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ABSTRACT

DEVELOPMENT AND DISCONTENT: A STUDY
OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN THE
NYERI DISTRICT OF KENYA

By

Ronald Ralph Stockton

The central concern of this study is with the impact of economic and social development upon levels of political discontent. Relying primarily upon the writings of Gurr, Deutsch, Lerner, and Lipset, the work evolves a central proposition: the process of social mobilization consists of two distinct dimensions, called here Perceptual Mobilization and Economic Mobilization. The first of these increases an individual's awareness of comparative standards and hence his level of discontent; the second increases his economic capacity, therefore his satisfaction.

Indices developed to measure each of these dimensions were juxtaposed against each other, producing four distinct patterns of mobilization: mobilization on both dimensions, mobilization on neither dimension, mobilization on one dimension but not the other. The four types of individuals specified by this typology were found to be significantly different in terms of attitudes, characteristics and behavior patterns.

The study has three main hypotheses; the first of these deals with perceived deprivation and political discontent. Basically it holds that persons who are Perceptually Mobilized but not Economically Mobilized will exhibit higher discontent levels than any other group in society. This hypothesis is proven true.

The second hypothesis deals with participation levels. It suggests that persons high on Economic Mobilization will participate in organizations which look after existing interests, while persons high on Perceptual Mobilization will participate in organizations or activities which are concerned with redistribution of existing resources or else the development of new resources. These expectations are shown to be true.

The third hypothesis concerns the process whereby attitudinal discontent is transformed into political preferences. It holds that people who are low on Economic Mobilization (i.e., poorer than average) but high on Perceptual Mobilization (i.e., with probable high expectations) will favor radical redistribution policies, such as the confiscation of property of foreign minorities. This hypothesis is not supported. The results are the opposite of the prediction. Two explanations are given for this.

A. The expected radicals are highly integrated into the political system in terms of participation, leadership, and supportive attitudes.

B. It is suggested that a discontented person will only pursue radical policies if he sees no alternative to his present



condition in the existing opportunity structure. If he believes the present system offers him an opportunity to overcome his deprivation he will adhere to it with greater enthusiasm than a person better favored than he. When controls for an "optimism about advancement and improvement opportunity" index are added, one finds that these expectations hold true. Those potential radicals who feel they are likely to improve in the future emerge as the most conservative of all groups in society; those who feel they have no opportunity to advance in the future behave in the predicted "radical" manner.

The data used consist of 436 interviews with a scientifically drawn sample of Nyeri Kikuyu farmers; there are also 98 supplementary interviews conducted in two nearby settlement schemes. All interviewing was done between December 1970 and April 1971.

In addition to chapters on theoretical issues and data analysis, there are sections on Nyeri's socio-political development during the 20th century, on the characteristics of the four developmental types, and on the political value system of the district as revealed by the data. Three appendices describe the survey, the survey instrument, and the indices used in the study.

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DEVELOPMENT AND DISCONTENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN THE NYERI DISTRICT OF KENYA

By

Ronald Ralph Stockton

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

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1973

G 30447

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RONALD RALPH STOCKTON

1973

PREFACE

Every scholar begins a research project with a set of goals. Basically I have two, one relating to my personal interests, one more scientific in nature.

Personally, I have a long-standing interest in Kenya due to my residence there for a period of over three years, first as a teacher under the Teachers for East Africa project from 1964-1966, and second as a researcher during 1970 and 1971. This firsthand contact with Kenya produced in me a desire to understand the country and its political system. Enhancing this understanding would be a personally satisfying achievement in itself even if nothing else were accomplished in this study.

More important, however, from a scientific point of view (and to me as a social scientist) is my interest in the impact of socio-economic change upon discontent levels in society. I have observed in my own country as well as in Kenya the process whereby such "progress" seems to raise rather than lower the total amount of unhappiness found in society. Kenya is a country much subject to socio-economic change, since in the past 75 years it has undergone a major transformation. Before colonization by the British in the early years of this century Kenya (and Nyeri in particular) led a traditional rural peasant existence, largely isolated from outside forces. Today roads crisscross

the country, cities are dotted across the landscape, and people move freely from one section of the country to the other in search of jobs and education.

The impact of this transformation is much discussed. The Kenya government produces a seemingly endless supply of reports on joblessness, school dropouts, crime, poverty, landlessness, ill-health, and a host of other matters. Few of these studies, however, report on what individual Kenyans think. This is a problem which I hope to overcome here.

The data which I will report in Part Three were generated during the time period between December 1970 and April 1971. Basically it consists of 436 hour-long interviews with a scientifically-chosen sample of Nyeri farmers. Ninety-eight supplementary interviews from two nearby settlement schemes are also reported from time to time, but are always identified. Interviewing was done by trained, locally-born persons. The sample was drawn from the Nyeri Land Registry and is, I believe, representative of Nyeri farmers (details of the sample and possible biases in it are discussed in Appendix A). This study is unique for Kenya and has not to my knowledge been duplicated elsewhere in the country. It is my hope that it will shed light on an aspect of development too often overlooked in African research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several people deserve thanks for the help they lent to this project along the way. Paul Abramson served as chairman of the dissertation committee and always gave encouraging and time-saving advice. Norman Miller facilitated research clearance and gave other help. Leroy Ferguson, Robert Chambers, Robert Melson, John Collins, and William Baugh were also helpful at different stages of the work.

In Kenya several people were helpful. My friend, Ben Makau of Kagumo High School, gave me hospitality and invaluable assistance; William Mathenge gave advice and encouragement; Danson Kiunge and the Mundia family of Mungaria made me a guest in their house and helped add insight and empathy to my data deck; Father Camisasi shared his guest house and his time; Mugo Gachuhi provided me with a critical introduction.

Kenya officials and Nyeri people were always courteous. Special thanks should go to Mr. Mwai of the Nyeri District Land Registry, to Divisional Officer Martin Sika, to Community Development Officer Isaac Muthanga, to Chief Henry of Aguthi, and to Sub-Chiefs Titus and John of Aguthi.

Special thanks also go to the several people who served as research assistants or interviewers. Erastus Gichuki, Joe Muhoya, Lawrence Kanja Mwai, Washington Njoroge Ndirangu, and Rufus Muriithi

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knocked themselves out to do a good job, even when the going was rough; Michael Gatari and Bernard Githaiga were advisors as well as assistants; William Kimari and David Githaiga also were helpful.

Funding came from the Fulbright-Hays program (United States Department of Education) and the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities. The National Science Foundation subsidized the computer work.

A final word of thanks should go to my wife, Jane. By mutual agreement she typed not one single word of this text, but provided sound advice and expert editorial assistance, and was always there when I needed her.

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PART ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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PART ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Many social scientists have pointed out that economic development and modernization often produce undesirable side effects for society, resulting in congestion, inequalities, disruption, unmanageable problems and ultimate instability. The fundamental argument seems to be that change is inherently disruptive since it breaks down existing relationships, produces new problems and weakens the structures which contain and solve the existing ones. Even so heartily welcomed an innovation as high yield grains have, according to observers, compounded the problems of society rather than diminished them. Studies of violence, of disruption, of coups, of leftist voting, and of separatist movements all show a positive correlation with social mobilization.

