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Collective Solidarity and Combat
Role Performance
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A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COLLECTIVE SOLIDARITY AND
COMBAT ROLE PERFORMANCE

By

Roger William Little

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of
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ABSTRACT

The relationship between an actor's combat role behavior and his membership in primary groups, as components of larger formal structures, was studied in an Infantry company in combat in Korea. It was assumed that combat role performance was affected by the degree to which members of the organization shared common normative standards. A conceptual scheme based on the work of Homans and Parsons was employed to test these hypotheses: (1) In the performance of a combat role, the actor is influenced by the elements of a collectivity in which he shares sentiments of solidarity. (2) As the degree of risk in the combat situation increases, the actor is influenced less frequently by the elements of the collectivity in the performance of his combat role.

In the course of the study, extending over a period of five months, the company was exposed to four tactical situations involving varied degrees of risk: (1) an outpost position, with maximum risk; (2) tactical reserve, with intensive patrolling; (3) positions on the main line of resistance; (4) reserve and retraining, a period in which tactical activity was minimal.

It is concluded that actors were united as collectivities on dimensions of status, authority, and risk. The influence of each collectivity on the actor's role performance varied with the tactical activity of the company. The status and authority dimensions

increased in significance as the degree of risk declined. In tactical reserve and in positions on the line, collectivities of risk were of primary significance, intersecting the dimensions of status and authority.

The basic social unit in the performance of a combat task consisted of two or more "buddies" who shared a position of risk. A buddy was selected when a condition of mutual risk was recognized. The sentiments of the collectivity referred primarily to minimizing the degree of risk entailed in the performance of a combat role. In a crisis situation the actor anticipated that he would act in terms of his commitment to the collectivity of buddies rather than the sentiments of the external system, including the ideals of the organization.

As risk declined in tactical activity there was a corresponding increase in the amount of ritual activity in the external system, expressing a relationship between the actor as an individual or as a collectivity, and combat events.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between an actor's combat role behavior and his membership in primary groups as components of larger formal structures is an important problem in the sociology of military organization. Military writers have stressed the motivational significance of emulation and of moral commitment to abstract symbols and national ideals. Recent research indicates that primary groups within combat units develop value standards and behavior patterns which are relatively independent of the formal structure of military organization. This study attempts to indicate how these relational systems are developed, to specify their constituent elements as partial social systems, and to define the relations between such systems and the formal structure of military organization.

A. The Problem

The present study assumes that combat role behavior is affected by the degree to which members of the organization share common normative standards. "Collective solidarity" exists when two or more members of an organization, referred to as "actors", conceive of their relationship to one another as involving a moral obligation to act in conformity and in concert with shared value standards. Two or more persons united by such relationships are defined as a

"collectivity".

A description and analysis of the activities of an infantry rifle company, in and near combat, as a social system, is presented. The purpose of the study is to determine whether, and to what extent, membership in a collectivity influences the actor in the performance of his combat role. Collectivities are differentiated in terms of relative degrees of risk, status, and power. The data consist of interviews and observations made by the investigator over a period of three months as a participant-observer with a rifle company in Korea, from November 16, 1952, through February 20, 1953.

A conceptual scheme is developed which combines several lines of thought and investigation. First is the early distinction made by Durkheim between mechanical and organic solidarity, and his later formulation of the concept of collective solidarity. There followed the development of the concepts of the formal and informal social structures in industrial organizations, theoretically by Bernard, and empirically by Roethlisberger and Dickson. The concept appears to have originated from many earlier sociological concepts distinguishing between rational organizational forms, and affectively significant social relational systems.

Two more recent theoretical developments have been of primary significance in this study. First, Homans has developed a conceptual scheme embracing the formal-informal dichotomy, but specifying the constituent analytical elements as "activity, interaction, and sentiment". This scheme is basic to the present study. A major defect,

the inability to define the relation between the external and internal systems, has been resolved by the use of the concepts of the collectivity and of collective solidarity as formulated by Parsons. It is believed that this conceptual scheme constitutes a significant step beyond existing frames of reference for the analysis of combat role behavior and the sociology of military organization.

B. Review of the Literature

Military writers have consistently recognized the importance of the collectivity in combat behavior but have stressed the relationship between the collectivity and formal organization. Only one (Marshall) has supported his assertions with empirical evidence, and all are concerned primarily with aspects of leadership. While noting that the actor's collectivity membership does influence tactical behavior, they usually assert that such influence is always in conformity with organizational goals. Du Picq and Marshall are leading examples of this approach.

Du Picq's BATTLE STUDIES has long been a basic text in military schools and has had wide influence on the development of command doctrine. The "studies" are a series of speculations on combat motivation in ancient and modern armies. His description of the collectivity is typical of the military writers of his period:

"... From living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from cooperation among men who quickly understand each other

in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all, unity. The duty of obedience, the right of imposing discipline, and the impossibility of escaping from it, would naturally follow."¹

Thus du Picq attributes the development of the collectivity to emulation and interaction, but explains away the possibility of collective deviance.

Marshall does recognize the possibility of deviance from the normative standards of military organization, but attributes such deviance to the actor's personality rather than the social structure. His data consist of interviews with combat infantrymen of about four hundred companies in the European and Pacific theaters in World War II. The interviews were conducted in the presence of commanders. From the responses, Marshall concluded that only fifteen percent of the participants in a combat event had fired their weapons at either enemy positions or personnel in the course of an engagement, while the "really active firers were usually in small groups working together". He attributes the low rate of fire of the riflemen to the socialization experience of American soldiers which, he asserts, fosters an aversion to killing.²

Marshall distinguishes between "social relationships" which he isolates without comment, and "tactical relationships" which are the basis of his analysis. This appears to be a distinction between formal and informal organization. He indicates further,

however, that "the spiritual unity of men on the battlefield" can be employed by the commander to increase the rate of fire. This can be done by identifying the men who fire their weapons rapidly and frequently in an engagement, and assigning them to positions where their behavior will influence men who do not fire. Because firing and aggressive action are ideal behavior patterns of military organization, Marshall implies that the collectivity will be influenced by the "visible presence" of individuals who accept and act toward those goals:

".... But ... the NCO who cannot exercise fire initiative will lose the respect of his men as quickly as his weakness is observed by them in battle. Even the soldier who cannot overcome a similar weakness in himself will look with contempt on a superior who appears to shirk his duty because of danger."³

Marshall's explanation is basically psychiatric. Stated as a hypothesis he would appear to contend that the childhood experiences of American men condition them against effective combat role behavior. This hypothesis would be supported by the 85 percent who failed to fire their weapons during an engagement. But what about the other 15 percent? Were their childhood experiences different? And what selective factors operated to place the "really active firers" with apparently distinctive childhood experiences, in small groups who worked together or on crew-served weapons? The weight of Marshall's evidence supports a situational rather than a personality explanation.

Interpretations of combat behavior by psychiatrists have been based largely on inferences drawn from individual cases and have stressed the importance of various features of formal organization, such as indoctrination, reward and punishment, and officer leaders. They note the relationship between the collectivity and the actor's personality, but fail to distinguish the collectivity from formal organization. Thus the Bartemeier report states:

"... The organized pattern of the unit and its emotional bonds constitute the dominant constructive and integrative force for the individual soldier in his fighting function. This group life is his inner life. ..."4

Grinker and Spiegel, in an analysis of psychiatric casualties in the Air Force in World War II, arrive at similar conclusions. They assert that the intensified personal relationships and close individual identification with the group are dependent on the quality of leadership. They note that the men of combat units appear to be fighting for someone rather than against somebody, and assuming that the leaders are the objects of their men's affection, conclude that for this "self-sacrifice" the leaders must return their men's "loyalty and affection" in kind.⁶

Psychiatric literature thus follows the pattern of military writers: the collectivity is recognized as a collection of personal relationships, significant to the individual personality not never attaining an independent structure. The commander at each level is assumed to be a primary source of motivation to individual members of the unit.

Simoneit was the first investigator to make a clear distinction between the collectivity and formal aspects of military organization. He asserts that the officer leader stands in a *Gesellschaft* relationship to his men, who are united to one another at a more intensive level of interaction by the "bonds of comradeship". The officer leader cannot regulate the thoughts of the group toward him; these sentiments must be discovered from individual members of the group. Although the officer is never a member of the *Gemeinschaft* of the unit he commands, he may use *Gemeinschaft* relationships in the supervision of individual members of the unit.⁷

Homans has analyzed his experiences as the commander of a small warship over a period of two years. He notes a "problem of balance" which arises when one segment of the crew "sets itself apart from the rest and against them." Unity or balance cannot be created on special occasions but only in the routine of everyday work. Sponsored group action will foster unity only if it existed prior to the event.⁸

The most extensive body of data bearing on combat role behavior is that reported by Stouffer, et al, in *THE AMERICAN SOLDIER*.⁹ This collection of surveys made during World War II represents the attitudes of individuals about the social relations and activities of many combat units. Hence it provides only a generalized description of the relationship between the actor, the collectivity, and larger

social structures. The status system is given particular emphasis.

The authors state:

"Few aspects of Army life were more alien to the customary folkways of the average American civilian than the social system which ascribed to an elite group social privileges from which the non-elite were legally barred and which enforced symbolic deferential behavior toward the elite off duty as well as on duty."¹⁰

Throughout their discussion of the status system, the functional significance of the phenomenon of status segregation is ignored, while its dysfunctional characteristics are exaggerated by comparing it with caste phenomena in the larger society.¹¹

The major concept developed in THE AMERICAN SOLDIER is that of "relative deprivation", which is said to be "related to and in part, include, such well-known sociological concepts as 'social frame of reference', 'patterns of expectation', or 'definitions of the situation'". As used by the authors, the term "relative deprivation" appears to be a standard in terms of which the actor evaluates his relative position in terms of other actors and collectivities at higher and lower positions on dimensions of risk, status, or authority.

The data reported in THE AMERICAN SOLDIER raise several significant questions which the present study has attempted to answer. First, the authors conclude that infantrymen had "high prestige" because their role behavior, involving greater personal risk, adequately demonstrated the actors' capacity to fulfill a "masculinity norm".

"For ground combat troops and soldiers in the rear echelons overseas, there is some evidence that this more general pattern of group status and respect carried over and was developed into a hierarchy with the line infantryman and his closest associates in danger at the top."¹²

In terms of the concept of relative deprivation, and to the extent that masculinity attributes were social values which all members of military organization sought to attain, front line infantrymen should have been, in this respect, the least deprived. However, the data fail to demonstrate that the infantryman's position did involve prestige in this sense.

Despite the "high prestige" of the combat position, it was valued by neither infantrymen nor rear echelon personnel. Both valued rear echelon positions more highly. In contrast, many officers were disliked as persons because they violated the norms of their positions, but the positions were valued because they provided the values which were least available to the combat infantry enlisted man. A question follows then, of whether the significance of the infantryman's position was the amount of esteem he received from those in more valued positions, or the relative life chances available in the position.

Such a question introduces the possibility of a second dimension - relative risk or life chances - as of comparable significance to the status system or the social order. This conception is supported by a differentiation of attitudes toward officers in terms of

front-line and rear echelon troops:

"Men in line Infantry companies in the European Theater were considered more likely to indicate favorable attitudes toward their officers than were men in organizations to the rear."¹³

However, the longer an enlisted man had been in combat, the more likely was he to have been critical of his officers.

Another question may be raised about the authors' discussion of the "generalized code of masculinity". They state: "In fact, the code of the combat soldier can be summarized by saying that behavior in combat was recognized as the test of being a man". Courage and aggressiveness are asserted as the primary component traits of this behavioral ideal. Two categories include 87 percent of the comments: "Courage and aggressiveness", which is mentioned by 59 percent, is comprised of two sub-categories which are fundamentally different. While 46 percent of the privates mentioned that the best combat soldier they had ever known was "fearless, brave, cool, 'had guts', disregarded personal safety", only 13 percent mentioned that such an ideal had "displayed aggressiveness and initiative". A similar relationship holds for the comments made by non-commissioned and commissioned officers.¹⁴

The second major category, which includes 28 percent of the comments, represents the significance in the combat role of "knowledge and adequate performance of job". However, 16 percent of these comments referred to soldiers who "knew what to do and did

job well", while only six percent mentioned "observant, alert; excellent on scouting and patrol work", and only three percent mentioned "carried out orders to the letter."¹⁵

Thus, data from THE AMERICAN SOLDIER tend to indicate that the test of "being a man" in combat tended to exclude aggressiveness, initiative, and proficiency in specific combat skills, while stressing characteristics which facilitated cooperation in mutually dependent roles.

Speier has suggested that "social perspective" is a significant variable in the attitudes reported in THE AMERICAN SOLDIER. He asserts that subjective evaluations of similar social subjects will vary according to the judge's position in terms of relative power or prestige. Data from THE AMERICAN SOLDIER are used to demonstrate this hypothesis. This formulation indicates that social perspective between officers and enlisted men varies with the subject evaluated.¹⁶

Speier also notes the failure of the authors of THE AMERICAN SOLDIER to recognize the political function of military organization in the formulation of their surveys and conclusions. He states:

"If the function of military organizations rather than the attitudes of civilians toward military practices are taken as the point of departure, it is evidently the expectation and the demand to destroy and to kill as well as the greater risk of suffering death by violence which distinguish the soldier from the civilian. This point rather than the authoritarianism, inequality, and traditionalism would seem to deserve the main attention of the analyst."¹⁷

Shils and Janowitz, in an analysis of Allied psychological warfare, concluded that ideological convictions were of little significance in maintaining morale in the German Army: although the "focus of attention and concern" was restricted to "immediate face-to-face social circles", a high degree of military effectiveness could still be achieved. The concluded further:

"... Attempts to modify behavior by means of symbols referring to events or values outside the focus of attention and concern would be given an indifferent response by the vast majority of German soldiers. This was almost equally true under conditions of primary group integrity and under conditions of extreme primary group disintegration."¹⁸

Their conclusions suggest that performance in the combat role is primarily dependent on the actor's relationship to a primary group of his combat collectivity, rather than the normative standards and rewards and sanctions of formal military organization.

Zentner has used data from THE AMERICAN SOLDIER to test empirically Blumer's conception of morale as a process dependent on the relation of the group to its goal, and the relations of the members of the group to each other. He concludes that the basic factor determining job satisfaction in the Army was "an active desire to avoid combat experience". This conclusion supports Speier's assertion that the most effective point of departure for the analysis of military organization is relative risk. From his analysis, Zentner asserts that Blumer's conception of morale, and others that place

emphasis on collective goals and rational persuasion, are not supported by data from THE AMERICAN SOLDIER. He concludes further:

".... That the sources of positive motivation in the combat situation were primarily the abstract objects of supplicatory rites, and secondarily, considerations arising out of loyalty to and regard for the welfare of the small informal status groups comprised of comrades in arms, upon which the individual was dependent in the main for protection and survival."¹⁹

These conclusions also support the findings of Shils and Janowitz that the immediate combat group does not derive its primary motivation from the formal organization.

Rose has presented data based on attitude surveys conducted with the staff of THE AMERICAN SOLDIER but published independently. He concludes that there is a significant discrepancy between the regulations which govern desertion in combat, and the attitudes of individual members of the group toward persons who desert. His study is based on interviews with 140 men who had gone AWOL from combat infantry companies, and 1,745 "normals" in the same companies. He concludes:

"Most combat soldiers do not condemn the typical AWOL from combat; rather they tend to sympathize with him. Thus there is no strong negative social sanction against going AWOL: the AWOL can retain his status in the evaluations of his fellows, and hence probably his own self-evaluation can remain high."²⁰

While the deviant behavior of the AWOL is supported by his status peers, there is also evidence that such behavior was supported by officers at the same echelon of risk. Rose notes, but does not

discuss, an observation that many combat AWOL's were never punished by their company commanders. Disciplinary treatment of the AWOL, however, became increasingly severe at rear echelons.

In summary, the literature concerned with the relationship between the actor in a combat role, and his relationship to larger social structures has been reviewed. Both recent military writers and psychiatric interpretations of combat behavior have personality rather than the social role as a frame of reference. The original data of THE AMERICAN SOLDIER and the subsequent re-interpretations have failed to adequately account for military organization as a unique social structure: it is described as either a massive bureaucratic structure, or as a series of emulating echelons. There are frequent suggestions that significant differences in social organization appear at various levels of risk, status, and authority.

E. The Conceptual Scheme

The basic problem in this study is the relationship between the technical and normative structure of military organization, and the social relational systems that develop within that structure. Since the basic elements of the social relational systems are actors whose perspective is limited by the positions they occupy within the total structure, it is necessary to use two complementary approaches to the problem. From an objective viewpoint, the total structure can

be represented as seen by the observer. The subjective viewpoint is inferred from the sentiments of the actors as they are expressed to the investigator.

Following Homans, the objective viewpoint is comprehended as an "external system", and the subjective viewpoint as an "internal system".²¹ The analytical elements of both systems are activity, interaction, and sentiments. Homans describes the internal system as "growing out of" the external system and elaborating upon it. The reaction of the internal system on the external system is described as "feedback". The internal system remains a residual category, consisting of all behavior which can be analytically distinguished from the external system. Any concrete group would thus consist of an indefinite number of internal systems without an independent analytical relationship. Such a relationship can be positively defined by isolating sets of actors whose behavior in the internal system is characterized by collective solidarity.

Following Parsons, a collectivity is defined as "a social system having the three properties of collective goals, shared goals, and of being a single system of interaction". A person is a member of a collectivity if he has a role in that collectivity. The boundary of a collectivity will vary in location with the situation. It may remain latent until a specific type of situation arises which activates a set of relevant role expectations for the actor.²² The

members of the collectivity are mutually oriented to common value patterns entailing responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations to one another. Collective solidarity exists in the extent to which moral significance is attributed to role expectations. In contrast, a purely "instrumental" or technical relational system does not constitute a collectivity. In so far as an instrumental relational system predominates, collective solidarity is disrupted.²³

From the objective viewpoint of the external system, three dimensions of stratification can be specified: risk, status, and authority. Each of these dimensions is a basis upon which actors of one collectivity can make differential evaluations of actors in other collectivities. Stratification is used here as a relative ordering of actors within a common structure according to a single criterion. The essential basis for stratification is the differential distribution of power: "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action."²⁴

The sources of power, following Weber, include three major institutions:²⁵ (1) the economic order, adapted here as the tactical order, to describe the distribution of actors with respect to exposure to risk and chances of survival; (2) the social order as the relative distribution of status honor; and (3) the legal order,

adapted here as the chain of command, as the relative distribution of legitimate authority to command the services of other individuals and collectivities.

The tactical order consists of the relative chances of acquiring similar goods, conditions, or experiences, at differential positions in relation to combat. Components of the tactical order are echelons, comparable to a "class" in the economic sense, to the extent that, as collectivities, they have differential "chances" for exploiting their tactical environment for personal safety and comfort in combat. "Class situation" is interpreted here, as defined by Weber, as "the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences, insofar as this chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order."²⁶ Relative risk, rather than income, is the criterion of membership in a particular collectivity of risk at a specific echelon.

The dimension of risk cuts across both the chain of command and the social order. A sergeant, rifle squad leader, and a sergeant, motor crew chief at battalion headquarters, have comparable authority as non-commissioned officers, are members of the same status group as enlisted men, but have widely different chances of survival. In the same sense, a lieutenant, infantry platoon leader would occupy the same position as the squad leader in the tactical order, but

would differ in terms of status (as an officer) and authority (as a platoon leader).²⁷ The relative risks of one position as compared to another will determine the nature of their living conditions, their access to goods, and the nature of their life experiences.

Under tactical conditions the hierarchical structure of military organization determines the spatial distribution of echelons, with collectivities possessing the least power and prestige being exposed to the greatest risk. As tactical considerations become less significant in locational decisions, criteria of power and prestige increase in importance.

The tactical order thus tends to correspond to the economic order in the larger society. Since specialized activities cannot be carried on under conditions of great risk, the individuals selected for performing those activities are distributed at more remote echelons. Similarly, individuals who possess scarce skills must be distributed in positions where the possibility of their loss to the organization will be minimized. Consequently, membership in the rifle company tends to be determined by the lack of valued characteristics, such as education, intelligence, or the fortunes of personnel classification. From the reception center through battalion headquarters, individuals with specialized skills are "screened out" for preferential assignments. The population at each descending echelon is increasingly residual, terminating in the rifle squad where specific and valued skills are not considered necessary for effective performance. At

each ascending echelon, there is an increased number of specialized activities, and positions that can be occupied by persons with scarce and increasingly valued attributes.

