CANADIAN EXPANSIONISM, 1903-1914

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ABSTRACT

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By

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In this study Canadian expansionism is seen as the expression of strong, nationalistic feelings aroused by the events surrounding the Alaska boundary award of 1903. This interpretation suggests that Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian prime minister, responded to an aroused public opinion by adopting a more independent stance in Canadian external relations. For this reason the award represented something of a diplomatic watershed in Canadian history.

Afraid that Britain would continue to sacrifice Canadian interests where the Anglo-American rapprochement was threatened, Canada decided to seize the initiative. During the period 1903-1914, Canada, therefore, exhibited interest in protecting her sovereignty in the Arctic, in seeking to acquire Newfoundland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and encouraging closer relations with the British West Indies.

Fear of American expansionist desires in these areas prompted a number of influential Canadians and Britishers

to join forces in defending what they viewed as Canada's manifest destiny. Imperialists and nationalists found themselves united in urging expansionist policies. Among the most forceful of the imperialists was Governor General Grey who was particularly interested in projects for confederation between Canada and Newfoundland. In his enthusiasm for Canadian expansion Grey exceeded the bounds of office. However, his activities were encouraged by Laurier, one of Canada's leading nationalists. Sir Wilfrid's attitude towards the Alaskan award was the astute politician's reaction to public opinion. Canadians did not easily forget what they considered to be a British "sell-out" and, thereafter, Canada exhibited greater independence in her dealings with both Britain and the United States.

The question of Canada's Arctic sovereignty was of particular interest to Captain Joseph Bernier of Quebec. In many respects the story of the government expeditions sent to Arctic waters in these years was Bernier's story. By appearing before various scientific organizations and writing to politicians, including Laurier, the captain awakened Canadians to their northern destiny. His work and that of the Royal North-West Mounted Police protected Canada against future claims by foreigners, especially Americans, to Hudson Bay and the Arctic Archipelago. Police posts and patrols in the North lent credence to Canada's claim of jurisdiction in the region. The Arctic represented the most natural and safest area of expansion for Canada.

This territory had been transferred to her by a British order-in-council and it seemed unlikely that conflict with the United States would result. Had Canada advanced a claim based on the "sector principle," as some Canadians were then urging, this might not have been true.

American interest in Newfoundland and the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon prompted the more obvious clashes of interest between Canada and the United States. Disputes over the fisheries led Canada to oppose any special arrangement between Newfoundland and the United States which did not also include Canada. This caused Robert Bond, the premier of Newfoundland, to resent Canadian interference and jeopardized chances of confederation. Bond tried to steer an independent course for his colony but he had to overcome political opponents on the island and the machinations of influential individuals in Canada. Among these, Governor General Grey was prominent. Acting on the advice of Harry Crowe, a leading union propagandist, Grey tried to influence the outcome of Newfoundland elections in 1908 and 1909. Although he was successful in winning the support of important Montreal financiers, Grey's plans were exposed and rejected by both Bond and his opponent William Morris.

Expansionism also found expression in the closer relations between Canada and the West Indies. Although more obviously of a commercial than a territorial nature, Canadian expansionism in the Caribbean had strong political

as well as commercial overtones. A number of those who promoted confederation with Newfoundland also expressed interest in annexing some of the British West Indian colonies to Canada. The main thrust of this movement came early in Robert Borden's term as prime minister.

This work is based upon primary sources to be found at the Public Archives of Canada including the recently opened files of the Department of External Affairs.

CANADIAN EXPANSIONISM, 1903-1914

By

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PREFACE

Canada is not generally considered to be an imperialist nation. Canadians like to endow their country with a certain moral superiority which does not embrace such concepts. However, Canadian expansion in the 1903-1904 period, although largely defensive, reflected the government's interest in asserting Canada's manifest destiny over a wide area and by various means. This imperialism was the natural outgrowth of the strong nationalist sentiments aroused by the Alaska award and was supported by British imperialists who wanted Canada to share the burdens of empire.

An earlier interest in the development of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic led me to the present study. As I investigated it became obvious that there was more than a coincidental relationship between the voyage of the Neptune to Hudson Bay and the Alaska Boundary negotiations and award of 1903. Upon further investigation the broader theme of Canadian expansionism in relation to Newfoundland, the French islands and the West Indies came to light.

Recently, in My First Seventy-five Years, Arthur R. M. Lower, who has described Canada's rise from

colony to nation, recalled his "personal chagrin, which echoed the country as a whole" in 1903. Lower claimed that "the Alaska boundary award will one day take its place as one of the major points of Canadian history, marking the spot where we say, for the first time as a people, that we would have to depend on ourselves." This thesis endeavours to demonstrate the validity of the foregoing conclusion by an examination of Canadian expansionism after 1903.

Some acknowledgments should be made. The early inspiration for this work came from Professor Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., now of Dalhousie University. He supervised the thesis at all stages, provided encouragement and taught in the best way--by example. In addition, he generously allowed me to make use of his own notes including some on the Bryce papers made while he was at the Bodleian. My debt to him is great.

Professors Harry Brown, Donald Lammers and Victor Hoare of Michigan State University also read the thesis and offered advice. Over the years, Professor Brown has been a benign mentor.

My two year sojurn in Ottawa, at the Public Archives of Canada, was made possible by a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship award. While at the Archives I enjoyed the courteous, efficient and knowledgeable guidance for which the staff is noted.

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CHAPTER I

ALASKA AND CANADIAN NATIONALISM

The Alaska boundary award of 1903 stands as a historical watershed in Canada's development from colony to nation. More than any other event, it laid the base of the movement for Canadian autonomy after 1914. In commenting on the award, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier did not mask his disappointment or his belief that Canada would in future exert a greater control over her own destiny. His speech to the House, on the last day of the session and two days after the decision was known, ushered in a new Canadian nationalism:

> I have often regretted also that we have not in our hands the treaty-making power, which would enable us to dispose of our own affairs. But in this matter we are dealing with a position that was forced on us--we have not the treaty-making power.[1]

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[1] House of Commons Debates, 1903, p. 14802. In his Life and Letters of Sir Wilfred Laurier, Toronto, 1921, O. D. Skelton stresses (Vol. II, p. 159) the award's effect "in demonstrating that the national current in Canadian opinion would not necessarily run thereafter in the same channel as the imperial; and the impulse it gave to independent control of foreign affairs." In The Canadian Dominion, published the same year, Skelton states:

Lord Minto, then governor general of Canada, had correctly predicted trouble over the settlement of the boundary, before it was announced that an agreement had been reached to have a judicial tribunal consider the conflicting claims advanced by Canada and the United States.[2] He knew that the Americans were unwilling to reach a compromise. President Roosevelt had made that quite clear.[3] Therefore, Britain was caught in the difficult, though not unfamiliar, position of trying to protect Canadian interests against American inroads. The position was further complicated in that Britain was abandoning her policy of "splendid isolation."[4] International tensions,

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"Canadian nationalism was growing fully as fast as Canadian imperialism."

See also, Carl George Winter, "American Impetus to Canadian Nationhood: Canadian-American Relations 1905-1927," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, February 1951). Like Skelton and most other authors, Winter considers Canadian criticism to have been directed mainly against Great Britain. For a dissenting view see: F. W. Howey, W. N. Sage, and H. F. Angus, British Columbia and the United States (Toronto, 1942), pp. 374-75.

[2]Minto to Henry Elliot, 2 December 1902, Minto Papers, Vol. 29. Elliot was Minto's uncle.

[3]Many articles and books have dealt with Roosevelt's bellicose attitude on the Alaska boundary. See in particular: Thomas A. Bailey, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaska Boundary Settlement," Canadian Historical Review, XVIII (June, 1937), 123-130; Elting E. Morison and John Blum, eds., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954), 8 vols.

[4]J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London,

the rise of America, Germany, and Japan, and the decline of British military and industrial leadership, forced Britain to move closer to the United States. After the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895-1896, the beginnings of an Anglo-American rapprochement could be detected. This was most obvious in the non-interference of each in the wars of the other.[5] Canada was to gain and to lose in the cause of Anglo-American amity; Alaska was one of the losses.

Numerous efforts had been made (prior to 1903) to have the boundary between Alaska and Canada delimited, but to no avail.[6] Although agreements on other Canadian-American problems were slowly achieved, no progress was made regarding Alaska. Both Roosevelt and Laurier wanted to settle the dispute before the situation was further

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1964). Covers the period 1895 to 1902. It is firmly based on primary souces and discusses the process whereby Britain abandoned her isolation; G. W. Monger, The End of Isolation; British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London, 1963).

[5]R. G. Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion 1898-1900 (East Lansing, 1966), questions the degree of rapprochement which occurred after the Spanish-American war.

[6]Canada and Britain had attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the Alaska and Panama Canal questions considered together, in order to win American concessions. This contributed to the failure of the Joint High Commission of 1898-1899. See R. C. Brown, Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton, 1964), Chs. X and XI; Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 (Baltimore, 1957), Chs. 3 and 4.

complicated by the presence of gold-hungry miners.[7] On his way to the Colonial Conference of 1902, Laurier took the opportunity of passing through New York to raise the issue.[8] Privately, in talks with Secretary of State John Hay, and publicly, in an interview with American reporters, Laurier made it known that he considered the Alaska boundary question to be filled with danger.[9] He referred to the unwillingness of the American government to have the dispute settled by arbitration. Upon arriving in London, he raised the question again with Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, and the American ambassador, Joseph Choate. Like Laurier, Lansdowne was also anxious to have the matter settled, but Choate was reluctant to commit

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[7]Choate to Hay, 19 July 1902; Lansdowne to Raiskes, 16 July 1902, Colonial Office Papers (hereafter C.O.) 42/890, p. 318; Alfred L. P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York, 1928), p. 144; New York Herald, 15 June 1902.

[8]"Upon the eve of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's departure for London a self-constituted sub-committee of the cabinet, made up of four or five of its most active members, Sifton included, called upon him to warn him that an attempt would be made while he was in England to get him to agree to a reference of the boundary dispute to a commission without an umpire, and urged him not to yield. Laurier declared his intention of upholding without flinching the Canadian contention." John W. Dafoe, Sir Clifford Sifton in relation to His Times (Toronto, 1931), p. 217.

[9]Roosevelt ordered American troops to Alaska on 26 March 1902. This action no doubt had something to do with Laurier's change of attitude concerning the composition of the tribunal. Philip C. Jessup. Elihu Root (New York, 1938), pp. 291-92.

his government. He only tried to make it clear that a compromise was impossible.[10]

During one of his conversations with Choate, Laurier adopted a significant change in position. In his eagerness to have the boundary question settled, Laurier let Choate know that the Canadian government "would probably not object to an arbitral tribunal composed of six members, three on each side, in spite of the objection which had previously been urged to a Commission so constituted."[11] This news was indeed a surprise to Choate. But Laurier was not finished. He also let the American ambassador know that "even if the arbitrators were to give Dyea and Skagway to Canada, it would be impossible for the Canadian Government to press for the surrender of these places which were, in fact, American towns which the Dominion Government would not desire to take over."[12] Laurier's remarks were quickly reported to Washington where they must have been received with some surprise and a great deal of satisfaction. In London, there was astonishment that "Laurier after making all the trouble of the last three or four years, has made an abject

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[10] Dennis, p. 144.

[11] Lansdowne to Raikes, 16 July 1902, C.O. 42/890, p. 318. Raikes was the British charge d'affaires at Washington.

[12] Ibid.

surrender of all the U.S. asks for."[13] Chamberlain noted rather drily: "I gathered Sir W. Laurier is in a conceding mood."[14] Later Laurier was most anxious that his conversations with Choate remain secret. In commenting on Laurier's reluctance to allow the publication of a letter reporting Choate's interpretation of the conversations Minto said:

> I have not a shadow of a doubt that Choate's version of Sir Wilfrid's views is correct . . . it is only what he has said to me dozens of times . . . [sic] besides he has had a printed copy in his hands for nearly two years and if he was not satisfied with the correctness of it he should have contradicted it before. . . . Of course his conversation with Choate absolutely stultifies him in the line he wants to adopt on the Alaska business-viz.--that he was let into the Tribunal by H. M.'s Govt.--which is sheer nonsense.[15]

Laurier's overtures were not disregarded. The Americans were convinced that his prime concern was "to save his face." This interpretation was based on Hay's interview with Laurier, during which the prime minister had indicated that he had lost hope of obtaining the Lynn

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[13]Departmental minute for Colonial Secretary covering Foreign Office Despatch (Lansdowne to Raikes, No. 146), 1 September 1902, C.O. 42/890, p. 316.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Minto to Lansdowne and Minto to Durand, 12 January 1904, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV.

Laurier's biographer denied that the prime minister did make concessions. The weight of evidence is not on his side however. O. D. Skelton, "Dafoe's Sifton," Queen's Quarterly, XXXIX (1932), p. 6.

Canal but would expect compensation elsewhere.[16] Any doubts about the validity of this interpretation were removed, when Henry White, first secretary in London, informed Hay to the same effect in August 1902. White also mentioned that Minto had expressed hope that some compromise might be reached, regarding the southern portion of the boundary, but had not seemed surprised when told that this was impossible.[17] This letter interested the State Department for it was obvious that the time was ripe for settlement.

Laurier had taken the initiative, hoping to have this troublesome question solved before open hostilities could erupt.[18] At the same time, he expected to save face

[16]Hay to Roosevelt, 7 July 1902, cited in Dennis, p. 144; White to Hay, 28 June 1902, cited in Allan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York, 1930), p. 192.

[17]White to Hay, 12 August 1902, cited in Nevins, p. 193.

[18]C. S. Campbell, p. 259. Campbell's is one of the most thoughtful, exhaustive, and readable accounts of the boundary settlement. He questions explanations which attribute Laurier's concern purely to fear of trouble over gold. Instead, Campbell suggests that Laurier was alarmed that he might lose the opportunity for confederation with Newfoundland. If Newfoundland was to make a treaty with the U.S., as was suggested at the time, confederation would be doomed. Therefore, Campbell argues, Laurier went to the 1902 imperial conference hoping "to fend off the catastrophe of United States-Newfoundland reciprocity." By renouncing Canada's claim to Dyea and Skagway, Laurier hoped to demonstrate Canadian cooperation to the British and thus secure their support on the Newfoundland issue. The conjecture is an appealing one in view of the Laurier-Choate conversations and the British reaction. Ibid., pp. 260-64.

by such a manoeuvre. He did not anticipate the effects of American bellicosity and British bungling.

On 24 January 1903, the United States and Great Britain signed an arbitration treaty, reluctantly approved by the Canadian government, which provided for a tribunal of "impartial jurists of repute."[19] Contrary to Laurier's earlier remarks to Choate and Hay, the Canadian government expressed its regret "that the proposed tribunal will not be constituted so as to insure certainty of a final decision being reached on the reference."[20] Laurier's cabinet, it appeared, was not going to suffer the hostility of Canadian public opinion.

A month later, when the American members of the commission were announced, the first signs of Canadian discontent erupted.[21] The three American "jurists" were Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and Senator John M. Turner of Washington. Unwilling to risk what he considered the justice of the American case, Roosevelt had appointed three men who could be counted on to act "correctly."[22] Root was a member of

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[19]Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Paper 149, 1903; Lord Minto to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 January 1903.

[20]Sessional Paper 149.

[21]House of Commons Debates, 13 March 1903, p. 34.

[22]Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 20 October 1903. Morison and Blum, Vol. III, pp. 634-35.

the administration--a most unusual choice. Lodge was a close friend and confidant of the president. And Turner was from Seattle, a city which had very direct interests in Alaska. In addition, Lodge and Turner had previously expressed strong opinions on the righteousness of America's claims.[23] Roosevelt could hardly have chosen commissioners more calculated to arouse Canadian hostility. By doing so, he placed Laurier in a difficult position and encouraged the growth of Canadian nationalism.

Britain also added fuel to the fires of Canadian discontent when she ratified the treaty prior to Canadian approval (3 March 1903). Laurier lost no time in denouncing to Minto what he considered a "slap in the face for Canada." It was Laurier's contention that Canadian interests had been lightly regarded, and he predicted that Canadian public opinion would rise against this unjustified action on the part of the British. Rarely one to allow his temper to get the better of him, Laurier uncharacteristically berated the British government and its ambassador to Washington, Sir Michael Herbert. He considered the

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[23]On 3 October 1902, at the Massachusetts Republican state convention Lodge had declared that reciprocity with Canada could not be considered until the Alaska boundary was settled. A week previously, he had made a similar statement. He was outspoken in his criticism of Canada's claim and asserted that the president would not give up territory. Raikes to Lansdowne, 2 and 4 October 1902, C.O. 42/890, pp. 423-24, 414-15.

British action as "just another example of a long series of similar transactions in which the interests of Canada had been disregarded." Indeed, so strong was the Canadian reaction that the privy council barely managed to decide in favour of accepting the treaty.[24]

During the ensuing months Laurier had every reason to suspect that the award would go against Canada. He had already admitted as much to the Americans. It was small consolation to know that at last the problem would cease to exist. Before the award was announced, there were reports in the Canadian press that the British Commissioner, Lord Alverstone, was inclined to support the American contention.[25] One writer warned that "the colony of the past is the nation of to-day; and, where the future is at stake, national patriotism is less submissive than colonial loyalty."[26]

Like Laurier, Minto realized that Canadians were slowly slipping the bonds which had held them to the mother country. He correctly took the pulse of the nation

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[24]Report of conversation between Minto and Laurier at Government House on Saturday, 7 March 1903. Minto Papers, Vol. 2; Minto to Chamberlain, 9 March 1903, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 173, Vol. 7 (a).

[25]Ottawa Citizen, 12 October 1903.

[26]Richard Jebb, The Contemporary Review, LXXXIX (1902), p. 39.

when he informed Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary and imperialist extraordinary, that "the dominant feeling in Canada is that of a rising young nationality, not of an imperial dependency--Canadian not Imperial interests are her first thought."[27] Chamberlain was disappointed, when he received this news; his mood was not improved when Minto later informed him that Canada was loyal, even though "the strongest feeling of her people is that of Canadian nationality."[28]

Minto sympathized with Laurier, for he did not consider America a trustworthy ally. He was particularly irriated by the ignorance of Canada and worship of the United States which he detected in Britain.[29] Although Laurier retained greater respect for the United States, he too was irritated by "American national vanity."[30] Both men expected that Canada would lose in claiming a port on the Lynn Canal, but they thought Canada had a strong case

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[27]Minto to Chamberlain, 9 March 1903, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 173, Vol. 7 (a).

[28]Minto to Chamberlain, 17 July 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 117-26.

[29]Minto to Arthur Elliot, 18 October 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, p. 196. Arthur Elliot was Minto's brother and editor of the Edinburgh Review.

[30]Laurier to Minto, 14 March 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 6.

for her Portland Canal claims. The award took them by surprise.[31]

When it became known that Lord Alverstone had voted to support the American case and that the two Canadian representatives had refused to sign the award, the reaction both men had predicted was unleashed. Newspaper opinion in Canada was rarely so uniform in its indictment of British diplomacy. The Ottawa Journal concluded, like Laurier, that the award was just one case but "the recurrence of such cases inevitably suggests that the foreign interests of Canada are not and can not be safe at London."[32] The Toronto Evening News also thought that Canada had little to gain from British diplomacy and added that she had even less to expect from American friendship. The News called upon Canadians to recognize that the United States was indifferent to Canada, therefore, Canada should not invite humiliation by seeking diplomatic or commercial concessions. Instead, the News argued, Canadians should concern themselves with building a strong sense of nationalism by binding racial and sectional wounds and expanding into unoccupied

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[31]Minto to Arthur Elliot, 18 October 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 194-202.

[32]21 October 1903.

territory.[33] It was generally assumed in Canada that the decision of the Alaska commission had been a diplomatic rather than a judicial one.[34] So intense was the public reaction that Canadians, usually regarded as quiet, unexpressive people, hissed the American flag during theatre performances in Montreal and Toronto.[35]

Memories of other occasions when Canadian interests had been sacrificed were dusted off and arranged beside this latest British betrayal. Liberal, Independent, and even Conservative editors referred to the Maine and Oregon boundary disputes as examples of British toadying to the United States. Canada had gained increasing control over its foreign affairs since Sir John A. Macdonald had served on the commission which resulted in the Treaty of Washington (1871). Having trod the road to independence, Canada looked forward to greater freedom. Alaska represented a backward step.

Liberal newspapers, as could be expected, took a very hard line toward both the British and the Americans. The Toronto Globe was initially inclined to accept the award in good faith, but after it became known that the

[33] 21 and 23 October 1903. On the twenty-seventh the News still considered the situation "highly explosive."

[34] Minto to Lyttelton, 25 October 1903, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 173, Vol. 7 (a).

[35] Minto to Lyttelton, 25 October 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 223-25.

two Canadian representatives had refused to sign the judgment, the Globe took an increasingly nationalistic stand:

> When Sir Wilfrid declared that Canada must petition for the right to negotiate her own treaties he came to the only conclusion that can be arrived at by anyone who reviews the situation dispassionately. . . . What gives us legitimate cause for resentment is that we have been treated through-out like mere children.
> . . .
> We in Canada believe that if the least backbone had been exhibited by the British Foreign Office the United States would have had to consent to real arbitration.
> . . .
> If we undertake the negotiating of treaties we will of course, not expect Great Britain to implement our efforts. We have come not to expect it now. If we must surrender to every demand made upon us by the United States it would not be so humiliating to see a people of six million abasing themselves before them as to see the whole British Empire scuttling away.
> . . . [36]

The Globe spoke for many, when it accused Alverstone of sacrificing Canadian interests. And it correctly judged Canadian public opinion by claiming that "the resentment is deep and settled."[37] Throughout Ontario, these sentiments were echoed in the newspapers. One of them, The London Advertiser, noted Canada's need to cut the apron strings that bound her to the mother country: "If the opinion of the Canadian people on this question could be focused, it would be found that they hope to see Canada take on all the attributes of nationhood."[38]

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[36] 19 and 26 October 1903.

[37] 27 October 1903.

[38] 6 November 1903.

Outside Ontario the Liberal papers expressed the same sentiments. The Halifax Chronicle was outspoken in its criticism:

> Would Canada maintain her rights at the expense of the American affection for this country? Perish the unimperial thought. . . . We were only in possible danger of attack apart from wars in which the United States might involve us, from one country in the world, the United States. We have nothing henceforth to fear from that quarter worse than another "arbitration." And we have suffered about all we can from "arbitration."[39]

The St. John Telegraph considered that the decision would "strengthen Canadian opposition to every new phase of Imperialism for years to come."[40] A month later, the Telegraph was warning its readers that Alaska had only "whetted Uncle Sam's appetite for more." America was now supposedly casting longing glances at the two French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.[41] This threat of American expansion was in the mind of Senator Pascal Poirier, of New Brunswick, when he declared in the Senate that Canada was in danger of being encircled by the United States. He expressed fear that Newfoundland was on America's menu, and warned that "imminent danger" was facing Canada, as the next arbitration might involve Hudsons Bay.[42]

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[39]21 October 1903. [40]21 October 1903.

[41]19 November 1903.

[42]Manitoba Free Press, 20 October 1903. Poirier was concerned that "the future independence of our own country may depend on the question here." He called for

French-Canadians were not as concerned about the decision as other Easterners. They had their own well-developed sense of national identity and did not consider their interests threatened. Henri Bourassa, the fiery nationalist, played down the decision much to the surprise of those who had heard him appeal for a greater independence for Canada.[43] English Canadians in Montreal could, however, find support for their wounded pride in the columns of the Herald. Like its Liberal counterparts elsewhere, the Herald unleased its editorial wrath against Britain:

> The only question that can be drawn from the papers brought down by Sir Wilfrid Laurier yesterday on the Alaska boundary question is that Canada has from the first had to contend against British as well as American diplomacy. . . . It will provide many people with a new point of view concerning the relations between Great Britain and her principal colony on the one hand, and Great Britain and her principal rival on the other.[44]

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government support for Canadian Arctic explorers and asked that Canada assert her claims in the North. Union with Newfoundland should also be pushed, he thought. Senate Debates, 20 October 1903, pp. 1662-63.

[43] House of Commons Debates, 23 October 1903, p. 14785. Bourassa thought Canada had no case from a judicial point of view. However, he did think Canada should look after her own interests: "I think, Sir, that the British government should look to their own interest and that we should look to our own interests. But, at the same time, I point out this fact, to show those who think that the bond of empire should be an exchange of mutual services, that if they calmly study the history of the relations between Canada and the United States as affected by British diplomacy, they will find that the services have been very often on the one side, and the favours very seldom on the other."

[44] 23 October 1903.

The same sentiments were expressed in the West. The Manitoba Free Press thought that the damage was irremediable.[45]

It was easy enough for the Liberals to criticize Britain. But the Conservatives were placed in a quandary. If they took Britain to task, they would be running counter to one of their basic principles. On the other hand if they did not, they would be accused of being unpatriotic. As it turned out, most Conservative papers chose a moderate nationalism. In Winnipeg, the Telegram hesitatingly suggested that Canada might have to consider a change in the imperial relationship.[46] The Ottawa Citizen and the Toronto World were not as cautious. Canada was seen as the "perfectly sophisticated unwilling but dutiful sacrifice" by the Ottawa paper; while the Toronto paper bluntly alleged that Canada had been "sacrificed on the altar of diplomacy to make Britain solid with the United States."[47]

Some Conservative editors did defend the mother country, and parried their opponent's editorial thrusts by suggesting that Laurier had been at least inconsistent, if not downright dishonest. They thought it strange that the prime minister had accepted the treaty in March but

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[45] 21 October 1903.

[46] 21 October 1903.

[47] Citizen, 23 October 1903, and World, 21 October 1903.

rejected it in October.[48] Suspicions were raised that Laurier had agreed to an arrangement whereby Canada would lose most of the territory awarded to the Americans.[49] And indeed such suspicion was not too far-fetched, for one of Laurier's main concerns, both before and after the award, was with the effect on public opinion.[50]

The Independent newspapers were as nationalistic as the Liberal. In one of them, the Toronto News, the

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[48]Toronto Daily Mail and Empire, 27 October 1903.

[49]Halifax Herald, 19 October 1903.

[50]Minto's conversation with Laurier, 7 March 1903, op. cit.; Minto to Lyttelton, 7 March 1904, Minto Papers (Letterbooks), Vol. 4. According to Minto, Laurier would have welcomed the decision of the tribunal if it had not been for the loss of the two small islands in the Portland Canal. The apparent diplomatic compromise on the ownership of the four islands involved, placed Laurier in a much more difficult position than if the decision had gone completely against Canada. Indeed, most of the reaction to the award revolved around this rather minor issue. The Canadians believed they had a good case for claiming all four islands. Lord Alverstone had initially agreed with the Canadian contention, but changed his mind shortly before the final award. In view of the reaction, it was ironic that Aylesworth had informed Alverstone that he considered the islands "of no value except in as much as they afford the U.S. a position inimical to Canada." (Minto to Lyttelton, 25 October 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 4: Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Alverstone and Mr. J. Pope on the subject of the Alaska Boundary, at Winterfold, Crouleigh, Surrey, on Sunday, 13 September 1930, Pope Papers, Vol. 60. Memorandum of conversation with Hon. Clifford Sifton, 11 November, Minto Papers, Vol. 4.)

The Portland Canal was the only area where Roosevelt admitted that there was room for argument in defining the boundary. (Roosevelt to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 25 July 1903, Morison and Blum, Vol. III, p. 530.)

cynical attitude of Canadians towards Anglo-American diplomacy was summed up in a short skit:

> LORD ALVERSTONE (to Canada): Is there anything more I can do for you?
>
> CANADA: We would like to go on drawing breath.
>
> LORD ALVERSTONE (to Messrs. Root, Lodge and Turner): Any objection to our young friend continuing to use the atmosphere?
>
> MESSRS. ROOT, LODGE AND TURNER (cheerfully): None at all just now.
>
> LORD ALVERSTONE (with a judicial air): My decision is that you are entitled to the temporary use of all air not required for United States purposes.[51]

Many individual Canadians wrote their local newspapers, objecting to the way Canada had been treated. Others protested more vociferously and dramatically. Vancouverites signed pledges not to sing "God Save the King" until Britain justified her conduct, and some refused to stand for the anthem when it was played at the Opera House. Vancover's mayor was not criticized when he said: "I would not be surprised if it resulted in a strong and widespread movement looking toward the establishment of Canadian independence." And for a while at least, the idea of an Independence Club found favour in that city.[52] One of the most remarkable individual acts of protest was performed by a well known Toronto school principal,

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[51] Toronto News, n.d. Cited in Dafoe, p. 235.

[52] Victoria Daily Colonist, 24 October 1903.

Alexander Muir, author of "The Maple Leaf for Ever." He asked for, and obtained, permission from his school board to fly the flag at half mast after the award was announced.[53] The award united Canadians as they had never been before.

The two "villians" in the "conspiracy" to deprive Canada of her rights, the United States and Great Britain, had good reason to congratulate themselves on the outcome. The last major obstacle to the rapprochement which Britain had sought was cleared, and the Americans felt that national honour and manifest destiny had been upheld. As the semi-official organ of the British government, The Times thought any temporary disappointment over the decision would be outweighed by "the inestimable gain of settling definitely a question which offered perennial opportunities for exciting discord between the two great kindred nations." Although other British papers generally agreed with this view, there was some difference of opinion. The London Daily Mail and the London Financial News were particularly concerned about the possible effects of the decision on the future of the imperial relationship.[54]

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[53]Manitoba Free Press, 22 October 1903.

[54]Cited by Montreal Star, 2 November 1903.

In the United States, the award was greeted with great satisfaction. Readers of the Washington Morning Post could enjoy their breakfasts knowing that Uncle Sam, with the help of John Bull, had got the better of Johnny Canuck:

> The President and the Cabinet regard the award as far and away the greatest diplomatic success which the United States have gained for a generation, ensuring as it does for the country, for all time the only spot on earth about which there ever was a question of relinquishing territory.[55]

Farther west, in Detroit, the eagle screeched louder. Unwilling or unable to accept victory with grace, the Detroit Evening News poked an editorial finger in the open wound of Canadian pride:

> . . . it is impossible to refrain from a loud guffaw at Canada's pouting petulance. . . . Like the babe who lies in his cradle and yearns for the nurse to give him the mirror of his own reflection in the chandelier, Canada mourns and refused to be comforted.[56]

Canadians were incensed. Not since the War of 1812 had anti-American sentiments been so loudly expressed. And never had the Dominion shown such hostility to Great Britain. A new day had dawned for Canadian nationalism.

Laurier's determination to steer an independent course was strengthened by the certain knowledge that a

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[55] 21 October 1903.

[56] Cited in John A. Munro, "English-Canadianism and the Demand for Canadian Autonomy: Ontario's Response to the Alaska Boundary Decision, 1903," Ontario History, LVII (December, 1965), pp. 189-203.

sense of Canadian identity was emerging. Minto was aware of this and referred to it repeatedly in his despatches to the Colonial Office. Instead of ebbing, the tide of nationalism remained high, and the possibility of separation was openly discussed "by individuals and newspapers at other times sane."[57] It was of special concern to the governor general that his ministers "instead of doing all in their power to allay the storm have talked thoughtlessly of the necessity of further treaty making power and have encouraged the idea that Canada is strong enough to look after herself."[58] However, Minto was not unsympathetic to the Canadian attitude.[59] It concerned him that Britain seemed to place altogether too high a value on the reliability of American friendship. From his vantage point, Minto viewed the United States in a different light:

> Their hunger for territory that doesn't belong to them, their scarcely concealed future hopes as to the possession of Canada, and their overbearing behaviour to anything British on this continent is very galling.[60]

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[57]Minto to Chamberlain, 14 December 1903, Minto Papers.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Minto to Durand, 12 January 1904, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, p. 285. The governor general thought the future was extremely problematical. He wanted the interests of "our own people" put before those of the United States.

[60]Minto to Henry Elliot, 17 December 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 29.

Minto's position was difficult. On the one hand, he enjoyed a personal friendship with Laurier and appreciated the difficulties the prime minister had to face. Governing Canada was no easy task when racial and political loyalties could erupt at any moment. On the other hand, Minto was afraid that Laurier had no "spark of Imperial enthusiasm in him." If Laurier had any enthusiasm it was for Canadian independence. Minto attributed Laurier's lack of interest in imperial affairs to his French blood and the influence of his French friends. He considered Laurier to be far too easily influenced by those around him.[61]

Among Laurier's informants was Edward Farrer, one of Canada's best known journalists, although he had retired from active journalism in 1892. Farrer was on intimate terms with public men in both Canada and the United States.[62] His years in the United States, and his

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[61]Minto to Chamberlain, 14 December 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 246-55. Minto to Lyttelton, 7 March 1904, ibid., pp. 310-15.

J. Israel Tarte, the controversial minister of public works, told Minto that Laurier was easily influenced by his colleagues. Shortly after this conversation Laurier, upon his return from London, dismissed Tarte for his activities on behalf of tariff revision. It has been suggested that Tarte knew of Laurier's serious illness at this time and wished to replace him as prime minister. Report of conversation with Tarte 17 September 1902, Minto Papers, Vol. 4; Dafoe, p. 231.