In contrast to these findings other research has shown the exact opposite outcome. In particular when one turns away from aggregate data studies and moves towards studies based upon survey or other micro data analysis, the results are often somewhat different. Sociological studies in particular have pointed out the "functional" aspects of development. People do benefit from economic and social progress, and those who benefit are far more likely to constitute a stable element in society than an unstable one.

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The key concern of this work will be to examine the impact of social mobilization upon society. Before proceeding with this task, however, a point of clarification is needed regarding the use of such words as "functional" and "dysfunctional," which are more intended to be of heuristic than of empirical value. Obviously, unless one is talking of some specific measure to which he can apply the term (such as level of violence), it is nearly impossible to give a precise definition of "functional" as it applies to social systems. In addition, as will be argued later in chapter one, a given change can simultaneously produce contradictory effects upon a society. But in spite of these limitations such words can, if read with proper caution, be useful in relaying a sense of direction towards which a given process is moving, or can be used as code words to summarize the chief results of empirical research.[1] Moreover, within the context of this study (which concentrates upon discontent levels) such terms can have a more precise meaning, since anything which increases the level of satisfaction with the existing society will be considered functional while anything which decreases that level of satisfaction will be considered dysfunctional.

Chapters one and two will contain several matters related to these arguments. Chapter one is a survey of the basic literature in the field, concentrating upon two fundamental considerations: First, the arguments which scholars make for the essentially functional or dysfunctional aspects of modernization and, second, an examination of the concept of social mobilization and some of the problems involved



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CHAPTER 1

A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

In the last few years studies of social discontent have focused increasingly on the concept of relative deprivation as a cause or pre-condition of social disruption. Gurr,[2] the Feierabends and Nesvold,[3] Runciman,[4] Davies,[5] Johnson,[6] and Huntington[7] have all dealt with the subject. Since the central concern of this work is with patterns of discontent in a developing society, it might be useful to examine some of the literature on relative deprivation to see what direction it has taken and what conclusions it has reached, particularly insofar as its applicability to the research under discussion is concerned.

The term relative deprivation is fairly new.[8] Most scholars credit its first prominent usage to the authors of The American Soldier.[9] Its origin, of course, is older, dating to the concepts of frame of reference, reference groups, and role perceptions. Efforts to define the term vary, but seem to be in basic agreement on the central concept: relative deprivation exists when there is a discrepancy between what a person has and what he wants--or what he perceives that others in his situation have. Stouffer, for example, never actually defined the term, but instead introduced it in the

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following way: "Becoming a soldier meant to many men a very real deprivation. But the felt sacrifice was greater for some than for others, depending on their standards of comparison."[10] Gurr, who has done major research on the subject, has defined it as "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities."[11] Perhaps the best explanation, however, was offered by Runciman, who suggested the following:

> A is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X.[12]

The interesting aspect of relative deprivation is that it exists purely in the mind of the person affected. Real levels of deprivation may exist but are largely irrelevant to the concept. What is relevant is whether people believe themselves to be deprived, regardless of whether they actually are in objective terms. With regard to the political system relevant reality consists less of what is than of what is believed to be. The advantage of this approach is that it adds a degree of order to the often chaotic pattern of political behavior found in most societies. Numerous scholars have observed, often with disbelief, the manner in which obviously deprived people cling slavishly to the very institutions which seem to oversee and perpetuate their deprivation, while the loudest cries of injustice come from those who by comparison seem far too well off to be complaining about their plight.[13] As Runciman has said:

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> resentment to which they give rise? People's attitudes to social inequalities seldom correlate strictly with the facts of their own position. It might be thought plausible to assume that a person's feelings about the structure of his society should vary with his own location; whatever the system of stratification, should we not expect those at the top to be pleased with it and those at the bottom dissatisfied? But this is not what happens. Dissatisfaction with the system of privileges and rewards in a society is never felt in an even proportion to the degree of inequality to whith its various members are subject. Many people at the bottom of society are less resentful of the system, and many nearer to the top are more so, than their actual position appears to warrant.[14]

To understand why this is so one must look then not simply for the presence or absence of inequalities in a society but for the conditions which either make people aware of actual inequalities or else make them feel that such inequalities exist. Paradoxically, the very forces which may be at work within a society to eradicate existing inequities often bring in their wake an escalation of awareness of inequities greater than the movement towards amelioration. De Tocqueville, observing that the French Revolution had been most violent in those areas where improvement in the conditions of the poor was the greatest, despondently commented that "only consumate statecraft can enable a King to save his throne when after a long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improving the lot of his subjects."[15]

There is good reason to believe that within this ironic relationship between improvement and disaffection lies a key to understanding political conditions in the developing world. In particular we must focus upon those processes or conditions which facilitate interpersonal comparisons. It is in this ability to compare that one develops a sense of deprivation. If everyone lives in a small house, as Marx said, no one is unhappy about the disadvantages of small-house

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living. However, "let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little house to a hut."[16] Comparison--the ability to see differences--is the key to levels of discontent. To study such discontent we must pay attention not only to those economic aspects of modernization which heighten in real terms differences between the rich and the poor, but also to those aspects of modernization which increase the capacity to draw comparisons. It is to these matters that we will now turn.

Development and Needs

Much of the major research on relative deprivation has dealt with it at a systemic level, using aggregate data, so that the unit of analysis is the society rather than the individual. Such studies assume that the major causes of relative deprivation are structural, that is, resulting from changes in the society, such as changes in the economic system, in the opportunity structure, in population concentrations, or in educational patterns. Relative deprivation is then implied from what the Feierabends and Nesvold call "systemic frustration," that is, the imbalance between indicators of social capabilities (such as economic growth rates or Gross National Product) and indicators of social aspiration (such as education), when the latter are greater than the former. The results of these studies have been almost unanimous in relating the process of modernization to higher levels of systemic frustration and hence to a greater tendency toward political instability.[17]



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The reasons which scholars give for this increase in instability accompanying modernization often vary according to their orientation or approach. Deutsch, for example, argues that as people modernize (mobilize in his terms) their orientation shifts away from the traditional to the modern sector. This shift brings with it a host of problems that tax the capacity of the government, often at a fragile stage of development. In traditional or pre-modern societies the role of the government in the economic and social system is often small, consisting perhaps of occasional regulation or minor intervention to insure stability. Welfare, for example, is usually handled by family or community units which by and large regulate their own affairs with no reference to external groups or organizations.[18] Modernization breaks individuals away from these traditional structures, however, and shifts the burden of responsibility in the direction of their new orientations--toward the political center. Paralleling this shift of functions there is a change in the nature of demands upon the political system. New interests and groups come into being which have been previously unheard of. Labor unions, residential groups, the unemployed, the underpaid, the affluent consumers, the technocrats, and the bureaucrats all have their needs and aspirations. Competition for government resources increases at a far faster rate than do the resources themselves. In the words of Deutsch, people caught up in the process of modernization

> experience drastic changes in their needs. They may now come to need provisions for housing and employment, for social security against illness and old age, for medical care against the health

> hazards of their crowded new dwellings and places of work and the risk of accidents with unfamiliar machinery. They may need succor against the risks of cyclical or seasonal unemployment, against oppressive charges of rent or interest, and against sharp fluctuations in the prices of the main commodities which they must sell or buy. They need instruction for themselves and education for their children. They need, in short, a wide range and large amounts of new government services.[19]

Related to need patterns is another problem often overlooked by many scholars--the homogenization of wants and desires. In a stable society the resources which people desire to possess, or the jobs they wish to hold, or the life styles to which they aspire are usually diverse, so that the conflicts resulting from several people wanting the same thing are limited in number and scope. People aspire to the farm which their father had, or to the job which their station in life addresses them. Aspirations are diversified, decentralized, and relatively stable. In some cases they are even formalized through the institutions of castes or guilds, so that conflict is legally impossible.

