

THE IRRESOLUTE YEARS:
AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL OPINION
TOWARDS JAPAN
1937-1941

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JUSTIN HARRIS LIBBY
1971



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

**The Irresolute Years:
American Congressional Opinion
Towards Japan
1937-1941**

presented by

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

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Date April 30, 1971

ABSTRACT

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By

Justin Harris Libby

From the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, initiated by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the American Congress became immersed in a four and a half year dispute over what the proper response of its Government should be to that aggression. Legislative opinion divided over how best American interests might be served; some Congressmen argued for a halt to Japanese expansion in Asia, even if such action increased the risks of war, while others maintained a pacifistic position, preaching peace at any cost. A result of the intense debate that ensued was to create, in Congress, three loosely constructed groupings of members, each advocating its own version of America's role in Asia and American-Japanese relations specifically. It must be stressed that the legislators, although classified by this study into particular factions, did not necessarily view themselves as members of any cohesive, or formally constructed unit. To the contrary, frequently they shared little in common in either domestic matters or foreign

policy issues exclusive of an agreement over how the United States ought to meet the challenge of renewed war in Eastern Asia. The Congressmen referred to in this study as the anti-Japanese group advocated economic embargoes and sanctions as the remedy for thwarting Japan while non-interventionist members on the Hill proclaimed that a policy of detachment, if not appeasement, would preclude any armed conflict between the United States and Japan. The non-interventionist Congressmen were divided, one segment supporting a defense of traditional neutral rights in Asia and a second segment demanding the total withdrawal of civilians and military forces from areas where American and Japanese soldiers might clash. From 1937 until 1941, Congressional thinking oscillated between those Congressmen willing to resist Japanese aggression and those hoping for a rapprochement via a less dogmatic and doctrinaire foreign policy.

This examination into Congressional opinion relied heavily upon the Congressional Record of the 75th through the 77th Congress first session, which was exhaustively consulted. The New York Times also proved indispensable for giving an inclusive survey of the speeches and issues of the late thirties and early forties. Relevant articles appearing in various periodicals provided further useful information, and of particular value were Christian

Century, Literary Digest, Nation, New Republic, and Vital Speeches Of The Day. The Manuscript collections of Senators William E. Borah, Tom Connally, James Hamilton Lewis, Charles McNary, George Norris, Key Pittman, Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Elbert Thomas, Arthur Vandenberg and Representative Louis Ludlow gave important insights into the opinions and positions of these men. The Papers of President Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and R. Walton Moore all aided in revealing the views of the Executive branch towards Japanese-American affairs and the relationship of the Administration to the legislature on this issue. The materials in the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Papers within the Legislative Division of the National Archives contained the correspondence of Congressmen who had definite opinions on matters relating to Japan. Finally, the Manuscript collections of Roger Sherman Greene and the American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression, by exposing this pressure group's attempts to create anti-Japanese sentiment on Capitol Hill, helped to establish a definite link between the members of Congress supporting embargoes on exports, especially war materials, to Japan.

This study has concluded that Congressional opinion towards Japan changed fundamentally during the years

Justin Harris Libby

1937 to 1941. At first Congress was fragmented over what policy America should implement but, in the aftermath of the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the dispute between the factions on the Hill slowly began to dissolve. By the summer of 1941, with Hitler's victories in Europe and Asia succumbing to the Japanese, Congress began to show signs of increasing impatience with a policy of neutrality. Nevertheless, there were a sufficient number of Congressmen still committed to the hope of ameliorating the growing enmity between the two nations to prevent passage of any anti-Japanese legislation. But a profound change had occurred in Congressional thinking towards Japan by the summer of 1941. No longer were there three distinct groups holding separate plans for the United States to follow in Asia. Instead, the moderate position had almost disappeared, its members frequently joining the ranks of the anti-Japanese forces which had continued to grow in strength. The Administration, increasing its activities against Japan during the summer and fall of 1941, found approval and support for this policy in Congress and correspondingly few disclaimers against its more militant stance. Yet Congress found no consensus over this issue until Japan, herself, provided the solution at Pearl Harbor. On December 7, 1941, Congressional opinion had finally reached unanimity, brought together by the very issue, Japanese aggression, that had kept it divided so long.

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1971

67017-7

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have become indebted to many scholars, archivists, and librarians in the course of this study. In particular, I wish to thank Mrs. Patricia Dowling of the State Department Archives, National Archives, Washington, D. C. for her very kind and patient introduction to the relevant files she knows so well. In the Legislative Division of the National Archives, Buford Rowling and his staff were more than helpful in facilitating reserach in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee Papers. Congressman Charles Chamberlain (R. Michigan) was most cooperative in seeing that I had the necessary clearance to view the latter collection. At the Manuscript Division in the Library of Congress, the expert staff headed by Horace F. Hilb were very kind and efficient and I wish to thank the Director of the State Department Historical Division, Dr. Arthur Kogan, for granting the clearance to view the Hull Papers for the years not open without permission at that time. Former Senator Burton K. Wheeler was kind to answer various queries and I wish to thank former Senator and now a member of the House of Representatives, Claude Pepper, for an enjoyable afternoon on Capitol Hill which detracted from his busy schedule.

I owe a profound indebtedness to James Damaslos of the Littauer Center Library and Rodney Dennis of the Houghton Library, both of Harvard University, for their assistance in reviewing the papers of the American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression and the Roger Greene MSS respectively. Mr. Dennis was extremely helpful in getting Professor John K. Fairbank's permission to see the Greene collection which entailed a concerted effort to locate Dr. Fairbank in Cambridge. The Roger Greene MSS was used in this study by permission of the Harvard College Library.

At the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Mr. Joseph Marshall and his staff, Mrs. Anne Morris, Mr. Robert Parks, and two unsung workers, Mr. Andre Greedan and Edward Hall, made my research enjoyable and productive. A special thanks to Mr. Parks is rendered not only for his knowledge of the archival material but his never ceasing enthusiasm in searching out relevant materials.

I would also like to express gratitude to the staff of the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for their graciousness while researching the Vandenberg collection. In Indiana, Miss Virginia Mauck and Mrs. Wilma Etnier of the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana were most helpful in reviewing the Ludlow MSS. At Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana, Mrs. Pauline Croft and Mrs. Vera

Schornhorst have been exceedingly kind in allowing me the use of the library facilities of that university. A special thanks to Mrs. Patricia Miller of the Indiana-Purdue University Library in Indianapolis who has been of great assistance in getting materials not in that city.

I also wish to thank Professors Walter Gourlay and Paul Sweet of Michigan State University for their concern and indulgence with this study. Dr. Madison Kuhn's knowledge of the New Deal era has been most helpful throughout this endeavor and his criticisms were greatly appreciated. The warmest acknowledgement goes to Dr. Warren I. Cohen, an indulgent teacher, an untiring scholar whose example, knowledge and inspiration has helped make this study possible. To my wife, Judith, I owe the greatest debt for enduring me and the dissertation these many months while maintaining a sane household.

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INTRODUCTION

The attack on Chinese forces at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 initiated the closing phase in the disintegration of American-Japanese relations. For nearly one hundred years there had been a tradition of friendship between the two nations, characterized by a vision of the United States in the role of teacher with Japan playing the pupil. If this portrayal of the bond between these two Pacific neighbors had ever been based upon reality, such notions were rapidly dispelled when Japan emerged as the predominant power in Asia in the Twentieth Century.

Nonetheless, Japan's entrance as a world power did not seriously jeopardize amicable relations for the first two decades of the Twentieth Century. In the aftermath of World War I, she sought friendly relations with most countries, withdrawing from Siberia, returning Shantung to China, signing the Washington Conference treaties, and pledging to support the tenets of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war. Yet underneath the guise of conforming to Western dictates and moral judgements, the Japanese churned to be a recognized major power and gain additional territories for economic exploitation and military security.

The impact of the depression in Japan provided a catalyst for releasing these repressed feelings of frustration. In addition, fearing the impact of Chinese nationalism in Manchuria, the Japanese struck on the night of September 18, 1931, to deprive China of that province. By this act, Japan actualized her plans for revising the status quo in Asia. One year later, "the country of the Manchus", Manchukuo, had been established. Meanwhile, under her Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, America began a policy of non-recognition which remained unaltered throughout the 1930's. Japan's announcement of the "Amiau Doctrine" in 1934, along with her intention of withdrawing from the obligations of the Washington Conference treaties, furthered the decline of confidence between Tokyo and Washington.

After these events, Japan spent the next few years consolidating her position and taking few actions that might provoke additional distrust or animosity. During this relatively quiescent period, Congress' attention was frequently diverted from Asia by the depression at home and the instability in Europe threatening world peace. Not until Japan's expansion into North China in 1937 did Congressional focus shift westward across the Pacific Ocean, raising questions over the type and degree of American response to this renewal of the Sino-Japanese war. Pressured by the mounting tension of events, some members of Congress began a determined campaign against

Japan. Their efforts to embargo trade touched off a lengthy debate on Capitol Hill which lasted until the final months of 1941, dividing Congressional opinion over almost all aspects of American policy in the Far East. This study shall examine the nature of the controversy that ensued from 1937 until Pearl Harbor, ascertain the proponents of each significant segment of Congressional opinion and whenever possible, identify the motives which induced the legislators to reach such disparate views.

CHAPTER I

THE OPPOSITION FORMS

During most of the crucial five year period preceding American entry into World War II Congressional opinion towards Japan coalesced around three separate, distinctive attitudes concerning the growing menace to the independence and integrity of the countries in Asia. For the sake of convenience, those members of the Congress who shared a similar view of Japanese-American relations shall be considered together as a group even though, at the time, they may not have referred to themselves as such; nor did they necessarily exhibit cohesiveness on issues other than those relating to foreign affairs. Tracing the development of these groups from 1937 to 1941, distinguishing their main features and showing how they interacted seems to be the most appropriate method for discerning overall Congressional opinion since the ideas represented by these groupings are inclusive enough to take into account almost every shade of opinion. In order to discover the concepts basic to each group and then to categorize appropriately the Congressmen and the policies they advocated towards Japan, their attitudes will be carefully analyzed. Acting as a catalyst were a number of crucial issues spanning this five year period;

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937; the sinking of the American gunboat Panay on December 12, 1937; the revision of the Neutrality Legislation in November, 1939; the termination of the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911 on January 26, 1940; Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 26, 1940; passage of Lend-Lease on March 11, 1941; and finally the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States on July 26, 1941.

A mistrust of Japan's intentions in Asia, frequently verging on hostility, characterized one segment of Congress which shall be referred to as the anti-Japanese group. Initially dominated by Western Democrats, including Senators Key Pittman (Nevada), William H. King (Utah), Lewis B. Schwellenbach (Washington), and Representative John M. Coffee (Washington), these Congressmen denounced Japanese aggression following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Their object, to effect a total embargo of trade, would eventually force Japan to end what they considered to be her brutal war in China. They spent the next four and a half years trying unsuccessfully to convince their colleagues Japan's war machine could be crippled, if not completely halted, by economic reprisals. In time, this alliance received strong support from other Democrats including Claude Pepper (Florida), Theodore Green (Rhode Island), as well as Congressmen H. Jerry

[illegible]

Voorhis and Byron Scott both of California, and Charles I. Faddis of Pennsylvania.

Except for belonging to the Democratic party and coming from the West, the Congressmen comprising this original anti-Japanese movement had little else in common to explain the cohesiveness of their attitude towards Japan. Frequently, even the motives for their hostility, when they could be determined, differed from man to man. From the outset of hostilities in North China, one of the Senate's leaders, Key Pittman, maintained a severe and outspoken criticism of Japan. Born in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on September 19, 1872, Pittman had attended Southwestern Presbyterian University in Clarksville, Tennessee before migrating westward. After spending five years in the Klondike, he settled in Tonopah, Nevada in 1902. Sworn into the Senate on January 29, 1913, after being elected to fill the unexpired term of George S. Nixon, Pittman served his adopted state as a member of the Upper House for the next twenty-seven years.¹

In the first years of his senatorial career, Pittman seldom spoke out on foreign policy issues. Until 1920, he voted as a loyal Democrat, supporting Wilson's use

¹ Judson C. Welliver, "The Triumph Of The South," Munsey's Magazine, XLIX (Aug. 1913), pp. 731-743; Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington: G.P.O., 1961), p. 14621; Hereinafter cited as Biographical Directory Of The American Congress.

of armed forces in Mexico and the note to Germany following the sinking of the Lusitania. In reward for his loyalty, he gained appointment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, 1916.² The Senator liked to think of himself as an "insider" to the President's circle of advisors, claiming to have "...broken the shell that has been thrown around the President."³

Though deluded in his importance and closeness to Wilson, Pittman's speeches, during the months leading up to American involvement in World War I, supported all of Wilson's plans and policies and called for an end to Prussianism even if it necessitated American blood and treasure to save the free world.⁴ In the controversy concerning the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, Pittman preferred no compromise on Wilson's Peace Plan, but on March 19, 1920, realizing reservations were going to be attached, the Nevadan voted for the treaty in that form against the wishes of the President. He joined twenty Democratic colleagues who "...felt that

²Fred L. Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 34-36.

³Ibid., p. 35.

⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, 65th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1917, Congressional Record, IV, 251.

the interests of the country, the world, and the life and happiness of the President requires that we vote for the ratification of the treaty with reservations."⁵

With the Democrats out of the White House and nearly out of power in Congress during the 1920's, Pittman focused most of his attention on domestic benefits for Nevada, a theme never lost sight of by a man who believed a shift of only one hundred votes could deny him his "re-employment" on Capitol Hill.⁶ More critical on domestic and foreign policy since these were Republican measures, he found opportunity to confront the Administration with partisan opposition.

When a decision had to be made in foreign policy, Pittman's position on an issue indicated his adherence to the Wilsonian views of American participation in world events. Throughout the twenties, Pittman governed his actions on these principles, voting for such collective security measures as the Five Power and Nine Power Pacts emerging from the Washington Conference and later in the decade the Kellogg-Briand Pact, while

⁵Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 40-41.

⁶Ibid., p. 47.

rejecting the Soviet Union's bid for recognition.⁷ On only one issue, American-Japanese relations, did Pittman vary from this pattern. Disliking Japan, the Senator dismissed collective security concerns to vote against the Four Power Treaty that also emerged from the Washington Conference. He did so, as he later remarked, out of fear Japan might gain hegemony in the Pacific if the Treaty was ratified.⁸ Always the politician, Pittman objected to the proposed treaty with Great Britain, France and Japan for the same reasons Lodge had used in his attack on the League of Nations, that it could interfere in domestic affairs of the nation.⁹

⁷For Pittman's voting pattern, consult: For the Five Power Treaty, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4718-4719 and for the Nine Power Treaty see Ibid., March 30, 1922, 4784; Pittman's affirmative vote for the Kellogg-Briand Pact may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 1929, Congressional Record, LXX, 1731; His view of Russia may be ascertained in Key Pittman, "The United States And Russia—Obstacles To Recognition Of Present Soviet Regime," The Annals Of The American Academy Of Social And Political Science, CXXVI (July. 1926), pp. 131-133; Hereinafter cited as the Annals.

⁸Joseph H. Baird, "Key Pittman: Frontier Statesman," American Mercury, L (July. 1940), pp. 310-312. Baird concluded that Pittman's dislike of Japan was the result of two circumstances: the Senator's long residence on the Pacific Coast and his longer service on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee.

⁹Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. 48.

Roosevelt's landslide in 1932 catapulted Pittman into national prominence as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ironically, during this next decade, when the Democrats were back in power with a pro-Wilsonian President residing in the White House, Pittman retreated from collective security and became more timid in foreign relations. Prone to frequent outbursts of temper that were abetted by a rising use of alcohol, he began slowly to evade the responsibilities of his new Senate position. Earlier in his career, cognizant of his incessant craving for alcohol, Pittman recognized that in his surrender to a gnawing desire to escape from responsibility and himself, he had been a drunkard for years.¹⁰ He lived in a twisted world and as Fred L. Israel has stated, "About twice a month Pittman would go out on a binge and get himself plastered."¹¹ During committee meetings in the thirties he would sip whiskey, consuming about a pint of alcohol per day.¹² In this condition he issued statements which embarrassed the Administration and the country.¹³ The

¹⁰Ibid., p. 42.

¹¹Ibid., p. 132.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 144; New York Times, December 21, 1935, p. 8 and December 22, 1935, p. 24.

result of his deterioration into an incessant drinker brought failure to comprehend the intricacies of foreign relations, and he could not lend statesmanlike direction to the Administration's foreign policies. Reinforcing this lack of leadership was a certain provincialism on the part of the Senator. Israel has suggested:

Pittman's statesmanship ended at Nevada's frontier and he defended his state against all adversaries, even the general welfare of the United States.¹⁴

While serving his tenure as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he sought consensus and compromise of the volatile issues, reluctant to anger or firmly oppose powerful non-interventionists in his committee. Among the members too nearly intimidate Pittman were Hiram Johnson (R. California), Arthur Vandenberg (R. Michigan), Arthur Capper (R. Kansas), William E. Borah (R. Idaho), and Henrik Shipstead (Farm-Labor. Minnesota). In dealing with these men, Pittman invariably emphasized his own weak position and overestimated the power of his opponents. Eventually this tendency became so pronounced that Pittman's leadership was reduced to ineffectiveness, leaving his committee adrift in never ending controversy.¹⁵

¹⁴Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. vii.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 155-173; Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 100; Manfred Jonas, Isolationism In America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 211.

As the issues of the 1930's came before the Foreign Relations Committee, Pittman was either too ineffective or too intoxicated to be of assistance. In 1933, while considering whether the President should have authority to impose embargoes against an aggressive nation, Pittman failed to get Roosevelt the discretionary powers the Administration desired.¹⁶ In 1935, he remained mute on the floor of the Senate during the World Court battle yet voted for the proposal.¹⁷ During the same year he was too intoxicated on one occasion to give any leadership during crucial consideration of mandatory versus discretionary neutrality legislation.¹⁸ Each failure reinforced his inadequacy as chairman, resulting in increased consumption of alcohol. The vicious cycle continued until his death in 1940.

But on one issue in the 1930's Pittman did not remain mute; his dislike of Japan intensified as the

¹⁶Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. 133; Pittman's view of Neutrality Legislation can be consulted in Wayne S. Cole, "Senator Key Pittman And American Neutrality Policies, 1933-1940," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (Mar. 1960), pp. 644-662; Also, "Pittman And Neutrality," Current History, L (Nov. 1939), p. 6.

¹⁷Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, p. 136.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 142.

decade progressed. Retaining his fear of Japan that had originated following World War I, Pittman, in 1930, opposed ratification of the London Naval Treaty on the grounds it would give Japan preponderance in the Pacific.¹⁹ Later he was frank to remark that ultimately Japan wanted to force the United States into a defensive war in the Pacific.²⁰ On February 11, 1936, Pittman's wrath towards Japan reached near hysteria. In a bitter attack on the Government and the people of Japan, he condemned that nation's aggressions in Manchuria for ending Chinese sovereignty and violating the agreements made with the United States contained in the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.²¹ The Japanese Foreign Office and press called the outburst incredible and the New York Times severely criticized Pittman in an editorial the following day. Labeling Pittman "...a man without knowledge of his responsibilities as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee", the editorial characterized him as angry at his own policies and

¹⁹New York Times, July 12, 1930, p. 1.

²⁰Ibid., December 21, 1935, p. 8 and December 27, 1935, p. 12.

²¹Ibid., February 11, 1936, p. 8; "Eastern Asia," Time, XXVII (Feb. 24, 1936), p. 26; U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., February 10, 1936, Congressional Record LXXX, 1703-1708 and U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 578-581.

confused by shallow sentimentality over China.²²

The Senator's sympathy for China took an ingenious turn when it induced him to promote the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 that was designed to boost the price of silver and thereby restore the purchasing power of the silver currency countries like China. This policy to raise the dollar price of silver failed to produce the hoped for effects and instead resulted in the collapse of prices, banks and finally the abandonment of the silver standard altogether in China. Ultimately these events led to a contraction of Chinese silver purchases from American silver states like Nevada. So narrow was the lens through which Pittman viewed international relations, and so intense had his dislike of the Japanese become, the Senator could only blame their incursions in China for the debacle in the silver market rather than recognizing the inherent weaknesses of the silver currency proposals.²³ This feeble attempt to keep the door open in China and at the same time promote the silver interests in Nevada revealed two of the fundamental motives behind Pittman's actions in foreign policy during the 1930's and

²²New York Times, February 12, 1936, p. 20.

²³Ibid.; For a scholarly appraisal of this silver problem see Dorothy Borg, The United States And The Far Eastern Crisis Of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 121-137.

explained why he could not achieve a balanced view of American-Japanese relations.²⁴ Despite his emergence as an early opponent of Japan, long before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Pittman ended up espousing the right cause but for the wrong reasons.

Throughout the crucial years prior to his death in 1940, Pittman, acting as the Administration's liason to the Foreign Relations Committee, continued to provide totally ineffectual leadership, hindering American efforts to formulate and implement policy. Beyond disliking Japan for her violations of the Nine Power Treaty to which he constantly referred when attacking that nation, Pittman never revealed any more than a superficial knowledge of affairs in Asia nor could he intellectualize his reasons for his enmity against Japan. Unlike many of his colleagues on Capitol Hill within the anti-Japanese group who represented constituencies with strong prejudices against Japan, Nevada had none or few Japanese residents. If the basis for Pittman's dislike of Japan remains cloudly, there is no doubt of his hostility, attested to by his irrational attacks on that nation, occurring particularly while under the influence of alcohol.

²⁴For Pittman's promotion of Western silver interests see Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 75-95; Key Pittman, "Should The Price Of Silver Be Regulated By Government Action," Congressional Digest, X (Nov. 1931), pp. 270-272.

In his dislike of Japan, Pittman was not alone.

Two Democratic Congressmen from Washington State, Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach and Representative John M. Coffee shared these anti-Japanese views. Born east of the Mississippi River on September 20, 1894, Schwellenbach moved to Spokane with his parents from Superior, Wisconsin when he was eight years old. Graduated from the University of Washington Law School in 1917, he was elected to the Senate in 1934 after a career of teaching at the University of Washington and practicing law in Seattle. Unfortunately for the anti-Japanese forces, on December 10, 1940, Schwellenbach resigned his Senate seat in order to accept a federal judgeship for Eastern Washington. Following World War II, he became President Truman's Secretary of Labor, a position he held until his death on June 10, 1948, in Washington, D. C.²⁵

Schwellenbach's dislike of the Japanese originated from his concern over Japan's encroachment on Alaskan salmon fishing grounds near Bristol Bay. As early as 1935, the Japanese Imperial Diet had appropriated 89,000 yen for the purpose of examining fishing possibilities off the Alaskan coast.²⁶ Since over 100,000 persons

²⁵Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1571; New York Times, November 8, 1934, p. 8.

²⁶New York Times, June 20, 1937, p. 7.

along the Pacific seaboard earned their living from the salmon industry, Schwellenbach was deeply apprehensive about this new Japanese fishing activity although his anger did not match that of Congressman William I. Sirovich (D. New York) who, in an inflammatory statement, suggested the United States send the Army, Navy and Air Force to get rid of the Japanese in the area surrounding Bristol Bay.²⁷ When the Japanese fishermen began using floating canneries near the bay, Schwellenbach's distrust of Japan increased, and in the spring of 1937, he began making anti-Japanese statements in the Senate.

The consistency of Schwellenbach's views regarding Japan did not extend to foreign policy in general. While campaigning for election to the Senate in 1934, Schwellenbach stated that wars were begun by a "...world wide combination known as the munitions trust that is constantly alert to the possibility of forcing the nations into war."²⁸ He believed the trust made its profit from the sale of munitions but had a more sinister characteristic as well. If it could not induce "...the boys of one nation to kill the boys of another nation", it made no profit.

²⁷Literary Digest, CXXV (Feb. 19, 1938), p. 5; Newsweek, XIV (Dec. 25, 1939), p. 25.

²⁸Consult draft of speech in 1935 found in Schwellenbach MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

Therefore, it spread its insidious propaganda in the hope of increasing profits by having one nation warring on another nation.²⁹ But a few years later in 1939, when the repeal of the arms embargo came under debate in Congress, Schwellenbach exhibited a decisive change of attitude. Observing that the non-interventionists had been incorrect in their claim that the sale of munitions had pushed the United States into World War I, he added:

Their argument that the furnishing of munitions will get us into war is not sound. Judged by the standards of the last war, this again is not sound. Every word of testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went to prove it was not munitions but other goods which led us into the last war.³⁰

Representative John M. Coffee concurred with Schwellenbach's mistrust of Japan. Elected to the House in 1936, Coffee became one of the leading anti-Japanese spokesman in the lower house. A native of Tacoma, the freshman Congressman, in defense of the fishing interests, voiced his concern against a Japanese menace. Coffee assumed, as did Schwellenbach, that any salmon spawned in American waters belonged to the United States. Moreover, he firmly believed the flag and the Constitution followed the fish wherever they went, and they deserved the

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰"Remarks by Honorable Lewis B. Schwellenbach On Neutrality Legislation," in Schwellenbach MSS.

protection of the American Government.³¹

This salmon controversy solidified Coffee and his colleague's dislike of Japan, and their correspondence to the State Department contained criticisms of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and his advisors, for their slowness in reacting to the violations of American fishing territory.³² When the fishing season ended, the controversy subsided. But for Schwellenbach and Coffee the resentment remained, and they became increasingly belligerent towards Japan in the ensuing years.³³

³¹New York Times, February 13, 1938, p. 2; For the same belief consult the comments by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Fisheries, Frank T. Bell, in Ibid., July 25, 1937, p. 1.

³²The correspondence between Coffee, Schwellenbach and the State Department may be found in U.S. Department of State, State Department File, 711.000/N. Pacific, National Archives, Washington, D.C. In particular, consult, 711.008/N. Pacific/22, March 4, 1937; 711.008/N. Pacific/44, March 24, 1937; 711.008/N. Pacific/97, June 9, 1937; 711.008/N. Pacific/106, June 10, 1937; and 711.008/N. Pacific/117 1/2, June 30, 1937.

³³The State Department's attempt to find a solution to the dilemma and uphold American rights can be found in the following State Department File: Grew to Hull, 711.008/N. Pacific/166, July 9, 1937; FDR to Hull and Roper, 711.008/N. Pacific/152, July 14, 1937; and a conversation between Schwellenbach, Dooman, and Sayre, 711.008/N. Pacific/27, March 9, 1937. See also 26th Annual Report Of The Secretary Of Commerce 1938 (Washington: G.P.O., 1938), p. 97; The note from Roosevelt to Hull and Roper may also be found in "Japan, 1933-1945," folder, OF-197, Box 1, Franklin D. Roosevelt MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The following memorandum and correspondence are revealing of the Government's position as well: Welles Memorandum, July 13, 1937; Roper to FDR, July 21, 1937; Roper to FDR, July 23, 1937; Hull to FDR, July 31, 1937, all found in "Japan, 1933-1945," Of-197,

Of all the anti-Japanese members of the Congress, Senator William H. King (D. Utah), had been on Capitol Hill the longest. A Western Democrat, born in Fillmore City, Utah, on June 3, 1863, he represented that state for nearly thirty years as a Congressman, being elected to the House in 1897 and then to the Senate in 1917. After attending Brigham Young University and the University of Utah, he was graduated from the University of Michigan School of Law in 1887. Prior to his political career in Washington, he served as a Mormon missionary in England from 1880 to 1883, and later was an Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme Court.³⁴

In the 1920's King favored American involvement in international programs typified by the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.³⁵ A man who spoke his mind on an issue throughout his career, King posed formidable opposition to those who advocated constricting American foreign policy.³⁶ Casting an affirmative vote for the

Box 1, FDR MSS. See also Hull to FDR, July 17, 1937 and R. Walton Moore to FDR, November 24, 1937, "Japan," folder, PSF, Box 13, FDR MSS.

³⁴Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1168; Who Was Who In America (4 vols; Chicago: A. N. Marquis Co., 1950), II, p. 300.

³⁵New York Times, April 26, 1927, p. 8 and January 8, 1929, p. 2.

³⁶"A Caribbean Comedy," Independent, CXVIII (Mar. 26, 1927), p. 329.

Five Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty which he called a "magnificent gesture",³⁷ he broke this pattern by voting against the Four Power Treaty. Unlike two other opponents of this same treaty, Borah and Johnson, King was unconcerned over the implied threat of an entangling alliance. His rejection of the treaty rested on the fear it would guarantee Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean and on the mainland of Asia.³⁸ Moreover, he did not believe the treaty would stand if the four powers became embroiled in a crisis or if an encounter strained their tenuous relationship with one another.³⁹

Earlier, King had rejected Japan's call for an equality article in the covenant of the League of Nations, remarking:

If Japan insists upon equality for her citizens in immigration that simply means that either Japan or the United States will not be a signatory to the League of Nations compact.⁴⁰

³⁷New York Times, March 31, 1922, p. 2.

³⁸For King's voting on the Washington Conference treaties consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 24, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4497; March 29, 1922, 4718-4719; March 30, 1922, 4784. See also New York Times, January 8, 1922, p. 2.

³⁹New York Times, December 11, 1921, p. 4 and December 29, 1921, p. 2.

⁴⁰Ibid., March 16, 1919, p. 3.

Recognizing that the issue was central to Japan's honor, King could still not allay his concern that if the article was inserted into the covenant and then signed by the United States, a possibility might arise whereby the League could interfere in American immigration policies.⁴¹ A rather farfetched assumption producing little danger of League intervention in American domestic affairs, it nevertheless caused King to remain adamant in his rejection, and portended, in 1919, the extent to which his anti-Japanese prejudices would color future foreign policy decisions.⁴² But throughout the decade, despite these sentiments, King still hoped for some rapprochement between Japan and the United States, even calling upon the Executive and the Congress to convince the Japanese they had nothing to fear from America.⁴³

Whereas his opposition to Japan continued to increase throughout this period, King was, at the same time, evidencing strong friendship for China. Desirous of ending all unequal treaties in that nation, he voted against the Chinese Customs Tariff Treaty and America's

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³"A Condemnation Of United States Naval Policy," Current History, XXII (May. 1925), pp. 167-177; New Republic, XXV (Feb. 2, 1921), p. 271.

[illegible]

participation in fixing Chinese tariff schedules, negotiated during the Washington Conference. In protest against what he termed insincere expressions of friendship for China, the Utah Democrat rebuked the treaty as "...an infringement upon the rights of China and of her sovereign authority."⁴⁴ He demanded removal of the tariff chains and acceptance of China as an equal member into the community of nations.⁴⁵ In 1926, King worked for removal of American warships from Chinese waters as well as American "imperialists" from that country.⁴⁶ Two years later, calling for recognition of the Nationalist Government in order to foster Sino-American amity, King remarked that recognition would help stabilize conditions in China and nullify any communist activities.⁴⁷ By 1931, King's pro-Chinese sympathy had become mixed with his dislike of Japan whose aggression against China forged King into a dedicated member of the incipient anti-Japanese movement in Congress throughout the next decade.

⁴⁴New York Times, March 31, 1922, p. 1; U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4790.

⁴⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4789-4791; The vote on the tariff treaty can be found in Ibid., 4791.

⁴⁶New York Times, February 17, 1926, p. 10.

⁴⁷Ibid., July 10, 1928, p. 5.

Following what he termed Japan's violations of Chinese sovereignty in 1931, King asked for an economic boycott against that nation.⁴⁸ Three years later, continuing his crusade, he called for impartial embargo powers for the President and for an investigation of Japanese actions in Manchuria and the alleged accusations that Japan was fortifying the mandated islands under her control in the Pacific Ocean.⁴⁹ The investigation, he insisted, was not to threaten Japanese interests but to preserve the territorial integrity of China and to insist on the observation of international agreements since the League of Nations had only given Japan the Pacific islands in trust not as outright possessions.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Ibid., January 31, 1932, p. 25.

⁴⁹Ibid., January 9, 1935, p. 3; See Senate Resolution 154, U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., June 17, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 9415-9416. It was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and never reported out. Impartial embargo power was studied by the State Department but the department informed Pittman that neither Hull nor his advisors had reached a conclusion on the matter. See R. Walton Moore to Walter Lamb, Clerk of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, State Department File, 811.113/556, January 25, 1935; Moore was a former Congressman from Virginia and served from 1919 to 1931. He was appointed Assistant Secretary of State as a replacement for Raymond Moley and served as Congressional liason from 1933 until his death on February 8, 1941. In 1937, he became State Department Counselor but kept his communication channels open to Congress.

⁵⁰New York Times, January 9, 1935, p. 3.

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No public record of King's initial reaction to the renewal of Japanese hostilities in North China in 1937 exists, but after the sinking of the gunboat Panay, there remained little doubt as to his views. Dismissing any moderate policy towards Japan, King stated the time had passed for believing the Japanese assurances and promises that they would not violate American rights in China again.⁵¹ That view never varied while King was in the Senate. Unfortunately for the anti-Japanese movement, King failed to win the Democratic party's primary election for re-nomination to the Senate in 1940. The Administration had not forgiven King, a ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, for helping to block the President's court reorganization attempts in 1937,⁵² and hailed his defeat as a victory for the New Deal.⁵³

The only Senator not representing a constituency from west of the Mississippi River was Claude Pepper (D. Florida).

⁵¹Ibid., December 14, 1937, p. 18.

⁵²James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal: The Growth Of The Conservative Coalition In Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), pp. 77-127.

⁵³New York Times, November 7, 1940, p. 16 and November 24, 1940, p. 2. The issue of Japan does not seem to have influenced the electorate since King was considered a Senator to be purged. His purge also provides an interesting commentary on the Administration's priorities.

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Graduated from the University of Alabama in 1921 and the law department of Harvard University three years later, Pepper had worked in a steel mill, taught high school, instructed in law at the University of Arkansas and commenced private practice in Tallahassee in 1925. On November 4, 1936, he was appointed to the Senate to fill the unexpired term of Duncan U. Fletcher. In his campaign for the party's endorsement, Pepper used the theme, "It is time someone in authority got in to do some fighting for the poor white man in the South."⁵⁴

A strong supporter of Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies, Pepper's liberal ideas contradicted his conservative dress and campaign oratory. On the Senate floor, his speeches were considered honest and sincere by his colleagues, though at times his eloquence was marred by grandiloquent phrases and gestures. During his tenure in the Senate in the late thirties Pepper never exerted the same degree of influence on foreign policy as his fellow Democrats Pittman, King, Schwollenbach, and Elbert D. Thomas, yet he consistently presented the Administration's international views to the Senate. One source in Washington considered that to be the reason

⁵⁴Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1443; "Pepper V. Sholtz V. Wilcox," Time, XXI (May. 2, 1938), p. 9.

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why his influence was lessened amongst his colleagues.⁵⁵

Once reaching the Senate, Pepper soon joined the anti-Japanese movement, but his motivation had less to do with long established antipathy towards Japan than with fear that the growing menace of Hitler in Europe would have dangerous ramifications for American Far Eastern policy. As a delegate to the Inter-Parliamentary Union at the Hague in 1938, Pepper had the opportunity to visit Germany. In Munich he saw Hitler and remarked that the leader of Germany seemed incapable of any sentiment.⁵⁶ When Hitler declared war on Great Britain and France, Pepper believed Japan would increase her aggressive activities in China and especially in Southeast Asia.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal, pp. 325-327; Time, XXXVI (Sept. 2, 1940), p. 15; For a discussion of Southern internationalism in the late 1930's and early 1940's of which Pepper was a leading spokesman, consult, Malcolm E. Jewell, "Evaluating The Decline Of Southern Internationalism Through Roll Call Votes," Journal Of Politics, XXI (Nov. 1959), pp. 624-646; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen And The 'New Isolationism'," Political Science Quarterly, LXXV (Sept. 1960), pp. 321-337; For a valuable discussion of sectional attitudes see George Grassmuck, Sectional Biases In Congress On Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), Chapter VII, pp. 133-174.

⁵⁶Francis P. Locke, "Claude D. Pepper: Champion Of Belligerent Democracy," in John T. Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 259.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 260.

He therefore urged a complete repeal of the Neutrality Act of 1937 in order to refurnish all Allied powers with provisions needed to fight the totalitarian aggressors.⁵⁸ The signing of the Tripartite Pact in 1940, linking Japan to the Facist-Nazi Axis, further convinced Pepper of Japan's militaristic tendencies, and he became a totally committed member of the anti-Japanese coalition.⁵⁹

Two California Democrats, Byron Scott and H. Jerry Voorhis, both members of the House, were also part of this original anti-Japanese grouping. An ardent New Dealer, Scott called for suspension of economic relations with Japan. While serving two terms in the House, from 1934 to 1938, Scott harshly condemned Japanese aggression. In his last year in Congress, he stated that he favored proposals for halting Japan through economic reprisals because, in that way, the United States would be effective in thwarting the conquest of all Asia by Japan.⁶⁰

Voorhis concurred essentially with Scott's position, but the basis of his policy beliefs differed from those of his colleague. The Californian's credentials revealed

⁵⁸Washington Evening Star, September 27, 1939, p. 1.

⁵⁹Honorable Claude Pepper (M.C.), private interview held in Cannon Office Building, February 4, 1969, Washington, D.C.

⁶⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1958; "Let's Avert War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Feb. 15, 1938), pp. 284-287.

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a man of varied qualities and interests. Politically he admitted being a registered Socialist until Roosevelt converted him to the Democratic party.⁶¹ Voorhis, elected to the 75th Congress in 1936, soon took an interest in the Far Eastern region following the outbreak of hostilities in China in 1937. He reasoned that since American material and resources were being used to bomb civilians in China, the United States ought to embargo all implements of war to Japan. It was the war trade, according to Voorhis, that detracted from peace, making businessmen more wealthy; if not stopped it would ultimately involve the United States in a foreign war. Voorhis' call for an economic embargo appeared to be based on a desire for halting the arms and munitions traffic which he considered to be immoral, rather than on a strong sympathy for China or any deepseated animosity towards Japan. His aversion to shipping war materials to any expansionistic power motivated his attack on Japan, thereby linking him with other Japanese critics on Capitol Hill.⁶²

⁶¹Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1941 (New York: H.W. Wilson and Company, 1941), p. 888; Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1757; H. Jerry Voorhis, Confessions Of A Congressman (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940).

