ABSTRACT

ALOERNON AND HENRY SIDNEY!
A STUDY IN STYLES AND METHODS OF OPPOSITION
AGAINST THE STUART MONARCHY, 1644-1688

By
Thomas Patrick Linkfield

The public careers of Algernon and Henry Sidney illustrate
the two-fold theme of general political opposition and the individual's
efforts at political survival. In the case of each brother, opposition.
was directed against one or more Stuart monarchs. In Algernon'scase,
he not only distrusted and disliked every Stuart with whom he came in
contact, but he also learned to distrust the institution of monarchy
in general. Algernon's opposition was considerably broader in concept
than was his brother Henry's, since it included not only certain
individuals within its framework, but also basically the institution of
monarchy itself. Algernon's fatal blunder was that he truly believed
at times that his opposition views would be listened to and respected
by the very monarchs whom he was criticizing.

Henry Sidney, on the other hand. approached the problem of
opposition with a completely different perspective. he was neither a
man of high and rigid principles nor an intellect with a comprehensive
and critical outlook on men and institutions. Unlike his brother
Algernon. Henry Sidney managed to have good relations with Charles II

most of the time. Instead, his opposition was directed against

Thomas Patrick Linkfield
Charles 11's brother. James, first as Duke of York and then as James 11.
Henry Sidney's concept of opposition was a curious blend of devotion to
Prince William of Orange. and whatever cause he might choose for himself,
and a desire to further his own interests in any way that he could.
Conditions during the reign of James II allowed both of these features
to coalesce for Henry. He was able to combine his natural charm and
good-natured disposition with his superb ability as an intriguer to
aid William's cause in 1688 and also to further his own interests. Much
in contrast to his brother Algernon, Henry Sidney was a realist
regarding his own opposition.

The years which receive the most emphasis and study in the
course of this work are those between 1677 and 1683. During this
period, Algernon was allowed to return to England after seventeen
years of political exile. It also marked his re-involvement in
domestic politics, namely the Exclusion Crisis, which led eventually
to his trial and execution for high treason in 1683. The some
political and constitutional crisis which brought about Algernon's
final downfall actually launched his brother Henry's career as a
diplomat and an intriguer. For it was during the Exclusion Crisis
that Henry Sidney managed to construct for himself an important
connection with Prince William of Orange, and this connection proved
to be invaluable for both william and Henry during the crisis year of
1688. In essence than, this particular period of years is focused
upon because it witnessed not only the spectacular and of one brother's
career, but also the beginning and development of the career of the
other.

Essentially then, this work is an explanation of how two

I“

34

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1.1

Thomas Patrick Linkfield
very different aristocratic brothers tried to survive in a turbulent
period of English history. Certainly, each brother is closely
examined to show precisely how his personality and adult career relate
to the events and movements which are always in the background. But
the lives of Algernon and Henry Sidney provide more than just an
opportunity to rehash old political events. for the two brothers
taken together represent in general the theme of opposition to the
Stuart monarchs, though in each case the monarch opposed is different.
Furthermore, each brother chose an essentially different approach to
opposition, which was really a reflection of his own character and
approach to life. Algernon, the proud idealist with an intellectual
approach to life, chose open warfare and roundtable intriguing as
avenues for his opposition. 0n the other hand, Henry Sidney, using
his natural charm and affable manner, developed his opposition through
diplomatic intrigue and intelligence work, both of which made ample
use of his ability to get along well with people.

In a larger sense, though, the lives of these two brothers
reveal an interesting feature of the nature of politics at that time.
It was a harsh world indeed, and to survive it, one had to be quick
and above all realistic about the nature of events. Algernon
possessed considerable intellectual capacity, but he lacked the ability
to "unbend" a little and approach matters realistically. The times
demanded a realistic approach, flavored with the right amount of
cynicism for people and institutions. Henry Sidney, though certainly
no mental giant, did approach matters realistically and had at all times
one primary goal in mind, that is, how to help Henry Sidney survive in
the world. Algernon had difficulty surviving and failed in the end;

on the other hand, Henry survived in admirable fashion.

ALGERNON AND HENRY SIDNEY!
A STUDY IN STYLES AND METHODS OF OPPOSITION

AGAINST THE STUART MONARCHY, 1644-1688

BY

Thomas Patrick Linkfield

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1975

To My Parents

A C K N O W L E D C E M E N T S

A number of people helped me in the preparation of this
dissertation in one way or another, and they all deserve recognition
for their assistance, some to a greater degree than others. First,
my parents deserve a large measure of my gratitude for their moral
encouragement and financial help over the past five years. It is
hoped that this effort has not been in vain. In addition, my
original committee chairman and dissertation director, Professor
Thomas L. Bushell, deserves special thanks and appreciation for his
guidance and friendship over the past five years. Unfortunately, he
died in April of 1975 before he had a chance to see the end result of
my labors. The dissertation was mainly written as something for him
to read. Professor Donald Lemmers deserves special thanks for coming
in at the last minute and guiding the dissertation through its final
stages. Not an easy thing to do, by any means. Professor Marjorie
Gesner's help in the preparation of chapter five is especially
appreciated. Dr. Josef Konvitz and Professor Frederick Williams

deserve thanks for their assistance and critical remarks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

Is A" IntPOdUCtion e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 1

PART I. ALGERNDN SIDNEY
II. Early Life and Commonwealth Service . . . . . . . . . . 14
III. Political Exiles 1660-1677 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
IV. Exclusion Crisis: Reinvolvement in Politics, 1679-81 . 78

V. The Council of Six, Rye House, and Treason: 1681-83 . 121

PART II. HENRY SIDNEY
VI. Diplomacy and the Exclusion Crisis . . . . . . . . . . 16?
VII. JC’OB II aha the DUtCh Connection 0 e e e e e e e e e e 209

VIII. A COUCIU81ON e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 246

Bibliographical Essay e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e 256

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

sum mm 9; m M g: Histogigal Begeaggh
cspo .... mflmm, Domgtig

DNB WQEWW

HMC .... Historical Manuscripts Commission

J85 .... Mflmm

J5" .... MQEWM

JP” Mflmm

mus W 91 m M Historiggl mu
m Magnum

C H A P T E R I

A N I N T R O D U C T I O N

The seventeenth century witnessed a great many changes and
upheavals in England, events which profoundly influenced the country
along the path toward a more modern state. There was, of course, the
continuing struggle between Parliament and the Stuart monarchs for a
clearer working definition of prerogative power. How much power did
Parliament, and in particular the House of Commons, have at its
disposal? Was the King in reality as in theory a monarch who ruled
by divine right as God's lieutenant on earth? The struggle for power
within the framework of the constitution between King and Parliament
reached a climax during midcentury in a civil war which is often
referred to as the Great Rebellion or the Puritan Revolution. For a
brief period, Parliament emerged supreme, but soon found it could not
cope with the likes of Oliver Cromwell and his army of Saints. Besides,
the war itself, like Pandora's Box in the Creek myth, turned loose a
host of religious and political ideas that were in themselves
revolutionary and far in advance of their time.1 Indeed, to many

people who lived through the troubled years of the 1640's and 1650's,

 

1For an in-depth and scholarly analysis of the radical
groups and their ideas during this period, see Christopher Hill's The

World Turned Upside Qogn (New York: Viking Press, 1972).
1

2
England must have seemed like a world ”turned upside down.”

Even though the Stuart dynasty was restored in 1660, things
could never be as they once had been, or as men had imagined them to
be. for one thing, Parliament, especially the House of Commons, had
tasted power and authority during the previous years, and this
experience was impossible to erase. Between 1660 and 1681 not only
did the Commons continue in its less than endearing role as a harsh
critic of royal ministers, but during the Dutch wars, it also became
a critic of war management and expenditure. In fact, the Commons was
even bold enough to engage in criticism of national policy itself. In
addition, the Commons had the audacity during the Exclusion Crisis of
1679-81 to challenge one of the very foundation stones of the monarchy
itself, that of the principle of hereditary succession. Though
Shaftesbury and his Whigs failed in their concerted effort to force
Charles II to abandon his Catholic brother James, they demonstrated
what good political organization in conjunction with national hysteria
could accomplish. Indeed, a new era of political activity was emerging
in England, one that involved borough manipulation on the local level
and the management of factions in Parliament on the national level.

The continuing struggle for power between King and
Parliament was intricately involved in another major struggle during
this century, but one which is not quite so obvious at times. The
second struggle involved the tendency of the Royal central government
in Westminster to expand its scope of operations at the expense of
local level government as carried out by the traditional gentry and
aristocratic classes. These classes had their social and economic

roots deeply planted in the land and were responsible for the

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functioning of government on the local level. These landowning
classes were also, of course, the politically active classes, and
their beliefs and opinions found expression in Parliament. Therefore,
while Parliament, especially the Commons, was grappling with the Crown
over a proper balance within the Constitution, many of the same men
were involved in the related struggle over control of institutions on
the local level. For example, after the Whig challenge during the
Exclusion Crisis, Charles II proceeded to manipulate boroughs and
corporations using the weapon of‘ggglwagganto writs. This was done
both to weed out the villainous Whigs and to ensure a more manageable
and docile Commons. This Royal campaign worked, and as J. R. Western
so aptly puts it: "The elections of 1685 were the culmination of the
royal drive for greater control over the traditional institutions of
power."2

A third major issue that occupied men's attention during
the reigns of Charles II and James II was the issue of religion.
First of all, there were the dissenters from Anglicanism who
represented a wide spectrum of religious thought, a legacy from the
previous decades. Many of them expected some degree of toleration
from, or at least accommodation with, the Anglicans. They did not
get it. But, a religious factor which was even more important during
this period was anti-Catholicism, which culminated in the national
hysteria of the Popish Plot and was certainly a key factor in bringing

about James II's downfall in 1688. This is extremely important

 

2J. R. Western, Monarchy 22g ngolution: ID! figglieh State
is EDS 1680's, part of the Elgndfogd Histggical Series, gen. ed. R. W.
Harris (London: Blandford Press, 1972), p. 69.

4
because anti-Catholicism was a very strong emotion in seventeenth-
century England and was found in every class and section of society.
In fact, according to one historian, "Anti-papery was the strongest,
most widespread and most persistent ideology in the life and thought
of seventeenth-century Britain."3 If people were upset and uneasy
over the alleged Catholic leanings of Charles II, it is easy to see
why some of them were quite shaken over the open acknowledgement by
James of his Catholicism, a Catholicism that was narrow and bigoted.
At a time when the Crown's prerogative was not yet clearly defined,
the presence of a Catholic king could represent a very real danger not
only to the Protestant establishment, but also to the very lives and
liberties of English subjects. If any Englishman doubted for a minute
the threat that Catholicism represented, he only needed to take a good,
hard look across the Channel and observe Charles and James Stuart's
royal cousin Louis XIV in action.

An excellent way in which to view the events of the period
from 1660 to 1688 is through the perspective of aristocratic family
history. By studying the lives of some of the members of a particular
family of aristocrats, the historian can emphasize noy only personal
biography, but he can also relate the individual members to each
other, to their immediate family connections, and to others in their
class. Family study gives the historian a wider perspective with which
to view personal achievements and failures. In addition, the

individuals being emphasized can be easily related to the general

 

3J. R. Jones, 15; Revolution 9! 1688 i3 England (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 75.

S

sweep of events and ideas developing around them.

A good example of this concept can be demonstrated with the
Sidney family of Penshurst in Kent. The Sidney family name is old and
well established, going back to the twelfth century to Sir William
Sidney (or Sydney), who was chamberlain to Henry II. The two family
members who are the central figures in this work, Algernon and Henry
Sidney, were both sons of Robert Sidney, the second Earl of Leicester.
Their grandfather, the first Earl, was the brother of Sir Philip
Sidney, the famous Elizabethan soldier, poet, and courtier. Since
both Algernon and Henry Sidney were younger sons in a large family,
neither one could count on inheriting the family's title, or the
prestige and responsibilities inherent in such a birthright. Sons of
an aristocrat though they were, each one had to make his own way in
the world, counting mainly upon his own native talents and the family
connections to such notable English families as the Percies, the
Saviles, the Spencers, and the Pelhams. The public and private lives
of Algernon and Henry Sidney span over three-quarters of the seven-
teenth century (1622-1704), and they were involved in many of the
crucial events and movements of the period, especially during the
reigns of Charles II and James II.

Algernon Sidney, the elder of the two brothers, was born in
1622 and died in 1683, after being found guilty of high treason. For
this particular Sidney, the Parliamentary war against Charles I in
the 1640's and the subsequent Commonwealth and Protectorate periods
in the 1650's were very real experiences, and ones which exerted a
considerable influence upon his own development and his particular

philosophy of government. Algernon was an ardent supporter of the

6
Parliamentary cause during the Civil War, and, after the fighting, he
was an active participant in both Commonwealth governments of the
1650's. The emergence of Oliver Cromwell and his army onto the
political stage forced Sidney into retirement, for as far as he was
concerned, Cromwell was just armarbitrary ruler as Charles I had been.
After the Restoration in 1660, Algernon Sidney remained unreconciled
with the Stuart monarchy for seventeen long and bitter years of exile
on the Continent. Indeed, at times he was little more than a
wandering vagabond, having only his pride and his high principles to
sustain him.

The main theme running through Algernon Sidney's adult
political life was his steadfastly consistent opposition to arbitrary
government and absolutist monarchy in England. Rather than discard
his principles, Algernon accepted the fate of a traitor, and his name
was enshrined in the Whig hall of English martyrs. For indeed, Sidney
viewed himself as a martyr for his principles, and subsequent
generations of Whigs viewed him as a martyr for the cause of constitutional
development in England. After his return to England from political
exile in 1677, Algernon Sidney continued his opposition to arbitrary
Stuart rule, begun under Charles 1. He was very much a part of the
Whig opposition to Charles II and the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81.
Unfortunately, he was also one of the many victims of the Tory
reaction and Stuart revenge upon the Whigs which followed Shaftesbury's
exile and death. In essence then, Algernon Sidney's views of the
English state and constitution must be seen in relation to the crucial
events which helped formulate them. He must be seen in relation to

larger movements and causes that raged and surged about him during his

lifetime.

The best and most detailed expression of Algernon Sidney's
views on political philosophy, monarchies in general, and the English
state in particular is to be found in a rather wordy and rambling work
by him known simply as scou ses QgQggrning Government. Though the
exact dates of composition have never been known, it is clear from a
careful perusal of the text that mast, if not all, of the work was
written between the Earl of Danby's fall in 1678 and Sidney's own
arrest on charges of treason in 1683. Sidney admittedly wrote this
work as a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarchg, itself a
rather obscure work which sought to extol the virtues of the divine-
right monarch. Simply stated, Algernon Sidney felt that no single
form of government was prescribed by Cod for mankind; rather, He
endowed men with the power of reason to create those forms of
government which best suited their needs.4 Magistrates in power, and
kings in particular, derived their lagggl authority from those they
ruled, and if they abused that power, the people had the right to
change rulers, even using sedition and war if necessary.5 Lest Sidney
be misinterpreted as e madcap radical, it should quickly be pointed
out that he was‘ggt advocating democratic rule by all of the people
for the seventeenth century. What he was advocating was a kind of
mixed government, with the landowning classes exerting the dominant

influence through Parliament. Nevertheless, through his actions and

 

4Algernon Sidney, ou see gogggrnigg Cov nm nt, ed.
John Toland (London: 1698), p. 130.

5m. 9 p. 174s

8
his words, Sidney made himself obnoxious enough so that the Crown had
him prosecuted for high treason in 1683 and executed. It should be
noted that excerpts from Algernon Sidney's Qigggggggg were used against
him at his trial to prove his evil and malicious intentions against
Charles II. Such is the stuff from which political heroes and martyrs
are made.

Almost an entire generation separated Algernon Sidney from
his youngest brother Henry, the other central figure of this work.
Since Henry Sidney was born in 1641 in Paris, the events in England of
the 1640's meant little to him as far as personal development was
concerned. While he may have enjoyed listening to stories of brother
Algernon's military exploits as a cavalry officer under Cromwell, the
more complex issues of King versus Parliament and Presbyterian versus
Independent must certainly have been above young Henry's head. The
differences between these two brothers do not end here, however. for,
Henry Sidney developed into quite a different person altogether from
his brother, Algernon. While Algernon stands out clearly as a man of
high, rigid principles who was arrogant and difficult to work with,
his brother Henry possessed the charm and grace of a courtier, which
in turn masked a cleverness and a considerable political agility that
allowed him to survive in troubled times. Indeed, as one historian has
described Henry Sidney, he was a person who possessed "in a rare degree
the instinct of intrigue."6 While both brothers were opponents of the

Stuart monarchs and each one participated in different types of

 

6
Thomas Seccombe, ”Henry Sidney," Qictionary‘gf National

may (1897), Vol. LII. pp. 217-219.

9
intrigues, Algernon failed in his efforts and paid the supreme penalty.
On the other hand, Henry Sidney, who could easily have shared his
brother's fate had he been caught, not only succeeded in his intrigues,
but was handsomely rewarded as well. These two Sidney brothers, one a
rigid idealist and the other a courtier known as "Handsome Henry,"
provide a fascinating study in contrast.

The same Exclusion Crisis which saw the Whigs in the House
of Commons challenge the Crown's prerogative provided Henry Sidney
with an opportunity to develop his instinct for intrigue and establish
a close relationship with William of Orange, which Henry found valuable
later on in James II's reign. While the revelations of Titus Dates and
Israel Tongs concerning the Popish Plot were fresh on the nation's
mind, and while the First Exclusion Parliament was still in session,
Henry was appointed special envoy to the United Provinces in June of
1679. Robert Spencer, second Earl of Sunderland, one of the shiftiest
politicians in England, was one of the Secretaries of State at the
time, and he sought to use his uncle Henry Sidney as the means through
which William of Orange could be enticed to visit England during the
Exclusion Crisis and perhaps influence events.7 After all, if James,
Duke of York was excluded from the succession, William, a staunch
Protestant, stood third in line to the English throne after James's
two daughters, to one of whom (Mary, the elder), William had been
married in 1677. Though Henry Sidney did not immediately succeed in

furthering his nephew's scheme, he did help achieve a diplomatic

 

7Robert Spencer was the eldest son of Henry Sidney's eldest
sister, Dorothy Sidney.

10

success against the French. But what is even more important is the
fact that Sidney gained the confidence and personal friendship of
Prince William, not an easy thing to do considering William's frigid
nature. Henry Sidney adroitly built upon this "Dutch Connection" of
his and utilized it during James II's reign to become a leading figure
in William's intelligence network and in the intrigues which culminated
in the famous "invitation" by the Immortal Seven to William of Orange
in 1585.

The period of years which will receive the most emphasis and
study in the course of this work is the period from 1677 to 1683.
There are a number of important reasons for this emphasis, and they
involve both Algernon and Henry Sidney. First of all, the period
witnessed Algernon Sidney's return to England from his long exile and
his re-involvsment in political affairs, even though this was not what
he had originally intended to do. This is also the period during which
he very definitely wrote the great bulk of his Discourses Concerning
‘Qgggzggggt, though the work was not published until 1698. Furthermore,
Algernon became quite deeply involved in Whig intrigues after the
dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March of 1681. These intrigues
came to a head in the famous Rye House Plot of 1683, in which it was
alleged that various Whig elements had plotted to assassinate Charles
II and perhaps even raise a rebellion in the kingdom. In the aftermath
of Rye House, the Crown used the law of treason as a political weapon
very effectively against the Whigs, and this "Stuart revenge" must be
:ssen in relation to the Royal campaign to manipulate local corporations.
Algernon Sidney, of course, was just one of the Crown's victims. In

addition, as previously pointed out, Henry Sidney was appointed special

I:

11
envoy to the United Provinces in June of 1679, and he served in that
capacity until June of 1681. The importance of this diplomatic mission
for him and his subsequent career has already been noted. It is clear
that many of the same events between 1677 and 1683 affected both
Algernon and Henry Sidney, though the degree and method differed in
each case. In essence then, this particular period of years will be
focused Upon because it witnessed not only the spectacular and of one
brother's career, but also the beginning and develOpment of the career
of the other. Because of the difference in ages between Algernon and
Henry, it was like one generation passing away and a younger, fresher
one moving in.

Essentially then, this work is an explanation of how two
very different aristocratic brothers tried to survive in a turbulent
period of English history. Certainly, each brother will be closely
examined to show precisely how his personality and adult career relate
to the events and movements which are always in the background. But,
the lives of Algernon and Henry Sidney provide more than just an
opportunity to rehash old political events. For, the two brothers
taken together represent in general the theme of opposition to the
Stuart monarchs, though in each case the monarch opposed is different.
Furthermore, each brother chose an essentially different approach to
opposition, which was really a reflection of his own character and
approach to life. Algernon, the proud idealist with an intellectual
approach to life, chose open warfare and roundtable intriguing as
avenues for his opposition. On the other hand, Henry Sidney, utilizing
his natural charm and affable manner, developed his opposition through

diplomatic intrigue and intelligence work, both of which made ample use

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12
of his ability to get along well with people. In a larger sense,
though, the lives of these two brothers reveal an interesting feature
of the nature of politics at that time. It was a harsh world indeed,
and to survive in it, one had to be quick and above all realistic about
the nature of events. Algernon possessed considerable intellectual
capacity, but he lacked the ability to ”unbend" a little and approach
matters realistically. The times demanded a realistic approach,
flavored with the right amount of cynicism for people and institutions.
Henry Sidney, though certainly no mental giant, did approach matters
realistically and had at all times one primary goal in mind, that is,
how to help Henry Sidney survive in the world. Algernon had difficulty
surviving and [eventually] failed in the end; on the other hand, Henry
survived in admirable fashion.

Before beginning a detailed investigation of the ideas
outlined above, a few essential points must be made. To begin with,
this work does not pretend to be a complete biographical study of two
brothers. Rather, it is an attempt to relate the lives of Algernon
and Henry Sidney to major events in the reigns of Charles II and
James II with the emphasis placed upon the years from 1677 to 1683.
Secondly, the soaps and length of the work preclude lengthly digressions
into the lives and careers of the dominant statesmen and politicians of
the time. Where necessary and proper, the reader will be referred to
the outstanding scholarly biographies of these people, which he can
investigate on his own. Thirdly, in an attempt to clarify the muddled
confusion due to the existence of two calender systems at the time,
allnggtgg referred to in this work will be in accordance with the old

Julian Calendar in use in England, unless otherwise stipulated as New

13
Style (N.S.). However, it can be assumed that the new year begins on
January 1, instead of March 25. Finally, every effort has been made
to modernize spelling in direct quotations, and in some cases the

grammar and punctuation have been modernized also.

'0:

 

PART ONE: ALCERNON SIDNEY
C H A P T E R I I
EARLY LIFE AND COMMONWEALTH SERVICE

Algernon Sidney was the second surviving son of Robert
Sidney, second Earl of Leicester and was born most likely in late
1622. The baptismal registers for Penshurst parish do not list a
baptismal date for Algernon Sidney, but the only possible time he
could have been born was either in the autumn of 1622 or before the
middle of 1623. The most reasonable date seems to be about November
or December of 1622.1 Algernon's father was the youngest son of Sir
Robert Sidney, brother of Sir Philip Sidney, the famous Elizabethan
soldier and poet, who was killed at Zutphen in the Spanish Netherlands
in 1586. Algernon's mother was Dorothy Percy, daughter of Henry Percy,
the ninth Earl of Northumberland and Lord High Admiral of England. As
Algernon Sidney showed early signs of possessing considerable talents,
his father personally undertook his education at Penhurst and made

every effort to cultivate young Algernon's skills.2

 

1Letter from the county archivist, Kent Archives Office,
”81d8t0m, Kent, E'glandg JUly 9, 1974s

2Alexander C. Ewald, The Life and Times.gf the Hon. Algernon
Signs! (2 vols.) London: Tinsley Brothers, 1873), Vol. I, pp. 28-29.

14

15

The second Earl of Leicester possessed a talent for diplomacy
and a desire to serve King Charles I, and Algernon was able to benefit
from his father's work. In 1632 he accompanied his father to Denmark
when his father was appointed ambassador extraordinary to the Court of
King Christian IV. In 1636 Leicester was appointed ambassador to
France and remained in that position until 1641. During both of these
foreign appointments, Algernon's education was given special care by
his father, and of course he had the additional benefit of travel
experience on the Continent. It was during the five year period in
Paris, according to the only biographer of Algernon Sidney, that the
gifted young man acquired his belief in republicanism:5 It is suggested
that he probably came in contact with intellectuals who espoused liberal
principles and drew their inspiration for political ideas and
institutions from Greek and Roman history. No documentary proof is
offered for this, but it is further claimed that Algernon acquired his
aversion to absolutist monarchy during this period, while studying the
French example at firsthand. Sidney developed into a republican, but
definitely not a nineteenth-century type of liberal democrat.4 For, as
his only biographer claims, ”He did not dislike the kingly offices all
he disliked was the feithless man who then in England filled it."5
This refers to Charles I, who had just completed an eleven-year period
of arbitrary rule in England without calling a Parliament. The
important point to remember is that Algernon did acquire an intellectual

attachment for classical republicanism that is clearly reflected in his

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By 1640 Charles I was in desperate straits for money and
troops and was forced to convene a parliament in November of that year.
In doing so, he provided opposition elements among the gentry and
aristocracy with a platform from which they could attack the King's
arbitrary rule of the previous eleven years. Before the House of
Commons would grant any supplies to Charles I for his latest war against
the Scots, it demanded a redress of many accumulated grievances,
including such matters as taxation, monopolies, alleged innovations in
religion, and the King's favoritism to Catholics. The majority of
those in the Commons wanted the King's two chief ministers, Archbishop
Laud and the Earl of Strafford, removed from office. In addition to
this, a smaller but very effectively led group in the Commons sought
to go even further than this by seeking a transfer of effective power
from Charles I‘s hands and into those of Parliament.6 The whole
position of the King was under attack now, and Charles I realized too
late that he had alienated important segments of the gentry, the
mainstay of government on the local level in England. Suffice it to
say that the situation at the time was not one to inspire much
confidence or hope for the immediate future. The battle lines were
being drawn.

Into this boiling turmoil Algernon Sidney and his father
were dumped in 1641, when the Earl was recalled from Paris and appointed
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to replace the recently executed Earl of

Strafford. A Catholic rebellion had been in progress in Ireland, and

 

6C. V. Wedgewood, The Kigg's Peace: 1637-1641 (New York:

The Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 367.

17
Leicester was dispatched to bring some order out of the chaos there.
Owing to a number of delays, however, Leicester never reached Ireland
to perform the duties of his office, and after a full year of indecision,
Charles I withdraw the commission and bestowed it upon the Marquess of
Ormonde. Having thus received what he considered to be a Royal insult,
Leicester retired in disgust to Penshurst to read books and write
erudite essays.7 But before he retired, the Earl outfitted a regiment
at his own expense for service in Ireland, with his eldest son Philip,
Viscount De L'Isle, in command. Algernon Sidney, only nineteen at the
time, was given the command of a troop of horse in this regiment.

Even though his father chose secluded retirement over active
involvement in the growing controversy between King and Parliament,
young Algernon was able to benefit from serving with his brother in
Ireland. Lord De L'Isle's regiment was involved in a number of
encounters with the elusive Irish insurgents, and Algernon gained
considerable military experience. Sir John Temple, a very close family
friend who was also serving in Ireland, wrote a brief account to the
Earl of Leicester concerning his sons' activities in Ireland. In a
letter dated January 14, 1642, Sir John wrote:

My Lord Lisle and his brother are both well, and I shall

serve them with the utmost of my life and gortunes. They

both deserve very well of the public here.
In 1643 a truce was arranged, and both brothers were able to return to

England.

 

7Ewald, Vol. I, p. 73.

8Historical Manuscripts Commission, Seventy-Seventh Report,

Viscount 2g L'Islg Menu ri ts, 7 Vols., Vol. VI Sidney Papers, 1626-
1698 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), p. 416.

.‘e,
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18

It was at this point that events and issues forced Algernon
Sidney to become more involved in the struggle between Charles I and
Parliament and to reach a critical decision involving commitment to one
side or the other. It seems that gggg sides in 1643 suspected the
loyalties of Algernon and his brother Lord De L'Isle because they were
sons of the Earl of Leicester, who himself was still under a cloud of
suspicion.9 To settle matters once and for all, both brothers returned
to London and openly declared for the Parliamentary side in the struggle
which had progressed by that time into open warfare. Fortunately, we
have Algernon's own explanation of his motives during this important
time in his life, even though it was written as part of his "Apology"
in 1683 as he calmly awaited his execution for treason against Charles
II. He stated simply that "I had from my youth endeavored to uphold
the common rights of mankind, the laws of this land, and the true
Protestant religion, against corrupt principles, arbitrary power, and
Popery."1o He claimed, moreover, that he had acted upon these principles
from 1642 until the Restoration of 1660. As proof of his new commitment
to the Parliamentary cause, Algernon volunteered to serve in its army
and was appointed to command a troop of horse in the Earl of Manchester's
regiment in the year 1644. In one of the major engagements of the war
fought in that same year, Marston Moor, Sidney was seriously wounded.
When the Parliamentary Army was reorganized to form the New Model Army,

Algernon Sidney was appointed one of the twenty-six colonels and given

 

gEmald, Vol. 1, Fe B1e

1DAlgernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government gith gig

Letterg, Trigl, Apology, ggg some Mgmoirs.g[ gig Lifg (London: printed
for As Millar’ 1763), p. 170e

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19
command of a troop of horse in Cromwell's own division. Sidney,
however, saw no further combat service during the civil war. Instead,
he decided to serve the Parliamentary cause in other ways.

From 1645 until 1653, when circumstances forced a complete
break with Oliver Cromwell and necessitated a quick retirement from
public life, Algernon Sidney managed to serve the cause of Parliament
and the first Commonwealth government in a number of ways. In May of
1645 by an ordinance of Parliament, he was appointed governor of
Chichester, and in that same year Algernon was elected to the Long

Parliament as a member for Cardiff.11

In 1646 Lord De L'Isle, who

was Lieutenant General of Ireland, appointed his brother governor of
Dublin; however, that appointment did not last long. A better position
came about in June of 1648 when Sidney was named governor of Dover
Castle and of the forts raised in its defense.12 In 1647 Algernon,
along with other members of Parliament, had marched with the army to
London in an attempt to overawe the Presbyterians in Parliament. Croups
which had once been united in the struggle against Charles I were now
fighting amongst themselves for control of Parliament, and Sidney, by
his actions, was in effect siding with the Independents against the

Presbyterians. Sidney, however, drew the line at the army's rather

heavy-handed maneuver of ”purging” the House of Commons of all

 

11There is disagreement over the exact year of Sidney's

election to Parliament for Cardiff. Ewald in his biography of Sidney
claims it was in 1645 (Ewald, Vol. I, p. 114). Charles Harding Firth,
however, writing the biographical sketch of Sidney in the Qigtionagy

2£Hfl§§l2211.§;ggggggx, claims he was returned on July 17, 1646 (D.N.B.,
Vol. LII, p. 203)e

12H.M.C., Sidney Eggggg, 1626-169 , p. 443.

20

suspected Presbyterians, viewing it as an "unjust and outrageous
interference of the army.”13 Nevertheless, Sidney retained his seat
in the Commons until 1653 and served on a number of Council of State
and Commons committees, including the financial committee of Navy and
Customs.

At this point it is essential to examine the degree of
Algernon Sidney's involvement or noninvolvement in the trial and
execution of King Charles I. This is important because some of
Sidney's friends and contemporaries were executed after the Restoration
for varying degrees of involvement in the rebellion against Charles I
and his execution. Regicide was a dangerous activity even to be
remotely connected with. Moreover, since Algernon was executed for
treason in 1683 on rather flimsy evidence and by perjured witnesses,
there is the possibility that Charles II was settling an old score
for his ”martyred" father against this dedicated and confirmed
republican. After all, there are enough passages in the Qiggougses
which, if taken out of context, can be interpreted to show that Sidney
was a violent radical bent upon destroying the Stuart monarchy.
Algernon Sidney's commitment to the Parliamentary cause and his
opposition against Charles I have already been noted. Finally, in a
letter written to his father from Augsburg in September of 1660,
Sidney explained that on a number of occasions, while acting as a
peace mediator in Denmark in 1659, he had defended the Parliamentary
government's action in executing Charles I. He said simply that "I

13E'31d, V010 I. pa 120s

21
have many times so justified that act."14 In the minds of some,
Algernon Sidney could very easily have tainted himself indirectly
with the crime of regicide.

After much wrangling and dickering with Charles I, it was
finally decided to bring him to trial for high treason against the
state, and on January 4, 1649, Parliament created a court of 135
commissioners to try the King. Algernon Sidney was named one of
those commissioners, but he refused to have anything to do with the
trial itself or the warrant for Charles I's execution. The fact that
his name appeared on the list of commissioners was later used against
Sidney after the Restoration in 1660. Once again, we have Sidney's
own account of the extent of his actual involvement in Charles I's
trial, written as part of a letter to his father in October of 1660
from Venice.15 Sidney admitted that he had attended two meetings in
January of 1649 of the trial commissioners and had debated with them
what course of action should be taken. He further claimed that he had
steadfastly opposed Oliver Cromwell, John Bradshaw, and others in the
matter of bringing Charles I to trial before the newly created court.
Sidney gave two reasons for his adamant position: ”First, the King
M 93 mg by no court; secondly, that 92 591; could be tried by
that court.” Cromwell countered Sidney's argument by saying, "I tell
you, we will cut off his head with the crown upon it." To this rather
blunt prediction, Sidney claims he responded by saying, "You may take

14R. W. Blencowe, ed., Sydney Pagggs (London: John Murray,

1825) 9 De 216s

15]bid.. pp. 235-240.

22
your own course, I cannot stop you, but I will keep myself clean from
having any hand in this business."16 It is precisely at this point
that Sidney claimed he left the meeting and never returned for another
one. Evidence supporting Algernon Sidney's claim can be found in his
father's own journal. In an entry dated January 25, 1649, the Earl of
l.eicester wrote the following:

My two sons Philip and Algernon came unexpected to Penshurst

Mggggy,';g, and stayed there till Monday, 29 January, so as

neither of them was at the condemnation of the King. Nor

was Philip at any time at the High Court, though a

commissioner, but Algernon, a commissioner also, was there

sometiges in the Painted Chamber, but never in Westminster

Hall.

King Charles I was executed on January 30, 1649. Algernon Sidney's
involvement was restricted to being one of the original trial
commissioners, even though he boycotted most of the proceedings. He
was, however, firmly dedicated to Parliament's cause and against that
of the arbitrary tyrant Charles I. These two factors were enough to
prejudice many royaliats against Algernon Sidney and to mark him for
the rest of his life.

An excellent way in which to analyze Sidney's position
during the 1640's and 1650's is to study him in relation to another
ardent republican whom he definitely admired a great deal during this
time, Sir Henry Vane the Younger. Vane was roughly nine years older
than Algernon Sidney, and their careers were similar in many respects.

This is the same Sir Henry Vane who had been Governor of Massachusetts

Bay Colony in 1636 and who was dedicated to seeing the Kingdom of God

16Ib1de, pe 237s

17H.M.C., mm, 1626-169 , p. 530.

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23

established here on earth.18 Sidney's official duties as governor of
Dover Castle brought him in contact with Sir Henry in 1649. Both were
members of the Long Parliament, Vane being elected from Hull. Further-
more, both Vans and Sidney were strongly opposed to the "purge" of
Presbyterians from the Long Parliament in late 1648; but yet, both
continued to sit in the abbreviated ”Rump" that functioned until
1653. Vane was also one of the commissioners appointed to try King
Charles I, and he was observed to have been present at the beginning
of Charles I's trial, although he did not sign the King's death
warrant.19 Both Sidney and Vane cooperated with the new government
after 1649 and served together on several Council of State and Commons
committees during 1652 and 1653. When Oliver Cromwell, in a fit of
temper, forcibly dissolved the quarrelsome Rump Parliament in 1653,
Algernon and Sir Henry retired from public life and did not return to
it until 1659. Both of these principled republicans viewed Cromwell
by 1653 as an arbitrary tyrant, e Charles I without the royal title,
if you will. While Sidney kept his opposition to the Lord Protector
fairly subdued, Sir Henry could not, and was imprisoned at Carisbrooke
on the Isle of Wight in 1656. Thus, Sir Henry Vans and Algernon
Sidney sided together on a number of important political issues and
causes during the 1640's and 1650's.

The issue of Sir Henry Vane the Younger has been raised

here because both the man and his public career from 1649 to 1660 made

 

18Roger Howell, "Henry Vane the Younger and the Politics of
Religion,"‘fligtggleoda , XIII (April, 1963), pp. 275-82.

19HeMeCe' Siting! 28281.8, l626-1698, pm 580.

24
quite a favorable and lasting impression upon Algernon Sidney, as
evidenced through Sidney's writings later on. Sidney and Vane each
had to work out in his own mind a rationale for serving the Parliamentary
government after Charles I's execution, but only Sidney lived long
enough after the Restoration to analyze England's Commonwealth
government. Many years later, as Sidney was writing his Qiscourses,
he incorporated in them his reflections concerning that period, using
it to illustrate how good government can operate when it is dedicated
to the proper principles. In two sections of Chapter Two Sidney
analyzed the nature of government and of government servants during
Charles II's reign and during the two periods of Commonwealth
government.20 Hereditary monarchies tended to breed kings who were
interested not in the public good, but in satisfying their own base
whims. These monarchs in turn tended to attract "evil, ambitious
advisers," parasites, buffoons, and bawds who themselves were interested
only in serving their own interests and the base whims of the monarch
they pandered to. Again, the public interest remained unserved.
Obviously, Charles II was just this kind of monarch, because Sidney
indicted Clarendon, Arlington, Danby, Sunderland, Jenkins, and the
Duchesses of Portsmouth and Cleveland all by name as the type of
adviser or bawd he most detested. Because these evil and ambitious
folk worked and schemed together for just their own interests and those
of the monarch who attracted them into office, the public good remained

'unattended, and the general tone and quality of leadership sank to a

20Sidney, Qiggougggs Concegnigg Cove nment, Chapter Two,

Section 25, pp. 200-2063 Section 28, pp. 215-223.

..
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25
low level. In short, a poorly structured system (hereditary monarchy)
fed upon a low level of servants, who in turn pandered to their
master's desires.

Now then, if matters were that seedy under Charles II,
exactly what were they like under the two periods of Parliamentary
government during the 1650's? Needless to say, Algernon Sidney found
these periods to have been vastly superior in every way by comparison
to the reign of Charles II. If hereditary monarchies found it easy to
appeal to evil, ambitious advisers, under a free government, it was
just as easy to appeal to servants who practiced honesty and virtue.
It was crystal clear to Sidney that "that society of men which
constitutes a government upon the foundation of justice, virtue, and
the common good, will always have men to promote these ends."21 For
Sidney, the two periods of Commonwealth rule constituted just such a
society because England was run by men chosen for their merit to do
their tasks. During the Commonwealth periods, valor, industry,
integrity, and incorruptible virtue were raised to a higher level
than at any other time in England’s history. This is much in contrast
to the reign of Charles II, which was noted only for its corruption,
baseness, and venality. The reason why the quality of leadership was
so much higher during the Commonwealth periods was because the public
servants, or magistrates as Sidney called them, had much better
motivation and inspiration for their service. Certainly, this is a
rather one-sided and glorified view of contemporary history by

Algernon, but nevertheless, it is the one that remained firm in his

211933., p. 218.

26
mind for over twenty years. Perhaps Sidney saw only what he wanted to
see, or remembered only what he wanted to remember. This would seem to
fit his rather pedantic nature and the tendency he had to view matters
only from his own rigid perspective.

At some time after 1662, when Sir Henry Vane was executed
for treason for his government services during the Commonwealth periods,
Algernon Sidney wrote a brief, but glowing, tribute to his fellow
republican with whom he had served before the Restoration. The essay
is undated and was discovered as part of the Cowper family papers in
Hertfordshire, but it could only have been written after 1662, as
Sidney refers to Vane's execution for treason as the "spilling of
innocent blood."22 Sidney praised Sir Henry for possessing honest and
sincere principles and for being a person "whom no body ever repented
trusting with the most important affairs."23 It is clear that Sidney
remembered Sir Henry Vane as being very close to an ideal public
servant because ”he was never a man that considered what would most
likely turn to his own advantage." Rather, Sir Henry "considered only
what was in itself equitable, true and just, and would probably
contribute to the good of his country."24 In addition, Sidney claims
that Vane was thoughtful enough to have warned his friends and
followers to be vigilant for "wicked ministers... who would level
their pernicious practices at the subversion of the Government, and

the utter extirpation of liberty and property." Thus, Sir Henry Vane

22Violet A. Rowe, 5i: mm thg Iougger: A Study 1.13
Egutigal 9.0.9. W ill-£221! (University of London: The
Athlone Press, 1970), "Appendix F," pp. 275-283.

zslgide, pe 278s zalbide, Fe 2810

27

is precisely that type of dedicated public servant, or magistrate, that
Algernon Sidney wrote about in general, but glowing, terms in his
Qigggggggg. That is, Vane was that type of magistrate who provided
such excellent public service at one period in England's history (the
Commonwealth period) and whose services were so sorely lacking in
another (the reign of Charles II). A careful study of the Discourses
in conjunction with the brief, but quite explicit, tribute to Vane
clearly indicates that it was Sir Henry himself whom Sidney had in
mind when he praised the era of Commonwealth government for its high
level of public service. Sidney's view of Vane is extremely one-sided,
but again, it fits with Sidney's tendency to measure people and events
by means of a rather exacting and rigid yardstick.

The career of Sir Henry Vane can be related to that of
Algernon Sidney in another and even more important aspect as well. As
previously mentioned, Sir Henry was executed for treason in the year
1662, and his indictment charged him with treason against Charles II,
and not against Charles I, because of his services rendered to the two
periods of Commonwealth government between 1649 and 1659. As proof of
his treason, the prosecution cited Vane's membership on the Council of
State and his work in naval affairs. This rather novel approach
caught Sir Henry off guard, and his only defense rested upon the plea
that he had only done what many other Englishmen, including Algernon
Sidney, had done at that time and under the same circumstances. That

is, Vane claimed he had merely cooperated with a‘gg facto government

 

tmtween 1649 and 1653 and once again in 1659 and had carried out its
Indore. As Vane himself said, "I would gladly know that person in

England of estate and fortune, and of age, that hath not counselled,

’nd

.
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.u

(I

28

aided or abetted...and submitted to the laws and government of the
powers that then were."25 Even though Sir Henry had staunchly opposed
the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, his involvement in government
during the Commonwealth years was enough to seal his fate after the
monarchy was restored in 1660.

Luckily for Algernon, he was out of the country when the
Stuart monarchy was restored. Indeed, had he been present in England
with his friend and fellow republican, Sidney could easily have
suffered the same fate Vane did for the same reasons. After all,
Algernon Sidney had served on the same Council of State with Vans and
on some of the same Commons committees. He too had willingly served
the established power in England at the time, namely Parliament, even
though he was just as staunchly opposed to Cromwell's Protectorate as
Sir Henry had been. Though Sidney did not express himself quite as
explicitly concerning a person‘s obligations to the‘gg.£gg§g
government that exercised power in the absence of a Stuart monarch as
Vane did, Sidney did leave enough evidence to make his position quite
clear. In a letter to his father dated September 21, 1660 (N.S.),
Sidney defended his official work as a peace mediator in Denmark, which
he performed during the last period of Commonwealth rule.26 As a
diplomatic representative, Sidney claimed he was more or less obligated
to uphold the authority of the government that sent him on the mission,
and in doing so he was merely fulfilling part of his job. This is not

to imply that there was any doubt in Sidney's mind, for he was fully

251b;d., pp. 235-37.

26Blencowe, §idney Pa rs, pp. 214-227.

29
ggggigggg to the cause of Parliament's rule in England in 1659, just
as he had been in the early 1650's before the tyrant Cromwell had
dissolved the Rump Parliament. The fate suffered by Sir Henry Vane
for his Commonwealth service jolted Algernon Sidney into the
awareness that he too could very well be liable for the same treason
charges because of his service during the Commonwealth periods.

This is one of the key factors that convinced Sidney to
remain in exile on the Continent, and his fears and apprehensions are
plainly revealed in his letters to England in 1660. In a letter to his
father in July of that year, Sidney was quite aware that if the new
government chose ggt to overlook his previous service under the
Commonwealth governments, he would never be able to return to
England.27 It was doubtful whether Charles II would listen with a
sympathetic ear to any explanation Algernon could have given to excuse
his actions in cooperation with the Commonwealth governments.

Voluntary exile might be a bitter fate for Algernon to accept, but

"not so much so, as the others that are in my prospect." By this time
Sir Henry Vans and other noted republicans had been arrested and
imprisoned. In an undated letter, but one which was written after the
letter just referred to, Sidney stated emphatically that "where Vane,
Lambert, Haselrigs cannot live in safety, I cannot live at all."28
Without a doubt, Algernon Sidney identified his own fate and security
with the proceedings against Sir Henry Vane, the republican with whom

Sidney had shared so many Commonwealth experiences.

271b1d.. pp. 189-194.
28

Igid., p. 202. (Also, see below page 30, fotenote 29.)

”M

30

By now it must be fairly obvious that Algernon Sidney was a
courageous and highly principled man, though both qualities were
considerably distorted by a rigid perspective of life that only became
more so as Sidney grew older. As an illustration of this, one only
need look at Sidney's attitude and actions regarding the Lord
Protector, Oliver Cromwell. When Cromwell dissolved the Rump
Parliament by force in April of 1653, Algernon Sidney was a prominent
actor in the whole dramatic incident. In his journal the Earl of
Leicester wrote that after'the Speaker of the House of Commons had
been pulled from his chair, Cromwell pointed directly at Algernon and
said to Thomas Harrison, "Put him out.” Algernon, however, not to be
intimidated, displayed his mettle by remaining fast. After he was
told to leave a second time,

Harrison and Worstley put their hands upon Sidney's

shoulders as if they would force hi; to go out. Then

he rose and went towards the door.
This single incident revealed Algernon's opposition to Cromwell's
”coup” and convinced him that this self-styled "agent of the Lord"
was nothing more than a tyrant, just as Charles I had been. Sidney
may very well have wondered to himself whether all those years of
fighting and dedication to a cause had been worth it.30

Besides abstaining completely from any overt political

 

29HeMeCe, m m, I626-I62§, pe.615e
30

For a more indepth view of Oliver Cromwell, the reader
should investigate Charles Harding Firth's classic biography entitled
m M 293, 31;; Rulg 2f. _1_:_h_g Puritans y; fimland (New York:

G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900) and also an excellent recent analysis by
Christopher Hill entitled flog's Egglisgggn, Oliver Cgomwell‘ggg.§ng

English ngglution (New York: Dial Press, 1970).

(1

31

activity regarding the new Lord Protector, Algernon was involved in
one minor, but very interesting, episode involving Cromwell. It seems
that at some time in the late spring of 1656 Sidney, perhaps to show
how clever he could be, arranged to have Shakespeare's Agligg.ggg§g£_
performed at Penshurst. Sidney himself played the part of Brutus. The
performance, it is said, was quite a success, and Algernon probably
allowed himself a few good Vchuckles" over the whole incident.31 The
political implications of performing this particular play, however, are
quite obvious. One person who was more than just a bit upset over the
whole incident was Viscount De L'Isle, Algernon's brother. In a letter
to the Earl of Leicester dated June 17, [1656] Lord De L'Isle complained
that,

In my poor opinion the business of your Lordship's house

hath past somewhat unlickily, and that it had been better

used to do a seasonable courtesy to my Lord Protector then

to have had a play acted in it of psalic affront to him,

which doth much entertain the town.
It should be quickly pointed out that Lord De L'Isle was on Cromwell's
Council of State and was no doubt concerned for his own career and
image. At any rate, Cromwell chose to ignore the whole incident, and
Algernon Sidney remained in secluded retirement at Penshurst,
apparently choosing not to push his image of Marcus Brutus any further.

Algernon's self-imposed isolation at Penshurst and his
rather haughty contempt for Cromwell were both much in contrast to the

course that Philip Sidney, Viscount De L‘Isle steered in regard to the

Lord Protector. When the two brothers had fought against Charles I,

 

31Ewald, V01. 1, pa 198s

32H.M.C., Sidney Pa ers, 1626-1698, p. 499.

