratic party, presumably they might cast their votes for candidates of that party if the candidates were attractive enough.

We also found that those who moved to Livonia were likely to come from the more Republican areas of Detroit, and that they were more likely than the average voter from those areas to vote for Eisenhower for President and Williams for Governor in 1952. In the mass, the respondents shifted more towards Eisenhower in 1956 than did the voters in the areas from which they came, but this shift stemmed from the tendency of those who had not voted in 1952 to vote for Eisenhower in 1956, a process we call differential mobilization.

Differential mobilization took place in voting for Governor as well, and Williams did more poorly among the members of our sample in 1956 than he had in 1952. But, he lost votes as a result of shifting from split ticket voting to straight Republican voting too.

### Further Research

If further research is to be done on this topic, the present study suggests several lines of attack. First, a concentration on the phenomenon of change in voting <u>per se</u> is indicated, as opposed to stability of voting pattern. Second, there should be an emphasis on personality variables which might be associated with change and political instability. Third, we must devise sampling techniques which will permit us to oversample changers of all types.

On the theoretical side it would seem desirable to examine in more detail some of the possible reasons why the major hypothesis of this study did not stand up under scrutiny. The picture of social and personal interaction suggested by the Bureau of Applied Social Research studies is persuasive and well enough substantiated by other research as to warrant more than rejection out-of-hand.

### Politics Suppressed

Clearly our respondents did experience new patterns of social interaction as a result of their suburban migration. Many of them report a disjunction between themselves and their old Detroit associates, and many of them report rather weak ties with their Detroit neighbors in the first place. I should suggest that the flaw in the major hypothesis insofar as suburban political change is concerned lies in the de-politicalization of suburban social interaction. Interest in politics in the United States is generally low. Most people perceive themselves as having little at stake in the way in which political decisions are made. One might therefore expect that political values would be the first to change since they are so weakly held. But, just for that reason, they are unlikely to change, for the disinterest in politics is so general that politics does not matter. It is not necessary to agree with someone politically in order to get along with him, therefore, the neophyte, ambitious to be accepted by a new group will adopt those values which seem important to group acceptance, and those are not political values.

I have been using "disinterest" in a very broad sense. A person may be superficially "interested" in politics, he may view it as an activity worth talking about, without taking it seriously. He is in a sense a consumer of political dispute, not a participant. In his book Political Life, Lane points out that "many more people talk politics than seek to persuade others of their point of view."<sup>1</sup> At another point he guesses, "It is possible, at least, that one reason for American political apathy is that American political preferences frequently cut across class, religious, and ethnic lines so that without a clear orientation on the attitudes of one's social groups, the expression of political opinions offers risk of social friction rather than opportunity for social adjustment."<sup>2</sup> One needs only to add that it is also possible that the "clear orientation" to which Lane refers may itself be impossible. A person can hardly be expected to orient himself clearly towards a position which is both ambiguous and vague.

Ambiguity in political values is probably more important in this regard than is vagueness. I am fairly certain that ambiguity is a definite characteristic of the political value structures of most Americans, and quite certain it is characteristic of the people interviewed in this study. The ambiguity which seems most important is closely analagous to that which is characteristic of religious belief in the United States. Just as religious tolerance is dependent upon the fact that people no longer take religious questions seriously, so political toleration increases as a result of the essential disinterest in political parties in the United States. But, and this is where ambiguity arises, people in the large still view both religious and political discussion, or rather religious and political argument, as potentially divisive. The ecumenical movement could not have arisen if the classic questions of which religions are "right" and which are "wrong" had not subsided. But, though people seem to have decided that

Lane, Political Life, p. 92.

<sup>2</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 108.

all religions are "right" or at least better than no religion, they none the less avoid the potentially divisive analysis of just how the religions in question differ from each other and how important these differences are.

Similarly, in politics, there seems to be general consensus that everyone ought to be interested in politics combined with a general horror of doing anything as gauche as to take politics seriously enough as to dispute about it. In the responses to the questions in our survey of suburbanites this second attitude came through clearly. One respondent said that if a man insisted on asserting his political views which were different from his neighbor's they would. "be reticent about it. People here are different from our old neighborhood. They have more tolerance for different opinions. Some would argue with him, but politely." Another said that of a man of different views that, "He would keep quiet if his beliefs were communistic. If his beliefs were other than that he'd argue and the people around would listen to him but not seriously. They would try to avoid the topic in the future." Supposing that a man of different politics insisted on arguing, one respondent said, "No one would argue with him; they would laugh and walk away." Another said, "I would ignore him and he would have to drop the subject," and still another said, "He would probably keep quiet so as not to be an outcaste." Another told of "one particular person around here who always argues in any political issue. I personally like him. People avoid him because he constantly argues political issues. He is a radical on local issues only, and never quits arguing." Another said of the neighborhood group, "Even in the last presidential elections no one ever mentioned who they had voted for." Another said, "The neighbors would

probably avoid politics when he was around. That's the way most unpleasant topics are treated. It's just like religion." Summing up the general attitude was the comment, "Any sensible person would not let differences in political belief spoil a friendship, a sensible man would keep quiet."