[62]Minto to Lansdowne and Minto to Durand, 12 January 1904, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 275-78;

friendships in Washington, admirably suited him for the role of Canada's unofficial representative in America. Although aware that Farrer functioned in this capacity, Minto reluctantly accepted the situation, since to object would only have the effect of shrouding the relationship in even greater secrecy. As it was, Laurier had informed Minto, quite candidly, that he employed Farrer as an agent in Washington.[63] In this way, the Canadian prime minister was able to deal directly and quickly, if unofficially, with the Americans.

The relationship between Farrer and Laurier is an interesting one. Minto had no doubts that Farrer was

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Stanley to Knutford, 19 February 1891, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 202, Vol. 4 (a). Minto made it quite clear that he did not share Laurier's high opinion of Farrer. This may have been due, in part at least, to Farrer's advocacy of union with the United States. Minto did recognize, that the journalist had the ear of influential Americans, including Secretary of State John Hay.

It is interesting to note Minto's preoccupation with what he seems to have regarded as a conspiracy at this time. He was concerned about the "backstairs channel of communication between my ministers and Washington" and suggested to Lyttelton that Canadian leaders had done nothing to "allay the storm" of protest. The following statement in a letter to Lyttelton is of particular interest as reflecting Minto's concern: "I do not like entertaining suspicions but I doubt if the recent criticism of the Motherland was as absolutely unwelcome to everyone as one would wish it to have been. I am suspicious as to the initiation of the statement in the 'Times' by the Canadian Commissioners. . . . The statement ought never to have seen the light . . [sic] Sifton ought to have stopped it." 19 November 1903, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV, pp. 223-25.

[63]Minto to Lansdowne, 12 January 1904, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV.

closely connected to the government. It was even suggested that, in January 1904, Farrer was employed in the prime minister's office.[64] Knowing Farrer's frequently expressed opinion in favour of union with the United States, Minto viewed the relationship with concern. It was not difficult for the governor general, therefore, to suspect that Farrer's article on "Canada and the New Imperialism" was "inspired by someone of high standing"--possibly Laurier.[65]

In his article, Farrer stressed the differences between Canadians and the British. He claimed that Canadians of both French and British background were opposed to the "New Imperialism" which tried to "narrow the sphere of Canadian self-government" and share the burdens of imperial defence. Canada was closely tied to the United States and protected by the Monroe Doctrine, Farrer declared. Therefore, "the notion of a federated Empire, of a permanent union between the mother country and the colonies" was unpopular in Canada. He claimed that Laurier viewed public questions "strictly from a Canadian standpoint" and was against the "New Imperialism."[66]

Minto's suspicion that there was "an inclination in high quarters towards the doctrine of the Contemporary

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] E. Farrer, "Canada and the New Imperialism," The Contemporary Review, December 1903, pp. 761-74.

article" was not unreasonable. Laurier had adopted a more independent stance after the award was announced. As well, he had assured Minto that he had "the highest opinion of Farrer." The governor general was also aware that Laurier had employed the journalist as "the backstairs go-between . . . during the Alaska Tribunal negotiations." Events seemed to warrant Minto's conclusions.[67]

Minto realized that he was witnessing a great change in Canada's history. His despatches to the Colonial Office were filled with references to the confused political scene and to the need for a strong imperial-minded leader. However, none was forthcoming. Canadian nationalism fed on the prosperity of the times, and Canadians became increasingly convinced that they could act independently. This was the attitude of the cabinet ministers and was reflected in the delay in adding the word "Royal" to the title of the North West Mounted Police. Minto found this lack of action particularly frustrating, since he had obtained the King's permission

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[67]There seems little reason to doubt that it was Farrer whom Laurier sent to Washington, to protest the appointments of Turner and Lodge. During the course of a conversation with Hay, Farrer made the surprising admission that "Sir Wilfred knows, and all of us know, that we have no case." Farrer's frankness may have been due to his intimacy with Hay and his possible knowledge that Laurier had said as much to Henry White in the summer of 1902. Secretary Hay to Henry White, 10 April 1903, in Allan Nevins, Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York, 1930), p. 195; Charles C. Tansill, Canadian-American Relations 1875-1911 (New Haven, 1943), p. 239; Above p. 6.

to change the title. His explanation to the colonial secretary was that the cabinet was composed of nationalists and annexationists. These men, Minto believed, did not represent the majority of Canadians, who were at heart loyal to Britain.[68]

Loyalist sentiments did rise in response to the resentment and antagonism directed against Britain over Alaska. On 18 November 1903, a small meeting took place, in Webb's Restaurant at Toronto, for preliminary discussion regarding the founding of a new club. Founded in reaction to anti-British sentiments, the policy of the club was to be "the advancement of the interests of Canada and a United Empire." At the inaugural luncheon of the Empire Club of Canada, Joseph Chamberlain was nominated as the first honorary member.[69] The other members of the club, in spite of their affection for Great Britain, shared many of the same goals as the members of the more nationalistic Canadian Club.[70]

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[68]Minto to Lyttelton, 7 March 1904, Minto Papers, Letterbook IV.

[69]William Clark, ed., Empire Club Speeches: Being Addresses Delivered Before the Empire Club of Canada During its Session of 1903-1904 (Toronto, 1904), pp. 5-6; Castell Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1903 (Toronto, 1904), p. 339; Arthur R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada (Toronto, 1958), p. 348.

[70]At the second meeting, the speaker referred to Senator Lodge's "alleged proposal" to have the United States acquire Saint Pierre and Miquelon. J. M. Clark, the

Although the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Club did not open until 1903, the club itself had been organized in Hamilton in 1893.[71] It grew rapidly and established branches throughout the country. The club's purposes were set forth in the constitution of the Ottawa branch:

> To foster patriotism by encouraging the study of the institutions, history, arts, literature and resources of Canada, and by endeavouring to unite Canadians in such work for the welfare and progress of the Dominion as may be desirable and expedient.[72]

This Ottawa Canadian Club included many prominent Canadians among its membership. When it was organized, William Lyon Mackenzie King was elected first vice president and the following year he became president. Starting with a membership of 237 the club grew until six years later it could claim 1,100 members. During this period the list of visitors and speakers included prominent leaders in politics, diplomacy, literature, and science.

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speaker, favoured union between Canada and Newfoundland, and called upon Britain to acquire the French islands.

[71]Lower, p. 347. The Winnipeg Canadian Club was organized in 1904. John S. Ewart, its first president and staunch nationalist, delivered the inaugural address. "Canada and the Canadian Clubs" was his topic. He decried the lack of a "Canadian national sentiment," but declared that the Canadian Clubs reflected a new confidence in Canada. Since the Boer War, Ewart argued, Canadians had started "to feel the thrill of national life." Report of the Canadian Club of Winnipeg: Together with the Inaugural address of the First President Mr. J. S. Ewart, K.C. 1904-1906 (Public Archives Library).

[72]Constitution of the Canadian Club of Ottawa (Ottawa, 1903).

Among the topics considered were: "Relations Between the United States and Canada," "Canada's Path to Nationhood," "The Boundaries of Canada," "The Future of Canada," "Canada's Fertile Northland," "Canada To-day and To-morrow," and "Canadian Rights in the Arctic."[73] Like the branches in other cities and towns, the Ottawa Canadian Club was concerned with fostering strong patriotic sentiments.

At the second meeting of the Ottawa branch (7 December 1903), Sir Clifford Sifton, minister of the interior, and advisor to the Canadian commission on Alaska, spoke on "Some Matters of National Interest to Canadians." Sifton found a receptive audience for his support of the Canadian commissioners' actions in refusing to sign the award. In future, he thought Canada should be represented only by Canadians. Canadian autonomy, in Sifton's view, was necessary to the continuation of a strong British Empire.[74] This speech came only a week after Sifton had assured Minto that he did not intend to make any remarks on the award in public.[75]

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[73]Gerald H. Brown, ed., Addresses delivered before the Canadian Club of Ottawa, 1903-1909 (Ottawa, 1910), pp. 3-10.

[74]Addresses delivered before the Canadian Club of Ottawa, 1903-1909, pp. 71-73.

[75]Memorandum of conversation with Clifford Sifton, 11 November 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 4. As Sifton was leaving, he told Minto that he hoped time would smooth matters over. Minto doubted this and reminded the minister that the settlement of the Maine frontier had created long-held animosity.

In spite of the feelings aroused by the Alaska award, no strong leader emerged in Canada to rally the forces of discontent. Alyesworth, who for a short time became something of a popular hero, passed up the opportunity when he delivered a very moderate speech before the Canadian Club of Toronto, upon his return to Canada. Excitement had built up in anticipation of the blast which Aylesworth was expected to unleash against Great Britain and the United States. There were reports that the hall was to be marked by an absence of British flags. But when it came time to speak, Aylesworth disappointed the large audience of young men. Instead of seizing the opportunity to start a movement for Canadian independence, Aylesworth chose to assert his loyalty to "the British sovereign and authority."[76]

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[76] Montreal Daily Star, 2 November 1903; F. B. Tracy, The Tercentenary History of Canada (Toronto, 1908), p. 1045; Lower, p. 348. Lower mentions a story that claimed that it was only with difficulty that Aylesworth "prevailed upon the committee to allow the flag to be exhibited." He had his way and made a point of stating his pleasure at seeing "that the walls were still adorned with the British flag." See Montreal Gazette, 5 November 1903.

Aylesworth later sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal, from 1905-1911. He was postmaster general and minister of labour in 1905-1906, and minister of justice 1906-1911. It is not clear why he did not press his objections to the award. Could it be that he wanted to avoid putting Laurier in an even more difficult position? It was not long after the speech that Senator W. Templeman wrote to Laurier suggesting that if Aylesworth could be

Like Aylesworth, the leaders of the two national political parties were reluctant to seize the opportunity for an open break with Great Britain. Robert Borden, the leader of the Conservatives, did make a point of raising the Alaska award, on the first day of the new session of parliament, in 1904.[77] And during a Toronto campaign speech that year, he attempted to discredit the Liberals by declaring that their motto ought not to be "Laurier and the larger Canada," but, "Laurier and the larger United States." As for Laurier, he contented himself, for the time being, with his dream of "an independent Canada, in the distant future."[78] To the disappointment of many, Canadian nationalism lacked a leader.

Laurier was too astute a politician to ignore the aroused state of nationalistic feelings. His aversion to

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induced to seek election, the Liberal party would be greatly strengthened in Ontario, Laurier agreed.

Saturday Night, 24 November 1906, suggested that Aylesworth might have been approached by influential imperialists to tone down his speech. Toronto Globe, 5 October 1904, referred to Aylesworth's speech. It praised the "slow, deliberate utterances on that occasion . . . and the deep earnestness with which he deprecated any feeling of bitterness toward the mother country as the result of the award." The Globe's report was prompted by information that Aylesworth had been appointed to the Laurier cabinet as minister without portfolio.

[77]House of Commons Debates, 10 March 1904, p. 5; Toronto Globe, 5 October 1904.

[78]Minto to Lyttelton, 14 December 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. IV.

such schemes as Imperial Federation was strenghtened by the award. Aware that public opinion was behind him, he continued to resist those who wanted a more centralized empire, and throughout the remainder of his term of office, he worked to increase Canadian independence. To this end he supported Canadian expansionist impulses in the North, East, and South.

The Alaskan boundary award, coupled with fear of further American expansion, created in the Canadian prime minister and his government a strong will to assert Canada's own manifest destiny. During the course of an interview with Minto, at the end of 1903, Laurier made this clear. When Minto referred to press reports of a movement in Newfoundland favouring confederation with Canada, Laurier replied that he proposed to send an agent to the island, to investigate the possibilities. This answer surprised the governor general for Laurier had previously shied clear of union with Newfoundland, at least until the French Shore Question had been settled. Both men agreed that, in view of American ambitions, it would be better to run the risk of trouble with France. The French islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence presented a similar problem. Although Laurier was inclined to discount the newspaper reports of Lodge's remarks regarding an American takeover, he was anxious about the

"evident wish of the United States to acquire further territory on the North American continent."[79]

Farther south, the British West Indies, represented another area where the interests of Canada and the United States might conflict. American involvement in the affairs of these colonies increased markedly after the Spanish-American War. But Canadians were also interested in the future of the Caribbean islands. The historic trading ties between Canada and the West Indies, coupled with the

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[79]Memorandum of conversation with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 3 December 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 2. The following is part of Minto's report: "He [Laurier] referred to the expeditions recently sent by Canada to the mouth of the Mackenzie River and to Hudson Bay, and expressed his apprehension lest the Americans should establish posts on what is undoubtedly Canadian territory in the far North, but on which it was quite possible American posts might exist for some years without anybody being acquainted with their existence, and that subsequently claims of possession might be put forward for such territory by the U.S. It is with the view of meeting any such action that the above expeditions have been despatched, and it is intended in future to exact customs duties on any foreigners trading with the natives in these northern seas. He expects that notwithstanding Canada's undoubted claim to enforce such duties, that Canada's action will be represented as a grievance by American whalers and traders at Washington."

See also: Minto to Durand, 12 May 1904, Minto Papers, Vol. 4. Minto hoped to get Laurier to come to terms with the United States on the sealing dispute but found him intractable: "The whole tone of the conversation was difficult as regards hopes of coming to terms--a constant assertion that the U.S. were always trying to get the best of the bargain, and that the feeling against them in Canada at the present moment was most bitter--and he personally expressed more suspicion and dislike of them as bargainers than I had expected from him."

future promise of mutual benefits, created interest in plans for commercial and possibly political union.

Laurier knew that there were many political and diplomatic considerations to overcome if Canada was to embrace Newfoundland, the French islands, and, possibly, some of the West Indian colonies. Therefore, he turned his immediate attention to the area where Canada could act safely on her own initiative, to forestall any American threats--the Arctic.

CHAPTER II

CANADA'S NORTHERN DESTINY

On 29 July 1904, Sir Wilfrid Laurier rose in the House of Commons to state that the D.G.S. Neptune had been sent to Hudson Bay and the northern waters of Canada to "explore, patrol and assert the sovereignty of the Government of Canada in these regions." He reminded the members that "the object of this expedition was fully explained to the House last year and met with general favour. The view was to assert beyond any possibility of doubt, so as to prevent any future possible conflict, the undoubted authority of the Dominion of Canada in the waters of Hudson's Bay and beyond." After describing the composition of the expedition, Laurier informed the House that "no definite instructions were given to the expedition as to the location of the post" which the North West Mounted Police were to establish.[1]

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[1] House of Commons Debates, 1904, pp. 7968-7969. Similar sentiments were later expressed by Sir Joseph Pope, Canada's first undersecretary of state for external affairs: "In the past our territorial claims have suffered not a little by inaction and delay e.g., Alaska and Labrador." Memorandum for the Prime Minister from the

At the time of Laurier's speech, a second government expedition, under the command of Captain Joseph Elzear Bernier, was already preparing to relieve the officers and crew of the Neptune. Laurier explained that this second expedition, on board the D.G.S. Arctic would carry an officer and ten men of the police, in addition to the crew of the ship. The intention was to establish posts "and to assert the jurisdiction of Canada." Laurier's concern that foreign expansionism might deprive Canada of her rights was reflected in his final declaration:

> The government has been induced to come to this action because it is evident that the time has come when our interests in these northern waters should no longer be neglected. At the present time there are whalers and fishermen of different nations cruising in those waters, and unless we take active steps to assert, what is the undoubted fact, that these lands belong to Canada, we may perhaps find ourselves later on in the face of serious complications.[2]

By 1903, the Laurier government decided that Canada would have to protect her own interests. The events surrounding the selection of the Alaska boundary commissioners, and the terms of the award had convinced many Canadians, rightly or wrongly, that their country was only a pawn in the game of diplomacy being played by the United States and Great Britain. Fear of American expansionism, which had contributed so much to Canadian

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Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 November 1920, Department of External Affairs, File 9058-B-40.

[2] Ibid.

confederation, was again the principal force encouraging strong nationalist feelings in Canada.

This new nationalism led Canada to inform Britain that imperial interests were at stake:

> It is obviously in the interest of the Empire that no additional territory should be acquired by the United States in or adjacent to the north half of the continent of North America. American whaling vessels frequent Hudson's Bay and the rivers of Canada flowing into the Arctic Ocean, and my Government has recently established a post at the mouth of the MacKenzie River, not only as a protection to the natives, but also as an evidence of British sovereignty over that remote section of the continent.[3]

The land, in other words, was Canada's and Britain should cooperate to limit American expansionism.

This official concern for Canadian territorial rights in the Arctic reflected the private concern of a number of influential Canadians, in addition to the prime minister and his cabinet. William Findlay Maclean, a member of Parliament and publisher of the Toronto World, was among these. On 12 May 1903, Maclean introduced a bill to change the name of Hudson Bay to the "Canadian Sea." He referred to British territory in North America which had been lost to the United States and called upon the government to assert Canadian supremacy in the Bay before it was too late. Furthermore, he asked that the

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[3]Memorandum marked "Secret" in Governor General's Office, Drafts of Secret and Confidential Despatches to the Colonial Office, 1856-1913, Vol. 34.

government encourage Captain Bernier, in his efforts to reach the North Pole.[4]

Speaking before the Toronto Canadian Club (24 February 1904), Maclean urged that Canada proclaim a "Canadian Doctrine" which would protect Canadian interests in the same way that the Monroe Doctrine safeguarded American interests.[5] Three days later, the subject of

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[4] House of Commons Debates, 12 May 1903, pp. 2794-2796; C.A.R. 1903, p. 388; Bernier planned to sail his ship up the west coast from Vancouver or Victoria to Bering Strait. Once there, he would allow the ship to become imprisoned in the ice at a suitable point north of Alaska. Then, according to his theory, he would drift across or near the North Pole continuing until the ship was released from its icy grasp, in the vicinity of Spitzbergen, three or four years later.

At the time, many reputable explorers and scientists believed Bernier's theory sound. The Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen had already drifted from the New Siberian Islands to Spitzbergen in the Fram (1893-1896), coming closer to the Pole than anyone else.

[5] W. F. Maclean, "Hudson Bay the Front Door," Proceedings of the Canadian Club, Toronto for the year 1903-1904, (Toronto, n.d.), pp. 86-88. Many of the arguments used by Canadian nationalists appeared in his speech. He claimed that Canada had all too often been sacrificed for imperial reasons, and mentioned Alaska as a particular case in point. American imperialism concerned him, therefore, he urged the founding of a "national" party to protect Canadian interests in Hudson Bay and Newfoundland. Newfoundland and Labrador, he thought, should soon be included in Canada.

Some of Maclean's ideas were in advance of his time. In particular, he was interested in efforts to bring about spelling reform, and he supported a St. Lawrence seaway plan. Although opponents derided such suggestions, Maclean was recognized as a "man of original ideas." Sixteen years after Maclean advocated a "Canadian Monroe Doctrine," one of Canada's most influential civil servants made exactly the same proposal. Loring Christie, legal

Canadian rights in the north was raised by James William Tyrrell, the Arctic explorer, at a meeting of the Canadian Institute.[6] Tyrrell agreed with Maclean that the United States had no rights in the region. He based Canada's claim on British discoveries and exploration. He also regarded Hudson Bay as "the natural commercial outlet of the Canadian North-West." Tyrrell and Maclean missed no opportunity to make their views known.

By 1903, Captain Bernier had spent considerable time and effort trying to interest Laurier in Arctic exploration.[7] Bernier came from an old sea-faring family

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adviser to the Department of External Affairs, advanced this idea, at a time when Denmark showed interest in Ellesmere Island. Much of Christie's argument was based on recommendations made to him during conversations with Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the Arctic explorer. Christie claimed that the Stefansson and Bernier expeditions "were designed and announced as an integral part of the policy of making good the Canadian claims to the northern islands."

Saturday Night, XXIII (30 April 1910), p. 6; Frederick Greyson, "Menace of Honesty at Ottawa," Maclean's Magazine, XXIII (December, 1911), p. 114; Memorandum for the Prime Minister by Loring Christie, 28 October 1920, Christie Papers, Vol. VI.

[6]C.A.R., 1904, pp. 155-56; The Canadian Institute was incorporated by Royal Charter on 4 November 1856. Its aims were to promote scientific research in Canada, to encourage cooperation among Canadian scientists, and to create public interest in science. Tyrrell supported Bernier as early as 1 June 1899.

[7]What might have been the first letter from Bernier to Laurier accompanied a lengthy essay, "Plan of an Expedition to the North Pole," Bernier to Laurier, 5 March 1898, Laurier Papers, Vol. 68.

In 1899, Bernier informed the prime minister that he had talked with Sir Charles Tupper, the leader of the

and claimed to have been interested in Arctic exploration since the Hall Polar Expedition of 1871.[8] Certainly the number of letters and clippings he sent to Laurier attest to his enthusiasm for a Canadian expedition. He had little doubt about the outcome of his plans or his own ability. In 1900 he asked Laurier for a ship of 200 tons and guaranteed that the expedition would be a success.[9]

Although his hopes were doomed to disappointment in 1900, Bernier persisted in his efforts to win support. He travelled in Great Britain and the United States, speaking before meetings of various learned societies including the Royal Colonial Institute.[10] In his book, Master Mariner, he credited the Institute's support with having encouraged him to wage an intensive two-year

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Opposition, who had indicated his willingness to support Bernier. By this time, Bernier could also claim the support of the Royal Society of Canada, the Geographical Society of Quebec, the Ontario Land Surveyors' Association, and members of the Canadian Geological Survey. Bernier to Laurier, 29 May 1899, Laurier Papers, Vol. 113.

Throughout the period 1899-1903, Bernier kept up a steady stream of letters informing Laurier of his activities. His efforts to win support received a great deal of publicity.

[8]Joseph E. Bernier, Master Mariner and Arctic Explorer; a narrative of sixty years at sea from the logs and yarns of Captain J. E. Bernier (Ottawa, 1939), "Capt. Bernier's Arctic Expedition," The Canadian Engineer, p. 237.

[9]Bernier to Laurier, 8 May 1900, Laurier Papers, Vol. 154.

[10]The Royal Colonial Institute was "founded in 1869, in order to stem the tide of imperial disengagement." Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1869-1914 (Toronto, 1970),

campaign which culminated in his Arctic voyage of 1904.[11] So dedicated was he to the idea of a Canadian polar expedition that he spent as much as $21,000 of his own money on the venture.[12] But he had to abandon his plan to drift across the north pole in an ice-bound ship. Instead he decided to devote his life "to what after all may be regarded as a more important object, that is to say to securing all the islands in the Arctic archipelago for Canada."[13]

Bernier, like many other Canadians, was afriad that the expansionist desires of the United States embraced the Arctic territory to Canada's north. As early as February 1901, he had made public his concern that "owning to our neglect the Americans are going in." He suggested that the Americans were taking "$8,000,000 a year of sea animals and fish from Canadian waters, which Canada has not yet been able to claim by right of discovery."[14] In later estimating the value of his own work, Bernier considered that the Canadian expeditions between 1904 and 1925 had "shut the door on possible complications between Canada and the United States, or Denmark or any other country which might have taken advantage of Canadian official

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p. 3. During 1901 and 1902, Bernier spent several months in England trying to stimulate interest in the proposed Canadian Polar Expedition. Bernier to Laurier, 25 November 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 213.

[11] Bernier, pp. 303-04.

[12] Ibid., p. 305. [13] Ibid., p. 306.

[14] Clipping from Montreal Daily Witness, 9 February 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 187.

indifference to step in and establish some sort of rights to territory already ours."[15]

Throughout the first quarter of the century Bernier repeatedly voiced his fear of American expansionism. Like other Canadian expansionists, his memories of the Alaskan award were long lasting. Not one to mince words, Bernier bluntly informed successive prime ministers that the Americans coveted Canada's Arctic. His advice to Arthur Meighen was typical of what he told Laurier and Sir Robert Borden: "Alaska was taken away from us, to our everlasting shame, and the Americans must not be allowed to get another foothold on the East, as they have the West."[16] And towards the end of his life he recalled that, as late as 1925, the governor of Maine had suggested that an American explorer should take possession of the Arctic Archipelago for the United States.[17]

Bernier's motives were clear. He wanted Canada to explore and lay claim to the archipelago. Such a move would, he believed, enhance Canadian prestige in the eyes

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[15]Bernier, p. 308.

[16]Bernier to Meighen, 29 July 1921, Department of External Affairs, File 9058-B-40. Bernier pointed out that Sir Allan Aylesworth had stated in one of his judgments that "Hudson Bay was a Canadian Sea, owing to the fact that we had collected dues from American whalers, and they having paid said dues, they thereby acknowledged our sovereignity." Bernier wanted Canada to follow the same procedure throughout the Arctic.

[17]Bernier, pp. 307-08.

of other nations and insure against foreign exploitation of a potentially valuable region.[18] The Montreal Daily Witness was not as sure as Bernier of the outcome of the proposed polar expedition of 1901. The Witness mentioned that six people, including Bernier, would attempt to reach the pole. And if any were successful, which the Witness writer doubted, they would gain nothing for their country except "a well-earned right to a cock-a-doodle-doo."[19] Bernier would no doubt have liked to crow for he was "very enthusiastic and jealous as a Canadian that Canada, backed by England, should succeed and hoist the British flag on the North Pole."[20]

Bernier's strong nationalism dominated his correspondence with Laurier. In one letter, he enclosed a newspaper report of an interview in which he set forth his views:

> If Canada be nation, we must claim our own and place our flag at our extreme north. Time will come when we will need it, for we must bear in mind that the temperature to the North is getting milder and milder, and our great wealth of the unknown parts of our land and water is highly probable.[21]

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[18]J. B. Bernier, "A Canadian Polar Expedition," Paper read before the Royal Institute, London, England, 17 January 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 187.

[19]Montreal Daily Witness, 21 January 1901.

[20]Clipping from the Journal of Commerce (Liverpool), 23 January 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 187.

[21]Montreal Star, January 1901.

He regarded the polar regions as legitimately part of Canada.[22] Underlying his nationalism was a fear that the Americans might seize the initiative if Canada did not.

American trading activities, in particular, concerned the North West Mounted Police. Even before the police were officially despatched to Hudson Bay in 1903, they reported on the movements and activities of American vessels. In 1900, Superintendent A. H. Greisbach of "G" division wrote to Fred White, the comptroller, commenting on the trade carried on by Americans:

> I find that there is no doubt that a large trade is done not only by American whalers, but also, by ships regularly equipped for this trade. . . . The trade properly belongs to Canada and the time has fully arrived when it should be looked after and if this were done it would seen pay all expenses to say nothing of upholding Canadian prestige.[23]

James Bain, the president of the Canadian Institute, was another who expressed his concern that Canada might lose out to foreigners; he also encouraged Bernier's efforts.[24] Lord Minto, Lord Strathcona, Sir Clements Markham, and Richard Reid Dobell, M.P., showed their support in 1901, by consenting to serve on "a General Committee in charge of the Canadian North Pole Expedition," to be commanded by

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[22]Ottawa Citizen, 11 February 1901.

[23]Greisbach to White, 28 May 1900, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177.

[24]Bain to Laurier, 13 March 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 190.

Bernier.[25] Laurier too was invited to be president of the committee but he apparently declined. Soon after the committee was formed, Bernier was able to report to Laurier that arrangements had been completed to establish subscription lists in every bank "from Dawson City to Cape Breton," and with every newspaper.[26] Doggedly, Bernier worked on. By 1901, he could claim the governor general as his patron, and many other influential men had indicated their interest.[27] Newspaper opinion was favourable. But Laurier did not act.

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[25]Bernier to Laurier, 15 April 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 282.

Minto suggested to Bernier that he approach officials at the Colonial Office while he was in England in 1902. The governor general thought Bernier deserving of support, but Laurier considered the expedition "was not sufficiently matured to warrant [royal] patronage." It appears that the Colonial Office might have supported Bernier's request before Laurier's attitude was known. On 7 February 1902, advisers in the Office were inclined to favour the expedition. They thought that, although Laurier had not promised or given assistance to Bernier, he would if other help was not forthcoming. Upon discovering Laurier's attitude, three days later, Chamberlain's advisers changed their minds. C.O. 42/888, pp. 187-202.

By September 1903, Lord Strathcona had promised $5,000 for "a north pole expedition as soon as the government voted the funds to build a ship." Bernier to Laurier, 19 September 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 282.

[26]Bernier to Laurier, 1 May 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 194.

[27]Arthur F. Sladen to Bernier, 20 March 1901, Laurier Papers, Vol. 190. Sladen was Minto's secretary.

Bernier's efforts, however, were not totally without success. In 1899, 1901, and again in 1902, he was permitted to address members of the House and the Senate.[28] After the 1902 meeting, Bernier was able to present Laurier with a document in support of a Canadian polar expedition, signed by the majority of the members of the House of Commons. The document stated that "even if the North Pole was not reached, the exploration of the polar regions which form part of Canada would be worth the cost."[29] Attention was also drawn to the recent presidential address, of John Scott Keltie, before a meeting of the British Association. He had called upon Canada to explore her polar regions for the "honour and glory of the Dominion."[30]

One of those who endorsed Keltie's remarks was John Charlton, an influential Liberal member of Parliament (N. Norfolk). He later spoke out forcefully and at length, during a discussion on the expenditure for Bernier's proposed voyage. He no doubt spoke for many Canadians when he emphasized the "possibility of an active and

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[28]Bernier to Laurier, 3 May 1899, 13 February 1901, and 22 March 1901, Laurier Papers, Vols. 110, 187, and 190; House of Commons Debates, 1 May 1902, p. 3955.

[29]Ibid., Bernier to Laurier, 12 April 1902, Laurier Papers, Vol. 229.

[30]Address by J. S. Keltie, ibid.

aggressive national life in Canada." Charlton was determined not to be apologetic for being Canadian, and urged that Canada's sacrifice in the Boer War had gained her an enviable position in the world. He argued:

> Aside entirely from the reputation that would accrue to this country from the settlement of a geographical problem . . . we would establish our right to all the territories and islands that might lie between our present northern boundary and the north pole itself. . . . And these possessions may be of value. They may contain enormous mineral wealth.[31]

After returning to the subject of Canadian national aspirations, Charlton concluded: "This polar expedition would be a nationalizing factor in our experience."

Government and Opposition members alike applauded Charlton's speech. Robert Borden, the new leader of the Conservatives, referred to the "several interviews" he had with Bernier, and expressed his belief that the French Canadian was "well qualified to lead a polar expedition." Other members mentioned Bernier's "activities for years," in Canada and the United Kingdom, to promote interest in his plan to reach the North Pole. One speaker stated that Bernier could easily obtain American backing. This, he warned, would only add to the trouble Canada had with the United States, in trying to settle territorial disputes. "And the next thing we know," he said, "we shall have

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[31] House of Commons Debates, 1 May 1902, p. 3951-52. Charlton claimed that Bernier had the support of 113 members.

another Alaska boundary question near the North Pole, with commissioners sitting at Washington to settle question [sic] of our northern boundary."

Sensing the mood of the House, Laurier rose to declare: "Even if there was nothing in the enterprise [Bernier's expedition] but sentiment, that alone is a thing which no nation can afford to be indifferent to." He then affirmed his confidence in Bernier's abilities. His one reservation, and it was to prove an important one, was that he had expected Bernier to raise $100,000 privately--unfortunately, only $20,000 had been promised.

After Charlton's speech, Bernier asked Laurier again for government support.[32] He enclosed a copy of a resolution, passed by the Royal Society of Canada (28 May 1902), reaffirming the Society's approval of his proposed expedition. Senator Pascal Poirier had moved the original resolution (23 May 1901), which was seconded by Dr. Robert Bell, director of the Geological Survey.[33] Bernier also

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[32]Bernier to Laurier, 29 May 1902, Laurier Papers, Vol. 234.

[33]Clipping from the Quebec Daily Telegraph, 29 November 1902. Bell had taken part in expeditions to Hudson Bay in 1884, 1885, and 1897. On the last occasion, he also explored Baffin Island. A charter member of the Royal Society of Canada, respected scientist and explorer, and director of the Canadian Geological Survey (1901-1906), Bell's influence was considerable.

informed the prime minister that he was still trying to raise subscriptions.

Undaunted by Laurier's reluctance to commit the government, Bernier continued his crusade throughout 1902. But as the year drew to a close, his labours left him frustrated for in spite of the support he seemingly enjoyed the government did not seize the opportunity to embark upon an enterprise which would engender strong nationalist sentiments.

Canadian concern for her national rights mounted during 1902. In September, the Edmonton Bulletin expressed its regret that American whalers had a trade advantage over the Edmonton traders, since the Americans did not have to pay duties on this valuable trade with the Indians and Eskimos.[34] Early in December, a Mounted Police constable echoed the Bulletin's concern, in a letter to Fred White.[35] This prompted White to approach Clifford Sifton, minister of the interior, about "sealing matters in Mackenzie Bay." White mentioned two or three trips undertaken by

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[34]Edmonton Bulletin, 22 September 1902. Frank Oliver, the publisher of the Bulletin, and member of Parliament for Alberta, had urged the extension of police jurisdiction at the mouth of the Mackenzie since 1899. Later, he succeeded Sifton as minister of the interior and superintendent of Indian affairs (1905-1911). See "Memorandum re. Trading at the Mouth of the Mackenzie," Sifton to White, 23 January 1901, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177.

[35]Smart to White, 4 December 1902, ibid.; see also Greisbach to White, 28 May 1900, ibid.

