ABSTRACT THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION, 1939-1963: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLITICS AND CHANGING PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES BY Daniel M. Masterson This study examines the influence of national politics and changing professional attitudes upon the institutional development of the Peruvian armed forces in the period 1939- 1963. Although the military was the dominant power holder in national political affairs throughout the entire period of this study, the officer corps was rarely characterized by institutional unanimity on the key issues which divided the nation- Before 1950 the partisan tactics of rival Civilian and military power groups factionalized the armed forces, lowered military morale and aroused the contempt of junior officers for civilian politicians and politically ambitious military commanders. The 5235 party was involved in most of the civil—military intrigues of this era and despite the party's abandonment of revolutionary politics after the abortive Callao revolt of 1948, most military men continued to distrust the motives of the Aprista leaders. Consequently, the continuing antagonism between Daniel M. Masterson APRA and the armed forces was an important reason for the military' 8 annulment of the 1962 election in which Aprista leader, Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, was the leading vote getter. By 1962, however, the military's professional self— image had improved dramatically from the politically troubled years of the 1940's. Founded on an increasingly sophisticated perception of the dimensions of national defense, the armed forces profes- sional perspectives broadened to include an ambitious social and economic role for the military. As a result of the dynamic leadership of its first two directors, the Centro d_e_ Altos EStUdiOS Militares (C_A§_I‘_’I_) became the most important agency for clarifying the military's role as an agent for promoting national development. SEE-linked officers were not, however, exclusive advocates of a social and economic function for the armed forces. This theme had been the subject of officer's writings in Peru's leading service journals since the early twentieth century. But after 1950, the appeals of progressive officers for the military. 5 involvement in a wide range of social action pro- grams found acceptance throughout the entire officer corps. As political tensions and resultant armed forces fac- tionalism eased during the 1950's progressive officers who Daniel M. Masterson had been previously stymmied by these problems were able to make great progress towards improving the military's educa— tional system. Aiding this process was the high command's increased conviction that improved training and educational standards were mandatory requirements of military profession- alism. With the opening of the Centro d_e_ Instruccion Militar in 1948 and the CAEM in 1950, specialized post academy studies were greatly expanded to supplement the training offered at the Escuela Superior d_e Guerra. Leading military educators were instrumental in promoting the notion that quality education was fundamentally important in molding the armed forces into a modern and technically proficient insti— tution. As a result of the improved educational level of the officer corps, military men of the 1960's displayed a greater confidence in their professional capabilities. They came to believe that they were among the best trained soldiers in Latin America. Moreover, given the technical expertise of many armed forces officers and the concomitant shortage of civilian technicians in Peru, military men came to view their institution--in the words of one prominent Officer-u-as Peru's permanent vehicle for modernization. This perception of the military's role in national affairs Daniel M. Masterson coupled with a growing belief that civilian politicians were incapable of implementing the reforms necessary to insure national development, made the officer corps impatient allies of the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belafinde Terry, after his election to the presidency in 1963. This outlook also had critically significant implica- tions for Belafinde's subsequent overthrow in 1968 by officers then prepared to launch a program of reform un- paralleled in the history of Peru. THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION, 1939-1963: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLITICS .AND CHANGING PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES BY Daniel M. Masterson A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1976 Copyright by DANIEL M. MASTERSON 1976 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER II. JIII. PREFACEOOOOOO ...... C OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO CAUDILLOS AND THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER ........ Military Professionalozation and Civilian 1895-1919.... Political Instability: Continued Armed Forces Politicization During the Oncenio............ .......... Conclusion..... ........................... A NEW RIVALRY IS BORN...... ..... ... ..... . ..... Sanchez Cerro and APRA...... ............... The Leticia Dispute and the Demise of SénChez cerrOOOOOO......OOOOOOOOOOOO The Benavides Era: 1933-1939.......... conClUSionIOOOOOOO0............CCOOOOOO BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES AND BARRACKS TENSIONS. The Armed Forces of 1939.... ......... ... Civilian Rule Restored.................. A Time of Triumph....................... Prado, Ureta and the Issue of Promotions. The Three Army Factions................ The Civilian Alternative: The Frente Democratico National............... conCIUSionCOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.00.......... PRELUDE TO REBELLIONOOOOOOOOOO0.0....O ........ A Broadening Mission.................. Aprismo, The Military and the Renewed StruggleOOIIOOOOOOOOOOO0......0.... Bustamante and the Generals.. The Political Impasse........ The Seeds of Rebellion....... Conclusion................... iii Page 19 29 31 31 50 54 7O 72 72 77 80 95 100 106 120 122 122 132 139 152 159 166 TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued CHAPTER Page V. CRISIS AND DECISION. .......................... 168 Reluctant Revolutionaries....... ........... 168 Uprising in the South ...................... 175 Two Paths to Power...... ................... 181 The Restoration Movement of Arequipa ....... 193 conClqu-on.......OOOOOOOOOOOOO....... ...... 200 VI. THE LAST CAUDILLO. . . . . . ......... . ............. 202 The Junta Militar: 1948-1950...... ........ 202 An Attempt at Legitimacy ............. . ..... 215 The Outline of a New National Mission ...... 219 The Growing Opposition ..... . ............... 225 The General's Last Years... ................ 236 Conclusion ......... . ....................... 250 VII. "A PERMANENT VEHICLE FOR PERU ' S MODERNIZATION" 252 Changing Professional Perspectives ......... 252 Command and Internal Reform ....... .... ..... 254 Developmentalism, National Defense and the CAEMCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO....OOOOOOOOOOOOO 256 Modern Technology and the Roots of Counter- Insurgency. ..... ....... ....... .......... 262 The Armed Forces and the Politics of the Convivencia.................... ...... ... 269 The Military’and the Electoral Process..... 282 The Con d} Etat of July 18... ...... ....... 294 ConcluSion....... ........................ .. 304 VIII. GENERALS AS PRESIDENTS. ....................... 306 Consolidation and Reform ................... 306 Dissension and Disorder........... ......... 317 A Return to the Barracks.. ....... .......... 336 The Armed Forces in 1963....... ............ 342 conCIUSionOOOOO00.00.0000........OOOOOOOOOO 346 Ix . CONCLUSION. O O O O O ......... O ....... O O C O O O O O O O O O O 349 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY. . ...... . ........ . . . . . . . ........ 358 iv Vvu. “ u. '01. “A.” 1 A. . '4. ‘n I'- PREFACE At 3:20 A.M. on July 18, 1962 thirty tanks surrounded the Peruvian National Palace and Colonel Gonzalo Bricefio Zevallos, commander of the army's anti-guerrilla ranger unit, quickly arrested the civilian President, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche. This was the fourth time in the twentieth century that Peruvian armed forces officers had deposed a civilian president and placed themselves in power. Peru- vians were accustomed to the military's role as a dominant power holder and there was little public reaction to the gng.d' étgt, But many observers who quickly dismissed the action of the armed forces as merely another example of opportunistic praetorianism misjudged the motivations of the military men who overthrew President Prado. The Peruvian armed forces underwent a marked transform— ation in the quarter century before 1962. Directly shaping ‘the armed forces' altered professional perspective were the (iivisive impact of national politics and the increasing (Hammitment of Peruvian officers to expand the military‘s ITDle in national affairs. These two problems, rather than 'tfne social origins or class allegiances of Peruvian military Personnel, form the central focus of this study. ,w. .v. .~- -.' “o i~ ‘“~ 0., v.- 1‘ v The years 1939-1963 were a formative period for the refinement of military professionalism in Peru. During this era armed forces officers most clearly expressed their con- tempt for the institutionally divisive tactics of competing Inilitary and civilian political power groups. This resulted .in the alienation of progressive junior officers seeking a Inore modern apolitical military from civilian politicians 51nd ambitious military commanders. After 1950 the chronic niilitary factionalism prompted by the major political issues (Di? the 1930's and 1940's eased, and forward-looking military t1hueorticians began to articulate a professional rationale 16(3): the military's sharply increased commitment to Peru's :3c3c2ial and economic development. Thus, even though the coup ()1? July 18, 1962 seemed superficially to fit the pattern of onreavious military interventions, the subsequent actions of 121163 military chiefs who assumed power on that day were more Jreajflective of the new military outlook than of the political (Dzngortunism of past armed forces senior officers. In 1963 the armed forces were not yet ready to accept .f111_1_ responsibility for the conduct of Peru's national development programs. Consequently, military leaders St1-"CDng1y backed the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belafinde Terry, for president, and they returned to their barracks Wheat), Jae emerged victorious in the 1963 national elections. But: 'Vvuithin the officer corps in 1963 there was a growing vi conviction that the preservation of civilian political rule and the continuance of democratic processes was of secondary importance to the solution of Peru's problems of underde- velopment. This attitude emerged as the most important legacy of the armed forces' changed professional perspec- tives in the period 1939-1963. I am indebted to a number of people who aided me in the preparation of this study. Leslie B. Rout, Jr. origin- ally engendered my interest in Latin American history and I wish to express my appreciation for his continued help and encouragement. David C. Bailey also took a keen interest in my work and offered many valuable suggestions regarding research and writing. Professors Paul A. Varg and Warren I. (3c311en's comments on the manuscript also proved to be very helpful. Providing important assistance during my research in 1:11e3 United States were the staffs of the National Archives .i11 'Washington, D.C. and the Federal Records Center in ESLljgtland, Meryland. Dr. James I. Loeb, former United States Auhdaéissador to Peru offered invaluable insights into the nature of Peruvian internal affairs as well as Peruvian— United States relations while he was ambassador during 1961- 1962 - I cannot fully express my appreciation for Dr. Loeb's contribution to this study. My thanks also goes to Dr. JOhn F. Bratzel of Michigan State University for kindly vii lending me his camera and microfilm reader. This equipment facilitated my research in Peru and the United States im- measurably. I am deeply grateful to Victor Villanueva Valencia for his kindness and many valuable suggestions concerning re- :search leads during my stay in Peru. My conversations with ESefior Villanueva and our subsequent correspondence has Eiroved to be one of the highlights of my research. I am 51180 indebted to Elia Lazarte of the Centro de Estudios Iijdstorico-Militares del Peru and the staff of the Sala de- LIrrvestigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional del Peru for tflneeir efficiency and helpful cooperation. My special thanks ID1153t also be extended to Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, Ikearniro Prialé and Armando Villanueva del Campo of the APRA [Piilfty for granting me extensive interviews that covered a vijcie range of historical and contemporary issues. Similarly, IE aim also grateful to Division General (retired) Ricardo I?é§1nez Godoy, former co-military president of Peru in 1962- 1963 and Fernando Schwalb Ldpez Aldafia, prime minister in tiles ‘government of Fernando Belafinde Terry, for their very uSeful comments during my talks with them. I am especially irlcieelyted to my long-time friend Manuel Lecca, who along “nitzfl»lhis wife and family, provided the best in Peruvian hos31.:>unterparts concerning controversial social, political and 6Economic questions. With these divisions within the armed fOrces, it was seldom possible for either a military or <2i‘vilian president to govern without confronting opposition jSIRom military personnel allied with an anti-government CLivilian faction. But since interaction by military men VEith civilians for partisan political purposes was con- ESidered a breach of discipline——which most armed forces (bfficers considered the primary component of professional- ism--the institutional development of the military was impeded. Only when there has been wide agreement within the officer corps concerning the attainment of basic institutional and national policy objectives, has the no, ..n iv. 9" “v '1- no- 9“ n- A 1:" '\ l" I (1' military experienced reduced factionalism and become a dominant power holder to the exclusion of the civilian sector. This seldom occurred even during the first fifty years of national independence when various caudillos con- trolled national politics.1 The military caudillos who ruled Peru after Simdn Iholivar crushed Spanish power in December, 1824 were not Exrofessional soldiers. The power of these chieftans rested Mnith.their ability (both charismatic and financial) to main- tZELin the allegiance of an army of personal followers who fought to promote the leader's political ambitions. This EPILenomenon characterized Peru's early presidents until the The most complete history of Peru from independence t:Irrough the early 1920's is Jorge Basadre, Historia SE 13 SEfigpfiblica del Perfi (11 volumes, fifth revised edition, Lima, 1-961—1968). The most prolific and one of the most percep- ive Peruvian political writers is former army Major Victor \7illanueva Valencia. His books on twentieth century civil- Imilitary affairs constitute an invaluable research aid. 39he most helpful for this study include: La sublevacién El rista del 48: Tragedia de un pueblo y un_Eartido (Lima, J.973), EifmiIitarismo en 51 earn (Lima, I962), Un afio bajo $31 sable (Lima, 1963),_Z Nueva mentalidad milita? Eifel IPerfi? (Lima, 1969), 100 afiOs del éjército peruano: Frus- jiraciones y_cambios (Lima, 1972), El CAEM y la revolucidn Cie la fuerza armada (Lima, 1973), EjérCito—pEEuano: Del Siaudillaje anarquico a1 militarismo reformista (Lima, 1973), iind his 1 Latest study ET APRA en busca del poder (Lima, 1975). ESee also Carlos Dellepiane, Historia miIitar del Perfi (Lima, 1965) and Felipe d3 13 Barra, Objetivo: Palacio del On both the military and civilian sectors. The basis of IPeruvian national security, Pardo argued, rested with nego- tLiated treaties with neighboring nations rather than a 1marge, poorly trained national army. Consequently, during 1"1:15 four-year term, Pardo cut the size of the army and pro- E>osed the formation of a national guard to balance the EDower of the armed forces.3 After a secret pact of mutual military assistance be— ‘tween Peru and Bolivia was exposed in 1873, the opponents (of the Civilista president charged that his program would 2Basadre, Historia, IV, 1911—45. 31bid., v, 2069-71. ‘9 [A- n (I: ... '4. pt I. 1" ¢ ~ ‘s - ~ - undermine the nation's ability to confront the increasing threat of aggression from Chile. Pardo's answer to his critics was that he was seeking a smaller, more profession- al military that would be more effective once its political ambitions had been curbed. But his strategy proved futile; his administration was plagued with numerous insurrections, “the most important of which was led by Nicolas de Piérola, ea civilian cabinet member under the previous military president. Acknowledging the unpopularity of his program 618; the 1876 elections approached, Pardo felt compelled to laéick.a military man, General Mariano Ignacio Prado, for EPJsesident. Pardo saw the general as the only candidate <261pable of maintaining internal order. General Prado, with Cljnvilista support, won an easy victory over his opponent, 1\éhnira1 Lizardo Montero, and the brief period of civilian Ifule came to an end. Plagued by the problems of a deteriorating economy, I?’rado quickly lost the support of his Civilista backers. Iiis weakened government was then confronted with a deepening Ciiplomatic crisis involving Chile which erupted into open Vvarfare in April, 1879. Because Peru refused to disavow .its 1873 treaty with Bolivia, Chile seized the Bolivian In iport of Antafogasta and declared war on both nations. the war of the Pacific (1879-1883) the combined forces of 4Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 105. 'F .0“ .... — surv- -... a. on ul- - up) .. .v‘ 0A,. vi.-. ‘psr cw.» . ‘\ u‘q‘. 1“- . AN‘. Peru and Bolivia were no match for the well-trained and better-equipped Chileans. Due to the heroic efforts of individual Peruvian commanders, hostilities were protracted until October, 1883 when Peru was finally compelled to sign the Treaty of Ancén. Under the terms of this treaty Peru was forced to surrender her nitrate rich region of Tarapaca 'to Chile. The victors also gained possession of the Depart- nuents of Tacna and Arica until a plebescite could be held ‘tc> decide their future status as Peruvian or Chilean terri- tories.5 Peru's military difficulties during this conflict were Czcxmpounded by a lack of presidential leadership and serious lirlternal dissension. President Prado's chief political foe, Nicolas de Piérola, refused to support the president during tihe initial months of the war. When Prado sailed for Europe 5Ln December, 1879 in a desperate search for funds to con- 1:inue the war effort, Piérola seized the presidency and (declared Prado a traitor who had fled his country in time (of national crisis. Piérola remained president until ~January, 1881 when invading Chilean forces drove him from ILima. A three-way struggle for the presidency then arose ‘between Piérola, General Andrés Avelino Caceres (one of the 5For the most detailed discussion of the War of the Pacific see Basadre, Historia, V, 2269—VI, 2646. See also Villanueva, §1_militarismo, pp. 28-30. ov y. o. rv~ v. a ‘1'» 5., N.‘ -" few successful Peruvian generals) and Miguel Iglesias, who sought the office with Chilean support. Piérola, lacking an effective military force of his own, soon renounced his claims to the office. But Céceres, who had continued to resist Chilean occupation with an adept military campaign in central Peru, was proclaimed president by his supporters .in 1882. Because of Iglesias' role in negotiating the unipopular Treaty of Ancdn his political position was badly Mneakened. Following the withdrawal of Chilean occupation 1fc>rces from Peru in August, 1884 the path for the war hero (Zéiceres was Opened to challenge Iglesias for the presidency.6 During the course of the War of the Pacific these \fj;triolic political rivalries convinced many Peruvians that ‘tlne conflict had been lost because of civilian indecision Eirui lack of preparation rather than by military incompetence. IPeru's soldiers and sailors had performed courageously and flad given the nation some of its greatest martyr-heroes, lDut the country, nevertheless, had suffered a crushing Ciefeat. The Civilista policies of military cutbacks were (:onsequently discredited and few now questioned the wisdom (of creating strong armed forces capable of protecting national security. Desiring a strong president capable of building Peru's military strength, the backers of Caceres formed the Basadre, Historia, VI, 2573-2995. .‘yc c‘AUI " O‘ 6-,. .u .... .. . . ‘fi. '— ‘oun. . A1,. I... .’V ‘ ~¢. ' 4 A. _ v_ :- “"v. . A . :s ..4- Partido Constitucional in 1884 as the vehicle for their candidate's campaign against Iglesias. Pierolistas then formed the Partido Demécrata, and Civilistas also regrouped in the same year in attempts to gain presidential control. But when Céceres dislodged Iglesias by force in December, 1885, his success was rewarded by the union of Civilista aand Constitucionalista adherents. Both groups supported ‘tfue general's unopposed bid for a full four—year term in the ealxections of March, 1886. Piérola's followers chose to boy- <3c>tt the election rather than ally themselves with their traditional enemies, the Civilistas.7 General Caceres dominated national politics from 1886 1:<> 1895. When his original term expired in 1890 he arranged IEcbr the election of his hand-picked successor, Colonel Remegio Morales Bermfidez. At the same time he removed the 1host prominent civilians from leadership positions in the IPartido Constitucional, giving the party an even stronger huilitaristic orientation. These tactics, coupled with (laceres' clear intention to seek the presidency again in 31894, convinced civilian leaders Mariano Nicolas Valcarcel (of the Civilistas and Piérola (head of the Partido Demécrata) ‘to drop their traditional antagonism in order to cooperate in a united civilian revolutionary movement against Caceres. Ibid. or~ ..-. A. ‘ 0.. n..,. ._.. «... .e.‘ -I .~ ‘- - h. ... v. n " u. .. "v .i- ‘U Piérola succeeded in unifying a number of diverse insurrectionist movements that had begun even before the civilian leader had launched his own campaign from Chile. After months of bloody civil war that left over ten thousand dead in Lima and the provinces, Piérola's forces captured the capital in March, 1895. The civilian revolt had ‘triumphed over the better-equipped military forces because c>f its broad support among almost all sectors of Peru's Cnivilian population. Caceres' defeat and subsequent exile Ineaant that the Peruvian military was forced to accept Eiruother stunning reverse only twelve years after the dis— aStrous conclusion of the War of the Pacific. Unlike the disafeat in the Chilean conflict, however, no glory was sal- ‘76uged by the armed forces in its losing effort against the Clivilian revolutionaries. Rather, the institutional pres- tlige of the military was substantially reduced.8 Once Piérola was legally installed as president in July, JL895, he immediately began a program he hoped would insure 1:hat Peru's military would remain under the control of (Divilian leaders. Piérola pragmatically accepted the Ipolitical necessity of maintaining a standing army. But by adopting fundamental military reforms, he was able to lay 8 Ibid., V1, 2995-3023, Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 121-23, and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 157- 159. the foundation for nineteen years of continuous civilian rule between 1895 and 1914. Military Professionalization and Civilian Political Instability: 1895—1919 The actual beginning of military professionalism in .Peru dates from the administration of President Nicolas de I?iérola (1895-1899). Aiming to create a body of career cxfficers and a permanent standing army the president con- ‘tqracted a French military training mission in 1896, estab- lished the Escuela Militar cle_ Chorrillos (Peru's West Point), EDIHomulgated a law of obligatory military service, and regu— :Léited salaries, promotions and the system of military Zillstice. These measures enabled Piérola to achieve a goal tihat had eluded the Civilistas under Pardo: a greater c.iegree of civilian control over a more professional mili- flary.9 President Piérola left office in 1899 having laid the IEOundation for a professional armed forces. But as Peru Gentered the twentieth century, some of the critical issues ‘that dominated the interaction of civilian politicians and Inen in uniform from 1872 to 1899 continued to appear in Inodified form in the ensuing four decades. These included: Basadre, Historia, VII, 3147-55, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 124-38. .- aci- I'Q. -‘-- 0‘. near»: Nu- n. . _ .N ‘4': 'FA'. '- a. ’- ‘~‘. u. 10 1) the universal acceptance of the need for a standing army; 2) the inclination of nearly all twentieth century political parties to reach accommodations with the armed forces; and 3) the continuing mandate of all national leaders to at least tacitly support military professional programs. Between 1899 and 1914 Peruvian national politics re- mained free from military interference but, at the same time, demonstrated chronic instability. The problem can be traced in part to the growing diversity of the nation's socio-economic groups and the weakness of the national political parties, which soon began to factionalize after Piérola left office. As increasing economic opportunities promoted the emergence of new interest groups such as an industrial working class and a professional middle class these groups sought a role in national politics, tending to fragment existing party structures. The military was not insulated from these changes; and the political pressures exerted by these groups continued to have a dramatic impact upon the institutional stability of the armed forces throughout this period. Interestingly, in the bitter political infighting that characterized national politics between 1900 and 1914, it was the Civilistas that reached the most effective accommo- dation with the nation's military elements. The pact between the Dem6cratas and the Civilistas which formed the ..v 1.1 N‘ iv .1: ~13 q; p-‘ 'D An vi. u.. ‘n 12 with most of the increase coming under Leguia. Pardo acquired two naval cruisers from Great Britain, installed coastal guns to protect Callao harbor, and arranged for the construction of an ammunition factory. Leguia, partly motivated by the armed forces' loyalty during an abortive 992p against his regime in 1909, supported military programs even more actively than his predecessor. In addition to substantially increasing the size of the army he further cemented military allegiance by enacting salary bonuses over the objections of a reluctant congress in 1912.12 Important aspects of the military policies of Pardo and Leguia were the improvement of an inequitable officer- troop ratio in the army and an upgrading of the professional quality of the officer corps in general. While the size of the army increased 350 per cent from 1900 to 1912, the number of officers actually declined by over one thousand. Previously the officer-troop ration in 1901 had stood at 117 officers for every one hundred soldiers. Moreover, a stead— ily increasing percentage of the newly commissioned officers during this era were graduates of the Escuela Militar, which provided good professional training under the direction of the French military mission.l3 12Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 141—45. 