



ABSTRACT

THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION,  
1939-1963: THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL POLITICS  
AND CHANGING PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES

By

Daniel M. Masterson

This study examines the influence of national politics and changing professional attitudes upon the institutional development of the Peruvian armed forces in the period 1939-1963. Although the military was the dominant power holder in national political affairs throughout the entire period of this study, the officer corps was rarely characterized by institutional unanimity on the key issues which divided the nation. Before 1950 the partisan tactics of rival civilian and military power groups factionalized the armed forces, lowered military morale and aroused the contempt of junior officers for civilian politicians and politically ambitious military commanders. The APRA party was involved in most of the civil-military intrigues of this era and despite the party's abandonment of revolutionary politics after the abortive Callao revolt of 1948, most military men continued to distrust the motives of the Aprista leaders. Consequently, the continuing antagonism between

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APRA and the armed forces was an important reason for the military's annulment of the 1962 election in which Aprista leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, was the leading vote getter. By 1962, however, the military's professional self-image had improved dramatically from the politically troubled years of the 1940's.

Founded on an increasingly sophisticated perception of the dimensions of national defense, the armed forces professional perspectives broadened to include an ambitious social and economic role for the military. As a result of the dynamic leadership of its first two directors, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) became the most important agency for clarifying the military's role as an agent for promoting national development. CAEM-linked officers were not, however, exclusive advocates of a social and economic function for the armed forces. This theme had been the subject of officer's writings in Peru's leading service journals since the early twentieth century. But after 1950, the appeals of progressive officers for the military's involvement in a wide range of social action programs found acceptance throughout the entire officer corps.

As political tensions and resultant armed forces factionalism eased during the 1950's progressive officers who

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had been previously stymied by these problems were able to make great progress towards improving the military's educational system. Aiding this process was the high command's increased conviction that improved training and educational standards were mandatory requirements of military professionalism. With the opening of the Centro de Instrucción Militar in 1948 and the CAEM in 1950, specialized post academy studies were greatly expanded to supplement the training offered at the Escuela Superior de Guerra. Leading military educators were instrumental in promoting the notion that quality education was fundamentally important in molding the armed forces into a modern and technically proficient institution.

As a result of the improved educational level of the officer corps, military men of the 1960's displayed a greater confidence in their professional capabilities. They came to believe that they were among the best trained soldiers in Latin America. Moreover, given the technical expertise of many armed forces officers and the concomitant shortage of civilian technicians in Peru, military men came to view their institution--in the words of one prominent officer--as Peru's permanent vehicle for modernization. This perception of the military's role in national affairs



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coupled with a growing belief that civilian politicians were incapable of implementing the reforms necessary to insure national development, made the officer corps impatient allies of the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, after his election to the presidency in 1963. This outlook also had critically significant implications for Belaúnde's subsequent overthrow in 1968 by officers then prepared to launch a program of reform unparalleled in the history of Peru.

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By  
Daniel M. Masterson

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## PREFACE

At 3:20 A.M. on July 18, 1962 thirty tanks surrounded the Peruvian National Palace and Colonel Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos, commander of the army's anti-guerrilla ranger unit, quickly arrested the civilian President, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche. This was the fourth time in the twentieth century that Peruvian armed forces officers had deposed a civilian president and placed themselves in power. Peruvians were accustomed to the military's role as a dominant power holder and there was little public reaction to the coup d' état. But many observers who quickly dismissed the action of the armed forces as merely another example of opportunistic praetorianism misjudged the motivations of the military men who overthrew President Prado.

The Peruvian armed forces underwent a marked transformation in the quarter century before 1962. Directly shaping the armed forces' altered professional perspective were the divisive impact of national politics and the increasing commitment of Peruvian officers to expand the military's role in national affairs. These two problems, rather than the social origins or class allegiances of Peruvian military personnel, form the central focus of this study.



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The years 1939-1963 were a formative period for the refinement of military professionalism in Peru. During this era armed forces officers most clearly expressed their contempt for the institutionally divisive tactics of competing military and civilian political power groups. This resulted in the alienation of progressive junior officers seeking a more modern apolitical military from civilian politicians and ambitious military commanders. After 1950 the chronic military factionalism prompted by the major political issues of the 1930's and 1940's eased, and forward-looking military theoreticians began to articulate a professional rationale for the military's sharply increased commitment to Peru's social and economic development. Thus, even though the coup of July 18, 1962 seemed superficially to fit the pattern of previous military interventions, the subsequent actions of the military chiefs who assumed power on that day were more reflective of the new military outlook than of the political opportunism of past armed forces senior officers.

In 1963 the armed forces were not yet ready to accept full responsibility for the conduct of Peru's national development programs. Consequently, military leaders strongly backed the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, for president, and they returned to their barracks when he emerged victorious in the 1963 national elections. But within the officer corps in 1963 there was a growing

conviction that the preservation of civilian political rule and the continuance of democratic processes was of secondary importance to the solution of Peru's problems of underdevelopment. This attitude emerged as the most important legacy of the armed forces' changed professional perspectives in the period 1939-1963.

I am indebted to a number of people who aided me in the preparation of this study. Leslie B. Rout, Jr. originally engendered my interest in Latin American history and I wish to express my appreciation for his continued help and encouragement. David C. Bailey also took a keen interest in my work and offered many valuable suggestions regarding research and writing. Professors Paul A. Varg and Warren I. Cohen's comments on the manuscript also proved to be very helpful.

Providing important assistance during my research in the United States were the staffs of the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. Dr. James I. Loeb, former United States Ambassador to Peru offered invaluable insights into the nature of Peruvian internal affairs as well as Peruvian-United States relations while he was ambassador during 1961-1962. I cannot fully express my appreciation for Dr. Loeb's contribution to this study. My thanks also goes to Dr. John F. Bratzel of Michigan State University for kindly

lending me his camera and microfilm reader. This equipment facilitated my research in Peru and the United States immeasurably.

I am deeply grateful to Víctor Villanueva Valencia for his kindness and many valuable suggestions concerning research leads during my stay in Peru. My conversations with Señor Villanueva and our subsequent correspondence has proved to be one of the highlights of my research. I am also indebted to Elia Lazarte of the Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares del Perú and the staff of the Sala de Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú for their efficiency and helpful cooperation. My special thanks must also be extended to Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Ramiro Priale and Armando Villanueva del Campo of the APRA party for granting me extensive interviews that covered a wide range of historical and contemporary issues. Similarly, I am also grateful to Division General (retired) Ricardo Pérez Godoy, former co-military president of Peru in 1962-1963 and Fernando Schwalb López Aldaña, prime minister in the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, for their very useful comments during my talks with them. I am especially indebted to my long-time friend Manuel Lecca, who along with his wife and family, provided the best in Peruvian hospitality while my wife and I were in Peru.

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Finally, I am most deeply grateful to my wife Deborah whose encouragement, help and oftentimes sheer stamina were very instrumental in bringing this work to fruition.

I alone, of course, bear the responsibility for any of the shortcomings of this work.

Grand Rapids, Michigan

D.M.M.

December, 1975

## CHAPTER I

### CAUDILLOS AND THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER

The military has been a powerful and often dominant element in Peruvian national affairs during the country's republican history. Nevertheless, the armed forces have rarely been characterized by institutional unanimity on the key issues which have divided the nation's civilian political leaders. Consequently, military men very often reflected the same tensions and frustrations as their civilian counterparts concerning controversial social, political and economic questions. With these divisions within the armed forces, it was seldom possible for either a military or civilian president to govern without confronting opposition from military personnel allied with an anti-government civilian faction. But since interaction by military men with civilians for partisan political purposes was considered a breach of discipline--which most armed forces officers considered the primary component of professionalism--the institutional development of the military was impeded. Only when there has been wide agreement within the officer corps concerning the attainment of basic institutional and national policy objectives, has the





military experienced reduced factionalism and become a dominant power holder to the exclusion of the civilian sector. This seldom occurred even during the first fifty years of national independence when various caudillos controlled national politics.<sup>1</sup>

The military caudillos who ruled Peru after Simón Bolívar crushed Spanish power in December, 1824 were not professional soldiers. The power of these chieftans rested with their ability (both charismatic and financial) to maintain the allegiance of an army of personal followers who fought to promote the leader's political ambitions. This phenomenon characterized Peru's early presidents until the

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<sup>1</sup>The most complete history of Peru from independence through the early 1920's is Jorge Basadre, Historia de la república del Perú (11 volumes, fifth revised edition, Lima, 1961-1968). The most prolific and one of the most perceptive Peruvian political writers is former army Major Víctor Villanueva Valencia. His books on twentieth century civil-military affairs constitute an invaluable research aid. The most helpful for this study include: La sublevación aprista del 48: Tragedia de un pueblo y un partido (Lima, 1973), El militarismo en el Perú (Lima, 1962), Un año bajo el sable (Lima, 1963), ¿ Nueva mentalidad militar en el Perú? (Lima, 1969), 100 años del ejército peruano: Frustraciones y cambios (Lima, 1972), El CAEM y la revolución de la fuerza armada (Lima, 1973), Ejército peruano: Del caudillaje anárquico al militarismo reformista (Lima, 1973), and his latest study El APRA en busca del poder (Lima, 1975). See also Carlos Dellepiane, Historia militar del Perú (Lima, 1965) and Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: Palacio del Gobierno (Lima, 1967). Fredrick Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York, 1967) is the best work in English dealing with republican Peru.

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particularly adept caudillo, Ramón Castilla, brought a measure of political stability to the nation in the more than twenty years following his assumption of power in 1845. Castilla, however, relied heavily upon his personal military skill and the strength of an improved national military force to reduce internal strife. Not until 1872 was a civilian political movement, the Partido Civil, able to mount a viable campaign for the presidency.

The most controversial aspect of the Partido Civil's platform in the presidential campaign of 1872 was its proposal to substantially reduce the role of the military in national affairs.<sup>2</sup> Manuel Pardo, the party's successful candidate, condemned caudillismo as a negative influence upon both the military and civilian sectors. The basis of Peruvian national security, Pardo argued, rested with negotiated treaties with neighboring nations rather than a large, poorly trained national army. Consequently, during his four-year term, Pardo cut the size of the army and proposed the formation of a national guard to balance the power of the armed forces.<sup>3</sup>

After a secret pact of mutual military assistance between Peru and Bolivia was exposed in 1873, the opponents of the Civilista president charged that his program would

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<sup>2</sup>Basadre, Historia, IV, 1911-45.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., V, 2069-71.

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undermine the nation's ability to confront the increasing threat of aggression from Chile. Pardo's answer to his critics was that he was seeking a smaller, more professional military that would be more effective once its political ambitions had been curbed. But his strategy proved futile; his administration was plagued with numerous insurrections, the most important of which was led by Nicolás de Piérola, a civilian cabinet member under the previous military president. Acknowledging the unpopularity of his program as the 1876 elections approached, Pardo felt compelled to back a military man, General Mariano Ignacio Prado, for president. Pardo saw the general as the only candidate capable of maintaining internal order. General Prado, with Civilista support, won an easy victory over his opponent, Admiral Lizardo Montero, and the brief period of civilian rule came to an end.<sup>4</sup>

Plagued by the problems of a deteriorating economy, Prado quickly lost the support of his Civilista backers. His weakened government was then confronted with a deepening diplomatic crisis involving Chile which erupted into open warfare in April, 1879. Because Peru refused to disavow its 1873 treaty with Bolivia, Chile seized the Bolivian port of Antafogasta and declared war on both nations. In the war of the Pacific (1879-1883) the combined forces of

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<sup>4</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 105.

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Peru and Bolivia were no match for the well-trained and better-equipped Chileans. Due to the heroic efforts of individual Peruvian commanders, hostilities were protracted until October, 1883 when Peru was finally compelled to sign the Treaty of Ancón. Under the terms of this treaty Peru was forced to surrender her nitrate rich region of Tarapacá to Chile. The victors also gained possession of the Departments of Tacna and Arica until a plebescite could be held to decide their future status as Peruvian or Chilean territories.<sup>5</sup>

Peru's military difficulties during this conflict were compounded by a lack of presidential leadership and serious internal dissension. President Prado's chief political foe, Nicolás de Piérola, refused to support the president during the initial months of the war. When Prado sailed for Europe in December, 1879 in a desperate search for funds to continue the war effort, Piérola seized the presidency and declared Prado a traitor who had fled his country in time of national crisis. Piérola remained president until January, 1881 when invading Chilean forces drove him from Lima. A three-way struggle for the presidency then arose between Piérola, General Andrés Avelino Cáceres (one of the

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<sup>5</sup>For the most detailed discussion of the War of the Pacific see Basadre, Historia, V, 2269-VI, 2646. See also Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 28-30.

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few successful Peruvian generals) and Miguel Iglesias, who sought the office with Chilean support. Piérola, lacking an effective military force of his own, soon renounced his claims to the office. But Cáceres, who had continued to resist Chilean occupation with an adept military campaign in central Peru, was proclaimed president by his supporters in 1882. Because of Iglesias' role in negotiating the unpopular Treaty of Ancón his political position was badly weakened. Following the withdrawal of Chilean occupation forces from Peru in August, 1884 the path for the war hero Cáceres was opened to challenge Iglesias for the presidency.<sup>6</sup>

During the course of the War of the Pacific these vitriolic political rivalries convinced many Peruvians that the conflict had been lost because of civilian indecision and lack of preparation rather than by military incompetence. Peru's soldiers and sailors had performed courageously and had given the nation some of its greatest martyr-heroes, but the country, nevertheless, had suffered a crushing defeat. The Civilista policies of military cutbacks were consequently discredited and few now questioned the wisdom of creating strong armed forces capable of protecting national security.

Desiring a strong president capable of building Peru's military strength, the backers of Cáceres formed the

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<sup>6</sup>Basadre, Historia, VI, 2573-2995.

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Partido Constitucional in 1884 as the vehicle for their candidate's campaign against Iglesias. Pierolistas then formed the Partido Demócrata, and Civilistas also regrouped in the same year in attempts to gain presidential control. But when Cáceres dislodged Iglesias by force in December, 1885, his success was rewarded by the union of Civilista and Constitucionalista adherents. Both groups supported the general's unopposed bid for a full four-year term in the elections of March, 1886. Piérola's followers chose to boycott the election rather than ally themselves with their traditional enemies, the Civilistas.<sup>7</sup>

General Cáceres dominated national politics from 1886 to 1895. When his original term expired in 1890 he arranged for the election of his hand-picked successor, Colonel Remigio Morales Bermúdez. At the same time he removed the most prominent civilians from leadership positions in the Partido Constitucional, giving the party an even stronger militaristic orientation. These tactics, coupled with Cáceres' clear intention to seek the presidency again in 1894, convinced civilian leaders Mariano Nicolás Valcarcel of the Civilistas and Piérola (head of the Partido Demócrata) to drop their traditional antagonism in order to cooperate in a united civilian revolutionary movement against Cáceres.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

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Piérولا succeeded in unifying a number of diverse insurrectionist movements that had begun even before the civilian leader had launched his own campaign from Chile. After months of bloody civil war that left over ten thousand dead in Lima and the provinces, Piérولا's forces captured the capital in March, 1895. The civilian revolt had triumphed over the better-equipped military forces because of its broad support among almost all sectors of Peru's civilian population. Cáceres' defeat and subsequent exile meant that the Peruvian military was forced to accept another stunning reverse only twelve years after the disastrous conclusion of the War of the Pacific. Unlike the defeat in the Chilean conflict, however, no glory was salvaged by the armed forces in its losing effort against the civilian revolutionaries. Rather, the institutional prestige of the military was substantially reduced.<sup>8</sup>

Once Piérولا was legally installed as president in July, 1895, he immediately began a program he hoped would insure that Peru's military would remain under the control of civilian leaders. Piérولا pragmatically accepted the political necessity of maintaining a standing army. But by adopting fundamental military reforms, he was able to lay

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., VI, 2995-3023, Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 121-23, and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 157-159.

the foundation for nineteen years of continuous civilian rule between 1895 and 1914.

Military Professionalization and Civilian  
Political Instability: 1895-1919

The actual beginning of military professionalism in Peru dates from the administration of President Nicolás de Piérola (1895-1899). Aiming to create a body of career officers and a permanent standing army the president contracted a French military training mission in 1896, established the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (Peru's West Point), promulgated a law of obligatory military service, and regulated salaries, promotions and the system of military justice. These measures enabled Piérola to achieve a goal that had eluded the Civilistas under Pardo: a greater degree of civilian control over a more professional military.<sup>9</sup>

President Piérola left office in 1899 having laid the foundation for a professional armed forces. But as Peru entered the twentieth century, some of the critical issues that dominated the interaction of civilian politicians and men in uniform from 1872 to 1899 continued to appear in modified form in the ensuing four decades. These included:

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<sup>9</sup>Basadre, Historia, VII, 3147-55, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 124-38.

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- 1) the universal acceptance of the need for a standing army;
- 2) the inclination of nearly all twentieth century political parties to reach accommodations with the armed forces; and
- 3) the continuing mandate of all national leaders to at least tacitly support military professional programs.

Between 1899 and 1914 Peruvian national politics remained free from military interference but, at the same time, demonstrated chronic instability. The problem can be traced in part to the growing diversity of the nation's socio-economic groups and the weakness of the national political parties, which soon began to factionalize after Piérola left office. As increasing economic opportunities promoted the emergence of new interest groups such as an industrial working class and a professional middle class these groups sought a role in national politics, tending to fragment existing party structures. The military was not insulated from these changes; and the political pressures exerted by these groups continued to have a dramatic impact upon the institutional stability of the armed forces throughout this period.

Interestingly, in the bitter political infighting that characterized national politics between 1900 and 1914, it was the Civilistas that reached the most effective accommodation with the nation's military elements. The pact between the Demócratas and the Civilistas which formed the



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with most of the increase coming under Leguía. Pardo acquired two naval cruisers from Great Britain, installed coastal guns to protect Callao harbor, and arranged for the construction of an ammunition factory. Leguía, partly motivated by the armed forces' loyalty during an abortive coup against his regime in 1909, supported military programs even more actively than his predecessor. In addition to substantially increasing the size of the army he further cemented military allegiance by enacting salary bonuses over the objections of a reluctant congress in 1912.<sup>12</sup>

Important aspects of the military policies of Pardo and Leguía were the improvement of an inequitable officer-troop ratio in the army and an upgrading of the professional quality of the officer corps in general. While the size of the army increased 350 per cent from 1900 to 1912, the number of officers actually declined by over one thousand. Previously the officer-troop ration in 1901 had stood at 117 officers for every one hundred soldiers. Moreover, a steadily increasing percentage of the newly commissioned officers during this era were graduates of the Escuela Militar, which provided good professional training under the direction of the French military mission.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 141-45.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 144.

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Adding to the improved self-concept of the military was a successful confrontation with Colombian troops on Peru's northeastern frontier in 1911. Foreshadowing a far more serious border clash in the same general area in 1933, this dispute evolved from the two nations' inability to define their common frontier. In a limited engagement under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Óscar R. Benavides Peruvian troops forced a Colombian contingent to flee their positions. Despite the subsequent withdrawal of Peruvian forces from the disputed area, Benavides gained national recognition, and in late 1913 he was promoted and made Army Chief of Staff. Benavides, who was born into an upper class family in 1876, went on to become one of Peru's most powerful and astute soldier-politicians.<sup>14</sup>

Because of the professionalization programs initiated in 1896 which culminated in the victory over the Colombians, by the end of 1913 Peru's men in uniform had regained most of the power and prestige lost during their defeat of the 1895 Civil War. Civilian support for increased military manpower and armaments and the fragmentation of the nation's political system, were also prime factors bolstering the armed forces' power in relation to the civilian sector. Consequently, the military--with the highly respected

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<sup>14</sup>Basadre, Historia, VII, 3515-17 and VIII, 3602-05.

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Benavides in command--was able to execute the first twentieth century coup d' état in February, 1914.

The 1914 coup was directed against President Guillermo Billinghurst, who had been elected in 1912 despite the early opposition of outgoing President Leguía.<sup>15</sup> The issues that promoted civilian politicians and military leaders to conspire are complex. The most critical were Billinghurst's attempt to dissolve the congress (then controlled by Leguistas) and his program of national budget cuts which slashed Peru's defense outlay nearly ten per cent during his term in office. Other points of contention between Billinghurst and the conspirators centered on his relatively progressive socio-economic programs, his unpopular attempts to negotiate a settlement of the Tacna-Arica plebescite question, and his repressive tactics against Leguía and his supporters.<sup>16</sup>

In mid-January, 1914 Colonel Benavides gave his critical support to the movement that had already included a number of important army officers and the congressional

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<sup>15</sup>For the best discussion of the 1914 coup d' état see Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3733-48, Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 125-35, and Allen Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations in Peru: 1914-1945" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1973), pp. 26-56. Gerlach's study demonstrates first-rate historical research.

<sup>16</sup>De la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 129-31.

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opponents of Billinghurst led by Augusto Durand. By the evening of February 3, the conspiracy, which was originally hatched by civilians, had fallen under the control of the military because Billinghurst had attempted to arm his civilian allies. The coup was executed in the early morning hours of February 4. The president, after his capture in the National Palace, was forced to resign and submit to exile in Chile where he died one year later. Benavides, upon the urgings of his civilian and military confidants--including the politically ambitious brothers Jorge and Manuel Prado y Ugarteche--immediately assumed the leadership of a transitional junta charged with governing until a new president could be selected.<sup>17</sup>

It is important to recognize that in the 1914 coup, despite Benavides' role as provisional president, military men acted more as an extension of civilian political interests than from their own political ambitions. The armed forces' corporate self-interest was involved as Billinghurst's reduced military budgets illustrate. But army leaders acted primarily in response to pressures created by Peru's political instability and appeals from the ousted president's political opponents. The intervention seemed to disprove the belief that a better trained, more

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<sup>17</sup>Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3748-51, and de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 130-33.



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professional military would disdain political intrigue; many of the military leaders of 1914 were products of the upgraded military training institutions.

Following the coup Benavides remained as provisional president until August, 1915. During these nineteen months he was confronted with sharply renewed political partisanship and military unrest that prevented the selection of a new civilian president. Finally in March, 1915 Benavides urged the creation of a national political convention to select a unity candidate capable of gaining the support of all political groups for president. Only the Partido Demócrata boycotted the convention, and former President José Pardo emerged as the choice of the delegates. In mid-May Pardo easily defeated the candidate of the badly weakened Partido Demócrata, but three months later, on August 18, he took office in the midst of an abortive military uprising in Huaraz directly north of Lima.<sup>18</sup>

The troubled circumstances surrounding Pardo's inauguration accurately foreshadowed the political tensions that plagued his second administration. Key issues contributing to his political difficulties were Peru's neutral position during World War I, increasing national pressures to settle the prolonged Tacna-Arica dispute, and growing popular

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<sup>18</sup>Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3796-3808.

unrest stemming from a high rate of inflation, food shortages and resultant labor agitation. Peru's financial problems before 1916 forced Pardo to reduce the size of the army and decrease purchases of munitions and other military equipment already in short supply. Even after 1916, when Peru's petroleum, sugar and cotton were again reaching favorable markets, Pardo kept the military budget at a relatively low level despite increasing expenditures in most other areas of government. After the war, the government relaxed its fiscal restrictions on the military and began to purchase significant amounts of ammunition and small arms in addition to making preparations to organize an air force. But these measures came too late to placate many disgruntled military leaders who were disgusted with the president's handling of military affairs.<sup>19</sup>

Unlike Billinghamurst, the politically skillful Pardo was able to withstand the challenges of his civilian and military opponents almost to the completion of his regime. But as the final troubled year of his term drew to a close in a climate of violent labor unrest and military discontent, the president made a grave tactical mistake by supporting the presidential candidacy of the aging and rigidly conservative Civilista Artero Aspillaga. Augusto B. Leguía, running for

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<sup>19</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 108-111.

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a second term in 1919, immediately attacked his opponent as a reactionary who could not provide the progressive leadership Peru then desperately needed.<sup>20</sup> Leguía also correctly gauged the attitudes of the majority of the officer corps. Following the pattern of Billinghurst's civilian opponents, he openly courted the backing of the armed forces leadership in his quest for power. He named an army general as his first vice-presidential (under Peruvian law the nation elected two vice-presidents) running mate. He also campaigned with other officers at his side (including the now venerable war hero General Andrés A. Cáceres) and stressed his record of support for military programs during his first administration. Leguía's relatively progressive campaign proposals also gained him support from some elements within the officer corps.<sup>21</sup>

The national elections were held in May but although Leguía had apparently won a clear victory, the outcome was thrown in doubt when both sides presented a conflicting set of vote returns. As tensions mounted in June it became obvious that the new president would have to be chosen by the congress. Leguía, fearing an adverse vote and hoping

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<sup>20</sup>For Leguía's 1919 coup see de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 136-48, and Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3927-46.

<sup>21</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 214.

to totally control the national political machinery, executed a coup d' état on July 4, 1919. With only limited active support by the army, Leguía's forces were able to seize Pardo after subverting the Palace Guard, important police units, and elements of the fleet in Lima's port city of Callao.<sup>22</sup> The movement benefited from the absence of the influential General Benavides, who at that time was in Italy.

Thus only five years after the coup ousting President Guillermo Billinghurst, armed forces officers executed another golpe on behalf of the civilian Augusto Leguía. President Pardo was forced to resign and was quickly exiled. Unlike the political situation after the 1914 coup, Leguía rapidly consolidated his position with only token opposition from isolated military challengers. In the next eleven years, the chief executive refined his skills of political manipulation to a degree unmatched in twentieth century Peruvian politics.

#### Continued Armed Forces Politicization During the Oncenio

Other than the endurance of Leguía's second regime (known as the Oncenio, eleven year rule) this era was

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<sup>22</sup>Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3936-43.

notable for a number of developments which refashioned the relationship between Peru's military and civilian sectors. Leguía's progressive capitalist policies favoring increased foreign investment promoted substantive economic development and the continued growth of a small but politically active middle class. But for the vast majority of Peru's impoverished masses, these policies failed to arrest exploitation by rural landowners and urban industrialists who often relied upon the military to defend their interests. Also suffering from the repressive tactics of the Leguía regime were Peru's beleaguered political parties. By the end of the Oncenio in 1930, most of the nation's parties were no longer serving as functioning representatives of Peru's dominant interest groups.

Military support for the administration was garnered through a mixed policy of political favoritism, repression and generous attention to carefully chosen armed forces programs. These policies fostered the continued and direct involvement of the military in national politics during this civilian regime. They also contributed to the continuing factionalism of the armed forces throughout the Oncenio and on into the decade of the 1930's. Specifically, during the first three years of his regime, Leguía initiated a series of transfers, arrests and promotions that placed his key military supporters in critical command

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positions and removed or neutralized officers who opposed his regime. The most important constant in the president's dealings with the armed forces was his demand for political loyalty. Thus unscheduled promotions and transfers were often ordered for this sole reason. The actions of some corrupt officers were also ignored because of their political loyalty. As might be expected, these policies lowered armed forces professional morale, particularly among those young officers who were recent graduates of Peru's military schools.<sup>23</sup>

The president's handling of his military opponents effectively thwarted the efforts of his chief armed forces foes, General Benavides, Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz (Director of the Escuela Militar) and Captain Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, from unseating him immediately following the coup of 1919. Due to Benavides absence from Peru he was unable to actively oppose Leguía's golpe. The other officers were soon convinced, after short-lived attempts to block the takeover, that it would be better to delay further opposition until they had gained more support.<sup>24</sup> Leguía was equally successful in stifling his civilian opposition during the first twenty-four months of his regime.

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<sup>23</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 170-72 and 100 años, pp. 74-77.

<sup>24</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 126.

The president immediately suppressed the newly elected congress and decreed new elections for an assembly empowered to write a new constitution which would go into effect in 1920. The government also restricted the press while curtailing almost all opposition political activity by means of arrest, imprisonment and exile. By 1921 Leguía's chief political enemies, including José Pardo, Augusto Durand and General Benavides were in exile and his political position was relatively secure.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless he was still forced to suppress six violent insurrections and five conspiracies between 1919 and 1924. The most significant of these movements were the August, 1921 rebellion of Captain Guillermo Cervantes in the jungle city of Iquitos, a civil-military uprising in Cuzco one year later, and a widely based conspiracy of police and army personnel led by the president's cousin, German Leguía y Martínez, in late 1923. The Iquitos and Cuzco uprisings were inspired by individuals involved in the 1914 coup and men later to be instrumental in Leguía's downfall in 1930.<sup>26</sup>

Captain Cervantes and Captain Luis M. Sánchez Cerro (the instigator of the Cuzco revolt) were both confidants of General Benavides. The general had been quickly exiled

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<sup>25</sup>Basadre, Historia, VIII, 3947-63.

<sup>26</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 174-84.

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after his return to Peru in 1921. From Costa Rica, Benavides encouraged the Cervantes and Sánchez Cerro movements and unsuccessfully attempted to supply the Cuzco insurgents with arms. Leguía's support within the ranks remained firm, however, and although Cervantes held out for five months in his isolated jungle headquarters, his rebellion, like the Cuzco rising, was subdued by loyalist troops.<sup>27</sup>

The president's intention to initiate a constitutional amendment allowing his re-election in 1924 prompted his ambitious cousin, German Leguía y Martínez, to conspire with Lima police and army units to overthrow the president. Leguía y Martínez's former post as the Minister of Government and Police aided him in his plotting. But again, through a series of command shifts, arrests, and major police reassignments, Leguía was able to thwart the conspiracy.<sup>28</sup>

University students added their voices to those of the dissident military and civilian opponents of Leguía before 1924. A leader of the student opposition was Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, head of the University of San Marcos Student Federation. Born in Trujillo in 1895,

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<sup>27</sup>Basadre, Historia, IX, 4025-4039.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 4037-4039.

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Haya de la Torre became one of Leguía's most vocal critics and like many political foes of the president he conspired to depose the chief executive. His efforts resulted only in his exile in late 1923. In Mexico during the following year he formed the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA). Originally directed toward an international Latin American political base, the party, after 1930, became the single most important political group in Peru.<sup>29</sup>

After Leguía defused much of the student opposition with the exile of Haya de la Torre, he successfully accomplished his re-election in 1924, and faced no serious opposition until the revolt that toppled him in 1930. Between 1924 and 1930 his chief antagonists were either dead, in jail or exiled, and his government was too strong to allow any subversive movement to flourish. During these six years the stability of the regime was assured by the obedience of the armed forces, which were kept in line by a calculated backing of selected military programs aimed at neutralizing the power of the army.

Throughout the 1920's Peru's military men were given advanced training through comprehensive study missions in

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<sup>29</sup> A profile of the early APRA movement will be presented in the following chapter. It should be noted, however, that the years 1924-1930 were used by Haya de la Torre to consolidate the party's political ideology despite his absence from Peru.

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five European countries. This special training was complemented by a United States' naval training mission contracted in 1920 and both French and German army missions which served in Peru during the decade. The United States contingent became a key training unit as Peru purchased a number of naval vessels from the United States, including four submarines.<sup>30</sup>

The special attention devoted to improving Peru's naval strength reflected Leguía's desire to both modernize the nation's fighting forces and offset the power of the army. With the latter objective in mind, a separate Navy Ministry--independent of the Ministry of War--was established in 1919. Naval spending was also sharply increased and involved new ship purchases, modernization of old equipment and the construction of a naval base on San Lorenzo Island in Callao Harbor. A program of expansion for the small air force was born out of the same motives as those for the navy. The government acquired planes from France, Germany, and the United States, integrated a Ministry of Aviation branch into the Naval Ministry in 1929, and vastly improved the quality of aviation instruction during the Oncenio.<sup>31</sup>

Leguía was unable to ignore the army in his program of expansion and both its manpower and budget were increased

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<sup>30</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 153-54.

<sup>31</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 173-74.



during his regime. But at the same time, the politically shrewd president was building the guardia civil (national guard) in a further effort to counterbalance the army's power. By 1927 his efforts had led to a guardia civil force numbering 6,800 men as opposed to the army's manpower of 7,442. The guardia civil, which was trained by a Spanish police mission, also was used to suppress urban and rural disorders.<sup>32</sup>

Although Leguía made progress in building a stronger navy, air force and guardia civil, the army still remained the dominant element in the armed forces. When a series of developments during 1929 and 1930 weakened the props of the Oncenio, it was the army that once again accomplished a president's downfall.

In August, 1929 Leguía was again re-elected without formal opposition. This angered many civilian and military leaders who thought it time for the aging leader to step down. Discontent increased as massive economic problems spawned by the world depression drove Peru into a deepening crisis in 1930. The depressed economy was perhaps the single most damaging problem contributing to the collapse

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<sup>32</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 160, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 174. Villanueva cites statistics which indicate that Leguía gave very substantial support to police programs through means of budget increases for the Ministry of Government and Police that totalled 250 per cent during his eleven-year-rule.



of the regime, as was the case with numerous other South American governments in 1930 and 1931.

Also leading to the destruction of the Oncenio was the president's unpopular settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute with Chile in June, 1929. The decision to resolve the forty-eight-year-old issue by allowing Chile permanent possession of Arica while Peru regained control of its former province of Tacna alienated large segments of the populace and provoked sharp dissent from the military command.<sup>33</sup> Leguía's prolonged suppression of the nation's political parties added to the groundswell of civilian support for the revolutionary movement begun in the southern city of Arequipa in August, 1930.

Finally, the president's uncharacteristic leniency in allowing Luis M. Sánchez Cerro to return to Peru in April, 1929, and then promoting him to lieutenant colonel in order that he could assume command of a battalion in Arequipa was his gravest tactical mistake. Sánchez Cerro had been in prison and "diplomatic exile" following the abortive rising in Cuzco in 1923. Only Leguía's false sense of security can explain his generosity toward this aggressive young officer, who only one year after his return toppled his benefactor

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<sup>33</sup>This issue had been a divisive problem in Peruvian political affairs since the end of the War of the Pacific.

from power.<sup>34</sup>

Sánchez Cerro launched his revolt with support from Lieutenant Colonel José G. Gammara and Arequipa's civilian political opponents of Leguía on August 22. The uprising quickly spread, and by the following day all but two of Peru's five military districts were in revolt. On the afternoon of August 24, Leguía, confronting a desperate situation, resigned in favor of an all military provisional junta rather than risk a bloody confrontation between remaining loyal troops and the rebels. After three days in which the Army Chief of Staff, General Manuel Ponce, jockeyed for control of the revolution, Sánchez Cerro won the power struggle and assumed the presidency of a new military government. Leguía's attempted escape aboard the naval cruiser Almirante Grau was thwarted, and the once powerful dictator was imprisoned; he died after a painful illness, in February 1932.<sup>35</sup>

The acute political and military instability which plagued Peru for the next three years was in great part due to ramifications of the world depression. But Leguía's near liquidation of the traditional political party system

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<sup>34</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 247.

<sup>35</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 187-92, de la Barra, Objetivo, pp. 149-63, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 226-48.

and the continuing politicization of the armed forces were equally deleterious legacies of the Oncenio.

### Conclusion

Military caudillos controlled Peru's early political life to the extent that the first civilian president was not elected until fifty years after the nation won its independence from Spain. Despite an increasing assertion of civilian political strength after 1895, military men were often called upon to act as arbiters in the struggles of various civilian factions for political power. These struggles divided the armed forces and undermined its professional morale at the very time they were making progress toward internal modernization.

Nevertheless, the armed forces officers of 1930 could not be accurately cast in the same mold as the heavy-handed, ill-trained and unschooled military caudillos of the nineteenth century. Military reform programs begun under President Piérola provided the foundation for a more professional military. However, these measures failed to produce apolitical armed forces. Military men were also enlisted to protect the socio-economic interests of the nation's elite upper class groups against the threats of an impoverished class of urban and rural poor. Even during the extended civilian rule of Leguía, the political involvement of the



armed forces continued. The crafty leader balanced military groups against one another through a system that rewarded political loyalty more than military expertise. These policies, and the legacy of Peru's chronic political instability, had a profound impact upon the nation's military institutions in the 1930's and beyond.

## CHAPTER II

### A NEW RIVALRY IS BORN

#### Sánchez Cerro and APRA

During the troubled decade of the 1930's national political power centered in the hands of Peru's two most powerful military figures, Luis M. Sánchez Cerro and Oscar R. Benavides. But the rise of APRA as a potent political force after 1930, further undermined the stability and discipline of the officer corps. Aprista subversive activities involved mainly junior and non-commissioned officers but on two occasions during the 1930's senior officers were involved with Apristas to overthrow the government. The breakdown of military discipline inspired mainly by APRA and the defeat of Peruvian military forces in a short engagement with Colombia in 1933 provoked serious tension and deep frustration in the armed forces. This reinforced the Peruvian military man's traditional distrust of civilians and his desire to gain institutional autonomy for the armed forces in order to curtail civilian meddling in military internal affairs. During the Sánchez Cerro era (1930-1933) the violence and political disorder produced by the



Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100
1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100	

APRA-armed forces rivalry reached its greatest intensity.

Although Sánchez Cerro's revolution was greeted with great enthusiasm throughout Peru, it launched a period of profound military and political instability that lasted till his death in April, 1933. The roots of this instability can be traced to Leguía's near liquidation of Peru's traditional political parties and the economic distress posed by the deepening world depression. Exacerbating the crisis was the increased participation of the Peruvian masses in national politics. Sánchez Cerro's movement inadvertently opened the way for the increasing radicalization of the political process and APRA emerged as the most cohesive political group in the months immediately following the Arequipa revolt of 1930.<sup>1</sup>

In 1930 APRA had been in existence for six years and was headed by its founder Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. While in exile originally imposed by Leguía in 1923, Haya de la Torre had formulated an ideology designed to create a sufficient political base to successfully sustain his candidacy for the presidency of Peru.

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<sup>1</sup>For the best discussions of APRA and civil-military relations during the period 1930-1933 see Víctor Villanueva, El APRA en busca del poder, 1930-1940 (Lima, 1975), pp. 38-158, Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932 (Austin, 1973), pp. 106-157, Thomas M. Davies, Indian Integration in Peru: A Half Century of Experience, 1900-1948 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1974), pp. 97-123, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 258-422.

Upon settling in Mexico after his exile from Peru, Haya de la Torre in December, 1924 detailed the basic five-point program that formed the core of APRA's political platform for years to come. These general points included: 1) Action against Yankee imperialism; 2) The political unity of Latin America; 3) Nationalization of lands and industry; 4) Internationalization of the Panama Canal; and 5) Solidarity of all oppressed peoples of the world. The original objective of APRA was the construction of a broadly-based alliance of students, intellectuals, workers, and elements of the middle and peasant classes grouped in a political front opposing the penetration of foreign political and economic interests in Latin America.<sup>2</sup>

Despite some very limited organizational progress in several Latin American countries during the 1920's, APRA

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<sup>2</sup>Students of the APRA movement have been hampered by the highly polemical nature of most of the hundreds of books, articles and pamphlets devoted to an analysis of the party's history and ideology. Useful pro-APRA studies are: Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Party (Berkeley, 1953), Luis Alberto Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra (Santiago, 1955), and Haya de la Torre o el político (Santiago, 1934), Felipe Cossio del Pomar, Haya de la Torre: El indoamericano (Lima, 1946). For works critical of APRA's role in Peruvian political affairs see Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, and El APRA en busca del poder, Fredrick Pike, The Modern History of Peru, and Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan Way (New York, 1951). Of Haya de la Torre's own writings his El antiimperialismo y el APRA (Santiago, 1936), is most illuminating in terms of APRA's early ideology. For English translations of much of Haya de la Torre's substantive writings see Robert Alexander, Aprismo: The Ideas and Writings of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Kent, Ohio, 1973).

became a distinctly Peruvian political party after 1930. Haya de la Torre's desire to attract the widest possible political support during the early years of the party explains his reluctance to carefully detail any specific proposals for political action before 1930. One important exception was his use of the term Indo-America for the area commonly referred to as Latin America. This was done as the party attempted to identify itself with the Indian and mestizo population of Peru and all of Latin America in a bid for their support.

Between 1926 and 1930 the APRA leader traveled and studied extensively in the Soviet Union, Germany, England, Italy and the United States.<sup>3</sup> During this period he also refined the vague outlines of APRA's ideological program, carefully separating its objectives from any association with the goals of the international communist movement. By 1928, Haya de la Torre's denunciation of European socialist and communist philosophies helped splinter the small radical leftist element in Peru. And when the APRA chief attempted in early 1929 to unilaterally launch an armed rebellion against Leguía (after failing to gain support for his own presidential candidacy), Peru's leading marxist intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui, severed his relations with Haya de la Torre. The split temporarily undermined APRA's

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<sup>3</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 111.

organizational efforts, but by mid-1930 the party was still the most unified representative of Peru's political left.<sup>4</sup>

Although APRA made important political gains during 1930, for most of the three months following the fall of Leguía, Sánchez Cerro governed with substantial political support. The aggressive lieutenant colonel's "man of the people" image, his dark-skinned cholo appearance, his consistent record of opposition to Leguía's dictatorship, and his announced intention to end the corruption left over from the Oncenio all bolstered his political position.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the junta chief felt compelled to quickly purge army and guardia civil leaders whose loyalty was suspect. Sánchez Cerro's particular enmity towards the guardia civil was motivated by his conception of that institution as a political tool of Leguía during the 1920's.<sup>6</sup>

Military and civilian support for Sánchez Cerro began to evaporate in early December, 1930, however, when it became clear he was planning to seek the presidency without first resigning as head of the governing junta. His intentions had been signalled earlier by the adoption of

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<sup>4</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 118, and John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariátegui and the Myth (Tuscaloosa, 1972), pp. 72-76. Among other things, Haya de la Torre charged Mariátegui with excessive "tropicalism."

<sup>5</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 209.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 202.

repressive measures against APRA and the Communist Party, which he claimed were responsible for a rash of labor strikes and student disorders. The lines between the military leader and the APRA became even more clearly drawn when conservative elements of the old Civilista party began to support the army colonel's presidential ambitions.<sup>7</sup>

By the first week of January, 1931, a wide range of civilian political groups had demonstrated their open hostility to Sánchez Cerro's plans and voiced their desire for open elections in which only civilian candidates would be allowed to seek the presidency. These demands were backed by many army officers who felt that Sánchez Cerro's affiliation with the Civilistas had compromised the revolution against Leguía, which they had supported. Nonetheless, in early February the chief executive announced his intention to hold elections at the end of March in which he would be a candidate for president.<sup>8</sup> Within two weeks Peru was in open rebellion. Sánchez Cerro's attempt to calm the opposition by withdrawing his candidacy on February 23 failed, and with the nation on the verge of civil war, he resigned as provisional president on March 1. Claiming his resignation reflected the sense of "self-sacrifice" he felt was

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<sup>7</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 121.

<sup>8</sup>Villanueva, 100 años, pp. 82-83, is highly critical of Sánchez Cerro's highly divisive political ambitions in relation to the armed forces.

necessary for the good of Peru, the outgoing president vowed to return from his self-imposed exile in France once new national elections were announced.<sup>9</sup> After a turbulent ten days, a civilian political leader from Arequipa, David Samanez Ocampo, was named head of a new provisional junta which ruled Peru from March 10 to December 8, 1931.

The junta represented a broad range of political opinion and had the critical support of Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo Jiménez, commander of the important Lima garrison. The government was thus soon able to announce its plans to hold national elections for a new president and a constituent congress in which all parties except the communists would be allowed to participate. In the spirit of this more open political climate, a new electoral law was promulgated on May 27 which instituted the secret ballot and removed property qualifications for voting. These measures, while significantly increasing the size of the electorate, still did not sanction the vote for most of Peru's impoverished Indian population, which was barred from the ballot box by the law's literacy requirement.<sup>10</sup>

Quickly emerging as the dominant political groups by May, 1931 were the APRA and the faction supporting

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<sup>9</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 307.

<sup>10</sup>Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 267-74 provides a good review of these organizational efforts.

Sánchez Cerro. APRA leaders registered the party under the title Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP) and initiated an effective organizational campaign in Peru's northern departments even while Haya de la Torre still remained in exile.

Sánchez Cerro's backers received a temporary setback on May 17 when the government announced its intention of preventing the army colonel's return to campaign for president. This decision was primarily the work of Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez, who was now Sánchez Cerro's chief political rival in Peru.<sup>11</sup> Jiménez viewed his fellow officer's candidacy as a serious threat to the internal stability of the armed forces and for practical as well as ideological reasons favored the PAP in the upcoming elections.

The junta was unable to block Sánchez Cerro's presidential bid, however, and in early June lifted its ban on the military leader's return. Still facing intense opposition from certain military and civilian elements, Sánchez Cerro arrived in Peru on July 7 and began his campaign immediately. Ten days later, Haya de la Torre ended nearly nine years of exile with his return to Talara in northern Peru.<sup>12</sup> The stage was set for the most open political race to that date

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<sup>11</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 252-253.

<sup>12</sup>Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y del Apra, p. 270, and Klaren, Modernization, p. 128.



in Peruvian history. The elections, scheduled for early October, were preceded by a bitter campaign which intensified the already polarized political climate.

Attempting to generate a broader political base, Haya de la Torre moderated the seemingly radical positions espoused by APRA during the 1920's. The primary target of his campaign messages were the nation's disaffected middle class groups. While still clinging to the basic tenet of anti-imperialism, the APRA chief declared that the middle class represented the "essence" of the nation. It was this group, he insisted, that had suffered the most from the engulfing forces of foreign imperialism. The core of his party's solution to the economic threat of foreign capital was a sweeping political alliance involving the middle class, the emerging urban proletariat and the exploited Indian masses.<sup>13</sup> Haya de la Torre, however, pragmatically realized the danger of an uncompromising denunciation of all foreign interests in Peru. He thus qualified his position by stating his party would respect the rights of foreign capital if its role in the national economy were carefully

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<sup>13</sup> Klaren, Modernization, pp. 130-31, Davies, Indian Integration, pp. 108-11 and Villanueva, El APRA en busca del poder, pp. 44-45. Klaren and Davies agree that Haya de la Torre attempted to moderate his party's image. Davies states that the APRA leader even sought out important officials of foreign corporations in London and New York to assure them that he had substantially moderated his views concerning Yankee imperialism and nationalization of railroads and industry.

[illegible]

controlled. Moreover, the APRA leader further softened his political stance in private discussions with the United States ambassador in Peru. After an interview with Haya de la Torre in early September, Ambassador Frederick Dearing concluded that United States' interests had "nothing to fear" if the APRA candidate was elected president.<sup>14</sup>

During the 1931 campaign APRA experienced little success in gaining significant support from the armed forces. APRA's relationship with the military during 1931 and throughout the time span of this study deserves close scrutiny. Many of the substantive developments in civil-military relations in Peru to the present day must be viewed in the context of the rivalry that existed between these two institutions. Because the ideological orientation of APRA was at odds with the dominant thinking of Peru's military leadership, senior armed forces officers viewed the party as a threat to the continued viability of their institution. This threat was made even more imposing by the rigid organizational framework and strict party discipline which made APRA the most unified political force in Peru after 1930. The party's internal structure in fact closely paralleled

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<sup>14</sup> Ambassador Frederick Dearing to SecState, September 7, 1931, NA, RG 59, 810.43 APRA/102, cited in Davies, Indian Integration, p. 111. Dearing went on to conclude that if APRA won the 1931 elections a "strongly liberal and beneficent administration" could be expected.

that of the armed forces and was an important factor in holding the organization together during many years of political proscription following 1931.<sup>15</sup>

After 1931 when APRA became the target of repression by the Sánchez Cerro regime, APRA responded violently to the suppression of its political activities. It can not be accurately argued, however, that a completely polarized and bitter relationship existed between the total armed forces and APRA. Despite violent confrontations between these two groups in 1932 and 1933, armed forces officers and enlisted men in significant numbers were continually willing to cooperate and conspire with APRA for a variety of personal and political reasons until 1948. Ironically, APRA's political power, generated in large measure by party discipline and the concomitant loyalty of its activist adherents, was an important reason why many dissatisfied and ambitious military men ignored the principles of discipline so basic to the unity of their own institution. Consequently, APRA's successful subversion of many armed forces personnel added immeasurably to the hostility of loyal military officers towards the party.

In the 1931 presidential campaign Haya de la Torre recognized that his earlier statements criticizing the

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<sup>15</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 214-16.

military, and Sánchez Cerro's own popularity among a majority of the armed forces worked against his candidacy. The party leader therefore attempted to blunt the force of the military opposition. He noted that the bulk of armed forces personnel had middle and lower class origins, and insisted that these groups would be the main beneficiaries of APRA's reform programs.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, Haya de la Torre emphasized that the military, with its technically oriented training, could play an active role in civic action projects once he was president. In response to allegations that APRA was intensely anti-military and sought to replace the national army with its own party militia APRA leaders pointed to the party membership of a number of army officers in an attempt to refute these charges.<sup>17</sup>

Antonio Miró Quesada, editor of the powerful Lima newspaper El Comercio and Sánchez Cerro's most ardent supporter, was primarily responsible for the allegations that APRA was anti-military. Miró Quesada and other conservative politicians with Civilista backgrounds formed the Unión Revolucionaria as the vehicle for Sánchez Cerro's presidential bid

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<sup>16</sup>Thomas M. Davies, "The Indigenismo of the Peruvian Aprista Party," Hispanic American Historical Review, 51, 4 (November, 1971), 629, and Klaren, Modernization, p. 134.

<sup>17</sup>Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, p. 273, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 355. Such officers were Lieutenant Colonel Julio C. Guerrero, Colonel Cesar Enrique Pardo and Colonel Aurelio García Godos.

shortly after the colonel's return to Peru in July, 1931. The military candidate still hoped to capitalize upon his charismatic image among large segments of the voting population. Vaguely planning to form a political alliance between urban upper-class groups and the rural masses, Sánchez Cerro remained heavily reliant upon the financial and political backing of the nation's elite upper class elements.<sup>18</sup>

Largely because of this support, his political program contained few concrete proposals for economic or social reform. Stressing decentralization, fiscal responsibility and continued foreign investment, the army colonel made only general references to the need for future land reform measures. Sánchez Cerro gained popularity among Peru's Indian population, however, with his abolition of Conscripcion Vial, a type of forced public work program, that exploited Indian labor during Leguía's dictatorship.<sup>19</sup>

With the arrival of national election day on October 11, 1931 a thoroughly polarized political climate existed in Peru. Attempts by moderate centerist groups to have Sánchez Cerro and Haya de la Torre withdraw in favor of a compromise candidate were rejected by both men.<sup>20</sup> Despite

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<sup>18</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 251.

<sup>19</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 131, and Davies, Indian Integration, p. 99.

<sup>20</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 135.

fears of possible election day violence, the voting was peaceful. Contrary to Sánchez Cerro's suspicions that the Samanez Ocampo junta would rig the elections against him, he emerged the victor over Haya de la Torre by a count of 152,148 to 106,088.<sup>21</sup> Not surprisingly, Haya de la Torre's best showing was in the Aprista strongholds of Peru's northern departments. Sánchez Cerro triumphed by drawing strong support in the urban centers and among the rural population in Peru's central and southern regions. Although historical opinion is divided regarding the honesty of the 1931 elections, the best assessments portray them as the cleanest in Peruvian history up to that time.<sup>22</sup>

Embittered Apristas, convinced that Sánchez Cerro would use his electoral victory to block meaningful reforms and liquidate their party, soon opted for violent revolution to attain national power. Haya de la Torre solicited the help of sympathetic army officers and guardia civil personnel in planned civil-military insurrections aimed at blocking the president-elect's inauguration on December 8. Due to a

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<sup>21</sup>Basadre, Historia, XI, 201-03, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 358.