Commissioner Aylesworth Bowen Perry, to San Francisco, in connection with such matters.[36] "It could do no harm" White ventured, "to find out, quietly, what vessels there were at San Francisco or at present in the Arctic region." In this connection, White wanted to determine the extent of American activities. But he was equally interested in discovering whether "a suitable boat" could be purchased for use in policing the Arctic.[37] Sifton readily approved the comptroller's plan, and it was only four days before White issued secret instructions to Perry.[38] After

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[36]White to Perry, 14 May 1900, ibid. On these previous trips to the United States, Perry's task was to gather all the information he could on American whaling and trading activities at Herschel Island. This small wind-swept island at the mouth of the Mackenzie was a popular wintering harbour for American whalers.

[37]White to Sifton, 19 December 1902, ibid.; see also White to Francois Frederic Gourdeau, 4 March 1903, ibid. White told the deputy minister of marine and fisheries that Perry had been sent to the United States to inquire into the "feasibility of securing there a boat suitable for the extension of your fishery protection service at the mouth of the Mackenzie River."

[38]Sifton had previously made known his belief that Canada should have a police post at the mouth of the Mackenzie. His concern arose out of talks he had with George Dawson, Bell's predecessor as Director of the Geological Survey, who had told Sifton that Americans were trading with Indians in Canadian territory. Sifton to White, 22 January 1901, ibid.

The presence of American whalers, at the mouth of the Mackenzie, created a dangerous situation for Canada. If steps were not taken to establish law and order among the whalers wintering at Herschel Island, it was feared that the United States would assert control over the region. In addition to the economic and diplomatic factors involved, there was the question of morality. More than anything

informing Perry that he thought "the Canadian government was about to send a vessel to Mackenzie Bay for the protection of Canadian Fisheries and Canadian interests generally," White instructed the commissioner to find out as much as he could about the whaling fleet controlled from San Francisco. White concluded his letter with some words of caution: "I am particularly instructed to impress

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else, it was the immoral behaviour of the whalers which attracted the attention of Canadians to this small, distant, and barren island.

Herschel Island had, by 1896, become a regular American whaling station, where as many as twelve large steamers and 600 men wintered. The only laws were those enforced by the individual captains who were reluctant to punish offenders. It was, therefore, decided that in order to protect the native population, Canada would have to establish a police post on the island.

The first police detachment arrived at the island in 1903. The first year was quiet allowing the men to become familiar with the terrain and the native population. Only two whalers wintered there and customs dues were not collected, since there was very little trading. Three years later, the whaling fleet was caught in the ice. Unable to return to San Francisco, the crews posed a problem for the small police detachment. But in spite of the presence of 230 men, the only serious occurence was the murder of a ship's captain several hundred miles east of the island.

Although there were infrequent complaints of immoral behaviour, the police presence was effective. One veteran whaling captain claimed, in 1910, that he had "never seen the island so quiet and orderly." He commented on the change since "the old days when many ships wintered there, liquor abundant, and vice rampant." The willingness of the whalers to comply with Canadian laws indicated that Canadian sovereignty was recognized. N.W.M.P. Annual Report, 1903, p. 53; R.N.W.M.P. Annual Report, 1906, p. 4; Rev. C. E. Whittaker to White, 18 March 1907, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1907, File 254; Inspector G. L. Jennings to Perry, 9 July 1910, R.N.W.M.P. Annual Report, 1910, p. 158.

upon you the desirability of secrecy as to the subject of your inquiries."[39] The cloak-and-dagger aspect of the mission was based partly on an awareness that the price of vessels would likely be increased, if it were known that the prospective buyer was the Canadian government. However, influential people in Canada were becoming increasingly aware of American activities in the North, and wished to find out the specific nature of these activities, without giving offence to the American government. The selection of such a high ranking and capable officer as Perry indicated the seriousness with which Canada viewed the situation.

The nature of White's concern for preserving secrecy was obvious. In his letter of 30 December 1902, White warned Perry against giving any specific reasons for his enquiries, since a suitable boat might be found in British Columbia. "We have all been impressed," White said, "with the importance of not making known the intention of the Government with regard to the policing, etc., of these far northern waters."[40] White's "etc." was vague, but there was no doubt that Canada was waking to the threat of American domination in Arctic waters.

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[39]White to Perry, 23 December 1902, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177.

[40]White to Perry, 30 December 1902, ibid.

Reporting to White, from California, Perry expressed his suspicion that the Americans would be "likely to engage in illicit trading." But he was not sure that they visited Canadian arctic shores.[41] Perry frequented the waterfront of San Francisco hoping to glean information from American sailors who had visited Arctic waters. One of his informants, Robert P. Rithet, was not a sailor but head of a shipping form operating out of Victoria and San Francisco. Rithet complained to Perry that he found it "a little difficult to get to the point without creating more 'suspicion' than I wish to."[42]

Mounting concern over the activities of American whalers and foreign explorers, in the eastern Arctic, led the Canadian government to despatch the D.G.S. Neptune in

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[41]Perry to White, 30 January 1903, ibid.

[42]Rithet to Perry, 9 February 1903, ibid. Robert Peterson Rithet began his mercantile business in Victoria in 1872. He served as president of the Board of Trade, and was mayor of Victoria during 1885-86. As president of the Victoria Canning Company and the Canadian Pacific Navigation Company, Rithet was one of British Columbia's leading figures.

Perry returned to San Francisco in 1904. As before, he was quite secretive. However, anonymity was more of a business than a diplomatic necessity. White to Perry, 14 November 1904, and Perry to White, 9 December 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177. White to Perry, 27 February 1905, ibid.

1903.[43] By the spring of that year, the decision to establish some system of supervision and control over the Northern coast and islands had been made. James A. Smart, the deputy minister of the interior, suggested to White that a post be located where "it is felt there should be some exercise of the Customs laws with regard to trading with the Indians and Esquimaux by American traders."[44] The deputy minister was anxious lest "unfounded and troublesome claims may be set up if Americans are permitted to land and pursue the industries of whaling, fishing and trading with the Indians without complying with the revenue laws of Canada and without any assertion of sovereignty on the part of Canada."[45] Although Canada's sovereignty in the region had not been seriously challenged, there were

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[43]Minto to Lyttelton, 17 November 1903, C.O. 42/893, pp. 178-80. Below Ch. 3, n. 5.

There is reason to believe that Laurier had decided, by 1902, that the time was opportune for delimiting Canada's boundaries. See above, pp. 3-6. The activities of the American Robert Peary, and the Norwegians, Otto Sverdrup, and Roald Amundsen, in the Arctic, created some concern in Canada. Peary used Ellesmere Island as a winter camp and as a base from which to attempt to reach the Pole in 1898-1902. Sverdrup was active in exploring Ellesmere Island and the islands which now bear his name, during the same time span. And by 1902, Amundsen's preparations for his attempt to sail the North-West Passage were well under way.

[44]Smart to White, 15 July 1903, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[45]Memorandum enclosed with letter Smart to White, 30 July 1903, ibid.

Canadians who thought this a distinct possibility. Commander Albert Peter Low was appointed, to the Neptune expedition, early in June, by the Minister of Marine and Fisheries. Low was told that he was likely to come in contact with American fishing vessels. In which event, he was instructed that "Canada claims Hudson Bay."[46]

Accompanying Low, on the 1903 voyage, was Major John D. Moodie of the Mounted Police and a detachment of the force. Low's orders were issued by the Department of Marine and Fisheries, while Moodie received his instructions from Comptroller White. In his instructions, issued on 5 August 1903, White said that the government had decided that the time had arrived "when some system of supervision and control should be established over the coast and the islands in the northern part of the Dominion."[47] Moodie was directed to "explore, patrol and establish the authority of the Government of Canada in the waters and

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[46]Magee to Low, 18 August 1903, Ibid. See also Robert Bell, Report on the Dominion Government Expedition to Hudson Bay and the Arctic Islands on Board the D.G.S. Neptune, 1903-1904 (Ottawa, 1906). Low was appointed by Raymond Prefontaine, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, in 1903. Low had previously received verbal instructions as to the purposes and intentions of the expedition. Memorandum for Arthur G. Doughty prepared by Hensley R. Holmden, 26 April 1921, Interior Department Papers, Vol. 3.

[47]White to Moodie, 5 Auguat 1903, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236. Moodie later stated that Low had informed him that the principal reason for the expedition and his orders was to take possession of Ellesmere Island and North Devon Island. Moodie to Comptroller, 1 July 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1904, File 716.

islands of Hudson's Bay, and north thereof."[48] He was also told to find a suitable spot where "a small force representing the authority of the Canadian Government can be stationed and exercise jurisdiction over the surrounding waters and territory."[49] At this time, attention was focused on Hudson Bay. The Canadian government was aware that Canada's assertion of sovereign rights could touch off diplomatic "incidents," for Moodie was cautioned against "any harsh or hurried enforcement of the laws of Canada." Moodie's first duty was to impress upon everyone he met that "after reasonable notice and warning the laws would be enforced as elsewhere in Canada."[50]

The major diplomatic events for Canadians, in 1903, were the Alaska Boundary negotiations and settlement. The Boundary Commission announced its findings on Tuesday, 20 October; the following Saturday, Sir Wilfrid Laurier met H. M. Ausi, of the Geological Survey, to discuss "the apparent urgent necessity of having the limits of British North America . . . defined by a solemn decree." Undoubtedly, the two men were conscious that some day

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[48]White viewed the expedition as one essentially of exploration. He thought that it would lead to the government placing a patrol vessel permanently in the Bay. White to Sifton, 23 July and 11 August 1903, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[49]White to Moodie, 5 August 1903, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[50]Ibid.

Canada's claim to northern possessions could "be placed in doubt by some foreign power." Ausi was convinced that Canada's northern resources were great. He included coal, asbestos, copper, iron, lead, jade and "other useful and rare metals" among the riches of the north. Ausi reminded Laurier that Low was to take possession of the country around the north-western part of Hudson Bay. "The time is opportune," he asserted, "to define clearly the boundaries of the British portion of the North American continent north of the border between Canada and the United States." Laurier and Ausi were in agreement that Canadian claims to the Arctic archipelago should be recognized and that Hudson Bay be declared a mare clausum.[51]

Although the Alaskan award came as a shock to many Canadians, many others had become increasinly aware, early in 1903, that the decision might go against Canada. The latter group based their pessimism on Roosevelt's

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[51]Ausi to Laurier, 26 October 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 288. Ausi prepared a memorandum proposing "that an Imperial edict or Decree be sent forth giving in no uncertain terms utterance to the statement which we here in Canada have always held, that, exclusive of Alaska and Greenland, the whole territory of the Arctic Archipelago, as well as all the lands appertaining thereto, . . . to the north of the International Boundary line between Canada and the United States of America, constitute British soil together with all the rights and privileges along their coasts appertaining thereto.

The memorandum concluded by calling for Hudson Bay to be decreed a mare clausum. No further action seems to have been taken on this memorandum.

controversial selection of the American members of the commission. Accompanying this mood of pessimism was a resolve that Canada should look to her own interests. It was then that some Canadians, including the prime minister, decided Canadian interests should not be so readily sacrificed in the future.

Among the many letters Laurier received from Canadians protesting the award was one from Vancouver which was typical. The writer asked that Canada be secured "against an Eastern Alaska." He was particularly concerned that the United States might try to acquire Greenland from Denmark. In support of this argument he mentioned that the United States had secured the reversion of Danish territory in the West Indies. He urged that Canada should secure the reversion of Greenland. To bolster his argument, he mentioned Greenland's mineral wealth and strategic importance. He also warned Laurier that Canada would have to effectively occupy Labrador, Hudson Bay and the Arctic coast of Canada, in order to protect herself against American expansionism.[52]

The Toronto Globe was quick to relate the voyage of the Neptune to the government's dissatisfaction with the Alaskan award. On the last day of October, the Globe

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[52]T. W. Cleave to Laurier, 28 October 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 288.

drew attention to the Low-Moodie expedition and commented on its significance:

> The despatch by the Canadian Government of an expedition to Hudson Bay marks a new epoch in the national status of the Dominion. For one of the chief purposes of the expedition is to drive out of that inland sea the American whalers who have been using it as their own and disregarding British sovereignty and rights there. . . . These are the international aspects of the voyage, and they are dictated by Canada's unpleasant experience over the Alaska Boundary dispute.[53]

The Globe concluded that Canada should do more in the way of actual occupation, in order to protect her title, and to avoid future diplomatic friction. The same theme was apparent in a later Globe report concerning rumours that Canada was undertaking negotiations for union with Newfoundland and Greenland:

> The decision of the Alaska Tribunal, giving permanently to the United States a strip of territory on our northeastern border, and the direction in which the foreign policy of the United States Executive seems to be gravitating, have awakened in Canada the feeling that unless proper precautions are taken we may have a repetition of the Alaska incident on the shores of Hudson Bay and on the Atlantic seaboard. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. The Government have already taken measures to patrol the great inland sea to the north and assert our authority there.[54]

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[53]Toronto Globe, 31 October 1903.

[54]Toronto Globe, 21 December 1903. The possibility that Denmark might be willing to sell Greenland to Canada was pursued. On January 1904, Bertram Cox, the Undersecretary of State at the Colonial Office, asked his counterpart at the Foreign Office if Denmark had been approached. The reply was not encouraging. Denmark would not sell. W. E. Coshen to Lansdowne, 18 February 1904.

The time was opportune, according to the Toronto paper, to negotiate a settlement of the French Shore and bring Newfoundland, and possibly Greenland, into Canada.

The outbreak of nationalism brought on by the Alaskan settlement worked to Bernier's advantage. In August, he complained to Laurier that his work of six years had been to no avail, even though he could claim 90,000 subscriptions.[55] No doubt Bernier must have experienced some disappointment when he found out that he had not been chosen to command the Neptune.[56] By December, however, Bernier was buoyed up by the increasing interest in his plan and he declared: "our term as a nation has come and we cannot well back out."[57] On the same morning that Bernier was writing from Quebec, the prime minister called upon Lord Minto, the Governor General, to discuss

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[55]Bernier to Laurier, 4 August 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 275.

[56]Low had been in the Bay "a number of times" before and Samuel W. Bartlett, the Neptune's captain, was regarded as "the best ice navigator in the Atlantic." Bartlett's reputation was well-earned, as he had worked with Peary in the Arctic, in 1897. James A. Smart to White, 17 July 1903, and White to Perry, 11 August 1903, R.C.M.P. Papers 1905, File 236; Toronto Globe, 31 October 1903.

[57]Bernier to Laurier, 3 December 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 244. Bernier's spirits received a further boost when he was sent by the government to Germany, in April 1904. His mission was to bring over the Arctic (the Gauss of Antarctic fame) to Canada. The government paid $75,000 for this vessel. White to Perry, 6 April 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236; memorandum for Sir W. Laurier, 16 July 1904, ibid.

the threat of American expansionism. Laurier described the history of United State expansionism as a "popular policy."[58] In the Canadian government's opinion, he said, public men in the United States looked to Canada to fall to them. Laurier wanted no further American expansion and asked that negotiations commence for the eventual purchase of Greenland by Canada.[59] As the year ended, Canada had embarked on a new and vigorous policy of expansion in the North. The reaction to the Alaska boundary award and fear of America's apparently insatiable appetite for territory contributed greatly to Canada's more aggressive role.

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[58]Canada, Privy Council Memorandum, 3 December 1903, Secret and Confidential Despatches, Vol. 34.

[59]Ibid.

CHAPTER III

HUDSON BAY AND BEYOND, 1904-1914

The question of sovereignty in Hudson Bay occupied much of the government's attention during 1904. Early in the new year (6 January), Fred White called for the continuation of the work done by the Neptune and the Mounted Police, in Hudson Bay and northern waters. He also wanted the extension of a similar service to Mackenzie Bay. In order to administer the area properly, White suggested that a Western and an Eastern District be formed. This met with Laurier's approval.[1] The comptroller's words were still fresh in the prime minister's mind, when he talked with Lord Minto about Sir Mortimer Durand's anxiety over Canada's forthright claim to the fisheries of Hudson Bay.[2] Durand, the British ambassador to the United States, was concerned about the effect of such a claim on relations

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[1]White Memorandum, 6 July 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[2]Minto to Laurier, 12 January 1904; Minto to Laurier, 16 January 1904, Laurier Papers, Vol. 4.

with the Americans and asked for clarification of the Canadian position.

The ambassador's fears were well-founded, for the boundaries of the territory annexed to Canada by the British order-in-council of 1880, remained uncertain.[3]

William F. King, the Dominion astronomer, was particularly aware of the need to assert Canadian sovereignty in the north. In his preliminary report on Canada's title to the Arctic archipelago (23 January 1904), King informed Sifton that Canada's claim was inchoate. Canada, therefore, did not hold undisputed title to the Arctic islands. King considered the order-in-council to be unsatisfactory, both because it did not define the possessions transferred, and because it did not carry the legal authority of an act.[4]

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[3]C.O. 42/759, p. 19. The Colonial Office correspondence reveals that Britain and Canada were not clear as to the extent of the territory to be transferred. Britain was anxious, however, to transfer her rights or territory to Canada. This would have the effect, it was thought, of discouraging United States' expansion in the North. One Colonial Office official wrote a revealing memorandum: "The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is, I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada."

[4]William F. King, Report Upon the Title of Canada to the Islands North of the Mainland of Canada (Ottawa, 1905), in Interior Department Papers, Vol. 5-6. See also his memorandum for the Minister of the Interior, "Preliminary report on the title of Canada to the Northern

In the course of their conversation, Minto asked Laurier whether Canada would consider the three-mile limit to apply to the fisheries of the Bay, or whether the Canadian government considered the Bay as a mare clausum, with all rights reserved to Canada. Laurier replied, somewhat unsatisfactorily, that he was not clear as to the actual position, though Canada undoubtedly claimed rights over Hudson Bay. He did tell Minto though that another government expedition would get underway during the summer, the intention being to sail north of Hudson Bay, planting flags to indicate Canadian possession. There was "no manner of doubt," Minto reassured Laurier, as to Canadian possessions, as far as the North Pole. Although Laurier agreed emphatically, he thought it possible "that the

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islands," 23 January 1904, Governor General's Papers, No. 296.

Gordon W. Smith, "The Historical and Legal Background of Canada's Arctic Claims," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952), is the best work available on this subject. Smith details the voyages of discovery, deals with British and Canadian government attitudes, discusses the legal aspects involved at some length, and suggests possible future difficulties. Although he was not able to use the Department of External Affairs Files, he made excellent use of available sources. See the same author's "The Transfer of Arctic Territories from Great Britain to Canada in 1880, and Some Related Matters, as Seen in Official Correspondence," Arctic, XIV (March, 1961), 53-73; "Sovereignty in the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International Problem," The Arctic Frontier (Toronto, 1966), pp. 194-255.

See also V. Kenneth Johnson, "Canada's Title to the Arctic Islands," Canadian Historical Review, XIV (March, 1933), 24-41.

Americans might establish posts and subsequently claim possession of lands in the far North from which it might be difficult to dislodge them, and he cited the American post at the mouth of the Mackenzie River."[5] He went on to explain that the government had decided to claim customs duties from the American traders in the North. They had previously enjoyed duty-free trade with the Indians. And he anticipated possible trouble with the traders over the enforcement of customs regulations.

Durand's anxiety may have indicated that the United States was interested in these Canadian moves to assert sovereignty. The ambassador acknowledged that no official interest had been shown in the voyage of the Neptune but he also intimated that Canadian actions could arouse popular

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[5]Note of conversation between Minto and Laurier, 9 January 1904, enclosed with Minto to Lyttelton, 10 February 1904, Secret and Confidential Despatches, Vol. 35. Laurier chose not to make Minto aware of the objects of the 1903 expedition. But Minto, in spite of the secrecy, was confidentially informed that the expedition and the North-West Mounted Police post at Herschel Island had similar objectives: "The ostensible intention of the expedition is geological survey and enquiry into the Hudson Bay fisheries, but it has been to a great extent instigated by the apprehension of the growth of United States' influence in the northern seas, as represented by American whalers and explorers, and anxiety as to the possible future claims of possession by the United States."

At least one Colonial Office advisor thought Canada's claim to territory in the neighbourhood of Hudson Bay and the north would be too audacious. Minto Lyttelton, 17 November 1903, C.O. 42/893, pp. 178-80.

feeling in the United States.[6] At the end of 1903, some American newspapers had claimed that Hudson Bay and Straits could not be regarded as a mare clausum. These newspapers were more interested in what they regarded as New England fishing rights than with any territorial claims made by Canada.[7]

Canadian newspapers and magazines supported the government's expansionist policy in the Arctic. An article in the Ottawa Citizen, referring to the second voyage undertaken by the government, suggested that Bernier would be planting the flag "on territory coveted by the Americans."[8] The writer of this article was also concerned that the "enterprising Yankee" had settled on land belonging to the "British Empire."[9] The use of American names for geographical features on some maps was cited by the writer as proof of American expansionism. If more proof was needed, it was provided by Robert E. Peary's remarks before the Royal Geographical Society later in the year. The American Arctic explorer told his audience that he regarded the North Pole as the "natural and logical

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[6]Lyttelton to Minto, 18 March 1904, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 296.

[7]Ottawa Citizen, 15 December 1903.

[8]11 April 1904.

[9]Ibid.

boundary to her [United States] destiny."[10] Two days later, the Citizen warned that the Alaska decision was good reason for Canada to be alert for American "aggressiveness on the northeast boundaries of our continent." Shortly after the Alaskan award was known, the Montreal Daily Herald noted that if Bernier did "get the North Pole, some later Webster would give it to the States."[11] The same sentiments were expressed quite unequivocally in the Canadian Magazine:

> It is the unwavering policy of the United States to claim, and if possible secure, by hook or by crook, every additional inch of territory in North America which may be obtained either by chance, by the indulgent weakness of the rightful owners or, where feasible, by a little gentle buccaneering. The aim is never lost sight of. If some intrepid explorer from the Republic ultimately locates the North Pole the Stars and Stripes will at once be hoisted, a republic of ice set up, and a northern boundary dispute provided for Canada.[12]

It appeared that Canadians had much more definite ideas about American aims than the Americans had themselves.

Although Canada wanted to protect her claims to northern dominion, a long-range plan was still lacking. As so often, in affairs of government, policy was largely determined in response to events. Important civil

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[10] Ibid., 12 November 1903. When he reached the Pole (6 April 1909), Peary claimed the "entire region, and adjacent, for and in the name of the President of the United States of America," Smith, p. 110.

[11] 22 October 1903.

[12] Norman Patterson, "The Alaskan Boundary," The Canadian Magazine, XX (November 1902), 59-62.

servants had no idea what to do next. In the spring of 1904, Fred White complained to Francois Frederic Gourdeau, Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries, that he had no information as to what the government planned to do, other than what he read in the newspapers. Seeking guidance, White politely stated that he had "no desire to unreasonably press the urgency of our reaching some understanding as to what I shall be expected to do in connection with the proposed development of Canadian jurisdiction in Hudson's Bay and north thereof."[13] But two months passed, and he was equally ignorant of government policy. White was afraid that the police would have "the responsibility but little say for the patrols."[14]

Fortunately for White's peace of mind, the government's indecision did not last long. By July, he was able to write confidently, to Moodie on board the Neptune, that although "there has been a good deal of hesitation . . . one thing is quite settled and that is, that our force is

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[13]White to Gourdeau, 25 April 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[14]White to Perry, 18 June 1904, ibid. White had opposed police participation in the Hudson Bay expedition. He thought it "foreign to anything done before." In January 1905, an agreement was reached "in order to avoid confusion of control between the Department of Marine and Fisheries and the Mounted Police," whereby the police would supervise only the west shore of the Bay. White to Perry, 11 August 1903, and 6 July 1904, ibid.; White to Smart, 16 July 1903, ibid.; Memorandum by White, 19 July 1905, ibid.

to take charge of the preservation of law and order in that extended District."[15] Moodie had earlier written to White, from Fullerton, on Hudson Bay, calling his attention to the reported presence of a French company in the Bay.[16] Since such a company would be trading in opposition to the Hudson's Bay Company, Moodie asked for increased patrols and the establishment of posts on both sides of the Bay.[17] By mid-July, Moodie, acting as the agent of the Canadian government, asserted Canadian sovereignty in a most distinct manner. He sent a notice to all whalers and traders, calling their attention to "the fact that your fishing in these waters is contrary to law. My instructions are that the laws are to be strictly enforced, after due notice has been given . . ."[18] Moodie expected that the law would be enforced during 1905 and after. This proclamation was in keeping with his instructions, as approved by Laurier. Speaking in the House of Commons, on 29 July

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[15]White to Moodie, 12 July 1904, ibid.

[16]Fullerton was chosen since it provided a good location from which to supervise the activities of American whalers in the chief whaling ground. According to Canadian experts the U.S. had "for fifty years been annually taking about $100,000 worth of oil and bone." Toronto Globe, 15 April 1904.

[17]Moodie to White, 1 July 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1904, File 716.

[18]Moodie to "All Masters of Whalers, Agents in charge of stations, and all whom it may concern," 16 July 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1911, File 161.

1904, Laurier emphasized that the purpose of the Bernier and Low expeditions was to assert Canadian sovereignty. By this time, Canada was firmly committed to northern expansion. The Mounted Police acted as agents of this expansion, since it was their responsibility to board vessels, establish posts, and introduce "the system of Government control as prevails in the organized portions of Canada."[19] By early August, White was able to report confidentially to Laurier that he felt "sure we have now made a fair start in opening up those regions."[20]

The reaction of the American and Scottish whalers to Canada's assertion of territorial jurisdiction was reassuring. Moodie reported that in every case where the police met the whalers, "the best feeling existed," and he had no trouble.[21]

Apparently, the greatest friction during the Neptune expedition was not between the whalers and the

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[19] C.A.R. 1904, p. 154; White's draft instructions for Hudson Bay Patrol, 1 August 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[20] White to Laurier, 8 August 1904, Laurier Papers, Vol. 331.

[21] Moodie to White, 30 August 1904, R.N.W.M.P. Annual Report, 1904, Part IV, p. 3. Most of the whalers that Moodie's men met in 1904 were out of Dundee. The total customs collected amounted to less than five hundred dollars. These men told Moodie that whales were very scarce.

Moodie also issued a notice, in November 1903, prohibiting the export or possession of musk-ox skins by anyone but a native. Ibid., p. 12.

police, but between the police and ship's officers. The Toronto Mail and Empire reported clashes of authority on board the Neptune.[22] Unfortunately the report was accurate. Low and Moodie did not get along. After further difficulties with the Department of Marine in connection with a later voyage, White decided that it would be desirable for the police to "paddle their own canoes" in the future.[23]

During 1904 and 1905, William Maclean repeatedly expressed his interest in protecting Canadian rights in the north. Maclean had a practical as well as visionary turn of mind. On the latter side, he suggested, in a speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto (24 February 1904), that Hudson Bay was "the northern doorway to the continent which must be opened up by railways and other ways and might in time become the finest summer resort in America."[24]

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[22]Toronto Mail and Empire, 24 August 1904.

[23]White to Perry, 25 October 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177. The major dispute was over Moodie's selection of Fullerton as the location for a police post. Low informed Moodie that he disclaimed any responsibility for leaving a police detachment at Fullerton. Bartlett apparently was in agreement with him. Both considered the west coast very dangerous. See exchange of correspondence which took place on board ship between Moodie and Low, 22 and 23 April 1904, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1905, File 236.

[24]See above p. 38.

Sir Sandford Fleming, the famous Canadian engineer and scientist, was the main speaker on this occasion. Fleming urged the development of Canada's north. He was

On the practical side, Maclean was an expert on railroad shipping costs. Apparently, his interest in Hudson Bay grew out of his belief that the riches of the north were lying ready to be tapped. The way to do this, he declared, was to build a railroad to Hudson Bay.[25] Before the House, on 9 May 1905, Maclean drew attention to the presence of American patrols in northern waters. His immediate concern was that American names were being given to Canadian territory and that Americans were apparently attempting to exercise jurisdication. He called upon the Canadian government to organize these territories, establish a new territorial government farther to the north, raise the Canadian flag, and put Canadian laws into effect for the region.[26]

In his reply to Maclean, Laurier admitted that the Canadian government too was concerned about the presence of American patrols and the problem of American names on recent maps. He thought the government ought to provide against it, and asserted: "We cannot allow the Americans to take possession of these lands; we claim them to be British territory and we intend to assert our jurisdiction over them." Laurier discussed the problem of jurisdiction in the north and claimed that planting the flag was the

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particularly interested in the Hudson Bay railroad scheme. "Build Up Canada," was the title of his speech.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ottawa Citizen, 10 May 1905.

only way to assert Canadian control in the area. The work of the Low and Bernier expeditions was mentioned in particular.[27]

Meanwhile, Bernier and Moodie were preparing for the Arctic's summer patrol.[28] Moodie had warned American whalers of Canada's intentions to assert jurisdiction. While he and the American whaling captain, George Cromer, were in Fullerton Harbour, Moodie reminded Cromer that all laws of Canada would be strictly enforced. He referred to permission previously granted to Cromer to fish in Canadian waters and said that the "permission so granted was exceptional and does not in any way establish a precedent. In future no such permission will be granted to any foreign

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[27] House of Commons Debates, 9 May 1905, pp. 5609-5610.

[28] Saturday Night, 1 October 1904, p. 2, reported that Bernier, "made an ineffectual protest against the humiliation of playing second fiddle to a landsman." The same article was critical of Bernier, calling him a comic opera explorer and river boatman who was completely unsuited for the delicate task of asserting Canadian sovereignty. Two years later, under a different editor, the same magazine reported Bernier's return from the Arctic in a much more flattering manner: "Captain Bernier has long been the butt of politicians; but Bernier is no fool, . . . he is a capable officer and knows his business." Ibid., 9 October 1909, p. 27.

The Toronto Daily Star (17 April 1926) recognized Bernier as "the dean of Canadian Arctic explorers." It proposed that "a grateful Canada might some day erect statues to Captain Bernier as to a Polar Jacques Cartier."

vessels. . . ."[29] Canada's presence in the north was now being made known.

After working for so many years to promote Canada's Arctic, it was natural that Bernier would expect some credit for his foresight. He claimed, after returning in 1905, that his voyages had resulted in turning the attention of the government to the "fine fisheries" of Canada's northern coast which "were being worked with impunity by the United States and European whalers."[30] Bernier expressed his wish to work on Canada's behalf, but he also suggested that if the Canadian government wouldn't help him he would go elsewhere. Years later, Bernier considered Low's work to have been "only a beginning of the work [he] had consistently urged upon the Canadian government for many years before it was finally undertaken." Bernier recognized that the Hudson Bay voyage of 1904 was useful in establishing police posts, and studying ice conditions and navigation, but he placed greater importance

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[29]Moodie to Cromer, 6 June 1905, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1911, File 161. Cromer was most cooperative. He readily recognized Canadian rights in the Arctic: "I wish to see the time when the Hudson Bay Route will be opened up to commerce; then with such aid as lighthouses and wireless telegraphy Canada can well feel proud of squaring out her possessions." Cromer to White, 19 and 26 May 1907, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1910, File 248.

[30]Montreal Star, 10 October 1905.

on the 1906-97 voyage.[31] He claimed that it was not until this voyage that the Canadian government made any "systematic effort to assert her sovereignty" by exercising jurisdiction therein.[32]

The Mounted Police also credited Bernier with having made a significant contribution. They emphasized that the result of the expedition marked "a further advance

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[31]In his Report on the Dominion Government Expedition . . . 1906-1907, p. 76, Bernier claimed that the whaling industry was exhausted. He called for a closed season for ten or fifteen years. On this voyage, he issued two licenses to each of five Scottish whalers. Ibid., p. 72.

[32]Bernier, Master Mariner, p. 307. Another famous Arctic explore, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, disparaged Bernier's work. Stefansson likened Bernier's Melville Island metal tablet (1 July 1909), taking possession of the Arctic archipelago, to Balboa's claim to all lands washed by the waters of the Pacific. Stefansson to Christie, 25 September 1925, Christie Papers, Vol. 6.

Christie did not share Stefansson's views. He thought that the Bernier and Low expeditions had kept Canadian rights alive by local acts. Christie had initially (October 1920) supported Stefansson in his desire to claim new territory for Canada including Wrangel Island. With this in mind, he urged that Canada not limit her claims to the region described by the application of the sector principle. Four months later, Christie agreed with Pope that Canada's claim would be weakened if she claimed territory so far afield as Wrangel Island.

Christie's attitude towards Stefansson also underwent change during this short period. This was due to the press publicity which Stefansson sought out and his misrepresentations of Christie's views to other Canadian officials. Another factor was Stefansson's attempt to have Christie change a legal opinion--a change which would have been advantageous to the explorer. Christie soon made up his mind to have nothing more to do with Stefansson. See Christie memorandum for the prime minister, 28 October 1920, ibid.; Memorandum by Christie, 12 June 1922, ibid., Vol. 3.

in enforcing Canadian jurisdiction over our northern waters and territories, particularly with regard to the Customs, Game and Fisheries, and the acquisition of valuable information respecting the navigation of Hudson Strait and Bay as a commercial route, and the location of harbours suitable for shipping."[33]

One of the most significant legal steps taken by the Canadian government, in order to establish sovereignty in Hudson Bay, was the passage, in July 1906, of an "Act to amend the Fisheries Act." This act was concerned with the issuing of licenses for whaling in Hudson Bay and the territorial waters of Canada north of the fifty-fifth parallel.[34] All foreign vessels were to pay a $50 annual fee and Hudson Bay was declared to be Canadian territorial water.[35] In his instructions to Bernier, prior to sailing, Gourdeau states: "It will be your duty to formally annex all new lands at which you may call, leaving proclamations in cairns at all points." At the same time, the deputy minister was aware that the Canadian government was in a rather precarious position diplomatically:

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[33]Answer to Senator Macdonald, 31 May 1906, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 281.