13Ibid., p. 144. -p Is my . A! ‘va '- “t F-‘ 13 Adding to the improved self-concept of the military was a successful confrontation with Colombian trOOps on Peru's northeastern frontier in 1911. Foreshadowing a far more serious border clash in the same general area in 1933, this dispute evolved from the two nations' inability to define their common frontier. In a limited engagement under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Oscar R. Benavides Peruvian troops forced a Colombian contingent to flee their positions. DeSpite the subsequent withdrawal of Peruvian forces from the disputed area, Benavides gained national recognition, and in late 1913 he was promoted and made Army Chief of Staff. Benavides, who was born into an upper class family in 1876, went on to become one of Peru's most power- ful and astute soldier—politicians.l4 Because of the professionalization programs initiated in 1896 which culminated in the victory over the Colombians, by the end of 1913 Peru's men in uniform had regained most of the power and prestige lost during their defeat of the 1895 Civil War. Civilian support for increased military manpower and armanents and the fragmentation of the nation's political system, were also prime factors bolstering the armed forces' power in relation to the civilian sector. Consequently, the military-—with the highly respected l4Basadre, Historia, VII, 3515-17 and VIII, 3602-05. ...v _ . . uh' Au:- .1». .. or; «u Iv” ‘v s- 'v ll! 'u Q 14 Benavides in command--was able to execute the first twen- tieth century coup d' état in February, 1914. The 1914 ggup_was directed against President Guillermo Billinghurst, who had been elected in 1912 despite the early opposition of outgoing President Leguia.15 The issues that promoted civilian politicians and military leaders to con- spire are complex. The most critical were Billinghurst's attempt to dissolve the congress (then controlled by Leguiistas) and his program of national budget cuts which slashed Peru's defense outlay nearly ten per cent during his term in office. Other points of contention between Billinghurst and the conspirators centered on his relatively progressive socio-economic programs, his unpopular attempts to negotiate a settlement of the Tacna—Arica plebescite question, and his repressive tactics against Leguia and his supporters.16 In mid-January, 1914 Colonel Benavides gave his criti- cal support to the movement that had already included a number of important army officers and the congressional 15For the best discussion of the 1914 coup d' état see Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3733-48, Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 125—35, and Allen Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations in Peru: 1914-1945" (Unpublished Ph.D. disserta- tion, University of New Mexico, 1973), pp. 26-56. Gerlach's study demonstrates first-rate historical research. 16 De la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 129-31. AV .1 A" nu nu ' I 'D- p- 'a I" n. \ U I u, “ _. .v-‘ 5 15 opponents of Billinghurst led by Augusto Durand. By the evening of February 3, the conspiracy, which was originally hatched by civilians, had fallen under the control of the military because Billinghurst had attempted to arm his civilian allies. The ggup_was executed in the early morn- ing hours of February 4. The president, after his capture in the National Palace, was forced to resign and submit to exile in Chile where he died one year later. Benavides, upon the urgings of his civilian and military confidants-- including the politically ambitious brothers Jorge and Manuel Prado y Ugarteche--immediately assumed the leader- ship of a transitional juntg charged with governing until a new president could be selected.17 It is important to recognize that in the 1914 3932, despite Benavides' role as provisional president, military men acted more as an extension of civilian political inter- ests than from their own political ambitions. The armed forces' corporate self-interest was involved as Billing- hurst's reduced military budgets illustrate. But army leaders acted primarily in response to pressures created by Peru's political instability and appeals from the ousted president's political opponents. The intervention seemed to disprove the belief that a better trained, more 17Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3748-51, and de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 130-33. II, “As! ”an. ‘3‘ .. ‘. II) V... .3. ...A ..v~ \— fi‘. ,- u‘. i'» ...- "’ ‘w ‘ u 16 professional military would disdain political intrigue; many of the military leaders of 1914 were products of the upgraded military training institutions. Following the ggup Benavides remained as provisional president until August, 1915. During these nineteen months he was confronted with sharply renewed political partisan- ship and military unrest that prevented the selection of a new civilian president. Finally in March, 1915 Benavides urged the creation of a national political convention to select a unity candidate capable of gaining the support of all political groups for president. Only the Partido Dem6crata boycotted the convention, and former President José Pardo emerged as the choice of the delegates. In mid- May Pardo easily defeated the candidate of the badly weak- ened Partido Demécrata, but three months later, on August 18, he took office in the midst of an abortive military uprising in Huaraz directly north of Lima.18 The troubled circumstances surrounding Pardo's inaugu- ration accurately foreshadowed the political tensions that plagued his second administration. Key issues contributing to his political difficulties were Peru's neutral position during World War I, increasing national pressures to settle the prolonged Tacna—Arica dispute, and growing popular 18Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3796-3808. 17 unrest stemming from a high rate of inflation, food short- ages and resultant labor agitation. Peru's financial prob- lems before 1916 forced Pardo to reduce the size of the army and decrease purchases of munitions and other military equipment already in short supply. Even after 1916, when Peru's petroleum, sugar and cotton were again reaching favorable markets, Pardo kept the military budget at a rela- tively low level despite increasing expenditures in most other areas of government. After the war, the government relaxed its fiscal restrictions on the military and began to purchase significant amounts of ammunition and small arms in addition to making preparations to organize an air force. But these measures came too late to placate many disgruntled military leaders who were disgusted with the president's handling of military affairs.19 Unlike Billinghurst, the politically skillful Pardo was able to withstand the challenges of his civilian and mili- tary opponents almost to the completion of his regime. But as the final troubled year of his term drew to a close in a climate of violent labor unrest and military discontent, the president made a grave tactical mistake by supporting the presidential candidacy of the aging and rigidly conservative Civilista Artero Aspillaga. Augusto B. Leguia, running for 19Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 108-111. l (I! (D ( J ‘1. ' ‘ 1?) Lu ":F n... ‘ ..fl‘ u..- (I) u: I I (D 18 a second term in 1919, immediately attacked his opponent as a reactionary who could not provide the progressive leader- ship Peru then desperately needed.20 Leguia also correctly gauged the attitudes of the majority of the officer corps. Following the pattern of Billinghurst's civilian opponents, he openly courted the backing of the armed forces leader- ship in his quest for power. He named an army general as his first vice-presidential (under Peruvian law the nation elected two vice-presidents) running mate. He also cam- paigned with other officers at his side (including the now venerable war hero General Andrés A. Caceres) and stressed his record of support for military programs during his first administration. Leguia's relatively progressive campaign proposals also gained him support from some elements within the officer corps.21 The national elections were held in May but although Leguia had apparently won a clear victory, the outcome was thrown in doubt when both sides presented a conflicting set of vote returns. As tensions mounted in June it became obvious that the new president would have to be chosen by the congress. Leguia, fearing an adverse vote and hoping 20For Leguia's 1919 coup see de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 136-48, and Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3927-46. 21Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 214. 19 to totally control the national political machinery, exe- cuted a coup d' état on July 4, 1919. With only limited active support by the army, Leguia's forces were able to seize Pardo after subverting the Palace Guard, important police units, and elements of the fleet in Lima's port city of Callao.22 The movement benefited from the absence of the influential General Benavides, who at that time was in Italy. Thus only five years after the 9922 ousting President Guillermo Billinghurst, armed forces officers executed another golpe on behalf of the civilian Augusto Leguia. President Pardo was forced to resign and was quickly exiled. Unlike the political situation after the 1914 9932, Leguia rapidly consolidated his position with only token opposi— tion from isolated military challengers. In the next eleven years, the chief executive refined his skills of political manipulation to a degree unmatched in twentieth century Peruvian politics. Continued Armed Forces Politicization During the Oncenio Other than the endurance of Leguia's second regime (known as the Oncenio, eleven year rule) this era was 22Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3936—43. 20 notable for a number of developments which refashioned the relationship between Peru's military and civilian sectors. Leguia's progressive capitalist policies favoring increased foreign investment promoted substantive economic develop- ment and the continued growth of a small but politically active middle class. But for the vast majority of Peru's impoverished masses, these policies failed to arrest exploi- tation by rural landowners and urban industrialists who of- ten relied upon the military to defend their interests. Also suffering from the repressive tactics of the Leguia regime were Peru's beleagured political parties. By the end of the Oncenio in 1930, most of the nation's parties were no longer serving as functioning representatives of Peru's dominant interest groups. Military support for the administration was garnered through a mixed policy of political favoritism, repression and generous attention to carefully chosen armed forces programs. These policies fostered the continued and direct involvement of the military in national politics during this civilian regime. They also contributed to the con- tinuing factionalism of the armed forces throughout the Oncenio and on into the decade of the 1930's. Specifically, during the first three years of his regime, Leguia ini- tiated a series of transfers, arrests and promotions that placed his key military supporters in critical command . Avg; . v. D! Mn Vi.- A. n vi. - t- as...“ ..Fu' v‘ a. C “‘r‘- Um... I) ‘1' (I) Vu ‘« 21 positions and removed or neutralized officers who opposed his regime. The most important constant in the president's dealings with the armed forces was his demand for political loyalty. Thus unscheduled promotions and transfers were often ordered for this sole reason. The actions of some corrupt officers were also ignored because of their politi- cal loyalty. As might be expected, these policies lowered armed forces professional morale, particularly among those young officers who were recent graduates of Peru's military schools.23 The president's handling of his military opponents effectively thwarted the efforts of his chief armed forces foes, General Benavides, Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz (Director of the Escuela Militar) and Captain Luis M. Sanchez Cerro, from unseating him immediately follow- ing the ggup of 1919. Due to Benavides absence from Peru he was unable to actively oppose Leguia's gglpe. The other officers were soon convinced, after short-lived attempts to block the takeover, that it would be better to delay further opposition until they had gained more support.24 Leguia was equally successful in stifling his civilian opposition during the first twenty-four months of his regime. 23Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 170-72 and 100 ands, pp. 74-77. 24 Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations,I p. 126. 22 The president immediately suppressed the newly elected congress and decreed new elections for an assembly empowered to write a new constitution which would go into effect in 1920. The government also restricted the press while cur- tailing almost all opposition political activity by means of arrest, imprisonment and exile. By 1921 Leguia's chief political enemies, including José Pardo, Augusto Durand and General Benavides were in exile and his political position was relatively secure.25 Nevertheless he was still forced to suppress six violent insurrections and five conspiracies between 1919 and 1924. The most significant of these move- ments were the August, 1921 rebellion of Captain Guillermo Cervantes in the jungle city of Iquitos, a civil-military uprising in Cuzco one year later, and a widely based con- spiracy of police and army personnel led by the president's cousin, German Leguia y Martinez, in late 1923. The Iquitos and Cuzco uprisings were inspired by individuals involved in the 1914 9922 and men later to be instrumental in Leguia's downfall in 1930.26 Captain Cervantes and Captain Luis M. Sanchez Cerro (the instigator of the Cuzco revolt) were both confidants of General Benavides. The general had been quickly exiled 25Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3947—63. 26Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 174-84. y--. . unn- ..v. .Y‘A oodu “a b l'-§ 23 after his return to Peru in 1921. From Costa Rica, Benavides encouraged the Cervantes and Sanchez Cerro move- ments and unsuccessfully attempted to supply the Cuzco insurgents with arms. Leguia's support within the ranks remained firm, however, and although Cervantes held out for five months in his isolated jungle headquarters, his rebel- lion, like the Cuzco rising, was subdued by loyalist trOOpS.27 The president's intention to initiate a constitutional amendment allowing his re-election in 1924 prompted his ambitious cousin, German Leguia y Martinez, to conspire with Lima police and army units to overthrow the president. Leguia y Martinez's former post as the Minister of Govern- ment and Police aided him in his plotting. But again, through a series of command shifts, arrests, and major police reassignments, Leguia was able to thwart the con- spiracy. University students added their voices to those of the dissident military and civilian Opponents of Leguia before 1924. A leader of the student opposition was Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, head of the University of San Marcos Student Federation. Born in Trujillo in 1895, 27Basadre, Historia, IX, 4025-4039. 281bid., pp. 4037-4039. ..v- Hp . u u:- ‘ a l ‘00“ .5 , vv ‘ :- F on A c, 0.4. ... ‘tuh on it“ AA v“‘ 'I( . n‘A’.‘ v“ ' ~‘b “-4 24 Haya de la Torre became one of Leguia's most vocal critics and like many political foes of the president he conspired to depose the chief executive. His efforts resulted only in his exile in late 1923. In Mexico during the following year he formed the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA). Originally directed toward an international Latin American political base, the party, after 1930, became the single most import- ant political group in Peru.29 After Leguia defused much of the student opposition with the exile of Haya de la Torre, he successfully accom- plished his re-election in 1924, and faced no serious oppo- sition until the revolt that toppled him in 1930. Between 1924 and 1930 his chief antagonists were either dead, in jail or exiled, and his government was too strong to allow any subversive movement to flourish. During these six years the stability of the regime was assured by the obedi- ence of the armed forces, which were kept in line by a calculated backing of selected military programs aimed at neutralizing the power of the army. Throughout the 1920's Peru's military men were given advanced training through comprehensive study missions in 29A profile of the early APRA movement will be pre- sented in the following chapter. It should be noted, however, that the years 1924—1930 were used by Haya de la Torre to consolidate the party's political ideology despite his absence from Peru. u ‘«\1 -u .0: (II (l) .0 D. . v 9‘. 0“ 5‘ ~I‘J ~‘h v! 25 five European countries. This special training was comple- mented by a United States' naval training mission contracted in 1920 and both French and German army missions which served in Peru during the decade. The United States con- tingent became a key training unit as Peru purchased a number of naval vessels from the United States, including four submarines.3o The special attention devoted to improving Peru's naval strength reflected Leguia's desire to both modernize the nation's fighting forces and offset the power of the army. With the latter objective in mind, a separate Navy Ministry-- independent of the Ministry of War--was established in 1919. Naval spending was also sharply increased and involved new ship purchases, modernization of old equipment and the con- struction of a naval base on San Lorenzo Island in Callao Harbor. A program of expansion for the small air force was born out of the same motives as those for the navy. The government acquired planes from France, Germany, and the United States, integrated a Ministry of Aviation branch into the Naval Ministry in 1929, and vastly improved the quality of aviation instruction during the Oncenio.31 Leguia was unable to ignore the army in his program of expansion and both its manpower and budget were increased 3oGerlach, "Civil—Military Relations," pp. 153-54. 31Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 173-74. 26 during his regime. But at the same time, the politically shrewd president was building the guardia civil (national guard) in a further effort to counterbalance the army's power. By 1927 his efforts had led to a guardia civil force numbering 6,800 men as opposed to the army's manpower of 7,442. The guardia civil, which was trained by a Spanish police mission, also was used to suppress urban and rural disorders.32 Although Leguia made progress in building a stronger navy, air force and guardia civil, the army still remained the dominant element in the armed forces. When a series of developments during 1929 and 1930 weakened the props of the Oncenio, it was the army that once again accomplished a president's downfall. In August, 1929 Leguia was again re-elected without formal opposition. This angered many civilian and military leaders who thought it time for the aging leader to step down. Discontent increased as massive economic problems spawned by the world depression drove Peru into a deepening crisis in 1930. The depressed economy was perhaps the single most damaging problem contributing to the collapse 32Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 160, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 174. Villanueva cites statistics which indicate that Leguia gave very substantial support to police programs through means of budget increases for the Ministry of Government and Police that totalled 250 per cent during his eleven-year-rule. 27 of the regime, as was the case with numerous other South American governments in 1930 and 1931. Also leading to the destruction of the Oncenio was the president's unpopular settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute with Chile in June, 1929. The decision to resolve the forty-eight-year-old issue by allowing Chile permanent possession of Arica while Peru regained control of its former province of Tacna alienated large segments of the populace and provoked sharp dissent from the military command.33 Leguia's prolonged suppression of the nation's political parties added to the groundswell of civilian sup- port for the revolutionary movement begun in the southern city of Arequipa in August, 1930. Finally, the president's uncharacteristic leniency in allowing Luis M. Sanchez Cerro to return to Peru in April, 1929, and then promoting him to lieutenant colonel in order that he could assume command of a battalion in Arequipa was his gravest tactical mistake. Sanchez Cerro had been in prison and "diplomatic exile" following the abortive rising in Cuzco in 1923. Only Leguia's false sense of security can explain his generosity toward this aggressive young officer, who only one year after his return toppled his benefactor 33This issue had been a divisive problem in Peruvian political affairs since the end of the War of the Pacific. 28 from power.34 Sénchez Cerro launched his revolt with support from Lieutenant Colonel José G. Gammara and Arequipa's civilian political opponents of Leguia on August 22. The uprising quickly spread, and by the following day all but two of Peru's five military districts were in revolt. On the afternoon of August 24, Leguia, confronting a desperate situation, resigned in favor of an all military provisional junta rather than risk a bloody confrontation between remaining loyal troops and the rebels. After three days in which the Army Chief of Staff, General Manuel Ponce, jockeyed for control of the revolution, Sanchez Cerro won the power struggle and assumed the presidency of a new mili- tary government. Leguia's attempted escape aboard the naval cruiser Almirante Grau was thwarted, and the once powerful dictator was imprisoned; he died after a painful illness, in February 1932.35 The acute political and military instability which plagued Peru for the next three years was in great part due to ramifications of the world depression. But Leguia's near liquidation of the traditional political party system 34Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 247. 3SVillanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 187-92, de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 149-63, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Rela- tions, pp. 226-48. 29 and the continuing politicization of the armed forces were equally deleterious legacies of the Oncenio. Conclusion Military caudillos controlled Peru's early political life to the extent that the first civilian president was not elected until fifty years after the nation won its independence from Spain. Despite an increasing assertion of civilian political strength after 1895, military men were often called upon to act as arbiters in the struggles of various civilian factions for political power. These struggles divided the armed forces and undermined its pro- fessional morale at the very time they were making progress toward internal modernization. Nevertheless, the armed forces officers of 1930 could not be accurately cast in the same mold as the heavy-handed, ill-trained and unschooled military caudillos of the nine- teenth century. Military reform programs begun under President Piérola provided the foundation for a more profes- sional military. However, these measures failed to produce apolitical armed forces. Military men were also enlisted to protect the socio-economic interests of the nation's elite upper class groups against the threats of an impoverished class of urban and rural poor. Even during the extended civilian rule of Leguia, the political involvement of the AI in ‘7 b. 30 armed forces continued. The crafty leader balanced military groups against one another through a system that rewarded political loyalty more than military expertise. These policies, and the legacy of Peru's chronic political insta- bility, had a profound impact upon the nation's military institutions in the 1930's and beyond. CHAPTER II A NEW RIVALRY IS BORN Sanchez Cerro and APRA During the troubled decade of the 1930's national political power centered in the hands of Peru's two most powerful military figures, Luis M. Sénchez Cerro and Oscar R. Benavides. But the rise of APRA as a potent political force after 1930, further undermined the stability and discipline of the officer corps. Aprista subversive activi- ties involved mainly junior and non-commissioned officers but on two occasions during the 1930's senior officers were involved with Apristas to overthrow the government. The breakdown of military discipline inspired mainly by APRA and the defeat of Peruvian military forces in a short en— gagement with Colombia in 1933 provoked serious tension and deep frustration in the armed forces. This reinforced the Peruvian military man's traditional distrust of civilians and his desire to gain institutional autonomy for the armed forces in order to curtail civilian meddling in military internal affairs. During the Sanchez Cerro era (1930-1933) the violence and political disorder produced by the 31 ‘1 ‘1 cu .4 a: n.. .