<sup>22</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 136, calls the elections, "from all appearances the fairest in Peruvian history." Davies, Indian Integration, p. 112 agrees. But Haya de la Torre claims their existed "clear manifestations of irregularities in the vote counting, particularly in Lima and Cajamarca (Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima Peru).

lack of coordination among APRA and dissident army and police units, however, small scale uprisings throughout Peru were easily quelled by government troops during the first week of December.<sup>23</sup>

Almost immediately after donning the presidential sash, Sánchez Cerro moved to deal with the APRA-subverted military elements. His first target was the guardia civil. He shifted regional commanders, made drastic cuts in personnel and deprived suspect units of important military equipment. Command shuffles were also engineered in the navy and the president took the unusual step of naming a civilian as navy minister to better insure the loyalty of that institution.<sup>24</sup>

Most importantly, the chief executive also made changes in the command assignments of the nation's top army officers. He promoted his most trusted comrades and eliminated troublesome rivals. The most prominent victim of these purges was Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez, who was placed on inactive duty soon after Sánchez Cerro took office.<sup>25</sup> These measures lowered armed forces morale and the personal enmity created

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<sup>23</sup>Klaren, Modernization, pp. 137-38, and Villanueva, El APRA en busca del poder, pp. 53-68.

<sup>24</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 383-85.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 386.



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between Sánchez Cerro and Jiménez exacerbated existing internal divisions within the army.

The president also took strong action against his Aprista opponents. After the police invaded APRA party headquarters in Trujillo in late December, wounding several party members in the process, measures were quickly enacted to deal with Aprista resistance on the national level. An emergency law forced through congress in early January established virtual martial law. By mid-February the president had arrested and exiled all twenty-three of the Aprista deputies elected to congress in October. Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was also deported to Chile, on charges of engaging in political subversion.<sup>26</sup>

Political tensions intensified on March 6 when a young Aprista wounded Sánchez Cerro in a Miraflores church during an assassination attempt. While the wounded president recuperated, orders were issued for the arrest of Haya de la Torre on charges of subverting public order. The APRA leader was finally captured early in May. With their leader facing an unknown fate, party members made preparations for a massive civil-military revolt in Trujillo.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 282-88, Klaren, Modernization, p. 138, and Villanueva, El APRA en busca del poder, pp. 93-94.

<sup>27</sup> Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 296-308.

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Designated as the chief organizer of the Trujillo revolt in Haya de la Torre's absence was the party leader's brother, Agustín Haya de la Torre.<sup>28</sup> Trujillo was the logical site for the uprising due to the Aprista strength in the region and the manpower supplied by the militant sugar workers from the nearby plantations in the Chicama Valley. Original plans called for the sugar workers and other Aprista revolutionaries to be trained by army veterans who had joined the party's ranks. Once Trujillo had been taken, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez was slated to assume command of the revolt as it spread to other parts of Peru. Precise timing was critical to the success of the movement, as the initial operations in Trujillo would be reinforced by simultaneous uprisings in a number of northern towns and Lima itself. Only after initial successes in these areas would Jiménez leave his Chilean exile in mid-July to take command of operations in the Trujillo region.

Hoping to take advantage of the temporarily undermanned condition at Trujillo's main army garrison, an aggressive young Aprista mechanic, Manuel Barreto, persuaded Agustín Haya de la Torre to attack on July 7, well ahead of the

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<sup>28</sup> One of the most balanced accounts of the Trujillo revolt is Basadre, Historia, XI, 273-38. See also Villanueva, El APRA en busca del poder, pp. 95-116, Klaren, Modernization, pp. 38-41, Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 398-40, and Guillermo Thorndike, El año de la barbarie, Peru, 1932 (Lima, 1969), pp. 170-195. For a good summary of the Aprista version of these events see Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y Apra, pp. 279-302.

scheduled date for the beginning of the revolt. The target of the Trujillo rebels was the O'Donavan military garrison with its stores of arms and ammunition.<sup>29</sup> Barreto's short-term assessment of the military situation proved correct when the garrison fell to the rebels after a sharp four-hour battle. Although the insurgents quickly gained control of the entire city, the premature initiation of the revolt caught other Aprista elements by surprise and supportive movements in other regions quickly fizzled.

The Trujillo rebels were then forced into a defensive posture within the city as Sánchez Cerro sent overwhelming air, sea and ground forces to crush the revolt. By the fourth day of hostilities the city was in government hands and order was restored. Agustín Haya de la Torre and other Aprista leaders managed to escape to the interior on July 9 in a futile effort to initiate a new guerrilla campaign. But most of the rebels remained to face the government troops that overwhelmed the city the following two days.<sup>30</sup> After the Aprista leadership had left the city on July 9, some of the rebels took a terrible vengeance upon army officers, guardia civil, and civilian prisoners held in the Trujillo jail. Over thirty of the prisoners were shot to

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<sup>29</sup>Thorndike, El año, pp. 186-187, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 399-400.

<sup>30</sup>Klaren, Modernization, pp. 140-41.

death in their cells.<sup>31</sup> Responsibility for the atrocities have never been accurately fixed, but Sánchez Cerro troops indulged in large-scale executions of suspected participants in the days following the fall of the city.<sup>32</sup>

The Trujillo jail massacre has had a dramatic impact on APRA-military relations even to the present day. Yearly military ceremonies are held on July 9 honoring the memory of those armed forces personnel who died at the hands of the Trujillo revolutionaries. Some armed forces officers viewed the massacre as proof that APRA, if given the opportunity, would attempt to liquidate the military.<sup>33</sup> But while these tactics repelled most military men and turned them strongly against APRA, they also demonstrated the party's commitment to radical revolution. This commitment was an important factor in the maintenance of the party's

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<sup>31</sup>There is no consensus on the exact number of military prisoners killed or whether they were tortured (as alleged) by their captors. Víctor Villanueva, one of the most knowledgeable writers on the Peruvian military accepts the figure of fourteen army officers and soldiers and twenty members of the guardia civil offered by Basadre. This account refutes the prevailing version that the prisoners were tortured or that their bodies were mutilated, although many of the dead were found to have multiple gunshot wounds (Basadre, Historia, IX, 238).

<sup>32</sup>Klaren, Modernization, p. 141, and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 266, places the number of those executed between 1,000 and 1,500.

<sup>33</sup>This belief was still expressed by senior armed forces officers in 1962 when they acted to overturn the electoral victory that would have made Haya de la Torre president.

radical image during the 1930's and 1940's as it unified Apristas during the political repression of the era.<sup>34</sup> APRA's willingness to engage in revolution also had a significant impact on dissident armed forces personnel. It attracted those military men who were willing to forget the excesses of Trujillo in exchange for APRA support for their own causes.

#### The Leticia Dispute and the Demise of Sánchez Cerro

From the suppression of the Trujillo insurrection in July, 1932, until his death at the hands of an Aprista assassin in April, 1933, Sánchez Cerro's attention was drawn from internal political affairs to a deepening border crisis with neighboring Colombia. After a contingent of armed Peruvian civilian and military personnel invaded the Colombian-controlled territory of Leticia on September 1, 1932, the president was faced with the dilemma of supporting the action or respecting the terms of the Salomon-Lozano treaty of 1922 granting the area to Colombia. Although the treaty had been ratified by the Peruvian Congress in 1927,

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<sup>34</sup>For the idea that the Aprista victims of the Trujillo reprisals were remembered with religious fervor by the residents of the surrounding region see Jeffrey S. Klaiber, S. J. "Religion and Revolution in Peru: 1920-1945," The Americas, XXXI, 3 (January, 1975), 308.

it had never been popular with large segments of the civilian population or the armed forces.<sup>35</sup>

The initial response of Sánchez Cerro and other political leaders took the form of allegations that APRA had promoted the invasion to create an international crisis.<sup>36</sup> Party leaders rejected these charges and called for negotiations to bring about a settlement of the dispute.<sup>37</sup> Once public reaction to the Peruvian occupation became clearly favorable, the president chose not to repudiate his countrymen's actions but rather to let further developments dictate his policy. Since the government would neither order a withdrawal from Leticia nor reinforce the original invaders, Colombia initiated a successful campaign against Peruvian forces at Tarapacá in mid-February, recapturing most of the disputed territory.<sup>38</sup> Attempting to reverse the loss of prestige to his regime and the armed forces by the Leticia defeat, Sánchez Cerro tried to generate support for a full-scale war with Colombia. At the end of February, males

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<sup>35</sup>For the best review of the border conflict with Colombia see Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942 (New York, 1966), pp. 169-255, and Colonel José H. Vallejo, El conflicto Peru-Colombiano (Lima, 1934).

<sup>36</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 175-211.

<sup>37</sup>Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1975, Lima, Peru.

<sup>38</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 228.



between twenty-one and twenty-five were ordered drafted into the army. Propaganda campaigns were also launched to convince Peruvians of the need to retaliate against Colombian "aggression" with a large-scale military effort.<sup>39</sup>

In the midst of these war preparations, Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez, convinced that Sánchez Cerro was leading Peru into another disastrous defeat, decided to ally with APRA to overthrow the government. Jiménez arrived in northern Peru from Chile and began to organize support for a rebellion among the personnel of the army regiment stationed at Cajamarca. On March 11, Jiménez led about three hundred men into revolt. But expected Aprista support from the surrounding areas failed to materialize and the rebel leader's forces were swiftly defeated by government troops on the road to Trujillo on March 14. Rather than surrender, Jiménez shot himself.<sup>40</sup> The insurrection further convinced APRA's military enemies of the party's subversive potential. The Jiménez revolt occurred at a time of national crisis when military discipline should have been strongest. It indicated instead that deep divisions had been created by Sánchez Cerro's decision to press for war without proper military preparations.

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<sup>39</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 412.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.



Undaunted by the internal military problems caused by his war plans, the president sought in early April to strengthen his position by appointing the highly respected General Benavides (newly arrived from his ambassadorial post in Great Britain and hero of the 1911 conflict with Colombia) as head of a Junta Defensa Nacional (National Defense Council). As chief of the junta Benavides would be in charge of all military forces in the campaign against Colombia. The president hoped the prestigious Benavides would lend more legitimacy to his efforts to engineer a national commitment to the war.<sup>41</sup> The government's position was made seemingly more secure when a previously named Constituent Assembly promulgated a new Constitution on April 9, 1933 which clearly legitimized the prominent role of the armed forces in national affairs. Article 213 of the charter read:

The purpose of the armed forces is to secure the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the laws, and the preservation of the public order.<sup>42</sup>

Barely three weeks after the Constitution went into effect, however, the Sánchez Cerro era came to a violent end with the president's assassination at the hand of a seventeen-year-old Aprista named Abelardo Mendoza Leyva.

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<sup>41</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 228.

<sup>42</sup>Russell H. Fitzgibbon, ed., The Constitutions of the Americas (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 666-67.

The assailant was immediately killed by the crowd attending the military rally at which the president was slain. Suspicions were aroused that there existed a widespread conspiracy, possibly even involving General Benavides, which was responsible for Sánchez Cerro's assassination. But the young Aprista was subsequently found to have acted alone.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, Mendoza Leyva's Aprista affiliation added to the party's growing reputation as a violently radical organization, and thus the continued proscription of APRA for most of the period until 1945 was more easily justified by the party's enemies.

#### The Benavides Era: 1933-1939

Within hours after the assassin struck, the Constituent Assembly met and selected General Benavides as president for the remainder of the slain executive's term. The Assembly acted in direct violation of the new Constitution which prohibited active members of the armed forces from assuming the presidency. But because Benavides was Peru's most respected military figure and had demonstrated administrative ability as provisional president in 1914-1915 he was

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<sup>43</sup> Among those who have charged Benavides with complicity in the assassination of Sánchez Cerro is Víctor Villanueva. See Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 22.

the overwhelming choice to lead Peru in its time of crisis.<sup>44</sup>

The most immediate problem confronting the new president was the imminent possibility of renewed hostilities with Colombia. Benavides immediately sought to defuse the situation, claiming it was imperative that Peru avoid a war it had little chance of winning. Two days after assuming office, direct negotiations involving the Leticia dispute were begun between Benavides and president-elect Alfonso López of Colombia. The men had become close friends during their respective ambassadorial assignments in London and López was soon invited to Peru to discuss the issue with the Peruvian president. After six days of talks, López returned to Colombia on May 21, having secured Benavides' acceptance of the League of Nations' proposal to resolve the conflict. With the withdrawal of Peruvian troops from the area in mid-June war tensions between the two nations were substantially reduced.<sup>45</sup>

Benavides' quick settlement of the Leticia affair promptly alienated many Sánchez Cerrista war advocates.

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<sup>44</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 225.

<sup>45</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 228-51. The final settlement of the dispute in 1935 involved a return to the conditions of the Solomon-Lozano Treaty of 1922, or in essence a re-establishment of the status quo before 1932.

The president was able to withstand their violent criticism due to his own personal prestige and he had the support of Apristas who favored the peace efforts that ended a conflict they viewed as an "invention of Sánchez Cerro's."<sup>46</sup> Most military officers backed Benavides because they recognized that Peru's defeat at Tarapacá revealed the nation's shockingly ineffective war potential. Internal factionalism, low morale resulting from repeated command and troop transfers, and a lack of effective combat training were the main causes of this problem. Although in 1933, seventy per cent of the army officers were graduates of Peru's improved military college, the Colombian defeat only served to undermine the confidence of the nation's young army officers in their military and political leaders.<sup>47</sup> The Benavides' government thus attempted in the next six years to institute reforms in military training and acquired more modern armaments in an effort to improve the nation's national defense capabilities.

Coinciding with the government's efforts to smother the divisive Leticia dispute was a program aimed at eliminating domestic political strife by reducing political

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<sup>46</sup>Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Lima, Peru, July 13, 1974.

<sup>47</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 217-20, and 100 años, pp. 91-107.

repression. During early May, martial law was lifted and many political prisoners were released. Within three months amnesty was given to nearly all remaining political internees including Haya de la Torre. Benavides also announced that elections to fill vacated congressional seats would soon be called. This would apparently give APRA the chance to regain some of the twenty-three seats the party had lost in February, 1932, when Sánchez Cerro exiled the Aprista congressmen.

As Benavides drew farther away from the policies of his predecessor, the dead president's supporters grew violent in their opposition. Between May and November, 1933, the president was forced to dissolve his original Sánchez-Cerrista cabinet, suppress an army revolt by the jungle garrison in Iquitos and arrest a number of members of the Partido Unión Revolucionaria for plotting his assassination.<sup>48</sup>

While the government effectively dealt with the new opposition, its announced policy of "peace and concord" still remained tacitly in effect. APRA was allowed to renew its political activity, and in November the party became the dominant member of a newly formed political coalition, the Alianza Nacional. The coalition, composed

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<sup>48</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 225-26.

of former supporters of Leguía, and Luis Antonio Eguiguren's Partido Democratico Social, demanded that the president call elections to select an entirely new congress, not simply to fill the relatively small number of vacated seats. The demand was rejected by Benavides, who apparently feared that it represented APRA's bid to gain increased national power through domination of the national legislature. In the year following the formation of the Alianza Nacional the government defaulted on its promise to hold congressional elections. Mistrusting APRA and clearly fearing the renewed internal discord that elections might produce, Benavides cancelled the elections in early November, 1934 without announcing a new date for the voting.<sup>49</sup>

After a year of frustration, the Alianza Nacional collapsed and APRA leaders once again decided to employ force to attain national power. During the latter part of November and early December, 1934, APRA instigated a series of insurrections throughout Peru. For the most part, Benavides' support in the military barracks remained firm and all the uprisings were suppressed quickly. With the arrest and exile in early December of a small number of army officers and important Aprista leaders, including Luis Alberto Sanchez, Carlos Manuel Cox, former army Colonel

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<sup>49</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 269-70.



César Enrique Pardo and Agustín Haya de la Torre, the uneasy political truce between Apristas and the Benavides regime came to an end. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre avoided capture, but continued Aprista subversive activity was met by a strengthened National Emergency Law enacted in February, 1935.<sup>50</sup>

Despite continuing internal disorder the government still rejected a program of political repression along the lines established by the Sánchez Cerro regime.<sup>51</sup> This is evidenced by the relatively light jail sentence given to the Aprista assassin of El Comercio editor Antonia Miró Quesada and his wife in May, 1935. Under the terms of the Emergency Law, the murderer should have received the death penalty from the military tribunal that tried the case. Instead the twenty-five year sentence aroused strong anti-Benavides sentiment among the nation's extreme conservative groups. It also embroiled the armed forces' high command in a bitter confrontation between fellow Civilista backers of Miró Quesada and their traditional APRA enemies. Strong feelings resulting from the Miró Quesada incident created a

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<sup>50</sup> Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 454-58.

<sup>51</sup> This is evidenced by the fact that Benavides never really made a concerted attempt to arrest Haya de la Torre during his underground years after 1934. Despite the arrest and deportation of many APRA leaders after 1934 Haya de la Torre remained in Peru, often giving clandestine interviews with foreign journalists and scholars who were not hard put to make contact with him.

continuing feud involving close military associates of Benavides and the assassinated editor's family until Benavides' death in 1945.<sup>52</sup>

Aided by strengthened police powers and a markedly improved economy, Benavides felt sufficiently secure by early 1936 to begin preparations for national elections to select a new president and national congress. Nevertheless, the president was still wary of continuing Aprista efforts to subvert army and police units. Consequently, in February, 1936, he removed the director of the National Police School and implemented more transfers in army command positions.<sup>53</sup>

By June the presidential campaign was in full swing with four candidates announcing their intention to seek the office. Representing the nation's right-wing elements were Dr. Manuel Vicente Villaran (a former Civilista) and Luis M. Flores of the Partido Unión Revolucionaria. Jorge Prado y Urgarteche, candidate of the Frente Nacional and long-time associate of Benavides, had the unofficial backing of the government. Haya de la Torre, still in hiding, announced his candidacy in early June and named the exiled

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<sup>52</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 273-74, and Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, p. 351.

<sup>53</sup>Dearing to SecState, February 19, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1189.

former army Colonel Enrique Pardo as his first vice-presidential candidate. This political gesture was aimed at demonstrating that APRA was not violently anti-military, as its critics charged.<sup>54</sup>

Although APRA presented Haya de la Torre as a candidate, party leaders had little confidence in the government's willingness to conduct open elections. Therefore in April, 1936, APRA leader Manuel Seoane made an overture to the Bolivian government for assistance in overthrowing the Benavides regime. Risking a possible insult to his hosts by promoting Bolivian interests during a speech in Asuncion, Paraguay, Seoane discussed APRA's position on one of the central issues of the Chaco War involving Paraguay and Bolivia.

Aprista opinion has always esteemed Paraguayan valor and has criticized official Peruvian policy for being unable to prevent the [Chaco] war [but] when Aprismo assumes power it will endeavor to bring about a favorable resolution of Bolivia's right to a port on the Pacific.<sup>55</sup>

APRA offered Bolivia support in gaining the port of Arica from Chile in exchange for that country's aid in its revolutionary campaign against Benavides. Bolivian president David Toro's desire to regain a seacoast for his

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<sup>54</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 463-64.

<sup>55</sup>Ambassador Findley B. Howard (Asuncion, Paraguay) to SecState, April 24, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1203.

nation (landlocked since Bolivia's defeat in the War of the Pacific) and his close personal relationship with Seoane prompted him to offer a large quantity of arms and ammunition to the Aprista cause in August. The Benavides government was made quickly aware of the plot, however, and by exerting strong diplomatic pressure forced Toro to withdraw his support by September 1.<sup>56</sup>

Undoubtedly responding to APRA's revolutionary scheme, the National Election Board on September 5 disbarred APRA and Haya de la Torre from participation in the national elections scheduled for October 11. The Board justified its action on the grounds that article fifty-three of the constitution, which prohibited international organizations from participation in national elections, disqualified APRA. With the party out of the running, Luis Antonio Eguiguren, candidate of the Frente Democrático, joined the presidential race. Eguiguren quickly exploited the dissatisfaction voters felt towards the other candidates while also gaining the support of Apristas in his presidential bid.<sup>57</sup> APRA viewed Eguiguren as the candidate least likely to continue the conservative policies of Benavides and possibly hoped to dominate his government once he was elected.

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<sup>56</sup>Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 468-470.

<sup>57</sup>Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru.

With APRA's voting support, Eguiguren moved into an early lead and appeared headed for an electoral victory until Benavides ordered the National Election Board to suspend the vote tabulation on October 21. One day later the president solidified his political position by naming an all-military cabinet headed by General Ernesto Montagne Markholtz as Minister of War.<sup>58</sup> As most Peruvians anticipated, the national congress then met on November 4 and annulled the election on the basis of illegal Aprista participation in support of Eguiguren. After gaining the assurance of support from most of Lima's senior military officers, on November 14 Benavides had the congress extend his presidential term until December 8, 1939. He thus assumed full dictatorial powers; no congress would serve for the remainder of his term since the elections to replace that body had been voided.<sup>59</sup>

Both APRA and the Sánchez-Cerrista Partido Unión Revolucionaria led by Luis Flores attempted to retaliate against the cancellation of the elections. But efforts by Aprista elements and air force personnel to seize a Lima police barracks and the air force base at Ancón in late

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<sup>58</sup>Dearing to SecState, October 23, 1936, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1223.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., November 5, 1936, 823.00/1232.

October again met with failure. A month later, Flores and General Cirilo H. Ortega--once a close friend of Sánchez Cerro--were implicated in an extensive plot to overthrow Benavides. With the arrest and deportation of Flores and eight associates, all effective anti-government resistance ended.<sup>60</sup>

Using a program of arrest, imprisonment and exile employed frequently within the context of his strong executive powers, Benavides ruled until early 1939 without facing any serious challenges to his regime. A continually improving economy contributed to the stability of these years. National income rose sixty-one per cent between 1935 and 1939, reflecting higher world prices for Peru's mineral exports. The government, while keeping the military budget at about fourteen per cent of total expenditures, used the additional revenues to make important purchases of naval vessels, airplanes, and other military equipment which modernized many armed forces units.<sup>61</sup> Benavides also contracted a short-lived German army mission and Italian air force and police training teams in 1937. The regime's affiliation with the German and Italian military institutions brought charges that Benavides had pro-fascist leanings.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., November 28, 1936, 823.00/1250.

<sup>61</sup> Peru, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, Anuario Estadístico del Perú: 1944-45, cited in Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 546.

But in the case of the Italian air mission at least, it is clear that the government's acceptance of Italian military aid was motivated in large part by the highly competitive nature of the contract bid. The Italian Caproni aircraft company had previously agreed to construct a factory on the outskirts of Lima in early 1937. Moreover, just before the air mission contract was signed, twelve modern Fiat combat planes were sent to perform at the Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference in Lima to influence the government's decision. Evidence that Benavides was motivated as much by the quality of foreign training missions as by his personal politics is reflected in the reinstatement of the large and prestigious United States naval mission whose contract was renewed in 1938 after a five year lapse.<sup>62</sup>

Although the Benavides regime did make significant progress towards improving the professional expertise of the nation's armed forces officers, subversion of individual officers and entire military units by APRA and other civilian political groups never completely abated during the years 1936-1939. In September, 1938, Haya de la Torre claimed that if economic conditions worsened, Benavides would be quickly unseated. In such an instance the APRA leader asserted, "the army will come to me for support,

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<sup>62</sup>Charge d' Affairs Louis G. Dryfus to SecState, October 6, 1937, NA, RG 59, 823.248/128.

since I have many partisans among the officers, particularly the younger ones."<sup>63</sup> Events in February 1939, in which Apristas and right-wing members of the Partido Unión Revolucionaria conspired with army General Antonio Rodríguez Ramírez to overthrow Benavides confirmed the substance of Haya de la Torre's boast.

General Rodríguez was one of the most powerful members of the armed forces and he had parlayed his adept support of Benavides' 1914 coup and Sánchez Cerro's 1930 golpe into a top army command position. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1934 after serving as Army Chief of Staff during Sánchez Cerro's second regime. The general was then appointed to Benavides' cabinet as Minister of Government and Police in 1935.<sup>64</sup> In early 1939, however, Rodríguez resolved to overthrow his long-time colleague and make himself military president.

In a broad-based conspiracy Rodríguez allied with APRA and its chief political rival the Partido Unión Revolucionaria in his plot against the Benavides' regime. Aprista leaders joined the conspiracy only after they had failed to convince Colonel Eloy G. Ureta, commander of the Third Army Division in Arequipa, to head a revolutionary movement.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., September 8, 1938, 823.00/1315.

<sup>64</sup>The New York Times, February 20, 1939, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 227.



The stated goals of the Rodríguez movement were twofold: To restore full participation for all political parties and to guarantee complete amnesty as a prelude to national elections scheduled to be held six months after the general's seizure of power. Upon toppling Benavides, the rebel general planned to establish a provisional government including elements from nearly all of Peru's major political groups. Destined to hold the key position as Minister of Government and Police was the Aprista Lieutenant Colonel, Gerardo Gamara Huerta, General Cirilo H. Ortega, a staunch Sánchez Cerrista, was slated for the equally important post as Minister of War.<sup>66</sup>

Rodríguez launched his revolt in the early morning hours of February 19 after Benavides had departed for a short holiday at Ica in southern Peru. Support for the movement was spread throughout the three service branches and the police with twenty-five officers of the army, navy, air force and guardia civil taking an active role.<sup>67</sup>

During the first hours of the revolt, Rodríguez made a serious tactical error when he attempted to use his post as

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<sup>66</sup>Dreyfus to SecState, May 25, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1363, Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 17-23, and Por la verdad histórica: la revolución democrática de Antonio Rodríguez Ramírez (Lima, 1942), authors listed as "friends" of the deceased general. This pamphlet contains speeches, proclamations, and proposed government personnel in Rodríguez' planned revolutionary junta.

<sup>67</sup>La Crónica, March 23, 1939, p. 14.

Minister of Government and Police to secure military control of Lima before making a radio appeal for civilian (mainly Aprista) support in other parts of Peru. The resulting confusion within the ranks of both civilian and military insurgents prevented the simultaneous activation of the revolt. Consequently, most subverted military units did not join Rodríguez at his headquarters in the National Palace as they believed the uprising had been aborted. Six hours after the instigation of the revolt, the general met Major Luis Riza Patrón, commander of the Assault Troop Police Regiment, and a number of police and army personnel in the patio of the National Palace. Rodríguez, was unaware that Riza Patrón had not joined the ranks of the rebels, and he was immediately shot and killed by the police captain. In the ensuing gun battle three more persons died and another six were wounded before Rodríguez' supporters were overwhelmed and imprisoned. A supporting movement led by air force Major José Estremadoyro Navarro at Ancón was also rapidly suppressed after the arrest of the major and a small number of his air force associates.<sup>68</sup>

The Minister of War, General Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, was chiefly responsible for suppressing the revolt

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., February 20, 1939, p. 15, The New York Times, February 20, 1939, p. 1, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 473-78.

in Benavides' absence. His orders confining most of Lima's army troops to their barracks prevented the spread of the uprising during the morning of February 19. When Benavides returned to the capital on the evening of the uprising, complete order was restored. Documents found on Rodríguez' body implicated a number of conspirators who were quickly arrested. On March 22, twenty-four military men were sentenced to prison terms from one to ten years for participating in the revolt.<sup>69</sup> The Rodríguez conspiracy represented APRA's best chance to overthrow Benavides, but the movement lacked the critical support of junior army officers who had conspired with the party throughout the 1930's. Because of the rebel general's close association with Benavides and Sánchez Cerro, the younger officers were wary of his political motives.<sup>70</sup> After the conspiracy was suppressed by Benavides, APRA was again denied the opportunity to regain political legality when the president arranged for his long-time political ally, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, to succeed him as president. This launched a new era of civilian rule. But the civil-military confrontations of the 1930's would continue to effect the development of the armed forces' professional role during the Prado years and after.

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<sup>69</sup>La Crónica, March 23, 1939, p. 14.

<sup>70</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 18-20.

### Conclusion

Between 1930 and 1939 the Peruvian armed forces remained intensely factionalized as they had been throughout much of the time since the turn of the century. Divisions within the officer corps reached a critical level during the Sánchez Cerro era due to pressures of greater mass political participation, the economic dislocation caused by the world depression, and the emergence of APRA as a potent political and subversive force. While Aprista excesses such as the Trujillo massacre and the assassination of Sánchez Cerro convinced many officers that APRA was violently anti-military, at the same time these radical actions enhanced the party's revolutionary appeal for dissident officers like Lieutenant Colonel Jiménez and General Rodríguez. These conspiracies and other repeated breakdowns of military discipline plus the military defeat at Tarapaca in 1933 had a disastrous impact on the armed forces professional morale. Loyal and professionally competent military officers were thus convinced that civilian interference in military affairs and the tendency of their colleagues to play politics were primarily responsible for the military's backwardness. The repeated manipulation of promotions and command transfers by both Sánchez Cerro and Benavides for political purposes also added to their discontent. Ironically, it would be during the civilian administration of

Manuel Prado y Ugarteche that the armed forces would achieve their greatest military success after suffering serious military defeats while men in uniform were in office.

## CHAPTER III

### BATTLEFIELD VICTORIES AND BARRACKS TENSIONS

#### The Armed Forces of 1939

An examination of the armed forces organization in 1939 reveals a number of elements that are fundamentally important for this study. In that year the armed forces officer corps was divided as a result of the repeated subversion of military personnel by competing civilian factions, interference in the internal affairs of the military by both civilian and military leaders for partisan political purposes and the inferior record of Peru's military leaders in time of war. The result of these problems was that officers had a poor image of their own institution.

It is unrealistic to assume that an organization as large and diverse as an armed forces officer corps could consistently concur on issues such as national political leadership, internal military policies and questions of national defense. But in Peru, these problems were so severe that many of the nation's younger officers distrusted the capability and professional commitment of their superiors. These officers also had a profound distrust for

civilian politicians they deemed largely responsible for much of the discord within their profession.<sup>1</sup> Within this context Peruvian battlefield victories in the brief border conflict with Ecuador in July, 1941 and a virtual moratorium on civilian subversive political activity during World War II lessened tensions within the armed forces for the first three years of the Prado administration. As the crucial election year of 1945 approached, however, new factions again formed representing discontented junior officers and army commanders seeking political power themselves.

Notwithstanding the factionalism that plagued the armed forces in 1939, President Benavides had overseen the development of a more modern institution during his years as chief executive. Foreign training missions, including German and French army units along with Italian air force and United States navy training teams provided up-to-date instruction for armed forces officers. Junior officers demonstrating command potential were also given advanced training in France and other European countries until early 1940. The government's acquisition of more modern armaments in the

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<sup>1</sup>For a succinct statement of these points see Frederick Nunn, "Notes on the 'Junta Phenomenon' and the 'Military Regime' in Latin America with Special Reference to Peru, 1968-1972," The Americas, XXXI (January, 1975), 237-252. Nunn's analysis of the factors promoting the growth of what he terms "professional militarism" in Peru is first-rate.

period 1934-1940 facilitated the modernization of Peru's fighting forces prior to the Ecuador conflict in 1941.<sup>2</sup>

In 1939 the armed forces totalled approximately 17,000 officers and men. The army, with a strength of about 13,000, was by far the most powerful of the three armed services.<sup>3</sup> Headed by Benavides as senior army officer holding the rank of division (major) general, the army officer corp numbered 1,500. Nearly eighty per cent of army officers entering the profession during the 1930's were graduates of the Chorrillos officers college; representing an increase of over ten per cent from the 1920's. The ranks of the army's general officers remained small, however, as Benavides was one of only ten brigadier generals in 1939. Between 1931 and 1940 (one year after Benavides left office) only

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<sup>2</sup>The best discussions of the key civil-military issues of the Prado administration are: Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, pp. 231-244, and La sublevación aprista, pp. 17-35, Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 255-345, David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute (New York, 1964), Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 365-85 and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," pp. 495-523.

<sup>3</sup>See G-2 Report no. 202039, August 27, 1945, NA, RG 319. This highly significant report summarizes a Peruvian Army General Staff study done in late 1944 which was entitled (U.S. military attaché's translation) "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization." Extensive information on the General Staff's analysis of the army's military capabilities, basic weaknesses and future requirements is provided. The document was listed as "secret" by the Peruvians in 1944, but the U.S. military attaché was able to obtain a copy in mid-1945.



seven officers were promoted to general.<sup>4</sup> This low number of promotions would have an impact on the Prado government's relations with senior officers, as many became impatient for advancement after years of waiting under Benavides.

Although the bulk of Peruvian officers studying overseas were army men serving in France, talented junior officers of the small air force (which operated within the framework of the navy ministry until 1942) were sent to Italy for advanced training. The largest group of these air force cadets began a three year course at the aviation academy at Caserta, Italy, in 1939.<sup>5</sup> A number of cadets attending earlier classes at the Italian aviation school had performed exceptionally well, impressing air force senior officers with their professional expertise upon returning to Peru.<sup>6</sup>

The United States naval mission had originally been contracted in 1920, and after a six-year absence between 1932 and 1938 Benavides renewed its contract. The president praised the work of this unit in December, 1939, claiming that Peruvian naval officers were benefiting from the

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<sup>4</sup>Perú, Ministerio de Guerra, Escalafón General del Ejército, 1939, p. 116. Hereafter cited as Escalafón with year and page number, and Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, p. 408.

<sup>5</sup>Report of the United States naval attaché (unsigned), June 23, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.248/188.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

North American nation's technically superior naval advisors.<sup>7</sup> As the army's ranking officer, however, the president saved his highest praise for the French army mission, which he asserted was the "most complete" of any foreign training unit ever to serve in Peru.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the military programs of the Benavides government the combat efficiency of the active Peruvian army was considered to be on a par with that of neighboring Colombia and significantly superior to the Ecuadoran army soon after Benavides left office. Some military commanders were still troubled by the fact that Peru's potential mobilization force of 60,000 (men aged 21-25 not in the active army) had almost no equipment available for use. To them this was a serious weakness in the nation's national defense scheme which they felt should be characterized by "defense in depth" aimed at the potential deployment of large numbers of reserves in time of war.<sup>9</sup> As a result, soon after the new civilian president assumed office, military commanders placed immense pressure upon him to take vigorous measures to correct these deficiencies.

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<sup>7</sup>Chargé d' Affaires Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. to SecState, December 19, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/78.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Report of the United States military attaché Captain Uzal G. Ent, February 23, 1940, NA, RG 59, 823.20 M.I.D./5.



### Civilian Rule Restored

During the last week of March, 1939, Benavides declared that he would leave office as scheduled on December 8. He also announced that national elections for president and a national congress would be held in late October.<sup>10</sup> The outgoing president, following the pattern of the 1915 and 1936 elections, was determined to have a civilian succeed him. His choice was Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, brother of Jorge Prado y Ugarteche, who had been Benevides' candidate in the 1936 elections. Manuel Prado belonged to one of the wealthiest and most influential families in Peru. Son of former president Mariano Ignacio Prado (1876-1879), he was president of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru and had extensive holdings in other financial and insurance institutions. Benavides and the Prado brothers had conspired to overthrow President Guillermo Billinghurst in 1914, but Manuel Prado was subsequently exiled during the Oncenio due to his opposition to Leguía. After Benavides became president in 1933, Manuel Prado remained politically loyal and he was named to the cabinet in April, 1939.<sup>11</sup> Benavides then used his substantial influence to advance the formation of the

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<sup>10</sup>El Comercio, March 28, 1939, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>The New York Times, April 20, 1939, p. 3, and the Peruvian Times, March 23, 1945, p. 2.

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Concentración Nacional, a coalition of centerist and conservative groups to back Prado's candidacy.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, during May the chief executive announced plans to conduct a plebiscite in order to lengthen the presidential term from four to six years and the congressional tenure from five to six.<sup>13</sup> Despite opposition from APRA and some junior army officers, by mid-June the longer terms of office had been approved and Manuel Prado's campaign was in full swing.

The only serious political challenge to Prado came from José Quesada Larrea, who organized the Frente Patriótico with the support of Manuel Vicente Villaran and his conservative adherents as well as Luis Flores and his wing of the Partido Unión Revolucionaria. Quesada Larrea, after purchasing the newspaper La Prensa, used it as a forum to attack his political opponent. The thrust of this criticism was that Prado, as the son of President Mariano Ignacio Prado who left Peru in the midst of the War of the Pacific, might not be a trustworthy chief executive in a time of national crisis.<sup>14</sup> The Prado family's "questionable"

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<sup>12</sup>Dreyfus to SecState, May 13, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1361.

<sup>13</sup>Enrique Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente a junio de 1962 (Lima, 1962), p. 54. This is one of the most valuable general reviews of twentieth century Peruvian politics.

<sup>14</sup>Dreyfus to SecState, October 20, 1939, NA, RG 59, 823.00/36 and Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 366-367.

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patriotism was the central issue of the campaign.

La Prensa's increasingly vitriolic attacks prompted the government to close the newspaper six days before the national elections.<sup>15</sup>

APRA voters played a key role in the election of Prado. Negotiations were conducted between Prado and APRA representatives during early October, but a pact that would have guaranteed a general political amnesty and legalization of the party in return for Aprista support for Prado did not materialize.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, it seems clear that APRA adherents cast a sizeable number of ballots for Prado as his winning margin of nearly 187,000 votes out of a total of 339,000 cast reflects electoral support well beyond the range of his announced political supporters. Although party chief Haya de la Torre denies that there existed an official party directive to vote for Prado, another APRA leader suggests that rank and file Apristas may have been unsure of party policy.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Chrinós Soto, El Perú frente, p. 55.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., and Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 366-368.

<sup>17</sup>Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 367-368 concedes that confusion over party directives may have led to a large number of Aprista votes for Prado. Haya de la Torre insists that the 1939 election was a "fake" and that there was no formal support for the winning candidate by APRA. Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru.



Even though many party members voted for Prado, Apristas still made an attempt to block his inauguration by organizing a civil-military conspiracy in Trujillo during mid-November. The ill-planned uprising was crushed on November 19, however, after Lieutenant Colonel Remigo Morales Bermúdez, commander of an army battalion in Trujillo, was fatally shot in his home.<sup>18</sup> Although Apristas Tomás Solano Bocanegra and Gregorio Zavelata Diaz were convicted of the Morales Bermúdez killing and quickly executed, APRA leaders denied the government's version of the incident and claimed Benavides' agents had assassinated the Colonel. According to APRA, the military man's death resulted from his opposition to Prado and his plans to resist the inauguration of the new president.<sup>19</sup> With the destruction of the Trujillo conspiracy, however, the path was clear for Prado's uneventful inauguration on December 8.

### A Time of Triumph

During most of Prado's first twenty months in office many observers speculated that his government would not

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<sup>18</sup>Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 89.

<sup>19</sup>The New York Times, December 8, 1939, p. 6, and Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 363-364.

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survive its full six year term.<sup>20</sup> But due largely to the unifying impact of the border war with Ecuador and World War II, his administration demonstrated greater stability than any civilian government up to that time. Benavides had taken an important step to help ensure this stability by increasing the pay of all armed forces officers an average of eighteen per cent on November 16, 1939.<sup>21</sup> This was deemed necessary by the outgoing president as a sizeable number of army officers were not in favor of Prado's candidacy.<sup>22</sup> After rewarding Benavides with a marshal's baton and an appointment as Peruvian Ambassador to Spain in December, 1939, Prado made another bid to gain a more stable political base. He promulgated a political amnesty in June, 1940 that pardoned all political prisoners except those who were "terroristic or connected with any international organization whose doctrines are in violation of Peruvian democratic principles."<sup>23</sup> This clause excluded APRA members from the otherwise general pardon, thus continuing the

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<sup>20</sup> Ambassador Henry Norweb to SecState, June 4, 1940, NA, RG 59 823.00/1433.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> G-2 Report no. 4040, June 14, 1940, U.S. Military Attache to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>23</sup> Perú, Ministerio de Guerra, Legislación Militar, 1940, pp. 254-255. Hereafter cited as Legislación Militar, with year and page number, and Norweb to SecState, June 26, 1940, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1427.

party's political proscription initiated by Sánchez Cerro in 1932. Haya de la Torre remained in Peru throughout the Prado administration, however, and he was given unofficial freedom to conduct limited party activities.

In spite of Prado's refusal to legalize APRA or free its political prisoners, the party did not mount any serious challenge to his administration before March, 1945. As early as August, 1940, APRA's conciliatory attitude towards the government was recognized by the United States ambassador who noted: "The Aprista party naturally wants to be recognized as a political party in Peru. However, there are few if any indications that it is seeking to cause trouble for the Prado administration."<sup>24</sup> The ambassador also commented that APRA was aware of the danger to its international image if it promoted the overthrow of a "democratically elected government" at the height of Nazi Germany's advances in Europe. Thus he noted that APRA's clandestine journal La Tribuna was continuing to make pleas for "political harmony in Peru and the wholehearted support of Inter-American programs for defense and economic co-operation."<sup>25</sup> Throughout the war Haya de la Torre made a

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<sup>24</sup>Norweb to SecState, August 14, 1940, NA, RG 59 823.00/1433.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

concerted effort to demonstrate his pro-allied stand. He even proposed the formation of a Latin American division under a joint Inter-American command to engage in military activities aimed at eliminating pro-axis elements throughout the hemisphere.<sup>26</sup>

The Prado administration's support of the allies, his government's severance of relations with the Axis in January, 1942 and the declaration of war in January, 1945 were in keeping with the public position of the vast majority of Peru's political groups. In terms of the civil-military relations during most of the war years, the support of these political groups was manifested by an almost complete abatement of political conspiracies against the government.

In keeping with the government's rejection of ties with the Axis, the Italian air mission was terminated in March, 1940. Peruvian air force officers also pressured the administration to replace the Italian unit with a United States aviation team.<sup>27</sup> This was accomplished on July 31, 1940, when the Peruvian government approved the contract

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<sup>26</sup>Butler to SecState, January 14, 1943, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1625. For Haya de la Torre's pro-allied stance see his La defensa continental (fourth ed. Lima, 1967).

<sup>27</sup>Norweb to SecState, March 14, 1940, Na, RG 59, 823.248/243, and "Naval Aviation Mission: Agreement between the United States of America and Peru," Executive Agreement Series no. 178 (Washington, D.C., 1940).

for a United States naval aviation mission.<sup>28</sup> With the conclusion of this agreement the United States was operating advisory teams for two of the three branches of the Peruvian armed forces. The aviation mission, coupled with the even more important navy advisory team, increased the influence of the United States in Peruvian military affairs substantially. Still, the French army advisors remained on very close terms with the top army command. Even after the fall of France in the summer of 1940 and the subsequent termination of the French government's contract in January, 1941, French army officers remained in Peru until 1944 as unofficial consultants to the Army General Staff.<sup>29</sup> The United States exerted pressure upon the Peruvian government after 1941 to contract a full-sized (eight or more officers) army mission to replace the French team. But this objective was not realized until nearly the end of the war. Thus while United States military influence increased during World War II, senior army officers remained closely tied to their French associates. Few of these Peruvian officers were on close terms with any United States military representative prior to 1945.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> G-2 Report no. 5940, February 28, 1944, NA, RG 319.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., see also Frederick Nunn, "Notes on the Junta Phenomenon".

The Prado government's close cooperation with the United States navy, coupled with the retention of the French army mission illustrated the president's pragmatic dealings with the armed forces. His relations with the military benefited from the fact that high ranking army officers during 1940 and 1941 readily cooperated with his government as few had any immediate political ambitions.<sup>31</sup> As 1940 drew to a close, the major concern of the Army General Staff was the increasing probability of war with neighboring Ecuador.

Peru and Ecuador had disagreed over their common boundaries since 1829. The specific territory in contention in 1941 involved a small area on the Pacific Ocean and approximately 120,000 square miles in the Oriente (Eastern Peru and Ecuador) lying between the equator and the Javarí river, and the Andes mountains and Leticia on the Colombian frontier.<sup>32</sup> Following a series of border incidents in late 1940 and early 1941 the Prado administration adopted a rigid stance in negotiations to resolve the dispute. The government's position was in great part dictated by the Prado

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<sup>31</sup>G-2 Report no. 4040, June 14, 1940, U.S. Military Attache to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>32</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 255. As with the Leticia conflict, Wood's discussion of the diplomatic aspects of the Peru-Ecuador border controversy is quite comprehensive.

family's background and intense pressure from the senior officers of the army. Because of president Mariano Ignacio Prado's highly questionable conduct during the War of the Pacific, his son Manuel Prado was extremely sensitive to allegations regarding his own lack of patriotism. Consequently, it was assumed by most Peruvians that the president had no choice but to act firmly in the Ecuadoran crisis.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the armed forces leadership, given the history of defeat in the War of the Pacific and the Leticia conflict with Colombia in 1933, insisted that the government put the nation on a war footing in preparation for a military solution to the border dispute.

In early 1941 the army demanded that Prado purchase large quantities of small arms and ammunition and indicated that it was willing to get them from any source.<sup>34</sup> Military pressure on Prado in 1941 was succinctly described by the United States military attaché:

The army is loyal but needs arms and ammunition and the leaders are demanding that active and immediate

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<sup>33</sup>Numerous scholars have noted that Prado's family background was an important factor in determining the government's position during the controversy. See particularly Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 295, and Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, p. 368.

<sup>34</sup>G-2 Report no. 4190, January 3, 1941, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, Na, RG 319.



steps be taken to get them. The army will not allow a settlement of the [Ecuadoran] border dispute that is not favorable to Peru. The government, aware of these things, is working on a defense program to be financed by a 300 million soles internal loan.<sup>35</sup>

The internal loan was negotiated with the Prado family's Central Reserve Bank of Peru and was never publicly announced. It provided immediate funding for war preparations and was used throughout the bulk of the 1940's as a supplement to the official national defense budget.<sup>36</sup> These financial dealings were clearly prompted by pressure from senior army officers, but their younger colleagues shared their complaints about the army's need for more modern equipment and combat training.<sup>37</sup> These complaints took on greater significance as both Peru and Ecuador braced for the imminent conflict during May, 1941.

Border incidents during May led to diplomatic efforts by the United States, Brazil and Argentina to resolve the dispute. When negotiations in Washington involving Peru, Ecuador, and the three mediating nations broke down in early June, Peruvian forces situated in the Zarumilla-Marañón region along the Ecuadoran frontier were placed on alert.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., and G-2 Report no. 385333, June 30, 1947, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>37</sup> G-2 Report no. 4324, June 30, 1941, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 165.

<sup>38</sup> Peruvian Times, June 13, 1941, p. 18.

Commanding the Peruvian armed forces in the area was Brigadier General Eloy G. Ureta. Born in Chiclayo in northern Peru in 1892, Ureta graduated from the Chorrillos Military Academy in 1913. After serving in Europe to perfect his military training, he was subsequently assigned to the staff at Chorrillos. Upon attaining the rank of colonel, he was named commander of the Third Army Division in Arequipa in 1936. In early 1941, after promotion to general, he assumed command of all military forces in northern Peru.<sup>39</sup> General Ureta was a coolly reserved officer who displayed occasional flashes of humor. He was regarded by his colleagues as one of the most competent officers in the army.

After establishing his headquarters in Piura, Ureta received orders in June only to hold Peru's present positions and repel any Ecuadoran attack.<sup>40</sup> There is evidence that the general was unwilling to abide by these instructions, however. Colonel Damasco Arenas Sánchez, the Bolivian military attaché to Peru, claimed Ureta and other senior officers in the army had become extremely sensitive during May and June to accusations that the army was reluctant to take active steps to resolve the border controversy.

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., April 13, 1945, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup>Eloy G. Ureta, Apuntes sobre una campaña (Madrid, 1953), p. 34.

Arenas went on to report that Ureta then delivered an ultimatum to Prado during the last week of June declaring that if he was not allowed to initiate operations against Ecuadoran forces in the Tumbes region, then a military revolt against the government would result.<sup>41</sup> When new border clashes erupted during the first week of July, Ureta went well beyond the confines of his original orders in advancing against Ecuadoran positions, thus lending substance to Colonel Arenas' reports.

On July 5, hostilities between Peru and Ecuador commenced on a large scale. Peru charged that Ecuadoran troops garrisoned in the province of El Oro attacked its outposts at Augas Verdes and La Palma but were driven back. Ecuador countered with the version that Peruvian guardia civil personnel accompanying farm workers into territory claimed by Ecuador exchanged gunfire with Ecuadoran patrols. In any case, these hostilities precipitated Ureta's initial large-scale operation against enemy positions on July 6. The operation, however, bogged down apparently due to incomplete planning. The United States, Brazil and Argentina once again offered their good offices to mediate the dispute on July 9. Ecuador, in a precarious military position,

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<sup>41</sup>G-2 Report no. 4336, July 14, 1941, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 165.

quickly accepted the offer but Peru held back as it sought a more definitive military settlement to the controversy.<sup>42</sup>

After Ureta regrouped his forces during mid-July he prepared to make a second assault against enemy lines. Employing modern warfare tactics by implementing air, sea and ground forces simultaneously, the general opened his attack on July 22 after charging that Ecuadoran soldiers had attacked his units earlier in the day. Operating along a fifty kilometer front, Peruvian troops advanced quickly against their outnumbered foes.<sup>43</sup> On July 28, President Prado announced to a huge independence day crowd that Peruvian troops had entered Ecuadoran territory and they would not return until Peru's territorial rights were recognized.<sup>44</sup> Three days later General Ureta launched a small blitzkrieg utilizing motorized infantry, air transport troops, and a parachute squad to capture the Ecuadoran towns of Puerto

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<sup>42</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, pp. 278-279. For the best discussion of the military aspects of the conflict see David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute (New York, 1964). Other useful works are Luis Humberto Delgado, Las guerras del Perú: campana del Ecuador, batalla del Zarumilla (Lima, 1944), General E. P. Felipe de la Barra, El conflicto Peruano-Ecuatoriano y la victoriosa campana de 1941 en las fronteras de Zarumilla y nor-oriente (Lima, 1969). For the Ecuadoran version of these events see Luis A. Rodriguez, La agresion peruana: La campana del Zarumilla documentada (Quito, 1955).

<sup>43</sup>Zook, Zarumilla-Marañón, p. 177.

<sup>44</sup>El Comercio, July 28, 1941, p. 19.

Bolívar, Santa Rosa, and Machala.<sup>45</sup> On August 1, Brigadier General Antonio Silva Sanisteban, commander of the Peruvian forces in the Oriente, launched another offensive with three battalions totalling 1,845 men on the Ecuadoran outposts at Yaupí and Santiago in the Zarumilla region. His forces continued the assault during the first week of August and occupied considerable Ecuadoran territory before discontinuing the operation.<sup>46</sup>

By mid-August, Ecuadoran resistance on both fronts had completely collapsed. Massive desertions by Ecuadoran officers and troops gave Peru the capability of capturing Guayaquil and Quito. The swift and overwhelming defeat of the Ecuadoran army was due to a number of factors. Peruvian forces vastly outnumbered their opponents in the main theater north of Tumbes. The Peruvian Northern Army group totalled 441 officers and 9,386 troops against an estimated 3,000 Ecuadoran officers and men.<sup>47</sup> Peru's effective military leadership provided by Ureta, Silva Sanisteban and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel A. Odría (leader of a particularly impressive attack on July 22), contrasted greatly with the professionally poor leadership provided by the Ecuadoran

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<sup>45</sup>Zook, Zarumilla-Marañón, p. 183.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>47</sup>De la Barra, El conflicto Peruano-Ecuadoriano, p. 51.

command. Additionally, the vanquished nation's troops suffered from a disastrous lack of war material and civilian support for the war effort. Very simply, Ecuador was almost totally unprepared to go to war with Peru in 1941.<sup>48</sup>

On the other hand, for the first time in its national history, Peru was able to mount a well-coordinated military campaign that was firmly supported by the government and the general population. The resulting victory overcame a tradition of military defeat and raised the morale of the armed forces substantially. APRA, in line with the sweeping civilian support for the military effort, praised General Ureta's actions in its clandestine newspaper La Tribuna. The newspaper declared that the military campaign in the boundary dispute was "exceedingly well-handled." Apristas also took the daring step of visiting Ureta at his military headquarters in late September, 1941 to offer their support for his efforts.<sup>49</sup> Clearly, the party recognized the political necessity of openly backing the nation's most popular and successful military effort in history.

President Prado also attempted to use the military success to his immediate political advantage. During the campaign in late July, the president's wife and daughter

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<sup>48</sup>Zook, Zarumilla-Marañón, pp. 184-185.

<sup>49</sup>Norweb to SecState, October 1, 1941, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1472, and October 7, 1941, 823.00/1475.

visited wounded soldiers at the hospital at Tumbes, and Prado, during his independence day speech, profusely praised the armed forces units engaged in the conflict.<sup>50</sup> Military men killed in the campaign were granted recognition as national heroes and Prado himself was given an official resolution of gratitude by the congress in 1942 for his contribution to the war effort.<sup>51</sup> By late 1941, the president only needed to have Peru's battlefield victories validated by international recognition of its territorial gains to complete his political success.

