ABSTRACT

CHRISTIAN LUDWIG LISCOW:
A PRECURSOR OF MODERN IRONY

By

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The purpose of this study is to examine Liscow's use of satire and irony and to determine to what extent he prefigures and exhibits modern tendencies.

The first chapter, "Changing Modes of Satire and Irony," seeks to establish definitions of the major literary terms referred to throughout the thesis, namely, irony, satire, and parody. Discussion of parody is limited to a working definition, but irony and satire are considered from both an historical and a modern point of view. Chief interest centers upon the scope of irony with particular reference to its applications by Thomas Mann and Robert Musil, who are regarded as most exemplary of modern ironists. Liscow has been spoken of as both an ironist and a satirist. This is partly because in his day irony and satire were close complements of each other; sometimes they were even considered to be synonymous. Irony is distinguished from satire most perceptibly, however, when one notes the differing posture of the satirist and the ironist toward a moral norm or any absolute—the satirist defends or protects it; the ironist neither accepts it nor rejects it but simply shrugs his shoulders, because he lives in a world that has discarded absolute values.

Since Liscow is a rather obscure figure today, the second

chapter, "Liscow in Conflict With His Age," contains pertinent biographical and historical data which serve to identify him with his age and particularly with the hostile milieu that he countered with satire and irony. Liscow is shown to be outside the mainstream of his times by highlighting some of his life circumstances and the attitudes that are reflected by them. Irony entails as much a way of thinking as it does application of a literary device; therefore, Liscow's attitudes toward his life and times assume a vital aesthetic significance. His problematic view of life encouraged the dialectic and the opposition which manifested themselves in his writings as irony.

Liscow's writings are analyzed in the third chapter, "Liscow's Satires: Transcending the Stereotype," in order to ascertain his motivations and the manner of his satire, parody, and especially, irony. Liscow's skill as an ironist culminates in his Vortrefflichkeit und Nohtwendigkeit der elenden Scribenten, the work which best illustrates the range of his irony. Specific findings concerning Liscow's affinities with the twentieth century are stated at the end of this chapter. His modern tendencies are evident in his artistic detachment, in his scepticism toward authority and dogma, in the ambiguity of his personal positions, and in his permeating sustained irony.

In the last chapter Liscow's irony is contrasted more conclusively with that of modern ironists in order to point out significant areas of divergence. Liscow is seen as a

precursor of changes in irony and one who shares the intellectual impetus prominent in a lineage of important writers in whom the authorial point of view is changing from the idealism of the Enlightenment to a progressively greater realism. Gradually satire and irony become virtually opposing forces, because satire is aggressive in its ridicule and is tendentious, having for its purpose to correct or improve according to some norm, while irony is increasingly marked by a gentler concern for absurdities which frequently involve the author himself; the ironist does not recognize absolutes and norms but sees two or more sides to everything. Thus traditional satire and "modern" irony have become mutually exclusive, because they now have very different purposes. In the eighteenth century they were closely wedded, with irony perhaps "subservient" to satire. This is no longer possible. Liscow's place in this is to have been one who reflects the beginnings of the changes that took place in the as-yet-unwritten history of irony.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS


| | |
|---|---|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Changing Modes of Satire and Irony | 8 |
| Liscow in Conflict With His Age | 38 |
| Liscow's Satires: Transcending the Stereotype | 63 |
| Conclusion | 120 |
| Footnotes | 130 |
| Bibliography | 142 |

# INTRODUCTION

The satirical writings of Christian Ludwig Liscow have not enjoyed currency in the two centuries since he died. His name, if his work is included for discussion in German literary histories, appears when there is concern for describing the many modes of writing and the various attitudes prevalent in the "Frühaufklärung." Many of those who mention Liscow tend toward either high praise or utter damnation, with little middle ground in evidence.

The remarks of one of his most severe critics, Hermann Hettner, are particularly interesting to a modern reader. Hettner wrote in 1870:

> Und wo ist in Liscow auch nur der leiseste Funke dichterischer Gestaltungskraft? Die einzige Form, welche Liscow handhabt, ist weit mehr noch als bei Rabener die Form der unmittelbaren Ironie; er lobt was er tadelt. Diejenige Schrift, welche gewöhnlich am meisten gerühmt wird, die Satire Von der Vortrefflichkeit und Notwendigkeit der elenden Skribenten, leidet an diesem Fehler grade am ärgsten.[1]

Hettner's criticism that Liscow overused direct irony in his writings contrasts sharply with L. Wienbarg's appraisal of Liscow (printed 1845) as "den grössten ironischen Schriftsteller Deutschlands."[2] Such divergent views indicate how controversial Liscow was (and is), but also point up the great changes that have taken place in the way irony has been

regarded by the cultivated public over the past two hundred to two hundred and fifty years. Perhaps Hettner was simply seconding Goethe's criticism of Rabener, of whom Goethe wrote: "In den äussern Formen ist er zwar mannigfaltig genug, aber durchaus bedient er sich der direkten Ironie zu viel, dass er nämlich das Tadelnswürdige lobt und das Lobenswürdige tadelt, welches rednerische Mittel nur höchst selten angewendet werden sollte."[3] Or perhaps Hettner was defending the irony of nineteenth century romantics before an earlier Swiftian type. Responding to the Wienbarg statement above, Klaus Lazarowicz wrote in 1963, "Diese Einstufung ist zwar einigermassen willkürlich, sie unterschätzt auf jeden Fall die Leistung eines Lichtenberg, Jean Paul, F. Schlegel, L. Tieck u. a. Indessen ist zuzugeben, dass Liscow als Ironiker und als Parodist in der deutschen Literatur kaum seinesgleichen hat."[4] One sees then that an investigation of Liscow's irony could be instructive. It could provide insights into early eighteenth century thinking, into Liscow himself and any changes he might have helped bring about, and into our conception of the nature of irony today. The present-day reading public has come to expect irony whether it issues from poets, prosists, or dramatists. D. C. Muecke observes that "irony now pervades literature, obliterating very largely [the] distinction of ironical and non-ironical. Nowadays only popular literature is predominantly non-ironical."[5]

It is from a twentieth century standpoint that we wish to examine Liscow's writings, to determine what, if any,

"modern" elements of irony can be found and to ascertain the attitudes which accompany ironical expression in his time and ours, in order to more precisely account for the differences or similarities.

However, mere mention of the term "irony" introduces doubt, if not confusion. How shall this literary term be defined? (One may well consider the question ambiguous.) What is the scope of irony? And, since Liscow was a satirist who employed irony, how does satire differ from or relate to irony?

Answers to these questions are not easily discovered. To consult standard references is to court frustration; the articles on irony and satire contained in them offer a brief definition, with some attention to etymology, and then proceed through an outline of the term's historical application, which is liberally interrupted along the way with notes to see entries on related literary terms. One can come full circle in following the direction, "siehe dort."

In more specialized studies, as for example in Erich Heller's The Ironic German, one finds, rather typically (and two-thirds of the way into the book), the lament: "Deeply discouraged by even the best writers on the subject (with Hegel and Kierkegaard among them) as well as by Thomas Mann's extremely resourceful employment of the term, I have attempted neither a definition of [irony] nor a catalogue of its varieties (which are such that it is impossible to grasp hold of the thing they vary)." He concludes, "Every attempt

to define irony unambiguously is in itself ironical."[6] Reinhart Baumgart remarks in a footnote to Das Ironische und die Ironie in den Werken Thomas Manns that he discovered twenty-four different interpretations of irony during his studies.[7]

While interest in irony, and, to a lesser extent, satire, presently runs high, no thorough-going history of either has yet been written. In the case of satire, Lazarowicz remarks with disappointment that unlike the histories of the genres --novel, novella, drama, Lyrik, there is no sufficient and up-to-date history of German satire, and that those extant, by Flögel and Ebeling, are "veraltet und unbrauchbar."[8] Concerning irony, the situation is about the same, according to Muecke, who has done the latest and most exhaustive study of irony from the standpoint of "ironology," which term he uses to distinguish his investigations from those of the literary critic. He writes: "There is no history of irony in European literature, or even the outline of a history. So far as I know, there is no complete history of irony in any of the principal European literatures."[9]

Many investigators have come to this impasse, with some concluding that it is best not to try to construct any formal all-encompassing definition of irony, others hazarding to try, still others attempting to define what the term does not mean, and, perhaps most, giving evidence of irony by illustration from the works of selected authors.

Problems of a similar nature arise, of course, when one

tries to define satire or to distinguish between satire and irony. Helmut Arntzen says: "Je mehr wir uns nämlich von der Satire als mehr oder minder eindeutig bestimmter Gattung entfernen, um so verwirrender wird die Fülle von Begriffen, die dem des Satirischen angenähert werden: Komik, Humor, Witz usw., vor allem aber Ironie."[10]

The foregoing is included in order to convince, or perhaps only to remind the reader that as commonplace as these two literary terms have been, yet there is no firm identification of their meanings and no conclusive separation of their modes. Nonetheless, the present study necessarily depends especially upon the current compass of irony to achieve its purposes. The task will therefore be to construct its scope from various authorities and from sources which are most convincing, general, and capacious. We will also define satire and attempt to distinguish it from irony since both are operative in Liscow's writings. Indeed he has been called both an ironist and a satirist. And, because it is a rather prominent device in his works, we will explain the function of parody, though in this case too, there is little to draw upon in the way of adequate definition or historical review.

Chapter one then will deal principally with the scope of irony, because it is as ironist that we believe to discern a peculiarly modern dimension in Liscow. In order to describe the compass of modern applications of irony, we will briefly characterize the theory and practice of the irony of Thomas Mann and Robert Musil who, we believe, are most exemplary of

modern ironists. Concerning the two other literary terms, satire and parody, we wish to limit our discussion to working definitions. No attempt will be made to describe the scope of modern satire and parody. The reasons for these limitations are, that a broader endeavor would be unmanageable in a dissertation, and that our major concern is not so much with satire and parody as it is with irony. For similar reasons we will not offer a comparison of Liscow with any modern satirist, as say, Karl Kraus. However, there are additional considerations for this which will be contained in our conclusions, to be taken up in chapter four.

We wish to emphasize also that no comparison is intended between Liscow and the two modern authors we have chosen to illustrate contemporary irony. They are introduced only to present the dominant nature of irony today. With little exception discussion will be limited throughout to German prose writings.

Because Liscow is not well known to the modern reader we will present a brief sketch of his life within chapter two. Revealing certain biographical aspects will contribute to a fuller development of our thesis, but unfortunately many details of Liscow's life remain obscure. The bulk of the chapter, however, will deal with establishing Liscow as an eighteenth century man who is considerably out of step with his time. To identify him as a satirist already suggests to the reader a person who does not quite fit the mold. We will explore the implications of that, in part, by presenting a

brief comparison of Liscow and his contemporary G. W. Rabener. Rabener, also a satirical writer of the Early Enlightenment, was very popular in his day and, we believe, epitomizes his times. Liscow's manner and character contrast very sharply with Rabener's, so by looking at them together we can highlight the ways in which Liscow was divorced from the mainstream.

In chapter three we will review most of Liscow's writings to discover the facets of his satire, parody, and as we said, especially of his irony. We want to determine to what extent Liscow uses the "direct irony" (or "blame-by-praise" irony as it is also called) which Hettner considered burdensome and to find out to what degree, if any, more "modern" irony occurs. As much as possible we want to avoid the many adjectives used to describe irony except in chapter three where we will be concerned to indicate the scope and variety of Liscow's irony. It should be remembered that irony has become a very encompassing term and that when we use the term "modern" it is not really very accurate as a designator for the present, because one can find at least some aspects of "modern" irony in the writings of the ancients. Interestingly enough Aristotle spoke of "eironeia" not in De poetica but rather in Ethica Nicomachea where it signified an attitude or behavior. Nonetheless, it will be useful from time to time to speak of "modern" irony, as we seek parallels between Liscow's era and our own.

We will make final assessments and present concluding opinions in chapter four.

## CHANGING MODES OF SATIRE AND IRONY

Scholars have long been fascinated by Socrates' irony. J. A. K. Thomson may be right when he asserts that although irony did not begin with Socrates, "irony in the modern sense dates mainly from him."[11] G. G. Sedgewick, writing in the early 1900's, is confident that "Socratic irony contains the germs of all the newer ironies which have so afflicted the literature of the last century." (Italics mine)[12] The utterances of Socrates are indeed convenient as a starting point for analysis of irony, because scholars believe to have discerned several forms of irony in the aggregate expression of this one person: his repeated use of blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame, which was the nucleus of his later dialectical method; his life style and attitude, manifested by self-depreciation and feigned sympathy toward his contemporaries and his times; and there was what Sedgewick calls his irony of detachment, his ability to meld disparate elements into harmonious idea.[13]

Beda Allemann regards irony as, at first a "Redeweise," out of which a dynamic range of expression becomes possible. He defines irony succinctly as "transparenter Gegensatz zwischen wörtlich und eigentlich Gesagtem."[14] Irony, in his opinion, emerges largely from the dialectic and reflection inherent in the perceived opposition between the literal and

the actual. He chooses the well-known example of Shakespeare's Antony who says in the third act of Julius Caesar, "And Brutus is an honorable man." This would be the simplest application of irony, he notes, because the recurrence of the remark (i.e., as leitmotive) in an otherwise non-ironic context soon makes it clear that Antony is not really saying what he means. It is signalled irony. On the other hand, the most highly ironic text, he believes, is almost devoid of signals and merely proceeds from the context. Literary irony, according to Allemann, finds itself between two poles, that is, it is neither literal nor satirical. Antony's utterance taken seriously, or literally, could not be ironical, and if he had simply said something in mockery of Brutus as a means of exposing him, that would not be ironical either. Thus the skillful ironist must maintain his balance between seriousness toward and mockery of his subject matter.[15] Allemann considers that irony is only effective when it is sublimated by means of pretense and when so-called "direkte Ironie," i.e., merely saying the opposite of what one means, is avoided.[16] This is an interesting and welcome attempt to discover a basic definition of irony. It perhaps obviates the further qualification of the term into formulations such as: tragic irony, cosmic irony, irony of manner, irony of situation, philosophical irony, practical irony, dramatic irony, verbal irony, ingenu irony, double irony, rhetorical irony, self-irony, Socratic irony, romantic irony, sentimental irony, irony of fate, irony of chance, irony of

character, irony of things, etc. This is but a selection of the terms that have been used to designate the varieties of ironic application. These terms represent the "signals" that Allemann mentions, which are intended to more precisely characterize the irony.

In the early eighteenth century there were four formulations extant on the meaning of irony. Most popular was the definition that irony is "saying the contrary of what one means." Less popular was the notion of irony as "saying something other than one means." The third and fourth formulations found in dictionaries were: "to censure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretense of blame; and any kind of "mocking or scoffing," regardless of the rhetorical structure.[17] The fourth formulation was an English definition which clearly indicates confusion or irony with satire. The others describe a broader range and all contain the principle of opposition which is basic to all irony. Especially the idea of saying something other than (as opposed to merely opposite of) what one means, is suggestive of the dialectic and reflective aspects of more complex irony.

The irony found in the satires of the eighteenth century is largely "Redefigur" based on the opposition of appearance and reality, i.e., saying the opposite of what one means. Gottsched spoke of "Ironie oder Verspottung" as a figure of speech in which one says "gerade das Gegenteil dessen, was man denket, doch so, dass der Leser aus dem Zusammenhange

leicht begreift, was die wahre Meinung ist."[18] One sees from this that even the literary lawgiver of the first decades of the century considered irony and satire to be practically synonymous. And as simple as the irony would seem to us now, still the literary public often took it seriously. Liscow among others remarked about this, as did Rabener in his essay Von dem Missbrauch der Satire, "dass viele um deswillen Feinde der Satire sind, weil sie nicht wissen, was die Ironie sei und worin deren Stärke und Schönheit bestehe."[19]

Muecke discerns a major dividing line in the overall development of irony, which derives from the observation that from roughly the sixteenth century to about the middle of the eighteenth century, society was dominated by a more or less "closed ideology," that is to say, by a Christian conception of the world, temporally and spacially limited, hierarchically and statically governed to a large degree. In such a tightly structured society, people were not so aware of change, development, and progress, but were very sensitive to any aberration and departure from the norm. One looked forward in anticipation of heaven, and backward for cultural orientation. Irony manifested from out of the "closed ideology" is therefore corrective or normative irony, according to Muecke, often a device of the satirist or polemicist.

> . . . a foolish opinion, a narrow doctrine, a rigid institution, an ignoramus, a hypocrite, a fop, a pharisee, a politician, a blind, presumptuous generation, or simply a thoughtless, unlucky fellow is made or becomes a spectacle to be looked down upon from the unassailable battlements of universal reason, honesty, prudence, common sense, good fortune,

> unassumingness, or insignificance. When the victim is dealt with the incident is closed, the irony is over.[20]

What Muecke describes here comes close to defining satire. What he terms corrective or normative irony is the measuring of a victim against a moral yardstick, posing the wrong one against the right many--a traditional mode of satire. Finality too is more characteristic of satire, so that one might say that a "satire is over;" irony on the other hand often proceeds without resolve.

But it is Muecke's idea of the origins of changes in irony that is of most immediate interest to us here. The irony of the "closed ideology" contrasts with that of the concurrently developing and gradually dominant "open ideology" in the eighteenth century. Irony of the "open ideology" demonstrated a more broadly conceived opposition than "saying the opposite of what is meant." People became more strongly aware of the puzzling contradictions in life, the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, the humane and the scientific, the emotional and the rational.

This slowly emerging "open ideology," engendered at first only by the most exceptional minds, brought the heretofore transcendentally conceived cosmos, the eternal and the infinite, into immanence. Life was now viewed as dynamic, and there was increasing rejection of hindrances to free thought and expression. Longstanding laws, customs and institutions were reinspected, foundations of civilization, philosophy and art were reexamined. Muecke explains that

since dynamism deplores anything that stabilizes life, rules, and in particular rules of art, will not only be seen as an imposition on the natural expression of the artist, but art itself, if it is to represent life, becomes suspect, since art is necessarily static and limited, while nature, on the contrary, is at once vast, unbounded and inexhaustible.[21] Such attitude, deriving from the "open ideology," fostered an enlarging of the conception of irony to "any general aspect of life seen as fundamentally and inescapably an ironic state of affairs."[22]

All irony plays on two (or more) levels as a virtual contrast between a reality and an appearance. There is always an opposition between these two levels, perhaps as contradiction, incongruity or incompatibility. There is in irony an element of "innocence," that is, the innocence of a victim confidently unaware of the possibility of another level or point of view countering his own, or perhaps the ironist himself simply feigns unawareness of another level. Muecke tells us that the victim or object of irony "may be a person (including the ironist himself), an attitude, a belief, a social custom or institution, a philosophical system, a religion, even a whole civilization, even life itself.[23]

Whereas comedy relies on the unexpected and suddenness for its effect, irony, while often humorous, is much more subtle, agile, and requires a larger scope on which to play itself out. The longer prose forms have therefore been the most frequent vehicles for modern irony.[24] The highest

ironic style relies on subtle reference to something in a richly detailed background which remains unspecified, but which the reader nonetheless perceives and understands. This affords the ironic style "das Spielerische, Schwebende, Schillernde."[25] However, ironic writing is too subtle if the author's real intention does not come through to the reader. There must be a fine balance between the author's real meaning and the pretended meaning, which therefore calls for great precision by the ironist.

The distancing of the author from his subject, so often felt in ironic writings, was, in earlier, simpler irony, often an attitude of superiority, a kind of cat and mouse relationship. Modern ironic distance, however, finds the artist also strongly amidst the world, which he regards as pervasively ironic, and thus he himself is often the object or the victim of irony. Muecke makes an interesting point on this matter of ironic detachment. He distinguishes the writer who only employs irony from time to time as it suits his purposes from the one whose irony is a part of his character. The former pretends detachment as a part of his ironic strategy, the latter really is detached, he says. "The former, if he is a satirist, may be motivated by indignation, disgust, or contempt; but as an ironist he will conceal his real feelings under a show of dispassionate logic, gravity, or urbanity, or even go beyond neutrality to express the opposite of what he really feels by pretending sympathy, earnestness, or enthusiasm." The latter, being really

detached, sees the world always ironically--he need not pretend.[26]

From the common rudiments given above a more elaborate gauge of the modern ironic impulse can be constructed by briefly examining the attitudes of two authors whose works, it is generally agreed, most examplify the scope of modern irony, Thomas Mann and Robert Musil. It is mostly a matter of an ironic way of thinking that characterizes their writing, an attitude toward life and art that emerged largely from early German Romanticism and its primary theorist, Friedrich Schlegel.

Schlegel, influenced by Fichte's subjective idealism and by Socratic Irony, had been preoccupied with the apparent antithesis between the classical and the romantic, between the finite and the infinite, between objectivity and subjectivity, between the rational and the irrational, between the "Naiven" and the "Sentimentalischen," between the absolute and the relative. He determined that one must seek to bring harmony to these opposite perceptions, since it would be unthinkable to discard the values inherent in any of them. Irony became for him in effect a metaphysical principle, "das Gefühl von dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mittheilung."[27] And the mood of irony is that "welche alles übersieht, und sich über alles Bedingte unendlich erhebt, auch über eigne Kunst, Tugend oder Genialität."[28] René Wellek says that for Schlegel, irony was "recognition of

the fact that the world in its essence is paradoxical and that an ambivalent attitude alone can grasp its contradictory totality."[29] Schlegel himself said paradox is the "conditio sine qua non" of irony.[30]

Romantic irony became variously manifested in the writings of many Romanticists, notably in those of Tieck, Hoffmann, Jean Paul, Novalis, Brentano, Grabbe, Chamisso, von Arnim, and La-Motte-Fouqué. But Schlegel himself considered only one piece of contemporary literature to embody the essence of literary irony as he conceived of it, Goethe's Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. His essay "Über Goethes Meister" reviews the spirit of irony he found there, a spirit which he later defined as "klares Bewusstsein der ewigen Agilität des unendlich vollen Chaos."[31] His review of Goethe's irony in "Lehrjahre" describes Thomas Mann's attitudes toward his Zauberberg remarkably well. Schlegel says:

> Man lasse sich also dadurch, dass der Dichter die Personen und die Begebenheiten so leicht und launig zu nehmen, den Helden fast nie ohne Ironie zu erwähnen, und auf sein Meisterwerk selbst von der Höhe seines Geistes herabzulächeln scheint, nicht täuschen, als sei es ihm nicht der heiligste Ernst.[32]

One can agree with Hermann J. Weigand that "the way Schlegel's review anticipates the temper of the Zauberberg is nothing short of amazing."[33] Muecke regards Thomas Mann's novels as "almost programmatic examples" of Romantic Irony. He adds: "Their appearance, a hundred and more years after the theory, turns our embarrassment at the paucity of earlier examples into a recognition of Schlegel's astonishing ability to see in Romanticism the seeds of modernism."[34]

The source of irony, as expressed by Thomas Mann in Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, consists in its middle and mediating position between mind and life.[35] He viewed reality as dualistic and antithetic and, like Hegel, he saw opposite forces at play in everything, so that disease, for example, could be, on the one hand, degrading and a spur to decadence, as with the musically gifted Hanno Buddenbrook, but in another light, the influence of disease could cause a person to become more sensitive and questive and thus promote the ennobling of an otherwise very physically oriented person, as in the case of Hans Castorp, who ultimately achieves a kind of "Steigerung" amidst the competing sources of the sick and the sound.

