

ABSTRACT

THE TEACHER AS MORAL ADVISER

By

James Douglas Stewart

In the wave of renewed interest in moral education in the schools insufficient attention has thus far been given to the idea of the teacher giving moral advice to students. This study is an attempt at redressing the oversight. Special reference is made to giving moral advice to secondary school students.

The view is taken that in order to say what is involved in giving moral advice it is necessary to explicate the concept of advising. The first part of the study is devoted to conceptual analysis. The approach taken is essentially an ordinary language one. Advising is examined as a speech act (following J. L. Austin). The main logical features of the concept are identified as are its main uses. The different kinds of sentences used for giving advice (e.g., the imperative, subjunctive and ought sentences) are discussed. Advising is compared and contrasted with other concepts like recommending, counseling, persuading, and ordering. The connection between advising and giving reasons is examined; and the general kinds of reasons appealed to in advising are identified.

The writer claims that advising someone to do something is a moral activity. It involves the adviser's taking into consideration

600 198

James Douglas Stewart

the **interests** of the advisee; and it satisfies the criteria of **prescriptivity** and universalizability. A position in respect of the **nature of the** moral domain is thus required and taken.

Two questions are then addressed: "Who can be in a position to give advice?" and "Who can be in a position to be given advice?" In answering these questions the writer claims that certain conceptual conditions as well as certain psychological conditions must be satisfied. These various conditions are made explicit for both the advisee and the adviser. The discussion here draws, in part, on the work of developmental psychology.

The concept of moral advice is then examined. In giving moral advice to another it is claimed that "third party" interests must be at least taken into account. The role of moral principles in the giving of moral advice is discussed. Certain views of moral principles are criticized. The writer concludes that the view of principles held by John Dewey is the most apposite for moral advising. The writer then argues that the secondary school teacher can be in a good position to satisfy the conditions for giving moral advice to students. It is suggested that in giving moral advice the secondary school teacher generally avoid the use of the imperative sentence.

Can the secondary school student be in a position to receive moral advice? This depends on the particular stage of moral development the student is at. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development is examined with particular reference to the stages of development of the secondary school student. Assuming that Kohlberg stages three and four are predominate during the high school years the writer shows

that students at stage three are in the best position to be given moral advice. It is found that stage four thinking is essentially incompatible with the concept of moral advising. This leads to some odd consequences.

Finally, in reacting against John Wilson's study of moral education as imparting skills or procedures and not content, it is claimed that in any sort of moral activity or program in the school, form and content cannot be divorced. The writer concludes that giving moral advice satisfies the "form and content" requirement suitably.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iv
Chapter	
I. ADVISING I	1
1.1 X Advises Y to do Z	4
1.2 "Advising To" and "Advising That"	28
II. ADVISING II	39
2.1 Implicit Advising Utterances	40
2.2 Things That Can Go Wrong	67
2.3 Advising and Other Concepts	77
III. ADVISING AND REASONS	100
3.1 The Connection Between Advising and Having Reasons	100
3.2 Reasons in Advising	109
3.3 Reasoning in Advising	133
IV. ADVISERS AND ADVISEES	140
4.1 The Morality of Advising	141
4.2 Advisers	161
4.3 Advisees	189
V. MORAL ADVISING IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL	206
5.1 Moral Advice	206
5.2 The Teacher-Adviser	238
5.3 The Student-Advisee	258
VI. CONCLUSION	282
BIBLIOGRAPHY	303

PREFACE

The idea for this study arose from a reading of William K. Frankena's Ethics. In the second chapter of that book Frankena briefly alludes to the giving of moral advice in his discussion of ethical egoism. His point, I believe, is that since (a) an important part of morality is the business of advising and judging and since (b) the ethical egoist, by virtue of the tenets to which he adheres, cannot be said to give advice that is satisfactory and to the point then (c) ethical egoism seems to be an unacceptable basis for this part of morality. Such claims raise important questions about the nature of the activity we call "advising" as well as questions about the nature of ethical egoism. My immediate response was to the former set of questions rather than the latter. I thought that if we could get a clearer notion of what advising is about then we might be able to say something about the giving of moral advice to people. Since my own interests are in the study of education and since my teaching experience has been gained at the secondary school level I further thought that if we could get clearer about advising we may be able to say something about the giving of moral advice to young people, notably secondary school students.

I assumed that within these ideas there was some sort of logical order in terms of which I could develop the study. Since my end concern was with the notion of giving moral advice to students (and the

teacher's role therein) I took it that my first task was to provide a conceptual analysis of advising; and that what would follow would then be a discussion of moral advice and finally some examination of the role of the teacher in giving moral advice to students. This basically is the pattern I follow. The first part of the study, consisting of a philosophical analysis of the concept advising, covers the first two chapters as well as small portions of Chapters III and IV. It may seem to some readers that I am devoting an inordinate amount of time to conceptual analysis and that I am thereby "dodging" the real issue of the teacher giving moral advice to students. To these readers I can only repeat that in order to be on relatively solid ground for a discussion of the moral advising of students we first need to be clear about the logical and conceptual features of advising.

When I began this study I was under the impression that little work of a conceptual nature had been done with the notion of advising. Although I did not know it at the time I was later to find out that I was not alone in this view. In the introduction to her Theories of Ethics Mrs. Philippa Foot writes: "And it is strange that more work has not been done on such concepts as that of an attitude, and on the small (or large?) differences between such things as approving, commending, recommending, advising, praising, evaluating and the like. It will certainly be natural to turn to these topics now that Austin has shown us some ways in, and one feels that this part of moral philosophy will be found to change for the better, when his work has

been thoroughly absorbed."¹ Actually, prior to Mrs. Foot's writing this a few philosophers had given some attention to the concept of advising so that it was, at that time, not entirely uncharted. The best example, in my view, of an analysis of advising that I have come across is to be found in David P. Gauthier's Practical Reasoning. Gauthier devotes two chapters of his book to a study of advising as prudential discourse and one chapter to the giving of what he calls "moral counsel." I take these chapters to be an important contribution to our understanding of advising though I think his treatment of "moral counsel" is unsatisfactory on the whole. Without going into details here, the upshot of his discussion on "moral counsel" is a very odd use of "counsel" and an obscuring of some important distinctions between counseling, advising and persuading.

There are a few passages in Paul Taylor's Normative Discourse principally that entitled "Concept of Prescribing" in which advising is discussed; and P. H. Howell Smith's Ethics has a short chapter called "Advice and Exhortation." Then there are a few articles in philosophical journals which deal in part with advising and these articles (or most of them) are to be found in a footnote on page 77 of the main text. One other article not listed there but which deals with certain aspects of advising is B. J. Diggs' "A Technical Ought" which appears in Mind, Volume LXII, 1960. This article examines the use of "ought" sentences as a vehicle for giving advice of only a factual or informational nature--what I refer to in Chapter I as the

¹Philippa Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 12-13.

"advising that" use of the concept as distinct from the "advising to" use. Most of these articles as well as the relevant portions of the above mentioned texts engage in some fairly standard activities in the analysis of advising such as comparing and contrasting the use of "advise" to that of "order," "command," "urge," "persuade" and so on. I do this, too. But whereas these others do not, I attempt in Chapter II to analyse the relationships between advising and its closer cognates like recommending and counseling. Moreover there is no attempt in the above cited materials to examine advising sentences as performative utterances after the fashion of J. L. Austin (on whose work I draw for this part of my analysis in Chapters I and II)--though some of the discussions in the above materials doubtless presuppose it. This means then that a treatment for example of the "infelicities" that may befall advice-giving is not to be found in the published materials. I attempt to help remove this oversight in Chapter II. Finally, I have not found any discussion which specifies the sorts of conditions for one to satisfy in order to be in a position to give advice; and similarly to receive advice. Thus "Who can advise?" and "Who can be advised?" are two questions I explore in some detail in Chapter IV. My answers to these questions are to be seen as necessary but not sufficient conditions for advisers and advisees to meet.

A second impression (in addition to the foregoing one) I had at the outset of my research was that very little has been written about moral advising in the schools. It seems that words like "advise" and "advising" are much less commonly used in secondary schools than they are say in universities where we speak of "academic advisers,"

"residence hall advisers" and so on. The related words which are commonly used in the schools are "counseling" and "guidance." Part of the reason for the (apparent) infrequent use of "advise," "advice," and "advising" seems to be due to a suspicion of advising held by many school counselors (at least the literature would suggest this). They somehow think that advising someone to do something is an unjustifiable interference with the advisee's right to decide for himself what to do. Indeed some seem to think that to advise a student to do something is to make up that student's mind for him. I do not think these claims will bear inspection and indeed I assert that part of the difficulty we run into here with the notion of giving advice to students stems from a misunderstanding of the concept of advising on the part of many counselors. Be that as it may the best article I have found on the subject of giving moral advice to young people is L. A. Reid's "General Problems of Guidance in Moral Choice" which is to be found in The Yearbook of Education, 1955. My own treatment of moral advice and the giving of it in the secondary school, all of which constitutes my lengthy Chapter V, is best summed up in this way. I discuss the conditions for moral advisers to satisfy, with special reference to the position of the teacher. This discussion is built upon the one in the previous chapter on the general conditions for advisers to meet (and points out the need to analyse the concept advising prior to analysing that of moral advising). I argue that some teachers, at any rate, are in a good position to give moral advice and I give reasons why I think this is so. I then discuss the question as to who can receive moral advice and for this part I draw on Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of

moral development. It seems that a student would have to be at a certain minimal stage of moral development to be in a position to be given moral advice. Of course not every student would be at or beyond this stage. I should point here that these discussions in Chapter V are preceded by a treatment of the notion "moral advice" in which I deal with some of the considerations that go into the giving of moral advice. This part of the discussion, I should add, is tied in certain respects to the main discussion in Chapter III, namely the discussion on reasoning in advising. This topic, reasoning in advising, and its cognate topic, reasoning in moral advising, are the most complex parts of the study with which I had to deal. Doubtless much further work needs to be done in these areas.

The title of the study is perhaps slightly misleading; for the study is by no means a sustained treatment of the teacher as moral adviser; nor is it a sustained treatment of what counts as moral advice. Further, references to the school setting are to be found primarily in Chapter V and only infrequently in one or two of the earlier chapters. However I believe I have given reasons for this particular development of the study. It may well be that a follow-up study could now treat more specifically and in more detail the giving of moral advice to students. I have been primarily concerned with the logical structure of advising and the conditions which advisers and advisees have to meet; and then, secondarily with moral advisers (in this case teachers) and students (advisees). If the reader expects to find answers to questions like "What moral advice can I give to my student?" he (she) will be disappointed for there are no such answers

to be found in this study. This is regrettable, perhaps, but the particular kind of moral advice that is to be given to some student can only best be decided in the situation--that is by the adviser examining the circumstances and features of the student's moral problem and by calling upon his (adviser's) own moral experience and knowledge. My concern here is what the teacher should do, what he (she) should attend to in saying to a student "I advise you to do such and such." It is not my objective to draw up a list consisting of pieces of moral advice suited to the secondary school student; nor is it at all clear that this could even be done in any sort of satisfactory way.

Finally, in addition to the earlier assumptions which I have specified, I have also assumed that if moral advice can be given to young people then the school is one good place where this could be done, though not the only good place. But it does seem reasonable to suppose that students could get assistance with their moral problems from (some of) their teachers. This claim further supposes that young people, at least some of them, have moral problems to begin with which they alone have not been able to solve satisfactorily; and that some of them are disposed to seek help or guidance from an adult under appropriate conditions. I do not provide a justification, in a philosophical sense, for the giving of moral advice in the school, though in the Conclusions I do touch upon this matter in at least one respect. But it could not be said that the study provides a justification in any full way. The study assumes that moral advice-giving to students could be justified and proceeds to examine

the conditions under which such an activity could occur. To get involved in justifying the giving of moral advice in the school is to become involved, in a general way, with justifying moral education in the school, and that is beyond the scope of the study.

CHAPTER I

ADVISING I

My initial task in both this chapter and the one that follows is to provide an analysis of the concept advising. Since my approach to this task shall be an "ordinary language" one, essentially, I shall begin by examining some apparently typical examples of advising. I have two examples I wish to use at this point. These examples differ markedly in a variety of ways. First the subject of the advice in one case bears no relation to that of the other; second the stations or positions in life of the advisers in each case are quite different; and third the general background or contexts in which the advice is given are logically distinct. My first example is taken from correspondence between a young man, Kenneth Hopkins, who aspires to become a poet and the writer Llewelyn Powys. The second example is found in the letters of Lord Chesterfield to his son. In the former example, Hopkins, the advisee, asks for advice. He wants to know what he should do in order to write good poetry. In the first quotation that follows shortly, Powys gives his response, that is, his advice to Hopkins. In the second example, on the other hand, the advice that is given is unsolicited. Lord Chesterfield's son (the advisee) has not asked his father for advice, rather the father, by virtue of his position qua father, offers his advice to his son (who is travelling abroad) as,

shall we say, a matter of duty. Thus we have two different contexts in which advice is offered. In the former case advice is given by one person to another because that other asks for it; in the second case, it is given because of the adviser's special relation to the advisee. In a later chapter it shall become clear that I am primarily interested, in this study, in advising situations typified by the first example, that is cases of giving solicited advice. But for a start at explicating the logical features of the concept it will be important to approach the task from a "broad base"; thus my reason for beginning with cases of advising that differ widely in their contextual features.

Example 1: I am very pleased that you have acquired that good edition of Rabelais--Sir Thomas Urquart is wonderful with this translation, he died of laughter at hearing of the return of Charles II to England. I advise you to read with concentration and not skim--choosing only the more outrageous passages as I used to do as a young man. I would do the same with Andrew Lang's translation of the Iliad and Odyssey--you cannot give too much attention to these books. They will have a lasting influence on your work and lift it out of any provincial limitations. I would also read Christopher Marlowe very carefully especially Faustus and Hero and Leander--he will be a great inspiration to you. . . . I would also read Don Quixote very slowly and carefully and I should keep a notebook near you to copy out anything that especially hits your fancy I would be very eclectic in your reading--I would try to outgrow your taste for writers who are not quite first rate¹

Example 2: While you have been at Leipsig, which is a place of study more than of pleasure or company, you have had all opportunities of pursuing your studies uninterruptedly; and have had, I believe, very few temptations to the contrary. But the case will be quite different at Berlin, where the splendor and dissipation of a court and the beau monde, will present themselves to you in gaudy shapes, attractive enough to all young people. Do not think, now, that like an old fellow I am going to advise you to

¹R. L. Blackmore, ed., Advice to a Young Poet: The Correspondence Between Llewelyn Powys and Kenneth Hopkins (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969), pp. 95-96.

reject them and shut yourself up in your closet; quite the contrary, I advise you to take your share, and enter into them with spirit and pleasure; but then I advise you, too, to allot your time so prudently, as that learning may keep pace with pleasures; there is full time, in the course of the day, for both The whole morning, if diligently and attentively devoted to solid studies, will go a great way at the year's end; and the evenings spent in the pleasures of good company, will go as far in teaching you a knowledge, not much less necessary than the other, I mean the knowledge of the world.²

We notice in both examples that when the speakers wish to advise their addressees they use the expression "I advise you to"

Thus Powys says to Hopkins "I advise you to read with concentration" and Chesterfield says to his son "I advise you to allot your time so prudently" and "I advise you to take your share and"

In both examples one person is advising another person to do one thing rather than something else by saying "I advise you to"

It is not however the only way in which advice is given. Consider the first example again. Here we see that Powys sometimes says "I would also read Christopher Marlowe very carefully and I should keep a notebook near you to copy out anything"

Evidently advice can be given by using expressions which begin with "I would" and "I should," that is by using expressions in which the word "advise" does not feature. From a linguistic point of view there seems to be a variety of ways open to us by which we can give advice to another person. This is an important point. If it can be shown that teachers can (or should) give moral advice to

²Earl of Chesterfield, Letters to His Son: On the Fine Art of Becoming a Man of the World and a Gentleman, Vol. I (New York: Dingwall-Rock Ltd., 1929), p. 146.

students it would be unreasonable to suppose that they be constrained in their advice-giving to one particular form of utterance. It will be necessary then for me to examine these different utterances--both those which make use of the word "advise" and those which do not. Our guess is (at this point) that within the latter class of utterances itself a considerable variety in grammatical constructions will be found. This exploration must wait, however. For the moment I wish to focus on what appears to be the most explicit way of giving advice to another person, namely by saying "I advise you to . . ." and in particular I want to elucidate the logical structure of this expression. In Chapter II I shall take up the case of the other expressions used for giving advice.

1.1 X Advises Y to do Z

In analyzing "I advise you to . . ." I shall, following J. L. Austin, refer to it as a "performative" or "performative utterance." What does Austin mean by a "performative." Put simply a performative is the doing of something by (or in) saying something, or it is that in which "to say something is to do something."³ The classic example of a performative, according to Austin, is "I promise," for in saying these words I thereby make a promise. Other examples are: "I pronounce," "I christen," "I bequeath," "I predict," "I order," "I declare," and so on. In each of these cases, to utter the appropriate words is to

³J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 12. I might add here that while Austin does not himself provide an analysis of advising he does give us a most useful framework in which to provide such an analysis as I hope what follows will show. Austin's references to "advise" are always treated as examples (among many) of performatives.

perform the act in question (e.g., pronouncing, christening, bequeathing, and so on). Now "I advise" (or more correctly "I advise you") is a member of this family of performatives. Just as my saying "I pronounce" is my pronouncing so also is my saying "I advise you . . ." my advising. In saying "I advise" I thereby do my advising. I should point out however that this characterization of performatives and of "I advise you" in particular is very imprecise as it stands. For one thing, the converse of the foregoing claim would not, strictly speaking, be correct. Thus, though I may be advising you I may not be saying the words "I advise you." There are other linguistic ways of doing the same job (of advising) as we saw in Example 1 a moment ago. It will be convenient then to refer to "I advise you" as the explicit (advising) performative and to the utterances in which the word "advise" does not feature, as the implicit (advising) performatives.⁴ In Example 1, Powys uses both. Second, my merely saying "I advise you" is in fact not sufficient for my performing the act of advising--or at least not sufficient for bringing it off satisfactorily. A number of conditions would have to be satisfied for this--conditions for which the speaker (in this case adviser) would be responsible. To see that this is so is to get somewhat ahead of our account. In the meantime we might, however, pay heed to Austin's warning that "Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performatives, a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to

⁴In keeping with the stated objective for this present section I shall restrict my analysis to the explicit performative.

have happily brought off our action."⁵ My bare "I advise you" could be a failure (in some sense) of advising for a variety of reasons which I shall be considering in due course.

There are a number of "logical" features of "I advise you" which we must consider but before doing this I want to introduce some further relevant distinctions which Austin makes later in his book. These distinctions refer to classification of the different sorts of actions that involve the uses of sentences, namely the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. A locutionary act "is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense or reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense."⁶ This seems to be a common kind of use to which we put sentences. But we may use locutions on certain occasions with a certain force thus generating an illocutionary act. For instance "It is going to charge" is a locutionary act; but in certain contexts the sentence by virtue of the way in which it is used could be a warning to someone and as such it has a force not to be found in the locution per se. As Austin puts it "To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution."⁷ An illocutionary act, then, requires a locutionary act as a base. Warning, along with requesting, ordering, predicting, promising, proposing and advising are illocutionary acts. Though they are based on locutionary acts they differ from them in at least this

⁵ Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 14.

⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

⁷ Ibid., p. 98.

respect; the illocutionary act is the performance of an act in saying something, whereas the locutionary act is the performance of an act of saying something.⁸ Illocutionary acts are not statements in the sense in which locutionary acts are. The perlocutionary act, on the other hand involves the production of some consequence or effect--"what we bring about or achieve by saying something."⁹ To say that I persuaded you is to say that what I did had some effect on you. Typically persuade, deceive, irritate, amuse, impress, distract, embarrass, frighten and so on are perlocutions. "I persuaded him to take a bath" is a perlocutionary act whereas "I advise you to take a bath" is illocutionary. A further major distinction between these two classes of sentence-uses is that the illocutionary but not the perlocutionary act can be made explicit by the "performative formula" (to which I shall now turn). In sum then I shall of necessity be interested in the illocutionary act since advising falls under that head, and to a lesser extent the locutionary act since these two acts are related in the way indicated above. Perlocutionary acts shall not figure in our discussion.

To explicate "performative formula" let us return to our initial examples and to the explicit advising utterances of Powys and Chesterfield, namely their "I advise you to."¹⁰ In this expression we note that the subject and object are both pronouns, the first person singular and the second person singular (or plural as the case may be)

⁸Ibid., p. 99.

⁹Ibid., p. 103.

¹⁰At this point I shall focus only on the "advising to" uses of the concept of advising. In the last section of the chapter I examine other uses such as the "advising that" use.

respectively. Further we observe that the verb "advise" is in the present tense indicative active. These two features namely the use of "I" and "you" in combination as subject and object respectively and of the present indicative active of the verb are constituents of the "performative formula" and are what help make an utterance like "I advise you" an explicit performative. As Austin points out however these features are not absolutely essential to a performative utterance for it is possible that one could advise another person using the passive voice of the verb "advise" in conjunction with either the second or third person (singular or plural). Thus "You are hereby advised to get a small pox vaccination" just is an act of advising.¹¹ Further, at least with some verbs that feature in illocutionary acts, the performance can be brought off when the verb is in some tense other than present tense. In the main however, the first two criteria will hold; they are not however the only criteria we need for characterizing the performative. To get at these let us bring out some of the differences that accrue when the pronouns "I" and "you" as subject and object respectively are replaced in "I advise you to . . ." by other combinations of pronouns. Our discussion will be aided by appealing to the general form under which "I advise you to . . ." falls, namely X advises Y to do Z. Our claim is that when "X" is replaced by "I" and "Y" by "you" we have an explicit advising performative. What happens to this claim when other pronouns are substituted for "X" and "Y"? Obviously we get expressions like these: "She advises you to . . .";

¹¹Of the word "hereby" Austin says it is a "useful criterion that the utterance is performative." How to Do Things With Words, p. 57.

"They advise us to . . ."; "He advises her to . . ."; "You advise them to . . ."; etc. Further we may of course replace "X" and "Y" with proper names as well as pronouns or in conjunction with pronouns. Thus we may say "Mr. Powys advises Mr. Hopkins to . . ."; "Lord Chesterfield advises his son to . . ."; "She advises Mr. Trudeau to . . ."; and so on.

Now there are two important differences between the expressions I have just generated and our standard utterance "I advise you to" The first is that of all those expressions in which the combination "I" and "you" has been replaced by combinations of other pronouns and (or) proper names, none can be said to be performative utterances. They are, instead, reports or descriptions.¹² Take for example the expression "He advises you to" Suppose you are puzzled by what someone is saying to you and you turn to me and ask "What is he talking about?" I might reply, "Well, he advises you to do such and such." Or take the expression "They advise her to . . ." and then suppose that someone has just arrived on the scene (as it were). He asks "What's going on here?" and I reply "Oh, they are advising her to do this rather than that." In the first case (above) I am reporting to you what another person is saying to you; and in the second, I am describing what is going on in a certain situation. But in neither case am I myself advising. My saying "He advises you to . . ." is not my advising. It would be very odd indeed if I could advise someone by saying "He advises you to" So whereas my saying "I advise you to . . ." is thereby my advising, my

¹²The one exception to this is the speaker's using the third person in a self-referring way; for example, De Gaulle's saying "De Gaulle, he advises you to" This would not be a report, but an act of advising.

saying "He advises you to . . ." is not. Depending on the context it is a report or a description or a stating that something is the case. The difference between the use of an utterance to report or describe something (locution) and the use of an utterance to perform an act like advising (illocution) rests, according to Austin, on a point of asymmetry.¹³ This asymmetry comes out in two ways: (a) between the first person present indicative of words like "advise" and the second or third person present indicative; (b) between the first person present indicative and other tenses. When I say "I advise you to . . ." I am (to paraphrase Austin) indulging in advising. But when I shift to the third person and say "He advises you to . . ." or to the past tense and say "I advised you to . . ." I am not indulging in advising, I am reporting what someone is doing on the one hand and on the other (likely) reminding you that I advised you on some earlier occasion.¹⁴ According to Austin this asymmetry is "precisely the mark of the performative verb"¹⁵ thus providing us with a third general criterion for "performative."

¹³Ibid., p. 63; and J. L. Austin, "Performative Constantive," Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. by Charles E. Caton (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 25-31.

¹⁴An interesting and apparent exception is my saying "I am advising you to" This utterance would normally be used as a response to the question "Are you advising me to . . . ?" in which case it is a report of my advising and not just my advising. However my concern in this study is not with questions like "Are you advising me to . . . ?" but with questions like "Do you advise me to . . . ?" This latter is an advice-seeking question; and one perfectly proper way to respond to it is "Yes, I advise you to" This response is not a report of my advising; it is my advising. "Do you advise me to make a will?" "Yes, I advise you to do so."

¹⁵Ibid., p. 63.

A further difference between the above family of expressions that fall under the general form X advises Y to do Z and the explicit member, "I advise you to . . . ," is one that follows from the foregoing distinction between the use of these expressions in the second and third person present (past) indicative to report or describe something and the use of "I advise you . . ." to advise. Reports and descriptions as such are always amenable to truth tests. In giving a report or a description I am stating that something is or is not the case. Since "He advises you to . . ." can be a report of someone's advising another we should be able to assign a truth value to it; whereas in saying "I advise you to . . ." since I am not reporting that something is or is not the case, nor am I describing anything then my utterance cannot be subject to truth tests. Suppose the utterance "He advises you to buy 100 shares of Company A" is your reply to my question "What did the broker advise me to do?" Now either the broker did or did not advise me to buy 100 shares of Company A. If he did then "He advises you to buy 100 shares of Company A" is true; otherwise it is false. That is to say, if your "He advises you to buy 100 shares of Company A" corresponds to a certain set of facts then the utterance is true; if it fails to correspond it is false. This is a perfectly straightforward treatment of the notion of a report and its truth or falsity. "'He advises you to . . . ' is true (false)" is a meaningful claim to make. But the notion of correspondence to the facts is, strictly speaking, devoid of meaning in relation to the use of the performative "I advise you to . . ."; for what facts could "I advise you to" possibly correspond to? Since the linguistic act of advising

neither corresponds nor fails to correspond to facts then it does not make sense to say that the utterance "I advise you to . . ." is either true or false. It is neither. These truth labels simply do not apply. "'I advise you to . . .' is true (false)" is an unintelligible claim. This point, by the way, is a separate one from whether the advice one gives another is good (bad) or helpful (misleading) advice. There are independent criteria for making these latter sorts of judgments. From the fact that we cannot attach truth values to "I advise you to . . ." it does not follow that we cannot assess a piece of advice as "good" or "bad." Nor does it follow that the utterance "I advise you . . ." cannot be assessed in ways other than appeals to truth values (as I shall show in Chapter II of my discussion of "infelicities" respecting performatives). In summing up then, some occurrences of the verb "advise" are performances of the speech act of advising and some occurrences which are not performances are reports that advising has been (is being) performed. The foregoing criteria which I have touched on here helps us to identify or say which occurrences of "advise" are which.

It is significant that of the classes of substitutions for X in the locution X advises Y to do Z which have thus far been identified, namely, pronouns and proper names, they both function in a unique way--that of referring to persons. Beyond pronouns and proper names any word or expression which functions in place of either and which preserves truth values on those occasions when "advise" features in a sentence giving a report, may also be included in the list of substitutions for X. In place of the "they" as in "They advise me to . . .",

I may, on appropriate occasions put "my friends," "neighbors," "relatives," "colleagues," etc., thus rendering the original utterance somewhat more explicit. Instead of saying "Mr. Trudeau advises us to . . ." we may say "The present Prime Minister of Canada advises us to" These various descriptive phrases which I have just used for "they" and "Mr. Trudeau," respectively, must be said to fulfill the same role in the above advising utterances as that of the expressions they replace. That role, again, is one of referring to persons. Thus the substitutions which typically are made for X in X advises Y to do Z to wit, pronouns, proper names and definite descriptions all preserve the person-referring function of the place-holder X.¹⁶ On this very limited basis we may draw the tentative conclusions that the notion of person is centrally involved in the giving of advice. I suppose this in a way is self-evident; but I hope to show why it is important to demonstrate fairly precisely the nature of the connection between the notion of person and that of advising, particularly moral advising.

What could be meant by the expression "centrally involved" which I used in the second last sentence of the preceding paragraph? Is it the case that when someone is advised that person is normally advised by another person or necessarily advised by another person? It is a logically necessary condition of advising that advisers be persons (as the present list of substitutions for X would so far indicate) or is it merely a contingent condition--i.e., that things other than persons could advise? I propose to approach this matter by rephrasing this

¹⁶Insofar as proper names are concerned here I exclude those that do not refer to persons: "Place Ville-Marie," "Atlantic Ocean," "The Empire State Building," etc.

last question regarding necessity and contingency in a way which will extend the theme I have been developing in preceding paragraphs. The rephrased question is this: What (if any) class of words or expressions (other than the ones already specified) can be substituted for X in the locution X advises Y to do Z and which refer, but not to persons? By "can" I mean "what ordinary usage will permit us to substitute for X." Let us suppose that we could find such a class of words or expressions which can be substituted for X but which clearly do not refer to individuals (or groups of individuals). If we could do this, then I believe we would have shown that it is not a necessary condition of advising that the adviser, X, be a person--that the adviser could be something other than a person though just what that might be would depend on the particular substitution. I say "not a necessary condition" because our list of possible substitutes for X would, by this discovery, be expanded to include not only pronouns, proper names (and their descriptive replacements), but words or expressions which do not refer to persons at all. It would thus be possible to say that there can be advisers who are or need not be persons. Now why is this point an important one to make? If the above situation which I have just depicted is possible, then any case for claiming that the teacher has a role as moral adviser to students is greatly jeopardized. For if it is merely a contingent matter that persons advise, then someone might well argue that moral advice should be given to students not by teachers but, say, by some kind of machine. After all, there are teaching machines; why not advising machines? Letting a machine do a difficult job like giving moral advice may have

a very strong appeal to many people, including teachers themselves. We should surely want to know what the effects of such a move as this would be. But there would be no need to find out if we could show the move was not logically possible; and this I shall now attempt to do.

In what follows I examine typical utterances in which "advise" occurs and in which the expressions replacing X appear to function in such a way as to refer to entities other than persons. If these examples of advising withstand scrutiny, that is, if they show in fact that reference to non persons as advisers is being made, then we may conclude, I believe, that having a person as adviser is merely a contingent condition of advising. In short, then, I am looking for possible counter-examples in the language of advising which might destroy my hypothesis that a necessary condition of advising (at least moral advising) is that advisers be persons.

Suppose, with respect to my Example 2, that Mr. Hopkins says, "This letter advises me to read with care" Or suppose someone says, "This telegram (document, proclamation, notice, etc.) advises me to do such and such"; or, alternatively, "I am advised by this letter (etc.), to do" Do not these utterances, in which expressions like "this letter" are used for X show that advising is possible without the adviser being a person? "This" as in "this letter" unmistakably refers, but not to a person, at least not on the face of it. But it would be just as improper to say that letters, telegrams, proclamations, etc., of themselves advise as it would to say that desks, lamps and stamps advise--though writers of letters, senders of telegrams and issuers of proclamations may well advise. So when we say "This letter

advises me to . . . ," we mean, I take it, "The writer of this letter advises me to . . ." or more specifically "The writer of this letter, Mr. So-and-so, advises me to" Once the phrase "this letter" is thus spelled out we see that it consists of a definite description ("the writer of this letter") and a proper name (Mr. So-and-so) both of which refer to a person and both of which are already included in the original list of substitutes for X. We must conclude that this present example has not generated a class of expressions for X that fail to refer to persons.

But let us pursue the matter further. Many pieces of advisory communication simply bear the "signature" of some organization, for example "The Admissions Board," or "The Revenue Department" or "The Telephone Company." In these cases the persons receiving such communication would be correct in saying, "The Admissions Board (Revenue Department, etc.) advises me to" Here the expressions which are replacing X doubtless refer, but it is not clear that they refer to persons. What then is meant by saying that organizations advise? That will depend primarily on what is meant by "organizations and their actions." I understand there are two possible interpretations of that expression.¹⁷ One is that an organization in its actions is deemed to be an individual sui generis. On this view organizations are said to have certain rights and duties, like individuals. They may be praised or blamed for their actions thus presupposing they are held accountable for their actions. They may, and have on occasion, been tried by a

¹⁷See for example, Lawrence Haworth, "Do Organizations Act?" Ethics, LXX (1959), 59-63.

court of law. They may be punished for their actions by being fined. Thus we have the notion of organization qua corporate person. On the second interpretation, when an organization acts it is said that these actions are each reducible to actions of individuals within the organization. When it is said "The Bell Telephone Company raised its long distance rates," what is meant is that some ranking official(s) within the company duly decided that rates will be raised; and that had no one in the company taken that decision, it could not then be said that the company had raised its rates. On this second view when organizations act, certain people in them act necessarily. The action of a company is the action of certain individuals in the company, no more, no less.¹⁸

Now suppose a student receives a notice from the Admissions Board of a university to which he has applied; and suppose upon reading it he says to his friend "The Admissions Board advises me to re-apply at the beginning of the next school year." On the second view of "organization" we would take this utterance to mean something like this: "The Chairman and members of the Board advise me to re-apply next year"--because as we have seen, it is not, at bottom, that organizations are said to act but rather certain individuals within organizations. So when "The Admissions Board" which takes the place of X in the above advisory utterance is itself replaced by an expression which correctly indicates that it is individuals in the organization who act (in this

¹⁸It is arguable that the reduction indicated here may not go through. I tend to think it does however. Despite ordinary speech I hold that an organization can be said to act only if certain authorized persons in the organization act.

case who advise) we see that this replacement, namely, "the Chairman and members" has thereby just the referring function needed for my hypothesis; and similarly (mutatis mutandis) for utterances like "the Telephone Company (the Revenue Department, the Church, etc.) advises me to" In all these cases we see that when the appropriate replacements for "the Board," "the Company," "the Department," "the Church," etc., are made none are of a type which fail to refer to persons--that is none are of a type which do not already appear on our list of substitutions for X. So the second view of "organization" at any rate is compatible with the notion of advisers as persons.

The first view on how organizations are said to act is not uncommonly held, I take it, and I must now briefly examine this rather more difficult case. Does "organization" on this view present the counter-example for which we have been searching? I personally find it difficult to concede that an organization is an individual sui generis. But if I deny this I can see no way of saying (on the first view) that organizations can advise--because if we deny that organizations are individuals sui generis what we are left with is a collection of (say) materials and (or) buildings, or some structure at any rate, none of which can be said to advise; and we cannot say that we are left with a collection of individuals who advise since this claim directly reduces the first view of "organization" to the second. Yet ordinary language makes provision for our saying things like organizations of themselves can advise. Either we make some sense of "corporate personality" or defy ordinary use. It seems that the only way to make sense of this concept is to tie it, in certain respects, to the notion of persons,

and this, of course, is just what is done. But the "tie-in" is evidently far from perfect. Therefore while we may say that expressions like "the Board," "the Company," and so on as used in "The Board (Company, etc.), advises me to . . ." refer to a corporate person the referent ex hypothesi is not exactly like you and me. Where then does this present example in respect of the first view of "organization" leave us? On the one hand we do not have a clear case of an expression which picks out something other than persons; on the other hand we do not have a clear case of an expression which refers to persons. On balance the first view of "organization" leaves us with a borderline case.

There is one further possible set of counter-examples. I have in mind the cases where people claim they have been advised to do something by a "voice" of some sort. Normally the "voice" is rendered as "my conscience" or as "God" as in "God advises me to do this" spoken by a religious person. Now both "conscience" and "God" are complex notions the analyses of which lie well beyond the scope of this study. I shall circumvent the complexities in the following way by suggesting that we take "conscience" to mean (at least embryonically) something like this: "the constraints presently acting on one which result from the teachings of one's parents or other adults in one's childhood." Thus for someone who says "My conscience advises me to do . . ." he would mean "My parents always used to say to me about matters of these sorts, 'Never do . . .'; or, 'My parents would advise me never to . . . , and they were right.'" Our speaker need not be aware or conscious of this kind of reflection though under psychoanalysis some such

commentary would doubtless emerge. In any event, we would say there is (wittingly or otherwise) on the part of the speaker an appeal here to other persons as advisers, in this case one's parents. The voice of his conscience just is the voice of his parents. In essence, they are still advising him.¹⁹

With respect to the utterance "God advises me to . . ."--and leaving aside the special difficulties associated with religious language--we could say of anyone who uses this expression that he (she) conceives of God as a personal, concerned Being who guides or helps those who place faith in Him. That is, they conceive of God as a Being who cares. I find it immensely difficult to imagine someone who, on the one hand, professes to be irreligious or non-religious but who, on the other hand, sincerely claims that God advises him. That move is simply not open to this sort of person. All this is by way of trying to show that of those who do say, seriously, "God advises me to do . . . ," their use of "God" is such as to refer to a person though a rather special one--nonetheless the notion of person is involved. To say that they use "God" to refer to a being totally devoid of personal attributes of the kind I have alluded to, would be (to them) to speak in an unintelligible way. So, of those who can claim to say "God

¹⁹ Could a person be said to advise himself to do one thing rather than something else? It is not clear that this could be so. A person could say to himself "I ought to do such and such" but this need not be a case of self-advising. It could be a command to oneself or a decision to act, neither of which count as self-advising. Advising presumes there is some uncertainty, doubt or puzzle about what to do on the part of the advisee. Self-advising then presumes the agent is both uncertain and (at least relatively) certain about what to do; and this seems odd.

advises me to . . ." we can say of them that their replacement for X refers to a person.

It may be argued that these last two cases, as well as the case related to the first view of "organization" do not provide clear or convincing examples supporting my hypothesis respecting the kinds of expressions that can replace X in X advises Y to do Z. I say they do not provide clear counter-examples. I am thus led to the conclusion that utterances which are instances of the locution X advises Y to do Z must employ expressions for X which refer to persons. Are the consequences of this conclusion plausible? For example the conclusion seems to render the following sentence meaningless: "The computer advises me to" But is it meaningless? I suspect it is not and I would have thought that at least among computer people (and quite possibly beyond) the sentence is a rather common one. But if this be so how can we continue to adhere to the above conclusion. The answer to this I believe turns on making certain distinctions, primarily the distinction between the "advising to" use of the concept and the "advising that" use of it. I discuss this distinction more fully later in the chapter. Briefly, the "advising that" use of the concept is an apprising use and in this sense of "advise" there is clearly a place in our language for being able to say "The computer advises me that such and such is the case." To the extent that computers give us information they can be said to advise us in the "advising that" sense. But my concern primarily is with the "advising to" use of the concept under which falls the giving of moral advice (as we shall see). To give moral advice is to advise someone to do something, not that something is the case. Now

I think that in some contexts some "advising to" uses of "advise" may also be stated in the "advising that" terminology, and thence in these cases we could even say that the computer advises us to do such and such. The argument however will not carry over to the giving of moral advice which, as I said, involves an "advising to" use of "advise." Moreover to give moral advice by saying, "I advise you to . . ." is to have a whole way of life behind one (as I shall show) which it does not make sense to say that computers can have.²⁰

Apart from the qualifications just cited anyone who claims that he was advised but that no person advised him would be speaking unintelligibly. We would be quite within our right to protest, "But someone must have advised you." If he persisted that no one had yet he had still been advised to do something we would conclude that he does not understand what it means to be advised; that he does not have a hold of the concept. Let us take it as settled then that within the normal range of "advising to" uses of "advise" replacements for X in advising sentences must refer to persons. Persons advise. However a person's saying "I advise" is not sufficient for advising. There must, in addition and among other things, be someone who is advised. It is time then to focus briefly on the place-holder Y in the locution X advises Y to do Z. A second necessary condition for advising is that there be some person, or advisee, of whom we can say receives advice.

²⁰ An adviser must have features of a person. To the extent computers may have these features or attributes then maybe computers can advise too (in the "advising to" sense). We could doubtless conceive of an elaborate and sophisticated computer (or robot) that would have feelings, interests, imagination and so on. But then we would be inclined to say that the computer is really just a person.

I do not wish to suggest by "receives advice" that part of what we mean by "advisee" is one who accepts advice. In this context, "accepts" suggests agreement or concurrence with the advice given whereas there is no conceptual connection between "advisee," on the one hand, and "agreeing or concurring with the advice," on the other. The more neutral phrase "receives advice" preserves this distinction but at the same time leaves open the possibility of the advisee either accepting or rejecting the advice he receives. Now of anyone who has ostensibly been advising, it is always possible to ask of that person whom it was he advised. If he replies, "Oh, no one," we are bound to be puzzled, unless it is clear from the context that by this reply he intends to preserve (say) the privacy of a professional adviser-client relationship. In this case, his expression "Oh, no one" is a sign that he in fact advised someone though whom, specifically, he is not going to say--all of which is proper enough. But if our adviser seriously and sincerely maintains that he was advising though there was no one at all whom he advised, we would conclude that he does not know how to use words like "advise"; that he too does not have a grasp or understanding of the concept of advising. If he did, he would see why his utterance confuses us. He would see why it is necessary that if someone's activity is to be described correctly as advising, there must be a person or group of persons of whom we can say he is (or has been) advising.

There seems to be an interesting and important consequence of this claim. Many books have been written and published the sole intention of which is to give people advice on various matters. Here is a typical passage in such a book:

Example 3: In regard to . . . smoking--we would earnestly recommend every young man not already addicted to it to avoid contracting a habit that must injure the health, and which is exceedingly disagreeable to almost every one. Tobacco is a vile and offensive weed We see men of intelligence and refinement . . . smoking it, with an earnestness that would be really amusing, were it not that a feeling of disgust quiets the mind down into sobriety. What the use of it is, no one can tell, while nearly all agree that it seriously injures the health.²¹

This, apparently, is a piece of advice.²² There is an adviser namely, Mr. Arthur, the author. But can it be correctly said that this is a case of advising? We cannot deny that Mr. Arthur states in many passages of the book, typical of the foregoing one, "I (we) recommend (advise) you (young men) to do such and such." Though he makes these statements, can we say of his doing so that this counts as advising? That depends on whether there are persons of whom we can say they receive this advice. Since in this case (and others like it) it is logically possible that no one reads the book (or the relevant passages in it), and since we have already argued for the necessity of advisees (in this case readers), it seems to follow that it is at least logically possible there is no advising here at all; that is, there may not be any advising in the book Advise to Young Men! Suppose however some people do read Arthur's book but suppose that of those who do no one is of the category of persons to whom Arthur is addressing himself. No one of the readers, that is, is (i) a young man and either (ii) a non-smoker or (iii) a non-smoker contemplating smoking or (iv) a smoker but

²¹T. S. Arthur, Advice to Young Men (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1850), pp. 142-143.

²²I am assuming here that recommending and advising are synonymous. This is not quite correct. See my discussion of the differences between the two in Chapter II, Section 2.3.

not addicted to smoking. If these conditions hold, though others read the passage in question, we could not say that there has been any advising. There has not been advising because none of the readers (and thus potential advisees) can be said to be in what I call the relevant position to receive the advice. To be in that position for this case, the first and one other of the three remaining conditions just specified would have to be satisfied; otherwise, no advisees, thence no advising. Thus to say that there are (or have been) readers of this particular passage is not a sufficient condition for saying there has been advising.

Does the logic of our argument really drive us this far? If no one reads a book on advice or if those who do are not in the relevant position does it follow that the author has not been advising? To say "yes" surely runs counter to common sense; for the author of Advice to Young Men certainly took himself to be advising. It was certainly his intent to give advice and to give it to a specificable class of people the author had in mind. He could say whom he was intending to advise and in fact did say by virtue of the description he gave in the above quoted passage. However the author may not have achieved what he set out to do. He may in fact have failed at giving advice in ways I have already specified (e.g., no one reads the book). The intent-achievement distinction is thus important here. We should not want to deny that a person had not been advising on the basis that he was not successful (in some sense). As long as he tried to give advice and as long as he had some person or group of persons in mind to whom he directed his advice we should want to say that certain

minimal conditions for advising had been met. If only "successful advising" counts as advising then very little advising could actually be said to be done. This would be too restrictive and out of line with ordinary language. Of course the way in which we interpret "success" in advising is important here too. There are in fact two successes in advising--one for the adviser and one for the advisee. The obtaining of one kind of success in advising does not entail the obtaining of the other kind. The adviser can be successful even though the advisee is not. But what would this mean? Well, we can say that an adviser is successful (in one sense of "success") if he satisfactorily meets the conditions for advising (yet to be fully specified) even though the advisee pays no heed to the advice or fails to achieve what he (advisee) wants by acting on the advice. Once we make these distinctions it is easier to see that a plausible way of speaking is to say that advising has gone on (given the adviser's success in the sense indicated) regardless of the success or failure of the advisee. Thus though no one reads Mr. Arthur's book, provided he has satisfied the conditions of advising (which include intent to advise and a specifiable audience) it still makes sense to say that he was (or is) advising in his book.

With respect to the component Z (representing the advice) in the locution X advises Y to do Z, arguments similar to those used with Y will show the former to be a third necessary condition of advising. If, for example, you say to me "I advise you," I am entitled to ask, "Well, what is it you advise me to do?" If you reply, "Oh, nothing, I just advise you" then I will not be able to understand what you are saying. For of anyone who says this sort of thing there is a sense in

which one is contradicting oneself. One is saying, in effect, "I advise you but there is nothing I advise you to do."²³ This kind of utterance does not facilitate intelligible communication. Consequently, if there is no advice, that is, if there is nothing which one advises another to do when he says "I advise you," there can be no advising.

At this point it is tempting to declare that the three necessary conditions of advising thus identified are, when taken together, also sufficient conditions. There are at least two reasons for not making such a declaration. One is that the entire discussion has taken place within the confines of the general locution X advises Y to do Z. Since there are other and differing grammatical constructions by which one can advise another it would be premature at this point to claim that an adequate rendering of the concept has been given. The second reason is that to claim the three conditions are necessary and sufficient is to claim that advising is just a three-place predicate, no more, no less, answering to: (i) who advises, (ii) whom is advised, and (iii) what is the advice. While this evidently is correct as far as it goes, it may turn out that additional conditions are required such as the specifying of a certain time or place during and in which advice is to be given if an activity is to count as advising. Thus, it is possible that time or place predicates be required. On the face of it these may not seem to be serious contenders for additional predicates since surely it doesn't much matter where or when advice is given.

²³ Later I discuss a situation where this utterance is not contradictory. Also it is possible to use "I advise you" in the following way without the utterance being unintelligible. Consider: a student says "Who advises me?" (asking for information). A teacher replies "I advise you" meaning "I am your adviser," thus giving information.

After all, what would the times and places be in which an activity to count as advising would have to occur? However, let us not neglect the ambiguity in the word "when." Usually, a "when" question is calling for a day, week, month or year as in "When did Columbus discover America?" But "when" can also refer to the stage or level of one's development as in "When can one be said to reason morally?" It could turn out that on this second interpretation of "when" a fourth (i.e., time) predicate is required in order that of some activity we can say it is advising. If, for example, a person is not at some minimal stage of development it may be that he cannot either give or receive advice.²⁴ So we shall leave open the matter of sufficient conditions for advising.

1.2 "Advising To" and "Advising That"

I have referred a number of times to these two uses of the concept of advising throughout the course of this chapter. These uses are featured respectively in sentences that have the following form: "I advise you to do such and such" and "I advise you that such and such is the case." The primary objectives of this section are: (a) to show that these two uses of the concept are fundamental uses and that any other uses are derivative from one or other of these two; (b) to show how the "advising to" use of the concept differs from the "advising that" use. I shall begin on (a) by listing the standard range of uses to which we commonly put the concept of advising. In addition to (1) "advises to" and (2) "advises that," there are (3) "advises on how to,"

²⁴On this matter see the discussion in Chapters IV and V under Sections 4.2 and 4.3 and Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

(4) advises about, (5) advises of the" and (6) "advises." In sentence form, the construction from (3) to (6) would appear as follows: X advises Y on how to do such and such; X advises Y about such and such; X advises Y of the such and such; and X advises Y such and such. I do not intend that this list of the uses of the concept be exhaustive though I believe it does include the main uses (and the ones to which I will limit my discussion). My aim then in (a) is to show that (3), (4), (5) and (6) reduce to either (1) or (2).