Of the entire group of migrants, only twenty-three mentioned that they had noticed a person who insisted on discussing politics when the neighbors did not care to do so, and almost every person who answered these projective questions felt that sooner or later the topic of politics would be avoided and possibly, the man who insisted on talking about politics would have been shunned as well. I would argue. therefore, that though political interest may rise as a result of suburban residence, political dispute is suppressed, though whether this is more true of suburbs than of other areas I am not prepared to say. What can be discussed in such a situation? Only what Riesman calls "the consumer's view of politics." "Who is doing better?" "What arguments are being made?" "Whose chances are improving and whose weakening?" "How many people are likely to vote?", etc. Political discussions at this level can be carried out with a high degree of expertise, but surely this is not the style of free speech which Mill and Milton sought to defend, nor is it the stuff of which political conversion is produced. What comes out of the suburbs is not a dramatic shift to one party or the other, but a continuation or new fruition of the same level of political apathy characteristic of the rest of the American body politic. In most cases it is unrelieved by even the low degree of organization and political recruiting characteristic of our larger cities from which the suburbanites have fled.

### Parties Abandoned

If our respondents are to be believed, split ticket voting is even more characteristic of the new suburbanites than of the population at large. Yet could this not be consistent with the view of the independent voter left us by the Erie and Elmira studies? Given a group of people who value voting but do not value politics the split ticket could well be logically as well as psychologically valid. The vote is a decision, the very thing an independent voter does not wish to make. The split vote is a split decision; the next thing to no decision at all.

Notice, for example, that in the tables below the Eisenhower-Williams voters rank next to those who have never voted at all in the number who say they usually split their ticket. The overwhelming reason given by all ticket splitters was that they voted for the man and not for the party. But, though this is a respectable and popular answer it implies that those who give it might have confidence in an individual, but none in the organization to which that individual has joined himself. Evidently, in politics, a man is not known by the company he keeps. But for what is he known? Our study provides no information on this, yet it seems an important area to investigate for any one who would pursue the problem of the political effects of suburbanization further.

One particular characteristic of Livonia, which may be present in other suburban areas, is the relative absence of political party organizations. Neither the Republican nor the Democratic party has been able to create an enduring organization to take up the tasks of canvassing, campaigning and political stimulation which one might expect of a

TABLE LXXII

USUALLY VOTE STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, MIGRANTS.

11

Straight Or	Direct	ional	Straig	ht.	Votin Eisen	g Pattel 10wer-	rn Type Resid	e luals	-noN		Tota	Ţ
Spilt Ticket	Cnange Number	ers Per Cent	Number	voters Per Cent	Numbel	rer Cent	Numbeı	r Per Cent	Vc Numbei	cent Cent	Number	r Per Cent
Straight	9	35.3	40	57.1	ω	20.0	5	45.5	Ч	4.5	60	37.5
Split	ΙI	64.7	30	42.9	31	77.5	9	54.5	ω	36.4	86	53.8
No response	I	ı	I	ı	Ч	2.5	ı	ı	13	59.1	14	8 <b>.</b> 8
Total	17	100.0	70	100.0	140	100.0	11	100.0	22	100.0	160	100.1

e,
TABLE LXXIII

USUALLY VOTE STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, OLD-TIMERS.

Straight Or Swiit mickat	Direct	tional rs	Straig There	ht Voters	Voting Eisent Will	g Pattel Iower-	rn Type Resid	luals	Non- Votens	Tota	гļ
	Numbei	r Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	r Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Straight	б	60.0	29	48.3	14	38.9	б	25.0	were	49	43.4
Split	2	0.04	30	50.0	21	58.3	6	75.0	not	62	54.9
No response	ı	ı	г	1.7	Ч	2.8	I	I	asked	2	1.8
Total	5	100.0	60	100 <b>.</b> 0	36	100.0	12	100.0	question	113	100.1

TABLE LXXIV

USUALLY VOTE STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET, BY VOTING PATTERN TYPE, NEWCOMERS.

Straight Or Split Ticket	Direc <sup>1</sup> Change Numbei	tional ers r Per	Straig Ticket Number	cht Voters Per	Voting Eisenr Willi Number	r Patte. Nower- ams	rn Type Resic Numbei	e luals ? Per	Non- Vot Number	ers Per	Tota Numbei	tl ? Per
		Cent		Cent		Cent		Cent		Cent		Cent
Straight	t	I	10	24.4	Ч	5.6	ı	ı	were		11	16 <b>.</b> 9
Split	4	100.0	29	70 <b>.</b> 7	17	94.4	2	100.0	not		52	80.0
No response	I	I	N	4.9	I	I	I	t	asked		2	3.1
Total	4	100.0	Γħ	100.0	18	100.0	2	100.0	quest	ion	65	100.0

political group. There is a Livonia Republican Club and a Democratic Club, but neither meets as frequently as once a month, and neither has as many as 50 members. In part this might be due to the non-partisan local government structure. Local issues stimulate more concern among Livonians than do state or national disputes, but since political parties <u>qua</u> parties do not participate in these, there is no carry-over to national or state politics.

In extended talks with local officials, some of whom were active in what little political party organizations there were, I gathered that in the 1956 elections the UAW had sent out workers to man the Livonia precincts for the Democratic Party. This was done, however, only on the day of the election and one day previously and was not seen to have been particularly effective.