[34]Statutes of Canada, 6 Edward VII, c. 13, 13 July 1906.

[35]Gourdeau to White, 18 July 1906, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1911, File 161.

> I am to impress upon you the necessity of being most careful in all your actions, not to take any steps which might result in international complications with any foreign country. When action on your part would seem even likely to give rise to any such contingency, you will hold your hand and report the facts fully on your return.[36]

Of course the most likely foreign country to object to Canada's assertion of sovereignty was the United States.

Apparently the British were also concerned about the possible international repercussions that could result. Lord Elgin, the colonial secretary, wrote to Governor General Grey about a Times report that Canada had claimed Hudson Bay as territorial water. Elgin asked Grey to send him a copy of the Act and an explanation of the basis of Canada's claim "in order that we may be in a position to return an early and authoritative answer to the representations which the United States Government in view of the long period during which their vessels have whaled in Bay [sic] without interference may be expected to make."[37] This unilateral action by Canada caused one Colonial Office adviser to complain: "The calm manner in which the colonies raise international questions is exasperating."[38]

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[36]Gourdeau to Bernier, 24 July 1906, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 744.

[37]Elgin to Grey, 24 July 1906, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 296. . . .

[38]C.O. 42/907, pp. 146-47; London Times, 5 July 1906. Two years before, this same official, Bertram Cox, had raised objections to any Canadian assertion of sovereignty over Hudson Bay. He recognized that "Canada had

The Americans did not concern themselves with Canada's expansionist moves in the North. Most of the whalers paid the new fee without complaint. Although, in August 1906, Donald M. Howard, the inspector at Herschel Island, did consider it necessary for Canada to assert her jurisdiction over the northern coast, since "the Americans seem to have a very hazy idea of the Boundary."[39] Howard met one American officer who told him that he "thought it was a great pity that at the time of the Boundary award [Alaska] the United States did not claim all the land about the Arctic Coast and hold it, and then there would have been no trouble with regard to customs, etc." Most Americans were too concerned with domestic affairs to worry about Canadian expansionism in an area which was of doubtful value. Howard had previously expressed his dismay that Americans should make all the profit in the Arctic whaling industry. He thought Canadians could compete successfully with the Americans, since the voyage from Vancouver and Victoria was shorter and the Canadians would not have to pay duty.[40]

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never forgotten the Alaska boundary," but he was more concerned about possible American objections. C.O. 42/896, p. 776.

[39]Report from Herschel Island, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 177.

[40]D. M. Howard, Supplementary Report to Annual Report 1905 (Ottawa, 1906), p. 19.

Another champion of Canadian rights in the Arctic was Senator Pascal Poirier of New Brunswick. Poirier, apparently, did not believe that the government was doing enough. For on 20 February 1907, he declared that "the time had come for Canada to make formal declaration of possession of all lands and islands situated in the north of the Dominion and extending to the North Pole."[41] Press announcements, which, from time to time, told of American whalers and explorers hoisting their country's flag on Canadian soil, were singled out for attack. After reviewing the history of North American exploration, Poirier disagreed with the idea that continuous occupation was necessary to retain possession of lands. He then enunciated the "sector principle" relating to Arctic territoriality. By applying this principle, Canada could lay claim to all Arctic lands which lay between lines extending from her eastern and western boundaries through to the Pole. In concluding his speech, Poirier stressed that the Arctic region could have possible future value. Sir Richard Cartwright, the government spokesman, remarked that he

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[41]Canada, Senate Debates, 20 February 1907; according to Smith, The Historical and Legal Background . . . , p. 337, this speech is generally regarded "as the first pronouncement of the sector principle." Smith also mentions that the sector principle was proposed in a speech the year before, at the Arctic Club of New York. Poirier, himself, recognized that the principle was "not a novel affair." It is only fair to Poirier, however, to credit him with being the first influential Canadian to bring public attention to the principle.

thought Canada's title to Hudson Bay was clear, but he also considered it would be well to wait until "present work in the north is complete." Like Poirier, Cartwright also thought that the North might prove valuable.[42]

The possible value of the northern lands was a recurrent theme after 1903. Low thought that minerals might well exist in the region between Hudson Bay and the Mackenzie River. He cited the reports of expeditions which had shown that large deposits of iron ore and copper existed.[43] Inspector Arthur M. Jarvis, of the Mounted Police, like Howard, emphasized the value of the whaling industry. Jarvis estimated that between 1889 and 1908 about $13,250,000 worth of whale bone was taken. Adding the fur trade with the natives, Jarvis judged the total would reach $14 million.[44] He visualized ships returning from Arctic waters laden down with copper and other minerals for ballast, rather than sand and gravel. His superior officer, Commissioner Perry, shared Jarvis' belief that a great mining industry would spring up.[45]

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[42]At this time, Cartwright was Minister of Trade and Commerce.

[43]Gourdeau to Caldwell, 23 July 1906, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1906, File 743.

[44]Jarvis to Perry, 28 January 1908, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1908, File 149.

[45]Perry to White, 7 April 1908, R.C.M.P. Papers.

By the end of 1909, Canada had laid claim to practically all the Arctic region between Alaska and Greenland. At the start of his 1908-1909 voyage, Captain Bernier was instructed to intercept whalers, collect duties, and annex all land not already possessed. In an interview with a reporter from the Quebec Daily Telegraph, Bernier stated that he "expected to annex the balance of land in the far north."[46] Two months later, Bernier left a record in a cairn to indicate that he had "taken possession of all the Northern Islands except Banks Land and Prince of Wales." He declared his intention to take Banks Land in the spring.[47] Just prior to setting out on this voyage, Bernier had met the Prince of Wales, and had taken the opportunity to describe his plan of possession for Canada of all the islands discovered and annexed by British explorers. The Prince had "warmly commended" Bernier for his "persistence in urging this matter upon the Canadian government."[48]

Since his first voyage, Bernier had assiduously annexed "all Arctic territory granted by the British Crown to Canada." Finally, on 1 July 1909, he climaxed his

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[46]Clipping from Quebec Daily Telegraph, 13 June 1908, Bernier Papers, Vol. 2.

[47]Copy of a record left at Bridgeport Inlet, 31 August 1908, Bernier Papers, Vol. 2, Folder 9.

[48]Bernier, Master Marnier, p. 325.

previous declarations in the course of a special Dominion Day celebration.[49] On board the flag-bedecked ship, toasts were drunk, then the men gathered round a large rock to witness the unveiling of a metal tablet sculptured by the ship's engineer. Bernier referred to the British grant of 1880 and formally annexed "the whole 'Arctic Archipelago,' lying to the north of America, from long. 60° W. to 141°W. up to the latitude of 90° N."[50]

When he returned from this voyage Bernier was asked to address the Ottawa Canadian Club. The enthusiastic reception he received attested to the high regard in which he was held by many influential Canadians. As he rose to speak "he was greeted by ringing cheers and a handkerchief salute in which the prime minister led." In the course of his speech, Bernier told his audience the purpose of his work:

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[49]In most of these declarations of annexation, reference was made to previous British sovereignty. Part of the document claiming Bylot Island (21 August 1906) follows: "This island, Bylot Island was graciously given to the dominion of Canada by the Imperial Government in the year 1880, and being ordered to take possession of it in the name of Canada, know all men that on this day the Canadian Government Streamer Arctic, anchored here, and I planted the Canadian flag and took possession of Bylot Island in the name of Canada." Report on the Dominion Government Expedition to Arctic Islands and the Hudson Strait on board the C.G.S. "ARCTIC" 1906-1907 (Ottawa, 1907), p. 12.

[50]Report on the Dominion Government of Canada Expedition to the Arctic Islands and Hudson Strait on board the D.G.S. "ARCTIC" (Ottawa, 1910), p. 194.

> My mission to the far North was to secure lands that rightfully belong to us having been given to Canada by Great Britain years ago. My little trip was to confirm what had already been done and I have secured for Canada the whole of the Arctic Archipelago, in detail and wholesale. (Cheers and laughter.)[51]

"The trip had been undertaken," he continued, "not for the reward, but because of the importance of taking hold of the land now to save disputes later on." He was sorry that the "little Arctic had not been on the coast before the Alaska Bonndary [sic] Question was settled."

Once the applause for Bernier's speech had subsided, Laurier made some pertinent remarks which indicated the importance he attached to Bernier's work:

> I deserve no thanks for being here and would have been very sorry indeed if I did not have that privilege. I am representing the feeling of every Canadian when I say I am proud of Captain Bernier. He bears his laurels modestly and does not blow his own trumpet. What he had done is a most useful work for Canada. He was commissioned to assert Canada's dominion over the northern lands, and he fulfilled his mission to the letter. . . . Let me say to Captain Bernier that if he undertakes the task again he will be given all the latitude he desires. We will tell him to take the same good ship, the same good crew and put all the stores aboard he wants to and to carry the British flag as far to the north as he can and bring back any observations of use to science and of glory and profit to the country. May I express the hope that Captain Bernier will be ready to start early next year. He will have no instructions but to take possession of the lands for the Dominion. The Government is determined to keep a patrol of the northern seas. Islands there that have been thought barren are a wealth for us and our children. Captain Bernier's mission will be to resume his work and come back when he thinks he has accomplished it. He shall not be fettered by this or that. He shall go to the Pole or beyond if he desires.

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[51]Gerald H. Brown, ed., Addresses delivered before the Canadian Club of Ottawa, 1903-1909 (Ottawa, 1910), p. 190.

> It is an important mission and I am sure you are agreed it could not be entrusted to safer hands than Captain Bernier.[52]

Laurier's words and the attendent applause seemed to justify Bernier's efforts over the years.

Bernier could be satisfied, having claimed so much territory for Canada; Fred White could also reflect on the excellent work of the Mounted Police in asserting Canadian jurisdiction from Hudson Bay to Herschel Island. White's men had done this at very little cost to Canada and with almost no opposition.[53] Unfortunately the British did not share Canada's enthusiasm for northern expansion. Lord Crewe, the secretary of state for the colonies, in a reply to a secret despatch from Earl Grey, acknowledged the importance of maintaining the claim to British sovereignty over Hudson Bay, yet he though it would be difficult to sustain such a claim before an arbitral tribunal. Crewe expressed the hope, on behalf of the British Government, that Canada's claim would not be questioned.[54] As it was,

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[52] Ibid., pp. 191-92.

[53] White to Perry, 23 April 1908, R.C.M.P. Papers, 1909, File 18.

[54] Crewe to Grey, 25 June 1908, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 296. No less a person than Lord Loreburn, the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, declared that he did not think an impartial arbitrator would entertain the idea of Hudson Bay being a mare clausum. He thought Canada had no right to such a claim since no charter, Act of Parliament, or treaty claimed this and American whalers had been there since 1861. Loreburn thought "the precedent of a Colony seeking to

there was little chance of opposition from the United States, where the approaching political conventions at Chicago and Denver occupied most people's thoughts.[55]

Canada's claim to Hudson Bay remained a contentious issue. In 1910, Durand's successor in Washington, James Bryce, informed the Canadian governor general that some American newspapers had "been fussing over the claim that Hudson Bay is mare clausum."[56] Bryce was aware that the American representatives had been upset when the question had been raised at the Hague during arbitration meetings. He thought it would have been better to "let the thing sleep."[57]

Two other prominent Britishers urged a more active policy on the old question of a Hudson Bay shipping route. Leopold S. Amery and Governor General Grey, both noted imperialists, tried to win support for the plan to connect

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affirm by Colonial Statutes without the previous approval of His Majesty's Government propositions affecting the territorial rights or claims of other nations is very dangerous."

Surprisingly, he recommended that the Canadian act be not disallowed, but asked that Canada be told that Britain could not defend the Canadian position. Draft despatch Crewe to Grey, May 1908, C.O. 42/924.

[55]Bryce to Grey, 26 May 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 8.

[56]Bryce to Grey, 22 July 1910, ibid., Vol. 10.

[57]Bryce to Grey, 27 July 1910, ibid.

the prairies by sea to the outside world. With this in mind, they sailed from Fort Churchill to St. John's, Newfoundland, during the summer of 1910. Before setting out, Grey made his intention very clear: "By thus advertising the Hudson Bay route I shall be helping Canada more than by any other means."[58] Both men were impressed with what they considered "the natural and imperial importance" of this northerly route. Amery considered it important not only for Canada's defence but also for the effect it would have in promoting imperial unity. Western Canada would be drawn closer to Great Britain, Newfoundland, and the West Indies, he reasoned.[59]

In spite of Canada's assertion of sovereignty in the Arctic, there was considerable concern that the United States might still decide to challenge Canadian claims. Bernier was made painfully aware of this, in 1910, when it was reported that he had publicized his Arctic activities. The issue was raised in the Senate (1 February), shortly after Poirier spoke on behalf of appointing a

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[58]Grey to Crewe, 26 May 1910, ibid., Vol 16. Reporting to Laurier on his return, Grey was satisfied that the Bay route was safe for summer navigation. He also mentioned how impressed he had been with Dr. Grenfell's mission station on the Labrador coast and thought they might be used as "a medium of enlightenment on the advantages to Newfoundland of confederation with Canada." Grey to Laurier, 5 September 1910, ibid., Vol. 5.

[59]Empire Club Speeches: Being Addressed Delivered Before the Empire Club of Canada During its Session of 1910-1911 (Toronto, n.d.), pp. 27-36.

commissioner to superintend Canada's Arctic possessions. Senator James A. Lougheed called upon the government to require secrecy of its officials charged with carrying out its "designs . . . in acquiring territory in these northern waters." In reply, Sir Richard Cartwright agreed, but suggested that Bernier's remarks might have been exaggerated by newspaper reporters. This was Bernier's contention in defending himself to Laurier.

The misunderstanding arose from a speech which the captain delivered before the Arctic Club of New York.[60] One of the New York newspapers reported that Bernier said he would ask Laurier to request representatives of various nations to form a North Pole expedition.[61] Bernier claimed he had made no such statement, nor had he made public his work in the North.[62] Before receiving Bernier's explanation, Laurier repudiated the reported remarks. The issue was soon forgotten, but it served to show that

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[60]Memorandum for the deputy minister of marine and fisheries by Bernier, 8 February 1910, Laurier Papers, Vol. 613.

[61]Clipping from New York Herald, n.d., ibid.

[62]Bradley S. Osbun to Bernier, 3 February 1910, ibid. Osbun, an officer in the Mexican navy, had been asked by Bernier to comment on the newspaper report since he had been present at the meeting.

According to Saturday Night, 5 February 1910, it was Sam Hughes, who saw a copy of Bernier's speech and told Laurier.

Canadian sensitivities, on the Arctic sovereignty issue, could be easily aroused.

Not long after this incident, Bernier called Laurier's attention to a proposed American expedition. He suspected that the Americans were going to hunt on Ellesmere Island and suggested that the next logical step for Canada would be to pass a game law for the whole archipelago. Laurier accepted the idea but thought it too late to do anything during the 1910 session.[63] In July, Bernier left Quebec on yet another Arctic cruise.

Little attention was paid to the 1910-1911 voyage. The sovereignty question had been satisfactorily settled in many minds by Bernier's Melville Island Declaration. Significantly, his instructions did not mention annexation of territory. He was told to ask for written refusal if anyone was unwilling to pay for a fishing license. Further, Bernier was informed; "It is not desirable that you would take any action which would be likely to embarrass the Government." No such action occurred, and Bernier brought the ship and crew home safely.[64]

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[63]Bernier to Laurier, 13 April 1910, and Laurier to Bernier, 14 April, Laurier Papers, Vol. 614. An Arctic game preserve was established 19 July 1926. Canada claimed it extended over the area covered by the sector principle. The previous year, Charles Stewart, the minister of the interior, re-asserted Canada's sector claim. Canada Gazette, 31 July 1926; House of Commons Debates, 1 June 1925, p. 2773.

[64]Report on the Dominion Government Expedition to The Northern Waters and Arctic Archipelago of the D.G.S.

The last Arctic expedition to leave Canada before the Great War was Vilhjalmur Stefansson's. Originally, Stefannson was to have received support from the National Geographical Society of Washington and the American Museum of Natural History.[65] But the Canadian government decided it would be best for Canada to take over cost of this expensive expedition.[66] An understanding was reached between the government and Stefansson that he would consent to becoming "a naturalized British subject before leaving and the expedition would fly the British flag."[67] In this way, it was expected Canada would get the "entire benefit of the expedition," including any land discovered.[68] The possibility of new lands being discovered raised the question of Stefansson's right to claim territory. Lewis Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, informed Borden that

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"Arctic" in 1910 (n.p., n.d.), p. 3. This was to be his last official Arctic cruise until 1922 when the government began regular annual patrols. Bernier commanded the Arctic on the first four of these expeditions.

[65]Under the auspices of the American Museum of Natural History and the Geological Survey of Canada, Stefansson had made an ethnological survey of the central Arctic coast in 1908-1912.

[66]Borden to Gilbert Grosvenor, 21 February 1913, Borden Papers, R.L.B. Series, Vol. 234.

[67]Report by sub-committee of Privy Council, 7 February 1913, Borden Papers, ibid. Stefansson was born in Manitoba but his parents shortly after moved to the United States.

[68]Ibid. Copy of Report of Privy Council approved by Governor General, P.C. 406, 22 February 1913, Department of External Affairs, File 9058-E-40.

Canada did not have "formal authority to annex territory." However, Harcourt obtained permission for the governor general to do so.[69] He did warn Borden though that "no stress should be laid on the fact that a portion of the territory may not already be British." A new order in council could be issued, suggested the secretary, to replace that of 1880. This suggestion was not acted upon.

By 1909, Canada had met the threat of American expansionism squarely. The nationalistic feelings aroused by the Alaskan boundary settlement created greater interest in Canada's North. Apart from a few visionaries and explorers, this interest was new. Canadians had generally concerned themselves with the task of filling up the West. Among the new converts to a vision of the North was Laurier. It was a Laurier government which first asserted Canada's claims by sending Low to Hudson Bay in 1903.

Each year thereafter, until Laurier left office in 1911, a Canadian government ship patrolled the frigid waters of the archipelago. At the same time, the Mounted Police post on Herschel Island served to protect the native people and establish Canadian control. Although Bernier's

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[69]Harcourt to Borden, 10 May 1913, Borden Papers, R.L.B. Series, Vol. 234. This must have been unsatisfactory to the Canadian government for it continued to request permission from Britain. Minute of the Privy Council, 2 June 1913, Department of External Affairs, File 9058-E-40. C. Fitzpatrick, Administrator, to Harcourt, 10 June, 1913, Secret and Confidential Despatches Vol. 44.

1910-1911 voyage was the last official cruise before the war, the significant period of activity was between 1903 and 1909. Faced by domestic and foreign issues of more immediate importance than the Arctic, Laurier was content to consider Bernier's Melville Island declaration final. He could be satisfied that Canada was protected against the possibility of an "eastern Alaska."

CHAPTER IV

CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND, 1903-1907

After 1903, Canadian expansionists focussed their attention on Newfoundland as well as the Arctic. Since Newfoundland had not chosen to enter the Canadian confederation in 1867 many Canadian politicians had looked upon the island colony with covetous eyes. Although repeated attempts were made to remedy the situation they did not meet with success until 1949. Surprisingly the histories of these attempts neglected the period 1903-1914 when significant efforts were launched by Canadian expansionists to woo the islanders.

The closest approach to confederation, between 1867 and 1903, was made in 1895. This was brought on as a result of the financial collapse of the colony. In an effort to regain financial solvency the Liberal government of Newfoundland approached the Conservative government of Canada to discuss terms of union. Included in the Newfoundland delegation were Robert Bond and Edward Morris, both of whom later became prime ministers of Newfoundland. Unfortunately the two governments came exasperatingly close to terms without being able to reach a final agreement.

No doubt Bond's memories of these negotiations were significant when the question of confederation arose in later years.

As in the case of Canada's Arctic expansion, interest in Newfoundland was motivated to a large extent by fear of American expansionism.[1] The oldest and thorniest of Anglo-Canadian-American relations, the fisheries question, continued to plague politicians and diplomats in 1903. Canada had been able to exert her influence to Newfoundland's detriment in 1890 when Bond negotiated a threaty with the American Secretary of State James G. Blaine; the resultant Blaine-Bond Treaty would have secured special economic privileges for Newfoundland from the United States.[2]

When the Bond-Blaine Treaty was revived in the form of the Bond-Hay Treaty of 1902, the Canadian Government was less disposed to act directly. This proved unnecessary since Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the Gloucester, Massachusetts fishermen opposed the Treaty. Lodge had at first

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[1]Minto to Lyttelton, 13 December 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 2; Minto to Lyttelton, 3 December 1903, Minto Papers, Vol. 2.

[2]Peter F. Neary and Sidney J. R. Noel, "Newfoundland's Quest for Reciprocity, 1890-1910," in Mason Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community (Toronto, 1969), p. 212. The authors suggest that Blaine foresaw the disruptive effect which the proposed agreement would have on relations between Canada and Newfoundland and that he entered into negotiations with this mischief in mind. This is based upon John Hay, From Poetry to Politics (Washington, 1933), p. 423.

lent his support and had argued against those who suggested that the Treaty would be an entering wedge to be followed by reciprocity with Canada. He thought that a unique opportunity to secure the Newfoundland trade and exclude Canada had been presented to the United States.[3] When the opposition of the Gloucester fishermen was made known, however, Lodge quickly defended their interests in the Unied States Senate. Political opportunism dictated this action, for Lodge's son-in-law was running for election as congressman from the district which included Gloucester.[4] This turn of events worked to Canada's advantage.

Laurier strongly opposed any special arrangement between the United States and Newfoundland which excluded Canada.[5] He informed Governor General Minto that he expected all the North American colonies or provinces to

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[3]See John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1953); Sir Mortimer Durand to Lord Lansdowne, 10 February 1905, F.O. 5/2622. Lodge and the Gloucester fishermen carried an undue amount of influence in Canadian-American relations. British diplomats like Earl Grey could not understand how "Lodge and his piognee of fishermen" could be so influential. Grey to Sir Edward Grey, 28 January 1907, Grey of Howick Papers (cited hereafter as Grey Papers) Vol. 7.

[4]As virtual chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lodge was able to wield his influence and have the Secretary of State delay signing the agreement until after the congressional elections. It was only after Roosevelt requested it that the drastically amended Bond-Hay Treaty was reported out of committee (January, 1905).

[5]Memorandum of interview with Laurier, 19 January 1901, Minto Papers, Vol. 1.

be included in any discussions affecting their common interests. Laurier was particularly concerned, no doubt, that if Newfoundland arrived independently at a Treaty with the United States, Canadian hopes for confederation would be disappointed.

Lord Minto supported Laurier's contention that Newfoundland should not be allowed to negotiate unilaterally with the United States. When questioned by the colonial secretary on this point, Minto argued that if Newfoundland were allowed to negotiate separately this would encourage the islanders' independence. In addition, Laurier pointed out that it was the established policy for Canada and Newfoundland to work things out together.

Sir Wilfrid then believed that if Newfoundland reached an agreement with the United States before the French Shore question was settled it could cause problems between France and England.[6] Such an agreement, he reasoned, would create a rush of settlers to Newfoundland,

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[6]Professor Frederic F. Thompson has pointed out in The French Shore Problem in Newfoundland (Toronto, 1961), that it was the new mood of rapprochement which occurred at the turn of the century which allowed the two nations to settle old differences on this issue. Laurier's fears that the Shore issue could have caused great diplomatic friction were well grounded. The convention signed on 8 April 1904 brought an end to this issue which had so long plagued Anglo-French relations. At a time when European problems were of major concern to British diplomats the settlement of North American difficulties was to be welcomed.

once it was known that the colony's prospects were brighter; in all probability these settlers would trespass on the French treaty rights, thus creating serious friction with France. For much the same reason, Laurier wanted the French Shore question resolved before confederation of Canada and Newfoundland was considered.[7]

Early in 1901, Laurier pursued the French Shore question with the consul general of France at Montreal. The consul had raised the question with the French foreign minister the previous summer and encouraged Laurier to write to the minister. In his letter the Canadian asked if the French would consider abrogation or modification of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). Delcassé replied politely but negatively.[8] France still attached some importance to her historic fishing rights.

So convinced was Laurier that the time was ripe for discussion with Newfoundland that he was willing to negotiate, in spite of the continued French Shore difficulty. He did ask, however, that the British Government assure him

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[7]Minto to Joseph Chamgerlain, 16 January 1901, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 202, Vol. 6. Robert Borden also favoured union but wanted the French Shore question settled first. He thought confederation would be mutually advantageous. Halifax Morning Chronicle, 22 January 1903; Ottawa Evening Journal, 14 March 1903.

[8]Copy of letter, Delcassé to Kleczkowski, n.d. Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 202, Vol. 6.

that it would see him through this difficulty.[9] The governor general had to tell Laurier that this was not possible although the British Government was then discussing the treaty shore with the French.[10] Minto suspected that his advisors already had negotiations underway with the Bank of Montreal with respect to Newfoundland.[11] The bank was the first Canadian bank in Newfoundland, and one of its directors was the influential Newfoundland railroad and shipping magnate, Robert G. Reid, who (Minto thought) was involved in the negotiations in some way. In the light of later developments, Minto's suspicions were to prove well-founded. Indeed, the opportunity for union seemed favourable for Laurier had also received assurances from influential Frenchmen that France wanted to settle their Newfoundland claims.[12] His enthusiasm for union was tempered, however, by the knowledge that the island colony was interested in separate treaty negotiations with the United States.

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[9]Minto to Chamberlain, 4 September 1901, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 202, Vol. 2.

[10]Chamberlain to Minto, 11 November 1901, ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Laurier also had conversations with André Siegfreid who had been a member of the French government. Siegfreid was hopeful that the "Shore" question could be solved. To this end Laurier again requested British help. Minto to Chamberlain, Interview with Laurier, 2 June 1902, Minto Papers, Vol. 2.

In spite of Canada's opposition to negotiations between Newfoundland and the United States, Newfoundland's Prime Minister Bond informed Joseph Chamberlain that he would proceed directly to Washington at the end of the Imperial Conference of 1902, whereupon Chamberlain notified the Canadian Government by secret dispatch of Bond's intentions.[13] Two months later, Chamberlain informed the Canadians that Bond had successfully arranged a convention with the United States, along the lines of the Bond-Blaine Convention of 1890, and that the British ambassador to Washington had been authorized to sign the convention.[14] On 8 November 1902, Sir Michael Herbert and Secretary of State John Hay signed the agreement.

In spite of Canadian protests, the British government had backed Newfoundland's bid for a special arrangement with the United States. Bond had his way. But for Laurier and other Canadians, Britain's action had a significance beyond the immediate issue of the fisheries. In a long and carefully considered letter to Minto, Sir Wilfrid had earlier stated his objections to any agreement which excluded Canada.[15] After tracing the history of the fisheries, Laurier pointed out that "the idea of

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[13]Chamberlain to Minto, 15 August 1902, ibid.

[14]Chamberlain to Minto, 20 October 1902, ibid.

[15]Laurier to Minto, 16 February 1901, ibid.

discrimination by one British colony against another in favour of Foreigners, was never thought of." He reminded the British that when Sir John A. Macdonald's government had objected vigorously to the proposed Bond-Blaine convention of 1890 the British had considered the Canadian position valid and had stopped negotiations.

The Canadian prime minister was not only concerned with the economic loss to Canada entailed in allowing the Americans to fish free from the restrictions of the 1818 Convention. If Bond was successful, a potential trump card would have been removed from Laurier's hand in his own negotiations with the United States. For the old goal of reciprocity between the two countries was closely tied to the Atlantic fisheries.

The question of confederation had interested Laurier since he become prime minister in 1896.[16] And in

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[16]Laurier to Elias Rogers, 4 November 1899, Laurier Papers, Vol. 129. Rogers was a Toronto coal merchant who had visited Newfoundland in August 1899 and was concerned that the island was becoming closely tied economically to the United States. Laurier reassured Rogers that "the subject of the annexation of Newfoundland is one which has been engrossing my attention for the last three years. I may tell you that, at this moment, I am causing a quiet inquiry to be made as to the condition of things on the island." See Rogers to Laurier, 2 November 1899, ibid.

The Canadian prime minister's well-known reluctance to commit himself in writing was reflected in his employment of a "friend" as intermediary between him and Bond. In a letter to Henry S. Whitney, a Bostonian with lumber interests in Newfoundland, Laurier said: "I prefer to communicate this way, rather than through the mails." The identity of Laurier's "friend" is not clear. It could have been William Mulock, the postmaster general. William

1901 he thought that Newfoundland would soon become part of Canada.[17] At the same time he was inclined to cultivate friendly relations with the island and allow public opinion there to develop in favour of union. Laurier was afraid that if Newfoundland signed a treaty with the United States it would draw Newfoundland closer to the United States and farther from Canada.[18]

The Canadian prime minister's enthusiasm for confederation was not shared by his counterpart in Newfoundland. Sir Robert Bond's attitude was based upon his

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Smith, one of Mulock's officials, had visited Newfoundland in June and December 1901. He informed the postmaster of Bond's terms for confederation. Laurier to Whitney, 6 January 1902, Laurier Papers, Vol. 218; Mulock to Laurier, 9 January 1902, ibid.; O. D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto, 1932), pp. 102, 211.

Whitney's motives for urging union between Canada and Newfoundland are suspect. In 1904 he called for "an aggressive campaign by United States manufacturers for enlargement of their trade in Newfoundland." It could be that Whitney thought Newfoundland would provide a more stable field for investment if it were part of Canada. No doubt, his views were dictated in a large extent by his partnership with R. G. Reid in the Newfoundland Timber Estates Company. Whitney to Laurier, 18 January 1902, ibid.; "American Trade and Capital in Newfoundland," Extracts From United States Monthly Consular Reports for February 1904, pp. 308-09, in Charles N. Ponton Papers, Vol. 8; "Sir Robert Gillespie Reid," The Busy Man's Magazine, XIV (October 1907), 11-16.

[17]Minto to Chamberlain, 4 September 1901, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 202, Vol. 6; Chamberlain to Minto, 11 November 1901, ibid. Minto suspected that Laurier was practising personal diplomacy to achieve a settlement of the French Shore and bring about union with Newfoundland.

[18]Above, p. 95.

previous experience with Canadian interference in his colony's affairs.[19] Canadian opposition to the Blaine-Bond convention and his own participation as a member of a Newfoundland delegation sent to Canada in 1895, to bring about confederation, must have strengthened his conviction that Newfoundland had better look after her own interests. Otherwise Britain would be inclined to yield to Canadian demands.

In the early 1890's Newfoundland suffered a series of calamaties. The St. John's fire of 1892, a poor catch in 1893, and a bank failure in 1894, created an emergency situation on the island. Canadian aid had then promoted sentiment in favour of confederation. And in 1895 delegates from Newfoundland journeyed to Ottawa to consider the terms Canada could offer to bring about confederation. Unfortunately Canada was also caught in the world-wide depression and was unable to meet Newfoundland's terms.[20]

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[19]A. W. Smith to Charles Ponton, 19 September 1904, Ponton Papers, Vol. 8.

[20]The best account of Newfoundland's problems at this time is St. John Chadwick's Newfoundland: Island Into Province (Cambridge, 1967). See also Harvey Mitchell, "Canada's Negotiations With Newfoundland, 1887-1895," Canadian Historical Review, XL (December 1959), 277-93; Neary and Noel, p. 213. They refer to the "characteristic ineptitude" of the Mackenzie Bowell administration which "sought to take advantage of Newfoundland's desperation by driving an excessively hard bargain." Mackenzie Bowell defended his refusal to meet Newfoundland's terms claiming that "millions" not "thousands" of dollars had been involved. He claimed he was in favour of annexing Newfoundland and expressed his hope that Laurier would "lose no

With the improved economic situation after 1896 the best argument for confederation was removed.

In 1902 it was Newfoundland which held the strong hand. William S. Fielding, the Canadian minister of finance, wrote to Bond, with Laurier's permission, shortly after Bond left London for Washington. Unfortunately, the finance minister chose to lecture Bond on the possible results for Canada-Newfoundland relations if an agreement was reached between Newfoundlanders and the Americans.[21] It was no wonder, therefore, that Bond chose to answer Fielding in kind. Bond's successful negotiations and memory of earlier Canadian actions predisposed him to reject the minister's suggested that confederation was possible. Bond discounted the opinions of the "many Newfoundlanders" who had told Fielding that public opinion in the colony favoured confederation.[22] He stated his own conviction that Newfoundlanders were "strongly hostile" to confederation. Not content to rebuff Fielding's ill-considered proposal, Bond let the Canadian minister know that the attitude of the Canadian government and hostility

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opportunity to bring that union about." Addresses Delivered Before The Canadian Club of Ottawa, 1903-1909, p. 36.

[21]Fielding to Bond, 15 September 1902; see also Fielding to Bond, 15 September 1902, Laurier Papers, Vol. 241.

[22]Robert Bond to W. S. Fielding, 17 October 1902, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

of the Canadian press were strong weapons in the hands of anti-confederate Newfoundlanders.

Fielding wanted to put Bond in his place but Laurier intervened to smooth matters over. In his reply to Bond, Fielding mentioned only his surprise that Newfoundlanders were hostile to Canada and assured Bond that the Canadian government would respond favourably if the Newfoundland government should wish to discuss union in the future.[23] Fielding was willing to dismiss the exchange as a matter of little importance but his prime minister believed otherwise. Laurier wanted confederation.