Mann believed that the challenges to Hans Castorp parallel every man's struggle to assimilate the spheres of nature and spirit and to put them in proper balance with each other. The ideal would be to blend these two forces into a perfect harmony. That he sought harmony rather than decision[36] indicates how strongly he, as Schlegel, was aware of the sheer paradox of life, and that to achieve this harmony a person must know both sides of his being. Of Castrop he said:

> Was er begreifen lernt, ist, dass alle höhere Gesundheit durch die tiefen Erfahrungen von Krankheit und Tod hindurchgegangen sein muss; so wie die Kenntnis der Sünde eine Vorbedingung der Erlösung ist. "Zum Leben," sagt einmal Hans Castorp zu Madame Chauchat, "zum Leben gibt es zwei Wege: der eine ist der gewöhnliche, direkte und brave. Der andere ist schlimm, er führt über den Tod, und das ist der geniale Weg." (Italics mine)[37]

Thomas Mann's stories usually focus on heroes who are not in

balance, who have so exaggerated one side of their being, or certain elements of one side of their being, that, at some point in life, they experience the revenge taken finally by the other side: Gustav Aschenbach's denial of nature culminates in a perverse outpouring of emotion; Adrian Leverkühn's agreement to deny himself normal human relationships brings him loneliness and tragedy in his later years. With Hans Castorp it is a bit different, because the instinctual, somatic, and, in the beginning, latent intellectual tendencies of the simple young man are receptive to the jostling around within the pedagogic atmosphere of the magic mountain. He leaves Davos carrying, at least for a time as far as we know, a synthesis of harmony.

An important facet of Mann's irony, beginning with Der Zauberberg, is his close attention to detail and exploration of content for ironical possibilities. Minute description of milieu and objects (which almost have life themselves), is enlarged to include scientific analysis of the illnesses prevalent in Haus Berghof, of Behrens' physical view of disease as organic, of Krokowski's view of disease as psychic; and toward his characters, penetration of their physical and mental make-up. One feels throughout this long novel that Thomas Mann is enjoying his creation immensely, that he has a warm feeling toward all the many characters that inhabit Davos, in spite of their weaknesses, idiosyncrasies, absurdities, and that he wishes to present everything within his purview, object, milieu, character and idea,

in manifold light. The ironic temper of Thomas Mann, as Weigand so well puts it, is "self-conscious playing with its own content, reflecting it in a series of mirrors that make it sparkle on a succession of planes simultaneously."[38]

Thomas Mann's irony reflects Schlegel's theory of irony, in that it is the basis for an art which is progressive rather than resolute, that it forms the investigative attitude which explores both the subjective and objective sides of life, with recognition that man finds himself in a dynamic, paradoxical world where his own limitations force him to treat life and art and himself both seriously and unseriously.

Similar statements would generally characterize the irony of Robert Musil, but we hasten to add, that Musil's irony is a good deal more complex than that of Thomas Mann. Each of these authors sought in his way to reconcile the paradox of life toward some principle which would be a more dependable guide to a significant existence. For Thomas Mann this was to follow "den genialen Weg" seeking not decision, but harmony of fundamental polarities. For Musil it was to be ever-conscious of myriad possibilities, to see things as they are and, at the same time, to see them as they could just as well be but are not. Thus Ulrich in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften cannot commit himself to any one idea, ideal, or profession, because commitment would mean limitation to an unwarranted dependency on absolute, eternal verities. But what are these immutable truths? Diotima makes some discoveries:

> Es zeigte sich, dass sie in einer grossen Zeit lebte, denn die Zeit war voll von grossen Ideen; aber man sollte nicht glauben, wie schwierig es ist, das Grösste und Wichtigste davon zu verwirklichen, sobald alle Bedingungen dafür gegeben sind, bis auf die eine, was man dafür halten soll! Jedesmal, wenn Diotima sich beinahe schon für eine solche Idee entschieden hatte, musste sie bemerken, dass es auch etwas Grosses wäre, das Gegenteil davon zu verwirklichen. So ist es nun einmal, und sie konnte nichts dafür. Ideale haben merkwürdige Eigenschaften und darunter auch die, dass sie in ihren Widersinn umschlagen, wenn man sie genau befolgen will.
>
> Diotima hätte sich ein Leben ohne ewige Wahrheiten niemals vorzustellen vermocht, aber nun bemerkte sie zu ihrer Verwunderung, dass es jede ewige Wahrheit doppelt und mehrfach gibt. Darum hat der vernünfige Mensch, und das war in diesem Fall Sektionschef Tuzzi, der dadurch sogar eine gewisse Ehrenrettung erfuhr, ein tief eingewurzeltes Misstrauen gegen ewige Wahrheiten; er wird zwar niemals bestreiten, dass sie unentbehrlich seien, aber er ist überzeugt, dass Menschen, die sie wörtlich nehmen, verrückt sind. Nach seiner Einsicht--die er seiner Gattin hilfreich darbot--, enthalten die menschlichen Ideale ein Unmass der Forderung, das ins Verderben führen muss, wenn man es nicht schon von vornherein nicht ganz ernst nimmt.[39]

Diotima cannot imagine life without firmly established truths, yet she is awakened to a realization that truth can erode into doubt when counter-possibilities are introduced. A more reasonable attitude is to accept an idea or ideal on a tentative basis, receptive to the chance that it might not stand up under the challenge of closer inspection. One feels the hovering ironist here gently chiding Diotima for her naivete and hears his omniscient interpretation of her innocence: "So ist es nun einmal, und sie konnte nichts dafür." Tuzzi, "der vernünftige Mensch," who finds ideals too demanding does not fare any more favorably before Musil's irony.

The rival principles objectivity and subjectivity both make claim to ultimate reality. Science attempts to drive out subjective factors by relying on facts, figures, and laws; the humanities, on the other hand, posit human characteristics, values, and purposes in seeking after truth. Neither polar principle offers assurance, but particularly does Musil ironize science, which modern men have held in such esteem:

> Man kann gleich mit der eigenartigen Vorliebe beginnen, die das wissenschaftliche Denken für mechanische, statistische, materialle Erklärungen hat, denen gleichsam das Herz ausgestochen ist. Die Güte nur für eine besondere Form des Egoismus anzusehen; Gemütsbewegungen in Zusammenhang mit inneren Ausscheidungen zu bringen; festzustellen, dass der Mensch zu acht oder neun Zehnteln aus Wasser besteht; die berühmte sittliche Freiheit des Charakters als ein automatisch entstandenes Gedankenanhängsel des Freihandels zu erklären; Schönheit auf gute Verdauung und ordentliche Fettgewebe zurückzuführen; Zeugung und Selbstmord auf Jahreskurven zu bringen, die das, was freieste Entscheidung zu sein scheint, als zwangsmässig zeigen; Rausch und Geisteskrankheit als verwandt zu empfinden; After und Mund als das rektale und orale Ende derselben Sache einander gleichzustellen —: derartige Vorstellungen, die im Zauberkunststück der menschlichen Illusionen gewissermassen den Trick blosslegen, finden immer eine Art günstiger Vormeinung, um für besonders wissenschaftlich zu gelten. Es ist allerdings die Wahrheit, was man da liebt; aber rings um diese blanke Liebe liegt eine Vorliebe für Desillusion, Zwang, Unerbittlichkeit, kalte Abschreckung und trockene Zurechtweisung, eine hämische Vorliebe oder wenigstens eine unfreiwillige Gefühlsausstrahlung von solcher Art.
>
> Mit einem anderen Wort, die Stimme der Wahrheit hat ein verdächtiges Nebengeräusch, aber die am nächsten Beteiligten wollen nichts davon hören.[40]

Emphasizing the delusion of most people that their world is more or less stable and endurable, is the very setting and time of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften which provides the dramatic irony of the Austrian Empire on the verge of war and

catastrophe. The reader's knowledge of this impending turn ironizes the many characters' actions and statements. And in a less conventional manner Musil chides his characters by juxtaposition, by spotlighting incongruities:

> . . . stelle einen Windhund neben einen Mops, eine Weide neben eine Pappel, ein Weinglas auf einen Sturzacker oder ein Porträt statt in eine Kunstausstellung in ein Segelboot, kurz, bringe zwei hochgezüchtete und ausgeprägte Formen des Lebens nebeneinander, so entsteht zwischen ihnen beiden eine Leere, eine Aufhebung, eine ganz bösartige Lächerlichkeit ohne Boden.[41]

The incongruity of General Stumm in a library, the contrast between Arnheim and his Moorish servant Soliman, Moosbrugger's perception of the world and the other characters' attitudes toward him are examples.[42]

Or Musil may present opposing points of view:

> So war es einmal bei einer Ausfahrt über Land vorgekommen, dass der Wagen an entzückenden Tälern vorbeirollte, zwischen denen von dunklen Fichtenwäldern bedeckte Berghänge nahe an die Strasse herantraten, und Diotima mit den Versen "Wer hat dich, du schöner Wald, aufgebaut so hoch da droben . . . ?" darauf hindeutete; sie zitierte diese Verse selbstverständlich als Gedicht, ohne den dazugehörigen Gesang auch nur anzudeuten, dann das wäre ihr verbraucht und nichtssagend erschienen. Aber Ulrich erwiderte: "Die Niederösterreichische Bodenbank. Das wissen Sie nicht, Kusine, dass alle Wälder hier der Bodenbank gehören? Und der Meister, den Sie loben wollen, ist ein bei ihr angestellter Forstmeister. Die Natur hier ist ein planmässiges Produkt der Forstindustrie; ein reihenweise gesetzter Speicher der Zellulosefabrikation, was man ihr auch ohne weiteres ansehen kann." Von dieser Art waren sehr oft seine Antworten. Wenn sie von Schönheit sprach, sprach er von einem Fettgewebe, das die Haut stützt. Wenn sie von Liebe sprach, sprach er von der Jahreskurve, die das automatische Steigen und Sinken der Geburtenziffer anzeigt. Wenn sie von den grossen Gestalten der Kunst sprach, fing er mit der Kette der Entlehnungen an, die diese Gestalten untereinander verbindet. Es kam eigentlich immer so, dass Diotima zu sprechen begann, als ob Gott den Menschen am siebenten Tage als Perle in die Weltmuschel hineingesetzt hätte, worauf er daran erinnerte, dass der

> Mensch ein Häuflein von Pünktchen auf der äussersten Rinde eines Zwergglobus sei. Es war nicht ganz einfach zu durchschauen, was Ulrich damit wollte; offenbar galt es jener Sphäre des Grossen, der sie sich verbunden fühlte, und Diotima empfand es vor allem als kränkende Besserwisserei.[43]

This passage well-illuminates Musil's intention in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (at least in parts one and two). It is to break down the usual relationships which bind people together as well as to their world. Ulrich does know better than Diotima, because for every idea he is aware of a counter-idea, and for every subjective notion there is an objective notion. Ulrich is the man without qualities or characteristics because he is a possibilitarian who recognizes no absolutes. Among the constellation of figures that Musil places around him, Ulrich draws closer to a sort of void where the subjective and the objective cancel each other out. He cannot bring antitheses or divergencies into accord; all he can do is recognize them, and, by treating them ironically, rise above them, though not entirely.

Parts One and Two of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften ironize the ideas and ideals of people who take the appearance of their world as reality, whenever this "reality" is too heavily based on either an objective or a subjective standpoint. In Part Three, however, Musil seeks to move on from the irreal attitudes of Diotima, Arnheim, the "Parallelaktion," and the rest, in quest of a mythical utopia based on possibility. Pronounced detachment enables the ironist to see the world rather apart from himself (although never

entirely; he continues to ironize himself in another character or characters), and he begins to weigh the possibilities of a simplified conception of the world, stripped of present historical associations and bearing resemblance to present time only in the portrayal of perpetual human traits. But in so doing, he diagrams, as it were, what could be, instead of what is, i.e., what is possible to be, not what should be. It is a search for the prototype or prototypical life. In Thomas Mann's Joseph-Series the myth plays in the remote past, but tacitly reflects historical repetition of the human condition right into the present. "Das Wesen des Mythus ist Wiederkehr, Zeitlosigkeit, Immer-Gegenwart."[44] Rather than prying into the past, Musil looks to future horizons, to "den anderen Zustand," by modernizing the quest of Isis and Osiris to find complementary unity. The myth enacted by Ulrich and Agathe takes on the universal drive for fulfillment and harmony between man and family, man and society, man and self.[45]

The attitude which guides his thought throughout Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is irony. "Ironie ist," as he himself defines it, "einen Klerikalen so darstellen, dass neben ihm auch ein Bolschewik getroffen ist. Einen Trottel so darstellen, dass der Autor plötzlich fühlt: das bin ich ja zum Teil selbst."[46] This definition embodies his principle of possibilitarianism as illuminated by incongruity. As in the case of Thomas Mann, the more profound irony emerges from the depth and breadth of the narrative. Musil termed it

"konstruktive Ironie." "Es ist der Zusammenhang der Dinge, aus dem sie nackt hervorgeht."[47] His point of view is like that of the experimental scientist or mathematician, whose approach to a problem is an inductive method which very often leads only to partial solution.[48] His manner of expression is less elegant than Thomas Mann's; there is in fact, a conscious stiffness of style, which does not depend for its effect on our usual conceptions of refined prose. It is rather, in Musil's words, "Mit keinem Wort, und mit jedem Satz etwas gesagt haben."[49]

Irony has broad application and manifestation, but its most elemental feature is opposition. It proceeds from that, and therefore we believe Allemann's definition holds, except that we would prefer a slight modification to indicate the scope of irony more emphatically, thus: Irony is transparent opposition between what is said and what is meant. So conceived, irony can be a rhetorical device or it can be a complex literary point of view.

It is clear that the modern ironist, exemplified most fully by Thomas Mann and Robert Musil, proceeds from a particular, and perhaps peculiar, "Weltanschauung." There is a strain of negativism in his stance, in that he rejects a comforting dogma, suspends judgement, and attempts to detach himself from the dynamism of a world which he so often finds illusory, contradictory or absurd. On the other hand, there is something positive in the ironist's capacity to accept this state of affairs and to laugh at, or at least smile

down upon, the human condition. For the ironist himself this attitude affords a measure of freedom, a means of rising above incongruity. For the reader, it may be as Kenneth Burke suggests: "Irony, novelty, experimentalism, vacillation, the cult of conflict--are not these men (he is speaking here of Mann and Gide, but we could also add Musil) trying to make us at home in indecision, are they not trying to humanize the state of doubt?"[50] Thomas Mann acknowledges only two alternatives for the intelligent person: he may either elect to regard the world ironically or radically.[51] If the latter choice is made, that is to say, if he orients his life with imbalance to either nature or spirit, he will find himself innocently unaware, the victim of paradox and on the point of the ironist's pen.

As in the case of irony, there are differences of opinion today on what constitutes satire, amply illustrated in the strong opposition of Helmut Arntzen, author of Satirischer Stil. Zur Satire Robert Musils im Mann ohne Eigenschaften, toward conclusions drawn by Beda Allemann in his Ironie und Dichtung. Allemann regards satire in the more traditional sense, that is as representing a basically militant attitude toward an opponent or opponents with the purpose of exposing errors and folly.[52]

The Early Enlightenment was rich in satire as is well known. One can say the same of the preceding two centuries too, however. We think for example of the "Narrenliteratur," Epistolae obscurorum virorum, Dedekind's Grobianus, and

Fischart's epic satirical poetry and prose in the sixteenth century and of Grimmelshausen, Gryphius' "Lustspiele," the satirical epigrams of Logau, Moscherosch's Philander von Sittewald in the Baroque age. What distinguishes "Aufklärungssatire" from that of the earlier periods, especially the baroque, is an impetus arising from a new feeling that sees the world as less oppressive or at least becoming so. Enlightenment meant elimination of old prejudices and the break-up of old bonds between faith and knowledge, religion and philosophy. The term suggests positiveness, love of freedom and human dignity. "Aufklärung" provided the satirist with a tangible ideal by which to compare and contrast his fellows. Emil Ermatinger expressed the difference between satire of the Baroque age and that of the Enlightenment this way: "Die Schärfung des Verstandes durch Kritik und Logik, wie sie das neue Bildungsideal der Aufklärung mit sich brachte, erleichterte, ja bedingte die Entstehung satirischer Dichtung."[53] But it is also accompanied by a different tone: "Die Satire wird nun gegenüber der eines Lauremberg und Rachel freier, beweglicher, überlegener und umfassender. Sie wächst aus einer ganz anderen Lebensstimmung hervor. . . . Diese neue Stimmung ist die der Ironie als des Bewusstseins der Autonomie."[54]

There are of course similarities between satire and irony; indeed the terms have been used interchangeably. Both often signify less a form than a "Denkweise." They are both vehicles of ridicule and exposure of absurdity. Both

are frequently humorous (in the broadest possible sense, ranging from perhaps a smirk to a smile to a laugh). In this regard we would mention the term "Witz," which had a peculiar eighteenth century significance that it no longer bears. The earlier meaning is associated with the growing departure from the "Schwulst" of the previous period toward a mode of rhetoric more closely aligned with Enlightenment ideals of clarity and simplicity. However, there was still concern for elegance in language too, and one was therefore "witzig" when one rejected pathos and grand gestures and instead used language which was level in tone yet jocular. The playfulness of "Witz" led to that certain superiority and the "Pointierung" noticed in the poetry of the anacreontic rococo poets. It is easy to see that this "Pointierung" eventually gave way to what we recognize today as a joke with its "punch line." But what we observe here now is the delight of the eighteenth century man who preferred the immediacy of wittiness to more plodding diplomacy. Christian Wernicke, the epigrammist, said: "Der Witz besteht in einer gewissen Hitze und Lebhaftigkeit des Gehirns, welche der Klugheit zuwider ist, indem dieselbe langsam und bedachtsam zu Werk gehet. Ein witziger Mann, sagt man, verliert lieber zehn Freunde als einen guten Einfall, da hergegen ein kluger Mann lieber zehn ganze Gedichte verbrennen, als einen guten Freund verlieren wollte."[55] With the unexpected culmination in a "Pointe," "Witz" has the capacity to be "scherzhaft" but also to be "spöttisch," and critical.

An author's involvement or lack of it in this critical aspect is for André Jolles decisive. He writes: "Je nachdem die Entfernung zwischen dem Tadelnswerten, durch das Spott gelöst wird, und dem Spötter, der es löst, grösser oder geringer ist, unterscheiden wir wieder zwei Formen, die wir Satire und Ironie nennen."[56] The point is well taken, because the stance of the ironist and the satirist are similar; they differ, however, in that the ironist is often likely to be a victim of his own mockery whereas the satirist is simply superior. One speaks of self-irony but not often of self-satire.

Parody too is a frequent device of both satirist and ironist. A general definition of parody is that it is exaggerated imitation of a style with the purpose of satirizing or ridiculing either manners, ways of thought or both. The aspect of parody which is ironical is the indirection of it. The reader supposes what the author's true opinions would be if he were not reading a parody. The satirical side is seen in the criticisms inherent in the caricaturing of the style. The parodist often picks for his subject something trivial or obviously inappropriate to underscore the ridicule.

As in the case of irony and satire there is no history of parody in German letters. The very long article which appears in the newer Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturgeschichte helps to fill the gap, however. Liscow's parody is designated there as "critical" parody, about which it is said there are historically recurring goals: "parodiert werden eine noch herrschende, aber absterbende, zu

überwindende literarische Strömung, dann der persönliche Gegner im Kampf zwischen den Generationen oder zwischen Vertretern derselben Richtung, und schliesslich wird die errungene literarische Macht gegen Trivialisierungen und gegen neue literarische Strömungen verteidigt."[57] We will show later where Liscow fits into this description of the parodist's intentions.

We have pointed out some similarities between irony and satire, but they are not essentially the same. In the period under study, the Early Enlightenment, satire was defined by Gottsched as "ein moralisches Strafgedichte über einreissende Laster, darinn entweder das Lächerliche derselben entdecket, oder das abscheuliche Wesen der Bosheit mit lebhaften Farben abgeschildert wird."[58] More encompassing and also more accurate, we believe, is the following definition by Eschenburg (in 1783): "Die Satire, als poetische Gattung betrachtet, ist eine durch die Rede bewirkte, sinnlich vollkommene Darstellung menschlicher Laster und Torheiten von ihrer nachteiligen und lächerlichen Seite, um jene zu bestrafen und verhasst zu machen, diese zu verspotten und zu belachen, und beides, den Lasterhaften und Toren zu beschämen und zu bessern."[59] Günter Wellmanns summarizes his findings toward a definition by saying "soviel ist klar: man kämpft in der Satire der Aufklärung gegen Torheit und Laster; man tut dies, um die Menschen zu bessern bzw. vor diesen Mangeln zu warnen."[60] And insofar as the satirist laughs and mocks his victim, Wellmanns shows it is the

aspect of "Besserung" which demonstrates, "dass der Satiriker der Aufklärung mehr Moralist als komischer Dichter zu sein hatte, obgleich er beides sozusagen in einer Person vereinigte."[61]

Satire has historically comprised a criticism of human characteristics, conventions, and institutions, with its temper of expression running from gaiety to tragic pathos. The attack by the satirist on the negative qualities of the object assumes a tacit but accepted norm. The need for such standards may explain why there was such a flowering of satire in the eighteenth century. Satiric attack may at times border on the sadistic; coarse, vehement language is not uncommon. Its traditional objects have been especially, politicos, pedants, virtuosi, bigots, and parvenus. Allemann admits to elements of satire in Musil's novel, above all in connection with the "Parallelaktion," but dismisses it as the overall impetus of the work: "denn das Stilprinzip dieses Romans ist eben doch keineswegs die reine Satire, sondern vielmehr ihre Milderung und Überführung in die verhaltenere Form der Ironie."[62]

Arntzen, however, considers Allemann's conception of satire too narrow. Satire, he says, can no longer be today, "Verurteilung nach dem Massstab gesicherter sittlicher Normen."[63] Accepting Schiller's well-known definition of satire as his basis ("In der Satire wird die Wirklichkeit als Mangel, dem Ideal als der höchsten Realität gegenübergestellt")[64] Arntzen's view is that Musil did not allude to

any standard credo of human behavior in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, but went beyond this to envision a utopia.[65] Utopia and morality, Arntzen believes, are more the concern of the satirist than the ironist, even though both proceed to examine the ambivalence of human existence. The difference is stated this way: "Der Satiriker wird 'Ironiker' und erkennt—indem er 'sich dumm stellt,' dass 'in allem etwas Richtiges stecke' und damit in allem auch etwas Falsches.[66] "Aber diese Ambivalenz, in allem," Arntzen continues, "ist es gerade, "über die er sich nicht darstellend beruhigt, sondern die er als tief Beunruhigendes immer wieder aufruft, um zu beschwören, was sein könnte (denn er ist Utopist) und was sein sollte (denn er ist Moralist)."[67] The ironist, on the other hand, does not, in his opinion, share this fundamental concern with the satirist, that is, he does not portray the contrast between "Wirklichkeit als Mangel, dem Ideal als der höchsten Realität," but rather assumes an attitude of detachment from reality, "ein Schweben."[68] Arntzen asserts that irony does not present the firm critical purpose that satire does; satire is directed toward mockery of the disorder in the world measured against a utopian notion of what the world could and should be.[69] He seconds Kierkegaard in this differentiation of purpose. Kierkegaard wrote, "Irony . . . has no purpose, its purpose is immanent in itself, a metaphysical purpose. The purpose is none other than irony itself."[70] Further, he says that irony and satire have an affinity for each other in that they both perceive the vanities in life,

but they differ markedly in the setting forth of this observation. "[Irony] does not destroy vanity, it is not what punitive justice is in relation to vice, nor does it have the power of reconciliation within itself as does the comic. On the contrary, it reinforces vanity in its vanity and renders madness more mad. This is what might be called irony's attempt to mediate the discrete moments, not in a higher unity but in a higher madness."[71]

The consequential terms in Arntzen's case for considering Musil's novel as essentially satirical rather than ironical, are "criticism" and "utopia." He regards their application to Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften to be implicit in Musil's definition of his own writing style. Arntzen writes, "Konstruktive Ironie--eine besondere Art also--, das ist nichts anderes als das Ergebnis satirischen Stils, es ist ironische Satire, die, indem sie erkennt, dass in allem etwas Falsches und etwas Richtiges ist, zeigt, dass alles falsch ist, damit im Gedächtnis bleibe, dass alles auf dem Wege sein soll, richtig zu werden."[72]

Aside from the fact that a new blurring of the terms is introduced here ("ironische Satire"), it is difficult to see where there is any important de facto departure from the ironic manner of thinking established earlier. We could point to the discussions held on the magic mountain between Naphta and Settembrini who encircle Castorp with currents and counter-currents of thought, then see him later necessarily re-orient himself to the cross-currents interposed

by Peeperkorn. The confused, but eventually enlightened, Hans Castorp finds "in allem etwas Falsches und etwas Richtiges" too, but in spite of life's paradox, he means to march onward. Of course Castorp goes off to war, and we do not hear from him again, whereas Ulrich and Agathe abandon the "real" world in search of utopia. It is on this conception of the utopian that the fine point of difference hangs in judging whether Musil's novel is in its essence satire or irony. If there is any distinction between satire and irony at all, then it must be that satire is more aggressive and definitive than irony. Within the traditions of satire, utopia would suggest not only an ideal existence, a perfect (albeit imaginary) state, but it would also connote an end-point, a definite and decisive condition, an absolute. Utopia, in a satirical context, would not involve so much the process as the goal. But in Musil's novel the emphasis is on the process of attempting to reach the outer limits of possibility. Moreover, the attempt fails; Agathe disappears and Ulrich returns to Vienna. At this point the novel breaks off and it remained unfinished, so further interpretation of the author's intention would be rather speculative. But judging from what precedes, we note once again that Musil seems to treat the whole of it as a great inductive experiment with no final conclusions in sight. This attitude marks the ironist more than the satirist.