But compare this with what happens when economic opportunity becomes widespread, and the economic differential between the traditional and the modern systems becomes obvious. The attractiveness of the modern sector is so great, the number of people attracted so large, and the probability of successfully changing stations so plausible, that intense competition for relatively few resources occurs. The homogenization of society, to which many people look for the ultimate <u>reduction</u> of conflict among social groups, instead has the opposite effect of <u>increasing</u> it. As Melson and Wolpe have said in their very perceptive article on communalism,



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> the orientation of the mobilized to a common set of rewards and paths to rewards means, in effect, that many people come to desire precisely the same things. Men enter into conflict not because they are different but because they are essentially the same. It is by making men "more alike," in the sense of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote conflict.[20]

That such a homogenization will almost inevitably occur is obvious when one examines the disparities of wealth which exist between classes in modern as compared with traditional societies. In a traditional or perhaps rural society there are often leveling factors which reduce inequalities by providing a sort of social minimum below which no man is allowed to fall.[21] In a society undergoing economic transformation, however, the compensatory mechanisms which serve to alleviate inequalities (unions, welfare provisions, progressive taxation, subsidies, development programs) may be inadequate or unheard of. The great disparity of wealth, which often occurs when a modern sector emerges in the midst of a non-modern economy, creates extreme and potentially disruptive discrepancies of incomes, not only between modern and non-modern elements of the economy but also within the modern sector itself.[23]

These discrepancies, both real and perceived, create groups of people who are unhappy, for one reason or the other, with the distribution of rewards and benefits within the system. An examination of system-level indicators can permit us to establish with some accuracy the fact that modernization creates potentially destabilizing conditions in society. To better understand the process by which this occurs, however, we must turn to the individual and his response to modernization. In particular since aspirations and expectations are

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matters of individual perception, it seems far more profitable to leave behind systemic changes and to look instead at the way in which certain types of systemic changes affect individual perceptions of those changes. No individual exists in a vacuum. Each person is surrounded by institutions, forces, and events which are more powerful than he and which are largely beyond his control. His reality consists not so much in the true nature of these institutions, forces, and events but rather in his perception of them. This perception is influenced by such factors as his position in the structure, his access to information, and the behavior of his peers.[24] If we are to understand the reality we must understand the forces which shape the individual's perception of it.

Development as Perception

Perhaps one of the most valuable approaches to this problem is that of Daniel Lerner, whose interest is focused almost entirely upon changes in perceptual orientations, or upon what he refers to as "wants." His concern is not so much with the impact of escalating needs on system response capacities but more with why those needs and wants come into being in the first place.

Lerner's concern is focused on the mass media and the "awareness" which people have of non-traditional modes of acting and living, in other words with knowledge of "choice."[25] This awareness has led to what is commonly called the revolution of rising expectations, or, when those expectations are not met, to what Lerner calls "the

revolution of rising frustrations."[26] Lerner argues that the key dimension of modernization is an attitudinal one, that people respond to their wants and desires, which are in turn derived from their knowledge of what other people have.

Critical to this approach is the concept of what Lerner calls "empathy," defined essentially as "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation."[27] Lerner argues that in a static society where a person's station is largely fixed and where fundamental changes are uncommon, people have difficulty conceiving of themselves in different roles. The farmer is unlikely to become a tax collector, and the tax collector unlikely to become an advisor to the king. In contrast, in a changing soceity where movement of peoples is common and where the vehicles of mobility are open (for example, through a widespread modern educational system), it is possible and even likely that the son of a farmer will not follow in his father's footsteps but will someday live in a city among people far different from himself and in a job which his father would never dream of holding. Anticipating this change in their lives, people develop a "mobile sensibility" which enables them to "see the social future as manipulable rather than ordained and their personal prospects in terms of achievement rather than heritage."[28] They thus become subject to what a sociologist might call "anticipatory socialization,"[29] or what Joseph Schlesinger (in discussing the structure of opportunity in American politics) refers to as "ambition."[30]

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One key assumption of Lerner's theory is that the dysfunctional aspects of development occur not so much because people have changing needs to which they expect the government to respond, but rather because they have changing wants and desires. In effect, discontent derives not so much from objectively defined needs as from an awareness of comparative standards. One is discontented with what he has only when he is aware that other people have something different (and by implication better). A sense of deprivation grows out of exposure to non-local conditions, or an awareness of comparative standards. These new wants and desires lead in turn to participation and to the creation of organizations which promote and protect not just what one has but more important what one desires to have as well.

Lerner is so confident of the importance of exposure and awareness as instigators of change that he credits them with being the single most essential element in the process of modernization. He has suggested, for example, that if "developing societies-in-a-hurry" wish to make a headlong rush to modernization they should put an imbalanced emphasis on the mass media, which will "reach the most people fastest and cheapest" and by altering their "values" (wants and desires) plunge them directly into advanced stages of political participation.[31]

If Lerner is correct in these assumptions (and this writer believes he is), then it is essential that we focus our attention upon those aspects of society which promote comparison among persons. It should be within these forces that we find the dynamic for change as well as the dynamic for disruption. Chapter two will outline some

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proposals for doing this, and will suggest some characteristics of people who have been perceptually mobilized to different levels. Before doing that, however, it is essential to consider evidence that development is basically functional for society.

Development as a Stabilizing Force

By simple logic one could argue that the economic development associated with modernization reduces discontent through the alleviation of fundamental problems in society. Since many of those problems are problems of allocation, it is only logical that any improvement in the level of system resources increases total levels of satisfaction. Certainly this position is the one accepted by the governments of most developing countries, which often treat the word "development" as something of a totem. As Jomo Kenyatta once said when speaking of the role of economic development in Kenya and of its importance to the government:

> Achievement of sovereign status and the urge for reform must have a fundamental purpose, that is never set aside. This is to remove from our people the burden of poverty, and scourge of malnutrition and ill-health, the frustration of illiteracy, and the demoralizing lack of economic opportunity. Here is our motive, in all that we are working on now.[32]

Perhaps the most important scholar in the "development is functional" school is Seymour Martin Lipset. Many of the arguments supporting this point of view have appeared at one time or another in his writings, and though Lipset is often critized for over-simplification, his conclusions are usually backed up with extensive citations of supportive research.



