THE IRRESOLUTE YEARS:
AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL OPINION.
TOWARDS JAPAN
1937- 1941

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JUSTIN HARRIS LIBBY
1971

 

   
    

 
 

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

—-———‘—v

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

The Irresolute Years:
American Congressional Opinion
Towards Japan
1937-1941

presented by

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

 

 

Date April 30, 1971

0-7639

 

ABSTRACT
THE IRRESOLUTE YEARS:
AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL OPINION

TOWARDS JAPAN
1937-1941

By
Justin Harris Libby

From the outbreak of the Second Sine-Japanese War
on July 7, 1937, initiated by the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident, the American Congress became immersed in a four
and a half year dispute over what the prOper response of
its Government should be to that aggression. Legislative
opinion divided over how best American interests might
be served; some Congressmen argued for a halt to Japanese
expansidn in Asia, even if such action increased the
risks of war, while others maintained a pacifistic
position, preaching peace at any cost. A result of the
intense debate that ensued was to create, in Congress,
three loosely constructed groupings of members, each
advocating its own version of America's role in Asia
and American-Japanese relations specifically. It must be
stressed that the legislators, although classified by
this study into particular factions, did not necessarily
view themselves as members of any cohesive, or formally
constructed unit. To the contrary, frequently they shared

little in common in either domestic matters or foreign

Justin Harris Libby

policy issues exclusive of an agreement over how the
United States ought to meet the challenge of renewed

war in Eastern Asia. The Congressmen referred to in

this study as the anti-Japanese group advocated economic
embargoes and sanctions as the remedy for thwarting

Japan while non-interventionist members on the Hill
proclaimed that a policy of detachment, if not appeasement,
would preclude any armed conflict between the United
States and Japan. The non-interventionist Congressmen
were divided, one segment supporting a defense of
traditional neutral rights in Asia and a second segment
demanding the total withdrawal of civilians and military
forces from areas where American and Japanese soldiers
might clash. From 1937 until 1941, Congressional thinking
oscillated between those Congressmen willing to resist
Japanese aggression and those hoping for a rapprochement
via a less dogmatic and doctrinaire foreign policy.

This examination into Congressional opinion relied
heavily upon the Congressional Record of the 75“ through
the 77“I Congress first session, which was exhaustively
consulted. The New York Times also proved indispensable
for giving an inclusive survey of the speeches and issues
of the late thirties and early forties. Relevant articles
appearing in various periodicals provided further useful

information, and of particular value were Christian

Justin Harris Libby

Centur , Literary Digest, Nation, New Re ublio, and X1321
Speeches or The Day. The Manuscript collections of
Senators William E. Borah, Tom Connally, James Hamilton
Lewis, Charles McNary, George Norris, Key Pittman, Lewis
B. Sohwellenbach, Elbert Thomas, Arthur Vandenberg and
Representative Louis Ludlow gave important insights into
the opinions and positions of these men. The Papers of
President Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and R. Walton
Moore all aided in revealing the views of the Executive
branch towards Japanese-American affairs and the relation-
ship of the Administration to the legislature on this
issue. The materials in the Senate Foreign Relations and
House Foreign Affairs Paners within the Legislative
Division of the National Archives contained the corre-
spondence of Congressmen who had definite opinions on
matters relating to Japan. Finally, the Manuscript
collections of Roger Sherman Greene and the American
Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression,
by exposingthis pressure group's attempts to create
anti-Japanese sentiment on Capitol Hill, helped to
establish a definite link between the members of Congress
supporting embargoes on exports, especially war materials,
to Japan.

This study has concluded that Congressional opinion
towards Japan changed fundamentally during the years

Justin Harris Libby

1937 to 1941. At first Congress was fragmented over what
policy America should implement but, in the aftermath of
the outbreak of war in EurOpe in 1939, the dispute between
the factions on the Hill slowly began to dissolve. By the
summer of 1941, with Hitler's victories in Europe and
Asia succumbing to the Japanese, Congress began to show
signs of increasing impatience with a policy of neutrality.
Nevertheless, there were a sufficient number of Congress-
men still committed to the hope of ameliorating the growing
enmity between the two nations to prevent passage of any
anti-Japanese legislation. But a profound change had
occurred in Congressional thinking towards Japan by the
summer of 1941. No longer were there three distinct
groups holding separate plans for the United States to
follow in Asia. Instead, the moderate position had almost
dissappeared, its members frequently joining the ranks of
the anti-Japanese forces which had continued to grow in
strength. The Administration, increasing its activities
against Japan during the summer and fall of 1941, found
approval and support for this policy in Congress and
correspondingly few disclaimers against its more militant
stance. Yet Congress found no consensus over this issue
until Japan, herself, provided the solution at Pearl
Harbor. On December 7, 1941, Congressional opinion had
finally reached unanimity, brought together by the very

1 issue, Japanese aggression, that had kept it divided so

long.

THE IRRESOLUTE YEARS:
AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL OPINION
TOWARDS JAPAN

1937-1941

By

Justin Harris Libby

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1971

(:)Copyright by
JUSTIN HARRIS LIBBY

1971

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have become indebted to many scholars, archivists,
and librarians in the course of this study. In particular,
I wish to thank Mrs. Patricia Dowling of the State
Department Archives, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
for her very kind and patient introductionto the relevant
files she knows so well. In the Legislative Division of
the National Archives, Buford Rowling and his staff were
more than helpful in facilitating reserach in the Senatg
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Forgign Affairs
Committee Pagers. Congressman Charles Chamberlain (R.
Michigan) was most cooperative in seeing that I had the
necessary clearance to view the latter collection. At the
Manuscript Division in the Library of Congress, the expert
staff headed by Horace F. Hilb were very kind and efficient
and I wish to thank the Director of the State Department
Historical Division, Dr. Arthur Kogan, for granting the
clearance to view the Hull Papern for the years not open
without permission at that time. Former Senator Burton K.
Wheeler was kind to answer various queries and I wish to
thank former Senator and now a member of the House of
Representatives, Claude Pepper, for an enjoyable afternoon
on Capitol Hill which detracted from his busy schedule.

ii

u

’1...

I owe a profound indebtedness to James Damaslos of
the Littauer Center Library and Rodney Dennis of the
Houghton Library, both of Harvard University, for their
assistance in reviewing the papers of the American
Committee For Noanarticipation In Japanese Aggression
and the Roger Greene MSS respectively. Mr. Dennis was
extremely helpful in getting Professor John K; Fairbank's
permission to see the Greens collection which entailed a
concerted effort to locate Dr. Fairbank in Cambridge.

The Roger Greene MSS was used in this study by permission
of the Harvard College Library.

At theFranklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,

New York, Mr. Joseph Marshall and his staff, Mrs. Anne
Morris, Mr. Robert Parks, and two unsung workers, Mr.
Andre Greedan and Edward Hall, made my research enjoyable
and productive. A special thanks to Mr. Parke is rendered
not only for his knowledge of the archival material but
his never ceasing enthusiasm in searching out relevant
materials.

I would also like to express gratitude to the staff
of the William.L; Clements Library, University of Michigan,
Ann.Arbor, Michigan, for their graciousness while
researching the Vandenberg collection. In Indiana, Miss
Virginia Mauck and Mrs. Wilma Etnier of the Lilly Library,
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana were most helpful
in reviewing the Ludlow MSS. At Butler University,
Indianapolis, Indiana, nre. Pauline Croft and Mrs. Vera

111

Schornhorst have been exceedingly kind in allowing me
the use of the library facilities of that university.. A
special thanks to Mrs. Patricia Miller of the Indiana-
Purdue University Library in Indianapolis who has been of
great assistance in getting materials not in that city.

I also wish to thank Professors Walter Gourlay and
Paul Sweet of Michigan State University for their concern
and indulgence with this study. Dr. Madison Kuhn's
knowledge of the New Deal era has been most helpful
throughout this endeavor and his criticisms were greatly
appreciated. The warmest acknowledgement goes to Dr.
Warren I. Cohen, an indulgent teacher, an untiring
scholar whose example, knowledge and inspiration has
helped make this study possible. To my wife, Judith,
I owe the greatest debt for enduring me and the
dissertation these many months while maintaining a sane
household.

iv

Introduction:

Chapter I:

Chapter II:
Chapter III:
Chapter IV:

Chapter V:
Chapter VI:

Chap ter VII:
Cone lus ion:

31131 iographical
BB 8 ay:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1

The Opposition Forms 4
The Policy or Accomodation 33

Anti-Japanese Sentiment Matures 79

The Controversy Between Peace
And Honor 10?

Congressional Opinion Hardens 137

The Ant i-Japanese Pressure

Increases 164
The Search For Consensus 191
233
237

INTRODUCTION

The attack on Chinese forces at the Marco Polo

Bridge in 1937 initiated the closing phase in the
disintegration of American-Japanese relations. For
nearly one hundred years there had been a tradition of
friendship between the two nations, characterized by a
visa ion of the United States in the role of teacher with
Japan playing the pupil. If this portrayal of the bond
between these two Pacific neighbors had ever been based
upon reality, such notions were rapidly dispelled when
Japan emerged as the predominant power in Asia in the
Twentieth Century.

Nonetheless, Japan's entrance as a world power did
not Seriously jeepardize amicable relations for the first
“’0 decades of the Twwtieth Century. In the aftermath
°f World War I, she sought friendly relations with most
c"ul'l‘btries, withdrawing from Siberia, returning Shantung
to china, signing the Washington Conference treaties, and
pledging to support the tenets of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact ‘to outlaw war. Yet underneath the guise of conforming
to western dictates and moral judgements, the Japanese
churned to be a recognized major power and gain additional
territories for economic exploitation and military security.

1

The impact of the depression in Japan provided a
catalyst for releasing these repressed feelings of
frustration. In addition, fearing the impact of Chinese

nationalism in Manchuria, the Japanese struck on the night
of September 18, 1931, to deprive China of that province.
By this act, Japan actualized her plans for revising the
status quo in Asia. One year later, "the country of the
Manchus", Manchukuo, had been established. Meanwhile,
under her Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, America
began a policy of non-recognition which remained unaltered
throughout the 1930's. Japan's announcement of the
"Arnau Doctrine" in 1934, along with her intention of
withdrawing from the obligations of the Washington
Conference treaties, furthered the decline of confidence
betWeen Tokyo and Washington.

After these events, Japan spent the next few years
consolidating her position and taking few actions that
might provoke additional distrust or animosity. During
this relatively quiescent period, Congress' attention was
fre(ll—lently diverted from Asia by the depression at home
and the instability in Europe threatening world peace.
No1; until Japan's expansion into North China in 1937 did
Con'g-‘t‘essional focus shift westward across the Pacific
Ocean, raising questions over the type and degree of
Ame3'~‘1<:an response to this renewal of the Sino-Japanese
War. Pressured by the mounting tension of events, some

me
mbers of Congress began a determined campaign against

Japan. Their efforts to embargo trade touched off a
lengthy debate on Capitol Hill which lasted until the
final months of 1941, dividing Congressional Opinion over
almost all aspects of American policy in the Far East.
This study shall examine the nature of the controversy
that ensued from 1937 until Pearl Harbor, ascertain the
proponents of each significant segment of Congressional
opinion and whenever possible, identify the motives which

induced the legislators to reach such disparate views.

CHAPTER I
THE OPPOSITION FORMS

During most of the crucial five year period preceding
American entry into World War II Congressional opinion
towards Japan coalesced around three separate, distinctive
attitudes concerning the growing menace to the independence
and integrity of the countries in Asia. For the sake of
convenience, those members of the Congress who shared a
similar view of Japanese-American relations shall be
considered together as a group even though, at the time,
they may not have referred to themselves as such: nor did
they necessarily exhibit cohesiveness on issues other
“3‘11 those relating to foreign affairs. Tracing the
deve lopment of these groups from 1937 to 1941, dis-
tinguishing their main features and showing how they
interacted seems to be the most appropriate method for
diaeerning overall Congressional Opinion since the ideas
represented by these groupings are inclusive enough to
take into account almost every shade of opinion. In
Order to discover the concepts basic to each group and
than to categorize appropriately the Congressmen and the
P91113193 they advocated towards Japan, their attitudes
Will be carefully analyzed. Acting as a catalyst were a
number of crucial issues spanning this five year period:

4

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937; the sinking
of the American gunboat gang on December 12, 1937: the
revision of the Neutrality Legislation in November, 1939:
the termination of the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty
of 1911 on January 26, 1940: Japan's signing of the
Tripartite Pact on September 26, 1940; passage of Lend-
Lease on March 11, 1941: and finally the freezing of
Japanese assets in the United States on July 26, 1941.

A mistrust of Japan's intentions in Asia, frequently
verging on hostility, characterized one segment of
Congress which shall be referred to as the anti-Japanese
group. Initially dominated by Western Democrats, including
Senators Key Pittman (Nevada), William H. King (Utah),
Lewis B; Schwellenbach (Washington), and Representative
John M. Coffee (Washington), these Congressmen denounced
Japaneseaggression following the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident. Their object, to effect a total embargo of
trade , would eventually force Japan to end what they
°°n8 idered to be her brutal war in China. They spent the
next four and a half years trying unsuccessfully to
°°nvince their colleagues Japan's war machine could be
crippled, if not completely halted, by economic reprisals.
In 1:ihne, this alliance received strong support from other
Dem° crate including Claude Pepper (Florida), Theodore

G
139311 (Rhode Island), as well as Congressmen H. Jerry

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Voorhis and Byron Scott both of California, and Charles
I. Faddis of Pennsylvania.

Except for belonging to the Democratic party and
coming from the West, the Congressmen comprising this
original anti-Japanese movement had little else in common
to explain the cohesiveness of their attitude towards
Japan. Frequently, even the motives for their hostility,

when they could be determined, differed from man to man.
From the outset of hostilities in North China, one of the
Senate's leaders, Key Pittman, maintained a severe and
outspoken criticism of Japan. Born in Vicksburg,
Mississppi, on September 19, 1872, Pittman had attended
Southwestern Presbyterian University in Clarksville,
Tennessee before migrating westward. After Spending five
Years in the Klondike, he settled in TonOpah, Nevada in
1902 - Sworn into the Senate on January 29, 1913, after
be ing elected to fill the unexpired term of George S.
Nixon, Pittman served his adopted state as a member of
the Upper House for the next twenty-seven years.1

In the first years of his senatorial career, Pittman

Beld°m spoke out on foreign policy issues. Until 1920,
he v0 ted as a loyal Democrat, supporting Wilson's use

\
lJudson C. Welliver "The Triumph Of The South,"

M

\Eggsex's Magazine, XLIX (Aug. 1913), pp. 731-743; 1310-

Rifle, ica Directory Of The American Congress, 1774-1961

as §§hgton: G.P.O., 9 7, D. 14621; Hereinafter cited
thical DirectorLOf The American Congress.

of armed forces in Mexico and the note to Germany
following the sinking of the Lusitania. In reward
for his loyalty, he gained appointment to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 1916.2 The
Senator liked to think of himself as an "insider" to
the President's circle of advisors, claiming to have
" - - .broken the shell that has been thrown around the
President."3
Though deluded in his importance and closeness to
Wilson, Pittman's speeches, during the months leading
up to American involvement in World War I, supported all
Of 'Wilson's plans and policies and called for an end
to Prussianism even if it necessitated American blood
and treasure to save the free world.4 In the contro-
Versy concerning the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles, Pittman preferred no compromise on Wilson's
Peace Plan, but on March 19, 1920, realizing reservations
Were going to be attached, the Nevadan voted for the
treaty in that form against the wishes of the President.

He jOined twenty Democratic colleagues who "...felt that

\

Uni 2Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln:
versity of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 34-36.

3Ibid., p. 35.

Apri 4U.S., Congress, Senate, 6‘5m Cong., 1st sess.,
l 4, 1917, Congressional Record, LV, 251.

 

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the interests of the country, the world, and the life
and happiness of the President requires that we vote for
the ratification of the treaty with reservations."5
With the Democrats out of the White House and
nearly out of power in Congress during the 1920's,
Pittman focused most of his attention on domestic benefits
for Nevada, a theme never lost sight of by a man who
believed a shift of only one hundred votes could deny
him his "re-employment" on Capitol Hill.6 More critical
on domestic and foreign policy since these were Republican
measures, he found Opportunity to confront the Adminis-
tration with partisan Opposition.
When a decision had to be made in foreign policy,
Pittman's position on an issue indicated his adherence
to the Wilsonian views of American participation in
world events. Throughout the twenties, Pittman governed
his actions on these principles, voting for such
°ollective security measures as the Five Power and Nine
POWGI‘ Pacts emerging from the Washington Conference and
later in the decade the Kellogg-Briand Pact, while
\
5Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 40-41.
62149.. p. 47.

rejecting the Soviet Union's bid for recognition.7 On
only one issue, American-Japanese relations, did Pittman
vary from this pattern. Disliking Japan, the Senator
dismissed collective security concerns to vote against
the Four Power Treaty that also emerged from the
Washington Conference. He did so, as he later remarked,
out of fear Japan might gain hegemony in the Pacific if

the Treaty was ratified.8 Always the politician,
Pittman objected to the prOposed treaty with Great

Britain, France and Japan for the same reasons Lodge
had

it

used in his attack on the League of Nations, that

could interfere in domestic affairs of the nation.9

7For Pittman's voting pattern, consult: For the

Five Power Treaty, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67tn Cong.,
2nd sess., March 29, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII,
4718-4719 and for the Nine Power Treaty see Ibid., March
30, 1922, 4784; Pittman's affirmative vote for the Kellogg-
BT—‘iand Pact may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, '70th

011g" 2nd sess., January 15, 1929, Congressional Record,
133K3i, 1731; His view of Russia may be ascertained in
Key Pittman, "The United States And Russia—Obstacles To
Egeognition Of Present Soviet Regime," The Annals Of The

erican Academ Of Social And Political Science, CXXVI
( July. 19235

 

1L , pp. 131-133; Hereinafter cited as the
%.
Q 8Joseph H. Baird, "Key Pittman: Frontier Statesman,"

W. L (July. 1940). pp. 310-312. Baird
ognc ude t at ittman's dislike of Japan was the result

1? two circumstances: the Senator's long residence on the

Aac ific Coast and his longer service on the Senate Naval
ffairs Committee.

9Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman. p. 48.

10

Roosevelt's landslide in 1932 catapulted Pittman
into national prominence as Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. ironically, during this

next decade, when the Democrats were back in power with
a pro-Wilsonian President residing in the White House,
Pittman retreated from collective security and became
more timid in foreign relations. Prone to frequent
outbursts of temper that were abetted by a rising use
of alcohol, he began slowly to evade the responsibilities
of his new Senate position. Earlier in his career,
Ongnizant of his incessant craving for alcohol, Pittman
recognized that in his surrender to a gnawing desire to
escape from responsibility and himself, he had been a
drunkard for years.10 He lived in a twisted world and
as Fred L. Israel has stated, "About twice a month

P ittman would go out on a binge and get himself

133.8Lstered."11 During committee meetings in the thirties

he would sip whiskey, consuming about a pint of alcohol
per day.12 In this condition he issued statements which

embarrassed the Administration and the country.13 The

 

\
10_I_b_i_g.. p. 42.
11M” p. 132.
12.12.12:
p. 131mm,, p, 144; New York Times, December 21, 1935.

 

8 and December 22, I935, p. 24.

11

result of his deterioration into an incessant drinker
brought failure to comprehend the intricacies of foreign
relations, and he could not lend statesmanlike direction
to the Administration's foreign policies. Reinforcing
this lack of leadership was a certain provincialism on
t11£3 part of the Senator. Israel has suggested:
Pittman's statesmanship ended at Nevada's

frontier and he defended his state against

all adversaries, even the general welfare
of the United States.l4

While serving his tenure as Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, he sought consensus and
compromise of the volatile issues, reluctant to anger
or firmly Oppose powerful non-interventionists in his
00mmittee. Among the members to nearly intimidate
P11: ‘Innan were Hiram Johnson (R. California), Arthur
va-leic'ienberg (R. Michigan), Arthur Capper (R. Kansas),
William E. Borah (R. Idaho), and Henrik Shipstead
( Farm-Labor. Minnesota). In dealing with these men,
P1‘|=".'man invariably emphasized his own weak position
and overestimated the power of his Opponents. Eventually
this tendency became so pronounced that Pittman's
leadership was reduced to ineffectiveness, leaving his
committee adrift in never ending controversy.15

\

“Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. vii.
P- 15Ibidu PP. 155-173: Wayne 8. Cole, Senator Gerald
\Uh Nxe Aid—American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis:
Jo Varsity of Minnesota Press, 19 2 , p. 100: Manfred
Conaa, Isolationism In America 1 -l l (Ithaca:
I3151911 University Press, 19635, p. 211.

12

As the issues of the 1930's came before the Foreign
Relations Committee, Pittman was either too ineffective
or too intoxicated to be of assistance. In 1933, while

considering whether the President should have authority
to upose embargoes against an aggressive nation, Pittman
fa :Lled to get Roosevelt the discretionary powers the
ilcaazrinistration desired.16 In 1935, he remained mute on
the floor of the Senate during the World Court battle
yet voted for the prOposal.17 During the same year he
was too intoxicated on one occasion to give any leader-
ship during crucial consideration of mandatory versus
discretionary neutrality legislation.18 Each failure
re inforced his inadequacy as chairman, resulting in
increased consumption of alcohol. The vicious cycle
c(Diri'tinued until his death in 1940.

But on one issue in the 1930's Pittman did not

remain mute; his dislike of Japan intensified as the

 

 

\
16Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman. P. 133; Pittman's
giew of Neutrality Legislation can be consulted in Wayne

19. Cole, ”Senator Key Pittman And American Neutrality

‘ Olicies, 1933-1940," Mississppi ValleLHistorical Review,

Z£§33VI (Mar. 1960), pp. 6112662; Also, "Pittman And
entrality," Current History, L (Nov. 1939), p. 6.

17Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. 136.
181bid., p. 142.

13

decade progressed. Retaining his fear of Japan that
had originated following World War I, Pittman, in 1930,
opposed ratification of the London Naval Treaty on the
grounds it would give Japan preponderance in the Pacific.19
Later he was frankly to remark that ultimately Japan
wanted to force the United States into a defensive war

in the Pacific .20

On February 11, 1936, Pittman's wrath
towards Japan reached near hysteria. In a bitter attack
on the Government and the people of Japan, he condemned
that nation's aggressions in Manchuria for ending Chinese
sovereignty and violating the agreements made with the
United States contained in the Nine Power Treaty and the

21

Keil.?J.ogg-Briand Pact. The Japanese Foreign Office and

Press called the outburst incredible and the New York

 

W severely criticized Pittman in an editorial the
fcllowing day. Labeling Pittman "...a man without
krAowledge of his responsibilities as Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee", the editorial
c31:18.rs.cterized him as angry at his own policies and
\

19New York Times, July 12, 1930, p. 1.

20
Ibid. December 21 1 . 8 and D b 2
1935’ p. .. , 935. p ecem er 7,

1‘ , 21Ibid. February 11, 1936, p. 8; "Eastern Asia,"
7721*, MIT (Feb. 24, 1936), p. 26: U.S. Congress, Senate,
Re Cong., 2nd sess., February 10, 1936, Con ressional
W LXXX, 1703-1708 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 755
57ggéé12nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII,

l4

confused by shallow sentimentality over China.22

The Senator's sympathy for China took an ingenious
turn when it induced him to promote the Silver Purchase
Act of 1934 that was designed to boost the price of silver
and thereby restore the purchasing power of the silver
currency countries like China. This policy to raise the
dollar price of silver failed to produce the hOped for
effects and instead resulted in the collapse of prices,
banks and finally the abandonment of the silver standard
altogether in China. Ultimately these events led to a
contraction of Chinese silver purchases from American
8 ilver states like Nevada. So narrow was the lens
through which Pittman viewed international relations,
and so intense had his dislike of the Japanese become,
the Senator could only blame their incursions in China
1' 01:- the debacle in the silver market rather than
I‘ecognizing the inherent weaknesses of the silver currency
DI‘Oposals.23 This feeble attempt to keep the door Open
in China and at the same time promote the silver interests
in Nevada revealed two of the fundamental motives behind
Pittman's actions in foreign policy during the 1930's and
\
22New York Tipgg, February 12, 1936, p. 20.
problzsfiflq For a scholarly appraisal of this silver
E em see Dorothy Borg, The United States And The Far

Pistern Crisis Of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University
988, 94:13:90 2’30

0“

15

explained why he could not achieve a balanced view of
American-Japanese relations.24 Despite his emergence
as an early Opponent of Japan, long before the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident, Pittman ended up espousing the
right cause but for the wrong reasons.
Throughout the crucial years prior to his death
in 1940, Pittman, acting as the Administration's liason
to the Foreign Relations Committee, continued to provide
totally ineffectual leadership, hindering American efforts
to formulate and implement policy. Beyond disliking
Japan for her violations of the Nine Power Treaty to
which he constantly referred when attacking that nation,
Pittman never revealed any more than a superficial
kl'lowwledge of affairs in Asia nor could he intellectualize
his reasons for his enmity against Japan. Unlike many
or his colleagues on Capitol Hill within the anti-
Japanese group who represented constituencies with
8'tFII':ong prejudices'against Japan, Nevada had none or few
Japanese residents. If the basis for Pittman's dislike
or Japan remains cloudly, there is no doubt of his
hoatility, attested to by his irrational attacks on that

heat ion, occurring particularly while under the influence
or alcohol.

\

Be “For Pittman's promotion of Western silver interests

"Se Israel, Nevada's Ke Pittman, pp. 75-95:,Key Pittman,

A Ghould The Price Of Sigver Be Re lated By Government
1lion," Congressional Di set, X Nov. 1931), pp. 270-272.

16

In his dislike of Japan, Pittman was not alone.
Two Democratic Congressmen from Washington State,

Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach and Representative John
M. Coffee shared these anti-Japanese views. Born east
of the Mississippi River on September 20, 1894, Schwellen-
bach moved to Spokane with his parents from Superior,
Wisconsin when he was eight years old. Graduated from
the University of Washington Law School in 1917 , he was
elected to the Senate in 1934 after a career of teaching
at ‘the University of Washington and practicing law in
Seattle. Unfortunately for the anti-Japanese forces, on
December 10, 1940, Schwellenbach resigned his Senate seat
111 order to accept a federal judgeship for Eastern
Washington. Following World War II, he became President
Truman's Secretary of Labor, a position he held until his
a~ea‘th on June 10, 1948, in Washington, D. C.25

Schwellenbach's dislike of the Japanese originated

fl‘Om his concern over Japan's encroachment on Alaskan
BaSLmon fishing grounds near Bristol Bay. As early as
1935, the Japanese Imperial Diet had appropriated 89,000
yen for the purpose of examining fishing possibilities

26

or 1‘ the Alaskan coast. Since over 100,000 persons

\
1) 25Bio ra hical Director Of The American CO ress,
° 1571; New gork Times, November 8, 1934, p. 8.

26W. June 20, 1937. p. 7.

17

along the Pacific seaboard earned their living from the
salmon industry, Schwellenbach was deeply apprehensive
about this new Japanese fishing activity although his
anger did not match that of Congressman William I.
Sirovich (D. New York) who, in an inflammatory statement,
suggested the United States send the Army, Navy and Air
Force to get rid of the Japanese in the area surrounding
Bristol Bay.27 When the Japanese fishermen began using
floating canneries near the bay, Schwellenbach's distrust
of Japan increased, and in the spring of 1937. he began
making anti-Japanese statements in the Senate.

The consistency of Schwellenbach's views regarding
Japan did not extend to foreign policy in general. While
campaigning for election to the Senate in 1934, Sohwellen-
bach stated that were were begun by a "...world wide
combination known as the munitions trust that is constantly
alert to the possibility of forcing the nations into war."28
He believed the trust made its profit from the sale
of munitions but had a more sinister characteristic as

well. If it could not induce "...the boys of one nation

to kill the boys of another nation", it made no profit.

a

27Literar Di est, oxxv (Feb. 19, 1938), p. 5:
Epwsweek, XIV (Dec. 25, 1939). p. 25.
28Consult draft of speech in 1935 found in

Schwellenbach MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Ongress, as ngton, D. C.

18

Therefore, it spread its insidious prOpaganda in the
hOpe of increasing profits by having one nation warring
on another nation.29 But a few years later in 1939, when
the repeal of the arms embargo came under debate in
Congress, Schwellenbach exhibited a decisive change of
attitude. Observing that the non-interventionists had
been incorrect in their claim that the sale of munitions
had pushed the United States into World War I, he added:

Their argument that the furnishing of munitions

will get us into war is not sound. Judged by the

standards of the last war, this again is not

sound. Every word of testimony before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee went to prove it was

not munitions but other goods which led us into
the last war.30

Representative John M. Coffee concurred with
Schwellenbach's mistrust of Japan. Elected to the House
in 1936, Coffee became one of the leading anti-Japanese
spokesman in the lower house. A native of Tacoma, the
freshman Congressman, in defense of the fishing interests,
voiced his concern against a Japanese menace. Coffee
assumed, as did Schwellenbach, that any salmon spawned
in American waters belonged to the United States. Moreover,
he firmly believed the flag and the Constitution followed
the fish wherever they went, and they deserved the

292221-

30"Remarks by Honorable Lewis B. Schwellenbach On
Neutrality Legislation," in Schwellenbach MSS.

19

protection of the American Government.31

This salmon controversy solidified Coffee and his
colleague's dislike of Japan, and their correspondence
to the State Department contained criticisms of the
Secretary Of State, Cordell Hull, and his advisors, for
their slowness in reacting to the violations of American
fishing territory.32 When the fishing season ended, the
controversy subsided. But for Schwellenbach and Coffee
the resentment remained, and they became increasingly

belligerent towards Japan in the ensuing years.33

 

31New York Times, February 13, 1938, p. 2; For the
same belief consult the comments by the Commissioner of
the Bureau Of Fisheries, Frank T. Bell, in Ibid., July

25, 1937, p. 1.

32The correspondence between Coffee, Schwellenbach
and the State Department may be found in U.S. Department
of State, State Depappment File, 711.000/N. Pacific,
National Archives, Washington, D.C. In particular,
consult, 711.008/N. Pacific 22, March 4, 1937; 711.008
March 24, 193 ; 711.008 N. Pacific

N. Pacificl$4,
June 9, 3 ; 11 008 N. Pacific , une
937.

111,008/N. Pacific

33The State Department's attempt to find a solution

to the dilemma and uphold American rights can be found in
the following State De artment File: Grew to Hull, 111.0081
N. Pacific 166, u y 9, 37; FDR to Hull and ROper,
211.0087N. Pacific/152, July 14, 1937; and a conversation
betweenSchwellenbach, Dooman, and Sayre, 111.008/N.
Pacific[2%, March 9, 1937. See also 26th Annual Report Of

e ecre ary Ofigpmmerce l 8 (Washington: G.P.O.,'19387,
p. 97; The note from Rooseve t to Hull and ROper may also be
found in "Japan, 1933-1945," folder, OF-l97, Box 1,
Franklin D. Roosevelt MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York. The following memorandum and
correspondence are revealing of the Government's position
as well: Welles Memorandum, July 13, 1937: Roper to FDR,
July 21, 1937: Roper to FDR, July 23, 1937: Hull to FDR,
July 31, 1937, all found in "Japan,l933-l945," Of-197,

  
            
   

..'

20

Of all the anti-Japanese members of the Congress,
Senator William H. King (D. Utah), had been on Capitol
Hill the longest. A Western Democrat, born in Fillmore
City, Utah, on June 3, 1863, he represented that state
for nearly thirty years as a Congressman, being elected
to the House in 1897 and then to the Senate in 1917.

After attending Brigham Young University and the Universi-
ty of Utah, he was graduated from the University of
Michigan School of Law in 1887. Prior to his political
career in Washington, he served as a Mormon missionary

in England from 1880 to 1883, and later was an Associate
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court.34

In the 1920's King favored American involvement in
international programs typified by the League of Nations,
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.35 A man who spoke his mind
on an issue throughout his career, King posed formidable
Opposition to those who advocated constricting American

36

foreign policy. Casting an affirmative vote for the

a

Box 1, FDR MSS. See also Hull to FDR, July 17, 1937 and
R. Walton Mbore to FDR, November 24, 1937, "Japan," folder,
PSF, Box 13, FDR MSS.

34Biographical Directory Of The American Con ress,
P. 1168; Who Was Who_ln America (4 vols; Chicago: A. N.
Marquis Co., 1950), II, p. 300.

 

35New York Times, April 26, 1927, p. 8 and January 8,
1929, p. 20

36"A Caribbean Comedy," Independent. CXVIII (Mar. 26.
1927), p. 329.

21

Five Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty which he
called a "magnificent gesture",37 he broke this pattern

by voting against the Four Power Treaty. Unlike two other
opponents of this same treaty, Borah and Johnson, King was
unconcerned over the implied threat of an entangling
alliance. His rejection of the treaty rested on the fear
it would guarantee Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean

38

and on the mainland of Asia. Moreover, he did not

believe the treaty would stand if the four powers became

embroiled in a crisis or if an encounter strained their
39

tenuous relationship with one another.
Earlier, King had rejected Japan's call for an

equality article in the covenant of the League of Nations,

remarking:

If Japan insists upon equality for her citizens
in immigration that simply means that either
Japan or the United States will not be a 40
signatory to the League of Nations compact.

 

37New York Times, March 31, 1922, p. 2.

38For King's voting on the Washington Conference
treaties consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd
sess., March 24, 1922, Con ressional Record, LXII, 4497:
March 29, 1922, 4718-47 ; arc , , 4784. See also
flpw York Times, January 8, 1922, p. 2.

39New York Times, December 11, 1921, p. 4 and December
29, 1921, p. 2.

40Ibid., March 16, 1919, p. 3.

22

Recognizing that the issue was central to Japan's

honor, King could still not allay his concern that if

the article was inserted into the covenant and then

signed by the United States, a possibility might arise
whereby the League could interfere in American immigration

41 A rather farfetohed assumption producing

policies.
little danger of League intervention in American domestic
affairs, it nevertheless caused King to remain adamant
in his rejection, and portended, in 1919, the extent
to which his anti-Japanese prejudices would color future
foreign policy decisions.42 But throughout the decade,
despite these sentiments, King still hoped for some
rapprochement between Japan and the United States, even
calling upon the Executive and the Congress to convince
the Japanese they had nothing to fear from America.43
Whereas his Opposition to Japan continued to
increase throughout this period, King was, at the same
time, evidencing strong friendship for China. Desirous

of ending all unequal treaties in that nation, he voted

against the Chinese Customs Tariff Treaty and America's

41Ibid.
421bid.
43"A Condemnation Of United States Naval Policy,"

Current Histor , XXII (May. 1925), pp. 167-177; New
Re ublio, XKV (Feb. 2, 1921), p. 271.

 

 

 

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23

participation in fixing Chinese tariff schedules,
negotiated during the Washington Conference. In protest
against what he termed insincere expressions of
friendship for China, the Utah Democrat rebuked the
treaty as "...an infringement upon the rights of China
and of her sovereign authority."44 He demanded removal
of the tariff chains and acceptance of China as an equal
member into the community of nations.45 In 1926, King
worked for removal of American warships from Chinese
waters as well as American "imperialists" from that

46 Two years later, calling for recognition of

country.
the Nationalist Government in order to foster Sino-
American amity, King remarked that recognition would
help stabilize conditions in China and nullify any

communist activities.47 By 1931, King's pro-Chinese
sympathy had become mixed with his dislike of Japan
whose aggression against China forged King into a

dedicated member of the incipient anti-Japanese movement

in Congress throughout the next decade.

44New York Times, March 31, 1922, p. 1; U.S. Congress,
Senate, 67“ Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional
Record, LXII, 4790.

45U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March
30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4789-4791; The vote
on the tariff treaty can befifaund in Ibid., 4791.

46New York Times, February 17, 1926, p. 10.

47Ibid., July 10, 1928, p. 5.

24

Following what he termed Japan's violations of
Chinese sovereignty in 1931, King asked for an economic
boycott against that nation.48 Three years later,
continuing his crusade, he called for impartial embargo
powers for the President and for an investigation of
Japanese actions in Manchuria and the alleged accusations
that Japan was fortifying the mandated islands under her
control in the Pacific Ocean.49 The investigation, he
insisted, was not to threaten Japanese interests but to
preserve the territorial integrity of China and to insist
on the observation of international agreements since the
League of Nations had only given Japan the Pacific islands

in trust not as outright possessions.50

 

48%., January 319 1932, P0 250

49Ibid., January 9, 1935, p. 3; See Senate Resolution
154, U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., June 17,
1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 9415-9416. It was
referrEd to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
never reported out. Impartial embargo power was studied
by the State Department but the department informed
Pittman that neither Hull nor his advisors had reached
a conclusion on the matter. See R. Walton Moore to Walter
Lamb, Clerk of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
State Department File, 811.1131556, January 25, 1935:
Moore was a ormer ongressman from Virginia and served
from 1919 to 1931. He was appointed Aesistant Secretary
of State as a replacement for Raymond Moley and served as
Congressional liason from 1933 until his death on February
8“ 1941. In 1937. he became State Department Counselor
'but kept his communication channels Open to Congress.

50

 

New York Times, January 9, 1935, p. 3.

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25

NO public record of King's initial reaction to the
renewal of Japanese hostilities in North China in 1937
exists, but after the sinking of the gunboat Pana , there
remained little doubt as to his views. Dismissing any
moderate policy towards Japan, King stated the time had
passed for believing the Japanese assurances and promises
that they would not violate American rights in China again.51
That view never varied while King was in the Senate.
Unfortunately for the anti-Japanese movement, King failed
to win the Democratic party's primary election for re- _
nomination to the Senate in 1940. The Administration had
not forgiven King, a ranking member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, for helping to block the President's court
reorganization attempts in 1937,52 and hailed his defeat
as a victory for the New Deal.53

The only Senator not representing a constituency from
west of the Mississippi River was Claude Pepper (D. Florida).

4

51%.! December 14, 1937’ Po 180

52James T. Patterson, Con ressional Conservatism And
The New Deal: The Growth Of The Conservative anIItIon In
Ctiress 1 - exington: University 0 entuc
Press, 19 , pp. 7-127.

53New York Times, November 7, 1940, p. 16 and
November 21, 1920, p. 2. The issue of Japan does not
seem to have influenced the electorate since King was
considered a Senator to be purged. His purge also
provides an interesting commentary on the Administration's
priorities.

 

 

 

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Graduated from the University of Alabama in 1921 and the
law department of Harvard University three years later,
Ibpper had worked in a steel mill, taught high school,
instructed in law at the University of Arkansas and
commenced private practice in Tallahassee in 1925. On
November 4, 1936, he was appointed to the Senate to fill
the unexpired term of Duncan U. Fletcher. In his campaign
for the party's endorsement, Pepper used the theme, "It
is time someone in authority got in to do some fighting
for the poor white man in the South."54
A strong supporter of Roosevelt's domestic and
kareign policies, Pepper's liberal ideas contradicted
Iris conservative dress and campaign oratory. On the
Senate floor, his Speeches were considered honest and
E31.noere by his colleagues, though at times his eloquence
‘NEis marred by grandiloquent phrases and gestures. During
IliAS tenure in the Senate in the late thirties Pepper
Ile‘ver exerted the same degree of influence on foreign
I><>licy'as his fellow Democrats Pittman, King, Schwellen-
bach, and Elbert D. Thomas, yet he consistently presented
13119 Administration's international views to the Senate.

()1me source in Washington considered that to be the reason

 

 

.__‘___
54glggraphical Directory Of The AmericangpngreBS,
€E‘. ‘1443; "Pepper V. Sholtz V. Wilcox," Time, XXI (May. 29
938), P. 90

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27

why his influence was lessened amongst his colleagues.55

Once reaching the Senate, Pepper soon joined the
anti-Japanese movement, but his motivation had less to
do with long established antipathy towards Japan than
with fear that the growing menace of Hitler in EurOpe
would have dangerous ramifications for American Far
Eastern policy. As a delegate to the Inter-Parliamentary
Union at the Hague in 1938, Pepper had the Opportunity to

visit Germany. In Munich he saw Hitler and remarked that

the leader of Germany seemed incapable of any sentiment.56

When Hitler declared war on Great Britain and France,

Pepper believed Japan would increase her aggressive

activities in China and especially in Southeast Asia.57

*

55Patterson, ggngressional Conservatism And The New

.lfléégl, pp. 325-327; Time, XXXVI (Sept. 2, 1940), p. 15;
For a discussion of Southern internationalism in the late
1930's and early 1940's of which Pepper was a leading
8pokesman, consult, Malcolm E. Jewell, "Evaluating The
IDecline Of Southern internationalism Through Roll Call
‘Vcrtee," Journal or Politics, XXI (Nov. 1959). Pp. 624-
646; Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen And
The 'New Isolationism'," Political Science Quarterly,
JLIKJUV (Sept. 1960), pp. 321:?37: For a valuable discussion
gr sectional attitudes see George Grassmuck, Sectional

1fises In Con ress On Forei Polio (Baltimore: JOhns

<DIJkins University ress, 95 , Chapter VII, pp. 133-174.

13 56Francie P. Locke, "Claude D. Pepper: Champion or

Ielligerent Democracy " in John T. Salter, ed., Public Men

fizalland Out or Office (Chapel Hill: University of'North
arelina Press, 1946), p. 259.

 

57Ibid., p. 260.

0:

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28

He therefore urged a complete repeal of the Neutrality

Act of 1937 in order to refurnish all Allied powers with
provisions needed to fight the totalitarianaggressors.58

The signing of the Tripartite Pact in 1940, linking
Japan to the Faoist-Nazi Axis, further convinced Pepper

of Japan's militaristic tendencies, and he became a
totally committed member of the anti-Japanese coalition.59

Two California Democrats, Byron Scott and H. Jerry

Voorhis, both members of the House, were also part of

this original anti-Japanese grouping. An ardent New

.Dealer, Scott called for suspension of economic relations

Vwith.Japan. While serving two terms in the House, from

1£934 to 1938, Scott harshly condemned Japanese aggression.
Iii his last year in Congress, he stated that he favored

Preposals for halting Japan through economic reprisals

because, in that way, the United States would be effective

1111 thwarting the conquest of all Asia by Japan.60

Voorhis concurred essentially with Scott's position,

IDIlt the basis of his policy beliefs differed from those

(31? his colleague. The Californian's credentials revealed

._____
58Washington Evening Star, September 27, 1939, p. l.

11 59Honorable Claude Pepper (Moo-)0 private interview
IDENId in Cannon Office Building, February 4, 1969, Washington,

.0.

I) 6OU.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Gong-9 2nd 8933'!
necember 20, 1937, Congressional Record LXXXII, 1958;
Let's Avert War," Vita‘fsoeeohes or e Day, IV (Feb. 15,

19 3s) . pp. 284-287.

 

c...