Kierkegaard's charges that irony is self-serving and has no ethical purport, that the ironist, as an observer from on

high, simply affirms the madness of the world while the satirist seeks to destroy it, have been answered by Beda Allemann, Ingrid Strohschneider-Kohrs, and D. C. Muecke. They have shown that the ironist is immanent in his work as well as transcendent, and that Kierkegaard misrepresented Romantic Irony.[73] A point made by Muecke relates especially to our present concern. "The real basis of [Kierkegaard's] objections to irony is his commitment as a Christian to a closed-world ideology."[74] Commitment to dogma or to an unwavering moral standard of any kind is the one factor which most separates the satirist from the ironist. They are both critics of human ethics, but the satirist is more decisive and militant toward his victim or victims, deriving confidence of the rightness of his attack from adherence to a preconceived notion of what is right and what is wrong. Such certainty the ironist, at least the modern ironist, does not have. He is a questioner, a prober, he is suspicious of authority. He is more gentle toward his victims (of which he himself is often one), his criticism is more submerged and subtle than that of the satirist, and he is most acutely aware of instability and contradictory pressures in life. The attitudes of Robert Musil, as discussed earlier, are more nearly that of the ironist than the satirist.

Whether Musil considered himself a satirist or an ironist will concern investigators for some time to come. Perusal of his many, and often aphoristic, reflections on both irony and satire offer the student of Musil as much

recondite, yet fascinating material as do Friedrich Schlegel's thoughts on irony. That Musil was much aware of satire of course warrants its serious attention in interpreting Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. The most satisfying explanation is to see irony and satire in a relationship such as Wolfdietrich Rasch does:

> Musil gibt ein umfassendes, alle Schichten und Lebensbereiche umgreifendes Bild dieser Welt, wie es dem echten Roman zukommt. Dieses Bild ist ironisch gesehen, und zwar trifft die Ironie alle Erscheinungen der Zeit, die reaktionären wie die fortschrittlichen Gesinnungen, die Bewahrer und die Reformer, die Opportunisten und die Sucher. Es ist eine grosse Satire auf das sterbende Österreich, aber sie ist nicht lieblos. Musil entfaltet in seiner Darstellung einen satirischen Humor, der in die Gründe des Verfalls hinableuchtet und die innere Aushöhlung aufdeckt, aber nicht vergisst, dass sich hier ein tragisches geschichtliches Schicksal vollzieht, auch wenn es komisch aussieht . . . "[75]

Rasch then describes the epitome of Musil's manner of satire: "[Sie] vermeidet die grellen Farben und lauten Effekte, sie ist immer leise, gedämpft, subtil, arbeitet mit versteckten Pointen und ironischen Anspielungen."[76] Excepting that there is no mention of the author's intention in this summary of Musil's satire, it comes very close to defining irony. But beyond that, the total impression is that a satirical element is used in service to irony. While strong attention is given by Musil to ridiculing a dying Austria, the larger concern is devoted to an open-ended quest for a more dependable universal behavior. Dealing with the broader aspects of irony and satire, Morton Gurewitch tells us in European Romantic Irony:

> Perhaps the fundamental distinction between irony and satire, in the largest sense of each, is simply that irony deals with the absurd, whereas satire treats the

> ridiculous. The absurd may be taken to symbolize the incurable and chimerical hoax of things, while the ridiculous may be accepted as standing for life's corrigible deformities. This means that while the manners of men are the domain of the satirist, the morals of the universe are the preserve of the ironist.
>
> Irony, unlike satire, does not work in the interests of stability. Irony entails hypersensitivity to a universe permanently out of joint and unfailingly grotesque. The ironist does not pretend to cure such a universe or to solve its mysteries. It is satire that solves. The images of vanity, for example, that litter the world's satire are always satisfactorily deflated in the end; but the vanity of vanities that informs the world's irony is beyond liquidation.[77]

While admitting that both irony and satire may inform the work of a modern author, irony, that is, irony within the modern compass, must be regarded as the guiding spirit if the two are elemental in an author or his works. An ironic work may be "satirical," just as it may be a melange of things, but the modern ironist proceeds with a mind open to every contradiction, closed to every rigid moral, political or intellectual canon.

## LISCOW IN CONFLICT WITH HIS AGE

No complete biography of Liscow exists. The monographs by K. G. Helbig,[78] G. C. F. Lisch,[79] and J. Classen[80] which appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century still left a great deal of his life unaccounted for, especially concerning the important formative years, and the last ten years are practically blank. Berthold Litzmann's Christian Ludwig Liscow in seiner litterarischen Laufbahn, published in 1883,[81] was the last attempt at enlarging biographical data.[82] Litzmann had access to some correspondence between Liscow and the brothers Hagedorn, which had not been available to Helbig and Lisch. Nonetheless the major gaps remain. Litzmann's purpose however had been more to offer a balanced appraisal of Liscow and his works than it had been to reconstruct his life. His book was something of a culmination to some vigorous nineteenth century discussion of Liscow's literary "feud" with Johann Ernst Philippi which focused on the admissability and justification of personal satire. This of course helped to preserve interest in Liscow's writings into the nineteenth century. So did the reissuance of his writings in 1806 by Carl Müchler, who counted Liscow among the "genievollsten Schriftstellern seines Zeitalters."[83] It was Müchler's opinion that Liscow "verdient mit Recht unter allen deutschen

Satyrikern einen vorzüglichen Rang und in der Ironie hat ihn vielleicht keiner übertroffen. Er ist der Swift der Deutschen."[84] If Liscow was not appreciated by his contemporaries, Müchler wrote, it was simply because he was, like all eminent spirits, too far ahead of his time.[85]

But interest in Liscow faded for a variety of reasons. The revolt from the rationalism of the early "Aufklärung" toward sentimentality and "Sturm und Drang" continued into the nineteenth century with the Romantic movement. As inquisitive as one was in the early nineteenth century there was little concern for the Early Enlightenment. Herbert Roch, looking back as he prefaced a 1939 reprinting of one of Liscow's satires, wrote that the Müchler edition came out at a bad time. "Es waren die Jahre der romantischen Schwärmerei und der verfeinerten romantischen Ironie, die sich über Lessings derbe Art unendlich erhoben dünkte und somit in wohl noch grösserem Masse über Liscows."[86]

Some believe decisive Goethe's abrupt dismissal of Liscow as "ein unruhiger, unregelmässiger Jüngling" who did no more than find foolish people foolish.[87] Jürgen Manthey considers that Goethe's Liscow-Vignette is "eine wenig zulängliche Charakerisierung;[88] Lazarowicz calls it "indiskutabel."[89] Goethe was not entirely conversant with the circumstances. He apparently thought that Liscow had died after nothing more was heard of him after 1735, and his remarks indicate he was as much concerned to chastize his countrymen for attributing to "Frühabgeschiedene" talents

and noble character as he was in considering Liscow's satires.[90]

German satire was never more significant nor more profuse than in the eighteenth century. The eighteenth century satirist's purposes, in contrast to those of his medieval counterpart, generally reflect an optimism and hope for happiness in this world. And while the common impetus was to enlighten and to foster improvements in his fellow humans, the mere mention of these motives says little about the range or limitation of the satirist's efforts. Most satirists were not very sure of themselves, and proceeding from a strong moral awareness, they were bothered about the question of whether it should even be allowed to mock and dispraise one's fellows. Many also felt compelled to write a defense of their satire.

It will be significant for us to establish the satirist Liscow in his time in part by contrasting him with the satirist-contemporary with whom he is frequently paired in literary histories, Gottlieb Wilhelm Rabener. Rabener, who lived from 1714 to 1771, thus thirteen years younger than Liscow, was the most successful writer of satire in the Early Enlightenment,[91] and into the 1770's his writings enjoyed "erstaunliche Wertschätzung und Popularität."[92] They were frequently translated into other European languages as well.[93]

Rabener's satires were published at first in Johann Joachim Schwabe's Belustigungen des Verstandes und Witzes,

the monthly magazine which carried Gottsched's authority and approval, but later, when he, like many others, grew dissatisfied with Gottsched's stringency, he went over to the Bremer Beyträge. One of the founders of that journal, Gärtner, was a friend of Rabener, as was Gellert. J. A. Schlegel, Hagedorn, Gleim, Uz, and Gessner were all within his circle of associates. Thus Rabener was comfortably within the mainstream of early eighteenth century life and letters and enjoyed the days of his life according to the personally set limits which he felt were dictated by common sense and virtue. He was by most accounts a gentle and good man, one to whom Early Enlightenment moralists could proudly point as perhaps the epitome of those sought and taught virtues which would bring the reward of happiness.

Christian Felix Weisse attests that Rabener did not have an enemy in the world, and that even if others, being struck by the oft-times ridiculousness and unseemly behavior of people, became eventually cynical toward the human race, this kind of attitude could never have taken hold in the gentle nature of Rabener.[94]

Rabener did not make a profession of writing, but only spent his leisure at it. He was very happy with his regular work, for which he showed, from early on, a propensity and inclination. Even as a fellow pupil of Gellert and Gärtner at the Fürstenschule in Meissen, he was most interested and occupied with tax matters, and he became, progressively, revenue inspector in Leipzig, then later,

"Obersteuersekretär" and "Steuerrat" in Dresden.

But even though he was not heavily engaged in his writing, he had a great deal to say about the conduct and attitude of the satirist and about what satire should and should not be. In fact, the five essays he wrote on satire constitute nearly a quarter of his entire output.[95] As a highly regarded man and the most popular satirist of his day, these writings must have exerted quite an important influence on his contemporaries. His two main concerns were that satire did not become mere pasquil ("Schmähschrift"), and that satire always remain general and never personal. Thus the targets of his own prose satires, like the "Verlachkomödie" which Gottsched endorsed, are not named or suggested personages, but rather they are "Lastertypen" who display the foolishness, the vices, and the errors of the time--misers, "Betschwestern," loafers, ignorant physicians, greedy jurists, pedants, corrupt clerics, and others. Rabener always aimed at the middle class, intent on improving the morality of his fellow countrymen, but he emphatically rejected attacks on the church and the authorities of the state. In the following passage, taken from his essay, "Vom Missbrauche der Satyre," Rabener speaks of the "rechtschaffenen" satirist: "Das Ehrwürdige der Religion muss seine ganze Seele erfüllen. Nach der Religion muss ihm der Thron der Fürsten and das Ansehen der Obern das Heiligste seyn. Die Religion und den Fürsten zu beleidigen, ist ihm der schrecklichste Gedanke."[96]

Elsewhere Rabener rebuked as audacious any satirist who would present his superiors in an odious or ridiculing light; writers who did that kind of thing, he maintained, had not yet learned to be "gute Unerthanen," so how could they teach us the "Pflichten eines vernünftigen Bürgers."[97] Even schoolmasters and clerics should be spared satirical attack, according to Rabener, else the authority over pupils and congregation could suffer.[98] (There is occasional violation of his own theories in the case of clerics.) It appears that Rabener's highest desire was that his satires should not be offensive to anyone. And apparently they were not. In a letter to Gellert, he expressed the wish, "dass meine Satiren das Siegel der Orthodoxie erhalten möchten; und es ist mir immer erfreulich, wenn meine Schriften auch denen gefallen, die den Beruf eben nicht haben, witzig zu seyn."[99]

Rabener carried his sense of what was permissible and responsible in satire to the point where he would rather be still about the truth than risk overstepping the bounds of candor which he thought might, in some way, serve to injure other people:

> So verhasst mir die Lüge ist, so unbesonnen scheint es zu seyn, wenn ich allemal die Wahrheit reden wollte. Kann ich durch ein vernünftiges Stillschweigen so wohl meinen Pflichten, als der geselligen Klugheit, Genüge tun, so tue ich am besten, wenn ich schweige . . . der Schade, welchen wir durch eine unüberlegte Freymütigkeit uns selbst augenscheinlich zuziehen, ist wichtiger, als der ungewisse Nutzen, den wir durch eine unbedachtsame Satyre zu schaffen suchen.[100]

Lazarowicz devotes a chapter to Rabener's writing which

he entitles, "Die gefallende Satire," and says finally that Rabener's writings are not satire at all:

> Sie [Rabener's satire] ist das Produkt der Devotion, des Phlegmas, und der Eitelheit; sie nivelliert die Unterschiede zwischen der Torheit und der Bosheit; sie scherzt wo sie eigentlich zürnen, schelten und strafen müsste; und das Unglück liefert sie mitleidlos dem Spott und der Schadenfreude aus. Rabener, so können wir jetzt sagen, betreibt nicht das Geschäft eines Satirikers, sondern das eines wendigen Journalisten.[101]

By "Journalist" Lazarowicz means particularly those writers in the mid-eighteenth century who often read, and frequently contributed to, the Early Enlightenment's favorite pedagogical vehicle, the moral weekly. As such, Lazarowicz and others[102] see many such writers as successors to the preacher, or as H. Schöffler puts it, "Moralische Wochenschriften schreiben heisst (im 18. Jahrhundert) Prediger sein, ohne auf der Kanzel stehen zu wollen."[103]

Rabener's work as a tax official placed him in the daily operations of the absolutistic state, and his private life was directed by an adherence to prescribed enlightened principles. His satires reflect a moral norm, a tacit standard of conduct, by which he measures his "Lastertypen."

Fear of the censor or of reprisal dissuaded Rabener from engaging in political satire, a rather traditional field of satire which is left blank by all the eighteenth century German satirists, including Liscow, and also by Lessing. Eduard Engel observed:

> So unaussprechlich elend waren die öffentlichen Zustände nahezu in ganz Deutschland, dass--sie nicht einmal zur Satire reizten! Weder bei Rabener noch

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> bei Lessing, den unerbittlichen Züchtiger aller andern geistigen Gebrechen seines Volkes findet sich eine Spur politischer Satire, ja kaum von Beschäftigung mit nicht-literarischen öffentlichen Angelegenheiten.[104]

Rabener mentioned his awareness of this by citing the lack of free speech in Germany: "Deutschland ist nicht das Land, in welchem eine bessernde Satire es wagen dürfte, das Haupt mit Freiheit emporzuheben; in Deutschland mag ich es nicht wagen, einem Dorfschullehrer diejenige Wahrheit sagen, die in London ein Erzbischof anhören muss."[105]

Particularly as writers of satire, Rabener and Liscow must have been envious of the greater freedoms, especially the rather extensive guarantee of freedom of the press, enjoyed by the English. In 1688 England had experienced the bloodless revolution which shifted power from the Crown to the Parliament, and by the early eighteenth century the influence of the "rising middle class" was pervasive. Also in France the middle class was becoming more and more politically aware, anticipating the upheavals to come later in the century. Compared to England and France, Germany was decades behind in advancement toward civil liberties.

It is interesting to take note of the role played by the moral weeklies in Germany when considering the climate in which the German satirists wrote. "Der Vernünfftler" appeared in Hamburg in 1713, as the first of hundreds of moral weeklies to follow. By the end of the century there had been 511 of them in Germany (as opposed to 200 in England and 28 in France).[106] They were largely concerned with the moral refinement of their readers, and also,

especially in Germany, with raising the literary and aesthetic level of their readership. Here again, the German moral weeklies contrast with the English, which also presented political discussion.

Prevailing opinion about the moral weeklies has been that they provided secular reading matter for the non-specialist reading public. Hettner, for instance, saw them as mental food for the "bildungs-bedürftige und doch bildungsverlassene Masse."[107] Richard Newald says the articles in them were directed toward "den gebildenten Mittelstand," but then quickly adds that they are the "Lese- und Bildungsstoff des Durchschnittbürgers," and thus representative of the thoughts and feelings of the German people in the eighteenth century.[108] Pamela Currie suggests that the opinion of Hettner and the literary historians that follow him needs modification. The reading public, she says, is not constituted as they thought: "The writers of the best known early weeklies addressed themselves to the higher groups of urban society: the aristocracy, magistrates, university-trained professional men, wealthy merchants, and masters in the more prestigious crafts."[109] Currie's research indicates the moral weeklies did not reach a broad cross-section of the population, because they were too expensive for all but the wealthy, and they also had a very limited circulation. But their subject matter too would not have concerned a broader readership. Even though homely matters such as dress, good manners, and child care are

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discussed, they are presented against a background of wealth and leisure.[110]

All the best known writers of the time contributed to these weeklies, including Rabener. Currie says of them, however, "the weeklies of the period 1711-50 did not bring new social and cultural ideas into the generality of German homes," and "a large number probably exercised virtually no influence."[111]

Unlike Rabener, Liscow's associations were chiefly with the bi-weekly city newspaper. Liscow's younger brother Joachim Friedrich was for a time editor of literary-scholarly affairs for the Hamburgischen Correspondenten, at the time, the most influencial newspaper in Hamburg and one of the most prestigious on the continent.[112] He, Liscow and Friedrich Hagedorn all contributed reviews to it. Noteworthy is the paper's general policy statement and the role it wanted to play as an organ of criticism:

> Die Wahrheit ist . . . unsere einzige Regel, nach welcher wir alle unsere Beurtheilungen abfassen. Sie leidet keinen Achselträger und man muss sie entweder ganz bekennen oder ganz verläugnen. Die Critick ist nicht nur bey der Gelehrsamkeit erlaubt, sondern unumgänglich nothwendig. Sie war es, welche den Engelländern und den Franzosen die Bahn gebrochen, die Barbarey zu verbannen und die Pedantric von ihrem Trohne zu reissen.[113]

But as resolute and laudable as this sounds there was hesitation about taking a stand on literary questions. It stemmed from an unwillingness to challenge the literary authorities, especially Gottsched.[114]

So the period in which Rabener and Liscow wrote was a

highly restrictive one for satirists and polemicists. Jürgen Jacobs summarizes the situation this way: "Sie [Satire] beschränkte sich aufs Private und die Sphäre bürgerlicher Moralität, weil man zu ängstlich war, es für moralisch nicht statthaft ansah oder nicht das Bedürfnis fühlte, Themen von allgemeiner sozialer oder politischer Relevanz aufzugreifen."[115] Perhaps all three of Jacobs' reasons might be applicable in the case of Rabener, but only the first could conceivably apply to his contemporary, Christian Ludwig Liscow, a very different kind of man than Rabener.

It will not take many words to first sketch the outline of Liscow's life before returning to elaborate on those aspects which seem to us most significant in establishing his manner and character. He was born on 29 April 1701 in Wittenburg (Mecklenburg). It is assumed he attended a "Gymnasium" in Lübeck, then studied in Rostock (from 1718) and in Jena (from 1721) and still later in Halle. Who his professors were is not known. It is probable that he heard Thomasius in Halle, but it is not certain. He began by studying theology, but eventually broke with the family tradition--his father, his grandfather, and his great-grandfather had all been Protestant ministers--and switched to studies of law. It is thought that he may have accompanied a nobleman on travels and that a long stay in France might explain his thorough acquaintance with French language and literature. He was in Lübeck again from 1729 to 1734 where he apparently worked as a tutor--for a time in the home of the

"Domdechanten." Lisch tells that one day the "Domdechant" had his two step-sons tested by one "Cantor Sivers." The boys did poorly on the test and Liscow was fired. The "Cantor" was the father of Heinrich Jacob Sivers who was later to be the target of Liscow's first published satire.[116]

Liscow left Lübeck in 1734 and until 1739 held positions as private secretary to the privy counselor of Schleswig-Holstein, Mattias von Clausenheim, then with Duke Karl Leopold von Schwerin, and finally with privy counselor von Blome. During these years he spent a good deal of his time in Hamburg in the company of the poet Friedrich Hagedorn and his younger brother Joachim Friedrich Liscow.

Liscow did not seem settled into a career until 1741 when he joined the staff of Count Heinrich von Brühl in Dresden, at first as Brühl's private secretary. The years he spent in Dresden turned out to be the most unsettling of Liscow's life, and ended with his forced retirement in 1750. He spent the remaining ten years of his life in apparent seclusion. We will tell more about this toward the end of the chapter.

An anecdote from his student days in Rostock, though apocryphal, seems nonetheless a worthwhile inclusion here to begin characterizing Liscow. According to the story (which was recorded by Liscow's sister), Liscow was to take part in the university's ceremonies commemorating the Reformation—ceremonies which would feature a "Streitgespräch" between Luther and Tetzel, the "Ablassverkäufer." Liscow was

assigned to play the role of Tetzel, but had really not prepared his part very well, and besides, at a Luthern university the debate could have only one outcome, namely Luther's victory over Tetzel and the doctrine of indulgences. The presentation ran at first as prescribed, with Liscow playing his part according to the way it had been outlined for him, even if he did have to ad lib a good deal. But as they proceeded Liscow began to warm to his part and started to speak the arguments of Tetzel so effectively that the student playing Luther was not able to counter them. At this point the director of the university stepped in to aid "Luther," but by that time, it was impossible to alter the result of the debate; in fact, Liscow determined to go ahead and finish off his opponent, at which time the director called a halt to everything, and, with great embarassment before the assembled university community plus honored guests, he expelled Liscow.[117]

The story illustrates some things that we can generalize about Liscow. It presents the kind of situation that he would find ludicrous and therefore one that would call forth his satirical sense. Unlike the gentler Rabener, Liscow was less able to resist the urge to attack, even before a situation as precarious for him as the one described above. A contemporary observer called Liscow's satirical itch "das Zeichen der seltenen Klasse von Menschen, die bei einem reizbaren Gefühl für das Lächerliche einen witzigen Einfall so wenig zurückhalten können als das Niesen."[118] While Liscow certainly would not defend the sale of indulgences, neither

could he submit to the speciousness and smugness of the Lutheran orthodoxy of his time. He countered sophistry and narrow dogma with sharp theological dialectic, and did not hesitate to rebuke churchmen for hypocrisy. The position he took was similar to that of the pietists, although he cannot properly be called a pietist himself--he was too militant to find company with those quiet-spoken souls.