Two of the local officials whom I interviewed are active in partisan politics, one as a Democrat, one a Republican. The Democrat reported more favorably about the possibility of an organization being created. He anticipated no difficulty in manning the precincts with local Democratic workers in the forthcoming elections but hinted that the integration between the local club and the county organization was rather poor and that there had been real difficulty between the Livonia group and the 17th Congressional district organization, which was dominated by groups from Detroit and Redford Township. He viewed Williams's personal appeal as the greatest asset which the Democrats had and was concerned about his possible withdrawal from state politics as a candidate.

The Republican active was much more pessimistic. The old-timers who had been extremely active in Livonia in its pre-suburban period had all but withdrawn from the political scene and no individual or group

had replaced them. The Republicans have never canvassed the area and cannot man all precincts even with clerks and poll-watchers on election day. None of the respondents in the sample reported ever having been approached by party workers of either group, so perhaps the report of the Democratic active was over-optimistic.

Both these men, and all the other political actives to whom I talked, were sure that the population of Livonia was far more concerned with local politics than with state or national affairs. But, the local blocs cross over party lines and there does not seem to be any participation of the partisan organizations as organizations although most of those who are interested in partisan politics are also interested in local affairs.

The trend to suburban living would seem to have no inherent advantages for either party insofar as state and national politics is concerned. Accompanying migration to the suburbs is an increase in political interest and particularly interest in local political affairs. Local non-partisanship in Livonia definitely inhibited the transfer of such increased interest to national and state concerns and also inhibited the creation of viable, enduring political party organizations which might serve to alleviate the general trend towards lack of concern with partisan politics.

#### The Suburban Political Creed

The discrepancy in voting in Livonia between national and state elections was acute. This might also be the result of the lack of political organizations which could vigorously put the case for partisan politics. Political discussion in the suburb is generally tolerated. Though several respondents volunteered that, "We never discuss politics," many more reported that they did discuss politics rather frequently, probably more frequently than they had in Detroit. What was also apparent, however, was that political dispute or argument, as opposed to discussion, was rare and feared by most of the migrants. In the absence of party organization the political canons of the suburbanites we talked to might be stated as follows:

- 1) It is good to vote.
- 2) It is good to vote for the best man.
- 3) It is good to talk about politics and government.
- 4) It is bad to argue about politics and government.
- 5) If you cannot talk about politics without arguing about it, don't talk about it.

It might even be true that most people's politics change as a result of suburban migration. The change however is not from Democrat to Republican, still less from Republican to Democrat. Rather it is in the direction of increased withdrawal from partisan politics and political argument, accompanied by an increased interest with local political matters and a spectator's interest in national affairs.

The responses to the projective questions in our schedule clearly implied that a political deviant would be punished by being ignored, or controlled by having certain topics of conversation avoided in his presence. A political deviant is not, however, a Democrat among Republicans or a Republican among Democrats, but a hot-head among tho**s**e who, by and large, take politics as coolly as possible.

What are the implications of this view for national politics? In the first place, it is conceivable that the partisan election of local officials might well create a different climate for local opinion. If the mechanism for choosing local leaders were to be tied into the

national and state political organizations, there might well be some arousing or transferring of interest to state and national political affairs. This is not the case in Livonia, however. Where this does not take place, the suburbanite will vote, for voting is part of the political creed, but the source of his voting decision will not likely be his neighborhood based primary group. This is a responsibility the social groups of suburbia shun, if Livonia is any fair example. Perhaps the mass media will have a more direct effect on the political decisions of suburbanites than they did in the Bureau of Applied Social Research study of the stable community of Elmira. New York. But which mass media, giving which messages? This I cannot guess. Newspapers and television seem to be the two major competing sources, with magazines a possible third. I should certainly advise any candidate whose election depends in part upon suburban votes to pay the closest possible attention to the sources of information the suburbanite will use to cast his vote. In Chicago, there are areas in the northwest part of the city known as "newspaper wards." These are sections which the professional politicians identify as voting in harmony with the recommendations of the Chicago dailies. Perhaps the suburbs will be "newspaper towns," following not the recommendations of their own papers, which are typically local-oriented weeklies, but of the press of the metropolitan center to which they turn for economic and cultural advantages.

If this be the case, the Democratic Party may in fact be in trouble in suburbia, not because of political conversion, but because of the Republican bias of most of the press. A dramatic charismatic candidate may be able to overcome such a built-in disability for the

Democrats, garnering enough attention and making his points so strongly that they filter through the Republican press relatively unharmed, but lesser lights would have to depend on coat-tails, shrinking in the increase of ticket splitting, or good luck.

The only clear way out of this dilemma would be the creation of strong local party organizations which could balance the mass media with face to face persuasion. However, the pervading political style of suburbia places two stumbling blocks in that path. First, although a political organization probably need not encompass much of the population, it must necessarily have some members, and recruiting in the suburbs will be a tough job. This will be so because political organization membership demands one thing which goes against the suburban grain. It demands a serious commitment to politics. Closely related to this is the second problem. Given an organization, can it be effective in the face of suburban reluctance to discuss politics argumentatively? The suburban political active would probably have to wear two hats. As a member of his own social group, to remain a member he would have to accept the salient values of the group. Don't argue politics! As a campaigner he would have to do precisely what he is not supposed to do as a good neighbor. The only way I can think of in which these roles could be combined would be to depend on tetea-tete campaigning, paralleling the fund drive techniques of the voluntary organizations. Mothers (or fathers) do not march on polio, muscular dystrophy, et. al., continuously, but sporadically. In an analagous way suburban political campaigning would necessarily be sporadic at best, even in campaign season, if it were to exist at all.