 

 

29

a.man of varied qualities and interests. Politically

he amnitted being a registered Socialist until Roosevelt
converted him to the Democratic party.()1 Voorhis,

elected to the 75m Congress in 1936, soon took an interest
in the Far Eastern region following the outbreak of
hostilities in China in 1937. He reasoned that since
American material and resources were being used to bomb
civilians in China, the United States ought to embargo

all implements of war to Japan. It was the war trade,
according to Voorhis, that detracted from peace, making
businessmen more wealthy; if not stepped it would
ultimately involve the United States in a foreign war.
Voorhis' call for an economic embargo appeared to be based
on a desire for halting the arms and munitions traffic
which he considered to be immoral, rather than on a

strong sympathy for China or any deepseated animosity
towards Japan. His aversion to shipping war materials

to any expansionistic power motivated his attack on

Japan, thereby linking him with other Japanese critics

on Capitol Hill.62

61Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1941 (New York:
H.W. Wilson and Company, 1941), p. 888; Biographical
Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1757; H. Jerry
Voorhis, Confessions Of A Congressman (New York: iacmillan

Company, 1940).

62U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutralitngolic Hearin s, 75th Cong., lst sess.,
1937, pp. 89-94: Ibid., 7%& Cong lst sess., 1939, pp.
41-45: U.S. Congress, House, 75 Cong., lst sess., March

30

Another early prOponent of embargoing trade to
aggressors, Charles I. Faddis, a Democratic Congressman
from Pennsylvania, had voted as early as 1933 for the
arms embargo bill. Preposed in 1932 by Secretary of
State Henry L. Stimson, this bill wasan attempt to move
the United States towards collective security by allowing
her to join with other nations in halting arms shipments
wherever hostilities existed or were threatened. Although
the House gave its approval, the issue was dropped during
the Roosevelt Administration, only to be picked up at a
later time by the non-interventionists who distorted its
original meaning into a call for an absolute prohibition
of arms to all belligerents.63 Faddis, serving in the
House from 1933 until 1942, was not an internationalist
on most issues,64 but from 1937 onward he moved towards
an anti-Japanese posture because of his belief that
Japan, as the aggressor nation in Asia, ought to have an
arms embargo applied to her.

18, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 2402-2403; Block,
ed., Current Biography-1941, pp. 888-889; For Voorhis'
reaction when Congress voted the repeal of the arms
embargo provision of the Neutrality Act in 1939 see

Robert A. Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality: Franklin

£5 Roosevelt And The Struggle Over The Arms Embargp
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 332-333.

 

63U.S. Congress, House, 73rd Cong., lst sess., April
17, 1953, Congressional Record, LXXVII, 1850.

64For instance see his condemnation of the World Court,
ng York Times, January 28, 1935. P. 2.

31

The men composing the anti-Japanese grouping in the
House and Senate in 1937, struggled to convince non-
interventionists and possible skeptics that they only
way to stOp Japan was through embargoing trade. By 1941,
even when most of the original members of this group
were no longer present in Congress, their awareness of
the Japanese threat in Asia and their willingness to
advocate a firm American policy, based on economic
pressures, remained an important influence upon the rest
of Congress. Unfortunately, they were never able to
muster enough votes to pass anti-Japanese legislation,
for Congress seemed more willing to defer action and
follow the lead of the Administration. But for the
next four and a half years following the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident, Congressional members of the anti-
Japanese coalition strove diligently to thwart Japan's
quest for hegemony in Asia not through military response,
although a few urged that action, but through economic
reprisals. When the Administration finally retaliated
against Japan with a total embargo of trade on July 26,
1941, the response of Congress was overwhelming in its
approval. Perhaps the importance of this coalition should
not be judged by their failure to enact the desired
legislation but in the role they played as part of the

effort to awaken the President, the Congress, and the

 

 

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32

Anmrican peOple to the menace of Japan's aggression in

Asia resulting in a nearly unanimous anti-Japanese feeling

in the United States by 1941.65

 

65On American response to Japan by 1941, consult,
Robert Aura Smith, "The Triple-Axis Pact And American
Reaction," Annals, CCXV (May. 1941), pp. 127-132; See
also, Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese

American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University
PresS, 1958 9 Pp. 1 8-1990

CHAPTER II
THE POLICY OF ACCOMODATION

The second grouping of Congressmen, led by Senators
William E. Borah (R. Idaho), Hiram Johnson (R. California),
and Representative Hamilton Fish (R. New York), desired
no overt embargoing of trade to Japan. Nevertheless,
unlike the other non-interventionist bloc to be discussed
next, this alliance believed in defending Americans in
areas of conflict. They argued for this position out of
moral and ethical considerations: consequently, while
wanting to avoid war with Japan, they also believed with
equal fervor that America must defend herself as a neutral
in a combat zone if the belligerents would not recognize
these rights. At the heart of such reasoning rested a
strong sense of honor, motivating them to refuse a withs
drawal from China under fire because it implied an Ameri-
can abrogation of her rights as a neutral. It should be
noted, however, that if the circumstances were ever
altered, these men.were not adverse to an American
withdrawal from China. Similar reasoning also explained
their dislike of the cash and carry provision of the
Neutrality Act passed May 1, 1937. because they felt it
oircwmscribed some of the United States' rights to

33

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34

freedom of the seas as defined by international law.1

Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from 1925 to 1933, based his
philos0phy of foreign relations on the premise that
goodness and peace could be extended through the rule
of law and judicial tribunals rather than secret
diplomacy, intrigue, imperialism, and force.2 De-
scribing the international role of the United States,
Borah advocated complete independence of action unem-
barrassed and unburdened by previous political commitments.3
Moreover, he considered the primary interests of the

United States totally different from the rest of the
world and along with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge helped

 

1New York Times, August 20, 1937, p. 3.

2Claudius 0. Johnson, Borah Of Idaho (New York:
Longmans, Green and Company, 1936); John Chalmers Vinson,
Willigm E. Borah And Thg Outlawpy Of War (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1957), are both worth consulting for
Borah's ideas on the rule of law in international affairs;
a new book worth consulting is Robert James Maddox,
Hilliam E. Borah And American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Less significant
on this issue was Marian McKenna , Borah (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1961). Also consult, "How
To End War," Nation, CXIX (Dec. 31, 1924), pp. 736-7393
"Law Must Displace War," Christian Centur , XLII (Jan. 1,
1925), p. 8; Ray T. Tucker, "Borah Of Idaho," American
Mercur , IX (Dec. 1926), pp. 385-393; "Representative Men,"
English Review, LXII (Jan. 1936), pp. 25-31; See also
TiAmerican Portraits," Spectator, CXXXI (July. 21, 1923),
pp. 77-78; and Bernard Fay, Portrait Of Mr. Borah," Review
Qngeviews, LXXXV (Jan. 1932), pp. 57-58.

 

3"Law Must Displace War," ghristian Centurx. p- 8;
New York Times, May 4, 1930, III, p. 1; For further
evidence of his concern for international law consult,

 

 

 

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35

defeat the Treaty of Versailles, remarking that passage
of that treaty would be the first step towards
internationalizing the foreign policy of the nation.4
He further Opposed the results of the Paris negotiations
because the treaty gave Japan the German leaseholds in
Shantung which he feared might provide the Opening for
eventual Japanese control of that peninsula. The
Shantung proposal, he called, "the most complete moral
breakdown in the history of treaty making." In an
interview by the New York Times, he reminded the country
that China was an ally, and she had gone into the war
with American assurances that her rights would be
protected at the Peace Conference. Concluding the
interview by attacking Japan's quest for racial equality,
Borah did not care if Japan considered it a slap at her
honor.5 A fierce nationalist and firm adherent to the
doctrine no other country had the right to tell the

h

U.S. Congress, Senate, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., February

7, 1917, Congressional Record, LIV, 2748-2749 and Ibid.,
65“ Cong., lst sess., April 4, 1917, Congressional Record,
LV, 252-253.

4Allan Nevins, "Borah And World Politics," Current
Histo , XXXVII (Feb. 1933), pp. 513-519; "Borah n
Johnson: Disturbers Of Peace," Literary Digest, LXII
(Aug. 23, 1919), p. 52; "Militarism In A Nationalistic
League Of Nations," Forum, LXI (Mar. 1919), pp. 297-306:
New York Times, January I5, 1919, p. 2 and March 28, 1919,
Do I.

5New York Times, Iarch 25, 1919, p. 3; June 19, 1919,
De 5 and August 18, 1919, p. 40

 

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36

United States what its foreign policy should encompass,
the Idaho Senator consistently urged Americans not to
give up that freedom by joining an international
organization that would impede American sovereignty.6
During the 1920's, Borah endorsed the concept of
the Washington Conference although he attacked the Four
Power Treaty as a quadruple alliance resulting from
secret diplomacy, the same reasons for which he had
opposed the adOption of the Treaty of Versailles and

7 Willing to favor

adherence to the League of Nations.
American participation in the World Court, the Senator
had two reservations; first, the court must be divorced
from the League of Nations, and second, he would Oppose
American participation as long as Germany and Russia
were not represented. The concept of a "World Court"

was impossible, in Borah's thinking, if two of the most

potentially powerful nations in the world were not members.

6William E. Borah, "American Foreign Policy in A
Nationalistic World," Foreign Affairs, XII (Jan .1934).
Supplement, pp. iii-xii.

 

7"Disarmament Winning At Washington," Literary Digest,

LXIX (June. 11, 1921), pp. 7-10; See also HOKEnna, Borah,
pp. 172-196; John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace;
The United States Senate And The Washington Conference
1921-1922 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955)?
"The Progress Of The World," Review Of Reviews, LXIII

(Feb. 1921), pp. 115-116; Maddox, William E. Borah And
American Foreign Polio . PP. 97-119; U.S. Congress, Senate,

7“ Cong., 2nd sess., December 12, 1921, Congressional
Record, LXII, 229-237.

 

5.!

 

 

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37

Without these two nations being represented, they would
reject the court's decisions and render the tribunal's
Opinions and directives meaningless.8 Borah's dislike
of a World Court did not inhibit him from desiring an
international agreement to outlaw war; on January 15, 1929,
this goal was realized when the Senate passed the Kellogg-
Briand Pact.9 Borah's hOpe for a world that had outlawed
war as an instrument of national policy seemed close to
realization at the end of the twenties, but Optimism was
shattered along with South Manchurian Railroad near Mukden,
Manchuria on September 18, 1931.

It is not surprising therefore, given his faith in
law as a means for preserving world peace and order, that

Borah was angered over Japan's incursions into Manchuria,

 

8"Law Must Displace War," Christian Century, XLIII

(Jan. 1, 1925) pp. 8-9; Ibid., 1‘Senator Borah On The
World Court," (Feb. 5, 19237“pp. 186-188; Ibid., "War
And The World Court," XLIII (Feb. 11, 1926y7“75. 194-197;
Ibid., "Senator Borah And World Peace," XLVI May. 8, 1929),

p. 607-610: "Borah And The Court," Independent, CXIV

Apr. 18, 1925), p. 453; "The World Court And The Senate,"
Review Of Reviews, LXXI (June. 1925), p. 576; McKenna,
Borah, pp. 237-250; Vinson, William E. Borah And The
fiptlawry Of War, pp. 104-113.

 

9Robert H. Ferrell, Peace In Their Time: The Origins
Of The Kello -Briand Pact (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1952 , pp. 240-252; "Toward The Outlawry Of War,"
New Re ublio, XXXIX (July. 9, 1924). PP. 179-180; "Can War
Be Outlawed," Congressional Digest, VII (Mar. 1928), pp. 87-
89: "The Renunciation Of War," Christian Century, XLV
(Feb. 23, 1928), p . 266-268; Ibid., "The Debate On The
Peace Pact," XLVI EJan. 31, 1929), pp. 145-172° Ibid.,
"Senator Borah And World Peace," (May. 8, 1929),"5p7 607-
610; "Three Plans To Make The Dream Of Peace Come True,"
lfifierary Digest, LXXXXV (Dec. 10, 1927), pp. lO-ll; See also

I
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38

but he did not advocate any harsh military or economic

10

retaliation. Ironically, for a man who had Opposed

the League Of Nations, Borah now relied upon its
covenant to condemn Japan for violation of a sacred

trust and called upon her to restore captured Manchurian

11

territory to China. While distressed over Japan's

actions prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Borah
still sought to calm relations with that nation. When
the Japanese renounced their adherence to the Washington
Conference treaties in 1934, Borah remarked that Japan's
move was unfortunate but, "we ought not to make the

mistake Of interpreting Japan's act as indicating a

warlike attitude towards the United States."12

Sharing Borah's foreign policy ideology was a
fellow Westerner and member of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, Hiram Johnson of California.

U.S. Congress, Senate, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., January 3,
1929, Congressional Recggg, LXX, 1022 and 1062-1070:
Ibid., Senate, 7Otn Cong., 2nd sess., January 4, 1929,
s’o a R ord, LXX, 1120-1139 and Ibid., 70”1 Cong.,

2nd sess., January 15, 1929, Congpessional Record, LXX,
1727-1731; Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign
Polic , pp. 150-182.

10New York Times, November 21, 1931, p. 2; Ibid.,
January 31, 1932, p. 25; Ibid., February 21, 1932, p. 13;
Ibid., March 13, 1932, p. 2.

11
Ibid. September 25 1931 p. 1 and September 26
1931, pfiTTE8.' ' ' '

12Ibid., December 20, 1934, p. 9.

39

Opposing entangling foreign commitments, Johnson did
stress the protection and preservation of American
neutral rights. As intense and fierce a nationalist
as Borah, the Californian's aversion to international
OOOperation was legendary from his freshman year in the
Senate until Pearl Harbor.13 He had Opposed American
entry into World War I and joined Borah in leading
the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles
and the League Of Nations. The League Of Nations,

he viewed as an attempt to foist upon the world a
superstate and rejected any provision committing the
United States to react automatically against ag-
gression.l4 Throughout the 1920's Johnson Opposed
binding international commitments, voting against the

Four Power Treaty drafted during the Washington

 

13Johnson's personality, career and voting record
may be consulted in the following: "Hiram Johnson,"
Nation, CV (Nov. 1, 1917), p. 492; Elbert Francis Baldwin,
"Hiram Johnson: His Assets And Liabilities," Outlook,
CXXIV (Apr. 21, 1920), pp. 696—698; For a sympathetic
account see Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram W. Johnson,"
Nation, CXI (June. 5. 1920), pp. 748-749; John W. Ownes,
"The Tragic Hiram," American Mercury, I (Jan. 1924), pp.
57—61; "Let's Not Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan. 30, 1932),
p. 50; Theodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: Symbol Of Extreme
Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), p. 13;
For an interesting article that considered Johnson the
most even tempered man in public life, always mad, see
S.T. Williams, "In Querulous Times," New York Times, IX
December 27, 1931, p. 2; Jonas, Isolationism In America;
1935-1951;, pp. 42-45 and Pp. 48-49.

14New York Times, January 6, 1922, p. 16.

 

 

 

 

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40

Conference.15 If it did not promote an entangling
alliance Johnson concluded, the treaty was futile and
should be rejected anyway as useless.16
When it came to the question of what role America
ought to play in Asia, Johnson showed more willingness
to antagonize Japan than Borah who had sought a
rapprochement with her throughout his career. Johnson's
reputation for disliking the Japanese had originated
while he was governor of California. In 1913, when the
State Legislature passed the Alien Land Act disqualifying
aliens who were ineligible for citizenship from owning
land, its main victims were the Japanese who composed
the largest portion Of these aliens. Upon signing the
bill into law on May 19, 1913, Johnson claimed he had

done so out of interest for the integrity of California,

and not out of any motives of discrimination against the

 

15U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March

13, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 3778-3779; Ibid.,

67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1922, Congressional_Record,
LXII, 4189-4190; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 23,
1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4336: Ibid., 67th Cong.,
2nd sess., Congressional Record, LXII, 4613-4614; The vote
on the Four Power Treaty may be found in Ibid., 67th Cong.,
2nd sess., March 24, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII,

4497.

16New York Times, January 6, 1922, p. 16; He did vote
for the Five Power Treaty, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67tn Cong.,
2nd sess., March 29, 1922, Congressional Regord, LXII, 4718-
4719: and the Nine Power Treaty in Ibid., 67‘h Cong., 2nd
sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4784;
See also Vinson, The Parchment Peace, pp. 175-195. Addition-
al views may be consulted in New York Times, January 5,
1922, p. 2 and January 14, 1922, p. 3.

41

Japanese.17 But any doubt as to the Californian's true
feelings towards the Japanese disappeared upon his
accession to the Senate in 1917. During the Upper House's
debate on the Treaty of Versailles, Johnson showed overt
hostility for the Japanese, by Opposing their acquisition
of former German possessions in China and the islands in

18

the Pacific Ocean. As Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in

the Nation, Johnson, "...is violently anti-Japanese, as
is practically every other politician from Oregon and

California."19

Villard speculated that if Johnson ever
became President, the United States might go to war with
Japan; fortunately, Johnson missed the Opportunity by
scornfully refusing to be Harding's running mate and

thereby tossing away the Presidency upon Harding's death.20

 

17For the role of Johnson during the Alien Land Bill
debate consult, New York Times, April 20, 1913, II, p. 1;
April 22, 1913, p. 1; April 23, 1913, p. 1; April 25, 1913,
p. 1; May 1, 1913, p. 1; May 2, 1913, p. 3; May 20, 1913,
p. 1; and May 28, 1913, p. 6; Also consult, "The Issue
Between Japan And California," Literary Digest, XLVI (May.
3, 1913). PP. 991-994.

18New York Times, July 11, 1919, p. 2.

19Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram Johnson," Nation,
CXI (June. 5, 1920), p. 748; Johnson was also Executive
Chairman Of Movement Of Westerners To Curb Japanese, an
organization he supported; see New York Times, April 21,
1921, p. 17.

2OTheodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: A Symbol Of Extreme
Nationalism," Literarprigest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), P- 13.

42

Later, in the same decade, Johnson Opposed the
American participation in the World Court since it had
originated with the League of Nations.21 Summarizing
his international outlook, Johnson remarked:

There's just one course to pursue, just one
way to play our proud part, just one method
to render real service——Speak our voice,
frankly and boldly, be true to our own
institutions, hold to our own ideals, be
fair and just to all peOples, but standing
upon our own shores, remain the master Of 22
our own destiny, the captain Of our own souls.
He justified Opposing American entry into the Court by
insisting no citizen of the United States would assent

23

to a judgement made by a foreign jurist, and claimed

the United States could ill afford to take time out of
domestic problems to search for foreign involvements.24
Johnson consistently rejected any significant American
role in international affairs. When the Senate debated
American adherence to the proposed Kellogg-Briand Pact,
he supported the Reed-Moses Resolution proposing that the

treaty contain no coercive Obligations, not interfere

in self-defense preparations, the Monroe Doctrine, nor

 

21"The Return Of An Innocent Abroad," Outhok, CXXXIV
(Aug. 8, 1923), P. 534.

221bid., The same belief may be seen in "Let's Not
Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan. 30, 1932), p. 50.

2332!.12£E_2l22§9 January 13, 1935. Pa 25 and January
17, 1935, p. 1.

24Ibid.

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43

involve the United States in League affairs.25

Witnessing the disintegration Of world peace
during the 1930's, Johnson moved even closer to a
negative, Obstructionist posture in dealing with other
nations. In 1934, an act bearing his name prohibited
future loans to nations already defaulting in repayment
of debts incurred during World War 1. Following the
outbreak of fighting in North China in 1937, Johnson
expressed a resentment at the invasion by Japan but
cautioned there should be no American action on any

26

level to aid China. His stubborn refusal to change

positions on an issue was nowhere better illustrated
than in his unwillingness to vote for repeal of the
Neutrality Legislation even when, in 1941, a Gallup
Poll stated that 67% of Californians eligible to vote
favored repeal. Rejecting the polls results, Johnson
claimed:

It may be that the Gallup Poll shows 90%

Of the peOple of the state of California

in favor of war. It may be that 99 percent

of other polls show the peOple of the state

of California in favor Of war. Even if it
were so, I would not vote to take the country
into war. I would stand here and with every
bit Of force that I have, protest against such
a proposa1.27

 

25Ferrell, Peace In Their Time, pp. 242-243.

26New York Times, August 3, 1937, p. 2.

27U.S. Congress, Senate, 77'11 Cong., lst sess., November
5, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8514-8515; Despite
Johnson's resistance to repeal Of the Neutrality Act, he

44

True to these convictions, even after the Japanese

attacked Pearl Harbor, Johnson attempted to hold up

passage of the bill authorizing the use of National ,

Guard trOOps and draftees outside the Western Hemisphere.28
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, the

position being advocated by Johnson and Borah found

support from one of the ranking members of both the

House Rules and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hamilton

Fish.(R. New York). Despite having served in Congress

since November 2, 1920, when he filled the vacancy caused

by the resignation of Edmund Platt, Fish's record for

the next twenty-five years in Congress was uneven and

uninspiring. But his record did not prevent Fish from

considering himself a liberal in the same progressive

tradition as Thomas Jefferson, although one writer

stated that his peers believed that, in fact, Fish's

presence in Congress was a standing threat to pOpular

government.29 While in the House, Fish did gain a record

as a notorious communist hunter, becoming Chairman of the

 

did believe the legislation.would not prevent war but
increase its possibilities. See, "Peace Passion Cold,"
Time, XXVII (Feb. 24, 1936), Po 160

zaBlock, ed., Current Biography-124 , p. 441.

29Richard Current, "Hamilton Fish: Crusading
Isolationist," as quoted in Salter, ed., Public Men In
And Out Of Office, p. 210.

45

House Committee investigating communism in the country.30

NO internationalist, Fish was nevertheless willing
to see a limited American involvement in world affairs.
In the twenties, he supported the results of the
Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.31
Following the signing of the Pact of Paris, Fish spent
the next decade prior to Pearl Harbor agitating for
American embargoes of all arms and munitions to warring
nations. In a 1930 radio address over NBC, sponsored
by the Women's International League For Peace And Freedom,
Fish considered a total embargo in keeping with the spirit
of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. If the United States joined
other nations in embargoing war, he summarized, then the
country should be willing to embargo munitions and arms

32 He also Opposed involving

to violators of the treaty.
Americans in areas where the nation's interests were
minimal. Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, he
criticized Stimson's proposal to send protest notes to
the Japanese Government because the United States had no

intention of thwarting Japan's aggression by force; thus

 

3O"Presidential Possibility," Literary Digest, XX
(Nov. 16, 1935). p. 35; "Russia Turns A Corner, Livin
%g%, CCCXL (Mar. 1931), pp. 31-33; "The Trend Of Events,"

u look And Independent, CLV (July. 30, 1930), p. 495.

BluThe Renunciation Of War," Annals, CXXXVIII (July.
1928), pp. 164-165.

32New York Times, February 23, 1930, p. 27.

46

the notes were of no use and could only humiliate the
American Government.33 As if to emphasize his position,
he later remarked, "We are not the guardians of the
world's peace." The sentimental attitude that the
United States should aid China, he continued, "should
be rejected. We owe nothing to China but our moral
efforts to enable it to restore peace but the American
peOple are not going to war with any nation after the
experience of World War 1."34 While not advocating a
public boycott of Japan, Fish stated he preferred to
restrict items like nitrate of soda which when converted
to nitric acid were used in the manufacturing of munitions
as well as arms, ammunition, and implements of war.35
When hostilities began in North China in 1937, Fish
asked for a total withdrawal Of American civilians and
especially removal of Marines from Tientsin and Peking

36 Prior to

along with the naval craft in Chinese waters.
his conversion to the nationalistic Borah-Johnson position

later in 1937, he even advocated the impeachment of the

 

33Ibid., October 16, 1931, p. 2,
34liii.. February 13. 1952, p. 2.

35Ibid., March 13, 1932, p. 2; also Divine, The
Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 26-31.

36New York Times, July 24, 1937, p. 4.

47

President for not recognizing a state of war in China
which would demand invoking the Neutrality Legislation.
He also criticized the President for talking of a
quarantine against Japan on one hand then seeking to
mediate the peace between the two belligerents. Fish
called the Chief Executive's policies nothing but
ineffectual lip service to peace, full of inconsistencies
and empty gestures.37 It was not long afterwards, when
the gunboat Baggy was attacked and sunk, that Fish,
considering the action an affront to American honor,
shifted his ideas to coincide with the Borah-Johnson
position which he then maintained until he was converted
to an anti-Japanese posture along with the majority in
Congress in 1941.58
The third attitude towards American-Japanese relations,
co-existing with the two previously discussed views, also
had its Congressional spokesmen in 1937. Although
agreeing with most of the non-interventionist beliefs
espoused by Borah, Johnson, and Fish, this third grouping
differed significantly over the issue of withdrawing
Americans from China to such an extent that they must be

considered as separate and distinct from the Opinions

 

37lhléo. October 17. 1937, p. 40.

38See Chapter VII.

48

examined earlier. The Congressmen exerting the greatest
influence within this group, Senators Gerald P. Nye

(R. North Dakota), Arthur H. Vandenberg (R. Michigan),
Arthur Capper (R. Kansas), and Joel Bennett Clark (D.
Missouri), believed that America's defense of neutral
rights had helped to involve her in the First World War.
Therefore, they did not want the United States to repeat
past mistakes, even if this meant sacrificing some of the
nation's rights as a neutral. Once Japan renewed
hostilities in China, these Senators advocated withdrawing
all Americans rather than risking a conflict with Japan,
a position they would maintain unless American territory
was directly threatened with attack.

It is not surprising, after examining Nye's record,
to find that he supported the call for American withdrawal
from China. Despite his support of President Wilson
during World War I, by the time Nye reached the Senate,
disappointment with the results of the war had brought
about disillusionment with American involvement in world
affairs. HOping to avoid any possible duplication of
the events that had lead the country into World War I,

Nye, in August, 1935, introduced a series of bills:

49

...that would have withheld passports from

Americans wishing to travel in war zones,

forbidden citizens to sail on vessels owned

by belligerents, embargoed loans, credits,

and munitions, prevented contraband of any

sort leaving this country under the United

States' flag, and in other ways would have

voluntarily relinquished traditional neutral

rights.39

Though a believer in an adequate national defense,
Nye voted against all bills for naval expansion and
Opposed the protection Of American residents and in-
vestments by the armed forces in other countries.40
With regard to the Pacific Region, Nye considered naval
appropriations wasteful since the United States could not
defend its interests in Asia. He was reluctant to build
a fleet that Japan would see as a challenge to her
hegemony in the Orient and reiterated time and again
that the Japanese could not invade the United States,
thereby making Offensive fleets impractical and unneces-
sary. As Wayne Cole has noted, Nye feared military
spending, big business, and bankers at home more than
the Japanese. From North Dakota, Japan was a continent
and an ocean away; and with North Dakota ranking last

in receipt Of military apprOpriations during 1940 to 1941,

 

39Jonas, Isolationism In America, 1935-1941, p. 58.

4OElbert Francis Baldwin, The Crusading Mr. Nye,"
Current History, XLI (Feb. 1935), P- 526.

5O

Nye could afford the luxury of being anti-military without

sacrificing his political existence.41

More than once
Nye stated American-Japanese relations would be improved
if the United States would not provoke that Asian nation
with belligerent speeches, depictions of an ensuing war
in newspaper editorials and increased armaments.42
Unwilling Or unable to recognize and admit Japanese
violations of international agreements, Nye considered the
onus of any future war to be the responsibility Of
Roosevelt, bankers, and munitions makers. To Nye, Japan
only acted in response to American, English, and French
war preparations, and the slogans Of their leaders to
"Look Out For Japan", was a convenient means of rallying
support for their policies.43
Prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Nye led a
move to reduce the possibility of America going out on
another crusade to save the world. To prevent such a
catastrOphe during the thirties, Nye attacked the munitions

industry and advocated stringent and non-discretionary

neutrality legislation. Shunning international cooperation

 

41Cole, Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations,
p. 131. ,

42U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., May 7,
1936, Congressional Record, LXXX, 6800-6802; Ibid.,
75th Cong., 3rd sess., April 27, 1938, Congressional Record,
LXXXIII, 5840.

43"The Munitions Investigation," Jpprnal Of National
Educational Association, XXIV (Sept. 1935)} Pp. 185-192.

51

out of fear the United States would become embroiled
in world conflicts, he Opposed the concept of the
League of Nations and American membership in the

Permanent Court of International Justice.44

If Nye's
efforts to keep the United States out of war proved
futile, his resolve proved unshakable. Even while the
Japanese bombs were falling on American ships, planes
and military personnel at Pearl Harbor, Nye was addressing
a "Keep America Out Of War" rally in Pittsburgh. As the
speech ended, it was obvious that his position and his
cause during the thirties had been lost and in his next
bid for reelection, he would be shoved into political
oblivion.45
One of Nye's colleagues, Arthur Vandenberg, considered
himself an insulationist rather than an isolationist
although the difference between the two may not have been

anything more than semantics. Vandenberg defined his view

of diplomatic relations as the attempt to cushion America,

 

44U. S. Congress, Senate, 69tn Cong., lst sess.,
January 23, 1926, Congressional Record, LXVII, 2643-2656;
Cole, Senator Geralde_Nye And American Foreign Relations,
p. 107; "War: Must Over May " Time, XXVI (Sept. 2, 1935),
pp. 11-12; New York Timeg, January 30,1935, p. 1;
"Neutrality Controversy," Congressional Di est, XV (Jan.
1936), pp. 16-18; For an unsympathetic view Of Nye by a
contemporary colleague in the Senate, consult, Tom Connally,
My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell And
Company, 1954), pp. 211-214.

 

45Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreigp
Relations, pp. 197-201.

52

as much as possible, from the impact of foreign events.46

He called for self-determination in American foreign
policy based on "independence but not isolation". Willing
to OOOperate with other nations when feasible, Vandenberg
hOped the United States could remain aloof from inter-
national quarrels and warfare.47 In regard to the

Pacific region, the Michigan Republican was confident that
if America would retain friendly relations with Japan all
the problems then existing between these two countries
could be worked out. He substantiated this claim by
referring to the success America had achieved by using
persuasion and not threats of force after World War I to
convince the Japanese to relinquish most of their claims

48 Furthermore, Vandenberg assumed that any

in China.
collective action taken against Japan would eventually
lead to war. Therefore, as he sometimes lectured his
colleagues, the United States should not try to equalize

any differences between belligerents, eSpecially in the

 

46Vandenberg to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg
MSS, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

47New York Times, May 4, 1950, III, p. 1.

48Arthur Vandenberg Jr. and Joe Alex Morris, eds.,
The Private Papers Of Senate; Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 17; Hereinafter cited as
Vandenberg Papers.

53

conflict in China. In a letter to Nora Dyron, a member

of the Provisional Committee TO Aid The Chinese PeOple,

he was willing to agree that China should be helped; yet

he was careful to qualify his statement with the provision

that this aid should not entail any action branding Japan

an aggressor in China.49
Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg followed

a position similar to Nye's concerning international

relations. The Michigan Senator had been a member of the

Nye Committee investigating the munitions industry and

had helped Nye draft Senate Resolution 206 that created

50 As a member Of the Senate Foreign

the committee.
Relations Committee he favored mandatory neutrality

legislation requiring the President to embargo munitions
and implements Of war to all belligerents in case of an

armed conflict.51 In 1937, he voted for the Neutrality

 

49Vandenberg to Nora Dyron, undated letter in
Vandenberg MSS, as quoted in Jackson Citizen Patriot.

50For Vandenberg's views see U.S. Congress, Senate,
73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 1934, Congressional Record,
LXXVIII, 3784; Nye's views may be consulted in Ibid.,
73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 1934, Congressional Record,
LXXVIII, 3783-3791. Vandenberg's resolution was Senate
Concurrent Resolution 9 and Nye's resolution was Senate
Resolution 179. They were'combined into Senate Resolution
206; See, Ibid., 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1934,
Congressional Record, LXXVIII, 4228-4229.

51Ibid., 74th Cong., lst sess., August 20, 1935,
Congressional Record, LXXIX, 13777-13791; Literary Digest,
CXX (July. 13, 1935), p. 38; and Ibid., (Sept. 28,1935). p. 59.

54

Act and two years later against the repeal of the arms
embargo; in 1941, Vandenberg voted with Nye against Lend-
Lease, commenting in his diary, that he was witnessing the
suicide of the Republic by its passage.52 The United
States, he lamented, would defend the freedom of the

seas in order to aid the allies; but he believed such
neutral rights should have been repudiated.53 After
Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Vandenberg began to
shift from what he called his insulationist position
until he became, following the attack on Pearl Harbor,

an important member Of a bi-partisan coalition calling
for international cooperation.

In Arthur Capper, Nye and Vandenberg found additional
support for their attempt to remove Americans from areas
of conflict. Born in Garnett, Kansas, Capper had devoted
most of his earlier life to journalism as had his two
colleagues in the Senate. After serving as Governor of
Kansas from 1914 to 1918, he was elected to the Senate
where he served until 1949. Appointed to the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee in 1927, Capper, by the early

 

52Vandenberg and Morris, eds, VandenbergyPrivate
Papers, p. 10; Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American
Foreign Relations, pp. 116-118 and pp. 166-168.

53Vandenberg And Morris, eds., Vandenberg Private
Papers, p. 10; U.S. Congress, Senate, 7SUTCong., 1st sess.,
April 29, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 3943-3944.

... ... ,

 

O
u
n
u
I
. s

 
 

 

 

55

thirties, came to rely on geographical distance and
diplomacy based on non-interventionism to keep the
nation out of war. He agreed with the ideas Of Nye
and Vandenberg, especially in relation to American
actions in the Far East.54 Moreover, Capper Opposed
large military and naval funds because he was convinced
that they would provoke war instead of preserving the
peace.55

Prior to the depression years, however, Capper
had supported numerous manuvers aimed at obtaining
international OOOperation. While in his first decade
on Capitol Hill, the Kansas Republican had supported
the Treaty Of Versailles with reservations as well as

56 He continued

the Covenant Of the League of Nations.
to favor limited American involvement, voting for all
three treaties concluded during the Washington Conference,

desiring American membership in a World Court and

 

54Homer E. Socolofsky, Art ur Ca er: Publis e
Politician P ilantro ist (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 1962), p. 175.

55Ibid,, pp. 175-176.

S6Ibid., pp. 1314134.

56

approving the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929.57 Two years
earlier, indicating a prior idealistic view of inter-
national relations, Capper had even introduced in Congress
his own resolution calling for the outlawing of war.58
Following the Senate's ratification of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, Capper, in conjunction with two professors
from Columbia University, James T. Shotwell and Joseph
P. Chamberlain, hOped to "put teeth" into it. Briefly,
Capper's resolution empowered the President to determine
when a nation had violated the treaty to outlaw war and
subsequently to embargo the export Of arms and implements

of war to that nation.59 As Capper admitted, he did not

expect his resolution to pass but to stimulate debate in

 

57U.S. Congress, Senate, 6'!th Cong., 2nd sess., March
24& 1922, angrgssiopal Rggorg, LXII, 4497; Ibid.,
67 Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1922, CongpgssionglpRecorg,
LXII, 47184719: Ibid., 67“ Cong., 2nd sess., March 30,
1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4784; New York Times,
December 14, 1930, p. 5; Ibid., January 4, 1928, p. 24
and November 24, 1928, p. 2.

58Vinson, William F, Borah And Tpe Outlawry Of War,
p. 1349

59Divine, The Illusiop Of Neutrality, p. 13; New York
Times, January 4, 1928, p. 24; November 24, 1928, p. 2;

February 11, and February 12, 1929, p. 1; July 28, 1929,
p. 5° "A Threat For A Promise," Outlook, CLI (Feb. 20,
1929), p. 291; "Making The Peace‘PaEt'Fffective," Annals,
CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 40-48; For Opposition to Capper's
resolution consult, "Prostituting The Peace Pact,"

Christian Centur , XLVI (Feb. 21, 1929), pp. 257-258;
Dhring the thirties, Capper continued to Speak approvingly
Of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Consult, U.S. Congress, Senate,

72nd Cong., 1st sess., April 21, 1932, Congressional Record,
LXXV, 8560-8561; New York Times, April 7, l932, p.'1.

57

60 Capper's

the hOpe future action might be taken.
intention in submitting the prOposal was to initiate

a partial embargo in case of conflict by economically
retaliating against the aggressor nation. Later the
Congress would pass Neutrality Legislation incorporating
an impartial ban on exports of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war to aggressor and victims alike which
Capper would favor.

Capper's willingness to support international
cOOperation extended into the early 1930's as evidenced
by his desire the United States adhere to the London
Naval Treaty of 1930. HOping it would end expensive
competition in naval armaments, Capper also considered
it even more important that the United States he in the
forefront of international morality by endorsing the

61 He estimated it would save

results of the agreement.
the United States $500,000,000 by reducing the American
Navy to 165,000 tons. In a nation facing an economic
crisis, Capper was concerned that military apprOpriations
should not limit the amount of money needed for domestic
reform and recovery.62 But within a few years, the

impact of the conflicts in Eastern Asia, EthiOpia and

 

6O
61

62Ioid., p. 1.

New York Times, February 11, 1929, p. 2.
Ibid., April 15, 1930, p. 24.

58

Spain forced Capper to reconsider his dependence on
international cooperation as a means for maintaining
world peace. Reflecting a new mood, he became convinced
of one thing; America ought to remain aloof from such
conflicts, a feat that could best be accomplished by
closing loopholes in the Neutrality Legislation, enforcing
trade embargoes, and banning private loans to belligerents.63
As early as 1932, he endorsed the Lowell-Baker petition
to embargo war supplies to Japan.64 It is not surprising
that his concern for embargoing war material resulted in
Capper's acceptance of the Nye Committee's conclusions of
why the nation had entered World War I.65

By the mid 1930's Capper's earlier views had been
revised by acknowledging the need for America to retrench
from her previous overtures on the international scene.
Entertaining no doubts as to the correctness of this
policy, on October 3, 1937. he offered a six point peace
plan in a radio address over WIBC in Washington, D. C. It
called for the United States to keep out Of the League of

Nations and all alliances, keep American ships, soldiers,

 

63Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 179-180; New York
Times, December 1, l 3 , p. 8.

64W. February 21. 1932. p. 13.
65Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 176-180.

59

and dollars at home, carry out the Neutrality Act, and
pass a constitutional amendment giving the peOple the
right to vote on participation in foreign wars.66 After
all, Capper argued, the citizens ought to have a say since
they would be the ones to fight, die, and pay the taxes in
case of a world wide conflagration.67 By 1940, Capper

was making radio speeches on behalf of the America First

68 and the following year voted against Lend-

movement
Lease.69 Ultimately, Capper would change his views once
more and like Vandenberg, his position regarding Asia in
general and Japan in particular would become more
belligerent following that nation's signing of the

Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940.

 

66Ibid., p. 181; "Let The People Decide," Vital

Speeches Of Tpg Day, IV (Jan. 1,1938), p. 165; "Should
A War Referendum Amendment Be Added To The Constitution,"

CO ressional Di est, XVII (Feb. 1938), p. 143.

67U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., July
25, 1935, Con ressional Record, LXXIX, 11820-11821; New
York Times, Novemher l8, I937, p. 5; Should A War .
Referendum Amendment Be Added To The Constitution,"

Copgressional Digest. P. 143; Literary Digest, CXXV (Jan.
9 3,1).

68Calm-Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign
Relations, p.

69U.S. Congress, Senate, 77tn Cong., lst sess., March
8, 1941, Con ressional Record, LXXXVII, 2097.

60

The last significant figure in this third grouping
of Senators was Joel Bennett (Champ) Clark of Missouri.
An ardent anti-New Dealer, Clark was literally raised in
Congress. His father arrived in Washington in 1893 to
take his seat in the 53rd Congress when the young Clark
was only three years old. Later, when his father was
Speaker of the House, the younger Clark served as House
Parliamentarian from 1913 until 1917. A charter member
and former national commander of the American Legion,
Clark entered the Senate in 1933 after a successful law
career in St. Louis. A believer in strict neutrality and
non-interventionist foreign policies, he served on the Nye
Munitions investigating Committee and was appointed to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April, 1939.
Throughout the thirties, hifi two favorite projects were
campaigning against what he termed the communist menace,
and devising methods to divest the President of any
discretionary powers concerning neutrality legislation.70

In 1935, he joined Nye in sponsoring Senate Joint
Resolution 120 which would have automatically prohibited

 

7OHis Opposition to the New Deal as interpreted by a
student of the domestic battles in the thirties "...emanated
less from a clear conservative philosophy than from an
independent, almost maverick posture." See Patterson,
Congressional Conservatism_§nd The New Deal, pp. 113-114;
Ralph Coghlan, "Missouri-A Threat And A Promise," Nation,
CXXXV (Nov. 2, 1932), pp. 422-424; Jack Alexander,
"Missouri's Dark Mule," SaturdayEveningPogt, CCXI (Oct.
8, 1938), pp. 5-7; Paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election
Means," Nation, CXLVII (Nov. 19, 1938), pp. 527-528;
Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 698.

61

the export of arms and munitions to all belligerents when
a state of war was recognized; shippers of non-contraband
goods would have to do so at their own risk. Like Nye
and Vandenberg, the Missouri Democrat desired an impartial
embargo to all belligerents with no Presidential discretion.
The resolution was not voted out of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee but it did put pressure on Pittman
and the State Department to draft immediate neutrality
legislation.71 On one occassion in the thirties Clark
did differ from some of his non-interventionist senatorial
colleagues. In 1935, he voted for American participation
in the World Court without giving his reasons for such a
departure from his usual voting behavior. But it remained
the only international accord Clark approved of throughout
the decade prior to Pearl Harbor.72
Due to America's geographical distance from EurOpe
and Asia, Clark considered it possible to restrict Ameri-
can involvement in foreign conflicts. Willing to advocate

a degree of national preparedness, he would not accept an

 

71Divine, The Illusion Of LNeutrality, pp. 93-117;
Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations,
pp. ICES-16331128.Congress,‘Senate,:74m Cong., 1st sess.,
May 7, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 7042; Senate Joint
Resolution l20'was a combination of Senate Joint Resolution
99 and Senate Joint Resolution 100 both of which were co-
sponsored by Nye and Clark as well.

72New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1.

62

army or navy so large that it took monies from domestic
needs for use in foreign ventures.73 Evidence of his
continental philos0phy appeared during the debate over
Lend-Lease in 1941 in his assertion the United States
had nothing to gain by aiding Great Britain. When
advised that if England fell to Hitler America would be
next, Clark remarked that the United States had nothing
to worry about. First, Germany could not even cross a
body of water only twenty miles wide. He asserted, "It
is preposterous that anyone should think the Germans at
any time in the reasonable future could cross 3,000 miles
of sea from EurOpe to invade the United States."74
When the Sino-Japanese conflict erupted in 1957,
Clark called for total withdrawal of Americans from China
while also criticizing any actions that could possibly
worsen relations with Japan. Exaggerating, Clark remarked
that the United States could gain "...the greatest moral
victory in the history of civilization" if it actually

75

kept out of war. One Washington correspondent

characterized the Missouri Democrat as a prima donna,

 

73"The Question Of National Defense," Vital Speeches
Of The Day, v (Jan. 15, 1939), pp. 216-219.

74U.S. Congress, Senate, 77tn Cong., lst sess.,
February 18, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1108.