Let us consider the following passage taken from Hilaire Belloc's Advice.

Example 4: It is strange that the clear and necessary doctrine on the uncorking of wine should be so little known. Get it firmly in early wine-drinking and it will make your life the easier. It is this. Always uncork wine with a Lazy Tongs. Like this (there follows a diagram in the text). You screw in the screw with the Lazy Tongs, flat like this (another diagram). Then you pull at the handle and as it extends like this (another diagram), the cork comes out, however stiff, with perfect ease, as though pulled by a giant

Many waste their lives dealing with corks of Fizzy wines--including ciders. These are corked with a sort of mushroom-shaped excrescence like this (another diagram). The rule is to take a sharp knife and cut off the excrescence leaving the rest of the cork flush with the top of the bottle. Then pull it out as you would an ordinary cork.²⁵

The author is addressing a Miss Bridget Herbert to whom the book is dedicated on the occasion of the latter's marriage. Now imagine an observer reporting as follows: "Mr. Belloc advises Miss Herbert on how to uncork bottles of wine." You ask, "In what does his advise consist?" and our observer replies, "Well, he advises her to use Lazy Tongs, to screw in the screw, to pull at the handle and, in the case of

²⁵Hilaire Belloc, Advice (London: The Harvill Press, 1960), pp. 11-13.

fizzy wines, he advises her to take a sharp knife and cut off the excrescence." Notice the shift in the observer's reports from the first one in which his utterance is in the form (3) to the second one in which his utterance is in the form of (1). In order to respond to your question, our reporter has found it convenient to drop "on how" but retain "to" so that the shift in question is from "advising on how to" to just "advising to." But, you say, "He could have retained "on how" and replied to my original question using (3)." Indeed, he could and in this case his reply would have been as follows: "He advises her on how to use Lazy Tongs, on how to screw in the screw, etc." Yet this last report, like the first one, gives a very limited account--so that to know what Belloc advises Miss Herbert, with respect to using the Lazy Tongs for instance, we need to say something like this: "He advises her to hold the Tongs with (say) the thumb and two fingers, to place it in an upright position, to press or twist one place or way rather than another, and so on, until an adequate account of how to use the tongs is thereby rendered.

I believe that we have thus reached the limit here in our line of reasoning. To show this let us suppose that, having reached the present point, we now ask our reporter for one more account using locution (2). His report would have to consist of statements like the following: "He (Belloc) advises her on how to use her thumbs and two fingers." But this is not very meaningful because, other things being equal, it is not possible to advise someone on how to perform such basic movements like using thumbs and fingers which are already learned at very early stages of development and long before one can be said to

understand what it is to be advised about such matters in any case. So it turns out that by pressing our man for one more report we get something not too intelligible; and this is a sign that in our use of (3) we have gone too far. We avoid this by stopping at a meaningful level of discourse--that is, at a level where we had a residue of "advising to" utterances.

My claim is that we can always translate sentences in which the expression "advises on how to" features into sentences in which just the "advises to" use features. Schematically we may represent this in the following way: "X advises Y on how to do Z" becomes, on analysis, "X advises Y to do Z_1 "; to do Z_2 ; . . . to do Z_n " (or some subset therein). Here we see that the sentence to be analysed reduces to a conjunction of sentences in which only the "advises to" use of the concept appears. Thus of sentences like "X advises Y on how to do Z" it can always be asked "What is it that X advises Y to do when he advises Y on how to do Z?"; whereas with respect to the sentence "X advises Y to do Z" such a question would evidently be redundant. For the use of "X advises Y to do Z" would just be the answer to the question. Thus (1) is a more basic use of the concept of advising than is (3)--more basic in that (3) can be seen to reduce to (1) in the manner just indicated. There is another sense in which (1) is more basic than (3) and this sense is brought out by trying to force (3) into the mold of the performative formula. We know, of course, that (1) fits the mold eminently; but putting (3) into it yields the following locution: "I advise you on how to do such and such." This is extremely awkward and I am inclined to think that it does not have a use in the language; that is, I am

inclined to think that in this use of (3) the replacements for X and Y (subject and object) cannot be the combination of "I" and "you," respectively, though combinations of other pronouns are possible here. In short (3) seems to have this restriction on its use which (1) does not.

Suppose Mr. Whitlaw (the British cabinet minister assigned to Northern Ireland) has just returned to London to consult with Mr. Heath, the Prime Minister.²⁶ Suppose further that the London papers carry the following account: "Mr. Whitlaw is advising the Prime Minister about the latest developments in Northern Ireland." This could be taken in one of two ways. It could be that when someone says he is advising someone else about something the former is advising the latter to do one thing rather than another. It could be, in the above example, that Mr. Whitlaw is advising Mr. Heath "about" Northern Ireland by advising him "to" (for instance) increase the number of British forces stationed there. But more likely, he is advising Mr. Heath about the Northern Ireland situation by advising him (for instance) that the I.R.A. is mounting a new offensive, that twenty civilians were killed this past week, that Mr. Paisley is making new demands, and so on. In short, it is more likely that by advising the Prime Minister about Northern Ireland, Mr. Whitlaw is giving Mr. Heath certain pieces of information--that he is apprising him of the situation there. Indeed, it could be the case that Mr. Whitlaw's advising Mr. Heath about Northern Ireland in the sense of advising that such and such is the case

²⁶I devised this example when Whitlaw and Heath were holding the positions indicated.

is preparatory to his advising Mr. Heath in the "advising to" sense, though it need not be. I believe this discussion shows us that utterances like (4), namely, "X advises Y about Z" do not have a life of their own, so to speak, since on analysis they turn out to be utterances either of the "advising to" type or, more likely, of the "advising that" type. Just as (3) may be cashed out in terms of (1) by a conjunction of "advising to" sentences so also may (4) be cashed out in terms of (2) by a conjunction of "advising that" sentences. Sentences of the form X advises Y about Z are, of themselves, not what we would call "basic."

Sentences in which the "advises of" use of the concept of advising features can, I think, be readily seen to be an alternative way of expressing the "advises that" use. Thus "X advises Y of the Z" (5) reduces to "X advises Y that Z" (2). For example the sentence "His broker advises him of the risks involved" would normally be taken as giving information or apprising someone of a situation that exists or is likely to exist. Finally utterances that employ (6) such as "X advises Z" are truncated versions of utterances that employ (1). Take, for example, the following sentences: "He advises immunity" or "He advises secrecy." The full-blown version of these sentences is nothing more nor less than (for instance) "He advises you to adopt a policy of secrecy." We could attempt reducing "He advises secrecy" to "He advises you that secrecy is the best policy." But I think this is readily seen to be no more than "He advises you to adopt a policy of secrecy." For the "that" clause obviously contains a recommendation which at bottom requires an "advising to" use of the concept of advising. Utterances

of the "advising that" type are sui generis provided the "that" clause does not contain a recommendation, either explicitly or implicitly.

In response to our objective, (a), of this section I conclude that (3) and (6) reduce to (1) and that (4) and (5) reduce to (2). It does not follow that (3) to (6) inclusive fail to have an important place in advising nor does it follow that on each occasion of their uses must we think of cashing them out in terms of either (1) or (2) as the case may be. The uses of each of (3) to (6) may be given their own descriptive labels. For example (6) is a good locution for expressing a warning; whereas (4) is good for expressing an opinion. But in some contexts (5) could also be a warning and (3) an opinion. In short, what identifying these various locutions of advising amounts to (and helps us to see) is that as a concept advising has a fairly substantial range of uses; and that in the final analysis they are (or can always be) expressed in one or other of the two basic forms I have identified as (1) and (2).

What is the nature of the conceptual distinction between (1) "I advise you to do such and such" and (2) "I advise you that such and such is the case"? We note that the combination of the pronouns "I" and "you" features in both as subject and object respectively. So there is some resemblance of (2) to the performative formula. The only apparent difference in the construction of the two sentences is that (1) makes use of "to do" whereas (2) makes use of "that." But both sentences are set in the present indicative active of the verb "advise." Does this mean then that (2) is a performative utterance like (1). In saying "I advise you that the enemy has surrendered" do I thereby advise you as I do by

saying "I advise you to surrender"? In saying "I advise you that the enemy has surrendered" I am giving you information or reporting to you on a certain state of affairs (reporting that the enemy has in fact surrendered). Thus is it not the case that to say "I advise you that the enemy has surrendered" is thereby to report; and since to report is to do something then am I not doing something by saying something, that is by saying "I advise you that . . ." making this utterance a performative? I do not think that Austin ever resolved this sort of puzzle. If we say that by uttering "I report that . . ." or "I state that . . ." I thereby report (or state) we would have to concede that "I report that" is a performative (hence also is "I advise you that . . ."). To concede this however is to erase the performative-constative distinction one consequence of which would be that truth values would no longer cease to apply to utterances like "I promise" and "I advise you to." That being the case it would no longer be meaningless to say that "'I advise you to surrender' is true." But on the other hand it is not clear exactly what it would mean to say that either. So if we include utterances like "I report that . . ." or "I advise you that . . ." in the performative category we have to live with the consequences of so doing (and I am not sure that Austin was prepared). For purposes of this study I shall take it that "I advise you that . . ." is not performative. This enables us to make the following sensible claims. First, to say "I advise you to surrender" is to make explicit the action which the utterance is, namely advising, which is not the same thing as to state that it is that action, nor to state that it is anything; whereas to say "I advise you that the enemy has surrendered" is to state that

that something is the case. Moreover since this latter is a report and if in fact the enemy has surrendered then we could say that the utterance "I advise you that the enemy has surrendered" is true, otherwise it would be false. Thus sentences in which the "advising that" use of the concept of advising features are subject to truth claims whereas sentences in which the "advising to" use features, are not.

With these distinctions between "advising to" and "advising that" in mind we may now re-assess an earlier tentative conclusion I drew with respect to the contradictoriness of "I advise you but there is nothing I advise you to do." If by "advise" in its first occurrence here we mean "advise that" or "informs" or "apprises" then it is clear the sentence is not contradictory. For on this interpretation it would read as follows: "I advise you that such and such is the case but there is nothing I advise you to do." In advising someone that something is the case we are not thereby committed (logically) to advise that person to do something. Thus I can apprise you of a situation without at the same time advising you to do anything and not be inconsistent in what I say. Of course, if by the first occurrence of "advise" in the above sentence we mean "advise to," then the sentence is contradictory. Though in apprising (advising that) I am not logically advising someone to do something, does the converse of this hold. That is, if I advise you to do something do I thereby apprise you of something? When I use an "advising to" sentence I presuppose that certain things are the case or that certain conditions have obtained but by "presuppose" I do not intend a meaning connection between "I advise you to . . ." and "such and such is the case." For example in saying "I advise you to

surrender" I presuppose that you have not already surrendered and that you're in a position to surrender (i.e., that you are in a context in which "surrendering" makes sense). But I am not reporting that you have not surrendered; I am only presupposing it. These presupposed conditions, the knowledge of which is the responsibility of the adviser if his advising is not to be "unhappy" to use Austin's term, is a subject I discuss in the next chapter so I will not comment further on the matter here.

Two further qualifications regarding the distinction between "advising to" and "advising that" are in order. One has already been touched upon and it involves the constituents of the "that clause" in sentences of the kind "X advises Y that" Consider the following example: "Moore's health was quite good in 1946-47, but before that he had suffered a stroke and his doctor had advised that he should not become greatly excited or fatigues."²⁷ Ostensibly this is an "advising that" use of the concept, but the "that" clause contains the expression "he should not become" Thus the doctor's advising is not a report as it might have first appeared but a recommendation to Moore to remain rested and relaxed. The occurrence of "advises that" is not a genuine one by virtue of what follows in the "that" clause. Here then is a case where, in a sense, "advising that" reduces to "advising to" though the reduction is really a hollow one; for "advises that one should do" is just "advises one to do" For a second qualification let us suppose that I am vacationing in one of our

²⁷ From Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Memoir, quoted in R. W. Beardmore, Moral Reasoning (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 22.

national parks and that I ask the park attendant at the main entrance "What is the most scenic route to take in the park?" Suppose he replies "I advise you to take Route A rather than Route B." From this reply I am informed (apprised) that the prettier, more scenic route is A, not B. In the attendant's advising me what to do he has also told me that something is the case. I now know something I didn't know before. How does this case differ from my claim of a moment ago that sentences like "I advise you to surrender" only presuppose certain things obtain, and do not actually give information? The difference is just this. In saying to me "I advise you to surrender" you are not giving me any information. You are not telling me that I have not yet surrendered or that I am in a position to surrender for I already know these things. I am not therefore being informed by your saying "I advise you to surrender" as I am being informed by the attendant's saying "I advise you to take Route A rather than Route B." (Though, admittedly in saying "I advise you to surrender" you presuppose there are reasons why I should.) So in some contexts it will be the case that an "advising to" sentence informs us of something or of some situation. However the basic distinctions between "I advise you to . . ." and "I advise you that . . ." still hold.

CHAPTER II

ADVISING II

At the outset of the first chapter I claimed, following Austin, that "I advise you to . . ." is an explicit performative utterance and much of Chapter I was devoted to an examination of this particular utterance. There are, however, other linguistic expressions which do not have the word "advise" in them but which are nonetheless used to advise another person to do one thing or another. These expressions are what I believe Austin would call "implicit performatives."¹ The first section of this chapter is devoted to a study of the uses (and logic) of some of these implicit advising utterances. My second objective in this chapter is to examine some of the different ways in which the utterance "I advise you to . . ." and its implicit counterparts can go wrong (misfire) or be abused by the speaker. Austin refers to these misfires and abuses as "infelicities."² Finally, I propose to examine some of the relationships between the concept of advising and other concepts like ordering, recommending, persuading and in particular between advising and counseling.

¹ Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 32.

² Ibid., Lectures II, III and IV.

2.1 Implicit Advising Utterances

Suppose that a certain person is in my house and that I wish to get rid of him. I could order him to leave simply by saying, "I order you to leave this house now!" But I could also order him to leave without making use of the explicit performative "I order you." For instance I could say, "Get out!" or "Please leave!" or "You are not welcome here!" In saying "Get out!" etc., in this context I am doing the job I would be doing if I were to say "I order you to leave this house!" "Get out!" is an implicit performative. Now I want to show that like ordering someone to do something, the job of advising someone to do some thing or other can be accomplished in different ways using linguistic expressions of various kinds and constructions. To see this let us examine the following examples of advising.

Example One: When you come to college . . . (you) are what your environment and your elders have made you. Your ideas are not your own. The first thing you must learn is to stand on your ideas. This is why you should not take us and our ideas too seriously. Broaden your horizon so that as you become more and more able to take care of yourself you will move intelligently. Do considerable mental visiting in your first years of college. Try to encounter the major points of view represented on the faculty and among the students. Entertain them the more seriously they differ from your own. . . . In gaining this (liberal) perspective you must come to know the nature which surrounds and compels you, the society with which you must live and cooperate, the creative spirit which is your heritage, and the tools of language and of thought.³

Example Two: Now if poets would only give up their habit of ridiculous exaggeration and put things reasonably people might pay more attention to them. Is it judicious, I ask you, when trying to describe a sunrise over Westminster Bridge to start off by

³Roger W. Holmes, "What Every Freshman Should Know," The Modern Omnibus, ed. by Franklin P. Rolfe, William H. Davenport, and Paul Bowerman (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), pp. 280-281.

saying "Earth has not anything to show more fair"? It puts the reader at once in an argumentative mood. He says to himself . . . "Come, come, now, it's all a matter of opinion."⁴

Example Three: Besides reading, a young man ought to write, if he has the capacity and leisure. If you wish to remember a thing well, put it into writing . . . for the eye greatly assists the mind. . . . A Journal should be kept by every young man. Put something down against every day of the year. . . . You will not have done this for one year without finding the benefit of it. It disburthens the mind of many things to be recollected; it is amusing and useful, and ought by no means to be neglected.⁵

Example Four: You will never write a good book until you have written some bad ones. . . . You must go through the mill, . . . and you can't possibly start too soon. Write a thousand words a day for the next five years at least nine months every year. Read all the great critics. . . . Get a ticket for the British Museum reading room, and live there as much as you can. Go to all the first-rate orchestral concerts, and to the opera, as well as to the theatre. Join debating societies and learn to speak in public. Haunt little Sunday evening political meetings. . . . Study men and politics in this way.⁶

Example Five: You shall privately every morning before you go out of your chamber upon your knees say the Lord's Prayer . . . otherwise you shall offend God. . . . You shall also repeat the Creed and then humbly and heartily thank Him for your creation. . . . You shall do well to get some small commentary of the Psalter and after your prayers to peruse the exposition of all dark and hard speeches for which you may procure Hominius; you shall also do the like procuring some shorter exposition of the words of the New Testament and Old, daily perusing the hard places. . . . You shall do well to be present with attention every sermon that you hear being preached.⁷

⁴Jan Struther, "A Plain Man's Advice to Poets," A Pocket Full of Pebbles (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), p. 80.

⁵William Cobbett, "Advice on Reading and Writing," A Book of Essays from Montaigne to E. B. White, ed. by Homer Combs (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1950), pp. 154-155.

⁶Bernard Shaw, Advice to a Young Critic (Letters 1894-1928) (London: Peter Owen Ltd., 1956), pp. 18-19.

⁷William Cecil, "A Memorial for Thomas Cecil," Advice to a Son (Precepts of Lord Burghley, Sir Walter Raleigh and Francis Osborne), ed. by Louis B. Wright (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 3-5.

Example Six: As to your studies . . . I wish you to learn Latin, French, and dancing. I would insist upon the last more particularly, both because it is more likely to be neglected, and because it is of the greatest consequence to your success in life. . . . Another thing I would caution you against is not to pore over your books until you are bent almost double. . . . A stoop in the shoulders sinks a man in public and in private estimation. . . . I would wish you to make it a rule never to read at meal times. . . . I would have you, as I said, make yourself master of French because . . . ; and I would have you learn Latin partly because⁸

In these examples we have a number of different ways in which the various speakers give advice to their listeners. I shall list some of these. First, one seemingly popular construction used for advising is the imperative sentence. Thus we find the following: "Broaden your horizons . . . ," "Do considerable mental visiting . . ." and "Try to encounter the major points of view . . ." (Example One); "Put something down against every day of the year" (Example Three); "Write a thousand words a day . . . ," "Go to all the first-rate orchestral concerts . . ." and "Join debating societies and learn to speak in public" (Example Four). These we may call explicit or clear uses of the imperative sentence since each begins typically with the verb in the imperative mood--"Broaden . . . ," "Do . . . ," "Try . . . ," "Put . . . ," "Write . . . ," "Go . . . ," "Join . . . ," and so on. Second, another grammatical mood which recurs in these examples of advising is the subjunctive. For instance in Example Two the speaker says "Now if poets would only give up their habit of ridiculous exaggeration"; and in Example Three, "Another thing I would caution you against is"

⁸William Hazlitt, *On the Conduct of Life; or, Advice to a School Boy*, "Unseen Harvests: A Treasury of Teaching," ed. by C. M. Fuess and E. S. Basford (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 394-396.

and "I would wish you to make it a rule never to" These I take it are (or can be construed to be) commonly used variations of the subjunctive sentence "If I were you I would do" Thus "I would caution you against . . ." is another way of saying "If I were you I would not do" Third, there is the rather frequent use of the words "ought" and "should" in the above examples. In Example One for instance, the speaker says ". . . you should not take us and our ideas too seriously"; and in Example Three he says "Besides reading, a young man ought to write if he have the capacity and leisure A Journal should be kept by every young man."

These are three fairly recognizable categories or types of sentences which we can readily use on certain occasions for advising another person to do one thing rather than another. But there are other expressions in these examples which we also use to advise. We notice for instance the use of the word "must" as in "The first thing you must learn is to . . ." (Example One) and "You must go through the mill . . ." (Example Four); also the word "wish" as in "If you wish to . . . (then) . . ." (Example Three) and "I wish you to . . ." (Example Six). Then there are expressions like "You shall do well to . . ." (Example Five), and like "I would insist upon . . ."; "I would have you . . ." (Example Six); and finally "You will never . . . until you . . ." (Example Four). Now I think most of these expressions can be accounted for by one or other of the three categories or groupings identified briefly in the preceeding paragraph with the possible

exception of the conditional sentence.⁹ Certainly the utterance "If you wish to . . . (then) . . ." seems to fall in this last category as does (or could) "You will never . . . until you . . ." as well as some of the uses of "must." Actually I think the utterances using "must" are somewhat ambivalent on this matter and they could be construed either as a conditional sentence or as a non-hypothetical imperative sentence depending on the context in which they are used (including the way the speaker utters these particular statements). As for expressions like "You shall do well to . . ." these typically can be translated, without loss, into "You ought to do . . ." although depending again on mannerisms, tones of voice, etc. of the speakers they could be more like an imperative sentence when it is used to command. Next, the expressions "I would insist upon . . ." and "I would have you . . . ," while they have a prima facie resemblance to the subjunctive might in some contexts at least, be slightly too strong for that mood and thus more appropriately taken as an imperative sentence. These expressions which I have just now identified as variations on some of the standard categories are by no means exhaustive of such variations. Although none of the six examples of advising make use of them, expressions such as "If I were you I should do . . . ," "You would do well to . . ." and "The best thing for you to do is . . ." are commonly found in advising contexts and normally perform the (advising) function of "You ought to do" Finally there are utterances like "I urge you . . . ," "I suggest . . . ," "I

⁹Since the subject of the conditional sentence is briefly explored in Chapter III I shall not comment further on its use (to advise) here.

recommend . . . ," all of which are commonly used in an advising capacity. In Section 2.3 of this chapter I show why "recommending" for instance, is a good substitute for "advising" in many of its contexts. So all these grammatical expressions so far discussed or mentioned are acceptable ways of answering the typical advice-seeking question "What shall (ought) I do?"

To summarize, apart from the explicit advising utterance ("I advise you to . . .") and the conditional sentence, there appears, from the point of view of ordinary usage, to be quite a variety of expressions we can use for advising another person to do this rather than that though in what follows I focus on only three, the use of (1) the imperative sentence, (2) the subjunctive sentence, and (3) the ought sentence. Now, I do not conceive of these categories as rigorously tight ones. The likelihood that many of the advising utterances just examined could, under suitable circumstances, fall in more than one of these groupings is too great for such a conception to hold. An evident subjunctive sentence like "I would caution you against . . ." could in some contexts do the job of advising someone just as well if it were simply said as an imperative "Do not do . . ." and an ought sentence can function as an imperative, and so on. To put matters metaphorically, we need to conceive of the above three categories in such a way that a certain flow back and forth across them is permissible. I have already implied that the "rate of flow" across these classifications is a function of contextual features. On the whole, the categories (1) to (3) are much more heavily context-dependent than is "I advise you to" In any event we need to conceive of the boundaries marking off these categories as porous rather than opaque.

To simplify matters somewhat for the following discussion I shall use paradigm characterizations of (1) to (3) rather than any of the many variations on these which we may find in the above six examples of advising or elsewhere in common speech. These paradigms (clearest statements) are as follows: (1) "Do such and such" (the imperative sentence); (2) "If I were you I would do . . ." (the subjunctive sentence); and (3) "You ought to do . . ." (the ought sentence). The question I propose to explore at this point is this. Recognizing that each of (1) to (3) can have a number of different uses¹⁰ in the language what is it that makes these constructions appropriate or suitable for use in advising another person to do one thing rather than another? I answer this question in the following way: Must it not be that the logic of the constructions (1) to (3) is either compatible with or makes provision for at least some of the logical features associated with the explicit advising utterance "I advise you to . . ."? I turn now to explain what I mean by this hypothesis.

In Chapter I I examined many, though not all, of the logical features of "I advise you to" There I said that in the general advising locution X advises Y to do Z an explicit performative utterance is generated by replacing "X" with the first person pronoun "I", and "Y" with the second person pronoun "you" given that the tense and mood of the verb "advise" is present indicative active. The first logical point then is that, in advising, it is the "second person" that is directly addressed by the speaker or adviser so that advising utterances

¹⁰See pp. 52-57.

have an affinity for that person. The second logical point is this. When I say "I advise you to . . ." I do not state or report that I am advising you rather I thereby perform the act of advising you. So "I advise you to . . ." is, strictly speaking, non fact-stating though as we shall see in Section 2.2 it presupposes that certain states of affairs have obtained. The third logical feature, and one which is related to the first, is that we cannot advise someone to do something by using our explicit advising utterance in the past tense.¹¹ To be sure I can say "I advised you to . . ." but I am not thereby advising you. I am stating that something is or was the case. "I advised you to . . ." is not a performative utterance. The fourth point, and one which is related to the second, is that "I advise you to . . ." can be neither true nor false because it does not state or report anything though it presupposes that certain other statements are either true or false. The fifth point is that the performative "I advise you to . . ." has to do with human action, primarily that of the advisee (the second person). This point rests on the distinction between the two fundamental uses of the concept advising, namely the advising "to" or action use and the advising "that" or informing use of the concept. These I believe are the five main logical features of "I advise you to . . ." which were covered in the last chapter.

There are additional logical features which I have not yet mentioned in this study, two of which I shall discuss now. The first of these is that the use of our explicit advising utterance presupposes

¹¹ Though it is possible to advise someone using the passive voice: "Passengers are advised to have their passports stamped before disembarking." See Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 57.

the presence of alternative courses of action open to the advisee and from among which he may choose one to follow. There would be something extremely puzzling about my advising you to do A rather than B if in the circumstances A is the only possible course of action open to you. I could tell you to do A but it would not make sense to say that I could advise you to do A. So "I advise you to do A" is always elliptical for "I advise you to do A rather than B or C"

Moreover, unless there are other possible courses open to an advisee we will not be able to make much sense of the claim that there are always reasons for advising a person to do this rather than that.¹² A second additional logical feature of our explicit performative and one which follows from the foregoing one is that in saying to someone "I advise you to do A" you are not thereby deciding for that person to do A. Barring special explanations to the contrary, as in the case of young children for example, no one can decide for another person what that other is to do. The decision to say to someone to do this rather than that (i.e., to advise him) is the adviser's. The decision to do this rather than that is the advisee's. There is, in other words, a logical gap between the utterance "I advise you to . . ." and your deciding to do one thing and not another to the extent that you are not logically committed to deciding to do or to doing what one advises you to do. You are, qua advisee, free either to accept, reject or modify the advice you are given and to act or not act on it as the case may be. These decisions are yours. Now this account rules out the possibility that a causal connection obtains between "I advise you to do X" and

¹²I devote Section 3.1 of Chapter III to this point.

your doing it. The utterance "I advise you to do X" of itself cannot cause (make, induce, etc.) you to act though admittedly when it is uttered by certain persons in certain ways it is possible that these latter conditions be contingently sufficient to get the advisee to do just what he was advised to do (and without thought or reflection on his part). Suppose for instance, that an adviser has a particularly gruff mannerism or that he speaks forcefully and authoritatively thereby inducing fear in his addressees. Then his saying "I advise you to do X" could cause you to do it. The casual factor is not what he says but how he says it.¹³ But then if you felt compelled to do X because of his saying "I advise you to do X" you could not correctly be described as "being advised." People who are threatened or forced to do something as a result of the way in which another addresses them are not free to decide what to do in that situation.

The point about the logical distinction between the adviser's "I advise you to do X" and your deciding to do or not to do X can be brought out in another way--one in which a reference to notions of responsibility and excuses is made. Suppose you are being blamed for doing something which you had been advised to do. You might think that you could dodge being held responsible (or plea for non-responsibility) by saying "It's not my fault. He advised me to do X." But this will not excuse you. The utterance "He advised me to do X" does not function in an exonerating capacity; and the reason for this is that the use of "He advised me to do X" presupposes one's being free

¹³These matters are important for the teacher who acts as moral adviser and I shall discuss them again in that context.

either to follow or reject the advise one receives. It was your decision to do X and you could have decided differently. You were not compelled to do X by the fact that you were advised to do X. But suppose instead you had been compelled then your saying "It's not my fault; he made (commanded, forced, etc.) me to do X" would work in favor of your exoneration. This is just a difference between forcing someone to do something and advising him to do it. "He made me do X" is excusing whereas "He advised me to do X" is not. So advisees, in the light of the advice they receive, are necessarily held accountable for what they do. Thus they are subject to praise as well as to blame. Logically, the adviser on the other hand cannot be held accountable for what the advisee does--not even when the advisee acts on the adviser's suggestions--since of necessity these actions are not his (the adviser's) own. Advisers cannot be praised or blamed for what advisees do. But advisers are held accountable for what they themselves say to advisees. An adviser can be chastised for giving bad advice or for systematically misleading the advisee; but he can also be praised for giving good or sound advice.

There are then, at least seven logical points or features associated with the explicit performative "I advise you to" An eighth, respecting the relation between advising and having reasons comes up for discussion in the next chapter though I shall have occasion to make reference to the place of reasons in advising from time to time in the course of this chapter. Now I have hypothesized that what makes the imperative, the subjunctive and the ought sentences appropriate linguistic vehicles for advising someone to do one thing rather than

another is that they can be shown to share the logical features (or some of them) of our explicit advising utterance. This presupposes that there is sufficient room within the structures of each of (1) to (3) such that they can, though need not always in every use, be said to satisfy these logical features of "I advise you to" For example, to take the first feature, the use of the second person pronoun "you" signifying the addressee, it is evident from even a superficial examination of ordinary language that we cannot specify that in every use of each of (1) to (3) the second person be referred to. That would eliminate such common and legitimate locutions as the imperative "Let us prey," the subjunctive "If I were he I would do" and ought sentences like "I (she, they) ought to do" There remain, however, in each of the three classifications, locutions which quite properly pick out the second person, as the paradigms I am using for (2) and (3) explicitly, and for (1) implicitly show (see p. 46). Regarding (1), the imperative sentence, we typically though not exclusively address the second person. But there is with the case of imperative sentences moreso than with (2) and (3) a preponderance of the second person. As R. M. Hare puts it, "the second person seems, indeed, to be the person for which (the imperative) mood has the greatest liking."¹⁴ So in respect of the first logical point I think we can fairly say that there is provision in each of the constructions (1) to (3) for the use of the second person.

Rather than cover each of the remaining six logical features consecutively with each of the constructions (1) to (3)--a procedure

¹⁴R. M. Hare, "Imperative Sentences," Mind, LVIII (1949), 25.

which would result in a tedious and unduly long discussion--I propose to try to shorten matters here somewhat by treating, rather summarily and in a block, the next four features of "I advise you to . . ." with respect to constructions (1) to (3), leaving the last two features for a slightly more detailed rendering. In doing this I am aware that some of the issues I raise are controversial from a philosophical point of view, though I shall not enter into any controversy here since that would create an unnecessary digression. I believe, however, that, for my purposes, there is enough evidence on balance to give support for most (if not all) of the bald claims I will be making. The next four logical features of our explicit advising utterance are (to recall) as follows: An advising utterance is (a) non fact-stating; (b) insusceptible of being expressed in the past tense; (c) insusceptible of having it assigned truth values; and (d) action-related. Now to utter an imperative sentence, irrespective of the many uses to which it can be put,¹⁵ is not to state or report that you are doing something but to try and make something the case by your telling someone to do this or that or to act on such and such a matter.¹⁶ Thus (a) and (d) can be satisfied in one stroke, as it were, with respect to imperative sentences. And if (a) is satisfied so also must (c) be satisfied.

¹⁵For example, to command, order, warn ("Keep off the bridge"), request ("Help, I'm stuck"), reproach ("Don't ever do that again"), denounce ("Go to the devil"), pray ("Give us this day . . ."). See Nickolas Rescher, The Logic of Commands (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), Chapter One.

¹⁶Hare, "Imperative Sentences," p. 25.

Imperative sentences themselves are neither true nor false.¹⁷ Moreover, it seems to follow from (d) that imperatives must refer to actions in the future, either near or distant, so that to speak of using an imperative sentence in the past tense would be puzzling to say the least.¹⁸ To be sure we say "I commanded you to . . . ," "I requested you to . . ." and so on but in saying these things we are not thereby commanding or requesting, that is, we are not using a sentence in the imperative mood. We are more than likely reporting that something is or was the case, namely that someone did in fact command or request you to do something or other. So point (b) is also satisfied by the imperative sentence.

Now with respect to the subjunctive sentence it is, like the imperative, capable of many uses--e.g., making a wish, a command, or expressing a hope--and while such sentences are not in every case aimed at bringing something about by human action as "Oh, if it would only rain!" seems to show, they can be so used as in for instance, "If it were me I would do . . . ," and frequently are so used. Further and apart from their different uses, subjunctive sentences strictly speaking cannot be said to state or report facts or to state that something is the case. For the subjunctive, we are told, designates "the mood of a verb which represents an attitude or concern with, the denoted action or state not as a fact but as something . . . entertained in thought,

¹⁷Ibid., p. 36. See also H. N. Casteneda, "Outline of a Theory on the General Logical Structure of the Language of Action," Theoria, XXVI (1960), 154.

¹⁸For a slightly stronger statement on this see Elizabeth L. Beardsley, "Imperative Sentences in Relation to Indicatives," The Philosophical Review, LIII (1944), 181.

contingent, possible" ¹⁹ Further, if subjunctive sentences are non-fact-stating then it is meaningful to say that truth values do not apply to them. On the matter of their use in the past tense however, they differ here from imperatives to the extent that utterances like "If I were you I would have done such and such" at least imply certain advice, or can be so construed to imply this. Suppose I say to you "If I were you I would have done this in that situation." Suppose also that you are now in a situation which is remarkably like that former situation. It seems to me that my use of the above subjunctive sentence (past tense) together with my pointing out to you the similarity between your present situation and this past one imply my advising you to do one thing rather than another now. There are, of course, limitations on the use of the subjunctive sentence (past tense) as an advising utterance but it does seem plausible to say that in some situations they can be used to advise someone to do one thing and not another. This claim does not detract in any way from the use of "If I were you I would do . . ." to advise people. So sentences in the subjunctive mood certainly seem to satisfy our logical conditions (a) and (d) along with the interesting exception I have just noted. And I think this is generally true of ought sentences. With respect to point (a) for example Nowell-Smith reminds us that "to say 'You ought' is to act, to intervene in the world, not to describe it." ²⁰ Similarly, I think we could run through the points (b) to (d) with ought sentences showing that these points are generally satisfied by such sentences

¹⁹ Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition.

²⁰ P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Penguin Books Ltd., 1954), p. 194.

including the point about using these sentences sometimes in the past tense to advise. "You ought to have done such and such in that situation" can play essentially the same advising role as "If I were you I would have done . . ." and in essentially the same way. I shall thus not comment further on points (b) and (d) regarding ought sentences but I do want to expand on points (a) and (c) in the context of both ought sentences and imperative sentences for reasons that will become clear presently.

When I say to you "Shut the door!" I use these words to do a certain job. I could be commanding or ordering you or requesting you to perform a certain act, in this case shutting the door. But in saying "Shut the door!" I am not reporting or stating that I am commanding (ordering, requesting) you so the statement "'Shut the door" is true" does not make sense. To this extent the utterance in question is non fact-stating. But there is a sense, nonetheless, in which this utterance gives us information about certain aspects of the world. When I sincerely say "Shut the door" I suggest both that the door is open and that someone wants it shut. In other words "Shut the door" suggests that the statements "The door is open" and "Someone wants the door closed" are both true. Although "Shut the door" is itself neither true nor false it is related to certain other statements that are either true or false by virtue of their picking out certain states of affairs. So imperative sentences can be said to have a certain descriptive or factual element at least to the extent that they are "tied" to other statements which give us pieces of information about the world. There is, I believe, a similarity in this respect between

imperative sentences and ought sentences. R. M. Hare observes that "It is clear that some sentences containing the word 'ought' have descriptive force. Suppose I say 'At the very moment when he ought to have been arriving at the play he was grovelling underneath his car five miles away.' Here, provided that we know at what time the play began we are as accurately informed about the time, as about the place at which he was grovelling. This is because we accept the principle that the time at which we ought to arrive at a play . . . is shortly before it begins."²¹ Hare also tells us that ought sentences can be used to convey psychological information about the speaker.²² But these information-giving uses are not, according to him, the primary jobs that ought sentences do. Their primary function is "to prescribe, or advise or instruct; and this function can be fulfilled when no information is being conveyed."²³ When someone uses an ought sentence to prescribe, for example, he is not, apparently, or he need not be conveying any information about the world at all. This is, perhaps, too extreme a claim and I shall have occasion to reconsider it again presently. In any case I take it that one of Hare's main concerns here is to establish the fact that when ought statements are used evaluatively they are not amenable to truth tests because, by virtue of

²¹R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 159.

²²Ibid., p. 167.

²³Ibid., p. 159. Other uses to which ought sentences are put are those of expressing decisions, giving commands, preaching, exhorting. See also Alasdair Macintyre, "What Morality is Not," The Definition of Morality, ed. by G. Wallace and A. D. M. Walker (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1970), especially pp. 31-33.

their logic, it is not essential that when they are so used they convey information, though at times they can and do. When they do, the information is presupposed. Thus ought sentences used evaluatively while neither true nor false themselves are (or can be) related to statements that are either true or false. So the ought sentence, in some of its uses, is rather like the imperative sentence; and both these in turn are rather like the explicit advising utterance in these very respects we have just been discussing as I shall show in the latter part of Section 2.2 of this chapter.

I turn now to the remaining two logical features namely (e), the necessity of alternative courses of action being open to the advisee and (f) the necessity of the advisee being free to decide what course of action to follow, both of which are closely related. It behooves us to proceed rather cautiously here with respect to our constructions (1) to (3). Regarding the imperative sentence, a difficulty arises for the use of this sentence in advising contexts from a tendency on the part of users of the language to conceive of the imperative sentence fulfilling primarily and essentially one function, that of commanding somebody to do something. The extreme position on this matter is simply to equate "the use of the imperative sentence" to "to command." The slightly less extreme though equally misleading view is the claim that because of the (apparent) frequency with which we use the imperative sentence to command, the latter thereby is the "natural" or "standard" job which the imperative sentence does. These views or ones very much like them which, in the light of points (e) and (f) I shall be attacking, have been held by a number of philosophers including G. C. Field and R. M. Hare. Field

says that the "direct command to do something" is the job of the "imperative proper."²⁴ This leaves the impression that any other uses to which imperative sentences can be put are somehow "improper." Such an impression is strengthened by Field's claim that the command is "the typical and natural way in which to use the imperative."²⁵ And while Hare notes that many different kinds of utterances like military orders, instructions for cooking and fixing vacuum cleaners, pieces of advice, requests and entreaties all fall under "the imperative mood proper" he then goes on surprisingly to say "I shall . . . use the single term 'command' to cover all these sorts of things that sentences in the imperative mood express"²⁶ On the one hand Field restricts "the use of the imperative sentence" to just "to command" thereby assuming a rough equivalence in meaning between the two expressions; and on the other hand Hare extends the use of "to command" to cover the different jobs imperative sentences can perform, but in so doing he subordinates all these other uses to the command-use of the imperative sentence thereby also generating a kind of equivalence between "the use of the imperative sentence" and "to command." Neither of these moves will do.

For one thing there seems to be a category mistake being made here to the extent that, in "puffing up" the command to a level of (rough) equivalence in meaning to the imperative sentence, a use is

²⁴G. C. Field, "Note on Imperatives," Mind, LIX (1950), 230.

²⁵Ibid., p. 231.

²⁶Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 4.

being confused with a grammatical category or classification namely, the imperative sentence. The use of an item from a grammatical category however is not itself the category. There is the imperative sentence (classification) and there are many uses of imperative sentences one of which is to command somebody to do something, another of which is to request, another to warn, and so on. The command-use has no logical priority or special claim over the other uses of the imperative sentence. As uses, they are all on a logical par, so to speak--all are equally valid uses of the imperative sentence. The particular use to which an imperative sentence is put on a given occasion will, of course, depend on the context; but from the fact that a particular use of imperative sentences appears more frequently than the other uses nothing follows with respect to the former's logical status along side that of the remaining uses.

The second difficulty that can arise from views like those of Field and Hare and one that bears more directly on our discussion of the logic of implicit advising utterances, is that these views can lead to the violation of points (e) and (f) thereby rendering the use of an imperative sentence as an advising utterance, ineffective. For, if the equation between "the use of an imperative sentence" and "to command" is adhered to, then we would have to say that in using an imperative sentence in telling someone to do this rather than that we are always in fact commanding them not ever (and could not ever be) advising them to do this rather than that. Our language of action would thus be placed in a strait-jacket. Now "commanding" as it is normally used is a forceful word. It presupposes both that the speaker (commander) be

in a position of authority over those whom he addresses and that his objective is to get compliance on the part of the addressees in doing what he commands them to do. Compliance can be got, if necessary, in a number of different (and sometimes undesirable) ways but in most of the contexts in which commanding is an accepted verbal act the rank and words of the speaker are normally sufficient to induce the required behavior in the addressee. A second conceptual point about commanding is that while reasons are not necessarily ruled out, the one who commands is not logically bound to give reasons why his commands should be obeyed. Further, there is not normally room for the addressee to ask why he is to do what he has been commanded to do, nor can it be said that the reasons the commander has are designed to serve the interests of the addressee. The interests that are being served when one is commanded to do something are typically those of the speaker or his party. Further when one commands another person the decision respecting what the addressee is to do is taken by the former not the latter so that when one is under a command it is rather pointless for one to say that it is up to him to decide what he is going to do. The decision-making element has been removed from his domain qua addressee. When you are commanded to do something you are not normally considered to have an option open to you, at least not a very lively one. I take it then that on the usual rendering of the concept of commanding we can say that the logical gap, which we identified with advising, between saying to someone to do this rather than that and his being free to decide what to do simply does not obtain. Thus commanding someone to do something cannot constitute a solution to the person's problem of having to choose

between alternative courses of action open to him; that is, commanding never adequately answers the question "What shall I do?" asked by another, whereas advising can constitute a solution or adequately answer the question. So commanding is not advising.

Now the upshot of all this is as follows. If the only use (following Field) or even the use (following Hare) of the imperative sentence is to command then it is clear that such a sentence cannot have an advising function to fulfill.²⁷ This is an incorrect conclusion to be forced to draw and we need not be forced to draw it. To avoid this conclusion, and consequently the views of Field and Hare, all we need do is to keep some fairly elementary distinctions before us respecting the imperative sentence and the uses thereof. These distinctions are: (i) that an imperative sentence itself is not a command; (ii) that we do not use imperative sentences solely to command; and (iii) that we sometimes use sentences not in the imperative mood to command. I think I have said enough about (ii) to indicate the variety of uses to which imperative sentences can be put. Respecting (iii) we can and often do use indicative sentences to command. My saying "You are no longer welcome here" in the appropriate setting does the job of the command "Get out of my house!"; and "Your bus is about to leave" can function in place of "Hurry up!" The point in making the above three distinctions is to show that there is no

²⁷ It might be thought that a case can be made for a weaker sense of "to command" which would provide latitude for the addressee such that (e) and (f) need not be violated in using an imperative sentence to command someone. We might reserve the verb "to order" to function in this weaker sense but in the next section of this chapter I show why ordering is not advising.

(logical) affinity between the use of the imperative sentence and commanding, and thereby to break any tendency there may be to equate or otherwise confound these two notions. So the imperative sentence need not be seen to violate points (e) and (f) in all its uses though in some of its uses it doubtless does. In exploring the implications for advising of the views of Field and Hare I have examined one use of the imperative sentence that does namely, the command use. But for some of the other uses of the imperative sentence, if they are recognized in their own right and are not blurred out as the Field-Hare views would have it, they are of a sufficiently lesser force as to be suitable for use as an advising utterance. This lesser force is manifested by the fact that in some uses of the imperative sentence the speaker's position is not of necessity one of being in authority over people and by the fact that the addressee has some latitude respecting points (e) and (f). If you request me to help you by using the imperative sentence "Get me out, I'm stuck!" I am not thereby bound to do as you say as I would be if in appropriate situations you were to command me. I might or I might not decide to help you. I am free to do either. Similarly if you advise me by saying "Write a thousand words a day" or "Get a ticket to the reading room in the British Museum" I am not thereby bound to do as you say even though you have used an imperative sentence in addressing me.

Ought sentences in respect of (e) and (f) are, on the whole, less troublesome. The use of an ought sentence typically presupposes a choice in the courses of action open to the agent addressed (and his being free to decide which course to take). "You ought to do A"

normally does not tie you to doing A though it presupposes there are good reasons for choosing to do it rather than choosing to do something else. These features of the ought sentence help make it a suitable candidate for use in advising people to do one thing rather than another. But sometimes the logic of ought sentences is construed in such a way that it is not possible for them to be used as an advising utterance because such a construal, if correct, would violate (e) and (f). One such construal I believe worth considering is that of R. M. Hare who claims in The Language of Morals that ought sentences entail imperatives. We have seen how Hare uses "imperatives" so his claim in the final analysis must be that ought sentences entail commands. However let us first hear him out on the matter. Hare says that he does not "wish to claim that all 'ought'-sentences entail imperatives, but only that they do so when they are being used evaluatively."²⁸ Now when ought sentences are used this way they are, for Hare, fulfilling their primary function which is to prescribe or to advise (as we noted earlier). It follows then that when ought sentences are used to advise or prescribe they entail imperatives. Suppose then that I advise you by saying "You ought to do X." This (evaluative) use of the ought sentence entails according to Hare, the imperative (command) "You, do X." That is "You ought to do X" as an advising utterance entails "Do X."²⁹ Now when philosophers use the word "entails" they normally mean

²⁸Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 164.

²⁹See Language of Morals, p. 178. There he says that when "You ought not to smoke in this compartment" is used evaluatively it entails the command "Do not (now) smoke in this compartment." Also see p. 172 where he says: "Thus to say that moral judgments guide actions, and to say that they entail imperatives, comes to much the same thing."

by the expression "p entails q" that it would be logically contradictory to assert p and deny q. So their use of "entails" normally picks out a meaning connection between two statements or expressions to the extent that it would be correct to say that at least part of what we mean by "p" is "q." So far as I can see Hare does not stray from this usage. "To say that one judgment entails another is simply to say that you cannot assent to the first and dissent from the second unless you misunderstood one or the other; and this 'cannot' is a logical 'cannot.'"³⁰ Thus if "You ought to do X" used evaluatively entails "Do X" then part of the meaning of the former just is the latter, namely "Do X." But what part? We know that it cannot be the descriptive part of "You ought to do X" because as Hare has already told us this utterance can be used to advise or prescribe when no information is being conveyed (see p. 56 above). But if "You ought to do X" as an advising utterance can be devoid of descriptive meaning then when it is said that "You ought to do X" entails "Do X" what is being said is that the evaluative meaning exhausts that of "You ought to do X" and that meaning in turn is of necessity nothing but the force of the command "Do X." Thus according to Hare's analysis of ought sentences (so far as I can see) the advising utterance "You ought to do X" collapses into "Do X" so that when I advise you by saying "You ought to do X" I am in fact commanding you to do X. This is a mistaken view. I argued earlier that you cannot advise and command someone in the same breath and phrase yet it looks as though this is precisely what Hare tries to do. But advising is not commanding because, at bottom, commanding violates

³⁰Ibid., p. 172.

our conditions (e) and (f). If you are commanding you cannot also be advising, and conversely. To be sure advising utterances have a "force," so to speak, but it does not reside in an entailed command--rather it lies in the fact that there are reasons for saying to a person that he ought to do one thing rather than another. These reasons, being factual in nature, are connected to advising utterances through the latter's presupposed descriptive element an account of which is found on pp. 76-77 below. The difficulties for advising encountered in Hare's position can be circumvented by dropping the claims that ought sentences used evaluatively entail commands and convey no information at all.