The social order consists of an arrangement of persons and collectivities according to their differential possession of attributes of social honor or prestige.²⁸ Two complementary aspects of the distribution of social honor are the status bearer, and status observers or collectively, the status audience.²⁹ Status is bestowed when the relevant attribute of the actor is responded to by other persons, or observers, who collectively comprise a status audience, with deference gestures. Formal distinctions of social honor are made by symbolic systems of rank, each gradation accompanied by varying amounts of prestige and corresponding restrictions on the positions that the actor may occupy and the amount of esteem that may be derived from performing in the associated role.

Status groups are comprised of actors who collectively are characterized by a general style of life, distinctive insignia, and related restrictions on social intercourse with other actors who occupy higher or lower positions in the distribution of status attributes. In military organization, officers and enlisted men constitute the major status groups with normative and legal differentiation.

The chain of command is a system of authority in which one person is capable of exercising legitimate authority over another

person or collectivity. As a legal order, it is characterized by the use of physical or psychical compulsion to obtain conformity with an order, or of invoking sanctions for violation of an order. Power relationships may be either unilateral (between subordinate and superior positions), or bilateral (between positional peers).³⁰

Authority exists in the office to the extent that, as a component of a position in a hierarchy of command relationships, it is included in the rights and duties of the incumbent of that position. Only a person who has a command relationship with another person, who is "in the performance of duty", can legitimately use physical or psychical compulsion or invoke sanctions. An officer cannot "prefer charges" against a subordinate not under his command. He can only make a written complaint to the subordinate's commander who must decide and initiate sanctions. A staff officer or a first sergeant have legitimate power only insofar as it is derived from their commanding officers. Hence, authority is a component of an office or position, not of the actor's prestige or "rank".

Command consists of domination and force.³¹ Domination is used when the commander explicitly defines the behavior desired as a "mission", and the persons to whom the order is given acknowledge the authority of the commander as legitimate. Thus a platoon leader has the authority to use domination as a form of influence in ordering a rifleman to advance. The rifleman may comply in recognition

of the sanctions available to the platoon leader if he should refuse. But if the rifleman should refuse to advance the commander has no power to compel the individual to comply; he can only make repeated threats of sanctions.

In punishing the offender, the commander may use force, but he does so, not to accomplish the mission, but to demonstrate that the capacity to use force is inherent in his office. Force consists of the application or execution of a formally prescribed sanction, by the commander himself, or by a specialized agency at a rear echelon.

At each ascending echelon of the chain of command, power is increasingly exercised by manipulation: the utilization of indirect or symbolic acts which induce implicitly the desired behavior. This form of influence may be highly ritualized as in parades or ceremonies, the award of decorations for wounds or aggressive actions, or derive its effectiveness by breaching the rigid limitations of the social order in visits to the sick or informal welfare inquiries while on formal inspection tours.

The efficiency report is a specific instrument of power by manipulation. The numerical value which a superior attributes to the performance of a subordinate is a principal determinant in his subsequent promotions. The rating may affect the entire career of the subordinate, and when the rating is known (in the form of a simplified index) by subsequent commanders, it becomes a factor in the continuous evaluation of the officer's competence.

Each ascending echelon involves a more intricate proliferation of staff agencies, and consequently a greater diffusion of power by the delegation of responsibility to the staff as distinct from the chain of command. A staff section must use the commander's power to get their work done, but they lack the prestige of his position. To the extent that they make decisions affecting subordinate units, they limit the commander's power and become a power group in themselves.

Although analytically distinguishable, the three orders converge. Lipset and Bendix have specified the relationship between positions on the dimensions of legal and economic power: "Persons who occupy high economic positions, or positions of power, seek to secure themselves by attaining status recognition."³² By controlling the distribution of status attributes, they can effectively exclude others from the positions they seek to monopolize. Conversely, the lower the actor's position in legal or economic power, the less effectively can he monopolize status symbols.

In summary, a conceptual scheme has been developed which comprehends both the objective and subjective aspects of the social structure of military organization. From an objective viewpoint, three dimensions of stratification in the external system can be specified. Sets of actors who occupy similar positions on each of these dimensions constitute collectivities to the extent that they share value standards and attribute moral significance to the role expectations

of others in such positions. Such collectivities are components of the internal system. The analytical elements of both the external and internal systems are activity, interaction, and sentiment.

F. Restatement of the Problem

The company is considered as a social system, with two component and mutually dependent sub-systems: the "external system", and the "internal system". The elements of both sub-systems are defined as activity, interaction, and sentiment. The mutual dependence of these elements will be analyzed on the basis of (1) the principal activities of the company as presented in situational descriptions, and (2) group and individual responses to variations in the activities of the company.

The external system describes an arrangement of positions and an activity which requires cooperative effort among persons who are motivated to occupy the positions and to behave in accordance with explicit rules which regulate their functional relations to one another. The component elements of the external system are activity, interaction, and sentiment.

Activity designates those operations which the organization performs collectively in accordance with goals, procedures, and standards imposed by their position in a larger social structure. Activity in the external system is technical and instrumental, rather than expressive.

Interaction describes a series of operations among individual actors whose positions involve functional relationships when the activity of the organization is being performed. The scheme of interaction is regulated by explicit rules which specify the arrangement of positions and require distinct patterns of individual behavior in operations between actors whose positions are differentiated by attributes of relative power and prestige as required for coordination of the total activity.

Sentiments are internalized standards of behavior which the actor can state or imply in the form of a proposition that among available alternatives, a specific course of action is desirable. In the external system, sentiments include the value standards of the larger society, technical knowledge required for effective role performance, and normative standards imposed by the organization.

The internal system designates a complex of behavior which develops between two or more actors as a consequence of the fact that they occupy positions with relatively equal amounts of risk, status, or power, and can communicate with one another beyond the limits imposed by the external system. It is "internal" because the development occurs as a segment of the total structure of relationships involved in the external system. It is a "consequence" because the relevant behavior originates when persons occupy the positions specified by the external system.

Activity in the internal system consists of those operations which express the actor's membership in a collectivity in which he shares sentiments of moral obligation toward the collectivity, and toward individual actors of the collectivity. Activities in the internal system are expressive, rather than technical and prescribed.

Interaction consists of a series of operations among two or more actors which is initiated and maintained by the sentiments of solidarity which such actors hold toward one another, and toward the collectivity as a whole.

Sentiments in the internal system are standards of behavior which originate or are modified as a result of membership in a collectivity, including the normative standards of the actor's collectivity, and knowledge which is restricted to members of such a collectivity.

In both the external and internal systems, the constituent elements are mutually dependent. The sentiments which actors bring into their positions make cooperative activity possible. The activity entails a scheme of interaction among the persons who occupy the positions. As a result of this interaction, additional sentiments are developed. These independently evolved sentiments are expressed by other activities. To the extent that these activities in the internal system involve two or more persons, an additional scheme of interaction is entailed. Since all three components of the internal system are developed and maintained within the external system, they are continuously dependent on the functional relations between those positions.

In summary, it may be assumed that the activity of a social system will be formally organized and coordinated, acquire and assign the individuals necessary for performing in the component positions, and provide motives for participating in the activity. The resulting activity, interaction, and sentiments is termed an external system. The incumbents of the positions will develop and share sentiments with other actors occupying similar positions, and will express such sentiments in an internal system. The actor's role in the internal system is defined by shared sentiments of moral obligation to a collectivity, in which conformity is induced by the actor's anticipation of the granting or withdrawal of affective responses by other members of the collectivity.

Therefore, it may be predicted that, in the performance of a combat role, the actor is influenced by the elements of a collectivity in which he shares sentiments of solidarity.

It may be further assumed that under conditions of minimal risk, members of a collectivity would be able to perform their roles in some cooperative activity, communicate within a patterned scheme of interaction, and otherwise maintain their roles in both the external and internal systems. An increase in the degree of risk in the situation would tend to decrease the influence of these elements.

Therefore, it may be predicted that, as the degree of risk in the combat situation increases, the actor is influenced by the elements of the collectivity less frequently in the performance of his combat role.

E. Population Used

The groups for this study consisted of a rifle company considered as a formal structure of status and power, and a component rifle platoon in which the interpersonal relationships were intensively analyzed. Although an attempt was made to select a "rifle company in combat" at random, the following factors influenced the final choice:

(1) The tactical employment of major units could not be ascertained prior to the choice. The Division selected was in reserve, and unofficial information available to the investigator indicated that it would shortly be employed in a tactical position for an extended period. Before the investigator arrived, the Division had been moved into tactical positions.

(2) The Division commander suggested, on the basis of information then available to him, a specific Battalion which was in reserve and rotating companies on an outpost. It was probable that the Battalion would later move to the line on defensive positions. This unit would provide opportunities to observe a wide variety of tactical situations.

(3) The Battalion commander permitted the investigator to choose any company desired, but was unable to predict the future employment of any one of them. The investigator then suggested the company on the outpost, but it was rotated to tactical reserve within three days. The final selection was made on the basis of the probable

amount of combat activity that could be observed during the time available for the study.

Once the selection had been made and field work begun, it appeared that other units would have provided more opportunities for observations of tactical activity. However, it appeared equally probable that a selection made at that point might also revert to a less active situation. Thus tactical activity as a variable could not be controlled.

There are no apparent reasons why the persons assigned to this company differed significantly from those assigned to any other rifle company in Korea. There is no apparent relationship between the factors affecting the selection of the company for this investigation, and the actual composition of the organization.

F. Procedures Used

The study was initiated three days before the company was withdrawn from an outpost position, and continued through three subsequent months. During this period the company was observed in three tactical situations: (1) a reserve bivouac involving intensive patrol activity; (2) defensive positions on the main line of resistance with intermittent patrolling; and (3) withdrawal into reserve for reception of replacements and retraining.

During the period of the study, the investigator lived with the company as a Medical Service officer, without any command respon-

sibilities to the organization. He was with the company continuously during the period in the reserve bivouac and on the line, but was absent for an aggregate period of three weeks in the retraining phase. This time was required for periodic reports to the Army Surgeon, and to collect records which were maintained at the Division rear echelon.

The investigator defined his role in the company by the following consistently used prefatory statement: "I am making a study of how the men in a company such as this live together, and what kinds of things they do." Informal significance was attributed to the investigator's formal status attributes, and his role was associated with typical medical functions. Two common interpretations of his role were as a "sanitary officer" and as a "psychiatrist".

The principal sources of data were interviews with members of the company, and observations of their behavior and conversations on work details, at mess, and in the bunkers. Every man in the subject platoon and company headquarters was interviewed at least once. Variations in expressive ability, willingness to contribute material, and conceptions of the investigator's role in the company ultimately resulted in the selection of a limited number of consistent informants. Initial interviews were directed toward eliciting a description of their roles in the platoon, the persons whom they contacted most frequently, and conceptions of themselves as members

of larger structures, such as battalion, regiment, and division. Subsequent interviews considered individual and group responses to specific persons and events within the company, and any other material that seemed relevant to the situation in which the contact was made.

Detailed records were kept of each situation in which the unit was engaged. The "Journals" of higher command levels were examined for information not available to the company, but they revealed little data of significance for this study. The company Morning Report and Sick Report were the only personnel records maintained in the company area. Individual personnel records were copied by photostat at the Division rear echelon.

G. Summary

The elements of the social system are defined as activity, interaction, and sentiments. The mutual dependence of these elements are analyzed on the basis of situational descriptions, group and individual responses to specific events, and changes in membership. By analysis of the external system, the factors associated with combat role performance are determined. By analysis of the internal system, the factors associated with membership in collectivities are determined. The relationship between the external system and the internal system is then analyzed in terms of whether, and to what extent, the actor's membership in a collectivity influenced his performance of a combat role.

Footnotes

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CHAPTER II

THE EXTERNAL SYSTEM: SENTIMENT - ACTIVITY

A. Introduction

The sentiments of the larger society prescribe the structure and function of military organization as a partial social system, and provide motives for participating in the activity of the organization. In this chapter the major administrative factors affecting the company are described. These are (1) the "Table of Organization", a standardized structure of positions for rifle companies; (2) the "Pipeline", an administrative process by which the positions were filled with persons trained and equipped to perform the required roles; and (3) "Rotation", a personnel policy and procedure for establishing the terminal point of an individual's assignment to the unit.

B. The Table of Organization¹

The rifle company consists of 184 men in three rifle platoons, one weapons platoon, and a company headquarters. It is the basic infantry unit with the three functions of tactical activity, administration, and supply. The mission of the company in the attack

¹See Figure 1, "The Formal Structure of the Organization"

is to "close with the enemy and destroy or capture him". In the defense, the mission is to "repel the enemy assault by fire or close combat".²

Company headquarters consisted of 24 officers and enlisted men divided into a "command group" and an "administrative group". The command group included the Company Commander (a Captain), the Executive Officer (a First Lieutenant), the First Sergeant (a Master Sergeant), and the Communications Sergeant (a Sergeant). Other personnel assigned to the administrative group included the Unit Administrator (a Warrant Officer), the Supply Sergeant and the Mess Sergeant (both Master Sergeants), and other kitchen and supply personnel.

Under tactical conditions the command group was to be located at the forward "Command Post" under the supervision of the Executive Officer. The administrative group would have remained at a rear position located near supply and communications routes. Because of their location and activities (with respect to reports and supplies) they have more frequent contacts with other units and echelons than the command group.

The rifle platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, three rifle squads, and a weapons squad. The platoon of 42 men is com-

² "Rifle Company Infantry Regiment", Department of The Army Field Manual 7-10 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 1 - 2.

manded by an officer, the Platoon Leader (either Second or First Lieutenant). Under tactical conditions the Platoon Leader would live with his platoon headquarters which included the Platoon Sergeant (Master Sergeant) and the Assistant Platoon Sergeant (Sergeant First Class), a Radio Operator, two Messengers, and two Medical Aid men attached from the regimental Medical Company.

The rifle squad of nine men included a Squad Leader (Sergeant First Class) and his assistant (Sergeant), an automatic rifleman (Corporal) and his assistant (Private First Class), and five riflemen (Privates). One of the riflemen was designated and specially equipped as a "sniper". All men of the rifle squad except the automatic rifleman were armed with the standard infantry rifle.

The weapons squad of nine men consisted of a Squad Leader (Sergeant First Class), and two light machine gun sections, each with a Gunner (Corporal) and an assistant (Private First Class), and two ammunition bearers (Privates). The weapons squad was always used with one or more of the rifle squads who provided rifle protection.

The weapons platoon with 34 men was on an organizational level with the three rifle platoons, but rarely operated as a unit. It was commanded by a First Lieutenant. Platoon Headquarters consisted of a Platoon Sergeant (Master Sergeant), two messengers, and a radio operator. The elements of the platoon consisted of a 57 millimeter rifle section and a 60 millimeter mortar section, each under the direction of a section leader (Sergeant First Class).

Each section was comprised of three squads consisting of a squad leader (Sergeant), a gunner (Corporal), an assistant gunner (Private), an ammunition bearer and a driver (Privates). Two medical aid men were attached to the platoon.

Official policies differentiated three categories of personnel: Caucasian, Negro, and "KATUSA's" (Korean soldiers attached to the United States Army). Daily personnel reports distinguished between Caucasian and Negro members of the company. The proportion of Negro soldiers in the company was limited to ten percent by the assignment echelons. However, a higher proportion of Korean troops could be assigned than American Negroes.

The KATUSA's were initially assigned to augment troop strength during a period when there was a shortage of American replacements. Each Korean was assigned to an American "buddy" who was officially responsible for the Korean's welfare and tactical readiness. Rigid policies from higher echelons limited utilization of the Koreans to combat tasks. Few were able to communicate effectively by language with their American companions.

Two other types of personnel were less frequently encountered. Elements of the "Korean Service Corps", a non-combatant organization of the Korean Army, were often assigned to labor details in the company area. They never became an integral component of an American unit. Native civilian laborers were also employed by each company




Figure 1. Formal Structure of The Organization

as mess attendants or kitchen police, and paid by voluntary contributions from members of the company.

Specialized personnel were attached from other units, such as the medical aid men already mentioned. The artillery Forward Observer Team consisted of a First Lieutenant and his assistant (a Sergeant), a radio operator and a driver (Privates). Observers and their teams were occasionally attached from the Mortar Platoon of the Heavy Weapons Company, and from the regimental Heavy Mortar Company.

The only significance of the grade specified by the Table of Organization was to indicate the degree of prestige ascribed to the position officially. The promotion of enlisted men depended on monthly promotion quotas which were never adequate to promote everyone to the grade specified by the Table of Organization. It was more probable that a position vacancy would be filled by a replacement non-commissioned officer before the person who was temporarily acting in the role could be promoted. A private who had performed effectively for several months as a squad leader, for example, would then revert to his old position in the squad, as would the acting leaders in other positions.

Officer promotions were much less frequent. Second Lieutenants could be promoted to First Lieutenant almost routinely, after completing 18 months of active duty as an officer, and with the recom-

mendations of company and battalion commanders. Promotions to higher grades were made by the Department of the Army, except under unusual circumstances which did not occur during the course or scope of this study.

C. The Pipeline³

The administrative process by which a replacement officer or enlisted man was transferred from a training center in the United States to his final assignment was officially designated as the "Pipeline".

After induction (or enlistment) enlisted men received 16 weeks of basic infantry training. All were given a battery of at least eight aptitude tests and one general intelligence test. Scores were recorded on individual personnel records. Some men were screened out for physical defects, classified for limited duties, and assigned to specialized positions. Those who were considered qualified for overseas duty were given written orders to report to a Port of Embarkation upon completion of a leave of from ten to fifteen days. Upon arrival at the port they awaited transportation for a period ranging from several days to a month.

Officers joined the pipeline at the Port after a different initial experience. Upon completion of their college training

³See Figure 2, "The Pipeline"

Reserve Officer Training Corps officers were sent to the Basic Officers' Course at Fort Benning, Georgia for a period of three months. Then they were assigned to a training station in the United States for initial troop duty for a period of three months to a year. Then they were ordered to the Port. Officer Candidate School graduates had been selected from applicants for the six month course after a period of enlisted service. They were given a similar period of troop duty before they were ordered to the Port for overseas duty.

The ocean voyage to Japan lasted about two weeks. In Japan, they were assigned to a Replacement Depot where they awaited further orders. At this point some men were assigned to units in Japan, while others re-joined the Pipeline at the Replacement Depot after a period of duty with a unit stationed in Japan. All essential individual combat equipment was issued at this echelon. They were given written orders designating the Division to which they would be assigned and the type of position vacancy (or "Military Occupational Specialty") for which they were replacements.

After another period of waiting they were transported by sea to a Replacement Depot at Inchon, Korea, where they were sorted into groups according to the organization specified in their orders. Then they travelled by rail or truck to the Division Replacement Company which was located at the rear echelon with all major administrative elements of the Division including the personnel sections of each

regiment. They were formally welcomed to the Division by the Adjutant General representing the Division Commander. They were then confined to a fenced enclosure until further orders were received.

The "shipment" of replacements was distributed to each regiment and smaller component on the basis of losses and prevailing strength. Each man received written orders assigning him to a company of one of the regiments (or other elements of the Division). When a group of replacements was ready to leave for their units, their names were called over a loudspeaker and they assembled for loading on trucks by which they were transported to the regimental service company. At this point, officers left the pipeline and proceeded through "command channels". Enlisted men continued the journey until they reached the orderly room of the company to which they had been assigned.

Usually the Company Commander talked with each man individually. Then he told the First Sergeant the platoon to which the man would be assigned. The First Sergeant contacted the Platoon Sergeant, and a representative of the platoon came to the orderly room or the trailhead to pick up the new man. He would probably have been assigned to the squad with the least number of men. Within the following two or three days the new man might have been transferred to another squad so that an older man (in terms of service in the squad) could have been moved to a more favored position.

But usually the platoon to which he was initially assigned was the one in which he would remain while in Korea.