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Probably the most well-read work in this vein is the article by Lipset on economic development and political legitimacy in which he summarized many of the major arguments related to this position. The central point of the essay is that economic development increases the capacity of the political system to meet the needs of the citizenry, which in turn increases the acceptability of the system, and over time produces high levels of legitimacy.[33] In his own words:

> The stability of a given democratic system depends not only upon the system's efficiency in modernization, but also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of the political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society. . . . Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. . . . Prolonged effectiveness of the system as a whole may . . . eventually legitimate the democratic political system.[34]

But economic capacity is not the only consideration. Other changes occur under conditions of economic development which contribute to a stable society. As early as the fifth century B.C. in his discussion of middle class government Aristotle pointed out the importance of such matters as relative class size for political stability. Where there is a big middle class, he argued, government is based upon people who "possess a moderate and adequate property" and "do not, like the poor, covet the goods of others; nor do others covet their possessions. . . ." As a result of this they "live in freedom from danger" and can be expected to behave in a responsible and competent manner, avoiding factional or divisive policies.[35]

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The wisdom of Aristotle has not been lost upon modern scholars, many of whom have used the same arguments and reached basically the same conclusions. There is a striking similarity, for example, between the "middle type" arguments which Aristotle put forth in The Politics and the "middle majority" argument put forth by Lipset and others in contemporary works.[36] Lipset, in fact, acknowledges his debt to Aristotle while expanding upon his ideas and developing additional hypotheses to substantiate the basic conclusion. These hypotheses--which form the backbone of the "development is functional" argument--can be summarized under five headings, each of which deserves some elaboration.

1. The first argument relates to the relative size of the various classes in society. Essentially this argument holds that if a middle class is desirable, then a large middle class is even more desirable. Economic growth will increase the number of wealthy people in society, thus changing the social pyramid (many people at the bottom, a few in the middle, and even fewer at the top) into a social diamond (a few poor, a few rich, but most in the center). This will produce a "middle majority" which will dominate the political system. Such a majority will avoid extremist policies (either of a confiscatory or reactionary nature) and will prove sensitive to the needs of society as a whole, rather than just to the needs of a selected group or class. Its policies will be moderate and progressive, and will produce maximum levels of acceptance and stability.[37]

2. Related to the "middle majority" argument is the belief that economic development will ultimately reduce the distance between



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classes and therefore reduce the intensity of conflict. This is perhaps one of the weakest arguments made by Lipset and other scholars of this school because of the overwhelming evidence that, in the short run at least, the result of economic modernization and growth is to increase rather than decrease economic differentiations.[38] What one could probably argue instead (as do several scholars who have conducted research on the subject) is that there exists a curvilinear relationship between levels of economic growth and the degree of economic distance between classes.[39] In traditional or modern economies the distance is minimal, but in a developing system distances (and hence the tendency to have conflict) are greatest. As Mancur Olson says:

> Economic growth increases the number of nouveaux riches, who may use their economic power to change the political and social order in their interest . . . economic growth may paradoxically also create a surprisingly large number of "nouveaux pauvres," who will be much more resentful of their poverty than those who have known nothing else.[40]

The outcome of this is that, while in the end economic development may reduce conflict among classes, in the short run it increases those conflicts.

3. Another point made by Lipset (as well as by others) is that economic development produces more moderate politics by increasing the complexity of societies. This complexity, which is characterized by role overlap and the multiplication of interests and orientations, leads to what is often called "cross-cutting cleavages."[41] The logic of this argument is that as individuals get more economic

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and social interests they are more likely on any given polarization to have conflicting interests or to be in conflict with people with whom they share positive ties. Increasing complexity, in other words, produces a type of conflict or competition (often referred to by political scientists as "non-zero sum") in which one's preferences are not totally maximized or totally minimized regardless of the outcome of a given confrontation. Even if one fails to achieve his most-preferred outcome, he has not completely "lost," since he may have had second or third order preferences which were promoted even while his first order preference was being defeated. This blurring of boundaries, according to many scholars, produces behavior of a more moderate type, hence reducing tensions within society.

This optimistic view unfortunately is challenged by several scholars. Melson and Wolpe, for example, argue that economic development in a multi-ethnic society inevitably produces coincidence between communal identity and economic interest, thus increasing the intensity of conflict.[42] Duverger, considering the same phenomenon in relationship to French political parties, contends that "overlapping cleavages" have so fragmented the society that it is impossible for the government to agree upon anything, thus producing instability.[43]

But, in spite of these criticisms, there is substantial evidence to support the hypothesis. Voting studies, to cite one case, have shown that in a polarized contest voters with diverse interests are far less likely to "polarize" than those voters whose interests are consistent in terms of the polarization. In the 1960 American



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presidential election, for example, Converse argues that religious and party identifications were inconsistent in enough cases to largely nullify the Catholicism of John Kennedy as an issue in the campaign.[44] Elsewhere, Runciman shows that cross-generational economic change (in terms of either upward or downward mobility) serves to reduce levels of class identification and hence class voting.[45] Melson, in his study of Nigerian workers, found that conflicting demands from communally-based and class-based parties led to patterned inconsistency in both voting and group identification.[46] These and other studies[47] thus lend credence to the proposition that economic development produces moderation through the multiplication of interests found in the society and their tendency to occur within one individual.

4. Somewhat related to this argument is the case which is often made for the structural manifestation of different interests, i.e., that economic development leads to increasing structural complexity which in turn increases the probability that extremist policies will be vetoed or moderated along the way by the action of organized interest groups who would be adversely affected by them.[48] This concept of countervailing powers is essential to pluralists such as DeTocqueville, Kornhauser, and Dahl, who argue that democracy (or accomodation) occurs between organizations rather than within them.[49] Certainly there is evidence that economic development brings into being new interests and organizations. Coleman showed this to be true in the case of Nigeria,[50] Rustow in the case of Turkey,[51] Weiner in the case of India,[52] to cite three examples. The questions about the evolution of such

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organizations and their effectiveness in moderating conflict are two: (1) Will such organizations be broadly based enough to represent all interests in society or will they simply represent better-off groups such as bureaucrats, technocrats, and employed workers? If the latter is the case, they could increase cleavages rather than reduce them.[53] (2) Will such organizations evolve soon enough to be effective or will the growth of problems far out-distance (in the early stages of development at least) the evolution of organizations which could attack and perhaps solve them?

As the reader will see in chapter six, the countervailing powers idea seems a very useful one in at least one instance in the analysis of the data. Before generalizing its applicability to the whole of the development process, however, one must consider the above limitations on its usefulness.