I conclude this first section of the chapter³¹ by claiming that the constructions (1) to (3), namely the imperative, the subjunctive and the ought sentences can, in some of their uses, be seen to satisfy or otherwise make provision for the seven logical points respecting the explicit advising utterance "I advise you to . . ." provided (a) that the expression "the use of the imperative sentence" is not equated to or confused with the expression "to command"; and (b) the ought sentence when used evaluatively, in particular to advise, is not construed to entail a command. Given these provisions then we can claim that, at least on some occasions, by saying "Do such and such" or "If I were you I would do . . ." or "You ought to do . . ." one thereby advises another person to do something. Of course the claim that (1) to (3) have an adequate logical structure is not

³¹I do not think that the subjunctive sentence is problematic with respect to points (e) and (f) so I will not comment further on it here.

sufficient. In baldly saying to you "Do such and such" you can hardly be expected to understand what I intend by using this imperative sentence. Am I issuing a command, a warning, or a piece of advice? In order for you to understand that in saying "Do such and such" I am advising you rather than warning or commanding you, a context is needed in which the utterance can reasonably be placed such that my intent is thereby made clear. All the constructs (1) to (3) and in particular (1) require a context if they are to do the work of "I advise you to . . ." and are to be seen to be doing it unambiguously, by the addressee. Otherwise commands and pieces of advice will become indistinguishable in the eyes of the people we address.

We can now provide an answer to the following question: Is there, for the adviser, anything to choose between the advising uses of any of (1) to (3) and that of the explicit advising utterance? Yes. We have seen that we need a context in order to know that each of (1) to (3) is being used by a speaker to advise on any given occasion; and such an (advising) context can be properly and clearly established by an initial use of the explicit performative "I advise you to" So our explicit utterance has a certain priority over the advising uses of (1) to (3). But once the context is established is there anything to choose between (1) to (3) in advising someone to do one thing rather than another? On the whole I think (3), the ought sentence, is the most suitable implicit advising utterance in our language. The subjunctive sentence is slightly weaker than either (1) or (3) though it can do the (advising) job for us and in fact has an advantage or two which I will bring out in connection with the discussion in Chapter IV.

The imperative sentence is doubtless the most difficult to use successfully or effectively in advising someone--given the tendency to confuse it with the command--that is, to use it such that the adviser's intent will not be misread by the advisee. There may in fact be good reasons for those in positions of authority who also have an advising function to fulfill to avoid completely the use of the imperative sentence in advising lest they be misunderstood by their advisees--or at least employ a variation on the imperative such as "You shall do well to" Beyond these considerations however I suspect that whether an adviser uses (1), (2) or (3) to advise another person is largely a matter of personal style and taste. These constructions can, at the very least, provide a variety to one's methods of advising. One final point: we have seen in this section that advising utterances are not to be identified by virtue of their (always) being in a certain mood and only that mood. Such utterances can be in any of the indicative active (and passive), the imperative or the subjunctive moods.

2.2 Things That Can Go Wrong

Suppose that (i) I say to you "I advise you to do A" (or words to that effect), (ii) the seven logical points I discussed last section are satisfied, and (iii) I have reasons for advising you as I do, then does this guarantee that I will have successfully advised you? Are these conditions sufficient for pulling off an act of advising or could something still go wrong? Before getting further into this it will be helpful to make a distinction in order to remove the ambiguity of the phrase "successfully advised." In verbal acts that like advising are essentially bi-polar it makes sense to distinguish between two kinds of

successes (and failures), namely the success of the speaker, in this case the adviser, and the success of the listener, in this case the advisee. Since it is possible to have the success of either without the concomitant success of the other, whenever we speak of "successful advising" we should specify whether by that phrase we mean the success of the adviser or of the advisee or of both. Suppose I have satisfied (i) to (iii) but that you, the advisee, didn't fully hear what I said qua adviser or you misunderstood some of the things I said to you. Would this not count against saying I had succeeded in advising you? That depends. In the first sense of "success" (that of the adviser) it might not count against it whereas in the second sense of "success" (that of the advisee) it probably would. In this case we are inclined to say that something went wrong on the addressee-side but not necessarily on the speaker-side. Equally however something could go wrong on the speaker-side but not necessarily on the addressee-side. Is it, for instance, the case that just anybody satisfying (i) to (iii) can thereby be said to be successful qua adviser or are there (say) additional personal requirements to be met from the speaker's side? In what follows I will be primarily concerned with the speaker-side. What then are some of the possible things that can go wrong here such that even though (i) to (iii) have been met by the speaker we might still say that he had not been successful in advising someone.

In his How to Do Things with Words Austin identifies at least six things that can go wrong on the occasions during which performative utterances are used and he refers to these as the "doctrine of the

infelicities."³² According to Austin an infelicity is a "dimension of unsatisfactoriness" or an "ill" to which verbal acts may be subject--though not every kind of ill to which such acts may fall prey is an infelicity. Austin excludes from the class "infelicity" verbal acts done under duress or uttered by mistake, accident or uttered unintentionally.³³ He includes what he calls "Misfires" which make a verbal act null and void, and "Abuses" which make an act not void but "unhappy."³⁴ Misfires are subdivided into "misapplications" on the one hand and "flaws" and "hitches" or generally "misexecutions" on the other. Under "abuses" there are "insincereties." There are two other sub-types of infelicity for which Austin gives no name--one under "misfires" and one under "abuses." Now every performative apparently is liable to some of these infelicities but not necessarily all of them. For example our advising utterance does not appear to be subject to that type of infelicity which Austin calls "misexecutions." A verbal act is rendered fruitless, so to speak, or ineffectual if the procedure is not executed by all participants both correctly and completely.³⁵ Thus "my attempt to make a bet by saying 'I bet you sixpence' is abortive unless you say 'I take you on' or words to that effect; my attempt to marry by saying 'I will' is abortive if the woman says 'I will not.'"³⁶ These examples suggest that my attempt to advise you by

³²Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 14.

³³Ibid., p. 21.

³⁴Ibid., p. 25.

³⁵Ibid., p. 15.

³⁶Ibid., p. 36.

saying "I advise you to do A" will be abortive unless you (the advisee) reply "I consent to do A" or words to that effect. But this is not so. Unlike betting where your failure to say "I take you on" (or words like it) is a sufficient condition for aborting the attempt, advising admits of a whole range of possible verbal responses or none at all no one of which is either necessary or sufficient to abort my attempt at advising you. This point about advising is guaranteed by the essential logical gap (discussed in Section 2.1) between the utterance "I advise you to do . . ." and the advisee's logically independent decision to do one thing or another which may or may not reflect the advice given him. Advising highlights the speaker's saying something and the listener's deciding to do something, not the latter's saying something in return. Nor is my attempt at advising you by saying "I advise you to do . . ." aborted if you do not decide to do something; for not deciding to do something is, in a sense, still to decide. So it's not clear how an advisee could ever "misexecute" his part at least on Austin's sense of "misexecute." I must concede however that an adviser could misexecute (in some sense) his part. If I attempt to advise you by saying "I advise you to do . . ." but have no reasons for the advice I give you then I will be unsuccessful in my advising (as I will establish in Chapter III).

On the whole, however, I think advising utterances are more liable to those infelicities covered by "misapplications" and "insincerities." Some examples³⁷ of the former are: my saying "I give . . ." when whatever I give is not mine to give; "I christen you . . ." when

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

I am not vested with the authority appropriate for christening people; "I name this ship . . ." when I am not the person selected to perform the ceremony; "I appoint you . . ." when you are already appointed. The infelicities here arise from essentially two sources--one relating to the position (or lack of) of the speaker and the other to the circumstances of the utterance. My saying "I christen you . . ." is null and void if I lack authorization to christen people, that is if I am not entitled to do this or if I am not in the appropriate position to do this. Also in saying "I name this ship . . ." I do not thereby name it if I have not been put in a position to do this. And when I say "I appoint you . . ." what renders the utterance void is the particular circumstance namely that you are already appointed. What makes "I give" void are infelicities arising from both position and circumstance since in claiming to be giving what is not mine I am thereby also not in a position (not entitled) to give even though I say "I give." Suppose then I say to you "I advise you to take Education 801A this term" when in fact you had previously taken the course; or "You ought to jog one mile each day" when in fact you have an artificial leg; or "You would do well to obtain borrowing privileges at the university library" when in fact by regulation you are not permitted to borrow books there. Now I take it that these are all cases where it is possible for the adviser to meet each of the conditions (i) to (iii) above, and yet because of circumstances to have his utterance rendered void. You can always say to someone "I advise you to do A" when that person either is already doing or has done A or cannot do it but you cannot then be said to be advising him. Some of the things [in addition to (i) to (iii)] that

have to go right in attempting to advise someone by saying "I advise you to do . . ." is that what you advise a person to do is not already being done by him and is neither a physical or legal impossibility for him. You will not be considered a good (i.e., helpful) adviser if for many of the things you purportedly advise people to do they either have done or cannot (in the various sense of "cannot") do, because your advice will be without point or effect. This of course can fairly easily be remedied by the adviser's obtaining adequate information about his advisees and the relevant parts of the world (see Chapter III, Section 3.2).

With respect to the appropriateness of the speaker or of his position particularly when the speaker is advising someone to do something this raises, of necessity, the complex matter of who is to advise or who can be said to advise. Since I shall be taking up this matter in some detail in Chapter IV I shall curtail my treatment of it here. There is a sense, of course, in which almost anyone (save perhaps young children and imbeciles) can be said to be in a position to advise about every day sorts of things even though much of the advice is not well received by the listeners, or is unwanted. Even here however it is arguable that one's own particular experiences may set him in a better position than, say, his neighbour to advise about some everyday matter. But I am primarily concerned about advising in respect of rather more specialized matters--for example the giving of economic, medical, legal, vocational, spiritual and in particular moral advice. I take it that unless a person is in a certain position to give (say) legal advice, then for anyone not so placed who nonetheless attempts to

advise another on legal matters by saying to that other "I advise you to do . . ."--while we might not say that his utterance is null and void--we would be extremely wary of heeding it as legal advice. Just as one cannot appoint another to some position by saying "I appoint you" if the former is not duly authorized to do this so I cannot really be said to be giving you legal advice by saying "I advise you to do . . ." or "You ought to do . . ." if I am not in a position to do this--that is if I do not, at bottom, have the relevant knowledge and understanding. I believe it is correct to say that some people, by virtue of their skills and abilities or their training or both, are in a better position than are others to give certain kinds of advice such as legal, medical, economic advice--though I concede for the moment that the case for moral advice is more difficult and one I shall have to argue for later in Chapter V. As I suggested a moment ago we do not say, necessarily, that my attempt at advising you on legal matters by saying "I advise you to . . ." when I am not in a position to give this kind of advice is null and void, since this may be too strong a claim, though we do or would say that my utterance is subject to grave doubt, to skepticism, or to question. That is, for those who, like myself, try to advise on matters for which we are not entitled to give advice we must expect such utterances to be branded at least as "unfortunate" or "inappropriate" or "unacceptable." Giving advice in rather specialized domains almost certainly requires that the role or position of the adviser be subject to requirements it otherwise would not be. All this turns on what it means to say of someone that he (she) is "in a position" to advise another.

Insincerities, on the other hand arise when certain verbal performances are undertaken without the speaker having the appropriate thoughts or beliefs, feelings or convictions, and intentions, examples of which are my saying "I promise" when I do not intend to keep the promise and my saying "I congratulate you" when I do not feel pleased, when perhaps I am jealous of you, and so on. The infelicities here arise from the fact that in uttering these things without the appropriate thoughts, feelings or intentions I am abusing the procedure thereby rendering the performances in question not null and void but "unhappy" because insincere. Suppose then that I advise someone to do something when I believe (think) that what I advise him to do is clearly not in his interests and that if acted on will almost certainly place him in a position worse off than that in which he was before. Suppose in other words I advise someone to do what I think will be detrimental to him. I might, for example, hold a particular grudge against this person (unknownst to him) and I might therefore feel justified in so advising him. In the next chapter I argue that one good reason for advising another for doing this rather than that is that if the advice is acted on the advisee's interests will likely be better served than they otherwise would be. Then to the extent that we advise someone to do what we think will be detrimental to him we normally have a bad reason for so advising; and when we advise on the basis of bad reasons we advise insincerely. Giving advice on this basis is rather analogous to lying to the advisee. The latter in asking, "What shall I do?" is not asking to be placed in a position that leaves him worse off than he is now--rather the contrary. To the extent that

I reply to his question by advising him to do one thing rather than another on the pretense that doing it will be beneficial to him when in fact it will be detrimental to him, I am advising him unfaithfully, as it were, or qua adviser I am systematically misleading him, thereby abusing the procedure. His question presupposes I will respond in good faith if I respond at all. By not so responding I advise insincerely. There is, however, a difference between advising insincerely (by having bad reasons of the kind I suggest) and giving bad advice. I may, in all good faith and for good reasons so far as I can tell, advise you to do A thinking it to be in your interests when in fact it turns out not to be so. This advice is certainly to be criticized (as bad) but not in the same way that advising intentionally on the basis of bad reasons is to be criticized. There is no excuse for the latter whereas there may be for the former.

Other ills to which our advising utterances may be subject are as follows: my saying "I advise you to do . . ." when I am on stage acting in a play or said when I am dreaming or heavily drugged or hypnotized. All these conditions would in some way render the utterances void. Austin does not include these in his discussion of infelicities because "our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances"³⁸ and the conditions listed in this paragraph are not "ordinary" according to Austin. I mention them however to make our list of things that can go or be wrong with our advising utterances more complete.

³⁸Ibid., p. 22.

We are now in a position to see more clearly than we were before that for one's advising someone else to do something by saying "I advise you to . . ." to be brought off successfully, certain things in the world have to obtain and certain statements about these things have to be true. When I say "I advise you to . . ." or "You ought to . . ." etc., I imply that a good many things have to be--for example, that I have appropriate thoughts, feelings, intentions; that I am in an appropriate position; that the person whom I address has not done but can do what I advise him to do; that I have good reasons for the advice I give; that the advisee is free to decide what to do; and so on. In other words when I say "I advise you to take Education 801A" then to be successful (not void, unhappy) it must be true, not false, that (a) you have not taken Education 801A; (b) you can take it; (c) you are free to decide whether to take it or not; (d) I think it would serve your interests to take it, i.e., I have a good reason for advising you this way; (e) I am not hypnotized or drugged, and so on. "I advise you to take Education 801A" suggests that "You have not yet taken Education 801A" is true, that "You can take it" is true, that "I think it in your interest to take it" is true, etc., though it does not follow that our advising utterance itself can be said to be true (or false). All the conditions (felicities) I have been discussing plus items (ii) and (iii) referred to at the outset of this section taken together help make it a fact that by my saying "I advise you to do . . ." I thereby advise you successfully to do one thing rather than another. But my saying "I advise you to . . ." is not a report or statement of this fact. So while "I advise you to . . ." or "You ought to . . ."

(when used to advise) can themselves be neither true nor false they are related to a whole cluster of statements which are either true or false. If these latter are all true then our advising is successful; if not all true then not successful or not entirely so, depending, of course, on which of the statements are true and which false. In other words to assess as "successful" the utterance "I advise you to . . ." is to assess the total situation in which the utterance is issued.

2.3 Advising and Other Concepts³⁹

Consider the following list of concepts: advising, ordering, suggesting, persuading, recommending, demanding, begging, urging, pleading, commanding, goading, admonishing, warning, beseaching, imploring, counseling, directing, prescribing, inducing, commanding, influencing. There is nothing mysterious or magical about this list which I have constructed. All the concepts mentioned have, very generally, to do with the actions of at least two people and in particular the actions of one person as they are or could be related to the actions of another person. Obviously, the list is open-ended. Given this general criterion numerous other concepts could be added but I shall not and need not bother with that since the list as it stands is more than adequate for my purpose which is to compare and contrast advising with a number of these other notions. In so doing I shall be saying a little

³⁹ In writing parts of this section I have found the following articles helpful: R. M. Hare, "The Freedom of the Will," The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, XXV (1951), 201-216; W. D. Falk, "Goading and Guiding," Mind, LXXII, No. 246 (April, 1953), 145-171; Basil Mitchell, "Varieties of Imperative," The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, XXXI (1957), 175-190; Herbert Morris, "Imperatives and Orders," Theoria, XXVI (1960), 183-209.

about quite a number of these concepts and rather more about very few of them notably, persuading, ordering, counseling and recommending, all in an attempt to help illuminate further the concept of advising.

I begin by noting that while many of the concepts listed, like advising, have performative uses they by no means all do. When I say "I order . . . ," "I suggest . . . ," "I recommend . . . ," "I demand . . . ," "I beg . . . ," "I urge . . . ," "I command . . . ," "I admonish . . . ," "I beseech . . . ," "I prescribe . . . ," "I warn . . . ," "I commend . . ." in each case I perform the act in question; that is, I thereby order, suggest, recommend, demand, beg, urge, commend and so on. Whereas in saying "I persuade . . . ," "I plead . . . ," "I goad . . . ," "I counsel . . . ," "I induce . . . ," "I influence . . ." I do not thereby persuade, plead, goad, counsel or influence.⁴⁰ What this shows us is that some of these actions cannot be performed apart from either the use of the written or spoken word. I cannot engage in the acts we call "ordering," "recommending," "demanding," "urging," "commanding," "commending," "warning," "beseeching" without saying or writing something, that is without using the language; and this as we have seen is eminently the case with advising. There are no conceivable situations in which it would be possible to say that someone is or has been advising another person to do something (or even that something is the case) wherein the former fails to use words. Advising is a linguistic activity and this no doubt explains

⁴⁰Two exceptions: "I plead" as in "I plead guilty" can be my pleading so there is a sense of pleading in which "I plead" is performative. Also "I counsel" as in "I counsel caution" is performative. Here "counsel" is equivalent to "advise." But there are other senses of "counsel" where this equivalence does not hold. See pp. 88-96.

why general terms like "speaker" and "addresser" can be used to name or otherwise identify the persons who engage in this and other speech acts.

However with respect to persuading, pleading, goading, counseling (in some uses) and influencing there are no necessary connections with the use of language. While it is true that we often persuade or influence someone to do something by using language we need not and sometimes do not. Persuading can be pulled off non-linguistically by the use of threats (non-verbal), force, or fear for example. In counseling, at least in the non-directive sense, silence and passivity on the part of the counselor are often virtues. "The counselor's task" writes Arbuckle, "is basically one of listening and clarifying in a quiet, unobtrusive, and accepting way."⁴¹ So on this view of counseling it would be perfectly meaningful to reply to the question "What did you counsel him?" by saying, "Oh nothing, I simply listened while my counselee did all the talking." Counselor talk is not essential to counseling. I could also in some situations plead without saying anything. If the stakes were high--if for instance my life was at stake--I could plead for it by getting down before my would-be assassin on my knees and raising my hands in prayer-like posture. It would not be my words but rather my bodily position and my facial expressions that would constitute my pleading. Actually begging and imploring are rather like pleading in this respect. But begging and imploring are also like advising in that they have performative uses. My saying "I beg you," "I implore you" is my begging or my imploring whereas "I plead (with)

⁴¹ Dugald S. Arbuckle, Guidance and Counseling in the Classroom (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1957), p. 69.

you" is not my pleading. These facts place concepts like begging and imploring in an interesting position. In some cases they share certain features with pleading and in other cases certain features with advising.

We may now draw the following general line of demarcation between concepts like persuading, pleading, goading, counseling (non-directive) inducing, influencing on the one hand and advising, ordering, recommending, demanding, urging, commending, admonishing on the other, by saying: (a) the performance of the latter acts but not the former have a necessary connection with the use of language; (b) in the case of the former acts but not the latter (or much less so in the latter) there is a tendency to make use of appropriate bodily movements (including certain postures, nods of the head, etc.), facial expressions and tones of voice; and (c) similarly with the former but not the latter there is a tendency (or at least provision for) both the use of emotive words and the emotive use of words in performing the acts in question. On this limited basis we may add the following general distinctions. Concepts like advising, urging, prescribing, recommending, commending pick out verbal acts that are on the whole, relatively impersonal in the sense of their being essentially objective and cognitive in nature while the actions picked out by concepts like persuading, goading, pleading, influencing, etc. are, on the whole, subjective and affective in nature--subjective at least to the extent that the person doing the persuading, goading, pleading, etc., normally engages in these activities in order to have things his way, and affective to the extent that words are commonly used emotively by the

people in question. While there is not this kind of subjective element in non-directive counseling there is an affective element though it is apparently brought out in a different way. It is said that the counselor's job (in part) is to reflect "what he thinks and feels that the client is thinking and feeling The more one empathizes with the client, the more likely it is that he can reflect accurately the deep and personal feelings of the client, and thus be close, and sensitive, to the client's frame of reference."⁴² This reflection of feeling is by no means word-dependent. A smile, a nod, a frown, can all reflect another's feelings given an appropriate setting.

This survey is rather rough and hasty and I now want to focus on the notion of persuading and its cognates lest important distinctions here are overlooked. The foregoing treatment suggests that by virtue of words frequently used emotively and (or) bodily movements that persuading, pleading, and goading causally affect (i.e., induce, make or get) other people to do what we want them to do by putting them under some kind of psychological pressure. This I believe is correct as far as it goes. That there is a causal mechanism conceptually associated with these notions helps to mark them off from other notions like advising, recommending, urging, prescribing, and so on. There is too a causal mechanism typically associated with the notion of commanding (as I suggested in an earlier section). In this case the cause or force often arises from the threat of penalties or punishment--penalties or punishment that are imposed for disobeying the command.

⁴²Dugald S. Arbuckle, Counseling: Philosophy, Theory and Practice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1965), p. 208.

There is however an important difference between commanding and persuading (and for that matter, advising) and it is this: in the case of the latter but not the former one need not be in a position of authority to carry out the act. Yet commanding along with persuading, goading, pleading all differ from advising to the extent that in the latter but not the former activities one is not trying to get (cause, induce) the addressee to do one thing rather than another. As I showed in the first section of this chapter there is no room in the logic of advising for a causal connection between "I advise you to do A" and your doing it. In advising someone you are not engaged in dragging or trying to drag that person where he does not want to go or forcing him to do what he does not want to do, all of which is what you are often trying to do when you are persuading him and normally doing when goading him. Turning matters around when someone asks you for advice he is not asking to be told (commanded) to do something nor is he asking to be persuaded⁴³ or goaded into doing something. All these violate some of the essential conditions for being advised such as that of being free and able to choose independently between alternative courses of action. The reason that it is odd for one qua rational being to ask to be persuaded or goaded into doing something is that one would thereby be denying his freedom and his rationality; whereas if he asked qua rational being to be advised he would be doing something consistent with his rationality and his freedom. Like commanding someone, neither persuading nor goading an advisee can be said to constitute a solution to his problem of having to choose among alternative courses of action.

⁴³But see discussion on "rational persuasion" on pp. 83-84.

To dwell on these points for a moment, what one in fact is after in asking for advice is the considered opinion or belief of another person as to the best thing for one to do in a certain situation. Thus in seeking advice you are asking another person for the merits of doing one thing rather than another, that is you are asking for impersonal facts or reasons and not the adviser's own special reasons why you should do this rather than that. But you need not and often times are not asking for impersonal facts or reasons when you ask to be persuaded (in some senses of "persuade") or to be goaded or commanded. Here you probably do not care particularly what the facts are, rather you simply want someone to remove the burden of decision-making from you in some situation by doing whatever will result in your being caused to act a certain way. But in relinquishing this freedom you place yourself at the disposal of the other person for him to use you as he pleases. The point I am trying to make here is that different conditions are presupposed in approaching someone for advice as distinct from asking to be persuaded or goaded and these different presuppositions help mark off advising from concepts like persuading and goading. To put matters (once more) slightly differently, we can only advise people who on the whole are relatively free and who are disposed to conducting their affairs rationally whereas we can persuade, goad, command people who tend on the whole, to be governed by their passions.

Now, "persuading" has, I believe, another use which is not incompatible with that of "advising" and it is important to bring this out. We sometimes speak of being persuaded by the facts or by an argument to do one thing rather than another. In this use of "persuade"

we are not saying that we have been caused or forced by the facts or reasons to do something. It is not logically contradictory to say "I know these are compelling reasons for doing X but I am not going to do it"--though it is logically odd since under these circumstances we usually would do X. What we mean when we say that one has been persuaded by the facts or the argument is that having reflected on the facts and their relevance, the soundness of the reasons, the cogency of the argument one then decides in the light of these considerations to do one thing rather than another. Here "persuading" amounts to "weighing and deciding" not "causing" or "inducing." To say that I have been persuaded by the facts is to say that I am duly convinced by them. Clearly then advising utterances and ordinary statements of fact can persuade (in the present sense of "persuade" we are considering). "Your house is on fire" will persuade you qua rational being to leave for home immediately just as "I advise you to do A" can be said to persuade you to do A given that there are reasons and you are duly convinced by these. There are then at least two distinct uses for the concept persuading. In the former, when words are used to persuade someone to do something the words are used causally not performatively and this is what helps to distinguish persuading (in this sense) from advising. In the second use, however, persuading can be compatible with advising and to this extent there is nothing odd about my saying that the advice I received persuaded me to do this rather than that for all I am saying is that in weighing the advice I received I have decided in favor of one course of action over another.

There is one final point about persuading (first use) which marks it off from advising and it is this: "persuade" is an achievement word necessarily whereas "advise" is not (or at least not in the same way). This difference may be brought out as follows. It would be contradictory for me to say "I persuaded him to do X but he wouldn't or didn't do it" whereas it would not be contradictory to say "I advised him to do X but he wouldn't or didn't do it." In the former case to say that one has in fact persuaded another person to do something is to say that one has got him to do it (by one means or another). Thus "I persuaded him to do X but he would not do it" both asserts and denies the same fact. But in the case of advising it does not follow that because one has been advised to do X he does it and therefore "I advised him to do X but he would not or did not do it" does not assert and deny the same fact. Whereas "I persuaded him to do X" means "I got him to do it," the utterance "I advised him to do X" does not mean "I got him to do it"--and I think I have given ample justification earlier in this chapter why this is so. It is true, of course, that in the case of advising there is a sense of "achievement" in which the speaker may be said to be successful even though the addressee does not do what he was advised to do. I have also touched upon this point before and what it amounts to is this. In the case of advising, the adviser may be successful while the advisee is not provided the former does his job correctly, that is, provided he attends to what I have previously identified as the logical points of advising as well as the felicities of advising. Nonetheless "persuading" necessarily is an achievement word in places where "advising" easily fails to be one. But then this

is just a logical point about advising and the fact that advising does not have successes where persuading does is not a negative claim against the former. In having been advised by someone to do X one is necessarily still free to decide whether to do X or not but in having been persuaded to do X one cannot be said still to be free to decide whether to do X.

Ordering, to which I now turn, is like commanding, not advising. As far as the giving of reasons is concerned, one who orders you to do something is not logically bound to say why you are to obey though he doubtless has reasons. In advising on the other hand there is a sense in which the advice is incomplete until the reasons for doing one thing rather than another have been given by the adviser. Further, in ordering there is no conceptual connection with enhancing the best interests of the person ordered. Like commanding, persuading (first sense), goading, and imploring, in ordering we normally try to get the other person to do what serves our interests not his--though I think we would make at least this exception namely that in ordering young children we not infrequently are trying to get them to do what will be in their best interests, at least so far as we can tell at the moment of ordering. And in some contexts we order adults (who could not possibly be expected to have the facts) to do one thing rather than another in the interests of (say) their safety, health, comfort, etc. But apart from these exceptions ordering is not a disinterested activity; whereas when we advise another person to do something we necessarily take into account whether, in following our advice, his best interests will be served not ours. I cannot be said to have advised you if I suggest to you to do (say) X on the basis that your doing it will help me to gain

but not you. The gain that is conceptually tied to advising is that of the advisee not the adviser. To be sure an adviser can gain but only incidentally. If he consistently gives good advice his reputation no doubt rises. Giving good advice in principle amounts to telling the advisee (as a reasonable person) to do what he (the advisee) would himself likely choose to do if he were not (say) presently ignorant of the facts of a situation. But one can give good advice to the extent that one first takes into consideration the advisee's present interests and what, other things considered, will be in his best interests. So advising is on balance a disinterested activity.

As our reference to young children indicates, to be in a position to be ordered one need not be able to reason in the sense of making sound choices or decisions as between alternative courses of action. The fact that we never speak of advising young children (or animals) to do this rather than that suggests that they lack the requisite skills and (or) abilities to be advised. As far as we know they are not able to deliberate and exercise rational choice. So we do not advise young children and animals because we cannot (due to their lack). Of course there are some adults whom, for similar reasons, we cannot advise either. Whereas those who can be advised can also follow orders, those who can follow orders cannot always be advised. It is interesting to note here that whereas we speak of obeying and disobeying or contravening orders on the one hand we speak of heeding, consenting to advice and rejecting advice on the other hand; and we never speak of obeying or disobeying advice though we do speak this way about orders. The notion of obeying orders suggests submission on the part of the

addressee whereas the notions of heeding and consenting to advice suggest reflective awareness on the part of the advisee--though admittedly disobeying and contravening an order may be construed (at least in the case of children) as a mark of embryonic rationality that is beginning to surface.

I turn now to the concept of counseling. There is, of course, one use of "counseling" which is interchangeable with that of "advising" and it is the use with which we talk for example, of giving legal counsel. When a lawyer gives counsel to his client he is taken either to be advising his client to do one thing rather than another or that something is the case. But there is another use--or better still, cluster of uses--of "counseling" which cannot be interchanged with "advising" with the same degree of ease. I refer to the use of "counseling" made popular by psychologists, psycho-therapists, counselors, and others--uses which are identified by such labels as "directive," "clinical," "client-centered," "non-directive," "eclectic," and so on. What is known as "direct" counseling is probably closer in use to "advising" than are the remaining notions of counseling. As I understand it the person who sees himself as a directive counselor typically gives advice to his counselee. The same is true though to a lesser extent, with the clinical counselor. But, the most fruitful contrast to work on here between counseling and advising is that between client-centered counseling and advising. Before treating this matter more fully, it will be helpful to set down in general terms some of the features which seem common to all types of counseling and advising. Central to all these notions is that of helping another person in some

difficulty though admittedly the way in which "helping" is interpreted varies significantly throughout the different interpretations of "counseling." I shall comment shortly on the distinction in this respect of procedure (and objective) between non-directive counseling and advising in particular. The help that is administered typically comes in response to a deficiency or need, to a problem or difficulty or puzzlement of one kind or another on the part of some person. Counselors and advisers alike have the best interests of their clients in mind in whatever they do qua counselor and qua advisee. Both attempt to "see," to understand, their client's situation from the latter's point of view to the extent that this is possible though I believe the adviser will make use of what he sees in formulating advice whereas the counselor will not--at least not a client-centered counselor because he does not advise. Neither counselor nor adviser considers himself to be in a position of authority over his clients though advisers may see themselves as an authority in some area. Nor do advisers and counselors conceive of themselves as disciplinarians. So there clearly is some common ground here among these notions in question.

In my limited reading on the subject of counseling I have come to the tentative conclusion that the concept counselors and other related professionals have of advising is often times inaccurate. Since such inaccuracies blur rather than clarify the distinctions between counseling and advising and since they may also influence attitudes negatively towards the activity of advising it is important to bring out briefly some of the misleading things that are said about

advising. For example, one person suggests that the methods of advising can be classed as "persuasive"⁴⁴ among other things; another that advising amounts on the one hand to exerting a "controlling and directing force"⁴⁵ on the client and, on the other, to "dominance"⁴⁶ of the speaker over the client. Another counselor⁴⁷ refers to advising as the "amorphous stage" in the development of the notion of guidance (counseling) and as the "unsystematized" attempt at helping others. Yet another says that advising is "an attempt to manipulate,"⁴⁸ and finally one says that advising is a "mere" activity and one doomed to failure since students are either incapable or unwilling to act on advice.⁴⁹ I shall not answer these "charges" in detail other than to point out what I have already argued. I have said that advising is neither persuading (in the normal sense of that term) nor ordering nor commanding where we typically expect to be "controlled," "directed," "dominated." To suggest that these terms have a place in advising contexts is plainly an error. Further to suggest that advising is a primitive and outmoded procedure lacking the necessary complexity and

⁴⁴E. C. Williamson, Counseling Adolescents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 233.

⁴⁵Arbuckle, Counseling: Philosophy, Theory and Practice, p. 252.

⁴⁶Arbuckle, Guidance and Counseling in the Classroom, p. 179.

⁴⁷Carlton E. Beck, Philosophical Foundations of Guidance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 55.

⁴⁸Charles L. Lacy, "The School Counselors Dilemma: To Advise or Not to Advise," Catholic Educational Review, LXXVI, No. 14 (May, 1969), 883.

⁴⁹Michael J. Frederick, "Counseling is More than Giving Advice," Chicago Schools Journal, XLVI, No. 6 (March, 1965), 257.

sophistication to do a job in helping others is (perhaps) to confuse what advising has been in the past with what it can be (within the logic of its structure). In addition there is a fairly widespread view among counselors that in advising another person we are in fact deciding for that person what he is to do in the situation and that if he does not do it our advising has been a failure. But there is no logical commitment in advising to the effect that advising is deciding for the advisee as I argued in the first section of the chapter. And we have also seen that with advising there is more than one kind of success or failure, so that given one kind of failure--say that of the advisee to act and bring about his objective--there is not necessarily a failure in toto. There is, it would appear, considerable conceptual confusion among counselors about advising. My treatment of advising suggests that they should attend to a more thorough analysis of this concept and its relationship to counseling.

These I believe are some of the misleading ways in which many counselors and people connected with counseling handle the notion of advising. These errors are serious and are in part responsible for the rather negative attitude towards the notion of advising which many counselors and others seem to have. Logically speaking there is not a good reason for this attitude. The attitude results from a failure to see how advising as a concept functions. Both advising and counseling are complex activities but (apart from direct counseling) they function for largely different objectives and with somewhat different clientele. Nothing is to be gained by suggesting that one is inferior to the other in doing a certain job because on the whole they do different jobs in

different ways in different situations. Let us examine this matter now. Earlier in this section I noted some of the ways in which advising and counseling differ primarily in respect of procedures to be followed with the client (as opposed to objectives to be reached). Listening, for the counselor (we saw) is extremely important. It is meaningful to say "I counseled Smith this morning but just listened to him." That is, the utterance "I counseled Smith but didn't say anything to him" is not at all contradictory whereas "I advised Smith but I didn't say anything to him" is contradictory. That counselor-talk is not essential to counseling is reflected also by the fact that the (non-directive) counselor makes no judgments or evaluations nor does he suggest to the client that he ought to do this rather than that. (Of course this fact also reflects the counselor's own professed uncertainty about his being in a position to know what is the best thing for his client to do.) The counselor prefers to leave the discovery of such matters to the client himself. The "help" given to the client by the counselor is one of simply being present with the client, re-assuring the client through his quiet presence, attending sympathetically to what the client says and reacting to the client's emotional expressions by a similar emotional response, that is, by "mirroring back" as it were the client's own emotional state. In all of this the counselor's facial expressions, nods of the head, "hm-hm's," etc., play an important role. The point of this procedure, as I understand it, is to enable (at most) the client to uncover the causes of his disorder or difficulty and (at least) to face his weaknesses, limitations and strengths realistically so as to be able to cope better with himself and the external world.

The procedure in short is aimed at increasing the self-awareness and self-acceptance of the client: and it is, by the nature of the case, incompatible with such utterances as "I counsel you to" In counseling of the kind in question one eminently does not counsel another by saying to him "I counsel you"

Advising on the other hand necessarily is a linguistic activity involving talk not only by the adviser but also the advisee. Unlike the counselor the adviser makes and expresses judgments and evaluations respecting what he thinks the advisee ought to do in a situation. Whereas the counselor professes an uncertainty on this matter, the adviser evidently expresses (at least limited) confidence; but then, as I noted, counselors and advisers deal with different types of clients and where certainty or confidence about what to say or do with one type of client is appropriate it need not be so with another type of client. Advisee-talk consists, in part, in expressing what it is that puzzles the advisee, or expressing uncertainty about how to achieve his objectives, as well as consisting of the client's describing his relevant interests, attitudes and background situation. So in advising the talk of necessity is two-way whereas in counseling it is essentially one-way from counselee to counselor. In counseling, the person whose talk is significant is the counselee's; in advising the talk of both parties is significant. Further we note that when counselees resolve their problems they do so typically without the aid or benefit of reasons given by the counselor. Reasons for the counselee's doing one thing rather than another are withheld from him by the counselor whereas in advising someone the adviser (logically) gives

reasons for the advice he offers his client. When an advisee makes a decision to do one thing rather than another it is done with the benefit of reasons given him by the adviser. Reasons given by the adviser are essential to being advised; reasons given by the counselor are detrimental to being counseled; or so it seems.

"Counseling" as it is used by client-centered people (and to a lesser extent by others) is rather closely connected to the notion of psychotherapy. The overlap between counseling and psychotherapy picks out in part the types of problems counselors commonly see themselves encountering and treating in counseling sessions. Thus the emphasis in (client-centered) counseling is treatment of personality and (or) emotional disorders--fears, anxieties, prejudices, distresses, superstitions, guilt feelings, depressions, and so on. In effect the notion of counseling as it is increasingly understood deals with "disturbances" of a relatively deep psychological kind. Even the school counselor, as Arbuckle reminds us, may have a job to do in therapy in addition to his (normal) tasks of vocational guidance, aptitude testing, and so on. He writes "the teacher-counselor . . . should be able to function as counselor with disturbed children"⁵⁰ Now the stress on psychotherapy in counseling, on the treatment of personality and emotional disorders and on the general objectives of helping clients to greater self-awareness and self-acceptance are, to put matters plainly, outside the domain of advising. Doubtless some people may experience a renewed or enriched self-awareness upon being advised and if so, so much the

⁵⁰ Arbuckle, Guidance and Counseling in the Classroom, p. 113. My emphasis.

better. But one does not advise another in order to heighten that other's self-awareness or one's self-acceptance: rather the point is that unless one has already attained a degree of self-awareness and of self-acceptance and unless one is already at a level of emotional stability one is not a candidate in the first place for receiving advice about what one ought to do in certain situations. So we might say that self-awareness and acceptance and emotional and personality stability are necessary conditions of advising a person; and to the extent that counseling is one method, the aim of which is to bring these things about, counseling may be said to be a temporally prior activity to advising in some situations (though not a logically prior activity). For an emotionally unstable advisee, counseling precedes advising; to be in a position to be advised one must be (at least) emotionally stable, have a fairly clear conception of oneself, and be aware of the external world. To the extent that these do not obtain in the person then advising (for him) cannot take place though counseling can and maybe should. Arbuckle is clearly correct when he says that there "would obviously be much more of an argument for the offering of advice to a rational individual under no stress or strain, than for giving advice to a highly disturbed individual who might clutch it as a complete answer to his difficulties, or reject it and the counselor completely."⁵¹ Thus the lines of demarcation between counseling (non-directive) and advising are fairly sharp. To mix the two is to invite additional aggravation of the client's existing problems. Extreme anxiety is to be met with a calm, accepting counselor and a

⁵¹ Arbuckle, Counseling: Philosophy, Theory and Practice, p. 252.

nonjudgmental attitude, not a piece of advice. The situations in which we advise are radically different from those in which we counsel. These are different ways of dealing with people at different levels of personal development or deficiency, in differing contexts. The two activities of advising and counseling are not to be assimilated or conceptually tied to each other save at a very minimal level. It is false that in order for one to be advised one must have been previously counseled. It is true that there are situations in which counseling could make it possible ultimately for some people to be advised. In some situations counseling goes before advising.

I shall now consider the concept of recommending. Advising and recommending are closely related concepts. In many contexts in which "advise" is used, "recommend" could be substituted without change of meaning; and conversely. But the two concepts are not equivalent as we may see from examining the following locutions: recommending . . . ; recommending that . . . ; recommending to . . . ; and recommending for Examples of these are: (i) "I recommend your (his, their) seeing the president at your (his, their) earliest convenience"; (ii) "I recommend that you (she, they) seek the presidency"; (iii) "I recommend you (him, them) to the president"; (iv) "I recommend you (him) for the presidency." Not all these locutions have exact parallels with our advising locutions discussed in Chapter I, Section 2.1. For example, "I recommend you for the presidency" has no opposite number on the advising side. We do not say "I advise you for the presidency." Admittedly there is a third person use of "advising" as instanced by someone asking why you advised him to do such and such and your replying

"I advised him for perfectly good reasons"--though this utterance normally has a hollow ring to it. But in making such a reply you are not thereby advising someone whereas in saying "I recommend you for the presidency" you are recommending. So there is a clear performative use for "I recommend you for . . ." but not for "I advise you for"

A second difference between advising and recommending is that the former but not the latter has a non-evaluative use. I have referred to this use of the concept advising as the apprising of fact-stating use; and the locution which is suited for this particular use of the concept is the "advising that . . ." locution. Suppose the President is traveling abroad and he says to his foreign host "I advise (you) that the United States is now on year-round daylight saving time." In saying this the President is reporting a fact or apprising his host of the situation in his own country with respect to matters of energy conservation. Now it is interesting to note that there is no corresponding apprising use of the concept recommending. "Advising that . . ." and "recommending that . . ." do not square with each other. The President could not say to his host "I recommend that the United States is now on year-round daylight saving time" for this utterance would have no meaning. To be sure the President could say something like this to his host, "I recommend that you go on daylight saving time too" but such an utterance is non fact-stating. In it the President is urging his host to adopt a daylight saving time policy for his (the host's) country. The difference here between advising and recommending may be expressed as follows. The "advising that" use of the concept advising picks out an apprising function while the "recommending that"

use of the concept recommending picks out an appraising function of that concept. In other words, and appearances to the contrary, the utterance "I recommend that you do such and such" is an appropriate replacement for "I advise you to do such and such" but not a replacement for "I advise you that such and such is the case." This last utterance has no counter-part or opposite number (as it were) on the recommending side. So "recommending that" is at home with "advising to" whereas "advising that" on the one hand and "recommending for" on the other are each in their own right without respective counter-parts. Moreover "recommending to" is by no means a parallel for "advising to." I could not replace "I recommend you to the president" with "I advise you to the president." The latter is grammatically awkward if not unsound and it may be so for this reason: the use of "recommending to" is not aimed at the addressee's action whereas the use of "advising to" is so aimed. When I say "I recommend you to the President" I am placing the onus of acting on the President who in this example is the "third" person and not on you, the addressee; but in saying "I advise you to . . ." I place the onus for action on you directly, and not on any third person. Often there is an element of "indirection" in respect of action when "recommending to" is used which is not present when "advising to" is used.

In summary then our list of recommending locutions does not mirror the list of advising locutions very closely. Further we have seen that for every use to which the concept recommending is put there is an evaluative or judgmental dimension conceptually tied to it, whereas with the concept of advising this is not the case with all its

uses. It does not follow however that because of this common evaluative element found in the uses of "recommending" that each of (i) to (iv) above has the same meaning. My recommending you for the presidency (iv) is not the same as my recommending that you seek the presidency (ii); nor is my recommending you to the president (iii) the same as my recommending your seeing him (i). Each of these differs in meaning but there is a judgmental aspect tied to them all, namely a judgment that certain things are worth doing over certain other things. Thus in uttering any of (i) to (iv) I am taken to have good reasons for doing the things I recommend doing and against doing something else. In none of these cases am I stating that something is or will be the case. Instead I am saying what I take to be desirable moves for either you or someone else [in the case of (iii) and possibly (iv)] to make. Needless to say it is this element of appraising which runs through the use of "recommend" that makes it a suitable substitute for "advise" when the latter is used in its "advising to" form, not however, when it is used in its "advising that" form.

CHAPTER III

ADVISING AND REASONS

In the course of the previous chapter a number of references were made to the connection between advising and having reasons for the advice one gives. In the first section of this present chapter I propose to explore more fully the nature of this connection. This will be a conceptual discussion essentially, and will not deal with the more substantive matters such as the particular kinds of reasons that stand behind pieces of advice or what would count as a good reason for advising one to do thus and so. These latter issues, complex as they are, will be the primary focus of the second section of this chapter. The third section will deal briefly with the subject of reasoning in advising.

3.1 The Connection Between Advising¹ and Having Reasons

We might begin by noting that many of the examples of advising used in the first two chapters make either an explicit or implicit reference to reasons. In the first example of Chapter I, for instance, Powys advises Hopkins to read certain authors and avoid others which are not quite first rate because the former "will have a lasting influence on (one's) work and lift it out of any provincial limitations."

¹I am thinking here of the "advising to" or "action" use of the concept rather than the "advising that" use.

And later on in the correspondence between these two men Powys advises Hopkins "to go to the sea every day" because "we are all in danger of being trapped by our environments" from which one can escape if "you every day meditate even for a moment on the beauty and mystery of the sea The smell of it, the sound of it, the sight of it should enable you to forget . . . all the modern vulgarities and realize that you are looking at what Homer looked at and all the long line of great poets."² In Example Three of the first chapter the reader is given as a reason for being advised to stop smoking that "tobacco is a vile and offensive weed" that "seriously injures the health." A teenager whose parents are divorcing, much to her chagrin, is advised by her columnist "not to take sides," precisely because she cannot possibly know all the sides to the matter--the relationship between husband and wife being far more "complex than the love between parents and children."³ Hilaire Belloc advises a young man to marry a woman "who is a widow, childless and possessed of sufficient means" and of good judgment and temper because "she will understand men, she will not be too impatient of your selfishness and folly, and you will be compelled to respect her."⁴ These examples of advising (and many more could be brought forward) suggest that advising utterances typically are followed by reason-giving clauses denoted by such words as "because" or "since," "for," "lest," etc. Thus it seems to be in order to say that "I advise you to do X" is,

²Blackmore, p. 89.

³Abigail Wood, "Split Parent Blues," Seventeen, July, 1968.

⁴Hilaire Belloc, "Advice to a Young Man," A Conversation with a Cat (and Others) (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), p. 172.

in a sense, incomplete until a reason for advising one to do X is given. The completed vision would then be "I advise you to do X because Y"--Y being a reason for X, the advice, or more precisely, Y being a reason for your doing X. The question I wish to raise is whether having a reason-giving clause is a logical requirement of advising someone to do something. Is it the case, logically speaking, that whenever anyone sincerely says "I advise you to do . . ." (or words to that effect) one is thereby committed to adding a "because" or "reason-giving" clause to the advice-giving statement? Is it possible (i.e., conceivable) that one could be said to give advice to another but not have a reason at all for the advice he gives that other? Would this make sense? Would we call it advising? Suppose someone said to you "I advise you to do it but I don't know why you should." Would you be able to make sense out of what this person said to you? Would you say that you had been advised?

In order to answer these sorts of questions definitively--question which, at bottom, call for a specifying of the relationship between the concept of advising and that of having reasons--let us, following a suggestion of Thomas F. Green⁵ respecting procedure in conceptual analysis, focus on the relationship between two statements rather than two concepts. Suppose the two statements, one about the giving of advice, the other about the advisee's having reasons are as follows (and represented by p and q respectively): "X advises Y to do Z" (p) and "X has reasons for advising Y to do Z" (q). Our question

⁵Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), Chapter V, especially pp. 106-117.

then is this: what is the nature of the connection or relation between 'p' and 'q'?

We know that a conditional, e.g., $p \rightarrow q$, asserts a relation between two statements (like p and q) such that the truth of the consequent q is a necessary condition for the truth of the antecedent p, and the truth of the antecedent p is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent q. In the present example, if the conditional $p \rightarrow q$ is valid it will be possible to say both that a necessary condition for X advising Y to do Z is that X have reasons for his advice and further that knowing X has advised Y to do Z will be a sufficient condition for concluding X had reasons for advising Y to do Z. We could then say that the statement about advising (represented by p) necessarily implies the statement about having reasons (represented by q). How do we test for this relation of necessary implication? We could try to show either that denying q while asserting p yields a self-contradiction or that by denying q we are thereby committed also to denying p. Since these are equivalent tests either will do the job for us. In terms of the present example the tests are as follows: if denying that X has reasons for advising Y to do Z while still asserting that X advises Y to do Z yields a contradiction or if denying that X has reasons for advising Y to do Z also commits us to denying that X advises Y to do Z then "X advises Y to do Z" logically implies "X has reasons for advising Y to do Z." But if these tests fail--if for example denying q while asserting p is not contradictory we will know that the relation between p and q is at least not one of necessary implication. Our procedure here is to try to imagine or conceive of cases where the conditions I

have just specified do not hold--cases where we could still say (meaningfully) that someone is advising another person even though the former has no reasons to give for his advice. Failure to come up with such examples, however, would show both that a necessary condition of advising someone to do something is that one have (or can indicate) reasons and that knowing one has advised someone to do something will be sufficient to conclude he has (or knows of) reasons.

