ABSTRACT

A CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF
'SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY' THROUGH AN
EXAMINATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE
EXTENSION OF THE DOMAIN OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

By

Kathryn M. Lindemann

The term 'social philosophy' is used frequently within the philosophical community. Examination of the use of the term reveals, however, that its meaning is vague. There is no consistency in its extensional application.

After enunciating the above problem, this thesis proceeds to clarify the meaning of 'social philosophy' by examining and clarifying the extension of the domain of social philosophy. The examination dwells on the relation of the domain of social philosophy to that of ethics.

The results of this examination not only show that social philosophy is different from ethics, but also that social philosophy has three distinct domains. There is social philosophy$_1$ which is a branch of philosophy extending to both theoretical and problematical issues concerning society. There is social philosophy$_2$ which is a general class term extending to all those branches of philosophy

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which consider social issues <u>e.g.</u> ethics, philosophy of law, social philosophy$_1$ and so forth. Finally there is social philosophy$_3$ which extends to work on social issues which is not philosophical in the technical sense of that term.

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by

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I.  THE PROBLEM

The larger problem.  Philosophers talk about social
philosophy and some claim to do social philosophy.

1.  In 1972 The Philosopher's Index, an international
    index to philosophical periodicals, listed 286
    articles under the subject 'social philosophy'.[1]

2.  Both the American Philosophical Association and the
    American Catholic Philosophical Association, two of
    the largest philosophical associations in this
    country, have periodically included papers and dis-
    cussions on 'social philosophy' in their annual
    conventions.[2]

3.  Of the forty-nine graduate schools of philosophy
    included in A Rating of Graduate Programs in 1957,

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[1]Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index:
Cumulative Edition 1972 (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy
Documentation Center, 1972), pp. 353-359.

[2]For example:  The Western Division of the American
Philosophical Association devoted program time to 'social
philosophy' in 1968 and in 1963.  The Thirty-seventh Annual
Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
did the same.  Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association XL (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1968),
p. 116 and XLVI (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1963), pp. 160-161.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
XXXVII (Washington, D.C.), pp. iii.

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1964 and 1969,[3] twenty-nine list courses in 'social
philosophy' or 'social and political philosophy' in
their catalogues.[4]  Further, of sixteen departments
included in this study which list areas of special-
ization, six offer specialization in 'social and
political philosophy', one offers specialization in
'social or political philosophy', and one offers
specialization in 'social philosophy'.[5]

Such widespread talk about 'social philosophy' in the
philosophic community would lead one to believe that there
is a specific branch of philosophy called 'social philosophy'.
This belief gives rise to the expectation that social
philosophy has a well specified domain and that, despite

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[3]Kenneth D. Roose and Charles J. Anderson, A Rating of
Graduate Programs (Washington, D.C.:  American Council on
Education), 1970, pp. 50-51.

[4]These institutions include:  Boston University, Bran-
deis University, California State University, Los Angeles
University, Columbia University, Emory University, Fordham
University, Indiana University, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Michigan State University, Northwestern Uni-
versity, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, Princeton University, State University of New York at
Buffalo, Syracuse University, University of California at
Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Colorado,
University of Illinois, University of Michigan, University
of Minnesota, University of North Carolina, University of
Oregon, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh,
University of Rochester, University of Wisconsin, Vanderbilt
University, Yale University.

[5]These institutions include:  Johns Hopkins University,
University of Colorado, University of Minnesota, University
of Pittsburgh, University of Washington (Seattle), Vander-
bilt University for social or political philosophy; and
Pennsylvania State University for social philosophy.

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possible quarrels concerning the inclusion or non-inclusion of certain topics, the topical content of social philosophy would be easily identifiable.

This is not the case. Even a cursory survey of the literature reveals that the term 'social philosophy' is vague.[6] The domains of ethics, philosophy of law, philosophy of state, philosophy of the social sciences, political philosophy and social philosophy are in a tangled state.

1. Books entitled 'social philosophy' often describe their subject matter as that of other philosophical areas and the areas included in such descriptions are not constant. If one considers works from a variety of historical periods one finds that, for example, the preface to The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of Caroline begins: "The aim of this book is to present in a systematic form the political and economic thought of one of the most thorough-going exponents of Jeffersonian democracy;"[7] while the author of The Social Philosophy of English Idealism states: "By their (English idealist) social philosophy, I

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[6]"An occurrence of a word is vague when it can not be determined what limits the speaker intended to put on the inclusiveness of the word in question." Henry S. Leonard, Principles of Right Reason (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), p. 26.

[7]Eugene Tenbroeck Mudge, The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of Caroline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. x.

mean that part of their work which was concerned with human life in society, in particular their ethics and political theory;"[8] and <u>The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus</u> tries "to combine into a systematic whole, the social and economic teachings of Rodbertus."[9]

2. Even within books of the same era there is little agreement. If one considers the contents of three works published within the same era (1965-1973), Joel Feinberg's <u>Social Philosophy</u>, Daya Krishna's <u>Social Philosophy</u>, and Martin Plattel's <u>Social Philosophy</u>, one finds not a single topic common to all.[10]

3. When one makes a further study of the specific topics covered by books designated as 'social philosophy', one finds many topics which are also considered in works in other branches of philosophy. For example, freedom (determinism/indeterminism), duty (obligation), justice, natural law and natural right which appear in the tables of

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[8]A. J. M. Milne, <u>The Social Philosophy of English Idealism</u> (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 12.

[9]E. C. K. Gonner, <u>The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus</u> (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1899), p. vii.

[10]Joel Feinberg, <u>Social Philosophy</u> ("Foundations of Philosophy;" Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973). Daya Krishna, <u>Social Philosophy</u> (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969). Martin G. Plattel, <u>Social Philosophy</u> ("Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series," Vol. XVIII; Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965).

contents of several volumes of social philosophy

also appear in the tables of contents of ethical

works.[11] Then, too, ownership (property), rights

and social contract appear in works both of social

philosophy and political philosophy.[12]

4.  Even a reference work such as The Philosopher's

Index reveals puzzling classifications concerning

social philosophy.  Sometimes articles included

under a particular topic are uniformly included or

excluded from the category of social philosophy.

For example, articles on Peace are included in the

category of social philosophy while no article on

Justice is so included.  In a number of cases, how-

ever, articles listed under the same particular

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[11]This list was compiled by comparing the Tables of
Contents of the following works of social philosophy in the
Michigan State University Library collection: Stuart G.
Brown, The Social Philosophy of Josiah Royce; Joel Feinberg,
Social Philosophy; E.C.K. Gonner, The Social Philosophy of
Robertus; Charles C. Josey, The Social Philosophy of Instinct;
Daya Krishna, Social Philosophy Past and Present; A.J.M.
Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism; Eugene
Tenbroeck Mudge, The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of
Caroline; Martin G. Plattel, Social Philosophy; Mahadera
Prosad, Social Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi; and P. Sorokin,
Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis with the following
works in ethics: William Frankena, Ethics; Sir W. David
Ross, Foundations of Ethics.

[12]This list was compiled by comparing the Table of Con-
tents of the following works of political philosophy: Francis
William Cocker, Readings in Political Philosophy; Margaret
Spahr, Readings in Recent Political Philosophy; and Vishwan-
ath Prasad Varma, Political Philosophy with these social
philosophy works: Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy; E.C.K.
Gonner, The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus; A.J.M. Milne,
The Social Philosophy of English Idealism.

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topic are not uniformly classified under the areas
of philosophy.  For example, articles on Right,
Human Values, Freedom, Equality/Inequality are
sometimes listed as social philosophy and sometimes
as ethics.  An article on Powerlessness is classi-
fied as ethics while those dealing with Power are
classified as social philosophy.  Further puzzles
include the classification of articles on Obscenity
as social philosophy and those on Punishment as
ethics.[13]

5.  Finally, the results of the above brief survey re-
veal further disagreements over the scope of
'social philosophy'.  Comparing the classification
of topics cited in point three above with those of
point four, one realizes that the authors of the
books used for point three do not agree with the
editors of The Philosopher's Index on the classi-
fication of Justice.

In the light of these several examples it is apparent
that the term 'social philosophy' is vague.  One cannot
possibly know what is meant by the term when it is used in
ordinary philosophical discourse.

This vagueness of 'social philosophy' is a problem from
two aspects in the philosophical tradition:

1.  Clarity in terminology always has been held as a

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[13]Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index,
Vols. I-III (Bowling Green, Ohio:  Bowling Green University,
1967, 1968, 1969).

value by a large part of the philosophic community. The removal of vagueness from philosophy's terminology has been a recurring task throughout philosophic history. There exist many who claim that lack of attention to clarity of terms created some of the long arguments in the history of the field.

2. Philosophers have traditionally reflected on their own discipline. Not only have they been interested in answering the question of "what is philosophy?" but they have tried to distinguish the various branches of philosophy and their mutual relations. Aristotle's reflections, especially in the <u>Metaphysics</u>, Descartes in the Dedication and Letter to the Translator of <u>The Principles of Philosophy</u>, and much of the twentieth century writing on the nature and bounds of ethics, are but three examples from this tradition.

Thus, given the apparent confusion over the meaning of 'social philosophy' and given the tradition of reflection on the nature and scope of the various branches of philosophy, it is apparent that the term 'social philosophy' deserves examination and clarification by philosophers.[14]

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[14]One of the assumptions of this paper is that a term naming a discipline, a field of study or a specific area of a field of study purports to mean that discipline or field of study or specific area of the field of study. Hence a clarification of the term 'social philosophy' includes a study of and clarification of the area of social philosophy.

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'Social philosophy' needs clarification. One needs to ask if this term specifies an actual branch of philosophy or if the term is vacuous. Perhaps it is irremediably vague and philosophers should simply keep that fact in mind.[15] If, however, 'social philosophy' does denote a specific branch of philosophy one needs to ask: What delineates social philosophy from other branches of philosophy? What constitutes membership in social philosophy's domain? What criteria become crucial for deciding the applicability of the term in difficult cases?

Such is the larger task of which this study is a part. This paper does not attempt to deal with the entire task of clarifying 'social philosophy', however; rather, it considers one of the sub-problems of this task.

Sub-problems. The establishment of an explication of a term such as 'social philosophy' is a sophisticated task which requires preliminary work. One must clarify 'social philosophy's' relation to other relevant terms before one can reconstruct a more precise meaning for this common, vague term. This clarification of 'social philosophy's' relation to other relevant terms requires two sub-steps: (1) deciding which terms are relevant to 'social philosophy' and then (2) deciding the relations(s) between 'social philosophy' and each of the relevant terms.

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[15]One is reminded of what Wittgenstein called "slogan words". They are irremediably vague.

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Earlier, this paper indicated terms which seem relevant to 'social philosophy'. There are at least five: 'ethics', 'philosophy of law', 'philosophy of state', philosophy of the social sciences', and 'political philosophy'. Since attempting to clarify the relation of 'social philosophy' to each one of these is too ambitious a project for a single study, this paper is limited to a consideration of the relation(s) between 'social philosophy' and one of these terms.

The task of this study. This paper critically considers the relationship which exists between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.[16] More specifically, the paper will examine a single hypothesis which is sometimes advanced to express this relation: the hypothesis that there is a distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.

Evidence that there are those who advance such a distinction is readily available:

1. Separate works for social philosophy and ethics are often used in the various philosophy series, such as the Foundations of Philosophy Series edited by Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley.[17]

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[16]Several reasons could be cited to justify this choice. One is that contemporary philosophers have been discussing the proper domain of ethics far more than they have discussed the domain of the other areas. Thus ethics becomes easier to use than political philosophy, philosophy of law, or others.

[17]Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley (eds.), Foundation of Philosophy Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.). Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 1973 and William Frankena, Ethics, 1963.

2. Convention programs often honor the distinction by establishing different sub-sections for papers in each category.[18]

3. The Philosopher's Index utilizes separate categories for social philosophy and ethics.[19]

4. In the previously mentioned American Council on Education study, eight graduate schools offer specialization in 'social philosophy', and each of these also offers specialization in 'ethics'.[20]

Despite the use of this distinction between social philosophy and ethics, the import or the validity of the distinction is not all clear. One needs to ask: Is the content of social philosophy a sub-set of that of ethics or is that of ethics a sub-set of social philosophy? Do their contents form disjoint sets or are they partially intersecting? If they do intersect in part, what items fall within/without the intersection? Or, finally, could the use

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[18]See the programs for the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1968, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 1967-1968 XLI (Yellow Springs: Antioch Press), pp. 116, 118 and Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1963, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association XXXVII (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America), pp. i-ii.

[19]It should be noted that the original edition of volume I did not include the category 'social philosophy' although it did include 'ethics'. There was a category 'social', just as there was one for 'ethical'. In the publication of the First Cumulative Edition, works listed under 'social' and 'ethical' in the original edition were listed under 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' respectively.

[20]See note five above.

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of separate terms be misleading? Could it be that 'ethics'
is identical with 'social philosophy'?[21]

Although the results of this study shed light on each
of the questions cited above, the paper does not aim to pro-
vide detailed answers to all of them. Rather, the study
examines one question directly: Is it correct to distinguish
'social philosophy' from 'ethics'?

There are several ways of approaching this question for
there are several methods advanced for defining a discipline
or a branch of a discipline or a term. It is not the in-
tention of this paper to utilize all methods, nor to decide
which is the best among them. This is not a formal examin-
ation of methodology. Rather this study takes one of the
several approaches, the one which states that branches of a
discipline differ in their extension by containing different
specific topics of inquiry, and then examines the question
of the distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'
in this light. After making the examination, this study
relates its results to some of the issues already raised in
this chapter, viz. the apparent confusion in classifications
of topics and the larger issue of the complete clarification
of the term 'social philosophy'.

Thus the major question of this study may be restated

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[21]This question, answered in the affirmative by some,
then provides the contradictory hypothesis to the one
articulated above. This hypothesis, that 'social philosophy'
and 'ethics' are not distinct, is not overtly discussed in
this paper although the results of this paper do bear on the
validity of this alternate hypothesis. See: Chapter VII.

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with greater specificity as:

1. Is it correct to make a distinction between social philosophy and ethics and ground this in a distinction of topical content?

Two further questions will be considered upon answering this main question:

2. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) of this distinction affect the apparent confusions over classification of topics cited in the opening sections of this paper? Can it resolve any or all of these confusions?

3. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) of this distinction affect the larger task of completely clarifying the meaning of the term 'social philosophy'?

Having established that there is a problem concerning the meaning of 'social philosophy' and having indicated that the consideration of such problems is consistent with the philosophical tradition, this chapter explains the specific portion of the total problem to be considered in this paper. In the next chapter the methodological issues involved in this consideration are discussed.

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## II.  METHOD

Introduction.  The three aims of this chapter are the
following:  (1) to indicate some of the methodological
questions involved in a study such as this one, (2) to state
and give reason(s) for the methodological choices made by
this writer, and (3) to indicate the limitations bound into
this study by these specific choices.

The chapter is organized accordingly.  First, there is
a brief consideration of the problems involved in finding a
correct method for the clarification of a term naming an
academic discipline or area of academic inquiry.  Second,
there is an exposition of the method chosen for this study.
This exposition includes both some explanation and justi-
fication of the general approach of the study and a summary
of the specific steps taken in the study.  Finally, there is
a noting of the limitations generated by these methods.

Problems of method.  There are two major areas of un-
resolved philosophical problems central to this thesis:
problems concerning the nature of academic disciplines or
areas of academic inquiry and those concerning the clarifi-
cation of the meaning of terms.  This latter problem area
immediately raises another--that of the nature of language.

Multifarious questions from these areas are directly

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related to the choice of method in this study:

Concerning the nature of academic disciplines or areas of academic inquiry one wonders:

1. Are academic disciplines or areas of academic inquiry fixed in their extensions or do these extensions undergo change by revolution or evolution?

2. Can one know the extension of an area of academic discipline 'a priori' or is empirical data necessary?

3. If the present state of an academic discipline is not sufficient for describing the proper extension of a discipline, what is sufficient?

Concerning the clarification of terms one asks:

1. Do academic disciplines or areas of academic inquiry use natural or artificial languages?

2. Is the language of an academic discipline inherently circular?

3. If the language of an academic discipline is inherently circular, how does one attain any certainty when trying to clarify the meaning of a term?

4. How precise a clarification of the meaning of a term is possible?

These two sets of question do not form an exhaustive list of all of the philosophical questions related to the methodology of this study. They do, however, indicate some of the central issues involved in any of the decisions

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Methodological context. It is obvious to any prac-
titioner of philosophy that none of the above questions has
been fully resolved at this time. It is also obvious that
any one of these questions could be the subject of an entire
thesis.

Considering the dependency of the present study on the
answers to these questions, one unfamiliar with the history
of philosophy might be tempted to suggest that the present
thesis should not be attempted until these other issues are
adequately resolved. Those more acquainted with philosophy
recognize, however, that philosophy, unlike some other
academic enterprises, does not demand that all foundational
issues be settled before a given problem be attempted.
Philosophers have tried, and still do try, to settle par-
ticular issues without resolving the debates concerning their
premises or methods.[22]

This study is not a study of a "foundational issue" in
philosophy. It is not a study in method either. It is a
study in the clarification of the extensional meaning of the
term 'social philosophy' and, as such, a study in the clari-
fication of the extension of the domain of social philosophy.
It makes no claim to resolving the methodological issues

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[22]This is not to say that one must begin 'in the middle
of things.' Some philosophers, Descartes and Spinoza for
example, have tried to begin 'at the beginning'. However,
others, such as Plato, Augustine and Hume, have not. The
point being made is that neither approach has sole canon-
ization in philosophical circles.

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which are related to this topic.  It is written in the context of those philosophical works which begin 'in the midst of things' to study a particular puzzle, problem or issue.

As a study it uses certain methods, none of which is original with this writer.  The paper is grounded in the approaches of what is sometimes called 'traditional philosophy'.  It is not restricted, however, to the use of purely classical devices.  It strives to utilize methods of both the modern formalists and modern informalists which seem both fruitful for the issue at hand and agreeable to traditional philosophy.[23]

Empirical and non-empirical.  The study utilizes both empirical and non-empirical methods.  Its general movement is to begin with the empirical; to cast the resultant data against the non-empirical framework of 'what is possible'; to note anomalies and then to adjudicate these anomalies by criteria from both empirical and non-empirical sources.  The criteria for these adjudications are consistency, fruitfulness, simplicity, 'what is the case in the practice of the discipline' and 'what has been the case in the practice of the discipline'.[24]

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[23]It may be well to note that such a wedding of traditions often entails some loss of rigor in utilizing the most formal aspects of each tradition.  This is noted not by way of apology but by way of apologia for parts of the ensuing chapters.

[24]These criteria are listed in alphabetical order since the relative importance of each criterion in the adjudication process is not detailed in this chapter.  Such detailing and the resultant explanations or justifications would consume too much of this thesis for a non-methodological study.  Perhaps this item, in light of the moves made in Chapters V and VI could be developed at another time for study more concerned with method.

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This writer believes that the combination of empirical and non-empirical methods is a correct method for approaching the issue of this study for the following reasons:

1.  If one were to use empirical methods alone, one could have an accurate description of what is the domain of social philosophy and ethics but one would have no means of deciding if this is what ought to be the domain of these areas of academic inquiry. The purely empirical is insufficient for revealing what ought to be the case.

2.  If one were to use non-empirical methods alone, one could obtain a strong statement of what ought to be the domain of social philosophy and ethics. When considering the domain of an area of academic inquiry, however, one is considering something which by its very nature must be (or has been) in act; must be (or has been) practiced in order to have meaning. Now what is conceived by the mind need not exist outside the conceiving mind. What is arrived at in an 'a priori' fashion need not exist in extra-mental reality. Areas of academic inqury, however, do exist outside the defining mind. They usually exist in the practice of a community of thinkers or scholars. Thus, although a purely non-empirical approach to the domain of an area of academic inquiry may produce a coherent, logical statement of what 'ought to be' the domain

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of the area, this statement need not be correct. Any statement of what 'ought to be the domain of an existing area of academic inquiry' must make some reference to the practice of that area of inquiry. Empirical data is necessary.

3. Thus it is apparent that neither purely empirical nor purely non-empirical methods are sufficient for this study. A combination of both is necessary.

Having given this general introduction to method, the chapter continues with a detailing of the specific steps involved in the study.

Summary of the steps involved.

I. Steps already accomplished:

A. Indicate that there is a problem with the term 'social philosophy'.

B. State and justify the need for clarification of the term 'social philosophy'.

C. State and justify the narrower intent of this study: to examine the hypothesis that there is a distinction between social philosophy and ethics which is grounded in a distinction of topical content.

D. State the three specific questions the paper will attempt to answer.

E. Give some explanation of and justification for the general methodological approach of the

study.

II. Steps yet to be taken:

A. Answer question one.

1. Explain a method for establishing the validity or non-validity of the hypothesis in question.

2. Establish the parameters for the corpus of social philosophy and ethics to be used in the survey section of the study.

3. Report the topical analysis of the corpus.

4. State some positions concerning the relation of social philosophy to ethics.

5. Show how these positions would classify specific topics as either social philosophy or ethics.

6. Examine the results of step five to see if one could establish the validity or non-validity of the hypothesis at this point. If it is possible, advance to question two below. If it is not possible, continue with step seven.

7. Adjudicate the positions established in step five, by the criteria enunciated above until one has established a single position (or mutually compatible set of positions) which is adequate.

8. Show how this position would classify

specific topics as either social phil-

osophy or ethics.

9. Examine the results of step eight and

establish the validity or non-validity

of the hypothesis in accord with the

method explained in step one.

B. Answer question two. Summarize the appro-

priate sections developed to answer question

one which supply information related to this

question. (See steps three, five, and eight

above.)

C. Answer question three.

1. State what needs to be done to answer

the larger question.

2. Summarize what has been done.

3. Enumerate the remaining tasks.

Step II A #1: Explain a method for establishing the

validity or non-validity of the hypothesis in question. One

selects one's methods according to one's goals. The first

question to be answered in this study is: Is it correct to

make a distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'

and ground this distinction in a distinction of topical

content? In the context of this question 'social philosophy'

and 'ethics' are used as class terms, terms applied to sets

of topics. Thus, to establish the correctness or incorrect-

ness of the distinction of terms one may establish the

correctness or incorrectness of the distinction between the

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sets designated by the terms.  Thus, if every topic of ethics
is also a topic of social philosophy and every topic of
social philosophy is a topic of ethics, then the sets are
identical and the distinction of terms grounded in a dis-
tinction of topical content is not correct and the hy-
pothesis not valid.  If the mutual relations between the
sets of topics fall into any one of the four other possible
outcomes, the distinction is correct and the hypothesis
validated.  Further, it should be noted that the very
proving of correctness will also define the set relations of
the terms to each other.  If all topics of social philosophy
are topics of ethics but at least one topic of ethics is
not a topic of social philosophy, then the distinction is
correct and it is shown that social philosophy is a sub-set
of ethics.  If all topics of ethics are topics of social
philosophy but at least one topic of social philosophy is
not a topic of ethics, then the distinction is correct and
it is shown that ethics is a sub-set of social philosophy.
If at least one, but not all, topics of social philosophy are
also topics of ethics and at least one, but not all, topics
of ethics are also topics of social philosophy, then the
distinction is correct and it is shown that social philosophy
and ethics are partially intersecting sets.  Finally, if no
topic of social philosophy is a topic of ethics, the
distinction is correct and it is shown that social philosophy
and ethics are disjoint sets.

To discover which of the above cases holds, one needs to

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do an empirical survey of which topics are discussed in social
philosophy and which are discussed in ethics. This survey
will be done and the results of this empirical investigation
will be reported in Chapter Three. (The reporting forms Step
II A #3.)

Step II A #2: Establish the parameters for the corpus
of social philosophy and ethics to be used in the survey
section of the study. Since the corpus in both social
philosophy and ethics is vast, it is imperative that limits
be placed on the range of the survey described in step two.
The establishment of such limits, however, always raises the
possibility of the criticism of non-objectivity. An in-
vestigator needs to either find an already established
limited population or be prepared to defend every inclusion
or non-inclusion of possible members in her survey. Happily
there already exists at least one established, limited sub-
section of the corpus in social philosophy and ethics:
works listed in The Philosopher's Index.[25]

The number of articles listed in The Philosopher's
Index as either social philosophy or ethics since volume
one, number one in 1967 exceeds 2,500.[26] Thus, this study
requires a further limit. The empirical investigation will
be confined to articles published in English and listed in
The Philosopher's Index for the first three years of that
publication: 1967, 1968 and 1969. More specifically, the

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[25]Some further justification for the selection of this
corpus is found in the opening pages of Chapter III.

[26]Lineback, Cumulative Edition I-,1967-.

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study will consider all such articles classified as either 'social philosophy' or 'ethics'.

Step II A #4:  State theories concerning the relation of social philosophy to ethics.  If it were the case that there was general agreement as to which topics belonged to 'social philosophy' and which belonged to 'ethics', it would be a relatively easy matter, after doing the topical analysis of the articles considered, to construct the required set membership lists, observe their intersection or non-intersection and decide which of the previously listed cases hold and thus answer the question concerning the validity of the distinction between terms.  It has been shown in Chapter One, however, that such general agreement does not exist.  A common classification of topics must be brought into existence before the study can proceed.

The place of positions in classifying.  The act of classifying presupposes the existence of some position or view of the subject which determines particular decisions as to the inclusion or non-inclusion of a given item in a specific category.  Sometimes, a classifier denies the existence of such a position; however, a few challenges of particular decisions concerning the inclusion or non-inclusion of specific items usually produce justifying statements which reveal the basic position which was implicit in the previous acts of classification.  Inconsistent classifications may result either from inconsistencies in a clearly articulated position or from inconsistencies which are the

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result of the inadequate development of a position. Dis-
agreements over specific classifications are usually the
result of different positions being used by separate
classifiers. Thus, if one needs a consistent classification
of topics for social philosophy and ethics, one must have
(1) a consistent position on the scope of social philosophy
and ethics and (2) a consistent position on the relation(s)
these two areas have to each other. Chapter Four is con-
cerned with these issues.