5. We have mentioned already the fact that mobile people tend to have lower class-identification levels than non-mobile people. In addition, those who are upwardly mobile are generally more conservative in their behavior. Whether this is because of psychological factors which aid mobility[54] or because the upwardly mobile person is better off than he was and is in a sense "grateful" to the system[55] is unclear. Be that as it may, the basic relationship between upward mobility and cautious conservative behavior seems clear.[56] There is again, however, contrary evidence. Lipset and Bendix conclude that upward mobility exacts a high cost from individuals "in terms of the combativeness, frustration, rootlessness and ills that are engendered"

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and discuss several studies to substantiate their conclusion.[57] Such problems emerge out of the fact that although upwardly mobile individuals enjoy "increased income, greater economic security, and higher education," they are simultaneously confronted with strange and unfamiliar situations which often leave them insecure and unstable.[58] To this extent, at least, there is little difference between upward and downward mobility since persons mobile in either direction are subject to the same disruptive forces. As Mancur Olson has said, "Both the gainers and the losers from economic growth can be destabilizing forces."[59]

Many of the negative effects of mobility are brushed aside, however, when one draws a distinction between changed position and perceived opportunity for improvement. Both are often the result of the same economic phenomenon, but the first involves actual changes while the second involves only attitudinal changes. This distinction is perhaps a valid one because most individuals do not themselves go from one class to another during their adult lifetime. Mobility is usually cross-generational rather than intra-generational. This means that a large percentage of the population can be subject to the stabilizing force of economic opportunity without being subject to the unfortunate side effects which it may produce. The Horatio Alger myth that hard work, perseverence and honesty are all one needs to become rich is often credited with containing discontent in America,[60] even though studies show that most people aspire to only moderate improvement in their lives and only a miniscule number hope for or



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expect any substantive change.[61] Thus the simple belief that one is able to advance through personal achievement (regardless of whether an individual expects to advance himself) may introduce into the system a sense of optimism which will have all the advantages of social mobility but none of the disadvantages.[62] If this belief is matched in actuality by visible though not necessarily drastic evidence of actual improvement (perhaps through moderate economic betterment), the individual's sense of satisfaction with the economic (and by implication political) system is likely to be high.[63]

It is easy to see from the above discussions that the problem is not a simple one and that the scholars of both schools of thought have assembled good arguments and supporting data for their points of view. The way out of this dilemma, however, is perhaps not as serious as it may seem. It will be the argument of this work that the "development and discontent" debate is largely the result of a failure to distinguish between different aspects of the development process. In particular it seems that the developmental process involves two distinct dimensions, one of which increases social discontent and one of which decreases it. Chapter two will offer a definition of development and will then specify what these two dimensions are, offering in the process a typology of developmental types.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

[1]James A. Gregor, "Political Science the the Use of Functional Analysis," American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 425-439.

[2]Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[3]I. K. Feierabend, R. L. Feierabend, and B. A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr, The History of Violence in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 632-667.

[4]W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[5]James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, The History of Violence in America, 690-730.

[6]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

[8]A good introduction to the concept and its origin is found in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957), 225-280.

[9]Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Volume I (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1949), 52 and 125.

[10] Ibid., 125.

[11] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 125.

[12] Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 13.

[13] Marx talks of the fact that some people have no "class consciousness." See Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx, Selected Works, Volume I (New York: International Publishers, 1933).



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[14] Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 3.

[15] Alexis DeTocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955), 177.

[16] Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in One Volume (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 84.

[17] See, for example, Feierabend et al., "Social Change and Political Violence," 666-667, and Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 47-59.

[18] Myers Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, 1940) discusses several of these systems.

[19] Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55 (September, 1961), 498.

[20] Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, 64 (December, 1970), 1114.

[21] This is discussed in Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 497.

[22] B. Guy Peters, "Economic and Political Effects on the Development of Social Expenditures in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 16, No. 3 (May, 1972), 225-238.

[23] Arrighi and Saul have discussed this in the East African context. See Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 6, No. 2 (1968).

[24] For discussions of ways in which information can be distorted and altered see Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1966); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965); and Angus Campbell and Henry Valen, "Party Identification in Norway and the United States," in Angus Campbel et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 245-268.

[25] See David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) for a discussion of "choice" as a component of political development.

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[27] Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), 50.

[28] Ibid., 48.

[29] This general matter is discussed by S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 227-259.

[30] Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[31] Lerner, "Communications and Prospects," 316.

[32] Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee! The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963-1964 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1964), 2-3.

[33] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 53 (March, 1959). For a psychological argument in the same vein using the concept of conditioning see Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 60 (September, 1966).

[34] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 86 and 91.

[35] The Politics of Aristotle. Ernest Barker, editor and translator (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 181-182.

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[37] For criticisms of this theory see any of the major anti-pluralist works. Two good examples are Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959); and Morris Janowitz and David R. Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," American Journal of Sociology, 72, No. 6 (May, 1967), 601-618.

[38] See, for example, U.S. Congress, The Green Revolution (Washington, D.C.: 1970).

[39] One writer who talks of this is Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

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[42] Melson and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism."

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[44] Phillip Converse, "Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election," in Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order, 96-124.

[45] Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, part three.

[46] Robert Melson, "Ideology and Inconsistency: The 'Cross-Pressured' Nigerian Worker," American Political Science Review, 65 (March, 1971).

[47] See Lipset, Political Man, 211-229, for a summary of these studies.

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[49] Alexis DeTocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1945); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1965); and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[50] James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

[51] Dankwart Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 107-136.

[52] Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[53] Arrighi and Saul argue that this is happening in Africa. See Arrighi and Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa."

[54] David McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: Van Nostrand, 1961).

[55] Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, 260-287.

[56] For wa
[57] Lipset
[58] Lipset,
[59] Olson,
[60] Lipset
[61] Runcima
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[63] Alan H.

[56] For ways in which upward caste mobility in India introduces self-imposed restrictions upon behavior, see Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 9-35, discusses the more general literature.

[57] Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, 285.

[58] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 83.

[59] Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," 217.

[60] Lipset and Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society, 81; and Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 26.

[61] Runciman discusses several pieces of research which indicate that people "are likely to modify their reference groups in such a way that their aspirations are diverted from those goals which the rags-to-riches myth misleadingly holds out for them." In other words, rising expectations are self-limiting. See Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 26-32. Quote from page 27.

[62] For evidence that high mobility rates may lead to greater dissatisfaction with perceived opportunity to advance, see Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, 250-258.

[63] Alan H. Barton, Social Organizations Under Stress (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1963). Barton cites evidence that satisfaction with one's condition may be greater even if that condition has declined recently, providing the decline is not as great as that of others in the reference group.

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CHAPTER 2

A TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION TYPES

Part of the confusion over the impact of modernization and development upon levels of discontent and stability seems to lie in the lack of precision in distinguishing between the different processes at work in a modernizing society and in the lack of consistency in the way observers use words to describe these processes. "Economic growth," "modernization," "development," and "social mobilization" are all terms used with relative interchangeability by scholars who are often examining entirely different matters.[1] To avoid such confusion it might be helpful to examine the concept of social mobilization which will be used in this work and to clarify some of the confusion which often surrounds this term.