Suppose you visit your doctor for your annual physical examination and that at the end of it he says to you "I advise you to slow down and take things easier." Suppose that you have been feeling fit, that you take yourself to be in a healthy condition and that, somewhat astonished, you ask him "Why do you say this?" His reply let us say, is "Never mind, just do as I say!" Now this reply could be interpreted in a number of different ways. First, it could be that your doctor is confused about the linguistic act he is performing. He could in fact have found some rather disturbing symptoms (in spite of your feeling fit) and, determined that you take better care of yourself, he might have thought that he was, qua your doctor, ordering you to take life easier though he somehow got the word "advise" into his utterance. That is, he could have mis-used the word "advise" (unknowingly) all the while thinking he was giving you an instruction to follow, and that by so doing he was not logically committed to give you reasons for his order--hence his reply "Never mind, just do as I say!" But if all of this is true then this present case should not be coming up for examination here as a possible counter-example testing for logical implication between statements like p and q since the case is clearly not one of advising at all but one of giving orders.

A second possible interpretation is that by his initial reply to you the doctor meant to say that while there are reasons for his advising as he did, he believes that it would be unwise to disclose his reasons to you at this time. So he has reasons for saying "I advise you to . . ." but he declines from saying what they are. We might think this a tactical error on his part or that in this case he is not being a particularly good adviser but the fact that he says he has reasons coupled with the position he occupies is normally sufficient to remove our puzzle about his initial reply to your question. It seems that his "Never mind, just do as I say" thus interpreted is not inconsistent with our description of him as advising you. An adviser's failure to disclose reasons for his advice is not sufficient to deny that he was advising--though, as I have indicated, it may suggest that he is not a particularly good adviser. But that is a rather different point.

Neither of these two interpretations of your doctor's reply has provided us with the counter-example we need in order to show that 'p' does not logically imply 'q.' We might now attempt a third interpretation in search of our counter-example. Suppose that by his reply your doctor means "Oh, I have (there are) no reasons, I just advise you to slow down and take things easier," or to put his meaning slightly differently, "I can't imagine why I said 'I advise you to slow down . . .' but I stand by it in any case." Now you would be cheated by this response and you would also be confused by it. You would be cheated because as we use those expressions by which we advise another person to do one thing rather than another it is always appropriate to ask of

the user why he said what he said. You would never be thought to be raising an odd or pointless question nor would you ever be taken to be "out of order" in asking "What reason has he for advising me to do this rather than that?" When, as in the present example, there is a confession on the part of the adviser that he has (there are) no reasons you wonder what he could possibly mean. In the absence of some explanation (as for instance the one given a moment ago in which it is suggested your doctor may have meant to give you an order rather than advice) you do not think that he has advised you at all. Your confusion or puzzlement arises from the inconsistency in the idea that your doctor utters "I advise you to . . ." without being able to say why (for what reason) you are advised to take things easier. If all he can say is that there are no reasons for advising you to take things easier then clearly it is the case you should not take things easier unless, of course, you want to. So his utterance "I advise you to . . . but there is no reason why you should" reduces to "you should take things easier but you also should not." In terms of our earlier designations 'p' and 'q' we can say that the conjunction of p (your doctor advises you to . . .) and not q (your doctor does not have reasons for advising you to . . .) is self-contradictory. Thus "X advises Y to do Z" does seem to entail "X has or can show reasons for advising Y to do Z" and thence "having or showing reasons," we can say, is logically tied to the notion of advising. So at least part of what is meant by "advising someone to . . ." is that one as adviser has reasons for so advising. There cannot be any advising in the "advising to" sense without there being reasons for the advice. An adviser's having or showing reasons

is a necessary condition for his advising and his having advised someone to do something is a sufficient condition for saying there are reasons: otherwise his use of "advise" is unintelligible.

Let us return to the question I posed near the outset of this section. I asked whether in sincerely saying to someone "I advise you to do such and such" I am logically committed to adding a "because" or "reason-giving" clause to my advising utterance. Would it make sense to say I can use "I advise you to do . . ." without also having to use "because . . ." ? Evidently the answer here is "yes" insofar as the structure of the performative ("I advise you to . . .") itself is concerned. There is nothing in that which would entail a further utterance of the kind "because so and so." For, "I advise you to . . ." is a complete linguistic unit as it stands. But in using it to advise someone to do something I am opening the way for the use of a "reason-giving" clause. This is a consequence of the claim (made in this section) that advising someone to do something necessarily implies the existence of reasons for the advice. So the requirements for the use of the concept advising supervenes on the requirements for the use of the performative "I advise you to" Though I need not follow the utterance "I advise you to . . ." with a "because" clause it must be the case that I could do so (if called upon) or that someone else could do so for me. Thus to use "I advise you to . . ." I must know there are reasons for the advice I give you even though I myself may not be able to say specifically what they are. I may have to refer my advisee to someone else who can say what the reasons are. If I give advice there must be someone who can say what the reasons are even if I cannot.

Advising then is by no means an arbitrary or free-floating activity. It is grounded in the notion of the adviser's having reasons. This, I take it, is what gives "force" to the notion of advising--the force deriving from the fact that there are reasons for a person advising you to do one thing rather than another. An advised course of action we can say, has the backing of reasons. It is a considered course of action--one reached by deliberation on the part of the adviser. Moreover the force of reasons is one of the features which picks advising out from other activities like commanding or pleading with someone to do one thing rather than another where reasons are not typically appealed to.⁶ Also in Chapter I (towards the end) where I drew a distinction between the two central uses of the concept advising, namely the "advising to" use and the "advising that" use I said that sometimes the "advising that" use of the concept may precede and be preparatory for the "advising to" use. We may not provide additional meaning to this claim. Recalling that the "advising that" use of the concept is one of apprising someone of the facts (as it were), then a sense in which "advising that" is preparatory for "advising to" is the sense in which having information about such and such a matter may count as a reason for advising someone to do one thing rather than another. It is perfectly in order to say that as an adviser I first apprise myself of a certain situation and then secondly, use the information I obtain as a reason for giving you a certain piece of advice. In other words I may be said to advise myself that such and such is the case in order to have a reason for advising you to do this

⁶See Chapter II, Section 2.3.

rather than that. So we see that the "advising that" use of the concept of advising can have an important role to play in conjunction with the "advising to" use of the concept.

3.2 Reasons in Advising

When I advise you to do such and such I logically imply that I have (there are) reasons for my advice. Turning this claim around it seems to follow that when you ask me for advice about what to do in some situation, you are asking me, in part at least, for reasons why you should do one thing rather than some other thing. So in asking for advice one is asking basically for two things: (a) what to do, and (b) why do this rather than that. As we just saw in the first section to answer (a) but not (b) is to fall short of advising someone. This is a logical point about advising and of itself does not help us specify the kinds of reasons that one would give in responding to (b). All it claims is that in advising someone to do something reasons must be given. But in what do these reasons consist? To what does or would one appeal, given consideration to, in reaching a piece of advice? Are there any general sorts of considerations that we could identify quite irrespective of the particular kind of advice being given?

Let us try to approach these matters through an analysis of the situations in which the giving of advice to another person normally arises. A common situation, and one alluded to in the foregoing paragraph, is one in which advice is sought or asked for by a person who is uncertain, puzzled or confused about what course of action he or she should follow. Unlike a command or order, a piece of advice is something for which one asks. A second situation is that in which a person

by virtue of the office he holds is vested with authority to give advice to others who stand in a specifiable relation to the office-holder even though (or even when) his advice is not sought by those persons.

Examples of this situation are: parents giving advice to sons and daughters though it is not sought; managers to their staffs; rulers to their subjects; and so on. The scope of the advice given by the office-holder is normally restricted by the nature of the office in question. Thus rulers are in a position to advise their subjects on matters of public concern that are deemed to affect national interest, not on private and personal matters. Managers may advise their staffs on matters relating to the running and conduct of a business but not on matters outside and beyond. A third situation evidently is that in which one gives advice to another even though the former is not in a position to offer it and even though the latter does not seek it. This advice is at once both unsolicited and volunteered by persons not in the relevant position. As such it is commonly ill-considered and thus not well received or unwanted; and unwanted advice, almost as a matter of definition, is unheeded advice.

I shall assume that the main genuine situations in which advice-giving can arise are those of the first two kinds typified respectively in this study by the two lead-off examples in Chapter I, namely the case of Hopkins seeking advice from the poet Powys on what one should do to become a poet and Lord Chesterfield offering unsolicited advice to his son respecting conduct appropriate for a young gentleman. In the discussion that follows on the kinds of considerations in light of which pieces of advice are given, I shall concentrate primarily on

advising situations of the first kind noted above rather than the second. There are a number of reasons for this. Generally, cases of advising that arise in the first type of situation are somewhat more specific and concrete and hence a little easier to get hold of.

Secondly, the same sorts of reasons for the giving of a piece of advice to another will apply in a general way to both situations as will the general logical and other conditions. For instance, advisers in the first situation as well as the second must be in the appropriate position to offer advice though what counts as appropriate for the former situation will not so count in the latter. As we shall see in the next chapter, to be in a position to advise in the first situation involves, among other things, having the relevant knowledge, expertise and experience in some domain, not in holding an office. That is, it involves being an authority in some respect rather than being in authority as advisers in the second situation find themselves. Thirdly, and in anticipation of certain objections to our discussion of the teacher as a moral adviser (Chapter V) it will be more defensible to conceive of the teacher in a situation of the first kind rather than the second. A stronger case can be made for the teacher as moral adviser if we consider him (her) as one whose moral advice is sought by a student rather than as one whose unsolicited moral advice is given as a matter of duty or as part of one's role qua teacher. It is better (in this case at any rate) to give moral advice when asked and to give it in virtue of one's understanding and experience than to give it when not asked and in virtue of one's position of authority.

Now to say that the giving of advice to another arises from situations in which one is confused, puzzled or doubtful about what to do and who thence seeks advice is not saying as much as one might think. For being confused (etc.) about what to do in respect of some matter is by no means a sufficient condition for seeking advice. Asking for advice in such a situation could be the logically inappropriate thing for which to ask. A grade ten mathematics student, for instance, is confused about finding square roots of numbers. What he needs however, is instruction of some kind, not advice. He needs to be shown (taught) the procedure for finding square roots. Since this procedure is a fixed and precise one and one on which there is complete agreement there is no (logical) room here for seeking advice on the matter even though one is confused. For in asking for advice on what to do here, the student would, in his question, be presupposing that alternative ways are open to him but that one way among the many may be better or superior and thence the one to follow. This is the wrong domain in which to make those presuppositions and thus the wrong domain in which to seek advice. We speak of the method for finding square roots but not the method for becoming a poet, painter or puppeteer. It is the latter not the former domain, normally, where it would be appropriate to seek advice given one's puzzlement or confusion about how best to procede. I suppose what this really shows it that one's being confused, puzzled or doubtful about what to do in certain sorts of situations but not others constitutes a sufficient condition for seeking advice. Unless one had a doubt, puzzle or query of some sort it would not be conceivable that he would seek advice though his having a doubt per se

does not inevitably lead to advice-seeking. For if one's doubts, puzzles or confusions are about subjects that are themselves relatively precise, fixed and certain then advice is not what we would ask for.

We might note here that the doubt and confusion would be all on one side--the subjective side or the side of the agent. The external objective side of the situation would be settled as in the case of the method for finding square roots--a method which is beyond doubt or question and in light of which the teacher can be said to know what the student must do to solve his puzzle. But suppose the student is confused about a matter which itself is unsettled and imprecise--a situation which I believe John Dewey would call "indeterminate"--that is, one in which uncertainty exists on both sides, subjective and objective alike, and where ready-made and explicit answers about what to do are by no means forthcoming at least not immediately. Taking the indeterminacy out of situations requires on the part of some observer with the appropriate skills and temperament, a careful analysis consisting in part in the gathering of facts from both sides of the situation, objective and subjective, assigning relative weights to the facts so gathered and finally judging or deciding as to the best or most efficacious course of action for one to follow. Thus the "first situation" as I have been calling it in which it is appropriate to give advice--namely one in which another person seeks it--is to be characterized in the way I have just indicated, that is, as an indeterminate situation in which one with the relevant skills reaches considered judgments as to the best thing for another to do. To say that one seeks advice because one is uncertain, doubtful (etc.), about what to do is not quite enough. Additionally

there must be a certain imprecision on the objective side of the situation as well. It is into this context that problems of a "practical" nature fall.

Let us consider some typical cases of these: (a) there is the case of the person who is uncertain as to his goals, aims or main objectives in life--uncertain as to the sort of person he wants to be, the sort of life he wants to live. He does not know what direction his life should take or the special orientation he should give to it. He is unclear about what would constitute the best life for him or the life most satisfying and productive or the greatest well-being for him. Should he pursue a life of service to others, of cooperative endeavor, of power and influence, of selfish acquisitiveness or of isolation? How should he mold his life and indeed, what is possible for him given what he is now and his background? A second case, (b), is that of the person who has selected certain ideals or goals which he desires to pursue but which he cannot pursue simultaneously because incompatible. He would like to be a teacher, space engineer and company executive (or let us say he thinks he would like to hold these positions) though obviously it is not possible to follow all these courses together. He must therefore choose and his question is "Which one should I pursue" or "Which career would I have the greatest personal interest in?" A third case, (c), arises as follows: the person knows what he wants to do, be or have but is uncertain as to the procedure by which he can best realize the object of his wants. His question is: "How do you suggest I go about this?" or "What should I do to become (get, have, etc.) . . . ?" We need not, of course, restrict our examples to such grand and grave

issues as life styles, careers and so on. Under case (a) for instance we could consider the person who has a two-week holiday but does not know what he wants to do with it. Where should he holiday--that is, where should he go to enjoy himself most? Under case (c) we could have considered the person who knows what he wants, namely a new car, but is uncertain as to what kind of car he would most prefer. Obviously he wants one from which he can derive a good deal of pleasure and satisfaction; but which car would best do that for him?

We notice in these examples certain items to which reference is repeatedly made. The first of these is the wants, desires, or interests of the agents (advice-seekers) in question; and the second is the concern of the agents to follow courses of action that would bring about a desirable state of affairs for them--a state variously referred to as "satisfying," "pleasing," "of well-being," and so on. Suppose then that you are an adviser facing these sorts of questions. What would be suitable responses for one to make and what justification would you give for your responses? There are certain preliminary moves which are appropriate for one to make here. You would endeavor to familiarize yourself at least to some extent with the "subjective side" of the situation in which your advisee is placed. What for instance are some of his interests, his attitudes or dispositions? What are some of the experiences he has had; what abilities and capabilities does he seem to have? But it may be that you are not able to ascertain sufficient relevant information about the advisee to guide you in reaching a piece of advice. This may be so particularly with situations like that of case (a) above. It could be that your advisee does not

presently have any clear opinions, likes or dislikes; and that his experiences to date have been of a nebulous kind. Your advice would of necessity have a generality it might otherwise not have. You recommend his doing certain things on the basis that his doing so might lead to his discovery of what it is he most wants to do with his life. Thus you might say: "I advise you to read these novels and those biographies and to reflect somewhat on what you find in them. I also advise you to visit parts of the country or the continent where you have not been and where you may expose yourself to life styles, customs and ideas that differ from your own. It might also be advisable for you to enroll in a general undergraduate program where you may initiate yourself into a variety of forms of thoughts from the sciences through to the humanities." Assuming that your advisee can do these things--that he can read and has the ability to reflect on what he reads and that he has the means whereby he may travel and/or enroll in a university or community college, then we could say that the over-riding consideration in giving this kind of advice is that the exposure of the person to a variety of situations and experiences seems to be the best means (if followed) of helping him to see where his main interests lie and thus what it is he might very well want to do with his life. The fact that exposure to a wide range of situations is on the whole more likely to generate these results than is exposure to one situation or a narrow range of situations is a good reason for advising this person to read, travel, and take some course work, other things considered. In sum, the three general considerations that lead to your piece of advice are: the facts that (i) your advisee wanted some direction and ultimately

wanted to solve his puzzle about what to do, (ii) he had certain capabilities or capacities, and (iii) the projected consequences of following one course of action over some other seemed likely to be more efficacious than the possible available alternatives at hand. The first two considerations clearly are related to the subjective (advisee) side whereas the third picks out certain aspects of the external world (objective side) with which the agent may profitably interact, at least so far as we can tell.

Suppose that your advisee follows your recommendations either in part or in full and subsequently returns to report that he has now formulated much clearer notions about the sort of life he wants to lead. He has, let us say, expressed a strong interest in pursuing two life styles that are (however) incompatible or conflicting. This is case (b). After discussing the matter anew with him you might reply as follows: "Given what I now know about you--your heightened interests, your capabilities and temperament, I would advise you to pursue the goal of literary critic rather than that of company executive. To be sure you have an interest in the latter and you would doubtless make a contribution there, provide sound leadership, and withstand the inevitable pressures of business but it seems to me in light of what you have said and done recently that your real interests and capabilities lie with writing and working with the expressing of your ideas in the cultural field. I've noticed that you experience a good deal of personal satisfaction in your creative writing. You have a flair here and I think it would be more to your advantage, to your well-being in the long-run, to follow a course in which you can regularly give expression

to this creative side of your personality. You may end up not being as wealthy as you would otherwise be (and only you can decide how important that matter is to you) but you will be in a field where you can do what I think at bottom you really want to do and have the ability to do and which should therefore, be immensely satisfying to you."

Unlike the former piece of advice which was advice about certain means to some end this latter piece is about an end itself. While a good deal of the advice we give is commonly about the best means to take to obtain some desired end or goal it by no means follows that we cannot advise about the ends themselves as the present example seems to show. The general sorts of considerations apply to both pieces of advice. Indeed it does not seem reasonable that we could adequately advise as to the best or most appropriate means without, thereupon, taking into consideration the end desired; nor that we could advise as to the best end or goal for a person without at some point a consideration of the means to be taken. In the above example [case (b)] it was judged that one end or goal (i.e., one career or life-style) was "better" than another for the person in question--"better" in the sense that given the facts about the advisee (his interests and talents) and the facts about the possible ends or goals (being a critic vs. being an executive) that literary criticism afforded, on balance, the life of greater satisfaction or enrichment for this person than did the life of company executive. Your advisee's interests, talents and temperament along with the qualities and properties inherent in the activity of literary criticism provide a better "fit" or "mesh" than other possible

combinations of subjective and objective conditions. So far as we can tell your judgment (advice) respecting the most appropriate attainable goal for this person to pursue, correctly weighted the life of literary criticism over that of company executive.

To follow our theme here one step further, namely to case (c) let us suppose that the advisee does decide to be a literary critic and now seeks advice as to what he should do to realize this particular objective. This is the case (again) of Hopkins asking Powys what one should do to become a poet and of Golding Bright asking Bernard Shaw what one should do to become a drama critic (see Example Four, Chapter II). These questions [as those in case (a)] call for advice about the appropriate means to some desired end. That both Hopkins and Bright had the abilities and the temperament for literary work were good but not sufficient reasons for their being advised to follow certain courses of action but not others. Why in fact did Powys advise Hopkins to read the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad* (and other classic works but not those of Chesterton and Belloc for example) and to visit the sea daily? Why did Shaw advise Bright to get a ticket to the reading room in the British Museum and to haunt Sunday evening political meetings? These courses of action were seen by the advisers in question, respectively, to be appropriate, indeed essential to developing certain necessary literary skills, and thence to satisfying the desired objectives of the advisees. As Powys noted, one's literary work is lifted out of its provincial limitations by reading the classical works, not the lesser works; and one's self-awareness and awareness of one's environment is heightened by daily visits to the sea and reflecting thereupon.

The consequences of acting on the advice are such that the advisee would thus be in a position to do good literary work. Both Powys and Shaw evidently realized that interaction with certain aspects of the external world such as reading certain books, visiting the sea daily, attending small political meetings, etc., was an instrument in generating certain qualities in the person conducive to creative writing. As before it was a case of the adviser bringing together, in thought, sets of facts both about the subjective and the objective sides of the situation--about the interests, abilities and capabilities of the advisee on the one hand and properties inherent in certain external objects and activities on the other. Had Hopkins, like Robert Louis Stevenson, been an invalid and hence incapable of daily visits to the sea then this fact would count as a good reason against advising him doing these sorts of things.

The imprecision of the objective side here may be brought out as follows. Imagine Shaw, not Powys advising Hopkins. It by no means follows that Shaw's advice to Hopkins would be the same as Powys' advice. Powys thought it essential to visit the sea daily in order to heighten ones' self awareness; to read the classics in order to remove one's writing from provincial limitations. Shaw would doubtless agree with these objectives, i.e., with the value of removing one's writing from provincial limitations but whether, in order to achieve this, he would advise reading the classics is very much open to question. He might believe it to be more appropriate for one to read contemporary material or indeed to focus on the practice of writing. Thus it is conceivable that each would have attached differing weights to these

procedures while agreeing about the value of the objective at hand. In light of their own personal experiences, insights, and understanding of literature and the world, Shaw and Powys could very readily offer different pieces of advice to the same advisee respecting the most appropriate means to be taken to a worthwhile end. This, of course, is by no means detrimental to the notion of giving advice given the nature of "practical" domains; and it certainly (and rightly) underscores the role of the advisee as decision-maker in respect of the course of action he finally takes. That Shaw and Powys could offer different advice here also highlights the fact that if the conditional sentence is used to advise it needs to be construed as recommendatory-like rather than either command-like or as specifying the indispensable means to the end in question. The latter are (or can be) appropriately used to answer questions of a theoretical nature (e.g., "What shall I do to find the square root?" or "What shall I do to become a doctor?") whereas recommendatory-like conditional sentences are appropriately used to answer questions of a practical nature ("What shall I do to become a poet?"). Respecting the theoretical questions we reply in the conditional as follows: "If you want to be a doctor then you must attend and graduate from medical school"; whereas with the practical question we may reply "If you want to be a poet then I advise you to" In the first reply we use "must" and fill in the "then" clause with a specification as to the indispensably necessary means to the end desired. In the second reply we use "advise" and leave the "then" clause unspecified only to indicate that alternative means to the end in question are possible. The presupposition of the reply to

the theoretical question is that alternative courses of action as means are not open to the agent given the nature of the end; whereas the presupposition of the reply to the practical question is just the opposite of this. Theoretical questions cannot be satisfied (answered adequately) by practical replies. Thus practical words like "advise" or "should" must not feature in replies to theoretical questions precisely because of the presuppositions of these words. Conditional sentences that use "advise" etc. in the "then" clause are thus suited to giving answers to questions of a practical nature whereas conditional sentences that use "must" or the imperative, "do," in the "then" clause are not suited to reply to such questions. The one exception to this claim is that use of "advise" which simply conveys information to another. "What shall I do to become a doctor?" is thus responded to by "Be advised that attendance at and graduation from medical school is required" which is no more nor less than "In order to become a doctor attendance at and graduation from a medical school is required"--a fact to be reckoned with for certain people. To return to our main theme and to use a Kantian distinction here, if we choose to advise another person to do one thing rather than another by using the conditional (hypothetical imperative) we need to conceive of it not as an "imperative of skill" but as a "counsel of prudence." The former specifies the indispensably necessary means to some end; and the person who seriously desires the end is thereby committed to taking the means to it. But the counsels of prudence⁷ are "empirical counsels" of diet, economy,

⁷Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), p. 41.

courtesy, restraint, etc., which experience shows best promotes our welfare--though the task of "infallibly" determining what action will promote well-being is, according to Kant, "completely unsolvable." At any rate it is because in counsels of prudence wanting the end does not analytically imply wanting the means that advice about means is appropriate.

I turn now to draw together the various considerations which are seen to justify the giving of one piece of advice over some other piece. First, the fact that a person desires to do something (or to have some object or particular experience) or the fact that he would enjoy doing something (or having some object or experience) is normally considered to be a reason for recommending to that person a procedure for attaining the object of his desire or his enjoyment if he asks for advice. That he merely wishes to have some object, experience, or that some state of affairs come about, is not a good reason and indeed is not a reason at all. For wishes are fanciful things expressed without regard for what is empirically possible. I can wish that Paul Revere ride again or that green forests grow on the moon. The fact that the objects of my wishing are empirical impossibilities fails to make my wishing outrageous. Further, and because my wishing disregards the empirical possible, my wishing for something need not commit me to expending any effort and energy towards realizing the object of my wish. My wishing is thus not usually a moving or motivating force. To the extent that the objects of wishing are typically not possible to attain (empirically) then wishes do not count as reasons for advising someone to do what it is empirically possible for him to execute. A

person's wishes, that is to say, cannot be a constituent of a solution to a practical problem about what another person should do in some situation.

Desiring or wanting something on the other hand are more sober matters. It would be odd if I claimed sincerely (and persistently) to want something either for which no effort on my part is possible (or needed) or for which I was not prepared to expend some effort and energy to attain the object of my want. In the first alternative just mentioned my want is really just a wish; and in the second I am, in spite of my words to the contrary, simply not sincere in my wanting something. For I cannot with consistency seriously want to have or do something without at the same time being prepared or disposed to follow some course of action calculated to bring to fruition the object of my want. Wants (desires) have a "moving force" to them which wishes normally do not. This presupposes that the objects of wants normally are within the realm of empirical possibility. These two facts about wants, namely that their objects normally are possible to attain and that they signify a disposition on the part of the wanter to act, make wants and desires superior to wishes insofar as their counting as reasons for giving a piece of advice is concerned. Of course, impulses, it may be said, have a moving force to them too. But just as we distinguish between wants and wishes we need also distinguish between wants and impulses. For impulses typically move us without thought and attention being given to the consequences of our movements. You could not use impulses to explain why you did something. Indeed it is just in those cases where you cannot explain why you did

something that you would likely appeal to impulses. "I don't know what came over me. I just felt the urge to pull the trigger. Had I been able to reflect about what I felt urged to do at that moment I wouldn't have done it." Impulses are primitive biological drives or forces that require or stand in need of transformation by thought and reflection if they are to be channeled into more positive directions; or that may be controlled by thought and reflection if (and when) they would otherwise interfere with more efficacious courses of action. Impulses so transformed may actually be our wants and desires; but bare impulses are not. Wants are something that we can speak of casting off or rejecting but we do not speak this way about our impulses. We may use wants and desires to explain why we do things but we do not use impulses for this purpose. Impulses are "blind." We speak of objects of our wants but not of our impulses. Thus while wants can be reasons for acting (though not all such reasons are wants) it does not follow that impulses can be reasons for acting.

However, the fact that something is wanted, desired or prized is not of itself a sufficient reason for advising someone to have the object of his want or to advise him how he may obtain the object of his want. What we want or desire is not necessarily worth wanting or desiring. When one's wants and interests do not coincide with what is desirable for one to have or to get then it seems we have a reason against advising a person having or getting the object of his want. (if he asks for advice). But what sense do we make of terms like "desirable," "worth wanting (or having)" and so on. It is tautologous but perhaps not entirely uninformative to say that what is desirable

for one (what is worth wanting) is that which is in one's best interests or which promotes one's well-being over-all. But what then would count as "being in one's best interests?" We may state the negative case generally as follows. To the extent that having an object (i.e., a thing, experience, or being in a state of affairs) or undertaking some action either of which would be detrimental to one's physical, mental or emotional health, or which would bring prolonged suffering and pain to one, or which would collapse one's financial basis, destroy one's property or which would violate the laws of the land, then having the object or following the course of action would not be in one's best interests. Of course very few people would knowingly possess an object or follow a course of action either of which would have these rather dire consequences for him though sometimes courses of action are pursued in which the unintended consequences are of just such a magnitude. Thus if it could be shown to someone that what he wanted involved following a course of action the consequences of which would be of the kind just indicated; or if it could be shown to him that his having some object is likely to generate these sorts of results then what is wanted or possessed is not for him worth wanting or possessing. Wants, desires, interests are judged worthwhile or desirable for a person both in terms of the qualities or properties of the object and in terms of the costs (benefits) to one involved in getting the object in question. If the means whereby a "desired" object is to be got is excessively risky or dangerous, excessively time and energy consuming or if it involves the contravention of laws with a resultant imposition of penalties on the agent,

normally we would conclude that the object in question is not desirable for him. Though the object may be initially prized by the person it is not worth the risks involved in securing it and therefore it is not in his best interests to procure the object. We do, of course, subject ourselves to pain and suffering in the short term provided there is a good chance of a continuing improvement in conditions thereafter as, for example, undergoing surgery to sustain better health. Here the means is risky but the end (continued good health) more than outweighs the inconvenience of the moment--long-term interests taking precedence over short-term ones. On the other hand some means to ends are (or would be) themselves satisfying or enjoyable though the end, once attained, discomforting or painful (as in, for example the case of a person delighting in his plotting the death of his ruler versus the continuing remorse and guilt he feels once the act is accomplished).

In the health example there is a good reason for the agent subjecting himself to a painful and perhaps risky course of action. In the treason example there is a good reason against pursuing a course of action which the agent finds satisfying. These reasons would be that in the former case the qualities of the end sought outweigh the cost of the means and that in the latter the satisfaction of the means fails to outweigh the price of the end. In the former the want (good health) of the agent is worthwhile; in the latter, not--at least not for him.

I desire to pursue (let us say) a certain line of inquiry in my dissertation; my doctoral committee recommends pursuit of another line. It is in my best interests (worthwhile for me) to heed the committee's recommendations otherwise the completion of my work may well be prolonged

thereby imposing additional financial hardships on me and delaying the development of my own professional career. These facts count as good reasons for me to modify my proposal to meet the committee's approval even though I desire to pursue a different course with the study.

Judgments about what is desirable or worthwhile for one or about what is in one's interests are the result of complex evaluations about the object desired and the best means to be taken in the light of other possible alternatives. If the long-term costs of having a "prized" object (costs in terms of harmful consequences, etc.) outweigh the satisfactions to one in procuring it then one has a reason against pursuing it even though the pursuit itself is something in which one can take delight. On the other hand if the benefits of having some object outweigh the costs of getting it and if it could be shown with some good probability that the time, energy, and effort involved could not be better spent in pursuing some other interest one presently has, is likely to have or could have, then one has a good reason on balance for pursuing the present object. So far as one's deliberations show, taking account of the costs of the means, possible future desires and other present desires, the present object is deemed worth having. Thus from an advising point of view, the fact that a person wants something or has an interest in something which is also judged desirable or worthwhile for that person, an adviser has good reasons for recommending the agent's getting the object in question--provided of course the adviser is in a position to make the sorts of calculations or good estimates involved (i.e., has the requisite abilities for advising as discussed in the next chapter, Section 4.2) and is asked by another for

advice. These reasons are the facts that what is wanted, if pursued by the advisee on the recommendation of the adviser, would result in the well-being of the advisee being extended rather than impaired (so far as it is possible to tell). Alternatively, when the advisee's wants do not coincide with what is judged or deemed to be worthwhile for him--when the object of his desires or the pursuit of it would be detrimental to his well-being (so far as one can tell)--the adviser has a good and perhaps over-riding reason against recommending a course of action calculated to bring to fruition the object of the advisee's desires, and a good reason for advising the pursuit of a different objective. Although your advisee wants A you may (in some cases) justifiably advise him against A. Your justification as before is based on your best assessment or evaluation both of the prized object and the costs to the person in attaining it in the light of his other possible wants and the costs (benefits) of attaining those, etc. With these things accounted for (at least in some way) you judge that either his pursuing his present desire would leave him worse off than before or that if not worse off there are other interests he has which if pursued would likely leave him better off overall than would the pursuit of the present interest. You advise accordingly.

A further consideration or reason (along with the foregoing) for giving one piece of advice rather than some other is the fact of whether or not it is possible for the advisee to follow the advice offered him if he chooses to do so. There are a number of senses of "possibility" that we need to distinguish here. It should, first of all, be legally possible for your advisee to act on the recommendation

you give him. By this I mean it should be possible for him to follow your advice without violating the duly constituted legal laws in so doing. Since it is normally the case that a person's violating such a law is not in his best interests then in the fact that your advice is such that your advisee is able to act on it without contravening the laws you have a further good reason for that piece of advice; otherwise you would have a good reason for advising differently. Secondly, actions which are legally possible are also, of necessity, empirically possible as are legally impossible acts. But in the category of "empirically possible and impossible acts" we require two further distinctions. There are some actions that are empirically impossible for anyone to perform and some that are empirically impossible for only some to perform. Under the former head we place those actions which are impossible to perform because they would contravene a physical law of nature, examples of which would be jumping 100 feet into the air unaided or running the 100 yards in three seconds. But whereas no one can jump 100 feet into the air some can jump six feet and others not. So under the second head (above) we place those actions which are not in principle impossible for anyone to perform but because of certain deficiencies or incapacabilities some persons cannot perform. Those who are unable to jump six feet in the air differ from those who can in that the former lack physical strength or body coordination (or both)--though they may in due course develop these capabilities. This is why actions for one that are empirically impossible in the second sense of "empirical impossibility" are not necessarily always so, as

they are in the first sense of "empirical impossibility." We can usually do something about the deficiencies, inabilities or incapacities that make an action impossible for one to perform (second sense) but not the first, barring, of course, radical changes in the structure of the universe itself. That it would be empirically impossible (first sense) for your advisee to act on the advice you give obviously counts as a good reason against that advice. This is why (as we saw earlier) that wishes as distinct from wants do not normally feature in the considerations from which a piece of advice arises. That it would be empirically impossible (second sense) for your advisee to act on the advice you are about to give him also counts as a good reason against that advice. We need not continue to think here only of physical inabilities or incapacities. Persons with mental or emotional disturbances are not capable in many situations of acting on advice. So incapacities in these other ways would also count as good reasons against giving at least certain pieces of advice. To put these matters positively, in general we would say that a good though not sufficient reason for advising a person to do one thing rather than another is that the action so prescribed is empirically possible for that person in both the above senses: (i) the action would not involve counter-instances to the laws of nature, and (ii) the advisee has the capabilities and capacities for undertaking the course prescribed if he decides to do so.

I have, I believe, identified three general considerations used to justify the giving of one piece of advice rather than another to a person: (a) the wants or interests of the advisee, (b) the desirability

of these wants or interests for the advisee, and (c) the relevant abilities and capacities of the advisee. These considerations are to be seen in the light of the general purpose or function of advising another person. That purpose is to assist the advisee in making a choice in solving a practical problem. This assistance takes the form of the adviser's best judgment as to the most desirable or worthwhile objective, over other possible ends, for an advisee; or the adviser's best judgment about the most efficacious means to follow in attaining an end desired by an advisee. So construed, advising typically is aimed at helping another promote or improve that other's personal situation. Thus we might say that advising is characteristically though not necessarily a prudential activity. When an adviser says to another person "You should do such and such (to enhance best your own position or interests) the "should" is essentially prudential or self-regarding rather than others-regarding. It presupposes there are good (prudential) reasons for your doing such and such--that your following the advice in question will, as far as one can tell, be to your own personal advantage over-all. The gain will be your gain, not someone else's.

In the next chapter I argue that advising is also a moral activity in the minimal sense of "moral" there specified. We have then the paradoxical-looking proposition that advising is at once both a prudential and a moral activity. The appearance of paradox is in part removed by recalling that advising is bi-polar. It can be viewed from two positions, namely that of the adviser and that of the advisee. From the advisee side of the activity we say that advising is

typically a prudential activity since it is the advisee who personally stands to gain. The exception here will doubtless be the advisee's acting on moral advice. From the adviser side of the activity advising is essentially a moral enterprise for reasons to be offered in Section 4.1. At this point we might hazard to say that while the adviser is a moral agent even in the giving of prudential advice since it is his job to discount his own personal interests or at least not subject them to gain in recommending a course of action to another, the advisee on the other hand (qua advisee) is not a moral agent except possibly where acting on moral advice is concerned. To the extent that a person is unwilling or not inclined to put other people's interests before his own at least on some occasions or in some situations it does not seem possible that such a person could be in a position to give prudential or moral advice nor himself to receive moral advice, though evidently such a person could still receive prudential advice. I shall have more to say on these matters in the chapters that follow.

3.3 Reasoning in Advising

A certain amount has already been said on this subject over the course of the preceding section. It will be helpful however to think, at least briefly, in terms of formalizing somewhat our approach to reasoning in advising to the extent we can and to envisage "arguments" in terms of which "conclusions" about advice can be drawn. In doing this we may expect to show the "steps" leading to a conclusion and to clarify the matter of the "connection" between the steps and the conclusion. Needless to say, this is not an attempt to show how advisers actually reach the advice they give for that would necessitate an

empirical psychological study. I am not trying to describe how individual advisers think but rather to indicate the form or structure of a practical argument in an advising context.

The main constituents of such an argument would be (a) the premises and (b) the conclusion. The premises would consist of the kinds of considerations examined in the last section, to wit, statements of the advisee's desires and interests; the desirability of these objects for the advisee; and the advisee's capacities and capabilities. The conclusion would consist of what the person is to be advised to do, incorporating, of course, typical advising language. Now we have seen that advice-seeking typically arises from problematic situations in which the advisee is puzzled, confused or uncertain about what to do, either because he does not know clearly what he most wants to do, or because he has a number of objectives he desires to pursue, some or all of which conflict, or because he does not know how best to attain what he most desires to do (be or have). Wants (desires) are the basis of prudential problematic situations in terms of which advice is sought and they also form the basis on which desirability statements about the worthwhileness of the objects wanted are constructed. The first, or if we wish, major premise in the practical argument will thus be a desirability statement about what action or object is deemed to be in the best interests of the advisee (agent) given his particular situation. Of course, there may be a number of actions or objects open to the agent and related to his situation which in varying degrees are desirable for him in some respects but not others. So the desirability statement in question may of necessity be a comparative statement of an

object's or action's worthwhileness for the advisee. The second premise will consist of a statement(s) indicating the most efficacious means to the object or action in question (taking due account, of course, of the possible effects of other means open to the agent including the likely effects of following the present designated course on the possible future wants of the advisee and their worthwhileness for him). The third premise will consist of a statement(s) about the present capacities and capabilities of the agent (advisee) particularly with respect to his being able or unable to follow the course (means) specified in the foregoing premise.

Now this is rather cumbersome so let us simplify matters somewhat by taking three statements, each representative of one of the above three premises and cast them into the following argument form:

1. A is desirable for X to have (do or be).
2. X's doing B will most appropriately enable X to have (do or be) A.
3. X can do B.
4. Therefore X is (best) advised to do B.

As a practical argument this sets forth what should be said to X regarding the best available means for him to take to some end. It is clear that no one of the premises alone is sufficient to get the conclusion (4). From the fact that X can do B it does not follow that he is thereby advised to do B. Nor from the fact alone that A is desirable for X does it follow that he is to be advised to procure A. On the other hand it is also the case that if any one of (1) to (3) is violated though the remaining two are not then (4) is pointless. If, for example, A is desirable for X and A may be procured by doing B but X is not capable of doing B, then (4) is unwarranted. Thus in this

case the violation of (3) alone is sufficient for withholding (4). In sum, (1) to (3) are necessary for (4). But taken together can we also say that (1) to (3) are sufficient for (4) in either a logical or contingent sense of "sufficient." The logical sense of "sufficient" would commit us to the claim that a meaning connection between the premises and conclusion obtains such that (4), the conclusion, could be said to be entailed by the conjunction of (1) to (3). This will not do for a number of reasons. First it would be impossible (self-contradictory) ever to assert the premises but deny the conclusion. Yet in practical reasoning this is precisely what must be possible. For even though, in a given situation, (1) to (3) are asserted it could be that other considerations call for the denial of (4) as for example in the case of a moral concern over the effects of X's action, (B), on the interests or well being of other persons in his community. If the effects of his doing B would interfere with others in the pursuits of their own interests or objectives then in that fact we would have a superior or over-riding obligation to negate (4) despite the fact that X's doing B is in his own interests. In practical prudential reasoning it does not follow that moral considerations do not figure.

A second reason why (4) is not entailed by the conjunction of (1) to (3) is that entailment relations obtain necessarily between statements and, strictly speaking, (4) is not a statement. Rather (4) is a performance--not the advisee's action as one might think but the verbal utterance (speech act) of the adviser. Recalling the work of Chapter I, a performative utterance need not always be expressed in the first person present indicative active of the verb, in this case,

"advise." In some cases [as in (4) of the present example] the use of the third person in conjunction with the verb in the passive voice is sufficient for a performative utterance.⁸ Though (4) is somewhat formal-sounding it nonetheless advises. Writing (4) is thereby advising. Thus (4) does not state anything is the case; it performs. Entailment relations do not hold between statements on the one hand and performances (verbal or otherwise) on the other hand. It is therefore misleading to speak of (4) as a judgment. It would be more accurate to say that (4) implies (loosely) certain judgments, namely those couched in the statements (premises) in (1) to (3). By using "implies" in a weaker sense than "entails" we preserve the possibility of rebutting (4) without committing a logical error. A specification of the precise strength of "implies" would take us into deep philosophical waters which I do not intend to chart. Let it suffice to say that I believe Kurt Baier's treatment of "presumptive implication"⁹ seems to come closest to specifying the connection between (1) to (3) and (4) in practical reasoning. To put these matters slightly differently we cannot derive with certainty or show conclusively that (4) follows

⁸ Austin, How to do Things with Words, p. 57.

⁹ Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (A Rational Basis of Ethics) (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 102. "A given presumption is rebutted if some other reason or combination of reasons is found weightier than the one which has given rise to the original presumption. In other words, the fact that I have a reason for or against entering on the proposed line of action does not entail that I ought or ought not to enter on it--it merely 'presumptively implies' it. That is to say, it must be taken to imply that I ought or ought not enter on it unless later on, in the weighting of considerations, I find some that are weightier than this one. In that case, the original presumptive implication has been rebutted."

from the conjunction of (1) to (3). "One can never demonstrate a practical conclusion unless one can predict with full certainty, all of the consequences of all of the actions open to the agent (in our case, advisee), and specify the agent's entire basis of action, his wants present and future, and the relative desirability of their objects. The sphere of the practical is necessarily the sphere of the uncertain; this is the condition of significant action."¹⁰ At least the sphere of the practical is uncertain given the present development of our knowledge and predictive powers. Whether the sphere of the practical will always be the sphere of the uncertain is a nice question. But at the moment it is simply not humanly possible to make the kinds of precise and detailed calculations that would be required for demonstrating (4). To try to examine every aspect of a situation and weigh every reason (etc.) is to attempt the impossible. We might, of course, as Gauthier suggests attain demonstrability of a conclusion like (4) if "stringent conditions are laid down for the relevance of reasons, if the possible actions are fully determinable (and), if their effects are equally determinable"¹¹ But this he correctly concedes is an artificial restriction of the context of the practical problem. As an answer to a practical question like "What should he do?" (4), while a performance, is action-guiding rather than action-determining. Further the "inference" from the premises to (4) cannot be said to establish the truth of (4). Of course, since (4) is performative it evidently cannot have

¹⁰David P. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (The Structure and Foundations of Prudential and Moral Arguments and Their Exemplification in Discourse) (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 48-49.

¹¹Ibid., p. 48.

a truth value in any case. This claim is substantiated by the fact that at least one of the premises, principally (1) is not a statement of what really is desirable for an advisee but only what seems to be desirable for the advisee to the judging mind of the adviser. Thus we could not say that (1) is true or false.

To complete our discussion in this section let us refer briefly to the second major question posed a few moments ago about the premises (taken together) constituting a sufficient contingent condition for conclusion (4). To say that the premises (1) to (3) are sufficient in the sense is to assert a causal connection between the premises and the conclusion. But this interpretation is mistaken. Even though A is desirable for X and X can do B (in order to get A) it does not follow that one is thereby caused to advise X to do such and such. Conditions (1) to (3) do not psychologically induce or otherwise force or constrain one to say or write "X is best advised to do B." What this means is that (1) to (3) are not motives for one's performance of (4), but reasons. It is true, of course, that motives can also be reasons for doing or saying something to another but false that all reasons are thus motives. We have in the argument form on p. 135 reasons not causes for (4). The justification for (4) is the set of reasons given in (1) to (3). We cannot say that (1) to (3) fully justify (4) because, as noted earlier, it is not possible to say that all of (1) to (3) are complete given the complexities of the calculations involved. Thus (4) is at best, reasonably well justified. The advice, we would say, is sound; and that is the best we can say under the circumstances.

CHAPTER IV

ADVISERS AND ADVISEES

This chapter, as the title suggests, is primarily about advisers and advisees and in particular about the sorts of conditions which one would have to satisfy if one were to be an adviser or if he were to be an advisee. My principal objectives are to answer two questions:

(a) "Who can advise?" i.e., "What requirements have to be met before one can be in a position to advise?" and (b) "Who can be an advisee?" i.e., "What requirements have to be met before one can be in a position to receive and consider advice?" By "requirements" I mean such things as cognitive abilities, levels of emotional development, knowledge and understanding. The requirements will not necessarily be the same for both advisers and advisees and towards the end of the chapter I shall indicate certain differences between the requirements for each group. I shall also indicate how and why it is possible that some persons fail to satisfy the requirements in question and thus how it is that not just anyone can advise or be advised.

Since almost all the requirements I treat in this chapter may be seen to "fall out," logically speaking, from our analysis of advising in the preceding chapters, i.e., may be seen as logical consequences of the analysis, it will be appropriate to speak of our requirements as conditions for the roles of adviser and advisee. Thus it is necessary to have the work of the previous chapters before us in

order to proceed with the work of the present chapter; for without the former it would appear as though we were randomly and arbitrarily picking conditions out of thin air. In fact I have found that in order to provide a relatively complete rendering of the conditions which advisers and advisees respectively have to meet I have had to extend the analysis of advising found in preceding chapters by building principally on part of the work of Chapter III. While this extension may appear to be a digression from the main theme of this chapter it is not. I intend therefore to engage in further study of the concept of advising in the immediately following first section as preparation for a treatment of adviser and advisee conditions which follows in sections two and three respectively where I attempt to answer the two questions I posed a moment ago.

4.1 The Morality of Advising

The question I propose to explore here is whether it is meaningful to say that we have advised another person to do something without at any point taking into consideration his background, dispositions, purposes, interests, needs, feelings, attitudes, or some reasonable combination thereof¹ at all? If we could say something like this--if we urged a person to do "this" rather than "that" completely ignoring his position and point of view would we still call this advising? I think not. For even at the most general levels of advising--for example, where we advise a whole class of people (of whose individual members we know nothing) to do this rather than that we still assume,

¹I shall frequently use the expression "another's position and point of view" to cover this collection of items.

ceteris paribus, that they have certain basic interests or needs such as interests in their safety, health and comfort. Signs or announcements that say "You are advised to stop smoking," "You are advised to avoid the footbridge," "You are advised to have your passports stamped before docking" all assume that the relevant class of persons in question have certain basic desires, interests, etc. to be satisfied; and to the extent we make these assumptions at this general level of advising we thereby take into consideration other people's positions and points of view, albeit in a limited way, but sufficient given the level of generality we work at in these kinds of cases. Of course at more specialized levels of advising, examples of which I examined in the previous chapter, it is apparently more than ever the case that we take into account the interests (etc.) of the advisee. But why is this so? What is there about the concept of advising which apparently commits us to the stance that the advisee's point of view be taken into consideration, though not necessarily only that?