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their careers had been quite parallel; however, after 1653 a marked
coolness began to develop between them that would only increase over
the years. For one thing, Lord De L'Isle had no qualms at all about
supporting Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector. Indeed, as Algernon's
biographer points out, Lord De L'Isle could apparently accomodate
himself with whichever group or person was in power during the 1650's
and after.33 He had the uncanny ability always to back the winning
side in the political struggles of the time and seems not to have
suffered in the least for it, even after the Restoration. Not only was
his lordship ”nominated" as one of the 140 members of the Barebones
Parliament that met in 1653, but he was also named to Cromwell's
Council of State. This type of service by politicians and other
prominent folk during the 1650's was harshly criticized by Algernon
after he had gone into exile in 1660 as being nothing more than "base
compliance with fortune.”34 Another reason for the growing coolness
between the two brothers was Lord De L'Isle's personal jealousy over
brother Algernon's influence with their father, the Earl of Leicester.
In the same letter in which Lord De L'Isle complained about Algernon's
production of ngigg gases; at Penshurst, he also upbraided his father
for the degree to which the Earl allowed his second son to dominate
him. He said quite frankly that,

not only in regard to this matter which I have spoken of,

but at all times I am uncertain whether I can have the

liberty to look into it or no, for it seems it is not only
his [Algernon's] chamber but the great rooms of the house,

 

SSE'ald, V010 I, pe 197s

34Blencowe, Signey Pa e 3, pp. 214-227.

33

and perhaps the whole, he commands.35
People were beginning to talk and question the Earl's lack of judgment.
Two brothers who had worked together during the 1640's, found them-
selves drifting apart during the 1650's due to political and personal
reasons. The split would become greater after the Restoration.

The political retirement of Algernon Sidney ended in 1659,
after Oliver Cromwell's death and his son Richard's forced "retirement"
from power. Once again, Sidney was given the opportunity of serving
the type of government he deemed best during the revolutionary years
in England, namely rule by Parliament as the duly elected representatives
of the political nation. Suddenly, the old Long Parliament was
resurrected and given a new lease on life. Sidney and other republicans
like Sir Henry Vane apparently thought they could return to the year
1653 and renew their efforts to make government by Parliament in
England a feasible operation. Such a government, however, faced an
almost daily struggle for existence against the army and against
ambitious generals like John Lambert and Charles Fleetwood. Algernon
was quite ready to work for Parliament's cause and was one of those
who endeavored to subordinate the potentially dangerous military to
civilian control.36 Edmund Ludlow, another ardent republican, recalled
in his memoirs that in May of 1659 both he and Algernon Sidney were

named by Parliament to the Council of State.37 In addition to this, in

 

asHeMOCe, Sidngx Pa 8 3’ l626’l62 , pe 499s
36E'ald9 v01. I) pe 200s
37

Charles Harding Firth, ed., The Memoirs g£_Edmund‘nglgg,

625- 672 (2 Vols.: Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), Vol. I, p.
84.

34

June Algernon along with Bulstrode Whitelocke and Sir Robert Honeywood
were named as peace commissioners to mediate a war between Sweden and
Denmark. Whitelocke, however, refused to serve on the peace mediation
team because of the ”overruling temper and height of Colonel Sidney".38
Nevertheless, this view of Sidney by the former ambassador to Sweden
did nothing to prevent Algernon from going on the diplomatic mission.

Before following Algernon Sidney overseas, it is essential
to understand the background for this rather important mission to
settle the ”Baltic Problem." One of the aims of Oliver Cromwell's
foreign policy as Lord Protector had been the formation of a Protestant
League in the North of Europe to fight the Catholic Hapsburg Power.
The Lord Protector's dream was not realized because Sweden under
Charles X had ambitions of its own of increasing its power in the
Baltic, primarily at Denmark's expense. Both of these countries were,
of course, Protestant. The maritime nations of Europe, mainly England
and the United Provinces, became alarmed lest Sweden succeed in over-
running Denmark and Norway and perhaps shutting off their trade through
the Sound. When Oliver Cromwell died in September of 1658, war was in
progress between Sweden and Denmark. Alarmed by the threat which the
war presented to their extensive Baltic carrying trade, the Dutch
decided to send a fleet and some troops to aid Denmark. This move
checked Swedish aggression, but it also aroused English fear of the

possibility of Dutch monopoly of the Baltic trade.39 After all, the

 

389-2. fie, p. 204.

39Godfrey Davies, The Restoggtion‘g§’Chgrles‘ll (Los
Angeles: Anderson, Ritchie and Simon, 1955), pp. 190-98.

35
English received the bulk of their naval stores from the Baltic, and
they simply did not trust Dutch motives.40 During Richard Cromwell's
very brief Protectorate, an English fleet under Edward Montagu was
sent into the Sound to attempt to maintain some semblance of a "balance
of power" and to make Sweden and Denmark come to terms.41 In addition,
before Richard Cromwell was eased from power in England, a convention
was signed in May of 1659 between England, France, and the United
Provinces whereby these nations agreed to mediate the war between
Sweden and Denmark. The Commonwealth government that replaced Cromwell
dispatched three peace commissioners, Algernon Sidney, Sir Robert
Honeywood, and Thomas Boone to join Montagu in Copenhagen to effect a
peace settlement. Therefore, Algernon's diplomatic stint must be viewed
against the background of a lingering Swedish-Danish war in the Baltic,
a still strong Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry, and a commitment between
the French, Dutch, and English to attempt mediation, using force if
necessary.

The serious-minded attitude and high-principled dedication
to a cause that had marked Sidney's career since the early 1640's was
transferred over into Algernon's rather short but important diplomatic
career. While Parliament was quarreling and bickering with the army
generals in England, Algernon Sidney did everything he could to secure
a settlement between Denmark and Sweden. Sidney was earnest in his

desire to serve the struggling Commonwealth government, and he

 

4OlGodfrey Davies,‘1gg Early Stuarts, 1603-166 , Vol. Ix of

m M my; M, ed. by Sir George Clark (15 vols., 2nd
ed.: Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 228.

“92. £131., p. 203.

36

patiently stuck to his diplomatic post at Copenhagen, though the
desired peace remained elusive after months of negotiation. In a
letter to his father, Algernon complained that while the King of
Sweden, Charles K, was a very able and industrious monarch, he was
also ruled by a violent ambition. To complicate matters further, the
Danish monarch, Christian IV, was a rather dull-witted fellow who was
enveloped by a mental fog most of the time.42 Frustrating as matters
were, Sidney had hopes that something concrete could be accomplished:

I hope that whatsoever be the issue of our negotiations, as

mediators of peace between these two northern Kings, we

shall have this fruit of our journey, as to be able to lay

a good foundation of a43ear alliance between the United

Provinces and England.
Sidney, ever the close observer of men and institutions, was able to
sharpen his skills and to add to his knowledge of government while
working in Copenhagen. Later on, Algernon was quick to defend his
work as a diplomat for England's Commonwealth government. He was
proud not only to have served England but also the general interests
of a European peace as well.44 It is interesting to note that while
in Copenhagen, Sidney scrawled some Latin words in a book, which later
became known as his motto. The words were simply "menus haec inimica
tyrannis,' or ”This hand is opposed to tyrants.” These words would be
held against him by some for the rest of his life.

While the diplomatic front in Northern Europe may have

moved at a leisurely pace in 1659, the same could not be said for the

political front in England. As Algernon Sidney labored patiently and

 

42Blencowe, Signeylflggggg, pp. 166-67.

431%.! Po 1680 44lb1de, ppe 214-15.

37

quietly in Copenhagen, a fierce political struggle was taking place in
England, seesawing back and forth between the Long Parliament and
Cromwell's old army, led by generals like John Lambert and Charles
Fleetwood. Neither side trusted the other, and as the situation in
England became more confused, another general, George Monk, played a
key role in preparing the way for the return of the exiled Stuart
monarchy. Events happened so rapidly in late 1659 and early 1660 that
Algernon simply could not keep up with them. Sidney complained about
this and a number of other things in a letter to Bulstrode Whitelocke
in November of 1659.45 Algernon had to rely upon Dutch diplomats for
news of the latest events in England, and what news he did receive
presented a very confusing picture to him. He stated frankly to
Whitelocke, “Your Lordship sees how much I am in the dark as to those
actions amongst you."46 Sidney's diplomatic position in Copenhagen
was being considerably weakened by political instability at home. He
suspected that the position of the Commonwealth government may have
been deteriorating and that a movement may have been afoot to restore
the Stuart monarchy. For, in closing the letter to Whitelocke,
Algernon declared:

If the government in England do continue on the good old

principles, I shall be ready to serve them; if it returns to

monarchy I desire nothing but liberty to retira, finding

myself a very unfit stone for such a building.

Algernon Sidney would soon get a chance to test those precious "good

old principles" of his.

 

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The year 1660 was perhaps the most difficult year of all in
Algernon Sidney's life. From an overseas vantage point and without a
clear idea of exactly how or why it was happening, he was forced to
watch the last dying shudders of the old Long Parliament and the
restoration to power of the Stuart monarchy. By late spring of 1660,
the Commonwealth government with its "good old principles" was gone. In
its place were a new Parliament and a new King, Charles II, son of the
monarch whom Sidney had fought against and had helped to overthrow, but
not to execute. Luckily for Sidney, he was still in Copenhagen when the
Restoration occurred, or he might have shared the fate of Sir Henry Vans
and other ardent republicans who were caught in England. Almost over-
night, Sidney became a diplomat who in effect was representing a
governmental power that had ceased to exist. A rather awkward position
to be in, to say the least. He was uncertain as to exactly what the
unfolding events in England meant in relation to himself, and he was
also uncertain as to precisely how he would be received there if he
suddenly were to arrive unannounced in England. Therefore, Algernon
Sidney was immediately confronted with a situation that required much
self-examination and soul-searching for a man whose dedication to the
republican cause of Commonwealth England was well know by that time. In
short, Algernon had to decide in 1660 whether to return to England and
attempt some reconciliation with the new government, or simply to remain
abroad if a reconciliation proved impossible. After observing the
situation in England from Copenhagen and Stockholm for several months
and analyzing the attitudes of the restored monarchy, Algernon Sidney
cruese the latter course of action. Thus began Sidney's long and diffi-

cult road through seventeen years of self-imposed exile.

C H A P T E R I I I

POLITICAL EXILE: 1660-1677

In the spring of 1660 a number of important events occurred
in rapid succession in England that would all have an important effect
upon Algernon Sidney's future. For one thing, a general election was
held, producing a new Parliament which met on April 25. Public opinion
was heavily in favor of restoring the old monarchy. After being shown
Charles Stuart's Declaration of Breda, which was first issued on April
4, both houses of Parliament agreed that the government of England
should be by King, Lords, and Commons. A proclamation was issued
declaring that Charles Stuart had indeed become Charles II immediately
upon his father's death on January 30, 1649. Charles II, who had
learned by experience what adversity was all about, accepted the
invitation to return to England, and on May 29, 1660, he triumphantly
entered London.1 On that memorable day, the Earl of Leicester wrote
in his journal, ”I saluted his Majesty among the rest and kissed his
hand, but there was so great disorder and confusion that the King
scarce knew or took particular notice of any body."2 John Evelyn,

loyal royalist and unshakable Anglican, probably summed up the whole

 

1Codfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660, pp. 257-59.

2HeMeCe, Sidney pa 81's, 1626-l69 , pe 6220
'39

40
event best when he wrote in his diary, "I stood in the Strand and
beheld it, and blessed God."3 The days of uncertainty and confusion
had ended: the Restoration was now a fact.

With the Restoration of Charles II, Algernon Sidney found
himself in a rather delicate and uncertain position, to say the least.
He was no longer the diplomatic representative of a‘gg.fggtg
government. In fact, by the very terms of the Restoration itself,
Sidney had supported and officially represented in 1659 a government
that now had no legitimacy at all. Matters were definitely ”up in the
air" for Algernon, and even though he had received official leave to
return to England just prior to the election in April of 1660, he
preferred to wait for official word from the new government. Toward
the end of May, Sidney wrote his father a letter from Copenhagen in
which he expressed as best he could his analysis of his own position
and attitudes.4 Concerning family friends such as Sir John Temple and
the Earl of Northumberland, who had been working quietly on his behalf,
Algernon said, "I press nothing upon them, but that this employment...
may be no prejudice unto me." His attitudes toward the new government
were quite clear and uncomplicated:

Since the Parliament hath acknowledged a king, I know, and

acknowledge, I owe him the duty and the service that belongs

unto a subject, and will pay it. If things are carried out
in a legal and moderate way, I had rather be in employment,
than without any. If I am trusted, I shall perform my duty

with as much fidelity gnd care, as any that I have ever
undertaken in my life.

 

3E. S. de Beer, ed., The Diary‘gfi John Evelyn (4 vols.;
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1955), Vol. III, p. 246.

4Blencowe, Sidngy Pa ers, pp. 181-187. 5Ibid., p. 186.

41

The major difficulty centered upon one key phrase for Sidney: "If I
am trusted." The uncertainty of the new government's attitude toward
him must certainly have left him in an unsettled frame of mind. If
there were conditions attached to his return, Sidney could be
"contented with a private life, or liberty to go beyond the sea." In
his own mind then, in the spring of 1660, Sidney had a fairly clear
idea of what he personally could do in good conscience. However,
everything depended upon some word or action from the new government
in England, and therein lay the uncertainty.

The situation remained nebulous throughout the month of
June, and Algernon's letters to his father serve as excellent
indicators of the rather ambiguous nature of his position and the degree
of uncertainty surrounding his future. The strange silence existing at
Whitehall concerning Sidney, plus his rather desperate financial
position, combined to create an unsettled condition for Sidney to
exist in, to say the least. In a letter to his father on June 16,
1660 (N.S.) from Stockholm, Algernon expressed his desire to return to
England, but admitted that the entire situation was still clouded with

uncertainty. He said quite frankly:

I do not at all know in what condition I am there, nor what
effects I shall find of General Monk's expressions of kind-
ness towards me, and his remembgance of the ancient
friendship that was between us.
(Seorge Monk had been a major general under Cromwell and virtual ruler
of'Scotland with his army until he very adroitly came out in favor of

a restoration in early 1660. He was one of a small group working in

 

6Ewald, V010 I, p0 2730

42

London on Algernon's behalf, but together their efforts were producing
very few results. Matters had not improved any by June 23 when
Algernon wrote the following to his father: ”I am uncertain how my
actions or person will be looked upon at home."7 By the end of June,
Sidney had received no official instructions from England, and he must
certainly have been experiencing some personal anxiety. On June 27,
1660 (N.S.) Sidney wrote his last letter to the Earl of Leicester
before leaving Stockholm. Its tone clearly reveals the doubt and
confusion that perplexed Algernon:

The news I hear from England of public things is punctual

and certain enough, but my friends are so short in what

particularly relates unto myself, that I can make no

judgment at all upon what they say. Perhaps the truth is,

they can say nothing to my adgantage, and leave me to guess

at the rest by public things.
As matters stood then, by the end of June 1660, considerable doubt and
uncertainty surrounded Algernon Sidney's position as an ex-diplomat
stranded in a foreign capital. At this point he would have been
willing to return to England, acknowledge Charles II as King, and
perhaps even serve the government if accepted. He could even have
accepted a private retirement again at Penshurst. He refused, however,
to make a final commitment for himself until the new government in
England had revealed its own attitudes toward him, either by official
word or else by some action. It really boiled down to whether or not
Algernon Sidney could be trusted to live under the restored Stuart
monarchy.

In just one month's time, however, the entire situation

 

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changed quite drastically, and for the worse at that. For a variety
of reasons, the new government had reached a decision regarding
Algernon Sidney, and that decision had been communicated to him through
friends. Sidney's reaction to the current opinion of him at Whitehall
was both swift and quite frank. In a letter to his father from
Copenhagen dated July 28, 1660 (N.S.), he reviewed briefly the nature
of his previous uncertainty, but he added quickly that "the letters of
the last two posts have put me out of that uncertainty, and show me
plainly what I am to expect."9 Even though he might still possibly be
allowed an obscure retirement at Penshurst, Sidney had a good idea of
what the attitude at court must really have been like concerning him.
For he said that:

I have too well learnt under the government of thetzromwells,

what it is to live under the protection of those unto whom I

am tthght an enemy, to expose myself willingly unto the

same.
Algernon was quite willing to acknowledge Charles II as his lawful
sovereign and to live quietly in England: however, Charles II somehow
would have to show that he was in fact reconciled to Sidney as well as
to others who had been "of a party contrary unto his and his father's."
Unless this were to happen, said Sidney, ”I shall be ever suspected,
and often affronted, and upon every little tumult that may happen, be
exposed to ruin."11 Sidney wanted desperately to avoid placing himself

in such a position in England and would sooner remain abroad. Never-

‘theless, Algernon would be willing to come to England and defend his

 

9Blencowe, Sidney Papers, pp. 189-194.

1°Ib1d0, p0 1890 11Ib1d0’ p0 1900

44
actions and attitudes during the 1650's relating to his participation
in the Commonwealth governments. However, he vetoed this idea since
"finding myself and my proceedings disowned and slighted, I cannot
expect that either the king or his council will give me the hearing,
or receive any account from me." Therefore, after weighing all the
factors and considering his position from every angle, Algernon Sidney
reached his final decision: "I choose this voluntary exile as the
least evil condition that is within my reach."12 A tough decision
indeed to make, but one which was quite consistent with Sidney's
nature. It was not cowardice that kept Algernon Sidney out of England,
but rather an awareness on his part of the stark reality of the
attitudes at Court concerning him.

Precisely why did the English court look with such disfavor
upon Algernon Sidney? Apparently a number of factors combined to
soroduce a considerable air of hostility at Whitehall regarding the
man. The fact that Sidney's name appeared on the list of 135
commissioners appointed to try Charles I for treason certainly did not
help his cause any with Charles II. Algernon's staunch republican
principles were well known by that time, as was his friendship with
men like Sir Sidney Vane the Younger and Edmund Ludlow. Incidentally,
Ludlow had fled England and was residing in Switzerland. Sidney's
connection with and attachment to Sir Henry Vane have already been
pointed out and developed.” Vane at this time was clearly a marked
man, and the fact that the careers of Vans and Sidney had been so

parallel curing the previous decade did not help Sidney's image either.

 

12Ibid., p. 190. 13Su ra, pp. 22-29.

3179

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45
Royalists, such as John Evelyn, might admire Algernon for his courage,
but perhaps the image which stuck in their minds the most regarding
Sidney, as indeed it did in Evelyn's, was that he had been an

'4 Indeed, this

"inveterate” enemy to the last King, Charles I.
particular image of Sidney, plus his reputation for stiff adherence to
republican principles, followed him around like a shadow for the rest
of his life, and even after his death. In addition, Sidney knew quite
well, probably through correspondence from his friends, that he was
regarded at Whitehall as a ”fierce, violent, seditious, mutinuous,

turbulent” fellow.15

Sidney probably expressed the real crux of the
problem regarding himself best when he wrote the following to his
father: ”The cause and root of all the bitterness against me is from
my stiff adherence to the party they [i.e., Charles II and his

ministers] hate."16

With a Stuart once again on the throne and the
royaliats in firm control of matters, very little sympathy or
understanding could be expected regarding a staunch republican like
Algernon Sidney.

Sidney may have surmised the truth behind the bitterness
against him when he singled out his “stiff adherence" to the party
which espoused republican principles and had opposed Charles I. This
alone, however, was not enough to create the air of great hostility

that existed against him at Whitehall: for, in 1660 this hostility

grew to vicious proportions indeed. Quite a few rumors concerning

 

14E. S. de Beer, Ihe Qiary‘gf gohn Evelyn, Vol. IV, p. 353.
15Blencowe, §idngy Pagegs, p. 196.

161b1d0 , p0 2310

 

 

46

Algernon Sidney were churning about Whitehall, and they concerned his
behavior and attitudes as a diplomatic representative of the
Parliamentary government in 1659. Some of them did have a basis in
fact, while others rested upon nothing but hearsay and innuendo.
Taken together, they added considerably to Sidney's suspect image at
Court. He was confronted with the rumors in a rather heart-rending
letter from his father written in the latter part of August of 1660.17
It was definitely not safe for Algernon to return to England, as it had
been believed at one time that Sidney would be excepted from the
general act of pardon and oblivion. As it turned out, he was not
excepted from the Act of Oblivion which received the royal signature on
August 29, 1660, but the mere fact that Sidney could even have been
considered for such marked disfavor certainly revealed something about
the nature of the hostility with which he was viewed. The Earl of
Leicester, who was at a loss now as to precisely what he should advise
his son to do, said frankly:

And though I know not what you have done or said, here or

there, yet I have several ways heard that there is as ill an

opinion of1you as of any, even of those that condemned the

late king.
General George Monk, who had done so much to make the Restoration a
reality and was working on Sidney's behalf, informed the Earl of
Leicester that "very ill Offices" had been done to his son. A final
:revealing comment came when Leicester said that "I have heard such

things of you that in doubtfulness only of their being true, no man

will open his mouth for you.”19 From the tone of the Earl's letter,

 

17M0' ppe 205-2130 181bid0’ p0 2090 191b1d0

47
one would almost think that Algernon Sidney's name had become synonymous
with "Typhoid Mary."

What Leicester referred to in a rather neutral way as "things"
which were in circulation concerning his son were in reality some very
nasty rumors. For one thing, Sidney's motto, "Menus haec inimica
tyrannis," was working to his disadvantage. Leicester also lamented
that according to various reports, Algernon had treated the Danish royal
family in a very scornful and contemptuous manner while he was serving
as a peace negotiator in Copenhagen. If this rumor had any basis in
fact, Sidney could find himself in real trouble, since the Stuarts were
related to the Danish royal house.20 The most vicious rumor of all
that Leicester knew of concerning his son was one that involved a
remark which Algernon allegedly made in relation to Charles I's
execution. When asked by a Mr. Brockman if he had been one of the ones
guilty of Charles I's death , Algernon supposedly remarked:

Guiltyl said you, do you call that guilt! Why, it was the

justest and br yest action that ever was done in England or

anywhere else.
Remarks such as this, lamented Algernon's father, if they were true,
would make a deep and lasting impression at Whitehall, an impression
that would be impossible to erase. Rumors and stories, circulated by
persons who remain unnamed, had undermined Sidney's position in
England and had contributed greatly to the air of hostility that now
surrounded the republican's name.

The awkward position in which Algernon Sidney found himself

 

20Eharles II's grandfather James I had married a Danish

Princess.

21Blencowe, Sidney Pa e s, p. 211.

48
in early 1660 rapidly had deteriorated to a very untenable one by the
summer of that year. Not only had his official position as a
representative of the Commonwealth government ceased to exist, but he
was now viewed with such hostility at Whitehall that he could hope for
little in the way of a fair hearing. Not only did Sidney have to
defend his opposition to Charles I and his support for and involvement
in the experiment in Commonwealth government in England, but he also
had to contend with rumors about his character and actions abroad.
Sidney could not defend himself from his position on the Continent,
and very, very few Englishmen were willing to risk defending him at
home. Sidney could not really count on being allowed to return to
England and live the private life of a recluse, at least not for the
immediate future. Even though he had not been excepted from the Act
of Oblivion, that did not mean he would have been free from harassment
by various officials, from top echelons right on down to the local
sheriff. For as his father pointedly remarked to Sidney:
Yet if there be any particular and great displeasure against
you, which I fear there is, you may feel the effects thereof
from the gigher powers, and receive affronts from the
inferior.
Royal displeasure and official hostility could be like infestious
diseases that would follow a person like Sidney everywhere he went and
would taint him for life, making others wary of keeping company with
him. Once royal displeasure and hostility had been earned, Sidney would

news found himself constantly under suspicion if he lived in England.

Perhaps he even would have found himself the incessant target of wagging

 

22]bid., p. 213.

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tongues and mediocre minds, eager for advancement at the expense of
someone like Sidney. Algernon usually found it quite difficult to
keep his opinions to himself, and it would have been an arduous task
indeed for this proud and decidedly stiff-necked fellow to have
resigned himself to a life of quiet solitude at the age of thirty-eight
at Penshurst, where the memory of Marcus Brutus still lurked about.

In trying to discover the actual sources or people responsi-
ble for the rumors and ill-feeling generated against Algernon Sidney,
the historian must rely mainly upon personal speculation and intuitive
hunches. This may not be a very sophisticated approach to the problem
of "who was out to get Algernon Sidney," but due to the lack of any
substantial or concrete evidence, there is simply not much else to go
on. One possible avenue of speculation is connected with the other
members of the peace mediation team who served with Sidney at
Copenhagen. It is a bit peculiar that Sir Robert Honeywood, who worked
with Sidney, could return to England shortly after the Restoration and
be quite graciously received by Charles 11.23 It is not at all clear
just how Honeywood managed to ingratiate himself with Charles II, since
he too had been a member of the Commonwealth's Council of State along

with Sidney and Sir Henry Vane.

Much stronger suspicion surrounds the figure of the Admiral
of the Fleet, Edward Montagu, who had been sent to the Baltic area in
lflarch of 1659 with an English fleet. Instead of applying himself to
'11s appointed diplomatic work in Copenhagen, it seems that Montagu

began ingratiating himself with those who were working for a

 

231bid., p. 212.

50
restoration of Charles Stuart. Sidney reported his suspicions about
the admiral's "extraofficial" activities to the ruling Parliament, but
before he could be officially dealt with, Montagu retired to England
with the Baltic Fleet, thus undermining considerably England's
influence at the conference table.24 It was Montagu's own idea to
retire with the fleet, and in this move he was supported by the other
English peace commissioners, except Sidney who stubbornly opposed all
of them.25 Montagu was one of those crafty fellows who could change
sides at the drop of a hat: he had fought against Charles I; actively
supported Oliver Cromwell: and then rendered his services for the
Restoration cause. His reward was the Earldom of Sandwich and a
continued successful naval career under Charles II. One must always
wonder about a political animal of this type, that is, one who can
emerge from political turmoil covered with roses, while others around
him are battered in the maelstrom. As far as Algernon Sidney was
concerned, Montagu was nothing but a scheming time-server, and he

verbally blasted the admiral in a letter to his father. He said

sarcastically:

If I had regarded my own convenience, I might perhaps have
known where the sun rose, how to adore him, and how 8 gain
the benefit of his rays, as well as General Montagu.
It is not at all certain whether Honeywood and Montagu had anything to
do with the verbal sabotage of Algernon Sidney at the English court.

However, enough suspicion surrounds Edward Montagu at least to make him

 

24Ewald, Vol. 1, pp. 225-27.

25Davies, The Restoration 2:,Charles‘ll, p. 207.

26Blencowe, Sidney Pa are, p. 223.

51
a good suspect.

Today it is considered quite unscholarly to advocate any
"conspiracy theory" in an attempt to explain events in history, and the
unwary scholar risks the scorn of his colleagues and perhaps even
banishment to another discipline if he attempts to apply such a theory.
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the hostility generated
toward Algernon Sidney in 1660 are downright peculiar, to say the
least. True, he was a man of republican principles with an arrogant,
stiff-necked perspective to life. In addition, he must have been
rather difficult to get along with, considering his "overruling
temper." It is also true that Algernon Sidney committed himself firmly
to Parliament's cause during the 1640's and 1650's, though he definitely
was not an actual regicide. But then, other men had opposed Charles I
as Sidney had, yet they survived the Restoration in good order. One
need only point to Colonel Hutchinson who had opposed Charles I and had
actually signed his death warrant. Yet, he escaped with impunity
apparently due to the intercession of friends on his behalf.27 Instead,
Sidney had to cope with the effects of the hostility generated against
him by some powerful and consistent enemies at Whitehall. One of those
enemies could very well have been Charles II himself. In 1670 when
Algernon appeared at Paris, the French government was anxious to know
how it should react in regard to Mr. Sidney. According to the French
official in London who communicated to Paris Whitehall's position

concerning Algernon,

The King said to me again that he did not care whether the

 

27Ewald, Vol. I, p. 283.

 

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52

said Sidney lived in Paris, Languedoc, or any other place

he pleased, provided he did not return to England, where,

said he, his pernicious sentiments, sngorted with so great

parts and courage might do much harm.
Granted, this incident occurred ten years after the period in question,
but it can be considered as fairly indicative of Charles II's attitude
toward Sidney. Whether the maneuvers of the other "enemies" at
Whitehall actually constituted a concerted "conspiracy" to defame
Algernon Sidney or not must remain a matter for speculation. They at
least represent a classic example of backstabbing and character
assassination, with the victim being unable to defend himself properly.

Algernon Sidney did not remain silent in the face of
hostile opinions and attitudes that formed and developed at Whitehall
against him. In several noble and at times passion-filled letters to
his father, Sidney responded to the rumors and accusations circulating
against him.29 These letters contain not only denials of most of the
rumors concerning himself, but also a very careful and perceptive
analysis of the gggl.£ggggg for the hostility against him. In

pinpointing his firm adherence to the Commonwealth cause as the true

source for Royal enmity, Sidney defended not only his own actions

 

28Sir John Dalrymple, ed., Memoirs'gfl Great Britain and
Ireland (2 vols., 2nd ed.: London: printed for W. Strahan and T.
Cadell, 1771-3), Vol. II, Appendix, Part I, p. 61.

nglencowe, Sidney Pa ers, letter v11. pp. 194-198: letter
VIII. PP. 199-204: letter X. PP. 214-227: letter XI, pp. 229-235.
l.etter no. VIII is undated and is assumed by the editor, R. W. Blencowe,
to have been written around August 29, 1660. However, Sidney consis-
tently refers to Sir Henry Vans and others as having already been
executed. Vane was executed on Tower Hill on June 14, 1662, and it
qust be assumed that the letter was written in that year. Nevertheless,
the letter will be used here with the other three because it fits into
the general pattern established and followed by them.

53
during the previous two decades, but also the ”good old cause" in
general for which he had fought and worked so hard. In addition to
this, the letters also reveal a bitterness and biting contempt for
those politicians who possessed chameleon-style consciences: that is,
those who could easily abandon Parliament's sinking ship, and one set
of principles in the process, and then jump merrily upon the
Restoration bandwagon. In doing so, Algernon Sidney shed considerable
light upon the workings of his own mind and upon his rather lofty
personality with its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, these valuable
letters reveal the particular way in which Sidney viewed the country of
his birth and the institution of Parliament. Sidney does much more
than merely defend his actions for the Earl of Leicester's benefit.
For in these letters Sidney was actually attempting to champion the
“good old cause" itself for anyone who was willing to listen to him.
He was addressing himself to future generations of Englishmen as well
as to his own father.

Algernon Sidney did his best to set the record straight for
his father concerning the verbal and written comments which had been
attributed to him and which had been working so decidedly to his
detriment at Whitehall. In one letter from Augsburg dated September
21, 1660 (N.S.), Sidney denied making insulting or rude comments
concerning the Danish Royal family.30 Though he admitted that he
:3erhaps showed partiality to the Swedish side in the peace negotiations
leecause he admired Sweden's monarch, he insisted that his only interest

was to follow his orders and affect a solution to the Baltic problem

 

solbidee pp0 214-2270

54
that would benefit England. Simply stated, "I did my duty, and
troubled myself no further.”31 Though Sidney specifically denied
making the rather fiendish comment concerning Charles I's execution
that had been attributed to him, he did admit that he publicly
defended the execution in his official capacity as a diplomat.32
There is always the possibility that such remarks made their way to
Charles II's ears in slightly altered or elaborated form. Once again,
one must question the behavior and motives of Edward Montagu.

Sidney was well aware of the problems involved in trying to
defend himself against remarks that he made while serving one
government and that were being counted against him by the new power.
Words, of themselves, could be extremely self-incriminating. For, as
he wrote to his father in another letter: ”They are in their own
nature subject to various interpretations, and are almost ever
variously reported."33 So much depended upon the exact context
surrounding the specific remarks in question. Apparently, Sidney's
enemies at Whitehall were reaching far back into the past for
ammunition to use against him, and it would have been quite impossible
for Algernon to have defended himself against such a tactic. Algernon
outlined the problem as follows:

Who can answer for what he hath said in eighteen years of a

party onto which he professed utter enmity? I do in my

heart believe that I never made many discourses that are
reported of me, at least not in the manner in which they are
reported: yet cannot I say they are absolutely false. Some

such thing may have passed that I have forgotten, that would
make my assertion a lie, or at least it would be thought so.

 

31
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33Blencowe, SiggngEggggg, p. 231. S‘Ibid.

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55
Too many events had passed and too many statements, public and private,
had been uttered: both together constituted a trap from which it would
have been impossible for Sidney to have extricated himself. As Sidney
perceived quite lucidly, even if he could successfully refute Ell the
accusations against him to the satisfaction of Charles II, "who shall
oblige him to say he is satisfied?"35 Sidney was really in that very
unenviable position where he would be "damned if he did and damned if
he didn't.” Sidney was never one to shy away from expressing opinions,
and this characteristic would ultimately contribute to his downfall.
For, ironically enough, certain passages from his Discourses were read
.ggglgfl context at his treason trial in 1683 to prove his evil
intentions against Charles II.

Certainly, some of Algernon Sidney's remarks and statements
uttered during the 1640's and 1650's could be considered self-
incriminating, especially if viewed by someone who was looking
specifically for that type of proof. But, were they the real cause of
the animosity against him? According to Sidney's own analysis of the
situation, they were not. He stated the problem quite clearly to his
father in a letter dated September 26, 1660 (N.S.):

I do believe my peace may be made, but not by the means

that are proposed. The King doth not give any testimony of

desiring to destroy all that were against him, but he will

have all to 9.9.9133: to scant, renoun e, 31191535 2213192. I

find this and other things are expected from me. I can do

the first, cheerfully and willingly, as hesgs acknowledged
by the Parliament. Nothing of the others.

True problem, then, was really one of principles for Sidney. He

steadfastly refused to renounce his participation in the rebellion

 

351bid., p. 232. 361bid., p. 233.

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56
against Charles I, and he likewise refused to ask pardon for his
involvement in and wholehearted support for the Commonwealth government
in England. Sidney defended himself quite stubbornly to his father on
these points. As far as his ownipersonal actions during the recent
civil troubles were concerned, "I cannot find one that I can look upon
as a breach of the rules of justice or honor."37 Clearly, Sidney's
firm adherence to a rigid set of principles was the vital source for
the inner strength that sustained him. As he pointed out to his father:
If I lose this by vile and unworthy submissions, acknowledge-
ment of errors, asking of pardon, or the like, I shall from
that mom at be the miserablest man alive and the scorn of
all “he
If the enmity against him at Whitehall was based upon his past political
activities, Sidney claimed to be not the least bit surprised:
I did not take the war in which I was engaged to be a slight
matter, nor to be done by halves. I thought it undertaken
upon good grounds, and that it was the part of an honest man
to pursue them heartily. It is not strange that this should
raise great animosities against me. It is usual to desire
to destroy tBBse that will not be corrupted. I could not
expect less.
Algernon Sidney had served the Commonwealth government in good faith,
and he simply refused to beg Charles II's forgiveness for having done
so. In a rather naive fashion, Sidney even expected Charles II to
respect him for refusing to abandon his principles.
It was indeed an ironic, and one might even say an almost
‘tragic, situation in which Sidney found himself. For, while he had
pserched himself with his clear conscience upon a lofty and quite

issolatsd pedestal, others who had shared Sidney's experiences found it

 

37M" p. 195' 38mg. sglbideg p0 2220

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more convenient and profitable to reach some accommodation with Charles
II. The rapid changes in the political climate during these tempestuous
years brought out in a number of men a certain quality of time-serving
which allowed them to survive in the long run. Indeed, some of them
practiced their arts with an agility that would simply boggle the
average mind. For these men, Algernon Sidney felt a deep and abiding
contempt. In a particularly bitter letter to his father, Sidney
proudly announced: "I have in my life been guilty of many follies,
but, as I think, of no meanness: I Will not blot and defile that which
is past by endeavoring to provide for the future."40 With politicians
like Colonel Hutchinson and Edward Montagu clearly in mind, Sidney
fumed:

Let them rejoice in their subtlety, who, by betraying the

former powers, have gained the favor of this: and not only

preserveg‘ but advanced themselves in these dangerous

changes.
Sidney might have been able to have procured his safety in the same
manner, but as he emphatically stated for his father's benefit, "I
had rather be a vagabond all my life, than buy my being in my own
country at so dear a rate."42 Other men might shed their consciences
like fur costs, but Sidney must live with his. The irony of the entire
situation was that while Sidney might stand upon his honesty, courage,
and rigid principles, he would suffer because of it and ultimately be

destroyed. The men who found it easy or convenient to change sides,

for whatever reason, were the ones who survived in troubled political

 

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waters. The Algernon Sidneys of this world are forever butting their
heads against stone walls: it is the clever, subtle, crafty people who
always seem to survive and improve themselves. Sidney possessed none
of the subtle arts of a courtier, and it would have been grossly
dishonest of him had he even pretended that he did. Sidney was really
trapped by events he could not control and by a personality that would
not allow him to accommodate himself with the changing times. His life
from this point on has many of the elements of genuine tradegy.

By 1662, after two years of exile, it might be thought that
perhaps Algernon Sidney could somehow have found it in him to "bend a
little" in his attitude. But events in England during those two years
made it impossible for him to do so, even if the thought had occurred
to him. Republicans like Sir Henry Vane, John Lambert, and Sir Arthur
Hesilrige were arrested and imprisoned. No doubt they were too
dangerous to be simply ignored by Charles II. But what about a man
like Hugh Peters, the Independent preacher and army chaplin to Lord
Fairfax, who was imprisoned and executed. Was he really that dangerous?
In addition, Restoration government in England was definitely not being
conducted along the standards by which Sidney thought it should have
been. Like a man attempting to shout into a hurricane, Algernon
expressed his sense of utter frustration and disapproval over the
condition of England for his father's benefit in a letter written after
Sir Henry Vane's execution for treason.43 Instead of ruling for the
lgeneral good and prosperity of his subjects, Charles II seemed more

.intent upon the glorification of himself and his court of time-servers.

 

431b1d0, ppe 199‘2040

59
The liberty that Sidney and others like him had hoped to establish in
England during the Commonwealth period had been trampled under foot.
The ”piety, virtue, sobriety, and modesty" of the 1650's had been
replaced by the "luxury and lewdness" of Restoration England under
Charles II. Parliament, which used to be "the palace of our liberty,
the sure defenders of the oppressed" had somehow been transformed into
the very instrument of the nation's oppression. Parliament had been
stripped of its honor, and England itself had been reduced to a
"miserable nation". Those responsible for this decline, the King
himself, his ambitious advisers, and all the pandering time-servers,
must all share a guilt that was nearly as infamous as that incurred by
Judas himself. For a patriotic man like Sidney who was proud of the
part he played in Commonwealth government, exile from his homeland was
clearly a ”great evil." Nevertheless, rather than attempting to learn
the "vile court arts" that others used so well, Sidney could readily
accept a life among strangers in exile.

Algernon Sidney's harsh and emotional evaluation of
Restoration England in 1662 was more than just the embittered cry of a
frustrated exile. For he was by that time already displaying those
particular ideals and interpretations which would reach their full
development in his own Digggugses and in the writings of others during
the Exclusion Crisis of 1678-81. In short, Sidney was clearly showing
signs of becoming what would later be termed a ”Whig," though the word
itself in 1662 had no political implications at all. When Sidney
:referred to the English Parliament as "the palace of our liberty" and
the "defenders of the oppressed," he was clearly laying the foundation

ffiar an intellectual interpretation that would later be expanded upon

60

in his Disggurges. In his later writing, Sidney stated quite
emphatically that it was Parliament's duty and right to provide for
the Dggligngggg of the nation, and that it ought not to be dissolved
until this had been accomplished.44 In 1662 Sidney could also
interpret Parliament as an assembly of men "who formerly could bridle
kings, and keep the balance equal between them and the people."45
Parliament in addition could make England "glorious and happy" as
Sidney obviously thought it had during the Commonwealth period.

In 1662 Sidney was doing more than just praising Parliament's
role during the 1650's. He was also displaying early signs of a
decidedly "Whiggish" interpretation of government, with a special
emphasis upon Parliament's importance within the constitution.
Algernon Sidney clearly was willing to credit Parliament with being a
much more essential institution in the English state than any Stuart
king would ever have allowed. In criticizing Restoration government
in 1662 for being lewd and corrupt and for not being interested in the
nation's prosperity, Sidney was laying the basis for the conclusion in
his later Digggugsgs. There he stated that the real difference between
good government and evil government was that a good government used the
power it had for the good of the people.46 For Sidney, the Restoration
government of Charles II deserved all the scorn he could heap upon it.
But, beneath Sidney's scorn and sense of frustration can be detected

the embryonic foundation for an intellectual interpretation that he

 

44
pp 0 421-260

Sidney, Diggougsgs Dongggning governmgn , ch. 3, sec. 38,

45Blencowe, Sidngy Pa 9, p. 202.

4692. .c—LE'! Che 3, SBCe 45, ppe 455-570

61

would later expand upon into a decidedly "Whiggish" view of English
history and government.4

It is easy to see why Algernon Sidney's sole biographer,
and a Whiggish one at that, could interpret him as a sincere and
patriotic republican whose vision of an ideal commonwealth in the
seventeenth century closely matched the reality of England's
constitutional monarchy of the 1870's.48 It is claimed that Sidney
was able to discern in the seventeenth century the keystone of the
arch of English parliamentary government in the nineteenth and the
secret of England's national happiness and tranquility when he
observed that ”the whole body of a nation cannot be tied to any other
obedience than is consistent with the common good according to their
own judgment."49 Problems arise because of this tempting, but very
misleading, interpretation. In the first place, this interpretation
is nothing more than a variation on the standard Whig song of the
steady organic development of the English constitution and its
inevitable advance towards that time period from which the particular
Whig interpreter is looking backward. By doing this, Algernon Sidney
naturally looks like a nineteenth-century type of prophet who had the
misfortune to have lived in the seventeenth century. Admittedly, the
tone and wording of certain passages in letters written in the early
‘1660's make Sidney sound like an early Whig "crying in the political

:eilderness.” But rather then view Sidney as a man looking ahead to a

 

4702-.2ito. pp. 201-202.
“5'31”! Mend Ii_"’°_§. °_"‘. Alggrnon Signey. Vol. I, pp. 256-66.
49

191d., p. 266.

62
new are or epoch for England, it would be much more accurate to view
him as someone who longed for the "good old cause" (i.e., Commonwealth
government of the 1650's) to be re-established in England. This is
really what Algernon Sidney was getting at in chapter three of his
Digggggggg,when he wrote that changes had to be made in the English
constitution to restore England to its ancient liberty, dignity, and
happiness.50 Algernon Sidney's gaze was not directed primarily into
the future, but rather constantly back to the "good old days" of the
1650's.

The particular quote used by Sidney's biographer to show
the parallel between Sidney's concept of a Commonwealth and the
author's view of his own period is dangerously misleading on a number
of other points also. If read closely, it can make Algernon Sidney
sound like a democratic republican who was willing to place his trust
in a kind of consensus rule of the people. It should, however, be
quickly pointed out that there is a consistently aristocratic tone
running through the Digggggggg that shatters this false illusion. For
Sidney, the English Parliament was not only the one institution that
should counterbalance the Royal power, but it was also the means through
which the aristocratic families could maintain their political power
within the concept of "mixed government”. Sidney was not the least bit
interested in reform measures that would have widened the franchise or
redistributed seats in the Commons. Indeed, the idea probably would

have sent him into a vicious tailspin. Sidney was the product of an

 

soSidney, Diggoursgs Dgnggrning Doyegnment, ch. 3, se. 37,
pp. 418-420.

63
aristocratic environment, not a liberal democratic one. It cannot be
emphasized strongly enough that his view of English politics during
his long exile was a backward looking one. Rather than honor Sidney
as a liberal-Whig type of political philosopher who would have enjoyed
living in the late nineteenth century, it would be much more accurate
to place him nearer to his friend Sir Henry Vane. For it was Vane who
probably expressed the real essence of their political position in
terms with which Sidney could readily have agreed when he said simply,
"Sovereignty ought to be in the whole body of the peopleltgggnggyg
m jig 9.1!. Mrs” That cause was the "good old cause" that
saw its best days from 1648 to 1653.

In addition to the imprisonment of some of Sidney's friends,
the political apostasy of old comrades, and frustration over his exile,
Algernon Sidney also had to struggle under the burden of personal
family problems at the same time. A split between Algernon and his
father, which had developed because Algernon had returned to Common-
wealth government after Cromwell's death, became much more intense and
harsh after the Restoration.52 Not only did the old Earl of Leicester
refuse to send his son monetary help, but he also neglected to answer
most of Algernon's letters. The struggle between father and son can
be accurately established and followed in their correspondence in
1660 and 1661. It was a struggle on the son's part to justify his
position and principles before his father, and an equal struggle on

Leicester's part to comprehend and accept his son's exile and perhaps

 

51110-6. Bit. been lens in: 1.420% . p- 254-
52

E'ald, V010 I, ppe 266-670

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64

bring himself to offer some advise and help.5:3 Sidney was clearly
disturbed and perplexed by his father's seeming inability to understand
his decision to remain abroad in 1660. The problem of communication
was made more difficult and frustrating because Leicester rarely
bothered to write his son. In fact, communication was so one-sided
that by August of 1660, Algernon was complaining that his last twenty
letters to his father had been unanswered.S4 The letters written by
Algernon Sidney in exile were mainly attempts to explain carefully the
reasons for his self-imposed exile to his afther and to implore his
father not to interpret his absence from England as any personal act
of disloyalty to him. That Sidney was concerned lest his father
misinterpret his actions is plainly evident in a letter written from
Augsburg in September of 1660 in which Sidney said:

Your lordship may perhaps think you have a son that is

headstrong and violent, or guilty of some other faults of

which he is often accused: but you shall not find I ggve any

quality that is dishonorable to you, or your family.

Leicester, for his part, blamed his inability to write upon
age and poor eyesight, but these reasons were not the primary reasons,
though they probably compounded the problem.56 The aging aristocrat
also chided his second son rather severely for what he termed his
"neglect” when Algernon left his father "sick, solitary, and sad at

Penhurst." Perhaps Leicester could not quite comprehend his son's

lofty sense of duty or his dedication to republican principles. But

 

5y’Blencowe, Sidney Pagerg. See in particular letter V, pp.
181-88: letter VII, pp. 194-98: letter IX. PP. 205-213: letter X, pp.
214-22 7 0

54Ibid., p. 194. 55;bid., p. 223.

561g1d., pp. 205-213.

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there were other factors as well that combined with Algernon's absence
to produce a rather chilly atmosphere at Penhurst. For one thing, the
Earl's beloved countess had died in August of 1659 while Algernon was
in Copenhagen. In addition, his son-in-law, Lord Strangford, who had
married the youngest of the Sidney daughters, turned out to be a first-
class scoundrel. Not only had he nearly ruined himself by wild
extravagance, but apparently he had refused to fulfill his marriage
contract.57 What made matters worse was the fact that apparently the
daughter herself was not a completely innocent victim. To add to the
Sidney family problems was the fact that Leicester may still have been
estranged from his eldest son, Viscount De L'Isle, who had assaulted
the Earl at Penhurst in late 1652.58 It is no wonder that the Earl of
Leicester was an aging and sick man in 1660: for it must have seemed
to him as though the very structure of his family was crumbling before
his eyes. All of these family problems no doubt prevented Leicester
from viewing Algernon's absence from England in the proper way. Indeed,
he may possibly have viewed his second son in part as merely a younger
edition of his eldest, that is as a hard-to-menage ingrate. In one of
his few letters to Algernon in 1660, the old Earl unburdened himself:
And concerning you, what to resolve in myself, or what to
advise you, truly I know not: for you must give me leave to
remember of how little weight my opinions and counsel have
been with you, and how unkindly and unfriendly you have

rejected the exortations and admonitions which in much
affection and kindness I have given you on many occasion.

 

57Ib1d0, p0 1910
58H.M.C., Signgy Pa 8, 1626-1698, p. 614.
59

Blencowe, Sidney Pa e s, p. 208.

66
Algernon Sidney's inability to accept the Restoration government may
easily have been the last of a long series of family crises which
combined to undermine the Earl's existence at Penhurst and erode his
patience and his capacity for understanding.