- 5. (‘1- '11 in . ’1 1 ‘ v u; 32 APRA-armed forces rivalry reached its greatest intensity. Although Sanchez Cerro's revolution was greeted with great enthusiasm throughout Peru, it launched a period of profound military and political instability that lasted till his death in April, 1933. The roots of this instabil- ity can be traced to Leguia's near liquidation of Peru's traditional political parties and the economic distress posed by the deepening world depression. Exacerbating the crisis was the increased participation of the Peruvian masses in national politics. Sanchez Cerro's movement inadvertently opened the way for the increasing radicaliza- tion of the political process and AP§A_emerged as the most cohesive political group in the months immediately follow- ing the Arequipa revolt of 1930.1 In 1930 APRA had been in existence for six years and was headed by its founder Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre. While in exile originally imposed by Leguia in 1923, Haya de la Torre had formulated an ideology designed to create a sufficient political base to successfully sustain his candidacy for the presidency of Peru. 1For the best discussions of APRA and civil-military relations during the period 1930-1933 see Victor Villanueva, E1 APRA en busca del poder, 1930-1940 (Lima, 1975), PP. 38- i58, Pets? F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932 Austin, 1973), pp. 106-157, Thomas M. Davies, Indian Inte- gration in_Peru: ‘A Half Century 9f Experience, 1900-1948 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1974), pp. 97-123, and Gerlach, "Civil- Military Relations," pp. 258-422. 33 Upon settling in Mexico after his exile from Peru, Haya de la Torre in December, 1924 detailed the basic five- point program that formed the core of APRA's political platform for years to come. These general points included: 1) Action against Yankee imperialism; 2) The political unity of Latin America; 3) Nationalization of lands and industry; 4) Internationalization of the Panama Canal; and 5) Solidarity of all oppressed peoples of the world. The original objective of APRA_was the construction of a broadly- based alliance of students, intellectuals, workers, and elements of the middle and peasant classes grouped in a political front opposing the penetration of foreign politi— cal and economic interests in Latin America.2 Despite some very limited organizational progress in several Latin American countries during the 1920's, APRA 2Students of the APRA movement have been hampered by the highly polemical nature of most of the hundreds of books, articles and pamphlets devoted to an analysis of the party's history and ideology. Useful pro-APRA studies are: Harry Kantor, The Ideolggy and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Party (Berkeley, 1953), Luis Alberto Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra (Santiago, 1955), and Haya de la Torre 0 el politico (Santiago, 1934), Felipe Cossio del Pomar, Haya de la Torre: El indoamericano (Lima, 1946). For works criti- cal of APRA's role in Peruvian political affairs see Villanueva, La sublevachidn aprista, and El APRA en buscal del poder, Fredrick Pike, The Modern Histdiy of Peru, and Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan Way (New York, 1951). Of Haya de la Torre's own writings his El antiimperialismo yeel APRA (Santiago, 1936), is most illuminating in terms of APRA's early ideology. For English translations of much of Haya de la Torre's substantive writings see Robert Alexander, Aprismo: The Ideas and Writings of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre TKent, Ohio, 1973). 34 became a distinctly Peruvian political party after 1930. Haya de la Torre's desire to attract the widest possible political support during the early years of the party ex- plains his reluctance to carefully detail any specific proposals for political action before 1930. One important exception was his use of the term Indo-America for the area commonly referred to as Latin America. This was done as the party attempted to identify itself with the Indian and mestizo population of Peru and all of Latin America in a bid for their support. Between 1926 and 1930 the APRA leader traveled and studied extensively in the Soviet Union, Germany, England, Italy and the United States.3 During this period he also refined the vague outlines of APRA's ideological program, carefully separating its objectives from any association with the goals of the international communist movement. By 1928, Haya de la Torre's denunciation of European socialist and communist philosophies helped splinter the small radical leftist element in Peru. And when the APRA chief attempted in early 1929 to unilaterally launch an armed rebellion against Leguia (after failing to gain support for his own presidential candidacy), Peru's leading marxist intellectual José Carlos Mariétegui, severed his relations with Haya de la Torre. The Split temporarily undermined APRA's 3Klaren, Modernization, p. 111. 35 organizational efforts, but by mid-1930 the party was still the most unified representative of Peru's political left.4 Although APRA made important political gains during 1930, for most of the three months following the fall of Leguia, Sanchez Cerro governed with substantial political support. The aggressive lieutenant colonel's "man of the people" image, his dark-skinned ghglg_appearance, his con- sistent record of opposition to Leguia's dictatorship, and his announced intention to end the corruption left over from the Oncenio all bolstered his political position.5 Nevertheless, the junta chief felt compelled to quickly purge army and guardia civil leaders whose loyalty was suspect. Sanchez Cerro's particular emnity towards the guardia civil was motivated by his conception of that insti- 6 tution as a political tool of Leguia during the 1920's. Military and civilian support for Sanchez Cerro began to evaporate in early December, 1930, however, when it became clear he was planning to seek the presidency without first resigning as head of the governing 12232. His inten- tions had been signalled earlier by the adoption of 4Klaren, Modernization, p. 118, and John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariétegui and the Myth (Tuscaloosa, 1972), pp. 72-76. Among other things, Haya de la Torre charged Mariétegui with excessive "tropicalism." 5Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 209. 61bid., p. 202. 36 repressive measures against APRA and the Communist Party, which he claimed were responsible for a rash of labor strikes and student disorders. The lines between the mili- tary leader and the AP§A_became even more clearly drawn when conservative elements of the old Civilista party began to support the army colonel's presidential ambitions.7 By the first week of January, 1931, a wide range of civilian political groups had demonstrated their open hos- tility to Sanchez Cerro's plans and voiced their desire for open elections in which only civilian candidates would be allowed to seek the presidency. These demands were backed by many army officers who felt that Sanchez Cerro's affilia- tion with the Civilistas had compromised the revolution against Leguia, which they had supported. Nonetheless, in early February the chief executive announced his intention to hold elections at the end of March in which he would be a candidate for president.8 Within two weeks Peru was in open rebellion. Sanchez Cerro's attempt to calm the oppo- sition by withdrawing his candidacy on February 23 failed, and with the nation on the verge of civil war, he resigned as provisional president on March 1. Claiming his resigna- tion reflected the sense of "self-sacrifice" he felt was 7Klaren, Modernization, p. 121. 8Villanueva, 100 ands, pp. 82-83, is highly critical of Sénchez Cerro's highly divisive political ambitions in relation to the armed forces. 37 necessary for the good of Peru, the outgoing president vowed to return from his self-imposed exile in France once new national elections were announced.9 After a turbulent ten days, a civilian political leader from Arequipa, David Samanez Ocampo, was named head of a new provisional junta which ruled Peru from March 10 to December 8, 1931. The junta represented a broad range of political opin- ion and had the critical support of Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Jiménez, commander of the important Lima garrison. The government was thus soon able to announce its plans to hold national elections for a new president and a constitu- ent congress in which all parties except the communists would be allowed to participate. In the spirit of this more Open political climate, a new electoral law was pro- mulgated on May 27 which instituted the secret ballot and removed property qualifications for voting. These measures, while significantly increasing the size of the electorate, still did not sanction the vote for most of Peru's impover- ished Indian population, which was barred from the ballot box by the law's literacy requirement.lo Quickly emerging as the dominant political groups by May, 1931 were the APRA and the faction supporting 9Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 307. loSanchez, Hgya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 267-74 pro- vides a good review of these organizational efforts. 38 :Séinchez Cerro. AP§A_leaders registered the party under the t:j_tle Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) and initiated an effec- t;j_ve organizational campaign in Peru's northern departments eaxren while Haya de la Torre still remained in exile. ESéinchez Cerro's backers received a temporary setback on May 1.77 when the government announced its intention of preventing titie army colonel's return to campaign for president. This decision was primarily the work of Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez, who was now Sanchez Cerro's chief political rival .ixu. Peru.ll Jiménez viewed his fellow officer's candidacy ass a serious threat to the internal stability of the armed fc>Jsces and for practical as well as ideological reasons favored the 11A}: in the upcoming elections. The junta was unable to block Sanchez Cerro's presiden- tia:ll.bid, however, and in early June lifted its ban on the military leader's return. Still facing intense opposition frc>rn certain military and civilian elements, Sanchez Cerro arrived in Peru on July 7 and began his campaign immediately. Ter1 days later, Haya de la Torre ended nearly nine years of 12 eKile with his return to Talara in northern Peru. The Stage was set for the most open political race to that date llPike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 252-253. 12Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y del Apra, p. 270, and Klaren, Modernization, p. 128. 39 .111 Peruvian history. The elections, scheduled for early October, were preceded by a bitter campaign which intensi- ifj_ed the already polarized political climate. Attempting to generate a broader political base, Haya (163 la Torre moderated the seemingly radical positions espoused by APRA during the 1920's. The primary target of hrj.s campaign messages were the nation's disaffected middle c:1.ass groups. While still clinging to the basic tenet of situati-imperialism, the APRA_chief declared that the middle CLlnass represented the "essence" of the nation. It was this gyzrcoup, he insisted, that had suffered the most from the erlgjulfing forces of foreign imperialism. The core of his party's solution to the economic threat of foreign capital wars a sweeping political alliance involving the middle (filatsss, the emerging urban proletariat and the exploited Intizian masses.l3 Haya de la Torre, however, pragmatically reEiZLized the danger of an uncompromising denunciation of all fOlreeign interests in Peru. He thus qualified his position bY' Estating his party would respect the rights of foreign Capital if its role in the national economy were carefully 13Klaren, Modernization, pp. 130-31, Davies, Indian EPtflagration, pp. 108-11 and Villanueva, El APRA en busca SEJ- poder, pp. 44-45. Klaren and Davies agree that Haya de laTorre attempted to moderate his party's image. Davies S§ates that the APRA leader even sought out important offi- clals of foreign corporations in London and New York to asSure them that he had substantially moderated his views Concerning Yankee imperialism and nationalization of rail— rOads and industry. a...— a... to. «\b no‘ b -.,. QAQN 40 controlled. Moreover, the APRA leader further softened his political stance in private discussions with the United States ambassador in Peru. After an interview with Haya de la Torre in early September, Ambassador Frederick Dearing concluded that United States' interests had "nothing to fear" if the A§§A_candidate was elected president.14 During the 1931 campaign APRA_experienced little suc- cess in gaining significant support from the armed forces. APRA's relationship with the military during 1931 and throughout the time span of this study deserves close scrutiny. Many of the substantive developments in civil- military relations in Peru to the present day must be viewed in the context of the rivalry that existed between these two institutions. Because the ideological orientation of APRA was at odds with the dominant thinking of Peru's military leadership, senior armed forces officers viewed the party as a threat to the continued viability of their institution. This threat was made even more imposing by the rigid organi- zational framework and strict party discipline which made APRA the most unified political force in Peru after 1930. The party's internal structure in fact closely paralleled l4Ambassador Frederick Dearing to SecState, September 7, 1931, NA, RG 59, 810.43 APRA/102, cited in Davies, Indian Integration, p. 111. Dearing went on to conclude that if APRA won the 1931 elections a "strongly liberal and beneficent administration" could be expected. 41 that of the armed forces and was an important factor in holding the organization together during many years of political proscription following 1931.15 After 1931 when APRA_became the target of repression by the Sanchez Cerro regime, AP§A_responded violently to the suppression of its political activities. It can not be accurately argued, however, that a completely polarized and bitter relationship existed between the total armed forces and APRA, Despite violent confrontations between these two groups in 1932 and 1933, armed forces officers and enlisted men in significant numbers were continually willing to cooperate and conspire with APRA for a variety of personal and political reasons until 1948. Ironically, APRA's political power, generated in large measure by party discipline and the concomitant loyalty of its activist adherents, was an important reason why many dissatisfied and ambitious military men ignored the principles of disci- pline so basic to the unity of their own institution. Consequently, APRA's successful subversion of many armed forces personnel added immeasureably to the hostility of loyal military officers towards the party. In the 1931 presidential campaign Haya de la Torre recognized that his earlier statements criticizing the 15Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 214-16. 42 military, and Sdnchez Cerro's own popularity among a major- ity of the armed forces worked against his candidacy. The party leader therefore attempted to blunt the force of the military Opposition. He noted that the bulk of armed forces personnel had middle and lower class origins, and in- sisted that these groups would be the main beneficiaries of APRA's reform programs.16 Moreover, Haya de la Torre empha- sized that the military, with its technically oriented training, could play an active role in civic action projects once he was president. In response to allegations that AP§A_was intensely anti-military and sought to replace the national army with its own party militia APRA leaders pointed to the party membership of a number of army officers in an attempt to refute these charges.17 Antonio Miré Quesada, editor of the powerful Lima news- paper §1_Comercio and Sanchez Cerro's most ardent supporter, was primarily responsible for the allegations that APRA_was anti-military. MirO Quesada and other conservative politi- cians with Civilista backgrounds formed the UniOn Revolucion- aria as the vehicle for Sanchez Cerro's presidential bid 16Thomas M. Davies, "The Indigenismo of the Peruvian Aprista Party," Hispanic American Historical Review, 51, 4 (November, 1971), 629] and Klaren, Modernizatibn, p. 134. l7Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, p. 273, and Gerlach, "Civil-Milifary Relations," p. 355. Such Officers were Lieutenant Colonel Julio C. Guerrero, Colonel Cesar Enrique Pardo and Colonel Aurelio Garcia Godos. 43 shortly after the colonel's return to Peru in July, 1931. The military candidate still hoped to capitalize upon his charismatic image among large segments of the voting popula- tion. Vaguely planning to form a political alliance between urban upper-class groups and the rural masses, Sénchez Cerro remained heavily reliant upon the financial and political backing of the nation's elite upper class elements.18 Largely because of this support, his political program con- tained few concrete proposals for economic or social reform. Stressing decentralization, fiscal responsibility and con- tinued foreign investment, the army colonel made only gener- al references to the need for future land reform measures. Sanchez Cerro gained popularity among Peru's Indian popula- tion, however, with his abolition of Conscripcion Vial, a type of forced public work program, that exploited Indian labor during Leguia's dictatorship.19 With the arrival of national election day on October 11, 1931 a thoroughly polarized political climate existed in Peru. Attempts by moderate centerist groups to have Sanchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre withdraw in favor of a compromise candidate were rejected by both men.20 Despite 18Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 251. l9Klaren, Modernization, p. 131, and Davies, Indian Integration, p. 99. 20 Klaren, Modernization, p. 135. 44 fears of possible election day violence, the voting was peaceful. Contrary to Sénchez Cerro's suspicions that the Samanez Ocampo junta would rig the elections against him, he emerged the victor over Haya de la Torre by a count of 152,148 to 106,088.21 Not surprisingly, Haya de la Torre's best showing was in the Aprista strongholds of Peru's northern departments. Sanchez Cerro triumphed by drawing strong support in the urban centers and among the rural population in Peru's central and southern regions. Although historical opinion is divided regarding the honesty of the 1931 elections, the best assessments portray them as the cleanest in Peruvian history up to that time.22 Embittered Apristas, convinced that Sanchez Cerro would use his electoral victory to block meaningful reforms and liquidate their party, soon opted for violent revolution to attain national power. Haya de la Torre solicited the help of sympathetic army officers and guardia civil personnel in planned civil-military insurrections aimed at blocking the president-elect's inaugaration on December 8. Due to a 21Basadre, Historia, XI, 201-03, and Gerlach, "Civil- Military Relations," p. 358. 22Klaren, Modernization, p. 136, calls the elections, "from all appearances the fairest in Peruvian history." Davies, Indian Integration, p. 112 agrees. But Haya de la Torre claims their existed "clear manifestations of irregu- larities in the vote counting, particularly in Lima and Cajamarca (Interview with Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima Peru). 45 lack of coordination among AP§A_and dissident army and police units, however, small scale uprisings throughout Peru were easily quelled by government troops during the first week of December.23 Almost immediately after donning the presidential sash, Sénchez Cerro moved to deal with the APRA-subverted mili- tary elements. His first target was the guardia civil. He shifted regional commanders, made drastic cuts in person- nel and deprived suspect units of important military equip- ment. Command shuffles were also engineered in the navy and the president took the unusual step of naming a civilian as navy minister to better insure the loyalty of that insti- tution.24 Most importantly, the chief executive also made changes in the command assignments of the nation's top army officers. He promoted his most trusted comrades and eliminated trouble- some rivals. The most prominent victim of these purges was Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez, who was placed on inactive duty soon after Sanchez Cerro took office.25 These measures lowered armed forces morale and the personal enmity created 23Klaren, Modernization, pp. 137-38, and Villanueva, E1 APRA en busca del_poder, pp. 53-68. 24Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 383-85. 25Ibid., p. 386. rvc s;- Va Vu ,- p M in. v» 3‘: i. y \“ 46 between Sanchez Cerro and Jiménez exacerbated existing internal divisions within the army. The president also took strong action against his Aprista opponents. After the police invaded AP§A_party headquarters in Trujillo in late December, wounding several party members in the process, measures were quickly enacted to deal with Aprista resistance on the national level. An emergency law forced through congress in early January established virtual martial law. By mid-February the president had arrested and exiled all twenty-three of the Aprista deputies elected to congress in October. Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was also deported to Chile, on charges of engaging in political subversion.26 Political tensions intensified on March 6 when a young Aprista wounded Sanchez Cerro in a Miraflores church during an assassination attempt. While the wounded president re- cuperated, orders were issued for the arrest of Haya de la Torre on charges of subverting public order. The APRA leader was finally captured early in May. With their leader facing an unknown fate, party members made preparations for a massive civil-military revolt in Trujillo.27 26Sénchez, Haya de la Torre_yAel Apra, pp. 282-88, Klaren, Modernization, p. 138, and Villanueva, E1 APRA en busca del poder, pp. 93-94. 27 Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y elgApra, pp. 296-308. 9‘ S ~- .... ‘1' (1“ n.. “A "a {I I" t)! 47 Designated as the chief organizer of the Trujillo revolt in Haya de la Torre's absence was the party leader's brother, Agustin Haya de la Torre.28 Trujillo was the logical site for the uprising due to the Aprista strength in the region and the manpower supplied by the militant sugar workers from the nearby plantations in the Chicama Valley. Original plans called for the sugar workers and other Aprista revolutionaries to be trained by army veterans who had joined the party's ranks. Once Trujillo had been taken, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was slated to assume com- mand of the revolt as it spread to other parts of Peru. Precise timing was critical to the success of the movement, as the initial Operations in Trujillo would be reinforced by simultaneous uprisings in a number of northern towns and Lima itself. Only after initial successes in these areas would Jiménez leave his Chilean exile in mid-July to take command of operations in the Trujillo region. Hoping to take advantage of the temporarily undermanned condition at Trujillo's main army garrison, an aggressive young Aprista mechanic, Manuel Barreto, persuaded Agustin Haya de la Torre to attack on July 7, well ahead of the 28One of the most balanced accounts of the Trujillo revolt is Basadre, Historia, XI, 273-38. See also Villanueva, E1 APRA en busca del poder, pp. 95-116, Klaren, Modernization, pp. 38-41, Gerlach, “Ci vil-Military Relations,’ pp. 398-40, and Guillermo Thorndike, El afio de la barbarie, Peru, 1932 (Lima, 1969), pp. 170-195. For a good summary of the Aprista version of these events see Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y Apra, pp. 279-302. 48 scheduled date for the beginning of the revolt. The target of the Trujillo rebels was the O'Donavan military garrison 29 Barreto's short- with its stores of arms and ammunition. term assessment of the military situation proved correct when the garrison fell to the rebels after a sharp four- hour battle. Although the insurgents quickly gained control of the entire city, the premature initiation of the revolt caught other Aprista elements by surprise and supportive movements in other regions quickly fizzled. The Trujillo rebels were then forced into a defensive posture within the city as Sanchez Cerro sent overwhelming air, sea and ground forces to crush the revolt. By the fourth day of hostilities the city was in government hands and order was restored. Agustin Haya de la Torre and other Aprista leaders managed to escape to the interior on July 9 in a futile effort to initiate a new guerrilla campaign. But most of the rebels remained to face the government troops that overwhelmed the city the following two days.30 After the Aprista leadership had left the city on July 9, some of the rebels took a terrible vengeance upon army officers, ggardia civil, and civilian prisoners held in the Trujillo jail. Over thirty of the prisoners were shot to 29Thorndike, E1 afio, pp. 186-187, and Gerlach, "Civil- Military Relations," pp. 399-400. 30Klaren, Modernization, pp. 140-41. 49 death in their cells.31 Responsibility for the atrocities have never been accurately fixed, but Sanchez Cerro troops indulged in large-scale executions of suspected participants in the days following the fall of the city.32 The Trujillo jail massacre has had a dramatic impact on APRA-military relations even to the present day. Yearly military ceremonies are held on July 9 honoring the memory of those armed forces personnel who died at the hands of the Trujillo revolutionaries. Some armed forces officers viewed the massacre as proof that APRA, if given the oppor- tunity, would attempt to liquidate the military.33 But while these tactics repelled most military men and turned them strongly against APRA, they also demonstrated the party's commitment to radical revolution. This commitment was an important factor in the maintenance of the party's 31There is no consensus on the exact number of military prisoners killed or whether they were tortured (as alleged) by their captors. Victor Villanueva, one of the most knowl- edgeable writers on the Peruvian military accepts the figure of fourteen army officers and soldiers and twenty members of the qgardia civil offered by Basadre. This account re- futes the prevailing version that the prisoners were tor- tured or that their bodies were mutilated, although many of the dead were found to have multiple gunshot wounds (Basadre, Historia, IX, 238). 