The answer to this lies, I believe, in the grammar of advising. In Chapter II I examined three grammatical constructions--the imperative, subjunctive and ought sentences; and I showed that each despite its many different uses has the logical structure required of any sentence which is used to advise another person to do something. The construction most apposite for our present discussion is the subjunctive, "If I were you I would do . . ."; and I turn now to re-examine it qua advising utterance and in particular the first part of the utterance namely "If I were you." Let us treat this expression in as literal a way as possible. What then could we say is the intent of the phrase "If I were

you"? When we sincerely use this expression in addressing another person what is suggested is the speaker's conceiving of himself temporarily taking leave of his own position and point of view to take up that of the addressee. In other words the expression "If I were you I would do . . ." is simply a truncated version of "If given my particular background, understanding, etc. I could take up or cast myself in your place and look at the world from your point of view with your particular interests, feelings, etc., then I would do such and such." Are we in fact justified in making this expansion of "If I were you . . ." ? I believe we are for all I have done is to replace in the "if" clause of the original subjunctive sentence the words "I" and "you" with descriptive expressions that have the same referent as "I" and "you" respectively. Thus in place of "I" we have the description "my particular background, understanding etc."; and in place of "you" we have "your particular interests, feelings, etc." The verb "were" of course is replaced by an equivalent enabling expression, namely "could take up." In fact this expansion as it turns out is just a restatement of the conception of advising I articulated in an earlier chapter. There I said that in advising another person to do one thing rather than another our advice must be such that, other things considered, it would most probably be the sort of thing the advisee would himself choose to do if he had sufficient understanding of or insight into the situation. That is to say that one's advice to this person would be the sort of thing he would doubtless do if he were somehow to combine his own position and point of view with what the adviser knows and can offer. It is this marriage between the advisee's present point of view and

conception of the world and the adviser's understanding of the world that one tries to execute in advising another by conceiving of oneself temporarily taking up the advisee's position. Thus the "direction" or "flow" so to speak in advising is from that of the adviser leaving his position and moving over imaginatively into the position of the advisee, and not the converse of this. This difference in direction or flow is just the difference between (i) "If I were you I would do" and (ii) "If you were me you would do" It is the former utterance not the latter, or not normally the latter, which is used by one person to advise another. For it is not a requirement of advising that the advisee conceive of himself taking the position and point of view of the adviser, which is the suggestion of (ii), at least not in the way in which the adviser conceives of himself taking the point of view of the advisee, which is the suggestion of (i). It is not a requirement for at least two reasons; first, the advisee is not expected to have the understanding and experience in the relevant domain which the adviser is expected to have, and second, it is not normally the case anyway that the adviser's personal orientation is a relevant consideration when advising another what to do. Now there is a limit, of course, to the extent one person can look at the world from another's point of view with that other's feelings, interests, etc. In some sense of "same" I can have the same interests, feelings, attitudes as you and I can imagine in some situations what you feel, but I cannot have these feelings in precisely the same way as you have them. In your case there is a logical privacy I cannot penetrate. To have actually your feelings as you have them--to feel your guilt,

remorse, shame or to feel your puzzlement, confusion, anxiety, or your joy, etc., as you feel all these is just to be you and that I (logically) cannot be. This impossibility is recognized by the grammar of "If I were you I would . . . ," i.e., by the use of ". . . were . . . would" Thus the value of the subjunctive sentence qua advising utterance over both the imperative and ought sentences is just that it reminds us of these very requirements and limitations. As the subjunctive sentence draws to our attention, it is the speaker (the adviser) who conceives of himself in the position of the addressee (the advisee) to the extent this is possible; and to this extent then advising another is, in part at least, taking that person's point of view into account (though not only that point of view).

Two conclusions follow. In advising another person to do something it seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition that the adviser take into consideration the position and point of view of the advisee at some stage in the former's deliberations. To the extent that one person who, in addressing another, neglects or fails to take these matters into account then whatever it is the former may be said to be doing it is not advising that person. A second conclusion follows from the first. To the extent that a person takes into consideration only his own position and point of view in addressing another person thereby disregarding completely the interests and feelings of that other, whatever it is the former may be doing it is and cannot be advising. This is not a case of just giving bad or unsound advice, rather of not giving advice at all. Unsound advice arises from a misunderstanding of the advisee's situation because of having

incorrect information about the advisee or irrelevant information leading to the drawing of erroneous judgments about what is in his best interests. Having misunderstood the advisee's situation is not the same as completely disregarding that situation. At one point in his writings Jean-Paul Sartre discusses the case of one of his student's trying to decide whether he should stay at home to look after his aged mother or leave her to join the Free French Forces during the Second World War.² What should the student do? Should he seek advice? Sartre says that "if you seek advice from a priest for example, you have chosen this priest; you already knew, more or less, just about what advice he was going to give you But some priests are collaborating, some are just marking time, some are resisting. Which to chose? If the young man chooses a priest who is resisting or collaborating he has already decided on the kind of advice he is going to get."³ This passage from Sartre is illuminating for its misconceptions about the notion of advising--misconceptions which arise in violation of the two conclusions stated a moment ago. For one thing the Sartrean view of the adviser's function is self-defeating. It makes (or could make) the asking for advice redundant; for all you require qua advisee on Sartre's view is some understanding of your adviser's general orientation to life and the world, to his point of view or to his over-riding personal commitments. Your having this information is a sufficient condition for your having his advice; for

²Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1957), pp. 24-28.

³Ibid., p. 27.

his advice to you, as I understand Sartre, would be nothing but a statement of his views and commitments. So you would have his advice without asking for it! Further absurdities follow. Suppose you choose an adviser, call him A, but that you are not clear what his general orientation, point of view, etc. is. Suppose another person B, does know. So you ask B what A's orientation is and he tells you. In other words you get A's advice not by asking A but by asking B what A's conception of the world is! Who then really is your adviser? Also, suppose you don't ask B or anyone else what A's orientation is but ask A directly for his advice. What you get from A of course is not advice but a statement of A's conception of the world. Yet when one asks for advice one normally asks for an objective response to questions of the kind "What ought I to do in this situation?" Indeed, qua advisee one has a right to expect from his adviser a considered and impartial judgment about what in all likelihood is the best thing for one to do in the situation and not just a statement of the adviser's position and of his own commitments. To the extent that Sartre's conception of advising another consists of the adviser's expounding on the matters just indicated, and only that, to the exclusion of considering the advisee's position and point of view, our two conclusions are thus violated.

My main claim to this point is that, among other things, advising another person is taking into account the interests, etc., of the advisee. Does this claim entail a further one namely, that of promoting or furthering the interests of the advisee? The answer to this is "no." Taking another person's point of view into consideration

is one thing, promoting his point of view or recommending a course of action to him which if followed would promote that view is quite another thing. Doing the former does not logically commit one qua adviser to doing the latter though it is usually the case in advising that we take another's point into account so that we may better advise him, that is to say, so that his interests will in all probability be furthered. Thus while it may seem (or be) odd it is not self-contradictory to say "I advised him to do what will not be in his own interests, not even in the long run"--though some sort of explanation is doubtless required to remove the oddness. Suppose that a person whom you know, has committed a series of murders (unbeknownst to you) and has thus far evaded the police. He then comes to you. He tells you all and asks for advice about what his next move should be. Suppose further that the death penalty for first degree murder has not been revoked and that, upon consideration, you advise him to surrender himself forthwith to the authorities knowing that his following your advice will almost certainly result in his premature death. You could hardly say that your advice was intended to promote or further his own interests or that it was in his best interests not even in the long run. You justify your advice however on the grounds that the person in question is a definite menace to society and that if left to his own designs will likely inflict further needless harm and suffering on others especially those with whom he comes into direct contact. So you advise on the basis of an over-riding moral concern (for the well-being of others)--a concern that in this case takes precedence over the strictly prudential or self-interested concern of the advisee. Even on

(or particularly in the case of) life and death issues it is meaningful to say that we can advise another person to do what will be in his worst interests provided there is some over-riding consideration in the light of which such advice can be justified. Of course, if we could somehow combine compatibly the moral and the prudential concerns by (for instance) making the latter consideration a consistent moral one--if, that is, there was a way in which each of us could pursue wholeheartedly his interests without interfering with or encroaching upon the interests of others (or better still, promoting the interests of others by promoting his own)--then and only then might advising another to do something be logically connected to promoting that other's interests. But we are not structured in such a way as to make this possible. Our own interests at times inevitably conflict; and if it were the moral thing to do to follow wholeheartedly our own interests the upshot would be a return to a Hobbesian state of nature (where advising would have no place in any case) with the further odd consequence that in following this moral principle our destruction is ultimately wrought. Understandably when there is a conflict between moral and prudential considerations we normally ascribe precedence to the former and distinguish it from the latter whether that conflict arises in advising contexts or elsewhere.

Given the conclusions I drew on p. 145 and the discussion which has since followed we are in a position to see why the act of advising itself is a moral activity, in a minimal sense to be explained, quite irrespective of the particular kinds of advice we may happen to

give.⁴ We see this moral dimension to all instances of advising another person to do one thing rather than another by holding up our analysis of advising to a conception of morality and observing that certain features of the former fall within the requirements of the latter. For a necessary requirement of morality is that a material social condition be satisfied; and this condition in turn consists of taking into account (i) the relations of one individual to another (or others), and (ii) the effects of one person's action on the interests of another (or others) from the latter's point of view.⁵ Thus for an activity X, to be a moral activity it must be seen to satisfy at least (i) and (ii). I take it that in light of our analysis of advising that these two conditions are in fact satisfied by the speech act we call "advising." For as I have tried to show, the logic of advising requires that, among other things, the adviser take into consideration the present position and point of view of the advisee and that, in giving advice to another, the adviser take into consideration the likely effects on the advisee's interests of the latter's acting on the advice. This however does not necessarily involve promoting those interests as I have already explained, though in cases where it does not, and in other cases too, it does involve taking into account the likely effects of the advisee's actions on other persons in society apart from the advisee himself. To this extent, advising has a two-fold moral dimension about it. It is

⁴It does not follow from this claim that all advising is moral advising (i.e., giving moral advice) though it is not impossible that much of our legal, economic, and political advice is or can also be moral advice.

⁵I draw here from W. K. Frankena, "The Concept of Morality," The Definition of Morality, ed. by G. Wallace and A. D. M. Walker (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 156.

moral on what we might call the immediate level in that it picks out a relation between a minimum of two people, the adviser and advisee, and in particular a relation between what the former says and the effects of what he says on the interests of the latter if the latter acts on what the former says. Advising can be moral on a further level in that it may pick out a relation between what one person says (the adviser), what another (the advisee) does in light of what the former says and the effects of what the latter does (if he acts on what the former says) on the interests of other persons. To sum up this account of the moral dimension found in all cases of advising we could say that as an activity advising falls under the moral consideration of respect for other persons, notably for the advisee but not always only the advisee. We fail to have respect for others when in our deliberations with another we neglect, ignore, or disregard their interests, feelings, purposes and so on--that is when we fail to take account of what I have been calling "their position and point of view." This concept of respect for the other person as taking that other's point of view into consideration (though not necessarily promoting it) was initially brought to our attention by the grammatical structure of the advising utterance "If I were you I would do" As such it is embedded in the notion of advising without which the speech-act, advising, could not get off the ground.

Does this act of advising satisfy a formal requirement (which might also be seen to be part of a conception of morality) in addition to the material social requirement? I am thinking here of the formal requirements of prescriptivity and universalizability which R. M.

Hare, for example, identifies and discusses at length in his second major work on moral philosophy. Hare says⁶ that in deciding what we ought (evaluative use) to do what we look for is an action to which we can commit ourselves (the prescriptive element) but which we are also prepared to accept as exemplifying a principle of action to be prescribed for other persons in similar circumstances (the universalizable element). In other words, for Hare, the evaluative use of "ought" in some judgment makes that judgment a "universalizable prescription." The sincerely made judgment "I ought to do X in situation Y" both commits me to doing X and to the principle that any person in a "precisely similar situation"⁷ ought also to do the same thing. Hare illustrates these claims in his example of the creditor and debtor case found in his discussion of the criteria of a moral argument.⁸

The creditor says to himself "My decision that I ought to put A into prison because he will not repay me involves accepting the principle that anyone who is in my position or one like it ought to put his debtor into prison if he does not pay even if I myself happen to be in the position of debtor." Even though one is not actually in that position (of debtor) when he formulates his original decision he must at least conceive of himself being in that position and then ask if he could accept (commit himself to) the principle that any debtor who does not pay ought to be imprisoned by his creditors. And if he could

⁶R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 89.

⁷Ibid., p. 153.

⁸Ibid., pp. 90-92.

not, that is, if he could not universalize his prescription (decision) then, according to Hare, he cannot logically abide by it. If our creditor is prepared to imprison A but if he would not grant at the same time that his own creditor imprison him given similar circumstances, then our original creditor is expressing an evaluatively unsound decision because logically incompatible with the general principle which the latter entails. To assert a decision (I ought to put A into prison) but to dissent from the principle which entails it (Anyone in my position or one like it ought to put his debtor into prison) is, according to Hare, to be in a logical bind.

We might now rephrase our question of a few moments ago and ask if advising utterances are meant (or have) to satisfy the two formal criteria of prescriptivity and universalizability. I shall treat the former, and I believe easier, criterion first. One of the things I took myself to be doing in Chapter II in discussing Hare's use of evaluative "ought" sentences was criticising the close connection he believes obtains between the evaluative "ought" and commands. His claim is that such "oughts" entail commands. Thus if I sincerely say "I ought to do X" then according to Hare I am issuing a command to myself to do X; and if I say "You ought to do X" I am issuing a command to you to do X. Now these commands which the ought sentences entail provide the prescriptive element of which Hare speaks. As Hare would say, my uttering "I ought to do X" at least commits me to doing X by virtue of the entailed command "Let me do X." I argued in Chapter II that this use of the evaluative "ought" is unsatisfactory as an advising utterance because the entailed command-part violates certain

logical or conceptual requirements for advising. If my argument is sound, it follows that an advising utterance cannot satisfy Hare's criterion of prescriptivity--that is, an advising utterance cannot meet the prescriptive condition as Hare interprets that condition. However, since his interpretation seems to be too strong in any case we should not thereby conclude that advising utterances are or cannot be prescriptive.

When we engage in the act of prescribing then what is it we may be said to be doing if we are not commanding or committing someone to some course of action? Put simply, the answer is that we are telling someone what he ought to do; we are guiding or rationally influencing someone to do one thing rather than another and this is not quite the same thing as committing someone to some course of action. In advising someone then are we necessarily prescribing? Well, we are evidently not prescribing when we are advising someone that something is the case. The appraising use of the concept is not an instance of prescribing (or at least not normally so). Is the appraising use of the concept an instance? It would be difficult to see how we could deny that it is. In advising someone to do one thing rather than another we just are guiding the person to give serious consideration to the advised course of action. Such guidance, as I have argued, presupposes the advisee is in a situation of choice in which following the advised course is but one alternative open to him. It further presupposes that the advisee is free to choose as between alternative courses and that he is within his right to ask for the reasons which presumably support the advised course of action. But these

presuppositions are conditions which any verbal act must satisfy if it is to be an act of prescribing.⁹ Evidently then in saying "I advise you to do . . ." I am prescribing. The advising utterance is a prescription.

Let us now treat the universalizability criterion after the fashion of Hare. It seems that from the point of view of advising we would be committed to a position like the following. As an adviser expressing a decision to you about what you should do in some situation, my advice that you ought to do X in that situation must be such as could be given to anyone (including myself) in your situation (or one like it) who asks for advice. In other words in sincerely saying to you "I advise you to do X in that situation" I logically presuppose the principle that anyone (including myself) in a situation like yours be advised to do the same thing you were advised to do. This is the principle that advisees in similar situations be advised similarly--that the same advice is valid for all advisees similarly placed. If I were to advise someone else who is in a position like yours to do Y, not X, then I take it I would be involved in some sort of inconsistency rendering my advice logically unsound; for I would have asserted a decision about what I think that person should do but which involves denying the principle that entails the decision. Is this adapted version of the Harean position acceptable from the point of view of advising? Up to a limited point (at least) I believe it is. For one thing it obviously has a mark of fairness about it in treating

⁹See Paul Taylor, Normative Discourse (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 206.

advisees in similar situations similarly. For another, Hare's position makes advising others what they should do in some situation a relatively straight forward and uncomplicated affair. This is all right so long as the cases we deal with as advisers are themselves relatively straightforward and uncomplicated, which doubtless many cases are. In the fairly "routine" cases of advising and in those situations where there are no conflicts or tensions between, say, prudential considerations and moral considerations (or other complications) then it seems to me that subscribing to the Hare-like principle that similarly placed advisees be advised similarly is a helpful principle by which one qua adviser can live. Provided, as advisers, we have good memories (or good imaginations) so that we can recall (envisage) what we advised (or would advise) others to do whose situations were (would be) similar to that of our present advisee; and provided there are no complications attending the situation of our present advisee we are entitled to advise him just as we advised those others. Perhaps the best application of the principle is in those situations where, for one reason or another, we have to advise another hurriedly without being given the opportunity to explore more fully our advisee's position. These hurried advising situations are bound to arise and short of saying nothing, or something irresponsible, to our advisees we can very usefully invoke the above principle and advise the person in question as we advised those in the past whose situations were like that of our present advisee--though in hurried situations we should warn our advisee that the advice given is based on apparent similarities between his case and other cases and nothing more. This presupposes as

indicated that a requirement for being an adviser is that he have not only a fairly good memory but a fairly wide-ranging advising experience or a fairly good imagination such that the probability of a "new" advisee situation arising is not high--i.e., new at least to him.

But does this notion of new, novel or complex situations in advising another person what to do close out any further extension of our application of Hare's universalizability criterion to advising utterances? If we were to accept Hare's claims respecting universalizability could we make sense of the following advising utterance: "In the past I have advised people who were in a situation like yours to do A rather than B, but in your case, other things considered, I am going to advise you (i.e., you ought) to do C rather than either A or B." This does not seem to be meaningless and any analysis of "ought" that renders it so must surely be rejected. Hare, of course, would respond that the present advisee situation (in the utterance) is not sufficiently similar to the previous cases after all. He would say that there must be something additional or outstanding about the present case that is not to be found in the previous ones and which leads the adviser to recommend his advisee's doing C rather than either A or B--and that since the cases in question are not sufficiently alike, the adviser is still committed to advising anyone whose situation is sufficiently similar to the previous cases to do A rather than B. But what counts as "sufficiently similar" here? We have seen that Hare sometimes uses the expression "precisely similar situation." On this interpretation of "sufficient similarity" the general principle to which advisers are ostensibly to adhere would read as follows:

"advisees in precisely similar situations be advised similarly." How helpful would this principle be? If we were to treat the expression "precisely similar situation" literally then clearly there would be no advisee whose situation would be precisely similar to the situation of another. Given a person's own heredity, particular upbringing, and so on it is logically the case that no other person could be said to be in the same situation. If we treat Hare's use of "precisely similar" in this literal way then clearly the above principle has a hollow ring to it. For there would be one and only one agent (advisee) that would fall under it in any given advising situation. Since no one else could be in the same situation as one's present advisee it would be impossible for the adviser to live by the principle. Each advisee-situation would be strictly unique. Despite his use of expressions like "precisely similar" it is doubtful that Hare could accept the case for universalizability being pushed this far since at this point it would seem to be self-defeating.

Thus Hare must actually intend a less rigorous interpretation of "precisely similar situation." It is evident that he by no means always uses the word "precisely" to modify "similar situation." Frequently he uses expressions like "similar situation" or "a situation like." This generates a more defensible position. Whereas no one can (logically) be in a situation precisely the same as another person, someone can (logically) be in a situation like that of another. So our advising principle (à la Hare) might be salvaged by replacing "precisely similar situation" with "a situation like." At least the principle that similar advises in similar situations be advised similarly would not

have the same hollow ring. However we would be left with a residual problem namely how do we judge when one person is in a situation like that of another? How many features of the two situations would have to correspond to make the situations alike; and how would we know whether the features are relevant? I do not see any way of answering these questions apart from an actual context. Only in some context can we decide these matters. In some contexts it will be the physical features of people--their height, weight, color of eyes, hair, skin, etc. that are relevant and that make situations "alike." You are overweight in proportion to your height (let us say) and you have a certain type of heart condition. Your doctor advises you to go on a special diet. There would be something odd about your doctor not advising me to go on the same diet if I went to him with the same over-weight problem (in proportion to my height) and the same type of heart condition. Here the physical features of two people are what make the situations alike, as well as the features themselves being the relevant ones. But features (of situations) that are relevant do not necessarily also make those situations alike. A group has chartered a plane to Africa for a month's vacation. I am their adviser. South Africa is a very beautiful part of that continent, but there are a number of blacks in the group. What parts of Africa should I advise them to visit. Here the color of skin is a relevant feature, but in the circumstances (including the political climate of South Africa) the blacks and whites in the group are not in like positions relative to the advice I give them about visiting South Africa. I may advise the white members to visit South Africa but it would (or could be) irresponsible of me to so

advise the black members of the group. Here is a case then where the features which are relevant do not generate situations which are alike in respect to advising the members of the group where to visit.

Finally, physical features of persons need not figure at all, but rather their actions, or their beliefs for example. To recur to the "murder case" I used earlier in this chapter, Hare's claim would be that in my advising the murderer to surrender himself forthwith to the authorities I am logically bound to say that if I myself (or anyone else) were in a similar position of having committed a series of murders (etc.) I too should be advised to turn myself over to the police. Here it is the actions of people (and their intentions) which are both relevant and which make situations alike (at least in certain respects). Psychologically speaking I may not want to concede that I should be advised to surrender myself since doing so would place me in a most unenviable position; and that is not something I want. Logically speaking, however, I would have to concede the advice is justified.

Where does this discussion leave us in respect of advising utterances and the universalizability criterion? Although there are evident difficulties with the criterion it does not seem that we can deny that advising utterances do not (or need not) satisfy the criterion. Indeed when I discuss (later in the chapter) the necessary conditions of experience and imagination for advisers to meet, it will be seen that the criterion is presupposed. Furthermore the notion of "good" or "sound" advice as advice "backed by relevant considerations" seems to presuppose the criterion. For "good advice" and "relevant

considerations" in respect of some matter implies (at least some) agreement on both the advice and the supporting considerations among those persons (advisers) who are in a position to know (by virtue of their expertise) that the advice on some matter is good or sound. Thus the notion of intersubjectivity of reasons in advising seems to presuppose the criterion of universalizability. Finally--on a point of clarification--when I say to someone "I advise you to do X" it does not follow straight away that I approve of X in the sense of my doing it. In the utterance in question I am approving of your doing X (obviously). It would be self-contradictory for me to say "I advise you to do X" and then add "but, yet, I disapprove of your doing it." Only if I am in situations like yours must I approve of doing X myself: otherwise not. I can in fact openly disapprove of my doing X while advising you to do it without being inconsistent. For there can be good reasons for your doing X and very bad reasons for my doing it.

4.2 Advisers

Advising necessarily is a linguistic activity. In order to advise another person either to do something or that something is the case, the spoken or written word must be used. This is neatly summed up in the claim that, other things considered, my saying "I advise you . . ." (or words to that effect in an appropriate context) is my advising. It is a necessary truth about all uses of "advising" that to advise another is, among other things, to use words and to use them intelligibly; whereas for example it does not seem to be a necessary truth about all use of "counseling" that to counsel another is, among

other things, always to use words. This logical dependence of advising on the use of language can be brought out in a different way and one related primarily to the "advising to" use of the concept. Normally the advice that someone gives you respecting what you ought to do in some situation is an opinion or belief he holds about which of the possible courses of action open to you if taken by you would in all likelihood be to your best interests. Evidently one's advice to another to do this rather than that is not a mere opinion or a mere belief, but one (as we said earlier) that is considered--i.e., one that has the backing of interpersonal reasons. To be sure the belief or opinion that is embodied in a piece of advice to another person is subjective to the extent that it is an adviser's belief or opinion which he has formulated; but it is objective or impersonal to the extent that the reasons in the light of which the adviser formulates his advice respecting what another ought to do are not just his own personal reasons, but are ones which can be expected to withstand scrutiny from those in relevant positions to the adviser. So our being able to advise another about what he should do in a certain situation depends on our having or formulating certain considered beliefs or opinions; and our having these beliefs in turn depends on our having a language. "This dependence," writes Stuart Hampshire, "is not a mere contingent matter of fact It is intrinsic to the concept of belief. No sense could be given to the question about the beliefs of beings who possess no language in which to express them, not merely because we could not ascertain their beliefs, but rather because we would not know what would be meant by attributing any specific opinions to them. A

belief is essentially something that the believer is ready to express in a statement, even if, for various contingent reasons, he is prevented from expressing it."¹² A logically necessary condition of having a belief is having a language in which to express a belief. If I do not have a language, then I cannot be said to have beliefs; and my having a belief presupposes I have a language. To the extent that advising someone to do something is to have a belief about what that other should do, advising necessarily depends on one qua adviser having a language.

It thus remains to be said that to be in a position to advise another one must at least have facility with that language. One must know how to use words and sentences correctly. In short, to have facility with the language, at least so far as advising is concerned, is to be able to use language to communicate one's meaning to another person; it is to be able to express oneself verbally in a reasonably clear, consistent and coherent way thereby minimizing (presumably) the addressee's confusion or puzzlement over what you say to him. To confuse consistently other people by what you say to them is not to have a facility with the language. Now, from the point of view of advising, communication or making oneself understood is hampered (and may even be blocked) in at least two general ways. The first of these ways is the adviser's improper use of the logical connectives (e.g., "if . . . then," "either . . . or," etc.) and (or) the use of logically contradictory expressions or expressions which are otherwise "odd" or

¹²Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), pp. 141-142.

"internally inconsistent" in the advice he gives. It is not sufficient to say that these "mistakes" can be corrected by the adviser's knowing what the logical connectives are and what is a contradiction. Additionally, one must know when and how to use the connectives and how to formulate statements that are internally consistent; and these particular items of knowledge depend in part on having a context or subject matter in which to work. It is possible for a person to know (formally) what a logical contradiction is but in using language in a certain context be unaware that he has in fact contradicted himself. This can be detected by the speaker only if he has, in addition, an understanding of the features of the context or subject in or about which he is discoursing, as the following examples show.

Suppose the context is advising; and suppose an instructor says to a student, "I advise you to take Education 801A, but there are no reasons why you should take it." I argued (in the last chapter) that this kind of utterance is contradictory. For in saying "I advise you to take Education 801A" the teacher is thereby advising but by adding "there are no reasons why you should take it" he thereby denies that he advises the student to take that course. In short, I said that there are no conceivable situations in which it would be correct (meaningful) to describe one as advising another person to do one thing rather than another without there being reasons for that person's doing it. Now, unless a would-be adviser understands this (logical) point about advising--unless he knows that the concept of advising entails the notion of having reasons for the advice one gives, then even though he may know what a contradiction is, he will not know that utterances of

the kind "I advise you to do X but there are no reasons why you should do it" are self-contradictory and hence puzzling to his advisee. In a like fashion, there are other expressions which while not necessarily contradictory have an air of contradiction about them and will be seen by the advisee to be so unless some special explanation of them is given. I am thinking here of expressions which Nowell-Smith would call "logically odd" but not "self-contradictory." To say that an utterance is logically odd is not to say that it is necessarily senseless "but that we should be puzzled to know what it meant and should have to give it some unusual interpretation."¹³ For example, "I advise you to swim the Channel but you ought not to do it" has its oddness removed by explaining that the second use of "you" is general and could be replaced by "one." Thus the utterance in question means that there are reasons for advising you specifically to swim the Channel and reasons against advising just anyone to swim the Channel. So advising utterances of the kind "I advise you to do X but you ought not to" are not necessarily self-contradictory; but unless our would-be adviser understands that expressions like "I advise you to do X" contextually implies¹⁴ rather than logically implies utterances like "you ought to do X" he would not know that "I advise you to do X but you ought not to do it" requires an "unusual interpretation" to remove the oddness and hence the puzzlement for the advisee.

A final example involves the use of the connective "either . . . or" in certain advising utterances. The restrictions on the use

¹³ Nowell-Smith, Ethics, p. 83.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 80-81.

of this logical connective are wrought by the fact that my saying "I advise you to do either A or B or C" presupposes that there is nothing to choose between these alternative courses of action--there are no reasons which weigh in favor of selecting any one of the alternatives over the others. So, in effect, I am simply saying to my advisee "I advise you just to choose!" This does not mean there are no reasons for saying this or that there are no reasons for choosing A (say); indeed the reason for saying "just choose" is that there are no reasons which favor one course over the other. But to the extent that there are reasons weighing in favor of one alternative and to the extent that I still say "I advise you to do A or B or C" I have, qua adviser, systematically misled you. If there are reasons for choosing A over the others, I cannot reflect this fact by the use of "either . . . or" in my advising utterance. In such cases my advising of necessity is selective. In cases where there is something to choose across alternatives we must say, in advising another, "I advise you to do A rather than B or C," not "A or B or C." Normally when we advise a person we advise them to do this rather than that. Giving advice is a way of supporting one course of action over some other and the language we use must reflect this fact. Thus, to the extent that a would-be adviser does not understand these restrictions on the use of connectives like "either . . . or" in advising contexts, he cannot be in a position to advise because he cannot succeed in making himself understood.

A second general impediment to advising (apart from the lack of facility with language, misunderstanding of logical points and

concepts) is the lack of wittingness or awareness as to what one qua adviser is doing, or lack of intention. Thus certain further requirements for advisers to meet are set. Advising is an intentional activity. In advising another there is necessarily some point or purpose to what we are trying (intending) to do; e.g., to inform, to guide. Thus I cannot advise a person by accident. Nor can I advise without attending to what I am saying. It is true, of course, that something I might say to you in conversation might subsequently help you in deciding on one course of action over another, but my merely saying some things to you which you find helpful is not a sufficient condition for my advising you. Nor, for that matter, is your finding some things helpful in what I say to you a sufficient condition for claiming that I thereby advised you. As I have elsewhere noted, a whole host of conditions have to be satisfied, one of which is intentionally saying certain things to you which, in my best judgment, will likely be of aid to you in your deciding what to do in some situation. If a person does something without knowing that he is doing it, it is a necessary truth that he is not doing it intentionally. If, in the above example, I did not (or could not) know that I was helping you by what I said to you, then I could not be described as having helped you intentionally by saying what I did. And if I did or could not have acted intentionally to help you by saying such and such to you, I could not be said to have advised you. If, to continue the example, you were to say to me "What you said a moment ago was very helpful. Thanks for the advice!" my protestation "But I wasn't advising you!" is perfectly correct. I wasn't advising you because, and among other things, it

wasn't my intention to use my words in such a way as to give you advice even though it turns out you were assisted in your decision by what I said to you. Fortunately, this point we are discussing eliminates a good deal of what might otherwise be called advice from our ordinary conversations with people. It also legislates against the possibility of a person advising while he is (say) dreaming (even day-dreaming) or in certain stages of being drugged. Ex hypothesi being in these sorts of conditions is to lack wittingness with respect to what one is saying, with respect to the external situation confronting one and to the difference what one says makes, all of which are essential to being in a position to advise another person. So evidently some of the things we cannot do if we are to be correctly described as advising another person are: talking absent-mindedly, without attending to or concentrating on what we say to another; talking without intending to help another come to some decision about the latter's course of action; talking while in states of semi-consciousness or while delirious or in states of unconsciousness (e.g., while dreaming in sleep).

The discussion to this point shows that the two general conditions which either block or impede communication between two people consist of (i) language and conceptual confusions, and (ii) a lack in either attention or intention or both. To the extent that a person is unclear or confused about the conceptual or logical points and structure of advising and the consequent permitted (prohibited) verbal moves within that structure, or to the extent that one has serious difficulty in concentrating on (holding one's attention to) what one says to another, is subject to states of delirium, has a tendency to

exist at levels of semi-consciousness (etc.) one cannot be in a position to advise another person. We might then ask what is minimally presupposed by the positive case--the case of the person who is free from conceptual confusions, who has powers of attention, etc. and who, to this extent, is a suitable candidate for the role of adviser. We might circumscribe the question further in the following way. Since there is necessarily an extensive use (both explicit and implicit) of certain pronouns in advising, particularly "I" and "you" (e.g., "I advise you to . . . ," "If I were you, I would . . . ," "I think you should do . . . ," "Do such and such," etc.) the question may be rephrased by calling for the presuppositions of the use of words like "I" and "you." It seems clear that if one were unable to use words like "I" and "you" properly, that is to say, if one did not know to what the words "I" and "you" referred, one would not be able to perform the speech act we call advising. A correct use of "I" and "you" at least presupposes the speaker's ability to make certain fundamental and essential distinctions between himself and other objects in the external world. If I could not make these distinctions (or not make them very clearly)--if I could not perceive (or perceive very clearly) an external world separate from me but consisting of objects including other persons alike, though distinct from me, I could not possibly know what "I" and "you" mean (refer to). Hence, my saying (or trying to say) "I advise you to do . . ." would be vacuous. The word "I" and its cognates has meaning to the extent that "you" and its cognates has meaning. In a sense these are (or resemble) correlative terms. My use of "you" presupposes my being able to point to another person as an

entity separate and distinct from myself and occupying space "over there" as distinct from the space I occupy "over here." This recognition of a reality existing apart from me is the product of my encountering the world--of my brushing up against external objects and of their impinging on me. It is through this interaction and the subsequent awareness of other objects (including other persons) that I progressively sharpen my own boundaries, define myself or fill myself in as it were. My emotions, for example, are in part the result of my coming up against certain objects in the world. So in recognizing myself to be distinct from other things by recognizing the external existence of those things my use of "I" also becomes meaningful because I am aware of the object to which the word refers. When I use "I" in referring to myself, I thereby implicitly or explicitly contrast myself with those things over there; and when I say "I advise you to . . . ," I implicitly or explicitly contrast myself and situation with you and your situation. To the extent that one cannot make this contrast and this distinction, he cannot be said to know what "I advise you to" means and hence cannot be in a position to advise another person.

Thus a minimal condition for one to satisfy as adviser is that of self-awareness and others-awareness, both of which are presupposed by one's correct use of the pronouns "I" and "you"--that is to say, a condition of being an adviser is having the ability both to perceive oneself as a center of consciousness having certain needs, desires, interests, etc., and to perceive others as distinct centers of consciousness having certain needs, desires, etc. Given that advising is a moral activity in the sense indicated in the previous section, it

is essential that the adviser be able to at least recognize the existence of other points of view and to take these into account in reaching some piece of advice. Any psychological or cognitive disorder or defect which clouds or interferes with these awarenesses and perceptions would be sufficient, it seems, to prevent one from being in a position to advise another person. Apparently egocentrism would count as such a defect. Jean Piaget, who has studied extensively the phenomenon of childhood egocentrism, characterizes it as a confusion of the ego and the external world and as the inability to differentiate between the ego and the environment;¹⁵ and other psychologists as the child's "incapacity to see that points of view other than his own exist and therefore as his lack of awareness that he has a point of view of his own."¹⁶ According to Piaget, childhood egocentrism predominates throughout the early years from roughly ages four to seven or eight, though it is more pronounced at the lower end of the range than at the upper; and it may recur in adults, particularly if the adult has been raised by his parents along strict authoritarian lines.¹⁷ Thus, as Piaget sees it, childhood egocentrism is directly tied to the phenomenon of "adult (or external) constraint" which is the imposition by parents and other adults of rules, regulations, commands, expectations, etc., on the child who accepts these impositions unwittingly¹⁸--

¹⁵Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965), especially pp. 90-95.

¹⁶Derek Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behavior (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 158.

¹⁷Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, p. 85.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 92.

unwittingly because he is not able to distinguish clearly between the external and the internal, the objective and subjective (as Piaget puts it). Thence, the words and thoughts of the adult mix into and intervene with the child's own thinking exercising a control or check on the child's socialization. As long as the child is under the power of the adult, as long as he conceives of adult rules and commands as sacred, immutable and objects of obedience--that is, as long as there is adult constraint on the child, there is egocentrism. But once the child begins to develop peer-group associations where he can interact with his fellows, he begins to dissociate his thought from that of adults. Egocentrism wanes; and the child gains a more realistic conception of others and himself. "Henceforth," says Piaget, "he (the child) will not only discover the boundaries that separate his self from the other person, but will learn to understand the other person and be understood by him. So that cooperation is really a factor in the creation of the personality . . . i.e., (of) the self that takes up its stand on the norms of reciprocity and objective discussion, and knows how to submit to these in order to make itself respected."¹⁹ Declining egocentrism in children is balanced by an increasing cooperation between and mutual respect for each other as persons. According to Piaget, this normal development from unilateral respect for the adult (a product of egocentrism and adult constraint) and heteronomy (submission to adult authority) to cooperation and mutual respect (wherein rules are no longer seen to be sacred and immutable,

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 95-96.

but changeable through mutual consent) and thence to personal autonomy²⁰ is underway usually by age ten.

If we were to place a "great divide" or "watershed mark" in Piaget's cognitive developmental scheme it would have to be at the pre-adolescent periods of ages ten to twelve. Roughly speaking, prior to this period the child tends to look at the world heteronomously and afterwards autonomously. This does not mean, of course, that the seven or eight year old is necessarily egocentric. It is possible he could be semi-autonomous, but it would be rare or unusual. Nor does it mean that the thirteen year old having passed the "great divide" is automatically fully autonomous (in the sense of being free of external adult pressure to self-direct his own life) though again this is possible. The move towards personal autonomy normally is a gradual development with no guarantee that in any given individual the progressions will culminate in the autonomous personality. What we can say apparently is that for anyone who is fully autonomous (in Piaget's sense) he would have to have passed through pre-adolescence and more than likely be a young adult. But development towards the autonomous personality is much more than a matter of age. There are lots of adolescents and adults who are still heteronomous, some who are partly heteronomous and partly autonomous, and some who are egocentric. The thrust of Piaget's work (and others in his developmental tradition) is to show that the progression towards the autonomous personality is contingent upon one having passed sequentially through

²⁰Autonomy "appears only with reciprocity, when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated." Ibid., p. 196.

earlier stages of development, such as the stage of unilateral respect for adults and the stage of cooperation with and mutual respect for peers. These apparently are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions or phases. To the extent that one has not been subject to adult constraint and to social interaction with one's peers or to the extent that one has not moved beyond such stages, one cannot be or become an autonomous person. Even if these stages have been passed through, other things can still "go wrong." As Lawrence Kohlberg²¹ has shown, the shift in early adolescence from, what Piaget calls "concrete operations" to "formal operations" can result in some cases in "adolescent solipsism"--the condition in which the individual, because he now sees his own internal world to be the real and the external world to be the unreal, takes his own self to be the only real thing there is. While such a condition is somewhat extreme, it evidently is sufficient to frustrate temporarily the development of autonomy in the person.

Now, if Piaget (and others) are, in the main, correct in what they are saying, then it seems to follow for our study that since egocentrism (as here understood) is a cognitive defect which hinders the individual's awareness and perception both of his self and other selves and which blurs the distinction between the external and the internal, then children at least up to about pre-adolescence are not in a position to advise other people respecting what those others should

²¹ Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World," Daedalus (Fall, 1971), p. 1064.

do in certain situations. They cannot advise because they lack sufficient awareness of both their own point of view and that of others-- and it is principally this latter which counts in advising as I have shown. To be able to take into consideration the interests, etc., of others at least presupposes one's recognizing that other points of view exist sui generis and that, in turn, entails that one who advises be free from adult constraint and authority which young children, according to Piaget, eminently are not. It follows further from Piaget's account that anyone, child, adolescent or adult who is still under the control and constraint of another adult or of a group, who is dominated by the other person or a group, and who therefore is still essentially a heteronomous individual, is not in a position to advise others. He is not because he is not able to judge independently what in his view is the best thing for an advisee to do.

With Piaget's account in mind, it will be worthwhile for us to explore some of the typical personality or character traits which would make it impossible (at least temporarily) for one to be in a position to give advice. I have already noted that advising is an intentional activity and that wittingness on the part of the adviser is required. As an adviser one must attend to what he is saying to another. This condition can be extended to include one's ability to hold one's attention to (to heed) what another person (advisee) is saying to him. There are at least two ways in which a person cannot attend to what another is saying. The first is that he is overworked and preoccupied with other problems to the extent that he is not fully aware of another person's presence. The second is that he is preoccupied with

himself and is therefore unable to attend to another person's presence. The former should not be put in a position where he has to advise others though it does not follow that if his work-load were reduced that he could not advise. The second person, to the extent that he is only minimally aware of the other person's presence, who talks only or primarily of himself and who does not hear the other person because he cannot listen, is and cannot be in a position to advise. He is a "centered" person and thence a species of the class egocentric. The egoist, on the other hand, while centered in a sense, manifests his centeredness in a different way. There are two kinds of egoists--the individual or personal egoist and the impersonal egoist. The former is the person whose sole concern is just the promotion of his own interests exclusively. To the extent that other persons can be used by him as means to furthering his own ends, he must certainly take cognizance of their presence (or existence). We could even say that the personal egoist takes into account the interests of others--but he does so only in so far as that will be to his own advantage and only his. Thus, in treating other persons merely as means in promoting his own personal ends, he necessarily lacks the respect for others which we saw to be the moral requirement of all cases of advising. Further, the only "advice" the personal egoist could give to another would be such that if acted on by that other would serve not his interests but that of the egoist. Your following the advice of a personal egoist would under most circumstances not be to your advantage; thence, advising as we normally understand it would become counter-productive.

The impersonal egoist, on the other hand, appears to be a more likely candidate for the role of adviser. For he believes that every-one (including himself) is to pursue his own interests exclusively. If someone were to ask him for advice, he could say apparently with all consistency "You ought to pursue your own interests exclusively"; and, given some information about his advisee, the impersonal egoist could then be rather more specific about the best means the advisee could take in order to advance those interests. But then we recall that the impersonal egoist's principle applies equally to himself as to others. Thus, he too takes it as his duty to pursue his own interests exclusively. Now, if it is in his own interests only to have a reputation as being a good adviser, then his own interests are being served exclusively by advising others as to the best means to take in order to advance their interests. But if it is in the impersonal egoist's interests to be more than or something other than a good adviser, it is necessarily the case that, in pursuing his own interests exclusively, his advice to another be such that that other's acting on it be advantageous to him (the egoist) not the advisee. So the impersonal egoist qua adviser has the following logical problem on his hands. Because he is an impersonal egoist, his advice to another must be such that the latter's acting on it, on the one hand, is advantageous to the advisee; but, on the other hand, since it is to the adviser's advantage to have his advisee act in such a way that his (the adviser's) interests are served exclusively (which cannot be to the advisee's interests exclusively), the impersonal egoist's advice also must be such that it is to his own advantage to have his advisee

act on it. In sum, the impersonal egoist qua adviser faces logically incompatible criteria which cannot both be satisfied. One's advice to another cannot both be in that other's interests exclusively and at the same time not in that other's interest; and yet this is what the impersonal egoist would have to pull off. Evidently the impersonal egoist cannot be an adviser either.

Piaget claims, as we have seen, that children raised in the climate of adult constraint begin to "decenter" themselves and become separate persons only through social interaction with their peers. Such interaction enables the child to develop an area of privacy in his life which he does not share with his parents and it also enables the child to see the relativity of his parents' views and values. Not all children however start off in this "normal" way by being subject to adult constraint. Some indeed are raised essentially in and by their own peer group (as in wartime, for instance) the result of which is an early and persisting attachment of the child to his peers rather than to adults. The growth and expression of individuality is apparently thwarted in deference to group solidarity and in the long run the person so raised may not be egocentric but what psychologists call "group-centric"--one who has been "primarily socialized through the peer group so that it is from this group he derives his sense of identity, security and belonging."²² Expulsion from the group is the worst possible fate that could befall the group-centric; thus, loyalty and devotion to group norms, standards, objectives, views, etc., are the means by which his survival is ensured. Group-centrism is extreme

²²Wright, The Psychology of Moral Behavior, p. 212.

conformism. Now since advising a person presupposes that genuine alternative courses of action are available to the advisee, it is essential that the person who is the adviser be able to confront openly and freely these and other alternative possibilities and in due consideration of the various views, positions and facts prescribe what, on balance, would be in the best interests of the advisee. That is to say, one who is to be an adviser must be able to choose; and to be a chooser, is to be free from various impediments and constraints such as group centrism that thwart the making of genuine selections. If one qua group-centric attempted to advise another person, his advice would be an injunction to act in accordance with his (the centric's) group standards, morality or objectives quite irrespective of the advisee's own particular situation, interests, and so on. For the group-centric's views and beliefs are just the views or beliefs of his group. He is committed to promoting these lest he suffer the fate of expulsion, thence to that extent he is and cannot be a chooser of genuine alternatives. As an adviser, he would have to translate the expression "what is in your best interests" to "what is in accordance with my group's views." Just as your following the egoist's advice would result in your promoting his interests, not yours, your following the group centric's advice would result in your promoting his group's interests, not yours. In both cases, the position and point of view of the advisee are neglected and to this extent we can say that neither an egoist nor a group centric can be in a position to advise.

There are then at least two general types of disorders or defects which if obtain in the person make it impossible for one to be in a

position to advise others: (a) egocentrism and (b) group-centrism. To the extent that we are too closely tied to ourselves, too centered as it were, or too closely tied to another person in some position of authority; or to the extent that we are tied too closely to our group, too willing to let it control and dominate our thinking, too conforming as it were, we cannot be advisers because basically we are insufficiently aware and free. This account admittedly is negative for it states the conditions (e.g., personality-types) we must avoid if we are to be in a position to advise. Clearly my account here is incomplete. One could doubtless show that the compulsive, the obsessive and the paranoid are not in a position to advise. Equally, the closed-minded, insecure person--the one who feels threatened or uneasy by views and beliefs of others that fail to square with his own beliefs, who is not open to alternative conceptions of the world and who will either avoid encountering these conceptions or suppress them when he does encounter them and who therefore is unable to react sympathetically or understandingly to another's point of view alien to his own or to react innovatively or creatively in helping that other decide what is best for him--obviously cannot be in a position to advise. And the authoritarian character, who also resembles the group-centric in at least the respect that both are controlled by the expectations of others albeit in different ways, cannot advise. This last character is perhaps of somewhat special interest since the role of the teacher as moral adviser will raise questions as to the compatibility between being a teacher and being an adviser--between being a person in authority and being an adviser. There is no necessary connection between

"authoritarian character" and "being in a position of authority" though to be sure in many cases these, in practice, coincide. Nonetheless, one can be in authority without being authoritarian. But for those teachers who are authoritarian, who are preoccupied with status and power, with controlling others by orders, commands, directives, etc., and who view others as inferiors as some (hopefully few) teachers are wont to do, then these people simply are not in a position to advise. They lack the necessary respect for the student and are unable to take account of the student's interests, etc., sincerely; and very often they are themselves not sufficiently free to choose between alternative courses of action and to prescribe one such alternative for their student. Even if a teacher is seen to be authoritarian though he, in fact, is not, it is extremely unlikely that he could advise with any success; for if students have this conception of a teacher, what he says by way of advice to them will invariably be taken as an order or command to be obeyed rather than as something for them to reflect on and to decide for themselves.