Peruvian troops remained in captured Ecuadoran territory until a preliminary settlement of the dispute was hammered out at the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States at Rio de Janeiro in late January, 1942. Faced with an unbending stance by Peru regarding any major withdrawal from occupied territories, Ecuador accepted a preliminary boundary agreement that was guaranteed by the

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<sup>50</sup>El Comercio, July 27, 1941, p. 5, and July 28, 1941, p. 19.

<sup>51</sup>The relatively limited scale of the conflict is reflected in the low number of casualties suffered by both Peru and Ecuador. Ecuador suffered an estimated 400 killed and wounded while Peru lost 107 army, air force and guardia civil personnel killed. Zook, Zarumilla-Marañón, p. 186, and El Centro de Estudios Histórico-Militares del Perú, "Relación nominal de los oficiales, clases y soldados muertos en las acciones de armas en la fronteras del norte y nor-oriente en el conflicto con el Ecuador en 1941," Mimeographed list of individual armed forces members killed in the Ecuador conflict.

United States, Argentina, Chile and Brazil. The so-called Rio Protocol granted Peru most of the 120,000 square miles contested by the belligerents. The quick settlement of the dispute reflected the desire of the United States and its close ally Brazil to achieve hemispheric solidarity in the wake of Pearl Harbor. The Department of State "did not really care where the boundary lines were drawn so long as a formal settlement was reached."<sup>52</sup> At the Rio Conference, Peru attained its diplomatic objectives and also agreed to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis. In a further demonstration of solidarity with the United States, in 1942 the government granted the North American nation permission to operate an air base at Talara in Northern Peru.<sup>53</sup> In the aftermath of the military and diplomatic success attained in the confrontation with Ecuador, President Prado and armed forces senior officers enjoyed their most cordial relations during the course of his administration. General Ureta's prestige among both civilians and military personnel stemming from the Ecuador conflict soon made him a powerful new force that Prado had to watch carefully, however. Additionally, the government's military promotion policies

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<sup>52</sup>Wood, Latin American Wars, p. 338.

<sup>53</sup>James C. Carey, Peru and the United States, 1900-1962 (Notre Dame, 1964), p. 108.





and increasing dissension among army junior officers soon contributed to renewed armed forces facionalism after the flush of the battlefield victories in 1941 had diminished.

### Prado, Ureta and the Issue of Promotions

General Ureta was the main beneficiary of the praise showered upon the nation's military personnel following the Ecuador conflict. He was promoted to division general and was soon named to the powerful post of Inspector General of the Army even though he was the youngest general officer in the institution. Also promoted to division general was Antonio Silva Sanisteban, who commanded the army's campaign in the Oriente.<sup>54</sup> The congress, which approved all promotions above the grade of major or its equivalent, also concurred with the promotions of approximately eighty officers who had served on the Ecuadoran front under Ureta. The quick action by congress in approving the promotions in November, 1941, reflected congressional satisfaction with the military effort as well as a recognition of the necessity of rewarding Ureta and his fellow officers.<sup>55</sup> Other officers

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<sup>54</sup>Escalafón General del Ejército, 1942, p. 21.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., pp. 21-69 passim, and Ambassador John Campbell White to SecState, April 3, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-345. Special promotions were granted during November, 1941 (regularly promotions were scheduled for February) for approximately 85 officers serving in the areas of the Ecuador

who had not served on the northern front and were not promoted soon after the Ecuador conflict were dismayed by the fact that a number of the officers who were promoted as a result of the Ecuador conflict had not engaged in combat but had merely been fortunate enough to have been serving in the region when hostilities began.<sup>56</sup>

By late 1943 the government's handling of promotions sparked jealousies among army senior officers as well. During November Prado failed to supply the yearly list of recommended promotions to the congress for its approval. At that time six vacancies at the rank of general existed in the army, and a number of important posts, including the command of two light divisions, were held by colonels.<sup>57</sup> Prado failed to suggest action on these vacancies because of a clash with Ureta over the nomination of a national police general to the Supreme Tribunal of Military Justice (Consejo de Oficiales Generales). Ureta and his fellow officers were aware of past attempts to use the national police as a check on the power of the army. Therefore, they did not favor any increase in the prestige or power of that

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conflict. From 1939 to 1941 the number of yearly promotions in the army officer corps was approximately 70.

<sup>56</sup>Letter from Víctor Villanueva, May 3, 1975.

<sup>57</sup>G-2 Report no. 5856, December 31, 1943, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

institution.<sup>58</sup> The president was apparently using the army promotions as a bargaining tool to get the police general placed on the Tribunal.

Another element in the promotion issue was Prado's desire to avoid permanently alienating army officers involved in the controversy. Originally the president had planned to promote Brigadier General Federico Hurtado (a former cabinet member under Benavides) to division general. Strong protests by Brigadier General Yáñez--who had powerful allies in the Senate and was furious at being passed over--forced Prado to hold back. Brigadier General Fausto Figueroa, who like Yáñez, would have been jumped by Hurtado, added his voice to the protests. Rather than risk an open confrontation with Figueroa and Yáñez the president decided to postpone promotions involving general officers until a less volatile political solution could be reached.<sup>59</sup> Ultimately, no new appointments to the grade of division general were made before Prado left office in July, 1945.

Although Prado was unable to promote friendly senior army officers he had more success in the Peruvian air force. In 1942 a close associate of Prado's, General Fernando Melgar, was made Minister of Aviation. In that year the

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid., Report no. 5911, June 25, 1944.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

air force had been made independent of the navy ministry, under which it had operated since 1929. Additionally, most of the initial Lend-Lease equipment obtained from the United States during 1942 and 1943 went to the air force in an effort to modernize that armed service branch. Thirty P-36 fighters, thirteen A-33 bombers and twenty-five PT-19 trainers were received during these two years.<sup>60</sup> A new air force training school at Las Palmas was also opened in late 1942 in order to expand the pool of active air force pilots.<sup>61</sup> Prado's military budgets reflected the government's support of the air force during its first three years of independent operation. The portion of military expenditures allocated to the air force climbed from eighteen to twenty-four per cent between 1942 and 1945, primarily at the expense of the navy, whose share of the budget dropped from twenty to less than 18 per cent during these years.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, VII, 1508.

<sup>61</sup>G-2 Report no. 352, April 1, 1944, U.S. military attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319. Entrance into the flight school at Las Palmas was largely based upon political contacts as each cadet was obliged to have a "sponsor" before being admitted. The military attache concluded that the majority of officers entering the school were "upper class" and there was a very low number of cholo (mestizo) pilots.

<sup>62</sup>Perú, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, Dirección Nacional de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico del Peru: 1948-1949, pp. 710-711. Hereafter cited as Anuario Estadístico, with year and page number.

The special attention given to the air force, while contributing to its expansion and modernization, also created internal problems within the institution and sparked inter-service rivalries as well. The idea of chain of command was often abused by air force officers who frequently disregarded orders from military superiors and appealed directly to the president himself. This resulted in a lack of trust among commanding officers which was compounded by air force officers who attempted to manage a squadron for their own personal benefit.<sup>63</sup> Army officers regarded the air force with suspicion and considered it to be closely allied with the president. One army officer in late 1943 claimed that in the event of trouble between the army and Prado, it might be necessary to destroy the Peruvian air force on the ground.<sup>64</sup> Undoubtedly due in part to Prado's policies, little unity existed among the three service branches throughout the remainder of his administration. However, these rivalries did not reach a critical level at any time before Prado left office. But as the 1945 elections drew close, General Ureta and Marshal Benavides competed for the support of the army officer corps as a prelude

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<sup>63</sup>G-2 Report no. 9210, February 27, 1943, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>64</sup>First Secretary Jefferson Patterson to SecState, December 27, 1943, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1726. Report of conversation with an unnamed army officer.

to their presidential candidacies. This once again forced military men to choose sides in the political struggles involving senior army officers.

### The Three Army Factions

Marshal Benavides, after accepting an ambassadorship to Spain in 1939, subsequently was transferred to Argentina. Nevertheless, Benavides' political and military influence remained substantial during his absence from Peru. Many of his appointees remained in office during the Prado administration not only in the national government but in the departments, provinces and municipalities as well. Candidates for congress in 1939 were in most cases approved by him, and Senator Carlos Concha, Minister of Foreign Relations during the Benavides regime, was one of the most powerful members of that body.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, General Ureta, as the military hero of the Ecuador war and Inspector General of the Army, had developed his own power base both within the army and civilian political circles.

In mid-1943 the Miró Quesada family, owners of the powerful conservative newspaper El Comercio, urged Ureta to seek the presidency in 1945. The Miró Quesadas wanted a strong military candidate like Ureta to oppose the expected

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<sup>65</sup>Norweb to SecState, June 4, 1940, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1433.

presidential bid of their staunch political enemy, Benavides.<sup>66</sup> With a view toward strengthening Ureta's candidacy, the owners of El Comercio urged him to persuade his fellow officers during July, 1943 to exert pressure on the Prado government for a declaration of war on the Axis.<sup>67</sup> These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and four months after this episode, a group of general officers in a secret meeting voted eleven to seven to support Benavides should another major political issue involving the two ranking Peruvian army officers develop.<sup>68</sup>

Marshal Benavides, keeping closely informed of these events in Argentina, made overtures in December, 1943 to APRA for support in a possible presidential campaign in 1945. This was necessary, in part, because President Prado, in spite of his obligations to the marshal, was not prepared to support his presidential ambitions.<sup>69</sup> Prado's reluctance seemed to stem from his desire in late 1943 and 1944 to have

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<sup>66</sup>Norweb to SecState, July 29, 1943, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1666. The Miró Quesada's opposition to Benavides was a manifestation of the continuing feud begun with the former president in 1935 after the assassination of Antonio Miró Quesada and his wife by an Aprista. See chapter two.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>G-2 Report no. 5842, December 24, 1943, U.S. military attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>69</sup>Patterson to SecState, December 18, 1943, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1718.



the constitution amended so that his term of office could be extended beyond July, 1945.<sup>70</sup> This hope faded in 1945, when he was unable to consolidate any support for such a move.

Junior army officers, already disgusted with the system of promotions, watched the political maneuverings of their senior officers with increasing dismay after 1943. General Ureta was forced on three occasions to "step down hard upon younger army officers" to dissipate budding discontent with their military superiors and the government.<sup>71</sup> Major Víctor Villanueva, writing later about this problem, lamented that the officers of his generation (1930's and 1940's) were testimony of the political influence necessary to reach the rank of lieutenant colonel and above, "Promotions dictated by politics were the norm. This system was detrimental to the efficiency of the army, as politics tended to intervene not only in promotions but also in the assignment of officers and troops."<sup>72</sup> During 1944 and 1945 unrest among junior army officers resulted in one anti-government conspiracy and the creation of a clandestine organization of junior army officers dedicated to forcing

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Patterson to SecState December 27, 1943, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1726.

<sup>72</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 30.

fundamental military and civilian reforms. With the creation of the Revolutionary Committee of Army Officers (Comité Revolucionaria de Oficiales del Ejército, or CROE) in July, 1944, the army officer corps was effectively divided into three factions: the Benavides and Ureta groups, and the CROE.

CROE was composed of approximately one hundred army officers from the ranks below colonel. Major Víctor Villanueva, a socially progressive cavalry officer and former instructor at the Superior War College, was primarily responsible for the creation of this organization. A number of junior officers belonging to CROE had been students of Villanueva's at the War College.<sup>73</sup> All of these army men had become alienated from civilian politicians and the high command after witnessing years of political intrigue, dictatorships and corruption in both civilian and military circles. They sought fundamental reforms within the armed forces and national politics in order to rectify these ills. A CROE manifesto distributed to hundreds of officers and non-commissioned officers of the army, air force, navy and national police in early 1945 provides one of the most concise statements of junior army officer grievances in Peru's twentieth century military affairs:

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<sup>73</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru.

A few generals and chiefs who have benefited from the government are not the army; not even a part of it. They are a few individuals, nothing more. They do not have the weight of opinion of the officer corps behind them because they lack professional prestige, lost through their dedication to national politics. The modern officer has a higher concept of discipline than his superiors; a clearer criterion of the national situation as the mass of the army is made up of conscientious officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who are united around one ideal: to liberate the country from tyranny and tyrants and to make the constitution respected not mocked. [Thus] the army, which is the same flesh and blood as the people, is united with them.<sup>74</sup>

Specifically the dissident junior officers called for a better trained army, free from political involvement, which would safeguard the right of the Peruvian people to be governed by authentically representative leaders.<sup>75</sup>

Two aspects of the CROE philosophy illustrate concepts fundamentally important to the development of this study. CROE members, in referring to their "higher concept of discipline," meant that they recognized discipline was both the major criterion of professionalism and, at the same time, the most important characteristic that unequivocally distinguished the armed forces officer from the civilian. This was extremely important to many young army officers because they felt "officers who have frequent and continuing contact

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<sup>74</sup>White to SecState, February 2, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/2-245.

<sup>75</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru, and "Programa de accion de C.R.O.E.," in Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 191-192.

with civilians run the risk of contamination, of losing their discipline, and of no longer being sufficiently 'military' in the eyes of their colleagues."<sup>76</sup> Thus, as the CROE manifesto clearly reflects, junior officers--who witnessed the intense political partisanship of civil-military relations during their formative years in the military--looked with contempt upon those officers who "played politics" and consequently impeded the professional development of the armed forces.<sup>77</sup>

Clearly recognizable in the CROE philosophy is that these officers (and dozens of others who conspired with civilians prior to 1944) were inclined to view national politics from a fundamentally apolitical viewpoint. CROE members and other armed forces personnel such as General Antonio Rodríguez--who conspired with APRA and other civilian political elements in 1939 for ostensibly "democratic motives"--failed to realize or admit that revolution, for whatever reasons, is an inherently political activity. This plain contradiction in political values plagued sincerely progressive armed forces personnel, including members of CROE, who sought during the 1940's to initiate badly needed reforms in the areas of promotions, training, and

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<sup>76</sup>Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica, 1971), pp. 12-13.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

military justice. Their problem was, that only through political activism could they hope to accomplish their objectives and this, of course, undermined the discipline of the institution and exacerbated already existing factions within the armed forces. Events in late 1944 clearly demonstrated the dilemma confronting CROE activists.

The Civilian Alternative: The Frente  
Democratico National

In 1944, Benavides returned to Peru from his diplomatic post in Argentina in the midst of General Ureta's efforts to generate support for his presidential candidacy.<sup>78</sup> But in Arequipa on June 3, a coalition of centrist and leftist civilian political leaders formed the Frente Democratico National (FDN) to select a civilian alternative to these military men.<sup>79</sup> Twenty-six political figures representing a wide variety of political views formed the FDN which soon expanded from a regional organization to a viable national

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<sup>78</sup>Peruvian Times, July 8, 1945, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup>First Secretary George Butler to SecState, June 13, 1944, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1780½. There were twenty-six individuals listed as founders of the FDN in its first political flyer released in early June in Arequipa. Listed as the president of the coalition was Manuel Bustamante de la Fuente, as vice president Julio Ernesto Portugal and secretaries Jorge Vasquez Salas and Jaime Rey de Castro. Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 508, presents Haya de la Torre's version that he was responsible for the formation of the Democratic Front.

political movement. APRA was instrumental in the formation of the Arequipa group, which called for the establishment of a genuinely representative and democratically elected regime capable of guaranteeing fundamental freedoms for all Peruvians.<sup>80</sup> APRA supported the FDN (which was headed by the Arequipa political leader Manuel Bustamante de la Fuente) as party leaders hoped to use the new political coalition as a means to achieve legalization and full political participation. Apristas were pessimistic about their future if General Ureta--backed by the intensely anti-APRA Miró Quesada faction--were elected president. Moreover, Benavides, after making overtures to APRA during late 1943 concerning the party's support for his possible presidential bid, lost interest in continuing his election efforts relatively soon after returning to Peru.

During the last five months of 1944, it became clear to Benavides that his presidential chances were seriously hampered by the growing opposition of junior officers to any military candidate and the commitment of the FDN to back a civilian for president. Adding to his difficulties was the powerful opposition of the Miró Quesadas, and President Prado's unwillingness to aid his former political mentor.

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<sup>80</sup>Butler to SecState, June 13, 1944, NA, RG 59, 823.00/1780½.

Consequently, on January 7, 1945 Benavides released a manifesto declaring that he would not be a presidential candidate, and urging the election of a civilian government that could achieve national unity. The marshal warned of serious divisions within the armed forces dangerous to the national well-being should a military man be elected president. This warning was aimed directly at General Ureta, who was at that time, finalizing his candidacy with the backing of the Miró Quesadas, elements of the Partido Union Revolucionaria, and a number of minor parties.<sup>81</sup>

Benavides' manifesto also signalled the finishing touches on an agreement between himself and APRA which stipulated that both would support the candidate of the FDN, and the marshal would use his influence to guarantee the legalization and political participation of the party. After the manifesto appeared, Haya de la Torre and Benavides exchanged congratulatory messages and the marshall received telegrams of felicitations from leading Apristas in exile.<sup>82</sup> This pact reflected Benavides' strong desire to block the election of his chief military rival and prevent serious divisions in the officer corps. It also was in keeping with

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<sup>81</sup>El Callao, January 7, 1945, p. 8, and Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente, p. 61.

<sup>82</sup>White to SecState, January 13, 1945, NA, RG 823.00/1-1345.

his consistent backing of civilian candidates in the elections of 1915, 1936, and 1939.

By the first week of March Benavides and APRA had offered their support to José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, then Peruvian Ambassador to Bolivia, if he would run for president as the choice of the FDN.<sup>83</sup> At the same time, however, Haya de la Torre, allied with the most activist members of the CROE, decided to launch a civil-military uprising aimed at warning the Prado administration against any attempt to rig the coming elections. CROE members feared the possibility that Prado might attempt to install General Ureta as president and thus Major Víctor Villanueva laid the groundwork for a civil-military insurrection, involving Apristas, army, and air force personnel, to be centered in Lima and Ancón.<sup>84</sup> Villanueva's arrest in February did not prevent the plot from proceeding as most of the important

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<sup>83</sup>Counselor of Embassy Edward G. Trueblood to SecState, March 6, 1945, NA, RG 823.00/3-645. Trueblood indicated that if Bustamante refused the offer, Haya de la Torre was prepared to explore the possibility of presenting his own candidacy.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., and interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru. Trueblood reported that an Aprista informant close to Haya de la Torre told him during the first week of March that if the coming elections were "rigged" then, "APRA would attempt to carry out a coup designed to place in power a junta which would have the sole purpose of guaranteeing fair and uncontrolled elections." The informant indicated that steps were already in progress to prepare for this contingency. The Villanueva plot clearly fits the informant's description of APRA's contingency plans.



preparations had been completed before his seizure.<sup>85</sup> On March 17, General Ureta made the formal announcement of his presidential candidacy, and in the early morning hours of the following day the plot was activated.<sup>86</sup>

Under the leadership of Sargeant Claudio López Lavalles, approximately twelve non-commissioned air force personnel rose at the air base at Ancón. The rebels detained air force minister Fernando Melgar (spending the weekend at the base) and the base commander at gunpoint for several hours, waiting for expected supportive movements to begin.<sup>87</sup> But because of divisions within the CROE ranks, and the last-minute cancellation of Aprista support for the uprising, the Ancón conspirators were isolated and persuaded to surrender after only several hours.<sup>88</sup> Some members of the CROE were opposed to collaboration with APRA, and still others were apparently not willing to engage in an uprising when an electoral pact with the civilian leader Bustamante y Rivero

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<sup>85</sup>Villanueva interview, July 27, 1974.

<sup>86</sup>El Comercio, March 17, 1945, p. 2, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 26.

<sup>87</sup>Peruvian Times, March 23, 1945, p. 2, El Comercio, March 19, 1945, p. 3, and White to SecState, March 19, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/3-1945.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 26-27, and Villanueva interview, July 27, 1974.

seemed imminent.<sup>89</sup> APRA leader Haya de la Torre called off his party's support for the Ancón uprising when Bustamante y Rivero agreed to accept the backing of the FDN on March 17. But the subverted elements in Ancón were not informed of these counterorders before they initiated their part of the conspiracy according to the original plans.<sup>90</sup>

As a result of subversive activities during February and March a number of CROE members were transferred to remote garrisons and eighteen air force and army personnel were court-martialed. Although Haya de la Torre was originally charged with complicity in the abortive revolt, no charges were brought against him because of an agreement between Prado and Bustamante in early April.<sup>91</sup> Bustamante had announced his presidential candidacy on March 19 after formally accepting APRA's support in return for a promise of legalization and electoral opportunities for Aprista congressional candidates.

Despite the failure of the Ancón uprising, many APRA sympathizers within the army openly expressed their

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<sup>89</sup>Villanueva interview, July 27, 1974. Bustamante agreed to run as the presidential candidate of the FDN as the Ancón rising was being activated.

<sup>90</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 26-27.

<sup>91</sup>White to SecState, April 19, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1945, La Cronica, March 23, 1945, pp. 3, 5, and Escalafón General del Ejército, 1945, p. 85.



allegiances to the party during April and May. The Bustamante candidacy freed many young officers to openly support the FDN. These officers had previously feared that any demonstration of solidarity with Apristas would seriously damage their careers.<sup>92</sup> Some CROE members not implicated by the government in previous subversive activities distributed flyers calling for Ureta to renounce his candidacy and avoid following in the footsteps of other ambitious military leaders such as Sánchez Cerro. They also insisted that "only defeated and decadent nations" were under military governments and Peruvian military leaders should follow the examples of Pershing, Foch, and MacArthur who did not exploit their military prestige for political gain.<sup>93</sup>

In mid-April Haya de la Torre claimed he was receiving a flood of adhesions from the young officer element in the army. Many of these young officers were sincerely committed to the election of a civilian president under democratic procedures and they viewed APRA as a key element in realizing

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<sup>92</sup>White to SecState, April 19, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1945. The U.S. Ambassador reported that Haya de la Torre informed one of his colleagues that he had the support of some, "70 per cent of the entire young officer element in the army." Even while discounting what he considered an exaggerated claim by Haya de la Torre, the Ambassador acknowledged evidence of sizeable support for APRA among junior army officers.

<sup>93</sup>Patriotas, Civiles y Militares, "Carta abierta al General Eloy G. Ureta," Lima, April, 1945, Colección de Volantes, 1945.

these goals. Another very important issue motivating their opposition to Ureta was his leadership of a close knit group of conservative senior officers, opposed to Benavides and APRA and seeking to gain control of the army if Ureta was elected president.<sup>94</sup> Naturally CROE members and other junior officers were alarmed at this prospect and worked actively to prevent it. Benavides, obviously also opposed to the Ureta clique, reacted strongly to his military rival's announced presidential candidacy on March 20. In a published attack on Ureta's political ambitions the marshal again warned that the polarization of the military must be avoided at all costs. He also insisted that his renunciation of any presidential ambitions was sincere and should not be interpreted as a political ploy.<sup>95</sup>

General Ureta's presidential hopes suffered a severe jolt on May 15, when after two months of negotiations, the Prado government finally legalized APRA. After inscribing the party under the title Partido del Pueblo, APRA leaders were free, after thirteen years of political proscription, to present congressional candidates for national elections

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<sup>94</sup> See White to SecState, April, 19, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1945, and April 3, 1945, 823.00/5-345. This group belonged to a military lodge called "Marcial Lamar."

<sup>95</sup> El Callao, March 20, 1945, p. 3.

scheduled for June 10.<sup>96</sup> Haya de la Torre did not attempt to seek office, but it was clear to the APRA-Bustamante alliance that the party chief would assume a prominent, if unofficial, role in the government of the Democratic Front.

The FDN candidate was not an experienced politician, having served only a short time as a local official in Arequipa during the 1930's and briefly in Sánchez Cerro's cabinet after supporting the 1930 coup. He was named Ambassador to Bolivia in 1942 and held that post until he was selected as the candidate of the FDN in March, 1945.<sup>97</sup> A lawyer by profession, this rather shy, religious, and scholarly man was not well-suited for the rigors of high-level Peruvian politics. Haya de la Torre years later described Bustamante as a "very innocent man." But Bustamante's relative political aloofness and sincerity prompted the APRA leader to comment that he was favorably impressed with the FDN candidate after their first meeting in late 1944.<sup>98</sup> Bustamante also accepted Haya de la Torre as the leader of a party that had come to reject the "extremes" marking the first fifteen years of APRA's participation in

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., May 16, 1945, p. 3, and the Peruvian Times, May 18, 1945, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup> Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 280, and Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 515.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima Peru.



Peruvian politics.<sup>99</sup> Despite these initial impressions, both men entered the political alliance with some suspicions of the other's ultimate intentions.

In the initial negotiations Bustamante imposed the condition on APRA that he would reserve the right to "gradualize" the reforms initiated by the party during his administration. Moreover, prior to the legalization of APRA on May 15, there were disagreements between the party and Bustamante regarding the number of Aprista congressional candidates allowed to seek office in the June elections.<sup>100</sup> Bustamante, apparently fearing the domination of the new congress by APRA, sought to keep the party's candidacies below forty per cent of the number of available seats. APRA leaders resisted this restriction strenuously and Bustamante dropped his efforts, allowing the party to present a full slate of candidates.<sup>101</sup>

In the 1945 election Haya de la Torre sought to encourage the widest possible support for APRA candidates.

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<sup>99</sup>José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, *Tres años de lucha por la democracia en el Perú*, pp. 18-22. This is Bustamante's account of his three years as president and is a valuable source for his version of the controversial events of these years.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22, and White to SecState, May 11, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/5-1145.

<sup>101</sup>White to Department of State, May 11, 1945, 823.00/5-1145.



Paralleling his attempt to present a more moderate image during the 1931 presidential election, he sought to allay fears of APRA radicalism during and immediately following the election campaign. Speaking at a huge rally on May 20, 1945 only a few yards away from the exclusive upper class Club Nacional he stated: "It is not necessary to seize the wealth of those who possess it but rather new wealth should be created for those who do not have it."<sup>102</sup> This clear effort to soften his public hard-line anti-capitalism was coupled with a rejection of the anti-military image of APRA. He insisted that the army and the Partido del Pueblo were united in defending the best interests of the nation.<sup>103</sup> This comment was in keeping with the APRA tactic of avoiding any direct attack on General Ureta's candidacy so as to avoid arousing new antagonisms within the army leadership against APRA. In July, Haya de la Torre also demonstrated a desire to head off any foreign business opposition to APRA. Speaking with a United States correspondent he claimed he was not in favor of the expropriation or splitting up of private property. He also encouraged foreign capital investment as "large capital does not exist in Peru."<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> El Callao, May 21, 1945, p. 3, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 29.

<sup>103</sup> El Callao, May 22, 1945, p. 3.

<sup>104</sup> The Peruvian Times, July 6, 1945, p. 2.

The moderate stance of APRA in the 1945 campaign corresponded to the cautious and rather vague political platform of Bustamante. He made only a brief reference to the armed forces, pledging to upgrade its technological potential. He also proposed the expropriation of uncultivated estates (with compensation) which were then to be distributed among small land holders. Other tax and social welfare reforms plus guarantees for the protection of civil liberties composed the remaining significant provisions of the platform.<sup>105</sup>

Ureta's campaign principles were even more vague than those of his political opponent. As the candidate of the Unión Nacional Democrática he made only general references to the need for national unity and the protection of such basic institutions as the church and the family.<sup>106</sup> Despite heated exchanges between the supporters of Ureta and Bustamante in the nation's newspapers, the candidates themselves did not engage in vitriolic campaign rhetoric.

Voting was conducted in an open and legal manner on June 10. Bustamante, with the support of APRA and most of the nation's centrist and leftist groups, garnered 305,590 votes as opposed to Ureta's total of 150,720.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup>Bustamante Tres años, pp. 23-25, and White to SecState, April 19, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1945.

<sup>106</sup>El Comercio, March 17, 1945, p. 3.

<sup>107</sup>Peruvian Times, July 20, 1945, p. 1.

Bustamante's resounding victory resulted from the critical support of APRA and Benavides as well as the serious divisions within the armed forces which weakened Ureta's candidacy. A more nebulous factor seems to have been the attitude of many voters that Peru, in electing a military president, would be at odds with the democratic trends fostered by World War II and the defeat of the Axis. In the spirit of this atmosphere Ureta did not contest Bustamante's victory and even took the highly unusual step of personally congratulating the victor.<sup>108</sup>

Elected with Bustamante were thirty-five senators and seventy-three deputies running under the banner of the Democratic Front. Within this group were eighteen Aprista senators and forty-six deputies from a total of forty-six senate, and 101 seats in the chamber of deputies.<sup>109</sup> Although APRA lacked a voting majority in either chamber it represented the largest single voting bloc in the congress. This apparently prompted members of Lima's upper class to hold a lavish dinner party in Haya de la Torre's honor at the home of Pedro de Osma Gildermiester (a member of one of the wealthiest families in Peru) in late June. Few Peruvians

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<sup>108</sup>Bustamante, Tres años, p. 29, and Trueblood to SecState, June 29, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/6-2945.

<sup>109</sup>Peruvian Times, August 3, 1945, p. 1.

questioned the likelihood of Haya de la Torre assuming a powerful role in national politics, and Lima's leading "bluebloods" were no exception.<sup>110</sup>

On July 28, 1945, Manuel Prado transferred the reins of government to José Bustamante y Rivero. Marshal Benavides, who had been instrumental in the election of the president, was denied witnessing the culmination of his labors, as he died of a heart attack on July 5.<sup>111</sup> But the armed forces, following his lead (and that of General Ureta), quietly accepted the constitutional transfer of the presidency from one civilian to another for only the fifth time in the twentieth century.<sup>112</sup> Many junior officers (particularly CROE members), however, now prepared to push for internal military reforms they felt had been ignored during the Prado regime. Apristas, closer than ever to achieving national power, prepared to use their congressional representatives in order to attain that objective. To President Bustamante, who lacked a personal political power base, would fall the role of arbitrating these demands against

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<sup>110</sup> Trueblood to SecState, June 29, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/6-2945.

<sup>111</sup> Peruvian Times, July 6, 1945, p. 1.

<sup>112</sup> This had occurred previously in 1903 with the election of Manuel Candamo, in 1904 with José Pardo, in 1908 with Augusto D. Leguía and in 1912 with Guillermo Billinghurst.

the opposing pressures of conservative opponents of APRA and activist junior officers.

### Conclusion

Considering the continued progress towards the modernization of the Peruvian armed forces and the impressive battlefield victories in the Ecuador conflict, the regime of civilian President Manuel Prado must be considered one of the high points in the twentieth century military affairs in Peru. But the internal factionalism which seriously divided the armed forces in the years before 1939 only temporarily abated amidst the flush of military success and the marked lessening of civilian political subversion during the first four years of Prado's presidency. Then, activist junior army officers, reacting to the renewed familiar patterns of civilian interference in their professional affairs and army senior officers playing politics, formed the CROE. This was the first cohesive organization of junior army officers to forcefully represent the views of military men. But CROE members, and other armed forces personnel who sympathized with their cause, while sincerely seeking beneficial military and civilian political reforms, employed the same tactics that they condemned in their own manifesto.

Perhaps, in the face of resistance by senior armed forces officers and civilian political leaders to their

proposals, junior officers had no choice but to employ these measures. Certainly, given the history of twentieth century civil-military relations, where subversion and the use of violence were established forms of attaining political and military objectives, the actions of the CROE were not atypical. But the professional refinement of the armed forces officer corps, which junior officers equated in great part with a strict maintenance on military discipline and a rejection of political involvement, was not advanced (by their definition) during the Prado years. During the first eighteen months of the Bustamante government, a dramatic intensification of this factionalism within the military would drive many more armed forces personnel to take even more desperate measures to accomplish their objectives.

## CHAPTER IV

### PRELUDE TO REBELLION

#### A Broadening Mission

During the first eighteen months of the Bustamante regime the political bipartisanship that characterized the acceptance of the APRA-backed FDN collapsed as a result of a number of developments. Rightist civilian and military opponents of APRA opposed the party's efforts to dominate the government. This prompted street violence and political terrorism by Apristas and their opponents as the political crisis deepened. Also contributing to the factionalization of the officer corps were APRA efforts to gain military support through the manipulation of promotions and salaries. Finally, when efforts of progressive junior officers committed to instigating fundamental institutional reforms and further clarifying the post war role of the armed forces in national affairs met with little success, their frustration further alienated them from their military superiors and civilian political leaders. These officers recognized that important changes had to be made in the institutional make-up of the military if the Peruvian armed forces was to

respond to the changing nature of the military profession in their nation.

An examination of the armed forces as it emerged from the relatively tranquil Prado years reveals significant changes in training techniques, influential leaders and professional perspectives. The army, which had relied heavily on French military advisors for most of the years since 1896, had severed its ties with the French and turned to the United States as a new source of technical training assistance. By the beginning of the Bustamante administration all three of the armed services were under contract to United States military missions. Besides the long-standing naval mission, the army command replaced the French with a sixteen-man United States army mission in July, 1944. On October 7, 1946 the naval aviation mission--serving as a training unit for Peruvian air force pilots--was replaced by a much larger United States air force team.<sup>1</sup> The policy of bringing Peruvian armed forces personnel to the United States and its overseas bases for advanced training which was begun during World War II, was expanded in the two years following the end of the world conflict. On one such visit in August, 1947 thirty-five officers and 263 men of the Peruvian navy traveled to the United States and returned

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<sup>1</sup>Peruvian Times, February 16, 1947, p. 29.



sailing nine vessels sold to Peru by Washington.<sup>2</sup> Despite this re-orientation towards the United States military establishment, many senior officers still retained their allegiance to their former French tutors and the military theories taught in French military institutions. Other older officers, and a number of younger military men, recognized that these theories would have to be re-examined, however, in light of the sharply altered structure of world military power after 1945.

An astute observer of the Peruvian military has suggested that before World War II, the best Peruvian officers (with high quality French training) were theoretically on a par with top-flight officers of other world military institutions. But with the advent of the atomic age and a new world order dominated militarily by the United States and the Soviet Union, underdeveloped countries such as Peru were forced to recognize that their national security was intimately tied to the immense military might of the two super-powers. As a result Peruvian generals and admirals, handicapped by their limited conventional means of making war, could no longer "sit at the same table" with their United States counterparts during discussions of mutual security.<sup>3</sup> Some of the shrewdest Peruvian military leaders

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., August 8, 1947, cover page.

<sup>3</sup>Villanueva, 100 años, pp. 141-142.

recognized that this new power structure based on the possession of atomic weaponry meant that the technical development of their armed forces would always be limited by Peru's inability to compete on a technological basis with the more advanced nations of the world. Consequently these few armed forces leaders sought to redefine the role of the nation's military institution within the scope of this new reality.

Following the Ecuador conflict Army Chief of Staff General Felipe de la Barra and fellow members of the General Staff worked on a comprehensive program of national defense planning. Seeking to use the strategic lessons of the Ecuador engagement and the "total war" concepts being employed during World War II as a basis for Peru's national defense scheme, these army leaders detailed their findings in a report entitled "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization." Completed in mid-1944, the study designated the army as the most important element in the national defense potential. The General Staff recognized, however, that divisions existed among the three armed services and thus the report stressed the need for the creation of a centralized armed forces high command designed to bridge these divisions and facilitate a more coordinated

framework for national defense.<sup>4</sup>

The primary recommendations of this highly significant document are important as precedents for post war national defense policy formation but they also give evidence of the forward-looking concerns of some army leaders long before most of their suggestions were implemented. The most important conclusions of this study were: 1) The army, as the predominant institution of the armed services, has the primary duty to study the realities of modern combat and make commensurate adjustments in Peru's military training techniques; 2) The national conscription law must be reformed as it discriminated against the nation's "impoverished and humble" Indian population, who were often in bad health and were consequently not fit for military service; 3) The military promotion law, which gave the congress control over promotions above the rank of major or its equivalent, must be reviewed to remove politics from this vital internal military matter; 4) Improvement of recruitment and the rate of re-enlistment (only five per cent at the time of this study) must be promoted; 5) Education programs for illiterate Indians to better prepare them for military service and help raise their basic living standard was urged; and 6) The enactment of a national defense law "assuring the full

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<sup>4</sup>G-2 Report no. 202039, August 27, 1945, U.S. Military Attache to War Department, NA, RG 319. Full information on this document is given in footnote three in Chapter III.

contribution of all factors of the nation in case of war mobilization" was also urged at the earliest possible date.<sup>5</sup>

The final recommendation of this study was the key statement of the report. The necessity of developing a strategy of full-scale mobilization was an indication of the General Staff's recognition of the realities of total war so graphically demonstrated during the world conflict. Moreover, the pervasive influence of French military theory among members of the General Staff is evidenced by this document. General Raymond Laurent, as Chief of the French Army Mission from 1941 to 1943, was an advisor to the General Staff during this entire period.<sup>6</sup> Laurent regularly attended staff conferences and it is evident that the formalization of this national defense scheme was predicated generally on a French model developed during the early twentieth century. The army document, calling for full national mobilization in time of war, and the enactment of a national defense law to facilitate such mobilization closely mirrors similar measures enacted in France in 1938. In France, legislation governing the "Organization of the Nation in Time of War" was passed in that year and created

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>G-2 Report no. 5940, February 28, 1944, U.S. Military Attache to War Department, NA, RG 165.

the framework for a centralized defense organization headed by a Ministry of Defense.<sup>7</sup> But civilian fears of centralized military authority and resistance by air force and navy commanders blocked the implementation of these measures before the French military disasters of 1940.<sup>8</sup> These same pressures militated against the application of the Peruvian Army's defense scheme during the remainder of the Prado regime. But the campaign to implement a broad national defense plan occupied the attention of far-sighted army officers during the years of the Bustamante regime and beyond.

After 1945 the social aspect of national defense planning--reflected in the recommendations of the 1944 General Staff study calling for the education of the "impoverished" Indian population--took on much greater importance. The writings of army officers reflected both their acceptance of the broadening social implications of a comprehensive national defense plan as well as their willingness to defend the role of the army partly on the basis of its social contributions to Peruvian society. These concepts were defined in relatively unsophisticated form during the 1940's, but

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<sup>7</sup>John Stewart Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), p. 57.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

became closely interwoven with national defense strategy after 1950.

Writing for the Revista Militar del Perú in August, 1946, Lieutenant Colonel César A. Pando Esgusquiza, in an article entitled "The Army, Is It Unproductive?" argued that for national defense purposes the army will always be needed because "the guarantee of national tranquility and liberty do not have a price."<sup>9</sup> Pando also stressed that the army had been traditionally involved in social projects that, while not falling strictly within the realm of military operations, did contribute to the national welfare and represented a positive contribution to the nation. He cited as examples, colonization and road building projects undertaken by the army to populate remote areas along Peru's contested frontiers. Such projects contributed to national development as well as national defense according to Pando.<sup>10</sup>

Along this same line Pando insisted that all Peruvians must be cognizant of their responsibility to contribute to the defense of the nation. He alluded to the defeat of France in 1940 and claimed that the lack of civilian support for the French army's national defense scheme was largely

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<sup>9</sup>Lieutenant Colonel César A. Pando Esgusquiza, "El ejército, ¿Es enproductivo,?" Revista Militar del Perú, XLIII, 8 (August 1946), 389. Hereafter this military journal will be cited as RMP with date and page numbers.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

responsible for the collapse of the war machine. The lesson for Peru, according to Pando, was that during war, single battle defeats do not completely determine the outcome of the struggle; but rather that during peacetime the finality of defeat is decided through lack of preparation.<sup>11</sup>

In arguing that the army performed valuable social as well as military functions for the state, Lieutenant Colonel Pando referred to an article written in 1933 by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla Concha entitled "The Social Function of the Army in the National Organization." Morla Concha clearly defined the need for the army to become involved in social projects involving education, communication, transportation and assistance for the nation's impoverished Indian population.<sup>12</sup> This plea was not originally initiated by Morla Concha, as other army officers as early as 1904 had suggested that the performance of social functions such as education was a legitimate activity of the Peruvian military man.<sup>13</sup> Morla Concha's article did, however, present in the

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 391.

<sup>12</sup>See Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla Concha, "La función social del ejército peruano en la organización de la nacionalidad," RMP, XXX, 10 (October 1933), 843-872.

<sup>13</sup>In 1904 the role of the military man as an educator was discussed by Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Velarde Alvaréz in an article in the Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina entitled, "Instrucción civil del soldado," BMGM, I, 7 (October, 1904), 843-845. Subsequent articles dealing with the social aspects of the military career appeared intermittantly during the following three decades.

most forceful fashion the philosophy that was later argued in a more sophisticated form.

In 1940 Colonel Oscar N. Torres (later named Bustamante's first Minister of War) insisted that the role of the military man should not be incompatible with that of the civilian educator and that the social function of armed forces officers should not be overlooked by other professionals. More importantly, Torres argued that national defense was not the sole problem of the military. Presenting the concept that would become an integral aspect of the armed forces professional perspective in years to come, the Colonel--before his audience of San Marcos University professors--stated that the politician, government bureaucrat, economist and other civilian professionals must be aware of their role in the defense of the nation. The relative efficiency of civilian government leaders in constructing sound governmental policies directly affected the ability of the armed forces to insure national security, Torres told his listeners. In further remarks that pre-dated the armed forces' commitment to broadening the social education of its officers during the 1950's and beyond, Torres claimed that a humanistic education should not alienate the intellectual from the military man. On this point Torres seemed to be recognizing the mutual antagonism that had always existed between civilian intellectual leaders and armed



forces officers in Peru. But as one of the most articulate spokesmen for the armed forces, Torres was not prepared to concede that the military man could not compete on the same intellectual level as his civilian professional counterparts.<sup>14</sup> As Bustamante's Minister of War in 1945, however, General Torres was confronted with problems less abstract and more politically explosive than the issue of humanism and the professional soldier. The newly legitimatized APRA's efforts to gain a stronger foothold among junior army officers and enlisted men presented Torres with his chief challenge as the new Minister of War.

#### Aprismo, The Military and the Renewed Struggle

Although APRA was not represented in Bustamante's first cabinet, party leaders planned to exert sufficient political power in the national congress to direct government policy. Aprista party discipline--insured by the undated resignations of the party's congressman which were held by Haya de la Torre--strengthened their congressional bloc vis-a-vis their unorganized opponents.<sup>15</sup> Thus APRA was able to enact a

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<sup>14</sup>Colonel Oscar N. Torres, "La instrucción militar en las universidades y escuelas superiores," RMP, XXXVII, 7 (July, 1940), 369-402.

<sup>15</sup>Chrinós Soto, El Perú frente, p. 65.

substantial amount of its legislative proposals before July, 1947. Adding to the party's congressional strength was its support in the labor movement, the universities and local government agencies. Apristas lost no time in exerting their political power. When congress first convened on July 28, 1945, party representatives engineered the repeal of the constitutional amendments passed in June, 1939 which had expanded the power of the president in relation to Congress.<sup>16</sup> This opened the way for a measure which allowed Congress to override a presidential veto by a simple majority vote. On the same eventful day the emergency laws passed by the Benavides and Prado governments were also repealed and a general amnesty for all military and civilian prisoners sentenced by military court martial was enacted.<sup>17</sup>

The amnesty provoked immediate controversy within the armed forces due to its stipulation that military men sentenced for political crimes were to be reinstated as active members of the armed forces and returned to the process of regular promotion.<sup>18</sup> This clause pertained to a significant number of officers who had been involved in past Aprista subversive activity and an incident emanating from senate

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., and Peruvian Times, August 3, 1945, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Legislación Militar, August, 1945, pp. 87-88.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

debates concerning the amnesty illustrates the high emotions generated by this measure. APRA senator and retired army Colonel César Enrique Pardo, while speaking in the senate, praised those members of the armed forces who had resisted the "dictatorships" which had controlled Peru since 1930. These men, according to Pardo, were the ones who had remained most true to the principles and "high moral code" of their profession. These comments provoked an immediate reaction from General Federico Hurtado, the Inspector-General of the Army. Hurtado, who had served in both the Benavides and Prado governments, was enraged by Pardo's statements and challenged the senator to a duel. After contesting with pistols at the close range of 24 paces, both men emerged from the incident without injury. Pardo was later to confront strong verbal challenges from Senator (and retired General) Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, who also strongly opposed the promotions.<sup>19</sup> During these debates Haya de la Torre insisted that Pardo was speaking for "himself alone" but few opponents of the amnesty accepted this interpretation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Ambassador William D. Pawley to SecState, October 27, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/10-2745.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

During March, 1946 General Hurtado (already staunchly anti-APRA) and Colonel Luis A. Solari along with Admiral Carlos Roltaldi, Enrique Morón, and Rocque A. Saldías became incensed over APRA interference in the promotion process. Hurtado and Solari had been denied promotion to division general and brigadier general respectively by the vote of APRA representatives in Congress. The three navy admirals threatened to resign in protest over APRA attempts to reinstate Captain Pablo Ontaneda to active service and promote him to the rank of rear admiral. Ontaneda was known for his pro-Aprista sympathies during the Benavides administration but he had been court-martialed on charges of incompetence. Therefore the political amnesty of July, 1945 did not clearly apply to his case.<sup>21</sup> This prompted the vehement objections of the naval officers.

By May, 1946, more senior officers of the armed forces had joined together to resist APRA's handling of internal military issues. Apristas had completed the draft of a congressional proposal that would have caused the immediate retirement of 240 older officers, including eighteen generals, by lowering the retirement age. The bill would have also increased the rank and salaries of junior officers at the same time. United States Chargé d' Affairs Walter J.

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<sup>21</sup>Pawley to SecState, March 20, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/3-2046.

Donnelly commented that the obvious purpose of this proposed legislation was to gain the allegiance of junior officers while at the same time removing some of the most troublesome anti-APRA elements in the senior ranks.<sup>22</sup> The bill did not progress very far but it marked one of the boldest attempts by Apristas to manipulate the power structure of the officer corps. This measure helped create new and powerful enemies for APRA in the armed forces.

Disenchantment with APRA tactics also spurred Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Llosa, who had been actively involved in political intrigue throughout the early 1940's, to organize support among anti-APRA army officers for his political ally Luis A. Flores. Both Llosa and Flores were leading members of the rightest Partido Unión Revolucionaria, and the latter hoped to gain support for his candidacy for a senate seat in special congressional elections scheduled for June 30, 1946.<sup>23</sup> Llosa, an impetuous officer who drank heavily, continued to exploit anti-Aprista sentiments in the military throughout the Bustamante regime. In September, 1947 he led a small group of army officers in an assault on

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<sup>22</sup>Chargé d' Affairs Walter J. Donnelly to SecState, April 16, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1646.

<sup>23</sup>Pawley to SecState, March 20, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/3-2046.

the office of the APRA newspaper La Tribuna as a prelude to more ambitious revolutionary activities in mid-1948.<sup>24</sup>

While some senior officers were becoming alienated from the APRA during the first two years of the Bustamante regime, other junior army officers sought the aid of the party in promoting the institutional reforms they favored. A group of junior army officers, many of whom were members of CROE, under the leadership of Major Víctor Villanueva (released from prison under the terms of the July, 1945 amnesty) met with Haya de la Torre in early 1946 to discuss his party's possible support for their program. Minister of War Torres, after being informed of these discussions, reprimanded Villanueva for dealing with APRA and refused to meet with the delegation of junior officers to listen to the proposals they had presented to Haya de la Torre.<sup>25</sup> Interestingly, the proposals of this group were apparently in line with those initiated in late 1945 in the congress creating a mixed commission of armed forces officers and civilians designed to study possible administrative reforms for the military.

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<sup>24</sup>Peruvian Times, September 1947, p. 1 and Ackerson to SecState, October 2, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/10-247.

<sup>25</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 33-35.

Specifically, the mixed commission was mandated to deal with the reorganization of the high command of the armed forces and the writing of new laws and the revision of existing legislation regarding the organization of the army.<sup>26</sup> The panel began its work in early 1946, but as with less ambitious proposals for internal military reform during the Prado administration, political partisanship and the resistance of influential senior officers prevented the passage of any substantive legislation dealing with internal military reforms. While these issues were being discussed in congress, Major Villanueva, along with fifty army junior officers and thirty members of the national police, went to the Congressional Chamber to demonstrate their support for the military reforms. The Minister of War, General Torres, reacted to this demonstration by transferring many of the men involved to remote garrisons. A number of these officers were members of CROE, and this action effectively ended the organized activity of the group, as its leader, Villanueva, was also transferred to the United States on an

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<sup>26</sup> Legislación Militar, August, 1946, pp. 19-20, and Víctor Villanueva, El CAEM y la revolución de la fuerza armada (Lima, 1973), pp. 28-29. A ley organico del ejército or basic organizational law of the army did not exist in 1945 and the commission was charged with writing such a law. Also the law of obligatory military service was written in 1895, giving evidence of the need for basic administrative reforms in the military at the beginning of the Bustamante regime.

arms purchasing mission. He did not return until mid-November, 1947.<sup>27</sup> Added to the unrest among junior officers prompted by the failure of military reforms to gain acceptance, was the growing tendency of APRA during 1946 to resort to violence in an effort to intimidate the political opposition. Consequently, political tensions increased dramatically as President Bustamante entered his second year of office.

#### Bustamante and the Generals

President Bustamante was ill-prepared to deal with increasing disorder during the first eighteen months of his administration. Unlike his immediate presidential predecessors, he did not employ a secret police agency to deal with political subversion before mid-1947. The Social Brigade of the Division of Investigations of the national police was abandoned during his first month in office. Also abandoned was the effective informer (soploneria) system that had aided both Benavides and Prado.<sup>28</sup> As a result the government was not well prepared to deal with the organized

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<sup>27</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 35.

<sup>28</sup>G-2 Report no. 36812, May 8, 1947, U.S. Military Attache to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.



violence carried out by APRA against its political opponents. At an anti-APRA rally on December 7, 1945 demonstrators, protesting the party's attempts to pass a press censorship bill aimed at curtailing conservative criticism of its tactics, were attacked by Apristas who used dynamite to destroy the speakers platform and break up the rally.<sup>29</sup> APRA leader Manuel Seoane in two interviews with Edward G. Trueblood, counselor of the United States embassy in Lima following the riots in December, claimed that the disorders by his party reflected the growing opinion among its members that Bustamante was moving too slowly in allowing the party to assert greater political power. Moreover, Seoane claimed that the APRA violence had gained the party new respect from some members of the armed forces who considered Apristas "soft or effeminate" and as a result he had received numerous visits from military men soon after the incident.<sup>30</sup>

Bolstered by their success in December, Apristas stormed the offices of La Prensa and El Comercio in early April, 1946 after the two newspapers attacked the party's violent activities and political programs. In the aftermath of these actions, the Minister of Government and Police

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<sup>29</sup> Pawley to SecState, December 11, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/12-1145.

<sup>30</sup> Counselor of the Embassy Edward G. Trueblood to SecState, December 7, 1945, NA, RG 59, 823.00/12-745.

General Manuel Rodríguez, an avowed anti-Aprista, fired the Lima Prefect of Police and ordered the arrest of policemen who failed to defend the newspaper offices.<sup>31</sup> After Bustamante vigorously denounced APRA's tactics in a national radio broadcast on April 30, high-ranking army officers assured him of their unqualified support in his stand against the Apristas.<sup>32</sup> The president then assigned the armed forces the task of supervising the upcoming congressional by-elections scheduled for June 30 in an obvious attempt to prevent any further violence.<sup>33</sup>

"Wealthy and influential reactionaries" who were convinced that the Apristas would win a majority of the four senate and fifteen chamber of deputies seats at stake in the elections offered their support to General Rodríguez if he would lead a coup d' état against the Bustamante government in June.<sup>34</sup> But Rodríguez remained loyal to the government and the elections were conducted without any major incidents. Apristas won nine seats in the chamber of deputies and two in the senate, thus strengthening their

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<sup>31</sup>Pawley to SecState, April 16, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1646.

<sup>32</sup>Peruvian Times, May 10, 1946, p. 2, and Pawley to SecState, May 6, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/5-646.