32Klaren, Modernization, p. 141, and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 266, places the number of those executed between 1,000 and 1,500. 33This belief was still expressed by senior armed forces officers in 1962 when they acted to overturn the electoral victory that would have made Haya de la Torre president. 50 radical image during the 1930's and 1940's as it unified Apristas during the political repression of the era.34 APRAfs willingness to engage in revolution also had a sig- nificant impact on dissident armed forces personnel. It attracted those military men who were willing to forget the excesses of Trujillo in exchange for APRA support for their own causes . The Leticia Dispute and the Demise of Sanchez Cerro From the suppression of the Trujillo insurrection in July, 1932, until his death at the hands of an Aprista assassin in April, 1933, Sanchez Cerro's attention was drawn from internal political affairs to a deepening border crisis with neighboring Colombia. After a contingent of armed Peruvian civilian and military personnel invaded the Colombian-controlled territory of Leticia on September 1, 1932, the president was faced with the dilemma of supporting the action or respecting the terms of the Salomon-Lozano treaty of 1922 granting the area to Colombia. Although the treaty had been ratified by the Peruvian Congress in 1927, 34For the idea that the Aprista victims of the Trujillo reprisals were remembered with religious fervor by the resi- dents of the surrounding region see Jeffrey S. Klaiber, S. J. "Religion and Revolution in Peru: 1920-1945," The Americas, XXXI, 3 (January, 1975), 308. 51 it had never been popular with large segments of the civilian population or the armed forces.35 The initial response of Sanchez Cerro and other politi- cal leaders took the form of allegations that A£§A_had promoted the invasion to create an international crisis.36 Party leaders rejected these charges and called for negoti- ations to bring about a settlement of the dispute.37 Once public reaction to the Peruvian occupation became clearly favorable, the president chose not to repudiate his country- men's actions but rather to let further developments dictate his policy. Since the government would neither order a withdrawal from Leticia nor reinforce the original invaders, Colombia initiated a successful campaign against Peruvian forces at Tarapacé in mid-February, recapturing most of the disputed territory.38 Attempting to reverse the loss of prestige to his regime and the armed forces by the Leticia defeat, Sanchez Cerro tried to generate support for a full- scale war with Colombia. At the end of February, males 35For the best review of the border conflict with Colombia see Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin Ameri— can Wars, 1932-1942 (New York, 1966), pp. 169-255, and Colonéi’JoseiH. Vallejo, E1 conflicto Peru-Colombiano (Lima, 1934). 36 Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 175-211. 37Interview with Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1975, Lima, Peru. 38Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 228. 52 between twenty-one and twenty-five were ordered drafted into the army. Propaganda campaigns were also launched to convince Peruvians of the need to retaliate against Colombian "aggression" with a large-scale military effort.39 In the midst of these war preparations, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez, convinced that Sanchez Cerro was leading Peru into another disastrous defeat, decided to ally with APRA to overthrow the government. Jimenez arrived in north- ern Peru from Chile and began to organize support for a rebellion among the personnel of the army regiment stationed at Cajamarca. On March 11, Jiménez led about three hundred men into revolt. But expected Aprista support from the sur- rounding areas failed to materialize and the rebel leader's forces were swiftly defeated by government troops on the road to Trujillo on March 14. Rather than surrender, Jiménez shot himself.40 The insurrection further convinced APRA's military enemies of the party's subversive potential. The Jiménez revolt occurred at a time of national crisis when military discipline should have been strongest. It indicated instead that deep divisions had been created by Sénchez Cerro's decision to press for war without proper military preparations. 39Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 412. 4oIbid. ‘ .... \. #1.. 53 Undaunted by the internal military problems caused by his war plans, the president sought in early April to strenghthen his position by appointing the highly respected General Benavides (newly arrived from his ambassadorial post in Great Britain and hero of the 1911 conflict with Colom- bia) as head of a Junta Defensa Nacional (National Defense Council). As chief of the jggtg Benavides would be in charge of all military forces in the campaign against Colombia. The president hoped the prestigious Benavides would lend more legitimacy to his efforts to engineer a national commitment to the war.41 The government's position was made seemingly more secure when a previously named Constituent Assembly promulgated a new Constitution on April 9, 1933 which clearly legitimatized the prominent role of the armed forces in national affairs. Article 213 of the charter read: The purpose of the armed forces is to secure the rights of the Republic, the fullfillment of the Constitution and the laws, and the preservation of the public order.42 Barely three weeks after the Constitution went into effect, however, the Sanchez Cerro era came to a violent end with the president's assassination at the hand of a seventeen-year-old Aprista named Abelardo Mendoza Leyva. 41Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 228. 42Russell H. Fitzgibbon, ed., The Constitutions of the Americas (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 54 The assailant was immediately killed by the crowd attending the military rally at which the president was slain. Suspicions were aroused that there existed a widespread conspiracy, possibly even involving General Benavides, which was responsible for Sénchez Cerro's assassination. But the young Aprista was subsequently found to have acted alone.43 Nevertheless, Mendoza Leyva's Aprista affiliation added to the party's growing reputation as a violently radical organ— ization, and thus the continued proscription of APRA for most of the period until 1945 was more easily justified by the party's enemies. The Benavides Era: 1933-1939 Within hours after the assassin struck, the Constituent Assembly met and selected General Benavides as president for the remainder of the slain executive's term. The Assembly acted in direct violation of the new Constitution which prohibited active members of the armed forces from assuming the presidency. But because Benavides was Peru's most respected military figure and had demonstrated administra- tive ability as provisional president in 1914-1915 he was 43Among those who have charged Benavides with compli- city in the assassination of Sénchez Cerro is Victor Villanueva. See Villanueva, La sublevacion aprista, p. 22. 55 the overwhelming choice to lead Peru in its time of crisis.44 The most immediate problem confronting the new presi- dent was the imminent possibility of renewed hostilities with Colombia. Benavides immediately sought to defuse the situation, claiming it was imperative that Peru avoid a war it had little chance of winning. Two days after assuming office, direct negotiations involving the Leticia dispute were begun between Benavides and president-elect Alfonso Lépez of Colombia. The men had become close friends during their respective ambassadorial assignments in London and Lépez was soon invited to Peru to discuss the issue with the Peruvian president. After six days of talks, LOpez re- turned to Colombia on May 21, having secured Benavides' acceptance of the League of Nations' proposal to resolve the conflict. With the withdrawal of Peruvian troops from the area in mid-June war tensions between the two nations were substantially reduced.45 Benavides' quick settlement of the Leticia affair promptly alienated many Sanchez Cerrista war advocates. 44Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 225. 45Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 228-51. The final settlement of the dispute in 1935 involved a return to the conditions of the Solomon-Lozano Treaty of 1922, or in essence a re-establishment of the status quo before 1932. 56 The president was able to withstand their violent criticism due to his own personal prestige and he had the support of Apristas who favored the peace efforts that ended a con- flict they viewed as an "invention of Sanchez Cerro's."46 Most military officers backed Benavides because they recog- nized that Peru's defeat at Tarapaca revealed the nation's shockingly ineffective war potential. Internal factional- ism, 1ow morale resulting from repeated command and troop transfers, and a lack of effective combat training were the main causes of this problem. Although in 1933, seventy per cent of the army officers were graduates of Peru's improved military college, the Colombian defeat only served to under- mine the confidence of the nation's young army officers in their military and political leaders.47 The Benavides' government thus attempted in the next six years to institute reforms in military training and acquired more modern arma- ments in an effort to improve the nation's national defense capabilities. Coinciding with the government's efforts to smother the divisive Leticia dispute was a program aimed at elimi- nating domestic political strife by reducing political 46Interview with Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, Lima, Peru, July 13, 1974. 47Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 217-20, and 1 0 ands, pp. 91-107. 57 repression. During early May, martial law was lifted and many political prisoners were released. Within three months amnesty was given to nearly all remaining political intern- ees including Haya de la Torre. Benavides also announced that elections to fill vacated congressional seats would soon be called. This would apparently give APRA the chance to regain some of the twenty-three seats the party had lost in February, 1932, when Sénchez Cerro exiled the Aprista congressmen. As Benavides drew farther away from the policies of his predecessor, the dead president's supporters grew vio- lent in their opposition. Between May and November, 1933, the president was forced to dissolve his original Sénchez- Cerrista cabinet, suppress an army revolt by the jungle garrison in Iquitos and arrest a number of members of the Partido Unidn Revolucionaria for plotting his assassina- tion.48 While the government effectively dealt with the new opposition, its announced policy of "peace and concord" still remained tacitly in effect. APRA was allowed to renew its political activity, and in November the party became the dominant member of a newly formed political coalition, the Alianza Nacional. The coalition, composed 48Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 225-26. 58 of former supporters of Leguia, and Luis Antonio Eguiguren's Partido Democratico Social, demanded that the president call elections to select an entirely new congress, not simply to fill the relatively small number of vacated seats. The demand was rejected by Benavides, who apparently feared that it represented APRA's bid to gain increased national power through domination of the national legislature. In the year following the formation of the Alianza Nacional the govern- ment defaulted on its promise to hold congressional elec- tions. Mistrusting APRA and clearly fearing the renewed internal discord that elections might produce, Benavides cancelled the elections in early November, 1934 without 49 announcing a new date for the voting. After a year of frustration, the Alianza Nacional collapsed and APRA_leaders once again decided to employ force to attain national power. During the latter part of November and early December, 1934, APRA_instigated a series of insurrections throughout Peru. For the most part, Benavides' support in the military barracks remained firm and all the uprisings were suppressed quickly. With the arrest and exile in early December of a small number of army officers and important Aprista leaders, including Luis Alberto Sanchez, Carlos Manuel Cox, former army Colonel 49Pike, Modern History, pp. 269-70. 59 César Enrique Pardo and Agustin Haya de la Torre, the uneasy political truce between Apristas and the Benavides regime came to an end. Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre avoided cap- ture, but continued Aprista subversive activity was met by a strengthened National Emergency Law enacted in February, 1935.50 Despite continuing internal disorder the government still rejected a program of political repression along the lines established by the Sénchez Cerro regime.51 This is evidenced by the relatively light jail sentence given to the Aprista assassin of E1 Comercio editor Antonia Mird Quesada and his wife in May, 1935. Under the terms of the Emergency Law, the murderer should have received the death penalty from the military tribunal that tried the case. Instead the twenty-five year sentence aroused strong anti- Benavides sentiment among the nation's extreme conservative groups. It also embroiled the armed forces' high command in a bitter confrontation between fellow Civilista backers of Mird Quesada and their traditional APRA enemies. Strong feelings resulting from the Mird Quesada incident created a 50Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 454-58. 51This is evidenced by the fact that Benavides never really made a concerted attempt to arrest Haya de la Torre during his underground years after 1934. Despite the arrest and deportation of many APRA leaders after 1934 Haya de la Torre remained in Peru, often giving clandestine interviews with foreign journalists and scholars who were not hard put to make contact with him. 60 continuing feud involving close military associates of Benavides and the assassinated editor's family until Benavides' death in 1945.52 Aided by strengthened police powers and a markedly improved economy, Benavides felt sufficiently secure by early 1936 to begin preparations for national elections to select a new president and national congress. Nevertheless, the president was still wary of continuing Aprista efforts to subvert army and police units. Consequently, in February, 1936, he removed the director of the National Police School and implemented more transfers in army com- mand positions.53 By June the presidential campaign was in full swing with four candidates announcing their intention to seek the office. Representing the nation's right-wing elements were Dr. Manuel Vicente Villaran (a former Civilista) and Luis M. Flores of the Partido Unidn Revolucionaria. Jorge Prado y Urgarteche, candidate of the Frente Nacional and long- time associate of Benavides, had the unofficial backing of the government. Haya de la Torre, still in hiding, announced his candidacy in early June and named the exiled 52Pike, The Modern Historyjof Peru, pp. 273-74, and Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, p. 351. 53Dearing to SecState, February 19, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1189. 61 former army Colonel Enrique Pardo as his first vice- presidential candidate. This political gesture was aimed at demonstrating that A§§A_was not violently anti-military, as its critics charged.54 Although APRA presented Haya de la Torre as a candi- date, party leaders had little confidence in the govern- ment's willingness to conduct open elections. Therefore in April, 1936, APRA leader Manuel Seoane made an overture to the Bolivian government for assistance in overthrowing the Benavides regime. Risking a possible insult to his hosts by promoting Bolivian interests during a speech in Asuncion, Paraguay, Seoane discussed APRA's position on one of the central issues of the Chaco War involving Paraguay and Bolivia. Aprista opinion has always esteemed Paraguayan valor and has criticized official Peruvian policy for being unable to prevent the [Chaco] war [but] when Aprismo assumes power it will endeavor to bring about a favor- able resolution Of Bolivia's right to a port on the Pacific.55 APRA offered Bolivia support in gaining the port of Arica from Chile in exchange for that country's aid in its revolutionary campaign against Benavides. Bolivian presi- dent David Toro's desire to regain a seacoast for his 54Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 463-64. 55Ambassador Findley B. Howard (Asuncion, Paraguay) to SecState, April 24, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1203. 62 nation (landlocked since Bolivia's defeat in the War of the Pacific) and his close personal relationship with Seoane prompted him to offer a large quantity of arms and ammuni- tion to the Aprista cause in August. The Benavides govern- ment was made quickly aware of the plot, however, and by exerting strong diplomatic pressure forced Toro to withdraw his support by September 1.56 Undoubtedly responding to APRA's revolutionary scheme, the National Election Board on September 5 disbarred APRA and Haya de la Torre from participation in the national elections scheduled for October 11. The Board justified its action on the grounds that article fifty—three of the constitution, which prohibited international organizations from participation in national elections, disqualified APRA, With the party out of the running, Luis Antonio Eguiguren, candidate of the Frente Democratico, joined the presidential race. Eguiguren quickly exploited the dissatisfaction voters felt towards the other candidates while also gaining the support of Apristas in his presidential bid.57 A§§A_ viewed Eguiguren as the candidate least likely to continue the conservative policies of Benavides and possibly hoped to dominate his government once he was elected. 56Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 468—470. 57Interview with Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru. 63 With APRA's voting support, Eguiguren moved into an early lead and appeared headed for an electoral victory un- til Benavides ordered the National Election Board to suspend the vote tabulation on October 21. One day later the presi- dent solidified his political position by naming an all- military cabinet headed by General Ernesto Montagne Mark- holtz as Minister of War.58 As most Peruvians anticipated, the national congress then met on November 4 and annulled the election on the basis of illegal Aprista participation in support of Eguiguren. After gaining the assurance of support from most of Lima's senior military officers, on November 14 Benavides had the congress extend his presiden- tial term until December 8, 1939. He thus assumed full dictatorial powers; no congress would serve for the re- mainder of his term since the elections to replace that body 59 had been voided. Both APRA and the Sanchez-Cerrista Partido Unidn Revolucionaria led by Luis Flores attempted to retaliate against the cancellation of the elections. But efforts by Aprista elements and air force personnel to seize a Lima police barracks and the air force base at Ancdn in late 58Dearing to SecState, October 23, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1223. 591bid., November 5, 1936, 823.00/1232. 64 October again met with failure. A month later, Flores and General Cirilo H. Ortega--once a close friend of Sanchez Cerro--were implicated in an extensive plot to overthrow Benavides. With the arrest and deportation of Flores and eight associates, all effective anti-government resistance ended.60 Using a program of arrest, imprisonment and exile em- ployed frequently within the context of his strong executive powers, Benavides ruled until early 1939 without facing any serious challenges to his regime. A continually improving economy contributed to the stability of these years. National income rose sixty-one per cent between 1935 and 1939, reflecting higher world prices for Peru's mineral exports. The government, while keeping the military budget at about fourteen per cent of total expenditures, used the additional revenues to make important purchases of naval vessels, airplanes, and other military equipment which 61 Benavides also con- modernized many armed forces units. tracted a short-lived German army mission and Italian air force and police training teams in 1937. The regime's affiliation with the German and Italian military institu- tions brought charges that Benavidesluuipro-fascist leanings. 601bid., November 28, 1936, 823.00/1250. 61Peru, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, Anuario Estadistico del Peru: 1944-45, cited in Gerlach, "C1v11- Military Relations,“ p. 546. 65 But in the case of the Italian air mission at least, it is clear that the government's acceptance of Italian military aid was motivated in large part by the highly competitive nature of the contract bid. The Italian Caproni aircraft company had previously agreed to construct a factory on the outskirts of Lima in early 1937. Moreover, just before the air mission contract was signed, twelve modern Fiat combat planes were sent to perform at the Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference in Lima to influence the government's decision. Evidence that Benavides was motivated as much by the quality of foreign training missions as by his personal politics is reflected in the reinstatement of the large and prestigious United States naval mission whose contract was renewed in 1938 after a five year lapse.62 Although the Benavides regime did make significant progress towards improving the professional expertise of the nation's armed forces officers, subversion of individual officers and entire military units by APRA and other civil- ian political groups never completely abated during the years 1936-1939. In September, 1938, Haya de la Torre claimed that if economic conditions worsened, Benavides would be quickly unseated. In such an instance the APRA leader asserted, "the army will come to me for support, 62Charge d' Affairs Louis G. Dryfus to SecState, October 6, 1937, NA, RG 59, 823.248/128. 66 since I have many partisans among the officers, particularly the younger ones."63 Events in February 1939, in which Apristas and right—wing members of the Partido Unidn Revolu- cionaria conspired with army General Antonio Rodriguez Ramirez to overthrow Benavides confirmed the substance of Haya de la Torre's boast. General Rodriguez was one of the most powerful members of the armed forces and he had parlayed his adept support of Benavidesl 1914 gggp and Sanchez Cerro's 1930 gglpe into a top army command position. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1934 after serving as Army Chief of Staff during Sénchez Cerro's second regime. The general was then ap- pointed to Benavides‘ cabinet as Minister of Government and Police in 1935.64 In early 1939, however, Rodriguez re- solved to overthrow his long-time colleague and make him- self military president. In a broad-based conspiracy Rodriguez allied with APRA and its chief political rival the Partido Unidn Revolucion- aria in his plot against the Benavides' regime. Aprista leaders joined the conspiracy only after they had failed to convince Colonel Eloy G. Ureta, commander of the Third Army Division in Arequipa, to head a revolutionary movement.65 63Ibid., September 8, 1938, 823.00/1315. 64The New York Times, February 20, 1939, p. 9. 65Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 227. 67 The stated goals of the Rodriguez movement were twofold: To restore full participation for all political parties and to guarantee complete amnesty as a prelude to national elections scheduled to be held six months after the general's seizure of power. Upon toppling Benavides, the rebel general planned to establish a provisional government includ- ing elements from nearly all of Peru's major political groups. Destined to hold the key position as Minister of Government and Police was the Aprista Lieutenant Colonel, Gerardo Gamara Huerta, General Cirilo H. Ortega, a staunch Sanchez Cerrista, was slated for the equally important post as Minister of War.66 Rodriguez launched his revolt in the early morning hours of February 19 after Benavides had departed for a short holiday at Ica in southern Peru. Support for the movement was spread throughout the three service branches and the police with twenty-five officers of the army, navy, air force and guardia civil taking an active role.67 During the first hours of the revolt, Rodriguez made a serious tactical error when he attempted to use his post as 66Dreyfus to SecState, May 25, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/ 1363, Villanueva, La sublevacidn aprista, pp. 17-23, and For la verdad historica: 1a revolucion democratica de Antonio Rodriguez Ramirez (Lima, 1942), authors listed as "friends" of the deceased general. This pamphlet contains speeches, proclamations, and proposed government personnel in Rodriguez' planned revolutionary junta. 67 L§_Crdnica, March 23, 1939, p. 14. 68 Minister of Government and Police to secure military con- trol of Lima before making a radio appeal for civilian (mainly Aprista) support in other parts of Peru. The result- ing confusion within the ranks of both civilian and military insurgents prevented the simultaneous activation of the revolt. Consequently, most subverted military units did not join Rodriguez at his headquarters in the National Palace as they believed the uprising had been aborted. Six hours after the instigation of the revolt, the general met Major Luis Riza Patrdn, commander of the Assault Troop Police Regiment, and a number of police and army personnel in the patio of the National Palace. Rodriguez, was unaware that Riza Patrdn had not joined the ranks of the rebels, and he was immediately shot and killed by the police captain. In the ensuing gun battle three more persons died and another six were wounded before Rodriguez' supporters were over- whelmed and imprisoned. A supporting movement led by air force Major José Estremadoyro Navarro at Ancdn was also rapidly suppressed after the arrest of the major and a small number of his air force asociates.68 The Minister of War, General Ernesto Montagne Marck- holtz, was chiefly responsible for suppressing the revolt 68Ibid., February 20, 1939, p. 15, The New York Times, February 20, 1939, p. 1, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Rela- tions," pp. 473-78. 