#### What Is To Be Done

Some generalization about the appropriate future strategies of research in voting behavior can be drawn from these findings. The suburbs do not look, to me, like a fertile place to search for the genesis of new social movements, nor do they appear to be a region where mass transfers of allegiance between existing political parties will take place.

If suburbia has any intrinsic political significance for state and national politics, it is simply because it is growing rapidly, and in the process it is disordering older political commitments. At present the results of such disorder is a high level of political entropy rather than any change towards one or the other of the two major parties.

Political scientists who concern themselves with voting behavior face, it seems to me, an increasingly difficult task in future research. We are studying an area of human behavior which was never very well organized or defined, and one that shows every sign of becoming less rather than more organized in the future. There is probably no area of political science whose students stand to gain less and lose more by an uncritical adoption of the conventional categories of explanation than this one.

The major question facing the study of voting in the United States is determining just what meaning allegiance to a political party has to the various people who profess it. Party allegiance in the United States is not, I hope, all things to all men, but it certainly is many things to many different men. Closely related to this is the question of stability and instability of party allegiances. Under what conditions

will a person depart from his party allegiances to vote for the candidate of another party? For example, we should want to know how many times and for how many offices a person can vote contrary to his party preference and still maintain that party preference unchanged. Judging from this study, the capacity for inconsistency between party preference and voting on the presidential level is surprisingly high. Still another closely related problem is that of the sources of information for the individual political decision. The model described in the Bureau of Applied Social Research study of Elmira, New York and modified by Luce in his article in American Voting Behavior, is still inadequate, though perhaps a start at the problem. Luce suggests that the Elmira study assumes that interaction per se is the determinate of political decisions.<sup>2</sup> He then asserts that a more complex descriptive device is desirable and proposes adding to social interaction the variable of individual motivation. This, I think, is fine as far as it goes, but I should argue that the level of motivation in the individual voter is likely to be so low in our country that special attention ought to be given to this case.

#### Theoretical Problems

What we seem to face in the study of voting behavior is a decision which is overwhelmingly more important to the social system, and to the social scientists who study it, than it is to the decision maker. A Theory of weak interactions might be the best description of what a theory of voting behavior in our day would have to be. In prying into the determinants of voting behavior the social scientist is looking for information which his respondents themselves do not possess. The

<sup>5</sup>Luce, in Burdick and Brodbeck, <u>American Voting Behavior</u>.

reason they do not possess it is not because it is so sensitive, so central to their personalities, that it must be defended from outside knowledge at all costs. This would be the case if politics were perceived to be as important as sex. On the contrary, self-knowledge about the motivation for political decision is not present because the decision is one viewed by most members of our society as trivial.

Investigation into the roots of voting behavior is made still more difficult, however, because the verbal valuation of political action in the United States is at odds with the value which would be assigned to it by seeing how people act. Relatively few people would say that voting is unimportant, useless, or meaningless. Expressing such an opinion, in fact, is antithetical enough to the standard American stereotype of politics as to be grounds for segregating such individuals into a theoretic category--the highly alienated. But, a very large part of our population, a part which is growing ever larger if my generalizations about the effects of suburbanization are correct, acts as though this were true though they will not say it.

Social scientists seem to have developed the techniques and theory necessary for studying the social determinants of voting at a time when the society is changing rapidly. And, at a time when it is changing particularly rapidly in those areas where social determinants of voting will be most affected. Without prior investigation and theory building about the nature, content, and effect of political party affiliation in the United States, any study of shifting political allegiances is likely to be superficial and sterile.

Turning from research strategy to research tactics, future studies in voting behavior should use methods of selecting respondents which

would permit them to oversample those people whose behavior is anomalous under the present theories. The study of directional changers, residuals, and split ticket voters seems to offer more opportunities for developing a theory of voting behavior than does the representative sample. This I would argue is particularly true since the conditions which lead to such forms of political response seem to be spreading, and those conditions leading to highly structured political response are decreasing in present day America. It is precisely the anomalous case which points up the weakness in existing theory. The study of such cases should provide the means of buttressing our explanatory schemes. This study does not suggest the need for replication in other suburban milieus. The findings are not clear enough to demand it. What it does suggest is that suburbia might well be a good place to look for a rich supply of individuals whose voting behavior is not readily explained by the present state of theory in political science. APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

### WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH BUREAU SUBURBAN STUDY

#### INTRODUCTION:

3.

4.

Good afternoon, I am from the Wayne State University Political Science Department. We are interested in finding out from people who live in the suburbs something about their experiences and opinions on government and about life in the suburbs generally as compared to the city. We feel that moving to the suburbs must create new problems and needs, both for the people who move and the governments that serve them. In order to help solve these problems we must know how the people concerned feel, so we have selected a cross-section of suburban residents. I wonder if you could help us by telling us something about the way people live in Livonia and giving us your opinions on suburban living.

- First of all I would like to know how long you have lived in Livonia?
- 2. Did you move here from Detroit?