Liscow was well-read in classic Roman literature, much less so in Greek, and only slightly in Italian and English, to judge by the quotations one finds in his writings. German authors were quoted less than French. He seems to have been drawn to French authors such as LaFontaine, Montaigne, Bayle, and others, including Boileau whose thoughts on satire had considerable influence upon Liscow, which conflicts somewhat with the notion of Liscow's being the "German Swift."[119] Liscow mentioned Swift only once, Boileau many times, in his writings.[120]

Quite apart from possible authorial influences upon Liscow's writings is Manthey's surmise that Liscow's consciousness of being an "Einzelgänger" so far removed him from other "bürgerlichen" authors of his time that he was ever more strongly impelled to develop his own writing style.[121] This is quite plausible. Liscow has with little exception been singled out for the clarity and precision of his style and for his avoidance of ballast. His prose stands out in sharp contrast with that of his contemporaries, and his writing has been favorably compared with Lessing's in this regard.[122]

Further evidence of Liscow's isolation is his rejection of all invitations to join literary societies, such as the "Teutsche Gesellschaft" in Jena as well as invitations from prominent people, including Gottsched, who apparently sought Liscow as a collaborator for a "deutschen Spectator."[123] This is a purposeful, self-imposed isolation, of course, and reinforces the impression that Liscow was not simply locked out of the mainstream, but rather that he did not want to associate with it. One recalls that that mainstream was in part typified by Rabener's innocuous satires, which were popular because they chided the failings of certain general, almost classic, "Lastertypen," and did not otherwise disturb the sense that the world was properly and progressively improving itself. It seems not to have been a time that was prepared to laugh at itself as a whole or to accept challenges to the authority of any of its institutions. It was an age which did not readily accept Liscow, and one has to wonder whether even Lessing could have been effective in the first third of the eighteenth century. Manthey recalls the tendency toward sobriety reflected in Gottsched's banning the "Hanswurst" from the stage, as well as dramatizations using masks, "Verstellung" and dialectic, scepticism and intellectualism, all of which are the raw materials of Liscow's satire.[124] The positive aspects of Gottsched's reform measures, are, of course, well understood, but they were perhaps carried too far in the general consciousness of the changing society which, though optimistic,

took itself pretty seriously.

One becomes impressed that Liscow wanted to set a new tone and foster a truly discerning reading public by satirizing the pedantry, censoriousness, intolerance and dogmatism which was prevalent then. The Swiss Johann Jakob Bodmer, in fact, thought he saw in Liscow an initiator of modern German literary criticism.[125] But Liscow would have had to challenge Gottsched repeatedly and probably come out from behind his anonymity (he was quite well known anyway), as well as broaden the base of his own production in order to sound a new note effectively. He did not have that kind of ambition--or so it appears, even though in 1742 he wrote a foreword to Heineken's translation of "Longin" (a piece made famous by Boileau), in which he struck out sharply at Gottsched and allied himself with Bodmer. For a while it was thought that Liscow might lead the campaign against Gottsched which was then issuing more and more strongly from Dresden. But while further attacks appeared anonymously in the Dresdnischen Nachrichten, it has not been proven that Liscow took any further part.[126] It is significant, in any case, to recall that a self-conscious, developing German middle class was not yet receptive toward either literary criticism or to polemic and personal satire. Bartsch says of the early eighteenth century: "Das lesende Publikum wollte sich nicht das Wohlgefallen an Werken, für die es einmal Neigung gefasst hatte, durch ungünstige Urtheile verkümmern lassen; die Schriftsteller selbst

verlangten nur gelobt zu werden."[127] Aversion toward the very word "Kritisch" led Gottsched to justify its use in the preface to his Critische Dichtkunst.[128]

It was mentioned above that only the first of the reasons that Jürgen Jacobs offers for the absence of political and social satire in the Early Enlightenment, that is, fear of recriminations, could possibly apply to Liscow, whose outspokenness brought him serious trouble toward the end of his life. On hearing that Liscow would be coming to take a position at the court in Dresden, the brother of Friedrich Hagedorn wrote that he feared for the satirist, and warned: "Wofern er [Liscow] aber seine Freydenkerei in Dresden nicht einstellet, und aus der Kirchenhistorie Weisheit zu pflegen meint, so wird er, wenn man dahinterkommt, sich ärger schaden, als er wohl glaubt."[129] Hagedorn's remarks turned out to be prophetic. Liscow spent the years from 1741 through 1750 in service to Graf Heinrich von Brühl, who from 1746 on was prime minister of Saxony. Liscow began as his private secretary and eventually became minister of war. Under Brühl the state finances had been so mismanaged that bankrupcy threatened. Brühl pursued financial manipulations which made things worse and brought on a wave of reproaches by his political opponents. In order to extricate himself from a situation that he could no longer control, Brühl charged that a conspiracy was afoot against his government and had his two finance officers arrested. Then more charges were brought against several so-called accomplices, of which Liscow was

named as one. Investigations into the activities of the two finance officers continued, but charges against the accomplices, who were threatened with six-months jail terms, were suddenly and surprisingly dropped--except in the case of Liscow, who by reason of statements made by one of the chief conspirators, was taken into custody. He was held for two weeks under house arrest until he was finally taken to jail. A hearing took place at which Liscow was charged with having written to King Friedrich II demanding that Brühl be dismissed from office. Liscow denied the charges and was returned to jail. Some time later he wrote a letter to Brühl in which he hoped to convince Brühl of his honesty and innocence. He admitted that he had made remarks about the Prime Minister which were "ungebührlich," but he denied having had any part in a plot against him. This candor only prompted Brühl to order Liscow to reveal when, where, and to whom he had made the derogatory remarks. Liscow wrote two more letters to Brühl in which he simply pleaded with Brühl to release him from prison: "Erbarmen Sie Sich über mich und meine Frau und Kinder, und schencken mir meine Freyheit wieder."[130] Up to this point no final sentencing had taken place. In the final disposal of the case on 18 April 1750, the two finance officers were sentenced to eight years imprisonment and to life imprisonment, respectively (the latter ran only six years, however), and Liscow, who had spent several months behind bars, was released from prison on the condition that he never reveal anything about his

case whatsoever, and that he take up new residence away from Dresden within four weeks. He was admonished to be careful of his conduct on penalty of even more severe punishment than he had already suffered. In addition, all pay was denied him, and all his papers and manuscripts were confiscated.[131]

Liscow retired immediately to his wife's property in Eilburg, where he spent the last ten years of his life. He received further warning from Dresden in January 1751 "nicht ohne besondere Permission nach Sachsen zurückzukehren."[132] Whether Liscow's fingers were sufficiently burned to prevent him from taking up his satirical pen again is not known for certain. Friedrich Griese tells of a man named Gubitz, publisher of the Gesellschafter, who in the year 1872 maintained that Liscow's widow had given her husband's manuscripts to a country parson, who was in turn, entrusted to find a publisher for them. But the parson, after having read a few pages of the "Nachlass," burned them.[133] A similar reference to lost Liscow writings was mentioned some thirty years earlier in the autobiography of Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart. There Schubart tells of one "Herrn von Pankuch" who had tried to collect Liscow's unpublished writings. The man related to Schubart: "Liscows arme Witwe brachte dem Geistlichen ein Manuscript voll der allermarkigsten Zeichnungen von der Hand dieses unsern Swifts und bat ihn, es an einen Verleger zu verhandeln. Der Geistliche hatte kaum ein paar Seiten gelesen, als ihn eine markige Pfaffenzeichnung auffiel und--das Manuscript lag im Feuer."[134] These accounts

must be considered apocryphal, of course, because they were never further supported. Litzmann mentioned two unpublished writings that were taken from Liscow during the Brühl investigations, which were only incompletely returned to him later. They were entitled "Schrift wider des seeligen Herrn Dr. Löscher reflexions über die pensees libres" and "Gedanken über die Historie von Jacob und Esau."[135] But there is no further word on these.

We wish to complete this sketch of Liscow as "Aussenseiter" by reviewing his intentions as a satirist as we did earlier with Rabener. What Liscow had to say on the subject was much less voluminous than his counterpart, but much more striking, because it so emphatically departs from the more-or-less universally accepted credo of the time (practically unchanged between Opitz and Gottsched) that the satirist's role is to ridicule the shortcomings of his fellows in an effort to affect their moral improvement. And, as mentioned above, Rabener insisted that satire should not become mere pasquil, that it always remain general, without naming the victim or victims, and that two subject areas, religion and the authority of the state, be considered taboo. Except for political satire, Liscow was charged with violating all these tenets plus a few more, by both his contemporary detractors as well as his later critics (including Hettner).[136] Indeed, Jürgen Jacobs seconds several of the reproaches raised against Liscow and indicates, therefore, which ones survive to the present day, namely, that Liscow was ruthless in his

personal attacks; that his claim that he sought the betterment of his opponents by using satire as an "Arzeney" was questionable; that his inclination toward sharp polemic makes him dubious as a satirist; and finally, that his opponents were "durchweg uninteressante und zweilichtige Gestalten."[132]

The victims of Liscow's satires, "die elenden Scribenten," as he referred to them, were, as Jacobs and others have said, unimportant persons--at least from an historical standpoint. And as Manthey reminds us, Liscow violated Lessing's dictum for critics: "Einen elenden Dichter tadelt man gar nicht; mit einem mittelmässigen verfährt man gelinde; gegen einem grossen ist man unerbittlich."[138] But Lessing might have been less magnanimous if he had been living and writing in the 1720's and 1730's. There were few great names then in German letters.

Liscow challenged the profusion of silly articles, tracts, and essays flowing from such undistinguished persons as Heinrich Jacob Sivers (or "Mr. Makewind" as Liscow refers to him in Vitrea fracta).[139] Sivers was a university teacher in Rostock and a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences and later, a protestant minister. Johann Ernst Philippi was another Liscow target, who, thanks to his father's influence, received the professorship of Rhetoric in Halle. It is said, in fact, that he was chosen for the post over Gottsched. Philippi was a member of two scientific societies.[140] So although these two major opponents of his

satires are indeed lesser lights, for Liscow they represented an affront to the "Gelehrtenrepublik" (or "gesunden Vernunft") and to his sense of good taste. He lamented the ludicrous pride and the audacity with which so much "Geschmier" was being laid before the public. He considered that the reading public was suffering much too much poor writing and wished for a more critical readership with the sensitivity and universality that seemed only to be felt in the general revulsion and rejection of fleas, mosquitoes, and flies. "Warum wollte man sich dann ein Gewissen machen, das gelehrte Ungeziefer auszurotten," he asked rhetorically in the Vorrede to Sammlung Satyrischer und Ernsthafter Schriften,[141] and continued, "Es wäre wahrhaftig zu wünschen, dass man noch empfindlicher wäre und sich mehr Mühe gebe, die Welt von diesem Ungeziefer zu befreien. Es nimmt von Jahr zu Jahr zu, und ich weiss nicht, wo es damit endlich hinaus will?"[142]

Liscow's interest in both the cultivation of a more refined readership and his desire to take a part in hindering poor writing, largely describes the role of the literary critic. He always insisted upon the reader's right to judge something written and placed before the public. "Ein jeder, der schreibt, unterwirft sich durch die Herausgebung seiner Schrift dem Eigensinn seiner Leser."[143] "Wann ich ein Buch kaufe, so erkaufe ich zugleich das Recht, davon zu sagen, was ich will."[144] Whether the book is good or bad cannot, of course, be determined by appeal to the "Obrigkeit";

rather evaluation of a piece of writing is most properly the concern of the "Gelehrtenrepublik," which recognizes reason as its supreme standard.[145] Should "ein böser Scribent" insult "die Majestät der gesunden Vernunft," then he makes himself vulnerable to rebuke.[146]

We have been quoting from Liscow's Unpartheyische Untersuchung, in which Liscow made his broadest--if somewhat broken and enigmatic--statements about his concept of satire. The work is itself satirical and ironical and it purports to be a defense of the (unidentified) author against charges of religious mockery. Early in this rather long piece we read that "eine Satire greift allemal eine gewisse Art der Torheit an, und macht diejenigen lächerlich, welche damit behaftet sind" (II, 90). That definition is common enough. The target of the literary satirist, it is explained further, is not simply the foolishness or the mistakes which we all make. The attack is made upon him who is seen to be incorrigibly and mistakenly enamored of his own powers as a great speaker and poet. Such arrogance is properly met with sharp satire in order to drive the offender out of the "Gelehrtenrepublik" and to avenge the insult to reason (II, 175-79). "Denn an einem solchen Menschen ist alle Hoffnung verlohren. Er bessert sich nicht, wenn man ihm gleich seine Fehler noch so deutlich und glimpflich vorstellen wollte; weil er eingebildet, er sey vollkommen" (II, 179). Thus improvement or correction is not the expected result of the satirical attack upon an arrogant transgressor. Satire is seen as an

effective instrument in the disputation of errors and foolishness and equal to serious criticism. One has, in fact, the choice of making a serious or a satirical response in a dispute. If he chooses the latter, writes Liscow, then he can present himself as approving the doctrine that he would criticize and draw conclusions that are so ridiculous that even the one attacked should be able to recognize the absurdity. "Eine Satyre ist eigentlich nichts anders, als eine deductio ad absurdum" (II, 186). Astonishing departures from common sense cannot be answered seriously, according to Liscow. A serious response would not be worthy of the foolishness committed, and the clearest argumentation of a serious nature would be lost on the opponent anyway (II, 187-88).

Therefore Liscow, who assumes the mask of an impartial scholar in Unpartheyische Untersuchung, proposes that it is most satisfactory to regard satire as "Arzeney." "Eine Satyre ist eine Arzeney, weil sie die Besserung der Thoren zum Endzweck hat; und sie hört es nicht auf zu seyn, wenn sie gleich, als ein Gift, den Thoren tödtlich ist" (II, 194). Thus satire is a medicine from which the patients are expected to die, but death brings new life, "denn in dem Tode, welchen sie [die Satire] verursacht, besteht eben die Besserung. Dieser Tod gereicht ihnen zum Leben. Sie sollen der Thorheit absterben und klug werden" (II, 194). Just about the time the reader is thinking how biblical this passage sounds, Liscow refers him to the source of his

paraphrase--the Confessions of St. Augustine (*mori vitaliter*, Book VIII, chapter 8). It is clear that Liscow is playing with the reader here in a manner that we would describe as ironical. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge to what degree he means what he says about satire.

At this point we can say that Liscow's intentions with his satirical writings do not correspond to the pervasive early eighteenth century optimism and the reliance on gentle remonstrance for moral improvement. But we think a more revealing and accurate measure of his intentions will emerge by examining the writings themselves.

## LISCOW'S SATIRES: TRANSCENDING THE STEREOTYPE

In this chapter we wish to examine Liscow's writings in order to determine the range of his use of irony. We will start by looking at Liscow's series of three satires against Heinrich Jacob Sivers.[147] In 1732 Sivers, a young and especially prolific Lübeck theologian, professor, and lately, member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, published a book entitled, Geschichte des Leidens und Sterbens, der Aufferstehung und Himmelfahrt Jesu Christi, aus den vier Evangelisten mit kurtzen exegetischen Anmerkungen.[148] Although Liscow had been aware of Sivers' writings for some time and thought them a mishmash of ordinary, immature, and largely stolen ideas, in addition to his opinion that they were exceedingly poorly written,[149] he did not at first have in mind to make any response to them. But it happened that shortly after this book by Sivers appeared, it was satirized in an unsigned review which appeared in the Hamburgischen Correspondenten.[150] Sivers was outraged. The review had included page reference to such pseudo-scholarly commentary as this: Where the biblical text relates that the disciples brought the burro to Jesus, laid covers over it and then sat Jesus upon it, Sivers provides a footnote to explain that the disciples

did this so that Jesus could ride more comfortably.[151] Elsewhere Sivers' linguistic interest leads him to explain in a note that the word "daheime," according to Bugenhagen's first edition of the Dutch rendition of the history of the passion, means "im Huse" in Low German.[152] Sivers was sure Liscow was the unnamed reviewer and wrote a counter-piece denouncing him, which was printed in the thirty-third number of the same publication. Liscow denied authorship of the book review and attempted to convince Sivers of his innocence by urging acquaintances of the Herrn Magister to intervene on his behalf. To no avail. Liscow relates in the Vorrede (I, 303) that Sivers persisted in berating him, but that he still had no thoughts of revenge. Meanwhile, Sivers' book was a general topic of conversation in Lübeck. During such a discussion with a friend Liscow boasted that if he wrote like Magister Sivers he could easily turn out a book every twenty-four hours. The friend encouraged him to do just that, so Liscow decided to annotate the "Historia von der Zerstöhrung der Stadt Jerusalem," which Sivers had appended to his latest book. The result is an elaborate and close parody of Siver's work, consisting, like the original, of a preface, the text (of Sivers' "Historia") replete with notes, followed by three indexes, and finally a few pages listing the author's previously published writings. He called it Klägliche Geschichte von der jämmerlichen Zerstöhrung der Stadt Jerusalem; mit kurzen, aber dabey deutlichen und erbaulichen, Anmerkungen, nach dem Geschmacke

des (S. T.) Herrn M. Heinrich Jacob Sievers, erläutert, . . . [153] (One notes here already the parodying of long Baroque titles.)

If the piece is simply considered a satire or parody directed against Sivers alone, then it is a trifle. Rather it is illustrative of Liscow's manner of taking aim at a named offender while intending to hit anyone else standing nearby. In the preface to this satire Liscow assumes his favorite mode of irony--praising in order to blame, and immediately announces his intent is parody: "Ich habe mir dieses vortrefflichen Mannes Schriften zu einem Muster vorgestellt" (I, 108). Liscow withholds his name in this satire as in all the others, identifying himself here only as "X. Y. Z. Rev. Minist. Cand." He pretends to be a young man who admires Sivers and combines irony, wit, and feigned adulation: "Ich hätte hier die schönste Gelegenheit dem Herrn Magister Sievers ein Lobrede zu halten: allein ich thue es nicht, denn ich kenne seine Bescheidenheit und weiss, wie wenig ihm mein Lob nützen kann" (I, 109). The last two phrases of the sentence are of course purposely ambiguous--another source of irony. Pretending defense of and identification with his victim, Liscow scorns the zoiluses and momuses of this world who have of late sought to discourage so many writers like Sivers and himself from writing. As pretended ally of Sivers he expresses the scope of the expected critical reaction to his annotations, while at the same time exposing his true feelings. "Da wird der eine

[Rezensent] sprechen: Meine Anmerkungen wären läppisch; ich zeigte darinn weder Verstand noch Gelehrsamkeit. . . . " He imagines that a second critic will say he is young and therefore not so much can be expected of him, that if scholars do not make use of his annotations then perhaps non-scholars can. He anticipates that a third critic will simply dismiss his book summarily saying, "Ich lese dergleichen Geschmier nicht" (I, 113-14). He guesses that several more critics would say he never should have written his little book in the first place (ibid.).

The ironic defense is sustained throughout the preface, and the review of Sivers' book which appeared in the Hamburgischen Correspondenten is referred to as "Schmähschrift." In this guise Liscow also takes a satirical-ironical swipe at the Prussian Academy of Sciences for admitting Sivers into their society, "einen Mann, dessen Schriften so vortrefflich sind, dass eine der berühmtesten gelehrten Gesellschaften in der Welt dadurch bewogen worden, ihn . . . zu ihrem Mitgliede zu erwählen" (I, 115). And throughout, Liscow encourages Sivers to go on writing and to pay no mind to his detractors. A biblical ironical parody exhorts Sivers "Sey fruchtbar, und mehre die Anzahl deiner Schriften täglich" (I, 121).

The bulk of this satire parodies Sivers' pseudo-scholarly annotations of Christ's passion. Much of it is pretty silly, but then much of the original is too. Several pages contain six lines or less of text and the rest is footnotes to that

text. The first of the three registers which follow the annotations lists the biblical authors quoted; the second register inventories alphabetically the classical authors referred to--nothing else, just the names; the third register lists practically everything. Under the entry "Sievers (M. Heinr. Jac.)," one finds twenty-seven references, among them:

| | |
|---|---|
| ein vortrefflicher Mann | 112 |
| ein wackerer Mann | 112 |
| ist ein Liebling und Schosskind des Apollo | 119 |
| bringt seiner Vaterstadt viel Ehre | 121 |
| macht ihr manche Lust | 121 |

Finally, Liscow attaches a few pages announcing the titles of twelve books he intends to publish shortly. With one exception, Vitrea fracta, they are entirely fictitious and are meant as a parody of the appendage to Sivers' book in which Sivers had listed all his previous publications and advised his readers that if they purchase numbers 19 and 20 on the list, it will not be necessary for them to buy numbers 5 through 17, etc. (I, 315).

Liscow's next satire, Vitrea fracta, may also be considered a parody, and it continues the ridicule of Sivers' pseudo-scholarship, but this time the connection is not only theological but also scientific. According to Liscow, Sivers aspired to renown not only as a theologian but also as a natural science historian. Liscow wonders in the Vorrede whether Sivers' acceptance for membership by the "königliche

preussische Societät der Wissenschaften" was the thing that later prompted him to explore the shores of the Baltic Sea searching for colored stones (I, 305). Sivers published a "Descriptio lapidis musicalis," and shortly after received the "Diplom" from the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Thus encouraged, he published three additional papers in quick succession. Sivers did in fact claim the "scientific" discovery that on one of the stones he found, there were mysterious musical symbols, which he subsequently had etched in copper. This etching, together with an explanatory letter in Latin,[154] he sent out to various famous men throughout Germany for their comment and reaction (I, 305).[155]

Liscow's satire is once again directed at Sivers personally, but has for its primary concern a much larger target, namely, all of academe. To Liscow it was incredible to think that a respected scholarly society like the Prussian Academy should have honored one like Sivers with membership, and the ridiculing of the learned societies and the universities is his chief interest in Vitrea fracta. In fact, Sivers is not mentioned by name, even though it is clear that "Mr. Makewind" refers to him. The title of the piece is Vitrea fracta oder des Ritters Robert Clifton Schreiben an einen gelehrten Samojeden, betreffend die seltsamen und nachdenklichen Figuren, welche derselbe den 13. Januar st. v. 1732 auf einer gefrornen Fensterscheibe wahrgenommen. Aus dem Englischen ins Deutsche übersetzt (I, 173). The words "Vitrea fracta," which Liscow translated in the

Vorrede with "nichtswürdig, läppisch Zeug" (I, 305), is taken from Petronius.[156]

He probably placed the addressee of the letter in an exotic setting, that is, Samoyed in northern Siberia, in order to emphasize his contempt for what he deemed the fatuity of much of the academic world. Samoyed was, at that time at least, considered a barren wasteland and certainly not renowned as a center of learning. The reason for placing the writer of the letter, Robert Clifton, in London and giving all the other characters English names is not so clear. Litzmann is not sure but suggests that perhaps out of admiration for Swift Liscow created the fiction of the letter having been translated from English to German.[157] Swift's Tale of a Tub had appeared in translation in 1729, and England was widely held as the model of prose satire. It is probably just as reasonable to believe that Liscow chose this not uncommon device of ironists simply to remove himself further as author at the same time he provided the German reader with a little different perspective. And perhaps he thought that the victim of the satire would otherwise be too easily identified.