⁶²U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy, Hearings, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937, pp. 89-94; Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 41-45; U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess., March

Another early proponent of embargoing trade to aggressors, Charles I. Faddis, a Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania, had voted as early as 1933 for the arms embargo bill. Proposed in 1932 by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, this bill was an attempt to move the United States towards collective security by allowing her to join with other nations in halting arms shipments wherever hostilities existed or were threatened. Although the House gave its approval, the issue was dropped during the Roosevelt Administration, only to be picked up at a later time by the non-interventionists who distorted its original meaning into a call for an absolute prohibition of arms to all belligerents.⁶³ Faddis, serving in the House from 1933 until 1942, was not an internationalist on most issues,⁶⁴ but from 1937 onward he moved towards an anti-Japanese posture because of his belief that Japan, as the aggressor nation in Asia, ought to have an arms embargo applied to her.

18, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 2402-2403; Block, ed., Current Biography-1941, pp. 888-889; For Voorhis' reaction when Congress voted the repeal of the arms embargo provision of the Neutrality Act in 1939 see Robert A. Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality: Franklin D. Roosevelt And The Struggle Over The Arms Embargo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 332-333.

⁶³U.S. Congress, House, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 1933, Congressional Record, LXXVII, 1850.

⁶⁴For instance see his condemnation of the World Court, New York Times, January 28, 1935, p. 2.

The men composing the anti-Japanese grouping in the House and Senate in 1937, struggled to convince non-interventionists and possible skeptics that the only way to stop Japan was through embargoing trade. By 1941, even when most of the original members of this group were no longer present in Congress, their awareness of the Japanese threat in Asia and their willingness to advocate a firm American policy, based on economic pressures, remained an important influence upon the rest of Congress. Unfortunately, they were never able to muster enough votes to pass anti-Japanese legislation, for Congress seemed more willing to defer action and follow the lead of the Administration. But for the next four and a half years following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Congressional members of the anti-Japanese coalition strove diligently to thwart Japan's quest for hegemony in Asia not through military response, although a few urged that action, but through economic reprisals. When the Administration finally retaliated against Japan with a total embargo of trade on July 26, 1941, the response of Congress was overwhelming in its approval. Perhaps the importance of this coalition should not be judged by their failure to enact the desired legislation but in the role they played as part of the effort to awaken the President, the Congress, and the

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American people to the menace of Japan's aggression in Asia resulting in a nearly unanimous anti-Japanese feeling in the United States by 1941.⁶⁵

⁶⁵On American response to Japan by 1941, consult, Robert Aura Smith, "The Triple-Axis Pact And American Reaction," Annals, CCXV (May. 1941), pp. 127-132; See also, Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 168-199.

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CHAPTER II

THE POLICY OF ACCOMODATION

The second grouping of Congressmen, led by Senators William E. Borah (R. Idaho), Hiram Johnson (R. California), and Representative Hamilton Fish (R. New York), desired no overt embargoing of trade to Japan. Nevertheless, unlike the other non-interventionist bloc to be discussed next, this alliance believed in defending Americans in areas of conflict. They argued for this position out of moral and ethical considerations; consequently, while wanting to avoid war with Japan, they also believed with equal fervor that America must defend herself as a neutral in a combat zone if the belligerents would not recognize these rights. At the heart of such reasoning rested a strong sense of honor, motivating them to refuse a withdrawal from China under fire because it implied an American abrogation of her rights as a neutral. It should be noted, however, that if the circumstances were ever altered, these men were not adverse to an American withdrawal from China. Similar reasoning also explained their dislike of the cash and carry provision of the Neutrality Act passed May 1, 1937, because they felt it circumscribed some of the United States' rights to

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freedom of the seas as defined by international law.¹

Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1925 to 1933, based his philosophy of foreign relations on the premise that goodness and peace could be extended through the rule of law and judicial tribunals rather than secret diplomacy, intrigue, imperialism, and force.² Describing the international role of the United States, Borah advocated complete independence of action unbarrased and unburdened by previous political commitments.³ Moreover, he considered the primary interests of the United States totally different from the rest of the world and along with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge helped

¹New York Times, August 20, 1937, p. 3.

²Claudius O. Johnson, Borah Of Idaho (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1936); John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah And The Outlawry Of War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1957), are both worth consulting for Borah's ideas on the rule of law in international affairs; a new book worth consulting is Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Less significant on this issue was Marian McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961). Also consult, "How To End War," Nation, CXIX (Dec. 31, 1924), pp. 736-739; "Law Must Displace War," Christian Century, XLII (Jan. 1, 1925), p. 8; Ray T. Tucker, "Borah Of Idaho," American Mercury, IX (Dec. 1926), pp. 385-393; "Representative Men," English Review, LXII (Jan. 1936), pp. 25-31; See also "American Portraits," Spectator, CXXXI (July. 21, 1923), pp. 77-78; and Bernard Fay, "Portrait Of Mr. Borah," Review Of Reviews, LXXXV (Jan. 1932), pp. 57-58.

³"Law Must Displace War," Christian Century, p. 8; New York Times, May 4, 1930, III, p. 1; For further evidence of his concern for international law consult,

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defeat the Treaty of Versailles, remarking that passage of that treaty would be the first step towards internationalizing the foreign policy of the nation.⁴ He further opposed the results of the Paris negotiations because the treaty gave Japan the German leaseholds in Shantung which he feared might provide the opening for eventual Japanese control of that peninsula. The Shantung proposal, he called, "the most complete moral breakdown in the history of treaty making." In an interview by the New York Times, he reminded the country that China was an ally, and she had gone into the war with American assurances that her rights would be protected at the Peace Conference. Concluding the interview by attacking Japan's quest for racial equality, Borah did not care if Japan considered it a slap at her honor.⁵ A fierce nationalist and firm adherent to the doctrine no other country had the right to tell the

U.S. Congress, Senate, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., February 7, 1917, Congressional Record, LIV, 2748-2749 and Ibid., 65th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1917, Congressional Record, LV, 252-253.

⁴Allan Nevins, "Borah And World Politics," Current History, XXXVII (Feb. 1933), pp. 513-519; "Borah And Johnson: Disturbers Of Peace," Literary Digest, LXII (Aug. 23, 1919), p. 52; "Militarism In A Nationalistic League Of Nations," Forum, LXI (Mar. 1919), pp. 297-306; New York Times, January 15, 1919, p. 2 and March 28, 1919, p. 1.

⁵New York Times, March 25, 1919, p. 3; June 19, 1919, p. 5 and August 18, 1919, p. 4.

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United States what its foreign policy should encompass, the Idaho Senator consistently urged Americans not to give up that freedom by joining an international organization that would impede American sovereignty.⁶

During the 1920's, Borah endorsed the concept of the Washington Conference although he attacked the Four Power Treaty as a quadruple alliance resulting from secret diplomacy, the same reasons for which he had opposed the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles and adherence to the League of Nations.⁷ Willing to favor American participation in the World Court, the Senator had two reservations; first, the court must be divorced from the League of Nations, and second, he would oppose American participation as long as Germany and Russia were not represented. The concept of a "World Court" was impossible, in Borah's thinking, if two of the most potentially powerful nations in the world were not members.

⁶William E. Borah, "American Foreign Policy In A Nationalistic World," Foreign Affairs, XII (Jan .1934), Supplement, pp. iii-xii.

⁷"Disarmament Winning At Washington," Literary Digest, LXIX (June. 11, 1921), pp. 7-10; See also McKenna, Borah, pp. 172-196; John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate And The Washington Conference 1921-1922 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955); "The Progress Of The World," Review Of Reviews, LXIII (Feb. 1921), pp. 115-116; Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Policy, pp. 97-119; U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., December 12, 1921, Congressional Record, LXII, 229-237.

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Without these two nations being represented, they would reject the court's decisions and render the tribunal's opinions and directives meaningless.⁸ Borah's dislike of a World Court did not inhibit him from desiring an international agreement to outlaw war; on January 15, 1929, this goal was realized when the Senate passed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.⁹ Borah's hope for a world that had outlawed war as an instrument of national policy seemed close to realization at the end of the twenties, but optimism was shattered along with South Manchurian Railroad near Mukden, Manchuria on September 18, 1931.

It is not surprising therefore, given his faith in law as a means for preserving world peace and order, that Borah was angered over Japan's incursions into Manchuria,

⁸"Law Must Displace War," Christian Century, XLIII (Jan. 1, 1925), pp. 8-9; Ibid., "Senator Borah On The World Court," (Feb. 5, 1925), pp. 186-188; Ibid., "War And The World Court," XLIII (Feb. 11, 1926), pp. 194-197; Ibid., "Senator Borah And World Peace," XLVI (May. 8, 1929), pp. 607-610; "Borah And The Court," Independent, CXIV (Apr. 18, 1925), p. 453; "The World Court And The Senate," Review Of Reviews, LXXI (June. 1925), p. 576; McKenna, Borah, pp. 237-250; Vinson, William E. Borah And The Outlawry Of War, pp. 104-113.

⁹Robert H. Ferrell, Peace In Their Time: The Origins Of The Kellogg-Briand Pact (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1952), pp. 240-252; "Toward The Outlawry Of War," New Republic, XXXIX (July. 9, 1924), pp. 179-180; "Can War Be Outlawed," Congressional Digest, VII (Mar. 1928), pp. 87-89; "The Renunciation Of War," Christian Century, XLV (Feb. 23, 1928), pp. 266-268; Ibid., "The Debate On The Peace Pact," XLVI (Jan. 31, 1929), pp. 145-172; Ibid., "Senator Borah And World Peace," (May. 8, 1929), pp. 607-610; "Three Plans To Make The Dream Of Peace Come True," Literary Digest, LXXXV (Dec. 10, 1927), pp. 10-11; See also

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but he did not advocate any harsh military or economic retaliation.¹⁰ Ironically, for a man who had opposed the League of Nations, Borah now relied upon its covenant to condemn Japan for violation of a sacred trust and called upon her to restore captured Manchurian territory to China.¹¹ While distressed over Japan's actions prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Borah still sought to calm relations with that nation. When the Japanese renounced their adherence to the Washington Conference treaties in 1934, Borah remarked that Japan's move was unfortunate but, "we ought not to make the mistake of interpreting Japan's act as indicating a warlike attitude towards the United States."¹²

Sharing Borah's foreign policy ideology was a fellow Westerner and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hiram Johnson of California.

U.S. Congress, Senate, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., January 3, 1929, Congressional Record, LXX, 1022 and 1062-1070; Ibid., Senate, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., January 4, 1929, Congressional Record, LXX, 1120-1139 and Ibid., 70th Cong., 2nd sess., January 15, 1929, Congressional Record, LXX, 1727-1731; Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Policy, pp. 150-182.

¹⁰New York Times, November 21, 1931, p. 2; Ibid., January 31, 1932, p. 25; Ibid., February 21, 1932, p. 13; Ibid., March 13, 1932, p. 2.

¹¹Ibid., September 25, 1931, p. 1 and September 26, 1931, p. 18.

¹²Ibid., December 20, 1934, p. 9.

Opposing entangling foreign commitments, Johnson did stress the protection and preservation of American neutral rights. As intense and fierce a nationalist as Borah, the Californian's aversion to international cooperation was legendary from his freshman year in the Senate until Pearl Harbor.¹³ He had opposed American entry into World War I and joined Borah in leading the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. The League of Nations, he viewed as an attempt to foist upon the world a superstate and rejected any provision committing the United States to react automatically against aggression.¹⁴ Throughout the 1920's Johnson opposed binding international commitments, voting against the Four Power Treaty drafted during the Washington

¹³Johnson's personality, career and voting record may be consulted in the following: "Hiram Johnson," Nation, CV (Nov. 1, 1917), p. 492; Elbert Francis Baldwin, "Hiram Johnson: His Assets And Liabilities," Outlook, CXXIV (Apr. 21, 1920), pp. 696-698; For a sympathetic account see Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram W. Johnson," Nation, CXI (June. 5, 1920), pp. 748-749; John W. Ownes, "The Tragic Hiram," American Mercury, I (Jan. 1924), pp. 57-61; "Let's Not Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan. 30, 1932), p. 50; Theodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: Symbol Of Extreme Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), p. 13; For an interesting article that considered Johnson the most even tempered man in public life, always mad, see S.T. Williams, "In Querulous Times," New York Times, IX December 27, 1931, p. 2; Jonas, Isolationism In America, 1935-1941, pp. 42-45 and pp. 48-49.

¹⁴New York Times, January 6, 1922, p. 16.

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Conference.¹⁵ If it did not promote an entangling alliance Johnson concluded, the treaty was futile and should be rejected anyway as useless.¹⁶

When it came to the question of what role America ought to play in Asia, Johnson showed more willingness to antagonize Japan than Borah who had sought a rapprochement with her throughout his career. Johnson's reputation for disliking the Japanese had originated while he was governor of California. In 1913, when the State Legislature passed the Alien Land Act disqualifying aliens who were ineligible for citizenship from owning land, its main victims were the Japanese who composed the largest portion of these aliens. Upon signing the bill into law on May 19, 1913, Johnson claimed he had done so out of interest for the integrity of California, and not out of any motives of discrimination against the

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 13, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 3778-3779; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4189-4190; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 23, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4336; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, LXII, 4613-4614; The vote on the Four Power Treaty may be found in Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 24, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4497.

¹⁶New York Times, January 6, 1922, p. 16; He did vote for the Five Power Treaty, U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4718-4719; and the Nine Power Treaty in Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4784; See also Vinson, The Parchment Peace, pp. 175-195. Additional views may be consulted in New York Times, January 5, 1922, p. 2 and January 14, 1922, p. 3.

Japanese.¹⁷ But any doubt as to the Californian's true feelings towards the Japanese disappeared upon his accession to the Senate in 1917. During the Upper House's debate on the Treaty of Versailles, Johnson showed overt hostility for the Japanese, by opposing their acquisition of former German possessions in China and the islands in the Pacific Ocean.¹⁸ As Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in the Nation, Johnson, "...is violently anti-Japanese, as is practically every other politician from Oregon and California."¹⁹ Villard speculated that if Johnson ever became President, the United States might go to war with Japan; fortunately, Johnson missed the opportunity by scornfully refusing to be Harding's running mate and thereby tossing away the Presidency upon Harding's death.²⁰

¹⁷For the role of Johnson during the Alien Land Bill debate consult, New York Times, April 20, 1913, II, p. 1; April 22, 1913, p. 1; April 23, 1913, p. 1; April 25, 1913, p. 1; May 1, 1913, p. 1; May 2, 1913, p. 3; May 20, 1913, p. 1; and May 28, 1913, p. 6; Also consult, "The Issue Between Japan And California," Literary Digest, XLVI (May. 3, 1913), pp. 991-994.

¹⁸New York Times, July 11, 1919, p. 2.

¹⁹Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram Johnson," Nation, CXI (June. 5, 1920), p. 748; Johnson was also Executive Chairman of Movement Of Westerners To Curb Japanese, an organization he supported; see New York Times, April 21, 1921, p. 17.

²⁰Theodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: A Symbol Of Extreme Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), p. 13.

Later, in the same decade, Johnson opposed the American participation in the World Court since it had originated with the League of Nations.²¹ Summarizing his international outlook, Johnson remarked:

There's just one course to pursue, just one way to play our proud part, just one method to render real service—speak our voice, frankly and boldly, be true to our own institutions, hold to our own ideals, be fair and just to all peoples, but standing upon our own shores, remain the master of our own destiny, the captain of our own souls.²²

He justified opposing American entry into the Court by insisting no citizen of the United States would assent to a judgement made by a foreign jurist,²³ and claimed the United States could ill afford to take time out of domestic problems to search for foreign involvements.²⁴ Johnson consistently rejected any significant American role in international affairs. When the Senate debated American adherence to the proposed Kellogg-Briand Pact, he supported the Reed-Moses Resolution proposing that the treaty contain no coercive obligations, not interfere in self-defense preparations, the Monroe Doctrine, nor

²¹"The Return Of An Innocent Abroad," Outlook, CXXXIV (Aug. 8, 1923), p. 534.

²²Ibid., The same belief may be seen in "Let's Not Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan. 30, 1932), p. 50.

²³New York Times, January 13, 1935, p. 25 and January 17, 1935, p. 1.

²⁴Ibid.

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involve the United States in League affairs.²⁵

Witnessing the disintegration of world peace during the 1930's, Johnson moved even closer to a negative, obstructionist posture in dealing with other nations. In 1934, an act bearing his name prohibited future loans to nations already defaulting in repayment of debts incurred during World War I. Following the outbreak of fighting in North China in 1937, Johnson expressed a resentment at the invasion by Japan but cautioned there should be no American action on any level to aid China.²⁶ His stubborn refusal to change positions on an issue was nowhere better illustrated than in his unwillingness to vote for repeal of the Neutrality Legislation even when, in 1941, a Gallup Poll stated that 67% of Californians eligible to vote favored repeal. Rejecting the polls results, Johnson claimed:

It may be that the Gallup Poll shows 90% of the people of the state of California in favor of war. It may be that 99 percent of other polls show the people of the state of California in favor of war. Even if it were so, I would not vote to take the country into war. I would stand here and with every bit of force that I have, protest against such a proposal.²⁷

²⁵Ferrell, Peace In Their Time, pp. 242-243.

²⁶New York Times, August 3, 1937, p. 2.

²⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8514-8515; Despite Johnson's resistance to repeal of the Neutrality Act, he

True to these convictions, even after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Johnson attempted to hold up passage of the bill authorizing the use of National Guard troops and draftees outside the Western Hemisphere.²⁸

Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, the position being advocated by Johnson and Borah found support from one of the ranking members of both the House Rules and House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hamilton Fish (R. New York). Despite having served in Congress since November 2, 1920, when he filled the vacancy caused by the resignation of Edmund Platt, Fish's record for the next twenty-five years in Congress was uneven and uninspiring. But his record did not prevent Fish from considering himself a liberal in the same progressive tradition as Thomas Jefferson, although one writer stated that his peers believed that, in fact, Fish's presence in Congress was a standing threat to popular government.²⁹ While in the House, Fish did gain a record as a notorious communist hunter, becoming Chairman of the

did believe the legislation would not prevent war but increase its possibilities. See, "Peace Passion Cold," Time, XXVII (Feb. 24, 1936), p. 16.

²⁸Block, ed., Current Biography-1941, p. 441.

²⁹Richard Current, "Hamilton Fish: Crusading Isolationist," as quoted in Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office, p. 210.

House Committee investigating communism in the country.³⁰

No internationalist, Fish was nevertheless willing to see a limited American involvement in world affairs. In the twenties, he supported the results of the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.³¹ Following the signing of the **Pact of Paris**, Fish spent the next decade prior to Pearl Harbor agitating for American embargoes of all arms and munitions to warring nations. In a 1930 radio address over NBC, sponsored by the Women's International League For Peace And Freedom, Fish considered a total embargo in keeping with the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. If the United States joined other nations in embargoing war, he summarized, then the country should be willing to embargo munitions and arms to violators of the treaty.³² He also opposed involving Americans in areas where the nation's interests were minimal. Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, he criticized Stimson's proposal to send protest notes to the Japanese **Government** because the United States had no intention of thwarting Japan's aggression by force; thus

³⁰"Presidential Possibility," Literary Digest, XX (Nov. 16, 1935), p. 35; "Russia Turns A Corner," Living Age, CCCXL (Mar. 1931), pp. 31-33; "The Trend Of Events," Outlook And Independent, CLV (July. 30, 1930), p. 495.

³¹"The Renunciation Of War," Annals, CXXXVIII (July. 1928), pp. 164-165.

³²New York Times, February 23, 1930, p. 27.

the notes were of no use and could only humiliate the American Government.³³ As if to emphasize his position, he later remarked, "We are not the guardians of the world's peace." The sentimental attitude that the United States should aid China, he continued, "should be rejected. We owe nothing to China but our moral efforts to enable it to restore peace but the American people are not going to war with any nation after the experience of World War I."³⁴ While not advocating a public boycott of Japan, Fish stated he preferred to restrict items like nitrate of soda which when converted to nitric acid were used in the manufacturing of munitions as well as arms, ammunition, and implements of war.³⁵

When hostilities began in North China in 1937, Fish asked for a total withdrawal of American civilians and especially removal of Marines from Tientsin and Peking along with the naval craft in Chinese waters.³⁶ Prior to his conversion to the nationalistic Borah-Johnson position later in 1937, he even advocated the impeachment of the

³³Ibid., October 16, 1931, p. 2.

³⁴Ibid., February 13, 1932, p. 2.

³⁵Ibid., March 13, 1932, p. 2; also Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 26-31.

³⁶New York Times, July 24, 1937, p. 4.

President for not recognizing a state of war in China which would demand invoking the Neutrality Legislation. He also criticized the President for talking of a quarantine against Japan on one hand then seeking to mediate the peace between the two belligerents. Fish called the Chief Executive's policies nothing but ineffectual lip service to peace, full of inconsistencies and empty gestures.³⁷ It was not long afterwards, when the gunboat Panay was attacked and sunk, that Fish, considering the action an affront to American honor, shifted his ideas to coincide with the Borah-Johnson position which he then maintained until he was converted to an anti-Japanese posture along with the majority in Congress in 1941.³⁸

The third attitude towards American-Japanese relations, co-existing with the two previously discussed views, also had its Congressional spokesmen in 1937. Although agreeing with most of the non-interventionist beliefs espoused by Borah, Johnson, and Fish, this third grouping differed significantly over the issue of withdrawing Americans from China to such an extent that they must be considered as separate and distinct from the opinions

³⁷Ibid., October 17, 1937, p. 40.

³⁸See Chapter VII.

examined earlier. The Congressmen exerting the greatest influence within this group, Senators Gerald P. Nye (R. North Dakota), Arthur H. Vandenberg (R. Michigan), Arthur Capper (R. Kansas), and Joel Bennett Clark (D. Missouri), believed that America's defense of neutral rights had helped to involve her in the First World War. Therefore, they did not want the United States to repeat past mistakes, even if this meant sacrificing some of the nation's rights as a neutral. Once Japan renewed hostilities in China, these Senators advocated withdrawing all Americans rather than risking a conflict with Japan, a position they would maintain unless American territory was directly threatened with attack.

It is not surprising, after examining Nye's record, to find that he supported the call for American withdrawal from China. Despite his support of President Wilson during World War I, by the time Nye reached the Senate, disappointment with the results of the war had brought about disillusionment with American involvement in world affairs. Hoping to avoid any possible duplication of the events that had lead the country into World War I, Nye, in August, 1935, introduced a series of bills:

...that would have withheld passports from Americans wishing to travel in war zones, forbidden citizens to sail on vessels owned by belligerents, embargoed loans, credits, and munitions, prevented contraband of any sort leaving this country under the United States' flag, and in other ways would have voluntarily relinquished traditional neutral rights.³⁹

Though a believer in an adequate national defense, Nye voted against all bills for naval expansion and opposed the protection of American residents and investments by the armed forces in other countries.⁴⁰ With regard to the Pacific Region, Nye considered naval appropriations wasteful since the United States could not defend its interests in Asia. He was reluctant to build a fleet that Japan would see as a challenge to her hegemony in the Orient and reiterated time and again that the Japanese could not invade the United States, thereby making offensive fleets impractical and unnecessary. As Wayne Cole has noted, Nye feared military spending, big business, and bankers at home more than the Japanese. From North Dakota, Japan was a continent and an ocean away; and with North Dakota ranking last in receipt of military appropriations during 1940 to 1941,

³⁹Jonas, Isolationism In America, 1935-1941, p. 58.

⁴⁰Elbert Francis Baldwin, "The Crusading Mr. Nye," Current History, XLI (Feb. 1935), p. 526.

Nye could afford the luxury of being anti-military without sacrificing his political existence.⁴¹ More than once Nye stated American-Japanese relations would be improved if the United States would not provoke that Asian nation with belligerent speeches, depictions of an ensuing war in newspaper editorials and increased armaments.⁴² Unwilling or unable to recognize and admit Japanese violations of international agreements, Nye considered the onus of any future war to be the responsibility of Roosevelt, bankers, and munitions makers. To Nye, Japan only acted in response to American, English, and French war preparations, and the slogans of their leaders to "Look Out For Japan", was a convenient means of rallying support for their policies.⁴³

Prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Nye led a move to reduce the possibility of America going out on another crusade to save the world. To prevent such a catastrophe during the thirties, Nye attacked the munitions industry and advocated stringent and non-discretionary neutrality legislation. Shunning international cooperation

⁴¹Cole, Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, p. 131.

⁴²U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., May 7, 1936, Congressional Record, LXXX, 6800-6802; Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., April 27, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 5840.

⁴³"The Munitions Investigation," Journal Of National Educational Association, XXIV (Sept. 1935), pp. 185-192.

out of fear the United States would become embroiled in world conflicts, he opposed the concept of the League of Nations and American membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice.⁴⁴ If Nye's efforts to keep the United States out of war proved futile, his resolve proved unshakable. Even while the Japanese bombs were falling on American ships, planes and military personnel at Pearl Harbor, Nye was addressing a "Keep America Out Of War" rally in Pittsburgh. As the speech ended, it was obvious that his position and his cause during the thirties had been lost and in his next bid for reelection, he would be shoved into political oblivion.⁴⁵

One of Nye's colleagues, Arthur Vandenberg, considered himself an **insulationist** rather than an **isolationist** although the difference between the two may not have been anything more than semantics. Vandenberg defined his view of diplomatic relations as the attempt to cushion America,

⁴⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, 69th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 1926, Congressional Record, LXVII, 2643-2656; Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, p. 107; "War: Must Over May," Time, XXVI (Sept. 2, 1935), pp. 11-12; New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1; "Neutrality Controversy," Congressional Digest, XV (Jan. 1936), pp. 16-18; For an unsympathetic view of Nye by a contemporary colleague in the Senate, consult, Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell And Company, 1954), pp. 211-214.

⁴⁵Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, pp. 197-201.

as much as possible, from the impact of foreign events.⁴⁶ He called for self-determination in American foreign policy based on "independence but not isolation". Willing to cooperate with other nations when feasible, Vandenberg hoped the United States could remain aloof from international quarrels and warfare.⁴⁷ In regard to the Pacific region, the Michigan Republican was confident that if America would retain friendly relations with Japan all the problems then existing between these two countries could be worked out. He substantiated this claim by referring to the success America had achieved by using persuasion and not threats of force after World War I to convince the Japanese to relinquish most of their claims in China.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Vandenberg assumed that any collective action taken against Japan would eventually lead to war. Therefore, as he sometimes lectured his colleagues, the United States should not try to equalize any differences between belligerents, especially in the

⁴⁶Vandenberg to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg MSS, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

⁴⁷New York Times, May 4, 1930, III, p. 1.

⁴⁸Arthur Vandenberg Jr. and Joe Alex Morris, eds., The Private Papers Of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 17; Hereinafter cited as Vandenberg Papers.

conflict in China. In a letter to Nora Dyron, a member of the Provisional Committee To Aid The Chinese People, he was willing to agree that China should be helped; yet he was careful to qualify his statement with the provision that this aid should not entail any action branding Japan an aggressor in China.⁴⁹

Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg followed a position similar to Nye's concerning international relations. The Michigan Senator had been a member of the Nye Committee investigating the munitions industry and had helped Nye draft Senate Resolution 206 that created the committee.⁵⁰ As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he favored mandatory neutrality legislation requiring the President to embargo munitions and implements of war to all belligerents in case of an armed conflict.⁵¹ In 1937, he voted for the Neutrality

⁴⁹Vandenberg to Nora Dyron, undated letter in Vandenberg MSS, as quoted in Jackson Citizen Patriot.

⁵⁰For Vandenberg's views see U.S. Congress, Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 1934, Congressional Record, LXXVIII, 3784; Nye's views may be consulted in Ibid., 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 1934, Congressional Record, LXXVIII, 3783-3791. Vandenberg's resolution was Senate Concurrent Resolution 9 and Nye's resolution was Senate Resolution 179. They were combined into Senate Resolution 206; See, Ibid., 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 1934, Congressional Record, LXXVIII, 4228-4229.

⁵¹Ibid., 74th Cong., 1st sess., August 20, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 13777-13791; Literary Digest, CXX (July. 13, 1935), p. 38; and Ibid., (Sept. 28, 1935), p. 39.

Act and two years later against the repeal of the arms embargo; in 1941, Vandenberg voted with Nye against Lend-Lease, commenting in his diary, that he was witnessing the suicide of the Republic by its passage.⁵² The United States, he lamented, would defend the freedom of the seas in order to aid the allies; but he believed such neutral rights should have been repudiated.⁵³ After Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Vandenberg began to shift from what he called his insulationist position until he became, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, an important member of a bi-partisan coalition calling for international cooperation.

In Arthur Capper, Nye and Vandenberg found additional support for their attempt to remove Americans from areas of conflict. Born in Garnett, Kansas, Capper had devoted most of his earlier life to journalism as had his two colleagues in the Senate. After serving as Governor of Kansas from 1914 to 1918, he was elected to the Senate where he served until 1949. Appointed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1927, Capper, by the early

⁵²Vandenberg and Morris, eds, Vandenberg Private Papers, p. 10; Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, pp. 116-118 and pp. 166-168.

⁵³Vandenberg And Morris, eds., Vandenberg Private Papers, p. 10; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., April 29, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 3943-3944.

thirties, came to rely on geographical distance and diplomacy based on non-interventionism to keep the nation out of war. He agreed with the ideas of Nye and Vandenberg, especially in relation to American actions in the Far East.⁵⁴ Moreover, Capper opposed large military and naval funds because he was convinced that they would provoke war instead of preserving the peace.⁵⁵

Prior to the depression years, however, Capper had supported numerous maneuvers aimed at obtaining international cooperation. While in his first decade on Capitol Hill, the Kansas Republican had supported the Treaty of Versailles with reservations as well as the Covenant of the League of Nations.⁵⁶ He continued to favor limited American involvement, voting for all three treaties concluded during the Washington Conference, desiring American membership in a World Court and

⁵⁴Homer E. Socolofsky, Arthur Capper: Publisher. Politician. Philanthropist (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962), p. 175.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 175-176.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 131-134.

approving the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1929.⁵⁷ Two years earlier, indicating a prior idealistic view of international relations, Capper had even introduced in Congress his own resolution calling for the outlawing of war.⁵⁸

Following the Senate's ratification of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Capper, in conjunction with two professors from Columbia University, James T. Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain, hoped to "put teeth" into it. Briefly, Capper's resolution empowered the President to determine when a nation had violated the treaty to outlaw war and subsequently to embargo the export of arms and implements of war to that nation.⁵⁹ As Capper admitted, he did not expect his resolution to pass but to stimulate debate in

⁵⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 24, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4497; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 29, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 47184-19; Ibid., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 1922, Congressional Record, LXII, 4784; New York Times, December 14, 1930, p. 5; Ibid., January 4, 1928, p. 24 and November 24, 1928, p. 2.

⁵⁸Vinson, William E. Borah And The Outlawry Of War, p. 134.

⁵⁹Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 13; New York Times, January 4, 1928, p. 24; November 24, 1928, p. 2; February 11, and February 12, 1929, p. 1; July 28, 1929, p. 5; "A Threat For A Promise," Outlook, CLI (Feb. 20, 1929), p. 291; "Making The Peace Pact Effective," Annals, CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 40-48; For opposition to Capper's resolution consult, "Prostituting The Peace Pact," Christian Century, XLVI (Feb. 21, 1929), pp. 257-258; During the thirties, Capper continued to speak approvingly of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., April 21, 1932, Congressional Record, LXXV, 8560-8561; New York Times, April 7, 1932, p. 1.

the hope future action might be taken.⁶⁰ Capper's intention in submitting the proposal was to initiate a partial embargo in case of conflict by economically retaliating against the aggressor nation. Later the Congress would pass Neutrality Legislation incorporating an impartial ban on exports of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to aggressor and victims alike which Capper would favor.

Capper's willingness to support international cooperation extended into the early 1930's as evidenced by his desire the United States adhere to the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Hoping it would end expensive competition in naval armaments, Capper also considered it even more important that the United States be in the forefront of international morality by endorsing the results of the agreement.⁶¹ He estimated it would save the United States \$500,000,000 by reducing the American Navy to 165,000 tons. In a nation facing an economic crisis, Capper was concerned that military appropriations should not limit the amount of money needed for domestic reform and recovery.⁶² But within a few years, the impact of the conflicts in Eastern Asia, Ethiopia and

⁶⁰New York Times, February 11, 1929, p. 2.

⁶¹Ibid., April 15, 1930, p. 24.

⁶²Ibid., p. 1.

Spain forced Capper to reconsider his dependence on international cooperation as a means for maintaining world peace. Reflecting a new mood, he became convinced of one thing; America ought to remain aloof from such conflicts, a feat that could best be accomplished by closing loopholes in the Neutrality Legislation, enforcing trade embargoes, and banning private loans to belligerents.⁶³ As early as 1932, he endorsed the Lowell-Baker petition to embargo war supplies to Japan.⁶⁴ It is not surprising that his concern for embargoing war material resulted in Capper's acceptance of the Nye Committee's conclusions of why the nation had entered World War I.⁶⁵

By the mid 1930's Capper's earlier views had been revised by acknowledging the need for America to retrench from her previous overtures on the international scene. Entertaining no doubts as to the correctness of this policy, on October 3, 1937, he offered a six point peace plan in a radio address over WIBC in Washington, D. C. It called for the United States to keep out of the League of Nations and all alliances, keep American ships, soldiers,

⁶³Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 179-180; New York Times, December 1, 1937, p. 8.

⁶⁴New York Times, February 21, 1932, p. 13.

⁶⁵Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 176-180.

and dollars at home, carry out the Neutrality Act, and pass a constitutional amendment giving the people the right to vote on participation in foreign wars.⁶⁶ After all, Capper argued, the citizens ought to have a say since they would be the ones to fight, die, and pay the taxes in case of a world wide conflagration.⁶⁷ By 1940, Capper was making radio speeches on behalf of the America First movement⁶⁸ and the following year voted against Lend-Lease.⁶⁹ Ultimately, Capper would change his views once more and like Vandenberg, his position regarding Asia in general and Japan in particular would become more belligerent following that nation's signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 181; "Let The People Decide," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Jan. 1, 1938), p. 165; "Should A War Referendum Amendment Be Added To The Constitution," Congressional Digest, XVII (Feb. 1938), p. 143.

⁶⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., July 25, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 11820-11821; New York Times, November 18, 1937, p. 5; "Should A War Referendum Amendment Be Added To The Constitution," Congressional Digest, p. 143; Literary Digest, CXXV (Jan. 1, 1938), p. 7.

⁶⁸Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, p. 179.

⁶⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 2097.

The last significant figure in this third grouping of Senators was Joel Bennett (Champ) Clark of Missouri. An ardent anti-New Dealer, Clark was literally raised in Congress. His father arrived in Washington in 1893 to take his seat in the 53rd Congress when the young Clark was only three years old. Later, when his father was Speaker of the House, the younger Clark served as House Parliamentarian from 1913 until 1917. A charter member and former national commander of the American Legion, Clark entered the Senate in 1933 after a successful law career in St. Louis. A believer in strict neutrality and non-interventionist foreign policies, he served on the Nye Munitions Investigating Committee and was appointed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April, 1939. Throughout the thirties, ~~his~~ two favorite projects were campaigning against what he termed the communist menace, and devising methods to divest the President of any discretionary powers concerning neutrality legislation.⁷⁰

In 1935, he joined Nye in sponsoring Senate Joint Resolution 120 which would have automatically prohibited

⁷⁰His opposition to the New Deal as interpreted by a student of the domestic battles in the thirties "...emanated less from a clear conservative philosophy than from an independent, almost maverick posture." See Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal, pp. 113-114; Ralph Coghlan, "Missouri-A Threat And A Promise," Nation, CXXXV (Nov. 2, 1932), pp. 422-424; Jack Alexander, "Missouri's Dark Mule," Saturday Evening Post, CCXI (Oct. 8, 1938), pp. 5-7; Paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election Means," Nation, CXLVII (Nov. 19, 1938), pp. 527-528; Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 698.

the export of arms and munitions to all belligerents when a state of war was recognized; shippers of non-contraband goods would have to do so at their own risk. Like Nye and Vandenberg, the Missouri Democrat desired an impartial embargo to all belligerents with no Presidential discretion. The resolution was not voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but it did put pressure on Pittman and the State Department to draft immediate neutrality legislation.⁷¹ On one occasion in the thirties Clark did differ from some of his non-interventionist senatorial colleagues. In 1935, he voted for American participation in the World Court without giving his reasons for such a departure from his usual voting behavior. But it remained the only international accord Clark approved of throughout the decade prior to Pearl Harbor.⁷²

Due to America's geographical distance from Europe and Asia, Clark considered it possible to restrict American involvement in foreign conflicts. Willing to advocate a degree of national preparedness, he would not accept an

⁷¹Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 93-117; Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, pp. 101-103; U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 7042; Senate Joint Resolution 120 was a combination of Senate Joint Resolution 99 and Senate Joint Resolution 100 both of which were co-sponsored by Nye and Clark as well.

⁷²New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1.

army or navy so large that it took monies from domestic needs for use in foreign ventures.⁷³ Evidence of his continental philosophy appeared during the debate over Lend-Lease in 1941 in his assertion the United States had nothing to gain by aiding Great Britain. When advised that if England fell to Hitler America would be next, Clark remarked that the United States had nothing to worry about. First, Germany could not even cross a body of water only twenty miles wide. He asserted, "It is preposterous that anyone should think the Germans at any time in the reasonable future could cross 3,000 miles of sea from Europe to invade the United States."⁷⁴

When the Sino-Japanese conflict erupted in 1937, Clark called for total withdrawal of Americans from China while also criticizing any actions that could possibly worsen relations with Japan. Exaggerating, Clark remarked that the United States could gain "...the greatest moral victory in the history of civilization" if it actually kept out of war.⁷⁵ One Washington correspondent characterized the Missouri Democrat as a prima donna,

⁷³"The Question Of National Defense," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Jan. 15, 1939), pp. 216-219.

⁷⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 18, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1108.