It is time now to state a more positive account. The tentative conclusion we can draw at this point is that to be in a position to advise another, one must be hewing some kind of middle course between egocentrism, on the one hand, and group-centrism on the other. This middle way can be characterized as follows. To be in a position to advise, one must be relatively (i) open-minded, (ii) free to make choices between genuine alternative views and courses of action, (iii) independent of group pressures and of pressures and expectations of other individuals; in short, one must be relatively free, independent

and rational. This, of course, is saying a good deal, but, I believe, not too much. These three positive notions (freedom, independence, rationality) are by no means unconnected. To be independent of some group or of some other person is at least to be free from the social and other constraints of the group or of the other person, hence free to do things on one's own. But independence is more than being free--this latter being a necessary but not sufficient condition of independence. Independence is being able to develop a stance or position on rational grounds and to adjust one's stance or position to changing conditions. It is to have the necessary fortitude to resist absorption by the group or dominance by another person and to have the concomitant skills and abilities to make decisions for oneself. Thus stated, independence is closely akin to, indeed is a necessary condition of, rationality which consists of certain activities of mind (e.g., reflecting, deliberating, planning, deciding, choosing) in the guiding of one's actions and activities and which presuppose one's being free from the psychological, cognitive and social constraints and disorders we have been discussing. These activities of mind are additionally contingent on one's having "content" on which to reflect, deliberate, etc., and on one's having a conception of the world generally as an ordered place in which prediction of events and consequences can be made with reasonably good chances of success. The "content" in respect of rationality as guiding one's conduct consists of items like actions, consequences, motives, intentions, desires, rules, reasons and so on. The rational person then is (at least) one who can distinguish (roughly) between an act and its effects, who can give reasons for doing

one thing rather than another and hence has some notion of what a reason consists of. Thus, the rational person normally can say to himself or to another, "Doing this will likely result in that because of such and such," and be correct in his prediction and sound in his justification. His predictive power is good partly because of his objective sense of reality (i.e., his conception of the world as a reasonably ordered place), partly because he can distinguish actions and consequences and can judge which actions are probably going to bring desired results, and partly because of his own reflections on his own experiences and that of others. His justification is normally sound partly because he knows what counts as relevant considerations (reasons), partly because he is attuned and sensitive to the desires, intentions, interests, background, etc., of another person or of himself as pertinent to judging what that other or himself ought to do. The rational person will not merely judge an act (his or another's) in terms of whether it satisfies or deviates from some established principle. Rather, principles are adopted and modified by this person in the light of changed or changing conditions and situations in which a variety of factors (already mentioned) are taken into account.

The account of freedom, independence and rationality, admittedly embryonic, is sufficient to indicate a primary positive condition; namely, that of personal autonomy.²³ To the extent that heteronomy is the "logically opposite" of autonomy, we may conclude that the

²³I am indebted here to R. F. Dearden, "Autonomy and Education," Education and the Development of Reason, ed. by R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 448-465.

heteronomous person as such cannot function in the role of adviser to other persons. This conclusion adds weight to our earlier conclusion (based on Piaget's work) that normally the pre-adolescent cannot be in a position to advise. In this connection our conclusion is also compatible with Piaget's description of what he calls "objective responsibility"²⁴--the child's taking rules literally and judging the actions of others in terms of their exact conformity with those established rules and not in accordance with those others' intentions or motives. This is a further outgrowth of adult constraint and unilateral respect and thence a pre-adolescent phenomenon. "We did not come across a single definite case of it (objective responsibility) after age 10,"²⁵ writes Piaget, while subjective responsibility--the person's judging another's actions in terms of motives and intentions (and which presupposes the child's being at least at the stage of cooperation and mutual respect) is very much in evidence from the pre-adolescent stage onwards though, to be sure, its beginnings doubtless predate age ten. However, inasmuch as subjective responsibility is a "condition" of the development of autonomy in the individual, we may say that one, regardless of age, who is "subjectively responsible," in Piaget's sense, has mastered certainly some of the essential conditions for being in a position to advise. For one would, at this point, have a much clearer grasp of the distinction between another person's actions and the consequences thereof, as well as of some of the considerations (e.g., desires, intentions) relevant to judging the actions of other

²⁴Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 111-112.

²⁵Ibid., p. 124.

persons. One's thinking, that is, would have been freed from having to assess actions solely in terms of their conformity or deviation from fixed rules laid down by those in positions of authority. The subjectively responsible person would, in short, be relatively free to reach decisions about human action on more justifiable grounds.

But personal autonomy is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for being in a position to advise. Additional conditions are experience and imagination both of which are related but neither of which are part and parcel with autonomy. That experience is not tied to autonomy may be seen in the following ways. First, experience is not a sufficient condition of autonomy--there being heteronomous persons with lots of experience. Second, experience is something we can say we "have" or "had," whereas autonomy is what we call a developed disposition to deal with the world in certain rational ways. Third, experience is not a conceptually necessary condition of the notion of autonomy though it is necessary for the development of autonomy in the individual. Piaget, as we have seen, and developmental psychologists generally, stress the necessity of social interaction with peers (i.e., experience) in normal cognitive and moral development of the person. Without experience of this social kind, we could (apparently) not only not develop self-awareness but others-awareness as well. Experience of a social nature is a necessary condition for the development of the self into the fully autonomous individual; and, as such, a necessary condition for one qua adviser to have satisfied.

A second argument for experience, and a more pragmatic one, is that with experience, particularly of a diverse nature, the adviser is

likely to be in a better position both to appreciate what his advisee feels and to foresee the consequences of his actions. Experience enables the adviser to enter more sympathetically his advisee's situation. While being able to see oneself over there in the advisee's predicament or knowing how it "feels" is not decisive in every case regarding the piece of advice selected for one's advisee, it may nonetheless help temper one's advice to another, or it may lead to expressing the advice in a more sensitive and tactful way than might otherwise be possible. Of course, we are here dealing with experience as well as imagination. The closer in kind an adviser's set of experiences is to that of his advisee, the less need the former will have of imagination for conceiving what it would be like to be in that situation; for he would know what it is like by virtue of his own experience. Suppose, for instance, a teen-ager is trying to decide whether or not to sever his church affiliation and that he comes to you for advice. Suppose further that he has been raised by a religious family in a religious community and that his church adherence is taken by his friends and family as a matter of course, so that his severing this affiliation would not be without certain "emotional hardships" on his family, close friends and quite possibly himself. Now if when you were a teen-ager you faced and resolved the same question (given a similar up-bringing), then by virtue of this experience you are in a very good position to appreciate what your advisee is "going through" or feeling at the moment--though it does not follow (as I have said before) that you would advise him necessarily to do as you yourself did in that situation. It could be that in retrospect and in light of subsequent experience you

regret your decision. But the point is that you will at least understand the particular anguish of your advisee and be able to take that into account in your advice to him. Even if you faced this situation not in your teens, but (say) later in life or if you faced other somewhat similar trying decisions as a teenager--e.g., your deciding not to go into the family business after high school graduation when such a move had been to that point taken for granted (and anxiously awaited) by your family and their friends--then by virtue of these related experiences you are still in a better position to understand your advisee's present problem respecting his church affiliation than would someone else with an entirely different set of experiences. What you lack in exactly comparable experiences you make up with experiences of a similar kind that enable you to at least imagine your being in your advisee's place. This imaginative thinking is possible because you once faced dilemmas of the kind in question and struggled with "trying" decisions of the kind your advisee is now facing. If, on the other hand, you had no experience at all in struggling with difficult decisions of any kind it seems unlikely that you could even picture what it would be like to be in just such a situation. Imagination can take over where experience has not been only if there is some, even remote, likeness between one's own experiences and the predicament another happens to be in. Without experience there would be no imagination at all. Of course, if you have done a good deal of reading--especially of novels in which the characters are sometimes caught up in trying situations that require decisions--you could develop to a considerable degree an imaginative awareness, though clearly this

awareness would be the product of your imaginatively "interacting" with the novel's characters; that is, the product of social experience of an indirect kind. A recluse, hermit, or isolate who has indirect social experience of this kind could conceivably be in a position to advise, otherwise not. This indirect social experience is better (in the present context) than no social experience at all.

It may be thought that this account rules out the possibility of young people giving advice on the basis that the socially experienced person is the "mature" person who has "years of experience" behind him. But it is not the length of one's experience that counts in advising, but the breadth and variety of the experience. For narrow experiences are certainly compatible with being older. To be sure, breadth and variety of experiences are tied to time but still it is a merely contingent fact about the world that the experienced person is often the older person; it is not a logical truth. "Maturity and experience" is not conceptually tied to "older person." There are many young people who are both experienced and mature and who have struggled with difficult personal decisions. To this extent they are capable of being advisers.

A final condition to be met by one who advises is that of having the relevant knowledge, understanding or insight into the domain about which one is giving advice. To give medical advice one must have a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, pharmacology, and so on: economic advice, a knowledge of economics; legal advice, a knowledge of the laws; spiritual advice, a knowledge of religion. Unless the adviser has some developed expertise in these domains, in addition to all the

other conditions--unless he knows or understands the subject matter about which he is talking and which constitutes his advice, then it seems impossible that he could be said to be giving medical or legal or economic, etc., advice. To a large extent, I believe, these claims also hold for the giving of moral advice and in the next chapter I shall try to show that a certain knowledge and understanding of morality is required of the moral adviser.

To sum up, the general sorts of conditions which would have to be met by one who is to advise other people are as follows. One must (a) have facility with the language and have communication skills; (b) have some understanding of the logic of advising; (c) have an awareness of self and other persons and respect for others as persons; (d) be personally autonomous; that is, be relatively free from internal and external constraints, independent and rational; (e) have experience and imagination; and (f) have an understanding of the subject matter from which one's advice is drawn. These are necessary, not sufficient conditions. They are, I take it, what constitutes the answer to one of our questions posed at the outset of the chapter--namely, "Who can advise?"

4.3 Advisees

Happily a number of the conditions for advisers are also conditions for advisees. Examples of common ground here are as follows. First, advisees, like advisers, require a certain minimal facility with the language. The advisee must be able to communicate to another as well as to understand what that other person says in turn. Advising is

a dialogue. One who cannot put words together intelligibly at least to the extent of knowing how to ask another for advice and to explain to that other what his own puzzlement, or objective etc., is about cannot be in a position to receive advice. Second, the advisee must see himself and his adviser as separate and distinct persons, otherwise, like young children, the advisee will be unable to untangle his own thinking from that of his adviser. The distinction between subjective and objective in Piaget's sense is essential for being an advisee and thus to the extent that one has not evolved from the phenomenon of childhood egocentrism one cannot receive advice. Third, wittingness and the ability to hold one's attention to what another is saying to one, that is, paying heed to what one is being told while he is being told it also counts as a condition for being advised as well as for advising another. In as much as one is unable to focus on what another says to him, has difficulty in heeding the message and who is readily and frequently distracted by other things, one is not normally in a position to receive advice. Fourth, to receive advice presupposes one's being free to choose. I shall have more to say about this matter presently.

Although there are these common conditions for both advisers and advisees the following proposition is nonetheless true: whereas all advisers can also receive advice not all advisees can also give advice. One's being an adviser is sufficient for his being an advisee; but one's being an advisee is not sufficient for his being an adviser. There are conditions which advisers have to satisfy which advisees need not or, to put it the other way around, there are conditions which one as advisee can satisfy but which one as adviser cannot. For example,

although the child egocentric cannot be in a position to receive advice it does not follow that the egoist cannot receive advice. We have seen that the egoist cannot be in a position to advise another person but there evidently is nothing which prohibits his being an advisee (other conditions of course being satisfied). The reason for this is not difficult to identify. Normally when one asks for advice one is asking how he can best promote his own interests, ends, or objectives and normally our advice to others is tapered, all things considered, to help him do just that. So there is nothing incompatible between or odd about being an egoist and being an advisee--though it does seem unlikely that the egoist could be in a position to receive moral advice (see Chapter V). A second and related case where advisee and adviser conditions do not match is this: whereas being an adviser necessitates taking the other person's (advisee) point of view into consideration or of having at least minimal respect for the other person (as earlier defined) being an advisee does not require that such a condition be satisfied. Again the likely exception here is the receiving of moral advice but apart from this there is no reason at all for imposing the "minimal respect for others" condition on advisees. In receiving economic, legal, medical, spiritual advice for instance, or even "backyard" advice. I am, qua advisee, not normally committed to taking into account the interests (etc.) of other persons since it is in the nature of receiving non-moral advice that I do so to enhance my own ends or my own well-being without regard for the position of other people. I ask for medical advice to promote or improve my health; for economic advice, to improve the return on my investments; vocational

advice to obtain a better job; spiritual advice to put myself in a better relationship with God; and so on. These, on the whole, are private and personal matters which do not have a social commitment; and in getting advice on these various matters I am simply highlighting the typical prudential thrust of being an advisee. This does not rule out my having respect for others, it simply does not exercise it or require that it be exercised. To be sure, in asking for advice I exercise my respect for my adviser in that I believe him to be a wise and judicious person. I respect his ability to give sound advice. But this kind of respect is not the respect we speak of when we talk about taking the other person's interests, point of view, etc., into account in advising him to do one thing rather than another.

Other conditions which advisers but not advisees are to meet are: (a) a grasp of the main logical points of advising, (b) substantial and wide-ranging personal experience particularly of situations involving difficult personal decisions, (c) imagination, and (d) knowledge, understanding, expertise or insight into the domain or subject area from (or in) which the advice is drawn. The fact that one does not understand the logic of advising is not sufficient to deny him the role of advisee though he should at least be aware, in a rudimentary way, of what reasons are since advice necessarily has the backing of reasons. That is, he should be able to see the point of the reasons which are given for the particular piece of advice he receives and to detect whether the reasons are for him sufficiently compelling to accept the advice. Respecting (b) and (c) while it is apparently a requirement of normal development that one have social experience

especially with one's peers in childhood, the advisee need not and more than likely will not have had experience in which difficult, trying decisions in a certain domain have had to be made; further it is not necessary that in the receiving of at least non-moral advice one have a developed imagination since it is not normally the case that in deciding whether or not to accept a piece of non-moral advice one must imaginatively put oneself in another person's position or imagine reversing roles with that other. Finally, respecting (d) it is usually the advisee's deficiency in knowledge, understanding, expertise or insight in some matter or domain in light of which he initially seeks advice. To a large extent, giving advice is conveying information to the advisee which the latter is presumed to be without though it is wrong to conclude that the information is always or necessarily of a strictly factual nature. The information could consist of certain principles, or of probabilities (predictions, suppositions, etc.); it could be about certain aims, goals, objectives for the advisee to consider pursuing, and so on. In sum it is deficiencies respecting (a) to (d) which place one in a good position to receive advice that also prevents one from being in a position to give advice.

In Chapter II I drew attention to the logical distinction between (i) the adviser's saying to someone to do such and such and (ii) the advisee's deciding whether or not to do what the adviser suggests doing. I did so to point out the responsibility of the advisee in the adviser-advisee relationship and thence to show that there is no causal connection between the adviser's saying something and the advisee's deciding to act accordingly, though there may be a causal

connection between the way in which an adviser says something and his advisee's doing it. The relevance of the logical distinction for the present discussion is just this; the advisee is free to accept, reject or modify the advice he receives, to act or not act on it as the case may be. The decision is his and no one else's, especially not the adviser's. In the final analysis the advisee "goes it alone" though his doing so is partly dependent on his adviser giving him guidance (relevant input) on the matter and partly on his ability to reflect and ultimately to choose one course of action over another. Being in a position to choose is thus essential to being in a position of advisee. Conditions which hamper or frustrate choice are sufficient to block one's being in that position. To the extent that one is a strict conformist to group norms and standards (or to the views of one authoritative individual) and who therefore is psychologically unable to make genuine choices as between alternative courses of action, one cannot be in a position to be advised. Consider for example, the case of the student whose obsessive passions for her teacher leads her blindly to do all that he requests of her or even suggests to her. She is so closely tied to him that whatever he says is sufficient to block out from her view all other considerations. Thus she is, in effect, unable to choose between alternative views and (or) courses of action. His advice to her on some matter would be an occasion for unquestioning obedience rather than an occasion for thought, reflection and, ultimately, choice. She would not see it as advice because she could not--that is, because she is unable to distinguish between "the teacher said to me to do this" and "the teacher advised me to do this." The

latter entails reasons and hence involves choice, whereas the former does not necessarily entail reasons nor involve choice.²⁶

The position of the advisee as chooser (and as recognizer of good reasons for doing something) is best brought out by the case of one's receiving conflicting pieces of advice from different sources. Suppose you are uncertain about the best course of action to take in some situation and you ask one person for advice who replies that you ought to do X; then you ask another person and he says you ought to do Y, not X (X and Y being incompatible courses of action). What do you do? You could go on getting further advice, then tally up your pieces of advice as to whether they support on balance doing X or doing Y; or you could examine the different reasons given for your doing X and your doing Y and judge which seems to you to be the weightiest reason(s) overall. In the end however you have to choose which course of action to take. Closing one's eyes and blindly going for one piece of advice over another is not choosing. If you are not prepared to reflect on the reasons offered by your various advisers for doing X on the one hand and Y on the other in the light of the requirements of your present situation and your objectives, then your seeking advice in the first place was a hollow move on your part because evidently you do not at bottom wish to be in a position to choose for yourself what you ought to do. In advising contexts, especially where pieces of advice

²⁶This case should not be confused with that of having respect for one's teacher. Respect for one's teacher (because he is wise or knowledgeable or understanding or fair, etc.) recognizes a distance and distinction between oneself and the other person whereas the example cited above blurs and tends to collapse this distinction. Respect for another does not prevent one from receiving advice from that other; but obsessive passion for that other normally does.

conflict, choosing what one ultimately is to do involves (a) knowing what one most wants, (b) knowing one's limitations, and one's present position and other relevant aspects of his situation, and (c) matching that piece of advice (from among other possible though incompatible pieces) which best fits one's situation, i.e., the piece which is most likely to solve satisfactorily the problem at hand. Being an advisee therefore not only involves being free and able to choose (and face choice-situations) but being able to reflect soberly on one's situation in the light of the array of advice before one--advice, some of which may profitably cast additional light on one's own situation. Thus, being in a position of advisee involves certain activities of mind such as reflecting, planning, deliberating, judging, etc. which are logically prior to the activity of choosing one piece of advice over another.

One might argue however that such situations of conflict in advising are uncommon and that normally when one receives advice he just follows it more or less automatically. But what does this mean? It could mean (I suppose) that when people receive advice they follow it without reflecting on it or on the reasons given; they follow the advice, in other words, as a matter of course. Hence one might argue that normally we do not choose to follow our adviser's injunctions, and therefore the condition of being a chooser is not required of one qua advisee. Yet choosing is inescapably part of the advisee's role. Even if one more or less just follows whatever his adviser suggests doing, it is the case that the former must thereby have respect for his adviser and have confidence in what his adviser says; and this

presupposes a careful choosing of one's adviser in the first place. It is true of course, that one does not often know enough about a person when one first seeks advice from him; but if one is unsatisfied or unhappy about the advice one is receiving one is free to choose another adviser. There would indeed be something odd about an advisee claiming that his adviser is misguided or that he lacks respect for and confidence in his adviser but still goes on following that person's advice. Further, one need only to follow (as a matter of course) bad advice once to realize that he alone is responsible and that he could have done otherwise--i.e., chosen differently.

Yet it may still be thought by some that, by couching our discussion of the advisee conditions in terms of mental activities like reflecting, deliberating, deciding, choosing, we are pitching our account too high and therein denying many the opportunity of ever receiving advice. For is it not the case (they would say) that we advise another to do something precisely because that person is unable to decide for himself what he is to do--that our advising, in other words, is clearly our getting that other person out of some situation from which he can not extricate himself? This, I fear, is a misleading way of speaking about advising and it turns on an ambiguity in the expression "unable to decide." If by "unable to decide" we mean that the advisee does not have the requisite information, knowledge or understanding about some external matter or even about certain aspects of his own situation such that in light of this deficiency he cannot decide what to do, then it is not a misconception to say that we advise others who are unable to decide for themselves given their present lack

of information. Here "unable" does not mean a deficiency in performing certain mental tasks (e.g., reflecting, deciding, etc.) but a deficiency on the part of the advisee in relevant data. Or if by "unable to decide" we mean that one has certain conflicting interests, purposes, goals, etc., and cannot decide what to do because he is uncertain which of these he desires to pursue most, then there is nothing unusual about the claim that we advise others who are unable to decide for themselves given their present uncertainty about the relative strengths of their interests. Again the advisee is merely deficient in certain information which (if he had) would help him clarify and (or) rank his desires and objectives. To inform another and to assist that other in clarifying priorities is not to decide for that other what he is to do but to lay the groundwork for him to decide. On the other hand if by "unable to decide" we mean that the advisee cannot make decisions, see the point of reason, etc., because of certain mental inabilities or emotional instabilities that cloud and distort his thinking or because of (other) psychological disorders and defects, then it is simply meaningless to say that we advise people because they themselves are unable to decide what they are to do. It is meaningless since in this last sense of "unable" it is simply not possible to say of persons with the disabilities in question that they can be in positions to receive advice in the first place. Thus when we speak of giving others advice because they are unable to decide for themselves what to do, unless we wish to be speaking unintelligibly we had better use "unable to decide" in one or other (or both) of the first two senses identified above, not the last sense. In using language in the way suggested here it would then be false to say that

our advising another is our getting that person out of some predicament he could not extricate himself from. He must get out of it himself; our advising him hopefully will be of help to him.

Our claim that the account of the advisee is not "too rich" can be strengthened, I believe, by an appeal to the findings of developmental psychology. To perform the mental acts associated with being a chooser not only presupposes freedom from various constraints but a requisite level of cognitive maturity as well. If the mental acts in question are such that they require a level of cognitive maturity that is reached (say) only in adulthood or perhaps later life or only by a very few people then our account apparently would be too rich. Let us therefore briefly determine what age groups would likely be excluded from the role of advisee by appealing to stages of development both in respect of cognitive maturity and absence of certain external constraints (social-moral maturity).

To take the latter, and by now the more familiar, case first we may say that since young children, according to Piaget et al., are under the influence of adult constraint and unilateral respect for authority figures (i.e., adults) it seems to follow that they (children) are thereby unable (because basically unfree) to make genuine choices between alternative views and courses of action. Assuming this to be so, then because young children (under age 9) are generally not free or not sufficiently free to choose they are not in a position to be advised; and thus it seems that parents, teachers and other adults who attempt to advise young children will almost always fail in their efforts. They will fail because they will not be seen by the children

to be advising; and they will not thus be seen because young children basically conceive of adult injunctions as objects of obedience. This will be particularly so if teachers, parents and others use the imperative sentence (which, of course, they are entitled to do) in their attempts to advise young children for evidently, the young child will not be able to distinguish between the use of the imperative sentence to advise and the use of it to command or to order--their conceiving of all imperative sentences uttered by adults as commands. Even if adults attempt to advise these young children by using the subjunctive or ought sentences or the explicit advising sentence it is still unlikely that the latter will conceive of what is being said to them as anything other than commands or orders. For what the child at this stage perceives is not just what is said but more significantly who says it and the way (tone of voice etc.) in which it is said--in this case, adults in positions of authority over him and speaking firmly, all of which is normally a sufficient contingent condition for the young child's obedience. To generalize somewhat, it seems unlikely then that on this basis children in elementary school in the main below about fifth grade would be in a position to be advised whereas those in middle school (or senior public school) and secondary school could be in a position to be advised by adults. I say "could" because it is well to recall at this point that stages of cognitive and moral development are more than age-related. If a twelve, fourteen or sixteen year-old student is to be in a position to be advised other developmental conditions have to be satisfied, as we have seen, notably that of social experience (interaction) in peer groups thereby enabling the development

of mutual co-operation and respect (and without which it would be difficult if not impossible for one to make genuine choices as between alternative views and courses of action). It is not impossible that an adolescent or adult still be at that stage of development typically associated with the four to eight year old group. However the age categories remind us that the development (say) of mutual respect and co-operation is not likely to manifest itself much before pre-adolescence; and that typically by pre-adolescence the freeing of oneself from much of the adult constraint of earlier years is in the completing phases (other things being equal). So on the basis of one's being relatively free from phenomena like Piaget's adult constraint and unilateral respect, it seems that, on average, persons from pre-adolescence upward can be in positions to be advised though it does not follow that any such person is in a position to be advised.

Obviously this is not a sufficient condition for being an advisee. By the period of pre-adolescence does the individual normally have the requisite cognitive maturity in order to reflect, deliberate, judge and choose? To answer this we must turn to what Piaget, Kohlberg and others have to say about "operational thinking." For our purposes it will suffice to refer to just the last two stages (or eras) of operational thinking, namely "concrete operational thought" and "formal operational thought." The former is characteristic of the thinking of young children from about ages six to ten.²⁷ Success at concrete operational thinking is apparently picked out by the child's mastery of

²⁷ Kohlberg and Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World," p. 1063.

certain relational operations with concrete objects (e.g., grouping, classifying, placing in series, conserving, etc.). Thus the level of thought tied to concrete operations is circumscribed by one's experience with physical external objects (things) in one's environment. For the concrete operational person the "real" is the physical world and in particular that part of the physical world with which he has had personal experience. Normally he is unable to imagine or envisage possibilities, events, occurrences that he has not already experienced in the physical world; so it is extremely unlikely that he could predict or forecast consequences of actions that have not yet taken place in his space and his time. Thus concrete operational thinking is limiting thinking but evidently necessary, nonetheless, for one's passage into the era of formal operational thinking which is characteristic of the thinking of individuals generally from age eleven to adulthood.²⁸ Apparently as this stage develops it is possible for one "to see relations as simultaneously reciprocal," to "order triads of propositions or relations" and eventually to construct all possible combinations of relations . . . and (to undertake finally) deductive hypothesis-testing."²⁹ The era of formal operational thought is the era of "reasoning about reasoning." It is thus possible for the individual capable of formal operational thinking to anticipate conditions different from those in his immediate experience. Unending possibilities open up. One can envisage or project events into the future and imagine or conceive of oneself exchanging roles with other

²⁸Ibid., p. 1063.

²⁹Ibid.

persons. The "real" is no longer just the external physical world but in addition the internal world of ideas, thoughts, concepts, abstractions and so on. Hence formal operational thinking is (or tends to be) liberating thinking.

Now being in a position to make choices as between alternative views, courses of action etc. involves, in part, being able to envisage and project consequences of events yet to take place and being able to judge whether such consequences are what one really wants or what fits with one's situation or one's projected situation. To think in this way is at least to have a conception of the future as real (not just of the present and the immediate as real). These activities of mind (reflecting, deliberating, envisaging, etc.) as we have already noticed are logically prior and necessary for choosing. It is evidently the case then that the level of cognitive maturity required for being in a position to choose is that characterized by formal operational thinking. And since choosing itself is a condition of being an advisee, given the adviser's input, we may say that the level of cognitive maturity required for receiving and acting on advice of at least a non-moral kind is also that characterized by formal operational thinking. And finally since one does not normally begin to think at this level until pre-adolescence (about age 11 according to Kohlberg), assuming prior mastery of concrete operational thinking, it would seem that the middle school (or senior public school) student can be in a position to be advised from the point of view of having sufficient cognitive maturity. Again, caution is in order. This does not mean that everyone from age eleven onwards is in a position to receive advice, because not everyone from that age is cognitively mature in the sense of having

reached and mastered the level of formal operational thinking. Kohlberg reminds us that sizeable proportions of adults never develop the capacity for abstract thought, but of those who do, most develop it in early adolescence (age eleven to fifteen).³⁰ However, these findings on the whole square well with the ones on a few pages ago in which it was stated that it is also at the period of pre-adolescence when one is (normally) sufficiently free from external adult constraint and pressure to be in a position to make choices for oneself. Evidently then there is a (rough) parallel between the rate of cognitive development and social-moral development³¹ such that during pre-adolescence both lines of development enter into new and important stages respectively, each of which turn out to be requisite stages for being in the position of advisee (and, of course, for that matter, adviser). In the former case it is the stage of formal operational thinking and in the latter, the stage of co-operation, mutual respect and reciprocity. These findings do not suggest that our account of the advisee is pitched too high by making it possible for too few to receive advice. For if the findings are (generally) correct then we can say it is at least in principle possible for students in the upper elementary school years and beyond to be in positions to be advised to do one thing rather than another.

In reply to the second general question posed at the outset of the chapter, namely "Who can be advised?" I answer that to be advised one must have (a) facility with the language, (b) staying, attentive

³⁰Ibid., p. 1065.

³¹Ibid., p. 1072.

or heeding power, (c) awareness of self and others, (d) freedom to choose (and all that that involves respecting social and cognitive developments.) These conditions are also conditions for the adviser but there, we recall, the list was longer, indicating that the adviser has other conditions to meet which the advisee does not. In addition, we have noted that the advisee can satisfy certain conditions which the adviser cannot, at least in so far as the giving and accepting of non-moral advice is concerned (or so it appears). There seems to be no reason why egoists cannot be in a position to accept non-moral advice, or a person who disregards the interests of others, provided these people satisfy the above conditions (a) to (d) which they can, with consistency, do. Further, the advisee must recognize that he is in a position to demand reasons for the advice he is given; it is within his right to do so. We do not speak of the adviser demanding reasons for his advisee. In summary we may say that in so far as the giving of non-moral advice is concerned, while the adviser still has a moral role to play, the advisee need only have a prudential role to play; hence an important difference between advisers and advisees (in addition of course, to the other differences noted on pp. 190-193.

CHAPTER V

MORAL ADVISING IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

In this chapter I propose to examine three related issues: (i) the concept of moral advice, (ii) the teacher as moral adviser, and (iii) the student as moral advisee. Regarding (ii) I shall build the discussion there on the necessary conditions for the adviser to meet which I established in the last chapter. Respecting (iii) I shall analyse the position of the student advisee from the point of view of the stages of moral development typically found in the 13-18 year age span.

5.1 Moral Advice

When I use the expression "moral advice" I am assuming that the term "moral" provides a classification rather than an evaluation of the advice. I am not saying then that the expression "moral advice" means "good advice" as I do when I use the expression "moral person" to mean "good person." Rather by "moral advice" I intend to classify the advice thus differentiating it from other classes or kinds of advice such as medical, legal economic, vocational, spiritual, etc. advice. My use of "moral" in "moral advice" is to be contrasted with "non-moral" not "immoral." If I want to evaluate a piece of moral advice then I shall have to add such modifiers as "good" or "bad," "sound" or "unsound," "helpful" or "misleading." As I am

using the expression "X is a piece of moral advice" here it does not of itself tell us whether it is good or bad advice. Judgments about the soundness (unsoundness) of a piece of moral advice are made in the light of criteria that differ from those for classifying advice as moral, or economic, legal and so on.

To talk about moral advice as distinct from these other kinds of advice presupposes that the moral domain (domain of morality) can be differentiated from other domains like the medical, legal, economic, and so on. That is to say, we should be able to give some specification of the moral domain in light of which the notion of moral advice can begin to take shape. Prior to describing moral advice we need to describe the moral domain on which the former will feed. In the last chapter I attempted to mark out some of the features of morality--features of both a formal and material kind. There I said, on the material side, that morality concerns the relations of one individual to others and that it calls for a consideration of the effects of one's actions on others from their point of view. On the formal side I examined the features of universalizability and prescriptivity. I take it that these items (both the material and formal) are what fill in (at least partially) the moral domain and which therefore help mark off that domain from other domains. Filling in these other (non-moral) domains seems to be a wholly descriptive function. The moral domain, on the other hand, has its special difficulties in this regard for when one attempts to specify its content that activity inevitably is charged as being non-neutral. The charge specifically is that in explicating the moral

domain one is not in fact describing the constituents of that domain but is, rather, stating a preference for those constituents over some others. In "describing" the moral domain one is charged with appealing to presupposed moral standards and thence that the whole attempt is question-begging right from the start. I am not at all sure that this problem--if it is a problem--can be solved; and I know of no one who has satisfactorily worked his way through it. Fortunately the solution of the problem is not really germane to the balance of this study. The position that I shall take on this matter is simply that in describing the moral domain--in specifying its constituents--a non-neutral stance cannot be avoided. To describe morality is to make a moral stand. Thus in saying that morality is about (in part) the effects of one person's actions on others from their point of view or to say that morality has a social dimension to it is to take a moral position however minimal that might be.

In the giving of non-moral advice, of which there are numerous examples in this study, a minimum of two people are involved--the adviser and the advisee. The problem in light of which an advisee seeks assistance or in light of which advice is given is assumed to be a personal one, i.e., one that does not have ramifications respecting the interests or concerns of other people. A doctor advises a young bachelor to stop smoking. It is in his own best interests to do so. The concern here is strictly a prudential one. Five years later, the young man is married, has two children, heavy mortgage payments and still enjoys his cigarettes. The doctor again advises him to stop smoking. This time however the doctor's reasons

are expanded beyond the earlier prudential ones. "Your premature death would leave your wife and children in an extremely difficult situation. It is no longer just in your own best interests to stop smoking but also in their best interests. Think of the struggle they would have if you weren't around." The advice given in both cases is essentially the same but the reasons given for the advice in each case are substantially different. They are different because at the time of the young man's second visit to the doctor the former's situation had radically changed. He now has dependents whose welfare is to be taken into consideration whereas before he need only consider his own welfare. At the time of the first visit the doctor need only offer prudential considerations for his advice; at the second visit he offers moral considerations which take into account the interests of a third party beyond the advisee. In the first case the advice given was strictly prudential advice; in the second it was moral advice. A major feature then which justifies re-classifying the same advice (essentially) from "prudential" to "moral" is the others-regarding considerations that are taken into account. This presupposes that the interests of a third party are relevant to what the advisee may decide to do--relevant to the extent that the interests or well-being of the party are likely to be affected by the advisee's actions.¹

¹It should not be thought however that the foregoing example serves as a model for showing how we get from prudential advice to moral advice. As a model it would be both oversimplified and misleading. For it indicates that the only change in going from prudential to moral advice is in the kinds of reasons the adviser appeals to and that back up the advice to another--the actual advice itself remaining unchanged. In the above example the content of the advice (from prudential to moral) remained unchanged because it would have served the

In the giving of moral advice then it seems that a minimum of three persons are involved--the adviser, the advisee and what I will call the "third party." This is the party whose wants, needs and (or) interests stand to be affected by the proposed actions of the advisee. The third party is also referred to as "others." In the above example the third party consists of the advisee's immediate family. In other cases or situations it might be but one person; or it might consist of the groups (social and working) in which the advisee daily circulates; and in some cases the third party might well pick out the members of the entire community. This conception of moral advising that takes into account both the interests of the agent (advisee) and that of others when the agent's situation is such that his actions are likely to affect others, follows directly from the analysis both of advising and of the moral domain. In advising per se the point of view taken into account is that of the advisee; in the strictly moral domain it is that of others as well. Thus in moral

best interests of the advisee in both cases, though in the second case it would also have served the best interests of his family too. All this is perhaps coincidental. In many cases where one goes from strictly prudential to moral advice by introducing relevant others--regarding considerations the act advised also changes at the same time. Thus in advising situations where relevant moral considerations have been introduced and take precedence over the other existing considerations (which formerly had precedence) the advisee may more than likely be advised to follow a new course of action now which would benefit others but no longer himself (at least in the short run); and the same piece of advice cannot both suggest that he follow a course of action that would be to his advantage and that would not be to his advantage. So in going from an earlier piece of strictly prudential advice to moral advice the advice itself will normally be changed (unlike our above example).

advising the two points of view, that of the advisee and of the "others," are thereby brought together for consideration. The one view centers on what is desirable for the advisee; the other on what is desirable for the third party.

But this conception presents certain fairly obvious difficulties. Let us consider some of these from the position of the adviser in this tripartite relationship. In non-moral advising where, strictly speaking, only the personal interests of the advisee are at stake it is the job of the adviser (as we have seen) to take those interests into account and thence to advise doing what will most likely promote the well-being of the advisee himself. Such an activity involves temporarily taking the point of view of the advisee. In moral advising on the other hand it seems that the "vision" and "adaptability" of the adviser must be substantially extended to include now the point of view of the third party likely to be affected by the advisee's actions. Thus the moral adviser at once must be able not only to cast himself into the position of the advisee but also into that of the third party. In the former position the adviser imagines himself as the advisee with the advisee's problem and asks "Would I, if I were this advisee, find doing such and such (i.e., following the advice) acceptable for me?" In the latter position the adviser also imagines himself as the third party asking "Would I be prepared if I were this person, to accept the consequences of the advisee's acting on the proposed advice?" In other words the moral adviser must be able to see a proposed possible solution to an advisee's problem (i.e., must be able to see the advice) from two

logically distinct points of view--that of the advisee and that of the third party. Evidently the moral adviser must judge impartially what is in the best interests of the persons occupying these logically distinct positions. Advising per se commits him to act in the best interests of his advisee to the extent that the advice he gives if acted upon will be to the advisee's advantage as far as one can tell; and yet morality commits the moral adviser apparently to act also in the best interests of the third party to the extent that his advice be such that if acted upon by the advisee will not be disadvantageous to that party. Now if the best interests of the advisee happen to be such that in following the advice the best interests of the third party are also promoted then the burden on the adviser is clearly lessened. If however this is not the case--if what will serve the advisee will disserve the third party--are we not placing the moral adviser in an unreasonable if not impossible position from which to adjudicate between the advisee and the third party since he is presumably to be taking the best interests of both qua moral adviser into account and advising accordingly? Is not the moral adviser in some kind of dilemma here out of which he cannot satisfactorily work his way? It might even be asked "Is the notion of moral advice not paradoxical?"

There are different responses that can be made to this point. I have suggested that in moral advising the basis from which the adviser reaches a piece of moral advice be expanded over that for non-moral advice in respect of the kinds of reasons appealed to. Normally reasoning in moral advising consists in appealing to both

moral and prudential considerations. In Chapter III, where prudential advising was discussed, only prudential considerations were called upon to support a piece of advice there. Now in those cases where a piece of proposed advice if followed by the advisee would serve his own interests but disserve those of a third party the moral adviser must be prepared to re-examine the reasons by assigning relative weights to them so that one or other of the sets of reasons (prudential or moral) are justifiably superior in the situation. The reasons given the greater weight will thus support the drawing of one kind of advice rather than some other. If after due deliberation the moral adviser judges the moral considerations in the case to be the weightier then he will advise taking that course of action which benefits the third person or party but not necessarily the advisee. On the other hand if the prudential reasons are judged to be the weightier the act advised will be that which benefits the advisee not the third party.

It will be claimed that this last case is simply not possible in the domain of moral advising. Someone will argue that in moral advising the moral or others-regarding reasons must take precedence over self-regarding reasons in cases of conflict of interest and that under those circumstances moral advice must not be such as to serve the interests of the advisee at the expense of the third party. The view that moral considerations take precedence over self-regarding ones is held, for example, by Baier. "The very raison d'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's following self-interest would

be harmful to everyone. Hence moral reasons are superior to all others."² Of course if Baier is right that moral reasons are superior to all others then as a moral adviser one has a good guide to use in assigning weights to the moral and prudential considerations (when they conflict) in reaching a piece of advice. One would, after the fashion of Baier, assign the greater weight to the moral consideration whenever one's advisee is in a situation in which his acting on the proposed advice would adversely affect the desires and interests of others. This would mean that in all such cases the interests of the third party would at least be protected if not positively promoted while the interests of the advisee may well be disadvantageously placed at least in the short run. In short using Baier's guide (as I will call it) would relieve one qua moral adviser of the burden of having to take up imaginatively the position of the third party. At least it would solve one's problem as adviser in being committed to give a piece of advice that would at once be in the best interests of both advisee and the third party in those situations where their interests are at odds. The adviser would simply say that moral considerations are special, that they must take precedence over any other kind of consideration.

How rigorously does Baier intend the reader to treat his claim that moral reasons are superior to all others? Are they always superior; or is it possible that moral reasons could on some occasions be justifiably over-ruled by other ones. On the other hand Baier's

²Baier, The Moral Point of View, p. 309.

claim is pointed in the right direction for is it not normally the case that if doing X is desirable from the point of view of the third party then "I advise you to do X" is a good piece of advice to give? Or if doing Y would hamper or interfere with the third party in its pursuit of its own interests and goals then is not this a good reason for advising against that course of action? However would these sorts of reasons always be superior? Baier says that only in those cases when everyone's following self-interest would be harmful to everyone do moral reasons take precedence over other reasons. Thus if everyone's following self-interest would not be harmful to everyone then presumably moral reasons would lose their superiority. But Baier seems to think this latter situation is not empirically possible. If moral reasons lose their superiority a state of nature obtains. Thus moral reasons really are superior to all others. I should want to leave open, however, at least the possibility that there may be situations in which the moral reasons, though relevant, are not superior say to reasons of self-interest or to reasons of other kinds; and hence there may well be cases where advising a person to do that which benefits him in the long run but not the third party is justified and that such cases could be cases of moral advising in which the advice given is moral advice.

As an example consider the case of a young artist who has very evident artistic talent and who is thus capable of making a significant contribution to art given an opportunity and a proper environment in which to work. However it turns out he is married to a devoted but also a very dependent woman. The artist is now convinced

being in a husband-wife relationship is a severe constraint on his development as an artist. He believes that he cannot ever be in a position to do the creative work (perhaps "masterpieces") which he and others both know he is capable of doing unless he deserts his wife. Yet he knows his desertion will cause his wife inordinate hardships. Thus the young artist is torn between this fact (and the fact of his commitment to her in the marriage vow) on the one hand and his desire on the other hand to pursue an objective not only for which he is more than capable but one which provides for him the essence of his existence. If he asks for advice what would one advise him to do? In citing this example I have in mind the artist Gauguin who did in fact desert his wife in order to pursue his artistic interests and thereupon produced works of art which by most standards are judged as "masterpieces" in the Post-Impressionist tradition. Had Gauguin not deserted his wife at this crucial point in his life it is arguable that today there would be fewer significant works of art. How important a consideration would this fact be if one were asked to give advice to a young artist like Gauguin in a situation where if he did not desert his wife he would not likely have produced great works of art. In a situation like this aesthetic considerations might well take precedence over moral considerations. To be sure the adviser would have to know a good deal more both about the young artist and his abilities, his wife (the sort of person she is, etc.) and their relationship, in order to reach a decision on the weight to be attached to these considerations. Indeed, there would also be prudential considerations to take account of for clearly what the young artist wants to do and

what (so it seems) would be in his best interests overall would be his pursuing his artistic career uninterruptedly. If as adviser one were to give superiority to the aesthetic consideration--the fact that his being free to paint enables him to increase significantly the stock of great works of art--one also promotes in the advice one gives him, his own personal well-being if it is the case that all that he can take delight in is just his own creative work.

It seems to me that this kind of case slips through Baier's guide (as I understand it). Moral reasons are superior to all others if everyone's following self-interest would be harmful to everyone. Now in the above example we could not generalize in this way because it is not possible for everyone to have the abilities and temperaments commensurate with those of great artists. To pursue self-interests in this sort of example is contingent on having these exceptional requisite abilities. Only very few could in fact follow self-interests here and their following their self-interests would not be harmful to everyone. So I take it to be possible to say of this kind of example that the moral considerations are not necessarily superior to all others. The prudential considerations or aesthetic (or both) might take precedence over the moral even though in advising a young artist to desert his wife in order to pursue his career the woman is placed at a clear disadvantage. I wish to say again that this case and this kind of advice would still in my view be called a moral case and moral advice, respectively, even though non-moral considerations are given the greater weight in the deliberations that lead up to the particular piece of advice. This is so because the

ultimate question being decided here is a moral question--namely a question about whether we are to advise a course of action favoring the advisee or one favoring the third party (assuming we cannot do both to their satisfaction). If there were no third party or if the interests of the third party didn't relate to the desire (aim, objective) of the advisee then the situation would not be a moral one and the advice would not be moral advice. But this is not the case here. There is a third party, her interests and well-being are connected to the advisee's (artist) desires and those interests are considered though, on balance, they do not override. Indeed it is the tension between the moral and non-moral considerations which helps make the overall situation a moral one; and the fact that in the final analysis the advice favors the non-moral considerations is not sufficient to say that either the advice itself is non-moral or that it is bad moral advice. In moral situations and in situations of moral advising the interests of all parties concerned are to be considered. If the advisee's self-interests take precedence over moral considerations then there must be certain further reasons to support this preference --say the special position of the advisee or special entitlements. In strictly prudential advising these extra considerations need not apply. But in the present case they do and such considerations would doubtless consist of the following facts: (a) exceptional artistic talent, (b) concomitant production of significant works of art, (c) the necessity of being free from marital constraints to bring (b) about. In the absence of special considerations of the kind the moral

reasons would indeed be superior and the advisee would be urged not to abandon his wife.

If one gives up Baier's guide for use in assigning weights to the various considerations in reaching pieces of moral advice, a price must be paid. It will be recalled that I appealed to his guide as a possible means for lessening the "load" on the moral adviser. That load consists of the adviser's having to place himself imaginatively in two logically distinct positions (advisee and third party) and judging what would best serve the interests of both (ideally). If these interests are incompatible how best is the adviser to adjudicate? Baier's view would be that the moral or third party interests are superior to all other considerations; and this seemed helpful until the artist's example was examined which seemed to support a somewhat broader interpretation of moral advice-giving. There is however another response to the so-called adviser's dilemma. This consists in the adviser shifting part of the burden of reasoning onto the advisee; specifically that part in which the position of the third party is imaginatively taken up by the latter. Thus the adviser might say to advisee "Imagine yourself in the place of this other (third) person and then ask yourself 'Would I want what my proposed actions would do to him be done to me also?'" This move on the part of the adviser is aimed at getting the advisee to recognize that his actions have ramifications beyond himself--that in a sense his problem is not just his alone but that it has a public dimension to it--by getting him to reflect imaginatively on the plight of the third person as the "receiver" of the consequences of his own (advisee's) actions. I am

reminded here of what Dewey calls "sympathy" in a moral situation. He says "The emotion of sympathy is morally invaluable Intelligent sympathy widens and deepens concern for consequences. To put ourselves in the place of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims and values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they assume in the eyes of the impartial observer, is the surest way to appreciate what justice demands in concrete cases."³ Load-shifting by the adviser is certainly facilitated if the advisee has the sympathy of which Dewey speaks.

A number of possibilities now arise. The first is that the advisee is sympathetically attuned to others in the way indicated and is thus disposed to be guided by the others-regarding situation without the adviser himself having to take up that point of view for him and having to tell him what it would be like to be "over there" on the receiving end of his own actions. The second possibility is that while the advisee recognizes the existence of a third party and their interests he fails to see that these interests are of concern to him in deciding what he is to do. As far as the advisee is concerned the well-being of a third party is not relevant to his case; their interests simply do not count insofar as his own actions are concerned. Thus he is not disposed to consider others-regarding reasons as relevant. A third possibility is that the advisee simply fails to recognize that there is a third party whose members will be affected by his actions qua advisee.

³John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1932), p. 107.

Clearly the first possibility is non-problematic for the adviser or at least is relatively so. The second and third possibilities are problematic for the adviser. I shall consider here only the second one since the remarks made about it will apply to a considerable extent to the third possibility as well. Suppose then that a moral adviser has an advisee who fits the second possibility described above. In this situation the advisee either simply fails to see that his actions have ramifications beyond himself or he openly disputes with the adviser that his problem has a public dimension to it. That is to say, the advisee may challenge the advisor's "reading" of the case. The former may claim that the adviser's inclusion of moral considerations is mistaken--that his problem is not a moral problem but strictly a private and personal one. So the adviser's recommendation that the advisee do such and such because of the others-regarding considerations presumably would be rejected out of hand by the advisee. This being the case there are two moves open to the adviser assuming his assessment of the situation is correct. He could try to convince rationally the advisee that moral considerations really do apply to the latter's situation by bringing forward further reasons in support of the others-regarding considerations already cited by him. These further reasons would of necessity be increasingly broader in scope so as to be inclusive of the earlier reasons. For example the adviser might point out that failure to take account of the interests of others ultimately places certain institutions, which are the fabric of one's society and which make the pursuits of personal goals possible, on shaky grounds. There is however a limit to reasoning

here. The adviser cannot continue to go behind reasons for further reasons which justify the former for very long. Reasoning soon comes to an end; and if in coming to an end the advisee still claims the third-party interests are irrelevant to his case there is nothing further the adviser can do in this direction--that is in the direction of providing reasons.