When the Bond-Hay convention was signed, it appeared that the hopes of confederationists had been dashed. Bond was relishing the short-lived diplomatic coup he had arranged and the Canadian government was just beginning to wake up to their role as sacrificial victim in the cause of Anglo-American unity.[24] Once the Bond-Hay convention

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[23]Fielding to Bond, 12 November 1902. Grey Papers, Vol. 21; apparently Laurier objected to Fielding's first draft of this letter and asked his finance minister to rewrite it. For Bond's speech see London (Ontario) Free Press, 17 July 1902, London. Toronto Mail and Empire, 7 May 1904.

[24]Bond's pre-occupation with "diplomacy" is interestingly summed up by Neary and Noel, p. 211: "[Bond] was exceptional in that for him the appeal of politics lay not so much in the mundane business of administering domestic affairs and dispensing local patronage as in the heady realm of international relations. The dominant thread in his political career is the pursuit of policy at this grand level. He was also a 'nationalist' in the sense that his consistent aim in seeking to strengthen

was signed Canada could only await developments. This attitude proved wise for by January 1903 there was dissatisfaction being voiced in Newfoundland with the delay in Senate approval. One St. John's newspaper was even talking about retaliation if the Americans did not approve the convention.[25]

By this time of course, Canadian attention was focussed on the formation of the Alaska boundary tribunal and the terms of settlement. Canada was also readying her first official expedition to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Newfoundland and confederation remained a fairly quiet issue until 1906 when Lord Grey visited the island on what was supposed to be an informal holiday visit.[26]

Newfoundland's economic position through closer ties with the United States was to preserve the island's political independence."

[25]St. John's Free Press, cited in Ottawa Evening Journal, 30 January 1903.

[26]There were, however, Canadians like Charles Nisbet Ponton, lawyer and archivist of the Ontario Bar Association, who were concerned about possible United States expansion in the north and Newfoundland. Soon after the Alaska award Ponton complimented Aylesworth for having defended Canadian interests. He drew Aylesworth's attention to the American threat in the area around Hudson Bay and also to Newfoundland. Ponton also urged the ex-prime minister of Newfoundland, Sir William V. Whiteway, to encourage confederation. Whiteway, a confederationist himself, thought "the general tone of the country is adverse to the union." Ponton to Aylesworth, 3 November 1903, Ponton Papers, Vol. 10; Whiteway to Ponton, 11 April

Earl Grey succeeded Lord Minto as governor general of Canada on December 10, 1904.[27] When he came to Canada, Grey had no intention of remaining in the background.[28] It was said of him that he was a man with ideas who "projected himself into active affairs, and things that were not active he stirred up." He continually thrust his

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1904, Ponton Papers, Vol. 8; Ponton to Whiteway, 21 April 1904, ibid.; Ottawa Journal, 28 May 1904.

Ponton's fear of United State capitalists developing Newfoundland was most clearly stated in an article entitled "A United British North America," Canadian Law Review, III (May 1904), 285-90. He called for a campaign of "education and persuasion" in Newfoundland, and warned that "Canada must be vigilant and ready, allowing no opportunity of completing her northern and eastern bounds to pass by." He delivered similar warnings before the Canadian Clubs of Toronto and Ottawa. His twenty-five years as a vice-consul in the United States qualified Ponton as something of an expert on Canadian-United States relations. See Who's Who and Why: A Biographical Dictionary of Men and Women of Canada and Newfoundland (Toronto, n.d.), Vols. 6 and 7 (1915-1916), p. 987.

[27]For excellent thumbnail sketches of Minto, Grey and others involved in Anglo-Canadian-American relations see Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., "Pilgrimages to Ottawa: Canadian-American Diplomacy, 1903-1913." Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers, 1968, 65-83. H. Pearson Gundy, "Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Lord Minto," Canadian Historical Association Report (1962), pp. 28-38, presents a view contrary to the traditional Dafoe interpretation of Minto as "a combination of country squire and heavy dragoon." J. W. Dafoe, Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics (Toronto, 1922), p. 77.

Although not as popular as Grey, Minto was an astute observer of Canadian affairs. Gundy provides a useful corrective to the Dafoe indictment.

[28]Britton B. Cooke, "The Man Who Wouldn't Stay Dead--Earl Grey," MacLean's Magazine (May 1911), 58-62. Cooke paid Grey the supreme compliment of saying that he was "almost American in his energy."

views of empire to the forefront taking every opportunity to educate Canadians to their country's destiny as a great co-partner of the Empire. Unlike his predecessor Minto, Grey was to prove one of Canada's most popular governor generals. Indeed he proved so popular that his stay was extended twice at the request of the Canadian government.

Grey viewed his appointment to Canada as a great challenge and opportunity to elucidate his imperialism. He took every chance to foster a strong sense of national pride among Canadians.[29] Wherever Canadian interests were at stake Grey was quick to defend them. Thus, when it seemed that Newfoundland would be lost to the Canadian confederation he tried to interest as many influential people as possible in confederation. Apart from his larger view of Canada's position in a new empire Grey thought that for very practical reasons the two should be united as one. By combining the affairs of Newfoundland and Canada it would be easier for the British government to administer empire affairs.

Throughout his time in Canada Grey devoted much of his energies to the project of union. On the occasion of his second Christmas in Canada, Grey sent his congratulations to Laurier on "the approach made during the past year to the fulfillment of your appropriation of the XX

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[29]Grey to Laurier, 29 July 1911, Grey Papers, Vol. 5.

Century to Canada." But then he added that he would not feel really happy until "reluctant Newfoundland is an integral province of the Dominion."[30] Sir Wilfrid agreed that Canada was prospering and hoped that Grey would enjoy his stay "even if all your aspirations are not realized, and if Newfoundland continues to remain . . . in the cold."[31]

Like his prime minister, Grey supported a united front between Canada and Newfoundland on the fisheries problem. In Grey's opinion, Newfoundland's best chance for obtaining free entry of fish into the United States was to co-operate with Canada. This aim was frustrated by Secretary of State Root's unwillingness to accord Canada the same favours he was prepared to advance to Newfoundland.[32]

Unlike Grey, the prime minister of Newfoundland had no desire to have his island's interests connected with Canadian ones. Laurier was aware of Bond's desire to play a lone hand and believed that he could do nothing to influence the Newfoundlander. Once during the Imperial Conference of 1907, in London, Laurier had tried to convince Bond that he would gain nothing by trying to force an

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[30]Grey to Laurier, 23 December 1905, Grey Papers, Vol. 1.

[31]Laurier to Grey, 24 December 1905, ibid.

[32]Grey to Lord Elgin, 2 December 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 14; Grey to Esme Howard, 12 January 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 6.

issue with the United States.[33] This advice went unheeded. "Bond is averse to mix corn with Canada, and desires to paddle his own canoe," was the way the British governor of Newfoundland, William MacGregor, described Bond's attitude.[34]

The Canadian prime minister knew there was nothing to be gained and a great deal to be lost by interfering too directly in the island's affairs. Bond had told Laurier that Newfoundland wanted to "paddle her own canoe unassisted by Canada." Although this was about as plain as he could make it, Grey thought this attitude represented a "boorish aloofness on Bond's part"; but Laurier's inclination was to co-operate with Bond, and let Newfoundland lead the way in the Atlantic fisheries dispute. The governor general interpreted Laurier's passivity to mean that the latter was motivated by a feeling of sympathy for the underdog in dealing with Bond. It was more reasonable to conclude that Laurier simply wanted to keep relations between Canada and Newfoundland as agreeable as possible.[35]

The fisheries issue was further complicated by the personal relations between Bond and Laurier. Bond was very

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[33]Laurier to Grey, 25 September 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

[34]Grey to Elgin, 11 November 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 14.

[35]Laurier to Grey, 28 October 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

sensitive to his position in relation to Laurier's. While on his way to the 1907 Imperial Conference Bond found out that Laurier would be travelling on the same ship to Liverpool. On arriving in Truro, Bond postponed his departure to avoid having to play second fiddle to the Canadian prime minister.[36] At least this was Grey's interpretation of the incident. MacGregor, the Newfoundland governor, agreed that Bond was extremely jealous of Laurier.

More than anyone else it was Grey who rallied the unionist forces throughout his term as governor general. This was possible since Laurier's primary concern was with domestic affairs. He was content to let Grey act as Canada's unofficial foreign secretary as long as he protected Canadian interests. Laurier's confidence in Grey earned great returns for Canada. By the time his term of office had finished Grey had successfully managed to resolve most of the questions that had plagued Canadian-American relations. While he by no means could claim sole credit for the slate-cleaning that took place, Grey's contribution was his great ability to bring the right

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[36]Grey to Laurier, 1 August 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2; MacGregor to Elgin, 18 July 1907, C.O. 194/268. Bond visited the United States instead of leaving on the steamer carrying Laurier.

people together in an atmosphere which was conducive to the settlement of disputes.[37]

As early as August 1905 Grey seems to have committed himself to efforts on behalf of confederation. He believed that free trade with Newfoundland was an essential step toward this goal and raised the question of union with Laurier a number of times.

Grey viewed American expansionist desires as one of the major obstacles to union between Canada and Newfoundland. When the American secretary of state, Elihu Root, visited Newfoundland in the fall of 1905, Grey thought the visit ominous. He told Laurier that he did not like Root's choice of a holiday resort.[38]

The British policy with respect to Newfoundland was of some concern to Grey. He received no reply to his request of the Home Government that Newfoundlanders should be educated to the advantages of union with Canada.[39]

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[37]See Gluek, "Pilgrimages to Ottawa: Canadian-American Diplomacy 1903-1913," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers, 1968, pp. 65-83.

[38]Grey to Laurier 5 August 1905, Grey Papers, Vol. 1. In a letter to the editor of the Economist, Edward Farrer drew attention to Root's yachting cruise along the Labrador coast. He suggested that "it may be the United States wants to make Labrador or the Labrador coast a base of operations for fishermen." At the same time he mentioned the work of Canadian "agents" who had "planted the flag as far north as Ellesmere Island." 26 September 1905, Farrer Papers, Vol. 1.

[39]Grey to Lyttelton, 6 August 1905, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

This did not mean that the British were unsympathetic to proposals for union. Indeed, they probably welcomed the prospect of having Canada take over Newfoundland's external affairs. His legal advisor in the Colonial Office suggested as much to Elgin: "At present the Colony handles its foreign relations in the most inconsiderate and irresponsible fashion, and we are often put in a very false position having to take up its quarrels."[40] The colonial secretary, however, preferred to leave the initiative for confederation to Canada and Newfoundland. When Governor MacGregor expressed interest in hastening union, Elgin stated his position clearly: "I do not want you to work in favour of it [Federation]: I shall be satisfied if you will not discourage any desire which may show itself among the people of Newfoundland to take advantage of the provisions of Section 146 of The British North America Act."[41] Chastened but not undaunted MacGregor persisted in his plan to have Grey visit Newfoundland for he believed that "such a visit would do good, in fostering and encouraging closer relations between the two colonies."[42]

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[40]Minute by Bertram Cox on MacGregor to Elgin, 8 June 1905, C.O. 194/262, p. 520.

[41]Elgin to MacGregor, 11 July 1905, C.O. 194/262, p. 532.

[42]MacGregor to Elgin, 8 June 1905, C.O. 194/262, pp. 531-32; Grey to Elgin, 25 May 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

Grey wrote to the colonial secretary seeking permission for such a visit.[43] Though the permission was forthcoming, Elgin cautioned Grey to listen and observe rather than attempt to influence the situation directly by making overtures in the direction of union.[44] The secretary had heard that Bond was hostile to the idea of confederation but thought he might change his mind when he found out that the Roman Catholic archbishop of Newfoundland was in favour.

Thus encouraged, Grey proposed to Laurier that, subject to the prime minister's approval, he would visit Newfoundland for a week or ten days.[45] The visit was to appear inconspicuous. Grey suggested that no one could misinterpret his visit's purpose since he was making it during the course of a holiday cruise. However, Grey and Laurier were not unaware of the uses he could make of such a visit.

Bond and other Newfoundlanders were no less aware of Grey's true motive for visiting their colony. When the governor general arrived at Port-au-Basques after a rough passage on board the D.G.S. Minto, he must have been

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[43]Grey to Elgin, 25 May 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

[44]Elgin to Grey, 7 June 1906, ibid.

[45]Grey to Laurier, 15 June 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 1.

disappointed by the lack of an official welcoming party. He was welcomed, however, by a member of the influential Reid family. The Reids did everything they could to make a success of Grey's visit even to the extent of lavishly decorating the St. John's railway station with electric lights in his honour.[46] The first newspaper reports of the visit must have caused Laurier to question his decision. The day after Grey landed in Newfoundland the St. John's Daily News carried a report from the Canadian Press under the heading "Confederation Canard Again." The report claimed that Grey's visit was undertaken largely to discuss confederation. Any ill effects of this report were modified by disclosures in the St. John's Evening Telegram that confederation was not at issue. The Telegram stated that Bond was opposed to confederation which by then was considered a dead issue anyway.[47]

After the initial furour over Grey's motives the original Canadian Press report was dismissed as "a strong story sponsored by a sea serpent for summer consumption." The Montreal Star was particularly active in laying the

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[46]St. John's Evening Telegram, 25 July 1906. The patriarch of this family, Robert G. Reid, had made a name for himself building railroads and bridges in Canada and the United States. He had contracts with the C.P.R. and, before coming to Newfoundland, had lived in Montreal, where he had known Lord Shaughnessy and Lord Strathcona.

[47]Cited in St. John's Evening Telegram, 26 July 1906.

story to rest. The Star considered this tempest in a teapot to be "as ridiculous as the bugaboo that the Americans may sneak up and steal [Newfoundland] some night."[48]

However, it was interesting to observe that the Star saw fit to publish two lengthy editorials on relations between Canada and Newfoundland. The Star's editors maintained that Canada was preoccupied with western development and had no desire to bribe Newfoundland into confederation. When Newfoundland was ready, the editors reasoned, union would come about. In the meantime they were content to let Newfoundland enjoy their right to "sit in darkness."[49]

After the initial setback of his first reception Grey was buoyed up by subsequent events.[50] His reception in St. John's brought a carnival-like atmosphere to that rather drab town. Even Bond had to extend himself and take part in the social activities surrounding Grey's visit. The premier did not have a reputation for mixing socially yet he attended a ball and fireworks display for Grey. This was even more unusual since Bond had vetoed a

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[48]Cited in St. John's Evening Telegram, 31 July 1906.

[49]Montreal Daily Star, 26 and 28 July 1906; Saturday Night, 29 September 1906 commented on Grey's visit and the confederation rumour, which it discounted. Earlier (17 February 1906) the magazine had called for union.

[50]Grey to Laurier, 8 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

Morris-sponsored motion requesting an official ball in Grey's honour.[51]

The sights and sounds of the fireworks and ball marked a high point in the Newfoundland social season. Grey appeared relaxed and enjoyed himself as a man on holiday, but he had not lost sight of his true purpose. In the course of attending dinners, dances, and other events, he explored the possibilities of confederation. Sometimes he came dangerously close to confirming Bond's suspicisions regarding his visit. On one occasion the Newfoundlander expressed his interest in Canada and Newfoundland having a united policy on fishing--to which Grey responded that there was an obvious way. Bond quickly let Grey know that he thought confederation would be injurious to the best interests of Newfoundland. One of Bond's main concerns was that free trade with Canada would destroy Newfoundland's developing industry.

Apart from his failure to win Bond to his cause, Grey was able to consider his visit a great success. He had met Newfoundlanders and learned something of the political climate at first hand. On the basis of his observations, Grey decided that the people supported Bond in opposing confederation. At the same time, he believed that the intelligent, the wealthy and the educated

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[51]Grey to Laurier, 8 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

supported confederation. Included in this group were Governor MacGregor, Archbishop Michael Howley, ex-premier Sir William Whiteway, the Reids, and Judge Daniel Woodley Prowse.[52] As it was, Grey still saw two possible plans for union. One was to persuade Bond to make a new attempt. The other was to persuade Sir Edward Morris, whom Grey had met for the first time, to break with Bond and assume leadership of the confederationists. Grey thought the time was ripe for confederation but he also knew that a leader must be found who would be acceptable to Archbishop Howley since the Roman Catholics made up the largest single denomination on the island.[53]

Laurier generally agreed with Grey's assessment of the situation. It had been Laurier's hope at one time to carry confederation with Bond's co-operation. This had proved unrealistic. Then the dispute over the Labrador boundary came along to further complicate relations between the two men.[54] The dispute was an old one, dating back to 1763 when Canada was ceded to Great Britain by

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[52]Prowse was an ex-judge and a noted authority on Newfoundland. His History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and French Records (London, 1895), was for a long time the standard work.

[53]Grey to William MacGregor, 23 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 21

[54]Laurier to Grey, 10 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 1.

France. Like so many boundary disputes, its origins lay in the ambiguous phrasing of the documents defining the territory involved. Throughout the nineteenth century no satisfactory agreement was reached but Quebec and Newfoundland were able to maintain good relations. It was only when the Quebec government called attention to the operations of a pulp and lumber company in Labrador that the issue became contentious. The Newfoundland government had issued a licence to the company to cut timber on the Hamilton River. Quebec maintained that Newfoundland had no such right. After a great deal of correspondence Newfoundland agreed (2 October 1907) to submit the dispute to a judicial committee.[55] In the meantime, Canada had opened a customs house in Hamilton Inlet (1902) which caused strong reaction in Newfoundland.[56]

Laurier's attitude to the Labrador boundary issue was that of the practical politician. His first concern as prime minister was with domestic problems and it was as such that he viewed the boundary. Nothing should be done, Laurier maintained, to antagonise Quebec, therefore, the Canadian government had to support any and all of Quebec's claims in the boundary dispute with Newfoundland. To have

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[55]Enclosure with W. W. Cory, Deputy Minister of Interior, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 16 December 1911, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 1.

[56]Saturday Night, 27 August 1904.

done less would have created a quarrel with Quebec far more disagreeable than any with Newfoundland. The difference in perspective between Laurier and Grey was apparent. Laurier's concern was with Canada as a nation. Grey's concern was with Canada as part of empire. Laurier would never place confederation with Newfoundland ahead of Canadian internal harmony. Grey would concern himself primarily with the bonds of empire. Each man had different priorities.

When Grey returned from Newfoundland, his hopes were high. He had established important contacts with influential islanders and he had discovered how confederation could best be brought about. Of the three possible leaders--Bond, Morris, and Morrison--Grey favoured Morris. Donald Morrison's Orange Lodge activities would make him unacceptable to Howley while Bond's personality and opposition to union seemed to rule him out. For all his own well-known charm, Grey knew that he had not made a friend of Bond. Yet even then he considered Bond the best leader and conceded, like Laurier, that Bond was a formidable opponent.[57] He also considered Bond to have been touched by the madness which was in his family. Grey thought Bond was not only strong by reason of his political position but that he was also "like other madmen, jealous,

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[57]Laurier to Grey, 10 August 1906, ibid.

suspicious, avariciously tenacious of all patronage, a strong and unforgiving hater, and most vindictive and consequently rules by fear."[58] At the same time Grey was willing to grant that Bond was a good speaker and a hard worker. In spite of his strong dislike for the Newfoundlander, Grey thought that confederation was still possible.[59]

During his visit, Grey had formed a favourable impression of Governor MacGregor. MacGregor represented the finest type of British colonial official. He was a scholar, a statesman and a diplomat. He had gained considerable experience in the Pacific colonial possessions of Great Britain. He came to Newfoundland in July 1904 and left for an appointment in Queensland in March 1908.[60] Not only did Grey consider MacGregor an able and valued British

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[58]Grey to Laurier, 8 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

[59]Grey to Laurier, 18 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 1. Neary and Noel, p. 219, present too harsh a portrait of MacGregor as a man whose "main concern appears to have been to carry such favour with his superiors as would secure for him the pension he felt he deserved but to which under the strict letter of Colonial Office regulations he was not entitled. He evidentally thought that by undermining Bond and supporting Confederation he could ingratiate himself with those who were sufficiently well-connected to help him personally."

[60]A. J. Clark, "A Scholar, a Statesman and a Diplomat," Westminister Magazine (April 1908), 119. Bond had requested MacGregor's appointment. Bond to Boyle, and Boyle to Lyttelton, 10 March 1904, C.O. 194/254, pp. 113-114.

official but he also thought that MacGregor was a great friend of Canada's.[61] Later events were to prove such praise justified. MacGregory not only had the character and knowledge required for his position but he was also a perceptive observer of Newfoundland politics. In addition, he was to prove a better judge of people than Grey; MacGregor did not allow his own desire for confederation to cloud his judgment. Although enthusiastic for confederation, he realized that Bond was more interested in his colony's relations with the United States than with those of Canada.[62] By the end of 1906, even Grey had to admit that this was true.[63]

However, during the year Newfoundland's relationship with, and Bond's attitude toward, the United States and Great Britain underwent a considerable change. This was the result of Bond's attempts to force a reciprocal agreement upon the Americans by putting pressure on the New England fishermen. Encouraged by his landslide win in the 1904 election (32 of 36 seats), and aware of the substantial support for the agreement in the United States, Bond decided to try to force the issue. During the 1905

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[61]Grey to Elgin, 16 August 1906, and 8 September 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

[62]MacGregor to Grey, 8 September 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[63]Grey to Elgin, 25 December 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 14.

legislative session restrictive measures were enacted against foreign fishermen.[64] When, in May 1906, Newfoundland brought further pressure on the New Englanders the situation became almost impossible as far as the United States and Britain were concerned. Not wanting to upset the rapprochment which she enjoyed with the United States, Britain decided to defuse the explosive situation. To placate the Americans, a modus vivendi was arranged in October. By its terms the situation was satisfactorily returned to its pre-1905 state and American fishermen were allowed their old privileges.

Bond was faced by an almost intolerable situation. Having committed himself and the Liberal party to a policy of reciprocity through restriction, he had to retreat under British pressure. Archbishop Howley called the modus "a shameful betrayal of the colony's interests."[65] Rebuffed by the United States and abandoned by Britain, the time was appropriate for Newfoundland to reconsider closer relations with Canada. Bond may very well have been encouraged in this line by the sympathetic Canadian reaction to the modus. The Toronto Globe carried the heading: "Join Great

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[64]Chadwick, pp. 114-20; Harold A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of An International Economy (Toronto, 1940), p. 455.

[65]Toronto Globe, 10 October 1906.

Dominion--If They Would Avoid Being Lord Alvestoned . . ."[66] And the Toronto paper suggested sympathetically that Newfoundlanders should write to King Edward in protest. The Globe warned that nothing could be expected from Lodge, "whose great mission in public life is to use the United States Government to secure non-treaty privileges for his Gloucester fishermen."[67] The time seemed opportune for Canada to make new overtures to Newfoundland. Such was the plan of a small but powerful group of Canadians led by their governor general.

While Grey was visiting Newfoundland, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, the chief justice, acted as his deputy.[68] Fitzpatrick was one of Grey's inner circle of influential Canadians who worked for confederation.[69] He was appointed to the post of chief justice in 1906 and before this he had served as Canada's justice minister. Also in this circle were prominent Montrealers such as E. S. Clouston, Lord

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[66]9 October 1906.

[67]10 October 1906.

[68]The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1906, p. 531.

[69]When this appointment had been hinted at in the previous year, Saturday Night, a Canadian magazine, had called the justice minister "Laurier's able and apparently unscrupulous ally." The magazine proposed that it was the Laurier government's plan to place "unpopular and discredited politicians on the bench as judges." 8 April 1905 and 20 May 1905.

Strathcona, and Lord Shaughnessy.[70] Grey depended on the support of Clouston, the vice-president and manager of the Bank of Montreal and Shaughnessy of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Grey, Fitzpatrick and Laurier believed that the Bank of Montreal could be used to exercise an influence in Newfoundland affairs.[71] By September 1907, Grey was convinced that the hopes of the confederates had to be tied to the leadership of Morris.[72] Although Grey had met Sir Edward during his 1906 visit to Newfoundland he had been careful not to mention confederation in the event that Morris might be asked if the question had come up.[73] Unfortunately for Grey's plans, Morris was apparently afraid to break with Bond, but Grey counted on Clouston

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[70]Strathcona's service with the Hudson's Bay Company in Labrador after he left Scotland as a young man had stimulated an interest in Labrador and Newfoundland which remained with him until his death. In 1894 he wrote to Robert Prowse, the Newfoundland judge stating his belief that Canada would welcome Newfoundland. His friendship with R. G. Reid was also one of long-standing. Donald A. Smith to Robert H. Prowse, 15 March, 1894, Strathcona Papers, Vol. 1.

[71]Laurier to Grey, 25 September 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2. Fitzpatrick suggested that the Bank of Montreal might be able to influence Bond. Laurier thought the idea a good one.

[72]However, Grey later said: "Personally I do not care how we get Newfoundland into the Dominion whether by Bond or Morris, the sooner it comes the better." Grey to Bryce, 16 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 7.

[73]Grey to Elgin, 16 August 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13; Grey to James Bryce, 26 September 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 7.

and Shaughnessy to be "useful in putting some backbone into Morris."[74] This concern for Morris's leadership abilities, and Laurier's interest in confederation were the subject of a significant dispatch from Grey to the Colonial Secretary:

> I wish we could get the interpretation of the Hague Tribunal of the 1818 Treaty before the next General Election in Newfoundland. The case against Bond that could be made by a clever fighter is one that if properly pressed ought to carry the Island. I wish we had a clever and hard fighter in Sir E. Morris--and Sir Wilfrid wishes he were a Protestant--for he is afraid that the fact of his being a R.C. will enable Bond to rally the Orangemen behind him. The Canadians who have interests in Newfoundland can be relied upon to do whatever is possible to stiffen Morris and to assist him in his battle against Bond. All the money he wants to enable him to conduct an educational campaign will be forthcoming, so I have been privately informed.

Morris had little reason to be afraid, it seemed. Laurier, Grey and influential Canadian businessmen were behind him. In addition he would have the support of Newfoundland's first family--the wealthy and influential Reids.[76] Their

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[74] Ibid.

[75] 10 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 14.

[76] Robert Gillespie Reid emigrated to Canada from Scotland in 1871. Before that he had sought gold in Australia. He built a number of bridges in the United States and Canada including the first international bridge to span the Niagara River. Much of his work was for the Canadian Pacific Railway of which he was appointed a director in 1903. He also became a director of the Bank of Montreal and was instrumental in inducing the Bank to establish itself in Newfoundland where it "became the government's financial mainstay." From 1895 on when he tried to influence the outcome of the union discussions in Ottawa, Reid worked for confederation. He died in 1908.

financial interests included a monopoly of the island's railroads, a steamship company and extensive docks, lumbering operations and other interests. The fact that Reid himself depended upon Bank of Montreal backing accounted for Clouston's influence in Newfoundland. As the largest employer on the island, Reid's influence could be used to good advantage in any election.[77]

Reid's previous encounters with Bond made him receptive to Canadian suggestions that he aid Morris. Bond had led the opposition to the notorious Reid Railway contract of 1898. Under the terms of the contract, Reid obtained "concessions in money, land and monopolies unprecedented in the history of such transactions." Reid was given the entire Newfoundland railway system for a period of fifty years with the option of buying it outright for one million dollars. In addition he was granted five thousand acres of land per mile and the monopoly of coal lands, to vote in favour of the contract.[78] Morris always

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[77]The two general elections of 1900 were fought largely on the contract issue. When Bond won the first election and became prime minister he tried to get Reid to surrender his most valuable assets. Reid's unwillingness to co-operate led to a second election which was marked by Reid's open participation. Reid put up his own nominees including one of his sons, two of his captains, one of his shipmasters, and a clothier who supplied the Reid Company uniforms. In spite of this, and maybe because of it, Reid suffered a crushing defeat. Both Reid and Bond were never able to bury the memories of this election. St. John Chadwick, Newfoundland, pp. 96-98.

[78]Ottawa Evening Journal, 30 March 1912.

showed greater sympathy for the Reid interests than Bond; therefore, the Reid-Morris combination evolved.

Although Grey was disappointed by Bond's refusal to consider confederation, it cheered him to hear from Clouston, (9 October 1907) that Morris then enjoyed the support of two newspapers, with a possible third in the offing.[79] Sir Edward's star was rising but Grey knew that Bond would not yield easily. Both the governor general and the British ambassador to Washington, James Bryce, were concerned that Bond's mental health was such that it might jeopardize Anglo-Canadian-American relations.[80] Bryce thought it was possible that Bond would act in an irrational manner towards the United States.[81] Grey's interest in fostering Canadian-American friendship and understanding caused him to be thankful that Laurier

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[79]Clouston to Grey, 9 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21. Reid was Clouston's informant. The two newspapers were the Daily News and the Morning Chronicle. A third was the Western Star.

[80]Grey to Bryce, 8 September 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13; see also Grey to Bryce, 7 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 18. Reid told Grey that Bond's brother was in an asylum and Reid said he would not be surprised if Bond were to join his brother within a year. The date of Reid's disclosure is uncertain.

[81]Bryce to Fitzpatrick, 20 September and 8 October 1907. Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13, PAC. Bryce hoped that Fitzpatrick's "Montreal friends" could "exert influence to deter Sir R. Bond from the policy of exasperation which he is reported to contemplate." Apparently Fitzpatrick had told Bryce that influences in Canada were being brought to bear on bond.

maintained a friendly attitude toward the United States and he only wished that Bond would act as responsibly.[82]

Unlike Grey, the governor of Newfoundland was not blessed with a friendly and co-operative prime minister. Sir William had to be extremely careful in his dealings with Bond. However, he did take heart from signs that confederation was a possibility. These signs were the heavy taxation, increased cost of living, and size of the public debt.[83] With this in mind, MacGregor once again invited Grey to visit Newfoundland. He thought that a second visit would be useful, especially if confederation was not mentioned. This was suggested in spite of MacGregor's knowledge that Bond did not want to propose confederation since he thought it would hurt him politically. Although their hopes for union had suffered many setbacks, MacGregor and Grey could take some small consolation from the social ties established as a result of Grey's visit.

Throughout his term as prime minister, Bond publicly opposed confederation.[84] If at times he might

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[82]Grey to Bryce, 7 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 8; Grey to Elgin, 9 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 14.

[83]MacGregor to Grey, 29 November 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[84]St. John's Evening Telegram, 15 August 1908.

have reconsidered his stand there is no evidence to indicate that such was the case. There was some suggestion that when Bond visited Canada in June and July 1906 he might have been exploring the possibilities for union. The real reason for his journey was that he was visiting his sick brother in Toronto, the Reverend George J. Bond. When he was asked the nature of his visit Bond responded that it was private and not political. He added that Newfoundland was on a wave of unprecedented prosperity and that confederation was not in the region of practical politics. At this time Bond still hoped for ratification of the treaty with the United States. As Bond had stated in a visit to Canada four years earlier, Newfoundlanders did not want to become Canadians; they wished to pursue their own destiny.[85]

The strength of the islanders' determination to remain apart from Canada was reflected in the Newfoundland election results of 1908 and 1909. These two elections and the events surrounding them form a special chapter in the story of Canadian expansionism.

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[85] Ibid., 9 July 1906.

CHAPTER V

CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND, 1908-1914

At the end of 1906 Lord Grey considered all his hopes for confederation and the cleaning of the slate between Canada and the United States to have been dashed by news of the impending ratification of the Bond-Hay Treaty. Bond's hard line toward American fishermen had been rewarded, Grey thought, and his power in Newfoundland which had been collapsing was reestablished. Thus, Grey had seen hopes for the achievement of two of his three goals as governor general disappear in less than a month's time. Christmas 1906 was in many ways the low point of Grey's term in Canada.[1]

One year later, the situation had changed considerably. The United States Senate, influenced by Senator Lodge and the Gloucester fishermen, had refused to ratify the Bond-Hay Treaty.[2] As a result, Bond's political

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[1]Grey to Minto, 24 November 1906, Minto Papers, Vol. 27; Grey to Elgin, 25 December 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

[2]Grey did not consider the influence of Lodge and the Gloucester fishermen to be as important a consideration

power had waned considerably, and opposition to him mounted under the leadership of Edward Morris, who had split with Bond in July over the remuneration for Public Works employees.[3] The issue was a trivial one, and Bond quite rightly suspected that Morris used it as a convenient excuse for publicly breaking with him.[4] A new journal, the Evening Chronicle, under the able directorship of Morris's friend, Patrick T. McGrath, provided a propagandistic organ for the opposition to Bond.[5] McGrath had been a colonial correspondent of the London Times for a

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for Congress as protection. Grey to Elgin, 16 August and 8 September 1906, Grey Papers, Vol. 13.

[3]While Bond attended the 1907 Imperial Conference, Morris was in charge of the Newfoundland government. Soon after Bond returned, the two men split over the wage issue. Both men agreed that pay should be increased from $1.00 to $1.25 per day but disagreed as to which of them should get credit for the raise. Colonial Office officials welcomed the break thinking and hoping it marked the beginning of opposition to Bond. Morris was regarded as possessing superior ability to Bond but there was doubt, at the Colonial Office, that "he could shake the Bond party." MacGregor to Elgin, 18, 22 and 27 July 1907, C.O. 194/268.