⁷⁵New York Times, June 17, 1938, p. 3; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 19, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 2187; "Neutrality-What Kind?," Vital Speeches Of The Day, III (Feb. 1, 1937), p. 252.

consorting with reactionaries.⁷⁶ Whether or not his description was accurate, there was no doubt that Clark remained a formidable exponent of neutrality and non-interventionism, battling during the years 1937 to 1941 to avoid an armed clash with Japan.

While a majority of the members in Congress could be classified into one of the three groups just described, it should be recognized that in 1937 there were some important deviations to the above categories of opinion. One such exception, the Democratic Senator from Utah, Elbert D. Thomas, probably had more familiarity and personal experience with Japan and Eastern Asia than any other Congressmen serving on the Hill. Thomas had attained his first hand knowledge as missionary and president of the Japan mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints from 1907 to 1912. During this time, he not only traveled throughout the Empire spreading the Mormon faith, he also taught English to students of the Japanese War College, learned the language well enough to speak and read it fluently, and even wrote articles for Japanese magazines. Before returning to the University of Utah in 1913, Thomas and his wife traveled throughout Asia, and in the following years he continued to extend his knowledge of the Far East by obtaining a PhD

⁷⁶Robert S. Allen, "Washington Sweatshop," Nation, CXLV (July. 17, 1937), pp. 63-64; New York Times, May 28, 1935), p. 27.

from the University of California at Berkley, and writing his doctoral thesis on Chinese Political Thought which was published in 1927. Defeating five term Senator, Reed Smoot, Thomas was elected to the Upper House of Congress in 1932, and served until 1951.⁷⁷

Prior to Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact in 1940, Thomas had been one of Japan's strongest allies, working diligently in the Senate to convince his colleagues that the Government in Tokyo could be won over to a moderate, peaceful policy whereby the two nations could avoid an armed conflict. In 1935, he had called for an interchange of students between Japan and America to foster understanding. If cordial relations and understanding were not achieved, Thomas warned, within ten years fear and distrust would lead to "the bloodiest war ever known in the world."⁷⁸ Proposing that student exchanges were better defenses against war than \$26,000,000 appropriations for defense of Hawaii and \$100,000 for air defense programs and fortifications in Alaska and the Aleutian

⁷⁷Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, pp. 1703-1704; Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1942, (New York: H.W. Wilson and Company, 1942), pp. 830-831; Time, XXXIX (Jan. 5, 1942), p. 29; New York Times, December 30, 1941, p. 3; For additional biographical material consult, "Biographical Data On Senator Elbert D. Thomas," Biographical Data 1938 folder, Box 7, Thomas MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

⁷⁸New York Times, February 15, 1935, p. 4.

Islands, he remarked his plan would help guarantee peace for "nations that understand each other and have no fear of each other will never fight."⁷⁹ But after 1940, despite his earlier desire for a moderate policy towards Japan, Thomas acknowledged that nation's aggressiveness, recognizing that placation was tantamount to appeasement. With Thomas' conversion, Japan lost her only true admirer in Congress, thereafter standing friendless on Capitol Hill.

Unlike previously discussed non-interventionists, Thomas trusted President Roosevelt implicitly. During an interview, he stated that Roosevelt's,

...understanding of world conditions, as they exist today, are not only correct, but also are so wise and so safe that anything he might do as a result of that understanding may be relied upon as being the best thing for the American people and the people of the world at large.⁸⁰

Moreover, Roosevelt, "...had the ability to get at the heart of things."⁸¹ Earlier, Thomas had compared Roosevelt to the Hebrew prophets, saying if the President had lived in India they would have called him Mahatma.⁸² Certainly, no other non-interventionist in the two groups already discussed respected the President's understanding of world

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid., October 6, 1937, p. 5.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal, pp. 12-13, Note 34.

affairs to this degree, nor did they totally trust his judgement, and none would have compared him to a Hebrew prophet much less referring to him as Mahatma.

Closely paralleling Thomas pro-administration viewpoint was Senator James Hamilton Lewis (D. Illinois), who also hoped to avoid armed conflict with Japan. Maintaining an international outlook while in Congress, Lewis served from 1889 to 1898 on the Joint American-British High Commission concerned with the Canadian-Alaskan boundary dispute. Lewis first went to Congress in 1897 where he represented the city of Seattle until 1898. In 1913, he was elected to the Senate from the State of Illinois where he had moved in 1903.⁸³ Proud of being a Spanish-American War veteran, Lewis was known, if not for his oratory and incisive thinking, at least for his perfectly tailored suits, matching accessories, a rakish hat, and a pink beard. Defeated in the 1918 elections, Lewis, who was a good Democrat, supported the peace making attempts of President Wilson as well as the League of Nations.⁸⁴ In 1930, upon reelection to the Upper House, he became a member of the Foreign Relations

⁸³Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1216; Newsweek, XII (Aug. 15, 1938), pp. 10-11; Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1939, p. 1 found in Lewis MSS Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C; "The New Senators From Illinois," Literary Digest, XLVI (Apr. 12, 1913), pp. 860-862.

⁸⁴New York Times, June 4, 1915, p. 2; Ibid., January 3, 1919, p. 3; "Defending The World's Right To Democracy," New York Times Current History, XV (May. 1918), pp. 281-283.

Committee.⁸⁵

Now a Senator again, Lewis followed Franklin Roosevelt's leadership except when the President attempted to procure Senate passage of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pact with Canada and have the United States participate in the World Court, two proposals he opposed steadily and vigorously.⁸⁶ In the debates over the neutrality legislation, Lewis had supported the President's desire for discretionary powers, believing the Chief Executive should have complete freedom to impose travel, trade, munition, and loan restrictions against any nation he deemed the aggressor.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, when fighting occurred in China in the summer of 1937, Lewis' first impulse was to call for withdrawal of all Americans from China, a position similar to that of Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper. In fact, on August 6, he introduced a resolution requesting that the Secretary of War report the reasons

⁸⁵"The New Political Issues," Nation, CVII (Aug. 31, 1931), p. 216.

⁸⁶New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1; Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1939, p. 1 in Lewis MSS.

⁸⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., August 21, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 13953; Ibid., 75th Cong., 1st sess., February 10, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 1074-1075.

for maintaining American troops in China.⁸⁸ By November, however, he had moved closer to the position held by Borah, Johnson, and Fish. Making a speech before the Senate on November 16, Lewis stated that while he did not want war with Japan, American interests in the Pacific had to be defended. If they were not protected now, he warned his colleagues, then Japan would eventually attempt to eliminate Americans from the Orient economically, politically, and ultimately physically.⁸⁹ Even up to the time of his death on April 9, 1939, Lewis continued to advocate a defense of American interests in the Pacific.⁹⁰

Another Democratic Senator, Tom Connally of Texas, also generally followed Roosevelt on most issues. Serving thirty-six years in Congress, Connally had spent twelve years in the House before being elected to the Senate in

⁸⁸Senate Resolution 170 in U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 6, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8351; See also Lewis' desire for troop removals from China in New York Times, August 5, 1937, p. 3 and August 7, 1937, p. 5; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 16, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8939-8941.

⁸⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 580-581; He also feared a Russo-Japanese Pact designed to take Alaska and the Philippines and favored preparedness. Consult, New York Times, February 11, 1936, p. 8; That was the same theme Lewis reiterated in the Senate before American entry into World War I. See for example, New York Times, February 27, 1915, p. 4; April 8, 1915, p. 14; January 21, 1917, p. 6 and January 28, 1917, VII, p. 2.

⁹⁰Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1939, p. 1, Lewis MSS.

1928. In favor of an active foreign policy, the Texan expected the United States to defend its interests in the world. In 1935 he supported the participation of the United States in the World Court,⁹¹ while at the same time voting for Senate Joint Resolution 173, the Neutrality Act of 1935. When debate over the resolution occurred, he remarked:

I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that no matter where the contest, no matter what the issue, America in advance promised that she will exert no influence, will do no act either to bring peace or to prevent the outrage of the weak and the defenseless by the strong and the aggressive.⁹²

Like Borah, Johnson, and Fish, Connally agreed with the doctrine of freedom of the seas during wartime and defense of neutral rights.⁹³ Nevertheless, he voted for the proposal after being assured that the compulsory arms embargo provision was only temporary.⁹⁴

Later, Connally voted for repeal of the arms embargo

⁹¹New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1.

⁹²U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., August 24, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 14433; Connally's views on neutrality during the debate in the spring of 1937 can be seen in Ibid., 75th Cong., 1st sess., April 29, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 3954-3957.

⁹³New York Times, January 14, 1936, p. 3.

⁹⁴Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, p. 220.

in 1939,⁹⁵ the Selective Service Acts,⁹⁶ and Lend-Lease,⁹⁷ while defending Roosevelt's sending troops to Iceland which the President called a movement for hemispheric defense. Moreover, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee beginning on July 31, 1941, Connally helped frame and pass the Barkley-Connally Amendment, permitting American ships to be armed, enter belligerent ports, and cross combat zones in November, 1941.⁹⁸

Connally's support of such an active role for the United States in world affairs appears difficult at first to reconcile with his initial reaction towards resumption of warfare in China in 1937. From 1937 to 1939, he called for withdrawal of Americans from China as had Nye, Clark, Capper, and Vandenberg; yet, when war came to Europe in 1939, Connally began to urge aid to the allies but retained his position towards the conflict in Asia.⁹⁹ Connally saw no inconsistency in such behavior,

⁹⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXV, 1022-1024.

⁹⁶Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, pp. 238-239.

⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 242-244; U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 2097.

⁹⁸Block, ed., Current Biography-1941, pp. 167-168.

⁹⁹Otis Miller and Anita F. Alpern, "Tom Connally: One Of The Senate Gallery's Favorites," as quoted in Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office, pp. 311-321.

for he did not consider America's presence in China to be as crucial to her interests as did Senators Pittman or Schwollenbach. Although he did become more belligerent towards Japan, the Texas Democrat deemphasized the role of the United States in China and did not view withdrawal of American military forces from that nation as damaging to the country's honor.¹⁰⁰ Throughout the last year of peace, Connally did shift his views towards Japan considerably and regarded those who favored non-interventionist policies in Asia with little respect.¹⁰¹

The antithesis of William E. Borah and one of the staunchest, pro-administration Democratic Senators, James P. Pope of Idaho, advocated American participation in the League of Nations, the World Court and collective security.¹⁰² He had been a member of the Nye Committee and had sponsored a munitions control bill in 1935 whereby

¹⁰⁰New York Times, November 15, 1941, p. 5.

¹⁰¹For Connally's brutal and disrespectful questioning of the former Governor of Wisconsin, Phillip LaFollette, consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign Relations, To Promote The Defense Of The United States, Hearings, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, pp. 262-287; Hereinafter cited as Senate Lend-Lease Hearings; New York Times, December 3, 1941, p. 6 has additional statements condemning non-interventionists.

¹⁰²Literary Digest, x (Sept. 7, 1935), p. 27; "International Cross-Currents," Journal Of The National Education Association, XXIV (Mar. 1935), p. 92; Christian Science Monitor, August 14, 1935, p. 1; Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 66; For an overview of Pope's career consult, Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, p. 1470.

a National Munitions Control Board would license all arms shipments and publish the export totals every year.¹⁰³ In the summer of 1935, Pope's munitions control bill was incorporated in the Neutrality Act which Roosevelt signed into law on August 31. Pope did not consider banning the sale of arms, halting foreign propaganda or forbidding travel on the seas the correct means for securing American neutrality; instead he advocated working for international cooperation rather than passing legislation. To Pope, the Neutrality Act could not guarantee American non-involvement in foreign conflicts.¹⁰⁴

Pope served only one term in the Senate, being defeated in the Idaho Democratic primary by D. Worth Clark in 1938.¹⁰⁵ Clark, a Congressman since 1935, was well educated, articulate and unenthusiastic about the New Deal. Differing markedly from Pope over foreign policy, Clark viewed himself as an avowed non-interventionist. Pope was defeated by 4,000 votes in spite

¹⁰³Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 66 and p. 97.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 115-117; New York Times, April 23, p. 5; Ibid., August 26, 1935, p. 4; See also Pope's Senate Joint Resolution 119 providing for American adherence to the League of Nations to foster international cooperation in U.S. Congress, Senate, '74th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 7041-7042.

¹⁰⁵New York Times, August 8, 1938, p. 2; August 9, 1938, p. 3; August 11, 1938, p. 3; and August 28, 1938, IV, p. 1, offer analysis of why Pope lost.

of the President's active campaigning in Idaho for his ally on domestic and foreign policies.¹⁰⁶

But before leaving office, Pope made known his position concerning Americans in China. Unconvinced that the best policy was withdrawal from that nation following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he was willing to support whatever policy the Administration formulated. Furthermore, he had become shocked at the continuing Japanese barbarities towards the Chinese people. Calling for an end to Japan's easy accessibility to American goods, Pope hoped this would force the Japanese to discontinue their war on the Asian mainland.¹⁰⁷ This last statement revealed that Pope had moved nearer to the anti-Japanese position even though he never directly stated he was in favor of a total embargo. Without defining the term "easy accessibility", Pope left the Senate before he made any further statements on the Asian problem.

The last important figure to be discussed and for many years a maverick in his adopted state of Montana, Democratic Senator Burton K. Wheeler, vacillated over foreign policy issues. Although born in Hudson, Massachusetts on February 27, 1882, Wheeler's home was Butte,

¹⁰⁶McKenna, Borah, p. 343; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal, pp. 268-269.

¹⁰⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., June 8, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 8486.

Montana, a tough, sprawling, ugly mining town. Wheeler arrived there in 1905, after being graduated from the University of Michigan School of Law where he became a \$50.00 a month stenographer.¹⁰⁸

Winning popularity fighting the Anaconda Copper Company, he was elected to the Senate in 1922, and in 1924 he became LaFollette's running mate on the Progressive ticket. Besides his Progressive philosophy, Wheeler had supported the World Court proposal and had endorsed the League of Nations in the 1920's. His muckraking investigation into the Harding Administration's scandals led one Hollywood writer to concoct a screen script depicting Wheeler's activities. Known originally as The Man From Montana, and later changed to Mr. Smith Goes To Washington, the movie delighted the freshman Senator.¹⁰⁹ In 1933, he welcomed Roosevelt's victory, but their

¹⁰⁸Richard A. Haste, "Burton K. Wheeler," Review Of Reviews, LXX (Oct. 1924), pp. 407-408; Burton K. Wheeler and P. F. Healy, Yankee From The West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962) is an intriguing account of Wheeler's early life and ambitions.

¹⁰⁹For a review of Wheeler's fight for the removal of Harry Daugherty as Attorney General see, "Burton K. Wheeler, The Fighting Senator Who Undid Daugherty," Current Opinion, LXXVI (May. 1924), pp. 643-645; Also "An Investigator Investigated," Literary Digest, LXXXI (Apr. 26, 1924), pp. 8-9; It revealed an attempt by the FBI to bring Wheeler's honesty into disrepute. Ibid., "First Blood For Wheeler," (May. 31, 1924), pp. 14-15; Ibid., "The Kind Of Sting Wheeler Has," LXXXII (Aug. 16, 1924), pp. 46-50.

relationship chilled soon afterwards when Homer Cummings, one of Wheeler's bitterest enemies in Montana politics, was appointed Attorney General. Moreover, Wheeler broke with the President over the Court reorganization plan in 1937 and soon emerged as a steadfast opponent of the Chief Executive's policies.¹¹⁰

Wheeler arrived at his opinions concerning foreign affairs not from scholarly investigation but from what he called experience. With a strong belief that international bankers and British propagandists had deceived the American people into entering World War I, Wheeler cautioned his colleagues and constituents that these bankers and propagandists were doing so again in the 1930's. Moreover, believing that Roosevelt would ultimately lead the nation into war, he became a carping critic of the Administration, a role Wheeler enjoyed playing.¹¹¹ The historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., has written that Wheeler left some people with the impression he was pro-German prior to Pearl Harbor. During the Lend-Lease debate in 1941, however, Wheeler protested that "No blood but English flows through my veins or any

¹¹⁰ New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1; Alva Johnston, "President Tamer," Saturday Evening Post, CCXI (Nov. 13, 1937), p. 51; Hubert Kay, "Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life, X (May. 19, 1941), pp. 110-119; Maxine Block, ed., Current Biography-1940 (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1940), pp. 857-860.

¹¹¹ Kay, "Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life, pp. 110-119.

of my family. And next to being pro-American I am pro-British."¹¹² Like Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Johnson, the Montana Democrat had no sympathy for Germany but was an insulationist, convinced that the Third Reich could neither invade the Western Hemisphere nor the United States and therefore he supported non-interventionism in European and Asian affairs.¹¹³ "We are safe now—and for years to come", Wheeler continued, "if only Americans will have faith in their own industry, resourcefulness and genius." The only thing to fear according to Wheeler was insidious and untruthful propaganda spread by internationalists in the United States and British Royalists abroad who were intent on having American farm boys "do their duty" and save the British Empire once again.¹¹⁴

Concerning Japan, at one time Wheeler would agree with the ideas of Nye, Vandenberg, Capper, and Clark,

¹¹² Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age Of Roosevelt, Vol. III, The Politics Of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 141-142; Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), pp. 109-110; Burton K. Wheeler, "What If Germany Seizes The British Fleet," as quoted in Nancy Schoonmaker and Doris Fielding Reid, eds., We Testify (New York: Smith and Durrell, Inc., 1941), pp. 187-188.

¹¹³ Burton K. Wheeler, "The American People Want No War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (June. 1, 1941), pp. 489-491; Also, "What If Germany Seizes The British Fleet," as quoted in Schoonmaker and Reid, eds., We Testify, p. 193.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

and then again, he would later support the tenets of the anti-Japanese group. Like Nye, he believed if Roosevelt took the nation into war, it would be to protect and defend Britain's worldwide empire.¹¹⁵ Wheeler's fluctuating opinion mirrored an inability to settle on one policy towards Japan and adhere to it unequivocally, a problem not uncommon to more than one Congressmen being faced with a rapidly shifting set of world events over the next four and a half years.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵Following a trip to the Orient in the fall of 1935, Wheeler called the idea of Japan ever attacking America as preposterous, New York Times, January 17, 1936, p. 13; Also, Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, pp. 179-180; For additional information on Senator Wheeler's thinking and career consult, "Senator Wheeler Turns Conservative," New Republic, LXXX (Apr. 7, 1937), pp. 261-262; Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Faces The Music," Nation, CVL (Aug. 28, 1937), p. 217; Hamilton Basso, "Burton The Bronx," New Republic, CII (Apr. 22, 1940), pp. 527-530; Robert Bendiner, "Men Who Could Be President: Burton K. Wheeler," Nation, CL (Apr. 27, 1940), pp. 532-536; Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Of Montana," Harper's Magazine, CLXXX (May. 1940), pp. 609-618; Joseph Kinsey Howard, "The Decline And Fall Of Burton K. Wheeler," Harper's Magazine, CLXXXIV (May. 1947), pp. 226-236; See also "Burton K. Wheeler," Time, XXXV (Apr. 15, 1940), pp. 21-22; and Ibid., "Evolution Of A Senator," (June. 24, 1940), pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁶Two monographs tried to categorize Wheeler's political thinking. See Blair Coan, The Red Webb: An Underground Political History Of The United States From 1918—Present (Chicago: Northwest Publishing Company, 1925) which considered the senator a communist and David G. Kin[David G. Plotkin], Senator Wheeler And The Forces Behind Him (Missoula: J. E. Kennedy Company, 1946), which considered him a Facist.

In organizing the Congressmen just discussed into groups, one problem must be recognized; there were no issues directly involving Japan that were voted on in Congress during the four and a half years from July, 1937 to Pearl Harbor. Consequently, upon what basis have these men been classified? Fortunately, there were a number of controversial issues such as neutrality legislation, the repeal of the arms embargo, the end of the commercial treaty, Lend-Lease, and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States that elicited comment from various Congressmen in quantities sufficient to indicate their views towards Japan, the Far East, and the diplomatic position of the United States in the world. In addition to these legislative controversies, three equally significant events; the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the sinking of the American gunboat Panay, and the signing by Japan of the Tripartite Pact, created tremendous excitement and debate in Congress, providing further indications of Congressional opinion about Japanese-American relations. Since it would be the anti-Japanese group's philosophy that would gain the greatest amount of adherents and influence in later years, a more detailed examination of that very important strand of Congressional thinking will be examined next as it existed in 1937 to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939.

CHAPTER III

ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT MATURES

One month before the first session of the 75th Congress was to adjourn for the summer, the perennially troublesome problem of Japanese incursions into China, having laid dormant for some time except for minor skirmishes, again erupted. Once more American attention focused on a Far Eastern crisis. This new threat to world peace known as the "China Incident" began on July 7, 1937, in a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops ten miles southwest of Peking. Although the details of the early fighting were vague, there appeared little doubt that Japan's sights extended beyond the limits of Manchuria and threatened Eastern Asia with her expansion. The prospect of a collision between Japanese soldiers and Americans residing in China launched a debate in Congress that intensified following the incident. A number of Congressmen, inspired by this latest battle in China, made speeches indicating both their displeasure with Japan as well as their fear of further Japanese inroads in Asia. Recommending that the United States take a stronger position against Japan, these Congressmen formed the nucleus around which growing anti-Japanese sentiment would ultimately coalesce.

Initially this anti-Japanese force, composed mainly of

Western Democrats at the outset, had as their goal the conversion of their non-interventionist and uncommitted colleagues to a harsher policy towards Japan. Key Pittman, soon to become an outspoken member of this movement, was at first more concerned with defending the Administration's refusal to apply the Neutrality Act of 1937, than he was with making hostile statements against Japan.¹ But by October, 1937, Pittman's attitude had become distinctly hostile, and he began denouncing Japan's expansion. Concurring with Roosevelt's call for a quarantine of aggressors, in a speech made by the President in Chicago on October 5, Pittman stated that such a policy should be specifically applied to Japan. Moreover, he remarked that an economic embargo would end the conflict in China within thirty days.² According to Pittman, the President and the nation had previously been too patient with the Japanese, making it necessary now to force Japan into abandoning her "unlawful, immoral, and brutal" conduct in China. By force, Pittman meant that

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July 30, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 7862; Ibid., 75th Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 7919-7920; New York Times, July 30, 1937, p. 1.

²New York Times, October 6, 1937, p. 1; Atlanta Constitution, October 6, 1937, p. 3; Washington Post, October 6, 1937, p. 7.

first the United States should implement an economic quarantine and then diplomatically ostracize the Japanese. These ideas proved to be too vague for serious consideration however, because Pittman carefully qualified his advice by making it clear he was neither advocating, at that time, a severance of diplomatic relations nor an implementation of a total embargo.³

If Pittman had been vague and imprecise in the autumn of 1937, the sinking of the American gunboat Panay, on December 12, convinced him that a harsh policy to end this aggression was needed.⁴ Even though the Japanese Government offered to assume the entire responsibility and promised to pay full compensation for personnel and property losses, such a settlement was unsatisfactory to Pittman because in the intervening months, his attitude towards Japan had grown more hostile. Now abhorring what the Nevadan referred to as Japan's "illegal and inhuman acts" and no longer content to express vague generalities about how to cope with Japanese aggression, by December, 1937, he had come to

³New York Times, October 7, 1937, p. 1.

⁴Ibid., December 14, 1937, p. 18; Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1, Box 105B, National Archives, Legislative Division, Washington, D. C; Hereinafter cited as NA. LD.

believe that Japan was guilty of crimes against humanity and deserving of having a complete American trade embargo enacted against her.⁵

In retrospect, it may seem hard to understand why the bombing and sinking of the Panay did not become one of the most dramatic aspects of Japanese-American relations in the 1930's. Interestingly, this incident in itself did not lead to a further deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two nations, nor did it lead to a war hysteria. Instead, the response of Americans and especially the Congress to the incident was extremely mild and non-belligerent. Even when the official Japanese version, reporting that the Panay had been mistaken for a Chinese troopship and that the weather had made visibility poor, was proven false, the episode failed to arouse any serious demand for retaliation. Reaction continued to be non-belligerent even after the American version of the affair, made public on December 16, stated the weather had been clear and that the gunboat had been bedecked with American flags in addition to two horizontal 18' by 14' American flags painted on the

⁵Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1, Box 105B, NA. LD.

awnings and superstructure.⁶

Initially, news of the bombing and sinking of the gunboat touched off heated debate in Congress, but a war spirit was missing. There were several reasons why no great outcry to "Remember the Panay" occurred. First, the prompt action of Japan in rendering apologies and reparations showed that at least the Japanese Government desired placating any adverse American opinion resulting from the incident.⁷ Second, it has been suggested the American Government, Congress, and the people seemed more anxious to avoid trouble by withdrawing from China rather than oppose Japan.⁸ Finally, the Japanese Government was never directly implicated in the affair and the interest in the sinking died down rather quickly as other more important and pressing events in Europe and Asia came

⁶Johnson to Hull, December 12, 1937, 394.115 Panay/350 National Archives, Record Group 59, cited hereinafter as NA. RG; Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, Japan: 1931-1941 (2vols; Washington: G.P.O., 1943), I, p. 534; Hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941; The report by the commander of the Panay, Lt. Commander James J. Hughes, to Roosevelt can be found in "Panay" folder, OF-150C, December 24, 1937 FDR MSS.

⁷Japan paid the sum of \$2,214,007.36 as indemnification for the loss of the Panay and injuries to persons and property as a result of the attack. Consult, United States Department of State, Peace And War, The United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Washington: G.P.O., 1942), pp. 561-563.

⁸William C. Johnstone, The United States And Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 209-225.

to the forefront.⁹ Therefore, neither the Executive nor the Legislative branches of the Government regarded the sinking as a casus belli, and it slowly passed quietly into the background.

But Pittman refused to allow the potential threat of Japanese aggression to fade into the background of his colleagues' consciousness, and throughout the year 1938, he continued to engage in active speech making against Japan. In February, in answer to queries from constituents, he wrote that he opposed any extension of credits to Japan.¹⁰ By the beginning of the summer, Pittman had begun to specifically condemn Japan as a treaty violator and an international criminal. On May 23, he was asked for his opinion by the New York Tribune about an interview made with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, the day before, concerning his proposal that the United States and Japan sign a non-aggression pact. Opposed to such a suggestion, Pittman insisted Japan must first remedy the wrong done by her treaty violations in China before

⁹For an unsuccessful attempt to create a new thesis concerning the ramifications of the sinking of the Panay consult, Manny T. Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude To War (Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1967). For a well written reminiscence of the sinking by members of the crew see Hamilton D. Perry, The Panay Incident: Prelude To Pearl Harbor (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969).

¹⁰Letter from Pittman to Mrs. Murray Crane, February 14, 1938, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1, Box 105F, Correspondence A-C, NA. LD.

America could seriously consider such an overture.¹¹ Continuing, Pittman commented that the American Government "...holds that Japan has violated and is now violating a treaty of non-aggression with the United States—namely the Nine Power Treaty."¹² Although Pittman insisted he was speaking personally and not for the Administration, the indication was clear. There would be no settlement of the outstanding differences between the two nations as long as Japanese forces occupied Chinese territory, thereby violating a solemn and sacrosanct treaty with the United States. As if his anti-Japanese sentiments needed further clarification, Pittman ended the interview with the Tribune by stating, "If Chiang Kai-shek was driven back to a cave in the mountains 3,000 miles from the coast and the Government consisted only of Chiang Kai-shek," he would continue to recognize him as the only legitimate Government in all China.¹³

Following this outburst to the press, Pittman seldom deviated from the theme of the treaty violation in pressing

¹¹The interview may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 2120; New York Times, May 23, 1938, p. 8.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

his case for an embargo of trade to Japan. Previously, his speeches had not defined the proper American response to Japanese aggression, but by May, 1938, Pittman was demanding that Japan live up to her treaty obligations or face economic retaliation by the United States.¹⁴

In a radio address a month before the Munich Conference, Pittman once more presented his case against trading with Japan, basing it on the following syllogism:

The United States has no sympathy with Japan.
We have every sympathy with China.
We have no cause that would justify us in
aiding Japan.¹⁵

Emphasizing as usual Japanese violations, Pittman further urged the United States to aid China out of sentiment and national interest "...in her heroic defense of her independence, of her territory, and the lives of her citizens."¹⁶

Pittman received encouragement and endorsement of his views from Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the Foreign Policy Association and author of a monograph in 1922, The Washington Conference, strongly criticizing Japan's

¹⁴Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1, Box 105B, NA. LD. Consult also the letter to H. H. Kung, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance-Hankow dated June 13, 1938, condemning Japan and hoping for American protests leading to economic sanctions found in the same file.

¹⁵Draft of a speech to be presented on August 22, 1938, may be found in Pittman MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Pittman made a similar speech as quoted in the New York Times, July 11, 1938, p. 21.

¹⁶Ibid.

intention in Eastern Asia. In December, 1922, Buell also published an equally severe article on Japan in the Political Science Quarterly.¹⁷ Sixteen years later, with his critical attitude concerning Japan unaltered, he lamented to Pittman that America was supplying raw materials to Japan, enabling her to pursue conquests in China while at the same time preventing the United States from wielding her maximum influence to end the fighting. Buell preferred that the United States consult with other powers interested in ending the Asian conflict, hoping they might agree to an economic boycott against Japan. Discounting and criticizing the opponents of a boycott, he told Pittman that it was inconceivable that Japan could immediately institute naval reprisals against the Philippines, Hong Kong, or the International Settlement at Shanghai. Furthermore, Buell considered it extremely unlikely that Japan could challenge the boycott except by an act of war, a suicidal step for the Asian nation. Agreeing with Buell's analysis of the situation, Pittman also promised to challenge Japan by initiating whatever legislation was necessary to help China and curtail the

¹⁷For Buell's earlier views consult, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1922) and "The Development Of Anti-Japanese Agitation In The United States," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII (Dec. 1922), pp. 605-638.

imperialistic ventures of Japan.¹⁸

While the partition of Czechoslovakia captured most Americans' attention throughout the summer and autumn of 1938, Pittman's concern remained focused on Congress' tendency towards appeasement. Congressional timidity regarding Japan especially worried Pittman who indicated, in a letter to State Department Counselor, R. Walton Moore, his irritation because "...the extreme and foolish pacifist sentiment in the United States was based on fear and could dominate the 76th Congress due to convene in January, 1939."¹⁹ This fear later proved to be unwarranted. Nevertheless, Pittman's belligerent attitude over matters related to Japan caused him to view with anxiety any possible aid the United States might give that nation.²⁰ As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pittman lost no opportunity to press for an embargo of trade and to call for an end to the Commercial Treaty of 1911.²¹

¹⁸Buell to Pittman, July 19, 1938, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 75A-F9-1, Box 105G, Correspondence D-I, NA. LD.

¹⁹Pittman to Moore, November 15, 1938 in Ibid., Box 105H; Also Moore to Pittman, October 13, 1938, "Neutrality, 1938," folder, Group 55, Box 15, Moore MSS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

²⁰New York Times, July 10, 1939, p. 21 and July 12, 1939, p. 9; Consult also "Our Foreign Policy," Democratic Review, XVI (Mar. 1939), p. 5 in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9, Container 15, Correspondence D folder.

²¹Ibid., China Weekly Review, XCI (Dec. 2, 1939), p. 8.

Unfortunately, his efforts frequently met with frustration. On one occasion Pittman wrote to Harry B. Price, Executive Secretary of the American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression, telling him of his lack of success obtaining a majority in his committee to report out a proposal for economic embargoes against Japan.²² Pittman also revealed an inconsistency and lack of support and sincerity concerning China. On March 20, 1939, he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 97 which would put on a cash and carry basis articles that heretofore had been embargoed in times of war. Arms, ammunition, and implements of war would now be available to any nation who could come to American ports and pay for the goods. The provisions of Pittman's bill provided for no distinction between lethal weapons and other commodities.²³ Former Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, wrote Pittman pointing out that the so-called "Peace Act of

and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9-146, January 8, 1940, Correspondence K folder, NA. LD.

²²Pittman to Price, August 14, 1939, "Correspondence Jan.-Sept., 1939," folder, Box 2, Roger S. Greene MSS, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression will hereinafter be cited as the American Committee, the Committee or Price's Committee, the latter name being what the organization was called in the thirties. Its activities will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI.

²³New York Times, March 20, 1939, p. 1.

1939" would not work to America's advantage in the Pacific. Designed to aid France and Great Britain, the "Peace Act" jeopardized China's interests by giving Japan, with its merchant fleet and purchasing power, undue advantage in replenishing her arsenals. Stimson called upon Pittman to introduce legislation that would halt all war trade with Japan.²⁴ Criticism also came from Harry Price who was astounded by Pittman's proposal given the Senator's previous statements of aiding China by embargoing Japan.²⁵

In addition to Stimson and Price's criticisms, the State Department Counselor and Congressional liason, R. Walton Moore, wrote the President strongly condemning

²⁴Stimson to Pittman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9-141, April 25, 1939. See also Stimson's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings concerning revision of neutrality legislation. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee On Foreign Relations, American Neutrality Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, Part I, pp. 2-50; Stimson's testimony before the committee was praised by Harry B. Price and he agreed that Pittman's bill was not in America's or China's interests. See Price to Stimson, April 7, 1939, "Henry L. Stimson," file, American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression Papers, Littauer Center Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hereinafter cited as ACNPJA Papers. See also Price's analysis of conversations with Pittman concerning the neutrality bill in Ibid., Price to Stimson, March 29, 1939. An identical letter was sent on March 28, 1939 for no apparent reason.

²⁵Price to Pittman, March 28, 1939, "Congressional Correspondence," folder, ACNPJA Papers, should be consulted for the committee's official protest against the bill.

Pittman's bill. Stating that for Europe the proposal was ample, Moore remarked that in Asia it worked against American interests. Implying that the President should pressure Pittman to drop the bill or modify it, Moore seemed even more anxious to avoid Chinese criticism of the State Department and to protect Hull from being denounced by Congressmen with definite pro-Chinese leanings.²⁶

Pittman, faced with opposition to his proposal, proceeded to introduce Senate Joint Resolution 123 on April 27, 1939, which would place an embargo on the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war to any nation violating the Nine Power Treaty. The President would have the discretion to determine when the treaty had been violated and by which nation. This new proposal met the objections of those who originally opposed his "Peace Act" yet desired some retribution against Japan without crippling China's ability to get the sinews of war.²⁷ Forced to overcome the State Department's timidity,

²⁶Moore to Roosevelt, March 18, 1939, State Department File 811.04418/375A and Moore to Roosevelt, March 18, 1939, "Neutrality 1939," folder # 1, Box 15, Moore MSS. The letters are similar. For the State Department's view see Carlton Savage to Moore, February 24, 1939, "Neutrality 1939," folder # 1, Box 15, Moore MSS.; New York Times, March 20, 1939, p. 1 and March 26, 1939, p. 29; For China's criticisms of the proposal see Willys R. Peck, Charge d'Affaires, Chunking, to Hull, March 27, 1939, State Department File, 811.04418/362 and Memorandum by Hull in Ibid., March 29, 1939, 811.04418/372.

²⁷New York Times, March 28, 1939, p. 10; April 2, 1939, p. 36; April 28, 1939, p. 4; Hull to Pittman, July

the Administration's lack of resolve and Pittman's ineffectual leadership in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to survive, the proposal suffered defeat in the spring and summer of 1939.²⁸

Senator King, another Western Democrat asking for an even sterner policy than Pittman, found little solace in Japanese guarantees to respect treaty obligations and foreign nationals where Japanese troops were stationed; thus, he remarked it was of little use to send diplomatic protests to Tokyo. Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, King emerged as a critic of Japan, but it took the sinking of the Panay to convert him into a strident member of the anti-Japanese bloc.²⁹ For three consecutive days in February, 1938, King addressed the Senate, explaining his reasons for disliking the Japanese and in the process filling thirty pages of the Congressional Record. Referring first to his one time friendship for the Japanese, he noted that he had defended her during the occupation of

17, 1939, Box entitled "Jan-July, 1939," File 118, Hull MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

²⁸For a detailed discussion and analysis of this fiasco, consult, Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 236-285; Also, Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 160-167.

²⁹New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

the Shantung Peninsula following the First World War. Her withdrawal from that area, King had hoped, would mean the beginning of a new, liberal and democratic government. Japan's reversal of incipient democratic reforms initiated during the early thirties, however, plus her return to autocracy, instilled within King a feeling that he had been betrayed. Stating that Japan was motivated by greed and ambition for power, King called her policies abhorrent and uncivilized.³⁰ Later in the year he condemned Japan more vehemently, making it clear that he would not be averse to an embargo of trade and perhaps even the severance of diplomatic relations.³¹ Not even Pittman called for a diplomatic rupture; in fact, among all the initial members of the anti-Japanese coalition, King wanted the severest reprisals and ultimately became one of the Senators least willing to appease Japan.

Closely matching King and Pittman's dislike of Japan were the two Congressmen from Washington state, Senator Schwellenbach and Representative Coffee. Coffee, one of

³⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., February 2, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 1400-1407; Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., February 3, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 1450-1464; Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., February 4, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 1504-1512.

³¹Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., June 16, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 9525-9526; New York Times, July 17, 1938, p. 2.

the strongest advocates of an embargo, never went so far as to call for severance of diplomatic relations even though he mistrusted the Japanese as intensely as King. Despite his early antagonism growing out of the salmon fishing controversy in 1937, Coffee managed to reserve his strongest outbursts against Japan until 1939, inspired perhaps by the forum presented to him by the Neutrality hearings as well as the tense world situation.

During the Committee hearings, Coffee admitted that he was never an admirer of Japan or her policies, calling attention to House Resolution 5432 which he had introduced to prohibit the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Japan.³² Intending with this bill to begin an appeal for the total embargo of all exports and later all imports to and from Japan, Coffee claimed to be speaking for over 350,000 Americans from all regions of the country who had petitioned the Congress urging an embargo against the Japanese Empire.³³ These petitions were a result of the actions of the American Committee which had agitated

³²Referred to the Committee On Foreign Relations and never reported out. See U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 3501.