75New York Times, June 17, 1938, p. 3; U.S. Congress,
Senate, 75tn Cong., 1st sess., August 19, 1937, Con ressional
Record, LXXXI, 2187; "Neutrality-What Kind?," Vita Speeches
Of The Day, III (Feb. 1, 1937). p. 252.

63

76 Whether or not his

consorting with reactionaries.
description was accurate, there was no doubt that Clark
remained a formidable exponent of neutrality and non-
interventionism, battling during the years 1937 to 1941
to avoid an armed clash with Japan.

While a majority of the members in Congress could
be classified into one of the three groups just described,
it should be recognized that in 1937 there were some
important deviations to the above categories of Opinion.
One such exception, the Democratic Senator from Utah,
Elbert D. Thomas, probably had more familiarity and
personal experience with Japan and Eastern Asia than any
other Congressmen serving on the Hill. Thomas had
attained his first hand knowledge as missionary and
president of the Japan mission for the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints from 1907 to 1912. During
this time, he not only traveled throughout the Empire
spreading the Mormon faith, he also taught English to
students of the Japanese War College, learned the language
well enough to speak and read it fluently, and even wrote
articles for Japanese magazines. Before returning to the
University of Utah in 1913, Thomas and his wife traveled

throughout Asia, and in the following years he continued

to extend his knowledge of the Far East by obtaining a PhD

 

76Robert S. Allen, "Washington SweatshOp," Nation,
CXLV (July. 17, 1937), pp. 63-64; New York Times, May 28,
1935). P. 27.

64

from the University of California at Berkley, and writing
his doctoral thesis on Chinese Political Thought which was
published in 1927. Defeating five term Senator, Reed
Smoot, Thomas was elected to the Upper House of Congress
in 1932, and served until 1951.77

Prior to Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact in
1940, Thomas had been one of Japan's strongest allies,
working diligently in the Senate to convince his colleagues
that the Government in Tokyo could be won over to a moderate,
peaceful policy whereby the two nations could avoid an
armed conflict. In 1935, he had called for an interchange
of students between Japan and America to foster under-
standing. If cordial relations and understanding were
not achieved, Thomas warned, within ten years fear and
distrust would lead to "the bloodiest war ever known in
the world."78 PrOposing that student exchanges were
better defenses against war than $26,000,000 apprOpriations
for defense of Hawaii and $100,000 for air defense

programs and fortifications in Alaska and the Aleutian

 

77Biographical Directory Of The American Congress,
p. 1703-1704; Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1942,
New York: H.W. Wilson and Company, 1942), pp. 830-831;
Time, XXXIX (Jan. 5, 1942), p. 29; New York Times, December
30,1941, p. 3; For additional biographical material
consult, "Biographical Data On Senator Elbert D. Thomas,"
Biographical Data 1938 folder, Box 7, Thomas MSS,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

78New York Times, February 15, 1935. p. 4.

65

Islands, he remarked his plan would help guarantee peace
for "nations that understand each other and have no fear
of each other will never fight."79 But after 1940, despite
his earlier desire for a moderate policy towards Japan,
Thomas acknowledged that nation's aggressiveness, recog-
nizing that placation was tantamount to appeasement. With
Thomas' conversion, Japan lost her only true admirer in
Congress, thereafter standing friendless on Capitol Hill.

Unlike previously discussed non-interventionists,
Thomas trusted President Roosevelt implicitly. During an
interview, he stated that Roosevelt's,

...understanding of world conditions, as they

exist today, are not only correct, but also are

so wise and so safe that anything he might do

as a result of that understanding may be relied

upon as being the best thing for the American

peOple and the peeple of the world at large.80
Moreover, Roosevelt, "...had the ability to get at the

81 Earlier, Thomas had compared Roosevelt

heart of things."
to the Hebrew prophets, saying if the President had lived
in India they would have called him Mahatma.82 Certainly,
no other non-interventionist in the two groups already

discussed respected the President's understanding of world

 

79Ibid.
80
Ibid., October 6, 1937, p. 5.

81Ibid.

82Patterson, CongressionalgConservatgsm And The New

66

affairs to th1s degree, nor did they totally trust his
judgement, and none would have compared him to a Hebrew
prOphet much less referring to him as Mahatma.

Closely paralleling Thomas pro-administration view-
point was Senator James Hamilton Lewis (D. Illinois),
who also hOped to avoid armed conflict with Japan.
Maintaining an international outlook while in Congress,
Lewis served from 1889 to 1898 on the Joint American-
British High Commission concerned with the Canadian-
Alaskan boundary dispute. Lewis first went to Congress
in 1897 where he represented the city of Seattle until
1898. In 1913, he was elected to the Senate from the
State of Illinois where he had moved in 1903.83 Proud
of being a Spanish-American War veteran, Lewis was known,
if not for his oratory and incisive thinking, at least
for his perfectly tailored suits, matching accessories,
a rakish hat, and a pink beard. Defeated in the 1918
elections, Lewis, who was a good Democrat, supported the
peace making attempts of President Wilson as well as the

84

League of Nations. In 1930, upon reelection to the

Upper House, he became a member of the Foreign Relations

 

83Bio ra hical Director Of The American Con ress,
p. 1216; Newsweek, XII (Aug. 15, 19385, pp. lO-ll; ng
Angeles Times, May 10, 1939, p. 1 found in Lewis MSS
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C;

"The New Senators From Illinois," Literary Digest, XLVI
(Apr. 12, 1913), pp. 860-862.

84New York Times, June 4, 1915, p. 2; Ibid., January
3, 1919, p. 3; “Defending The World's Right To Democracy,"
New York Times Current Histor , XV (May. 1918), pp. 281-283.

67

Committee.85

Now a Senator again, Lewis followed Franklin
Roosevelt's leadership except when the President
attempted to procure Senate passage of the Saint
Lawrence Seaway Pact with Canada and have the United
States participate in the World Court, two prOposals

85 In the debates

he Opposed steadily and vigorously.
over the neutrality legislation, Lewis had supported

the President's desire for discretionary powers, be-
lieving the Chief Executive should have complete

freedom to impose travel, trade, munition, and loan
restrictions against any nation he deemed the aggressor.87
Nevertheless, when fighting occurred in China in the
summer of 1937, Lewis' first impulse was to call for
withdrawal of all Americans from China, a position
similar to that of Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper.

In fact, on August 6, he introduced a resolution

requesting that the Secretary of War report the reasons

 

85"The New Political Issues,” Nation, CVII (Aug. 31.
1931), p. 216.

86New York Times, January 30,1935, p. 1; Los Angeles
Times, May 10,1939, p. l in Lewis MSS,

87H. S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., lst sess., August
21,1935, Con ressional Record, LXXIX, 13953; Ibid., 75m
Cong., lst sess., February 10,1937, Congression aI Record,
LXXXI,1074-10750

68

for maintaining American trOOps in China.88 By

November, however, he had moved closer to the

position held by Borah, Johnson, and Fish. Making

a speech before the Senate on November 16, Lewis

stated that while he did not want war with Japan,

American interests in the Pacific had to be defended.

If they were not protected now, he warned his colleagues,

then Japan would eventually attempt to eliminate

Americans from the Orient economically, politically,

and ultimately physically.69 Even up to the time of

his death on April 9, 1939, Lewis continued to advocate

a defense of American interests in the Pacific.90
Another Democratic Senator, Tom Connally of Texas,

also generally followed Roosevelt on most issues, Serving

thirty-pix years in Congress, Connally had spent twelve

years in the House before being elected to the Senate in

 

88Senate Resolution 170 in U.S. Congress, Senate,
75“ Cong., lst sess., August 6 1937, Congressional
Record, LXXXI, 8351; See also Lewis' desire for troop
removals from China in New York Times, August 5, 1937,
p. 3 and August 7, 1937, p. 3; U.S. Congress, Senate,
75th Cong., lst sess., August 16, 1937, Congressional
Record, LXXXI, 8939-8941. .

89U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., 2nd sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 580-581; He also
feared a Russo-Japanese Pact designed to take Alaska and
the Philippines and favored preparedness. Consult, New
York Times, February 11, 1936, p. 8; That was the same
theme Lewis reiterated in the Senate before American entry
into World War I. See for example, New York Times, February
27, 1915, p. 4; April 8, 1915, p. 14; January 21, 1917, p.
6 and January 28, 1917, VII, p. 2.

90Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1939, p. 1, Lewis MSS.

 

69

1928. In favor of an active foreign policy, the Texan
expected the United States to defend its interests in
the world. In 1935 he supported the participation of
the United States in the World Court?1 while at the
same time voting for Senate Joint Resolution 173, the
Neutrality Act of 1935. When debate over the resolution
occurred, he remarked:

I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that no

matter where the contest, no matter what the

issue, America in advance promised that she

will exert no influence, will do no act either

to bring peace or to prevent the outrage of the

weak and the defenseless by the strong and the

aggressive.92
Like Borah, Johnson, and Fish, Connally agreed with the
doctrine of freedom of the seas during wartime and
defense of neutral rights.93 Nevertheless, he voted
for the proposal after being assured that the compulsory
arms embargo provision was only temporary.94

Later, Connally voted for repeal of the arms embargo

 

91

92U.S. Congress, Senate, 74tn Cong., 1st sess.,
August 24, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 14433;
Connally's views on neutrality during the debate in the
spring of 1937 can be seen in Ibid., 75“1 Cong., lst sess.,
April 29, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 3954-3957.

New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1.

93New York Times, January 14, 1936, p. 3.

94Connally, My Name Is Tom Connall , p. 220.

70

in 1939.95 the Selective Service Acts,96 and Lend-Lease,97
while defending Roosevelt's sending tr00ps to Iceland
which the President called a movement for hemispheric
defense. Moreover, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee beginning on July 31, 1941, Connally
helped frame and pass the Barkley-Connally Amendment,
permitting American ships to be armed, enter belligerent
ports, and cross combat zones in November, 1941.98
Connally's support of such an active role for the
United States in world affairs appears difficult at first
to reconcile with his initial reaction towards resumption
of warfare in China in 1937. From 1937 to 1939, he
called for withdrawal of Americans from China as had
Nye, Clark, Capper, and Vandenberg; yet, when war came
to Eur0pe in 1939, Connally began to urge aid to the
allies but retained his position towards the conflict

in Asia.99 Connally saw no inconsistency in such behavior,

 

95U. S. Congress, Senate, 76tn Cong., 2nd sess.,
Ogtober 27, 1939, Con ressional Record, LXXXV, 1022-
1 24.

96Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, pp. 238-239.
97Ibid., pp. 242-244, U. 3. Congress, Senate, 77“I Cong.,

lst sess., “March 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII,
2097. A

98Block, ed., Current Biography-1941, pp. 167-168.
99Otis Miller and Anita F. Alpern, "Tom Connally:

One Of The Senate Gallery's Favorites," as quoted in
Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office, pp. 311-321.

71

for he did not consider America's presence in China to

be as crucial to her interests as did Senators Pittman

or Schwellenbach. Although he did become more belligerent
towards Japan, the Texas Democrat deemphasized the role

of the United States in China and did not view withdrawal
of American military forces from that nation as damaging

100 Throughout the last year of

to the country's honor.
peace, Connally did shift his views towards Japan

considerably and regarded those who favored non-inter-
ventionist policies in Asia with little respect.101

The antithesis of William E. Borah and one of the

staunchest, pro-administration Democratic Senators,

James P. Pope of Idaho, advocated American participation
in the League of Nations, the World Court and collective

102

security. He had been a member of the Nye Committee

and had sponsored a munitions control bill in 1935 whereby

 

100

101For Connally's brutal and disreSpectful question-

ing of the former Governor of Wisconsin, Phillip LaFollette,
consult, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign
Relations, To Promote The Defense Of The United States,
Hearin s, 7 Cong., st sess., 94 , pp. 2 - 8

ereina ter cited as Senate Lend-Lease Hearings; New
York Times, December 3, i941, p. 6 has additional-State-
ments condemning non-interventionists.

1° 2Literary Digest, 1 (Sept. 7, 1935), p. 27;
"International Cross-Currents," Journal Of The National
Education Association, XXIV (Mar. 1955), p. 92; Christian
Science Monitor, August 14, 1935, p. 1; Divine, The
Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 66; For an overview of Pape' 3
career consult, Biographical Directory Of The American
Con ress, p. 1470.

New York Times, November 15, 1941, p. 5.

 

72

a National Munitions Control Board would license all
arms shipments and publish the eXport totals every year.103
In the summer of 1935, Pope's munitions control bill was
incorporated in the Neutrality Act which Roosevelt signed
into law on August 31. POpe did not consider banning the
sale of arms, halting foreign prOpaganda or forbidding
travel on the seas the correct means for securing
American neutrality; instead he advocated working for
international cooperation rather than passing legislation.
To POpe, the Neutrality Act could not guarantee American
non-involvement in foreign conflicts.104
Pape served only one term in the Senate, being
defeated in the Idaho Democratic primary by D. Worth
Clark in 1938.105 Clark, a Congressman since 1935, was
well educated, articulate and unenthusiastic about the
New Deal. Differing markedly from Pape over foreign

policy, Clark viewed himself as an avowed non-inter-

ventionist. POpe was defeated by 4,000 votes in Spite

 

103Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 66 and Pa 970

l041nm” pp. 115-117; New Yprk Times, April 23,
p. 5; Ibid., August 26, 1955, p. 4; See also P0pe's
Senate—Joint Resolution 119 providing for American .
adherence to the League of Nations to foster international
cOOperation in U.S. Congress, Senate, 74“ Cong., lst sess.,
May 7, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 7041-7042.

losNew York Times, August 8, 1938, p. 2; August 9,
1938, p. 3; August 11, 1938, p. 3; and August 28, 1938,
IV, p. 1, offer analysis of why POpe lost.

73

of the President's active campaigning in Idaho for his
ally on domestic and foreign policies.106

But before leaving office, POpe made known his
position concerning Americans in China. Unconvinced'
that the best policy was withdrawal from that nation
following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he was willing
to support whatever policy the Administration formulated.
Furthermore, he had become shocked at the continuing
Japanese barbarities towards the Chinese people. Calling
for an end to Japan's easy accessibility to American goods,
P0pe hOped this would force the Japanese to discontinue
their war on the Asian mainland.107 This last statement
revealed that Pope had moved nearer to the anti-Japanese
position even though he never directly stated he was in
favor of a total embargo. Without defining the term
"easy accessibility", POpe left the Senate before he made
any further statements on the Asian problem.

The last important figure to be discussed and for
many years a maverick in his adOpted state of Montana,
Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler, vacillated over
foreign policy issues. Although born in Hudson, Massa-

chusetts on February 27, 1882, Wheeler's home was Butte,

 

106McKenna, Borah, p. 343; Patterson, Congressional
Conservatism And The New Deal, pp. 268-269.

107U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., 3rd sess.,
June 8, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 8486.

74

Montana, a tough, sprawling, ugly mining town. Wheeler

arrived there in 1905, after being graduated from the

University of Michigan School_of Law where he became

a $50.00 a month stenographer.108
Winning papularity fighting the Anaconda Copper

Company, he was elected to the Senate in 1922, and in

1924 he became LaFollette's running mate on the Pro-

gressive ticket. Besides his Progressive philosOphy,

Wheeler had supported the World Court preposal and had

endorsed the League of Nations in the 1920's. His

muckraking investigation into the Harding Administration's

scandals led one Hollywood writer to concoct a screen

script depicting Wheeler's activities. Known originally

as The Man From Montana, and later changed to Mr, Smith Goes

ggWashington, the movie delighted the freshman Senator.109

In 1933, he welcomed Roosevelt's victory, but their

 

108Richard A. Haste, "Burton K. Wheeler,” Review Of
Reviews, LXX (Oct. 1924), pp. 407-408; Burton K. Whee er
and F: F. Healy, Yankee From The West (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday an ompany, nc., 962) is an intriguing
account of Wheeler's early life and ambitions.

109For a review of Wheeler's fight for the removal of
Harry Daugherty as Attorney General see, ”Burton K. Wheeler,
The F1 hting Senator Who Undid Daugherty," gggrent Opinion,
LXXVI May. 1924), pp. 643-645; Also "An.Investigator
Investigated,” Literggy Digest, LXXXI (Apr. 26, 1924),
PP. 8-9; It revea ed an attempt by the FBI to bring
Wheeler's honesty into disre ute. Ibid., "First Blood
For Wheeler," (May. 31, 1924 , pp. II-lfi; Ibid., "The
EéngOOf Sting Wheeler Has," LXXXII (Aug. 13, I924), pp.

75

relationship chilled soon afterwards when Homer Cummings,
one of Wheeler's bitterest enemies in Montana politics,
was appointed Attorney General. Moreover, Wheeler broke
with the President over the Court reorganization plan
in 1937 and soon emerged as a steadfast Opponent of the
Chief Executive's policies.110
Wheeler arrived at his Opinions concerning foreign
affairs not from scholarly investigation but from what
he called experience. With a strong belief that
international bankers and British prOpagandists had
deceived the American peOple into entering World War I,
Wheeler cautioned his colleagues and constituents that
these bankers and propagandists were doing so again in
the 1930's. Moreover, believing that Roosevelt would
ultimately lead the nation into war, he became a carping
critic of the Administration, a role Wheeler enjoyed

playing.111

The historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., has
written that Wheeler left some peOple with the impression
he was pro-German prior to Pearl Harbor. During the
Lend-Lease debate in 1941, however, Wheeler protested

that "No blood but English flows through my veins or any

 

110New York Times, January 30,1935, p. l; Alva
Johnston, "President Tamer," Saturda BEvening Post, CCXI
(Nov. 13, 1937), p. 51; Hubert Kay, Boss Isolationist:
Burton K. Wheeler," Life, X (May. 19, 1941), pp. 110-119;
Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1940 (New York. H.W.
Wilson Company, 1940), pp. 85'1-860.

111Kay, "Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life,

76

of my family. And next to being pro-American I am
pro-British."112 Like Nye,°Vandenberg, Clark, and
Johnson, the Montana Democrat had no sympathy for Germany
but was an insulationist, convinced that the Third Reich
could neither invade the Western Hemisphere nor the United
States and therefore he supported non-interventionism in

113 "We are safe nowh—and for

European and Asian affairs.
years to come", Wheeler continued, "if only Americans
will have faith in their own industry, resourcefulness
and genius.” The only thing to fear according to
Wheeler was insidious and untruthful propaganda spread
by internationalists in the United States and British
Royalists abroad who were intent on having American farm
boys ”do their duty" and save the British Empire once
again.114
Concerning Japan, at one time Wheeler would agree

with the ideas of Nye, Vandenberg, Capper, and Clark,

 

112Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The A 9 0f Roosevelt,
Vol. III, The Politics or U heaval Boston: HougEton ,
Mifflin Company, 1935), pp. 141-142; Wayne S. Cole, America
First: The Battle Against Intervention 1 0-19 1 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 9 3 , pp. - 0; Burton
K. Wheeler, ”What If Germany Seizes The British Fleet," as
quoted in Nancy Schoonmaker and Doris Fielding Reid eds.,
We Testify (New York: Smith and Durrell, Inc., 1941 , pp.

llaBurton K. Wheeler, "The American People Want No
War,” Vital S eeches Of The Da , VII (June. 1, 1941), pp.
489-49 3 so, at ermany Seizes The British Fleet,”
as quoted in Schoonmaker and Reid, eds., We Testify, p. 193.

114Ibid.

'77

and then again, he would later support the tenets of the
anti-Japanese group. Like Nye, he believed if Roosevelt
took the nation into war, it would be to protect and
defend Britain's worldwide empire.115 Wheeler's fluctu-
ating Opinion mirrored an inability to settle on one
policy towards Japan and adhere to it unequivocally, a
problem not uncommon to more than one Congressmen being
faced with a rapidly shifting set of world events over

the next four and a half years.116

 

115Following a trip to the Orient in the fall of
1935, Wheeler called the idea of Japan ever attacking
America as preposterous, New York Times, January 17, 1936,
p. 13; Also, Connally, Myfiame Is Tom Connally, pp. 179-
180; For additional information on Senator Wheeler's
thinking and career consult, "Senator Wheeler Turns
Conservative," New Republig, LXXXX (Apr. 7. 1937). PP-
261-262; Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Faces The Music,"
Nation, CVL (Aug. 28, 1937). p. 217; Hamilton Basso, "Burton
The Bronc," New Republic, CII (Apr. 22, 1940), pp. 527-530;
Robert Bendiner, f'rMenWho Could Be President: Burton K.
Wheeler," Nation, CL (Apr. 27, 1940), pp. 532-536; Richard
L. Neuberger, "Wheeler 0f Montana," Harper's Magazine, CLXXX
(May. 1940), pp. 609-618; Joseph Kinsey Howard, 1TThe
Decline And Fall Of Burton K. Wheeler," Harper's Magazine,
CLXXXXIV (May. 1947). Pp. 226-236; See also 1TBErton‘K.
Wheeler," Time, XXXV (Apr. 15, 1940), pp. 21-22; and Ibid.,

'7 T

3volution Of A Senator," (June. 24, 1940), pp. 15-16.

116Two monographs tried to categorize Wheeler's
political thinking. See Blair Coan, The Red Webb: An
gndcrground Political History Of The United‘States From
191a——Present (Chicago: Northwest Publishing Company,
1925) Jthh considered the senator a communist and
David G. Kinipavid G. Plotkinj, Senator Wheeler And The
gprces Behind Him (Missoula: J. E. Kennedy Company, 1946),
which considered him a Facist.

 

 

78

In organizing the Congressmen just discussed into
groups, one problem must be recognized; there were no
issues directly involving Japan that were voted on in
Congress during the four and a half years from July, 1937
to Pearl Harbor. Consequently, upon what basis have
these men been classified? Fortunately, there were a
number of controversial issues such as neutrality
legislation, the repeal of the arms embargo, the end
Of the commercial treaty, Lend-Lease, and the freezing
of Japanese assets in the United States that elicited
comment from various Congressmen in quantities sufficient
to indicate their views towards Japan, the Far East, and
the diplomatic position of the United States in the
world. In addition to these legislative controversies,
three equally significant events; the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident, the sinking of the American gunboat Pana , and
the signing by Japan of the Tripartite Pact, created
tremendous excitment and debate in Congress, providing
further indications of Congressional Opinion about
Japanese-American relations. Since it would be the
anti-Japanese group's philosophy that would gain the
greatest amount of adherents and influence in later years,
a more detailed examination of that very important strand
of Congressional thinking will be examined next as it
existed in 1937 to the outbreak of war in EurOpe in 1939.

CHAPTER III
ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT MATURES

One month before the first session of the 75th Congress
was to adjourn for the summer, the perenially troublesome
problem of Japanese incursions into China, having laid
dormant for some time except for minor skirmishes, again
erupted. Once more American attention focused on a Far
Eastern crisis. This new threat to world peace known as
the "China Incident” began on July 7, 1937. in a clash
between Chinese and Japanese trOOps ten miles southwest of
Peking. Although the details Of the early fighting were
vague, there appeared little doubt that Japan's sights
extended beyond the limits of Manchuria and threatened
Eastern Asia with her expansion. The prospect of a
collision between Japanese soldiers and Americans residing
in China launched a debate in Congress that intensified
following the incident. A number of Congressmen, inspired
by this latest battle in China, made speeches indicating
both their displeasure with Japan as well as their fear
of further Japanese inroads in Asia. Recommending that
the United States take a stronger position against Japan,
these Congressmen formed the nucleus around which growing
anti-Japanese sentiment would ultimately coalesce.

Initially this anti-Japanese force, composed mainly of
79

80

Western Democrats at the outset, had as their goal the
conversion of their non-interventionist and uncommitted
colleagues to a harsher policy towards Japan. Key
Pittman, soon to become an outspoken member of this
movement, was at first more concerned with defending
the Administration's refusal to apply the Neutrality
Act Of 1937, than he was with making hostile statements

against Japan.1

But by October, 1937, Pittman's attitude
had become distinctly hostile, and he began denouncing
Japan's expansion. Concurring with Roosevelt's call for
a quarantine of aggressors, in a speech made by the
President in Chicago on October 5, Pittman stated that
such a policy should be specifically applied to Japan.
Moreover, he remarked that an economic embargo would end
the conflict in China within thirty days.2 According to
Pittman, the President and the nation had previously been
too patient with the Japanese, making it necessary now to

force Japan into abandoning her "unlawful, immoral, and

brutal" conduct in China. By force, Pittman meant that

 

1U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., lst sess., July

30, 1937, Con ressional Record, LXXXI, 7862; Ibid., 75tn

Cong., lst sess., July EI, I937, Con ressional Record,

LXXXI, 7919-7920; New York Times, 3n§y 35, 1937, p. I.
2New York Times, October 6, 1937, p. 1; Atlanta

Constitution, October 6, 1937, p. 3; Washington Post,
October 3, 1937. p. 7.

81

first the United States should implement an economic

quarantine and then diplomatically ostracize the

Japanese. These ideas proved to be too vague for serious

consideration however, because Pittman carefully

qualified his advice by making it clear he was neither

advocating, at that time, a severance of diplomatic

relations nor an implementation of a total embargo.3
If Pittman had been vague and imprecise in the autumn

of 1937, the sinking of the American gunboat Baggy, on

December 12, convinced him that a harsh policy to end

this aggression was needed.4 Even though the Japanese

Government offered to assume the entire responsibility

and promised to pay full compensation for personnel and

prOperty losses, such a settlement was unsatisfactory

to Pittman because in the intervening months, his

attitude towards Japan had grown more hostile. Now

abhoring what the Nevadan referred to as Japan's

"illegal and inhuman acts" and no longer content to

express vague generalities about how to cOpe with

Japanese aggression, by December, 1937, he had come to

 

3New York Times, October 7, 1937. p. 1.

41bid., December 14, 1937, p. 18; Senate Forei
Relations Committee Pa ers, 7bA-F9-l, Box 105B, National
Archives, egis ative Division, Washington, D. C;
Hereinafter cited as NA. LD.

82

believe that Japan was guilty of crimes against humanity

and deserving of having a complete American trade embargo

enacted against her.5
In retrOSpect, it may seem hard to understand why

the bombing and sinking of the 22231 did not become one

of the most dramatic aspects of Japanese-American relations

in the 1930's. Interestingly, this incident in itself

did not lead to a further deterioration of diplomatic

relations between the two nations, nor did it lead to a

war hysteria. Instead, the response of Americans and

especially the Congress to the incident was extremely

mild and non-belligerent. Even when the Official

Japanese version, reporting that the Eéflél had been

mistaken for a Chinese trOOpship and that the weather had

made visibility poor, was proven false, the episode

failed to arouse any serious demand for retaliation.

Reaction continued to be non-belligerent even after the

American version of the affair, made public on December

16, stated the weather had been clear and that the gunboat

had been bedecked with American flags in addition to two

horizontal 18' by 14' American flags painted on the

 

5Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1,
Box 105B, NA. LD.

83

awnings and superstructure.6

Initially, news Of the bombing and sinking of the
gunboat touched off heated debate in Congress, but a war
spirit was missing. There were several reasons why no
great outcry to "Remember the Panay" occurred. First,
the prompt action of Japan in rendering apologies and
reparations showed that at least the Japanese Government
desired placating any adverse American Opinion resulting
from the incident.7 Second, it has been suggested the
American Government, Congress, and the peOple seemed
more anxious to avoid trouble by withdrawing from China

8 Finally, the Japanese Govern!

rather than Oppose Japan.
ment was never directly implicated in the affair and the
interest in the sinking died down rather quickly as other

more important and pressing events in Europe and Asia came

 

6Johnson to Hull, December 12, 1937, 9 .11 Fans 0
National Archivesi Record Group 59, cited ere na or as

NA. RG; Papers Re ating To The Foreign Relations Of The
United States Ja an: 1 1-1 1 (2vols; Washington: G.P.O.,
1943), I, p. 934; Hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations,
Japan: 1%:1-1241; The report by the commander of the

Panay, . ommander James J. Hughes, to Roosevelt can be
found in "Panay" folder, OF-lSOC, December 24, 1937 FDR MSS,

7Japan paid the sum of $2,214,007.36 as indemnification
for the loss of the Fans and injuries to persons and
prOperty as a result of ¥he attack. Consult, United States
Department of State, Peace And War The United States

Foreiég Policy 1251-l§§: (Washington: G.P.O., I922). pp.
8William C. Johnstone, The United States And Ja an's
New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 594:). pp.

269“225 e

 

84

to the forefront.9 Therefore, neither the Executive nor
the Legislative branches of the Government regarded the
sinking as a casus belli, and it slowly passed quietly
into the background.

But Pittman refused to allow the potential threat of
Japanese aggression to fade into the background of his
colleagues' consciousness, and throughout the year 1938,
he continued to engage in active speech making against
Japan. In February, in answer to queries from constitu-
ents, he wrote that he Opposed any extension of credits to

1° By the beginning of the summer, Pittman had

Japan.
begun to specifically condemn Japan as a treaty violator
and an international criminal. On May 23, he was asked
for his Opinion by the New York Tribune about an interview
made with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, the
day before, concerning his proposal that the United States
and Japan sign a non-aggression pact. Opposed to such a
suggestion, Pittman insisted Japan must first remedy the

wrong done by her treaty violations in China before

 

9For an unsuccessful attempt to create a new thesis
concerning the ramifications of the sinking of the Pansy
consult, Manny T. Koginos, T e Pana Incident: Prelude To
War (Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1937). For a
wETl written reminiscence of the sinking by members of the
crew see Hamilton D. Perry, T e Pana Incident: Prelude To
Pearl Harbor (New York: MachElan Company, T969).

10Letter from Pittman to Mrs. Murray Crane, February

14, 1938, Senate Foreign_Relations Committee Pa ers, 75A-
F9-l, Box IOSF, Correspondence -C, NA. LD.

85

America could seriously consider such an overture.ll

Continuing, Pittman commented that the American Government
"...holds that Japan has violated and is now violating a
treaty of non-aggression with the United States——namely

the Nine Power Treaty."12

Although Pittman insisted he
was speaking personally and not for the Administration,
the indication was clear. There would be no settlement

of the outstanding differences between the two nations

as long as Japanese forces occupied Chinese territory,
thereby violating a solemn and sacrosanct treaty with the
United States. As if his anti-Japanese sentiments needed
further clarification, Pittman ended the interview with
the Tribune by stating, "If Chiang Kai-shek was driven
back to a cave in the mountains 3,000 miles from the coast
and the Government consisted only of Chiang Kai-shek,"

he would continue to recognize him as the only legitimate
Government in all China.13

Following this outburst to the press, Pittman seldom

deviated from the theme of the treaty violation in pressing

 

_11The interview may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate

75u Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix Congressional Record, LXXXIII,
2120; New York Times, May 23, 1938, p. 8.

12Ibid.

13Ibid.

86

his case for an embargo of trade to Japan. Previously,
his speeches had not defined the prOper American response
to Japanese aggression, but by May, 1938, Pittman was
demanding that Japan live up to her treaty obligations
or face economic retaliation by the United States.14
In a radio address a month before the Munich
Conference, Pittman once more presented his case against
trading with Japan, basing it on the following syllogism:
The United States has no sympathy with Japan.
We have every sympathy with China.
We have no cause that would justify us in
aiding Japan.15
Emphasizing as usual Japanese violations, Pittman further
urged the United States to aid China out of sentiment and
national interest "...in her heroic defense of her
independence, Of her territory, and the lives of her
citizens.”16
Pittman received encouragement and endorsement of his
views from Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the Foreign

Policy Association and author of a monograph in 1922,
The Washington Conference, strongly criticizing Japan's

 

14Senate Forei Relations Committee Pa ers, 75A-F9-l,
Box 105B, NI. L5. Consult also the letter to H. H. Kung,
President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance-
Hankow dated June 13, 1938, condemning Japan and hOping

for American protests leading to economic sanctions found
in the same file.

15Draft of a speech to be presented on August 22, 1938,
may be found in Pittman MSS, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washiigton, D. 0.; Pittman made a similar
speech as quoted in the New York Times, July 11, 1938, p. 21.

16Ibid.

87

intention in Eastern Asia. In December, 1922, Buell also
published an equally severe article on Japan in the
Eglitical:Science Quarterly.17 Sixteen years later,

with his critical attitude concerning Japan unaltered,

he lamented to Pittman that America was supplying raw
materials to Japan, enabling her to pursue conquests in
China while at the same time preventing the United States
from wielding her maximum influence to end the fighting.
Buell preferred that the United States consult with other
powers interested in ending the Asian conflict, hoping
they might agree to an economic boycott against Japan.
Discounting and criticizing the Opponents of a boycott,
he told Pittman that it was inconceivable that Japan
could immediately institute naval reprisals against the
Philippines, Hong Kong, or the International Settlement
at Shanghai. Furthermore, Buell considered it extremely
unlikely that Japan could challenge the boycott except

by an act of war, a suicidal step for the Asian nation.
Agreeing with Buell's analysis of the situation, Pittman
also promised to challenge Japan by initiating whatever

legislation was necessary to help China and curtail the

 

17For Buell's earlier views consult, The Washin ton
Conference (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, I922)a nd
e eve Opment Of Anti-Japanese Agitation In The United
States," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII (Dec. 1922),

pp 0 605-6% 38 e

“I

88

imperialistic ventures of Japan.18

While the partition of Czechoslovakia captured most
Americans' attention throughout the summer and autumn of
1938, Pittman's concern remained focused on Congress'
tendency towards appeasement. Congressional timidity
regarding Japan especially worried Pittman who indicated,
in a letter to State Department Counselor, R. Walton Moore,
his irritation because "...the extreme and foolish pacifist
sentiment in the United States was based on fear and could
dominate the 76th Congress due to convene in January, 1939."19
This fear later proved to be unwarranted. Nevertheless,
Pittman's belligerent attitude over matters related to
Japan caused him to view with anxiety any possible aid
the United States might give that nation.20 As Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pittman lost no
Opportunity to press for an embargo Of trade and to call

for an end to the Commercial Treaty Of 1911.21

 

18 Buell to Pittman, July 19, 1938, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Pa ers, 75A-F9-l, Box 105G, Corre-
spondence D-I, NI. LD.

19Pittman to Moore, November 15, 1938 in Ibid., Box
lOSH; Also Moore to Pittman, October 13, 1938, "Neutrality,
1938," folder, Group 55, Box 15, Moore MSS, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

20New York Times, July 10,1939, p. 21 and July 12,
1939, p. 9; Consult also "Our Foreign Policy," Democratic

RevieW, XVI (Mar. 1939), p. 5 in Senate Forei Relations
Committee Papers, 76A-F9, Container II, Correspondence D
folder.

21;2§Q., China Weekl Review, XCI (Dec. 2, 1939), p. 8.

89

Unfortunately, his efforts frequently met with
frustration. On one occasion Pittman wrote to Harry
B. Price, Executive Secretary of the American Committee
For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression, telling
him of his lack of success obtaining a majority in his
committee to report out a preposal for economic embargoes

22 Pittman also revealed an inconsistency

against Japan.
and lack of support and sincerity concerning China. On
March 20, 1939, he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 97
which would put on a cash and carry basis articles that
heretofore had been embargoed in times of war. Arms,
ammunition, and implements of war would now be available
to any nation who could come to American ports and pay
for the goods. The provisions of Pittman's bill provided
for no distinction between lethal weapons and other

commodities.23 Former Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson,

wrote Pittman pointing out that the so-called "Peace Act of

 

and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9-l46,
January 8, 1940, Correspondence K folder, NA. LD.

22Pittman to Price, August 14, 1939, "Correspondence
Jan.-Sept., 1939," folder, Box 2, Roger S. Greene MSS,
Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The American
Committee For Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression
will hereinafter be cited as the American Committee, the
Committee or Price's Committee, the latter name being what
the organization was called in the thirties. 1t activities
will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI.

23New York Times, March 20, 1939, p. l.

90

1939" would not work to America's advantage in the
Pacific. Designed to aid France and Great Britain, the
"Peace Act" jeopardized China's interests by giving Japan,
with its merchant fleet and purchasing power, undue
advantage in replenishing her arsenals. Stimson called
upon Pittman to introduce legislation that would halt
all war trade with Japan.24 Criticism also came from
Harry Price who was astounded by Pittman's prOposal given
the Senator's previous statements of aiding China by
embargoing Japan.25
In addition to Stimson and Price's criticisms, the

State Department Counselor and Congressional liason, R.

Walton Moore, wrote the President strongly condemning

 

24Stimson to Pittman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Papers, 7bA-F9-l4l, April 25, 1939. See also
Stimson‘s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearings concerning revision Of neutrality
legislation. See U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee On
Foreign Relations, American Neutrality,Hearing§, 76th
Cong., lst sess., 1939, Part I, pp. 2-50; Stimson's
testimony before the committee was praised by Harry B.
Price and he agreed that Pittman's bill was not in
America's or China's interests. See Price to Stimson,
April 7, 1939, "Henry L. Stimson, " file, American Committe
For Non-Participation In Japanese AggresszLon Papers,
Littauer Center Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Hereinafter cited as ACNPJA Papers, See
also Price' 8 analysis of conversations with Pittman
concerning the neutrality bill in Ibid., Price to Stimson,
March 29, 1939. An identical letter was sent on March 28,
1939 for no apparent reason.

 

 

25Price to Pittman, March 28, 1939. "Congressional
Correspondence, " folder, ACNPJA Papers, should be
cigiulted for the committee's official protest against the
b .

91

Pittman's bill. Stating that for Europe the proposal
was ample, Moore remarked that in Asia it worked against
American interests. Implying that the President should
pressure Pittman to drop the bill or modify it, Moore
seemed even more anxious to avoid Chinese criticism of
the State Department and to protect Hull from being
denounced by Congressmen with definite pro-Chinese
leanings.26
Pittman, faced with Opposition to his prOposal,
proceded to introduce Senate Joint Resolution 123 on
April 27, 1939, which would place an embargo on the
eXport of arms, ammunition and implements of war to any
nation violating the Nine Power Treaty. The President
would have the discretion to determine when the treaty
had been violated and by which nation. This new proposal
met the objections of those who originally Opposed his
"Peace Act" yet desired some retribution against Japan
without crippling China's ability to get the sinews of

war.27 Forced to overcome the State Department's timidity,

 

26Moore to Roosevelt, March 18,1939, State Department
File 811.05418é313A and Moore to Roosevelt, March 18,1939.
"Neutra y folder # 1, Box 15, Moore M88. The
letters are similar. For the State Department's view see
Carlton Savage to Moore, February 24, 1939, "Neutrality
1939," folder # 1, Box 15, Moore MSS; New York Times,
March 20,1939, p. l and March 26,1939, p. 29; For
China' s criticisms of the prOposal see Willys R. Peck,
Charge d'Affaires, Chunking, to Hull, March 27, 1939.
State Department File, 811,0fiilalfi62 and Memorandum by
Hull in Ibid., March 29, 1939, 81l104418[3]2.

27New York Times, March 28, 1939, p. 10; April 2,
1939, p. BE?‘I§EII‘§§, 1939, p. 4; Hull to Pittman, July

92

the Administration's lack of resolve and Pittman's
ineffectual leadership in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in order to survive, the proposal suffered
defeat in the spring and summer of 1939.28
Senator King, another Western Democrat asking for
an even sterner policy than Pittman, found little solace
in Japanese guarantees to respect treaty obligations and
foreign nationals where Japanese troops were stationed;
thus, he remarked it was of little use to send diplomatic
protests to Tokyo. Following the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident, King emerged as a critic of Japan, but it took
the sinking of the Panay to convert him into a strident
member of the anti-Japanese bloc.29 For three consecutive
days in February, 1938, King addressed the Senate, ex-
plaining his reasons for disliking the Japanese and in the
process filling thirty pages of the Congressional Record.
Referring first to his one time friendship for the Japanese,

he noted that he had defended her during the occupation of

 

17, 1939, Box entitled "Jan-July, 1939," File 118, Hull MSS,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

28For a detailed discussion and analysis of this
fiasco, consult, Divine, The Illusion Of Neutralit , pp.
236-285; Also, Israel, Nevada's Kengittman, pp. TED-167.

29W. December 14. 1937. p. 18.

 

93

the Shantung Peninsula following the First World War.
Her withdrawal from that area, King had hOped, would
mean the beginning of a new, liberal and democratic
government. Japan's reversal of incipient democratic
reforms initiated during the early thirties, however,
plus her return to autocracy, instilled within King a
feeling that he had been betrayed. Stating that Japan
was motivated by greed and ambition for power, King
called her policies abhorent and uncivilized.30 Later
in the year he condehned Japan more vehemently, making
it clear that he would not be averse to an embargo

of trade and perhaps even the severance of diplomatic

relations.31

Not even Pittman called for a diplomatic
rupture; in fact, among all the initial members of the
anti-Japanese coalition, King wanted the severest
reprisals and ultimately became one of the Senators
least willing to appease Japan.

1 Closely matching King and Pittman's dislike of Japan

were the two Congressmen from Washington state, Senator

Schwellenbach and Representative Coffee. Coffee, one of

 

30U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., 3rd sess., Febru-
ary 2, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 1400-1407; Ibid.,
75h Cong., Braisess., February 3} 1938, Congressional
Record, LXXXIII, 1450-1464; Ibid., 7Sth Cong., 3rd sess.,
FeBruary 4, 1938, Congressigpal Record, LKXXIII, 1504-1512.

31Ibid., 75m Ceng., 3rd sess., June 16, 1938,

Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 9525-9526; New York Times,
uy 9 93’p02.

 

94

the strongest advocates of an embargo, never went so far
as to call for severance of diplomatic relations even
though he mistrusted the Japanese as intensely as King.
Despite his early antagonism growing out of the salmon
fishing controversy in 1937, Coffee managed to reserve

his strongest outbursts against Japan until 1959, inspired
perhaps by the forum presented to him by the Neutrality
hearings as well as the tense world situation.

During the Committee hearings, Coffee admitted that
he was never an admirer of Japan or her policies, calling
attention to House Resolution 5452 which he had introduced
to prohibit the export of arms, ammunition, and implements
of war to Japan.32 Intending with this bill to begin an
appeal for the total embargo of all exports and later all
imports to and from Japan, Coffee claimed to be speaking
for over 350,000 Americans from all regions of the country
who had petitioned the Congress urging an embargo against
the Japanese Empire.33 These petitions were a result of
the actions of the American Committee which had agitated

 

32Referred to the Committee On Foreign Relations and
never reported out. See U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong.,
lst sess., March 29, 1959, Congressional Record, LXXXIV,
3501.

33U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutrality, Hearings, 76tn Cong., lst sess.,
1939, p. 221; U.S. Congress, House, 76"1 Cong., lst sess.,
June 5, 1939, Congressional Record LXXXIV, 6634-6635.

