ABSTRACT

A CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF
'SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY' THROUGH AN
EXAMINATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE
EXTENSION OF THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

BY

Kathryn M. Lindemann

The term 'social philOSOphy' is used frequently within
the philOSOphical community. Examination of the use of the
term reveals, however, that its meaning is vague. There is
no consistency in its extensional application.

After enunciating the above problem, this thesis
proceeds to clarify the meaning of 'social phi1050phy' by
examining and clarifying the extension of the domain of
social philosophy. The examination dwells on the relation
of the domain of social phi1050phy to that of ethics.

The results of this examination not only show that
social phi1050phy is different from ethics, but also that
social phi1050phy has three distinct domains. There is
social philosophyl which is a branch of philosophy extend-
ing to both theoretical and problematical issues concerning
society. There is social philosophy2 which is a general

class term extending to all those branches of philosophy

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Kathryn M. Lindemann

which consider social issues e.g. ethics, philOSOphy of law,
social phi1050phy1 and so forth. Finally there is social
philosophy3 which extends to work on social issues which is

not philosophical in the technical sense of that term.

A CLARIFICATION OE THE MEANING OE
'SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY' THROUGH AN
EXAMINATION AND CLARIPICATION OF THE
EXTENSION OF THE DOMAIN OE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
by

Kathryn Mfwlindemann

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Philosophy

1975

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter
I. The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Subject Analysis . . . . . . . . . .

IV. Positions and Ramifications . . . . .

V. The Elimination of Inadequate Positions
Concerning the Scope of Social Philosophy

and Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI. The Relation of 'Social Philosophy' to 'Ethics'

VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . .

Page

ii

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29

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125
151

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many persons were of help in the completion of this
thesis. Besides the many friends whose interest and
encouragement were a support, I wish to acknowledge
Professor Joseph Hanna, Professor Donald Koch and Professor
Harold Walsh, all of whom served on my dissertation
committee and whose questions and suggestions were of great
value as the work went through its various revisions.

To Professor Lewis Zerby, chairman of the dissertation
committee I owe much. His keen insights and perceptive
criticisms were always offered in a manner which freed
rather than shackled the intellect of the student. His
enthusiasm and dedication to his task of advisement were
often an inspiration.

Finally, I offer a word of thanks to Judson Mather who

offered service in friendship at critical moments.

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I. THE PROBLEM

The larger problem. Philosophers talk about social
philosophy and some claim to do social philosophy.
1. In 1972 The Philosopher's Index, an international
index to philosophical periodicals, listed 286
articles under the subject 'social philosophy'.1
2. Both the American Philosophical Association and the
American Catholic Philosophical Association, two of
the largest philosophical associations in this
country, have periodically included papers and dis-
cussions on 'social philosophy' in their annual
conventions.2

3. Of the forty-nine graduate schools of philosophy

included in A Rating of Graduate Programs in 1957,

 

 

1Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index:
Cumulative Edition 1972 (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy
Documentation Center, I972), pp. 353-359.

 

2For example: The Western Division of the American
Philosophical Association devoted program time to 'social
philosophy' in 1968 and in 1963. The Thirty-seventh Annual
Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
did the same. Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association XL (YelTEwSprings,thio,_l96§),
p. 116 and—XLVI (YellowSprings, Ohio, 1963), pp. 160-161.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
XXXVII (waghihgton, D.CT7} pp. iii.

 

 

 

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2
196% and 1969,3 twenty—nine list courses in 'social
philosophy' or 'social and political philosophy' in

” Further, of sixteen departments

their catalogues.
included in this study which list areas of special-
ization, six offer specialization in 'social and
political philosophy', one offers specialization in
'social or political philosophy', and one offers
specialization in 'social philosophy'.5
Such widespread talk about 'social philosophy' in the
philosophic community would lead one to believe that there
is a specific branch of philosophy called 'social philosophy'.

This belief gives rise to the expectation that social

philosophy has a well specified domain and that, despite

 

3Kenneth D. Roose and Charles J. Anderson, A Rating of
Graduate Pro rams (Washington, D.C.: American CounciI on
Education}, I975, pp. 50-51.

”These institutions include: Boston University, Bran-
deis University, California State University, Los Angeles
University, Columbia University, Emory University, Fordham
University, Indiana University, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Michigan State University, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, Princeton University, State University of New York at
Buffalo, Syracuse University, University of California at
Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Colorado,
University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University
of Minnesota, University of North Carolina, University of
Oregon, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh,
University of Rochester, University of Wisconsin, Vanderbilt
University, Yale University.

 

5These institutions include: Johns Hopkins University,
University of Colorado, University of Minnesota, University
of Pittsburgh, University of Washington (Seattle), Vander-
bilt University for social or political philosophy; and
Pennsylvania State University for social philosophy.

3
possible quarrels concerning the inclusion or non-inclusion
of certain topics, the topical content of social philosophy
would be easily identifiable.

This is not the case. Even a cursory survey of the
literature reveals that the term 'social philosophy' is
vague.6 The domains of ethics, philosophy of law, philos-
ophy of state, philosophy of the social sciences, political
philosophy and social philosophy are in a tangled state.

1. Books entitled 'social philosophy' often describe
their subject matter as that of other philosophic-
al areas and the areas included in such descrip-
tions are not constant. If one considers works

from a variety of historical periods one finds

that, for example, the preface to The Social

 

Philosophy of John Taylpr of Caroline begins:

 

"The aim of this book is to present in a system-
atic form the political and economic thought of
one of the most thorough-going exponents of
Jeffersonian democracy;”7 while the author of Th3
Social Philosgphy of English Idealism states:

"By their (English idealist) social philosophy, I

 

6"An occurrence of a word is vague when it can not be
determined what limits the speaker intended to put on the
inclusiveness of the word in question." Henry 8. Leonard,
Principles of Right Reason (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1957), p. 26. —'

 

7Eugene Tenbroeck Mudge, The Social Philosophy of John
Taylor of Caroline (New York: ‘Columbia Uhiversity Press,
1999), p. x.

 

 

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mean that part of their work which was concerned
with human life in society, in particular their

ethics and political theory;"8 and The Social

 

Philosophy of Rodbertus tries "to combine into a

 

systematic whole, the social and economic teach-

ings of Rodbertus."9

2. Even within books of the same era there is little
agreement. If one considers the contents of three

works published within the same era (1965-1973),

Joel Eeinberg's Social Philosophy, Daya Krishna's

 

Social Philosophy, and Martin Plattel's Social

 

Philosophy, one finds not a single topic common
10

 

to all.
3. When one makes a further study of the specific
topics covered by books designated as 'social
philosophy', one finds many topics which are also
considered in works in other branches of philos-
ophy. For example, freedom (determinism/indeter-
minism), duty (obligation), justice, natural law

and natural right which appear in the tables of

 

8A. J. M. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English
Idealism (London: George—Allen E—Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 12.

9E. C. K. Gonner, The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus
(London: Macmillan and’Cbmpany, Ltd., 19999, p. vii.

10Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy ("Foundations of
Philosophy;" Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,

Inc., 1973). Daya Krishna, Social Philoso h (Simla: Indian
Institute of Advanced Study, I969). Martin E. Plattel,

Social Philoso h ("Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series,"
VoI. XVIII; Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965).

 

 

5
contents of several volumes of social philosophy
also appear in the tables of contents of ethical
works.11 Then, too, ownership (property), rights
and social contract appear in works both of social
philosOphy and political philosophy.12

4. Even a reference work such as The Philosopher's

 

Ipdgx reveals puzzling classifications concerning
social philosOphy. Sometimes articles included
under a particular tOpic are uniformly included or
excluded from the category of social philOSOphy.
For example, articles on Peace are included in the
category of social philosophy while no article on
Justice is so included. In a number of cases, how—

ever, articles listed under the same particular

 

11This list was compiled by comparing the Tables of
Contents of the following works of social philOSOphy in the
Michigan State University Library collection: Stuart G.
Brown, The Social PhilOSOphy of Josiah Royce; Joel Feinberg,
Social PhiIOSOphy; E.C.K. Gonner, The Social Philosophy of
Robertus; Charles C. Josey, The Social Philosophy of Instinct;
Daya Krishna, Social PhilOSOphy Past and Present; A.J.M.
Milne, The Social PhiIOSOphy of English Idealism; Eugene
Tenbroeck Mudge, The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of
Caroline; Martin G. Plattel, Social PhilOSOphy; Mahadera
Prosad, Social PhiloSOphy of Mahatma Gandhi; and P. Sorokin,
Social PhilosophiEs of an Age of_Crisis with the following
works in ethics: William Frankena, Ethics; Sir W. David
Ross, Foundations of Ethics.

12This list was compiled by comparing the Table of Con—
tents of the following works of political philoSOphy: Francis
William Cocker, Readings in Political PhilOSOphy; Margaret
Spahr, Readings in Recent Political Philosophy; and Vishwan-
ath Prasad Varma, Political Philosophy with these social
phiIOSOphy works: Joel Feinberg, Social PhiloSOphy; E.C.K.
Gonner, The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus; A.J.M. Milne,
The Social PhilOSOphyof English Idealism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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6
topic are not uniformly classified under the areas
of philosophy. For example, articles on Right,
Human Values, Freedom, Equality/Inequality are
sometimes listed as social philosophy and sometimes
as ethics. An article on Powerlessness is classi-
fied as ethics while those dealing with Power are
classified as social philosophy. Further puzzles
include the classification of articles on Obscenity
as social philosophy and those on Punishment as
ethics.13

5. Finally, the results of the above brief survey re-

veal further disagreements over the scope of
'social philosophy'. Comparing the classification
of topics cited in point three above with those of
point four, one realizes that the authors of the
books used for point three do not agree with the
editors of The Philosopher's Index on the classi-
fication of Justice.

In the light of these several examples it is apparent
that the term 'social philosophy' is vague. One cannot
possibly know what is meant by the term when it is used in
ordinary philosophical discourse.

This vagueness of 'social philosophy' is a problem from
two aspects in the philosophical tradition:

I. Clarity in terminology always has been held as a

 

13Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index,

Vols. I-III (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green’UniverSity,
1967, 1968, 1969).

 

7
value by a large part of the philosophic community.
The removal of vagueness from philosophy's termin-
ology has been a recurring task throughout philo-
sophic history. There exist many who claim that
lack of attention to clarity of terms created some
of the long arguments in the history of the field.

2. Philosophers have traditionally reflected on their

own discipline. Not only have they been interested
in answering the question of "what is philosophy?"
but they have tried to distinguish the various
branches of philosophy and their mutual relations.
Aristotle's reflections, especially in the M333;
physics, Descartes in the Dedication and Letter to
the Translator of Tpe_Principles of PhilosoPhy,

and much of the twentieth century writing on the
nature and bounds of ethics, are but three examples
from this tradition.

Thus, given the apparent confusion over the meaning of
'social philosophy' and given the tradition of reflection on
the nature and scope of the various branches of philosophy,
it is apparent that the term 'social philosophy' deserves

examination and clarification by philosophers.1u

 

1”One of the assumptions of this paper is that a term
naming a discipline, a field of study or a specific area of a
field of study purports to mean that discipline or field of
study or specific area of the field of study. Hence a clari-
fication of the term 'social philosophy' includes a study of
and clarification of the area of social philosophy.

 

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'Social philosophy' needs clarification. One needs to
ask if this term specifies an actual branch of philosophy or
if the term is vacuous. Perhaps it is irremediably vague
and philosophers should simply keep that fact in mind.15 If,
however, 'social philosophy' does denote a specific branch of
philosophy one needs to ask: What delineates social philos—
ophy from other branches of philosophy? What constitutes
membership in social philosophy's domain? What criteria be-
come crucial for deciding the applicability of the term in
difficult cases?

Such is the larger task of which this study is a part.
This paper does not attempt to deal with the entire task of
clarifying 'social philosophy', however; rather, it considers
one of the sub-problems of this task.

Sub-problems. The establishment of an explication of a

 

term such as 'social philosophy' is a sophisticated task
which requires preliminary work. One must clarify 'social
philosophy's' relation to other relevant terms before one
can reconstruct a more precise meaning for this common,
vague term. This clarification of 'social philosophy's'
relation to other relevant terms requires two sub-steps:

(l) deciding which terms are relevant to 'social philosophy'
and then (2) deciding the relations(s) between 'social

philosophy' and each of the relevant terms.

 

15One is reminded of what Wittgenstein called "slogan
words". They are irremediably vague.

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Earlier, this paper indicated terms which seem relevant
to 'social philoSOphy'. There are at least five: 'ethics',
'philosophy of law', 'philosophy of state', philosophy of the
social sciences', and 'political philosophy'. Since attempt-
ing to clarify the relation of 'social philosophy' to each
one of these is too ambitious a project for a single study,
this paper is limited to a consideration of the relation(s)
between 'social philosophy' and one of these terms.

The task of this study. This paper critically con-

 

siders the relationship which exists between 'social phil-
osophy' and 'ethics'.16 More specifically, the paper will
examine a single hypothesis which is sometimes advanced to
express this relation: the hypothesis that there is a
distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.

Evidence that there are those who advance such a dis-
tinction is readily available:

1. Separate works for social philosophy and ethics are

often used in the various philosophy series, such

as the Foundations of Philosophy Series edited by

 

Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley.l7

 

16Several reasons could be cited to justify this choice.
One is that contemporary philosophers have been discussing
the proper domain of ethics far more than they have dis-
cussed the domain of the other areas. Thus ethics becomes
easier to use than political philosophy, philosophy of law,
or others.

17Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley (eds.), Foundation of
Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Ific.7} Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 1973 and
William Frankena, Ethics, 1963.

 

 

 

10
2. Convention programs often honor the distinction by
establishing different sub-sections for papers in
18

each category.

3. The Philosopher's Index utilizes separate categories

9

 

for social philosophy and ethics.1
6. In the previously mentioned American Council on
Education study, eight graduate schools offer
specialization in 'social philosophy', and each of
these also offers specialization in 'ethics'.20
Despite the use of this distinction between social
philosophy and ethics, the import or the validity of the
distinction is not all clear. One needs to ask: Is the con-
tent of social philosophy a sub-set of that of ethics or is
that of ethics a sub-set of social philosophy? Do their
contents form disjoint sets or are they partially inter-

secting? If they do intersect in part, what items fall

within/without the intersection? Or, finally, could the use

 

18See the programs for the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of
the Western Division of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, 1968, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Phil-
osophical Association l967-l968‘XLI'(Yellow Springs: Antioch
Press7, pp. 116,9118 and Thirty—seventh Annual Meeting of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1963,
Proceedin s of the American Catholic Philosophical Associa-
tion XXXVII (WaShington, DIC.: The Cathhlic UniVerSity of
America), pp. i-ii.

19It should be noted that the original edition of
volume I did not include the category 'social philosophy'
although it did include 'ethics'. There was a category
'social', just as there was one for 'ethical'. In the
publication of the First Cumulative Edition, works listed
under 'social' and 'ethical' in the original edition were
listed under 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' respectively.

20

 

 

 

See note five above.

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of separate terms be misleading? Could it be that 'ethics'
is identical with 'social philosophy'?21

Although the results of this study shed light on each
of the questions cited above, the paper does not aim to pro-
vide detailed answers to all of them. Rather, the study
examines one question directly: Is it correct to distinguish
'social philosophy' from 'ethics'?

There are several ways of approaching this question for
there are several methods advanced for defining a discipline
or a branch of a discipline or a term. It is not the in-
tention of this paper to utilize all methods, nor to decide
which is the best among them. This is not a formal examin-
ation of methodology. Rather this study takes one of the
several approaches, the one which states that branches of a
discipline differ in their extension by containing different
specific topics of inquiry, and then examines the question
of the distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'
in this light. After making the examination, this study
relates its results to some of the issues already raised in
this chapter, yip. the apparent confusion in classifications
of topics and the larger issue of the complete clarification
of the term 'social philosophy'.

Thus the major question of this study may be restated

 

21This question, answered in the affirmative by some,
then provides the contradictory hypothesis to the one
articulated above. This hypothesis, that 'social philosophy'
and 'ethics' are not distinct, is not overtly discussed in
this paper although the results of this paper do bear on the
validity of this alternate hypothesis. See: Chapter VII.

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12
with greater specificity as:

1. Is it correct to make a distinction between social
philosophy and ethics and ground this in a
distinction of topical content?

Two further questions will be considered upon answering

this main question:

2. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) of
this distinction affect the apparent confusions
over classification of topics cited in the opening
sections of this paper? Can it resolve any or all
of these confusions?

3. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) of
this distinction affect the larger task of com-
pletely clarifying the meaning of the term 'social
philosophy'?

Having established that there is a problem concerning

the meaning of 'social philosophy' and having indicated
that the consideration of such problems is consistent with
the philosophical tradition, this chapter explains the
specific portion of the total problem to be considered in
this paper. In the next chapter the methodological issues

involved in this consideration are discussed.

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II. METHOD

Introduction. The three aims of this chapter are the

 

following: (1) to indicate some of the methodological
questions involved in a study such as this one, (2) to state
and give reason(s) for the methodological choices made by
this writer, and (3) to indicate the limitations bound into
this study by these specific choices.

The chapter is organized accordingly. First, there is
a brief consideration of the problems involved in finding a
correct method for the clarification of a term naming an
academic discipline or area of academic inquiry. Second,
there is an exposition of the method chosen for this study.
This exposition includes both some explanation and justi-
fication of the general approach of the study and a summary
of the specific steps taken in the study. Finally, there is
a noting of the limitations generated by these methods.

Problems of method. There are two major areas of un-

 

resolved philosophical problems central to this thesis:
problems concerning the nature of academic disciplines or
areas of academic inquiry and those concerning the clarifi—
cation of the meaning of terms. This latter problem area
immediately raises another—-that of the nature of language.

Multifarious questions from these areas are directly

13

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14

related to the choice of method in this study:

Concerning the nature of academic disciplines or areas

of academic inquiry one wonders:

1.

Are academic disciplines or areas of academic in-
quiry fixed in their extensions or do these ex-
tensions undergo change by revolution or evolution?
Can one know the extension of an area of academic
discipline 'a priori' or is empirical data
necessary?

If the present state of an academic discipline is
not sufficient for describing the proper extension

of a discipline, what is sufficient?

Concerning the clarification of terms one asks:

1.

Do academic disciplines or areas of academic in-
quiry use natural or artificial languages?

Is the language of an academic discipline in-
herently circular?

If the language of an academic discipline is in—
herently circular, how does one attain any
certainty when trying to clarify the meaning of a
term?

How precise a clarification of the meaning of a

term is possible?

These two sets of question do not form an exhaustive

list of all of the philosophical questions related to the

methodology of this study. They do, however, indicate some

of the central issues involved in any of the decisions

 

 

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15
concerning method for this work.

Methodological context. It is obvious to any prac-

 

titioner of philosophy that none of the above questions has
been fully resolved at this time. It is also obvious that
any one of these questions could be the subject of an entire
thesis.

Considering the dependency of the present study on the
answers to these questions, one unfamiliar with the history
of philosophy might be tempted to suggest that the present
thesis should not be attempted until these other issues are
adequately resolved. Those more acquainted with philosophy
recognize, however, that philosophy, unlike some other
academic enterprises, does not demand that all foundational
issues be settled before a given problem be attempted.
Philosophers have tried, and still do try, to settle par-
ticular issues without resolving the debates concerning their
premises or methods.22

This study is not a study of a "foundational issue" in
philosophy. It is not a study in method either. It is a
study in the clarification of the extensional meaning of the
term 'social philosophy' and, as such, a study in the clari-
fication of the extension of the domain of social philosophy.

It makes no claim to resolving the methodological issues

 

22This is not to say that one must begin 'in the middle
of things.' Some philosophers, Descartes and Spinoza for
example, have tried to begin 'at the beginning'. However,
others, such as Plato, Augustine and Hume, have not. The
point being made is that neither approach has sole canon-
ization in philos0phical circles.

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My. «NW :C On Q. .1. 2w t A» my PM .nm‘ t s ‘6‘ Pk vfi 8 \~ HI? .s c x x e \—

 

 

16

which are related to this topic. It is written in the con-
text of those philosophical works which begin 'in the midst
of things' to study a particular puzzle, problem or issue.

As a study it uses certain methods, none of which is
original with this writer. The paper is grounded in the
approaches of what is sometimes called 'traditional phil—
osophy'. It is not restricted, however, to the use of
purely classical devices. It strives to utilize methods of
both the modern formalists and modern informalists which
seem both fruitful for the issue at hand and agreeable to
23

traditional philosophy.

Empirical and non-empirical. The study utilizes both

 

empirical and non-empirical methods. Its general movement
is to begin with the empirical; to cast the resultant data
against the non-empirical framework of 'what is possible';
to note anomalies and then to adjudicate these anomalies by
criteria from both empirical and non-empirical sources. The
criteria for these adjudications are consistency, fruitful-
ness, simplicity, 'what is the case in the practice of the
discipline' and 'what has been the case in the practice of

the discipline'.214

 

2alt may be well to note that such a wedding of tra-
ditions often entails some loss of rigor in utilizing the
most formal aspects of each tradition. This is noted not by
way of apology but by way of apologia for parts of the en-
suing chapters.

2”These criteria are listed in alphabetical order since
the relative importance of each criterion in the adjudication
process is not detailed in this chapter. Such detailing and
the resultant explanations or justifications would consume
too much of this thesis for a non-methodological study.
Perhaps this item, in light of the moves made in Chapters V
and VI could be developed at another time for study more
concerned with method.

. I
PL 6 .
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Jug $5

 

'5’ I‘
.9

iv

... 3‘

 

17

This writer believes that the combination of empirical

and non-empirical methods is a correct method for approach-

ing the issue of this study for the following reasons:

1.

If one were to use empirical methods alone, one
could have an accurate description of what is the
domain of social philosophy and ethics but one
would have no means of deciding if this is what
ought to be the domain of these areas of academic
inquiry. The purely empirical is insufficient for
revealing what ought to be the case.

If one were to use non-empirical methods alone,
one could obtain a strong statement of what ought
to be the domain of social philosophy and ethics.
When considering the domain of an area of academic
inquiry, however, one is considering something
which by its very nature must be (or has been) in
act; must be (or has been) practiced in order to
have meaning. Now what is conceived by the mind
need not exist outside the conceiving mind. What
is arrived at in an 'a priori' fashion need not
exist in extra-mental reality. Areas of academic
inqury, however, do exist outside the defining
mind. They usually exist in the practice of a
community of thinkers or scholars. Thus, although
a purely non-empirical approach to the domain of an
area of academic inquiry may produce a coherent,

logical statement of what 'ought to be' the domain

 

 

 

 

18
of the area, this statement need not be correct.
Any statement of what 'ought to be the domain of
an existing area of academic inquiry' must make
some reference to the practice of that area of
inquiry. Empirical data is necessary.
Thus it is apparent that neither purely empirical
nor purely non-empirical methods are sufficient
for this study. A combination of both is

necessary.

Having given this general introduction to method, the

chapter continues with a detailing of the specific steps

involved in the study.

Summary of the steps involved.

I.

Steps already accomplished:

A. Indicate that there is a problem with the
term 'social philosophy'.

B. State and justify the need for clarification
of the term 'social philosophy'.

C. State and justify the narrower intent of this
study: to examine the hypothesis that there
is a distinction between social philosophy
and ethics which is grounded in a distinction
of topical content.

D. State the three specific questions the paper
will attempt to answer.

E. Give some explanation of and justification

for the general methodological approach of the

II.

19

study.

Steps yet to be taken:

A.

Answer question one.

1.

Explain a method for establishing the
validity or non-validity of the hy-
pothesis in question.

Establish the parameters for the corpus
of social philosophy and ethics to be
used in the survey section of the study.
Report the topical analysis of the corpus.
State some positions concerning the re-
lation of social philosophy to ethics.
Show how these positions would classify
specific topics as either social phil-
osophy or ethics.

Examine the results of step five to see
if one could establish the validity or
non-validity of the hypothesis at this
point. If it is possible, advance to
question two below. If it is not
possible, continue with step seven.
Adjudicate the positions established in
step five, by the criteria enunciated
above until one has established a single
position (or mutually compatible set of
positions) which is adequate.

Show how this position would classify

20
specific topics as either social phil-
osophy or ethics.

9. Examine the results of step eight and
establish the validity or non-validity
of the hypothesis in accord with the
method explained in step one.

B. Answer question two. Summarize the appro-
priate sections developed to answer question

one which supply information related to this

question. (See steps three, five, and eight
above.)

C. Answer question three.
1. State what needs to be done to answer

the larger question.
2. Summarize what has been done.
3. Enumerate the remaining tasks.

Step II A #1: Explain_a method for establishingthe
validity or non-validipyof the hypothesis in question. One
selects one's methods according to one's goals. The first
question to be answered in this study is: Is it correct to
make a distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'
and ground this distinction in a distinction of topical
content? In the context of this question 'social philOSOphy'
and 'ethics' are used as class terms, terms applied to sets
of topics. Thus, to establish the correctness or incorrect-
ness of the distinction of terms one may establish the

correctness or incorrectness of the distinction between the

¢.¢ -

Au
n l.
6:

21
sets designated by the terms. Thus, if every topic of ethics
is also a topic of social philosophy and every topic of
social philosophy is a topic of ethics, then the sets are
identical and the distinction of terms grounded in a dis-
tinction of topical content is not correct and the hy-
pothesis not valid. If the mutual relations between the
sets of topics fall into any one of the four other possible
outcomes, the distinction is correct and the hypothesis
validated. Further, it should be noted that the very
proving of correctness will also define the set relations of
the terms to each other. If all topics of social philosophy
are topics of ethics but at least one topic of ethics is
not a topic of social philosophy, then the distinction is
correct and it is shown that social philosophy is a sub-set
of ethics. If all topics of ethics are topics of social
philosophy but at least one topic of social philosophy is
not a topic of ethics, then the distinction is correct and
it is shown that ethics is a sub-set of social philosophy.
If at least one, but not all, topics of social philosophy are
also topics of ethics and at least one, but not all, topics
of ethics are also topics of social philosophy, then the
distinction is correct and it is shown that social philosophy
and ethics are partially intersecting sets. Finally, if no
topic of social philosophy is a topic of ethics, the
distinction is correct and it is shown that social philosophy
and ethics are disjoint sets.

To discover which of the above cases holds, one needs to

n~v

~

«‘in

 

bl

22

do an empirical survey of which topics are discussed in social
philosophy and which are discussed in ethics. This survey
will be done and the results of this empirical investigation
will be reported in Chapter Three. (The reporting forms Step
II A #3.)

SteprI A #2: Establish the parameters for the corpus
of social philosophy and ethics to be used in the survey

section of the study. Since the corpus in both social

 

philosophy and ethics is vast, it is imperative that limits
be placed on the range of the survey described in step two.
The establishment of such limits, however, always raises the
possibility of the criticism of non-objectivity. An in-
vestigator needs to either find an already established
limited population or be prepared to defend every inclusion
or non—inclusion of possible members in her survey. Happily
there already exists at least one established, limited sub-
section of the corpus in social philosophy and ethics:

works listed in The Philosopher's Index.25

 

The number of articles listed in The Philosopher's
nggx as either social philosophy or ethics since volume
one, number one in 1967 exceeds 2,500.26 Thus, this study
requires a further limit. The empirical investigation will
be confined to articles published in English and listed in
The Philosopher's Index for the first three years of that

publication: 1967, 1968 and 1969. More specifically, the

 

25Some further justification for the selection of this
corpus is found in the opening pages of Chapter III.

26Lineback, Cumulative Edition I-,l967-.