<sup>33</sup>Donnelly to SecState, June 21, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/6-2146.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., June 25, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/6-2546.

position in congress. However, the Minister of Government and Police remained in the forefront of the struggle between APRA and its political opponents throughout the remainder of 1946. In early December an assassination attempt was made against Rodríguez by terrorists who tried to bomb his home in the Lima suburb of San Isidro. APRA claimed that its political enemies were responsible for the act, as they sought to instigate government repression against Apristas. This version was supported by an anonymous non-Aprista army lieutenant colonel who told the United States military attaché that Communist Party terrorists, who were fiercely at odds with APRA, were responsible for the attempted bombing.<sup>35</sup>

APRA-Communist rivalries, which centered primarily on the control of the Peruvian labor movement and the Confederación de Trabajadores del Peru (Worker's Confederation of Peru or CTP), were encouraged by conservative opponents of APRA as they preferred the more manageable Communists in positions of trade union leadership.<sup>36</sup> The Peruvian

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<sup>35</sup>La Tribuna, July 3, 1946, p. 1, The New York Times, December 30, 1946, p. 5, and Ambassador Prentice Cooper to SecState, August 9, 1946, NA, RG 59, 823.00/8-946. APRA now controlled 65 of the 132 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 20 of the 47 seats in the Senate.

<sup>36</sup>See Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass Parties of Latin America (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 117-118.

Communist Party, which numbered only 2,000 in 1942, had grown to approximately 25,000 by December, 1946.<sup>37</sup> Haya de la Torre attempted to use the issue of growing Communist influence and their increasingly close ties with right-wing opponents of APRA as a tool to gain stronger support for his party from Washington.

Apristas, in an effort to solicit support from the United States, supplied information about Communist activities in Peru during late 1946 and 1947. During a conversation with a United States Embassy representative on October 29, 1947, Haya de la Torre claimed that rightist elements under the banner of the Alianza Nacional had close ties with Eudocio Ravines, whom the APRA leader claimed was the "No. 1 Moscow representative in Peru." He also insisted that Communists had gained a strong foothold within the Bustamante government itself and suggested that the United States government find a way of expressing to friendly members of the Bustamante regime "its concern at the drift away from democratic methods and at the similarity of the Communist line with that of the Alianza Nacional which now appears to dominate the government."<sup>38</sup> Seemingly as a show of good

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<sup>37</sup>The New York Times, December 30, 1946, p. 5.

<sup>38</sup>Cooper to SecState, November 11, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/11-347. Ambassador Cooper was reporting on the content of a conversation between Haya de la Torre and embassy official Maurice J. Broderick.

faith concerning APRA's anti-Communist position, Haya de la Torre claimed that he would like to re-establish the liason which he had previously held with the F.B.I. The APRA chief also stated that he wished a similar relationship could be set up with a representative of the Embassy who could, by maintaining contact with leading Apristas, follow-up the frequent Communist leads that the party uncovered in its regular activities.<sup>39</sup>

Haya de la Torre's bold effort to seek the support of the United States in 1947 by stressing the anti-Communism of APRA stemmed in part from the growing strength of the party's civilian and military opponents during the preceding twelve months. A controversial foreign petroleum contract, the assassination of a prominent outspoken critic of APRA and intensified political unrest all contributed to the unification of anti-APRA elements.

In early 1946 President Bustamante, seeking to increase the nation's petroleum production in the midst of serious economic difficulties, signed a contract with the International Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil, I.P.C.) for an exploration concession in the Sechura desert area of northern Peru involving an area of 5,600,000 acres.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Peruvian Times, March 15, 1946, p. 2, and Bustamante, Tres años, pp. 89-107 passim.

I.P.C., which produced the vast majority of Peru's petroleum and natural gas, had been a subject of nationalist controversy ever since its initial operations in the 1920's.

During mid-1946 both wealthy capitalists and economic nationalists denounced the Sechura contract as a give-away in the pages of La Prensa and El Comercio.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, the contract was approved by the chamber of deputies on June 8, 1946 with the wholehearted support of APRA, whose leader Haya de la Torre stated, that United States investment would "facilitate social and economic betterment" in Peru.<sup>42</sup>

Final congressional approval of the petroleum contract was blocked however, by the refusal of conservative senators to pass the measure in the upper chamber. Debate over this issue continued throughout 1946 while APRA became the target of increasingly harsh criticism from the two conservative newspapers who portrayed the party as the betrayer of the national interest.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 285.

<sup>42</sup>Peruvian Times, January 24, 1947, p. 1, and The New York Times, October 30, 1946, p. 15.

<sup>43</sup>See the political flyer, "El gran negociado petroleo de Sechura," Colección de Volantes, 1947 folder for charges that APRA was in league with United States business interests to betray the country's just claim to its natural resources. The ebb and flow of the Senate debates concerning the Sechura Contract can be followed in the Diario de los Debates del Senado Legislativo Extraordinario de 1946, Volume 2, 813-969, and 1355-1380.

In the forefront of the attacks on APRA was conservative businessman and associate editor of La Prensa, Francisco Graña Garland. On the night of January 7, 1947 Graña Garland was assassinated as he was leaving his pharmaceutical firm in downtown Lima. The crime touched off an immediate political crisis and Bustamante's entire cabinet, including three APRA ministers who had served since January, 1946, quickly resigned.<sup>44</sup> Despite the denials by APRA leaders that their party was involved in any way with the Graña murder, the opposition immediately linked Apristas to the crime. Bustamante, facing the most crucial test of his presidential tenure, responded to the crisis by naming powerful military figures to his new cabinet on January 12.

Named as minister of government and police and placed in charge of the Graña investigation was General Manuel A. Odría, who was one of the staunchest anti-APRA officers in the army. He was born in Tarma, in central Peru, on November 26, 1897 into a relatively prosperous family. His grandfather was an officer in the Peruvian army and distinguished himself in a brief confrontation with invading Spanish forces in May, 1866. Following in the footsteps of his grandfather, Manuel entered the Chorrillos Military Academy

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<sup>44</sup>El Comercio, January 9, 1947, p. 3, Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente, p. 73, and "Retiro sus ministros el Aprismo," Colección de Volantes, January 8, 1947.

in 1915 and graduated at the head of his class. After serving as an instructor at the Academy he attended the Escuela Superior de Guerra and was eventually promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1936. He then assumed command of the First Light Division in northern Peru where he emerged as one of the heroes of the brief border war with Ecuador in 1941. Before being named to Bustamante's cabinet in January, 1947 he was promoted to colonel and then to brigadier general while serving as an instructor at the Escuela Superior de Guerra.<sup>45</sup>

Odría was shrewd, politically tough and a good judge of personalities. Before 1947 he used his close association with General Federico Hurtado (the Inspector General of the Army and an equally strong anti-APRA force in the army) to increase his influence in the high command.<sup>46</sup> His well-known aversion to Aprista policies regarding the armed forces helped Odría emerge as one of the leading spokesman of the anti-APRA element among senior officers. After Bustamante selected Odría to help guide his government through the political crisis, an observer correctly suggested that the president "took upon himself a dangerous

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<sup>45</sup>Unsigned, El General de Brigada D. Manuel A. Odría, Presidente de la Junta Militar de Gobierno, RMP, XLV, 10 (October, 1948), V-VIII.

<sup>46</sup>Cooper to SecState, October 30, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/10-3047.



counselor, and perhaps his master."<sup>47</sup>

Acting as a counterweight to Odría's influence in the new cabinet was General José del Carmen Marín who was appointed as the minister of war. Marín, like Odría, had demonstrated leadership qualities early in his career. He was born in San Miguel de Guayabamba on March 2, 1899 and at the age of eighteen entered the School of Infantry at Chorrillos where he graduated first in his class. As an army second lieutenant Marín was trained as an engineer. Between 1921 and 1939 he spent two training periods in France studying engineering and graduating with honors from the Superior War College in Paris in 1939. During the early 1940's he attained a reputation as one of the leading intellectuals in the army and was also a "recognized mathematician and engineering authority both in and out of the army."<sup>48</sup> In late 1943 Marín was named director of the military preparatory school, the Colegio Militar Leoncio Prado, and in October, 1945 he assumed the directorship of the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos.<sup>49</sup> As head of these two institutions Marín had an opportunity to gain substantial prestige among

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., September 16, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/9-1647.

<sup>48</sup>G-2 Report no. 353, February 2, 1944, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319, and Unsigned, "General D. José del Carmen Marín, Nuevo Ministro de Guerra," RMP, XLI, 1 (January, 1947), I-IV.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

the younger officers of the army. But the United States military attaché reported in 1944 that Marín as "probably the purest-blooded Indian in the Peruvian army" tended to be non-committal to his colleagues, "from whom he has undoubtedly received social slights in the past."<sup>50</sup> As minister of war in January, 1947 Marín--who was inclined towards moderating tough measures against APRA--represented the party's only check on the policies of the new minister of government and police.

Notwithstanding Haya de la Torre's claim that General Marín was one of his party's best friends, in the cabinet Bustamante appeared to be accepting the counsel of Odría and other anti-APRA political elements in the six months following the Graña murder.<sup>51</sup> After replacing the civilian Prefect of Arequipa with army Colonel Benjamin Chiarliza Vásquez in early January, the president then received pressure from Odría to remove Apristas from other government positions.<sup>52</sup> In the face of this threat to his party,

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<sup>50</sup>G-2 Report no. 353, February 2, 1944, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>51</sup>Cooper to SecState, February 2, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/2-247. Haya de la Torre also warned the U.S. Ambassador that Odría was capable of engineering a coup against Bustamante in the near future.

<sup>52</sup>The New York Times, January 13, 1947, p. 4, and Cooper to SecState, May 12, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/5-1247.

Haya de la Torre still remained confident that the anti-APRA officers would be unable to force the complete repression of the party. He reasoned that such a campaign by anti-APRA senior army officers would be opposed by junior officers who were largely pro-Aprista. Additionally the party chief declared that any attempted coup directed against APRA would ignite a civil-war since "the great mass of the people would not submit to such a government."<sup>53</sup>

In spite of the APRA leader's confidence, Bustamante clearly indicated the more authoritative stance of his government in a speech on April 12. He insisted that his administration was ending the "period of appeasement in dealing with disruptive political forces." And in a direct reference to APRA he stated that the prevailing political agitation was due to attempts by political groups to achieve an "unwise and even exclusive predominance in the direction of national affairs."<sup>54</sup> Bustamante also called upon the armed forces to adopt a non-political position regarding the solution of the Graña murder and related political controversy.<sup>55</sup> But the actions of senior officers in the month following his address illustrated the unrealistic nature of this request.

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<sup>53</sup>Donnelly to SecState, February 3, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/2-347.

<sup>54</sup>Peruvian Times, April 18, 1947, p. 1.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

Three days after the president's April 12 speech a delegation of high ranking officers of the three armed services along with the Director General of the national police called upon Bustamante at the National Palace to express their support for the firm tone of his address.<sup>56</sup> But General Odría was still not satisfied that the government was taking strong enough measures to deal with APRA. Consequently, during the first week in May he threatened to resign his cabinet post if he were not allowed to have a free hand in purging Apristas from their positions as prefects and sub-prefects in a number of departments throughout Peru. Bustamante bent to the pressure from his Minister of Government and Gerardo Bedoya, the Aprista prefect of the department of Junín, was quickly replaced. Plans were then made to appoint army officers to the prefect posts at Callao, Trujillo and Puno and a naval officer to the prefecture at Ica.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile Haya de la Torre responded to these measures by attempting to remove some of the most troublesome army opponents of APRA who were immediate threats to his party.

Exploiting his good relations with the United States diplomatic delegation in Peru, Haya de la Torre, during an

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid., and Cooper to SecState, April 18, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/4-1847.

<sup>57</sup>Cooper to SecState, May 19, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/5-1947.

interview with Maurice J. Broderick, Third Secretary of the United States Embassy, requested that the United States invite General Alejandro Villalobos, commanding general of the Armored Division, Colonel César Pando Esgusquiza and Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Llosa on a training mission to the United States along with six to ten other army officers.<sup>58</sup> The APRA leader's stated purpose for this request was that he hoped these officers would benefit from viewing "democratic processes" at work in the United States. Broderick, however, suggested that the political expediency of removing these officers from Peru for an extended period of time was clearly at the root of APRA's request. The U.S. diplomat also indicated that a dangerous precedent might be established if his government granted this favor.<sup>59</sup>

### The Political Impasse

The six month investigation of the Graña killing culminated in mid-June with the arrest of two Apristas. Alfredo Tello Salavarría (a member of the Chamber of Deputies) and Héctor Pretell Cobosmalón were charged with assassinating Graña.<sup>60</sup> As with many other cases of political

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<sup>58</sup>Third Secretary Maurice J. Broderick to SecState, May 23, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/5-2347.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>The New York Times, June 21, 1947, p. 6.

terrorism attributed to APRA before 1947, party leaders denied the validity of the government's charges. Tello in an open letter to Bustamante insisted upon his innocence and charged the police were intent upon persecuting Apristas.<sup>61</sup> Tello and Pretell were never brought to trial during the Bustamante regime and were eventually found guilty only after a protracted legal process that ended in December, 1949 with their sentencing to long prison terms.<sup>62</sup> Following the arrest of the two Apristas civilian political opposition to APRA united under the leadership of Pedro Beltrán, editor of La Prensa, and Héctor Boza a conservative leader in the senate. These two men were the most influential members of the Alianza Nacional, which was a coalition of rightist groups and other political opponents of APRA formed during early 1947.

As the strength of the Alianza Nacional grew, a U.S. official observed in late June, 1947 that there was "little doubt that the more intransigent among the conservatives favor turning the government over to a military group which would ruthlessly attempt to destroy the Aprista party."<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup>"Carta abierta del Deputado Tello al Presidente de la Republica," Colección de Volantes, June 17, 1947. See also Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra, pp. 422-426.

<sup>62</sup>The New York Times, December 7, 1949, p. 16.

<sup>63</sup>Ackerman to SecState, June 23, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/6-2347.

But it was in the senate, under Boza's leadership, that conservatives launched their first coordinated effort to undermine the political power base of APRA.

In late July Boza, as the leader of a bloc of twenty-two conservative senators opposed to APRA organized a boycott of the senate session beginning on July 28. According to the constitution, the senate could not conduct a legislative session until its executive officers had been elected. For this to occur two-thirds of the senate membership (thirty-four members) must be present. The government charter prohibited the chamber of deputies from conducting business without a simultaneous session of the senate. Thus Boza and his twenty-one colleagues prevented the nineteen Aprista senators and their five Frente Democrático Nacional sympathizers from convening the congress as they were two votes short of a quorum and ten shy of electing the vital senate officers.<sup>64</sup> The conservative senators were, of course, aiming to cripple the principal source of APRA's national power by the senate boycott. This tactic proved to be effective, but it plunged the Bustamante regime into a political crisis from which it never recovered.

APRA leaders first tried negotiation and legal arguments to end the political impasse during August, 1947.

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<sup>64</sup>Peruvian Times, August 1, 1947, pp. 1-2, Bustamante, Tres años, pp. 113-124.

On August 14, APRA Senator, Ramiro Prialé, approached Boza in an effort to arrive at a compromise solution with the dissenting members.<sup>65</sup> During the same week the Minister of War, General Marín, arranged a meeting at the French Embassy between Haya de la Torre and Pedro Beltrán.<sup>66</sup> Marín also made an appeal for armed forces support for the Bustamante regime at the same time. But these efforts at mediation proved fruitless. APRA leaders then charged that the senate boycott was clearly in violation of the constitution and that the dissident senators were breaking the law by their calculated absence from the senate chamber.<sup>67</sup> These arguments also proved to be of no avail and party leaders then turned to direct action to force the hand of their conservative opponents.

On August 28, APRA leaders called a general strike in Lima and Callao which was implemented by the Aprista-dominated Workers Syndical Union (Unión Sindical de Trabajadores).<sup>68</sup> The strike was organized in an effort to break the stalemate in congress and force the resignation of the

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<sup>65</sup>Peruvian Times, August 15, 1947, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup>Cooper to SecState, August 18, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/8-1847.

<sup>67</sup>See Celula Parlamentaria Aprista, "La Constitución del Estado y el Receso de las Camaras Legislativas" (Lima, 1947), for the APRA position on the Senate boycott.

<sup>68</sup>Peruvian Times, September 5, 1947, p. 1.



Bustamante cabinet dominated by the Minister of Government, General Odría. On September 1, after serious student rioting in Lima, the president suspended constitutional guarantees of civil liberties for thirty days.<sup>69</sup> Bustamante--elected on a political platform that most heavily emphasized his commitment to defend basic human rights--was pressured to take this firm step by General Odría.<sup>70</sup>

The tense climate promoted by the general strike and the suspension of constitutional guarantees contributed to a serious confrontation between navy enlisted men and army troops aiding municipal police in Callao during the last week of September. Instigated by a clash between a sailor and a policeman over a streetcar fare, a riot involving naval enlisted men stationed at the port city of Callao and elements of the Thirty-ninth Infantry Regiment broke out on September 21.<sup>71</sup> After numerous arrests and injuries the disturbance was finally quelled the following day.<sup>72</sup> But the incident reflected the tensions building in the navy

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<sup>69</sup>El Comercio, September 19, 1947, p. 1.

<sup>70</sup>Cooper to SecState, September 16, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/9-1647. Ambassador Cooper reported that Odría and other "ultra-conservative" political elements led by the former Peruvian ambassador to the U.S. Pedro Beltrán pushed Bustamante to take this action.

<sup>71</sup>Peruvian Times, September 26, 1947, Supplement 1, and Cooper to SecState, September 25, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/9-2547.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

and the armed forces in general regarding the worsening political situation and the political polarization of the nation's military leadership.

During the last three months of 1947 the officer corps, mirroring the divisions in the civilian body politic, became further divided over the issue of Bustamante's increasing reliance on rightest military and civilian supporters. Leading anti-Apristas were army Generals Manuel Odría, Federico Hurtado, Alejandro Villalobos, Zenón Noriega, and Armando Artola. In the navy, Admiral Rocque A. Saldías (who had earlier clashed with APRA on the promotion issue) was the primary anti-APRA figure.<sup>73</sup> General Juan de Dios Caudros, who commanded the Second Light Division in Lima, was the only general officer in the army who was willing to cooperate with APRA against the officers who sought the party's destruction.<sup>74</sup> General Marín was not willing to commit himself regarding support for the party during his tenure as minister of war, but he was later to make contact with party leaders regarding an anti-government revolutionary movement.

On October 18, 1947 anti-APRA senior officers, disturbed by continuing labor strife and the unwillingness of the

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<sup>73</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 48, and Cooper to SecState, October 30, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/10-3047.

<sup>74</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 46-47.

president to take even stronger measures against APRA, demanded a meeting with Bustamante. With Generals Odría and Hurtado, and Admiral Saldías as their leading spokesmen, the delegation issued a virtual ultimatum to the president to either assume a stronger role as chief executive, or step down and turn the government over to a military junta which would do so. Bustamante's only response was that he needed more time to work out a solution for the problems besetting the nation.<sup>75</sup> Within two weeks, the president reorganized his cabinet which had served since the week following the Graña assassination.<sup>76</sup> Saldías was named the president of the new cabinet replacing Admiral José R. Alzamora. General Odría was retained as minister of government and police and his anti-APRA colleague, General Armando Artola, was designated as minister of justice and labor. General Marín, who was still assuming a cautious political stance, was renamed to his post as head of the ministry of war.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Cooper to SecState, October 30, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/10-3047.

<sup>76</sup>Peruvian Times, November 2, 1947, p. 2, and The New York Times, November 1, 1947, p. 8.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

The Seeds of Rebellion

By mid-November, 1947 APRA leaders, facing a primarily hostile cabinet, a congressional impasse which effectively negated their national political power, and the prospect of President Bustamante ruling by decree in the absence of a functioning legislature, began laying plans for the overthrow of the president. Haya de la Torre adopted a flexible approach towards the revolutionary preparations. He allowed militant civilian and military activists within the party to prepare the groundwork for a widespread popular insurrection. At the same time he sought the support of a few senior officers in the army for a simple coup d' état aimed at deposing the president in order that new elections could be held in which APRA hoped to gain a more firm hold on national power.<sup>78</sup> The APRA leaders hope for a simple coup rested with the ability of Generals Marín and Caudros to organize support for the plot among the high command. But meanwhile, party militants were progressing much more rapidly in organizing popular support for their cause.

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<sup>78</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 39-47. This is Major Villanueva's personal account of his revolutionary activities during the 1940's and it provides some invaluable insights into the relationship of military and civilian revolutionaries with the APRA leadership. Taken as a whole this book represents one of the best treatments of twentieth century Peruvian political affairs.

Soon after Major Víctor Villanueva returned from the United States on November 15, 1947, he began organizational work with civilian and military APRA adherents in an effort to raise money, acquire arms, and coordinate plans for a popular revolt.<sup>79</sup> During the last two months of 1946, Villanueva and other APRA militants sought out the support of the rank and file of the armed forces in addition to that of the traditionally politically active junior officers.

However, in contrast to the high degree of support for APRA and its proposed revolutionary effort among junior army officers, the rank and file soldier viewed revolutionary politics with indifference. The vast majority of army troops were Indian conscripts from the sierra (mountain regions) who had been drafted into the army with little formal education or direct contact with national political issues.<sup>80</sup> Most of these army recruits thus lacked the social consciousness necessary to commit themselves to an allegiance with a political party or a revolutionary campaign.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the Indian conscripts, who suffered most from the rigors of the national conscription law, were the

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-56.

<sup>80</sup> G-2 Report no. 202039, August 27, 1945, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 56.

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru.

group most accustomed to the injustices, abuses and lack of basic rights in Peruvian society. It is understandable that these soldiers would lack the militancy of other armed forces personnel who were more acutely aware of the fundamental political, social and professional issues affecting their lives. APRA leaders nevertheless attempted to gain the support of some army enlisted men by sponsoring legislation aimed at improving their economic condition. One such example of this was a bill introduced during a January, 1947 session of congress which proposed the establishment of a series of grades for army mechanics which would have raised the highest paid mechanics to the level of second lieutenant, depending on the time of service.<sup>82</sup> Measures such as these, however, directly affected only a very small number of soldiers and seemed to have little impact on the political allegiance of these men. Apristas had greater success in gaining adherents among the air force and police ranks, while the greatest number of converts was among the navy enlisted men.

The Peruvian navy--numbering 443 officers and 4,370 enlisted men in June, 1947--had remained relatively free from political activity during the twentieth century.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>Cooper to SecState, February 3, 1947, NA, RG 59, 823.00/2-347.

<sup>83</sup>G-2 Report no. 385333, June 30, 1957, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

One important exception to this trend was the Aprista-inspired mutiny of non-commissioned officers of the cruisers Almirante Grau and Colonel Bolegnesi in May, 1932. The Sánchez Cerro regime had sanctioned the execution of eight sailors as a result of this action. Thirteen years later in August, 1945, APRA leaders had the remains of the sailors moved from their original graves on the prison island of San Lorenzo for reburial in the Lima cemetery after holding a memorial service in the Plaza Dos de Mayo.<sup>84</sup> The demonstration hailing the sailors as "martyrs" to the APRA cause signaled the party's willingness to openly acknowledge the support of navy enlisted men in party revolutionary activities. It also angered military leaders who felt the government should not have allowed a demonstration which glorified Aprista success in subverting military personnel.<sup>85</sup>

The August, 1945 ceremony indicated that APRA recognized the sharp divisions that existed in the navy between the officer class and the enlisted men and was intent upon exploiting this schism. The factors contributing to this polarization were both social and professional. Most of the officers in the navy were from financially secure families and family ties were often an important qualification

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<sup>84</sup>Peruvian Times, September 7, 1945, Supplement 1.

<sup>85</sup>Villanueva, 100 años, pp. 129-130.

for admittance into the naval officers school (Escuela Naval). The predominantly conservative political views of the majority of these officers was characterized by Villanueva:

Nearly all [of those naval officers] had been educated in the religious schools, lived in exclusive neighborhoods and were in contact with the so-called aristocratic class, and from their infancy they have supported the Catholic clergy and its love of peace and order.<sup>86</sup>

In contrast to the naval officer class, most of the navy enlisted men were draftees who were ill-educated and few wanted to make a career of the navy.<sup>87</sup> A lack of adequate funding for the proper technical training of navy enlisted men also served to lower their morale and further alienate them from an officer class.<sup>88</sup> The confrontation with army troops and police involving navy enlisted men in Callao during late September illustrated the belligerent mood of the sailors at the time APRA was making its appeal for revolutionary support. The party would enjoy its greatest organizational success among the disaffected naval enlisted men during the next eight months.

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<sup>86</sup> Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 57.

<sup>87</sup> G-2 Report no. 385333, June 30, 1947, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.



Aiding Major Villanueva with his organizational efforts during the last two months of 1947 were very militant party activists called definistas. These men had served in the party's "Defense Brigades" as shock troops during the years of Aprista revolutionary activity after 1930. Most of the definistas were veterans of a number of insurrections and the vast majority had suffered prison and torture during the years before 1945.<sup>89</sup> Principal figures among the definistas were Luis Chanduvi, Carlos Collantes, Víctor Colina, Amadeo Varillas and Julio Luzquinos, all of whom worked closely with Villanueva to organize a cadre of approximately five hundred civilian followers.<sup>90</sup>

The party leadership viewed the definistas as a necessary but potentially volatile element in APRA quest for power. Party discipline, which was strictly maintained throughout the years of APRA's illegality, required that these militants remain completely subservient to the orders of Haya de la Torre and the party's Executive Committee (Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, CEN). But as Haya de la Torre vacillated during late 1947 regarding the course that the party should take in terminating the Bustamante regime,

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<sup>89</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1947, Lima, Peru, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 44.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

relations between the militant wing of the APRA and the party leadership began to become severely strained.

During the last three days of 1947, Haya de la Torre added to the growing tension between the party leadership and the definistas by ordering Luis Barrios Llona (the APRA chief's aide) to organize a civil-military insurrection in Arequipa aimed at toppling Bustamante. Very little organizational work had been done in that southern Peruvian city by party activists and the possibility of gaining recruits for an anti-government revolt was small. Nevertheless, Haya de la Torre stressed the symbolic impact of beginning a revolution in Bustamante's native city and claimed the conduct of the revolt would be easy. However, after only a few days in Arequipa, Barrios sent a coded message to APRA leaders in Lima that conditions did not exist for a successful revolution to be initiated in that city.<sup>91</sup> Villanueva and other party activists, deeply troubled by the lack of coordination between their operations and the overall objectives of the party leadership, nevertheless went ahead with plans to launch a widespread civil-military revolt during the first two months of 1948. Thus, less than eighteen months after President Bustamante had assumed the presidency with APRA support and the approval of the nation's armed

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<sup>91</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 67-68.

forces, political factionalism within the military and civilian body politic rendered his civilian regime politically impotent and ripe for forceful overthrow. The first ten months of 1948 would witness the violent culmination of these struggles.

### Conclusion

The Peruvian armed forces seemed to be headed in new progressive professional directions in the immediate post-World War II era. Forward-looking officers were rationalizing a broader role for the military in national affairs premised on a more comprehensive definition of national defense. Additionally, expanded contacts with the United States military establishment made it possible for the three Peruvian armed services to receive coordinated training from the same foreign military institution for the first time.

But the same political problems that retarded the professional development of the military before 1945 also undermined the efforts of reformist armed forces officers in the first eighteen months of the Bustamante regime. The newly legitimatized APRA in its quest for national political leadership quickly polarized both civilian political groups and the armed forces and brought Peru to the brink of revolution in January, 1948. In the first ten months of that

year rebellious armed forces personnel allied with opposing civilian factions plunged the nation into turmoil and ended the rule of President Bustamante.

## CHAPTER V

### CRISIS AND DECISION

#### Reluctant Revolutionaries

The first ten months of 1948 witnessed the most intense political unrest since the Sánchez Cerro era. During this period one conspiracy and two abortive revolts severely undermined President Bustamante's remaining political support. This opened the way for the coup d' état of General Manuel Odría in late October. The violence and political tension of these months resulted from Aprista success in subverting both senior army officers and naval personnel as part of the party's campaign to seize complete political control of the nation. Also contributing to the political instability was the campaign by rightist civilians and anti-APRA armed forces officers to combat these Aprista tactics and ultimately topple Bustamante in order to completely crush the party. The most active militants during this ten month period were Major Víctor Villanueva and his definista allies who were involved in two of the four civil-military movements.

Throughout January, 1948, dissident armed forces personnel and Aprista militants under the leadership of Villanueva consolidated support for a proposed civil-military insurrection they hoped would ignite a popular revolution against the Bustamante government. Villanueva and his definista supporters had managed to subvert a large number of naval enlisted personnel, and to a lesser extent, police and junior air force officers stationed at the Las Palmas air field near Lima.<sup>1</sup> In late January, before leaving on a lecture tour in the United States, APRA chief Haya de la Torre had given Villanueva his approval to finalize plans for the revolt. Leading figures in the conspiracy, besides Villanueva, were General Juan de Dios Cuadros, air force Colonel José Extremadoyro Navarro and the APRA's Committee of Action (Comité de Acción) consisting of party leaders Ramiro Prialé, Pedro Múñiz, Fernando León de Vivero, Carlos Manuel Cox, Luis Barrios and Jorge Idiáquez.<sup>2</sup>

The general plan for the insurrection called for naval, air force and police units to seize strategic military and communications facilities in the Lima and Callao area, while APRA civilian revolutionaries aided in the

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<sup>1</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 78-79.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 75-76.

neutralization of the army's armored units headed by the anti-Aprista Colonel Alejandro Villalobos. Once these objectives had been accomplished, it was expected that Bustamante, deprived of his critical military support in Lima, would capitulate. The conspirators then planned to establish a transitional revolutionary junta to be headed by General Cuadros. He would be given the primary task of calling new elections aimed at giving APRA full claim to national political power.<sup>3</sup>

On January 31 Villanueva reported to Priale and other members of the Committee of Action that the civil-military units under his command were ready to initiate the revolt. But General Cuadros and APRA leaders Luis Alberto Sánchez and Manuel Seoane voiced their opposition to the timing of the insurrection. Seoane and Sánchez maintained that since the Bustamante government was in the throes of an economic crisis prompted by acute food shortages and serious inflation, the revolt should be postponed until these economic problems reached a "climax". Cuadros also insisted that the military situation was not yet favorable for the launching of the insurrection. Thus, APRA leaders rejected Villanueva's argument that the revolt had to be launched

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 73-90, *passim*.

within a week if it was to have any chance of success.<sup>4</sup>

After being rebuffed by the APRA leadership, Villanueva decided to lead the revolt on his own. Contributing heavily to this decision was the fact that many of the subverted armed forces personnel who were scheduled to play key roles in the movement would be shifted from their posts due to the armed forces general transfers which were to take place in February.<sup>5</sup> On the night of February 6 Villanueva gave orders for the initiation of the insurrection. Almost immediately, however, APRA leaders learned of the move and issued counter-orders which temporarily immobilized key rebel units. The inspector general of the army and the minister of war quickly reacted to the rebel activity by confining all troops to their barracks and ordering the occupation of the strategic Central Telephone Exchange in downtown Lima. The insurrection was thus quickly aborted in its initial stage with no loss of life and few arrests.<sup>6</sup>

Apparently aiming to avoid exacerbating tensions within the military at the time of the abortive insurrection, armed forces leaders adopted a restrained approach to their handling of the identified conspirators. No public

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<sup>4</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 82.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru.

<sup>6</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 73-90, and El Callao, February 12, 1948, p. 1.



acknowledgement of the movement was made until February 12 when the newspaper El Callao carried a general account of the insurrection and the subsequent arrest of nine air force officers along with an army captain and a police lieutenant. Major Villanueva and Colonel Extremadouro were also mentioned in connection with the plot.<sup>7</sup> Neither officer was detained by the police, however, and Minister of War Marín issued a communique which labeled the El Callao story "absolutely false and tendentious." He claimed that it was not the armed institutions which were responsible for the grave political crisis of that present moment, but on the contrary it was the "meritorious and patriotic attitude" of the military which stood in opposition to those who disrupted public order.<sup>8</sup> On the same day the communique was released, Jornada recognized the existence of the conspiracy, but claimed it was of "only minor importance" and involved a "disorderly scandal promoted by discredited persons."<sup>9</sup>

Despite the failure of the Villanueva conspiracy and the resulting disunity among Aprista military and civilian activists, the party continued its violent anti-government tactics. On February 16 the civilian Prefect of Cerro de

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<sup>7</sup>El Callao, February 12, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup>Peruvian Times, February 13, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>Jornada, February 13, 1948, p. 1.

Pasco, Francisco Tovar Belmont, was assassinated by a mob led by APRA party members Mercedes Agüero, Atilio León and Pablo Chávez.<sup>10</sup> The Minister of Government, Odría, immediately placed the blame for the murder on the APRA party leadership and ordered army Colonel Emilio Pereyra to assume military control of the Cerro de Pasco district. Immediately after the Tovar Belmont assassination, Odría and Admiral Roque Saldías demanded that President Bustamante outlaw APRA. When Bustamante refused to accede to the anti-APRA officers' demands, a serious cabinet crisis ensued.

Although Bustamante remained firm in his refusal to declare APRA illegal, the anti-APRA faction of the armed forces leadership unquestionably dominated a new all-military cabinet named by the president on February 27. Minister of War Marín, who failed to take decisive action against the military personnel in the abortive revolt in early February, was replaced by Odría's close associate, General Armando Artola. Odría was retained as minister of government and police, and Admiral Saldías was named prime minister in a government now almost totally dominated by rightist armed forces officers.<sup>11</sup> In addition to the cabinet shuffle, the

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<sup>10</sup>Peruvian Times, February 20, 1948, p. 1, and El Comercio, February 18, 1948, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>Peruvian Times, February 27, 1948, p. 2.

transfer of General Cuadros from command of the strategically important Second Light Division in Lima to the Superior Council of the Army in late February deprived APRA of its most powerful ally in the army. Cuadros lost his troop command to General Zenón Noriega, who later became an ally in Odría's seizure of power in late October. With the shift of Marín and Cuadros from influential command positions to relatively meaningless advisory roles (Marín was slated to become director of a proposed Higher Military Studies Center) the anti-APRA armed forces faction now dominated the cabinet as well as the key military command positions in the Lima regions. Colonel Alejandro Villalobos held both the post of minister of justice and the command of the army's armored division simultaneously.<sup>12</sup> Thus the abortive revolt of February 6, while evoking a relatively mild response by the armed forces hierarchy, did have important repercussions after the anti-APRA clique asserted its power.

Reflecting the pressure from his new cabinet to take a firmer line against APRA, Bustamante lashed out during a national radio broadcast of February 29 against the "irresponsible" tactics employed by Aprista leaders to foster "discontent". One week later the president abolished

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<sup>12</sup>G-2 Report no. 446306, March 9, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

the local municipal councils which had been established at the beginning of his term and had come under the control of APRA in many areas throughout the nation.<sup>13</sup> Thus the political situation by April 1 found APRA isolated and the government dominated by Odría and Saldías with Bustamante "deep in the background."<sup>14</sup> Still, the chief executive, who had lost most of his power through his increasing dependence upon conservative armed forces officers, refused to make the final break with APRA by declaring the party illegal.

#### Uprising in the South

Between the beginning of April and mid-June, Saldías and Odría intensified their demands that Bustamante proscribe APRA as a means of controlling the party's continuing subversive activities within the armed forces officer corps. The two men may have been aware that General Marín, soon after he was removed from his post as minister of war, had approached APRA leaders offering his services in support of their efforts to overthrow Bustamante.<sup>15</sup> Although the

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., no. 454624, April 1, 1948, and Peruvian Times, April 2, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 104.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

sincerity of Marín's offer was questioned by many Apristas including Major Villanueva, Haya de la Torre considered the former minister of war to be a valuable check against the anti-APRA campaign of the Odría-Saldías clique.<sup>16</sup>

On June 17 after Bustamante once again rejected the proposal by a majority of his ministers that APRA be outlawed, the entire cabinet resigned. General Odría was then replaced as minister of government and police by Dr. Julio César Villegas and Saldías relinquished his post to Admiral Armando Revorado.<sup>17</sup>

Soon after General Odría lost the showdown with Bustamante over the question of outlawing APRA, he resolved to lead a revolt and establish a military government with himself as provisional president. Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Llosa, commander of the army garrison at Juliaca in southern Peru, was selected to initiate the movement by seizing the army posts at Cuzco, Juliaca and Puno, Llosa had been involved in numerous conspiracies throughout his military career and was labeled "the longtime badboy of the army."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., General Marín's affiliation with the APRA leadership was not a well kept secret. In October, 1948, U.S. Ambassador Harold Tittman claimed that Marín "has been suspected of being APRA's chief spokesman within the army." See U.S. Ambassador Harold Tittman to SecState, October 15, 1948, filed under G-2 Report no. 500943, NA, RG 319.

<sup>17</sup>Peruvian Times, June 18, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>G-2 Report no. 476531, July 7, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

As a bitter foe of APRA, Llosa had been transferred to the Juliaca region after his armed attack on the office of the party newspaper, La Tribuna, in September, 1947.<sup>19</sup> Also involved in the conspiracy to oust Bustamante were Colonel Alejandro Villalobos, still in command of the armored division in Lima, General Zenón Noriega, chief of the Second Light Division in the capital, Colonel Félix Hauman, who headed the Chorrillos Military School, eight army officers stationed in the Juliaca and Puno regions and the Miró Quesada family, which backed the movement with the expectation that the resulting military government would liquidate APRA.<sup>20</sup>

The general plan of the revolt called for Llosa to gain control of the Cuzco, Juliaca and Puno garrisons and arrange for the capture and retention of the commander of the Third Military Region in Arequipa, General Eduardo Castro Ríos. In Lima, General Odría was to lead the guardia republicana, the cuerpo asalto of the police force and elements of the Second Light Division into rebellion. Colonel Félix Hauman's role was to assure that the cadets in the Chorrillos Military School did not oppose Odría's forces. Much the same task was assigned to the armored division commander,

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<sup>19</sup>See chapter four for a brief discussion of this episode.

<sup>20</sup>G-2 Report no. 483966, August 5, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

Colonel Villalobos. His units were to be used only if APRA elements took to the street against Odría. The signal for military action to be initiated in Lima was to be the spread of the uprising from Juliaca and Puno and the capture of General Castro Rios.<sup>21</sup>

The plans of the conspirators went awry, however, when Llosa launched his phase of the revolt prematurely on the night of July 4, in Juliaca and Puno. Issuing a revolutionary manifesto that had been largely written by Carlos Miró Quesada, the rebel leader called for the military forces in Arequipa and Cuzco to join his movement even before he had any firm support in these garrisons. Llosa's actions may be explained by his impetuous personality which had led him to rash actions in the past.<sup>22</sup> He might have also wanted to follow the pattern of Sánchez Cerro in 1930, who had used his revolutionary base of operations in Arequipa to successfully topple the Leguía government before the army's senior officers could consolidate their own movement. In any event, Odría did not initiate any action in Lima to support Llosa, nor was the lieutenant colonel able to extend his revolt beyond the two initial rebel garrisons.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Llosa had boasted to United States and Bolivian army officers in 1944 (while he was serving as the Peruvian military attaché to Bolivia) that he would someday lead a revolution in Peru.

The Inspector General of the Army, Federico Hurtado, after receiving pledges of loyalty from the commanders of the Cuzco and Arequipa regions, ordered troops from these areas to capture the Juliaca and Puno garrisons and government planes were sent to assist in the operation. Hurtado also issued a government order suspending constitutional guarantees throughout the nation, and declaring that a "state of siege" existed.<sup>23</sup>

By the afternoon of July 6 Llosa's movement had collapsed. Nine officers at the rebel garrison in Puno repudiated the revolt's leaders and sent a radiogram to General Hurtado in Lima which declared: "Having been deceived and not knowing the true situation, we have resolved to reject the command of the uprising."<sup>24</sup> Faced with a hopeless situation, Llosa and seven fellow officers involved in the revolt in Juliaca fled to the Bolivian border town of Puerto Acosta on the morning of July 7. The Bolivian authorities granted the rebel officers political asylum in La Paz.<sup>25</sup> With the flight of these officers the most

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<sup>23</sup>El Comercio, July 6, 1948, p. 2, and The New York Times, July 6, 1948, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>El Comercio, July 7, 1948, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., July 8, 1948, p. 2. The officers who fled to Bolivia with Llosa were Major Alejandro Elizaguirre Valverde, Lieutenant Colonel Reinalde Rubio T., Major Belisario Bastilles P., Major Oscar Zamillo O., Major Reuben Ayala A., Captain Alberto Otero P., and Lieutenant Rafael Serrando J.



serious military challenge to the Bustamante government up to that time ended.

Other than Llosa's immediate supporters in the Juliaca and Puno garrisons, the only officer involved in the conspiracy against whom the government took action was Colonel Villalobos. He was replaced in mid-July as chief of the armored division by Colonel José M. Tamayo. General Odría, who applied for retirement from the army in the wake of his resignation from the government in June, continued living quietly at his residence in Lima while he renewed his efforts to organize another anti-government uprising.<sup>26</sup> In the aftermath of the Llosa uprising, he reportedly claimed: "I do not support revolutions, I start them. Llosa acted prematurely."<sup>27</sup> After the events of early July, Odría's political influence still remained substantial. This was made clear when the editor of the newspaper Vanguardia, Eudocio Ravines, was arrested after publishing a report that Bustamante's Minister of Government and Police, Julio Cesar

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<sup>26</sup>G-2 Report no. 483966, August 5, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319, and Bustamante, Tres años, pp. 248-252.

<sup>27</sup>Tad Szulc, Twilight of the Tyrants (New York, 1959), p. 178. This is a colorful, if not always completely, accurate journalistic account of the careers of Odría and four other authoritarian political leaders in Latin America during the 1950's.

Villegas, had ordered Odría's detention after the Llosa revolt.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the failure of Llosa's revolt and his apparent effort to upstage Odría and other senior officers involved in the conspiracy, he remained in contact with his fellow conspirators from his place of exile in La Paz. Señora Laura Vinelli de Cenepa Sardón apparently served as the contact between Odría and his close associate and fellow Juliaca conspirator, Major Alejandro Izaguirre Valverde. Izaguirre then relayed information of Odría's continuing revolutionary plans to Llosa.<sup>29</sup> Thus between mid-July and the end of October the threat to Bustamante from the rightist officers who had failed to depose him on July 4 gathered renewed strength.

### Two Paths to Power

In the wake of the Llosa revolt, three clearly identifiable elements within the armed forces emerged, all of which were determined to end Bustamante's ineffectual rule. The Odría faction, allied with intensely anti-APRA civilians led by the Miró Quesada clan confronted radical junior officers and enlisted men under the leadership of Major

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<sup>28</sup>Peruvian Times, July 16, 1948, p. 1

<sup>29</sup>La Prensa, October 31, 1948, p. 4.

Villanueva and Navy Commander Enrique Aguila Pardo. In addition, General Marín headed a small group of army senior officers which, while favoring the overthrow of the president, advocated only a peaceful golpe de estado aimed at establishing a short-term military government.

During early August Marín approached Haya de la Torre with the plan that if the APRA leadership would cooperate with him and Generals Cuadros and Noriega in a simple golpe de estado to depose Bustamante, then Apristas would be allowed to participate in the free elections which Marín claimed would subsequently be held.<sup>30</sup> The APRA chief was clearly attracted by Marín's proposal as it seemed to him to represent a less risky path to national power for the party than a wide-scale revolutionary movement. Also, Haya de la Torre may have been prompted to welcome the proposed support of the generals because Bustamante had announced his intention to call a convention to revise the constitution as a means of breaking the political impasse created by the continuing senate boycott. If this tactic was successful it would have strengthened Bustamante's political position, and this the APRA leader wanted to avoid.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 114-117.

<sup>31</sup>Bustamante, Tres años, p. 168.

Party militants Víctor Villanueva and Aguila Pardo doubted whether Marín ever intended to allow APRA to gain power through a free electoral process. They wondered why Marín approached APRA only after he was removed as minister of war, when it was exactly that position that would have enabled him to wield the military and political power necessary to depose the president. When August and most of September had passed without any action being taken by Marín against the government, APRA militants and subverted military units decided to initiate the long-postponed revolution that had been in preparation for almost one year.

During the last week of September, retired army Colonel César Enrique Pardo joined his nephew, naval Commander Enrique Aguila Pardo, and Major Víctor Villanueva as leaders of the planned insurrection. The decision was also made not to inform the APRA leadership of the details of the uprising.<sup>32</sup> It is important to note that Haya de la Torre was aware of most activities of the party's militant wing. But because of his reluctance to sanction a full-scale revolt, and his apparent willingness to back Marín's plans, the revolt's leaders feared Haya de la Torre or other party leaders might sabotage the insurrection.<sup>33</sup> Undoubtedly,

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<sup>32</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 120-126, and Tittman to SecState, October 14, 1948, filed under G-2 Report no. 500373 NA, RG 319.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

Haya de la Torre hoped to hold the APRA activists in reserve in case his plans with Marín fell through and a full-scale uprising was the party's only means of achieving power. But pressure from the revolutionary cells within the ranks of the navy enlisted men to act, and the refusal of the revolt's leaders to accept the strategy of Haya de la Torre, set the stage for the rebellion which centered in Lima's port city of Callao on October 3.<sup>34</sup>

The basic plan called for subverted naval units to begin the action in the early morning hours of October 3. Sailors aboard the cruiser Almirante Grau under the command of Aguila Pardo were to incite the attack by shelling the barracks of the Thirty-Ninth Infantry Battalion in Callao. The main targets of the rebels were the Chorrillos Military School, the Naval School and arsenal in Callao, the old fortress and arsenal of Real Felipe and the Central Telephone Exchange in downtown Lima. Designated to lead the action in Callao besides Commander Aguila Pardo were navy Lieutenants Juan F. Ontenada and Víctor Romero, who were charged with taking the Chorrillos Military School, and Commander José Mosto, whose task was to capture the Naval Arsenal. Air force Major Luis Contero, with other subverted pilots from the air force base at Las Palmas, were

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid.



ordered to fly support for the action against the Military School and bomb the building if necessary. Aprista definistas under Major Villanueva's leadership were to aid the naval units in the capture of the key targets in Callao as well as the strategic Telephone Exchange, which controlled most of the communications for the Lima metropolitan area.

Most important for the success of the revolt, Aprista civilian revolutionaries were required to block the movement of government troops from Lima during the first crucial hours of the revolt in order that their rebel operation in Callao and Chorrillos would not be overwhelmed before their military objectives could be accomplished. This meant that Apristas would have to prevent units from the Thirty-Third and Nineteenth Infantry Battalions as well as tanks from the armored division from reinforcing the Thirty-Ninth Battalion which the rebels hoped to isolate and destroy.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, the revolt would probably fail unless the APRA leadership decided to throw the full support of the party to the rebel cause. Apristas would have to take to the streets by the hundreds not only to initiate appropriate military action, but also to create the impression that the revolt was very broad-based. This would be the only way to convince both government and armed forces leaders to

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<sup>35</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, pp. 127-128.

capitulate to the rebels. Such was the situation when the guns of the cruiser Almirante Grau commenced firing at military targets in Callao at 2 A.M. on October 3.

During the first hours of the revolt the rebels achieved most of their military objectives, but failed to neutralize the vitally important Thirty-Ninth Infantry Battalion. Rebel sailors gained control of the cruisers Almirante Grau and the Colonel Bolgnesi (which was undergoing repairs at the Naval Arsenal) as well as the frigates Ferre and Teniente Palačios and the destroyer Contralmirante Villar. A few minutes after 2 A.M. navy men in cars and on foot advanced on the Real Felipe fortress while a contingent of sailors and civilians tried to overwhelm the headquarters of the Thirty-Ninth Infantry Battalion.<sup>36</sup> The Real Felipe was easily taken but the Infantry Battalion successfully withstood a three hour attack before going on the offensive at approximately 5 A.M. Meanwhile the Naval Arsenal, the Naval School at La Punta and the Central Telephone Exchange in Lima all fell to the revolutionaries.<sup>37</sup>

The general success of the rebel efforts in Callao were more than balanced by setbacks in Lima and at the air force base at Las Palmas. Major Contero and his supporters

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<sup>36</sup>La Prensa, October 4, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., October 5, 1948, p. 1.



were unable to gain control of the base and after dawn loyal pilots flew a number of sorties against the rebellious ships forcing them to abandon their attack positions.<sup>38</sup> In Lima, Generals Noriega and Hurtado were quickly informed of the rebellion and took immediate steps to suppress the uprising. General Hurtado received a telephone warning that a revolt was imminent at midnight from a person who was later identified as an Aprista. He then issued orders which confined all army troops to their barracks until they received direct orders from him to act.<sup>39</sup> General Noriega arrived in Callao around 2:30 A.M. and personally directed the defense of the Thirty-Ninth Infantry Battalion headquarters until reinforcements arrived.<sup>40</sup> Four hours after the revolt began the government brought troops from the Military School (which had resisted a light rebel assault), Artillery Groups Two and Seven, a tank battalion, the Assault Battalion of the National Police, and Infantry Battalions Thirty-Nine, Thirty-Three and Nineteen into the battle against the rebels.

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<sup>39</sup>Bustamante, Tres años, p. 179, G-2 Report no. 504530, October 27, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319, and Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 155. Bustamante charged that General Noreiga was "negligent" in not immediately placing all of his forces on alert after General Hurtado received the information that the rebellion was about to begin. Villanueva offers a slightly different version of these events claiming an Aprista called the office of the Prefect of Lima at 12:00 A.M. and said, "The Party of the People (APRA) has nothing to do with the Callao revolt." Since the uprising had not yet begun this provided a warning to government authorities.

<sup>40</sup>La Prensa, October 4, 1948, p. 4.

With the recapture of the Central Telephone Exchange by guardia republicana troops only a few hours after it was seized by Aprista civilians, government communications were restored and by dawn the tide of the battle clearly turned against the rebels.<sup>41</sup>

From the initiation of the revolt at 2 A.M. until government reinforcements effectively isolated the rebels in the Callao area four hours later, it is conceivable that the revolt might have had a good chance of success had the Aprista leadership decided to support the rebellion. Major Villanueva, who recognized that the rebel military situation was desperate by 5 A.M., sought to open a second front in Lima manned by Aprista street fighters. This he hoped would engage the troops that were being sent to put down the rebellion in Callao.<sup>42</sup> But the APRA leaders, having failed to persuade Generals Marín and Caudros to initiate their proposed movement in conjunction with the Callao uprising, withheld their support for the revolt.<sup>43</sup> APRA leader Manuel Seoane, shortly after the Callao revolt, claimed that the rebellion was not authorized or supported by the party and represented the work of "hotheads" within the organization's

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., and La sublevación aprista, pp. 142-143.

<sup>42</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

ranks.<sup>44</sup> The party leadership's lack of support for the movement was also recognized by United States Ambassador, Harold Tittman, who reported on October 14 that: "The Callao affair, while probably not unknown to the APRA directorship beforehand, was not officially ordered or supported by the party."<sup>45</sup> The division between the APRA leadership and the militant wing of the party during the crucial stages of the revolt ended any chance of success for the rebels.

With the full force of government troops thrown against them, the sailors and civilians occupying the Real Felipe surrendered at 2:45 P.M. on October 3. The Naval School, which was held by 150 sailors, fell before a tank and infantry assault fifteen minutes later. The last rebel position to surrender was the Naval Arsenal, which capitulated at 8 P.M. Meanwhile, the naval vessels captured by the mutinous sailors remained under constant harassment by government planes and finally surrendered after the mutineers

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<sup>44</sup>Tittman to SecState, October 7, 1948, filed under G-2 Report no. 500213, Na, RG 319. As of July, 1974, Haya de la Torre denied that the APRA leadership was connected with the Callao revolt. He claimed that the rebels were affiliated with General Odría who wished to create a state of civil disorder so as to promote the conditions necessary for his own movement to triumph. Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru.