Vitrea fracta parodies Sivers' paper "Curiosa Niederpiensia" in which Sivers had described finding the mysterious musical notations on a stone. The situation is very rich in comic possibilities, and Liscow exploits them fully. It is his most readable and enjoyable satire today, because the fictive element is stronger than in most of Liscow's writings.

Jürgen Manthey omits it from his recent reprint of some of Liscow's writings, because he believes it cannot be fully appreciated today. He says, our complete understanding is dependent on acquaintance with the "abwegigen" content of a previous publication by Sivers.[158] (That Liscow's piece should be in any way dependent on one of his victims, who would otherwise be altogether forgotten, is a bit of irony itself.) We agree with Manthey, but because most of it is understandable, and moreover, because it is interesting, highly entertaining, and says important things, we feel it should even be the featured satire of Liscow, more so than the usually selected Vortrefflichkeit und Nohtwendigkeit der elenden Scribenten. One should of course expect some of any writer's allusions to be obscure if one is reading them over 200 years after they were written. In so far as the frozen window pane is concerned, although the symbols may have some real references beyond those Liscow himself makes in the satire, it is more likely that it is mostly a collection of doodlings designed to accompany Vitrea fracta. Liscow suggests they are quite casual when he says in the Vorrede, "Es gelung mir einmal des Morgens beym Thee, ein Blättchen Papier mit so viel wunderlichen Figuren zu bemahlen, als ich zu meinem Zweck nöhtig zu haben vermeynte" (I, 306). This drawing was included with the satire. (See Figure 1, page 71.)

Liscow begins Vitrea fracta by chiding the dogmatic attitudes of contemporary theologians. He has Ritter Clifton say in anticipation that some will scoff at his discovery of

Figure 1

the figures on the window pane, "Mich deucht, eine solche Fensterscheibe ist wehrt, dass wer dadurch nicht gerührt wird, ein vollständiger Atheiste sey" (I, 189). And later when Clifton brings an august group of wisemen and scholars together to attempt an interpretation of his findings, one Dr. Bromley offers that the images on the window are prophetic and full of mysteries; he is certain that although the church does not hold with new revelations, this is surely a message from God. These are but two examples of many we could offer that illustrate one aspect of rigid thinking or what D. C. Muecke refers to as the "closed ideology," as we mentioned in chapter one above. Liscow, who is trained and knowledgeable in theology, recognizes the absurdity of interpreting everything in terms of dogma. In the first quotation above it is implicit that if one does not defer to the pronouncements of the spokesman for the church, one is an "atheist"--perhaps the most horrendous name one could be called at that time. With the second quotation Liscow reveals how unbending he believes dogma remains--even to the point of disallowing any new miracles.

But Bromley only indicates the nature of the symbols; the other scholars render opinions too. One scholar sees in the frozen pane of glass the passage of Don Carlos to Italy, another, the unrest in Corsica; a third, the fate of the Pretender (I, 196). These are all references to historical-political circumstances of the time, and we could only guess at any satirical point Liscow intended to make

with them, if any.[159] The events themselves do not appear to have been of the greatest moment, but the image of scholars who advance such absurdities further illustrates Liscow's lack of confidence in much of the learned world. He rounds out his indictment by ridiculing the mathematician, whom he causes to say that if only the numerical symbols on the window were juxtaposed arithmetically, they would surely yield the quadra uram circuli, and the metaphysician opines that "wer die Zahlen 1234567890 auf alle mögliche Arten versetzte, und die Summe, so alle diese Versetzungen, zusammen genommen, ausmachten, mit 666 vermehrte, und darauf mit 96 theilte, der würde seine Zeit nicht übel anwenden" (I, 196). Finally, even linguistic arts are represented by the notion of the sixth scholar who believes the cabala is the key to understanding the whole thing, hinted at by the Hebrew letters he sees on the window (I, 196-97). It is noteworthy that Liscow polemisizes the entire university community in Vitrea fracta and not simply one of its members nor even one faculty. He is saying to them that as scholars and scientists they are irrational and unscientific, closed-minded and pedantic. Liscow brings into their midst one Ritter Cockburn who has not yet been heard from. When Clifton finally asks him whom he thinks has put forward the correct interpretation of the significance of the frozen window pane, Cockburn answers that it does not mean anything at all, because the figures were formed entirely by chance; however, he adds, "hat . . . die Natur eine Absicht gehabt: so ist es

keine andere, als den verworrenen Zustand des Gehirnes vieler Gelehrten abzubilden. . . . " (I, 197). With that unexpected interjection of good sense, the meeting breaks up, and Clifton is left alone to muse upon the origin of the figures—their significance having been effectively dispatched by Ritter Cockburn. In the passage that follows this, one sees how broadly based is Liscow's sense of the ridiculous and in how wide an area it is played out, because where he had just portrayed such egregious irrationality among characters whom he satirizes as representative of the wisemen and scholars of his day, so does he then indicate that rationality is not necessarily more dependable than irrationality as a guide to straight thinking. He demonstrates by having Ritter Clifton reason his way to an answer to the question of the symbols on the windowpane. The window frosts, he writes, because a warm room has more evaporation than a room that is unheated. The exhalations of bodies provides the moisture which always seeks release to the outdoors, but it is prevented from escaping, because when it strikes a cold window pane in winter, it remains there frozen, etc. etc. (I, 200). All this is, of course, entirely acceptable. But then, remembering that the figures on the window were noticed after holding a large party for scholarly people the day before, at which many and various subjects had been discussed, Clifton concludes that these icy images were formed from the thoughts of his guests by their frozen breath. Astounding as it may seem, Clifton

writes to the Samoyed, there can be no doubt of this. We believe it is Liscow's intention here to indicate that neither irrationality nor rationality is a reliable guide to straight thinking, and that, indeed, reason untempered by common sense can lead to the greatest absurdities. Not only that, he indicates that a certain fatuity obtains when he has his characters speak with such assurance and confidence. This utter certainty in the attitude of his opponents is seen in other of his writings often enough to show he considers it a part of the Zeitgeist.

Finally, the evaluation that Ritter Clifton places on his findings presents another interesting aspect of Liscow's perception of society. Clifton writes that if the spoken thoughts of people are "recorded" on windows in winter, then it would be possible for the government to read the windows of all suspicious people every morning to find out who is disloyal, who is a troublemaker, or where trouble might be brewing. "In dem mitternächtlichen Theile von Grossbrittanien wäre eine solche Besichtigung am nöhtigsten," he continues, "weil daselbst die Zahl der Missvergnügten so gross ist, als die Kälte" (I, 209). This is probably a reference to the spread of deism in eighteenth century England, which might partly explain Liscow's purpose of placing the letter writer in England. Liscow was himself disparaged as a "freethinker," and at that time deism was considered to be something of a euphemism for atheism. The scope of Liscow's reference can, of course, easily apply to the lack of

personal freedoms in his own absolutistic homeland--perhaps another reason for placing his central character in London.

The last several pages of Vitrea fracta deal with the plight of one "Mr. Makewind" who seeks in vain to be accepted into literary-scholarly societies at home. Makewind is clearly Sivers who is soundly satirized, but the real thrust of the piece is a polemic against the societies themselves. Liscow suggests that these societies are taking people like Sivers into their midst simply to muzzle them, that is, they accept them with the understanding that they will cease writing--or at least publishing. Alas, that does not work. Moreover, such procedure appears to the public as an endorsement of the "elenden Scribenten," all of which tends to support Ritter Clifton's contention to the Samoyed poet at the close of the letter: "der Microcosmos eines Dichters hat ein so starkes Centralfeuer, dass er eben der Sonne nicht bedarf" (I, 234).

Liscow's irony in this piece has a good deal of scope; he aims not only at a single person, but at prevalent contemporary attitudes and scientific and theological institutions. By removing himself effectively, that is, by assuming the character of Ritter Clifton in London and by creating imaginative circumstances, Liscow has made his irony less direct than in most of his satires. There are two major types of irony at work here. One is verbal irony, i.e., our consciousness that Liscow is being ironical by employing a literary technique; the other is situational

irony, i.e., irony which is simply evoked by the circumstances. In the first instance—through the Englishman, Robert Clifton—he presents the views of an earnest fellow who says in innocence what the reader knows is absurd. Clifton is Liscow's ingenu who believes to see plainly the sorry state that his own countrymen find themselves in by not properly honoring him and his colleague Mr. Makewind. The other aspect is the ingénu's self-exposure of ignorance and error, therefore a kind of ironic self-betrayal akin to that seen in the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum, the series of letters written by the pretended anti-humanist enemies of John Reuchlin. Not only is there irony in what the writer is saying, but the writer reveals himself merely by his part in a situation.

Sivers, of course, recognized himself in Vitrea fracta, and he, along with those sympathetic to him, continued to denounce Liscow's writings as pasquil. They also charged Liscow with a punishable misuse of biblical language in his first satire, Klägliche Geschichte. The response to all this is the third and last satire directed at Sivers, called Der sich selbst entdeckende X. Y. Z., . . .[160] Liscow maintained anonymity here also, but in response to Sivers' frustrated demand that he identify himself, Liscow gave his name as L-c-s H-rm-nn B-ckm—st-r, the thinly disguised name of an actual candidate of theology in Lübeck. Liscow's defense of this in the Vorrede is weak; he said that no one did believe or could possibly believe that Backmeister was the real author of the satire, because Backmeister was the mildest

mannered of men and the whole episode, in his opinion, did Backmeister no harm. However, he did publicly ask Backmeister's forgiveness in the Vorrede (I, 310). As with the previous satire, Liscow claims this one was printed at the prompting of friends (unnamed) who were enthusiastic about it (I, 311).

Of interest for our purposes is what "Backmeister" says about satire as it augments statements on that subject made in the 1739 Vorrede. In this piece he identifies with his opponent and says that, on the contrary, far from mocking Mr. Sivers, his intention in his Klägliche Geschichte was to demonstrate the highest regard for Sivers; and besides to be a satirist is to be critical; he is, he claims, very satisfied with the world and more likely to praise than to criticize (I, 254). Moreover, he maintains, it is dangerous to write satire. On the other hand, he expresses admiration for Magister Sivers as a satirist of the first rank and knows it would be folly to tangle with him. It is his purpose rather to imitate the Herrn Magister, he says. There is, of course, a contradiction involved here; it involves what Muecke calls "internal contradiction" and is a device used in order to tip off the reader to an incongruity and therefore to the recognition of irony.

It soon becomes obvious that Liscow's pose in this work is to praise in order to blame. In fact, he spells out this ironic device by anticipating that some will reject his defense of Mr. Sivers as "ein verstelltes Lob" and that his

real intention is to make Sivers appear ridiculous. Having said that, he denies it is true (I, 266-67). The ironical defense is continued when he again asserts his innocence saying that the only reason to suspect him of being ironical about his praise of Sivers is if Sivers does not possess the laudable qualities that he is ascribing to him (I, 268-69).

Liscow concludes his account of the Sivers satires in the Vorrede by reaffirming his opinion that Sivers himself had acted arrogantly and that his writings were unbearable, yet he was also prompted to record: "Er [Sivers] hatte viel Gutes an sich, und ich habe ihn immer für den besten und vernünftigsten von allen meinen Gegnern gehalten" (I, 312). He refers to these satires of Sivers as "sehr heilsam," (I, 312) which is reminiscent of his contention that satire is good medicine.

It was really on account of the satires of Sivers that Liscow become involved with his next victim, Johann Ernst Philippi (1701-1750), a recently appointed professor of Rhetoric in Halle. A friend of Liscow's had brought his Klägliche Geschichte to Saxony where it was not only well received but also gave rise to the request from people there for similar satirizing of Herrn Professor Philippi. Philippi had published numerous papers from the time he assumed his post in 1731. Liscow calls them "im höchsten Grade elend" (Vorrede, II, 450) and reports that various scholars in Saxony shared his opinion, but no one wanted to attack Philippi out of fear of Philippi's father, then "Hofprediger"

in Merseburg, who had many friends in the "Oberconsistorio" in Dresden. Even before coming to Halle, Philippi had a reputation which might be called adventurous. In 1726 he published a paper critical of the then extensive lottery in Saxony and was for a short time imprisoned. Had it not been for that he probably would have received a professorship in Dresden which his father sought to arrange for him. After his release from jail he went to Merseburg to pursue a post as advocate. He was, however, an irritant to the court society there with his tactless occasional poems, and when he also came into conflict with the duelling laws, it became necessary that he flee Merseburg. He proceeded to Halle where in 1731 it was his good fortune (at first) to receive the newly established professorship of German Rhetoric. His "Antrittsrede" had for its theme the rights of academic freedom. It is significant to note here that among those from whom Philippi received congratulatory notes on the appointment was none other than Gottsched who had very much aspired to the position himself. It must have been a bitter blow to his ego that one such as Philippi was chosen over him to be "der erste öffentliche Lehrer der deutschen Sprache in ganz Deutschland."[161] Nonetheless Gottsched closed his letter of best wishes to Philippi by writing, "Unserer Gesellschaft gereicht es zu besonderer Ehre, dass eben ein Mitglied derselben dazu tüchtig erfunden und berufen worden."[162] The reference Gottsched makes is to the "Deutsche Gesellschaft" to which Philippi belonged since 1726. He was also a

member of the "Vertraute Rednergesellschaft."[163] At this time therefore, that is, in 1731 and before Liscow began his satirical salvoes, Philippi's academic reputation was rather sound. He even felt confident enough to write to Gottsched some time later to suggest that the two enter into a mutual exchange of their professorships. It did not take place, of course. It is, by the way, a nice example of situational irony.

When Liscow was sent the Sechs deutsche Reden[164] plus the Heldengedicht auf den König von Polen[165] published by Philippi in 1732, he was astonished to discover an even worse violator of reason and good taste than Sivers had been (II, 451-52). Liscow did not know Philippi at the time, but the interested parties in Halle sent him information about Philippi and his circumstances. Liscow wrote an ironical eulogy to Philippi which appeared in 1732 under the title Briontes der Jungere.[166] "Briontes" alludes to a name Philippi called himself in a memorial speech before the so-called "Patriotische Assemblée" of Merseburg. This society was apparently patterned after a more prestigious one in Hamburg, whose members went to some lengths to conceal their identity.[167] In the guise of an admirer of Philippi, Liscow begins Briontes with a Vorbericht in which the very first sentences were ones that later caused some stir among his critics and brought charges of religious mockery. "Die Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister" (before which the eulogy to Philippi would be delivered), he wrote,

"hat einige Aehnlichkeit mit der unsichtbaren Kirche. Sie ist in der ganzen Welt ausgebreitet, und doch kann niemand sagen: Siehe, hie oder da ist sie" (II, 5). Not only is the simile apt and witty, but it also alludes to the silly society mentioned above, the "Patriotische Assemblée," whose secretiveness led to concealed meeting places and the use of coded names--perhaps a throwback to the practices of some of the "Sprachgesellschaften" of Opitz' day. Liscow, in his persona as "der kleine Geist" whose honor it is to eulogize Professor Philippi, carries this a bit further by advising that the outsider will not discover where the meetings take place any more than he will find out who "der ältere Herr Briontes" is (II, 6), but we are assured that the "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister" does in fact exist. If one believes there is an invisible church, a patriotic assembly, and a society of the dead in Friedensburg, one should have no trouble believing there is a "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister."[168] Of course, the mockery of secrecy also provides Liscow or "der kleine Geist" a natural and easy means of declaring his intention to remain anonymous once more before the public.

With the Vorbericht Liscow sets the circumstances which then allow the full exploitation of his irony in the text itself. In this as in all his writings we do not have Liscow himself in mind--we only hear the voice of his persona or mask. In Briontes it is the voice of an admirer of Philippi speaking to the "kleinen Geistern." The eulogy

begins with a parody of Philippi's speech "Von den Rechten der Akademischen Freiheit" in which Philippi had begun by exclaiming, "Es lebe die unschätzbare Freiheit!" In Liscow's version the speaker exclaims, "Es lebe der Herr Professor Philippi! Hoch!" (II, 9). This outcry occurs several times throughout the eulogy, which is carried out in Philippi's own bombastic style. The piece is profusely provided with footnote references to Philippi's Sechs deutsche Reden, making it appear to be carefully constructed and scholarly.

Liscow's own language often closely parallels the phraseology of the original. For example, Philippi had said in the "Gedächtnisrede" before the "Patriotische Assemblée":

> Es breche also nunmehro ohngehindert die verborgene Wehmut meines Hertzens aus der Quelle der Ehrerbietigkeit hervor, und ohnerachtet solche dero allerseits hellen Gemüths-Augen bereits unverborgen ist; so vermenge sich doch mein Trauer-Ton mit den Klag-Liedern des gantzen Landes und erfülle die Luft mit lauter gebrochenen Seufzern, mit einem bangen Ach! mit einem wehmütigsten Geschrey![169]

Liscow's parody of the passage runs:

> Es breche also nunmehr ungehindert die verborgene Freude meines Herzens aus der Quelle der Ehrerbietigkeit hervor; und ohnerachtet solche Dero allerseits hellen Gemüthsaugen bereits unverborgen ist: so vermenge sich doch mein Freudenton mit dem "In dulci Jubilo" aller, so die Verdienste des Herrn Professor Philippi kennen, und erfülle die Luft mit einem hellen und deutlichen Vivat! mit einem freudigen Hoch! und mit einem frohlockenden Jubelgeschrey (II, 17-18).

Even had he been able to sustain such close parody throughout, Liscow no doubt saw that the piece would be more effective, less monotonous, if he used a means that allowed

him greater freedom than parody, which of course depends largely on a model. So he combines with the parody blame-by-praise irony. Departure from the actual speeches of Philippi make it possible for Liscow to indulge his fondness for jokes based on ambiguity, as when he speaks in ironic praise of the--may we say here--"artlessness" of Philippi's writings: "[Professor Philippi's] Schriften sind nach dem Urtheile der Kenner, mit solcher Kunst verfertigt, dass man Mühe hat, die Kunst darinn zu finden. . . . Er hat mit solcher Sorgfalt seine Geschicklichkeit verborgen, dass zu deren Entdeckung die Einsicht eines grossen Staatsmannes erfordert wird, und die Weisheit der Schulgelehrten dazu nicht hinlänglich ist. Diese Nachteulen blendet ein so grosses Licht" (II, 19-20). The close parody occurs only when Liscow wishes to highlight some of the more ridiculous notions Philippi had expressed in Sechs deutsche Reden. A good example which runs several pages in Briontes is the discussion of Philippi's speech of lament on the passing of the queen of Poland. At some point during the speech Professor Philippi was apparently so overcome by his own rhetoric that he fainted dead away on the podium. With some assistance, however, he was quickly and completely revived and was even able to continue his speech. In commenting upon that incident in the six collected speeches, Philippi suggests that it would have a good rhetorical effect if one could, during a "Trauerrede," manage to faint or perform some other heart rending act (II, 54). Liscow parodies this made-to-order material. "Der kleine Geist" extols his

master before the assembled "kleinen Geistern": "[Der Himmel] schickt dir [grossem Philippi] eine Ohnmacht zu, damit du Gelegenheit haben mögest, aller Welt zu zeigen, dass du wenn du halb tot bist, eine bessere Rede halten kannst, als alle andere Redner" (II, 54) and defends Professor Philippi's new directions in rhetoric before the pronouncements of the ancients, such as Cicero, who maintained that theatrics are only suitable on stage and not during a speech (II, 55).

Liscow quotes Philippi frequently as he reviews his rules of good speaking and writing. Most of Philippi's rules reveal the tenacity with which he adhered to the bombast and pomposity still thriving during this period on the edge of change; indeed, Philippi would seem to represent something of a revival of that kind of language. Liscow ridicules not only his prose but also his poetry. The ironic eulogy lauds the professor for his "heroische Beredsamkeit" and his refusal to be fettered by the artistic rules which are being promulgated lately. "Abschnitt, Sylbenmaass und Füsse sind bey ihm gar verächtliche Sachen, und seine einzige Sorge gehet auf das einige Nohtwendige in der Poesie, ich meyne den Reim. Dieses muss ihm nohtwendig die Hochachtung aller Kenner erwerben, und, nach Art der Ochsenkäufer, aus dem Hintertheile eines Verses von dessen Güte zu urtheilen wissen" (II, 75-76).

Briontes ends with an apostrophe to Philippi bidding him to complete the great work that he has started and to destroy the realm of false rhetoric. There is reference to

his position at the University of Halle and to his responsibilities there when it is said: "Lass die Spötter schwatzen. Man habe dich zu einem ausserordentlichen Bekenner der deutschen Beredsamkeit erkoren, um durch dein lehrreiches Beyspiel die Jugend auf eben die Art beredt zu machen, als die alten Lacedämonier ihre Kinder durch das Exempel trunkener Knechte zur Mässigkeit anführten" (II, 81-82).

Here again Liscow has employed a developed verbal irony. It is overt irony, meaning that it is immediately perceived by the victim and the careful reader, because contradictions or incongruities are recognized quickly. A new element in Briontes is the creation of the "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister," which, once set, becomes a situation that Liscow can keep going in successive satires, (though he later uses the phrase "elende Scribenten" to designate targets of his satire). Klaus Lazarowicz sees this "Gesellschaft" as "einen ironischen Spielraum, in dem sich eine totale Verkehrung vollzieht," and which, he believes, obviates Liscow's having to re-establish for successive satires the framework on which his persiflage plays.[170] Therefore, once understood by the reader, the irony emerges from the circumstances, so that the utterances of the ingénu admirer as "kleiner Geist" are understood to be incongruous and ironic. A further distancing which Lazarowicz points out is effected by having "der kleine Geist" function as publisher and commentator of his eulogy. In the Vorbericht he describes the "Gesellschaft" and the speech itself as an attempt to imitate his

master Philippi.

We may note here in passing that Liscow is by this time increasing his use of quotation from various literatures--Latin, Greek, French, German, and others. His fondness for quotation does bear on his irony somewhat; we will return to this later.[171]

Briontes is a particularly sharp satire--"beissende Ironie" Litzmann calls it,[172] and is more directly personal than the previous satires. It even resulted in Philippi's students quoting it to him. Philippi's father tried to intervene on his son's behalf by appealing to two of his friends who were members of the Upper Consistory in Dresden to suppress further sales of Briontes. It was, they charged, a "Religionsspötterey" (Vorrede, II, 453). Their suit found its way to the "Büchercommission" in Leipzig which was ordered to investigate, but that is where it remained--nothing more was done (ibid.).

Meanwhile, Philippi could not discover who the author of Briontes was, and he compounded his plight by making the wild and improbable guess that it must be Professor Gottsched. Gottsched replied and politely denied Philippi's charge, and it was later rumored that Gottsched named Liscow as the author of Briontes and also branded it an "infames Pasquil," but Liscow writes in the Vorrede that he did not believe this of Gottsched.

In Briontes Liscow had compared "die Gesellschaft der Geister" with the invisible church and had mentioned the

Bible in two other passages which were perhaps somewhat less than reverent, according to existing community standards, so the satire was branded by some a mockery of religion. In this case Philippi's appeal to the police failed, but it is important to note that even Liscow's friends warned him to be careful. Friedrich Hagedorn--whom Litzmann believes wrote the review of Briontes appearing in the Niedersächsischen Nachrichten of 27 October 1732[173]--cautions Liscow: "Nur möchte sich das beredte Mitglied der kleinen Geister, von welchem die philippische Lobrede herkömmt, dieses lassen ins Ohr gesagt seyn, dass es sich der Redensarten, die eine schlechte Ehrerbietung für die Schrift und Theologie an Tag legen, enthielte . . . wohl hätten wegbleiben mögen" (II, 483).