³³U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, p. 221; U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1939, Congressional Record LXXXIV, 6634-6635.

to have the Congress cut off war materials to Japan.³⁴ Coffee even called the United States a partner in Japan's destruction of the Chinese nation, reasoning that if Japan could not obtain American goods, the former's war machine would collapse, ending the conflict in China. Presumably in an attempt to reveal bi-partisan support for his bill, Coffee announced that other Westerners, including Senator Charles McNary (R. Oregon), agreed with his proposal. He insisted the United States show its desire not to be Japan's supply house and arsenal and indicated his willingness to support any legislation that would help cripple her expansionistic-imperialistic acts.³⁵ For the present, Coffee concluded, Japan was the most overt international law breaker and America, to redeem its honor, must initiate a complete embargo of all exports to her.³⁶

³⁴Donald J. Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The Campaign Of The American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression 1938-1941 (Cambridge: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1968), pp. 26-44; For the Committee's activities in petitioning supporters see "Correspondence Jan-Sept, 1939," Box 2, Greene MSS; See also letter E. Stanley Jones to supporters, December 2, 1938, Greene MSS; Interestingly, for all his views that coincided with the Committee's objectives, the monograph by Friedman, the Committee papers at Littauer Library and the Greene papers at the Houghton Library make no reference to Coffee. Inquiries to Coffee concerning his activities within the Committee have gone unanswered.

³⁵U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 222-223.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 223-229.

Throughout the summer of 1939, Coffee remained a leading advocate of a harsher economic policy, intensifying, meanwhile, his condemnation of Japan on the House floor. One June 5, during a heated debate in the House over his House Resolution 5432, Coffee replied to opposition claims that the proposed embargo of exports was too offensive by asserting:

The history of the island empire since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 has been one of continuous and wanton aggression. Let us not be a party to this aggression. Let us refuse no longer to participate in it. Let us deny to the Japanese arms, equipment, and financial help and discourage her aggression.³⁷

Paralleling the American Committee's anger over America's support of Japanese aggression, Coffee ended his comments with a reaffirmation of his belief that the embargo of high grade oil, automobile equipment, and scrap metal would readily end Japan's destruction of China. He failed to consider here, as in previous statements, the possibility that Japan might retaliate. Coffee was not alone in this lack of foresight; neither had other members of the anti-Japanese bloc acknowledged the eventuality of a Japanese attack on the mainland or on one of America's

³⁷U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 6634-6635; Italics are mine.

possessions in response to economic sanctions.³⁸

Another Senator quite ready to join forces with the faction in Congress attacking the Japanese position in Asia was Lewis B. Schwellenbach. Like his fellow Congressman from Washington state, Schwellenbach's dislike of Japan had its origins in the salmon fishing controversy that occurred in 1937.³⁹ His attitude continued to harden during the next two years, and early in 1939, Schwellenbach introduced Senate Joint Resolution 143, providing for the control of exports used to violate the sovereignty, independence, territorial or administrative integrity of any nation.⁴⁰ Senator Pittman had also introduced a resolution similar

³⁸Ibid., See also speech by Coffee on this same subject in Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 2325-2326.

³⁹See telegram Hull to Roosevelt, September 29, 1937, "Japan 1933-1945," Box 1, OF-197, FDR MSS; Ibid., R. Walton Moore to Roosevelt, November 24, 1937, "Japan 1937," Box 13, PSF; Ibid., Roosevelt to Hull and Secretary of Commerce Roper, July 14, 1937, "1936-1937," folder, OF-197.

⁴⁰In an analysis of Congressional attitude towards economic retaliation against Japan conducted by the American Committee in 1939, Schwellenbach was among those considered a strong supporter and his resolution was written in collaboration with committee members. See Roger S. Greene to Harry B. Price, December 28, 1939, RSG Folder # 2, ACNPJA Papers; The list is in Greene MSS under date April 14, 1939.

to the Washington Senator's proposal, calling for the President to end all trade with Japan.⁴¹ The major difference between the two proposals, as Herbert Feis has commented, was that while Pittman's resolution authorized the President to embargo trade, Schwollenbach's resolution made it mandatory for him to do so.⁴² Angered over Japan's violations of an international agreement to which the United States had been a signatory, Schwollenbach remarked:

The solemn obligations of the Nine Power Pact require that we as a nation cease furnishing to Japan those articles which she uses to destroy the territorial integrity of China. From the sense of morality the American people demand this action.⁴³

Although both resolutions died in the Foreign Relations Committee, other Congressmen were attracted to the anti-Japanese position. Among them were two Democrats, Byron

⁴¹For Schwollenbach's resolution see Senate Joint Resolution 143, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., June 1, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 6473; For Pittman, see Senate Joint Resolution 123, Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st sess., April 27, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 4820-4821.

⁴²Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor: The Coming Of The War Between The United States And Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 50.

⁴³Undated letter found in Scrapbook 1936-1939, Box 5, Schwollenbach MSS; New York Times, July 8, 1939, p. 3 revealed Schwollenbach's desire to uphold treaty obligations in Asia. For a condemnation of Japan by the Senator and an analysis of American foreign policy in Eastern Asia, see U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 10750-10786.

Scott and H. Jerry Voorhis, both of California. Scott favored a policy of economic pressure against Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident⁴⁴ and his position hardened even further following the sinking of the Panay, when he introduced House Resolution 537, authorizing the President to suspend economic relations with Japan.⁴⁵ Next he began a campaign to educate his colleagues to his ideas, and by the summer of 1938, Scott was deeply entrenched in the anti-Japanese coalition.

On May 18, 1938, Scott placed into the Congressional Record what he considered to be a very significant article written by Paul McManus for New Masses magazine in which he stated that the United States was in the strategic position of being able to cripple the Japanese war machine. According to the article, this feat could be accomplished by embargoing the export of scrap needed in the making of steel. Statistics cited by McManus supporting this assertion showed America was providing the source of enough steel in the form of scrap metal to enable Japan to continue her imperialistic ventures. Giving the year 1937 as an excellent example, the article illustrated

⁴⁴New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

⁴⁵Ibid., "Let's Avert War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Feb. 15, 1938), pp. 284-287; U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1958.

that in Japan, of the 5,300,000 tons of steel produced, 2,000,000 tons of scrap were utilized in this production, 1,900,000 tons of which were supplied by the United States.⁴⁶ Obviously, any sudden stoppage of the flow of raw material would adversely affect Japan's ability to produce the steel so necessary to carry on a war.

Totally agreeing with McManus' views, Scott extended the concept of a boycott to include other powers who, though at the present timid and reluctant to oppose aggressive powers either in Europe or Asia, would be willing to follow the American example and initiate economic sanctions of their own against Japan.⁴⁷ Resorting finally to a moral plea to reinforce his arguments, Scott warned that the United States would stand convicted before the world of being the supplier of the Japanese war makers and the responsible party for the death of countless innocent Chinese women and children.⁴⁸

Not content with entering articles into the Congressional Record or putting forth his views on the

⁴⁶U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., May 18, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 2045-2047.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

floor of Congress, Scott, in an address on May 25, continued his plea for America to reverse its present economic policy towards Japan. His ideas, he remarked, would not only promote peace but would help China resist a Japanese takeover as well. Unfortunately, Scott, like Pittman, King, Coffee, and Schwellenbach, also failed to explain why a change in the present economic policy towards Japan would not trigger some form of retaliation against the United States.⁴⁹

When Scott was defeated in the Congressional election of 1938, his fellow Congressman from California H. Jerry Voorhis, took over his fight for ending trade with Japan. Although holding views similar to Scott's, Voorhis was also sure that ultimately the United States would become involved in war with Japan if the sanctions were not put into effect.⁵⁰ Both Scott and Voorhis emphasized the moral aspects of trading with Japan, claiming it was making American businessmen wealthy at the expense of innocent Chinese women and children who were victims of the Japanese perfidiousness.⁵¹ Since the outbreak

⁴⁹Ibid., May 25, 1938, pp. 2150-2152.

⁵⁰U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Hearings, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937, pp. 89-94; Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 41-45; Block, ed., Current Biography-1941, pp. 888-889.

⁵¹Ibid.

of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Voorhis had urged ending the supply of war materials to Japan; unlike the other members of the anti-Japanese bloc, he claimed to be motivated not totally by a sense of sentimentality towards the Chinese but rather out of a deep concern over the immorality of shipments of arms and munitions to a country which had violated international treaties with treacherous behavior.⁵²

The fourth member of the House of Representatives, Democrat Charles I. Faddis of Pennsylvania, completely agreed with Coffee, Scott, and Voorhis' desire to embargo trade to Japan. In an appearance before the House hearings on Neutrality Legislation in April, 1939, Faddis declared himself a leading advocate for terminating trade with Japan, saying that he had urged this policy since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Stressing the moral aspects of American trade with Japan as had Scott and especially Voorhis, Faddis claimed that such trade was not only detrimental to China, but that halting it was the only honorable course for the United States to follow. Throughout the remainder of his testimony to the House committee, Faddis maintained this position,

⁵²Ibid., See letter to FDR, December 29, 1937, "Chinese-Japanese War 1938," folder, Box 6, OF-150-C, FDR MSS.

calling for an end to Japan's aggression, and indicating his willingness to follow any policy that would accomplish that goal.⁵³

With the loss of the Panay, two Republicans also began speaking out against Japan, establishing by this action the first indications of bi-partisan support to augment the prestige of the anti-Japanese faction. Representative William P. Lambertson (R. Kansas), in an address to the House shortly after the war vessel was sunk, announced that he had received letters from his brother-in-law, Dr. Frank J. White, who had resided for the past thirty years in China as President of the Shanghai Baptist College. Strongly anti-Japanese, Dr. White exerted significant influence over Lambertson, who credited the reports provided by his relation in China with enabling him to be better informed on the Japanese aggression in that nation than his peers. Reflecting Dr. White's dislike of the Japanese, the Kansan quite readily supported an economic boycott to stop Japan. Moreover, he emphatically remarked that economic restrictions would not lead to war since Japan lacked the means to wage a trans-Pacific conflict. The only adverse result from the

⁵³U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 6-7.

sanctions, he advised the House, would be a slight loss in revenue which could be easily remedied by increasing trade with China.⁵⁴ While Lambertson added nothing new to the debate over American policy vis-a-vis Japan, his claims of inside knowledge about affairs within China did add credence to the fears growing among a number of Congressmen over further Japanese encroachments in Asia.

The other Republican calling for a harsher policy towards Japan, Congressman Robert Rich of Pennsylvania, introduced House Joint Resolution 574, directing the President to suspend commercial relations with the Empire of Japan while that nation occupied Chinese territory.⁵⁵ Rich discounted, as had other anti-Japanese members of Congress, the possibility that American withdrawal of raw materials from Japanese markets might strengthen the militarists. Instead, he theorized that continued trade with America was responsible for enhancing the militarists at the expense of the moderates in Japan. Accepting uncritically the ideas of Dr. E. Stanley Jones, a missionary in India, Rich maintained his opposition to

⁵⁴U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 21, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 592.

⁵⁵Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., January 17, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 643; Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., January 26, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 1160.

trade with Japan over the next two years. Dr. Jones had been a Methodist missionary to China where he taught school and had served in the Secretariat of the Conference On Pacific And Far Eastern Affairs in Washington from 1921 to 1922. A supporter of the American Committee, Jones by 1941 had an idea he could mediate the Sino-Japanese war and avoid American participation.⁵⁶ Jones' conviction

⁵⁶Ibid., Congressman John M. Vorys of Ohio seemed to sponsor Jones even more than Rich did. For example, consult Vorys to Roosevelt, July 11, 1941, "Chinese-Japanese War, 1940-1941," folder, Box 6, OF-150-C, FDR MSS; See also Ibid., October 27, 1941, "Japan-Miscellaneous, 1941-1945," folder, Box 4, OF-197A. Vorys desired Jones to be one of three Americans sent to the Pacific in the hope of mediating the Sino-Japanese conflict. Jones' ideas may be consulted in his article, "Apply The Gandhi Method To Japan," Christian Century, LVI (Feb. 2, 1939), pp. 184-185; For Jones' correspondence with Roosevelt, see Jones to Roosevelt, November 27, 1941, "Japan-Miscellaneous," folder, Box 4, OF-197A, FDR MSS; Consult Foreign Relations Of The United States, Far East, IV, pp. 557-558. For Jones' link to the American Committee, see Jones to Greene, December 2, 1938, Greene MSS. For Jones' statements of friendship for Japan and his attempts at reconciliation with that nation through the settlement of economic, immigration, and political problems consult the following: "An Open Letter To The People Of Japan," Christian Century, LIV (Sept. 15, 1937), pp. 1131-1133; Ibid., "The Only Door To Peace: An Open Letter To The Japanese People And The Christians Of The World," LV (Feb. 16, 1938), pp. 203-204; Ibid., "What Is America's Role In This Crisis?," LVIII (Mar. 19, 1941), pp. 388-390; Ibid., "Did Japan's Envoys Know?," LVIII (Dec. 24, 1941), p. 1613; Ibid., "The Score So Far," LIX (May. 20, 1942), pp. 661-662; Ibid., "Jones Urges Definition Of Aims In Pacific," LIX (Aug. 12, 1942), pp. 973-974; See also "Reaching The Unreached," Time, XXXVI (Oct. 14, 1940), p. 80; Block, ed., Current Biography-1940, pp. 438-440; In addition consult E. Stanley Jones, "Asia: The Acid Test," as quoted in Harrop Arthur Freeman, ed., Peace Is The Victory (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 208-227. Jones' views concerning Japan are found on pp. 225-227; In his writing, Jones did not desire to see Japan punished, destroyed or relegated to a second-rate power. He wanted to give Japan the island of New Guinea for her surplus population.

that an abrogation of all commercial enterprises would return the moderates to power persuaded the Pennsylvania Congressman to eventually call specifically for an oil embargo by the summer of 1941.⁵⁷

By the summer of 1939, an increasing number of Congressmen concerned over American trade with Japan began favoring an embargo in the hope it would cripple the Japanese war making ability and put an end to further military expansion. Use of economic pressures to stop the war in Asia had great appeal because Congressmen advocating this policy credited it with alleviating the need for the United States to intervene militarily. They appeared to have given little consideration to the possibility of a Japanese retaliatory thrust to counter the economic coercion of the United States. On the contrary, convinced of the correctness of their policy, Senators like Pittman, King, and Schwollenbach, along with their counterparts in the House, worked hard at converting other Congressmen to their ideas. They were moderately successful in the first few months after the sinking of the Panay; a small bipartisan base had begun to form in favor of the embargo. But Congress as a whole still remained unwilling to consider such strong action.

⁵⁷U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., June 6, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3639.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN PEACE AND HONOR

While the anti-Japanese group spent the years from 1937 to 1939 urging passage of an embargo against Japan, they failed to gain sufficient support for such a harsh action. Instead, throughout the two years prior to Hitler's invasion of Poland in the early autumn of 1939, Congress remained staunchly convinced that the United States must not intervene in conflicts between other nations. Within this general area of agreement, however, there was considerable divergence over just how America ought to respond to Japanese aggression short of using economic sanctions.

For some Congressmen, fear or dislike of Japan was a secondary concern compared with their overriding interest in protecting America's rights as a neutral without resorting to war. The resumption of fighting in China posed numerous problems connected with this issue for Senator Borah. Faced with the dilemma of whether or not to invoke the Neutrality Act of May, 1937, along with the question of how best to protect American nationals residing in China, Borah responded by adhering to the principle that the United States must uphold traditional neutral rights. In the case of Neutrality Legislation, his opposition to

its being invoked rested on the premise that only Japan would be aided by such action. Borah claimed it was obvious that "...there is war—an aggressive war", in China, and its reality would not be augmented by the President officially recognizing its existence.¹

Reflecting his strong desire to defend American rights as a neutral, Borah's response to American citizens being fired upon proved to be as consistent as his stand on the Neutrality Act. Regardless of who fired on his countrymen, Borah had a standard reaction; they should not evacuate areas where they earned their livelihood and carried on legitimate business and residence. Thus, when Chinese forces accidentally shelled the USS Augusta on August 20, 1937, while anchored in the Wangpoa River, Borah merely described the incident as one of those unfortunate occurrences that happen where war exists. Admitting that he "...did not know of anything affirmative the government could do", he meanwhile opposed removal of Americans from China while the flag was under fire.² Similarly, when Japan sank the Panay four months later, on December 12, 1937, Borah urged restraint, remarking

¹New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 3.

²Ibid., August 20, 1937, p. 3.

"...the incident was one of those regrettable things. It does not appear so far to require drastic action by the United States."³ If indeed Borah desired anything, it was that the United States do nothing provocative to antagonize the Japanese Government or people. In a letter to a constituent, he clearly indicated his unwillingness to vote to send American boys to the Orient because of a boat that was sunk while traveling in a dangerous zone.⁴ He did continue to support the maintenance of naval vessels and American military forces to protect American nationals and concluded America could maintain her presence in China and defend her rights in that nation while also avoiding war with Japan. Borah acknowledged the possibility of both policies; he did not consider protecting American self-respect and national interests in China contingent upon becoming involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He only feared that internationalists would label Japan a menace to world peace and Congress would pass bills relating

³Ibid., December 14, 1937, p. 18; See also Literary Digest, CXXV (Jan. 18, 1938), p. 8; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 13, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1356.

⁴Correspondence, December 17, 1937, Borah MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

to expansion of the Navy. Otherwise, Borah considered talk of war with Japan "sheer folly" and inconceivable given the size navy Japan would need in order to attack America or any of her possessions.⁵

Even though he advocated policies similar to those espoused by Borah, Hiram Johnson tended to speak out more harshly than his colleague when American citizens were fired upon. The sinking of the Panay so disturbed Johnson that he made a long speech in the Senate, voicing his fear that the United States Government might admonish its citizens to leave areas in which hostilities were occurring. If such a doctrine became accepted Johnson claimed, it would then endanger America's neutral rights and he rejected it saying:

I will not subscribe to the idea that a gunboat of America may be blown to pieces because somebody may see fit to take a shot at her and then subsequently, with tongue in cheek, say that she is sorry and apologize.⁶

Nevertheless, Johnson decided to follow the Administration's decision to accept the apology and reparations and let the matter rest. He did this not because he generally supported the Roosevelt Administration, but

⁵Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Policy, p. 234.

⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 13, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1357; New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

because he did not want to unnecessarily provoke any Japanese retaliation against Americans residing or stationed in China.⁷

Holding a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, ranking Republican from New York, Hamilton Fish, initially called for the President to declare a state of war in China and thereby cause the provisions of the Neutrality Act to be implemented. Until the bombing of the Panay Fish had been content to call for the United States to adhere strictly to a non-interventionist position by removing all of its citizens from China. He also hoped to end extraterritoriality because of the "...antiquated policy of maintaining troops and ships in foreign territories", which could lead to involvement in the conflict raging in China.⁸

In conjunction with his warning of the danger of war, Fish also considered it impractical to have the American Government spend 10 million dollars a year for maintenance and upkeep of 2,500 Marines and 10 gunboats to protect American business interests in China totaling but 50 million dollars.⁹ Fish neglected

⁷Ibid.

⁸U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8156-8158; New York Times, July 22, 1937, p. 10.

⁹Ibid.

to mention the number of educational, medical, and religious missionaries in China that were also protected by these troops and outlays of monies; he was content to allude only to the economic spheres of influence. In addition, Fish considered the war a problem affecting China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and to a large extent, Great Britain, which had a billion dollars invested in China. It was in the best interest of the United States to remain aloof from the conflict, and as an additional inducement for accepting this position Fish indicated that by comparison with the Chinese market, United States trade with Japan was far greater of the two, totaling 200 million dollars per annum.

Believing so strongly that the United States refrain from any involvement in Asia, it is not surprising to find that the President's refusal to find a state of war existing in China irritated the New York Congressman tremendously. Referring to this matter, Fish sarcastically commented:

If the President does not know a state of war exists in China today, or if the Secretary of State does not know this, then the administration had better get a new Secretary of State, because there is no one in this country who does not know that a state of war exists in China at the present time.¹⁰

¹⁰U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., November 17, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 92.

Fish blamed propagandists in Congress, the State Department, and the White House for trying to make the invoking of the Neutrality Law appear favorable to Japan; throughout the crisis he disagreed with this form of reasoning. Instead, he insisted that the United States had already admitted the existence of war in Asia when it signed the Brussels Declaration stating, "The war¹¹ in China had brought to all peoples of all nations a sense of horror and indignation, to all the world a feeling of uncertainty and apprehension."¹² The failure to invoke the Neutrality Legislation proved so reprehensible to Fish that he managed to correlate this omission with the spectre of fascism by reasoning:

If the President can pick out any law he wants to and enforce it or not enforce it, when he has a special constitutional duty to carry out and execute this law like any other law, then we are in the midst of fascism.¹³

¹¹Italics are mine.

¹²U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., November 17, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 92.

¹³Ibid., Interestingly, one of the organizations Fish referred to was the American Committee. At first the Committee criticized Fish for not understanding world affairs. See Greene to Price, March 4, 1939, RSG Folder # 1, ACNPJA Papers; One year later when Fish stood for a harsher policy towards Japan and joined Borah and Johnson in asking for a defense of American neutral rights Greene was pleased that the New York Republican was now calling for economic embargoes. See Greene to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers. For Fish it revealed no reluctance to become hostile to Japan while maintaining a reluctance to become belligerent in European matters.

With the sinking of the Panay Fish ended his pleas for American citizens and armed forces to leave China. Although cautioning the House that "the American people must not under any circumstances become hysterical and beat the war drums",¹⁴ over this latest attack on her citizens, he called the sinking an international tragedy.¹⁵ Fish further acknowledged that while "the angel of death for Americans was near", such considerations should not encourage the United States into withdrawing any civilian or military personnel from China.¹⁶ Like Borah and Johnson, Fish, too, was anxious to avoid war with Japan, but he did not want any hasty departure from Eastern Asia.¹⁷ In line with his new belligerency, Fish even began to call for a defense of the nation's rights and interests in China; he did not consider his actions jeopardizing peace because he was convinced Japan would settle the dispute expeditiously by acceding to Roosevelt's demands for compensation to cover the loss of American lives and property.¹⁸ What Fish did fear was that the United

¹⁴U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1968.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., 1969.

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States might provoke Japan by using the incident as an excuse to initiate a total boycott against her, a position he did not support entirely until 1941. Considering either a boycott or an embargo an act of war against a "...highly sensitive, highly patriotic, and proud militaristic race", Fish declared:

If we adopt this provocative policy and permit it to spread—that we will not buy from Japan, that we will boycott her, that we will go further into embargoes, reprisals, and economic sanctions—then I say it is a step towards war.¹⁹

Deeply anxious over antagonizing Japan to the point of war, Fish continued to favor eventual American withdrawal from China; yet reflecting his new and harsher stance, he refused to have America appear intimidated because a gunboat had been sunk. As a precaution against such incidents occurring again, Fish encouraged developing and building a navy "second to none" which would force Japan to have second thoughts about launching a naval war against America.²⁰ Wanting even further insurance against Japan becoming a serious threat to American security, Fish persisted in his previous request for implementing the neutrality legislation despite his growing belligerency,

¹⁹Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1937, p. 2.

²⁰U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1968-1971.

in the belief that by prohibiting Japanese purchases of arms, ammunition, and other implements of war from the United States, her aggression in Eastern Asia would be substantially reduced.²¹

Of all the Congressmen to favor defending American rights in Asia against Japanese encroachments, only Fish argued that the neutrality legislation offered the best means for restraining further Japanese assaults on China's integrity. Other members of this group, like Borah and Johnson, while equally anxious to avoid extending Japanese power, adhered to the view that any admission by Roosevelt that a state of war existed in China would automatically benefit Japan's war machine. But despite such differences, on one issue all could readily acquiesce, morally and ethically, the United States was bound to defend its rights as a neutral; an idea, which when extended to the conflict in Asia, implied that America would not be coerced into withdrawing under fire.

Differing sharply from such an attitude, Congressmen like Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper pleaded instead for a total withdrawal of American civilian and military personnel from China.²² Senator Nye epitomized a

²¹Ibid., pp. 1971-1972.

²²New York Times, August 14, 1937, p. 1.

significant portion of Senate opinion over the Marco Polo Bridge Incident by his insistence that the President declare a state of war existing in China, thereby making it mandatory for the Administration to institute the Neutrality Act. In addition, Nye called for the embargo of all shipments of scrap metal overseas.²³ Prophetically, he stated that the continuous shipment of scrap metal would return to the United States someday in the "...flesh and in the bodies of our sons."²⁴ When the Panay was bombed and sunk, Nye, like many of his colleagues, tended to view this disaster as one that could have been avoided if only the Neutrality Legislation had been activated and Americans withdrawn from China.²⁵ Such incidents served to reinforce fears of an eventual conflict with Japan and convinced Nye that it would be best for America to abandon her claims to neutral rights in China.²⁶

Endorsing Nye's sentiments, Arthur Vandenberg

²³U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 10, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8585-8586.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18.

²⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 10, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8585-8586; Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, pp. 119-120.

reiterated the demand for America to remain neutral. In response to those Senators who argued such a course would be detrimental to China in her fight against Japan, the Michigan Republican replied that it was not America's business, as a neutral, to worry about what effect such a position would have on any nation.²⁷ Not only did Vandenberg consider it foolish for the United States to try and equalize any differences between belligerents by direct participation, he warned it would only serve to antagonize Japan further.²⁸ For the next two years, neither Vandenberg's position nor the content of his speeches shifted from this approach to foreign relations.

In complete agreement with Nye and Vandenberg's non-belligerent policy towards Japan, Senator Capper considered a complete withdrawal of Americans from China not only prudent but necessary to avoid a clash with Japan. He was alarmed about the ramifications of the sinking of the Panay, and was relieved when America and Japan settled the issue quickly and peacefully. Nevertheless, Capper feared the American Government and people's pacific reaction to the Panay affair might change to one demanding retribution

²⁷New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 1; Vandenberg to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg MSS.

²⁸Ibid.

if another incident occurred. Capper disavowed arguments made by his fellow Senators like Borah and Johnson who stressed the need to maintain a strong American military establishment in China. In Capper's opinion, the best way to avoid war would be to remove potential causes of friction by pulling out of China.²⁹

Joining with his Republican counterparts in forming the nucleus of a non-belligerent movement in Congress was Democratic Senator Clark of Missouri. He strongly criticized any action that would worsen relations with Japan.³⁰ As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Clark used every opportunity to express his beliefs, often times intemperately questioning the witnesses appearing before the committee when they did not share his convictions.³¹

This third strand of Congressional opinion towards Japan, as represented by Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper, deviated little over the next two years from an endorsement of absolute neutrality. Contrary to their

²⁹New York Times, December 18, 1937, p. 2 and June 17, 1938, p. 3.

³⁰Ibid.; Also consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 2187.

³¹Senate Lend-Lease Hearings, in particular, pp. 885-896, offers insight into Clark's position in the coercive and belligerent cross-examination of the 1940 Republican candidate for the Presidency, Wendell Willkie.

fellow Congressmen who were equally anxious to avoid war with Japan, members of this third coalition proved quite willing to sacrifice America's rights as a neutral if, in so doing, peace could be maintained. Fearful of making any move to antagonize Japan, the moral aspect of American neutral rights, so crucial to Congressmen like Borah, Johnson, and Fish, was only an irrelevant incidental to Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, and Capper.

Apparently, other members of Congress, in the months following the sinking of the Panay, were equally willing to sacrifice American neutral rights in China by adding their support to the non-belligerent faction in Congress. One such Senator, Robert R. Reynolds (D. North Carolina), had been a leader in previous fights against collective security measures. Prior to renewal of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937, Reynolds had remarked the American Government and people had nothing to fear from Japan. In fact, Japan provided a bulwark against Russian penetration in Asia and communism in China.³² But after the Panay affair, Reynolds changed his position, calling for a complete withdrawal from China in order to prevent another collision with Japan similar to the one that had just occurred. Reynolds had no doubt that the majority of

³²New York Times, January 17, 1936, p. 13.

Americans favored such a policy as well.³³

Reynolds wrote an article for the Washington Herald decrying the Administration's lack of realism for insisting the United States defend China from aggression. That the Government had never offered or insisted upon defending China from aggression did not prevent Reynolds from making the charge. Although his accusation was untruthful, it left an erroneous impression that the Government was moving to a more belligerent stance vis-a-vis Japanese aggression in Asia. In concluding the article, Reynolds noted that America had withdrawn troops from Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, and Mexico, and asked why then were troops still in China.³⁴

While a diplomatic settlement was being sought by the United States and Japan, the only serious threat to the Administration's policies after the sinking of the Panay came from the renewal of the war referendum amendment proposal by Indiana Democratic Congressman Louis Ludlow of Indianapolis. Ludlow had found both

³³U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 13, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1356-1358; Ibid., 75th Cong., 3rd sess., January 10, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 259; New York Times, December 18, 1937, p. 2.

³⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 21, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 581-582.

belligerents in the Sino-Japanese conflict guilty of using the United States as a supply house from which to provision themselves for a long war, especially the Japanese.³⁵ The amendment attempted to avoid war with Japan by having the American Government completely extricate itself from any responsibility for protecting either its citizens or their interests in China.

A leading non-interventionist, Ludlow was distrustful of Roosevelt's foreign policies and had on an earlier occasion introduced war referendum bills which had included the request that except in the event of attack or invasion, the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast in a nationwide election.³⁶ If the referendum became law, it was hoped that it could prevent the President from involving the nation in a world conflict. The use of a referendum rested upon the fear that an aggressive President could easily by-pass the Congress and the people if he desired to join in a world confrontation even when opposed by the majority of the

³⁵New York Times, September 14, 1937, p. 12.

³⁶House Joint Resolution 167, U.S. Congress, House, 74th Cong., 1st sess., February 14, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 1991.

people and their representatives. By February 5, 1937, Ludlow had added invasion of territorial possessions of the United States to his proposal.³⁷

Within twenty-four hours after the Panay sank in the Yangtze River, Ludlow gained the opportunity to bring his resolution to the floor of the House by seeking a discharge of his petition from the House Judiciary Committee. The House leaders scheduled January 10, 1938 as the day for the vote on whether the resolution should be brought out of committee and considered for debate on the floor of the House.³⁸

The debate in the press and various periodicals revealed that the die-hard non-interventionist supported the proposal as a way to remain aloof from war and to deprive the Chief Executive of the means for taking the nation to war without a mandate from the people.³⁹ But

³⁷House Joint Resolution 199, U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess., Papers accompanying specific Bills and Resolutions, NA. LD.

³⁸Whitney H. Shepardson and William C. Scroggs, The United States In World Affairs: An Account Of American Foreign Relations, 1938 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 155.

³⁹For a summary of Ludlow's thinking, consult his answers to the following telegrams. Blair Taylor to Ludlow, December 19, 1937, "December," folder; Leo Traugott to Ludlow, January 3, 1938, "Jan. 1-3, 1938," folder, Ludlow MSS, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. For Nye's support see Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, p. 121; For Senator LaFollette, see Foreign Policy Bulletin, XVII (Dec. 24, 1937), p. 3; Capper's attitude

a leading non-interventionist, Arthur Vandenberg, called the proposal "highly dangerous rather than protective" while Senator King, speaking for the anti-Japanese forces, remarked that the proposal "...is equivalent to telling a nation like Japan to go ahead and slap us in the face. Anything you do is all right with us."⁴⁰

The final vote revealed a rejection of Ludlow's action. The vote had been close, 188 to 209, with 111 Democrats, 64 Republicans, 8 Progressives, and 5 Farm-Laborites supporting the resolution. The opposition contained 188 Democrats and 21 Republicans.⁴¹ Viewing Ludlow's proposed amendment as an attempt to thwart the President's decision making and control of the nation's

may been seen in "Should A War Referendum Amendment Be Added To The Constitution", Congressional Digest, XVII (Feb. 1938), pp. 143-144; Literary Digest, CXXV (Jan. 1, 1938), p. 7; See also U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, pp. 25-26; pp. 233-234; pp. 532-533 for additional support by Representatives Koppelman (D. Connecticut), Fish (New York) and Bigelow (D. Ohio), respectively.

⁴⁰Literary Digest, CXXV (Jan. 1, 1938), p. 7; Ludlow agreed with King that Japan was America's enemy; see U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess., January 14, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 228.

⁴¹New York Times, January 11, 1938, p. 1; Department of State, Public Attitude Studies (Washington: G.P.O., 1941), p. 74; The actual vote may be found in U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., January 10, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 282-283.

diplomacy, many non-interventionists voted against it. The closeness of the vote indicated the disinclination of a significant number of Congressmen to become involved in hostilities overseas, but the fact that it was rejected showed that of even more importance was a reluctance by Congress to limit the President's power to conduct foreign policy and deprive themselves of a Constitutional provision.

American withdrawal from China, a position associated more frequently with Nye, Vandenberg, Capper, and Clark, for a time attracted the support of certain pro-Administration Senators as well. Senators Tom Connally, Elbert Thomas, and James Hamilton Lewis favored policies of non-intervention in their initial response to the Sino-Japanese conflict. Senator Thomas, a long time friend of Japan, tried to convince his colleagues and countrymen the Japanese could be won over to a moderate, peaceful policy. Moreover, if America truly wanted to avoid war, Thomas suggested refraining from any intervention on behalf of China. Thomas also hesitated over putting the Neutrality Legislation into effect, apprehensive such a move would anger Tokyo. He foresaw that should the United States recognize a state of war when it had not been legally declared by those involved, Japan might be provoked into attacking Americans residing in China. A further ramification of recognizing the war, Thomas added, might

be to cause:

...each nation now fighting to declare that war was forced on them as a result of America's action and the present ignoble lawlessness would become a glorious war, a war, too, which would, by the governments affected, be justified and therefore made bigger and more intrinsic by appeals to patriotism, sacrifice, and devotion to country.⁴²

Believing, even after the sinking of the Panay, that it would be in the best interests of the United States and Japan to reach a rapprochement, Thomas reminded his colleagues that Japan, by admitting it was wrong and compensating the families of the men lost in the incident, had undercut any argument for going to war.⁴³ In addition to promising to pay indemnities to the families of the crew members, Japan also agreed to punish the military personnel responsible for their deaths, leading Thomas to conclude that the apology and payment should end the controversy in Congress and the nation.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, even while he worked for Japan's

⁴²U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 96; Undated news release, Box 7, Thomas MSS.

⁴³New York Times, December 14, 1937, p. 18; See also Thomas to Willis W. Ritter, December 20, 1937, "R," folder, Box 26, and Thomas to Jiuji G. Kasai, a member of the House of Representatives in the Japanese Imperial Diet, February 9, 1938, and March 23, 1938, unmarked folder, Box 25, Thomas MSS.

⁴⁴Ibid.

friendship, the war in China began to irritate the Senator from Utah. As early as November, 1937, Thomas indicated reluctance over using the Neutrality Legislation, convinced that by putting it into effect Japan's superiority over China would be increased.⁴⁵ By February 13, 1939, Japan's strongest ally in the Senate had introduced a new proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 67, which if passed would have given the President the authority to forbid exports to belligerents. There was, however, one important exception; if the Chief Executive considered a country the victim of aggression he could lift the embargo to aid that nation in

⁴⁵See reprint of a speech over Columbia Broadcasting Company sponsored by World Peaceways, Inc., a non-profit organization for public information on peace and international affairs. Also letter, J. Max Weis to Thomas in folder, "November 4 Neutrality Act And Sino-Japanese Conflict," Box 5 and Thomas to G. Shiraishi, November 16, 1937, "S," folder, Box 26, both in Thomas MSS. Thomas' speech in Salt Lake City, November 4, 1937 concerning neutrality and the Sino-Japanese conflict is enlightening for his view in "Chinese-Japanese War," folder, OF-150-C, Box 5, FDR MSS. U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 96; For Thomas' concern that neutrality legislation would not keep the United States out of war see, "United States Relations With Foreign Countries," Vital Speeches Of The Day, II (Oct. 7, 1935), pp. 3-5; "Theory Of Neutrality," Annals, CLXXxVI (July. 1936), pp. 163-168; Ibid., CLXXXII (July. 1937), Supplement, pp. 131-137; "Can Impartial Neutrality Be Maintained," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Oct. 1, 1939), pp. 743-746.

its struggle.⁴⁶ In attempting unsuccessfully to reverse the supposedly neutral provisions contained in the Neutrality Act of 1937 by allowing the President latitude to determine the aggressor and the victim, Thomas' sponsorship of the measure portended growing animosity within the Senate towards the European dictatorships and Japan.⁴⁷ If, within only two years, Japan's friend could shift his position so radically that he would be willing to allow Roosevelt the discretion to use an embargo because of that nation's aggressive, imperialistic policy,⁴⁸ than what kind of attitudes could be expected from other, less moderate members of Congress?

⁴⁶U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 1347; New York Times, December 3, 1938, p. 10; Ibid., January 28, 1939, p. 5; Ibid., February 15, 1939, p. 2; Ibid., March 26, 1939, p. 29; Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 239-246.

⁴⁷Address by Thomas over Columbia Broadcasting Company, March 16, 1939, defending his Senate Joint Resolution 67 in "Proposed Amendment To Neutrality Law," folder, Box 8, Thomas MSS; See also his speech "American-Japanese Relations," American Forum Of The Air, II (Oct. 6, 1940), p. 4 found in RSG Folder # 5, ACNPJA Papers; Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 239-246.

⁴⁸U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 1067; See Thomas' speech before the Institute Of World Affairs held at Riverside, California, December 16, 1938, "The United States In World Affairs," folder, Box 7, Thomas MSS.

Another Democratic admirer of Roosevelt, Senator Lewis of Illinois, acted as one of the Senate's most vocal members in condemning Japanese aggression during the days following the outbreak of fighting in North China. He paralleled Thomas' position on the Neutrality Law, agreeing that it would be wrong for the President to acknowledge the war because, "if America recognized a state of war existing in China, the United States would find itself in a conflict with both China and Japan."⁴⁹ Lewis theorized that the moment the United States took such a step, American merchants, businessmen, and other nationals would be arrested, detained, and imprisoned, thereby practically guaranteeing American intervention.⁵⁰ Instead, he rationalized that since the fighting appeared to be between sections and factions rather than between countries, the whole affair could be reduced to the level of a military action over a regional conflict, obviating the need for any neutrality legislation. Anticipating a possible collision between American and Japanese forces, Lewis followed the same pattern as other non-interventionists by asking for removal of United States troops from China, especially those stationed in Northern China at Peking

⁴⁹New York Times, August 1, 1937, p. 30.