<sup>45</sup>Tittman to SecState, G-2 Report no. 500213.

were threatened by three submarines manned by loyal naval personnel.<sup>46</sup>

By the morning of October 4 all fighting had ceased and government troops were in complete control of Lima and Callao. The most serious insurrection in Peru since the Trujillo revolt of July, 1932 cost the lives of approximately sixty government and rebel troops and between 150 and 200 civilians.<sup>47</sup> Since the rebellion had not spread to other areas of the nation, government troops and police concentrated their roundup of suspected insurgents in the Lima metropolitan area. Although only about five hundred naval personnel and approximately one hundred civilians actively participated in the revolt, on October 4, 1,127 persons were arrested and charged with complicity in the rebellion.<sup>48</sup>

Claiming that the APRA "proposed and directed the revolutionary movement in Callao on October 3 costing numerous lives, attacking the stability of the constitutional institutions and destroying important elements of national defense," President Bustamante finally outlawed the party

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<sup>46</sup> La Prensa, October 4, 1948, p. 4, and Peruvian Times, October 8, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> Tittman to SecState, G-2 Report no. 500213.

<sup>48</sup> Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 143, G-2 Report no. 536711, February 10, 1949, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319, and *ibid.*, Report no. 497953, October 5, 1948.

on October 4.<sup>49</sup> The Casa del Pueblo (People's House), the APRA party headquarters, and the offices of the party newspaper La Tribuna were occupied by government troops in the immediate aftermath of the revolt; party leaders either went into hiding or sought asylum in foreign embassies to avoid arrest.<sup>50</sup> By October 14, the government had issued indictments against ninety four Aprista party leaders including Haya de la Torre in connection with the Callao revolt. Minister of Government and Police Julio César Villegas also announced on October 14 that police had seized a letter at the APRA headquarters written by Commander Aguila Pardo to Haya de la Torre in April which "proved" the party leader's complicity in the rebellion.<sup>51</sup>

Despite the arrest of a large number of Apristas and the deportation of party leaders Manuel Seoane and Luis Alberto Sánchez to Chile on October 13, party members attempted to regroup and organize another uprising. On October 19, Haya de la Torre named Major Luis Contero to "reorganize the Aprista military forces."<sup>52</sup> Attempts were made to raise money to finance a second movement but the

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<sup>49</sup>Peruvian Times, October 8, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup>The New York Times, October 8, 1948, p. 19.

<sup>51</sup>Peruvian Times, October 14, 1948, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup>Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, p. 169.

distrust generated within APRA ranks as a result of the party leadership's failure to back the Callao revolutionaries doomed these efforts to failure. Nevertheless, Aprista student leaders at the University of San Marcos and the University of Trujillo staged protest demonstrations that were only suppressed after strong government action.<sup>53</sup> These protests maintained political tension throughout the first three weeks of October and helped erode President Bustamante's last remaining support within the armed forces.

The Callao uprising and the continuing conspiracies in its aftermath had a profound impact upon the armed forces. Over 800 of the navy's 4,800 officers and enlisted men were arrested and interrogated.<sup>54</sup> A few months after the revolt, navy junior officers and cadets in the Naval School openly blamed the navy leadership for the revolt. Many young officers felt the low pay and the need for administrative reform had caused the discontent among the ranks of the enlisted men.<sup>55</sup>

In the other branches of the armed services the effect of Aprista subversive efforts was also dramatic. Scores of air force and police personnel sympathized with the APRA

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<sup>53</sup>Peruvian Times, October 22, 1948, p. 2, and Bustamante, Tres años, p. 186.

<sup>54</sup>G-2 Report no. 536711, February 10, 1949, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

cause but had not joined the movement because of the indecision of the party's leadership at the time of the revolt. In outlawing APRA Bustamante alluded to the party's subversive activities and claimed that the Callao revolt was the "culmination" of its' efforts to subvert members of the nation's military.<sup>56</sup> Most of all the Callao revolt convinced many armed forces officers that APRA--as the most serious threat to the discipline and corporate unity of the officer corp--must be dealt with far more harshly than President Bustamante was capable of doing. This strengthened the position of the staunch anti-APRA faction led by General Odría, and established the setting for still another military plot aimed at deposing Bustamante and destroying the last vestiges of APRA political power in Peru.

#### The Restoration Movement of Arequipa

President Bustamante's failure to effectively suppress APRA-related subversive activity after October 3 led to the evaporation of his support among armed forces leaders during the last three weeks of his presidency. General Noriega, having participated personally in the suppression of the Callao uprising, now was more forcefully committed to pushing the president to completely suppress APRA. Noriega and

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<sup>56</sup>Peruvian Times, October 8, 1948, p. 1.





other military leaders went to the National Palace on October 8 to pledge their support for the president, but General Odría, Admiral Saldfas and Marshal Eloy Ureta did not join them.<sup>57</sup> Thus three of the most influential armed forces leaders had pointedly displayed their disapproval of the president's handling of the Callao crisis. Additionally, Generals Marín and Hector Martínez were forced to publically deny reports in the Lima press that they were involved in the Callao affair. This placed both of these officers on the defensive and made other officers even more distressed over the public airing of the worst armed forces discipline crisis in decades.<sup>58</sup>

The failure of the Bustamante regime to apprehend most of the key APRA chiefs and leaders of the Callao revolt was the main source of discord between the president and the armed forces senior officers. Nearly all of the APRA leadership (including Haya de la Torre) avoided arrest until Bustamante was deposed. Majors Villanueva and Contero as well as a number of the definista leaders also remained free during this period.<sup>59</sup>

Consequently, at the end of October the armed forces leadership was now more inclined to back Odría's anti-APRA

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<sup>57</sup>Tittman to SecState, October 14, 1948, filed under G-2 Report no. 500373, NA, RG 319.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., Report no. 500943, October 15, 1948.

<sup>59</sup>Villanueva La sublevación aprista, pp. 166-180.

campaign than they had been when Lieutenant Colonel Llosa attempted his coup in July. The Callao revolt had clearly tipped the balance against Bustamante by the end of October. The economic crisis which gripped the nation in the last month of Bustamante's regime, which was marked by massive food shortages and a high rate of inflation, further convinced military leaders that Bustamante had to be deposed. Student disorders in Lima underscored Bustamante's lack of control of the political situation. On October 25, in the midst of this tense political climate, General Odría arrived in Arequipa to begin the military movement that ousted the president.<sup>60</sup>

Odría's general plan was much the same as that of Lieutenant Colonel Llosa in that he hoped to gain control of Arequipa and persuade other important garrisons in central and southern Peru (Cuzco, Juliaca and Puno) to join his rebellion. The general would then rely on his support among officers in the high command in Lima as he assumed that they would not risk a bloody confrontation to put down his uprising in order to save the discredited Bustamante. Odría's key fellow conspirators in Arequipa were Colonel Daniel Meza Cuadra, guardia civil Lieutenant Colonel Isidoro Ortega Cáceras, Majors Oswaldo Berrocal and José Gaitan López, and Captain José Vargas Mata. Major Alejandro

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<sup>60</sup> La Prensa, October 31, 1948, p. 4.



Izaguirre Valverde, who had participated in the Llosa uprising, returned from Bolivia to render valuable service to the revolutionary cause (presumably in the border garrison of Juliaca) when Odría launched his uprising on October 27.<sup>61</sup>

The Arequipa revolt began at 7 P.M. on the twenty-seventh when the conspirators seized the central plaza, the prefecture, and local mail and telephone offices in the city. The main radio stations and the airport were also quickly taken and the leading political figures affiliated with the Bustamante regime were arrested.<sup>62</sup> Among those detained were the brothers of the president Miguel, Guillermo and Ricardo Bustamante y Rivero and the Prefect of Arequipa, General Figueroa San Miguel. Colonel Meza Cuadra was named Jefe Politico (Political Chief) of Arequipa by Odría soon after the city was in his hands. Once Odría was completely assured of the allegiance of the personnel of the five army regiments stationed in the Arequipa region, he broadcast a radio appeal for the other military garrisons throughout Peru to join his movement.

On October 28 the Arequipa uprising spread to Cuzco, Juliaca, Puno and Huancané, but military leaders in Lima still remained undecided whether or not to support Odría.

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., and Bustamante, Tres años, pp. 253-255.

The issue was resolved the following day when twenty-five armed forces leaders met in a stormy three hour session to decide Bustamante's fate. Most of the air force leaders and the Inspector General of the Army, Federico Hurtado, supported the president, but Hurtado was unwilling to commit large numbers of troops to suppress Odría's uprising in the south. Marshal Ureta, the most prestigious member of the group, cast an important vote for Bustamante's removal, and General Noriega, commander of the critically important Second Light Division in Lima, ended the debate when he decided he would not use his troops against Odría.<sup>63</sup>

Bustamante was then ordered by the armed forces commanders to submit his resignation. He refused, but at 11:40 P.M. on October 29, he was escorted from the National Palace and placed aboard an airplane bound for Argentina in the company of Colonel Alejandro Cuadra Rabines.<sup>64</sup> Odría's coup d' état had triumphed without a single shot being fired by his supporters.

The revolt was supported by the extreme right and the conservative La Prensa hailed the coup with bold headlines

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<sup>63</sup>G-2 Report no. 507002, November 4, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319, The New York Times, October 30, 1948, p. 1, and La Prensa, October 30, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>64</sup>Unsigned, "La Revolución del Sur," RMP, XLV, 10 (October, 1948), 150-155, and Bustamante, Tres años, pp. 256-260.

proclaiming "The patriotic movement of the army has triumphed."<sup>65</sup> The Miró Quesada family had backed the abortive Llosa uprising with which Odría was affiliated, and although it is uncertain whether they gave any direct support to the October 27 movement, it seems likely that they were in agreement with the strongly anti-APRA overtones of what Odría called his "Restoration Movement of Arequipa." A further link between the Miró Quesada-backed Llosa conspiracy and that of Odría's was the lieutenant colonel's appointment to the rebel general's first cabinet as minister of development. Moreover, by a decree law of December 14, 1948 the Odría government appropriated the sum of 138,000 soles to "cover the expenses occasioned in connection with the revolutionary movement in Juliaca" in July, 1948.<sup>66</sup> This bold public move gave proof of Odría's support for Bustamante's overthrow several months before his own campaign was initiated.

General Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, the prominent retired army leader and senator, in characterizing the Odría movement, claimed that "Odría's rebellion was proposed one year before by a group of capitalists, supported by some political professionals and executed by ambitious

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<sup>65</sup>La Prensa, October 29, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup>G-2 Report no. 521324, January 6, 1949, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

military figures."<sup>67</sup> Bustamante's evaluation of the October 27 revolt was, of course, highly critical. From Buenos Aires on October 31, he defended his actions as president and claimed that there had been "no justification" for his overthrow."<sup>68</sup> Odría and the staunchly anti-APRA military and civilian figures who engineered the president's ouster immediately set out to refute Bustamante's allegations.

Odría arrived in Lima on October 30 to assume the post as provisional president of the revolutionary government which he promised would "only remain in power long enough to call a new election in the name of democracy and freedom."<sup>69</sup> During a speech at Limatambo Airport before a receptive crowd, the general vigorously attacked APRA and justified his seizure of power by asserting that the violently partisan politics of the Bustamante regime had "poisoned the hearts of the people and sickened their minds."<sup>70</sup> Despite Odría's promise of free elections, few

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<sup>67</sup>Ernesto Montagne Markholtz, Memories del General de Brigada E.P. Ernesto Montagne Markholtz (Callao, 1962), p. 218.

<sup>68</sup>The New York Times, November 1, 1948, p. 7.

<sup>69</sup>La Prensa, October 31, 1948, p. 1

<sup>70</sup>Ibid. The crowd greeting Odría was very likely swelled by the active efforts of his supporters. See the flyer calling for a warm reception for Odría upon his arrival at the Limatambo airport in the capital, Unsigned, "Manuel A. Odría, Es un deber patriótico de todo Peruanos. Render nomenaje al salvador de la patria." Colección de Volantes, October 30, 1948, 1948 folder.

Peruvians expected that in the aftermath of the swift collapse of democratic institutions under Bustamante, any measure of civil liberties would be quickly granted by the new military regime. Armed forces leaders, for the most part, also gave little credence to their colleague's remarks concerning free elections. Their main concern was the re-establishment of discipline within the officer corps after the massive subversive inroads made by Apristas during the three years of the Bustamante government. They were thus anticipating tough authoritarian measures from the new president aimed at eliminating remaining subversive cells within the armed forces. These measures were quickly forthcoming.

### Conclusion

The violence and political tension marking the last ten months of the Bustamante government resulted mainly from the dual threat of Aprismo to the corporate unity of the officer corps. The subversion of a few high-ranking army officers by APRA leaders, and the alliance of Aprista activists with a militant cadre of naval enlisted men inflamed the smoldering antagonisms against the party by armed forces officers who were frustrated by the widespread breakdown of military discipline and its resultant impact upon the professional morale of the armed forces. Thus the



anti-APRA coup of General Odría went unopposed by most armed forces officers who had allowed the party to be legalized in 1945. The failure of Bustamante to cope with the growing subversive threat of Aprismo also added to the traditional distrust of civilian politicians by most military men in Peru.

With Odría's rise to power, APRA--its image badly undermined by the failure of its leaders to present a unified revolutionary front during the last critical months of the Bustamante regime--was once again forced underground. But unlike the party's previous periods of political proscription, after October, 1948 no significant cooperation between dissident armed forces personnel and Apristas materialized. The party had lost its revolutionary appeal for military activists.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE LAST CAUDILLO

#### The Junta Militar: 1948-1950

General Manuel Odría's coup did not represent a major variance from the historical pattern of twentieth century civil-military relations in Peru. But like the Benavides and Sánchez Cerro coups of 1914 and 1933 respectively, Odría was not able to rely on armed forces unanimity in support of his regime. Most of the armed forces hierarchy sympathized with the anti-APRA motivations of the October 27 movement because Aprista subversive efforts in 1948 posed the greatest threat to the corporate unity of the officer corps since the 1930's. Yet, officers not directly linked to any of the conspiracies or revolutionary movements resented still another incursion into national politics by colleagues whom they felt should be exclusively concerned with strictly military matters. This feeling was particularly strong among navy junior officers not involved in the Callao revolt and a few army senior officers who resented Odría's seizure of power. As armed forces' resentment to Odría's continued rule grew sharply after 1953, key army

commanders and his former rightist civilian allies worked actively to end his regime. Meanwhile, other progressive officers during the early 1950's moved beyond criticism of Odría's repressive policies to outline a broader mission for the armed forces other than the simple guardianship role dictated by the programs of the military president. None of these currents of resistance to Odría coalesced, however, until he had solidified his hold on political power during the first two years of his military government.

General Odría ruled as president of the military Junta until he was able to engineer his own election as constitutional president in June, 1950. During this period he consolidated his political position by jailing and deporting civilian and military opponents of his regime. The primary target of the government were Apristas, hundreds of whom were arrested in the two months following Odría's seizure of power. At the same time he solicited the support of urban working class groups by launching a series of public works projects which employed thousands of unskilled laborers in the Lima area.

Firmly supporting Odría's initial policies were the right-wing anti-APRA officers comprising the general's first cabinet. Most were young--the majority being in their forties--and only two of the army officers held the rank of



general.<sup>1</sup> General Zenón Noriega and Admiral Roque A. Saldías (as war and navy ministers respectively) had demonstrated their solidarity with Odría during his tenure in Bustamante's government and the subsequent coup. Some other members of the all-military cabinet traced their connection to the Junta leader to a comradeship forged during the military campaign against Ecuador.<sup>2</sup> The ministers, particularly Lieutenant Colonel Alfonso Llosa, backed the campaign to crush APRA as a political force, and this resolve was enthusiastically seconded by the conservative civilian elements who encouraged the overthrow of Bustamante.

Odría's leading civilian supporters, Oscar and Carlos Miró Quesada, Pedro Beltrán, and Ramon Aspillaga were pleased when during early November the government extended the state of seige originally imposed by Bustamante on October 4, and employed its sweeping powers to arrest nearly one thousand Apristas. Party leaders Ramiro Priale and Armando Villanueva were captured, but Haya de la Torre eluded the dragnet.<sup>3</sup> The government also outlawed the

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<sup>1</sup>Unsigned, "La junta militar del gobierno," RMP, XLV, 10 (October, 1948), 154-160.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., these included Minister of Housing and Commerce Colonel Luis Ramirez Ortíz, Minister of Public Health Colonel Alberto López Flores, and Minister of Agriculture Carlos Miñano Mendicilla.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., and Peruvian Times, November 12, 1948, p. 1.



Communist Party on November 2 charging Communists and Apristas with joint responsibility for anti-government subversion against Bustamante.<sup>4</sup>

Strong measures aimed at preventing organized military opposition to the Junta were also adopted during November. During the first days of the Odría regime, government police raided the homes of suspect military personnel and interrogated them at length before confining them to the Lima Penitentiary.<sup>5</sup> Of all those imprisoned, the sailors involved in the Callao revolt received the worst treatment.<sup>6</sup> A number of Odría's military opponents were also subsequently deported including Major Villanueva who was exiled to Venezuela. From Panama in July, 1949 a small group of these deportees voiced their sentiments concerning Odría's coup. Claiming that the military government had "profaned" the name of the armed forces by allowing partisan politics to totally dictate the conduct of military affairs, the group insisted that they spoke for the majority of Peru's junior officers. They declared that:

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<sup>4</sup>The government issued during 1948-49 a series of pamphlets purporting to prove that Aprismo and Communism were one in the same and both should be liquidated for the good of Peru.

<sup>5</sup>"Manifiesto a los institutos armados y el pueblo del Perú, signed by Major Jorge Tejada Lapoint, Captain German Guerrero, Major Carlos Meza Navaro and Captain Jorge Rosas Burgos in Panama during July, 1949. Colección de Volantes, 1949 folder.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

We only seek to return the institution to its former level of professional prestige and remove the armed forces from the political involvement which provides a painful spectacle to the Peruvian people. We do not propose an armed forces revolt. Our resolution is sacred and pure; the return of peace and constitutionality to Peru. We know this feeling is shared among the rank and file of the armed forces of today.<sup>7</sup>

Although the appeals of these disaffected officers went unanswered, Odría was well aware of the potential threat to his regime posed by officers who shared these views.

Consequently, he balanced the numerous arrests and deportations of suspect military men with measures designed to placate disenchanted junior officers. On March 11, 1949, pay raises ranging from fifteen to twenty-five per cent were ordered for army officers and police. Significantly, the biggest pay boosts were granted to the grades below major in the army and to all grades in the police.<sup>8</sup>

While ordering pay raises, the government also modified the promotion law of the army to clarify the minimum time of service each officer above the rank of major would have to serve before promotion to the next grade.<sup>9</sup> Prior to this law, factors other than seniority were more important for promotion to lieutenant colonel and above. Odría thus

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Perú, Ministerio de Guerra, Ordenes Generales del Ejército, March 11, 1949, p. 71. Hereafter cited as Ordenes Generales del Ejército with date and page number

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., General officers (brigadier general and above) received the minimum pay raises of fifteen per cent.



appeared to be demonstrating to junior army officers his concern with rectifying the promotion problems prevalent during the civilian regimes of Prado and Bustamante. In practice, however, the general used promotions as a political tool throughout most of his rule after 1950. The government also moved to demonstrate its concern for the social welfare of military personnel by ordering the construction of a modern military hospital in Lima during December, 1948.<sup>10</sup> Overall, Odría's expansion of government revenues for the military was reflected in a forty-five per cent increase in the military budget during his first year in office.<sup>11</sup>

The military president also sought the support of Peru's urban working class groups by enacting a number of social welfare measures. Only three weeks after taking office, the president ordered the creation of a system of social security for the nation's workers.<sup>12</sup> On April 30, 1949, the government institutionalized its labor programs by creating a new ministry of labor and Indian affairs.<sup>13</sup> An extensive

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<sup>10</sup>Legislación Militar, December 9, 1948, p. 69.

<sup>11</sup>Perú, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, Anuario Estadístico del Perú: 1948-1949, pp. 710-11.

<sup>12</sup>The New York Times, November 17, 1948, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup>El Comercio, May 1, 1949, p. 1.

program of public works projects was also begun during 1949 which provided large numbers of jobs in the construction of public buildings in Lima and irrigation systems along Peru's arid coastal regions. At the end of 1949, Odría followed the salary increases ordered for the military in March, by granting a twenty per cent increase in the pay of government employees. At the same time, the chief executive suggested that private employers follow the government's example.<sup>14</sup> The regime was able to finance these programs without incurring major budget deficits due to its effective financial policy which stressed increased foreign investment and the elimination of trade restricting foreign exchange rates.<sup>15</sup> Increased demand for Peruvian exports created by the Korean War enabled the government to expand its public works and social welfare projects throughout the next four years. The economic prosperity of these years contributed significantly to the president's popularity among the working classes of Lima, who benefited directly from these extensive public projects.<sup>16</sup> But despite growing economic prosperity during 1949 and 1950, Odría refused to loosen the tight restrictions

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<sup>14</sup>Peruvian Times, November 25, 1949, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup>Odría solicited the advice of U.S. economic consultants in planning his economic program.

<sup>16</sup>The president's lasting popularity among the Lima working class was demonstrated by his strong showing in the 1962 election in the capital.

on individual liberties imposed during his first year in power.

In a New Year's Day address in 1949 Odría justified his campaign against the APRA by claiming that the party was dominated by marxists who were directing a continuing campaign of anti-government subversion.<sup>17</sup> Most important APRA leaders at this time, however, were either in exile or in prison and on January 3, party chief Haya de la Torre finally despaired of further resistance and sought diplomatic asylum in the Colombian embassy in Lima.<sup>18</sup> The government's refusal to allow the APRA leader a safe conduct to leave the country initiated one of the most bizarre episodes in Peruvian history. For the next five years, Haya de la Torre remained a prisoner in the Colombian embassy building which was surrounded by trenches and machinegun positions erected soon after his presence was made known to the government. Efforts by the Colombian government and the International Court of Justice to resolve the political asylum issue failed until the party chief was finally allowed to leave Peru in April, 1954.<sup>19</sup> With Haya de la Torre's isolation

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<sup>17</sup>El Comercio, January 1, 1949, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>Peruvian Times, January 7, 1949, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup>For Haya de la Torre's description of his ordeal see "My Five Year Exile in My Own Country," Life, May 3, 1954, pp. 154-162.



APRA was deprived of its most important leader. The party continued underground activity, however, and Manuel Seoane worked to hold APRA together by organizing a committee of APRA members in exile.<sup>20</sup>

Between January and July, 1949 Odría sought to suppress remaining resistance to his regime by enacting tough new measures to deal with acts of political subversion. In late March the penal code was modified, sanctioning the death penalty for political terrorism.<sup>21</sup> In mid-April, the government announced that it aborted a plot by fugitive Apristas and a small number of armed forces and police personnel to assassinate Odría and other members of the military Junta.<sup>22</sup> The arrest and imprisonment of the plotters was followed on July 5 by the declaration of the comprehensive National Law of Internal Security. This law, which remained in force throughout Odría's rule, granted government agents sweeping powers of search and seizure in addition to suspending the right of habeus corpus to persons suspected of committing political crimes.<sup>23</sup> APRA was the immediate target of this

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<sup>20</sup>Edward Charles Epstein, "Motivational Bases of Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970, pp. 56-58.

<sup>21</sup>El Comercio, March 26, 1949, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup>Peruvian Times, April 22, 1949, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup>Perú, Ministerio de Gobierno y Policía, Ordenes Generales de Guardia Civil y Policía, July 5, 1949, p. 2.

measure, but it was soon used to deal with all forms of political opposition. In response to these measures APRA exiles began an anti-government propaganda campaign in a number of Latin American countries in an effort to discredit Odría.<sup>24</sup>

The president used his independence day speech on July 27 to justify the necessity of the Internal Security Law and outline his proposals for further military spending. Insisting that the fundamental reason for the existence of his military government was the elimination of the APRA "menace", Odría claimed that the security law was a needed tool for dealing with the sect most responsible for the violence and political unrest of the past eighteen years in Peru.<sup>25</sup> On the subject of armed forces' morale, the general maintained that the navy had recovered from the crisis of the Callao mutiny.

Odría's claim was not true, however. In the wake of the Callao revolt, navy junior officers expressed the belief that the blame for the mutiny rested mainly with the poor leadership provided by their institution's senior officers.

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<sup>24</sup>PAP, Comité Nacional de Acción, Secretaria Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda, "Directiva Nacional #1" July 1, 1949. Colección de Volantes. This flyer claimed that exiled Aprista committees were publishing newspapers and bulletins in Uruguay, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, Guatemala and Costa Rica.

<sup>25</sup>General Manuel A. Odría, "Mensaje a la Nación del Señor Presidente de la Junta Militar del Gobierno, General de Brigada, Manuel A. Odría (Lima, 1949), p. 6.

They felt that the October 3, 1948 uprising had disgraced the navy and the junior officers pushed for a reorganization of the navy command and internal structure "from top to bottom". Most importantly, the discontented younger officers felt that their own superiors were incapable of conducting these reforms and suggested that substantive changes should be made under guidelines provided by the United States naval mission to Peru. No action was taken on these demands during the Odría regime and naval morale remained low for most of his tenure as president. Odría did promise in 1949, however, to upgrade the quality of the navy's equipment and coastal defenses along with his plans to renovate army and air force installations at Pisco, Juliaca, and Cuzco.<sup>26</sup>

While the Odría government fulfilled its initial promises to improve the financial and material condition of the armed forces, there is evidence that military resistance to his regime continued throughout his first eighteen months in office. An army officer, risking contacts with APRA, explained to a party representative in November, 1949, that many young army officers deplored the government's involvement in the suppression of civil liberties. Echoing the sentiments of the army exiles in Panama, he charged that Odría was not qualified to run the government. The new

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-115, passim.

generation of officers and soldiers, he further claimed, were completely dedicated to their profession, and the institution's involvement in national politics had created a sense of uneasiness concerning the Peruvian people's attitude towards the military's professional mission.<sup>27</sup>

Among senior officers of the army, there also prevailed opposition towards Odría's policies. Within the membership of the Superior Council of the Army, Generals Juan de Dios Cuadros and José del Carmen Marín provided Odría's chief critics. Marín, apparently because of his personal prestige was not purged from the army leadership, although his position on the Superior Council was relatively powerless.<sup>28</sup> Cuadros, however, after openly ridiculing the Odría regime in late 1949, was replaced by General José Vásquez Benavides and placed on inactive duty.<sup>29</sup>

Adding to the internal tensions within the armed forces was the trial of the military personnel and civilians charged in the Callao revolt. The proceedings, begun in January, 1950, aroused uneasiness in the navy concerning the

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<sup>27</sup>Unsigned, "Juventud Aprista Peruano," Colección de Volantes, November, 1949, p. 5. The officer, unidentified for obvious reasons was described as young and prestigious" by the APRA representative.

<sup>28</sup>G-2 Report no. 655428, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, March 31, 1950, NA, RG 319.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., Escalafón, General del Ejército, 1950, p. 18.



possibility of death sentences which might be imposed by the tribunal headed by Vice-Admiral Carlos Rotalde.<sup>30</sup> When the sentences were read on March 21, their relative lack of severity apparently reflected a desire on the part of the tribunal to avoid exacerbating naval morale problems stemming from the Callao mutiny. Of the 198 military and fifty civilian defendants, only one non-commissioned navy officer, Domingo Castañan Rivera, was given the death sentence. Petty officers Ricardo Olayo Mogollón and Francisco Dávila Manrique were the only two receiving life prison terms. Other sentences ranged from one to fourteen years with navy Captain José Mosto given the stiffest sentence among this group.<sup>31</sup>

The tribunal charged APRA with inspiring and planning the revolt and sentenced party members Ramiro Prialé, Carlos Manuel Cox, Luis Heyesen, Armando Villanueva and air force Major José Estremadoyro to from three to four years in prison. The panel also cited fifty-three civilians, including Haya de la Torre, Manuel Seoane and Luis Alberto Sánchez (most of the remaining APRA leadership) as fugitives from justice. Odría was not in complete agreement with

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Report no. 622042, December 23, 1949.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., Report no. 653333, April 4, 1950, and El Comercio, March 22, 1950, pp. 1-10.

these penalties, but as he was preparing his presidential campaign for national elections scheduled for June, 1950, he apparently wished to avoid creating a major issue of the tribunal's decision, and he let the sentences stand.<sup>32</sup>

### An Attempt at Legitimacy

In early January, 1950 the chief executive announced plans to hold elections for president and a national congress on July 2. Odría soon established the electoral framework for his almost certain election. The electoral statute was issued by the Junta Militar which he controlled, and the National Election Jury, which monitored the balloting, was hand-picked by the general and included two of his relatives.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the Internal Security Law could be used by the government to severely limit the political activities of opposition candidates. Despite being nominated for president by a coalition of six minor conservative parties under the title Partido Unión Democrática, Odría refused to make formal his candidacy until May 19.<sup>34</sup>

Five weeks before the Junta chief announced his intention to run, another political coalition calling itself the

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente, p. 87.

<sup>34</sup>El Comercio, May 20, 1950, p. 2..

Liga Nacional Democrática organized a campaign to present an alternative candidate to Odría. During the first week of May the Liga named retired army General Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz and Dr. Francisco Mostajo as its first and second vice presidential candidates respectively.<sup>35</sup> Once Odría had formally entered the race he demonstrated a marked uneasiness concerning the strength of the aging Montagne's campaign.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps fearing that his opponent would seek electoral support from Apristas, the president had the National Election Jury invalidate Montagne's electoral petitions during the last week of May.<sup>37</sup> All formal political opposition was thus liquidated by June 1. Nevertheless, on that date the Junta leader observed the legal formality of temporarily resigning as chief executive in order to run for president as a private citizen. General Zenón Noriega, Odría's minister of war, replaced him as head of the Junta.

Less than three weeks after Odría resigned, a serious revolt erupted in Arequipa precipitated by a strike at the

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<sup>35</sup>Peruvian Times, May 10, 1950, p. 1, and Unsigned, "Los Hechos Hablan," Colección de Volantes, May, 1950. This handbill called for signatures for Montagne's election petitions.

<sup>36</sup>A government propaganda campaign against Montagne centered on his alleged lack of authentic Peruvian citizenship.

<sup>37</sup>For Montagne's version of these events see Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, Memories del General de Brigada E. P. Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz (Lima, 1963), pp. 220-240.

Colegio Nacional de Independencia. Students, protesting the government's suppression of political opposition, engaged in a bloody confrontation with police and army units on June 13. The military prefect of Arequipa, Colonel Daniel Meza Cuadra, was quickly forced to withdraw his troops to the city's perimeters.<sup>38</sup> On the fourteenth the rebels gained control of the city and named Dr. Francisco Mostajo--second vice-presidential candidate of the Liga Nacional Democrática--as president of the hastily-formed Junta del Gobierno de Arequipa. The insurgents' hold on the city was short-lived, however, as reinforced government troops recaptured Arequipa on the morning of June 16 after a sharp battle that left over fifty dead and two hundred wounded.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, the police arrested General Montagne at his home in Lima on June 14 and charged him with plotting the revolt with Aprista support. APRA in fact had offered its support to Montagne's presidential bid and undoubtedly took part in the Arequipa revolt.<sup>40</sup> It is uncertain, however, whether the retired general was directly involved in the

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<sup>38</sup> El Comercio, June 16, 1950, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> Peruvian Times, June 23, 1950, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> Montagne, Memorias, p. 240. Peruvian Times, June 30, 1950, p. 1. Víctor Villanueva holds the view that Montagne accepted APRA support in his campaign. Letter from Víctor Villanueva, February 25, 1975.

uprising.<sup>41</sup> But despite his claims of innocence, Montagne was deported to Argentina in July and hundreds of other suspected plotters were arrested in the wake of this first serious threat to the Odría government.

Odría felt secure enough on July 2 to proceed with the formality of holding national elections as scheduled. Without opposition, he was "elected" as constitutional president for a six-year term along with a subservient congress that contained some token opposition members from the Socialist Party.<sup>42</sup>

The circumstances surrounding Odría's election further alienated officers who questioned his seizure of power in 1948. During the next six years, Odría gradually lost his grip on the military institution that did not seriously challenge him during his first nineteen months in office. This enabled more forward-looking officers and their progressive ideas to gain acceptance from an officer class that was separating itself from Odría's autocratic leadership.

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<sup>41</sup>For the version that Montagne was not linked to the Arequipa revolt see, Chrinos Soto, El Perú frente, p. 91.

<sup>42</sup>Peruvian Times, July 21, 1950, p. 1, and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 291. Odría received 550,779 votes slightly more than his First Vice-Presidential running mate Hector Boza.

The Outline of a New National Mission

As had been illustrated from the discussion of the writings of army officers prior to the 1950's, there is clear evidence that military men were concerned with such fundamental national issues as education, public administration and Indian problems.<sup>43</sup> But despite the limited road-building, public education, and similar civic action projects that the army engaged in before the Odría administration, little effective action was taken by the military to deal with these basic national problems. One important reason for this inaction was the lack of a clearly defined rationale for the army to deal with projects outside the realm of its traditional concept of national defense. The army's role had been defined as protection of Peru's frontiers from external military threats and the suppression of major incidents of internal disorder. Although the 1944 general staff study entitled "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization" cautiously proposed a broader definition of national defense that included some references to army-sponsored social reforms, no significant action was taken on the study's recommendations during the 1940's.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>For a selected review of the military journal articles dealing with these topics see Nunn, "The Junta Phenomenon," p. 243.

<sup>44</sup>See chapter four for a detailed discussion of this document.

Partly because of the lack of action on the suggestions of the general staff document and also due to the concern of a few army senior officers who felt that the Escuela Superior de Guerra did not prepare the army's high command with the means of formulating a modern national defense strategy, some officers suggested that a new military studies center be created. This center would be dedicated primarily to formulating new theories of national defense based on the realities of Peru's national potential and commensurate military capabilities. Such a center would also have a key role in preparing armed forces officers for important command positions upon their graduation from the institution.

The first appeal calling for the creation of a specialized military training center was made by General Óscar N. Torres in 1945.<sup>45</sup> The general declared that a Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Center of Higher Military Studies) should be formed to prepare army officers for the command of strategically important military units.<sup>46</sup> But for three years his proposal was not acted upon despite the creation of a mixed commission charged with writing the Organic Law of National Defense in 1945.<sup>47</sup> Only five months before

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<sup>45</sup>Víctor Villanueva, El CAEM y la revolución de la fuerza armada (Lima, 1973), p. 28.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>See chapter four for a discussion of this commission.

Odría's coup retired Colonel César Enrique Pardo, the Aprista senator from Lima, presented to the Second National Congress of his party a proposal calling for the creation of a military studies center to improve the quality of military professional training.<sup>48</sup> Pardo's action reflected his recognition of the growing desire among armed forces officers for a government commitment to act on this project.

When Odría took office he bowed to this pressure and soon named a commission to study ways of upgrading the quality of Peru's armed forces. Among the measures the commission advocated were the organization of the three armed services under a joint command structure, and the establishment of a higher military studies center for the armed forces.<sup>49</sup> However, resistance by navy chiefs to a joint command, which would have assuredly been dominated by the army, undermined both that project and the proposal for a studies center.<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, intellectually active army officers like General Carmen Marín, who sat on the armed forces commission, finally succeeded in securing the establishment of the Centro de Altos Estudios del Ejército (Center of Higher

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<sup>48</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 29.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. 30-32.

<sup>50</sup>G-2 Report no. 667591, May 17, 1950, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.



Military Studies of the Army) in July, 1950. Three months later the institution's name was changed to the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM).<sup>51</sup> Outlined as the original objectives of the CAEM were: 1) to define a national war doctrine; 2) to incorporate the basic principles of this doctrine into the training of army officers destined for high command positions; 3) to study the fundamental questions of national defense and their relation to basic national problems; 4) to develop systems of education and instruction for the army; 5) to handle the instruction of army colonels as a means of preparing them for promotion to brigadier general.<sup>52</sup> These functions were in line with those of similar studies centers in Argentina, Brazil, France and the United States. The National War College, founded in Washington in 1947, and particularly a center for advanced military studies, created in France during the 1920's, provided the best working models for the architects of the Peruvian institution.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>The Center was included as a provision of the Ley Organico del Ejército (Organic Law of the Army) of July 14, 1950. See Colonel Armando Cueto Zevallos, "El CAEM, escuela de la defensa nacional," Revista Diplomatica Peruano Internacional, V, 36 (January-February-March, 1972), 10-11, 62.

<sup>52</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, pp. 32-33.

<sup>53</sup>Nunn, "Junta Phenomenon," p. 249, stressed the influence of the French model while Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 37, cites the impact of the National War College.

Named as the first director of the CAEM was General Marín. He was an accomplished mathematician and engineer and was considered one of the leading intellectuals in the army.<sup>54</sup> But General Marín's association with APRA during 1948, aroused Odría's distrust of his army colleague, and the president used the post of CAEM director to isolate Marín from a position of power in the army.<sup>55</sup> Although Marín had been slated to assume the post as director of a future studies center as early as March, 1948, Odría's influence did apparently prevent the center from becoming a focal point of prestige and influence within the military during its first years of operation.<sup>56</sup> Two commentators on the CAEM's role during the Odría administration claim the president sought to downgrade its importance:

During the first years there was a widespread feeling, at least within the army, that the CAEM was a junkyard designed to dump officers unwanted by those in command or who were politically unreliable to the Odría regime. Consequently many colonels resorted to influences

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<sup>54</sup>A U.S. military attaché commented on Marín's intellectual ability as early as 1944, claiming he was "a man to be reckoned with." See G-2 Report no. 353, February 2, 1944, U.S. Military Attaché to War Department, NA, RG 319.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., G-2 Report no. 446306, March 9, 1948, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

<sup>56</sup>Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientacion de las fuerzas armadas en el Perú," Aportes (January, 1971), 177.

and political-military contacts to avoid assignment there.<sup>57</sup>

The make-up of the first class of colonels at the CAEM in 1951 seems to substantiate its relatively unimportant role in the army's institutional framework. Seven of the ten colonels attending the center's first program retired the following year. And one of the other colonels, Miguel Monteza Tafur, had been a consistent critic of Odría's policies for a number of years.<sup>58</sup> Nearly all these men lacked potential for top command positions in the army. Thus CAEM's mandate for the preparation of candidates for leadership roles in the armed forces was undermined.

Despite the handicaps imposed by Odría, General Marín manifested a determination to make the center an important source of military theory and influence within the armed forces. In an address delivered at the opening of the CAEM in 1951 Marín insisted that the center would play an integral role in developing an ever-broadening concept of national defense. It would then become the armed forces high command's duty to translate this concept into positive actions designed to promote the nation's well-being, he

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<sup>57</sup>Carlos A. Astiz and José Z. Garcia, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies," Western Political Quarterly, XXV, 4 (December, 1972), 674.

<sup>58</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, pp. 40-41, and G-2 Report no. 642900, March 3, 1950, U.S. Military Attaché to Department of the Army, NA, RG 319.

concluded.<sup>59</sup> For the most part, the military leadership under Odría ignored the work being done at the CAEM during his administration. But as the president became increasingly occupied with growing civil-military opposition to his regime after 1953, the CAEM's prestige increased concomitantly. This was partly due to a growing recognition among armed forces officers that the social reformist ideology advocated by the center for the armed forces was a far more acceptable alternative than the autocratic paternalism of the Odría regime.

#### The Growing Opposition

In the four years following his 1950 election as constitutional president, Odría responded to increasing resistance to his regime by repeated implementation of the Internal Security Law. During the 1950 electoral campaign the government's tactics and the violent suppression of the Arequipa uprising alienated civilian leaders who had supported Odría during his tenure as president of the Junta Militar. Pedro Beltrán, the editor of the newspaper La Prensa and a strong supporter of Odría in 1948, became estranged from the president because he believed that Odría

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<sup>59</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, pp. 41-42.

was no longer responsive to the views of the civilians who had backed the general's original coup.<sup>60</sup>

Odría responded to civilian pressures for a greater voice in his government, by naming six civilians to the twelve cabinet posts in his government in July, 1950. The most powerful cabinet post of minister of war remained in the hands of General Noriega, however, and Admiral Roque A. Saldías was retained as minister of the navy.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, the president gave notice that his constitutional leadership would follow the same pattern as his earlier rule when he ordered that the six hundred decree laws issued by the Junta Militar be declared constitutional laws of the Republic.<sup>62</sup>

For the next three years the government centered its financial priorities on military programs and various social welfare and public works projects. During late 1950 additional pay raises were ordered for public employees and military officers serving in foreign countries as attaches and trainees.<sup>63</sup> Ambitious road building and irrigation projects were also announced along with a proposal calling

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<sup>60</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 259.

<sup>61</sup>Peruvian Times, August 4, 1950, p. 4.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, September 19, 1950, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup>Legislación Militar, November 11, 1950, p. 86.

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for the creation of a National Health and Social Welfare Fund.<sup>64</sup> Increases in the value of Peruvian exports and loans for development programs sponsored by the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Research and Development supplied the initial funding for these projects.<sup>65</sup>

A bilateral military assistance pact between the United States and Peru signed on February 22, 1952 gave a substantial boost to Odría's military programs. The agreement, signed under the auspices of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, formalized a United States military presence in Peru that had been growing increasingly important since the end of World War II.<sup>66</sup> At the time of the treaty, the United States Army mission in Peru was assigned to a number of important advisory positions. Colonel James Cole, chief of the mission, was assigned to the ministry of war and the inspector general of the army. The deputy chief, Colonel Andrew J. Adams, worked with the commanding general of the armored division, and Colonel Adrian L. Hoebeke served as an advisor to the CAEM.<sup>67</sup> The United States Defense

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<sup>64</sup>Peruvian Times, January 6, 1952, p. 1.

<sup>65</sup>The New York Times, June 20, 1952, p. 7.

<sup>66</sup>Peruvian Times, February 29, 1952, and Federico Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York, 1971), p. 215.

<sup>67</sup>Ordenes Generales del Ejército, February 22, 1952, pp. 5-6.

Department was also continuing its policy, begun during World War II, of sponsoring study missions and good will visits of Peruvian officers to United States military installations. During the early 1950's such officers as General Zenón Noriega, air force General Ernesto Bernales and Admiral Roque A. Saldías were given extensive tours of such establishments as Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Army General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.<sup>68</sup>

Under the military assistance agreement, United States military aid (grants and loans) increased from only one hundred thousand dollars in 1952 to 9.1 million dollars at the end of the Odría regime in 1956.<sup>69</sup> This assistance provided the government with part of the funds for some of its major equipment purchases among which included three used destroyers, two new submarines and a squadron (25) of P-47 pursuit planes.<sup>70</sup> The submarines were the most important acquisitions and represented the first purchases of this kind by the Peruvian government since the 1920's.

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<sup>68</sup> Numerous other visits by junior officers were conducted at U.S. bases in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal Zone.

<sup>69</sup> United States Congressional Record Senate, "U.S. Foreign Assistance and Loan Obligations," (Washington, 1962), p. 15443.

<sup>70</sup> Peruvian Times, February 29, 1952, p. 2, and March 27, 1953, p. 1.



These additions apparently reflected Odría's recognition of the navy's continuing complaints that it was traditionally shorted in the military budgets beginning with the early 1940's.<sup>71</sup>

In civilian matters relative economic prosperity before 1953 did not prevent the continuation of protests against the government's restriction of civil liberties. Anti-government student strikes in Arequipa during September, 1952 were so serious that the Prefect of Arequipa, Daniel Camino Brent, was replaced by army Colonel Ricardo Pérez Godoy who had commanded the Third Light Division in that southern Peruvian city.<sup>72</sup> Students were then joined by textile workers in a series of strikes in 1953 that reflected rising unemployment as Peru's economy began to suffer from declining world prices of sugar and cotton. Suddenly faced with an unfavorable trade balance that reached seventy million dollars in 1953, Odría adopted a tougher stance towards labor union agitation. After a general strike immobilized Arequipa in January, 1953, government police arrested members of the Communist Party, thirty-nine of whom were subsequently imprisoned under the provisions of

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<sup>71</sup>This complaint was common among navy senior officers during the 1940's

<sup>72</sup>Federación Universitario de Arequipa, Comité Ejecutivo de Huelga, "Comunicado #1" September 5, 1952, Colección de Volantes, and The New York Times, October 5, 1952, p. 25.

the Internal Security Law. These arrests signaled the abandonment of Odría's policy which encouraged limited Communist penetration of the labor movement in an effort to offset APRA influence among working groups.<sup>73</sup>

The depressed economy also forced Odría to make cutbacks in military spending and curtail his program of public works and social welfare projects during 1954.<sup>74</sup> The uneven nature of his public assistance programs was thus soon made apparent as little effort was made to extend government aid beyond Lima and a few other coastal areas.<sup>75</sup> As had been the case with all government leaders throughout modern Peruvian history, Odría did little to alleviate the crushing poverty of the Indian population. The government's inaction in this regard was at odds with the thinking of the military strategists at the CAEM and some progressive armed forces officers who viewed the plight of the Indian as a serious national problem that had important implications for the armed forces.

Concern for the economic and social backwardness of the Indian had been a re-occurring theme in the writings of armed

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<sup>73</sup>The New York Times, February 4, 1953, p. 7.

<sup>74</sup>Anuario Estadístico del Perú: 1953-1954, pp. 710-11. Government spending which had been rising sharply since 1948, declined by 3.5 per cent in 1954 over the preceding year.

<sup>75</sup>Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca, 1969), pp. 123-24.

forces officers for decades. But a young army officer, writing in the institutions principle journal, the Revista Militar del Peru, in 1955 complained rather strongly that the education and literacy deficiencies of the Indian seriously undermined the military capabilities of the average Peruvian soldier. Pointing out that the army's basic manpower was drawn from the Indian population, the officer insisted that education of the Indian and his resultant integration into Peru's social and political mainstream would not only strengthen the armed forces, but it would also help develop a true national consciousness as well.<sup>76</sup>

The concept of Indian integration was one component of an increasingly sophisticated concept of national defense that was being developed at the CAEM during its first years of operation. Largely through the efforts of General Marín, the Center had been able to overcome its initial stigma as a "junkyard" for unreliable armed forces officers by 1953. The CAEM's growing prestige as an important source of military theory and a key training institution for officers with high command potential attracted top-flight army officers in increasing numbers by the mid-1950's. Attending the 1953 class was Colonel Alejandro Cuadra Ravines, destined to be named minister of war in 1956, and promoted as the

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<sup>76</sup> Captain Marcial Figueroa Arévalo, "El oficial del ejército y la integración del indigena a la nacionalidad," RMP, LII, 51 (September, 1955), 104-09.

youngest brigadier general in the army in 1955.<sup>77</sup> The following year, Colonels Marcial Romero Pardo and Marcial Merino Pereyra (a former minister in Odría's first cabinet) enrolled at the CAEM. Colonel Romero Pardo soon replaced General Marín as director of the Center, and Colonel Merino Pereyra assumed command of the army's jungle division headquartered in Iquitos after being promoted to general in 1955.<sup>78</sup> At the CAEM these officers had been prepared for their command posts after a careful "introduction into the realities of the state and its national potential."<sup>79</sup>

The CAEM's interpretation of national defense included social and economic development as a mandatory component of national security.<sup>80</sup> In essence, the Center's doctrine stated that a weak and underdeveloped nation such as Peru was extremely vulnerable to threats of internal subversion and disorder as well as attack from external enemies. National development and national defense were thus considered closely interwoven concepts. The instruction offered at the CAEM for senior armed forces officers was

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<sup>77</sup>Escalafón General del Ejército, 1955, p. 18, and Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 221.

<sup>78</sup>Escalafón General del Ejército, 1955, p. 10.

<sup>79</sup>Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "El ejército de hoy y proyección en nuestra sociedad en período de transición RMP, LIX, 685 (November-December, 1964), 1-20.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

aimed at defining the military's relationship to Peru's basic problem of underdevelopment. During the early 1950's the CAEM became the most important agency for the clarification of the military's growing commitment to developmentalism. But the Center was not the exclusive proponent of a more socially active role for the armed forces. As will be illustrated in the following chapter, after 1956 army officers without any links with the CAEM, began to advocate an expanded role for the armed forces in solving Peru's basic national problems.

The developmentalist ideologies which were germinating within the armed forces during the Odría regime were formulated with minimal influence from APRA, Peru's only viable reformist party. During the party's first twenty years of political activity, its relatively progressive ideology had an impact upon socially-conscious military men. But during Odría's first seven years in office, the APRA leadership had been scattered in exile and imprisoned and its party chief, Haya de la Torre, remained immobilized in the Colombian Embassy. Moreover the party's image as a revolutionary force for change in Peru had been badly tarnished by the failure of APRA leaders to back the Callao revolt. Consequently, many more defections from the party's ranks occurred during the period of underground activity under Odría (1948-1956) than the earlier period of party

illegality (1931-1945).<sup>81</sup>

At the Party Congress of APRA Exiles in Guatamala in 1952, four Apristas denounced the party leadership. These dissidents charged the APRA leaders had abandoned the party's policy of anti-imperialism and had created unnecessary divisions in the working classes. They also claimed that the problems of the Indian and related agrarian reform had been largely ignored by the party chiefs.<sup>82</sup> Much of the bitterness of these particular critics stemmed from their conviction that the failure of the Callao revolt signalled the end of APRA's commitment to revolution. They insisted that because APRA leaders had resorted to political opportunism in denying their affiliation with the revolt, the party had lost a great deal of continental prestige regarding its reputation as Peru's leading representative of the working class and the peasantry.<sup>83</sup> The defections of such party militants as Major Víctor Villanueva and its leading female radical, Magda Portal, after the Callao revolt demonstrated the divisiveness of this issue among party activists.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>Epstein, "Motivational Bases for Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party," p. 57.

<sup>82</sup>Víctor Cárdenas, Laureano Checa, Hector Guevara and Orestes Romero Toldeo, El Apra y la revolución, Tesis para un replanteamiento revolucionario (Buenos Aires, 1952), pp. 5-9.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>See Villanueva, La sublevación aprista, for the best statement of the dissident's sense of betrayal.

The accusations by party dissidents that the APRA leadership had moved to the right during the early 1950's were valid. When the Odría government finally allowed Haya de la Torre to leave Peru on April 6, 1954, one of his first statements to the press indicated his intention to present a moderate party image.<sup>85</sup> In Mexico City during late April he stated that: "I believe democracy and capitalism offer the surest road toward a solution of world problems even though capitalism has its faults."<sup>86</sup> The APRA leader also continued to deny an involvement of the party leadership in the Callao revolt.<sup>87</sup> Haya de la Torre's comments were in line with the relatively moderate party rhetoric issued by other APRA chiefs after 1952. At some point during the final three years of the Odría administration beleaguered party heads became convinced that APRA would have little chance of gaining power unless it could demonstrate that the organization could co-exist peacefully with longtime enemies within the political right and the military.<sup>88</sup> During early 1956 this policy was given its

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<sup>85</sup>Haya de la Torre left Peru at five P.M. on April 6, 1954 after sixty-three months in confinement in the Colombian Embassy in Lima.

<sup>86</sup>Haya de la Torre Interview, Life, May 3, 1954, p. 164.

<sup>87</sup>Haya de la Torre continued to deny the party leadership's involvement in the Callao revolt as late as 1974. (Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 13, 1974, Lima, Peru.)

<sup>88</sup>Epstein, "Motivational Bases of Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party," p. 55.

first test as Odría's opposition to APRA began to soften in the wake of growing attacks on his government from both rightest politicians and senior army officers.