There is however a further move open to the moral adviser. Appeals to moral considerations in giving moral advice will not work for the type of advisee presently under consideration. Yet it does not follow that such an advisee is not in a position to receive some moral advice provided appropriate considerations are brought forward by the adviser. Appeals to prudential considerations appear to be in order. Whereas "I advise you to tell the truth else the good reputations of these people will be unjustifiably damaged" will not receive the assent of the present type of advisee, "I advise you to tell the truth else you risk indictment" will unless, of course, the advisee is a fanatic. Barring this, the second utterance which appeals to the advisee's own well-being as a reason for being advised to tell the truth stands a good chance of being heeded. Normally the advisee will be less likely to dispute the moral advice given him if it can be shown that in not following it his own interests are placed in jeopardy. This might be considered a negative approach to the giving of moral advice; for does this particular approach not concede that the advisee still continues to see the world from a self-interested point of view? To be sure it does. Further one might think that giving a piece of moral advice on purely prudential grounds is a

logically impossible move to make. But clearly it is not; for if a piece of good moral advice can be got across to an advisee by appealing to the effect that following that advice will have on the latter's own well-being then surely it is better that he be advised on prudential grounds than not at all (which at this point is the only other alternative). Moreover does this approach also not leave room for an egoist to be in a position to receive some moral advice?

There are however certain evident limitations to moral advice-giving in situations where only prudential reasons are considered. Appealing to prudential considerations in the way just indicated will by no means always transform seeming implausible moral advice (from advisee's point of view) into plausible moral advice. This kind of appeal works only in those situations where the adviser's moral recommendation to do one thing rather than another is of such a kind that following it also enables the advisee to preserve or protect his own well-being. It is doubtful that the following of all moral advice has this enabling feature built into it; for some pieces of moral advice, perhaps most in fact, will call for a course of action which if followed could not serve or preserve at one and the same time both the interests or well-being of advisee and third party but only that of the latter. In such cases, an appeal to strictly prudential considerations by the adviser in order to get the advisee to assent to a piece of moral advice is out of place because the prudential considerations here fail to bear at all on the advisee's situation. In other words the appeal here to prudential considerations to get the advisee to assent to a piece of moral advice is improper when, by the

nature of the act advised, following it in no way could be connected with the promotion of the interests or well-being of the advisee. Such a move or appeal by the adviser would be pure deception; for he would be trying to make the prudential consideration look as though it backed the advice he was giving when in fact it could not. Thus a second limitation is as follows. Just as reasoning comes to an end, so also must advising. If the advisee disputes the relevance of moral considerations and rejects them despite the adviser's attempt at justification of the advice by further and further appeals to reasons and if prudential (or other non-moral) considerations (unlike the above example of truth-telling) are not relevant then there is nothing further the adviser can do. Advising comes to an end. One could of course try to use various non-rational or psychological techniques (e.g., goading, brain-washing) to get another person to assent to doing something but these activities are logically distinct from advising and whatever one got the other person to do it could not be described as the latter's following advice nor could the former person be described as an adviser. If reasons fail and if a disagreement between the adviser and advisee persists respecting the relevance of the third party's interests to the advisee's situations, all an adviser can do at this point is simply to repeat his advice. He cannot qua adviser go on from here to cause or induce the advisee to follow the advice using say a psychological theory of meaning (following for example C. L. Stevenson's emotive theory of ethics). A line is thus drawn beyond which the adviser cannot step; and if he does

he is no longer functioning as an adviser to another but as that other's brain-washer or goader or something of that sort.

I turn now more specifically to the content of moral advice. This, one might say, consists of various moral issues while moral advising consists of specifying a course of action for the advisee to consider following relative to some moral issue. Moral issues commonly are thought to cover such items as honesty, truth-telling, debt-paying, promise-keeping, kindness, respect for others (including matters relating to sexual conduct) or stealing, cheating, lying deceiving physically harming others (including issues of abortion, capital punishment). Thus moral advising would be the act of saying to another in appropriate situations that he (she) ought (or ought not) to cheat, lie, keep a promise, pay a debt, help another, and so on. It would seem to follow that since moral principles commonly make these sorts of items their subjects one could give moral advice to another by making use of moral principles. For example, "I advise you to follow the principle 'one ought to tell the truth'" appears to be a perfectly good instance of giving moral advice. Whether or not it is will depend on what has gone on before the utterance is given by the adviser. It will depend on what the adviser has attended to in the advisee's situation and on how the adviser conceives of moral principles, in particular, their role or function. For simply knowing the moral principles is not sufficient for being in a position thereby to give moral advice. Further, moral principles are thought to satisfy a condition of generality which on the face of it does not make them suitable candidates for inclusion in the statement of a piece of moral

advice to another person--that statement having reference to a particular person in a concrete situation identified by certain specific features. I am inclined to think that the mere stating of a moral principle preceded by "I advise you to" is not a satisfactory way of giving moral advice to another person.

To be sure moral principles, and for that matter duties and obligations, have roles to play in moral advising contexts but it seems to me that their roles are best played out at other levels, not the level at which a piece of moral advice is given to another via a linguistic act. One such level is this. I find myself in a situation where two moral principles prescribe respectively that I both do and not do the same thing. One principle, P1, states that it is right to do X and the other, P2, that it is wrong to do X. I make a promise and therefore according to (say) P1 I ought to keep it. But my keeping a promise (as it turns out) will result in a life being taken or in the severe anguish of another and therefore according to P2 (one ought not to cause harm to another), I ought to break the promise. So at once I both ought and ought not to keep the promise. What then am I to do? Whichever way I act I do something of which I morally disapprove. A plausible move for a person to make in these cases is to seek moral advice from someone. Here then is a way in which moral principles get involved in moral advising--namely by providing a dilemmatic context or backdrop out of which moral advice-seeking may arise. When two principles prescribe that one both ought and ought not to perform the same act a climate is established in terms of which a person may seek moral advice. An advisee may not realize that

his moral problem or puzzle arises out of a context in which moral principles conflict but the moral adviser should be able to make clear to the advisee what the source of the latter's dilemma is and thence what principles are involved. Of course not all moral dilemmas are created in the same way. Some arise because of conflicts between two duties or between two obligations or between a principle and a duty or a principle and an obligation or a principle and a personal ideal. Others arise when it is unclear as to whether an agent is really under an obligation to do something in which case he needs clarification of his situation and further information. Any of these cases may be a sufficient condition for the seeking of moral advice.

The claim for the role of moral principles in moral advising thus far is rather a minimal one. A more positive or expansive claim can be made by considering a second level (way) at (in) which moral principles may function in moral advising, namely, at the level of reasoning in moral advising. At this point it will be helpful to say something about how moral principles are conceived of and how and at what stage they come into reasoning in moral advising. To begin, there is the view that moral principles are upheld in all circumstances --that they always apply and that in no situation are exceptions justified. Principles are thus construed to be rigid and fixed in both application and interpretation. Dewey suggests⁴ that this conception of principles has arisen because "their origin in experience" as well as "their proper use in further experience" is forgotten. He

⁴Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 136.

characterizes this view of principles as their existing "in and of themselves as if it were simply a question of bringing action under them in order to determine what is right and good." Accordingly, under the following principles, "one ought to tell the truth," "one ought not to take the life of another," all acts of lying, stealing and killing fall respectively, and are judged as "wrong." Now there are obvious difficulties with this conception of moral principles as principles to be rigorously upheld in all cases and, not surprisingly, attempts have been made to account in some way for exceptions to principles without substantial loss in the force of the latter.

According to one attempt, moral principles are initially "provisional" in nature but by building successive exceptions into them they become "precise" in nature. "Suppose that we start off with a principle never to say what is false, but regard this principle as provisional, and recognize that there may be exceptions. Suppose, then, that we decide to make an exception in the case of lies told in war-time to deceive the enemy. The rule has now become 'Never say what is false, except in war-time to deceive the enemy.' This principle, once the exception has been made explicit and included in the wording of the principle is not looser than it was before but tighter. In one large class of cases . . . the position is now regulated; the principle lays down that in these circumstances we may say what is false Thus, far from principles like 'Never say what is false' being in some way irredeemably loose, it is part of our moral development to turn them from provisional principles into precise principles with their exceptions

definitely laid down."⁵ Whereas on the former conception of principles they are described as "fixed," "rigid," on Hare's view in the final analysis they are described as "precise." Does this slightly modified terminology represent a significant shift in view or not?

According to Hare the principle "never say what is false" is provisional. The principle "never say what is false except in wartime to deceive the enemy" is less provisional, that is, more precise. By expanding the list of exceptions and enumerating them in the wording of the principle, the principle becomes increasingly precise. When all possible exceptions are enumerated the principle is precise. Thus for Hare "precise moral principle" means "moral principle with all its exceptions spelled out in it." Why does Hare stress precision in moral principles in this way? The answer to this lies in the role he has these principles play. That role is one of functioning as a major premise in a deductive argument which when conjoined with a factual minor premise entails a valid conclusion (in this case a moral judgment or imperative about what one is to do). Given the rigor of deduction it is necessary that a moral principle be conceived of as precise if that principle is to function as the major premise in the argument and as part of an entailment relationship. In deduction, any uncertainty attached to the premises must also be found in the conclusion. If the moral principle stated in the major premise is loose or imprecise so also must be the moral conclusion. To cast moral principles into the form of major premises

⁵Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 52-54.

is to demand that they be precise (i.e., stated with the possible exceptions laid out in the principle).

This conception of moral principles both with respect to the feature of precision (as Hare uses that term) and their role as major premises is, I believe, mistaken. It is mistaken on at least this one ground, namely that precision in moral principles is not possible to attain. For it to be possible for a principle to be precise (on Hare's terms) one would have to imagine all conceivable cases of exceptions to any given moral principle in order to state it as a precise principle. But how is one to know when all the possible exceptions to a principle have been imagined? How would one know when one has come to the end of the exceptions? And even if one could conceive of all possible cases of exceptions the principle would be so lengthy and so complex that it would not be possible to formulate it or state it. Further, even within the exceptions themselves there are ambiguities and possible further exceptions. Take Hare's first exception to the principle "never say what is false" namely "except in wartime to deceive the enemy." Does "wartime" cover cold wars as well as hot wars or just the latter? If only the latter, why just that? Cold-wartime could be interpreted as "all the time" so maybe lying is justifiable all the time to deceive the enemy. Then does "enemy" apply to peacetime as well as wartime? Do groups like the S.L.A. and the F.L.Q. count as "enemy?" Would one be justified in lying to deceive these people? Basically, what counts as "wartime," "peacetime," "enemy" and so on? Clearly within this first exception there are very substantial problems of both a conceptual and

justificatory nature which would have to be resolved before the exception could be appended meaningfully to the statement of the original principle; and similarly for each succeeding exception. The task of making provisional moral principles precise ones seems insurmountable.

A rather similar conception of moral principles is held by Baier though I do not know that he would have them function as major premises in a deductive argument. Nonetheless his view of principles trades on "precision." He distinguishes between "making an exception to a rule" and "a rule has an exception" and says: "As soon as this muddle is cleared away, it can be seen that Kant is right in saying that acting on principles implies making no exception in anyone's favor, but wrong in thinking that therefore all moral rules must be absolutely without exception."⁶ His example of a principle with exceptions is that of killing. "Killing is wrong unless it is killing in self-defense, killing by the hangman, killing of an enemy in war-time, accidental killing, and possibly mercy killing. If it is one of these types of killing, then it is not wrong."⁷ For Baier, these exceptions which are stated in the principle "more precisely define its range of application."⁸ Thus exceptions to moral principles function for both Baier and Hare in similar ways--they give principles their precision. To know a moral principle is to know not just the bare principle but also the "recognized"⁹ exceptions to it. Knowing the

⁶Baier, The Moral Point of View, p. 192.

⁷Ibid., p. 193.

⁸Ibid., p. 192.

⁹Ibid., p. 193.

principle entails knowing its exceptions. The exceptions are part of the principle. Now I think that the criticisms which can be brought against Hare's position on this matter can also be brought against Baier. How, for example, does one recognize a "recognized exception" in advance of examining some context in which killing is an issue? How does one know when one has come to the end of all the recognized exceptions? I will not rehearse again all the attendant difficulties here. Let me say instead that the obvious strength of these views (Hare's and Baier's) is that they recognize that moral principles have exceptions to them--that principles need not be upheld in all situations. But when this claim is examined it is seen that only those provisional principles in which exceptions are not stated need not be upheld in all situations; whereas principles that have the recognized exceptions included in them are to be upheld in every remaining situation. The rigor found in the first conception of principles seems to be sustained in this second present conception though perhaps on a more constrained basis. The difference between the two conceptions is just this. What the first view considers to be fixed and rigid in the matter of principles, the present view considers to be provisional. The earlier view takes "one ought to tell the truth" as rigid, the latter as provisional (which may be transformed however into a precise principle by enumerating all the recognized exceptions). On the former view, "fixed" and "rigid" refer to a principle's always being upheld in all situations; on the latter, "precise" refers to a principle's including its exceptions--that is, it refers to those residual situations in which a principle

is always upheld. Finally the former view of principles does not while the latter does, make the statement of a (precise) moral principle impossible.

Despite the above difficulties, these accounts of moral principles suggest design criteria for a third conception of principles. What is needed is a conception in which principles are seen to be (a) readily formulated (b) more like rules-of-thumb, and (c) admit of exceptions. Evidently the provisional quality of principles identified by Hare satisfies these criteria whereas his notion of "precise" principles would violate both (a) and (b). To admit that principles can have exceptions to them is not the same thing as building those exceptions into the statement of the principle. The third view of principles stops short of incorporating exceptions into the wording of the principle. Thus "one ought to tell the truth" is neither rigid nor precise; it is provisional--not in the sense that it may be discarded but in the sense that it may not always be upheld. The advantage in conceiving of principles as provisional is that in moral problem-situations it helps one to focus on the relevant issues and facts and on actions that will need justification even though in the final analysis, after examination and deliberation, a decision is taken to act in such a way that overrides the principle. The fact that the principle is ultimately "violated" fails to prevent it from functioning as a useful guide in moral inquiry. As Dewey puts it "A moral principle . . . gives the agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a

short of partial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by supplying him with the main heads by reference to which to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes; it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the lookout."¹⁰ Far from being a command to act in a given way,

a moral principle "is a tool for analyzing a special situation."¹¹

The difference between this third view of principles and the preceding views is that taking moral principles as provisional (as guides) into a situation rather than as precise moral imperatives in which exceptions are all worked out in advance, frees the agent to reason out exceptions and deviations in the light of the particular contextual features themselves. Does this third notion of principle then not detract from the generality of moral principles? No, for "it is clear that the various situations in which a person is called to deliberate and judge have common elements It is also obvious that general ideas are a great aid in judging particular cases. If different situations were wholly unlike one another, nothing could be learned from one which would be of avail in any other. But having like points, experience carries over from one to another, and experience is intellectually cumulative. Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop These ideas constitute principles."¹²

It is in the tradition of Dewey rather than Hare or Baier that I think moral principles are best construed particularly for

¹⁰Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life, p. 141.

¹¹Ibid., p. 141.

¹²Ibid., p. 136. Emphasis added.

purposes of reasoning in moral advising. In conceiving of moral principles in Dewey's way one need not deal with major premises in deductive arguments nor be faced with moral conclusions or imperatives that are logically entailed by the premises. Further, this third conception of principles frees one (as already stated) from going into moral problem-situations with preconceived views about recognized exceptions and about precise limits of application of the moral principle. Such a conception both enables one to be guided in but also to reflect about a moral issue and how best to resolve it. An example might be helpful here. A special children's play (let us suppose) is coming to East Lansing for one night only. The actors and actresses involved are nationally regarded for their skilled interpretations of children's works. Some time ago I promised my daughter I would take her to the play and she has been eagerly awaiting the event. She has done some reading in advance about the play and we have discussed what she has read. On the day of the play I receive a telephone call from a dear friend and associate in Canada who is stopping over that night (only) in East Lansing on his way to the west coast. It is a long time since we have seen each other and we are not likely to see each other again for some time. Our friendship is a meaningful one and one that we both prize. I ask him to visit us and stay with us overnight (forgetting my earlier commitment to my daughter). I have thus made two commitments, both of a serious nature, but which conflict. What should I do? I am aware of the moral principle that promises sincerely made ought to be kept; and I have made a promise to take my daughter to the play. If I break the promise I know she will be most upset and

disappointed--though despite this it is still possible she might understand my predicament. I might try to get my wife to take her if she is free that evening. But she may not be; and in any case my daughter had been counting on my taking her, not someone else. I could also suggest that we go to the next children's play that comes; but that will not be for quite some time and the actors will not be as good next time. And, anyway, it will be a different play which may not appeal to my daughter. I could sit down with her, try to explain the dilemma I am in pointing out to her that sometimes promises sincerely made have to be broken if other more pressing obligations intervene. But she might then think that I do not consider her to be important--that my old friends are more valuable to me than is she. Also I might, in breaking the promise, be setting a bad example. Will she not be encouraged to break her promises to others by my example? On the other side of the situation if I tell my friend not to come for the night what will he think? Will he be offended and perhaps conclude that our friendship is no longer of value to me? Or will he understand and urge me to take my daughter to the play citing as a reason that it is more important not to disappoint her than him. But then I suspect that, apart from the pleasure of seeing my friend and engaging him in discussion, he may have information about teaching positions in Canadian universities. So it might be in the best interests of myself and my family to visit with my friend and disappoint my daughter. Further, my friend purposely came via East Lansing just to see me and if I go with my daughter am I not wasting his time and making his

detour this way utterly pointless? Perhaps he will say that I am downright rude. What am I to do?

There is no neat and tidy or straightforward answer to this question. There is no requisite injunction (*à la* Hare) which follows logically from all the facts and considerations that I raise (including the fact that one ought to keep promising sincerely made). Be that as it may the principle just cited does help me to focus on the issues (pro and con) in light of which I will have to make a decision. The issues that I consider are in some cases purely factual, in others, conjectural; and still others, valiative; but they are all related one way or another to two alternative courses of action--either to break a promise or keep it--between which I must choose. My task is, in large part, envisaging possible effects of one proposal, then another and then deciding. This deliberative process is very aptly described by Dewey (to refer to him once again) who says that "we try in our mind, some plan. Following its career through various steps we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow; and as we then like to approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences we find the original . . . plan good or bad. Deliberation is dramatic and active, hence not mathematical and impersonal."¹³ In this deliberating I am not without moral principles but I am not letting them dictate in advance what I am to do; for that would surely be an unsatisfactory way of resolving a difficult issue--unsatisfactory because overlooking many of the features of the situation. Now had I sought advice about what to do

¹³Ibid., p. 135.

here rather than work through the matter on my own I would have expected my adviser to have gone through a similar reasoning for me. This would have involved him in eliciting considerable information from me (as advisee) and while he might not have covered all the considerations I did, I would have expected him to cover a good many of them given his ability to imagine himself in my position; and finally, to have arrived at a piece of advice for me. His advice may not be the same as the decision I come to on my own about what to do in this matter. This would not mean that he reasoned without the guidance of relevant moral principles or other considerations but rather that he assigned differing weights to them than I did--all of which is very possible in highly complex situations like the one at hand. Of course since it is advice that I get I am not committed to acting on it though it is helpful to me in reaching a decision as an advisee.

5.2 The Teacher-Adviser

At the close of Section 4.2 in the last chapter I summarized the main necessary conditions for being in a position to give advice to another person. These conditions will apply to the moral adviser as well as to other types of advisers (e.g., economic, medical, legal, spiritual, etc.). The conditions consist of: (a) facility with the language; (b) some understanding of the logic of advising; (c) awareness of self and others and respect for others as persons; (d) personal autonomy--i.e., relative freedom from internal and external constraints, relative independence and rationality; (e) experience and imagination; and (f) an understanding, knowledge or insight into the

domain from which one's advice is drawn (i.e., knowledge of the subject of the advice).

It will be recalled from the discussion of Chapter IV that the egocentric, the authoritarian character and the closed-minded person all fail to satisfy (c), the condition of awareness and respect for others as persons. This condition (c) comes very close to what John Wilson identifies as the component of PHIL in his list of six moral components.¹⁴ Wilson's moral components are a cluster of specifiable attitudes, abilities and attainments in terms of which a person may be assessed as "morally educated." It is possible, Wilson seems to think, that by observing how well or badly one does (so to speak) at PHIL, EMP and the other components, to assign a "moral education rating" to that person. However my momentary interest in Wilson's scheme here is with the first component PHIL which is described as an attitude or frame of mind and is characterized variously as follows:¹⁵ regarding other people as equals; thinking that other people's interests count; looking on other people as human beings with rights; not thinking that one's own interests are a special case; having a concern for the interests of others. To the extent a person fails to recognize the other as a moral and conscious being whose desires, interests and purposes count as much as his own he cannot satisfy the component PHIL and what I have been calling condition (c). This condition and component PHIL thus call for those teachers who are also

¹⁴ John Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum (A Guide for Teachers and Research Workers) (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969), pp. 2-9.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

to be moral advisers to respect their student-advisees as significant persons whose interests count as much as their own. It seems odd, in a way, that one should have to stress this point but in fact disrespect for students by (some) teachers apparently continues. This comes about largely for psychological reasons. Teachers are put in a position of authority by virtue of a legal procedure through which they are hired to do a certain job; but of all those put in a position of authority there are some who then become authoritarian in conduct because of (psychological) disorders of one sort or another. The authoritarian teacher normally does not hold the respect for the student that is required by condition (c) and is not therefore in a position to advise students. Martin Buber's terminology is apposite here. The teacher who fails to see the student "over there" as a significant person, as a "thou" not an "it" or a "thing" cannot be in a position to advise. Fortunately "being in a position of authority" is not conceptually tied to "being authoritarian"; so it does not follow that all teachers (who are in positions of authority in some sense) are also authoritarians and hence that no teacher can be in a position to give advice to a student. It is what a teacher does after being placed in a position of authority that either marks him (her) out as "authoritarian" or as "reasonable." It is possible, of course, that a student could conceive of all teachers as authoritarian even those who are not. This arises from a psychological defect on the student-advisee side, not on the teacher-side. But this does suggest a precaution. Those teachers who are also advisers should refrain wherever possible from using authoritarian-type language in advising,

notably the imperative sentence, to avoid creating the impression of authoritarianism. In other settings where moral advice is given the use of the imperative sentence is not problematic; but in the context of the school there are good reasons for the teacher who is also moral adviser to avoid that linguistic form, using instead the explicit advising utterance or the subjunctive or one of the other common forms. (See Section 2.1, Chapter II.)

None of the conditions (a) to (d) when spelled out are of themselves sufficient for distinguishing between a moral adviser, a medical adviser, a legal adviser, and so on. Each of these conditions is the same for all classes or types of advisers. Conditions (e) and (f) however differ from the foregoing ones in this respect, namely that when filled in they are sufficient for differentiating between a moral adviser and these other kinds of advisers. Of course, as stated, (e) and (f) merely specify that experience (and imagination) and knowledge, respectively, are required. But once these matters are elucidated under the heads of (e) and (f) significant differences among the various types of advisers begin to emerge. In medical advising, for example, the experience and knowledge that is required differs substantially from that required for economic advising; and for economic advising the experience and knowledge required is different again from that for vocational advising or spiritual advising; and so on. In essence, medical, legal, vocational, spiritual, etc. advisers (and their advice) will all be seen to differ from each other in certain respects and these are primarily associated with conditions (e) and (f) not with conditions (a) to (d).

My concern here is with the moral adviser and in particular the teacher as moral adviser to secondary school students. What puts someone, a teacher say, in a position to give moral advice from the point of view of condition (e)?¹⁶ How is this condition to be elucidated in the case of the moral adviser? The short answer is that to satisfy the experiential condition (e), is to have had moral experience. But what then is to count as that? Since I am approaching the study of advice-giving from essentially a problem-centered orientation --that is the orientation in which advice is sought by someone in a problematic situation as, for instance, in moral advising where the advice-seeker is in a moral dilemma of the kind characterized in the previous section--I shall take it that the moral experience required of the adviser is just his own personal experience of being in moral dilemmas in which he has struggled with difficult moral issues in reaching some decision about the best thing for him to do. Such examples of moral experience are to be found in the case of Sartre's student which I referred to in Section 4.1 and in the case of my promising my daughter a night at the theatre and my inviting an old friend passing through East Lansing that same night over for a visit. These are the situations in which one must have personally immersed oneself in order to feel the pulls in one direction, then another, and to have struggled with the problem of weighing up the various considerations for and against the competing or dilemmatic claims of the situation. There is no substitute for direct moral involvement. To

¹⁶Though one is in a position to give moral advice it does not follow that he should give it. There may be overriding considerations (e.g., it wasn't asked for).

flavor the tensions and pulls of a moral dilemma is to be in that situation. If one has never been in such a situation at some point in his career or past and who has thus not been exposed to the tensions, frustrations, bewilderments and anguish that are typically associated with moral dilemmas then I am inclined to think that one cannot satisfy condition (e); that one will not have had "moral experience."

I want now to temper this conclusion somewhat both by calling for the role of imagination in moral experience and by broadening the interpretation of "moral experience." It seems plausible to say that one could at least try to imagine what it would be like to be in a moral dilemmatic situation. But what would one have to do to imagine it short of actually having experienced a moral dilemma in which case imagination here would likely be unnecessary? A component of moral experience which I have not yet made sufficiently explicit, and which will help insofar as specifying the role of imagination is concerned here, is that of having awareness of or being able to sense the feelings of the other person(s) inevitably involved in one's moral dilemma. Moral experience is incomplete to the extent that the agent in a moral dilemma is unable to predict how the consequences of the various alternative actions open to him will likely affect the others involved--to know, in other words, what people will feel as a result of his doing this or that in resolving his dilemma. Moral experience then is in a large part an experience of feeling--feeling the various pulls and tensions of the moral dilemma as well as being aware of how others will be affected by one resolution to a dilemma rather than another. To refer once again to Wilson's work, the moral component of

his which most closely relates to the point under study here is what he calls EMP--"an ability to know what other people are feeling, in particular situations"; or "an awareness of other people's feeling," or "the ability to understand what people's interests are."¹⁷ Now an important conceptual point here is that awareness of other people's feelings is tied up with the awareness of one's own feelings. As Wilson has elsewhere noted: "By suppressing or failing to be aware of our own feelings, we distort our perception of other people Because we keep some of our feelings out of our consciousness, we limit the range of feelings which we are aware of, and hence are unable to recognize them in other people."¹⁸

Two important consequences follow for the condition (e), moral experience; one is relative to moral experience of a direct kind, of actually being in a situation, and the other, to experience of what I call an indirect kind and which is tied to the notion of imagination. If moral experience is in a large measure an experience of feeling as I claim, and if Wilson is correct in stating that awareness of the feelings of others is conceptually (and in practice) tied to the awareness of one's own feelings then any non-moral experience by which one becomes increasingly aware of one's own feelings is surely relevant to satisfying condition (e) for the case of the moral adviser. For example, if by having certain aesthetic experiences I become more aware of my own feelings both in terms of their intensity and range

¹⁷Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum, pp. 3-4.

¹⁸John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education (London: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 87.

then I can say I am better able to recognize these feelings in other people. And since being able to recognize feelings in others is part of moral experience which counts as satisfying condition (e) if aesthetic experiences enable me to have this kind of recognition then aesthetic experiences, at least partially, can also be said to meet condition (e). Even if I have never had a moral experience of the kind described earlier, or being directly caught up in a moral dilemma and working through it, but have had appropriate aesthetic experiences then it would be wrong to say that I could not meet at least some of the requirements of (e). Further, other experiences such as to be had by (say) attendance at sensitivity training sessions would also count (presumably) towards meeting condition (e). Thus direct non-moral experiences of a kind that increases one's awareness of one's feelings are relevant to having experiences of a kind that help put one in a position to give moral advice. So in fact it turns out that to restrict (e) to just "moral" experience is unjustified given the variety of situations (moral and non-moral) in which we can become aware of the feelings of others by increasing the awareness of our own.

But suppose that a teacher has neither had direct moral experiences of the kind indicated nor attended sensitivity training sessions. Does this mean the teacher could not be in a position to give moral advice because of a failure to satisfy condition (e)? It is not clear that in order to become more aware of one's feelings that one must have direct social interaction with other persons though this is doubtless a desirable mode of doing so. Surely I can have aesthetic experiences the objects of which are inanimate--for example,

a painting, or a sculpting--in which I become increasingly aware of my feelings. Further, by reading certain novelists, say Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Sartre and others--whose characters sometimes get caught up in moral dilemmas and problems--and by using my imagination I should be able to conceive of what it would be like to be in the position of one of these characters. That is, given a skillful novelist (one who with insight is able to portray in vivid terms the feelings of his characters that are caught up in situations of moral conflict) and some imagination on the reader's part, the latter by imaginatively "interacting" with these characters on a feeling level, should be able to claim for himself some moral experience even if it be of an indirect kind. Putting oneself "into a novel" is not exactly like being in an actual moral dilemma; but it is an approximation of sorts. And if one as reader can stay with the character in the novel while the latter experiences the anguish of the situation and works it through to some resolution, the former (i.e., the reader) will be said, justifiably, to have at least limited moral experience. These indirect experiences which I am discussing here and which almost wholly turn on the type of novelist one reads and one's imaginative powers will perhaps not be as maturing as are moral experiences of a direct kind; yet for those who have not had the latter but only the former, that fact should not necessarily count against their being in a position to give moral advice. This account, by the way, seems to suggest that teachers of English literature and perhaps the fine arts are in a slightly better position qua teacher to give moral advice to students than are teachers of other disciplines--"better" in the sense

of having had a sustained exposure to literature or "the world of imagination" as Northrop Frye refers to it.¹⁹ Frye claims²⁰ that a study of literature produces tolerance in one through "detachment in imagination" (where things are removed just out of reach of belief and action) which literature helps to give one. Literature enables us to detach ourselves from our own immediate points of view to see (imagine) the points of views of others as real possibilities. Frye concedes however that this detachment can be got from "history and philosophy and science and everything else worth studying"--though literature does have its own peculiar or special contribution to make. However, I do not wish to press my claim about the teacher of literature as moral adviser too far; for there are other conditions for the moral adviser to satisfy and, moreover, being a teacher of history, mathematics or science, etc. does not preclude one from sustained exposure to literature nor from having a developed imagination.

I have broadened the ways in which (e) can now be satisfied--e.g., by direct moral experience, by direct non-moral experiences that heighten one's awareness of oneself, and by imagination. But it seems that my interpretation of "direct moral experience" is too restrictive. I doubt that "direct moral experience" can justifiably be interpreted only as "experiences in moral dilemmas." For there are many experiences we would want to call "moral" but which are had outside a dilemmatic situation. My helping another person in distress or

¹⁹Northrop Frye, The Educated Imagination (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 77.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 71-78.

who is incapacitated when I am in a position to do so and when no conflict is involved would surely count as a moral experience. I suppose given a relatively normal upbringing most people have had moral experiences at one time or another (in this broader sense). In this broader sense then condition (e) is not a particularly selective condition so far as moral advising is concerned. Many people can satisfy it-- many more than could satisfy (e) in the domain of legal advising or medical advising where rather specialized experiences would be called for. Nonetheless the difference (in part) between a good moral adviser and a poor moral adviser will turn on how well each satisfies (e); and that will be a function of many things such as the extent to which one reflects on one's experiences, the range of the experiences, the imagination and the insight one develops into how other people feel.

I turn now to condition (f), the knowledge condition. I shall interpret "knowledge" in a relatively non-rigorous way to include propositional knowledge (knowing that something is the case or having information), skills (knowing how to do something) and insights [thus tying condition (f) to condition (e)]. What the medical and legal adviser needs to know is rather more easily specified than is the knowledge requirement for the moral adviser. Evidently the medical adviser requires a knowledge of a variety of medical subjects such as anatomy, physiology, pharmacology and so on; the legal adviser a knowledge of the laws of one's society, of the functioning of the courts, of the nature of wills, contracts, etc. In these cases then there are fairly substantial and specifiable amounts of information

and skills to be mastered in order that condition (f), for medical and legal advising, be satisfied. It is with less certainty that one specifies the knowledge requirements for moral advisers. As a minimal start it seems that a moral adviser would have to know the general moral principles, duties and obligations which are normally upheld as well as the social customs and conventions that obtain. He would have to know, generally speaking, that it is wrong to kill or harm another person, to cheat, steal, lie, break promises, etc.; and conversely that it is right, generally speaking, to preserve life, to be honest, to keep one's word, to help others less fortunate than oneself, to respect others, and so on. The moral adviser would further have to know how to reason, calculate or judge when exceptions to these moral principles and obligations are warranted. To expand somewhat on these knowledge claims the moral adviser would have to know (i) what moral principles seem to apply (are relevant) in the case of a given moral dilemma, (ii) what facts or considerations of both moral and non-moral kinds are pertinent to resolving the dilemma one way or the other, and (iii) which facts carry the greater weight on balance, and hence which principle is to be violated or contravened and which principle to be upheld. Further he would have to know that (iv) unlike scientific principles, moral principles can be violated (admit of exceptions) without their having to be cast off--that a moral principle which is contravened in one situation may be upheld in another. Also the moral adviser would have to know that (v) moral principles are guides to action not fixed and rigorous injunctions to do one thing rather than another; and thence that (vi) lacking the

certainty they do they are not suited to function as major premises in deductive arguments. In other words the adviser would have to know that reasoning in moral advising does not follow the pattern of logical deduction but is rather more analogous to judicial reasoning where the evidence on both sides is somewhat inconclusive. Thence the moral adviser would have to know (vii) that decisions to help resolve an advisee's moral problem or dilemma are typically "untidy" and lacking the finality they might otherwise have. Finally, (viii) the moral adviser would have to know what counts as stealing, lying, killing, promise-breaking, or keeping, being honest, and so on in order to know what additional factors to take into consideration. That is, he would have to know the descriptions of these and other moral notions--or at least some of the criteria involved. As John Hospers has shown, a vagueness commonly pervades these crucial moral terms and that it is not always clear whether a certain action nominally classed as "stealing" (or "killing," "lying," etc.) really is an act of stealing.²¹ "Exactly when is one lying?" is a reasonable question to ask. Even though a moral adviser may not be able to give a full descriptive account of "lying" he should at least be able to persevere in a given moral problem to get clearer as to whether or not the advisee actually is facing, as one of his alternatives to action, lying, or whether he has actually been engaged in lying.

²¹ John Hospers, Human Conduct (An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics) (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 12-15.

If one were to classify the foregoing eight items of knowledge as propositional, skills, or insights, I think the classification would probably come out as follows. Since, by the nature of the case, it is not possible to have advanced knowledge of the specific principles that will pertain to an advisee's moral problem, nor to know, a priori whether (or what) exceptions will be warranted and hence precisely what considerations, pro and con, will be pertinent in suggesting a resolution to the advisee, I am inclined to think that items (i) to (iii) are more appropriately classed as "skills" rather than as "information" or "facts"--though, to be sure, they presuppose knowing that the moral principles state such and such actions are right (or wrong). But basically items (i) to (iii) seem to be a matter of having mastered certain skills or perhaps having developed certain dispositions (and possibly insights) in respect of handling dilemmatic situations in which another person is involved (and who seeks advice). It is in short a question of knowing how and when to apply moral principles and of knowing how to justify exceptions to principles. Items (iv) to (vii) on the other hand seem to me to be items of propositional knowledge rather than skills. Of course I am here presupposing the validity of a certain conception of "moral principle" as outlined in the previous section of this chapter. Given that conception however it seems that these particular items in question are items of "knowing that." Finally, item (viii), it seems to me, is ubiquitous. It partakes of all three classes of knowing which I am appealing to in this discussion. We simply do not have adequate descriptions of all the main moral notions such that we

could know without an examination of the features of a situation, whether a case of lying or promise-keeping, etc. is actually involved. Skills, insight, and information are all required for (viii).²²

Thus to be a moral adviser the teacher would require the sorts of knowledge (facts, skills, insights) as briefly indicated above, thereby satisfying condition (f), the knowledge provision. Is this a reasonable requirement to expect at least some teachers to satisfy, or not? It looks unreasonable but that, I think, is largely an illusion. Unlike the medical and legal advisers who need substantial amounts of specialized training at advanced levels, it is not at all clear what would even count as specialized training for a moral adviser, or where one would go to get it. Insofar as knowing the general moral principles, the obligations and duties and the social conventions of one's community are concerned no specialized training is required. Most people, given a relatively decent upbringing, just know these things. They are the knowledge-products of normal family life and extra-family social interaction. No one could claim to be a moral expert in the sense of having a special mastery of the general moral principles. Does this mean then that almost anyone can (or should) give moral advice? If "yes" why then should I single out the teacher as a (possible) special agent in this respect? What has

²²To continue the analogy with Wilson's moral components, the above specification for my condition (f) resembles the component called GIG. This component which is classed as an "attainment" has two parts, namely, the "hard" facts relevant to a moral situation (knowledge of laws, rules, conventions, of the human body, etc.) and social skills or know-how or an adeptness rather than a cognitive mastery. See Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum, pp. 4-6.

the secondary school teacher presumably got that the rest of us do not have? Clearly, the answer to my first question here is "no"; and to my last question "nothing," at least insofar as knowing the general moral principles, obligations and conventions of society are concerned. Earlier I suggested that the teacher of literature and of the fine arts might have an "edge" over other candidates for the role of the moral adviser in that by virtue of the training in their own disciplines they may have a more developed imagination and a greater awareness of feelings (both their own and others). I hesitated to push that claim too far (after all it is largely an empirical claim) though I believe it to be a plausible one. I am now further inclined to think that a more general factor is at work here in the case of the secondary school teacher that might enable this person to satisfy condition (f) more effectively than others. This factor is related to the rigors of being initiated into one or more of the academic disciplines in which the secondary school teacher gives instruction and certain resultant dispositions, suited to problem-solving. I am not claiming that the secondary school teacher by virtue of his (her) academic training has special insights into the moral problems of another and is therefore in a better position to offer moral advice. My claim is that as a result of being exposed to the academic disciplines (whether it be literature, history, geography, science, mathematics or whatever) and having to work through problems in those disciplines to some conclusion, of having to engage in analysis of situations, of appealing to various facts and considerations and dealing with questions of relevance of these in reaching solutions to

problems, that certain dispositions and skills are developed which are also essential to tackling moral problems equally if not more complex than those studied in the academic disciplines.²³ To be sure, solving problems in history differs from solving problems in literature, mathematics or science but all problem-solving requires certain disciplined moves which desirably develop into "ways of doing things." These dispositions might simply be labeled as "perseverance," "staying power," "attending to facts," "control of emotions," "clearness of thinking," "seeing a problem through to some conclusion," and so on. If such dispositions or skills can be developed by a study of and training in the academic disciplines (normally found on the high school curriculum) then it seems to me that the secondary school teacher, because of this training is, in principle, in a good position to be a moral adviser (provided the other conditions I have outlined are satisfied). So there may be a stronger case for claiming that the teacher has an "edge" over the rest of us in being in a position to give moral advice.²⁴

I trust I have not created the impression that all secondary school teachers qua teacher are in a position to give moral advice to students. That would be to overlook too much of what I have already said. Though a teacher has been exposed or initiated into the academic disciplines it does not necessarily follow that he (she) is good at

²³I am not advocating that teachers-in-training should master problems in an academic discipline in order to be good at giving moral advice, but simply that they learn how to solve these problems as problems in their own right.

²⁴For possible counterclaims, see Conclusions.

problem-solving or has developed the dispositions just mentioned. Further, as I indicated earlier, the teacher could be authoritarian and lacking respect for students. It is also possible the teacher could fail on some of the other necessary conditions for being in a position to advise such as lacking imagination or being indifferent to and callous towards the feelings of others or lacking ability in predicting consequences of another person's actions, or even lacking facility with the language! There are many ways in which a teacher, like anyone else, may fail to satisfy the specified conditions. Further, it could be that the teacher adheres to a moral position or theory which is "incompatible" with the giving of moral advice. If a teacher for example were an ethical egoist he would not normally be in a position to give moral advice to another (see Section 4.2).

There are some kinds of intuitionism which I think can be shown to be incompatible with moral advising principally that kind which takes "ought" as the fundamental and indefinable moral notion. If such an intuitionist tried to be a moral adviser he would have to deny that there are reasons for advising another that he ought to do this rather than that. Such a position, however, is logically inconsistent with the notion of advising as I have shown in Section 3.1. Further, I have doubts that certain aspects of emotivism (see p. 224) could be compatible with advising; and since at various points in this study I have criticized R. M. Hare, the leading prescriptivist, I have doubts that parts of that position are compatible either. These claims I make here are undeniably bald and hurried though I think they are sound in the main. To show that they are sound would be a

major task in itself and one I shall not undertake here preferring instead to leave that to a study at a later time. I raise these points about the incompatibility of certain moral positions with the giving of moral advice to indicate another way in which a school teacher (or anyone else) could fail to be in a position of moral adviser. I thus shall tentatively assert here that a further necessary condition for being in a position of moral adviser is that the moral views of the adviser not be incompatible or inconsistent with the logical structure of advice-giving. If school principals ever reach a point where they assign the function of moral advising to some of their teachers, they should do so with cognizance of the moral views and beliefs of the teachers in question; else they may find either that moral advising is not being done or something else is (like moral persuasion, commanding or goading).

In my view, the person in the school who should give moral advice if anyone gives it, is the classroom teacher rather than the school principal or the guidance counselor. The principal is "the" authority figure of the school thus placing him in an unlikely position to give moral advice. Moreover, the principal does not have the opportunity to interact on a regular and constant basis with students as does the classroom teacher and is thus not in as good a position to be aware of their feelings, interests, thoughts, etc. This is also the case, to a large extent, with the guidance counselor who normally sees students in his office on scheduled (and hence formal) visits only. Further, if the counselor is of the non-directive persuasion he (she) will not see it as part of his function ever to advise a

student and therefore would not give advice. It would be odd to place a person in a position of moral adviser who by virtue of his professional role would not give advice.²⁵ The clear edge which the classroom teacher has over these other school personnel in respect of being in a position to give moral advice derives not only from the nature of the academic training but from (i) the teacher's regular interaction with students in the classroom which enables him (her) to become aware of "where they are at" and (ii) their being able regularly to observe the teacher to know "where he (she) is at"--the latter, equally as important as the former. The teacher who is judged or observed by students to be intolerant of their views, who is easily offended, short-tempered, prejudiced, or plays favorites will not have the respect of students and will thus not be seen as a person from whom a student would want to get moral advice. It seems to me that to be accepted as a moral adviser by the students the teacher would have to be: open and approachable, fair-minded, understanding, willing to set an example of sacrificing expediency for morality in both his own life and in what he suggests others do (i.e., willing to cast aside living by a double standard--one for himself, another for his students) and certainly respected for his knowledge of his subject and ability to teach it. I am rather hesitant to say these latter conditions are also necessary for a teacher's being in a position to give moral advice to a student, but they would certainly help differentiate between a good adviser and a poor one in

²⁵See my discussion in Section 2.3, Chapter II, on the differences between advising and counseling.

the school context. While I doubt very much that every secondary school teacher is so suited to give moral advice I believe that in every secondary school some teachers are.

5.3 The Student-Advisee

At the close of Section 4.3 I summarized the conditions that are satisfied by one who is in a position to be advised. A number of these conditions were identical with those for the adviser to satisfy, such as: having facility with the language and being able to communicate; paying heed or attention to what another person says to one; awareness of self and others. I claimed there are other conditions which one qua adviser has to meet though the advisee does not, and in light of which the latter is eminently placed to receive advice--conditions like having appropriate experiences, imagination and knowledge or understanding. Normally it is a deficiency in these respects that helps put one in a good position to be advised. There are also some conditions which an advisee can meet but which an adviser cannot, such as being an egoist or lacking concern for others. I noted however that these latter claims respecting advisee conditions were made with the receiving of non-moral advice in mind and that certain modifications to these may be required in the receiving of moral advice. Finally, I spent some time on developing two further advisee-conditions namely (1) the necessity of one qua advisee being relatively or sufficiently free to make choices as between alternative views and courses of action and (2) being able to grasp the notion of reasons for doing one thing rather than another. Condition (1) is essential to help maintain the conceptual distinction between an adviser's

saying "I advise you to do" and the advisee's choosing either to assent to, dissent from, or modify the advice. Such an activity on the part of the advisee presupposes some ability in reflecting and deliberating on what an adviser says to him and of being relatively independent of social constraints such as group pressures to conform or of the authoritarian demands of some other individual. In summing up I claimed that this account of advisee conditions was not pitched too high by appealing to the results of developmental psychology which show that, in the main, by about age 11 there has been sufficient cognitive growth in individuals to enable them to perform the foregoing operations, even if in a rudimentary way. Condition (2) is essential because advising is a rational activity. In asking for a piece of advice one is asking, in part, for reasons in support of the advice. It is part of the advisee's role to demand reasons for the advice given. An advisee then needs to differentiate to some extent between good and bad reasons for doing something.

With this review in mind I turn to the secondary school student as an advisee--a receiver of moral advice in particular. Since secondary school students are of age range 13-18 years on average and since many of them will have mastered at least some of the formal operations (outlined in Section 4.3) by this age they should be in a position to be receivers of advice. But are they capable of receiving moral advice? Is their moral development at a corresponding requisite level? What level(s) in fact would that be? Cognitive development alone is not a sufficient condition for moral development; so we cannot assume that because a student is cognitively developed that he (she)

is also morally developed to a point where he (she) can receive moral advice. Take condition 2 (last paragraph) as an example. Although a student, let us say, knows that advice has the backing of reasons and although he knows how to ask for reasons and can usually distinguish between good and bad reasons, it does not necessarily follow that he can distinguish between moral and non-moral reasons. For him, it could be that all reasons for his doing something are of a strictly prudential kind and that within that class some reasons he sees to be better than others. But unless he understands that moral considerations can also be good reasons for his doing something he could not be in a position to be advised morally. His moral reasoning is not sufficiently developed. So although a student can receive non-moral advice it does not necessarily follow he can also receive moral advice. In this section I shall examine the stages of moral development which have been shown to pertain typically to the secondary school age range and I shall indicate which stages of development seem to be adequate for a person's being able to receive moral advice. If a student is at a stage of moral development which is below the level required for the moral advising of another, or which (by virtue of its structure) is incompatible with the logic of advising then presumably it is pointless to try to give moral advice to such a student. In developing this section I shall rely heavily on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg not because it is free of difficulties but because it is probably more fully worked out than other similar theories. Also it indicates the different kinds of moral reasons that are understood by persons at the different stages of moral

thinking thus making the theory suitable for discussion in the context of moral advising.

Kohlberg proceeds by presenting examples of hypothetical moral dilemmas to his subjects ranging in age from seven years to late twenties. In one of his standard dilemmas Heinz's wife is dying of a rare form of cancer. A new drug has recently been developed which the doctors think might save Heinz's wife. But the drug is scarce and the local druggist who developed it increases the price of the drug tenfold, from \$200 to \$2,000. Heinz doesn't have that amount of money. He is able to raise or borrow only \$1,000. He pleads with the druggist to sell the drug at a reduced rate but the druggist refuses. In desperation Heinz breaks into the store and steals the drug for his wife. Kohlberg asks his subjects: (a) Should the husband have done that? (b) Why? In response to (a) the subjects express moral judgments about the propriety of Heinz's action; and in response to (b) they give their reasons for their particular judgments. Now Kohlberg apparently is primarily concerned with describing the ways in which his various subjects reason or think in reaching a moral judgment--the thought processes they engage, and the concepts they employ in looking at a problem--and it is his belief that the key to understanding how various people think about morality resides in analyzing the replies to (b), not to (a). The moral judgments that are given in response to (a) are important for their content; but the reasons given in response to (b) are important for what they reveal about the structure of the human mind at various levels of development and it is on these latter responses that Kohlberg focuses

his greatest attention. So the apparent distinction between content [given by replies to (a)] and form or structure [discovered in replies to (b)] is crucial for Kohlberg's theory of moral development though it is clear, I think, that he himself does not always uphold that distinction. Nonetheless his objective, one might say, is to describe the operations of thinking that occur when the mind confronts hypothetical moral dilemmas. A young child (say age seven) might claim that Heinz did the wrong thing because he will be put in jail for stealing. A slightly older child might say that Heinz did the right thing because people will spurn him if he lets his wife die. Still another person might claim that Heinz did the right thing because it is his duty as a husband to help save his wife's life whatever the cost.