Enlisted men could not estimate the duration of any personal contacts until they reached the company. Their written orders specified the company to which they had been assigned. Until they reached there, they were on a transient status. They travelled with men who might have been assigned to other units of the regiment or battalion. Officers, however, were on orders assigning them to the Division: they went first to the Division forward Command Post where transient billets were available. They were interviewed by a staff officer in charge of officer assignments ("G-1"), and subsequently, the Division Commander or his assistant addressed them in a group. Then they were assigned to a regiment, and travelled to the regimental command post.

At regiment, new officers were first interviewed by the Adjutant, and then seen individually by the Regimental Commander. Just as the arrival of a new man in the platoon initiated a process of mobility, the assignment of a new officer to the regiment made it possible for a company commander or a senior platoon leader to move to battalion or regiment, and the new officer was assigned to the lowest vacancy thus created. The prestige of his predecessor in terms of rotation eligibility or desirability as a staff officer frequently created the position vacancy to which the new officer was assigned. Much

less frequently, the failure of his predecessor would be the determining factor. Most officers did, or expected to, move successively through positions as platoon leader, company commander, or to battalion or regimental headquarters or service units.

If the new officer remained overnight at regimental headquarters he had supper at the officers' mess, and was introduced to all members of the regimental staff. When he reached battalion headquarters a similar procedure was followed. At both regiment and battalion, the new officer was required to read the "Standard Operating Procedures" and a brief history of the unit.

The new officer was finally brought to the company by a staff officer, or returned from the battalion briefing with the company representative. During the first three days he remained with the company commander, learning the details of company operation. He did not command a platoon on patrol until after he had accompanied a more experienced platoon leader on at least three patrols. The old platoon leader remained with the new officer during his first day with the platoon, introducing him to as many men as possible, showing him tactical locations, and going over the platoon roster with a description of each man. The old platoon leader then moved to his new position and the new officer was on his own.




Figure 2. The Pipeline

D. Rotation

"Rotation" was a Department of the Army policy which required that men who had served with units in Korea be given priority in relief over those whose positions involved relatively less hardship and risk. The policy was implemented by establishing and modifying according to the availability of replacements, "zones" of relative risk or hardship, and crediting each individual with "constructive months of service" (commonly referred to as "points") for the period in which he was in a specific zone.

The normal tour of duty in a foreign area for a Regular Army soldier was used as a base: three years. A soldier stationed in Japan would thus "rotate", or be reassigned to the continental United States when he had accumulated 36 "points": one point for each month of service. In Korea, the number of points varied according to the echelon of assignment, and the tactical employment of the unit to which assigned. Since most units were in fixed locations, the zones were administratively prescribed by geographical location rather than by echelon. Infantry units moved more frequently from "high point" to "low point" areas than their supporting echelons. The number of points would then vary according to the geographical zone in which their bivouac was located.

Individuals assigned to units at the Army and Corps levels, and to Division rear echelons received 1.5 points; at the forward

Divisional levels, 2 points; at the Regimental level, 3 points. From the Battalion level forward, individuals received 4 points while the company was in active combat, or in regimental reserve. When the entire regiment was withdrawn into Division reserve, however, everyone received the same number of points because relative degrees of risk and hardship were considered insignificant. The number of points were computed monthly at the Division Rear Echelon on the basis of directives which specified the number of points to which members of each unit were entitled.

A company roster indicating the relative standing of each man with reference to the number of points he had accumulated was kept available in the orderly room. Although each man was aware of his own "points" and attempted to predict the probable date of his departure from Korea, the official roster was the determining record and either confirmed or altered the individual's own conception of his point status. Much of the First Sergeant's activity involved "checking" by telephone on disputes involving the standing indicated on the roster, but changes were rarely made.

Rotation was more significant for the Regular Army enlisted men than for men inducted under Selective Service. The period of active duty under Selective Service was 21 months. At least seven months would be consumed in the process of training and transportation through the pipeline, leaving a maximum possible period of 14 months

in Korea. Rotation required 36 cumulative months of service, or "points". Each actual month on the line was computed as four "constructive months of service". However, if the Selective Service soldier was unable to accumulate the required number of points for rotation in nine months, he would still be returned to the continental United States because his term of service would have expired at an earlier point.

Regular Army men had usually enlisted for longer periods. The rotation maximum would more frequently precede the end of his enlistment period if he had travelled directly from the training center to Korea. The Selective Service soldier was less dependent on whether the company was on the line or in reserve because his term of service would expire earlier. On the other hand, the Regular Army soldier's period of service in Korea depended more on the opportunities which the tactical situation provided to accumulate the requisite number of points.

When two or more men joined the company together, their rotation status would be the same as long as they remained with the company. The number of points was not affected by promotions, awards, punishments, transfers, or any other factor than the individual's period of service with the company or larger unit within the same zone of risk. It provided every man with an individual goal which could be achieved without activities involving greater

risk than that to which all other members of the company were exposed.

Accumulation of points did not automatically entitle the individual to rotation. Relief from his assignment depended on the availability of replacements. The men who were rotated left in a group when the company was notified by a higher echelon of a "drop". The commander at each echelon thanked the men rotating for their contribution to the unit's activities. The "rotation road" was the reverse of the Pipeline. At the Replacement Company, men who were "rotating", watched and shouted at their replacements as they entrucked for the journey to their old positions.

E. Summary

The major administrative policies affecting the company have been specified as "sentiments" because they are derived from the value system of the larger society. The implications of such policies for solidarity and status groups have been indicated.

CHAPTER III

THE EXTERNAL SYSTEM: ACTIVITY - INTERACTION

A. Introduction

The performance of all activities by the organization involves a systematic distribution of personnel and a scheme of coordination among the component roles. In this chapter, the tactical environment and the activities of the organization are described in relation to the interaction among the actors occupying the various roles prescribed by the Table of Organization.

B. The Outpost¹

While the remainder of the Battalion continued in reserve, the Company was detached and placed under the control of another Battalion which occupied positions on the main line of resistance. As an additional unit, the Company was used to reconstruct and defend a forward outpost which was considered the most critical sector in the Battalion area. The outpost had earlier been subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire, then overrun by enemy forces. When retaken, it had been reduced to a pile of rubble. The Company was to restore the outpost as a strongly fortified defensive position while exposed to continuous enemy fire by artillery, mortars, and snipers.

¹See Figure 3, "Sketch of The Outpost"




Figure 3. Sketch of the Outpost

The position consisted of a large hill, about 1000 yards from the main line of resistance. A trail led from the hill to a "warming bunker" located on the reverse slope of a hill, accessible to the supply route. Each day the platoons were designated by their major task. The "working platoon" dug positions, filled sandbags, carried supplies forward on packboards, and erected prefabricated bunkers. The "guard platoon" maintained listening posts and weapons positions. A third platoon rested in the warming bunker. All platoons rotated daily except the Weapons Platoon. Members of that platoon developed and maintained their own positions.

The routine and task designations were arranged by the Company Commander when the outpost was occupied. At that time the few protected positions in strategic locations were occupied by the platoon maintaining the guard. The working platoon attracted more hostile fire because their activity was observable to the enemy, and worked in unprotected positions, frequently forward of the guard platoon. As the living bunkers were completed, the men moved out of the vestiges of the older structures and into the newer ones. Each day marked some improvement in the position and more protection for the night.

The men on the hill ate canned rations, three times daily. The cans were brought forward on packboards by Korean laborers, and distributed in an isolated and protected position on the reverse slope

of the hill. Platoon sergeants sent representatives from each squad to pick up the rations for their squads. While in the warming bunker, hot food was served.

Sleeping arrangements were determined by the task assignments of the platoons. Members of the guard platoon slept near their positions in their own shelters. In the warming bunker, fifty individual bunks were suspended from the ceiling in tiers of five.²

Each platoon thus changed their activity and setting daily. First, they would spend one day and night in the warming bunker, sleeping, bathing, changing socks, and resting. Before daylight on the following morning, they moved forward the outpost and relieved the guard platoon which in turn became the working platoon. The working platoon then moved back to the warming bunker to rest. The constant shifts prevented the company from ever becoming "settled". There was no opportunity to become accustomed to a fighting or living position, either because of the rotation of platoons or because of modifications in the position.

The situation tended to isolate the company from a larger unit and members of the platoon from one another. Detached from their own Battalion, they were uncertain of their tour on the outpost or the amount of support they would receive from the other companies if attacked. It was impossible to communicate between positions

²See Figure 4, "Photographs of the Outpost"



above: the enemy line as seen from the
outpost
below: the Outpost, rear view, showing
access trench and bunkers.



Figure 4. Photographs of the Outpost

without attracting enemy fire. Talking, smoking, or physical movement were activities which could be carried on only at additional risk.

C. Tactical Reserve³

The company moved back into reserve on the night before Thanksgiving Day, occupying a position isolated from the Battalion bivouac. A large number of bunkers had been constructed by the unit that had previously occupied the area. These, with some tents, were used as sleeping quarters. In reserve, the company had two major missions. First, they were to send out patrols designated by Battalion headquarters, usually each day, passing through the lines of another battalion. They were, secondly, to send out working parties of platoon size to construct a reserve line of defense in a rear area. Intervening periods were to be used for training.

The "chow line" was the only activity in which the company participated regularly as a unit. The platoons rotated in order of appearance to avoid congestion in the messing area. The officers sat at a small table outside the kitchen tent, large enough to accommodate the six officers assigned to the company. The enlisted men waited in line to be served, separated by an interval of about one yard. The company commander's position at the table faced the line.

³See Figure 5, "Sketch of the Reserve Bivouac"




Figure 5. Sketch of the Reserve Bivouac

As the men passed he made comments to those who were unshaven or whose field jackets were unbuttoned. After being served on plastic trays the men scattered around the kitchen tent in small clusters. When finished, they placed their trays in stacks and washed their implements in a series of large cans of boiling water. The trays were washed later by Korean laborers, the company's mess attendants.

The officers were served at their table by one of the native mess attendants who also acted as their houseboy. Tableware consisted of porcelain plates and cups, provided in a standard "Officers' Mess Kit". As soon as an officer was seated the attendant picked up a plate and cup from the kit and broke into the serving line. The conversation at the table was guarded in recognition of the close observation that it received from the men waiting in the serving line. When they were finished, the officers left the table and it was cleared by the attendant. The company commander was usually the last one to arrive and rarely left the table or kitchen area until all of the other officers had left.

Each platoon was assigned to a different sector of the company area with access to a varying number of bunkers. Each of the squads and platoon headquarters of the Second Platoon were in separate bunkers. The officers used two smaller bunkers: one (the larger of the two) for the Company Commander and the Executive Officer, and another for all other officers. The Company Commander's bunker was

usually lighted by a gasoline lantern (as was the orderly room and the kitchen); the other officers' bunker was lighted in the same manner as the squad bunkers: by candles. All bunkers were heated at night by small Yukon stoves which burned Diesel oil. During the day the stoves were extinguished to conserve oil unless the bunker was occupied by men who had been on patrol the night before.

The day began at 0500. From 0600 until 0700 breakfast was served (in darkness) although only a small proportion of the company appeared. At 0730 the platoon designated as the working detail assembled for loading in trucks. When they reached the area they were directed to various positions by the platoon leader where they dug emplacements for weapons and fighting bunkers. The ground was frozen, the work slow and tedious, and the exertion appeared to foster warmth.

At noon, the Mess Sergeant brought hot food from the kitchen in the bivouac area. After the noon meal the detail continued working until the trucks arrived at 1500 when the platoon returned to the bivouac area. They went immediately to their bunkers, started the fires, and dried clothing until 1700 when supper was served. Some read letters and others wrote letters during this interval. After supper mail call was held. Representatives from each platoon picked up their bundle, then took it to the platoon area for distribution.

After supper the bivouac area was dark. The only regular source of light in the bunkers was candles which were in chronic shortage.

The Company Commander personally distributed one candle to each squad every three days. One candle lasted for three or four hours. After the candle was gone, flashlights might be used or the stove lid raised to expose the flame. When the sources of light were exhausted some men continued to talk in the darkness. Before they were asleep the Squad Leader was called to platoon headquarters where he was told by the Platoon Sergeant what the detail would be for the next day and in what sequence the squad would appear in the chow line. After the Squad Leader returned to the bunker he told the other men and the day was over.

The patrol platoon remained in the bivouac area when the working platoons moved out. Shortly after breakfast, the Platoon Sergeant would come to the Platoon Leader's bunker to make plans for the patrol. They discussed the route and the objective as designated by the patrol order from Battalion headquarters, and selected the men for the patrol. After the noon meal the members of the platoon selected for the patrol were assembled and given the information by the Platoon Leader. The weapons were test fired. At about 1700 the patrol was loaded on a truck and transported to a forward assembly area. From there they walked to a warming bunker to await the hour of departure, to sleep if possible, and to eat a last meal of canned rations.

When the patrol moved to the assembly area, the Company Commander and Platoon Leader preceded the truck in a jeep, joining the men at

the point from which they walked to the bunker. When the patrol departed for the objective, the Company Commander, his Radio Operator, and the Artillery Forward Observer remained in the bunker, maintaining contact with the patrol by a telephone line which they unreeled as they went forward, and by radio if the telephone wire failed.

D. Positions on the Line⁴

The Company Commander and Platoon Leaders went on a reconnaissance with the Battalion Commander on December 7. When they returned the company prepared to move out. After supper all equipment was packed. The trucks arrived after darkness and the company moved to positions on the line. The trucks halted at a forward assembly area and the men walked to previously designated points. There they were met by guides from platoons of the company to be relieved. When the new Platoon Leader assumed responsibility for the area, the old Platoon Leader telephoned the Company Commander and received instructions to move back to the assembly area. When all of the platoons of the relieving company were in place, the new Company Commander assumed responsibility and correspondingly telephoned the Battalion Commander.

Each platoon occupied bunkers and positions constructed and modified over a period of several months by many previous units.

⁴See Figure 6, "Sketch of Positions on the Line"




Figure 6. Sketch of Positions on the Line



Figure 7. Photographs of activities on the line. Above: a fighting bunker being manned at night. Below: the "chow line" at breakfast.

The platoon sector was further subdivided into zones of responsibility for each squad. Each squad had at least one "living bunker" and several "fighting positions", all connected by trenches which were about six feet deep. Platoon headquarters was located in the largest bunker in the area. The company command post was located on the crest of a ridge along which, on the forward slope, the platoons were located. To the rear of the company command post, about one-half mile, was the trailhead where the kitchen and administrative elements of the company were located. The trailhead was the farthest forward point to which a vehicle could be brought.⁵

Breakfast and supper were served in the kitchen area at the trailhead. At breakfast each man picked up canned rations for the noon meal which was eaten in or near their forward positions. Supplies had to be carried by riflemen to the forward positions from the platoon command post. Supplies were brought to that point from the trailhead by Korean laborers. Hence men in the platoon headquarters had access to food and fuel with much less difficulty.

The two major living problems were heat and light. Usually platoon headquarters exhausted the candle supply for the entire platoon because of frequent administrative activity there. Charcoal was provided in limited and inadequate quantities for heat

⁵See Figure 7, Photographs of activities on the line

but was an inefficient fuel. No other fuel was authorized however because it might have revealed tactical dispositions. Despite this prohibition wood was frequently used at night.

The day on the line began at 0600 when half of each squad left their positions and started over their trails to the kitchen. The trails were slippery, led over two steep hills, and varied in distance: for the Second Platoon, about one-half mile; for the First Platoon, about one mile. When the snow on the trail became packed and discolored it was visible to the enemy and received intermittent mortar fire. Then alternate trails, longer and more difficult to follow, had to be used. After breakfast the men returned to their positions and the remainder of the squad came down. Daylight found all men back in their positions, prepared for inspection at 0800.

The "living bunker" was the focal point of the squad's activities. A large living bunker would be about seven feet square. During the day the entrance provided some light but cold winds usually required that it be closed with a blanket. It was rarely possible to stand erect. The stove was against an outer wall, providing a smoke outlet. Although the trenches made it possible to move from one position to another, men rarely did because an artillery barrage would have left them isolated from their squads.

The major activity of the day consisted of "improving the positions" by deepening the trenches or constructing additional fighting

positions. Weapons and ammunition were cleaned, and trash and surplus ammunition were picked up to be carried back to the trailhead in the evening. The guard posts were attended throughout the day and night. At 0900 the Company Commander came through the positions with the Platoon Leader on an inspection of tactical readiness and personal hygiene. Groups of two and three men would gather by small fires outside their bunkers after the inspection, warming their hands and talking.

At noon, all tasks ceased and the men moved into the bunkers to eat. The cans were heated on the small charcoal stove. Each man took his turn heating rations on the stove lid. When all had finished eating, they continued talking until about 1330. Some went to sleep in their bunkers, others moved through the trenches on small isolated tasks or looking for an isolated spot in which to read old letters. If a patrol was to go out that night, the members of the patrol were called to the platoon command post late in the afternoon. They went to chow early, assembling after dark at the designated time and place. In the morning they were permitted to sleep later than the other men.

At 0600 the squads again split up to go to "chow". Those returning last brought the mail bundle with them and it was distributed to squad representatives at the platoon command post. By the time all of the men were back in their bunkers or at their posts it was dark again.

The squads were divided into guard pairs at night. Each American stood guard with his official Korean "buddy". The duration of the tour depended on how many men were available for guard in the squad. When their tour was over the American went back to his living bunker and awakened the American of the succeeding guard pair. Sometimes an hour passed before the new guard pair appeared for the relief. Then the old guard pair moved back to their living bunker. If there was still fuel they started the fire and warmed up water for coffee. Frequently the American read letters by the light of the exposed flame. Then they removed their shoes and climbed into their sleeping bags. If there was no fuel, they went to bed immediately.

The men who were not on guard gathered in the living bunker after supper. Some men sat around the stove and light. As one moved forward to warm his hands, to read or write a letter, another moved back to the darkened periphery of the bunker. As the hours passed the circle changed constantly, one or two leaving for a patrol, a guard pair leaving or returning, a man back from his rest period in Japan, or a squad leader going to platoon headquarters for a meeting or to bring back a replacement. But a circle remained until the heat and the light were gone.

E. Reserve and Retraining

The company was withdrawn from their positions on the line to a retraining area on Christmas Eve. Each company of the Battalion

was in an adjacent area connected by a common trail. Living quarters in the retraining area consisted of "squad tents" to which two or three squads were assigned. All officers were quartered in one tent near the kitchen. Their meals were served in the tent by the Korean mess attendant, so they seldom appeared in the kitchen area while meals were being served. At night one enlisted man stood guard at a point between the officers' tent and the orderly room.⁶

During this period the entire regiment began a program of extensive "retraining". The program was intended to have two effects. First, it was represented as a "refresher course" in basic infantry doctrine which had not been used in tactical situations or which had been unofficially modified by situational exigencies. Second, it was defended at regiment and higher echelons as necessary to improve "morale" by restoring old habits of discipline.

Instructional material was drawn from official "field manuals", and recent combat experiences were used as illustrative material. The theme that tactical doctrine was correct and more effective than "field expedients" was stressed. Combat experiences were evaluated as success or failure in terms of the degree to which they conformed to official tactical doctrine.

When a lecture was scheduled the men assembled on an open field sitting on the ground facing the instructor. The weather during the

⁶See Figure 8, "Sketch of the Retraining Area"

period was very cold, and heavy winter clothing had to be worn. Each Platoon Leader lectured to his own platoon on some subjects, and to the entire company on other topics. Non-commissioned officers were designated to lecture on minor subjects. Each lecture continued for a period of about forty minutes. During the intervals between lectures the men moved about the area stamping their feet and hands.

The program also included "field problems" during which squads and platoons simulated tactical situations. Although these activities required more physical exertion, they were participated in with much more enthusiasm than the lecture situations. Usually only one officer was present during these problems; others remained in the company area preparing lecture material for subsequent classes.

There was an increased number of status segregated activities during this period. The officers' tent and separate mess facilities have been mentioned. All of the officers of the Battalion gathered at least once a week for a "school" at Battalion headquarters. At least three officers' parties were held, two at Battalion and one at Regimental headquarters. Commanders and staff officers of the next higher echelons were always invited and usually attended these activities.

Despite the close proximity of all elements of the Battalion there was little visiting among companies, except among persons whose positions routinely permitted the establishment of such relationships.