[4]St. John's Evening Telegram, 27 July 1907; Grey to Laurier, 18 June 1907. Grey Papers, Vol. 2. Fitzpatrick had told Grey that he had heard that Morris was prepared to break with Bond and champion confederation if Bond did not do so himself.

[5]MacGregor to Grey, 10 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21. MacGrath later wrote a book, Newfoundland in 1911 (London, 1911), which indicates his close relationship with both Morris and Reid. Morris also had the backing of the Reid-controlled St. John's Daily News and the Western Star. The latter paper was the only one published on the west coast where the American fishermen were most active. See Neary and Noel, p. 220.

number of years and had contributed to many foreign magazines and journals. It appeared also that Morris enjoyed the support of the head of the Orange Lodges. All things considered, Grey agreed after talking with Reid and Clouston that Bond was in political difficulties. However, he did not think, at the end of 1907, that the time to oppose Bond openly had arrived.[6]

During 1907, Grey met someone who was to influence his attitude toward Newfoundland. This was Harry J. Crowe, a man who had been influential in attracting Lord Northcliffe's (Alred Harmsworth) interest in establishing a Newfoundland pulp and paper mill. At this time Northcliffe was proprietor of the Daily News and other newspapers. In 1908, he took control of The Times. A staunch imperialist, Northcliffe's interest in Newfoundland arose from his desire to protect his paper supply in the event that war broke out.[7] Therefore, in the autumn of 1902, he sent his brother Harold to Newfoundland to get timber concessions and build mills.[8] In the course of negotiations between Northcliffe and the Newfoundland government, Crowe had

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[6]Grey to Bryce, 7 December 1907 and Bryce to Grey, 14 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 1. Bryce suspected that Bond was stronger than Reid thought.

[7]Reginald Pound and Geoffrey Harmsworth, Northcliffe (London, 1959), p. 276.

[8]Ibid., p. 293.

got to know Bond well.[9] Grey first met Crowe on board the "Empress of Ireland," while crossing the Atlantic in 1907.[10] Crowe had taken this opportunity to tell Grey his thoughts about the possibility of confederation. He argued that Bond was in a politically tight position as a result of a bad railroad contract he had made with the Reids. It was Crowe's opinion that although Bond's only way out was confederation, he was reluctant to make the first move. Grey's enthusiasm for confederation caused him to accept Crowe's evaluation. There was no doubt that Crowe was on particularly intimate terms with Bond but MacGregor warned Grey that the Newfoundland prime minister would disown Crowe as his agent on very slight grounds. The governor found it difficult to understand why Bond would confide in "a man off the street" like Crowe and thought that Crowe had an inflated opinion of himself.[11] Crowe had also approached Laurier on the subject of confederation but Laurier cautiously avoided committing himself, preferring

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[9]St. John's Evening Telegram, 29 April 1909; Montreal Daily Star, 6 May 1909, Grey to Laurier, 13 June 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

[10]Grey to Crowe, 28 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[11]MacGregor to Grey, 11 November 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21. Macgregor had first met Crowe on 8 February 1907. Thereafter, Crowe called on him "many times." MacGregor to Crowe, 21 June 1909, C.O. 194/276.

to let Bond make the first move.[12] Thus, by November 1907, an impasse had been reached. Both Laurier and Bond were interested in union, however, each was waiting for the other to make the first move.

Like MacGregor, Crowe thought that confederation sentiment in the island was growing stronger; and unwilling to neglect any opportunity, he decided to approach Ambassador Bryce concerning his scheme for confederation. During their conversation, Crowe tried to interest Bryce in an intercolonial and British preferential tariff scheme. At the same time Bryce questioned Crowe closely on the situation in Newfoundland and gathered that Bond had come to believe privately in the idea of confederation. For the moment Bond was concealing this view (Crowe maintained) in order to win the November 1908 election, after which he could push confederation.[13] Crowe may have been mistaken, this may simply have been a ploy to secure Canadian non-interference in the election.

Bond's attitude to confederation hardened during 1908. Early in the year he declared that Newfoundland

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[12]Grey to MacGregor, 25 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21. Grey did suspect, however, that Laurier had written or sent a message asking Bond to meet him secretly in Montreal. Laurier's opinion of Crowe at this time is difficult to determine but by late January 1908, he had referred to Crowe as a "busybody" with little influence. See Grey to Bryce, 22 January 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 1.

[13]Bryce to Grey, 18 January 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 8.

would not enter into any understanding with Canada as to the preparation or presentation of The North Atlantic Fisheries case before The Hague Tribunal. This was consistent with his determination to have Newfoundland's problems with the United States treated separately from Canada's.[14] Faced with the united efforts of Bryce, Grey and Secretary of State Root to clean the slate of Canadian-American questions, including the fisheries, it was no wonder Bond's frustration caused outbursts of intemperate behaviour and language when he dealt with American fishing rights.[15] Laurier sympathized privately with Bond's position.[16] In many ways Newfoundland's relations with Canada were similar to Canada's relations with the United States. Both prime ministers were aware that the British Foreign Office placed Britain's relations with the United States ahead of her relations with either Canada or Newfoundland. Newfoundland's desire to pursue an independent

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[14]MacGregor to Grey, 4 February 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[15]MacGregor to Grey, 9 January 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21; MacGregor to Bryce, 19 March 1908, Bryce Papers, USA No. 27, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

[15]Laurier to Grey, 28 October 1908. Grey Papers, Vol. 1; Grey to Bryce, 8 November 1907. Grey Papers, Vol. 7; Laurier to Bond, 30 November 1907. Governor General's Numbered Files, NO. 192, Vol. 1(b). Laurier indicated to Bond his desire to cooperate on the fisheries question and Hague Tribunal. He was content to let Bond lead the way on the fisheries issue.

fisheries policy complicated matters further. Laurier's Alaska experience had made him wary of trusting the British to have Canada's best interests at heart; therefore, he was vigilant for any signs that Canadian interests were being sacrificed to appease the Americans. Unlike Canada, Newfoundland was in a relatively weak bargaining position. Laurier knew that Bond had the cards stacked against him; but on the other hand, Laurier himself had an election coming up in 1908 and it would take precedence over all other considerations.

Events in Newfoundland came to a head in March 1908 when Sir Edward Morris accepted the leadership of the Opposition and preparations got under way for the quadrennial elections to be held in November. Morris' leadership of the Opposition caused rejoicing among the confederates. Laurier and Grey thought that "Bond is in a funk" and would have nothing to do with Canadians unless it was interpreted that he was considering confederation.[17] Governor MacGregor agreed but in a more restrained manner. MacGregor considered Morris as "a very formidable opponent" for Bond, but he was unwilling to predict the outcome of the elections.[18] The confederation bogey could be raised

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[17]Laurier to Grey, 20 March 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 3; Grey to MacGregor, 26 March 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[18]MacGregor to Bryce, 5 March 1908, Bryce Papers, USA No. 27; MacGregor to Grey, 5 March 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

by both sides (MacGregor thought) if it proved a popular rallying cry for the voters. The fact that it had proved effective in previous elections, as recently as 1904, would encourage each party to denounce confederation and claim that their opponents supported it. Another tactic previously used in Newfoundland elections was to connect the Reid interests with a political party in order to play upon the emotions of those who opposed the Reids for one reason or another. MacGregor let Grey know that the Bond party would try to rally support by connecting Morris and Reid in some way.[19] This did not prove difficult, for it could be shown that Morris had split with Bond previously over the award of lucrative contracts to the Reids. When Lord Strathcona predicted the speedy accomplishment of the annexation of Newfoundland, many Newfoundlanders saw a plot to have the Canadian Pacific Railway take over Reid's Newfoundland railroads, thus rescuing Reid from a difficult financial situation and at the same time increasing the Canadian railroad's empire.[20]

The cause of confederation received another setback in May, 1908, when it was reported that a group of

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[19]MacGregor to Grey, 19 March 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[20]St. John's Evening Telegram, 3 August 1908. After the election, Reid maintained that neither he nor any of his employees had taken part in the campaign.

Canadian MPs at a dinner in New York had stated that Canada would soon become a separate nation rather than a dependency.[21] Such a statement was anathema to Newfoundlanders. Their ties, indeed their dependence upon Great Britain, made them unwilling to contemplate a separate existence. Bond recognized this fact and had made large concessions of lumber lands in order to encourage Lord Northcliffe to develop pulp and paper mills in Newfoundland.[22] The following year, a modern paper mill and township was begun at Grand Falls. These pulp and paper operations of Lord Northcliffe came under the control of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company.

The hopes of confederationists which had been so high earlier in the year took another shock when it was announced that Canada's Chief Justice, Charles Fitzpatrick, would represent Canadian interests at The Hague Tribunal. Adam Shortt, the historian, wrote to congratulate Fitzpatrick on his appointment and suggested that this was just the latest phase in Canada's national expansion.[23] Shortt was concerned with the expansion of Canada's diplomatic freedom. However, others who congratulated

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[21]MacGregor to Grey, 21 May 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

[22]Bryce to Grey, 18 June 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 8.

[23]Adam Shortt to Fitzpatrick, 16 June 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13.

Fitzpatrick, such as Sir William Van Horne, were thinking in terms of territorial expansion.[24] In Newfoundland the news of Fitzpatrick's appointment was not received with unrestrained joy. Both Morris and Bond thought that a Newfoundlander should represent their colony at The Hague. The Evening Chronicle, which supported Morris, claimed that Bond's intemperate and uncooperative manner explained the unwillingness of the British to invite him to represent his colony.[25] The decision to exclude Newfoundland was poor but unavoidable and certainly accounted to a large extent for the popularity of an anti-confederate position by both parties.

Early in August 1908, an interesting letter to the St. John's Evening Telegram appeared over the signature--"The Pink, White and Green." The writer, apparently well informed, described a "deep laid scheme" supported by Canadian capitalists and politicians to bring Newfoundland into confederation. These men, the writer claimed, were giving their moral if not their material support to Morris in the campaign.[26]

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[24]Sir William Van Horne to Fitzpatrick, 26 June 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13.

[25]St. John's Evening Chronicle, 15 May 1908; Ottawa Evening Journal, 31 October 1908.

[26]St. John's Evening Telegram, 3 August 1908.

One man who supported confederation, but not Morris, was Archbishop Howley. It was he who delivered the most telling blow to the hopes of the confederationists in Canada when he informed Fitzpatrick that he could not support Morris.[27] When Fitzpatrick passed on this news to Shaughnessy, the Canadian capitalist expressed great surprise and disappointment since he knew that Morris was counting on Howley's support.[28] Morris's position as a Roman Catholic in a colony which was two-thirds Protestant was difficult enough without having to worry about the backing of the Catholics. Without Howley his chances of winning seemed slim, since the archbishop's influence was considerable. Howley not only thought Morris "a miserable fellow" but also considered him treacherous for having split with Bond. The archbishop had hoped that the two men would bring confederation about between them. When Morris left Bond, on such a flimsy policy issue, Howley's sympathies were with Bond. As it turned out, Howley was the key to the election results.

During the campaign, newspapers and spokesmen on both sides did all they could to identify the other side with the cause of confederation. The Bond-controlled

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[27]Howley to Fitzpatrick, 28 March 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13. Howley and Fitzpatrick were related.

[28]Shaughnessy to Fitzpatrick, 7 April 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13.

Evening Telegram pointed to what it considered treacherous conduct on Morris's part by referring to his splits with Bond in 1898 and again in 1907. The paper also showed that Morris's associates were all involved in the notorious deal of 1898. If this was not convincing enough the Telegram argued that by electing Morris, Newfoundlanders could expect the financial ruin of their colony, which in turn would lead to confederation with Canada.[29] Bond, on the other hand, it was argued, had the best interests of the colony at heart as he had in 1894 when he rescued Newfoundland from a financial crisis.[30] Bond had also by September of 1908 publicly pledged himself against confederation.[31]

Right down to election day the two sides accused each other of working for confederation.[32] Morris's

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[29]St. John's Evening Telegram, 1 12, 15 and 31 August 1908. Bond told the governor that he controlled the Telegram. MacGregor to Crowe, 18 June 1909, C.O. 194/276, p. 460.

[30]St. John Chadwick, Newfoundland: Island Into Province (Cambridge, 1967), Ch. 6. On this occasion Bond had journeyed to Montreal, New York and London in search of loans. He ended up pledging his personal credit for the first of three loans which saved the colony from financial ruin and spared the government the probings of a Royal Commission of Inquiry.

[31]MacGregor to Grey, 30 September 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21; Bryce to Grey, 29 October 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 8. MacGregor hoped there would not be an even split--eighteen seats to each party.

[32]St. John's Evening Telegram, 2 November 1908.

supporters, like Bond's, were quick to point out that their man had opposed confederation for some time.[33] However, the political edge lay with Bond. Not only did his party have the advantage of being in power, with control over the election machinery, but it also held the edge in propaganda values. Bond could, and did, point to his past work on behalf of the colony, Morris's two splits with Bond, and Morris's support from known confederates such as Donald Morrison, an ex-judge of the Supreme Court.[34] If this was not convincing enough, Bond could whip up emotional fervour by referring to the Reid interests--which it was understood differed from Newfoundland's interests.[35] Reports of Canadian newspaper opinion in favour of confederation and the ill-timed remarks of

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[33]St. John's Evening Telegram, 11 August 1906. In this issue a poem "We Won't Federate" claimed that "Bond, Jackman, and Morris are valued and true men."

[34]In 1902, Morrison had resigned from the Supreme Court when Bond refused to appoint him Chief Justice. He re-entered politics with confederation as his platform and made a speaking tour of Canada in favour of union. His attempt to wrest the premiership from Bond in 1904 failed. See Toronto Globe, 29 October 1904; The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1902, p. 152.

[35]St. John's Evening Telegram, 29 September 1908. A favourite target of Bond's was the "notorious railroad deal of 1898." Bond persistently opposed the Reid interests and fought two successful elections in 1900 when the contract was the central issue. In the second of these two elections Reid openly and vigorously opposed Bond but public opinion rallied behind Bond. See St. John Chadwick, Newfoundland, Ch. 7.

Canadian MPs at a Pilgrims Club dinner in New York added more fuel to the fire. On 12 November 1908 Newfoundlanders made their choice.

The election results were a surprise. Each party received half of the seats in the thirty-six seat legislature.[36] The appointment of a speaker would be crucial, for if he was nominated from the government party that would mean that the government could be outvoted by the opposition. Although the result satisfied neither side it appeared that Morris could take heart from having done as well as he had. Governor General Grey did not view the situation this way. He expressed his disappointment with Morris; yet by the year's end he suggested that the situation in Newfoundland was analagous to that in Canada in 1866 when confederation was only a year away.[37]

The months between the Newfoundland election of 1908 and the subsequent one of 1909 marked the high point of confederate hopes in the 1903-1914 period. During this time the governor general of Canada conspired with influential Montreal businessmen to bring about confederation. The story of these efforts is an intriguing one indeed.

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[36]Edward Morris to MacGregor, 12 November 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[37]Grey to MacGregor, 27 December 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 21.

The 1908 election campaign had drawn the battle lines for the next election. Archbishop Howley was even more firmly on Bond's side as a result of his dislike of the Reids. And both Bond and Howley suspected MacGregor of favouring Morris.[38] Howley was able to convince Fitzpatrick that such was the case, and the chief justice tried to persuade Grey that Bond should be supported. Fitzpatrick feared that if the Morris-Reid combination took over, it might lead not only to a break with Britain but to union with the United States.[39] These views were based on information from Howley, who seemed to have decided that the time had come for him to throw off his false cloak of modesty and use his influence on Bond's behalf.[40] Howley described not only how the Reids had

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[38]Howley to Fitzpatrick, 24 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. Bond and MacGregor had a disagreement over the prime minister's way of making appointments. The governor considered Bond's methods "deplorable." MacGregor to Crowe, 21 January 1909, C.O. 194/275.

[39]Fitzpatrick to Grey, 6 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. "I am not pessimistic by nature but to think of the possibility of Newfoundland and St. Pierre in the hands of the Yankees gives me the night-mare."

[40]Howley to Fitzpatrick, 24 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. Howley maintained that his influence was great since he, as a leader of the Catholics, was the first native bishop and an ardent exile Newfoundlander. This was quite a change from his position in March 1908, when he claimed that he had little influence. See Howley to Grey, 28 March 1908, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13.

MacGregor was aware that Howley was believed to have the power to determine who was to be the prime minister. MacGregor to Crowe, 21 January 1909, C.O. 194/275.

spent "money like water" in the November election but also how they were able to seduce governors and others through their monopolistic holdings. Reid soon ensnared governors after their appointments, Howley declared. The method of ensnarement was to extend favours to the governor which would favourably dispose him to the Reids. So strongly did Howley hold these views that he asked Fitzpatrick to have the Colonial Office give "the most stringent orders" for governors to "beware of the Reids." But Howley's most immediate concern was that what he saw as a conspiracy against Bond be stopped.

A conspiracy did exist but it was not initially directed against Bond. The main conspirators were Lord Grey, a group of Montreal businessmen, and the ubiquitous Harry Crowe. On January 11, Crowe arrived in St. Johns from Montreal.[41] In the light of later developments it seems safe to surmise that he had been in contact with either Clouston or Shaughnessy and wanted to talk to Bond. Crowe's part in bringing a ten million dollar industry to Newfoundland accounts for Bond's willingness to receive him. Certainly Crowe was convinced that confederation was possible and saw it as the major step in his scheme to bring all the British possessions in North America and the Caribbean together. In order to advance his plans Crowe

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[41]St. John's Evening Telegram, 11 January 1909.

needed influential backing. His visit to Newfoundland convinced him that the political deadlock and Bond's attitude were favourable to union. With this in mind he wrote to Lord Grey reminding him that they had met previously and asked for an interview.[42] The interview was set for 5:45 p.m. on January 23 and the governor general was sufficiently interested to have Crowe stay to dine with him.[43]

When Crowe reached Government House he proved to Grey's satisfaction, by letters and cables, that he enjoyed an intimate relationship with Bond. Unfortunately Grey was not to discover until much later that Crowe was in the habit of carrying letters from influential people in order to impress others.[44] In the course of their conversation Crowe informed Grey that Bond interpreted the election results as reflecting a change of public opinion towards him. Since he had spent so many years in Newfoundland politics, Bond hoped to leave in a blaze of glory. With this in mind, Bond proposed, according to Crowe, that he would be willing to work for confederation. Bond's change

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[42]Crowe to Grey, 23, 25 and 29 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[43]Grey to Crewe, 18 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 27.

[44]MacGregor to Grey, 2 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

of heart was to be explained by his fear that, if Morris and the Reids took over, the colony would be quickly ruined.[45] In addition to the political considerations involved in Bond's decision, there were also reasons of health; Bond was looking forward to retirement in London with a seat in the House of Lords if it could be arranged.

Although Grey's interest in confederation disposed him to accept Crowe's evaluation of the Newfoundland situation, he took the precaution of referring Crowe to Fitzpatrick. The chief justice had already affirmed that Bond was at heart a confederate--an evaluation he had received from Howley.[46]

Upon his return to the Russell House Hotel from Government House, Crowe found a wire from Bond informing him that legislation in Newfoundland had to be postponed until Attorney General Kent had returned from Washington.[47] The Newfoundland legislature still had to meet for the first time since the November election. Crowe wanted this event delayed so that Bond and Morris would have ample

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[45]Grey to Crewe, and Grey to MacGregor, 25 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[46]Grey to Crewe, 28 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. This letter marked "Very Secret" deals at length with the people and events involved in the conspiracy.

[47]Crowe to Grey, 23 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. Kent was in Washington to confer with Bryce and the Canadian minister of justice concerning the terms of reference and questions to be submitted to The Hague Tribunal. MacGregor to Crewe, 18 January 1909, C.O. 194/275.

opportunity to meet and discuss the arrangements whereby confederation could be achieved. MacGregor, Bryce, and Grey, cooperated in a scheme to keep Kent away as long as possible, thus postponing the opening of the colony's legislature. MacGregor assumed responsibility for deferring parliament as long as Bryce required Kent in Washington. Grey, in turn, asked Bryce to keep Kent with him.[48] It appeared that Grey's hopes were about to be realized.

His enthusiasm for confederation caused Grey to act unwisely. The opportunity seemed too good to let pass, so Grey hurriedly arranged a meeting at Government House with Laurier for the afternoon following Crowe's visit; and on the same day, he informed the Colonial Office of what had happened. Laurier's reaction to Crowe's news was cautious. He agreed that the Newfoundland political situation might provide the opportunity for confederation and he wanted to make Bond's task as easy as possible, should he renew negotiations with Canada. However, Laurier also wanted Fitzpatrick to go to Washington in order to check Crowe's assessment of the situation with Kent.

Like Grey, Laurier was receptive to Crowe's news. The key to the scheme described by Crowe was to bring Bond

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[48]Grey to Crewe, 28 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22; Grey to Bryce, 26 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 9; Grey to MacGregor, and Bryce to MacGregor, 15 January 1909, MacGregor to Crewe, 18 January 1909, C.O. 194/275.

and Morris together. Even though the two men had long been political colleagues it would be difficult to overcome the personal animosities generated by the 1908 election campaign. The vituperative attacks by their newspaper supporters had opened old wounds, yet Grey thought that pressure could be brought to bear on each in order to achieve their cooperation. Grey and Fitzpatrick thought that Archbishop Howley could use his influence with Bond to encourage union. Morris could be reached, or so Grey thought, through Montreal financiers Sir Edward Clouston and Sir Thomas Shaughnessy. Clouston as Vice-President and General Manager of the Bank of Montreal could bring the bank's power, over the Reid railway company and the Nova Scotia Steel Company, to bear on Morris, who relied heavily upon them for support. As President of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Shaughnessy's influence was with the Reid Railway. In rather picturesque language Grey described the chain of influence: "Reid can squeeze Morris, and Reid can be squeezed by Clouston and Shaughnessy." The effect of all this squeezing would be to force Morris to cooperate with Bond in bringing Newfoundland into the Dominion.

By the end of their conversation, Grey had agreed, at Laurier's request, to ask Clouston to come to Ottawa for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of his control over

Morris.[49] It turned out that Clouston, because of bad health, was unable to travel. Therefore, Grey asked Laurier if it would be satisfactory if he went to Montreal on Tuesday, January 26, in order to call privately upon Clouston, Laurier quickly agreed. Grey not only saw Clouston but Shaughnessy as well. Both men assured him that there would be no difficulty in bringing Morris into line; they also told him that they would do everything in their power to take advantage of this opportunity to bring Newfoundland into confederation.[50] Indeed Crowe had spoken to Shaughnessy earlier the same day and obtained his offer to influence Morris through the Reid Newfoundland Company.[51] Shaughnessy added that he thought the Newfoundland government, before confederation, should assume the railway by exchanging government bonds for stocks. This maneuver would benefit holders of Newfoundland securities, including a number of Canadians. Shaughnessy's first step was taken promptly. He telegraphed William D. Reid, R. G. Reid's eldest son, and asked him to come to

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[49]The same suggestion had been made two years previously. See above p. 123.

[50]Grey to MacGregor, 27 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[51]Crowe to Fitzpatrick, 26 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

Montreal for the ostensible purpose of discussing his father's estate.[52]

By the end of his day in Montreal, Grey was elated over the prospects of achieving his long-sought goal of confederation. Armed with the information and scheme outlined by Crowe and sure in the knowledge that he had the support of Laurier, Fitzpatrick, Howley, Shaughnessy, and Clouston, Grey confidently described to Bryce how he hoped to squeeze Newfoundland into Canada before the end of the summer.

Bryce thought Grey's plan "ingenious" and offered to visit Newfoundland himself if it would be of use; but by the time Grey received Bryce's reply, Grey's hopes had been dashed once more.[53] The cause for this sudden reversal was contained in a letter from Crowe. He reported that "something seems to have happened" for the communications he received from Bond were not as favourable on the subject of confederation. Grey's hopes for union which had repeatedly waxed and waned were never to reach such heights again--even though a week later he could still believe that the forces for confederation "would appear to

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[52]Grey to Crewe, 28 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. R. G. Reid died 3 June 1908.

[53]Bryce to Grey, 4 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 9; Crowe to Grey, 29 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. Crowe wrote from Boston while on his way back to Newfoundland.

sufficiently weighty and influential to dominate even a reluctant and stupid people."[54] Grey realized too late that he had over-stepped the bounds of his office.

In his enthusiasm for his cause Grey had ignored evidence which indicated that his scheme would not work. Even Crowe had indicated that it would be difficult to bring Bond and Morris together. According to Crowe, Bond suspected that Governor MacGregor favoured Morris, while Morris suspected Bond of arranging a secret Montreal meeting with Laurier to discuss confederation.[55] Bond and Morris were simply irreconcilable.

As he had previously, it was the Governor of Newfoundland who revealed the greatest grasp of the situation. Although himself a confederate, MacGregor realized that confederation was gaining ground but would not come in his day. He reasoned that the majority of Newfoundlanders opposed the idea and neither Bond nor Morris or both combined could bring it about.[56] As for Crowe, MacGregor recognized that Bond did confide in him but doubted that Crowe had anything which could compromise Bond. Crowe's

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[54]Grey to Crewe, 7 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[55]Grey to MacGregor, 25 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[56]MacGregor to Grey, 2 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

habit of carrying letters from government officials with him and showing them to impress others concerned MacGregor in particular. For these reasons MacGregor thought Crowe dangerous and imprudent to a degree which could result in bad publicity for the government and place Bond at Morris's mercy.[57] MacGregory's foresight was remarkable.

When Crowe returned to Newfoundland from Canada he consulted Bond on his talks with the Canadians. Crowe set all his cards before Bond. These were the offer of a peerage and liberal terms for confederation, including the fantastic possibility of adding the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon to Newfoundland.[58] But Bond refused to trust Grey and the Canadians. His personal dislike for Morris and his fear that an unscrupulous combination would seize power, made it impossible for Bond to cooperate.[59] Afraid that Crowe's activities would in some way implicate him Bond repudiated Crowe and his activities on behalf of confederation. In disclaiming efforts by Crowe on his

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[57]MacGregory to Grey, 8 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[58]MacGregor to Grey, 2 February and Crowe to Bond, 12 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[59]Grey to Bryce, 13 January 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 9.

behalf, Bond told MacGregor that Crowe was "a busybody and an adventurer."[60]

Quick to sense the turn of events, MacGregor warned Crowe against using names and suggested that he let matters drop for a while. MacGregor feared that Crowe's actions would have repercussions in the next general election.[61] Attorney General Kent shared MacGregor's fears and asked the Canadian government through Sir Charles Fitzpatrick to help the Bond government retain power.[62] This was the least Kent could do after he had been called by Bond to account for his correspondence with Fitzpatrick. Another Fitzpatrick correspondent, Archbishop Howley, wrote at the same time urging that Morris's Canadian friends withdraw their support and deal only with Bond.[63]

Howley's fears of Morris's Canadian friends were by no means unjustified. But apparently the archbishop did not realize that Morris was not as firmly "in Reid's

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[60]MacGregor to Grey, 11 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 9. Grey to Crewe, 18 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 15.

[61]MacGregor to Crowe, 27 February 1909, enclosed in MacGregor to Grey, 2 March 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22; MacGregor to Grey, 2 March 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[62]J. M. Kent to Fitzpatrick, 16 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[63]Howley to Fitzpatrick, 17 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

pocket" as he, Grey and others believed.[64] Shaughnessy had already attempted to influence Morris through Reid and failed. This was the outcome of the wire he had dispatched to Reid after talking with Crowe and Grey in January. The message had not proved sufficient to attract Reid to Montreal, and Reid's desire to see Bond removed quickly and permanently from the Newfoundland political scene was too strong for the Canadian magnate to overcome.[65] All three Newfoundlanders--Bond, Morris and Reid--had asserted their independence of the Canadians.

By mid-February 1909, Bond's back was to the political wall. Unable to secure the support of a single opposition member in order to provide both a speaker and a one-vote majority, Bond asked the governor to dissolve the legislature and call an election. When MacGregor refused, Bond tendered his resignation.[66] In doing this, and consequently in calling upon Morris to form a ministry, MacGregor was constitutionally correct.[67] Unlike Bond,

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[64]Laurier had earlier warned Grey that Bond was "peculiar": "The worst with him is that he plays a lone hand, and may escape you at the very moment you think you hold him." Laurier to Grey, 25 September 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 15.

[65]Crowe to Fitzpatrick, 19 February 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[66]St. John's Evening Telegram, 3 March 1909.

[67]MacGregor had anticipated all the problems that arose--the deadlock, the difficulty in appointing a Speaker, and the grant of dissolution. On this last point

Morris met with the legislature and attempted to elect a speaker, but this attempt was defeated by the Bond party, which voted against nominees from both sides of the House. After an unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition ministry, MacGregor granted a dissolution to Morris on April 10. The election was set for May 8.

Bond's supporters were incensed that the governor should have granted Morris what he had refused Bond. It seemed more evidence that Morris and the governor were cooperating to dump Bond. The Evening Telegram quickly came to Bond's defence and claimed that the election had been sprung on the people with only a month's notice.[68]

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he had British support. The Colonial Secretary informed the governor that he would be justified in refusing Bond dissolution. MacGregor to Crewe, 7 January 1909, and Crewe to MacGregor, 28 January 1909, C.O. 194/275.

Bond asked for dissolution, when this was refused he asked MacGregor whom he would grant it to. MacGregor planned to ask Morris. If he failed to obtain a majority then the governor hoped that a coalition could be formed. But MacGregor did not tell Bond who would be granted the dissolution. He also pointed out to the prime minister that there were historical precedents for opposing a spring election. Bond, himself, had objected to a spring election in 1900, as being unsuitable due to factors involving climate, topography, and employment. Bond to MacGregor, 18 February 1909, C.O. 194/275, MacGregor to Crewe, 24 February 1909, ibid.; MacGregor to Bond, 20 February 1909, ibid.

[68] Ibid., 31 March 1909. For more on this topic see S. J. R. Noel, "Politics and the Crown: The Case of the 1908 Tie Election in Newfoundland," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXXIII (February-November 1967), pp. 285-91. Noel states that the 1909 election was "fought mainly on the issue of the dissolution." The issue of confederation, however, was at least of equal importance. See below pp. 156-57.

Again as in the previous election the anti-confederation slogans appeared; the Evening Telegram declared that MacGregor was in the Reid-Morris combine, which was working for confederation.[69] In fact, the governor's sympathies did lie with Morris, for he had found him an abler administrator than Bond. However, he tried to avoid partisanship.[70]

Bond quickly got his campaign into high gear in a published address. "To The Free and Independent Voters of Newfoundland." In the address he declared:

> I do not hesitate to say that those who are in temporary control of the Government are but the Instruments of Others some of whom are outside this colony and whose ultimate aim is to bring Newfoundland into the Canadian Dominion by fair means or foul.
>
> I only do my duty to you when I declare that within the past three months an attempt has been made by parties anxious for union between this Colony and Canada to take advantage of the political situation here to bring about a fusion of parties with a view to Confederation and before my Government resigned we were urged to adopt this course by men in high positions in Canada who furnished assurances of ability to direct and control the action of our political opponents. This conspiracy which had the countenance of some who are high in authority was spurned by myself and colleagues.[71]

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[69]MacGregor to Grey, 12 March 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22; St. John's Evening Telegram, 26 April 1909.

[70]MacGregor to Grey, 12 March 1909, Grey Papers. Copy of telegram, MacGregor to Crewe enclosed with letter. MacGregor to Grey, 4 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[71]St. John's Evening Telegram, 17 April 1909.

Shortly after this political bombshell, the Telegram printed a ficticious and malicious interview between the non-existent Montreal Octopus and Morris.[72] Morris retaliated in kind and sued the Evening Telegram, alleging that it had libelled him in commenting upon the case of a prominent St. John's merchant who had been arrested after Morris charged him with slander. The merchant had written a letter accusing Morris of being in the pay of the Canadian Government for the purpose of furthering a confederation plan.[73] As the campaign progressed the charges and counter charges flew, but still the most effective charge used by both sides was to declare their opponents to be in favour of confederation.

Unknown to Bond, Morris had an ace up his sleeve which had been inadvertently dealt by Harry Crowe soon after the previous election. As the campaign neared its final week, Morris decided to play his card. A story appeared in the Daily News, a Morris organ, to the effect that Crowe had been used as an intermediary between Bond and Sir Frederick Borden, the Canadian Minister of Militia,

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[72] Ibid., 23 April 1909. The Telegram was forced to print a retraction of this story on 7 June 1909.

[73] Montreal Daily Star, 26 April 1909. The merchant was W. B. Grieve. See MacGregor to Crewe, 27 April 1909, C.O. 194/276, p. 251.

for the purpose of negotiating the terms of confederation.[74] Crowe's habit of confiding in too many people had caused him to make the mistake, in December 1908, of telling J. F. Downey, one of Morris's supporters, that he had acted as an intermediary. His purpose in doing this had been to demonstrate to Downey that the Canadian influence was behind Bond; thus reassured, Downey could protect his own future by throwing his lot in with Bond. In return, Bond told Crowe by letter that he would appoint Downey, first, as Speaker and, later, as deputy minister of marine and fisheries. Foolishly, Crowe had given Downey three letters to prove his position with respect to confederation and his relations with Borden and Bond. These letters were, unknown to Crowe, quickly taken to a photographer, duplicated and returned to him. Then Downey and those involved with him waited for the right psychological moment to explode their bomb.[75]

Bond's forces were sent reeling from the repercussions of this story. Speaking before a political

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[74]St. John's Daily News, cited in Montreal Daily Star, 27 April 1909; Crowe attempted to exonerate Bond by declaring that Bond was not the recipient of Borden's letter to Crowe but the damage was done, see St. John's Evening Telegram, 27 April and 6 May 1909; Montreal Daily Star, 28 April and 6 May 1909. See also clippings from Daily News concerning the Downey exposures with MacGregor to Crewe, 27 April 1909, C.O. 194/276, pp. 265-68.