 

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23
study will consider all such articles classified as either
'social philosophy' or 'ethics'.

Step II A #9: State theories concerning the relation
of social philosophy_to ethics. If it were the case that
there was general agreement as to which topics belonged to
'social philosophy' and which belonged to 'ethics', it would
be a relatively easy matter, after doing the topical
analysis of the articles considered, to construct the re-
quired set membership lists, observe their intersection or
non-intersection and decide which of the previously listed
cases hold and thus answer the question concerning the
validity of the distinction between terms. It has been
shown in Chapter One, however, that such general agreement
does not exist. A common classification of topics must be
brought into existence before the study can proceed.

The place ofpositions in classifying. The act of

 

classifying presupposes the existence of some position or
view of the subject which determines particular decisions as
to the inclusion or non-inclusion of a given item in a
specific category. Sometimes, a classifier denies the
existence of such a position; however, a few challenges of
particular decisions concerning the inclusion or non-
inclusion of specific items usually produce justifying state-
ments which reveal the basic position which was implicit in
the previous acts of classification. Inconsistent classi-
fications may result either from inconsistencies in a clearly

articulated position or from inconsistencies which are the

V—A

 

 

4:? ,u.q.4-«& 19.1.u....H.V.tlua.d 3.... l‘

.3
1.,Hfl1<.\\

29
result of the inadequate development of a position. Dis-
agreements over specific classifications are usually the
result of different positions being used by separate
classifiers. Thus, if one needs a consistent classification
of topics for social philosophy and ethics, one must have
(1) a consistent position on the scope of social philosophy
and ethics and (2) a consistent position on the relation(s)
these two areas have to each other. Chapter Four is con-
cerned with these issues.

Since it is an accepted fact that there are several
contemporary conceptions of the nature and scope of ethics
and since one can posit several conceptions of the scope of
social philosophy, the description of the relation(s) of

social philosophy to ethics is generated in the following

way:
1. Some conceptions of ethics are described
(El, E2 . . . En).
2. Some conceptions of social philosophy are described
(81, 82 o O o Sm).
3. The above descriptions are then paired in all
possible ways (3131’ . . . ElSm . . . EnSm). This

pairing forms a set of possible conceptions of the
relations between social philosophy and ethics.

Step II A #566: Show how these positions would classify

 

specific topics and examine the results for validipy of the

 

hypothesis. The next step in the procedure consists in
applying each of the above conceptions to the task of classi-

fying specific topics to the domain of social philosophy or

LC
CE

:1“ .H‘. \ u
. . ..C H a .3
1 hi. -i¢ ..q i .
.\(A t HU- MMW h Maia

 

25
ethics. This is done in order to be able to judge whether or
not the distinction in terms holds in any of the varied con-
ceptions of the relation between social philosophy and
ethics. If the distinction holds in all or none of the
cases, the first question of this study is answered. If,
however, it holds in some but not all cases, the question
is not answered. There needs to be some adjudication among
the various positions until either one position or a set of
mutually compatible positions can be adduced. Arriving at
a single position, or set of mutually compatible positions,
steps eight and nine, which are similar to five and six
described above, are taken and the answer to the first
question is obtained.

A possible objection and reply. At this point the

 

careful reader, recalling that the purpose of finding the
consistent classification of topics was to examine the
relative domains of social philosophy and ethics, might
sense a circularity of thought upon hearing the above call
for a consistent theory of the nature of social philosoPhy
and ethics. If one already knows the nature and sc0pe of
social philosophy and ethics, why begin with an empirical
investigation of topics at all? Why not simply appeal to
this knowledge to see if the distinction between terms is
valid? Indeed, why not appeal to the conception concerning
the nature and scope of social philosophy to resolve the
larger problem of explicating 'social philosophy'? Such

questions need to be answered.

 

1"“E
V4.

C1}

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26

This writer believes that upon discovering vagueness in
the use of a common term one has two basic approaches for
attaining clarity. Either one may create one's own defi-
nition and then try to get the scholarly community to adopt
it, or one may try to reconstruct the term along lines
indicated by the general use of the term and the current
conceptions of the term. It is the latter course which is
adopted in this paper. This method involves a mediation
between instances of actual use and the conceptions which
govern use. Since neither of these is in a precise state,
one first describes both usage and conceptions as they
currently exist. Then noting anomalies, one adds to or
revises each in the light of the other until a consistent
usage and conception are obtained. This consistent usage
and conception should preserve all the common intuitions
about the term, but may introduce new precisions in those
areas where common intuitions are inadequate or confused.27

Qpestion two of the study. The second question con—

 

cerns the relation of the validity or non—validity of the
hypothesis examined in question one to the confusions
sketched early in this introduction. It should be apparent
that the data for answering this question will be generated
in the answering of the first question. This data will be
set apart and summarized in order to (1) make the material

easier to follow and (2) make more apparent the power of the

 

27Joseph F. Hanna, "An Explication of 'Explication'",
Philosophy of Science, XXXV (March, 1968), p. 36.

 

new

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2.

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r1. ‘ . n5).
“1. h. .3 Q.
«Q . 4 .ad

 

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as n I‘ \ \ 3‘ \ud

i.

27
proposed solution to question one.

Question three of the study. The steps outlined under
this question have been suggested by the work of Thomas Kuhn
and Stephen Toulmin.28 Each suggests that the setting of
the ideal (those questions which if answered would tell us
everything we need to know), comparing it with the present
store of knowledge, and then finding the tasks to be done
from the difference, is basic to the pursuit of knowledge.

Final remarks. It could be claimed that this study is

 

extremely limited in scope. This writer agrees with such a
claim. She recognizes the limits of the study both in
relation to the total problem of explicating 'social philos-
ophy', since so many methodological issues related to this
study are as yet unresolved and in relation to the actual
confirmation or disconfirmation of the specific hypothesis
in question, since the empirical data is limited to

articles listed in The Philosopher's Index from 1967 through
1969.

This writer believes, however, that philosophers should
be very clear in their terminology and, thus, that the
larger task of clarifying the term 'social philosophy' is
worth doing. She also believes that unless one's clari-
fication is to be purely personal and not intended for use

in the larger philosophic community, the task is large and

 

28Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970) and Stephen Toul-
Inin, Human Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1972).

fim' "

 

must I
theory
contri

of ill

 

28
must take into account the current state of common usage and
theory. Hopefully, this study, though limited, will
contribute to the eventual resolution of the larger task

of fully explicating 'social philosophy'.

PL!

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III. SUBJECT ANALYSIS

Aim. In keeping with the methodology outlined in the
previous chapter this chapter Provides a survey of the
subjects discussed in social philosophy and those discussed F3

in ethics as indicated by the English language listings in

3.1-" ~.\

The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968, and 1969. Since
this survey is limited to the domain of The Philosopher's
ngpx, the reader may want some information to judge the
philosophical adequacy of this domain. Are its listings
truly philosophical? How complete is its coverage? Who
decides the categorization of articles? How are such
category decisions made?

Thus this chapter is divided into several sections.
First, there is a section giving background on The Philos-

opher's Index. This attempts to provide information to

 

answer the questions cited above. This section is followed
by one explaining the method employed in doing the survey.
Third, is a section citing a few cautions to be kept in mind
‘when reading the survey report. Finally, there is the sur-
vey report itself.

Background on The Index. The Philosopher's Index was
begun in 1967. The first volume states that the Index is "a

subject and author index to all major American and British

29

 

 

"I'

V
\h'
ru-a¥;

.angus

 

 

30

philosophical periodicals, selected journals in other
languages and related interdisciplinary publications."29

Richard H. Lineback has been the editor and Romona
Cormier is the assistant editor.30 Six philosophers form
the editorial board: William Blackston, James Collins,
Alan Douagan, Adolf Grunbaum, Patrick Suppes and Henry B.
Veatch.31 There is also an advisory board of faculty from
various disciplines at Bowling Green University.32

In the introductory pages of each volume the editors
state the factors they consider when choosing journals to
be indexed. These factors are three in number: "1) The
purpose of the journal, 2) its circulation, and 3) recommen-
dation from members of the philosophic community."33 The

editors further state that articles from interdisciplinary

journals "are indexed only if they are related to philos-

ophy. n 34

 

29Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index:
Cumulative Edition 1972 (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy
Documentation Center, 1972), 1, ii.

 

30Ibid.
3lIbid.

32These are: Robert Goodwin, professor of philosophy;
John Holmes, professor of marketing; Walter Morris, chairman
of the department of German and Russian; Richard Newman,
director of the computer center; Robert Rogers, director of
the university library; Karl Rahdert, director of graduate
studies in business. (Ibid.)

331bid.

3”Ibid.

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.-M

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.uv.a

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......u. c

9-

the

va
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31

Thus, controlled by philosophers and having philosophic

guidelines for its operation, The PhilOSOpher's Index is

designed to include the maximum number of philosophical

articles and the minimum of non-philosophical articles in

each volume.

Concerning the assignment of specific articles to

subject categories, the editors explain that "The Subject

Index lists in alphabetical order the significant words and

names that describe the content of the articles indexed.

.3

1‘?

"35

9, "x u

These subject listings fall into six classes:

6)

proper names such as Quine, Kant, and Hegel;
nationalities such as American and Soviet;
historical periods such as medieval and renaissance;
major fields of philosophy such as metaphysics,
aesthetics, ethics, and logic;

subdivisions of the major fields of philosophy

such as utilitarianism, induction, realism, and
nominalism; and

other specific topics such as grue, pain, paradox,
and turing-machine.

Decisions as to which subject(s) describe a given article

are made by the editors after reading each article "since

titles are frequently misleading."37

Such policies seem designed to preserve the philoSOph-

ical purity of all listings and to insure accuracy in the

assignment of articles to subject headings.

Method. The analysis of subjects discussed in social

philosophy and ethics was obtained by cross-tabulating every

article listed under 'social philosophy' and every article

 

35Ibid., x.

36Ibid.

37Ibid.

32
listed under 'ethics', with every other listing included in
the 1967, 1968 and 1969 Subject Index section of TE:
Philosopher's Index.38
More specifically, results were obtained as follows:
1. Every article listed as 'social philosophy' was
cross-tabulated with every article listed as
'ethics' so as to locate any article assigned as a
member to both sets.

2. Every article listed as 'social philosophy' and

a .a I.‘ -_—mn:.s .5
u
I
.

every article listed as 'ethics' was cross-

tabulated with every article listed as a member of

every other subject listing. This yielded:

a. Subjects with no membership of articles also
listed as 'social philosophy' or 'ethics'.

b. Subjects with members which were also members
of 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics'.

c. Subjects with members which were also members

 

38For the purpose of this study, the most relevant
categories used by The Philosopher's Index are numbers four,
"major fields in philosophy," and six, “other specific
topics." Reports concerning the analysis of the other four
subject categories could be omitted since they bear little
direct relation to the problems of this study. However,
in no place do the editors of The Philosopher's Index desig-
nate which subject listings they consider members of’any
given category. This presents difficulties. Although in
many cases it is simple to decide whether or not a given
subject belongs to "other specific topics," in other cases
it is not so simple. Errors are possible. To prevent such
errors one could either (1) check each of one's own assign-
lnents of subjects to categories with the editors, or (2) one
could include all the categories in one's survey report.
This study adopts the latter course. The reasons are two-
fold: (1) accuracy is better served since readers are
enabled to challenge assignments of subjects to categories
more easily and (2) resources of time and money are con-
served.

 

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33
of 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy'.
d. Subjects with members which were members of
both 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.

3. Each subject whose cross tabulation with 'social
philosophy' or 'ethics' contained at least one
member was then assigned to one of the six cate—
gories: proper names, nationalities, historical
periods, major fields of philosophy, subdivisions
of the major fields of philosophy, and other
specific topics.

6. The results were then summarized for this report.39

Review ofypurpose and some cautionary comments. The

immediate purpose of this survey report on the cross-listing

of articles in The Philosopher's Index is to provide data

 

from the actual practice of philosophy concerning the list

of subjects included in social philosophy and ethics. This
data will then form a major source for later reflection on

the proper extension to the meaning of 'social philosophy'

and 'ethics'.

In light of this purpose and the nature of the
materials being used as well as the method being employed,
it is important to keep several points in mind as one con-
siders the report. First, there is no attempt in this
report to count the number of articles on a given subject

which are cross-indexed under 'social philosophy' or

 

39The report omits citing the lengthy list of subjects
falling into category 2a above. These subjects have no
direct bearing on this study since they are not listed as
either 'social philosophy' or 'ethics'. Little, if
anything, is lost by their omission.

«44

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'ethics'. Mere numerosity adds nothing to resolving member-
ship in a set or class. One instance of membership is as
good an argument as ten instances when one is trying to
show that membership does exist. Second, the mere report of
a subject as cross-indexed does not guarantee that the
subject, per se, is proper to social philosophy or to
ethics. It could be the case that some aspect of the
subject or the particular treatment of the subject is proper
to social philosophy or ethics but that the subject in it-
self is not.l+0

Remembering these points will do much to keep this sur-
vey report in its proper perspective. Mere survey is in-
sufficient to resolve the issues raised in this thesis.
Although empirical methods are employed, neither sociology
or lexicography are sufficient to answer the questions.

Philosophy is needed.

 

”OThe careful reader of the methodology outlined on
pages 31 to 33 above, might be concerned about a third
possible caution. A given article can be categorized under
multiple specific topics and multiple branches of philos-
ophy. For such cases, there is no guide as to which
specific topics the editors view as belonging to which
branches of philosophy. Since this report does not include
cross tabulation branches of philosophy, one might be in
error if one assumed that the specific topics listed as
either 'social philosophy' or 'ethics' truly belonged to
those branches of philosophy and not some other branches,
e.g., logic, metaphysics.

Realizing this possibility, this researcher checked
such cross tabulation and found the possibility operative
in so few cases as to make a more elaborate reporting system
unnecessary. The margin of error is too small to be of
concern.

35

The survey report. Having considered the source of the

 

data and the methods used to obtain this report, one may
consider the report itself.

Proper names x social_philosophy.l‘l Those subjects

 

which are proper names, some of whose members in The Philos-

opher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the

 

subject 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:u2
Avineri, S. Horowitz, 1. Mills, C.
Bourne, R. Kolmogaroff Myrdal, G.
Camus Lewin, K. Rahner
Chaadaer, P. Lorenz, K. Russell
Comte Mannheim, K. Schutz, A.
Confucius Mao Vandevate
Engels Marcuse Wasserman, R.
Freud Maritain Whitehead
Herzen McLuhan, M. Yao, W.
Proper names x ethics. Those subjects, which are

 

proper names, some of whose members in The Philosopher's
Index of 1967, 1968 and 1969 are also members of the

subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

Anscombe, G. Berlin, I. Castaneda, H.
Aquinas Behthan Cernuserskij, N.
Austin Bradley Chisholm

Baier, K. Brandt, R. Chomsky, N.
Baumrin, B. Bretano Cicero

Benedict, R. Buber Cohen, B.
Bennett, J. Butler, J. Cohen, M.
Bergson Campbell, K. Cooley, C.
Bergstrom Cargill, J. Cooper, D.
Berkeley Carnes, J. D'Arey

 

l'lProper names are listed in this report just as they
are found in The Philosopher's Index. Some have initials,
some do not.

 

”Zln this and all following listings the introductory
formula state, "some of whose members. . ." This was chosen
because it best expresses the data. 'Some' includes not
only the case in which several but not all members are
cross-indexed but also the cases in which only one member
or in which all members are cross-indexed.

36

Demos Locke, D.
Dennis, M. Lonergan
Descartes Lyons, D.
Devlin, P. MacCallum
Dostoyevski Mahan, A.
Downie, R. Marcias, P.
Emersion Marrodes, G.
Feibleman, J. Mayo, B.
Flew, A. McCloskey, H.
Foot, P. Meldon
Frankena, W. Mill

Gandhi Milo, R.
Gewirth, A. Moore
Gibbard, A. Murphy, A.
Glasgow, W. Murphy, J.
Gosling, J. Narveson, J.
Grant, C. Nietzsche
Grice Nowell-Smith
Hare, P. Oldenquist
Heed, V. Paton, H.
Heidegger Peirce
Hodgson, D. Pepper, 8.
Hospers, J. Phillips, D.
Hume Plotinus
James Polangi, M.
Kalin, J. Rand, A.
Kant Rawls, J.
Kelsen, H. Rees, J.
Kenny, A. Ross, W.
Kierkegaard Runciman, W.
Kolenda, K. Sachs, D.
Kraus, O. Saran, D.
Leibniz Scheler

Proper names x social philosophy x ethics.

 

Searle, J.

Selsam, H.

Shakespeare

Shwayder

Siegler, F.

Singer, M.

Skemp

Sleeper, R.

Smart, J.

Smith, A.

Socrates

Stevenson, C.

Strauss, L.

Strawson

Sumner, L. Ffi
Taylor, A.
Thalberg, I.
Thomas, D.
Thomas, G.
Toulmin, S.
Tullock, G.
Von-Wright, G.
Warvender, H.
Watkins, J.
Weber

Weil, S.
Westermarck, E.
Williamson, C.
Wilson, H.
Winch, P.
Wittgenstein
Wolff, R.
Wolff, V.

I ~ ~‘.1;.'mu"'...¢ .V'

Those subjects,

which are proper names, some of whose members in The Philos-

 

opher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the

 

subject 'social philosophy' and the subject 'ethics' are:

Aristotle Marcel, G.
Dewey Marx
Hart, H. Plato
Lenin Ress, J.

Nationalities x social philosophy.

 

Royce
Sartre
Spinoza
Sumner, W.

Those subjects which are

nationalities, some of whose members in The Philosopher's

 

Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject

37

'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:

American German Occidental
Chinese Greek Soviet
French Italian

Nationalities x ethics. Those subjects which are

 

nationalities some of whose members in The Philosopher's

 

Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject
'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:
Arabic Indian

Nationalities x social philosophy x ethics. There are no

 

subjects with members in all three of these sets.

Historicalyperiods x socialyphilosophy. Those subjects

 

which are historical periods some of whose members in The

Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of

 

the subject 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:
Enlightenment

Historical_periods x ethics. There are no subjects with

 

members in both these sets which are not also members of
'social philosophy'.

Historical periods x socialyphilosophy x ethics. Those
subjects which are historical periods some of whose members
in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also mem-
bers of the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' are:
Ancient Contemporary

Major fields ofgphilosophy x social philosoPhy. Those
subjects which are major fields of philosophy some of whose

members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are

 

also members of the subject 'social philosophy' but not of

38
'ethics' are:
history
Major fields ofjphilosophy x ethics. Those subjects which
are major fields of philosophy some of whose members in Th3

Philosppher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of

 

the subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:
Axiology Deontic-logic

Major fields x social philosophy x ethics. Those subjects

 

which are major fields of philosophy some of whose members

in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also

 

members of the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'

are:
Aesthetics Metaphysics
Epistemology Political philosophy
Logic

Subdivisions of the major fields x social philosophy.

Those subjects which are subdivisions of the major fields
of philosophy some of whose members in The Philosopher's
12925 of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject

'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:

Mechanism Phenomenology Transactionalism
Nihilism Socialism
Organicism Structuralism

Subdivisions of the major fields x ethics. Those subjects
which are subdivisions of the major fields of philosophy

some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967,

 

1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'ethics' but not

of 'social philosophy' are:

39

Analysis Intuitionism Objectivism
Confucianism Leninism Pacificism
Consequentialism Materialism Pragmatism
Contractualism Meta-ethics Relativism
Emotivism Naturalism Social ethics
Empiricism Normative ethics Scholasticism
Hinduism Neo-Platonism Utilitarianism

Subdivisions of the majpr fields x social philosophy x

ethics. Those subjects which are subdivisions of the

major fields of philosophy some of whose members in The

Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of

 

the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' are:

Determinism
Existentialism

Specific topips x social_philosoph .

Humanism

 

Marxism

Those subjects which

are specific topics of philosophy some of whose members in

The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also

 

members of the subject 'social philosophy' but not of

'ethics' are:

Alienation
Attitude(s)
Capitalism
Change
Civilization(s)
Communication
Conation
Cybernetics
Demography
Dialectic
Dialogues
Drama

Film
Generation gap
Gerontophopia
Goals

God

Hai-Jai

Heroes
Hierarchi(es)
Ideology
Individuality
Institutions
Landscapes
Lawyer(s)
Liberation
Negro(es)
Obscenity
Philosophy
Planning
Pornography
Poverty
Power
Production
Proletariet
Psychedelics

Public Relations
Punctuality
Race

Roles

Silence

Social Sciences
Speech
Technology
Television
Theology

Time
Translation
Unity

Utopia
University
Women

Youth

 

 

AL «.1 .C We as; P.
\ sq :4 RV he ‘4‘ a...

 

 

 

I I

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-.. .MA 1.1 c. .. .. .r. J“ a. 3 S... “M ”Nina Fe M” M; m. J... C ... 3 S S ... C
Ru .9 .. .1 . . .11. ?L nl . : n1. +1. .9 “I. no u an. . F. . ,. 7. J r. at a. a. e. . Ia S: n1 ‘4 f
. u, .... 5' =— u.‘ . . . g a ~ IA 1» AD 4» 3 CV AIV fl . . .1 . u‘ n .o v 2,! V). if.
. . 1 .1 :u c, t. .r...‘..«.\.. 6.,.n.«:.7.. .. .7..J..L .4 ....L .11.; FL I. P. P... .163
,. . AJ
_

 

 

Specific topics x ethics.

no

 

Those subjects which are specific

topics of philosophy some of whose members in The Philos-

opher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the

 

subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

Actions
Anthropology
Beauty
Beliefs
Beneficiaries
Better

Birth control
Birth defects
Blame

Can
Categories
Causation
Censorship
Choice
Commitment
Compulsion
Conscience
Consequences
Contextualism
Contraception
Contract(s)
Courage
Criticism
Decision(s)
Definition
Deontological
Description(s)
Distribution
Duty

Egoism

Ends
Euthanasia
Evaluation
Excuses
Explanation
Fact(s)
Fallacy
Forgiveness
Free will
Game Theory
Genetics

Gratitude

Good

Goodness

Guilt
Happiness

Hope
Imperatives
Incorrigibility
Israel
Judgement(s)
Justification(s)
Killing
Knowing
Liberty

Love

Lying

Machines

Man

Marijuana
Means
Methodology
Moral judgements
Morals '
Nations
Natural law
Nature
Necessity(ies)
Neurotics
Norms
Objectivity
Ought
Paradox(es)
Passions
Peneology
Personality
Piety
Pleasure
Predicate(s)
Predictability
Preference
Procreation

Promising
Protestantism
Prudence
Psychology
Punishment
Reason
Reasoning
Reasons
Redistribution
Remorse
Responsibility
Resentment
Retribution
Revelation
Rules
Sanctions
Sacrifices
Self
Self-interest
Selfishness
Situation ethic
Social change
Statements
Stealing
Supererogation
Syllogism
Teleology(ical)
Temperance
Thinking
Thought

Trust
Truthfulness
Uniqueness
Universalizability
Universality
Utterances
Virtues
Voluntary
Wants

War(s)

Wealth

 

 

\Yf-

 

v
FA:
”Us

 

 

 

 

41

Specific topics x social philosophy x ethics. Those

subjects which are specific topics of philosophy some of

whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968,

 

1969 are also members of the subjects 'social philosophy'

and 'ethics' are:

Agression
Art

Biology
Catholicism
Christianity
Cognitive(ion)
Communities
Culture(s)
Democracy
Desire(s)
Duties
Economics
Education

Equality
Freedom
Friendship
Islam
Justice
Knowledge
Language
Laws
Literature
Medicine
Morality
Obligation(s)
Person(s)

Progress
Religion
Revolution
Rights,
Science
Sex
Society
Sociology
Students
Values
Violence
Will

Having listed the results of the cross-tabulation of

articles in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, and

 

1969, this study now moves on to describe some of the

possible theoretical positions concerning the scope of

social philosophy and ethics.

‘ ~ ERIK—V‘M'B'I‘C fir"): FIR—'1‘“

 

 

‘3.
‘1'
r‘f

I‘ll

 

 

IV. POSITIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS

Introduction. This chapter is divided into three
parts. The first part describes positions concerning the
scope of ethics. The second part describes positions con-
cerning the scope of social philosophy. The last part pairs
these various positions about the scope of ethics and social
philosophy, indicates the significant differences among the
various pairings for the categorization of specific philo-
sophical topics as either 'ethics' or 'social philosophy',
and examines the possibility of deciding the validity or
non-validity of the original hypothesis in the light of the
data reviewed thus far.

It should be noted that the basic approach to the
descriptions concerning the scope of ethics and the scope
of social philosophy is grounded in the traditional
theoretical-practical continuum for describing areas of
inquiry. This continuum, which is often sub-divided into
categories by philosophers reflecting on their fields of
endeavor, is utilized in this categorized form. More, rather
than fewer, sub-divisions of the theoretical-practical
continuum are used where possible since the descriptive

categories ennunciated in this chapter will be compared with

H2

u3
the categories of subjects actually published by philoso-
phers. This use of more, rather than fewer categories, is
done in the belief that narrower, and thus more numerous,
categories are more likely to yield a category with no
membership than wider and less numerous categories.

Positions on the scope of ethics. This is an

 

abbreviated treatment of the topic. Most of the material
comes from sources which attempt either to describe the
nature and scope of ethics directly or to explain the
positions of others concerning the nature or scope of ethics.
No attempt is made to review all relevant literature.

Several works, significant for their concise or well
documented handling of the topic, are utilized extensively.

In format, schemata replace long explanatory passages
in several places. Arguments for ascribing particular
positions to specific philosophers are usually omitted,
although references are supplied for those wishing to review
such arguments.

Many textbooks and anthologies on ethics open with an
explanation of the nature or scope of the subject. One of
the basic distinctions drawn in many of these works is the
distinction between the philosophical consideration of moral
problems or issues and the causistic consideration of moral
problems or issues. The latter, a study of specific

individual moral problems or decisions,”3 is generally

 

”3W. R. Sorley and R. M. Wenley, "Causistry," Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology, ed. James Mark Baldwin,’I
(1925), p. 157}

 

n
M‘ ’
JLL- -

 

 

 

 

1m

omitted from the scope of philosophical ethics:

When a man reasons about his own concrete

and particular problems, he is going beyond

even practical sciencea he is then in the

area of prudence. ”

Moral philosophers did not, of course,

undertake to give detailed practical

advice as to how you should behave on

this or that occasion. A philosopher is

not a parish priest or Univegsal Aunt

of Citizens' Advice Bureau.u

In such manner is this category of inquiry at the
extreme end of the practical side of the theoretical-
practical continuum of moral issues omitted from the realm
of philosophy. Philosophy only begins with the area of
issues beyond the personal, concrete and particular. Thus
the causistic category is not included in any of the
descriptions of positions concerning the scope of ethics.
Since it is not philosophy, it is not relevant to the ongoing
work of this study.
There are distinctions made within the realm of

philosophical ethics. A primary one is the distinction

between philosophical reflection on moral principles, terms

or arguments and the philosophical resolution of moral

 

””Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan

usP. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1957), p. 12.