95

to have the Congress cut off war materials to Japan.34

Coffee even called the United States a partner in Japan's
destruction of the Chinese nation, reasoning that if

Japan could not obtain American goods, the former's

war machine would collapse, ending the conflict in China.
Presumably in an attempt to reveal bi-partisan support

for his bill, Coffee announced that other Westerners,
including Senator Charles McNary (R. Oregon), agreed

with his proposal. He insisted the United States show

its desire not to be Japan's supply house and arsenal and
indicated his willingness to support any legislation that
would help cripple her expansionistic-imperialistic acts}5
For the present, Coffee concluded, Japan was the most
overt international law breaker and America, to redeem
its honor, must initiate a complete embargo of all exports

to her.36

 

34Donald J. Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The
Campaigg Of The American Committee For Non-Participation
In Japanese Aggression lQEB-lfiil (Cambridge: Harvard East
Asian Monographs, 1968 , pp. 26-44; For the Committee's
activities in petitioning supporters see "Correspondence
Jan-Sept 1939," Box 2, Greene MSS; See also letter B.
Stanley jones to supporters, December 2, 1938, Greene MSS;
Interestingly, for all his views that coincided with the
Committee's objectives, the monograph by Friedman, the
Committee papers at Littauer Library and the Greene papers
at the Houghton Library make no reference to Coffee.

Inquiries to Coffee concerning his activities within the
Committee have gone unanswered.

 

 

 

35U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutralit Hearin s, 76th Cong., lst sess., 1939.
pp. 222-223.

351bid., pp. 223-229.

96

Throughout the summer of 1939, Coffee remained a
leading advocate of a harsher economic policy, intensifying,
meanwhile, his condemnation of Japan on the House floor.
One June 5, during a heated debate in the House over his
House Resolution 5432, Coffee replied to Opposition
claims that the prOposed embargo of eXports was too
offensive by asserting:

The history of the island empire since the

Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 has been one

of continuous and wanton aggression. Let us

not be a party to this aggression. Let us

refuse no longer to participate in it. Let

us deny to the Japanese arms, equipment, and 37

financial help and discourage her aggression.
Paralleling the American Committee's anger over America's
support of Japanese aggression, Coffee ended his comments
with a reaffirmation of his belief that the embargo of
high grade oil, automobile equipment, and scrap metal
would readily end Japan's destruction of China. He
failed to consider here, as in previous statements, the
possibility that Japan might retaliate. Coffee was not
alone in this lack of foresight; neither had other members

of the anti-Japanese bloc acknowledged the eventuality of

a Japanese attack on the mainland or on one of America's

 

37U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., lst sess., June 5,
1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, b654-6635; Italics are
mine.

97

38

possessions in response to economic sanctions.
Another Senator quite ready to join forces with the
faction in Congress attacking the Japanese position in
Asia was Lewis B. Schwellenbach. Like his fellow
Congressman from Washington state, Schwellenbach's
dislike of Japan had its origins in the salmon fishing
controversy that occurred in 1937.39 His attitude
continued to harden during the next two years, and
early in 1939, Schwellenbach introduced Senate Joint
Resolution 143. providing for the control of exports
used to violate the sovereignty, independence,
territorial or administrative integrity of any nation.40

Senator Pittman had also introduced a resolution similar

 

38Ibid., See also speech by Coffee on this same
subject in Ibid., 76tn Cong., lst sess., Appendix,
Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 2325-2326.

39See telegram Hull to Roosevelt, September 29, 1937,
"Japan 1933-1945," Box 1, OF-l97, FDR MSS; Ibid., R. Walton
Moore to Roosevelt, November 24, 1937, "Japan I937," Box
13, PSF; Ibid., Roosevelt to Hull and Secretary of Commerce
ROper, July I4, 1937, "1936-1937," folder, 0F-197.

40In an analysis of Congressional attitude towards
economic retaliation against Japan conducted by the
American Committee in 1939. Schwellenbach was among those
considered a strong supporter and his resolution was
written in collaboration with committee members. See
Roger S. Greene to Harry B. Price, December 28, 1939, RSG

Folder # 2, ACNPJA Pa era; The list is in Greene MSS
under date April l1, E939.

 

98

to the Washington Senator's prOposal, calling for the
President to end all trade with Japan.41 The major
difference between the two prOposals, as Herbert Feis

has commented, was that while Pittman's resolution
authorized the President to embargo trade, Schwellenbach's

42

resolution made it mandatory for him to do so. Angered
over Japan's violations of an international agreement
to which the United States had been a signatory,
Schwellenbach remarked:

The solemn obligations of the Nine Power Pact

require that we as a nation cease furnishing

to Japan those articles which she uses to

destroy the territorial integrity of China.

From the sense of morality the American peOple

demand this action.43

Although both resolutions died in the Foreign Relations
Committee, other Congressmen were attracted to the anti-

Japanese position. Among them were two Democrats, Byron

 

41For Schwellenbach's resoltuion see Senate Joint
Resolution 145, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., lst
sess., June 1, 1959, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 6475;
For Pittman, see Senate Joint Resolution 125, Ibid.,
76m Cong., 1st sess., April 27, 1959, Congressional Record,
LXXXIV, 4820-4821.

42Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor: The Coming
Of The War Between The United States‘And Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 50.

43Undated letter found in Scrapbook 1956-1959, Box 5,
Schwellenbach MSS; New York Times, July 8, 1959, p. 5
revealed schwellenbachTs desire to uphold treaty obligations
in Asia. For a condemnation of Japan by the Senator and
an analysis of American foreign policy in Eastern Asia,
see U.S. Congress, Senate, 76'11 Cong., 1st sess., August 2,
1959, Copggessional Record, LXXXIV, 10750-10786.

99

Scott and H. Jerry Voorhis, both of California. Scott

favored a policy of economic pressure against Japan

after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident44 and his position

hardened even further following the sinking of the

Panay, when he introduced House Resolution 557,

authorizing the President to suspend economic relations

with Japan.45 Next he began a campaign to educate his

colleagues to his ideas, and by the summer of 1958,

Scott was deeply entrenched in the anti-Japanese coalition.
On May 18, 1958, Scott placed into the Congressional

Record what he considered to be a very significant article

written by Paul McManus for New Masses magazine in which

 

he stated that the United States was in the strategic
position of being able to cripple the Japanese war machine.

According to the article, this feat could be accomplished
by embargoing the export of scrap needed in the making of

steel. Statistics cited by McManus supporting this
assertion showed America was providing the source of
enough steel in the form of scrap metal to enable Japan
to continue her imperialistic ventures. Giving the year

1957 as an excellent example, the article illustrated

 

44New York Times, December 14, 1957, p. 18.

45Ibid., "Let's Avert War," Vital Speeches Of Theggy,
IV (Feb. IS, 1958), pp. 284-287; U.S. Congress, House, 75
Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937. Congressional Record,
LXXXII, 1958.

100

that in Japan, of the 5,500,000 tons of steel produced,
2,000,000 tons of scrap were utilized in this production,
1,900,000 tons of which were supplied by the United
States.46 Obviously, any sudden stOppage of the flow
of raw material would adversely affect Japan's ability
to produce the steel so necessary to carry on a war.

Totally agreeing with McManus' views, Scott extended
the concept of a boycott to include other powers who,
though at the present timid and reluctant to oppose
aggressive powers either in Europe or Asia, would be
willing to follow the American example and initiate
economic sanctions of their own against Japan.47
Resorting finally to a moral plea to reinforce his
arguments, Scott warned that the United States would
stand convicted before the world of being the supplier
of the Japanese war makers and the responsible party
for the death of countless innocent Chinese women and
children.48

Not content with entering articles into the
Congressional Record or putting forth his views on the

-—_

46U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., May 18,
1938, Congresgignal Record, LXXXIII, 2045-2047.

47Ibid.
481bid.

101

floor of Congress, Scott, in an address on May 25,
continued his plea for America to reverse its present
economic policy towards Japan. His ideas, he remarked,
would not only promote peace but would help China resist
a Japanese takeover as well. Unfortunately, Scott, like
Pittman, King, Coffee, and Schwellenbach, also failed
to explain why a change in the present economic policy
towards dapan would not trigger some form of retaliation
against the United States.49

When Scott was defeated in the Congressional election
of 1958, his fellow Congressman from California H. Jerry
Voorhis, took over his fight for ending trade with Japan.
Although holding views similar to Scott's, Voorhis was
also sure that ultimately the United States would become
involved in war with Japan if the sanctions were not put

into effect.50

Both Scott and Voorhis emphasized the
moral aspects of trading with Japan, claiming it was
making American businessmen wealthy at the expense of
innocent Chinese women and children who were victims

51

of the Japanese perfidiousness. Since the outbreak

A‘

49l22909 May 25, 1958, pp. 2150-2152.

50U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutralit Hearin s, 75tn Cong., lst sess., 1957,

 

 

pp. 89-94; Ibid., Cong., lst sess., 1959, pp. 41-45;
Block, ed., Current Biggraphy-1941, pp. 888-889.
51

Ibid.

102

of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Voorhis had urged ending
the supply of war materials to Japan; unlike the other
members of the anti-Japanese bloc, he claimed to be
motivated not totally by a sense of sentimentality towards
the Chinese but rather out of a deep concern over the
immorality of shipments of arms and munitions to a
country which had violated international treaties with
treacherous behavior.52
The fourth member of the House of Representatives,
Democrat Charles I. Faddis of Pennsylvania, completely
agreed with Coffee, Scott, and Voorhis' desire to embargo
trade to Japan. In an appearance before the House hearings
on Neutrality Legislation in April, 1959, Faddis declared
himself a leading advocate for terminating trade with
Japan, saying that he had urged this policy since the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Stressing the
moral aspects of American trade with Japan as had Scott
and especially Voorhis, Faddis claimed that such trade
was not only detrimental to China, but that halting it
was the only honorable course for the United States to
follow. Throughout the remainder of his testimony to
the House committee, Faddis maintained this position,

 

52Ibid., See letter to FDR, December 29, 1957,
"Chinese-Japanese War 1958," folder, Box 6, OF-150-C,
FDR MSSa

105

calling for an end to Japan's aggression, and indicating
his willingness to follow any policy that would accomplish
that goal.53

With the loss of the Pana , two Republicans also
began speaking out against Japan, establishing by this
action the first indications of bi-partisan support to
augment the prestige of the anti-Japanese faction.
Representative William P. Lambertson (R. Kansas), in an
address to the House shortly after the war vessel was
sunk, announced that he had received letters from his
brother-in-law, Dr. Frank J. White, who had resided for
the past thirty years in China as President of the
Shanghai Baptist College. Strongly anti-Japanese, Dr.
White exerted significant influence over Lambertson, who
credited the reports provided by his relation in China
with enabling him to be better informed on the Japanese
aggression in that nation than his peers. Reflecting Dr.
White's dislike of the Japanese, the Kansan quite readily
supported an economic boycott to stOp Japan. Moreover,
he emphatically remarked that economic restrictions would
not lead to war since Japan lacked the means to wage a

trans-Pacific conflict. The only adverse result from the

 

53U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., lst sess.,
1939, pp. 6-70

 

104

sanctions, he advised the House, would be a slight loss
in revenue which could be easily remedied by increasing
trade with China.54 While Lambertson added nothing new
to the debate over American policy vis-a-vis Japan, his
claims of inside knowledge about affairs within China
did add credence to the fears growing among a number of
Congressmen over further Japanese encroachments in Asia.
The other Republican calling for a harsher policy
towards Japan, Congressman Robert Rich of Pennsylvania,
introduced House Joint Resolution 574, directing the
President to suspend commercial relations with the
Empire of Japan while that nation occupied Chinese
territory.55 Rich discounted, as had other anti-Japanese
members of Congress, the possibility that American withdrawal
of raw materials from Japanese markets might strengthen
the militarists. Instead, he theorized that continued
trade with America was responsible for enhancing the
militarists at the expense of the moderates in Japan.
Accepting uncritically the ideas of Dr. E. Stanley Jones,

a missionary in India, Rich maintained his opposition to

S4U.S. Congress, House, 75“I Cong., 2nd sess., December
21, 1957, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 592.

55Ibid., 75th Cong., 5rd sess., January 17, 1938,

Congressggnal_Record, LXXXIII, 643: Ibid., 75th Cong.,
ll: sess., January 26, 1958, Congressional Record, LXXKIII,
0.

105

trade with Japan over the next two years. Dr. Jones

had been a Methodist missionary to China where he taught
school and had served in the Secretariat of the Conference
On Pacific And Far Eastern Affairs in Washington from 1921
to 1922. A supporter of the American Committee, Jones

by 1941 had an idea he could mediate the Sino-Japanese

56

war and avoid American participation. Jones' conviction

 

56Ibid., Congressman John M. Vorys of Ohio seemed to

sponsor Jones even more than Rich did. For example, consult
Vorys to Roosevelt, July 11, 1941, "Chinese-Japanese War,
1940-1941," folder, Box 6, OF-l50-C, FDR MSS; See also
Ibid., October 27, 1941, "Japan-Miscellaneous, 1941-1945,"
folder, Box 4, 0F-l97A. Vorys desired Jones to be one of
three Americans sent to the Pacific in the hopecf mediating
the Sino-Japanese conflict. Jones' ideas may be consulted
in his article, "Apply The Gandhi Method To Japan,"
Christian Century, LVI (Feb. 2, 1939). pp. 184-185; For
Jones' correspondence with Roosevelt, see Jones to Roosevelt,
November 27, 1941, "Japan-Miscellaneous," folder, Box 4,
OF-197A, FDR MSS; Consult Foreign Rglations Of The United
States; Far East, IV, pp. 557-558. For Jones' link to the
American Committee, see Jones to Greene, December 2, 1958,
Greene MSS. For Jones' statements of friendship for Japan
and his attempts at reconciliation with that nation through
the settlement of economic, immigration, and political
problems consult the following: "An Open Letter To The
PeOple Of Japan," Christian Centur , LIV (Sept. 15, 1957),
pp. 1151-1155; Ibid., "The Unly Door To Peace: An Open
Letter To The Japanese PeOple And The Christians Of The
World," LV (Feb. 16, 1958), pp. 205-204; Ibid., "What Is
America's Role In This Crisis?," LVIII (Mar. 19, 1941),
pp. 588-590; Ibid., "Did Japan's Envoys Know?," LVIII

(Dec. 24, 194 , p. 1615: Ibid., "The Score So Far," LIX
(May. 20, 1942 , pp. 661-662; Ibid., "Jones Urges Definition
Of Aims In Pacific," LIX (Aug. I2, 1942), p . 975-974; See
also "Reaching The Unreached," Time, XXXVI (Oct. 14, 1940),
p. 80; Block, ed., Current Biography-1940, pp. 458-440;

In addition consult E. Stanley Jones, 1"Asia: The Acid Test,"
as quoted in HarrOp Arthur Freeman, ed., Peace Is The
Victory (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944). pp. 208-227.

ones views concerning Japan are found on pp. 225-227; In
his writing, Jones did not desire to see Japan punished,
destroyed or relegated to a second-rate power. He wanted to
give Japan the island of New Guinea for her surplus pOpulation.

106

that an abrogation of all commercial enterprises would
return the moderates to power persuaded the Pennsylvania
Congressman to eventually call Specifically for an oil
embargo by the summer of 1941.57
By the summer of 1959, an increasing number of
Congressmen concerned over American trade with Japan
began favoring an embargo in the hOpe it would cripple
the Japanese war making ability and put an end to further
military expansion. Use of economic pressures to stOp the
war in Asia had great appeal because Congressmen advocating
this policy credited it with alleviating the need for the
United States to intervene militarily. They appeared to
have given little consideration to the possibility of a
Japanese retaliatory thrust to counter the economic
coercion of the United States. On the contrary, convinced
of the correctness of their policy, Senators like Pittman,
King, and Schwellenbach, along with their counterparts in
the House, worked hard at converting other Congressmen to
their ideas. They were moderately successful in the first
few months after the sinking of the Eapgy; a small bi-
partisan base had begun to form in favor of the embargo.
But Congress as a whole still remained unwilling to

consider such strong action.

 

57U.S. Congress, House, 77“1 Cong., lst sess., June 6,
1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 5659.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PEACE AND HONOR

While the anti-Japanese group spent the years from
1957 to 1959 urging passage of an embargo against Japan,
they failed to gain sufficient support for such a harsh
action. Instead, throughout the two years prior to
Hitler's invasion of Poland in the early autumn of 1939.
Congress remained staunchly convinced that the United
States must not intervene in conflicts between other
nations. Within this general area of agreement, however,
there was considerable divergence over just how America
ought to respond to Japanese aggression short of using
economic sanctions.

For some Congressmen, fear or dislike of Japan was a
secondary concern compared with their overriding interest
in protecting America's rights as a neutral without re-
sorting to war. The resumption of fighting in China posed
numerous problems connected with this issue for Senator
Borah. Faced with the dilemma of whether or not to invoke
the Neutrality Act of May, 1937, along with the question
of how best to protect American nationals residing in China,
Borah responded by adhering to the principle that the
United States must uphold traditional neutral rights.

In the case of Neutrality Legislation, his opposition to
107

108

its being invoked rested on the premise that only Japan
would be aided by such action. Borah claimed it was
obvious that "...there is war-—an aggressive war", in
China, and its reality would not be augmented by the
President officially recognizing its existence.1
Reflecting his strong desire to defend American
rights as a neutral, Borah's response to American citizens
being fired upon proved to be as consistent as his stand
on the Neutrality Act. Regardless of who fired on his
countrymen, Borah had a standard reaction; they should not
evacuate areas where they earned their livelihood and
carried on legitimate business and residence. Thus, when
Chinese forces accidentally shelled the USS Auggsta on
August 20, 1957, while anchored in the Wangpoa River,
Borah merely described the incident as one of those
unfortunate occurrences that happen where war exists.
Admitting that he "...did not know of anything affirmative
the government could do", he meanwhile Opposed removal of
Americans from China while the flag was under fire.2
Similarly, when Japan sank the Baggy four months later,

on December 12, 1957, Borah urged restraint, remarking

 

1New York Times, August 51, 1957, p. 3.
21bid., August 20, 1937, p. 3.

109

"...the incident was one of those regrettable things. It
does not appear so far to require drastic action by

the United States."3 If indeed Borah desired anything,

it was that the United States do nothing provocative to
antagonize the Japanese Government or people. In a letter
to a constituent, he clearly indicated his unwillingness to
vote to send American boys to the Orient because of a boat
that was sunk while traveling in a dangerous zone.4 He
did continue to support the maintenance of naval vessels
and American military forces to protect American nationals
and concluded America could maintain her presence in China
and defend her rights in that nation while also avoiding
war with Japan. Borah acknowledged the possibility of
both policies; he did not consider protecting American
self-respect and national interests in China contingent
upon becoming involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He
only feared that internationalists would label Japan a

menace to world peace and Congress would pass bills relating

 

3Ibid., December 14, 1957, p. 18; See also Literary
Di"est, CXXV (Jan. 18,1958), p. 8; U. S. Congress, Senate,
753 Cong., 2nd sess., December 15, 1957, Congressional
Record, LXXXII, 1556.

 

4CorreSpondence, December 17, 1957, Borah MSS,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

 

110

to expansion of the Navy. Otherwise, Borah considered
talk of war with Japan "sheer folly" and inconceivable
given the size navy Japan would need in order to attack
America or any of her possessions.5

Even though he advocated policies similar to those
espoused by Borah, Hiram Johnson tended to speak out
more harshly than his colleague when American citizens
were fired upon. The sinking of the gapgy so disturbed
Johnson that he made a long speech in the Senate, voicing
his fear that the United States Government might admonish
its citizens to leave areas in which hostilities were
occurring. If such a doctrine became accepted Johnson
claimed, it would then endanger America's neutral rights
and he rejected it saying:

I will not subscribe to the idea that a

gunboat of America may be blown to pieces

because somebody may see fit to take a shot

at her and then subsequently, with tongue i

cheek, say that she is sorry and apologize.
Nevertheless, Johnson decided to follow the Adminis-
tration's decision to accept the apology and reparations

and let the matter rest. He did this not because he

generally supported the Roosevelt Administration, but

 

5Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Policy,
Po 2340

6U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December
13, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1357; New Ygrk
Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

111

because he did not want to unnecessarily provoke any
Japanese retaliation against Americans residing or
stationed in China.7
Holding a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee in
the House, ranking Republican from New York, Hamilton
Fish, initially called for the President to declare a
state of war in China and thereby cause the provisions
of the Neutrality Act to be implemented. Until the
bombing of the Egpgy Fish had been content to call for
the United States to adhere strictly to a non—inter—
ventionist position by removing all of its citizens
from China. He also hoped to end extraterritoriality
because of the "...antiquated policy of maintaining
troops and ships in foreign territories", which could
lead to involvement in the conflict raging in China.8
In conjunction with his warning of the danger of
war, Fish also considered it impractical to have the
American Government spend 10 million dollars a year
for maintenance and upkeep of 2,500 Marines and 10

gunboats to protect American business interests in

China totaling but 50 million dollars.9 Fish neglected

 

71b1d.

8U.S. Congress, House, 75Ln Cong., 1st sess., August
3, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXrl, 8156-8158; New York

 

Times, July 22, 1957, p. 10.
91bid.

In

112

to mention the number of educational, medical, and
religious missionaries in China that were also protected
by these trOOps and outlays of monies; he was content

to allude only to the economic spheres of influence.

In addition, Fish considered the war a problem affecting
China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and to a large extent,
Great Britain, which had a billion dollars invested in
China. It was in the best interest of the United States
to remain aloof from the conflict, and as an additional
inducement for accepting this position Fish indicated
that by comparison with the Chinese market, United States
trade with Japan was far greater of the two, totaling
200 million dollars per annum.

Believing so strongly that the United States refrain
from any involvement in Asia, it is not surprising to find
that the President's refusal to find a state of war
existing in China irritated the New York Congressman
tremendously. Referring to this matter, Fish sarcastically
commented:

If the President does not know a state of war
exists in China today, or if the Secretary of
State does not know this, then the adminis-
tration had better get a new Secretary of
State, because there is no one in this country

who does not know that a state of war exists
in China at the present time.10

 

10U.S. Congress, House, 75“ Cong., 2nd sess.,

November 17, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 92.

113

Fish blamed prOpagandists in Congress, the State
Department, and the White House for trying to make

the invoking of the Neutrality Law appear favorable

to Japan; throughout the crisis he disagreed with this
form of reasoning. Instead, he insisted that the
United States had already admitted the existence of
war in Asia when it signed the Brussels Declaration

11

stating, "The war in China had brought to all peOples

of all nations a sense of horror and indignation, to

all the world a feeling of uncertainty and apprehension."12

The failure to invoke the Neutrality Legislation proved
so reprehensible to Fish that he managed to correlate
this omission with the spectre of fascism by reasoning:

If the President can pick out any law he
wants to and enforce it or not enforce it,
when he has a special constitutional duty
to carry out and execute this law like any
other law then we are in the midst of
fascism.13

 

11

12U.S. Congress, House, 75“ Cong., 2nd sess.,
November 17, 1937, Congressional Record, LKXXII, 92.

Italics are mine.

13Ibid., Interestingly, one of the organizations
Fish referred to was the American Committee. At first
the Committee criticized Fish for not understanding world
affairs. See Greene to Price, March 4, 1939, RSG Folder
# l, ACNPJA Papers; One year later when Fish stood for
a harsher policy towards Japan and joined Borah and
Johnson in asking for a defense of American neutral
rights Greene was pleased that the New York Republican
was now calling for economic embargoes. See Greene to
Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers. For
Fish it revealed no reluctance to become hostile to Japan
while maintaining a reluctance to become belligerent in
European matters.

 

114

With the sinking of the nggy Fish ended his pleas
for American citizens and armed forces to leave China.
Although cautioning the House that "the American peOple
must not under any circumstances become hysterical and

14

beat the war drums", over this latest attack on her

citizens, he called the sinking an international tragedy.15
Fish further acknowledged that while "the angel of death
for Americans was near", such considerations should not

encourage the United States into withdrawing any civilian

16 Like Borah and

or military personnel from China.
Johnson, Fish, too, was anxious to avoid war with Japan,

but he did not want any hasty departure from Eastern Asia.17
In line with his new belligerency, Fish even began to

call for a defense of the nation's rights and interests

in China; he did not consider his actions jeopardizing

peace because he was convinced Japan would settle the
dispute expeditiously by acceding to Roosevelt's demands

for compensation to cover the loss of American lives and

18

property. What Fish did fear was that the United

 

14U.S. Congress, House, 75"1 Cong., 2nd sess.,
December 20, 1937, Go ressional Record, LXXXII, 1968.

lslbid.
lélbid.
17Ibid.

181bid., 1969.

i“

An;

A.

115

States might provoke Japan by using the incident as an
excuse to initiate a total boycott against her, a position
he did not support entirely until 1941. Considering
either a boycott or an embargo an act of war against a
"...highly sensitive, highly patriotic, and proud
militaristic race", Fish declared:

If we adopt this provocative policy and

permit it to spread-—that we will not buy

from Japan, that we will boycott her, that

we will go further into embargoes, reprisals,

and economic sanctions——then I say it is a

step towards war.19

Deeply anxious over antagonizing Japan to the point

of war, Fish continued to favor eventual American with-
drawal from China; yet reflecting his new and harsher
stance, he refused to have America appear intimidated
because a gunboat had been sunk. As a precaution against
such incidents occurring again, Fish encouraged deve10ping
and building a navy "second to none" which would force
Japan to have second thoughts about launching a naval war
against America.20 Wanting even further insurance against
Japan becoming a serious threat to American security, Fish

persisted in his previous request for implementing the

neutrality legislation despite his growing belligerency,

 

19Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1937, p. 2.

20U.S. Congress, House, 75“ Cong., 2nd sess.,
December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1968-
1971.

116

in the belief that by prohibiting Japanese purchases of
arms, ammunition, and other implements of war from the
United States, her aggression in Eastern Asia would be
substantially reduced.21

Of all the Congressmen to favor defending American
rights in Asia against Japanese encroachments, only Fish
argued that the neutrality legislation offered the best
means for restraining further Japanese assaults on China's
integrity. Other members of this group, like Borah and
Johnson, while equally anxious to avoid extending Japanese
power, adhered to the view that any admission by Roosevelt
that a state of war existed in China would automatically .
benefit Japan's war machine. But despite such differences,
on one issue all could readily acquiesce, morally and
ethically, the United States was bound to defend its
rights as a neutral; an idea, which when extended to the'
conflict in Asia, implied that America would not be coerced
into withdrawing under fire.

Differing sharply from such an attitude, Congressmen
like Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper pleaded instead
for a total withdrawal of American civilian and military '

22

personnel from China. Senator Nye epitomized a

 

211bid.. pp. 1971-1972.

22W. August 14. 1937. p- 1.

117

significant portion of Senate Opinion over the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident by his insistence that the President
declare a state of war existing in China, thereby making

it mandatory for the Administration to institute the
Neutrality Act. In addition, Nye called for the embargo
of all shipments of scrap metal overseas.23 PrOphetically,
he stated that the continuous shipment of scrap metal
would return to the United States someday in the "...flesh

and in the bodies of our sons."24

When the ngay was
bombed and sunk, Nye, like many of his colleagues, tended
to view this disaster as one that could have been avoided
if only the Neutrality Legislation had been activated and
Americans withdrawn from China.25 Such incidents served
to reinforce fears of an eventual conflict with Japan

and convinced Nye that it would be best for America to
abandon her claims to neutral rights in China.26

Endorsing Nye's sentiments, Arthur Vandenberg

 

23U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., lst sess., August
10, 1957, Congressional Record, LXXKI, 8585-8586.

24Ibid.

25New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

26U.S. Congress, Senate, 75m Cong., lst sess., August
10, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8585-8586; Cole,

Senator Gerald P. Nye AndlAmerican Foreign Relations, pp.
9- O.

118

reiterated the demand for America to remain neutral. In
response to those Senators who argued such a course would
be detrimental to China in her fight against Japan, the
Michigan Republican replied that it was not America's
business, as a neutral, to worry about what effect such

27

a position would have on any nation. Not only did
Vandenberg consider it foolish for the United States to
try and equalize any differences between belligerents by
direct participation, he warned it would only serve to
antagonize Japan further.28 For the next two years,
neither Vandenberg's position nor the content of his
speeches shifted from this approach to foreign relations.
In complete agreement with Nye and Vandenberg's non-
belligerent policy towards Japan, Senator Capper considered
a complete withdrawal of Americans from Ciina not only
prudent but necessary to avoid a clash with Japan. He
was alarmed about the ramifications of the sinking of the
Pana , and was relieved when America and Japan settled the
issue quickly and peacefully. Nevertheless, Capper feared

the American Government and peOple's pacific reaction to

the Panay affair might change to one demanding retribution

 

27New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 1; Vandenberg
to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg MSS.

281bid.

 

119

if another incident occurred. Capper disavowed arguments
made by his fellow Senators like Borah and Johnson who
stressed the need to maintain a strong American military
establishment in China. In Capper's Opinion, the best
way to avoid war would be to remove potential causes of
friction by pulling out of China.29

Joining with his Republican counterparts in forming
the nucleus of a non-belligerent movement in Congress
was Democratic Senator Clark of Missouri. He strongly
criticized any action that would worsen relations with

30 As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations

Japan.
Committee, Clark used every opportunity to express his
beliefs, often times intemperately questioning the
witnesses appearing before the committee when they did
not share his convictions.31
This third strand of Congressional opinion towards
Japan, as represented by Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and
Capper, deviated little over the next two years from an

endorsement of absolute neutrality. Contrary to their

 

zgflgzizessiiiees. December 18. 1937. p. 2 and June
17, 1938, p. 3.

30Ibid.; Also consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 75m
Cong., lst sess., Appendix, Co ressional Record, LKXXI,
2187.

31Senate Lend-Lease Hear' 5, in particular, pp. 885-
896, offers Insight into Clarfigs position in the coercive
and belligerent cross-examination of the 1940 Republican
candidate for the Presidency, Wendell Willkie.

120

fellow Congressmen who were equally anxious to avoid war
with Japan, members of this third coalition proved quite
willing to sacrifice America's rights as a neutral if,
in so doing, peace could be maintained. Fearful of
making any move to antagonize Japan, the moral aspect of
American neutral rights, so crucial to Congressmen like
Borah, Johnson, and Fish, was only an irrelevant incidental
to Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper.

Apparently, other members of Congress, in the months
following the sinking of the Panay, were equally willing
to sacrifice American neutral rights in China by adding
their support to the non-belligerent faction in Congress.
One such Senator, Robert R. Reynolds (D. North Carolina),
had been a leader in previous fights against collective
security measures. Prior to renewal of the Sino-Japanese
conflict in 1957, Reynolds had remarked the American
Government and people had nothing to fear from Japan.
In fact, Japan provided a bulwark against Russian penetration

32

in Asia and communism in China. But after the Panay
affair, Reynolds changed his position, calling for a
complete withdrawal from China in order to prevent another
collision with Japan similar to the one that had just

occurred. Reynolds had no doubt that the majority of

 

32New York Times, January 17, 1936, p. 15.

121

Americans favored such a policy as well.33

Reynolds wrote an article for the Washipgton Herald
decrying the Administration's lack of realism for
insisting the United States defend China from aggression.
That the Government had never offered or insisted upon
defending China from aggression did not prevent Reynolds
from making the charge. Although his accusation.was
untruthful, it left an erroneous impression that the
Government was moving to a more belligerent stance
vis-a-vis Japanese aggression in Asia. In concluding
the article, Reynolds noted that America had withdrawn
troops from Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and Mexico, and
asked why then were troops still in China.“

While a diplomatic settlement was being sought by
the United States and Japan, the only serious threat to
the Administration's policies after the sinking of the
Pansy came from the renewal of the war referendum
amendment proposal by Indiana Democratic Congressman

Louis Ludlow of Indianapolis. Ludlow had found both

 

33U.S. Congress, Senate, 75m Cong., 2nd sess.,
December 13, 1937, Coggressional Record, LXXXII, 1356-
1358; Ibid., 75“ Cong., 3rd sess., January 105 1938,

Co ressional Record, LXXXIII, 2593 Few York imes,
December 18, 1937, p. 2.

34U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess.,
December 21, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 581-582.

122

belligerents in the Sino—Japanese conflict guilty of
using the United States as a supply house from which to
provision themselves for a long war, especially the
Japanese}5 The amendment attempted to avoid war with
Japan by having the American Government completely
extricate itself from any responsibility for protecting
either its citizens or their interests in China.

A leading non—interventionist, Ludlow was distrustful
of Roosevelt's foreign policies and had on an earlier
occasion introduced war referendum bills which had
included the request that except in the event of attack
or invasion, the authority of Congress to declare war
shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority

36 If the

of all votes cast in a nationwide election.
referendum became law, it was hOped that it could prevent
the President from involving the nation in a world
conflict. The use of a referendum rested upon the fear
that an aggressive President could easily by-pass the

Congress and the peOple if he desired to join in a world

confrontation even when Opposed by the majority of the

 

35New York Times, September 14, 1937, p. 12.

36House Joint Resolution 167, U.S. Congress, House,
74th Cong., lst sess., February 14, 1935, Congressional
Record, LXXIX, 1991.

123

people and their representatives. By February 5, 1937,
Ludlow had added invasion of territorial possessions
of the United States to his prOposal.37
Within twenty-four hours after the nggy sank in the
Yangtze River, Ludlow gained the opportunity to bring his
resolution to the floor of the House by seeking a dis-
charge Of his petition from the House Judiciary Committee.
The House leaders scheduled January 10, 1938 as the day
for the vote on whether the resolution should be brought
out of committee and considered for debate on the floor
of the House.58
The debate in the press and various periodicals
revealed that the die-hard non-interventionist supported
the prOposal as a way to remain aloof from war and to

deprive the Chief Executive of the means for taking the

nation to war without a mandate from the peOple.39 But

 

37House Joint Resolution 199, U.S. Congress, House,
75th Cong., lst sess., Papers accompanyinggspecific Bills
and Resolutions, NA. LD.

38Whitney H. Shepardson and William C. Scroggs, Thg
Upited States In Wopld Affairs: An Account Of American
Foreign Relations, 1238 (New York: Harper and Brothers,
939), P0 1550

39For a summary of Ludlow's thinking, consult his
answers to the following telegrams. Blair Taylor to
Ludlow, December 19, 1937, "December," folder; Leo
Traugott to Ludlow, January 3, 1938, "Jan. l-3, 1938,"
folder, Ludlow MSS, Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana. For Nye's support see Cole,
Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations,
p. 121; For Senator LaFollette, see Foreign Policy
Bulletin, XVII (Dec. 24, 1937), p. 3; Capper‘s attitude

 

1

124

a leading non-interventionist, Arthur Vandenberg, called
the prOposal "highly dangerous rather than protective"
while Senator King, speaking for the anti-Japanese
forces, remarked that the proposal "...is equivalent
to telling a nation like Japan to go ahead and slap
us in the face. Anything you do is all right with
us."40

The final vote revealed a rejection of Ludlow's
action. The vote had been close, 188 to 209, with 111
Democrats, 64 Republicans, 8 Progressives, and 5 Farm-
Laborites supporting the resolution. The Opposition

contained 188 Democrats and 21 Republicans.41

Viewing
Ludlow's proposed amendment as an attempt to thwart the

President's decision making and control of the nation's

 

may been seen in "Should A War Referendum Amendment Be
Added To The Constitution"," Congressional Diggst, XVII
(Feb. 1938), pp. 143-144; Literary Digest, CXXV‘(Jan. 1,
1938), p. 7; See also U.S. Congress, House, 75m Cong.,

3rd sess., Appendix, Con ressional Record, LXXXII, pp. 25-
26; pp. 233-234; pp. 532-533 for additional support by
Representatives Koppelmann (D. Connecticut), Fish

(New York) and Bigelow (D. Ohio), respectively.

4OLiterary Digest, cxxv (Jan. 1, 1938), p. 7;
Ludlow agreed with King that Japan was America's enemy;
see U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., lst sess., January
14, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 228.

41New York Times, January 11, 1938, p. 1; Department
of State, Public Attitude Studies (Washington: G.P.O.,
1941), p. 74; The actual vote may be found in U.S. Congress,
House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., January 10, 1938, Con-
gressional Record, LXXXIII, 282-283.

125

diplomacy, many non-interventionists voted against it.
The closeness of the vote indicated the disinclination of
a significant number of Congressmen to become involved

in hostilities overseas, but the fact that it was
rejected showed that of even more importance was a
reluctance by Congress to limit the President's power

to conduct foreign policy and deprive themselves of a
Constitutional provision.

American withdrawal from China, a position associated
more frequently with Nye, Vandenberg, Capper, and Clark,
for a time attracted the support of certain pro-Adminis-
tration Senators as well. Senators Tom Connally, Elbert
Thomas, and James Hamilton Lewis favored policies of
non-intervention in their initial response to the Sino-
Japanese conflict. Senator Thomas, a long time friend
of Japan, tried to convince his colleagues and countrymen
the Japanese could be won over to a moderate, peaceful
policy. Moreover, if America truly wanted to avoid war,
Thomas suggested refraining from any intervention on behalf
of China. Thomas also hesitated over putting the Neutrality
Legislation into effect, apprehensive such a move would
anger Tokyo. He foresaw that should the United States
recognize a state of war when it had not been legally
declared by those involved, Japan might be provoked into
attacking Americans residing in China. A further

ramification of recognizing the war, Thomas added, might

126

be to cause:

...each nation now fighting to declare that

war was forced on them as a result of America's

action and the present ignoble lawlessness

would become a glorious war, a war, too, which

would, by the governments affected, be justified

and therefore made bigger and more intrinsic by

appeals to patriotism, sacrifice, and devotion

to country. 2
Believing, even after the sinking of the Pana , that it
would be in the best interests of the United States and
Japan to reach a rapprochement, Thomas reminded his
colleagues that Japan, by admitting it was wrong and
compensating the families of the men lost in the incident,
had undercut any argument for going to war.43 In addition
to promising to pay indemnities to the families of the
crew members, Japan also agreed to punish the military
personnel responsible for their deaths, leading Thomas to
conclude that the apology and payment should end the
controversy in Congress and the nation.44

Nevertheless, even while he worked for Japan's

 

42U.S. Congress, Senate, 75Ln Cong., 2nd sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LAXAII, 96; Undated
news release, Box 7, Thomas MSS.

43New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18; See
also Thomas to Willis w. Ritter, December 20, 1937, "R,"
folder, Box 26, and Thomas to Jiuji G. Kasai, a member of
the House of Representatives in the Japanese Imperial Diet,
February 9, 1938, and March 23, 1938, unmarked folder,
Box 25, Thomas MSS.

44Ibid.

127

friendship, the war in China began to irritate the Senator
from Utah. As early as November, 1937, Thomas indicated
reluctance over using the Neutrality Legislation, convinced
that by putting it into effect Japan's superiority over
China would be increased.45 By February 13, 1939, Japan's
strongest ally in the Senate had introduced a new proposal,
Senate Joint Resolution 67, which if passed would have
given the President the authority to forbid exports to
belligerents. There was, however, one important exception;
if the Chief Executive considered a country the victim of

aggression he could lift the embargo to aid that nation in

 

45See reprint of a speech over Columbia Broadcasting
Company sponsored by World Peaceways, Inc., a non-profit
organization for public information on peace and inter-
national affairs. Also letter, J. Max Weis to Thomas
in folder, "November 4 Neutrality Act And Sino-Japanese
Conflict," Box 5 and Thomas to G. Shiraishi, November 16,
1937, "S," folder, Box 26, both in Thomas MSS. Thomas'
speech in Salt Lake City, November 4, 1937 concerning
neutrality and the Sino-Japanese conflict is enlightening
for his view in "Chinese-Japanese War," folder, OF-lbO-C,
Box 5, FDR MSS. U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd
sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 96; For
Thomas' concern that neutrality legislation would not
keep the United States out of war see, "United States
Relations With Foreign Countries," Vital Speeches Of Thg
Day, II (Oct. 7, 1935), pp. 3-5; "Theory Of Neutrality,"
Annals, CLXXAVI (July. 1936), pp. 163-168; Ibid., CLXXXXII
(331?? 1937), Supplement, pp. 131-137; "Confifipartial
Neutrality Be Maintained," Vital Speeches Of The Day,
v (Oct. 1, 1939). pp. 743-746.

128

46 In attempting unsuccessfully to reverse

its struggle.
the supposedly neutral provisions contained in the
Neutrality Act of 1937 by allowing the President latitude
to determine the aggressor and the victim, Thomas'
sponsorship of the measure portended growing animosity
within the Senate towards the EurOpean dictatorships and
Japan.47 If, within only two years, Japan's friend could
shift his position so radically that he would be willing
to allow Roosevelt the discretion to use an embargo
because of that nation's aggressive, imperialistic

policy,48 than what kind of attitudes could be expected

from other, less moderate members of Congress?

 

46U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., lst sess.,
February 13, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 1347;
New York Times, December 3, 1938, p. 10; Ibid., January
28, 1939, p. 5; Ibid., February 15, 1939, p. 2; Ibid.,
Marc; §6é4%939’ p. 29; Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality,
pp. 3 - 0

47Address by Thomas over Columbia Broadcasting
Company, March 16, 1939, defending his Senate Joint
Resolution 67 in "PrOposed Amendment To Neutrality Law,"
folder, Box 8, Thomas MSS; See also his speech "American-
Japanese Relations," American Forum Of The Air, II (Oct.
6, 1940), p. 4 found in RSG Folder # 5, ACNPJA Papers;
Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 239-246}

48U.S. Congress, Senate, 76m Cong., 1st sess.,
August 2, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 1067;
See Thomas' speech before the Institute Of World Affairs
held at Riverside, California, December 16, 1938, "The
Pnited States In World Affairs," folder, Box 7, Thomas
ASS.

 

129

Another Democratic admirer of Roosevelt, Senator
Lewis of Illinois, acted as one of the Senate's most
vocal members in condemning Japanese aggression during
the days following the outbreak of fighting in North
China. He paralleled Thomas' position on the Neutrality
Law, agreeing that it would be wrong for the President
to acknowledge the war because, "if America recognized
a state of war existing in China, the United States would
find itself in a conflict with both China and Japan."49
Lewis theorized that the moment the United States took
such a step, American merchants, businessmen, and other
nationals would be arrested, detained, and imprisoned,
thereby practically guaranteeing American intervention.50
Instead, he rationalized that since the fighting appeared
to be between sections and factions rather than between
countries, the whole affair could be reduced to the level
of a military action over a regional conflict, obviating
the need for any neutrality legislation. Anticipating
a possible collision between American and Japanese forces,
Lewis followed the same pattern as other non-interventionists
by asking for removal of United States trOOps from China,

especially those stationed in Northern China at Peking

 

”Wes. August 1. 1937, p. 30.
soIbid.