As the year 1660 lengthened into 1661, the estrangement
between Algernon and his father worsened. Leicester continued to
withhold financial help and stubbornly maintained his silence at
Penhurst. Sir John Temple, who was Master of the Rolls in Ireland and
an old and trusted family friend, endeavored to mediate on Algernon's
behalf and offer the Earl some advice. Writing to Leicester in November
of 1660, Sir John tried to counsel him concerning his son:

I shall most humbly offer it to your lordship, whether you

will not think fit to write somewhat to him. That may let

him know you shall continue ygur affections to him, and
take care of his subsistence.
As a family friend who had a son of his own, Sir John was perhaps
apprehensive lest the burden of Algernon's exile combine with
Leicester's coldness toward his haughty son to push the exile into a
dangerous position. For Temple warned Leicester:
I confess I think him in very great danger: and that he may
run such a course, (for he speaks of going to serve against
the Turk)61as will deprive his friends of all means of his
recovery.
IJnfortunately, Sidney's continued alienation from his father brought
cht the worse in him, and the bitterness, frustration, sarcasm, and

rnJre spite so garishly thrown at Leicester were quite unbecoming and

even pathetic. In December of 1660, Algernon put it this way to his

 

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father:

I write to your Lordship sometimes because I am not forbidden:
not often, because I am neither commanded, nor hgye reason to
think that diligence would be acceptable to you.

Algernon's emotional nadir was reached in January of 1661 when he wrote
the following to his father: "According to my custom, I give your
Lordship this testimony of my being alive: which I think necessary
since your Lordship gives no sign of remembering I am so."63 Forced
to reject his country at this time, it is sad indeed that Algernon
Sidney should also have to struggle under the burden of his own
father's temporary rejection of him.

At some time during the first half of 1661 the Earl of
Leicester experienced a change of heart regarding his vagabond son,
who by this time had settled in Rome. In June of that year Leicester
broke his long silence, and the frigid relations between father and
son experienced a considerable thaw when the Earl actually began
sending money to his son. He could only advise his son to remain
outside of England, but at least at that point he seems to have
accepted Algernon's exile as a fact of life.64 Sir John Temple, who
probably had a lot to do with Leicester's change of heart, sincerely
approved of the Earl's new resolution to help his son and was quick to

analyze the possibilities of the situation. On July 31, 1661, Tewle

Iwrote to Leicester concerning his new attitude:

 

62Arthur Collins, ed.,llgg Signgy Lettggs.ggg,Memorialslgfi

State (2 vols.: London: printed for T. Osborne in Grey's Inn, 1746),
Vol. II, pp. 702-704.

Gzlbigeg ppe 704-7050
64

Euald, V010 I, p0 3850

68

I believe you could never do it in a more seasonable time.

The last letter I received here [Dublin] from him, which

bore data some months since, was full of high discontents

expressggg the great sense he had of his friends' neglect

of him.
As Sir John plainly saw, the new and improved relations between father
and son were not without possibilities for the future:

If your Lordship would be pleased to express now your

fatherly care of him, and to send him such a supply at

present as might express your affection to him, I think it

were a work worthy of you, and such as woulgébe a perpetual

tie and obligation upon him for the future.
This change of heart in 1661 on Leicester's part concerning his son
was not a temporary one, for in 1671 the Earl mortgaged Leicester
House for four thousand pounds, two thousand of that amount being
designated for Algernon.67

In July of 1660 when Algernon Sidney committed himself to
an exile from his native England, he could not possibly have envisioned
the seventeen-year odyssey upon which he was embarking. Nor could he
have foreseen the dangers and intrigues that he would be involved in.
For in his endeavors to find a suitable place to settle, Sidney was
forced to spend much of his time traveling about from one European
country to another, sometimes just a few steps ahead of would-be
assassins. After rejecting France and especially the ”drunken
countries of Germany," Sidney finally finally determined to settle in
Italy, arriving in Rome by the fall of 1660.68 He found life in the

Eternal City and its surrounding area much more to his liking than the

 

65H.M.C., Signey‘gggggg, 1626-16 D, pp. 513-14.
afilbideg p0 5140 671b1d0, p0 5300
68

Blencowe, Signey Pa e 3, pp. 190-91.

69
melancholy North of Europe. In Rome Algernon was befriended by a few
of the Cardinals in the Vatican and was able to study the administrative
and political sides of Catholicism at first hand, and with a surprising
degree of impartiality at that.69 It is one of the great ironies of
his life that Algernon should have gotten along so well with the high
princes of the Catholic Church, when, as an Englishman, he shared the
strong hatred and fear of Papists which most of his native countrymen
possessed. But then, Sidney was a very good observer of men and
events, and apparently for once in his life he kept any offensive
opinions he might have had to himself.

Sidney found other benefactors in Italy besides a few of the
high princes in the Vatican. During the summer of 1661, Algernon was
entertained as the guest of Prince Pamfili, nephew of Pope Innocent X,
at his splendid villa near Frascati.70 Because of the hot, stifling
air that settles over Rome in the summer, it was (and still is for that
matter) a city which those who could afford it abandoned for the
healthier climate in the surrounding hills. Near Frascati, Algernon
Sidney found a peace and contentment which he had not known for many
months. Sidney rapidly adjusted to a hermit-like existence at the
villa, where he contented himself by reading books and taking nature
walks. He could even write to his father that his ”natural delight in
solitude" had been greatly increased, and he hoped to continue in his
new residence.71 In fact, Sidney's correspondence during this period

takes on a much different tone from the bitter letters of the previous

 

GQEUOIds V010 I: ppe 328’680 7olbid0, p0 3560

7"Collins, fiydngy Letters and Mgmorialslgfi St te, pp. 718-19.

70
months. The frustration and spiteful sarcasm are in a great part
replaced by a more subdued, but yet lofty, stoicism tempered by a sort
of bleeding-heart awareness of his own political self-martyrdom. In
one particular letter to his father written on July 3, 1661 (N.S.),
Sidney evaluated his current situation:

I cannot but rejoice a little to find that when I wander as

a vagabond through the world, forsaken of my friends, poor,

and known only to be a broken limb of a ship-wrecked faction:

I yet find humanity and civility om those who are in the

height of fortune and reputation.

Algernon even ventured to speculate that perhaps his "half burial” in
Italy might induce his enemies at Whitehall to view him now as a
rather harmless, dull, and lazy fellow.

This rather idyllic Italian interlude ended very abruptly
and rudely for Algernon Sidney when the first of two assassination.
attempts was made upon his life, thus forcing him to take to the
highroad once again in search of safety. In his‘ggglggy, written
twenty years after the incident, Sidney asserted that he was a target
for assassination attempts because certain people in Whitehall found
him particularly offensive, due to his incorruptible nature, and
wanted him destroyed. Sidney claimed that he had been practicing
nothing offensive at the time against the English government and
merely desired to be left alone and even managed some backroom

maneuvering to prevent him from serving with any foreign government.73

Forced to abandon Italy, Algernon decided upon a flying trip to

 

72121d0, ppe 720‘210

73Algernon Sidney, Diggggnggg,goggggning govggnment gith
Dig Letters, T ial, A 010 , 239 Some Megigs 2!; big Life. PP. 170-71.

71
Switzerland, arriving at Lake Geneva in the autumn of 1663. There he
encountered another exile from the "good old days", his comrade and
fellow republican, Edmund Ludlow. The two exiles got along famously
together, with Sidney, according to Ludlow, ”assuring us of his
affection and friendship, and no way declining to own us and the cause
for which we suffer'd."74 After leaving Edmund Ludlow behind in
Switzerland, Algernon Sidney wandered quite restlessly across Flanders,
the United Provinces, France, and Germany for four years. His odyssey
did not lack excitement, however, for in 1663 a second attempt was made
on Sidney's life, this time in Augsburg, Germany. In his‘Agglggy
Sidney named a certain Andrew White as being among the gang that had
been sent by Whitehall to assassinate him this time.75 In his Mgmoirs
Edmund Ludlow substantiated Sidney's charge, claiming that some of the
same ruffians had been dispatched to assassinate him also.76 It seems
that Ludlow too was found to be obnoxious by Whitehall. Being an
English republican in exile at that time had become a very risky
business indeed.

Sidney's connection with Edmund Ludlow in exile runs much
deeper, however, than merely the three weeks he spent with Ludlow at
Lake Geneva, reminiscing about the "good old cause." These two staunch
republicans and firm enemies of Charles II were involved in intrigues
with other English exiles who endeavored to involve the Dutch in a

scheme to re-sstablish a Commonwealth government in England in 1665

 

7
II, p0 3460

75%. 2.1.30! P0 1700 76m0 site. V010 11, p0 3820

4Firth, ed., 1119 Mgmoigs 91; m Ludlog, 1625-1672, Vol.

72

and 1666. The connection is worth exploring here because Algernon
Sidney was involved in these intrigues to a much greater degree than
was Edmund Ludlow. In 1665 England was at war with the United
Provinces, and Sidney appeared in The Hague, having recently fled from
Augsburg and the unsuccessful attempt upon his life._ The Hague at this
time was a veritable beehive of disaffected English exiles, and Sidney
was upset enough with Whitehall to get involved with these exiles in
their intrigues. In his Higtory 91 111.3 933 Mg. Bishop Burnet
narrates that in 1665 Algernon Sidney and other men of the Commonwealth
party went to John De Witt, the Grand Pensionary of the United
Provinces, and pressed him for a Dutch invasion of England. Their
objective was to establish another Commonwealth government in England,
and they assured De Witt of strong support for the cause within England
itself, a sort of "fifth column” movement that would spring into action
in conjunction with a Dutch invasion.77

What all of this meant, of course, was revolution, and
Algernon Sidney, by his subsequent involvement and actions, merely
demonstrated to his enemies in Whitehall that he was that very same
"dangerous fellow” they had suspected him of being all along. In his
Mgggirs, Edmund Ludlow stated that in April of 1666, pressure was
exerted on him by English exiles on the Continent and by friends of the
cause back in England to join the intrigues and help make some
arrangements with the Dutch. He further stated that Algernon Sidney

and a certain Mr. Say ”both endeavored to the utmost of their power to

 

77Thomas Burnet, ed., Bishog Burnet's Histogy‘gfi His Own

ligg_(2 vols.: London: printed by B. McMillan, 1809), Vol. I, p. 317.

 

73
engage me in this affair."78 It must have seemed, for Sidney at least,
that this was a golden opportunity to transform the more talk of the
”good old cause” into a much more substantial reality, with Dutch help
of course. According to Ludlow, Sidney wrote to him and attempted to
enlist Ludlow's participation in a scheme by which the two of them
would journey to Paris and negotiate with the Dutch ambassador there
for some aid. He further claimed that Sidney had obtained for both of
them a promise of safe conduct across France from Louis XIV himself.
During this same period, 1665-66, Sidney wrote to one Benjamin Furley,
an English merchant in Rotterdam, who was known to have contacts with
several of the English exiles in the Netherlands. The letter is undated
and rather vague in places, but it is clear enough to implicate Sidney
in some intrigues and very likely those about which Edmund Ludlow
wrote.80 The general tone of the letter is that of an exile who was no
longer content with a life of solitude or "half burial," for Sidney
clearly expressed a desire to make himself useful in this world. Perhaps
Whitehall's incessant hounding of Sidney wherever he went produced a
change of attitude in him and jolted him out of his passive retirement.
At one point Sidney assured Furley: "The work in hand is great and
good: I am a weak instrument employed in it with others."81 Philoso-
phizing about certain undertakings which were very likely intrigues with

elements of the exiled Commonwealth party, Sidney confided to Furley:

 

78Firth, lgg,flemoi£s‘g§ Edmung Ludlow, Vol. II, p. 391.

791919., pp. 390-393.

80Blencowe, Sidney Pa ers, letter XVIII. pp. 258-60.

811bid., p. 259.

74

I do not know what success God will give unto our undertakings,

but I am certain I can have no peace in my own spirit, if I

do not endeavor By all means possible to advance the interest

of God's people.
The fact that there were English spies lurking about The Hague probably
accounts in great part for the rather guarded wording of this particular
letter. Nevertheless, it definitely seems to fit into the general
pattern of the intrigues in 1665-66 as related by Bishop Burnet and
Edmund Ludlow. All of these pieces fit together. Algernon Sidney was
involved in intrigues with other English exiles to breathe life into
the cold embers of the "good old cause," and in doing so, Sidney was
demonstrating the pattern of the opposition to the Stuart monarchy
established in the 1640's and which formed a very important aspect of
his political life.

That the government of Charles II was aware of these
intrigues being hatched in the Netherlands by discontented elements of
the old Commonwealth party, including Algernon Sidney, is quite evident
when one carefully investigates the Domestig Sggggufiggggg. In a letter
dated February 10, 1666, Benjamin Harrison commented to Sir Thomas
Peyton about the extent of "disaffection" in England, especially around
Dover. More importantly, he claimed to have knowledge of secret
intrigues at home and abroad. Men and arms were waiting under cover to

join forces with a suspected Dutch invasion, to be led by either Richard

(:romwell or Edmund Ludlow.83 In addition, on April 9, 1666, Algernon

 

azlbideg p0 2600

83Great Britain, Public Record Office, Dglgggggug£_5tate

Pa 6 s, Domesti , 21’. the Reign gj Dharles 2, Vol. CXLVII (1666):
February, 1666, Benjamin Harrison to Sir Thomas Peyton, pp. 239-40.

75
Sidney's name was added to, but eventually removed from, a list in a
proclamation ordering certain men to return to England and stand trial,
or else suffer attainder and forfeiture for treason.84 It was indicative
of Whitehall's mood that Algernon's name should even have appeared on the
list in the first place. On July 15, 1666, Charles II issued a circular
letter to all lords lieutenant in England, warning them of the possibility
of a Dutch invasion in conjunction with English fugitives in Holland and
disaffected people in England. Charles II instructed the lords
lieutenant to sharpen their vigilance in particular for the sudden
ownership of guns and horses by men when such items would normally have
been beyond their means.85 It was wartime, and Charles II was definitely
skeptical over the loyalty of some of his subjects. The government also
sent spies across the Channel to gather information. An elusive
character named Mrs. Aphra Behn was one of these, and from August
through December of 1666 she was on a secret mission to gather
information about the movements of English fugitives residing in the
United Provinces.86 The whole business has heavy overtones of a
seventeenth-century James Bond thriller, but it should be remembered
that both sides in the matter were quite serious about their attitudes
:and actions. Subsequently, the English government merely had its
Llong-standing suspicions confirmed concerning these exiles, especially
'that turbulent fellow Algernon Sidney.

This web of intrigue spun by exiled elements of the English

 

B4

19;g., V010 CLII (1666): 9 April, 1666, p. 342.
851916., Vol. CLXIII (1666): 15 July, 1666, p. 538.
86

Ibids, Preface to V0130 CLXVI.CXCVO

76

Commonwealth party on the Continent was all for naught, however.
According to Bishop Burnet, Grand Pensionary De Witt rejected the idea
of aiding the Commonwealth exiles in their schemes because he was
afraid that the French might take advantage of the situation by
declaring war on the Dutch. In addition, De Witt perceived quite
shrewdly that the general discontent upon which the exiles were basing
their plans simply did not seem to be present in England, at least not
to the extent that these exiles claimed it was.87 Another major factor
was undoubtedly De Witt's reluctance to aid in the establishment of
another republican type of government in the very nation which recently
had been such a strong commercial and naval rival during its
Commonwealth period.88 As much as Algernon Sidney and the other
English political exiles may have dreamed of re-establishing a
Commonwealth in England in 1666, that shrewd Dutchman, John De Witt,
was determined not to get involved in their incessant intrigues.

Before Algernon Sidney slipped into quiet obscurity in
France, the Grand Pensionary of the United Provinces did, however,
perform one service to him. Using diplomatic influence with the French
ambassador at The Hague, the Comte D'Estrades, De Witt suggested that
Sidney be issued a passport to go into France. D'Estrades obliged and
even recommended Sidney to a French government official as one who
”desires to place himself under the protection of his Majesty [Louis

XIV], and to go himself to F rance to offer his services if occasion

 

B7Burnet, Histogy1gfi His Own Time, Vol. I, p. 317.

Bat'ald, V010 1, p0 4010

 

77
should present itself for their exercise."89 Sidney eventually did
retire into France, after getting nowhere with his intriguing, and
settled in Montpellier for about ten years. Hardly any evidence
exists to document this period of Sidney's exile, but apparently he
was left unmolested by the government of Charles 11. Sidney may have
contemplated weighty matters that were later incorporated into his
Disggugses, or he may simply have brooded about the fate which had
been dealt him, thereby adding to his already developing sense of
martyrdom. Whatever the case, he virtually disappeared from view

for ten years until 1677.

 

89Firth, ed., he Memoigs‘_£ Edmund Ludlow, V01- 11. P- 395.

n. 10

C H A P T E R I V
EXCLUSION CRISIS: REINVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS, 1679-81

Montpellier is a small city in the South of France, which
during the seventeenth century possessed a reputation as a health
resort specializing in the treatment of phthisis, or pulmonary
tuberculosis.1 Algernon Sidney settled there in approximately 1667
after repeated attempts to interest John De Witt and Louis XIV in
English republican intrigues had ended in failure. Unfortunately,
precious little evidence exists to document Sidney's ten-year residence
in Montpellier, or his activities during those years. Algernon did
communicate to Sir William Temple in Brussels his decision to settle in
the French resort city, and he asked Temple to inform his friends and
family of his decision.2 It is known that Sidney was in Paris in 1670,
the year in which the Secret Treaty of Dover was negotiated between
Charles II of England and Louis XIV of France. It was at this time
also that Charles II expressed to a French official his displeasure of

Algernon Sidney and the sincere desire that Sidney would remain outside

 

1Maurice Cranston, John Locke (New York: Macmillan Company,
1957), p. 160.

2Alexander Ewald, [he Life and Tims§.gfl,Algernon Sidne ,
V010 IIs ps 1.

7B

79

of England.3 Except for these unspectacular bits of information, very
little else is known about this particular period of Algernon Sidney's
long exile. He simply slipped into quiet obscurity for ten years in
Montpellier, France.

In 1677 the long exile on the Continent came to an end for
Algernon Sidney. The old Earl of Leicester was in his eighties, and
he expressed the desire to see his second son once again before he
died. As the maneuvering got under way on both sides of the English
Channel to ensure Algernon's safe return to England, the important
family connections of the Sidneys were brought into play. Leicester
himself appealed to his grandson (Algernon's nephew) Robert Spencer,
the second Earl of Sunderland, to use his influence with Charles II to
allow Algernon to return to England.4 For this particular purpose,
the prominent Savile family proved to be even more important. Sir
George Savile, later the Marquis of Halifax, was married to Dorothy
Spencer, the Earl of Sunderland's sister. Sir George's brother, Henry
Savile, was the English ambassador at Paris. A combination of
Algernon's personal appeal to the French court and the efforts of
Henry Savile in Paris on his behalf resulted eventually in Algernon's
return to England. Savile used his influence with Henry Coventry, the
English Secretary of State for the South, to secure an assurance of
safety and a passport for Algernon Sidney from Charles II.5

The King's aversion to Sidney was the principal obstacle

 

b

SEUEPQ, ppo 51’520 E0010, V010 II, p. 340

5Helen C. Foxcroft, The Lifg and Letters‘gfi,George Savile,

3331., Figgt M391 Halifay (2 vols.: London: Longmans, Green
1800 C00, 1890), V010 I, p0 1370

80

that had to be overcome. Henry Savile must have exerted considerable
pressure upon Whitehall through diplomatic and political channels
because in the end the opposition of Charles II was removed. In a
letter dated December 18, 1676 (N.S.), Algernon expressed his
gratitude to Savile for the services performed on his behalf:

My obligation unto you is the same, and I so far acknowledge

it to be the greatest that I have in a long time received

from any man, as not to value the leave you have obtained

for me to return into my country after so lgng an absence,

at a lower rate than the saving of my life.
Sidney claimed that his only business in England concerned himself and
his family. If he could not live in England to the complete satisfaction
of Charles II, Sidney would be content to live out the rest of his life
in Southern France. But, he was nonetheless deeply grateful to Henry
Savile for the chance to return to England and see his aging father
before the Earl died. Robert Sidney, second Earl of Leicester, died on
November 2, 1677, at the age of eighty-two, just two months after his
son Algernon had returned to England from his long exile abroad.

Shortly after his father's death, Algernon wrote to his
friend Benjamin Furley in Rotterdam and informed him of his plans for
the future. Furley, of course, was the wealthy Ouaker merchant with
whom Sidney and other republican exiles had had contacts in relation to
the intrigues to re-establish a Commonwealth in England. In his letter
to Furley, dated November 29, 1677, Sidney claimed that permission to
return to England was quite easy to get, considering that he had to
wait seventeen years for it. He admitted to Furley that he had inherited

a considerable sum from his father, both in ready cash and in land, which

 

fiE'ald, V010 II, pps 35‘300

51
'4

a--. -
.. HI 2.11 .1
a: afiw . . . a
I, .G 5.3-.-
\ 1. \ sew

ix. O

81
would provide a steady income for him. With his financial situation
seemingly bolstered, Sidney earnestly desired to retire to a small
place outside of Bordeaux in Gascony and live out his life on his
inheritance. In preparation for this move, Sidney asked Benjamin
Furley for some advice on a possible safe, but sure, investment for
his money.7 Algernon Sidney was confident that he could retire
unmolested from England at this point and leave others the more
complicated matters of business and politics.

Unfortunately, ever since 1660 things had rarely gone
exactly as Sidney had planned that they would. The pattern did not
change very much after the exile's return to England. The Earl of
Leicester had left Algernon fifty-one hundred pounds in his will.
Before he could realize his father's legacy, however, Algernon had to
wage a long and extended fight in Chancery Court against his elder
brother Philip Sidney, now the third Earl of Leicester. The third
Earl disputed his father's will and challenged Algernon's right to the
money.8 The two brothers, it will be remembered, had been drawing
further apart since the days of Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate.9 This
struggle over Algernon's right to receive his legacy certainly did not
help the already strained relations between the two brothers. Moreover,
Algernon was not the only member of the Sidney family who had legal
difficulties with the new Earl: for, the youngest brother in the family,

Henry Sidney, also had to wage a similar battle in Chancery Court over

 

7T. Foster, ed., Dgigingllgggggggqgfi Donn Locke: Algernon

Siggey: and Anthony Logd Shgftggbury (London: J. B. Nichols and Son,
1030), ppe 79-010

BEllald, V010 II, pm 370 950 0, ppe 31‘320

82
his legacy. The point to remember is that Algernon Sidney's extended
court fight kept him in England much longer than he had originally
anticipated.

It is essential at this point to leave Algernon Sidney and
his personal problems for a time and concentrate upon political and
constitutional problems in England during the late 1670's. The major
constitutional issue during Charles II's reign was the problem of
working out a more clearly defined relationship between King and
Parliament. This, of course, involved a proper, working definition of
the Royal prerogative. It was a very difficult matter to define the
limits of the Royal prerogative, and as the reign of Charles II
lengthened, the tension between the King and his Parliament increased.
The bishops could be expected to uphold the King's prerogative power
in the House of Lords: however, it was the House of Commons that
became increasingly more difficult to deal with. The problem of the
extent of the Royal prerogative came to a climax in March of 1672 when
Charles II, invoking his prerogative and his supreme power in
ecclesiastical matters, issued his famous Declaration of Indulgence.
This was an attempt by the King to suspend all of the penal laws which
had been in effect against Protestant nonconformists and Catholic
recusants. This use by Charles II of his prerogative power stirred up
a veritable hornet's nest in Parliament, and before the Commons would
agree to vote any supplies for 1673, they forced the King to cancel
the Declaration of Indulgence. Charles II could then continue his new
war against the Dutch, but he had been forced to back down on his
policy of religious toleration.

This rather aggressive challenge by the Commons of the Royal

83

prerogative in 1673 represented much more than merely a sudden
awakening by sleepy-eyed squires and country gentleman from a
prolonged slumber. Instead, it should be viewed as part of a pattern
that had been developing throughout the seventeenth century in the
relations between the Stuart monarchs and the third estate. As the
House of Commons gradually became more skilled in its techniques and
developed a greater self-awareness of its own potentialities, it
became bolder in its assertions. Though the precise role of the
Commons was still very ill-defined by the 1670's it had won the right
to initiate money grants and control taxation. When the Commons
realized the potential power it had through its control of the purse
strings, it gradually became more critical of Royal policies in both
domestic and foreign areas. The tension produced by the struggle
between the King on the one hand to get what he wanted from the Commons
without making concessions, and the Commons on the other to avoid
becoming a mere cipher, put a severe strain on the constitution in the
seventeenth century. The verbal eruption in 1673 over Charles II's
Declaration of Indulgence was only one battle in the century long
struggle between the King and Parliament, and in particular between
the King and the House of Commons.10

Sidney himself was well aware of the struggle taking place
within the framework of the constitution and the tensions and discord

produced because of this struggle. In his Discourseg he commented on

 

10For a more detailed analysis of the reign of Charles II,
the reader should investigate David Ogg's excellent book entitled

M in thg figigg .o_f. Dhanles I; (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967) and also Sir George Clark's [he ngg; Stuggts, 1660-171 , Vol. X
of 1th Oyforg Higtory gt England (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965).

84

the fact that the seventeenth century had witnessed a decided shift in
the balance of power within the constitution. By this he meant that
the position of the nobility had been altered, and they were no longer
the "natural leaders and advisers” who at one time had been able to
check the monarch. Instead, Sidney now saw the struggle within the
constitution as being one between the King and the Commons, with the
”true nobleman“ of England being driven to seek common cause with the
House of Commons. The bitter divisions and factions which characterized
the years of the Exclusion Crisis were seen by Sidney to be the effects
of this shift in the balance of power.11

In the continuing struggle between Charles II and the House
of Commons over the use of power and the voting of supplies, the King
possessed a number of potential advantages that stood to work in his
behalf. Since it was not yet established practice that Parliament had
to be summoned on a regular basis, Charles II only needed to call a
parliament when he was getting desperate for money. The need for money
usually involved expensive foreign endeavors such as the Dutch wars.
In addition, the actual life of a Parliament was controlled by the
King's will: he could use his prerogative power and either prorogue
it or dissolve it, as he saw fit. Parliament was not yet an absolutely
indispensable part of the English constitution and would not become so
until gfggr the Glorious Revolution of 1688. As matters stood in the
1670's, Charles II could have been less dependent upon his touchy and

tempermental Commons if he could have brought some organization to his

 

11Sidney, Disgoursgs Dongerning vaernmgnt, ch. 3, sec. 37,
pp. 418-420.

85
decidedly chaotic financial situation.

From 1673 until 1679, Charles II possessed another advantage
in the person of Sir Thomas Osborne, the Earl of Danby, who served as
Lord Treasurer during those years. Danby, who was vehemently anti-
French, wanted to restore the Crown's financial independence by
building a working majority in Parliament based upon a foundation of
Church and King. His importance, as seen by one historian, was that
for the first time the King had a minister who drew his entire resources
from Parliament and who represented the King with a clear, coherent
program of action.12 But even the Earl of Danby, who possessed
considerable ability in administrative and financial matters, found
the management of the Commons to be a difficult and nerve-racking job.
A major problem which worked against Danby was the fact that Parliament
could not yet accept the need for organization as a natural corollary
to its desire to act as a critic of Royal policy. Parliament, and
‘especially the House of Commons, objected to being organized by anyone
for any reason because it was felt that organization was simply

"incompatible with liberty."13

Acting as Lord Treasurer, and actually
as chief minister, Danby was partially successful in bringing some
organization to the rather chaotic Royal finances. Nevertheless, even
with these potential advantages, Charles II found Parliamentary sessions
after the crisis of 1673 to be increasingly more difficult.

Two revelations came to light in 1678 which had the effect

 

12Keith Failing, A_History p; the Tory Party, 1640-1714
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 154.

13Andrew Browning, ”Parties and Party Organization in the
Reign of Charles II," TRHS, 4th. series, XXX (1948), pp. 21-36.

86

of upsetting the very delicate and tenuous balance that existed in
English political affairs. The first and more important of those
concerned the allegations by Titus Dates and Israel Tongs that are
known collectively as the Pepish Plot. In August of 1678, Oates
alleged that a Jesuit plot existed to assassinate Charles II and place
his Catholic brother, James the Duke of York, on the throne, all with
the assistance of the Pope and Louis XIV of France. Using their vivid
imaginations to fill in the general outline with lurid details, Dates
and Tongs managed to play upon the intense hatred and fear of Catholics
that existed in England during the seventeenth century. The hysteria
produced by the revelations of Dates and Tonga may seem difficult to
comprehend today, and perhaps even a bit ludicrous, especially since
Catholics comprised only a very small percentage of the total
population of England at that time. Anti-Catholicism, however, was a
very strong emotion in England, and as one historian has pointed out,
the English public had a reputation for being the most unstable and
excitable in Northern Europe.14

When Parliament met in October of 1678, more pressing
matters, such as Charles II's desperate financial position, became
overshadowed by the rumors and allegations of the Popish Plot. While
the House of Commons was investigating the various allegations of the
plot, another bombshell exploded when Ralph Montagu presented the
Commons with documentary proof that the Earl of Danby had been engaged

in secret negotiations to secure a treaty with France and a pension

 

1‘J. P. Kenyon, "The Exclusion Crisis,” History Toda , XIV
(Part One, April, 1964), pp. 252-9.

87

for Charles II. Denby's effective position as Charles II's chief
minister was immediately destroyed. Utilizing the maxim that ”The King
can do no wrong, but his ministers could,” the Commons reacted swiftly
and impeached the Lord Treasurer for high treason. The delicate
balance which Charles II had tried to maintain in his relations with
Parliament was very seriously upset. In an attempt to save his chief
minister and perhaps to prevent complete chaos from developing, Charles
II dissolved his eighteen-year-old Parliament on January 24, 1679.

Elections were quickly held, and the new Parliament, which
met in March of 1679, has come to be known as the first Exclusion
Parliament. If Charles II had hoped that by dissolving one Parliament
and calling a new one the political tension would be lessened,
subsequent events proved him to have been quite mistaken. Not only
did the House of Commons continue with its preoccupation with the
Popish Plot, but it pressed home its attack upon Danby with a vengeance,
even going so far as to declare the King's pardon of his Lord Treasurer
to be illegal. But, even more important than these two items was the
fact that the Commons now turned its attention to the heir of the
throne, James, Duke of York. After carefully expressing its concern
for the safety of Charles II and the security of the established
Protestant religion, the Commons actually began to question the right
of the Catholic Duke to succeed his brother Charles II as King of

15

England. The Commons was doing more than merely challenging the

Royal prerogative on certain points, because in questioning the

 

15Charles II at that time (1679) had no legitimate sons,
and it was doubtful if he ever would have any.

88

principle of hereditary succession, the House of Commons was challenging

the very foundation of the monarchy itself. In the emotion charged

debate over the Duke which took place in this first Exclusion

Parliament, Sir John Knight probably expressed the fears of a number

of his countrymen and fellow M.P.'s when he offered the following

analysis:
It is impossible that the Protestant religion should be
preserved under a popish prince: as inconsistent as light
and darkness. The King's coronation oath is to maintain
religion, and that is the Protestant religion.

Sir John ended his emotional speech with a rather bizarre prediction:
If the Pope gets his great toe into England, all his body
will follow. Something mgst be done, but I dare not
venture to propose what.

Other members of the Commons were not as undecided over solutions as

Sir John apparently was. On May 15, 1679, the first Exclusion Bill,

which simply declared James to be incapable of inheriting the crowns

of England, Scotland, and Ireland, was introduced and passed its first
reading. To protect his brother's right of succession to the throne,

Charles II first prorogued and then dissolved the first Exclusion

Parliament on July 11, 1679.

Thus began the Exclusion Crisis which lasted until March of

1681 and which represented an extremely dangerous threat to the

political and constitutional stability of England. What first had

begun as a reaction to the Popish Plot became intermingled with and
yet overshadowed by the debate over James's fitness to be King and the

concerted efforts to exclude him from the succession to the throne.

 

16Cobbett's Eagligmgntggy History.g£ Eggland (35 vols.:
London: R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, 1806-1820), Vol. IV, p. 1131.

89

Englishmen of the time viewed a Catholic prince as a symbol for
arbitrary power and absolute rule. In addition, if a Catholic were to
become King of England, not only would the established Protestant
Church of England be endangered, but so too, it was believed, would be
the property and liberty of all Englishmen. When all of the full
implications of "popery" are understood, it becomes easier to comprehend
the national hysteria that developed because of the Popish Plot and the
Duke of York's Catholicism. Sir John Knight's gloomy prediction of a
Papal invasion of England may seem ludicrous to readers today, but to
Protestant Englishmen of the seventeenth century, the fear and distrust
of anything Catholic was part of the very fiber of their established
society. When all of this is understood, the emotional and rhetorical
outpouring that accompanied the Exclusion Crisis becomes less surprising.

The Exclusion Crisis, moreover, can be viewed in a broader
scope than merely traditional English fear of Catholicism. As
previously pointed out, the struggle between King and Parliament for a
clearer, working definition of power had been a constant theme throughout
the seventeenth century. Neither the Royal prerogative nor the position
of Parliament, especially the House of Commons, within the constitution
was as yet clearly defined in the modern sense. The House of Commons
.in particular, with its control of the purse strings and its aggressive
criticism of foreign and domestic policy, represented an increasing
challenge to the King and his own view of what was properly within the
Royal prerogative. Because of the changes in relationships taking
place within the constitution, the Exclusion Crisis simply intensified
the struggle between the King and Parliament, and especially between

the King and the House of Comons. According to one historian, the

90
possibility of the succession of a Catholic heir to the throne brought
many underlying issues to a head and put a serious strain upon a
constitutional system undergoing change. The Exclusion Crisis itself
provided the occasion for a valuable debate on authority, prerogative
power, and the relationship between Parliament and the Crown that

17 In the

would prove advantageous during the confrontation in 1688.
view of another historian, the move to exclude the Duke of York from
the succession to the throne "expressed the frustration and anger of
the Parliamentary classes, or large sections of them, with the King's
foreign policy since his restoration, and his domestic policy since
1672.:-18
The pattern established during the first Exclusion
Parliament was transferred into the next two, as Charles II and
Parliament continued the struggle which focused on the Duke of York.
Over a year separated the first from the second Exclusion Parliament
which finally met in October of 1680. The year's break between these
two parliaments did nothing to lessen the tension created during the
first Exclusion Parliament. In fact, the Commons proved to be even
more determined to press on with its attack against James. On the
opening day of the second Exclusion Parliament, Lord William Russell

urged his fellow M.P.'s in the Commons to consider carefully the

threat that Popery represented to England and the Protestant religion.

 

17Carolyn A. Edie, "Succession and Monarchy: the Controversy

of 1679-1681,“ Agngiggg,flistogigal flgyigy, LXX (January, 1965), pp. 350-
70.

18J. P. Kenyon, ”The Exclusion Crisis," fliggg y Toda , XIV
(Part Two, May, 1964), pp. 344-9.

91
Popery, claimed Russell, could destroy everything in England, even
Parliament itself. Therefore, the assembled members of the Commons
should "resolve to take into our consideration in the first place,
how to suppress Popery, and to prevent a Popish successor."19 An
Exclusion Bill was introduced into the Commons and passed its third
reading after much heated debate. It was then sent up to the House of
Lords where it was defeated after a debate between the Earl of
Shaftesbury and the Earl of Halifax. The Commons were furious, but the
issue of exclusion was left hanging because on January 18, 1681,
Charles II dissolved his unruly Parliament. A third Exclusion
Parliament met in March of 1681 at Oxford, and the Commons again
attempted to take up the matter of James's fitness to ever become King.
This third and last Exclusion Parliament lasted only four days, as
Charles II, secure in his knowledge of a substantial French subsidy
which had been promised him, dissolved Parliament on March 28, 1681.
The Duke of York's right of succession had been successfully defended,
but a clearer settlement over the broad issue of power would have to
await another day.

Besides the constitutional issues which were interwoven in
the Exclusion Crisis, the struggle over Exclusion witnessed important
political deveIOpments as well. The crisis years of 1679 through 1681
saw the emergence of a two-party system in England, and the formation
of this system centered upon the issue of James's fitness to rule. It

was during this Exclusion Crisis that the terms "Whig" and "Tory" were

 

19Cobbstt's Eagliaggntagy fligtogngLIEngIan , Vol. IV, p.
1162.

92
first used in a political sense. The word "Whig” was a shortened form
of "Whiggsmore," an abusive word which referred to Presbyterian outlaws
in the southern Uplands of Scotland. Therefore, when Court supporters
of Charles II applied the word to the opposition forces in Parliament
who backed Exclusion and favored limits on the Royal prerogative, the
word was meant to convey considerable contempt and disgust. The
opposition forces to the Court retaliated in kind by adopting the word
"Tory" to refer to their opponents. This abusive word referred to
dispossessed Irish outlaws who would rob and murder English settlers in
Ireland.20 It is difficult to say exactly who received the worst of
it in this name calling contest. Whigs were also referred to as
"Petitioners" because of their tactic of petitioning Charles II to call
a Parliament in 1680. Because the Tories abhorred this Whig tactic,
viewing it as an insolent outrage, they in turn came to be called
”Abhorrers." The bitter emotionalism and rhetoric surrounding the use
of these words reflected the political divisions taking place in
England during the years of the Exclusion Crisis.

It is essential to understand the Whigs and their objectives
because they really provided the driving force behind the effort in
Parliament to exclude James the Duke of York. Essentially, the Whig
party was a collection of various groups and interests which were bound
together by common distrust of the Stuarts, fear of Catholicism in
general, and fear of James's Catholicism in particular. The Whigs drew

support from such aristocratic families as the Russells, the Capels,

 

20P. J. Helm, Jeffrgys: {A,New Portrait‘gf England's flgggigg

JDggg_(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), p. 56.

93
the Cavendishes, and the Sidneys. But, the Whigs also drew support
from Nonconformists and commercial interests in London, as well as
from other, smaller incorporated boroughs.21 In fact, metrOpolitan
London, with its merchants and small tradesmen, was a principal source
of Whig strength, and it remained a continuous trouble spot for Charles
during the entire Exclusion Crisis. It was Anthony Ashley Cooper, the
first Earl of Shaftesbury, who provided the political leadership
necessary to combine and unify all the elements of opposition in the
attack against James. Shaftesbury, who has been called the most
important statesman between the Restoration and the Revolution of 1688,
was bitterly anti-Catholic and anti-French. This capable, but very
ambitious, aristocrat felt that political power in England should be
based on Parliament and that it should be enjoyed in direct proportion
to the ownership of property.22 This was the gifted politician who was
ridiculed by the poet John Dryden as ”the false Achitophel."

Organizing around Shaftesbury's leadership in Parliament,
the Whigs pushed vigorously for the exclusion of James and advocated
restraints upon the use of the Royal prerogative. For the Whigs the
exclusion of the Duke of York was a matter of self-preservation, for
they claimed that as King the Catholic Duke would be an active agent of

arbitrary power and would endanger both religion and liberty}:5 The

 

21Wilbur C. Abbott, "What Was a Whig?" in The Quest For

Politiggl Dnity it; World History, ed. by Stanley M. Pargellis
(Washington: U. 5. Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 253-67.

22J. H. Plumb, ”The First Earl of Shaftesbury,” fiistgry
Iggy, III (April, 1953), pp. 266-70.
23The best single secondary work on Shaftesbury's Whigs is
J. 1!. Jones's excellent study entitled 153 First Whigs: The Politics‘gf
true Exclusion Crisis, 1678-83 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

94

Whigs, of course, needed Parliament as a base from which to mobilize
popular support and also to press home their demands upon Charles II.
This is why the elections for the three Exclusion Parliaments acquired
such a degree of importance. As divisions in the Commons became more
clearly defined along lines of "Whig," or ”Tory," the election on the
local level for seats in the Commons became disputed and more reflective
of the divisions on the national level in Parliament itself. This is
not to imply that every M.P. in the Commons during the Exclusion Crisis
was either a Whig or a Tory, with no choice in between. For such was
certainly not the case. Nevertheless, the initiative was clearly with
the Whigs during the crisis, and in three successive Parliaments
between 1679 and 1681 the Whigs comprised a majority in the House of
Commons, though they remained a minority in the Lords.24 The political
divisions were sharp, and the struggle in the Commons was bitter and at
times even furious. As skilful as the Whigs were in their Propaganda
and electioneering techniques, they had to have Parliament in session
in order to maintain their initiative. For, without Parliament as a
platform, or forum, from which they could operate, the Whigs could not
maintain their steady pressure for James's exclusion. Thus, when the
third and last Exclusion Parliament was dissolved on March 28, 1681,
and it began to look as if another one would not be called, the only
recourse left was rebellion, a step which most Whigs refused to take.

As the Popish Plot unfolded and the struggle against the

Duke of York began to take shape, Algernon Sidney became increasingly

 

24O. W. Furley, "The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature

in the Exclusion Campaign, 1678-81,” ngbrigge Higtorigal Journal, XIII
(no. 1, 1957), pp. 19-36.

95
more involved in the English political scene, both as an observer and
as an actual participant in the events of the Exclusion Crisis. Forced
to remain in England because of his lawsuit in Chancery Court, Sidney
was thus compelled to abandon his planned retirement to France. During
1679 Sidney wrote a number of letters to his good friend Henry Savile
in Paris, and in these letters, Sidney again displayed his talent for
keen observation of men and events. The letters provide interesting
insights and opinions by Sidney on the events happening around him.
But, in addition to this, Algernon Sidney became actively involved in
those events by seeking election to the House of Commons on three
different occasions. Moreover, it was during these years of the
Exclusion Crisis that Sidney wrote most, if not all, of his Qiggoursgg
figggggniggbggyggnmen . This work in part reflected Sidney's growing
concern over England's political and constitutional crisis and the
fitness of the Stuarts to be Kings. The Qigggggggg also represented
Sidney's commitment to a cause, because his Whiggism reveals itself in
a clear and unmistakable fashion. In essence then, Algernon Sidney
became more dedicated to a cause as he became more deeply involved in
the rapidly unfolding events of the Exclusion Crisis.

During the year 1679, Algernon Sidney stood for election to
the House of Commons on two different occasions, and in each instance
he utilized the connection he had developed with the well-to-do Quaker,
William Penn. It was a curious political alliance indeed to behold:
William Penn the Quaker and pacifist and Algernon Sidney the veteran
classical republican who believed that violent rebellion could be used
as a last resort to redress grievances against an unjust government.

Penn and Sidney were, however, in agreement on enough principles so

96
that they could work together for the elections in 1679 for the first
and second Exclusion Parliaments.25 In the elections held for the
first Exclusion Parliament in 1679, Sidney, with Penn's backing, stood
for Cuildford in Surrey. Algernon received a majority of the votes,
but his opponent, Thomas Dalmahoy, won the election. It seems that
both the mayor and the magistrates of Guildford were adherents of the
Court Party, and the mayor refused to make Sidney a freeman of the
town, which was a requirement for election.26 In addition, a number of
votes for Sidney were not allowed because the sheriff claimed that
these voters had not pronounced Algernon's name properly. After the
election was finished, William Penn wrote a letter to his friend
Algernon in which he offered Sidney some soothing words of comfort:

Thou... had a conscientious regard to England: and to be put
aside, by such base ways, is really a suffering for righteous-
ness. Thou hast embarked thyself with them, that seek, and
love, and choose the best things: and number is not weight
with thee. I hope it is rgtrievable, for to me it looks not
a fair and clear election.
Sidney tried to petition the House of Commons, claiming a false return.
The petition, however, was referred to a committee, where it was promptly
buried in a remote corner and never again saw the light of day.28

Since the first Exclusion Parliament had been dissolved in

July of 1679 and another one was called for in October of that year,

 

25Mary Maples Dunn, William Penn: Politigs‘ggg Conscience
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 33-4.

26The ”Court Party" was the nucleus for the developing Tory
Party, which was formed to counteract the Whigs.

27Collins,'§;gggx_Lettegs'ggg_nemozials.g§ State, Vol. I, p.
154.

28Dunn, milliam Egnn: Politics and Conscience, pp. 36-7.

97

Sidney and Penn thought they saw a second opportunity to win a seat in
the Commons. In the elections for the second Exclusion Parliament,
which actually did not meet until October of 1680, Algernon Sidney
stood for election to the Commons from Amersham in Buckinghamshire.
This time, both Sidney and Sir William Drake were returned on a double
return. Both of them submitted petitions to the House of Commons, but
the Commons decided that the election for Amersham would go to neither
Drake nor Sidney. Undaunted, Penn and Sidney decided to support Sir
Charles Worseley for Bramber for the same Parliament. They were sure
that they could count upon the support of such friends of the Sidney
family as Sir John Temple and Sir John Pelham, Algernon's brother-in-law.29

Interference suddenly appeared from a very unexpected and
unwelcome quarter, when Algernon's youngest brother Henry Sidney,
recently appointed as envoy to the United Provinces, decided that he
too would stand for Bramber. Henry Sidney's campaign was skillfully
managed by his faithful steward Gilbert Spencer. After the Pelham
family decided to back Henry Sidney rather than Algernon's candidate,
Gilbert Spencer convinced the third candidate, Percy Goring, that for
a sum of eighty pounds he should drop out of the contest altogether.
Henry's faithful steward also spent almost two hundred pounds more in
.luring supporters away from‘Algernon's candidate by ”treating" the
folks to wine, brandy and fresh buck. The detailed facts of this
corrUpt, but by no means uniquely corrupt, election are documented in

Henry Sidney's Diary in a letter written by Gilbert Spencer to his

 

zglbide, ppm 38-9e

98
master in The Hague.30 Victory in this closely fought election for
Bramber went to Henry Sidney, who never even made an appearance on his
own behalf. Needless to say, Algernon Sidney was more than merely
irritated with his brother Henry for his interference and ultimate
victory.

This contest for the little borough of Bramber takes on a
double, and a very ironic, significance when one considers the political
connection that existed between Algernon Sidney and his election backer
William Penn. Earlier in 1679 Penn had written a pamphlet entitled
M 5m; Interest in the M 91 This M Pnligment in which
Penn had criticized various campaign practices, such as bribery,
entertainment, and absenteeism, which existed in the English elections
for Parliament.:51 Penn's support of Algernon Sidney for Parliament in
1679 should be viewed as an attempt to put into practice the ideas and
criticisms developed in his pamphlet. Both Penn and Sidney made a
genuine effort to conduct what they thought were honest campaigns
during the various elections in 1679. The ironic twist to this entire
episode comes when the observer realizes that Penn and Sidney were
defeated at Bramber by the very same campaign abuses which William Penn
had written about and criticized in his pamphlet. Henry Sidney was
.indeed guilty of practicing bribery, voter “entertainment,” and
absenteeism to get himself elected, and the fact that he was Algernon's

own brother merely rubbed salt into an open wound. Algernon tried for

 

3OWEN)! Sidney. 9.1.9.11 2E __9.th lime 2!: M. ed- by
Robert W. Blencowe (2 vols.: London: Henry Colburn Publisher, 1843),
V01. 1, pp. 114-20e

31Dunn, William Penn: Politics and Conscience, p. 31.

 

99
a third and final time to get himself elected to the Commons when he
stood for Amersham in the election for the Oxford Parliament in 1681,
but he was unsuccessful in this attempt also.