HS

96

problems. Different authors use different words to ex-

press this distinction. This paper adopts the convention
of those who refer to the philosophical reflection on
moral principles, terms or arguments as theoretical ethics

and the philosophical resolution of moral problems as

special ethics.1+7

Another distinction, one within the realm of theo-
retical ethics, between 'metaethics' and 'morality' has
been enunciated and used by William K. Frankena in an
article, "Recent Conceptions of Morality.""’8 This
distinction may be elucidated by the opening paragraph
of the author's article:

There has been an interesting shift of attention
in recent moral philosophy. For a long time the
primary concern was with the analysis, definition,
translation, or elucidation of first-order
ethical terms and sentences. Then the main
debates were between intuitionist, naturalist,
and emotivist or other anti—descriptivist
analyses of such terms as "right" and "good."
Lately, however, the concern has been more with
the definition or elucidation of such second-
order terms as "moral" and "non-moral" when these

 

|+6See, for example, Gordon H. Clark and T. V. Smith
(eds.), Reading in Ethics (2nd ed.; New York: F. S.
Crofts and—Co., 1935), p. 7. Thomas E. Hall, Ethics in
Theory and Practice (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1955), p. A2 I. Melden, Ethical Theories (2nd ed.;
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1955),
pp. 2-3. Nowell-Smith, pp. 21-2.

 

l”Bourke, p. 17.

”BWilliam K. Frankena, "Recent Conceptions of Moral-
ity," Morality and the Language of Conduct (eds.), Hector-
Nevi Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1963), p. 1. Additional synonyms for
metaethics and morality are listed in Nielsen Kai,
"Problems of Ethics," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.)
Paul Edwards, III (1967), p. 1181

 

43.;-

 

h. .s.& D»
nulé :‘ t
: . l ....-
H n v 2‘

EVIL I “1%,. v4 ragvlyflé in I‘

.mQ

5U Wu t Ll. «L A, a
nu . . . :4 a . a 5.. n11
- . a a: h . Q . a .. a .1

 

1+6

are applied, not to acts or kinds of acts, but

to judgments, obligations, principles, reasons,
and the like. This shift has, of course, not
been complete--the later interest was present
previously and the earlier one still persists--
but it has been and is taking place. Contemporary
moral philosophy may, therefore, be represented
as primarily an attempt to understand what
morality is, meaning by "morality" not the
quality of conduct which is opposed to immorality
but what Butler so nicely refers to as "the

moral institution of life." The current endeavor
is not to promote certain moral goals or
principles, or to clarify only such words as
"right" and "ought," but rather to grasp the
nature of morality itself, as compared with

law, religion, or science. In this endeavor

both Continental and English-speaking philos-
ophers are engaged, though to different degrees,
in different ways, and with different equipment.

Frankena distinguishes between ethical issues concerning
"first order terms" and those of "second order terms." He
claims that the distinction has always been there. His
attempt to describe recent work in ethics makes it
necessary to state the distinction clearly.

Since this distinction sub-divides theoretical ethics
into more theoretical and less theoretical categories, and
since this paper has already stated its intent to use more
rather than fewer subdivisions of theoretical-practical
ethics, Frankena's distinction is adopted and the ramifi-

cations of this distinction are considered in future pages.

Having noted the distinction between theoretical ethics

and special ethics, and the distinction between meta-ethics

and morality, one now sees the ethical field sub-divided in

 

”gFrankena, pp. 1-2.

 

Vi

 

.-.! .vl“. 1U:IIII1 4‘ A .. a. r."

m. . .
Flt? ..EV.

—

 

111011:

(6)

'47

the following manner:

AL L ETHICAL issues

/‘ N

M°+0- . Special
6141,95 MOPO‘II/

 

/

 

 

 

 

 

Given this analysis of the field of ethical issues, one
recognizes three areas as possibly proper to philosophical
ethics: meta-ethics, morality, and special ethics.
Logically these three areas would produce seven possible
positions on the scope of ethics: (1) meta-ethics alone,
(2) morality alone, (3) special ethics alone, (H) meta-
ethics and morality, (5) meta-ethics and special ethics,

(6) morality and special ethics, (7) meta-ethics and
morality and moral problems.

As one reflects on those seven positions, one realizes

that several of them could be eliminated immediately because

 

 

 

1n +
Cons
the
so

1

P
5

|_

98
they have no adherents.50 They may be logically possible
but they are never advanced by ethicians. In practice, for
example, four positions are never advanced. Any philosopher
who affirms a less theoretic area as proper to ethics,
always includes the more theoretic aspect also, e.g., those
including morality as proper to ethics will include meta-
ethics also.51 This limits the possible theories to three:
(1) meta-ethics alone, (2) meta-ethics and morality, (3)
meta-ethics and morality and moral problems.

Further reflection on the actual practice of ethicians
introduces a further limit on the number of positions con-
sidered. Although there are philosophers who seem to con-
fine much of their discussion to meta-ethics, this limit may
be more a case of topical interest than a rule on the scope
of ethics. In no place do any of them outlaw the discussion
of second order issues from ethics. Indeed, if one looks to
Frankena's discussion of contemporary ethics, in "Recent
Conceptions of Morality," one sees that most of the philoso-
phers doing meta-ethics actually do discuss second order

issues also.52 Thus, one finds that in practice two major

 

SOTechnically such elimination of positions belongs
in the next chapter. Its inclusion here, however, saves
considerable work in both this part of the chapter and in
the later pairing of conceptions of the scope of ethics and
social philosophy.

51A check of ethical texts which include topics in
special ethics substantiates this. See, for example, Bourke,
Hill and Philip Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to
Ethics, (3rd ed.; New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1959).

52Frankena, pp. 3-11.

 

 

H9
postions concerning the scope of ethics may be advanced.

I. Those who confine ethics to discussions in meta-

ethics and morality.

II. Those who see ethics as including discussions of
special ethics as well as meta-ethics and
morality.

In "Recent Conceptions of Morality," William K.
Frankena introduces a further series of distinctions within
this dichotomous model. These will be discussed presently,
but first some additional explanation for the utilization
of this article will be given.

As was stated earlier, one aim of the study is to
introduce more rather than fewer possible subdivisions with-
in the field of ethics. Frankena offers a series of sub—
divisions. He uses the meta—ethics-morality distinction.
He then offers a series of four subdivisions of morality.
Given the aim of trying to consider many sub-divisions of
the field of ethics, it follows that Frankena's subdivisions
should be considered.

It is possible, however, that someone might question
the inclusion of Frankena's sub-divisions of morality in
light of the omission of the sub-divisions of meta-ethics
provided by intuitionism, naturalism and emotivism.

Surely, such a questioner might argue, these sub-divide
meta-ethics as clearly as Frankena's four positions sub-
divide morality. The inclusion of one set of sub-divisions

implies that the other set should be included also.

 

Anznn.‘ . ’u. 4.

—

nu...

.u\l.l\

A»

ab

mt.

 

 

C.
\ Vt

50

To this one can only reply that the Frankena sub-
divisions are new and have not been subject to full exam-
ination by the philosophical community. Perhaps some one
of them would be significant to the results of this study.
The sub-divisions of meta-ethics provided by intuitionism,
naturalism and emotivism are not so new. They have been
subject to examination by the philOSOphical community and
it is generally agreed that all are forms of philOSOphical
ethics. An intuitionist, for example, might claim an
emotivist is "wrongheaded" but he would not claim he is
not a philosopher. Thus, while a consideration of each of
these sub—divisions of meta-ethics might lend an aura of
completeness to this study, it would have no practical
import on the results of this study. The outcome is known
from the start: all three are in the scope of ethics.

It may be the case that all four of Frankena's sub-
divisions are within the scope of ethics also. In their
case, however, the subdivisions have not been recognized and
examined for a long period of time. As new, somewhat
unexamined sub-divisions, they deserve attention in a study
such as this.

In his analysis of the contemporary scene, Frankena
finds four positions concerning morality.53

Position A - which characterizes morality in terms

that are formal and individualistic.5u

 

53Ibid., p. 11.

51+References to philosophers Frankena sees as holding
position A are found on pp. 2-5. Ibid.

51
Position B - which characterizes morality in terms
that are formal and social.55
Position C - which characterizes morality in terms
that are material and social.56
Position D - which characterizes morality in terms
that are material and individualistic.S7
As can be seen from the above, these positions evolve
from the stand taken concerning whether morality has (1)
specific material content or only formal conditions, and,
(2) individual or social aspect as inherent in morality.
If one adds these four positions to the two previously

described, eight possibilities concerning ethics emerge.

 

Position A B C D
I l 2 3 u
II 5 6 7 8

These eight positions may be described as follows:

1. - IA - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
excludes special ethics. Within the
theoretic realm, morality is seen as

formal and individualistic.

 

55References to philOSOphers Frankena sees as holding
position B are found on pages 5-8. Ibid.

56References to philOSOphers Frankena sees as holding
Position C are found on pages 8-11. Ibid.

S7Frankena cites only one philosopher, A. C. Garnett,
as subscribing to this position on pages 11-12. Ibid.

52

2. - IB - Ethics includes theoretic
excludes special ethics.
theoretic realm, morality
formal and social.

3. - IC - Ethics includes theoretic
excludes special ethics.
theoretic realm, morality
material and social.

u. - ID - Ethics includes theoretic
excludes special ethics.

theoretic realm, morality

issues and
Within the

is seen as

issues and
Within the

is seen as

issues and
Within the

is seen as

material and individualistic.

5. - IIA - Ethics includes theoretic

issues and

special ethics issues. Morality is seen

in formal and individualistic terms.

6. - IIB - Ethics includes theoretic

issues and

special ethics issues. Morality is seen

in formal and social terms.

7. - IIC - Ethics includes theoretic

issues and

special ethics issues. Morality is seen

as material and social.

8. - IID - Ethics includes theoretic

issues and

special ethics issues. Morality is seen

in material and individualistic terms.

Positions on the scope of social philosophy. As

 

indicated in the introduction, discussion of the nature and

sc0pe of social philosophy is not a common, current topic

53

in philosophical circles. Few conceptions concerning the
scope of the subject are articulated either in journal
articles or in the introductions to anthologies or texts.
This section, is, therefore, less dependent on the remarks
of others concerning the issue than was the previous section
in ethics, and much of it is adduced from reflection on the
work being done in social philosophy.

One can distinguish several areas of philosophy from

social philosophy. For example, although The Journal of

 

Social Philosophy58 includes articles concerning the philos-
ophy of the social sciences, this is an exception rather
than the rule. Most books, journals and university courses
distinguish philosophy of the social sciences from social
philosophy.59 Questions concerning the use of mathematics
in the social sciences or the criteria for theoretic
adequacy in the social sciences belong to the philosophy
of the social sciences rather than social philosophy.60

A second area which is distinguished from social

philosophy is the philosophy of history. Even a cursory

 

58W. Creighton Peden (ed.), Journal of Social Philos-
ophy, Augusta College, Augusta, Georgia.

 

59See, for example, David Bradbrooke, Philosophical
Problems of the Social Sciences: Sources in Philosophy,
ed}, Lewis White Beck (11 v515.;INew York: The Macmillan
Company, 1965), Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social
Science: Foundations of Philosophy Series, eds., Elizabeth
Beardsley andiMonroe Beardsley, (15 vols.; Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall International, Inc., 1966), Alan Ryan,
The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (London: Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 1970).

 

 

 

 

50Ibid.

 

5H
review of the philosophical corpus attests to the existence
of an area, philosophy of history.61 Despite this, the
distinction between social philosoPhy and the philosophy of
history is not always easily applied nor is it always
observed. There is a definite problem when considering the
works of many Marxists since they see the dynamics of
history as the true explanation of society. Even among non-
Marxists the problem sometimes arises. In 1951, for example,
Pitirim Sorokin published Social Philosophies for an Age of
Crisis.62 This work actually explains philosophies of
history rather than social philosophy. Yet one can argue
that society is different from its record or story and thus
that the philosophy of society or social philosophy is
different from the philosophy of history.

Additional branches of philosophy can also be dis-
tinguished from social philosophy. One can say that a
society's laws are different from the society itself. The
principles and conduct of government are in some way(s)
different from society and individual men are not synony-
mous with society. Thus one distinguishes philosophy of law,

political philosophy and philosophy of man from social

 

61Consider, for example, R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of
Histor , (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree,
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1861): Jacques Maritain, On The
Philosophy of History, ed., Joseph W. Evan, (New York:
Charles Shribner's Sons, 1957), Frederick Von Schlegel, The
Philosophy of History, trans. James B. Robertson, (6th e37—
rev.; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1898).

 

62Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of
Crisis, (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951).

 

55
philoSOphy.

Even with these exclusions the scope of social philos—
ophy remains very broad. Possible topics range from the
nature of society, the possibility of collective respons-
ibility, the specific nature of the relations between the
individual and the community, through issues of poverty
and censorship.

It is possible to conceive an analysis of these topics
which parallels the first analysis of ethical topics ex-
plained in part one of this chapter. Such an analysis
yields three groups: first order theoretical topics, such
as the nature of society, the meaning of community or the
characteristics of the collective; second order theoretical
topics such as the specific nature of the relation between
the individual and the community, the nature of inter-
relating groups or the necessity or non-necessity of social
roles; and specific problems such as poverty or censorship.63
This analysis can yield seven possible positions concerning
the scope of social philosophy: (1) first order theoretical
issues alone, (2) second order theoretical issues alone,

(3) social problems alone, (A) first and second order
theoretical issues, (5) first order theoretical issues and
social problems, (6) second order theoretical issues and

social problems, and (7) first and second order theoretical

 

63Again paralleling the realm of ethics, there are a
whole series of specific problems, like those of ethical
causistry, which do not belong to social philosophy at all.
These are often treated in the social sciences or "prac-
titioners manuals" for public administrators, counselors and
so forth.

 

56
issues and social problems. For the present, all seven
positions will be utilized as the study moves on to the
pairing of theories on the scope of ethics with theories on
the scope of social philosophy.

Pairing and Ramifications. If one combines the

 

positions on the scope of ethics and social philosophy,
one obtains fifty-six pairs:

E E E S E E S E S

11: 12’ 13’ 13m 15’ 16’ 17’
£21,................ £27,
E381,.................E37,
EuSl, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EuS7,
E581,.................E57,
£61,........... £67,
£71,.................£77,
E881,.................E88,

Each of these fifty-six pairs could be described and the
ramifications for categorization indicated. This would,
however, form an extensive section and such quantity is not
necessary. Some of these pairs have common characteristics
as to how they affect categorization. By first grouping
the pairs by common characteristics and describing the
ramifications of these groups for categorization, it is
possible to judge the adequacy of whole groups of positions.
Since this judgement process, which is part of Chapter Five
in this study, will lead to the elimination of certain groups
of positions, it reduces the number of pairs which actually

need to be described. Hence in a move to eliminate super-

. /—;

57
fluities, this study now groups the fifty—six pairs listed
above by common characteristics and indicates what each
group would include and exclude from its topical domain.
In trying to group the pairs from E S . . . E S the

1 l 8 7
first division is that of E S . . . EuS7 from E S .

1 l 5 1
E887. Such a division separates all pairs which include
only theoretical topics in ethics from those which include
both theoretical topics and topics of special ethics.6”
Next, one can divide each of these two main groups into
three according to the distinctions in the sc0pe granted to

social phiIOSOphy. 31’ 82, 8 limit social philosophy to

u

theoretical topics alone. S S S

5, 6’ 7 extends social philos-
ophy to both theoretical topics and social problem topics.
83 limits social philosophy to social problems alone. Thus
six major groups can be formed from the fifty-six pairs.
I. E S - This group limits both social philos-
1-u 1,2,u
ophy and ethics to theoretical topics.
It excludes all problem topics.65
II. E S - This group extends both social philos-
1-u 5,6,7

ophy and ethics to theoretic topics.

It extends social philOSOphy to

 

Bl*Subdivisions in accord with the distinctions intro-
duced from Frankena's article (Above, pp. u5-52) are post-
poned until Chapter Five in hopes that some of these larger
categories can be excluded first, thus shortening the task
at hand.

65Henceforth in this study "problems" will be used to
designate both the area of "special ethics" and "social
problems."

58
problem t0pics but eliminates these
from ethics.

III. E S - This group extends ethics to
theoretic topics but not problem
topics. It eliminates theoretical
topics from social philosophy but
includes problem t0pics.

IV. E5-881,2,H - This extends both social philosophy
and ethics to theoretic topics. It

extends ethics to problem topics but

eliminates these from social philos—

ophy.
V. E S - This extends both social philosophy
5-8 5,6,7
and ethics to both theoretic topics
and problem topics.
VI. E5 883 — This extends social philosophy to

problem topics but not theoretic
topics. It extends ethics to both
theoretic topics and problem tOpics.
The procedure specified in Chapter One calls for a
judgement at this stage of the inquiry. Is the evidence
considered thus far sufficient to decide the validity of the
original hypothesis?66 Clearly it is not for the following
reasons:
1. The six groups E 8 through E S are not

1-4 1,2,u 5—8 3
congruent in their extension. Thus there needs to

 

66Above, p. 19.

 

59
be some adjudication among the groups to find out
which is/are appropriate (or correct) before any
can be brought to bear on validating the
hypothesis.

2. The analysis completed is insufficient for
validating the hypothesis since the character of
the relation between social philosophy and ethics
is not examined sufficiently. In those groups
where both social philosophy and ethics extend to
theoretical topics or both extend to problem
topics, the analysis does not show whether the
social philosophy and ethical topics form dis-
crete or intersecting sets.

Thus, the character of the relation between social

philosophy and ethics is not examined sufficiently. The
original issue is not settled and the study of the question

continues.

V. THE ELIMINATION OF INADEQUATE POSITIONS CONCERNING

THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

Introduction. Chapter four described possible positions con-

 

cerning the sc0pe of social philosophy and ethics. This
chapter aims to eliminate from this group all the positions
which can be shown to be inadequate because they exclude
from the domain of social philosophy or ethics t0pics which
are part of that domain. The chapter is divided into two
major parts: (1) the elimination of positions because they
are inadequate in their ethical scope and, (2) the elimin-
ation of positions because they are inadequate in their
social philosophy scope.

Much of the argumentation in this chapter is concerned
with showing that philosophical work can be done in some
area excluded by a given position on the scope of social
philosophy and ethics. Frequently this is shown by demon—
strating that philosophical work is done in the given area.
Even one case of philosophical work being done in the area
is sufficient to show that philosophical work can be done in
that area.

This sort of argument immediately raises the question
of how one shows that a piece of intellectual work is
philosophical. What distinguishes philosophy from non-

philosophy?
60

61

Basic to all the work which ensues is the conviction
that the members of a given discipline are the best judges
as to whether a work belongs to their discipline or not.
Physicists, for example, should be able to identify a work
of physics. Chemists should be able to judge works pur-
porting to be chemistry and philosophers should be able to
judge philosophy.

Such judgements are usually made through the careful
consideration of the work in question. The physicist need
not be able to define physics, nor articulate the necessary
or sufficient conditions of physics,but he must be able to
identify a work of physics. Such recognition is basic to
his training in his discipline. Articulation of particular
characteristics only begins when there is disagreement among
members of a discipline as to whether or not a given piece
is really of the discipline.

The case of philosophy is, however, more complicated.
Philosophy, more than any other academic area, save perhaps
psychology, is filled with controversy as to what counts as
philosophy. Ask any philosopher to define philosophy, to
articulate necessary or sufficient conditions of philo-
SOphical work and the person is bound to say something which,
if applied as criteria for philosophy, would eliminate some

of what a sizeable portion of the philOSOphical community

62
would call philosophy.67

Faced by this difficulty and faced by the need to show
specific works as philOSOphical this writer has not set out
a formal definition of philOSOphy to be accepted by all
philosophers. She has searched, instead, for examples of
works from each category under consideration which she
believes any philOSOpher would recognize as philosophical.
She cites long passages from each work so that the reader
has sufficient material on which to base a judgement. For
each category considered she offers several works for
examination, convinced that even if the reader should object
to one work at least one of the others would be acknowledged
as philosophical.68

Some readers may wish an enunciation of the crucial
characteristics embodied by these examples of philosophy.
It will be noted that all embody reasoning about generalized

issues, issues which are not purely personal, concrete and

particular. This reasoning about such issues also includes

 

67This situation is engendered both because various
schools of philosophy by their very philosophical positions
may eliminate other schools of philosophy from the domain of
philosophy and because of the difficulty of finding common
characteristics to works as varied as that of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, Austin's How to Do Things With Words, Boethius'
Consolation of PhilOSOphy, DeweyTs Individualism Old and New,
Kierkegaards‘s Works of Love, PopperIsILogic of Scientific
Discovery and WittgensteinTs Philosophical Investigations.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

68As noted previously, the acknowledgement of one
instance of a philosophical work in a given category is
sufficient to show the possibility of doing philosophical
work in that category. A reader would have to object to all
the works presented in order to negate the point being made.

63
logical analysis or logical argumentation and often includes
the vocabulary or particular moves associated with a specific
school of philosophy.
It is the contention of this writer that any work em-
bodying all the above mentioned characteristics to a high

69

degree would be a paradigm case of philosophy, while works

containing none of these characteristics would be classi-
fied as non-philosophy. She further contends that (1) if a
work were to include all the characteristics except that of
generalized issues it would not be considered a work of
technical philosophy and (2) if a work were about a gener-
alized issue but contained none of the other characteristics
it would not be considered a work of technical philosophy.
The term 'philosophy' may be predicated of such work in some
analogous manner but it could not be predicated univocally.
Such works may be serious and reflective but they do not
belong to the technical field of academic inquiry of
philosophy.70
Having made these remarks about one of the main forms

of argument in this chapter, the paper moves on to the main

work of the chapter.

k

69There is no expectation that this contention would
receive support by all philosophers.

70This paper introduces the term 'technical philosophy'
at this point to designate all work, whether concerned with
theoretical or problematical issues, which belongs to the
"technical field of academic inquiry of philosophy." The
ternlis meant to designate what philosophers normally call
'Philosophy'. It is introduced to aid clarity; to separate
Serious, reflective but essentially non-philosophical works
fronlthose which are properly philosophical.

69

Elimination of positions inadequate in their ethical scope.

 

This first section of the chapter eliminates all those
positions concerning the scope of social philosophy and

71 which are inadequate because they fail to reflect

ethics

the actual scope of ethics. The discussion proceeds in the
following manner: first, there is argument for the elimin-
t'o of Gro I (E S ) Gro II (E S and

a l n up 1-u 1,2,u ’ ”p 1-u 5,5,7)

Group III (E S ). Then the four positions introduced by

1-u 3
Frankena's distinctions are considered and it is argued that
they should be eliminated also. Finally, there is a state-
ment of which positions remain for further consideration.
Groups I, II1_III. A key characteristic common to each of
these groups is their limitation of the scepe of ethics to
theoretical topics alone; their not extending ethics to
problem tOpics.

Even a cursory glance at the list of topics cross—

indexed with ethics from 1967 through 1969 in The Philoso—

 

pher's Index reveals many ethical problem issues. There are,

 

for example, birth control, birth defects, censorship,
euthanasia, genetics, killing, lying, machines, marijuana,
procreation, sanctions, stealing, war(s) and wealth.72 If
it can be shown that these topics are truly proper to ethics
and not just adventitious inclusions, then positions

E S E S and E 83 will be shown inadequate

1-u 1,2,u’ 1—u 5,5,7 l-u
representations of the actual sc0pe of the subject.

 

7lSee: Above pp. 57-58.

72See: Above p. HO.

65
This researcher believes one can justify such problem
‘topics as being proper to the scope of ethics (1) by reason
cof the content and styles of the discussions, (2) by reason
(of tradition and, (3) by reason of the legitimization of
ssuch topics by the "authoritative reference group,"73:
l. The content and style of articles written about
problem issues are both philosophical and ethical.
First, fifteen of the sixteen articles listed under

the fourteen topics cited above are properly and

not just peripherally concerned with the topic in

 

73Authoritative reference group is a term used by
Ertephen Toulmin in General Introduction and Part 14 The
(Rollective Use and Evolution of Cbncepts, Vbl.II: 'Human
UTfiderstandin IPrinceton: _Princeton University Press,
13972). It W111 be discussed more fully later in the text
of-. this paper.

66

7“ Only "Men, Machines, Materialism and

question.
Morality," by Peter T. Manicas appears more con-
cerned with other issues than 'machines'. Second,
of the fifteen articles directly concerned with the
topic under which they are listed, many appear to

be truly philosophical and not just serious,

popular reflections. One might read Donald W.

 

7uThe sixteen articles by topic are: BIRTH CONTROL/
PROCREATION, Carl Cohen, "Sex, Birth Control, and Human
Life, " Ethics, LXXIX (July, 1969), pp. 251- 62. J. F.
Costanzo, "Pa apal Magesterium and Humanae Vitae, " Thou ht,
XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 377- #12. Joseph V. Dolan, "'Humanae
Vitae' and Nature," Thou ht, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 358-76.
Sabbas S. Kilian, "The Question of Authority in 'Humanae
Vitae,'" Thou ht, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 327-“2. John Giles
Milhaven, "The Grounds of the Opposition to 'Humanae
Vitae,'" Thou ht, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 3u3-57; BIRTH
DEFECTS, Leroy Augenstein, "Birth Defects, The Ethical
Problem," The Humanist, XXVIII (Sept. —Oct., 1968), pp. 18-
20; CENSORSHIP, Donald W. Crawford, "Can Disputes Over
Censorship Be Resolved?, " Ethics, LXXVIII (January, 1968),
pp. 93- 108. Salomon Rettig, "A Note on Censorship and the
Changing Ethic of Sex," Ethics, LXXVIII (January, 1968),
pp. 151- 5, EUTHANASIA/KIEEING— T. Goodrich, "The Morality of
Killing," Philoso h , XLIV (April, 1969), pp. 127-39;
GENETICS, Edward fianier, "Genetics and The Future of Man,
Scientific and Ethical Possibilities," Proceedin s of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association, XLII (I969),
pp. 193- 92; LYING, D. S. Mannison, "Lying and Lies, " The

Australasian Journal of Philoso h , XLVII (August, 19697,
pp. I32-EH; MACHINES, Peter T. Eanicas, "Men, Machines,
Materialism and Morality," Philoso h and Phenomenolo ical
Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp. 238-56; MARIJUAEA,

MiEhaeIIR. Aldrich, "The Pentheus Approach, " The Humanist,
XXVIII (Mar.-Apr., 1968), pp. 15- 19; SANCTIONS, A. D.
Woozley, "Legal Duties, Offences, and Sanctions," Mind,
LXXVII (October, 1968), pp. #61— 79, STEALING, P. T.
Mackenzie, "The Analyticity of 'Stealing,'" Mind, LXVIII
(October, 1969), pp. 611- 15; WARS, Donald R. Burrill and F.
Schiller, "F. C. S. Schiller' s Supercelestial Politics, "
Personalist, L (Winter, 1969), pp. 5-32. Richard A. Wasser-
strom, "Three Arguments Concerning the Morality of War,"
Journal of Philoso h , LXV (October, 1968), pp. 578- 89;
WEAETH, E. C. West, i:Adam Smith's Philosophy of Riches,"
Philosophy, XLIV (April, 1969), pp. 101- 15.