Meanwhile Philippi, apparently undaunted by Liscow's Briontes, wrote (still in 1732) Sieben neue Versuche in der deutschen Beredsamkeit, in which one of the essays bore the title, "Rede von dem Character der kleinen Redner; als eine vorläufige Abfertigung der Satyre Briontes," and another separate essay was entitled for short, "Gleiche Brüder, gleiche Kappen."[174] Both of these were supposed to be defenses of his Sechs deutsche Reden as well as a condemnation of Liscow as a "Pasquillant" and a mocker of religion. But Philippi was not able to find a publisher for his manuscripts, at least not in Leipzig or Hamburg. However, two friends of Liscow's sent him excerpts of the manuscripts, and that was all he needed to pick up his pen

again to respond to his critics generally and to Professor Philippi particularly. "Es verdross mich, dass man, obgleich meine Schriften von keinen Religionsmaterien handelten, dennoch so dreiste und verwegen von meinem Glauben und Unglauben urtheilete, als wenn ich einen Catechismum geschrieben hätte" (II, 458). In order to answer Philippi adequately, he decided to publish the excerpts mentioned above himself—not because he considered such "elendes Zeug" worthy of an answer, but more that he wanted to state his views on satire (Vorrede, II, 459).

The resulting work he called, Unpartheyische Untersuchung der Frage: ob die bekannte Satyre, Briontes der Jungere . . . mit entsetzlichen Religionsspöttereyen angefüllet, und eine strafbare Schrift sey . . . bey welcher Gelegenheit gezeigt wird, dass Hr. Professor Philippi die Schrift: "Gleiche Brüder, gleiche Kappen etc." unmöglich gemacht haben könne.[175] Liscow attempted a great deal with this writing because instead of straightforward discourse or polemic, it is itself ironical and satirical. This time the mask he dons is that of a disinterested third party—a scholar who has come forward to defend satire and the right to criticize. He can be impartial in this, says the scholar, because, "Ich kenne diesen ungenannten Scribenten (i.e., Liscow as author of Briontes) so wenig, als den Herrn Professor Philippi" (II, 101).

Of chief importance in this long work is Liscow's discussion of satire as "Arzeney," which we already outlined

in chapter two, and his clear defense of literary criticism, whose main tenets are that whoever publishes must expect and accept public judgement of his writings and that the sharpest criticism must be permitted as long as the critic limits himself to comment upon an author's writings and not upon the author personally. The last part of this statement indicates the boundaries Liscow set between satire and pasquil.

Liscow's demand for unhampered literary criticism caught the attention of Bodmer and Breitinger. In fact, Bodmer wrote in the Vorrede to Breitinger's Critischer Dichtkunst:

> Der Geschmack an critischen Schriften ist bei der deutschen Nation noch nicht so wohl befestigt, dass man nicht nöthig hätte, sie mit Vorerinnerungen über gewisse Puncten einzuführen, wiewohl man mit der grössten Begründnis hoffen kan, dass er in kurtzer Zeit insgemeine durchbrechen werde, nachdem der unerschrockene Hr. von Liscov in dem philosophischen Werekgen: Unpartheyische Untersuchung etc. das allgemeine Recht der Menschen zu critisieren so vollkommen bewiesen hat, dass die Deutschen ohne Zweifel zu diesem Geschmacke nunmehr genugsam vorbereitet sind.[176]

But Bodmer's optimism here was a bit premature, especially concerning satire, since the public was still prone to sympathize with the victim. "Man denkt: heute mir, morgen dir, und lieset also eine Satyre mit Furcht und Zittern" (II, 91). And apparently mockery of religion was always a safe reproach to make against a satirist if there was no other way of striking back. "Ist es dem D. Swift wohl besser gegangen?" asks the scholar in Unpartheyische Untersuchung. Liscow refers here to Jonathan Swift's Tale of

a Tub. (It is noteworthy that this is the only mention of Swift in all of Liscow's writings.)[177]

The "defense" Liscow provides against the rebuke of "Religionsspötterey" is a curious one. The scholar says that some people have simply not understood the irony. "Der Briontes," he says, "ist eine Satyre, in welcher von Anfang bis zu Ende eine immerwährende Ironie herrschet. . . . Wer nun entweder so blödes Verstandes ist, dass er den verborgenen Sinn einer Ironie nicht zu erreichen vermag, oder auch so schwermüthig, dass er allen Scherz für sündlich hält, und in den unschuldigsten Schriften, wenn sie nicht nach der Salbung schmecken, nichts als Greuel entdecket, der wisse, dass ich für ihn nicht schreibe" (II, 104). Later, after having examined the allegedly offensive portions more closely, the scholar concludes that no one who knows what irony is would be offended (II, 132). A detailed analysis of the pertinent passages of Briontes is not important here. What is significant is that the response Liscow made is surprisingly unconvincing, and one hardly knows whether to take it seriously. More important is the implicit lament that many of his readers do not recognize when irony is being used and that they do not have much of a sense of humor.

As we noted elsewhere, Liscow's thinking was influenced considerably by the English. However, the position he describes in Unpartheyische Untersuchung is very like that of Boileau. Litzmann compares the two and says that Liscow's

satire, like Boileau's, lacks any rancor, "er ist scharf, witzig, stellenweise in seiner Ironie anscheinend grausam, aber er wird nie eigentlich bitter, gehässig."[178] Much of what Liscow writes on the subject of satire is, in Litzmann's opinion, a virtual paraphrasing of Boileau. Yet from his own day onward Liscow has been more frequently compared with Jonathan Swift.[179] We would like to return to this question again later.

Liscow turns his attention to Philippi again in the second part of Unpartheyische Untersuchung. He remains masked, of course, as the unbiased scholar who refutes the piece "Gleiche Brüder, gleiche Kappen," and a refined irony proceeds from the notion that "Kappen" is so foolish, so wretchedly written that Philippi could not possibly have authored it. In point by point refutation the scholar disparages both content and language of "Kappen" repeating again and again that it was written by an enemy of Philippi in order to make him look bad before the public. He is sure it is a plot, he says, because the attitudes of Professor Philippi occilate so much in the "Kappen." At first he "tanzt [seinen Widersachern] auf den Köpfen, und aus allem, was er sagt, leuchtet nichts, als Hochmut, Trotz, Zorn, Rachgierde, Grobheit und eine grosse Verachtung seiner Feinde hervor" (II, 241). But toward the end, he says, the professor lays himself at the feet of his enemies. "Er lässet nichts als Demuht, Kleinmüthigkeit, Geduld und Friedfertigkeit von sich blicken"—proof positive, he believes,

that it must have been written by more than one person (II, 241). With this, Liscow indicates not only his disregard for Philippi as a professor of Rhetoric, but also doubts his sincerity as a person. Personal remarks of this kind approach the limits that Liscow himself set for satire.

By pursuing the ironic ruse that Philippi cannot be the author, Liscow in effect pits Philippi against himself, and the scholar ends his remarks by admonishing Professor Philippi to seek out and defeat the author of "Kappen" rather than worry about any harm that could be done him by the unnamed author of Briontes. He advises that in so doing, Professor Philippi can save his honor and disarm his mockers (II, 256-57). "Hat er diesen Feind besieget, und unter seine Füsse gebracht: so kann er versichert seyn, dass er, durch dessen Niederlage, die Quelle seines Jammers verstopfet" (II, 256-57).

But far from taking Liscow's advice, Professor Philippi insisted he did write "Gleiche Brüder, gleiche Kappen" and even had it included as a supplement in the printing of a new book entitled Cicero, ein grosser Windbeutel, . . .[180] Another appendage to the book is called "Von acht Vertheidigungs-Schrifften gegen eben so viel Chartequen," of which one was directed against Liscow's Unpartheyische Untersuchung. So this literary feud continued.

Liscow's third satire against Philippi[181] involves a further exploitation of the "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister" and is therefore a sequel to Briontes. It is

entitled, Stand- oder Antrittsrede[182] and consists of two parts. The first part is an actual speech by Philippi, called Rede vom Charakter der kleinen Geister, which had been one of a collection, entitled Sieben neue Versuche in der deutschen Beredsamkeit (referred to above). In this speech Philippi had tried to match Liscow by pretending to address the "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister" in order to berate one of their members, "Bockshorn," as he refers to Liscow, and in order to distance himself from their society. Philippi attempted irony as the device with which to carry off this fiction, but it is embarassingly clumsy. Liscow uses the speech just as it is but provides it with a new title, Stand- oder Antrittsrede des (S. T.) Herrn Professor Philippi, gehalten in der Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister, which satirizes the custom of the learned societies of the time to have each new member give an inaugural address, to which one of the distinguished older members would immediately reply. This is the purport of the second part of the satire, called Höfliche Antwort des Aeltesten der kleinen Geister, auf des (S. T.) Herrn Professor Philippi Antrittsrede. It is one of Liscow's cleverest inventions and overall an effective satire, even if in so saying, one has to overlook his unauthorized publishing of one of Philippi's speeches for his own purposes. Concerning this "Manuskript-Diebstahl," Litzmann does not condone it but does point out that such things were looked upon differently in Liscow's time. "Wie im wirklichen Kriege galt auch in der

litterarischen Fehde jedes Mittel, dem Gegner zu schaden, für erlaubt."[183] As further example he relates the instance of a Count Manteuffel, who for some reason wanted a certain manuscript of J. J. Lange's which had already been delivered to the printer in Leipzig. He prevailed upon Gottsched to acquire it for him. Gottsched did not take offense at the request and, as attested by letters, did in fact fulfill the Count's wish.[184]

Where Philippi had begun his ironic speech to the "kleinen Geistern" by apologizing for appearing before them unannounced, Liscow begins Höfliche Antwort by having the eldest among them greet Professor Philippi with jubilation and pleasure. The brothers are exhorted to lift their voices in loud "Freudengeschrey," and a footnote added later relates that everyone cried out, "Es lebe der Herr Professor Philippi, hoch!" with such enthusiasm that the elder had to wave at the members three times and stamp his feet four times in order to regain their attention. "Der Leser beliebe die philippische Natürlichkeit dieser Stelle meiner Rede zu merken" (II, 290). This last is an allusion to Philippi's having said in Sechs deutsche Reden that some theatrics can have a good effect in giving a speech.

Of course in his speech Philippi had protested any connection with the "Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister." Liscow seeks to reverse this protest by having the elder express doubts that the professor's attacks on their society are really serious. He believes, he says, Professor

Philippi is simply playing with them, "weil du nur blind schiessest und mit einem stumpfen Speer auf uns losrennest" (II, 293). This is of course meant to belittle Philippi's attempt to satirize Liscow.

The elder, speaking for the society, implores Philippi to join them, because even though he mocks them, yet is he one of them. "Du bezeigest dich in deinem Spotten, in deinem Zorn, mit einem Worte, in deiner ganzen Anrede, als ein Ausbund und Muster eines kleinen Geistes . . . " (II, 291). "Komm demnach, o unendlich kleiner Geist," he beseeches, "und nimm den Platz ein, der als unserm Haupte, gebührt. . . . Sei unser König, und errette uns von Feinden" (II, 363). With that the elder approaches Philippi to tender him "den Kuss des Friedens," but Philippi, it is related in a footnote, pushed him away and stuck his tongue out at him (II, 364). "Du sollst unser König seyn: Du musst unser König seyn, du magst wollen, oder nicht. . . . Du magst noch so hart darauf bestehen, dass du kein kleiner Geist seyst, wir wissen doch wohl, was wir glauben sollen. Deine Schriften bezeugen das Gegentheil, und eben dieser merkliche Mangel der Selbsterkenntnis macht dich in unsern Augen gross und ehrwürdig" (II, 364).

Finally, Professor Philippi is further distinguished among the three types of "kleiner Geister." "Einige Glieder unserer Gesellschaft geben sich für kleine Geister aus, und sind es nicht." They cause the society "eitel Verdruss und Herzeleid" and are false brothers and secret

enemies. "Einige geben sich dafür aus, und sind es auch." These are "gute ehrliche Leute," who simply lack stability. "Einige hergegen sind es, und wissen es nicht" (II, 365). Professor Philippi is, of course, placed in the last category as "den Besten unter den Besten," (II, 368) and this third class makes up the "Kern unserer Gesellschaft. . . . Selbst unsere Verfolger bekennen, dass derjenige der grösseste kleine Geist ist, der es nicht wissen will" (II, 366).

Liscow calls this satire "unstreitig die giftigste Schrift" that he wrote against Philippi, but at the same time considers that Philippi got what he deserved (II, 461-62). Lazarowicz, commenting on Höfliche Antwort, writes, "Die grimmigsten Zynismen werden hier im Gewand einer hyperbölischen Devotion vorgetragen. Dergleichen findet sich in der deutschen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts sonst höchstens bei Lichtenberg." Further, he believes in this phase of the feud with Liscow, that Philippi is now more a victim than an opponent.[185] Manthey agrees.[186] So does Litzmann, who does, however, add that Philippi largely deserved to be ridiculed; at the same time he indicates that such a "Verschärfung der Ironie" by Liscow must degenerate into personal animosity and points to evidence that Philippi is now being looked upon with sympathy by some.[187] Liscow himself asks rhetorically, "Warum wagte er sich in die Ironie, eine Figur, die ihm zu hoch war?" (Vorrede, II, 462). We think Liscow's words here are of some significance for our concern with irony, namely that he separates "Spotten," closely

associated with satire and even sometimes used to define satire, and irony, which he indicates is a rhetorical figure demanding considerably more finesse than his opponent Philippi can manage. Liscow did not have really definitive things to say about irony as he did with satire--discussion of irony and the naming of various types of irony was not vigorous until about the middle of the eighteenth century, and, of course, in the nineteenth century. But perhaps that does not matter so much--it is more reliable to examine what Liscow makes of it in his writings than what he actually had to say about it. That he refers to it as "Figur" in the statement above, however, suggests that he identifies it as a literary device as opposed to an artistic attitude.

The irony in Höfliche Antwort is manifold. There is the innocence of "der Aelteste" who believes Philippi's speech must be beyond him--referring to Philippi's venture with irony. He tried to make literal sense of the words, says the elder, but believes there must be a "geheimen Sinn," to them (II, 310-11). The effusive politeness to and praise of Professor Philippi is exaggerated to absurdity. There is ironic defense of "Boxhorn," the author of Briontes, whose ironic "Lobrede" of Philippi is taken seriously by the elder and played against Philippi's protest that he is not a "kleiner Geist." A considerable part of this satire is also taken up with analysis of two other works of Philippi's, Mathematischer Versuch von der

Unmöglichkeit einer ewigen Welt and Thüringische Historie which Liscow uses to convince Philippi that he is indeed and undeniably "ein kleiner Geist." Liscow quotes from them frequently as he refutes their content.

In so far as Liscow imitates the custom of the "Antrittsrede" and its rejoinder, this satire is also partly parody. Of course the Antrittsrede itself is no parody--it is the original.

Liscow expected Stand- oder Antrittsrede to be the last thing he would write against Philippi, and nearly a year passed before a new incident brought renewal of the lop-sided contest between them. Philippi had never been brought to silence by Liscow's satires, and when Philippi issued a new book in the spring of 1734, called Maximen der Marquise von Sablé. Mit 366 moralischen Bildnissen erläutert . . . aus dem Französischen übersetzt, it was reviewed in the Hamburgischen Correspondenten by Liscow's younger brother Joachim Friedrich Liscow, who had become editor a short time before. His review was entirely sarcastic; he wrote for example, that Philippi was "eines zum Bathos gebohrnen, und durch Uebung darinn vollkommen gewordenen Redners" (II, 526). This was more than Philippi would tolerate. He complained to the "Senat" in Hamburg about the "Studenten Liscow, der nichts als ein Zeitungsschreiber ist," and demanded that steps be taken to ensure there would be no further attacks of this kind. Apparently Joachim was admonished by the authorities and was more restrained thereafter.[188] Liscow

remarks in the Vorrede only that Philippi's petition or letter, which Philippi later had printed as a part of a larger work, was "auf gewisse Maasse nicht ohne Wirkung" (II, 468). Perhaps part of the effect of it was to put him in a mood to avenge himself and his brother Joachim, or was it? He writes in the Vorrede, "die Wahrheit zu sagen, es verdross mich, dass der Herr Professor Philippi, nach aller meiner Mühe, die ich mir gegeben hatte, ihn zu demüthigen, sich doch noch so trotzig gebehrdete, und unverschämt genug war, mit Ungestüm zu verlangen, dass die Leute anders, als mit Verachtung und Abscheu, von seinen Schriften reden sollten." This Vorrede that we have so often referred to is deceptive. The quoted passage is an example of Liscow's way of seeming to speak forthrightly about matters in this after-the-fact review of his own writings and their circumstances, yet he also seems to be playing with the reader. If one says, "Frankly, it made me angry that after all the trouble I went to to humiliate him, he still acts so arrogantly and even has the gall to violently demand that people take his writings with other than contempt and aversion," we would not take that kind of language entirely seriously. We might, for lack of a more appropriate terminology say such a statement is uttered "tongue-in-cheek," but more accurately, we would say it is ironical, in fact, it is a good example of self-irony. The statement above from the Vorrede, however, is followed in the next paragraph by one that has often been quoted by those who have dealt with

Liscow's satires. He wrote, "Ich wollte ihm [Philippi] demnach den Rest geben," meaning, presumably, that he wanted to put an end to Philippi's suffering by delivering one last satirical blow. As it happened, real life circumstances provided Liscow plenty of material to write Eines berühmten Medici Glaubwürdiger Bericht von dem Zustande in welchem er (S.T.) Herrn Professor Philippi den 20sten Juni, 1734 angetroffen.[189] It was reported that on or about that date Philippi had been beaten up by two officers in a Wirtshaus in Halle, and badly enough so that he had to be carried home. Liscow creates an attending physician who discloses that on account of a blow on the head, Philippi's "Gehirn ganz umgekehret, und just in die Ordnung gesetzet worden, in welcher es sich bey Leuten von gesundem Verstande befindet" (II, 415). This rearrangement of his brain causes him to realize how awful his writings are and, in last conversation with the doctor, he denounces them one by one. "Ach meine verfluchten Schriften!" he cries (II, 408). A brief preface by the "publisher" accompanies the doctor's report in which the author rejoices at the unexpected repentance of a sinner and announces that "Er starb, wie der Medicus vermutet, den 21sten Junius, Abends um 6 Uhr 53 Minuten. Eine halbe Stunde vorher wiederholte er nochmal das gethane Bekenntnis von der Scheusslichkeit seiner Schriften" (II, 403). And Liscow ironizes himself when he declares that "Ein stumpfer Prügel muss dasjenige möglich machen, woran bishero so viele spitzige Federn umsonst gearbeitet haben" (II, 401). A single blow on

the head could awaken a consciousness in Philippi that the sharpest satire could not (ibid.).

Shortly after Glaubwürdiger Bericht appeared, Philippi received further blows "von höherer Hand," as Liscow reports it (II, 470). Philippi's star was fast fading. He was forced to leave Halle and his professorship not only because of the brawling incident; he stood in general disfavor with the university. He tried to procure a new position in Göttingen, but his Halle reputation preceded him, and the professors he prevailed upon there turned him down, although he stayed in Göttingen long enough to edit for a short time a "Wochenschrift" called Der Freydenker. He also issued a "Verteidigungsschrift," in which it was his intention to set forth evidence that he was not dead, and he directed the most violent slander against two former colleagues whom he thought were the authors of Glaubwürdiger Bericht.[190] Now Liscow wrote his last piece against Philippi, entitled Bescheidene Beantwortung der Einwürfe, welche einige Freunde des Herrn D. Johann Ernst Philippi . . . wider die Nachricht von dessen Tode gemacht haben.[191] In it the publisher of Glaubwürdiger Bericht denies the account of some unknown person in the Hamburgischen Berichte that Herr Professor Philippi was still living and protests the "Verteidigungsschrift" and its enclosures, apparently issued by the so-called "geheime patriotische Assemblée," which charges the doctor's report was purely a fabrication (II, 419-20). The editor is distressed that the unnamed person called him a

"namlosen Pasquillanten" in a public paper and the society branded his Bericht "eine infame Chartesque" and him personally an "infamen Scribenten" (II, 422). If he had falsely reported that Philippi had murdered his father and raped his mother he would perhaps understand such unrestrained invective, but all he did was to report the passing of Philippi (II, 422); can that damage Philippi's honor, he asks? (II, 424). Everything his opponents charge him with consists of contradiction and sophistry, he says (II, 426). At this point Liscow proceeds in word and tone as if his arguments against Philippi and the society are serious. If his report were false, he contends, Philippi would doubtless have issued a denial immediately. "Wer den sel. Mann gekannt hat, der weiss, dass er sehr empfindlich und hitzig war. . . . Er schenkte seinen Feinden nichts, und so bald kam nicht eine Schrift gegen ihn heraus, so war er mit der Antwort fertig" (II, 438). But, he continues, there has been no response from the professor, even though all Halle and half of Germany have heard of his demise; and the letter purportedly written by Philippi and being shown around by friends of Philippi's, is simply further proof that a fraud is afoot, because the letter does not contain the slightest trace of "Schwulst"--an ever-present mark in Philippi's writings (II, 440).

Finally the editor contends that the devil must be playing some role in all this, and whoever is not an atheist or Thomasian will agree with him. Pious Christians

know from the history of D. Faust what happened to Wagner at the marketplace in Wittenberg. "Der Philippi, der jetzo zu Göttingen zu sehen seyn soll, [ist] nicht der rechte Philippi, sondern sein Gespenst, und also weit geschickter ist meine Nachrichten . . . zu bestärken, als verdächtig zu machen" (II, 444).

Philippi did not fare well from this point on--Göttingen, Halberstadt, Helmstedt, again Halle, Jena, Erfurt--in all these places he tried to establish himself again without success. He turned up in Leipzig "mit einer grossen Last von Schmieralien, die er alle drucken lassen will," as Frau Gottsched reported it to Manteuffel.[192] A letter to Friedrich Hagedorn from his brother written in 1742 has it that Philippi, then seen in Dresden "in Gestalt eines halben Bettlers," had expressed the insight that he had written "bisher nicht viel gutes," but that, according to Hagedorn, he was not yet cured of his passion to publish.[193] From his last writings arises the suspicion that he must have become deranged.[194] How ironical then that in one of his last writings he speaks of Liscow with such praise and understanding.

> . . . so halte ihn in allen Ehren, denn er straft etwas scharf, aber er meynts doch gut. . . . Eben der den du etwa vor deinen Feind hältst, ist zugleich ein Liebhaber eines gesunden Witzes; ein Liebhaber der Wahrheit und guten Geschmacks, ein Liebhaber der Richtigkeit, dass ein Schüler seinen Lehr-Meister nicht über die Gebühr erhebe und gar zu einem Abgott mache, ein Liebhaber endlich der Freyheit, damit keine Monarchia litteraria universalis aufkomme . . .[195]

Liscow sympathized with Philippi when he learned of his distress, and it is reported that he even provided Philippi with financial support during these years,[196] which would seem to indicate the extent to which he felt responsible for Philippi's plight, but at the same time it shows there was no rancor involved in his attacks.