⁵⁰Ibid.

and Tientsin.⁵¹ Inspired by his strong feelings over this issue, Lewis presented a resolution in August, 1937, which enjoined the Secretary of War to give the reasons for keeping American troops in China.⁵² The continued fighting in Asia, however, apparently began to affect Lewis in much the same manner as it had Thomas, because within three months after introducing the resolution, the tone of Lewis's speeches had begun to change slightly. In a speech on November 16, 1937, he urged the defense of American interests in the Pacific; otherwise Japan would, he prophesized, eventually attempt to eliminate Americans from the Orient economically, politically, and physically.⁵³ At the time of his death on April 9, 1939, Lewis was still calling for withdrawal from China and defense of American interests in the Pacific.⁵⁴

⁵¹U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July 31, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 7918-7919; Ibid., 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 4, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8178-8179.

⁵²Senate Resolution 170 in Ibid., 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 6, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8351; The resolution was received, printed, and ordered to lie on the table and there it remained. See Lewis' desire for troop removals from China in New York Times, August 5, 1937, p. 5; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 16, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8939-8941.

⁵³U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., November 16, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 580-581.

⁵⁴Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1939, as found in Lewis MSS.

Tom Connally, the last of the pro-Administration Democrats to take a position of absolute neutrality in 1937, reacted, as had Thomas and Lewis to the situation in China. Connally, too, feared that the United States could readily become involved in the war, but he chose another line of reasoning, different from either the views of Thomas or Lewis, to further his cause. Invoking patriotism, Connally stated:

Americans living in China owe it to their country to get out of the Sino-Japanese war zone. American citizens residing in China owe a duty to their country, no less than citizens residing at home.⁵⁵

Stressing the selfish motives of American citizens in China to bolster his position, Connally over-generalized the situation by claiming these people were:

...generally in China for profit and their own financial advancement. They should seek to remove themselves from the scene of hostilities. They should not expect American boys residing at home in the United States to fight in China to protect their dollars when it is possible for them to avert our embroilment.⁵⁶

Such arguments, although contrary to Connally's view of world affairs, managed to shift the blame for a possible

⁵⁵New York Times, September 8, 1937, p. 2; Connally's speech may also be found in the Fort Worth-Star Telegram, September 20, 1937, p. 3 and Waco Times, September 16, 1937, p. 1, both in Scrapbook 602A, Connally MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁶Ibid.

war to the Americans in China; they also revealed his limited view of the Japanese-American situation.⁵⁷

While Thomas, Lewis, and Connally devoted themselves, initially, to gaining adherents for a policy of non-intervention, another fellow Democratic Senator, Burton K. Wheeler, followed a course uniquely his own. Denying it was necessary to defend American rights as a neutral yet disliking a position of complete uninvolvedness or total withdrawal, Wheeler did not adhere strongly to any of the previously discussed reactions to the Sino-Japanese war. On the contrary, he had little to say at the outset of hostilities; it took Roosevelt's "Quarantine Speech" on October 5, 1937, to arouse Wheeler's sentiments. Agreeing with President Roosevelt's desire for peace, Wheeler could not help worrying that if strong words failed to contain Japan, the Chief Executive would have no recourse but to quarantine the aggressor, increasing the danger of the United States becoming involved in an armed conflict.⁵⁸ Even though he admitted "...that the only way Japan can be brought to her senses is by an

⁵⁷There is no hint to Connally's attitude in the autobiography, My Name Is Tom Connally, but consult Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons Of Intervention In World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 163 for earlier ideas on neutrality.

⁵⁸Washington Post, October 7, 1937, p. 7; Atlanta Constitution, October 7, 1937, p. 3; Letter from Burton K. Wheeler to author, April 30, 1969, in author's possession.

economic boycott,"⁵⁹ Wheeler recoiled from the consequences of such an action. Over the next two years, he continued to deplore Japanese aggression in China. At the same time he remonstrated his fellow Senators against plunging the United States "...into another war to make the world safe for democracy for war as a means of encouraging and fostering democracy had been tried and found wanting."⁶⁰ Wheeler remained constant to this belief until the outbreak of World War II in Europe.

It was evident from July 1937, to the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, that no one group on Capitol Hill dominated Congressional opinion; yet each strove to impose their philosophy upon the rest. But over the two year period succeeding the renewal of hostilities in China, each group had clarified its position and, by the autumn of 1939, their attitudes revealed a slow but steady recognition that in the long run America's interests in Asia might need more than token defense. Congress, temporarily distracted from its concern over the Far East by Hitler's invasion of Poland and the ensuing war in Europe, never lost sight of the Japanese threat. Any further polarization of the Congress' view of Japan was

⁵⁹Washington Post, October 9, 1937, p. 2.

⁶⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., May 3, 1938, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 6128.

avoided by that nation's alliance with the European dictatorships the following year as well as her continued violations of international law and morality in Asia. From 1939 to 1941, therefore, groups became increasingly fluid, reflecting a blurring of distinctions between them as attitudes towards Japan hardened.

CHAPTER V

CONGRESSIONAL OPINION HARDENS

Until the summer of 1939, delineating Congressional opinion towards Japan had been a reasonably straight forward task. But from this time onward events such as America announcing the termination of the Commercial Treaty of 1911 on July 26, 1939,¹ the Japanese invasion of Indo-China in July, 1940, and the signing by Japan of the Tripartite Pact on September 27 of that same year, offered proponents of a harsher policy more opportunities for pressing their objectives. Rejecting their colleague's alarm, a significant number of Congressmen still favored pacifying Japan; yet continued Japanese aggression was making such policies less attractive and more difficult to defend.

The policy providing the greatest appeal to Congressmen throughout that troubled year proved to be the one advocating firmness against further Japanese encroachment on the Asian mainland. Still unprepared

¹Announcement of the pending termination of the Commercial Treaty may be found in Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1939, I, p. 81 and Foreign Relations Papers, Far East, III, pp. 558-559.

to accept a military solution, Congress expected the embargo to accomplish this task, and the anti-Japanese forces found an avid spokesman in Senator Schwollenbach. Two weeks before the expiration of the Commercial Treaty, he delivered a damning speech against Japan before the Women's Democratic Club in Washington, D.C. Tracing the record of international affairs over the past decade, the senior Senator from Washington concluded that since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the major powers had been derelict in protecting weaker nations like China against erosion of their independence. In order to justify his claim that such incidents portended a general decline in international morality, Schwollenbach pointed to pledges incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Nine Power Treaty whereby the stronger nations of the world offered to guarantee the integrity of weaker nations. Having violated both of these agreements, Japan ought to be considered immoral, according to the Senator; for that reason, if for no other, the United States had a clear duty to prevent further Japanese expansion. Emphasis on Japan's role as a treaty violator was not a new argument; Schwollenbach only expanded a line of reasoning previously used by Senator Pittman when he refuted the signing of a proposed non-aggression pact between Japan

and the United States.² Perceiving the problem of how to restrain Japan in a moral rather than a political context, Schwellenbach also believed he had the right to criticize Roosevelt's foreign policy for its failure to protect China. By allowing Japan access to American oils, gasoline, scrap iron, automobile parts and accessories, Schwellenbach contended that the United States was thereby made an accessory in China's destruction. Such reasoning reflected the influence upon Schwellenbach of the American Committee and using language typical of this committee's objectives, he exhorted America to end such trade, stating:

We have provided the tools and the instrumentality by which China's integrity is being destroyed. After January 26, the opportunity will have come to wash from our hands the stain of our violation of this agreement. If we speak seriously, if we really are motivated by good faith, we can do no less than to stop participating in this Chinese-Japanese war.³

The next month, Schwellenbach renewed his attack on Japan. In an effort to awaken the people to the immorality of America's position in Eastern Asia, he

²For Pittman's view of Japan as a treaty violator and an immoral power, consult Chapter III, pp. 80-92; New York Times, July 8, 1939, p. 3.

³Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, January 10, 1940, Schwellenbach MSS; Italics are mine.

spoke, one Sunday evening in February, on the American Forum Of The Air, stating the United States was Japan's "...number one partner in helping destroy China."⁴ This situation had to end, he continued, so America could regain her status as moral leader in international affairs.⁵ By June, the Washington Democrat's irritation over the continued flow of war materials to Japan turned to anger; his belief that the end of the commercial treaty would place a curb on goods to that nation had failed to materialize.⁶ Referring repeatedly throughout the year 1940 to this issue, he discounted fears that a unilateral American embargo against Japan would bring on a conflict.⁷ Throughout 1940, Schwellenbach's position was supported and aided by the American Committee. Its chairman, Roger Greene, wrote Schwellenbach on various occasions praising his anti-Japanese resolutions, speeches, and aid to the committee. Remarking that Schwellenbach's endeavors were responsible for enlightening the country,

⁴Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach on the American Forum Of The Air, February 18, 1940, Schwellenbach MSS. The speech may also be found as an unmarked, undated treatise in Schwellenbach Papers, contained in box entitled, "Speeches And Statements,".

⁵Ibid.

⁶Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwellenbach, as quoted in the Washington Daily News, June 15, 1940, p. 19 found in undated entry, Box 2, Schwellenbach MSS.

⁷Ibid.

Greene called his support invaluable and clear sighted.⁸

With the situation in Europe rapidly deteriorating into war, Key Pittman joined his fellow Westerner in pushing for a strong policy in Asia out of a conviction that the Far East held greater potential for American involvement in war. Critical of any moderate proposals, saying they smacked of appeasement, Pittman remarked:

If the United States appeared afraid of Japan, then the chances of war in Asia increased. The only way to thwart Japan was to end all shipments of war supplies lest Japan makes itself the master of all China.⁹

In a letter from Henry L. Stimson to Pittman on January 22, the former Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration echoed similar sentiments. Referring to his desire for economic sanctions against Japan in 1931, after her invasion of Manchuria, Stimson agreed with Pittman and Schwellenbach's call to end American shipments of all war supplies to Japan. Stimson also enclosed a copy of his letter to the New York Times in which he blamed the sale of war materials and the failure to get the Neutrality Legislation invoked, not on the Administration, but "...chiefly on the merchants who are selling

⁸Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, June 18, 1940, and September 24, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

⁹Pittman in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9-146, January 8, 1940, NA. LD. Comments may be found in folder marked "Correspondence K,".

to Japan the ore, the steel, and scrap iron."¹⁰ The Government, he presumed, would now see fit to restrict the substantial aid flowing to Japan. As Honorary Chairman of the American Committee, Stimson notified Pittman that the committee's objectives were an honest and intelligent attempt to place before the American people one of the most significant issues in the foreign policy of the country. Moreover, Stimson remarked he would cooperate with as well as support any measure against Japan that Congress or the Executive branch enacted.¹¹

Once Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Pittman called for a total embargo on all exports and imports to Japan so that, "their airplanes will cease to fly, and their bombs will cease to drop on the unfortunate people of China."¹² Throughout October, in his campaign for reelection to the Senate, Pittman continued to express harsh sentiments towards Japan, directing his

¹⁰Henry L. Stimson to Pittman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9-135, January 22, 1940, NA. LD, found in folder marked "Various Subjects China-Japan,". Stimson's letter may be found in the New York Times, January 11, 1940, p. 1 as well as quoted in U.S. Congress, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 144-145.

¹¹Ibid.; For the Government's action see Chapter VII.

¹²Pittman as quoted in Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1940, n.p. Article is in Pittman MSS.

wrath, in particular, towards the belligerent, anti-American Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka. Calling Matsuoka a "bluffing bulldog", Pittman told a crowd in Reno, that the United States should not surrender any rights in Asia regardless of what belligerent words come out of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In what was to be one of his last anti-Japanese outbursts before he died in November, Pittman cautioned Americans not to be intimidated in the Pacific region by an insignificant soldier of the military clique now ruling Tokyo. Americans must do everything to stay out of war in that region, Pittman added; but Japan, and especially Matsuoka, should not mistake America's pacifism for appeasement.¹³

Pittman's willingness to introduce strong anti-Japanese rhetoric into his campaign indicated that in Nevada a harsh stand against Japan would not displease his constituency; in fact, Pittman was reelected in November, only to die a week later. Pittman's death removed a leading member of the anti-Japanese forces in the Senate. Before he died, Pittman had correspondence and conversations with Price and Greene of the American Committee. Since the Committee's beginning in 1938, Pittman had received its literature and advice on revision of

¹³New York Times, October 18, 1940, p. 3.

Neutrality Legislation and implementing an embargo against Japan. In June, 1940, Price wrote Pittman praising the latter's contributions to the cause, and assured him that the Nevadan would continue to receive the Committee's support, and by implication, their advice and scrutiny as well.¹⁴

During the same period of time, Senator King and Congressman Coffee added their endorsement to Pittman and Schwellenbach's call for an embargo of all exports to Japan. King, as has already been noted, was even willing to sever diplomatic relations, and throughout 1940, he deviated little from his advocacy of a total break with Japan.¹⁵ Frequently decrying the situation in Eastern Asia, King remained a potent asset to the anti-Japanese forces until his failure to gain renomination to the Senate during the Democratic primary in the spring of 1940.¹⁶ In a letter to his wife on October 1,

¹⁴Greene to Price, January 31, 1940, February 18, 1940, and March 14, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers; Ibid., unsigned letter to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4; Ibid., Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File,"; Greene to Pittman, May 17, 1940, Greene MSS.

¹⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 143-144; Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 25, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 666; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: (Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 578.

¹⁶See Chapter I, p. 25.

1940, Roger Greene wrote kindly and affectionately of King. Calling him a friend of China and as an ally of the anti-Japanese committee, Greene expressed concern that with the Utah Democrat losing his bid for reelection that his help would be sorely missed on Capitol Hill.¹⁷ King had been a recognized stalwart of anti-Japanese sentiment on the Hill as well as acting as a forum for Greene and Price's committee.¹⁸

Meanwhile, in the House, Coffee led the movement for embargoing trade to Japan. Throughout 1940, he inserted into the Congressional Record numerous articles reiterating his ideas. One of these, an important article written by Harry Price, cited statistics to prove America was supporting Japan's war machine.¹⁹ Using information similar to Price's to support an embargo, Coffee continued his fight for Congressional approval of his House Resolution 5432 which would end this undesirable American trade.

Although the anti-Japanese bloc lost three of its

¹⁷Roger S. Greene to Mrs. Katherine Greene, October 1, 1940, Greene MSS.

¹⁸King's sentiments may be consulted, King to George Fielding Eliot, November 9, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

¹⁹U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., April 25, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2420-2421.

most prominent members in 1940, King, Pittman, and Schwellenbach, who resigned from Congress on December 10, to become a federal judge, their cause was never significantly set back. Representative Hamilton Fish's transformation exemplified the slow conversion of more moderate Congressmen to greater hostility by Spring, 1940. Having previously worked for a rapprochement with Japan over the past two years, he had as recently as March 12, 1940, criticized an embargo for being too provocative and warlike an action. An embargo, Fish feared, might drive Japan to declare war on China, blockade the Chinese coast and lead to other unforeseen complications.²⁰ Nevertheless, by April, 1940, with the renewal of hostilities in Europe, Fish found himself looking with more favor on an embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war to Japan along with protecting domestic scrap iron.²¹

Following Japan's signature on the Triple-Axis Pact, the New York Congressman called for a complete embargo against Japan and praised Roosevelt for the embargo placed on scrap iron of September 26, although he still considered the Government in Washington a dictatorship

²⁰Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., March 12, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2730.

²¹Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., April 23, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 4898.

led by the President and Left-Wing New Dealers.²² Fish typified the experience of many Congressmen in the months ahead, a slow and painstaking change from non-belligerency towards Japan to one of great enmity.

For many Congressmen, the Administration's reluctance to embargo all trade to Japan proved a constant irritant. Their annoyance lay in the Government's assurances to Japan following the termination of the Commercial Treaty of 1911 on January 26, 1940, that there would be no complete rupture of commercial relations.²³ Herein lay a fundamental problem for the anti-Japanese group in Congress and their allies off the Hill like Stimson, Greene, and Price. Even had Congress usurped the initiative by legislating an embargo against Japan, this action had no guarantee of success. For without the President's willingness to support economic sanctions as Commander-In-Chief, such measures would be useless. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, understood the implications of an embargo when he remarked: "If we once

²²Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12944-12945. For the Administration's action of embargoing scrap steel to Japan which Fish praised, consult State Department Bulletin, September 28, 1940, p. 250; Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 222-223.

²³Langer and Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation, 1937-1940, p. 308 and pp. 577-578.

start sanctions against Japan we must see them through to the end and the end may conceivably be war."²⁴ As Langer and Gleason explained, the President and the State Department therefore had persuaded themselves that an embargo would probably not halt Japanese aggression in China, but instead might well serve to provoke new expansion by Japan to the southwest in search of the needed raw materials, if not actually precipitate war with the United States.²⁵ Commercial relations between the two countries, therefore, remained on a temporary basis with the American threat of a total embargo serving as the deterrent to further Japanese encroachments on American rights in Asia and especially in China.²⁶ Still unwilling at this time to provoke Japan by an embargo, yet recognizing that some action must be taken to forestall further deterioration of China's sovereignty, the Administration chose to increase aid to China with loans through the Export-Import Bank.²⁷ This measure made it

²⁴Feis, Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 41; According to Hull the State Department was awaiting evidence of Japan's intentions regarding violations of American rights in China before inaugurating any harsh policies. See Hull to Grew, January 8, 1940, as quoted in Foreign Relations Of The United States, Far East, IV, pp. 625-626.

²⁵Langer and Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation, 1937-1940, p. 578.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 578-579.

²⁷Ibid., p. 579.

clear that despite some Congressional pressure for an embargoing of trade, there would be no serious economic retaliation against Japanese aggression.²⁸

In July, 1940, a more aggressive cabinet led by Prince Fumimaro Konoye as Premier, Yosuke Matsuoka as Foreign Minister, and Tojo Hideki in the War Office replaced the government of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai in Tokyo. The American Government reacted cautiously to the change in the Japanese Government but with the renewal of warfare in Europe in April, 1940, the fall of France in June as well as Japanese encroachments in the Netherlands East Indies and Indo-China, the President began to move in the direction of economic retaliation. By July, 1941, the anti-Japanese group's hopes were fulfilled. Japanese assets in the United States were frozen by an Executive Order and by September all trade had been terminated.²⁹

But not all Congressmen who favored defending American neutral rights in Asia succumbed to the increased pressures being exerted by their associates and by events for economic sanctions against Japan. One such Senator, William Borah, persisted up to his death on January 19, 1940, to oppose what he considered to be an unnecessary

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹For a more detailed discussion see Chapter VII.

belligerency on the part of the anti-Japanese group.³⁰ During the debate concerning the termination of the Commercial Treaty, Borah made it clear that he approved using all reasonable efforts to maintain American trade relations with Japan, excluding always the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to that nation.³¹ Not wanting the United States to give up \$400,000,000 annual trade with Japan "except for a very sound reason", Borah did not accept Hull's view that a good reason existed.³² He warned a termination of the treaty without provisions for a new pact to take its place could only be a tragic blunder. So strongly convinced of the necessity to maintain trade with Japan, especially since trade in Europe and on the Atlantic was dwindling, Borah was willing to overlook possible benefits trade with the United States might have on Japan's war making capabilities.

³⁰See the article on Borah in Buenos Aires Herald, January 11, 1939 in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 76A-F9, Container, 140, NA. LD.

³¹Borah to J.P. Herber, "Speech Data 1938-1939," Miscellaneous File, Borah MSS.

³²China Weekly Review, December 2, 1939, XCI, p. 8; See also Borah's agreement with TRB's comment on the termination of the Commercial Treaty in New Republic, CIV (Jan. 21, 1940), p. 21; also found in Container 544 "Foreign Relations, 1918-1940," Borah MSS.

Instead he remarked:

A new commercial treaty with Japan does not require American sanction of Japan's invasion of China or the New Order in East Asia that Japan hopes to inaugurate.³³

If political issues were to be entered into negotiations for a new treaty, Borah was content to let Japan, not the United States, raise them. Apparently intent upon maintaining trade with Japan, Borah was willing to sacrifice what had previously been so important to him, America's rights as a neutral. By stating that small infringements on American businessmen in China plus the China trade were insufficient reasons for ending commerce with Japan, Borah indicated just how far he had moved away from his original position in 1937, at which time he had called for a show of firmness by the United States in the face of threats to its citizens by the Japanese.³⁴ Now sounding more like Senators Vandenberg, Clark, Capper, and Nye, Borah seemed ready to compromise his earlier views.

Borah gathered support for the movement to retain trade with Japan from the faction in Congress which had been urging, since 1937, a policy based essentially on

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid. Borah never changed his policy concerning Europe and constantly preached non-intervention. See New York Times, March 26, 1939, p. 29.

appeasement. Senator Vandenberg, a prominent member of this bloc, appeared certain that economic sanctions against Japan would lead to war; as a result, he was willing to see the Commercial Treaty of 1911 lapse if a new, more meaningful agreement could be negotiated.³⁵ To accomplish this purpose he introduced Senate Resolution 166 on July 18, 1939, which called for termination of the 1911 treaty of Commerce, Amity and Navigation and the immediate negotiation of a new treaty.³⁶ The reasoning implicit in Vandenberg's position over maintaining trade was not readily fathomable at first glance. Ostensibly, as the Senator indicated in response to a letter from William Castle, former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan during the Hoover Administration, he feared if the United States renounced the treaty, Japan would be drawn by economic necessity into the arms of Germany and Italy. Moreover, he agreed with Castle's

³⁵For an interesting exchange concerning Vandenberg's position see Walter Lippmann, "The Seriousness Of The Far Eastern Question," Washington Post, January 30, 1940, and Vandenberg's reply in Ibid., February 1, 1940; Both articles may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., February 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 886-887.

³⁶Senate Resolution 166 in U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 9341.

analogy that the United States "...should not prod and prick the dictators every twenty minutes thereby leading to a possible outbreak of warfare."³⁷ Although wishing to avoid war with Japan, Vandenberg was not diplomatically naive; he believed the issue of the Commercial Treaty provided the United States with an excellent mode for testing the sincerity of Japan's intentions towards America. If Japan was bent on a course of further aggression in Asia, with the recognition that her actions incurred the risk of eventual conflict with the United States, Vandenberg acknowledged that the sooner such motives could be determined, the greater would be the benefit to American foreign policy. In his reply to Castle's letter, Vandenberg expanded this line of reasoning, claiming that an abrogation of the treaty:

...is only a threat if Japan chooses to interpret it as such. If she intends to be fair with us in the Far East she can make a new treaty before the old one expires. If she intends to rape us we may as well find it out now through the medium of these treaty negotiations.³⁸

In addition to seeing the treaty as a vehicle for

³⁷For Castle's view concerning American-Japanese relations, consult his letter to Vandenberg, July 30, 1939, found in "Correspondence July, 1939-July, 1940," Vandenberg MSS.

³⁸Vandenberg to William R. Castle, August 1, 1939 found in Ibid.

determining the degree of Japanese good faith, the Michigan Senator declared that the treaty could be construed as a test of America's will to stay in Eastern Asia. At the same time he also claimed the treaty would indicate Japanese recognition of American interests in the area. Ultimately, however, perhaps Vandenberg's letter to Hull written a week later best summed up his expectations of the treaty:

I want to take the liberty of making it plain that my own theory of abrogation is definitely predicated upon earnest efforts to agree upon a new engagement. I do not need to tell you that I would not be interested in a mere arbitrary prelude to a subsequent one-sided embargo. If such an embargo ultimately becomes indispensable to the adequate protection of legitimate American interest and rights in the Far East, and if the American people are ever deliberately and consciously ready to take what might thus be the first step toward war itself, we can meet that situation when the issue is unavoidably precipitated.³⁹

Implicit in Vandenberg's letter was a promise to support the Administration if a conflict became inevitable, but only if all feasible methods to satisfy Japan, including maintaining some form of a commercial agreement, had been tried.⁴⁰ Nothing separated Vandenberg from Nye more than

³⁹Vandenberg to Cordell Hull, August 7, 1939, State Department File, 711.942/232, NA. A draft of this letter is loosely filed in Vandenberg MSS; The resolution was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and there it died. Consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 9341.

⁴⁰Ibid.

that final statement. Vandenberg had been careful to point out to Hull that the United States should promptly indicate to Japan a preparedness to negotiate a new treaty. Should Japan spurn the overture, the hope of perpetuating a friendly and mutual relationship would be diminished, but he stressed to Hull the attempt must be made.⁴¹

Vandenberg's fear of Japanese retaliation to a unilateral American imposed embargo on all trade was not allayed by his correspondence with Roger Greene of the American Committee. Recognizing Vandenberg's apprehension about Japanese reaction to embargoes, Greene assured the Michigan Republican that although Japan would resent sanctions, "there was not the slightest chance that Japan would make war upon us or indulge in actions so provocative that the United States would take the initiative in going to war."⁴² Greene also inferred that since some Congressmen were running for reelection in 1940, including Vandenberg, perhaps it would not be best to favor

⁴¹Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 4263; Consult also Vandenberg to Hull, September 20, 1939, State Department File, 711.942/284, NA. An interesting aspect of Vandenberg's and the State Department's thinking on the issue of the Commercial Treaty negotiations may also be found in Sumner Welles to Vandenberg, August 22, 1939, and Vandenberg to Welles, August 24, 1939, Vandenberg MSS.

⁴²Greene to Vandenberg, April 2, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers.

"...economic cooperation with powers like Germany and Japan" in order to be returned to Capitol Hill as a representative of the people.⁴³

The controversy surrounding termination of the Commercial Treaty of 1911 inspired Alexander Wiley, a freshman Senator from Wisconsin elected in November, 1938, to join fellow Republicans Borah and Vandenberg in their effort to keep intact American trade with Japan. Wiley's belief in the efficacy of Neutrality Legislation and a war referendum as incorporated in the Ludlow Amendment proposal indicated his general desire to avoid American involvement in foreign conflicts.⁴⁴ Realizing that renewal of the Commercial Treaty offered a good opportunity to pursue cordial relations with Japan, Wiley presented a judicious, well reasoned speech on its behalf prior to expiration, inferring that by allowing the treaty to be terminated additional commercial restrictions would

⁴³Ibid., There is no answer by Vandenberg in the Senator's Papers at Ann Arbor, the Greene Papers, or the American Committee Papers at Harvard.

⁴⁴New York Times, October 31, 1941, p. 5; See also Senate Joint Resolution 140, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., May 29, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 6261.

be made possible, the eventual outcome being an embargo which would not help China nor promote peace. Rather than prevent a conflict, trade restrictions would merely provoke Japanese reprisals, continued Wiley, causing Japan to blockade Chinese ports, impose martial law and exclude all foreigners from China, making it almost imperative for the United States to retaliate.

Suggesting an alternative course, Wiley proposed that the United States recognize Japan's right to the same prerogatives America granted to European nations. To illustrate his meaning, Wiley referred to the unequal immigration laws and asked America to extend to the Japanese the same laws that governed Western Europeans coming into this country. Seeking to avoid alienating Japan, Wiley noted, "It pays to put the ointment of friendship and understanding in the wounds of nations the same as in the case of wounds we have inflicted on individuals."⁴⁵ Wiley also called for negotiations to implement a new commercial pact based on a reaffirmation of the principles incorporated in the Nine Power Treaty.⁴⁶ Finally, America should give Japan access on equitable

⁴⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 23, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 541-542.

⁴⁶Ibid.

terms of raw materials of the country and the world as well as a full right to fair competition because the Wisconsin Senator believed:

The normal flow of commerce to nations is like the normal flow of blood within our veins and arteries, and in the field of commerce we must restate and put into practice those rules which speak of fair dealing, understanding and fair play.⁴⁷

It would be wrong to presume Wiley was diplomatically unsophisticated because of his program for a rapprochement with Japan. On the contrary, Wiley did not deny the menace Japan's presence in Asia constituted to world peace. He was clearly cognizant of Japanese desires to dominate Eastern Asia and recognized the threat Japan felt America's presence posed to realizing those goals. Urging the United States to face reality in the Far East, as it existed in the autumn of 1939 and the early months of 1940, Wiley insisted that only by treating Japan as an equal could a resurgence of goodwill in American-Japanese relations occur.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.; Wiley's advocacy of cordiality in commercial relations with Japan does not seem to be based on exports or imports between the Wisconsin Custom District and Japan for the years 1937-1941...In fact, imports for the five years under discussion totaled \$325, 231 and there were no lists of Wisconsin exports. See Foreign Commerce And Navigation Of The United States For The Calendar Year 1937 (Washington: G.P.O., 1939), p. 744; For the year 1938, consult Ibid., (Washington: G.P.O., 1940), p. 919; For 1939, consult Ibid., p. 754; For 1940, consult Ibid., (Washington: G.P.O., 1942), p. 870; For 1941, Ibid., (Washington: G.P.O., 1944), p. 623.

In spite of the efforts of Senators Vandenberg, Borah, and Wiley in behalf of Japanese trade, other Congressmen previously moderate or silent on this issue found it difficult in 1940 to refrain from supporting the move for an embargo. One such convert, Senator Guy M. Gillette (D. Iowa), an important member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had sought a rapprochement with Japan prior to 1940.⁴⁹ Persuaded by the apparent failure to appease Japan's appetite for territory, Gillette now asked for a halt to all goods shipped to Japan.⁵⁰ Another member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Theodore Green (D. Rhode Island), who had opposed economic sanctions against Japan, showed willingness in 1940 to endorse Gillette's recommendations for a more stringent trade policy.⁵¹ Additional support came from Senator James Slattery (D. Illinois), who had been chosen to fill the vacancy caused by the death of James H. Lewis in 1939. Slattery believed an embargo of

⁴⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 16, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 355; Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography-1946 (New York: H.W. Wilson and Company, 1947), p. 208.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 503.

trade would end Japanese aggression in China while at the same time putting the United States back on the path to international morality by reaffirming its faith in the Nine Power Treaty.⁵² From the House of Representatives, Congressman James A. Shanley (D. Connecticut), included his support for an embargo, a policy he considered justified given Japan's actions in China.⁵³

No Congressman's transformation imported such significance for future American-Japanese relations as that of Senator Elbert Thomas. A long time friend of Japan until 1940, Thomas had begun to realize an embargo would be necessary. Discouraged over the signing of the Tripartite Pact, Thomas sadly admonished the Japanese:

That Japan, a victor, should ally herself with Germany which was a defeated country, and make common cause with that defeated country, leaves Japan in an inconsistent position. Today she is confused, The old order is changing, but a new order will not come by reverting to the ways of the barbarian. Since the Manchurian and the Chapei incidents, Japan's history has not been an enviable one. Her latest act is in no sense one of self-defense or self-protection. It is one of aggression.⁵⁴

⁵²Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 29, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 462.

⁵³Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October 2, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6004.

⁵⁴Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6154-6155.

To act as the assailant, to slay and bomb women and children, to consort with other aggressors should make no nation proud of itself; yet, Thomas noted that Japan appeared pleased with its performance during the past decade of expansion. Thomas counseled Japan to end its senseless brutality and reinstitute morality so that peace might be preserved.⁵⁵

Alarmed at the increasing friction between Japan and the United States and assured that if war did come Japan would prove a surprisingly strong, determined enemy, Thomas hoped America could redirect Tokyo's foreign policy towards peaceful objectives. With foreboding Thomas remarked, "Without this change the Far East is doomed."⁵⁶ Calling Britain's decision to allow the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to lapse a terrible mistake, Thomas importuned the United States Government to replace Great Britain and act as Japan's East Asian tutor concerning matters of peace, morality, and international diplomacy.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.; New York Times, June 22, 1939, p. 23.

⁵⁷ Elbert Thomas, The Four Freedoms (New York: Ziff-Davis and Company, 1944), pp. 93-94; See also Thomas' speech before the Institute Of Far Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan, June 29, 1939, reprinted in the U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 3014-3016; In the Thomas MSS two speeches are worth noting. See address in folder entitled, "Chaotic World Conditions," March 17, 1939, Box 8 and "To What Extent Are American Interests Involved In Present Day World Activities," March 28, 1939, Box 8 given

A concept of Japanese-American relations implicit in Thomas' recommendations, that of relegating Japan to the position of a student and America the teacher, demonstrated a serious limitation in the Senator's thinking. While the premise of converting Japan to peaceful intentions could not be faulted, Thomas presumed a Japanese moral and ethical inferiority to the Western World that could only further antagonize Japanese opinion.

During his transition from friend of the Japanese to a foe, Thomas became an ardent supporter of the American Committee. On February 5, 1940, Greene had an interview with Thomas and wrote that the Utah Democrat was interested in halting Japanese expansionism. Moreover, Greene remarked that he liked Thomas both personally and for his aid on Capitol Hill concerning an embargo of trade to Japan.⁵⁸ Thomas, with his previous liking for Japan and scholarly research in Eastern Asian culture, was a powerful ally in the Senate and his conversion was relished and considered a major victory by Greene and his anti-Japanese committee.⁵⁹

over the Columbia Broadcasting Company System under the auspices of the American Council Against Nazi Propaganda.

⁵⁸ Interview of Elbert D. Thomas by Roger S. Greene, February 5, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Undergoing a profound disillusionment about Japanese-American relations similar to that of Thomas, Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D. Colorado), found that he too could no longer tolerate a policy approaching appeasement. Although in previous years Johnson had tried to moderate his anti-Japanese remarks and sentiments on the Senate floor, by 1940, he reluctantly accepted the use of the embargo in order to halt Japanese expansion in China. In an impassioned speech to his colleagues Johnson criticized the United States and Great Britain for supplying war materials to Japan. "These two 'holier than thou Christian Democracies'", Johnson remarked, "have supplied the pagan assassin of women and children with 90 percent of her sinews of war."⁶⁰ As had others before him, Johnson too, linked American trade with morality, charging that the United States had a clear duty to institute economic sanctions against Japan in order to prevent her from continuing the war in China.⁶¹

In retrospect, it is apparent that Congressional opinion became transfigured more decidedly in 1940 than during any succeeding period. Particularly the controversy

⁶⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6155.

⁶¹Ibid.

over trade—to continue commerce with Japan on the one hand or to embargo goods, in varying amounts, on the other hand—aroused strong feelings with many Congressmen. Whereas in the past few years debate had touched upon all facets of Japanese-American relations, the focus had narrowed considerably by 1940. As Robert Aura Smith commented in the May, 1941, issue of the Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science:

Japan's alliance with the Axis had done more than anything else could have done to convince Americans that the war in Europe and the war in Asia are the same war.⁶²

The voices of moderation sounded less and less distinctly in the chasm of widening differences of opinion. The leading advocates of an embargo remained the same Senators who had been in the forefront of the anti-Japanese movement since 1937; Senators Schwellenbach, Pittman, and King, as well as Representative Coffee. Their forces had been augmented throughout the year by heretofore non-belligerent members of the Congress, including Senators Thomas, Gillette, Slattery, Johnson, Green and Congressman Fish. Men who had spoken in the past for

⁶²Robert Aura Smith, "The Triple-Axis Pact And American Reactions," Annals, CCXV (May. 1941), pp. 127-132; Expressions of the same viewpoint are also found in Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American Relations, 1941, pp. 14-25.

moderation moved closer to the extremes; thus Representative Fish entered into the anti-Japanese sphere while Senator Borah tended to find greater sympathy for his views among the holdouts for appeasement. The center, in so far as offering any effective solutions to the dilemma of the Sino-Japanese war, appeared to be denuded of any significant representation after 1940. Even the conciliators were finding their position increasingly untenable by mid-year, and arguments for maintaining trade, endorsed by Senators Wiley, Borah, and Vandenberg would be seriously undercut through further Japanese actions in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER VI

THE ANTI-JAPANESE PRESSURE INCREASES

In 1937 Congress had been willing to accept Japan's apologies for the sinking of the Panay. Harsh words muttered by Pittman, King, Schwellenbach, and Coffee, fell upon indifferent ears for the most part; their colleagues, at this time, could not yet be roused into anger sufficient enough to jeopardize existing American-Japanese relations. By the autumn of 1940, an entirely different mood pervaded Congress. No longer could fears of angering Japan contain the legislator's distaste for the "New Order In Asia". A climate of opinion favorable to belligerent measures had emerged over the past three years, overcoming past Congressional temerity. Four forces were responsible for producing this growing unanimity of opinion on Capitol Hill; Japan's continued threat to the status quo in Asia, sympathy for China's rapidly deteriorating position, Japan's signing the Tripartite Pact, and a renewed drive for an aggressive American policy emanating from pressure groups both within and without the Congress.

Although there were numerous groups lobbying to influence foreign policy throughout the 1930's and early 1940's, only one organization had as its sole objective

the cutting off of war trade to Japan. As a reaction to Japanese incursions in Asia, especially in China, the American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression was formed in August, 1938. From its inception, the organization restricted itself only to anti-Japanese measures, considering at first both a prohibition against American exports of essential war materials to Japan and a restriction of the imports from that nation into America.¹ But it was finally decided to concentrate on the export problem in order to prevent duplicating the activities of the Committee For A Boycott Against Japanese Aggression, an organization concerned primarily with a domestic consumer boycott against Japanese goods.²

Harry B. Price, the leading force behind the Committee, had been born in China in 1905. Sympathetic to that country's increasing distress over the years, he brought to the Price Committee a missionary zeal to save the hapless and victimized Chinese people from further conquest by an aggressive and barbarous Japan. The son of Presbyterian missionary, Price had been educated in the United States at Davidson College; in 1929 he returned

¹Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 4-5.

²Ibid.

to China as Assistant to the American Commission Of Financial Experts to the Chinese Government, a position he held briefly until deciding to further his studies in the United States. In 1932, with a Masters Degree in Economics from Yale, Price returned to China where he taught at Yenching University before returning permanently to America in 1937. He was on leave from Yenching University when he helped organize the American Committee.³

Working in conjunction with his brother, Reverend Frank W. Price, a missionary at Nanking Theological Seminary, the Price brothers laid the groundwork and created the structure of this new private pressure group. The majority of the membership consisted of men and women directly affiliated with China in some educational, missionary, medical, philanthropic or diplomatic capacity.⁴ They had the support of various Government officials, especially Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief Advisor of the State Department on Far Eastern matters, who encouraged the education of the American people and Government about Japanese expansionism. With Philip J. Jaffe, Thomas A. Bisson, and Eliot Janeway as experienced journalists, the

³Ibid., pp. 1-2

⁴Ibid., p. 7; For Harry B. Price's view of Japan see his article entitled "Japanese Strategy And Aims," Contemporary Review, CCII (Nov. 19, 1937), pp. 560-569.