Since it is an accepted fact that there are several
contemporary conceptions of the nature and scope of ethics
and since one can posit several conceptions of the scope of
social philosophy, the description of the relation(s) of
social philosophy to ethics is generated in the following
way:

1. Some conceptions of ethics are described
   $(E_1, E_2 \ldots E_n)$.

2. Some conceptions of social philosophy are described
   $(S_1, S_2 \ldots S_m)$.

3. The above descriptions are then paired in all
   possible ways $(E_1 S_1, \ldots E_1 S_m \ldots E_n S_m)$. This
   pairing forms a set of possible conceptions of the
   relations between social philosophy and ethics.

Step II A #5&6: Show how these positions would classify
specific topics and examine the results for validity of the
hypothesis. The next step in the procedure consists in
applying each of the above conceptions to the task of classi-
fying specific topics to the domain of social philosophy or

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ethics. This is done in order to be able to judge whether or not the distinction in terms holds in any of the varied conceptions of the relation between social philosophy and ethics. If the distinction holds in all or none of the cases, the first question of this study is answered. If, however, it holds in some but not all cases, the question is not answered. There needs to be some adjudication among the various positions until either one position or a set of mutually compatible positions can be adduced. Arriving at a single position, or set of mutually compatible positions, steps eight and nine, which are similar to five and six described above, are taken and the answer to the first question is obtained.

A possible objection and reply. At this point the careful reader, recalling that the purpose of finding the consistent classification of topics was to examine the relative domains of social philosophy and ethics, might sense a circularity of thought upon hearing the above call for a consistent theory of the nature of social philosophy and ethics. If one already knows the nature and scope of social philosophy and ethics, why begin with an empirical investigation of topics at all? Why not simply appeal to this knowledge to see if the distinction between terms is valid? Indeed, why not appeal to the conception concerning the nature and scope of social philosophy to resolve the larger problem of explicating 'social philosophy'? Such questions need to be answered.

This writer believes that upon discovering vagueness in the use of a common term one has two basic approaches for attaining clarity. Either one may create one's own definition and then try to get the scholarly community to adopt it, or one may try to reconstruct the term along lines indicated by the general use of the term and the current conceptions of the term. It is the latter course which is adopted in this paper. This method involves a mediation between instances of actual use and the conceptions which govern use. Since neither of these is in a precise state, one first describes both usage and conceptions as they currently exist. Then noting anomalies, one adds to or revises each in the light of the other until a consistent usage and conception are obtained. This consistent usage and conception should preserve all the common intuitions about the term, but may introduce new precisions in those areas where common intuitions are inadequate or confused.[27]

Question two of the study. The second question concerns the relation of the validity or non-validity of the hypothesis examined in question one to the confusions sketched early in this introduction. It should be apparent that the data for answering this question will be generated in the answering of the first question. This data will be set apart and summarized in order to (1) make the material easier to follow and (2) make more apparent the power of the

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[27]Joseph F. Hanna, "An Explication of 'Explication'", Philosophy of Science, XXXV (March, 1968), p. 36.

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proposed solution to question one.

Question three of the study. The steps outlined under this question have been suggested by the work of Thomas Kuhn and Stephen Toulmin.[28] Each suggests that the setting of the ideal (those questions which if answered would tell us everything we need to know), comparing it with the present store of knowledge, and then finding the tasks to be done from the difference, is basic to the pursuit of knowledge.

Final remarks. It could be claimed that this study is extremely limited in scope. This writer agrees with such a claim. She recognizes the limits of the study both in relation to the total problem of explicating 'social philosophy', since so many methodological issues related to this study are as yet unresolved and in relation to the actual confirmation or disconfirmation of the specific hypothesis in question, since the empirical data is limited to articles listed in The Philosopher's Index from 1967 through 1969.

This writer believes, however, that philosophers should be very clear in their terminology and, thus, that the larger task of clarifying the term 'social philosophy' is worth doing. She also believes that unless one's clarification is to be purely personal and not intended for use in the larger philosophic community, the task is large and

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[28]Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970) and Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

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must take into account the current state of common usage and theory. Hopefully, this study, though limited, will contribute to the eventual resolution of the larger task of fully explicating 'social philosophy'.

III.  SUBJECT ANALYSIS

Aim.  In keeping with the methodology outlined in the
previous chapter this chapter provides a survey of the
subjects discussed in social philosophy and those discussed
in ethics as indicated by the English language listings in
The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968, and 1969.  Since
this survey is limited to the domain of The Philosopher's
Index, the reader may want some information to judge the
philosophical adequacy of this domain.  Are its listings
truly philosophical?  How complete is its coverage?  Who
decides the categorization of articles?  How are such
category decisions made?

Thus this chapter is divided into several sections.
First, there is a section giving background on The Philos-
opher's Index.  This attempts to provide information to
answer the questions cited above.  This section is followed
by one explaining the method employed in doing the survey.
Third, is a section citing a few cautions to be kept in mind
when reading the survey report.  Finally, there is the sur-
vey report itself.

Background on The Index.  The Philosopher's Index was
begun in 1967.  The first volume states that the Index is "a
subject and author index to all major American and British

philosophical periodicals, selected journals in other languages and related interdisciplinary publications."[29]

Richard H. Lineback has been the editor and Romona Cormier is the assistant editor.[30] Six philosophers form the editorial board: William Blackston, James Collins, Alan Douagan, Adolf Grunbaum, Patrick Suppes and Henry B. Veatch.[31] There is also an advisory board of faculty from various disciplines at Bowling Green University.[32]

In the introductory pages of each volume the editors state the factors they consider when choosing journals to be indexed. These factors are three in number: "1) The purpose of the journal, 2) its circulation, and 3) recommendation from members of the philosophic community."[33] The editors further state that articles from interdisciplinary journals "are indexed only if they are related to philosophy."[34]

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[29]Richard H. Lineback (ed.), The Philosopher's Index: Cumulative Edition 1972 (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1972), I, ii.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]These are: Robert Goodwin, professor of philosophy; John Holmes, professor of marketing; Walter Morris, chairman of the department of German and Russian; Richard Newman, director of the computer center; Robert Rogers, director of the university library; Karl Rahdert, director of graduate studies in business. (Ibid.)

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

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Thus, controlled by philosophers and having philosophic guidelines for its operation, The Philosopher's Index is designed to include the maximum number of philosophical articles and the minimum of non-philosophical articles in each volume.

Concerning the assignment of specific articles to subject categories, the editors explain that "The Subject Index lists in alphabetical order the significant words and names that describe the content of the articles indexed."[35] These subject listings fall into six classes:

1) proper names such as Quine, Kant, and Hegel;
2) nationalities such as American and Soviet;
3) historical periods such as medieval and renaissance;
4) major fields of philosophy such as metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, and logic;
5) subdivisions of the major fields of philosophy such as utilitarianism, induction, realism, and nominalism; and
6) other specific topics such as grue, pain, paradox, and turing-machine.[36]

Decisions as to which subject(s) describe a given article are made by the editors after reading each article "since titles are frequently misleading."[37]

Such policies seem designed to preserve the philosophical purity of all listings and to insure accuracy in the assignment of articles to subject headings.

Method. The analysis of subjects discussed in social philosophy and ethics was obtained by cross-tabulating every article listed under 'social philosophy' and every article

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[35]Ibid., x.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

listed under 'ethics', with every other listing included in
the 1967, 1968 and 1969 Subject Index section of The
Philosopher's Index.[38]

More specifically, results were obtained as follows:

1. Every article listed as 'social philosophy' was
   cross-tabulated with every article listed as
   'ethics' so as to locate any article assigned as a
   member to both sets.

2. Every article listed as 'social philosophy' and
   every article listed as 'ethics' was cross-
   tabulated with every article listed as a member of
   every other subject listing. This yielded:

   a. Subjects with no membership of articles also
      listed as 'social philosophy' or 'ethics'.

   b. Subjects with members which were also members
      of 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics'.

   c. Subjects with members which were also members

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[38]For the purpose of this study, the most relevant
categories used by The Philosopher's Index are numbers four,
"major fields in philosophy," and six, "other specific
topics." Reports concerning the analysis of the other four
subject categories could be omitted since they bear little
direct relation to the problems of this study. However,
in no place do the editors of The Philosopher's Index desig-
nate which subject listings they consider members of any
given category. This presents difficulties. Although in
many cases it is simple to decide whether or not a given
subject belongs to "other specific topics," in other cases
it is not so simple. Errors are possible. To prevent such
errors one could either (1) check each of one's own assign-
ments of subjects to categories with the editors, or (2) one
could include all the categories in one's survey report.
This study adopts the latter course. The reasons are two-
fold: (1) accuracy is better served since readers are
enabled to challenge assignments of subjects to categories
more easily and (2) resources of time and money are con-
served.

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of 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy'.

    d.    Subjects with members which were members of both 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.

3.    Each subject whose cross tabulation with 'social philosophy' or 'ethics' contained at least one member was then assigned to one of the six categories: proper names, nationalities, historical periods, major fields of philosophy, subdivisions of the major fields of philosophy, and other specific topics.

4.    The results were then summarized for this report.[39]

Review of purpose and some cautionary comments. The immediate purpose of this survey report on the cross-listing of articles in The Philosopher's Index is to provide data from the actual practice of philosophy concerning the list of subjects included in social philosophy and ethics. This data will then form a major source for later reflection on the proper extension to the meaning of 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'.

In light of this purpose and the nature of the materials being used as well as the method being employed, it is important to keep several points in mind as one considers the report. First, there is no attempt in this report to count the number of articles on a given subject which are cross-indexed under 'social philosophy' or

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[39]The report omits citing the lengthy list of subjects falling into category 2a above. These subjects have no direct bearing on this study since they are not listed as either 'social philosophy' or 'ethics'. Little, if anything, is lost by their omission.

'ethics'. Mere numerosity adds nothing to resolving member-
ship in a set or class. One instance of membership is as
good an argument as ten instances when one is trying to
show that membership does exist. Second, the mere report of
a subject as cross-indexed does not guarantee that the
subject, per se, is proper to social philosophy or to
ethics. It could be the case that some aspect of the
subject or the particular treatment of the subject is proper
to social philosophy or ethics but that the subject in it-
self is not.[40]

Remembering these points will do much to keep this sur-
vey report in its proper perspective. Mere survey is in-
sufficient to resolve the issues raised in this thesis.
Although empirical methods are employed, neither sociology
or lexicography are sufficient to answer the questions.
Philosophy is needed.

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[40]The careful reader of the methodology outlined on
pages 31 to 33 above, might be concerned about a third
possible caution. A given article can be categorized under
multiple specific topics and multiple branches of philos-
ophy. For such cases, there is no guide as to which
specific topics the editors view as belonging to which
branches of philosophy. Since this report does not include
cross tabulation branches of philosophy, one might be in
error if one assumed that the specific topics listed as
either 'social philosophy' or 'ethics' truly belonged to
those branches of philosophy and not some other branches,
e.g., logic, metaphysics.
    Realizing this possibility, this researcher checked
such cross tabulation and found the possibility operative
in so few cases as to make a more elaborate reporting system
unnecessary. The margin of error is too small to be of
concern.

The survey report. Having considered the source of the
data and the methods used to obtain this report, one may
consider the report itself.

Proper names x social philosophy.[41]  Those subjects
which are proper names, some of whose members in The Philos-
opher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the
subject 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:[42]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Avineri, S. | Horowitz, I. | Mills, C. |
| Bourne, R. | Kolmogaroff | Myrdal, G. |
| Camus | Lewin, K. | Rahner |
| Chaadaer, P. | Lorenz, K. | Russell |
| Comte | Mannheim, K. | Schutz, A. |
| Confucius | Mao | Vandevate |
| Engels | Marcuse | Wasserman, R. |
| Freud | Maritain | Whitehead |
| Herzen | McLuhan, M. | Yao, W. |

Proper names x ethics. Those subjects, which are
proper names, some of whose members in The Philosopher's
Index of 1967, 1968 and 1969 are also members of the
subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, G. | Berlin, I. | Castaneda, H. |
| Aquinas | Behthan | Cernuserskij, N. |
| Austin | Bradley | Chisholm |
| Baier, K. | Brandt, R. | Chomsky, N. |
| Baumrin, B. | Bretano | Cicero |
| Benedict, R. | Buber | Cohen, B. |
| Bennett, J. | Butler, J. | Cohen, M. |
| Bergson | Campbell, K. | Cooley, C. |
| Bergstrom | Cargill, J. | Cooper, D. |
| Berkeley | Carnes, J. | D'Arey |

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[41]Proper names are listed in this report just as they
are found in The Philosopher's Index.  Some have initials,
some do not.

[42]In this and all following listings the introductory
formula state, "some of whose members. . ."  This was chosen
because it best expresses the data.  'Some' includes not
only the case in which several but not all members are
cross-indexed but also the cases in which only one member
or in which all members are cross-indexed.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Demos | Locke, D. | Searle, J. |
| Dennis, M. | Lonergan | Selsam, H. |
| Descartes | Lyons, D. | Shakespeare |
| Devlin, P. | MacCallum | Shwayder |
| Dostoyevski | Mahan, A. | Siegler, F. |
| Downie, R. | Marcias, P. | Singer, M. |
| Emersion | Marrodes, G. | Skemp |
| Feibleman, J. | Mayo, B. | Sleeper, R. |
| Flew, A. | McCloskey, H. | Smart, J. |
| Foot, P. | Meldon | Smith, A. |
| Frankena, W. | Mill | Socrates |
| Gandhi | Milo, R. | Stevenson, C. |
| Gewirth, A. | Moore | Strauss, L. |
| Gibbard, A. | Murphy, A. | Strawson |
| Glasgow, W. | Murphy, J. | Sumner, L. |
| Gosling, J. | Narveson, J. | Taylor, A. |
| Grant, C. | Nietzsche | Thalberg, I. |
| Grice | Nowell-Smith | Thomas, D. |
| Hare, P. | Oldenquist | Thomas, G. |
| Heed, V. | Paton, H. | Toulmin, S. |
| Heidegger | Peirce | Tullock, G. |
| Hodgson, D. | Pepper, S. | Von-Wright, G. |
| Hospers, J. | Phillips, D. | Warvender, H. |
| Hume | Plotinus | Watkins, J. |
| James | Polangi, M. | Weber |
| Kalin, J. | Rand, A. | Weil, S. |
| Kant | Rawls, J. | Westermarck, E. |
| Kelsen, H. | Rees, J. | Williamson, C. |
| Kenny, A. | Ross, W. | Wilson, H. |
| Kierkegaard | Runciman, W. | Winch, P. |
| Kolenda, K. | Sachs, D. | Wittgenstein |
| Kraus, O. | Saran, D. | Wolff, R. |
| Leibniz | Scheler | Wolff, V. |

Proper names x social philosophy x ethics. Those subjects,
which are proper names, some of whose members in The Philos-
opher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the
subject 'social philosophy' and the subject 'ethics' are:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Marcel, G. | Royce |
| Dewey | Marx | Sartre |
| Hart, H. | Plato | Spinoza |
| Lenin | Ress, J. | Sumner, W. |

Nationalities x social philosophy. Those subjects which are
nationalities, some of whose members in The Philosopher's
Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject

'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:

| American | German | Occidental |
| Chinese | Greek | Soviet |
| French | Italian | |

Nationalities x ethics. Those subjects which are nationalities some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

Arabic                  Indian

Nationalities x social philosophy x ethics. There are no subjects with members in all three of these sets.

Historical periods x social philosophy. Those subjects which are historical periods some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:

Enlightenment

Historical periods x ethics. There are no subjects with members in both these sets which are not also members of 'social philosophy'.

Historical periods x social philosophy x ethics. Those subjects which are historical periods some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' are:

Ancient                  Contemporary

Major fields of philosophy x social philosophy. Those subjects which are major fields of philosophy some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'social philosophy' but not of

'ethics' are:

history

Major fields of philosophy x ethics. Those subjects which
are major fields of philosophy some of whose members in The
Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of
the subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

Axiology                    Deontic-logic

Major fields x social philosophy x ethics. Those subjects
which are major fields of philosophy some of whose members
in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also
members of the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics'
are:

Aesthetics              Metaphysics
Epistemology            Political philosophy
Logic

Subdivisions of the major fields x social philosophy.
Those subjects which are subdivisions of the major fields
of philosophy some of whose members in The Philosopher's
Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject
'social philosophy' but not of 'ethics' are:

Mechanism           Phenomenology       Transactionalism
Nihilism            Socialism
Organicism          Structuralism

Subdivisions of the major fields x ethics. Those subjects
which are subdivisions of the major fields of philosophy
some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967,
1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'ethics' but not
of 'social philosophy' are:

Analysis          Intuitionism        Objectivism
Confucianism      Leninism            Pacificism
Consequentialism  Materialism         Pragmatism
Contractualism    Meta-ethics         Relativism
Emotivism         Naturalism          Social ethics
Empiricism        Normative ethics    Scholasticism
Hinduism          Neo-Platonism       Utilitarianism

Subdivisions of the major fields x social philosophy x

ethics.  Those subjects which are subdivisions of the

major fields of philosophy some of whose members in The

Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of

the subjects 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' are:

Determinism        Humanism            Marxism
Existentialism

Specific topics x social philosophy.  Those subjects which

are specific topics of philosophy some of whose members in

The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also

members of the subject 'social philosophy' but not of

'ethics' are:

Alienation         Heroes              Public Relations
Attitude(s)        Hierarchi(es)       Punctuality
Capitalism         Ideology            Race
Change             Individuality       Roles
Civilization(s)    Institutions        Silence
Communication      Landscapes          Social Sciences
Conation           Lawyer(s)           Speech
Cybernetics        Liberation          Technology
Demography         Negro(es)           Television
Dialectic          Obscenity           Theology
Dialogues          Philosophy          Time
Drama              Planning            Translation
Film               Pornography         Unity
Generation gap     Poverty             Utopia
Gerontophopia      Power               University
Goals              Production          Women
God                Proletariet         Youth
Hai-Jai            Psychedelics

Specific topics x ethics. Those subjects which are specific topics of philosophy some of whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, 1969 are also members of the subject 'ethics' but not of 'social philosophy' are:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Actions | Gratitude | Promising |
| Anthropology | Good | Protestantism |
| Beauty | Goodness | Prudence |
| Beliefs | Guilt | Psychology |
| Beneficiaries | Happiness | Punishment |
| Better | Hope | Reason |
| Birth control | Imperatives | Reasoning |
| Birth defects | Incorrigibility | Reasons |
| Blame | Israel | Redistribution |
| Can | Judgement(s) | Remorse |
| Categories | Justification(s) | Responsibility |
| Causation | Killing | Resentment |
| Censorship | Knowing | Retribution |
| Choice | Liberty | Revelation |
| Commitment | Love | Rules |
| Compulsion | Lying | Sanctions |
| Conscience | Machines | Sacrifices |
| Consequences | Man | Self |
| Contextualism | Marijuana | Self-interest |
| Contraception | Means | Selfishness |
| Contract(s) | Methodology | Situation ethic |
| Courage | Moral judgements | Social change |
| Criticism | Morals | Statements |
| Decision(s) | Nations | Stealing |
| Definition | Natural law | Supererogation |
| Deontological | Nature | Syllogism |
| Description(s) | Necessity(ies) | Teleology(ical) |
| Distribution | Neurotics | Temperance |
| Duty | Norms | Thinking |
| Egoism | Objectivity | Thought |
| Ends | Ought | Trust |
| Euthanasia | Paradox(es) | Truthfulness |
| Evaluation | Passions | Uniqueness |
| Excuses | Peneology | Universalizability |
| Explanation | Personality | Universality |
| Fact(s) | Piety | Utterances |
| Fallacy | Pleasure | Virtues |
| Forgiveness | Predicate(s) | Voluntary |
| Free will | Predictability | Wants |
| Game Theory | Preference | War(s) |
| Genetics | Procreation | Wealth |

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Specific topics x social philosophy x ethics.  Those
subjects which are specific topics of philosophy some of
whose members in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968,
1969 are also members of the subjects 'social philosophy'
and 'ethics' are:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Agression | Equality | Progress |
| Art | Freedom | Religion |
| Biology | Friendship | Revolution |
| Catholicism | Islam | Rights |
| Christianity | Justice | Science |
| Cognitive(ion) | Knowledge | Sex |
| Communities | Language | Society |
| Culture(s) | Laws | Sociology |
| Democracy | Literature | Students |
| Desire(s) | Medicine | Values |
| Duties | Morality | Violence |
| Economics | Obligation(s) | Will |
| Education | Person(s) | |

Having listed the results of the cross-tabulation of
articles in The Philosopher's Index of 1967, 1968, and
1969, this study now moves on to describe some of the
possible theoretical positions concerning the scope of
social philosophy and ethics.

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# IV.  POSITIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS

Introduction.  This chapter is divided into three
parts.  The first part describes positions concerning the
scope of ethics.  The second part describes positions con-
cerning the scope of social philosophy.  The last part pairs
these various positions about the scope of ethics and social
philosophy, indicates the significant differences among the
various pairings for the categorization of specific philo-
sophical topics as either 'ethics' or 'social philosophy',
and examines the possibility of deciding the validity or
non-validity of the original hypothesis in the light of the
data reviewed thus far.

It should be noted that the basic approach to the
descriptions concerning the scope of ethics and the scope
of social philosophy is grounded in the traditional
theoretical-practical continuum for describing areas of
inquiry.  This continuum, which is often sub-divided into
categories by philosophers reflecting on their fields of
endeavor, is utilized in this categorized form.  More, rather
than fewer, sub-divisions of the theoretical-practical
continuum are used where possible since the descriptive
categories ennunciated in this chapter will be compared with

the categories of subjects actually published by philoso-
phers.  This use of more, rather than fewer categories, is
done in the belief that narrower, and thus more numerous,
categories are more likely to yield a category with no
membership than wider and less numerous categories.

Positions on the scope of ethics.  This is an
abbreviated treatment of the topic.  Most of the material
comes from sources which attempt either to describe the
nature and scope of ethics directly or to explain the
positions of others concerning the nature or scope of ethics.
No attempt is made to review all relevant literature.
Several works, significant for their concise or well
documented handling of the topic, are utilized extensively.

In format, schemata replace long explanatory passages
in several places.  Arguments for ascribing particular
positions to specific philosophers are usually omitted,
although references are supplied for those wishing to review
such arguments.

Many textbooks and anthologies on ethics open with an
explanation of the nature or scope of the subject.  One of
the basic distinctions drawn in many of these works is the
distinction between the philosophical consideration of moral
problems or issues and the causistic consideration of moral
problems or issues.  The latter, a study of specific
individual moral problems or decisions,[43] is generally

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[43]W. R. Sorley and R. M. Wenley, "Causistry," Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology, ed. James Mark Baldwin, I
(1925), p. 157.

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omitted from the scope of philosophical ethics:

> When a man reasons about his own concrete
> and particular problems, he is going beyond
> even practical science, he is then in the
> area of prudence. . .[44]

> Moral philosophers did not, of course,
> undertake to give detailed practical
> advice as to how you should behave on
> this or that occasion.  A philosopher is
> not a parish priest or Universal Aunt
> of Citizens' Advice Bureau.[45]

In such manner is this category of inquiry at the

extreme end of the practical side of the theoretical-

practical continuum of moral issues omitted from the realm

of philosophy.  Philosophy only begins with the area of

issues beyond the personal, concrete and particular.  Thus

the causistic category is not included in any of the

descriptions of positions concerning the scope of ethics.

Since it is not philosophy, it is not relevant to the ongoing

work of this study.

There are distinctions made within the realm of

philosophical ethics.  A primary one is the distinction

between philosophical reflection on moral principles, terms

or arguments and the philosophical resolution of moral

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[44]Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics (New York:  The Macmillan
Company, 1951), p. 17.

[45]P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell,
1957), p. 12.

problems.[46]   Different authors use different words to ex-

press this distinction.   This paper adopts the convention

of those who refer to the philosophical reflection on

moral principles, terms or arguments as theoretical ethics

and the philosophical resolution of moral problems as

special ethics.[47]

Another distinction, one within the realm of theo-

retical ethics, between 'metaethics' and 'morality' has

been enunciated and used by William K. Frankena in an

article, "Recent Conceptions of Morality."[48]   This

distinction may be elucidated by the opening paragraph

of the author's article:

> There has been an interesting shift of attention
> in recent moral philosophy.  For a long time the
> primary concern was with the analysis, definition,
> translation, or elucidation of first-order
> ethical terms and sentences.  Then the main
> debates were between intuitionist, naturalist,
> and emotivist or other anti-descriptivist
> analyses of such terms as "right" and "good."
> Lately, however, the concern has been more with
> the definition or elucidation of such second-
> order terms as "moral" and "non-moral" when these

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[46]See, for example, Gordon H. Clark and T. V. Smith
(eds.), Reading in Ethics (2nd ed.; New York:  F. S.
Crofts and Co., 1935), p. 7.  Thomas E. Hall, Ethics in
Theory and Practice (New York:  Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1956), p.     A. I. Melden, Ethical Theories (2nd ed.;
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:  Prentice Hall, Inc., 1955),
pp. 2-3.  Nowell-Smith, pp. 21-2.

[47]Bourke, p. 17.

[48]William K. Frankena, "Recent Conceptions of Moral-
ity," Morality and the Language of Conduct (eds.), Hector-
Nevi Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit:  Wayne State
University Press, 1963), p. 1.  Additional synonyms for
metaethics and morality are listed in Nielsen Kai,
"Problems of Ethics," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.)
Paul Edwards, III (1967), p. 118.