69 in Benavides' absence. His orders confining most of Lima's army troops to their barracks prevented the spread of the uprising during the morning of February 19. When Benavides returned to the capital on the evening of the uprising, complete order was restored. Documents found on Rodriguez' body implicated a number of conspirators who were quickly arrested. On March 22, twenty-four military men were sen- tenced to prison terms from one to ten years for participat- ing in the revolt.69 The Rodriguez conspiracy represented APRA's best chance to overthrow Benavides, but the movement lacked the critical support of junior army officers who had conspired with the party throughout the 1930's. Because of the rebel general's close association with Benavides and Sanchez Cerro, the younger officers were wary of his polit- ical motives.70 After the conspiracy was suppressed by Benavides, APRA was again denied the opportunity to regain political legality when the president arranged for his long- time political ally, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, to succeed him as president. This launched a new era of civilian rule. But the civil-military confrontations of the 1930's would continue to effect the development of the armed forces' professional role during the Prado years and after. 69La Crdnica, March 23, 1939, p. 14. 70Villanueva, La sublevacidn aprista, pp. 18-20. 70 Conclusion Between 1930 and 1939 the Peruvian armed forces re- mained intensely factionalized as they had been throughout much of the time since the turn of the century. Divisions within the officer corps reached a critical level during the Sanchez Cerro era due to pressures of greater mass political participation, the economic dislocation caused by the world depression, and the emergence of APRA as a potent political and subversive force. While Aprista excesses such as the Trujillo massacre and the assassination of Sanchez Cerro convinced many officers that APRA was violent- ly anti-military, at the same time these radical actions enhanced the party's revolutionary appeal for dissident officers like Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez and General Rodriguez. These conspiracies and other repeated breakdowns of military discipline plus the military defeat at Tarapaca in 1933 had a disastrous impact on the armed forces profes- sional morale. Loyal and professionally competent military officers were thus convinced that civilian interference in military affairs and the tendency of their colleagues to play politics were primarily responsible for the military's backwardness. The repeated manipulation of promotions and command transfers by both Sanchez Cerro and Benavides for political purposes also added to their discontent. Ironical- ly, it would be during the civilian administration of 71 Manuel Prado y Ugarteche that the armed forces would achieve their greatest military success after suffering serious military defeats while men in uniform were in office. CHAPTER III BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES AND BARRACKS TENSIONS The Armed Forces of 1939 An examination of the armed forces organization in 1939 reveals a number of elements that are fundamentally impor- tant for this study. In that year the armed forces officer corps was divided as a result of the repeated subversion of military personnel by competing civilian factiOns, inter- ference in the internal affairs of the military by both civilian and military leaders for partisan political pur- poses and the inferior record of Peru's military leaders in time of war. The result of these problems was that officers had a poor image of their own institution. It is unrealistic to assume that an organization as large and diverse as an armed forces officer corps could consistently concur on issues such as national political leadership, internal military policies and questions of national defense. But in Peru, these problems were so severe that many of the nation's younger officers distrusted the capability and professional commitment of their superi- ors. These officers also had a profound distrust for 72 73 civilian politicians they deemed largely responsible for much of the discord within their profession.1 Within this context Peruvian battlefield victories in the brief border conflict with Ecuador in July, 1941 and a virtual moratorium on civilian subversive political activity during World War II lessened tensions within the armed forces for the first three years of the Prado administration. As the crucial election year of 1945 approached, however, new factions again formed representing discontented junior officers and army commanders seeking political power themselves. Notwithstanding the factionalism that plagued the armed forces in 1939, President Benavides had overseen the develop- ment of a more modern institution during his years as chief executive. Foreign training missions, including German and French army units along with Italian air force and United States navy training teams provided up-to-date instruction for armed forces officers. Junior officers demonstrating command potential were also given advanced training in France and other European countries until early 1940. The government's acquisition of more modern armaments in the 1For a succinct statement of these points see Frederick Nunn,"Notes on the 'Junta Phenomenon' and the 'Military Regime' in Latin America with Special Reference to Peru, 1968-1972," The Americas, XXXI (January, 1975), 237-252. Nunn's analysis of the factors promoting the growth of what he terms "professional militarism" in Peru is first-rate. 74 period 1934-1940 facilitated the modernization of Peru's fighting forces prior to the Ecuador conflict in 1941.2 In 1939 the armed forces totalled approximately 17,000 officers and men. The army, with a strength of about 13,000, was by far the most powerful of the three armed services.3 Headed by Benavides as senior army officer hold- ing the rank of division (major) general, the army officer corp numbered 1,500. Nearly eighty per cent of army offic- ers entering the profession during the 1930's were graduates of the Chorrillos officers college; representing an increase of over ten per cent from the 1920's. The ranks of the army's general officers remained small, however, as Benavides was one of only ten brigadier generals in 1939. Between 1931 and 1940 (one year after Benavides left office) only 2The best discussions of the key civil-military issues of the Prado administration are: Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, pp. 231-244, and La sublevacidn aprista, pp. 17-35, Wood, Latin American Wars,-pp. 255-345, David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marafidn: The Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute (New York, 1964), Sdhchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 365- 85 and Gerlach, "Civil-MiliEEry_Relations " pp. 495-523. 3See G-2 Report no. 202039, August 27, 1945, NA, RG 319. This highly significant report summarizes a Peruvian Army General Staff study done in late 1944 which was entitled (U.S. military attaché's translation) "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization." Extensive informa- tion on the General Staff's analysis of the army's military capabilities, basic weaknesses and future requirements is provided. The document was listed as "secret" by the Peruvians in 1944, but the U.S. military attaché was able to obtain a copy in mid-1945. 75 seven officers were promoted to general.4 This low number of promotions would have an impact on the Prado government's relations with senior officers, as many became impatient for advancement after years of waiting under Benavides. Although the bulk of Peruvian officers studying over- seas were army men serving in France, talented junior offic- ers of the small air force (which operated within the frame- work of the navy ministry until 1942) were sent to Italy for advanced training. The largest group of these air force cadets began a three year course at the aviation academy at Caserta, Italy, in 1939.5 A number of cadets attending earlier classes at the Italian aviation school had performed exceptionally well, impressing air force senior officers with their professional expertise upon returning to Peru.6 The United States naval mission had originally been contracted in 1920, and after a six-year absence between 1932 and 1938 Benavides renewed its contract. The president praised the work of this unit in December, 1939, claiming that Peruvian naval officers were benefiting from the 4Peru, Ministerio de Guerra, Escalafén General del Ejército, 1939, p. 116. Hereafter Cited as Escalafén with year and page number, and Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, p. 408. 5Report of the United States naval attache'(unsigned), June 23, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.248/188. 61bid. 76 North American nation's technically superior naval advisors.7 As the army's ranking officer, however, the president saved his highest praise for the French army mission, which he asserted was the "most complete" of any foreign training unit ever to serve in Peru.8 As a result of the military programs of the Benavides government the combat efficiency of the active Peruvian army was considered to be on a par with that of neighboring Colombia and significantly superior to the Ecuadoran army soon after Benavides left office. Some military commanders were still troubled by the fact that Peru's potential mobil- ization force of 60,000 (men aged 21-25 not in the active army) had almost no equipment available for use. To them this was a serious weakness in the nation's national defense scheme which they felt should be characterized by "defense in depth“ aimed at the potential deployment of large numbers of reserves in time of war.9 As a result, soon after the new civilian president assumed office, military commanders placed immense pressure upon him to take vigorous measures to correct these deficiencies. 7Chargé d' Affaires Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. to SecState, December 19, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/78. 81bid. 9Report of the United States military attache Captain Uzal G. Ent, February 23, 1940, NA, RG 59, 823.20 M.I.D./5. I. ‘~A\ 77 Civilian Rule Restored During the last week of March, 1939, Benavides declared that he would leave office as scheduled on December 8. He also announced that national elections for president and a national congress would be held in late October.10 The out- going president, following the pattern of the 1915 and 1936 elections, was determined to have a civilian succeed him. His choice was Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, brother of Jorge Prado y Ugarteche, who had been Benevides' candidate in the 1936 elections. Manuel Prado belonged to one of the wealth- iest and most influential families in Peru. Son of former president Mariano Ignacio Prado (1876-1879), he was presi— dent of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru and had extensive holdings in other financial and insurance institutions. Benavides and the Prado brothers had conspired to overthrow President Guillermo Billinghurst in 1914, but Manuel Prado was subsequently exiled during the Oncenio due to his oppo- sition to Leguia. After Benavides became president in 1933, Manuel Prado remained politically loyal and he was named to 11 the cabinet in April, 1939. Benavides then used his sub- stantial influence to advance the formation of the 10§l_Comercio, March 28, 1939, p. 1. 11The New York Times, April 20, 1939, p. 3, and the Peruvian Times, March 23, 1945, p. 2. ab .91. i. «.‘ .rd 78 Concentracién Nacional, a coalition of centerist and conser— vative groups to back Prado's candidacy.12 Additionally, during May the chief executive announced plans to conduct a plebiscite in order to lengthen the presidential term from four to six years and the congressional tenure from five to six. Despite Opposition from APRA and some junior army officers, by mid-June the longer terms of office had been approved and Manuel Prado's campaign was in full swing. The only serious political challenge to Prado came from José Quesada Larrea, who organized the Frente Patriotico with the support of Manuel Vicente Villaran and his con- servative adherents as well as Luis Flores and his wing of the Partido Union Revolucionaria. Quesada Larrea, after purchasing the newspaper La Prensa, used it as a forum to attack his political opponent. The thrust of this criticism was that Prado, as the son of President Mariano Ignacio Prado who left Peru in the midst of the War of the Pacific, might not be a trustworthy chief executive in a time of national crisis.14 The Prado family's "questionable" 12Dreyfus to SecState, May 13, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/ 1361. l3Enrique Chrinos Soto, El Perfi frente a junio de 1962 (Lima, 1962), p. 54. This is one of the most valuable general reviews of twentieth century Peruvian politics. l4Dreyfus to SecState, October 20, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/36 and Sanchez, Haya de la Torre y el_Apra, pp. 366- 367. via- "a V. Y‘. - ,- u ‘1‘ «a. .1.- 79 patriotism was the central issue of the campaign. La Prensa's increasingly vitriolic attacks prompted the government to close the newspaper six days before the national elections.15 APRA voters played a key role in the election of Prado. Negotiations were conducted between Prado and APRA representatives during early October, but a pact that would have guaranteed a general political amnesty and legaliza- tion of the party in return for Aprista support for Prado did not materialize.16 Nevertheless, it seems clear that APRA adherents cast a sizeable number of ballots for Prado as his winning margin of nearly 187,000 votes out of a total of 339,000 cast reflects electoral support well beyond the range of his announced political supporters. Although party chief Haya de la Torre denies that there existed an official party directive to vote for Prado, another APRA leader sug- gests that rank and file Apristas may have been unsure of party policy.l7 15Chrinos Soto, El Peru frente, p. 55. 16Ibid., and Sanchez, Haya dg_la_Torre y el Apra, pp. 17 Sanchez, Haya d3 la Torre 1,3l Apra, pp. 367-368 con- cedes that confusion over party directives may have led to a large number of Aprista votes for Prado. Haya de la Torre insists that the 1939 election was a "fake" and that there was no formal support for the winning candidate by APRA. Interview with Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru. 80 Even though many party members voted for Prado, Apristas still made an attempt to block his inauguration by organizing a civil-military conspiracy in Trujillo during mid-November. The ill-planned uprising was crushed on November 19, however, after Lieutenant Colonel Remigo Morales Bermudez, commander of an army battalion in Trujillo, was fatally shot in his home.18 Although Apristas Tomas Solano Bocanegra and Gregorio Zavelata Diaz were convicted of the Morales Bermfidez killing and quickly executed, APRA leaders denied the government's*versionother reform measures deal- ing with tax and education reform in late 1962. On December 5, 1962 the guppA issued a decree declaring 1963 "The Year of Literacy" and proposing an all-out effort to reduce illiterary in the nation. The ministry of educa- tion proposed a plan to effect national literacy training and the government encouraged other educational programs. But these initiatives were more of a commitment to educa- tional reform rather than a manifestation of the govern- ment's intent to launch an ambitious program in its six remaining months in office. Thus little progress was made 23Héctor Béjar, Peru 1965: Notes pp A Guerrilla Experi- ence (New York, 1965), p. 56. Useful works on the Cuzco la land seizures are Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la rebelidn campesina (Lima, 1967), Hugo Niera, Cuzco: Tierra y muerte (Lima, n.d.). 317 before the Apppg stepped down in July, 1963.24 On the issue of tax reform, however, more tangible efforts were made. At the end of 1962 the government de- creed a tax of twenty-five soles per ton (about 94¢) on the nation's fishing industry. In addition, a new progressive tax scale on private incomes in excess of 100,000 soles per year ($3,730) was put into effect on January 1, 1963.25 These taxes, while not excessive, were unpopular with busi- ness interests and upper income groups. The tax controversy was apparently one of a number of issues that prompted the removal of Pérez Godoy as president of the EEEEE by his more conservative military colleagues on March 3, 1963. Other cracks in the institutional solidarity of the military gov- ernment were clearly evident, however, before Pérez Godoy's replacement by General Nicolas Lindley Lépez in March, 1963. Dissension and Disorder The first indication Of dissension within the military government came on October 5, 1962 with the resignation Of the Minister of Government and Police, General Juan Bossio Collas. General Bossio gave "health reasons" for his 24§l.§ggp£gip, December 6, 1962, p. l, and Villanueva, pp afio bajo 3A sable, pp. 151-157. 25Pérez Godoy questionnaire, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 292. 318 resignation but according to Pérez Godoy, the minister of government and police renounced his cabinet post under in— tense pressure from General Lindley LOpez.26 General Bossio was the most progressive officer in the military government and had been a member of the activist junior army Officer organization, QBQB_during the early 1940's.27 Before his resignation General Bossio made a number of public statements that led to his removal from the cabinet. During September he engaged in a debate with the editors of BA Prensa, who warned that the peasant unionizing and land seizures led by Hugo Blanco in La Convencién and Lares might be the begin- nings of a Castro-inspired guerrilla movement. General Bossio discounted the importance of what he termed "paper guerrillas" and derided the "journalistic visions" of the AA Prensa editors.28 Far more serious, however, was his declaration in late September that the military government had immediate plans to nullify the long-standing and contro- versial contract of the International Petroleum Company.2 The Junta was not prepared to take such action and General 26§l_§g§g£gipj October 6, 1962, p. l. and Pérez Godoy questionnaire. 27See chapter three for the discussion of the CROE. 28Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 318. ‘9Pérez Godoy questionnaire and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 286. 319 Lindley LOpez, in particular, viewed General Bossio's state- ment as a form of censure of the Junta's actions.30 Consequently, General Lindley LOpez secured the minister's resignation with the support of the other members of the Junta.31 General Bossio's removal reflected the military government's sensitivity on the issues of foreign capital and rural unrest. As General Pérez Godoy's statements to the foreign business community in July, 1962 prove, the Junta was com- mitted to maintaining a friendly relationship with foreign capital. The Junta president took pride in the fact that the military government in the remaining months Of 1962 after the gppp d' §E3E_was able to substantially improve the condition of Peru's balance Of payments, oversee an in- crease in the nation's BBB, and still realize a budget sur- plus in excess of 400 million soles.32 It is Obvious that the military government viewed immediate economic stability as closely linked with the continued presence of Peru's chief sources of foreign investment. On this key point, the senior officers in the government were at odds with 30Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire. 31Ibid. In an often quoted statement Bossio was also reported to have said that the armed forces of 1962 were tired of being the "watchdogs of the oligarchy" in Peru. 32Pérez Godoy questionnaire. 320 military planners in the CAEM who wrote in 1963: The sad and desperate truth is that in Peru the real powers are not the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial or the Electoral, but the latifundistos (owners of excessively large land holdingsT] the exporters the bankers, and the American [U.S.] in- vestors.33 While not a dominant aspect of the armed forces' profession- al perspective before 1963, economic nationalism emerged as a key element in the military's ideology between 1963 and 1968.34 But despite a lack of consensus on the issue Of the role of foreign capital before 1963, military men were in accord in supporting the guppg's decisive actions against radical activists operating in Peru's central and southern regions. The most charismatic and successful radical figure during the early 1960's was the peasant organizer Hugo Blanco.35 This young trotskyite began his work to unify various peasant groups in the Cuzco area in 1958.36 By 1961 Blanco had created 148 individual peasant unions in the La Convencién Valley and had led a number of successful 33CAEM, El estado y la politica general (Chorrillos, 1963), p. 89,—quoted in EIHaudIIand Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 18. 34For a discussion of this point see Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 321. 35The best work dealing with Hugo Blanco is Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y AA rebeliOn campesina. 36 Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, p. 75. 321 strikes by the tenants of the large haciendas Of the region.37 Primarily because of ideological differences with Peru's leading marxist groups, Blanco was unable to Obtain the needed manpower or financial support for a campaign of peasant land seizures he attempted to lead during 1962.38 During late October, 1962 the government responded to the land seizures in the La ConvenciOn region by sending a large force of guardia civil units, under the command of Colonel Arturo Zapata Cesti, to dislodge the peasants. The guardia civil established headquarters in two key haciendas 39 in La ConvenciOn and the valley of Lares. These units met with stubborn resistance from the peasants, and Blanco himself became a fugitive after killing a member of the guardia civil while attempting to seize arms for his move- ment on November 13, 1962.40 Blanco was not captured until late May, 1963 but his effectiveness as a peasant organizer ended after he was forced into hiding to avoid arrest.41 During the last two 37Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements 12 Latin America (New York, 1972), p. 319. 38Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, pp. 102-134. 39BA Comercio, October 23, 1962, p. 13. 40Ibid.; Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 328, and Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, pp. 138-139. 41Blanco was sentenced to twenty years in prison in 1963 for the murder Of a member Of the Guardia Civil; he was subsequently released in 1970. 322 months of 1962, however, disorders continued in the La ConvenciOn and Lares region. Violent confrontations between the guardia civil and peasants near the town of Chalhuay in December resulted in the deaths of forty-six tenant farmers.42 Only after the announcement of the Junta's agrarian reform program for the La ConvenciOn region in March, 1963, did the land seizures and the unrest begin to subside. The activi- ties of peasant unions in this area never went beyond the point of strikes and occupation of the large land holdings. But Blanco's organizational success during his five years of work in the politically volatile La ConvenciOn and Lares region convinced military leaders of the potential for agrarian rebellion in the area. The fact that the Junta's agrarian reform program contributed to the reduction of peasant unrest in this region had a profound impact upon the military's attitude towards the value of land reform in the years to come.43 In contrast to the Junta's approach towards unrest in the La Convencién region, it took stronger measures to deal with labor disorders in northern and central Peru during late 1962 and early 1963. In December, 1962 bloody riots at the copper mines at La Oroya in central Peru and the large commercial sugar 42Villanueva, BA afio bajo 3A sable, p. 141. 3Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 26. 323 plantations near the north coast town of Chiclayo, resulted in the Apppg's roundup Of communist labor leaders and other leftists during the first week of January, 1963. Prior to the mass arrests of leftist leaders in early January, the Apppg had allowed communist labor organizers a relatively free hand in gaining new adherents. Pérez Godoy had lent his support for these activities by attending a meeting of the communist-controlled port workers union.44 This policy was followed in an apparent effort to counteract ABBA's strength in Peru's labor movement. Nevertheless, an abrupt reversal of this strategy was initiated by the military government after the outbreak of violence and sabotage at the end of 1962. During the third week of December a strike by four thousand members of the metal workers union at the U.S. owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation complex at La Oroya, errupted into rioting which caused one death, numerous in- juries and resulted in $4 million in damage to the Cerro Operation's facilities.45 The government attributed the rioting to the communist Frente gg_Liberaci6n Nacional and sent the Minister of Government and Police, General 44The New York Times, January 14, 1963, p. 12. 45Peruvian Times, December 21, 1962, p. l. 324 German Pagador Blondet, to personally deal with the dis— turbances.4 The rioting at La Oroya was followed on January 2, 1963 by even more violent clashes between workers and police at the Hacienda Patapp in the sugar raising area near Chiclayo. A series of fires set by the labor agitators caused over $1 million damage to the Hacienda's buildings and crops. In the ensuing confrontations between guardia civil units and rioting workers, three persons were killed and twenty injured (including seven policemen).47 According to Pérez Godoy the disturbances at La Oroya and Chiclayo were the work not only of "elements with communist tendencies" but also Apristas and some members Of the oligarchy who were trying to tarnish the image of the military government as the 1963 elections drew nearer.48 In any event, the A2233 arrested only a few ABBA members and no prominent wealthy Peruvians in its sweeping crackdown on leftist groups launched on January 4. On the night of January 4 and throughout the following day police and other government agents arrested over eight 46Ibid., and Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire. 47BAC0mercio, January 3, 1963, p. l. 48Pérez Godoy questionnaire. 