[75]MacGregor to Grey, 7 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

gathering at Clark's Beach, Bond claimed the story was part of a plot by Downey to embarrass him. He tried to turn the tables by declaring that the proponents of the real plot were much more important men than either Downey or Crowe. He charged that high officials in Canada had advanced a proposal "that for daring and impropriety could hardly be excelled." Thereupon he elaborated on the earlier scheme he had described concerning Canadian pressure which could be used to swing Morris to Bond in order to achieve confederation.[76]

Support for Bond's side of the story came quickly from Edward M. Jackman, Bond's minister of finance, and until 1913, a strong anti-confederate. Jackman claimed to have seen an absolute, written assurance that the financial men of Montreal who subscribed Morris's campaign funds had undertaken to guarantee and command Morris's support if Bond would fall into line on the subject of confederation.[77] Although he mentioned that this scheme had the support of the highest officials in England and Canada, it was not until election eve May 7, that Jackman named names. On that evening, in the Temperance Hall at Repassey, he swore that Governor General Grey and Governor MacGregor knew and

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[76]St. John's Evening Telegram, 28 April 1909.

[77]Ibid., 29 April 1909; Jackman to Fitzpatrick, 12 and 15 November 1913, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 14.

supported a plot to unite the two political parties for the purpose of carrying confederation.[78] Again, as he and Bond had done before, Jackman maintained that the "most influential railroad and financial men of Montreal were behind the plot." However, Jackman continued, Bond had declined to accept the Canadian proposal. The timing of Jackman's charge made it impossible for Morris to contradict. Great coloured placards posted by the Evening Telegram appeared on election day with large letters "Earl Grey, The Governor and Confederation."[79]

Both sides, having fired their biggest salvos, awaited the outcome of the bitterest election campaign Newfoundland had witnessed.[80] The voters decided in favour of Morris. He won twenty-six seats while Bond was only able to retain ten.[81]

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[78]MacGregor later claimed that he was not, and had never been, aware of a confederation plot. MacGregor to Crewe, 21 June 1909, C.O. 194/276.

[79]MacGregor to Grey, 12 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22; Bryce to Grey, 8 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 8.

[80]MacGregor to Crewe, 2 April 1909, C.O. 194/276, p. 14. On one occasion Bond was kicked in the chest and knocked senseless into the water as he attempted to land at a dock. St. John's Evening Telegram, 1 May 1909. The Telegram also made use of the story of a plot to bribe George Roberts, a Bond supporter. The bribe was offered in March in order to secure a one seat majority for the Morris government. Since the bribe was $25,000 the Telegram reported that the money could only have come from Canadian companies in Newfoundland or parties outside the colony. See Telegram, 30 April and 3 May 1909.

[81]Ottawa Evening Journal, 12 May 1909.

Propaganda by both sides had been influential but the Bond supporters insisted that Morris's position as Government leader accounted for the change. MacGregor was once again castigated for having declined Bond's request for a dissolution.[82] Bond's opponents maintained that dissatisfaction with his long and dictatorial rule, coupled with evidences of his willingess to deal with the Canadians accounted for the results. Whatever their explanation of the results, Newfoundland politicians realized that confederation with Canada was a practical impossibility.

The Canadian confederates were similarly convinced although die-hards like Harry Crowe and Lord Grey considered the election results as only a temporary set-back. In spite of his fall from favour, Crowe was back at his personal crusade for confederation by the end of 1909.[83] Once again he suggested that Bond would be receptive to plans for confederation. By this time, however, Grey had learned to restrict his enthusiasm for union--and for

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[82]Noel, p. 290-91 concludes that Bond had antagonised the British government "by his efforts to conduct an independent policy towards the United States." Therefore, MacGregor's superiors at the Colonial Office decided that Morris should be granted the dissolution. This conclusion seems justified by the relevant colonial office correspondence. One official trusted Morris as little as he did Bond; another thought that, "from an Imperial viewpoint," Bond was better. Opinion was strongly in favour of granting Morris the dissolution. See C.O. 194/275, pp. 398-406.

[83]Crowe to Grey, 28 December 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 197(4).

Crowe's proposals.[84] The governor general now believed that the pressure of enlightenment had to replace the pressure of necessity.

Confederation had been one of Grey's personal goals upon his arrival in Canada and it remained such until he left. Apart from his interest in revitalizing the British Empire, Grey's fear of an American takeover in Newfoundland made him work for confederation. Although he had always suspected the Americans of wanting to expand their territory to include the island colony, it was during his last year in Canada that Grey's concern over the activities of American capitalists reached its peak. For this reason he wanted British capital rather than American to be used for the new field opened by cold storage techniques.[85] His fear of American capital in Newfoundland, and his interest in Dr. Wilfrid Grenfell's work on the Labrador coast combined to provide him with a solution to the confederation dilemma. Grey proposed the establishment of a powerful organization, in British hands, working on the cooperative lines of Grenfell's mission, which could

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[84]Grey to MacGregor, 25 March 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 22. The governor general reported he had not heard any more of Crowe. Grey blamed Crowe for the whole fiasco. It was just as well, the earl thought, that he was going to the Yukon during the summer and would be unable to visit Newfoundland.

[85]Grey to Lord Northcliffe, 1 November 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 22; Toronto Globe, 7 November 1910.

purchase the fishermen's catch on the Labrador coast and organize its transportation and marketing. At the same time Grey proposed that political educational missionary work could be introduced which would advance the cause of confederation by winning the fishermen's support. Like Grey, Grenfell wanted Newfoundland to become a province of Canada.[86] The scheme was a daring one and after his previous abortive attempts to secure union Grey was extremely anxious that it be kept secret. In particular he asked Grenfell to burn all their correspondence referring to Newfoundland.[87]

Soon after his election to office Sir Edward Morris attempted to alleviate fears that Newfoundland was interested in union with the United States. He emphasized that there never had been any feeling towards union; Newfoundland was loyal to the British flag and empire.[88]

Confederation was far from being a dead issue in the period between the 1909 election and the Great War. Although the peak of sentiment had been reached in 1909, Canadians remained optimistic about their chances of

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[86]Grey to Arthur Grenfell, 5 November 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 23.

[87]Grey to Grenfell, 1 November 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 22.

[88]Morris to Bryce, 10 July 1909, Bryce Papers, USA, No. 92; Bryce still wanted confederation and wrote to Grey asking if Canada would be prepared to make proposals to Newfoundland which would lead to union. Bryce to Grey, 5 January 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 10.

expanding their domain. In thanking Lord Northcliffe for his speech (6 November 1910) on "Canada To-Day and To-Morrow," William S. Fielding told the Ottawa Canadian Club that he thought Northcliffe's interests in Canada and Newfoundland might be instrumental in bringing about union.[89] By the end of 1910 some were again claiming that an election in favour of confederation could be carried.[90] For their part, the British were quite willing to leave matters to natural evolution.[91] Harry Crowe, the perennial optimist, confidently predicted, in 1911, that confederation would take place within two years. And he tried to interest the new Canadian prime minister, Robert Borden, in his scheme, telling Borden that he could expect to add Newfoundland to Canada before his first term as prime minister had expired.[92]

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[89]Grey continued to hope that Newfoundland would recognize the advantages of union: "It is desirable that that ignorant and dour handful of people should realise the advantage of having the momentum of 8,000,000 people behind them when negotiating with the United States. Grey to Bryce, 20 January 1911, Grey Papers, Vol. 10.

[90]Young to Bryce, 30 November 1910, Bryce Papers, USA, No. 30.

[91]MacGregor to Bryce, 2 August 1909, Bryce Papers, USA, No. 29.

[92]Crowe to Borden, 5 October 1911, Borden Papers, Vol. 154; two years later Crowe told Borden that he had secured the unquestioned support of Bond for the cause of confederation. Crowe talked to Borden in Ottawa concerning the possibility of Newfoundland entering confederation. See Crowe to Borden, 2 May 1913, Borden Papers, Vol. 32.

Borden also received similar advice from ex-Newfoundland political leader Alfred B. Morine. Early in 1914, Morine reported that there was great interest in confederation in Newfoundland. Some informal advances were made, purportedly on Morris's behalf, suggesting that negotiations on the terms of union could begin.[93] At the same time Borden was made aware that the United States was interested in acquiring the two tiny French islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon had been granted to France by Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1763). It, therefore, seemed logical to Canada that Britain should acquire them if France ever decided to part with the islands. When it was reported, in November 1903, that Senator Lodge had publicly advocated American annexation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Canada was quick to respond.[94] Following so soon after the Alaska award, the

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[93]Morine to Borden, 5 February 1914, and Borden to Harcourt, 9 February 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 32.

[94]Ottawa Evening Journal, 23 November 1903. The editorial writer spoke for many Canadians: "The efforts of the United States to discover the pole, their contention that Hudson Bay is an open sea, their covert efforts at Greenland, all point to the one conclusion that the American republic intends to buy, arbitrate or steal every bit of land on the northern half of the western hemisphere that can be bought, arbitrated or stolen. . . . The question of the Arctic, of Greenland, of Hudson Bay, of Newfoundland, of the French islands cannot be indefinitely postponed." Aylesworth to Laurier, 23 November 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 291. Aylesworth had a high regard for Lodge's influence and ability. The senator was a man to be reckoned with, Aylesworth warned: "From what

report raised new Canadian fears of further American expansion. The fact that Lodge was connected with the alleged annexationist statements only made the report seem more credible. Lodge had been the most unpopular of the American commissioners, in Canadian eyes.

Faced by what seemed to be new evidence of American territorial cupidity, Canada turned to Britain. The Laurier government urged Britain to prevent any American takeover of the islands.[95] In addition, the British government was called upon to arrange for Canada's acquisition of St. Pierre and Miquelon, a settlement of the French shore question in Newfoundland and to arrange with Denmark the transfer of Greenland to Canada.[96] In lieu of British ownership of the French islands, Canada asked that

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I saw of Mr. Lodge this year, in six weeks of daily personal communication, I formed the opinion that he is an exceedingly crafty politician, ambitious to be prominent in the public eye in his own country, and identified with territorial aggrandisement in any quarter where opportunity might occur, and animated always, with a feeling of hostility to Great Britain." Aylesworth also advised Laurier that the time was opportune to raise the question of the sale or cession of the French islands to Canada.

Lodge claimed he "never made any such statement in my life or any statement whatever as to St. Pierre and Miquelon." H. C. Lodge to A. J. Magurn, 9 December 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 753 (Pt. 2).

[95]Minto to Lyttelton, 25 November 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 753 (Pt. 2).

[96]Ibid.

France give assurance that she would not sell them to the United States.[97]

The Canadian prime minister, always aware of the possible political repercussions of American expansionism, sought to reassure concerned Canadians. He let it be known that his government was in "communication with the Imperial authorities on the subject."[98] And he did not think there was "reason to believe that the French Government would part with those islands under any consideration."[99] This was also the view of the British government which had been informed by its charge d'Affairs in Washington that Lodge had not made the remarks attributed to him.[100] Britain did, however, make the decision to establish a British consulate on St. Pierre. The United States had had one there for some time.[101]

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[97]Minto to Lyttelton, 1 December 1903, ibid., also in C.O. 42/893, p. 316; Minto to Lyttelton, 3 December 1903, Secret and Confidential Despatches, Vol. 35.

[98]Laurier to Senator Templeman, 30 November 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 291.

[99]Ibid.

[100]Lyttelton to Minto, 30 November 1903, Laurier Papers, Vol. 753 (Pt. 2).

[101]Boyle to Lyttelton, 26 January 1904, C.O. 194/243.

Talk of American annexation was heard again in 1905 and 1907.[102] This was based on reports that the islands' inhabitants believed that France neglected them.[103] Many of the islanders were so discontented that they emigrated to Canada.[104] Others who remained behind agitated for union with the United States.[105] When Governor General Grey inquired about the possibility of France ceding the islands to Britain, he was informed that the United States would probably protest such a move and possibly invoke the Monroe Doctrine.[106] Grey agreed, but feared that the French ambassador in Washington might "advocate and carry through the cession of the islands to the United States."[107]

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[102]Clipping from St. John's Daily News, 27 December 1905, sent with MacGregor to Elgin, 29 December 1905, C.O. 194/258.

[103]Hampson to Lansdowne, 1 August 1905, C.O. 194/260, Charles S. Hampson was the first British consul to be sent to St. Pierre.

[104]Grey to Elgin, 8 January 1907, Secret and Confidential Despatches, Vol. 38.

[105]Toronto Globe, 5 January 1907.

[106]Elgin to Grey, 22 January 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 14; Grey to Laurier, 10 February 1907, ibid., Vol. 2; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 January 1907, Secret and Confidential Despatches from the Colonial Office, Vol. 41.

[107]Grey to Fitzpatrick, 2 February 1907, Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 13.

While he admitted it unlikely that France would sell the islands, Sir Wilfrid was cautious. "On the other hand, anything is likely," he told Grey, "which goes to show that the Americans are trying to put their brands upon everything available around Canada."[108] Laurier's suspicions about the reported American overtures to France prompted him to request the governor general to find out "what is in the wind." The time was opportune, it seemed, for Canada to acquire the islands herself.[110] Laurier stated his intentions clearly: "If it were true that the Americans are attempting negotiations we should make a supreme effort to cut the grass from under their feet."[111] With just such an intention in mind, the Canadian minister of finance took the opportunity, while in Paris, to sound out the French on the matter. He was assured that France would not part with the islands.[112]

When disturbances broke out on St. Pierre in 1908, talk of union with the United States was rampant. Discontent focussed on the immediate issue of the French

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[108]Laurier to Grey, 8 June 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

[109]Ibid.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Laurier to Grey, 8 June 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

[112]Francis Bentie to Edward Grey, 20 February 1907, Secret and Confidential Despatches from the Colonial Office, Vol. 41.

government's refusal to allow denominational schools. But this was only one expression of the islanders' dissatisfaction with French rule. Union with America, it was argued would bring greater freedom and prosperity. On the evening of November 17, the American flag was carried in front of nearly a thousand protesters.[114] Since there were only eight gendarmes on the island, the situation was dangerous and led the French to despatch two cruisers and a new administrator to the island.[115]

Robert Borden, like his predecessor, evinced strong interest in acquiring the French islands for Canada. He was also concerned about American intentions in this area and considered that an American takeover would be "very unfortunate for us and for British interests in general."[116] The British colonial secretary sought to reassure him that France had been informed of Britain's view that "the treaties under which she hold[s] St. Pierre and Miquelon do not allow her to cede them to anyone else but Great

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[113] St. John's Evening Telegram, 18 and 19 November 1908.

[114] Ibid., 18 November 1908.

[115] Ibid., 21 and 30 November 1908. After their arrival, nightly watches were sent ashore from one of the French ships in case of any "eventuality." Ibid., 16 December 1908.

[116] Borden to Harcourt, 9 February 1914, Borden Papers, Vol. 32.

Britain."[117] Borden, apparently, was satisfied. American designs on Newfoundland and the French islands were among the least of Canada's concerns when the First World War broke out.

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[117]Harcourt to Borden, 3 March 1914, Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

CANADA AND THE WEST INDIES, 1903-1914

The surge of Canadian expansionism after 1903 was not limited to the cold North and the bleak East. The warm and sunny Caribbean region also attracted Canada's attention. It was far easier to interest Canadians in the prospect of closer relations with the British West Indies than it was to create concern for Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic or for union with Newfoundland. Although the West Indies remained a distant tropical paradise for most Canadians, the advent of steamer service between Canadian and West Indian ports resulted in an increasing number escaping the biting cold of mid-winter Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa by holidaying in the Caribbean. Some of these people, including Thomas B. Macauley and Harry Crowe, were to broaden their expansionist horizons as a result of such contacts.

By 1903, historical ties between Canada and the West Indies were deep rooted.[1] Since the eighteenth

[1]Berger, The Sense of Power, p. 71 states that one of the basic proposals of the founders of the nationalist Canada-first movement was "closer trade relations with the West Indies--'with a view to ultimate political connection'."

century, trading had formed the basis of the relationship. Although the United States was their major market, West Indian planters hoped that Canada would buy more of their major export--sugar. When prospects of increased sales to the larger American market were good, interest in Canada waned. However, when rejected by the United States the planters and merchants turned their attention to Canada.[2]

One of the earliest moves on behalf of union between the West Indies and Canada occurred in the 1880's. In 1882, the Planters' Bank of Canada was formed by a group of Canadian financiers--including officers of the Sun Life Assurance Company. One of their goals was to promote increased Canadian-West Indian trade relations. Unfortunately, the Canadian government was not receptive to their proposals. And even the threat of an American takeover was not sufficient to convince the prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, that political or economic interests justified Canadian annexation of the islands.

One of Macdonald's chief worries, apart from the opposition of Conservative newspapers, was the question of dealing with the West Indian colored population.[3] Throughout the history of the unionist movement this

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[2]Robin W. Winks, Canadian-West Indian Union: A Forty Year Minuet (London, 1968), is the best account of the subject.

[3]Ibid., p. 19.

problem was raised time and time again. Although most Canadians had little personal experience with blacks, Nova Scotians had reached quite definite conclusions based on first hand knowledge. Partly as a result of Nova Scotia's trading ties with the West Indies, and partly as a result of having a number of blacks living in the province, Nova Scotians were more outspokenly anti-Negro than other Canadians. But the rest of Canada shared with the Nova Scotians the racial prejudices which were common throughout the empire.[4]

In spite of the reluctance of Canada's political leaders to push for territorial expansion in the Carribbean, both government and business showed interest in economic expansion. The Department of Trade and Commerce began sending representatives to the West Indies in 1892, and in 1900 a two-year contract was awarded to a Halifax steamship company by the Canadian government to establish a subsidized steamship service between Canada and the West Indies. In 1905 the contract was extended one year, and in 1906 a further four-year extension was granted. Although there were many complaints about the unreliability and inadequate tonnage of the service, the Halifax company continued to receive annual subsidies from Canada until

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[4]See Berger, The Sense of Power, pp. 116-19, 128-31, 162-63, and 226-30.

1913.[5] Among the Canadian companies established in the West Indies by 1914 were the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and the Sun Life Assurance Company. Recognizing the potential value of the West Indian market for Canadian goods, these companies decided not to be left behind in the scramble for the West Indies; their presence in the islands reflected the Canadian businessman's dream of expanded markets.

Before Canada's confederation in 1867, some Maritime merchants had enjoyed a profitable trade with the West Indies. Restrictive measures imposed by the United States government in the period, 1906-1908, had the effect of promoting increased trade between the maritimes and the West Indies. The maritimes sent cargoes of salt fish, lumber, ground provisions and various manufactured goods to the Caribbean, where they were exchanged for sugar, molasses and rum. Although products from the maritimes never displaced those of Great Britain or the United States in volume, the trade with the West Indies was considered important to the economies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

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[5] Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1909-1918, Vol. 1 (Ottawa, 1967), p. 676; Duncan Fraser, "The West Indies and Canada: The Present Relationship," The West Indies and the Atlantic Provinces of Canada (Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1966), pp. 33-41; Algernon E. Aspinall, The British West Indies: Their History, Resources and Progress (London, 1913), p. 352.

As a result of Britain's adoption of free trade policies in the first half of the nineteenth century the British preference on West Indian sugar was abolished. This action had a dramatic effect on the West Indies, which depended upon sugar exports to buy provisions from the outside world. Lacking a diversified agriculture, the West Indies were plunged into a difficult period of economic, social and political unrest. As a consequence, West Indian trade with Canada became more important for the islands. Although Canadian attempts to negotiate a preferential tariff agreement with the West Indies failed--due to British protests that it would not be in keeping with free trade policy--Canadian governments were not easily dissuaded.[6] Both Macdonald and Laurier continued to show interest in the West Indies.

Macdonald's appointment of Sir Francis Hincks, an ex-Governor of Barbados, as his advisor on West Indian affairs, lent encouragement to the sugar producers at a time when they urgently needed new markets.[7] Britain had begun to import continental, bounty-fed sugar in place of the West Indian product.[8] Therefore, it was natural for some West Indians to suggest that political union with Canada should be considered. Informal discussions were

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[6]Duncan Fraser, p. 34.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

held in the 1880's but nothing came of them.[9] However, commercial reciprocity attracted more support. Although the Colonial Office raised objections to such proposals during the 1880's and 1890's, Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government insisted upon Canada's rights to establish its own tariffs. And, in 1898, Canada asserted her fiscal independence of Great Britain by making a unilateral preferential grant to West Indian sugar entering the Canadian market.[10]

The importance of this agreement for the West Indies was realized in the period, 1903-1914. As a result of America's victory in her war with Spain, the empire of the United States embraced sugar-producing possessions; and in 1903 the American government decided to grant a preference to sugar from Cuba and Philippines while Puerto Rican sugar was allowed to enter the American market duty free.[11] Unable to compete in the United States' market, West Indian sugar producers turned to Canada.

Canadians were not unsympathetic. After the Alaska boundary award, Canada revealed an imperialism of her own, itself a natural extension of Canadian

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[9]Alice R. Stewart, "Canadian-West Indian Union, 1884-1885," Canadian Historical Review, XXXI (December 1950), 369-89.

[10]Fraser, p. 35. [11]Ibid.

nationalism.[12] The plight of the West Indies aroused a humanitarian response which combined happily with Canadian economic interests. In the decade before the Great War, Canadian involvement in West Indian affairs increased dramatically.

When Canada generously granted preference to the sugar-producing colonies, no one imagined how important this move would eventually prove. After 1903 Canada replaced the United States as the main market for West Indian sugar. British Guiana, the largest exporter, sent £800,400 of sugar to the United States in 1901-1902. This figure was halved in each successive two-year period until 1907-1908, when none was sent. During the same time span Canada's imports from British Guiana shot up from £73,690 to £858,800. Between 1903 and 1909, Canada's

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[12]See William Nisbet Ponton, "A United British North America," Canadian Law Review, III (May, 1904), pp. 283-90. Ponton was a Belleville lawyer, registrar of the Canadian Bar Association, president of the Ontario Bar Association and an executive on the Association of Boards of Trade of Ontario. He argued in favour of Canada acquiring Newfoundland, the West Indies, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and Greenland, and asserting her claim to Hudson Bay.

Another Canadian, Dr. Ian C. Hannah, president of King's College (Windsor, Nova Scotia), thought Canada should administer the West Indies: "I am certain that it would be very welcome to Canada's rapidly growing sense of nationality to be entrusted with some of our tropical territory. I can imagine nothing more calculated to make her forget the Alaska boundary and other frontier awards of the same kind . . ." London (Ontario) Times, 26 August 1905, (cited in Canadian Annual Review 1905, p. 492).

total imports of raw sugar from all sources increased by approximately twelve times as much.[13] It was natural that such an increase in trade should be accompanied by the extension of Canadian banking, steamship, and other services.

The first Canadian bank in the West Indies was the Bank of Nova Scotia which established an office in Kingston, Jamaica in 1889. Its main purpose was to serve the Halifax merchants who had West Indian interests. By 1912, The Bank of Nova Scotia had established seven other branches in Jamaica. Soon the bank served not only the import-export trade but also the need for an internal banking service in the Caribbean. One of the bank's principal depositors was the Government of Jamaica. Equally active was the Royal Bank of Canada. In 1910 it had nineteen branches in the West Indies including the Union Bank of Halifax's branch, which had opened in 1902 in Port of Spain, Trinidad.[14]

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[13]See Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Relations Between Canada and the West Indies (London, 1910), p. 7. The report provides useful historical data pertaining to trade and communications.

[14]Ibid., Minutes of Evidence Taken in Canada and Appendices, p. 53-56. The general manager of the Union Bank of Halifax regarded the West Indies as a very favourable field forinvestment; Aspinall, pp. 362-63; Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1910, p. 81; Canadian Almanac and Miscellaneous Directory, 1914, p. 110.

Ten years before the Bank of Nova Scotia opened its first office, the Sun Life Assurance of Canada had begun what was to prove a long and rewarding association with the West Indies. In Barbados, Sun Life established its first branch outside Canada. Throughout the ensuing years officials of the company actively promoted closer relations between Canada and the West Indies. None was more outspoken in this regard than Thomas Macauley, whose efforts to interest the Canadian government in the West Indies were only equalled by Harry Crowe.

Macauley had distinguished himself as an actuary before becoming managing director of Sun Life and, in 1915, he succeeded his father as the company's president. Under his guidance, Sun Life further extended its business in the West Indies. Macauley's efforts on behalf of political union of the Bahamas and Canada were widely publicized. Political and business leaders in both the Bahamas and Canada listened to his views with respect. His own business standing and the commitment of his company to the West Indies lent credence to his persuasive arguments on behalf of union. A believer in the "ripe fruit theory" of empire, Macauley was convinced, after a trip to the Bahamas in early 1911, that the islands were ready to become part of Canada.[15]

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[15]Macauley to Laurier, 20 February 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 668. Knowing his prime minister's concern for

During his visit, Macauley raised the question of union with members of the Bahaman legislature and, on 20 February 1911, he addressed a public meeting at Nassau, on the topic "Union with Canada." In the course of his speech Macauley raised visions of increased trade for the Bahamas and better living conditions which would follow if union was achieved. In order to allay any fears of Canada's motives, Macauley assured the Bahamans that Canadians wished to strengthen the bonds of empire. This meeting resulted in the legislature passing (13 March 1911) a resolution asking for an enquiry into the possibility of confederation with Canada.[16] Although the resolution was of a non-committal nature it appealed to the imagination of many islanders. It seemed to present a solution to the economic upheaval brought on by hurricane damage, droughts, large scale emmigration, and poor crops.[17] One of Macauley's most convincing arguments was that the Bahamas would stand to benefit under the proposed reciprocity agreement being considered by Canada and the United States.[18]

American expansionism, Macauley stressed the importance the Bahamas would have once the Panama canal was opened.

[16]"Resolution of Legislative Council of Bahamas," Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 1, pp. 687-88.

[17]Governor of Bahamas to Colonial Secretary, 4 April 1911, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 1, pp. 686-87.

[18]This belief was not shared by Lord Harcourt, the British colonial secretary, who pointed out that the list

The warm reception which welcomed his speech prompted Macauley to dash off a letter to Laurier the same day. He was afraid that the United States would take over the islands if Canada did not move quickly. Although he was not then ready to advocate the inclusion of all the West Indies in the Dominion, Macauley thought union with the Bahamas a logical first step. Aware of Laurier's eye for the political aspects of his proposal Macauley expressed his belief that such a project would be greeted enthusiastically by Canadians. In this way, interest in foreign affairs would divert attention from pressing internal difficulties during an election year.[19] The controversy surrounding the Canadian naval question would dissappear--Macauley reasoned--when Canadians thought in expansionist terms.[20] Also, by including the Bahamas in confederation, one solved the practical problem of finding a wintering harbour for the Canadian fleet; Canada

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of fresh fruits to be admitted to Canada in the proposed agreement did not include those varieties grown in the West Indies. Colonial Secretary to Governor of Bahamas, 15 April 1911, and Colonial Secretary to Governor General, 20 April 1911, ibid., pp. 688-89, 685-86.

[19]During the previous election campaign a Toronto businessman had suggested to Laurier that the idea of annexing the West Indies would appeal to Canadians. It would have the effect, he thought, of undoing the damage done to Laurier by the loss of Alaska. Harry Symons to Laurier, 12 October 1908, Laurier Papers, Vol. 538.

[20]Macauley to Laurier, 23 February 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 668.

stood to benefit almost as much as the West Indies.[21] Laurier's reaction to this bit of proselytizing was cautious but encouraging. While he thought there were "insuperable obstacles" in the way, he was sufficiently interested to invite Macauley to visit him.[22]

The Canadian prime minister had considered the question of political union on a number of occasions, but he was convinced that distance, climate, and race posed obstacles to such a scheme.[23] Although confederation with Newfoundland seemed to him a more practical consideration, he did not discourage closer Canadian-West Indian

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[21]Macauley to Laurier, 6 March 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 669. See also T. C. Keenleyside to Laurier, 7 April 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 675. Keenleyside, a Winnipeg businessman, reported to Laurier that Elisha F. Hutchings--a prominent wholesale dealer, manufacturer, and financier--had just returned from the West Indies. Hutchings claimed the Bahamas wanted union, and Keenleyside suggested that "nothing will tend to develop Canadian national sentiment more than absorbing into confederation, adjacent British territory such as Newfoundland, Labrador, St. Pierre, and Miquelon, in the St. Lawrence, Greenland, and last but not least, such of the West India Islands as wish to be taken in."

[22]Laurier to Macauley, 3 March 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 668. See also Laurier to Grey, 7 April 1911, Governor General's Numbered Files, No. 4866 and C.O. 42/947. The British were aware of Laurier's interest in the Bahamas and of Macauley's role as information gatherer. Gilbert Grindle, the head of the West Indian Department of the Colonial Office, suggested that the Canadian prime minister "hankered after the Bahamas" and the West Indies in general.

[23]Laurier to John S. Irwin, 16 and 20 February 1905, Laurier Papers, Vol. 355. At this time Laurier did not consider union with the West Indies as being within the realm of practical politics although he recognized that it

relations.[24] His awareness of the possible political implications would not allow him to ignore the strong opinion in favour of Canadian expansion in the Caribbean. For this reason, Laurier expressed interest in a suggestion that Canada develop the West Indies as the United States had Puerto Rico.[25] Recognizing the growing American interest in the West Indies, Laurier wanted to protect Canadian prospects, therefore, he found Macauley's ideas appealing.

Macauley was not content, however, with trying to influence the prime minister. He knew that the idea had to have popular appeal before Laurier would act. With this in mind he worked to interest leading Canadians in West Indian affairs. In the spring of 1911, a Canadian West Indian League was formed in Montreal with Sir Thomas Shaughnessy of the C.P.R. as Honourary President (Macauley himself was president).[26] League membership included

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was "an idea well worth fostering." See also Laurier to George Johnson, 9 May 1905, Laurier Papers, Vol. 365. Johnson was the Dominion statistician.

[24]In the House of Commons on 19 March 1906 Laurier said that Canada was ready to discuss confederation anytime Newfoundland asked. But as far as the West Indies were concerned, while he was willing to extend relations, he was not prepared to invite or encourage political union.

[25]Laurier to James Hutchison, 20 July 1908, Laurier Papers, Vol. 582. Hutchison was president of the West India Electric Company which had its head office in Montreal. The company had interests in Jamaica and Hutchison wanted Canada to annex that colony.

[26]Macauley to Laurier, 20 April 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 677; C.A.R. 1912, p. 115. Winks has an

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representatives of nearly all Canadian businesses with West Indian connections. The League published advertising directories and issued a monthly journal called the Canada-West India Magazine, which concerned itself primarily with trade relations. In addition, the Sun Life Company's monthly publication, Sunshine, was also used to air Macauley's views. He arranged to have the May 1911 issues devoted to the Bahamas, and three thousand extra copies were printed for distribution to influential people in Canada, the West Indies and Great Britain. Along with the copy he mailed to Laurier, Macauley included his assurance that a "quiet but steady campaign" would be kept under way.[27] At least on one occasion Macauley's campaign was resented by Laurier, who complained that while he was at the 1911 Imperial Conference he was being bothered about the question of union with the Bahamas. Macauley's claim that he knew nothing about the people bothering Laurier on this occasion strained the bonds of friendship between them.[28] One of the people who approached the prime

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excellent discussion of Macauley's activities and the Canadian-West Indian League.

[27]Macauley to Laurier, 11 May 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 681. Macauley was convinced that most Canadian newspapers were in favour of union. See also Macauley to Laurier, 20 June 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 684.

[28]Macauley to Laurier, 5 August 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 689.

minister had been an officer of Sun Life. The other stated that Macauley had urged him to see Laurier.[29] Soon after the conference Laurier was no longer prime minister of Canada. Macauley, therefore, had to apply his considerable talents elsewhere.

In all his efforts, Macauley was encouraged by Sir William Grey-Wilson, a cousin of the Canadian Governor General and himself Governor of the Bahamas. Unfortunately he possessed none of the qualities which his cousin brought to Government House in Ottawa. He was a very mediocre official who had enjoyed a "uniquely undistinguished career."[30] In spite of this, and maybe because of it, he decided to work for union between Canada and the Bahamas. He became friends with Macauley during the latter's visit and decided to make a personal visit to Canada later in the year. He was particularly pleased to hear from Macauley that Laurier showed "great interest" in annexation, and he thought the Canadian press was doing a good job of educating the public mind.[31]

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[29]James F. Junkin to Laurier, 19 June 1911, and J. H. Polak to Laurier, 22 June 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 684. Junkin was a well known insurance man. He reached a high rank in Sun Life then resigned in 1892. In 1911, he was in business for himself.

[30]Winks, p. 26.

[31]Grey-Wilson to Macauley, 12 April 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 677.