Karl Deutsch, who popularized the expression social mobilization in the late 1950's, defined it as

> a breaking away from old commitments to traditional ways of living, and a moving into new situations, where new patterns of behavior are relevant and needed, and where new commitments may have to be made. It denotes a concept which brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associations, of institutions, roles and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations, and finally of personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new images of personal identity.

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One problem with this concept is that it is difficult to distinguish certain aspects of it from economic growth. Certainly the two seem to overlap and go together, and Deutsch would surely agree that economic growth leads to social mobilization. There is, however, more to social mobilization than simple economic change. The essential difference, perhaps, is the fact that social mobilization leads to "new situations, where new patterns of behavior are relevant and needed, and where new commitments may have to be made. . . ." Economic growth can conceivably occur within the context of the existing social circumstances; social mobilization, by definition, results in a set of changed relationships which either alter or ignore those which were present before. These changed relationships are a critical element in social mobilization, and locating the causes of that change is a critical step in understanding exactly what social mobilization is.

A second problem with operationalizing Deutsch's concept is that it assumes but does not clearly distinguish between traditional and modern systems; it assumes that people are being mobilized <u>from</u> one society or set of relationships <u>into</u> another but does not suggest a way of distinguishing either empirically or conceptually between the two. In the view of this writer these two problems go together and must be considered before data analysis can commence.

To begin this consideration let us offer the following definition of social mobilization, which is empirically operationalized elsewhere in this work:

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> In dealing with a pre-industrial agrarian society whose economy is basically subsistence and whose culture is essentially peasant, social mobilization is reflected by the degree to which an individual is involved in non-traditional and/or non-local matters, activities, ventures, modes of living, or means of making a livelihood.

The distinction between local and traditional was perhaps not important in the Nyeri context before this century because the two largely overlapped. In recent years, however, local has ceased to mean traditional because of the influx of modernity into the district. Now modern and traditional characteristics exist side by side in the rural areas so that the modern system, which originated in the cities, has ceased to be an urban phenomenon. The term "traditional hinterland" which might be appropriate in other places is not appropriate in Nyeri. For this reason it has become necessary to add the term "non-local" to the definition. The logic of this is that a farmer living in Nyeri who is simultaneously involved in matters outside the district is of necessity involved in "new situations, where new patterns of behavior are relevant" and hence should be classified as "mobilized."

This association of urban with modern and rural with traditional may have been justified historically because of the tendency for new value systems to originate in cities or other developed areas and spread to the less developed, rural hinterland areas. In the contemporary literature of development one quite often gets a passive view of change with emphasis on reaction, well illustrated by the term "penetration," meaning basically the process whereby the influence and values of one society or social system diffuse or come to be widespread within another society or system.[2] As C. E. Black has said, "Outside

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influences are so powerful that modernization is sometimes thought of primarily as acculturation--the adoption of the culture traits of another society."[3]

Several recent studies of the process of development, however, have indicated that a clear-cut distinction between old and new is not conceptually precise or sufficient to describe the process of political change. The shortcomings of this view are particularly obvious in areas where there are viable and effective systems already in existence. Under these conditions what happens more often is that rather than replacement one finds a process of adaptation, whereby old structures or value systems are altered to meet the needs of new circumstances. Syncretic or modified systems come into being which combine traditional legitimacy with functional modernity. Thus in India para-communities replace castes,[4] in Tanzania traditional chiefs become party leaders or Headmen,[5] in Northern Nigeria noblemen join Parliament,[6] and in Southern Nigeria communal organizations solidify diffuse cultural identifications.[7] The confrontation of systems is seldom zero-sum. More often it results in modification and absorption than in destruction.

In later chapters several cases of functional adaptation taken from the Nyeri experience will be discussed. The problem here, however, is to develop some precise means of distinguishing between traditional and non-traditional characteristics of the society under study.

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isolated, and uninvolved in affairs outside of its own immediate environment. The contrast between Nyeri then and Nyeri today is so great that it is fairly simple to delimit the distinguishing characteristics of the two societies. The period of transformation has been so short, relatively speaking, that by using the definition of social mobilization just offered one is able without much difficulty to distinguish by an examination of individual characteristics the extent to which a person is more or less mobilized. Education, economic activities, memberships, personal experiences, and information patterns all give clues to the degree of involvement in non-traditional and non-local matters.

Critics of survey research often point out that because the researcher usually concentrates on only one time period (the present) he is unable to determine either causes or trends. Laboratory experiments, they say, are more scientifically valid because the researcher can introduce a test factor into a controlled population and clearly observe its results.[8] In response to this very valid comment one could reply (though there are obvious limits on how far to push this argument) that because of the short time span involved and because of the clarity of the test factor (modernization) being introduced, there is almost an experimental situation in Nyeri. Thus we have T_1, the pre-modern period when the population was homogeneous in terms of social mobilization and modernization. Following this is T_2, covering a fairly extended period during which Nyeri was exposed to the existence of the test factor; in other words, from 1900 to

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1970 various aspects of modernization were introduced into the society. At T_3, the time of the study, the population is "re-examined" to measure their response to the modern system, their degree of involvement in it, their attitude toward it. Differences at this stage (which are considerable in many cases) should give insight into the impact of the test factor on the society and differential response to it.

We have the difficulty, of course, that T_2 is an extended time period, but this problem is lessened for two reasons. First, modernization accelerated considerably in the last few decades, so that the percentage of the modern population who are first-generation modern is very high, perhaps approaching 100% in some areas. In other words, each individual has had to personally consider the fact of modernization and how he would himself respond to it, regardless of the time span covered by T_2. Secondly, to the extent that there is a generational factor it can be examined by comparing different age groups to determine how response to the stimuli varied at different stages of T_2.

Thus far we have done two things:

1. We have offered a working definition of social mobilization and
2. We have argued that it is possible to distinguish between old and new systems so that individuals can somehow be ranked as to their degree of involvement with one or the other.

The critical matter remains to be done, that is, to explain the two dimensions of social mobilization and their probable relationship to discontent levels in society.

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The Social Mobilization Typology

In his article on social mobilization Deutsch suggested that the concept was unidimensional, consisting of "a single underlying process of which particular indicators represent only particular aspects." In the early stages of data analysis in this project an effort was made to create a single index to measure social mobilization. This index was made up of measures of literacy, economic interests, language facility, and physical mobility. The items were weighted in two separate ways, one which used equal weighting and one which used unequal weightings (the item score was inversely proportional to the percentage of the population having the characteristic). In both cases the same pattern emerged from cross-tabulations: those people on the ends of the indices (those who were most or least socially mobilized) possessed characteristics and attitudes which fell into predictable patterns. Those in the middle, however, were neither predictable nor patterned.

This finding was disturbing, to say the least. It meant either that no pattern existed or that the measure was inadequate. The first possibility was not unheard of but was not academically attractive. There was a possibility, of course, that the pattern of political behavior in a changing society was that no pattern existed, that the order of the day was disorder. But against such a possibility there were several arguments. First, there seemed all too much of a tendency on the part of scholars to label as "transitional" anything which they did not understand and could not explain. The literature abounds with

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catch-all categories which are supposed to "explain" seemingly random or abberant behavior in terms of programmed or god-given irregularity. The use of such categories sometimes seems to explain only the failure of the scholar's conceptualization, not the reason for the political process he was observing.