 

 

 

 

 

67
Crawford's "The Morality of Killing," D. S. Manni-
son's "Lying and Lies" and P. T. Mackenzie's "The
Analyticity of Stealing" for examples of the
philosophical enterprise, while Michael R. Aldrich's
"The Pentheus Approach" would be an example of
serious, but not technical, philosophical work.
Finally, one must note that most of these articles
are 'ethical', rather than 'metaphysical' or
'epistemological' writings. The previously cited
articles by Crawford, Goodrich, Mannison and
Mackenzie provide examples for this.
2. Although the parameters established for this study
exclude all but items listed in The Philosopher's
Ipdgx, 1967, 1968, 1969, it is worth noting here
that the inclusion of problem topics within the
scope of ethics is in accord with philosophical
tradition. From the Greeks onward there have been
numerous ethicians whose writings have been con-
cerned with such issues. So many examples exist in
the philosophical corpus that it is impossible to
cite them all. However, the writings of Aristotle,
Immanuel Kant and Benedict Spinoza75 might serve as
examples.
75One might consider: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, v.
11383-1138b and ix.; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork ofithe Meta-
Eflgysic of Morals, translated and analyzed, H. J.PPatton
VNew York: ’Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 67; and
Benedict Spinoza, Ethic, trans. W. Hale White; trans. revised

Amelia Hatchison StirIing (Nth ed. rev.; London: Oxford
University Press, 1927), p. 2148, XXVII—XXIX.

 

 

68
3. Finally, if anyone claims that the tradition has
changed radically one can appeal to Stephen Toul-
min's analysis of change within an academic
community. In Volume I of Human Understanding, he
mentions the role of an "authoritative reference
group."

All accredited members of a scientific
profession may, in theory, be equal; but
some turn out to be 'more equal' than
others . . . there are the men whose word
carries weight in the profession--the
men whose judgements are accepted as
authoritative by other workers in the field,
and who come to speak 'gor and in the name of'
the science concerned.7

Scientific professions, in short, are
like all other social organizations. They
have their 'reference groups,‘ comprising
the men whose individual choices become--
in effect--the choices of the whole profession .

A new concept, theory, or strategy, for
example, becomes an effective 'possibility'
in a scientific discipline, only when it is
taken seriously by influential members of
the relevant profession, and it becomes fully
'established ' only when it wins their positive
endorsement.’7

When one surveys the authors of articles on ethical
problem topics from 1967 through 1969, one finds names such
as Carl Cohen, P. T. Mackenzie, J. G. Milhaven, Richard A.

78

Wasserstrom and A. D. Woozley. Even granting the plural

state of philosophy, it is probable that almost any

¥

76Toulmin, p. 26%.
77Ibid., pp. 255—5.

78See: Above, p. 66 footnote 7U.

69
practitioner of philosophy would recognize some of these men
as authoritative reference figures.
It should also be noted that these ethical problem
articles appeared in journals such as Ethics, Journal of

Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological

 

Research. Such periodicals are among philosophy's authori-

 

tative reference journals.

Given the above evidence from the content and style of
articles, the tradition, and reference groups it is apparent
that problem topics are part of the ethical enterprise.7g

Of course there could be objections. Someone steeped
in the positivistic tradition might object that although
ethical problems are considered by philOSOphers, such con-
siderations are simply wrong-headed. Problems should not be
included in ethical studies; ethics should be limited to
theoretical issues alone.

Such an objection deserves a reply and the reply which
follows is grounded in the distinction between real and
hortatory definitions.

A real definition is "one intended to explain the
signification of a word or phrase as that word is used by

"80

authors other than the definer. A hortatory definition

is "one that recommends to its receivers that they adOpt it

*

79There is no intent to indicate that these three
Categories of evidence are all of equal weight. Surely the
first two are more important than the last.

80Leonard, p. Slu.

 

 

 

 

70
their productive discourse the indicated meaning for the
definiendum."81

Those who have advocated that ethics be defined
extensionally to include only theoretical topics have
offered a hortatory definition to the philosophical communi-
ty. It was a recommended change from the traditional notion
of the extension of ethics. If this recommendation had been
accepted by the philosophical community and ethicians had
confined themselves to theoretical topics, this hortatory
definition would have become a real definition for the sc0pe
of ethics. However, such has not happened. The recommen-
dation of limiting ethics to the theoretical alone remains
just that; a recommendation.

One working for a real definition of the scope of ethics
must consider as paramount what actually is done within that
branch of the philosophical enterprise. Since problem topics
are being discussed with some frequency in ethics, despite
the many years of recommendation that they are not a part of
ethics, the definer who is concerned with a real definition
has no recourse but to include these topics in the extension
of his definition.

If,however, at some future date the practice of the
community of ethicians changes and such problem topics are
excluded from discussion, then the definition might change.

At present, ethics does extend to such problem topics as well

y
_

811bid., p. 611.

71

as theoretical topics and thus positions E S ,

1"” 1’2,“
El-uSS,6,7 and El-HS3’ which exclude problem top1cs from
ethics, are inadequate positions on the scope of social

philosophy and ethics.

Having presented arguments for the elimination of
Ei-u31,2,u’ Bl-HSS,6,7 and El-HSB and having dealt with
likely objections, this paper continues its quest for an
adequate position on the scope of social philosophy and
ethics. Continuing with the procedure of considering the

ethical aspects first, the study now takes up the four

pxositions generated by the reflections of William Frankena

ir1 "Some Recent Conceptions of Morality."82
As explained on pages fifty through fifty-two above,

true positions depend on whether morality is viewed as formal

or~ material; individual or social:

E5 1_7 - views morality in formal and individualistic
terms

B681-7 - views morality in formal and social terms

E781_7 - views morality in material and social terms

E881-7 - views morality in material and individualistic
terms.83

The differences in these positions have ramifications
fCH’ 1ihe scope of ethics. Each would define this sc0pe
differently. If morality is formal but not material then

etjli<2s extends to topics such as universalizability, moral
\

82Frankena, pp. 1-24.
83See: Above p. 50, 51, 52 and 55.

 

72

principles, supererogation, formal conditions of morality
and rule-likeness but ethics does not extend to discussion
of the content, direction or goal of all morality. If
morality is material but not formal, the latter topic is
included but not the former ones. One holding that morality
is individual might discuss self-interest and self-decision
while those holding that morality is social would include
trans-individual issues and omit the former ones.

These differences are easily illustrated by noting
which of the following eight issues would be included or
excluded from the scope of ethics by each position. The

issues, taken from the pages of The Philosopher's Index are:

 

beneficiaries, deontological, ends, rules, self-interest,

situation ethic, supererogation and universalizability.8u

 

81+See: Above p. no.

Position

 

73

Issues included in
the scope of ethics

 

Issues excluded from
the scope of ethics

 

 

 

 

581_7 deontological beneficiaries
rules ends
self-interest situation ethic
supererogation
631-7 deontological ends
beneficiaries self-interest
rules situation ethic
supererogation
universalizability
781_7 beneficiaries deontological
ends rules
situation ethic self-interest
supererogation
universalizability
881-7 ends beneficiaries
self-interest deontological
situation ethic rules
supererogation
universalizability

 

 

 

Such a list makes it clear that the discovery of which

position is correct is important to any study examining the
scope of ethics. However, it must be stated that the
resolution of this issue is impossible at this point in
tine. One simply cannot establish any one of these four
positions as correct.

Frankena, himself, admits this when he states at the
end of his article:

Such are the objections to a material and social
definition of morality in favor of a more formal or
individualistic one. We have seen that something
may be said in reply to them. However, the questions

involved are large and complex, especially since they
cannot be answered simply by looking to see how we

7n

use the expressions "moral" and "morality." They
need to be clarified further and to be discussed
more fully. At least three sharply opposed
conceptions of morality are in the field;
fundamental and far-reaching questions are at

issue between them; and the relevant considerations
capable of influencing the mind one way or the
other are varied and weighty.

Then too, a review of the topics cross~indexed with ethics
in The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968, and 196986 shows
all eight of the t0pics being discussed by philosophers.

If any one of the positions correctly described the scope
of ethics, some of those tOpics simply would not appear in
the ethical corpus.

Thus one can only conclude that (1) although a demon-
strated correctness for one of the positions would affect
the defined scope of ethics (2) none can be established as
correct at present. (3) The only recourse is to ignore the
distinctions and accept an extensional definition which
includes all the topics in question. From this point on

this paper will drop these distinctions in positions.87

 

85Frankena, p. 21
86See: Above, p. #0.

87One might possibly question the very introduction of
these positions since they prove to be irrelevant to the
eventual solution of the problem. (One is reminded of Quine's
"don't cares.") After all other possible distinctions in
positions, e.g., cognitivist, non-cognitivist, were not
1ntroduced. The reasons why Frankena's four positions were
introduced are two: (1) the positions could have made a
difference in defining the scope of ethics if any were
Shown to be correct and (2) Frankena's analysis is rather
new; Unlike cognitivist, non-cognitivist distinctions it
has not been around long enough for everyone to be aware
that the issues cannot be settled. Thus it seemed that
800d scholarship demanded a consideration of Frankena's
andlysis even though some of the older distinctions would be
Omltted.

 

75
E5 will now be used to symbolize the sole remaining position
concerning the scope of ethics. Ethics extends to both
theoretical and problem topics. On the theoretical level
it includes all the tOpics each of the four positions dis-

cussed above would include in the scope of this branch of

philosophy.

Elimination of positions inadeqoate in their social

philosophy scope. Three groups of positions remain for our

 

consideration:
£531,2,u - which extends both social philOSOphy and
ethics to theoretical topics. It extends
ethics to problem topics but eliminates
these from social phiIOSOphy.
£585,6,7 - which extends both social philosophy and
ethics to both theoretical topics and
problem topics.

S - which extends social philosophy to problem
topics but not theoretical topics. It
extends ethics to both theoretical topics

and problem tOpics.88

This last position, E583, will be shown to be inadequate.

Its inadequacy stems from its exclusion of theoretical

topics from the domain of social philosophy. Such exclusion

is contrary to actual philosophical practice.

¥

88See: Above, p. 58.

76

The elimination of E5S3. As one reads the list of specific

 

topics which have articles cross-indexed under social
philosophy in The Philosopher's Index, at least nine specif-
ic topics appear to be theoretical topics rather than social
problem tOpics: alienation, change, connation, dialectic,
individuality, institutions, roles, translation and unity.89
Admittedly some of the articles listed under these nine
specific topics and under social philosophy deal with either

90 Also some of the articles

category only peripherally.
appear as serious, popular articles rather than ones which
are philosophical.gl Yet, to actually establish that social
philosophy does extend to the theoretical, one need only
establish that there is at least one theoretical topic with-
in the scope of that branch of philosophy. It will be shown
here that both 'alienation' and 'individuality' are such
topics. Each has articles listed under them which:

1. deal directly, rather than peripherally, with the

tOpic and field in question,

2. have technically philosophical rather than serious,

popular approaches to the topic,

89See: Above p. 39.

90For example, Joseph C. Flay, "Alienation and the
Status Quo," Man and World, II (May, 1969), pp. 2u8—62 is
listed under both Talienation' and 'change'. The article is
predominately about 'alienation' and peripherally about
'change'.

 

91Some might wish to advance such an argument, for
example, about Sidney Hook and Harold Taylor, "The Crisis of
Our Democratic Institutions," The Humanist, XXIX (July-
August, 1969), pp. 6-7.

 

77

3. contain theoretical rather than social problem

treatments of the issues.

The method, adopted here to show this, consists in a
brief consideration of and exposition of each article
indexed under alienation or individuality and social
philOSOphy. Because it is not possible to appeal to some
canon to prove directness or philosophical, theoretical
approaches, each article is quoted rather extensively to
make it possible for the reader to make his own judgement of
agreement or non-agreement with this researcher's claims
that these articles show the presence of theoretical topics
in the domain of social philosophy. Finally, there is some
notation of how these articles conform to the character-
istics of technical philosophy outlined in the introductory

paragraphs of this chapter.

Alienation. There are six articles listed under both

 

alienation and social phiIOSOphy in the 1967, 1968 and 1969

editions of The Philosopher's Index. These are: Gerald A.

 

Cohen's "Bourgeois and Proletarians," Joseph C. Flay's
"Alienation and the Status Quo," D. C. Hodges' "The Young
Marx, A Reappraisal," Irving L. Horowitz's "On Alienation

and the Social Order," Bernard Marchland's "Some Comments

78

on Alienation," and Carl D. Schneider's "Utopia and Histo-

ry."92

Two of these articles will not be considered in detail
because it could possibly be claimed that alienation is not
their primary subject.93 The omitted articles are Carl D.
Schneider's "Utopia and History" and D. C. Hodges' "The
Young Marx, A Reappraisal." The former is a study of
Marcuse's thought and the concept of alienation fills only
the first few pages. The latter article deals with
alienation but other issues are of import also. The author,
D. C. Hodges, states:

Especially noteworthy among recent would-be
scholars of Marxism is the absence of an aware-
ness both of the historical significance of what
they are doing and of any distinction between
the historical Marx and their humanistic image
of him. First of all, I am distressed by the
efforts of commentators to reconstruct the
historical Marx without considering the social
conditions and biases of their own attempts at
reconstruction. And, secondly, I am increasingly
irritated by recent philosophical attempts to make

 

92Gerald A. Cohen, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," Jour-
nal of the History of Ideas, XXVII (Apr.-June, 1968), pp.
211-30; Joseph C. Flay, TrAlienation and the Status Quo," Moo
and World, II (May, 1969), pp. 298-62; D. C. Hodges, "The
Young Marx, A Reappraisal," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp. 216-29; Irving Louis
Horowitz, "On Alienation and the Social Order," Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp.
230-7;7Bernard*Murchland, "Some Comments on Alienation,"
Philosophyand Phenomenological Research, XXIX (March, 1969),
pp. 932-8; Carl D. SchnEider, "Utopia and History," Philos-
opheroday, XII (Winter, 1968), pp. 236-u5.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

93Such a claim may or may not be justified. Some
explanation of why it could be advanced is given in the text.
Rather than argue the claim, the articles are omitted from
full discussion. They are not necessary to make the point
in question. The other four articles provide sufficient
evidence.

79

his early humanism, if we are to call it that,

respectable in the light of ethical culture and the

mental health movement. In any case, the rash of

recent literature on Marx's views concerning

alienation is a challenge to the critic to set

matters straight. Consequently, I should like,

first, to consider the historical significance of

current reinterpretations of Marxism in this

country and, second, to reconsider the alleged

humanism of the young Marx as presented in his

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 18HH.9”

The other four articles, "Alienation and the Social
Order," "Some Comments on Alienation," "Alienation and
the Status Quo" and "Bourgeois and Proletarians," reflect
different ways of doing philosophy. Horowitz in "Alien-
ation and the Social Order" deals with the concept of
alienation rather analytically. Murchland, whose article is
a discussion of the one by Horowitz, engages in history of
philosophy and history of ideas. Flay, having a profound
grasp of both Marcuse and Dewey,attempts to show the thought
of the former as a natural consequent to a key defect in the
thought of the latter in his "Alienation and the Status
Quo." Cohen engages in a textual explanation and illumin-

ation of the alienation of bourgeois and proletarians as

expressed in a section of The Holy Family. He does this

 

through other texts by Marx, works by commentators and other

Marxists, and Cohen's own analysis of the social situation.

¥_.

91'Hodges, p. 217.

80

Each of these articles will not be considered in turn.95

"On Alienation and the Social Order" by Irving L. Horowitz,
begins by the author stating, "Despite the incredible degree
of confusion which exists about the term alienation-~a
confusion which has caused many influentials in sociology
and psychology to try to do without it--there is danger in

a premature scrapping of the term."96 He locates the source

of the confusion in "the philOSOphical ambiguities of

nineteenth century German realism."97

This section is followed by an analysis of the use of

the term in Hegel:

The true meaning of alienation lay in the separation
of the object of cognition from the man of
consciousness, the philosopher. Hence, for Hegel

the chief way of overcoming alienation is through
philosophical understanding, an embrace of the
rational world; as if to know the world is somehow

to be at one with that world, to become identified
with it. To be reasonable for Hegel is the same

as being at peace. It was in this problem that the
equation of reality with rationality was the
resolution of the problem of philosophical alienation;
just as the reduction of reason to reasonableness was
the resolution of the problem of practical alienation.98

 

95It should be noted that the fact that two of these
articles have been accepted by the editors of such a
prestigious philosophy journal as Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research also serves as an indication that the
articles are examples of technical philOSOphy.

 

96Horowitz, p. 230.

97Ibid.

 

98Ibid.

 

81
in Feuerbach,

alienation comes to be seen as an anthropological
problem. The word "anthropology" was being used
as a surrogate for "psychology," since Feuerbach
neither knew of nor really appreciated anthro-
pology in any exact, empirical sense. Feuerbach
considered the problem of alienation as a
separation out, a parceling out, of human
consciousness--one part of man is invested
(prOperly) in the material world, and another

to the world of God; the projective ideal

world. In effect the dualism in Feuerbach

is almost Platonic. The material world being
dreary and dismal gives rise to a set of
projections about a spiritual world of
perfection. As long as these two worlds remain
separated there cannot 8e any resolution of the
problem of alienation.9

and in Marx:

(1:5) At its source the word "alienation"
implies an intense separation first from
objects in a world, second from other people,
third from ideas about the world held by other
people. It might be said that the synonym of
alienation is separation, while the precise
antonym of the word alienation is integration.100

He then juxtaposes the three positions, notes their
differences and ends the section by stating:

The really important break therefore which
began with Marx is that in the modern usage of
the concept of alienation, there is a
distinctive concern for distinguishing therapy
from description, and separating recommendations
from analysis. There is in the dialectical
approach a common belief that alienation is no
better and no worse than integration, that
either concept might serve positive social ends.
Alienation is a driveshaft of revolution; and
integration is a transitional equilibrium
generating new forms of separation from the
mainstream, i.e., new forms of alienation.

991bid., p. 231.
1001bid., p. 231.

101Ibid., p. 232.

82

Part two of this article contains an examination of "three
fundamental categories of the concept of alienation. . ."
The psychological meanings, the sociological and "the third
general variety of alienation theory. . ." based on consider-
ing it as part of a general cultural milieu.102

This examination reveals for Horowitz that the problem
area has shifted. "The problem is no longer a fusion of
psychological or sociological cultural techniques. The
study of alienation is now confronted with a distinction
between two modalities of analyses, one formal and the other
descriptive."103 Wondering if this might simply be a
reflection of the analytic synthetic mode debate within the
social sciences,101+ Horowitz ends his article by appealing
to philosophers for help:

The task of philosophy in this area might be

a clarifying one, to show how various usages

of alienation are either synonymous, over-

lapping, or entirely different from one another.

The philOSOpher might develop some kind of

logical or periodic table of alienation. I

am given to understand that this is what

modern philOSOphy of science is all about.105

"Some Comments On Alienation" by Bernard Murchland is a

discussion of Horowitz's article and so it will be discussed

immediately. Murchland begins by stating:

 

1021bid., pp. 232, 235.

1031bid., p. 235.

10”Ibid., p. 237.

105Ibid.

 

83

Professor Horowitz is quite right about
the confusion in our contemporary uses of the
term alienation. (ON ALIENATION AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
December, I966T)' The concept has—loomed_1arge
in our intellectual baggage for some hundred
years now; but we still lack an adequate vocabu-
lary and conceptual framework by means of which
its meaning might be clarified and the problems
attendant upon it resolved in some satisfactory
manner. By way of seconding Professor Horowitz's
efforts and furthering the discussion I should
like to offer the following comments.

 

1?}1ere then follows several statements of agreement and dis-
eaggreement with Professor Horowitz's positions:

1. Murchland is puzzled "by the reference to German
realism" since the "idealists . . . first formu-
lated the problem."107

2. Although he agrees that "alienation was given
explicit attention for the first time in the 19th
century" and "our present difficulties with the
term were 'nascent within German philosophical
sources,'" Murchland wants these "sources be
construed in a sufficiently broad historical
context."108

There then follows a historical sketch and historical

aJPERJment concerning the concept of alienation. Murchland
l<Dczates the origin of alienation in the transition from late

Middle Ages to Renaissance with its rise of "atomistic

\

lOBMurchland, p. u32.

107Ibid.

108Ibid., p. u33.

an

nominalism and the subsequent pulverization of being."109

The author then moves through the thought of the Renaissance
and comes to Descartes the first articulator of "the
dynamics of alienation."

He (Descartes),

rather than Hegel first articulated the dynamics
of alienation. He is, so to speak, the spokes-
man for an era that is literally world-less.

It was quite natural for him to found his
system on the isolated reality of the extra-
mundane Ego. It was the only fragment of the
world available to him. Nor does it come as
any surprise that he never successfully
extricated himself from the confines of the
Ego. There was no place to go. If we read
Descartes as a philosophical expression of an
alienated world the cluster of problems he
bequeathed us make more sense. They remain
insoluble but they make more sense. Thus
Karsten Harries rightly remarks that what is

at stake in Descartes' philosophy is "the
ontological status of the world itself."
Methodical doubt is the birthmark of the
burdened self. Erwin Strauss has also given

us a useful analysis of Descartes as a
philosopher of alienation. Since Descartes,

he notes, the soul (mind, spirit) and nature
have nothing to do with one another. Sensations
do not tell us anything directly about the
outside world. They have become, so to speak,
sealed in wax. Nature belongs exclusively to
res extensa - to be understood mathematically,
abstractly and inferentially. Consciousness is
discontinuous with the rest of reality. The
world is no longer experienced as given nor the
body as revelatory of meaning. This, in
starkest outline, is the problem we have been
wrestling with ever since.

 

Murchland then states his own position on the meaning of

the concept.

 

l091bid., p. u3u.

llOIbid., pp. ass-7.

 

85

The foregoing justifies Professor Horowitz's
remark that "the synonym of alienation is
separation." An alienated world is indeed a
world in which the parts are separated out -
whether this be the personal, social or
scientific world. But it should be further
noted that what essentially constitutes
alienation is not separation as such but the
Humpty Dumpty predicament of not being able to
put the parts back together or bring them into
meaningful relationship. I prefer Professor
Heinemann's characterization of alienation as
the "fallacy of isolation," principally the
isolation of consciousness from the external
world and the assumption that the principles of
discursive reason and life at large are antithetical.
Hegel tried to mediate the various dualities
inherited from Descartes' system. His effort was
both noteworthy and praiseworthy; he might have
succeeded had he not succumbed to similar
faulty assumptions. As has been well said:

"It is essentially impossible to derive the

realm of real existence from the reduced realm of
consciousness." Nor do I think the existentialists,
in their many valiant attempts, have resolved

the problem. The bulk of contemporary literature
on the theme would seem to indicate that alienation
is still very much at the center of our pre-
occupations. 11

Finally, Murchland adds his hope for the future. "But I
should hope, contra Horowitz, that the philosopher's contri-
bution to clarification will be more than 'some kind of
logical or periodic table of alienation.’ The philosopher's
task is to show man how to gain an integral world."112 The
author ends by noting the sketchiness of his comments and
noting the need for further work.

The third article to be considered is "Alienation and

the Status Quo" by Joseph C. Flay. Of the work Flay states:

 

1111bid., p. u37.

llZIbid.

86

I have attempted to evoke the paradox
presented to political philosophy by Marcuse's
plea for the great refusal and the reasoning
behind it. I have shown that the theory of
John Dewey, a theory eminently qualified to
represent technological thought, contained
the point of negativity which has led us to a
Marcusean analysis. This paradox would seem to
present us with a vacuum into which no positive
power can enter unless a totally new mode of
rationality develops which is not subject to
the hegemony of technological rationality. Yet,
tradition bound as we are, and permeated as is
public education by technological rationality,
no clue to a social and political solution seems
present. Our very language causes us to fall
again and again into old modes of thought--
modes already taken up by the logic of technology
and rendered harmless. At best, perhaps, we can
see the dialectical emergence of what must truly
be called nihilism: the great refusal. And the
great refusal is also, perhaps, the great irony:
it has now been noted and filed away.

In this attempt Flay begins with an exposition of

Marcuse's concept of one-dimensionality and then states that

it

has far-reaching consequences. For in effect it
states that not only is evolutionary change
highly improbable (if not impossible), but
revolutionary change as well. Marcuse leaves

us with nothing but hope in the form of "the
great refusal," a refusal which contains within
itself nothing constructive since whatever can be
counted as constructive is already controlled by
the logic of the status quo.1

Flay claims that Marcuse's view is both a break with and

rooted in modern western tradition. He claims that "modern

technological society has had its own philosophers" and that

John Dewey was not only among the more articulate, but also

 

113Play, p. 261.

11L'Ibid., p. 2u9.

87

offered a hope and a machinery to prevent one-dimension-
ality.115

Flay then notes Dewey's "method of intelligence" which
was to have been the machinery to prevent one dimensionality.
He exposes a structural defect in this "method of intelli-
gence" which Flay claims that Dewey himself recognized and
did not seek to remedy.

A spectre, recognized by Dewey himself,
haunted his position almost from the beginning.
It amounted to the realization that those in
favor of or controlling the status quo will oppose
anything which will mean a change in that status quo,
at least in so far as it affects their position
in the power hierarchy. And this realization
strikes at the heart of Dewey's own social
and educational proposals. 115

Briefly, the process which will bring about
changes is circular, and contains an inertial
factor which limits its own implementation and
effectiveness. In order for society to change
in its process of bringing about change the
educational institutions must insert the method
of intelligence into the mainstream of society.
But the society itself enervates this process.
The individuals who control the status quo are
not against the method of intelligence as such,
but are against certain of the conclusions which
inevitably will be reached by this method. These
conclusions are perceived not as tentative
hypotheses meant to be tested for their validity,
but as revolutionary dogma destined to destroy
the society. The result is a vigorous and careful
control of the educational institutions.117

It is this defect which has led to the Marcusean analysis,

to one-dimensionality and the great refusal.

 

115Ibid.

 

116Ibid., p. 250.

117Ibid., p. 251.

88
The last article to be considered in this section
dealing with articles on alienation is "Bourgeois and
Proletarians" by Gerald A. Cohen. The author opens his
article by stating:

In The Holy Family Marx draws an important
distifictionibetween the alienation endured by
the worker and the alienation endured by the
capitalist in bourgeois society: The possessing
classes and the class of the proletariat present
pictures of the same human self-estrangement.
But the former class feels at home in and
confirmed by this self-estrangement, recognizes
its estrangement as its special power, and
enjoys in it the semblance of a human existence;
the latter feels annihilated in its estrangement,
and glimpses in it the reality of an inhuman
existence. My first task is to explain what
Marx means in this difficult passage, and why

he thinks it is true.

He then follows with seven pages of tightly written
exposition which relies heavily on notions expressed in The

German Ideology and Paris Manuscripts as well as other

 

 

sections of The Holy Family. At the end of the section he

 

summarizes, "the man who works for a living encounters the
world both as agent and as patient, though in an alienated
way; while the man who owns for a living is separated by
what he owns from both active and passive contact with
things outside him."119

In the rest of the paper Cohen explores "proletarian

and bourgeois alienation in greater detail."120

 

118Cohen, p. 211.
119Ibid., p. 217.
1201bid.

 

89

Capital is the link between the worker
and the capitalist, since the former works at
a machine, which is a physical form of capital,
and the latter owns money, which is convertible
into capital. I shall discuss the worker's
alienation in his relation to the machine, and
the capitalist's in his relation to money, since
I wish to compare their situations, and capital
provides a convenient meeting-point for the
comparison. This means that I shall neglect
certain aspects of alienation, such as man's
distance from his fellow man, and his incapacity
for sensuous enjoyment of nature.

He notes that "In treating the capitalist, I shall

try simply to expound Marx, since exposition of
his views on this subject is rarely offered. By
contrast, many discussions of the worker's
alienation are available. Indeed, often what

is presented as an account of man's alienation

is restricted to a consideration of the worker.122

The article is long. Its tight style makes excerpting
difficult but the author does provide a few summary state-
ments:

The contrast between bourgeois and proletarian
may now be restated. For Marx, human characteristics
are powers, and powers are interpreted as
capacities to produce. In bourgeois society
property is what is produced, so that to have
properties is to create property. The worker
does create property, in an alienated way;
therefore he has properties, of a deformed sort.
The capitalist, as mere Owner of property, has
no properties. He does not even have the property
he owns, for to have a thing is to Be in intimate
active contact with it. The capitalist is more
distant from being truly human than the worker is.
He is not a creator and he is therefore not even
a real possessor: he is a sham possessor. The
worker is a degenerate creator, and this is
thought to be better.