The work of Liscow's which has been considered his best appeared toward the end of 1734 and before Bescheidene Beantwortung. It is the satire Von der Vortrefflichkeit und Nothwendigkeit der elenden Scribenten gründlich erwiesen von * * * . The greater acceptance of this work than of all the others--it was reprinted in 1736 and, of course, reissued with the collection in 1739--can perhaps be explained by noting that it is no longer personal satire. The reading public, as we established above in chapter two, was much more atuned to Rabener's conception of satire and found Elende Scribenten, as we will refer to this satire, less threatening than most of Liscow's other writings. Although Sivers and Philippi are named in it several times, they are perceived more as identifiable types than as actual persons. The emphasis of the satire lies more generally.

It is the author's purpose in this work to say something new, as he explains in the Vorbericht. His intention is to save the honor of the so-called "elenden Scribenten," and to defend him against his slanderers, to prove beyond doubt that his kind of writer is both outstanding and indispensable; he knows he is setting himself a difficult task,

he says (II, 5). In the first few paragraphs we recognize that Liscow is setting things up, so to speak. He is the anonymous admirer or sympathizer who has come forward to plead a case before his readers on behalf of a person or group that apparently does not effectively defend itself. He identifies with that group, which he calls here "die elenden Scribenten," where elsewhere they were "die Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister."

The ironic circumstances he creates are applied and sustained throughout. The reversal, or better, dissimulation is complete and uninterrupted. As Hettner observed, the type of irony which is most obviously at work in Elende Scribenten is blame-by-praise irony. But it is more complex a matter than that, as we shall demonstrate.

Continuing the Vorbericht, the sympathetic (yet anonymous) author notes that in order to unify against their detractors "die elenden Scribenten" must be able to recognize each other. A piece of ironic reasoning follows which also involves an exemplary use of quotation. The author calls upon Cicero who said that no one but a wise man can recognize another as wise: "Statuere quis sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis" (Cicero Acad. Quaest. Lib. IV). The insertion of the quotation, given first directly then indirectly, adds nothing whatsoever in making the point, indicates no context from the original, and is really quite useless, except that a readily identifiable name is injected as authoritative. Liscow does this quite often and his purpose is

probably partly to ridicule the strong sense one had of authority at the time and also to indicate that one can prove practically anything by quoting, especially quoting out of context or without understanding. This is, of course, also an instance of irony, because he purposely distorts the conditions of the quotation, and offers it as proof of his own argument. Liscow's frequent use of quotation in this way serves more to remind us of his broadly based reading, than to delight us, because the effect, at least upon the modern reader, is minimal. Perhaps at that time they reinforced the ironical overstatement, that is, bringing a scholarliness to bear which is out of all proportion to the importance of the subject. This might have appealed strongly to an early eighteenth century reader who would have recognized the tacit image of true erudition contrasted with that of mere pedantry. Liscow's quotations are taken from Latin, French, German, Greek, Italian and English literatures--in that order of their frequency.[197] Following the quotation from Cicero the author of the Vorbericht says, "so folget unwidertreiblich, dass ein elender Scribent ganz unfähig sey, seine Brüder zu kennen" (III, 12). It appears, it is further related, that nature has made as much difference between the good writers and the wretched writers as she has between human beings and unreasoning animals. A good writer, it is explained, always casts his eyes above to the peak of Parnassus, which he tries to climb. The wretched writer, being of nature heavy-headed, does not look up to

the heights but down into the abyss and sumps that surround Parnassus, and because he sees there below creatures who are even lower than he, he rejoices in the sight and believes he has already climbed Parnassus. "Der Parnass ist just so beschaffen, als die Leibnitzische Pyramide der möglichen Welten. Oberwerts hat er ein Ende, unterwerts nicht." It follows then that even the "elendste Scribent" is superior to someone (III, 13-15).

The Vorbericht closes with an appeal to all wretched writers to come forth and identify themselves. "Es ist einmal Zeit, dass wir die Larve abziehen, und uns in unserm natürlichen Wesen zeigen" (III, 17). They should have nothing to fear because they outnumber their enemies, we are told. The author says he has estimated their number at three-quarters of the scholarly world and considers that to be a conservative estimate (III, 18-19). He does not hesitate in the least to publicly declare war on "den guten Scribenten," and calling on the Parnassus metaphor again, asserts that it is silly to climb a rough mountain peak in order to find pleasure that is readily available without all that work in the valleys and quiet depths where they reside (III, 19-20).

The satire proper which follows is based on a sustained ironic reasoning as Liscow's persona contrasts good writers and bad. The eighteenth century model is defined: "Wer unter die guten Scribenten gerechnet seyn will, der muss vernünftig, ordentlich, und zierlich schreiben: In dessen

Schriften also weder Vernunft, noch Ordnung, noch Zierlichkeit anzutreffen ist, der ist ein elender Scribent" (III, 23). The reader may wonder at this admission, he says, but he will prove that the very lack of these qualities is the strength of the "elenden Scribenten"; and the mockers will be silenced. He freely admits the "elenden Scribenten" do not employ reason, but asks, do we not have this in common with the good writers, indeed with all mankind? Historians, poets, wisemen lament the lack of reason constantly, and whoever would want to act "recht vernünftig" should do the opposite of the majority. "Da man nun ohne Vernunft ganze Völker regieren, Länder erobern, Schlachten gewinnen, Seelen bekehren, Rechtshändel entscheiden, Pillen drechseln, Recepte verschreiben, und ein Weltweiser seyn kann: so möchte ich wohl wissen, warum es dann nicht erlaubt seyn sollte, ohne Vernunft ein Buch zu schreiben?" (III, 29). Reason only causes unhappiness, the argument continues, by depriving a person of his prejudices and making him critical to the point where he would say, better not to have been born (III, 32-33). Liscow carries this denunciation of "Vernunft" about as far as it will go by developing the line that employing reason causes a person to limit his desires, and by limiting his desires he becomes somnolent. Further, he says, the goal of all human activity is honor, advantage, and satisfaction of desire; if people were deprived of these, if reason prevailed over passion (die Affecten), then no virtuous deeds could take place and no one would want to

serve either church or state. And as one acts with reason, so he obeys the law, does what he should. Thus many human institutions would no longer be needed--the armies, the courts, as well as the operations of commerce and trade would become idle. The whole social structure would fall apart. This is, of course, a "deductio ad absurdum." Liscow had used this phrase himself to define satire in Unpartheyische Untersuchung. It is an effective means of exposing folly, he said there (II, 186). The sophistry against reason continues. Witness all the trouble caused the church and the state by the practice of reason--it breeds rebellion and heresy, he declares. He appeals to the reader's reason to disparage reason. "Ob der Mangel der Vernunft, den sie [their enemies] in unsern Schriften wahrnehmen, ein solcher Hauptmangel sey, dass wir desfalls verdienten ausgezischet zu werden?" (III, 43).

However absurd the reasoning has been up to this point, it becomes much less so when Liscow protests in the name of the "elenden Scribenten," that in limiting their reason they are simply following the advice of some of the better writers. One of the best, he says, is Montaigne, who asserts that reason itself places narrow boundaries on human understanding which should be well understood within the scientific world as well as the literary world; he admits that reason is a dangerous tool in the hands of one who would use it immoderately. Montaigne, it will be recalled, was the sixteenth century sceptic who incessantly asked the question

"Que sais-je?" and fought against what he considered the false confidence in human ability to reason. He believed more virtue derived out of learning from nature. Liscow had read Montaigne's Essays and quotes him several times in Elende Scribenten.

Liscow poses the question which occupied the eighteenth century until it was effectively answered by Kant, that is, how reason should be limited, but he does not pursue the question himself to any depth, which is disappointing. Perhaps he felt it could not be dealt with in a satire. F. J. Schneider remarks, however, that he carries the irony so far that he becomes unawares the prophet of the disadvantages of "einer einseitigen Verstandeskultur," and if one were not conversant with his basic attitudes, one might think he were a champion of irrationality.[198] The ironic defense of the "elenden Scribenten" continues. Their despisal of reason allows them to produce truly wondrous books. Even their enemies are astonished: "Ist es möglich, schreyen sie gemeiniglich, dass ein vernünftiger Mensch dergleichen Zeug schreiben könne?" (III, 60). Here is another example of Liscow's partiality for wit based on ambiguity.

Interspersed in the ongoing mock polemic supporting "elende Scribenten" are Liscow's several criticisms--enmeshed, of course, in the ironic presentation--of the low level of taste of the reading public, the unhappy fate of truly good writers, the narrow, usually dogmatic basis for

judging everything, the good fortune of wretched writers and the bliss that is theirs in ignorance. Publishers are scorned for growing rich by printing rubbish--"Ich möchte . . . gerne wissen, was die armen Buchführer und Buchdrucker wohl anfangen wollten, wenn keine elenden Scribenten in der Welt wären?" (III, 124-25).

The other marks of good writers, "Ordnung" and "Zierlichkeit" are not neglected but are not so thoroughly treated as "Vernunft." "Was die Ordnung der Wörter unter sich anlanget: so bilde ich mir ein, wir thun genug, wenn wir sie so setzen, dass die meiste Zeit, ein Verstand herauskömmt" (III, 111). One can peruse the book of an "elenden Scribenten," he says, and he will always find order to it. In fact, he goes on, even our enemies, the good writers, say one can read them from back to front as well as from front to back without any risk of confusion (III, 114). And on their lack of elegance comes the polemic:

> Ich sage nur, dass ich und meines gleichen elende Scribenten besser thun, wenn wir uns der gekünstelten und zierlichen Schreibart, in welcher unsere Feinde ihr Vergnügen suchen, gänzlich enthalten.
>
> Denn gewiss die gar zu ängstliche Sorgfalt, mit welcher die guten Scribenten ihre Worte aussuchen, und ihre Schriften schmücken, stehet einem weisen Mann, der sich mit Kleinigkeiten nicht aufhält, ganz und gar nicht an. . . . (III, 122)

Liscow no doubt had himself strongly in mind when he wrote that passage. His great care with the language has been considered outstanding by all who have written about him.

The piece culminates in an ironic appeal to public

leaders and to the clergy to continue their protection of the "elenden Scribenten" and particularly to defend them against satirists. These two groups are recurrent targets in Liscow's mockery, except that he is less direct and circumspect with them than with his personal opponents.

There is not really much new in this work, if one knows all the other satires that have gone before, but it is very skillfully executed. It suffers from being repetitive and it is too long, but Liscow is by now well-practiced and comfortable as an ironist, and it is one of his best works.

The irony that Liscow uses here as in other satires is mostly verbal. Ironic opposition is effected when he praises in order to blame ("die elenden Scribenten") and when he blames in order to praise ("die guten Scribenten"). The ironic defense of his victims entails pretended agreement with them, sympathy with them and advice to them. He attacks the victim's critics by sophistic reasoning reduced to absurdity. He feigns adulation and sometimes parodies his victim's manner of speaking and writing. Ambiguity is profuse and usually forms the basis for his wit.

Opposition is common to all irony, but it does not necessarily imply that we should assume that exactly the opposite of what the ironist says is what is meant. His real meaning may contain more than he says or something other than he says. In Elende Scribenten, for example, Liscow indicates there are many facets to the human capacity to reason. On the basis of ironic opposition we cannot

be sure of his own standpoint, since on the one hand he employs an ironic reasoning, drawing it to absurd lengths, then on the other hand he injects a pertinent reminder from Montaigne on the limitations of reason. What his own true opinions are must sometimes be surmised, which is an aspect that Liscow shares with modern ironists. His irony is so pervasive that one is not always sure how to interpret what he says. Furthermore, there is no finality about his satire, that is, it does not solve, it is not conclusive, nothing is changed at the end. And the moral tendenz which characterizes most of the satire, if not literature generally, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century is missing. We would second Klaus Lazarowicz when he writes:

> [Liscow's] Satiren haben keine moralischen Rezepte, weder Belehrendes noch Erbauliches anzubieten; wo das gelegentlich geschieht (wie etwa in der Unpartheyischen Untersuchung), wird der Ernst einer bestimmten Überzeugung oder Meinung durch die Selbst-Ironie wieder annihiliert.[199]

Lazarowicz believes that Liscow had no interest in asserting a moral superiority in contest with opponents who were not his intellectual equal; if that had been his purpose, no such refined satire would have been necessary. At base, he contends, most of Liscow's works are the monologs of a satirical intellect, whose "opponents" are really only objects in a "Selbst-inszenierung" designed to provide "geistliche Kützelung"--a phrase Liscow used. Further, he sees the satires as allowing no reply by an opponent. "Als Partner erkennt Liscow nur den Leser an, der . . . seine ironische Zweideutigkeit zu entschlüsseln weiss."[200]

We agree, but Lazarowicz' reference to Liscow's satire as "zwecklose Satire," strikes us as a contradiction of terms. He sees Liscow's "verkehrte Welt" ("die Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister," "die Gemeinschaft der elenden Scribenten") as an "erdichtete" literary autonomy which affords Liscow the intellectual and aesthetic pleasure of sovereign play. Although he admits there could be no satire if there were not at least the appearance of a bond to religious, moral, political or ideological norms, ideas and interests, he writes of Liscow: "Zwar gefällt er sich bis zuletzt im Habitus eines Rächers der beleidigten Vernunft. Allein diese Haltung ist nur noch Kostüm."[201] This would be a curious pose for a satirist to take. In fact, we question whether one remains a genuine satirist if the moralistic tendenz or the role of avenger of a violated norm is as casual as Lazarowicz suggests. It is more satisfactory to think that Liscow's basic personal motivations derive as much from his instincts as an ironist as from those of a satirist, or at least as a combination of these. The opposition inherent in irony elicits a manifold view of things which is not bounded by a limiting moral measuring stick. Moreover the ironic impulse is habitual, and as many ironists have been aware, it seems by its nature to have a power to corrupt the ironist, to bring him to nihilistic tendencies, or perhaps short of that, to produce in him a mental shrug of the shoulders. In the case of Liscow we have foremost a satirist who uses irony. There is nothing

uncommon about that, but Liscow's irony is so pervasive that it melds with the satire. It is no longer merely a device used to enhance the satire but rather becomes an integral force which makes its author both satirist and ironist as opposed to the satirist who simply employs irony sporadically. This combination serves to attenuate the satirical bent enough to account for the apparent purposelessness that Liscow displays as a satirist when he departs from the usual eighteenth century motive of moral improvement or correction as well as his apparent lack of mission. As we pointed out earlier, Liscow often wrote at the behest of friends; he had no care for fame, no interest in seeing his name in print; he did not worry how his writings were received, but loved them as if they were his children. All these things are spoken of in the first few pages of the Vorrede.

Liscow called the collection of writings he published in 1739 Sammlung Satyrischer und Ernsthafter Schriften, of which the only "serious" piece, placed last, was entitled Anmerkungen in Form eines Briefes über den Abriss eines neuen Rechts der Natur.[202] It was written in response to a tract issued by one Ernst Johann Manzel, professor of theology and law in Rostock in 1726. Manzel had intended to prove by reasoning that natural law has a theological basis and drew his "proofs" from the Scriptures. Liscow effectively dispatches that argument and shows that religion and "Vernunft" do not mix. But that will not be our

point of interest here. What is intriguing to note is the role played by the date of origin of the publication and by the nature of its execution. Whether it was written between 1726 and 1729 or whether it was considerably revised and then published in 1735 has been disputed. Liscow wrote in the Neue Vorrede des Verfassers, "Die Schrift, von welcher ich in dieser Vorrede handeln werde, ist zwar nicht satyrisch, als die vorigen. Ich glaube aber nicht, dass sie darum diese Sammlung verunzieren wird." (III, 141). The work itself, in the form of a long letter, is essentially a seriously conceived polemic against Manzel's theory --at first. But gradually and especially toward the end, as if he can no longer resist, Liscow reveals his penchant for wit and irony. The question is, did Liscow begin his writing career in this manner, i.e., without the intense satirical thrust of the other works, or should it be considered as actually the latest piece in the collection and a reflection of a changed or modified style? Was he moving away from satire toward irony? Litzmann favors the position that the Anmerkungen are an "Erstlingswerk."[203] But on the basis of the progressive increase of Liscow's quotations from French authors between the years in question, Seuffert and Schirokauer believe they can prove Liscow wrote a revision of the work in 1735.[204] The arguments on both sides are convincing but not sufficiently conclusive. However, it is not implausible that the ironic attitude was becoming stronger in Liscow just as

it was to increase generally later on in German literature. Liscow regarded the world as a bit out of joint and not proceeding as Enlightenment thinkers had theorized. Certainly his own life circumstances could have induced him to effect a mood of superiority toward the often oppressive pettiness of reality—there were his difficulties in securing an adequate professional position, his exposure to the intrigues of court life, the frustrations of censorship, and, of course, the culminating disaster for him as minister to Count Brühl. This superiority manifests itself in ironic detachment and the creation of an autonomous world of petty intellects and scribblers. He dons a mask of some kind and betrays no personal, authorial feeling, sentimentality or naivete. His ironic cover is always complete, and to the extent that he creates and controls the conditions of his satires, he can be said to hover above his own invention in intellectual play.

Liscow is primarily a satirist. We would characterize him as essentially a Swiftian satirist, as he was called from very early on. However, Liscow cannot be counted simply an imitator of Swift. Thomas P. Saine observes, for example, that "the particular technique, ironic sophistry to prove, and at the same time expose, the absurd, could hardly have been taken over from Swift, since Liscow uses it with such virtuosity."[205] Interesting also is Saine's comparison of Swift's character Bickerstaff (in Vindication of Isaac Bickerstaff, Esq.) and Liscow's

editor (in Bescheidene Beantwortung). "Whereas Bickerstaff goes to the heart of the problem [of proving that Partridge is no longer alive], Liscow's writer [who asserts that Philippi must be dead] seems to suggest every possible hypothesis, only to reject it. The circular sophistical arguments demonstrate his own keen sense of enjoyment in exercising his ironic talent."[206] This kind of playful meandering that Liscow engages in becomes a trait that is more richly developed by later ironists.

As ironist Liscow bears some affinity with the attitudes of our age. His most "modern" tendencies are manifested in his artistic detachment, in his scepticism of authority and dogma, in the ambiguity of his personal position, and in his permeating sustained irony. Of course we do not find the strong sense of distress, paradox and enigma of our modern society in Liscow. His was a simpler time. Even so, his world often looked pretty absurd to him. "Ich sehe alles, was in der Welt vorgehet, mit Gelassenheit, und grösstentheils von der lächerlichen Seite an: und ich befinde mich wohl dabey." (I, xxxii).

# CONCLUSION

We have pointed to some correlations between the irony in Liscow's writings and the scope of the so-called "modern" irony. But there are important elements of twentieth century irony which are not found in Liscow's writings. There is, for instance, a lack of cosmic breadth, because his focus of interest is, with some exception, quite narrow. The sense of paradox that one feels in modern irony appears as a simpler opposition and dialectic in Liscow. The brocaded prose out of which modern situational and dramatic irony proceeds we would not even expect to find in Liscow, who was reacting in part to the excesses of the previous literary period. "Das Schweben" of the modern ironist who seeks to reveal incongruity and paradox contrasts with Liscow's toying with the figures of a "verkehrten Welt," and the gentle smile of the modern ironist whose empathy includes a strong self-ironizing, is rather more a laugh with some edge to it in Liscow's writings. Liscow, after all, lived in an age when life was considered to be a harmonious whole.

But of course Liscow was a satirist--an early eighteenth century satirist, who used irony effectively to ridicule and criticize some of the most important failings of his time. His satire goes beyond the mocking of personal conduct to

defend reason--or perhaps better, "gesunden Menschenverstand," before the arrogant and fatuous violations of wretched writers, clerics, pedants, and sophists. He does not share the degree of optimism or didactic drive of most of his contemporaries, but he is nonetheless an enlightened man who displays some of the most enduring qualities of genuine enlightenment: he questions authority, traditional doctrines and values, and he tends toward individualism.

As satirist-ironist Liscow represents in other terms an idealist-realist. This is to say he has a vision of "Besserung" before him which is perhaps realizable, but it is countered by a lack of confidence in any substantial or immediate change in society. He views the times he lives in critically and realistically, and this results in a considerable dulling of his authorial fervor, even though his satire remains pungent. Thus his satire is "Arzeney" which does not cure--it kills. But in weighing the two tempers we put "idealist" before "realist," because this relationship is what marks Liscow's life and works. Idealism is strongly in the forefront of his mind, but it is moderated by a cognition of the practical which engenders in him an objectivity and detachment.

The spirit of the Enlightenment survived well into the nineteenth century, and today we continue to use the term, defining it in vaguely the same way as it was originally. Concerning Liscow, one can recognize a spiritual-intellectual kinship between him and other important figures who

came after him, whose irony was also marked by the product of a peculiar amalgam of idealism and realism.

Even his friendship with Friedrich Hagedorn tells us something. Hagedorn's tales and fables, for example, reflect the spirit of the "Aufklärung" in the avoidance of dialect, foreign models, and the manner of expression associated with the Baroque period. He rejects ballast and over-ornamentation and intends language to serve reason, clarity, and nature. Beyond these demands he makes upon language, his tone--full of wit and irony--demonstrates a distancing which allows satirical exposure of the prejudices and foolishness of the citizens of Hamburg. Hagedorn is careful to provide his figures with proper motivation and credibility; he strives for a greater realism which contrasts with, say, Gellert's Fabeln und Erzählungen, in which remonstrance is more gentle perhaps, but the whole of it is also more moralizing, more thoroughly idealistic. In this Gellert is akin to Rabener. But Hagedorn's tone is more objective, more like that of the ironist, and he is less inclined toward portrayal of "Lastertypen."

Adherence to the ideals of Enlightenment as well as an emergent realism is discernible also in Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, who was directly influenced by Liscow.[207] This is especially evident in his early satire, Timorus (1770),[208] where his irony is produced by using a persona who steps forward to defend two proselytizers. It is after Liscow's model an ironic encomium. There are also

some parallels in the personal circumstances of Liscow and Lichtenberg which reveal some things about their attitudes; for example, both were sons of Protestant ministers who rejected their theological roots; both considered themselves outsiders; both were influenced by Swift's satires. Like Liscow, Lichtenberg also attacked what he believed were offenses against enlightened principles; in Lichtenberg's case these are Lavater's physiognomy, "Empfindsamkeit," "Sturm und Drang," mysticism, superstition and religious intolerance. He ironizes these things in a witty, realistic manner, in which the moralizing tendenz is muted, and like Liscow, he came to feel that there was really no purpose to satire, as sharp as it was, that no real changes or improvements could be expected as a result of his mockery. Lichtenberg is even more sceptical than Liscow; the idealism of "Aufklärung" is diminished to a further degree in him. His satire sometimes assumes gloomy, pessimistic tones, and even indicates a psychological interest well in advance of the coming Romantic period.