Thus supply, mess, and communications personnel frequently visited persons with comparable positions in other companies, but platoon sergeants never did. Within the company, platoon sergeants visited each other more than men in any other positions. Weapons Platoon men visited members of other platoons more frequently than those visits were returned. Although there was a slight increase in interaction among components of the company and of the Battalion during this period, both the company and the platoons remained almost as isolated in reserve as they had been on the line.

The day in retraining and reserve began at 0600 when the company was awakened. At 0630 they assembled near the kitchen area for a reveille formation. One officer was detailed to attend this formation and to "take the report" that the company was "all present". The other officers did not rise until later. After reveille, breakfast was served. Then all men returned to their tents for shaving and to prepare the tents for inspection. At 0730 the company assembled again to begin the day of training. If the company was on a field problem during the noon meal, it was brought to them. At 1700, the day of training was finished. After supper a retreat ceremony was held with rigid formality and all officers in attendance. At this time the Company Commander made routine announcements, and presented awards or promotions to members of the company. This was the only routine appearance of the Company Commander before the entire assembled company.




Figure 8. Sketch of the Retraining Area

When the company moved out for training, the Company Commander and one or more officers remained in the bivouac area on administrative tasks. The Company Commander inspected the tents, the surrounding area, and then visited the training areas. At any point, a commander or a staff officer from a higher echelon might arrive in the area. His arrival was announced by a guard post at the entrance to the company area. The Company Commander was notified, and immediately went to the entrance or the location of the visitor, made a formal report, and then proceeded through the area with the visitor.

After supper mail call was held. All of the men then returned to their tents. Usually the central activity was a card game. If a candle was available it was used. Men who wanted to read or write letters gathered near the game and the light, or shared a private source of light at another point in the tent. Other small groups of two or three gathered at bedsides, in the darkness, talking about home, their leave in Japan, or their approaching rotation. Events within the company or combat experiences were rare topics of discussion.

On Sunday, church services were held in the morning, and were attended by about ten percent of the company. In the afternoon all men were required to participate in group athletics. Throughout the day, however, there were routine guard details and preparations for the following week of training.

The company carried on the training program independently, but there were two occasions when the company participated as an element of the Battalion. Both of these were Battalion retreat parades. These were the only two occasions when the Battalion Commander was in visual contact with the entire Battalion. The ceremony was attended by a band and the Regimental Commander.

F. Summary

Four tactical situations have been described in terms of the activities carried on. The situations were: (1) the outpost; (2) tactical reserve; (3) positions on the main line of resistance; and (4) reserve and retraining. A relationship is indicated between the type of tactical situation, and the degree of risk, isolation or contact with other units of the Battalion, segregation or interaction between status groups, and the types of resources available in the environment for exploitation.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERNAL SYSTEM: INTERACTION - SENTIMENT

A. Introduction

The coordination of the activities of the company with the larger organization, and cooperation among the actors in the various roles, involves the values of the larger society, a body of technical knowledge, and operational procedures. These have been described in the preceding chapter. In this chapter, the actors are described and factors are specified which affected the performance of the various roles.

B. Company Headquarters¹

The major actors in company headquarters were the Company Commander (Lieutenant A), the Executive Officer (Lieutenant B, and later, Lieutenant C), the Unit Administrator (Mr. F, a Warrant Officer), and the First Sergeant (Master Sergeant Abel). This section also included the Mess, Supply and Communications Sergeants, but these men rarely had significant contacts with the platoons. They functioned primarily as administrative aides to the Company Commander, left the company area frequently, drew supplies from non-commissioned officer peers at rear echelons, and were seldom included in discussions with the platoon sergeants.

¹See Figure 9, "The Organization of the Company"

The activities of the company headquarters group were usually confined to the Orderly Room, except for the Company Commander. The First Sergeant was there most consistently, and in the reserve phase the Company Commander and the Executive Officer also conducted much of their business in the Orderly Room. In addition to these persons two or three others were usually present: the Company Clerk, the Mail Clerk, and two or more messengers or "runners" (usually men whose rotation was imminent or who were on some medically limited status). All of the enlisted men lived in the Orderly Room tent or bunker, while the officers were only present during the day. During the day the Orderly Room was a scene of intense activity, but after the officers had left, it resembled the other bunkers in the company area. One difference was that the Orderly Room, like the Company Commander's bunker, the Kitchen, and the Supply Room, had a gasoline lantern rather than candles for illumination.

Among the company headquarters group, the First Sergeant had been the first assigned (in May). He had moved up from a position as Platoon Sergeant, and most of his contacts in the company were with Platoon Sergeants. There was always tension in his contacts with the Company Commander. In discussions with the Platoon Sergeants he often mentioned how the company had changed since Lieutenant A had taken over. He consistently supported the Platoon Sergeants in critical comments about the Company Commander. The other

enlisted men assigned to the Orderly Room had been selected by the First Sergeant. They consistently supported him in his attitude toward the Company Commander.

From the perspective of the men in the platoons, the Orderly Room men were considered "sissies". The First Sergeant was frequently referred to as "Mother Abel", and the clerks as his "boys". On Christmas Eve, the Third Platoon sent a messenger to the Orderly Room with a box of candy addressed to the "teatless WAC's of the Orderly Room". The feminine stereotype was reinforced by the sharp difference between their living conditions, and activities, and that of the men in the platoons.

C. Company Officers

There were five officers in the company when the study began. The Company Commander had the most combat experience, extending from service as an enlisted man in World War II. The Korean Conflict was the first combat experience for all of the others. Lieutenants A and E were graduates of the Infantry Officer Candidate School. Lieutenants B, C, and D were commissioned from the Reserve Officers Training Corps and were college graduates. Lieutenant A had less than a high school education while Lieutenant E had completed two years of college before enlisting. Lieutenant A was almost ten years older than the other officers, who were all between 22 and 23 years of age.

In terms of service with the company, Lieutenant B was the senior officer. He had been assigned in June. Lieutenants C and D were assigned in August, and Lieutenant E in September. Mr. F joined the company in October. Lieutenant A, the Company Commander, was assigned late in November, as the study began.

The expected mobility pattern among the company officers was for rifle platoon leaders to move successively through the positions of Weapons Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Company Commander. This pattern was followed only in the final phase of the study. It was violated repeatedly initially. Lieutenant A was assigned from a Battalion headquarters staff section, although the company Executive Officer was his senior by date of rank. Then when Lieutenant B was transferred to Battalion headquarters to await rotation, the Company Commander appointed Lieutenant C (First Platoon Leader) as Executive Officer rather than Lieutenant D (Weapons Platoon Leader). In the final phase, as new officers were assigned, the pattern was followed: Lieutenant D became Executive Officer when Lieutenant C rotated, and Lieutenant E succeeded Lieutenant D as Weapons Platoon Leader.

The Company Commander tended to isolate himself from social activities with the other officers in the bunker. When he was absent from the bunker his behavior was evaluated. Lieutenant E was most critical. Lieutenant C was outspoken in his criticism while the Company Commander was present but defended him in his absence.

Lieutenant A depended on Lieutenant C as a link with the platoon leaders. Lieutenants C and E interacted most frequently as a pair. Although Mr. F and Lieutenant D interacted with each other more than with anyone else, both tended to remain ~~neutral~~. Lieutenant D spent the least amount of time with the other officers and most of his time in the platoon area. Mr. F spent most of his time in the officers' bunker or tent, in the supply or kitchen tent, or the Orderly Room. Both Lieutenant D and Mr. F were Negro.

D. Members of the Second Platoon

At the beginning of the study there were 30 enlisted men and one officer in the platoon. Of the 31 persons, only 21 remained when the study was completed in March. The Platoon Leader (Lieutenant D) as a Second Lieutenant; the Platoon Sergeant was a Sergeant (two grades below the grade stipulated for his position). There were two Corporals (the Assistant Platoon Sergeant and the Weapons Squad Leader). The remaining 27 members of the platoon were Privates First Class or Privates.

If all members of the platoon had the grades stipulated for their positions there would have been one Master Sergeant, four Sergeants First Class, three Sergeants, five Corporals, and thirty-four Privates First Class or Privates, for a total strength of 46 enlisted men and one officer. The actual strength of the platoon was augmented by nine Korean soldiers, for a total actual strength of 39 men.




Figure 9. The Organization of the Company

The Platoon Sergeant (Sergeant Alex) was the oldest member of the platoon (age 38). Ninety percent of the men (including the Platoon Leader) were 23 years of age or less. Sixty-one percent were in the age group from 21 to 18 years. Two other exceptional cases (in addition to the Platoon Sergeant) were Private Bart (Squad Leader, 1st Squad) and Private Caro (Assistant Squad Leader, 2nd Squad). These men were respectively 28 and 26 years of age. The age distribution of the platoon is thus a homogeneous one, a span of only five years including 87 percent of the members, as indicated in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SECOND PLATOON
(N = 31)

AGE	FREQUENCY
18	1
19	5
20	5
21	8
22	6
23	3
- - - -	- - - -
26	1
- - - -	- - - -
28	1
- - - -	- - - -
38	1

In period of service with the company, members of the platoon ranged over a period of nine months at the time the study began. Two men were present then who had been assigned in March, 1952. In May,

one more man was assigned, and in June, four men. The composition of the platoon by dates of assignment and departure are presented in Table 2, below.

TABLE 2
PLATOON COMPOSITION BY MONTH OF ASSIGNMENT
AND DEPARTURE

Year and Month:	Number of : Men : Assigned	Number of Men : Departing
1952: March	2	
April	0	
May	1	
June	4	
July	4	
August	1	
September	3	
October	6	
November	5	
December	3	3
1953: January	0	4
February	9	2
March	1	1
TOTALS	39	10

E. Establishing the Buddy Relationship

Participation in a combat event was considered the basic factor in establishing a "buddy relationship" in interviews with 20 or 66 percent of the thirty members of the platoon. Four met as replacements on the way to the company, two were sponsors of the men they chose, four men chose their sponsor. Five men picked the buddy for his tactical proficiency; five others chose the buddy because they

had participated in some recent combat event together. These factors are considered an "integrative mode" in the sense that they are oriented toward establishing a more intimate relationship with the social system.

Another mode of establishing a buddy relationship may be described as "isolating". Such factors were expressed by six men (20 percent). Four chose buddies because of an ethnic identity (Hawaiian and Porto Rican). Two asserted that their membership in a minority service component (Regular Army) was the basis upon which they chose one another to the exclusion of others. These choices based on an identity of individual attributes tended to isolate the pairs from other elements of the social system. A common characteristic of such pairs was the expression of conflict relations with persons who lacked the isolating attribute. The two Hawaiians objected to being mistaken for Korean soldiers, and the two Regular Army men thought that their motivation to fight was limited by tactical dependency on men who had less motivation.

The integrative mode of establishing the buddy relationship is characterized by such statements as the following:

"I was in a bunker when we got a direct hit but he stuck with the gun and wouldn't leave it as long as it would fire. That's when he became a buddy. I know that he would stay with me no matter what happened." (Corporal Earl, referring to Private Egan)

Private East, in referring to a buddy who had been wounded and evacuated, said:

"We came up on the hill together. He never got much mail so I let him read mine. Then I got him to write to my little sister, and he got more mail from her than I did. That made us feel that we were part of the same family. He always seemed to be picking up things that I lost."

Private Dail, referring to Private Dion, said:

"He's a guy you can depend on and trust - let him read your letters or tell him things that you wouldn't trust with other people. We both came from small towns. I feel more confident when Dion is around. I know that he can stand up in combat, but I don't think that it would make much difference if one of use fell down; we'd be buddies anyway."

The "isolating mode" is characterized by the following statement from one of the two Regular Army men who chose each other:

"I buddy around with Dodd and don't have much to do with the others. I was a jumper and belonged to a first rate outfit - all R.A. In this outfit, all they're interested in is points and going home. If an R. A. has nothing but draftees around him he'll begin to think the same way as they do. But if there are other R.A.'s around, he's proud of it."

The three Hawaiians and one Porto Rican were the only members of their ethnic groups in the platoon. However, one of the Hawaiians and the Porto Rican were chosen by at least one other member of their squads as a buddy. Furthermore, of the 16 Regular Army men in the platoon, only two used this attribute as distinguishing them from other members of the platoon. There were four Negroes in the Platoon but only one choice was based on this attribute. Thus there appears to be little consensus in the degree to which these attributes were considered significant by other members of the platoon.

Four members of the platoon (10 percent) indicated no buddy choices. One was the Platoon Sergeant whose age and position restricted his interaction among members of the platoon as well as peers in other elements of the company. Another was Cole, a Regular Army airborne soldier, who had been transferred to the company after release from the stockade in Japan. A third was unable to designate any one person as a buddy, and considered all members of his squad as standing in that relation to him. The last was a Negro ammunition bearer, who was also unchosen.

F. Maintaining the Buddy Relationship

The twenty members of the platoon who made "integrative" choices expressed four major themes as necessary to maintain the buddy relationship. Eight stated that the buddy had to be a person in whom he could confide, and to whom he could talk about anything that came to mind. Six required the buddy to be a person who "would not change his mind about me, even if I should bug out". Four said that a buddy had to "share everything that he has or knows with me". Two said that a buddy should "know what to do in a tight spot so that I can depend on him.

The single theme expressed by men who made isolating choices was that "we are more alike as individuals than other members of the platoon. As noted previously, these men were two Hawaiians, a Porto Rican, a Negro, and two Regular Army men. Four men made no buddy choices.

G. Authority and Buddies

The selection of a man to fill a position as Squad Leader or Platoon Sergeant always threatened the solidarity of the person selected with the men he had considered buddies. First, the selection was always dependent on the approval or decision of a member of the superior status group. Second, the position required more frequent interaction with the members of that status group. And third, in order to perform his role with even a minimum degree of effectiveness, the selected man had to violate some of the sentiments of the group from which he had been selected.

When Bart was made Squad Leader over Baum who had been with the platoon five months longer, Bart denied any deviance from the sentiments of the group. He said:

"Some of the men think that Lieutenant E was partial to me when he gave me the job instead of Baum, but I feel the same way about him that they do. Most of the time he's just 'Joe College', doesn't want to take responsibility for anything, and gets rattled easily."

The position could be used to reinforce the new leader's solidarity with the group, but restricted his interaction with a specific buddy. Camp (Squad Leader, 2nd Squad) said:

"You've got to make every man in the squad your buddy in order to get things done. You've got to get down and work with them and get them to feel that they can depend on you to stick by them. But I can never show that one man is my buddy because a lot of guys may think that I'm a buddy."

But Chap, who was Camp's assistant Squad Leader, indicated how the solidarity of Camp forced him to avoid or to pass on to others, the use of the authority in his position. Chap stated:

"Camp had me do all of the dirty work. I had to get the oil and rations. He had to give me the orders instead of telling them himself. So the men got sore at me instead of him. All he was interested in was being a nice guy."

Positions below that of Squad Leader were more likely to be regulated by the Squad Leader himself, or by members of the squad collectively. In the selection of an automatic rifleman, Dail said:

"We usually pick the automatic rifleman as assistant Squad Leader, and I can pick my own automatic rifleman. He's got to be dependable and take good care of the weapon because some day everyone in the squad may depend on how it works. So after you've used it for a while you begin to feel like you're taking care of the whole squad, just like the Squad Leader."

Changes among Squad Leaders, caused by rotation or replacements with a higher grade than any other member of the squad, frequently disturbed the mobility pattern described by Dail. A member who had been assigned to the platoon in October (Crum) stated:

"I've seen lots of guys join the platoon and take over jobs that I had worked for. I was automatic rifleman for a while, then a new Squad Leader came along and took me off. It happens that way all the time. You work for one Squad Leader for a long time and think that you're getting ahead, then he's rotated and you have to start all over again."

H. Deviance and Buddies

The buddy relationship was a mechanism of social control, influencing activities in the external system in two ways. First, it enforced compliance with those elements of the external system that operated to protect the relationship, or to minimize risk to both actors. Secondly, it tended to neutralize those elements of

the external system that threatened the relationship, or increased risk to either actor. The polar stereotypes of the "dud" and the "hero" express the sentiments which were utilized in social control.

The "dud" was the symbol for deviance in the external system. He was described as a person who could not be depended on to perform effectively in an emergency, or who lacked the capacity to share the activities of the platoon or squad. From the perspective of the group he refused to participate because the activity involved risk for himself, as an individual, without reference to the collectivity. Chronic sickness was one attribute of the dud. Dodd who went on sick call frequently for "flat feet", attempting to get transferred to the Battalion headquarters company as a driver said:

"Since I got the light duty slip I haven't been able to get along with the other men. They just rip you up and down when you get out of something that they have to do. They say that I'm a dud because I just sit around and keep warm while they're out on the line freezing. But I just tell them that I love it. I'll be transferred back to Battalion before long, and if it wasn't for that I wouldn't be able to stand their guff much longer."

When a man couldn't maintain a place in the activities of the Squad he was designated as a "dud". Getting packages from home and distributing them, having common experiences, and being willing to share the risks were resources used in maintaining one's role in the Squad. There were two ways of being designated a "dud". The first was a result of chronic sick call attendance, like Dodd.

Similarly, Private Camp described how Private Crum's sick call attendance affected his activities in the squad:

"When a man goes on sick call a lot, he misses out on things that happen to the squad. Then when he comes back he can't talk about it as if he had been with us. When he's gone someone else has to take his place, and that means more work for everyone else and no sweat for him. When he does come back, if the doctor didn't do anything for him, the guys think that he's been aping off. Crum just can't get close to the guys any more, but he doesn't care because he has so many points and will rotate soon."

In contrast, the term "hero" described a person who defied risk as a limitation on his role behavior, thus increasing the risk for all mutually dependent members of the group, but especially the buddy whose relationship to the actor entailed an implicit obligation to follow. The "hero" was a symbol that operated to neutralize the pressures from the external system that threatened the buddy relationship or increased the risk to either actor. Private Baum described a hero in these terms:

"A guy who is just trying to show that he's not scared, and sometimes trying to show up the other fellows. He's not braver. You shouldn't stick your neck out unless you have to. If someone gives me an order, we'll do it but we aren't going to take any unnecessary chances. If a guy gets a medal for doing his job it's O.K. But if he's taken a chance or exposed his men, he's no hero because he's made it more risky for everyone."

The relationship between the "dud" and the "hero" was stated by Private Dail, who said:

"The hero is a kind of dud. He talks big when he's back here, but up there he doesn't even do his own job well. There aren't many guys who really want to be a hero; they just become one accidentally."

Private Beck was afraid of being considered a "hero" because he was a Regular Army soldier, and hence, assumed to be more likely to attempt to conform with the ideal image of the soldier as aggressive in combat. He said:

"A squad leader who takes as little risk as possible is going to take better care of his squad. I get kidded a lot about being Regular Army, but it goes the other way too. We're all over here for the same thing. A Regular Army man usually isn't married, so he may be more willing to take risks. But that's not for me.

Two other attributes commonly associated with the "hero" stereotype were officer status, and official awards. In reference to the first attribute, Corporal Bart recalled that Lieutenant E had been "tagged" as a "hero" when he first came to the company, and said:

"After chow one day we were talking about a man who got killed. Lieutenant E said 'Well, he got the Silver Star, didn't he?' That left a bitter taste in our mouths for a long time because we thought that he was 'gung ho' and would want to make himself a hero by using us."

With respect to the second attribute, Corporal Earl (Squad Leader, Weapons Squad) was the only man who had been decorated. Bart mentioned again:

"Sergeant Alex (Platoon Sergeant) was calling Earl out of his bunker to give him orders every five minutes. Earl objected and Sergeant Alex called him 'our little hero' because he got the Bronze Star on Sandbag Castle. Earl got mad and said that he hadn't asked for it; they gave it to him. He told me that he wished that he'd been someplace else when it happened. I've been on every patrol the platoon has ever pulled, not because I like it, but only because it's my job while I'm over here."

Private Dean differentiated between "motivation" and "capacity" to participate in the required activities of the squad as the distinctive attribute of the "dud". He stated:

"A dud is a guy who won't do it. Some guys can't take this combat stuff, but they're not duds. Maybe he's too small or weak or jumpy. Dick is like that. He doesn't eat this combat stuff up any more than I do, but he's smart at a lot of things. There are a lot of things that he can't do but he's no dud."