Committee was able to publish in June, 1938, America's Share In Japan's War Guilt. This booklet, through its claim that the United States was supporting the crushing of China by supplying the Japanese with the materials of war, provided the ideological framework for the Committee. Overseeing general activities was the National Board consisting of twenty-one members. Henry L. Stimson agreed to be the Honorary Chairman of the organization and Harry B. Price became the Executive Secretary. The search for a chairman ended with the selection of Roger S. Greene, a man with a long career in Eastern Asia and connections in Washington.⁵

Greene's past experience both in government and in China, and his contacts among influential citizens all contributed to making him an ideal choice to head the Committee. Even though he had not been born in China as had Price, Greene developed a strong interest in the Chinese people while acting as director of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1914 to 1927. During his tenure as director, Greene also came into contact with many of the men who would become active in the future with the American Committee, and one of these men, Harry B. Price, maintained a continuous correspondence

⁵Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 9-10.

with Greene throughout the years. Greene's credentials, an A.B. from Harvard in 1901 and an A.M. from the same institution the following year, employment in the State Department in 1903, serving as consul in various foreign countries including China and Japan, made him a distinguished candidate for the Committee's chairmanship. Greene gained additional familiarity with Chinese affairs from his appointment as Vice-President in the Far East for the Rockefeller Foundation in 1927, a position he held for the next two years until he became acting director of the Peiping Union Medical College. Upon returning to the United States in 1938, Greene moved to Chicago as director of the World Citizens Association, but through his correspondence with Price kept abreast of the activities of the American Committee. Deciding to join the organization in July, Greene was selected Chairman five months later.⁶

Throughout its existence, the Price Committee remained faithful to its original aim of gaining a widespread

⁶Ibid., p. 10; For Roger Greene's earlier life and activities consult Biographical folder, Greene MSS. Because of the lack of indexing and filing when the author saw the Greene collection letters and other information are randomly filed; For Greene's view on foreign relation see "The Price Of Peace," Christian Century, LVI (Aug. 30, 1939), pp. 1040-1042; For additional information on the Committee's formation, organization, membership, financial situation and policy see Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 1-44 although, as has been noted, the work suffers from not including material from the Greene MSS.

acceptance for the principle of non-participation in Japanese aggression and refused to sponsor additional goals for fear of dissipating its energies or duplicating the work of other committees. Recognizing that there were other, closely related issues, the members of the Price Committee did not want to have their attention diverted.⁷ But support for China did intrude and sympathy over her plight found unanimous support among the Committee's members. In spite of the member's Chinese sentiments, the emphasis of all the Committee's efforts remained centered on Japan and followed a program of rousing public opinion against the Japanese in order to bring pressure upon both the Executive and Legislative branches of Government.⁸

In its relationship with Congress the Price Committee stressed the need to embargo all war trade to Japan and used the reservoir of sympathy for China prevalent among the members of Congress to promote this end. Pro-Chinese sentiment existed in Congress for various reasons, and often there appeared to be little correlation between the motives for a Congressman's concern and the type of role he envisaged America assuming in China. Japan's blatant

⁷Friedman, The Road From Isolation, p. 21.

⁸Ibid., p. 30.

disregard for morality by violating numerous treaties and killing Chinese civilians, the dislike and fear of an expansionistic Japan, plus sentimental concern for the victims of Japan's brutal war, generated in all segments of Congress a pro-Chinese sentiment. Objecting strongly to Japan's obvious disregard for international accords like the Nine Power Pact, Congress was indignant over Japanese violations of existing treaty pledges.

Both of these forces, dislike of Japan and sympathy for China, combined in the person of Key Pittman, and he promised to provide a receptive ear for the American Committee's urgings. Pittman, exemplifying the attitude the Committee hoped to implement throughout Congress while also occupying an influential position in the Senate, received all of its literature in addition to frequent visits and correspondence from both Greene and Price. In return, Pittman praised the Committee for aiding in his agitation for a harsher policy against Japan, remarking that Greene and Price were indispensable in converting recalcitrant Congressmen.⁹

Using the moral issue raised by Japan's evasion of

⁹Greene to Price, October 18, 1938, RSG Folder # 1, ACNPJA Papers; Ibid., Greene to Price, February 3, 1939, RSG Folder # 1, and Pittman to Price, August 14, 1939, "Correspondence Jan-Sept, 1939," Box 2, Greene MSS.

her treaty obligations to further the anti-Japanese cause, Pittman also voiced concern over the possibility China might become closed to all non-Japanese interests. He had warned of this danger even before the renewal of war in 1937, during a speech made the previous year in which he stated his belief Japan would go to war to close off the world's access to China.¹⁰ Two years later, in the summer of 1938, the Senator was still referring to this eventuality and expressing his total commitment to maintaining China's integrity and independence.¹¹

But despite his history of pro-Chinese rhetoric, Pittman failed to consider China's true interests in a provision of the "Peace Act of 1939". Aimed specifically at aiding France and England, unforeseen ramifications of the act proved detrimental to China. The American Committee, appreciating this discrepancy, opposed the Pittman proposal on the grounds it placed China in an unfavorable position as far as obtaining arms, munitions,

¹⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., February 10, 1936, Congressional Record, LXXX, 1703-1708; See also Ibid., 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 578-581; Consult also an exchange between Borah and Pittman on this subject in "Speeches, Articles, And Remarks," Box 161, Pittman MSS.

¹¹U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 2120; New York Times, May 23, 1938, p. 8, and July 10, 1938, p. 21.

and other implements of war.¹² Faced with mounting objections, Pittman changed his bill, but his initial lack of foresight over this proposal reduced the confidence that Greene and Price had invested in the Senator's leadership.¹³ Still, the Committee hesitated to antagonize Pittman since he held a powerful position in Government even if he did not use it as effectively as he might have done. Five months before his death, Pittman received a letter from Price expressing the Committee's appreciation of the Senator's "...clear-headed leadership" on seeking to embargo trade to Japan the past two years, and for being a dedicated foe of appeasing that nation.¹⁴

¹²See Chapter III, pp. 89-92; also Price to Pittman, March 28, 1939, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers.

¹³U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 578-581; Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers; Ibid., Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File,"; Greene carried on an intensive and extensive correspondence with his wife, Katherine, who lived in Worcester, Massachusetts, while her husband first lived in Chicago and then in Washington. The correspondence is refreshingly candid. Concerning Pittman, see RSG To KG, April 24, 1940; May 3, 1940; and July 1, 1940, in folder RSG To KG, 1940, Box 12, Greene MSS.

¹⁴Price to Pittman, June 18, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; Other informative correspondence may be consulted in Greene to Price, January 31, 1940; Greene to Price, March 14, 1940, found in Ibid., RSG Folder # 3; Moreover, see Greene to Pittman, May 17, 1940, Greene MSS. For Pittman's pro-Chinese sentiments consult, Draft of a message to be delivered to members of the Veterans Of Foreign Wars, August 22, 1938,

The American Committee found another Congressional ally in Senator Schwollenbach. Enthusiastic over any type of economic measure against Japan, Schwollenbach called a total embargo an immeasurable aid to China in contrast to what he termed pro-Chinese rhetoric devoid of any substance and plans for implementation.¹⁵ Like many other anti-Japanese Congressmen, Schwollenbach envisaged aid to China taking an indirect course. Reflecting the emphasis of the Price Committee, the Washington Democrat focused mainly on provisions against Japan, supporting economic sanctions to limit her aggressive capacity. The American Committee kept him abreast of the organization's work and thanked him for invaluable service on the Hill in their behalf. Both Greene and Price liked Schwollenbach's proposals and in their correspondence to him noted the Washingtonian's

Pittman MSS; Ibid., "Our National Defense," The American Forum Of The Air, January 22, 1939, Box 161 and "Speeches, Articles, Remarks," February 20, 1939. This was a speech broadcast over NBC and may also be found in pamphlet form in Scrapbook, "June 22, 1939-October 4, 1940," folder, Pittman MSS; Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, pp. 251-258; Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman, pp. 159-170.

¹⁵Speech by Senator Lewis B. Schwollenbach, January 10, 1940 and February 18, 1940 as well as speech in the Washington Daily News, June 15, 1940, p. 19 all found in Schwollenbach MSS.

contribution to the cause of a potentially peaceful Asia.¹⁶ In a letter to Schwellenbach on February 21, 1940, Greene also made clear his conviction that America could easily¹⁷ thwart any action Japan might take against this country. It was inconceivable to Greene that Japan could send her fleet across great distances to attack American possessions, excepting the Philippine Islands which did lie within feasible striking range of the Japanese home islands. Although Schwellenbach never answered Greene's letter, his speeches on the radio and in Congress coincided with the Price Committee's position that the United States had little to fear of a Japanese retaliation.¹⁸

Senator King, another recognized foe of Japan, needed little prompting from the American Committee; in fact,

¹⁶For the correspondence between the American Committee and Schwellenbach, consult Price to Schwellenbach, January 23, 1940, "Jan-May," folder, Box 2, Greene MSS; Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, RSG Folder # 3; Price to Schwellenbach, June 18, 1940, and September 24, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; See also Greene to Katherine Greene, October 1, 1940, Greene MSS. The Schwellenbach file in the ACNPJA Papers is disappointing. The file contains four reprints of speeches in the Congressional Record and a copy of Senate Joint Resolution 143 he introduced on June 1, 1939, already cited...See Chapter III, pp. 97-98.

¹⁷*Italics are mine.*

¹⁸Greene to Schwellenbach, February 21, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers.

King had moved beyond its call for an economic embargo. Presenting a bill in 1940 that would have given the President authorization to negotiate with other powers friendly to the United States for naval bases in the Pacific, King showed a willingness to directly challenge Japan militarily.¹⁹ In an emotional outburst on the floor of the Senate, King called for halting Japan's "...oriental tyranny and mediaeval barbarism in China" and implied other regions of Asia as well.²⁰ King impressed the members of the American Committee and they enjoyed speaking to him on the Hill where they always received a genuine welcome. They found the Utah Democrat pessimistic about the readiness of the Administration to effectively halt Japanese aggression or support his bill. Although the Government had terminated the Commercial Treaty of 1911, King did not deem that action

¹⁹The bill was first introduced on September 30, 1940, and was ordered to lie on the table. The next day King asked that it be sent to the Foreign Relations Committee where it was never acted upon. See Senate Resolution 4391, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., September 30, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12780 and Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12902.

²⁰Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 143-144; Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., January 25, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 666.

sufficient to stop Japan. Greene readily concurred.²¹

Unaccountably, the American Committee showed little disposition to work with the Senate's anti-Japanese counterparts in the House such as Scott, Faddis, Celler, and Coffee.²² There are no records of any correspondence between the Price Committee and these Congressmen who nevertheless pursued a strong program against Japan, buttressed by their awareness of China's continued decimation. Referring to the menace of Japan, Representative Scott informed his colleagues:

I think it goes without saying that we would be much safer with a free, pacific China on the other side of the Pacific Ocean than we would if China were subjugated and ruled by militaristic Japan.²³

²¹Greene to Katherine Greene, October 1, 1940, Greene MSS; King to George Fielding Eliot, November 9, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; Eliot was an Army Major who considered America impregnable. In the monograph The Ramparts We Watch: A Study Of The Problems Of American National Defense (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1938), Eliot wrote that America's geographical distance from war in Europe and Asia was sufficient to maintain peace at home. King's letter was a refutation of that thesis.

²²For Coffee's earlier statements see U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 221-229; Also U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 1st sess., May 31, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 2323-2326 and Ibid., 76th Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXIV, 6634-6635.

²³"Let's Avert War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Feb. 15, 1938), pp. 284-287.

Unlike Scott, for whom China's destruction evoked pictures of a direct Japanese military threat to the United States, Congressman Faddis found himself drawn to China by the courageousness of that nation's fight to maintain her sovereignty.²⁴

In addition, Emanuel Celler (D. New York), now made his views known and in an eloquent plea for an embargo of trade to Japan, remarked such action would serve two purposes. First, it would aid China but even more importantly it would also "...wash away some of the American guilt" in sponsoring and supporting Japan's war machine. In fact, the least the United States could do, he continued, was to wipe out the "damned spot" and alleviate the suffering of the Chinese people.²⁵ In a commencement address at Wellesley College where his daughter was graduating in June, 1938, Celler poignantly stated that his mind was traveling across the seas to the Orient where:

²⁴U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality, Hearings, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 6-13; U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., March 12, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 2745-2747.

²⁵U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXIII, 3193-3194.

Humans are being subjected to the torture and the sufferings of the Middle Ages. Were Japan's planes hovering over head to let drop deadly bombs upon Wellesley, it would be doing no worse than its willful and deadly slaughter in China today.²⁶

In all of these Congressmen's speeches a subtle but none the less significant distinction must be established on this whole question of how best to resolve the problems of China and Japan that had grown more critical with each succeeding year. Spokesmen for the anti-Japanese movement both from within Congress and the American Committee stressed the need to halt Japan by taking direct and specific measures against her. Acknowledging that one benefit of such action would be to remove the Japanese from the Asian mainland, thereby preserving China's independence, advocates of a harsh policy against Japan always insisted that the United States must focus its attention on stopping her rather than on propping up the Government of Chiang Kai-shek. Needless to say, the emotional appeal of a brutal Japanese Air Force bombing innocent Chinese women and children aroused widespread concern throughout Congress, but such atrocities only reinforced the conviction that the best way to avert further tragedy in Asia lay in restraining Japan.

²⁶Ibid.

The moderates and confirmed non-interventionists in Congress also deplored the continued aggression in China and were equally aroused by the Japanese bombing missions. Many among their ranks were even willing to voice their sympathy and concern for her plight. Nevertheless, these men refused to consider saving China by directly challenging Japan. Prior to the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, only the most limited aid to China might be condoned, providing Japan was not antagonized.

Inescapably bound by their abhorrence of war to a policy of retreat from China, only a few Congressmen within this coalition, namely Borah, Johnson, and Fish, were willing to preface American retrenchment in the Pacific with considerations of the effect overly precipitous actions might have on American neutral rights. The difference between moderate groupings themselves was one of degree rather than kind. All members of this non-belligerent faction wanted to eliminate any eventuality of a clash. If Japan became irritated, even by limited American aid to China, then they reasoned the United States ought to withdraw from the area rather than chance a war. Vandenberg, Clark, Capper, and Nye would do so despite the cost to America's prestige, whereas Borah, Johnson, and Fish insisted the United States not withdraw while under fire.

Senator Borah saw the United States on the verge of being dragged into the vortex of an Oriental conflict due to the embargo agitation. In correspondence and interviews, while not mentioning the Price Committee by name, he implied that suspicious organizations behind the powerful effort to get sanctions enacted were not furthering American interests.²⁷ In 1939, Greene wrote an angry letter to the Editor of the New York Times asking how long the United States was going to tolerate the so-called defenders of peace like Borah who jeopardized American security. Greene criticized the Idahoan's obstructionist policies and inferred that the Senator's lack of faith in the Committee's programs to preserve peace while halting Japan was based on the Congressman's usual ignorance of foreign affairs.²⁸

Hiram Johnson, also intent upon preventing a direct confrontation with Japan, whether economic or military, proved equally unresponsive to the Committee's pressures. Answering an inquiry from a Californian about the

²⁷New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 3; Borah to Ralph M. Easley, January 27, 1938, OF-150-C, "Chinese-Japanese War 1938," FDR MSS; Easley sent the letter to Roosevelt's Secretary, Stephen Early, which accounts for its being in the Roosevelt collection.

²⁸Greene to the Editor of the New York Times, June 16, 1939, RSG Folder # 1, ACNPJA Papers; A draft of the letter is also in the Greene MSS.

Committee, Greene made his only reference to Johnson, remarking how disappointed the organization was in Johnson's lack of overt agitation against Japan given his past views of that nation and her people. Greene hoped Californians would persuade Johnson to support such legislation if not initiate it.²⁹ Inexplicably, Johnson remained aloof from the anti-Japanese movement in spite of his notorious dislike for Japan.³⁰

On the other hand, Hamilton Fish, never known as a foe of Japan, began to indicate a readiness to abandon his previous position. Never during this period, except for token expressions of sympathy for China, had Fish indicated a willingness to give the Chinese any significant help. On the contrary he seemed more anxious to restrict American influence and interest in East Asia, telling a press conference on July 22, 1937, of his intention to introduce legislation in the House that would terminate American extraterritoriality in China.³¹ Fish

²⁹Greene to Oliver J. Todd, October 13, 1939, RSG Folder # 2, ACNPJA Papers.

³⁰See Chapter II, pp. 40-41.

³¹New York Times, July 22, 1937, p. 10; See also U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXI, 8156-8158; Ibid., 75th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 1968-1973.

implied that such a move would benefit China by ending the special privileges granted to foreigners in that country; in reality, he never doubted that by ending extraterritoriality, Americans would abandon China, thus removing any possibility of coming into conflict with Japan.

By 1940, however, Fish had begun to view Japanese expansionism with alarm and slowly to overcome previous reservations towards halting that nation's aggression. In a letter to Greene, a Committee supporter related that during an interview Fish stated he was not opposed to a limited embargo on war materials to Japan. What he did reject was stopping all trade, commenting that sanctions of that magnitude would mean a loss of American employment, reprisals and eventually war.³² Even with his new militancy, the Committee worked for Fish's defeat in the November elections, an attempt that proved unsuccessful. It is interesting to note that after Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, Fish became convinced a more forceful

³²Greene to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers; For an earlier view of Fish see Greene to Price, March 4, 1939, RSG Folder # 1, ACNPJA Papers; Hoping for Fish's defeat in the 1940 election see Greene to Katherine Greene, October 9, 1940, "Jun-Dec, 1940," Box 2, and Greene to Katherine Greene, October 10, 1940, RSG To KG, 1940, both in Greene MSS.

policy was needed and supported total sanctions against Japan throughout 1941.³³ Neither Greene nor the other members of the American Committee comprehended Fish's shift in position during these last fourteen months of peace and missed an opportunity to utilize this important member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

In opposition to almost everything being advocated by the sponsors of a strong anti-Japanese policy stood the small but equally committed group of Congressmen who feared any American involvement in Asia. Determined to keep the United States neutral in "thought as well as deed" if, in this way war with Japan would be circumvented, these Congressmen referred only infrequently to the situation in China despite often sympathetic personal feelings. Senator Vandenberg, typifying this unwillingness to involve the country in China's fate, presented the Price Committee with one of its greatest challenges. Refusing to support a pro-Chinese position, Vandenberg believed the East Asian problem could be settled peacefully which would, in effect, aid China. Therefore, "...by not clamoring for aggressive action against Japan," the Michigan Republican revealed his sentiments for not

³³For Fish's conversion see Chapter VII.

increasing the tempo of war in China.³⁴ In essence, this was a negative response to international aggression but one that fit the temper of the Senator at that time. Beyond stating his sympathy for China's plight, Vandenberg considered himself pulled in two directions simultaneously in regard to America's role in Eastern Asia. At one time remarking he would have liked to aid China, Vandenberg concluded the possibility of war with Japan necessitated a prudent and circumspect foreign policy. Vandenberg also remarked that helping one belligerent in a war invariably invited retaliation by the other belligerent; therefore, he did not consider the defense of China's integrity and sovereignty as a primary consideration of the United States since the possibility of dire consequences outweighed any

³⁴Vandenberg to Drew Pearson, March 12, 1940, Vandenberg MSS; Vandenberg to Hull, August 7, 1939, State Department File 711.942/232, NA; Vandenberg's colleagues in the Senate, Gerald P. Nye and Bennett C. Clark, supported his position. For example Nye's sentiments may be viewed in the Washington Post, October 9, 1937, p. 2; U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 2187; Ibid., 75th Cong., 2nd sess., August 21, 1937, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 2257; Although there was no extensive correspondence with Nye, consult Nye to Greene, April 27, 1940, "Correspondence Jan-May, 1940," Box 2, Greene MSS; See also Greene's letter to the Editor of the New York Times, attacking Nye's reluctance to embargo trade to Japan, June 16, 1939, RSG Folder # 1, ACNPJA Papers; For Clark's position consult, U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXII, 2187; Arthur Capper's views towards the Committee's activities can be seen in Capper to Price, October 18, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," and letter from Hull to Capper, May 22, 1939, "Cordell Hull File," ACNPJA Papers.

moral-ethical commitment.³⁵

Greene contacted Vandenberg to allay his fears of American involvement in the Sino-Japanese conflict or even a war between the United States and Japan. Admitting Japan would resent an embargo of trade Greene added, "there was not the slightest chance that Japan would make war upon us or indulge in actions so provocative that the United States would take the initiative in going to war."³⁶ Vandenberg remained unconvinced. Despite Greene's assurances, the Michigan Republican still considered non-involvement the only correct American policy vis-a-vis Japan.³⁷

Until the Tripartite Pact, the American Committee had an equal lack of success in persuading Elbert Thomas, Japan's long time friend in the Senate, to revise his position.³⁸ Greene, in various contacts with Thomas,

³⁵Ibid.; New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 1.

³⁶Greene to Vandenberg, April 2, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers.

³⁷Vandenberg to Drew Pearson, March 12, 1940, Vandenberg MSS; Vandenberg to Hull, August 7, 1939, State Department File 711.942/232, NA; The view was held steadfastly since the origin of the Sino-Japanese conflict, consult New York Times, August 31, 1937, p. 1.

³⁸See speech by Thomas, U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 2nd sess., October 6, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXV, 150-159; Interview by Greene, February 5, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File,"; Greene to Price, March 20, 1940, RSG Folder # 3; and Greene to Price, April 5, 1940, RSG Folder # 4 in ACNPJA Papers; Greene to Katherine Greene, July 23, 1941, Greene MSS. The Thomas

tried to sway him, even going so far as to invite Thomas to a dinner party for friends and would-be friends of China and then seating him between two Chinese guests, but all attempts proved futile.³⁹ Ultimately, Thomas did come to recognize the Japanese threat, but he claimed that he owed his new insight more to Japanese warlike actions than to the pressure of the American Committee.⁴⁰

Edwin C. Johnson, another long time non-interventionist concerning Asian affairs, also showed much resistance to the Price Committee's objectives. Rejecting a plea from Price to support an embargo, Johnson explained that he feared the organization's memorandums about Japan sounded like ultimatums if not declarations of war. Johnson did indicate a growing concern for China, but because of the strong statements made by Greene and Price, he refused to join their campaign.⁴¹

MSS are disappointing in so far as learning what the Utah Democrat wrote on the issue of China and an embargo of trade to Japan. Consult for an overview of his thoughts: "Radio Address On Neutrality During 1939," folder, Box 9, Thomas MSS. The folder is composed of Thomas' speeches on Neutrality and embargoes for 1939.

³⁹Greene to Price, March 20, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers.

⁴⁰See Chapter VII.

⁴¹Johnson to Price, October 5, 1940, and Price to Johnson, October 8, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; For Johnson's view of Japan and possible embargoing of trade see his speech in the American Forum Of The Air debate found in Ibid., October 6, 1940.

The American Committee, despite the paucity of its success among the non-belligerent members of Congress, continued its efforts to awaken them to the dangers Japan posed to American interests. Meanwhile the Committee also concentrated its efforts among another element of Congress, those who had heretofore remained silent on the events occurring in Asia. Having not yet publicly stated their views, these Congressmen offered the possibility of becoming recruits to the anti-Japanese cause, and Greene and Price proceeded to correspond with these uncommitted legislators. In the Senate they included Republicans Charles L. McNary (Oregon), Warren R. Austin (Vermont), William W. Barbour (New Jersey) and Democrats Guy M. Gillette (Iowa), and Frederick Van Nuys (Indiana). The Committee also sought in the House members receptive to their program. Among the Republicans they approached were Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey), Bruce Barton (New York), Ralph O. Brewster (Maine) and Democrats James A. Shanley (Connecticut) and Robert G. Allen (Pennsylvania).

One of the least satisfactory responses to the Committee's pressure came from Senator McNary, the Republican minority leader in the Senate since 1933. After an interview with McNary, Price wrote that the Oregonian supported measures to stop the export of war supplies to Japan but apparently desired the Administration to take all the responsibility for initiating the

proposal. Price gained the impression that McNary was using the issue for partisan purposes as he wanted the President to take all the risks so no Republican could be blamed if embargoing trade to Japan led to disaster.⁴²

Although Price considered McNary's recalcitrance a failure for the Committee, this does not invalidate the organization's efforts in behalf of the anti-Japanese movement. By ascertaining that McNary would be willing to support an embargo should the President propose it to Congress, Price and Greene were performing a valuable function in defining more precisely a changing mood on Capitol Hill that would soon become more receptive to measures against Japan.

If McNary was reluctant to overtly initiate anti-Japanese legislation for partisan reasons, the same could not be said of Senators Austin and Barbour.⁴³ Like other Congressmen of both parties they dared not propose such legislation unless they knew they had the Administration's support, but from interviews with Greene and Price their attitude was as Price wrote, "...balanced and constructive." Austin complained Congress was awaiting the President, that

⁴²Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers.

⁴³For Barbour consult Ibid., Greene to Price, April 3, 1940, RSG Folder # 4.

Congress was ahead of Roosevelt in being anti-Japanese and that Greene and Price should keep up their pressures on Capitol Hill and at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue to see the fruition of their objectives. Price wrote Greene that Austin was "...probably our most influential and important link on the Republican side of the Senate", and both men continually cultivated his friendship and support.⁴⁴

Apparently the contacts with these Congressmen convinced Greene and Price that little hope existed for reaching their goals via legislative action and they began to redirect the Committee's emphasis towards the Administration to initiate a total embargo. As Greene made his rounds on Capitol Hill interviewing various members of Congress, he realized this was their consensus.⁴⁵ Representative Brewster summed up Congress'

⁴⁴See Greene's interview with Senator Austin in Ibid., February 5, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," and Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4.

⁴⁵For Eaton, see Ibid., Greene to Price, June 29, 1939 and Greene to Eaton the same day both in RSG Folder # 1 and Price to Greene, May 15, 1940, RSG Folder # 4. Ibid., Greene to Representative Barton, June 29, 1939, RSG Folder # 1. Robert G. Allen seemed to respond the most to the Committee's agitation as indicated in Allen to Greene, March 6, 1939 and May 2, 1939, "Correspondence Jan.-Sept., 1939," Box 2, Greene MSS. For Shanley's support if the Administration acted see Greene to Price, July 21, 1939, RSG Folder # 2, ACNPJA Papers; Because Shanley had been graduated from Yale, Greene thought it would be "...a good line of attack" to get alumni to personally see and correspond with the Connecticut Democrat in the hope of converting him to a rabid anti-Japanese position.

sentiments when he remarked to Greene that, "there is little doubt that the Congress would readily adopt an embargo resolution if the Administration would only indicate its approval."⁴⁶ Never totally foregoing their former strategy however, Greene and Price continued to pressure Congressmen whenever the opportunity arose as in the case of Senators Van Nuys from Indiana and Gillette of Iowa. No effort was spared to convince these two influential Democrats that a harsh policy was needed against Japan and that such a policy had the support of their constituencies.⁴⁷

Ultimately, neither the lobbying of the American Committee on behalf of an embargo, nor concern over China would prove sufficiently potent to rouse Congress into legislative action against Japan. Undeniably a significant portion of the House and Senate were moving towards the concept of an embargo; but in the end, the Administration had to provide Congress with the necessary impetus for action.

⁴⁶Greene to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers.

⁴⁷Ibid., Greene to Price, July 13, 1939, RSG Folder # 2.

CHAPTER VII

THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS

Until the autumn of 1940, American policy towards Japan underwent little fundamental alteration. Congress, confronted throughout the decade by the problem of numerous provocations against the status quo in Asia, resisted pressures for an embargo, declining to pass any anti-Japanese legislation. Serious divisions over the proper role of the United States in Asia undercut all efforts to achieve a unity of opinion in either the House or the Senate. In order to indicate at least some degree of displeasure against Japanese aggression, the Administration had taken the initiative by calling for a moral embargo in 1938. The Government's action combined with businesses' affirmative response effectively stopped the export of airplanes, aircraft parts, and equipment to Japan. By December 20, 1939, planes, plants, manufacturing rights and technical information needed in the production of high quality aviation fuel also had come under this moral embargo.¹

¹Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 200-204; State Department Bulletin, December 23, 1939, p. 714; New York Times, December 21, 1939, p. 1.

But not until mid-1940 did the first overt indications of any tangible reorientation of American policy become apparent. Hitler's victories in Europe during the spring and summer of that year had produced serious repercussions for Asia. With the collapse of Europe by June, Japan now had ready access to the colonial empires of the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies; this threat posed by further Japanese expansion helped reorder American policy.

The change in the direction of American relations with Japan, long debated in Congress, became actualized in September 1940, with two Administration measures; a loan to Chiang Kai-shek on September 25, followed the next day by a complete embargo of iron and steel scrap to Japan.² The authority to implement these sanctions had been delegated by Congress to the President that previous July under the guise of the National Defense Act. Passed July 2, 1940, for the purpose of stockpiling strategic materials needed in fighting a modern war, this act also empowered President Roosevelt to place the export

²Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 222-223; State Department Bulletin, September 28, 1940, p. 250.

of certain key materials in a category requiring a special license.³ On July 26, Roosevelt, making use of these provisions, announced that exports of petroleum, aviation gasoline and number one scrap steel would be placed under licensing control.⁴ Five days later, a Presidential proclamation banned completely the export of aviation fuel to all nations outside the Western Hemisphere.⁵

Through the passage of the National Defense Act, Congress had provided the President with the means for pursuing those very objectives long pled for by the American Committee and the anti-Japanese faction in Congress. Yet, ironically the debate both in the House and Senate suggests that at no time was the eventuality of this measure being used against Japan ever viewed as its primary or even secondary purpose by the legislators.

³See House Resolution 9850 introduced by Congressman Andrew J. May (D. Kentucky), U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., May 21, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6579 and sent to the House Committee On Military Affairs chaired by Representative May. The bill was debated on May 24, 1940, pp. 6821-6862. In the Senate see Senate Bill 4025 introduced by Morris Sheppard (. Texas), who was May's counterpart in the Upper House. See Ibid., Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., May 22, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6582. See also Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 211-216; State Department Bulletin, July 6, 1940, p. 12.

⁴Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, II, pp. 216-218; State Department Bulletin, July 27, 1940, pp. 49-50.

⁵Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 93.

The discussion that occurred in connection with this bill emphasized the need for the United States to begin taking actions to protect itself by strengthening national defense. One of the most obvious means for gaining that end was through the safeguarding of strategic materials necessary for conducting war. In none of the debate did anyone imply that an inverse result of this measure, the withholding of strategic materials, could provide the means for retaliating against Japan. Only one Congressman, Charles I. Faddis, made any reference to Japan at all, and then only in vague, abstract terms.⁶ Criticism of the proposal when forthcoming, centered around the general disinclination to further augment President Roosevelt's powers. The results of the vote on this measure reinforced the view that Congress had not intended to place at the President's disposal a new weapon for dealing with Japan. In the House the vote was 392 to 1 with 37 abstentions and in the Senate the vote was 80 to 0 with 16 abstentions. An examination of the roll call shows that as many non-interventionists had voted for the measure as had outspoken belligerents.⁷

⁶U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., May 24, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6821-6862.

⁷For the House vote consult Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., May 24, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 6862; In the Senate, the measure's roll call may be consulted in Ibid., 76th Cong., 3rd sess., June 11, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 7935. The one negative vote in the House was cast by Vito Marcantonio (American-Laborite-New York).

Roger Greene, however, had recognized the potential ramifications for halting trade with Japan that were implicit in the proposed measures for national defense. The members of the American Committee, having previously called for a direct embargo based upon the premise that Japan had violated the Nine Power Pact, became persuaded to accept a more circuitous and less volatile approach to their goals.⁸ The National Defense Act, by emphasizing the need to preserve critical raw materials, especially in the face of the growing menace to Europe, also afforded to the American Government the necessary means for indirectly limiting shipments of war materials to Japan. Greene, convinced that such an expediency was the only viable method for inaugurating some form of an embargo against Japan available at this time, contacted Senator Pittman in May and directed him to ask, under the aegis of the National Defense proposals:

...for a law authorizing the President to withhold from export basic war materials for the purpose of conserving our national resources and **protecting** our national security, with a suitable provision for exemption in the case of articles to be used in a manner compatible with American national interests.⁹

⁸Friedman, The Road From Isolation, pp. 32-33.

⁹Greene to Pittman, May 17, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, ACNPJA Papers.

In this same correspondence Greene added that the Administration, in gaining the powers to halt the export of raw materials needed by the United States, could go further than merely a "moral embargo" against Japan "...without new Congressional action should circumstances warrant."¹⁰ Furthermore, Greene assured Pittman of the increased chances for success of the aims by this new tactic, reasoning that, "such a law, as part of a general plan for greater national security, would be very difficult to oppose politically."¹¹

Upon passage of the National Defense Act, Greene, pleased with the outcome, wrote letters to Pittman, Schwellenbach and other "friends and supporters" thanking them for their help in making, "...possible legislation which would enable the President to curtail or prohibit exports of war supplies to Japan."¹²

The American Committee and the members of the anti-Japanese faction in Congress were not to be disappointed in their expectations for the National Defense Act. In

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Greene to Pittman, June 18, 1940 and Greene to Schwellenbach the same day, both letters found in the "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers. The names of the "friends and supporters" was not disclosed in the letters. Additional correspondence was Greene to Roosevelt, May 17, 1940, RSG Folder # 4, and Greene to Hull, March 7, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, both found in ACNPJA Papers.

July and September, President Roosevelt made use of the act to implement embargoes against Japan, and with these decisions the Administration had begun to fulfill the anti-Japanese Congressmen's quest for sanctions. By the end of September, 1940, American neutrality was only a technicality. The essence of the Administration's actions was to relieve the embargo advocates of having to fight for legislation that non-interventionists could attack, defer, or possibly defeat in the Senate and in the House. With the Chief Executive and the State Department moving slowly but steadily towards ending all trade with Japan, even if some of the action was due indirectly to needs created by the European situation, the anti-Japanese group in Congress could relinquish to the Administration the actual implementation of sanctions. They really had little alternative; impeded by a divided Congress, little opportunity existed for successfully passing any legislation directly aimed at limiting Japan.

In 1941, the last year of peace for the United States, Congress, which for much of the 1930's had been a repository for concepts of neutrality, showed an awareness of the deficiencies inherent in this policy. The attempt at remaining neutral had failed to promote American interests and security in a world threatened by the ambitions of militaristic nations in Europe and Asia bent upon a

revisionist course and made it necessary for Congress to reach a consensus on future American foreign policy. Japan herself conveniently provided the key for enabling Congress to overcome its divisions.

No previous action taken by the Japanese in these difficult years had quite the impact upon Congress as the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, linking the menace of Germany in Europe to the threat of Japan in Asia. But Congressional opinion was still not unified over how to deal with this challenge to American interests in the Pacific. It was not until after Japanese forces moved into South Indo-China in early July, 1941, that attitudes hardened perceptibly on Capitol Hill. In retaliation to that move Roosevelt ordered all Japanese assets in the United States frozen on July 26, and issued an Executive Order directing the Navy to begin on that same day to protect convoys to Iceland.¹³ One historian, Paul Schroeder, has suggested that if the American Government went on the diplomatic

¹³Consult, Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor, p. 221; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 428 and 579; For Japan's dilemma and reaction see Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo And The Coming Of The War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Chapter II, pp. 310-363.

offensive after July, 1941, the same may be said of Congressional opinion, each certain that, "the freezing orders were to teach Japan that she had gone far enough—indeed, too far—and that she must now begin to retreat."¹⁴ With the collapse of the more moderate Konoye Cabinet and the rise to power of a militaristic government, led by Hideki Tojo on October 16, 1941, Japan clearly indicated her unwillingness to abandon efforts to create an empire in Asia despite stiffening United States diplomatic and economic pressure. Once the futility of altering Japan's course through economic measures became apparent to the men on Capitol Hill, they entertained with less reluctance the possibility of using physical means to halt Japan. Significantly, while the patience of numerous Congressmen had been sufficiently exhausted by Japan's activities to induce them to risk a military engagement, many of these same men clung stubbornly to their non-interventionist beliefs regarding the strife in Europe.¹⁵ Selig Adler has offered an explanation to the apparently paradoxical behavior of these legislators who advocated that America

¹⁴Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American Relations, 1941, p. 175; Schroeder has suggested the rise to power of the militaristic government was the result of the stiffening American position.

¹⁵Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise To World Power, 1898-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), pp. 198-199.

assume, in essence, a double standard in her conduct of international relations with the suggestion that their condescending view of Japan:

...came from the American tendency to belittle the prowess of non-Caucasian races. The Japanese were written off, in popular estimation, as jackals who waited in hiding to pick up stray pieces of territory pried loose during a major encounter of white nations.¹⁶

The question in the declining months of 1941 was no longer whether the United States ought to curtail Japan but rather how best to accomplish this objective. Except for a few diehard non-interventionists as Nye, Clark, and Hiram Johnson, the majority of Congress offered no objections to the Administration's efforts to contain Japan. The evidence for this conclusion did not come from examining changing voting patterns in the last years of peace; once the United States position towards Japan had hardened, the Administration initiated all of the action, removing any need for Congress to legislate anti-Japanese measures. The only means for measuring the alteration of Congressional opinion is through the legislator's reactions to both Government policy and Japanese actions throughout this climactic period in American-Japanese relations. Their speeches and

¹⁶Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1957), p. 289.

correspondence reveal that the distinctions between what had previously been three separate and definite movements, each with its own policies and ideological framework, had begun to blur by 1940 and during this year a number of legislators shifted towards a more extreme position. Furthermore, by 1941, the anti-Japanese movement had grown significantly both in membership and virulence in their attacks upon Japan; many of the former moderates had converted to a hostile position and those Congressmen who had relied upon non-intervention in the past were noticeably silent over the President's freezing of Japanese assets in July, 1941.