Each is a man who is dominated by a thing,
namely capital, whose most immediate form for one

 

1211bid.

 

1221bid., pp. 217-8.

90

is the machine, for the other, money. In the
body of the paper I have tried to show the
objective differences between the two relations
of domination.123

In the last section Cohen draws attention to the
psychological aspects via the following chart.
Relation between Man and Thing

(worker and machine-- capitalist and money--
i.e. capital i.e. capital)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I ' ’1
M dominates T T dominates M
M's will M's will does M's will M's will does
conforms not conform conforms not conform
(l) (u)
M's will is M's will M's will is M's will

not contrary is contrary not contrary is contrary
(2) (3) (5) (6)

The chart distinguishes six states of mind.
I am using "will" in a very general sense,
comprehending any mode of desire or volition.
My will conforms to my situation (1,9) if I
enjoy what I am doing, if I feel fulfilled in
it. If my will fails to conform (2, 3, 5, 6),
this may be because I am opposed to what I am
doing and I find it oppressive (3, 6) or because
I merely acquiesce in my position, without
investigating my self in it (2, 5).12”

He then reviews the exposition of worker/capitalist in terms

of this chart:

Marx usually locates the worker under (6),
portraying him as disposed to resent and react
against his position. The worker never falls
under (9): he never enjoys his alienated life.
Some things Marx says about the worker warrant
the application of (5). But (6) must be standard

 

123Ibid., p. 227.

l2“‘Ibid.

 

91

for the worker: he can satisfy (5) only
temporarily, since otherwise his revolutionism
would disappear.

In the Holy Family passage, the capitalist
is allocated to category (8): he enjoys his
alienated life. I have found confirmation and
explanation of this in the Manuscripts, although
some of the texts I have used’mightfibe construed
so as to deposit the capitalist in category (5),
making him a dull and passive agent of his capital.
But no interpretation could make him satisfy (6).

What would satisfy the descriptions on the
left-hand side of the table? It seems that (1)
applies to the energetic capitalist presiding in
the early phases of bourgeois society. Such a
capitalist is as close as any can be to being
non-alienated.

Items (2) and (3) could represent resourceful
industrialists who, in different ways, get no
satisfaction out of their activity. . . A worker
who fell under (1) would be a genuinely non-
alienated man. There cannot be workers of types
(2) and (3), for this would violate the principle
that it is satisfying to live in accordance with
the definition of one's essence. Nevertheless
many contemporary alienation-hunters would be
prepared to find cases of (2) and (3), and would
declare that they instantiate alienation, since
psychological phenomena are now often treated as
sufficient for that designation. Again much of
what is now identified as alienation falls under
(H), another category containing no workers for
Marx. This is the worker as described by semi-
Marxist radicals who make concessions, like
those I referred to in II-l. C. Wright Mills'
"cheerful rpbot" probably belongs in this
category.12

 

 

The author ends by noting (1) that his article could be

considered a critical reply to D. C. Hodges article (2)

that certain criticisms could be made of his stance and (3)

that he believes he can answer such criticisms.126

What can one say of these four articles? They appear

to be philosophical discussions--and they are theoretical

 

1251bid., p. 228.

126Ibid., pp. 228-30.

92
in nature.

To anyone questioning their philosophical nature one
might point out that each deals with a general topic,
alienation, and that each exhibits several of the other
characteristics identified with technical philosophy earlier
in this study. One might note, for example, that:

l. The article by Horowitz is primarily analytical
although it also contains a philosophical develop-
ment of the concept of alienation. The work con-
tains philosophical interpretation, "To be
reasonable for Hegel is the same as being at

"127 and the use of philOSOphical termin-

peace
ology, "objects of cognition", "dualism" and
"material world."128 One of its key moves toward
resolution is philosophical, "The study of
alienation is now confronted with a distinction
between two modalities of analyses, one formal and
the other descriptive."129

2. Murchland's paper is both critical and creative.
It is grounded in history of philosophy and also
includes some analytic work. In addition to the
use of philosophical terminology and texts, the

author offers a significant philosophical inter-

pretation of Descartes as the articulator of

127See: p. 80 above.

128See: pp. 80-81 above.

129See: p. 82 above.

93

"the dynamics of alienation" and then offers

argument to support this interpretation.130

Towards the end of the article Murchland states
his preferred characterization of alienation and
then marshals an indirect argument in support of
this characterization.131

3. Flay's article is different from either of the
former since it contains little concept analysis.
Reviewing the author's own summary of his paper
makes evident that the work is a Marxist philo-
sophical analysis of intellectual history:

I have attempted to evoke the paradox presented
to political philosophy by Marcuse's plea for the
great refusal and the reasoning behind it. I
have shown that the theory of John Dewey, a theory
eminently qualified to represent technological
thought, contained the point of negativity which
has led us to a Marcusean analysis. This paradox
would seem to present us with a vacuum into which
no positive power can enter unless a totally new
mode of rationality develops which is not subject
to the hegemony of technological rationality.
Yet, tradition bound as we are, and permeated
as is public education by technological
rationality, no clue to a social and political
solution seems present. Our very language causes
us to fall again and again into old modes of
thought--modes already taken up by the logic of
technology and rendered harmless. At best,
perhaps, we can see the dialectical emergence
of what must truly be called nihilism: the great
refusal. And the great refusal is also, perhaps,
the great irony: it has now been noted and filed
away.

 

130See: p. 89 above.
131See: p. 88-5 above.
132

Flay, p. 251.

Qu
Even without further reference to the text one
notes the use of philosophical terminology,
rational argument and the dialectical movement
native to Marxist philosophy.

8. The last paper, by Cohen, is an explication and
interpretation of text. The author also includes
some logical analysis as the chart on page ninety
above illustrates.

To anyone questioning the theoretical orientation of
these works one need only recommend a serious reading of
the articles. In each one alienation is approached
primarily as an idea to be grasped, a concept to be under-
stood and not as a problem to be solved. In no place does
the recommendation of courses of action or solution sets
become paramount. The topic as considered is theoretical.

In light of the above it appears that there is at
least one topic, alienation, in the theoretical category of

social philosophy.

Individuality. During the period of 1967-1969 of The

Philosopher's Index only one article listed under

 

'individuality' was also listed under 'social philosophy'.
This was "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness'"

by Daniel J. Shine.133

 

133Daniel J. Shine, "The Analogy of Individuality and
'Togetherness,'" The Thomist, XXXIII (July, 1969),
pp. 897-518.

 

95
The author examines a perennial problem in social
philosophy:

In the paragraphs which follow we wish to bring
out this point, namely, that one must be,
necessarily, both an individual and a member of
community, but particularly we wish to expand the
thought that neither individuality nor community
is a univocal concept or reality. Rather, in man
there are various levels of individuality.
Likewise there are various levels of community.
We have used the word "togetherness" as a

generic term because, as will appear later,
community, at least in our future use of the
word, will be limited to a particular level of
togetherness.l

He establishes his vocabulary:

By these terms "noumenal" and "phenomenal
ego" we wish to give a name to two aspects of
man which, although they cannot be separated,
yet must be distinguished. Man is spirit in
matter, or if you will, spirit in the world.

By the "noumenal ego" we mean man as spirit . . .
By the term "phenomenal ego" we mean the same
human soul which informs matter.

If man is a spirit (noumenal ego) and
spirit in matter (phenomenal ego) on the
substantial level, it will be necessary that
these two agpects of man appear in his levels of
activity.1

and follows this with a long analysis of man's intellect-
understanding; intellectual will-rational will.

Shine utilizes a scholastic framework but admits much
indebtedness to Karl Rahner, a Christian Heidiggerian, and
Gabriel Marcel, an existentialist, for both concepts and

136

terminology. Anyone even somewhat familiar with these

 

13u8hine, p. 897.

1351bid., pp. 897-8.
135Ibid., p. 897.

96
traditions can surmise much of the content and style of the
article by reading the subheadings used for the remainder
of the article:
AN INDIVIDUAL - ANALOGY OF BEING-BEING AND THE ONE ARE
CONVERTIBLE - ANALOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY
What is an individual?
Analogy of being.
Being and one are convertible.
Analogy of individuality.
THE GREATER THE INDIVIDUALITY, THE GREATER IS THE
COMMUNICABILITY AND NEED FOR COMMUNICATION
The greater the transcendance of form over matter, the
greater is the inferiority of the activity of the being.
The greater the inferiority of the activity of the
being, the greater is the individuality of the being.
The greater the individuality of the being, the
greater is the communicability and need for communication.
ANALOGY OF "TOGETHERNESS"
MAN-STRATIFIED UNITY OF INDIVIDUALITY AND "TOGETHER-
NESS"
Analogy of Individuality in a man
Biological unity
Rational person
Intellectual person
Grace-given supernatural individuality
Analogy of "Togetherness" in a man

Analogy of natural "togetherness"

97

Civil community

Communion

Analogy of supernatural "togetherness"

The church as pneumatic society

The church as pneumatic cell137

The title of the article indicates a generalized issue,

"The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness.'" The
sub-headings certainly indicate a theoretical discussion, an
item which even the author notes near the end of the work.
He states, "In the foregoing essay we have been almost
exclusively concerned with principles and not with appli-

cations."138

The sub-headings also indicate a paper employ-
ing many philosophical techniques and terminology utilized
by at least one and in some instances many segments of the
philosophical community. "The Analogy of Individuality and
'Togetherness'" by Daniel Shine is another example of a
specific theoretical topic which can be explored within the
domain of social philosophy.

Having shown through this long exposition of articles
that theoretical topics are considered within social philos-
ophy, it is obvious that position E583, which excludes such

topics from the domain of social philosophy, should be

eliminated from further consideration in this study.

 

137Ibid., pp. 500-5, 509-11, 513-6.

138Shine states, "In the foregoing essay we have been
almost exclusively concerned with principles and not with
applications." Ibid., p. 516.

98

There remains for our consideration E58l 2 8 and
9 3

ESSS,S,7' It will be shown that E581,2,u is inadequate. It

excludes problem topics from the scOpe of social philosophy.

The elimination of E 8 As one reads the list of

5 1,2,8'

specific topics which have articles cross-indexed under

 

social philosophy in The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968

 

and 1969, at least twenty-six appear to be social problem
topics rather than theoretical topics. This number includes:
communication, dialogue, demography, drama, generation gap,
gerontophobia, goals, Hai-Jai, lawyer(s), negroes, obscenity,
planning, pronography, poverty, production, psychedelics,
public relations, punctuality, race, silence, speech
technology, television, university, women and youth.139

As one begins to read the articles listed under these
topics and social philosophy, one is struck by how many are
examples of serious, popular thought rather than technical
philosophy. A quick sampling could tempt one to believe
that problem topics are not a part of technical social
philosophy. A full study of the forty-three articles,
however, reveals examples of technical philosophy. Social
philOSOphy does include problem topics.

As in the previous section the method adopted to show
the correctness of this judgement is an exposition of
articles indexed under both specific problem topics and

social philosophy. The topics chosen are 'communication',

 

139See: Above, p. 39.

99
'dialogue' and 'technology'. 'Communication' has four

articles cross-indexed under 'social philosophy': "Culture,

190

Communication and Silence" by S. Ganguly, "Violence,

Persons, Communication: A Transactional Model" by Samuel

Gomez,lul "Person, Communication and Violence" by William

192

Sacksteder and "The Analogy of Individuality and

183 'Dialogue' has one

'Togetherness'" by Daniel J. Shine.
article cross-indexed under social philosophy, "On the

Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" by Andre Mercier of

Berne University.1”” 'Technology' has five articles which
are so cross-indexed: "Note on the Coherence of the
American Phenomenon" by Andre Doremus,ll'5 "Letter to

Doxiadis" by Buckminster Fuller,ll'6 "The Possibilities and

 

1808. Ganguly, "Culture, Communication and Silence,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XIX (December,
MT, pp. 132-7000

lulSamuel Gomez, "Violence, Persons, Communication: A
Transactional Model," The Philosophy Forum, VII (March,
1969), pp. 182-200.

lquilliam Sacksteder, "Person, Communication and
Violence," The PhilosophyForum, VII (March, 1969),
pp. 35-86.

 

lu3Daniel J. Shine, "The Analogy of Individuality and
'Togetherness,'" The Thomist, XXXIII (July, 1969), pp. 897-
518.

 

ll”Andre Mercier, "On the Foundation of Man's Rights
and Duties," Man and World, I (November, 1968), pp. 528-39.

luSAndre Doremus, "Note on the Coherence of the Ameri-
can Phenomenon," Diogenes, LXV (Sept. 1969), pp. 89-73.

 

 

lL'BBuckminster Fuller, "Letter to Doxiadis," Main
Currents, XXV (Mar.-Apr., 1969), pp. 87-97.

 

100
Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" by Veljko Korac,1l+7
"Technology and Humanism" by Howard L. Parsonsll‘L8 and "A
Humanistic Technology" by Hyman G. Rickover.lug
This paper will not examine all of the above articles
in detail. Instead, one article from each of the three
categories will be considered. In reviewing the articles
cross-indexed under 'communication' and 'social philosophy'
one realizes that "The Analogy of Individuality and
'Togetherness'" has already been discussed in this chapter.
Another article, "Culture, Communication and Silence" will
be considered. Since 'dialogue' only has one article cross-
indexed under social philosophy that article, "On the
Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" will be considered.
Finally, "The Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" will
be examined in the 'technology' category. The other

articles are omitted because they are examples of serious

popular thought rather than of technical philosophy.150

Communication. "Culture, Communication and Silence" is a

 

rather difficult article to excerpt. This may be as much a

question of the author's style as it is the concurrent

 

1L”Veljko Korac, "The Possibilities and Prospects of
Freedom in Modern World," Praxis, IV (1968), pp. 73-82.

1u8Howard L. Parsons, "Technology and Humanism,"
Praxis, V (1969), pp. 168-80.

1ugHyman G. Rickover, "A Humanistic Technology," The
Humanist, XXVIIII (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 22-8.

150See: Chapter V for some discussion of this issue.

101
interplay of several distinct ideas. It has resulted, how-
ever, in quotations which are generally longer than those
cited heretofore.
The opening paragraph not only sets the style but
provides an overview for what follows:

In this paper I want to emphasize that silence
is a phenomenon which exerts a positive influence
on our culture. Culture not only develops
through the possibility of communication but also
changes its forms through a widening of communi-
cation with the length and breadth of the world.
Culture and communication have been, more than ever,
inseparably connected. Language, therefore,
plays the most important part in our culture
today. Culture breeds and fosters the individual
in his uniqueness and yet the individual feels
cramped through participating in his culture.
Strange, how culture itself brings in us the
consciousness of being dissatisfied with it. We
somehow, though often very vaguely, realize a
sort of maladjustment between the freely deciding
individual and the rule-governed society in which
we move and have our being. The individual cannot
help, and perhaps justifiably so, feeling that
after a certain point his role in society is not
only unrewarding but positively injurious to
his individual existence. Whenever we try to take
a comprehensive view of human civilization and
culture we are impressed by a continuous tension and
strain dominating the depth of individual minds.
The individual can hardly do away with his unique-
ness; the pressing demands of his own culture
therefore naturally prompt him to come off the
stage for a while and retire into his inner self
of silence. When silence comes as such a relief
it has not merely a negative value but positively
enriches the individual and inspires him to use a
kind of statement, pointing to, and yet not
describing, this world of silence. Our analysis
will chiefly center round the problem of
communication; an analysis which will identify the
referred to "malady" as essential to communicating
animals. The tension that we suffer from our desire
to exPress, is not accidental or temporary but
intrinsic to the language-oriented culture that we
have. The conflict, to put it very tersely, is
between our desire to express and the failure of
expression--the ultimate insignificance residing

102

vis-a-vis the totality of significant discourse.
We shall not, in such circumstances, try to offer
a therapy or a solution but only identify and
determine the nature of this, as it were,
existential vacuum (the "malady").

The author then moves to Section II Culture and the

Individual. He distinguishes culture from civilization;

 

the former being "concerned with the intrinsic values and
spiritual freedom of man" and the latter with the "apparatus
man uses in order to control the conditions of his life in
his outside world."152 This distinction plays a key role
because:

It is this subjectivity which gives culture
its peculiar importance in guaranteeing the
individual excellence and freedom. It is by
admitting this sense in our culture that we shall
try to show an eternal alternation between the
objective world of expression and the
subjective world of security and absolute
freedom.l

 

Ganguly continues by showing the crucial influences of

culture upon "one's life and personality."15u

The third section, Culture and Communication opens:

 

The faith that my feelings can be communicated,
that my ideas can be understood, accepted and
spread, makes me feel secure. The worst fear
is the fear of being misunderstood. Through
communication we rise above our loneliness--we
explore a common world with others; man feels
anchored and tagged to a universe wide enough to
make him feel his existence. The nonmaterial
culture is mostly developed centering round this

 

 

lslsanguly, p. 182.
152Ibid., pp. 83-8.
153Ibid., p. 183.

15"Ibid., pp. 183-5.

103

possibility of communication. Communication,
of course, is a term with side connotation.
For our purpose communication will stand for
verbal communication only. The possession of
language is the greatest characteristic of our
culture. '

Language is so much a part of our daily
life that we often tend to look at it as a
natural act like breathing, but we realize as
soon as we attend a little that there is
nothing natural or automatic about language.
We do not inherit language° we acquire it only
by intensive learning. . 155

He continues with some reflections about language:

Language is, broadly speaking, a 'system of
symbols.‘ The two words in the above line need
a little explanation. Language performs an
essentially social function helping us to get
along together, to communicate and achieve a
cooperation and understanding among us.

As such, language has to obey certain rules--
rules which are available to all of us when we
use the language. In other words, however
arbitrary the nature of signs may seem, once
they are accepted in the corpus there is no
more anarchy in their combinations. Their
combinations are well-organized and rule-
governed. All the moves we make must be
according to the rules. However fascinating
it may seem to us, a private language is a
misnomer. Just as any sound is not a word,
any handling of the pawns on the chess board
is not a 'move,' similarly, any utterance is not
a significant statement. A move is either
correct or incorrect; a statement is either
true or false. Where intelligibility and
communication are the ends, absence of rules
will defeat the very purpose. A full set of
elements with rules of combination is what is
meant here by a 'system.’ 'Symbols' are the
words in a language. They are symbolic as
opposed to their BEing 'iconic' as well as
for their self-transcending reference to things
and entities. It is this aspect of reference that
will be important for our purpose here. Another
distinction will not be out of place. Talking in a
language and talking about a language are two VEFy
different things. When we speak about the

 

 

155Ibid., pp. 188-5.

109

language, obviously language can be shown to

have all sorts of laws for the three specific
aspects, e.g., syntactics, semantics, and
pragmatics. But when we are suggesting that
language is a 'system' where moves can be

judged to be correct or incorrect we are not
referring to any metalinguistic rules but

rules existing inside the language to be adhered
to by the participants. Any positivistic
analysis of language has to start with an
analysis of words. Words, mostly, stand for
things, entities, or relations. These nonverbal
elements can be regarded as the referents of
which the words are generally Names. At an
advanced stage of learning this feature may

not be explicit, as when we learn the meaning of
a word through certain synonyms in the dictionary;
but such verbal learning cannot go on indefinitely.
It stops at a point when one has to learn the
technique of referring to a nonlinguistic element
through a verbal symbol. This naming operation
exerts a powerful influence on our mind and
without this basic referring habit of language

we can hardly learn the art of communication.

These reflections are later followed by an analysis
and critique of "the-word-as-reference" attitude:

Let us start with the 'class' term.
Empirical terms representing classes have
vagueness so far as they admit of borderline
cases. The paradigm class of such terms should
be color terms, say 'blue' or 'green.' . . .
regarding the terms expressing personal experience,
e.g., toothache or terms of emotions. Here we
face that notorious problem of the 'privacy of
experience.' Meaning is expected to be something
which can be publicly communicated. But are
our toothaches, or even joy for that matter, ever
adequately communicable so that the possibility
of misunderstanding is completely and finally
eliminated? In saying all this we should not
be understood to mean that communication is
just impossible; we are merely asserting that
there is only an essential vagueness in the
meaning of such terms to the result that we are
always aware of a possibility of misunderstanding.
This constant apprehension of being 'misunderstood'
greatly affects the psychology of the users of

 

1551bid., pp. 185-5.

105

language.

Finally, when we come to 'theoretical
terms,‘ we discover that vagueness inherent in
them is not so much regarding their meaning-
specification as their connection with our
experience. In other words, these terms seem
to draw their meaning not so much from available
experiences but from the system to which they
belong. This creates a new dimension in the
problem of understanding. We seem to idealize and
abstract from our experience to impart an
accuracy of meaning to such terms. Naturally,
therefore, there shows up a gap between their
meanings and their application.

He then speaks of a new outlook developed by men such
as P. K. Feyerabend:

The new outlook with regard to theoretical terms,
i.e., that they are the results of abstraction
and idealization, completely reversed the
attitude to the problem of meaning of theoretical
terms; the meaning of a term, therefore, is taken
to the tOp which exerts a pressure on the

terms occurring at the bottom of a theory or a
system. In short, all words have a specific
meaning with reference to a particular theory.
Meaning cannot be known in isolation, it is
theory-laden. The traditional faith in empirical
facts (or 'experience derived through senses')

as the ultimate legislator of meaning is thus
shaken even for the empirical sciences. Certainly
this behavior of the terms does not make their
meaning vague but only makes us feel that there
is a final arbitrariness in the application of
such terms to our experience. The result is the
same, that is, a sense of insecurity creeps into
our mind whenever we discover that the truth and
also the meaning of what we say are not determined
by a common observable world or nature but merely
by the principle of convenience or even an
aesthetic choice. The arbitrariness involved in
the meaning of such terms allows a free play to
certain subjective factors so solemnly avoided

by us to maintain the objective purity of our
language.1

 

157Ibid., pp. 188-9.
lselbid., p. 189.

106
Finally, Ganguly raises the "open texture" point made

by Waisman and then goes on to discuss the difficulties

which particular terms raise for communication.159

He continues to offer arguments to show that ordinary

communication is vague and thus leads to a sense of in-

security--"the insecurity of being misunderstood."160

Ganguly ends the section by stating:

We long for a rule-free zone and silence comes

to our rescue. The self comes out of its silent
corner to objectify and externalize itself in
and through expression, through an advancing
symbolic consciousness; but unfortunately,
through "applicative" failure we are frustrated
and are pushed back again into the subjective
world beyond language--the world of silence.

This is the full picture of the restless cycle
inherent in our verbalistic culture. We are
tossed between these two worlds incessantly.

This unsteadiness is thus essential to our
culture which every age discovers and describes
as the "crisis of the age." Such an alternation
is finally unavoidable. According to K. Jaspers,
"Since man can find no completion in the
realization of his life as a whole, soaring
above life, he builds for himself a second world,
the world of the mind, in the space wherein he
becomes articulately sure of himself in the
general form of his being . . . cutting loose,
for a moment, from mere Reality, he finds his way
back into the being that he has become through the
visions and the creations of his mind." The
above lines very powerfully describe our retreat
into a world of our own except that such a world
cannot be "articulate" as Jaspers thinks.
Religious faith and our faith in a world of
values are sometimes clung to in this world of
silence through a mystic identification and that
is why we indulge in the "indescribable," the
"unsayable," the "Anirvachya." End points in
the world of language act as silencers.

 

 

1591bid., pp. 189-91.
1501bid., pp. 193-5.
161Ibid., pp. 198-5.

107
The fourth and final section of the paper is concerned
with silence. After some introductory remarks the author

states:

. . . silence partially restores to us a sense
of security and a sense of freedom. In the
abdve we have discussed’how our‘language habits
stand in the way of achieving these two goals.
Let us see how silence acts as the restorer of
these two basic pursuits. We shall, therefore,
try to answer the two following questions
throughout this section: (1) 'How does silence
give us security?‘ (2) 'How does silence help
us to enjoy freedom?‘16

 

 

This section is followed by some reflections aimed at

showing that poets, religious thinkers, philosophers and

"163

scientists all "admit silence. The author then notes

that the culture has 'silencers'--steps, points, or state-
ments by which we ask others to be silent.16” He develops
an analysis of them and ends by saying:

For our purpose, we have sufficiently quoted

to confirm our thesis that language on every
front is strewn with silencer statements. It
is through these silencers that we are to

reach the world of silence to regain our
security lost in our descriptive efforts. What
is necessary is only to be aware when silencers
are being used; otherwise we shall create
unnecessary and avoidable verbiage and make a
casualty of 'sense.‘ This is our answer to the
first question posed earlier, which is: "How
does silence give us security?"165

He immediately moves on to argument about the second

question:

 

162Ibid., p. 195.
163Ibid., pp. 195-9.
16"Ibid., p. 197.

165Ibid., p. 198.

108

"How does silence help us enjoy freedom," let us
begin by stating that we are presuming that freedom
can be absolute. A state of absolute freedom we
assume as a state where no rules have to be obeyed,
no answer is required of one. By definition,
therefore, such a state of freedom cannot be
described, for as soon as we try to describe we
are committed to obey, at least, rules of
description. Even metaphor is of no use,

sifiCe metaphors are dependent on the literal

sense of the words where some rules of identi-
fication or reference will be needed to stick to
the 'meaning core' of those words. We have been
so thoroughly conditioned to believe that
fundamental freedom of an individual lies in an
increment of his linguistic skill that we seldom
see the trap we fall into when we excitedly try
to describe a state of absolute freedom. Though
we all agree that freedom is essential for every
individual we invariably search for it at wrong
places; we try to speak about it or describe it
through our language, systematically losing our
freedom by that very effort. This is indeed a
paradox of language. Ask a man when or where he
is free completely, he is sure to Be misled if he
is tempted to participate in the game of language,
and no wonder. He is immediately under the
obligation (what can be more opposed to freedom?)
of obeying some rules; consequently, he loses his
freedom in the bargain. There can be an act of
freedom but we are unable to describe it.__H§——
deCiSion to describe may be an absolutely free act
but as soon as we enter the world of language to
put that decision into practice we lose our
freedom. In other words, we can decide to be

free by preserving our silence. To enter into
such a world of freedom we must use a set of
silencers either 'individual' or 'social.' The
case of the Indian yogis and sanyasins can be
cited for confirmation; the first temptation that
they overcome is the temptation to communicate.

To put the matter more metaphysically, it is only
in utter subjectivity that we can feel free, or
more precisely speaking, be free. This is how
and why only silence helps us enjoy our freedom.166

 

 

 

The article ends with a highlighting of what has been

accomplished in these pages and some suggestions for further

 

1551bid., p. 199.

109

research concerning cultures and silence.167

Dialogue. "On the Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" by

 

Andre Mercier is indexed under 'dialogue'. The discussion
about dialogue is concentrated in the center sections of the
article and despite the fact that it undergirds Mercier's
whole discussion of rights and duties, these sections could
be cut out and form an article in their own right with
little alteration.