Second, since the theories which were available could explain the behavior of some people, it seemed illogical that they could not explain the behavior of others who were subject to exactly the same forces, though perhaps to a different degree. Though social laws are not as precise as natural laws because of the difficulty of measuring accurately all human motivations and considerations, it would be a repudiation of the raison d'etre of social science to argue that some elements of society behave in an ordered and predictable manner while others do not. The theory which had led to the measures in question could explain the behavior and attitudes of those people on both ends of the indices. Why could it not explain those in the middle? If modern and traditional people behave in a logical manner but transitional people do not, then how does a transitional person become modern? It seemed obvious that the indices or the theory or both were somehow inadequate.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that Deutsch was interested primarily in generalizing about societies, not about individual behavior. Though he did not ignore sub-national differences in mobilization levels (as his book Nationalism and Social Communication shows),[9] his use of aggregate data did tend to blur such distinctions. Thus, while

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his measures might be unidimensional on a national level, they could equally likely be inadequate when looking at individuals. Furthermore, even within Deutsch's work there seems evidence of two dimensions of social mobilization, though they are not identified as such. To see what these two dimensions are, it might be helpful to work backwards for a moment. Scholars have observed for some time that as man becomes more modern (or socially mobilized) his level of public activities increases as does the level of formal demands which he makes on the political system. Instead of using these observed characteristics to define modernity (man is modern because he does these things), we might more profitably ask <u>why</u> socially mobilized persons show higher levels of activity and higher demand levels. There seem to be two main explanations:

First, the modern man has interests and needs not known by the traditional man. He has economic interests (such as a job) which he has to promote and defend in the public arena. He may join a union to deal with problems of wages and working conditions or lead a delegation to see his legislative representative in an effort to encourage the passage of a bill. If his job takes him off into the city, he has problems of housing, sanitation, security, transportation, clean water, and high food prices, all of which cry out for government action. To promote such action he may join and support a political party which will defend his interests.

Second, the modern man is exposed to a whole host of information not available to the traditional man. This information and his

knowledge of the world outside of the local environment considerably increase his ability to compare, to perceive problems, and to be critical of what he sees around him. It leads logically to increased activity and to changed demand patterns.

The fact that there may be two causal explanations for the same pheonomena sheds interesting light upon the political process under observation. It was pointed out that one of the confusing aspects of social mobilization revolved around whether it was essentially functional or dysfunctional in terms of satisfaction levels and hence social stability. Most likely, social mobilization is both. The confusion may have resulted from the practice of viewing it as a unidimensional process. If there is one dimension, then there should be just one set of results, either functional or dysfunctional. If there are two dimensions, however, the results can be not only distinct but contradictory. As we have suggested, there <u>are</u> two dimensions, which might be designated at this time as <u>economic mobilization</u> and <u>perceptual mobilization</u>.[10] In defining these two terms we could say that <u>economic mobilization</u> revolves around the extent to which a man's objectively-defined economic interests are non-traditional in the sense that they direct his attention away from the local setting and into the national-modern arena. Since this relates to the flow of resources, it also serves as a reflection of wealth levels. This is particularly true in the case of Nyeri, where the traditional economy was subsistence and the modern economy is cash-based.

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Perceptual mobilization deals with the subjectively-defined level of exposure to non-local situations and to non-local conditions (even though this can occur in the local setting). It is nontangible, abstract, perhaps even psychological, and stands in clear contrast to economic mobilization which deals with a visible flow of materials such as income.

One reason for the complexity of the social mobilization process is that although these two dimensions should be and in fact usually are found together, it is possible for them to occur independent of each other. In order to examine this interrelationship it would be helpful to set up a typological matrix by which one can visually conceptualize four ideal types in the social mobilization process.

Perceptual Mobilization	Economic Mobilization: High	Economic Mobilization: Low
High	Type I Fully Mobilized	Type II Perceptually Mobilized
Low	Type III Economically Mobilized	Type IV Non-Mobilized

Figure 2-1. A typology of social mobilization types.

Types one and four are made up of people who are either high on both indices or low on both. They represent the "pure moderns" and the "pure traditionals" to the extent that such groups exist. In subsequent references they will be referred to as fully mobilized

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and non-mobilized. They should conform well to the findings of most scholars on the expected behavior patterns of modern and traditional groups.[11] It should be pointed out that the criticisms of such terms (discussed in chapter one) do not deny their value but rather suggest that they are often not comprehensive or precise in the form usually stated. Once one gets away from over-simplistic dichotomies it is clearly possible to delimit segments of the population which can be accurately designated as "modern" and "traditional." Many of the generalizations which social scientists make about such types seem both useful and valid.

Type two respondents are high on perceptual mobilization but low on economic mobilization. In many ways they may prove the most interesting of all the cells. They possess the capacity to be modern but are not visibly receiving any of the advantages which flow from modernization. Put differently, they are similar to the non-mobilized in that both are deprived, but the perceptually mobilized are distinct in that they possess the capacity to be aware of their deprivation. While the fully mobilized and non-mobilized groups represent basically complacent components within the existing political system (for different reasons), the perceptually mobilized may be expected to constitute an element of dynamic instability. One should expect them above all other groups to provide an engine for change within the political system. Possessed as they are with an awareness of the inequities and problems of society, and yet not favored by a disproportionate share of the material benefits of modernization, they can

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Type three, the economically mobilized, combine relative wealth with a local orientation. Perhaps the nature of this cell can best be illustrated by looking briefly at the probable relationship between the two dimensions. The reason economic mobilization and perceptual mobilization go together in most cases probably lies in the fact that one grows out of the other. At least in one way, perceptual mobilization seems logically a function of economic mobilization (though, as Lerner suggested, it can have other origins as well). If one has a job or commercial farming interests he will, in the natural course of pursuing those interests, move from place to place, encounter information or opinions, and become interested in issues. The one almost automatically flows from the other. The economically mobilized are unusual in that although they rank high in economic benefits, they seem almost to have gone out of their way to avoid contact with the society of which they are a part. Though they could never be as "traditional" as the non-mobilized elements, they will surely be closer to that cell in many ways than either the fully mobilized or the perceptually mobilized. One would expect that they are very locally oriented people who benefit from the resources of the modern sector but are not deeply involved in it in any psychological way.

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These four groups--the fully mobilized, the perceptually mobilized, the economically mobilized, and the non-mobilized--seem to be sufficiently distinct in their characteristics to lend themselves to analysis and comparison. This chapter has contained some allusions to hypotheses about their level of discontent, their political behavior, and their relationship to the political system. Chapter seven will contain an examination of these four groups in terms of their socio-economic characteristics. Chapter eight includes a statement of the above hypotheses and several others in a formal manner and an examination of them in light of the data. Before doing this, however, it seems useful to examine the area in which the research was conducted, the Nyeri District of Kenya. Though social scientists have gotten away from the belief that each political system is unique in its behavior, only the most radical of them would argue that historical events are of no consequence. The historical framework out of which a political system has evolved is in many ways as important a factor in its behavior as the socio-economic conditions in which it may now operate.[13] For this reason Part II, including chapters three, four, and five, is concentrated exclusively upon the geographical, political, social, and economic characteristics of Nyeri District. Only after doing this will the analysis return to an examination of the survey data.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

[1]For a survey of some of the different points of view, see Lucian Pye, "A Concept of Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 357 (March, 1965), 1-13.