325 hundred known communists and members of other leftist groups in a carefully coordinated effort throughout Peru.49 Over three hundred arrests were made in Lima, including General (retired) César Pando Esgfisquiza, the BBB presidential can- didate in the 1962 elections, Luis Alvarado, head Of the bank employees union, and Guillermo Sheen, chief of the commercial employees union, both of which were communist- dominated.50 After the government suspended constitutional guaran- tees in the wake Of the mass arrests on January 5, General Pagador Blondet charged that the Junta had acted to destroy a communist conspiracy which was directed through Havana with headquarters in Prague.51 A government communique issued on January 6 claimed that the conspiracy involved a wide range of leftist groups which planned to launch a ser- ies of hit and run raids between January 15 and 20. These raids would involve the destruction of bridges, fuel storage areas, communications facilities and military installations. Key military and police leaders were also said to be targets for assassination.52 The government's statement charged 49El Comercio January 6, 1963, p. l, and Peruvian Times, January-I1, 1963, p. l. Villanueva, Bjército peruano, claims that the number arrested was actually 1,500 to 2,000. 50 Ibid., and The New York Times, January 7, 1963, p. l. SIBA CrOnica, January 7, 1963, p. l. 52Peruvian Times, January 11, 1963, p. 1. 326 that the first phase of the conspirators' operation had already begun with the infiltration of the nation's labor movement and the initiation Of a series of violent strikes like those at Cerro de Pasco and Chiclayo.53 The day before the issuance of the communique the government demonstrated its newly adopted hard line against strikes by using tanks to suppress the seizure of a Callao shoe factory by its 1,200 workers.54 Despite the severity of the government's charges, only two hundred of those originally arrested on January 4 and 5 were detained for an extended period. This group was taken to the BA BppA Penal Colony in the Department of Loreto where they were gradually released until only sixty remained to stand trial.55 Eventually, none of the suspects was ever convicted due to a lack of sufficient evidence and the government was never able to validate its charges of a widespread communist conspiracy.56 The Apppg's anti— communist campaign was a direct shift from its policy of maintaining an open political climate with the continuance 53Ibid. 54Ibid. SSE; QggpggAp, January 8. 1963, p. l, and Villanueva, BB afio bajo §A_sable, pp. 163-199. 56Villanueva, Bjército peruano, pp. 287-288. 327 of full constitutional liberties. Moreover, the government crackdown followed soon after the conservative press chided the guppg_for allowing communist infiltration of the labor and student movements. BA Prensa charged that the commun- ists were using their new freedom to instigate violent attacks on policemen and soldiers and promote the destruc- tion of private property, such as occurred in the riots at La Oroya.57 The thrust of the newspapers' argument was that by using communists to displace ABBA elements in the nation's labor movement, the Junta was exposing soldiers and policemen to the risk of being killed or injured by subver- sives whom the military leaders erroneously imagined they could control for their own benefit.58 Whether the Junta acted in direct response to the charges of the conservative press is not certain. But military leaders clearly per- ceived the subversive potential of Peru's small cadres of communist, trotskyite and castroite militants. With the arrest and detention of most of the nation's leftist leaders, the military government embarked on a more conservative political course that de—emphasized reformism. The most important casualty of this policy shift was Apppg president Pérez Godoy. 57BA Prensa, December 22, 1962, p. 1. 58Ibid., and Bourricaud, Power and Sociepy, p. 317. 328 The first reports Of dissension within the Junta appeared in January 1963 after the date of retirement for Pérez Godoy from the armed forces and Navy Commander and Chief, Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, had passed. Torres Matos was replaced as navy commander by Vice-Admiral Florencio Texeira on January 1, but both he and Pérez Godoy retained their positions in the military Junta.59 At a news conference on January 11, Pérez Godoy emphatically denied rumors of divisions within the military government and in- sisted that both his and Torres Matos' retirement would not have any effect upon their continued presence in the military government.60 One week later, at another press conference, the Junta president raised the controversial issue of the International Petroleum Company's contract in the same man- ner that was instrumental in the removal of General Bossio from the government in October, 1962. He claimed that the military government considered the question of the ABE. contract to be of national importance and insisted that plans existed to give the issue a "constitutional solution" before the Junta left office.61 59BAComercio, January 2, 1963, p. 4. 60Ibid., January 12, 1963, p. l, and Peruvian Times, January 18, 1963, p. 1. 61BA Comercio, January 17, 1963, p. l, and Peruvian Times, January 18, 1963, p. 1. . .I u. . 1| . ’ I‘ll I‘ll). 329 As was the case when General Bossio announced an immi- nent settlement of the ABE question, after Pérez Godoy's pronouncement no further statement was made by the govern- ment. Instead, during early February the three other members of the 92222 presented their colleague with a memorandum demanding that he adopt a more restricted role as president of the B3233, Specifically, they insisted that Pérez Godoy l) abolish his monthly national television addresses and his frequent news conferences; 2) not make any decision of na- tional importance without consulting the three other members of the guppg; 3) remove himself and his family from the National Palace as a place of residence; 4) cease issuing decree laws on matters that required prolonged study; and 5) help assure that the Junta's full attention would be de- voted to conducting the national elections as scheduled on June 9 and subsequently transferring the executive power to the newly elected president on July 28.62 The demands presented in the memorandum reflect the principal issues causing intense friction between Pérez Godoy and the other co-presidents of the Apppg, Generals Lindley LOpez and Vargas Prada along with Admiral Torres Matos insisted that Pérez Godoy must immediately comply with these demands if he was to remain a member Of the ruling Junta.63 Throughout 62Villanueva, Ejercito Peruano, p. 290. 63Ibid. 330 February, Pérez Godoy complied with all of these demands with the exception of transferring his residence from the National Palace. He refrained from conducting press con- ferences and did not make important policy decisions.64 Nevertheless, the serious split in the military leadership became public knowledge and the topic of gossip-type arti- cles in the national press. The news magazine Caretas in mid-February reported that the differences among the Junta members extended even to their wives. The wife of General Pedro Vargas Prada was said to be extremely upset that Pérez Godoy, in his post of president of the guppg, was receiving a larger salary than her husband. Moreover, because of Pérez Godoy's position, his wife was given the directorship of a national charitable organization and that caused even more hard feelings accord- ing to the magazine.65 This public airing of personal problems among the Apppg_members undoubtedly heightened the tension among the co-presidents. Less than three weeks after the article appeared, a confrontation between General Lindley LOpez and Pérez Godoy resulted in the latter's re- moval from the military government. Despite Pérez Godoy's compliance with nearly all the demands contained in the memorandum of early February, 64Ibid. 65Caretas, February 1-15, 1963, p. 10. 331 Lindley LOpez provoked a showdown with the Junta president on February 28 by resigning from the government to protest Pérez Godoy's personalist conduct in office.66 In the two days following Lindley LOpez's resignation a series of meet- ings involving the Junta, the cabinet and other members of the armed forces high command were held to resolve the crisis. These meetings resulted in the decision to reject the resignation of Lindley LOpez while instead demanding that Pérez Godoy renounce his post in the military govern- ment.67 In the early morning hours of March 3, Lindley LOpez and the other two co-presidents in the guppg acted to assure Pérez Godoy's swift removal from office. The National Palace was surrounded by troops from the army's anti— guerrilla ranger unit. Then soldiers armed with machineguns accompanied air force General Carlos Silas Baroni and his army colleague General Rudolfo Belaunde into the building and escorted Pérez Godoy and his family from the executive mansion at 6:30 A.M.68 After the deposed £2223 president was taken to his permanent residence in the Lima suburb of Miraflores he made a brief statement denying the charges Of 66BAComercio, March 3, 1963, p. 1. 67Ibid. 68Ibid., March 4, 1963, pp. 1, 6. 332 personalism that had been used by the other Junta members as a justification for his removel from office. He also in— sisted that his former colleagues did not intend to deport him or make him a prisoner. Guardia civil sentries were placed outside Pérez Godoy's residence, however, immediately following his arrival.69 After assuming Pérez Godoy's post in the military government, Lindley Lépez claimed that the action was taken for purely institutional reasons. He said: "We did not overthrow the government last July to enthrone Perez Godoy as a dictator."70 Elaborating, Lindley LOpez claimed that the personal way in which Pérez Godoy ran his Office was contrary to the collective organization of the presidency.71 Other interpretations have been offered as to the exact reasons for Pérez Godoy's ouster besides those presented by Lindley LOpez. According to AA Prensa, Pérez Godoy's friend- ship with former President Manuel Odria prompted the ousted Junta member to favor Odria's interests over those of Belafinde's in making government appointments. Lindley Lépez' strong advocacy of Belafinde's candidacy thus led to the 69Ibid., p. 4. 70The New York Times, March 4, 1963, p. l. 7lIbid. 333 crisis which toppled Pérez Godoy.72 Similar to this version is Victor Villanueva's suggestion that Pérez Godoy had actually attempted to cement a pact among Odria, Haya de la Torre, and himself to block the victory of Belafinde in the coming elections. This was the main reason for his removal according to this interpretation. Pérez Godoy himself pointed to the unwillingness of the three co-presidents to continue the reforms initiated while he was Junta president as the main reason for his dis- missal.74 He correctly maintained that the tax reform measures initiated by the military government on January 1, 1963 were reversed soon after Lindley LOpez replaced him. On March 21 the Junta issued a decree law that reduced corporate levies, eliminated the special government tax on fish tonnage, and lowered taxes on upper income groups. Taxes on incomes ranging from one million to five million soles per year ($37,300 to $186,000) were reduced from thirty-eight to thirty-four per cent.75 Pérez Godoy claimed that these tax reductions forced the Junta to order a 72 Power afid Society, p. 319, Villanueva, Ejército peruano, 291 and Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 6. 73 La Prensa, March 10, 1963, p. 1. See also Bourricaud, Villanueva, Bjército peruano, p. 291. 74Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire. 75Ibid., and Peruvian Times, March 29, 1963, p. l. 334 comprehensive four per cent cut in government spending for the remainder of its tenure in office.76 While it is true that the cancellation of the tax in— creases initiated while Pérez Godoy was in Office indicated that a more conservative fiscal policy was followed by the military government after March 3, these reductions did not foreshadow a complete abandonment of the reform programs begun earlier. The pilot agrarian reform project in La ConvenciOn was, or course, initiated less than a month after Pérez Godoy was deposed. On March 29 the Junta also announced that its housing construction program would con— tinue; it released plans to build or improve 12,000 homes for teachers at a cost of $35 million (part of which would be funded by foreign assistance loans).77 Additionally, the National Planning Institute and the National Housing Bank were encouraged to continue their operations during the final five months of the military government.78 But because very few substantive reforms were begun during this period and because the tax measures of late March clearly benefited the wealthy,some critics charged that with the rise Of 76Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire. 77BAComercio, March 29, 1963, p. 1. 78Both of these institutions became important for national planning and urban housing programs during the Belafinde administration and the military government that took office in 1968. 335 Lindley LOpez to the presidency of the {BEES the plutocracy was better served.79 In the same vein, the new Junta chief's praise of the United States as the "Great Democracy of the North" during a press conference on March 29 also caused consternation among Peruvian nationalists who had earlier applauded the Apppg's firm public position towards Washington.80 Despite the charges that he led the Junta away from the reforms initiated under Pérez Godoy, Lindley L6pez' comments after the 1963 elections offer evidence that he favored some of the key progressive measures enacted by the military government. On June 15, 1963 Lindley LOpez proudly pointed to the reforms the EEEEE enacted. He claimed that the mili- tary government "had broken with a bad tradition. . . . In the last twelve months, the government has made much prog- ress. . . . It has created a Housing Bank and set down the necessary platform for agrarian reform. We have created an Institute for Planning that has been well received."81 These comments notwithstanding, Lindley LOpez and his col- leagues Torres Matos and Vargas Prada were still primarily political caretakers. 79Villanueva, Bjército peruano, p. 292. 80BA Comercio, March 30, 1963, p. 1. 81Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 5. ....le 353' “13“.". 't 336 Lindley LOpez continued to insist in the face Of much skepticism that the Apppg_was fully committed to leaving office on July 28 after a new president had been elected.82 The ultimatum given to Pérez Godoy in early February, which in part demanded the government's full attention be devoted to facilitating a smooth voting process in 1963, fore- shadowed the style Of the military government after the dis- missal Of the first guppg president. Moreover, when Fernando Belafinde Terry cemented a political alliance in February 1963 that greatly enhanced his presidential chances, the Junta was given an added incentive to hold the elections as scheduled. A Return to the Barracks In late February, 1963 Belafinde's AcciOn Popular consu- mated an agreement with the Partido Democratico Cristiano. BBB_leaders pledged their badly needed electoral support in Lima and Arequipa.83 Also aiding Belafinde's cause was the absence of all but one candidate from the extreme left in the presidential field. The left had been dispersed and its key leaders imprisoned after the January, 1963 roundup by 82§A_Qgflg£gAg, March 4, 1963, p. l, and March 30, 1963, p. l. 83Peruvian Times, March 1, 1963, p. 1, and Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 11. ‘77—" 7 ' 337 the Junta. Therefore no candidates were presented by the Partido Socialista, the Partido Social Progresista and the Frente LiberaciOn Nacional whose standard bearers had gar- nered a total of nearly sixty thousand votes in the 1962 elections. Only a little known candidate, Mario Samame ? BOggio, represented the "independent left" in the 1963 3 elections. Therefore, Belafinde was able to gain the vast % majority of these votes as well as those of the Partido g r Democratico Cristiano.84 Armed forces' support for Belaunde was also a critical factor in the 1963 elections. With the passage of the new electoral statute and the close supervision of the registra- tion process by the EEEEE during 1963, the military assumed almost complete responsibility for the conduct of the elec— tions. Yet, deposed Apppg_president Pérez Godoy later claimed that there were voting irregularities involving the use Of blank ballots that favored Belafinde in the Aprista strongholds of Cajamarca and Trujillo.85 Although Haya de la Torre and Odria were again allowed to seek the presidency, both candidates were clearly unacceptable to the officer corps.86 It seems likely that the military would have again 84Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," pp. 9-11, and Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 320. 85 Pérez Godoy questionnaire. 86Interview with Victor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru. 338 intervened to prevent the victory of Haya de la Torre or Odria had such been the result of the balloting in 1963. Odria's last minute pact with Haya de la Torre imme- diately before the gpup of July 18 made him even more Objectionable to many officers who considered him the symbol of intrigue and political reaction.87 The military govern- ment decided to risk allowing Odria and Haya de la Torre to run again in 1963 because they controlled the electoral machinery and Belafinde's presidential chances appeared de- cidedly better than they had been before the 1962 elections. The armed forces leaders also recognized that the cancella- tion of the candidacies of Odria and Haya de la Torre would have made the electoral process a political sham; this would have unquestionably weakened Belafinde's legitimacy once he assumed the presidency. In the elections held on June 9, 1963 Belafinde emerged a decisive victor over both Haya de la Torre and Odria. The final vote tabulation showed Belafinde with 708,931 or 39 per cent, while Haya de la Torre tallied 623,532 or 34.3 per cent and Odria trailed 463,325 and 25.5 per cent.88 Of the three candidates, only Odria lost votes from the previous election, and the relative honesty of the voting 87Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 320. 88Peruvian Times, June 21, 1963, p. l. 339 is demonstrated by the 66,000 vote increase in the ABBA chief's total. Belafinde's victory was attributable to his ability to harness the votes of the far left, which had gone to three different candidates in 1962, and his alliance with the BBB, whose candidate had polled nearly 50,000 votes in the previous election. In the 1963 balloting Mario Samame Boggio attracted only a miniscule one per cent Of the total votes cast, opening the way for Belafinde's electoral gains.89 In the congressional balloting, however, Belafinde's AcciOn Popular fell far short of gaining a majority in the senate or the chamber of deputies. The AB and BBB bloc won only twenty of the forty-five seats in the upper chamber while ABBA controlled eighteen seats and Odria's BBQ the remaining seven.90 Of the 140 seats in the chamber of deputies, Belafinde's forces won only fifty seats, Apristas occupied forty-eight and the BBQ twenty-seven. Five seats went to independent candidates.91 In view of his party's minority position in the con- gress, Belafinde tried to establish a modus operandi with APRA and the UNO in order to obtain a working legislative majority. After a series of conferences between Belaunde, 891bid. goIbid. 91Ibid. 340 Odria and Haya de la Torre during early July, however, the president-elect failed to reach an agreement. An important item impeding an accord was Belaunde's proposed agrarian reform program, which neither the BBB or the ABBA represen- 92 After Belafinde's efforts tatives were ready to support. to construct a legislative coalition fell through, ABBA and the BBB arrived at an agreement on July 26 to control the election Of congressional officers in the voting that occurred the following day.93 Thus when Belafinde took the oath of office on July 28, he faced a presidential tenure with a hostile congress. In strict accordance with the repeated statements of the EEEEE during 1962 and 1963, General Lindley LOpez delivered the presidential sash to Belafinde on July 28. The guppg_was obviously pleased with the results of the election; soon after Belafinde declared victory, the chief of the military household of the Apppg_called at his private residence to present the congratulations of the three co- presidents of the military government.94 When the armed forces Officers returned to their barracks after restoring 92Ibid., July 12, 1963, p. 1, July 19, 1963, p. 1, and August 2, 1963, p. 1. 93Ibid., August 2, 1963, p. 1. 94p; Comercio, July 3, 1963, p. 1. 341 the presidency to civilian control, there was a strong cur- rent Of Opinion in the Lima press to the effect that the military--having witnessed the election Of a candidate closely allied with their professional interests--would now be satisfied to remain politically aloof in the years to come.95 But Richard Patch, the American Universities Field Staff representative in Peru, offered a more insightful contemporary analysis of the new president's relationship with the armed forces: The Officers expect much and they tend to be impatient. If Belaunde is unable to resolve differences and under- take reforms by constitutional means, there remain officers who believe that the welfare Of the country is above the constitution and bears no relationship to the observance of democratic processes. The memory of the coup of July 18, 1962 1ingers.96 The impatience of armed forces officers that Patch refers to resulted from their feeling that the military should be in the forefront of the campaign for basic change in Peruvian society; civilian leaders would have to allow for their greater participation in the process of national development. This institutional self-confidence stemmed, in great part, from the military man's belief that he was a well-educated professional. 95Victor Villanueva,£Nueva mentalidad militar pp Ag Peru? (Lima, 1969), p. 7. 96 Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 14. 342 The Armed Forces in 1963 In sharp contrast with the inadequate level of profes- sional military training at the end of the Benavides admin- istration in 1939, the Peruvian Officer of 1963 was one of the most highly schooled in all of Latin America. Army Officers, after four years of preparation at the military academy, were expected to undergo eighteen months of speci- alized training before even being considered for promotion to captain. And if an officer wanted to advance beyond the rank of major it was almost mandatory to complete a two-year, three thousand hour training course at the Escuela Superior _dpGuerra.97 Especially after 1950, entrance into the BBB became highly competitive, and despite being permitted to apply up to four separate times for admission, it has been estimated that only thirty to fifty per cent of the appli- cants were eventually successful.98 A few top graduates of the BBB_were sent overseas to complete specialized command courses in the United States (and to a lesser extent Europe) after finishing their train- ing in Peru. Promising Officers in the navy and air force 97Interview with Victor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru,and Astiz and Garcia, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies," p. 672. 981bid. 343 also attended U.S. military schools to supplement their advanced training. Seven of the eleven members of the original military government that took office after the July 18, 1962 gppp trained for extended periods in the U.S. General Lindley LOpez attended the Command School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during 1946-1947, as did his Co-President, General Pedro Vargas Prada. Vargas Prada's air force colleagues, Generals Jesus Melgar Escuti (Minis- ter of Agriculture) and José Galiarde Schiaffino (Minister of Labor) each spent more than eighteen months in the United States during the mid-1940's studying at air force installations in Texas. The highly respected Foreign Minister, Vice-Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa, also took in- tensive training at the United States Navy's Fleet Sonar School at Key West, Florida during the late 1940's.99 A number of military men, including Colonels Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, José Benavides, and Alfredo Arrisueno, were among a later generation of officers who rose to prominent posi- tions in the armed forces after 1963. Before that year they had completed service at such installations as Fort Leavenworth, Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington.100 99U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 1962, p. 15423. 100Marvin Alisky, Peruvian Political Perspective (Tempe, Arizona, 1975), pp. 17-18. 344 Many graduates of the BBB and advanced foreign military training schools served as instructors at Peru's various military education centers after the completion of their com- mand training. Both Generals Lindley LOpez and Pérez Godoy taught at the BBB after graduating from that institution. Lindley LOpez also served as director of the Cavalry School and the Centro B3_Instrucci6n Militar del Perfi (BABB) during the late 1940's and early 1950's.101 With the military's strong commitment to education it was possible for an Officer, if he was one of the few selected to study at the BABB, to spend nearly one third of his thirty-five year military career in a variety of service schools. Up to one half of an officer's career could be directly related to educational pursuits if he also served as an instructor or an adminis- trator in these schools.102 Before 1963 leading military educators clearly perceived the critical role of education in molding the Peruvian armed forces into a modern, profes- sional institution capable of assuming an active role in the struggle against the nation's backwardness. The first CAEM director, General José del Carmen Marin, stated this concept clearly when he said:"When we [the Peruvian military] 101"La Junta Militar del Gobierno," RMP, LVII, 671 (July-August, 1962), 4. 102Astiz and Garcia, "The Peruvian Military, Achievment Orientation Training, and Political Tendencies," p. 673. 