Apparently the occasion of this article was Mercier's
reflections on both Professor Guido Calogero's thesis "that

Man's rights are rooted in . . . will go dialogue" which was

 

put forth at the 1964 meeting of the International Institute
of Philosophy in L'Aquila, Italy and Mercier's own thesis
put forth at the same meeting, that "the problem is
insufficiently explicated if it is put only with regard to
Man's rights, because Man has not only natural rights, he
also has natural duties."168 Mercier indicates the aim of
the present article when he states:

Now since, on the one hand, rights are somehow
related to a will to require, to a request, to an
exigency, and on the other hand, duties are some-
how related to a will to accept, to a recognition,
to a consent, and since Calogero's will to dialogue
does in fact contain these two elements 5? request
and consent, we may hope that Calogero's thesis and
ours do not contradict each other; we may even hope
that they will, if not coincide, at least have a

 

 

1671bid., p. 200.

168Mercier, p. 528.

110

common origin.
It is the purpose of this essay to
establish that relation.

He begins:

The will to dialogue is the will to respect
other peopIe'E‘bpinibns, a will without which all
judgments remain selfish and unchecked, and
therefore, in that sense, arbitrary. In order
to respect the other person's opinion, one
has to understand that opinion, and in order to
understand it, one has to have a dialogue.

"one has to" = one should or must. It is a
compulsory will, which is meant to rise above
arbitrariness. A mere will to exact what we
hold to be good, without listening to other
opinions, would amount to the imposition of
our own opinion, i.e. to a monologue, in which
we would make ourselves to our own criterion,
which is begging the question, for we cannot
be the object of a criterion and at the same
time, establish that criterion, whereas a
dialogue amounts to ordination into human
society.

Human society includes, of course, innumerable
opponents who are all also bound by the same
compulsory will to dialogue. Therefore the
dialogue does not—consist simply in a relation
between two individuals, but in a relation between
each individual and every other one.

 

 

He then notes that this will go dialogue establishes

 

a kind of equality between men but that "this equality is a
theoretical one . . . whereas in practice it always mani-
fests itself as _i__n_equality."171 That as soon as dialogue is
realized between individuals, parties or classes:172

one man is found to possess greater force of
persua31on than his neighbours, one party is

 

1691bid., p. 525.

1701bid.

 

1711bid.

 

1721bid.

 

111

more numerous or disposes of better propaganda
than another, such and such a class of the
population is richer or more influential than
the others, and so on. Then such inequali-
ties appear as obstacles to the equality
between men. But at the same time they are
necessary for an understanding of what equality
is, and they are also the practical origin of
the necessity for dialogue. Because, if
equality between men had been realized from
the beginning, not merely the principle of
equality but factual equality, there would be
no reason for dialogue, since dialogue is
meant to smooth out differences, to lead to
understanding, to eradicate and even suppress
divergences. Theoretical equality, and

factual inequality are, in spite of their
verbal differences and their apparent contra-
diction, one and the same thing, seen, however,

from the opposite ends of the will go dialogue.173

 

He continues with a long analogy with thermodynamics but
returns to exposition of dialogue with:

in all cases, there is a distance between the
theoretical equality of all partners and the
factual inequality found among them. This
distance is a measure of the intensity of the
requirements of the dialogue.

However, this distance should not be con-
fused with mutual ignorance or lack of
acquaintance between partners. Partners may
be very far apart for various reasons. Then,
no dialogue is really possible, for the partners
become incommensurable. There must be some
common feature between them, putting them into
local and homogeneous communities, in space
and time, as well as in their way of life and
thought, and the aims of their work and actions.
Lack of acquaintance makes people strangers.
Complete strangers do not enter into a dialogue
at all. Entering into a dialogue overcomes,
or at least decreases, their status of being
foreigners or strangers. . . In a society where
social barriers are extremely rigid and obeyed by
both sides as a result of deeply respected
conventions, the individuals of different classes
have only technical relations, as, for instance,
between master and slave, manager and workman,

 

173Ibid., pp. 525-5.

112

monarch and subject . . ., and no dialogue is
conceived of by either of them. A dialogue
arises only where a common problem produces a
form of "dialysis." Through dialysis, all
kinds of contacts become possible, ranging
from mere discourse to sexual proximity,
including friendship, professional collabor-
ation, and so on. All such contacts are
specific forms of that fundamental dialogue
which we are talking about.

Mercier explains that in patriarchal times the family
or clan realized the dialysis most immediately.175 Now,
with the loss of homogenity of the family other dialoguing
systems are in the fore. He states:

The American citizen, for instance, emigrates from
one town to another several times in the course

of his lifetime, at the age of 18, when, leaving
his family, he goes to college thousands of miles
away, from then on beginning the life of an
industrialized nomad, which has become one feature
of the Western civilization of our day. On the
other hand, school creates self-sufficient systems
facilitating dialysis, and dialogue at school

is easier and more intense than in the family.176

The author then introduces a distinction in dialogues:

However, in all cases, whether it be in the
clan, in the family, at school or at the factory,
the practice of dialogue is inevitably twofold.

On the one hand, there is dialogue between what

we shall call homotypes; on the other hand, there
is dialogue between heterotypes. For instance, the
children of one family are homotypes, nearly equal,
and they find dialogue easy, because they share
beds, rooms, clothes, in short, everything; so
they need a dialogue only to rule out minor
differences and they talk practically on an

equal footing, in their divergences as well as

in their confidences. For them, the dialogue is
superficial and of short duration . . .

 

1”Ibid., p. 528.

175Ibid., pp. 528-9.

176Ibid., p. 529.

113

. . . The same applies to workers in the
same workshop, and to all such cases of
homotypy where quasi-equality makes dialogue
easy.

Heterotypy, on the contrary, manifests
itself between parents and children, teachers
and pupils, heads of factories and workers. .

In such cases, there is, on the one hand, as much
moral contact between heterotypes as there is
between homotypes, but the distance is great

and the stress is intense, hence dialogue is
‘much more difficult. The necessity of

dialogue is therefore greatest among heterotypes
of one and the same community.

He adds that among heterotypes;

something else happens in such cases, namely, the
appearance of what may be called pre-eminence
or precedence of one individual over the
others: The father stands above the son, the
teacher above the pupil, the director above
the worker. Such pre-eminence is not the
essence of inequality. . . There may be,
without los§_of pre-eminence a comrade-head and
a comrade-worker, or a perfect understanding
between parents and children. It is not a
difference of right, but a relation that is
included in the definition of the specific
community under consideration: family,
factory, school etc. Yet the relation stands,
and renders the dialogue between heterotypes
more profound than that between homotypes,

for whom it is superficial. Moreover,
dialogue is as difficult for him who is
pre-eminent as for him who is not . . .

The first steps are difficult for both
partners. So are the second steps.178

Mercier illustrates the above observations with a
father-son business enterprise and then moves on to note
some of the qualities dialogue should have:

Of course, everybody will agree that a

dialogue should not be fought out with weapons,
but must be unarmed. But it is not easy to say

 

177Ibid., pp. 529-30.

178Ibid., pp. 530-1.

This

119

precisely when a dialogue takes place without
weapons, for it cannot take place without
talking, and every talk is accompanied by
facial expression, gestures of the arms and
hands, which may look like an armed attack;

a simple motion of the arm may seem intended
to be a slap in the face of the opponent,

and so on. Then in cases of pre-eminence,

the head of the factory has a large sum of
money in his pocket, or he may, be talking
about labour inefficiency, give the impression
that he is threatening; or a father may impose
on his child by virtue of his authority.17

leads him to the statement that:

The unarmed dialogue is a dialogue in which
each party will try at each step, not only to
understand the premisses and the arguments of
the other, but also to present his own '
premisses and arguments in such a way that
nothing in his speech can be interpreted as a
threat or as a weapon.

This amounts to requiring that an ideal
dialogue should never be undertaken with the
intention of destroying one of the parties.

Thus there is, to our knowledge, only one
way to take. This is union. And again, to our
knowledge, there is only one kind of union which
is at the same time unarmed, exacting and con-
senting, namely the union by love. For we are
not interested in the mere integration of two
parties into one common system; this would
merely be co-existence. There is no common
system pre-existent to the union; the union
will be realized when, and only when, the
parties are willing to interact by mutual and
simultaneous request and consent. At that
moment the parties will be infinitely near each
other.1

At this point Mercier moves to apply these reflections

about dialogue to the issue of Man's rights and duties. The

application takes only a few pages but since this paper is

 

l791bid., p. 533.

180Ibid.

 

115
considering the dialogic rather than the rights or duties

topics of the article, those sections will be omitted.

Technology. Of the five articles on technology, "The
Possibilities and Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" by
Veljko Korac appears to treat the issue both at the problem
level and as technical philosophy. The following excerpts
should substantiate this claim.

Korac Opens his article by describing current, growing
attitudes about technology and economic progress:

In the modern world there has been an
increasing tendency to seek the possibilities
and prospects of freedom in the sphere of
technological and economic progress. . .

Technology offers itself . . . indeed
imposes itself, as the possibility of a
triumphant break-through beyond the borders
of this planet into the immense regions of
the universe and the transhuman world, i.e.
as a possibility of planetary practice.

The economy, at the same time, offers and
promises less and less work and more and more
prosperity, i.e. life without any immediate

care concerning daily living. Either possibility
appears as a liberation from immediate want.l

He adds that these tendencies are so persistent that:

these illusions appear not only in capitalist,
but also in socialist systems. Moreover,
countries which have passed through socialist
revolutions on a lower, or even the lowest
level of technology and economy, and which make
efforts to achieve a faster technical and
economic advance on the basis of planning show
a growing tendency to accept the advancement of
technology and the economy as the exclusive
standards of social advance as a whole.182

 

181Korac, p. 73.

182Ibid.

 

116
Korac immediately articulates criticism (antithesis) of
these trends:

The entire experience of the modern world,
however, shows that the potentialities of
technology and the economy are being realized
nowadays in a highly contradictory manner, even
paradoxically. For it is obvious that spectacular
technical and economic progress does not lead
towards a solution of the contradictions of the
modern world but, on the contrary, towards
widening the gap between the exploiters and the
exploited, the rich and the poor, the developed
and the underdeveloped . . . Thus modern society
is moving in two diametrically opposed directions
which at their extreme points of movement appear
as two irreconcilable extremes of the modern
world. This is what lends the most characteristic
mark to all contemporary world developments.
At the same time the potentialities of technological
progress are becoming realized in a manner which
makes it increasingly obvious that this progress
could turn into total regression, or even total
self-annihilation; as a result an existential
uneasiness, even pessimism, can be observed as the
reverse of militant technocratic and economistic
optimism. Naturally, this stimulates critical
thought to examine the advance of technology and the
economy in order to determine and explain not
only its favourable but also its adverse effects.183

There follows a section in which the author appeals to
Marx for a resolving insight but then suggests that it would
appear in the light of history that Marx's insight was not
correct. The author resolves this contradiction by noting:

Marx's critical words about technology
obviously had a deeper ontological and anthropo-
logical meaning, which perfectly expresses the
modern tendencies of technocratism while not
negating the instrumental or functional value of
technology. Marx did not doubt at all that it was
the development of the economy and of technology
which would change the economic and political
structure of the capitalist society, and also the
position and role of the working class in this

 

1831bid., p. 78.

117

society, but with his criticism of technology,

as an ideology, as an outlook, he drew attention
as early as a hundred years ago to the contra-
dictory character of technical development,

i.e. to the fact that technology by itself not
only is not humane, but threatens to become the
most inhumane thing that mankind has ever

created unless society itself becomes humanized . .

In any case, then, Marx saw quite clearly
that technological and economic rationalization
offers man two possibilities: one--to overcome
human work as a necessity and become able to
create universally and freely and be a genuinely
free being and, the other, to identify himself
with technology and resign himself to technical
manipulation, quantification, quantophreny, etc.,
i.e. to the total domination of technology.
Nowadays the latter danger is incomparably more
obvious than it was a hundred years ago. In
entirely rationalizing man's being, technology
reifies and alienates it completely, turning it
into a component part of the machine. . .

The consequences of this reification and
alienation are fully obvious today. This is also
indicated by the every-day language of political
and social activity, especially among the
bureaucracy. Every ambition and initiative are
usually reduced to a persistent search for
'systems,’ 'organisms,' 'mechanisms,' 'structures'
etc. of society, while man as man is being
forgotten. Thus a situation is created where
anything can be found in the 'systems' and
'organisms' of the modern world except freedom
for man as man.

Korac then says, "There is no doubt that those

tendencies have greatly compromised socialist systems"185

and he then introduces some analysis of specific historical

situations. He notes the shift in importance of intellectual

production and producers. He discusses the varieties of

modern socialisms and the evils of bureaucracy and despotism

which can and does taint some of them. He describes

 

18"Ibid., pp. 75,75,77.

185Ibid., p. 77.

118
misapplications of the logic of history and in the end
returns to Marx:

He showed, above all, that the freedom of man
as man is not achieved by political revolution.
Political revolution enables the State to
realize a greater or smaller degree of freedom,
but the State may be free as a State without,
however, man being free in it as man.

In emphasizing this, Marx had in mind the
insufficiency of any national and any political
freedom, and he defined his conception of
freedom as a condition in which the freedom of
each individual becomes the condition for the
freedom of all, i.e. a condition in which man's
individual totality and his social totality
converge. In order to enable man to reach this
degree of freedom, the development of his
human potentialities must become a purpose in
itself. This is that kind of self-productive
activity which rises above immediate necessity
or, as Marx would say, which stands beyond
necessity. But this kind of freedom is only
a possibility which will be realized only in
the measure to which man will be able to
struggle for it. It is an indispensable
condition of this struggle that he should
have firm criteria which will not allow 'today'
and 'tomorrow' to be separated as separate
elements of chronolOgical duration but as the
essence of human practice where purpose reigns
supreme. In this sense freedom of man as man
can only be realized if it is treated as the
highest objective and purpose of human practice,
while everything else is regarded only as an
instrument which should help to achieve this
objective.

Conclusion. As one reflects on the above articles one is
struck by their philosophical nature. One notes, for
example, that:

1. Each considers generalized issues: communication,

dialogue and technology.

 

l851bid., pp. 81-2.

119

2. Each uses philosophical terminology. Terms such
as 'freely deciding individual', 'rule-governed
society', 'subjectivity', 'self-transcending
reference', 'the problem of the privacy of
experience', 'mere Reality', 'absolute freedom',
'metaphysically', 'will to dialogue', 'theoretical
equality', 'homotype', 'premisses and arguments',
'existential uneasiness', 'ontological', and
'conception of freedom' can be found on each page
of this study which cites the text of these
articles.

3. Each utilizes rational argument. There is, for
example, the argument concerning silence and
freedom cited on pages one hundred seven and one
hundred eight; the argument concerning the will to
dialogue cited on pages one hundred nine and one
hundred ten, and the dialectical argument structure

of Korac's entire consideration of technology.187

The three articles are problem oriented. Their main
thrust is not the purely theoretical:
1. "Culture, Communication and Silence" is grounded
in the human experience of language, culture and
silence, and in the frustrations and problems

generated by these. Further, the culmination of

 

187The above list is by no means exhaustive of the
examples of philosophical characteristics of each article.
It is offered merely as a sample to indicate that such
characteristics are present.

120
of the article is a recommendation and not simply
a theory. The author recommends silence--it alone
helps us enjoy our freedom.

2. The discussion of dialogue found in "On the Founda-
tion of Man's Rights and Duties" is also grounded
in human life and experience. It too makes
recommendations, but the recommending is less
direct, more subtle than in the Ganguly article.
The writer consistently points out the need for
dialogue and the results of dialogue--results
which he phrases in approving language.

3. "The Possibilities and Prospects of Freedom in
Modern World" treats technology as a problem. The
author spends much of the article showing the
negative results of technology as on-going problems
for the state.188 Further he sees these problems
and the 'problem of technology' as problems for
human freedom. At the very end of the work he

offers a possible solution.189

Not only are the articles grounded in life experience, but

their main thrust is to recommend a course of action or

resolve a social problem. Hence it is apparent that problem
topics are possible in the domain of social philosophy.
Since these excerpts from the articles by Andre,

Mercier and Veljko Korac indicate that it is possible to

 

188See pp. 82-83 above.

189Ibid.

 

121
consider problem topics within the realm of social philoso-
phy in the manner of technical philosophy, it is clear

that E58l 2 u is an inadequate position concerning the
9 9

scope of social philosophy and ethics since it denies such

problem topics to social philosophy. E585 6 7 is shown to
9 9

be the adequate position. It now remains only to consider

whether S 86, or S7 expresses the correct extension of

59
social philosophy.

The elimination of inadequate sub-positions on the

5, S6 and S7 all

see social philOSOphy as extending to both theoretical and

theoretical domain of social philOSOphy. 8

problem topics. The differences among these positions con-
cern what kinds of topics are included within the theoreti-
cal domain.

S5 - sees social philosophy as including first order

theoretical topics alone

86 - sees social philosophy as including second order

theoretical topics alone

S7 - sees social philosophy as including both first and

second order theoretical topics.

The first point which should be noted in trying to
decide among these positions is that it has already been
shown that second order theoretical topics are part of the
domain of social philosophy. The second section of this

chapter indicated this in its discussion of articles on

122
'alienation' and ' individuality.'190 Perhaps one would like
to add other such tOpics as 'change', 'dialectic' or 'power'
but the issue has been settled and really needs no additional
substantiation.
Since there are second order theoretical topics within

the domain of social philosophy, 8 is an inadequate

5
position and the field is reduced to 86 and S7.

The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968 and 1969 cross-
indexes only one specific tOpic with social philosophy which
might be considered a first order theoretic topic;
institutions.lgl An examination of the article listed under
both institution(s) and social philosophy, "The Crisis in
Our Democratic Institutions" by Sidney Hook and Harold
Taylor192 reveals that the article is not a discussion of
institution(s) per se, however, but an examination of some
contemporary problems in American democratic institutions.
It appears that there are no first order theoretical topics
in this corpus.

The absence of such topics from this philosophical
corpus does not, however, demonstrate their absence from the
domain of social philOSOphy. Indeed examination of other

parts of the philosophical corpus in social philosophy does

reveal the existence of such first order theoretical topics.

 

190See: Above pp. 77-97.
lglLineback, 1959, pp. 85, 189.
192Sidney Hook and Harold Taylor, "The Crisis of Our

Democratic Institutions," The Humanist, XXVIII (July-
August, 1969), pp. 6-7.

 

123

Social Philosophyby Martin G. Plattel reveals topics such

 

as "Being-together in the world" and "Aspects of Human co-
existence" in its Table of Contents,193 while the Contents

of The Social Philosophyand Religion of Comte by Edward

 

Caird includes the "Nature of Social Organization and Three
Forms of Society."191+
A second argument can be made for the inclusion of
first order theoretic topics in the domain of social philos-

ophy: It has been shown that second order theoretical
topics are part of social philosophy. However, the treat-
ment of second order topics, such as the analysis of
individual-community relationship(s) presupposes the con-
sideration of certain first order topics such as the
meaning of community. Thus, the consideration of first
order theoretical tOpics is required for the enterprise of
social philosophy to operate successfully. First order
theoretical topics belong in the domain of social philoso-
phy.

Since it has now been shown that both first order and
second order theoretical tOpics are part of social philoso-
phy, it should be apparent that 86 is an inadequate position
concerning the scope of social philosophy. S7 is an

adequate position.

 

193Plattel, pp. vii-x.

lg“Edward Caird, The Social PhilOSOphy and Religion of
Comte. (New York: The MacMillan and Co.,51895),

pp. vii-viii.

 

128

Summary. This chapter has shown both the inadequacy of all
other articulated positions and the adequacy of E587 for
describing the scope of social philosophy and ethics. It
has been indicated that both branches of philosophy extend
to theoretical and problematical issues.

The next chapter in its further clarification of the
extension of the meaning of the term 'social philosophy'

will review and explain some of the ramifications of certain

points made in these sections.

VI. THE RELATION OF 'SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY' TO 'ETHICS'

Introduction. This study has, thus far, tried to clarify

 

the relation(s) between the meanings of 'social philosophy'
and 'ethics' by examining the actual practice of philoso-
phers. It was found that both branches of philosophy
include theoretical topics and general problem topics. It
was also found that ethics, a well defined field with
authoritative reference persons and authoritative reference
journals, required the broadest possible definition to
describe the actual state of the enterprise.195 Since
ethics required such a broad definition, it should not be
surprising to find that social philOSOphy, which is a less
clearly defined branch of philOSOphy, lacking a strong
community of reference persons, cannot be defined more
narrowly. Indeed one might question whether the extension
of the meaning of 'social philOSOphy' can be made any more
precise than the broad statement reached at the end of
Chapter IV.

If one reflects on the work accomplished thus far,
however, one realizes that the basis for further clarifi-

cation exists within this work. For example, it has been

 

195See: Above pp. 71-75.

125

126
necessary to make certain distinctions about social philos-
ophy.196 Reflection on such distinctions should generate
greater precision concerning the meaning of 'social

philosophy'.

Technical vs. non-technicalphilosophy. There is the

 

distinction between work which is technical philosophy and
that which is not technical philosophy. Earlier in this
text articles by Flay, Horowitz, Murchland, Shine, Mercier
and Korac were cited in some detail in order to show that
these articles were technical philosophy. It was also noted
that there were numerous articles which appeared to be
examples of serious, popular thought rather than technical

philosophy.197

Within the limits of this study, it is not
necessary to review all such articles indexed under 'social
philosophy' in The Philosophers Index 1967, 1968, and 1969.
The point to be demonstrated is that 'social philosophy' is
used to designate such articles. For such a purpose the
consideration of three articles is sufficient: "Geronto-
phobia--Some Remarks on a Social Policy for the Elderly" by
Joseph H. Bunzel,198 "Four-Letter Words: A Symposium" by

199

Daniel Schwarz and "The Religion of the Hippies" by

 

196See: Above pp. 76, 77, 98.
197Ibid.

198Joseph H. Bunzel, "Gerontophobia--Some Remarks on a
Social Policy for the Elderly," The Humanist, XXIX (July-
August, 1969), pp. 17-18.

9 . .

19 Daniel Schwarz, "Four-Letter Words: A SympOSium,"

The Humanist, XXIX (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 7-8.

 

 

 

127

Lowell D. Streiker and Louis Del Soldo.200

The many, long quotations are intended to provide
evidence of the fact that these articles are not technical
philos0phy. The quotations are not intended to demonstrate
either quality or "seriousness" of the articles.

"Gerontophobia--Some Remarks on a Social Policy for the
Elderly" opens with three expository paragraphs followed by
a series of questions:

If it is true that the greatness of a civilization
can be judged by the way its women are treated,

it is even more true that the humaneness of a
civilization can be judged by the way in which

its elderly are regarded. The manner in which

a civilization treats its aged is indicative of
the degree of its responsibility for human life.

Ours is a society that values youth, health,
and work. It is sharply problem-oriented, and
tends to seek victories, overcome obstacles, and
solve problems. There is, however, an unfortunate
product of our youth orientation that is often
ignored; that is, the prevalence of geronto-
phobia, or fear of the aged. Indeed, this
condition raises serious ethical problems.

The position of the aging has changed
markedly in the United States in the last
decades. This country, once one of the
youngest, has aged considerably in spirit and
in fact. As usual, technology has outrun
semantics and sociology; the aging person of
today, his position in society, and his feeling
of self have suffered increasingly strident
strictures. Nothing less than the ethics of
aging stands in question.

Why is legislation regarding the elderly
beset with conditions and prerequisites?

Why is sexual behavior of the elderly--
courtship and marriage, which is encouraged
at other age levels--a source of derision and
ridicule?

 

200Lowell D. Streiker and Louis Del Soldo, "The
Religion of the Hippies," Religious Humanism, 11 (Summer,

 

128
Why do housing and living arrangments
for the elderly exclude, if not expel, them
from the mainstream of life?
The answers are neither simple nor

unequivocal.

This section is followed by a statistical analysis of
the "older American" population which lists certain demo-
graphic characteristics such as sex, marital status and
household status.202 The third section lists and explains
legislation which has been passed to aid the elderly.203

Bunzel begins the fourth section by stating, "in spite
of an increase in the number of aged in the United States,
and some significant social gains in their behalf, there
exists a widespread phobia against them."20” He then
explains the meaning of 'phobia' and states, "that geronto-
phobia can be explained and illustrated on the basis of the
types of defense mechanisms involved: (1) Repression . . .
(2) Identification . . . (3) Rationalization . . . (8) Over-
Compensation . . . (5) Withdrawal or denial . . . (6) Pro-
jection."205

In the fifth and last section Bunzel shows that

"restructuring our attitudes towards old age is essential"

and offers three possible solution sets:

 

201Bunzel, p. 17.

202Ibid.

 

2O31bid., pp. 17-18.
2“Ibid., p. 18.

205Ibid.

 

129

One remedial approach would be, frankly,
semantic. Value-laden words such as
"aging," "leisure time," and "retirement"
might usefully be replaced. The effect of
these words is one of futility and terminal-
ism. We might substitute in their place
"free time" for leisure time and "post-
employment" for retirement.

Another would be the restructuring of Social Security
to allow part-time employment and a third would be to make
all new policies concerning senior citizens in light of the
fact that gerontophobia exists.207

The second article, "Four-Letter Words: A Symposium"
consists of statements from six men in reply to a question-
naire from The Humanist. The article is prefaced by:

Magazines have often discussed what should be
their policy concerning four-letter words. In
some cases there have been protests from
readers; some printers have attempted to censor
magazines by not setting them in type; and
dealers and booksellers have often refused
material that they considered "obscene."
Interested in the question of what should be
the appropriate policy concerning the use of
four-letter words, The Humanist sent out the
following three questions—to editors and
authors, and to the A.C.L.U.:

1. What do you think should be the policy of
magazines, newspapers, and journals on the
use of four-letter words?

Do you have an individual policy?

Have you encountered any restrictions from
printers, newsdealers, booksellers, or
readers on this matter?

We are glad to publish some representative
replies.

(DN
0 c

There then follow the replies from: Daniel Schwarz, Sunday

 

206Ibid.

 

207Ibid.

208Schwarz, p. 7.

130

Editor of The New York Times; Carey McWilliams, editor of

 

The Nation; John Barth, an author of fiction; Rev. B. J.

 

Stiles, former editor of the Methodist magazine, Motive;
Alan Reitman, associate director of The American Civil

Liberties Union; and William Phillips, editor of Partisan

 

Review. The following excerpts should give the flavor of
these brief replies.209
Daniel Schwarz:

Standards of good taste change radically in
relatively short periods . . .

It is not the function of a newspaper, I
think, to lead the sexual and verbal revo-
lution, but to report it . . . Those
standards (of good taste) are changing now,
but I think The Times Mogazine should retain
the old standards fdr the present . . . Our
purpose is to report the news. So we don't
use four-letter words.

 

Carey McWilliams:

Too much has been made, or so it seems to me,
of four-letter words. If such words are

used in a context in which the usage is
appropriate, then we at The Nation would not
delete them, nor would we BBtHer to suggest
some different usage to the author . . . So
far as I can recall, we have encountered no
objections from printers, newsdealers, or
booksellers to the use of such terms; we have
had occasional letters from readers objecting
to a particular word or words. . .

As a final comment I might say that we
object to so-called "dirty" words when used by
writers as adjectives or expletives, on the
ground that they are singularly inexpressive.
Also that, for this very reason, the problem
is not great. A writer may use "fucking" or
"shitty" once or twice just to show his
independence, but if he's any good he almost

 

 

209The longest reply is but seven paragraphs.

210Schwarz, p. 7.

John

Rev.