The most extreme form of deviance was "bugging-out": deserting the field and leaving one's buddy to continue the fight, alone or with others. The significance of bugging-out was that it diminished the deserted buddy's chances of survival. Private Dean said:

"I always wanted to shoot the guy who bugged out on me, and I would anybody but my buddy, Dion. Lots of times fellows do things when they're scared that they don't do at any other time. But I don't like to think of that happening."

Of the 26 men who made buddy choices in the platoon, 20 stated that even if the buddy should bug out, they would remain "buddies" without any change in the relationship. Of the remaining six men, three stated that they weren't sure that it would make a difference, while three also stated that it would break the relationship.

I. Mobility and Buddies

A major distinguishing factor among the members of the platoon was the length of common service in the platoon. Members frequently referred to the "old men" or the "new men". A similar period of service usually corresponded with a mutuality of combat experiences.

Private Beck (1st Squad) stated:

"When I joined the squad Baum was it. Now he's the only one who was with us at Sandbag Castle. We depend on each other. I don't think that he would bug out, but if he did, it wouldn't make much difference. The only thing that would break us up would be if one of us was killed or left the company. Bell has been buddying with us but he's still a new man and hasn't been through any of the things that Baum and I have been through."

In the Weapons Squad, Corporal Earl stated:

"I was in the 1st Squad when I made my first buddy. Then he was wounded. I was sent to the Command Post to get him. We were both new guys, and it's easier for two new guys to buddy than to get in with the old ones. The first few nights we pulled Listening Posts together. We were so close that we would read each other's letters. That way we got to feel that we were in the same family. I think that what really made us buddies, though, was that we were new men together."

The influence of "seniority" in the establishment of the buddy relationship is also evident in the degree to which sponsorship affected the choice of a buddy. Three men selected Camp (Squad Leader, 2nd Squad) as their buddy after he had sponsored them in the combat role. For example, Clay said:

"Camp introduced me to everyone in the squad, and stayed with me that night because I was a new man. He told me a lot about each man in the squad, about the Chinese and their tricks. Then he told me that there would be days when we would feel like brothers, other days that we would hate each other, but that feeling that way was all just part of the job."

In two other cases, the sponsor selected the new man as his buddy. For example, Dean who had chosen Dion, said:

"From the first time that I saw Dion on Sandbag Castle I liked him. That night I volunteered to take his place on the Listening Post because he was a little jumpy. I wasn't being a hero - I just felt that I'd rather go myself than let someone go who was jumpy. Now no matter what happened he'd still be my buddy."

J. Summary

The factors involved in the internal organization of the Company have been described. The general characteristics of the members of Company Headquarters, the company officers, and the members of the Second Platoon, have been indicated. The sentiments involved in various aspects of the buddy relationship have been specified, and their influence on such aspects of the external system as authority, deviance, and mobility have been indicated.



Figure 10. Mail Call: A Photograph



Figure 11. "Buddies": A Photograph

CHAPTER V

THE INTERNAL SYSTEM: SENTIMENT - ACTIVITY

A. Introduction

The sentiments developed as one result of the interaction between actors is expressed in activities which are either independent of the activities required by the external system or imposed on such activities. In this chapter, sentiments are specified which influence the relationships between the two major status groups, and which further affect the external activity of the company.

B. Relations with Higher Echelons

Personal contacts between the Company Commander and officers of higher levels were limited to inspection visits, principally by the Battalion Commander, once every two or three days. On other rare occasions, the Company Commander was called to the Battalion headquarters. Except for these contacts, the company was isolated from any formal or informal personal relationships with persons at higher echelons. There were two routine activities, however, by which communication was maintained.

First, the "briefing" was a morning meeting of the Battalion Commander, his staff, and representatives of all of the companies. Before the briefing began, the Battalion Commander called the roll by unit. At this meeting, orders from higher echelons were given

verbally to the company representatives. Then the Battalion Commander would comment on the state of training, the police of the area, or other factors that had come to his attention on inspection tours. The company representative was responsible for explaining any delinquency, or explaining the comments to his company commander. Each company evaluated its standing in relation to the Battalion Commander by the frequency and importance of the comments made at the briefing. The briefing thus took on the additional function of a medium of evaluation.

Another channel of communication was by written reports, all of which were signed by the Company Commander. Such reports were of two general types. One was the "administrative report", such as the Morning Report, grade status report, or officer duty assignment report. Another type was the "compliance report" which required the certification of the Company Commander that a specific directive had been complied with. The compliance reports were usually involved in matters of fire prevention, or disciplinary action taken in response to a delinquency reported by a higher echelon.

Both types of reports passed through the appropriate staff section, and if routine, no significant comments were made. When an unusual event was recorded, or were grossly in error, they were brought to the attention of the Battalion Commander and discussed publicly at the briefing.

C. Interaction Between Status Groups

The Company Commander had assumed command of the company over an officer who was his senior by date of rank. He interpreted this breach of the established mobility pattern of company officers to indicate that the Battalion Commander wanted him to change "the way that things were being run." Another officer had commanded the company between Lieutenant A and a Captain X; Lieutenant A's immediate predecessor had not exerted much influence on the company. It was the company as it had existed under Captain X that the older men remembered as "the old company".

Tactical reserve. The company moved off the outpost and into the reserve bivouac seven days after Lieutenant A had become company commander. The first night in bivouac he permitted the men to drink all of the beer that they wanted so that they could "let off steam". Then he attempted two major changes. First, he attempted to break down the patterns of behavior characteristic of the "old Company". These had provided a wide area of freedom for each platoon and a minimum of surveillance by company headquarters. The First Sergeant and Platoon Sergeants had been given a maximum amount of responsibility. Secondly, he tried to alter the prevailing attitudes toward property.

The first opportunity to demonstrate these changes was in a meeting with the non-commissioned officers which he arranged on the

second day in the reserve bivouac. The Platoon Leaders were not notified of the meeting and none attended.

The Company Commander began the meeting by reading off a list of things that he had "found wrong" with the company since he had assumed command. After reading the list he asked for "any comments or complaints that you may have". Sergeant Y (Platoon Sergeant, Weapons Platoon) stated that his men had insufficient time for shaving and cleaning up their bunkers before they had to fall out for company duty. The Company Commander responded that henceforth the company would get up at 0515 instead of 0600, and "that should give them enough time".

Later in the meeting the Mess Sergeant indicated that the kitchen maintained a fifty gallon drum of hot water from which any man could draw water for shaving. None of the Platoon Sergeants knew of this facility. Sergeant Y then referred to his earlier complaint and explained that with hot water thus available, an earlier rising time would be unnecessary. The men would not have to wait until daylight to heat shaving water without violating blackout regulations. The Company Commander stated that Sergeant Y should have thought of that sooner, and that his original order would stand until the men had demonstrated that they could clean up in time.

Toward the close of the meeting, the Company Commander said that the bunkers and areas would be inspected by the Battalion Executive Officer on the following day. Sergeant Alex then mentioned some of

the difficulties that his platoon had encountered in building a latrine. They had been unable to get a hammer from the supply room and the box had to be hammered together with a stone. The Company Commander answered this complaint with a comment that they would encounter many difficulties in Korea, and that it was the duty of the Platoon Sergeant to show the men how to overcome such obstacles.

During the meeting the Platoon Sergeants attracted each other's attention and communicated by sneers or head-shaking. They were in opposite corners of the room with their Squad Leaders clustered around them. The Squad Leaders whispered among themselves, and to their Platoon Sergeants, but rarely to a Squad Leader of another Platoon. The First Sergeant stared at the floor throughout the meeting.

In dealing with the Platoon Sergeants, the most significant position was that of the First Sergeant. Most of the routine activity of the company was initiated through him. The Company Commander rarely contacted the Platoon Sergeants directly. Whenever any activity was initiated, the orders were communicated in one of two ways. If the First Sergeant initiated it, he called the Platoon Sergeant who then transmitted the instructions through each of the Squad Leaders who were called to the platoon command post to receive them. If the Company Commander initiated the action, he either notified the First Sergeant, who then used the Platoon Sergeant system, or he

notified the officers. When the Platoon Leaders complied with the order (usually a tactical activity), or initiated an action of their own, they called their Squad Leaders together. The one exception to this was the patrol. Then the Platoon Leader and the Platoon Sergeant would plan the patrol by themselves, but later the Platoon Leader always gave the patrol order to the assembled members of the patrol.

In order to control the position of First Sergeant, the Company Commander avoided the complications created by the loyalty of the First Sergeant to the "old company" of Captain X. The Table of Organization had previously been modified by Captain X to withdraw some men from the platoons and give them specialist details in company headquarters. The most important of these "extra" positions was the "Field First Sergeant", a position used in training centers when the regular First Sergeant remains in the company area while the Field First Sergeant manages the company in the training areas. Under tactical conditions there is no provision for this position. But the Company Commander used the Field First Sergeant to initiate action with the Platoon Sergeants while the First Sergeant was increasingly confined to administrative and clerical duties in the orderly room.

The second major change attempted was in attitudes toward property. When the equipment was checked after moving off the outpost many men were without packs, bayonets, sleeping bags, and even

rifles. The Company Commander had taken over the property accounts from his predecessor without an inventory because the former Company Commander had been wounded and immediately evacuated.

Officially, there were three kinds of property in the company, all of which were governed by specific regulations. The first type was "company property", and included all equipment shared by two or more men. Crew-served weapons, tents, stoves, and armored vests were company property, and the Company Commander was financially responsible for the items.

When company property was lost, a "Report of Survey" was initiated, passed through command channels, and required an investigation by an officer from a higher echelon. Usually the investigating officer determined that the property was lost without negligence. The Company Commander was then excused from responsibility and replacement items were issued. Less frequently, the investigating officer found the Company Commander responsible because of inadequate supervision of the supply accounts, lack of good judgment in utilization of property, or "poor leadership" because the men abandoned property wantonly. An Army-wide program of "cost-consciousness" was carried on in all units, and officers were graded on their efficiency reports with respect to their effectiveness in conserving property.

A second type of property was designated as "Individual Equipment". This included clothing, individual weapons, and other items issued by the government but used personally. The individual accepted

financial responsibility for these items when he initialled a form on which they were listed. Company property could be made individual equipment by listing it on this form and requiring a subordinate (such as a Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, or Squad Leader) to sign for it.

When individual equipment was lost, or could not be accounted for, the Company Commander initiated a "Statement of Charges" which made an enlisted man financially responsible for the loss. This report did not pass through command channels. After signature by the responsible individual and the Company Commander, it was sent to the Personnel Officer at the Division rear echelon where the amount was deducted from the enlisted man's pay. If the officer was responsible for the equipment, however, a Report of Survey would have been required.

A third type of property was individually owned "personal" items. This type included watches, cameras, or contents of packages from home. Bulky items were stored in a locked duffel bag in the supply tent. Other items were carried by the man or left in his bunker. The only protection for such property when left unguarded was the honor of every person who had access to it. The term "stealing" referred exclusively to this type of property, and formal and informal sanctions were applied with equal severity when the thief was caught. But usually the thief was not caught, nor the property recovered.

Although the external system, by the administrative rules designed to regulate the handling of property and fixing the responsibility for its disposition and use, designated three types of property, the sentiments of the internal system referred to only two types: government and personal. While the severe sanctions of the external system were supported and reinforced when applied to personal property, they were ignored or evaded by activities and sentiments of the internal system when applied to government property. These distinctions are indicated by three events.

In a first event, the Company Commander initiated a Report of Survey to cover the losses which were apparent after his first inventory. He was not held responsible because the items were considered lost prior to his assumption of command. This would have made his predecessor responsible, but the missing items were made up by the Supply Sergeant through "scrounging transactions" within the Battalion and at more remote echelons. To prevent further losses the Company Commander then initiated a plan of checking the individual equipment of four men each day and requiring them to sign a Statement of Charges for the missing items. Individuals were made responsible for all of the company property under their supervision. Although the Company Commander was thus relieved of financial responsibility, it was also possible for him to make up the property losses by a method which avoided command channels.

In a second event, a jeep trailer was "lost" from the company area. The evidence indicated that someone from another unit had entered the company area, attached the trailer to another vehicle, and driven off. A Report of Survey was prescribed for such a loss, but the outcome of the investigation could not be easily predicted. The trailer should have been under guard. Another guard at the entrance to the company area had failed to note the trailer being removed by a "stranger". Jeeps and trailers entered and left the company area frequently during the day. Members of the guard detail were drawn from the platoons, and they were rarely acquainted with the men of company headquarters who were in charge of the jeeps. Under such conditions, the removal of the trailer was not difficult.

The missing trailer was reported to the Provost Marshal by the Company Commander as a "theft". But the Provost Marshal was unable to take any action to recover it. It would have been necessary to check every unit in the division area using trailers, and such action was considered futile because the identification on the trailer had probably been changed immediately. Furthermore, although thefts were frequently reported, government property was rarely recovered from another unit which was using the property legitimately.

In this case, the Company Commander was faced with a choice of initiating a Report of Survey, or of utilizing the internal system in which the Supply Sergeant participated. Since the loss of the trailer, which was ordinarily parked near the supply tent, also

implicated the Supply Sergeant, he was given permission to "find the trailer". He returned to the company area late that night with a new trailer.

Although the Company Commander was dependent on appropriate status symbols for effective action in the external system, and within his own status group, the Supply Sergeant could exploit irregularities in the external system because of his subordinate status. He was one of the few persons who left the company area frequently, and he met other Supply Sergeants at supply points and depots. Whenever a supply shortage developed, he contacted the Supply Sergeants of other units and "scrounged" items to make up the shortage. Every time a company moved into a new area abandoned items were found and turned into the supply room. Enroute to a supply point, the Supply Sergeant might find other apparently discarded equipment and turn it in for salvage.

"Scrounging" was illegal; the external system stipulated the procedures by which shortages or surpluses would be reported. As an internal activity scrounging protected the Supply Sergeants from having to reveal a shortage, and from accumulating a surplus which would have been detected by inspectors. The exchanges always took place between enlisted men; an officer never exchanged with a Supply Sergeant. But it was tolerated by Company Commanders because it helped to keep the supply accounts in good condition for inspections by higher echelons, and reduced the number of Reports of Survey.

In a third event, occurring on the day that the loss of the trailer had been discovered, a man who was leaving the company on rotation reported to the Company Commander that an electric shaver had been stolen from his duffel bag in the supply room. The Company Commander personally interrogated all of the men who had access to the bags, and then told the First Sergeant that if anyone found the thief, he was to be "brought in on a stretcher". Although the Company Commander threatened to use all of the formal sanctions available to him, and encouraged the use of informal sanctions, the shaver was not recovered. Everyone who had access to the bags denied knowledge of the incident, and a "shake-down" inspection of their property failed to reveal it.

Thus the Company Commander also differentiated between the communal nature of government property, and the "sacred" nature of personal property. While permitting the "scrounging" of government property from another unit, just as he had been "victimized" by the taking of a trailer for which he had been responsible, he used all of his authority to discover and punish the person who had stolen the shaver. The terminological distinction of "scrounging" which referred to property controlled by the external system, and "stealing" which described property which could only be protected by the internal system, invoked distinct patterns of behavior.

The Platoon Sergeants reacted the most strongly against the changes instituted by the Company Commander. In the meeting with

the Company Commander, only the Platoon Sergeants had spoken out, while the First Sergeant had remained neutral. In the bivouac during inspections, they were the most likely to come into contact with the Company Commander. They received the orders passed down by either the Platoon Leaders or the First Sergeant. Although they were responsible for getting the tasks done, they were afraid to report the obstacles they encountered. In intimate contact with the men of the platoons, they were unable to give logical explanations of the changes, and defended themselves by criticism of the Company Commander.

Sergeant Y (Platoon Sergeant, Weapons Platoon) had been the most aggressive participant in the meeting with the non-commissioned officers. He had been assigned to the company in May, and had been promoted to Master Sergeant by Captain X. The Weapons Platoon rarely had an officer assigned to it, except for short periods of time. Sergeant Y acted in the capacity of an officer Platoon Leader but was excluded from comparable status group activities. He said:

"I see the officers talking among themselves at chow, and wonder who's going to speak up for our platoon. That's where they make up their minds, and I can't say anything. The only time that the Company Commander hears from the Weapons Platoon is when something goes wrong, or when I ask to see him. It makes a lot of difference in the breaks your platoon gets. It puts us at a disadvantage."

The changes instituted by the Company Commander were least felt at the squad level. Corporal Earl (Squad Leader, Weapons Squad) said:

"A new Company Commander doesn't make much difference for a long time. You hear a lot at the platoon C.P. about the changes he's making but by the time they get down to us they don't seem much different. As long as you stay out of his way and don't get noticed everything works out the same."

The frequency of the Company Commander's contacts with the Platoon Sergeants increased their vulnerability in other ways. He learned their names more quickly, and could recognize them in a group of several other persons. In the chow line and throughout the company area, he made frequent "corrections" and reprimands, attempting to establish new patterns of behavior. Personal knowledge was necessary to identify a person's role in the company. None of the enlisted men wore chevrons on their garments, and few were entitled to: most of the Squad Leaders were Privates with the responsibilities of non-commissioned officers. When the Company Commander extended the range of his interaction beyond those persons with whom he was personally acquainted, as in the chow line and on inspection tours through the company area, he was compelled to depend on the knowledge of the Platoon Sergeants who knew their names. Hence, from the perspective of the Platoon Sergeants, the Company Commander's reprimands appeared impersonal and arbitrary while he was more likely to remember the persons who were delinquent than those who conformed to the standards he was establishing.

On the Line. The Company Commander had three major contacts with the company during this period: the daily inspections, the meals

at the trailhead, and a "conference call" telephone meeting with all Platoon Leaders and company administrative non-commissioned officers.

The inspections constituted the most intimate contact between the Company Commander and the men of the platoons. Two themes were stressed: tactical readiness and personal cleanliness. Upon arrival in the platoon area, the platoon command post was first inspected; then the Platoon Leader accompanied the Company Commander on his inspection of the platoon area. The first inspection occurred on the day after the positions on the line were occupied. The investigator accompanied the Company Commander on this occasion.

The First Platoon was the first inspected. Sergeant Z was acting Platoon Leader since Lieutenant C had been designated as Company Executive Officer. He reported to the Company Commander at the entrance to the platoon area. As the inspection proceeded through the area of each squad, three corrections were made repeatedly by the Company Commander.

First, three of the four Squad Leaders failed to "report" properly. The correct form of reporting was prescribed by a regimental order as:

"Sir, (rank) (name) (squad) (platoon) (company)
(regimental "nickname") reporting!"

Sergeant Z reported to each of these corrections with a comment that he had failed to instruct the Squad Leaders in the proper form of reporting, but would do so immediately. A second correction was

that several men appeared unshaven. Standing policy was that all men would be shaved before 0800. Third, one man appeared to have been drinking beer. Sergeant Z responded that he would correct these two delinquencies immediately.

The Second Platoon was inspected next. Lieutenant E met the Company Commander at the platoon command post, greeting him by his first name, without making a formal report. The Platoon Sergeant and Radio Operator were working at a small table. Lieutenant E initiated the conversation with a comment that the area had been "in terrible shape." Although they had been working all day and had put it "in fair shape", they still had a lot of work to do. The Company Commander then asked whether the fire plan was prepared. Lieutenant E replied eagerly that they had been working hard on that: he and the Platoon Sergeant had personally fired the final protective lines, and Corporal Abid (Assistant Platoon Sergeant) was now copying the plan because he could print better than Lieutenant E.

The inspection of squad areas revealed conditions like those in the First Platoon area, but Lieutenant E's responses to the corrections differed from Sergeant Z's. Whenever a delinquency was noted Lieutenant E indicated that he had already issued instructions that it be corrected and that someone was "on the way" at that time. Sergeant Z always acknowledged that he had been in error. Thus Lieutenant E's interaction with the Company Commander was as a peer.

Despite the position held by Sergeant Z (acting Platoon Leader), he accepted a subordinate role and the Company Commander interacted with him as a member of a subordinate status group. Like Sergeant Y of the Weapons Platoon, he lacked the status attributes for his position, and as a result, was unable to "speak up" for his platoon.

The inspection was concluded at the boundary of the Second and Third Platoons. The Company Commander directed Lieutenant E to assume responsibility for a gap between the platoon areas. Lieutenant E argued that the Third Platoon should be responsible for it. The Company Commander insisted and finally Lieutenant E replied "You're the Company Commander, sir." This was the only response made by Lieutenant E recognizing the Company Commander's position. After leaving the area, the Company Commander commented to the investigator that Lieutenant E's area had been much superior to the First Platoon, and was a reflection of Lieutenant E's ability. An equal number of similar corrections had been made in both areas.