345 have a solid school system, nobody will be able to stop "103 us. Understandably, after 1939, military promotions were closely linked to one's ranking in the military academy graduating class. Between 1940 and 1965 eighty per cent of the officers reaching the rank Of general pp division (division general) graduated in the top twenty-five per cent of their academy class. For general dp_brigada (brigadier general) the figure was nearly fifty—four per cent. As regards the officer corps in general, without attendance at the academy it became almost impossible to rise through the ranks to the grade Of second lieutenant after 1950. Between 1951 and 1965 less than four per cent of the new members of the army Officer corps were promoted from the ranks. This is in sharp contrast with the figure of twenty-seven per cent for the period 1936-1950.104 The emphasis on intensive education and the direct relationship between academic rank and professional promo- tion helped to create the armed forces' self-image as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society. It was true that politics, family ties and the traditional 103Astiz and Garcia, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation Training, and Political Tendencies," p. 672. 104Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica, 1969), p. 7, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 408. 346 military criterion of discipline still played a critical role in professional advancement in 1963.105 But talented military men were not as stifled by these factors as they had been until the administration of Manuel Odria. Because of his comprehensive training, the outstanding young Peru- vian Officer of 1963 had far more confidence in himself and his institution than earlier generations of military men. This led him to perceive an expanded role for the armed forces in national affairs and to be less tolerant Of civil- ian politicians who failed to find solutions for pressing national problems. President Fernando Belafinde Terry-ea civilian technocrat whom armed forces officers trusted more than they did most civilian leaders-—was faced with this reality as he began his term in July, 1963. Conclusion The 1962-1963 military government manifested the chang- ing role of the armed forces in Peruvian society. Neither Generals Lindley LOpez nor Pérez Godoy were as avidly reformist as many younger officers who promoted the military 105Astiz and Garcia, "The Peruvian Military, Achieve- ment Orientation Training and Political Tendencies," argue that the Peruvian military of the 1960's is still subject to the traditional problems of nepotism and an overemphasis on the issue of discipline versus academic merit in the armed forces promotion process. The authors are fundament— ally skeptical of the military's self-proclaimed image as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society. 347 as the principal agent of change in Peru. None of the four co-presidents of the Apppp had attended the BABM, and that institution's contribution to the reform programs Of the military government was not significant. Additionally, all members of the Junta, with the possible exception of Pérez Godoy, perceived themselves essentially as political care- takers during the twelve months they held power. Neverthe- less, the military leaders introduced substantive reforms aimed at immediately reducing the potential for internal subversion while at the same time establishing the frame- work for long term change. Significantly, the military government acted in a uni- fied institutional fashion and not as an extension of an individual leader's personal ambitions. Pérez Godoy's ouster was in part due to his unwillingness to conform to the collective style of leadership advocated by the other Bppppoembers. His fall can also be interpreted as a re- jection of the old style of military politics that benefited the careers of leaders like Sanchez Cerro, Benavides and Odria. Politically, what was Of paramount importance to the military government was the transfer of executive leadership to Fernando Belafinde Terry, whom the armed forces leadership felt was least likely to reverse the trend Of cautious reformism they had begun. This transfer was suc- cessfully accomplished despite a growing belief within the 348 officer corps that existing political institutions were incapable of implementing the reforms necessary to insure national development and commensurate internal security. The increasing acceptance of this belief by growing numbers of military men set the tone of Belaunde's relationship with the armed forces for the ensuing five years. CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION The two primary influences upon the professional develop- ment of the Peruvian armed forces in the period 1939-1963 were national politics and the growing commitment of military men to broaden the dimensions Of their role in national affairs. The military was the dominant force in national political affairs for the entire period of this study. NO Peruvian president after 1912 assumed office without the participation of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the very weakness of the civilian sector in relation to the military produced much of the corporate disunity that plagued the armed forces until the late 1950's. The repeated use of ambitious and discontented military men by competing civilian political power groups stemmed from their own lack of broad-based appeal among the Peruvian pOpu- lace. Even ABBA, which was clearly the strongest political party in the nation, lacked sufficient political strength to achieve power independent of the military. This is demonstrated by ABBA's failure in the relatively honest elections of 1931 and 1962. A case in point was the 1939 elections when Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was forced to rely 349 350 heavily upon the powerful support of General Oscar Benavides in order to be elected president. But characteristically, Benavides' backing of his close political confidant spawned the widespread conspiracy of General Antonio Rodriguez Ramirez, which included both Apristas and rightist opponents Of Benavides. As president, Prado was compelled-~even after the unifying impact of the Ecuador War--to manipulate armed forces promotions and other internal military affairs because of his need to strengthen his tenuous hold on political power. Prado's interference in primarily military matters for partisan political purposes was nothing new. This tactic had been employed by most Peruvian chief executives before 1939. Presidents Leguia and Benavides were particularly skillful in the use of promotions and transfers as effective political tools, and Prado followed their example with a good degree Of success. But the end result of repeated civil-military intrigues and the infusion of partisan poli- tics into such sensitive issues as promotions and military assignments was factionalism, frustration and very poor armed forces morale. These problems were most severe during the chaotic Sanchez Cerro era and again during the last ten months of the Bustamante regime. But it was during the first Prado regime that activist army junior officers first clearly articulated their disgust with the state of their 351 profession and their distrust of senior Officers and civil- ian politicians they felt were responsible for the armed forces' problems. The junior army Officers who created the Comité Revolu- cionaria pp Oficiales del Ejército (CROE) in 1944 correctly complained that the politicization of the armed forces had undermined the basis of military professionalism. These Officers sought to promote a "higher concept Of discipline" because they believed that discipline was the most important quality of a good officer. Discipline by their definition meant a strict abstention from politics. Many members of BBQB including its founder Major Victor Villanueva also sought badly overdue reforms of military regulations and procedures that would have modernized the internal structure of the armed forces. The paradox of the BBQB_movement was that they employed political activism to accomplish their Objectives. The AncOn revolt of 1945 and the far more serious Callao rebellion Of 1948 were partly initiated by officers affiliated with BBQB_whO were convinced that revo- lution was the only course left Open to them. It was logical for BBQB dissidents in 1945 and navy enlisted men in 1948 to ally with ABBA elements because that party was the only broad—based political power group in the nation. The nature of ABBA'S relationship with the armed forces is one of the fundamental problems of this study. Aprismo 352 was the only political movement in Peru before the emergence of Fernando Belafinde Terry's AcciOn Popular that demonstrated any real political strength or more than a token commitment to social and political reform. During the period 1931-1948 APRA elements allied with dissident junior officers who sought substantive military reforms or were simply disgusted with the conservative politics Of their senior Officers and the nation's civilian political leaders. The most notable examples of this after 1939 were the AncOn and Callao revolts. But ABBA leaders were also willing to conspire with senior officers whose interests often conflicted with those of their junior colleagues. In 1939 when ABBA supported General Rodriguez, and then again in 1948 when Haya de la Torre attempted to enlist the revolutionary support of Generals José del Carmen Marin and Juan de Dios Cuadros, the mutual distrust between the high—ranking dissidents and militant junior officers and enlisted men helped doom both movements to failure. ABBA leaders adOpted these tactics because they were prepared to use any methods to achieve national power. But their methods resulted in the alienation of both radical armed forces revolutionaries and rightist military commanders. After 1948 ABBA was no longer a revolutionary force in Peru nor a serious threat to the unity of the officer corps. But its swing to the right during the 1950's failed to con— vince many Officers that the party was no longer dedicated 353 to destroying the armed forces as Admiral Guillermo Tirado Lamb claimed before the 1962 elections. Thus the thirty year old rivalry that existed between ABBA and the armed forces was an important factor in the annulment of the 1962 electoral process. By 1962, however, the military's insti- tutional self—image had undergone a marked transformation from the years of ABBA's revolutionary activism of the 1940's. Based primarily on an increasingly sophisticated con- ception of the dimensions of national defense, the armed forces' professional perspectives widened to incompass social and economic functions that, for the most part, had been traditionally within the realm of the civilian sector. The first solid indication that the armed forces were adopt- ing a broader view of national defense came with the framing of the Army General Staff study entitled the "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization" in 1944. The total war concepts outlined by the French in the late 1930's and employed to their fullest extent by the major combatants during World War II prompted this army study. But efforts to initiate the military and administrative programs pro- posed by the general staff met with little success. It was not until the late 1950's that an armed forces joint com- mand was created and many of the administrative procedures and internal military regulations were modernized. 354 In the meantime, however, intellectually active army officers had recognized the realities of the post-1945 world military power structure based upon the possession of atomic weaponry. This meant that the Peruvian armed forces'mili- tary potential would always be severely restricted by its limited conventional equipment and Peru's social and economic backwardness. This was recognized as the reality of the armed forces situation by army intellectuals such as Generals Carmen Marin and Marcial Romero Pardo. Those men sought to use the Centro pg Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) as an agency for outlining a more pragmatic professional role for the armed forces as well as providing the best possible edu- cation for promising military officers. The BABB became the single most important institution for rationalizing the armed forces' role as an agent for Peru's economic and social development. ggpg strategists linked development with national defense because they reason- ed that Peru's military strength, the potential for internal subversion and the possibility of external military invasion were all intricately related to the nation's economic and social progress. During the 1950's, as armed forces officers became better trained and in some cases highly schooled in sophisticated technical fields, they began to logically assume that the military should properly plan and conduct important development projects. Officers at the CAEM thus 355 prepared the regional project for the Peruvian ppAyp area in 1958, but it was subsequently rejected by the conserva- tive civilian Prime Minister, Pedro Beltran. While administrators, instructors and students at the BABB_most effectively articulated a broader mission for the military in national affairs, they were not exclusive pro- ponents of a social function for the armed forces. This had been a consistent, if not always frequently stated, theme in the writings of army officers since 1904. After 1950, proposals for the military's participation in educa- tion, transportation, communication and public administra- tion projects became a very common subject of articles in the nation's leading armed service journals. The widespread acceptance of the armed forces' commit- ment to social action projects is demonstrated by the 1962 assessment of the armed forces as a "physically and intel- lectually prepared force" oriented towards the solution of Peru's national problems by the conservative Navy Minis- ter, Guillermo Tirado Lamb. It is even more strongly illus- trated by the support Of the candidacy Of the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belafinde Terry in 1962 by a significant majority of the officer corps. With the failure of the Belafinde candidacy in 1962, the ensuing actions of the military government reflected the military's acceptance of the most basic precepts of the armed forces' emerging theory 356 of national defense. The military government's pilot agrar— ian reform project in the La ConvenciOn region indicated that the Junta recognized that reform could be an effective tool for defusing tensions among the rural population. Despite the very limited nature of this agrarian reform pro- gram, it still represented the first substantive effort by any Peruvian regime to initiate desperately needed reform in Peru's agrarian sector. The July, 1962 gppp_and the ouster of General Ricardo Pérez Godoy in March, 1963 from the Apppp also marked a critical turning point in this study. These actions repre— sented the high point of institutional solidarity for the armed forces up to that time. Efforts by the Joint Command to enlist the support Of the entire officer corps before the pppp, and the institutional nature of the military government once it assumed power were sharp departures from the patterns of past golpes and the personalist rule of military caudillos like Sanchez Cerro, Benavides, and Odria. Pérez Godoy's fall from power was partly the result of his efforts to challenge the strength of the Appppfs commitment to collective leadership. The Officer corps was not seriously factionalized by the events of 1962-1963 as it had been by the major politi- cal controversies of the period before 1956. Junior as well as senior officers were in basic agreement that Fernando 357 Belafinde Terry was the best qualified civilian political leader to direct the national development advocated by the armed forces. But the military man's traditional distrust of civilians, coupled with the unwillingness Of past civil— ian regimes to confront Peru's basic national problems, made the armed forces a restless ally of the new president. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY This essay reviews the documents, interviews, books and articles that are cited in this study. It does not include an exhaustive listing of the literature on civil- military relations in Peru for the period examined in this dissertation. But I believe nothing of major significance is missing. Unpublished Primary Sources The primary Peruvian archival collection consulted for this study was the ColecciOn de Volantes, located in the Sala pg Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional del Peru. This collection contains handbills, political propaganda, and manifestos of various legal and clandestine civilian and military groups, and is contained in folders arranged in one to three year groups for the period 1939-1963. The folders for the late 1940's and early 1960's provided the most useful material for this study, but occasional documents of importance for the remaining years made a careful perusal of these folders mandatory. The chief sources of documentation in the United States were the National Archives in Washington and the Federal 358 359 Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. The Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Peru, Record Group 59, Serial File 823.00 (Political Affairs) and 823.20 (Military Affairs) were examined for the period 1936- 1947. These documents provided invaluable commentaries on internal political developments and assessments of individu- al military and civilian personalities as well as the United States Government's policy towards Peru. Particularly use- ful for an examination of internal military affairs for the period 1940-1951 were the files of the Military Intelligence Division Of the War Department General Staff, Record Groups 165, and 319. Access to Record Group 319 is restricted after 1945, but with a clearance from the Department Of the Army (Office of the Adjutant General) I was able to review classified documents through the year 1951. All notes taken on classified documents must be reviewed by Officials at the Federal Records Center or by the staff of the Department Of the Army, but this process was handled swiftly and effi- ciently by the personnel involved with my research materials. I also found the Records of the Office of Strategic Services (058), Record Group 226 of occasional value for this study. Clarification Of a number Of problems in this study has been provided in correspondence with Victor Villanueva. His letters provided especially helpful information concern— ing the attitudes Of armed forces officers regarding 360 promotions after the Ecuador War and the participation of ABBA in the abortive electoral campaign of retired General and Senator Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz in 1950. The list of the Peruvian military casualties in the Ecuador War with troop affiliation entitled "Relacion nominal de los Oficiales, clases y soldados muertos en los acciones de armas en la fronteras del norte y nor-oriente en el conflicto con el Ecuador en 1941," is available in the Centro Bp_Estudios Historico-Militares del Peru. This list was helpful for my study as it was the only com- plete list of Peruvian military casualties that I was able to locate. Published Primary Sources The Centro dp_Estudios Historico-Militares del Perfi is the main repository for the published documents dealing with the Peruvian military. The staff lists for the army officer corps are contained in the EscalafOn General del Ejército, 1939-1956, 1962-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra). The general orders for the army in addition to decrees of military governments, information on armed forces foreign study missions and punitive action taken against armed forces dissidents is found in Ordenes Generales del Ejército, 1948-1958, 1962-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra). Similar data for the other armed services and the police is provided 361 in the Ordenes Generals gp_Marina, 1947, 1950-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Marina); Ordenes Generales pp Aeronautica, 1947—1953, 1955-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Aeronautica); and Ordenes Generales pg Guardia Civil y Policia, 1949 (Lima: Ministerio de Gobierno y Policia). The source for military legislation is LegislaciOn Militar del Peru, 1939-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra and various publishers). Two very useful Memorias (Reports) of Peruvian Ministers of the Navy are located in the Sala de Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional. They are: Memoria anual presentada por el senor contralmirante Mariano B. Melgar, ministro dp_ marina a1 sefior presidente constitucional de la repfiblica (Lima: Ministerio de Marina, 1947-1948), and Sintesis expositiva de Ap_gestion ministerial del vice-almirante Guillermo Tirado Lamb (Lima: Ministerio de Marina, 1962). Presidential speeches and records of the proceedings in the national congress are found in the Sala de Investiga- ciones. I found the most helpful of these to be: General Manuel A. Odria, Mensaje presentado pA_congreso nacional por sefior presidente constitucional de la repfiblica, General Manuel A. Odria (Lima: Direccion General de Inform- acidn, 1955); President Manuel Odria, Principios y postula- dos del movimiento restaudor gp_Arequipia; Extractos d3 discursos y_mensajes del General Don Manuel A. Odria (Lima: Direccion General de InformaciOn, 1956); and Peru, Congreso, 362 diario pg 103 debates pg las cémaras pg senadores y diputa- dos (Lima: 1945-1948). Of these Congressional records the most valuable for this study was: Diario pp.los debates del senado: Legislativa extraordinario pp 1946, volume II (Lima: 1946). The principal source for government expenditures and general breakdowns of military budgets (outlays for each of the three armed services without reference to specific spending proposals) for this study were: Anuario estadistico del Perfi(Lima: Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1948- 1949), and Anuario dp_estadistico del Peru (Lima: DirecciOn National de Estadistica, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1966). These materials are also located in the Biblioteca National. Additional information on military spending was obtained from the Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and from the Peruvian Times, which carried pro- posed and actual military budgets (total figures only) and news of specific purchases of military equipment by the Peruvian government. An extremely valuable personal account of one Peruvian army officer's involvement in many of the critically impor— tant civil-military issues of the 1940's is former Major Victor Villanueva, AA sublevaciOn aprista del 48: La tragedia pp pp_pueblo y_pp partido (Lima: Milla Batres, 1973). Villanueva's first-hand account of the civil—military 363 conspiracies of 1948 and his own participation in the 1948 Callao revolt is the single most valuable source for these important events. Another valuable primary account of a prominent senior army officer's military and political career experiences is Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, Memorias del general g3 brigada E.P. Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz (Lima: N.P., 1962). Two valuable publications of the Peruvian armed forces dealing with the 1962 elections and the history of the army Officer college are: BA fuerza armada y_§A_proceso elector— il.§2.1962 (Lima: Fuerzas Armadas, 1963), which provides the military's version of the incidents of fraud in the election, and Historia £2.12 escuela militar del Peru (Lima: Reprografica, 1962), a comprehensive history of Peru's principle military training institution. The most useful primary source material published in the United States were: Papprs Relating pp the Foreign Relations p£_the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, various years), and the United States Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, various years). Personal Interviews Interviews conducted with a number of Peruvian and United States civilian and military figures who were 364 intricately involved in the central issues of this study provided important (and often differing) sources of informa- tion. Those interviews, which I found to be most helpful were with former army Major Victor Villanueva (whom I con- versed with at length on a number of occasions during my stay in Peru), Division General (retired) and former Co- military President of Peru in 1962, Ricardo Pérez Godoy, ABBA chief Victor Rafil Haya de la Torre, and former United States Ambassador to Peru, James I. Loeb. Villanueva, not only provided insights into many key events in Peruvian civil-military relations during the course of this study, but was also immensely helpful in suggesting research leads. General Pérez Godoy also consented to complete a question- naire which provided valuable interpretations of his role in the various policies and controversies of the 1962-1963 military government. Haya de la Torre kindly granted me two lengthy interviews in which the whole range of ABBA's participation in national politics for the period 1930-1968 was discussed. Conversations with Ambassador Loeb in December, 1973 touched upon key internal military and civil- ian political issues during his tenure as United States Ambassador. They also provided helpful interpretations of the United States policy towards Peru in the period 1960- 1963. Among other useful interviews were those with Fernando Schwalb LOpez Aldana, one of the founders of the 365 AcciOn Popular and President Fernando Belafinde Terry's first Prime Minister in 1963, and APRA leaders Ramiro Prialé and Armando Villanueva del Campo. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Theses By far the most valuable doctoral dissertation for this study is Allen Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations in Peru: 1914-1945" (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1973). A useful treatment of the ABBA primarily after 1950 is Edward Charles Epstein, "Motivational Bases for Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party" (Champaign: University Of Illinois, 1970). José Z. Garcia, "The Velasco Coup in Peru" (Albuquerque: University Of New Mexico, 1974) provides an especially helpful discussion of the BABB. Finally, Angela King Westwater, "Recognition of Latin American Military Regimes During the Kennedy Administration" (New York: New York University, 1967) is a masters thesis that displays solid research on the subject of U.S. policy towards Peru's military government of 1962-1963. Newspapers I relied heavily upon a variety of Peruvian newspapers and The New York Times for day-to-day accounts of important events throughout the time—span covered in this dissertation. 