After analyzing the various tactics and practices that either
prevented Algernon Sidney from being elected to the House of Commons, or
else helped his brother Henry to get elected, one might be led to
conclude that Algernon Sidney was unduly victimized. Or, it might be
argued that what happened to Algernon in his various election attempts
was somehow unique. It should be noted, however, that the many practices
which we today would immediately label as “campaign irregularities" and
piously condemn as being blatantly corrupt, were very much a part of the
English election process at that time. This was especially true during
the tense and heated elections for Parliament during the Exclusion
Crisis. There existed in England a considerable lack of uniformity in
methods by which elections were conducted, and this lack of uniformity
bred evils and disputed elections.32 Chances for fraud and irregular
practices were many, due not only to the cumbersome, outmoded system,
but also to the rapid succession of Parliamentary elections during the
Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81. Local sheriffs could, and frequently did,
arbitrarily change the date or actual polling place for an election in
order to prevent either Whig or Tory sympathizers from turning out in
force. As one historian of the subject has remarked concerning election
saractices on the county and borough level, "Every possible pretext, in

fact, for tricking the electors was resorted to, and often only too

 

32Ephraim Lipson, "Elections to the Exclusion Parliaments,

1679-1681,” M ngtogigal 3911-11: XXVIII (January, 1913), pp. 59-
85L-

100

33 When all of this is understood, it becomes clearer

successfully.”
that what happened to Algernon Sidney, first at Cuildford and then at
Bramber, was by no means unique or really too unusual.
When not actually involved in the elections for the two
Exclusion Parliaments of 1679, Algernon Sidney proved to be a careful
observer and commentator of the events unfolding around him. Most of
his thoughts and observations were written down in the form of letters
to his friend and benefactor Henry Savile, the man who had done so
much to secure Sidney's safe return from exile.3‘ Sidney commented
upon a wide range of topics including the Popish Plot, the Parliamentary
assault upon the Earl of Danby, and the general uneasiness of the times.
In one letter, dated May S, 1679, Sidney recounted for Savile the tense
struggle taking shape in Parliament concerning the Duke of York and
Exclusion. Sidney offered the opinion that if James were to be
excluded from the succession, the most plausible choice to take his
place would be William of Orange. However, some people in England were
hesitant about putting William on the throne, fearing that the
Commonwealth party in Holland would be driven into the arms of Louis
XIV. Commenting upon the revelations concerning the Popish Plot and
the growing sentiment to exclude the Duke of York, Sidney posited that,
When I have said what I can upon this business, I must confess
I do not know three men of a mind, and that a spirit of giddi-

ness sgigns amongst us, far beyond I have ever observed in my
11f9e

 

sslbide, pe 60s

3‘Algernon Sidney, Discourses Qoggegnigg overnment withIng
Letters, Trial, Agglggy and Sm Memoriab 91: filg Life, pp. 60-102.

sslgids. p. 77.

 

101
Sidney found it impossible to conceal his enthusiasm for the growing
pressure in the Commons to secure a judgment against the Earl of Danby,
impeached earlier for high treason. Commenting upon Danby and the
tenseness in the political atmosphere, Sidney professed:

We live in a time that no man, by what is passed, can well

judge what is to be expected for the future; but I am much

inclined to believe that Danby having in this last act
followed his own disposition, that ever delighted in juggling
and indirectness, will, by tgg tricks he hath played, have
found a way to hang himself.
A number of factors coalesced to add a considerable degree of uneasiness
to the times.

After the first Exclusion Parliament was dissolved in July
of 1679, a new one was called for October of that year, only to be
prorogued until October of the following year. The ensuing delays and
prorogations merely added to the tenseness and uneasiness of the times.
Sidney, of course, attempted to get elected to the second Exclusion
Parliament and promised to inform Henry Savile in detail of the
developments that might transpire in Parliament. At this time he was
apparently confident of his being returned, but he did express his
concern over the security of the postal system. It was simply not
safe to attempt to send too much information, or the wrong kind,
through the mail.37 In October of 1679, Sidney wrote a letter to his
cxld friend Benjamin Furley in Rotterdam and tried explaining to him the
tense situation in England. He observed for Furley's benefit that,

We are here in the strangest confusion that I ever remember

to have seen in English business. There never was more
intrigues, and less truth.

 

35M” p. 79. 37lbid., p. 97.

102
The tension and uneasiness had been increasing steadily since the
previous May, primarily because of the Exclusion business. Sidney was
keenly aware of the disturbed state of political affairs around him,
and he was motivated to observe that, "Things are so entangled, that
liberty of language is almost lost: and no man knows how to speak of
anything.”38 Shortly after writing to Furley, Algernon Sidney wrote to
Savile concerning the scheduled Parliament and his own possible position
in it:
I am not able to give so much as a guess, whether the
parliament shall sit the 24th of January or not, and though
I think myself in all respects well chosen, am uncertain
whether I shall be of it or not, there being a double return;
and nothing can be assured, until the question arising there-
upon be determined, unless it be that as I and my principles
are out of fashion, my inclinations going one way my
friendships and alliance with those that are like to give
occasion for the greatest contests drawing another, I shall
be equally disliked and suspected by both parties, and
thereby become the most inconsiderable member of the house.
The unsettled nature of the times is clearly revealed through these
letters by Sidney to Benjamin Furley and Henry Savile.
During these crisis years, and even before, Louis XIV of
France had been in the practice of channeling funds into England to
two different destinations. Louis not only provided his Royal cousin
Charles II with a pension on certain occasions, but he also in effect
"subsidized" the Parliamentary opposition to Danby and Charles by
providing various members of the Country Party with funds. Charles II

accepted the French pension because he was usually in dire need of the

 

38
Foster, ed., Original Lettegs‘gg Locke, §idney, and
Shaftesbury, pp. 97-8 .

39
92s Site, p. 95s

103
money and because he would like to have ended the necessity of always
having to ask the House of Commons for more funds. An empty exchequer
for Charles necessitated the calling of a parliament, which usually
meant enduring the Commons' abusive criticisms on foreign and domestic
policy. Charles II could not afford the luxury of much criticism or a
close scrutiny by the Commons because he had a treaty with Louis XIV
to keep secret. King Louis shrewdly provided opposition elements in
Parliament with funds in order to keep the English political situation
in a state of turmoil. If England could be kept politically weak and
divided, it would be in no position to pursue a vigorous anti-French
foreign policy by possibly siding with the United Provinces on the
Continent.

All of this is relevant to Algernon Sidney because he had
been accused of accepting a french pension during 1679. At first
glance this charge would seem to contradict the life-long pattern of
Sidney's character up to that year. As an adult, his high principles
and stubborn honesty had been prominent features of his character. In
fact, it was his very outspoken honesty that frequently got Sidney into
trouble: he even naively believed that an honest and high principled
approach to life would be respected by his enemies. Unfortunately,
honesty was not a standout virtue in English public affairs at that
time. But, in addition to the man's character, were his personal
experiences with English elections and slectioneering practices during
‘1679. Neither at Guildford nor at Bramber was there any evidence to
show that Algernon Sidney employed any "irregular“ practices in these
campaigns, even though such practices were certainly used to great

advantage by the opposition. It would seem strange that a man of

104

Sidney's ilk would suddenly reverse himself and begin filling his
pockets with the French money that was being handed out by the French
ambassador to England, Paul Barillon.

The charge against Algernon Sidney of having accepted a
French pension in 1679 is substantiated by evidence uncovered in the
French Foreign Affairs Archives in Versailles by Sir John Dalrymple, a
Scottish lawyer, in the eighteenth century. The damaging documents are
part of Barillon's official dispatches. First of all, in his official
account of the funds which he paid to various members of the Country
Party in England, Barillon listed Algernon Sidney as having been paid
five hundred guineas on each of two different occasions.40 The second
piece of evidence consists of a letter written by Barillon to Louis XIV
on December 14, 1679, from England.41 In this letter Barillon provided
Louis with the names and brief descriptions of the various individuals
who were in what he termed the "Popular Party” in England. In
Barillon's humble opinion, these Englishmen seemed to be willing to
support France (i.e., take money), and the French ambassador seemed
hopeful that they would prove useful. Besides identifying Lord Holles
as a man who might definitely respond to a good bribe, Barillon singled
out Algernon Sidney for close analysis. According to the French
ambassador :

Mr. Sidney has been of great use to me on many occasions. He

is a man who was in the first wars, and who is naturally an
enemy to the Court. He has for some time been suspected of

 

40Sir John Dalrymple, ed., ugmoirs g£,Cgeat Britain‘ggg
Igualgng, Vol. II, First Appendix, pp. 315, 317. (1000 guineas equalled

1 050 pounds.)

41Ib1gep ppm 260-264e

105

being gained by Lord Sunderland: but he always appeared to

me to have the same sentiments, and not to have changed

maxims. He has a great deal of credit amongst the
independents, and is also intimate with those who are the
most opposite to the court in parliament. He was elected
for this present one. I gave him only what your Majesty

permitted me. He would willingly have had more, and if a

new gratification was given him, it would be easy to engage

him entirely. However he is very favorably disposed to what
your Majesty may desire: and is not willlgg that England and
the States General should make a league.
Barillon terminated his commentary on Algernon Sidney by saying, "I
believe he is a man who would be very useful if the affairs of England
should be brought to extremities.”

Most historians, except Sidney's only biographer, have simply
accepted the accusation against Algernon Sidney and the evidence cited
above. Alexander Ewald rejected every aspect of the charge concerning
Sidney, and he even attacked the personal credibility of Barillon
himself as a commentator. Reasoning that the moral standards of the
time were lax and that "desperate evils require desperate remedies,"
Ewald argued that the Country opposition needed French aid in order to
thwart Charles II's drive toward absolutism. If Sidney accepted French
money for himself, then he can be accused of having taken a bribe. On
the other hand, if he merely received the money from Barillon in order
to distribute it to others for the purpose of organizing the Country
opposition, then Sidney cannot be accused of any wrong doing. Sidney,
according to Ewald, did not accept any money from Barillon. Nobleness
of’ purpose had always characterized Sidney's behavior in the past. The
charge against Algernon Sidney was simply rejected outright by Ewald

rust only because of Algernon's known standard of behavior, but also

 

“mg. , pp. 261 -52.

106
because of the character of Barillon himself, which was known to be
"avaricious, unscrupulous, sensual, and luxurious.”

The argument presented by Algernon Sidney's sole biographer

to exonerate him of bribery charges is simply too pro-Sidney and
ignores too many other avenues of approach to the problem. Admittedly,
the problem is a difficult one to unravel because of the scarcity of
evidence other than that provided by Barillon. Nevertheless, an
attempt at a solution can be made utilizing an approach not considered
by Sidney's biographer. To begin with, a pro-French connection is
fairly easy to establish for Sidney. Before he slipped into obscurity
in Montpellier, Sidney had approached Louis XIV over the possibility
of French aid to English exiles who were intriguing to re-establish a
Commonwealth government in England. Louis rejected the idea, but he
did allow Sidney to settle in France. It was partly due to French
help that Sidney was allowed to return to England in 1677. Secondly,
Sidney's dedication to the idea of a Commonwealth government in
England has been shown in previous chapters. He sincerely believed
'that a revival of the type of government which existed in England
between 1649 and 1653 was the best remedy for the state of corruption
.and arbitrary rule that had developed in England under Charles II.
‘These two threads come together in a letter written by Paul Barillon
to Louis XIV in September of 1680. Barillon claimed that Algernon
Sidney was one of several Englishmen who believed that it would be

more in the interests of F rance to have England a republic than it

would to have William of Orange on the English throne. Essentially,

 

43Ewald, Life 9_f_ Sidne , Vol. 11, pp. 152-175.

107
an English republic (assuming the Duke of York would be excluded from
the succession) would represent no danger to France. According to
Barillon, ”Mr. Sidney is one of those who talks to me with the most
force and the most openness on the matter."4‘

It is impossible, and even a bit dangerous, simply to ignore
the personal dispatches and financial accounts of Paul Barillon
concerning Algernon Sidney. To question the documents closely because
they contradict the general pattern of Sidney's character performance
up to 1679 is one thing. But to ignore them and argue that perhaps
Barillon was being mean and unscrupulous against Sidney is something
entirely different. Algernon may very well have accepted money from
Barillon to help offset his expenses incurred in his lawsuit against
his brother in Chancery Court. He may have kept some of the thousand
guineas for himself and passed the remainder on to other Whigs. It is
very likely that Sidney's personal observations of Charles II's rule
combined with his firsthand experiences in the elections in 1679 to
convince him that the English system had become totally corrupt. This
approach might very well have justified in Sidney's mind the taking of
some French money. A thousand guineas was not that much when one
considers that Barillon was contemplating bribing Lord Holles with a
box of precious jewels. Bishop Burnet commented in his History that a
number of people had suspected Algernon Sidney of being a pensioner of

F rance because Sidney had argued strongly against England's entry into

 

44Dalrymple, flemoirs‘g£,0;ggt Britain and lgelan , Vol. II,
First Appendix, p. 313.

108
any war against France upon his return from exile in 1677.45 There are
simply too many gaps in our knowledge to permit us to make an absolute
pronouncement one way or the other regarding this matter. Nevertheless,
the existing evidence against Sidney must be considered, and he must
remain under very strong suspicion of having accepted money from
Barillon for reasons and purposes known only to him.

The period of years from 1679 through 1681 witnessed a
considerable outpouring of political publications and writings of
different types. In connection with their campaign to force Charles II
to call a Parliament in 1680, the Whigs turned out a voluminous amount
of pamphlet literature and newspaper propaganda to bolster their cause
of exclusion. Besides purely propaganda literature, however, other
and more sophisticated works were either published or composed. Their
authors were certainly motivated by the Exclusion Crisis, but the works
did more than merely rehash contemporary events, for they included not
only evaluations of governmental institutions themselves, but also
investigations of types and theories of government. A renewed interest
in classical republicanism was evident when Henry Nevile published his
work entitled‘fllgtg Bgdlvlyus, which was meant to influence Charles II
:and the Oxford Parliament early in 1681. Nevile, keenly interested in
'the old Roman Republic and in the Republic of Venice, would like to

have seen the English monarchy remodeled along different lines.46 Also

 

45Thomas Burnet, ed., Bishop Burnet's History 2: is Own
lime, VOle II, p. 193a

46Zera S. Fink,.In§,§lg§sicgl bli ns, no. 9 in

Nogthgestgrn Unlvegsity §tudigs la the Humanities (Menasha, Wisconsin:
George Banta Publishing Co., 1945), p. 129.

109
in 1681, James Tyrrell published a book entitled‘gglrlgrrgguflgg,Monar ha,
or‘lng,Patrigrrh Unmoggrghgd, an attack upon Sir Robert Filmer's
.Eglrlgrgng which the Tories were using to defend the Royal prerogative
power. It has also been contended that John Locke, inspired by the
issues of the Exclusion Crisis, began work on his lgg'Trgatises at
about this time.47 One historian has even asserted that Locke's
Irratirgs should not be viewed as justification for the successful
Revolution of 1688, but rather as a political tract inspired by the
Exclusion Crisis.48 The Tories produced their own propaganda materials
and published in 1680 for the first time Sir Robert Filmer's work.

Even though Algernon Sidney's‘ergggrgggugggrgrglgg
figggrgggnl were not published until 1698 for the first time, a very
convincing case can be argued to show that he probably composed most
of the work (at least two of the three chapters) between the years
1680 and 1683. At his treason trial in 1683, Sidney argued that these
works (he never actually admitted that they were his, even though they
were found in his study) had been written fifteen or twenty years
prior to 1683. Sidney was being intentionally misleading because
there is simply too much internal evidence within the ngrggrggg
themselves that proves him wrong. In two different sections of chapter

two, Sidney consistently referred to the Earl of Danby by name as being

merely one of the several evil ministers who had held power under

 

47Cranston, John Logkg, p. 207.

48Peter Laslett, "The English Revolution and Locke's Two

Treatises of Government," Cambriggg Historiggl Journal, XII (no. 1,
1956), pp. 40-550

110

Charles II.49 Danby fell from power as Lord Treasurer at the very end
of 1678. Sidney's purpose in attacking Danby was to demonstrate that
a corrupt monarchy, as most monarchies which adhered strictly to the
principle of hereditary succession were, attracted corrupt, unscrupulous
ministers. A bit later in the same chapter, Sidney indirectly referred
to the Exclusion Crisis and the Duke of York within the general context
of Charles II's "friendship with France." Sidney postulated that if any
Englishman doubted the trend of recent events, or their meaning,

He may soon see a man in the throne, who had rather be a

tributary to France than a lawful king of England, whilst

either parliament or people shall dare to dispute his

commands insist upon their own rights, or defend a religion

inconsistent with that which he has espoused: angothen the

truth will be so evident as to require no proof.
Clearly, this is a reference to James and his known (and greatly
mistrusted) Catholicism. In one section of chapter three, Sidney
argued forcefully for the necessity of having annual Parliaments in
England, reasoning that it was only through the institution of
Parliament that the basic law could be changed and the King's use of
his power could be properly judged.51 During the height of the
Exclusion Crisis, Charles II used his prerogative power to delay the
meeting of a parliament from July of 1679 until October of 1680.

The most concrete evidence within the Qisgoursgs themselves

comes near the end of the last chapter. It is in section forty-three

‘bhat Algernon Sidney finally made a clear and unmistakable reference to

 

49Sidney, legoursgs Qonggrnigg Govgrnggnt, ch. 2, sec. 20,

pp. 151-53: sec. 25, pp. 200-206.

501.9120: Ch. 29 880- 27: Po 211a

51192.2" ch- 3. sec. 27. pp. 376-79.

111
the Exclusion Crisis, something he had been building up to since the
middle of chapter two.52 In no uncertain terms, Sidney made his
position quite clear concerning the Duke of York. If James ever became
King of England, he would be a threat to the liberties of England, both
because of his religion, which was not known for its tolerance of
humaneness, and because of James's pronounced tendency to view his own
will as being above the law. In addition, Sidney mentioned that Sir
Robert Filmer's Prtrlargha, which he had been criticizing from the
beginning of chapter one, had just recently been "brought to light."
Filmer's work was not published for the first time until 1680.

There are other factors also that support the contention
that Algernon Sidney composed the vast majority of his Discourses
during the turbulent years of the Exclusion Crisis. Sidney did not
write in an intellectual vacuum. The composition of the Qisgourses
fits into the general pattern of intellectual and political writings
which were motivated by the Exclusion Crisis. Like Nevile, Sidney was
a fervent admirer of the Roman and Venetian Republics. Algernon's
attachment to classical republicanism is positive and unqualified. In
addition to Sidney's attack on the theories and ideas of Sir Robert
Filmer, Tyrrell and Locke each did essentially the same thing in their
works. Whipping Sir Robert Filmer with pen and ink was one of the
favorite indoor sports among Whig intellectuals during the Exclusion
Crisis. Finally, many of the same concerns for England and fears for
its future can be found in both Sidney's nggurses and in the letters

he wrote in 1679 to Henry Savile and Benjamin Furley. The same gnawing

 

521.1%" Ch. 3, 886. 43, ppe 445-50e

112
uneasiness that was present in Sidney's mind over the general trend of
events can be found both in his political writings and in his letters
to friends. Algernon Sidney was deeply concerned over the extremely
low quality of English government on the national level under Charles
II. Furthermore, he was more than just a bit frightened over the
probability of the Catholic Duke of York's succession to the throne.
Algernon Sidney was motivated by the turbulence of the Exclusion Crisis
to compose his ideas on governmental theory and practice in England.
It is not known whether he had any direct contacts with John Locke or
James Tyrrell, but the very nature of Sidney's work and the patterns of
his thought reflected therein certainly fit into the general scope of
the Exclusion Crisis years.

Before beginning a chapter by chapter analysis of Algernon
Sidney's‘ngrggrrrg, it would be wise to look at the Tory work which
provided such ample grist for the mills of Whig intellectuals like
Sidney. Sir Robert Filmer, the author of Pat is ha, was born in 1588
and died in 1653. Egrrlrrggg itself was written in the late 1630's or
early 1640's, and the political concepts expressed in the work belonged
essentially to the Elizabethan Era. Filmer strongly defended the Royal
prerogative in his work, and the term "Filmerism" has come to stand for
a defense of the established order and the exaltation of the family in
society.” Simply stated, Filmer believed that the authority of a king
over his people was instituted by God and was based on the authority of

a father over his children. Or, stated another way, the King was to

 

53Peter Laslett, ”Sir Robert Filmer: The Man Versus the
Whig Myth,” W140, third series, V (October, 1948), pp. 523-46.

113

his subjects as a father was to his children. As one historian has

pointed out:

Filmer's object was to assert that all government was by
nature and God's will despotic, that men had no time
voluntarily placed themselves under government and at no
time could so place themselves, and that at no time hadsgen,
at no time could they, impose conditions on government.
This is the work that was literally dragged from obscurity in 1680 and
used by Tory defenders of the Royal prerogative to counteract Whig
propaganda and political writings during the Exclusion Crisis. Little
wonder that Whig intellectuals like Tyrrell, Locke, and Sidney went out
of their way to refute the ideas expressed in Ertriargha.

Algernon Sidney's contribution to Whig doctrine and theory,
his W W Gove nment, is divided into three major
divisions or chapters. Within each chapter, Sidney developed a few
general theories and attempted to connect his ideas by his constant
criticisms of Filmer's Errrlrrrnr. Generally speaking, Sidney's ideas
and examples became more specific in nature as he progressed from
chapter to chapter. Chapter one is a brief introduction to the rest of
the work and includes a basic criticism of Filmer's Erlriarcha.
Needless to say, Sidney found Filmsr's ideas to be completely unsound
and thoroughly upsetting. Sidney attacked the whole concept of
monarchy by Divine Right, and he used this first chapter to initiate
111s own approach to the nature of government. In the second chapter,

which is really the heart of the entire work, Sidney analyzed the

nature of man, the origins of government, and the weaknesses to which

 

54Raymond W. K. Hinton, ”Husbands, Fathers and Conquerors,

I: Filmer and the Logic of Patriarchalism,"‘Egllrlrrl,5tudies, XV
(no. 3, 1967), pm 297a

 

114
monarchies seemed susceptible. It is in this chapter that Sidney
introduced his concepts of the compact theory of government, popular
consent, and the public good. In the third and last chapter, Sidney
brought his theories and arguments closer to home by analyzing specific
events and institutions in England. He even offered some specific
remedies to the evils he see around him. Besides being a refutation
of Filmer's‘figrrlgrghr, Sidney's work is an analysis of government in
general, monarchies in particular, and a criticism of England's system
under Charles II.

Denying that there was anything mysterious, or divinely
inspired about the institution of hereditary monarchy, Sidney proceeded
in chapter one to undercut Filmer's basic ideas by asserting that man
was created.rrlgrrllxngrgr and could not justly be deprived of his
liberty without cause. A mere crown did not bestow any extraordinary
qualities upon the person wearing it. God had not singled out monsrchial
rule as the only type of governemnt that was good for mankind. Instead,
God gave to men the grrrrlrx for judging what is good for themselves and
the llrgrrx of inventing those forms of government which best pleased
them. According to Sidney, the foundation of all jgrr,government was
general consent, and he saw the best type of government as that which
Inixed the democratic, aristocratic, and monarchic elements together in
a nice bland. What man essentially wanted most of all was to form his
own society in his own way and for his own good. Assaulting F ilmer's
position with a fury, Sidney denied that any man could be singled out
by God alone and given dominion over the rest of society. In Sidney's
View, there existed no general law to govern all people in the process

of creating constitutions, "but every people is by God and naturg

115

[reasonJ left to the liberty of regulating these matters relating to
themselves according to their own prudence or convenience."55 Sidney
simply rejected outright the theory of monarchy by divine right as
being a complete absurdity.

Placing great emphasis upon man as a rational creature,
Sidney was quick to disagree with Filmer over the ends toward which
governments were established. The basic consideration that motivated
the freeman (Sidney's word) of any community to form a society and
governmental authority was the consideration of their public good.
Freeman consented to give up some of their original freedom in order
to acquire more safety, convenience, and protection under the laws
which they agreed to preserve. No governmental power, said Sidney in
chapter two, was just unless it was founded upon consent. God endowed
man with the gift of reason, or understanding, and men used this gift
to choose those institutions and forms of government which best pleased
him. The situation differed from one nation to another, of course,
and if the French wanted a monarchy, while the Dutch were happy with
their own peculiar system, that was fine with Sidney. Each nation had
to work out a system which best suited its needs. Sidney, incidentally,
greatly admired the Dutch system of government. Using their rational
natures, the freeman delegated power to parliaments which in turn used
‘their delegated authority to act in the name of the original body of
‘freemen. Magistrates, or Kings, in positions of executive authority

were bound to act strictly within the law and for the public good.

 

55Sidney, Qisgourses Congernigg Government, ch. 1, sec. 18,

p. 48a

116
Sidney realized the importance of a society based upon authority, order,
and law, but he repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate goal of
governmental institutions and power was the public good.

Sidney's rationale for the establishment of a government by
rational consent of the governed was all very logical, though a bit
naive, and cannot be considered offensive in any way. It was when
Sidney developed his second major concept of chapter two, the right of
the people to engage in rebellion to overthrow an unjust ruler, that he
began crawling out on a limb from which there was no retreat. Sidney
believed that if officials in power abused their position of trust,
either by assuming power not originally granted to them or by somehow
ruling outside of the law, this constituted sufficient grounds for a
resort to force in order to check those officials abusing their power.
The first step was to attempt a redress of grievances by any legal, or
judicial, means provided by the system itself. If‘rll,judicial methods
available failed to correct the abuses in question, then those poor

folk groaning under unjust rule could, as a last rgsort, turn to armed

 

rebellion, sedition, or even war, and be assured that such violent
action was indeed justified by the laws of God and man. In Sidney's
own words, “Extrajudicial proceedings, by sedition, tumult, or war,
must take place, when the persons concerned are of such power, that
they cannot be brought under the judicial."56 In other words, sedition
can have a just goal, the deliverance of an oppressed people from a
wicked magistrate. Such action, according to Sidney, was sedition for

the public good. It is this whole concept of resorting to armed

 

5512i2.. ch. 2, sec. 24, p. 180.

117

rebellion which would ultimately bring Algernon Sidney to the
executioner'a block.

Interwoven with these two major concepts in chapter two is
a direct attack upon monarchies in general and an implied attack upon
the rule of Charles II, which is also carried over into chapter three.
Sidney found absolute monarchies to be an insidious evil because they
extinguished the liberty which was a fundamental aspect of man's nature.
But Sidney tended to dislike monarchies in general for a number of
reasons. In the first place, monarchies were usually based upon the
principle of hereditary succession, which was a great weakness because
there was always the chance that a feel, an idiot, or an unscrupulous
tyrant would inherit the throne. monarchies were also more prone to
civil disorders than were commonwealth governments. In addition,
monarchies were much more susceptible to corruption than were other
types of governments: monarchies just seemed naturally to attract
evil, ambitious advisers, like Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, Thomas
Osborne, Earl of Danby, and Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland. All
of these men were prominent political figures in the reign of Charles
II, a reign which Sidney found to be greatly lacking in moral direction
and quality of leadership. As Algernon Sidney surveyed the seventeenth-
century world about him, he concluded that monarchies generally did not
ch: an adequate job of providing for that ultimate good of all established
governments, namely the public good. A wise and good King was the
exception, not the rule. Therefore, while Sidney emhasized the

weaknesses of the monarchical institution in general, many of the

examples he used related directly or indirectly to England's monarchy

and Charles II in particular.

118
One of the concepts in E££££££2D2,'h1°h Sidney found to be
the most dangerous was Filmer's claim that no law could be proposed to
restrain Kings because there had been Kings long before any laws were
made. Sidney steadfastly maintained that Kings could not assume any
power or position not granted to them by the law. The law existed in
society before magistrates or Kings were created, and further laws were
made periodically to direct, to instruct, and if need be, to restrain
magistrates. Sidney emphatically asserted that no one could be a
rightful King, except by law. For instance, Kings might have the
delegated power to appoint judges, but the power itself came from the
law and was not inherent within the office of the King. Only those
who made the law in the first place were capable of judging whether
the King was using his power correctly. It was absurd to think that a
King could be left free to be the sole judge of his own actions. To
Sidney's way of thinking, Parliament and the people had the power of
making Kings because they possessed the sovereignty of a nation and
could direct or limit the exercise of it. Sidney crawled even farther
out on his limb by maintaining that those who had the power of making
the laws for a nation also had the power of making a King, or any other
magistrate for that matter. By now it should be clear to anyone why
Algernon Sidney was viewed as a violent and dangerous fellow: the full
implications of his political theories were simply too much for a
seventeenth-century Stuart monarch like Charles II to accept.
Claiming that the English monarchy was a monarchy established
by' consent and that the King's power was established by Magna Carts and
otlaer laws, Algernon Sidney concluded his nggggrg g,by analyzing the

Icoredition of the English constitutional system and monarchy during his

(r

119

own time. Even though the basic English system was all right, Sidney
observed that certain defects had arisen over the centuries and were
being aggravated by recent changes in practice and by what Sidney
termed “the corruption of the times." When the "mixed monarchy" was
first put into practice in England, the balance of power had been held
by the nobility, who had a real function in the power structure. But,
by Sidney's time, the position of the nobility had become altered to
the point where they were no longer the natural leaders and advisers
who were able to check the King. For Sidney, the old union of class
interests represented by the idea of "mixed monarchy" had been shaken
beyond repair. The basic, old constitution of England was all right,
but time had produced too many innovations. Therefore, changes had to
be made in order to restore England to its ancient liberty, dignity,
and happiness. The need for "corrective surgery" was imperative because
Sidney observed that in recent years the King of England had been able
to corrupt far too many men in England.

A number of observations immediately come to mind concerning
Sidney's work. For one thing, Algernon Sidney viewed the historical
process as being one of gradual change. One set of laws or one system
of government simply could not survive the onslaught of time unchanged.
IUhen Sidney scrutinized governments and institutions in relation to
:society, he emphasized that it was better to inquire after what was Earl,
rather than what was m. Sidney did not believe in preserving what

sues old just because it was old. He preferred to apply a simple but

 

57The edition of Algernon Sidney's Qiggourses Qongerning
goxarnment used in the preceding analysis is the one that was published
irt‘1698 and edited by John Toland, a copy of which can be found in the
Special Collections of the Michigan State University Library.

120
rather absolute standard when evaluating institutions: did they
function under the law: and did they provide for the public good. One
of the constitutional changes envisioned by Sidney was the need for
annual Parliaments in England, a necessity if the growing power of the
Stuarts were to be checked. In his Qisgourses, Sidney was not the least
bit interested in discuesing social or economic factors in society.
Using his refutation of Filmer's B!££l£££h£.°9 a starting point, Sidney
progressed from an investigation of the origins and nature of government
to an analysis of England's constitutional system and the reign of
Charles II in particular. As Sidney looked about him, he found the
corruption of Charles II's Court to be disgusting, and he found the
ominous figure of James, Duke of York, to be a direct threat to English
liberties. Sidney‘s lergurses should not be viewed as a formula for
progressive or liberal change which could be projected into the future.
He was ng§,attempting to devise a new system of government which would
incorporate such liberal ideas as franchise or campaign reforms.
Algernon Sidney's gaze was frequently directed back in time to England's
Commonwealth period, a period which he believed had provided England
with the best leadership in it history. What he immediately favored,
in all likelihood, was James‘s exclusion and sufficient restraints upon
the Royal prerogative to prevent absolutism in England. The point at
‘which Sidney differed from most Whigs was where he seriously advocated
armed rebellion as a last resort in order to redress political
grievances. The W reveal quite clearly that Algernon Sidney
would have been much happier living in a republic: the institution of
mxanarchy simply possessed too many inherent weaknesses that prevented

it: from providing adequate or capable leadership.

C H A P T E R V
THE COUNCIL OF SIX, RYE HOUSE, AND TREASON: 1681-83

In his‘ergggrg g Algernon Sidney had come out strongly in
favor of annual parliaments in England, a measure which he felt was
necessary if the Stuart monarchy was to be restrained within the law.
Perhaps Sidney foresaw, to some extent at least, the consequences of a
situation in which the King would rule without a parliament; for, after
the third Exclusion Parliament was dissolved in March of 1681, another
parliament was not called until after Charles II's death in 1685.
During this four-year period, Charles was able to take advantage of a
distinct Tory reaction in favor of the Crown and carefully exact his
”revenge” against the Whigs for their bold challenge during the
Exclusion Crisis. According to Charles II's most recent biographer.
the King himself directed the counterattack against the Whigs, which
consisted of a three-part program. First, he was determined not to
call another parliament unless actually driven to it by a war in the
Netherlands. Second, he decided to make every effort to place Tories
into positions of authority and influence not only in London, the main
citadel of Whig strength, but also in the provinces. This part of
IZharles II's program included an attack upon the corporation charters
of'towns and cities, since many of the incorporated boroughs were
controlled by the Whigs. Again, one of the main targets was London.

121

122

Finally, Charles II decided to use a "legion of informers” against the
Whigs themselves.1 When Charles II was through exacting his "revenge”,
not only had the Whig Party been smashed, with most of its leaders
either exiled or executed, but the Royal prerogative had been increased
to a point which Sidney would have considered extremely dangerous.
Algernon Sidney himself was merely one of the Whig victims of
Charles II's revenge.

As one might well expect, the Earl of Shaftesbury was one
of the first Whig leaders Charles II went after. On July 2, 1681,
Shaftesbury was arrested at Thanet House, his London home, and lodged
in the Tower of London on a charge of high treason. He remained in
the Tower until November 24, when the London grand jury met at Old
Bailey to consider the treason charge preferred against him.
Shaftesbury was refused bail under the very Habeas Corpus Act which he
had been instrumental in pushing through Parliament in 1679. It was
no coincidence that John Dryden had published a few days previously
his satirical poem w m Aghilorhgl, a brilliant work which
contains some of the most vicious lines of personal abuse and ridicule
in English poetry, all directed against Shaftesbury. The grand jury,
which had been carefully selected by the Whig sheriffs of London,
returned a bill of lgnoramus (not a true bill of indictment) in the
Eaml's case. Shaftesbury was free, but by no means out of danger.

lJne year later, after the Duke of Monmouth's arrest, Shaftesbury fled

 

1Maurice Ashley, Charles ll: lag,MQn and he Statesman
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 283.

123
England disguised as a Presbyterian minister.2 He died on January 21,
1683, in the Netherlands: the Whig Party had lost its principal leader
and organizing genius.

As important and formidible an adversary as Shaftesbury was
for Charles II, the King had even greater objectives in mind during
this period than the mere hounding of one political figure. Charles II
realized that the Whig Party would have to be attacked at its very
foundation, the incorporated towns and cities of England. By
controlling so many of the incorporated boroughs, the Whigs were assured
not only of local governmental control in those areas, but also of the
election of Whigs to the House of Commons on the national level. This
is why Charles II found himself confronted by such a strong and
aggressive Whig opposition in the Commons during the three successive
Parliaments of the Exclusion Crisis. If the Whigs could be rooted out
of their entrenched positions of power and influence in England's
towns and cities, the trouble makers would cease flocking into the
Commons, and Charles II ould count upon a more subservient Parliament
in the future, if the time ever arose for one.

The key to Charles II's campaign against Whig strongholds
was his assault upon the charters of incorporation for the towns and
cities. This was by no means the first instance during the seventeenth

<century in which the central government of Westminster had tried to

 

2The Duke of Monmouth was Charles II's eldest illegitimate
earn an attractive and colorful, but rather simple-minded character.
Monmouth at one point was Shaftesbury's candidate to replace the Duke
«of York, assuming the struggle for Exclusion had ended in a Whig
victory. Monmouth was a member of the Whig "Council of Six” along
with Algernon Sidney, and he was eventually executed for treason in
1685 by James II.

124
manipulate borough charters for its own advantage. Oliver Cromwell had
tried it during the Protectorate, and Charles II had attempted it to a
limited degree earlier in his reign. The assault by Charles II during
the last few years of his reign upon borough charters was the greatest
and most thorough campaign attempted by the central government up to
that point. The campaign assumes an extra degree of importance when
one realizes that the incorporated towns and cities of England returned
four-fifths of the House of Commons.3 Using a variety of legal, but
sometimes very technical, excuses, Charles II succeeded in obtaining
the forfeiture of the charters of some of the smaller towns. Then,
using a writ of 992, a nto, Charles obtained in 1683 the forfeiture
of London's charter. With London sufficiently humbled, the King
proceeded against the lesser cities of England. When new charters were
issued for the towns and cities, the central government made sure that
the terms of these new charters would ensure Tory corporations. With
this established first, the Crown could be assured of Tory sheriffs,
Tory juries, and Tory members in any future Commons.4 Very recent
research has demonstrated that for this campaign against the Whig
strongholds, Charles II utilized a long-standing resentment by the
gentry on the local level against the incorporated boroughs and the
gentry's desire to extend their influence into the towns. The result
of’Charles II's thorough campaign against the towns and cities was

twofold: Whig sympathizers were rooted out of their positions of

 

3J. R. Western, Monggghy and Bgvglutiona the English §tate
jg; the 1§§0'§ (1972), pp. 69-70.

45. Reed Brett, The Stuart antugys gang-1714 (London:
George C. Harrap a. Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 279.

125

influence on the local level, and in their places Tory country
gentlemen began infiltrating into positions of influence within the
corporations.5

The Royal assault against London deserves special study
because Algernon Sidney was living there during that time and because
he would ultimately be brought to trial after the city had been
secured for the Tories by Charles II's policy. One of the special
privileges enjoyed by London as an incorporated city was the right to
appoint two sheriffs for the shire of Middlssex. Normally, sheriffs
were Royal nominees, but London was a special case. The sheriffs, in
turn, were the officials who empaneled the juries for court trials.
Thus, with the Whigs strongly entrenched in London and its administrative
system, it is easy to see why Charles II was so eager to bring the great
city under his control. London had become a veritable hotbed of Whig
dissidents and potential trouble makers. In 1682 Charles II secured
the election of two Tory nominees as sheriffs for Middlesex. But the
crippling blow came in June of 1683 when London was finally forced to
surrender its charter and subsequently lost the privilege of appointing
its sheriffs. It should be mentioned that at this same time, June of
1683, the first testimonies concerning the Whig intrigues, which have
[come to be known collectively as the Rye House Plot, were just breaking
‘the surface in London. With London successfully humbled and remodeled
along Tory lines, the Crown could now be assured of a more favorable
type of justice. There would be no more Whig grand juries returning

verdicts of m, as was the case with the Earl of Shaftesbury.

 

59E. SE" ppe 73'6e

126

In the months after the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament
in March of 1681, the Whig opposition found itself to be in an
increasingly awkward and even precarious position. The keynote of the
Whig effort in Parliament had been the move to exclude James, Duke of
York, from the succession. Chalres II, ignoring the Triennial Act of
1664, did not summon another parliament for the remainder of his
reign.6 Thus, with no parliament in session, the Whigs were denied the
best platform from which they could have applied constant pressure on
Charles II. In conjunction with the Royal attack upon the city charter
of London, Charles II also had the Whig news sheets in London silenced.
The Whigs actually found themselves in a quandary after 1681. From
their vantage point, it appeared as though Charles II had no intention
of calling another parliament, and it seemed equally certain that the
Catholic James would eventually succeed his brother Charles after all:
that is, unless something drastic were to be done to prevent it.
Therefore, with the Whigs in a temporarily confused state and with
Shaftesbury clearly a marked man for Royal revenge, it was the Crown
itself which now enjoyed a position of considerable strength.

The real problem, then, for the Whigs in 1681 and 1682 was
one of deciding what steps to take in order to keep their apposition
alive, now that the initiative had clearly passed to Charles II. Some
historians claim that it was at this point that the Earl of Shaftesbury
committed himself to a plan of action that bordered on actual rebellion.

The Duke of Momouth's semi-royal progress through Cheshire is

 

6The Triennial Act of 1664, passed by Charles II's Cavalier

Parliament, simly stated that no more than three years were to elapse
between one parliament and another.

127
interpreted as the initial unfolding of Shaftesbury's plan.7 The
author of Shaftesbury's most extensive and scholarly biography,
however, contends that even though it is very likely that the
possibility of a rebellion was discussed at Thanet House by the Earl
and some of his trusted Whigs, there is no good evidence to prove that
during Shaftesbury's lifetime the discussions went beyond that stage.8
Actual contemporary evidence, that is, discussions among Whig leaders
as to what they were planning, has not survived. Accounts which have
survived and which implicate Shaftesbury in a planned rebellion were
written by rather dubious characters like Robert Ferguson and Lord Crey
of Wark 2352; they had fled England in 1683 and were safely in exile.
The blame for a great many things could then be dumped with impunity
into Shaftesbury's lap. Nevertheless, it seems certain that
Shaftesbury at least discussed with other Whig leaders different
alternatives open to them in their deteriorating political position at
that time. It is also fairly certain that Shaftesbury personally
favored the Duke of Monmouth over the Dutchman, William of Orange, as
a possible alternative to the Duke of York. But whether this backing
was ever transformed into an actual, planned effort to put Monmouth on
the throne, or whether Shaftesbury was merely using the Protestant Duke
for his own personal ends, it is extremely difficult to say. Monmouth
may have been personally popular in and around London, but he was an

incredibly shallow-minded character. Shaftesbury may have had his

 

7Brett, The §tuart Century: 1603-17] , pp. 277-78.

8Kenneth H. D. Haley, The First Earl gfi Shaftesbury
(Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 708.

128

faults, but a dull mind and an unobservant nature were not among them.

Difficult as it may be to penetrate the tortuous windings of
Shaftesbury's mind, it is certain that during the early 1680's
Shaftesbury and the Whigs were being watched closely by the Court and
its supporters. Not only that, but Charles II was beginning to utilize
informers to implicate Shaftesbury and certain other Whigs in anything
which might be construed as being treasonous. Sir John Reresby, M.P.
from Yorkshire for the second Exclusion Parliament and a staunch,
dedicated Tory, observed in his memoirs for 1680 that the Whig
apposition to the Court had conducted a number of meetings during that
year. These meetings, dubbed "cabals" by Reresby, were attended mainly
by Monmouth, Shaftesbury, Lord William Russell, and Lord Cavendish and
were frequently shifted from place to place to ensure more privacy.
In February of 1682 an informer named John Fitzgerald claimed that in
June of 1679 the Earl of Shaftesbury had approached him and asked for
any information he might have concerning the Dukes of York, Ormonde,
and Lauderdale, whom Shaftesbury regarded as the greatest enemies of
England. Fitzgerald in addition claimed that Shaftesbury had verbally
attacked Charles II, saying that he was no better than a fool for
allowing those three "notorious enemies of all Protestant interests"
to remain in power. Concluding his belated confession, Fitzgerald

said, "Much after the same manner have I heard Major Wildman, Col.

 

9Andrew Browning, ed., Memoirs 21,513 John Berebx (Glasgow:
Jackson, Son 5. Co., 1936), p. 193. Russell would perish on the block

if! 1683 for complicity in the Rye House Plot. Lord Cavendish would be
one of the signatories of the invitation to William of Orange in 1688,
along with Henry Sidney. Cavendish was rewarded with the Dukedom of
Devonshira.

129
Sidney and others speak treasonable expressions."10 Fitzgerald was
merely among the first of many informers and witnesses used by the
Crown in an attempt to discredit the Whigs.

Besides the hearsay testimonies and secondhand reports,
which can be found in the W 91 gm; 9.89.939. for 1682 and which
indicate more than just a passing interest in the Whigs by official
sources, there are clear indication that people outside the government
were also concerned about Whig activities. One such example is a
letter written by Dr. Matthew Fowler to his friend Dr. William Bell,
who was the vicar of St. Sepulchre's Church in London. Expressing a
deep concern over the Whigs and their possible intriguing in 1682,
Fowler was prompted to remember the days of Cromwell's Protectorate
when the local gentry used to meet at horse races and cock fights to
plan intrigues and designs. This is why the Lord Protector forbade
all meetings of this nature. Concerning the more contemporary
opposition to Charles II, "Our Whigs are of late much given to such
kind of sports, and I wish a watchful eye were on them to observe
their motions." Dr. Fowler was very concerned over the Duke of
Monmouth's tour through Cheshire and Staffordshire in 1682 because
those two shires in particular were notorious for being "very rotten
and full of potent Whigs and malcontents." Fowler confided his deep
uneasiness to Dr. Bell:

I think you believe me at 65 to be no vain fellow nor apt

to be afraid, where no cause of fear is, but with an enemy

it is better to play the fore than the after game. The

Whigs, finding their cause and party daily declining in
London, will endeavor what they can to buoy it Up again by

 

13D

raising some considerable tumults in the country and I

conceive no parts are at this day so proper, on which to

erect a stage1pf rebellion, as Lancashire, Cheshire and

Lincolnshire.

The acceptance of a loyal opposition within the political system was an
alien concept at this time in England. Whigs represented more than
just opposition to Charles II, for to good Tories, they must have
represented a sinister force at work trying to undermine the ordered
establishment. Because of this, the Whigs needed to be watched.

The problems of the Whigs, as an opposition group, multiplied
after Shaftesbury's flight in November of 1682, and their position
deteriorated rapidly. On this problem too, as with the exact nature
of Shaftesbury's plane, it is difficult to find agreement among
historians as to precisely what was going on. Nevertheless, there is
general agreement over the existence of a Whig "council,” or “inner
circle,” during the years 1681-83. Sidney's biographer claims that the
Whig council was formed g£t§;,Shaftesbury'e flight and included
Algernon Sidney as one of its original members. The council's purpose
was to serve as sort of a "standing committee” for the Whigs and to
prepare for Parliamentary elections, if any were ever called during
Charles II's reign. According to this interpretation, the Whig
council merely ”discussed” the best possible course of action to follow
in trying to resist Charles II's drive for arbitrary power.12 Other

historians claim that the Whig council, or ”inner circle" of advisers,

existed Q312;,to Shaftesbury's exile, and the members busied themselves

 

11esoo, Vol. coxxx (1682), pp. 313-14.

12Ewald, Life 2;,Sidn , Vol. II, p. 206.

131

discussing different alternatives and perhaps even advancing into the
initial stages of a rebellion to force Charles II to summon a
parliament. Under this interpretation, Algernon Sidney was not admitted
into the trusted "inner circle" of Whigs during Shaftesbury's lifetime,
mainly because there existed mutual distrust and dislike between these
two Whigs.13 Sidney merely became the new member of the "inner circle,”
maintaining and coordinating the existing plans for an actual rebellion
after Shaftesbury's flight to Holland.

This Whig "inner circle,“ which has come to be known as the
Council of Six, was comprised of a noticeably diverse collection of
Whigs and clearly reflected the factionalism that existed in Whig ranks
as a whole. In addition to Sidney, there were Arthur Capel, the Earl
of Essex, and young John Hampden, grandson of the John Hampden who had
won fame in 1634 for forcing a test case involving Charles I's ship
money tax. Both Hampden and Essex were under Sidney's influence, and
the three of them, especially Sidney and Essex, comprised the most
radical faction of the Council of Six.14 Bishop Burnet claimed that
Algernon Sidney had taken the Earl of Essex into such close confidence
and actually had ruled Essex to such a degree that Sidney "became

15

master of his spirit." In addition to the above three, there were

the Duke of Monmouth and Lord William Russell, son of the fifth Earl,

 

13Ha1ey, lgg,r1;§t figzlmgfl Shaftesbu , p. 718. J. H. m.
Salmon, ”Algernon Sidney and the Rye House Plot," History Toda , IV
(October, 1954), p. 700.
14Maurice Ashley, John Wildmgn: Blotter and Postmaster
(TVew Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 233.

1Sam-net, History r is Own Tigg, Vol. II, p. 193.

132

and later first Duke of Bedford. Monmouth, the charming crowd pleaser,
wanted to preserve the monarchy with himself as the monarch, while
Russell merely insisted Upon the exclusion of the Duke of York and the
redress of some basic grievances.16 The sixth member of the Council
was William, third Baron Howard of Escrick, whom Burnet claimed had
been personally befriended by Sidney.17 Lord Howard, a relative of the
Duke of Buckingham, had at one time set on the Lords' committee that
had credited Titus Oates' allegations concerning the Popish Plot. He
possessed a long career of political intriguing and furtive designing
which dated back to Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate.18 The man possessed
few scruples and even fewer principles: his main interest seems to have
been his own betterment. This is the man who turned King's evidence in
1683 to save himself and became the prosecution's star witness against
two of his fellow Council members, Lord William Russell and Algernon
Sidney. This Whig Council of Six encOMpassed a wide spectrum of
political thought, from Sidney's classical republicanism to Lord Howard's
back-stabbing self-interest.

SUpposedly, the Council of Six was the coordinating body
between London intriguers and mslcontents in Scotland, all of whom
were trying to formulate plans for an armed insurrection against
IZharles II. But again, because of a wide variety of contemporary

claims and latter-day interpretations, it is extremely difficult to

 

16E.aldp Liffl 9-: Sid" 9 V010 II, pa 208s
1793. m" p. 193.
15

Kenneth H. D. Haley, Willigg'gfi Orange 22g the English
gggosition, 1612-74 (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 28.