While in Canada, in October, Grey-Wilson called on Laurier, Fitzpatrick, Borden, and Foster. It was Foster who asked him to speak to the Empire Club of Toronto. Later Sir William claimed that he thought he was speaking before a private club.[32] As it was, he spoke out strongly in favour of political union and, unfortunately, chose to reveal his plan for the franchise. He proposed to eliminate the problem of the "ignorant blacks" simply by putting the qualifications for electors so high as to exclude them; he was willing to accept that this would also shut out some of the whites.[33] While he was speaking a Globe reporter faithfully copied down the speech for a story in his paper the next day.[34]

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[32]Grey-Wilson to Gilbert Grindle, 23 November 1911, C.O. 42/949, p. 168.

[33]Sir William Grey-Wilson, "Bahamas, West Indies, Canada," Empire Club Speeches (Toronto), 1911-12, pp. 40-47. The governor's racist views were apparently popular with his audience: "I say that a white woman in the Bahamas, in the most isolated position, is as secure to-day as if she were in this room now. (Applause.) I defy anyone to say that about the Southern States of America. Now, gentlemen, why is that? It is not because we have treated the blackman as the equal to the white; no. He admits himself the most intelligent of them with whom I have spoken, he admits himself that he is the white man's inferior; but it is because, being a child race, we have extended to him, as we have to all the other races of the Empire, that universal answering British justice which is our common heritage. (Applause.)"

Similar sentiments had been expressed by Sir Daniel Morris, the Imperial Commissioner of Agriculture for the British West Indies, in his speech "West Indian Recollections and Conditions," before the same branch of the Empire Club on 20 September 1907. Empire Club Speeches 1907-08, pp. 21-27.

[34]Toronto Globe, 27 October 1911.

When news of Grey-Wilson's speech reached the Colonial Office it was not long before Harcourt demanded a full report from him. Gilbert Grindle, the West Indian expert at the colonial office, thought that the governor had no business discussing the franchise or the color question before the Empire Club.[35] If there was any doubt as to the veracity of the Globe report of the speech, it vanished a month later when Grey-Wilson told Grindle, "It is important that Canadians realize that the Bahaman negro in no way resembles his brother the desperado of the Southern States."[36] Harcourt's assessment of Grey-Wilson's behaviour was a classic in succinctness: "The man is an ass, and had better realise that we know it."[37] Grey-Wilson was allowed to retain his office even though his judgment could not be trusted. Therefore, by necessity as much as policy, the Colonial Office was to oppose any immediate plans for union between Canada and the Bahamas. Macauley's task had been made more difficult but not impossible for he had to convince the Canadian government, not the Colonial Office.

Successive Canadian governments had become increasingly independent of the Colonial Office. The vestiges of a colonial status rapidly disappeared as both

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[35] C.O. 42/949, p. 164.

[36] Ibid., p. 168.

[37] Cited in Winks, p. 27.

Laurier and Borden defined Canada's new relationship with the mother country.[38] And the new government of Sir Robert Borden was no less favourable to closer trade relations than the old.[39] Throughout his term of office, Borden quite consistently favoured closer political and economic ties with the West Indies. He saw several advantages accruing to Canada. These included: greater influence in world affairs through increased territory, greater self-sufficiency of the Canadian economy, a larger market for Canadian products, and increased importance of a Canadian navy. In forming his views on the West Indies, Borden was influenced by Harry Crowe, who had worked so hard on behalf of union between Canada and Newfoundland.[40] Crowe visited the Caribbean colonies, as he had Newfoundland,

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[38]Grey-Wilson's speech appears to have little, if any, contrary effect on Canadians' attitudes. Saturday Night, 11 November 1911, reported finding unionist sentiment.

[39]Aspinall, pp. 413-14; Aspinall to Borden, 10 October 1911, Borden Papers, Vol. 132. The date of Aspinall's interview with Borden was 29 September.

[40]Borden to Perley, 2 and 3 June 1916, Documents On Canadian External Relations, 1909-1919, pp. 714-15. It seems safe to assume, based on Aspinall's evidence, that Borden felt this way in 1911. Perley, advised Borden to discuss the union question with someone having more responsibility than Crowe and more closely connected with the government over whom Borden could exert more control. He did, however, consider the question important and reported that Bonar Law thought that Britain would not interfere. See Perley to Borden, 27 June 1916, Documents on Canadian External Affairs, Vol. 1, pp. 716-17.

and returned with glowing reports of the advantages of confederation. In spite of the setback his efforts on behalf of Newfoundland had sustained, Crowe maintained his belief in a "Greater Canada" which would include all British colonial possessions in and near North America. After 1909 Crowe concentrated his efforts on behalf of West Indian annexation for he thought that Newfoundland would allow the lead of the sugar colonies. Although fellow members of the Canadian West Indian League had abandoned the goal of political union by 1919, Crowe received sufficient support to convince him that political union was still practicable.[41] Also among those favouring political union after 1914 were Joseph Pope the under-secretary of state for external affairs and Leopold S. Amery who was to become the British Colonial Secretary.[42]

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[41]Crowe to Borden, 13 September 1916, Department of External Affairs, File 176E.

Crowe expected that Newfoundland would follow the lead of the West Indies. See also Crowe to Borden, 30 August 1916, Department of External Affairs, File 172B; Crowe to Borden, 1 April 1919, Borden Papers, Vol. 584.

[42]"Confidential Memorandum Upon the Subject of the Annexation of the West India Islands to the Dominion of Canada," State Papers, Working Files, 31 January 1917, Department of External Affairs. Pope saw the inclusion of the British West Indies as compensation for Canada's loss during the war. After all, he argued, Canada should share in the "fruits of conquest." He thought that the advantages in terms of power and self-sufficiency outweighed disadvantages such as distance and the Negro question. An added advantage, he argued, would be that union with the West Indies would facilitate union with Newfoundland. Pope had earlier expressed interest in confederation with

Another who interested himself in the annexation of Newfoundland and the West Indies to Canada was Governor General Grey. As early as 1905, Grey had expressed interest in drawing Canada and the West Indies closer together; but after burning his fingers in the Newfoundland election of 1909, Grey moved cautiously.[43] In 1910 he suggested to Laurier that Canada's first cruiser, the Niobe could be used to promote West Indian interest in Canada. A visit by the Canadian governor general on board a Canadian warship would strike the imagination of the West Indian people (Grey thought) and cause them to look to Canada rather than the United States. As one of the first uses of the new Canadian navy Grey claimed that this plan would prove popular even in Quebec.[44] Never one to stifle his

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Newfoundland. Pope to Grey, 8 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 2.

See also, Amery to Borden, 19 August 1918, Documents on Canadian External Relations, Vol. 1, pp. 717-18. Like Crowe and Grey, Amery thought on a grand scale. He envisioned a "Greater Dominion of British America" which would include "Newfoundland, the Bermudas, the West Indies, and even, if you liked to have them thrown in, the Falkland Islands." Borden replied that he thought the union question deserved much consideration. Borden to Amery, 4 September 1918, ibid.

Later, Amery thought that Canadian efforts would be employed to better advantage on Newfoundland. Crowe disagreed. See Crowe to Borden, 7 February 1921, Borden Papers (Past 1921), Folder 80.

[43]Grey to Governor of the Bahamas, 13 June 1905, Governor's Internal Letterbooks, 1839-1909, Vol. 17.

[44]Grey to Laurier, 22 June 1911, Grey Papers, Vol. 5.

sense of the dramatic and love of ceremony, Grey persisted unsuccessfully in his attempts to win Laurier's permission for the visit. This was eventually obtained since the Liberals were sensitive to Opposition criticism of Canada's new navy. To allow the Niobe to lie idle in Halifax would expose the government to ridicule. In addition, as Grey pointed out, the ship's crew needed experience.[45] Lord Crewe, the colonial secretary, approved of Grey's plan, but the British Admiralty did not. The Admiralty maintained that, until the status of the Dominion navy was defined, the Niobe should remain in Canadian waters. In a last unsuccessful attempt to win support for his proposal Grey suggested that his visit would help create public opinion in favour of faster steamship service between Canada and the Caribbean.[46]

Over the years, the question of steamship service had been raised repeatedly. The Royal Commission appointed to examine trade relations between Canada and the West Indies in 1909 investigated the history of the service and concluded that both Canada and the West Indies had cause for complaint. The principal causes of complaint in Canada involved the unpredictableness of the steamers, inadequate

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[45]C.O. 42/940 and C.O. 42/946.

[46]Grey to Harcourt, 10 December 1910, and 6 January 1911, Grey Papers, Vol. 16.

accommodation, lack of care in transit, and delay at Halifax involved in shipments to St. John. The West Indians complained about the poor quality of the steamers, high rates, and uncertainty of available space. The commission recommended that a fast efficient service would have to be established to overcome the advantages the port of New York enjoyed in terms of geographical proximity and the presence there of large commission houses. Aware of the importance of the need for an improved steamer service the commission called upon the British government to continue its share of the subsidy.[47] However, the British withdrew their support for the subsidy and Canada decided to assume full responsibility. This decision had the advantage of allowing Canada a free hand in determining the ports of call.[48] A new agreement was negotiated during 1912 with Pickford and Black which came into effect on 1 July 1913 and ran for a period of one year. The steamship company agreed to provide four boats to sail every four days at an average of twelve knots. The Canadian government subsidy was for $250,000 a year, a sum which indicated the serious commitment of Canada to improved relations with the West Indies.[49]

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[47] Royal Commission Report, 1910, pp. 29-37, 48-50.

[48] C.O. 42/948.

[49] London Times, 30 April 1913.

It was the above report of the Royal Commission which laid the foundation for the important 1912 trade conference held in Ottawa. However Canada did not rush to the conference table after the Royal Commission Report had been published in September 1910. Practical considerations dictated that Canada should wait until, as the Report had suggested, "any three or more of the larger sugar-growing colonies would participate."[50] This recommendation reflected the Canadian government's official stand and received special support from Laurier's minister of finance, William S. Fielding. As a member of the Royal Commission, Fielding had not shown any great enthusiasm for closer ties between the West Indies and Canada. He had reluctantly accepted the role of Canada's chief representative on the Commission. It was only after Laurier urged him that Fielding accepted the appointment. In exasperation Laurier likened Fielding to a "pup which will not face water and had to be thrown in."[51] The British, aware of Laurier's difficulties with his minister, resolved to keep Fielding "up to the mark."[52] This news

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[50] Royal Commission Report, 1910, p. 23.

[51] Grey to Crewe, 3 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 15; Fielding to Laurier, 7 July 1909, Laurier Papers, Vol. 582; during his budget speech (20 April 1909) Fielding had told the House that he was not sure who would represent Canada on the Commission. He was in favour of Canadian membership and declared that Canada wanted "to encourage trade with the West Indies." House of Commons Debates, p. 4582.

[52] Crewe to Grey, 22 May 1909, Grey Papers, Vol. 15.

no doubt pleased Lord Grey, who considered Fielding a procrastinator both in finance and in politics. Although he had been asked to accept the appointment as early as May 1909 Fielding made excuses, claiming that affairs in Canada would keep him busy in Ottawa. As it was, he waited until the last moment before consenting to serve and purposely missed the commission hearings held in Jamaica.[53] All this seemed very strange to the British, for Canada had initiated the proposal for a Royal Commission.[54]

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[53]C.O. 42/931. The British chose to treat this as accidental; Crewe to Governor General, 4 August 1909, Documents on Canadian External Relations, p. 679.

[54]Crewe to Grey, 3 October 1908, Governor's Internal Letterbooks, 1839-1909, Vol. 42; C.O. 42/929; Canada's interest in a Royal Commission grew out of the investigations of a commission sent by the Boards of Trade of Halifax, Toronto and St. John to the islands in 1907. This commission recommended closer trade relations, and improved steamship and telegraph communications. And before Laurier left for the Colonial Conference of 1907 he received a memorandum from the Halifax Board of Trade advocating preferential trade with the West Indies.

The following year the Canadian deputy minister of trade and commerce attended an intercolonial conference in Barbados. He was accompanied by a former president of the Halifax Board of Trade who was also an experienced West India merchant. The Canadian Government proposed that a Royal Commission should be appointed to consider the question of reciprocity.

See, Aspinall, pp. 406-08; Royal Commission Report, 1910, p. 40; C.A.R. 1907, p. 366; House of Commons Debates, 1909, p. 4581. Fielding claimed that Britain had asked Canada "to join a commission of inquiry to be appointed by the British government. . . ."

After the report was published Fielding waited for the West Indies to make the next move.[55] By November 1911, reciprocity had been accepted in principle by Trinidad, Barbados, British Guiana, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica and Montserrat. Only Grenada deferred action. At this time a new government was in power in Canada under Sir Robert Borden. Both Borden and his minister of trade and commerce, George E. Foster, were keenly interested in Canadian-West Indian affairs, and they responded favourably to Harcourt's request that a conference be held to conclude an agreement as recommended by the Royal Commission.[56]

While the British very much favoured a trade agreement, they wisely decided to let Canada work out the terms alone. Officials in the Colonial Office, did, however, think that British sugar merchants should be represented at the conference. With this in mind, Algernon E. Aspinall, the Secretary of the powerful West India Committee in London, was informed of the negotiations. It was expected that Aspinall would promote the conference through the Committee's circular. These expectations were

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[55]Minutes of the Privy Council, (No. 2429) 2 December 1910.

[56]C.O. 42/949; 5 November 1911. Laurier's minister of trade and commerce, Sir Richard Cartwright, had expressed himself in favour of "as near an approach to Free Trade with the West Indies as possible." Cartwright to Grey, 6 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 7.

confirmed, for Aspinall had hoped that Canada would take the lead in initiating negotiations.[57] Thus Britain worked at an unofficial level to further Canadian-West Indian trade.

Few conferences start under such favourable circumstances. The Royal Commission of 1910 had laid the groundwork for an agreement which all parties favoured. Sir Robert Borden had indicated his desire to improve trade relations with the West Indies, and Britain allowed him a free hand.[58] It only remained for the West Indians to journey to Ottawa to work out the details of the agreement.

When the conference opened on 31 March 1911, the only cloud on the horizon was the threat of American retailation.[59] This same cloud had hung over the meetings of the Royal Commission and accounted in large part for the absence from Ottawa of Bermuda, Jamaica, and British Honduras. The economic dependence of these colonies upon the American market was too great to jeopardize. This fear was not unwarranted. It was while the Royal

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[57]Aspinall to Laurier, 9 June 1911, Laurier Papers, Vol. 683.

[58]Aspinall, p. 413.

[59]C.A.R. 1910, p. 114. In March, the New York Produce Exchange issued a circular stressing that the United States offered a larger market for West Indian goods than Canada and could make effective protest.

Commission was in the West Indies that the American tariff had been revised and provision made for a maximum United States duty of 25 per cent ad valorem over and above the general tariff on the products of any country discriminating against the United States. The commissioners had noted that while there was a general desire for closer relations with Canada throughout the West Indies this was tempered by fear of American reprisals.[60]

To some Canadians it seemed more than coincidental that the United States Senate Committee on Finance should hold hearings on the House Free Sugar Bill while the Canada-West Indies conference was in progress. One amendment to the bill was especially threatening. It provided for retaliation if the United States flour or other trade with the West Indies was discriminated against.[61] The Toronto Globe (10 April 1912) claimed that this amendment was aimed at the negotiations in Ottawa and revealed that a prominent New York lawyer representing American milling interests spent several days in Ottawa endeavouring to block the grant of a preference to Canada. Fortunately he did not receive a sympathetic hearing. The West Indian colonies represented in Ottawa had little to hope for from the United States since, as Foster pointed out

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[60] Royal Commission, 1910, p. 29.

[61] Ottawa Evening Journal, 2 April 1912.

in his welcoming address, the United States had tropical possessions of her own to supply most of her needs.[62]

For Foster, the 1912 conference was something of a personal triumph since he had journeyed to the West Indies in 1890 in an unsuccessful attempt to interest the islanders in a trade agreement. Although several events, including American expansion and Canada's grant of preferential treatment, had influenced the change in West Indian attitudes, Foster stressed the larger market that Canada could offer.[63] An enthusiasm for the future of Canada-West Indian relations led him to strike a note of imperialism at the final banquet held in Toronto:

> We do not know what may happen in the long future before us, we do hope that no less cordial relations will ever exist now between us and if, in the opinion of both countries, at some time in the future without compulsion, without trying to announce the hour before the hour arrives, we can decide upon closer relations and more binding relations, I believe we will be able to find a way by which that can be methodically and practically carried out. In the meantime, let us make the best of what we have.[64]

Like Foster and other Canadians, the Montreal Star read more into the conference than appeared on the surface. Before the conference opened the Star had emphasized the importance the Panama canal would have for the Caribbean

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[62]Canada-West Indies Conference (3 George V Sessional Paper No. 55, 1913), Ottawa, 1913, p. 4-5.

[63]Ibid., p. 89.

[64]Ibid., p. 90; Toronto, Globe, 11 April 1912.

when it opened. As a result, the Star warned, the Americans were showing growing interest in the area.[65] Although steamship services were at the crux of the trade problem the Montreal editor saw the commercial arrangements as leading in turn to closer political bonds between Canada and the British colonies in the future. So successful was this conference that by its end the Star was asking its readers if Canadians had "the stuff of which Imperial peoples are made?" The editor had visions of a new framework of Empire, a Canadian Empire which would embrace islands in the Caribbean. The case of Newfoundland was cited as an example of lack of vision on the part of Canada and the Star earnestly hoped that the treaty negotiated in Ottawa would be written by Empire-builders, not bargain hunters.[66]

In 1913, the Canadian-West Indian Reciprocity Treaty was passed. Its terms reduced duties on sugar and granted a preference of 20 per cent on other products. The West Indians in turn reduced duties on Canadian flour and allowed a 20 per cent preference to a list of manufactured goods. Canada also undertook to subsidize a direct mail and passenger steamship service. As a result of this treaty, a significant increase in trade was noted

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[65] 30 March 1912.

[66] 10 April 1912.

at the end of its first year in operation. Canadian exports to the West Indies, especially flour, increased while West Indian exports to Canada were almost three million dollars more than Canada's to the West Indies.[67]

Although Canada remained a poor third behind Great Britain and the United States in terms of imports to the West Indies, Canadian businessmen continued to hope that the Caribbean market would expand. The continued and increased presence of Canadian banks in the area indicated that Canadian finance regarded it as profitable for investment.

Memories of Alaska and the threat of American expansion created in Canada a desire to play a greater role in the West Indies after 1903. Individual Canadians as well as the government had shown an increasing desire to assume responsibilities in the Caribbean. For some this was a logical first step in the creation of a new British Empire. For others it seemed the most natural and rewarding area for Canadian expansion. By 1914 Canadian-West Indian relations were firmly and formally established.

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[67]Watson Griffin, Canada and the British West Indies: Report on the Possibilities of Trade Under the Preferential Tariff Agreement (Ottawa, 1915), pp. 10-11.

CHAPTER VII

CANADIAN EXPANSION 1903-1914: SOME CONCLUSIONS

After 1903 Canada moved through a period of expansion which was terminated by the first World War. This expansion took the form of exploring, patrolling, and asserting jurisdiction in Hudson Bay and the Arctic. It also accounted for Canada's interest in projects for the inclusion of Newfoundland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the British West Indies in the Dominion. Motivated mainly by fear of American expansionism and the belief that Britain had repeatedly sacrificed Canadian interests where the United States was involved, Canada adopted a more independent course in foreign relations thereafter.

The idea that Britain was more interested in a rapprochement with the United States than she was in protecting Canadian interests gained popularity, especially among nationalists in Canada. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was among the leading proponents of such a view, after the Alaska boundary award was decided. Four years later, in April 1907, Laurier made it obvious that the award still rankled him. On the ocassion of Ambassador Bryce's

appearance before the Ottawa Canadian Club, during his first official visit to Canada, Sir Wilfrid chose to remind the audience that Britain had yielded Canadian territory to the United States a number of times in the past. It was apparent, the prime minister thought, that Canada had little to gain from British diplomacy where the United States was involved.[1]

In commenting on Bryce's visit, the Toronto News summed up the views of many Canadians:

> If he gets to the root of our national feeling he will find that there is a deep and general contentment with the Imperial connection, and we are as eager as any British Minister can be for good relations with Washington, but that we distrust British diplomacy in its dealings with the United States and feel that we should be the final arbitrators in all diplomatic agreements which effect the commercial and territorial interests and legislative autonomy of Canada.[2]

By the end of his "first pilgrimmage" to Ottawa, the ambassador must have been impressed by the "sentiment of a self-respecting, vigorous nationality" which Grey had warned him, was growing in Canada.[3] The governor general

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[1] Addresses Delivered Before The Canadian Club of Ottawa 1903-1909, p. 27; Ottawa Evening Journal, 2 April 1907.

[2] 2 April 1907. The managing director of the News at this time was John S. Willison a "liberal imperialist" and, later, member of the Round Table movement. Like other Canadian imperialists he believed that "Canadian interests had been sacrificed by British diplomacy." Berger, pp. 41, 173 and 250.

[3] Grey to Bryce, 31 January 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 7.

was aware that Canadians sought some indication that Britain recognized Canada's nationality and would "attach as much importance to safeguarding the rights and promoting the interests of Canada as to cultivating the friendship of the United States."[4] Again, after Bryce's visit, Grey wrote to him in the same vein. A suggestion had been made that a commission should be appointed to investigate the diplomatic negotiations of the Ashburton Treaty and the Alaska boundary award.[5] The purpose Grey surmised, was to "prick the bubble which at present fills the Canadian horizon. The idea that Canada has been sacrificed again and again by John Bull in his desire to cultivate the friendship of Uncle Sam, is rooted so deep in the conviction of Canada that nothing I can say, nothing you can say, nothing any Englishman can say will uproot it. Our only chance is to get the pickaxe into Canadian hands."[6]

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[4] Ibid.; Grey to Elgin, 9 April 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 14. See also Gluek's "Pilgrimmages to Ottawa. . . ."

[5] "Letter to the British Ambassador at Washington," 8 April 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 7. Grey mentions "Fisher" as the originator of this suggestion. It is likely he meant Sydney A. Fisher, the minister of agriculture, whose department was responsible for the public archives. The idea was to have the Dominion archivist Arthur G. Doughty and other academics destroy the idea that Canada had been a sacrificial victim in Anglo-American diplomacy.

[6] Ibid.

The governor general's desire was not shared by his principal adviser.[7] Sir Wilfrid never forgot the Alaska boundary award. Throughout the remainder of his period in office, he referred to the need for Canada to protect her own interests. He was conscious of what he called "the development of the Canadian idea and the advancement of Canadian unity."[8] In a speech before the Ottawa Canadian Club, a few months after the Alaskan award, Laurier insisted that Canada's colonial status "carried no inferiority with it."[9] So confident was he of the country's future that he claimed the twentieth century for Canada. Among those present in the audience were the governor general, Robert Borden, and a future prime minister of Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King. Borden and King were to make their own contributions to Canadian independence in due time.[10]

Surprisingly, Laurier received support for his ideas for a stronger and more independent Canada from Earl Grey. It was Grey's contention that Canada was "destined one day to be the rudder of the Empire."[11] Never one to

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[7]Grey to Bryce, 14 October 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 7.

[8]Canadian Club Speeches, 1903-1909 (Ottawa), pp. 11-16.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Grey to Laurier, 9 June 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 5.

suppress his convictions, Grey told Laurier that he wanted to "consolidate Canada, unite the Empire and strengthen the Entente Cordiale with France and the United States."[12] With this in mind, he urged Sir Wilfrid to take the lead in Imperial evolution, especially the separation of the self-governing dominion and the crown colonies.[13] Laurier was receptive to his ideas, Grey believed, but hesitated out of regard for Fielding's opposition.[14] Therefore, Grey decided to try to win Fielding over to his views. In reporting this attempt to Laurier, the governor general said: "It was certainly a surprise to find myself as an Imperialist Governor General engaged in an endeavour to plant in His Majesty's Canadian Minister of Finance a proper respect for the dignity and status of Canadian nationality."[15]

Grey indeed had high aspirations for Canada. Like other imperialists in Canada and England he saw no need to separate the goals of Canadian nationalism and imperialism. One day, he prophesied, there might be a "Palace for the King" in Ottawa.[16] He contended that

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[12]Grey to Laurier, 2 March 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 3.

[13]Grey to Laurier, 28 April 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 4.

[14]Ibid [15]Ibid.

[16]Grey to Laurier, 9 June 1910, Grey Papers, Vol. 5.

"Canada must one day--if the Empire is held together--become the strongest part."

For the most part, Canadian nationalists and imperialists had no difficulty reconciling their ideas. The distinction between the two was vague and they often found themselves supporting similar policies. Many of the speeches made before the Canadian Clubs would have been enthusiastically applauded at the Empire Clubs. And moderate nationalists such as Laurier had no difficulty working on Canada's behalf with imperialists like Grey.

It was their shared attitudes toward the United States which, more than anything else, drew the nationalists and imperialists together. Fear of American expansion lay at the base of Canadian nationalism. The same fear prompted imperialists like the governor general to advocate a retaliatory expansion by Canada. Grey was critical of much that was American especially what he considered to be their selfishness and greed:

> What do you see in the United States to-day? A people who for 133 years have in their uncontrolled individualism subordinate public duty to self interest, to an extent which caused their chief executive officer Roosevelt, to realise that they were rushing headlong into material as well as moral Bankruptcy. . . .[17]

Once the Americans realized the resources of Canada, Grey warned, it "would excite their cupidity and make them

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[17]Grey to W. T. Stead, 9 March 1909, Governor General's Papers (Personal Correspondence), Vol. 107(4). Stead was the editor of The Review of Reviews.

anxious, having squandered their inheritance, to share ours."[18] This was also Laurier's fear.

The Canadian prime minister maintained that he had always shown the greatest consideration for the United States.[19] It was a consideration which he did not feel had been returned.[20] In particular, he was bitter about the "inexcusable action of the United States in appointing the three political partisans as jurists of repute" on the Alaska boundary tribunal.[21] Yet the American action and the subsequent award rallied Canadians behind their prime minister by crystalizing national sentiment. After Alaska, Laurier was not only able, but expected, to plot a more independent course for Canada. With Alaska the United States lost their chance to win Canada and "kicked into Canada a National Spirit."[22]

The threat of Canada's eventual absorption by the United States appalled most Canadians. Since Confederation,

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Grey to Bryce, 7 and 26 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 8; see also Laurier to Grey, 29 May 1911, Grey Papers, Vol. 5. Canada had always been a good neighbour to the United States, Laurier claimed.

[20] Grey to Bryce, 26 December 1907 and 13 June 1910, Grey Papers, Vols. 8 and 9.

[21] Grey to Bryce, 26 December 1907, Grey Papers, Vol. 8.

[22] Grey to Crewe, 8 December 1908, Grey Papers, Vol. 15.

overtures in this direction were made frequently enough to reinforce the belief that American manifest destiny had not run its course. American politicans it seemed had a peculiar penchant for making ill-timed proposals regarding Canada's future as part of the United States.[23] When such proposals were made, they only served to strengthen old Canadian hostilities and prejudices towards America. Always sensitive to their position in relation to the United States, Canadians were inclined to exhibit a form of "national paranoia." This fear was articulated by some of Canada's most prominent men including Laurier.

Sir Wilfrid was a Canadian nationalist. His preference for British over American institutions in no way indicated that he was an imperialist.[24] However, he

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[23]Early in 1903, at a time when Canadians were particularly sensitive to American territorial aggrandizement, a United States Congressman introduced a resolution requesting Roosevelt to find out if Britain would dispose of all or part of Canada. He thought that the United States should expand into contiguous territory. See Montreal Star, 27 February 1903.

There were many other such proposals before the war but the one that received the most publicity was probably "Champ" Clark's. James Beauchamp Clark, leader of the Democratic party in the House of Representatives, declared: "We are preparing to annex Canada." This statement made in the course of discussion on a proposed reciprocity treaty in Canada. See Montreal Gazette, 15 February 1911; Edgar McInnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto, 1947), p. 403; Creighton, p. 435.

[24]Neatby, "Laurier and Imperialism," Canadian Historical Association Report 1955, pp. 24-32, claims that Laurier was a "moderate imperialist." However, Neatby defines imperialism in a very narrow sense. He only

was an astute practical politican and realized that Canada's destiny was entwined with that of both the United States and Great Britain. He was also aware of the strong pro-British and anti-American sentiments shared by many of his fellow citizens in the Dominion. Unwilling to alienate any substantial group of voters, Laurier made good use of two of the tools of his trade--procrastination and ambivalence.[25] Political realist that he was, he refused to adopt a nationalist stance until public opinion demanded such an attitude. The reaction to the Alaska boundary settlement provided the opportunity to strengthen Canadian nationality.

Canadian expansionism was at heart defensive. Confederation had been brought about by men like Sir John A. Macdonald who feared that the United States wanted to annex Britain's remaining colonies in North America. Similar fear had prompted him to assert Canada's manifest destiny in the Northwest.[26] Although Laurier shared

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considers what he calls "intellectual imperialism" rather than racial or emotional imperialism.

[25]Paul Stevens, "Wilfrid Laurier: Politician," The Political Ideas of the Prime Ministers of Canada, ed. Marcel Hamelin (Ottawa, 1969) elaborates on this view of Laurier.

[26]Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian North-West: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Toronto, 1965) is the authoritative work on this subject.

Macdonald's misgivings, where American expansionism was concerned, he was reluctant to act until he was sure of popular support. This was provided by the diplomatic events affecting Canada in 1903.

Canada lost Alaska but increased her sense of nationality. Motivated by strong nationalist sentiments. Canada embarked upon a new phase of expansion. Under Laurier and Borden, the Dominion asserted her sovereignty in the Arctic, made overtures to Newfoundland, tried to acquire St. Pierre and Miquelon--as well as Greenland--and promoted closer relations with the West Indies. By 1914, Canada's destiny seemed to stretch not only from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but also from the Arctic to the Caribbean.

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This thesis is based primarily on manuscript sources, public records, and newspapers contemporary with the period described. The principal materials are collections of documents to be found at the Public Archives of Canada.

Personal Papers

Among the most useful personal papers were those of the prime ministers and governors general. The massive Laurier collection continues to prove an invaluable source to students of Canadian history. Like the Grey of Howick papers, it is relatively easy to use and, in spite of Laurier's reluctance to commit himself in writing, it provides clues to Sir Wilfrid's behaviour and the influences upon him. The Borden papers are also extensive and have been computer indexed. They reveal Canada's interest in the West Indies in particular.

Both Minto and Grey were astute observers of the Canadian scene. Although they were not completely impartial, the governors general were well informed and their papers provided some of the richest material for this

study. In their letters to the colonial secretary and others in England Grey and Minto recorded much of the behind-the-scenes activity in Ottawa.

The papers of some of the lesser personalities are disappointing. The Bernier, Farrer, and Ponton papers were of little value. All the relevant Bernier letters are to be found in the Laurier collection. The Smith papers were useful mainly to indicate the relationships existing among Montreal businessmen, federal politicians and influential Newfoundlanders. Of even greater value in this regard were the Fitzpatrick papers. They revealed aspects of the movement for union between Canada and Newfoundland not available elsewhere. The papers of three of the most prominent members of the Department of External Affairs--Joseph Pope, Oscar Skelton and Loring Christie--support the contention that the Alaska award had a long-ranging effect on the determination of Canadian foreign policy.

One important collection necessary for an understanding of Newfoundland affairs is the Bond papers. Unfortunately I could not obtain permission to use them. They are in the possession of Professor Frederic F. Thompson of Kingston.

Official Sources

The Public Archives of Canada has microfilmed the records of the colonial office concerning Canada. The series C.O. 42 contains a great amount of material relating

to Canadian expansionism. It is comprised of despatches between the governor general and the colonial secretary. Much of this correspondence is contained in the Records of the Governor-General's Office (R.G. 7). However, it is worthwhile to consult both.

Another group (C.O. 194) illuminates events in Newfoundland. Microfilm copies of F.O. 5 were also found to be useful. This series consists of the correspondence between the British minister at Washington and the foreign secretary.

Fortunately for students of Canadian foreign policy, the department of external affairs has recently adopted a thirty year policy governing access to their records. These files, with only a few exceptions, have now been transferred to the custody of the Public Archives. In addition, the department is publishing a series of volumes entitled "Documents on Canadian External Relations." These volumes are arranged chronologically.

In preparing the chapters on Canada's interest in the Arctic, I made extensive use of the Annual Reports of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Records of the police during the period 1900-1914. The latter collection rewards the effort necessary to track down subjects in the files. During this period the interior department shared much of the responsibility for asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. A large collection of this

department's papers have also been preserved and were enlightening.

Throughout the preparation of the thesis the official reports of debates for both the House of Commons and the Senate of Canada were consulted, as were the Records of the Privy Council and the Sessional Papers.

Much of the material on the West Indies was in the form of the official reports of the royal commissions and trade conferences.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Newspapers and periodicals form an indispensible source for any study of public opinion. Many Canadian newspapers are available at the Public Archives. However, in dealing with Newfoundland I was only able to consult the files of the St. John's Evening Telegram which supported Bond. Fortunately there were numerous clippings from other island papers included in Governor MacGregor's despatches home and in the Laurier, Minto and Grey papers.

Canadian newspapers consulted included: Halifax Chronicle, Manitoba Free Press, Toronto Globe (Liberal); Edmonton Bulletin (Independent Liberal); Halifax Herald, London Free Press, Montreal Gazette, Montreal Star, Ottawa Citizen, Toronto Mail and Empire, Toronto World (Conservative); Ottawa Journal, Toronto News (Independent). Foreign newspapers were also examined. The most important of these being The Times and The New York Times.

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