Reserve and retraining. In this period administrative activity increased in amount and significance. The Company Commander attended the Battalion briefings where erroneous reports were brought to his personal attention. Administration became a more important factor in the continued evaluation of the Company Commander by the Battalion Commander, and the exposure of error before other Company Commanders fostered competitive comparisons.

On Christmas Eve, the Company Commander made a large stock of beer available for purchase. He instructed the First Sergeant that the men could drink all that they wanted that night and would be permitted to "blow off steam". During the evening he circulated among the tents, drinking one beer at each tent, and joked with the men. When he returned to the officers' tent he spoke with great elation of the way he had been welcomed by the men, and of his satisfaction with the improvement in the company.

During this period, the First Sergeant's position came under increasingly close surveillance by the Company Commander. On the line they had been spatially separated. The First Sergeant depended on the Company Clerk to perform most of the duties involving preparation of reports and correspondence. The Clerk's position was also an "extra" one; it was not provided for under the Table of Organization. However, the increased emphasis on administration and written reports made his position an essential one, despite the lack of provision for it. Because he was familiar with "the regulations", the required format for reports or correspondence, and similar technical knowledge of the orderly room, his work was seldom examined or questioned.

However, in the reserve area, a promotion quota came through and the Clerk inserted his own name on the list for promotion to Sergeant. The Company Commander discovered the insertion and demanded an explanation. The Clerk stated that he thought he deserved a

promotion. The Company Commander answered that he would have to go where the promotions went, and had the Clerk transferred to a rifle platoon. The effect of the Clerk's promotion would have been to prevent the promotion of a Squad Leader in a platoon. If the Company Commander had not noticed the insertion, the Clerk would have been able to use his position in the orderly room to exercise the power of the Company Commander to make promotions.

The Company Commander's increased surveillance of the orderly room was one indication of his sensitivity to evaluations by higher echelons in this phase. He could control communications through this channel. However, in another event, the evaluation depended on his ability to induce the active support of every member of the company.

The company was being considered for selection as the Corps Headquarters honor guard, a regular detail for one company of the Battalion in reserve. It was announced by the Company Commander in a routine meeting with the Platoon Leaders and non-commissioned officers. When it was announced, the Platoon Sergeant, Third Platoon, commented that he had never expected the company to be selected for an honor guard; it had always impressed him as being a "rout step outfit". The Company Commander replied that "the company has changed, didn't you know?" The Platoon Sergeant replied that he had, then stepped back among the other Platoon Sergeants.

After this exchange there was no further response from either the company officers or non-commissioned officers. The Company Commander continued that the detail was an honor that would require major improvements in the discipline of the company. Failure to attain such a high level of performance might result in the selection of another company. All Platoon Leaders and non-commissioned officers, he continued, would be responsible for informing the men that this detail was an honor that had to be worked for.

The significance of the assignment varied with status groups. For the officers, the detail would be an opportunity for deriving prestige from their assignment to a company that had been "selected" for the detail. Among enlisted men, however, the detail was most significant as involving a reduction in the number of rotation points they could accumulate; although this factor affected officers in the same respect, they attributed less significance to it. Furthermore, their conduct while on the assignment would be under rigid surveillance by "strange" members of the superior status group. And unlike the officers, there would be few "trips to the rear", party life at clubs, or potential rewards in the expectation of subsequent assignments to rear echelon positions.

Two days after the meeting with the Platoon Leaders and the non-commissioned officers, the Regimental Commander inspected the company area. That evening the Company Commander held another meeting of the company officers and non-commissioned officers. He stated that the

Colonel had stood in front of the mess tent and "just picked the company apart", indicating the delinquencies. Discipline appeared to be deteriorating rather than improving. Men were observed, he said, walking around the company area in their jacket linings, without helmets or weapons. If this behavior continued the company would not be selected as an honor guard, he concluded.

The company was not selected for the detail, although it is not known that this was due to the Regimental Commander's inspection. The Company Commander attributed the deterioration in discipline to the fact that he had "relaxed" after coming off the line. Now he felt that the men of the company thought that he was going to be a "good Joe." In the future, he thought, he would have to "crack down" more severely.

Two other events indicate the Company Commander's inability to completely control the communications between the company and other echelons. In one event, Sergeant Abid (Assistant Platoon Sergeant, Second Platoon) was in the kitchen tent when it was visited by the Regimental and Company Commanders. Sergeant Abid described the event in these words:

"I was telling the Colonel that the men didn't like the training program. The Company Commander interrupted and said, 'Yes, sir. This company is begging to go back on the line.' I told the Colonel that some of the men might be - those who had never been up there and want points. But anyone who was around on Sandbag Castle doesn't. Even though they don't like the harassing here in reserve, they'd rather be here where there's at least a warm place to sleep."

In a second event, the Division Commander was visiting the kitchen tent. The Mess Sergeant mentioned, in a conversation initiated by the Division Commander, that he had been unable to get any lumber to make a table. The General instructed the Colonel to "see what could be done". When the lumber was expeditiously delivered, the Mess Sergeant interpreted the event as indicating that the Company Commander had never "tried very hard" to get the lumber, although he had actually made several unsuccessful attempts.

One effect of status segregation was to generalize negative status sentiments. In earlier periods, the Company Commander had been the primary target of hostile sentiments. In the final reserve period these sentiments were directed toward officers in general. The officers' tent was referred to as "the little Pentagon". Sergeant Abid (Assistant Platoon Sergeant, Second Platoon) stated:

"Officer privileges are flaunted. They're not sincere about the training. All they want is to have the company put on a good show for the Colonel. After I told the Colonel that the men weren't happy with all of the training, Lieutenant E said that I should have told him all the good things that were happening instead."

One week after Lieutenant E became Weapons Platoon Leader, he was mentioned by the Battalion Commander as a replacement for a staff officer who was due for rotation. After he learned of the probable transfer his interest in the activities of the platoon declined, and his behavior became more "dramatic".

In one event, while in a rear area Lieutenant E had purchased an elaborate shoulder holster, commonly worn by staff officers. When he returned to the company area he immediately went to the platoon command post tent where he displayed it to the men there. He came over to Sergeant Abid's bed and said, "How's Abid, my buddy?" Sergeant Abid replied "Bull". Then when Lieutenant E had left the tent the men present began to mention the mistakes that he had made on patrols and to deprecate his competence as a Platoon Leader.

In a second event, Lieutenant E was giving a lecture on patrols. While he was lecturing, the Regimental Commander visited the area, listened to Lieutenant E's lecture, and when it was concluded, commended him for it. Later, Lieutenant E said that what pleased him most about the commendation was that it would improve his standing with the members of his platoon. But Sergeant Abid stated:

"It was no reward to us because we don't even consider him a part of the platoon any more. He just took a few good phrases from the Field Manual and they sounded good. The platoon knew that the brass had been fooled, but were disappointed that it could be done so easily. The men don't have much confidence in him any more, so they don't tell him much."

Thus Lieutenant E's mobility was a factor in breaking his solidarity with the platoon. His behavior was increasingly oriented toward persons with greater prestige in his own status group, correspondingly limiting his interaction with members of the platoon.

D. Interaction within Status Groups: Officers

Although the Company Commander's position involved superior authority, his formal status was equal to that of the other company officers. The position he occupied called for a Captain under the Table of Organization, but he (and all except one of the other Company Commanders of the Battalion) was only a First Lieutenant. This factor tended to make status differences less significant, while increasing the importance of the positions held by the other officers as status peers.

Tactical reserve. The Company Commander's bunker was more spacious, warmer, and had more light at all times, but it was never visited by the Platoon Leaders unless they were called to it. The Company Commander and the Executive Officer always came to the Platoon Leaders' bunker, to give instructions, or information, or for informal conversations. The center of social activity for the officers was the Platoon Leaders' bunker. While the Company Commander was absent, his actions were interpreted and evaluated. Frequent references were made to the "old company", and to the influence that his behavior was having on the entire company. Lieutenant E originated most of the evaluations of the Company Commander.

One day while the Company Commander was absent from the area, Lieutenant E said to a group including Lieutenant D and Mr. F:

"He got to know all of the big-wigs and what they wanted while he was up there at Battalion. He sold himself up there - not here. Then when he found there was an opening as a Company Commander, he asked for it. The old Platoon Leaders had their feet on the ground - they knew what was going on in the company. When they send someone in from outside, they try to go by the book. They don't really know what's going on. He's trying to change things too fast."

But when the Battalion Commander visited the bunker the same day, Lieutenant E said:

"Lieutenant A is a mighty good Company Commander, sir. He really knows his stuff and looks out for his men. He's making a lot of changes but they're all for the good. It won't be long before this company is twice as good as it has ever been before."

Evaluations of the Company Commander were thus confined to the company officers, and the Battalion Commander's judgment of the company was influenced by creating an image of status group solidarity. Within the status group, however, a series of events indicated how superiors and subordinates utilized their positions to increase their prestige, and then consolidate their prestige with additional authority.

In one event, Mr. F, the Warrant Officer Unit Administrator, was relieved of his duties. The relationship between the Company Commander and Mr. F had become increasingly marked by conflicts and arguments. Lieutenant E had always defended Mr. F before the Company Commander, indicating that Mr. F had been particularly useful to a previous Company Commander on a supply problem. The Company

Commander would respond that Mr. F was a depot Warrant Officer, knew nothing about rifle company administration, and "was a good guy who tried hard but just didn't have it."

The position of Unit Administrator was a new one in the Table of Organization, and there was no standard guide for their duties in the company. The role conflicted with both the Executive Officer and the First Sergeant. The Company Commander thought that Mr. F should assume responsibility for mess and supply, but Mr. F was not aware of what his duties should be, where his responsibility began or ended.

After one payday, repeated telephone calls were received from staff officers at Battalion headquarters to the Company Commander that the company's payroll was the last to be completed, and that several reports were in error or poorly prepared. More discrepancies were being discovered in the supply accounts. Finally, the Company Commander had an order prepared announcing that Mr. F was relieved of duties as Supply Officer and Mess Officer.

Mr. F occupied a crucial position in the system of communication and evaluation between Battalion headquarters and the Company Commander. When he was late at the briefing, the Battalion Commander would refer to the delinquency of the company rather than Mr. F, the company representative. When his interaction with the Company Commander declined, he was less able to give adequate explanations for events occurring within the company. As he became

uncertain of his relationship with the Company Commander, he withdrew from the orderly room and worked in the supply room. Then the reports began to deteriorate, and were more frequently returned from Battalion headquarters for correction. The fact that Mr. F was a "weak link" in the company's communication with Battalion headquarters was an important factor in his reassignment.

Lieutenant E was able to maintain cordial relations with both the Company Commander and the other Platoon Leaders. When Mr. F was finally relieved of his duties they were divided between Lieutenant E and the Company Commander. On the third occasion that Mr. F had been late for briefing, the Company Commander designated Lieutenant D to replace him. However, Lieutenant D also overslept on the first morning that he was to attend. Then his jeep could not be started, so he missed the briefing completely. The following morning the Company Commander designated Lieutenant E to attend.

When Lieutenant E returned from the briefing, he reported to the Company Commander's bunker. He said that he had been the first company representative to arrive for the briefing. The Company Commander was very pleased. Lieutenant E then presented a long list of notes from the briefing and the Company Commander complimented him on the presentation. Then Lieutenant E mentioned that he was eligible for promotion and that Lieutenant B had said that he was getting a good efficiency report. The Company Commander replied

that the promotion papers had already been submitted and that he had been "happy to send it in."

After Lieutenant E's successful performance with the briefing his relationship with the Company Commander became more cordial. He came to the Company Commander's bunker more frequently to initiate discussions of patrols and assignments within the platoon. The night after he had attended the briefing, however, he invited the First Sergeant and Platoon Sergeants to play poker in the Platoon Leaders' bunker. The Company Commander and the other Platoon Leaders had left the company area on a patrol. During the game the Company Commander was the principal topic of discussion but Lieutenant E was less critical.

Lieutenant E was designated to succeed Mr. F as Mess Officer in addition to his primary duty as Platoon Leader. His duties in this position were limited to command supervision, insuring certain standards of sanitation, and representing the kitchen personnel in discussions with the Company Commander. But the kitchen personnel had technical skills which were not easily affected by "command supervision". They had always worked independently and maintained a high standard of food service. The significance of the Mess Officer to the enlisted men who worked in the kitchen was that he could make their tasks more difficult by raising standards, or their positions insecure by transferring them to other elements of the Company.

And to be promoted, they needed the Mess Officer to represent them before the Company Commander when a promotion quota came through.

The position of Mess Officer was used by both Lieutenant E and the kitchen crew. Lieutenant E used the position as a source of esteem with the Company Commander. He called attention to particularly attractive meals (prepared in accordance with a standard menu furnished to all units), remarked on their performance in making coffee available for patrols, and represented these factors as evidence of changes in mess management. The kitchen crew responded by making special "food services" available to Lieutenant E: cookies were brought to his bunker immediately after baking, his meat was prepared with the personal attention of the First Cook, and an expression of satisfaction was elicited by the Mess Sergeant after each meal. The increased interaction between the kitchen crew and the Mess Officer created the impression of more effective supervision although the activities involved had not been modified in any way.

When the Company Commander announced that Lieutenant C would succeed Lieutenant B as Executive Officer, Lieutenant D went to the Company Commander to ask why he had been "skipped". The Company Commander said that he had made the decision on the basis of their relative administrative abilities, and that he thought Lieutenant C would be more efficient in administration and supply. Both Lieutenants D and E, however, thought that the line of succession was being prescribed by Battalion headquarters, just as it had been when

Lieutenant B had been made Executive Officer and Lieutenant A the Company Commander. This violated the informal status system of officers within the company.

The Weapons Platoon Leader position had been considered as one which should be occupied by the senior Platoon Leader of the company. The Table of Organization stipulated that he would hold the rank of First Lieutenant, although rifle Platoon Leaders could be either First or Second Lieutenants. In stipulated rank and in formal prestige attributes, he was thus equal to the Executive Officer. Mobility in the status group was expected to follow this prestige scale. The senior rifle Platoon Leader would move to the Weapons Platoon. There he would not have to run patrols. From there he would move to the position of Company Executive Officer. The movement was based on gradations of prestige rather than tradition, however, because none of the previous three company Executive Officers had moved up from the Weapons Platoon.

When Lieutenant D was detached from the company for duty with a Korean military training camp, he was the Weapons Platoon Leader, having moved up from the Third Platoon. He had been on more patrols than any other officer in the company. When he returned to the company, the Third Platoon did not have a Platoon Leader. He was temporarily assigned until a replacement officer arrived so that the platoon could be used for patrolling (the Weapons Platoon did not go on patrols).

The appointment enabled the Company Commander to increase the gap between the "old company" and the organizational image that he was creating by his changes. Lieutenant C while he had been with the company had been in conflict with the old Company Commander, and was less well known in the company. But Lieutenant D had served with three Company Commanders, was well known to all of the "old men" of the company, and had little prestige at Battalion headquarters. Although his relationships with all of the Company Commanders had been about the same, his principal loyalty had been to his platoon. It would have been more difficult for him to have executed the changes which the Company Commander was continuously making.

On the Line. During this period there was a sharp decrease in the number of contacts between the Company Commander and other officers of the company. He was never alone with them: on inspections, at meals, or on the conference telephone call, enlisted men were in his immediate presence, restricting status relevant conversations. All officers were isolated from their status peers but the isolation of the Company Commander enabled him to maintain his identity as a member of the superior status group.

Platoon leaders lived with the platoon headquarters men, isolated from all contacts with the Company Commander except for meals, inspections, and telephone calls. In contrast the the reserve bivouac, their interaction and activity was almost exclusively with

enlisted men. Status distinctions were quickly obscured when they shared the same living space and conditions throughout the day and night, and were activated only when inspecting officers arrived in the platoon area.

In the second week on the line, a poker game was held in the Second Platoon command post. Two officers - Lieutenant E and the artillery Forward Observer - were participants, with Privates Axel and Camp. Gambling between officers and enlisted men was prohibited by military law. The game was in progress when the conference call came through. When it was concluded, the participants joined in critical comments about the way that the company was being managed.

One of the orders given over the telephone was that everyone, "including Platoon Leaders" would eat breakfast. The next morning the Company Commander was at the trailhead when Lieutenant E arrived after the regular feeding period. He reported formally to the Company Commander, stating that six of his men had made the fifteen minute walk with him, but they wouldn't eat and had immediately returned to their positions. He said that he was going to do the same thing. But then he walked to the kitchen and had breakfast. The Company Commander returned to the company command post at 0800. A short time later the First Sergeant telephoned that men from the Second Platoon were still coming down the hill for breakfast. The Company Commander then issued instructions that no more men would be fed unless they arrived at the stated time.

One further conflict occurred between the Company Commander and Lieutenant E. Preparations were being made for a patrol. A period of warm weather had melted most of the snow so that white was more noticeable in darkness. Battalion patrol orders routinely required the wearing of "snow suit" camouflage garments. At supper Lieutenant E said that they had compared a patrol from one company without snow suits, with another wearing them, and that the patrol wearing the white garments could be seen at a much greater distance. However, the Company Commander insisted that the snow suits be used and said that under prevailing visibility conditions, patrol members would look like "blobs of snow". Lieutenant E concluded the discussion with the comment, "Well, you're the boss."

This series of events indicates the increased deviance of Lieutenant E, the Platoon Leader, from the sentiments of his own status group, as his solidarity with the platoon was intensified by isolation from other officers. In gambling with status subordinates, in expressing and supporting criticism of the Company Commander, and in supporting the deviant reaction to the early feeding period, Lieutenant E expressed his solidarity with the subordinate status group while on the line.

The two other company officers had less frequent contacts with the Company Commander during this period. Lieutenant D was with the Third Platoon which was too far to walk to the company kitchen. Hot meals were brought to them by jeep and trailer. He rarely

came to the company command post. Lieutenant C, the Executive Officer, remained at a point in the rear of the Battalion command post where the heavy vehicles and supply services of the Battalion were located. He saw the Company Commander briefly every day, reporting on administrative details. Whenever he came to the company area he also visited his former platoon.

Lieutenant C's attachment to his former platoon was involved in one discussion with the Company Commander. Lieutenant C referred to members of the platoon as his "boys". The Company Commander objected to this term. Lieutenant C continued that the men of the platoon were doing a good job, and that the Company Commander should reduce some of the demands on them. The Company Commander then indicated that he considered Sergeant Z a poor leader for suggesting that a man should not go on a patrol if he had more than thirty points toward rotation. Lieutenant C replied that the "suggestion" had been company policy until Lieutenant A had taken over as Company Commander.

Lieutenant C's relative freedom in expressing conflict with the Company Commander was probably related to the marginal position that he held in the company. He was the only officer at the company supply point where he interacted consistently with enlisted men who had been under heavy pressure from the Company Commander. At the same time, he was still viewed by the men of the First Platoon as their Platoon Leader because no replacement officer had been assigned. This

combination of factors made him more responsive to the negative sentiments of the enlisted men than if he had been, in reality, responsible as Platoon Leader for their performance.

Reserve and retraining. In the first reserve period, the Company Commander had been segregated from the other company officers, but in the final reserve period, all officers lived together in a single tent. Meals were served in the tent so that this contact with the men of the company was eliminated. Status segregation reduced the interaction between status groups, while intensifying the interaction within status groups. Casual conversations among the Platoon Leaders were used by the Company Commander in his evaluation of them. Similarly, the Company Commander's activity was under critical evaluation by the Platoon Leaders.

Three new officers joined the company. Lieutenant H had joined on the day before the company withdrew from their positions on the line, and had been assigned to the Third Platoon. Lieutenant D then returned to the Weapons Platoon for two weeks, until Lieutenant C rotated; then Lieutenant D finally became Executive Officer. Lieutenant T was assigned to the First Platoon. He had been an officer candidate when the Company Commander was his Platoon Leader at Fort Benning. Lieutenant J was assigned as Second Platoon Leader, and Lieutenant E who had received his promotion to First Lieutenant, became Weapons Platoon Leader. In these changes, the expected mobility pattern for company officers was followed.