### The General's Last Years

In the final two years of Odría's regime, opposition from conservative political leaders and army commanders reached its peak. The Minister of War, General Zenón Noriega, led the first serious attempted military coup in August, 1954. Fearing that Odría would not step down as president after his constitutional mandate expired in July, 1956, Noriega made plans with army units in Lima to depose him. Working mainly with General Ernesto Rael Cisneros and the Seventh Artillery Unit in Lima, Noriega planned to seize strategic points in the capital and broadcast appeals for support from armed forces units throughout the nation.<sup>89</sup> The plot was activated at 2:30 a.m. on August tenth when rebellious army units seized the Central Telephone Exchange and Radio Magdalena in Lima. Simultaneously, General Rael Cisneros and Lieutenant Colonel Walker Alexander Osorio, commander of the Seventh Artillery Unit, attempted to deploy their forces throughout the city.<sup>90</sup> Despite his seemingly

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<sup>89</sup>El Comercio, August 11, 1954, p. 2.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.



powerful role as minister of war, Noriega's movement had no active support beyond the confines of Lima and within a few hours government troops and police had recaptured the city's main communications facilities. Odría, after communicating directly with leaders of the subverted artillery unit, convinced the rebels to surrender.<sup>91</sup>

Among the thirteen army officers implicated in the conspiracy besides Noriega, Ruez Cisneros and Alexander Osores, were Colonel Juan Baretto Saavedra, commander of the Lima garrison, and Lieutenant Colonel Romulo Vasquez Zapata, chief of the armored group Marcial Castilla.<sup>92</sup> Very likely hoping to avoid the problems of court martialling his supposedly closest military and political ally, Odría had General Noriega quickly deported abroad a navy destroyer on August 11. Upon his arrival in San Francisco on August 26, the former minister of war did not deny his role in the plot but justified his actions on the grounds that Odría had no plans in 1956 to hold elections in order to select his successor.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup>Peruvian Times, August 13, 1954, p. 2.

<sup>92</sup>Ordenes Generales del Ejército, August 21, 1954, pp. 81-90. Other officers implicated were Lieutenant Colonel Gustave Contero Fraysinet, Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Villavicancia Castañeda, and Lieutenant Colonel José Mattallana Morón.

<sup>93</sup>Peruvian Times, August 13, 1954, p. 2, and The New York Times, August 27, 1954, p. 3.

Noriega's failure to oust Odría and his subsequent deportation did not end his efforts to topple his former army comrade in the months immediately following his expulsion from Peru. After traveling from the United States to Argentina, he continued his subversive activities. In mid-December Noriega established contacts with Carlos and Enrique Miró Quesada, Senator Alejandro Rael, and with the aid of his brother, Edmundo Noriega made plans for a civil-military revolt.<sup>94</sup> The Miró Quesada brothers' opposition to the government stemmed from the decision to allow Haya de la Torre a safe conduct to leave Peru in April. Soon after the APRA leader's departure, Carlos Miró Quesada resigned his post as ambassador to Brazil in protest over what he deemed excessive leniency towards his family's avowed personal and political enemy.<sup>95</sup> Thus, in December Noriega was able to gain the Miró Quesada's assistance in his second planned coup.

The second plot by Noriega met with even less success than the first. He had planned to instigate the revolt in Arequipa but the arrest of one of the conspirators on December 19 led to the government's breakup of the conspiracy.

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<sup>94</sup>Legislación Militar, March 14, 1955, p. 232.

<sup>95</sup>The Miró Quesada family still carried on the feud with APRA begun in 1935 with the deaths of Antonio Miró Quesada and his wife at the hand of an Aprista assassin.

One of the civilian plotters, Wilfred Pflucker, was seized with documents implicating Noriega and his civilian allies.<sup>96</sup> Following up the investigation, government agents arrested Valentin Gazzini Cisneros and Lieutenant Colonel José Mattelana Morón as they entered Peru from Chile with plans to promote the military uprising in Arequipa to be later headed by Noriega. By the third week of January, all conspirators, with the exception of Rael, Gazzini and Mattalana had been exiled and Noriega's intrigues were ended.<sup>97</sup> The prime motivation for his continued plotting can be attributed to his own presidential ambitions. As the number two man in the Odría government for six years (and provisional president for a brief period in 1950), the general apparently felt he should succeed Odría in 1956.<sup>98</sup> When his prospects appeared uncertain in August, 1954, he began planning his attempted coup.

In response to the threats against his regime during the latter half of 1954 Odría continued to employ the Internal Security Law vigorously during all of the following

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<sup>96</sup>Legislación Militar, March 14, 1955, p. 232.

<sup>97</sup>Peruvian Times, January 21, 1955, p. 1, and The New York Times, January 18, 1955, p. 9.

<sup>98</sup>The largely political motivations of these subversive efforts apparently deterred many officers from supporting what appeared to be only a simple power play against Odría.

year. At the same time, the president made the first public announcements of his intentions to retire from the presidency when his term expired. In mid-April 1955, Odría claimed he was prepared to step down and insisted that Peruvians should trust him because, "the people know I do not talk nonsense."<sup>99</sup>

Most of his countrymen, however, were not convinced. In July, Pedro Beltrán, the editor of La Prensa--who had become increasingly alienated from Odría since the 1950 elections--initiated a campaign to prevent any continuation of the regime past July, 1956. Publishing a front page manifesto signed by a number of opponents of the government on July 20, the newspaper editor and his colleagues demanded repeal of the Internal Security Law, free elections and the declaration of a general political amnesty.<sup>100</sup> Soon after the publication of the manifesto, Beltrán's colleague Pedro Roselló formed the Coalición Nacional, based primarily on the single policy of opposition to the Odría government. Throughout the remainder of 1955 the group continued to press the administration to ease political controls and make guarantees for free elections.

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<sup>99</sup> The New York Times, April 14, 1955, p. 12. This comment was made to correspondent Herbert Matthews.

<sup>100</sup> La Prensa, July 20, 1955, p. 1. The political persuasions of the signees was extremely varied ranging from the extreme rightist Luis Flores to moderate reformers Luis Bedoya Reyes and Fernando Belaúnde Terry.

In early November the government did announce that elections for all national offices were scheduled for June 3, 1956.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, on December 3 a political amnesty for all political prisoners except Apristas and Communist Party members was decreed by the regime.<sup>102</sup> Some APRA exiles, however, were permitted to return to Peru during December, 1955 without fear of arrest as Odría demonstrated his first sign of conciliation toward his avowed political enemies.<sup>103</sup>

Civilian pressure for Odría to honor the constitutional process was also supported by important elements within the armed forces. As already discussed, many officers had continually questioned the participation of the military in national politics, and their role in the enforcement of the Internal Security Law disturbed them even more. In late 1955, General Miguel Monteza Tafur, a long-time critic of the regime, insisted that the military was against an effort to thwart the will of the people by subverting free elections.<sup>104</sup> Odría attempted to deal with this issue in an

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<sup>101</sup>Legislación Militar, November 2, 1955, p. 172.

<sup>102</sup>Peruvian Times, February 10, 1956, p. 2.

<sup>103</sup>Arnold Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' état of 1962: The Overthrow of Manuel Prado (Washington, 1965), p. 47.

<sup>104</sup>César Martín, El preludio de la democracia (Lima, 1956), pp. 64-66.

Army Day speech on December 9, asserting that his government had been marked by a lack of personal ambition in its attention to the needs of his countrymen and the armed forces in particular.<sup>105</sup> On this theme he emphasized the administrative reforms in the armed forces promulgated during his presidency. The most comprehensive of these, the Ley de Situación Militar del Oficiales de Ejército, Marina y Fuerzas Aereas (Law of the Military Condition of the Officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force) was being formulated during late 1955. This reform further clarified conditions for such important military matters as promotion and retirement.<sup>106</sup> Despite these measures (and Odría's assurances) some top army commanders remained intensely suspicious of the president's political ambitions.

One of these officers was General Marcial Merino Pereyra, who after graduating from the CAEM in 1954, had been given command of the army's Selva Division headquartered in Iquitos. There on February 16, 1956 Merino rose against the government and seized the Prefecture and other important buildings. The general then broadcast his revolutionary manifesto over Radio Loreto proclaiming that

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<sup>105</sup> General Manuel A. Odría, Principios y postulados del movimiento restaurador de Arequipa: Extractos de discursos y mensajes del General Don Manuel A. Odría (Lima, 1956), p. 149.

<sup>106</sup> Legislación Militar, July 2, 1956, p. 11.

his revolt was aimed at assuring that free and open elections would be held as scheduled on June 3. He also charged that Odría was attempting to convert the army into an instrument of terror (a reference to the army's role in the enforcement of the Internal Security Law) in order to impose his own electoral process upon the citizens.<sup>107</sup> In Lima the government responded immediately to the crisis by declaring martial law and arresting leading members of the Coalición Nacional who were charged with complicity in the Merino revolt. On February 17 Pedro Beltrán was imprisoned in Peru's maximum security installation of El Frontón.<sup>108</sup>

Merino was unable to enlist the support of other regional commanders from his relatively isolated jungle headquarters. His forces did hold out for ten days as government planes dropped propaganda leaflets on Iquitos' central plaza threatening the city with bombardment if the rebels failed to surrender. General Julio Humberto Luna Ferracio, sent by Odría to force Merino's surrender succeeded in capturing the city on February 26.<sup>109</sup> Casualties were light and

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<sup>107</sup>Peruvian Times, February 17, 1956, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., February 19, 1956, p. 3. In the process of arresting members of the Coalición, government police raided the exclusive Club Nacional in Lima. This further alienated many wealthy Peruvians from the Odría government.

<sup>109</sup>El Comercio, February 26, 1956, p. 2.

Merino, after failing to gain asylum in the Brazilian consulate in Iquitos turned himself over to Luna Ferracio. In a rambling radio message before his surrender, the rebel leader reiterated his charge that Odría planned to rig the coming elections and emphasized that his movement's overall objective was to achieve a clearer understanding with the Peruvian people concerning the good intentions of the armed forces.<sup>110</sup>

By the first week of April order had been restored and civilians jailed during the first days of the Merino revolt released. Pedro Beltrán's imprisonment had prompted severe criticism of the Odría government and led many Peruvians to doubt that elections would be held as scheduled.<sup>111</sup> Odría, even as he lashed out at his conservative political opponents, announced that the elections would be held as scheduled. Odría claimed that "the forces of the right had lost the political game to the left" because of their hostility to his regime in the last year.<sup>112</sup> This statement seemed to be in reference to the new policy adopted by Odría of enlisting APRA's aid in the election of a presidential

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<sup>110</sup>Peruvian Times, March 2, 1956, p. 2. The government announced fourteen casualties in the suppression of the revolt.

<sup>111</sup>The New York Times, February 27, 1956, p. 8, and February 28, 1956, p. 20.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., April 5, 1956, p. 14.



candidate acceptable to him. The government had already allowed the party to convene its Third National Congress in Lima during March thus granting the APRA de facto legality. But as the president hesitated in his endorsement of his own presidential choice APRA leaders began negotiations with the leading candidates to obtain a commitment for the legalization of the party after the June elections.<sup>113</sup>

Three candidates remained in contention for the presidency by May 5. On April 19 Odría gave his endorsement to Hernando de Lavalle, a conservative lawyer of little political appeal, who was running as the candidate of the Unificación Nacional party. Fernando Belaúnde Terry, a forty-four year-old architect and professor, sought the presidency as the head of the politically heterogeneous Frente Nacional de Juventudes Democráticas. Finally former president Manuel Prado y Ugarteche (1939-1945), after spending most of the Odría era in Paris, ran as the standard bearer of the well-financed Movimiento Democrático Pradista.<sup>114</sup> These three political leaders realized that APRA support would be the critical factor in deciding the national elections. Despite the party's proscription during the first seven

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<sup>113</sup>For the best discussions of the APRA leader's pre-election negotiations see Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente, pp. 11-126, Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (New York, 1970), pp. 272-278, Astiz, Pressure Groups, pp. 99-103.

<sup>114</sup>Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente, pp. 119-26.

years of Odría's rule it still claimed the largest single following of any political group in Peru. APRA needed rebuilding, however, after years of repression and party defections. APRA Secretary-General Ramiro Priale sought a guarantee of political legality as the price of support for a presidential candidate. Priale held talks with the candidates and President Odría only months after being released from the Lima penitentiary.<sup>115</sup> Justifying his dealing with the party's former enemy, the secretary-general offered the explanation that his most important mandate was to rebuild the party. He also added that APRA leaders had a great capacity to forget past injustices.<sup>116</sup>

Notwithstanding Odría's newly conciliatory attitude towards APRA, his hand-picked candidate Hernando de Lavalles was unable to gain the party's backing. Lavalles's failure can be traced to his unwillingness to make a firm public promise that APRA could legally function during his presidency. This reluctance is understandable in light of the long tradition of conservative opposition to the party and his apparent uncertainty of Odría's real position towards APRA. But Lavalles's indecision and the unpopularity of his

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<sup>115</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 81, and The New York Times, April 7, 1956, p. 6.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid.

association with the administration prevented him from gaining any substantial following, and his candidacy faded badly by mid-May.<sup>117</sup>

Fernando Belaúnde Terry, although coming from a distinguished family (his father Rafael was President Bustamante's first prime minister and his uncle Víctor Andrés Belaúnde was Peru's leading scholar-diplomat) had only limited political experience as a deputy in the national congress from 1945 to 1947. The young architect's political organization was composed largely of students and middle class professionals who ranged from moderate to marxist in political orientation.<sup>118</sup> Belaúnde's political strength was uncertain until Odría made the tactical error of ordering the National Election Jury to invalidate his electoral petitions; the same procedure he employed against General Montagne in 1950. This time the strategy backfired as the aggressive Belaúnde challenged Odría to reinstate his candidacy or face violent resistance. The president backed down and the Jury reversed its decision on June 1. One week later in Lima, Belaúnde drew one of the largest crowds at a political rally in Peru.<sup>119</sup> APRA leaders, apparently

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<sup>117</sup>Chrinos Soto, El Perú frente, p. 124.

<sup>118</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 91.

<sup>119</sup>Chrinos Soto, El Perú frente, pp. 121-22.

recognizing a possible threat to their following by the now evidently popular Belaúnde, balked at making a deal with the candidate seemingly closest to the party's political philosophy. The still lingering possibility that Odría might not accept Belaúnde's election, thus undermining an electoral agreement APRA might make with him, was another important reason in the decision not to support his candidacy.

The postponement of elections from June 3 to 16 allowed Ramiro Prialé more time to reach an accommodation with Manuel Prado. The former president had refused to legalize APRA during his first regime but he was ready to accept a policy of convivencia (co-existence) to assure his election in 1956. Only one day before the election he signaled an agreement with APRA by declaring in a public address:

One of the first acts of my government will be to convoke ample political amnesty; to abrogate the laws of political exception; to eliminate all dispositions foreign to the precepts of our constitution. In this way Peruvians will be able to enjoy fully their civil rights.<sup>120</sup>

With this announcement, Prado satisfied APRA leaders of his commitment to legalize APRA. and instructions were given to the party's followers to vote for the sixty-seven-year-old representative of Peru's conservative upper-class interests. Odría accepted the deal because he knew his own candidate would lose and he sought assurances--which Prado

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<sup>120</sup>El Comercio, June 16, 1956, p. 9.

was willing to give--that investigations of some of the corrupt practices of his regime would not be pursued.<sup>121</sup>

With this unlikely coalition, Prado was elected to a second term as president. With women voting for the first time, Prado polled 568,057 or forty-five per cent of the vote. Belaúnde made a very impressive showing with 458,248 or thirty-six per cent; identifying him as a definite future political force. Lavalle, whom Odría had all but abandoned in his last minute dealings with Prado and APRA, trailed badly with 222,618.<sup>122</sup> Although Prado was declared president on July 13, many Peruvians still expected a last minute effort by Odría to extend his presidential rule. But the general, ailing from an injured hip suffered in a fall soon after the elections, lacked the support for any such move. The armed forces accepted Prado because he was a better alternative to Odría's continuation in power. Very few officers were willing to back the generally discredited Odría beyond the constitutional limits of his regime. Moreover, Prado had pledged to continue the military housing, health, and pension programs begun under Odría. He also promised to make purchases of necessary military equipment and most importantly, he vowed not to interfere (as he had

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<sup>121</sup>Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 295, Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 255.

<sup>122</sup>El Comercio, July 15, 1956, p. 2.

done during his first regime) with military promotions or other primarily internal military matters.<sup>123</sup>

The Odría era closed quietly when the former military strongman left Peru practically unnoticed a day before Prado's inauguration on July 28, 1956. As Odría departed for the United States, few of the military men who composed his movement of October, 1948 remained his close comrades. The armed forces institution that he had led no longer identified with many of his views regarding the military's role in national affairs. When Odría returned after a five-year absence in 1961, the changes in the professional ideology of the officer corps would be even more profound.

### Conclusion

While General Manuel Odría ruled in the general pattern of Peru's two other twentieth century military presidents (Sánchez Cerro and Benavides), elements of the officer corps began advocating a more imaginative and progressive role for the military. This occurred partly because these officers were alienated by Odría's continued use of political repression which officers like General Merino claimed portrayed the military as an instrument of political terror. Other officers sought a more positive function for their

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid., June 15, 1956, p. 9.

institution than its role as merely a guardian of the status quo. The increasingly sophisticated military theories promulgated at the CAEM after 1950 began to provide the rationale for a broadening concept of military professionalism in Peru. These changes occurred while traditional civilian political alignments were in flux as APRA--formerly the leading proponent of reform in Peru--moved to the right to achieve political legality. During the tenure of the conservative Manuel Prado, changes in the professional orientation of the armed forces would become more pronounced as many more military men began impatiently voicing their support for a more aggressive approach to the solution of Peru's problems of underdevelopment.

## CHAPTER VII

### "A PERMANENT VEHICLE FOR PERU'S MODERNIZATION"

#### Changing Professional Perspectives

The second Prado administration was a formative period for the rationalization of the military's changing professional role. The military leadership's emerging perception of the armed forces as a disciplined developmentalist force was also a critical factor in its decision to overthrow President Prado in July, 1962 and cancel the national elections of that year. These actions were taken mainly because Fernando Belaúnde Terry--the candidate favored by most members of the officer corps due to his strong developmentalist orientation--failed in his presidential bid shortly before the coup d' etat of July 18, 1962. Notwithstanding the ousting of Prado only ten days before the end of his presidential term, his tenure was not plagued by the numerous civil-military conspiracies of previous administrations. This freed armed forces officers from much of the political bickering of the past and allowed them to turn more of their attention to the clarification of a new set of policy objectives for their institution.



The Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) became a focal point for the development of a socially conscious orientation concerned with national development. But this orientation was also displayed by officers who were never directly affiliated with that institution. Moreover, the need to modernize the command structure and internal mechanics of the armed forces was backed by the officer corps as a unit and not only by a select group of progressive officers as in the past. One of the army's most brilliant theoreticians, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, has suggested that four main ideological precepts formed the core of the armed forces' changing professional orientation during these years.

General Mercado Jarrín argued that the army, primarily as a result of its increasing professionalism and social consciousness, had developed a more confident and independent spirit following the border conflict with Ecuador in 1941. Contributing to this process after 1950 according to Mercado were: 1) the reorganization of the military's command and internal structure; 2) the "affirmation" of a new concept of national defense; 3) the influences of modern technology upon military thinking; and 4) the need to confront the reality of guerrilla warfare as a threat to the internal security of the nation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "El ejército de hoy y un proyección en nuestra sociedad en periodo de transición," RMP, LIX, 685 (November-December, 1964), 1.

Command and Internal Reform

Most of the armed forces structural reforms that Mercado Jarrín considered so important occurred during the second Prado administration. The Ley de Situación Militar, as previously indicated, provided a badly overdue revision of regulations governing promotions, retirements, military justice and discipline for all of the three armed services when it was enacted in 1956. The organization of the Comando Conjunto (Joint Command) of the armed forces created in February, 1957 provided a unified command structure for the first time.<sup>2</sup> Navy commanders, after an "exhaustive study," submitted their own Ley Organico de la Marina (Organic Law of the Navy), which was finally approved by the national congress in December, 1960.<sup>3</sup> This was followed by a detailed navy promotion law passed in August, 1961 which modernized the "archaic" promotion regulations that had been in effect since 1934. These two laws represented the first attempts by the navy to reform its internal

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<sup>2</sup>Legislación Militar, "Ley de Situación militar del oficiales del ejército, marina y fuerzas aereas del Perú," July 2, 1956, p. 11, and General Juan Mendoza R., "El ejército peruano en el siglo XX," Vision del Perú en el siglo XX, ed., José Pareja Paz Soldan (Lima, 1962), Volume 1, p. 324.

<sup>3</sup>Vice-Admiral Guillermo Tirado Lamb, Sintesis expositiva de la gestion ministerial del Vice-Almirante Guillermo Tirado Lamb, Ministerio de la Marina, July, 1962.

structure after the disastrously divisive Callao revolt of October, 1948. In addition to these measures, a new naval officers' school was opened in June, 1961, providing additional evidence of the government's attention to the reformist concerns of the naval leaders.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, a significant number of armed forces officers were attending command and staff schools in the United States during the 1950's. These experiences led them to evaluate the relative quality of their own Escuela Superior de Guerra upon their return. In the Revista de Escuela Superior de Guerra (Review of the Superior War College) in 1958 Mercado Jarrín offered a detailed comparison of the training offered at the U.S. Army's Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and of the training presented at the ESG in Peru. Mercado Jarrín concluded that Peruvian officers could benefit from the training at Fort Leavenworth, but they should also recognize that such training would not fulfill the officer's requirements for the Peruvian army's high command.<sup>5</sup> What Mercado Jarrín was alluding to was the concept--increasingly recognized by a growing number of military

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "La escuela comando de estado mayor de Fort Leavenworth y algunas deferencias con la nuestra," Revista Escuela Superior de Guerra, V, 2 (April-May-June, 1958), 15-35. This military journal will hereafter be cited as RESG with date and page number.

men--that the world atomic power structure imposed a military order that made the refinement of modern military skills in an underdeveloped nation such as Peru impractical.

With the capacity to engage in only the most limited type of conventional warfare, these officers recognized that their technical expertise could still be effectively employed within the confines of a more sophisticated definition of national defense. This meant that officers such as Mercado Jarrín, who viewed national defense and development as inseparable, could not be satisfied with command training that simply emphasized conventional military axioms as preparation for a high command post.<sup>6</sup> This is why the broadly-based developmentalist oriented training offered at the CAEM had an increasingly greater appeal for progressive officers.

#### Developmentalism, National Defense and the CAEM

Despite its importance in the clarification of military developmentalist theory, many observers of the Peruvian armed forces have overemphasized the importance of the CAEM

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<sup>6</sup>Villanueva, 100 años, pp. 140-142 and Luigi Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United States (Santa Monica, 1970), p. 6.

as a socializing agent for armed forces officers.<sup>7</sup> Ample evidence exists that military men who were never directly affiliated with the CAEM also were actively concerned with development issues. Captain Mario Lozada Uribe wrote a pamphlet in 1959 that made a strong plea for the military to assume a more intensified role in solving the nation's social and economic problems. He insisted that the military should devote at least thirty per cent of its time and resources to social action projects and the remainder to its traditional duties. In Captain Lozada's view, the army should lead the way in developing civic action projects which would raise the standard of living of the impoverished Indian classes.<sup>8</sup>

The writings of two other army officers are particularly illustrative of the developmentalist orientation of non-CAEM personnel. In 1956 Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V. advocated that the armed forces carefully examine the potential of atomic energy for its possible future use in agriculture, industry and transportation. Civic action programs

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<sup>7</sup>The most balanced analyses of the CAEM's role in shaping military ideology is Villanueva, El CAEM, and José Z. García, "The 1968 Velasco Coup in Peru," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1974, pp. 50-66.

<sup>8</sup>Captain Mario Lozada Uribe, El nuevo rol social de los institutos armados y fuerzas auxiliares del ejército, marina, fuerzas aéreas, guardia civil y regimiento guardia republicana (Lima, 1959), pp. 1-17.

involving roadbuilding and irrigation in Peru's remote regions were also carefully detailed and praised by Lieutenant Colonel Artemio García Vargas in the leading military journal in 1962. These and a significant number of other articles by officers unaffiliated with the CAEM, give evidence of the increasingly widespread nature of the developmentalist perspective throughout the officer corps.<sup>9</sup> Thus the significance of the CAEM is not so much that it exclusively introduced developmentalist and social science concepts to armed forces officers, but rather that it served to integrate these ideas into the new professional perspective involving national defense. The new CAEM director in 1956, General Marcial Romero Pardo, was the man most responsible for this accomplishment.

General Romero Pardo had been called the chief ideologist of the CAEM, and his training background and professional duties closely paralleled those of the first

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<sup>9</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V., "La geografía económica frente a la energía atómica," RMP, LII, 627 (March, 1956), 49-61, and Lieutenant Colonel Artemio García Vargas, "Programas de acción cívica," RMP, LVII, 608 (January-February, 1962), 49-56. Jorge Rodríguez and Alfred Stepan conducted a content analysis of both the RMP and RESG for the periods 1955-1959 and 1959-1962. In the RMP for the period 1955-1959 they classified 14 per cent of the articles as dealing with concepts of the "new professionalism (socio-economic problems and counter-insurgency theory). For the period 1959-1962 the percentage of articles dealing with these subjects had increased to 26 per cent. For the RESG for the same periods the figures were 14 per cent and 29 per cent respectively. Cited in Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 267.

director, General Marín. Romero Pardo was influenced by his early training in France and particularly that at the Superior War College in Paris. There he observed that French political leaders, economists and government bureaucrats were closely involved with the military leadership to chart long-range plans for national defense.<sup>10</sup> As CAEM director he resolved to emulate this pattern and mold it to what he viewed as Peru's particular national defense requirements.

Under Romero Pardo's command, the CAEM continued to increase in prestige. Between 1956 and 1961 twenty-four graduates of the CAEM went on to become government ministers in the Prado administration, and the two successive regimes. Many of these were civilians who had begun to attend the CAEM in 1955 and who entered the institution in increasing numbers after 1956.<sup>11</sup> For colonels (or officers of equal rank in the other armed services) the CAEM apparently became an increasingly important step towards promotion to general. Between 1952 and 1962, 213 army officers were promoted to colonel of whom approximately sixty per cent had attended the CAEM. Of those attending the CAEM, seventy per cent were eventually promoted to general while only 29 per cent of the non-CAEM students reached that rank. For armed

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<sup>10</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 57, and García, "The Velasco Coup," p. 52.

<sup>11</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, pp. 221-224.

forces officers appointment to the CAEM was made by the commander-in-chief of the three armed services and the police.<sup>12</sup>

By 1959 the CAEM course was composed of three separate four-month terms. In the first period the students studied such diverse subjects as climatology, budgetary analysis, statistics, demography, sociology, linear programming, geopolitics, agricultural development, national income accounting and banking. During the next two terms officers were asked to develop military strategies which would relate national development theory to hypothetical wartime situations. These students were required to demonstrate a methodology which would "exploit all of Peru's national resources in a wartime effort."<sup>13</sup>

Further evidence of the growing recognition of the armed forces' developmentalist role and the importance of the CAEM is provided by comments made to U.S. Ambassador James I. Loeb by Navy Minister Vice-Admiral Guillermo Tirado Lamb in February, 1962. Although Admiral Tirado never attended the CAEM, he succinctly expressed many of the key ideological precepts of that institution's philosophy in his comments to Loeb. Tirado claimed that the armed forces

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<sup>12</sup>García, "The Velasco Coup," pp. 53-54.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 50, 57.



were fully conscious of their dominant role as a disciplined and intellectually prepared force which has studied the national problems in a sincere effort to find the best solutions. After this obvious reference to the CAEM programs Tirado claimed that "in underdeveloped countries the armed forces represent the most organized and coherent sector" for developing an "accurate vision of the national realities." The admiral concluded that after several years of careful study of national problems the military finds itself in the "center of gravity" of those groups charged with the responsibility for dealing with these national issues.<sup>14</sup> These comments may have reflected a degree of acceptance of developmentalist theory among the military hierarchy by 1962, but civilian government leaders were not prepared to support the CAEM-sponsored programs which emerged from this body of theory.

In 1958 the CAEM proposed a development project for the central selva region. The proposal represented the first systematic military attempt to present financial estimates for such a program. Moreover, the CAEM project was centered on the concept of exclusive military administration of this large geographic area in order that a controlled experiment

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<sup>14</sup>Interview with former Ambassador James I. Loeb, Cabin John, Maryland, December 17, 1973. Hereafter cited as Loeb interview.

in agricultural and industrial development could be conducted. The ultra-conservative prime minister in Prado's government, Pedro Beltrán, opposed the project and was able to substitute a far less comprehensive program prepared by the A.D. Little Corporation of Cambridge, Massachusetts.<sup>15</sup>

The frustration caused by the government's rejection of the military's development program was compounded by Peru's inability to finance the purchase of military equipment that armed forces officers felt was needed for the basic requirements of national defense.

#### Modern Technology and the Roots of Counter-Insurgency

Although Peru's military men recognized that they could never be militarily competitive with most of the world's developed nations, the need to modernize their outdated conventional equipment was a logical aspect of their increased professionalism. Their dilemma is characterized well by the perceptive commentator on the Peruvian military, Luigi Einaudi.

The viability of maintaining conventional forces is severely tested nonetheless--by their costliness. Modern armaments are increasingly expensive. Military

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<sup>15</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Changing Military Perspectives, p. 37. See also a summary of the A.D. Little proposal, Unsigned, "Programa de desarrollo nacional y regional para el Perú," RESG, VIII, 2 (April-May-June, 1961), 7-38.

aircraft and naval vessels produced in the industrial nations require massive capital outlays that tax Peruvian resources even if bought in token quantities. ... Rising armament costs are particularly hard to bear in times of rising social consciousness and popular demands. Yet not to make certain acquisitions may seem ... tantamount to surrendering even the option to develop modern capacities at a later date.<sup>16</sup>

As Einaudi points out, a partial answer to this problem is, of course, foreign military assistance. In the case of the Peruvian military, as has been discussed, the United States was the source of this aid. Between 1956 and 1962, United States military assistance of all types (including deliveries of excess stocks) totalled over \$70 million.<sup>17</sup> This sum ranks as one of the highest in Latin America. A sizeable share of the military acquisitions made partially possible by this aid were allocated to the navy. Three destroyers, two submarines and a floating dry dock were obtained from the United States in the late 1950's. These purchases from the United States did not completely fulfill the navy's requirements as two more modern British cruisers were purchased in 1959 to replace the institutions obsolete flag ships the Almirante Grau and the Coronel Bolnesi.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup>U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1973, U.S. A.I.D. (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 57.

<sup>18</sup>Tirado Lamb, Sintesis expositiva, pp. 1-22, Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, p. 30, and the Peruvian Times February 8, 1957, p. 2.

The U.S. government's interest in promoting civic action programs after 1960 caused a sizeable amount of military aid to Peru to be channeled into road-building and other development projects. In 1961 the Sixth Engineer Combat Battalion, numbering over eight hundred men, was supplied with \$5 million worth of equipment for road clearing and construction projects in the Peruvian sierra.<sup>19</sup>

Some credit for the initiation of U.S.-sponsored civic action projects in Latin America must be given to General Juan Mendoza Rodríguez. As head of the Peruvian delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board, General Mendoza presented a resolution that the Board should work to facilitate vocational training for Latin American armed forces recruits for their employment in construction and colonization projects. This resulted in a 1960 resolution recommending such activities.<sup>20</sup> Point four of this resolution succinctly states the guiding theory of the civic action programs:

The General Military Plan for the Defense of the American Continent recognizes the desirability of doing everything possible to raise the standards of living of the peoples, with the object of effectively combating Communist propaganda, which tries to exploit the ignorance and poverty of the underdeveloped areas.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Peruvian Times, February 3, 1961, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter-insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), p. 65.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 271.

In the context of the Peruvian military's perspective General Mendoza's proposal was best articulated by General Mercado Jarrín. Other than the obvious value of the army's involvement in "nation building" projects, Mercado Jarrín saw the technically proficient Peruvian soldier as a "permanent vehicle for Peru's modernization."<sup>22</sup> He insisted that the army was one of the key factors for change in the nation as it was one of the first institutions in the country to understand the strategy of modernization and appreciate the state of technological deprivation that impeded Peru's development. Consequently, Mercado Jarrín argued that the illiterate campesino, upon being drafted into the army and given adequate technical training, could return after his two year stint in the military prepared to use his technical expertise for the Indian community's benefit.<sup>23</sup>

The primary motivation for the U.S. initiated civic action programs was, of course, the perceived threat posed by Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory in Cuba. In the case of Peru, it is also possible to characterize the military's markedly increased commitment to an internal development strategy as predicated partially on the basis of a latent threat of insurgency. Although other issues were

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<sup>22</sup>Mercado Jarrín, "El ejército de hoy," 9-11.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., and Mendoza, "El ejército peruano en el siglo XX," p. 329.

also instrumental in stimulating the developmentalist consciousness of the armed forces, bloody confrontations between campesinos and guardia civil units throughout Peru after 1958 dramatized to the armed forces the discontent of the rural population. In addition, the destruction of the regular army in Cuba and its replacement by a popular militia after 1959, starkly demonstrated the potential threat of successful guerrilla movements to the very existence of regular army forces throughout Latin America. The concepts of counter-insurgency warfare were not new to many army officers as their French training backgrounds included some exposure to the theories of guerrilla warfare.

Peruvian army leaders were familiar with the theories of two famous French colonial generals, Hubert Lyautey and Joseph Gallieni who stressed strategies of pacification based upon "winning the confidence of the local population and increasing the economic prosperity in the pacified zone."<sup>24</sup> Subsequent failures by the French army to defeat popular insurgent forces in Indo-China and Algeria undoubtedly had an impact upon the Peruvian officers' perception of the armed forces' role in counter-insurgency after 1956.

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<sup>24</sup> John Stewart Ambler, The French Army in Politics, p. 181 and Nunn, "The Junta Phenomenon," 249. Gallieni and Lyautey demonstrated success in dealing with insurgents in Indo-China from 1893 to 1896 and in Madagascar from 1896 to 1905.

These officers demonstrated in their writings and training programs an awareness of the difficulties in combating guerrilla forces. Writing in 1956, Major Romulo Zanabria Zamudio outlined what were then recognized as the basic tenets of guerrilla campaign tactics. He stressed the need of the armed forces to be able to combat the "highly mobile, cold-blooded and tightly disciplined" actions of the typical guerrilla fighter. Major Zanabria concluded that in order to deal effectively with a guerrilla threat, special counter-insurgency units should be organized and an efficient military intelligence organization should be created.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, in June, 1959 the army established an intelligence school, later to be followed by the creation of a special anti-guerrilla "ranger" unit in the early 1960's.<sup>26</sup>

The army's treatment and training of Indian conscripts also reflected a desire to counteract the growth of Indian revolutionary cadres as a prelude to future guerrilla activity in the sierra. Officers seemed to recognize that if Indian recruits were treated badly and no attempt was made to integrate them into society after their military service ended, then discontented future guerrillas (with effective

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<sup>25</sup>Major Romulo Zanabria Zamudio, "Algo sobre, Guerra de guerillas," RESG, III, I (January-February-March, 1956), 37-42.

<sup>26</sup>Legislación Militar, June 10, 1959, p. 37.

military skills) might emerge from the two years of army service.<sup>27</sup> Thus, satisfactory performance by Indian conscripts in literacy training was an important item on the new Army Inspection Code enacted in 1960. Significantly, junior officers charged with the training of these recruits could be penalized for the failures of their recruits to make adequate progress in their literacy training.<sup>28</sup>

Vocational training for army recruits was also actively initiated in April, 1962 concentrating on the simple trades desperately needed throughout Peru. Plumbing, carpentry, electronics, mechanics, and basic building construction were stressed. By the mid-1960's, this vocational program involved the training of three thousand recruits in ten different trades.<sup>29</sup> This training, seemed to serve the function of reducing the sense of exploitation that Indian conscripts had felt about their military service in the past. It may have helped to create the "permanent vehicles for modernization" that General Mercado Jarrín had claimed were the benefits of a military institution that acted as a force for change.

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<sup>27</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Changing Military Perspectives, p. 52.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Barber and Ronning, pp. 190-191.



For the four basic reasons discussed, the military's professional perspectives were significantly altered during the second Prado administration. It is not possible to quantify the impact of these changing attitudes within the officer corps. But it is evident from the policies and public statements of armed forces personnel that their perception of the military as a developmentalist force was recognized by an increasing percentage of the officer corps. Until July, 1962, however, when the military seized power from President Prado, civilian political rivalries kept the armed forces hierarchy more involved with national politics than with charting development projects.

The Armed Forces and the Politics  
of the Convivencia

Until the electoral crisis of July, 1962 military men only infrequently intervened in the workings of the Prado government. With the important exception of the July, 18 1962 coup d' état, only one civil-military conspiracy and a police barracks revolt occurred during the Prado years. Moreover, military men held only the three armed forces portfolios during the Prado presidency, sharply contrasting with their deep involvement in the two previous administrations.<sup>30</sup> This situation reflected markedly

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<sup>30</sup>Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962, p. 36.

reduced dissension within the officer corps and the desire of military leaders to demonstrate a politically independent public image after their identification with the politics of the Odría regime. Through the first four years of his own regime Prado seemed satisfied with the low political profile adopted by the armed forces. In January, 1960 Prado told U.S. Ambassador Theodore Achilles that he was sure that the armed forces were "completely loyal and democratically inclined."<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, a civil-military conspiracy organized in February, 1958 and a police barracks uprising which flared in July, 1959 were serious (if only brief) threats to the political stability of the period.

During January, 1958 Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Elizaguirre Valverde (one of the officers involved in the Llosa uprising in July, 1948) attempted to enlist the support of low-ranking army officers in a plot to overthrow Prado. Valverde's subversive efforts were soon exposed, however, and he was arrested on January 28.<sup>32</sup> This did not stop air force Major Julio Suárez Cornejo from continuing his plotting. By mid-February Major Suárez, Captain Atilio Capello Fernández, Colonel (Retired) José Matallana, Captain Alberto Sologuren, Senator Wilson Sologuren, Deputy Antonio

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<sup>31</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>32</sup>La Cronica, March 6, 1958, p. 1.

Ipinza and Clemente Revilla had finalized a plan that called for simultaneous capture of the National Palace, the Talara air base and the government broadcasting station on the night of February 21.<sup>33</sup> The plot failed when Captain Capello Fernández and elements of the Thirty-Third Infantry Battalion, were captured before they could reach the National Palace. The remaining parts of the conspirators' plan collapsed in quick order after the arrest of Captain Capello Fernández. Senator Sologuren was implicated in a scandal involving the sale of faulty armaments to the army just prior to the abortive revolt. This discredited even further the actions of the conspirators.<sup>34</sup> But the plot did demonstrate that the propensity of civilians and military men to conspire for partisan political purposes had not completely abated.

The police revolt which occurred at Lima's Rimac barracks on July 5, 1959, involved 160 rebellious policemen and resulted in one death and numerous injuries. Led by former police Major Carlos Sabenes Lozo (who had just finished a two-year prison sentence for insubordination), the revolt was put down by loyal police troops after a sharp three-hour battle.<sup>35</sup> The police rebellion reflected

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., and Peruvian Times, March 7, 1958, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Peruvian Times, July 10, 1959, p. 1.

discontent over salaries and general professional conditions rather than any serious effort by the dissidents to seize the government.<sup>36</sup> The lack of Aprista support for either the police rebellion or the earlier civil-military conspiracy demonstrated the strength of the APRA leaders' commitment to the conditions of the convivencia with the Prado government. The party's position was explained by APRA Secretary General Ramiro Prialé in April, 1957.

Prialé claimed that the party's support of Prado in the 1956 election was a necessary tactical move dictated by the need for the APRA to gain legal status so as to present its own candidates in the 1962 presidential election.<sup>37</sup> The secretary general insisted that the main points of the APRA ideological program were still valid. But he asserted that the party was not prepared to take an aggressive political stance which might provoke a military coup d'état.<sup>38</sup> Prialé's comments and the Apristas' abstention from subversive campaigns during the Prado administration demonstrated a recognition by the APRA leaders that they no longer had any real chance to gain power by force. After the repeated failures of past revolutionary efforts (most

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> The New York Times, April 27, 1957, p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

notably the Callao revolt of 1948) Haya de la Torre and other top Apristas seemingly recognized that the revolutionary tactics of the past no longer could produce political victory for the party.<sup>39</sup>

One of the most notable shifts in the Aprista ideology during the convivencia was the change in the international emphasis of the party from anti-imperialism to anti-communism.<sup>40</sup> In February, 1961 APRA leaders Haya de la Torre, Priale and Andres Townsend Ezcurra had extensive conversations with the Kennedy Administration representative, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. During these talks Haya de la Torre brought up the matter of his long standing proposal for the formation of a national economic council which would oversee Peru's economic development. The APRA chief insisted that foreign companies should be represented on the council, as such companies had a right to a voice in economic matters.<sup>41</sup> In regard to the volatile nationalist issue involving the status of the International Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) Haya de la Torre suggested that the solution might be the formation of a mixed state and foreign-owned enterprise with Peru

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<sup>39</sup>For a particularly good analysis of the changing ideological thrust of APRA during the Convivencia see Richard Lee Clinton, "APRA: An Appraisal," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XII, 2 (April, 1970), 280-297.

<sup>40</sup>Astiz, Pressure Groups, p. 100.

<sup>41</sup>Loeb Interview.

controlling fifty per cent of the I.P.C. operation. He also added that I.P.C. was worthy of praise for what it had done for its workers and that the company's labor policies should serve as a model for the rest of the nation's enterprises to emulate.<sup>42</sup>

In further conversations with U.S. Ambassador James I. Loeb in January, 1962 Haya de la Torre and Priale made a concerted effort to stress the anti-communist position of APRA.<sup>43</sup> They argued that after thirty years of experience in fighting communism in Peru, APRA was best able to carry on the struggle against organized communist activity. Both men rejected the idea that the armed forces should deal with the communists; they reasoned that military men could only rely on force and they implied that this was not an acceptable solution to the problem.<sup>44</sup>

Senior armed forces officers were not unaware of the more conservative ideological stance adopted by the APRA leadership. In March, 1961 the Minister of War, General Alejandro Cuadra Rabines, commented that he was impressed with the "moderate and forward looking" tone of the party's public pronouncements. Navy Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

Alfredo Sosa, although he considered himself an extreme conservative, stated that he saw no connection between APRA and the Communist Party as other rightist officers had done in the past. He said that he recognized the possibility of an APRA victory in the 1962 national elections and gave no indication that he thought the military would oppose an Aprista electoral success.<sup>45</sup> Both of these officers cautioned that they did not speak for the rest of the armed forces when they made these statements, but their views were certainly reflective of an understanding among some military men that APRA leaders had chosen a more conservative political course.

The marked drift of Aprismo to the right caused serious divisions within the party. As already noted, many militants left the party after leading Apristas failed to support the Callao revolt of 1948. In 1959, another group of APRA activists rejected the party's new ideological position and in November, 1960 they formed a political splinter group called APRA Rebelde (Rebellious APRA). Led by Luis de la Puente Uceda, these former Apristas (mostly younger members of the party) who were seriously disillusioned with the policies of APRA leadership, became increasingly militant. They devoted most of their efforts after November, 1960 to

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

advocating radical land reform.<sup>46</sup> In June, 1962 APRA Rebelde leaders decided to disassociate themselves completely from the parent party and change the name of their organization to the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR) with de la Puente Uceda being named as secretary general of the group. After establishing contact with the peasant organizer Hugo Blanco in October, 1962 the MIR began slowly preparing for the guerrilla campaign it was to launch in 1965.<sup>47</sup>

The creation of APRA Rebelde and later the MIR, which joined the Marxist Movimiento Social Progresista (Social Progressive Movement, MSP), the Partido Socialista del Perú (Peruvian Socialist Party, PSP) and the tiny Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front, FLN) on the political left, failed to fill the void created by the swing of APRA to the right after 1956. This was largely accomplished by Fernando Belaúnde Terry's Acción Popular (Popular Action, AP) party and to a much lesser extent by the Partido Democrático Cristiano (Christian Democratic

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<sup>46</sup>Epstein, "Motivational Bases of Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party," pp. 38-59, Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru, pp. 88-89, and Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York, 1972), pp. 336-351. See also Colección de Volantes, "Libertad a las Apristas Rebeldes" 1961 folder, a handbill calling for the release of two APRA Rebelde members who were arrested while doing organizational work in Cuzco and Puno.

<sup>47</sup>Víctor Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina (Lima, 1967), p. 131.



Party, PDC) headed by Héctor Cornejo Chávez.

Belaúnde, along with a number of his close political colleagues, formed Acción Popular soon after his surprisingly strong showing in the 1956 elections.<sup>48</sup> At Acción Popular's first party congress on June 1, 1957, Belaúnde set his party machinery in motion for a concerted bid for the presidency in the 1962 elections.<sup>49</sup>

Belaúnde was easily the most dynamic political figure during the Prado regime. He traveled throughout Peru during these years "seeking the reality" of his nation and working to project an image of a technically-oriented nationalistic reformer.<sup>50</sup> In keeping with his propensity for the dramatic gesture which he established during the 1956 elections he fought a duel with his outspoken political critic Senator Eduardo Watson Cisneros in January, 1957.<sup>51</sup> On another

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<sup>48</sup>Interview with Fernando Schwalb Lopez Aldaña, Cabin John, Maryland, April, 1974. Schwalb was one of the founders of Acción Popular and was Belaúnde's first Prime Minister in 1963.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., and Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962, p. 34.

<sup>50</sup>Belaúnde visited some of the most remote villages in Peru during these travels and in 1959 he published La conquista del Perú por los Peruanos (Lima, 1959) which was later translated as Peru's Own Conquest and contained the general outline of his proposed presidential programs.

<sup>51</sup>Peruvian Times, January 18, 1957, p. 1. Both men were slightly injured (Belaúnde sustained a cut hand and Watson a nicked ear) before the duel was terminated by the combatant's seconds.

occasion, in May, 1959 Belaúnde served a few days in Peru's maximum security prison, El Frontón, after defying a government ban against political demonstrations. He was released soon after a bungled escape attempt drew even more national attention to his energetic campaign.<sup>52</sup> In contrast to these flamboyant tactics, Belaúnde's careful efforts to court the support of armed forces officers displayed a shrewd understanding of changing military perspectives.

Both Belaúnde's training as an architect and his proposals during the 1956 election campaign and after, for the initiation of a broader range of armed forces-sponsored civic action projects, contained a special appeal for Peru's military men.<sup>53</sup> La conquista del Perú por los Peruanos--Belaúnde's first book written in 1959--contained specific proposals for the participation of the military in his development scheme for Peru. He suggested that badly needed mapping, sanitation, health, education and construction projects could be conducted best by the armed forces.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Peruvian Times, May 29, 1959, p. 2 and June 2, 1959, p. 1.

<sup>53</sup>For Belaúnde's 1956 campaign platform see M. Guillermo Ramirez y Berrios, Examen espectral de los elecciones del 9 de Junio de 1963 (Lima, 1963), p. 40.

<sup>54</sup>François Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (New York, 1970), pp. 229-260 provides an excellent analysis of Belaúnde's political style and programs as they were outlined in La conquista del Perú por los Peruanos and during his campaign. See also Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 264.

In a statement reminiscent of CAEM rhetoric, Belaúnde claimed that the "technical organizations of the military are well prepared to carry out a profound analysis of the national reality." He noted that the armed forces training schools were centers for high quality scientific education and that the nation's universities could profit from the work done at the military institutions. Belaúnde also made the key point that army officers (most notably Mercado Jarrín) had repeatedly stressed; that a military barracks can be considered a school; not just a school to train men in the use of weapons, but a basic center in which Indian youth is aculturated into the modern sector through military institutions.<sup>55</sup> In July, 1960 U.S. Ambassador Seldon Chapin noted Belaúnde's efforts to enlist the support of military men for his coming presidential candidacy. He indicated that Belaúnde was making contacts with armed forces officers, hoping for their support against the APRA candidate.<sup>56</sup> The aspiring presidential candidate may have also hoped that the identification of Aprismo with the conservative policies of the Prado administration would also further alienate officers inclined to oppose an APRA presidential bid in the first place.

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<sup>55</sup>Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Peru's Own Conquest (Lima, 1964), pp. 203-206.

<sup>56</sup>Loeb Interview.

The Prado regime was able to survive the difficulties of ruling Peru throughout almost the entire convivencia because of relatively stable economic conditions and its ability to maintain cohesion and solidarity among its political supporters. The increase in the cost of living for the first five years of the Prado government averaged a moderate 7.6 per cent, and the food and commodity shortages characteristic of Bustamante's civilian regime did not exist.<sup>57</sup> Prado was able to silence his most vocal political critic, Pedro Beltrán, by shrewdly offering him the post of prime minister in July, 1959. Through December, 1961 (when Beltrán resigned from the cabinet) APRA leaders worked in relative harmony with a government headed by two of the most representative members of the so-called oligarchy in Peru. The government's critics charged that this political harmony was sustained by mortgaging the future of Peru's impoverished sectors.<sup>58</sup> The Prado regime's hollow efforts on the issue of agrarian reform partially substantiates this criticism.

On September 30, 1960, the draft of a limited agrarian reform law was submitted to Prado. The law was supposedly designed to "raise the standard of living of the Peruvian

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<sup>57</sup>Peruvian Times, April 21, 1961, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 273.

farm worker and secure the maximum effective utilization of the land resources of Peru."<sup>59</sup> But it would not affect the highly industrialized (and mostly foreign-owned) estates in northern Peru. Moreover, the expropriation of other large estates, while provided for in the law, could not be accomplished without a review of the specific conditions existing in each case.<sup>60</sup> This provision made it highly unlikely that land reform would be carried out with any vigor by the government. An Italian land reform expert, acting as an advisor to the Prado administration, left Peru in December, 1961 after months of frustration in dealing with his recalcitrant employers. He claimed that "this government [the Prado administration] has no will for land reform."<sup>61</sup> The government's subsequent inaction throughout the remaining seven months of the Prado regime confirms this analysis. During the first half of 1962, however, the president's attention was turned more towards the national elections--scheduled for June 10, 1962--than agrarian reform or other related development issues.

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<sup>59</sup>Peruvian Times, October 7, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Loeb Interview.

### The Military and the Electoral Process

The 1962 national elections loomed as one of the most significant electoral contests in Peru's history. For the first time, two parties with broad-based political appeal, APRA and Acción Popular, would be contending for control of the presidency and the congress. Indications also pointed to the candidacy of Haya de la Torre for only the second time since APRA entered the national political arena in 1930. Although their support was very limited, the parties of the left including the PDC, FLN, MSP, and PSP gave progressives, marxists and socialists the best representation they had had in any twentieth century presidential election. Finally, the right, as always, lacked a cohesive political organization. Pedro Beltrán solicited support for his presidential candidacy in late 1961, but his effort soon collapsed. But shortly after returning to Peru in March 1961, former President Manuel Odría formed the Union Nacional Odriista (National Odrist Union, UNO).<sup>62</sup> Calling himself a "socialist of the right" Odría sought the support of the urban working classes who had benefitted from the social assistance programs of his administration. He was also endorsed by businessmen and industrialists who had

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<sup>62</sup>Peruvian Times, March 31, 1961, p. 2 and Colección de Volantes, "La Unión Nacional Odriista ¡Viva!" May 18, 1961, 1961 Folder.



profitted handsomely from the general's public works programs.<sup>63</sup>

The first three months of 1962 witnessed intense political maneuvering by armed forces leaders and civilian presidential candidates in preparation for the June elections. The government party, the Movimiento Democrática Pradista (Pradist Democratic Movement, MDP) threw its support to Haya de la Torre, culminating the political arrangement of the convivencia which saw APRA support Prado's candidacy in 1956. APRA's newly conservative political position and his long-standing enmity towards Odría, also persuaded Pedro Beltrán to support the APRA chief for the presidency. Apristas were thus placed in the totally unfamiliar position of having a government sponsored candidate with strong conservative backing.<sup>64</sup> Even the normally cautious Peruvian Times ventured the opinion in January, 1962 that "in the three decades [since 1930] APRA has swung from a far left to a rightist or at least middle of the road position."<sup>65</sup>

The announcement of Haya de la Torre's candidacy with the official backing of the Prado government brought a quick

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<sup>63</sup>Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962, pp. 38-39.

<sup>64</sup>Peruvian Times, January 5, 1962, p. 2, and Ramirez y Berrios, Examen espectral, pp. 40-41.