131

instantly gets tired of them.211

Barth:

My feeling is that it's important for a
language to include words generally held

by the users of the language to be obscene.
These words ought to be used very sparingly,
like strong spices, and on appropriate
occasions, to make their effect. Overuse or
inappropriate use of them debases their
value.2 2

B. J. Stiles:

The decision to publish four-letter words in
motive was hardly dramatic or revolutionary. . .
uring the eight years that I served as

editor of motive, four-letter words were
used only wfien we believed the literary or
reportorial context to justify using that
particular word. We did not set out on any
crusade to prove freedom of the press or to
test the limits of our critics. We used the
words only when they expressed ideas more
honestly and authentically than they would
have been expressed had we not used the words
in question.
Most of our uses of four-letter words came
in either poetry or fiction. . .
The criticisms of our policy came almost
exclusively from nonreaders of the magazine. . .
To my knowledge, motive has never been
hampered by newsdealers or distributors
because of any editorial content or language. . .
I have little interest in any type of journal-
ism which is flamboyant or crusading simply as a
means of calling attention to itself. . . I am
more concerned that journalism and writing
reflect life at a real level, and this concern
seemed to call for editorial consistency. How
could we advocate that this generation should
tell things as they see them, and then restrict
the form or language in which it is told? That
is the kind of nonsense which has led most
young people to distrust the old traditions,
especially those grounded in a legalistic

 

211Ibid.

 

2121515.

Alan

132

morality long since abandoned by most
intelligent, committed contemporary
religious folk.

There is much truth in the quote,
"There is nothing either good or bad but
thinking makes it so." The obscenity
attributed to motive is far more in the
eyes of the critic than in the expressions
themselves.213

Reitman: (This reply is so concise, it is
reprinted in its entirety.)

I am responding to your request for a state-
ment from the American Civil Liberties Union
as to what civil liberties issue may be
involved in the refusal of printing houses to
set in type four-letter words which they
consider offensive. The consensus of thinking
at the ACLU is that this does not raise a civil
liberties question for the following reasons:
(1) Printing houses are private companies and,
therefore, are not invested with the state-
action component which would allow us to say
this is state censorship. They do not perform
a public function. When a public agency acts
to censor or refuses to publish then a viable
civil liberties issue is present. (2) It is
possible that the publishing houses may feel
that if they do set four-letter words in type,
they may be held liable for prosecution under
local obscenity laws. Ordinarily such
prosecutions have not been brought against the
publishers of magazines and distributors, but
it is not inconceivable that an eager-beaver
prosecutor might enlarge the prosecution net.
While the above reasons represent our
views as to why we feel no civil liberties
violation occurs that can be challenged in a
court test, this does not mean that we condone
the action of printing houses. Certainly, the
spirit of free expression and free communication
is damaged when magazines, in effect, are not
able to publish what they wish because of the
refusal of commercial publishing houses to set
type because of their objection to the content
of the magazine. However, other than an appeal
to the printing house to recognize the importance
of the First-Amendment principle, there is no

 

213Ibid.

 

133

civil liberties ground on which a legal or
constitutional challenge could be brought
against a private business.2

William Phillips:

I don't think one can lay down a policy on
the use of "dirty" words, because there is
no moral, political, or aesthetic principle
that has anything to do with the question--
though I know that many have been dragged in
to justify one stand or another. . .

Writers and editors must be absolutely
free. .But this doesn't mean that we don't
judge the result, judge its quality, its
motives, its effects. . .

I--or we--don't have an abstract policy3
though I guess we have a working one. . .2

No, we have never had any trouble with
printers, newsdealers, booksellers or readers.
Some of our critics, however, complain
occasionally that we are too understanding of
the young rebels.216

The third and last example of a social philOSOphy
article which is not an example of technical philosophy is,
"The Religion of the Hippies" by Lowell D. Streiker and
Louis Del Soldo. Early in the article the authors say:

Hippiedom is dying. Hounded by the
authorities, terrorized by thugs, victimized
by the unscrupulous, disoriented by the drug-
induced ecstacy through which they seek the
shattering and reintegrating intensity
characteristic of all genuine religious
experience--the love generation is melting
away. What produced them? What are they
seeking? What have they discovered? What
is their future? What can be learned from
them? These are the unavoidable quandaries
posed by the tenuous existence of the hippies.217

 

2”Ibid.

 

215Ibid.

 

2151bid., p. 30.

 

217Streiker and Del Soldo, p. 107.

13H

Streiker and Del Soldo then go on to devote a section to

each of the questions they have posed:

What produced them?

What

Our grey world of self-alienation produced
and destroys the love generation, the idealistic
and irresponsible "Hippies" . . .

The hippie and his religion cannot be
understood apart from the society which unwillingly
produced them. Basically, the hippie is the child
of the tension between the alphabetical and
electronic epochs so skilfully delineated by
Marshall McLuhan.218

are they seeking?

 

The hippie flees the total externality
of the life which his elders offer him. Most
of his peers are content with a so-called
liberal education which forces a stream of
unrelated facts through the youthful conscious-
ness, numbing the neophyte and forever arresting
his ability to seek patterns of coherence and
meaning.
The hippie turns to the psychedelic high priests,
men of their parents' generation who offer the
youthful seeker what all religions promise--
meaning, intensity, and community. The gurus
of hippiedom extend all three in and through a
sacrament, a key experience upon which the
hippie way of life depends.21

The psychedelic experience

 

Exactly what happens during an LSD trip
cannot be reduced to concepts of scientific
jargon. Any profound experience outstrips
even the most scrupulous conceptualization. . .
The hippies have come to realize the sacramental
dimension, the numinous depths, the intense
satisfactions of their new, free life. Drugs
have opened their eyes but are unnecessary to
sustain their vision.2

 

2181bid.

 

2191bid., p. 108.

2201bid., pp. 108-9.

135
The hippie 'theology"

The realization that their elders have
found only meaninglessness and frustration
in the moral aphorisms and religious dogmas
of the past produces a fundamental pessimism
in the hippies. But pessimism, the cold and
loveless cynicism of youth, is not the answer.
Only a free life will suffice.

The way, the truth, and the life is to
be found in a realization of one's deepest
self. The same divine presence which reveals
itself as being, consciousness, and bliss in
the psychedelic experience is at the very
core of human personality. As the Hindu
Upanishadic tradition proclaims, the Atman
(true self) and Brahman (the divine spirit)
are identical. The religious path is the
progressive discovery and actualization of
one's true self, what the hippies term "doing
your own thing."221

Hippie community

 

The hippie concern for community initially
grew from his concern about "where, when and
with whom you trip." The importance of
preparation received an emphasis similar to
that directed to rites of purification in
many religions. Inadequate preparation
has been considered foolhardy from the
beginning of the psychedelic movement. . .

The various forms of social life among
the hippies, reminiscent of America's great
utopian experiments, range from Drop City near
Trinidad, Colorado, with its score of writers,
painters, and general scroungers to the
Eleventh Street Diggers Commune on the Lower
East Side of New York, described as "the busiest
communal pad and hippie rescue shelter in town."
Soup kitchens, clinics, the Neo-American
Church, impromptu concerts, hippie "non-families"
of poster designers, the Hip Job Co-op are only
a few manifestations of the hippies' acute
sense of community. Hippies in Canada, England,
France, the Netherlands, Germany, and India
together with the American "pioneers" form
a Buberian community of communes.

 

2211bid., p. 109.

2221bid., pp. 110-11.

 

136

The future

 

What is the future of the psychedelic
movement? What could be its future? Last
month Ron Thelin closed the Psychedelic Ship
in Haight-Ashbury and declared that hippie
was dead. . . The hippie is leaving the scene,
and the new man is symbolized in Haight by the
"Digger"--the man with free soup, social ideas
and a gun. The new man is the man portrayed in
Kenneth Anger's film Scorpio Risihg. His proto—
types are the activists of the new left and the
drug-crazed cyclist traveling in an anti-social
wolf pack.223

 

The future ofopsychedelics

 

Although the use of LSD is illegal, it is
spreading like prairie fire. . .

Without spiritual guidance and scientific
control, the hazards far outweigh any possible
gains.

What lessons can be learned from the hippies?
Perhaps they have made us aware, expanded our
minds, re-awakened our senses and sensuality,
reminded us of our own hunger for the experience
of a living God. At least they have forbidden
us to cry peace where there is no peace and to
realize once again our failure to answer ultimate
questions. If the hippies' elders are unwilling
or unable to reSpond, who will answer?

What can be said of these three articles? Although all
are about generalized issues, none exhibit the lOgical analy-
sis, the argument from philosophical principles, explanations
in philOSOphical terminology, or intellectual moves one
usually associates with technical philOSOphy. Each article
lacks indicators which might identify it with one of the
current approaches to philosophy, such as existentialism,

phenomenology, linguistic analysis, positivism, pragmatism

 

223
224

Ibid., p. 111.
Ibid.. pp. 111-112.

 

137
and so forth. Yet, these articles are labeled 'social
philosophy'.

Upon reflection most philosophers would agree that such
use of 'social philosophy' indicates a meaning different
from the one indicated when 'social philosophy' is used to
refer to a specific branch of technical philosophy.

Using 'social philosophy' to designate articles such as
the three cited above is somewhat like the use of 'philoso-
phy' when someone speaks of an administrator's "philosophy
of health care delivery," a person's "philosophy of life,"
or an author's "philosophy of writing." Using 'social
philosophy' to designate articles of technical philosophy
from a specific branch of the philosophical enterprise is
like the use of 'philosophy' when someone speaks of "the
philosophy of Hume" or of "majoring in philosophy." Surely
these usages are different; they indicate different sorts of

things. "Social philosophy' has at least two meanings.

Social philosophyas a generic term. Excluding the popular
use of 'social philOSOphy' and the technical use in which
'social philosophy' means a specific branch of the philo-
sophical enterprise, there is still another meaning and use
for 'social philosophy'. Sometimes the term can be employed
as a generic term. 'Social philosophy' can mean some or all
those specific branches of technical philosophy which are
concerned with society or groups. This meaning of 'social

philOSOphy' includes within its extension, for example,

138
philosophy of law, political philosophy and ethics. Here,
'social philOSOphy' performs a function in talk about
philosophy somewhat like that of 'value theory'. It
indicates branches of philosophy which have similar subject
matter.

The existence of this meaning for social philosophy is
evidenced in the classification of an article such as "The
Concept of Freedom: A Framework for the Study of Civili-
zations" by Mordecai Roshwald225 under 'social philosophy'
alone and not under 'ethics', 'political philosophy' or
'philOSOphy of law' also.226 This single classification
exists despite the fact that the author discusses: "law,
moral principles, custom, vogue, (and) aesthetic notions,"227
and these discussions play a significant part in the major
thesis of the article. Other such examples are found by the
careful reader. "Josiah Royce and the American Race Problem"
by William T. Fontaine228 includes both Royce's analysis of
a social issue and discussion of his ethics. The article is

classified, however, as 'social philOSOphy' alone.229 This

 

225Mordecai Roshwald, "The Concept of Freedom: A Frame-
work for the Study of Civilizations," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, XXX (September, 1969), pp. 102-12.

 

225Linebaok, 1959, p. 189.

227Roshwald, p. 103.

228William T. Fontaine, "Josiah Royce and the American
Race Problem," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

229Lineback, 1969, p. 188.

139
only makes sense if 'social philOSOphy' is being used in the
generic sense indicated above.

Of course someone might claim that the classifications
of these articles are simply classificatory errors. They do
not provide evidence of a generic sense to 'social philoso-
phy'. Such a claim would not be made, however, by anyone
familiar with the corpus of social philosophy. A thorough
reading of articles and books titled or classified 'social
philOSOphy' indicates an incredibly high number of 'social
philosophy' items of a kind similar to the articles noted
above. Philosophers do in fact use the term in this generic
sense. One could claim that these philosophers are all
wrong but such a claim does not make sense. No overwhelming
argument is apparent which favors excluding the generic
sense of the term. Practitioners in the field do seem to
use the term in this generic sense, and, as will be shown
in Chapter VII, the careful use of this meaning of the term
as well as the other meanings indicated earlier in this
paper, resolves many of the apparent confusions noted in

Chapter 1.

Three meanings. Given the above analysis and the evidence

 

put forth to sustain it, it appears that there are at least
three possible meanings for 'social philosophy':
social philosophyl indicates a specific branch of the
technical philosophical enterprise.

social philosophy2 indicates some or all the specific

190
branches of the technical philosophical enter-
prise which are concerned with society or groups.
social philosophy3 indicates work on social issues

which, though serious, is not technical philos-

If one were to analyze the relations among these
meanings one would see:

1. All three terms are alike in that they refer to

work dealing with social issues, society or groups.

2. The extension of social philosophyl and social
philosophyz is within that of technical philoso-
phy, while the extension of social philOSOphy3
falls outside the extension of technical philos-
ophy.

3. The extension of social philosophyz is greater
than that of social philosophyl. Indeed social
philosophyl is a member of the extension of
social philosophyQ.

When a single term in English has multiple meanings the
usual way to indicate which meaning is intended is to embed
the term in a specifying context. This ordinary means of
specifying meaning often fails in the case of 'social

philosophy' because the sentential contexts for all three

 

230It should be noted that works of sociology would be
classified as social philosophy3 and not social philosophyl
or*social philOSOphyQ. This study offers and will use the
following hortatory definition of sociology. Sociology is
a descriptive science which analyzes or explains social
phenomena.

181
meanings are so similar. All three are used in sentences
classifying ideas, publications or intellectual work. Thus,
this paper has introduced and will use the subscript con-

vention to keep the three meanings separate.

The relation of 'socialphilosophyl', 'SOCial PhilOSOPhYQL

 

and 'social philosophya' to 'ethics'. Since the aim of this

 

paper is to clarify the extensional relation of 'social
philosophy' to that branch of the philosophical enterprise
called 'ethics' and since it has been shown that 'social
philosophy' has at least three different meanings, some
clarification will be offered for each of these meanings.
It should be noted, however, that a greater effort for
clarification will be made between 'social philosophyl' and
'ethics', since from the beginning this paper has indicated
that its subject is that branch of philosophy called 'social
philosophy'.231 I

The extension for the meaning of the term 'social
philosophy3' and that of the branch of philosophy called
'ethics' cannot possibly intersect at all since social
philosophy3 falls outside the scope of technical philosophy

while ethics, as a branch of technical philOSOphy, must fall

 

231See: Above p. 2.

192

within the scope of technical philosophy.232

The extension for the meaning of the term 'social
philosophyz' and that of the branch of philosophy called
'ethics' must partially intersect but each has an area which
does not intersect with the other. Since 'social philos-
ophy2' is a general term whose meaning extends to those
branches of philOSOphy which are concerned with society or
social issues; and since ethics is a branch of philosophy
whose domain includes social concerns, the extensions of
'social philosophyZ' and 'ethics' intersect. At the same
time social philosophy2 includes items other than ethics,
e.g., philosophy of law and political philosophy. So too,
ethics includes areas which are not about social concerns.

The extension of the meaning of the term 'social
philosophyl' in relation to the extension of the meaning of
'ethics' as a branch of philosophy is more difficult to
ascertain. This study has already shown, however, that
'alienation' is a tOpic belonging to that branch of techni-
cal philosophy called 'social philosophy' i.e., social

philosophyl.233 It has also been shown that 'the nature of

 

W‘—

232This researcher believes that the term 'ethics' may
prove to have as many meanings as 'social philosophy'. Per—
haps it would be accurate to draw a parallel structure and
speak of 'ethicsl,' 'ethicsz' and 'ethics '. Such a study
would be very useful to this thesis, but it is not necessary
for the completion of the work outlined in the introduction
of the thesis. Hence, there is no attempt to study or
establish varied meanings for ethics in this paper. Ethics
is taken in the usual sense of a specific branch of philos-

ophy.
233See: Above pp. 75-98.

193

morality' and 'deontological' are topics of ethics.23” It
has not been shown, however, that 'alienation' is not a
topic of ethics and the 'nature of morality' or 'deonto-
logical'235 is not a tOpic of social philosophyl. This will
be done now.

What sort of argument can one advance to establish this
point?

1. One could argue out of empirical evidence showing
(1) that The Philosophers Index never cross-indexes these
topics so that articles on 'alienation' fall under ethics or
articles in 'the nature of morality' or 'deontological' fall
under social philosophy236 and (2) that books on ethics do
not list 'alienation' as a topic of ethics and books on
social philosophy do not list the 'nature of morality' or
'deontological' as a topic of social philosophy. However,
such an argument is weak. It establishes only that it is
not or has not been the case that these subjects have been
considered within both fields. It does not establish that
it cannot or ought not be the case.

2. In keeping with philosophical precedents one might
xaish to argue the issue on grounds of its obviousness, i.e.,

1Rny person understanding each topic mentioned would see that

 

23”See: Above pp. 72-75.

235Since The Philosopher's Index used the term 'deonto-
jhogical' rather than‘Ideontology' the former is retained
'throughout this study.

236Lineback, 1957, 1958, 1959.

188
the topic can belong to only one of the two branches of
philosophy mentioned.

This argument, though in some ways attractive, is also
weak. One cannot claim that a sentence affirming 'alien-
ation' as a term or topic proper to social philosophy but
not proper to ethics or one affirming the 'nature of
morality' or 'deontological' as prOper to ethics but not to
social philosophy, is an analytic sentence. Thus any claim
of obviousness cannot be grounded in analyticity or logical
obviousness. To claim that the statement is obvious in some
psychological sense--that "of course the rational person
would clearly see it in his mind" is also weak. What one
"sees" is often culturally conditioned. There is no reason,
even if every person known to us "saw" the point in question,
why a rational person with other cultural experiences from
another time or place could honestly "not see" what is
obvious to the "seeing" group. The history of philosophy
is strewn with assertions which were originally claimed to
be obvious in this psychological sense and later abandoned
as non-obvious.

3. Another way to try to establish the claim would
be to show the absence of contrary claims or contrary
evidence. This method might provide a more successful way
of using the evidence cited in the first argument. First,
one can note that the philosophical literature appears to
lack any works arguing either that 'alienation' is a topic

of ethics or that the 'nature of morality' or 'deontological'

145

is a topic of social philOSOphyl. Second, one can note the

absence of contrary evidence: The editors of The Philoso-

 

phers Index to not cross-index the tOpics. After examining

 

the Tables of Contents and indexes of a number of works in
ethics and social philosophy, it can be stated that none of
the ethical works list 'alienation' as a tOpiC of ethics and
none of the social philosophy books list the 'nature of
morality' or 'deontological' as a tOpic of social philoso-
phy.237 Given the fact that these tOpics have been a part

of philosophy for some time and given the vitality of

 

237Works in ethics include: Raziel Abelson, Ethics and
Metaethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. xi-xiii,
565-574. Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. ix-xiii, 529-
538. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930), pp. xxxi-xxxii, 576-596.
William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. xiii-xiv, 103-109. Thomas
E. Hill, Ethics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956),
pp. ix-xiii, 419-431. Oliver A. Johnson (ed.), Ethics (New
York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1958), pp. vii-ix, 533-546.
Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed. and Trans.), Contemporary European
Ethics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972)
pp. 1x-x, 487-490. A.I. Melden, Ethical Theories (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), pp. vii—viii, 375-386. Moritz
Schlick, Problems of Ethics, Trans. David Rynin (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), pp. ix-xii, 211-217. Wilbur
Marshall Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1930), pp. xi-473-476. Works in social
philosophy include: Robert N. Beck, Perspectives in Social
Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and WihSton, Inc.,
1967), pp. vii-x, 461-468. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973),
pp. xi-xii, 123-126. Daya Krishna, Social PhiIOSOphy Past
and Future (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969),
pp. v, 81-82. Martin G. Plattel, Social Philosophy, Duquesne
Studies Philosophical Series No. 18 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1965), pp. vii-x, 342-346. Mahadera
Prosad, Social PhiIOSOphyof Mahatma Gandhi (Allahabad,
India: Vishwavidyalays Prakastam Gorakshpur, 1958), pp. ix-
xii, 333-342.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

186
of ethical debates during the last century and the recent
revival of social philosophy studies, it would seem that if
a contrary claim were reasonable, it would have been made by
now.

8. There is still another, and by far a stronger, way
to establish the point in question. One can argue from the
nature of the topics themselves:

a. 'Alienation' certainly cannot be a 'meta-
ethical' question as the term 'metaethical' is used

by contemporary ethicians. Thus, if it were an ethical

topic it would have to be a second order theoretical

issue or a problem issue. Now all discussions of

second order ethical topics or problem topics of ethics,
unless they are historical in nature, are either value
oriented or normative. However, discussions of alien-
ation per se are not value discussions nor are they
normative discussions. They usually include an analy-
sis of the concept or phenomenon, or an examination of
its causes or effects or argument to show existence of
the phenomenon, or tracing the development of the
concept. Thus, since alienation is not a meta-ethical

issue, nor are discussions of alienation of either a

value or normative kind, it is clear that the topic

does not belong to the domain of ethics.
Of course one can generate ethical topics from the
topic of alienation. One can ask if alienation is

morally good or morally evil. One can ask if one ought

187
to remedy alienation or if alienation is so debili-
tating that it frees one from moral responsibility.

Such discussions, however, are not discussions of
alienation per se. They are similar to discussions
about truth which concern themselves with one's duty to
seek the truth, or the moral rightness of primarily
seeking speculative rather than practical knowledge.
Such discussions belong to ethics, but discussions of
truth per se or of speculative and practical knowledge
per se do not belong to ethics. These are subjects for
epistemology. So it is with discussions of alienation.
Alienation in itself is a topic belonging to the domain
of social philosophyl and not ethics, although one can
ask ethical questions about alienation.

b. The 'nature of morality' and 'deontological'
form similar cases. As indicated in Chapter V, both
these topics are second order theoretical tOpics in
ethics. If a social philosopher inquires about these
topics either he is doing ethics or he is concerned
with the topic in an accidental way.

In the case of 'deontological' another point can
be made. This term is one which only makes sense in an
ethical context. Like 'refraction', 'libido' or
'kerygma', 'deontological' is what Norwood Russell Han-

son calls a "theory laden" term.238 Each was generated

 

238Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam-
bridge: The University Press, 1972), pp. 58-69.

188

for a specific discipline and only retains its

primary meaning in the context of that discipline.

Thus, discussions of 'deontological' per se only make

sense in ethics and cannot make sense in social

philOSOphyl.

Given the lack of evidence of any opposing claim and
given the evidence in favor of the stated claim, it appears
that the only logical conclusion is that 'alienation' per se
is a topic of social philosophyl and not of ethics and that
the 'nature of morality' and 'deontological' are topics of
ethics and not of social philosophyl.

Since it has been shown that at least one topic of
social philosophyl is not a topic of ethics and that at
least one topic of ethics is not a tOpic of social philos-
ophyl it has been shown that neither domain is a proper
sub-set of the other and that it is correct to state that
social philOSOphyl and ethics are extensionally distinct.

Of course this distinction rests, at present, on an
extremely limited basis. Surely one would wish to expand
the list of topics proper to one but not both areas of
philosophy. Social philosophyl might include in its
distinctive subject matter community, collectivity, and the
individual-communal relation, while ethics might include
obligation, supererogation, and responsibility. What of
all the other topics or questions considered in these
fields? Unless one is satisfied with a reductionist view

of the branches of philosophy, one recognizes that some

189
topics properly belong to one branch but not another.
However, one needs criteria on which judgements as to what
topics are proper to which branches are made. What are
these criteria?

It is obvious that this researcher believes that the
actual practice of philosophers, what ethicians do consider
and what social philosophersl do consider as they philoso-
phize, is of paramount importance. Actual practice is a
major criterion.

Other criteria might be generated from reflection on
the nature of those two branches of philosophy.

One possible approach to distinguishing the natures of
branches of philosophy is to consider them in the light of
their value and/or normative content and form. The reader
has already seen that such an approach is useful in trying
to distinguish topics of social philosophy, from topics of

ethics.239

It may be that this approach would be quite
fruitful.

In this approach ethics and aesthetics would be para-
digmatic of value, normative studies. Epistemology and
metaphysics would be among the least value, normative
studies. Branches of philosophy such as philosophy of
person and social philosophy1 would occupy a position some-

where between these extremes. Thus one could consider the

branches of philosophy on a value, normative continuum:

 

23gSee: Above pp. 186-188.

150

 

Ethics Philosophy of Man Epistemology
Aesthetics Social Philosophy Metaphysics
Value Non-value
Normative Non-normative

Such a consideration could lead to distinguishing criteria
for social philosophyl and ethics, for example, considera-
tions of value(s) per se would belong to ethics or
aesthetics and not social philosophyl. A careful pursuit
of this approach might lead to other criteria, however,
this could be a topic for another study. It was not the
aim of this study to examine the nature of social
philosophyl and ethics per se, nor to pursue an intensional
definition. It was to consider the correctness of
distinguishing 'social philosophy' from 'ethics' if the
distinction is grounded in topical content. This has been

done as the next chapter indicates.

VII. CONCLUSION

This chapter will re-state each of the three questions
raised in Chapter I and will answer them in the light of
the work completed.

Question 1. Is it correct to make a distinction between

 

'social philosophy' and 'ethics' and ground this in a
distinction of topical content?

The only answer possible, in light of the work com-
pleted, is an affirmative one; the distinction is correct.
It has been shown that the distinction holds for all three
meanings of 'social philosophy'. Social philosophyl and
ethics are distinct because, although the topical domains
may intersect, each branch of philosophy has at least one
topic in its domain which is not also a tOpic of the other
branch of philosophy?”0 Social philosophy2 and ethics are
distinct because, again although their domains intersect,
each extends to topics not within the extension of the
other area.2”1 Finally, the distinction holds between
social philosophy3 and ethics since their topical domains

do not intersect at all.2l'2

 

21'OSee: Above pp. 186-188.
2u18ee: Above p. 182.
ZHZSee: Above pp. 181-182.

151

152

Question 2. How does the correctness of this distinction

 

affect the apparent confusions over classification of topics
cited in the Opening sections of this paper? Can it resolve
any or all of these confusions?

The apparatus assembled to ascertain the correctness of
the distinction makes possible some resolution of all the
confusions. Some of the confusions, however, are resolved
more satisfactorily than others, as will be noted later.

In considering those confusions the original presenta-
tion will be restated for the convenience of the reader.
Each will be considered in the order of its original
presentation.

The first two confusions noted in Chapter I arise
because it is assumed that 'social philosophy' has one
meaning, i.e., a specific branch of philosophy. If the
distinctions between social philosophyl, social philoSOphy2
and social philosophy3 are observed and the varied meanings
are applied carefully, the apparent confusions disappear.

Books entitled 'social philosophy' often describe

their subject matter as that of other philosophical

areas and the areas included in such descriptions

are not constant. If one considers works from a

variety of historical periods one finds that, for

example, the preface to The Social Philosophy of

John Taylor of Caroline begins: "The aim of this

bodkgis to present in a systematic form the

political and economic thought of one of the most

thorough-going exponents of Jeffersonian democracy";

while the author of The Social Philosophy of English

Idealism states: "By their (English idealistST

socialphilosophy, I mean that part of their work

which was concerned with human life in society,

in particular their ethics and political theory";
and The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus tries "to

 

 

153

combine into a systematic whole, the social
and economic teachings of Rodbertus."2"3

Reflecting on the material in Chapter VI, it becomes
obvious that each of these book titles utilizes social
philosophy2 because each includes in the domain of social
philosophy exogenous areas or branches of philosophy as well
as social philosophyl. Now social philosophy? indicates
some or all the branches of philosophy which deal with

288

social issues. Thus it is no problem that each author

chooses some and not all areas of philoSOphy and it is no
problem that each author chooses to include different areas
from the set of all those available for inclusion.