130

51 Inspired by his strong feelings over

and Tientsin.
this issue, Lewis presented a resolution in August,

1937, which enjoined the Secretary of .Iar to give the
reasons for keeping American trOOps in China.52 The
continued fighting in Asia, however, apparently began

to affect Lewis in much the same manner as it had

Thomas, because within three months after introducing

the resolution, the tone of Lewis's speeches had begun

to change slightly. In a speech on November 16, 1937,

he urged the defense of American interests in the Pacific;
otherwise Japan would, he prophesized, eventually attempt
to eliminate Americans from the Orient economically,
politically, and physically.53 At the time of his

death on April 9, 1939, Lewis was still calling for
withdrawal from China and defense of American interests

in the Pacific.54

 

51U. 8. Congress, Senate,’ 75“ Cong., lst sess., July
31,1937, Congressional Record, LXAXI, (918-7919; Ibid.,
75m Cong., lst sess., August 4, 1937, Congressional Record,
4W1, 8175-8179 a

52Senate Resolution 170 in Ibid., 751" Cong., lst
sess., August 6,1931, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8351;
The resolution was received, printed, and ordered to lie
on the table and there it remained. See Lewis' desire for
troop removals from China in New York Times, August 5,
1957, p. 5; U. S. Congress, Senate, “(5“ Cong., lst sess.,
August 16, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8939-8941.

53U. S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess.,
November 16,1937, Congressional Record, LXXAII, 580-581.

54Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1939, as found in Lewis
MSS.

131

Tom Connally, the last of the pro-Administration
Democrats to take a position of absolute neutrality in
1937, reacted, as had Thomas and Lewis to the situation
in China. Connally, too, feared that the United States
could readily become involved in the war, but he chose
another line of reasoning, different from either the views
of Thomas or Lewis, to further his cause. Invoking
patriotism, Connally stated:

Americans living in China owe it to their
country to get out of the Sino-Japanese war
zone. American citizens residing in China
owe a duty to their country no less than

citizens residing at home. 6
Stressing the selfish motives of American citizens in
China to bolster his position, Connally over-generalized
the situation by claiming these peOple were:

...generally in China for profit and their

own financial advancement. They should seek

to remove themselves from the scene of hos-

tilities. They should not expect American

boys residing at home in the United States to

fight in China to protect their dollars when

it is possible for them to avert our em-

broilment.56
Such arguments, although contrary to Connally's view of

world affairs, managed to shift the blame for a possible

 

55New York Times, September 8, 1937, p. 2; Connally's
Speech may also be found in the Fort Worth-Star Telegram,
September 20, 1937, p. 3 and Waco Times, Septemher 16, 1937,
p. 1, both in Scrapbook 602A, Connally HSS, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

561bid.

132

war to the Americans in China; they also revealed his
limited view of the Japanese-American situation.57

While Thomas, Lewis, and Connally devoted themselves,
initially, to gaining adherents for a policy of non-
intervention, another fellow Democratic Senator, Burton
K. Wheeler, followed a course uniquely his own. Denying
it was necessary to defend American rights as a neutral
yet disliking a position of complete uninvolvement or
total withdrawal, Wheeler did not adhere strongly to any
of the previously discussed reactions to the Sino-Japanese
war. On the contrary, he had little to say at the outset
of hostilities; it took Roosevelt's "Quarantine Speech"
on October 5, 1937. to arouse Wheeler's sentiments.
Agreeing with President Roosevelt's desire for peace,
Wheeler could not help worrying that if strong words
failed to contain Japan, the Chief Executive would have
no recourse but to quarantine the aggressor, increasing
the danger of the United States becoming involved in an
armed conflict.58 Even though he admitted "...that the

only way Japan can be brought to her senses is by an

 

57There is no hint to Connally's attitude in the
autobiography, My Name Is Tom Connall , but consult
Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons
0f Intervention In World War I Chicago: University of
hicago Press, 9 7 , p. 3 for earlier ideas on
neutrality.

58Washipgton Post, October 7, 1937. p. 7; Atlanta
Constitution,October 7, 1937, p. 3; Letter from Burton
K. Wheeler to author, April 30, 1969, in author's
possession.

133

economic boycott,"59 Wheeler recoiled from the consequences
of such an action. Over the next two years, he continued
to deplore Japanese aggression in China. At the same

time he remonstrated his fellow Senators against plunging
the United States "...into another war to make the world
safe for democracy for war as a means of encouraging and
fostering democracy had been tried and found wanting."60
Wheeler remained constant to this belief until the outbreak
of World War II in EurOpe.

It was evident from July 1937, to the outbreak of war
in Europe in September 1939, that no one group on Capitol
Hill dominated Congressional Opinion; yet each strove to
impose their philos0phy upon the rest. But over the two
year period succeeding the renewal of hostilities in China,
each group had clarified its position and, by the autumn
of 1939, their attitudes revealed a slow but steady
recognition that in the long run America's interests in
Asia might need more than token defense. Congress,
temporarily distracted from its concern over the Far East
by Hitler's invasion of Poland and the ensuing war in
EurOpe, never lost sight of the Japanese threat. Any

further polarization of the Congress' view of Japan was

 

59Washington Post, October 9, 1937, Pa 20

6OU.S. Congress, Senate, 75m Cong., 3rd sess., May 3,
1938, Congressional Record, LXXAIII, 6128.

134

avoided by that nation's alliance with the EurOpean
dictatorships the following year as well as her
continued violations of international law and morality
in Asia. From 1939 to 1941, therefore, groups became
increasingly fluid, reflecting a blurring of distinctions

between them as attitudes towards Japan hardened.

CHAPTER V
CONGRESSIONAL OPINION HARDENS

Until the summer of 1939, delineating Congressional
Opinion towards Japan had been a reasonably straight
forward task. But from this time onward events such as
America announcing the termination of the Commercial
Treaty Of 1911 on July 26, 1939} the Japanese invasion
Of Indo-China in July, 1940, and the signing by Japan of
the Tripartite Pact on September 27 of that same year,
offered prOponents of a harsher policy more Opportunities
for pressing their objectives. Rejecting their colleague's
alarm, a significant number Of Congressmen still favored
pacifying Japan; yet continued Japanese aggression was
making such policies less attractive and more difficult
to defend.

The policy providing the greatest appeal to
Congressmen throughout that troubled year proved to
be the one advocating firmness against further Japanese

encroachment on the Asian mainland. Still unprepared

 

1Announcement Of the pending termination Of the
Commercial Treaty may be found in Department Of State
Bulletin, July 29, 1959, I, p. 81 and Foreign Relations
Papers, Far East, III, pp. 558-559.

135

136

to accept a military solution, Congress expected the
embargo to accomplish this task, and the anti-Japanese
forces found an avid spokesman in Senator Schwellenbach.
Two weeks before the expiration of the Commercial Treaty,
he delivered a damning Speech against Japan before the
Women's Democratic Club in Washington, D.C. Tracing the
record of international affairs over the past decade, the
senior Senator from Washington concluded that since the
Manchurian Incident in 1931, the major powers had been
derelict in protecting weaker nations like China against
erosion of their independence. In order to justify his
claim that such incidents portended a general decline in
international morality, Schwellenbach pointed to pledges
incorporated into the Covenant Of the League of Nations
and theNine Power Treaty whereby the stronger nations

of the world Offered to guarantee the integrity Of weaker
nations. Having violated both Of these agreements, Japan
ought to be considered immoral, according to the Senator;
for that reason, if for no other, the United States had a
clear duty to prevent further Japanese expansion. Emphasis
on Japan's role as a treaty violator was not a new
argument; Schwellenbach only expanded a line of reasoning
previously used by Senator Pittman when he refuted the

signing of a prOposed non-aggression pact between Japan

137

and the United States.2 Perceiving the problem of how to
restrain Japan in a moral rather than a political context,
Schwellenbach also believed he had the right to criticize
Roosevelt's foreign policy for its failure tO protect
China. By allowing Japan access to American Oils, gasoline,
scrap iron, automobile parts and accessories, Schwellenbach
contended that the United States was thereby made an ac~
cessory in China's destruction. Such reasoning reflected
the influence upon Schwellenbach of the American Committee
and using language typical Of this committee's objectives,
he exhorted America to end such trade, stating:

We have provided the tools and the instru-

mentality by which China's integrity is

being destroyed. After January 26, the

Opportunity will have come to wash from our

hands the stain Of our violation Of this

agreement. If we speak seriously, if we

really are motivated by good faith, we can

do no less than to stOp participating in

this Chinese-Japanese war.3

The next month, Schwellenbach renewed his attack

on Japan. In an effort to awaken the peOple to the

immorality of America's position in Eastern Asia, he

 

2For Pittman's view of Japan as a treaty violator
and an immoral power, consult Chapter III, pp. 80-92;
New York Times, Ju1y 8, 1939’ P0 30

3Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, January
10, 1940, Schwellenbach MSS; Italics are mine.

138

spoke, one Sunday evening in February, on the American
Forum Of The Air, stating the United States was Japan's
"...number one partner in helping destroy China."4 This
situation had to end, he continued, so America could
regain her status as moral leader in international
affairs.5 By June, the Washington Democrat's irritation
over the continued flow of war materials to Japan turned
to anger; his belief that the end of the commercial
treaty would place a curb on goods to that nation had

failed to materialize.6

Referring repeatedly throughout
the year 1940 to this issue, he discounted fears that a
unilateral American embargo against Japan would bring on

a conflict.7 Throughout 1940, Schwellenbach's position
was supported and aided by the American Committee. Its
chairman, Roger Greene, wrote Schwellenbach on various
occasions praising his anti-Japanese resolutions, speeches,

and aid to the committee. Remarking that Schwellenbach's

endeavors were responsible for enlightening the country,

 

4Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach on the
American Forum Of The A;;, February 18, 1940, Schwellen-
bach MSS. The speech may also be found as an unmarked,
undated treatise in Schwellenbach Paperg, contained in
box entitled, "Speeches And Statements,".

5Ibid.

6Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, as quoted
in the Washin ton Dail News, June 15, 1940, p. 19 found
in undated entry, Box %, Schwellenbach MSS.

71b1d.

139

Greene called his support invaluable and clear sighted.8

With the situation in EurOpe rapidly deteriorating
into war, Key Pittman joined his fellow Westerner in
pushing for a strong policy in Asia out of a conviction
that the Far East held greater potential for American
involvement in war. Critical of any moderate prOposals,
saying they smacked of appeasement, Pittman remarked:

If the United States appeared afraid Of

Japan, then the chances of war in Asia

increased. The only way to thwart Japan

was to end all shipments of war supplies

lest Japan makes itself the master of all

China.9
In a letter from Henry L. Stimson to Pittman on January
22, the former Secretary of State in the Hoover Adminis-
tration echoed similar sentiments. Referring to his
desire for economic sanctions against Japan in 1931,
after her invasion Of Manchuria, Stimson agreed with
Pittman and Schwellenbach's call to end American shipments
of all war supplies to Japan. Stimson also enclosed a
cOpy Of his letter to the New York Timgg in which he
blamed the sale of war materials and the failure to get

the Neutrality Legislation invoked, not on the Adminis-

tration, but "...chiefly on the merchants who are selling

 

8Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, June 18,
1940, and September 24, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, "Con-
gressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

9Pittman in Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Pa ers, 76A-F9-146, January 8, 1940, NA. LD. Comments

may be found in folder marked "CorreSpondence K,";

 

140

to Japan the ore, the steel, and scrap iron."10 The
Government, he presumed, would now see fit to restrict
the substantial aid flowing to Japan. As Honorary
Chairman Of the American Committee, Stimson notified
Pittman that the committee's objectives were an honest
and intelligent attempt to place before the American
peOple one of the most significant issues in the
foreign policy of the country. Moreover, Stimson remarked
he would cOOperate with as well as support any measure
against Japan that Congress or the Executive branch
enacted.11
Once Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Pittman
called for a total embargo on all exports and imports
to Japan so that, "their airplanes will cease to fly,
and their bombs will cease to drOp on the unfortunate

12 Throughout October, in his

peOple of China."
campaign for reelection to the Senate, Pittman continued

to express harsh sentiments towards Japan, directing his

 

10Henry L. Stimson to Pittman, Senate Forei Relations
Committee Pa ers, 76A-F9-135, January 22, 1945, NA. LD,
found fo er marked "Various Subjects China-Japan,".

Stimson's letter may be found in the New York Times,
January 11, 1940, p. 1 as well as quoted in U.S. Congress,

76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressipnal Recogg,
Lxxxv1, 144-145.

11Ibid.; For the Government's action see Chapter VII.

12Pittman as quoted in Los Angeles Times, October 18,
1940, n.p. Article is in Pittman MSS.

141

wrath, in particular, towards the belligerent, anti-
American Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka. Calling
Matsuoka a "bluffing bulldog", Pittman told a crowd in
Reno, that the United States should not surrender any
rights in Asia regardless of what belligerent words

come out of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In what

was to be one of his last anti-Japanese outbursts before

he died in November, Pittman cautioned Americans not to

be intimidated in the Pacific region by an insignificant
soldier of the military clique now ruling Tokyo. Americans
must do everything to stay out of war in that region,
Pittman added; but Japan, and especially Matsuoka, should
not mistake America's pacifism for appeasement.13
Pittman's willingness to introduce strong anti-Japanese
rhetoric into his campaign indicated that in Nevada a
harsh stand against Japan would not displease his
constituency; in fact, Pittman was reelected in November,
only to die a week later. Pittman's death removed a
leading member of the anti-Japanese forces in the Senate.
Before he died, Pittman had correspondence and conver-
sations with Price and Greene of the American Committee.
Since the Committee's beginning in 1938, Pittman had

received its literature and advice on revision of

 

13New York Times, October 18, 1940, p. 3.

142

Neutrality Legislation and implementing an embargo against

Japan. In June, 1940, Price wrote Pittman praising the

latter's contributions to the cause, and assured him that

the Nevadan would continue to receive the Committee's

support, and by implication, their advice and scrutiny

as well.14
During the same period of time, Senator King and

Congressman Coffee added their endorsement to Pittman

and Schwellenbach's call for an embargo Of all exports

to Japan. King, as has already been noted, was even

willing to sever diplomatic relations, and throughout

1940, he deviated little from his advocacy Of a total

break with Japan.15 Frequently decrying the situation

in Eastern Asia, King remained a potent asset to the

anti-Japanese forces until his failure to gain renomi-

nation to the Senate during the Democratic primary in the

16

spring of 1940. In a letter to his wife on October 1,

 

14Greene to Price, January 31, 1940, February 18,
1940, and March 14, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Pa ers;
Ibid., unsigned letter to Greene, May 15, I945, RSG Folder

; Ibid., Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, "Congressional
Correspondence F119,"; Greene to Pittman, May 17, 1940,
Greene MSS.

15U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
Appendix, Con ressional Record, LXXXVI, 143-144; Ibid.,
76fll Cong., 3rd sess., January 25, 1940, Congressional
Record, LXXXVI, 666; William L. Langer and S. Everett
Gleason, The Challen e To Isolation 1 -l 0 (New York:
(Harper and Brothers, 9 2 , p. 578.

16See Chapter I, p. 25.

143

1940, Roger Greene wrote kindly and affectionately Of
King. Calling him a friend of China and as an ally of
the anti-Japanese committee, Greene expressed concern
that with the Utah Democrat losing his bid for reelection
that his help would be sorely missed on Capitol Hill.17
King had been a recognized stalwart of anti-Japanese
sentiment on the Hill as well as acting as a forum for
Greene and Price's committee.18
Meanwhile, in the House, Coffee led the movement
[for embargoing trade to Japan. Throughout 1940, he
inserted into the Congressional Record numerous articles
:reiterating his ideas. One of these, an important article
‘written by Harry Price, cited statistics to prove America
'was supporting Japan's war machine.19 Using information
similar to Price's to support an embargo, Coffee continued
his fight for Congressional approval of his House Reso-
lution 5432 which would end this undesirable American
trade.

Although the anti-Japanese bloc lost three of its

 

17Roger S. Greene to Mrs. Katherine Greene, October 1,
1940, Greene MSS.

18King's sentiments may be consulted, King to George
Fielding Eliot, November 9, 1940, "Congressional
Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

19U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., April
25, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2420-2421.

144

most prominent members in 1940, King, Pittman, and
Schwellenbach, who resigned from Congress on December 10,
to become a federal judge, their cause was never
significantly set back. Representative Hamilton Fish's
transformation exemplified the slow conversion of more
moderate Congressmen to greater hostility by Spring, 1940.
Having previously worked for a rapprochement with Japan
over the past two years, he had as recently as March 12,
1940, criticized an embargo for being too provocative and
'warlike an action. An embargo, Fish feared, might drive
Japan to declare war on China, blockade the Chinese coast

and lead to other unforeseen complications.2O

Nevertheless,
by April, 1940, with the renewal Of hostilities in EurOpe,
Fish found himself looking with more favor on an embargo
of arms, ammunition and implements of war to Japan along
'with protecting domestic scrap iron.21
Following Japan's signature on the Triple-Axis Pact,
the New York Congressman called for a complete embargo
against Japan and praised Roosevelt for the embargo
placed on scrap iron of September 26, although he still

considered the Government in Washington a dictatorship

 

201b1d., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., March 12,1940,
Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2730.

21Ibid., 76'11 Cong., 3rd sess., April 23, 1940,
80ngress1onal Record, LXXXVI, 4898.

145

22 Fish

led by the President and Left-Wing New Dealers.
typified the experience Of many Congressmen in the

months ahead, a slow and painstaking change from non-
belligerency towards Japan to one of great enmity.

For many Congressmen, the Administration's reluctance
to embargo all trade to Japan proved a constant irritant.
Their annoyance lay in the Government's assurances to
Japan following the termination Of the Commercial Treaty
of 1911 on January 26, 1940, that there would be no
complete rupture of commercial relations.23 Herein lay
a fundamental problem for the anti-Japanese group in
Congress and their allies off the Hill like Stimson,
Greene, and Price. Even had Congress usurped the
initiative by legislating an embargo against Japan, this
action had no guarantee of success. For without the
President's willingness to support economic sanctions
as Commander-In-Chief, such measures would be useless.
Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, understood the

implications of an embargo when he remarked: "If we once

 

221bid., 76m Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940,
Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12944-12945. For the
Administration's action of embargoing scrap steel to
Japan which Fish praised, consult State Department
Bulletin, September 28, 1940, p. 250; Foreign Relations,

Jagan: laél-laél’ II, pp. 222-223.

23Langer and Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation;
W913. 308 and pp. 577-5780

146

start sanctions against Japan we must see them through

to the end and the end may conceivably be war."24 As
Langer and Gleason explained, the President and the

State Department therefore had persuaded themselves that
an embargo would probably not halt Japanese aggression

in China, but instead might well serve to provoke new
expansion by Japan to the southwest in search of the
needed raw materials, if not actually precipitate war
with the United States.25 Commercial relations between
the two countries, therefore, remained on a temporary
basis with the American threat of a total embargo serving
as the deterrent to further Japanese encroachments on
American rights in Asia and especially in China.26 Still
unwilling at this time to provoke Japan by an embargo,
yet recognizing that some action must be taken to forestall
further deterioration Of China's sovereignty, the
Administration chose to increase aid to China with loans

through the ExPort-Import Bank.27 This measure made it

 

24Feis, Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 41; According to
Hull the State Department was awaiting evidence of Japan's
intentions regarding violations Of American rights in China
before inaugurating any harsh policies. See Hull to Grew,

January 8, 1940, as quoted in Foreign Relations Of The
United States. Far East, IV, pp. 625-62 .

25Langer and Gleason, The Challenge TO Isolation1
$237-1940 , p o 578 o

261bid., pp. 578-579.

27Ibid., p. 579.

147

clear that deepite some Congressional pressure for an

embargoing of trade, there would be no serious economic

retaliation against Japanese aggression.28

In July, 1940, a more aggressive cabinet led by
Prince Fumimaro Konoye as Premier, Yosuke Matsuoka as
Foreign Minister, and TOjO Hideki in the War Office
replaced the government of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai in

Tokyo. The American Government reacted cautiously to the

change in the Japanese Government but with the renewal Of
‘warfare in Europe in April, 1940, the fall Of France in
June as well as Japanese encroachments in the Netherlands

iEast Indies and Indo-China, the President began to move

in the direction of economic retaliation. By July, 1941,

idle anti-Japanese group's hopes were fulfilled. Japanese
aresets in the United States were frozen by an Executive
(Dzrder and by September all trade had been terminated.29
But not all Congressmen who favored defending
.Axnerican neutral rights in Asia succumbed to the increased

IDIPessures being exerted by their associates and by events

for economic sanctions against Japan. One such Senator,

william Borah, persisted up to his death on January 19,

1940, to Oppose what he considered to be an urmecessary

¥

Ibid.
29For a more detailed discussion see Chapter VII;

 

148

belligerency on the part of the anti-Japanese group.30

During the debate concerning the termination of the
Commercial Treaty, Borah made it clear that he approved
using all reasonable efforts to maintain American trade

relations with Japan, excluding always the shipment Of
31

arms, ammunition, and implements of war to that nation.
Not wanting the United States to give up $400,000,000
annual trade with Japan "except for a very sound reason",

Borah did not accept Hull's view that a good reason

existed.32 He warned a termination Of the treaty without

provisions for a new pact to take its place could only

be a tragic blunder. So strongly convinced of the

Jaecessity to maintain trade with Japan, especially since
'trede in EurOpe and on the Atlantic was dwindling, Borah
Haas willing to overlook possible benefits trade with the

'Uilited States might have on Japan's war making capabilities.

_~

30See the article on Borah in Buenos Aires Hggalg,
(Teanuary 11, 1939 in Senate Forei Relations Committee
Pa ers, 76A-F9, Conthainer“, "1' 4' ""%"O, N ."""LD'.'
. 31Borah to J.P. Herber, "Speech Data 1938-1939."
I‘Ilscellaneous File, Borah MSS. ,

3ZChina Weeklngeview, December 2, 1939, XCI, p. 8;
See also Borah's agreement with TRB's comment on the
germination of the Commercial Treaty in New Republih,
":r‘r (Jan. 21, 1940), p. 21; also found in Container 544

FOreign Relations, 1918-1940,' Borah MSS.

 

 

149

Instead he remarked:

A new commercial treaty with Japan does not

require American sanction of Japan's invasion

Of China or the New Order in East Asia that

Japan hopes to inaugurate.33
If political issues were to be entered into negotiations
for a new treaty, Borah was content to let Japan, not the
United States, raise them. Apparently intent upon
maintaining trade with Japan, Borah was willing to
sacrifice what had previously been so important to him,
America's rights as a neutral. By stating that small
infringements on American businessmen in China plus the
China trade were insufficient reasons for ending commerce
with Japan, Borah indicated just how far he had moved
away from his original position in 1937, at which time
he had called for a show Of firmness by the United States
in the face of threats to its citizens by the Japanese.34
New sounding more like Senators Vandenberg, Clark, Capper,
and Nye, Borah seemed ready to compromise his earlier views.

Borah gathered support for the movement to retain

trade with Japan from the faction in Congress which had

been urging, since 1937, a policy based essentially on

 

33Ibid.

34Ibid. Borah never changed his policy concerning
EurOpe and constantly preached non-intervention. See
New York Times, March 26, 1939, p. 29.

150

appeasement. Senator Vandenberg, a prominent member Of
this bloc, appeared certain that economic sanctions
against Japan would lead to war; as a result, he was
willing to see the Commercial Treaty of 1911 lapse if

a new, more meaningful agreement could be negotiated.35
To accomplish this purpose he introduced Senate Resolution
166 on July 18, 1939, which called for termination Of the
1911 treaty Of Commerce, Amity and Navigation and the

immediate negotiation of a new treaty.36

The reasoning
implicit in Vandenberg's position over maintaining trade
was not readily fathomable at first glance. Ostensibly,
as the Senator indicated in response to a letter from

William Castle, former Assistant Secretary of State and
Ambassador to Japan during the Hoover Administration, he
feared if the United States renounced the treaty, Japan

would be drawn by economic necessity into the arms of

Germany and Italy. Moreover, he agreed with Castle's

 

35For an interesting exchange concerning Vandenberg's
position see Walter Lippmann, "The Seriousness Of The Far
Eastern Question," Washington Post, January 30, 1940, and
Vandenberg's reply in Ibid., February 1, 1940; Both articles
may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 76tn Cong., 3rd sess.,
February 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 886-887.

36Senate Resolution 166 in U.S. Congress, Senate,

76th Cong., lst sess., July 18, 1939, Congressional Record,
LXIXIV, 9341.

151

analogy that the United States "...should not prod and
prick the dictators every twenty minutes thereby leading
to a possible outbreak Of warfare."37 Although wishing
to avoid war with Japan, Vandenberg was not diplomatically
naive; he believed the issue of the Commercial Treaty
provided the United States with an excellent mode for
testing the sincerity Of Japan's intentions towards
America. If Japan was bent on a course of further
aggression in Asia, with the recognition that her actions
incurred the risk of eventual conflict with the United
States, Vandenberg acknowledged that the sooner such
motives could be determined, the greater would be the
benefit to American foreign policy. In his reply to
Castle's letter, Vandenberg eXpanded this line of
reasoning, claiming that an abrogation Of the treaty:

...is only a threat if Japan chooses to

interpret it as such. If she intends to

be fair with us in the Far East she can

make a new treaty before the Old one

expires. If she intends to rape us we

may as well find it out now through the

medium of these treaty negotiations.58

In addition to seeing the treaty as a vehicle for

 

37For Castle's view concerning American-Japanese
relations, consult his letter to Vandenberg, July 30, 1939,
found in "Correspondence July, 1939-July, 1940,"
Vandenberg MSS.

38Vandenberg tO William R. Castle, August 1, 1939
found in Ibid.

152

determining the degree Of Japanese good faith, the
Michigan Senator declared that the treaty could be
construed as a test Of America's will to stay in
Eastern Asia. At the same time he also claimed the
treaty would indicate Japanese recognition of American
interests in the area. Ultimately, however, perhaps
Vandenberg's letter to Hull written a week later best
summed up his expectations of the treaty:

I want to take the liberty of making it plain
that my own theory of abrogation is definitely
predicated upon earnest efforts to agree upon
a new engagement. I do not need to tell you
that I would not be interested in a mere
arbitrary prelude to a subsequent one-sided
embargo. If such an embargo ultimately becomes
indispensable to the adequate protection of
legitimate American interest and rights in the
Far East, and if the American peOple are ever
deliberately and consciously ready to take what
might thus be the first step toward war itself,
we can meet that situation when the issue is
unavoidably precipitated.39

Implicit in Vandenberg's letter was a promise to support
the Administration if a conflict became inevitable, but
only if all feasible methods to satisfy Japan, including
maintaining some form Of a commercial agreement, had been

40

tried. Nothing separated Vandenberg from Nye more than

 

39Vandenberg to Cordell Hull, August 7, 1939, State
Department File, 111.9421232, NA. A draft Of this
letter is loosely filed in Vandenberg MSS; The resolution
was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
there it died. Consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong.,
93418688., July 18, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV,

4OIbid.

153

that final statement. Vandenberg had been careful to
point out to Hull that the United States should promptly
indicate to Japan a preparedness to negotiate a new
treaty. Should Japan spurn the overture, the hope Of
perpetuating a friendly and mutual relationship would be
diminished, but he stressed to Hull the attempt must be
made.41

Vandenberg's fear of Japanese retaliation to a
unilateral American imposed embargo on all trade was not
allayed by his correspondence with Roger Greene of the
American Committee. Recognizing Vandenberg's apprehension
about Japanese reaction to embargoes, Greene assured the
Michigan Republican that although Japan would resent
sanctions, "there was not the slightest chance that Japan
would make war upon us or indulge in actions so provocative
that the United States would take the initiative in going
to war."42 Greene also inferred that since some Congress-
men were running for reelection in 1940, including

Vandenberg, perhaps it would not be best to favor

 

41Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, gongressional

Record, LXXXVI, 4263; Consult also Vandenberg to Hull,
September 20, 1939, State Department File, %1l.%42[28&, NA.
An interesting aspect of Vandenberg's and t e ate
Department's thinking on the issue of the Commercial
Treaty negotiations may also be found in Sumner Welles

to Vandenberg, August 22, 1939, and Vandenberg to Welles,
August 24, 1939, Vandenberg MSS.

42Greene to Vandenberg, April 2, 1940, RSG Folder # 4,
ACNPJA Papers.

154

"...economic cOOperation with powers like Germany and
Japan" in order to be returned to Capitol Hill as a
representative of the peOple.43
The controversy surrounding termination of the
Commercial Treaty Of 1911 inspired Alexander Wiley,
a freshman Senator from Wisconsin elected in November,
1938, to join fellow Republicans Borah and Vandenberg
in their effort to keep intact American trade with Japan.
Wiley's belief in the efficacy of Neutrality Legislation
and a war referendum as incorporated in the Ludlow
Amendment prOposal indicated his general desire to avoid
American involvement in foreign conflicts.44 Realizing
that renewal Of the Commercial Treaty offered a good
Opportunity to pursue cordial relations with Japan, Wiley
presented a judicious, well reasoned Speech on its behalf
prior to expiration, inferring that by allowing the treaty

to be terminated additional commercial restrictions would

 

43Ibid., There is no answer by Vandenberg in the
Senator's Papers at Ann Arbor, the Greene Papers, or the
American Committee Papers at Harvard.

44New York Times, October 31, 1941, p. 5; See also
Senate Joint Resolution 140, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76"1
Cong., lst sess., May 29, 1939, Congressional Record,
LXXXIV, 6261.

155

be made possible, the eventual outcome being an embargo
which would not help China nor promote peace. Rather

than prevent a conflict, trade restrictions would merely
provoke Japanese reprisals, continued Wiley, causing Japan
to blockade Chinese ports, impose martial law and exclude
all foreigners from China, making it almost imperative for
the United States to retaliate.

Suggesting an alternative course, Wiley prOposed that
the United States recognize Japan's right to the same
prerogatives America granted to EurOpean nations. To
illustrate his meaning, Wiley referred to the unequal
immigration laws and asked America to extend to the,
Japanese the same laws that governed Western EurOpeans
coming into this country. Seeking to avoid alienating
Japan, Wiley noted, "It pays to put the Ointment of
friendship and understanding in the wounds Of nations the
same as in the case of wounds we have inflicted on
individuals."45 Wiley also called for negotiations to
implement a new commercial pact based on a reaffirmation
of the principles incorporated in the Nine Power Treaty.46

Finally, America should give Japan access on equitable

 

45U.S. Congress, Senate, 76tn Cong., 3rd sess.,
January 23, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 541-542.

46Ibid.

156

terms of raw materials of the country and the world as
well as a full right to fair competition because the
Wisconsin Senator believed:

The normal flow Of commerce to nations is

like the normal flow of blood within our

veins and arteries, and in the field of

commerce we must restate and put into

practice those rules which speak Of fair

dealing, understanding and fair play.47

It would be wrong to presume Wiley was diplomatically

unsophisticated because Of his program for a rapprochement
with Japan. On the contrary, Wiley did not deny the
menace Japan's presence in Asia constituted to world
peace. He was clearly cognizant of Japanese desires to
dominate Eastern Asia and recognized the threat Japan
felt America's presence posed to realizing those goals.
Urging the United States to face reality in the Far East,
as it existed in the autumn of 1939 and the early months
of 1940, Wiley insisted that only by treating Japan as an
equal could a resurgence of goodwill in American-Japanese

relations occur.48

 

471bid.

48Ibid.; Wiley's advocacy Of cordiality in commercial

relations with Japan does not seem to be based on experts
or imports between the Wisconsin Custom District and Japan
for the years 1937-1941...In fact, imports for the five
years under discussion totaled $325, 231 and there were no
lists of Wisconsin exports. See Foreign Commerce And
Navigation Of The United States For The Calendar Yep;
193 (Washington: G.P.O., 1939). Pa 744; For the year

3 , consult Ibid., (Washington: G.P.O., 1940), p. 919;
For 1939, consult Ibid., . 754; For 1940, consult Ibid.,
(Washington: G.P.O., I942 , p. 870; For 1941, Ibid.,
(Washington: G.P.O., 1944), p. 623.

157

In spite of the efforts of Senators Vandenberg,
Borah, and Wiley in behalf of Japanese trade, other
Congressmen previously moderate or silent on this issue
found it difficult in 1940 to refrain from supporting
the move for an embargo. One such convert, Senator Guy
M. Gillette (D. Iowa), an important member Of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, had sought a rapprochement
with Japan prior to 1940.49 Persuaded by the apparent
failure to appease Japan's appetite for territory,
Gillette now asked for a halt to all goods shipped to

50 Another member of the Senate Foreign Relations

Japan.
Committee, Senator Theodore Green (D. Rhode Island), who
had Opposed economic sanctions against Japan, showed

willingness in 1940 to endorse Gillette's recommendations

51 Additional support

for a more stringent trade policy.
came from Senator James Slattery (D. Illinois), who had
been chosen to fill the vacancy caused by the death of

James H. Lewis in 1939. Slattery believed an embargo Of

 

49U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
January 16, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 355

Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography-19g6 (New York: H.W.
Wilson and Company, 1947 , p. 208.

SOIbid.

51Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional
Record, LXXXVI, 503.

158

trade would end Japanese aggression in China while at the
same time putting the United States back on the path to

international morality by reaffirming its faith in the

52

Nine Power Treaty. From the House Of Representatives,

Congressman James A. Shanley (D. Connecticut), included

his support for an embargo, a policy he considered

justified given Japan's actions in China.53

NO Congressman's transformation imported such
significance for future American-Japanese relations as
that of Senator Elbert Thomas. A long time friend of
Japan until 1940, Thomas had begun to realize an embargo
would be necessary. Discouraged over the signing Of the
Tripartite Pact, Thomas sadly admonished the Japanese:

That Japan, a victor, should ally herself with
Germany which was a defeated country, and make
common cause with that defeated country, leaves
Japan in an inconsistent position. Today she
is confused, The Old order is changing, but a
new order will not come by reverting to the ways
of the barbarian. Since the Manchurian and the
Chapel incidents, Japan's history has not been
an enviable one. Her latest act is in no sense
one of self-defense or self-protection. It is
one Of aggression.54

 

52Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 29, 1940,
Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 462.

53lth-: 75m Cong., 3rd sess., October 2, 1940,
Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6004.

Sflhig.. 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional

159

To act as the assailant, to slay and bomb women and

children, to consort with other aggressors should make

no nation proud of itself; yet, Thomas noted that Japan

appeared pleased with its performance during the past

decade of expansion. Thomas counseled Japan to end its

senseless brutality and reinstitute morality so that

peace might be preserved.55
Alarmed at the increasing friction between Japan and

the United States and assured that if war did come Japan

would prove a surprisingly strong, determined enemy,

Thomas hOped America could redirect Tokyo's foreign

policy towards peaceful Objectives. With foreboding

Thomas remarked, "Without this change the Far East is

doomed."56 Calling Britain's decision to allow the

Anglo-Japanese Alliance to lapse a terrible mistake,

Thomas importuned the United States Government to replace

Great Britain and act as Japan's East Asian tutor concerning

57

matters of peace, morality, and international diplomacy.

 

551bid.

56;h;g.; New York Times, June 22, 1939. p. 23.

57Elbert Thomas, The Four Freedoms (New York: Ziff-
Davis and Company, 1944). PP. 93-94; See also Thomas'
speech before the Institute Of Far Eastern Studies at the
University of Michigan, June 29, 1939, reprinted in the
U.S. Congress, Senate, 76'11 Cong., lst sess., Appendix,
Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 3014-3016; In the Thomas MSS
two speeches are worth noting. See address in folder
entitled, "Chaotic World Conditions," March 17, 1939, Box
8 and "To What Extent Are American Interests Involved In
Present Day World Activities," March 28, 1939, Box 8 given

160

A concept of Japanese-American relations implicit in
Thomas' recommendations, that of relegating Japan to the
position of a student and America the teacher, demonstrated
a serious limitation in the Senator's thinking. While
the premise of converting Japan to peaceful intentions
could not be faulted, Thomas presumed a Japanese moral
and ethical inferiority to the Western World that could
only further antagonize Japanese Opinion.

During his transition from friend of the Japanese
to a foe, Thomas became an ardent supporter of the
American Committee. On February 5, 1940, Greene had an
interview with Thomas and wrote that the Utah Democrat
was interested in halting Japanese expansionism. Moreover,
Greene remarked that he liked Thomas both personally and
for his aid on Capitol Hill concerning an embargo of trade

to Japan.58

Thomas, with his previous liking for Japan
and scholarly research in Eastern Asian culture, was a
powerful ally in the Senate and his conversion was
relished and considered a major victory by Greene and his
59

anti-Japanese committee.

 

over the Columbia Broadcasting Company System under the
auspices Of the American Council Against Nazi PrOpaganda.

58Interview of Elbert D. Thomas by Roger S. Greene,
February 5, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File,"
ACNPJA Papers.

591bid.

161

Undergoing a profound disillusionment about
Japanese-American relations similar to that of Thomas,
Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D. Colorado), found that he
too could no longer tolerate a policy approaching
appeasement. Although in previous years Johnson had
tried to moderate his anti-Japanese remarks and sentiments
on the Senate floor, by 1940, he reluctantly accepted the
use of the embargo in order to halt Japanese expansion in
China. In an impassioned speech to his colleagues
Johnson criticized the United States and Great Britain
for supplying war materials to Japan. "These two 'holier
than thou Christian Democracies'", Johnson remarked, "have
supplied the pagan assassin of women and children with

60 As had others before

90 percent Of her sinews of war."
him, Johnson too, linked American trade with morality,
charging that the United States had a clear duty to
institute economic sanctions against Japan in order to
prevent her from continuing the war in China.61
In retrospect, it is apparent that Congressional
Opinion became transfigured more decidedly in 1940 than

during any succeeding period. Particularly the controversy

 

6OU.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6155.

61Ibid.

162

over trade-—to continue commerce with Japan on the one
hand or to embargo goods, in varying amounts, on the
other hand-aroused strong feelings with many Congressmen.
Whereas in the past few years debate had touched upon
all facets of Japanese-American relations, the focus
had narrowed considerably by 1940. As Robert Aura Smith
commented in the May, 1941, issue of the Annals 0§_Thp
American Academy Of Political And Social Science:

Japan's alliance with the Axis had done more

than anything else could have done to convince

Americans that the war in EurOpe and the war

in Asia are the same war.62

The voices of moderation sounded less and less
distinctly in the chasm Of widening differences Of Opinion.
The leading advocates of an embargo remained the same
Senators who had been in the forefront Of the anti-
Japanese movement since 1937; Senators Schwellenbach,
Pittman, and King, as well as Representative Coffee. Their
forces had been augmented throughout the year by hereto-
fore non-belligerent members of the Congress, including
Senators Thomas, Gillette, Slattery, Johnson, Green and

Congressman Fish. Men who had spoken in the past for

 

bZRObert Aura Smith, "The Triple-Axis Pact And
American Reactions," Annals, CCXV (May. 1941), pp. 127-
132; Expressions of the same vieWpOint are also found in
Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American
Relations. 1941, pp. 14-25.

163

moderation moved closer to the extremes; thus Repre-
sentative Fish entered into the anti-Japanese sphere
while Senator Borah tended to find greater sympathy
for his views among the holdouts for appeasement. The
center, in so far as Offering any effective solutions
to the dilemma of the Sino-Japanese war, appeared to be
denuded of any significant representation after 1940.
Even the conciliators were finding their position
increasingly untenable by mid-year, and arguments for
maintaining trade, endorsed by Senators Wiley, Borah,
and Vandenberg would be seriously undercut through

further Japanese actions in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER VI
THE ANTI-JAPANESE PRESSURE INCREASES

In 1937 Congress had been willing to accept Japan's
apologies for the sinking of the 222.1! Harsh words
muttered by Pittman, King, Schwellenbach, and Coffee,
fell upon indifferent ears for the most part; their
colleagues, at this time, could not yet be roused into
anger sufficient enough to jeOpardize existing American-
Japanese relations. By the autumn of 1940, an entirely
different mood pervaded Congress. NO longer could fears
of angering Japan contain the legislator's distaste for
the "New Order In Asia". A climate of Opinion favorable
to belligerent measures had emerged over the past three
years, overcoming past Congressional temerity. Four
forces were responsible for producing this growing
unanimity of Opinion on Capitol Hill; Japan's continued
threat to the status quo in Asia, sympathy for China's
rapidly deteriorating position, Japan's signing the
Tripartite Pact, and a renewed drive for an aggressive
American policy emanating from pressure groups both
within and without the Congress.

Although there were numerous groups lobbying to
influence foreign policy throughout the 1930's and early
1940's, only one organization had as its sole objective

164

165

the cutting Off of war trade to Japan. As a reaction to

Japanese incursions in Asia, especially in China, the

American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese

Aggression was formed in August, 1938. From its

inception, the organization restricted itself only

to anti-Japanese measures, considering at first both

a prohibition against American exports of essential

war materials to Japan and a restriction Of the imports

from that nation into America.1 But it was finally

decided to concentrate on the export problem in order

to prevent duplicating the activities of the Committee

For A Boycott Against Japanese Aggression, an organization

concerned primarily with a domestic consumer boycott

against Japanese goods.2
Harry B. Price, the leading force behind the

Committee, had been born in China in 1905. Sympathetic

to that country's increasing distress over the years, he

brought to the Price Committee a missionary zeal to save

the hapless and victimized Chinese peOple from further

conquest by an aggressive and barbarous Japan. The son Of

Presbyterian missionary, Price had been educated in the

United States at Davidson College; in 1929 he returned

 

1Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 4-5.

2Ibid.

166

to China as Assistant to the American Commission Of
Financial Experts to the Chinese Government, a position
he held briefly until deciding to further his studies in
the United States. In 1932, with a Masters Degree in
Economics from Yale, Price returned to China where he
taught at Yenching University before returning perma-
nently to America in 1937. He was on leave from Yenching
University when he helped organize the American Committee.3
Working in conjunction with his brother, Reverend
Frank W. Price, a missionary at Nanking Theological
Seminary, the Price brothers laid the groundwork and
created the structure of this new private pressure group.
The majority of the membership consisted of men and women
directly affiliated with China in some educational,
missionary, medical, philanthropic or diplomatic capacity.4
They had the support of various Government officials,
especially Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief Advisor Of the
State Department on Far Eastern matters, who encouraged
the education of the American people and Government about
Japanese expansionism. With Philip J. Jaffe, Thomas A.

Bisson, and Eliot Janeway as experienced journalists, the

' Ibid. , pp. 1-2

4Ibid., p. 7; For Harry B. Price's view of Japan see
his article entitled "Japanese Strategy And Aims,"

ContemporaryReview, 0011 (Nov. 19, 1937), pp. 560-569.

167

Committee was able to publish in June, 1938, America's

 

Share In Japan's War Guilt. This booklet, through its
claim that the United States was supporting the crushing
of China by supplying the Japanese with the materials Of
war, provided the ideological framework for the Committee.
Overseeing general activities was the National Board
consisting Of twenty-one members. gHenry L. Stimson
agreed to be the Honorary Chairman of the organization
and Harry B. Price became the Executive Secretary. The
search for a chairman ended with the selection of Roger
S. Greene, a man with a long career in Eastern Asia and
connections in Washington.5

Greene's past eXperience both in government and in
China, and his contacts among influential citizens all
contributed to making him an ideal choice to head the
Committee. Even though he had not been born in China as
had Price, Greene developed a strong interest in the
Chinese peOple while acting as director of the China
Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1914 to
1927. During his tenure as director, Greene also came
into contact with many of the men who would become active
in the future with the American Committee, and one of these

men, Harry B. Price, maintained a continuous correspondence

 

5Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 9-10.