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> are applied, not to acts or kinds of acts, but
> to judgments, obligations, principles, reasons,
> and the like.  This shift has, of course, not
> been complete--the later interest was present
> previously and the earlier one still persists--
> but it has been and is taking place.  Contemporary
> moral philosophy may, therefore, be represented
> as primarily an attempt to understand what
> morality is, meaning by "morality" not the
> quality of conduct which is opposed to immorality
> but what Butler so nicely refers to as "the
> moral institution of life."  The current endeavor
> is not to promote certain moral goals or
> principles, or to clarify only such words as
> "right" and "ought," but rather to grasp the
> nature of morality itself, as compared with
> law, religion, or science.  In this endeavor
> both Continental and English-speaking philos-
> ophers are engaged, though to different degrees,
> in different ways, and with different equipment.[49]

Frankena distinguishes between ethical issues concerning

"first order terms" and those of "second order terms."  He

claims that the distinction has always been there.  His

attempt to describe recent work in ethics makes it

necessary to state the distinction clearly.

Since this distinction sub-divides theoretical ethics

into more theoretical and less theoretical categories, and

since this paper has already stated its intent to use more

rather than fewer subdivisions of theoretical-practical

ethics, Frankena's distinction is adopted and the ramifi-

cations of this distinction are considered in future pages.

Having noted the distinction between theoretical ethics

and special ethics, and the distinction between meta-ethics

and morality, one now sees the ethical field sub-divided in

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[49]Frankena, pp. 1-2.

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the following manner:

ALL ETHICAL ISSUES



Given this analysis of the field of ethical issues, one recognizes three areas as possibly proper to philosophical ethics: meta-ethics, morality, and special ethics. Logically these three areas would produce seven possible positions on the scope of ethics: (1) meta-ethics alone, (2) morality alone, (3) special ethics alone, (4) meta-ethics and morality, (5) meta-ethics and special ethics, (6) morality and special ethics, (7) meta-ethics and morality and moral problems.

As one reflects on those seven positions, one realizes that several of them could be eliminated immediately because

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they have no adherents.[50]  They may be logically possible
but they are never advanced by ethicians.  In practice, for
example, four positions are never advanced.  Any philosopher
who affirms a less theoretic area as proper to ethics,
always includes the more theoretic aspect also, e.g., those
including morality as proper to ethics will include meta-
ethics also.[51]  This limits the possible theories to three:
(1) meta-ethics alone, (2) meta-ethics and morality, (3)
meta-ethics and morality and moral problems.

Further reflection on the actual practice of ethicians
introduces a further limit on the number of positions con-
sidered.  Although there are philosophers who seem to con-
fine much of their discussion to meta-ethics, this limit may
be more a case of topical interest than a rule on the scope
of ethics.  In no place do any of them outlaw the discussion
of second order issues from ethics.  Indeed, if one looks to
Frankena's discussion of contemporary ethics, in "Recent
Conceptions of Morality," one sees that most of the philoso-
phers doing meta-ethics actually do discuss second order
issues also.[52]  Thus, one finds that in practice two major

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[50]Technically such elimination of positions belongs
in the next chapter.  Its inclusion here, however, saves
considerable work in both this part of the chapter and in
the later pairing of conceptions of the scope of ethics and
social philosophy.

[51]A check of ethical texts which include topics in
special ethics substantiates this.  See, for example, Bourke,
Hill and Philip Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to
Ethics, (3rd ed.; New York:  The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1959).

[52]Frankena, pp. 3-11.

postions concerning the scope of ethics may be advanced.

    I.   Those who confine ethics to discussions in meta-
        ethics and morality.

   II.   Those who see ethics as including discussions of
        special ethics as well as meta-ethics and
        morality.

In "Recent Conceptions of Morality," William K. Frankena introduces a further series of distinctions within this dichotomous model. These will be discussed presently, but first some additional explanation for the utilization of this article will be given.

As was stated earlier, one aim of the study is to introduce more rather than fewer possible subdivisions within the field of ethics. Frankena offers a series of sub-divisions. He uses the meta-ethics-morality distinction. He then offers a series of four subdivisions of morality. Given the aim of trying to consider many sub-divisions of the field of ethics, it follows that Frankena's subdivisions should be considered.

It is possible, however, that someone might question the inclusion of Frankena's sub-divisions of morality in light of the omission of the sub-divisions of meta-ethics provided by intuitionism, naturalism and emotivism. Surely, such a questioner might argue, these sub-divide meta-ethics as clearly as Frankena's four positions sub-divide morality. The inclusion of one set of sub-divisions implies that the other set should be included also.

To this one can only reply that the Frankena sub-
divisions are new and have not been subject to full exam-
ination by the philosophical community.  Perhaps some one
of them would be significant to the results of this study.
The sub-divisions of meta-ethics provided by intuitionism,
naturalism and emotivism are not so new.  They have been
subject to examination by the philosophical community and
it is generally agreed that all are forms of philosophical
ethics.  An intuitionist, for example, might claim an
emotivist is "wrongheaded" but he would not claim he is
not a philosopher.  Thus, while a consideration of each of
these sub-divisions of meta-ethics might lend an aura of
completeness to this study, it would have no practical
import on the results of this study.  The outcome is known
from the start:  all three are in the scope of ethics.

It may be the case that all four of Frankena's sub-
divisions are within the scope of ethics also.  In their
case, however, the sub-divisions have not been recognized and
examined for a long period of time.  As new, somewhat
unexamined sub-divisions, they deserve attention in a study
such as this.

In his analysis of the contemporary scene, Frankena
finds four positions concerning morality.[53]

Position A - which characterizes morality in terms

that are formal and individualistic.[54]

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[53]_Ibid._, p. 11.

[54]References to philosophers Frankena sees as holding
position A are found on pp. 2-5.  _Ibid._

Position B - which characterizes morality in terms

that are formal and social.[55]

Position C - which characterizes morality in terms

that are material and social.[56]

Position D - which characterizes morality in terms

that are material and individualistic.[57]

As can be seen from the above, these positions evolve from the stand taken concerning whether morality has (1) specific material content or only formal conditions, and, (2) individual or social aspect as inherent in morality.

If one adds these four positions to the two previously described, eight possibilities concerning ethics emerge.

| Position | A | B | C | D |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| II | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |

These eight positions may be described as follows:

1. - IA - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
       excludes special ethics. Within the
       theoretic realm, morality is seen as
       formal and individualistic.

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[55]References to philosophers Frankena sees as holding position B are found on pages 5-8. _Ibid_.

[56]References to philosophers Frankena sees as holding Position C are found on pages 8-11. _Ibid_.

[57]Frankena cites only one philosopher, A. C. Garnett, as subscribing to this position on pages 11-12. _Ibid_.

2. - IB - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
excludes special ethics.  Within the
theoretic realm, morality is seen as
formal and social.

3. - IC - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
excludes special ethics.  Within the
theoretic realm, morality is seen as
material and social.

4. - ID - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
excludes special ethics.  Within the
theoretic realm, morality is seen as
material and individualistic.

5. - IIA - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
special ethics issues.  Morality is seen
in formal and individualistic terms.

6. - IIB - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
special ethics issues.  Morality is seen
in formal and social terms.

7. - IIC - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
special ethics issues.  Morality is seen
as material and social.

8. - IID - Ethics includes theoretic issues and
special ethics issues.  Morality is seen
in material and individualistic terms.

Positions on the scope of social philosophy.  As
indicated in the introduction, discussion of the nature and
scope of social philosophy is not a common, current topic

in philosophical circles. Few conceptions concerning the scope of the subject are articulated either in journal articles or in the introductions to anthologies or texts. This section, is, therefore, less dependent on the remarks of others concerning the issue than was the previous section in ethics, and much of it is adduced from reflection on the work being done in social philosophy.

One can distinguish several areas of philosophy from social philosophy. For example, although The Journal of Social Philosophy[58] includes articles concerning the philosophy of the social sciences, this is an exception rather than the rule. Most books, journals and university courses distinguish philosophy of the social sciences from social philosophy.[59] Questions concerning the use of mathematics in the social sciences or the criteria for theoretic adequacy in the social sciences belong to the philosophy of the social sciences rather than social philosophy.[60]

A second area which is distinguished from social philosophy is the philosophy of history. Even a cursory

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[58]W. Creighton Peden (ed.), Journal of Social Philosophy, Augusta College, Augusta, Georgia.

[59]See, for example, David Bradbrooke, Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences: Sources in Philosophy, ed., Lewis White Beck (11 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science: Foundations of Philosophy Series, eds., Elizabeth Beardsley and Monroe Beardsley, (15 vols.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall International, Inc., 1966), Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1970).

[60]Ibid.

review of the philosophical corpus attests to the existence of an area, philosophy of history.[61] Despite this, the distinction between social philosophy and the philosophy of history is not always easily applied nor is it always observed. There is a definite problem when considering the works of many Marxists since they see the dynamics of history as the true explanation of society. Even among non-Marxists the problem sometimes arises. In 1951, for example, Pitirim Sorokin published Social Philosophies for an Age of Crisis.[62] This work actually explains philosophies of history rather than social philosophy. Yet one can argue that society is different from its record or story and thus that the philosophy of society or social philosophy is different from the philosophy of history.

Additional branches of philosophy can also be distinguished from social philosophy. One can say that a society's laws are different from the society itself. The principles and conduct of government are in some way(s) different from society and individual men are not synonymous with society. Thus one distinguishes philosophy of law, political philosophy and philosophy of man from social

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[61]Consider, for example, R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1861), Jacques Maritain, On The Philosophy of History, ed., Joseph W. Evan, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), Frederick Von Schlegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. James B. Robertson, (6th ed. rev.; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1848).

[62]Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis, (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951).

philosophy.

Even with these exclusions the scope of social philosophy remains very broad. Possible topics range from the nature of society, the possibility of collective responsibility, the specific nature of the relations between the individual and the community, through issues of poverty and censorship.

It is possible to conceive an analysis of these topics which parallels the first analysis of ethical topics explained in part one of this chapter. Such an analysis yields three groups: first order theoretical topics, such as the nature of society, the meaning of community or the characteristics of the collective; second order theoretical topics such as the specific nature of the relation between the individual and the community, the nature of inter-relating groups or the necessity or non-necessity of social roles; and specific problems such as poverty or censorship.[63] This analysis can yield seven possible positions concerning the scope of social philosophy: (1) first order theoretical issues alone, (2) second order theoretical issues alone, (3) social problems alone, (4) first and second order theoretical issues, (5) first order theoretical issues and social problems, (6) second order theoretical issues and social problems, and (7) first and second order theoretical

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[63]Again paralleling the realm of ethics, there are a whole series of specific problems, like those of ethical causistry, which do not belong to social philosophy at all. These are often treated in the social sciences or "practitioners manuals" for public administrators, counselors and so forth.

issues and social problems. For the present, all seven
positions will be utilized as the study moves on to the
pairing of theories on the scope of ethics with theories on
the scope of social philosophy.

Pairing and Ramifications. If one combines the
positions on the scope of ethics and social philosophy,
one obtains fifty-six pairs:

$E_1S_1$, $E_1S_2$, $E_1S_3$, $E_1S_4$, $E_1S_5$, $E_1S_6$, $E_1S_7$,

$E_2S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_2S_7$,

$E_3S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_3S_7$,

$E_4S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_4S_7$,

$E_5S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_5S_7$,

$E_6S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_6S_7$,

$E_7S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_7S_7$,

$E_8S_1$, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $E_8S_8$,

Each of these fifty-six pairs could be described and the
ramifications for categorization indicated. This would,
however, form an extensive section and such quantity is not
necessary. Some of these pairs have common characteristics
as to how they affect categorization. By first grouping
the pairs by common characteristics and describing the
ramifications of these groups for categorization, it is
possible to judge the adequacy of whole groups of positions.
Since this judgement process, which is part of Chapter Five
in this study, will lead to the elimination of certain groups
of positions, it reduces the number of pairs which actually
need to be described. Hence in a move to eliminate super-

fluities, this study now groups the fifty-six pairs listed above by common characteristics and indicates what each group would include and exclude from its topical domain.

In trying to group the pairs from $E_1S_1$ . . . $E_8S_7$ the first division is that of $E_1S_1$ . . . $E_4S_7$ from $E_5S_1$ . . . $E_8S_7$. Such a division separates all pairs which include only theoretical topics in ethics from those which include both theoretical topics and topics of special ethics.[64]

Next, one can divide each of these two main groups into three according to the distinctions in the scope granted to social philosophy. $S_1$, $S_2$, $S_4$ limit social philosophy to theoretical topics alone. $S_5$, $S_6$, $S_7$ extends social philosophy to both theoretical topics and social problem topics. $S_3$ limits social philosophy to social problems alone. Thus six major groups can be formed from the fifty-six pairs.

I.  $E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$ - This group limits both social philosophy and ethics to theoretical topics. It excludes all problem topics.[65]

II.  $E_{1-4}S_{5,6,7}$ - This group extends both social philosophy and ethics to theoretic topics. It extends social philosophy to

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[64]Subdivisions in accord with the distinctions introduced from Frankena's article (Above, pp. 45-52) are postponed until Chapter Five in hopes that some of these larger categories can be excluded first, thus shortening the task at hand.

[65]Henceforth in this study "problems" will be used to designate both the area of "special ethics" and "social problems."

problem topics but eliminates these from ethics.

III. $E_{1-4}S_3$ — This group extends ethics to theoretic topics but not problem topics. It eliminates theoretical topics from social philosophy but includes problem topics.

IV. $E_{5-8}S_{1,2,4}$ — This extends both social philosophy and ethics to theoretic topics. It extends ethics to problem topics but eliminates these from social philosophy.

V. $E_{5-8}S_{5,6,7}$ — This extends both social philosophy and ethics to both theoretic topics and problem topics.

VI. $E_{5-8}S_3$ — This extends social philosophy to problem topics but not theoretic topics. It extends ethics to both theoretic topics and problem topics.

The procedure specified in Chapter One calls for a judgement at this stage of the inquiry. Is the evidence considered thus far sufficient to decide the validity of the original hypothesis?[66] Clearly it is not for the following reasons:

1. The six groups $E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$ through $E_{5-8}S_3$ are not congruent in their extension. Thus there needs to

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[66]Above, p. 19.

be some adjudication among the groups to find out which is/are appropriate (or correct) before any can be brought to bear on validating the hypothesis.

2. The analysis completed is insufficient for validating the hypothesis since the character of the relation between social philosophy and ethics is not examined sufficiently. In those groups where both social philosophy and ethics extend to theoretical topics or both extend to problem topics, the analysis does not show whether the social philosophy and ethical topics form discrete or intersecting sets.

Thus, the character of the relation between social philosophy and ethics is not examined sufficiently. The original issue is not settled and the study of the question continues.

V.  THE ELIMINATION OF INADEQUATE POSITIONS CONCERNING
THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

Introduction.  Chapter four described possible positions con-
cerning the scope of social philosophy and ethics.  This
chapter aims to eliminate from this group all the positions
which can be shown to be inadequate because they exclude
from the domain of social philosophy or ethics topics which
are part of that domain.  The chapter is divided into two
major parts:  (1) the elimination of positions because they
are inadequate in their ethical scope and, (2) the elimin-
ation of positions because they are inadequate in their
social philosophy scope.

Much of the argumentation in this chapter is concerned
with showing that philosophical work can be done in some
area excluded by a given position on the scope of social
philosophy and ethics.  Frequently this is shown by demon-
strating that philosophical work is done in the given area.
Even one case of philosophical work being done in the area
is sufficient to show that philosophical work can be done in
that area.

This sort of argument immediately raises the question
of how one shows that a piece of intellectual work is
philosophical.  What distinguishes philosophy from non-
philosophy?

Basic to all the work which ensues is the conviction that the members of a given discipline are the best judges as to whether a work belongs to their discipline or not. Physicists, for example, should be able to identify a work of physics. Chemists should be able to judge works purporting to be chemistry and philosophers should be able to judge philosophy.

Such judgements are usually made through the careful consideration of the work in question. The physicist need not be able to define physics, nor articulate the necessary or sufficient conditions of physics, but he must be able to identify a work of physics. Such recognition is basic to his training in his discipline. Articulation of particular characteristics only begins when there is disagreement among members of a discipline as to whether or not a given piece is really of the discipline.

The case of philosophy is, however, more complicated. Philosophy, more than any other academic area, save perhaps psychology, is filled with controversy as to what counts as philosophy. Ask any philosopher to define philosophy, to articulate necessary or sufficient conditions of philosophical work and the person is bound to say something which, if applied as criteria for philosophy, would eliminate some of what a sizeable portion of the philosophical community

would call philosophy.[67]

Faced by this difficulty and faced by the need to show specific works as philosophical this writer has not set out a formal definition of philosophy to be accepted by all philosophers. She has searched, instead, for examples of works from each category under consideration which she believes any philosopher would recognize as philosophical. She cites long passages from each work so that the reader has sufficient material on which to base a judgement. For each category considered she offers several works for examination, convinced that even if the reader should object to one work at least one of the others would be acknowledged as philosophical.[68]

Some readers may wish an enunciation of the crucial characteristics embodied by these examples of philosophy. It will be noted that all embody reasoning about generalized issues, issues which are not purely personal, concrete and particular. This reasoning about such issues also includes

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[67]This situation is engendered both because various schools of philosophy by their very philosophical positions may eliminate other schools of philosophy from the domain of philosophy and because of the difficulty of finding common characteristics to works as varied as that of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Austin's How to Do Things With Words, Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, Dewey's Individualism Old and New, Kierkegaards's Works of Love, Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery and Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

[68]As noted previously, the acknowledgement of one instance of a philosophical work in a given category is sufficient to show the possibility of doing philosophical work in that category. A reader would have to object to all the works presented in order to negate the point being made.

logical analysis or logical argumentation and often includes the vocabulary or particular moves associated with a specific school of philosophy.

It is the contention of this writer that any work embodying all the above mentioned characteristics to a high degree would be a paradigm case of philosophy,[69] while works containing none of these characteristics would be classified as non-philosophy. She further contends that (1) if a work were to include all the characteristics except that of generalized issues it would not be considered a work of technical philosophy and (2) if a work were about a generalized issue but contained none of the other characteristics it would not be considered a work of technical philosophy. The term 'philosophy' may be predicated of such work in some analogous manner but it could not be predicated univocally. Such works may be serious and reflective but they do not belong to the technical field of academic inquiry of philosophy.[70]

Having made these remarks about one of the main forms of argument in this chapter, the paper moves on to the main work of the chapter.

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[69]There is no expectation that this contention would receive support by all philosophers.

[70]This paper introduces the term 'technical philosophy' at this point to designate all work, whether concerned with theoretical or problematical issues, which belongs to the "technical field of academic inquiry of philosophy." The term is meant to designate what philosophers normally call 'philosophy'. It is introduced to aid clarity; to separate serious, reflective but essentially non-philosophical works from those which are properly philosophical.

Elimination of positions inadequate in their ethical scope.
This first section of the chapter eliminates all those
positions concerning the scope of social philosophy and
ethics[71] which are inadequate because they fail to reflect
the actual scope of ethics.  The discussion proceeds in the
following manner:  first, there is argument for the elimin-
ation of Group I ($E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$), Group II ($E_{1-4}S_{5,6,7}$) and
Group III ($E_{1-4}S_3$).  Then the four positions introduced by
Frankena's distinctions are considered and it is argued that
they should be eliminated also.  Finally, there is a state-
ment of which positions remain for further consideration.
Groups I, II, III.  A key characteristic common to each of
these groups is their limitation of the scope of ethics to
theoretical topics alone; their not extending ethics to
problem topics.

Even a cursory glance at the list of topics cross-
indexed with ethics from 1967 through 1969 in The Philoso-
pher's Index reveals many ethical problem issues.  There are,
for example, birth control, birth defects, censorship,
euthanasia, genetics, killing, lying, machines, marijuana,
procreation, sanctions, stealing, war(s) and wealth.[72]  If
it can be shown that these topics are truly proper to ethics
and not just adventitious inclusions, then positions
$E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$, $E_{1-4}S_{5,6,7}$ and $E_{1-4}S_3$ will be shown inadequate
representations of the actual scope of the subject.

[71]See:  Above pp. 57-58.

[72]See:  Above p. 40.

This researcher believes one can justify such problem topics as being proper to the scope of ethics (1) by reason of the content and styles of the discussions, (2) by reason of tradition and, (3) by reason of the legitimization of such topics by the "authoritative reference group,"[73]:

1. The content and style of articles written about problem issues are both philosophical and ethical. First, fifteen of the sixteen articles listed under the fourteen topics cited above are properly and not just peripherally concerned with the topic in

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[73]Authoritative reference group is a term used by Stephen Toulmin in General Introduction and Part 1, The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts, Vol. I: Human Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). It will be discussed more fully later in the text of this paper.

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question.[74] Only "Men, Machines, Materialism and Morality," by Peter T. Manicas appears more concerned with other issues than 'machines'. Second, of the fifteen articles directly concerned with the topic under which they are listed, many appear to be truly philosophical and not just serious, popular reflections. One might read Donald W.

[74]The sixteen articles by topic are: BIRTH CONTROL/ PROCREATION, Carl Cohen, "Sex, Birth Control, and Human Life," Ethics, LXXIX (July, 1969), pp. 251-62. J. F. Costanzo, "Papal Magesterium and Humanae Vitae," Thought, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 377-412. Joseph V. Dolan, "'Humanae Vitae' and Nature," Thought, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 358-76. Sabbas S. Kilian, "The Question of Authority in 'Humanae Vitae,'" Thought, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 327-42. John Giles Milhaven, "The Grounds of the Opposition to 'Humanae Vitae,'" Thought, XLIV (Fall, 1969), pp. 343-57; BIRTH DEFECTS, Leroy Augenstein, "Birth Defects, The Ethical Problem," The Humanist, XXVIII (Sept.-Oct., 1968), pp. 18-20; CENSORSHIP, Donald W. Crawford, "Can Disputes Over Censorship Be Resolved?," Ethics, LXXVIII (January, 1968), pp. 93-108. Salomon Rettig, "A Note on Censorship and the Changing Ethic of Sex," Ethics, LXXVIII (January, 1968), pp. 151-5; EUTHANASIA/KILLING, T. Goodrich, "The Morality of Killing," Philosophy, XLIV (April, 1969), pp. 127-39; GENETICS, Edward Manier, "Genetics and The Future of Man, Scientific and Ethical Possibilities," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XLII (1968), pp. 183-92; LYING, D. S. Mannison, "Lying and Lies," The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XLVII (August, 1969), pp. 132-44; MACHINES, Peter T. Manicas, "Men, Machines, Materialism and Morality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp. 238-46; MARIJUANA, Michael R. Aldrich, "The Pentheus Approach," The Humanist, XXVIII (Mar.-Apr., 1968), pp. 16-19; SANCTIONS, A. D. Woozley, "Legal Duties, Offences, and Sanctions," Mind, LXXVII (October, 1968), pp. 461-79; STEALING, P. T. Mackenzie, "The Analyticity of 'Stealing,'" Mind, LXVIII (October, 1969), pp. 611-15; WARS, Donald R. Burrill and F. Schiller, "F. C. S. Schiller's Supercelestial Politics," Personalist, L (Winter, 1969), pp. 5-32. Richard A. Wasserstrom, "Three Arguments Concerning the Morality of War," Journal of Philosophy, LXV (October, 1968), pp. 578-89; WEALTH, E. G. West, "Adam Smith's Philosophy of Riches," Philosophy, XLIV (April, 1969), pp. 101-15.

Crawford's "The Morality of Killing," D. S. Manni-

son's "Lying and Lies" and P. T. Mackenzie's "The

Analyticity of Stealing" for examples of the

philosophical enterprise, while Michael R. Aldrich's

"The Pentheus Approach" would be an example of

serious, but not technical, philosophical work.

Finally, one must note that most of these articles

are 'ethical', rather than 'metaphysical' or

'epistemological' writings.  The previously cited

articles by Crawford, Goodrich, Mannison and

Mackenzie provide examples for this.

2.  Although the parameters established for this study

exclude all but items listed in The Philosopher's

Index, 1967, 1968, 1969, it is worth noting here

that the inclusion of problem topics within the

scope of ethics is in accord with philosophical

tradition.  From the Greeks onward there have been

numerous ethicians whose writings have been con-

cerned with such issues.  So many examples exist in

the philosophical corpus that it is impossible to

cite them all.  However, the writings of Aristotle,

Immanuel Kant and Benedict Spinoza[75] might serve as

examples.

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[75]One might consider:  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, v. 1138$^a$-1138$^b$ and ix.; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Meta-physic of Morals, translated and analyzed, H. J. Patton (New York:  Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 67; and Benedict Spinoza, Ethic, trans. W. Hale White; trans. revised Amelia Hatchison Stirling (4th ed. rev.; London:  Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 248, XXVII-XXIX.

3. Finally, if anyone claims that the tradition has changed radically one can appeal to Stephen Toulmin's analysis of change within an academic community. In Volume I of <u>Human Understanding</u>, he mentions the role of an "authoritative reference group."

> All accredited members of a scientific profession may, in theory, be equal; but some turn out to be 'more equal' than others . . . there are the men whose word carries weight in the profession--the men whose judgements are accepted as authoritative by other workers in the field, and who come to speak 'for and in the name of' the science concerned.[76]

> Scientific professions, in short, are like all other social organizations. They have their 'reference groups,' comprising the men whose individual choices become-- in effect--the choices of the whole profession . . .