Yes	No		
IF YES: 2a.	What was your former ad	ldress?	
IF NO: 2b.	Where did you live befo	ore?	
How many peop	le live here with you?		
What are thei	r ages and relationship	to you?	
Ag	e <u>Relationship</u>	Age	Relationship

IF JAN	R. MOVED TO LIVONIA FROM DETROIT BETWEEN JANUARY FIRST 1953 AND WARY FIRST 1956, CONTINUE BELOW.
IF	R. MOVED EARLIER OR LATER SKIP TO QUESTION 205.
5.	Now I'd like to ask you to think back to when you moved to Livonia. Did you make a quick decision to move, or did you think about it for a while?
	Quick decision Thought about it a while
	5a. About how long would you say you thought it over?
6.	What would you say are the major advantages to living here?
7.	Are there any drawbacks? Yes No
	IF YES: 7a. What are they?
8.	How long did it take you to get acquainted here? Did it happen right away or did it seem to take quite a while?
	Right away Took a while
	TAKE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, BUT DO NOT PROBE
9.	How about your (husband-wife)? Did (he-she) make friends faster than you did, slower, or about the same?
	Faster Slower About the same
10.	How did you meet the people here? Just because they happened to be neighbors, or through other friends, or how?
11.	Since you moved here do you find you see less of the people you used to know in Detroit, or are you still keeping up your old contacts?
	See less of them Still keeping up old contacts
12.	Do you think the people around here are more interested in each other than those in your old neighborhood in Detroit, less interested, or about the same?
	More interested  Less interested About the same

13.	Do you think you have as much privacy here as you had where you used to live?
	Yes No
14.	As far as friendliness is concerned, are you satisfied with the way things are around here, or would you rather people were friendlier, or that they kept to themselves more?
	Satisfied Wants them to be friendlier Should keep to themselves
15.	Do you ever have coffee with any of the neighbors?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 15a. About how often? Once a day or more Between once a day and once a week Less than once a week
16.	How about your (husband-wife) does (he-she) ever have coffee and chat with them?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 16a. How often? Once a day or more Less than once a week Less than once a day but more than once a week
17.	Do you ever chat with the neighbors when you meet them outside the house, working in the yard and so on?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 17a. How often? Every day At least once a week Less than once a week
18.	Does your (husband-wife) ever chat with the neighbors outdoors?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 18a. How often? Every day At least once a week L Less than once a week
19.	Do you ever attend parties with the neighbors?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 19a. How often on the average? More than once a week Once a week Less than once a week, but more than once a month Less than once a month

20.	Does your (husband-wife) go to such affairs?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 20a. Does (he-she) attend more than you do
	Less than you do 🗌 As often as you do 🗌
21.	Do you ever drop in on the neighbors and visit with them during the day or evening?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 21a. About how often? More than once a week Once a week Less than once a week, but more than once a month Less than once a month
22.	Does this sort of thing go on quite a bit in the neighborhood having coffee, visiting back and forth and so on?
	Yes No
23.	Do you feel you see as much of the neighbors as you would like to?
	Yes No
	IF ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ARE GIVEN RECORD, BUT DO NOT PROBE
24.	Do you feel you do as much of this kind of visiting as the other people in the neighborhood, more of it, or less?
	As much More Less
25.	Do you find that more of this sort of thing, or less, goes on here than in your Detroit neighborhood?
	More About the same Less
	25a. How social were people in your Detroit neighborhood? Could you give me an idea what it was like? (PROBE FOR CHATTING, COFFEE, VISITING, PARTIES)
26.	How would you say you met most of the people you see socially these days? Were they:
	Neighbors Fellow church members Fellow members of clubs or other organizations People you or your (husband-wife) met at work Friends of relatives Other

27.	When it comes to pers people who live in th or less close to them	sonal friends, do you ne neighborhood than n?	feel closer to the to friends elsewhere,
	Closer	Less close	About the same
	27a. Why do you thir	nk this is true?	
28.	Do you feel you know better than your othe	the people who live er friends, or not as	in the neighborhood well?
	Better	Not as well	About the same
	28a. What do you thi	ink is the reason for	• that?
29.	Most of us want other you say that you valu hood more than those More	r people to have a go ae the opinions of th of other people you Less	od opinion of us. Would e people in the neighbor- know, or less? About the same
	29a. Why do you fee]	that way about it?	
30.	We know that many peo organizations. I wou your memory and I wou of your family belong	ople spend some of th ald like to read this ald like you to tell g to any groups like	eir time in clubs and list to you to refresh me if you or any members these.
	READ LIST	Member of Family	Organization
	Churches Church related organizations such as Ladies Aid etc. Business and Profess- ional such as AMA, Chamber of Commerce. Labor unions Neighborhood improve- ment associations. Fraternal organization Youth organizations, Veteran's organization Service Clubs, Rotary Political organization	ons, such as Elks, Mo Boy Scouts, etc. ons, VFW, American Le r, Kiwanis, etc. ons, League of Women as, card clubs, bowli	ose, etc. gion. Voters ng team, athletic club, etc.
	GET PRECISE NAME OF C	RGANIZATION, CONTINU	E ON REVERSE IF NECESSARY.

31. Have you or any member of your family joined any of these since moving here?

Yes	s		I	No 🗌
IF	YES:	31a.	Which or	nes?

32. Were there any organizations you used to belong to in Detroit that you have dropped out of since moving here?

Yes		No		
IF YES:	32a.	What were	their names?	