Even within books of the same era there is little
agreement. If one considers the contents of
three works published within the same era
(1965-1973), Joel Feinberg's Social Philosophy,
Daya Krishna's Social Philosophy era Martin

Plattel's Social Phildsophy one finds not a
single topiE common to a11T§u5

 

 

This confusion also disappears when one reviews the
Tables of Contents of each of these three books in light of
the meanings for social philosophyl, social philosophyz and
social philosophy3.

Consider Joel Feinberg's Social Philosophy. Despite
Feinberg's claim that he is considering only those social

issues which are left over from other works in the

 

2Q3See: Above pp. 3-8.
2”L'See: Above pp. 138-139.

2L"t’See: Above p. 8.

Foundations of Philosophy

158

286 series it is apparent from the

following Table of Contents that he is dealing with social

philosophyQ.

CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION, 1

1
THE CONCEPT OF
FREEDOM, 8

2
GROUNDS FOR
COERCION, 20

3
HARD CASES
FOR THE HARM
PRINCIPLE, 35

u
LEGAL RIGHTS, 55

5
CONFLICTS OF
LEGAL RIGHTS, 58

Freedom and Constraint, 8

Freedom from . . . and Freedom to . . ., 9

Whose Freedom? 11

"Positive and Negative Freedom," 12 Self-
restraint, 18

Freedom as Autonomy, 15
Ability, 17

Free on Balance, 18

Permission and

The
The

Presumptive Case for Liberty, 20
Anarchistic Principle, 22

The Formalistic Principle, 28

The Concept of Harm, 25

Lines of Attack on Mill, 31

Morals Offenses and Legal Moralism, 36
Obscenity and the Offense Principle, 81
Legal Paternalism, 85

Collective Goods and Collective Action, 52

Rights, Liberties, and Privileges, 56

Classification of Claim-rights, 59

Rights and Duties, 61 Rights and Claims,
68

Conflicts of Claims, 68

Levels of Generality in Statements of
Rights, 69

Conflicts between Rights (Valid Claims), 71

Prima-facie Rights, 73

Transcategorial Conflicts, 76

The Concept of an Absolute Constitutional
Right, 79

 

2l+6Feinberg, p. l.

155

6
HUMAN RIGHTS, 88 Moral rights, 88 Human Rights, 85
Grounds for Equality, 88
Absolute and Nonabsolute Human Rights, 98

7
SOCIAL JUSTICE, Comparative and Noncomparative Justice, 98
98 Formal and Material Principles, 99
Prizes, 103
General Rules, 103 Economic Income, 107
Fair Procedures and Just Outcomes, 117

FOR FURTHER
READING, 120

INDEX, 1222”7
Obviously, ethics and philOSOphy of law are considered

in this work. Feinberg has authored Social Philosophyz.

 

In considering Daya Krishna's book one reads in his
FOREWARD:

These lectures continue the theme of my
earlier book Considerations Towards a Theory of
Social Change, though they form a self-contained
Whole afidfipossess a unity of their own independent
of the earlier work. They seek to focus attention
on an aspect of thought about man and society which
most scientists and philosophers happen to miss;
that is, the effect of their thought in shaping
human and social reality itself. Man's thought
about himself and society is not causally
ineffective. But if this be accepted, its
implications have to be understood by all those
who concern themselves with society and man in
any capacity whatsoever. The present lectures
attempt to spell out these implications for the
attention of the social scientists and philos-
ophers for consideration and discussion.

The past civilizations, in this context, are
treated as the result of the ways in which men
conceived of themselves and society and the two
of the most significant among them, the Indian
and the Western, are singled out and discussed as
paradigmatic cases illustrating the basic

 

 

2“Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

156

contentions Of these lectures. An attempt is
made to provide a focal concept around which
the thinking in the social sciences may be
organized and which may bridge the gap, and
provide the continuity between the great typal
civilizations Of the past and Open the way for
their fecundating relationship with the present
and the future.

Freedom, it is suggested, is such a concept
and if it be given an Operational definition and
subjected to quantitative criteria of measurement,
it might provide an effective guide to the policy
sciences which seem so much in demand today by the
planner and the politician. The link between the
mathematical concept Of model and utOpia is
explained and it is suggested that the building
of scientifically articulated utopias should be
the task Of the social scientist Of the future.2”8

There is enough here to alert the reader to the fact

that this may include sociology as well as technical
philosophy.
The Table Of Contents re-inforces this idea since

"measuring rods" are instruments Of the social sciences:

C O N T E N T S

The Concept Of Society ... ... ... l
The Two Predicaments ... ... ... l2
Reflection on Action ... ... ... 28
Perspectives of Freedom ... ... ... 37
The Search for a Measuring Rod... ... ... 50
Society: Reality or Utopia ... ... ... 6821'9

If one moves on to study the text one finds a continued

mixture Of sociology and technical philosophy. Krishna

 

2”8Krishna, pp. i-ii.

2"S'Ibid., p. iii.

157
Opens his first chapter with a series of questions:

What sort Of a thing is society which the
social scientist so avidly studies? Is it
something completely independent of the way
human beings think about it and conceive it to
be? Or, is it affected in its very being by
the way men think about it and conceive it to
be? Has it, so to say, an essence of its own
which men have only to find and discover? Or,
is it something like what the existentialists
say about man; that is, something that has no
essence of its own, but something which is
made and created out of the infinite choices
of diverse men?

After long, serious reflections on whether asking
'What is Society?' is more like asking 'What is Man?‘ or if
it is more like asking 'What is Nature?':

The question 'What is Society?', then, seems
far more akin to the question 'What is Man?‘
than say, 'What is Nature?‘ However much the
dichotomy between Nature and Man may go against
our instinct for seeking a unified knowledge
and abhorrence of anything but a unitary reality,
we cannot but note the radical distinctions
between them even with respect to the processes
of knowledge. The way we conceive Nature does
not seem to affect in any significant way the
natural processes themselves. Their independence
Of knowledge is the very condition Of the seeking
Of truth in this realm. But can we say the same
with respect to either Man or Society? Will it
be really true to say that the way we conceive Of
man and society does not affect the way they are
or the way they have been or even the way they
will be? Is not the way we conceive them to be
intimately bound up with what they actually come
to be? In case this be the situation to even
the least imaginable extent, it would be
positively disastrous to foster the illusion that
our conceptual activity with respect to these
Objects can be value-neutral in the same sense as
our conceptual activity is supposed to be with
respect to natural Objects. If it be true in any
sense that man and society are deeply affected by
the way we conceive them to be, then it is an

 

2501bid., p. 1.

158

imperative duty to make ourselves and others
aware of the value-implications Of our conceptions
and hold ourselves responsible for the same . . 2

and some discussions concerning the characteristics of
conceptual adequacy:

Before we do this, however, let us reflect a
little over the notion of the adequacy of a
concept without any reference to those domains
or subject-matters where the concept-forming
activity may itself be said to make a difference
to what is attempted to be grasped or formulated
in the concept. In other words, what makes for
the adequacy of a concept? Shall we say that it
is the correctness Of its reflection of the
reality it concerns itself with? Or, is it the
success of the action based on the presupposition
that the concept correctly reflects the causal
relationships Obtaining among phenomena? Or,
is it just a tool whose adequacy is basically
judged by what we want to use it for? Even in the
context of cognitive activity, there may be a
diversity Of concepts having essentially
different functions which cooperatively help in
leading the activity to a successful conclusion.
Whatever the choice we may make between these and
even several other alternatives, at least one
characteristic shall be found implicitly or
explicitly in them all. This basically consists
in their judging the adequacy Of a conceptual
formulation in terms of its capacity to lead to
successful action 252

and then further reflections on our conception Of society,
he ends the chapter:

If the distinction between nature and society
be once conceded and if it be admitted that the
way we conceive society tends to shape the
society in that direction tOO, then the
necessity for a self-conscious explication of
the value-presuppositions and the value-
consequences of the particular way in which
society is prOposed to be conceived will have to
be admitted by everybody. . . In this series

 

251Ibid., p. 2.

2521bid., p. 8.

159

Of lectures. . . I should like to draw your
attention to a basic typal difference in the way
in which society can be conceived. The only
difference that I would like to emphasize and
bring to explicit consciousness for consideration
and comment here concerns the way in which we
ultimately conceive society to be. It may be
conceived either as the last term in our thought
in terms Of which we want to understand everything
else or only as an intermediate term beyond which
there are other terms to which it is instrumental
or subservient in a final sense. In a sense, we
live, move and have our being only in and

through society. What we think, feel, consider
beautiful or ugly, right or wrong, is determined
by the fact that we are social beings. It is
thus conceived as the equivalent Of God, and

many sociologists think and proclaim it to be

so. In fact, God Himself is supposed to be a
projected image of the society in the mind Of the
particular individual. On the other hand, it
seems difficult to believe that society would
show even its specific traits, were it not
constituted Of human individuals who must at
least be conceived to have latent possibility

in them for engaging in ideal pursuits.

The question 'What is Society?' is closely
linked to the question 'What is a human
individual?’ and the one cannot be answered
independently Of the other. The sociologist
is, in a sense, an interested party in the
debate. By his training and profession he
gradually gets committed to the ultimacy Of
society as the last term Of human thought in
terms of which everything else is tO be
understood. He sees everything as rooted in
a social nexus and as subserving a social
end. Whether it be, science or religion, art
or morality, love or friendship, each is
rooted in society and subserves a social function
or end. Durkheim is the classic name associated
with such a standpoint. But he is not alone,
nor even in a minority. Rather, he articulates
explicitly what is implicit in the writings
Of others. Every sociologist subscribes to
his dictum, whether implicitly or explicitly.
Society is his God, at least professionally.

But, however persuasive, it is not necessary.
Society need not be conceived as the last term
of human thought. The centrality may be
restored to the human individual who, then may
be viewed as the nucleus Of the social cell from
which all creativity emanates and originates.

160

In this perspective, then society would be
conceived as a facilitating mechanism so that
the individual may pursue his trans-social
ends. Instead Of art or religion, friendship
or love, being seen as lubricating Oil for the
functioning Of the social machine, the machine
itself would be seen as facilitating the
emergence and pursuit of various values and
its efficiency judged in terms Of that
performance.

The two conceptions are opposed ways of
conceiving society and turn basically on the
primacy we give to the individual or society
in our thought. As the way we conceive affects
the way we become, the choice between the two
ways of conceiving becomes a valuational choice
also. The cognitive task in such a situation is
to make the value-implications explicit and to
spell out the possible achievements and perversions
within the ambit Of one conception or the other.
Ideal type constructions may be helpful in
throwing into bold relief the diverse possibilities
involved in the various choices. Similarly, if
we could find some rough parallels in historical
cultures which have predominantly conceived
society in one way rather than another, it might
be helpful in giving a concrete feel to the
things we are saying. Keeping both these things
in mind, we shall designate the two ultimate
contrasts I have sketched above as the Western
and the Indian respectively. These give rise to
two types of value-achievements, two types Of
value-perversions and two types Of predicaments
which we shall try to delineate in the next
lecture. Each society, in this perspective, may
be seen as the perversion Of a basic value-
insight which is apprehended by a fgw and
vulgarly interpreted by the many.25

There is much in this selection which is evocative Of

technical philosophy and much that is sociological. Surely

the work is sociological in intent, yet many passages and

whole sections seem philosophical in both content and form.

The book is a mixture. It appears that Daya Krishna has

written a work which could be categorized as social

 

253Ibid., pp. 9-11.

161

philosophyl or social philosophyz and social philosophy3.25u
The plausibility of such a combination arising from this
author is recognized when one notes Daya Krishna's back-
ground. He has been a professor of philosophy at Rajasthan
University since 1963. Previous to that appointment he was
in the Institute of Philosophy at Delhi University and was
associated with a UNESCO project on research trends in
humanities and the social sciences.255

Finally, one considers Martin Plattel's Social

Philosophy. The book is in two parts and the chapter

 

headings for part one definitely suggest a work Of social

 

philosophyl:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Introduction . . . . . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

PART ONE

EXISTENCE IS CO-EXISTENCE

25”It is stated that the work could be categorized as
social philosophy or social philOSOphy2. The discussions
concerning the nature Of society are surely social philoso-
phyl, however, this paper has not discussed the proper
sphere Of freedom. If one were to argue that its discussion
belongs to social philosophyl then Krishna's book would be
Of social philosophyl and social philosophy3. If, however,
one were to argue that discussions about freedom belong to
social philosophy2 then the work would be classified as
social philosophy and social philosophy3. This researcher
leans toward the latter, however, the p01nt is moot and it
need not be definitively resolved in order to settle the
original confusion under discussion.

2555. Satyajuit (ed.), India Who's Who 1973, (New
Delhi: INFA Publications, 1973), p._9877

162

CHAPTER ONE--The Philosophical Attitude

1
2
3

u.
5.

6.
7

Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophy Versus Science . . . . . . . . . . .
The Contradictory Character Of

Philosophical Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Philosophy as Unscientific Science . . . . . . .
The Relationship Between Conceptual

Knowledge and Intuitive Ideas . . . . . . . . . .
The Various Philosophical Forms Of Knowledge . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER TWO--The Inescapable Experience of

7
8

9.

Being-A-Person as CO-Existence

The Rationalistic "Theory" of Society Versus the
Personalistic "Idea" Of Community . . . . . . . .
Methodic Doubt of the Other's Existence . . . . .
Methodic Doubt as an Incorrect

Rationalistic Starting Point . . . . . . . . .
The Rationalistic Theory Of Society Starts

from an Aprioristic Standpoint . . . . . . . . .
There is a Suprarational or

Metarational Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . .

Suprarational Knowledge Demands a

Correct Attitude Of Life . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solidarism Needs to Be Complemented . . . . . . .
Doubt About the Existence Of Fellow-Men

is Self-Contradictory . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER THREE--Person and Community

u
5
6
7
8
9
0

1

(AMP

Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Person is an Open Self . . . . . . . . . . .
The Person Becomes Himself

Through Disinterested Deeds . . . .

The Person as Communication . . . .
Categorical Approach to Community

The Bodily Being Of the Person . . . . .
The Body and Interpersonal Contact . . . . . . .

Personal Community and Functional Society . . . .
The Person in Reference to the Absolute Person
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER FOUR--The Mystery Of Being-Together-

(UNI-J

in-the-World

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Transcendental "We" . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Mystery of Person and Community and the
Problem Of Person and Society . . . .

\I

12
15

17
19
21

23
28

26
28
29

32
32

33
35

37
37

39
88
85
88
50
52
58
55

58
59

61

163

. The Dialog Of the Subjects as Giving and Receiving 68
Bodily Being as Colloquy . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The World as Human Togetherness . . . . . . . . . 73
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

\IOU'IJ:
O O .

CHAPTER FIVE--Aspects of Human CO-Existence

1. Introduction . . . . . . . 78
2. The Relation of Knowing and Loving the Other . . 78
3. The Loving Knowing Of the Other . . . . . . . . . 79
8. Love as Motiveless Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5. Love as Grace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6. Love as Free Bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7. Love in Its Repeatable Originality . . . . . . . 86
8. Intersubjective Faith and Hope . . . . . . . . . 88
9. I Believe in You Because of You . . . . . . . . . 90
10. I Hope in You Because Of You . . . . . . . . . . 91
ll. Disbelief and Despair as Self-Destruction . . . . 92

12. I Accept You . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
13. You Remain the Other for Me . . . . . . . . . . . 97
18. I Feel Lonely with You . . . . . . . . . . 98
15. The Idea of Loving You Fills Me with Awe . . . . 100
16. The Eternity Of Love and the Temporality of Care 102
17. Man and Woman in Intersubjectivity . . . . . . . 108
18. The Social Feast as Meaningful Waste . . . . . . 107

CHAPTER SIX--The Family as a Personal

Community
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2. The Family in the Changing Picture of Culture . . 112
3. An Erroneous Kind Of Personalism . . . . . . . 116
8. Fortunate Irrevocability . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5. The Child as the Gift of Love . . . . . . . . . . 118
6. A Plea for "Adventurous" Parenthood . . . . . . . 120
7. The Contemporary Marriage Crisis . . . . . . 121
8. The Family as a Suprafunctional Reality . . . . . 123
9. The Open and the Closed Type Of Family . . . . . 128
10. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

EPILOGUB 0 0 I 0 o o o o o o o o o o o O o o o o o o 129256
Part two, however, indicates social philosophyzz

PART TWO

MAN IN SOCIETY

 

256Plattel, pp. vii-ix.

168

CHAPTER SEVEN--Philosophical Orientation

3

l.
2

Introduction . . . . . . . . .
Understanding Society from the Standpoints Of
Philosophy and Of Social Science . . .

Some Essential Characteristics Of the PhilOSOphic

Reflection Upon Culture . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER EIGHT--Right, Law, and Justice

\Immcle-J

00

Introduction . . . . . . . .

The Ambivalent Character of Right and Law
The Relationship Between Love and Justice
The Relationship Between Right and Morality
Right as Mediator .-. . . . . . . . . . . .
The Natural Law as "Idea" and as "Doctrine"
The Wealth and Poverty of the Maxims of the
Natural Law . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Natural Law in Its Shifting

Historical Interpretations . . . . . . .
The Natural Law in Juridical and
Ethical Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER NINE--The State

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Essence Of the State . . . . .

The Classical Definition of the State

as a Perfect Society . . . . . . . .

The Origin Of the Modern Idea of the State .
The Progressive Character Of the Principle

Of Subsidiarity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Democratic State . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER TEN-~World and Work

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Some Characteristics Of the Human

Dimension Called "Work" . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Marxist Conception Of Work . . . . . .

Historical Sketch of the Appreciation of Work .
PhilOSOphical Reflection and the Technological
contFOl Of the world 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

CHAPTER ELEVEN--The Value of Ownership

0101-1:me

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Essential Structure Of PrOperty . . .

Property as Private Appropriation . . . . . . .
The Various Forms of PrOperty . . . . . . . . .

Personal Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;
Social Property . . . . . . . . . . .

135
136

181

188
186
151
155
157
163

169
171

187

191
192

198
208

220
230

282

285
252
256

279

285
289
293
296
298
302

165

7. Public Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
8. Property According to the View
Of Marxism-Leninism . . . . . . . . . . 318

9. The Situation Of Property in ContempOrary U. S. S. R. 316
10. Historical Sketch Of the Development of Ownership
in Connection with the Relationship Between

Individual and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
Index Of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Index of Subject Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382257

Since social philosophyl is included in the extension
of social philosophyz, this work can be classified as
social philosophy2 also.

Thus in reviewing the books one finds that: Joel
Feinberg's book is one of social philosophyz; Daya Krishna's
book is one of social philosophyl or 2 and social philos-
ophy3 and Martin Plattel's is social philosophyz. Whether
Krishna's book proves to be social philOSOphyl or social
philosophyz, the confusion is still resolvable. If all
three books embody social philosophyz, by definition one
does not expect commonality Of issues in social philOSOphyZ.
If one work is social philosophyl and social philosophya,
while the others are social philosophy2, one again would
not expect all three to embody common topics. One could
only expect commonality if the term 'social philosophy'
was used univocally.

The work Of this paper also provides a resolution to

the last three confusions related in Chapter I. Consider

 

2'57Ibid., pp. ix-x.

166

the issues:

3.

When one makes a further study Of the specific
topics covered by books designated as 'social
philosophy', one finds many topics which are
also considered in works in other branches

Of philosophy. For example, freedom
(determinism/indeterminism), duty (Obligation),
justice, natural law and natural right which
appear in the tables of contents Of several
volumes Of social philosophy also appear in
the tables Of contents Of ethical works. Then,
too, ownership (property), rights and social
contract appear in works both Of social phil-
osophy and political philosophy.258

Even a reference work such as The Philosopher's
Index reveals puzzling classificatiOns con-
cerning social philosophy. Sometimes articles
included under a particular topic are uniformly
included or excluded from the category Of social
philosophy. For example, articles on Peace are
included in the category Of social philosophy
while no article on Justice is so included. In

a number Of cases, however, articles listed under
the same particular topic are not uniformly
classified under the areas Of philOSOphy. For
example, articles on Right, Human Values, Freedom,
Equality/Inequality are sometimes listed as
social philosophy and sometimes as ethics. An
article on Powerlessness is classified as ethics
while those dealing with Power are classified as
social philosophy. Further puzzles include the
classification of articles on Obscenity as social
philosOphy and those on Punishment as ethics.

Finally, the results Of the above brief survey
reveal other disagreements over the scope Of
'social philosophy'. Comparing the classi-
fication of topics cited in point three above
with those Of point four, one realizes that the
authors Of the books used for point three do not
agree with the editors Of The Philosophor's
Index on the classification of Justice.2

 

 

258See: Above pp. 8-5.
259See: Above pp. 5-6.

260See: Above p. 6.

167

One way of resolving all these confusions is to claim
that each use of social philosophy is an example of social
philosophyz.

This dissolves the problem stated in number three.
Since social philosophy2 includes other branches Of philoso-
phy in its extension, there is no problem to finding ethics
and political philOSOphy dealing with freedom, duty,
justice, natural law and natural right.

The problem stated in number four also dissolves
through the use of social philosophyz. One can claim that
Right, Human, Values, Freedom, Equality/Inequality and
Power/Powerlessness are topics in the domain of social
philosophyz. This would justify the fact that articles on
these topics are cross-indexed under other branches Of
philosophy. One might also wish to argue that Obscenity
and Punishment are topics Of social philosophyz. It could
be claimed that it was just coincidental that articles
written on Obscenity from 1967-1969 did not consider ethical
aspects Of the issue and that those written on Punishment
did not consider the political or social aspects Of the
issue.261

The fifth problem can be resolved in like manner by

stating that Justice belongs to social philosophyz. It is

 

261One might also wish to argue that the editors of The
Philosopher' 5 Index made a category mistake in not cross-u
index1ng the article. Either claim would resolve the issue.
It is not important to this paper which claim is actually
made, only that the issue could be resolved. See pp. 168-170
for further discussion Of this point.

168

considered under several branches Of philOSOphy in the
literature.262 Again it may simply be a fact that articles
written on the subject during the three-year period did not
consider aspects other than the ethical or that the editors
of The Philosopher's Index made an error in indexing.263

This researcher recognizes the aptness Of the above
resolution. She also recognizes that given the current
degree of non-formalization Of social philosophyl as a
branch Of the philosophical enterprise this may be the only
resolution that is possible at this time.2614 However, she
experiences a certain dissatisfaction with the resolution.
Unlike the resolutions to the first two problems this one
seems to avoid possible complexities Of the issues involved.
Hence, another resolution procedure is suggested.

It would seem useful to examine every book noted for
problem four and every article indexed under the topics

listed in problem five. These should be classified as

social philOSOphyl, social philosophyz and social

 

262See: Above p. 8.

263See: Above p. 155, footnote 250, for further dis-
cussion of this issue.

26”If social philosophyl were more formalized with a
strong community of reference persons and a precise disci-
plinary ideal, one could be much more precise about which
topics are completely within its domain, which are partially
within its domain and which fall outside its domain. Such
clarity might reveal that some topics here classified as
belonging to more than one branch Of philosophy do in fact
only belong tO one branch, either social philosophyl or some
other. However, this is not the state of the enterprise at
this time.

169
philosophya. Such classification would be useful as a
start to defining the extensional meanings of 'social
philosophy' more precisely.

First, works falling into social philosOphy3 could be
duly ignored as technical philosophy. If it is found that
all works on certain topics are always in the extension of
social philosophy3 and never in the extension Of social
philosophyl and social philosophyz, some basis for labeling
those topics as 'non-philoSOphical' in the technical sense
is established. On the other hand it may be found that no
topic is exclusively social philosophy3 and a basis might
be established for claiming that no social issue is outside
the domain of technical philosophy.

Second, in categorizing works as social philosophyl or
social philosophy2 some possibilities could be checked
which might lead to further clarification Of the proper
domains of social philosophyl and social philosophyz. One
might find, for example, any Of the following:

a. All articles or books concerned with a given
topic might be included in the extension Of social
philosophyl and not in the extension Of any of
the other branches Of philosophy included in
social philosophyz.

b. All articles or books on a given topic might
always be included in the extension of social
philosophy1 and some other branch Of philosophy

included in social philosophy2.

170

c. Some but not all articles on a given topic might
be included in the extension of social philosophyl
but not in the extension Of any Of the other
branches Of philosophy included in social
philosophyz, while some but not all articles on
the same topic might be included in the extension
of the other branches of philosophy included in
social philosophy2 but not included in social
philosophyl.

d. Some articles or books on a given tOpic might be
included in the extension Of both social philoso-
phyl and other branch(es) of philosophy included
in social philosophy2 while other articles or
books on the same topic might be found tO be
included either in the extension Of social
philosophy1 or the other branches Of philOSOphy
included in social philosophy2 but not in the
extension of both.

A consistent pattern Of only a, or only b, or only c,
or only d might serve as a basis for the education Of present
intuitions concerning the scope Of social philosophyl and
social philosophyz.

Such a procedure would certainly reveal more Of the
possible complexities Of the original issues than the first
resolution Offered above. However, the carrying out Of this
procedure is not required for the completion Of the present

study nor is it desirable in light Of the original emphasis

171

placed on the first Of the three questions in this study.
Thus it is not worked out here.265
Question 3. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) Of
this distinction affect the larger task Of complete clari-
fication Of the term 'social philosophy'?

The correctness of the distinction between social
philOSOphyl, social philosophy2, social philosophy3 and
ethics indicates that the same sort Of investigation would be

worth pursuing in regard to 'social philosophy' and the

, '- nvn-a'u-u-r #1

other branches Of philosophy noted in Chapter I. The domain “7
Of social philosophy could be further clarified by discover-
ing if it is distinct from philosophy Of law, philosophy Of
state, philosophy Of the social sciences and political
philosophy.

Then, too, items worked out in the process of this study
point to possible fruitful ways of clarifying the meaning Of
'social philosophy'. First, the success Of the procedure
utilized in this study suggests a method for the additional
studies on the correctness of distinguishing social philos-
ophy from other branches of philosophy. Second, the
distinction in meanings among 'social philosophyl', 'social
philosophyz' and 'social philosophyB' established by this
study should facilitate additional studies. Finally, the

suggested procedure for fuller clarification Of the domains

 

265Such a procedure carried out on all the books and
articles indicated by problems four and five could generate
another full report or study.

172
Of 'social philosophyl', 'social philosophyz' and 'social
philosophyB' explained at the end of the reply to question
two above could introduce much more precision into the
extensional definitions of these terms than is currently
possible.

It should be noted that it is not until such precision
concerning the extensional definition Of 'social philos-
ophyl' and 'social philosophyz' is attained that all the
norms for ascertaining a 'category mistake' will be
formulated. This paper has not attempted to complete this
task. Rather it has:

1. Ascertained that there are at least three
meanings for 'social philosophy' and explained
what these meanings indicate.

2. Shown that 'social philosophyl' (and thus 'social
philosophyz' Of which it is a sub-set) includes
first and second order theoretical issues and
problem topics.

3. Shown that philosophical work on 'alienation'
per se belongs to social philosophyl and not
to ethics, and that philosophical work on 'the
nature Of morality' or 'deontological' per se
belongs to ethics and not to social philosophyl.

Thus, norms related to deciding whether or not a
category mistake has been made, have been established for
(1) kinds Of tOpics and (2) the specific topics of 'aliena-

tion', 'nature Of morality' and 'deontological'. Norms for

173
other specific issues await future studies.
The paper has answered the three questions set out in

Chapter 1. Thus this study is completed.

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