> A new concept, theory, or strategy, for example, becomes an effective 'possibility' in a scientific discipline, only when it is taken seriously by influential members of the relevant profession, and it becomes fully 'established,' only when it wins their positive endorsement.[77]

When one surveys the authors of articles on ethical problem topics from 1967 through 1969, one finds names such as Carl Cohen, P. T. Mackenzie, J. G. Milhaven, Richard A. Wasserstrom and A. D. Woozley.[78] Even granting the plural state of philosophy, it is probable that almost any

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[76]Toulmin, p. 264.

[77]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 265-6.

[78]See: Above, p. 66 footnote 74.

practitioner of philosophy would recognize some of these men as authoritative reference figures.

It should also be noted that these ethical problem articles appeared in journals such as Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Such periodicals are among philosophy's authoritative reference journals.

Given the above evidence from the content and style of articles, the tradition, and reference groups it is apparent that problem topics are part of the ethical enterprise.[79]

Of course there could be objections. Someone steeped in the positivistic tradition might object that although ethical problems are considered by philosophers, such considerations are simply wrong-headed. Problems should not be included in ethical studies; ethics should be limited to theoretical issues alone.

Such an objection deserves a reply and the reply which follows is grounded in the distinction between real and hortatory definitions.

A real definition is "one intended to explain the signification of a word or phrase as that word is used by authors other than the definer."[80] A hortatory definition is "one that recommends to its receivers that they adopt it

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[79]There is no intent to indicate that these three categories of evidence are all of equal weight. Surely the first two are more important than the last.

[80]Leonard, p. 614.

their productive discourse the indicated meaning for the definiendum."[81]

Those who have advocated that ethics be defined extensionally to include only theoretical topics have offered a hortatory definition to the philosophical community. It was a recommended change from the traditional notion of the extension of ethics. If this recommendation had been accepted by the philosophical community and ethicians had confined themselves to theoretical topics, this hortatory definition would have become a real definition for the scope of ethics. However, such has not happened. The recommendation of limiting ethics to the theoretical alone remains just that; a recommendation.

One working for a real definition of the scope of ethics must consider as paramount what actually is done within that branch of the philosophical enterprise. Since problem topics are being discussed with some frequency in ethics, despite the many years of recommendation that they are not a part of ethics, the definer who is concerned with a real definition has no recourse but to include these topics in the extension of his definition.

If,however, at some future date the practice of the community of ethicians changes and such problem topics are excluded from discussion, then the definition might change. At present, ethics does extend to such problem topics as well

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[81]Ibid., p. 611.

as theoretical topics and thus positions $E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$, $E_{1-4}S_{5,6,7}$ and $E_{1-4}S_3$, which exclude problem topics from ethics, are inadequate positions on the scope of social philosophy and ethics.

Having presented arguments for the elimination of $E_{1-4}S_{1,2,4}$, $E_{1-4}S_{5,6,7}$ and $E_{1-4}S_3$ and having dealt with likely objections, this paper continues its quest for an adequate position on the scope of social philosophy and ethics. Continuing with the procedure of considering the ethical aspects first, the study now takes up the four positions generated by the reflections of William Frankena in "Some Recent Conceptions of Morality."[82]

As explained on pages fifty through fifty-two above, the positions depend on whether morality is viewed as formal or material; individual or social:

$E_5S_{1-7}$ - views morality in formal and individualistic terms

$E_6S_{1-7}$ - views morality in formal and social terms

$E_7S_{1-7}$ - views morality in material and social terms

$E_8S_{1-7}$ - views morality in material and individualistic terms.[83]

The differences in these positions have ramifications for the scope of ethics. Each would define this scope differently. If morality is formal but not material then ethics extends to topics such as universalizability, moral

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[82]Frankena, pp. 1-24.

[83]See: Above p. 50, 51, 52 and 55.

principles, supererogation, formal conditions of morality and rule-likeness but ethics does not extend to discussion of the content, direction or goal of all morality. If morality is material but not formal, the latter topic is included but not the former ones. One holding that morality is individual might discuss self-interest and self-decision while those holding that morality is social would include trans-individual issues and omit the former ones.

These differences are easily illustrated by noting which of the following eight issues would be included or excluded from the scope of ethics by each position. The issues, taken from the pages of The Philosopher's Index are: beneficiaries, deontological, ends, rules, self-interest, situation ethic, supererogation and universalizability.[84]

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[84]See: Above p. 40.

| Position | Issues included in the scope of ethics | Issues excluded from the scope of ethics |
|----------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| $E_5S_{1-7}$ | deontological<br>rules<br>self-interest<br>supererogation | beneficiaries<br>ends<br>situation ethic |
| $E_6S_{1-7}$ | deontological<br>beneficiaries<br>rules<br>supererogation<br>universalizability | ends<br>self-interest<br>situation ethic |
| $E_7S_{1-7}$ | beneficiaries<br>ends<br>situation ethic | deontological<br>rules<br>self-interest<br>supererogation<br>universalizability |
| $E_8S_{1-7}$ | ends<br>self-interest<br>situation ethic | beneficiaries<br>deontological<br>rules<br>supererogation<br>universalizability |

Such a list makes it clear that the discovery of which position is correct is important to any study examining the scope of ethics. However, it must be stated that the resolution of this issue is impossible at this point in time. One simply cannot establish any one of these four positions as correct.

Frankena, himself, admits this when he states at the end of his article:

> Such are the objections to a material and social definition of morality in favor of a more formal or individualistic one. We have seen that something may be said in reply to them. However, the questions involved are large and complex, especially since they cannot be answered simply by looking to see how we

> use the expressions "moral" and "morality." They
> need to be clarified further and to be discussed
> more fully. At least three sharply opposed
> conceptions of morality are in the field;
> fundamental and far-reaching questions are at
> issue between them; and the relevant considerations
> capable of influencing the mind one way or the
> other are varied and weighty.[85]

Then too, a review of the topics cross-indexed with ethics

in The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968, and 1969[86] shows

all eight of the topics being discussed by philosophers.

If any one of the positions correctly described the scope

of ethics, some of those topics simply would not appear in

the ethical corpus.

Thus one can only conclude that (1) although a demon-

strated correctness for one of the positions would affect

the defined scope of ethics (2) none can be established as

correct at present. (3) The only recourse is to ignore the

distinctions and accept an extensional definition which

includes all the topics in question. From this point on

this paper will drop these distinctions in positions.[87]

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[85]Frankena, p. 21

[86]See: Above, p. 40.

[87]One might possibly question the very introduction of these positions since they prove to be irrelevant to the eventual solution of the problem. (One is reminded of Quine's "don't cares.") After all other possible distinctions in positions, e.g., cognitivist, non-cognitivist, were not introduced. The reasons why Frankena's four positions were introduced are two: (1) the positions could have made a difference in defining the scope of ethics if any were shown to be correct and (2) Frankena's analysis is rather new. Unlike cognitivist, non-cognitivist distinctions it has not been around long enough for everyone to be aware that the issues cannot be settled. Thus it seemed that good scholarship demanded a consideration of Frankena's analysis even though some of the older distinctions would be omitted.

$E_5$ will now be used to symbolize the sole remaining position concerning the scope of ethics. Ethics extends to both theoretical and problem topics. On the theoretical level it includes all the topics each of the four positions discussed above would include in the scope of this branch of philosophy.

Elimination of positions inadequate in their social philosophy scope. Three groups of positions remain for our consideration:

$E_5S_{1,2,4}$ - which extends both social philosophy and ethics to theoretical topics. It extends ethics to problem topics but eliminates these from social philosophy.

$E_5S_{5,6,7}$ - which extends both social philosophy and ethics to both theoretical topics and problem topics.

$E_5S_3$ - which extends social philosophy to problem topics but not theoretical topics. It extends ethics to both theoretical topics and problem topics.[88]

This last position, $E_5S_3$, will be shown to be inadequate. Its inadequacy stems from its exclusion of theoretical topics from the domain of social philosophy. Such exclusion is contrary to actual philosophical practice.

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[88]See: Above, p. 58.

The elimination of $E_5S_3$. As one reads the list of specific topics which have articles cross-indexed under social philosophy in The Philosopher's Index, at least nine specific topics appear to be theoretical topics rather than social problem topics:  alienation, change, connation, dialectic, individuality, institutions, roles, translation and unity.[89]

Admittedly some of the articles listed under these nine specific topics and under social philosophy deal with either category only peripherally.[90]  Also some of the articles appear as serious, popular articles rather than ones which are philosophical.[91]  Yet, to actually establish that social philosophy does extend to the theoretical, one need only establish that there is at least one theoretical topic within the scope of that branch of philosophy.  It will be shown here that both 'alienation' and 'individuality' are such topics.  Each has articles listed under them which:

1. deal directly, rather than peripherally, with the topic and field in question,

2. have technically philosophical rather than serious, popular approaches to the topic,

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[89]See:  Above p. 39.

[90]For example, Joseph C. Flay, "Alienation and the Status Quo," Man and World, II (May, 1969), pp. 248-62 is listed under both 'alienation' and 'change'.  The article is predominately about 'alienation' and peripherally about 'change'.

[91]Some might wish to advance such an argument, for example, about Sidney Hook and Harold Taylor, "The Crisis of Our Democratic Institutions," The Humanist, XXIX (July-August, 1969), pp. 6-7.

3.  contain theoretical rather than social problem

treatments of the issues.

The method, adopted here to show this, consists in a brief consideration of and exposition of each article indexed under alienation or individuality and social philosophy.  Because it is not possible to appeal to some canon to prove directness or philosophical, theoretical approaches, each article is quoted rather extensively to make it possible for the reader to make his own judgement of agreement or non-agreement with this researcher's claims that these articles show the presence of theoretical topics in the domain of social philosophy.  Finally, there is some notation of how these articles conform to the character- istics of technical philosophy outlined in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter.

Alienation.  There are six articles listed under both alienation and social philosophy in the 1967, 1968 and 1969 editions of The Philosopher's Index.  These are:  Gerald A. Cohen's "Bourgeois and Proletarians," Joseph C. Flay's "Alienation and the Status Quo," D. C. Hodges' "The Young Marx, A Reappraisal," Irving L. Horowitz's "On Alienation and the Social Order," Bernard Marchland's "Some Comments

on Alienation," and Carl D. Schneider's "Utopia and History."[92]

Two of these articles will not be considered in detail because it could possibly be claimed that alienation is not their primary subject.[93] The omitted articles are Carl D. Schneider's "Utopia and History" and D. C. Hodges' "The Young Marx, A Reappraisal." The former is a study of Marcuse's thought and the concept of alienation fills only the first few pages. The latter article deals with alienation but other issues are of import also. The author, D. C. Hodges, states:

> Especially noteworthy among recent would-be scholars of Marxism is the absence of an awareness both of the historical significance of what they are doing and of any distinction between the historical Marx and their humanistic image of him. First of all, I am distressed by the efforts of commentators to reconstruct the historical Marx without considering the social conditions and biases of their own attempts at reconstruction. And, secondly, I am increasingly irritated by recent philosophical attempts to make

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[92]Gerald A. Cohen, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," Journal of the History of Ideas, XXVII (Apr.-June, 1968), pp. 211-30; Joseph C. Flay, "Alienation and the Status Quo," Man and World, II (May, 1969), pp. 248-62; D. C. Hodges, "The Young Marx, A Reappraisal," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp. 216-29; Irving Louis Horowitz, "On Alienation and the Social Order," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (December, 1966), pp. 230-7; Bernard Murchland, "Some Comments on Alienation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX (March, 1969), pp. 432-8; Carl D. Schneider, "Utopia and History," Philosophy Today, XII (Winter, 1968), pp. 236-45.

[93]Such a claim may or may not be justified. Some explanation of why it could be advanced is given in the text. Rather than argue the claim, the articles are omitted from full discussion. They are not necessary to make the point in question. The other four articles provide sufficient evidence.

his early humanism, if we are to call it that,
respectable in the light of ethical culture and the
mental health movement.  In any case, the rash of
recent literature on Marx's views concerning
alienation is a challenge to the critic to set
matters straight.  Consequently, I should like,
first, to consider the historical significance of
current reinterpretations of Marxism in this
country and, second, to reconsider the alleged
humanism of the young Marx as presented in his
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.[94]

The other four articles, "Alienation and the Social

Order," "Some Comments on Alienation," "Alienation and

the Status Quo" and "Bourgeois and Proletarians," reflect

different ways of doing philosophy.  Horowitz in "Alien-

ation and the Social Order" deals with the concept of

alienation rather analytically.  Murchland, whose article is

a discussion of the one by Horowitz, engages in history of

philosophy and history of ideas.  Flay, having a profound

grasp of both Marcuse and Dewey,attempts to show the thought

of the former as a natural consequent to a key defect in the

thought of the latter in his "Alienation and the Status

Quo."  Cohen engages in a textual explanation and illumin-

ation of the alienation of bourgeois and proletarians as

expressed in a section of The Holy Family.  He does this

through other texts by Marx, works by commentators and other

Marxists, and Cohen's own analysis of the social situation.

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[94]Hodges, p. 217.

Each of these articles will not be considered in turn.[95]

"On Alienation and the Social Order" by Irving L. Horowitz, begins by the author stating, "Despite the incredible degree of confusion which exists about the term alienation--a confusion which has caused many influentials in sociology and psychology to try to do without it--there is danger in a premature scrapping of the term."[96] He locates the source of the confusion in "the philosophical ambiguities of nineteenth century German realism."[97]

This section is followed by an analysis of the use of the term in Hegel:

> The true meaning of alienation lay in the separation of the object of cognition from the man of consciousness, the philosopher. Hence, for Hegel the chief way of overcoming alienation is through philosophical understanding, an embrace of the rational world; as if to know the world is somehow to be at one with that world, to become identified with it. To be reasonable for Hegel is the same as being at peace. It was in this problem that the equation of reality with rationality was the resolution of the problem of philosophical alienation; just as the reduction of reason to reasonableness was the resolution of the problem of practical alienation.[98]

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[95]It should be noted that the fact that two of these articles have been accepted by the editors of such a prestigious philosophy journal as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research also serves as an indication that the articles are examples of technical philosophy.

[96]Horowitz, p. 230.

[97]Ibid.

[98]Ibid.

in Feuerbach,

> alienation comes to be seen as an anthropological
> problem. The word "anthropology" was being used
> as a surrogate for "psychology," since Feuerbach
> neither knew of nor really appreciated anthro-
> pology in any exact, empirical sense. Feuerbach
> considered the problem of alienation as a
> separation out, a parceling out, of human
> consciousness--one part of man is invested
> (properly) in the material world, and another
> to the world of God; the projective ideal
> world. In effect the dualism in Feuerbach
> is almost Platonic. The material world being
> dreary and dismal gives rise to a set of
> projections about a spiritual world of
> perfection. As long as these two worlds remain
> separated there cannot be any resolution of the
> problem of alienation.[99]

and in Marx:

> (1:5) At its source the word "alienation"
> implies an intense separation first from
> objects in a world, second from other people,
> third from ideas about the world held by other
> people. It might be said that the synonym of
> alienation is separation, while the precise
> antonym of the word alienation is integration.[100]

He then juxtaposes the three positions, notes their

differences and ends the section by stating:

> The really important break therefore which
> began with Marx is that in the modern usage of
> the concept of alienation, there is a
> distinctive concern for distinguishing therapy
> from description, and separating recommendations
> from analysis. There is in the dialectical
> approach a common belief that alienation is no
> better and no worse than integration, that
> either concept might serve positive social ends.
> Alienation is a driveshaft of revolution; and
> integration is a transitional equilibrium
> generating new forms of separation from the
> mainstream, i.e., new forms of alienation.[101]

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[99]_Ibid._, p. 231.

[100]_Ibid._, p. 231.

[101]_Ibid._, p. 232.

Part two of this article contains an examination of "three
fundamental categories of the concept of alienation. . ."
The psychological meanings, the sociological and "the third
general variety of alienation theory. . ." based on consider-
ing it as part of a general cultural milieu.[102]

This examination reveals for Horowitz that the problem
area has shifted. "The problem is no longer a fusion of
psychological or sociological cultural techniques. The
study of alienation is now confronted with a distinction
between two modalities of analyses, one formal and the other
descriptive."[103] Wondering if this might simply be a
reflection of the analytic synthetic mode debate within the
social sciences,[104] Horowitz ends his article by appealing
to philosophers for help:

> The task of philosophy in this area might be
> a clarifying one, to show how various usages
> of alienation are either synonymous, over-
> lapping, or entirely different from one another.
> The philosopher might develop some kind of
> logical or periodic table of alienation. I
> am given to understand that this is what
> modern philosophy of science is all about.[105]

"Some Comments On Alienation" by Bernard Murchland is a
discussion of Horowitz's article and so it will be discussed
immediately. Murchland begins by stating:

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[102]Ibid., pp. 232, 235.

[103]Ibid., p. 236.

[104]Ibid., p. 237.

[105]Ibid.

> Professor Horowitz is quite right about
> the confusion in our contemporary uses of the
> term alienation. (ON ALIENATION AND THE SOCIAL
> ORDER, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
> December, 1966.) The concept has loomed large
> in our intellectual baggage for some hundred
> years now; but we still lack an adequate vocabu-
> lary and conceptual framework by means of which
> its meaning might be clarified and the problems
> attendant upon it resolved in some satisfactory
> manner. By way of seconding Professor Horowitz's
> efforts and furthering the discussion I should
> like to offer the following comments.[106]

There then follows several statements of agreement and dis-
agreement with Professor Horowitz's positions:

1. Murchland is puzzled "by the reference to German
   realism" since the "idealists . . . first formu-
   lated the problem."[107]

2. Although he agrees that "alienation was given
   explicit attention for the first time in the 19th
   century" and "our present difficulties with the
   term were 'nascent within German philosophical
   sources,'" Murchland wants these "sources be
   construed in a sufficiently broad historical
   context."[108]

There then follows a historical sketch and historical
argument concerning the concept of alienation. Murchland
locates the origin of alienation in the transition from late
Middle Ages to Renaissance with its rise of "atomistic

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[106]Murchland, p. 432.

[107]Ibid.

[108]Ibid., p. 433.

nominalism and the subsequent pulverization of being."[109]

The author then moves through the thought of the Renaissance

and comes to Descartes the first articulator of "the

dynamics of alienation."

He (Descartes),

rather than Hegel first articulated the dynamics
of alienation. He is, so to speak, the spokes-
man for an era that is literally world-less.
It was quite natural for him to found his
system on the isolated reality of the extra-
mundane Ego. It was the only fragment of the
world available to him. Nor does it come as
any surprise that he never successfully
extricated himself from the confines of the
Ego. There was no place to go. If we read
Descartes as a philosophical expression of an
alienated world the cluster of problems he
bequeathed us make more sense. They remain
insoluble but they make more sense. Thus
Karsten Harries rightly remarks that what is
at stake in Descartes' philosophy is "the
ontological status of the world itself."
Methodical doubt is the birthmark of the
burdened self. Erwin Strauss has also given
us a useful analysis of Descartes as a
philosopher of alienation. Since Descartes,
he notes, the soul (mind, spirit) and nature
have nothing to do with one another. Sensations
do not tell us anything directly about the
outside world. They have become, so to speak,
sealed in wax. Nature belongs exclusively to
res extensa - to be understood mathematically,
abstractly and inferentially. Consciousness is
discontinuous with the rest of reality. The
world is no longer experienced as given nor the
body as revelatory of meaning. This, in
starkest outline, is the problem we have been
wrestling with ever since.[110]

Murchland then states his own position on the meaning of

the concept.

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[109] _Ibid._, p. 434.

[110] _Ibid._, pp. 436-7.

The foregoing justifies Professor Horowitz's remark that "the synonym of alienation is separation." An alienated world is indeed a world in which the parts are separated out - whether this be the personal, social or scientific world. But it should be further noted that what essentially constitutes alienation is not separation as such but the Humpty Dumpty predicament of not being able to put the parts back together or bring them into meaningful relationship. I prefer Professor Heinemann's characterization of alienation as the "fallacy of isolation," principally the isolation of consciousness from the external world and the assumption that the principles of discursive reason and life at large are antithetical. Hegel tried to mediate the various dualities inherited from Descartes' system. His effort was both noteworthy and praiseworthy; he might have succeeded had he not succumbed to similar faulty assumptions. As has been well said: "It is essentially impossible to derive the realm of real existence from the reduced realm of consciousness." Nor do I think the existentialists, in their many valiant attempts, have resolved the problem. The bulk of contemporary literature on the theme would seem to indicate that alienation is still very much at the center of our pre-occupations.[111]

Finally, Murchland adds his hope for the future. "But I should hope, contra Horowitz, that the philosopher's contribution to clarification will be more than 'some kind of logical or periodic table of alienation.' The philosopher's task is to show man how to gain an integral world."[112] The author ends by noting the sketchiness of his comments and noting the need for further work.

The third article to be considered is "Alienation and the Status Quo" by Joseph C. Flay. Of the work Flay states:

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[111]Ibid., p. 437.

[112]Ibid.

> I have attempted to evoke the paradox
> presented to political philosophy by Marcuse's
> plea for the great refusal and the reasoning
> behind it. I have shown that the theory of
> John Dewey, a theory eminently qualified to
> represent technological thought, contained
> the point of negativity which has led us to a
> Marcusean analysis. This paradox would seem to
> present us with a vacuum into which no positive
> power can enter unless a totally new mode of
> rationality develops which is not subject to
> the hegemony of technological rationality. Yet,
> tradition bound as we are, and permeated as is
> public education by technological rationality,
> no clue to a social and political solution seems
> present. Our very language causes us to fall
> again and again into old modes of thought--
> modes already taken up by the logic of technology
> and rendered harmless. At best, perhaps, we can
> see the dialectical emergence of what must truly
> be called nihilism: the great refusal. And the
> great refusal is also, perhaps, the great irony:
> it has now been noted and filed away.[113]

In this attempt Flay begins with an exposition of

Marcuse's concept of one-dimensionality and then states that

it

> has far-reaching consequences. For in effect it
> states that not only is evolutionary change
> highly improbable (if not impossible), but
> revolutionary change as well. Marcuse leaves
> us with nothing but hope in the form of "the
> great refusal," a refusal which contains within
> itself nothing constructive since whatever can be
> counted as constructive is already controlled by
> the logic of the status quo.[114]

Flay claims that Marcuse's view is both a break with and

rooted in modern western tradition. He claims that "modern

technological society has had its own philosophers" and that

John Dewey was not only among the more articulate, but also

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[113]Flay, p. 261.

[114]Ibid., p. 249.

offered a hope and a machinery to prevent one-dimension-
ality.[115]

Flay then notes Dewey's "method of intelligence" which
was to have been the machinery to prevent one dimensionality.
He exposes a structural defect in this "method of intelli-
gence" which Flay claims that Dewey himself recognized and
did not seek to remedy.

> A spectre, recognized by Dewey himself,
> haunted his position almost from the beginning.
> It amounted to the realization that those in
> favor of or controlling the status quo will oppose
> anything which will mean a change in that status quo,
> at least in so far as it affects their position
> in the power hierarchy.  And this realization
> strikes at the heart of Dewey's own social
> and educational proposals. . .[116]

> Briefly, the process which will bring about
> changes is circular, and contains an inertial
> factor which limits its own implementation and
> effectiveness.  In order for society to change
> in its process of bringing about change the
> educational institutions must insert the method
> of intelligence into the mainstream of society.
> But the society itself enervates this process.
> The individuals who control the status quo are
> not against the method of intelligence as such,
> but are against certain of the conclusions which
> inevitably will be reached by this method.  These
> conclusions are perceived not as tentative
> hypotheses meant to be tested for their validity,
> but as revolutionary dogma destined to destroy
> the society.  The result is a vigorous and careful
> control of the educational institutions.[117]

It is this defect which has led to the Marcusean analysis,
to one-dimensionality and the great refusal.

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[115]Ibid.

[116]Ibid., p. 250.

[117]Ibid., p. 251.

The last article to be considered in this section dealing with articles on alienation is "Bourgeois and Proletarians" by Gerald A. Cohen. The author opens his article by stating:

> In The Holy Family Marx draws an important
> distinction between the alienation endured by
> the worker and the alienation endured by the
> capitalist in bourgeois society: The possessing
> classes and the class of the proletariat present
> pictures of the same human self-estrangement.
> But the former class feels at home in and
> confirmed by this self-estrangement, recognizes
> its estrangement as its special power, and
> enjoys in it the semblance of a human existence;
> the latter feels annihilated in its estrangement,
> and glimpses in it the reality of an inhuman
> existence. My first task is to explain what
> Marx means in this difficult passage, and why
> he thinks it is true.[118]

He then follows with seven pages of tightly written exposition which relies heavily on notions expressed in The German Ideology and Paris Manuscripts as well as other sections of The Holy Family. At the end of the section he summarizes, "the man who works for a living encounters the world both as agent and as patient, though in an alienated way; while the man who owns for a living is separated by what he owns from both active and passive contact with things outside him."[119]

In the rest of the paper Cohen explores "proletarian and bourgeois alienation in greater detail."[120]

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[118]Cohen, p. 211.

[119]Ibid., p. 217.

[120]Ibid.