Although the life and works of Christoph Martin Wieland are immeasurably broader and more imposing than Liscow's, the two men share an intellectual orientation which describes a lineage in the development of an irony which continued to meld the fundamental impetus of Enlightenment ideals with an increasing realism. In this Wieland seems epitomical. His early "Schwärmerei" probably makes the realism of his mature years even more pronounced. Wieland's

satirical novel in the style of Don Quixote, Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei oder die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva (1764), further defines and refines the relationship of satire and irony as an idealistic-realistic response during this period of moving away from the Enlightenment. Here his detachment is both a superiority and a self-ironizing as he describes the victory of reality over emotionalism. He was also working on Agathon at this time, and between these two works Wieland establishes a new ironic tone which is present in his writings from then on. It is a satiric, elegantly witty, relaxed, sometimes even kindly and gracious irony (as in Musarion), which apparently reflects the influence upon Wieland of Socratic irony.[209] It is still the idealist-realist intellectual irony of the "Aufklärung," however and does not share with the later Romantics the ironical viewpoint that emanates from inner conflict. It continues to be a socially oriented, satirical irony which functions to expose hypocrisy, sophistry, and "Schwärmerei."[210] Beyond the implications of what has just been mentioned, one can note that Wieland admired Liscow even before his Zurich period, and a proximity of their styles can be seen in Wieland's Schreiben eines Junkers vom Lande.[211]

It has been our intention so far to indicate that Liscow's manner of irony--departing as it does from a purer, more optimistic idealism--reflects an admixture of two competing, and basically inharmonious, intellectual

dispositions: idealism and realism. The idealistic urge is often exhibited in the satirist's desire to expose, ridicule, and correct human failings which violate, usually, a moral norm. In the Early Enlightenment that norm was imprecisely conceived because of fundamental errors in its premises which were not clearly delineated until Kant wrote his essays on reason toward the end of the century. Liscow and others perceived the fallacies and delusions of their time and mocked them. On the other hand they also cherished and preserved what they deemed real and true. They reacted to the facade of enlightenment by assuming a greater distance and objectivity, and this is an evident force in their use of irony.

Wieland is, we believe, the last representative of this idealistic-realistic irony which often serves satire. It is a type of irony that is eventually overcome by Romantic irony, but the two modes are concurrent for some time in the nineteenth century. Franz Grillparzer, for example, entered in his diary in 1817: "Die wirksamste Gattung der Ironie ist wohl die, wenn der Satiriker das Absurdum, das aus seinen Sätzen fliesst, nicht selbst ausspricht, sondern nur durch eine Reihe von Folgerungen dahin leitet, es selbst auszusprechen aber dem Leser überlässt. Liskov war hierin der grösste Meister."[212] Aside from the favorable opinion of Liscow, the remark of Grillparzer reveals that in the first decades of the nineteenth century irony and satire were still regarded as complementary; but it also

shows that a certain refinement of irony is expected whenever it is used, most especially that it be objective expression.

It is probable that in the complexity of Jean Paul's humor the transition from an older to a newer modern irony is harbored. Early in his writing career Jean Paul expressed his approval of Liscow's irony when he wrote: "Liskov ist ein herlicher Satiriker, er übertrift Rabnern und erreicht Swiften; von ihm hab' ich eine bessere Ironie gelernt, die ich meinen gedrukten und meinen schon abgeschriebnen Sachen geben zu können gewünscht hätte."[213] Thus there was some intellectual affinity between Liscow and Jean Paul, but in Jean Paul aspects of wit and irony become increasingly stronger, while his satire is seen to lose its sting. In him the didactic, moralizing tendency recedes and runs out. His attention becomes directed toward a deeper penetration of the duality of idealism and realism,[214] which makes him the pivotal figure between an older and a newer "Denkweise."

Of course the satiric impulse continued, but satire itself is dependent upon adherence to commonly felt norms which in the nineteenth century are no longer so clear nor generally extant. Where the "Aufklärung" provided a tangible ideal of the "Weltbürger," of "Tugend," "Vernunft," and "Verstand," the dynamism of these lofty ideals was gradually lost as the realities of life intruded. One thinks of the eventual assimilation of Kant's momentous

essays, of the succession of wars during the reign of Friedrich II, of the French Revolution, and of the Napoleonic Wars which culminated in the egregiously disappointing edicts of the Congress of Vienna. Instead of a literature whose impetus in the eighteenth century was either idealistic or idealistic-realistic, in the period of Early Romanticism it seems that a reversed juxtapositioning of these forces takes place. Instead of the ideal seeking the real, the real seeks, or yearns for, the ideal.

In the terminology we have been using here it would be accurate to apply the designation "realist-idealist" to characterize the modified "Denkweise" of the "Früh-Romantik." This would also describe the impulse for what we established in chapter one as "modern" irony. We indicated there as well that the ironic attitudes theorized by Friedrich Schlegel are substantially those that obtain in the works of Thomas Mann and to a lesser degree also in the writings of Robert Musil.

The nineteenth century came to be dominated by a diffusive realism, at first as realism seeking the ideal, later as "poetic" realism, finally as stark realism or "naturalism." During this time the important differences between satire and "modern" irony become set. The Romantics had little interest in Enlightenment satire and its corrective irony, and even disparaged Swift. Needless to say Liscow's irony made little appeal either. Irony became philosophical and an all-encompassing "Weltanschauung."

The middle of the nineteenth century marks a significant turning point in German satire. After 1848 all revolutionary pressures were effectively put down. Instead of individualism the image of the state and nationhood became prevalent. The idealism of "Aufklärung" was sufficiently extinguished so that satire did not seem an appropriate response to the spirit of the times, and there was practically no satire written in the last half of the nineteenth century—it no longer had a raison d'etre.

There was something of a revival of satire at the turn of the century with Heinrich Mann, Karl Kraus, Carl Sternheim, and Franz Blei, and a satirical style has been evident in magazines and newspapers, and in "Kabarett" performances. And since 1945 satirical elements are apparent in the writings of, for example, Heinrich Böll, Reinhard Lettau, and Günter Grass. But one is prone to talk about satirical elements or a satirical style today, because there does not seem to be evidence of satire within the historical traditions. Satire seems disoriented. This is probably so, because there is no certainty about enlightenment and norms. Therefore some observers question that traditional satire is even possible. An interesting side to all this is the notion advanced by Marxist literary critics that a "new" satire has been developing in communist countries. Presumably the communist ideology provides the new norm, and satire would serve the state as a kind of "socialist idealism."

The quintessence of satire lies in three factors: (1) it is aggressive in its ridicule (2) it is tendentious, having for its purpose to correct or improve as measured against some kind of norm (3) it possesses aesthetic quality. As such, irony may or may not be used in satire, just as parody, grotesquery, and obscenity may or may not be a part of the satire. If irony is used in satire, however, then it is an irony which is subservient to satire and is related to eighteenth century irony. But we believe that "modern" irony and traditional satire are mutually exclusive. "Modern" irony could not simply be a device in satire, because the two are no longer compatible literary modes. The modern ironist is often gentle in his ridicule and often chides himself; he acknowledges no norms or absolutes, but rather sees two or more sides to everything. Although satire may appear as an element in the works of the ironist, the fundamental spirit of the modern ironist is alienated from that of the satirist.

Christian Ludwig Liscow was both a satirist and an ironist, because he stood on the edge of changes which saw a gradual drawing apart of two different perceptions of truth and life. He is one of a progression of figures whose writings reflect the diminishing idealism of satire and the enhanced realism of irony. Thus Liscow bears an important place in this significant segment of German literary history.

# FOOTNOTES

## FOOTNOTES

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[5]The Compass of Irony (London: Methuen, 1969), p. 10.

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[7](Munich: Carl Hanser, 1964), p. 200.

[8]Lazarowicz, p. ix.

[9]Muecke, p. 7.

[10]Satirischer Stil. Zur Satire Robert Musils im Mann ohne Eigenschaften in Abhandlungen zur Kunst- Musik- und Literaturwissenschaft (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1960), IX, 3.

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[17]Knox, pp. 9-10.

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[22]Ibid., p. 120.

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[24]Beda Allemann, Ironie und Dichtung, 2nd. ed. (Stuttgart: Verlag Günther Neske, 1969), p. 16.

[25]Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[26]Muecke, p. 94.

[27]Lyceums Fragment 108, cited by Allemann, Ironie und Dichtung, pp. 70-71.

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[30]Hans Eichner, ed., Literary Notebooks, 1797-1801 (London, 1957), p. 1068, cited by Allemann, Ironie und Dichtung, p. 60.

[31]August Wilhelm Schlegel and Friedrich Schlegel, eds., Athenaeum 1798-1800, 3 vols. (1800; rpt. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1960), III, 16.

[32]Ibid., I, 334.

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[34]Muecke, pp. 185-86.

[35]Gesammelte Werke, 12 vols. (Oldenburg: S. Fischer Verlag, 1960), XII, 571.

[36]Ibid., IX, 170-71.

[37]Ibid., XI, 613.

[38]Weigand, p. 86.

[39]Ed., Adolf Frisé (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1952), p. 236.

[40]Ibid., pp. 311-12.

[41]Ibid., p. 201.

[42]For further discussion of this see Burton Pike's Robert Musil: An Introduction to His Work (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 161-62.

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[44]Mann, IX, 229.

[45]Pike, p. 151.

[46]Musil, Tagebücher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden, ed. Adolf Frisé (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1955), p. 1645.

[47]Ibid.

[48]See further discussion of this in Allemann, Ironie und Dichtung, p. 183.

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[51]Mann, XII, 568.

[52]Allemann, Ironie und Dichtung, pp. 186-87.

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[54]Ibid.

[55]Epigramme, ed. Rudolf Pechel, vol. 71 (Berlin, 1909), cited by Paul Böckmann, Formgeschichte der deutschen Dichtung, 3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1967), pp. 493-94.

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[58]Gottsched, VI, part 2, 170.

[59]Johann Joachim Eschenburg, Entwurf einer Theorie und Literatur der schönen Wissenschaften (Berlin: 1783), p. 81, cited by Wellmanns, p. 51.

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[61]Ibid., p. 54.

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[63]Arntzen, p. 37.

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[65]Arntzen, p. 37.

[66]The quotes within the quote are from Musil's Tagebücher, Aphorismen, Essays und Reden, p. 260.

[67]Arntzen, p. 37.

[68]Ibid., p. 3.

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[71]Ibid., pp. 273-74.

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[73]Muecke, p. 244.

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[76]Ibid., pp. 147-48.

[77](Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1957), pp. 11-13.

[78]Christian Ludwig Liscow, Ein Beitrag zur Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, nach Liscows Papieren in Kursächsischen Hauptstaatsarchive und anderen Mittheilungen (Dresden and Leipzig, 1844).

[79]Christian Ludwig Liscows Leben nach den Acten des grossherzoglich-meklenburgischen Geheimen und Haupt Archivs und andern Originalquellen. Aus den Jahrbüchern des Vereins für meklenburgische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde besonders abgedruckt. (Schwerin: In Commission der Stiller'schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1845).

[80]Ueber Christian Ludwig Liscows Leben und Schriften: Eine Gelegenheitsschrift (Lübeck, 1846).

[81](Hamburg and Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss, 1883).

[82]A minor addition was Karl Schröder's correction of Liscow's birthdate and his immatriculation date in Rostock each of which had been in error by a few days. See his article, "Zu Christian Ludwig Liscows Jugend," in Euphorion vol. 13 (1906), pp. 556-57.

[83]Carl Müchler, ed., Christian Ludwig Liscov: Schriften, 3 vols. (1806; rpt. Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1972), I, iii. Citations from Liscow's writings will refer exclusively to the Müchler edition, since this edition is now so much more accessible than the original collection of 1739. References to the Müchler edition in the remainder of our text will appear in parentheses with volume and page number. When the source is the Vorrede to the original edition that will be so noted.

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[87]Goethe, VII, 260.

[88]Vortrefflichkeit und Nohtwendigkeit der elenden Scribenten und andere Schriften, by Christian Ludwig Liscow (Frankfurt: Sammlung Insel, 1968), p. 8.

[89]Lazarowicz, p. 42.

[90]Goethe, VII, 260.

[91]See Heinrich Vormweg, ed., Hieb und Stich: Deutsche Satire in 300 Jahren (Cologne: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1968), p. 472.

[92]Jurgen Jacobs, "Zur Satire der frühen Aufklärung: Rabener und Liscow," in Germanisch-Romantische Monatschrift, Neue Folge, 18, No. 1 (1968), p. 12.

[93]Ibid., p. 12.

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[95]Lazarowicz, p. 2.

[96]Gottlieb Wilhelm Rabener, Sämmtliche Schriften, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1777), I, 93, cited by Lazarowicz.

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[98]Ibid., I, 102-5.

[99]C. F. Weisse, ed., G. W. Rabeners Briefe (Leipzig, 1772), p. 257, cited by Lazarowicz.

[100]Rabener, Sämmtliche Schriften, II, 31.

[101]Lazarowicz, p. 114.

[102]Ibid., pp. 114-15.

[103]Ibid., footnote no. 45, p. 114.

[104]Geschichte der deutschen Literatur von den Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Vienna and Leipzig, 1908), I, 266.

[105]From the Vorrede to Gottleib Wilhelm Rabener's Satirische Schriften, IV, 1755, cited by Manthey, p. 13.

[106]Gero von Wilpert, Sachwörterbuch der Literatur, 4th ed. (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1964), p. 439.

[107]Hettner, I, 265.

[108]Helmut de Boor and Richard Newald, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 5 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1960), p. 452.

[109]"Moral Weeklies and the Reading Public in Germany, 1711-1750," in Oxford German Studies, ed. P. F. Ganz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 69.

[110]Ibid., p. 70.

[111]Ibid., p. 86.

[112]Litzmann, pp. 108-9.

[113]Cited by Litzmann, pp. 109-10.

[114]Ibid., p. 110.

[115]Jacobs, p. 13.

[116]Lisch, p. 27.

[117]Friedrich Griese, "Der mecklenburgische Satiriker Christian Ludwig Liscow, 1701-1760," in Das Carolinum, 27, No. 34, part IV (1961), p. 68.

[118]Ibid. See also Manthey, p. 10.

[119]Litzmann, pp. 73-74.

[120]Ibid.

[121]Manthey, p. 11.

[122]Engel I, 266.

[123]See the letter from Liscow to Gottsched dated 28 January 1735 in Theodor Wilhelm Danzel, Gottsched und seine Zeit (1848; rpt. Hildesheim & New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), p. 235.

[124]Manthey, p. 38.

[125]J. J. Bodmer, Preface to Breitinger's "Critische Dichtkunst," (Zurich, 1740), cited by Manthey, p. 202.

[126]Litzmann, p. 38. See also Manthey, p. 39.

[127]Karl Bartsch, reviser, August Koberstein's Grundriss der Geschichte der deutschen Nationalliteratur, 5th ed., 5 vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von F. C. W. Vogel, 1873), III,279.

[128]Ibid.

[129]Cited by Litzmann, p. 141.

[130]Cited by Helbig, pp. 72-73.

[131]Helbig, p. 73.

[132]Helbig, p. 74.

[133]Griese, p. 71

[134]Gesammelte Schriften und Schicksale, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1839), p. 127. Cited by Manthey.

[135]Litzmann, p. 34.

[136]Lazarowicz, p. 34.

[137]Jacobs, p. 8.

[138]Gotthold Lessing, Gesammelte Werke, p. 434, cited by Manthey, p. 7.

[139]Full title: Vitrea Fracta, oder des Ritters Robert Clifton Schreiben an einen gelehrten Samojeden, betreffend die seltsamen und nachdenklichen Figuren, welche derselbe den 13. Januar st. u. 1732 auf einer gefrornen Fensterscheibe wahrgenommen. Aus dem Englishen ins Deutsche übersetzet (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1732) In: Mächler I, 173-234.

[140]Manthey, p. 30.

[141]Mächler, I, xxiii.

[142]Ibid.

[143]Ibid, II, 160.

[144]Ibid.

[145]Ibid., pp. 161-63.

[146]Ibid., p. 164.

[147]Liscow consistently misspells Sivers' name with ie (i.e. Sievers).

[148]Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1739.

[149]Mächler, Vorrede, I, 301.

[150]Mächler, Anmerkungen, I, 314.

[151]Ibid.

[152]Ibid.

[153]Full title: Klägliche Geschichte von der jämmerlichen Zerstöhrung der Stadt Jerusalem; mit kurzen, aber dabey deutlichen und erbaulichen, Anmerkungen, nach dem Geschmacke des (S. T.) Herrn M. Heinrich Jacob Sievers, erlautert, und als eine Zugabe zu dessen Anmerkungen über die Passion ans Licht gestellet von X. Y. Z. Rev. Minist. Cand.

[154]Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (Leipzig, 1875-1912), XXXIV, 434.

[155]Accounts of the disposition of Sivers' treatise differ. Tronskaya says Sivers sent the engraving and letter to the Academy of Sciences in Berlin. Maria Tronskaya, Die deutsche Prosasatire der Aufklärung (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1969), p. 33. Manthey says the letter was dedicated ("gewidmet") to the Academy, p. 20. Liscow does not name the "unterschiedene berühmte Männer" he referred to.

[156]Lessing used this phrase in his "Ehemalige Fenstergemälde im Kloster Hirschau" which begins with those words. See Litzmann, p. 46.

[157]Litzmann, p. 46.

[158]Manthey, p. 29.

[159]In 1731 Don Carlos inherited Parma and Piacenza upon the death of the last Farnese, his uncle. This played a role in the Treaty of Vienna (1738). In 1730 there was a revolt in Corsica against Genoese rule. The ensuing struggle was not resolved until 1768. The reference to the Pretender may be to James III in connection with "The Fifteen" in Scotland in 1716 or it may be an entirely fictitious reference.

[160]Full title: Der sich selbst entdeckende X. Y. Z., oder L-c-s H-rm-n B-ckm-st-rs, Rev. Minist. Candidati, aufrichtige Anzeige der Ursachen, die ihn bewogen, die Geschichte von der Zerstöhrung der Stadt Jerusalem mit kurzen Anmerkungen zu erläutern, und diese Anmerkungen unter einem falschen Namen ans Licht zu stellen, zur Beruhigung und zum Trost des (S. T.) Herrn Magister Sievers, imgleichen zur Rettung der Unschuld seiner Absichten wider allerhand ungleiche Urtheile und Deutungen zum Drucke befordert (Leipzig, 1733).

[161]Gottsched to Philippi, 9 October 1731, in a letter appended to Philippi's Cicero, ein grosser Wind-Beutel, Rabulist und Charletan, (Halle, 1735), cited by Litzmann, p. 51.

[162]Ibid.

[163]Ibid.

[164]Full title: Sechs deutsche Reden über allerhand auserlesene Fälle nach den Regeln einer natürlichen, männlichen, und heroischen Beredsamkeit (Leipzig, 1932).

[165]Full title: Der eröfnete Tempel der Ehren und Vorschung und die im Pallaste der Glückseeligkeit abgelegte Wünsche vor dem höchst beglückten Antritt des Hohen 63ten Stufen-Jahres Ihro Königl. Maj. in Pohlen und Chur-Fürstl. Durchl. zu Sachsen, Friedrichs Augusti des Grossen (Halle, 1732).

Deutungen zum Drucke befördert (Leipzig, 1733).

[166]Full title: Briontes der Jüngere, oder Lobrede auf den Hochedelgebohrnen und Hochgelahrten Herrn, Hrn. D. Johann Ernst Philippi, öffentlichen Professor der deutschen Beredsamkeit auf der Universität Halle, wie auch Chursächsischen immatriculierten Advocaten etc., etc., nach den Regeln einer natürlichen, männlichen und heroischen Beredsamkeit, gehalten in der Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister, in Deutschland, von einem unwürdigen Mitgliede dieser zahlreichen Gesellschaft. 1732.

[167]Litzmann, pp. 58-59.

[168]We leave this phrase untranslated because the German makes verbal associations possible that English cannot.

[169]Litzmann, p. 59.

[170]Lazarowicz, p. 47.

[171]See Albert Leitzmann, "Liscows Zitate," in Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie, eds. Hugo Gering and Friedrich Kauffmann, 50 vols. (Stuttgart, 1926), p. 91.

[172]Litzmann, p. 63.

[173]Ibid., p. 75.

[174]Karl Goedeke, Grundriss zur Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung, vol. 4 (Dresden, 1891), Book VI, p. 23.

[175]Leipzig, 1733.

[176]Bodmer, cited by Manthey, p. 202.

[177]Leitzmann, p. 91.

[178]Litzmann, p. 80.

[179]Ibid., p. 73.

[180]Full title: Cicero, Ein grosser Wind-Beutel, Rabulist, und Charletan: Zur Probe aus Dessen Übersetzter Schutz-Rede, Die er Vor den Quintius gegen den Nervius (lies Nævius) gehalten, Klar erwiesen. Samt einem doppelten Anhange, 1. Der gleichen Brüder, gleicher Kappen, 2. Von acht Vertheidigungs-Schrifften gegen eben so viel Chartequen (Halle, 1735) 536 S.

[181]Chronologically there is an intervening episode involving a love poem which Philippi, as a university student, wrote to one Frau von Ziegler. "Gewisse Leute" somehow got hold of it, sent it to Liscow who in turn provided it with a very brief Vorrede. Liscow returned it to his friends who had it printed. Philippi was understandably outraged over



this. We would note here that Liscow clearly violated his own dictum on the limits of satire by taking part in such an unethical act.

[182]Full title: Stand- oder Antrittsrede, welche der (S. T.) Herr D. Johann Ernst Philippi, öffentlicher Professor der deutschen Wohlredenheit zu Halle, den 21sten December 1732. in der Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister gehalten, samt der Ihm darauf, im Namen der ganzen löblichen Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister, von dem (S. T.) Herrn B.G.R.S.F.M. als Aeltesten der Gesellschaft, gewordenen höflichen Antwort. Auf Befehl und Kosten der Gesellschaft der kleinen Geister zum Drucke befordert. 1733.

[183]Litzmann, p. 64.

[184]Ibid.

[185]Lazarowicz, p. 49.

[186]Manthey, pp. 30-31.

[187]Litzmann, p. 68.

[188]Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[189]Merseburg, 1734.

[190]Litzmann, pp. 90-91.

[191]Full title: Bescheidene Beantwortung der Einwürfe, welche einige Freunde des Herrn D. Johann Ernst Philippi, weiland wohlverdienten Professors der deutschen Wohlredenheit zu Halle, wider die Nachricht von Dessen Tode gemacht haben. Tasso. Andava combattendo ed era morto. (Halle, 1735).

[192]Litzmann, p. 93.

[193]Cited by Litzmann, p. 94.

[194]Ibid.

[195]Ibid., pp. 94-95.

[196]Ibid., p. 94.

[197]Leitzmann, p. 91.

[198]Ferdinand Josef Schneider, Die deutsche Dichtung der Aufklärungszeit, 2nd. ed. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler), p. 62.

[199]Lazarowicz, p. 71.

[200]Ibid., p. 68.

[201]Ibid., p. 59.

[202]Full title: Anmerkungen in Form eines Briefes über den Abriss eines neuen Rechts der Natur, welchen der (S. T.) Herr Professor Manzel zu Rostock in einer kleinen Schrift, die den Titel führet: Primae Lineae Juris Naturae vere talis secundum sanae rationis principia ductae, der Welt mitgetheilet hat (Kiel, 1735).

[203]Litzmann, p. 14.

[204]See Leitzmann, p. 90 and Arnold Schirokauer, "Zur Datierung der Liscowschen Schrift 'Anmerkungen in Form eines Briefes,'" in Euphorion, 22 (1915), p. 667.

[205]"Christian Ludwig Liscow: The First German Swift," in Lessing Yearbook, IV (Munich: Max Hueber, 1972), p. 142.

[206]Ibid., p. 146.

[207]J. P. Stern, Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasion Reconstructed from his Aphroisms and Reflections (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1959), p. 140. And, Tronskaya, p. 264.

[208]See discussion in Lararowicz, pp. 191-96.

[209]Georg Kurt Weissenborn, Wielands Ironie, Diss. Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1970 (on microfilm, National Library of Canada, No. 6958), p. 277.

[210]Ibid., p. 275.

[211]Friedrich Sengle, Wieland (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1949), p. 63.

[212]Franz Grillparzer, Sämtliche Werke, Ausgewählte Briefe, Gespräche, Berichte, eds. Peter Frank and Karl Pörnbacher (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1964), p. 755.

[213]Cited by Engel, p. 25.

[214]See discussion in Engel, pp. 25-30.

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