One of the most important of the new figures to speak out on Japanese-American relations, Senator Claude Pepper (D. Florida), was indicative of this new temper on the Hill after Japan had allied herself to the European dictatorships. Although he had not been heard from frequently in the past, Pepper now began to emerge as a leader in the movement for a total embargo of Japan, rallying the more belligerent members of Congress around him. Before resigning from the Senate, Schwellenbach congratulated Pepper on joining the anti-Japanese movement, and he aptly presaged future events when the Washington Democrat wished Pepper more success than he and his colleagues had found in trying to induce Congress

to apply a total embargo of trade to Japan.¹⁷

There was a difference between Pepper and many of the earlier devotees of an embargo against Japan. Men such as Pittman, Schwellenbach, King, and Coffee had acted out of a mistrust and fear of Japan, whereas Pepper's new found hostility has been called merely a reflection of the change in Roosevelt's thinking towards Japanese aggression. Greene downgraded the character of Pepper's commitment to the cause of halting Japan in an uncomplimentary observation to Price in which he described the Florida Senator as no more than an Administration errand runner. When the President changed, Pepper changed; when the Administration was in favor of a proposal, Pepper was the voice of the Government.¹⁸ Whether the Senator was acting as an Administration spokesman or whether he finally found it impossible to contain his fears any longer does not detract from his prediction that the uniting of the three totalitarian governments portended a direct threat to American

¹⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12926-12927.

¹⁸Greene to Price, March 4, 1940, RSG Folder # 3, ACNPJA Papers; For Pepper's denial he was just a spokesman for the Administration see U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., October 28, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8290.

security. The Florida Senator also prophesized further that in the meantime "the yellow men of the East" would raise their swords in an attempt to conquer the Netherlands East Indies.¹⁹ Pepper's enmity towards the Axis powers had begun to verge on the intemperate. During the early months of 1941, when the Lend-Lease hearings were in progress, the Senator not only advocated all out aid to the Allies, he demanded that if arms failed to save British democracy then American forces should be utilized.²⁰ Turning his attention to East Asian affairs next, the Florida Democrat parroted Roosevelt's accusation against Mussolini for the Duce's attack on France when he remarked Japan was "...an assassin lurking behind the door to stick a stilleto in our backs", and deemed it necessary to crush her imperialism.²¹

The formation of the Tojo Government in October, 1941, aroused Pepper to new heights of oratory against the Japanese. In order to reduce the Japanese threat,

¹⁹Locke, "Claude D. Pepper: Champion Of Belligerent Democracy," as quoted in Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office, p. 260.

²⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1058.

²¹As quoted in Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American Relations, 1941, p. 187.

Pepper suggested "literally immobilizing her."²² If that policy proved unsuccessful, the Senator stated two days later that the only way to deal with a country like Japan would be to draw a line and warn her if she crossed it, there would be shooting which would no doubt culminate in a war.²³ Within a week following the formation of Tojo's Government, Pepper was ready with a four point plan concerning Japanese-American relations which he presented to the press. Urging in the plan that a blockade be put into effect, he added, "We ought to see to it that Japan gets no materials from outside sources that will fatten her for further conquests."²⁴ To implement the blockade, Pepper said that all exports to Japan could be halted by closing the Panama Canal to her shipping and to all ships destined for her ports and launching patrols in the Pacific area to observe Japanese naval activities.²⁵ When the subject of severing diplomatic relations and possible Japanese retaliation was mentioned, Pepper claimed there was little danger of

²²New York Times, October 17, 1941, p. 8.

²³Ibid., October 19, 1941, p. 10.

²⁴New York Herald Tribune, October 26, 1941, as found in Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers, 77A-F11-Box 227, NA. LD.

²⁵Ibid.

Japan attacking the American mainland or any of its possessions. Showing little foresight, Pepper never indicated that he seriously contemplated any form of armed attack against America right up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In spite of the diplomatic problems his alarming rhetoric imposed on maintaining peaceful relations with the Japanese, Pepper never doubted, if war came, the responsibility would rest with Japan who he blamed for damaging the chances of peace by continuing her aggression in Asia.²⁶

In his newly assumed position as a leading critic of Japan, Pepper also felt it necessary to reveal his displeasure over the Hull-Nomura conversations which were seeking a readjustment of American-Japanese relations in the Pacific. He cautioned that the "...Senate would reject any agreement or treaty with Japan that would make the United States a party to any crime that Japan had committed."²⁷ Asserting that peace in the Orient would come when Japan abandoned her aggression and removed her army from China and Indo-China, the Senator saw no other basis for a rapprochement between the two

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷New York Times, November 20, 1941, p. 10.

countries.²⁸ Two weeks before Pearl Harbor, Pepper predicted America and Japan were verging on a shooting war, warning once again that "we are only waiting for Japan to cross a line before we start shooting."²⁹ Although vague over the whereabouts of this metaphorical line, Pepper insisted that once it was crossed war would ensue. Twelve days later, on December 7, everyone knew where the line was located.

Whereas Pepper's loud denunciations of Japan's militaristic regime would have sounded radical in 1937, by 1941, although still provocative, his outcries found a certain degree of sympathy and acceptance in an increasingly anti-Japanese Congress. Nothing illustrated the changing tone of Congress better than the fate of Representative Coffee's House Resolution 2946, calling for a total embargo of trade to Japan. When Coffee had introduced, in an earlier session, a similar resolution known as House Resolution 5432 which had contained much the same objective, it had been criticized on the floor of the House for being too harsh a measure. But by January 30, 1941, Congress had become so incensed by Japanese actions that Coffee's presentation of this new

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., November 25, 1941, p. 8.

proposal evoked no opposition.³⁰ Speaking for his latest resolution, Coffee did not avoid strong language to justify the need for an embargo. He rejected the less provocative reasons offered by some Congressmen who had claimed that shipments of certain strategic materials to Japan ought to be ended because they were needed at home. Instead, Coffee insisted upon an outright condemnation of Japan for violating the Nine Power Treaty, not just because of the ethical considerations involved in a broken treaty, but because Japan had attacked, invaded, and ravaged a Republic for imperialistic motives. Therefore, it was evident to an indignant Coffee that the United States should no longer participate in that aggression by supplying crucial materials to the Japanese.³¹

Later in the year, on May 5, Coffee introduced Concurrent Resolution 30 directed at investigating the shipment of war materials to Japan. The Rules Committee

³⁰U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., January 30, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 427.

³¹Ibid., See also Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1156; The bill was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee where it was tabled. Consult, Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., January 30, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 427.

held hearings but the bill was not reported out of the committee; the explanation offered was that the State Department opposed such a bill since a war might be precipitated by the enactment of Coffee's proposals.³² Coffee's resolution paralleled Pepper's views that Japan should be stopped by economic sanctions and the State Department feared the repercussions on American-Japanese foreign policy if such a proposal was enacted.³³ To accomplish this goal, these men believed all that was needed was a total American commitment to thwart Japan's quest for a new order in Asia.

Congressman Charles I. Faddis, another of the early members of the anti-Japanese group in the House, could not have agreed more completely with their sentiments, and reiterated his willingness to support any form of legislation to insure Japan's military and economic collapse.³⁴ In 1941, Faddis publicized his views in speaking engagements under the sponsorship of the

³²Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3602; Additional discussion by Coffee may be found in Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3640-3641.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1196-1198.

American Committee. The theme of the addresses was identical with what he was saying in Congress; Japan must be embargoed to prevent her aim of establishing a military and economic hegemony in Asia. Joining Coffee, Faddis remained a steadfast opponent of Japan in the House and lent unwavering support to the Price Committee's objectives.³⁵

Along with Pepper, Coffee, and Faddis, other Congressmen who in the previous years had professed few opinions on the issue of sanctions or severing of diplomatic relations began to agitate for a harsher policy towards Japan. Some of their statements were exercises in irresponsibility and showed an inability to recognize the ramifications their bellicosity might have on American foreign policy. Congressman Albert Gore (D. Tennessee), while expressing his wish for an embargo, gave a good illustration of the provocative type of remarks that were being heard with greater frequency in Congress. He used an unfortunate choice of words to describe the Japanese, referring to them as those

³⁵Greene to Katherine Greene, July 29, 1941, "RSG To KG, 1941," folder, Greene MSS. An example of Faddis' speeches may be found in U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., October 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 7725-7727 and Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., October 17, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8008.

"...scrubby, contemptible, squint eyed sons of the Rising Sun", who should be pummeled into oblivion.³⁶

Another freshman Congressman, Clyde T. Ellis (D. Arkansas), told his colleagues in the House he was ready to give Japan one week to withdraw from the Axis Pact, from China, and from all of Asia. Upon Japan's failure to comply with that ultimatum, and Ellis was sure she would fail, he considered it right and proper for the United States to begin at once "...the process of polishing her [Japan] into insignificance."³⁷ Other notable Democrats including Senators Tom Connally (Texas), Alban Barkley (Kentucky), and Guy M. Gillette (Iowa), adhered to a harsher policy and began to make stronger statements than they had done previously.³⁸ Senator Gillette summed up their viewpoint when he stated it was time "...to drop the policy of appeasement we have followed with Japan."³⁹ In his growing dislike of Japan

³⁶U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 19, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1197; Also consult, Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., October 17, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 8008.

³⁷Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3356.

³⁸For Connally, consult New York Times, January 12, 1941, p. 2; Gillette's comments may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3888 and May 15, 1941, 4108; For Barkley, consult, New York Times, August 25, 1941, p. 10.

³⁹Senator Gillette's comment is quoted in Baltimore Sun, October 12, 1941 found in Scrapbook, Part 3, #606B, Connally MSS.

and his increasing animosity towards non-interventionists since the outbreak of war in Europe, Connally too, warned:

If Japan wants war and must have a fight she will find out that we have a Navy in the Pacific that can shoot straight. We have rights and are not afraid to fight for them.⁴⁰

The comments of these Congressmen, and especially Connally who now advocated defense and protection of American rights in Asia,⁴¹ reveal how widespread the anti-Japanese movement had grown; no longer the monopoly of just Western Democrats and a few Eastern Congressmen, now all geographical regions were represented in this grouping.

The desire to stop Japan had gained sufficient respectability and enough influential supporters to stimulate the conversion of an ever larger number of Congressmen to a harsher policy. That conversion was nowhere more apparent than in the statements of Representative Hamilton Fish.⁴² Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact, which had acted as a catalyst in changing the opinion of so many others, also proved to

⁴⁰New York Times, December 3, 1941, p. 6.

⁴¹For a comparison of Connally's view in 1937 when he advocated withdraw of Americans from China and his view in 1941, consult Supra, Chapter II, pp. 70-71.

⁴²U.S. Congress, House, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., October 1, 1940, Congressional Record, LXXXVI, 12944-12945.

Fish the futility of his non-interventionist position towards Japan; as nothing else could have done, this alliance convinced him to take a more hostile stance. Believing in the necessity of a moral-ethical defense of American interests, Fish claimed Japan's link to the Rome-Berlin Axis challenged the American position and honor in Asia. He restated his fear that Japan might attempt to drive Americans from the Orient and remarked that the United States must defend what it considered to be its vital interests.⁴³ In December, 1940, Fish even reacted favorably to Roosevelt's "Arsenal Of Democracy" speech, considering the message one of the most forceful the President had ever delivered.⁴⁴ The Congressman's acceptance of a stronger position towards Japan did not, however, extend to his views of Europe where he continued to maintain his non-interventionist posture, even voting against the Lend-Lease Act.⁴⁵ When questioned on the floor of the House about his antithetical positions, Fish did admit a loan to Great Britain might be in order but purposely avoided a definite commitment to a strong

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴New York Times, December 30, 1940, p. 8.

⁴⁵U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 815.

stand in European matters.⁴⁶ Throughout 1941, apparently undeterred by his inconsistency in matters of foreign policy, Fish continued his criticism of Japan's aggressive militarism, her link to Germany and Italy, and continuing threat to American interests in Asia.⁴⁷

By 1941, Fish was not the only Republican to recognize how wide the gap had grown between the United States and Japan. A firm believer in remaining dis-entangled from overseas conflicts, freshman Representative Herman Carl Andersen (Minnesota) stated that after wrestling with the dilemma of American-Japanese relations, he now felt it would be wise to end all gasoline and oil shipments to Japan. The newly converted Andersen reasoned:

Surely it is time to forget the profits of oil companies and stop this supplying of the number one war necessity, oil, to a nation which has shown anything but a friendly attitude to our country of late.⁴⁸

Even more adamant than Andersen in his belief that there was no way to settle the outstanding issues with Japan was a fellow Republican, Bertrand W. Gearhart (California). Because of Japan's "heinous crimes" against humanity, the

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷New York Times, August 11, 1941, p. 3.

⁴⁸U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 3862.

three term Californian felt compelled to suggest a four part program for the Administration to follow and incorporate into the formulation of American-East Asian policy. It included the provisions America should do nothing to aid Japan, use every method to cripple her while aiding the victims of her aggression; finally, if Japan was not halted in her expansion, then declare war in order to crush her permanently.⁴⁹

Joining Fish, Andersen, and Gearhart in the growing list of converts to the anti-Japanese cause was a long time leader of Western Republican Progressives, Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska. No one member of Congress' change in attitude with respect to foreign policy could have had any greater impact on moderates in Congress. For over twenty-five years Norris had rejected any form of international entanglements; opposing in 1917 American entry into the World War, voting against the League of Nations after the war, and in the 1930's voting against the World Court proposal while firmly supporting mandatory and rigid neutrality legislation.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in

⁴⁹Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., November 23, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 5492-5493.

⁵⁰New York Times, January 30, 1935, p. 1; For an analysis of his non-interventionist beliefs see "After Twenty Years," Christian Century, LIV (Mar. 31, 1937), pp. 412-413.

spite of this long record of non-interventionism, by 1939, Norris had come to recognize the dissimilarities between the events leading up to the First World War and the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of this new war in Europe.⁵¹ The Senator now ascribed to the view that the Axis plans of aggression and conquest directly threatened the safety and security of the United States.⁵² Alarmed by the danger a possible defeat of Great Britain posed to American security and the Atlantic community, Norris voted for the repeal of the arms embargo on October 27, 1939, and then voted for the Lend-Lease Act on March 8, 1941, on the supposition "Hitler's triumphs had simplified America's choices." Moreover, if Germany were victorious in Europe, Norris added, Japan would then create disturbances in the Pacific region, forcing the United States to fight a war on two fronts.⁵³

⁵¹George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography Of George W. Norris (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 392; U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1975-1980; "American Neutrality," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Nov. 1, 1939), pp. 62-64.

⁵²Norris, Fighting Liberal, p. 392; U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1975-1980.

⁵³U.S. Congress, Senate, 76th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 1939, Congressional Record, LXXXV, 1024; Norris, Fighting Liberal, p. 392; "American Neutrality," Vital Speeches Of The Day, pp. 62-64; U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., March 8, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 2097.

Paralleling his acceptance of a more active United States role in the European conflict, Norris also began to develop, from 1938 onwards, a deep antagonism towards Japan for her wilful invasion of China the previous year. He accepted the need for a boycott of war materials to Japan although he did not call for a total embargo.⁵⁴ By 1941, Norris was ready to state that Japan possessed none of the genuine humane intentions of a peaceful nation and furthermore had initiated a crime against the Chinese people. He not only favored any action to end Japan's aggression, but continued to consider that nation completely treacherous in all of its international dealings.⁵⁵ With the Japanese signing of the Tripartite Pact and the formation of the Tojo Cabinet a year later, Norris' alienation from Japan became complete; consequently, any action America took against the Japanese Empire should be firm, Norris remarked, and he would be willing to give his full support.⁵⁶ For Norris and many of his colleagues, the fighting in Eastern and Southeastern Asia was viewed as an extension of the war in

⁵⁴Norris to Edwin Borchard, January 4, 1938 and to Freda Kirchwey, March 19, 1938, Tray 104, Box 4, Norris MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁵Norris, Fighting Liberal, pp. 208-210.

⁵⁶Ibid.

Europe. Sooner or later, he claimed, we would have to fight because the United States "...cannot appease Japan any more than we can appease Hitler."⁵⁷ Like many of his counterparts in Congress, Norris' statements concerning the European situation tended to be more temperate and cautious than his comments on the East Asian conflict.

Undergoing a change similar in nature to that of Norris', Senator Styles Bridges (R. New Hampshire), another staunch non-interventionist, had by 1941, acquiesced to the need for a harsher policy to contain Japan.⁵⁸ He remarked:

I don't think there is anything to be gained by trying to appease the Japanese. We have to be firm with them—it's the only language they know.⁵⁹

Two weeks later the language was transferred to the battlefield.

With increasing frequency throughout 1941, the heretofore uncommitted Congressmen were abandoning their cherished, non-interventionist attitudes in order to

⁵⁷New York Times, October 19, 1940, p. 10.

⁵⁸Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-1941, p. 230. The authors considered Bridges an "isolationist stalwart". Bridges, however, was closer to the moral-ethical grouping which advocated defending freedom of the seas; see Robert A. Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality, p. 186.

⁵⁹New York Times, November 21, 1941, p. 5.

support an actively aggressive American campaign against Japan. Two long time advocates of an American withdrawal from Asia, Arthur Vandenberg and Arthur Capper, finding themselves faced with the prospect of remaining silent onlookers to the spectacle of overt Japanese aggression, now also began to shift their positions.

Capper, in particular, found it difficult to restrain his frustration over the extended conflict in China and had correspondence with the American Committee concerning Japanese military movements into Southeast Asia.⁶⁰ The only alternative Capper saw open to him was to support stronger measures against Japan, a policy that already had gained much popularity with his constituency in Kansas.⁶¹ Accepting this condition, Capper then began to admonish his former non-interventionist colleagues for impeding the passage of an embargo now that he had become convinced economic measures were the most effective means for stopping Japan. He justified his new posture by claiming that since Japan cherished none of America's ideas of justice, democracy, or peace, he was afraid that

⁶⁰Capper to Harry B. Price, October 8, 1940, "Congressional Correspondence File," ACNPJA Papers; Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

⁶¹"Bad News For The Isolationists," New Republic, CV (Sept. 29, 1941), p. 403.

the Japanese would seek to destroy China's independence and enslave the Orient under the myth of Pan-Asianism. Furthermore, America should be chastised, in Capper's view, for allowing Japan's violations of international law and morality to escape unpunished.⁶²

Reflecting the tendency seen in other moderates turned belligerent to compartmentalize American diplomacy into two separate spheres—Asian and European—Capper continued to show a great reluctance to engage the United States in the problems of Europe. Referring to the war raging across the Atlantic, Capper berated his fellow Congressmen for attempting to involve the United States, and he opposed the type of all out aid to the allies incorporated in the Lend-Lease bill, although he never voiced any objection to aiding China. The Senator feared a war with Hitler and thought aiding Britain might bring this about.⁶³ He suggested that the United States resign herself to remaining aloof from the European war, stating:

⁶²U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1636-1637.

⁶³Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 202; "Time To Think American," Scribner's Commentator, IX (Feb. 1941), pp. 69-74; "Let Us Keep Out Of War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII, (Mar. 1, 1941), pp. 293-296.

Whether we like it or not we should make up our minds that we probably have to live in the same world with Mussolini and Hitler.⁶⁴

Although he evidenced few qualms about advising restraint in European affairs, Capper was not so willing to live in the same world with an expansionistic, militaristic, and totalitarian Japan.⁶⁵ Not until the fight over Lend-Lease was over did Capper reevaluate international affairs commenting:

Isolation and non-intervention are dead issues. Today the foreign policies of the United States, the very life of the United States and the lives and fortune of the people of the United States are tied into the programs and policies of the British Empire in its fight against the Axis powers.⁶⁶

Shortly before Pearl Harbor, Capper spoke out for a rigid policy towards Japan in which the United States should attempt to cripple the Japanese military machine and resist granting any demands. As stunned as other Congressmen whose views had hardened during the final year

⁶⁴"Let Us Keep Out Of War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, p. 294; "Time To Think American," Scribner's Commentator, p. 74.

⁶⁵Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

⁶⁶Ibid.; For Capper's praise of the "Arsenal Of Democracy" speech see New York Times, December 30, 1940, p. 8 which was an early indicator of his reevaluation.

of peace, Capper, too was shocked by the attack on an American possession. But he refused to admit that he and his colleagues might have had any share in the breakdown of relations between the two countries despite their frequent and contemptuous denunciations of the Japanese which had often been tinged with hints of racial superiority.⁶⁷ Capper entertained no doubts that Japan was completely at fault for Pearl Harbor.⁶⁸

Far more reluctant to divest himself of his non-interventionism than Senator Capper had been, Senator Vandenberg exemplified the agonies experienced by those men who were firmly dedicated to the pursuit of peaceful coexistence in the world. Given the international situation as it existed in the year preceding Pearl Harbor, attempts to maintain the peace proved to be a thankless task full of obstacles which could not be surmounted even by the best intentions. In the past Vandenberg had objected strongly to any American involvement overseas, claiming it might create conflicts

⁶⁷Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, p. 184.

⁶⁸Ibid.; In addition, consult Capper's speech in U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., December 30, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 5717-5719, which appears to be a statement of contrition for being an obstacle in furthering defense preparations prior to Pearl Harbor. For his views on military preparedness, see Socolofsky, Arthur Capper, pp. 175-176.

leading to war. Moreover, he had maintained the conviction that the United States could best avoid war by acting unilaterally rather than in concert with other major powers, thereby risking involvement in their quarrels.

Unfortunately for Vandenberg's theories world events prior to 1941, as well as throughout that entire crucial year, were destroying the viability of his past contentions. Acknowledging the failure of his non-interventionist beliefs, Vandenberg nevertheless clung to the idea that war could still be avoided if only the United States used sagacious diplomacy and indicated a willingness to satisfy some Japanese demands. To insure that the United States did not become involved in a new war, Vandenberg admitted it might even be practical for America to join with other countries who had an interest in preserving peace.⁶⁹

As a complement to his proposal for a multilateral search for peace, Vandenberg produced a positive program for enhancing Japanese-American relations to counteract the increasingly negative, antipathetical tone that

⁶⁹Vandenberg to Paul Rood, June 1, 1940, Vandenberg MSS; Vandenberg and Morris, eds., The Private Papers Of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 3-4.

Congress was taking towards Japan. Certain that war with Japan would severely debilitate America's economy, Vandenberg urged satisfying some of Japan's goals in Asia in place of instituting an embargo which could only further antagonize her. Great benefits could accrue from proceeding along such a path assured Vandenberg, by yielding certain areas, Japan might be pacified, and this in turn could perhaps induce her to break with Nazi Germany and Facist Italy, dealing these European powers a severe blow.⁷⁰ The Michigan Republican believed the United States could survive regardless of what kind of settlement occurred in Asia; therefore, America should recognize Manchukuo and guarantee Japan some concessions in China. He noted:

China is big enough so that additional territorial concessions, or trade zones, might have been arranged to the advantage of China herself in return for a guaranteed peace.⁷¹

Although he did not condone Japanese aggression, Vandenberg believed America's best interests would not be served by continuing a dogmatic diplomatic attitude. In fact, the

⁷⁰Vandenberg and Morris, eds., The Private Papers Of Senator Vandenberg, p. 17.

⁷¹Ibid.; Also consult, Vandenberg Scrapbook, "December, 1941-December, 1942," Vandenberg MSS.

highest statesmanship the United States could hope to practice in 1941 would be to sever Tokyo from Berlin.⁷²

Once Vandenberg had created an alternative policy which could contend with the program sponsored by the anti-Japanese group, he found a number of non-interventionists in Congress receptive to his conciliatory ideas. Senators Bennett Champ Clark and Gerald P. Nye were especially pleased to have another option to follow which excluded any new provocations directed at the Japanese. In Clark's estimation, if the United States would no present a military challenge to a reordering of the status quo in Europe or the Far East, it did not have to fear an attack from Germany or her ally, Japan.⁷³ Nye agreed that the Pacific region was safe from an attack, and moreover, that an end could be brought to the Sino-Japanese conflict if only America enabled Japan to "save face" in its disastrous China operation. Following Vandenberg's lead, Nye too, acceded to his suggestion that Japan receive concessions

⁷²Ibid.; Vandenberg to B.E. Hutchinson, October 28, 1944; See also Diary entry, December 9, 1941, Scrapbook XII; For Vandenberg's attempt to be prudent and wise concerning East Asian affairs see Vandenberg to Irving Glassband, November 18, 1941, found in Vandenberg MSS.

⁷³U.S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., February 18, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 1108.

in China, including an air base in Shanghai, and then resume trade with the United States.⁷⁴

A ranking moderate and non-interventionist, Senator Walter George (D. Georgia), had not yet spoken about the issue of Japanese-American relations. But finding significant similarities between Vandenberg's premises and his own thinking on the issues of the day, he knew he might find a segment of Congress receptive to his ideas. Following Japan's move into South Indo-China in July, 1941, George remarked that if Japan engaged in no further aggression the United States could work out a rapprochement with that nation concerning all Asian matters. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following the death of Key Pittman, until July 31, 1941, George admitted he feared a complete severance of relations with Japan since he did not consider American measures, short of war, capable of stopping Japan's moves into Southeast Asia.⁷⁵

Another of the non-interventionists, Hiram Johnson,

⁷⁴New York Times, November 21, 1941, p. 5; Nye's reflections on how his policies could have prevented war may be consulted in Cole, Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations, p. 199; New York Times, December 8, 1941, p. 6.

⁷⁵New York Times, August 3, 1941, p. 21.

considered America a cowardly nation and remarked it would be more courageous and brave to declare war on England's enemies than to have the Administration precipitate incidents and pass legislation like Lend-Lease. Let Congress declare war, Johnson intoned, or let America seriously refrain from involvement in the World War raging in Europe. In the same month his remarks appeared in Scribner's Commentator, Johnson had his opportunity to vote for a declaration of war.⁷⁶

With the exception of Nye, Clark, Vandenberg, and George, by 1941 few Congressmen had faith in the efficacy of conciliating Japan; the arguments being forwarded by the anti-Japanese group proved far more popular with an ever growing number of Congressmen. Nevertheless, up to the day Pearl Harbor was attacked some members of Congress persisted in vacillating between one policy and another. No better example of the indecision and lack of commitment to any one approach to Japanese-American relations could be found than in the person of Senator Burton K. Wheeler. At times staunchly defending the position held by Nye and Vandenberg, the Montana Democrat had little hesitation in turning one hundred

⁷⁶"Let's Declare Ourselves," Scribner's Commentator, XI (Dec. 1941), pp. 93-97.

and eighty degrees to espouse diplomatic, economic and military actions which could only produce a conflict with Japan. Revealing no firm beliefs based on any penetrating analysis of world events, he called, in June, 1940, for all out aid to the Allies in the wake of France's capitulation.⁷⁷ Later he voted against the legislation which had been designed to help the Allies, claiming that passage of Lend-Lease would allow President Roosevelt to begin "...leasing and lending American boys."⁷⁸ In a condemnation of the act, he called it the New Deal's "Triple 'A' foreign policy to plow under every fourth American boy."⁷⁹ Never tiring of reminding his colleagues that England deserved only American sympathy, not her support, Wheeler was fond of repeating Lord Palmerston's famous dictum: "England has no eternal enmities and no eternal friendships. She has only eternal interests."⁸⁰ Therefore, Wheeler frequently

⁷⁷"Evolution Of A Senator," Time, XXXV (June. 24, 1940), pp. 15-16.

⁷⁸"America's Present Emergency," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (Jan. 15, 1941), pp. 203-205.

⁷⁹Kay, "Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life, pp. 118-119; U. S. Congress, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st sess., January 12, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 178-179.

⁸⁰"The American People Want No War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (June. 1, 1941), p. 489.

reminded Congress and the American people that the United States should not rush to defend an England that had been ungrateful before and would be again.⁸¹

Wheeler's inconsistency with respect to the advice he disseminated in Congress about Europe extended to his views of Japanese-American relations as well. Indicating no reluctance to aid Chiang Kai-shek or embargo trade to Japan,⁸² he approved, in July, 1941, the freezing of Japanese assets in order to "...slow up Japan from an economic standpoint and call their bluff so they will not start anything serious."⁸³ Apparently Wheeler's actions and words inferred that he had no serious misgivings about fighting Japan should American policy instigate a military retaliation.⁸⁴ But upon hearing of Tojo's selection as Premier, War Minister, and Home Minister, Wheeler pointedly ignored his previous assertions. Taking a considerably different tact, the Montana Democrat proposed that the United States and

⁸¹Ibid.; See also "America Beware," Scribner's Commentator, X (June. 1941), pp. 88-92.

⁸²Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, p. 289.

⁸³As quoted in Cole, America First, pp. 189-190; New York Times, July 26, 1941, p. 7.

⁸⁴Ibid.

Japan could settle their differences peaceably "...unless the hotheads of Japan go crazy."⁸⁵ Two days later he urged caution in dealing with Japan for he saw no reason for a Pacific war. He even stated, "I cannot imagine anything more helpful for Hitler than us jumping into the war with Japan."⁸⁶ Like Nye, Wheeler considered the only reason the Administration was being belligerent was to save England's Oriental empire which he remarked was a monumental tragedy.⁸⁷

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Wheeler commented:

The Japanese have chosen war. We must now exert our every energy, not only to win but to give the Japanese such a whipping, that they will not want war again.⁸⁸

Yet he still criticized the Administration and especially Cordell Hull for bringing on the war. With twenty-one years of hindsight Wheeler remarked, "I believe we might have avoided an attack if the President had required Hull to negotiate seriously and realistically with the

⁸⁵New York Times, October 17, 1941, p. 8.

⁸⁶Ibid., October 19, 1941, p. 10.

⁸⁷Ibid., November 12, 1941, p. 8.

⁸⁸Ibid., December 8, 1941, p. 6.

Japanese."⁸⁹ Furthermore, Wheeler suggested that Hull rejected and ridiculed all Japanese claims in Asia thereby forcing that nation to strike first for a redress of grievances.⁹⁰ The Japanese solved the Senator's dilemma of searching for honor and courting appeasement. While laying blame for the coming of the war on Hull and the Administration, Wheeler did not remind himself that he had supported aid to Chiang Kai-shek and the freezing of Japanese assets in America. Like other non-interventionists, he viewed American involvement in Europe and Asia differently; but in the case of the latter area, he was as provocative at times as any member of the anti-Japanese grouping.⁹¹

The attack on Pearl Harbor resolved the debate within Congress concerning what American policy should be vis-a-vis Japan, and initiated the rhetoric of unanimity. No longer were there any demands at one extreme for legislation hostile to Japan while at the other extreme rejection of any involvement in East Asian affairs. The word was now unity. The goal was

⁸⁹Wheeler and Healy, Yankee From The West, p. 31.

⁹⁰Letter Burton K. Wheeler to the author, March 19, 1969, in the author's possession.

⁹¹See for instance, Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1941, p. 10.

victory.⁹² Representative Charles Plumley (R. Vermont), summed up Congressional sentiments after December 7, when he told his colleagues the debate was over. He reminded them it was now just idle talk to keep discussing what could have prevented the tragedy in the Pacific, for the unimaginable was now a reality.⁹³ "Out of the sky came a vicious assault by a skillful and determined enemy", remarked Congressman Clare E. Hoffman (R. Michigan), and in the aftermath of the attack Congress was now resolved to militarily crushing Japanese expansionism.⁹⁴ The bi-partisan support for an anti-Japanese stance in Congress, taking shape since late 1940, was now completed; both parties closed ranks to form a united front. The question was no longer how to stay out of war with Japan, but how to survive and win the conflict.

⁹²The only negative vote was cast by Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin (R. Montana), in the House of Representatives; Miss Rankin had voted against entry into World War I and was unsuccessful in her attempt to win a senatorial seat in 1918. She won again in 1940, just in time to return to Capitol Hill and object once again to war declarations. See Biographical Directory Of The American Congress, pp. 1497-1498.

⁹³U.S. Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 5506.

⁹⁴Ibid., 77th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 1941, Congressional Record, LXXXVII, 9856; An earlier non-interventionist, Hoffman's ideas may be consulted in Schoonmaker and Reid., eds., We Testify, p. 304.

For the moment, there was no difference between Pepper, Fish, Clark, Nye, Vandenberg, or Wheeler. The assault on Pearl Harbor did not end political controversies; nevertheless, the attack channeled Congressional opinion into a single purpose, a single determination and a single resolve to win the war. For the first time in many years, it could truthfully be stated that the irresolute years regarding Congressional opinion towards Japan had ended.

CONCLUSION

After dissecting Congressional opinion towards Japan, two generalizations can be concluded; one, it changed dramatically during the years 1937 to 1941, and two, as it evolved, it passed through three stages. The first of these stages, extending from 1937 to 1939, was characterized by a Congress divided between those calling for economic sanctions, those urging protection of neutral rights, and those pressing for a complete American withdrawal from Asia. In this early period, the differences of opinion were too great to be breached, and the six attempts made at initiating legislation against Japan never even reached the floor of the Senate or the House. The second stage, marked by a gradual blurring of the differences separating each of these groups, a disintegration of the moderate position in favor of one of the two extremes, a shift in support of a harsher policy against Japan, and the start of overt Administration action for an embargo, emerged throughout the year 1940. The third stage, a general identification of Congressional opinion with the goals of the anti-Japanese movement, culminated in the summer and fall of 1941 with the freezing order issued by Roosevelt in July and the rise of the militaristic Tojo Government three

months later.

What accounted for this divergence of opinion until 1941? One commonly held belief, that American interests would be adversely affected by a Japanese hegemony over China, influenced many legislators to take a stand against Japan. Some Congressmen also had previous animosities against that nation, reflecting their own racial prejudices or those of their constituents. Other Congressmen, insisting that international relations comply with legal, moral and ethical standards, pictured Japan as the personification of an international outlaw, breaking treaties and bombing women and children. Pressure groups like the American Committee, lobbying in Washington, effectively united these issues, bringing them to the attention of a wide range of legislators while at the same time agitating for an embargo. Early converts to the anti-Japanese movement also labored to educate their colleagues to the threat in Asia. Furthermore, the activities of Japan herself, no less than other issues, accelerated the transformation in Congressional opinion. This process of change received a final stimulus from the Administration after 1940; once Roosevelt had begun to act, the desire to follow the President's lead persuaded many previously uncommitted legislators to favor an embargo.

With all of these pressures bearing upon Congressional

opinion, no legislation directed against Japan ever emerged because another series of issues, equally potent in formulating opinion, countered the influence of the anti-Japanese movement. Among these forces acting to restrain Congress, Japan herself, frequently helped to blunt hostility by reaching compromises with the United States on such potentially volatile topics as the settlement of the Panay affair. Prior to 1940, the Administration offered little encouragement to Congressional efforts to pass an embargo. Yet, without active support from the President, there could be little chance for overcoming Congress' reluctance to pass such controversial legislation, and many legislators, rather than try, claimed such attempts might either embarrass or anger Roosevelt. Another significant portion of Congress, convinced of the need to continue expansion of American trade, abhorred all war as detrimental to overseas commercial interests. International trade could best be promoted by remaining neutral and not alienating either customer, Japan or China. A further check on precipitious action was the fear of a possible two front war should American security become simultaneously threatened in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Most potent of all considerations, however, was a fear of getting caught once again in another world war, and a number of Congressmen clung to the hope, even after it

had become impractical, that neutrality would provide the means for preventing the United States from becoming involved. Thus these men were disposed to appease Japan, even if it meant the dismemberment of China and the loss of much of Southeast Asia.

Many of these issues lost their attraction as events rapidly approached a climax in 1941, and the number of men willing to follow a strictly non-belligerent policy dwindled considerably. But Congressional opinion had been seriously split throughout much of this period; no legislation had been produced, and in the end only the Administration, through Executive Order, transcended these divisions.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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The historical record concerning Congressional opinion towards Japan from 1937 to 1941 offers a varied and vivid account of American history. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the sources which have been consulted and form the foundation of this study. The essay is divided into ten parts: Manuscript Sources; Government Printed Sources; Newspaper and Periodicals; Biographies, Autobiographies, and Memoirs; General Studies; Monographs And Articles Pertaining To Congress; Articles Pertaining To Various Congressmen; General Articles On American Foreign Policy; General Attacks On Japan; Unpublished Sources.

I. Manuscript Sources:

For this study an important research location was the private papers of various Congressmen who voiced opinions concerning Japanese-American relations in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, these papers were not as valuable as had been anticipated; however, they do offer a beginning in the research for the individual Congressman's viewpoint through his letters and correspondence. The

vast collection of the William E. Borah Papers are almost devoid of any comments on American-Japanese relations. There are more than seven hundred boxes which are in good order through the twenties when he was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but thin out considerably in the thirties. There are also fifty-five reels of microfilm reproduced from the Borah Scrapbooks at the University of Idaho. The Scrapbooks are a narcissistic collection offering some letters but the majority of the items contain newspaper clippings of the senator's career.

The Tom Connally Papers are also disappointing and the most relevant materials are boxes 134 and 135 as well as Scrapbook number 602. There are twelve scrapbooks covering the years 1937-1941. The Key Pittman Papers contain two hundred and one boxes yet given his position in the Senate and his connections with the State Department and the White House, the manuscript collection is nearly useless as a source for understanding the Senator's views towards Japan. Since both Connally and Pittman were Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is surprising and disappointing that the collections offer so little.

One of the leading anti-Japanese senators, Lewis B. Schwellenbach, gave no indication in his Papers where the foundations of his foreign policies originated. The

collection contains nearly four thousand items in ten containers. The only relevant material can be found in Box 2 "Speeches And Statements 1940-1946,". The James Hamilton Lewis MSS, the Charles McNary MSS, and the George Norris MSS are nearly devoid of any information on Japan as well. Finally, the Cordell Hull Papers, opened to 1939 for all researchers when the author was at the Library of Congress, were of no help in searching for the correspondence between the State Department and the Congress. Permission was granted by the State Department Historical Division to see the Papers for the years 1940 to 1941 but nothing new was noted that could not be viewed in Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull (2 vols; New York: Macmillan, 1948).

The Franklin Delano Roosevelt MSS, located at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, are an indispensable wealth of material concerning the Administration's correspondence with Congress and men who had influence on Capitol Hill. The collection is immense and the researcher is indeed fortunate to have some very fine archivists available for assistance. The most important portions of the Papers for this study included the following:

Papers as President, Official File,
1933-1945 (755 linear feet), Group 13.