168

with Greene throughout the years. Greene's credentials,
an A.B. from Harvard in 1901 and an A.M. from the same
institution the following year, employment in the State
Department in 1903, serving as consul in various foreign
countries including China and Japan, made him a dis-
tinguished candidate for the Committee's chairmanship.
Greene gained additional familiarity with Chinese affairs
from his appointment as Vice-President in the Far East
for the Rockefeller Foundation in 1927, a position he
held for the next two years until he became acting
director of the Peiping Union Medical College. Upon
returning to the United States in 1938, Greene moved to
Chicago as director Of the World Citizens Association, but
through his correspondence with Price kept abreast of the
activities Of the American Committee. Deciding to join
the organization in July, Greene was selected Chairman
five months later.6
Throughout its existence, the Price Committee remained

faithful to its original aim of gaining a widespread

 

6Ibid., p. 10; For Roger Greene's earlier life and
activitles consult Biographical folder, Greene MSS.
Because Of the lack Of indexing and filing when the
author saw the Greens collection letters and other
information are randomly filed; For Greene's view on
foreign relation see "The Price Of Peace, " Christian
Centur , LVI (Aug. 30,1939), pp. lOAO-lO42‘;""'Fo"r" ad‘-
ditional information on the Committee's formation, organ-
ization, membership, financial situation and policy see
Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 1-44 although, as
has been noted, the work suffers from not including
material from the Greene MSS;

 

 

169

acceptance for the principle of non-participation in
Japanese aggression and refused to sponsor additional
goals for fear of dissipating its energies or duplicating
the work of other committees. Recognizing that there
were other, closely related issues, the members of the
Price Committee did not want to have their attention
diverted.7 But support for China did intrude and
sympathy over her plight found unanimous support among
the Committee's members. In spite of the member's
Chinese sentiments, the emphasis of all the Committee's
efforts remained centered on Japan and followed a program
of rousing public Opinion against the Japanese in order to
bring pressure upon both the Executive and Legislative
branches of Government.8

In its relationship with Congress the Price Committee
stressed the need to embargo all war trade to Japan and
used the reservoir of sympathy for China prevalent among
the members of Congress to promote this end. Pro-Chinese
sentiment existed in Congress for various reasons, and
often there appeared to be little correlation between the
motives for a Congressman's concern and the type of role

he envisaged America assuming in China. Japan's blatant

 

7Friedman, The Road From Isolation, p. 21.

8Ibid., p. 30.

170

disregard for morality by violating numerous treaties
and killing Chinese civilians, the dislike and fear of
an expansionistio Japan, plus sentimental concern for
the victims of Japan's brutal war, generated in all
segments of Congress a pro-Chinese sentiment. Objecting
strongly to Japan's obvious disregard for international
accords like the Nine Power Pact, Congress was indignant
over Japanese violations of existing treaty pledges.

Both of these forces, dislike of Japan and sympathy
for China, combined in the person of Key Pittman, and he
promised to provide a receptive ear for the American
Committee's urgings. Pittman, exemplifying the attitude
the Committee hOped to implement throughout Congress while
also occupying an influential position in the Senate,
received all of its literature in addition to frequent
visits and correspondence from both Greene and Price. In
return, Pittman praised the Committee for aiding in his
agitation for a harsher policy against Japan, remarking
that Greene and Price were indispensable in converting
9

recalcitrant Congressmen.

Using the moral issue raised by Japan's evasion of

 

9Greene to Price, October 18, 1938, RSG Folder # l,
ACNPJA Papers; Ibid., Greene to Price, February 3, 1939,
RSG Folder*# 1, and Pittman to Price, August 14, 1939,
"Correspondence Jan-Sept, 1939," Box 2, Greene MSS.

171

her treaty obligations to further the anti-Japanese cause,
Pittman also voiced concern over the possibility China
might become closed to all non-Japanese interests. He had
warned of this danger even before the renewal of war in
1937, during a Speech made the previous year in which he
stated his belief Japan would go to war to close off the

world's access to China.10

Two years later, in the summer
of 1938, the Senator was still referring to this eventuality
and expressing his total commitment to maintaining China's
integrity and independence.11
But despite his history of pro-Chinese rhetoric,
Pittman failed to consider China's true interests in a
provision of the "Peace Act of 1939". Aimed specifically
at aiding France and England, unforeseen ramifications of
the act proved detrimental to China. The American
Committee, appreciating this discrepancy, Opposed the
Pittman prOposal on the grounds it placed China in an

unfavorable position as far as obtaining arms, munitions,

 

10U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 10, 1936, Congressional Record, LXXX, 1703—1708;
See also Ibid., 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Con-
gressional Record, LXXXII, 578-581; Consult also an
exchange between Borah and Pittman on this subject in
"Speeches, Articles, And Remarks," Box 161, Pittman MSS.

11U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., 3rd sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 2120; New York
Times, May 23, 1938, p. 8, and July 10, 1938, p. 21.

 

172

12 Faced with mounting

and other implements of war.
objections, Pittman changed his bill, but his initial
lack of foresight over this proposal reduced the
confidence that Greene and Price had invested in the
Senator's leadership.13 Still, the Committee hesitated
to antagonize Pittman since he held a powerful position
in Government even if he did not use it as effectively
as he might have done. Five months before his death,
Pittman received a letter from Price expressing the
Committee's appreciation of the Senator's "...clear-
headed leadership" on seeking to embargo trade to Japan
the past two years, and for being a dedicated foe of

appeasing that nation.14

 

128ee Chapter III, pp. 89-92; also Price to Pittman,
March 28, 1959, "Congressional Correspondence File,"
ACNPJA Papers.

13U.S. Congress, Senate, 75tn Cong., 2nd sess.,
Appendix, Con ressional Record, LXXXII, 578-581; Price
to Greene, May 15, I940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers;
Ibid., Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, 1‘CBngressionaI
Correspondence File,"; Greene carried on an intensive and
extensive correSpondence with his wife, Katherine, who
lived in Worcester, Massachusetts, while her husband first
lived in Chicago and then in Washington. The correspondence
is refreshingly candid. Concerning Pittman, see RSG To KG,
April 24, 1940; May 3, 1940; and July 1, 1940, in folder
RSG To KG, 1940, Box 12, Greene MSS.

14Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, "Congressional
Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; Other informative
correspondence may be consulted in Greene to Price,
January 31, 1940; Greene to Price, March 14, 1940, found
in Ibid., RSG Folder # 3; Moreover, see Greene to Pittman,
May 17, 1940, Greene MSS. For Pittman's pro-Chinese
sentiments consult, Draft of a message to be delivered to
members of the Veterans 0f Foreign Wars, August 22, 1938,

173

The American Committee found another Congressional
ally in Senator Schwellenbach. Enthusiastic over any
type of economic measure against Japan, Schwellenbach
called a total embargo an immeasurable aid to China in
contrast to what he termed pro-Chinese rhetoric devoid
of any substance and plans for implementation.15 Like
many other anti-Japanese Congressmen, Schwellenbach
envisaged aid to China taking an indirect course. Re-
flecting the emphasis of the Price Committee, the
Washington Democrat focused mainly on provisions against
Japan, supporting economic sanctions to limit her
aggressive capacity. The American Committee kept him
abreast of the organization's work and thanked him for
invaluable service on the Hill in their behalf. Both
Greene and Price liked Schwellenbach's prOposals and in

their correspondence to him noted the Washingtonian's

 

Pliimgn_M§§,;lh1fl., "Our National Defense, " The American

Foggm Of The Air, January 22,1939. Box 161 and "Speeches,
Articles, Remarks," February 20,1939. This was a speech
broadcast over NBC and may also be found in pamphlet form
in Scrapbook, "June 22,1939-October 4, 1940, " folder,
Pittman MSS; Divine, The Illusion 0f Neutralit , pp. 251-
258; Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 159-170.

15Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, January
10,1940 and February 18,1940 as well as speech in the
Washington Daily News, June 15, 1940, p. 19 all found in
Schwellenbach MSS

174

contribution to the cause of a potentially peaceful Asia.16

In a letter to Schwellenbach on February 21, 1940, Greene
also made clear his conviction that America could easily17
thwart any action Japan might take against this country.
It was inconceivable to Greene that Japan could send her
fleet across great distances to attack American possessions,
excepting the Philippine Islands which did lie within
feasible striking range of the Japanese home islands.
Although Schwellenbach never answered Greene's letter,

his speeches on the radio and in Congress coincided with
the Price Committee's position that the United States

had little to fear of a Japanese retaliation.18

Senator King, another recognized foe of Japan, needed

little prompting from the American Committee; in fact,

 

16For the correspondence between the American
Committee and Schwellenbach, consult Price to Schwellen-
bach, January 23, 1940, "Jan-May," folder, Box 2, Greene
MSS' Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, RSG
Folder # 3; Price to Schwellenbach, June 18, 1940, and
September 24, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File,"
ACNPJA Papers; See also Greene to Katherine Greene,
October 1, 1940, Greene MSS. The Schwellenbach file in
the ACNPJA Papers is disappointing. The file contains
four reprints of speeches in the Congressional Record and
a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 143 he introduced on
June 1, 1939, already cited...See Chapter III, pp. 97-98.

17Italics are mine.

18Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, RSG
Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers.

175

King had moved beyond its call for an economic embargo.
Presenting a bill in 1940 that would have given the
President authorization to negotiate with other powers
friendly to the United States for naval bases in the
Pacific, King showed a willingness to directly challenge
Japan militarily.19 In an emotional outburst on the
floor of the Senate, King called for halting Japan's
"...oriental tyranny and mediaeval barbarism in China"

and implied other regions of Asia as well.20

King
impressed the members of the American Committee and they
enjoyed speaking to him on the Hill where they always
received a genuine welcome. They found the Utah Democrat
pessimistic about the readiness of the Administration to
effectively halt Japanese aggression or support his

bill. Although the Government had terminated the Com-
mercial Treaty of 1911, King did not deem that action

 

19The bill was first introduced on September 30,
1940, and was ordered to lie on the table. The next
day King asked that it be sent to the Foreign Relations
Committee where it was never acted upon. See Senate
Resolution 4391, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76"1 Cong., 3rd
sess., September 30A 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI,
12780 and Ibid., 76 Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940,
Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12902,

20Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Con-
gressional Record, LXXXVI, 143-144; Ibid., 76th Cong.,
3rd sess., January 25, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI,

666.

176

sufficient to stOp Japan. Greene readily concurred.21

Unaccountably, the American Committee showed little
disposition to work with the Senate's anti-Japanese
counterparts in the House such as Scott, Faddis, Celler,
and Coffee.22 There are no records of any correspondence
between the Price Committee and these Congressmen who
nevertheless pursued a strong program against Japan,
buttressed by their awareness of China's continued
decimation. Referring to the menace of Japan, Repre-
sentative Scott informed his colleagues:

I think it goes without saying that we would
be much safer with a free, pacific China on
the other side of the Pacific Ocean than we

would if China were subjugated and ruled by
militaristic Japan.23

 

21Greene to Katherine Greene, October 1, 1940, Greene

MSS; King to George Fielding Eliot, November 9, 1940,

ongressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; Eliot
was an Army Major who considered Ameriha impregnable. In
the monograph The Rampapts We Watch: A Stud Of The
Problems Of American National Defense (New York: Reynal
and Hitchcock, I938), Eliot wrote that America's
geographical distance from war in Europe and Asia was

sufficient to maintain peace at home. King's letter
was a refutation of that thesis.

22For Coffee's earlier statements see U.S. Congress,

House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutralit ,
Hearin s, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939. pp. 221-229; Also

.3. Congress, House, 76"1 Cong., 1st sess., May 31, 1939.
Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 2323-2326 and Ibid., 76th

Cong., lst sess., June 5, 1939, Congressional Record,

 

23"Let's Avert War," Vital Speeches 0£The Day, Iv

177

Unlike Scott, for whom China's destruction evoked
pictures of a direct Japanese military threat to the
United States, Congressman Faddis found himself drawn
to China by the courageousness of that nation's fight
to maintain her sovereignty.24
In addition, Emanuel Geller (D. New York), now made
his views known and in an eloquent plea for an embargo
of trade to Japan, remarked such action would serve two
purposes. First, it would aid China but even more
importantly it would also "...wash away some of the
American guilt" in sponsoring and supporting Japan's war
machine. In fact, the least the United States could do,
he continued, was to wipe out the "damned spot" and
alleviate the suffering of the Chinese peOple.2S In a
commencement address at Wellesley College where his
daughter was graduating in June, 1938, Celler poignantly
stated that his mind was traveling across the seas to the

Orient where:

 

24U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., lst sess., 1939,
pp. 6-13; U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
March 12, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2745-2747.

25U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess.,“
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 3193-3194.

178

Humans are being subjected to the torture and

the sufferings of the Middle Ages. Were Japan's

planes hovering over head to let drop deadly

bombs upon Wellesley, it would be doing no worse

Egggyigg willful and deadly slaughter in China

In all of these Congressmen's speeches a subtle but

none the less significant distinction must be established
on this whole question of how best to resolve the problems
of China and Japan that had grown more critical with each
succeeding year. Spokesmen for the anti-Japanese movement
both from within Congress and the American Committee
stressed the need to halt Japan by taking direct and
specific measures against her. Acknowledging that one
benefit of such action would be to remove the Japanese
from the Asian mainland, thereby preserving China's
independence, advocates of a harsh policy against Japan
always insisted that the United States must focus its
attention on stopping her rather than on prOppingtu>
the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. Needless to say, the
emotional appeal of a brutal Japanese Air Force bombing
innocent Chinese women and children aroused.widespread
concern throughout Congress, but such atrocities only

reinforced the conviction that the best way to avert

further tragedy in Asia lay in restraining Japan.

 

 

179

The moderates and confirmed non-interventionists
in Congress also deplored the continued aggression in
China and were equally aroused by the Japanese bombing
missions. Many among their ranks were even willing to
voice their sympathy and concern for her plight. Never-
theless, these men refused to consider saving China by
directly challenging Japan. Prior to the Tripartite Pact
of September 27, 1940, only the most limited aid to China
might be condoned, providing Japan was not antagonized.

Inescapably bound by their abhorrence of war to a
policy of retreat from China, only a few Congressmen
within this coalition, namely Borah, Johnson, and Fish,
were willing to preface American retrenchment in the
Pacific with considerations of the effect overly
precipitous actions might have on American neutral rights.
The difference between moderate groupings themselves
was one of degree rather than kind. All members of this
non-belligerent faction wanted to eliminate any eventu-
ality of a clash. If Japan became irritated, even by
limited American aid to China, then they reasoned the
United States ought to withdraw from the area rather than
chance a war. Vandenberg, Clark, Capper, and Nye would do
so despite the cost to America's prestige, whereas Borah,
Johnson, and Fish insisted the United States not withdraw

while under fire.

180

Senator Borah saw the United States on the verge of
being dragged into the vortex of an Oriental conflict due
to the embargo agitation. In correspondence and interviews,
while not mentioning the Price Committee by name, he
implied that suspicious organizations behind the powerful
effort to get sanctions enacted were not furthering
American interests.27 In 1939, Greene wrote an angry
letter to the Editor of the New York Times asking how
long the United States was going to tolerate the so-
called defenders of peace like Borah who jeOpardized
American security. Greene criticized the Idahoan's
obstructionist policies and inferred that the Senator's
lack of faith in the Committee's programs to preserve
peace while halting Japan was based on the Congressman's
usual ignorance of foreign affairs.28
Hiram Johnson, also intent upon preventing a direct
confrontation with Japan, whether economic or military,
proved equally unreSponsive to the Committee's pressures.

Answering an inquiry from a Californian about the

 

27New York Times, August 31, 1937. p. 3; Borah to
Ralph M. Easley, January 27, 1938, 0F-150-C, "Chinese-
Japanese War 1938," FDR MSS; Easley sent the letter to
Roosevelt's Secretary, Stephen Early, which accounts for
its being in the Roosevelt collection.

28Greene to the Editor of the New York Times, June
16, 1939. RSG Folder # l, ACNPJA Papers; A draft of the
letter is also in the Greene MSS.

 

181

Committee, Greene made his only reference to Johnson,
remarking how disappointed the organization was in
Johnson's lack of overt agitation against Japan given
his past views Of that nation and her peOple. Greene
hOped Californians would persuade Johnson to support
such legislation if not initiate it.29 Inexplicably,
Johnson remained aloof from the anti-Japanese movement
in spite of his notorious dislike for Japan.30
On the other hand, Hamilton Fish, never known as a
foe of Japan, began to indicate a readiness to abandon
his previous position. Never during this period, except
for token expressions of sympathy for China, had Fish
indicated a willingness to give the Chinese any sig-
nificant help. On the contrary he seemed more anxious
to restrict American influence and interest in East Asia,
telling a press conference on July 22, 1937, of his
intention to introduce legislation in the House that would

31

terminate American extraterritoriality in China. Fish

 

29Greene to Oliver J. Todd, October 13, 1939, RSG
Folder # 2, ACNPJA Papers.

30See Chapter II, pp. 40-41.

31New York Times, July 22, 1937, p. 10; See also
U.S. Congress, House, 75“ Cong., lst sess., August 3,
1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8156-8158; Ibid.,
75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional
.Record, LXXXII, 1968-1973.

182

implied that such a move would benefit China by ending
the special privileges granted to foreigners in that
country; in reality, he never doubted that by ending
extraterritoriality, Americans would abandon China, thus
removing any possibility of coming into conflict with
Japan.

By 1940, however, Fish had begun to view Japanese
expansionism with alarm and slowly to overcome previous
reservations towards halting that nation's aggression.

In a letter to Greene, a Committee supporter related that
during an interview Fish stated he was not Opposed to a
limited embargo on war materials to Japan. What he did
reject was stOpping all trade, commenting that sanctions
of that magnitude would mean a loss of American employment,

32 Even with his new

reprisals and eventually war.
militancy, the Committee worked for Fish's defeat in the
November elections, an attempt that proved unsuccessful.
It is interesting to note that after Japan signed the

Tripartite Pact, Fish became convinced a more forceful

 

32Greene'to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3,
ACNPJA Papers; For an earlier view of Fish see Greene to
Price, March 4, 1939, RSG Folder # l, ACNPJA Papers; HOping
for Fish's defeat in the 1940 election see Greene to
Katherine Greene, October 9, 1940, "Jun-Dec, 1940," Box 2,
and Greene to Katherine Greene, October 10, 1940, RSG To
KG, 1940, both in Greene MSS.

 

183

policy was needed and supported total sanctions against
Japan throughout 1941.33 Neither Greene nor the other
members of the American Committee comprehended Fish's
shift in position during these last fourteen months of
peace and missed an Opportunity to utilize this important
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

In Opposition to almost everything being advocated
by the sponsors of a strong anti-Japanese policy stood the
small but equally committed group of Congressmen who
feared any American involvement in Asia. Determined to
keep the United States neutral in "thought as well as
deed" if, in this way war with Japan would be circumvented,
these Congressmen referred only infrequently to the
situation in China despite Often sympathetic personal
feelings. Senator Vandenberg, typifying this unwilling-
ness to involve the country in China's fate, presented
the Price Committee with one of its greatest challenges.
Refusing to support a pro-Chinese position, Vandenberg
believed the East Asian problem could be settled
peacefully which would, in effect, aid China. Therefore,
"...by not clamoring for aggressive action against Japan,"

the Michigan Republican revealed his sentiments for not

 

33For Fish's conversion see Chapter VII.

184

increasing the tempo of war in China.34 In essence, this
was a negative response to international aggression but
one that fit the temper of the Senator at that time.
Beyond stating his sympathy for China's plight, Vandenberg
considered himself pulled in two directions simultaneously
in regard to America's role in Eastern Asia. At one time
remarking he would have liked to aid China, Vandenberg
concluded the possibility of war with Japan necessitated

a prudent and circumspect foreign policy. Vandenberg also
remarked that helping one belligerent in a war invariably
invited retaliation by the other belligerent; therefore,
he did not consider the defense of China's integrity and
sovereignty as a primary consideration of the United States

since the possibility of dire consequences outweighed any

 

34Vandenberg to Drew Pearson, March 12, 1940,
Egndgnp§1g_MS§; Vandenberg to Hull, August 7, 1939,
State Department File 11112121232. NA; Vandenberg's col-
leagues in the Senate, Gerald . Nye and Bennett C. Clark,
supported his position. For example Nye's sentiments
may be viewed in the Washin ton Post, October 9, 1957. p.
2; U.S. Congress, Senate, 7%“ Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix,
Congressional Record, LXXXII, 2187; Ibid., 75"1 Cong.,

n sess., ugust 2 , 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII,
2257: Although there_was no extensive correspondence with
Nye, consult Nye to Greene, April 27, 1940, "Correspondence
Jan-May, 1940," Box 2, Greene MSS; See also Greene's
letter to the Editor of the New York Times, attacking Nye's
reluctance to embargo trade to Japan, June 16, 1939. RSG
Folder # l, ACNPJA Pa ersé For Clark's position consult,
U.S. Congress, Senate, 75 Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix,
Congressional Record, LXXXII, 2187; Arthur Capper's views
towards the Committee's activities can be seen in Capper
to Price, October 18, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence
File," and letter from Hull to Capper, May 22, 1939.
"Cordell Hull File," ACNPJA Papers.

185

moral-ethical commitment.35

Greene contacted vandenberg to allay his fears of
American involvement in the Sino-Japanese conflict or
even a war between the United States and Japan. Admitting
Japan would resent an embargo of trade Greene added,
"there was not the slightest chance that Japan would make

war upon us or indulge in actions so provocative that the

United States would take the initiative in going to war."36

Vandenberg remained unconvinced. Despite Greene's
assurances, the Michigan Republican still considered non-

involvement the only correct American policy vis-a-vis

Japan.37

Until the Tripartite Pact, the American Committee
had an equal lack of success in persuading Elbert Thomas,

Japan's long time friend in the Senate, to revise his

38

position. Greene, in various contacts with Thomas,

35;p;g.; New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. l.

. 36Greene to Vandenberg, April 2, 1940, RSG Folder
# 4, ACNPJA Papers.

37Vandenberg to Drew Pearson, March 12, 1940,
Vandenberg MSS; Vandenberg to Hull, August 7, 1939, State
Department Fi e 111.942ZZE2, NA; The view was held
steadfastly since the origin of the Sino-Japanese conflict,
consult New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 1.

38See speech by Thomas, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76"1
Cong., 2nd sess., October 6, 1939, Congressional Record,
LXXXV, 150-159; Interview by Greene, February 5, 1940,
"Congressional CorreSpondence File,"; Greene to Price,
March 20, 1940, RSG Folder # 3; and Greene to Price,
April 5, 1940, RSG Folder # 4 in ACNPJA Papers; Greene to
Katherine Greene, July 23, 1941, Greene MSS. The Thomas

186

tried to sway him, even going so far as to invite Thomas
to a dinner party for friends and would-be friends of
China and then seating him between two Chinese guests,
but all attempts proved futile.39 Ultimately, Thomas
did come to recognize the Japanese threat, but he claimed
that he owed his new insight more to Japanese warlike
actions than to the pressure of the American Committee.40
Edwin C. Johnson, another long time non-inter-
ventionist concerning Asian affairs, also showed much
resistance to the Price Committee's objectives. Rejecting
a plea from Price to support an embargo, Johnson explained
that he feared the organization's memorandums about Japan
sounded like ultimatums if not declarations of war.
Johnson did indicate a growing concern for China, but
because of the strong statements made by Greene and Price,

he refused to join their campaign.41

 

MSS are disappointing in so far as learning what the Utah
Democrat wrote on the issue of China and an embargo of
trade to Japan. Consult for an overview of his thoughts:
"Radio Address On Neutrality During 1939," folder, Box 9,
Thomas MSS. The folder is composed of Thomas' speeches
on Neutrality and embargoes for 1939.

39Greene to Price, March 20, 1940, RSG FOlder # 39
ACNPJA Papers.

40See Chapter VII.

41Johnson to Price, October 5, 1940, and Price to
Johnson, October 8, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence
File," ACNPJA Papers; For Johnson's view of Japan and
possible embargoing of trade see his speech in the
American Forum 0f TheAi; debate found in Ibid., October
6, 1940.

187

The American Committee, despite the paucity of its
success among the non-belligerent members of Congress,
continued its efforts to awaken them to the dangers Japan
posed to American interests. Meanwhile the Committee also
concentrated its efforts among another element of Congress,
those who had heretofore remained silent on the events
occurring in Asia. Having not yet publicly stated their
views, these Congressmen Offered the possibility of
becoming recruits to the anti-Japanese cause, and Greene
and Price proceeded to correspond with these uncommitted
legislators. In the Senate they included Republicans
Charles L. McNary (Oregon), Warren R. Austin (Vermont),
William W. Barbour (New Jersey) and Democrats Guy M.
Gillette (Iowa), and Frederick Van Nuys (Indiana). The
Committee also sought in the House members receptive to
their program. Among the Republicans they approached
were Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey), Bruce Barton (New
York), Ralph 0. Brewster (Maine) and Democrats James A.
Shanley (Connecticut) and Robert G. Allen (Pennsylvania).

One of the least satisfactory responses to the
Committee's pressure came from Senator McNary, the
Republican minority leader in the Senate since 1933.
After an interview with McNary, Price wrote that the
Oregonian supported measures to stop the export of war
supplies to Japan but apparently desired the Adminis-
tration to take all the responsibility for initiating the

188

prOposal. Price gained the impression that McNary was
using the issue for partisan purposes as he wanted the
President to take all the risks so no Republican could be
blamed if embargoing trade to Japan led to disaster.42

Although Price considered McNary's recalcitrance a
failure for the Committee, this does not invalidate the
organization's efforts in behalf of the anti-Japanese
movement. By ascertaining that McNary would be willing
to support an embargo should the President prOpose it
to Congress, Price and Greene were performing a valuable
function in defining more precisely a changing mood on
Capitol Hill that would soon become more receptive to
measures against Japan.

If McNary was reluctant to overtly initiate anti-
Japanese legislation for partisan reasons, the same could
not be said of Senators Austin and Barbour.43 Like other
Congressmen of both parties they dared not propose such
legislation unless they knew they had the Administration's
support, but from interviews with Greene and Price their
attitude was as Price wrote, "...balanced and constructive."

Austin complained Congress was awaiting the President, that

 

42Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4,
ACNPJA Papers.

43For Barbour consult Ibid., Greene to Price, April
3, 1940, RSG Folder # 4.

189

Congress was ahead of Roosevelt in being anti-Japanese
and that Greene and Price should keep up their pressures
on Capitol Hill and at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue to see
the fruition of their objectives. Price wrote Greene
that Austin was "...probably our most influential and
important link on the Republican side of the Senate",
and both men continually cultivated his friendship and
support.44
Apparently the contacts with these Congressmen

convinced Greene and Price that little hOpe existed for
reaching their goals via legislative action and they
began to redirect the Committee's emphasis towards the
Administration to initiate a total embargo. As Greene
made his rounds on Capitol Hill interviewing various

members of Congress, he realized this was their con-

sensus.45 Representative Brewster summed up Congress'

 

44See Greene's interview with Senator Austin in
Ibid., February 5, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence
File," and Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4.

45For Eaton, see Ibid., Greene to Price, June 29,
1939 and Greene to Eaton the same day both in RSG Folder
# l and Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4.
Ibid., Greene to Representative Barton, June 29, 1939,
RSG Folder # 1. Robert G. Allen seemed to respond the
most to the Committee's agitation as indicated in Allen
to Greene, March 6, 1939 and May 2, 1939, "Correspondence
Jan.-Sept., 1939." Box 2, Greene MSS. For Shanley's
support if the Administration acted see Greene to Price,
July 21, 1939, RSG Folder # 2, ACNPJA Papers; Because
Shanley had been graduated from Yale, Greene thought it
would be "...a good line of attack" to get alumni to
personally see and correspond with the Connecticut
Democrat in the hOpe of converting him to a rabid anti-
Japanese position.

190

sentiments when he remarked to Greene that, "there is
little doubt that the Congress would readily adOpt an
embargo resolution if the Administration would only

"46 Never totally foregoing their

indicate its approval.
former strategy however, Greene and Price continued to
pressure Congressmen whenever the Opportunity arose as in
the case of Senators Van Nuys from Indiana and Gillette
of Iowa. No effort was spared to convince these two
influential Democrats that a harsh policy was needed
against Japan and that such a policy had the support of
their constituencies.47
Ultimately, neither the lobbying of the American
Committee on behalf of an embargo, nor concern over China
would prove sufficiently potent to rouse Congress into
legislative action against Japan. Undeniably a
significant portion of the House and Senate were moving
towards the concept of an embargo; but in the end, the

Administration had to provide Congress with the necessary

impetus for action.

 

46Greene to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3.
ACNPJA Papers.

47;p;g., Greene to Price, July 13, 1939, RSG Folder
# 2.

CHAPTER VII
THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS

Until the autumn of 1940, American policy towards
Japan underwent little fundamental alteration. Congress,
confronted throughout the decade by the problem Of
numerous provocations against the status quo in Asia,
resisted pressures for an embargo, declining to pass
any anti-Japanese legislation. Serious divisions over
the proper role of the United States in Asia undercut
all efforts to achieve a unity of Opinion in either the
House or the Senate. In order to indicate at least some
degree of displeasure against Japanese aggression, the
Administration had taken the initiative by calling for
a moral embargo in 1938. The Government's action
combined with businesses' affirmative response effectively
stOpped the export of airplanes, aircraft parts, and
equipment to Japan. By December 20, 1939, planes, plants,
manufacturing rights and technical information needed in
the production of high quality aviation fuel also had

come under this moral embargo.1

 

1Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 200-
204; State Department Bulletin, December 23, 1939, p. 714;

New York Times, December 21, 1939, p. l.
191

192

But not until mid-1940 did the first overt
indications Of any tangible reorientation of American
policy become apparent. Hitler's victories in Europe
during the epring and summer of that year had produced
serious repercussions for Asia. With the collapse Of
Europe by June, Japan now had ready access to the
colonial empires of the French in Indo-China and the
Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies; this threat posed
by further Japanese expansion helped reorder American
policy.

The change in the direction of American relations
with Japan, long debated in Congress, became actualized
in September 1940, with two Administration measures; a
loan to Chiang Kai-shek on September 25, followed the
next day by a complete embargo of iron and steel scrap

to Japan.2

The authority to implement these sanctions
had been delegated by Congress to the President that
previous July under the guise of the National Defense
Act. Passed July 2, 1940, for the purpose of stockpiling
strategic materials needed in fighting a modern war, this

act also empowered President Roosevelt to place the export

 

2Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 222-
223; S a e epartment Bulletin, September 28, 1940, p.
250.

193

of certain key materials in a category requiring a
special license.3 On July 26, Roosevelt, making use
of these provisions, announced that exports of petroleum,
aviation gasoline and number one scrap steel would be
placed under licensing control.4 Five days later, a
Presidential proclamation banned completely the export
of aviation fuel to all nations outside the Western
Hemisphere.5
Through the passage of the National Defense Act,
Congress had provided the President with the means for
pursuing those very objectives long pled for by the
American Committee and the anti-Japanese faction in
Congress. Yet, ironically the debate both in the House
and Senate suggests that at no time was the eventuality

of this measure being used against Japan ever viewed as

its primary or even secondary purpose by the legislators.

 

. 3See House Resolution 9850 introduced by Congressman
Andrew J. May (D. Kentucky), U.S. Congress, House, 76"I

Cong., 3rd sess., May 21, 1940, Con r ssional Record,
LXXXVI, 6579 and sent to the House 50mmlttee On Military
Affairs chaired by Representative May. The bill was
debated on May 24, 1940, pp. 6821-6862. In the Senate
see Senate Bill 4025 introduced by Morris Sheppard (.
Texas), who was May's counterpart in the Upper House.
See Ibid., Senate, 76"' Cong., 3rd sess., May 22, 1940,

Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6582. See also Forei
RelationsI Japan: 1931-1911, II, pp. 211-216; State
Espartment Bu le ._, u y , 1940, p. 12.

4

ForeignRelaticnsi Japan: lgfil-lggl, II, pp. 216-
218; Sta e e ar ent Bu letin, Ju y 27,, 940, pp. 49-50.

5Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 93.

 

194

The discussion that occurred in connection with this bill
emphasized the need for the United States to begin taking
actions to protect itself by strengthening national
defense. One of the most Obvious means for gaining that
end was through the safeguarding of strategic materials
necessary for conducting war. In none of the debate did
anyone imply that an inverse result of this measure, the
withholding of strategic materials, could provide the

means for retaliating against Japan.' Only One Congressman,
Charles I. Faddis, made any reference to Japan at all, and
then only in vague, abstract terms.6 Criticism of the
proposal when forthcoming, centered around the general
disinclination to further augment President Roosevelt's
powers. The results of the vote on this measure reinforced
the view that Congress had not intended to place at the
President's disposal a new weapon for dealing with Japan.
In the House the vote was 392 to I with 37 abstentions

and in the Senate the vote was 80 to O with 16 abstentions.
An examination of the role call shows that as many non-
interventionists had voted for the measure as had outspoken

7

belligerents.

 

E)U.S. Congress, House, 76u Cong., 3rd sess., May 24,
1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6821-6862.

7For the House vote consult Ipid., 76th Cong., 3rd
sess., May 24, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6862;
In the Senate, the measure's roll call may be consulted
in Ibid., 76tn Cong., 3rd sess., June 11, 1940, Con-
gressional Record, LXXXVI, 7935. The one negative vote
in the House was cast by Vito Marcantonio (American-
Laborite-New York).

195

Roger Greene, however, had recognized the potential
ramifications for halting trade with Japan that were
implicit in the prOposed measures for national defense.
The members of the American Committee, having previously
called for a direct embargo based upon the premise that
Japan had violated the Nine Power Pact, became persuaded
to accept a more circuitous and less volatile approach
tO their goals.8 The National Defense Act, by emphasizing
the need to preserve critical raw materials, especially
in the face of the growing menace to EurOpe, also afforded
to the American Government the necessary means for
indirectly limiting shipments of war materials to Japan.
Greene, convinced that such an expediency was the only
viable method for inaugurating some form of an embargo
against Japan available at this time, contacted Senator
Pittman in May and directed him to ask, under the aegis
of the National Defense prOposals:

...for a law authorizing the President to

withhold from export basic war materials
for the purpose of conserving our national
resources and protecting our national
security, with a suitable provision for
exemption in the case of articles to be

used in a manner compatible with American
national interests.9

 

8Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 32-33.

9creene to Pittman, May 17, 1940, RSG Folder # 4,
ACNPJA Papers.

196

In this same correspondence Greene added that the
Administration, in gaining the powers to halt the
export of raw materials needed by the United States,
could go further than merely a "moral embargo" against
Japan "...without new Congressional action should

circumstances warrant."10

Furthermore, Greene assured
Pittman of the increased chances for success of the
aims by this new tactic, reasoning that, "such a law,
as part of a general plan for greater national security,
would be very difficult to Oppose politically."11
Upon passage of the National Defense Act, Greene,
pleased with the outcome, wrote letters to Pittman,
Schwellenbach and other "friends and supporters" thanking
them for their help in making, "...possible legislation
which would enable the President to curtail or prohibit
exports of war supplies to Japan."12
The American Committee and the members of the anti-
Japanese faction in Congress were not to be disappointed

in their expectations for the National Defense Act. In

 

1OIhid.
11

Ibid.

l2Greene to Pittman, June 18, 1940 and Greens to
Schwellenbach the same day, both letters found in the
"Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA ngers.
The names of the "friends and supporters" was not
disclosed in the letters. Additional correspondence
was Greene to Roosevelt, May 17, 1940, RSG Folder # 4,
and Greens to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, both
found in ACNPJA Papers.

 

197

July and September, President Roosevelt made use of the
act to implement embargoes against Japan, and with these
decisions the Administration had begun to fulfill the
anti-Japanese Congressman's quest for sanctions. By the
end of September, 1940, American neutrality was only a
technicality. The essence of the Administration's
actions was to relieve the embargo advocates of having
to fight for legislation that non-interventionists could
attack, defer, or possibly defeat in the Senate and in
the House. With the Chief Executive and the State
Department moving slowly but steadily towards ending
all trade with Japan, even if some of the action was due
indirectly to needs created by the EurOpean situation,
the anti-Japanese group in Congress could relinquish

to the Administration the actual implementation of
sanctions. They really had little alternative; impeded
by a divided Congress, little Opportunity existed for
successfully passing any legislation directly aimed at
limiting Japan.

In 1941, the last year of peace for the United States,
Congress, which for much of the 1930's had been a repository
for concepts of neutrality, showed an awareness of the
deficiencies inherent in this policy. The attempt at
remaining neutral had failed to promote American interests
and security in a world threatened by the ambitions of
militaristic nations in EurOpe and Asia bent upon a

198

revisionist course and made it necessary for Congress to
reach a consensus on future American foreign policy.
Japan herself conveniently provided the key for enabling
Congress to overcome its divisions.

NO previous action taken by the Japanese in these
difficult years had quite the impact upon Congress as
the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940,
linking the menace of Germany in EurOpe to the threat
of Japan in Asia. But Congressional Opinion was still not
unified over how to deal with this challenge to American
interests in the Pacific. It was not until after
Japanese forces moved into South Indo-China in early
July, 1941, that attitudes hardened perceptibly on
Capitol Hill. In retaliation to that move Roosevelt
ordered all Japanese assets in the United States frozen
on July 26, and issued an Executive Order directing the
Navy to begin on that same day to protect convoys to
Iceland.13 One historian, Paul Schroeder, has suggested

that if the American Government went on the diplomatic

 

13Consult, Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbpp, p. 221;_
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared
War 1 0-1 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 428
an 5 9; or Japan's dilemma and reaction see Robert J.C.

Butow, TO'O And The Comin Of The War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), Chapter II, pp. 310-363.

199

Offensive after July, 1941, the same may be said of
Congressional opinion, each certain that, "the freezing
orders were to teach Japan that she had gone far enough-—
indeed, too far——and that she must now begin to retreat."14
With the collapse of the more moderate Konoye Cabinet and
the rise to power of a militaristic government, led by
Hideki Tojo on October 16, 1941, Japan clearly indicated

her unwillingness to abandon efforts to create an empire

in Asia despite stiffening United States diplomatic and
economic pressure. Once the futility of altering Japan's
course through economic measures became apparent to the

men on Capitol Hill, they entertained with less reluctance
the possibility of using physical means to halt Japan.
Significantly, while the patience of numerous Congressmen
had been sufficiently exhausted by Japan's activities

to induce them to risk a military engagement, many of

these same men clung stubbornly to their non-interventionist
beliefs regarding the strife in EurOpe.15 Selig Adler

has offered an explanation to the apparently paradoxical

behavior of these legislators who advocated that America

 

14Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American

Relations, 1241, p. 175; Schroeder has suggested the rise
to power of the militaristic government was the result of
the stiffening American position.

15Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise To World Power,
1898-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), pp. 198-199.

200

assume, in essence, a double standard in her conduct of
international relations with the suggestion that their
condescending view of Japan:

...came from the American tendency to belittle

the prowess of non-Caucasion races. The Japa-

nese were written off, in popular estimation,

as jackals who waited in hiding to pick up

stray pieces of territory pried loose during

a major encounter of white nations.l6

The question in the declining months of 1941 was no
longer whether the United States ought to curtail Japan
but rather how best to accomplish this Objective. Except
for a few diehard non-interventionists as Nye, Clark, and
Hiram Johnson, the majority of Congress Offered no
Objections to the Administration's efforts to contain
Japan. The evidence for this conclusion did not come
from examining changing voting patterns in the last years
of peace; once the United States position towards Japan
had hardened, the Administration initiated all of the
action, removing any need for Congress to legislate anti-
Japanese measures. The only means for measuring the
alteration of Congressional Opinion is through the
legislator's reactions to both Government policy and

Japanese actions throughout this climactic period in

American-Japanese relations. Their speeches and

 

16Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its
Twentieth Century Reaction7(New York: Macmillan and
Company,:l9b77. p. 289.

201

correspondence reveal that the distinctions between
what had previously been three separate and definite
movements, each with its own policies and ideological
framework, had begun to blur by 1940 and during this
year a number of legislators shifted towards a more
extreme position. Furthermore, by 1941, the anti-
Japanese movement had grown significantly both in
membership and virulence in their attacks upon Japan;
many of the former moderates had converted to a hostile
position and those Congressmen who had relied upon
non-intervention in the past were noticeably silent
over the President's freezing of Japanese assets in
July, 1941.

One of the most important of the new figures to
speak out on Japanese-American relations, Senator Claude
Pepper (D. Florida), was indicative Of this new temper
on the Hill after Japan had allied herself to the
EurOpean dictatorships. Although he had not been heard
from frequently in the past, Pepper now began to emerge
as a leader in the movement for a total embargo of Japan,
rallying the more belligerent members of Congress around
him. Before resigning from the Senate, Schwellenbach
congratulated Pepper on joining the anti-Japanese
movement, and he aptly presaged future events when the
Washington Democrat wished Pepper more success than he

and his colleagues had found in trying to induce Congress

202

to apply a total embargo of trade to Japan.17

There was a difference between Pepper and many of
the earlier devotees of an embargo against Japan. Men
such as Pittman, Schwellenbach, King, and Coffee had
acted out Of a mistrust and fear of Japan, whereas
Pepper's new found hostility has been called merely a
reflection of the change in Roosevelt's thinking towards
Japanese aggression. Greene downgraded the character
of Pepper's commitment to the cause of halting Japan
in an uncomplimentary observation to Price in which he
described the Florida Senator as no more than an
Administration errand runner. When the President changed,
Pepper changed; when the Administration was in favor of
a proposal, Pepper was the voice of the Government.18
Whether the Senator was acting as an Administration
spokesman or whether he finally found it impossible to
contain his fears any longer does not detract from his

prediction that the uniting of the three totalitarian

governments portended a direct threat to American

 

17U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
Egggger l, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12926-

18Greene to Price, March 4, 1940, RSG Folder # 3,
ACNPJA Papers; For Pepper's denial he was just a
spokesman for the Administration see U.S. Congress,
Senate, 77tn Cong., lst sess., October 28, 1941,
Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8290.

203

security. The Florida Senator also prOphesized further
that in the meantime "the yellow men of the East" would
raise their swords in an attempt to conquer the
Netherlands East Indies.19 Pepper's enmity towards

the Axis powers had begun to verge on the intemperate.
During the early months of 1941, when the Lend-Lease
hearings were in progress, the Senator not only advocated
all out aid to the Allies, he demanded that if arms
failed to save British democracy then American forces

should be utilized.20

Turning his attention to East
Asian affairs next, the Florida Democrat parroted
Roosevelt's accusation against Mussolini for the Duce's
attack on France when he remarked Japan was "...an
assassin lurking behind the door to stick a stilleto
in our backs", and deemed it necessary to crush her
imperialism.21
The formation of the Tojo Government in October,
1941, aroused Pepper to new heights of oratory against

the Japanese. In order to reduce the Japanese threat,

 

19Looke, "Claude D. Pepper: Champion or Belligerent
Democracy," as quoted in Salter, ed., Public Men In And
Out Of Office, p. 260.