<sup>65</sup>Peruvian Times, January 5, 1962, p. 2.



reaction from the Belaúnde camp and senior officers of the armed forces. In talks with Adlai Stevenson during June, 1961 Belaúnde--possibly anticipating the Prado government's support for Haya de la Torre--expressed doubts that the 1962 elections would be free. He warned that if that proved to be the case there would be a revolution.<sup>66</sup> On February 9, 1962 Javier Orlandini, a leading member of Acción Popular, charged that serious voter registration irregularities were being perpetuated by APRA and MDP leaders. Two weeks later, the National Election Jury (the body responsible for supervising the elections) admitted that some of Orlandini's charges might have some justification.<sup>67</sup> More significant than these charges, however, was an initial warning given during early February to the U.S. ambassador that the armed forces officer corps was not prepared to accept the presidential victory of Haya de la Torre.

The warning was given to Ambassador Loeb by the Navy Minister, Vice-Admiral Tirado Lamb. Clearly referring to the ideological shift of APRA during the Prado years, Tirado claimed that for APRA no tactic is forbidden in their appetite for pretense; their apparent rectification of philosophies and methods does not bother them if that is the

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<sup>66</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>67</sup>El Comercio, February 9, 1962, p. 1, and La Prensa, February 23, 1962, p. 1.

easiest way to attain their objectives.<sup>68</sup> Pursuing this point further Tirado charged in an obvious reference to APRA that certain parties "which originally drank at communist fountains" have made changes in their political programs only because of expediency. Tirado Lamb cautioned Loeb against U.S. support for APRA and warned that if Washington backed only those parties it considered most popular, it could very well lead to the failure of U.S. policies in Latin America.<sup>69</sup>

By March 2 the armed forces' position on the candidacy of Haya de la Torre had been further clarified. Minister of War Alejandro Cuadra Rabines and General Juan Bossio Collas had joined Tirado Lamb in voicing strong opposition to the APRA chief's presidential ambitions. General Cuadra Rabines claimed that an important factor motivating the military's antipathy to APRA was the belief of many officers that Haya de la Torre was a homosexual.<sup>70</sup> In further conversations with Loeb, Tirado Lamb also stressed the history of anti-APRA indoctrination in the armed forces and especially the hatred of Haya de la Torre. He said that it was too much to expect the armed forces to serve under the rule of such a party. Tirado claimed that he and General Cuadra Rabines

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<sup>68</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

had become broadminded enough to work with APRA in the Prado government but he knew of no officer in the armed forces who would serve in an APRA cabinet. Finally the navy minister insisted that if Haya de la Torre won the presidential election the armed forces would prevent him from serving. This would mean, according to Tirado, that the military would then have to suppress APRA with the result that rebellious Apristas would probably turn to Castroism. Tirado Lamb told Loeb that he had expressed the same sentiments to APRA Secretary General Priale, and that the latter had merely listened without comment.<sup>71</sup>

Ambassador Loeb had been instructed to reply to the armed forces leaders that the U.S. Government would not support APRA or any other political group, and that it had no intention of participating in the Peruvian political process. However, he was informed that he should state that the U.S. was committed to the principles of representative democracy which U.S. policy-makers felt represented the views of the peoples of the Americas. Under these circumstances Loeb told Tirado that the U.S. would find it very difficult to justify to the rest of the continent the granting of recognition or financial aid to any military regime that had overthrown an anti-communist democratic government.

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

This United States position was finalized after Loeb consulted with President Kennedy and other top administration officials in Washington in early March.<sup>72</sup> But the coup d'état in Argentina that deposed President Arturo Frondizi on March 29 immediately put the U.S. policy to its first serious test. When the U.S. did not withhold recognition from the military-imposed interim government in Argentina, its position in opposing a similar military takeover in Peru was seriously undermined.<sup>73</sup>

During mid-April APRA leaders Prialé and Haya de la Torre downgraded the veracity of senior officers' threats to the Aprista chief's presidential candidacy. Prialé insisted that the rumors of a military intervention had no real foundations. He claimed that many officers had approached APRA looking for cabinet posts. Haya de la Torre offered the same evaluation of the military's position as Prialé.

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., Loeb had returned to Washington in early March, 1962 for consultations regarding the armed forces position on the candidacy of Haya de la Torre. His response to the position of the military was formulated at a meeting with President Kennedy which was also attended by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., George Ball and Richard Goodwin.

<sup>73</sup>The position of the Kennedy administration was explained by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in 1967 when he claimed that, "Frondizi sank without a trace, therefore it was difficult to suppose that nonrecognition would accomplish anything." Angela King Westwater, "Recognition of Latin American Military Regimes During the Kennedy Administration," unpublished Masters Thesis, New York University, 1967, p. 34.

According to the head Aprista the threats had no real substance. He even claimed that both Cuadra Rabines and General Odría had come to thank him for their promotions after the 1945 elections.<sup>74</sup> Despite his seemingly confident attitude, Haya de la Torre still sought to persuade Ambassador Loeb to notify all parties involved in the electoral process that the U.S. would not recognize any government imposed by force. Loeb and Chargé d'affaires Douglas Henderson refused to make such a blanket statement."<sup>75</sup> But as the elections drew closer the APRA leadership had greater reason for concern regarding the armed forces action.

The involvement of the military in the 1962 electoral process was inevitable under the provisions of Peruvian law. The supervision of public election officials and voters at the polling booths was clearly assigned to the armed forces. Public statements by armed forces' leaders indicated that they assumed the entire responsibility for the supervision of almost all phases of the election procedure.<sup>76</sup> This, of course, put the military at odds with the National Election Jury, which was dominated by Prado's appointees and supposedly had the final word in determining the outcome of any

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<sup>74</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>This attitude was reflective of the military's recognition of the broad powers granted to it under Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution.

disputed electoral returns.<sup>77</sup> In April General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, chairman of the armed forces' joint command referred to the military's broad interpretation of its electoral role as well as its ongoing investigation of alleged APRA and MDP registration irregularities. Speaking at the Escuela Superior de Guerra, Pérez Godoy emphasized that the constitutional responsibilities of the armed forces gave it the mandate to "confront all divisive and extremist forces which openly or covertly threaten the nation's institutions and to intervene in all situations which endanger the stability of democratic institutions and the ordered free and sovereign life of the Republic."<sup>78</sup>

Pérez Godoy's comments were a prelude to the communique of the armed forces joint command issued on May 26 announcing that their investigation of voter registration lists had revealed that "the will to commit fraud is patent."<sup>79</sup> The joint command claimed that of the 3,697 male voter registration cards the armed forces had examined, 1,697 had been illegally issued with most of the irregularities were attributed to the APRA-Prado coalition.<sup>80</sup> Prior to the

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<sup>77</sup>Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962, pp. 41-42.

<sup>78</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>79</sup>El Comercio, May 27, 1962, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, June 1, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup>Peruvian Times, June 1, 1962, p. 1.

issuance of the communique, Belaúnde had charged fraud in the registration process and on May 20 he threatened not to recognize the results of the coming elections unless the armed forces approved the final decision of the National Election Jury.<sup>81</sup>

It seems clear that Belaúnde's pre-election tactics reflected his own doubts about his ability to win the presidency without the aid of the armed forces. By demanding that the military review the election results, and casting doubts upon their legitimacy, he lent support to the military's campaign to block the election of Haya de la Torre. Admiral Tirado Lamb confirmed this on May 23 when he told Ambassador Loeb that the leaders of Acción Popular cried fraud because they feared they would lose the election. Tirado Lamb reasoned that had they been sure of success they would have kept silent. In this same conversation the admiral again insisted that the armed forces could not accept Haya de la Torre as president because many officers felt the APRA leader would "destroy the armed forces within three months."<sup>82</sup> This same attitude was expressed by General Julio Doig Sánchez, Peruvian military attaché in the United States, on

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<sup>81</sup> Enrique Chirinos Soto, Cuente y balance de las elecciones de 1962 (Lima, 1962), p. 63, and El Comercio,

<sup>82</sup> Loeb Interview.

May 22. General Doig, who identified himself as strongly pro-Belaúnde, told his U.S. military hosts at a dinner party that APRA would try to cripple the armed forces if Haya de la Torre was elected. The military attaché said, however, that he was sure the armed forces would intervene if APRA won, but only after the elections were over. General Doig also claimed that many officers felt that Odría was too old and "too old hat" for Peru.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore General Nicolás Lindley López, commanding officer of the army and another supporter of Belaúnde, toured the nation's army installations during April and May to gauge the feeling of the armed forces on the question of the coming elections.<sup>84</sup> Lindley's efforts were apparently part of the armed forces program to poll the officer corps several months before the elections to ascertain opinions as to what the attitude of the armed forces should be in certain "specific situations."<sup>85</sup> Clearly, the armed forces were prepared to abide by the results of the June 10 elections only so long as they met with their approval.<sup>86</sup>

Haya de la Torre made some last minute efforts during the first week of June to head off the increasingly evident

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Villanueva, El militarismo, pp. 210-211.

<sup>86</sup> Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 285.



armed forces opposition to a possible APRA presidential victory. During a campaign address he claimed that APRA and the military were unified in their opposition to the common threat of communism. He also promised that the armed forces would be given "preferential attention" in the modernization of its military equipment.<sup>87</sup> While campaigning in Piura, in northern Peru, the APRA chief also placed a wreath at the monument to Miguel Grau, the Peruvian naval hero of the War of the Pacific.<sup>88</sup> These efforts were made as six other presidential candidates made their final appeals to the electorate.

The seven candidates in the 1962 elections represented one of the largest field of presidential aspirants in the history of Peru. Haya de la Torre ran under the banner of the Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance), a coalition of APRA and Prado backers. Joining him in the field were Belaúnde (AP), Odría (UNO), Héctor Cornejo Chávez (PDC), Luciano Castillo (PSP), retired army general César Pando Esgusquiza (FLN), and lawyer Alberto Ruiz Eldridge (MSP).<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> La Tribuna, June 2, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> The literature dealing with the 1962 elections is extensive. The best works are Chirinos Soto, Cuente y balance, Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962, Bourricaud, Power and Society (especially, the chapter entitled "The Rules of the Game"), César Martín, Dichos y hechos de la política peruana (Lima, 1963), and Richard Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1962 and their Annulment" (New York, 1962).

Belaúnde took an early lead in the balloting and on June 11, he prematurely claimed victory while announcing in his colorful rhetorical style "I lay down the sword and bestow on the outgoing government the laurels which it has earned for itself by the freedom of the electoral process."<sup>90</sup> Also praising the honesty of the electoral process the day after the elections was Colonel Roberto Gonzales Polar, chief of the department of civil military affairs in the ministry of war. Colonel Gonzalez declared that "the elections have been conducted in all of the departments with complete order and all of the results were guarded by the armed forces."<sup>91</sup>

The vote counting proceeded very slowly, however, and a week after the elections, it became increasingly evident that Haya de la Torre and Odría were receiving sufficient electoral support to prevent any candidate from gaining the constitutionally required 33.3 per cent of the total vote to be named president. As the vote counting continued it became apparent that the final decision regarding the presidency would have to be decided by the new national congress. Thus the Prado government now faced its gravest political crisis.

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<sup>90</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 295.

<sup>91</sup>Martín, Dichos y hechos, p. 16.

The Coup d' État of July 18

When the final unofficial vote tabulation in late June showed Haya de la Torre with a slight lead over Belaúnde, the armed forces leadership challenged the legality of the electoral process and again declared their opposition to Haya de la Torre.<sup>92</sup> Prado tried to deal with the armed forces opposition by attempting to transfer the anti-APRA commander of the air force, General Pedro Vargas Prada, to the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington. But the president withdrew his order when forty top air force officers headed by Chief of Staff General Carlos Grantham Cardona threatened to resign in protest.<sup>93</sup> During the last week of June a joint armed forces committee took the initiative against Prado. Admiral Tirado, and Generals Cuadra Rabines, Lindley López, and Salvador Noya Ferre presented Prado with a document proclaiming that Haya de la Torre was completely unacceptable to the armed forces as

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<sup>92</sup>The final unofficial vote tabulations subject to the review of the National Election Jury were as follows: Haya de la Torre (Alianza Democrática)--557,047; Belaúnde (AP)--544,180; Odría (UNO)--480,798; Cornejo (PDC)--48,792; Pando (FLN)--33,941; Castillo (PSP)--16,658; Ruiz (MSP)--9,202. Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' état of 1962, p. 43. See The Peruvian Armed Forces, La fuerzas armadas y el proceso electoral de 1962 (Lima, 1963) for the military's version of the electoral fraud issue. The best interpretations of the 1962 elections concede that some vote fraud did take place; but as a whole the voting was probably the cleanest in Peru's history. See Bourricaud, Power and Society, pp. 301-302.

<sup>93</sup>Peruvian Times, June 22, 1962, p. 1.

president. But Prado was not then willing to accede to these demands. The Minister of Development, Jorge Grieve, was informed by General Cuadra Rabines after the meeting with Prado that the joint committee was strongly influenced by the armed forces poll which indicated both Haya de la Torre and Odría were not acceptable to the officer corps.<sup>94</sup>

The armed forces leadership then brought its campaign against the electoral process into the open on June 28 when it issued a communique charging that fraudulent voting had occurred in seven of the nation's twenty-four departments. Singled out as especially fraudulent were the returns from the Aprista strongholds of Cajamarca, La Libertad and Lambayeque.<sup>95</sup> On July 3 military leaders issued another ultimatum to Prado stating that the armed forces would act if Haya de la Torre did not withdraw his candidacy within one week. This time Prado passed the ultimatum on to Haya de la Torre. Then on July 4 the APRA chief announced that the military had vetoed his candidacy. Haya de la Torre offered to renounce his candidacy for the good of the "constitutional order" but he insisted he was leaving the final decision up to the APRA leadership. Negotiations between the three leading candidates and government

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<sup>94</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>95</sup>Peruvian Times, July 29, 1962, p. 1.

representatives then commenced with the aim of finding a solution to the electoral impasse which was confirmed by the National Election Jury on July 17.<sup>96</sup>

The final results released by the Jury had Haya de la Torre leading Belaúnde by slightly less than thirteen thousand votes but gaining only 32.98 per cent of the total ballots cast. Since the presidential decision was constitutionally mandated to the new congress in which APRA controlled forty per cent of the seats, Belaúnde or Odría's only chance for the presidency was an electoral pact with Haya de la Torre.<sup>97</sup> Belaúnde's talks with APRA broke down on July 8, however, when he refused Aprista support for the presidency because it meant that he would have been required to work with a congress in which he would have lacked a majority and which would have been dominated by APRA.<sup>98</sup> Belaúnde then left for Arequipa on July 11 where he established barricades around the AP headquarters and declared that if the Prado regime did not overturn the election results: "We will be obliged to overthrow the government

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<sup>97</sup> APRA controlled 109 of the 240 Congressional seats and Acción Popular only 81. Odría's UNO was the swing party with 44 elected Congressmen (Astiz, Pressure Groups), p. 103.

<sup>98</sup> Bourricaud, Power and Society, pp. 303-304 and Loeb Interview.

and punish its crimes."<sup>99</sup> Belaúnde's movement quickly fizzled when the armed forces leadership disassociated itself from his actions. But senior officers in Lima gave Prado a final ultimatum on July 14 that coincided with Belaúnde's demand.

The senior commanders insisted that the entire electoral process be annulled and that Prado establish the framework for new elections. This was the only way, the armed forces leaders declared, that Prado could finish his constitutional term. The president held out against these demands claiming that the National Election Jury was constitutionally independent and thus he had no authority to annul the elections.<sup>100</sup>

Meanwhile, with Belaúnde removed from the negotiations, Haya de la Torre and Odría worked to cement an agreement they hoped would prevent a military takeover and break the electoral deadlock. APRA leaders and the former president had engaged in discussions since the first week of July in a relatively cordial manner.<sup>101</sup> On July 14 Odría,

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<sup>99</sup>The New York Times, July 13, 1962, p. 7. Haya de la Torre claims he was in contact with Belaúnde in Arequipa attempting to continue the negotiations, but Belaúnde rejected this overture. Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 14, 1974, Lima, Peru.

<sup>100</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>101</sup>La Tribuna, July 4, 1962, p. 1. APRA Secretary General Priale held his discussions with Odría over cocktails at the fashionable Hotel Bolivar in Lima.

Haya de la Torre and General Pérez Godoy met together and the chairman of the joint command informed both men that because of the electoral fraud the armed forces could not accept an APRA president. Pérez Godoy would not concede that the military leaders were opposed to Haya personally. He also added that the armed service ministers, particularly General Cuadra Rabines and Admiral Tirado Lamb, would no longer represent the armed forces' position in the electoral controversy. This task, Pérez Godoy announced, would be assumed by the joint command.<sup>102</sup> This statement foreshadowed the virtual exclusion of the armed service ministers from the critical activities of the next four days. It also seemed to indicate the resolve of the joint command to take a unified institutional stand during the height of the crisis.

After the meeting of July 14 events moved swiftly, culminating in the coup d' état of July 18. Prado's cabinet resigned en masse on July 16 in the face of the armed forces' demands that the elections be annulled. At the final cabinet meeting Admiral Tirado Lamb made public his own letter of resignation dated July 12, in which he charged the National Election Jury with becoming the "complacent

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<sup>102</sup>Loeb Interview. Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 271-273 claims that the service ministers were displaced because the joint command considered them to be too closely linked with President Prado.

collaborator" of the APRA party. Tirado Lamb claimed that Peru was in grave danger of "political anarchy or fascist dictatorship" if the electoral crisis was not resolved.<sup>103</sup> The following day the joint command without any mention of the service ministers, formally demanded that the President of the National Election Jury, José Enrique Bustamante y Corzo, overturn the elections. A few hours later, Bustamante y Corzo denied that the armed forces had the right to request the cancellation of the elections. He also asserted that the electoral irregularities claimed by the military were not serious enough to change the results of the elections.<sup>104</sup> In the late afternoon of July 17 events drew closer to a climax with the announcement by General Odría that he had finally reached an accord with the APRA. The agreement would give Odría the presidency. Aprista leader Manuel Seoane would assume the first vice-president's post, and APRA would become the dominant party in the national congress.<sup>105</sup> Haya de la Torre later claimed that he contacted Pérez Godoy to inform him that APRA had reached an accord with Odría, but that he was told by the

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<sup>103</sup>The New York Times, July 17, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>104</sup>El Comercio, July 17, 1962, p. 2.

<sup>105</sup>Martín, Dichos y hechos, pp. 35-36, and Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 14, 1974, Lima, Peru.



chairman of the joint command that it was "too late".<sup>106</sup> The military then made its well-coordinated move to end the political deadlock on the terms of the officer corps.

At 3:20 A.M. on the morning of July 18 tanks surrounded the National Palace while other troops were dispatched to various strategic sites in Lima (including the APRA headquarters). Colonel Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos, commanding the units around the Palace, then ordered President Prado to surrender, claiming that he was authorized to destroy the building if the chief executive did not comply.<sup>107</sup> Only after eight tanks had pushed in the Palace gate and entered the interior courtyard did Prado leave his residence. He was taken to a naval transport vessel where he was detained briefly before being allowed to leave for Paris.<sup>108</sup> Military units also occupied the national congress, and the APRA headquarters, and by mid-morning of July 18 the joint command had established itself as the new Junta de Gobierno (Government Junta) without loss of life and with only minor street disturbances. APRA leaders called a general strike

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<sup>106</sup> Interview with Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, July 14, 1962, Lima Peru.

<sup>107</sup> El Comercio, July 18, 1962, p. 1. Much issue was made in the United States press that Colonel Briceño had been a student at the anti-guerilla ranger school at Fort Benning, Georgia.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., and Peruvian Times, July 20, 1962, p. 3.

in protest but it failed completely.<sup>109</sup>

The July 18 movement differed significantly from past armed forces' coups in that the military acted as a unit and not as the instrument of a single caudillo such as Sánchez Cerro or Odría. The four members of the joint command including its chairman, General Pérez Godoy, army commander General Nicholas Lindley López, air force chief General Pedro Vargas Prada, and navy commander Vice-Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos assumed posts as joint presidents of the new military government. The Junta quickly issued three decrees (co-signed by all four members) annulling the elections of June 10, 1962, setting new elections for the second Sunday in June, 1963 and suspending constitutional guarantees for thirty days.<sup>110</sup> The armed forces commanders thus established a time limit for their rule and General Pérez Godoy, in the government's first pronouncement, stressed that the Junta renounced any political ambitions of its own. He claimed that "none of us will be a candidate, nor offer himself as a candidate nor do anything to obtain a political post" as a result of their position in the military government. The general also insisted that

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<sup>109</sup> La Tribuna, July 21, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>110</sup> Ordenes Generales de Marina, July 31, 1962, pp. 2-4.

when the Junta's term expired, its members would return to their barracks in "silence and dignity".<sup>111</sup>

The new military government confronted minimal internal opposition following the coup. APRA leaders were relatively subdued, as was General Odría. The government kept order without press censorship or significant political repression.<sup>112</sup> Belaúnde praised the action of the armed forces and asserted that the coup was a "lesson" to those who "dare to commit fraud as a political method" that such action could not be permitted in Peru without punishment.<sup>113</sup> The fact that many Peruvians expected some form of military action after the electoral impasse became apparent seems to have had an important effect upon their apathetic reaction to the coup. Despite the absence of internal resistance, however, the new government was the target of sanctions from the U.S. government.

The United States broke diplomatic relations with the military government and suspended all but humanitarian assistance programs the same day the coup occurred.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>Loeb Interview.

<sup>112</sup>Haya de la Torre and other APRA leaders were not arrested and the party newspaper La Tribuna remained closed for only three days.

<sup>113</sup>The New York Times, July 19, 1962, p. 1

<sup>114</sup>Loeb Interview.

Ambassador Loeb concluded that the overthrow of Prado represented "the sharpest case yet to express the U.S. determination to support democratic governments" in Latin America.<sup>115</sup> Nevertheless, the U.S. business community in Peru did not, for the most part, support its government's policy. Representatives of the leading U.S. corporations in Peru met with General Pérez Godoy on July 19 and pledged their support for the regime.<sup>116</sup> In their talks with the general, executives of the Grace Corporation, however, expressed concern that "young Nasserite colonels were ready for radical changes."<sup>117</sup> The Junta's position on the U.S. action was given by Foreign Minister Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa on July 20. He claimed that the U.S. suspension of recognition represented a "headstrong and unjustifiable attitude" and that Washington had moved without knowing the true reasons why the armed forces had to act in "the defense of the constitution and the laws."<sup>118</sup> By the time the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations on August 17, however, the military government had given indications that it would not follow the pattern of

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> The New York Times, July 21, 1962, p. 6.

past authoritarian military regimes in Peru.<sup>119</sup> It embarked on a cautious reformist path that belied the military's image as "watchdogs" of established order in Peru.

### Conclusion

Peruvian military men manifested a desire to adopt a more dynamic role in national affairs during the second Prado administration. Central to this changing professional perspective was the growing recognition that the armed forces were a technically proficient and disciplined force for national development. The CAEM was a key agency for the rationalization of the new ideology, but CAEM strategists were neither original nor exclusive proponents of the military as a developmentalist force.

The conservative policies of the Prado government did not correspond to the changing trend in military thinking. On the other hand, Belaúnde's technically oriented solutions for the nation's problems gained increasing acceptance from the military as the 1962 elections approached. Strong support for Belaúnde's candidacy within the officer corps consequently must be considered one of the prime reasons for the coup d' état which occurred when the flamboyant architect

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., August 18, 1962, p. 1. All U.S. financial aid programs except military assistance (which was renewed in mid-October) were activated at this time.

lost his chance for the presidency. But the deep distrust of Haya de la Torre and the feeling that both APRA and Odría were not responsive to the realities of the nation's problems of underdevelopment also contributed heavily to the armed forces' action. Electoral fraud, which the joint command used as a justification of its overthrow of Prado did exist. But this fraud was probably no more extensive than in past elections and certainly did not constitute the decisive reason for the coup of July 18. Finally, the institutional nature of the coup was unique in twentieth century Peruvian military affairs, in that for the first time, a careful attempt was made by the armed forces leadership to enlist the support of the officer corp as a unit. It is clear that there was very little, if any, opposition to the joint command's action. This represented a fundamental departure from the armed forces' past history of institutional factionalism stemming from differences on major political issues. The collective nature of the new military government was also sharply different from the pattern established by the personalist military caudillos of the period before 1956. The events of July, 1962 reflected a new unity within the armed forces officer corps even while military men took actions that superficially portrayed them only as opportunistic praetorians.

## CHAPTER VIII

### GENERALS AS PRESIDENTS

#### Consolidation and Reform

While the 1962-1963 military government was in power it demonstrated the difficulty armed forces leaders confronted in translating their new professional ideology into government policy. A number of important reforms were enacted by decree in the first six months of the Junta's tenure, but no clear-cut rationale for the government's programs was articulated by the military leadership. As a result, the programs enacted lacked coherence and some were even reversed when General Ricardo Pérez Godoy was ousted from the presidential palace by the other co-Presidents, General Nicolás Lindley López, General Pedro Vargas Prada, and Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, in March, 1963. The vast majority of the armed forces leadership was united, however, in the desire to return the government to civilian hands after the scheduled elections of June 9, 1963. This reflected their certainty of a Belaúnde victory and their unwillingness, at that time, to remain in power for an extended period of time.

During its first four months in office the military government effectively consolidated its political position and initiated measures dealing with electoral, housing and agrarian reform. Due to the relative political tranquillity following the July 18 coup, the Junta ended the suspension of civil liberties only nine days after it seized power.<sup>1</sup> This was in keeping with its policy of avoiding the use of political repression which would have strengthened the Apristas and probably further delayed diplomatic recognition by the United States. Pérez Godoy also met with U.S. business leaders and asked for their support on July 24. He urged them to do everything possible to get the "facts" before the U.S. State Department regarding Peru's position on the issue of U.S. recognition. In return, the general promised U.S. and other foreign business representatives that the Junta would pose no threat to their interests.<sup>2</sup> U.S. investments in Peru totalled over \$850 million in 1962 and this undoubtedly influenced the military government's carefully conciliatory policy towards U.S. capital.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peruvian Times, July 27, 1962, p. 1. The best study of the 1962-1963 military government is Víctor Villanueva, Un año bajo el sable (Lima, 1963).

<sup>2</sup>Peruvian Times, July 27, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., August 3, 1962, p. 1.



After negotiations between U.S. chargé d'affairs Douglas Henderson and Peruvian government leaders, the United States resumed diplomatic relations with Peru on August 17.<sup>4</sup> Economic assistance programs, with the important exception of military aid, were reinstated at the same time.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. recognition statement, however, contained a reference to internal political conditions in Peru. This prompted the Minister of Foreign Relations, Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa, to release a strongly worded statement protesting the "improper tone" of the U.S. announcement. This stern attitude adopted by the Junta was praised as a "manifestation of dignity and independence" by the staunchly nationalist El Comercio on August 19.<sup>6</sup> The military government had thus hurdled the last major barrier impeding the consolidation of its political control and increased its prestige in the process. While the issue of U.S. recognition was being discussed during early August, the Junta made its first reform proposals public.

According to General Pérez Godoy, the Junta had clear objectives during his tenure as chief of the military government. The enactment of an electoral reform law was

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<sup>4</sup>Westwater, "U.S. Diplomatic Relations," pp. 67-68.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., and Peruvian Times, August 22, 1962, p. 1. Military aid was reinstated in early October.

<sup>6</sup>Loeb Interview; El Comercio, August 19, 1962, p. 1, and Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 311.

the government's highest priority. But also important were the regulation of the economy and the enactment of basic reforms in housing, national planning, taxation and the agrarian section.<sup>7</sup> During early August the first of these programs was put into motion when a commission was established to write a new electoral statute and Pérez Godoy announced that the Junta was in the process of creating a National Planning Institute.<sup>8</sup> On August 31, the government issued a decree which began preparations for the establishment of an Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization. These measures, issued during the first six weeks after the Junta assumed power, provided the basis for the key reforms of the next four months.

The new electoral law was promulgated on December 5 and it contained important revisions of existing electoral regulations. The multiple ballot system, wherein each political party printed its own list of candidates for the national elections, was scrapped and replaced by a single ballot form. More significantly, the number of deputies and senators was reduced from 241 to 180 as the government stated that it wanted to avoid the splintering of political representation

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<sup>7</sup>Interview with Division General (Retired) Ricardo Pérez Godoy, August 1, 1974, Lima, Peru. General Pérez Godoy also consented to answer a questionnaire submitted on the same date.

<sup>8</sup>Peruvian Times, August 3, 1962, p. 1, and La Prensa, August 3, 1962, p. 1.

in congress. In the first draft of the reform approved by the Junta in late September, the number of congressmen had been cut to 140, but the military leaders later restored forty-five seats. The measure also included tighter restrictions of voting and registration procedures.<sup>9</sup>

In a special address to the nation on October 20, Pérez Godoy announced the establishment of the Instituto Nacional de Planificación (National Planning Institute). The Institute was founded in order to "stimulate the incentive and creative quality of the distinct sectors of the population and especially to assure the participation of the active forces of the economy."<sup>10</sup> The head of this organization was given the rank of cabinet minister and its members were to be chosen from key sectors of the national economy. As the Institute was designed to be the foundation for national development planning, it was established on a permanent basis. Pérez Godoy stressed, however, that the Institute was to be an apolitical body, and that its members would refrain from political activity beyond the scope of their

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<sup>9</sup> Richard Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service (New York, 1963), p. 6; Peruvian Times, September 14, 1962, p. 1, and September 28, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ordenes Generales de Marina, Perú, Ministerio de Marina, October 29, 1962, pp. 1-7, and Peruvian Times, October 26, 1962, p. 1.

specific government duties.<sup>11</sup> The creation of the National Planning Institute was a manifestation of the developmentalist orientation of the Junta. The integration of economic development planning in a permanent cabinet-level body reflected the military government's recognition of the need for long-term economic planning. This type of organization had been advocated by the CAEM personnel before 1962. Nevertheless, Pérez Godoy later denied that the CAEM played any direct role in the creation of the Institute or participated officially in the planning or programs of the military government from July 18, 1962 to March 3, 1963 (the period of Pérez Godoy's leadership).<sup>12</sup>

In conjunction with the creation of the National Planning Institute, the military government in late November unsuccessfully sought the services of the Belgian sociologist and economic development advisor, Frere L. J. Lebret. During the Prado regime Peruvian officers had sought the teaching services of Lebret and they hoped the administration would heed some of his policy suggestions. The Prado government was opposed to the Lebret mission, however, and

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<sup>11</sup>Peruvian Times, October 26, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Reply to questionnaire submitted to General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, August 1, 1974. Hereafter cited as Pérez Godoy questionnaire.

the military request was cancelled.<sup>13</sup> The Junta's renewed efforts to obtain Le Bret's talents in 1962 demonstrated its desire to enlist foreign economic advice on the subject of national development planning, while at the same time virtually shunning the CAEM.

During November, 1962 the Junta moved ahead in the areas of housing and agrarian reform. The cooperation with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) the government announced plans to construct sixty thousand low cost housing units in Lima and other areas throughout Peru. The cost of the project was set at one billion soles (\$37 million) of which AID was to contribute 620 million soles.<sup>14</sup> Pérez Godoy also announced on November 19 the creation of a National Housing Bank, financed in part by funds provided through the Alliance for Progress. It was formed to extend credits for housing reconstruction and the establishment of essential services such as light, power and sewage.<sup>15</sup> These programs represented the first systematic effort by any Peruvian regime to deal with the dreadful living conditions

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<sup>13</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 23, El Comercio, November 21, 1962, p. 1, and Legislación Militar, February 17, 1959, pp. 129-130.

<sup>14</sup>El Peruano, November 10, 1962, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, November 16, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>15</sup>Pérez Godoy questionnaire, and El Comercio, November 20, 1962, p. 1.

of Lima's urban poor. During mid-November the Junta also established the necessary platform for the first substantive agrarian reform program in the history of Peru.

On November 13, the military government gave permanent legal status to the Instituto de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization, IRAC) which provided the bases for the application of agrarian reform.<sup>16</sup> The IRAC originally was mandated to write an agrarian reform law for seven impoverished regions throughout Peru where rural unrest was most intense. It became quickly evident, however, that the government would only attempt a small-scale pilot project in the strife-ridden La Convención province in the Cuzco region. Luis de la Puente Uceda, leader of the marxist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), typified the extreme left's view of the Junta's agrarian reform efforts when he charged that the government was not really committed to reform but only wanted to defuse the volatile political climate in the La Convención Valley. The MIR leader had visited the valley before the issuance of the agrarian reform decree and had witnessed the effective peasant union organizational activity of the trotskyite, Hugo Blanco. Despite the MIR's criticisms of the program, General Nicolás Lindley López, the premier and minister of war, replied to the criticisms

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<sup>16</sup>El Comercio, November 14, 1962, p. 1.

of the agrarian reform project by insisting that the Junta could not be expected to launch a full-scale program when it would remain in office for only one year.<sup>17</sup>

The actual details of the La Convención pilot project were not released until March 28, 1963, when the Junta's minister of agriculture announced that about fourteen thousand arrendires (roughly, tenant farmers) will "become owners of the land they work."<sup>18</sup> Twenty-three haciendas in the Ururamba Valley in La Convención were earmarked for acquisition by the government either by expropriation or by direct purchase for distribution among fourteen thousand landless residents of the region at a cost of \$1.1 million.<sup>19</sup> The land was to be taken by one of three separate measures outlined by the agrarian reform decree: 1) by direct expropriation; 2) by government purchase with a down payment of 15 per cent in cash and the balance in eight to fifteen annual installments with up to eight per cent interest on the balance outstanding; and 3) by direct purchase from the owners by the arrendires with the approval of the IRAC. The small farmers who purchased land under the pilot program

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<sup>17</sup>"Militares vs. Marxistas," Caretas, November 9-21, 1962, p. 15.

<sup>18</sup>El Comercio, March 30, 1963, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, April 5, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup>Peruvian Times, April 5, 1962, p. 1.

were to repay the government at a low rate of interest over a period extending up to twenty years. As a part of the project an army engineer battalion was sent to the region to construct a through highway from Cuzco and feeder roads within the pilot area itself.<sup>20</sup> The first land put up for sale from the expropriated properties was made available on June 12, 1963 only one month before the Junta left office.<sup>21</sup> But under the provisions of the decree initiating the project, land redistribution was to continue for up to three years from the beginning of the agrarian reform.<sup>22</sup>

Notwithstanding the limited scope of the Junta's agrarian reform project, it was the first attempt by a Peruvian government to begin the redistribution of land on a systematic basis. The creation of the IRAC demonstrated that the military leadership was committed to a broader agrarian reform program in the future. The selection of the La Convención and Lares region as the first site for the implementation of land redistribution was significant. It indicated that the armed forces clearly understood that agrarian reform was intricately linked to alleviating the conditions promoting rural unrest. MIR critics of the

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 5.

<sup>22</sup>Peruvian Times, April 5, 1963, p. 1.



La Concención and Lares project argued that peasant land seizures of much of the property involved in the program prior to the initiation of the pilot project reduced the Junta's agrarian reform to merely a recognition of the peasants' de facto control of the land they had seized.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, the relationship between social action projects and the armed forces' increasingly comprehensive definition of national defense (as it applied to the issue of internal subversion) was manifested in the agrarian reform project of 1963. Apart from the Junta's efforts in the area of land redistribution, it introduced two other reform measures dealing with tax and education reform in late 1962.

On December 5, 1962 the Junta issued a decree declaring 1963 "The Year of Literacy" and proposing an all-out effort to reduce illiteracy in the nation. The ministry of education proposed a plan to effect national literacy training and the government encouraged other educational programs. But these initiatives were more of a commitment to educational reform rather than a manifestation of the government's intent to launch an ambitious program in its six remaining months in office. Thus little progress was made

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<sup>23</sup>Héctor Béjar, Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience (New York, 1965), p. 56. Useful works on the Cuzco la land seizures are Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina (Lima, 1967), Hugo Niera, Cuzco: Tierra y muerte (Lima, n.d.).

before the Junta stepped down in July, 1963.<sup>24</sup>

On the issue of tax reform, however, more tangible efforts were made. At the end of 1962 the government decreed a tax of twenty-five soles per ton (about 94¢) on the nation's fishing industry. In addition, a new progressive tax scale on private incomes in excess of 100,000 soles per year (\$3,730) was put into effect on January 1, 1963.<sup>25</sup> These taxes, while not excessive, were unpopular with business interests and upper income groups. The tax controversy was apparently one of a number of issues that prompted the removal of Pérez Godoy as president of the Junta by his more conservative military colleagues on March 3, 1963. Other cracks in the institutional solidarity of the military government were clearly evident, however, before Pérez Godoy's replacement by General Nicolás Lindley López in March, 1963.

#### Dissension and Disorder

The first indication of dissension within the military government came on October 5, 1962 with the resignation of the Minister of Government and Police, General Juan Bossio Collas. General Bossio gave "health reasons" for his

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<sup>24</sup>El Comercio, December 6, 1962, p. 1, and Villanueva, Un año bajo el sable, pp. 151-157.

<sup>25</sup>Pérez Godoy questionnaire, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 292.

resignation but according to Pérez Godoy, the minister of government and police renounced his cabinet post under intense pressure from General Lindley López.<sup>26</sup> General Bossio was the most progressive officer in the military government and had been a member of the activist junior army officer organization, CROE during the early 1940's.<sup>27</sup> Before his resignation General Bossio made a number of public statements that led to his removal from the cabinet. During September he engaged in a debate with the editors of La Prensa, who warned that the peasant unionizing and land seizures led by Hugo Blanco in La Convención and Lares might be the beginnings of a Castro-inspired guerrilla movement. General Bossio discounted the importance of what he termed "paper guerrillas" and derided the "journalistic visions" of the La Prensa editors.<sup>28</sup> Far more serious, however, was his declaration in late September that the military government had immediate plans to nullify the long-standing and controversial contract of the International Petroleum Company.<sup>29</sup> The Junta was not prepared to take such action and General

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<sup>26</sup>El Comercio, October 6, 1962, p. 1. and Pérez Godoy questionnaire.

<sup>27</sup>See chapter three for the discussion of the CROE.

<sup>28</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 318.

<sup>29</sup>Pérez Godoy questionnaire and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 286.

Lindley López, in particular, viewed General Bossio's statement as a form of censure of the Junta's actions.<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, General Lindley López secured the minister's resignation with the support of the other members of the Junta.<sup>31</sup> General Bossio's removal reflected the military government's sensitivity on the issues of foreign capital and rural unrest.

As General Pérez Godoy's statements to the foreign business community in July, 1962 prove, the Junta was committed to maintaining a friendly relationship with foreign capital. The Junta president took pride in the fact that the military government in the remaining months of 1962 after the coup d' état was able to substantially improve the condition of Peru's balance of payments, oversee an increase in the nation's GNP, and still realize a budget surplus in excess of 400 million soles.<sup>32</sup> It is obvious that the military government viewed immediate economic stability as closely linked with the continued presence of Peru's chief sources of foreign investment. On this key point, the senior officers in the government were at odds with

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<sup>30</sup>Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid. In an often quoted statement Bossio was also reported to have said that the armed forces of 1962 were tired of being the "watchdogs of the oligarchy" in Peru.

<sup>32</sup>Pérez Godoy questionnaire.

military planners in the CAEM who wrote in 1963:

The sad and desperate truth is that in Peru the real powers are not the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial or the Electoral, but the latifundistas (owners of excessively large land holdings), the exporters, the bankers, and the American [U.S.] investors.<sup>33</sup>

While not a dominant aspect of the armed forces' professional perspective before 1963, economic nationalism emerged as a key element in the military's ideology between 1963 and 1968.<sup>34</sup> But despite a lack of consensus on the issue of the role of foreign capital before 1963, military men were in accord in supporting the Junta's decisive actions against radical activists operating in Peru's central and southern regions.

The most charismatic and successful radical figure during the early 1960's was the peasant organizer Hugo Blanco.<sup>35</sup> This young trotskyite began his work to unify various peasant groups in the Cuzco area in 1958.<sup>36</sup> By 1961 Blanco had created 148 individual peasant unions in the La Convención Valley and had led a number of successful

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<sup>33</sup>CAEM, El estado y la politica general (Chorrillos, 1963), p. 89, quoted in Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 18.

<sup>34</sup>For a discussion of this point see Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 321.

<sup>35</sup>The best work dealing with Hugo Blanco is Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina.

<sup>36</sup>Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, p. 75.

strikes by the tenants of the large haciendas of the region.<sup>37</sup> Primarily because of ideological differences with Peru's leading marxist groups, Blanco was unable to obtain the needed manpower or financial support for a campaign of peasant land seizures he attempted to lead during 1962.<sup>38</sup> During late October, 1962 the government responded to the land seizures in the La Convención region by sending a large force of guardia civil units, under the command of Colonel Arturo Zapata Cesti, to dislodge the peasants. The guardia civil established headquarters in two key haciendas in La Convención and the valley of Lares.<sup>39</sup> These units met with stubborn resistance from the peasants, and Blanco himself became a fugitive after killing a member of the guardia civil while attempting to seize arms for his movement on November 13, 1962.<sup>40</sup>

Blanco was not captured until late May, 1963 but his effectiveness as a peasant organizer ended after he was forced into hiding to avoid arrest.<sup>41</sup> During the last two

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<sup>37</sup> Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York, 1972), p. 319.

<sup>38</sup> Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, pp. 102-134.

<sup>39</sup> El Comercio, October 23, 1962, p. 13.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.; Gott, Guerrilla Movements, p. 328, and Villanueva, Hugo Blanco, pp. 138-139.

<sup>41</sup> Blanco was sentenced to twenty years in prison in 1963 for the murder of a member of the Guardia Civil; he was subsequently released in 1970.

months of 1962, however, disorders continued in the La Convención and Lares region. Violent confrontations between the guardia civil and peasants near the town of Chalhuyay in December resulted in the deaths of forty-six tenant farmers.<sup>42</sup> Only after the announcement of the Junta's agrarian reform program for the La Convención region in March, 1963, did the land seizures and the unrest begin to subside. The activities of peasant unions in this area never went beyond the point of strikes and occupation of the large land holdings. But Blanco's organizational success during his five years of work in the politically volatile La Convención and Lares region convinced military leaders of the potential for agrarian rebellion in the area. The fact that the Junta's agrarian reform program contributed to the reduction of peasant unrest in this region had a profound impact upon the military's attitude towards the value of land reform in the years to come.<sup>43</sup> In contrast to the Junta's approach towards unrest in the La Convención region, it took stronger measures to deal with labor disorders in northern and central Peru during late 1962 and early 1963.

In December, 1962 bloody riots at the copper mines at La Oroya in central Peru and the large commercial sugar

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<sup>42</sup>Villanueva, Un año bajo el sable, p. 141.

<sup>43</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 26.

plantations near the north coast town of Chiclayo, resulted in the Junta's roundup of communist labor leaders and other leftists during the first week of January, 1963. Prior to the mass arrests of leftist leaders in early January, the Junta had allowed communist labor organizers a relatively free hand in gaining new adherents. Pérez Godoy had lent his support for these activities by attending a meeting of the communist-controlled port workers union.<sup>44</sup> This policy was followed in an apparent effort to counteract APRA's strength in Peru's labor movement. Nevertheless, an abrupt reversal of this strategy was initiated by the military government after the outbreak of violence and sabotage at the end of 1962.

During the third week of December a strike by four thousand members of the metal workers union at the U.S. owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation complex at La Oroya, erupted into rioting which caused one death, numerous injuries and resulted in \$4 million in damage to the Cerro operation's facilities.<sup>45</sup> The government attributed the rioting to the communist Frente de Liberación Nacional and sent the Minister of Government and Police, General

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<sup>44</sup>The New York Times, January 14, 1963, p. 12.

<sup>45</sup>Peruvian Times, December 21, 1962, p. 1.



Germán Pagador Blondet, to personally deal with the disturbances.<sup>46</sup>

The rioting at La Oroya was followed on January 2, 1963 by even more violent clashes between workers and police at the Hacienda Pátapo in the sugar raising area near Chiclayo. A series of fires set by the labor agitators caused over \$1 million damage to the Hacienda's buildings and crops. In the ensuing confrontations between guardia civil units and rioting workers, three persons were killed and twenty injured (including seven policemen).<sup>47</sup> According to Pérez Godoy the disturbances at La Oroya and Chiclayo were the work not only of "elements with communist tendencies" but also Apristas and some members of the oligarchy who were trying to tarnish the image of the military government as the 1963 elections drew nearer.<sup>48</sup> In any event, the Junta arrested only a few APRA members and no prominent wealthy Peruvians in its sweeping crackdown on leftist groups launched on January 4.

On the night of January 4 and throughout the following day police and other government agents arrested over eight

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid., and Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire.

<sup>47</sup>El Comercio, January 3, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup>Pérez Godoy questionnaire.

hundred known communists and members of other leftist groups in a carefully coordinated effort throughout Peru.<sup>49</sup> Over three hundred arrests were made in Lima, including General (retired) César Pando Esgúsqiza, the FLN presidential candidate in the 1962 elections, Luis Alvarado, head of the bank employees union, and Guillermo Sheen, chief of the commercial employees union, both of which were communist-dominated.<sup>50</sup>

After the government suspended constitutional guarantees in the wake of the mass arrests on January 5, General Pagador Blondet charged that the Junta had acted to destroy a communist conspiracy which was directed through Havana with headquarters in Prague.<sup>51</sup> A government communique issued on January 6 claimed that the conspiracy involved a wide range of leftist groups which planned to launch a series of hit and run raids between January 15 and 20. These raids would involve the destruction of bridges, fuel storage areas, communications facilities and military installations. Key military and police leaders were also said to be targets for assassination.<sup>52</sup> The government's statement charged

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<sup>49</sup> El Comercio January 6, 1963, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, January 11, 1963, p. 1. Villanueva, Ejército peruano, claims that the number arrested was actually 1,500 to 2,000.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., and The New York Times, January 7, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> La Crónica, January 7, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup> Peruvian Times, January 11, 1963, p. 1.

that the first phase of the conspirators' operation had already begun with the infiltration of the nation's labor movement and the initiation of a series of violent strikes like those at Cerro de Pasco and Chiclayo.<sup>53</sup> The day before the issuance of the communique the government demonstrated its newly adopted hard line against strikes by using tanks to suppress the seizure of a Callao shoe factory by its 1,200 workers.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the severity of the government's charges, only two hundred of those originally arrested on January 4 and 5 were detained for an extended period. This group was taken to the El Sepa Penal Colony in the Department of Loreto where they were gradually released until only sixty remained to stand trial.<sup>55</sup> Eventually, none of the suspects was ever convicted due to a lack of sufficient evidence and the government was never able to validate its charges of a widespread communist conspiracy.<sup>56</sup> The Junta's anti-communist campaign was a direct shift from its policy of maintaining an open political climate with the continuance

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>El Comercio, January 8, 1963, p. 1, and Villanueva, Un año bajo el sable, pp. 163-199.

<sup>56</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, pp. 287-288.

of full constitutional liberties. Moreover, the government crackdown followed soon after the conservative press chided the Junta for allowing communist infiltration of the labor and student movements. La Prensa charged that the communists were using their new freedom to instigate violent attacks on policemen and soldiers and promote the destruction of private property, such as occurred in the riots at La Oroya.<sup>57</sup> The thrust of the newspapers' argument was that by using communists to displace APRA elements in the nation's labor movement, the Junta was exposing soldiers and policemen to the risk of being killed or injured by subversives whom the military leaders erroneously imagined they could control for their own benefit.<sup>58</sup> Whether the Junta acted in direct response to the charges of the conservative press is not certain. But military leaders clearly perceived the subversive potential of Peru's small cadres of communist, trotskyite and castroite militants. With the arrest and detention of most of the nation's leftist leaders, the military government embarked on a more conservative political course that de-emphasized reformism. The most important casualty of this policy shift was Junta president Pérez Godoy.

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<sup>57</sup> La Prensa, December 22, 1962, p. 1.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., and Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 317.

The first reports of dissension within the Junta appeared in January 1963 after the date of retirement for Pérez Godoy from the armed forces and Navy Commander and Chief, Admiral Juan Francisco Torres Matos, had passed. Torres Matos was replaced as navy commander by Vice-Admiral Florencio Texeira on January 1, but both he and Pérez Godoy retained their positions in the military Junta.<sup>59</sup> At a news conference on January 11, Pérez Godoy emphatically denied rumors of divisions within the military government and insisted that both his and Torres Matos' retirement would not have any effect upon their continued presence in the military government.<sup>60</sup> One week later, at another press conference, the Junta president raised the controversial issue of the International Petroleum Company's contract in the same manner that was instrumental in the removal of General Bossio from the government in October, 1962. He claimed that the military government considered the question of the IPC contract to be of national importance and insisted that plans existed to give the issue a "constitutional solution" before the Junta left office.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>El Comercio, January 2, 1963, p. 4.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., January 12, 1963, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, January 18, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup>El Comercio, January 17, 1963, p. 1, and Peruvian Times, January 18, 1963, p. 1.



As was the case when General Bossio announced an imminent settlement of the IPC question, after Pérez Godoy's pronouncement no further statement was made by the government. Instead, during early February the three other members of the Junta presented their colleague with a memorandum demanding that he adopt a more restricted role as president of the Junta. Specifically, they insisted that Pérez Godoy 1) abolish his monthly national television addresses and his frequent news conferences; 2) not make any decision of national importance without consulting the three other members of the Junta; 3) remove himself and his family from the National Palace as a place of residence; 4) cease issuing decree laws on matters that required prolonged study; and 5) help assure that the Junta's full attention would be devoted to conducting the national elections as scheduled on June 9 and subsequently transferring the executive power to the newly elected president on July 28.<sup>62</sup> The demands presented in the memorandum reflect the principal issues causing intense friction between Pérez Godoy and the other co-presidents of the Junta. Generals Lindley López and Vargas Prada along with Admiral Torres Matos insisted that Pérez Godoy must immediately comply with these demands if he was to remain a member of the ruling Junta.<sup>63</sup> Throughout

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<sup>62</sup>Villanueva, Ejercito Peruano, p. 290.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.





February, Pérez Godoy complied with all of these demands with the exception of transferring his residence from the National Palace. He refrained from conducting press conferences and did not make important policy decisions.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, the serious split in the military leadership became public knowledge and the topic of gossip-type articles in the national press.

The news magazine Caretas in mid-February reported that the differences among the Junta members extended even to their wives. The wife of General Pedro Vargas Prada was said to be extremely upset that Pérez Godoy, in his post of president of the Junta, was receiving a larger salary than her husband. Moreover, because of Pérez Godoy's position, his wife was given the directorship of a national charitable organization and that caused even more hard feelings according to the magazine.<sup>65</sup> This public airing of personal problems among the Junta members undoubtedly heightened the tension among the co-presidents. Less than three weeks after the article appeared, a confrontation between General Lindley López and Pérez Godoy resulted in the latter's removal from the military government.

Despite Pérez Godoy's compliance with nearly all the demands contained in the memorandum of early February,

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Caretas, February 1-15, 1963, p. 10.