- 33. We would like to get an idea of the sorts of things people talk about. What do you think are the main topics of conversation around here?
- 34. Thinking back to when you lived in Detroit, what were the main topics of conversation with your Detroit neighbors?
- 35. Do you ever discuss problems of local government with your friends?

	Yes No
	IF YES: 35a. How often would you say this happens? Once a week or more More than once a month Only during election campaigns Very seldom
36.	Do you ever discuss politics in general with your friends and neighbors?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 36a. How often? Once a week or more More than once a month Only during campaigns Very seldom
37.	Would you describe yourself as more interested, or less interested in local government than most of the people you know?
	More interested  Less interested  About the same
38.	What would you say are some of the problems Livonia faces right now?
	IF MORE THAN ONE PROBLEM NAMES: 38a. Which of these would you say is the most important?

39.	Do you think the government of Livonia is doing a good job of solving this problem?
	Yes No
40.	Do you find yourself more interested or less interested in problems of local government than you were when you lived in Detroit?
	More interested Less interested About the same
	IF MORE INTERESTED OR LESS INTERESTED: 40a. What do you think is the reason for this?
41.	What would you say was the main problem of Detroit government when you lived there?
42.	Which city do you think is doing the better job of solving its main problems, Livonia or Detroit?
	Livonia Detroit About the same
	IF "LIVONIA" OR "DETROIT": 42a. Why do you suppose that is true?
43.	How much of a say do you feel you have in the way the government of Livonia is run?
	Much Some Little Very little None
	43a. What makes you say so?
44.	How about Detroit. How much of a say in that government did you feel you had when you lived there?
	Much Some Little Very little None
	44a. Why do you say that?
45.	How close do you think Livonia's government comes to doing what the average citizen wants it to do?
	Very close Pretty close Depends on time and issues Rarely close Not close at all
46.	How close do you feel the Detroit government came to doing what the average man wanted it to do?
	Very close Rarely close Pretty close Depends on time and issues Not close at all

47.	Would you say most of interested in local c	the people who live or in state and natio	e around here are more onal government?
	Local S	State and national	About the same
48.	How about you? Which	are you more intere	ested in?
	Local S	tate and national	About the same
49.	Do you think you are and national governme	more interested or l ent since you moved h	ess interested in state ere?
	More	Less	About the same
	IF MORE OR LESS: 49a thi	. What do you think s change?	: is the reason for
50.	Do you consider yours	elf a Republican, De	mocrat, or what?
	Republican	Democrat	Other (explain)
	IF INDEPENDENT: 50a.	Which party do you	normally favor?
		Republican	Democrat
	IF "VOTE FOR BEST MAN	": 50b. Which part good men in it?	y seems to have the most
		Republican	Democrat
	IF BOTH PROBES FAIL,	CHECK HERE	
51.	What about most of th they are mostly Repub	e people who live ar licans or Democrats?	ound here, do you think
	Republican	Democrat	Don't know
	IF "REP." OR "DEM.":	51a. Well how sure that party?	are you that they favor
	Very sure	Sure	Not certain
	IF SURE: 51b. How d	id you find out abou	t this?
52.	How about the people they mostly Republica	back in Detroit wher ns or Democrats?	e you used to live? Were
	Republicans	Democrats	Don't know
	IF "REP." OR "DEM.":	52a. How sure are favored that party?	you that they mostly

	:	Sure	Not sure
	IF SURE: 52b. How die	d you find out about	t this?
53.	How much attention do gothers! political belie	you think people are	ound here pay to each
	Much	Some	None
54.	How much attention did one another's political Much	people in your old 1 preferences? Some	neighborhood pay to None
55.	Have you changed your p Yes	party preferences in No	n recent years?
	IF YES: 55a. When was	s that?	
	55b. What we	re your reasons?	
56.	Now I am going to read come up in recent years of these?	you a list of impor s. Could you tell n	rtant questions that have ne how you feel on each

Should the government do more to control big business? Should the government do more to control labor unions? Should the federal government provide financial aid to schools? Should the federal government force schools to integrate racially? Should the government provide more services to the people even if it means raising taxes?

Should the government cut taxes even if it means reducing services to the people?

READ LIST:

	Yes	No
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

57. How do you think most Republicans would feel on these questions?

READ LIST:

	Yes	No
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

58. How about Democrats? How would most of them feel on these questions?

READ LIST:

	Yes	No
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

59. What about most of the people around here? How would you think they would feel?

READ LIST AGAIN:

	Yes	No
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

60. What about the people where you used to live? How do you think they would feel about them?

READ LIST AGAIN:

	Yes	No
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		

61.	Are you regist Yes	ered to vote here in Livonia? No
	IF YES: 61a.	Did you vote for President in 1956?
		Yes No
		IF YES: 61b. For whom did you vote?
		Eisenhower Stevenson Other (specify)
	IF YES TO 61:	61c. Did you vote for Governor that year?
		Yes No
		IF YES: 61d. For whom did you vote?
		Williams Cobo Other (specify)
62.	Were you regis	tered to vote in 1954?
	Yes	No
	IF YES: 62a.	Where were you registered?
	626.	Did you vote for Governor that year?
		Yes No
	IF YE	S: 62c. For whom did you vote?
	Willi	ams Leonard Other (specify)
63.	Were you regis	tered to vote in 1952?
	Yes	No
	IF YES: 63a.	Where were you registered?
	IF YES TO 63:	63b. Did you vote for President that year?
		Yes No
		IF YES: 63c. For whom did you vote?
		Eisenhower Stevenson Other (specify)
	IF YES TO 63:	63d. Did you vote for Governor that year?
		Yes No
		IF YES: 63e. For whom did you vote?
		Williams Alger Other (specify)