133

get a clear picture in one's mind as to exactly what the Council of
Six was up to. The Crown's version of what the Council of Six had been
intending was based almost entirely upon Lord Howard's incredible
story, which he recited for Charles II and the Privy Council on July 9,
1683. Howard insisted that it was the Council of Six into whose
keeping had been placed the general ideas and schemes of Shaftesbury
after the Earl's death. The council existed to give direction and
guidance to the opposition.19 In addition, he maintained that this
”select council” met regularly at the homes of John Hampden and Lord
William Russell, and it was at those two places where a general
rebellion against Charles II was resolved upon by the Council. Lord
Howard fUrther claimed that Scotland was included in the plans, and he
identified Algernon Sidney as the Council member responsible for
establishing the Scottish connection through a man named Aaron Smith.20

Both at his treason trial and in his Agglggx, Algernon Sidney
denied that the Council of Six was planning an armed rebellion against
Charles II. Sidney declared that the Council of Six was not a secret
cabal, as the Crown was inclined to believe, and that there existed no
concerted effort among the men fingered by Lord Howard to conspire
together. The whole idea was absurd, claimed Sidney, because he
personally did not even know five men in all of England who would have

followed him in any such venture.21 According to John Hampden, who

 

19Cobbett's singlets Collggtion 91 Stat; m (33 vols.:
London: R. Bagshaw, Covent-Carden, 1809-26), Vol. IX, p. 434.

20cspo, v.1. coxxv111 (1683), p. 30.

2"Algernon Sidney, Discougggs goggernigg Government with‘flig

Letters, Trial, Agology.ggg Some Memogigls.g£.flig Lif , p. 178.

134

survived Charles II's purge of the Whigs with a fine of forty thousand
pounds and a prison term, the Council's actual "plans” were no more
revolutionary than those of the ”Immortal Seven" who invited Prince
William to England in 1688.22 His assertion does not throw much light
at all on the problem of what the Council was actually doing in 1682
and 1683. Lady Russell, whose husband was convicted on Lord Howard's
testimony, claimed that the meetings at her husband's house consisted
merely of ”loose talk" and speculations of a very general nature, not
concerted efforts to plan a rebellion.23

Modern historians tend to reject Lord Howard's claim that
the members of the Whig Council of Six had acted as a cohesive unit
and were seriously planning an armed rebellion against Charles II.
David 099 contends that with the exception of Lord Howard of Escrick,
the members of the Whig Council were actually rank amateurs at the
profession of plotting and intriguing.24 They were in reality rather
harmless, but unfortunately, some of them were also involved with less
scrupulous and much more dangerous Whigs. Another historian, P. J.
Helm, insists that by 1682 the extreme wing of the Whig Party had been
reduced to a perpetual state of largely theoretical conspiracy. After
Shaftesbury's death in 1683, the actual control of Whig discussions

had passed into the hands of much less practical men like Sidney,

Essex, Russell, and Hampden. These not very cautious Whigs became

 

22Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth:§gntu;y Qommonwealthman
(New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 29.

23Ewald, Lifg g, Sidn , Vol. 11, p. 208.

24099, finglgnd‘ig the Reign g§,§ha£les 11, p. 643.

'v

135
"enchanted by the mystique of conspiracy" and simply included too many
other Whigs in their discussions. With more people involved after
Shaftesbury's death, the chances that a "leak" would develop greatly
increased.25 Due to the lack of trustworthy evidence relating to the
problem of the Council's activities, the approach outlined above is
probably the safest one to take. Lord Howard's incredible story and
his reasons for turning King's evidence, plus his own personal history
of professional intriguing, naturally lead one to suspect the man and
his story. It does appear certain, however, that the Council of Six
did hold at least informal discussions during 1682 and 1683. But, the
exact nature of those discussions and the extent to which they had
progressed by March of 1683 are impossible to determine with any degree
of accuracy. Besides, the Council itself was too split by diverse
opinions really to act as a cohesive body.

It is interesting to study the various types of Whigs during
the period of 1681 through 1683 because there existed a sort of
”pecking order" within the Whig ranks. After the much studied Council
of Six came other orders of Whigs, and many of these Whigs had
connections either with individual members of the Council or originally
with Shaftesbury at Thanet House. One case in point is that of Robert
Ferguson, one of Shaftesbury's associates and another one of those
professional plotters like Lord Howard. Supposedly, Ferguson was not
only the connecting link between the Russell-Monmouth faction on the
Council itself and the more ruthless band of conspirators allegedly

contemplating a Royal assassination, but he was also supposed to have

 

25D. J. Helm, Jeff e 3, pp. 90-91-

136
been the main link between the Sidney faction in England and the
malcontents in Scotland under the ninth Earl of Argyll.26 In his own
account of his life and intrigues, written in exile after Shaftesbury's
death, Ferguson did admit to considerable internal dissention and
factionalism among the Whigs. It is interesting to note that Ferguson
somehow managed to ingratiate himself with William of Orange and
subsequently accompanied the Dutch invasion fleet in 1688. After that,
he involved himself in numerous assassination plots and Jacobite
intrigues until he died in 1714. Hardly a man whose person account of
Whig intrigues could be accepted without question.

Another fascinating character of the same order as Ferguson
was Major John Wildman, a man appropriately named because of his very
radical political beliefs. Originally an advocate of a democratic
republic for England, Major Wildman became a close associate of Algernon
Sidney after Shaftesbury's flight, and he eventually adopted Sidney's
political position of a greatly limited monarchy.27 This truly
incredible character spent over fifty years of his life just conspiring
and plotting. He spent a fifth of his active political life in prison
for his efforts, but in the end he became one of the richest alderman
in London.28 True perseverance can have its own reward. Wildman's
biographer asserts that the actual Rye House Plot for assassinating

Charles II and James originated as a figment of Wilman's imagination.

 

26James Ferguson, nggzt_fig;ggggg the Etottgr (Edinburgh:
DBVid Douglas, 1887), p. 640

27Ashley, gghn Wildmen: Plotter and Postmaster. Pp. 238,

 

280.

zalbidO, p. 80

137
According to this theory, after Wildman had abandoned the assassination
plan, it was retrieved by Robert West and John Rumsey, two London
dissidents who were on a level further down the pecking order, and then
given embellishment by them.29 Professional plotters like Ferguson and
Major Wildman existed on a level which at times was outside of and yet
at other times merged with the members of the Council of Six. Their
contacts ran in two directions at once, for these intriguers had
intimate personal contacts with members of the Council of Six and also
with some of the dissidents and malcontents in the city of London.

It was this group of Londoners, with their contacts in the
country, who existed on the bottom of the pecking order and who proved
ultimately to be the key factor in the Royal purge of the upper orders
of Whigs. Some of the Whigs on this level, like Robert West, a
barrister from the Middle Temple, John Rumsey, the ex-cavalry officer
under Cromwell, and Richard Coodenough, an ex-undersheriff of London,
were contemptuously referred to as "Lord Shaftesbury's creatures” by
Bishop Burnet, as if they had somehow been created in the Earl's own
image to spread mischief about the kingdom. These three, plus Josiah
Keeling, the bankrUpt Anabaptist dyer, belonged to the London faction
that was allegedly planning to assassinate Charles II and his brother.
Burnet, incidentally, dismissed the notion of an actual assassination

30 This particular group .

plot by insisting that "all was but talk.“
plus Sir Thomas Armstrong and Lord Cray of Wark used to meet at the

house of Thomas Sheppard, a rich London wine merchant, and indulge

 

Zglbide, ppe 239-‘00

30Burnet, Historx of is Own Time, Vol. 11. PP. 197-98.

 

138

themselves extravagantly in "loose talk,” and some of Sheppard's wine,
no doubt. Robert Ferguson figured prominently in those meetings at
Sheppard's home, as to some extent did Monmouth and Russell.31 It was
because of Russell's carelessness regarding his attendance at.ggg of
those meetings that he found himself very vulnerable to at least a
charge of misprision of treason, and admitted as much himself.32 The
connecting link from this group of London plotters to the country
malcontents was Colonel Richard Rumbold, the actual owner of the Rye
House, which was situated at Hoddesdon in Hertfordshire.

At times it is extremely difficult even to think of West,
Rumsey, Coodenough, Keeling, and the other members of this bottom
order of Whigs as having very much in common with the Whigs at the top
like Sidney and Russell, or even to think of them as ”Whigs” at all,
for that matter. Some of them, like Rumsey and Rumbold, appear more
like discontented, and perhaps even maladjuated, ex-Cromwellisn
soldiers whom time had simply passed by. They had once fought for a
cause under a magnetic leader, and they may have found the drudgery of
peacetime to be too boring for their tastes. Charles II had had
trouble with men of this type early in his reign. Sidney and Russell
were at least men who possessed political principles and beliefs, even
though they were undoubtedly careless and naive in consorting with
some of the members of this London gang. Admittedly, not enough is

known about this lowest order of plotters in London, but too many of

 

31Bryan Bevan, nges Dukg‘gfi_Monmogth (London: Robert Hale
and Co., 1973), p. 155.

32Harold Armitage, flggggtt andlfixg flogge (Letchworth,
Tiertfordshire: Letchworth Printers Limited, 1948), pp. 166-67.

139

them simply appear to have been men discontented with life for one
reason or another and subsequently drawn like moths to men like
Ferguson and Wildman and their dangerously imaginative schemes.
Because of this, these London malcontents proved to be exceedingly
dangerous for the Council of Six since they were the ones who turned
informers and bargained for Royal pardons, implicating just about
everyone they could think of in their testimonies. As a result, Sidney
and Russell perished on the block.33

The actual existence of the conspiracy, which has come to
be known as the Rye House Plot, first became known officially on June
12, 1683, when Josiah Keeling, one of the London gang, signed a
statement for Sir Leoline Jenkins, the Secretary of State. His
testimony consisted mostly of secondhand, hearsay stories, embellished
by his own fertile imagination. He implicated Coodenough and Monmouth
in the city itself and Rumbold in the country. It took several days
to extract the information from Keeling. But as June progressed,
Keeling's memory became more ”convenient,“ and his testimony soon
assumed the proportions of a small tidal wave. Following Keeling,
there was literally an avalanche of testimonies from Rumsey, West, and
Sheppard in June, and of course from Lord Howard of Escrick in July.
In addition, other Crown informers began emerging from the woodwork in
June, and they added their own details to the rapidly increasing mass
of testimony that was almost entirely hearsay in nature. The individual

members of the Council of Six were implicated in all sorts of tortuous

 

33Undoubtedly, the Earl of Essex would have suffered the

same fate, but he committed suicide in the Tower of London by slashing
his throat with a razor before he could be brought to trial.

140

intrigues and were tied together by a sticky web of circumstantial and
hearsay evidence. These testimonies in June and July, 1683, make
fascinating but rather bizarre reading. The London intriguers
literally fell all over one another in their efforts to come up with
improved versions of Whig intrigues and plots. The rush to testify and
secure a pardon became a stampede, and many of the plots and intrigues
"uncovered" by the witnesses can best be described as being simply
hare-brained to the tenth degree.34

After carefully sifting through the complicated and at times
contradictory testimonies in June and July of 1683, what emerges is
sort of a grand pattern of Whig intrigue that subdivides itself into
two main alleged plots. The first of these concerned the conspiracy to
assassinate Charles II and the Duke of York at Rumbold's Rye House in
Hertfordshire. Supposedly, the Royal pair were to be attacked on a
narrow lane beside the Rye House as they were returning from the
Newmarket races in March of 1683. According to Crown informers,
everything had been prepared in advance, but a sudden fire in Newmarket
forced Charles and James to curtail their holiday and return to London
earlier than anticipated, thus ruining the conspirators' time schedule.
Josiah Keeling in his testimony claimed that the murders of Charles and
James were to be blamed upon Catholics and thus linked with the previous
Pepish Plot.35 Not to be outdone, Rumsey claimed that the assassination
attempt was planned as part of a general rising that had been master-

:ninded by the Earl of Shaftesbury for the previous autumn. In addition

 

34Cobbett, State Trials, Vol. IX, pp. 365-434.

aslbide, p. 372s

141

to Shaftesbury, Rumsey put much of the blame upon the shoulders of
West, Coodenough and Rumbold, implicating Lord William Russell in the
process.36

The second major part of the alleged Whig designs concerned
plans for some sort of an armed uprising centered upon London, that
was or was not connected with the assassination conspiracy, depending
on whose testimony is believed. It is this aspect of the overall
picture of intrigue that is the most nebulous and difficult to unravel.
It was the same people who did the informing concerning this general
plot, and many of the same intriguers were implicated in the expanding
web of pure hearsay testimony, plus some additional Whigs. Rumsey and
West were the star informers regarding this conspiracy. According to
Rumsey, London had been divided up into twenty districts for the
purposes of raising money and troops (sometimes referred to as "brisk
boys") for an insurrection. Ferguson and Monmouth were identified as
two of the major planners in this London plot. By hearsay only,
Rumsey also identified Algernon Sidney, the Earl of Essex, Lord William
Russell, and John Hampden as being the agents who were actively engaged
in negotiating for help with Scottish malcontents.37 Robert West,
whose memory improved with each day of testimony, claimed that Ferguson
had told him that if only London could be secured by insurgents, the
rest of England would "fall in“ with the plan. West also insisted that
Lord Howard of Escrick, Algernon Sidney, and young John Hampden had been

pointed out to him as being three of the managers in a joint

 

361bid., pp. 374-75.
37

Ibide, ppm 376.810

142

insurrection for England and Scotland.36 On June 26 and again on July
12, 1683, West claimed that Algernon Sidney and Major John Wildman had
been managing the negotiations with the Scots. The negotiations,
however, collapsed because both Sidney and Wildman insisted upon a
Commonwealth if the general insurrection was successful: whereas, the
Scots refused to declare for a type of government that would mean the
eradication of the Stuart family.39 The second major intrigue, then,
allegedly consisted of gt est a rising in London with the likelihood
of a general insurrection for England and Scotland in the making also.

These revelations in June and July of 1683 were a godsend
for the Crown, a blessing in disguise that would enable Charles II to
crush most of the life out of the Whig Party by rolling the heads off
a few of its leaders. Just as the Whigs had previously used the
revelations of Titus Oates and the uproar of the Popish Plot to
pressure Charles 11 over the issue of Exclusion, the King now had a
golden opportunity to "turn the tables“ on his political enemies and
pursue them relentlessly. Needless to say, the Crown did not let the
opportunity slip through its fingers. By the use of informers and
offers of pardons, the Crown adroitly managed to link the alleged
assassination conspiracy with the alleged intrigues to plan a rebellion
and tie them both together. In the public's mind, therefore, the term
"Rye House Plot” came to mean several Whig plots that were somehow all
connected together. The Crown was not really after the "little people,”
the creatures like West, Rumsey, or Goodenough; instead, it was after

as many of the Whigs in the higher echelons of the party as possible.

 

38;b;d., pp. 389-411. 391b1d., pp. 398, 546.

143

This is why Lord Howard's testimony in July was such a handy tool for
the eager Crown to use. With the offer of a Royal pardon dangling
before him, Lord Howard described the existence of the Council of Six
in such a way, that it appeared to be a sort of Whig board of directors
exercising a unified and overall control over the whole business.
Howard turned King's evidence and saved himself, but the other five
members of the Council of Six were trapped, enmeshed in a complex web
of hearsay testimonials and circumstantial evidence. Using Lord
Howard's tale plus the stories of Rumsey and West, the Crown was able
to connect the Whig Council with just about anything it wanted to.

Noninvolved contemporaries expressed a variety of opinions
concerning the Rye House Plot and related intrigues. One of those
contemporaries was John Evelyn, a staunch loyalist, who had remained
completely aloof from the political intrigues of the Restoration
period. In his thgy for June of 1683, Evelyn calmly observed that
certain lords and other people "disaffected to the present government"
had designed the King's death along with a general uprising, with
special emphasis being placed on London. He further remarked that few
people actually believed that Russell and Essex had intended anything
evil against Charles II.40 Evelyn also mentioned Algernon Sidney as
being one of those connected with the plot and one who possessed
"Commonwealth principles." Worse than that, Evelyn viewed Sidney as a
man of "tragical principles" who wanted to turn everything "topsie

4
turvy." 1 Another contemporary account worth noting is that written

 

40
E. S. de Beer, ed., The Diaty‘gfi Jghn Evelyn, Vol. IV, pp.

322‘23e

411bide , pa 3290

144
by Sir John Reresby, the Tory M.P. from Yorkshire and former protég‘ of
the Earl of Danby. Reresby's personal account of the unfolding Rye
House Plot runs as follows:
Came the report of a dangerous conspiracy against the life
of our sovereign lord the King, laid by the anti-court
party, composed of such as had been disappointed of
preferments at Court, and of Protestant dissenters. It was
also against the Duke of York and intended to have shot the
King and the Duke coming from Newmarket in his coach... by
forty men well armed, and who after the blow given was to
fly to London, and to report that the papists had done it,
where there was a body of men ready to rise to make them-
selves masters of the city and Tower and consequently of the
whole kingdom, the Prince of Orange being in Holland (the
next right heir to the Crown), ggd the Duke of Monmouth
being ready to head the rebels.
Despite Sir John's peculiar grammar, his account is fairly close to
that given by the informer Josiah Keeling. Only one final contemporary
version needs to be looked at, and that is by Sir John Bramston. In
his autobiography Sir John claimed that it was the Earl of Shaftesbury
who was the chief conspirator. Bramston believed that there were two
separate conspiracies, one to assassinate the King and one to raise
insurrection in England and Scotland, and he named Robert Ferguson as
the connecting link between the two major conspiracies, first through
Shaftesbury and then through Monmouth.43
Even before the month of June had ended, Crown authorities
decided to move swiftly against the Whigs. On June 26, 1683, both
Russell (now styled Lord Russell because of the death of his older

brother) and Algernon Sidney were arrested on charges of high treason,

 

42Browning, ed., Memoirs g£.Sir John Reresb , p. 304.

43Sir John Bramston, Autobio a h , Camden Society, Old
Series, no. 32 (London: John Bowyer Nichols and Son, 1845), pp. 181-
82.

145
Russell at his house overlooking Bloomsbury Square and Sidney at his
house in Jermyn Street as he was eating his dinner. When Sidney was
arrested, the authorities also impounded some manuscript papers they
found in his study. Both Russell and Sidney were lodged in the Tower
of London, as was the Earl of Essex who was arrested a few days later.
Two days after his arrest, Sidney was questioned closely by members of
the Privy Council concerning his alleged connection with a certain
Aaron Smith and a possible conspiracy. Sidney refused to answer any
questions until he was informed of the specific charges against him
and until he knew who his accusers were.44 A few days later, Sidney's
house, money, and personal goods were all seized. Sidney was imprisoned
in the Tower until November of 1683 without being informed of the
specific nature of the treason charges against him. For several weeks
after his arrest, he was not even allowed such simple conveniences as
a change of linen. It took the personal intervention of the Earl of
Halifax to obtain relief for Sidney from some of his personal grievances
while imprisoned.4S While in the Tower, Algernon Sidney petitioned
Charles II for legal counsel to help him prepare his defense.
Permission was finally given at the end of October for some lawyers
and a solicitor to visit him in the Tower. He was also allowed the
use of paper, pen, and ink.46 While Sidney was incarcerated in the
Tower, Lord Russell was tried and found guilty of high treason on July

13, 1683, the same day that the Earl of Essex committed suicide.

 

44:590, Vol. coxxv (1683), p. 364.

45Foxcroft, Life and tgttets‘g£,6eogge Savile, Vol. I, p. 397.

‘GCSPD, Entry Book 56 (1683), pp. 64-5.

146

In his Agotogy, Algernon Sidney denounced the Crown's
procedures against him and his imprisonment in the Tower of London on
three major points. First, Sidney maintained that a defendant's
property and goods could not be seized until gjtgg he had been
convicted. Sidney's goods, of course, had been confiscated a few days
after his arrest on June 26, and he was not tried until November 21.
Furthermore, Sidney stated that both his life and health were placed
in great danger. Finally, he objected strenuously to the fact that he
was shown no indictment nor told the names of any of the witnesses
whom the Crown would be using against him until November 7, 1683.47
In Sidney's view the entire business of his imprisonment was contrary
to the laws of England.

In his Agologx, Algernon Sidney also remarked that during
June of 1683 his name was being linked with the alleged intrigues
disclosed by Keeling and West "in every coffee-house” in London.
Furthemore, he asserted that the Crown had been attempting for some

time to connect his name with every domestic discontent and "sham plot”

 

in England.48 There is enough evidence in the Catgndar‘gfl State Eggggg
for September of 1683 to add a considerable degree of credibility to
Sidney's entire case. The Crown did indeed use Sidney's imprisonment
in the Tower as an opportunity to connect his name with a variety of
plots and evil designs. For instance, in a letter to Secretary of

State Jenkins dated September 5, 1683, a certain Dr. John Standish

 

47Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government With

His tgttgts, Tgigt, Agologx ggg ngg flmgials gt 1;; Life, p. 173.

4513351., p. 171.

147
suggested that the probable author of the so-called "libel of the
Black Box" was none other than Algernon Sidney.49 Apparently, certain
people had been busy comparing the manuscripts seized in Sidney's
study with this infamous libel, several copies of which had been found
in Mr. Sheppard's house. The actual "libel of the Black Box" was a
paper professing the existence of a black box which supposedly contained
written proof that Charles II had actually married the Duke of Monmouth's
mother, Lucy Walters. Charles II had publicly denied this. On
September 21 an entry was made in the m g: §_t_a_t9_ M stating
simply that the so-called "Paper of Association" was to be compared
with Algernon Sidney's "Discourses,” for similarities in style and
handwriting no doubt.50 This very nebulous "Paper of Association" was
allegedly a document implicating Shaftesbury, Monmouth, and several
Baptist dissenters in a plot to kidnap Charles II during the Exclusion
Crisis. Honors for its authorship first had been given to Shaftesbury,
since the document had been discovered in his closet, but after Sidney's
imprisonment, suspicion was directed his way. One of the very last
entries in the figlendsg 2!; mt; Lame for September of 1683 is simply
entitled "Things that may be proved." Authorities were digging back to
the mid-1660's to establish that Sidney and Edmund Ludlow had negotiated
with the Dutch authorities for the purpose of making a rebellion in
England. According to this item, both Sidney and Ludlow had demanded

£200,000 and forty ships from the Dutch, while claiming that they

 

50CSPD, V01. CDXXX (1683), p. 412.

148
could produce forty thousand men in England for a rebellion.51 Crown
authorities were definitely making a concerted effort to dig up enough
material on Algernon Sidney to demonstrate that his past life exhibited
a clear pattern of treasonous activities and sinister intentions. Even
though Sidney may have felt that he was being harshly treated, such
procedure by the Secretary of State was by no means unusual in a case
involving alleged treason.

At the time when Algernon Sidney and the Whigs were supposed
to have been designing most of their plots and intrigues, Gilbert
Burnet was busy writing his fligtgry.g£.tgglBefggggtton. Later as the
Bishop of Salisbury, when he wrote fiistou gj’: HEM mg, Burnet
included a personal and detailed analysis of Algernon Sidney's
character. Burnet had more than just a scholar's interest in Sidney,
since he was a defense witness at Sidney's treason trial. He had found
Sidney to be "a man of the most extraordinary courage, a steady man,
even to obstinacy, sincere, but of a rough and boisterous temper that
could not bear contradiction." As to any religious aspect to his
character, Burnet said that Sidney "seemed to be a Christian," but in
a peculiar, individualistic way all his own. Sidney was against
public worship and institutional churches in general; instead, his
approach to religion was a philosophical one. Politically, Burnet
characterized Sidney as a man who was "stiff to all republican
principles" and opposed to anything that looked like monarchy. Burnet
did acknowledge, though, that Sidney "had studied the history of

government in all of its branches beyond any man I ever knew." In a

 

510390, Vol. CDXXXIII (1683), p. 443.

149

slightly sinister comment, Burnet stated that "Sidney had a peculiar
way of insinuating himself into people that would hearken to his
notions, and not contradict him." Bishop Burnet did not elaborate on
this statement much, except to say that during late 1682 and early
1683, Algernon Sidney had exerted a very great influence over Arthur
Capel, the Earl of Essex.52

The man whom Algernon Sidney would have to face at his
treason trial was Sir George Jeffreys, who was appointed Lord Chief
Justice of the Court of the King's Bench in September of 1683. The
trial of Algernon Sidney was Jeffreys' first state trial. One modern
legal historian has characterized Judge Jeffreys with this comment:
"Though a man of ability and industry he was insatiably ambitious and
totally unprincipled.”53 Jeffreys, who can best be described as a
High Tory, was a firm believer in the notion that kings ruled by Divine
Right and that the law was properly their instrument. He was
steadfastly opposed to any belief that kings were subservient to
parliaments or in any way accountable to their people.54 In his
Qiggougseg Sidney had been careful to point out that even though the
King might be entrusted with the power to appoint judges, the authority
by which those judges acted was derived from the law, as was the King's

own power. A judge's first duty was to the law, not to the King's

 

52Burnet, History.g£ His Own Time, Vol. II, pp. 192-93.
s3Alfred F. Havinghurst, "The Judiciary and Politics in the
Reign of Charles II," Law gugttettx Revi w, LXVI (April, 1950), p. 246.

54pa Je H81”, m, pe 630

1SO

personal desires.55 By an ironic twist of fate, when Algernon Sidney
had stood for Amersham in 1679, Jeffreys had worked for the Tory
opponent.56 Thus, when Sir George Jeffreys at his first state trial
confronted Algernon Sidney, the stage was set for a very drastic
clash of completely opposite political philosOphies.

The crime of treason has been, and still is for that matter,
by its very nature a political crime. In a harsher vein, treason is a
special crime reserved for losers. In the past, people charged with
treason were usually those who had planned or taken part in some
wickedly clandestine or sinister plot to overthrow their government.
If they failed and were apprehended, they had to face prosecution for
a crime which really had no equal for sheer infamy and baseness. Of
course, the ignominous and vile connotation attached to the crime of
treason was put there by the established government, the very enforcer
of the treason law. If, on the other hand, the conspirators had
succeeded with their designs and became the new established power,
treason would be the least of their worries. But in addition to this,
the frequency of a government's use of its treason law and the severity
of its application had been in the past directly proportional to that
government's degree of established security. A stable, secure, and
mature government usually has had little fear for treason plots. But
if for some reason a government does not feel safe or secure, than it

must protect itself with harsh and widely encompassing treason laws.

 

55Sidney, Qiscougses Qoncegning Gove nment, ch. 3, sec. 26,

p. 3700

SEC. W. Keaton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart
quse (London: Macdonald and Co., 1965), p. 271.

151
For instance, if a society is undergoing a complex series of changes,
or if the government itself is faced with a serious political crisis,
all at a time when the state itself is neither secure nor mature, than
the law of treason must be resorted to in order to ensure that
government's protection and survival.

This interpretation can be applied quite readily to the
early 1680's in England. The constitutional system had been experiencing
changes and adjustments throughout the seventeenth century. Not only
that, but the nation by 1683 was just emerging from a severe political
crisis that included a direct challenge to the very foundation of the
monarchy itself. To make sure that the monarchy would remain on a
relatively safe and secure footing after 1681, Charles II needed to
exact his revenge upon the Whigs and certain members of their front
ranks. Many of the aspects of this "Stuart Revenge" have already been
explored.57 As a corollary to his attack upon the city of London and
the other Whig strongholds in the provinces, Charles II also used the
judiciary itself as a political weapon against the Whigs. Because
security of tenure for judges was not established until after 1688,
Charles II was able to replace judges who might return unfavorable
opinions with judges like Jeffreys who could be relied upon zealously
to uphold a strong monarchy. One historian of the period has pointed
out that unless judges during that time were prepared to further Royal
policy, they simply could not expect promotion to the highest judicial

58
offices. The judiciary was brought under strict Royal control during

 

7
5 Su ra, pp. 121-126.

58
Keaton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause, p. 95.

 

152

Charles II's reign and became an integral part of his administration.
Thus, the English judiciary became inevitably involved with the political
and constitutional struggle during the Exclusion Crisis and its
aftermath. This was particularly true regarding state trials involving
treason. Thus, justice in a very real sense "became political action
disguised by judicial forms."59 Not only was compliance expected by
the Crown from its judges, but the law of treason itself was used to
pursue and eradicate political enemies. Therefore, when Algernon
Sidney faced Chief Justice Jeffreys at his trial, he was being
confronted not only by a strict High Tory, but also by an entire
judicial system that was harsh and authoritarian by nature and also
politically slanted against the Whigs by 1683.

If these factors were not enough to intimidate a Whig like
Algernon Sidney being tried for treason in 1683, the very nature of a
treason trial in England and the procedures used in its conduct all
operated against the defendant. To begin with, the guilt of the
defendant was simply assumed: the burden of proof was on him to clear
himself of treason charges. The defendant was not entitled to an
itemized list of the specific charges against him: no copy of the
actual indictment was given to him. Moreover, the defendant in a
treason trial was not entitled to legal counsel which could speak for
him. Instead, he had to petition the Crown to be allowed counsel which
could merely help him prepare his defense. As a case in point, Sidney's
petition for counsel was not approved until the and of October of 1683,

and he was formally arraigned on November 7 of that year. Thus, from

 

sglbide, D. 94s

153
our point of view today, a defendant frequently did not have adequate
time to prepare his defense. In addition, although prosecution
witnesses testified under oath at a treason trial, witnesses for the
defense were not allowed the same procedure. Thus, the prosecution's
argument naturally carried more weight before a jury. Furthermore,
testimony of a purely circumstantial or hearsay nature was quite
admissible at a treason trial.

There was yet another factor which worked against the
defendant in cases of treason. The basic treason act, which was passed
in the year 1352 in the reign of King Edward III (25 Edward III), was
quite vague in places. Consequently, it had been the practice,
especially in the seventeenth century, for judges to extend the scope
of the clauses of the statute by making judicial constructions or
interpretations as to the specific meaning or intention of those
clauses. This was by no means a judicial attempt to declare new types
of treason, but rather it was a necessary process by which certain
ambiguous words and phrases in 25 Edward III were clarified. The overall
effect of these interpretations by judges was to make the original law
of treason much more encompassing in nature. Thus, the interpretations
and rulings by Judge Jeffreys at Sidney's trial concerning the nature
of treason were simply the latest steps in a long process that had
greatly expanded the scope of treason as defined in 25 Edward III.

On November 7, 1683, Algernon Sidney was brought to the bar
of the court of King's Bench in Westminster and formally charged with
having committed the crime of high treason against his sovereign lord
and King, Charles II. Sidney was addressed as a false traitor "not

having the fear of God in his heart, nor weighing the duty of his

154
allegiance, but moved and seduced by the instigation of the Devil."
Sidney's alleged treason was so defined in his indictment as to fall
into two main categories. First, the indictment alleged that on
several recent occasions Algernon Sidney, along with others, did
"conspire, compass, imagine, and intend" to deprive Charles II not only
of his life, but also of his title and power as well. Second, it was
charged that Sidney also conspired to stir up an insurrection and
rebellion against the King. The indictment also specified two overt
actions on Sidney's part that allegedly proved his treasonous and
false intent. It was alleged that Sidney dispatched a man named Aaron
Smith to Scotland to incite other people to join certain conspiracies
being designed in England. The indictment further asserted that Sidney
wrote a ”false, seditious, and traitorous" libel to persuade people
that it was lawful to foment insurrection and rebellion against the
King. Referring to Sidney's manuscript of his thggggggg, the
indictment further specified certain sentences, mainly lifted out of
context from chapter two, which clearly proved the vicious nature of
the ideas contained within the libel. The quoted excerpts emphasized
the authority of Parliament and the idea that the law in England set
limits to the King's authority. Also included in the list of excerpts
from the Qisgougses was Sidney's statement to the effect that the King
had to conduct himself properly or risk being removed from office.
This last excerpt was the one which placed Algernon Sidney in the worse
possible position, since from the prosecution's point of view it was
clearly indicative of Sidney's evil and treasonous nature. In a verbal
*wrangle over procedural matters, Sidney insisted on being allowed first

to take exception to some of the allegations in the indictment and then

155

to enter his plea. Jeffreys refused and Sidney eventually had to plead
"not guilty." The defendant, however, was granted two weeks in which to
plan his defense.60

The trial of Algernon Sidney began at 10:00 A.M. on the
morning of November 21, 1683. He was informed that he was being tried
under the Statute of Treasons passed in 1352 (25 Edward III) which
defined several categories of treason, only two of which were used to
catch Sidney: compassing or imagining the King's death and levying
war against the King gitgtg his realm. The prosecution (Sir Robert
Sawyer and Mr. Heneage Finch) contended that Sidney's treason clearly
fell within the sc0pe of 25 Edward III because he was guilty of
imagining the King's death and of conspiring to levy war against
Charles II. The act of conspiring to levy war is not specifically
included in the actual wording of 25 Edward III, and Algernon Sidney
was quick to make a major issue of that fact, claiming that what was
not specifically included within that particular treason statute could
not be applied to him. A treason statute enacted in 1661 (13 Charles
II) did make it treason to conspire to levy war against the King, but
there was a six months statute of limitations on it. At any rate,
Algernon Sidney was not being tried under that act. Sidney insisted
that levying war and conspiring to levy war were not the same thing.

Sidney's objection that the act of conspiring to levy war

was not within the scope of 25 Edward 111 was countered by an official

 

601113 Arrai nment, Trial 5 Condemnation g: Algernon Sidne ,

flag. fog High Treason (London: printed for Benjamin Tooke at the Ship
.in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1684), pp. 1-3. The same material may also
(as found in Cobbett's State T ials, Vol. IX. PP. 817-836.

156

interpretation of the treason law by Chief Justice Jeffreys. It was
ruled that any overt act committed under one section of 25 Edward III
might be used to prove a man guilty of treason under one of the other
sections of the same statute. In addition, any act which showed a
person's intention to compass or imagine the King's death was sufficient
to prove high treason. For a person merely to imagine in his mind the
King's death without declaring himself by action did not constitute
treason. But if that person declared himself openly by some action,
that action could be used to prove that he was imagining the King's
death. Therefore, Judge Jeffreys was telling Sidney that plotting and
conspiring to levy war, without actual war being levied, did constitute
an overt act proving treason and did fall within the scope of 25
Edward 111.61

In pursuing the Crown's case against Algernon Sidney, the
prosecution utilized the testimony of the Crown's star informers along
with the actual manuscripts which had been seized in Sidney's study.
Robert West and John Rumsey testified as to the general existence of a
Whig plot to raise a rebellion, and they linked the members of the
Council of Six to the alleged secret meetings and plottings held at
Thomas Sheppard's establishment in London. West and Rumsey, however,
did all of this by hearsay testimony only, and Jeffreys admitted that
it was hearsay. Nevertheless, such testimony was introduced under
oath before the jury and allowed to stand. The stellar performance
was given by Lord Howard of Escrick, who was the Crown's only real

witness to show actual conspiracy on Sidney's part. With a straight

 

61111.2; 2:. spam Sidne . pp. 47-52.

157

face, Howard affirmed that Algernon Sidney was one of the prime movers
in the organization of the Council of Six and also in the plot to raise
a rebellion. It was also alleged by Howard that Sidney had tried to
coordinate the planned rebellion in England with a similar uprising in
Scotland. According to Lord Howard, the rebellion was designed by the
Whigs because of Charles II's misgovernment, especially his actions
taken against London after the Whig attempt at excluding the Duke of
York. The prosecution also contended that while attempts were being
made to foment an uprising in Scotland, Sidney had written his seditious
libel. Sidney's Discourses clearly demonstrated that his heart and mind
were entirely engaged in rebellion because the whole purpose of the work
was to convince the people of England that they had the right to set
aside their King. The entire book, according to the prosecution, was
an argument for the people to rise up in arms.62 Therefore, from the
Crown's point of view, the treason case against Algernon Sidney was
quite clear. Lord Howard was one witness to prove conspiracy on
Sidney's part to raise a rebellion, and Sidney's manuscript papers
clearly proved him guilty of imagining the King's death.

Sidney's defense was aimed at exposing the weak points in
the prosecution's case and was conducted in a surprisingly calm manner,
considering his reputation for having a violent temper. Since tag
witnesses were needed to convict in a treason case, Sidney emphasized
that the prosecution had produced only‘ggg witness for the charge of

levying war, and that was Lord Howard of Escrick. Sidney then proceeded

 

62gb1de , ppe 12-270

158
to undermine completely Lord Howard's credibility as a witness. He
pointed out that Lord Howard had obviously been granted a Royal pardon
in advance and that Howard was trying to secure his own indemnity by
destroying others. Sidney even produced Witnesses, Gilbert Burnet
among them, who all testified that Lord Howard was lying. Next, Sidney
turned his attention to the manuscript papers which had been introduced
as evidence by the prosecution. While never admitting that the papers
were his, Algernon Sidney maintained that the arguments in them were
obviously made upon general principles and did not apply to any
government in particular. The manuscript papers in question represented
merely one man's thoughts, political speculations on paper as it were,
and a person should be able to write what he wanted to in private, as
long as the material was not published. Besides, Sidney argued that
the King had two different capacities to his existence, his natural,
physical capacity as a person and his political capacity as a monarch.
The statute of 25 Edward III covered only attempts to deprive the King
of his physical capacity for life: it did not cover any attempts to
deprive the King only of his political capacity to rule. Sidney denied
that the papers found in his study imagined the death of the King, and
he contended that to argue from those manuscript papers was pure
conjecture by the prosecution. Moreover, mars written words did not
constitute an overt act of treason. Finally, Sidney claimed that the
power to determine "constructive treasons,” as he mistakenly labeled
Judge Jeffreys' interpretations, belonged only to Parliament, not to

63
any court.

 

63Ibid., pp. 27-45.

159

Algernon Sidney conducted a good, spirited defense on his
own behalf. But Chief Justice Jeffreys issued a series of opinions and
rulings of his own on the nature of treason and courtroom procedures
that undermined Sidney's arguments and pushed him into a legal corner
from which there was no escape. Concerning the matter of witnesses at
a treason trial, Jeffreys ruled that the two witnesses did not have to
testify to the same act of treason. Instead, their testimony need only
show "a tendency to the same treason." Neither was Jeffreys convinced
by Sidney's hair-splitting over the two separate capacities of the
King. The Lord Chief Justice ruled that merely plotting to imprison
the King was high treason. In fact, if any person tried to force or
compel the King to do anything which he might not otherwise do, that
was high treason within the scope of 25 Edward III. Conspiring to
levy war was clearly within the scope of the same statute. Furthermore,
words need not be published in order to be considered treasonous. Mere
written words on paper constituted an overt act proving high treason,
or as Jeffreys succinctly phrased it, sggibere.ggtuggggg (to write is
to act). Clearly, the most arbitrary and questionable decision on
Jeffreys' part was in allowing Sidney's manuscript of his Qisgourses to
stand in court in place of an actual witness.64 When Jeffreys had
finished his legal interpreting, Algernon Sidney was doomed. The
prosecution had its two witnesses, Lord Howard, a known informer, and
some manuscript papers which had been read out of context. Jeffreys
lead succeeded in interpreting high treason in such broad terms that the

:act of conspiring to levy war could be construed as placing the King in

 

641bide’ ppe 47-560

160
physical danger. Therefore, both Lord Howard and Sidney's Qiscoutses
could stand as witnesses attesting that Algernon Sidney did "conspire,
compass, imagine and intend" the death of Charles II.

After studying the transcript of Sidney's trial, it is very
difficult not to come to the conclusion that Chief Justice Jeffreys was
more zealous at times for a conviction than was the prosecution. His
constant interpretations of the defendant's answers prevented Sidney
from turning his trial into a platform from which he could attack
England's judicial system or promulgate his own political philosophy.
The interpretations and rulings by Jeffreys definitely proved
advantageous for the prosecution, to say the least. The trial produced
some interesting exchanges between Jeffreys and Sidney that demonstrated
the unbridgeable gulf separating the High Tory from the Whig classical
republican. They also demonstrated what Sidney was up against when he
tried to debate Jeffreys. For instance, when Algernon Sidney explained
that it was a ”right of mankind" to put one's private thoughts down on
paper, Jeffreys exclaimed indignantly:

Pray don'd go away with that right of mankind, that it is

lawful for me to write what I will in my own closet, unless I

publish it: I have been told, curse not the King, not in thy

thoughts, not in thy bedchsmber, the birds of the air will
carryegt. I took it to be the duty of mankind to observe
that.
When Sidney was actually sentenced, another verbal exchange occurred
between the defendant and the Lord Chief Justice. Sidney insisted that

there was nothing in the manuscript papers found in his study that was

treasonous. To this, Jeffreys replied, "There is not a line in the

 

651bid., p. 35.

161
book, scarce, but what is treason." One of the other justices replied
that the problem was that Sidney simply did not believe it to be
treason. Jeffreys refused to let the matter rest and belabored the
point relentlessly:

That is the worst part of your case: when men are riveted

in opinion that Kings may be deposed, that they are

accountable to their people, that a general insurrection
is no rebellion, and justify 166 'tis high time, upon my
word, to call them to account.
The opinion of the Lord Chief Justice was quite clear: Algernon
Sidney's book not only encouraged but justified all rebellion.

Chief Justice Jeffreys wanted to be sure that the jury
understood the dangerous and revolutionary ideas held by Algernon
Sidney and expressed in his manuscript papers. At the very and of
the trial, Jeffreys want out of his way to impress upon the jury that
Sidney's manuscript expressed principles which were strongly
reminiscent of the previous ”unhappy rebellion" in the reign of
Charles I. In an obviously flagrant attempt to prejudice the jury
against Sidney, Jeffreys skillfully drew a parallel between Sidney's
political principles and the beliefs which had been used to bring

Charles I ("the late blessed King") to the block.67

The implications
of Jeffreys' maneuver were clear enough for even the dullest jury
member to grasp and meditate upon. During this particular period in
England, the word "revolution" in a political sense usually meant a

complete cycle of political movement or development. But it was also

beginning to mean a drastic change or disruption in government.68

 

Gauge, [3. 63a 67Ib1de, p. 60s

68V. F. Snow, ”The Concept of Revolution in Seventeenth

Century England,"‘fitgtggtggt_gougna , v (no. 2, 1962), pp. 167-74.

162
Thus, when Jeffreys drew a parallel between Sidney's political beliefs
and those which had been responsible for Charles I's execution, he was
implying that Sidney was indeed a "revolutionary" because he desired a
return to the unhappy times of the 1640's (i.e., that a full cycle or
"revolution" would take place). But Jeffreys was also implying that
Algernon Sidney was a revolutionary because in his manuscript he
advocated the belief that monarchs could be replaced if they did not
rule properly. Algernon Sidney was dangerous no matter how you defined
the word "revolutionary," and Jeffreys went out of his way to prejudice
the jury in that respect.

The trial of Algernon Sidney for high treason would
naturally impress a modern reader as having been incredibly unfair and
a gross miscarriage of justice. But it should be remembered that this
was indeed a treason trial held during a time following a great
political upheaval and also at a time when the British state was
definitely insecure. The court procedures used against Sidney at his
trial were not really unusual when one considers both the nature of
the crime itself and the period in which the trial took place. The
Crown obviously must have considered Algernon Sidney to have been a
dangerous fellow, because it certainly pursued him with relentless
zeal and energy. Charles II undoubtedly regretted letting Sidney
return to England from exile in 1677. Charles II's relentless pursuit
of'the Whig leaders was merely part of his concerted effort to
tdiscredit their names and destroy their party. Algernon Sidney was
simply one of those Whig leaders.

The question remains, then, of what was Sidney actually

gLLilty? That he detested the Stuarts there can be no doubt whatsoever.

163

A careful reading of Sidney's thggggggg reveals that he was serious
when he advocated armed rebellion to overthrow a tyrannical monarch,
but only as a last resort after all legal methods had been used to
redress grievances. This was probably Sidney's greatest mistake: he
incriminated himself on paper by advocating a philosophy which he must
have known would be anathema to Charles II. If he did not realize
that, then he was one of the most incredibly naive men who ever lived.
His second greatest mistake was in associating himself with men like
Major John Wildman and Lord Howard of Escrick. Algernon Sidney can
certainly be reproached for having been politically naive, foolish and
reckless. Moreover, like William, Lord Russell, Algernon Sidney may
very well have been guilty of misprison of treason, that is, of having
secondhand knowledge of a treason plot and not reporting it to the
authorities. As to whether Sidney was involved in actual treason,
especially to the extent that Lord Howard claimed he was, this must
remain a matter for conjecture. Lord Howard and some of the other
informers were as accomplished in the art of lying as Titus Oates had
been. One fact does emerge from the tangled mass of hearsay testimonies,
the hints and rumors of grandiose Whig designs, and the judicial
interpretations of treason. The Crown‘ggltgggg,Algernon Sidney to be
a dangerous political opponent and used the law of treason as a
political weapon to get him.

On November 26, 1683, Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys sentenced
Algernon Sidney to the traitor's death of hanging, drawing, and
quertering. Charles II commuted that sentence to simple beheading.
While awaiting his death, Sidney wrote his Agotogy, which he termed

his "testimony unto the world." This Agglggy is actually a rehashing

164
of Sidney's treason trial, complete with specific reasons as to why he
thought the trial was unfair, plus a final indictment of England's
judicial system under Charles II.69 Specifically, Sidney complained
that the indictment against him was too long and involved: several
crimes, each one distinct in nature, were all deliberately entangled
together to confuse the issues. He denied that the Council of Six was
a select body organized for the purpose of conspiracy, and Sidney
further maintained that he never endeavored to take the life of
Charles II. He objected strenuously to the prosecution's use of the
manuscript papers found in his study. In fact, Sidney denounced the
entire trial procedure as a gigantic fraud perpetrated upon him.
Special vituperation was reserved for Chief Justice Jeffreys who was
accused of misrepresenting the evidence at the trial and of making
absurd constructions of treason that no judge had ever made before.
Sidney blamed the guilty verdict upon Jeffreys because, ”He did
probably fear he should not be taken for Caesar's friend, if he did
let this man go."70 Jeffreys had deliberately made the law a "snare"
with which to entrap Sidney. Indeed, the jury itself was "an ignorant,
sordid and packed jury" and was not composed entirely of forty shilling
freeholders as the law specified for a treason trial held in the shire
of Middlesex. Concluding his Agglggy, Sidney claimed that the tyranny
of Charles I had been bad enough because of his drive for arbitrary

power. But now, under Charles II "the tyranny over consciences is

 

69Sidney, thggggggg ggngggning Qovgrnmgnt with Hig Letters,
Lem. WMMWQLMM. pp-170-98-

701b1Qe , pa 190s

 

 

165

principally affected, and the civil powers are stretched into this
exorbitant height, for the establishment of popery."71 England was in
very serious trouble, especially since some Englishmen had lost "the
integrity of their principles.” Sidney knew he was going to be
executed and so had nothing really to lose by speaking out frankly.

Algernon Sidney was executed on the morning of December 7,
1683. Three days before the execution, James, Duke of York, had
written to William of Orange and had made reference to Sidney's
impending fate:

As for the news here, Algernon Sidney is to be beheaded on

Friday next on the Tower-hill, which besides the doing

justice on so ill a man, will give the lie to the Whigs who

reported he was not to suffer.
On the day of the actual execution, James wrote to Prince William:
”Algernon Sidney was beheaded this day, died very resolutely and like
a true republican."73 Among Sidney's last words to the sheriffs of
London were, ”I have made my peace with God and have nothing to say to
men, but here is a paper of what I have to say."74 Much to the chagrin
of Charles II and James Duke of York, Sidney's brief paper somehow
was published very shortly after his death and was circulating around
London in no time. Sidney's death was mercifully quick, the head

coming off at a single blow of the executioner's axe. The executioner,

incidentally, had insisted upon a rather stiff gratuity from Sidney of

 

7'1b1g., p. 197.

72Dalrymple, Mgggtgg, Vol. II, Appendix, Part I, p. 54.

731gide, ppm 54'55e

166
75
nearly five guineas in advance, no doubt to ensure a quick death.
In his flgggtgg, Sir John Verney remarked upon Sidney's almost complete
indifference while awaiting death, noting, ”He met death with an
unconcernedness that became one, who had set up Marcus Brutus for his
pattern."76 Algernon Sidney was buried quietly at Penshurst.

Thus died Algernon Sidney the staunch classical republican
and bitter opponent of Charles 1, Oliver Cromwell, and Charles II. The
Whig party was temporarily crushed, and some of its top leaders had
been eliminated. It would only remain for James II to push the
limits of the Royal prerogative power even further than Charles II had,
and to lose his throne in the process. After Sidney's execution, an
anonymous ”Elegy on A. Sidney" was written:

But where's his wandering spirit gone,
Since here he suff'red martyrdom?