Capital is the link between the worker
and the capitalist, since the former works at
a machine, which is a physical form of capital,
and the latter owns money, which is convertible
into capital. I shall discuss the worker's
alienation in his relation to the machine, and
the capitalist's in his relation to money, since
I wish to compare their situations, and capital
provides a convenient meeting-point for the
comparison. This means that I shall neglect
certain aspects of alienation, such as man's
distance from his fellow man, and his incapacity
for sensuous enjoyment of nature.[121]

He notes that "In treating the capitalist, I shall

try simply to expound Marx, since exposition of
his views on this subject is rarely offered. By
contrast, many discussions of the worker's
alienation are available. Indeed, often what
is presented as an account of man's alienation
is restricted to a consideration of the worker.[122]

The article is long. Its tight style makes excerpting

difficult but the author does provide a few summary state-

ments:

The contrast between bourgeois and proletarian
may now be restated. For Marx, human characteristics
are powers, and powers are interpreted as
capacities to produce. In bourgeois society
property is what is produced, so that to have
properties is to create property. The worker
does create property, in an alienated way;
therefore he has properties, of a deformed sort.
The capitalist, as mere Owner of property, has
no properties. He does not even have the property
he owns, for to have a thing is to be in intimate
active contact with it. The capitalist is more
distant from being truly human than the worker is.
He is not a creator and he is therefore not even
a real possessor: he is a sham possessor. The
worker is a degenerate creator, and this is
thought to be better.
Each is a man who is dominated by a thing,
namely capital, whose most immediate form for one

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[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid., pp. 217-8.

is the machine, for the other, money. In the body of the paper I have tried to show the objective differences between the two relations of domination.[123]

In the last section Cohen draws attention to the psychological aspects via the following chart.

Relation between Man and Thing

| (worker and machine-- i.e. capital | capitalist and money-- i.e. capital) |
|---|---|
| M dominates T | T dominates M |

| M's will conforms (1) | M's will does not conform | M's will conforms (4) | M's will does not conform |
|---|---|---|---|
| M's will is not contrary (2) | M's will is contrary (3) | M's will is not contrary (5) | M's will is contrary (6) |

> The chart distinguishes six states of mind. I am using "will" in a very general sense, comprehending any mode of desire or volition. My will conforms to my situation (1,4) if I enjoy what I am doing, if I feel fulfilled in it. If my will fails to conform (2, 3, 5, 6), this may be because I am opposed to what I am doing and I find it oppressive (3, 6) or because I merely acquiesce in my position, without investigating my self in it (2, 5).[124]

He then reviews the exposition of worker/capitalist in terms of this chart:

> Marx usually locates the worker under (6), portraying him as disposed to resent and react against his position. The worker never falls under (4): he never enjoys his alienated life. Some things Marx says about the worker warrant the application of (5). But (6) must be standard

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[123]Ibid., p. 227.

[124]Ibid.

for the worker: he can satisfy (5) only
temporarily, since otherwise his revolutionism
would disappear.

In the Holy Family passage, the capitalist
is allocated to category (4): he enjoys his
alienated life. I have found confirmation and
explanation of this in the Manuscripts, although
some of the texts I have used might be construed
so as to deposit the capitalist in category (5),
making him a dull and passive agent of his capital.
But no interpretation could make him satisfy (6).

What would satisfy the descriptions on the
left-hand side of the table? It seems that (1)
applies to the energetic capitalist presiding in
the early phases of bourgeois society. Such a
capitalist is as close as any can be to being
non-alienated.

Items (2) and (3) could represent resourceful
industrialists who, in different ways, get no
satisfaction out of their activity. . . A worker
who fell under (1) would be a genuinely non-
alienated man. There cannot be workers of types
(2) and (3), for this would violate the principle
that it is satisfying to live in accordance with
the definition of one's essence. Nevertheless
many contemporary alienation-hunters would be
prepared to find cases of (2) and (3), and would
declare that they instantiate alienation, since
psychological phenomena are now often treated as
sufficient for that designation. Again much of
what is now identified as alienation falls under
(4), another category containing no workers for
Marx. This is the worker as described by semi-
Marxist radicals who make concessions, like
those I referred to in II-1. C. Wright Mills'
"cheerful robot" probably belongs in this
category.[125]

The author ends by noting (1) that his article could be
considered a critical reply to D. C. Hodges article (2)
that certain criticisms could be made of his stance and (3)
that he believes he can answer such criticisms.[126]

What can one say of these four articles? They appear
to be philosophical discussions--and they are theoretical

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[125]Ibid., p. 228.

[126]Ibid., pp. 228-30.

in nature.

To anyone questioning their philosophical nature one might point out that each deals with a general topic, alienation, and that each exhibits several of the other characteristics identified with technical philosophy earlier in this study. One might note, for example, that:

1. The article by Horowitz is primarily analytical although it also contains a philosophical develop-ment of the concept of alienation. The work con-tains philosophical interpretation, "To be reasonable for Hegel is the same as being at peace"[127] and the use of philosophical termin-ology, "objects of cognition", "dualism" and "material world."[128] One of its key moves toward resolution is philosophical, "The study of alienation is now confronted with a distinction between two modalities of analyses, one formal and the other descriptive."[129]

2. Murchland's paper is both critical and creative. It is grounded in history of philosophy and also includes some analytic work. In addition to the use of philosophical terminology and texts, the author offers a significant philosophical inter-pretation of Descartes as the articulator of

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[127]See: p. 80 above.

[128]See: pp. 80-81 above.

[129]See: p. 82 above.

"the dynamics of alienation" and then offers argument to support this interpretation.[130]

Towards the end of the article Murchland states his preferred characterization of alienation and then marshals an indirect argument in support of this characterization.[131]

3.    Flay's article is different from either of the former since it contains little concept analysis. Reviewing the author's own summary of his paper makes evident that the work is a Marxist philosophical analysis of intellectual history:

> I have attempted to evoke the paradox presented to political philosophy by Marcuse's plea for the great refusal and the reasoning behind it. I have shown that the theory of John Dewey, a theory eminently qualified to represent technological thought, contained the point of negativity which has led us to a Marcusean analysis. This paradox would seem to present us with a vacuum into which no positive power can enter unless a totally new mode of rationality develops which is not subject to the hegemony of technological rationality. Yet, tradition bound as we are, and permeated as is public education by technological rationality, no clue to a social and political solution seems present. Our very language causes us to fall again and again into old modes of thought--modes already taken up by the logic of technology and rendered harmless. At best, perhaps, we can see the dialectical emergence of what must truly be called nihilism: the great refusal. And the great refusal is also, perhaps, the great irony: it has now been noted and filed away.[132]

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[130]See: p. 84 above.

[131]See: p. 84-5 above.

[132]Flay, p. 261.

Even without further reference to the text one

notes the use of philosophical terminology,

rational argument and the dialectical movement

native to Marxist philosophy.

4. The last paper, by Cohen, is an explication and

interpretation of text. The author also includes

some logical analysis as the chart on page ninety

above illustrates.

To anyone questioning the theoretical orientation of

these works one need only recommend a serious reading of

the articles. In each one alienation is approached

primarily as an idea to be grasped, a concept to be under-

stood and not as a problem to be solved. In no place does

the recommendation of courses of action or solution sets

become paramount. The topic as considered is theoretical.

In light of the above it appears that there is at

least one topic, alienation, in the theoretical category of

social philosophy.

Individuality. During the period of 1967-1969 of The

Philosopher's Index only one article listed under

'individuality' was also listed under 'social philosophy'.

This was "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness'"

by Daniel J. Shine.[133]

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[133]Daniel J. Shine, "The Analogy of Individuality and
'Togetherness,'" The Thomist, XXXIII (July, 1969),
pp. 497-518.

The author examines a perennial problem in social

philosophy:

> In the paragraphs which follow we wish to bring
> out this point, namely, that one must be,
> necessarily, both an individual and a member of
> community, but particularly we wish to expand the
> thought that neither individuality nor community
> is a univocal concept or reality. Rather, in man
> there are various levels of individuality.
> Likewise there are various levels of community.
> We have used the word "togetherness" as a
> generic term because, as will appear later,
> community, at least in our future use of the
> word, will be limited to a particular level of
> togetherness.[134]

He establishes his vocabulary:

> By these terms "noumenal" and "phenomenal
> ego" we wish to give a name to two aspects of
> man which, although they cannot be separated,
> yet must be distinguished. Man is spirit in
> matter, or if you will, spirit in the world.
> By the "noumenal ego" we mean man as spirit . . .
> By the term "phenomenal ego" we mean the same
> human soul which informs matter.
>     If man is a spirit (noumenal ego) and
> spirit in matter (phenomenal ego) on the
> substantial level, it will be necessary that
> these two aspects of man appear in his levels of
> activity.[135]

and follows this with a long analysis of man's intellect-

understanding; intellectual will-rational will.

Shine utilizes a scholastic framework but admits much

indebtedness to Karl Rahner, a Christian Heidiggerian, and

Gabriel Marcel, an existentialist, for both concepts and

terminology.[136]  Anyone even somewhat familiar with these

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[134]Shine, p. 497.

[135]Ibid., pp. 497-8.

[136]Ibid., p. 497.

traditions can surmise much of the content and style of the article by reading the subheadings used for the remainder of the article:

AN INDIVIDUAL - ANALOGY OF BEING-BEING AND THE ONE ARE CONVERTIBLE - ANALOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY

What is an individual?

Analogy of being.

Being and one are convertible.

Analogy of individuality.

THE GREATER THE INDIVIDUALITY, THE GREATER IS THE COMMUNICABILITY AND NEED FOR COMMUNICATION

The greater the transcendance of form over matter, the greater is the inferiority of the activity of the being.

The greater the inferiority of the activity of the being, the greater is the individuality of the being.

The greater the individuality of the being, the greater is the communicability and need for communication.

ANALOGY OF "TOGETHERNESS"

MAN-STRATIFIED UNITY OF INDIVIDUALITY AND "TOGETHER-NESS"

Analogy of Individuality in a man

Biological unity

Rational person

Intellectual person

Grace-given supernatural individuality

Analogy of "Togetherness" in a man

Analogy of natural "togetherness"

Civil community

Communion

Analogy of supernatural "togetherness"

The church as pneumatic society

The church as pneumatic cell[137]

The title of the article indicates a generalized issue, "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness.'" The sub-headings certainly indicate a theoretical discussion, an item which even the author notes near the end of the work. He states, "In the foregoing essay we have been almost exclusively concerned with principles and not with applications."[138] The sub-headings also indicate a paper employing many philosophical techniques and terminology utilized by at least one and in some instances many segments of the philosophical community. "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness'" by Daniel Shine is another example of a specific theoretical topic which can be explored within the domain of social philosophy.

Having shown through this long exposition of articles that theoretical topics are considered within social philosophy, it is obvious that position $E_5 S_3$, which excludes such topics from the domain of social philosophy, should be eliminated from further consideration in this study.

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[137]Ibid., pp. 500-6, 509-11, 513-6.

[138]Shine states, "In the foregoing essay we have been almost exclusively concerned with principles and not with applications." Ibid., p. 516.

There remains for our consideration $E_5S_{1,2,4}$ and $E_5S_{5,6,7}$. It will be shown that $E_5S_{1,2,4}$ is inadequate. It excludes problem topics from the scope of social philosophy.

The elimination of $E_5S_{1,2,4}$. As one reads the list of specific topics which have articles cross-indexed under social philosophy in The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968 and 1969, at least twenty-six appear to be social problem topics rather than theoretical topics. This number includes: communication, dialogue, demography, drama, generation gap, gerontophobia, goals, Hai-Jai, lawyer(s), negroes, obscenity, planning, pronography, poverty, production, psychedelics, public relations, punctuality, race, silence, speech technology, television, university, women and youth.[139]

As one begins to read the articles listed under these topics and social philosophy, one is struck by how many are examples of serious, popular thought rather than technical philosophy. A quick sampling could tempt one to believe that problem topics are not a part of technical social philosophy. A full study of the forty-three articles, however, reveals examples of technical philosophy. Social philosophy does include problem topics.

As in the previous section the method adopted to show the correctness of this judgement is an exposition of articles indexed under both specific problem topics and social philosophy. The topics chosen are 'communication',

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[139]See: Above, p. 39.

'dialogue' and 'technology'. 'Communication' has four

articles cross-indexed under 'social philosophy': "Culture,

Communication and Silence" by S. Ganguly,[140] "Violence,

Persons, Communication: A Transactional Model" by Samuel

Gomez,[141] "Person, Communication and Violence" by William

Sacksteder[142] and "The Analogy of Individuality and

'Togetherness'" by Daniel J. Shine.[143] 'Dialogue' has one

article cross-indexed under social philosophy, "On the

Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" by Andre Mercier of

Berne University.[144] 'Technology' has five articles which

are so cross-indexed: "Note on the Coherence of the

American Phenomenon" by Andre Doremus,[145] "Letter to

Doxiadis" by Buckminster Fuller,[146] "The Possibilities and

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[140]S. Ganguly, "Culture, Communication and Silence," _Philosophy and Phenomenological Research_, XIX (December, 1968), pp. 182-200.

[141]Samuel Gomez, "Violence, Persons, Communication: A Transactional Model," _The Philosophy Forum_, VII (March, 1969), pp. 182-200.

[142]William Sacksteder, "Person, Communication and Violence," _The Philosophy Forum_, VII (March, 1969), pp. 35-46.

[143]Daniel J. Shine, "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness,'" _The Thomist_, XXXIII (July, 1969), pp. 497-518.

[144]Andre Mercier, "On the Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties," _Man and World_, I (November, 1968), pp. 524-39.

[145]Andre Doremus, "Note on the Coherence of the American Phenomenon," _Diogenes_, LXV (Sept. 1969), pp. 49-73.

[146]Buckminster Fuller, "Letter to Doxiadis," _Main Currents_, XXV (Mar.-Apr., 1969), pp. 87-97.

Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" by Veljko Korac,[147] "Technology and Humanism" by Howard L. Parsons[148] and "A Humanistic Technology" by Hyman G. Rickover.[149]

This paper will not examine all of the above articles in detail. Instead, one article from each of the three categories will be considered. In reviewing the articles cross-indexed under 'communication' and 'social philosophy' one realizes that "The Analogy of Individuality and 'Togetherness'" has already been discussed in this chapter. Another article, "Culture, Communication and Silence" will be considered. Since 'dialogue' only has one article cross-indexed under social philosophy that article, "On the Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" will be considered. Finally, "The Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" will be examined in the 'technology' category. The other articles are omitted because they are examples of serious popular thought rather than of technical philosophy.[150]

Communication. "Culture, Communication and Silence" is a rather difficult article to excerpt. This may be as much a question of the author's style as it is the concurrent

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[147]Veljko Korac, "The Possibilities and Prospects of Freedom in Modern World," Praxis, IV (1968), pp. 73-82.

[148]Howard L. Parsons, "Technology and Humanism," Praxis, V (1969), pp. 164-80.

[149]Hyman G. Rickover, "A Humanistic Technology," The Humanist, XXVIIII (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 22-4.

[150]See: Chapter V for some discussion of this issue.

interplay of several distinct ideas. It has resulted, however, in quotations which are generally longer than those cited heretofore.

The opening paragraph not only sets the style but provides an overview for what follows:

> In this paper I want to emphasize that silence is a phenomenon which exerts a positive influence on our culture. Culture not only develops through the possibility of communication but also changes its forms through a widening of communication with the length and breadth of the world. Culture and communication have been, more than ever, inseparably connected. Language, therefore, plays the most important part in our culture today. Culture breeds and fosters the individual in his uniqueness and yet the individual feels cramped through participating in his culture. Strange, how culture itself brings in us the consciousness of being dissatisfied with it. We somehow, though often very vaguely, realize a sort of maladjustment between the freely deciding individual and the rule-governed society in which we move and have our being. The individual cannot help, and perhaps justifiably so, feeling that after a certain point his role in society is not only unrewarding but positively injurious to his individual existence. Whenever we try to take a comprehensive view of human civilization and culture we are impressed by a continuous tension and strain dominating the depth of individual minds. The individual can hardly do away with his uniqueness; the pressing demands of his own culture therefore naturally prompt him to come off the stage for a while and retire into his inner self of silence. When silence comes as such a relief it has not merely a negative value but positively enriches the individual and inspires him to use a kind of statement, pointing to, and yet not describing, this world of silence. Our analysis will chiefly center round the problem of communication; an analysis which will identify the referred to "malady" as essential to communicating animals. The tension that we suffer from our desire to express, is not accidental or temporary but intrinsic to the language-oriented culture that we have. The conflict, to put it very tersely, is between our desire to express and the failure of expression--the ultimate insignificance residing

vis-a-vis the totality of significant discourse.
We shall not, in such circumstances, try to offer
a therapy or a solution but only identify and
determine the nature of this, as it were,
existential vacuum (the "malady").[151]

The author then moves to <u>Section II Culture and the
Individual</u>. He distinguishes culture from civilization;
the former being "concerned with the intrinsic values and
spiritual freedom of man" and the latter with the "apparatus
man uses in order to control the conditions of his life in
his outside world."[152] This distinction plays a key role
because:

> It is this subjectivity which gives culture
> its peculiar importance in guaranteeing the
> individual excellence and freedom. It is by
> admitting this sense in our culture that we shall
> try to show an eternal alternation between the
> objective world of expression and the
> subjective world of security and <u>absolute
> freedom</u>.[153]

Ganguly continues by showing the crucial influences of
culture upon "one's life and personality."[154]

The third section, <u>Culture and Communication</u> opens:

> The faith that my feelings can be communicated,
> that my ideas can be understood, accepted and
> spread, makes me feel secure. The worst fear
> is the fear of being misunderstood. Through
> communication we rise above our loneliness--we
> explore a <u>common world</u> with others; man feels
> anchored and tagged to a universe wide enough to
> make him feel his existence. The nonmaterial
> culture is mostly developed centering round this

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[151]Ganguly, p. 182.

[152]Ibid., pp. 83-4.

[153]Ibid., p. 183.

[154]Ibid., pp. 183-5.

possibility of communication. Communication, of course, is a term with side connotation. For our purpose communication will stand for verbal communication only. The possession of language is the greatest characteristic of our culture.

Language is so much a part of our daily life that we often tend to look at it as a natural act like breathing, but we realize as soon as we attend a little that there is nothing natural or automatic about language. We do not inherit language; we acquire it only by intensive learning. . .[155]

He continues with some reflections about language:

Language is, broadly speaking, a 'system of symbols.' The two words in the above line need a little explanation. Language performs an essentially social function helping us to get along together, to communicate and achieve a cooperation and understanding among us.

As such, language has to obey certain rules-- rules which are available to all of us when we use the language. In other words, however arbitrary the nature of signs may seem, once they are accepted in the corpus there is no more anarchy in their combinations. Their combinations are well-organized and rule-governed. All the moves we make must be according to the rules. However fascinating it may seem to us, a private language is a misnomer. Just as any sound is not a word, any handling of the pawns on the chess board is not a 'move,' similarly, any utterance is not a significant statement. A move is either correct or incorrect; a statement is either true or false. Where intelligibility and communication are the ends, absence of rules will defeat the very purpose. A full set of elements with rules of combination is what is meant here by a 'system.' 'Symbols' are the words in a language. They are symbolic as opposed to their being 'iconic' as well as for their self-transcending reference to things and entities. It is this aspect of reference that will be important for our purpose here. Another distinction will not be out of place. Talking in a language and talking about a language are two very different things. When we speak about the

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[155] Ibid., pp. 184-5.

language, obviously language can be shown to
have all sorts of laws for the three specific
aspects, e.g., syntactics, semantics, and
pragmatics. But when we are suggesting that
language is a 'system' where moves can be
judged to be correct or incorrect we are not
referring to any metalinguistic rules but
rules existing inside the language to be adhered
to by the participants. Any positivistic
analysis of language has to start with an
analysis of words. Words, mostly, stand for
things, entities, or relations. These nonverbal
elements can be regarded as the referents of
which the words are generally <u>Names</u>. At an
advanced stage of learning this feature may
not be explicit, as when we learn the meaning of
a word through certain synonyms in the dictionary;
but such verbal learning cannot go on indefinitely.
It stops at a point when one has to learn the
technique of referring to a nonlinguistic element
through a verbal symbol. This naming operation
exerts a powerful influence on our mind and
without this basic referring habit of language
we can hardly learn the art of communication.[156]

These reflections are later followed by an analysis

and critique of "the-word-as-reference" attitude:

Let us start with the 'class' term.
Empirical terms representing classes have
vagueness so far as they admit of borderline
cases. The paradigm class of such terms should
be color terms, say 'blue' or 'green.' . . .
regarding the terms expressing personal experience,
e.g., toothache or terms of emotions. Here we
face that notorious problem of the 'privacy of
experience.' Meaning is expected to be something
which can be publicly communicated. But are
our toothaches, or even joy for that matter, ever
adequately communicable so that the possibility
of misunderstanding is completely and finally
eliminated? In saying all this we should not
be understood to mean that communication is
just impossible; we are merely asserting that
there is only an essential vagueness in the
meaning of such terms to the result that we are
always aware of a possibility of misunderstanding.
This constant apprehension of being 'misunderstood'
greatly affects the psychology of the users of

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[156]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 185-6.

language.

Finally, when we come to 'theoretical terms,' we discover that vagueness inherent in them is not so much regarding their meaning-specification as their connection with our experience. In other words, these terms seem to draw their meaning not so much from available experiences but from the system to which they belong. This creates a new dimension in the problem of understanding. We seem to idealize and abstract from our experience to impart an accuracy of meaning to such terms. Naturally, therefore, there shows up a gap between their meanings and their application.[157]

He then speaks of a new outlook developed by men such

as P. K. Feyerabend:

The new outlook with regard to theoretical terms, i.e., that they are the results of abstraction and idealization, completely reversed the attitude to the problem of meaning of theoretical terms; the meaning of a term, therefore, is taken to the top which exerts a pressure on the terms occurring at the bottom of a theory or a system. In short, all words have a specific meaning with reference to a particular theory. Meaning cannot be known in isolation, it is theory-laden. The traditional faith in empirical facts (or 'experience derived through senses') as the ultimate legislator of meaning is thus shaken even for the empirical sciences. Certainly this behavior of the terms does not make their meaning vague but only makes us feel that there is a final arbitrariness in the application of such terms to our experience. The result is the same, that is, a sense of insecurity creeps into our mind whenever we discover that the truth and also the meaning of what we say are not determined by a common observable world or nature but merely by the principle of convenience or even an aesthetic choice. The arbitrariness involved in the meaning of such terms allows a free play to certain subjective factors so solemnly avoided by us to maintain the objective purity of our language.[158]

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[157]Ibid., pp. 188-9.

[158]Ibid., p. 189.

Finally, Ganguly raises the "open texture" point made by Waisman and then goes on to discuss the difficulties which particular terms raise for communication.[159]

He continues to offer arguments to show that ordinary communication is vague and thus leads to a sense of insecurity--"the insecurity of being misunderstood."[160] Ganguly ends the section by stating:

> We long for a rule-free zone and silence comes
> to our rescue. The self comes out of its silent
> corner to objectify and externalize itself in
> and through expression, through an advancing
> symbolic consciousness; but unfortunately,
> through "applicative" failure we are frustrated
> and are pushed back again into the subjective
> world beyond language--the world of silence.
> This is the full picture of the restless cycle
> inherent in our verbalistic culture. We are
> tossed between these two worlds incessantly.
> This unsteadiness is thus essential to our
> culture which every age discovers and describes
> as the "crisis of the age." Such an alternation
> is finally unavoidable. According to K. Jaspers,
> "Since man can find no completion in the
> realization of his life as a whole, soaring
> above life, he builds for himself a second world,
> the world of the mind, in the space wherein he
> becomes articulately sure of himself in the
> general form of his being . . . cutting loose,
> for a moment, from mere Reality, he finds his way
> back into the being that he has become through the
> visions and the creations of his mind." The
> above lines very powerfully describe our retreat
> into a world of our own except that such a world
> cannot be "articulate" as Jaspers thinks.
> Religious faith and our faith in a world of
> values are sometimes clung to in this world of
> silence through a mystic identification and that
> is why we indulge in the "indescribable," the
> "unsayable," the "Anirvachya." End points in
> the world of language act as silencers.[161]

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[159] Ibid., pp. 189-91.

[160] Ibid., pp. 193-5.

[161] Ibid., pp. 194-5.

The fourth and final section of the paper is concerned

with silence. After some introductory remarks the author

states:

> . . . silence partially restores to us a <u>sense</u>
> <u>of security</u> and a <u>sense of freedom</u>. In the
> <u>above we have discussed how our language</u> habits
> stand in the way of achieving these two goals.
> Let us see how silence acts as the restorer of
> these two basic pursuits. We shall, therefore,
> try to answer the two following questions
> throughout this section: (1) 'How does silence
> give us security?' (2) 'How does silence help
> us to enjoy freedom?'[162]

This section is followed by some reflections aimed at

showing that poets, religious thinkers, philosophers and

scientists all "admit silence."[163] The author then notes

that the culture has 'silencers'--steps, points, or state-

ments by which we ask others to be silent.[164] He develops

an analysis of them and ends by saying:

> For our purpose, we have sufficiently quoted
> to confirm our thesis that language on every
> front is strewn with silencer statements. It
> is through these silencers that we are to
> reach the world of silence to regain our
> security lost in our descriptive efforts. What
> is necessary is only to be aware when silencers
> are being used; otherwise we shall create
> unnecessary and avoidable verbiage and make a
> casualty of 'sense.' This is our answer to the
> first question posed earlier, which is: "How
> does silence give us security?"[165]

He immediately moves on to argument about the second

question:

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[162]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 195.

[163]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 195-9.

[164]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 197.

[165]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 198.