	-
64.	Do you vote a straight ticket or generally split your ballot? Straight Split Split 64a. Why?
65.	Many people have said in books and magazines that people who move to the suburbs are likely to become very much like their neighbors in their political beliefs. Do you think that sort of thing happens around here? Yes No I IF YES: 65a. Could you give me some examples?
66.	Do you think a person would feel out of place here if his politics were different from those of a lot of people in the neighborhood? Yes No 66a. What are your reasons for saying that?
	IF NO ON 66: 66b. Have you ever noticed anything like that around here? Yes No IF YES: 66c. Could you give me an example?

67. Suppose a man lived around here who had very strong political beliefs that were different from his neighbors. How do you think he would act when politics were discussed?

ON THIS PROJECTIVE QUESTION YOU CAN USE THE PROBES BELOW TO TRY AND GET THE RESPONDENT TO TELL A STORY. PLEASE NOTE THE ONES USED AND GET THE NEAREST THING TO A VERBATIM ACCOUNT YOU CAN.

PROBES 1. Do you think he would keep quiet or argue or what?

- 2. Why do you think he would do that?
- 3. Suppose he insisted on arguing, how do you think people would treat him?
- 4. Do you think they would try and stop the discussion, or avoid the topic or what?

68.	Have you ever noticed anything like that around here?
	IF YES: 68a. Can you give me an example?
69.	Now although we don't want to know names we would like to get an idea of what sorts of people we have talked to. I wonder if you would tell me where you (your husband) works?
70.	What sort of work do you (does he) do? GET PRECISE DESCRIPTION
71.	Are you (is he) salaried or paid by the hour?
72.	Has your (his) job, or your (his) employer changed in recent years?
	Yes No No
	IF YES: 72a. What were these changes?
73.	Do you think you (he) will stick with this job in the future or are you (is he) likely to get promoted or change jobs?
	Stick Change
	IF CHANGE: 73a. What kind of changes do you expect?
74.	Does anyone else in the family work?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 74a. What sort of work do they (does he) do?
	74b. Are they (is he) salaried or paid by the hour?
75.	Does your family have any other income outside of what you earn?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 75a. What kind, pensions, interest, stocks, or what?

76.	What would you say your total family income is per year? Just in round numbers.
	Less than \$3,000 a \$3,000 to \$5,000 b \$5,000 to \$6,000
	\$6,000 to \$7,000 L \$7,000 to \$8,000 L \$8,000 to \$9,000 L
	\$9,000 to \$10,000 🔲 Over \$10,000 🛄
77.	Do you own or are you buying this home, or do you rent?
	IF OWNS OR IS BUYING: 77a. How much do you think it is worth right now?
	\$
78.	Did you own or were you buying a house in Detroit, or did you rent?
	IF RENTED: 78a. Was it a house Or an apartment
Well	thank you very much for your co-operation. Your answers will be

very helpful to us in studying the problems of local government in general and suburban government in particular. We are very grateful for your help.

WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENT AND HOUSE WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON DEGREE OF COOPERATION AND LEVEL OF INTEREST AND INFORMATION ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS. WE PLAN TO CALL BACK ON A SMALL SAMPLE OF GOOD INFORMANTS FOR EXTENDED INTERVIEWS.

#### TO BE USED WHEN RESPONDENT DOES NOT FIT SAMPLE.

205.	Has anyo: you move	ne ever d to Li	talked to you about registering to vote since vonia?
	Yes		No 🗌
206.	Were you	regist	ered to vote in 1956?
	Yes		No
	IF YES:	206a.	Where were you registered?
	IF YES:	206b.	Did you vote for President in that election?
			Yes No

	IF YES: 206c. For whom did you vote?
	Eisenhower Stevenson Other (specify)
	IF REGISTERED IN MICHIGAN IN 1956: 206d. Did you vote for Governor?
	Yes No
	IF YES: For whom?
	Williams Cobo
207.	Were you registered in 1954?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 207a. Where were you registered?
	IF REGISTERED IN MICHIGAN: 207b. Did you vote for Governor that year?
	Yes No
	IF YES: For whom did you vote?
	Williams Leonard
208.	Were you registered in 1952?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 208a. Where were you registered?
	IF YES TO 208: 208b. Did you vote for President that year?
	Yes No
	IF YES: 208c. For whom did you vote?
	Eisenhower Stevenson Other (specify)
	IF REGISTERED IN MICHIGAN: 208d. Did you vote for Governor that year?
	Yes No
	IF YES: For whom did you vote?
	Williams Alger Other (specify)

209.	Do you consider yourself a Republican or Democrat or what?
	Republican Democrat Other
	IF INDEPENDENT: 209a. What party do you normally favor?
	Republican Democrat
	IF BOTH PROBES FAIL CHECK HERE
210.	Do you usually vote a straight ticket or split your ballot?
	Straight Split
	210a. Why?