To heaven? Oh! It cannot be,

For heaven is a monarchy.

Where than I pray? To Purgatory?
That's an idle Romish story.

Such saint as he can't go to hell?

Where is he gone, I pri' thee 11,
The learned say to Achitophel.

 

75Ewaldp mg 9-: S$dnaxp V01. 11, ppe 316-18e

76Margaret Mary Verney, ed., flgmoigs‘gfi the Vegney Family

£2.95 thg Begtoggtion tg t_h_e_ Revolution, 1660-1696 (4 vols.: London:
Longman, Green and Co., 1899), Vol. IV, p. 272.

77Fink, Ifl§_filg§§t§gt Rgggbligans, p. 149.

PART TWO: HENRY SIDNEY

C H A P T E R V I

DIPLOMACY AND THE EXCLUSION CRISIS

Much in contrast to Algernon Sidney stood his youngest
brother Henry, who was Algernon's junior by nineteen years. Whereas
Algernon was proud, short-tempered, and difficult to get along with,
Henry Sidney was easygoing, polite, charming, and unassuming. Whereas
Algernon could go out of his way at times to irritate and upset his
contemporaries, his brother Henry was the ideal picture of a charming
courtier who got along well with nearly everyone. Henry Sidney
possessed those personal qualities and social graces which allowed a
person of this type to move easily and freely within the ranks of
those families which really counted in seventeenth-century England.
Known to different people as "Handsome Henry" or ”le beau Sidney,"
Henry Sidney reveled in the social life of Restoration London, a
lifestyle that repelled his brother Algernon. Henry Sidney possessed
quite a peputation as a ladies' man among his contemporaries, and he
supposedly developed a distinct weakness for the bottle before he was

‘forty.1 In fact, Henry Sidney's image has suffered continuously at

 

1Nesca Robb, William‘gt Ogange: A.Pg;sonal Pottrait (2
vols.: London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1966), Vol. II, p. 138.

167

168
the hands of historians ever since Jonathan Swift first viciously
characterized him as ”an idle, drunken, ignorant rake, without sense,
truth, or honor."2 There does seem to be some truth in this
characterization, however, because in the early 1680's Henry Sidney
abandoned his mistress of twenty years, Mrs. Grace Worthley, and their
child. Sidney even refused to listen to her pleas for financial
support, hiring bodyguards instead to protect himself against her
threats.3 On the whole, though, Swift's opinion of Henry Sidney
should be viewed as an obvious attempt at character assassination.
Compared with his brother Henry, Algernon led a distinctly austere
lifestyle.

These two brothers, moreover, differed from each other in
other respects besides their personal qualities. Algernon was staunchly
opposed to tyranny of any kind, and he measured governments and
political institutions by a very rigid standard. His principles were
clear and distinct, and he defended them consistently throughout his
life. In contrast to this approach, Henry Sidney was mainly concerned
with his own survival and in pleasing the right people. He was not
driven by the same type of ambition for power that drove his nephew
Robert Spencer, the second Earl of Sunderland, or that drove the Hyde
brothers or even John Churchill. Henry Sidney had a streak of laziness
in him, but he did possess enough good sense and native intelligence to
utilize his personal gifts for his own advantage. Henry Sidney was a

Whig only in the sense that he consistently favored the Duke of York's

 

2Henry Sidney, Qtagy, Vol. I, Introduction, p. xxxvi.

3
lgtg., pp. xxvi-xxxv.

169

exclusion. From 1679 until the end of his life, he was entirely
devoted to William of Orange. But this was a personal attraction
between the two men themselves, and it did not really involve a rigid
adherence to any political or constitutional principles on Sidney's
part. In short, Henry Sidney was an expert in the art of political
survival in the decidedly vicious and unstable political atmosphere of
late seventeenth-century England. Algernon Sidney could never climb
off his pedestal and adjust himself to the seamy world about him. By
contrast, Henry Sidney never bothered to construct a pedestal for
himself, and yet he survived the political turmoil in admirable fashion.
This is as much a commentary upon the times themselves as it is upon
the differences between these two Sidney brothers.

Henry Sidney was the youngest son of Robert Sidney, second
Earl of Leicester, and Lady Dorothy. He was also the second son to
bear the name Henry, the first son of that name having been born in
1621 and surviving only a year.4 Henry Sidney was born in Paris in
the spring of 1641, toward the and of his father's term as English
ambassador to France. Henry returned to England in October of that
year after the second Earl had been appointed lord lieutenant of
Ireland. Henry's boyhood was spent at Penshurst and at Althorp, the
Spencer family estate. Henry Sidney was only a few months older than
his nephew Robert Spencer, who was born in Paris on September 5, 1641.
The two of them were raised together and developed an intimate

friendship and relationship which would prove extremely useful to both

 

4Letter from the county archivist, Kent Archives Office,
Maidstone, Kent, England, July 9, 1974.

170
of them later on in their lives. From his youth, Henry Sidney was
favored by both of his parents, especially by his mother who, on her
deathbed, beseeched her husband to take special care of ”our dear boy."
The Countess left her favorite son two hundred pounds per year for
twenty-one years and also a considerable quantity of personal
possessions such as her French plate, porcelain, books, and furniture.5
On April 5, 1675, by means of a codicil to his will, the second Earl
of Leicester left his son Henry the manor and estate of Long-
Itchington in Warwickshire, plus twenty-five thousand pounds.6 This
youngest son of the Sidneyswas well provided for by his parents.

The early years of Henry Sidney's adulthood can best be
described as having been leisurely for the young man. In 1658 Sidney
briefly accompanied his nephew and Spencer's Oxford tutor, Dr. Thomas
Pierce, abroad to Europe. In July of 1663, Spencer began a three-year
trip abroad with his uncle Henry Sidney and also with his brother-in-
law, Henry Savile. At various stages of this ”grand tour," the trio
was joined by William Penn, Sidney Godolphin, Henry Compton, and
George Savile.7 In fact, until Robert Spencer married in 1665, the
years immediately following the Stuart Restoration were a period of
fun and good times for Sunderland, Henry Sidney, and the Savile
brothers. Henry's brother Algernon at that time was brooding in exile

and scheming with English exiles in the Netherlands. After the Earl

 

r5Collins, mmm Mgmogiats, Vol. 1. PP. 161-2.
lienry Sidney, thgy, Vol. I, Introduction, pp. xiv-xv.

6Collins, Stgney Lgttgrs and figmotialg, Vol. I, pp. 161-2.

7J. P. Kenyon, Robert 8 en er,‘§g;t‘gfi Sundgrland 1641-1702
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), pp. 5-8.

171
of Sunderland married, Henry Sidney lived the life of a fashionable
”beau" in Restoration London, but he remained linked to the Sunderlands
by strong ties of friendship and affection.8
Besides putting his social graces to good use during this
time period, Henry Sidney also managed to obtain a few positions at
court during the 1660's and 1670's. In 1665 Sidney secured an
appointment as Groom of the Bedchamber in the Duke of York's household.
He was also appointed as Master of the Horse to the Duchess of York.
Trouble developed, however, and Sidney was dismissed from his
positions when he carried his infatuation for the Duchess too far for
James to ignore. Henry Sidney's relationship with the Duchess of York
became a Court scandal, but as Sir John Reresby noted in his memoirs:
She was a very handsome woman, had a great deal of wit:
therefore it was not without reason that Mr. Sidney, the
handsomest youth of his time, then of the Duke's bedchsmber,
was so much in love with her, as appeared to us all, and the
Duchess not unkind to him, but very innocently. He was
afterward banished the Court for another reason, as was
reported.
Ten years passed before Henry Sidney received another position at
Court. He remained at Court with his nephew, Lord Sunderland, Sir
George Savile, and Sidney Godolphin rather then follow the Earl of

Shaftesbury into opposition against Danby.10

In 1675 Sidney was
appointed to the office of Gentlemen and Master of the Robes for

Charles II, a very lucrative post worth five hundred pounds per year.

 

8J. P. Kenyon, "The Earl of Sunderland and the Revolution

of 1688," Qgggttggg Histogigal Joutnat, II (no. 3, 1955), pp. 272-96.
98rown199. edu Memoirs 2!: 5.1.: .in—'19 89.19.21. 9- 55.
1oKenyon, fiobgtt S n ,'§ggtng£ Sundgrland, p. 29.

172
In 1678 Henry Sidney was made colonel of a regiment of foot. Up to
the early months of 1679, when the Exclusion Crisis began to develop
in Parliament, Henry Sidney had not displayed any real talent for
political intrigue or diplomatic work. At the age of thirty-eight,
Sidney had spent most of his adult life either traveling around Europe
or else lounging about the city of London enjoying the good life. His
reputation at this time was largely a negative one. Despite this, on
June 1, 1679, Charles II informed Henry Sidney that he would be sent
as Special Envoy to the United Provinces at The Hague, replacing Sir
William Temple. According to Sidney's‘thgy, Charles II had not
intended to send him to this important post, but William of Orange,
Stadholder of the United Provinces, had asked specifically for Henry

11 Prince William, a cold man but a very keen diplomat and

Sidney.
judge of men, had met Henry Sidney during one of his visits to England
and had been impressed with the young socialite.12 Charles II may
have had his reservations over Prince William's apparently unlikely
choice of Mr. Sidney as Special Envoy, but the appointment gave Henry
Sidney the opportunity to display the distinct talent he did have for
political intrigue and diplomacy. As one historian has analyzed the
situation, it would eventually become apparent that Henry Sidney's
rather dubious external habits merely veiled his considerable

political ability and diplomatic tact.13

 

.11Henry Sidney, Diggy, Vol. I, p. 1.

12Henri and Barbara Van Der Zee, thttgm and Mary (New York:
Alfred As Knopf, 1973), pa 152s

13Foxcroft, Life 21; Sir. figgggg Sevilg, Vol. I, p. 164.

173

It soon became apparent that Henry Sidney's diplomatic
mission to the United Provinces would concern two important matters,
and both matters were related to the unfolding Exclusion Crisis in
England. In his official capacity as Charles II's Special Envoy to
the United Provinces, Sidney was charged with the task of negotiating
a stronger and more permanent alliance with the Dutch States General.
An alliance had been negotiated the year before with the Dutch when
Sir William Temple had been the English envoy, but the alliance had
fallen short of what the English had desired. The Dutch were leaning
toward a general alliance, or league, that would include Spain, the
Empire, and any other European power that distrusted the French.
Charles II, by contrast, insisted upon a new, single treaty between
just England and the United Provinces that would "guarantee" the peace
between France and Spain. A new treaty had to be negotiated first:
then, other European powers could be brought into the arrangement after
the basic foundation had been constructed. Charles II was extremely
cool towards the idea of making Spain a partner in any general anti-
French league, because of the contempt he had for the weak Spanish
monarchy.14 To secure a new treaty with the Dutch, Henry Sidney found
himself working closely with his nephew, the second Earl of Sunderland,
who was the Secretary of State for the North at the time, and also
with Sir William Temple, who was then on the Privy Council.

In order to fulfill his official capacity as Special Envoy,
Henry Sidney discovered that he would have to overcome a number of

complex and interrelated problems. For one thing, he would have to

 

14Henry Sidney, Qiary, Vol. I, pp. 37-3, 110-14.

174

prove to a number of people that he was worthy of the appointment. One
of those people was his own brother Algernon, who was reported to have
viewed the project as a joke, rather than as something serious.15 Henry
was untested and untried in diplomatic work, and he would have to
establish himself with the Dutch States General and also with leading
Dutch citizens. He could rely upon advice from Temple and Sunderland,
and he could also be assured that he had at least one potential friend
at The Hague in the person of William of Orange. But even with these
advantages bolstering his position, Henry Sidney would have to seize
every opportunity and apply himself to the task of negotiating with the
Dutch.

The main problem for Henry Sidney as Special Envoy to the
States General would be the Dutch themselves and their own assessment
of English affairs and of Charles II and his intentions. There was an
active "peace" faction centered at Amsterdam, and this faction, which
was composed of wealthy Dutch merchants, was very susceptible to French
pressure and threats exerted by Louis XIV's ambassador at The Hague,
Jean-Antoine de Mesmes, Count d'Avaux. This peace faction usually
favored a "soft-line" approach to relations with France, fearing for
Dutch trade and commerce if it did otherwise. Opposed to this peace
faction was the "Orange" faction that followed Prince William, who
took a decidedly hard-line approach to France, viewing that nation as
a threat to European peace and security. Henry Sidney, who was anti-

French himself, had to deal with both factions.

 

15Dalrymple, Mgmotgs, Vol. II, First Appendix, pp. 261-2.
(Paul Barillon to Louis XIV, December 14, 1679)

175

But, in addition to their constant preoccupation with French
intentions, the Dutch were also concerned over events in England. As
Sunderland pointed out to his uncle in a letter at this time, the Dutch
were very concerned over the unsettled state of affairs in English
politics, and this concern was definitely related to the Dutch reaction
to French diplomatic pressure.16 To the Dutch, the English Exclusion
Crisis decidedly weakened England's position at the negotiating table.
On the one hand, England was asking for a strong treaty of ”guarantee”
with the Dutch, a treaty that would very likely involve the commitment
of English troops and English money on the Continent. This would
involve approval by Parliament. On the other hand, Parliament,
especially the Commons, demonstrated that it was not about to agree to
anything until the matter of exclusion had been dealt with. Charles II
was just as determined to preserve the principle of hereditary
succession. With English politics in a turmoil, the Dutch were
understandably hesitant about trusting England's ability to fulfill her
obligations in any defensive treaty. As it eventually turned out, the
Dutch were anxious for Charles II to come to some sort of agreement
with his Parliament, even if it meant the Duke of York's exclusion. If
Charles II desired to cut an imposing figure in European affairs, he
would have to put his domestic affairs in order first. This would give
strength to England's position at the negotiating table. Added to the
Dutch concern over England's domestic political weakness, was the
nagging distrust they had regarding Charles II's actual sincerity in

wanting a treaty in the first place. The Dutch were fearful that

 

16Henry Sidney, thgy, Vol. I, p. 111.

176
perhaps the English King's overtures to them were merely a diversion
to mask his real intentions, a separate Anglo-French treaty that would
leave the Dutch isolated. After all, the Dutch themselves had done
nearly the same thing the previous year at Nijmegen. Henry Sidney had
his work cut out for him in his official capacity of negotiating with

the Dutch.

By the early summer of 1679, it was clear that the Exclusion
Crisis in England would not be of short duration and that it was having
an effect upon Anglo-Dutch diplomacy. Even before Henry Sidney had
left England to assume his post as Special Envoy, it was made clear to
him by certain pro-William supporters at Court that he was to have a
second and “unofficial" capacity as a diplomat. As it turned out,
Henry Sidney would be as much the official envoy of Charles II to the
Dutch States General as he would be the personal envoy and contact man
of Temple, Sunderland, Halifax, Godolphin, and a few others to William
of Orange himself. Algernon Sidney, who was living in London at that
time, wrote to Henry Savile in Paris in July and tried to assess his
young brother's diplomatic appointment:

I have long since found that the design of sending H. Sidney

into Holland was like the rest of Sir William Temple's

projects, a matter of great depth, and kggt so close, that

not one of them would speak to me of it.
The group referred to by Algernon as "them" was in reality this close
and clannish group of court politicians and office holders that had

rersed to join Shaftesbury in opposition, though they themselves

(with the exception of Halifax) favored the Duke of York's exclusion.

 

17Algernon Sidney, Discourses gongegning Government With gig

Lgttets, Ttial, Agology and Some Memorials 2: His Life, pp. 93-4.

177
The "project" that no one would clarify for Algernon's benefit,
involved using Prince William of Orange as a counterweight to both the
Catholic Duke of York and the Protestant Duke of Monmouth. The
ultimate goal of "Temple's project" was to entice Prince William to
make a trip to England during the Exclusion Crisis in order that he
might influence a settlement between Charles II and Parliament. The
medium through which this group hoped to make its plan operational was
Henry Sidney, the Special Envoy to the States General.

Sir William Temple, who was credited by Algermon Sidney as
being the mastermind of this "project", was attempting to implement
his own foreign policy through the medium of Henry Sidney. Temple, a
skilled diplomat and expert in European affairs in his own right, felt
that France was definitely a threat to the peace and security of Europe.
Therefore, English policy should be directed toward the preservation of
Flanders against any French designs. To do this, it was imperative
that the English Court and nation be united at home. To Temple's way
of thinking, the political situation in England divided the nation into
two warring factions, and this division prevented any meaningful
involvement in Continental diplomacy. Without help from England, the
smaller countries in Europe would eventually have to give way to French
designs and pressure.18 Sir William gave Henry Sidney considerable
"coaching" in relation to both of Sidney's duties as a diplomat.

Sidney noted in his thgy,that Temple "advised not to mistrust Holland

in their trade, commerce, or anything else, for he was sure we should

 

18Jonathan Swift, ed., The Wotks 2: Si; William Temle (4
vols.: Edinburgh: printed for G. Hamilton, gtflgt., Glasgow, 1754),
Vol. I, M moi s, pp. 468-70.

178

find a faithful alliance there."19 Both Temple and Sidney agreed that
Prince William should make a trip to England as soon as possible, and
if he did, he could bring a treaty for a strict alliance between
England and the United Provinces along with him.20 It all sounded so
neat and almost predestined, with Sir William Temple and Henry Sidney
designing the maneuver.

Prince William of Orange, who became the focal point for
the designs of Temple, Sunderland, Sidney, and others at the English
Court, found himself in a difficult position in 1679. William was the
son of Charles I's daughter, Mary, and William II of Orange. Therefore,
after the Duke of York and the Duke's two daughters, Mary and Anne,
William stood next in line to the English throne. This was assuming
that neither Charles II nor James would produce a legitimate son. In
addition to this, however, William was married to James's eldest
daughter, Mary, and this factor greatly increased his interest in
England's Exclusion Crisis. If James were to be excluded from the
succession, William stood a chance of becoming the successor to the
throne. As Prince of Orange and Stadholder of the United Provinces,
William had a twofold interest in English politics. First, he wanted
a strong foreign policy from Charles II that would entail a general
alliance against France. This was impossible as long as English
politics remained in a state of turmoil. Second, William was naturally
interested in his own and in his wife's interests regarding the English

‘throne. Therefore, William was quite willing to listen to members of

 

1gHenry Sidney, Qiaty, Vol. I, p. 10.

zolbide, pa 30s

179

the anti-York faction in England when they approached him through
Henry Sidney over the possibility of making a trip to England in 1679.
Despite the urgings from Sidney and his friends back in England,
however, Prince William realized that such a trip in the midst of a
political crisis might produce the wrong result, thus damaging his
image both in England and in the Netherlands. William felt that it
was urgent that England's domestic affairs should be put in order, if
only to get a strong foreign policy from Charles II. But he was very
wary and cautious over what he should do, since the wrong move from him
at the wrong time might prove disastrous for all parties concerned.21

The maneuvering and intriguing to bring Prince William to
England began in early June of 1679 and were in full swing before Henry
Sidney even officially began his duties at The Hague in mid-July of
that year. Sidney's thgy provides ample evidence that not only was
Sidney himself an enthusiastic supporter of the project from the
beginning, but that a number of anti-York politicians at Court were
using the occasion of Sidney's appointment to build connections for
themselves to William. On June 6, Sidney noted in his thgy that he
and his nephew Sunderland both agreed,

that we thought it would be very good for him and everybody

else, for him to come over in October, and take his place at

the council and in the House of Peers: and we thought it

would be a great strengthening to our party.
Sidney even proposed to Sunderland that William might be granted the

Dukedom of Gloucester.22 In that same month the Duke of Monmouth was

 

21The best and most convincing analysis of William's policy
and intentions can be found in Stephen Baxter's excellent biography
entitled Witttgm III (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1966).

22Henry Sidney, thgy, Vol. I, pp. 3-4.

180
dispatched to Scotland by Charles II to put down the Revolt of the
Covenanters, a task at which he was successful. Charles II's use of
his illegitimate son caused some concern among Sidney's group that the
Duke's success in Scotland might enhance his position in England as a
Protestant champion. According to Sidney, "These, with several other
things, made us conclude how necessary it was for the Prince to come
to England, nobody to know it but Sir William, Lord Sunderland, and I."23
It is quite clear from Sidney's Dtaty entries, however, that by the end
of June, Viscount Halifax and Sidney Godolphin had been informed of the
plan and had approved of it.24 Just prior to Sidney's departure for
The Hague in mid-July, Sir Arthur Capel, the Earl of Essex, presented
Henry Sidney with a letter for William and explained to Sidney how
advantageous it would be if William were to come to England. In this
letter Essex addressed himself to Prince William as follows:
Upon so good an opportunity as Mr. Sidney's going to wait on
Your Highness, I could not omit the giving Your Highness
assurance of my real devotion to your service. All good
Protestants here do agree in this, that a firm conjunction
between England and the States of the United Provinces is
the only expedient now left to preserve both: and therefore
I cannot but congratulate Your Highness on this subject, when
two so powerful interests do thuszgappily conspire in doing
that which is for your advantage.
In addition, the Earl's younger brother Sir Henry Capel was a backer of

the whole project to bring William to England. All of these man made a

 

23
my... p. 13.

21191g., pp. 15-19. Viscount Halifax was created the Earl
of Halifax on July 16, 1679, and Marquess of Halifax on August 22,

1682.

25Nicolaas Japikse, ed., goggaggondentie ygn Wiltgg III 32
‘flggg.figgttgg§ (4 vols.: The Hague: 1927-37), Vol. II, part 2, p.

297. Sidney, piety, Vol. I, p. 29.

181
point of keeping in contact with Henry Sidney after he had arrived at
The Hague.

The diplomatic maneuvering and arm-twisting necessary to
convince Prince William to journey to England constitute a major theme
in Henry Sidney's Qiggy, and the effort that Sidney made to achieve
that and occupied a great deal of time during his first few months in
The Hague. Early in September of 1679, Sidney noted that William was
as yet not convinced of the wisdom of going to England during the
Exclusion Crisis. In fact, William saw no advantage at all in making
such a trip. Sidney endeavored to convince him otherwise, arguing
that such a trip would be of great service not only to William himself,
but to England as well. Sidney confided that "I told him that the
Duke would never inherit the Crown, and he is of that mind; and if the
succession is not settled somewhere, it will certainly turn to a
Commonwealth."26 After two days of discussions with Sidney over this
matter, William was still not convinced of the wisdom of making a trip
to England. Undaunted, Sidney merely increased the pressure upon
William:

But I told him the Monarchy was absolutely lost, unless he

recovered it. He is convinced the Duke [of York] will never

have the Crown, and I find wouldzge very willing to be put
into a way of having it himself.
Somehow or other, using either his patience and charm or the power of

persuasion, Henry Sidney finally managed to wear down William's

resistance to the proposed trip. On September 7, Sidney communicated

 

26Henry Sidney, Qiagy, Vol. I, p. 129.

27Ibid0, p0 1300

182
to his nephew Sunderland the long-awaited news, plus some suggestions
of his own:
The Prince was not easily to be persuaded that his coming
would be of any advantage, but he is at last, and bids me
write to you to know what is the best time, either before
the first of November this style, or after the last, for he
must be here [The Hague] the whole month of November. The
design of bringing him into the Council and House of Lords
he likes well: but he doubts it will not be, because he
cannot take the oath of allegiance. If you can find an
expedient for it, he desires you send it to him. I think
it would do as well to havgahim created Duke, though he
left England the next day.
Henry Sidney appeared to be on the threshold of bringing Sir William
Temple's "project” to fruition.
By mid-September, however, a rapid succession of events in
England and a reevaluation of the situation by Prince William
drastically altered the entire situation. Charles II had undergone a
serious illness, and the Duke of York had returned from his semi-exile
in Brussels to be with his brother. Consequently, the Duke of
Monmouth had been sent into exile, and the Catholic Duke was now
accepted back at Court. William of Orange, from his vantage point at
The Hague, feared that this sudden turn of events meant that James now
"had the King's ear.” In addition, he strongly suspected that Charles
II had given his brother assurances that Parliament (i.e., the Second
Exclusion Parliament) would be dissolved if it took up the matter of
the succession. Therefore, William judged that the time simply was not
right for him to make a ”flying trip" to England. If the new Parliament,
which was scheduled to meet the following month, took up the business

of succession and exclusion while Willaim was in England, he feared

 

28M0 , pp0 130-1 0

183
that the Duke of York would personally blame him. Also, if Charles II
had to dissolve Parliament to save his brother with William present,
William feared he might be blamed for this, too.29 Ever the diplomat,
however, William told Henry Sidney that he would leave the door open on
the project of a proposed trip, provided that the English political
situation improved. Concerning William's attitudes, Sidney recorded
the following notation:

All that he desires for the present is that he might be

declared the third heir to the crown: and he does advise the

King by all means to agree with his Parliament. He is for

having acts passed to exclude all Catholic kings, without

naming the Duke, and if he wgfl in the House, he believes he
should give his vote for it.
The English political situation got worse instead of better, and the
project of a trip to England for William, pushed so hard by Henry
Sidney and his nephew Sunderland, had to be shelved until a more
opportune time arrived.

While Henry Sidney and his nephew Sunderland were conducting
the maneuvering with regard to William's trip, Sunderland was conducting
some intriguing of his own on a project that came dangerously close to
undermining Sidney's position at The Hague and ruining England's position
in Continental diplomacy. The project involved Sunderland's establishing
himself with the French connection at Whitehall of Charles II, the

31

Duchess of Portsmouth, and Paul Barillon, the French ambassador. But,

it also involved Sunderland's very untimely angling for a possible

 

2?;ttg., pp. 142-44. 30Ibid., p. 143.

31Louise Renee de K6roualle, Duchess of Portsmouth, was one
of’Charles II's mistresses. She had been a lady-in-weiting to

Charles II's sister, Henrietta, Duchess of OrlGans.

184

Anglo-French alliance that would have isolated the Dutch. Henry Sidney
was alerted as to what was developing at the English Court by a frantic
communication from his nephew's wife. In mid-August the Countess had
written to Sidney:

I have somewhat on my spirits, that I must of necessity

communicate to you, but 'tis a secret of such vast

consequence, that I am ruined if it be known to any body

living. Therefore Szdare not venture it but by an express,

and then in cipher.
The letter alluded to by the Countess has not survived, but Sunderland's
biographer is probably correct in interpreting her great "secret” as
being a warning that her husband was in fact "double-dealing" Henry
Sidney and his friends.33

This devious maneuvering on Sunderland's part came at a most
inopportune time for all parties concerned, for the main thrust of
French diplomacy soon became apparent. Through his ambassador at The
Hague, Louis XIV was exerting considerable pressure on the Dutch to
enter into a French alliance that would isolate England. By September
and October of 1679, the Dutch were understandably worried because the
French ambassador, Count d'Avaux, was working overtime to undermine
England's image at The Hague. In addition, he was "barnstorming"
various Dutch towns and using a combination of soft words and threats
in an effort to convince them that a close French alliance was in their
best interests. It appeared that either the English were about to
abandon the Dutch for the French, or they were so paralyzed by the

turmoil of exclusion politics that decisive action on their part was

 

32Henry Sidney, Qigry, Vol. I, p. 85.

33Kenyon, Robgrt Sgenceg, Earl.g£}§unde;;gn , p. 36.

185
impossible. Charles II's wavering and Sunderland's scheming were
aided by Paul Barillon, who began spreading rumors about English
intentions to panic the Dutch. In October Henry Sidney was warned by
Conrad Van Beuningen, the leading and richest citizen of Amsterdam,
that if England did not do something soon to help the Dutch, the
States General would have to make a treaty with France.34 These
developments naturally placed a heavy burden of responsibility Upon
Sidney's shoulders.

As October draw to a close, Henry Sidney took an urgent
leave of absence from his post to communicate to Charles II and
Sunderland exactly what was happening in the Netherlands, and no doubt
to inform them concerning France's true intentions. If Sidney's
conferences with Charles II and Sunderland resulted in any harsh
recriminations or frayed nerves on Sunderland's part, there is no
direct evidence of such results in Sidney's thgy. Sidney had a
peculiarly cryptic way of writing his thgy that bordered on almost
complete indifference at times. It is almost as if Henry Sidney were
bored with the whole business, yet such was not the case as events
would clearly show. One can only surmise that the Earl of Sunderland
was beginning to stew in his own juice and perhaps to regret his
earlier intriguing with the French. It is uncertain exactly what
ensued behind the closed doors at Whitehall during Sidney's leave of
absence, but a change in attitude is clearly discernible in Sidney's

new instructions from Charles II and Sunderland. On November 15

 

34Background material for the early autumn of 1679 is

detailed in Sidney's Qisry, Volume One. See in particular pp. 147-49
and pp. 169-71.

186

Sidney recorded that:

I am to endeavor to hinder any alliance with France. I am to

tell the Prince that the King will prorogue the Parliament,

that there was no remedy, that they would have his crown. He

[Sunderland] desired me to tell him how he was his rvant,

and that it must be he at last that must settle us.

Even in the face of possible disaster, Sunderland never missed a chance
to build connections for himself.

When Henry Sidney resumed his post at The Hague, the
diplomatic maneuvering to upset French designs began in earnest. The
struggle to neutralize French diplomacy and prevent a Franco-Dutch
alliance lasted until January of 1680, and the main responsibility for
action devolved upon Henry Sidney. He had to combat not only the
pressure and threats which the Count d'Avaux was applying relentlessly
against the Dutch, but Sidney discovered that he also had to deal with
the rumors being circulated by Barillon through the Dutch ambassador
in London. In addition, Sidney had to counteract the pronounced Dutch
anxiety over England's apparently hopeless political crisis, an anxiety
that only increased when the Dutch learned of Charles II's prorogation
of Parliament. Sidney had to convince the Dutch that Charles II was in
a better condition in England than they thought him to be in, and he
had to persuade them that the French rumors that Charles II merely
desired a French treaty for himself were obvious nonsense from Barillon
and the Count d'Avaux.

In his diplomatic struggle against d'Avaux, Sidney worked in
close harmony with Prince William, and William constantly gave Sidney

advice as to what tactics he should use. In essence, Sidney did

 

35m. p p. 1860

187
exactly what the Count d'Avaux was doing, only he did it better. He
followed the French ambassador around the Provinces and spoke in the
same towns and to the same people d'Avaux did, articulating the English
position communicated to him from Charles II through Sunderland.
Sidney read memorials before the States General Assembly, and these
memorials were proofread and revised when necessary by William himself
to ensure they would have the best possible effect. According to
James Ralph, who wrote a history of this period based largely upon
pamphlet literature, Henry Sidney simply told the Dutch that Charles II
would view any defensive alliance between the United Provinces and
France as a league against him. If, however, the Dutch rejected the
French overtures and proposals, Charles II “would not only punctually
comply with what was stipulated and agreed in the defensive treaty of
1678, but also stand by them to the utmost, in case they were attacked
by France."36 Sidney and William were in constant touch during this
struggle, and Prince William exerted all the personal influence he
could muster upon the individual deputies of the States General
Assembly. He kept Henry Sidney constantly posted as to what the French
were doing: any information William was privy to, he shared with
Sidney. Prince William and Henry Sidney worked together doggedly to
defeat the French diplomatic efforts, but this alone was not enough to
win over the Dutch.37

Some type of direct and decisive action was needed from

 

3542mm Ralph. Ills distant 2E LsL—n and miss £1.19. 8.9.3.1 "8 2!.

mo 93.89.29. .929 W (2 vols-3 Loudom printed by
Daniel 830'”, 17“); V010 1, p0 ‘95s

37Henry Sidney, giggy, Vol. I, pp. 195-6, 213, 227-8.

188

Whitehall, and it came in early January 1680 from Charles II himself.
In response to urgent requests from Prince William and Henry Sidney,
Charles II sent a special, sealed letter to William‘ytg Sidney, and
the contents of this latter had an immediate effect upon the Dutch and
Prince William. According to Ralph, Charles II personally assured the
States General Assembly not only that he would assist the Dutch in
time of need, but also that he would meet with Parliament in April.38
Acting upon Charles II's assurances, the Dutch rejected the French
treaty.

Because of the part he had played in the struggle, Henry
Sidney suddenly found himself in the spotlight. Sidney had kept
Whitehall well informed of the struggle against d'Avaux with a regular
flow of dispatches from The Hague. In response to these dispatches
Sunderland complimented his uncle in a letter dated January 13, 1680:

His Majesty bid me tell you that he is very well satisfied

with the success your negotiations will, in all appearances,

have: and that he does entirely approve of all your

proceedings in it, as having done wh3§ you ought in

pursuance of the orders he sent you.
As far as William was concerned, Sunderland instructed Sidney to "pray
assure his Highness the King considers his interests as his own.” On
the same day the Countess of Sunderland wrote to Sidney and assured
him that his diplomatic efforts had gained a considerable reputation
for him in London. She further claimed that her husband was so pleased
with Sidney's performance and with the memorials he had read before the

Dutch States General that he remarked to some friends: "Let them but

 

”Ralph, fitgtgtygfi finglan , Vol. I, p. 496.

39Henry Sidney, piggy, Vol. I, pp. 229-30.

189
know how poor Harry Sidney has behaved; I don't care a pin for myself."40
Now that the immediate crisis was over, Sunderland could heave a sigh
of relief. It was largely due to the efforts of his uncle and Prince
William that Sunderland's own position had been saved and that a
possible English diplomatic disaster had been avoided.

After only six months on the job as Special Envoy, Henry
Sidney had proven his ability in relation to both of his duties as a
diplomat. In his official capacity as Charles II's representative at
The Hague, Sidney had reacted swiftly when he realized that his nephew's
infernal scheming with Barillon and Portsmouth could have ruined
everything. Alerted by Sidney's dispatches and his quick trip to
England, both Charles II and Sunderland realized that their flirtation
with the French could only have led to possible diplomatic isolation
for England. Henry Sidney deserves much of the credit for thwarting
the diplomatic efforts of the Count d'Avaux in the autumn of 1679. In
addition, Sidney had proven his value as the unofficial "contact men"
between the Court group in England led by Temple, Sunderland, and
Halifax, and Prince William at The Hague. Henry Sidney had worked
skillfully to bring Sir William Temple's "project” into realiztion,
only to have his work negated at the last minute by events in England.
Sidney became his nephew Sunderland's chief communications link with
Willaim of Orange, transmitting not only the Earl's official business
as Secretary of State for the North, but also his never-ending attempts
‘to ingratiate himself with William for any future contingency.

Sunderland even used his wife's correspondence with Henry Sidney to

 

40m. 3 p0 2310

19D

build up his connections with Prince William. Other members of Temple's
group, such as Halifax, Godolphin, and Sir Henry Capel, also consistently
used Henry Sidney as their main connection to Willaim of Orange.

In addition to these accomplishments and services, Henry
Sidney was able to do something very important for himself at the same
time. While working in his various capacities as a diplomatic
representative and as a contact man, Sidney was able to build up his
own personal connection and rapport with Prince William. Apparently,
Sidney possessed the type of personality that allowed him to win the
friendship of a man who otherwise was exceedingly cold and austere.
All of the social graces which had made "ls beau Sidney" such a social
success in London, worked to his distinct advantage at The Hague also.
Not only did William and Sidney work together constantly, but they
frequently dined together and attended various social functions at
night, such as tea parties and card parties. Sidney's social life
became really an extension of his official work, since he and William
frequently discussed business and the affairs of England as they dined
or hunted together. Sidney, moreover, quickly established himself
with important people like William Bentinck, Conrad Van Beuningen, and
other Dutch officials or friends of William. But the important thing
is that Henry Sidney was able to construct for himself an excellent
relationship with Prince William. In the course of William's stay at
The Hague, a firm and deep friendship eventually developed between
these two, and by the time Sidney was recalled from his post in June
of 1681, he had become entirely devoted to William. Sidney built upon

this personal connection he established with William and used it

during James II's brief reign to become the head of William's

191
intelligence network in England.

The diplomatic victory which Henry Sidney had helped so much
to achieve in January of 1680 did not settle by any means the original,
basic problem of an Anglo-Dutch treaty. Charles II still wanted a new
treaty with the Dutch, while the Dutch, still fearful of offending the
French, could only offer to reaffirm the treaty of 1678 with England.
The Count d'Avaux applied continuous pressure on the Dutch, taking
advantage of Dutch fears and the still active ”peace faction" at
Amsterdam. But this problem assumed a secondary importance as Sunderland
began steadily pressuring Henry Sidney in the spring of 1680 to get
William to agree to make a trip to England. Sunderland had been toying
with the idea of having Prince William make an appearance when the next
Parliament met. By the end of April, however, Sunderland had decided
that a trip by William should take place‘ggtgtg any future parliament
had a chance to meet.41 Sunderland, ever the incessant schemer, may
actually have thought that a sudden appearance by William would have
the effect of neutralizing the Duke of York's influence at Court, or of
bringing some degree of stability to a worsening political situation.
Whatever reasons prompted the Earl's maneuvering, it is clear that he
and a number of others in the long run underestimated Charles II's
determination to preserve his brother's right of succession. Constant
pressure was applied upon William through Sidney to get him to accept
Sunderland's plan. But by the end of May, Sidney noted William's
intentions: "As to his coming to England, he thinks it will do him a

great deal of hurt here [the Netherlands], may make him worse with the

 

411bid., Vol. II, pp. 51-2.

192
Duke, and he does not know what good it can do."42 William seemed
firm in his decision not to come, but Sunderland refused to abandon
his ”grand design."

Henry Sidney spent the month of June, 1680 in England on
official leave. Supposedly, it was a combination of rest and business
that included conferences on Dutch affairs and on a new Spanish treaty
that was signed on June 11 at Windsor. Sunderland had something else
up his sleeve, however, besides official business, and Sidney was a
willing partner in this particular maneuver by his nephew. On June 15
Sidney recorded the following entry in his'thgy: "They think his
being here will put an awe upon people and hinder them from being
stark mad, which is all we desire.”43 Sidney was referring to
Sunderland, the Earl of Halifax, Sidney Godolphin, and Lawrence Hyde,
who was a son of Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon. Sidney
huddled with these politicians at Althorp and sometimes at Sheen, Sir
William Temple's estate. The conferences were actually strategy
sessions masterminded by Sunderland for the purpose of figuring out a
way to get William to visit England before Parliament met. This group
felt that William's presence was urgently needed in England to combat
the influence of Monmouth, who was presenting himself to the nation as
a Protestant champion. This was basically the same project that had
been designed in June of 1679, but there was much more urgency attached
to it now. This group of politicians also wanted the Dutch ambassador
to do his part by urging Charles II to come to an agreement with his

next parliament. Once again, Henry Sidney was to serve as the contact

 

421.922., V01. 11) pp. 59-600 431bi§., V010 II, p. 750

193

men and connecting link between Sunderland and his friends in London
and Prince William in The Hague. Before returning to his post, Sidney
received his final instructions from his nephew: Sidney was to as his
”uttermost endeavors with the Prince to come over, that without it
nothing can be done."44

Henry Sidney returned to The Hague in early July dutifully
to perform his assigned task for Sunderland and also to secure Dutch
ratification of the new alliance between Spain and England. The Earl
of Sunderland was determined not to give up the project upon which he
placed so much importance. Three letters, dated July 21, from
Sunderland to his uncle represent the climax of the Earl's drive to
bring Prince William to England before the next Parliament.45 They
clearly demonstrate the hold which the entire project had come to have
on Sunderland's mind, and they also reveal a growing sense of
desperation on Sunderland's part. In his biography of Sunderland,
J. P. Kenyon points out that by this time, the Earl had already decided
to support exclusion. He was willing to gamble everything now upon
the proposed three-way alliance with Spain and the Duke of York's
exclusion, for which he needed William's help.46 The first letter was
meant for Sidney's eyes only and revealed part of Sunderland's approach:

The Prince's coming over is so necessary that I do not at

all doubt that he will be persuaded to it. For, all that
you and I talked of just before you went away is far

 

“fibig-. Vol. II, p. 77. See also pp. 75-6.
45

J. P. Kenyon, ”Charles II and William of Orange in 1680,”
BIHR, XXX (1957), pp. 95-101. The article contains the three letters
from Sunderland to Sidney printed in full.

46Kenyon, gobgrt 5 en ar, flagl 2: Sunderland, pp. 51-2.

194

advanced. In a word, the King and his people must aggee at
their next meeting, and the King is convinced of it.

The Earl sounded out his uncle as to whether William would be willing
to meet certain conditions for a visit; namely, would he allow himself
to be guided by Charles II. Sunderland was clearly counting upon
future events to turn the way he wanted them to turn, and he admitted
frankly to Sidney that the upcoming Parliament would be "the critical
time to settle or ruin us all." Sunderland did not realize at the
time how prophetic his words would be.

The remaining two letters of July 21, 1680, were for William
to read. In one, Sunderland admitted that he had decided to approach
Charles II himself on the possibility of a trip by William. The Earl
felt certain that an approval by Charles in advance would be the best
possible argument in try to convince William to come. According to
Sunderland, Charles II thought that William's coming "may be of great
use provided he does it willingly with a resolution of assisting and
supporting him in these measures he is now upon."48 In the last letter,
Sunderland expressed his supreme confidence that Prince William's
presence in England would actually help create an understanding between
Charles II and his Parliament. He could think of no better position
for William to be in than that of a "mediator between the King and his
people by whose means all jealousies may be removed." Saving the most
attractive bait until the and, Sunderland stated that Charles II

personally had commanded him to write Henry Sidney and instruct his

 

‘7Kenyon, "Charles II and William of Orange in 1680," p. 99.

“Ibige 9 p. 1000

195

uncle that he might persuade William to come to England.49 Perhaps
Sunderland viewed the arts of diplomacy and politics as being similar
to a game of chance, a personal vice of his for which he paid dearly
every time he lost heavily at London's fashionable gambling houses. On
this occasion, Sunderland was gambling a great deal just on William's
coming to England, and he was matching wits with two minds which were
far more subtle than his own, those of Charles II and William of Orange.

As so often happens when a design or plan is based mainly
upon suppositione and future conditional events, when one variable
factor turns against the designer, the entire structure collapses in a
heap of rubble. The Earl of Sunderland's "great design” for the fall
of 1680 is a case in point. It contained a number of variable factors,
and they all turned against the Earl. To begin with, the Dutch
rejected the Spanish treaty offered to them by Sidney and his nephew.
In addition, despite Henry Sidney's persuasive arts, Prince William
coolly rejected the bait offered to him by Sunderland in July and
refused to come to England in the midst of a political and constitutional
crisis. William, no doubt, wanted to ”wait upon events" in England and
. see if Charles II could control the situation. There was simply too
much at stake both for himself and his wife to risk everything at that
time by a trip that would make him appear more like a meddler than a
mediator. The last blow came when the Earl of Halifax, one of the
original group had been maneuvering since June of 1679 to bring William
into England, led the fight in the House of Lords gggtggt the Second

Exclusion Bill. Sunderland helped his own sinking ship to the bottom

 

49laid" pp. 100-101.

196

with his own vote £g£,tha Duke of York's exclusion. Sunderland's great
gamble had failed, and the position he had rashly assumed to be firm
quickly turned to more quicksand beneath his feet. Even though he
gamely fought on and continued his efforts to entice William over to
England in November and December of 1680, his position was really
untenable. Before the end of January, 1681, Sunderland had been forced
from office in disgrace.

Henry Sidney was in England from September 16 until November
1, 1680, and he found himself swept up in the hectic pace leading up to
and including the meeting of the Second Exclusion Parliament. Sidney
had been elected one of the two M.P.'s from Bramber, but he made no
notations in his th;y_to indicate that he participated in any of the
parliamentary proceedings during this important Parliament. It is
clear from his‘Qiggy, however, that Sidney spent much of the time from
September 16 to October 21 conferring with Sunderland, Temple, Halifax,
Godolphin, Lawrence Hyde, and Sir Henry Capel. These politicians most
likely discussed the project regarding William of Orange and also their
strategy for the upcoming Parliament. Parliament began on October 21,
and Sidney remarked cryptically in his Qiggy_on October 28, “I asked
the King his commands, and he immediately fell upon the proceedings in

50 It is unclear whether Sidney had

Parliament with great heat."
personally done something to incur Charles II's wrath, or whether the
King was merely venting his spleen in general upon a handy bystander.
An eighteenth-century French scholar, Paul Rapin de Thoyras, claimed

that Charles II was angry with his Special Envoy and Master of the

 

soHenry Sidney, thzy, Vol. II, p. 116.

197
Robes because Henry Sidney had spoken in favor of and had voted for
the exclusion of the Duke of York.51 Henry Sidney makes no mention in
his thgy,of having done that. It is just possible that he may have
voted for one or more of the petitions and resolutions which were
considered by the Commons between October 21 and 27. If indeed Henry
Sidney did any voting and speaking at all in the Commons before he
left London on November 1, no proof can be found in either his‘thgy
or in M W fltgtogy that he did so. It is certain,
however, that Henry Sidney was at his diplomatic post when the actual
fight over the Second Exclusion Bill occurred, first in the Commons
and than in the Lords.

England's political and constitutional crisis had a disturbing
effect upon concerned parties at The Hague. William, who relied upon
Henry Sidney for information on English affairs, wrote to Sir Leoline
Jenkins, who earlier had replaced Sunderland as Secretary of State for
the North, and he expressed to Jenkins his concern over the inability
of Charles II and Parliament to reach an agreement on anything. He
said, ”I foresee infallibly an imminent danger for the King, the royal
family, and the greatest part of Europe."52 Disturbed over reports
about the extent of the crisis in England, William wrote another letter
to Jenkins a few days later. His concern was not only for the present,
but for the future as well:

You know I have always wished a good intelligence between

the King and his Parliament: and that I wished to have been

able to contribute to it.... I must also own to you that I

was much surprised to learn of mitigations of the royal
authority being spoken of, in case the Crown should fall to

 

51 52

‘Lgtg., p. 116, footnote 1. 12;g., p. 127.

198

a Papist. I hope that his Majesty will not incline to

suffer gathing to be done so prejudicial to all the royal

family.
William realized that if any part of the Royal prerogative were to be
bargained away by Charles, it would be irretrievable in the future for
any successor. In addition to William's concern, several deputies to
the Dutch States General Assembly had become agitated over the
Exclusion Crisis in England. Henry Sidney wrote to Sunderland about
their concern:

Several of the States coming to me, crying they were lost

and ruined, that they had rejected all other alliances, and

thrown themselves entirely upon England: and now they saw
there was like to be such a disunion, that they ng almost
despair of any support or assistance from thence.
Shares in the Dutch East India Company had fallen, and apparently the
only cheerful face at The Hague belonged to the Count d'Avaux, who was
described by Sidney as being in a state of "great joy“ over England's
political turmoil.

According to Sir William Temple, one of the main reasons
why Charles II was on such bad terms with Sunderland by the and of
1680 was a memorial the King had received from The Hague. This paper
strongly implied, among other things, that Charles II should not break
with Parliament, even if it meant passing the Second Exclusion Bill.
This tactic caught Charles II and his advisers by surprise: "For they
believed it a thing directed and advised from hence: and, in a word,
by Lord Sunderland to Mr. Sidney his uncle, as a matter that would be
of weight to induce the King to pass the bill.” Charles II suspected

Sunderland of having written the offensive paper, but Temple was

 

531mg” pp. 138-9. 5111319., p. 132.

199
certain it had been written by Gaspar Fegel, the Grand Pensionary of
Holland. He, in turn, had talked Henry Sidney into sending it to
Charles II.55 Stephen Baxter, Prince William's biographer, insists
that Fegel and Sidney concocted the document together in an obvious
eleventh-hour attempt to influence Charles II's mind on the Second

Exclusion Bill.56

Gilbert Burnet, who was very close to the Princess
Mary, claimed that Sunderland and Sidney both encouraged the States
General to draw up the memorial. Gaspar Fegel managed it, and Prince
William unofficially approved and supported it.57 Whoever was
responsible for writing the memorial, it caused repercussions that
were felt immediately back at The Hague.