366 The Peruvian newspapers, for the most part, were strongly partisan in their political viewpoint. The most important exception was the Peruvian Times, the main English language newspaper in Peru. The Peruvian Times generally adopted a relatively impartial position during major political con- troversies, although during the Odria era it was noticeably pro-administration. This newspaper was also the best source for national economic news and particularly the role Of foreign investors in Peru. The political right in Peru was represented by the two Oldest papers BA Comercio and AA Prensa. BA Comercio was also the most anti-ABBA and staunch- ly nationalist journal in the nation. The ABBA was repre- sented by its party newspaper, Bp_Tribuna, which was pub- lished intermitantly during the period 1939-1963. For the year 1962, I used the official government newspaper BA Peruano as a source for the details of government policies and proposed programs. Other journals that were helpful for my research were: BA Cronica, BA Callao, Noticias, and Ap_Jornada. Peruvian Military Journals and Periodicals Peru's principal military journals are critically important sources of military theory and the professional attitudes of the armed forces. While the writings of a few members of the officer corps do not necessarily represent 367 the dominant thinking of the military in general, they do reflect changing perceptions of professionalism by some of its most intellectually active Officers. In my review of the military journals I found a number of articles by military men who were later to become some of the most influential leaders in their own institutions. The main journal of the Peruvian armed forces is the Revista Militar del Perfi which replaced the Boletin del Ministerio pg Guerra y Marina in 1919. The Revista Militar was published monthly until 1950, and then four to six times yearly thereafter. The Revista gp_Escue1a Superior gp_Guerra first appeared in 1953 and soon became a leading outlet for the progressive military theories of Peruvian army Officers. Actualidad Militar, beginning in 1962, served as a form of newsletter for the armed forces and provided more information on indi- vidual military figures than could be found in the other journals. The other military periodicals which I reviewed were: the Revista gp_Marina, the Revista Escuela Militar gp_Chorrillos, and the Revista del Centro pp Instruccién Militar del Peru. All of these military journals are located in the Centro dp Estudios Historicos Militares. The two most important Peruvian periodicals for my research purposes were the nation's leading news magazine in the early 1960's, Caretas, and the Revista Diplomatica Peruana Internacional. Caretas was characterized by its 368 bold reporting of controversial news items and carried inter- views with many of Peru's leading civilian and military personalities. The Revista Diplomatica carried occasional articles dealing with military affairs but was more oriented towards international news. Secondary Sources: Books Any review of twentieth century Peruvian civil-military relations must begin with a discussion of the ten key books of Victor Villanueva. They provide valuable insights into the armed forces mentality and the relationship of the civil- ian body politic to Peru's military institutions. As a former revolutionary activist, Villanueva remains fundamen- tally skeptical of the military's commitment to reform, although he recognizes that the Peruvian armed forces are no longer guardians of the conservative political and social order as they were prior to the 1950's. Villanueva's best book is, perhaps his previously discussed BA sublevaciOn pprista del AB: Tragedia g3 pp_pueblo y pp_partido, which displays a remarkable comprehension of Peruvian politics dur- ing the 1940's. The most thorough treatment of the armed forces role in twentieth century Peru is Ejército peruano: Del caudillaje anarquico pA_militarismo reformista (Lima: Juridica, 1973). His first general treatment of militarism in Peru is the now somewhat dated BA militarismo pp AA Peru 369 (Lima: T. Sceuch, 1962). This book was followed by his study of the 1962-1963 military government Bp afio bajo BA sable (Lima: T. Sceuch, 1963). Two of his books deal with the specific themes of the changing military mentality in Peru and the reasons for the new professional outlook. They are: .aNueva mentalidad militar pp BA Peru? (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1969) and 100 afios del ejército peruano (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1972). Villanueva BA CAEM y_Ap_revoluci6n pp_Ap fuerza armada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1973), is the best study of this key military institution. The most complete account of Hugo Blanco's career as a peasant organizer in the Cuzco region is Villanueva Bpgp_ Blanco y AA rebelidn compesina (Lima: Amuata, 1967). Finally, this prolific writer's latest book is the first of a proposed two-part study of the APRA's role in Peruvian national affairs; BA APRA pp ppsca del poder (Lima: Edi- torial Horizonte, 1975) best displays the careful historical research that has characterized Villanueva's most recent works. General works dealing with the military from both an historical and political science perspective that were use- ful for this study are: Morris Janowitz, The MilitaryAp the Political Development 9A_New Nations (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1964); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics pp New 370 Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); John J. Johnson, The Military and Society Ap Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics Ap Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1964); Lyle N. McAlister, Anthony Maingot, and Robert Potash, The Military Ap Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970). Other than Villanueva's books, the best sources for the Peruvian military in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are: Luis Humberto Delgado, BA militarismo pp El Perfi, 1821-1930 (Lima: Imprenta Gil, 1930); Carlos Delli- piane, Historia militar del Peru, fifth ed. (Lima: Minis- terio de Guerra, 1964); and Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: palacio pp.gpbierno (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1967). De la Barra, Historiografia general y_militar peruana y archivos: introducciOn BA catalogo del Archivo Historico Militar del Bppp (Lima: Tallares Graficas DIET, 1962) is a fairly help- ful bibliographical guide for materials dealing with nine— teenth century civil-military relations. Useful recent treatments Of the post-World War II Peruvian military are: Julio Cotler, Crisis politica y. populismo militar §p_pA_Perfi (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1969); and BA_populismo militar como modelo pp. desarrollo nacional: pA_caso peruano (Lima: Instituto de 371 Estudios Peruanos, 1969). The best works in English are Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1968); Peruvian Military Relations with the United States (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970); Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changinngilitary Perspectives Ap_Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1971); and Liisa North, Civil- Military Relations Ap_Argentina, Chile and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1966). Einuadi's brief but incisive commentaries on the Peruvian armed forces provide a helpful theoretical frame- work for the researcher, while North's work is one of the first efforts to deal with the subject of emerging social activism in the Peruvian military. John Stewart Ambler, The French Army Ap_Politics: 1945-1962 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966) was the most valuable source for an understanding of the French military theories that had a significant impact upon the Peruvian armed forces after 1896. In the category of general histories Jorge Basadre, Historia gg_Ap'repfiblica del Perfi (12 vols. fifth edition, Lima: Historia, 1964), is the most comprehensive history of Peru through the year 1933. Useful general reviews of politics since 1895 are Enrique Chrinos Soto, BA Peru frente 372 E junio dp_l962: sintesis 92.13 historia politica B3 AB repfiblica (Lima: Imprenta Universo, 1962); and Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Autopsia dp_los partidos politicos (Lima: Imprenta Minerva, 1961). A valuable two-volume collection of essays by distinguished Peruvian scholars on a variety Of social, political, economic, and military topics is José Pareja Paz-Soldan, ed., VisiOn del Peru pp EA siglo XX (Lima: Libreria Stadium, 1962, 1963). Fredrick B. Pike, The Modern History p£_Peru (New York: Praeger, 1967), is the best history of modern Peru in English. James C. Carey, Peru and the United States, 1900-1962 (Notre Dame: Univer- sity of Notre Dame Press, 1964), is the only adequate study of United States-Peruvian relations. Very incisive studies of Peru's social and political power groups are: Francois Bourricaud, Power and SocietyAp COptempprary Peru (New York: Praeger, 1970); Bourricaud et a1., Bp_oligarquia pp EA Perfi (Lima: Francisco Monoloa, 1969); Jorge Bravo Bressani, Mito y realidad gp_Ap_oli- garquia peruana (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1966); Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites Ap_ Peruvian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Edward Dew, Politics Ap the Altiplano: The Dynamics 9:. Change Ap Rural Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969); and James L. Payne, Labor and Politics Ap Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). 373 The role Of the ABBA in Peruvian politics has been the subject of hundreds of studies by Peruvian and foreign scholars most of which have been too polemical to contribute significantly to legitimate scholarship. The best pro- Aprista studies are: Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program 9A the Peruvian Aprista Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953); Luis Alberto Sanchez, Haya SS.£§ Torre y_gA_Apra (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, 1955); and Haya B3 AB Torre g_gA_politico (Santiago de Chile: Ercilla, 1934); Felipe Cossio del Pomar, Haya AA AA Torre: pA_indoamericano (Lima: Editorial Nueva Dia, 1946); and prisoneros apristas (Lima: Editorial Nuevo Dia, 1946). Of Haya de la Torre's own writings the most useful for an understanding Of his personal philosophy are: (£A_donde yp indoamerica? (second edition, Santiago de Chile: Ercilla, 1935); BA anti-imperialismo y_§A_Apra (third edition, Lima: Editorial Amauta, 1970); Ap_defensa continental (fourth edi- tion, Lima: Editorial Amuata, 1967); and Trienta afios pp aprismo (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura EconOmica, 1956). Grant Hilliker, The Politics pp Reform Ap Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass Parties pp Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971) is a good balanced assessment of APRA's political programs. Robert Alexander, The Ideas and Writings 9; Victor Raul Haya pg Ap_Torre 374 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1973), provides valuable English translations of Haya de la Torre's most important writings. Important studies that display a strong anti-APRA view- point are: Victor Villanueva, BA sublevaciOn aprista del 48: tragedia 92.22 pueblo y pp_partido and BA_APRA §p_busca del poder; Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan Way (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1951); Fredrick B. Pike, The Modern History 9A Peru; and Rogger Mercado, AA revoluciOn pg Trujillo y_Ap.traci6n del Apra (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1966). The best Objective study of the roots of Aprismo and the party's early years is Peter Klaren, Moderni- zation, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins 2A the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1973). Also useful for the early years of APRA is Thomas M. Davies, Indian Integration Ap Peru: A Half Century 9: Experience, 1900-1948 (Lincoln, Nebraska: Uni- vertiy of Nebraska Press, 1974). José Carlos Mariategui, 1 ensayos pp interpretacién SE.£E realidad peruana (tenth edition, Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1965); and John M. Baines, Revolution Ap Peru: Mariategui and the Myth (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), provide im— portant insights into the ideas and struggles of the Peru- vian left while APRA was emerging as its most cohesive representative during the late 1920's. Former Peruvian 375 President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero's personal account of his three years as chief executive, Tres afios de lucha por la democracia en el Peru (Buenos Aires: Artes Graficas Bartolome U. Chiesino, 1949), is strongly critical of the ABBA's role in formenting disorders that eventually brought his overthrow. Peru's involvement in the Leticia conflict with Colombia, in 1933 and the Ecuador war of 1941 is treated effectively in Bryce WOod, The United States and Latin American Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). The best primarily military studies of the Ecuador war are: David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marafién: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute (New York: Brookman Associates, 1964); Felipe de la Barra, BA conflicto peruano—ecuatoriano y la victoriosa campana gp_l94l pp_1as fronteras pp Zarumilla y nor-oriente (Lima: Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares del Perfi, 1969); General Eloy G. Ureta's personal account, Apuntes sobre una compafia, 1941 (Madrid: Editorial Antorocha, 1953); and Luis Humberto Delgado, Las gperras del Peru: campana del Ecuador battalla gp_Zarumilla (Lima: Latino America, 1944). Luis A. Rodriguez, AA verdad sobre Ap_agresi6n peruana (Quito: n.p., 1966) presents the Ecuador version of the conflict. The best works dealing with Peruvian elections of 1956, 1962 and 1963 are: César Martin, Dichos y hechos pg AA politica peruana (Lima: Santa Rosa, 1963); and BA ppeludio 376 gp_Ag democracia (Lima: n.p., 1956); Enrique Chrinos Soto, Cuenta y balance pp las elecciones pp 1962 (Lima: Villanueva, 1962); M. Guillermo Ramirez y Berrios, Examen espectral pp las elecciones del 2.S§ junio pp 1963 (Lima: Ravago, 1963); Héctor Cornejo Chavez, Nuevo principios para pp neuvo Perfi (Lima: El Condor, 1960); and Arnold Payne, The Peruvian Coup g} Etat pp 1962: The Overthrow pp Manuel Prado (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of' Political Systems, 1968). The land invasions and peasant strikes of the early 1960's are covered most comprehensively by: Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y_AA_rebeli6n campesina; Hugo Neira, Cuzco: tierra y muerte (Lima: Panamerica, 1964); Héctor Béjar, Peru 1965: Notes 9p_A Guerrilla Experience (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Rogger Mercado, Los guerrillas del Peru (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1967); Carlos Malpica, Guerra p_muerte AA latifundio (Lima: Voz Rebelde, n.d.). Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements Ap Latin America (New York: Doubleday, 1971), is the best review of these activities in English. Fernando Belaunde Terry's political philosophy and program for Peru's economic development prior to his elec- tion as president is outlined in his Ap_conquista del Perfi por los peruanos (Lima: Imprenta Minerva, 1959), which was translated as Peru's Own Conquest (Lima: American Studies 377 Press, 1965). This book contains one of the first clearly articulated appeals by a Peruvian civilian political leader for the full involvement of the armed forces in economic development projects. In this respect, it is the most important source for gaining a clear perception of Belafinde's appeal for developmentalist-oriented armed forces personnel. A number of works were useful as general references for this study. Jack W. Hopkins, The Government Executive pp Modern Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967); Rudolph Gomez, The Peruvian Administrative System (Boulder: The University of Colorado Press, 1969); and Russell H. Fitzgibbon ed., The Constitutions 9: the Americas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), supplied necessary data on the workings of Peru's constitution and governmental system. Willard F. Barber, and C. Neale Ron- ning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter- insupgency and Civic Action Ap_Latin America (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), details United States military civic action projects throughout Latin America and supplied some specific information on Peruvian army projects. Gertrude E. Heare, Trends Ap_Latin American Military Expenditures (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971); and Joseph Loftus, Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-1965 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), provided data on Peru's long-term military 378 expenditures and served as a general check on the figures presented in the Anuario pp Estadistico del Peru. Finally, an informative general reference source with a good up-to- date bibliography is Thomas E. Weil et a1., Area Handbook for Peru (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Print- ing Office, 1972). Secondary Sources: Articles The articles contained in Peru's military journals, particularly the Revista Militar del Perfi (RMP) and the Revista Escuela Superior pg Guerra (RESG) provided valuable biographical sketches, information regarding foreign study missions, and most importantly insights into the changing perceptions Of the Peruvian military's professional role. Among the many articles I reviewed for this study I have selected only a few of the most significant for this dis- cussion. Two articles written over thirty years apart best exemplify the Peruvian army officer's recognition of his institution's social role and the potential of the army as an agency for change. They are: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla Concha, "La funciOn social del ejército peruano en la organizacién de la nacionalidad," BBB, XXX, 10 (October, 1933), 843—872; and Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrin "E1 ejército de hoy y su proyecciOn en nuestra sociedad en periodo de transiciOn," RMP, LIX, 685 379 (November-December, 1964), 1-20. Articles in the Revista Militar during the 1940's reflected army officer's broaden- ing definition of the concept of national defense, their recognition of Peru's need for improved educational pro- grams, and their sensitivity concerning the armed forces' contribution to the national well-being. Some of the most representative of these articles are: Colonel Oscar N. Torres, "La instruccién militar en las universidades y escuelas superiores," BBB, XXXVII, 7 (July, 1940), 369-402; Colonel Juan Mendoza R., "La escuela militar en la obra de la educaciOn nacional," BBB, XLV, 4 (April, 1948), 259-265; Major Colina R. Leonico, "La industria y la defensa nacional," BBB, XLII, 1 (January, 1945), 37-59; Colonel César Pando Esgusquiza, "5E1 ejército es improductivo? BBB, XLVIII, 8 (August, 1946), 371-387; Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Pérez Godoy, "La guerra moderna," BBB, XLV, 5 (May, 1948), 87-91; and Unsigned, "Las escuelas superiores del ejército norte-americano," BBB, XLIV, 8 (August, 1947), 319- 322. The army's strong links to its former French military tutors is illustrated in the Revista Militar's November, 1946 issue which commemorated the fiftieth anniversary Of the founding of the French military mission in Peru. The entire issue is devoted to detailing the work of the mission in Peru, praising its accomplishments, and extolling the virtues of French military figures of the twentieth century. 380 During the 1950's and early 1960's the number of arti- cles in the Revista Militar and the Revista Escuela Superior g3 Guerra which were devoted to traditional non-military issues such as public administration, education, and agrar- ian and Indian problems increased dramatically. Articles dealing with national planning and mobilization for nation- al defense purposes are: Major Victor Sanchez Marin, "El departmento de movilizaciOn integral de la naciOn, elemento basico del ministro de defensa nacional,“ BBBB, II, 3 (Julyv August—September, 1955), 30-53; Colonel Victor Odicio Tamarez, "Ensayo sobre lo que podria ser una ley dey movilizacrfilnacional," BBBB, III, 4 (OctobervNovember— December, 1956), 74-77; Unsigned, "Programa de desarollo nacional y regional para el Peru," BBBB, VIII, 2 (AprilvMay— June, 1961), 7-38; and Captain Arturo Castilla Pizarro, "E1 Peru como naciOn—-nacionalismo y conciencia nacional," BBB, LI, 613 (January-February-March, 1955), 89—101. Some of the most useful articles dealing with the ques- tions Of Indian integration, rural reform, and communicav tion are: Captain Marcial Figueroa Arévalo, "El oficial de ejército y la integraciOn del indigena a la nacionalidad," BBB, LI, 621 (July-August-September, 1955), 104—108; Captain Jorge RendOn Gallegos, "El ejército y la informaciOn publica," BBBB, IX, 2 (April—May-June, 1962), 83-92; Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V., "Geografia social 381 y humana," BBB, LI, 624 (October-November—December, 1955), 41-45; Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V., "La geografia economica frente a la energia atomica," BBB, LII, 627 January-February-March, 1956), 49-61; and Lieutenant Colonel Artemio Garcia Vargas, "Programas de acciOn civica," BBB, LVII, 708 (January-February, 1962), 49-56. Finally, articles that were illustrative of army's concern with internal subversion and problems Of command reform are: Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Gallegos Venero, "E1 estudio de situaciones en guerra subversiva," BBBB, VII, 4 (October-November-December, 1960), 74-84; Major ROmulO Zanabria Zamudio, "Algo sobre guerra de guerrillas," BBBB, III, 1 (January-February-March, 1956), 37-42; and Lieutenant Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, "La escuela comando de estado mayor de Fort Leavenworth y algunas deferencias con la nuestra," BBBB, V, 2 (April-May-June, 1958), 15-35. Three articles by Peruvian army, navy and air force personnel in José Paraja Paz-Soldan, VisiOn del Perfi pp pA pAgAp BB give valuable general histories of the three armed services in the twentieth century. They are: Colonel Victor E. Arce, "La fuerza aérea del Peru en el siglo XX," Visién, volume I, pp. 393-443; Admiral José Valdizan Gamio, "La marina de guerra peruana en el siglo XX," VisiOn, volume I, pp. 351-392; and General Juan Mendoza R., "El ejército peruano en el siglo XX," VisiOn, volume I, pp. 291-349. 382 Carlos A. Astiz, and José Z. Garcia, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies," Western Political Quarterly, XXV, 4 (December, 1972), 667- 685; and Frederick M. Nunn, "Notes on the 'Junta Phenomenon' and the 'Military Regime' in Latin America," The Americas, XXXI, 3 (January, 1975), 237-251 are two very valuable dis- cussions of the Peruvian armed forces changing professional and political orientation. Astiz and Garcia are clearly skeptical of the Peruvian military's self-proclaimed role as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society. Although lacking the depth of the Astiz-Garcia and Nunn articles Richard L. Clinton "The Modernizing Military: The Case Of Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIV, 4 (Spring, 1971), 43-62 does a very fine job of tracing the relationship of the military to the principle political groups in Peru during the early 1960's. Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientaciOn de las fuerzas armadas en el Peru," Aportes, X, 17 (January, 1971), 163-181 is a useful general discussion of Peru's changing military men- tality. The two best reviews of the secondary literature deal- ing with the military in Latin America are: Lyle N. M McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin America Research Review, II, 1 (Fall, 1966), 5-36; and Richard C. Rankin, "The 383 Expanding Institutional Concerns of the Latin American Mili- tary Establishments: A Review Article," Latin American Research Review, IX, 1 (Spring, 1947), 81-109. Rankin's article is perhaps the most effective analysis of the liter- ature on the Latin American military yet published. A care- ful reading of the McAlister and Rankin articles would provide the non-specialist with an invaluable introductory guide to the study of the military in Latin America. Three articles dealing with ABBA provide necessary examinations of that party's political role in Peru. Fredrick B. Pike, "The Old and the New ABBA in Peru: Myth and Reality," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVIII, 2 (Autumn, 1964), 3-45, is a comprehensive and critical ex- amination of APRA from its birth in 1924 to the flight of radical Apristas to APRA Rebelde in the early 1960's. Thomas M. Davies, "The Indigenismo of the Peruvian Aprista Party: An Interpretation," offers new insights on the early (1931) position of Haya de la Torre on the issue of foreign capital in Peru and illustrates ABBA's lack of initiative in the area of agrarian reform and Indian inte- gration. A valuable recent interpretation Of ABBAfs in the post World War II era is Richard C. Clinton, "Apra: An Appraisal," Journal pp Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XII, 2 (April, 1970), 280-297. Clinton also pro- vides a fine bibliography in his essay. 384 The reports of the American Universities Field Staff representative in Peru, Richard Patch, are invaluable con- temporary commentaries on political and social conditions. Especially helpful for this study were, "The Peruvian Elec- tions of 1962 and their Annulment," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, West Coast of South American Series, IX, 6 (September, 1962); "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," ABBB, X, 1 (July, 1963); and "Peru's New President and Agrarian Reform," ABBA, X, 2 (August, 1963). Finally, the complex issue of the Peruvian military's motivations for adopting its reformist stance are discussed in an important and appropriately titled article by Francois Bourricaud, "Los Militares: Por Qué y Para Qué," Aportes, IX, (April, 1970), 13-55. This was one of the best early articles to address the subject of the orientation of the military government Of General Juan Velasco Alvarado that took power in October, 1968. I have not chosen to deal with the growing literature on the post-1968 military in Peru except as it bears directly upon the central questions of my study.