Lindley López provoked a showdown with the Junta president on February 28 by resigning from the government to protest Pérez Godoy's personalist conduct in office.<sup>66</sup> In the two days following Lindley López's resignation a series of meetings involving the Junta, the cabinet and other members of the armed forces high command were held to resolve the crisis. These meetings resulted in the decision to reject the resignation of Lindley López while instead demanding that Pérez Godoy renounce his post in the military government.<sup>67</sup>

In the early morning hours of March 3, Lindley López and the other two co-presidents in the Junta acted to assure Pérez Godoy's swift removal from office. The National Palace was surrounded by troops from the army's anti-guerrilla ranger unit. Then soldiers armed with machineguns accompanied air force General Carlos Silas Baroni and his army colleague General Rudolfo Belaúnde into the building and escorted Pérez Godoy and his family from the executive mansion at 6:30 A.M.<sup>68</sup> After the deposed Junta president was taken to his permanent residence in the Lima suburb of Miraflores he made a brief statement denying the charges of

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<sup>66</sup>El Comercio, March 3, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., March 4, 1963, pp. 1, 6.

personalism that had been used by the other Junta members as a justification for his removal from office. He also insisted that his former colleagues did not intend to deport him or make him a prisoner. Guardia civil sentries were placed outside Pérez Godoy's residence, however, immediately following his arrival.<sup>69</sup>

After assuming Pérez Godoy's post in the military government, Lindley López claimed that the action was taken for purely institutional reasons. He said: "We did not overthrow the government last July to enthrone Pérez Godoy as a dictator."<sup>70</sup> Elaborating, Lindley López claimed that the personal way in which Pérez Godoy ran his office was contrary to the collective organization of the presidency.<sup>71</sup>

Other interpretations have been offered as to the exact reasons for Pérez Godoy's ouster besides those presented by Lindley López. According to La Prensa, Pérez Godoy's friendship with former President Manuel Odría prompted the ousted Junta member to favor Odría's interests over those of Belaúnde's in making government appointments. Lindley López' strong advocacy of Belaúnde's candidacy thus led to the

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>70</sup>The New York Times, March 4, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

crisis which toppled Pérez Godoy.<sup>72</sup> Similar to this version is Víctor Villanueva's suggestion that Pérez Godoy had actually attempted to cement a pact among Odría, Haya de la Torre, and himself to block the victory of Belaúnde in the coming elections. This was the main reason for his removal according to this interpretation.<sup>73</sup>

Pérez Godoy himself pointed to the unwillingness of the three co-presidents to continue the reforms initiated while he was Junta president as the main reason for his dismissal.<sup>74</sup> He correctly maintained that the tax reform measures initiated by the military government on January 1, 1963 were reversed soon after Lindley López replaced him. On March 21 the Junta issued a decree law that reduced corporate levies, eliminated the special government tax on fish tonnage, and lowered taxes on upper income groups. Taxes on incomes ranging from one million to five million soles per year (\$37,300 to \$186,000) were reduced from thirty-eight to thirty-four per cent.<sup>75</sup> Pérez Godoy claimed that these tax reductions forced the Junta to order a

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<sup>72</sup>La Prensa, March 10, 1963, p. 1. See also Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 319, Villanueva, Ejército peruano, 291 and Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 6.

<sup>73</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 291.

<sup>74</sup>Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., and Peruvian Times, March 29, 1963, p. 1.

comprehensive four per cent cut in government spending for the remainder of its tenure in office.<sup>76</sup>

While it is true that the cancellation of the tax increases initiated while Pérez Godoy was in office indicated that a more conservative fiscal policy was followed by the military government after March 3, these reductions did not foreshadow a complete abandonment of the reform programs begun earlier. The pilot agrarian reform project in La Convención was, of course, initiated less than a month after Pérez Godoy was deposed. On March 29 the Junta also announced that its housing construction program would continue; it released plans to build or improve 12,000 homes for teachers at a cost of \$35 million (part of which would be funded by foreign assistance loans).<sup>77</sup> Additionally, the National Planning Institute and the National Housing Bank were encouraged to continue their operations during the final five months of the military government.<sup>78</sup> But because very few substantive reforms were begun during this period and because the tax measures of late March clearly benefited the wealthy, some critics charged that with the rise of

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<sup>76</sup> Pérez Godoy interview and questionnaire.

<sup>77</sup> El Comercio, March 29, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Both of these institutions became important for national planning and urban housing programs during the Belaúnde administration and the military government that took office in 1968.

Lindley López to the presidency of the Junta the plutocracy was better served.<sup>79</sup> In the same vein, the new Junta chief's praise of the United States as the "Great Democracy of the North" during a press conference on March 29 also caused consternation among Peruvian nationalists who had earlier applauded the Junta's firm public position towards Washington.<sup>80</sup>

Despite the charges that he led the Junta away from the reforms initiated under Pérez Godoy, Lindley López' comments after the 1963 elections offer evidence that he favored some of the key progressive measures enacted by the military government. On June 15, 1963 Lindley López proudly pointed to the reforms the Junta enacted. He claimed that the military government "had broken with a bad tradition. . . . In the last twelve months, the government has made much progress. . . . It has created a Housing Bank and set down the necessary platform for agrarian reform. We have created an Institute for Planning that has been well received."<sup>81</sup> These comments notwithstanding, Lindley López and his colleagues Torres Matos and Vargas Prada were still primarily political caretakers.

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<sup>79</sup>Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 292.

<sup>80</sup>El Comercio, March 30, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>81</sup>Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 5.

Lindley López continued to insist in the face of much skepticism that the Junta was fully committed to leaving office on July 28 after a new president had been elected.<sup>82</sup> The ultimatum given to Pérez Godoy in early February, which in part demanded the government's full attention be devoted to facilitating a smooth voting process in 1963, foreshadowed the style of the military government after the dismissal of the first Junta president. Moreover, when Fernando Belaúnde Terry cemented a political alliance in February 1963 that greatly enhanced his presidential chances, the Junta was given an added incentive to hold the elections as scheduled.

#### A Return to the Barracks

In late February, 1963 Belaúnde's Acción Popular consummated an agreement with the Partido Democrático Cristiano. PDC leaders pledged their badly needed electoral support in Lima and Arequipa.<sup>83</sup> Also aiding Belaúnde's cause was the absence of all but one candidate from the extreme left in the presidential field. The left had been dispersed and its key leaders imprisoned after the January, 1963 roundup by

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<sup>82</sup> El Comercio, March 4, 1963, p. 1, and March 30, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>83</sup> Peruvian Times, March 1, 1963, p. 1, and Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 11.

the Junta. Therefore no candidates were presented by the Partido Socialista, the Partido Social Progresista and the Frente Liberación Nacional whose standard bearers had garnered a total of nearly sixty thousand votes in the 1962 elections. Only a little known candidate, Mario Samame Boggio, represented the "independent left" in the 1963 elections. Therefore, Belaúnde was able to gain the vast majority of these votes as well as those of the Partido Democrático Cristiano.<sup>84</sup>

Armed forces' support for Belaúnde was also a critical factor in the 1963 elections. With the passage of the new electoral statute and the close supervision of the registration process by the Junta during 1963, the military assumed almost complete responsibility for the conduct of the elections. Yet, deposed Junta president Pérez Godoy later claimed that there were voting irregularities involving the use of blank ballots that favored Belaúnde in the Aprista strongholds of Cajamarca and Trujillo.<sup>85</sup> Although Haya de la Torre and Odría were again allowed to seek the presidency, both candidates were clearly unacceptable to the officer corps.<sup>86</sup> It seems likely that the military would have again

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<sup>84</sup> Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," pp. 9-11, and Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 320.

<sup>85</sup> Pérez Godoy questionnaire.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru.



intervened to prevent the victory of Haya de la Torre or Odría had such been the result of the balloting in 1963.

Odría's last minute pact with Haya de la Torre immediately before the coup of July 18 made him even more objectionable to many officers who considered him the symbol of intrigue and political reaction.<sup>87</sup> The military government decided to risk allowing Odría and Haya de la Torre to run again in 1963 because they controlled the electoral machinery and Belaúnde's presidential chances appeared decidedly better than they had been before the 1962 elections. The armed forces leaders also recognized that the cancellation of the candidacies of Odría and Haya de la Torre would have made the electoral process a political sham; this would have unquestionably weakened Belaúnde's legitimacy once he assumed the presidency.

In the elections held on June 9, 1963 Belaúnde emerged a decisive victor over both Haya de la Torre and Odría. The final vote tabulation showed Belaúnde with 708,931 or 39 per cent, while Haya de la Torre tallied 623,532 or 34.3 per cent and Odría trailed 463,325 and 25.5 per cent.<sup>88</sup> Of the three candidates, only Odría lost votes from the previous election, and the relative honesty of the voting

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<sup>87</sup>Bourricaud, Power and Society, p. 320.

<sup>88</sup>Peruvian Times, June 21, 1963, p. 1.

is demonstrated by the 66,000 vote increase in the APRA chief's total. Belaúnde's victory was attributable to his ability to harness the votes of the far left, which had gone to three different candidates in 1962, and his alliance with the PDC, whose candidate had polled nearly 50,000 votes in the previous election. In the 1963 balloting Mario Samame Boggio attracted only a miniscule one per cent of the total votes cast, opening the way for Belaúnde's electoral gains.<sup>89</sup>

In the congressional balloting, however, Belaúnde's Acción Popular fell far short of gaining a majority in the senate or the chamber of deputies. The AP and PDC bloc won only twenty of the forty-five seats in the upper chamber while APRA controlled eighteen seats and Odría's UNO the remaining seven.<sup>90</sup> Of the 140 seats in the chamber of deputies, Belaúnde's forces won only fifty seats, Apristas occupied forty-eight and the UNO twenty-seven. Five seats went to independent candidates.<sup>91</sup>

In view of his party's minority position in the congress, Belaúnde tried to establish a modus operandi with APRA and the UNO in order to obtain a working legislative majority. After a series of conferences between Belaúnde,

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<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

Odría and Haya de la Torre during early July, however, the president-elect failed to reach an agreement. An important item impeding an accord was Belaúnde's proposed agrarian reform program, which neither the UNO or the APRA representatives were ready to support.<sup>92</sup> After Belaúnde's efforts to construct a legislative coalition fell through, APRA and the UNO arrived at an agreement on July 26 to control the election of congressional officers in the voting that occurred the following day.<sup>93</sup> Thus when Belaúnde took the oath of office on July 28, he faced a presidential tenure with a hostile congress.

In strict accordance with the repeated statements of the Junta during 1962 and 1963, General Lindley López delivered the presidential sash to Belaúnde on July 28. The Junta was obviously pleased with the results of the election; soon after Belaúnde declared victory, the chief of the military household of the Junta called at his private residence to present the congratulations of the three co-presidents of the military government.<sup>94</sup> When the armed forces officers returned to their barracks after restoring

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<sup>92</sup>Ibid., July 12, 1963, p. 1, July 19, 1963, p. 1, and August 2, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., August 2, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup>El Comercio, July 3, 1963, p. 1.



the presidency to civilian control, there was a strong current of opinion in the Lima press to the effect that the military--having witnessed the election of a candidate closely allied with their professional interests--would now be satisfied to remain politically aloof in the years to come.<sup>95</sup> But Richard Patch, the American Universities Field Staff representative in Peru, offered a more insightful contemporary analysis of the new president's relationship with the armed forces:

The officers expect much and they tend to be impatient. If Belaúnde is unable to resolve differences and undertake reforms by constitutional means, there remain officers who believe that the welfare of the country is above the constitution and bears no relationship to the observance of democratic processes. The memory of the coup of July 18, 1962 lingers.<sup>96</sup>

The impatience of armed forces officers that Patch refers to resulted from their feeling that the military should be in the forefront of the campaign for basic change in Peruvian society; civilian leaders would have to allow for their greater participation in the process of national development. This institutional self-confidence stemmed, in great part, from the military man's belief that he was a well-educated professional.

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<sup>95</sup>Víctor Villanueva, ¿Nueva mentalidad militar en le Perú? (Lima, 1969), p. 7.

<sup>96</sup>Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," p. 14.



The Armed Forces in 1963

In sharp contrast with the inadequate level of professional military training at the end of the Benavides administration in 1939, the Peruvian officer of 1963 was one of the most highly schooled in all of Latin America. Army officers, after four years of preparation at the military academy, were expected to undergo eighteen months of specialized training before even being considered for promotion to captain. And if an officer wanted to advance beyond the rank of major it was almost mandatory to complete a two-year, three thousand hour training course at the Escuela Superior de Guerra.<sup>97</sup> Especially after 1950, entrance into the ESG became highly competitive, and despite being permitted to apply up to four separate times for admission, it has been estimated that only thirty to fifty per cent of the applicants were eventually successful.<sup>98</sup>

A few top graduates of the ESG were sent overseas to complete specialized command courses in the United States (and to a lesser extent Europe) after finishing their training in Peru. Promising officers in the navy and air force

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<sup>97</sup>Interview with Víctor Villanueva, July 27, 1974, Lima, Peru, and Astiz and García, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies," p. 672.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

also attended U.S. military schools to supplement their advanced training. Seven of the eleven members of the original military government that took office after the July 18, 1962 coup trained for extended periods in the U.S. General Lindley López attended the Command School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during 1946-1947, as did his Co-President, General Pedro Vargas Prada. Vargas Prada's air force colleagues, Generals Jesus Melgar Escuti (Minister of Agriculture) and José Galiarde Schiaffino (Minister of Labor) each spent more than eighteen months in the United States during the mid-1940's studying at air force installations in Texas. The highly respected Foreign Minister, Vice-Admiral Luis Edgardo Llosa, also took intensive training at the United States Navy's Fleet Sonar School at Key West, Florida during the late 1940's.<sup>99</sup>

A number of military men, including Colonels Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, José Benavides, and Alfredo Arrisueno, were among a later generation of officers who rose to prominent positions in the armed forces after 1963. Before that year they had completed service at such installations as Fort Leavenworth, Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>U.S. Congressional Record, Senate, 1962, p. 15423.

<sup>100</sup>Marvin Alisky, Peruvian Political Perspective (Tempe, Arizona, 1975), pp. 17-18.



Many graduates of the ESG and advanced foreign military training schools served as instructors at Peru's various military education centers after the completion of their command training. Both Generals Lindley López and Pérez Godoy taught at the ESG after graduating from that institution. Lindley López also served as director of the Cavalry School and the Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú (CIMP) during the late 1940's and early 1950's.<sup>101</sup> With the military's strong commitment to education it was possible for an officer, if he was one of the few selected to study at the CAEM, to spend nearly one third of his thirty-five year military career in a variety of service schools. Up to one half of an officer's career could be directly related to educational pursuits if he also served as an instructor or an administrator in these schools.<sup>102</sup> Before 1963 leading military educators clearly perceived the critical role of education in molding the Peruvian armed forces into a modern, professional institution capable of assuming an active role in the struggle against the nation's backwardness. The first CAEM director, General José del Carmen Marín, stated this concept clearly when he said: "When we [the Peruvian military]

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<sup>101</sup>"La Junta Militar del Gobierno," RMP, LVII, 671 (July-August, 1962), 4.

<sup>102</sup>Astiz and García, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation Training, and Political Tendencies," p. 673.

have a solid school system, nobody will be able to stop us."<sup>103</sup>

Understandably, after 1939, military promotions were closely linked to one's ranking in the military academy graduating class. Between 1940 and 1965 eighty per cent of the officers reaching the rank of general de division (division general) graduated in the top twenty-five per cent of their academy class. For general de brigada (brigadier general) the figure was nearly fifty-four per cent. As regards the officer corps in general, without attendance at the academy it became almost impossible to rise through the ranks to the grade of second lieutenant after 1950. Between 1951 and 1965 less than four per cent of the new members of the army officer corps were promoted from the ranks. This is in sharp contrast with the figure of twenty-seven per cent for the period 1936-1950.<sup>104</sup>

The emphasis on intensive education and the direct relationship between academic rank and professional promotion helped to create the armed forces' self-image as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society. It was true that politics, family ties and the traditional

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<sup>103</sup>Astiz and García, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation Training, and Political Tendencies," p. 672.

<sup>104</sup>Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica, 1969), p. 7, and Villanueva, Ejército peruano, p. 408.

military criterion of discipline still played a critical role in professional advancement in 1963.<sup>105</sup> But talented military men were not as stifled by these factors as they had been until the administration of Manuel Odría. Because of his comprehensive training, the outstanding young Peruvian officer of 1963 had far more confidence in himself and his institution than earlier generations of military men. This led him to perceive an expanded role for the armed forces in national affairs and to be less tolerant of civilian politicians who failed to find solutions for pressing national problems. President Fernando Belaúnde Terry--a civilian technocrat whom armed forces officers trusted more than they did most civilian leaders--was faced with this reality as he began his term in July, 1963.

### Conclusion

The 1962-1963 military government manifested the changing role of the armed forces in Peruvian society. Neither Generals Lindley López nor Pérez Godoy were as avidly reformist as many younger officers who promoted the military

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<sup>105</sup> Astiz and García, "The Peruvian Military, Achievement Orientation Training and Political Tendencies," argue that the Peruvian military of the 1960's is still subject to the traditional problems of nepotism and an overemphasis on the issue of discipline versus academic merit in the armed forces promotion process. The authors are fundamentally skeptical of the military's self-proclaimed image as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society.

as the principal agent of change in Peru. None of the four co-presidents of the Junta had attended the CAEM, and that institution's contribution to the reform programs of the military government was not significant. Additionally, all members of the Junta, with the possible exception of Pérez Godoy, perceived themselves essentially as political caretakers during the twelve months they held power. Nevertheless, the military leaders introduced substantive reforms aimed at immediately reducing the potential for internal subversion while at the same time establishing the framework for long term change.

Significantly, the military government acted in a unified institutional fashion and not as an extension of an individual leader's personal ambitions. Pérez Godoy's ouster was in part due to his unwillingness to conform to the collective style of leadership advocated by the other Junta members. His fall can also be interpreted as a rejection of the old style of military politics that benefited the careers of leaders like Sánchez Cerro, Benavides and Odría. Politically, what was of paramount importance to the military government was the transfer of executive leadership to Fernando Belaúnde Terry, whom the armed forces leadership felt was least likely to reverse the trend of cautious reformism they had begun. This transfer was successfully accomplished despite a growing belief within the

officer corps that existing political institutions were incapable of implementing the reforms necessary to insure national development and commensurate internal security. The increasing acceptance of this belief by growing numbers of military men set the tone of Belaúnde's relationship with the armed forces for the ensuing five years.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSION

The two primary influences upon the professional development of the Peruvian armed forces in the period 1939-1963 were national politics and the growing commitment of military men to broaden the dimensions of their role in national affairs. The military was the dominant force in national political affairs for the entire period of this study. No Peruvian president after 1912 assumed office without the participation of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the very weakness of the civilian sector in relation to the military produced much of the corporate disunity that plagued the armed forces until the late 1950's.

The repeated use of ambitious and discontented military men by competing civilian political power groups stemmed from their own lack of broad-based appeal among the Peruvian populace. Even APRA, which was clearly the strongest political party in the nation, lacked sufficient political strength to achieve power independent of the military. This is demonstrated by APRA's failure in the relatively honest elections of 1931 and 1962. A case in point was the 1939 elections when Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was forced to rely

heavily upon the powerful support of General Oscar Benavides in order to be elected president. But characteristically, Benavides' backing of his close political confidant spawned the widespread conspiracy of General Antonio Rodríguez Ramírez, which included both Apristas and rightist opponents of Benavides. As president, Prado was compelled--even after the unifying impact of the Ecuador War--to manipulate armed forces promotions and other internal military affairs because of his need to strengthen his tenuous hold on political power.

Prado's interference in primarily military matters for partisan political purposes was nothing new. This tactic had been employed by most Peruvian chief executives before 1939. Presidents Leguía and Benavides were particularly skillful in the use of promotions and transfers as effective political tools, and Prado followed their example with a good degree of success. But the end result of repeated civil-military intrigues and the infusion of partisan politics into such sensitive issues as promotions and military assignments was factionalism, frustration and very poor armed forces morale. These problems were most severe during the chaotic Sánchez Cerro era and again during the last ten months of the Bustamante regime. But it was during the first Prado regime that activist army junior officers first clearly articulated their disgust with the state of their

profession and their distrust of senior officers and civilian politicians they felt were responsible for the armed forces' problems.

The junior army officers who created the Comité Revolucionaria de Oficiales del Ejército (CROE) in 1944 correctly complained that the politicization of the armed forces had undermined the basis of military professionalism. These officers sought to promote a "higher concept of discipline" because they believed that discipline was the most important quality of a good officer. Discipline by their definition meant a strict abstention from politics. Many members of CROE including its founder Major Víctor Villanueva also sought badly overdue reforms of military regulations and procedures that would have modernized the internal structure of the armed forces. The paradox of the CROE movement was that they employed political activism to accomplish their objectives. The Ancón revolt of 1945 and the far more serious Callao rebellion of 1948 were partly initiated by officers affiliated with CROE who were convinced that revolution was the only course left open to them. It was logical for CROE dissidents in 1945 and navy enlisted men in 1948 to ally with APRA elements because that party was the only broad-based political power group in the nation.

The nature of APRA's relationship with the armed forces is one of the fundamental problems of this study. Aprismo



was the only political movement in Peru before the emergence of Fernando Belaúnde Terry's Acción Popular that demonstrated any real political strength or more than a token commitment to social and political reform. During the period 1931-1948 APRA elements allied with dissident junior officers who sought substantive military reforms or were simply disgusted with the conservative politics of their senior officers and the nation's civilian political leaders. The most notable examples of this after 1939 were the Ancón and Callao revolts. But APRA leaders were also willing to conspire with senior officers whose interests often conflicted with those of their junior colleagues. In 1939 when APRA supported General Rodríguez, and then again in 1948 when Haya de la Torre attempted to enlist the revolutionary support of Generals José del Carmen Marín and Juan de Dios Cuadros, the mutual distrust between the high-ranking dissidents and militant junior officers and enlisted men helped doom both movements to failure. APRA leaders adopted these tactics because they were prepared to use any methods to achieve national power. But their methods resulted in the alienation of both radical armed forces revolutionaries and rightist military commanders. After 1948 APRA was no longer a revolutionary force in Peru nor a serious threat to the unity of the officer corps. But its swing to the right during the 1950's failed to convince many officers that the party was no longer dedicated

to destroying the armed forces as Admiral Guillermo Tirado Lamb claimed before the 1962 elections. Thus the thirty year old rivalry that existed between APRA and the armed forces was an important factor in the annulment of the 1962 electoral process. By 1962, however, the military's institutional self-image had undergone a marked transformation from the years of APRA's revolutionary activism of the 1940's.

Based primarily on an increasingly sophisticated conception of the dimensions of national defense, the armed forces' professional perspectives widened to encompass social and economic functions that, for the most part, had been traditionally within the realm of the civilian sector. The first solid indication that the armed forces were adopting a broader view of national defense came with the framing of the Army General Staff study entitled the "Exposition of the Army on the War Strength Organization" in 1944. The total war concepts outlined by the French in the late 1930's and employed to their fullest extent by the major combatants during World War II prompted this army study. But efforts to initiate the military and administrative programs proposed by the general staff met with little success. It was not until the late 1950's that an armed forces joint command was created and many of the administrative procedures and internal military regulations were modernized.

In the meantime, however, intellectually active army officers had recognized the realities of the post-1945 world military power structure based upon the possession of atomic weaponry. This meant that the Peruvian armed forces' military potential would always be severely restricted by its limited conventional equipment and Peru's social and economic backwardness. This was recognized as the reality of the armed forces situation by army intellectuals such as Generals Carmen Marín and Marcial Romero Pardo. Those men sought to use the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) as an agency for outlining a more pragmatic professional role for the armed forces as well as providing the best possible education for promising military officers.

The CAEM became the single most important institution for rationalizing the armed forces' role as an agent for Peru's economic and social development. CAEM strategists linked development with national defense because they reasoned that Peru's military strength, the potential for internal subversion and the possibility of external military invasion were all intricately related to the nation's economic and social progress. During the 1950's, as armed forces officers became better trained and in some cases highly schooled in sophisticated technical fields, they began to logically assume that the military should properly plan and conduct important development projects. Officers at the CAEM thus

prepared the regional project for the Peruvian selva area in 1958, but it was subsequently rejected by the conservative civilian Prime Minister, Pedro Beltrán.

While administrators, instructors and students at the CAEM most effectively articulated a broader mission for the military in national affairs, they were not exclusive proponents of a social function for the armed forces. This had been a consistent, if not always frequently stated, theme in the writings of army officers since 1904. After 1950, proposals for the military's participation in education, transportation, communication and public administration projects became a very common subject of articles in the nation's leading armed service journals.

The widespread acceptance of the armed forces' commitment to social action projects is demonstrated by the 1962 assessment of the armed forces as a "physically and intellectually prepared force" oriented towards the solution of Peru's national problems by the conservative Navy Minister, Guillermo Tirado Lamb. It is even more strongly illustrated by the support of the candidacy of the civilian technocrat, Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1962 by a significant majority of the officer corps. With the failure of the Belaúnde candidacy in 1962, the ensuing actions of the military government reflected the military's acceptance of the most basic precepts of the armed forces' emerging theory

of national defense. The military government's pilot agrarian reform project in the La Convención region indicated that the Junta recognized that reform could be an effective tool for defusing tensions among the rural population. Despite the very limited nature of this agrarian reform program, it still represented the first substantive effort by any Peruvian regime to initiate desperately needed reform in Peru's agrarian sector.

The July, 1962 coup and the ouster of General Ricardo Pérez Godoy in March, 1963 from the Junta also marked a critical turning point in this study. These actions represented the high point of institutional solidarity for the armed forces up to that time. Efforts by the Joint Command to enlist the support of the entire officer corps before the coup, and the institutional nature of the military government once it assumed power were sharp departures from the patterns of past golpes and the personalist rule of military caudillos like Sánchez Cerro, Benavides, and Odría. Pérez Godoy's fall from power was partly the result of his efforts to challenge the strength of the Junta's commitment to collective leadership.

The officer corps was not seriously factionalized by the events of 1962-1963 as it had been by the major political controversies of the period before 1956. Junior as well as senior officers were in basic agreement that Fernando

Belaúnde Terry was the best qualified civilian political leader to direct the national development advocated by the armed forces. But the military man's traditional distrust of civilians, coupled with the unwillingness of past civilian regimes to confront Peru's basic national problems, made the armed forces a restless ally of the new president.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

This essay reviews the documents, interviews, books and articles that are cited in this study. It does not include an exhaustive listing of the literature on civil-military relations in Peru for the period examined in this dissertation. But I believe nothing of major significance is missing.

### Unpublished Primary Sources

The primary Peruvian archival collection consulted for this study was the Colección de Volantes, located in the Sala de Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú. This collection contains handbills, political propaganda, and manifestos of various legal and clandestine civilian and military groups, and is contained in folders arranged in one to three year groups for the period 1939-1963. The folders for the late 1940's and early 1960's provided the most useful material for this study, but occasional documents of importance for the remaining years made a careful perusal of these folders mandatory.

The chief sources of documentation in the United States were the National Archives in Washington and the Federal

Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. The Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Peru, Record Group 59, Serial File 823.00 (Political Affairs) and 823.20 (Military Affairs) were examined for the period 1936-1947. These documents provided invaluable commentaries on internal political developments and assessments of individual military and civilian personalities as well as the United States Government's policy towards Peru. Particularly useful for an examination of internal military affairs for the period 1940-1951 were the files of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, Record Groups 165, and 319. Access to Record Group 319 is restricted after 1945, but with a clearance from the Department of the Army (Office of the Adjutant General) I was able to review classified documents through the year 1951. All notes taken on classified documents must be reviewed by officials at the Federal Records Center or by the staff of the Department of the Army, but this process was handled swiftly and efficiently by the personnel involved with my research materials. I also found the Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Record Group 226 of occasional value for this study.

Clarification of a number of problems in this study has been provided in correspondence with Víctor Villanueva. His letters provided especially helpful information concerning the attitudes of armed forces officers regarding



promotions after the Ecuador War and the participation of APRA in the abortive electoral campaign of retired General and Senator Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz in 1950.

The list of the Peruvian military casualties in the Ecuador War with troop affiliation entitled "Relacion nominal de los oficiales, clases y soldados muertos en los acciones de armas en la fronteras del norte y nor-oriente en el conflicto con el Ecuador en 1941," is available in the Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares del Perú. This list was helpful for my study as it was the only complete list of Peruvian military casualties that I was able to locate.

#### Published Primary Sources

The Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares del Perú is the main repository for the published documents dealing with the Peruvian military. The staff lists for the army officer corps are contained in the Escalafón General del Ejército, 1939-1956, 1962-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra). The general orders for the army in addition to decrees of military governments, information on armed forces foreign study missions and punitive action taken against armed forces dissidents is found in Ordenes Generales del Ejército, 1948-1958, 1962-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra). Similar data for the other armed services and the police is provided

in the Ordenes Generales de Marina, 1947, 1950-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Marina); Ordenes Generales de Aeronautica, 1947-1953, 1955-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Aeronautica); and Ordenes Generales de Guardia Civil y Policfa, 1949 (Lima: Ministerio de Gobierno y Policfa). The source for military legislation is Legislación Militar del Perú, 1939-1963 (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra and various publishers). Two very useful Memorias (Reports) of Peruvian Ministers of the Navy are located in the Sala de Investigaciones of the Biblioteca Nacional. They are: Memoria anual presentada por el señor contralmirante Mariano H. Melgar, ministro de marina al señor presidente constitucional de la república (Lima: Ministerio de Marina, 1947-1948), and Sintesis expositiva de la gestion ministerial del vice-almirante Guillermo Tirado Lamb (Lima: Ministerio de Marina, 1962).

Presidential speeches and records of the proceedings in the national congress are found in the Sala de Investigaciones. I found the most helpful of these to be: General Manuel A. Odría, Mensaje presentado al congreso nacional por señor presidente constitucional de la república, General Manuel A. Odría (Lima: Direccion General de Información, 1955); President Manuel Odría, Principios y postulados del movimiento restaurador de Arequipa; Extractos de discursos y mensajes del General Don Manuel A. Odría (Lima: Direccion General de Información, 1956); and Perú, Congreso,

diario de los debates de las cámaras de senadores y diputados (Lima: 1945-1948). Of these Congressional records the most valuable for this study was: Diario de los debates del senado: Legislativa extraordinario de 1946, volume II (Lima: 1946).

The principal source for government expenditures and general breakdowns of military budgets (outlays for each of the three armed services without reference to specific spending proposals) for this study were: Anuario estadístico del Perú (Lima: Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1948-1949), and Anuario de estadístico del Perú (Lima: Dirección National de Estadística, Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1966). These materials are also located in the Biblioteca National. Additional information on military spending was obtained from the Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and from the Peruvian Times, which carried proposed and actual military budgets (total figures only) and news of specific purchases of military equipment by the Peruvian government.

An extremely valuable personal account of one Peruvian army officer's involvement in many of the critically important civil-military issues of the 1940's is former Major Víctor Villanueva, La sublevación aprista del 48: La tragedia de un pueblo y un partido (Lima: Milla Batres, 1973). Villanueva's first-hand account of the civil-military

conspiracies of 1948 and his own participation in the 1948 Callao revolt is the single most valuable source for these important events. Another valuable primary account of a prominent senior army officer's military and political career experiences is Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz, Memorias del general de brigada E.P. Ernesto Montagne Marckholtz (Lima: N.P., 1962).

Two valuable publications of the Peruvian armed forces dealing with the 1962 elections and the history of the army officer college are: La fuerza armada y el proceso electoral de 1962 (Lima: Fuerzas Armadas, 1963), which provides the military's version of the incidents of fraud in the election, and Historia de la escuela militar del Perú (Lima: Reprográfica, 1962), a comprehensive history of Peru's principle military training institution.

The most useful primary source material published in the United States were: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, various years), and the United States Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, various years).

#### Personal Interviews

Interviews conducted with a number of Peruvian and United States civilian and military figures who were

intricately involved in the central issues of this study provided important (and often differing) sources of information. Those interviews, which I found to be most helpful were with former army Major Víctor Villanueva (whom I conversed with at length on a number of occasions during my stay in Peru), Division General (retired) and former Co-military President of Peru in 1962, Ricardo Pérez Godoy, APRA chief Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and former United States Ambassador to Peru, James I. Loeb. Villanueva, not only provided insights into many key events in Peruvian civil-military relations during the course of this study, but was also immensely helpful in suggesting research leads. General Pérez Godoy also consented to complete a questionnaire which provided valuable interpretations of his role in the various policies and controversies of the 1962-1963 military government. Haya de la Torre kindly granted me two lengthy interviews in which the whole range of APRA's participation in national politics for the period 1930-1968 was discussed. Conversations with Ambassador Loeb in December, 1973 touched upon key internal military and civilian political issues during his tenure as United States Ambassador. They also provided helpful interpretations of the United States policy towards Peru in the period 1960-1963. Among other useful interviews were those with Fernando Schwalb López Aldana, one of the founders of the

Acción Popular and President Fernando Belaúnde Terry's first Prime Minister in 1963, and APRA leaders Ramiro Prialé and Armando Villanueva del Campo.

Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations  
and Masters Theses

By far the most valuable doctoral dissertation for this study is Allen Gerlach, "Civil-Military Relations in Peru: 1914-1945" (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1973). A useful treatment of the APRA primarily after 1950 is Edward Charles Epstein, "Motivational Bases for Loyalty in the Peruvian Aprista Party" (Champaign: University of Illinois, 1970). José Z. García, "The Velasco Coup in Peru" (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1974) provides an especially helpful discussion of the CAEM. Finally, Angela King Westwater, "Recognition of Latin American Military Regimes During the Kennedy Administration" (New York: New York University, 1967) is a masters thesis that displays solid research on the subject of U.S. policy towards Peru's military government of 1962-1963.

Newspapers

I relied heavily upon a variety of Peruvian newspapers and The New York Times for day-to-day accounts of important events throughout the time-span covered in this dissertation.

The Peruvian newspapers, for the most part, were strongly partisan in their political viewpoint. The most important exception was the Peruvian Times, the main English language newspaper in Peru. The Peruvian Times generally adopted a relatively impartial position during major political controversies, although during the Odría era it was noticeably pro-administration. This newspaper was also the best source for national economic news and particularly the role of foreign investors in Peru. The political right in Peru was represented by the two oldest papers El Comercio and La Prensa. El Comercio was also the most anti-APRA and staunchly nationalist journal in the nation. The APRA was represented by its party newspaper, La Tribuna, which was published intermitantly during the period 1939-1963. For the year 1962, I used the official government newspaper El Peruano as a source for the details of government policies and proposed programs. Other journals that were helpful for my research were: La Cronica, El Callao, Noticias, and La Jornada.

#### Peruvian Military Journals and Periodicals

Peru's principal military journals are critically important sources of military theory and the professional attitudes of the armed forces. While the writings of a few members of the officer corps do not necessarily represent

the dominant thinking of the military in general, they do reflect changing perceptions of professionalism by some of its most intellectually active officers. In my review of the military journals I found a number of articles by military men who were later to become some of the most influential leaders in their own institutions. The main journal of the Peruvian armed forces is the Revista Militar del Perú which replaced the Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina in 1919. The Revista Militar was published monthly until 1950, and then four to six times yearly thereafter. The Revista de Escuela Superior de Guerra first appeared in 1953 and soon became a leading outlet for the progressive military theories of Peruvian army officers. Actualidad Militar, beginning in 1962, served as a form of newsletter for the armed forces and provided more information on individual military figures than could be found in the other journals. The other military periodicals which I reviewed were: the Revista de Marina, the Revista Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, and the Revista del Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú. All of these military journals are located in the Centro de Estudios Historicos Militares.

The two most important Peruvian periodicals for my research purposes were the nation's leading news magazine in the early 1960's, Caretas, and the Revista Diplomatica Peruana Internacional. Caretas was characterized by its



bold reporting of controversial news items and carried interviews with many of Peru's leading civilian and military personalities. The Revista Diplomática carried occasional articles dealing with military affairs but was more oriented towards international news.

#### Secondary Sources: Books

Any review of twentieth century Peruvian civil-military relations must begin with a discussion of the ten key books of Víctor Villanueva. They provide valuable insights into the armed forces mentality and the relationship of the civilian body politic to Peru's military institutions. As a former revolutionary activist, Villanueva remains fundamentally skeptical of the military's commitment to reform, although he recognizes that the Peruvian armed forces are no longer guardians of the conservative political and social order as they were prior to the 1950's. Villanueva's best book is, perhaps his previously discussed La sublevación aprista del 48: Tragedia de un pueblo y un partido, which displays a remarkable comprehension of Peruvian politics during the 1940's. The most thorough treatment of the armed forces role in twentieth century Peru is Ejército peruano: Del caudillaje anárquico al militarismo reformista (Lima: Jurídica, 1973). His first general treatment of militarism in Peru is the now somewhat dated El militarismo en la Perú

(Lima: T. Sceuch, 1962). This book was followed by his study of the 1962-1963 military government Un año bajo el sable (Lima: T. Sceuch, 1963). Two of his books deal with the specific themes of the changing military mentality in Peru and the reasons for the new professional outlook. They are: ¿Nueva mentalidad militar en el Peru? (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1969) and 100 años del ejército peruano (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1972). Villanueva El CAEM y la revolución de la fuerza armada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1973), is the best study of this key military institution. The most complete account of Hugo Blanco's career as a peasant organizer in the Cuzco region is Villanueva Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina (Lima: Amuata, 1967). Finally, this prolific writer's latest book is the first of a proposed two-part study of the APRA's role in Peruvian national affairs; El APRA en busca del poder (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1975) best displays the careful historical research that has characterized Villanueva's most recent works.

General works dealing with the military from both an historical and political science perspective that were useful for this study are: Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of New

Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1964); Lyle N. McAlister, Anthony Maingot, and Robert Potash, The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970).

Other than Villanueva's books, the best sources for the Peruvian military in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are: Luis Humberto Delgado, El militarismo en el Perú, 1821-1930 (Lima: Imprenta Gil, 1930); Carlos Delli-piane, Historia militar del Perú, fifth ed. (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra, 1964); and Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: palacio de gobierno (Lima: Juan Mejia Baca, 1967). De la Barra, Historiografía general y militar peruana y archivos: introducción al catálogo del Archivo Historico Militar del Perú (Lima: Tallares Graficas DIET, 1962) is a fairly helpful bibliographical guide for materials dealing with nineteenth century civil-military relations.

Useful recent treatments of the post-World War II Peruvian military are: Julio Cotler, Crisis política y populismo militar en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1969); and El populismo militar como modelo de desarrollo nacional: el caso peruano (Lima: Instituto de

Estudios Peruanos, 1969). The best works in English are Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1968); Peruvian Military Relations with the United States (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970); Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1971); and Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1966). Einaudi's brief but incisive commentaries on the Peruvian armed forces provide a helpful theoretical framework for the researcher, while North's work is one of the first efforts to deal with the subject of emerging social activism in the Peruvian military. John Stewart Ambler, The French Army in Politics: 1945-1962 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966) was the most valuable source for an understanding of the French military theories that had a significant impact upon the Peruvian armed forces after 1896.

In the category of general histories Jorge Basadre, Historia de la república del Perú (12 vols. fifth edition, Lima: Historia, 1964), is the most comprehensive history of Peru through the year 1933. Useful general reviews of politics since 1895 are Enrique Chirinos Soto, El Perú frente

a junio de 1962: síntesis de la historia política de la república (Lima: Imprenta Universo, 1962); and Carlos Miró Quesada Laos, Autopsia de los partidos políticos (Lima: Imprenta Minerva, 1961). A valuable two-volume collection of essays by distinguished Peruvian scholars on a variety of social, political, economic, and military topics is José Pareja Paz-Soldan, ed., Visión del Peru en el siglo XX (Lima: Librería Stadium, 1962, 1963). Fredrick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York: Praeger, 1967), is the best history of modern Peru in English. James C. Carey, Peru and the United States, 1900-1962 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), is the only adequate study of United States-Peruvian relations.

Very incisive studies of Peru's social and political power groups are: Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (New York: Praeger, 1970); Bourricaud et al., La oligarquía en el Perú (Lima: Francisco Moncloa, 1969); Jorge Bravo Bressani, Mito y realidad de la oligarquía peruana (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1966); Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Edward Dew, Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969); and James L. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

The role of the APRA in Peruvian politics has been the subject of hundreds of studies by Peruvian and foreign scholars most of which have been too polemical to contribute significantly to legitimate scholarship. The best pro-Aprista studies are: Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953); Luis Alberto Sánchez, Haya de la Torre y el Apra (Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, 1955); and Haya de la Torre o el político (Santiago de Chile: Ercilla, 1934); Felipe Cossio del Pomar, Haya de la Torre: el indoamericano (Lima: Editorial Nueva Dia, 1946); and Carlos Manuel Cox ed., Cartas de Haya de la Torre a los prisioneros apristas (Lima: Editorial Nuevo Dia, 1946). Of Haya de la Torre's own writings the most useful for an understanding of his personal philosophy are: ¿A donde va indoamerica? (second edition, Santiago de Chile: Ercilla, 1935); El anti-imperialismo y el Apra (third edition, Lima: Editorial Amauta, 1970); La defensa continental (fourth edition, Lima: Editorial Amuata, 1967); and Trienta años de aprismo (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956).

Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass Parties of Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971) is a good balanced assessment of APRA's political programs. Robert Alexander, The Ideas and Writings of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre

(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1973), provides valuable English translations of Haya de la Torre's most important writings.

Important studies that display a strong anti-APRA viewpoint are: Víctor Villanueva, La sublevación aprista del 48: tragedia de un pueblo y un partido and El APRA en busca del poder; Eudocio Ravines, The Yenan Way (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1951); Fredrick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru; and Rogger Mercado, La revolución de Trujillo y la tracción del Apra (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1966). The best objective study of the roots of Aprismo and the party's early years is Peter Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1973). Also useful for the early years of APRA is Thomas M. Davies, Indian Integration in Peru: A Half Century of Experience, 1900-1948 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1974). José Carlos Mariátegui, 7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana (tenth edition, Lima: Biblioteca Amauta, 1965); and John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariátegui and the Myth (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), provide important insights into the ideas and struggles of the Peruvian left while APRA was emerging as its most cohesive representative during the late 1920's. Former Peruvian

President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero's personal account of his three years as chief executive, Tres años de lucha por la democracia en el Perú (Buenos Aires: Artes Gráficas Bartolome U. Chiesino, 1949), is strongly critical of the APRA's role in fomenting disorders that eventually brought his overthrow.

Peru's involvement in the Leticia conflict with Colombia, in 1933 and the Ecuador war of 1941 is treated effectively in Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). The best primarily military studies of the Ecuador war are: David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute (New York: Brookman Associates, 1964); Felipe de la Barra, El conflicto peruano-ecuatoriano y la victoriosa campaña de 1941 en las fronteras de Zarumilla y nor-oriente (Lima: Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares del Perú, 1969); General Eloy G. Ureta's personal account, Apuntes sobre una campaña, 1941 (Madrid: Editorial Antorocha, 1953); and Luis Humberto Delgado, Las guerras del Perú: campaña del Ecuador batalla de Zarumilla (Lima: Latino America, 1944). Luis A. Rodríguez, La verdad sobre la agresión peruana (Quito: n.p., 1966) presents the Ecuador version of the conflict.

The best works dealing with Peruvian elections of 1956, 1962 and 1963 are: César Martín, Dichos y hechos de la política peruana (Lima: Santa Rosa, 1963); and El preludio



de la democracia (Lima: n.p., 1956); Enrique Chrinos Soto, Cuenta y balance de las elecciones de 1962 (Lima: Villanueva, 1962); M. Guillermo Ramírez y Berrios, Examen espectral de las elecciones del 9 de junio de 1963 (Lima: Ravago, 1963); Héctor Cornejo Chávez, Nuevo principios para un nuevo Perú (Lima: El Condor, 1960); and Arnold Payne, The Peruvian Coup d' État of 1962: The Overthrow of Manuel Prado (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968).

The land invasions and peasant strikes of the early 1960's are covered most comprehensively by: Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina; Hugo Neira, Cuzco: tierra y muerte (Lima: Panamerica, 1964); Héctor Béjar, Peru 1965: Notes On A Guerrilla Experience (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Rogger Mercado, Los guerrillas del Peru (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1967); Carlos Malpica, Guerra a muerte al latifundio (Lima: Voz Rebelde, n.d.). Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America (New York: Doubleday, 1971), is the best review of these activities in English.

Fernando Belaúnde Terry's political philosophy and program for Peru's economic development prior to his election as president is outlined in his La conquista del Perú por los peruanos (Lima: Imprenta Minerva, 1959), which was translated as Peru's Own Conquest (Lima: American Studies

Press, 1965). This book contains one of the first clearly articulated appeals by a Peruvian civilian political leader for the full involvement of the armed forces in economic development projects. In this respect, it is the most important source for gaining a clear perception of Belaúnde's appeal for developmentalist-oriented armed forces personnel.

A number of works were useful as general references for this study. Jack W. Hopkins, The Government Executive of Modern Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967); Rudolph Gomez, The Peruvian Administrative System (Boulder: The University of Colorado Press, 1969); and Russell H. Fitzgibbon ed., The Constitutions of the Americas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), supplied necessary data on the workings of Peru's constitution and governmental system. Willard F. Barber, and C. Neale Ranning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter-insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966), details United States military civic action projects throughout Latin America and supplied some specific information on Peruvian army projects. Gertrude E. Heare, Trends in Latin American Military Expenditures (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971); and Joseph Loftus, Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-1965 (Santa Monica: Rand, 1968), provided data on Peru's long-term military

expenditures and served as a general check on the figures presented in the Anuario de Estadístico del Peru. Finally, an informative general reference source with a good up-to-date bibliography is Thomas E. Weil et al., Area Handbook for Peru (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972).

#### Secondary Sources: Articles

The articles contained in Peru's military journals, particularly the Revista Militar del Perú (RMP) and the Revista Escuela Superior de Guerra (RESG) provided valuable biographical sketches, information regarding foreign study missions, and most importantly insights into the changing perceptions of the Peruvian military's professional role. Among the many articles I reviewed for this study I have selected only a few of the most significant for this discussion. Two articles written over thirty years apart best exemplify the Peruvian army officer's recognition of his institution's social role and the potential of the army as an agency for change. They are: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla Concha, "La función social del ejército peruano en la organización de la nacionalidad," RMP, XXX, 10 (October, 1933), 843-872; and Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrín "El ejército de hoy y su proyección en nuestra sociedad en período de transición," RMP, LIX, 685

(November-December, 1964), 1-20. Articles in the Revista Militar during the 1940's reflected army officer's broadening definition of the concept of national defense, their recognition of Peru's need for improved educational programs, and their sensitivity concerning the armed forces' contribution to the national well-being. Some of the most representative of these articles are: Colonel Oscar N. Torres, "La instrucción militar en las universidades y escuelas superiores," RMP, XXXVII, 7 (July, 1940), 369-402; Colonel Juan Mendoza R., "La escuela militar en la obra de la educación nacional," RMP, XLV, 4 (April, 1948), 259-265; Major Colina R. Leonico, "La industria y la defensa nacional," RMP, XLII, 1 (January, 1945), 37-59; Colonel César Pando Esgusquiza, "¿El ejército es improductivo?" RMP, XLVIII, 8 (August, 1946), 371-387; Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Pérez Godoy, "La guerra moderna," RMP, XLV, 5 (May, 1948), 87-91; and Unsigned, "Las escuelas superiores del ejército norte-americano," RMP, XLIV, 8 (August, 1947), 319-322. The army's strong links to its former French military tutors is illustrated in the Revista Militar's November, 1946 issue which commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the French military mission in Peru. The entire issue is devoted to detailing the work of the mission in Peru, praising its accomplishments, and extolling the virtues of French military figures of the twentieth century.

During the 1950's and early 1960's the number of articles in the Revista Militar and the Revista Escuela Superior de Guerra which were devoted to traditional non-military issues such as public administration, education, and agrarian and Indian problems increased dramatically. Articles dealing with national planning and mobilization for national defense purposes are: Major Víctor Sánchez Marín, "El departamento de movilización integral de la nación, elemento básico del ministro de defensa nacional," RESG, II, 3 (July-August-September, 1955), 30-53; Colonel Víctor Odicio Tamarez, "Ensayo sobre lo que podría ser una ley de movilización nacional," RESG, III, 4 (October-November-December, 1956), 74-77; Unsigned, "Programa de desarrollo nacional y regional para el Perú," RESG, VIII, 2 (April-May-June, 1961), 7-38; and Captain Arturo Castilla Pizarro, "El Peru como nación--nacionalismo y conciencia nacional," RMP, LI, 613 (January-February-March, 1955), 89-101.

Some of the most useful articles dealing with the questions of Indian integration, rural reform, and communication are: Captain Marcial Figueroa Arévalo, "El oficial de ejército y la integración del indígena a la nacionalidad," RMP, LI, 621 (July-August-September, 1955), 104-108; Captain Jorge Rendón Gallegos, "El ejército y la información publica," RESG, IX, 2 (April-May-June, 1962), 83-92; Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V., "Geografía social

y humana," RMP, LI, 624 (October-November-December, 1955), 41-45; Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Medina V., "La geografía económica frente a la energía atómica," RMP, LII, 627 (January-February-March, 1956), 49-61; and Lieutenant Colonel Artemio García Vargas, "Programas de acción cívica," RMP, LVII, 708 (January-February, 1962), 49-56.

Finally, articles that were illustrative of army's concern with internal subversion and problems of command reform are: Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Gallegos Venero, "El estudio de situaciones en guerra subversiva," RESG, VII, 4 (October-November-December, 1960), 74-84; Major Rómulo Zanabria Zamudio, "Algo sobre guerra de guerrillas," RESG, III, 1 (January-February-March, 1956), 37-42; and Lieutenant Colonel Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, "La escuela comando de estado mayor de Fort Leavenworth y algunas deferencias con la nuestra," RESG, V, 2 (April-May-June, 1958), 15-35.

Three articles by Peruvian army, navy and air force personnel in José Paraja Paz-Soldan, Visión del Perú en el siglo XX give valuable general histories of the three armed services in the twentieth century. They are: Colonel Victor E. Arce, "La fuerza aérea del Peru en el siglo XX," Visión, volume I, pp. 393-443; Admiral José Valdizán Gamio, "La marina de guerra peruana en el siglo XX," Visión, volume I, pp. 351-392; and General Juan Mendoza R., "El ejército peruano en el siglo XX," Visión, volume I, pp. 291-349.

Carlos A. Astiz, and José Z. García, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training and Political Tendencies," Western Political Quarterly, XXV, 4 (December, 1972), 667-685; and Frederick M. Nunn, "Notes on the 'Junta Phenomenon' and the 'Military Regime' in Latin America," The Americas, XXXI, 3 (January, 1975), 237-251 are two very valuable discussions of the Peruvian armed forces changing professional and political orientation. Astiz and García are clearly skeptical of the Peruvian military's self-proclaimed role as the most merit-oriented institution in Peruvian society. Although lacking the depth of the Astiz-García and Nunn articles Richard L. Clinton "The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIV, 4 (Spring, 1971), 43-62 does a very fine job of tracing the relationship of the military to the principle political groups in Peru during the early 1960's. Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientación de las fuerzas armadas en el Peru," Aportes, X, 17 (January, 1971), 163-181 is a useful general discussion of Peru's changing military mentality.

The two best reviews of the secondary literature dealing with the military in Latin America are: Lyle N. M McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," Latin America Research Review, II, 1 (Fall, 1966), 5-36; and Richard C. Rankin, "The

Expanding Institutional Concerns of the Latin American Military Establishments: A Review Article," Latin American Research Review, IX, 1 (Spring, 1947), 81-109. Rankin's article is perhaps the most effective analysis of the literature on the Latin American military yet published. A careful reading of the McAlister and Rankin articles would provide the non-specialist with an invaluable introductory guide to the study of the military in Latin America.

Three articles dealing with APRA provide necessary examinations of that party's political role in Peru. Fredrick B. Pike, "The Old and the New APRA in Peru: Myth and Reality," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVIII, 2 (Autumn, 1964), 3-45, is a comprehensive and critical examination of APRA from its birth in 1924 to the flight of radical Apristas to APRA Rebelde in the early 1960's. Thomas M. Davies, "The Indigenismo of the Peruvian Aprista Party: An Interpretation," offers new insights on the early (1931) position of Haya de la Torre on the issue of foreign capital in Peru and illustrates APRA's lack of initiative in the area of agrarian reform and Indian integration. A valuable recent interpretation of APRA's in the post World War II era is Richard C. Clinton, "Apra: An Appraisal," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XII, 2 (April, 1970), 280-297. Clinton also provides a fine bibliography in his essay.



The reports of the American Universities Field Staff representative in Peru, Richard Patch, are invaluable contemporary commentaries on political and social conditions. Especially helpful for this study were, "The Peruvian Elections of 1962 and their Annulment," American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, West Coast of South American Series, IX, 6 (September, 1962); "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," AUFS, X, 1 (July, 1963); and "Peru's New President and Agrarian Reform," AUFS, X, 2 (August, 1963).

Finally, the complex issue of the Peruvian military's motivations for adopting its reformist stance are discussed in an important and appropriately titled article by Francois Bourricaud, "Los Militares: Por Qué y Para Qué," Aportes, IX, (April, 1970), 13-55. This was one of the best early articles to address the subject of the orientation of the military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado that took power in October, 1968. I have not chosen to deal with the growing literature on the post-1968 military in Peru except as it bears directly upon the central questions of my study.