"How does silence help us enjoy freedom," let us
begin by stating that we are presuming that freedom
can be absolute. A state of absolute freedom we
assume as a state where no rules have to be obeyed,
no answer is required of one. By definition,
therefore, such a state of freedom cannot be
described, for as soon as we try to describe we
are committed to obey, at least, rules of
description. Even metaphor is of no use,
since metaphors are dependent on the literal
sense of the words where some rules of identi-
fication or reference will be needed to stick to
the 'meaning core' of those words. We have been
so thoroughly conditioned to believe that
fundamental freedom of an individual lies in an
increment of his linguistic skill that we seldom
see the trap we fall into when we excitedly try
to describe a state of absolute freedom. Though
we all agree that freedom is essential for every
individual we invariably search for it at wrong
places; we try to speak about it or describe it
through our language, systematically losing our
freedom by that very effort. This is indeed a
paradox of language. Ask a man when or where he
is free completely, he is sure to be misled if he
is tempted to participate in the game of language,
and no wonder. He is immediately under the
obligation (what can be more opposed to freedom?)
of obeying some rules; consequently, he loses his
freedom in the bargain. There can be an act of
freedom but we are unable to describe it. My
decision to describe may be an absolutely free act
but as soon as we enter the world of language to
put that decision into practice we lose our
freedom. In other words, we can decide to be
free by preserving our silence. To enter into
such a world of freedom we must use a set of
silencers either 'individual' or 'social.' The
case of the Indian yogis and sanyasins can be
cited for confirmation; the first temptation that
they overcome is the temptation to communicate.
To put the matter more metaphysically, it is only
in utter subjectivity that we can feel free, or
more precisely speaking, be free. This is how
and why only silence helps us enjoy our freedom.[166]

The article ends with a highlighting of what has been

accomplished in these pages and some suggestions for further

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[166]Ibid., p. 199.

research concerning cultures and silence.[167]

<u>Dialogue</u>. "On the Foundation of Man's Rights and Duties" by Andre Mercier is indexed under 'dialogue'. The discussion about dialogue is concentrated in the center sections of the article and despite the fact that it undergirds Mercier's whole discussion of rights and duties, these sections could be cut out and form an article in their own right with little alteration.

Apparently the occasion of this article was Mercier's reflections on both Professor Guido Calogero's thesis "that Man's rights are rooted in . . . <u>will</u> <u>to</u> <u>dialogue</u>" which was put forth at the 1964 meeting of the International Institute of Philosophy in L'Aquila, Italy and Mercier's own thesis put forth at the same meeting, that "the problem is insufficiently explicated if it is put only with regard to Man's <u>rights</u>, because Man has not only natural rights, he also has natural duties."[168]  Mercier indicates the aim of the present article when he states:

> Now since, on the one hand, rights are somehow related to a will to require, to a request, to an exigency, and on the other hand, duties are some- how related to a will to accept, to a recognition, to a consent, and since Calogero's <u>will</u> <u>to</u> <u>dialogue</u> does in fact contain these two elements of request and consent, we may hope that Calogero's thesis and ours do not contradict each other; we may even hope that they will, if not coincide, at least have a

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[167]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 200.

[168]Mercier, p. 524.

common origin.

It is the purpose of this essay to establish that relation.[169]

He begins:

The will to dialogue is the will to respect other people's opinions, a will without which all judgments remain selfish and unchecked, and therefore, in that sense, arbitrary. In order to respect the other person's opinion, one has to understand that opinion, and in order to understand it, one has to have a dialogue. "one has to" = one should or must. It is a compulsory will, which is meant to rise above arbitrariness. A mere will to exact what we hold to be good, without listening to other opinions, would amount to the imposition of our own opinion, i.e. to a monologue, in which we would make ourselves to our own criterion, which is begging the question, for we cannot be the object of a criterion and at the same time, establish that criterion, whereas a dialogue amounts to ordination into human society.

Human society includes, of course, innumerable opponents who are all also bound by the same compulsory will to dialogue. Therefore the dialogue does not consist simply in a relation between two individuals, but in a relation between each individual and every other one.[170]

He then notes that this will to dialogue establishes a kind of equality between men but that "this equality is a theoretical one . . . whereas in practice it always manifests itself as inequality."[171] That as soon as dialogue is realized between individuals, parties or classes:[172]

one man is found to possess greater force of persuasion than his neighbours, one party is

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[169]Ibid., p. 525.

[170]Ibid.

[171]Ibid.

[172]Ibid.

more numerous or disposes of better propaganda
than another, such and such a class of the
population is richer or more influential than
the others, and so on. Then such inequali-
ties appear as obstacles to the equality
between men. But at the same time they are
necessary for an understanding of what equality
is, and they are also the practical origin of
the necessity for dialogue. Because, if
equality between men had been realized from
the beginning, not merely the principle of
equality but factual equality, there would be
no reason for dialogue, since dialogue is
meant to smooth out differences, to lead to
understanding, to eradicate and even suppress
divergences. Theoretical equality, and
factual inequality are, in spite of their
verbal differences and their apparent contra-
diction, one and the same thing, seen, however,
from the opposite ends of the will to dialogue.[173]

He continues with a long analogy with thermodynamics but

returns to exposition of dialogue with:

in all cases, there is a distance between the
theoretical equality of all partners and the
factual inequality found among them. This
distance is a measure of the intensity of the
requirements of the dialogue.

However, this distance should not be con-
fused with mutual ignorance or lack of
acquaintance between partners. Partners may
be very far apart for various reasons. Then,
no dialogue is really possible, for the partners
become incommensurable. There must be some
common feature between them, putting them into
local and homogeneous communities, in space
and time, as well as in their way of life and
thought, and the aims of their work and actions.
Lack of acquaintance makes people strangers.
Complete strangers do not enter into a dialogue
at all. Entering into a dialogue overcomes,
or at least decreases, their status of being
foreigners or strangers. . . In a society where
social barriers are extremely rigid and obeyed by
both sides as a result of deeply respected
conventions, the individuals of different classes
have only technical relations, as, for instance,
between master and slave, manager and workman,

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[173]Ibid., pp. 525-6.

> monarch and subject . . ., and no dialogue is
> conceived of by either of them.  A dialogue
> arises only where a common problem produces a
> form of "dialysis."  Through dialysis, all
> kinds of contacts become possible, ranging
> from mere discourse to sexual proximity,
> including friendship, professional collabor-
> ation, and so on.  All such contacts are
> specific forms of that fundamental dialogue
> which we are talking about.[174]

Mercier explains that in patriarchal times the family

or clan realized the dialysis most immediately.[175]  Now,

with the loss of homogenity of the family other dialoguing

systems are in the fore.  He states:

> The American citizen, for instance, emigrates from
> one town to another several times in the course
> of his lifetime, at the age of 18, when, leaving
> his family, he goes to college thousands of miles
> away, from then on beginning the life of an
> industrialized nomad, which has become one feature
> of the Western civilization of our day.  On the
> other hand, school creates self-sufficient systems
> facilitating dialysis, and dialogue at school
> is easier and more intense than in the family.[176]

The author then introduces a distinction in dialogues:

> However, in all cases, whether it be in the
> clan, in the family, at school or at the factory,
> the practice of dialogue is inevitably twofold.
> On the one hand, there is dialogue between what
> we shall call homotypes; on the other hand, there
> is dialogue between heterotypes.  For instance, the
> children of one family are homotypes, nearly equal,
> and they find dialogue easy, because they share
> beds, rooms, clothes, in short, everything; so
> they need a dialogue only to rule out minor
> differences and they talk practically on an
> equal footing, in their divergences as well as
> in their confidences.  For them, the dialogue is
> superficial and of short duration . . .

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[174]Ibid., p. 528.

[175]Ibid., pp. 528-9.

[176]Ibid., p. 529.

. . . The same applies to workers in the
same workshop, and to all such cases of
homotypy where quasi-equality makes dialogue
easy.
    Heterotypy, on the contrary, manifests
itself between parents and children, teachers
and pupils, heads of factories and workers. . .
In such cases, there is, on the one hand, as much
moral contact between heterotypes as there is
between homotypes, but the distance is great
and the stress is intense, hence dialogue is
much more difficult. The necessity of
dialogue is therefore greatest among heterotypes
of one and the same community.[177]

He adds that among heterotypes;

something else happens in such cases, namely, the
appearance of what may be called pre-eminence
or precedence of one individual over the
others: The father stands above the son, the
teacher above the pupil, the director above
the worker. Such pre-eminence is not the
essence of inequality. . . There may be,
without loss of pre-eminence a comrade-head and
a comrade-worker, or a perfect understanding
between parents and children. It is not a
difference of right, but a relation that is
included in the definition of the specific
community under consideration: family,
factory, school etc. Yet the relation stands,
and renders the dialogue between heterotypes
more profound than that between homotypes,
for whom it is superficial. Moreover,
dialogue is as difficult for him who is
pre-eminent as for him who is not . . .
The first steps are difficult for both
partners. So are the second steps.[178]

Mercier illustrates the above observations with a

father-son business enterprise and then moves on to note

some of the qualities dialogue should have:

Of course, everybody will agree that a
dialogue should not be fought out with weapons,
but must be unarmed. But it is not easy to say

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[177]Ibid., pp. 529-30.

[178]Ibid., pp. 530-1.

precisely when a dialogue takes place without
weapons, for it cannot take place without
talking, and every talk is accompanied by
facial expression, gestures of the arms and
hands, which may look like an armed attack;
a simple motion of the arm may seem intended
to be a slap in the face of the opponent,
and so on. Then in cases of pre-eminence,
the head of the factory has a large sum of
money in his pocket, or he may, be talking
about labour inefficiency, give the impression
that he is threatening; or a father may impose
on his child by virtue of his authority.[179]

This leads him to the statement that:

The unarmed dialogue is a dialogue in which
each party will try at each step, not only to
understand the premisses and the arguments of
the other, but also to present his own
premisses and arguments in such a way that
nothing in his speech can be interpreted as a
threat or as a weapon.
This amounts to requiring that an ideal
dialogue should never be undertaken with the
intention of destroying one of the parties.
Thus there is, to our knowledge, only one
way to take. This is union. And again, to our
knowledge, there is only one kind of union which
is at the same time unarmed, exacting and con-
senting, namely the union by love. For we are
not interested in the mere integration of two
parties into one common system; this would
merely be co-existence. There is no common
system pre-existent to the union; the union
will be realized when, and only when, the
parties are willing to interact by mutual and
simultaneous request and consent. At that
moment, the parties will be infinitely near each
other.[180]

At this point Mercier moves to apply these reflections

about dialogue to the issue of Man's rights and duties. The

application takes only a few pages but since this paper is

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[179]Ibid., p. 533.

[180]Ibid.

considering the dialogic rather than the rights or duties

topics of the article, those sections will be omitted.

Technology. Of the five articles on technology, "The

Possibilities and Prospects of Freedom in Modern World" by

Veljko Korac appears to treat the issue both at the problem

level and as technical philosophy. The following excerpts

should substantiate this claim.

Korac opens his article by describing current, growing

attitudes about technology and economic progress:

> In the modern world there has been an
> increasing tendency to seek the possibilities
> and prospects of freedom in the sphere of
> technological and economic progress. . .
> Technology offers itself . . . indeed
> imposes itself, as the possibility of a
> triumphant break-through beyond the borders
> of this planet into the immense regions of
> the universe and the transhuman world, i.e.
> as a possibility of planetary practice.
> The economy, at the same time, offers and
> promises less and less work and more and more
> prosperity, i.e. life without any immediate
> care concerning daily living. Either possibility
> appears as a liberation from immediate want.[181]

He adds that these tendencies are so persistent that:

> these illusions appear not only in capitalist,
> but also in socialist systems. Moreover,
> countries which have passed through socialist
> revolutions on a lower, or even the lowest
> level of technology and economy, and which make
> efforts to achieve a faster technical and
> economic advance on the basis of planning show
> a growing tendency to accept the advancement of
> technology and the economy as the exclusive
> standards of social advance as a whole.[182]

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[181]Korac, p. 73.

[182]Ibid.

Korac immediately articulates criticism (antithesis) of

these trends:

> The entire experience of the modern world,
> however, shows that the potentialities of
> technology and the economy are being realized
> nowadays in a highly contradictory manner, even
> paradoxically. For it is obvious that spectacular
> technical and economic progress does not lead
> towards a solution of the contradictions of the
> modern world but, on the contrary, towards
> widening the gap between the exploiters and the
> exploited, the rich and the poor, the developed
> and the underdeveloped . . . Thus modern society
> is moving in two diametrically opposed directions
> which at their extreme points of movement appear
> as two irreconcilable extremes of the modern
> world. This is what lends the most characteristic
> mark to all contemporary world developments.
> At the same time the potentialities of technological
> progress are becoming realized in a manner which
> makes it increasingly obvious that this progress
> could turn into total regression, or even total
> self-annihilation; as a result an existential
> uneasiness, even pessimism, can be observed as the
> reverse of militant technocratic and economistic
> optimism. Naturally, this stimulates critical
> thought to examine the advance of technology and the
> economy in order to determine and explain not
> only its favourable but also its adverse effects.[183]

There follows a section in which the author appeals to

Marx for a resolving insight but then suggests that it would

appear in the light of history that Marx's insight was not

correct. The author resolves this contradiction by noting:

> Marx's critical words about technology
> obviously had a deeper ontological and anthropo-
> logical meaning, which perfectly expresses the
> modern tendencies of technocratism while not
> negating the instrumental or functional value of
> technology. Marx did not doubt at all that it was
> the development of the economy and of technology
> which would change the economic and political
> structure of the capitalist society, and also the
> position and role of the working class in this

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[183]Ibid., p. 74.

society, but with his criticism of technology,
as an ideology, as an outlook, he drew attention
as early as a hundred years ago to the contra-
dictory character of technical development,
i.e. to the fact that technology by itself not
only is not humane, but threatens to become the
most inhumane thing that mankind has ever
created unless society itself becomes humanized . . .

   In any case, then, Marx saw quite clearly
that technological and economic rationalization
offers man two possibilities:  one--to overcome
human work as a necessity and become able to
create universally and freely and be a genuinely
free being and, the other, to identify himself
with technology and resign himself to technical
manipulation, quantification, quantophreny, etc.,
i.e. to the total domination of technology.
Nowadays the latter danger is incomparably more
obvious than it was a hundred years ago.  In
entirely rationalizing man's being, technology
reifies and alienates it completely, turning it
into a component part of the machine. . .

   The consequences of this reification and
alienation are fully obvious today.  This is also
indicated by the every-day language of political
and social activity, especially among the
bureaucracy.  Every ambition and initiative are
usually reduced to a persistent search for
'systems,' 'organisms,' 'mechanisms,' 'structures'
etc. of society, while man as man is being
forgotten.  Thus a situation is created where
anything can be found in the 'systems' and
'organisms' of the modern world except freedom
for man as man.[184]

Korac then says, "There is no doubt that those

tendencies have greatly compromised socialist systems"[185]

and he then introduces some analysis of specific historical

situations.  He notes the shift in importance of intellectual

production and producers.  He discusses the varieties of

modern socialisms and the evils of bureaucracy and despotism

which can and does taint some of them.  He describes

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[184]Ibid., pp. 75,76,77.

[185]Ibid., p. 77.

misapplications of the logic of history and in the end

returns to Marx:

> He showed, above all, that the freedom of man
> as man is not achieved by political revolution.
> Political revolution enables the State to
> realize a greater or smaller degree of freedom,
> but the State may be free as a State without,
> however, man being free in it as man.
>     In emphasizing this, Marx had in mind the
> insufficiency of any national and any political
> freedom, and he defined his conception of
> freedom as a condition in which the freedom of
> each individual becomes the condition for the
> freedom of all, i.e. a condition in which man's
> individual totality and his social totality
> converge.  In order to enable man to reach this
> degree of freedom, the development of his
> human potentialities must become a purpose in
> itself.  This is that kind of self-productive
> activity which rises above immediate necessity
> or, as Marx would say, which stands beyond
> necessity.  But this kind of freedom is only
> a possibility which will be realized only in
> the measure to which man will be able to
> struggle for it.  It is an indispensable
> condition of this struggle that he should
> have firm criteria which will not allow 'today'
> and 'tomorrow' to be separated as separate
> elements of chronological duration but as the
> essence of human practice where purpose reigns
> supreme.  In this sense freedom of man as man
> can only be realized if it is treated as the
> highest objective and purpose of human practice,
> while everything else is regarded only as an
> instrument which should help to achieve this
> objective.[186]

Conclusion.  As one reflects on the above articles one is

struck by their philosophical nature.  One notes, for

example, that:

1. Each considers generalized issues:  communication,

   dialogue and technology.

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[186]Ibid., pp. 81-2.

2. Each uses philosophical terminology. Terms such as 'freely deciding individual', 'rule-governed society', 'subjectivity', 'self-transcending reference', 'the problem of the privacy of experience', 'mere Reality', 'absolute freedom', 'metaphysically', 'will to dialogue', 'theoretical equality', 'homotype', 'premisses and arguments', 'existential uneasiness', 'ontological', and 'conception of freedom' can be found on each page of this study which cites the text of these articles.

3. Each utilizes rational argument. There is, for example, the argument concerning silence and freedom cited on pages one hundred seven and one hundred eight; the argument concerning the will to dialogue cited on pages one hundred nine and one hundred ten, and the dialectical argument structure of Korac's entire consideration of technology.[187]

The three articles are problem oriented. Their main thrust is not the purely theoretical:

1. "Culture, Communication and Silence" is grounded in the human experience of language, culture and silence, and in the frustrations and problems generated by these. Further, the culmination of

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[187]The above list is by no means exhaustive of the examples of philosophical characteristics of each article. It is offered merely as a sample to indicate that such characteristics are present.

of the article is a recommendation and not simply
a theory. The author recommends silence--it alone
helps us enjoy our freedom.

2. The discussion of dialogue found in "On the Founda-
   tion of Man's Rights and Duties" is also grounded
   in human life and experience. It too makes
   recommendations, but the recommending is less
   direct, more subtle than in the Ganguly article.
   The writer consistently points out the need for
   dialogue and the results of dialogue--results
   which he phrases in approving language.

3. "The Possibilities and Prospects of Freedom in
   Modern World" treats technology as a problem. The
   author spends much of the article showing the
   negative results of technology as on-going problems
   for the state.[188] Further he sees these problems
   and the 'problem of technology' as problems for
   human freedom. At the very end of the work he
   offers a possible solution.[189]

Not only are the articles grounded in life experience, but
their main thrust is to recommend a course of action or
resolve a social problem. Hence it is apparent that problem
topics are possible in the domain of social philosophy.

Since these excerpts from the articles by Andre,
Mercier and Veljko Korac indicate that it is possible to

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[188]See pp. 82-83 above.

[189]Ibid.

consider problem topics within the realm of social philoso-
phy in the manner of technical philosophy, it is clear
that $E_5S_{1,2,4}$ is an inadequate position concerning the
scope of social philosophy and ethics since it denies such
problem topics to social philosophy. $E_5S_{5,6,7}$ is shown to
be the adequate position. It now remains only to consider
whether $S_5$, $S_6$, or $S_7$ expresses the correct extension of
social philosophy.

The elimination of inadequate sub-positions on the
theoretical domain of social philosophy. $S_5$, $S_6$ and $S_7$ all
see social philosophy as extending to both theoretical and
problem topics. The differences among these positions con-
cern what kinds of topics are included within the theoreti-
cal domain.

> $S_5$ - sees social philosophy as including first order
>         theoretical topics alone
>
> $S_6$ - sees social philosophy as including second order
>         theoretical topics alone
>
> $S_7$ - sees social philosophy as including both first and
>         second order theoretical topics.

The first point which should be noted in trying to
decide among these positions is that it has already been
shown that second order theoretical topics are part of the
domain of social philosophy. The second section of this
chapter indicated this in its discussion of articles on

'alienation' and ' individuality.'[190] Perhaps one would like

to add other such topics as 'change', 'dialectic' or 'power'

but the issue has been settled and really needs no additional

substantiation.

Since there are second order theoretical topics within

the domain of social philosophy, $S_5$ is an inadequate

position and the field is reduced to $S_6$ and $S_7$.

The Philosopher's Index for 1967, 1968 and 1969 cross-

indexes only one specific topic with social philosophy which

might be considered a first order theoretic topic;

institutions.[191] An examination of the article listed under

both institution(s) and social philosophy, "The Crisis in

Our Democratic Institutions" by Sidney Hook and Harold

Taylor[192] reveals that the article is not a discussion of

institution(s) per se, however, but an examination of some

contemporary problems in American democratic institutions.

It appears that there are no first order theoretical topics

in this corpus.

The absence of such topics from this philosophical

corpus does not, however, demonstrate their absence from the

domain of social philosophy. Indeed examination of other

parts of the philosophical corpus in social philosophy does

reveal the existence of such first order theoretical topics.

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[190]See: Above pp. 77-97.

[191]Lineback, 1969, pp. 85, 189.

[192]Sidney Hook and Harold Taylor, "The Crisis of Our
Democratic Institutions," The Humanist, XXVIII (July-
August, 1969), pp. 6-7.

Social Philosophy by Martin G. Plattel reveals topics such as "Being-together in the world" and "Aspects of Human co-existence" in its Table of Contents,[193] while the Contents of The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte by Edward Caird includes the "Nature of Social Organization and Three Forms of Society."[194]

A second argument can be made for the inclusion of first order theoretic topics in the domain of social philosophy: It has been shown that second order theoretical topics are part of social philosophy. However, the treatment of second order topics, such as the analysis of individual-community relationship(s) presupposes the consideration of certain first order topics such as the meaning of community. Thus, the consideration of first order theoretical topics is required for the enterprise of social philosophy to operate successfully. First order theoretical topics belong in the domain of social philosophy.

Since it has now been shown that both first order and second order theoretical topics are part of social philosophy, it should be apparent that $S_6$ is an inadequate position concerning the scope of social philosophy. $S_7$ is an adequate position.

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[193]Plattel, pp. vii-x.

[194]Edward Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte. (New York: The MacMillan and Co., 1885), pp. vii-viii.

Summary. This chapter has shown both the inadequacy of all other articulated positions and the adequacy of $E_5S_7$ for describing the scope of social philosophy and ethics. It has been indicated that both branches of philosophy extend to theoretical and problematical issues.

The next chapter in its further clarification of the extension of the meaning of the term 'social philosophy' will review and explain some of the ramifications of certain points made in these sections.

## VI. THE RELATION OF 'SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY' TO 'ETHICS'

<u>Introduction</u>. This study has, thus far, tried to clarify the relation(s) between the meanings of 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' by examining the actual practice of philosophers. It was found that both branches of philosophy include theoretical topics and general problem topics. It was also found that ethics, a well defined field with authoritative reference persons and authoritative reference journals, required the broadest possible definition to describe the actual state of the enterprise.[195] Since ethics required such a broad definition, it should not be surprising to find that social philosophy, which is a less clearly defined branch of philosophy, lacking a strong community of reference persons, cannot be defined more narrowly. Indeed one might question whether the extension of the meaning of 'social philosophy' can be made any more precise than the broad statement reached at the end of Chapter IV.

If one reflects on the work accomplished thus far, however, one realizes that the basis for further clarification exists within this work. For example, it has been

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[195]See: Above pp. 71-75.

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necessary to make certain distinctions about social philosophy.[196] Reflection on such distinctions should generate greater precision concerning the meaning of 'social philosophy'.

Technical vs. non-technical philosophy. There is the distinction between work which is technical philosophy and that which is not technical philosophy. Earlier in this text articles by Flay, Horowitz, Murchland, Shine, Mercier and Korac were cited in some detail in order to show that these articles were technical philosophy. It was also noted that there were numerous articles which appeared to be examples of serious, popular thought rather than technical philosophy.[197] Within the limits of this study, it is not necessary to review all such articles indexed under 'social philosophy' in The Philosophers Index 1967, 1968, and 1969. The point to be demonstrated is that 'social philosophy' is used to designate such articles. For such a purpose the consideration of three articles is sufficient: "Gerontophobia--Some Remarks on a Social Policy for the Elderly" by Joseph H. Bunzel,[198] "Four-Letter Words: A Symposium" by Daniel Schwarz[199] and "The Religion of the Hippies" by

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[196]See: Above pp. 76, 77, 98.

[197]Ibid.

[198]Joseph H. Bunzel, "Gerontophobia--Some Remarks on a Social Policy for the Elderly," The Humanist, XXIX (July-August, 1969), pp. 17-18.

[199]Daniel Schwarz, "Four-Letter Words: A Symposium," The Humanist, XXIX (Sept.-Oct., 1969), pp. 7-8.

Lowell D. Streiker and Louis Del Soldo.[200]

The many, long quotations are intended to provide evidence of the fact that these articles are not technical philosophy. The quotations are not intended to demonstrate either quality or "seriousness" of the articles.

"Gerontophobia--Some Remarks on a Social Policy for the Elderly" opens with three expository paragraphs followed by a series of questions:

> If it is true that the greatness of a civilization can be judged by the way its women are treated, it is even more true that the humaneness of a civilization can be judged by the way in which its elderly are regarded. The manner in which a civilization treats its aged is indicative of the degree of its responsibility for human life.
> Ours is a society that values youth, health, and work. It is sharply problem-oriented, and tends to seek victories, overcome obstacles, and solve problems. There is, however, an unfortunate product of our youth orientation that is often ignored; that is, the prevalence of geronto-phobia, or fear of the aged. Indeed, this condition raises serious ethical problems.
> The position of the aging has changed markedly in the United States in the last decades. This country, once one of the youngest, has aged considerably in spirit and in fact. As usual, technology has outrun semantics and sociology; the aging person of today, his position in society, and his feeling of self have suffered increasingly strident strictures. Nothing less than the ethics of aging stands in question.
> Why is legislation regarding the elderly beset with conditions and prerequisites?
> Why is sexual behavior of the elderly--courtship and marriage, which is encouraged at other age levels--a source of derision and ridicule?

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[200]Lowell D. Streiker and Louis Del Soldo, "The Religion of the Hippies," Religious Humanism, II (Summer, 1968), pp. 107-12.