2OU.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., lst sess.,
February 17, 1941, COpgressional Recopg, LXXXVII, 1058.

21As quoted in Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And
Japanese-American Relations, 1941, p. 187.

204

22 If

Pepper suggested "literally immobilizing her."
that policy proved unsuccessful, the Senator stated

two days later that the only way to deal with a country
like Japan would be to draw a line and warn her if she
crossed it, there would be shooting which would no doubt
culminate in a war.23 Within a week following the
formation Of Tojo's Government, Pepper was ready with

a four point plan concerning Japanese-American relations
which he presented to the press. Urging in the plan that
a blockade be put into effect, he added, "We ought to see
to it that Japan gets no materials from outside sources
that will fatten her for further conquests."24 To
implement the blockade, Pepper said that all exports to
Japan could be halted by closing the Panama Canal to her
shipping and to all ships destined for her ports and
launching patrols in the Pacific area to Observe Japanese
naval activities.25 When the subject of severing
diplomatic relations and possible Japanese retaliation

was mentioned, Pepper claimed there was little danger of

 

22New York Times, October 17, 1941, p. 8.

23Ibid., October 19, 1941, p. 10.

24New York Herald Tribune, October 26, 1941, as found
in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 77A-Fll-Box
227, NA. LD.

25Ibid.

205

Japan attacking the American mainland or any of its

possessions. Showing little foresight, Pepper never

indicated that he seriously contemplated any form of

armed attack against America right up to the bombing

of Pearl Harbor. In spite of the diplomatic problems

his alarming rhetoric imposed on maintaining peaceful

relations with the Japanese, Pepper never doubted, if

war came, the responsibility would rest with Japan who

he blamed for damaging the chances of peace by continuing

her aggression in Asia.26
In his newly assumed position as a leading critic

of Japan, Pepper also felt it necessary to reveal his

displeasure over the Hull-Nomura conversations which

were seeking a readjustment of American-Japanese relations

in the Pacific. he cautioned that the "...Senate would

reject any agreement or treaty with Japan that would

make the United States a party to any crime that Japan

had committed."27 Asserting that peace in the Orient

would come when Japan abandoned her aggression and

removed her army from China and Indo-China, the Senator

saw no other basis for a rapprochement between the two

 

26Ibid.

27New York Times, November 20, 1941, p. 10.

206

28 Two weeks before Pearl Harbor, Pepper

countries.
predicted America and Japan were verging on a shooting
war, warning once again that "we are only waiting for
Japan to cross a line before we start shooting."29
Although vague over the whereabouts of this metaphorical
line, Pepper insisted that once it was crossed war would
ensue. Twelve days later, on December 7, everyone knew
where the line was located.

Whereas Pepper's loud denounciations of Japan's
militaristic regime would have sounded radical in 1937.
by 1941, although still provocative, his outcries found
a certain degree of sympathy and acceptance in an in-
creasingly anti-Japanese Congress. Nothing illustrated
the changing tone of Congress better than the fate of
Representative Coffee's House Resolution 2946, calling
for a total embargo of trade to Japan. When Coffee
had introduced, in an earlier session, a similar
resolution known as House Resolution 5432 which had
contained much the same Objective, it had been criticized
on the floor of the House for being tOO harsh a measure.

But by January 30, 1941, Congress had become so incensed

by Japanese actions that Coffee's presentation of this new

 

28Ibid.

29Ibid., November 25, 1941, p. s.

207

prOposal evoked no Opposition.30

Speaking for his
latest resolution, Coffee did not avoid strong language
to justify the need for an embargo. He rejected the
less provocative reasons Offered by some Congressmen
who had claimed that shipments of certain strategic
materials to Japan ought to be ended because they were
needed at home. Instead, Coffee insisted upon an
outright condemnation of Japan for violating the Nine
Power Treaty, not just because of the ethical consider-
ations involved in a broken treaty, but because Japan
had attacked, invaded, and ravaged a Republic for
imperialistic motives. Therefore, it was evident to
an indignant Coffee that the United States should no
longer participate in that aggression by supplying
crucial materials to the Japanese.31
Later in the year, on May 5, Coffee introduced

Concurrent Resolution 30 directed at investigating the

shipment of war materials to Japan. The Rules Committee

 

30U.S; Congress, House, 77"1 Cong., lst sess.,
January 30, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 427.

31Ibid., See also Ibid., 77"1 Cong., 1st sess.,
March 13, I941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1156;
The bill was referred to the Forelgn Affairs Committee
where it was tabled. Consult, Ibid.. 77th Cong., 1st sess.,
January 30, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 427.

208

held hearings but the bill was not reported out Of

the committee; the explanation offered was that the

State Department Opposed such a bill since a war might

be precipitated by the enactment of Coffee's proposals.32
Coffee's resolution paralleled Pepper's views that Japan
should be stOpped by economic sanctions and the State
Department feared the repercussions on American-Japanese
foreign policy if such a proposal was enacted.33 To
accomplish this goal, these men believed all that was
needed was a total American commitment to thwart Japan's
quest for a new order in Asia.

Congressman Charles I. Faddis, another of the early
members of the anti-Japanese group in the House, could
not have agreed more completely with their sentiments,
and reiterated his willingness to support any form of
legislation to insure Japan's military and economic

collapse.34 In 1941, Faddis publicized his views in

speaking engagements under the sponsorship of the

 

32Ibid., 77m Cong., lst sess., May 5, 1941,
Co resslonal Record, LKXXVII, 3602& Additional discussion
5y gaffes may he found in Ibid., 77 Cong., lst sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3640-3641.
33Ibid.

34Ibid., 77th Cong., lst sess., February 19, 1941,
Con resslonal Record, LXXXVII, 1196-1198.

209

American Committee. The theme of the addresses was

identical with what he was saying in Congress; Japan

must be embargoed to prevent her aim of establishing a

military and economic hegemony in Asia. Joining Coffee,

Faddis remained a steadfast Opponent of Japan in the

House and lent unwavering support to the Price Committee's

Objectives.35
Along with Pepper, Coffee, and Faddis, other

Congressmen who in the previous years had professed

few Opinions on the issue of sanctions or severing of

diplomatic relations began to agitate for a harsher

policy towards Japan. Some of their statements were

exercises in irresponsibility and showed an inability

to recognize the ramifications their bellicosity might

have on American foreign policy. Congressman Albert Gore

(D. Tennessee), while expressing his wish for an embargo,

gave a good illustration of the provocative type of

remarks that were being heard with greater frequency

in Congress. He used an unfortunate choice Of words to

describe the Japanese, referring to them as those

 

35Greene to Katherine Greene, July 29, 1941, "RSG To
KG, 1941," folder, Greene MSS. An example of Faddis'
speeches may be found in U.S. Congress, House, 77tn Cong.,
lst sess., October 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII,
7725-7727 and Ibid., 7']th Cong., lst sess., October 17, 1941,
Qpngressional Record, LXXXVII, 8008.

210

"...scrubby, contemptible, squint eyed sons of the
Rising Sun", who should be pummeled into Oblivion.36
Another freshman Congressman, Clyde T. Ellis (D.
Arkansas), told his colleagues in the House he was ready
to give Japan one week to withdraw from the Axis Pact,
from China, and from all of Asia. Upon Japan's failure
to comply with that ultimatum, and Ellis was sure she
would fail, he considered it right and proper for the
United States to begin at once "...the process of
polishing her [yapanfl into insignificance."37 Other
notable Democrats including Senators Tom Connally (Texas),
Alban Barkley (Kentucky), and Guy M. Gillette (Iowa),
adhered to a harsher policy and began to make stronger
statements than they had done previously.38 Senator
Gillette summed up their viewpoint when he stated it
was time "...to dr0p the policy of appeasement we have

followed with Japan."39 In his growing dislike of Japan

 

36U.S. Congress, House, 77"1 Cong., lst sess.,

February 19, 1941, Con ressional Record, LXXXVII, 1197;
Also consult, Ibid., 77“ Cong., ls t sess., October 17,
1941, CopgressIon a1 Record, LXXXVII, 8008.

371bid.,77'nI Cong., lst sess., May 5, 1941, Con-
gr ressiona I Record, LXXXVII, 3356.

38For Connally, consult New York Times, January 12,
1941, p. 2; Gillette's comments may be found in U. S.
Congress, Senate, 77“ Cong., lst sess., May 12, 1941,
Con ressional Record, LXXXVII, 3888 and May 15, 1941,
4108; For Barkley, consult, New York Times, August 25,
1941, p. 10.

39Senator Gillette's comment is quoted in Baltimore
Sun, October 12, 1941 found in Scrapbook, Part 3. $6033.

Connally MSS.

211

and his increasing animosity towards non-interventionists
since the outbreak of war in Europe, Connally too, warned:

If Japan wants war and must have a fight
she will find out that we have a Navy in
the Pacific that can shoot straight. We
have rights and are not afraid to fight
for them.4

The comments of these Congressmen, and especially Connally -—m
who now advocated defense and protection of American 3

41

rights in Asia, reveal how widespread the anti-Japanese

movement had grown; no longer the monOpoly of just

 

Western Democrats and a few Eastern Congressmen, now all
geographical regions were represented in this grouping.
The desire to stOp Japan had gained sufficient

respectability and enough influential supporters to
stimulate the conversion of an ever larger number of
Congressmen to a harsher policy. That conversion was
nowhere more apparent than in the statements of

Representative Hamilton Fish.42

Japan's signing of
the Tripartite Pact, which had acted as a catalyst in

changing the opinion of so many others, also proved to

 

40

41For a comparison of Connally's view in 1937 when he
advocated withdraw of Americans from China and his view in
1941, consult Su ra, Chapter II, pp. 70-71.

42U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October
1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12944-12945.

New York Times, December 3, 1941, p. 6.

212

Fish the futility of his non-interventionist position
towards Japan; as nothing else could have done, this
alliance convinced him to take a more hostile stance.
Believing in the necessity of a moral-ethical defense

of American interests, Fish claimed Japan's link to the
Rome-Berlin Axis challenged the American position and
honor in Asia. He restated his fear that Japan might
attempt to drive Americans from the Orient and remarked
that the United States must defend what it considered to
be its vital interests.43 In December, 1940, Fish even
reacted favorably to Roosevelt's "Arsenal Of Democracy"
speech, considering the message one of the most forceful
the President had ever delivered.44 The Congressman's
acceptance of a stronger position towards Japan did not,
however, extend to his views of EurOpe where he continued
to maintain his non-interventionist posture, even voting

45 When questioned on the

against the Lend-Lease Act.
floor of the House about his antithetical positions,
Fish did admit a loan to Great Britain might be in order

but purposely avoided a definite commitment to a strong

 

43Ibid.
44New York Times, December 30, 1940, p. 8.

45U.S. Congress, House, 77“ Cong., lst sess.,
February 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 815.

213

stand in EurOpean matters}6 Throughout 1941, apparently

undeterred by his inconsistency in matters of foreign
policy, Fish continued his criticism of Japan's

aggressive militarism, her link to Germany and Italy,
47

and continuing threat to American interests in Asia.
By 1941, Fish was not the only Republican to

recognize how wide the gap had grown between the United

States and Japan. A firm believer in remaining dis-
entangled from overseas conflicts, freshman Representative

Herman Carl Andersen (Minnesota) stated that after
wrestling with the dilemma of American-Japanese relations,

he now felt it would be wise to end all gasoline and oil
shipments to Japan. The newly converted Andersen reasoned:

Surely it is time to forget the profits of
oil companies and stOp this supplying of the

number one war necessity, oil, to a nation
which has shown anything but a friendly
attitude to our country of late.48

Even more adamant than Andersen in his belief that there
was no way to settle the outstanding issues with Japan
was a fellow Republican, Bertrand W. Gearhart (California).

Because of Japan's "heinous crimes" against humanity, the

 

46Ibid.
47New York Times, August 11, 1941, p. 3.

48U.S'.' Congress, House, 77"' Cong., lst sess., May 9,
Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3862.

 

1941,

 

 

214

three term Californian felt compelled to suggest a four
partznmgram for the Administration to follow and
incorporate into the formulation Of American-East Asian

poliqy. It included the provisions America should do

nothing to aid Japan, use every method to cripple her
while aiding the victims of her aggression; finally, if

Japan was not halted in her expansion, then declare war

in order to crush her permanently.49

Joining Fish, Andersen, and Gearhart in the growing

 

list of converts to the anti-Japanese cause was a long

time leader of Western Republican Progressives, Senator

George W. Norris of Nebraska. No one member of Congress'

change in attitude with respect to foreign policy could
have had any greater impact on moderates in Congress.

For over twenty-five years Norris had rejected any form
of international entanglements; Opposing in 1917 American
entry into the World War, voting against the League Of
'Nations after the war, and in the 1930's voting against

the World.Court prOposal while firmly supporting mandatory

and rigid neutrality legislation.SO Nevertheless, in

 

4?;22flp. 77th Cong., lst sess., November 23, 1941,
Congress10nal Recog, LXXXVII, 5492-5493.

50New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1; For an
analysis Of his non-interventionist beliefs see "After
Twenty Years," Christian Century, LIV (Mar. 31, 1937),

Pp 0 412-4130

 

215

spiuaof this long record of non-interventionism, by 1939,
Norris had come to recognize the dissimilarities between
the events leading up to the First World War and the

circumstances surrounding the outbreak Of this new war

in Europe.51 The Senator now ascribed to the view that

the Axis plans of aggression and conquest directly
threatened the safety and security of the United States.52
Alarmed by the danger a possible defeat of Great Britain
posed to American security and the Atlantic community,

Norris voted for the repeal of the arms embargo on
October 27, 1939, and then voted for the Lend-Lease Act

on March 8, 1941, on the supposition "Hitler's triumphs

had simplified America's choices." Moreover, if Germany

were victorious in Europe, Norris added, Japan would then

create disturbances in the Pacific region, forcing the

United States to fight a war on two fronts.53

51George w. Norris, Fi tin Liberal: The Aut -
bio ra h Of Geor e W. Norris (New York: Macmillan, 1945).
p. 392; U.S. Congress, enate, 77‘" Cong., lst sess.,

March 7, 1941, Congrepsional Record, LXXXVII, 1975-1980;
"American Neutrality," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V

(Nov. 1, 1939), pp. 62-64.

52Norris, Fighting_Liberal, p. 392; U.S. Congress,
Senate, 77'11 Cong., lst sess., March 7, 1941, Congressional
Record, LXXXVII, 1975-1980.

53U.S. Congress, Senate, 76“ Cong., 2nd sess.,
October 27, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXV, 1024;

Norris, Fi htin Liberal, p. 397; WAmerican Neutrality,"
Vital Speeches 5? The hay, pp. 62-64; U.S. Congress,
Senate, 77“ Cong., lst sess., March 8, 1941, Congressional
Record, LXXXVII, 2097.

 

 

 

216

Paralleling his acceptance Of a more active United
States role in the EurOpean conflict, Norris also began
to develOp, from 1938 onwards, a deep antagonism towards
Japan for her wilful invasion of China the previous year.

He accepted the need for a boycott of war materials to
54

Japan although he did not call for a total embargo.
By 1941, Norris was ready to state that Japan possessed
none of the genuine humane intentions of a peaceful

nation and furthermore had initiated a crime against

the Chinese people. He not only favored any action to

end Japan's aggression, but continued to consider that
nation completely treacherous in all Of its international
dealings.55 With the Japanese signing of the Tripartite
Pact and the formation of the Tojo Cabinet a year later,
Norris' alienation from Japan became complete; conse-
quently, any action America took against the Japanese

Empire should be firm, Norris remarked, and he would be
willing to give his full support.56 For Norris and many

of his colleagues, the fighting in Eastern and South-

eastern Asia was viewed as an extension Of the war in

 

54Norris to Edwin Borchard, January 4, 1938 and to

Freda Kirchwey, March 19, 1938, Tray 104, Box 4, Norris
MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,

55Norris, Fighting Liberal, pp. 208-210.

56Ibid.

217

EurOpe. Sooner or later, he claimed, we would have to
fight because the United States "...cannot appease Japan
any more than we can appease Hitler."57 Like many Of his
counterparts in Congress, Norris' statements concerning
the EurOpean situation tended to be more temperate and
cautious than his comments on the East Asian conflict.
Undergoing a change similar in nature to that of
Norris', Senator Styles Bridges (R. New Hampshire),

another staunch non-interventionist, had by 1941,

acquiesced to the need for a harsher policy to contain

Japan.58 He remarked:
I don't think there is anything to be gained

by trying to appease the Japanese. We have
to be firm with them-—it's the only language

they know.59

Two weeks later the language was transferred to the
battlefield.

With increasing frequency throughout 1941, the
heretofore uncommitted Congressmen were abandoning their

cherished, non-interventionist attitudes in order to

 

57New York Times, October 19, 1940, p. 10.

58 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-1941,
p. 230. The authors considered Bridges an 'isolationist
stalwart". Bridges, however, was closer to the moral-
ethical grouping which advocated defending freedom of the
seas; see Robert A. Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p.

186.
59NewYork Times, November 21, 1941, p. 5.

 

 

218

support an actively aggressive American campaign against
Japan. Two long time advocates of an American withdrawal
from Asia,.Arthur Vandenberg and Arthur Capper, finding
themselves faced with the prOSpect of remaining silent
onlookers to the spectacle of overt Japanese aggression,
now also began to shift their positions.

Capper, in particular, found it difficult to restrain
his frustration over the extended conflict in China and
had correspondence with the American Committee concerning
Japanese military movements into Southeast Asia.60 The
only alternative Capper saw Open to him was to support
stronger measures against Japan, a policy that already
had gained much pOpularity with his constituency in
Kansas.61 Accepting this condition, Capper then began to
admonish his former non-interventionist colleagues for
impeding the passage of an embargo now that he had
become convinced economic measures were the most effective
means for stOpping Japan. He justified his new posture

by claiming that since Japan cherished none of America's

ideas of justice, democracy, or peace, he was afraid that

 

6OCapper to Harry B. Price, October 8, 1940,
"Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers;
Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

61"Bad News For The Isolationists," New Republic,
CV (Sept. 29, 1941), p. 403.

 

 

219

the Japanese would seek to destroy China's independence
and enslave the Orient under the myth of Pan-Asianism.
Furthermore, America should be chastised, in Capper's
view, for allowing Japan's violations of international
law and morality to escape unpunished.62
Reflecting the tendency seen in other moderates
turned belligerent to compartmentalize American diplomacy
into two separate spheres-—Asian and European—~Capper
continued to show a great reluctance to engage the United
States in the problems of Europe. Referring to the war
raging across the Atlantic, Capper berated his fellow
Congressmen for attempting to involve the United States,
and he Opposed the type of all out aid to the allies
incorporated in the Lend-Lease bill, although he never
voiced any objection to aiding China. The Senator feared
a war with Hitler and thought aiding Britain might bring
this about.63 He suggested that the United States resign

herself to remaining aloof from the EurOpean war, stating:

 

62U.S. Congress, Senate, 77"1 Cong., lst sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1636-1637.

63Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 202; "Time To Think
American," ScribnerTs Commentator, IX (Feb. 1941), pp. 69-
74; "Let Us Keep Out Of War,“ Vital Speeches Of The Day,
VII, (Mar. 1, 1941), pp. 293-296.

 

 

- mi?

 

220

Whether we like it or not we should make
1u>our'minds that we probably have to live 64
in.the same world with Mussolini and Hitler.
Although he evidenced few qualms about advising restraint
in European affairs, Capper was not so willing to live in
the same world with an expansionistic, militaristic, and
totalitarian Japan.65 Not until the fight over Lend-Lease [nun

was over did Capper reevaluate international affairs

commenting:

n. 2:- .

Isolation and non-intervention are dead
issues. Today the foreign policies of

the United States, the very life of the
United States and the lives and fortune

of the peOple of the United States are
tied into the programs and policies of the
British Empire in its fight against the
Axis powers.66

 

‘Mfi -'
;i"‘_: .

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, Capper spoke out for a
rigid policy towards Japan in which the United States
should attempt to cripple the Japanese military machine
and resist granting any demands. As stunned as other

Congressmen whose views had hardened during the final year

 

64"Let Us Keep Out Of War," Vital Speeches Of The Day,
p. 294; "Time To Think American," Scribnegjs Commentator,

p. 74.
65Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

66Ibid.‘ For Capper's praise of the "Arsenal Of

9
Democracy“ speech.see New York Times, December 30, 1940,

jp. 8 which was an early indicator 5? his reevaluation.

 

221

of peace, Capper, too was shocked by the attack on an

American possession. But he refused to admit that he

and his colleagues might have had any share in the
breakdown of relations between the two countries despite
their frequent and contemptuous denounciations of the

Japanese which had often been tinged with hints of

racial superiority.67 Capper entertained no doubts that
Japan was completely at fault for Pearl Harbor.68

Far more reluctant to divest himself of his non-
interventionism than Senator Capper had been, Senator

Vandenberg exemplified the agonies experienced by those

men who were firmly dedicated to the pursuit of peaceful

coexistence in the world. Given the international

situation as it existed in the year preceding Pearl
Harbor, attempts to maintain the peace proved to be a

thankless task full of obstacles which could not be

surmounted even by the best intentions. In the past

Vandenberg had objected strongly to any American in-

volvement overseas, claiming it might create conflicts

 

67Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

6811318.: In additiont,h consult Capper's speech in
U.S. Congress, Senate, 77 Cong., lst sess., December 30,
1941, Congressional Record. LXXXVII, 5717-5719, which
appears to be a statement of contrition for being an
obstacle in furthering defense preparations prior to
Pearl Harbor. For his views on military preparedness,

see Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 175-176.

 

 

1'!- -..' '

 

 

222

leading to war. Moreover, he had maintained the
conviction that the United States could best avoid war
by acting unilaterally rather than in concert with
other major powers, thereby risking involvement in
their quarrels.

Unfortunately for Vandenberg's theories world events 4-‘1
prior to 1941, as well as throughout that entire crucial [~.
year, were destroying the viability of his past conten-
tions. Acknowledging the failure of his non-interventionist ,

i . _

 

beliefs, Vandenberg nevertheless clung to the idea that
war could still be avoided if only the United States
used sagacious diplomacy and indicated a willingness to
satisfy some Japanese demands. To insure that the
United States did not become involved in a new war,
Vandenberg admitted it might even be practical for
America to join with other countries who had an interest

in preserving peace.69

As a complement to his prOposal for a multilateral
search for peace, Vandenberg produced a positive program
for enhancing Japanese-American relations to counteract

the increasingly negative, antipathetical tone that

 

69Vandenberg to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg
MSS; Vandenberg and Morris, eds., The Private ngers Of
Senator Vandenberg, pp. 3-4.

 

 

223

Congress was taking towards Japan. Certain that war

wimlJamnxwould severely debilitate America's economy,
Vandenberg urged satisfying some of Japan's goals in
Asia hipflace of instituting an embargo which could only

further antagonize her. Great benefits could accrue

from proceeding along such a path assured Vandenberg,

by yielding certain areas, Japan might be pacified, and

 

 

this in turn could perhaps induce her to break with
|

Nazi Germany and Facist Italy, dealing these European
70 The Michigan Republican believed

F

powers a severe blow.
the United States could survive regardless of what kind

of settlement occured in Asia; therefore, America should

recognize Manchukuo and guarantee Japan some concessions

in China. He noted:

China is big enough so that additional
territorial concessions, or trade zones,
might have been arranged to the advantage
of China herself in return for a guaranteed

peace.7l
.Although he did not condone Japanese aggression, Vandenberg

believed America's best interests would not be served by

continuing a dogmatic diplomatic attitude. In fact, the

 

 

7OVandenberg and Morris, eds., The Private Papers
Of Senator Vandenberg, p. 17.

'7tggug1.; Also consult, Vandenberg Scrapbook,
"December, 1941-December, 1942," VandenbergMSS.

 

 

224

highest statesmanship the United States could hOpe to
practice in 1941 would be to sever Tokyo from Berlin.72

Once Vandenberg had created an alternative policy

which could contend with the program sponsored by the

anti-Japanese group, he found a number of non-inter-

 

 

ventionists in Congress receptive to his conciliatory .r.fi,
ideas. Senators Bennett Champ Clark and Gerald P. Nye

were especially pleased to have another Option to follow

which excluded any new provocations directed at the 5
Japanese. In Clark's estimation, if the United States E ;

would no present a military challenge to a reordering
of the status quo in EurOpe or the Far East, it did
not have to fear an attack from Germany or her ally,
Japan.73 Nye agreed that the Pacific region was safe
from an attack, and moreover, that an end could be
brought to the Sino-Japanese conflict if only America
enabled Japan to "save face" in its disastrous China
Operation. Following Vandenberg's lead, Nye too,

acceded to his suggestion that Japan receive concessions

 

72Ibid.; Vandenberg to B.E. Hutchinson, October 28,
1944; See also Diary entry, December 9, 1941, Scrapbook
lXII; For Vandenberg's attempt to be prudent and wise
concerning East Asian affairs see Vandenberg to Irving
Glassband, Nevember 18, 1941, found in VandenbergiMSS.

73U.S. Congress, Senate, 77tn Cong., lst sess.,
February 18, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1108.

 

 

225

in China, including an air base in Shanghai, and then

resume trade with the United States.74
A ranking moderate and non-interventionist, Senator

Walter George (D. Georgia), had not yet Spoken about the

issue of Japanese-American relations. But finding

significant similarities between Vandenberg's premises
and his own thinking on the issues of the day, he knew

he might find a segment of Congress receptive to his

ideas. Following Japan's move into South Indo-China in

July, 1941, George remarked that if Japan engaged in no
further aggression the United States could work out a

rapprochement with that nation concerning all Asian

matters. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee following the death of Key Pittman, until
July 31, 1941, George admitted he feared a complete
severance of relations with Japan since he did not
consider American measures, short of war, capable of

stepping Japan's moves into Southeast Asia.75

Another of the non-interventionists, Hiram Johnson,

 

74’New York Times, November 21, 1941, p. 5; Nye's

reflectibns on how his policies could have prevented war
may be consulted in Cole, Gerald P. Nre And American
Lmes, December 8,

Foreign Relations, p. 199; New Yor i
941' Po 0

75W. August 3, 1941. p. 21.

 

 

 

 

226

considered America a cowardly nation and remarked it
would be more courageous and brave to declare war on
England's enemies than to have the Administration
precipitate incidents and pass legislation like Lend-
Lease. Let Congress declare war, Johnson intoned, or
let America seriously refrain from involvement in the ,«2
World War raging in Europe. In the same month his [Mi]
remarks appeared in Scribner's Commentator, Johnson

had his Opportunity to vote for a declaration of war.76 f

 

With the exception of Nye, Clark, Vandenberg, and ; J
George, by 1941 few Congressmen had faith in the efficacy
of conciliating Japan; the arguments being forwarded by
the anti-Japanese group proved far more pOpular with
an ever growing number of Congressmen. Nevertheless,
up to the day Pearl Harbor was attacked some members
of Congress persisted in vacillating between one policy
and another. No better example of the indecision and
lack of commitment to any one approach to Japanese-
American relations could be found than in the person of
Senator Burton K. Wheeler. At times staunchly defending
the position held by Nye and Vandenberg, the Montana

Democrat had little hesitation in turning one hundred

 

76"Let's Declare Ourselves," Scribner's Commentator,
XI (Dec. 1941), PP. 93-970

 

227

and eighty degrees to espouse diplomatic, economic and
military actions which could only produce a conflict
‘with Japan. Revealing no firm beliefs based on any
penetrating analysis of world events, he called, in

June, 1940, for all out aid to the Allies in the wake

of France's capitulation.77 Later he voted against the
legislation which had been designed to help the Allies,
claiming that passage of Lend-Lease would allow President
Roosevelt to begin "...leasing and lending American

boys."78

In a condemnation of the act, he called it the
New Deal's "Triple 'A' foreign policy to plow under every
fourth American boy."79 Never tiring of reminding his
colleagues that England deserved only American sympathy,
not her support, Wheeler was fond of repeating Lord
Palmerston's famous dictum: "England has no eternal
enmities and no eternal friendships. She has only

80

eternal interests.” Therefore, Wheeler frequently

 

77"Evolution Of A Senator," 21229 XXXV (June. 24’
1940). pp. 15-16-

78"America's Present Emergency," Vital Speeches Of
The Day, VII (Jan. 15, 1941), pp. 203-265.

79Kay,'"Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life,
pp. 118-119; U. S. Congress, Senate, 77“1 Cong., lst sess.,
January 12, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 178-179.

80"The American People Want No War," Vital Speeches
Of The Day, VII (June. 1, 1941), p. 489.

 

 

 

228

reminded Congress and the American peOple that the
United States should not rush to defend an England
that had been ungrateful before and would be again.81
Wheeler's inconsistency with respect to the advice
he disseminated in Congress about Europe extended to his
views of Japanese-American relations as well. Indicating
no reluctance to aid Chiang Kai-shek or embargo trade to
Japan,82 he approved, in July, 1941, the freezing of
Japanese assets in order to "...slow up Japan from an
economic standpoint and call their bluff so they will
not start anything serious."83 Apparently Wheeler's
actions and words inferred that he had no serious
misgivings about fighting Japan should American policy

84

instigate a military retaliation. But upon hearing

of Tojo's selection as Premier, War Minister, and Home
Minister, Wheeler pointedly ignored his previous
assertions. Taking a considerably different tact, the

Montana Democrat prOposed that the United States and

 

81Ibid.; See also "America Beware," Scribner's
Commentator, X (June. 1941), pp. 88-92.

82Ad1er, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 289.

83As quoted in Cole, America First, pp. 189-190;
New York Times, July 26, 1941, p. 7.

84Ibid.

 

 

229

Japan could settle their differences peaceably
"...unless the hotheads of Japan go crazy."85 Two
days later he urged caution in dealing with Japan
for he saw no reason for a Pacific war. He even
stated, "I cannot imagine anything more helpful for
Hitler than us jumping into the war with Japan."86
Like Nye, Wheeler considered the only reason the
Administration was being belligerent was to save
England's Oriental empire which he remarked was a
monumental tragedy.87

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Wheeler
commented:

The Japanese have chosen war. We must now

exert our every energy, not only to win but

to give the Japanese such a whipping, that

they will not want war again.88
Yet he still criticized the Administration and especially
Cordell Hull for bringing on the war. With twenty-one
years of hindsight Wheeler remarked, "I believe we might

have avoided an attack if the President had required
Hull to negotiate seriously and realistically with the

 

85New York Times, October 17, 1941, p. 8.

86Ibid., October 19, 1941, p. 10.

87Ibid., November 12, 1941, p. 8.

88Ibid., December 8, 1941, p. 6.

 

 

 

 

Id

.... 'I elf,

230

Japanese."89 Furthermore, Wheeler suggested that Hull
rejected and ridiculed all Japanese claims in Asia
thereby forcing that nation to strike first for a

redress of grievances.90

The Japanese solved the
Senator's dilemma of searching for honor and courting
appeasement. While laying blame for the coming of the
war on Hull and the Administration, Wheeler did not
remind himself that he had supported aid to Chiang
Kai-shek and the freezing of Japanese assets in America.
Like other non—interventionists, he viewed American
involvement in EurOpe and Asia differently; but in the
case of the latter area, he was as provocative at times
as any member of the anti-Japanese grouping.91
The attack on Pearl Harbor resolved the debate
within Congress concerning what American policy should
be vis-a-vis Japan, and initiated the rhetoric of
unanimity. No longer were there any demands at one
extreme for legislation hostile to Japan while at the

other extreme rejection of any involvement in East Asian

affairs. The word was now unity. The goal was

 

89Wheeler and Healy, Yankee From The West, p. 31.

90Letter Burton K. Wheeler to the author, March 19,
1969, in the author's possession.

91

See for instance, Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1941,
p. 10.

231

ViCtOIYegZ

Representative Charles Plumley (R. Vermont),
summed up Congressional sentiments after December 7,

when he told his colleagues the debate was over. He
reminded them it was now just idle talk to keep discussing
what could have prevented the tragedy in the Pacific,

for the unimaginable was now a reality.93 "Out of the F"“
sky came a vicious assault by a skillful and determined
enemy", remarked Congressman Clare E. Hoffman (R; Michigan),
and in the aftermath of the attack Congress was now

resolved to militarily crushing Japanese expansionism.94

 

The bi-partisan support for an anti-Japanese stance in
Congress, taking shape since late 1940, was now
completed; both parties closed ranks to form a united
front. The question was no longer how to stay out of

war with Japan, but how to survive and win the conflict.

 

92The only negative vote was cast by Congresswoman
Jeanette Rankin (R. Montana), in the House of Repre-
sentatives; Miss Rankin had voted against entry into
World War I and was unsuccessful in her attempt to win
a senatorial seat in 1918. She won again in 1940, just
in time to return to Capitol Hill and object once again
to war declarations. See Bio ra hical Eirectory_0f The
American Congress, pp. 149 - 498.

93U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., lst sess.,
Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 5506.

94Ibid., 77'11 Cong., lst sess., December 16, 1941,
CongressionalfiRecord, LXXXVII, 9856; An earlier non-
interventionist, Hoffman's ideas may be consulted in
Schoonmaker and Reid., eds., We Testify, p. 304.

 

232

For the moment, there was no difference between Pepper,
Fish, Clark, Nye, Vandenberg, or Wheeler. The assault
on Pearl Harbor did not end political controversies;
nevertheless, the attack channeled Congressional Opinion
into a single purpose, a single determination and a
single resolve to win the war. For the first time in
many years, it could truthfully be stated that the
irresolute years regarding Congressional opinion towards

Japan had ended.

CONCLUSION

After dissecting Congressional opinion towards
Japan, two generalizations can be concluded; one, it
changed dramatically during the years 1937 to 1941, and
two, as it evolved, it passed through three stages. The T
first of these stages, extending from 1937 to 1939, was
characterized by a Congress divided between those

calling for economic sanctions, those urging protection

 

of neutral rights, and those pressing for a complete
American withdrawal from Asia. In this early period,

the differences of Opinion were too great to be breached,
and the six attempts made at initiating legislation
against Japan never even reached the floor of the

Senate or the House. The second stage, marked by a
gradual blurring of the differences separating each of
these groups, a disintegration of the moderate position
in favor of one of the two extremes, a shift in support
of a harsher policy against Japan, and the start of overt
Administration action for an embargo, emerged throughout
the year 1940. The third stage, a general identification
of Congressional Opinion with the goals of the anti-
Japanese movement, culminated in the summer and fall of
1941 with the freezing order issued by Roosevelt in July

and the rise of the militaristic Tojo Government three

233

234

months later.

What accounted for this divergence of opinion until
1941? One commonly held belief, that American interests
would be adversely affected by a Japanese hegemony over
China, influenced many legislators to take a stand
against Japan. Some Congressmen also had previous
animosities against that nation, reflecting their own
racial prejudices or those of their constituents. Other

Congressmen, insisting that international relations

 

comply with legal, moral and ethical standars, pictured

'="n.'m

Japan as the personification of an international outlaw,
breaking treaties and bombing women and children.
Pressure groups like the American Committee, lobbying

in Washington, effectively united these issues, bringing
them to the attention of a wide range of legislators
while at the same time agitating for an embargo. Early
converts to the anti-Japanese movement also labored to
educate their colleagues to the threat in Asia. Further-
more, the activities of Japan herself, no less than other
issues, accelerated the transformation in Congressional
opinion. This process of change received a final
stimulus from the Administration after 1940; once
Roosevelt had begun to act, the desire to follow the
President's lead persuaded many previously uncommitted
legislators to favor an embargo.

With all of these pressures bearing upon Congressional

235

Opinion, no legislation directed against Japan ever
emerged because another series of issues, equally potent
in formulating Opinion, countered the influence of the
anti-Japanese movement. Among these forces acting to
restrain Congress, Japan herself, frequently helped to
blunt hostility by reaching compromises with the United
States on such potentially volatile tOpics as the
settlement of the Baggy affair. Prior to 1940, the
Administration offered little encouragement to Con-

e'lr-g

gressional efforts to pass an embargo. Yet, without

 

1 'fl. ‘57

active support from the President, there could be little
chance for overcoming Congress' reluctance to pass such
controversial legislation, and many legislators, rather
than try, claimed such attempts might either embarrass
or anger Roosevelt. Another significant portion of
Congress, convinced of the need to continue expansion
of American trade, abhored all war as detrimental to
overseas commercial interests. International trade
could best be promoted by remaining neutral and not
alienating either customer, Japan or China. A further
check on precipitious action was the fear of a possible
two front war should American security become simul-
taneously threatened in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
Most potent of all considerations, however, was a fear
of getting caught once again in another world war, and

a number of Congressmen clung to the hope, even after it

256

had become impractical, that neutrality would provide
the means for preventing the United States from becoming
involved. Thus these men were disposed to appease Japan,
even if it meant the dismemberment of China and the

loss of much of Southeast Asia.

Many of these issues lost their attraction as
events rapidly approached a climax in 1941, and the
number of men willing to follow a strictly non-belligerent
policy dwindled considerably. But Congressional Opinion
had been seriously split throughout much of this period;
no legislation had been produced, and in the end only
the Administration, through Executive Order, transcended

these divisions.

"' ‘B'K'f't -. "I

 

‘R. ‘P

BIBLIOGRAPHI CAL ESSAY

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The historical record concerning Congressional
Opinion towards Japan from 1937 to 1941 offers a varied
and vivid account of American history. The purpose of
this essay is to evaluate the sources which have been
consulted and form the foundation of this study. The
essay is divided into ten parts: Manuscript Sources;
Government Printed Sources; Newspaper and Periodicals;
Biographies, Autobiographies, and Memoirs; General
Studies; Monographs And Articles Pertaining To Congress;
Articles Pertaining To Various Congressmen; General
Articles On American Foreign Policy; General Attacks

On Japan; Unpublished Sources.

I. Manuscript Sources:

For this study an important research location was
the private papers of various Congressmen who voiced
opinions concerning Japanese-American relations in the
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C. Unfortunately, these papers were not as valuable
as had been anticipated; however, they do offer a
beginning in the research for the individual Congressman's

viewpoint through his letters and correspondence. The

237

 

238

vast collection of the William E. Borah Papers are
almost devoid of any comments on American-Japanese
relations. There are more than seven hundred boxes
which are in good order through the twenties when he
was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
but thin out considerably in the thirties. There I?”‘
are also fifty—five reels of microfilm reproduced from
the Borah Scrapbooks at the University of Idaho. The

Scrapbooks are a narcissistic collection offering some

 

letters but the majority of the items contain newspaper
clippings of the senator's career.

The Tom Connally Papers are also disappointing and
the most relevant materials are boxes 134 and 135 as well
as Scrapbook number 602. There are twelve scrapbooks
covering the years 1937-1941. The Key Pittman Papers
contain two hundred and one boxes yet given his position
in the Senate and his connections with the State
Department and the White House, the manuscript collection
is nearly useless as a source for understanding the
Senator's views towards Japan. Since both Connally and
Pittman were Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, it is surprising and disappointing that the
collections offer so little.

One of the leading anti-Japanese senators, Lewis B.
Schwellenbach, gave no indication in his Papers where the
foundations of his foreign policies originated. The

239

collection contains nearly four thousand items in ten
containers. The only relevant material can be found
in Box 2 "Speeches And Statements 1940-1946,". The
James Hamilton Lewis MSS, the Charles McNar MSS, and

 

the George Norris MSS are nearly devoid of any information
on Japan as well. Finally, the Cordell Hull Pa ere, opened rm“.
to 1939 for all researchers when the author was at the

Library of Congress, were of no help in searching for the

correspondence between the State Department and the

 

I'C -.." .m

Congress. Permission was granted by the State Department
Historical Division to see the Papers for the years 1940
to 1941 but nothing new was noted that could not be viewed
in Cordell Hull, The Memoprs Of Cordell Hull (2 vols;

New York: Macmillan, 1948).

The Franklin Delano Roosevelt MSS, located at the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, are
an indispensable wealth of material concerning the
Administration's correspondence with Congress and men
who had influence on Capitol Hill. The collection is
immense and the researcher is indeed fortunate to have
some very fine archivists available for assistance.

The most important portions of the Papers for this
study included the following:

Papers as President, Official F119,
1933-1945 (755 linear feet), Group 13.

Papers as President, President's
Personal File, 1933-1945 (433 linear
feet), Group 13.

240

Papers as President, President's
Secretary's File, 1933-1945 (82
linear feet), Group 13.

In addition, the Roosevelt Library houses the R;
Walton Moore and the Elpppt Duncan Thomas Papers. In
particular, the Thomas collection is disappointing
considering the Senator's connections with the Mormon
Church in Japan, his fluency in the language and a
desire for peaceful and cordial relations between the
two countries. There is hardly a note, letter, address
or vieWpOint that Thomas wrote which cannot be found in
the Congressional Record or the New York Times, yet in
the collection are missing or completely omitted.

The Littauer Center Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, houses the American Commppppp
For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression Papers. The
file is extremely easy to use as important men in the
Committee or those who corresponded to the Executive
Secretary, Harry B. Price, or the Chairman, Roger S.
Greene, have separate files. Far more important and
useful, however, were the Roger Sherman Greene Paperg
at the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. The collection consists of incoming and
outgoing correspondence emphasizing the work of Greene
as Chairman of the ACNPJA and the Committee To Defend
America By Aiding The Allies. The former Committee

was an important and formidable pressure group attempting

”an“..- __.~1

 

241

to gain public, Congressional, and Administration
support for a total embargo of trade to Japan. Greene
was a refreshingly candid man and his correspondence to
his wife, Katherine, is not only relevant but provides
the researcher with a glimpse at an intense yet at

times very human individual. The collection was not

1

indexed or catalogued when the author viewed them, but
in 1971 the Library hOpes to accomplish that task.
The Vandenberg_MSS located in the William L.

 

 

Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,

nm‘AHJ-in -."Lll. 1— _
a

Michigan, was valuable in viewing an important non-
interventionist in the 1930's. For this study the

most valuable materials were: letters to and from
Vandenberg; his speeches between 1928 and 1950; his
scrapbooks. The last consist primarily of twenty-three
bound volumes of press clippings relating to his
senatorial career between 1928 and 1950. Their greatest
value lies in Vandenberg's comments on events with which
he was concerned; they also include his evaluation of
other men. The letters before 1941 are limited and before
1938 almost non-existant. Arthur Vandenberg Jr. destroyed
many Of the Senator's addresses, speeches and papers before
1938 considering them inconsequential and in doing so
destroyed a valuable source in the history of American
non-interventionism.

Finally, the Louis Ludlow Papers, located in the

242

Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana,
were helpful in evaluating Ludlow's activities following
the sinking of the Ppppy. There are thirty-nine boxes,
three hundred and thirty pieces in the manuscript
collection although nine boxes are uncatalogued. Some

of the Indiana Congressman's correspondence is interesting
but no great concern about Japan is evident throughout

the life of Ludlow.