211. Do you feel most of the people around here agree with your political beliefs, or disagree?

Agree		Disagree	
-------	--	----------	--

211a. What makes you say that?

- 212. Now although we don't want to know names we would like to get an idea of what sorts of people we have been talking to. I wonder if you would tell me where you (your husband) work(s)?
- 213. What sort of work do you (does he) do? GET PRECISE DESCRIPTION
- 214. Are you (is he) salaried or paid by the hour?
- 215. Has your (his) job, or your (his) employer changed in recent years?

IF YES: 215a. What were these changes?

No

216. Do you think you (he) will stick with this job in the future or are you (is he) likely to get promoted or change jobs?

Stick		Change
IF CHANGE:	216a.	What kind of changes do you expect?

217.	Does anyone else in the family work? Yes No No
	IF YES: 217a. What sort of work do they do?
	217b. Are they salaried or paid by the hour?
218.	Does your family have any other income outside of what you earn? Yes No
	IF YES: 218a. What kind, pensions, interest, stocks, or what?
219.	What would you say your total family income is per year? Just in round numbers.
	Less than \$3,000 🗋 \$3,000 to \$5,000 🗍 \$5,000 to \$6,000
	\$6,000 to \$7,000 \$7,000 to \$8,000 \$8,000 \$8,000 to \$9,000
	\$9,000 to \$10,000 🗌 Over \$10,000 🔲
220.	Do you own or are you buying this home, or do you rent?
	IF OWNS OR IS BUYING: 220a. How much do you think it is worth right now?
221.	Did you own or were you buying a house in Detroit, or did you rent?
	IF RENTED: 221a. Was it a house Or an apartment 🗌

Thank you very much for your co-operation. Your answers will be very helpful in letting us know the types of people who live in the suburbs and how they feel about politics.

### APPENDIX B

### ADDITIONAL TABLES

# Sexual Differences Among The Migrants

## TABLE LXXV

### SEX OF RESPONDENT BY INTEREST IN POLITICS

Interest Compared To Most Of The People You Know	Male	Female	Total
More	7	23	30
Less	9	27	36
Same	21	70	91
No resp <b>onse</b>	-	3	3
Total	37	123	160

Voting Pattern	Male	Female	Total
Straight Democratic	10	25	35
Changed to Democratic	1	3	4
Eisenhower-Williams	8	32	40
Changed to Republican	1	12	13
Straight Republican	8	27	35
Residuals	1	10	11
Non-voters	8	14	22
Total	37	123	160

# SEX OF RESPONDENT BY VOTING PATTERN.

#### TABLE LXXVII

SEX	BY	PROPENSITY	то	CHANGE.	

	Male	Female	Total	
Change	3	25	28	
Non-change	34	98	132	
Total	37	123	160	

Males are not significantly different from females in their interest in politics. They are less likely to have change voting patterns than are females, but chi-square computed on these differences as in Table LXXVII is not significant at the .05 level, which we have adopted in this research. If the difference had been greater then the effect of the sexual imbalance in the sample would have been to overestimate the amount of change in the sample. Change was low; if there had been more men in the sample it might have been even lower.

#### TABLE LXXVIII

Office	1952	<b>Year</b> 1954	1956	Frequency
President Governor	Stevenson No vote	No vote	Eisenhower Williams	1
President Governor	Stevenson Williams	No vote	Eisenhower Williams	1
President Governor	Stevenson Williams	Williams	Eisenhower Williams	4
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Leonard	Eisenhower Williams	1
President Governor	Eisenhower Alger	Williams	Eisenhower Cobo	1
President Governor	Stevenson Alger	Williams	No vote No vote	1
President Governor	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Williams	Leonard	No vote No vote	1
President Governor	Eisenhower Alger	Williams	No vote No vote	1
Total				11

### RESIDUAL VOTING PATTERNS AMONG THE MIGRANTS.

### TABLE LXXIX

### DIRECTIONAL CHANGE PATTERNS AMONG NON-SAMPLE SUBJECTS.

Office	1952	Year 1954	1956	Frequency
President Governor	Stevenson No vote	Williams	Eisenhower No vote	1
President Governor	Stevenson Williams	No vote	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Cobo	1
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Leonard	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Cobo	2
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Williams	Eisenhower Cobo	2
President Governor	Stevenson No vote	No vote	Eisenhower No vote	1
President Governor	No vote No vote	Williams	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Cobo	1
President Governor	Eisenhower No vote	Williams	Eisenhower Cobo	1
President Governor	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Williams	Williams	Stevenson Williams	3
President Governor	No vote Alger	Williams	Stevenson Williams	1
Total				13

### TABLE LXXX

Office	1952	Year 1954	1956	Frequency
President Governor	Stevenson No vote	Williams	Stevenson Cobo	1
President Governor	Stevenson Williams	Williams	Eisenhower Williams	3
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Williams	Stevenson Cobo	1
President Governor	No vote Alger	No vote	Stevenson No vote	1
President Governor	No vote No vote	Leonard	Eisenhower Williams	l
President Governor	Eisenhower Williams	Leonard	Stevenson Cobo	1
President Governor	Eisenhower Alger	Williams	Eisenhowe <b>r</b> Cobo	1
Total				9

# RESIDUAL PATTERNS AMONG NON-SAMPLE SUBJECTS.



Nearest Western Boundary of Detroit One and One-Half Miles East

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