Why do housing and living arrangments
for the elderly exclude, if not expel, them
from the mainstream of life?
The answers are neither simple nor
unequivocal.[201]

This section is followed by a statistical analysis of

the "older American" population which lists certain demo-

graphic characteristics such as sex, marital status and

household status.[202] The third section lists and explains

legislation which has been passed to aid the elderly.[203]

Bunzel begins the fourth section by stating, "in spite

of an increase in the number of aged in the United States,

and some significant social gains in their behalf, there

exists a widespread phobia against them."[204] He then

explains the meaning of 'phobia' and states, "that geronto-

phobia can be explained and illustrated on the basis of the

types of defense mechanisms involved: (1) Repression . . .

(2) Identification . . . (3) Rationalization . . . (4) Over-

Compensation . . . (5) Withdrawal or denial . . . (6) Pro-

jection."[205]

In the fifth and last section Bunzel shows that

"restructuring our attitudes towards old age is essential"

and offers three possible solution sets:

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[201]Bunzel, p. 17.

[202]Ibid.

[203]Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[204]Ibid., p. 18.

[205]Ibid.

One remedial approach would be, frankly,
semantic.  Value-laden words such as
"aging," "leisure time," and "retirement"
might usefully be replaced.  The effect of
these words is one of futility and terminal-
ism.  We might substitute in their place
"free time" for leisure time and "post-
employment" for retirement.[206]

Another would be the restructuring of Social Security

to allow part-time employment and a third would be to make

all new policies concerning senior citizens in light of the

fact that gerontophobia exists.[207]

The second article, "Four-Letter Words:  A Symposium"

consists of statements from six men in reply to a question-

naire from The Humanist.  The article is prefaced by:

> Magazines have often discussed what should be
> their policy concerning four-letter words.  In
> some cases there have been protests from
> readers; some printers have attempted to censor
> magazines by not setting them in type; and
> dealers and booksellers have often refused
> material that they considered "obscene."
> Interested in the question of what should be
> the appropriate policy concerning the use of
> four-letter words, The Humanist sent out the
> following three questions to editors and
> authors, and to the A.C.L.U.:
> 1. What do you think should be the policy of
>    magazines, newspapers, and journals on the
>    use of four-letter words?
> 2. Do you have an individual policy?
> 3. Have you encountered any restrictions from
>    printers, newsdealers, booksellers, or
>    readers on this matter?
>    We are glad to publish some representative
>    replies.[208]

There then follow the replies from:  Daniel Schwarz, Sunday

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[206]Ibid.

[207]Ibid.

[208]Schwarz, p. 7.

Editor of <u>The New York Times</u>; Carey McWilliams, editor of

<u>The Nation</u>; John Barth, an author of fiction; Rev. B. J.

Stiles, former editor of the Methodist magazine, <u>Motive</u>;

Alan Reitman, associate director of The American Civil

Liberties Union; and William Phillips, editor of <u>Partisan

Review</u>.  The following excerpts should give the flavor of

these brief replies.[209]

Daniel Schwarz:

> Standards of good taste change radically in
> relatively short periods . . .
> It is not the function of a newspaper, I
> think, to lead the sexual and verbal revo-
> lution, but to report it . . . Those
> standards (of good taste) are changing now,
> but I think <u>The Times Magazine</u> should retain
> the old standards for the present . . . Our
> purpose is to report the news.  So we don't
> use four-letter words.[210]

Carey McWilliams:

> Too much has been made, or so it seems to me,
> of four-letter words.  If such words are
> used in a context in which the usage is
> appropriate, then we at <u>The Nation</u> would not
> delete them, nor would we bother to suggest
> some different usage to the author . . . So
> far as I can recall, we have encountered no
> objections from printers, newsdealers, or
> booksellers to the use of such terms; we have
> had occasional letters from readers objecting
> to a particular word or words. . .
>     As a final comment I might say that we
> object to so-called "dirty" words when used by
> writers as adjectives or expletives, on the
> ground that they are singularly inexpressive.
> Also that, for this very reason, the problem
> is not great.  A writer may use "fucking" or
> "shitty" once or twice just to show his
> independence, but if he's any good he almost

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[209]The longest reply is but seven paragraphs.

[210]Schwarz, p. 7.

instantly gets tired of them.[211]

John Barth:

> My feeling is that it's important for a
> language to include words generally held
> by the users of the language to be obscene.
> These words ought to be used very sparingly,
> like strong spices, and on appropriate
> occasions, to make their effect. Overuse or
> inappropriate use of them debases their
> value.[212]

Rev. B. J. Stiles:

> The decision to publish four-letter words in
> motive was hardly dramatic or revolutionary. . .
> During the eight years that I served as
> editor of motive, four-letter words were
> used only when we believed the literary or
> reportorial context to justify using that
> particular word. We did not set out on any
> crusade to prove freedom of the press or to
> test the limits of our critics. We used the
> words only when they expressed ideas more
> honestly and authentically than they would
> have been expressed had we not used the words
> in question.
> Most of our uses of four-letter words came
> in either poetry or fiction. . .
> The criticisms of our policy came almost
> exclusively from nonreaders of the magazine. . .
> To my knowledge, motive has never been
> hampered by newsdealers or distributors
> because of any editorial content or language. . .
> I have little interest in any type of journal-
> ism which is flamboyant or crusading simply as a
> means of calling attention to itself. . . I am
> more concerned that journalism and writing
> reflect life at a real level, and this concern
> seemed to call for editorial consistency. How
> could we advocate that this generation should
> tell things as they see them, and then restrict
> the form or language in which it is told? That
> is the kind of nonsense which has led most
> young people to distrust the old traditions,
> especially those grounded in a legalistic

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[211]Ibid.

[212]Ibid.

morality long since abandoned by most
intelligent, committed contemporary
religious folk.
    There is much truth in the quote,
"There is nothing either good or bad but
thinking makes it so." The obscenity
attributed to motive is far more in the
eyes of the critic than in the expressions
themselves.[213]

Alan Reitman:  (This reply is so concise, it is
    reprinted in its entirety.)

I am responding to your request for a state-
ment from the American Civil Liberties Union
as to what civil liberties issue may be
involved in the refusal of printing houses to
set in type four-letter words which they
consider offensive.  The consensus of thinking
at the ACLU is that this does not raise a civil
liberties question for the following reasons:
(1) Printing houses are private companies and,
therefore, are not invested with the state-
action component which would allow us to say
this is state censorship.  They do not perform
a public function.  When a public agency acts
to censor or refuses to publish then a viable
civil liberties issue is present.  (2) It is
possible that the publishing houses may feel
that if they do set four-letter words in type,
they may be held liable for prosecution under
local obscenity laws.  Ordinarily such
prosecutions have not been brought against the
publishers of magazines and distributors, but
it is not inconceivable that an eager-beaver
prosecutor might enlarge the prosecution net.
    While the above reasons represent our
views as to why we feel no civil liberties
violation occurs that can be challenged in a
court test, this does not mean that we condone
the action of printing houses.  Certainly, the
spirit of free expression and free communication
is damaged when magazines, in effect, are not
able to publish what they wish because of the
refusal of commercial publishing houses to set
type because of their objection to the content
of the magazine.  However, other than an appeal
to the printing house to recognize the importance
of the First-Amendment principle, there is no

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[213]Ibid.

civil liberties ground on which a legal or
constitutional challenge could be brought
against a private business.[214]

William Phillips:

I don't think one can lay down a policy on
the use of "dirty" words, because there is
no moral, political, or aesthetic principle
that has anything to do with the question--
though I know that many have been dragged in
to justify one stand or another. . .
    Writers and editors must be absolutely
free. But this doesn't mean that we don't
judge the result, judge its quality, its
motives, its effects. . .
    I--or we--don't have an abstract policy,
though I guess we have a working one. . .[215]
    No, we have never had any trouble with
printers, newsdealers, booksellers or readers.
Some of our critics, however, complain
occasionally that we are too understanding of
the young rebels.[216]

The third and last example of a social philosophy

article which is not an example of technical philosophy is,

"The Religion of the Hippies" by Lowell D. Streiker and

Louis Del Soldo. Early in the article the authors say:

    Hippiedom is dying. Hounded by the
authorities, terrorized by thugs, victimized
by the unscrupulous, disoriented by the drug-
induced ecstacy through which they seek the
shattering and reintegrating intensity
characteristic of all genuine religious
experience--the love generation is melting
away. What produced them? What are they
seeking? What have they discovered? What
is their future? What can be learned from
them? These are the unavoidable quandaries
posed by the tenuous existence of the hippies.[217]

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[214]Ibid.

[215]Ibid.

[216]Ibid., p. 30.

[217]Streiker and Del Soldo, p. 107.

Streiker and Del Soldo then go on to devote a section to each of the questions they have posed:

## What produced them?

> Our grey world of self-alienation produced
> and destroys the love generation, the idealistic
> and irresponsible "Hippies" . . .
> The hippie and his religion cannot be
> understood apart from the society which unwillingly
> produced them.  Basically, the hippie is the child
> of the tension between the alphabetical and
> electronic epochs so skilfully delineated by
> Marshall McLuhan.[218]

## What are they seeking?

> The hippie flees the total externality
> of the life which his elders offer him.  Most
> of his peers are content with a so-called
> liberal education which forces a stream of
> unrelated facts through the youthful conscious-
> ness, numbing the neophyte and forever arresting
> his ability to seek patterns of coherence and
> meaning.
> The hippie turns to the psychedelic high priests,
> men of their parents' generation who offer the
> youthful seeker what all religions promise--
> meaning, intensity, and community.  The gurus
> of hippiedom extend all three in and through a
> sacrament, a key experience upon which the
> hippie way of life depends.[219]

## The psychedelic experience

> Exactly what happens during an LSD trip
> cannot be reduced to concepts of scientific
> jargon.  Any profound experience outstrips
> even the most scrupulous conceptualization. . .
> The hippies have come to realize the sacramental
> dimension, the numinous depths, the intense
> satisfactions of their new, free life.  Drugs
> have opened their eyes but are unnecessary to
> sustain their vision.[220]

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[218]Ibid.

[219]Ibid., p. 108.

[220]Ibid., pp. 108-9.

## The hippie "theology"

The realization that their elders have
found only meaninglessness and frustration
in the moral aphorisms and religious dogmas
of the past produces a fundamental pessimism
in the hippies. But pessimism, the cold and
loveless cynicism of youth, is not the answer.
Only a free life will suffice.
The way, the truth, and the life is to
be found in a realization of one's deepest
self. The same divine presence which reveals
itself as being, consciousness, and bliss in
the psychedelic experience is at the very
core of human personality. As the Hindu
Upanishadic tradition proclaims, the Atman
(true self) and Brahman (the divine spirit)
are identical. The religious path is the
progressive discovery and actualization of
one's true self, what the hippies term "doing
your own thing."[221]

## Hippie community

The hippie concern for community initially
grew from his concern about "where, when and
with whom you trip." The importance of
preparation received an emphasis similar to
that directed to rites of purification in
many religions. Inadequate preparation
has been considered foolhardy from the
beginning of the psychedelic movement. . .
The various forms of social life among
the hippies, reminiscent of America's great
utopian experiments, range from Drop City near
Trinidad, Colorado, with its score of writers,
painters, and general scroungers to the
Eleventh Street Diggers Commune on the Lower
East Side of New York, described as "the busiest
communal pad and hippie rescue shelter in town."
Soup kitchens, clinics, the Neo-American
Church, impromptu concerts, hippie "non-families"
of poster designers, the Hip Job Co-op are only
a few manifestations of the hippies' acute
sense of community. Hippies in Canada, England,
France, the Netherlands, Germany, and India
together with the American "pioneers" form
a Buberian community of communes.[222]

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[221]Ibid., p. 109.

[222]Ibid., pp. 110-11.

## The future

> What is the future of the psychedelic movement? What could be its future? Last month Ron Thelin closed the Psychedelic Ship in Haight-Ashbury and declared that hippie was dead. . . The hippie is leaving the scene, and the new man is symbolized in Haight by the "Digger"--the man with free soup, social ideas and a gun. The new man is the man portrayed in Kenneth Anger's film Scorpio Rising. His proto-types are the activists of the new left and the drug-crazed cyclist traveling in an anti-social wolf pack.[223]

## The future of psychedelics

> Although the use of LSD is illegal, it is spreading like prairie fire. . .
> Without spiritual guidance and scientific control, the hazards far outweigh any possible gains.
> What lessons can be learned from the hippies? Perhaps they have made us aware, expanded our minds, re-awakened our senses and sensuality, reminded us of our own hunger for the experience of a living God. At least they have forbidden us to cry peace where there is no peace and to realize once again our failure to answer ultimate questions. If the hippies' elders are unwilling or unable to respond, who will answer?[224]

What can be said of these three articles? Although all are about generalized issues, none exhibit the logical analysis, the argument from philosophical principles, explanations in philosophical terminology, or intellectual moves one usually associates with technical philosophy. Each article lacks indicators which might identify it with one of the current approaches to philosophy, such as existentialism, phenomenology, linguistic analysis, positivism, pragmatism

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[223]Ibid., p. 111.

[224]Ibid., pp. 111-112.

and so forth. Yet, these articles are labeled 'social philosophy'.

Upon reflection most philosophers would agree that such use of 'social philosophy' indicates a meaning different from the one indicated when 'social philosophy' is used to refer to a specific branch of technical philosophy.

Using 'social philosophy' to designate articles such as the three cited above is somewhat like the use of 'philosophy' when someone speaks of an administrator's "philosophy of health care delivery," a person's "philosophy of life," or an author's "philosophy of writing." Using 'social philosophy' to designate articles of technical philosophy from a specific branch of the philosophical enterprise is like the use of 'philosophy' when someone speaks of "the philosophy of Hume" or of "majoring in philosophy." Surely these usages are different; they indicate different sorts of things. "Social philosophy' has at least two meanings.

Social philosophy as a generic term. Excluding the popular use of 'social philosophy' and the technical use in which 'social philosophy' means a specific branch of the philosophical enterprise, there is still another meaning and use for 'social philosophy'. Sometimes the term can be employed as a generic term. 'Social philosophy' can mean some or all those specific branches of technical philosophy which are concerned with society or groups. This meaning of 'social philosophy' includes within its extension, for example,

philosophy of law, political philosophy and ethics. Here, 'social philosophy' performs a function in talk about philosophy somewhat like that of 'value theory'. It indicates branches of philosophy which have similar subject matter.

The existence of this meaning for social philosophy is evidenced in the classification of an article such as "The Concept of Freedom: A Framework for the Study of Civilizations" by Mordecai Roshwald[225] under 'social philosophy' alone and not under 'ethics', 'political philosophy' or 'philosophy of law' also.[226] This single classification exists despite the fact that the author discusses: "law, moral principles, custom, vogue, (and) aesthetic notions,"[227] and these discussions play a significant part in the major thesis of the article. Other such examples are found by the careful reader. "Josiah Royce and the American Race Problem" by William T. Fontaine[228] includes both Royce's analysis of a social issue and discussion of his ethics. The article is classified, however, as 'social philosophy' alone.[229] This

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[225]Mordecai Roshwald, "The Concept of Freedom: A Framework for the Study of Civilizations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXX (September, 1969), pp. 102-12.

[226]Lineback, 1969, p. 189.

[227]Roshwald, p. 103.

[228]William T. Fontaine, "Josiah Royce and the American Race Problem," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIX (December, 1968), pp. 282-88.

[229]Lineback, 1969, p. 188.

only makes sense if 'social philosophy' is being used in the generic sense indicated above.

Of course someone might claim that the classifications of these articles are simply classificatory errors. They do not provide evidence of a generic sense to 'social philosophy'. Such a claim would not be made, however, by anyone familiar with the corpus of social philosophy. A thorough reading of articles and books titled or classified 'social philosophy' indicates an incredibly high number of 'social philosophy' items of a kind similar to the articles noted above. Philosophers do in fact use the term in this generic sense. One could claim that these philosophers are all wrong but such a claim does not make sense. No overwhelming argument is apparent which favors excluding the generic sense of the term. Practitioners in the field do seem to use the term in this generic sense, and, as will be shown in Chapter VII, the careful use of this meaning of the term as well as the other meanings indicated earlier in this paper, resolves many of the apparent confusions noted in Chapter I.

Three meanings. Given the above analysis and the evidence put forth to sustain it, it appears that there are at least three possible meanings for 'social philosophy':

social philosophy$_1$ indicates a specific branch of the technical philosophical enterprise.

social philosophy$_2$ indicates some or all the specific

branches of the technical philosophical enter-

prise which are concerned with society or groups.

social philosophy$_3$ indicates work on social issues

which, though serious, is not technical philos-

ophy.[230]

If one were to analyze the relations among these

meanings one would see:

1. All three terms are alike in that they refer to

   work dealing with social issues, society or groups.

2. The extension of social philosophy$_1$ and social

   philosophy$_2$ is within that of technical philoso-

   phy, while the extension of social philosophy$_3$

   falls outside the extension of technical philos-

   ophy.

3. The extension of social philosophy$_2$ is greater

   than that of social philosophy$_1$. Indeed social

   philosophy$_1$ is a member of the extension of

   social philosophy$_2$.

When a single term in English has multiple meanings the

usual way to indicate which meaning is intended is to embed

the term in a specifying context. This ordinary means of

specifying meaning often fails in the case of 'social

philosophy' because the sentential contexts for all three

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[230]It should be noted that works of sociology would be
classified as social philosophy$_3$ and not social philosophy$_1$
or social philosophy$_2$. This study offers and will use the
following hortatory definition of sociology. Sociology is
a descriptive science which analyzes or explains social
phenomena.

meanings are so similar. All three are used in sentences classifying ideas, publications or intellectual work. Thus, this paper has introduced and will use the subscript convention to keep the three meanings separate.

The relation of 'social philosophy$_1$', 'social philosophy$_2$' and 'social philosophy$_3$' to 'ethics'. Since the aim of this paper is to clarify the extensional relation of 'social philosophy' to that branch of the philosophical enterprise called 'ethics' and since it has been shown that 'social philosophy' has at least three different meanings, some clarification will be offered for each of these meanings. It should be noted, however, that a greater effort for clarification will be made between 'social philosophy$_1$' and 'ethics', since from the beginning this paper has indicated that its subject is that branch of philosophy called 'social philosophy'.[231]

The extension for the meaning of the term 'social philosophy$_3$' and that of the branch of philosophy called 'ethics' cannot possibly intersect at all since social philosophy$_3$ falls outside the scope of technical philosophy while ethics, as a branch of technical philosophy, must fall

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[231]See: Above p. 2.

within the scope of technical philosophy.[232]

The extension for the meaning of the term 'social philosophy$_2$' and that of the branch of philosophy called 'ethics' must partially intersect but each has an area which does not intersect with the other. Since 'social philosophy$_2$' is a general term whose meaning extends to those branches of philosophy which are concerned with society or social issues; and since ethics is a branch of philosophy whose domain includes social concerns, the extensions of 'social philosophy$_2$' and 'ethics' intersect. At the same time social philosophy$_2$ includes items other than ethics, e.g., philosophy of law and political philosophy. So too, ethics includes areas which are not about social concerns.

The extension of the meaning of the term 'social philosophy$_1$' in relation to the extension of the meaning of 'ethics' as a branch of philosophy is more difficult to ascertain. This study has already shown, however, that 'alienation' is a topic belonging to that branch of technical philosophy called 'social philosophy' i.e., social philosophy$_1$.[233] It has also been shown that 'the nature of

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[232]This researcher believes that the term 'ethics' may prove to have as many meanings as 'social philosophy'. Perhaps it would be accurate to draw a parallel structure and speak of 'ethics$_1$,' 'ethics$_2$' and 'ethics$_3$'. Such a study would be very useful to this thesis, but it is not necessary for the completion of the work outlined in the introduction of the thesis. Hence, there is no attempt to study or establish varied meanings for ethics in this paper. Ethics is taken in the usual sense of a specific branch of philosophy.

[233]See: Above pp. 75-98.

morality' and 'deontological' are topics of ethics.[234]  It

has not been shown, however, that 'alienation' is not a

topic of ethics and the 'nature of morality' or 'deonto-

logical'[235] is not a topic of social philosophy$_1$.  This will

be done now.

What sort of argument can one advance to establish this

point?

1.  One could argue out of empirical evidence showing

(1) that The Philosophers Index never cross-indexes these

topics so that articles on 'alienation' fall under ethics or

articles in 'the nature of morality' or 'deontological' fall

under social philosophy[236] and (2) that books on ethics do

not list 'alienation' as a topic of ethics and books on

social philosophy do not list the 'nature of morality' or

'deontological' as a topic of social philosophy.  However,

such an argument is weak.  It establishes only that it is

not or has not been the case that these subjects have been

considered within both fields.  It does not establish that

it cannot or ought not be the case.

2.  In keeping with philosophical precedents one might

wish to argue the issue on grounds of its obviousness, i.e.,

Any person understanding each topic mentioned would see that

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[234]See:  Above pp. 72-75.

[235]Since The Philosopher's Index used the term 'deonto-
logical' rather than 'deontology' the former is retained
throughout this study.

[236]Lineback, 1967, 1968, 1969.

the topic can belong to only one of the two branches of philosophy mentioned.

This argument, though in some ways attractive, is also weak. One cannot claim that a sentence affirming 'alienation' as a term or topic proper to social philosophy but not proper to ethics or one affirming the 'nature of morality' or 'deontological' as proper to ethics but not to social philosophy, is an analytic sentence. Thus any claim of obviousness cannot be grounded in analyticity or logical obviousness. To claim that the statement is obvious in some psychological sense--that "of course the rational person would clearly see it in his mind" is also weak. What one "sees" is often culturally conditioned. There is no reason, even if every person known to us "saw" the point in question, why a rational person with other cultural experiences from another time or place could honestly "not see" what is obvious to the "seeing" group. The history of philosophy is strewn with assertions which were originally claimed to be obvious in this psychological sense and later abandoned as non-obvious.

3. Another way to try to establish the claim would be to show the absence of contrary claims or contrary evidence. This method might provide a more successful way of using the evidence cited in the first argument. First, one can note that the philosophical literature appears to lack any works arguing either that 'alienation' is a topic of ethics or that the 'nature of morality' or 'deontological'

is a topic of social philosophy₁. Second, one can note the absence of contrary evidence: The editors of The Philosophers Index to not cross-index the topics. After examining the Tables of Contents and indexes of a number of works in ethics and social philosophy, it can be stated that none of the ethical works list 'alienation' as a topic of ethics and none of the social philosophy books list the 'nature of morality' or 'deontological' as a topic of social philosophy.[237] Given the fact that these topics have been a part of philosophy for some time and given the vitality of

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[237]Works in ethics include: Raziel Abelson, Ethics and Metaethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), pp. xi-xiii, 565-574. Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. ix-xiii, 529-538. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930), pp. xxxi-xxxii, 576-596. William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. xiii-xiv, 103-109. Thomas E. Hill, Ethics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956), pp. ix-xiii, 419-431. Oliver A. Johnson (ed.), Ethics (New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1958), pp. vii-ix, 533-546. Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed. and Trans.), Contemporary European Ethics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972) pp. ix-x, 487-490. A.I. Melden, Ethical Theories (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), pp. vii-viii, 375-386. Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics, Trans. David Rynin (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), pp. ix-xii, 211-217. Wilbur Marshall Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930), pp. xi-473-476. Works in social philosophy include: Robert N. Beck, Perspectives in Social Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pp. vii-x, 461-468. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp. xi-xii, 123-126. Daya Krishna, Social Philosophy Past and Future (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969), pp. v, 81-82. Martin G. Plattel, Social Philosophy, Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series No. 18 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. vii-x, 342-346. Mahadera Prosad, Social Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Allahabad, India: Vishwavidyalays Prakastam Gorakshpur, 1958), pp. ix-xii, 333-342.

of ethical debates during the last century and the recent
revival of social philosophy studies, it would seem that if
a contrary claim were reasonable, it would have been made by
now.

4.   There is still another, and by far a stronger, way
to establish the point in question.  One can argue from the
nature of the topics themselves:

a.   'Alienation' certainly cannot be a 'meta-
ethical' question as the term 'metaethical' is used
by contemporary ethicians.  Thus, if it were an ethical
topic it would have to be a second order theoretical
issue or a problem issue.  Now all discussions of
second order ethical topics or problem topics of ethics,
unless they are historical in nature, are either value
oriented or normative.  However, discussions of alien-
ation per se are not value discussions nor are they
normative discussions.  They usually include an analy-
sis of the concept or phenomenon, or an examination of
its causes or effects or argument to show existence of
the phenomenon, or tracing the development of the
concept.  Thus, since alienation is not a meta-ethical
issue, nor are discussions of alienation of either a
value or normative kind, it is clear that the topic
does not belong to the domain of ethics.

Of course one can generate ethical topics from the
topic of alienation.  One can ask if alienation is
morally good or morally evil.  One can ask if one ought

to remedy alienation or if alienation is so debili-

tating that it frees one from moral responsibility.

Such discussions, however, are not discussions of

alienation per se. They are similar to discussions

about truth which concern themselves with one's duty to

seek the truth, or the moral rightness of primarily

seeking speculative rather than practical knowledge.

Such discussions belong to ethics, but discussions of

truth per se or of speculative and practical knowledge

per se do not belong to ethics. These are subjects for

epistemology. So it is with discussions of alienation.

Alienation in itself is a topic belonging to the domain

of social philosophy$_1$ and not ethics, although one can

ask ethical questions about alienation.

b. The 'nature of morality' and 'deontological'

form similar cases. As indicated in Chapter V, both

these topics are second order theoretical topics in

ethics. If a social philosopher inquires about these

topics either he is doing ethics or he is concerned

with the topic in an accidental way.

In the case of 'deontological' another point can

be made. This term is one which only makes sense in an

ethical context. Like 'refraction', 'libido' or

'kerygma', 'deontological' is what Norwood Russell Han-

son calls a "theory laden" term.[238] Each was generated

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[238]Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cam-
bridge: The University Press, 1972), pp. 54-69.

for a specific discipline and only retains its primary meaning in the context of that discipline. Thus, discussions of 'deontological' per se only make sense in ethics and cannot make sense in social philosophy$_1$.