Three events indicate the extent to which the Platoon Leaders' behavior was modified by their integration in the status group. In the first event, Lieutenant H (Platoon Leader, First Platoon) mentioned to Lieutenant E that one of his men had discovered that the toe of his boot had been burned through while they had been on the line. The Company Commander interrupted the conversation to comment that he should have been told about such an incident earlier. He continued that the man would have to be court-martialed and pay for the boots in addition. Lieutenant H replied that such an action would be an injustice, and would hurt his platoon. Lieutenant E disputed the Company Commander's assertion that a man could be made to pay and still be tried by a court-martial. Several days later the Company Commander commented in a discussion that he had only been "kidding" Lieutenant H about such an action.

In a second event, Lieutenant E mentioned that there had been a series of fights in his platoon. Most recently, Baum had "socked" Chap for refusing to go on detail. Later, Ellis knocked down East in an argument. Lieutenant E interpreted these incidents as evidence that his Squad Leaders "really knew how to handle their men." The Company Commander objected, stating that such things can "go too far and cause trouble". He continued that it could involve the company in an investigation by a higher echelon.

In a third event, Lieutenant E returned from a retreat ceremony and commented to the Company Commander that he "really chewed them"

today. The investigator had heard Lieutenant E tell the assembled company that all of the officers were "proud of them" but that they would have to "sharpen up" if they were to be selected for the Corps honor guard detail. Hence, he described the event to the Company Commander as a severe reprimand, while he had actually made only a mild admonition. The Company Commander stated that it was poor policy to "chew them out for everything in general"; rather, he should have reprimanded them, if at all, for something specific.

Although Lieutenant E had become the senior Platoon Leader his prestige with the Company Commander declined steadily, while the new Platoon Leaders were more frequently mentioned. Lieutenant E became a close friend of Lieutenant H, the new Platoon Leader of the First Platoon. Lieutenant T, who had known Lieutenant A at Fort Benning, remained neutral. The Company Commander frequently turned to Lieutenant T for support of his decisions, and Lieutenant T was never critical of the Company Commander when he was absent.

When the Company Commander attempted to distinguish his position from his status - which he shared with the Platoon Leaders - he aroused more criticism. Thus, when the company officers took up a collection to buy beer, and the Company Commander refused to contribute, they said that he was "playing too good". Later, when they made a decision to buy a radio jointly, they discussed the possibility of getting earphones so that the Company Commander, who would not contribute to the purchase, would be unable to hear it.

E. Interaction within Status Groups: Enlisted Men

The Korean soldiers ("ROK's"). The number of Korean soldiers in each squad has been mentioned. They were never mentioned as "buddies". Officially, each Korean soldier had an American soldier as a companion. The American was responsible for the Korean soldier's tactical proficiency and integration in the squad. However, these relationships were observed only on guard posts and when reporting to inspecting officers.

In most of the activities of the squads, the Koreans were differentiated from the Americans. Beck (First Squad) for example, described the Koreans as "duds": men who would not do their share in the required activities of the squad. He said:

"Some of the ROK's are pretty good; others don't want to do anything. Get them out on a patrol and they go to sleep. They don't keep clean. They don't have to shave so they never wash their faces. When you say something to them you can never be sure that they understand what you mean."

Private Bird (First Squad) described the behavior of the Koreans in a bull session in the bunker:

"Someone passes a package and everyone takes some, even the ROK's. Then we start talking about home, or places we've been. The Koreans don't understand us, and even if they did they wouldn't know about the same things. So they just sit there: when we talk, they look from face to face. When we laugh, they laugh. But we never get to know them, and we just do what we can to make them feel like they're part of the squad."

The Koreans were seldom differentiated by name. They did not go on patrols, and were never assigned as assistants on the auto-

matic rifle. They segregated themselves in the chow line. On work details they exchanged tools with one another but rarely with an American unless the American initiated the exchange. When the squad moved as a group, the Koreans walked at the rear of the column.

Changes in Platoon Composition.¹ During the final reserve period there was more mobility in the platoon than during the previous three months. Master Sergeant Fox joined the platoon as a replacement Platoon Sergeant in February. Eight other men were assigned as replacements.

Sergeant Fox, the replacement Platoon Sergeant, had served with the Company Commander when both were enlisted men. This fact was known to the platoon and aroused initial apprehension. Sergeant Abid (who had been promoted from Corporal) resumed his position as Assistant Platoon Sergeant. He stated:

"We all knew that he had served with Lieutenant A as an enlisted man. But he's turned out to be Number One. The second day he was here he learned how to deal with Lieutenant A: he just takes care of things by himself. At first I was a little sore because he squeezed me out of the job. But now I don't care because he has the rank for the responsibility."

Before his reassignment to the Weapons Platoon, Lieutenant E had shown much less interest in the assignments within the platoon.

¹See Figure 12, "Changes in Platoon Composition"

When Bell (First Squad) succeeded Caro as Squad Leader of the Second Squad, the selection was made by Sergeant Fox, on the advice of Sergeant Abid. Sergeant Fox explained:

"We'd like to get the men who are buddies as Squad Leaders. Beck will take over when Baum leaves. If the Squad Leaders are buddies they make agreements among themselves and swap things. There's less competition between squads, and they work together for the platoon as a whole."

Designation as Squad Leader involved no official reward, but promotion did. Although Sergeant Fox sponsored Bell as a Squad Leader, Lieutenant E selected Dean over Baum as a candidate for promotion to Sergeant. Dean had succeeded Earl as Squad Leader, Weapons Squad. He said:

"Nobody knows why Dean was chosen. With Baum it would have been different. He's been Squad Leader a long time. But Dean has been moved from one squad to another. It looks like they're just using our squad to give him a promotion."

Bell had also moved from one squad to a leadership position in another. His authority was initially resisted. He described the reactions of some members of the squad in these words:

"When I took over the squad, they thought that I was trying to act big. They were sore because I had been sent over here from the other squad, as if I was better than anyone here. One night when I posted Chap on guard he said not to work too hard, because I'd get to be a corporal anyway. I told him that I didn't ask for the job, and if I made Corporal it wouldn't be because I was brown-nosing."

Chap, the senior member of the squad, had suspected Bell of using personal influence to get his position, and expected the squad to be

exploited to maintain a favorable position with platoon headquarters.

Chap stated:

"When we first moved into this area, all of the squad leaders slept in the platoon headquarters tent. Then they moved all of them out except Bell, and moved all of our squad in with the Platoon Sergeant. We got most of the details because we were more available than the squads in the other tents. Bell is a buddy with the Platoon Sergeant so he's afraid to go to bat for us. They've got a big clique running things now. All of the Squad Leaders are buddies."

In his relations with the other Squad Leaders Bell utilized his relationship to them as a buddy. He said:

"Baum and Beck are still my buddies. I'm glad that the other Squad Leaders are buddies because we're all trying to improve our squads now. It's easier to admit that your squad needs improvement if you know that the other Squad Leaders aren't trying to take advantage of you."

F. Summary

In general, it may be said that the sentiments of the officers more frequently expressed the ideals of formal military organization. They often referred to the traditions of the organization, or abstract symbols. Initiative, aggressiveness, and tactical proficiency were the most valued attributes, which they used in evaluating one another and members of the subordinate status group.

In contrast, the sentiments of the enlisted men expressed the solidarity of a subordinate status group. They seldom referred to the traditions of the organization. Initiative, aggressiveness, and tactical proficiency were valued only to the extent that such attributes protected the group and minimized the risk to which they were collectively exposed.

FINAL ORGANIZATION	INTERIM CHANGES
<hr/>	
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS	
Plat.Sgt., M.Sgt. FOX	Sgt. ALEX, evacuated for self-inflicted wound.
Asst. Plat. Sgt., Sgt. ABID	
Act'g Asst. Plat. Sgt., Cpl. BART	Cpl. BART, moved from 1st Squad
Radio Operator, Pvt. FINN	Pvt. DION, moved from 3rd Squad
Messenger, Pvt. DION	Pvt. AXEL, moved to 1st Squad
	<u>Replacements: M.Sgt.FOX, Pvt. FINN</u>
<hr/>	
FIRST SQUAD	
Sqd. Ldr., Cpl. BAUM	Cpl. BART, moved to Plat. Hq.
Asst.Sqd.Ldr., Cpl. BECK	Pvt. AXEL, moved from Plat. Hq.
Auto.Rifleman, Pfc. FORD	Pvt. BIRD, moved to Rocket Team
Asst. Auto.Rifleman, Pfc. FREY	<u>Replacements: Pfc's FORD and FREY</u>
Riflemen: Pvt. AXEL, and ROK's Kim, Seun, Yook, and Joo	
<hr/>	
SECOND SQUAD	
Sqd. Ldr., Cpl. BELL	Cpl. Bell, moved from 1st Sqd.
Asst. Sqd. Ldr., Pfc. CLAY	Pvt. Craig, moved to 3rd Squad.
Auto. Rifleman, Pvt. CHAP	<u>Rotated: Pvt's CAMP and CRUM</u>
Asst.Auto.Rifleman, Pvt. FUNK	<u>Replacements: Pfc FUNK, Pvt.FURR</u>
Riflemen: Pvt's COX and FURR, and ROK's Ha, Lee, and Oh	
<hr/>	
THIRD SQUAD	
Sqd. Ldr., Cpl. DAIL	Cpl. DEAN, moved to Weapons Sqd.
Asst. Sqd. Ldr., Pfc. DICK	Pvt. DION, moved to Plat. Hq.
Auto. Rifleman, Pfc. DENT	Pvt. DRUM, moved to Co. Hq.
Asst. Auto. Rifleman, Pvt.FOSS	Pvt. DODD, moved to Bn. Hq.
Riflemen: Pvt. CRAIG, and ROK's Kwak, Joo, and Jin	Pvt. CRAIG, moved from 2nd Squad.
	<u>Replacement: Pvt. FOSS</u>
<hr/>	
WEAPONS SQUAD	
Sqd. Ldr., Sgt. DEAN	Sgt. DEAN, Moved from 3rd Squad
Gunner, Pfc. FIX	Pvt. EGAN, moved to Co. Hq.
Asst. Gunner, Pvt. FIFE	Pvt. EMERY, moved to Rocket Team
Gunner, Pfc. ELLIS	<u>Rotated: Cpl. EARL, Pfc's EAST and EVANS</u>
Asst. Gunner, Pvt. FRITZ	<u>Replacements: Pfc. FIX, Pvt's FIFE and FRITZ</u>
Ammunition Bearers: ROK's Kim, Sun, and Lee	
<hr/>	
ROCKET TEAM	
Gunner, Pfc. EMERY	Pfc. EMERY, moved from Weapons Sqd.
Asst. Gunner, Pvt. BIRD	Pvt. BIRD, moved from 1st Squad.

Figure 12. Final Platoon Organization

CHAPTER VI

THE INTERNAL SYSTEM: ACTIVITY - INTERACTION

A. Introduction

In this chapter, certain activities required and permitted by the external system are described, and a scheme of interaction related to the sentiments of the internal system is analyzed. "Sharing" was the major activity of bunker life and entirely unrelated to any prescriptions of the external system. Work details were required by the external system, but tool exchange patterns were not prescribed. The pattern of tool exchanges indicates interaction in the external system based on sentiments of the internal system.

B. Sharing

"Sharing was a term used to describe most of the activities carried on between buddies and among the members of the squad. One's capacity to share affected the number of interactions that once could initiate. The things shared ranged from such impersonal factors as risk, to the items of packages from home.

First Squad. In the bunker, Baum originated more interactions than any of the other members. He also received more packages from home, and had been around the squad longer than anyone else so that he had more experiences to use in conversations. He stated:

"I get more than anyone else because both my wife and mother send packages. It helps to make buddies. A guy who didn't share wouldn't have many buddies. It helps the Koreans too: even though they can never offer us anything, they like our food, and they can understand what we mean when we pass it around."

Beck was second to Baum, his buddy, in the number of interactions originated. He described two elements of sharing:

"There are some things that you can only talk to your buddy about. Like something that happened in the squad, or the way things are going at home. All buddies can do here is hang around together and wait for a chance to talk. I'd rather talk to Baum because we're closest. We've been through most of this together. But a package is different. We share it with everybody because some fellows don't get packages and it helps them out. That way it makes the whole squad stick together. Sometimes you think that it might help you out when you're on the line."

When men did not receive packages they exchanged whatever was in momentary need in the squad. Axel, Bart, and Bell did not receive packages. Baum and Beck had been originating interactions with Bell who was unable to reciprocate. Bell stated:

"It makes me feel good when someone offers me something, and I feel bad when I can't return it. All I've been able to offer is stuff that I get at the Post Exchange. I know that Baum and Beck understand but I'll feel better when my first package comes."

Second Squad. In the Second Squad, Camp received packages most frequently, while Clay and Cole never received them. As an "old man" of the squad, Camp distinguished between the way "old men" and "new men" shared their packages. He said:

"You feel more like sharing stuff with your buddy. The new men do it differently. A new man will usually pass a package around and offer some to everybody. If you like the guy or if he works with you, you'll take his offer. A guy who's been around quite a while will just put a box beside his bed and yell 'Come and get it.' Or the other men will pick it up and pass it around by themselves. If you're alone in a bunker you're not supposed to take anything, even though its open and you think that the other guy won't mind. You should only take an offer."

Cox anticipated the relationship between sharing in the bunker, and sharing risk in combat. He said:

"If a guy didn't share maybe some day he'd be in a tough spot and the buddy would remember it and think about when you didn't make an offer. You don't always have a chance to do a favor in combat, but if you share everything, you can be pretty sure that your buddy will remember it if you need help."

Chap described the function of a buddy in these terms:

"A buddy understands you and is interested in your story. Some big mouths talk as if everyone is interested in their story but they're not. You've got to find a guy you like and he likes you, then you're buddies and you know he'll listen to you when you want to talk. A buddy shares everything; if you don't get mail, he lets you read his. Some fellows don't share my stuff because its Hawaiian food and they don't like it, but it's there if they want it."

The "bull session" was another major activity of bunker life. The legitimacy of participation was determined by the number of experiences that the member had been through with the company. In this sharing of experiences, the "new men" formulated their own role conceptions. Clay said:

"When I first joined the squad I liked to listen to the stories of what the outfit had been through. You heard them so many times that you began to think that you had actually been there when they happened. Then you felt that you had to do things as the "old men" had done them."

The bull session was controlled by the "old men" of the squad.

Craig stated:

"In the bunker the men don't talk much about combat. When they do the old men like Camp and Chap call them "war daddy" and they shut up. Clay is like that. Most of the time they talk about places back in the States, or incidents around the company. It's a lot better to talk about things like that until you've really had some combat behind you."

One other activity was centered in the Second Squad but attracted men from other squads: the platoon poker game. Camp was the leader, arranging the place, setting the time, and making sure that illumination would be available. Camp said:

"We played poker last night - we do for a few days after every payday. Not many men pay because they send their money home. Usually the same guys play. Last night it was Chap, Egan (Weapons Squad), Dean (Third Squad), and another guy from the Weapons Squad. Clay played for a few games and quit. The other guys played through the whole game."

Third Squad. In the Third Squad, Dion received the greatest number of packages, and thus had the greatest number of opportunities for sharing. Dail stated:

"Dion is Number One for sharing. He gets lots of packages from home. You can't help liking a guy if he makes more offers. Sometimes you leave your stuff beside the bunk and tell the guys to take anything

if they want it, but you feel better if someone else is around when they take it because someone might come in from another squad or platoon. If a guy takes your offer, you'd like to know who it is and if a man comes around from another squad he'll tell you."

Dodd had stated that he was excluded from many of the activities of the squad because of his "light duty slip", and that he had been ridiculed because he was Regular Army. He had never received a package but accepted offers from the persons who were critical of him. He said:

"Even though a guy has been treating you pretty rough, he'll offer you something from his package and it helps you to forget what he said about you. Just like at home, you'd try to make up with a guy by buying him a beer. When you pass a package around you show that everyone is your buddy."

Dail described the significance of a buddy while on patrol:

"Buddies have to talk when they get the chance, and you're never sure when you'll get the chance. When on a patrol all the sweat is on the way out, when you're spread out and can't say anything to anyone. When you get to the objective you can say something to your buddy. Maybe you were afraid on the way out. You feel better after you've told someone. It could happen to anyone, and your buddy would understand that even if no one else did."

Fourth squad. When a package arrived in the Fourth Squad (the Weapons Squad) it was distributed among the men of the squad to which one or both guns of the squad was attached. Under these conditions the exchange had less significance than in the rifle squads.

C. Work Details

Work details were usually performed as a collective task of a platoon or squad under the supervision of the Platoon Leader or Squad Leader. The limited number of tools available required periodic exchanges between men who were working and those who were resting. When the task area was reached, those men then in possession of the tools began to work. If two buddies both had tools, both began to work and arranged the subsequent exchanges so that they would be near each other and could exchange in an alternating sequence.

In recording observations of tool exchanges, the originator of the exchange could not be specified because the signal was apparently too subtle to detect. It might occur in the context of an irrelevant conversation or in a period of silence. The frequency of exchange seemed to be the most significant measure of the relationship between two or more persons. The larger the number of persons working together, the more exchanges occurred between two persons. Men who were alone or in pairs worked for longer periods and exchanged less frequently. These factors cannot be indicated in the tabulations. The Squad Leader moved throughout the squad, exchanging with all men at least once. The Koreans are not counted in the exchanges because the investigator could not distinguish them as persons, although exchanges between an American and a Korean are indicated.

The pattern of tool exchanges in relation to buddy choices is presented in Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16, following. In the diagrams tool exchange is represented by a solid line, broken by a number which indicates the number of exchanges taking place between the related individuals. The number in the individual rectangle indicates the total number of exchanges with all individuals in the squad. The dotted line indicates a buddy choice, a single arrow indicating the direction of choice, a double arrow that the choice was reciprocal.

D. Summary

An attempt has been made to evaluate the relationship between interaction in the external system and sentiments in the internal system. First, the activity of "sharing" in the internal system was described as based on sentiments of solidarity between buddies and among members of the squad. Then, the tool exchanges in work details were counted. When compared with verbal buddy choices, an association is indicated between sentiments of solidarity and the frequency of tool exchange. Buddies tended to arrange themselves spatially so that they could interact with one another in the external system.




Figure 13. First Squad: Tool Exchanges and Buddy Choices




Figure 14. Second Squad: Tool Exchanges and Buddy Choices




Figure 15. Third Squad: Tool Exchanges and Buddy Choices




Figure 16. Fourth Squad: Tool Exchanges and Buddy Choices

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. A Theoretical Reformulation

A description and analysis of a rifle company as a social system has been presented. Two complementary aspects of social organization have been described as an external system and an internal system. The external system consists of the activity, interaction, and sentiments by which the actors are related to the larger society and the normative structure of military organization. The internal system consists of the activity, interaction, and sentiments by which actors are related in collectivities of risk, status, and authority. Each actor has been described in terms of his combat role in the external system, and a relationship has been sought between that role and the actor's membership in an internal system. The internal system has been conceived of as referring to a composite of collectivities in which the actor has both active and latent roles at any point in time.

The collectivity and the external system are related by the actor's role in the external system. On the one hand, the actor is assigned to a position within a scheme of interaction and provided with technical knowledge and sentiments which motivate participation in the activities of the external system. On the other hand, in the

internal system the actor participates in a relational system toward which he develops sentiments of moral obligation, including other actors and the collectivity. The buddy relationship, as a social relationship involving moral obligation in the performance of role expectations, is the basic element of solidarity.

The data presented here have indicated the factors involved in the induction of the actor from his position in the larger society and his assignment to a position in military organization. An analysis has been made of the relationship between the actor's position in the external system, the activities involved in that position, and the scheme of interaction involved in cooperation with other actors. Then an analysis has been made of the actor's position in a collectivity toward which he shares sentiments of moral obligation.

B. The Collectivity as a Resource
In Role Performance

The hypothesis asserts that in the performance of a combat role the actor is influenced by the elements of a collectivity in which he shares sentiments of solidarity. The elements of such collectivities have been referred to as (1) activity, (2) interaction, and (3) sentiments. An element is considered a resource when it contributes to an adaptation of the actor's role to situations involving varying kinds and degrees of stress. Conversely, an element is not a resource when an actor could have performed the role without access to such an element.