Papers as President, President's
Personal File, 1933-1945 (433 linear
feet), Group 13.

Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, 1933-1945 (82 linear feet), Group 13.

In addition, the Roosevelt Library houses the R. Walton Moore and the Elbert Duncan Thomas Papers. In particular, the Thomas collection is disappointing considering the Senator's connections with the Mormon Church in Japan, his fluency in the language and a desire for peaceful and cordial relations between the two countries. There is hardly a note, letter, address or viewpoint that Thomas wrote which cannot be found in the Congressional Record or the New York Times, yet in the collection are missing or completely omitted.

The Littauer Center Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, houses the American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression Papers. The file is extremely easy to use as important men in the Committee or those who corresponded to the Executive Secretary, Harry B. Price, or the Chairman, Roger S. Greene, have separate files. Far more important and useful, however, were the Roger Sherman Greene Papers at the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The collection consists of incoming and outgoing correspondence emphasizing the work of Greene as Chairman of the ACNPJA and the Committee To Defend America By Aiding The Allies. The former Committee was an important and formidable pressure group attempting

to gain public, Congressional, and Administration support for a total embargo of trade to Japan. Greene was a refreshingly candid man and his correspondence to his wife, Katherine, is not only relevant but provides the researcher with a glimpse at an intense yet at times very human individual. The collection was not indexed or catalogued when the author viewed them, but in 1971 the Library hopes to accomplish that task.

The Vandenberg MSS located in the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, was valuable in viewing an important non-interventionist in the 1930's. For this study the most valuable materials were: letters to and from Vandenberg; his speeches between 1928 and 1950; his scrapbooks. The last consist primarily of twenty-three bound volumes of press clippings relating to his senatorial career between 1928 and 1950. Their greatest value lies in Vandenberg's comments on events with which he was concerned; they also include his evaluation of other men. The letters before 1941 are limited and before 1938 almost non-existent. Arthur Vandenberg Jr. destroyed many of the Senator's addresses, speeches and papers before 1938 considering them inconsequential and in doing so destroyed a valuable source in the history of American non-interventionism.

Finally, the Louis Ludlow Papers, located in the

Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, were helpful in evaluating Ludlow's activities following the sinking of the Panay. There are thirty-nine boxes, three hundred and thirty pieces in the manuscript collection although nine boxes are uncatalogued. Some of the Indiana Congressman's correspondence is interesting but no great concern about Japan is evident throughout the life of Ludlow.

II. Government Printed Sources:

The most indispensable source for reviewing Congressional speeches and debates concerning Japanese-American relations was the Congressional Record. In particular, the 75th Congress, meeting in three sessions from January 5, 1937 to June 16, 1938, revealed the Congress' initial reaction to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The 76th Congress, in session from January 3, 1939 to January 3, 1941, was rich in material following the outbreak of World War II in Europe and Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact. Finally, the 77th Congress, especially the first session from January 3, 1941 until January 2, 1942, is an invaluable contemporary record of the last year of peace.

In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Papers and the House Foreign Affairs Committee Papers, in the Legislative Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C., were extremely useful. The Senate Papers are open

to all researchers without conditions while access to the House collection is gained through the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and no direct quotations are permitted. To gain access to the papers is not a formidable task and usually a letter to one's Congressman is sufficient.

The State Department File, National Archives, Washington, D.C., was especially valuable in connection with the salmon fishing controversy in 1937. Access is granted by the Director of the Historical Division, Department of States, and notes are scrutinized. The archivists are extremely knowledgeable and if the researcher follows the State Department's procedures the receiving of files is facilitated. The most relevant file for this study was 711.000/N. Pacific of which all notes were returned without deletion. The Department does ask the researcher to quote from Government sources if the same material has been printed by the Government Printing Office.

Also of value for this study were the hearings on various subjects before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In particular, consult, U.S. Congress, Hearings Before The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, Neutrality... February 13, 1937, pursuant to Proposed Legislation On Neutrality (75th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1937, 25 pp; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy...February 16-19 and February 23, 1937, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 147 and House Joint Resolution 242 (75th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937, 177 pp; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Relations, Neutrality, Peace Legislation And Our Foreign Policy...April 5-May 8, 1939, pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 21, Senate Joint Resolution 67, Senate Joint Resolution 97, Senate Joint Resolution 106, Senate Concurrent Resolution 8, Senate 203 and Senate 1745 (76th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939, 636, pp. Appendix; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs, American Neutrality Policy...April 11-13; 17-21; 24-28 and May 2, 1939, pursuant to Public Resolution No. 27 (76th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939, 639 pp. Tables; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs, To Promote The Defense Of The United States...January 15-18; 21-25; and January 29, 1941, pursuant to House Resolution 1776 (77th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941, 692 pp; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Relations, To Promote The Defense Of The United States...January 27-February 3;

February 4-February 11, 1941, pursuant to Senate Resolution 275 (77th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941, 914 pp; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs, Arming American Merchant Vessels...October 13-October 14, 1941, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 237 (77th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941, 84 pp; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Foreign Relations, Modification Of The Neutrality Act Of 1939...October 21-October 24, 1941, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 237 (77th Cong., 1st sess.) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941, 291 pp; Also consult State Department Press Releases until June 30, 1939; Thereinafter called State Department Bulletin from July 1, 1939. Valuable in reading drafts of Governmental actions and announcements of Government policies for this study from 1937 to 1941. Of some value were the Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, Japan: 1931-1941 (2vols; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943) and Department of State, Peace And War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943); Exports and imports to and from Japan may be found in Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce And Navigation Of The United States For The Calendar Year (Washington: Government Printing Office). A report was made for each year. A general overview of each Congressman's career may be seen

in Biographical Directory Of The American Congress 1774-1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961).

III. Newspapers And Periodicals:

By far the most authoritative and valuable contemporary source besides the Congressional Record was The New York Times. The reporters of that newspaper on Capitol Hill were indeed clairvoyant on various subjects concerning American-Japanese relations. The index was indispensable in searching out specific comments and speeches.

The most important periodicals were Vital Speeches Of The Day and the Congressional Digest which reprinted many important speeches on relations with Japan. Furthermore, the American Mercury, the pacifistic Christian Century, Current History, Current Opinion, Forum, Literary Digest, Nation, New Republic, Outlook, and Review Of Reviews were notable in writing about or reproducing articles concerned with important Congressmen. More scholarly periodicals including the Annals Of The American Academy Of Social And Political Science, Foreign Affairs and the American Political Science Review were very useful. Four news weeklies were helpful including Colliers, Newsweek, Saturday Evening Post, and Time. In the latter periodicals some very good sketches of the Congressmen aided in gaining some insight into their

behavior and character. All of these periodicals gave contemporary analysis, some of which was extremely accurate as well as giving the Congressmen an additional forum with which to air their viewpoints.

IV. Biographies-Autobiographies-Memoirs:

Personal reminiscences by the various Congressmen offered some insight into their thinking if not the motivations behind their actions. Unfortunately, these are usually written long after the event and at times differ significantly from what the author stated earlier. Too often the works as history are no more than "I told you so" accounts as each man tried to vindicate his position on a particular question. Thus, the memoirs and autobiographies become vehicles for rationalization of earlier statements and actions rather than revelations on how conclusions were reached.

Among the memoirs, Cordell Hull, The Memoirs Of Cordell Hull (2 vols; New York: Macmillan, 1948) are an overstatement of his importance and curiously proves what Hull would not likely admit, that he was a cautious, timid, and to a great degree intimidated man especially by the non-interventionists in Congress. Moreover, the conclusions Hull reaches are not always reliable. More readable and honest was George W. Norris, Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography Of George W. Norris (New York: Macmillan, 1945). At odds with facts at times, Tom Connally, and

Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), offers little in assessing Connally's opinions of Japan. Although revealing little on American-Japanese relations the following works offer some insight into the author's opinions: H. Jerry Voorhis, Confessions Of A Congressman (New York: Macmillan, 1940), Elbert D. Thomas, The Four Freedoms (New York: Zeff-Davis Company, 1944) and The Nation Under God (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), and Arthur Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1922).

Certain Congressmen have rated biographies although concerning Japan they are not always enlightening. Among those worth consulting are Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye And American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962); Homer E. Socolofsky, Arthur Capper: Publisher, Politician, Philanthropist (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1962); Fred Israel, Nevada's Key Pittman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963) which hardly mentions Pittman's view of Japan. William E. Borah had more biographies than any other Congressman of the period. The older work, Claudius O. Johnson, Borah Of Idaho (New York: Longsman Green and Company, 1936) is based primarily on interviews yet retains its value. Surprisingly, Marian G. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), is

less than satisfactory and reaches no conclusions that cannot be found in John Chalmers Vinson, William E. Borah And The Outlawry Of War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1957). Vinson's account is sophisticated yet makes Borah more pro-outlawry of war than he probably was, yet maintains its value in spite of a new monograph on Borah, Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah And American Foreign Relations (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) which attempts vainly to present Borah as inconsistently consistent on most foreign policy matters.

Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. Healy, Yankee From The West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962) is valuable for a study of Wheeler's life. The most provocative accounts of Wheeler may be found in Blair Coan, The Red Webb: An Underground Political History Of The United States From 1918--Present (Chicago: Northwest Publishing Company, 1925) which accused the Montana Democrat of being a communist and the equally unflattering account by David George Kin Plotkin , The Plot Against America: Senator Wheeler And The Forces Behind Him (Missoula, Montana: J. E. Kennedy, 1946) which called Wheeler a facist.

The Private Papers Of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952) edited by the Senator's son and Joe Alex Morris concentrate mainly on the period after 1941 and offered little on the Michigan Republican's view of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor.

V. General Studies:

Of the general works dealing with the foreign policy of the United States from 1937 to 1941, the second volume in the Chronicles Of America series by Allan Nevins, The New Deal And World Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), and the Council On Foreign Relations, The United States In World Affairs: An Account Of American Foreign Policy 1937-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938-1942) were most valuable. The latter work is a yearly chronicle of American foreign policy and although a contemporary history it is highly reliable. Another survey, Charles Austin Beard, American Foreign Policy In The Making: A Study In Responsibilities, 1932-1940 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946) is more judicious than his later work, President Roosevelt And The Coming Of The War, 1941: A Study In Appearances And Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), although the former work is critical of what the author considered Roosevelt's deception in changing from a non-interventionist to an interventionist after promising the American people the country would not become involved in the world conflagrations. For an overview of the interwar years see Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957). Although the work is weak in the thirties the monograph has merit especially in seeing Wheeler's dual views of American involvement in European and Asian affairs.

Various Congressmen in the thirties had been in the Senate during the Washington Conference debate of 1921-1922, and their views may be witnessed generally in Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1922) and Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington Conference And After (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1928). Two more recent works should be consulted. John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate And The Washington Conference (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955) and Thomas H. Buckley, The United States And The Washington Conference 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970) are useful although Vinson has more on Borah and Johnson. Two monographs concerned with the end of the 1920's by Robert H. Ferrell, Peace In Their Time: The Origins Of The Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952) and American Diplomacy In The Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), are most helpful. The first monograph has some interesting comments on Borah. Another valuable and well researched work, Dorothy Borg, American Policy And The Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968) offers incisive analysis of the Administration's and Congress' view concerning Eastern Asia in the 1920's. This edition is the exact reproduction of the 1947 edition published by the Institute Of Pacific Relations with a new preface that makes the new publication worth reviewing.

For the 1930's, a wealth of material has been written on the Administration and the various personalities within the Government. Among the best overviews of the decade prior to Pearl Harbor are Robert E. Osgood, Ideals And Self-Interest In American Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), although it is weak on Asian affairs. Dorothy Borg, The United States And The Far Eastern Crisis Of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964) is an exhaustive and judicious study, almost encyclopedical. Borg's work ends in 1938 with the analysis that the United States had no idea of fighting an armed conflict with Japan and the State Department saw the best way of preserving peace in Asia through a policy of inaction. Making order out of the neutrality controversy of the 1930's was Robert A. Divine, The Illusion Of Neutrality: Franklin D. Roosevelt And The Struggle Over Arms Embargo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Less valuable and written perfunctorily was Manfred Jonas, Isolationism In America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966) although the sketches of various Congressmen are worthwhile reviewing.

Four studies depicting the last years of peace that have merit are Herbert Feis, The Road To Pearl Harbor: The Coming Of The War Between The United States And Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950); the two massive volumes under the sponsorship of the Council On Foreign Relations, written by William L. Langer and S.

Everett Gleason, The Challenge To Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952) and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953) as well as Donald Francis Drummond, The Passing Of American Neutrality, 1937-1941 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Publications In History And Political Science, XX 1955) are worth consulting. Drummond's account is clear and valuable but the subject was studied more intensely by Langer and Gleason.

Two accounts of the sinking of the Panay are available in Manny T. Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude To War (Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1967) and Hamilton D. Perry, The Panay Incident: Prelude To Pearl Harbor (New York: Macmillan, 1969). Other than the titles being nearly identical the two works are completely different. Koginos has written a monograph filled with spelling errors, incorrect sources, a ponderous style and a dubious thesis. Perry's work is a journalistic account of the sinking written with verve and imagination relying heavily on personal interviews and reminiscences.

In addition to the sources listed, three other works concerned with the years 1940-1941 are essential in understanding the policy of America in the last year of peace and some mention of Congressional thinking and activities as well. See Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against Intervention (Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 1953), the somewhat revisionist Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance And Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958) and Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969). A number of contemporary accounts are worthwhile. In particular, consult America's Share In Japan's War Guilt (New York: American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression, 1938) and Shall America Stop Arming Japan (New York: 1940) published by the same committee. See also William C. Johnstone, The United States And Japan's New Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941) concerned primarily with economic enterprises in Asia; Nancy Schoonmaker and Doris Fielding Reid, eds., We Testify (New York: Smith and Durrell, 1941) especially the work by Wheeler, "What If Germany Seizes The British Fleet?," pp. 187-196; Stanley K. Hornbeck, The United States And The Far East (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942) which explains the author's view of the world being the spokes of the wheel and Eastern Asia being the hub. It is an apologetic account of American Far Eastern policy after Pearl Harbor by the Political Advisor to the State Department and Hull's greatest memorandum writer; Thomas A. Bisson, American Far Eastern Policy (New York: International Secretariat, Institute Of Pacific Relations, 1945) and Walter Johnson, The Battle Against

Isolation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) are both worth consulting. Later works dealing with organizations or individuals may be seen in Donald J. Friedman, The Road From Isolation: The Campaign Of The American Committee For Non-Participation In Japanese Aggression (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Research Center, 1968) which suffers from not having access to the Greene MSS; Fred Israel, ed., The War Diary Of Breckinridge Long (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966) has some revealing correspondence on various Congressmen and State Department officials; Waldo Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew And The Development Of The United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little Brown, 1966) and Grew's own Ten Years In Japan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944) are valuable, although Grew had an overestimation of his influence in formulating American policy towards Japan.

VI. Monographs And Articles Pertaining To Congress;

The study of Congress and its role in formulating and implementing foreign policy has begun to be recognized as an area where competent studies need to be accomplished. Among those works written the following will give the reader a basic introduction to the Congressional process not just in legislating but in dealing with the President and Congressional prerogatives. See Eleanor E. Dennison, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Palo Alto: Stanford

University Press, 1942), Lawrence Chamberlain, The President, Congress, And Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), Robert A. Dahl, Congress And Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace And Company, 1950), George Grassmuck, Sectional Biases In Congress On Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), Daniel Cleever and H. Field Haviland, American Foreign Policy And The Separation Of Powers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups: Congress And Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958), James A. Robinson, Congress And Foreign Policy Making: A Study In Legislative Influence And Initiative (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962), Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics And Foreign Policy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), Charles O. Lerche, Jr, The Uncertain South: Its Changing Pattern Of Politics In Foreign Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), and Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots Of Isolationism: Congressional Voting And Presidential Leadership In Foreign Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966). The last two are extremely valuable in seeing southern support for international ventures in the 1930's and early 1940's. One monograph dealt with Congress on domestic issues but should be consulted for the appraisal of the various Congressmen who figured prominently in American-Japanese relations as well. See James T.

Patterson, Congressional Conservatism And The New Deal: The Growth Of The Conservative Coalition In Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).

Various contemporary articles were also of value in observing the various Congressional sessions from 1937 to 1941. In particular, consult, "The Seventy-Fifth Congress," Commonweal, XXVI (Sept. 3, 1937), pp. 427-428; O. R. Altman, "First Session Of The Seventy-Fifth Congress, January 5, 1937 to August 5, 1937," American Political Science Review, XXXI (Dec. 1937), pp. 1071-1093; "The Seventy-Fifth," Nation, CXXXXVI (June. 25, 1938), p. 713; O. R. Altman, "Second And Third Sessions Of The Seventy-Fifth Congressm 1937-1938," American Political Science Review, XXXII (Dec. 1938), pp. 1099-1123; "Review Of The 76th Congress: A \$13,400,000,000 Runaway," Newsweek, XIV (Aug. 14, 1939), pp. 11-13; "The Record Of Congress," Current History, L (Sept. 1939), p. 8; Floyd M. Riddick, "First Session Of The Seventy-Sixth Congress, January 3 To August 5, 1939," American Political Science Review, XXXIII (Dec. 1939), pp. 1022-1043; Also by the same author, "The Third Session Of The Seventy-Sixth Congress, January 3, 1940 To January 3, 1941," American Political Science Review, XXXV (Apr. 1941), pp. 284-303; Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel Of The Seventy-Seventh Congress," American Political Science Review, XXXVI (Feb. 1942), pp. 67-75; Floyd M. Riddick, "The First Session Of The Seventy-Seventh Congress, January 3, 1941, To January 2, 1942,"

American Political Science Review, XXXVI (Apr. 1942), pp. 290-302; and Kenneth W. Colegrove, "The Role Of Congress And Public Opinion In Formulating Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (Oct. 1944), pp. 956-969.

VII. Articles Pertaining To Various Congressmen:

Because this is a study of Congressional opinion towards Japan from 1937 to 1941, articles written by or about the leading advocates of interventionist or non-interventionist policies are extremely important in discerning their viewpoints. Earlier opinions on American foreign policy were important in being able to trace whether various Congressmen remained steadfast in their views or changed with fluxuating international conditions. Because of the vastness of the material the author has endeavored to present only the most important articles, that is those which were most helpful in the study. Each Congressmen is listed with the articles following.

Key Pittman:

Judson C. Welliver, "The Triumph Of The South," Munsey's Magazine, XLIX (Aug. 1913), pp. 731-743; Key Pittman, "The United States And Russia-Obstacles To Recognition Of Present Soviet Regime," Annals Of The American Academy Of Social And Political Science, CXXVI

(July. 1926), pp. 131-133 (Hereinafter cited as the Annals); Also by Pittman, "Should The Price Of Silver Be Regulated By Government Action," Congressional Digest, X (Nov. 1931), pp. 270-272; "Our Foreign Policy," Democratic Digest, XVI (Mar. 1939), p. 5; "Pittman And Neutrality," Current History, L (Nov. 1939), p. 6; Joseph H. Baird, "Key Pittman: Frontier Statesman," American Mercury, L (July. 1940), pp. 306-313 and Wayne S. Cole, "Senator Key Pittman And American Neutrality Policies, 1933-1940," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVI (Mar. 1960), pp. 644-662.

Claude Pepper:

"Pepper v. Sholtz v. Wilcox," Time, XXXI (May. 2, 1938), p. 9.

Byron Scott:

Byron Scott, "Let's Avert War: Economic Pressure As A Peace Measure," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Feb. 15, 1938), pp. 284-287; "Scott Resolution," Time, XXXI (May. 2, 1938), pp. 7-8.

William E. Borah:

By far William E. Borah had the most coverage. Listed below are first articles that he wrote in his career that are worth consulting followed by articles that dealt with him as the primary subject. The articles by Borah were as follows:

"War For American Honor And Lives," Current History, XIII (Sept. 1917), pp. 460-463; "Militarism In A League Of Nations?," Forum, LXI (Mar. 1919), pp. 297-306; "How To End War," Nation, CXIX (Dec. 31, 1924), pp. 736-739; "Law Must Displace War," Christian Century, XLII (Jan. 1, 1925), p. 8; The Editor of the Christian Century, C. C. Morrison, a veteran Church pacifist, gave Borah's non-interventionist policies editorial support but he did agree with Borah that peace could be maintained if all nations supported an outlawry of war treaty. See also, "American Foreign Policy In A Nationalistic World," Foreign Affairs, XII (Jan. 1934), Supplement, pp. iii-xii; An article bearing the same title also appeared in the Far Eastern Review, XX (Apr. 1934), pp. 145-148; "Our Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches Of The Day, II (Oct. 21, 1935), pp. 36-38; "Our Imperative Task: To Mind Our Own Business," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Apr. 15, 1938), pp. 386-389; "What Our Position Should Be," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Apr. 15, 1939), pp. 397-399; "The Embargo And European Power Politics," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VI (Oct. 15, 1939), pp. 21-23.

Articles about Borah are plentiful but many are superficial and offer no alternative analysis of the Idahoan's beliefs. The following articles are not only the most informative but do offer conclusions to Borah's long career in the Senate. In particular, consult, "Borah

And Johnson: Disturbers Of Peace," Literary Digest, LXII (Aug. 23, 1919), p. 52; "The Progress Of The World," Review Of Reviews, LXIII (Feb. 1921), pp. 115-116 which revealed Borah's dislike of the Four Power Treaty as did "Disarmament Winning At Washington," Literary Digest, LXIX (June. 11, 1921), pp. 7-10; "American Portraits," Spectator, CXXXI (July. 21, 1923), pp. 77-78; On the Kellogg-Briand Pact see, "Toward The Outlawry Of War," New Republic, XXXIX (July. 9, 1924), pp. 179-180; "Three Plans To Make The Dream Of Peace Come True," Literary Digest, LXXXV (Dec. 10, 1927), pp. 10-11; "The Renunciation Of War," Christian Century, XLV (Feb. 23, 1928), pp. 266-268; "Can War Be Outlawed," Congressional Digest, VII (Mar. 1928), pp. 87-89; "The Debate On The Peace Pact," Christian Century, XLVI (Jan. 31, 1929), pp. 145-172; "Senator Borah And World Peace," Christian Century, XLVI (May. 8, 1929), pp. 607-610 and the latest article by Robert James Maddox, "William E. Borah And The Outlawry Crusade," Historian, XXIX (Feb. 1967), pp. 200-220.

For Borah's view on the World Court see "Senator Borah And The World Court," Christian Century, XLII (Feb. 5, 1925), pp. 186-188; "Borah And The Court," Independent, CXIV (Apr. 18, 1925), pp. 452-454; "The World Court And The Senate," Review Of Reviews, LXXI (June. 1925), p. 576; "War And The World Court,"

Christian Century, XLIII (Feb. 11, 1926), pp. 194-197.

Other relevant and informative articles on Borah are J. Frederick Essary, "Senator Borah," Spectator, CXXXVI (June. 12, 1926), pp. 979-980; Ray T. Tucker, "Borah Of Idaho," American Mercury, IX (Dec. 1926), pp. 385-393; "Senator Borah's Appeal For Justice In China," China Weekly Review, XXXI (Jan. 1, 1927), pp. 120-122; Bernard Fay, "Portrait Of Mr. Borah," Review Of Reviews, LXXXV (Jan. 1932), pp. 57-58; Allan Nevins, "Borah And World Politics," Current History, XXXVII (Feb. 1933), pp. 513-519; "Representative Men," English Review, LXII (Jan. 1936), pp. 25-31.

Hiram Johnson:

As a member of the non-interventionist grouping, Johnson was a defender of neutral rights and so was close to Borah's thinking concerning Japan. In 1941, he wrote three articles asking the Government and the people to practice neutrality concerning the wars raging in Asia and Europe. But if the Government and the people decide on joining the hostilities then Congress should declare war and be morally honest. See for instance "Masquerade Is Over," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VIII (May. 31, 1941), pp. 514-517; "Peace Or War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (Dec. 1, 1941), pp. 120-124; "Let's Declare Ourselves," Scribner's Commentator, XI (Dec. 1941), pp. 93-97; For an earlier call for honesty in foreign affairs see Johnson's

comments in "Let's Not Pretend," Colliers, LXXXIX (Jan. 30, 1932), p. 50.

Other important articles on Johnson are "The Issue Between Japan And California," Literary Digest, XLVI (May. 3, 1913), pp. 991-994 which analyzed his part in the Anti-Alien Law passed in California while Johnson was Governor. Reactions to Johnson's comments and voting record concerning American entry into World War I and the resulting peace and League of Nations may be consulted in "Hiram Johnson," Nation, CV (Nov. 1, 1917), p. 492; Elbert Francis Baldwin, "Hiram Johnson: His Assets And Liabilities," Outlook, CXXIV (Apr. 7, 1920), pp. 596-598; Oswald Garrison Villard, "Hiram W. Johnson," Nation, CXX (June. 5, 1920), pp. 748-749; George P. West, "Hiram Johnson: After Twelve Years," Nation, CXV (Aug. 9, 1922), pp. 142-144; His anti-World Court ideas are summarized in "The Return Of An Innocent Abroad," Outlook, CXXXIV (Aug. 8, 1923), p. 534; Four uncomplimentary articles were "What Johnson Would Do As President," Literary Digest, LXXIX (Dec. 22, 1923), pp. 8-9; John W. Ownes, "The Tragic Hiram," American Mercury, I (Jan. 1924), pp. 57-61; Theodore C. Wallen, "Johnson: Symbol Of Extreme Nationalism," Literary Digest, CXIX (Mar. 23, 1935), p. 13; and "Peace Passion Cold," Time, XXVII (Feb. 24, 1936), p. 16.

Hamilton Fish:

Four articles on Hamilton Fish are worth noting: "The

Renunciation Of War," Annals, CXXXVIII (July. 1928), pp. 164-165 in which the New York Republican supported the tenets of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. For more of a view of Fish as a non-interventionist see, "The Trend Of Events," Outlook And Independent, CLV (July. 30, 1930), p. 490; "Russia Turns A Corner: America, Russia And Hamilton Fish," Living Age, CCCXL (Mar. 1931), pp. 31-33; "Presidential Possibility," Literary Digest, XX (Nov. 16, 1935), p. 35.

The wealth of material on strict non-interventionists has grown in the last few years. Yet for Capper, Nye, Clark, and Vandenberg many of the contemporary articles are most revealing.

Arthur Capper:

For Capper, consult his article, "The American Farmer And Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, I (June. 1923), pp. 127-135; "Dr. Butler Calls For Action," Review Of Reviews, LXXVII (Jan. 1928), pp. 83-84 which supported Capper's resolution to strengthen the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See also, "A Threat For A Promise," Outlook, CLI (Feb. 20, 1929), p. 291. Opposition to his proposal can be found in "Prostituting The Peace Pact," Christian Century, XLVI (Feb. 21, 1929), pp. 257-258 and Edith Nourse Rogers, "How The Kellogg Peace Pact Can Be Made Effective," Annals, CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 51-54. Capper's reply to the criticism of his proposal was "Making The Peace Pact

Effective," Annals, CXLIV (July. 1929), pp. 40-48 which appeared right before Mrs. Nourse's condemning article. On the Ludlow proposal for a referendum Capper wrote "Let The People Decide," Vital Speeches Of The Day, IV (Jan. 1, 1938), pp. 165-166 and supported the Indianian's amendment proposal. In 1941 Capper opposed Lend-Lease and was answered by the New Republic. Consult, "Let Us Keep Out Of War: Kill The Lend-Lease Bill," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (Mar. 1, 1941), pp. 293-296 and "Time To Think American," Scribner's Commentator, IX (Feb. 1941), pp. 69-74; "Bad News For Isolationists," New Republic, CV (Sept. 29, 1941), p. 403.

Gerald P. Nye:

Four articles on Nye were concerned with the munitions investigation and neutrality controversy. Consult, Elbert Francis Baldwin, "The Crusading Mr. Nye," Current History, XLI (Feb. 1935), p. 526; "The Munitions Investigation," Journal Of The National Education Association, XXIV (Sept. 1935), pp. 185-192; "War: Must Over May," Time, XXVI (Sept. 2, 1935), pp. 11-12; "Neutrality Controversy," Congressional Digest, XV (Jan. 1936), pp. 16-18.

Bennett C. Clark:

Nye and Capper's colleague, Bennett Champ Clark, also espoused the same non-interventionist doctrine that the

two Republicans advocated. For an overview of Clark, see Ralph Coghlan, "Missouri—A Threat And A Promise," Nation, CXXXV (Nov. 2, 1932), pp. 422-424; Robert S. Allen, "Washington Sweatshop," Nation, CXLV (July. 17, 1937), pp. 63-64 who saw Clark as an ally of reactionary circles in Washington. Jack Alexander, "Missouri's Dark Mule," Saturday Evening Post, CCXI (Oct. 18, 1938), pp. 5-7; and Paul Y. Anderson, "What The Election Means," Nation, CXLVII (Nov. 19, 1938), pp. 527-528 are analyses with differing emphases and conclusions. On Neutrality Legislation, something the Missouri Democrat preached and advocated throughout his senatorial career see his articles, "Neutrality-What Kind?," Vital Speeches Of The Day, III (Feb. 1, 1937), pp. 252-253 and "The Question Of National Defense," in the same periodical, V (Jan. 15, 1939), pp. 216-219. For Clark's analysis on how to avert war see "Detour Around War," Harper's Magazine, CLXII (Dec. 1935), pp. 1-9.

Two other non-interventionists presented their views as well. For instance, consult, Robert R. Reynolds, "Out With The Alien Hordes," National Republic, XXIV (Mar. 1937), pp. 1-2 which created the illusion that immigration was America's chief problem for it was these people who advocated America join overseas crusades; See also, Robert A. Taft, "Let Us Stay Out of War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Feb. 1, 1939), pp. 254-256 and "Our Foreign Policy," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VI

(Mar. 15, 1940), pp. 345-348 which advocated strict neutrality.

There are two interesting articles concerned with George W. Norris' shift to a more interventionist foreign policy in "After Twenty Years," Christian Century, LIV (Mar. 31, 1937), pp. 412-413, and George W. Norris, "American Neutrality," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Nov. 1, 1939), pp. 62-64.

Three friends of the Administration, Elbert Thomas, James Hamilton Lewis, and James T. Pope were the subject of various articles revealing their attitudes towards American foreign relations which included Japan. For Thomas, consult, "United States Relations With Foreign Countries," Vital Speeches Of The Day, II (Oct. 7, 1935), pp. 3-5 and "Theory Of Neutrality," Annals, CLXXXVI (July. 1936), pp. 163-168. Two later articles by Thomas were "An Active Peace Policy," Annals, CLXXXII (July. 1937), pp. 131-137 and "Can Impartial Neutrality Be Maintained?," Vital Speeches Of The Day, V (Oct. 1, 1939), pp. 743-746 both advocated American participation in international affairs and an assumption of responsibility in maintaining the peace. A more general article about Thomas may be found in Time, XXXIX (Jan. 5, 1942), p. 29.

A summary of James Hamilton Lewis' early career may be seen in "The New Senators From Illinois," Literary Digest, XLVI (Apr. 12, 1913), pp. 860-862 and the Senator's

defense of the Wilsonian peace and treaty may be consulted in "Defending The World's Right To Democracy," New York Times Current History, XV (May. 1918), pp. 281-283. Two articles in the thirties are interesting including "The New Political Issues," Nation, CVII (Aug. 31, 1931), p. 216 and Newsweek, XII (Aug. 15, 1938), pp. 10-11. A valuable study of Pope's international outlook may be seen in his speech "International Cross-Currents," Journal Of The National Education Association, XXIV (Mar. 1935), p. 92.

The last important Congressman was Burton K. Wheeler. From his own articles and those written about him the reader can catch a glimpse of this maverick from Montana who at times exasperated friend and foe alike. Wheeler's own speeches may be seen in the following: "Keep America Out Of War," Virginia Quarterly Review, XVI (Spring. 1940), pp. 279-284; "America's Present Emergency: Don't Surrender Our Independence To War Mongers And Interventionists," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (Jan. 15, 1941), pp. 203-205; "America Beware," Scribner's Commentator, X (June. 1941), pp. 88-92; and "The American People Want No War," Vital Speeches Of The Day, VII (June. 1, 1941), pp. 489-491 which all concerned the Senator's fear the Roosevelt Administration was slowly but steadily plotting a course for collision with the totalitarian regimes in Europe and Asia. He saw it as his duty to warn his

constituents and colleagues what the President was doing and his articles have a sense of urgency which he considered vital to the preservation and security of the United States.

For Wheeler's investigations into the Harding Administration which gave the Senator his early reputation see "An Investigator Investigated," Literary Digest, LXXXI (Apr. 26, 1924), pp. 8-9; "Burton K. Wheeler, The Fighting Senator Who Undid Daugherty," Current Opinion, LXXVI (May. 1924), pp. 643-645; "First Blood For Wheeler," Literary Digest, LXXXI (May. 31, 1924), pp. 14-15; "The Kind Of Sting Has," Literary Digest, LXXXII (Aug. 16, 1924), pp. 46-50 and Richard A. Haste, "Burton K. Wheeler," Review Of Reviews, LXX (Oct. 1924), pp. 407-408.

Reactions to Wheeler's activities in the 1930's were varied but most saw him as a dedicated foe of the President and the Administration's policies. From being a Progressive, one writer viewed Wheeler as becoming a near reactionary in "Senator Wheeler Turns Conservative," New Republic, LXXXX (Apr. 7, 1937), pp. 261-262 which was concerned with Roosevelt's Court reorganization plan. See also Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Faces The Music," Nation, CVL (Aug. 28, 1937), pp. 217-219 and Alva Johnston, "President Tamer," Saturday Evening Post, CCXI (Nov. 13, 1937), p. 51.

By the 1940's Wheeler was considered not only a leading non-interventionist foe of the President but a

possibility for that high office himself. See for instance, "Burton K. Wheeler," Time, XXXV (Apr. 15, 1940), pp. 21-22; Hamilton Basso, "Burton The Bronco," New Republic, CII (Apr. 22, 1940), pp. 527-530, and Robert Bendiner, "Men Who Could Be President: Burton K. Wheeler," Nation, CL (Apr. 27, 1940), pp. 532-536. Three articles surveyed the Senator's career as in Richard L. Neuberger, "Wheeler Of Montana," Harper's Magazine, CLXXX (May. 1940), pp. 609-618; "Evolution Of A Senator," Time, XXXV (June. 24, 1940), pp. 15-16, and Hubert Kay, "Boss Isolationist: Burton K. Wheeler," Life, X (May. 19, 1941), pp. 110-119.

One article was very critical of Wheeler's activities and linked him to Facism as seen in I.F. Stone, "Wheeler's Clivden Set," Nation, CLII (Mar. 15, 1941), pp. 287-288. Wheeler's defeat in the 1946 senatorial race is analyzed in Joseph Kinsey Howard, "The Decline And Fall Of Burton K. Wheeler," Harper's Magazine, CLXXXIV (Mar. 1947), pp. 226-236.

Various essays exist concerning important Congressmen which are neither biographies nor articles. The most valuable are: Claudius O. Johnson, "George W. Norris," as quoted in J.T. Salter, ed., The American Politician (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1938), pp. 77-108; Also in the same edition consult Paul M. Cuncannon, "Arthur H. Vandenberg," pp. 47-66 who according to the author ran on the thesis that "one good

term deserves another":

Another edited version of portraits of Congressmen can be found in J. T. Salter, ed., Public Men In And Out Of Office (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946). In particular, consult, Francis P. Locke, "Claude D. Pepper: Champion Of Belligerent Democracy," pp. 257-276; Otis Miller and Anita F. Alpern, "Tom Connally: One Of The Senate Gallery's Favorites," pp. 311-321; Claudius O. Johnson, "Jerry Voorhis: What Is Right Rather Than What Is Expedient," pp. 322-343; J. L. Sayre, "Gerald P. Nye: Essentially Negative," pp. 127-146; Richard N. Current, "Hamilton Fish: Crusading Isolationist," pp. 210-224.

Two contemporary accounts of Borah and Johnson may be found in Clinton Gilbert, The Mirrors Of Washington (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921). For Borah, see "William E. Borah," pp. 245-256 and "Hiram Johnson," pp. 183-194.

VIII. General Articles On American Foreign Policy:

The most valuable articles on Neutrality Legislation were Stephen Raushenbush, "Neutrality Put To The Test," Asia, XXXVII (Nov. 1937), pp. 808-811 and Francis O. Wilcox, "Neutrality Fight In Congress, 1939," American Political Science Review, XXXIII (Oct. 1939), pp. 811-825; Also of value was John W. Masland, "Commercial Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy, 1937-1941," Pacific

Historical Review, XI (Sept. 1942), pp. 281-299.

Concerning Roosevelt and foreign policy see John C. Donovan, "Congressional Isolationists And The Roosevelt Foreign Policy," World Politics, II (Apr. 1951), pp. 299-320 which purported the thesis that Roosevelt was handicapped in pursuing a vigorous foreign policy by an "isolationist" Congress and public. This article has been revised by more scholarly writings on one issue. See Dorothy Borg, "Notes On Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (Sept. 1957), pp. 405-433; John McVikar Haight, Jr., "Roosevelt And The Aftermath Of The Quarantine Speech," Review Of Politics, XXIV (Apr. 1962), pp. 233-259, and Travis Beal Jacobs, "Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech," Historian, XXIV (Aug. 1962), pp. 488-502.

On a definition of that elusive term "isolationism" consult, Albert K. Weinberg, "The Historical Meaning Of The American Doctrine Of Isolationism," American Political Science Review, XXXIV (June. 1940), pp. 539-547 which sees American "isolationism" as a theory about a theory of American foreign relations. Three other scholarly articles worth noting on this subject were Ralph H. Smuckler, "The Region Of Isolationism," American Political Science Review, XLVII (June. 1953), pp. 386-401; William A. Williams, "The Legend Of Isolationism In The 1920's," Science And Society, XVIII (Winter. 1954), pp. 1-20, and

Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Basis Of Isolationist Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (Winter. 1960), pp. 645-657.

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X. Unpublished Studies:

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