Henry Sidney casually mentioned in his‘thgy for December 15,
1680, that he had just received a ”reprimand" from his immediate
superior, Sir Leoline Jenkins, for his part in the whole episode.58
Apparently, Charles II was displeased with Sidney for having sent the
memorial, because Jenkins implied that the document caused a mild
uproar when it was read before the King and his committee of intelligence:
”All my Lords took exceptions to the paper, as taking too much upon it
to advise in our great affairs." Jenkins cautioned Sidney that as a
minister in the foreign service of Charles II, it was his job to

proofread papers of this typa‘ggtggg_forwarding them to Whitehall. Any

 

555nm, ed., mg 91; ii: m m, Vol. 1, Memoigg,
pp. 462-3.

56Baxter, W, p. 171.

57Burnet, mfimmm, Vol. II, p. 118.

58Henry Sidney, Qigny, Vol. II, p. 142.

200
potentially offensive passages were to be either deleted completely or
otherwise toned down so that the papers would not offend His Majesty.
Sidney could do that, or he could refuse to send the papers in the
first place. In other words, if the Dutch could not mind their own
business, Sidney should let them do their meddling through their own
ambassador in London. But he should not appear so eager to let the
Dutch use his own office and position in their attempts to influence
affairs in England.59 Henry Sidney wrote to Jenkins in response to his
reprimand, and with an air of hurt innocence he expressed surprise over
Jenkins' previous letter. In an outburst of mild sarcasm, which was
extremely rare for Henry Sidney, he inquired whether Charles II and
the Lords on the committee were only interested in receiving Dutch news
sheets and information about the fashionable night-life at The Hague.
Sidney could not resist a parting jab at Jenkins by telling his superior
that he had just seen the great comet of 1680.60 All sarcasm aside,
Henry Sidney would have to watch himself in the future, for he was
apparently under suspicion as being too pro-Dutch, and perhaps too
close to William of Orange.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of Henry Sidney
was his ability to survive and take care of himself, even in the face
of adversity. He was usually able to help his own cause by utilizing
his connections with the right peeple for his own advantage. As a
case in point, ever since August 6, 1680, Henry Sidney had been casting
covetous eyes upon the position of commanding general of the six

English and Scottish regiments than in the service of the Dutch. The

 

59M“! PP. 143-4' solbidep pp. 145-6.

201

former commander, Thomas Butler, Earl of Ossory and eldest son of the
Duke of Ormonde, had died suddenly on July 30. Sidney thought he saw
a perfect opportunity to advance himself and at the same time remain
in the United Provinces close to William. The status of those six
regiments had never been clearly defined. Collectively, the King of
England had no control over them: however, by courtesy, the King had
been allowed to nominate their commanding officer.61 In August Sidney
had presented himself to William as the best candidate to fill the
vacant position. William agreed with Sidney, but he cautioned him
that nothing could be done until Charles II was informed of the idea
and had approved of it.62 The project had to be shelved for several
months due to all of the events relating to the second Exclusion
Parliament, but Henry Sidney never abandoned his ambition to command
those six regiments.

Henry Sidney's design on the Earl of Ossory's vacant position
assumed an extra degree of importance and urgency in early June of 1681
when Sidney was recalled from his diplomatic post at The Hague. This
action by Charles II should be viewed as part of a general housecleaning
by the King of pro-Williamites from positions of importance. Not only
had Sidney's nephew, Sunderland, been deprived of his important position
as Secretary of State for the South, but he had also been removed from
the Privy Council. In addition, Sir William Temple, who had been an

avid pro-William supporter for some time, was removed from the Privy

 

61F. C. Turner, Tamas II (New York: the Macmillan co.,
1948) ' p. 349.

62Henry Sidney,‘Q;ggy, Vol. II, pp. 93-4.

202
Council. Henry Sidney was merely the last of the group to get the axe.
Sidney's dismissal from office was probably the culmination of a number
of factors: his connection with Sunderland and Temple, his stand in
favor of the Duke of York's exclusion, and the memorial he had sent to
Charles II from the Dutch. Something else which definitely worked
against Henry Sidney was the ill-feeling which the Duke of York had
against him. The Duke's dislike of Sidney is clearly revealed in a
letter which James wrote to Lawrence Hyde on December 14, 1680. After
first attacking Sunderland, the Earl of Essex, and Sidney Godolphin,
the Duke made these remarks about Henry Sidney:
I see his Majesty has taken the paper sent him over by Mr.
Sidney as he ought to do, and am glad he has sent a
reprimand to him about it: and methinks it would be
requisite to remove him from that employment, and to have
somebody there his Majesty could trust, which he cannot do
him. Besides that, it must be very prejudicial to his
Majesty's affairs to have such a one as he there, who is so
related, and hasaguch dependence on his nephew, I mean
Lord Sunderland.
According to one historian, after James had been banished to Scotland
in the fall of 1680, he began to view himself as the victim of a
conspiracy, whose members included Temple, Sunderland, Prince William,
and Henry Sidney.64 If so, this would very easily explain the Duke's
attitude in his letter to Lawrence Hyde. The reader should recall that
the Duke had not been particularly enamored of Algernon Sidney either.
Henry Sidney may have lost his job in Charles II's foreign

service, but as future events would clearly demonstrate, he still

 

63Samuel Weller Singer, ed., figgggggggggggg gt Hgnry Hyde,

mammmmmm.mamu
vols.: London: Henry Colburn, 1828), Vol. 1. PP. 47-51.

64Baxter, William 111, p. 170.

203
retained his important connection with William of Orange. Sidney now
attempted to put that connection, which he had been carefully building
for two years to good use for himself. Even though the Oxford
Parliament had just been dissolved and nothing had really been settled
from the Whig point of view, William was seriously considering making
a trip to England. Prince William had two main reasons for favoring a
trip at this time (June, 1681). First, William's personal relations
with Charles II needed considerable improvement, especially since
William had expressed his great displeasure with Henry Sidney's
replacement at The Hague, Sir Bevil Skelton. Second, William wanted
to convince Charles II that Sidney should be given command of the six
regiments in Dutch service. Therefore, Henry Sidney immediately began
sounding out his contacts in London, friends like Temple, Godolphin,
and Halifax, as to the advisability of a visit by William.
In response to Sidney's overtures and constant proddings,
both Temple and Godolphin wrote letters to William on July 28, 1681.
Temple realized that William probably considered such a trip to be
necessary to repair the sagging relations between himself and Charles II,
but Sir William himself was now decidedly cool to the whole idea. His
real objection to such a trip Temple refused to entrust to his letter.
But he did venture this advice:
I am not apt to believe you will find at this time what you
may propose by a journey into England, nor that any discourses
between his Majesty and your Highness are likely to end in any
mutual satisfaction or agreement Upon the present state of
public affairs.
If William was that convinced that a trip to England would prove

valuable, he should direct all of his correspondence to Charles II

204

through Henry Sidney.65

In contrast to Temple, Sidney Godolphin was much more
enthusiastic about William's journey to England. In approaching
Godolphin initially, Henry Sidney had presented the idea of a trip as
if it had originated with William himself, whereas in reality, both
Sidney and William had worked out the plan together. Godolphin
admitted that the "good understanding“ between William and Charles II
was in danger of being lost unless William made some initiative.
Henry Sidney had suggested that Prince William should use the pretext
of a social visit to camouflage his real intentions. Godolphin was
against this, however, and reasoned that William should approach
Charles II directly and tell His Majesty exactly what was bothering
him, namely, Sir Bevil Skelton's appointment and Charles II's rersal
to accept Henry Sidney as the commanding general of the six British
regiments. An honest, straightforward approach would work wonders.66

Henry Sidney followed up his person diplomacy in England
with a lengthy letter of his own to William. This letter was actually
a progress report for William's benefit on the status of affairs which
affected both of them, and it included an up-to-date analysis by
Sidney of the English Court and certain people in it. Sidney stated
that since Charles II's sweep of pro-Williamites from the Privy
Council, the men who seemed to have the most influence with the King

were ”the Duke's creatures.” These and other inconvenient characters

 

6""oamwuune. mimics a: great inlaid 9.0.9 lLl._e an . Vol. 11,

Appendix, Part One, pp. 2-5.

66Henry Sidney, Qiggy, Vol. II. pp. 209-12.

205
were attempting to portray William as an enemy of Charles 11. According
to Sidney, these men at Court and on the Privy Council were doing
everything they could to cause a breach between Charles II and William.
This was obviously bait by Sidney to convince William that he simply
had to come to England. Sidney claimed that Temple, Godolphin, and
Halifax were still enthusiastic supporters of William, even though
Halifax was sometimes obliged to agree to matters which were “against
his inclinations." He strongly hinted that perhaps Lawrence Hyde
could not be trusted, because he was "for what the Duke would have,
right or wrong.” Sir Edward Seymour, a former Speaker of the House of
Commons, was named by Sidney as being the chief villain at Court, and
the one person who was working hard ”to make the King and your Highness
fall out.” Concerning Sidney's own position and the job he was
seeking, he had the following analysis for William:
These Lords [Halifax and Hyde] say that I am very likely to
contribute a great deal towards a breach between the King and
the Prince. I told them I had rather be hanged. Their
reason is that the King is resolved never to give his consent
to my having the command of the troops: that if your Highness
and I persist in it, his Majesty would take it ill of your
Highness, and never be kind or reconciled to me.
Feigning that familiar air of hurt innocence, Sidney asserted that he
simply could not understand why Charles II would not allow him to have
the position of commanding general that he wanted so badly, especially
since Charles II had promised Sidney the position in September of 1680.
At this point, Henry Sidney had not yet made a satisfactory submission
to Charles II, and he was probably counting heavily upon a trip by

William to help out his cause.67

 

67mg. . pp. 212-219.

206

Prince William's trip to England, for which Henry Sidney had
been carefully preparing the groundwork for two years, finally became a
reality in late July and early August of 1681. Despite Sidney's
planning and his high expectations for what such a trip might accomplish,
the trip itself proved to be a failure. Charles II refused to consent
to giving Henry Sidney the command of the six British regiments, even
though he could not prevent William from giving Sidney the command of
one of those regiments. In addition, according to William's biographer,
Prince William failed in his attempts to get help from Charles II to
combat French aggression on the Continent. The trip by William did
not bring about an improvement in relations between the two sovereigns.
In fact, as Baxter points out, "William and Charles parted in a very
bad mood, each regretting the visit had taken place."68 Henry Sidney's
connection had not worked this time the way that he had wanted.

Because Sidney's thty entries become very sporadic after
June 28, 1681 (the final entry being dated January 13, 1682), it is
difficult to trace Sidney's whereabouts and activities for the rest of
Charles II's reign. He spent the remainder of the year 1681 mainly
lounging about London and Althorp. He also conducted a whirlwind
courtship of Lady Ogle, who later married Charles Seymour, the seventh
Duke of Somerset.69 On January 13, 1682, Henry Sidney took his leave
of Charles II and paid a visit to William in the Netherlands, but by
March 21 of that year Sidney was back in England for the races at

Newmarket.70 On December 7, 1683, a warrant was issued to the sheriffs

 

GBBaXter’ willie". III, ppe 173-750
69Henry Sidney, Qiegy, Vol. II, pp. 222-4.

207
of London and Middlesex to allow the delivery of Algernon Sidney's body
to his brother Henry, Master of the Robes, for a private burial.71
Later that same month, Henry Sidney petitioned the Crown for a grant of
the forfeited‘gggl and ggggggg; property of his recently executed
brother Algernon. It seems that Algernon had died indebted to his
brother Henry for fifteen hundred pounds, and there was also a mortgage
on the land that Algernon had inherited from his father.72 In 1684
Henry Sidney finally got around to making up his accounts as Master of
the Robes for the two-year period which ended in 1681. After all
expenses had been deducted, there was a surplus of almost two thousand
pounds, which Henry was allowed to keep as a "free gift without account."7:5
Henry Sidney must have reached a reconciliation with Charles II for his
past "offenses," because he eventually received the command of the six
British regiments, only to lose it a few months after James had
succeeded his brother as King.

Henry Sidney had proven himself in a number of ways to a
number of different people between 1679 and 1682. He had proven his
worth as a Special Envoy by alerting Whitehall as to the trUe intent
of French diplomacy in the fall of 1679. Anyone who worked as hard as
Sidney did to combat the Count d'Avaux could hardly have been ”an idle,
drunken, ignorant rake, without sense, truth, or honor.” In addition,

Sidney had quickly established himself as the major communication link

 

7DCSPD, Vol. CDXVIII (1682), p. 133.

71CSPD, Entry Book 54 (1683), p. 138.

72CSPD, Entry Book 55 (1683), p. 173.

73CSPD, Entry Book 335 (1684), p. 21.

208
between his nephew, Sunderland, and Prince William at The Hague. In
fact, he had been utilized by an entire group of pro-William
exclusionists at the English Court for the same purpose, communication
with William of Orange. At times, Henry Sidney was operating as an
unofficial news service between London and The Hague. More important
for Sidney's own future, however, was the fact that he had quickly
established an excellent working relationship and deep friendship with
William of Orange. Henry Sidney was one of the very few Englishmen
whom William liked and trusted. The two of them worked well together,
and if Sidney's piggy is a true indicator of their compatibility,
there were no secrets between them. While he was Special Envoy, Henry
Sidney was actually William's chief source of information for English
affairs and also for conditions at Charles II's Court. Realizing
Sidney's closeness to the Prince of Orange, politicians and statesmen
wishing to communicate with William did so through Henry Sidney. In
effect, than, Sidney became William's trusted eyes and ears, mainly
because William could rely completely Upon him. This important
connection established by Henry Sidney would prove even more valuable
during the brief reign of James II, when William would call upon his

trusted friend to render an even more valuable service for him.

C H A P T E R V I I

JAMES II AND THE DUTCH CONNECTION

Despite Henry Sidney's connections with a number of outright
Whigs and Court exclusionists, it is not as easy to prove or document
his Whiggism as it is his outspoken brother Algernon's. Unlike his
brother Algernon, Henry Sidney left no written explanation of his own
political or constitutional beliefs. Algernon Sidney's Whiggism, as
it emerges from his Qtsgourses, is clear and unmistakable, and Algernon
practiced it with a rigid consistency. Henry Sidney's‘thgy and
surviving letters do provide the historian with valuable insight as to
his methods and particular style of operation, but they provide very
little help in pinpointing any principles or theories which might be
termed "Whiggism." For the most part, therefore, one must allow Henry
Sidney's actions to speak for themselves and to reflect any principles
he might have had.

Based on this approach, Henry Sidney can be called a Whig
for two main reasons. First of all, he definitely favored the
exclusion of the Duke of York from the succession to the throne. He
did not, however, trust the Earl of Shaftesbury and did not follow the
Earl into active and recognizable opposition during the Exclusion
Crisis. His opposition was more covert in nature, and it can best be
described as "backroom manervering" that was carried on with other

209

210

anti-Yorkists at Court of varying degrees of commitment. Because he
apparently avoided Shaftesbury like the plague, Henry Sidney's name
was never associated with the Whig discussions at Thanet House or with
the shady intrigues and designs that were connected with the Rye House
episode. Since Henry Sidney was not an opponent of Charles II, as
Algernon was, he could remain at Court and utilize the King's power of
patronage for his own benefit. Since his primary goal in life seems
to have been his own advancement, Henry Sidney probably saw no real
advantage in abandoning his Court connections for the wilderness of
political opposition.

Directly related to his opposition to James was Henry
Sidney's firm attachment to Prince William of Orange as a Protestant
champion. In this respect, Sidney can be identified with other
middle-of-tha-road Whigs like Sir William Temple, Sir Henry Capel, and
Sir Henry Savile. It is clear that Sidney regarded Prince William as
the logical and best successor to Charles II, provided that the Duke of
York's exclusion had become a reality. Looking into the immediate
future, Henry Sidney thought that the best prospects for the English
monarchy's survival lay with William of Orange, not with the Duke of
York, and certainly not with the Duke of Monmouth. It is also clear
that Sidney's commitment to Prince William bordered on hero-worship of
the Dutchman. Henry Sidney never bothered to articulate his own
political or constitutional principles (if indeed he had any), but his
actions for the most part identify him as a middle-of-the-road Whig
who was interested in just three things: the Duke of York's exclusion,
Prince William's success in whatever he chose to do, and his own

personal survival and advancement.

211

Henry Sidney had realized early in life that one of the beat
ways for the youngest son of an aristocrat to survive was to utilize
any existing connection he might have and to build new ones whenever
possible. He proved the validity of this generalization during his
two-year term as Special Envoy to the United Provinces. His connection
with his nephew, the second Earl of Sunderland, was a well-known fact
of English Court life, although having the Earl as his relative proved
to be a distinct liability at times for Henry Sidney. When this
connection failed him, Henry Sidney had his burgeoning Dutch connection
to fall back upon. It was only natural, then, during the brief reign
of James II for Henry Sidney to resort to this connection with Prince
William at The Hague and exploit it for all that it was worth. Not
only did Sidney and William continue their close personal friendship
during the reign of James II, but William continued to utilize Sidney
as a source of information on English affairs and as a contact man
with certain individuals in England. These were both roles that Sidney
had learned to play to perfection. The reign of James 11, then, saw
Henry Sidney continue his Dutch connection and build upon it until he
became a very important, though inconspicuous, member of Prince
William's intelligence network.

As Prince William gradUally came to the realization in 1687
that his personal intervention in English domestic affairs would be
necessary, Henry Sidney's connection with the Prince of Orange became
closer and more valuable for both of them. Even though it is clear
that Sidney acted as the head of the English and of William's
intelligence system from the end of 1687 through the summer of 1688,

it is very difficult to document his actual day-to-day activities,

212

because of the lack of source materials that might throw some light on
those activities. Considering the type of work in which Sidney was
engaged for William, this lack of documentation is not too surprising.
Though it may not be too surprising, it is certainly a frustrating
circumstance for the historian to deal with. The documents and materials
which have survived do provide valuable information on Henry Sidney's
activities during this time, but often the information is only of an
indirect nature. Nevertheless, a general pattern of activity can be
established for Henry Sidney during 1687 and 1688, and some specific
activities, which definitely link Sidney with Prince William's ”grand
design" against England, can be accurately documented. One of the
best indicators that Henry Sidney did indeed perform a very valuable
service for William during 1687 and 1688 is that in the years
immediately following James II's "abdication," Henry Sidney was awarded
a number of honors and high offices. Not only was Sidney created
Viscount Sidney of Shepey and eventually the Earl of Romney, but he
also served as Secretary of State for the North for two years and for
a brief time as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. William of Orange was by
no means a ”soft touch” when it came to rewarding or honoring people.
But the nature and the quantity of the honors bestowed upon Henry
Sidney indicate that William was very much in his debt for valuable
services rendered.

On February 16, 1685, Charles II of England died, and the
Catholic Duke of York became King James II, an event which Whigs like
Algernon Sidney had dreaded with an almost paranoiac fear. Henry
Sidney, always eager to please, tried his best to remain in the good

graces of James II, but he was not successful. Sidney was involved in

213
a curious incident during James II's coronation. It seems that when
the Archbishop of Canterbury placed the crown on James's head, it
immediately began to fall off. According to a popular story, Henry
Sidney was close enough to James so that he could reach out and steady
the crown on James's head. As he performed this potentially symbolic
gesture, Sidney was reported to have said: "This is not the first
time, your Majesty, that my family has supported the Crown."1 If this
story is true, James II neglected to show proper gratitude to Henry
Sidney for his "support.”

James II insisted upon Sidney's resignation as commanding
general of the Six British regiments in Dutch service. This move by
James should have come as no surprise, because his dislike for Henry
Sidney is easily documented. In 1681 James had written to William
regarding the effort to give the Earl of Ossory's command to Sidney:

I should be very sorry to see Mr. Sidney at the head of such

a body of men of his Majesty's subjects that is so influenced
by some of the greatest enemies I have in the world. I could

say much more upon this subject to let you see how yery unfit
a thing it would be to let him have such a command.

Despite this, when James II insisted upon Sidney's recall, Prince
William intervened with the King on Sidney's behalf. On June 25, 1685,

William wrote the following to James 118

I cannot dissemble with your Majesty that I could have wished

your Majesty had thought proper to have left him here, since
I can assure you that there never was a minister in this
country who succeeded better, or who did more faithful

services. It is also impossible that any person can be more

 

1F. M. C. Higham, Kigguggmgg the figgggg (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 193‘), pa 219a

2Marion E. Crew, Williga,8§n§;ngk and William 1;] (London:
John Murray, 1924), p. 64. Also, su a, p. 202.

214

zealous to your service, for which I can answer.

The strength of William's appeal on Sidney's behalf certainly reflects
the closeness with which Henry Sidney stood to William, and it also
shows the high regard William had for his friend. The Prince's effort
was wasted, however, and Sidney had to surrender his command.

Out of work and out of favor, Henry Sidney naturally resorted
to his Dutch connection in the summer of 1685. In August of that year,
Sidney returned to the United Provinces with William Bentinck, Prince
William's most trusted Dutch adviser. Bentinck had been in England on
a diplomatic mission to try and hold James II to his promise of
renewing the existing treaties between England and the United Provinces.
Sidney and Bentinck had become fairly close during Sidney's two-year
term as Special Envoy, and they had frequently entertained each other
at various social functions. But Sidney, who always referred to
Bentinck in his piggy as "Mr. Bentem," was never as close to William
Bentinck as he was to the Prince of Orange. While Henry Sidney was in
The Hague renewing his Dutch connection, his nephew Sunderland, who was
once again enjoying Court favor as Secretary of State for the South,
instructed the English envoy at The Hague to "cooperate unreservedly”
with Henry Sidney and report any important matters directly to him.4

Henry Sidney returned to England in late September of 1685
and immediately began performing a role which, by that time, he must
have become accustomed to doing. That is, Sidney performed the valuable

function as contact men between William of Orange and certain

 

3Henry Sidney, Diggx, Vol. II, pp. 251-3.

4Kenyon, fiobegt Sgggggg, Eagl‘g£,§underlan , p. 121.

215
individuals in positions of influence at Court. This time, the target
was Lawrence Hyde, now Earl of Rochester: and Prince William was
anxious to contact Rochester on a matter of great importance, the
details of which William refused to entrust to any letter. Instead,
he entrusted Henry Sidney to deliver an oral message to the Earl of
Rochester. Prince William addressed Rochester in the following manner:

I cannot let Mr. Sidney depart for England without renewing

to you the assurances of my services, and beg you to do him

good in all that is in your power, and although I know you
are his friend, I hope that, for the love of me, you will
have some consideration for him, knowing how much I esteemS
him: and certainly he merits it as much as any man I know.
William also made it perfectly clear to Rochester that Henry Sidney had
his complete confidence in all matters. The important affair which
Sidney was to discuss with Rochester, however, remained a secret.

This interesting correspondence between Prince William and
the Earl of Rochester, with Henry Sidney as an involved third party,
continued through October of 1685. Rochester's answer to William's
letter is permeated with an air of guarded caution. He was not very
specific about William's affair which Henry Sidney had communicated to
him, but Rochester did say that he foresaw several difficulties
connected with it. Concerning William's request in relation to Henry
Sidney, Rochester said:

As for what you are pleased to command me in relation to Mr.

Sidney himself, your Highness may be confident that all the

little services I can do him shall never be wanting to him,

and I am the more obliged to it, for his having let your

Highness know that I have at all times been his servant, and
so I will be to anybody that you are pleased to think fit to

 

Sanger. can MW. Vol. I. p. 162-

216

recommend to me.6

Whatever it was that Prince William and Henry Sidney were trying to get
from Rochester must remain a matter for speculation. It may have
concerned James II's two daughters, Mary and Anne, and their rights of
succession. Or Prince William may have been using Henry Sidney to find
out how close Rochester actually stood to James II, since the Earl was
indeed a brother-in-law to the new King. In June of 1661, Sidney had
cautioned William that perhaps Lawrence Hyde was a bit too close to the
then Duke of York to be trusted.7 This particular mission by Sidney
may have been a follow-up on Sidney's original evaluation of Hyde.
Whatever the case, Prince William continued to press Rochester on the
matter of this affair.a If this secretive business reveals nothing
else, however, it does reveal that Henry Sidney had Prince William's
complete confidence. It also demonstrates that Sidney in 1685 was
establishing a pattern of activity for himself which he would continue
throughout the remainder of James II's reign.

Henry Sidney's activities become extremely difficult to
trace for the remainder of 1686 and for all of 1686. In the summer of
‘1666 Prince William used Sidney for the same purposes as he had in the
previous autumn. In a letter written on August 19, 1686 (N.S.), to the
Earl of Rochester, William mentioned that he was responding to an

earlier letter from the Earl which Sidney had personally delivered to

 

6Japikse, ed., figggggggggggtig, Vol. II, p. 717.
7m. p. 205.
aSinger, ed., MW, Vol. I, p. 164.

217
him.9 Prince William also mentioned that he had just recently paid two
visits to the Elector of Brandenburg at Cleves. The purpose of these
visits by William was to lure the Elector into the League of Augsburg
against France. It is known that Henry Sidney, along with William
Bentinck and Gilbert Burnet, had accompanied Prince William on at least
one of those trips to Cleves for what amounted to a nine-day conference

10 It is also known that after the conference at

with the Elector.
Cleves, Henry Sidney proceeded to DUsseldorf where he made contact with
a certain John Hutton, who later became the Princess Mary's personal
physician and one of William Bentinck's chief agents for affairs in
England.11
The exact nature of Sidney's activities at Cleves and at
DUsseldorf is not at all clear. Prince William may have been
integrating his trusted English friend along with others into a more
thorough and comprehensive diplomatic and intelligence network during
the years 1685 and 1686. His missions to Cleves and DUsseldorf may
very well have been the culmination of two years of training for Henry
Sidney in European diplomacy and intelligence gathering. But this is
educated speculation based primarily upon Sidney's past record and
upon events in 1688. One thing is clear, however, and that is, when
it came to contacting and working with people, Henry Sidney was a very

skilled and smooth operator.

 

91m. 3 pa 170e

10John Carswell,'lg§ Desggnt‘gg_Egg;and (London: Barrie
and Rockliff, 1969), p. 79.

11Kenyon, fiobggt 525592;, Earl g§,§undgrland, p. 150.

218

For a period of several months which spanned the fall of
1686 and the winter of 1687, Henry Sidney mysteriously disappeared
into Italy. No documents survive to shed any light at all upon why
Sidney suddenly went to Italy after his mission to DUsseldcrf or even
what he did there. It is as if the earth simply swallowed him up.
Two theories have been advanced to explain Sidney's strange disappearance
in Italy. According to Gilbert Burnet, who was privy to a number of
secrets connected with William of Orange, Henry Sidney was more or
less forced to ”exile” himself to Italy for several months. This was
because he had become very apprehensive of the dangers that his Dutch
connection had placed him in. Because Henry Sidney by 1686 had become
too well-known as a close confident of William of Orange, he decided
(or it was decided for him) to travel in Italy for several months.12

James Ralph, the eighteenth-century English scholar,
however, proffered an alternate explanation for Sidney's sudden trip
to Italy. Ralph suggested that it was no coincidence that Sidney was
in Italy at the same time the Earl of Castlemaine was there on a
mission from James II to the Pope.13 According to Ralph, Henry Sidney
was sent to the Vatican on a special diplomatic mission by Prince
William:

He was admitted to several private audiences in the closet,

when his Excellency could scarce be favored with a public

one: that tho' Sidney had no public character, he was

instructed by the Prince of Orange with some secrets to be
communicated to the Pope: and that some people have even

 

12Burnet, History gfibflis Own Time, Vol. II, p. 494.

13Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, had married Barbara

Villiers, one of Charles II's cast-off mistresses. James II used
Castlemaine as his diplomatic representative to the Vatican.

219

fancied that the Revolution was one of them.1
Admittedly, James Ralph's explanation of Sidney's Italian sojourn is
much closer to pure speculation than is Gilbert Burnet's explanation.
Besides, Burnet himself was a contemporary of Sidney and Prince William,
and he even served as the Princess Mary's private chaplain. Therefore,
the weight of opinion is probably more on Burnet's side than it is on
Ralph's. Nevertheless, Henry Sidney's mysterious trip to Italy in 1686
and 1687 has never been satisfactorily explained.

By 1687, William of Orange had put together an extensive
and very smoothly operating intelligence system for himself. The
purposes of the system were to gather information about English
affairs and to establish and maintain contacts with as many potential
opponents of James II as possible. In order to circumvent the ordinary
mail service, Prince William used a number of the operatives to carry
materials into England and to transport letters out of England in 1687
and 1688.15 But the normal mail service was also used, and when it was,
precautions were taken to guarantee the security of the Operation. One
of the favorite methods used was to scramble secret messages written in
invisible ink along with ordinary, innocuous business correspondence.
When the business letters were soaked in special solutions, the secret

messages would appear in what had been blank spaces.16 Propaganda

 

1‘Ralph, History g£,E land, Vol. I, p. 957.

15Some of these letters for the year 1687 have survived and
can be found in Dalrymple's Memoirs, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 190-98 and
pp. 202-211.

16J. R. Jones, Thg Regolutionig£_]688 ig,§ngland, pp. 223-
24. Carswell, 293999.193 England, p. 131.

220
materials were even smuggled into England in wholesale quantities
aboard Dutch cargo ships. It would be an understatement to say that
during 1687 and the first half of 1688 the traffic in agents and
printed materials in and out of England was decidedly "brisk.” Perhaps
the most amazing thing about this operation itself is that during its
entire existence, only one agent was ever apprehended, and he was not
caught until the early autumn of 1688.17 Either William was able to
maintain a degree of discipline and secrecy that would be the envy of
twentieth-century governments, or the English officials were utter
fools as to what was going on around them.

Though William of Orange utilized the services of a number
of men during 1687 and 1688 for intelligence purposes, he depended for
the most part on just four trusted friends and confidents to organize
and sustain his important work. Prince William relied heavily upon
William Bentinck: Everaard van Weede, lord of Dykvelt: Frederick van
Nassau, Heer van Zuylestein; and Henry Sidney as special, personal
ambassadors to England. Bentinck, Dykvelt, and Zuylestein managed the
Dutch end of William's network, and the leading part at the English
and was played by Henry Sidney. The three Dutch representatives were
used to explain William's own views and opinions to various important
groups and individuals in England. The information they gathered was
used to supplement reports which William received from his English
agents and from Arnoud van Citters, the Dutch ambassador in England.
Henry Sidney was valuable because of his connections with a number of

aristocrats like Halifax and Sunderland and also because of the

 

17Jones, The Revolution‘gfi 1688 ig.England, p. 224.

221
contacts he had maintained with a number of officers in James II's
army. Many of those officers would later defect to William's cause
after he had invaded England.18 Sidney was also valuable because
Prince William trusted him completely. It was William's policy during
1687 and 1688 to have at least one of these four trusted confidents
always in England, and oftentimes two of them would be there. Indeed,
these four men, Bentinck, Dykvelt, Zuylestein, and Sidney, apparently
had no difficulty in deceiving James II and in maintaining secrecy for
William's plans.

Ever since Jonathan Swift first dumped ridicule and scorn
upon Henry Sidney, many historians have found it difficult to take
Sidney very seriously, either dismissing him as a dissipated flunkey
or simply ignoring him. Because of this, Henry Sidney's role in the
events leading up to William's invasion have never been fUlly under-
stood, much less completely appreciated. This is true despite the
fact that Gilbert Burnet clearly identified Henry Sidney as the one
person "who had the secret of all the correspondence that was between
the Prince and his party in England."19 Burnet stood very close to
both William and Mary during 1687 and 1688, and he was privy to much
of what was being designed concerning England in those years.

A very recent interpretation, based on exhaustive research,
by Professor J. R. Jones should go a long way toward revising and
modernizing the standard image of Henry Sidney. According to Professor

Jones, "Sidney consciously used his reputation as a man of pleasure to

 

1BIbig., pp. 216-22, p. 226.

19Burnet, History 2:,His Own Time, Vol. II, p. 483.

 

222

cover his clandestine work.” By his very nature and personal talents,
Henry Sidney was well suited to any situation or job that required the
arts of personal negotiation and persuasion. Sidney may have been a
hard-drinking man of the world, but he was also a suave, self-assured
extrovert who enjoyed political wheeling and dealing and diplomatic
maneuvering. Though never a deep thinker or philosopher by nature as
Algernon Sidney was, Henry Sidney was a shrewd and clever operator who
succeeded in concealing his true abilities and talents behind the
rather bland image of a dissipated rake.20 Not enough people took him
seriously, and Sidney counted on this fact to help conceal his
clandestine intelligence work from the English authorities. This is
the most convincing interpretation yet produced to explain how Henry
Sidney was able to conceal the true nature of his trips in and out of
England during 1687 and 1688 and his activities while he was actually
in England. If Henry Sidney had ever been caught in possession of
some of the documents and letters that he regularly toted about with
him on his missions, he would have found himself in a very embarassing
position to say the least. The fact that Sidney was never caught, and
apparently never even suspected, is a tribute to his skill as a shrewd
intelligence operative.

The success of Henry Sidney and his fellow intelligence
agents and operatives raises questions immediately as to why James II
apparently never caught on to the operation of William's intelligence
system that existed beneath his very nose. Was the man utterly blind

and unable to see Prince William's agents scurrying to and fro? Or

 

20Jones, The Revolution 2£_1688 lg England, pp. 223-6.

223

was James II merely the biggest fool in Christendom, taking the
position that ”nothing like that could ever happen here in England"?
The best explanation for James II's apparent inability to see what was
happening around him rests partly upon his almost complete preoccupation
with domestic policy during 1687 and 1688, and also partly upon the
nature of the man himself. From the end of 1686 through the summer of
1688, James II concerned himself almost entirely with two main domestic
programs, and both of these programs were so closely interrelated that
they were inseparable from each other. James II, himself a convert to
Catholicism, wanted to secure the repeal of the Test Act of 1673 and
the penal laws against Catholics. In all probability, James was not
attempting to establish Catholicism as a state religion, but rather he
was trying to secure recognition for Catholics of religious freedom and
political rights.

To secure full, legal sanction for his policy regarding
Catholics, James II needed Parliament's approval in statute form. To
ensure a completely subservient Parliament that would acquiesce in
James II's Catholic policy, the King decided upon an intensive
remodeling of the parliamentary boroughs. This took time to accomplish,
and until the King, working with Sunderland, could pack a parliament,
he relied upon the questionable use of his prerogative power simply to
dispense with the operation of the Test Act and the penal laws.
James II was so preoccupied during 1687 and 1688 with his program to
achieve toleration for Catholics in England and to pack a parliament
that he either could not or would not pay attention to anything else.
It is very ironic indeed that Prince William's intelligence system was

originally established in part to determine exactly what was going on

Its.

224

in England. James II simply could not understand that his domestic
policies could have any foreign repercussions.

The domestic program of James II was thoroughly upsetting to
Englishmen in a number of ways, and their uneasiness over the King's
intentions made the intelligence work of Henry Sidney, William Bentinck,
and the other agents all the more necessary and valuable. To good
Anglicans, James II's motives regarding Catholics appeared sinister:
the King was trying to subvert the Church of England and institute
Popery. Anti-Catholicism permeated every aspect of English life at
that time. Simply stated, Catholicism in England was synonymous with
absolutism in government and with an attack upon the precious rights
and property of all Englishmen, but especially of those in the
political and economic power structure. James II's use of the
dispensing power merely sharpened suspicions that the King was aiming
at an absolutist system patterned after that of his Royal cousin in
France. In addition, James II's effort to remodel parliamentary
boroughs can be viewed as a major effort by the central, national
government in Westminster to extend its power and control out into the
provinces, thus upsetting the English concept of local government
control. Charles II had remodeled the local corporations in the early
1680's in order to smash the Whig party. But in 1687 James II was
using paid agents of the Crown, many of whom were ex-Whigs themselves,
to undermine Anglican-Tory strength in the corporations and boroughs

to ensure a packed Parliament for the future.21 In attacking the Tories

 

21J. R. Jones, ”James II's Whig Collaborators," Historical
Journal, III (1960), pp. 65-73.

225

on the local level, James II in effect was undermining one of the major
supports for the monarchy. Tories eventually found themselves in the
unenviable position of having to chose between their King and their
Church. Viewing opposition as simply disloyal and wrong-headed, James II
could not begin to understand the fears and apprehensions generated by
his two-part domestic policy.22

The intelligence gathering activities of Henry Sidney and
the three Dutchmen, Bentinck, Dykvelt, and Zuylestein, in 1687 and 1688
must be seen in relation to James II's implementation of his domestic
policy. The two operations coincided in time, and William's intelligence
system quite often responded either to rumors of what James II was doing
in England or to actual reports from agents as to the status of affairs
in England. As a case in point, from February through June of 1687,
Dykvelt was in England on a very personal and delicate mission for
Prince William. Officially, Dykvelt was to try to effect a reconciliation
between William and James II. Unofficially, however, Dykvelt was
instructed to contact various individuals and groups and carefully
explain Prince William's position in relation to them. Dykvelt
contacted Tories and assured them that William would be firm in his
support of the Church of England. He also cautioned Protestant
dissenters to be wary of James II's promises of toleration for them in

return for their support of his Catholic policy.23 More important,

 

22The best background narrative for James II's domestic policy
can be found in two very recent studies: Ihg Bgvolution g]: 1688 _i_r;

jigglggg by J. R. Jones (1973), and Mongrrgy gnd ggvolulion by J. R.
Western (1972).

23James Muilenburg, The Embassy 2:,fiveraard Van Wegde, Lord
2]; kavglt, Lg M y; 168 . Univgrsity §tudies 9i E University
Nebraska, Vol. XX, no. 4 (October, 1920), pp. 22-3, 44-6.

l9.

226

however, were the contacts Dykvelt made with certain political leaders
in England. Gilbert Burnet, who drew up the actual instructions for
Dykvelt and received reports directly from him, is quite specific on
this important point. According to Burnet:

He [Dykvelt] desired, that those who wished well to their

religion and their country would meet together, and concert

such advices and advertisements, as might be fit for 5 e

prince to know, that he might govern himself by them.
During his stay in England, Dykvelt met often at the Earl of Shrewsbury's
home with the Marquess of Halifax, the Earls of Shrewsbury, Devonshire,
Danby, and Nottingham, the Lords Mordaunt and Lumley, Admirals Arthur
Herbert and Edward Russell, and Henry Compton, Bishop of London. Most
of these men were later assigned secret number codes by Henry Sidney
for purposes of correspondence, and six of them, Shrewsbury, Devonshire,
Danby, Lumley, Russell, and Compton, along with Henry Sidney, actually
signed the famous invitation to Prince William in June of 1688. During
Dykvelt's embassy to England, James II issued his first Declaration of
Indulgence, thus inaugurating his policy to achieve toleration for
Catholics. Dykvelt was able to rally various parties to William's
cause, and viewed in overall perspective, Dykvelt's embassy represented
the beginning of the offensive against James II.25

Dykvelt's embassy to England was certainly the first of the
Inajor intelligence operations against James II in 1687, but it should
also be viewed as part of a general pattern of operations directed

against James II (bring that year. In August of 1687, Prince William

 

24Burnet, History.g£ His Own Timg, Vol. II, pp. 421-2. See
also pp. 416-17.

2sMuilenburg, 1rg_Embassy g£_gykvelt £g_§nglgnd, p. 70..

22?
sent Zuylestein to England ostensibly to convey William's condolences
over the death of the Queen's mother. In fact, however, Zuylestein
was to contact many of the same politicians to whom Dykvelt had made
overtures dUring his mission. Zuylestein's mission coincided with the
beginning of James II's attempt to pack his future Parliament. He
personally carried letters from his contacts back to Prince William,
but these letters are very guarded in nature and simply do not reveal
much.26 By November of 1687, Henry Sidney, who had been residing in
the Netherlands since the end of his mysterious Italian trip, was back
in action again. Prince William sent Sidney to investigate the rumor
that James II's Queen was pregnant. After being briefed by William
Bentinck and John Hutton, both of whom had preceded Sidney to England,
Henry Sidney proceeded to organize the dispatch of intelligence and

27

propaganda materials in and out of England. With this flurry of

activity by WilliamFB agents in England in 1687, it is very hard not

to conclude that English officials were either blind or sound asleep.
After investigating the Crown's efforts to manipulate the local parlia-
mentary boroughs, Sidney made the following report to Bentinck:

'Tis certainly believed by all our wise men, except Milord
Halifax, that we shall have a parliament, and they say,

more certainly, that it will be a packed one, chose only by
those that return it: and that the Prince should take his
measures what he will do in that case, for that we must
never expect to $23 a free parliament here under the present
state of affairs.

 

26Jones, 1.09. Revolurign _g_f_ 1688 lg 599.311.: p. 222. The
Jletters themselves can be found in Dalrymple's Mgmoirs, Vol. II,

Appendix, pp. 202-211.

27Kenyon, Robert figggrgr,'Lgrl‘gfi’Sunderlan , p. 167.

23m” p. 174.

228
This matter of a "free Parliament" (i.e., one that was not controlled
and manipulated from the local level by the central government) played
a prominent part both in the actual invitation to William of Orange in
June of 1688 by the "Immortal Seven" and in William's own declaration,
which was issued at the end of the summer.

After many months of intelligence gathering and the
implementing of a policy of constant surveillance, Prince William
reached a decision to intervene personally in English affairs. Burnet
stated that in April of 1688, Admiral Russell went to The Hague and
prodded William as to what his intentions were. In response to
Russell's exortations, William reportedly said that:

If he was invited by some men of the best interest, and the

most valued in the nation, who should both in their own name,

and in the name of the others who trusted them, invite him to

come and rescue the nation, and the religion, he bellgved he

could be ready by the end of September to come over.
William's decision was based upon a number of reasons. As his
biographer pointed out, Prince William had expected to inherit the
English throne since his childhood, and he had married James's eldest
daughter to consolidate his claim. William had kept himself constantly
informed about events in England ever since 1685, and by the spring of
1688, he decided that he had to intervene in England in order to
capture control of a conspiracy of politicians and aristocrats.
Supposedly, Russell had told William that if he did not join the English
conspirators, they would go on without him. William was concerned that

the conspirators might succeed and establish a republic in England.

This had been a recurrent Dutch fear since the days of Oliver Cromwell.

 

29Burnet, History 9: His Own Ilmg, Vol. II, p. 469.

229
Another important factor motivating William was his desire to protect
the United Provinces from France by bringing England into an anti-
French alliance. To do this, he needed control over England's foreign
policy.30 In addition, James II's Queen was indeed pregnant, and the
King's attentions were directed even more toward the success of his
two-part domestic policy.

Until the right moment came for Prince William to make his
move against England, he was more or less forced to wait upon events
and to rely upon his intelligence system to keep him informed. Henry
Sidney remained in England from November of 1687 until August of 1688.
During that time, Sidney more than proved his value as one of the four
chief operatives of William's entire system. One of the main sources
for Sidney's activities during the early months of 1688 is Gilbert
Burnet's Hlstory. It is clear that Prince William relied upon Henry
Sidney to be his chief representative to the English aristocracy during
those crucial, early months of 1688. Burnet, who had access to many
of the reports coming out of England, described Sidney as ”the men in
whose hands the conduct of the whole design was chiefly deposited, by
the prince's own order.” Above all Englishmen, Henry Sidney had long
enjoyed the highest measure of William's trust and favor. Sidney's
closeness to Prince William was a well-known fact among the aristocracy,
and anyone who wished to recommend himself to William did it through
Henry Sidney. Sidney carefully approached the Marquess of Halifax
over the possibility of an intervention by William. At first Halifax

pretended he did not understand what Sidney was talking about, but

 

3 .
oBaxter, Wllllrgrlll, pp. 223-32.

230

under constant pressure from Sidney, the Marquess finally admitted that
he viewed such a project as impractical. Sidney did, however, bring
the Earl of Danby into the scheme, and Danby in turn brought in Henry
Compton, the outspoken Bishop of London.31 Sidney also drew up for
William's benefit a master key for the code numbers being used in their
correspondence. The code numbers corresponded to important aristocrats,
and they included not only the seven men who eventually signed the
invitation to William, but also the Marquess of Halifax and the Earls
of Nottingham and Bath.32 The Earl of Bath had begun corresponding
with William soon after James II's electoral agents had started
challenging his local authority and influence in Devon and Cornwall.33

June of 1688 proved to be a very important month as events
moved rapidly toward a conclusion. On June 20 James II's Queen, Mary
of Modena, gave birth to a male heir. If William had dreamed of
achieving power in England through his wife's likely inheritance, or if
he had planned on inheriting the crown himself, this single event
changed the entire picture. The new Prince of Wales would be brought
up a Catholic, and after the King's death, the Court would most likely
be dominated by a Catholic Queen. This single event added a great
deal of urgency to William's planning with regard to England. The
Earl of Sunderland, who rarely missed an opportunity to ensure his own

tnlrvival, announced his sudden conversion to Catholicism. Sunderland,

who was detested and thoroughly mistrusted by a number of the men

 

31Burnet, Hlstgry.g£ His Ogn Ilmg, Vol. II, p. 494.

32Dalrymple, Mgmolrs, Vol. II, Appendix, p. 227.

3:"'Jones, 1L1; Heyglutlon _g_f_ 1% lg Egglgn , pp. 160-3.

231

intriguing for William's success, was urged to resign his position as
Secretary of State by his uncle, Henry Sidney.:m Also in the month of
June, seven Anglican bishops went on trial in London for refusing to
allow the reading of the King's second Declaration of Indulgence in
their dioceses. They objected to the Declaration, not on religious
grounds, but because it was based upon a power (i.e., the dispensing
power) that had been declared illegal in Parliament.35 The bishops
were acquitted on June 30, the very same day that Admiral Arthur Herbert
left England disguised as a seamen and carried the famous invitation
from the "Immortal Seven” to Prince William of Orange.

The month of June 1688 found Henry Sidney very active
himself in the intelligence operations that were also building to a
climax. In fact, it would not be an exaggerated claim to say that
during this crucial month of June, Henry Sidney was really the focal
point for Prince William's entire operation. Sidney for some time had
been working intently to line up support for William's cause and to
collect pledges from various aristocrats. In response to William's
demand in April that he would move against James II only if invited by
”men of the best interest," Sidney and Admiral Russell had been
putting pressure on the group of intriguers that had been meeting at
the Earl of Shrewsbury's house. Sidney was eventually forced to give
up on the Marquess of Halifax, who himself preferred a policy of

“waiting upon events." The Earls of Bath and Nottingham both supported

 

34Kenyon,‘fig§§r§ S n , Earl'gfl Sunderland, p. 197.

35R. Thomas, ”The Seven Bishops and Their Petition, 18 May

1688," Jgurnal.gfi,§r§l§siastlgal Histo , XII (1961), pp. 56-70.

232
Prince William's cause, but they refused to commit themselves to the
actual written invitation, something that Prince William and Henry
Sidney would have preferred.

Henry Sidney could not do all the intelligence gathering
and necessary leg work himself, and he needed help from Russell,
Shrewsbury, and James Johnston, a cousin of Gilbert Burnet. Burnet
claimed that as events in June progressed to the crisis stage, Henry
Sidney slipped into his old lazy habits, thus jeopardizing the entire
operation.36 Burnet, no doubt, was trying to build up the reputation
of his cousin in claiming that Johnston was brought into the operation
at the last minute to "save the day” for Sidney. Actually, Johnston
was merely one of several operatives (like John Hutton) who worked
'eeger,William and Sidney. It is very possible that Sidney sustained a
stomach injury of some kind and needed some help at the last minute.37
At any rate, Count Zuylestein made a flying trip to England ostensibly
to congratulate James II on the birth of his son, but in reality his
chief business was to cooperate with Sidney, Russell, and the others
in bringing Prince William's great matter to a conclusion.38

By June 30, 1688, that conclusion, so cherished by latter-day
Whig historians, was reached. The drive by the Immortal Seven to put
their invitation to William in final form, along with Sidney's efforts

to collect personal, written pledges for William, coincided with the

 

36Burnet, History e£_His Own Time, Vol. II, p. 494.

37Henry Sidney, Diary, Vol. II, pp. 275-78. Letter from
‘the Countess of Sunderland to Sidney, September 11, 1688.

38Ralph, Hlstory 2: England, Vol. I, p. 999.