II. Government Printed Sources:

The most indispensable source for reviewing
Congressional speeches and debates concerning Japanese-
American relations was the Congressional Record. In
particular, the 75th Congress, meeting in three sessions
from January 5, 1937 to June 16, 1938, revealed the
Congress' initial reaction to the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident. The 76th Congress, in session from January 3,
1939 to January 3, 1941, was rich in material following
the outbreak of World War II in EurOpe and Japan's
signing of the Tripartite Pact. Finally, the 77th Congress,
especially the first session from January 3, 1941 until
January 2, 1942, is an invaluable contemporary record of
the last year of peace.

In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Papers and the House Foreign Affairs Committee Papers,
in the Legislative Division, National Archives, Washington,

D.C., were extremely useful. The Senate Papers are Open

 

243

to all researchers without conditions while access to
the House collection is gained through the Clerk of
the House of Representatives, and no direct quotations
are permitted. To gain access to the papers is not

a formidable task and usually a letter to one's
Congressman is sufficient.

The State Department File, National Archives,
Washington, D.C., was especially valuable in connection
with the salmon fishing controversy in 1937. Access is
granted by the Director of the Historical Division,
Department of States, and notes are scrutinized. The
archivists are extremely knowledgeable and if the
researcher follows the State Department's procedures the
receiving of files is facilitated. The most relevant
file for this study was 7ll.OOO/N. Pacific of which all
notes were returned without deletion. The Department
does ask the researcher to quote from Government sources
if the same material has been printed by the Government
Printing Office.

Also of value for this study were the hearings on
various subjects before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In
particular, consult, U.S. Congress, Hearings Before The
Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, Neutrality...
February 13, 1937, pursuant to PrOposed Legislation On

Neutrality (75th Cong., lst sess.) Washington: Government

 

244

Printing Office, 1937, 25 pp; U.S. Congress, House,
Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutrality Policy...February 16-19 and February
23, 1937, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 147 and
House Joint Resolution 242 (75th Cong., lst sess.)
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937, 177 pp;
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee

On Foreign Relations, Neutralitpreace Legislapppp

And Our Foreign Polipy...April 5-May 8, 1939, pursuant

to Senate Joint Resolution 21, Senate Joint Resolution
67, Senate Joint Resolution 97, Senate Joint Resolution
106, Senate Concurrent Resolution 8, Senate 203 and
Senate 1745 (76th Cong., lst sess.) Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1939, 636, pp. Appendix; U.S. Congress,
House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs,
American Neutrality Polipy...April 11-13; 17-21; 24-28
and May 2, 1939, pursuant to Public Resolution No. 27
(76"I Cong., lst sess.) Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1939, 639 pp. Tables; U.S. Congress, House,
Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs, 2p
Ppomote The Defense Of The United States...January 15-18;
21-25; and January 29, 1941, pursuant to House Resolution
1776 (77m Cong., lst sess.) Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1941, 692 pp; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings

Before The Committee On Foreign Relations, To Promote The

 

Defense Of The United States...January 27-February 3;

 

 

245

February 4-February 11, 1941, pursuant to Senate
Resolution 275 (77th Cong., lst sess.) Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941, 914 pp; U.S. Congress,
House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs,
Arming American Merchant Vessels...0ctober l3-October

14, 1941, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 237 (77th
Cong., lst sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office,
1941, 84 pp; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The
Committee On Foreign Relations, Modification Of The
Neutrality Act Of 1939...October 2l-October 24, 1941,

 

pursuant to House Joint Resolution 237 (77th Cong., 1st
sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941,

291 pp; Also consult State Department Press Releases
until June 30, 1939; Thereinafter called State Department
Bulletin from July 1, 1939. Valuable in reading drafts
of Governmental actions and announcements of Government
policies for this study from 1937 to 1941. Of some value
were the Papgrg Rglating To The Foreign Relations Of The
United States. Japan: 1931-1941 (2vols; Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1943) and Department of State,
Peace And War: Uniped States Foreign Policy. 1931:123l
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943): Exports
and imports to and from Japan may be found in Department
of Commerce, Foreign Copmgrce And Navigation Of The United
States For The Calendar Year (Washington: Government
Printing Office). A report was made for each year. A

general overview of each Congressman's career may be seen

246

in Bipgraphical Directory Of The American Congress
1214-1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1961).

III. Newspapers And Periodicals:

By far the most authoritative and valuable
contemporary source besides the Congressional Record was
'ipg New York Times. The reporters of that newspaper
on Capitol Hill were indeed clairvoyant on various
subjects concerning American-Japanese relations. The
index was indispensable in searching out specific comments
and speeches.

The most important periodicals were Vital Speeches
Of The Day and the Congressional Digest which reprinted
many important speeches on relations with Japan. Further-
more, the American Mercur , the pacifistic Christian
Centur , Cprrent History, Current Opinion, Fpppp,

Literapy Digest, Nation, New Republic, Outlook, and
prgew Of Reviews were notable in writing about or
reproducing articles concerned with important Congressmen.
More scholarly periodicals including the Annals Of The
American Academy Of Social And Political Science, Foreigp
Affairs and the American Politicgichience Rev}pp_were
very useful. Four news weeklies were helpful including
Colliers, Newsweek, SaturdaypEvening Post, and Tipp. In
the latter periodicals some very good sketches of the

Congressmen aided in gaining some insight into their

. 48":

 

247

behavior and character. All of these periodicals gave
contemporary analysis, some of which was extremely
accurate as well as giving the Congressmen an additional

forum with which to air their viewpoints.

IV. Biographies-Autobiographies-Memoirs:

Personal reminiscences by the various Congressmen f-—5

-Tr

offered some insight into their thinking if not the
motivations behind their actions. Unfortunately, these

are usually written long after the event and at times

 

differ significantly from what the author stated earlier.
Too often the works as history are no more than "I told
you so" accounts as each man tried to vindicate his
position on a particular question. Thus, the memoirs
and autobiographies become vehicles for rationalization
of earlier statements and actions rather than revelations
on how conclusions were reached.

Among the memoirs, Cordell Hull, Thg Memoirs 0:
Cordell Hull (2 vols; New York: Macmillan, 1948) are
an overstatement of his importance and curiously proves
what Hull would not likely admit, that he was a cautious,
timid, and to a great degree intimidated man especially
by the non-interventionists in Congress. Moreover, the
conclusions Hull reaches are not always reliable. More
readable and honest was George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal:
The Autobipgraphy Of George W. Norris (New York: Macmillan,
1945). At odds with facts at times, Tom Connally, and

248

Alfred Steinberg, My_Name Is Tom Connally (New York:

Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), offers little in

assessing Connally's opinions of Japan. Although

revealing little on American-Japanese relations the
following works offer some insight into the author's
opinions: H. Jerry Voorhis, Confessions Of A Congressman
(New York: Macmillan, 1940), Elbert D. Thomas, The Four
Freedoms (New Yerk: Zeff-Davis Company, 1944) and The Nation
Under God (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), and

Arthur Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt,

 

Brace, and Company, 1922).

Certain Congressmen have rated biographies although
concerning Japan they are not always enlightening. Among
those worth consulting are Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald
P. Nye And American Fopeign Relations (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1962); Homer E. Socolofsky,
prthur Capper: Publisher, Politican. Philantrophist
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962); Fred Israel,
Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1963) which hardly mentions Pittman's view of Japan.
William E. Borah had more biographies than any other
Congressman of the period. The older work, Claudius 0.
Johnson, Borah Of Idaho (New York: Longsman Green and
Company, 1936) is based primarily on interviews yet
retains its value. Surprisingly, Marian G. McKenna,

Borah (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), is

249

less than satisfactory and reaches no concluSions that
cannot be found in John Chalmers Vinson, Willigp E. Borah
And The Outlawry Of Wap (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1957). Vinson's account is sophisticated yet makes
Borah more pro-outlawry of war than he probably was, yet

maintains its value in spite of a new monograph on Borah,

 

 

 

Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Fé_1
Relations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, ’
1969) which attempts vainly to present Borah as incon-

sistently consistent on most foreign policy matters. E

Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. Healy, Yankee From The

 

West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962)
is valuable for a study of Wheeler's life. The most

provocative accounts of Wheeler may be found in Blair

Coan. MW

Thg Upipgd States From 19l8--Present (Chicago: Northwest
Publishing Company, 1925) which accused the Montana

Democrat of being a communist and the equally unflattering
account by David George Kin Plotkin , The Plot Against
Amepica: Senator Wheeler And The Forces Behind Him
(Missoula, Montana: J. E. Kennedy, 1946) which called
Wheeler a facist.

The Prgyate Papers Of Senator Vandenberg (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952) edited by the Senator's

 

son and Joe Alex Morris concentrate mainly on the period
after 1941 and offered little on the Michigan Repulbican's

view of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor.

250

Rf. General Studies:

Of the general works dealing with the foreign
Ipolicy of the United States from 1937 to 1941, the
ssecond volume in the Chronicles Of America series by
Ikllan Nevins, The New Deal And World Affairs (New Haven:
Tiale University Press, 1950), and the Council On Foreign
IRelations, The United States In World Affairs: An Account
(3f Amepppan ForeigpiPolicy 1937-1941 (New York: Harper
:and Brothers, 1938-1942) were most valuable. The latter
twork is a yearly chronicle of American foreign policy
and although a contemporary history it is highly reliable.
.Another survey, Charles Austin Beard, Amprican Foreign
Policy In The Makpngp A Study In Responsibilities, 1932-
1349 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946) is more
judicious than his later work, President Roosevelt And The
Coming O; The War. 123;: A Study71n Appearances And
Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948),
although the former work is critical of what the author
considered Roosevelt's deception in changing from a non-
interventionist to an interventionist after promising the
American peOple the country would not become involved in
the world conflagations. For an overview of the interwar
years see Selig Adler, The Isolatinnist Impulse: Its
Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957).
Although the work is weak in the thirties the monograph
has merit especially in seeing Wheeler's dual views of

American involvement in European and Asian affairs.

 

251

Various Congressmen in the thirties had been in the

ESeeznate during the Washington Conference debate of 1921-

1922, and their views may be witnessed generally in Raymond

II.- Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton-

Century-Crofts, 1922) and Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington

 

(Icynference And After (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,

19 28). Two more recent works should be consulted. John

C311almers Vinson, The Parchment Peace; The Unitgd Stateg

Eigenate And The Washington Conference (Athens: University ‘

Of Georgia Press, 1955) and Thomas H. Buckley, The United

 

 

itates And The Washington Conference 1221-1922 (Knoxville:
'llniversity of Tennessee Press, 1970) are useful although

\Tinson has more on Borah and Johnson. Two monographs

(concerned with the end of the 1920's by Robert H. Ferrell,
~ 0 ' ' O T K -Br'an
light (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952) and hpppgppp
JDiplomacy In The Great Depression: Hoovpp:Stimson Foreign
iPolicy, 1929-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
are most helpful., The first monograph has some interesting
comments on Borah. Another valuable and well researched
‘WOrk, Dorothy Borg, American Policy And The Chinese
Revolupppnpl925-1928 (New York: Octagon Books, Inc.,
1968) offers incisive analysis of the Administration's

and Congress' view concerning Eastern Asia in the 1920's.

This edition is the exact reproduction of the 1947 edition

Published by the Institute Of Pacific Relations with a new

preface that makes the new publication worth reviewing.

252

For the 1930's, a wealth of material has been written
cxn the Administration and the various personalities within
tshe Government. Among the best overviews of the decade
Ibrior to Pearl Harbor are Robert E. Osgood, Ideals Apd
ESelf-Interest In American Foreign Relation; (Chicago:
LJniversity of Chicago Press, 1953). although it is weak
(3n Asian affairs. Dorothy Borg, The United States And The
I§ap_Eastern Crisis Of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard
lJniversity Press, 1964) is an exhaustive and judicious
satudy, almost encyclopedical. Borg's work ends in 1938
tuith the analysis that the United States had no idea of
.fighting an armed conflict with Japan and the State
IDepartment saw the best way of preserving peace in Asia
through a policy of inaction. Making order out of the
neutrality controversy of the 1930's was Robert A. Divine,

a: ,-‘.. e T- - ‘ o

. -
v «‘0 C I..“" 6‘. ‘

Strugglg Over Arms Embapgg (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962). Less valuable and written perfunctorily
was Manfred Jonas, Isolationism In America. 1935-1941
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) although the
sketches of various Congressmen are worthwhile reviewing.
Four studies depicting the last years of peace that
have merit are Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor:
The Coming Of The War Between The United States And Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); the two

massive volumes under the sponsorship of the Council On

Foreign Relations, written by William L. Langer and S.

 

253

liverett Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation. 1937-1940

( New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952) and The Undeclared

 

‘VIar, 195031251 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953)

gas well as Donald Francis Drummond, The Passing Of
Ikmerican Neutrality, 1937-19$; (Ann Arbor: University

<>f Michigan Publications In History And Political Science,
){X 1955) are worth consulting. Drummond's account is
(:lear and valuable but the subject was studied more

intensely by Langer and Gleason.

Two accounts of the sinking of the Panay are

 

available in Manny T. Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude ‘L
To War (Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1967) and

iHamilton D. Perry, The Panay Incident: Prelude To Pearl

iHarbor (New York: Macmillan, 1969). Other than the titles

being nearly identical the two works are completely

different. Koginos has written a monograph filled with

spelling errors, incorrect sources, a ponderous style

and a dubious thesis. Perry's work is a journalistic

account of the sinking written with verve and imagination
relying heavily on personal interviews and reminiscences.
In addition to the sources listed, three other works
concerned with the years 1940-1941 are essential in
understanding the policy of America in the last year of

peace and some mention of Congressional thinking and

activities as well. See Wayne S. Cole, America First:

The Battle Against Intervention (Madison: University of

254

Fijisconsin Press, 1953), the somewhat revisionist Paul W.

E3<3hroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American

Ilealations, 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958)

Ellld Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease,
Cngpg-lggl (Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University Press,
ILEB69). A number of contemporary accounts are worthwhile.
:[11 particular, consult America's Share In Japan's War
(31111t (New York: American Committee For Non-Participation
31n.Japanese Aggression, 1938) and Shall America Stpp
;£grming Japan (New York: 1940) published by the same

 

(committee. See also William C. Johnstone, The United

 

Eitates And Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University
3?ress, 1941) concerned primarily with economic enterprises
:in Asia; Nancy Schoonmaker and Doris Fielding Reid, eds.,
EVe Testify (New York: Smith and Durrell, 1941) especially
‘the work by Wheeler, "What If Germany Seizes The British
:Fleet?," pp. 187-196; Stanley K. Hornbeck, Thg United
Eipates And The Far East (Boston: World Peace Foundation,
‘1942) which explains the author's view of the world being
the spokes of the wheel and Eastern Asia being the hub.
It is an apologetic account of American Far Eastern
policy after Pearl Harbor by the Political Advisor to

the State Department and Hull's greatest memorandum
writer; Thomas A. Bisson, American Far Eastern Policy

(New York: International Secretariat, Institute Of Pacific

Relations, 1945) and Walter Johnson, The Battle Against

 

ill-'11.

255

Isolation (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1944) are
both worth consulting. Later works dealing with
organizations or individuals may be seen in Donald J.
Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The Campaign 0; The
Amppgcan Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese
Aggression (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian
Research Center, 1968) which suffers from not having

access to the Greene MSS; Fred Israel, ed., The War Diary
Qf_§peckinridge Long (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1966) has some revealing correspondence on various
Congressmen and State Department officials; Waldo Heinrichs,
Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C, Grew And The Development
Of The United States Diplomatic Tradppgpp (Boston: Little
Brown, 1966) and Grew's own Teh Years In Japan (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1944) are valuable, although Grew had
an overestimation of his influence in formulating American

policy towards Japan.

VI. Monographs And Articles Pertaining To Congress;

The study of Congress and its role in formulating
and implementing foreign policy has begun to be recognized
as an area where competent studies need to be accomplished.
Among those works written the following will give the
reader a basic introduction to the Congressional process
not just in legislating but in dealing with the President
and Congressional prerogatives. See Eleanor E. Dennison,

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Palo Alto: Stanford

 

256

University Press, 1942), Lawrence Chamberlain, The
President, Congress, And Legislation (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1946), Robert A. Dahl, Congress And

 

Foreign Policy(New York: Harcourt, Brace And Company,

1950), George Grassmuck, Sectional Biases In Congress

 

On Foreign Policy(Baltimore: Johns HOpkins University
Press, 1951), Daniel Cleever and H. Field Haviland, Ameri-
can Foreign Polipy And The Separation Of Powers (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952), V. 0. Key, Politics,
Parties, And Pressure Groups: Congress And Foreign Policy
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958), James A. Robinson,
Congress And Foreign Policy Making; A Study In Legislative
Influence And Initiative (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey

Press, 1962), Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics And

 

Foreign Policy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1962), Charles 0. Lerche, Jr, The Uncertain South: Its

Changing Pattern Of Politics In Foreign Policy (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1964), and Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots Of

 

Isolationism: Congressional Voting And Presidential

 

Leadership In Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill

 

Company, 1966). The last two are extremely valuable in
seeing southern support for international ventures in the
1930's and early 1940's. One monograph dealt with Congress
on domestic issues but should be consulted for the

appraisal of the various Congressmen who figured prominently

in American-Japanese relations as well. See James T.

 

257

Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal:

The Growth Of The Conservative Coalition In Congress, 1933-

;222 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).
Various contemporary articles were also of value in

observing the various Congressional sessions from 1937 to

1941. In particular, consult, "The Seventy-Fifth Congress,"

Commonweal, XXVI (Sept. 3, 1937). PP. 427-428; 0. R.
Altman, "First Session Of The Seventy-Fifth Congress,
January 5, 1937 to August 5, 1937," American Polppiga;
Science Review, XXXI (Dec. 1937), pp. 1071-1093; "The
Seventy-Fifth," Nation, CXXXXVI (June. 25, 1938), p. 713;
O. R. Altman, "Second And Third Sessions Of The Seventy-
Fifth Congressm 1937-1938," Amepican Political Science
Review, KKXII (Dec. 1938), pp. 1099-1123; "Review Of The
76"1 Congress: A $13,400,000,000 Runaway," Newsweek, XIV
(Aug. 14, 1939). PP. 11-13; "The Record 0f Congress,"
Current History, L (Sept. 1939), p. 8; Floyd M. Riddick,
"First Session Of The Seventy-Sixth Congress, January 3 To
August 5, 1939," American Political Science Review, XXXIII
(Dec. 1939). PP. 1022-1043; Also by the same author,

"The Third Session Of The Seventy-Sixth Congress, January
3, 1940 To January 3, 1941," American Political Science
Review, XXXV (Apr. 1941), pp. 284-303; Madge M. McKinney,
"The Personnel Of The Seventy-Seventh Congress," American
Political Science Review, XXXVI (Feb. 1942), pp. 67-75;
Floyd M. Riddick, "The First Session Of The Seventy-

Seventh Congress, January 3, 1941, To January 2. 1942:"

 

 

258

American Political Science Review, XXXVI (Apr. 1942),
pp. 290-302; and Kenneth W. Colegrove, "The Role Of
Congress And Public Opinion In Formulating Foreign
Policy," American Political Science Review, XXXVIII

(Oct. 1944), pp. 956-969.

VII. Articles Pertaining To Various Congressmen: ”f“
Because this is a study of Congressional Opinion 1

towards Japan from 1937 to 1941, articles written by or

about the leading advocates of interventionist or non-

interventionist policies are extremely important in

 

discerning their vieWpoints. Earlier Opinions on
American foreign policy were important in being able to
trace whether various Congressmen remained steadfast in
their views or changed with fluxuating international
conditions. Because of the vastness of the material

the author has endeavored to present only the most
important articles, that is those which were most helpful
in the study. Each Congressmen is listed with the

articles following.

Key Pittman:

Judson C. Welliver, "The Triumph Of The South,"
Munseyfs Magazine, XLIX (Aug. 1913), PP. 731-743; Key
Pittman, "The United States And Russia-Obstacles To
Recognition Of Present Soviet Regime," Annals Of The

American Academy Of Social And Political Science, CXXVI

259

(July. 1926), pp. 131-133 (Hereinafter cited as the
Annals); Also by Pittman, "Should The Price Of Silver

Be Regulated By Government Action," Congressional Digest1
X (Nov. 1931), pp. 270-272; "Our Foreign Policy,"

Demogpatig Digesp, XVI (Mar. 1939), p. 5; "Pittman And
Neutrality," Current Histor , L (Nov. 1939), p. 6;

.mi.
Joseph H. Baird, "Key Pittman: Frontier Statesman,"
American Mercur , L (July. 1940), pp. 306-313 and Wayne

S. Cole, "Senator Key Pittman And American Neutrality
Policies, 1933-1940," Mississgppi Valley Historical Review,

XLVI (Mar. 1960), pp. 644-662.

 

Claude Pepper:
"Pepper v. Sholtz v. Wilcox," Time, XXXI (May. 2,
1938), p. 90

hypon Scott:

Byron Scott, "Let's Avert War: Economic Pressure As
A Peace Measure," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Feb. 15,
1938), pp. 284-287; "Scott Resolution," Tipp, XXXI (May.
2, 1938). pp. 7-8.

flgllgam E. Bopph:

By far William E. Borah had the most coverage.
Listed below are first articles that he wrote in his
career that are worth consulting followed by articles that
dealt with him as the primary subject. The articles by

Borah were as follows:

260

"War For American Honor And Lives," Current Histogy,

XIII (Sept. 1917), pp. 460-463; "Militarism In.A League
Of Nations?,",§ppph, LXI (Mar. 1919). pp. 297-306; "How
To End War,"4ߤp;gh, CXIX (Dec. 31, 1924). pp. 736-739:
"Law Must Displace War," Christian Centur , XLII (Jan. 1,
1925). p. e; The Editor of the Chpistian Century, 0. c;
Morrison, a veteran Church pacifist, gave Borah's non-
interventionist policies editorial support but he did
agree with Borah that peace could be maintained if all
nations supported an.outlawry of war treaty. See also,
"American Foreign Policy In.A Nationalistic World,"
Forei Affairs, XII (Jan. 1934). Supplement, pp. 111-
xii; An article bearing the same title also appeared in
the Far Eastern Review, XX (Apr. 1934). Pp. 145-148;

"Our Foreign Policy," Vital S eeches Of The Da , II

(Oct. 21, 1935), pp. 36-38; "Our Imperative Task: Tc Mind

Our Own Business," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Apr. 15,
1938), pp. 386-389; "What Our Position Should Be," Vital

Speeches Of The Day, V (Apr. 15, 1939). PP. 397-399; ”The
Embargo And EurOpean Power Politics," prg;_Speeches Of The
p21, VI (Oct. 15, 1939). pp. 21-23.

Articles about Borah are plentiful but many are
superficial and offer no alternative analysis of the
Idahoan's beliefs. The following articles are not only the
most informative but do offer conclusions to Borah's long

career in the Senate. In particular, consult, "Borah

 

 

261

And Johnson: Disturbers Of Peace," Literary Digest, LXII
(Aug. 23, 1919), p. 52; "The Progress Of The World,"
Review Of Reviews, LXIII (Feb. 1921), pp. 115-116 which
revealed Borah's dislike of the Four Power Treaty as did
"Disarmament Winning At Washington," Literar Di est,
LXIX (June. 11, 1921), pp. 7-10; "American Portraits,"
3 ectator, CXXXI (July. 21, 1923). pp. 77-78; On the
Kellogg-Briana Pact see, "Toward The Outlawry Of War,"
New Re ublio, XXXIX (July. 9, 1924). pp. 179-130;
"Three Plans To Make The Dream Of Peace Come True,"
Literar Di est, LXXXXV (Dec. 10, 1927). pp. 10-11;
"The Renunciation Of War," Chpistian Century, XLV (Feb.
23, 1928), pp. 266-268; "Can War Be Outlawed," 92p:
ressional Di est, VII (Mar. 1928), pp. 87-89; "The Debate
On The Peace Pact," Christian Centur , XLVI (Jan. 31,
1929), pp. 145-172; "Senator Borah And World Peace,"
gpppstian Centpyy, XLVI (May. a, 1929). pp. 607-610 and
the latest article by Robert James Maddox, "William.E;

[.3

—a

 

 

Borah And The Outlawry Crusade," Historian, XXIX (Feb.
1967). pp. 200-220;

For Borah's view on the World Court see "Senator
Borathnd The World Court," Christian Centur , XLII
(Feb. 5, 1925). pp. 186-188; "Borah And The Court,"
Inde endent, CXIV (Apr. 18, 1925). PP. 452-454: "The
World Court And The Senate," Review Of Reviews, LXXI
(June. 1925), p. 576; "War And The World Court,"

 

262

Christian Century, XLIII (Feb. 11, 1926), pp. 194-197.
Other relevant and informative articles on Borah

are J. Frederick Essary, "Senator Borah," Spectator,

 

CXXXVI (June. 12, 1926), pp. 979-980; Ray T. Tucker,
"Borah Of Idaho," American Mercupy, IX (Dec. 1926), pp.
385-393; "Senator Borah's Appeal For Justice In China,"
China Weekly Review, XXXI (Jan. 1, 1927), pp. 120-122;

Bernard Fay, "Portrait Of Mr. Borah," Review Of Reviews,

 

LXXXV (Jan. 1932), pp. 57-58; Allan Nevins, "Borah And

 

World Politics," Current History, XXXVII (Feb. 1933),

“m.— u 5‘. I'll; I" O
1

pp. 513-519; "Representative Men," English Review, LXII
(Jan. 1936), pp. 25-31.

Hiram Johnson:

As a member of the non-interventionist grouping,
Johnson was a defender of neutral rights and so was close
to Borah's thinking concerning Japan. In 1941, he wrote
three articles asking the Government and the people to
practice neutrality concerning the wars raging in Asia and
Europe. But if the Government and the people decide on
joining the hostilities then Congress should declare war
and be morally honest. See for instance "Masquerade Is
Over," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VIII (May. 31, 1941),
pp. 514-517; "Peace Or War," Vital Speeches Of The Day,
VII (Dec. 1, 1941), pp. 120-124; "Let's Declare Ourselves,"
Scribner's Commentator, XI (Dec. 1941), pp. 93-97; For an

earlier call for honesty in foreign affairs see Johnson's

 

263

comments in "Let's Not Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan.
30, 1932). P. 50.

Other important articles on Johnson are "The Issue
Between Japan And California," Literary ngest, XLVI
(May. 3, 1913), pp. 991-994 which analyzed his part in
the Anti-Alien Law passed in California while Johnson
was Governor. Reactions to Johnson's comments and voting
record concerning American entry into World War I and the
resulting peace and League of Nations may be consulted in
"Hiram Johnson," Nation, CV (Nov. 1, 1917), p. 492; Elbert
Francis Baldwin, "Hiram Johnson: His Assets And
Liabilities," Outlook, CXXIV (Apr. 7, 1920), pp. 596-5983
Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram W. Johnson," Nation, CXX
(June. 5, 1920), pp. 748-749; George P. West, "Hiram
Johnson: After Twelve Years," happpp, CXV (Aug. 9, 1922),
pp. 142-144; His anti-World Court ideas are summarized in
"The Return Of An Innocent Abroad," Outlook, CXXXIV (Aug.
8, 1923), p. 534; Four uncomplimentary articles were
"What Johnson Would Do As President," Literar Di est,
LXXIX (Dec. 22, 1923), pp. 8-9; John W. Ownes, "The Tragic
Hiram," American Mercury, 1 (Jan. 1924). PP. 57-61;
Theodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: Symbol Of Extreme National-
ism," Literary Digest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), p. 13; and
"Peace Passion Cold," Tipp, XXVII (Feb. 24, 1936), p. 16.

Hamilton Fish:
Four articles on Hamilton Fish are worth noting: "The

 

264

Renunciation Of War," hppplp, CXXXVIII (July. 1928),
pp. 164-165 in which the New York Republican supported
the tenets of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For more of a
view of Fish as a non-interventionist see, "The Trend Of
Events," Outlook And Independepp, CLV (July. 30, 1930),
p. 490; "Russia Turns A Corner: America, Russia And
Hamilton Fish," Living Age, CCCXL (Mar. 1931), pp. 31-33;
"Presidential Possibility," Literar Di est, XX (Nov. 16,
1935). p. 35.

The wealth of material on strict non-interventionists
has grown in the last few years. Yet for Capper, Nye,
Clark, and Vandenberg many of the contemporary articles

are most revealing.

Arthur Capper:
For Capper, consult his article, "The American Farmer

And Foreign Policy," Foreigp Affairs, I (June. 1923), pp.
127-135; "Dr. Butler CallsFor Action," Review Of Reviews,
LXXVII (Jan. 1928), pp. 83-84 which supported Capper's
resolution to strengthen the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See
also, "A Threat For A Promise," Outlook, CLI (Feb. 20, 1929),
p. 291. Opposition to his proposal can be found in
"Prostituting The Peace Pact," Chaistian Century, XLVI
(Feb. 21, 1929). pp. 257-258 and Edith Nourse Rogers,

"How The Kellogg Peace Pact Can.Be Made Effective," hpphgg,
CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 51-54. Capper's reply to the
criticism of his preposal was "Making The Peace Pact

 

265

Effective," hphppp, CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 40-48 which
appeared right before Mrs. Nourse's condemning article.
0n the Ludlow preposal for a referendum Capper wrote

"Let The People Decide," Vital Spggches Of The Da , IV
(Jan. 1, 1938), pp. 165-166 and supported the Indianian's
amendment proposal. In 1941 Capper Opposed Lend-Lease
and was answered by the New Republic. Consult, "Let Us
Keep Out Of War: Kill The Lend-Lease Bill," Vita; Speeches
0: The Day, VII (Mar. 1, 1941). pp. 293-296 and "Time To
Think American," Scribner's Commentator, IX (Feb. 1941),
pp. 69-74; "Bad News For Isolationists," New Re ublio, CV
(Sept. 29, 1941). P. 403.

Gerald P; Nye:
Four articles on Nye were concerned with the

munitions investigation and neutrality controversy.
Consult, Elbert Francis Baldwin, "The Crusading Mr. Nye,"
Current Histor , XLI (Feb. 1935), p. 526; "The Munitions
Investigation," Johghhl Of The National Edugation
Association, XXIV (Sept. 1935). Pp. 185-192; "War: Must
Over May," Tips, XXVI (Sept. 2, 1935). pp. 11-12;
Neutrality Controversy," Congressional Digest, XV (Jan.
1936), pp. 16-18. '

Bennett 0, Clark:

Nye and Capper's colleague, Bennett Champ Clark, also
espoused the same non-interventionist doctrine that the

 

 

 

266

two Republicans advocated. For an overview of Clark, see
Ralph Coghlan, "Missouri-—A Threat And A Promise," Nation,
cxxxv (Nov. 2, 1932), pp. 422-424; Robert s. Allen,
"Washington.Sweatsh0p," Nation, CXLV (July. 17, 1937),
pp. 63-64 who saw Clark as an ally of reactionary circles
in Washington. Jack Alexander, "Missouri's Dark Mule,"
Saturday Evenhhg Post, CCXI (Oct. 18, 1938), pp. 5-7; and
Paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election.Means," Nation, CXLVII
(Nov. 19, 1938), pp. 527-528 are analyses with differing
emphases and conclusions. On Neutrality Legislation,
something the Missouri Democrat preached and advocated
throughout his senatorial careeer see his articles,
"Neutrality-What Kind?," Vital Speeches Of The Day, III
(Feb. 1, 1937), pp. 252-253 and "The Question or National
Defense," in the same periodical, V (Jan. 15, 1939), pp.
216-219.. For Clark's analysis on how to avert war see
"Detour Around War," Har er's Ma azine, CLXII (Dec. 1935).
pp. 1-9.

Two other non-interventionists presented their views
as well. For instance, consult, Robert R. Reynolds,
"Out With The Alien Hordes," National Re ublie, XXIV
(Mar. 1937). PP. 1-2 which created the illusion that
immigration was America's chief problem for it was these
peOple who advocated America join overseas crusades; See
also, Robert A. Taft, "Let Us Stay Out of War," 1132;
Speeches or The Day, v (Feb. 1, 1939). pp. 254-256 and
"Our Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VI

 

 

267

(Mar. 15, 1940), pp. 345-348 which advocated strict
neutrality.

There are two interesting articles concerned with
George W. Norris' shift to a more interventionist foreign
policy in "After Twenty Years," Christian Cenphpy, LIV
(Mar. 31, 1937). pp. 412-413, and George w. Norris,
"American Neutrality," Vital S eeches Of The Da , V (Nov.
1, 1939). pp. 62-64.

Three friends of the Administration, Elbert Thomas,

James Hamilton Lewis, and James T. Pope were the subject

 

of various articles revealing their attitudes towards -"‘

American foreign relations which included Japan. For
Thomas, consult, "United States Relations With Foreign
Countries," Vital s eeches or The Da , II (Oct. 7, 1935).
pp. 3-5 and "Theory Of Neutrality," hphhlp, CLXXXVI (July.
1936), pp. 163-168. Two later articles by Thomas were
"An Active Peace Policy," hhhplg, OLXXXXII (July. 1937),
PP. 131-137 and "Can Impartial Neutrality Be Maintained?,"
Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Oct. 1, 1939). PPo 743-746
both advocated American participation in international
affairs and an assumption of responsibility in.maintaining
the peace. A more general article about Thomas may be found
in gppg, XXXIX (Jan. 5, 1942), p. 29.

A summary of James Hamilton Lewis' early career may
be seen.in "The New Senators From Illinois," Literary
‘ppgppp, XLVI (Apr. 12, 1913), PP. 860-862 and the Senator's

268

defense of the Wilsonian peace and treaty may be consulted
in "Defending The World's Right To Democracy," New York
Times Current Histor , XV (May. 1918), pp. 281-283. Two
articles in the thirties are interesting including "The
New Political Issues," yppppp, CVII (Aug. 31, 1931), p.
216 and Newsweek, XII (Aug. 15, 1938), pp. 10-11. A
valuable study of Pope's international outlook may be
seen in his speech "International Cross-Currents,"
Journal Of The National Education Association, XXIV (Mar.
1935). p. 92.

The last important Congressman.was Burton K. Wheeler.
From his own articles and those written about him the
reader can catch a glimpse of this maverick from Montana
who at times exasperated friend and foe alike. Wheeler's
own speeches may be seen in the following: "Keep America
Out Of War," Virginia Quarterly Review, XVI (Spring. 1940),
pp. 279-284; "America's Present Emergency: Don't
Surrender Our Independence To War Mangers And Intervention-
ists," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (Jan. 15, 1941),
pp. 203-205; "America Beware," Scribner's Commentator, X
(June. 1941), pp. 88-92; and "The American People Want No
War," Vital S eeches Of The Da , VII (June. 1, 1941),
pp. 489-491 which all concerned the Senator's fear the
Roosevelt Administration was slowly but steadily plotting
a course for collision with the totalitarian regimes in
EurOpe and Asia. He saw it as his duty to warn his

 

 

 

269

constituents and colleagues what the President was doing
and his articles have a sense of urgency which he
considered vital to the preservation and security of
the United States.

For Wheeler's investigations into the Harding
Administration which gave the Senator his early reputation .;
see "An Investigator Investigated," Lhtgrhry Dygesp, r
LXXXI (Apr. 26, 1924). pp. 8-9; "Burton K. Wheeler, The 1
Fighting Senator Who Undid Daugherty," Current 0 inion,
LXXVI (May. 1924). PP. 643-645; "First Blood For Wheeler,"
Literar Di est, LXXXI (may. 31, 1924). pp. 14-15; "The
Kind Of Sting Has," Literary Digest, LXXXII (Aug. 16,
1924). pp. 46-50 and Richard A. Haste, "Burton K. Wheeler,"
Review Of Reviews, LXX (Oct. 1924). PP. 407-408.

Reactions to Wheeler's activities in the 1930's

 

were varied but most saw him as a dedicated fee of the
President and the Administration's policies. From being
a Progressive, one writer viewed Wheeler as becoming a
near reactionary in "Senator Wheeler Turns Conservative,"
New Rgpublic, LXXXX (Apr. 7, 1937). PP. 261-262 which
was concerned with Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan.
See also Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Faces The Music,"
Natgpp, cvr (Aug. 28, 1937). pp. 217-219 and Alva '
Johnston, "President Tamer," Saturday Evenhpg Post, CCXI
(Nov. 13, 1937), P. 51.

By the1940's Wheeler was considered not only a
leading non-interventionist foe of the President but a

270

possibility for that high office himself. See for
instance, "Burton K. Wheeler," gppp, XXXV (Apr. 15, 1940),
pp. 21-22; Hamilton Basso, "Burton The Bronc," Np!

Re ubli , CII (Apr. 22, 1940), pp. 527-530, and Robert
Bendiner, "Men Who Could Be President: Burton K. Wheeler,"
‘hppppp, CL (Apr. 27, 1940), pp. 532-536. Three articles
surveyed the Senator's career as in Richard L. Neuberger,
"Wheeler Of Montana," Har er's Ma azine, CLXXX (May. 1940),
pp. 609-618; "Evolution Of A Senator," gppp, XXXV (June.
24, 1940), pp. 15-16, and Hubert Kay, "Boss Isolationist:
Burton K. Wheeler," hpyp, X (May. 19, 1941), pp. 110-119.

 

One article was very critical of Wheeler's activities
and linked him to Facism as seen in 13F; Stone, "Wheeler's
Clivden.Set," yppgpp, CLII (Mar. 15, 1941), pp. 287-288.
Wheeler's defeat in the 1946 senatorial race is analyzed
in Joseph Kinsey Howard, "The Decline And Fall Of Burton
K. Wheeler," Har er's Ma azine, CLXXXXIV (Mar. 1947). PP.
226-236.

Various essays exist concerning important Congressmen
which are neither biographies nor_articles. The most
valuable are: Claudius 0. Johnson, "George W. Norris,"
as quoted in J.T. Salter, ed., The American Politicanf
(Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1938),
pp. 77-108; Also in the same edition consult Paul M.
Cuncannon, "Arthur H. Vandenberg," pp. 47-66 who

according to the author ran on the thesis that "one good

271
term deserves another";

Another edited version of portraits of Congressmen
can be found in J. T. Salter, ed., Public Men Ig And On}
Of Office (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1946). In particular, consult, Francis P. Locke,
"Claude D. Pepper: Champion 0f Belligerent Democracy,"
pp. 257-276; Otis Miller and Anita F. Alpern, "Tom
Connally: One Of The Senate Gallery's Favorites," pp.
311-321; Claudius 0. Johnson, "Jerry Voorhis: What Is
Right Rather Than What Is Expedient," pp. 322-343; J. L.

 

Sayre, "Gerald P. Nye: Essentially Negative," pp. 127-
146; Richard N. Current, "Hamilton Fish: Crusading
Isolationist," pp. 210-224.

Two contemporary accounts of Borah and Johnson may
be found in Clinton Gilbert, The Mirrors 0f Washiggton
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921). For Borah, see
"William E. Borah," pp. 245-256 and "Hiram Johnson,"
pp. 183-194.

VIII. General Articles On American Foreign Policy:

The most valuable articles on Neutrality Legislation
were Stephen Raushenbush, "Neutrality Put To The Test,"
A233, XXXVII (Nov. 1937). PP. 808-811 and Francis 0.
Wilcox, "Neutrality Fight In Congress, 1939," American
Political Science RevLeg, mm (Oct. 1939). pp. 811-825;
Also of value was John W. Masland, "Commercial Influence

Upon American Far Eastern Policy, 1937-1941," Pacific

272

Historical Review, XI (Sept. 1942), pp. 281-299.
Concerning Roosevelt and foreign policy see John 0.
Donovan, "Congressional Isolationists And The Roosevelt
Foreign Policy," World Politics, II (Apr. 1951), pp. 299-
320 which purported the thesis that Roosevelt was ‘
handicapped in pursuing a vigorous foreign policy by an
"isolationist" Congress and public. This article has been

revised by more scholarly writings on one issue. See
Dorothy Borg, "Notes On Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech,"
.£2liiiae1_§aiasaa_flaaziazlx. LXXII (Sept. 1957). pp. 405-
433: John McVikar Haight, Jr., "Roosevelt And The
Aftermath Of The Quarantine Speech," Review Of Politics,
XXIV (Apr. 1962), pp. 233-259, and Trvis Beal Jacobs,
"Roosevelt's Quarantine Sppeoh," Historian, XXIV (Aug.
1962). PP. 488-502.

On a definition of that elusive term "isolationism"
consult, Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning Of
The American Doctrine Of Isolationism," Amg;iggg_2211§ig§1

 

Science Review, XXXIV (June. 1940), pp. 539-547 which sees
American "isolationism" as a theory about a theory of
American foreign relations. Three other scholarly
articles worth noting on this subject were Ralph H.
Smuckler, "The Region 0f Isolationism," American Political
Science Review, XLVII (June. 1953), pp. 385-401; William
A. Williams, "The Legend Of Isolationism In The 1920's,"
Science And scciet , XVIII (Winter. 1954). pp. 1-20, and

273

Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Basis Of Isolationist Behavior,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (Winter. 1960), pp. 645-
657.

Three Political Scientists have attempted to evaluate
demography and voting patterns to define "isolationist"
thinking. See Malcolm E. Jewell, "Evaluating The.Decline
Of Southern Internationalism Through Senatorial Roll Call
Votes," Journal or Politics, XXI (Nov. 1959). pp. 624-
646; Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen And The
'New Isolationism'," Political Science Quarterly, LXXV
(Sept. 1960), pp. 321-337: Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The
Demography Of The Congressional Vote On Foreign Aid, 1959-

1958," American Egliyiga; Science Review, LVIII (Sept.
1964), PPO 577-588.

IX. General Attacks On Japan:

Of some value was Robert K. Reischauer, "Japan's Road
To War," 5232, XXXVII (Feb. 1937). pp. 80-83 and Kenneth
G. Crawford, "Senatorial Follies Of 1939," Nation, CXXXXIX
(Sept. 30, 1939). pp. 339-340.

The most anti-Japanese articles sometimes verged
on the hysterical. Those with value in the study were
Raymond L. Buell, "The Development Of Anti-Japanese
Agitation In The United States," Political Science
Quarterly, XXXVII (Dec. 1922), pp. 605-638: George E.
McReynolds, "American Opinion Of Japan," Asia, XXXVII

 

274

(Nov. 1937). pp. 814-818; Thomas Tohou, "No Deal With
Japan," Ngyigg, CLI (July. 20, 1940), pp. 43-48: Robert
Aura Smith, "The Triple-Axis And American Reaction,"
m, ccxv (May. 1941), pp. 27-32 and John w. Masland's
article in the same periodical, "American Attitudes Towards
Japan," pp. 160-165: "Get Tougher With Japan," Nggl F‘I
Re ublic, CIV (June. 30, 1941), pp. 876-877: and Thomas ;
A. Bisson, "Call Japan's Bluff," New Re ublic, CV (Nov.
5, 1941). pp. 579-581.

 

X. Unpublished Studies:

John W. Masland, "Group Interests In.American
Relations With Japan," Unpublished PhD Dissertation,
Princeton University, 1938. Microfilm # 4454.

Clinton D. Tompkins, "Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
1884-1945," Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1966. Microfilm # 7211.