The various reasons, Kohlberg would say, are manifestations of different ways of thinking about or looking at a part of the world. Some of these ways are more sophisticated or mature than are other ways as (in a sense) is the third reason given above more sophisticated than the first. By analyzing a host of responses given by his subjects in a variety of cultures and across a number of socio-economic levels within a culture, Kohlberg has constructed a theory of moral development which is descriptive of six essentially different modes of "moral" thinking. Each way of thinking is called a "stage." Thus there are, according to Kohlberg, six stages in moral development comprising three levels (2 stages per level). These levels are characterized as: (I) Pre-moral, consisting of stages 1 and 2; (II) Conventional, consisting of stages 3 and 4; and (III) Post Conventional

or Principled, consisting of stages 5 and 6. Since I shall not be concerned with all the six stages in my discussion of the moral advisee I shall withhold describing the relevant stages until later--simply noting for the moment that stage 1 shall not figure in my discussion. Stage 1 which is characterized as "obedience and punishment orientation" and "egocentric deference to superior power and prestige" is essentially Piaget's phenomenon of childhood egocentrism. Anyone who conceives of the world from this point of view cannot be in a position to receive advice--moral or otherwise--as I have shown in Section 4.3 of the last chapter.

Two important assumptions underlie Kohlberg's theory, namely (1) that moral development has a cognitive core, and (2) that the origin of morality is "interactional." By (1) he means (roughly) that cognitive maturity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral maturity. "All morally advanced children are bright but not all bright children are morally advanced."²⁶ Moral maturity requires cognitive maturity or intelligence but it also requires more than that. By (2) Kohlberg means that the "moral stages represent the interaction between the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment."²⁷ Of importance here is the social environment--an environment that provides opportunities for social participation and role-taking. On the basis of his research

²⁶ Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," in Moral Education, ed. by C. M. Beck, B. S. Crittenden, and E. V. Sullivan (New York: Newman Press, 1971), p. 45.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

Kohlberg claims that such opportunities affect the rate and terminus of moral development, i.e., that social interaction and role-taking stimulate moral development. Thus "children with extensive peer-group participation advance considerably more quickly through the Kohlberg stages . . . than do children who are isolated from such participation."²⁸ But while participation in peer groups is important, moral development further requires participation in "structures of the social environment" in the form of making decisions in the running of the family, the school, the government, and so on. These structures are universal or transcultural since "all societies we have studied have the same basic institutions: family, economy, social stratification, law, and government."²⁹ Just as there are "universal structures of physical environment basic to 'pure' cognitive development" so also are there "universal structures of the social environment . . . basic to moral development."³⁰ This will also partially explain why there is a universal invariant sequence of development through the Kohlberg stages.

Kohlberg claims that if we were to take a concept like the moral worth of human life and examine how various people think about it or view the value of life we would find that in stage 1 thinking only the lives of important people are seen to be valuable; that in stage 3, the lives of family members valuable and in stage 6 thinking all life is seen to be of equal moral value. In passing from stage to

²⁸Ibid., p. 83.

²⁹Ibid., p. 51.

³⁰Ibid., p. 50.

stage there is evidence of an increasing moral maturity in thinking and in looking at certain aspects of the world and at stage 6, the level of thinking, Kohlberg says, is "fully moral."³¹ Thus the general direction of maturity in moral thinking is a direction of greater morality. The higher stages of thinking are more moral than the lower stages. "We do not mean by this that a more mature judgment is more moral in the sense of showing closer conformity to the conventional standards of a given community. We mean that a more mature judgment more closely corresponds to genuine moral judgments as these have been defined by philosophers . . . most philosophers (agreeing) upon the characteristics that make a judgment a genuine moral judgment."³² It turns out that by "most philosophers" Kohlberg means those formalists like Kant and Hare (particularly the latter) who claim that what makes a judgment a moral judgment is its satisfying the criteria of universality, prescriptiveness and overridingness. Thus for Kohlberg "genuine moral judgments" are universalizable prescriptions; and the person who makes genuine moral judgments is morally mature (or fully moral) in his thinking; he is at stage 6. In making a judgment at stage 6 the person both commits himself to the judgment and to the view that the judgment applies to all persons in similar situations. The person who makes judgments strictly from his own point of view (e.g., by asking what effects his actions will have for him only) is much less morally mature, or morally immature in his

³¹ Ibid., p. 54.

³² Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View," The School Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 1966), p. 21.

thinking. To use Kohlberg's terminology, this person's judgment would lack "differentiation" and "integration"--the formal criteria corresponding to prescriptivity and universality respectively, which define "all mature structures." Mature ways of looking at moral problems are the ways that satisfy these formal criteria.³³ Since these criteria are presumed to be devoid of content we might say that for Kohlberg, the thinking that is characteristic of the lower stages, i.e., the less morally mature thinking, is that in which matters of content of a prudential or social kind enters. Thus his "detailed coding of categories of moral judgment" lists the following: (a) prudence, (b) welfare of others, (c) respect for authority, (d) respect for persons, and (e) justice.³⁴ We will see that these correspond respectively to stages 2 through 6. Judgments that reflect a point of view represented by any of (a) to (d) are less than fully moral because not void of content. They fail to take on the character of a principled judgment. Only justice at stage 6 takes on that character--that is "Becomes something . . . obligatory, categorical and (that) takes precedence over law and other considerations including welfare."³⁵

³³The equating of "mature moral thinking (or mature moral judgment)" to "thinking prescriptively and universalizably (or judgment that is a universalizable prescription)" is surely one of the least defensible parts of Kohlberg's theory. That moral philosophers have been intensely debating what makes a judgment a moral judgment to inconclusive ends seems to have been completely overlooked by Kohlberg. His explicit use of Hare's formal criteria is his clear preference for one analysis of "moral judgment" over another with little justification being offered for his choice--save that Hare's criteria are presumably void of content.

³⁴Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 59.

³⁵Ibid., p. 65.

Moving through the Kohlberg stages of moral thinking (or development) then is less a matter of adding increasingly difficult content to be mastered than it is a matter of "internal cognitive reorganization." Passing to a next higher stage involves a substantial shift in the way one thinks about moral problems. It is a conceptual revolution of sorts; but the passage is also evolutionary because it builds on prior stages. "Each step of development . . . is a better cognitive organization than the one before it, one which takes account of everything present in the previous stage, but making new distinctions and organizing them into a more comprehensive or more equilibrated structure."³⁶ To take the concept of human life again when one shifts to a higher stage "the value of life becomes more differentiated from the value of property, more integrated (the value of life enters an organizational hierarchy where it is 'higher' than property so that one steals property in order to save life) and more universalized (the life of any sentient being is valuable regardless of status or property)."³⁷ So one sees the value of life differently and more maturely at a higher stage than at a lower stage. These changes in thinking about values and moral problems do not come in radical and sudden shifts from one conceptual structure to an entirely new one. Kohlberg reminds us over and over that progression through the stages is sequentially invariant. It is not possible to

³⁶ Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World," Daedalus (Fall, 1971), p. 1069.

³⁷ Ibid.

get to stage 3 via stage 5; nor to stage 5 by skipping stage 4. Each stage has to be passed through in order. To be at stage 3 is to have passed through stages 1 and 2 in sequence (no more, no less). To be sure, different people pass through the stages at differing rates and stop (in their development) at different levels, but all persons in their development (irrespective of cultural, socio-economic and religious background) follow the same sequence. So according to Kohlberg the stages are not only sequentially invariant but culturally too. Further it is (apparently) not possible to regress from a higher stage to a lower stage (though I understand Kohlberg was at one point puzzled by a seeming regression in the moral reasoning of freshman college students). If my development in moral thinking halts at stage 4 (as many people's do) I can at least take comfort in the fact that it will not decline to less mature levels. Cessation of a forward movement through higher stages does not entail initiation of a backward movement through lower stages. Finally, no person, says Kohlberg, is wholly in any one stage of development. If I am said to be a stage 4 what that means is that my major stage is 4 (a majority of my ideas are commensurate with stage 4 thinking) but that I am also partly in the stage I have left (stage 3) and partly in the stage into which I am moving (stage 5).

While the Kohlberg stages are more than age-related a fairly definite age pattern does emerge in connection with them. "The transition from preconventional to conventional morality generally occurs during the late elementary school years. The shift in adolescence from concrete to formal operations . . . constitutes the

necessary precondition for the transition from conventional to principled moral reasoning. It is in adolescence, then, that (one) has the cognitive capability for moving from a conventional to a post-conventional, reflective or philosophic view of values and society."³⁸

From this passage we may infer the following: (i) that a transition from stage 2 to stage 3 occurs in the main around eleven or twelve years of age; and (ii) that a transition from stage 4 to stage 5 is possible, in the main, at some point from about age sixteen onwards. Thus according to (ii) principled moral thinking would be possible for (some) secondary school students. However, I am told that Kohlberg has now revised his views on this second point.³⁹ Apparently he no longer believes it to be possible for an adolescent to reach the level of stage 5 thinking and that it is unlikely one could reach that stage before about age 23 (and stage 6, if at all, before middle or late twenties). This "realignment" of the stages by Kohlberg has been explained by the fact that, on his own admission, he failed to distinguish sufficiently between content and structure in moral reasoning with the result that a number of the responses to the dilemmatic problems were given too "high" a rating. The responses were in fact lower in structural properties than their content seemed to indicate. What appeared to be principled thinking in adolescence turned out (once the content-structure problem was "resolved") to be no higher than

³⁸ Ibid., p. 1073.

³⁹ By a fellow doctoral student, John Stewart, who attended a Kohlberg workshop at Harvard in 1973 and who has discussed the latest revisions to Kohlberg's theory.

stage 4 thinking at most.⁴⁰ I also understand that Kohlberg has introduced finer calibrations into his staging (e.g., a stage 5A and a 5B) and is considering adding a stage 7 which, so far as I can tell, is a stage "beyond" morality.

I am not aware that Kohlberg has published these revisions so it is not possible to tell how he actually treats the content-structure problem here. This problem, of course, cuts to the core of his developmental theory. It is at the basis (as we have seen) of his preference for the formalists' criteria as the measure of "mature moral judgment." Such a conception of mature moral judgment is moot to say the least; for it presupposes a notion of morality that is far from being accepted as the account of the moral domain. I shall not pursue these problems that Kohlberg's theory raises here (including the content-structure issue). Instead I shall examine the stages of moral development that typically fall within the age range (13 years to 18 years) of the secondary school student. My concern is with whether these stages are of such a structure that will permit the persons in them to be in a position to be given moral advice. According to Kohlberg's most recent views we may conclude that the stages of moral thinking for the secondary school student are primarily stages 3 and 4. By age 13 (or thereabouts) stage 3 thinking will be predominant and by age 16 or 17 stage 4 thinking will be predominant.

⁴⁰ Similarly Kohlberg also explains away the apparent regression problem (I referred to earlier) with college students. It turns out that many of them were not at as high a stage as he once thought. He now believes college students generally are in a transition stage from 4 to 5 and he is calling this stage "4-1/2." These people are beyond conventional morality but have not yet developed principled morality.

In short, according to Kohlberg, the secondary school student is at the level of conventional morality, level II (though I suspect that there are certain amounts of stage 2 thinking that will occur especially at the lower end of the secondary school age range). How are stages 3 and 4 characterized?

Stage 3 is described as the "good-boy-good-girl orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or 'natural' behavior. Behavior is often judged by intention--'he means well' becomes important for the first time and is overused. One seeks approval by being nice."⁴¹ Stage 3 thinking conceives of good behavior as that "which pleases or helps others and is approved by them." Central to this conception of helping others is that of empathy or role-taking, which Kohlberg claims is a distinctively human way of structuring thought and action. Thus in role-taking one reacts "to others as like the self and (reacts) to the self's behavior from the other's point of view To understand the development of role-taking we must not only consider the principle of empathy or 'welfare,' considering the effects of action upon the others involved, but also the principle of 'justice,' that is of reciprocity and equality in human relations."⁴² Thus role-taking is by no means a strictly stage 3 conception since it occurs in other stages, including stage 6 where it apparently embraces justice. But conceived as sympathy or concern for the welfare of

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 1067.

⁴² Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 51.

others, role-taking first clearly emerges in stage 3 thinking. (It is present only to a very limited extent in stage 2.) As a conceptual ability--the ability to take the other person's place and imagine being on the receiving end of one's own actions--role-taking is "the precondition for experiencing a moral conflict."⁴³ Without this capacity, according to Kohlberg, one would not know when one is in a situation of moral conflict. To be aware of moral conflicts one must be able to role-take. I have argued that a sufficient condition for requesting moral advice is one's being in a situation of moral conflict. Such a condition presupposes that the agent (advisee) is aware of the conflict in which he is caught. Kohlberg's discussion of role-taking suggests that this awareness is predominant in at least stage 3 thinking; so it seems to follow that a student at stage 3 has the necessary conceptual apparatus to at least seek moral advice from another. Further it seems that the stage 3 student could also receive moral advice given his developed concern and sympathy for the welfare of others. As an advisee he would be able to take into consideration the effects of his action on the well-being of the third party. He would know that their interests count. After all he seeks approval of others by trying to please, to be nice; so the others-regarding consideration which the moral adviser would doubtless mention would be meaningful and important to our stage 3 advisee. He would be disposed normally, to act in such a way that others are helped rather than hurt even, I suppose, if he himself were temporarily disadvantaged provided others still approved of his actions. There seems to be then

⁴³ Ibid., p. 64.

at least three reasons for saying the stage 3 student is in a position to be morally advised: (a) he is disposed to helping others, (b) he can role-take or take the position of the third party indicating concern or sympathy for others, (c) he can recognize situations of moral conflict.

But how closely is the stage 3 thinking tied to the notion of winning the approval of others? Suppose one were in a situation like the young talented artist I discussed earlier. If he were stage 3 could he be sufficiently open-minded to consider an advised course of action which if followed would (i) disserve the third party, (ii) bring disapproval on him, but (iii) immensely serve his own well-being (given the special nature of that case). Kohlberg would say, I believe, that this example is basically representative of stage 2 thinking and as such would be rejected by a stage 3 person--since it is customary for a person at a given stage, n , to reject the thinking of a lower stage, $n-1$.⁴⁴ Thus a stage 3 student would not be in a position to receive moral advice in those situations where the consideration of the welfare of the third party is finally overridden in the advice given him. The stage 3 person is able only to receive moral advice of a "straight" kind or advice that if followed will help others and thereby win him approval. Suppose, however, a stage 3 person is advised to follow a course of action which would be helpful to the third party but which would not bring him approval. Would the stage 3 advisee be in a position to give the advice serious consideration knowing that if he followed it others would benefit though his

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 49.

action would not be approved by them? This case is at least logically possible; and it raises the question as to the extent to which the stage 3 person is tied to the notion of having his actions approved by others. Kohlberg further stresses (in stage 3 thinking) conformity to majority behavior. Of course if one's "majority" is just the gang to which one belongs then it seems somewhat unlikely that a stage 3 student would be sufficiently free to consider following advice that runs counter to the group norms and standards. How important is "conformity" to stage 3 thinking? By all accounts it, along with "winning approval," seems to be quite important. Stage 3 seems to make room for the group-centric whose case, relative to being in a position to receive advice, was ruled out earlier on the grounds of insufficient independence of group control and pressure. Evidently then there are certain limitations to the giving of moral advice to a stage 3 student. The extent of these limitations is difficult to ascertain with precision at the moment and will remain so until Kohlberg is able to give us a more complete description of the stage. We need to know for example just how much freedom and independence a stage 3 thinker has. Can he really be a chooser in the sense required for one's being an advisee or do notions like conformity and winning approval override in stage 3 thinking?

Stage 4 thinking is described as follows: "Orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. One earns

respect by performing dutifully."⁴⁵ Unlike the prior stage where what counts as a moral reason for doing something is "It helps others and wins you approval," in stage 4 what counts is "It is your duty and wins you respect." Suppose then that a stage 4 student is uncertain about what his (her) duty is in a certain situation. It seems that he could be in a position to receive moral advice to the extent that the advice is a statement of the appropriate duty (as judged by the adviser) or to the extent that the advice given is backed up by a reason which states that it is the duty in question. For example "I advise you to be honest with your parents. After all it is your duty as their son (daughter) to do so," could be seen by a stage 4 student as meaningful advice, apparently, because it satisfies some of the conditions descriptive of stage 4 thinking. It appeals to one's duty as a reason for doing something and as such can figure in moral advising. But suppose that instead of not knowing what his duty is in some situation the student is in a position where his duties are in conflict; or where a duty conflicts with an obligation or moral principle. It obviously will not do to advise this person by saying "I advise you to do your duty which is . . ." since the issue is one of tension between two duties. Moreover role-taking, according to Kohlberg, cannot resolve the conflict since it is a precondition of experiencing moral conflicts in the first place. "Where such conflicts arise, the principles we use to resolve them are principles of justice,"⁴⁶ i.e., of equality and reciprocity. In other words moral

⁴⁵Kohlberg, "The Adolescent as a Philosopher," p. 1067.

⁴⁶Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 51.

conflicts are resolved by appealing to stage 6 reasoning. But stage 6 reasoning is two stages above stage 4 reasoning and Kohlberg says that a person who is at a lower stage is unable to comprehend examples of moral reasoning more than one stage above his own. So a moral adviser to a stage 4 student who is caught in a conflict of duties situation could not give advice (that would help the student resolve the conflict) that appealed to the principles of justice.

It seems to me that within the context of Kohlberg's theory of moral development the moral adviser of the stage 4 student has one final move open to him. He could appeal to something like a "higher duty." He could say to the advisee "Look, no matter which way you choose to act you are going to leave undone one of your duties. This is regrettable, but in the circumstances unavoidable. My advice to you is that you should perform duty B (thus neglecting duty A) because, other things considered, I think B really takes precedence over A in these circumstances." The adviser must then be prepared to give a justification for his judgment that B takes precedence over A. But at stage 4 thinking it is not clear to what the adviser would appeal in justifying his judgment to the advisee. He could hardly justify it by appealing to a reason commensurate with stage 4 thinking itself such as "Right behavior consists of doing one's duty." Further it is not likely that he could justify it by appealing to a stage 3 reason since (as we have noted) a stage 4 thinker rejects examples of thinking representative of stages below him. Stage 6 reasoning has been ruled out leaving but one possibility--appealing to a stage 5 reason as justification for the advisee's judgment. Will that work? A person

at a given stage, n , can comprehend moral reasoning at one stage higher, namely $n + 1$; moreover by being exposed to $n + 1$ thinking the person at stage n is (apparently) aided in his moral growth towards that higher stage. Do stages 4 and 5 stand in the relation of n to $n + 1$? Formerly they did but with Kohlberg's recent revisions to his theory it is not at all clear they do now. Evidently the new stage, called 4-1/2, is inserted between stages 4 and 5 to account for those whose thinking is beyond the 4th stage but not yet at the 5th stage. The precise status and nature of this new stage is as yet unclear (though I am told it can be labeled as a stage of "cynical ethical relativism") but it is at least conceivable that stage 4-1/2 is part of the regular development of moral thinking. Thus to get from stage 4 to stage 5 one would have to go through stage 4-1/2. So it is at least conceivable that stage 4-1/2 has the effect of placing stage 5 two stages beyond stage 4 thinking in which case stages 4 and 5 do not stand in the relation of stages n to $n + 1$. Thus stage 5 reasoning would not be comprehended by a stage 4 person and a stage 5 reason could not be used by a moral adviser to a stage 4 advisee. For those advisees whose moral development is not terminal at stage 4 it is possible that a few of them could comprehend an example of reasoning from stage 5, in particular stage 5A but not, I would think, from stage 5B.⁴⁷ In all, according to Kohlberg's theory it is not clear what an

⁴⁷ Kohlberg divides stage 5 into 5A and 5B. The former is characterized (briefly) as a social contract orientation where right action tends to be defined in terms of standards which have been actually examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. The latter (5B) is an orientation to internal decisions of conscience but without clear rational or universal principles. See "Adolescent as a Philosopher," p. 1067.

adviser could appeal to in helping a stage 4 student resolve a conflict of duties, which is to say that to be at stage 4 thinking is not to be in a good position for getting moral advice.

This conclusion is re-enforced, I believe, by the "obedience and respect for authority and fixed rules" dimension to stage 4 thinking. With this conception of the world it is unlikely that a stage 4 student will understand a teacher's "I advise you to do X" as a piece of advice but rather as an injunction or command to do X. Assuming that the teacher is seen as a "significant" person in the stage 4's environment and that the former is in a position of authority then given the stage 4's law and order orientation it is virtually beyond question that the student will not be able to take the advice for what it is--a recommendation to follow one course of action among possible alternatives. In other words, the stage 4 student, under these circumstances, will not be able to conceive of himself as being sufficiently free to dissent from the teacher's advice. The essential logical distinction between the adviser's "I advise you to do X" and the advisee's freely choosing either to assent or not is then replaced by a quasi psychological causal mechanism connecting the stage 4's obedience to the utterance of the person in authority. It is not logically possible to advise a person to do something under these circumstances. And finally, the stage 4's conception of rules as "fixed" (and exceptionless) is incompatible with the notion of rules and principles required in moral advising (as I argued in the previous section of this chapter). Rules (at least moral ones) need to be

taken as provisional guides to action not as fixed and rigid injunctions to be upheld in all circumstances.

What then can we conclude about the secondary school student's being in a position to be given moral advice from the point of view of that student's stage(s) of moral development? If Kohlberg's theory of moral development is sound then I believe we can take the following position. Of the two stages of moral thinking (3 and 4) normally associated with the secondary school age-range of 13 to 18 years, only one, namely stage 3, has a structure that enables a student to be given moral advice--stage 4 thinking on the whole being logically incompatible with the conception of receiving moral advice from another. While there are certain limitations (as I indicated) which stage 3 thinking imposes, normally a student at that stage can be said to be in a position to receive moral advice whereas a stage 4 student is not in a position (for reasons just given). These are rather odd conclusions to come to though I believe they do follow from Kohlberg's developmental theory and my analysis of advising. They are odd for these reasons: (a) Presumably vast numbers (i.e. stage 4s) are unable to receive moral advice which seems contrary to common sense. If they could regress to stage 3 thinking then they would be in a position to be advised but according to Kohlberg such regression does not occur. (b) Of all the stages of development Kohlberg has identified and described only two, namely stages 1 and 4, have structures that are incompatible with moral advising. Even stage 2 thinking with its predominant egoistic dimension enables a person there to receive at least limited moral advice--principally that which serves the interests

of both the stage 2 advisee and the third party. Furthermore stage 3 reasons which are good moral reasons, are understood by the stage 2 person. A student at stage 2 is by no means in a position where he cannot be given some moral advice. Thus students (and others) at stages 2, 3, 5 and 6 are all in a position, in varying ways, to be given moral advice. Expressed in a way which brings out the oddness of the situation we may say that normally a student from (roughly) ages 11 to about 15 or 16 is capable of being morally advised; from about ages 16 to 18 or 19 he is not; from about 19 or 20 on he is (assuming his development through to at least stage 5). One would have thought that if a student can receive moral advice at age 13 or 14 he could surely receive it at age 17 or 18 and indeed be in a better position to receive it; but according to the work of the present section this common sense view does not seem to bear scrutiny.

The "culprit" here seems to be stage 4 thinking which resembles stage 1 thinking in many respects. The presence of stage 4 generates a gap in what would otherwise be a fairly consistent development in the moral advisee, in respect of his being able to receive and reflect on moral advice. This gap could be closed by omitting stage 4. That however would clearly run counter to Kohlberg's theory of moral development; hence the following dilemma. We can accept Kohlberg's present theory but then we are left with the task of furnishing a new explanation that would close the gap if we want to square our views on giving moral advice with common sense; or we may simply omit stage 4 (asserting that students simply do not enter such a stage in their moral development after stage 3--thus in effect rejecting Kohlberg's

particular theory) but still adhering to a developmental view in a general way. Barring further refinement of Kohlberg's work, I favor the latter route which presents a more consistent picture of the moral advisee (i.e., which answers more consistently the question "Who can be given moral advice?"). The development approach however reminds us that our moral thinking changes at different ages and that we do not have a fixed moral nature which forever determines the way we think about moral problems. Evidently a good moral adviser of students would want to find out the level of development his (her) student-advisee is at and use moral reasons appropriate to that level.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Though moral advising in the secondary school is possible it is not likely to be a ubiquitous activity. Only some teachers will be in a position to give moral advice; and only some students, if Kohlberg's staging is right, to receive it. The most defensible circumstances in which moral advice is given by the teacher are those in which a student seeks it. If the initiative for moral advising rests with the student it seems to follow that the occasions for moral advising will not be school assemblies or morning announcements over the public address system where unsolicited moral advice is offered by the principal to the student body, but rather in the concerns of individual students over actual moral problems and difficulties which they are facing or see themselves facing, and for which they desire some assistance. These typically are complex interpersonal problems involving relations between themselves and their peers or themselves and adults, moral dilemmas and, not infrequently, feelings of moral guilt or remorse arising from some past action.

In a recent survey, 4,000 secondary school students (in England) were questioned on the place of moral education in the schools. Did they think there should be special classes for moral evaluation? What topics would they like to see discussed? Why? The researcher summarized the findings in the following way: "Pupils

repeatedly pointed out in their replies to many of the questions . . . that young people need wise and sympathetic guidance about many moral issues. They certainly do not wish to be told what to do. But they want help to sort out the issues involved in different moral judgments so they can arrive at opinions which are balanced, and take action that is considered sensible They recognize and acknowledge the seriousness of the many ideas, topics and situations they would like to discuss with sympathetic adult help Many pupils openly acknowledged their ignorance and puzzlement about these matters. They recognize the need for standards and are not unaware of the complexity of many moral decisions that they will have to make. They want assistance to enable them to clarify their thinking as far as possible."¹ I do not wish to confuse moral advising of students with moral education in the schools (nor even to relate them particularly) but it does seem to me that the foregoing account presents a good case for the giving of moral advice to students quite apart from whatever implications it might also have for a moral education program; for advising, as I have argued, provides the assistance or guidance in helping others to reach their own reasonable decisions without the compulsion. There can be no doubt that many students have concerns about moral issues. Whether they are also prepared to bring their concerns forward to the point of getting some moral advice is another, though related, matter. Probably only very few students will feel disposed to do so. This is their personal decision. It will be

¹Philip R. May, Moral Education in School (London: Methuen Educational Ltd., 1971), pp. 129-30.

tempered however by a number of factors such as their own development, the attitudes of teachers and the climate of the school generally. Conceivably, with improvements in these factors more students might be disposed to seek moral advice in school, though quite apart from the numbers involved, moral advising remains a justifiable activity.

This conclusion certainly requires some defense. Moral activities in the school are by no means beyond the reach of criticism. Antagonists may direct their attacks on either of two levels--a general level and a specific level. They may, for example, argue that moral activities in general have no place in the school at all holding that the teacher ought to adhere to the business of giving instruction in the normal range of curricular subjects. To them, the only proper locale for moral instruction is in the home. On the other hand the antagonists may specifically cite the activity of giving moral advice to students as an unwarranted encroachment by the teacher to influence overtly, persuade or pressure the student into taking a certain course of action. They may express concern (or fear) that in giving moral advice the teacher is in fact preaching to or indoctrinating the student--that the former is directly telling the student what to do rather than leaving him free to decide on his own. Or they may claim that the teacher is simply not competent to give moral advice or to know what, morally speaking, is best for the student to do. In response to these sorts of criticisms it should be pointed out that the present study does not suggest displacing moral advising from the home in order that it may take place in the school. Even if it is the case that the moral advising of the young is typically a "home

matter" it does not thereby follow that it cannot or should not also be a "school matter." The fact is that some students are more disposed to seek advice from their teachers than they are from their parents. If the various conditions for advising which I have specified in this study are met by the teacher, surely it is better the student be given moral advice by that person than not be given it at all--even if doing so involves exposing the teacher-adviser to certain personal and (or) family matters. Moral advising in the school is precisely for these students who want or feel the need of moral guidance but for one reason or another do not or cannot get it from their parents or other adults, save the teacher. Moral advising in the schools thus should be seen as (i) complementary to moral advising done elsewhere and (ii) an activity initiated by student-request, not as something that is given by teachers as a matter of course to their students or that is thrust upon their students in civics classes for instance, or during opening exercises.

To be sure, advising someone to do one thing rather than another is telling that person to do something; but it is not dictating, ordering or commanding that person to do it. When I say "I advise you to keep your promise to your friend" I am in a sense telling you what I think you should do; and I am implying there are good reasons in this case for your keeping your promise which I am prepared to give you. "I advise you to do X" does not mean "I command (or order) you to do X" because, while both are instances of telling you to do something not every instance of "telling to" is an instance of commanding or ordering. I can tell you what to do (by giving you advice)

which does not entail my ordering you. Further, as just indicated, commanding is not logically tied to the notion of reasons whereas advising is. This fact highlights the point that advising another to do something is an appeal to that person's ability to make choices and decisions for himself about what he should do. It recognizes that there are alternative options open to the advisee from among which he alone must finally choose what he deems to be the best course of action. So a teacher's giving moral advice to a student can in no way be construed as the former's attempt to coerce, force or compel the student to do one thing rather than another. Giving moral advice to a student presupposes his freedom (and ability) to reason. Those who argue to the contrary completely misunderstand what advising is about. Equally those who claim advising is a technique of psychological persuasion are thoroughly misguided. Unlike "I persuaded him to do X" the expression "I advised him to do X" does not mean "I got him to do it." The aim of persuasion is to get the addressee committed to some view--to "win him over" as it were. The aim of advising on the other hand is not that of winning someone over but helping the advisee solve his own problem by providing him with a "rudder" by which to "steer." While it is proper to speak of assenting to advice it does not follow that in failing to get an advisee's assent to do X that one has thus failed at advising in the way that failing to get an addressee's assent to do X counts as a failure in persuading. So giving moral advice to a student is not a case of moral persuasion. The two activities are conceptually distinct. To criticize the former activity for doing the latter (and thus lacking respect for the

thoughts and views of the addressee) is to be guilty of a logical mistake.

All of this has, of course, been argued in earlier chapters-- particularly in Chapters I and II where I discuss the logic of advising and in parts of Chapters III and IV. I have no doubt that the activity of moral advising in the school or elsewhere can withstand at least these usual sorts of criticisms brought against it (the most common of which is that in giving advice the adviser is actually making the decision for the student or is at least unduly manipulating the student's thinking) because these criticisms are in the main based on conceptual confusions. They indicate a lack in understanding of the concept advising. It is possible however that a deeper criticism can be leveled against moral advising in the schools. To see what this criticism is about I shall have to examine briefly the subject of form and content in moral education.

It is currently fashionable among writers, researchers and (presumably) practitioners in moral education to (a) distinguish between procedure or form in moral education and content or matter; and (b) to favor or stress the former to the exclusion of the latter. As one influential researcher has put it, "We must eventually define 'moral education' in operational terms, so that our results can be as objective as possible."² The presumption here is that by focusing on procedures and methods for making moral decisions rather than on inculcating traditional moral beliefs and codes (i.e., content) in the student, objectivity or neutrality in moral education can be

²Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 22.

attained. And the reasons for desiring objectivity and neutrality in moral education in the schools are two-fold. First, the traditional moral values and codes (what Wilson calls "first order principles" like the Ten Commandments) have lost their force and point in a rapidly changing society, and to continue teaching a moral code (or set of moral beliefs) as though it were still valid and applicable in all circumstances is to present a misleading and unjustifiably one-sided picture. Second, the traditional moral code (in Western society at any rate) has been inextricably enmeshed in Christian ethics. Yet given contemporary pluralism, to teach such a moral code to students who adhere to a variety of religious persuasions and to none at all, is bound to be found offensive and discriminatory. Thus those criticisms of moral education which are aimed at its partisanship can ostensibly be met by basing a moral program not on a particular set of moral beliefs but on a methodology which is deemed to be morally neutral. The emphasis in contemporary moral education is teaching students "how to do morality" rather than teaching them that honesty, etc. is right. The objections that Wilson and others have to traditional moral education programs is not only that they are one-sided (partisan) and somewhat outdated in content but also that the manner in which they are or were handled--namely by exhortation and indoctrination--is morally indefensible. Wilson's recommendations for doing moral education in the schools is that the traditional first order principles (content) be deleted and not replaced by other substantive issues and that a new procedure or method of moral education be introduced. Just as in science education students are taught how to think scientifically by

being taught certain appropriate skills such as "patient observation," "accuracy" and "testing by experiment," in moral education students are to be taught how to think morally by being taught certain appropriate (moral) skills. Hence the new basis for moral education "should consist of imparting those skills which are necessary to make good or reasonable moral decisions and to act on them. We are not primarily out to impart any specific content, but to give other people facility in a method."³

The skills required for reasoning in morals (for making good moral decisions)--what Wilson calls the "second order norms or rules of procedure"--consist of: attending to the facts, using language correctly, sticking to the laws of logic, developing imagination, having awareness of one's own feelings, taking into account the feelings and interests of others, being consistent, and so on. These norms or rules obviously are not all peculiar to rationality in morals; but some are sufficient for differentiating (according to Wilson) between rationality in morals from rationality in other areas. Those norms that are peculiar to the former are: treating others as equals, that is, giving the same weight to the wants and needs of other people as to one's own; and awareness of one's own and other people's feelings. These two norms or rules are elements in what Wilson later identifies as the moral component PHIL which I have already referred to in the last chapter. But irrespective of whether the norms are common to rationality in more than one area or are peculiar to rationality in morals, they all are non-partisan or morally neutral (so Wilson claims); and they all are required in

³Ibid., p. 27. Emphasis added.

making "good or reasonable moral decisions and (acting) on them."

Following these second-order norms or rules is the "ultimate objective"⁴ of moral education; and, one might add, in learning how to follow them one is being morally educated. To initiate people into these second-order norms "could not be described as indoctrination, or as the imposition of a particular set of values or beliefs on them: it is, rather, initiation into those general principles which are characteristic of a certain form of human thought."⁵ The new moral education is non-partisan and hence acceptable to anyone regardless of creed or culture because the second order rules of procedure on which it is based are themselves nothing more than ways of human thinking and as such are free of content. So Wilson apparently has achieved his objective. He has got beneath the troublesome realm of moral values and beliefs as a source of moral education to an underlying level of objectivity and neutrality, namely a way of thinking or reasoning about morals.

All of this is reminiscent of Kohlberg's work, too. Whereas Wilson objects to moral education as a laying on of first order moral principles, Kohlberg objects to it as constituting "bags of virtues" or a listing of absolute values in school codes, such as being good citizens, being kind, minding one's own business, working quietly, playing fair, being neat, clean, polite, and punctual, etc.⁶ Kohlberg's

⁴Ibid., p. 102.

⁵Ibid., p. 112.

⁶Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education, ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R.Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 61-2.

objection to bags of virtues is that "there are no such things. Virtues and vices are labels by which people award praise or blame to others, but the ways people use praise and blame towards others are not the ways in which they think when making moral decisions themselves."⁷ So according to Kohlberg it is misleading to base moral education on "bags of virtues" because they are not connected to the underlying thought processes which go into the making of moral decisions. We have seen that Kohlberg's primary objective is to explain how the young reason through hypothetical moral dilemmas at various ages and stages in their careers. What is important to Kohlberg is not so much the particular value judgment that a person makes about another's action but how he himself arrives at it, the reasoning he uses. Reasons are significant both to Wilson and Kohlberg--to the former because they just are the second order norms or rules on which moral education is based (so that reasoning or being reasonable in morals is following the second order rules); and to the latter because the reasons given for a particular judgment reveal the structure of the agent's thinking. In short, for both researchers, moral education is learning how to be good at reaching and participating in moral decisions. Ultimately for Kohlberg moral education in the school consists of "participation in the structure and decisions of the school itself."⁸ Thus the "issue of participation raises the issue of the social structure of the school and a complete approach to moral

⁷Ibid., p. 63.

⁸Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development," p. 83.

education means full student participation in a school in which justice is a living matter."⁹ For Kohlberg the principle of justice is the formal procedural principle that is analogous to Wilson's central procedural principle of treating others as equals (PHIL) both of which are deemed to be independent of any particular ethic, set of values, or way of life and, of themselves, form the bases for a viable moral education program. Finally, however, whereas Wilson sees the importance of moral action or conduct as following from a mastery of the second order norms (or a mastery of rationality) Kohlberg regretably has little to say on the matter of moral action. He does note that "moral maturity in judgment seems to correlate with more mature moral action. Principled subjects both cheat much less and resist pressures by authorities to inflict pain on others much more than do less mature students."¹⁰ But principled subjects are at stages 5 and 6 and are few in number. The less morally mature students, stage 2 and 3 students, are by implication much less inclined to be influenced in their conduct by their level of moral thinking. Working through a Kohlberg hypothetical moral dilemma has little transfer value over to the subject's own actual moral conduct.

In its 1969 report to the Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, the Committee on Religious Education¹¹ took the position

⁹ Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 78-9.

¹¹ The Report of the Committee on Religious Education in the Public Schools of the Province of Ontario, Religious Information and Moral Development (Ontario Department of Education, 1969).

that "it is the formal character or moral point of view of a particular judgment which is important, rather than its content. It is not the decision reached in a given situation that matters, so much as the process of arriving at that decision."¹² It is the Committee's view that developing morally is developing an ability to make sound moral judgments. Thus in the moral instruction of the young the teacher "ought to be concerned with the quality of thinking that produces a particular moral judgment or decision than with the behaviour which is its consequence."¹³ The Committee's apparent lack of concern for moral behavior, following Kohlberg, stems from its conviction that "to influence behavior rather than the underlying process of moral reasoning . . . leads to the establishing of absolute values It is regrettable, but absolute standards of morality are not a normal part of human experience and to teach that they can be is to risk the child at some later stage rejecting the whole system."¹⁴ Conduct, then, far from being interpreted "as synonymous with morality" is considered to be "a mere symptom of the individual's level of moral development."¹⁵

In summing up, the three positions (Wilson, Kohlberg, and the Committee) are all of a piece insofar as their conception of moral education in the schools is concerned. To be sure there are some differences among them (Wilson being more concerned about moral action

¹²Ibid., p. 44.

¹³Ibid., pp. 46-7.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 45.

than either Kohlberg or the Committee) but they all share in the procedural or methodological approach to moral education rather than a substantive or content approach. They all claim the basis of moral education is rationality, not the transmission of a set of moral beliefs. It remains unclear, though, the extent to which the proceduralists are prepared to include moral conduct or behavior in their conception of moral education. There seems to be less than concurrence on this matter, and probably for good reason; for moral conduct is likely to be construed as "content."

What is the "deeper criticism" that can be made of moral advising in the schools to which I referred a few paragraphs ago? It is simply this. "On the face of it (the antagonist will say) moral advising is a formal or procedural approach. After all does it not profess to be a rational activity and are not Wilson's second order norms or rules of procedure just the conditions which a moral adviser qua adviser must satisfy (as per Section 5.2). Is it not also the case that a series of 'logical' conditions must be met if a speech-act is to be an act of advising (as per Section 2.1)? But (he will continue) any further pretense of advising as being procedural or formal and hence neutral and non-partisan is shattered by the open and explicit appeal in moral advising to substantive matters or matters of content. For whenever one engages in the act of advising (by saying 'I advise you to . . . ' or words to that effect) he necessarily refers to the act advised. So in advising another person there are always two things of which to take account: (a) the verbal utterance, speech act or act of advising (which is the logical or procedural part)

and (b) the act advised (which is the content). So (he will conclude) moral advising is no improvement, at bottom, over the traditional moral education programs in which moral beliefs and values were laid on the student as absolute answers to moral problems; it is no improvement because it is tied to the notion of moral content and of telling a student what course of action to follow."

Our antagonist is remarkably accurate in his analysis of the procedural and substantive components of moral advising. After all, a piece of advice is unmistakably a piece of content; and advising, unmistakably a formal or logical act. I cannot advise you without advising you to do something. If I simply say to you "I advise you" it is always in order for you to ask "But what is it you advise me to do?" I cannot be said to have advised you unless I specify, in the act of advising, the advised act. Moreover I cannot advise you unless I use words in a certain logical pattern and ensure that certain logical requirements are satisfied. So any case of advising, including moral advising, of necessity is a conjunction of form and content. In the utterance "I advise you to tell the truth" the form consists of the act of advising, namely the "I advise you to" and the content of "tell the truth" (the act advised). But while our antagonist is correct in his analysis as far as he goes, he is mistaken in his view that a (deep) criticism of moral advising is its conjoining form with content. This misguided criticism comes about by our antagonist's misunderstanding of moral activities (like moral education) as being a wholly formal or procedural affair. My claim is that moral activities in the school by the nature of the case cannot help but appeal to

matters of content as well as procedure--that indeed, the procedures themselves have a substantive dimension to them. Thus rather than being a criticism of moral advising that it "muddies the waters" by bringing in content it is in fact a strength of it. Moral advising simply does (or attempts to do) what has to be done in any context of moral instruction or moral education, namely appeal to form and content. In fact the refreshing advantage of moral advising in a world of formalism just is that it faces up to actual moral issues and delivers material by which an advisee may be guided to a resolution of his moral problem.

Does this mean then that the methodological positions, respecting moral education, of Wilson, Kohlberg and the Committee are in error? Not necessarily; but it does mean, I believe, that they have given insufficient attention to the content which their procedures smuggle in; or that they are insufficiently aware they actually appeal to both form and content in the articulation of their views. The Committee's work falls under this second description. For shortly after having declared their formalist stance, namely, the view that moral education is developing a young person's power to reach sound moral judgments or to reason morally, the Committee quickly moves (unwittingly?) to embrace a program of character development. "We believe that the high duty of public education (is) to foster character building";¹⁶ and they make it clear that by "character building" they mean the "inculcation of desirable social attitudes and ethical and

¹⁶Ibid., p. 52.

moral values."¹⁷ They continue: "The curricular innovation which we recommend, then, in the field of moral education is the establishment of a program . . . (which) will have as its focus character building, ethics, social attitudes, and moral values and principles."¹⁸ Yet it is this precise substantive approach of inculcating desirable attitudes and moral values which the Committee members had earlier led the reader to believe they were rejecting in favor of the procedural approach. In the end the Committee adopts what looks like a very traditional program in moral education and one which both Kohlberg and Wilson have ostensibly found good reasons for criticizing. The Committee's attempt at a purely procedural conception of moral education fails; they evidently have been drawn to include (or have felt the need to include) a consideration of moral values and attitudes (first order principles) in their recommendations for a moral education program in the schools despite their earlier expressed discontent with the notion of inculcating moral values in the young.

A more interesting position with which to deal in this connection, and the one I shall consider the test case, is that of Wilson. Is Wilson's conception of moral education as based on second order rules or norms a purely procedural approach or does it in fact bring with it a content, a particular set of values. Let us by way of example re-consider some of Wilson's second order rules of procedure, namely that of treating others as equals or giving the same weight to the wants and needs of other people or to one's own; and that of

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 53-4.

awareness of the feelings of others and of one's own. Now when we talk about taking these sorts of things into consideration in reaching a moral decision (as Wilson does) it seems to me that we are thereby taking a moral position, and assigning worth to the considerations just cited. In saying that we give the same weight to the wants and needs of others as we give to our own we are saying, in effect, that the wants and needs of others count; and that, it seems to me, is a moral (value) claim. Wilson on the other hand would respond to this as follows. He would say that following the above rules of procedure is the rational thing to do. "Rationality," he notes, "is the characteristically human way of dealing with the world."¹⁹ Thus in attending to the facts, following the laws of logic, having an awareness of other people's feelings, giving equal weight to other's needs and wants, etc., we are according to Wilson, dealing with the world in a characteristically human way. Is this then a neutral, non-partisan claim or are there certain values hidden within it? Is Wilson recommending that rationality is the best way of approaching the world or is he making a descriptive claim that this is in fact the way people do approach the world. What turns on his use of the expression "characteristically human way"? So far as I can tell Wilson takes himself, at this point to be describing--not, however, how people approach the world, but the notion of person. His claim (roughly) is that once we are clear about what a person is (what it means to be a person)--once we fully understand personhood--it

¹⁹Wilson, Introduction to Moral Education, p. 51.

will just be seen that to treat others as equal just follows from this understanding.²⁰ "People are equals because they are the same in certain very important ways. They are the same in using language, having thoughts and feelings and wants One person may be stronger or cleverer, or richer or more powerful than another; but they are still equals. This means that what one of them desires, or wants or feels, or thinks, is no more and no less important than what the other desires."²¹ This evidently is part of the description of personhood--the beginnings of a logical definition of "person." Now logical definitions according to Wilson, are non-partisan and exclude first order norms or moral values.²² Accordingly, from a logical definition (value-free description) of "person" we will be able to say that "treating others as equals" is a logical consequence of the definition. But "treating others as equals" is one of our second order norms, so we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that since this second order norm follows from a logical definition the norm itself is free and independent of any set of values or ways of life or codes. As a second order, hence neutral and non-partisan, norm or principle "treating others as equals" cannot be derived from "It is what God (or our parents, or society) wants (or says is right)" and still retain its second orderedness. Rather it is a logical implication of the description of "person." How do we get the remaining

²⁰ John Wilson, A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education (London: Geoffery Chapman, 1973), p. 30.

²¹ Ibid., p. 28.

²² Ibid., p. 32.

second order rules which Wilson identified earlier? "Given this central principle (treating others as equals) it is clear that the other components (the other second order rules) are logically required. We must know what other people feel (EMP); know the facts (GIG) and be able and willing to bring this knowledge and our attitude of concern to bear on actual situations, so that we decide and act in the right way (KRAT). These are attributes which would be possessed by anyone who seriously asked the question 'What ought I to do?'; they follow logically from the question and are not the peculiar property of any particular ethic"23

Wilson's objective appears to have been met; and his defense rests. His second order principles of procedure are all independent of ethical codes, values and moral beliefs because they are all logically derived from a neutral description of "person." We are thus led to conclude that to be rational (to follow the second order rules) is just to be a person. But this seems to claim more than Wilson's earlier dictum that "Rationality is the characteristically human way of dealing with the world." But how could this be? The answer I believe lies in the fact that Wilson has not been as neutral in his defense as he claims to be. Something of "value" has been slipped in. If Wilson is correct in his explication of "person" and the connection between explication and the second order norm, then it will be true to say that from the fact that "people are the same in using language, having thoughts and feelings" we get the principle "treating others as equals (i.e., giving the same weight to their wants and needs as to

²³Ibid., p. 31.

our own)." It will be true as a matter of definition essentially; for the latter expression is just part of what the former means. But this, it turns out, is a terminological fiat of sorts. Rather than describing what is, Wilson has in fact carefully selected or chosen his description of "person" and asserted that from it the expression "treating others as equals" logically follows. Even if his description of "person" is correct as far as it goes one still cannot get from "people are the same in using language, having thoughts and feelings" straight off to "giving the same weight to other people's wants and needs as to one's own." For I can always say "Of course people are the same in that they all use language, have thoughts and feelings; but why treat them as equals?" without committing a logical inconsistency. What this means is that Wilson's second order rule of procedure does not after all follow from the description of "person" (i.e., is not logically determined by it): it is rather something he has himself chosen to promote as a viable basis on which to build a program for moral education. In his choosing a second order principle of the kind "treating others as equals" he assigns a value to it. He is in effect saying "treating others as equals" is a desirable way of looking at the world. Thus his second order rule of procedure is more than a logical consequence of a description of "person"; and that "more" consists of a moral value embedded in the procedure itself.

If this conclusion is correct, Wilson has not succeeded in divorcing content from form in moral education--i.e., succeeded in basing moral education on a procedural approach said to be independent of a set of values or moral beliefs. For the procedures (the second

order norms) themselves are expressions of value. It is still important however to distinguish between form and content provided it is understood that "making a distinction" is not necessarily "dividing and separating off." There is much in the traditional conception of moral education that needs to be criticized both by way of the content of that education and the manner in which it is or was handled. Wilson is quite right in his objective to put moral education on a sounder footing. But he is wrong in thinking that putting it on a procedural footing he thereby purges that footing of moral values. The concept of giving moral advice (in the schools) takes cognizance of this fact: namely, that form and content are both required. For this reason moral advising is defensible; it attempts to do what any attempt at moral education logically cannot escape from doing, namely addressing the question of form and content.

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