233

birth of James II's son and the famous trial of the seven bishops. The
actual invitation to Prince William was written by Henry Sidney, and it
represented the collective efforts of the entire group known as the
Immortal Seven.39 Because Henry Sidney both wrote it and collected
the signatures for it, the invitation must be viewed as the closest
thing to a statement of principles for him that the historian will
ever find. Sidney and the other members of the Immortal Seven were
trying to convince William that they had most of the nation steadfastly
behind them. Speaking in a collective manner, they addressed William:

We have great reason to believe, we shall be every day in a

worse condition than we are, and less able to defend

ourselves, and therefore we do earnestly wish we might be

so happy as to find a remedy before it be too late for us

to contribute to our own deliverance.
The remedy they had in mind was obvious, Prince William's personal
intervention. Specifically, they asserted that the people in England
were dissatisfied with James II because of his invasion of their
"religion, liberties, and properties." The document also contains a
complaint about James II's large standing army, and it clearly implies
the fear these men possessed that the concept of a "free parliament" in
England was in great danger. It was made clear in the invitation that
”nineteen parts of twenty of the people" desired a change in England
and would willingly work for it if given the chance. In addition, it
is also stated in the invitation that "the greatest part of the nobility
and gentry" was dissatisfied with James II's rule, although some of them

could not be counted on for actual support if William invaded.

Taken in its entirety, the invitation to William reads

 

39Dalrymple, Memoi s, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 228-31.

234
almost like a last-minute plea for help from desperate men who
deliberately exaggerated the support they represented. Henry Sidney
and his friends seemed to be saying to William, ”The English ship of
state is sinking, and only your personal intervention can save the
nation from utter ruin." In their own minds, the Seven no doubt
believed that if James II was allowed to complete his plans for packing
a parliament, the situation in England would be beyond repair. It is
little wonder that Whig historians have elevated the invitation itself
onto the high altar of constitutional government. The exact timing of
the invitation might lead one to conclude that it wasere,critical
step in forcing William's hand. To conclude this would be to ignore
the fact that William's final decision to intervene in England had
been made after many months of intensive intelligence gathering.
William's mind was fixed at least by April of 1688 after Admiral
Russell's visit, and William very likely had made up his own mind even
earlier than that. For William, then, the invitation of June 30
represented a commitment on paper to his cause by seven men who could
then be held as political hostages by William. As one historian has
analyzed the Immortal Seven and their invitation: "They merely
provided the means by which William could now justify to himself and
to England his decision to indeed come over.”40 William's mind had
already been made up by June of 1688: what he wanted from the English
conspirators was a written guarantee of support.

The importance of Henry Sidney and his fellow English

 

4oStuart Prall, The Bloodless Revolution: gegland, 1688
(Carden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 205.

235

conspirators in bringing William to England has been the subject of
considerble debate among historians.41 J. P. Kenyon in particular has
claimed that the importance of the Immortal Seven has been greatly
exaggerated by historians. Sidney and his friends were neither
"considerable" men, nor were they "representative" members of the
English ruling class. Two main factors contributed towards James II's
downfall after William's invasion of England: the Lords Lieutenant in
the western shires abandoned their King: and most of the influential
gentry and aristocracy either “waited upon events," or they pretended
not to know what was going on. According to Kenyon, less than ten per
cent of the English peerage was involved in the so-called ”Revolution“
of 1688.42

In contrast to this view, it has been pointed out that the
Immortal Seven, Sidney, Russell, Shrewsbury, Devonshire, Danby, Lumley,
and Compton represented in fact "the tip of an iceberg." They by no
means "stood alone," and William of Orange was quite aware of this
fact.43 A document found in the Bentinck archives at The Hague
substantiates this interpretation. The document is a classification of
the English peerage according to each member's attitudes regarding
James II, and in all likelihood it represents the end result of

Dykvelt's mission to England in 1687. The largest single group on the

 

4‘ISee in particular: J. R. Western, Monarehy and Reyolution,

p. 235; J. P. Kenyon, The Nebllity‘lg the Hevolution‘efi 1688, An
Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Hull on 2 May 1963
(University of Hull Publications, 1963).

42Kenyon, 1m Nobllity lg 3333 Heyolullon pl 1688, pp. 9,
19.

43Prall, The Bloodless Revolutlon, p. 205.

236
list (85 out of 161) are clearly listed as opponents of James II. This
group of eighty-five was comprised of both Whigs and Tories, and it
included the Duke of Somerset, the Marquess of Halifax, and the Earls
of Bedford, Danby, Pembroke, Suffolk, Leicester, Devonshire, and
Rutland. The list also classified most of the English bishops as being
opponents of James II.44 Based on this list of peers and on the
individual pledges of support delivered to William, the Prince of
Orange knew quite well that the Immortal Seven represented more than
just themselves.

When Admiral Herbert left England on June 30, 1688, with the
famous invitation for William, he also carried with him a valuable
personal letter from Henry Sidney to the Prince.45 As the head of the
English end of William's intelligence operation, Sidney was greatly
concerned over the success of the Prince's "great affair":

The bearer [Herbert] hereof carrying him a letter from the

most prudent and most knowing persons that we have in the

nation, ... it is a presumption in me to think of adding
anything else: but you, I have ever told you every thought

of my heart. I am too much concerned for your interest,

your life, and your reputation to say a word of persuasion

to you to undertake this matter. You know your own business

best, what power you have over the fleet and army, and
whether you can transport men with privacy, for it is most
certain that, if it be made public a fortnight before it be
put in execution, all your particular friends will be clapped
up, which will terrify others, or at least make them not know
what to do, and will, in all probability, ruin the whole
design.

Sidney took the liberty of recommending Marshal Schomberg, then in the

service of the Elector of Brandenburg, to Prince William as a man who

 

44Kenneth H. D. Haley, "A List of the English Peers, May,
1687," finglieh Historieal Re iew, LXIX (April, 1954), pp. 302-6.

45Sidney, glery, Vol. II, pp. 269-71.

237
"will be very useful to you." Schomberg had written to Sidney in
September of 1687 and had expressed a keen interest in the condition
of England. The tone of his letter to Sidney also suggests that
Schomberg was well aware of Sidney's close relation to William of
Orange.46 Henry Sidney was also justifiably concerned for his own
safety, as he implored William to burn both the letter and the
accompaning invitation. Luckily for posterity's sake, William did not
comply with his friend's request.

Henry Sidney remained in England until the end of August
collecting last-minute letters and pledges from various Englishmen.
Again, one can only wonder about the apparent inadequacy of the English
security system. If Henry Sidney had been caught at any time between
June and August of 1688 with some of his very incriminating documents,
his own safety and the security of the entire project would have been
placed in jeopardy. As it was, Sidney was allowed to go about his
intelligence activities for William completely unmolested. One of the
letters collected by Sidney was from the Marquess of Halifax. Cautious
and noncommittal to the very end, Halifax could only venture the
opinion that the trial of the seven bishops was an event which had
united all Protestants in England. It had also been a bad blunder by
the Crown and was something that would not easily be forgotten.
Admiral Russell was not as oblique as Halifax enjoyed being, and he

advised William that "the number of your friends here daily increase."

 

4?;glg., pp. 265-68. Schomberg, whose mother was English,

accompanied William's invasion fleet to England and was created a Duke
after William became King. The House of Commons voted him 2100,000
for his services. He died fighting for the English at the Battle of
the Boyne.

238
The most interesting letter to William was written by John Churchill,
a lieutenant-general in James II's army:
Mr. Sidney will let you know how I intend to behave myself:
I think it is what I owe to Cod and my country. My honor I
take leave to put into4your Royal Highness's hands, in
which I think it safe.
Sidney left England at the end of August under the pretext of visiting
Aix-la-Chapelle for his health. In fact, he went straight to Prince
William, who was then at his hunting residence of Het Loo, and
delivered his reports, letters, and a verbal message from Churchill.
William and his closest Dutch advisers, Bentinck, Dykvelt,
and Caspar Fegel, anxiously awaited Sidney's arrival in the United
Provinces. Sidney still had some important work to do, and tight
security precautions were still in effect. On August 27 (N.S.) Prince
William wrote the following to Bentinck concerning their mutual friend:
At last Mr. de Sidney has come here safe and sound, having
been a long time at sea, and has passed through Flanders,
and as he said he was going to Aix he has come incognito to
Appeldorn, whence he has come this evening and has been
talking with me up till now. He goes away tomorrow the
first thing in the morning to Utrecht and will embark the
same night in order to be at Lassum on Sunday morning. This
is the place that I have recommended to him since e dare
not go to the Hague for fear of being recognized.
Two days later William wrote again to Bentinck concerning Henry Sidney
and the plans for England. Sidney had been entrusted with the task of
delivering to Bentinck the draft of Prince William's intended

Declaration for the upcoming invasion of England. Bentinck was to

meet Sidney, explain the Declaration to Dykvelt and Fegel, and then

 

47All of these letters collected by Sidney can be found in

Dalrymple's M moi 3, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 235-9.

48Crew, William Bentinck and Williem Ill, p. 123.

239

make any necessary corrections in it. In his Declaration William
blamed James II's "evil councillors" for the subversion of England's
laws, religion, and liberties, not the King himself. William's stated
reason for invading England was to ensure the sitting of a free
parliament, and he was concerned lest this would make him too
dependent upon that institution:

You see from the conclusion that I throw myself entirely on

the mercy of a Parliament, although I much fear that that

cannot be otherwise, anggyet to put one's fate in their

hands is no small task.
With the delivery of William's Declaration to Bentinck, Henry Sidney's
important role in the Prince's "great affair" was finished. Sidney had
only to keep out of sight until the actual invasion day arrived.

News of Henry Sidney's whereabouts had filtered back to
England by September of 1688, and the Sunderlands were quick to realize
what was going on. Concerned for his position in England if William
actually succeeded in his venture, the Earl used his wife as a medium
by which to contact his uncle. Because of Sidney's known closeness to
Prince William, the Sunderlands were trying to use their connection
with Sidney to ingratiate themselves at the last minute with William
and to prepare a suitable future for themselves. The tone of the
Countess's letter to Sidney, dated September 11, 1688, strongly
suggests that the Earl was fearful he would be blamed for what was

going on in England.50 His fears were probably justified, for

undoubtedly Sunderland was one of the "evil councillors" referred to in

 

49M0’ pe 123a

50Sidney, Diar , Vol. II, pp. 275-78.

240
William's Declaration. Concerning the Prince's intentions, the Countess
wrote: ”If his design be against England, Cod send he be not failed,
for think what terrible ruin it must bring England and the Protestants
if the people fail.” Sensing that Henry Sidney had been playing an
important part in William's "design” against England all along, the
Countess was anxious to have Sidney use his valuable connection to
help them out. She implored Sidney:

It would be the kindest thing, and the only request I am

likely to make you at present, if you would but freely

write ms word, and with all speed you can, what place you'd
advise my Lord to go to, you are too good-natured to want
compassion to us.
In what appears to be an attempt to beg forgiveness for the Earl's
recent collaboration with James II, especially his conversion to
Catholicism, the Countess beseeched Sidney: "Oh how happy should I be
if we might be allowed the comfort of ending our days at Althorp.”
The Sunderlands were not taking any chances: the best prospects for
the future very likely would lie with William of Orange. Knowing the
hatred many people felt for Sunderland, the Countess was asking a
great deal from Henry Sidney.

William of Orange landed at Torbay in the West of England
in the first part of November, and the Sunderlands' fortunes began to
decline rapidly from that point. After borrowing some money and
selling his Irish pension, the Earl and his wife fled England on
December 10, 1688, for Rotterdam. The Countess returned to England
shortly to drum up support for her husband. The best she could do was
to obtain an assurance from Henry Sidney that William would not seek

vengeance on them. In the first month of 1689, Sunderland entered a

long period of depression, reconversion, and repentance for his past

241

sine. What the Sunderlands really wanted was permission to return to
England so they could live in retirement at Althorp. As Sunderland
was wallowing in his own self-pity and despair, Admiral Herbert
appeared in Rotterdam and pressured city officials into throwing the
once proud and arrogant aristocrat into jail. The Earl languished in
jail for the first half of February, 1689, but was eventually released
through the personal intervention of both William and Mary. Through
the efforts of Henry Sidney and others, the Sunderlands were eventually
allowed to return to England. To demonstrate to the world that he was
a changed man, the Earl even began reading books, which he borrowed
from John Evelyn, on horticulture and gardening.51

After the Sunderlands' fortunes had taken a turn for the
worse, one of the first persons they turned to for help was Henry
Sidney. If there were ever a time when two people needed a friend and
relative with high connections, it was during the first few months of
1689 for the Sunderlands. Accordingly, both the Earl and his Countess
literally deluged Henry Sidney with letters during those months in an
effort to use Sidney's connection with William to improve their
position.52 The letters clearly reveal not only the nadir into which
the Sunderlands had fallen, but also the extent to which they were
willing to impose upon Henry Sidney's good natured disposition to help
them out of the depths. The Countess worked tirelessly on her
husband's behalf. In one letter, she implored Sidney to use his

influence with William to help them:

 

S1Kenyon, Roberg S n e , M91 Sunderlene, pp. 227-43.

SZSidnBy. 21m, Vol. II. pp. 291-312e

242

The Prince is so absolute here [the United Provinces],

besides the inclination of the people to retain their

liberty in that point, that certainly a miserable man

that had not the benefit of being Mr. Sidney's nephew

and friend, might hope to find favor with a P nce that

all the world allows to be just and merciful.
After the Earl's release from jail, his letters to his uncle were
filled with expressions of person gratitude and a sort of fawning
humility that bordered on pathetic hypocrisy. Sunderland knew that
his best chance of getting back to England depended on his connection
with Henry Sidney, and his efforts to ingratiate himself with his uncle
were constant. At one point Sunderland wrote to Sidney:

The countenance of my friends, and chiefly of such an one

as you, is the-ruin or saving of me, therefore, pray take

care that a man in absentee l3 not too much run down,

neither in jest nor earnest.
With help from Sidney, the Earl of Sunderland did eventually return to
England and Althorp, but for a man of his proud stature, he had
suffered a great humiliation and disgrace. Sidney's efforts to repair
his nephew's shattered image culminated on April 26, 1691, when he
introduced Sunderland, who had recently reconverted back to
Protestantism, into the Court of William and Mary.55

A study of Henry Sidney's important role in bringing William
of Orange to England would not be complete without a close look at the
awards and honors that Sidney collected after 1688. On February 14.
1689, Sidney was appointed to the Privy Council, and two weeks later he

was made a gentleman of the bedchsmber. In March Sidney was made

 

53
1e;g., p. 294. 54lbld., p. 301.

55
Narcissus Luttrell, fl.§£$2£ Historieal Reletion.g£ State
Hfifeire frem 1678 le_17]4 (6 vols.: Oxford: the University Press,
1357), Vol. II, p. 216.

243

colonel of the King's regiment of footguards. In the following April,
he was raised to the peerage as Baron Milton and Viscount Sidney of
Shepey, on the same day that William Bentinck was made Earl of Portland
and Lord Lumley was created Viscount Lumley. He was Lord Lieutenant of
Kent from 1689 to 1692 and again from 1694 until his death in 1704.
Sidney accompanied King William III to Ireland in 1690 and was present
at the Battle of the Boyne. He was made one of the lords justices of
Ireland after receiving fifty thousand acres of confiscated Irish land.
From 1690 until 1692, Sidney served as Secretary of State for the
North. Also in 1692, Sidney served briefly as Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland, but he was an utter failure at this job. In 1693 he was made
Master-general of the Ordnance, a position which had been vacant since
Marshal Schomberg's death in 1690: and on May 14, 1694, Henry Sidney
was created Earl of Romney. From 1691 until 1702, Sidney was Lord
Warden of the Cinque Ports.56

Henry Sidney did more than merely collect titles and honors
like ribbons at a fair, however. From 1689 until King William's death
in 1702, Sidney's relationship with his close friend remained much the
same as it had been before the Revolution of 1688. Sidney continued
to be firmly attached and loyal to William III, and subsequently to
Queen Mary when William was absent from England, and no doubt some of
his honors after 1690 stemmed directly from his continued loyalty.

Henry Sidney could always be counted on to perform a variety of

 

56DNB, Vol. LII. PP. 21-219. A more detailed discussion of

Henry Sidney's activities after 1689 can be found in Narcissus
Luttrell's H.8rief Historical Relation.e£ State Affairs from 1678‘52
I7I4, v013e I-IIIe

244

services for either William or Mary, whether they were mundane services
like arranging fireworks displays to celebrate victories against the
French, or whether they were more arduous in nature like reorganizing
the Irish militia in 1690. For instance, on February 8, 1691, Sidney
represented William III as godfather at the christening of the Earl of
Nottingham's son.S7 On May 26, 1692, Sidney with other lords of the
Privy Council helped arrange a loan for Queen Mary of £100,000 from
the city of London.58 William was campaigning on the Continent at the
time, and Queen Mary was acting as Queen Regent during his absence.
Sidney delayed his departure for Dublin in the spring and summer of
1692 in order to be available to advise Queen Mary, since at that
particular time the fear of a possible French invasion was quite strong.
On May 28, 1692, Sidney, along with the Earls of Portland and Rochester,
was sent by Queen Mary to Portsmouth to distribute 50,000 among the
seamen of Admiral Edward Russell after his famous victory over the
French at La Hogue.59

Sidney's subsequent career at Court after 1689 was not
entirely without mishap, however. On March 31, 1692, he appeared
before the Privy Council to answer bribery charges which had been
lodged against him by Sir Rowland Gwyn. According to Narcissus
Luttrell, Sidney was accused by Sir Rowland of having sold several
offices when he had served as Secretary of State for the North. This
may simply have been an attempt to discredit Sidney before Queen Mary

(King William being absent from England at the time) so that Sir

 

57Luttrell, Brief Relation'gfi State Affairs, Vol. II, p. 174.

salbide, pa ‘63e sglgide, pe 465a

 

245

Rowland could advance either himself or a protégé waiting in the wings.
At any rate, Henry Sidney exonerated himself before Queen Mary and the
Privy Council, and the accusation itself was declared to be ”false,
frivolous, and scandalous."60

Henry Sidney died of smallpox on April 8, 1704. Like his
older brother Algernon before him, Henry had never married. Henry
Sidney's death followed the pattern of his political and diplomatic
life style: it was quiet and perhaps even a bit obscure. Henry's
demise certainly lacked the spectacle and drama that his brother
Algernon's death possessed. But this was so much like the man himself.
In life Henry Sidney was quite content simply to perform his official
and unofficial duties without a lot of heroics or grand flourish. He
loved working behind the scenes and was a first-rate intriguer whose
loyalty could be depended upon. Unlike his brother Algernon, Henry
Sidney was skilled in the arts of political survival. Even though he
possessed a streak of laziness and would have been bored beyond
description with his brother's meticulous analysis of political theory
and practice, Henry Sidney possessed to a high degree the instinctive

ability to look out for and protect his own interests.

 

Golbide, pe 412a See also ppe 404, 407a

C H A P T E R V I I I

A C 0 N C L U S I 0 N

The public careers of Algernon and Henry Sidney illustrate
the two-fold theme of general political opposition and individual
efforts at political survival. In the case of each brother, opposition
was directed against one or more Stuart monarchs. In Algernon's case,
he not only distrusted and disliked every Stuart he came in contact
with, but he also learned to distrust the institution of monarchy in
general. A good and wise King was an exception, not the rule as far
as Algernon Sidney was concerned. Thus, Algernon's opposition was
considerably broader in concept than was his brother Henry's, since it
included not only certain individuals within its framework, but
basically the institution of monarchy itself. Algernon's critical
gaze, which was very harsh and demanding most of the time, was broader
and much more intellectual in nature than was Henry's. Algernon's
fatal blunder was that he truly believed at times that his opposition
views would be listened to and respected by the very monarchs whom he
was criticizing. His naiveté on some occasions knew no bounds.
Algernon's opposition was based upon a comprehensive study of
contemporary political institutions in general and on English political
institutions and history in particular. It is ironic indeed that for
an intelligent man with his developed sense of history, Algernon Sidney

246

247

should have been so careless and naive regarding his approach to
opposition under a Stuart monarch like Charles II. The modern concept
of a loyal opposition never found any favor with a Stuart monarch, and
yet Algernon at times behaved and thought as if such a sophisticated
concept was in fact acceptable and even welcome.

Henry Sidney, on the other hand, approached the problem of
opposition with a completely different perspective. He was neither a
man of high and rigid principles nor an intellectual with a comprehensive
and critical outlook on men and institutions. Henry never bothered to
articulate his political philosophy, if indeed he possessed one at all.
His reasons for opposing James II are obscure at best. If he possessed
his brother's hatred and fear of Catholicism, there is no clear
indication of it in his glery or in his surviving letters investigated
for this study. Henry Sidney's concept of opposition was more a
curious blend of devotion to Prince William of Orange, and whatever
cause he might choose for himself, and a desire to further his own
interests any way that he could. Conditions during the reign of James II
allowed both of these aspects to coalesce for Henry. He was able to
combine his natural charm and good-natured disposition with his superb
ability as an intriguer to aid William's cause in 1688 and also to
further his own interests. Much in contrast to his brother Algernon,
Henry Sidney was a realist regarding his own opposition. Though he
lacked Algernon's intellectual prowess and his ability to analyze
critically on a wide scale, Henry compensated for this by being a
practical men who kept a cool head at all times.

Both Algernon and Henry Sidney deserve to be classified as

Whigs, but for different reasons. Each brother was representative of

248
a different type of Whig, and the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81 allows
the historian to examine both brothers in action at the same time,
each pursuing his own style of Whiggery. In the case of Algernon, his
Whiggery was much more in the open and more easily recognizable. He
viewed Charles II as a corrupt and decadent monarch who possessed a
natural tendency toward absolutism. Just as important, however, was
Algernon's loathing and fear of the King's Catholic brother. This
distrust and fear of James, Duke of York, was really the cement which
held most of the Whigs together during the Crisis years of 1679-81.
Algernon made it quite clear that England would be in great peril if
James ever became King. Because of his personal experiences with
Stuart monarchs, Sidney contended that restraints had to be placed
upon the Royal power. In his Qiseeurees, he developed the compact
theory of government and the related concept of the right of the
people to overthrow an unjust monarch. By the term ”the people,"
Algernon meant the traditional aristocracy and gentry of England: he
was no leveling democrat who viewed the masses as competent voters and
judges. To the Whiggism that arose from the Exclusion Crisis,
Algernon contributed not only his philosophical speculation and
analysis of government, but he also injected his own devotion to
classical republicanism. In his devotion to this particular creed,
Algernon stood almost alone during the Crisis years. Other English
devotees to this concept of government either had died by 1679, or had
been exiled. Algernon envisioned for England a type of government
reminiscent of the two periods of brief Commonwealth rule during the
1650's. That was Algernon Sidney's ideal, a classical republican

commonwealth for England.

249

Conditions and circumstances in England during the 1680's
demonstrated that Algernon's style of Wiggism and concept of opposition
would not occupy the center stage of the political arena. Events
would not be influenced or managed by theorists or philosophers.
Instead, events would be managed (with a considerable amount of luck
and good timing) by Whiggish politicians of a more practical type
among whom Henry Sidney could be listed. When the Exclusion Crisis
began in 1679, Henry decided that his own personal interests could
best be served by remaining at Court where positions could be obtained,
not by joining the Earl of Shaftesbury and his followers in the
wilderness of organized political opposition. Although Henry was not
particularly fond of James, Duke of York, he did get along well with
Charles II. Besides, his main goal in life was still the furthering
of his own interests, and that could best be done at Court. During
his term as Special Envoy to the United Provinces, Henry Sidney was
able to develop a strong connection for himself with Prince William of
Orange. Like many middle-of-the-road English politicians who favored
the Duke of York's exclusion, but who were also reluctant to break
openly with Charles II, Henry Sidney preferred to follow a policy of
”waiting upon events.” In this respect he shared much in common with
Court politicians like the Savile brothers, Sir William Temple, Sir
Henry Capel, and Sidney Godolphin. As was the case with these
politicians, Henry's forte was diplomacy and intrigue. Only once did
Henry Sidney find himself in an uncomfortable political situation, and
that was in 1680-81 over the Second Exclusion Bill. Even so, he
merely lost his diplomatic position, not his head. Henry was able to

utilize his important connection with William of Orange during

250

James II's brief reign to the point where he performed a significant
function in William's ”grand design." From Henry Sidney's point of
view, three distinct but related types of interests coincided in the
critical year of 1688: his own, Prince William's, and England's. This
Sidney brother was not concerned with philosophical hair-splitting,
but rather with his own political survival, and that survival could
best be ensured by hitching his wagon to William's rising star.

The problem now remains of trying to determine the degree
to which each brother was a success or a failure. It would be
pointless and rather simplistic to attempt rating each Sidney brother
on an absolute scale. Even though Algernon would certainly have done
it that way, such a method contracts one's historical perspective dawn
to an intolerably narrow margin. Success is a relative quantity: It
is a combination of a number of factors such as the times themselves,
an individual's personality, luck and good timing, and the individual's
personal interests and goals. A proper measurement of success also
depends to a great extent upon whether the historian is basing his
determination upon a short-term basis or upon a long-term one. Finally,
when any historian attempts to measure success or failure for an
historical personality, he invariably injects part of himself and his
own background into the whole process. This is unavoidable because,
in truth, the historian is making a subjective, though supposedly
intelligent, judgment.

With these factors in mind, let us consider Henry Sidney
first of all. One of his most striking characteristics was his ability
to get along well with people. He was a natural courtier at a time

and place when this type of a person could carve out a niche for

251
himself, with a little effort and the proper connections. Henry used
his talents and connections extremely well, and he managed to survive
a turbulent political period in admirable fashion. His goals in life
were his own survival and advancement, and since he achieved both, he
must be judged a success on that basis. In addition to this, Henry
Sidney played an important role in bringing William of Orange to
England in the fateful year of 1688. History will remember Henry as
one of the Immortal Seven, although he will probably remain one of the
more obscure members of the group, like Lord Lumley. Nevertheless, he
has achieved a small degree of historical immortality, even though the
historian must look long and hard to catch a fleeting glimpse of him.
Henry Sidney did not influence any events after 1688, much less after
his own death in 1704. Because of this and because he left posterity
with few written records of himself besides his Qlery, Henry has sunk
into a timeless obscurity. It is hoped that this work lifts away some
of that obscurity and brings Henry Sidney a bit closer to the fringes
of centerstage where he loved to maneuver. Henry should be judged a
considerable success in his own lifetime, and that is precisely what
he wanted for himself.

The process of evaluation for Algernon Sidney, however,
leads the historian to an entirely different set of conclusions.
Algernon was proud of the fact that from the 1640's until his death in
1683, he had rigidly adhered to a set of principles and had opposed
tyranny in whatever form he encountered it. Indeed, this is a very
admirable quality in a human being. Unfortunately, this same quality,

combined with his pride and arrogance, helped bring about his downfall.

Algernon's trial and execution for treason in 1683 proved that he

252
lacked the ability to survive as an opposition figure in a turbulent
period of English history. Neither was Algernon Sidney very successful
or influential as a Whig philosopher or theorist in his own lifetime.
Even though a number of Englishmen shared Algernon's devotion to
classical republicanism during the 1650's, by the 1680's Algernon
found himself practically alone in his devotion to that creed. When
Sidney perished on the executioner's block for his alleged treason,
classical republicanism, as a major current of Whig thought,
essentially died with him. The eighteenth century might remember this
Sidney brother as a political martyr to Stuart absolutism, but it
would not honor him as one whose writings had helped shape that
century's political or constitutional attitudes. In fact, his writings
would not even be honored as having had had the same influence upon
events in 1688-89 as those of John Locke were so honored, despite the
fact that chapter two of Sidney's Qleeeereee is very similar to Locke's
second treatise as far as content is concerned. Even though both works
were inspired by the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-81, John Locke has
mistakenly received all the credit for having articulated those ideas
and concepts that were later used by eager Whigs to justify the events
of 1688-89 in England. This is true despite the fact that Sidney also
articulated such concepts as the compact theory of government and the
right of the people to overthrow an unjust King. Since the same
political crisis inspired both men to come up with similar ideas about
the nature of government, Algernon Sidney is entitled to at least some
of the credit which John Locke has had entirely to himself all of these
years.

Even though Algernon Sidney's writings and ideas had very

253

little impact upon eighteenth-century English Whiggism, they definitely
had an impact upon the American counterpart during the Revolutionary
period. After closely examining the English constitution, American
Revolutionary leaders in the 1760's and 1770's decided that it had been
crippled almost beyond repair by a hopelessly corrupt Parliament and by
a tyrannical King. In their search for political principles and
concepts with which to bolster their cause, these American Whigs
naturally turned for inspiration to classical Greece and Rome and also
to English political thinkers of the seventeenth century like John
Milton, James Harrington, John Locke, and Algernon Sidney. The
seventeenth century was really a Golden Age of English political
writing, and its best philosophers provided American Whigs not only
with political concepts, but with inspiration for a cause as well. In
short, the eighteenth-century American concept of Republicanism was
based quite heavily upon English political philosophy articulated in
the seventeenth century, plus the American notion of Old World
corruptness.1

Algernon Sidney's ideas can be linked directly to two
important American Revolutionary leaders in particular, John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson. A careful reading of Sidney's Qleeeereee_formed
pert ofAdams's early education, and clear references to a number of

Sidney's ideas can be found in some of Adams's later political

 

1For an excellent discussion of the intellectural background
for American Whiggism, see in particular Gordon S. Wood, Ihe greetion

.2£.202.AMEEIQEO.83222112: 1726-]7§2 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 3-45. Also well worth investigating is

A. J. Beitzinger, _A_ History 91 Amerieen Erllgleel Theught (New York:
DOdd, Mead, & c009 1972)e

254
writings.2 As a very elderly man, Adams extolled the virtues of
Sidney's Qleeeereee for the benefit of his friend Thomas Jefferson.
In a letter to Jefferson dated September 17, 1823, Adams propounded:
I have lately undertaken to read Algernon Sidney on
government. There is a great difference in reading a book
at four-and-twenty and at eighty-eight. As often as I have
read it and fumbled it over, it now excites fresh admira-
tion that this work has excited so little interest in the
literary world.
Adams felt that Sidney's Qleeourses should be published in America not
only because of the "intrinsic merits of the work," but because of the
evidence the book provided of the "bitter sufferings of the advocate
of liberty from that time to this.”3
In the case of Jefferson, there is evidence proving that
Sidney's Qleeeereee provided some of the inspiration for that brilliant
Virginian when he wrote the Declaration of Independence. In a letter
written by Jefferson to Henry Lee on May 8, 1825, Jefferson denied that
his original intention in 1776 had been to articulate new political
principles or philosophical arguments. Instead, the Declaration itself
was intended to be "an expression of the American mind.“ The actual
authority for this expression rested upon what Jefferson termed ”the
harmonizing sentiments of the day," or those ideas that had been made
manifest in works by such thinkers as Aristotle, Cicero, John Locke,

and Algernon Sidney. The political writings of these four men, and

others as well, were termed ”elementary books of public right" by

 

2Charles Francis Adams, ed., The yerks‘efi,John Agems (1O
vols.: Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1850-56), Vol. IV, pp. 80,
420-23.

31mg” Vol. x, pp. 410-11.

256
Jefferson.4 It is clear, then, that Algernon Sidney's ideas on the
nature of government did survive him, and they definitely helped
influence and inspire certain men in a revolutionary cause, but in a

manner which Sidney could never have envisioned.

 

4Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., The Writings gfi'Thomas Jefferson
(20 vols.: Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Association, 1904), Vol. XVI, pp. 117-19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Before looking at the basic primary and secondary source
materials that are essential for the study of each Sidney brother
separately, it is necessary to investigate a few types of sources that
were applicable to both brothers. The beginning stages of the
dissertation would have been much more difficult without HeeeereElee
[fiegleeg, 1§60-]§§2 (Cambridge: 1971), which is a superb bibliographical
handbook compiled by William L. Sachse for the Conference on British
Studies. Every bibliography essentially is outdated as soon as it is
published, but this particular work will dominate its field for some
time. Also of merit was Stephen Leslie and Sidney Lee, eds.,
Mm 911 3.1119091 W, 63 vols. (London: 1885-1900).
Volume LII of this work provided a valuable article on each of the
Sidney brothers, and other volumes provided useful background material
for such people as Gilbert Burnet and John Evelyn. A work commonly

referred to simply as the G.E.C. Eeereee, which is a revised and

enlarged edition of George E. Cokayne, 111! W Eeereee e; Englen ,
522513.01: M: mm: Emmy-.2992!!! 13 V013-
(London: 1910-59), is the best source to consult for detailed
information on specific aristocratic titles and noble families prior
to the twentieth century. When the need arose for information of that
nature, this source proved to be invaluable.

There are a few primary source materials found applicable

256

257
for both brothers. The W efi m Helm Hereeey, edited by Andrew
Browning (Glasgow: 1936), is one of the best sources of this type
available to the student of the Restoration period. Sir John was a
careful observer, and his comments and opinions, though frequently in
need of grammatical revision, are of considerable value for the
historian. Also valuable for both Sidney brothers, but especially for
Henry Sidney, is the collection of letters and documents edited by the
eighteenth-century Scottish lawyer, Sir John Dalrymple, and entitled
MM _gfi rm m egg mg, 2 vols., second edition (London:
1771-3). The peculiar organization of this work makes it a bit
confusing at times to work with, but it contains literally dozens of
extremely valuable letters. A very careful perusal of the m 21:
m m. was. 2:. me 5.9m 2:; suspen- m... can-
CDXXXIII (Great Britain: Public Record Office) turned up a wealth of
detailed information on the Sidney brothers. Information is sometimes
difficult to extract from these volumes because of poor indexing, but
the patient researcher is ultimately rewarded for his labors. It is
indeed fortunate that the Michigan State University Library possesses
a complete set of the Historical Manuscripts Commission's Seventy-

Seventh Report, the De um; mm. 7 vols. (London: 1966).
This is an extremely valuable collection of Sidney family letters and

papers. Volume VI, 5.191121 Emre, 1219:1922: proved to be very useful
for this dissertation. A letter received from the county archivist,
Kent Archives Office, Maidstone, Kent, England on July 9, 1974,
provided some beneficial information on Algernon Sidney's birthdate.

A source which deserves special mention, especially because

of its relation to Henry Sidney's career, is Thomas Burnet, ed.,

258
3.1.9.022 W W 9}; H13 M 1m, 2 vols. (London: 1809).
Gilbert Burnet has the personality of an old maid aunt, but his work is
interesting to read and is a rich source of information for the
Restoration period. In many ways the work is more like a personal
memoir, since Burnet literally knew most of the people of his time.
Technically speaking, however, the work was compiled after the events
discussed in it actually took place. Nevertheless, no serious student
of the period can call himself an expert unless he has thoroughly
acquainted himself with this work.

There are numerous secondary works that provide the serious
student with a thorough and comprehensive background for the
seventeenth century. The appropriate volumes in the 95:2!!! Hlstory 9;
M deserve mention first: Godfrey Davies, 10.! fierly Me, 60 -
1m, second edition (Oxford: 1963), and Sir George Clark, Lee L222}:
.egg.;;§,.1§§g;1111, second edition (Oxford: 1965). The most prolific
writer (and perhaps the best writer) on the seventeenth century is
Christopher Hill. Most of his efforts are concerned with the years
prior to the Restoration. Nevertheless, everything he has written
should be eagerly consumed, especially his latest work entitled‘lee
my mm Me (New York: 1972). Two books by David Ogg
deserve praise for their careful scholarship and readability: fiegleeg
1.0.5119. Beige 9]: Cherles ll, second edition (New York: 1967), and
mammawmw (NB-I York! 1969)-
The best background for the problems leading up to the civil war in
Charles I's reign can be found in C. V. Wedgwood, 1.0.9. m 2332;.
1637-51 (New York: 1955). A short, but quite good, overview of the

century can be extracted from 5. Reed Brett, lee,§tuart gentury: 603-

259
1115 (London: 1964). The best single volume dealing with the Earl of
Shaftesbury's Whigs is J. R. Jones, 115 film Will-Bil m Hellfire e_f_‘
3He_figeleeleeufirlele, 1678:§3 (London: 1961). The best history of

the Tories is Keith Failing, A Hietory 21231.9.” P t , W
(Oxford: 1929). An excellent recent study, which should be read by
anyone who considers himself a scholar of the period, is J. R.
western. Weed o ut om mmmmmmwz
(London: 1972).

Fortunately, there are a number of important printed
collections of primary source materials pertaining to Algernon Sidney
that are available to the scholar in this country. The very best
edition of Sidney's W W W is the one edited
by John Toland (London: 1698). It is auspicious indeed that the
Michigan State University Special Collections possesses one of the few

copies of this rare book. An edition published in 1763 includes his

W plus a number of other items: WW
WMMM: 1.1.191: m 0 0 . swimmers
Llfie,(London: 1763). A number of valuable letters can also be found
in R. W. Blencowe, ed., mm: Wefieiomleiflu
Mathew. Emu“ 8 flmm (London!
1825), and Arthur Collins, ed., Lire m m m M efi
.33311: 2 vols. (London: 1746). A few useful letters can be found in
T- Foster. ..., more. Lamp situate. 53.9mm. 29.9
m 1.21;! W (London: 1830). Sidney's treason trial is
available in two other sources in addition to the one listed above:
Hrreignment, hlel _a_n_g Qendemeetion g1: ngernon filing, L33. fer HleH
hm (London: 1684), and Cebbett's m; W 91: 55.5.9.

26D
lrlele, Vol. Ix (London: 1811). The two specific sources that fall

into the category of personal chronicles and that are very useful are

E. S. De Beer, ed., negleryplgemm 6 vols. (Oxford: 1955),
Charles Harding Firth, ed., The Mire 91mg Lem, 1625-167 , 2

vols. (Oxford: 1894). A genuine feeling for and understanding of
the political and constitutional aspects of the Exclusion Crisis can
be secured by reading the appropriate speeches and debates in gebbetl's
WWQLM, Vol. IV (London: 1808).

The only biography of Algernon Sidney was written by
Alexander C. Ewald in the latter part of the nineteenth century: .IDE
ufie end we £11 £09. H933. Alger-9mm, 2 vols. (London: 1873).
Criticisms of Ewald's Whiggish interpretation of Sidney can be found
throughout Part One of this work. Suffice it to say that the work is
in desperate need of revision: Algernon Sidney deserves a good, short
scholarly biography. The work does have one tremendous strongpoint,
however: dozens of important letters are printed in full for the
reader's benefit. This alone makes the book worthwhile.

Numerous other biographical studies of Algernon's
contemporaries should be briefly noted. The most scholarly study of

the talented Earl of Shaftesbury is Kenneth H. D. Haley, IHe,Eiret
ml 91‘, W (Oxford: 1968). A good. recent biography of

Charles II is Maurice Ashley, W, l"! m aed gee em
(London: 1971). Other pertinent biographies are Maurice Ashley,

Jghn W: Pletter egg W (New Haven: 1947): Maurice

Cranston, mm: A W (New York: 1957): Mary Maples Dunn,
Wllliee Benn: 2°11t1£§.229HEQD§£l222£ (Princeton: 1967): James

Ferguson, BQEEEE Ferguson lHe_Pletter (Edinburgh: 1887); and Helen

261

Foxcroft, LHe Life 931 Let_ter§ 9_f_ fiegrge fieylle, Her_., £lr_s_t_ Marguis
efflHellfiey, 2 vols. (London: 1898). Two recent biographies of Judge
Jeffreys should be investigated by any scholar interested in shaking
off any remaining vestiges of Lord Macaulay's Whiggish interpretation
of the man before whom Sidney was tried for treason: P. J. Helm,
imam: ammo t 1 mummwmiemm" (New mm
1966), and C. W. Keaton, 5:23.! CHaeeeller Jeffreys egg _t_|1e M Cause

(London: 1965). Algernon Sidney's connection with Sir Henry Vane can

 

be better appreciated by reading Violet Rowe, 5;; Henry 13.11% mg
helper: _A_ M lg Ml m Adminlstrariye Hletgry (London:
1970).

A few monographs and non-biographical secondary works
deserve particular mention. A decidedly dull but necessary book is

Zara S. Fink, [be Hegel-eel W (Menaska, Wisconsin: 1945).

A work which proved to be very necessary in the preparation of chapter
five is William Holdsworth, A Hletery _o_( m m, Vols. VI, VIII
(London: 1925). This work is a definitive classic, and the sections
dealing with treason were invaluable. Finally, sections of Caroline
Robbins, 1.09. W W (New York: 1968) were
interesting.

An excellent background for Algernon Sidney's connection
with the American Revolution can be established with the following
books: Gordon Wood, 1.0.9. EM efi the emerleen HM, 1776-1787

(Chapel Hill: 1969), and A. J. Beitzinger, 8.11m 91: AME-m
IHeeeHl (New York: 1972). These secondary works should be supplemented

with the following primary source collections: Charles Francis Adams,

ed., Ihe‘flergeuefi John Aeems, 1O vols. (Boston: 1850-56): Andrew A.

262
Lipscomb, ed., 1.0.8. Hrllings _o_fi Me Heffierson, 20 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: 1904): and Paul Wilstach, ed., wagging-259$
.IDQEEEHJEEEEEERQ.(N9W York: 1966). This writer is also indebted for
his overall view of the American Revolution and pre-Revolutionary
society to a series of lectures delivered by Professor Peter Levine of
Michigan State University during the spring term of 1974.

There are a few scholarly journal articles that can provide
an excellent background for the turmoil of the Exclusion Crisis. Two
articles in particular concern themselves with the political terminology
of the period: Wilbur C. Abbott, “What Was a Whig," IDQHQ2225.£2£
Eelllleel Helry, ed., Stanley Pargellis (Washington, D.C.: 1944), and
Robert Willmen, "The Origins of 'Whig' and 'Tory' in English Political

Language,” ID§.fll§£2£1£2L Joureel, XVII (June, 1974), 247-64. Other

very beneficial articles include: Carolyn A. Edie, "Succession and
Monarchy: the Controversy of 1679-81," Hmerlean Hislorieal Heyley, LXX
(January, 1965), 350-70: J. P. Kenyon, ”The Exclusion Crisis," Hlelery
Leda. XIV (April, May, 1964), 252-9, 1544-9. and rpm-1.. Lipson,
"Elections to the Exclusion Parliaments, 1679-1681." EegllefluflleEereel
(Heylee, XXVIII (January, 1913), 59-85.

There exists a wealth of journal articles that provided
pertinent information and useful concepts on various aspects of
Algernon Sidney's life. There are two important articles on Sir
Robert Filmer and his ideas: William H. Greenleaf, "Filmer's
Patriarchal History,"llneHHlelerleel Joureel, IX (no. 2, 1966), 157-
71: and Peter Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man Versus the Whig
Myth," WMQ, third series, V (October, 1948), 523-46. Two weighty

articles by Raymond W. K. Hinton deserve special notice: "Husbands,

263
Fathers and Conquerors, I: Filmer and the Logic of Patriarchalism,"
Eflllllfillnilflfliflflo XV (no. 3, 1967), 291-300: and ”Husbands, Fathers
and Conquerors, II: Patriarchalism in Hobbes and Locke,” W
filefllee, XVI (no. 1, 1968), 55-67. Also of considerable value are the
following: A. F. Havingturst, ”The Judiciary and Politics in the Reign
of Charles II,” Lee_fleer£erlyufleylee, LXVI (January, April, 1950), 62-
78, 229-52; Roger Howell, ”Henry Vane the Younger and the Politics of
Religion,”‘Hlerery Leggy, XIII (1963), 275-82: Peter Laslett, "The
English Revolution and Locke's Two Treatises on Government," Qeebriege
Hlererleelnleereel, XII (no. 1, 1956), 40-55; J. H. M. Salmon,
"Algernon Sidney and the Rye House Plot,”‘HlereryHLeeey, IV (October,
1954), 698-705: and V. F. Snow, "The Concept of Revolution in
Seventeenth Century England,"[Hlelerleel,geeree_, V (no. 2, 1962),
167-74.

Whereas there is an abundance of printed primary source
material relating to Algernon Sidney, such is certainly not the case
with his elusive brother Henry. The best single printed source for
Henry Sidney is his Qlery, edited in two volumes by R. W. Blencowe
(London: 1843). On many occasions, Henry was a less than enthusiastic
compiler of his own thoughts, and consequently, several notations have
all the zest of an abbreviated weather report. Fortunately, however,
the editor included a large number of personal letters, and these
letters are a considerable help in clarifying and explaining the
circumstances surrounding many of Henry's cryptic entries. On occasions,
Henry could write detailed entries in his‘Qlery, but more often he
would put his thoughts into letters. Because of his streak of laziness,

Henry was prone to be incredibly careless concerning the spelling of

264
personal names and place names. In two years, he never mastered
William Bentinck's name.

A few other printed sources, after a long and patient search,
yielded a few stray letters and documents that added to the knowledge
about Henry Sidney. Of some use was Nicolaas Japikse, ed.,'§erreeeee-
me; no. W 911 m 8.91.11 Willis! Bentinck. 4 vols- (The Hague:
1927-37). The following collections yielded some worthwhile ideas and
facts: Samuel W. Singer, ed., Wgfimm, §_a_rl 91
mmmmmm. Miriam. 2 vols-
(London: 1828), and Jonathan Swift, ed., 1H3, geek; e; 531. We
lemele, Bart., 4 vols. (Edinburgh: 1754). The best source for Henry

Sidney's activities after 1688 is Narcissus Luttrell, H,§rle£_Historieal
My; 91 5.92.5.9. Affielre m M _te m4, 6 vols. (Oxford: 1857).
This particular work is repetitious, dull, and anything but ”brief,”
but it does contain much valuable information on this Sidney brother.
It is unfortunate that the process of scholarly extraction must be so

monotonous. Henry Sidney is also mentioned briefly in a very recent

publication: Henry Horwitz, ed., T_He We” Diery e_f_ Nareissus
Lellrell,(0xford: 1972).

A considerable number of secondary books proved to be quite
valuable for a solid background of the contemporary people and events
relating to Henry Sidney. The most outstanding biography of William
of Orange is still Stephen Baxter, Hllllee_lll (London: 1966). A very
recent work by Henri and Barbara Van Der Zee, Mlle; egg fiery (New
York: 1973), is prejudicial in its treatment of Henry Sidney. A good,
short work on these two monarchs is John Miller, 1.09. Life egg liege 9!;

Wllllee,end‘flery_(London: 1974). This particular book also contains

265

an outstanding reproduction of a portrait of Henry Sidney by the noted
English painter Godfrey Kneller. Another very useful biography is J.
P. Kenyon, 32931.35. Mr, Eerl_o_f_ W 1341:1192 (London: 1958).

Two old, but still useful works are James Muilenburg, Lee
isnuusaasu:£3uuaauwl!so1W3a_s. tarsus! Bikinis. is E29lead.in.ié§1
(Lincoln, Nebraska: 1920), and James Ralph, A Him 31: inglend
magmas.- wales. Q. m. awn- mu. v.1. I
(London: 1744). Ralph was a surprisingly good scholar who not only
did his research well, but who also cited the sources for his
statements.

There are quite a few good monographic studies on the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the serious student should read them
all. An outstanding book which gives an overall view of the events
leading up to 1688 is John Carswell, 1.09. 933mg 9;; M (London:
1969). Another superb work which contains the most recent interpretation
of the Revolution is J. R. Jones, 109. W 9:, my; will
(London: 1973). Two other scholarly and salient efforts are Maurice
Ashley, 103. W W 9_1_'_ 1.99.9. (London: 1966), and Stuart

Prall, MW Reyoletlen: M, 1% (Garden City, New York:
1972). '

There are only a few journal articles of importance that
have any direct bearing on Henry Sidney or on the events relating to
him. Jenneth H. D. Haley, "A List of the English Peers, May, 1687,"
WWW LXIX (April, 1954), 302-6, contains a
\Ialuable document. Three invaluable letters from Sunderland to Henry
Sidney are printed in J. P. Kenyon, "Charles II and William of Orange

in 1680," BIHR, XXX (1957), 95-101. Also of importance are the

266
following: J. R. Jones, "James II's Whig Collaborators,"‘_He Hlstorieal
Heurnal, III (1960), 65-73: J. P. Kenyon, ”The Earl of Sunderland and
the Revolution of 1688," m WM XI (no. 3. 1955),
272-96; and R. Thomas, "The Seven Bishops and Their Petition, 18 May
1688," JEH, XII (1961), 56-70. Unfortunately, no scholar has bothered
to take much more than a passing interest in Henry Sidney or even to
publish any essays of a biographical or interpretive nature on this
man. Admittedly, he is much more difficult to trace than is his
brother Algernon, but he still deserves some scholarly research on his
life and career that would lead to publication. Perhaps that situation

can be changed.