A review of the literature has indicated that four factors have been stressed as fundamental influences in combat role performance: (1) the ideological symbols of the larger society; (2) the actor's attachment to the symbols of formal military organization; (3) the "masculinity norm"; and (4) membership in a solidary collectivity.

The data presented here indicate that the sentiments of the larger society are of significant motivational value to the extent that they justify the actor's assignment to a position in military organization and the performance of a corresponding role. The relationship between the actor in a combat role, and his attachment to the larger society, is mediated primarily by his attachment to the sentiments of another collectivity: the family. Striving to maintain a satisfactory self-conception in terms of the family fostered adherence to the normative standards of the larger society requiring military service. Beyond the level of this collectivity there is no evidence of the sentiments of the larger society being utilized as resources. Such attributes as race and religion, of great symbolic value in the larger society, were almost completely ignored in the combat role.

A second factor which has been stressed is the actor's attachment to the symbols of formal military organization. The data indicate that such an attachment varied with the actor's status group membership. Among enlisted men, sentiments of attachment to structures larger than the company were rarely expressed. Few

opportunities existed for such sentiments to develop. Spatially and socially the company was isolated from other components of larger structures. With reference to awards and decorations to motivate hazardous behavior, the actor or the status audience consistently denied the distinctive value of such an award.

Among officers, however, there was a significant attachment to the larger organization, especially the regiment. Reference has been made to the protocol of assignment by which officers were introduced to superior commanders and indoctrinated with the symbols of each organizational level through which they passed. Subsequently the protocol of inspections, status segregation, and the evaluation of technical competence in terms of status solidarity, tended to maintain the officer's attachment to the larger organization and to facilitate the use of the authority in his position. Therefore, it may be concluded that such an attachment was a significant factor for officers in the performance of their combat roles.

A third factor which has been considered significant is the "norm of masculinity" which refers to an aspect of the personality in terms of which the actor evaluates his behavior as adequate to cope with stress and to act independently as a male adult. On a dimension of masculinity, the most masculine actor would be the least dependent. The least masculine actor would conceive of himself as totally dependent on collaboration with his peers.

However, these data indicate that such attributes as independence, aggressiveness, and initiative were negatively defined. Nor did the position involve such a high degree of gratificatory significance that it inhibited mobility striving to positions more remote from risk. An admission of dependency, and hence a denial of independence, was a primary technique which the actor used to strengthen his solidarity with the collectivity.

A fourth factor which has been considered, the subject of this investigation, is the actor's attachment to a solidary collectivity. The data indicate that collectivities are of differential significance depending on variations in the tactical activity of the company. At least three dimensions may be specified which are bases on which actors are united as collectivities: (1) status, (2) authority, and (3) risk.

Status. The actor is influenced by his membership in a collectivity based on relative status. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, officers segregated themselves and carried on activities that were exclusive to their status group. In reserve areas, officers and enlisted men were distinguished by their mode of living, segregation, and enforced deference gestures. During these periods there was a corresponding decrease in the frequency of interaction between status groups and of positive sentiments toward each other. During periods on the line, these differences were eliminated.

One factor affecting the significance of status distinctions among enlisted men was that the external system failed to provide the stipulated rank for persons who were performing in roles which called for such rank. Individuals were not motivated to attain or retain the rank when the organization could not provide the formal status symbols for the position in which the actor was performing.

Another factor affecting the formal status structure was the instability of assignments to positions within the structure. A private or a corporal who had performed in a leader role for several months might be "bumped" when a non-commissioned officer with a higher grade was assigned to the platoon as a replacement. The acting leader would then revert to his old position in the platoon. Meanwhile, the acting leader's position with his peers had been threatened. Men who attempted to use the authority of the positions to which they were temporarily assigned were resented or suspected of "bucking". Few men were motivated to move up to higher positions when it involved little probability of reward and almost certainly, the weakening of relationships in the squad which they were required to leave.

Although the grade "didn't count for much" in the platoon, it was expected to be a significant source of prestige in the larger society, through the family and the work group. Promotion disappointment became increasingly severe as the rotation date approached. Men

who had been performing in a higher position had frequently written letters to friends, relatives, or former employers, describing their responsibilities and mentioning the stipulated rank as a measure of the importance of their positions. Some received letters addressed to them in the appropriate grade for the position to which they had been assigned temporarily. Their apprehension was expressed by the statement that if they should come home as privates "They'll think that I've been giving them a line all the time." The rank held at the time of discharge was also expected to influence civilian employment opportunities.

Among officers the major source of status differentials was the position held by the actor. Within the company all officers were of approximately equal rank. Beyond the company, however, a person could be placed by status observers only by formal symbols of rank. When the Company Commander left the company area he could be identified only as a junior member of his status group. Among officers of higher rank, or of equal rank at echelons of less risk and more prestige, he lacked the responsive status audience of the company where his position was known.

It may be concluded, then, that status group membership influenced officers in the performance of their combat roles in the following ways: (1) An awareness of obligation to the larger organization was activated and maintained by the procedure of assignments,

the protocol of inspections, and exclusive status group activities.

(2) Employment of the legitimate authority of their positions was facilitated by segregation from the subordinate status group.

(3) Social ranking within the status group in terms of status solidarity, and rewards in the form of access to mobility channels to echelons of less risk, fostered compliance with the normative standards of military organization.

Among enlisted men, status group membership was significant in the following ways: (1) The lack of legitimate authority in the positions to which they were assigned was made up for by their own sentiments of solidarity. (2) Membership fostered conflict relations with the superior status group when that group acted collectively to enforce their own solidarity. (2) They had limited opportunities for transfer to echelons of less risk.

Risk. The actor is influenced by his membership in a collectivity based on relative risk. Gradations of risk occurred when the company was used on the line as a component of a larger military organization or when members of the company conceived of themselves as collectively exposed to greater risk than persons and collectivities at other echelons of power and prestige. Collectivities based on risk are defined by a set of actors who share relatively similar chances of exploiting their tactical environment for safety and comfort, in comparison to other echelons, regardless of status group membership.

The elements of collectivities based on risk affected combat roles in the following ways: (1) Exposure to risk was a consistent referent for the establishment of collectivities based on sentiments which express the mutual dependency of related actors.

(2) The existence of such a relationship provides social support in crisis situations, actual and anticipated. (3) The solidarity of the collectivity provides support in reaction to the subordinate positions occupied by the majority of the actors in the distribution of authority.

Among officers, membership in a collectivity of risk has additional implications. As the degree of risk increases, the intensity and frequency of the Platoon Leader's interaction with members of the subordinate status group is increased, and correspondingly, significant interaction with status peers is decreased. The more frequently and consistently the officer interacts with members of the subordinate status group, the more he tends to participate in their activities and to share their sentiments. Accordingly, the officer's collectivity membership, under conditions of increasing risk, limits his capacity to use the sanctions available to him as a member of the superior status group, and fosters deviance from the normative standards imposed by the external system. A conflict is created between the officer's role in the collectivity of risk and his role in the status group.

Authority. The actor is influenced by his membership in a collectivity based on relative authority. Authority exists in an office to the extent that it is a component of a position in a hierarchy of command relationships, and the incumbent of the office may issue an order and use physical or psychical compulsion to obtain conformity with the order, or invoke sanctions for violating it. Actors have relative authority in the extent to which their offices permit deviation from the order, in the number of persons whose conformity to an order can be commanded, and in their capacity to control the channels of communication by which orders are transmitted and compliance verified.

The dimensions of status and risk intersect the dimension of authority. As a status group, officers have access to more severe sanctions than enlisted men. But the greater the conditions of risk (and hence, the greater the potential deviance), the less effectively can status segregation be maintained, and the officer's authority is compromised by increasing solidarity with the subordinate status group.

But generalized individual compliance is essential for effective combat activity, and the use of physical force is of no immediate symbolic value. Accordingly the position of the officer is vested with a high degree of latent force so that by virtue of his status alone, his authority will be acknowledged.

The symbolic significance of the officer's status as latent force is developed and maintained by a formal differentiation of available sanctions, and by more intimate involvement in the formal activity of the organization. The officer has relatively more severe sanctions available. He is identified with a status group which has more power in decision making.

Thus, during the period on the line, combat conditions tended to isolate officers from one another. The motivation of the platoon leader to use sanctions was inhibited by the personal and urgent situations in which offenses occurred. Higher level commanders attempted to foster the Platoon Leader's continued status solidarity by close personal relationships, personal greetings when new officers joined the Regiment, or on inspections, and involvement in exclusive status group activities.

The effect of continued solidarity with the superior status group is to develop in the officer a conception of himself as having "status potency" or the capacity to induce compliance by virtue of his status attributes alone. Status attributes are expected to transform an officer, to become such an integral part of his personality that any social act will reflect his solidarity with the status group. Such characteristics are also components of an officer's occupational role and used by colleagues in social ranking. The use of force by "preferring charges" is unnecessary as long as the officer's "potency" in employing sanctions is recognized.

But if sanctions are invoked as a last resort, an admission of status impotence is involved. Status potency thus inhibits the use of severe formal sanctions. The commander's prestige can be protected only by restricting the significance of the offense and the punishment to his own command. When severe sanctions are invoked, the officer-accuser must relinquish his own responsibility to colleagues at remote echelons, thus admitting his status impotence to a wider audience. The subsequent trial procedure would entail a series of investigations involving status peers, with a consequent evaluation of the effectiveness of his status attributes.

In summary, it is possible to specify three points around which collectivities of authority were organized within the company. The first consisted of persons in the superior status group who exerted authority collectively and by virtue of their positions. A second type consisted of the subordinate status group whose authority was derived from their solidarity, enabling them to minimize compliance with the normative standards imposed by the external system. A third type consisted of actors whose positions involved conflicts between obligations to the larger organization and to the status group. The members of this collectivity were the First Sergeant, Platoon Sergeants, and less frequently, Platoon Leaders.

Among officers, collectivities based on relative authority affected combat role performance in the following ways: (1) The

channels of communication to echelons of greater authority were controlled by reporting techniques that stressed compliance with orders and described the existence of a condition of equilibrium. (2) The officer might utilize the activities of the subordinate status group to avoid compliance with procedures specified by higher echelons of authority. (3) Status group solidarity was interpreted as technical competence, fostering compliance with the normative standards of formal military organization.

A second type of collectivity consisted of actors who mediated between their own status group and the subordinate or superior status group. Such actors were Platoon Sergeants, and less frequently, Platoon Leaders. The normative standards of this collectivity referred to conflict relations between positions of greater and less authority. Membership in this collectivity affected role performance in the following ways: (1) By interacting with authority peers in other elements of the company, they integrated the smaller unit with the larger. (2) Conflict between status groups could be mitigated because their integration in either group was marginal and membership in either group could be legitimated. (3) Members of the collectivity had at least partial access to the sentiments of both groups and accordingly, could modify their role behavior as the situation demanded. (4) Negative sentiments toward the superior status group could be used by the actor to relieve him of responsibility for violating the sentiments of his own status group.

A third collectivity has been specified as consisting of actors in the positions of least authority who derived authority from their sentiments of solidarity. Membership in this collectivity affected role behavior in the following ways: (1) Isolation from activities involving positions of greater authority increased the interaction in the collectivity and their dependence on the sentiments of the collectivity. (2) The lack of responsibility for the exercise of legitimate authority required the members to have a minimal commitment to the sentiments imposed by the external system. (3) The lack of legitimate authority increased the significance of the buddy as a legitimating agent for potentially deviant behavior.

C. The Collectivity as a Resource and Variations in Stress

The second hypothesis asserts that, as the stressfulness of the situation increases, the actor is influenced by the elements of the collectivity less frequently in the performance of his combat role. The hypothesis has been tested by comparing activities, interaction, and sentiments in three tactical situations: tactical reserve, positions on the line, and a final reserve and retraining period. These variations also refer to relative degrees of risk, in increasing order as follows: reserve and retraining, tactical reserve, and positions on the line.

On the line and on patrol events in tactical reserve, collectivities based on risk were of primary significance. Status group

membership declined in significance as the Platoon Leader's activities and interaction with the subordinate status group increased. Within the rifle squads, buddy relationships were established on the experience or anticipation of support in crisis events. Spatial limitations on movement imposed by the tactical situation, isolation from activity in the larger unit, and mutual exposure to risk and deprivation intensified interaction within the collectivities based on risk.

The data indicate that the actor is influenced by different types of collectivities as the tactical situation varies. In reserve and retraining, solidarity within status groups and authority peers was intensified. Status segregation increased, interaction between status groups declined, and sentiments increasingly expressed conflict relations between status groups and authority echelons. Normative standards imposed by the external system were expressed in the collective activities of the superior status group and opposed by the solidarity of the subordinate status group.

The hypothesis that the actor is influenced by elements of the collectivity less frequently as the risks of the combat situation are increased must be rejected. The data indicate that as combat risk is increased, the actor is affected in the performance of his combat role by elements of collectivities based on risk more frequently, and elements of collectivities based on status and authority less frequently.

D. The Collectivity of Buddies

The data indicate that the basic social unit in the performance of a combat role consisted of two or more actors who shared a position of risk, one of whom described the other as a "buddy". A relationship to a buddy involved both men in a set of role expectations of mutual dependency and constituted a collectivity. It is now possible to specify the normative standards involved in a collectivity of buddies.

First, it can be noted that the most common sentiment expressed in the selection of a buddy was the recognition of mutual risk. The attachment of solidarity to a buddy occurred enroute to, or upon arrival in a position of risk.

Second, the collectivity accepted the normative standards imposed by the external system to the extent that such standards required performance in a combat role. The normative standards of the collectivity referred, however, to minimizing the degree of risk involved in the performance of the role. The terms "dud" and "hero" delimited this median position. The dud was a person who refused to participate in an activity with a buddy because it involved risk or hardship for himself, without reference to the collectivity. The hero defied risk as a limitation on his role behavior, thus increasing the risk for other mutually dependent actors, but especially for the buddy who was obligated to follow. Each actor was expected to demonstrate a minimal commitment to the

normative standards imposed by the external system. Each increment of commitment away from that minimum increased the chance that the actor would be isolated from the collectivity.

The sentiments of the collectivity of buddies may be specified as follows:

1. Buddy choices were private knowledge. One man could think of another as a buddy, but could never state it or boast of the attachment publicly. To do so would have required a conflict in loyalties among men who might have been chosen as buddies by several persons. This was especially important if the actor was a leader: other members of the squad would have anticipated favoritism in a crisis situation.

2. The buddy was a defense against isolation. He was always available when needed. He listened to whatever the actor wanted to say or express, whether anger, apprehension, or boldness. The more the actor told the buddy, the more they understood one another and the greater their mutual dependency became.

3. Communication between buddies included knowledge which was restricted to members of the collectivity. A buddy **never** laughed at what the actor said, nor revealed to others what they said to one another. Only on this condition was it possible, for example, to admit their apprehension to one another or to read each other's mail.

4. Relative judgements of combat proficiency were excluded from communication between buddies. The narration of a combat exper-

ience was interpreted as evidence of the actor's "hero" orientation and the possibility that he would expose to increased risk all persons who were related to him in mutually dependent roles.

5. The actor did not expose the buddy to the necessity of making a choice between his commitment to the external system or the collectivity. The actor did not volunteer for a hazardous mission unless the situation involved the sentiments of the collectivity (such as assistance to a wounded member of a patrol). To do so would have required a corresponding commitment of the buddy to the mission.

6. In a crisis situation the actor anticipated that he would act in terms of his commitment to the collectivity rather than to the sentiments of the external system. Although a buddy gave the actor his major support in conforming to his role in the external system, it might also have forced the actor to choose between that role and a moral obligation to the buddy. If the buddy "bugged out" and avoided his commitment to the external system, in most cases the actor would not condemn him but would have considered it a "normal" reaction. Similarly, if a buddy was wounded, the actor's first obligation was to a buddy, and secondarily to continued performance in the external system.

E. Risk and Ritual

As risk declined, either in tactical activity or in the echelon of assignment, there was a corresponding increase in the amount of formal and informal ritual activity, which expressed a relationship between the actor as an individual or as a collectivity, and combat events. The significance of status segregation for social control has been indicated. The officer platoon leader was the most forward agent of the normative standards imposed by the external system and enforced by military organization. Yet precisely because he was the only officer in the platoon, his activity and interaction with status group subordinates inhibited the freedom with which he could invoke formal sanctions. Withdrawal to reserve, and at echelons consistently removed from risk, the officer could maintain a solidary relationship with his status group.

Status segregation thus expressed the relationship between the actor and combat events: it was a ceremonial verification of the officer's membership in a collectivity of actors who adhered more closely to the normative standards imposed by the external system. The officer's role at risk remote echelons was accordingly modified to increase his freedom from moral commitments to other collectivities and to prevent such commitments from developing into solidary relationships.

Correspondingly, the reserve period provided an opportunity to break down other collectivities within the company and to reinforce

the formal structure by ritual activities expressing the company's relationship to formal military organization. It has been noted that the training program in the reserve period was based on an assumption that reinforcement of tactical doctrine would "raise morale" after the company was withdrawn from the line. Experiences were evaluated as success or failure in terms of the degree to which the fulfilled criteria of "correct" tactical doctrine. It has also been noted that the basic sentiment of the collectivities of risk was to minimize the threats imposed by the external system. Prolonged exposure to combat conditions potentially fostered the development of deviant collectivities, a dysfunctional phenomenon from the perspective of formal military organization.

Accordingly, the formal image of military organization was reinforced at all times by ritual activity which increased in degree and emphasis as risk became more remote. The rigid reporting protocol on the line, the emphasis on "correct" tactical doctrine, the frequent supply and administrative inspections, and participation in formal parades, reinforced the role prescriptions of the external system.

F. Collective Solidarity and "Morale"

The solidarity of the collectivity and its resistance to stress depended on the extent to which the members shared normative standards. "Morale" may be defined as the extent to which the normative

standards of the collectivities within the company converged with the standards imposed by the external system. Then "morale" may be said to rise and fall with the solidarity of collectivities based on risk.

It has been noted that risk, actual and anticipated, was the fundamental reason for the development of the collectivity of buddies. The ritual activities of the reserve period expressed the relationship between the actor and combat events. The longer the period in reserve, the less real risk appeared and the more real ritual became. The symbolic significance of the ritual as preparation for a combat event was transformed into a formal activity with precise indicators of efficiency and effectiveness which no longer had combat events as referents. Administrative adequacy, numerical factors, and competitive comparisons with other companies assumed primary significance in evaluations by higher echelons of authority and prestige.

The solidarity of the collectivity of buddies was threatened by two factors when risk was removed. First, the element of mutual dependency was reduced in significance. Secondly, the normative standards of the external system lacked concrete significance.

The disintegration of the collectivities of risk eliminated a primary element in motivating adherence to the normative standards imposed by the external system. It has been noted that one of the sentiments of the collectivity of risk was that the actor should

perform his role adequately. Adequacy was defined by the extent to which the actor's behavior complied with the requirements of the external system, while minimizing the risk to other members of the collectivity. Each increment of reduction in the reality of risk in combat events involved a corresponding reduction in the adequacy with which the actor's conformity to the external system could be evaluated, while failing to provide corresponding standards as substitutes. The potentiality of the emergence of deviant behavior was accordingly increased.

Finally the increased pressure to conform to the standards of the external system, fostered by the reduction in spatial isolation, was followed by an increase in conflict relations between status groups and authority echelons. The normative standards of collectivities of risk were replaced by standards which reinforced the segregation of status groups.

G. Summary

Collective solidarity develops among actors who occupy similar positions on dimensions of risk, status, and authority, and influences combat role performance according to the degree of risk entailed in the combat situation. The element of risk is a principal determinant of the normative standards of military organization. Combat events increase the significance of collectivities of risk, induce a minimal compliance with the role requirements of the external system, and provide functional consistency to the structure of the organization.

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Figure 17. Views of "living bunker". Above: exterior view.
Below: interior view.



Figure 18. Activities on the outpost. Above. Member of the guard platoon stands watch outside of fighting position. Below: A work group takes a warming break.



Figure 19. Breaks in a day on the line. Above: eating the noon meal, canned rations. Below: reading yesterday's mail.



Figure 20. Supper on the line. Above: the chow line. Below: "Sergeant's mess".




Figure 21. The outpost warming bunker. Above: Indoctrination.
Below: sanitation.

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