Given the lack of evidence of any opposing claim and given the evidence in favor of the stated claim, it appears that the only logical conclusion is that 'alienation' per se is a topic of social philosophy$_1$ and not of ethics and that the 'nature of morality' and 'deontological' are topics of ethics and not of social philosophy$_1$.

Since it has been shown that at least one topic of social philosophy$_1$ is not a topic of ethics and that at least one topic of ethics is not a topic of social philosophy$_1$ it has been shown that neither domain is a proper sub-set of the other and that it is correct to state that social philosophy$_1$ and ethics are extensionally distinct.

Of course this distinction rests, at present, on an extremely limited basis. Surely one would wish to expand the list of topics proper to one but not both areas of philosophy. Social philosophy$_1$ might include in its distinctive subject matter community, collectivity, and the individual-communal relation, while ethics might include obligation, supererogation, and responsibility. What of all the other topics or questions considered in these fields? Unless one is satisfied with a reductionist view of the branches of philosophy, one recognizes that some

topics properly belong to one branch but not another. However, one needs criteria on which judgements as to what topics are proper to which branches are made. What are these criteria?

It is obvious that this researcher believes that the actual practice of philosophers, what ethicians do consider and what social philosophers$_1$ do consider as they philosophize, is of paramount importance. Actual practice is a major criterion.

Other criteria might be generated from reflection on the nature of those two branches of philosophy.

One possible approach to distinguishing the natures of branches of philosophy is to consider them in the light of their value and/or normative content and form. The reader has already seen that such an approach is useful in trying to distinguish topics of social philosophy, from topics of ethics.[239] It may be that this approach would be quite fruitful.

In this approach ethics and aesthetics would be paradigmatic of value, normative studies. Epistemology and metaphysics would be among the least value, normative studies. Branches of philosophy such as philosophy of person and social philosophy$_1$ would occupy a position somewhere between these extremes. Thus one could consider the branches of philosophy on a value, normative continuum:

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[239]See: Above pp. 146-148.

| Ethics<br>Aesthetics | Philosophy of Man<br>Social Philosophy | Epistemology<br>Metaphysics |
|---|---|---|
| Value<br>Normative | | Non-value<br>Non-normative |

Such a consideration could lead to distinguishing criteria
for social philosophy$_1$ and ethics, for example, considera-
tions of value(s) per se would belong to ethics or
aesthetics and not social philosophy$_1$. A careful pursuit
of this approach might lead to other criteria, however,
this could be a topic for another study. It was not the
aim of this study to examine the nature of social
philosophy$_1$ and ethics per se, nor to pursue an intensional
definition. It was to consider the correctness of
distinguishing 'social philosophy' from 'ethics' if the
distinction is grounded in topical content. This has been
done as the next chapter indicates.

## VII.   CONCLUSION

This chapter will re-state each of the three questions raised in Chapter I and will answer them in the light of the work completed.

Question 1.   Is it correct to make a distinction between 'social philosophy' and 'ethics' and ground this in a distinction of topical content?

The only answer possible, in light of the work completed, is an affirmative one; the distinction is correct. It has been shown that the distinction holds for all three meanings of 'social philosophy'.  Social philosophy$_1$ and ethics are distinct because, although the topical domains may intersect, each branch of philosophy has at least one topic in its domain which is not also a topic of the other branch of philosophy.[240]  Social philosophy$_2$ and ethics are distinct because, again although their domains intersect, each extends to topics not within the extension of the other area.[241]  Finally, the distinction holds between social philosophy$_3$ and ethics since their topical domains do not intersect at all.[242]

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[240]See:  Above pp. 146-148.

[241]See:  Above p. 142.

[242]See:  Above pp. 141-142.

Question 2. How does the correctness of this distinction affect the apparent confusions over classification of topics cited in the opening sections of this paper? Can it resolve any or all of these confusions?

The apparatus assembled to ascertain the correctness of the distinction makes possible some resolution of all the confusions. Some of the confusions, however, are resolved more satisfactorily than others, as will be noted later.

In considering those confusions the original presentation will be restated for the convenience of the reader. Each will be considered in the order of its original presentation.

The first two confusions noted in Chapter I arise because it is assumed that 'social philosophy' has one meaning, i.e., a specific branch of philosophy. If the distinctions between social philosophy$_1$, social philosophy$_2$ and social philosophy$_3$ are observed and the varied meanings are applied carefully, the apparent confusions disappear.

> Books entitled 'social philosophy' often describe their subject matter as that of other philosophical areas and the areas included in such descriptions are not constant. If one considers works from a variety of historical periods one finds that, for example, the preface to The Social Philosophy of John Taylor of Caroline begins: "The aim of this book is to present in a systematic form the political and economic thought of one of the most thorough-going exponents of Jeffersonian democracy"; while the author of The Social Philosophy of English Idealism states: "By their (English idealists) social philosophy, I mean that part of their work which was concerned with human life in society, in particular their ethics and political theory"; and The Social Philosophy of Rodbertus tries "to

combine into a systematic whole, the social
and economic teachings of Rodbertus."[243]

Reflecting on the material in Chapter VI, it becomes
obvious that each of these book titles utilizes social
philosophy$_2$ because each includes in the domain of social
philosophy exogenous areas or branches of philosophy as well
as social philosophy$_1$. Now social philosophy$_2$ indicates
some or all the branches of philosophy which deal with
social issues.[244] Thus it is no problem that each author
chooses some and not all areas of philosophy and it is no
problem that each author chooses to include different areas
from the set of all those available for inclusion.

> Even within books of the same era there is little
> agreement. If one considers the contents of
> three works published within the same era
> (1965-1973), Joel Feinberg's Social Philosophy,
> Daya Krishna's Social Philosophy and Martin
> Plattel's Social Philosophy, one finds not a
> single topic common to all.[245]

This confusion also disappears when one reviews the
Tables of Contents of each of these three books in light of
the meanings for social philosophy$_1$, social philosophy$_2$ and
social philosophy$_3$.

Consider Joel Feinberg's Social Philosophy. Despite
Feinberg's claim that he is considering only those social
issues which are left over from other works in the

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[243]See: Above pp. 3-4.

[244]See: Above pp. 138-139.

[245]See: Above p. 4.

Foundations of Philosophy[246] series it is apparent from the following Table of Contents that he is dealing with social philosophy$_2$.

CONTENTS

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[246]Feinberg, p. 1.

Obviously, ethics and philosophy of law are considered in this work. Feinberg has authored Social Philosophy$_2$.

In considering Daya Krishna's book one reads in his FOREWARD:

> These lectures continue the theme of my earlier book Considerations Towards a Theory of Social Change, though they form a self-contained whole and possess a unity of their own independent of the earlier work. They seek to focus attention on an aspect of thought about man and society which most scientists and philosophers happen to miss; that is, the effect of their thought in shaping human and social reality itself. Man's thought about himself and society is not causally ineffective. But if this be accepted, its implications have to be understood by all those who concern themselves with society and man in any capacity whatsoever. The present lectures attempt to spell out these implications for the attention of the social scientists and philosophers for consideration and discussion.
>
> The past civilizations, in this context, are treated as the result of the ways in which men conceived of themselves and society and the two of the most significant among them, the Indian and the Western, are singled out and discussed as paradigmatic cases illustrating the basic

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[247]Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

contentions of these lectures. An attempt is
made to provide a focal concept around which
the thinking in the social sciences may be
organized and which may bridge the gap, and
provide the continuity between the great typal
civilizations of the past and open the way for
their fecundating relationship with the present
and the future.

Freedom, it is suggested, is such a concept
and if it be given an operational definition and
subjected to quantitative criteria of measurement,
it might provide an effective guide to the policy
sciences which seem so much in demand today by the
planner and the politician. The link between the
mathematical concept of model and utopia is
explained and it is suggested that the building
of scientifically articulated utopias should be
the task of the social scientist of the future.[248]

There is enough here to alert the reader to the fact
that this may include sociology as well as technical
philosophy.

The Table of Contents re-inforces this idea since
"measuring rods" are instruments of the social sciences:

## C O N T E N T S

If one moves on to study the text one finds a continued
mixture of sociology and technical philosophy. Krishna

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[248]Krishna, pp. i-ii.

[249]Ibid., p. iii.

opens his first chapter with a series of questions:

> What sort of a thing is society which the
> social scientist so avidly studies? Is it
> something completely independent of the way
> human beings think about it and conceive it to
> be? Or, is it affected in its very being by
> the way men think about it and conceive it to
> be? Has it, so to say, an essence of its own
> which men have only to find and discover? Or,
> is it something like what the existentialists
> say about man; that is, something that has no
> essence of its own, but something which is
> made and created out of the infinite choices
> of diverse men?[250]

After long, serious reflections on whether asking

'What is Society?' is more like asking 'What is Man?' or if

it is more like asking 'What is Nature?':

> The question 'What is Society?', then, seems
> far more akin to the question 'What is Man?'
> than say, 'What is Nature?' However much the
> dichotomy between Nature and Man may go against
> our instinct for seeking a unified knowledge
> and abhorrence of anything but a unitary reality,
> we cannot but note the radical distinctions
> between them even with respect to the processes
> of knowledge. The way we conceive Nature does
> not seem to affect in any significant way the
> natural processes themselves. Their independence
> of knowledge is the very condition of the seeking
> of truth in this realm. But can we say the same
> with respect to either Man or Society? Will it
> be really true to say that the way we conceive of
> man and society does not affect the way they are
> or the way they have been or even the way they
> will be? Is not the way we conceive them to be
> intimately bound up with what they actually come
> to be? In case this be the situation to even
> the least imaginable extent, it would be
> positively disastrous to foster the illusion that
> our conceptual activity with respect to these
> objects can be value-neutral in the same sense as
> our conceptual activity is supposed to be with
> respect to natural objects. If it be true in any
> sense that man and society are deeply affected by
> the way we conceive them to be, then it is an

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[250]Ibid., p. 1.

imperative duty to make ourselves and others
aware of the value-implications of our conceptions
and hold ourselves responsible for the same . . .[251]

and some discussions concerning the characteristics of

conceptual adequacy:

> Before we do this, however, let us reflect a
> little over the notion of the adequacy of a
> concept without any reference to those domains
> or subject-matters where the concept-forming
> activity may itself be said to make a difference
> to what is attempted to be grasped or formulated
> in the concept.  In other words, what makes for
> the adequacy of a concept?  Shall we say that it
> is the correctness of its reflection of the
> reality it concerns itself with?  Or, is it the
> success of the action based on the presupposition
> that the concept correctly reflects the causal
> relationships obtaining among phenomena?  Or,
> is it just a tool whose adequacy is basically
> judged by what we want to use it for?  Even in the
> context of cognitive activity, there may be a
> diversity of concepts having essentially
> different functions which cooperatively help in
> leading the activity to a successful conclusion.
> Whatever the choice we may make between these and
> even several other alternatives, at least one
> characteristic shall be found implicitly or
> explicitly in them all.  This basically consists
> in their judging the adequacy of a conceptual
> formulation in terms of its capacity to lead to
> successful action . . .[252]

and then further reflections on our conception of society,

he ends the chapter:

> If the distinction between nature and society
> be once conceded and if it be admitted that the
> way we conceive society tends to shape the
> society in that direction too, then the
> necessity for a self-conscious explication of
> the value-presuppositions and the value-
> consequences of the particular way in which
> society is proposed to be conceived will have to
> be admitted by everybody. . . In this series

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[251]Ibid., p. 2.

[252]Ibid., p. 4.

of lectures. . . I should like to draw your
attention to a basic typal difference in the way
in which society can be conceived.  The only
difference that I would like to emphasize and
bring to explicit consciousness for consideration
and comment here concerns the way in which we
ultimately conceive society to be.  It may be
conceived either as the last term in our thought
in terms of which we want to understand everything
else or only as an intermediate term beyond which
there are other terms to which it is instrumental
or subservient in a final sense.  In a sense, we
live, move and have our being only in and
through society. What we think, feel, consider
beautiful or ugly, right or wrong, is determined
by the fact that we are social beings.  It is
thus conceived as the equivalent of God, and
many sociologists think and proclaim it to be
so.  In fact, God Himself is supposed to be a
projected image of the society in the mind of the
particular individual.  On the other hand, it
seems difficult to believe that society would
show even its specific traits, were it not
constituted of human individuals who must at
least be conceived to have latent possibility
in them for engaging in ideal pursuits.

The question 'What is Society?' is closely
linked to the question 'What is a human
individual?' and the one cannot be answered
independently of the other.  The sociologist
is, in a sense, an interested party in the
debate.  By his training and profession he
gradually gets committed to the ultimacy of
society as the last term of human thought in
terms of which everything else is to be
understood.  He sees everything as rooted in
a social nexus and as subserving a social
end.  Whether it be, science or religion, art
or morality, love or friendship, each is
rooted in society and subserves a social function
or end.  Durkheim is the classic name associated
with such a standpoint.  But he is not alone,
nor even in a minority.  Rather, he articulates
explicitly what is implicit in the writings
of others.  Every sociologist subscribes to
his dictum, whether implicitly or explicitly.
Society is his God, at least professionally.

But, however persuasive, it is not necessary.
Society need not be conceived as the last term
of human thought.  The centrality may be
restored to the human individual who, then may
be viewed as the nucleus of the social cell from
which all creativity emanates and originates.

In this perspective, then society would be
conceived as a facilitating mechanism so that
the individual may pursue his trans-social
ends.  Instead of art or religion, friendship
or love, being seen as lubricating oil for the
functioning of the social machine, the machine
itself would be seen as facilitating the
emergence and pursuit of various values and
its efficiency judged in terms of that
performance.

The two conceptions are opposed ways of
conceiving society and turn basically on the
primacy we give to the individual or society
in our thought.  As the way we conceive affects
the way we become, the choice between the two
ways of conceiving becomes a valuational choice
also.  The cognitive task in such a situation is
to make the value-implications explicit and to
spell out the possible achievements and perversions
within the ambit of one conception or the other.
Ideal type constructions may be helpful in
throwing into bold relief the diverse possibilities
involved in the various choices.  Similarly, if
we could find some rough parallels in historical
cultures which have predominantly conceived
society in one way rather than another, it might
be helpful in giving a concrete feel to the
things we are saying.  Keeping both these things
in mind, we shall designate the two ultimate
contrasts I have sketched above as the Western
and the Indian respectively.  These give rise to
two types of value-achievements, two types of
value-perversions and two types of predicaments
which we shall try to delineate in the next
lecture.  Each society, in this perspective, may
be seen as the perversion of a basic value-
insight which is apprehended by a few and
vulgarly interpreted by the many.[253]

There is much in this selection which is evocative of

technical philosophy and much that is sociological.  Surely

the work is sociological in intent, yet many passages and

whole sections seem philosophical in both content and form.

The book is a mixture.  It appears that Daya Krishna has

written a work which could be categorized as social

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[253]Ibid., pp. 9-11.

philosophy$_1$ or social philosophy$_2$ and social philosophy$_3$.[254] The plausibility of such a combination arising from this author is recognized when one notes Daya Krishna's background. He has been a professor of philosophy at Rajasthan University since 1963. Previous to that appointment he was in the Institute of Philosophy at Delhi University and was associated with a UNESCO project on research trends in humanities and the social sciences.[255]

Finally, one considers Martin Plattel's <u>Social Philosophy</u>. The book is in two parts and the chapter headings for part one definitely suggest a work of social philosophy$_1$:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

EXISTENCE IS CO-EXISTENCE

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[254]It is stated that the work could be categorized as social philosophy$_1$ or social philosophy$_2$. The discussions concerning the nature of society are surely social philosophy$_1$, however, this paper has not discussed the proper sphere of freedom. If one were to argue that its discussion belongs to social philosophy$_1$ then Krishna's book would be of social philosophy$_1$ and social philosophy$_3$. If, however, one were to argue that discussions about freedom belong to social philosophy$_2$ then the work would be classified as social philosophy$_2$ and social philosophy$_3$. This researcher leans toward the latter, however, the point is moot and it need not be definitively resolved in order to settle the original confusion under discussion.

[255]S. Satyajuit (ed.), <u>India Who's Who 1973</u>, (New Delhi: INFA Publications, 1973), p. 447.

CHAPTER ONE--The Philosophical Attitude

CHAPTER TWO--The Inescapable Experience of
            Being-A-Person as Co-Existence

CHAPTER THREE--Person and Community

CHAPTER FOUR--The Mystery of Being-Together-
             in-the-World

Part two, however, indicates social philosophy[2]:

PART TWO

MAN IN SOCIETY

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[256]Plattel, pp. vii-ix.

Since social philosophy$_1$ is included in the extension of social philosophy$_2$, this work can be classified as social philosophy$_2$ also.

Thus in reviewing the books one finds that: Joel Feinberg's book is one of social philosophy$_2$; Daya Krishna's book is one of social philosophy$_1$ $_{or}$ $_2$ and social philosophy$_3$ and Martin Plattel's is social philosophy$_2$. Whether Krishna's book proves to be social philosophy$_1$ or social philosophy$_2$, the confusion is still resolvable. If all three books embody social philosophy$_2$, by definition one does not expect commonality of issues in social philosophy$_2$. If one work is social philosophy$_1$ and social philosophy$_3$, while the others are social philosophy$_2$, one again would not expect all three to embody common topics. One could only expect commonality if the term 'social philosophy' was used univocally.

The work of this paper also provides a resolution to the last three confusions related in Chapter I. Consider

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[257]Ibid., pp. ix-x.

the issues:

3. When one makes a further study of the specific topics covered by books designated as 'social philosophy', one finds many topics which are also considered in works in other branches of philosophy. For example, freedom (determinism/indeterminism), duty (obligation), justice, natural law and natural right which appear in the tables of contents of several volumes of social philosophy also appear in the tables of contents of ethical works. Then, too, ownership (property), rights and social contract appear in works both of social philosophy and political philosophy.[258]

4. Even a reference work such as The Philosopher's Index reveals puzzling classifications concerning social philosophy. Sometimes articles included under a particular topic are uniformly included or excluded from the category of social philosophy. For example, articles on Peace are included in the category of social philosophy while no article on Justice is so included. In a number of cases, however, articles listed under the same particular topic are not uniformly classified under the areas of philosophy. For example, articles on Right, Human Values, Freedom, Equality/Inequality are sometimes listed as social philosophy and sometimes as ethics. An article on Powerlessness is classified as ethics while those dealing with Power are classified as social philosophy. Further puzzles include the classification of articles on Obscenity as social philosophy and those on Punishment as ethics.[259]

5. Finally, the results of the above brief survey reveal other disagreements over the scope of 'social philosophy'. Comparing the classification of topics cited in point three above with those of point four, one realizes that the authors of the books used for point three do not agree with the editors of The Philosopher's Index on the classification of Justice.[260]

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[258]See: Above pp. 4-5.

[259]See: Above pp. 5-6.

[260]See: Above p. 6.

One way of resolving all these confusions is to claim that each use of social philosophy is an example of social philosophy$_2$.

This dissolves the problem stated in number three. Since social philosophy$_2$ includes other branches of philosophy in its extension, there is no problem to finding ethics and political philosophy dealing with freedom, duty, justice, natural law and natural right.

The problem stated in number four also dissolves through the use of social philosophy$_2$. One can claim that Right, Human, Values, Freedom, Equality/Inequality and Power/Powerlessness are topics in the domain of social philosophy$_2$. This would justify the fact that articles on these topics are cross-indexed under other branches of philosophy. One might also wish to argue that Obscenity and Punishment are topics of social philosophy$_2$. It could be claimed that it was just coincidental that articles written on Obscenity from 1967-1969 did not consider ethical aspects of the issue and that those written on Punishment did not consider the political or social aspects of the issue.[261]

The fifth problem can be resolved in like manner by stating that Justice belongs to social philosophy$_2$. It is

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[261]One might also wish to argue that the editors of The Philosopher's Index made a category mistake in not cross-indexing the article. Either claim would resolve the issue. It is not important to this paper which claim is actually made, only that the issue could be resolved. See pp. 168-170 for further discussion of this point.

considered under several branches of philosophy in the literature.[262] Again it may simply be a fact that articles written on the subject during the three-year period did not consider aspects other than the ethical or that the editors of The Philosopher's Index made an error in indexing.[263]

This researcher recognizes the aptness of the above resolution. She also recognizes that given the current degree of non-formalization of social philosophy$_1$ as a branch of the philosophical enterprise this may be the only resolution that is possible at this time.[264] However, she experiences a certain dissatisfaction with the resolution. Unlike the resolutions to the first two problems this one seems to avoid possible complexities of the issues involved. Hence, another resolution procedure is suggested.

It would seem useful to examine every book noted for problem four and every article indexed under the topics listed in problem five. These should be classified as social philosophy$_1$, social philosophy$_2$ and social

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[262]See:  Above p. 4.

[263]See:  Above p. 166, footnote 260, for further discussion of this issue.

[264]If social philosophy$_1$ were more formalized with a strong community of reference persons and a precise disciplinary ideal, one could be much more precise about which topics are completely within its domain, which are partially within its domain and which fall outside its domain. Such clarity might reveal that some topics here classified as belonging to more than one branch of philosophy do in fact only belong to one branch, either social philosophy$_1$ or some other. However, this is not the state of the enterprise at this time.

philosophy$_3$. Such classification would be useful as a start to defining the extensional meanings of 'social philosophy' more precisely.

First, works falling into social philosophy$_3$ could be duly ignored as technical philosophy. If it is found that all works on certain topics are always in the extension of social philosophy$_3$ and never in the extension of social philosophy$_1$ and social philosophy$_2$, some basis for labeling those topics as 'non-philosophical' in the technical sense is established. On the other hand it may be found that no topic is exclusively social philosophy$_3$ and a basis might be established for claiming that no social issue is outside the domain of technical philosophy.

Second, in categorizing works as social philosophy$_1$ or social philosophy$_2$ some possibilities could be checked which might lead to further clarification of the proper domains of social philosophy$_1$ and social philosophy$_2$. One might find, for example, any of the following:

a.   All articles or books concerned with a given topic might be included in the extension of social philosophy$_1$ and not in the extension of any of the other branches of philosophy included in social philosophy$_2$.

b.   All articles or books on a given topic might always be included in the extension of social philosophy$_1$ and some other branch of philosophy included in social philosophy$_2$.

c.   Some but not all articles on a given topic might
     be included in the extension of social philosophy$_1$
     but not in the extension of any of the other
     branches of philosophy included in social
     philosophy$_2$, while some but not all articles on
     the same topic might be included in the extension
     of the other branches of philosophy included in
     social philosophy$_2$ but not included in social
     philosophy$_1$.

d.   Some articles or books on a given topic might be
     included in the extension of both social philoso-
     phy$_1$ and other branch(es) of philosophy included
     in social philosophy$_2$ while other articles or
     books on the same topic might be found to be
     included either in the extension of social
     philosophy$_1$ or the other branches of philosophy
     included in social philosophy$_2$ but not in the
     extension of both.

A consistent pattern of only a, or only b, or only c,
or only d might serve as a basis for the education of present
intuitions concerning the scope of social philosophy$_1$ and
social philosophy$_2$.

Such a procedure would certainly reveal more of the
possible complexities of the original issues than the first
resolution offered above.  However, the carrying out of this
procedure is not required for the completion of the present
study nor is it desirable in light of the original emphasis

placed on the first of the three questions in this study.
Thus it is not worked out here.[265]

Question 3. How does the correctness (or incorrectness) of
this distinction affect the larger task of complete clari-
fication of the term 'social philosophy'?

The correctness of the distinction between social
philosophy$_1$, social philosophy$_2$, social philosophy$_3$ and
ethics indicates that the same sort of investigation would be
worth pursuing in regard to 'social philosophy' and the
other branches of philosophy noted in Chapter I. The domain
of social philosophy could be further clarified by discover-
ing if it is distinct from philosophy of law, philosophy of
state, philosophy of the social sciences and political
philosophy.

Then, too, items worked out in the process of this study
point to possible fruitful ways of clarifying the meaning of
'social philosophy'. First, the success of the procedure
utilized in this study suggests a method for the additional
studies on the correctness of distinguishing social philos-
ophy from other branches of philosophy. Second, the
distinction in meanings among 'social philosophy$_1$', 'social
philosophy$_2$' and 'social philosophy$_3$' established by this
study should facilitate additional studies. Finally, the
suggested procedure for fuller clarification of the domains

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[265]Such a procedure carried out on all the books and
articles indicated by problems four and five could generate
another full report or study.

of 'social philosophy$_1$', 'social philosophy$_2$' and 'social philosophy$_3$' explained at the end of the reply to question two above could introduce much more precision into the extensional definitions of these terms than is currently possible.

It should be noted that it is not until such precision concerning the extensional definition of 'social philosophy$_1$' and 'social philosophy$_2$' is attained that all the norms for ascertaining a 'category mistake' will be formulated. This paper has not attempted to complete this task. Rather it has:

1. Ascertained that there are at least three meanings for 'social philosophy' and explained what these meanings indicate.

2. Shown that 'social philosophy$_1$' (and thus 'social philosophy$_2$' of which it is a sub-set) includes first and second order theoretical issues and problem topics.

3. Shown that philosophical work on 'alienation' per se belongs to social philosophy$_1$ and not to ethics, and that philosophical work on 'the nature of morality' or 'deontological' per se belongs to ethics and not to social philosophy$_1$.

Thus, norms related to deciding whether or not a category mistake has been made, have been established for (1) kinds of topics and (2) the specific topics of 'alienation', 'nature of morality' and 'deontological'. Norms for

other specific issues await future studies.

The paper has answered the three questions set out in Chapter I.  Thus this study is completed.

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