[2]See Martin Staniland, "The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, No. 4 (1970), 617-636, for one example of this.

[3]C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 50.

[4]Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition.

[5]Norman N. Miller, "The Survival of Traditional Leadership," Journal of Modern African Studies, 6, No. 2 (August, 1968), 183-202.

[6]C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World Politics, 19 (January, 1967), 190-217.

[7]Melson and Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism."

[8]For a discussion of the advantages of this and other research designs, see Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 290-321.

[9]Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966).

[10]For similar distinctions see Feierabend et al., "Social Change and Political Violence," and Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.

[11]See Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition, 3-4, for a summary of these.

[12]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 49.

[13]For some discussions of the role of historical factors in political behavior see Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy,"

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in which he discusses the "loaded dice" concept, and also Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 155-192.

PART TWO

THE CASE FOR ANALYSIS:

THE KIKUYU OF NYERI DISTRICT, KENYA

PART TWO

THE CASE FOR ANALYSIS:
THE KIKUYU OF NYERI DISTRICT, KENYA

It is unlikely that the average reader of this work will know much about Kenya except perhaps for some general information about Jomo Kenyatta, Mau Mau, and Elsa the Lion. Even the informed person is unlikely to be familiar with Nyeri District and the role which it played in recent Kenya history. In order to understand the data to be presented in Part Three it is necessary to understand the background against which it was collected. Chapters three, four, and five contain some of this background. Chapter three is a descriptive look at the geographical and socio-economic characteristics of the district, covering such items as agriculture, government structure, education, religion, and trade. Chapter four relates the early history of the Kikuyu and describes the pre-European socio-political system. Though this system is on the wane, it is important to look at it for two reasons: first, elements of it still exist in every locality and have often been adapted to modern conditions so that it is still relevant to contemporary events. Second, the response of the Kikuyu to modernization and foreign control occurred within the context of the traditional system so that one cannot understand the former without understanding the latter.

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In chapter five the modern era is outlined, with emphasis being put upon socio-economic changes and how they influenced the political events of the period. For the reader who has always believed that rural Africa is "traditional," this chapter will surely change his opinion. By any measure that one could suggest, Nyeri has undergone since 1902 a rush to modernization seldom matched in other areas. Socially, economically, and politically it has seen fundamental changes which have transformed it from an isolated-rural-traditional society into a very modern and mobilized one. The results of this mobilization will be obvious in Part Three.

CHAPTER 3

A PROFILE OF THE DISTRICT

Nyeri District is located on the northern border of Central Province, in south-central Kenya (see Figure 3-1). It is an area blessed with abundant rainfall, good climate and good soil, and is one of Kenya's most fertile districts. It is bordered on the east by Mount Kenya with its snow-capped peaks of 17,000 feet and on the west by the Aberdare Range which rises to 12,000 feet. Just to the north lie the dry plains of what was once Masailand. Much of Nyeri District lies in the range of 5,500-6,000 feet altitude, but on the east and west sides it rises up towards the mountains to a height of 8,000 feet in some cases. The increasing altitude results in a drop in temperature (mild in any case) and a rise in rainfall, making, for example, tea growing possible.

Rainfall in Nyeri is sufficient for agriculture and is generally reliable. There are two rainy seasons, March to May and October to November, during which most of the district gets 30-60 inches. The distribution of rainfall into two distinct seasons makes two crops a year possible in some parts of the district.

Lake Victoria




Figure 3-1. Map of Kenya: Roads, Cities, Boundaries.

Population

Nyeri is inhabited almost exclusively by the Kikuyu people. They number 2.2 million of Kenya's 10.9 million people, though the population of Nyeri District was only 360,000 according to the 1969 census.[1] The Kikuyu are a Bantu-speaking group closely related in culture and language to many of the other peoples of the Kenya Highlands. They are primarily farmers, though they have a history of trading, and many of them have entered the cash economy. There are few villages in the Western sense in Kikuyuland, since each man tends to live on his plot of land with his family. Thus, though people are spread out over the countryside, the density tends to be fairly high.[2]

The non-Kikuyu population of Nyeri amounts only to 2 per cent of the total population, or about 8,000. Most of these are resident in and around the municipalities and seldom get into the rural area. Of this 8,000, 1,129 are Asian, 765 are European, and 21 are Arab. Since Nyeri Town is both a district and provincial capital, it tends to draw government personnel in large numbers so that many of its residents are non-Kikuyu Africans. In addition, Nyeri Town was traditionally something of an outpost of European settlement. Thus the historical tradition of Nyeri as a settler town has probably given the Nyeri people a greater awareness of foreign presence than their numbers would deserve under normal circumstances. Likewise, the Asian community, which is concentrated in the retail trade, is probably more visible than its numbers would warrant. The importance of this visibility will become more obvious as the study progresses.

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The rate of increase in Nyeri's population is fairly high. The exact figure is hard to calculate, but the increase is probably about 3.2 per cent or more per annum. The 1969 census showed that in Nyeri 21 per cent of the population was under four years of age, and a full 51 per cent was under fourteen years. This increase in population has put great pressure on the land (a matter to be discussed later), and has resulted in an out-migration of Kikuyu men to the cities and into the Rift Valley. The 1962 census, analyzed by S. H. Ominde, shows that at the age of 20 the ratio of men to women in Nyeri drops to 63/100 and does not return to normal until approximately the 45-49 age group, even then showing some minor distortions from the expected norm.[3]

Most of Nyeri is rural, though there are several municipalities spread around the 986 square miles that make up the district. (See Figure 3-2.) The largest of these is Nyeri Town which had 10,000 people at the time of the census of 1969; Karatina with 2,400 and Kiganjo with 1,700 were the other two classified as municipalities. In addition there are several smaller towns which may have up to several hundred people each, but which do not rate municipality status. Some of the larger of these are Othaya, Naro Moro, Mweiga, and Ruringu. These are primarily market towns with some administrative centers, which add an element of permanency. There are in Kikuyuland no "villages," if by village one means a concentration of housing units where people live. There are a few Emergency villages which still exist and which house the landless, but living in one is generally looked upon as a tragic thing. One also finds sprinkled across the countryside




Figure 3-2. Map of Nyeri District.

various centers consisting of perhaps a half dozen small stores selling matches, soap, cigarettes, tea and other items of daily use. The owners of these shops are invariably local farmers who stay in their farms at night and operate the shops during the day.

Government Structure

The Kenya polity consists of distinct administrative and political structures. Administratively the country is broken into eight provinces which have within them three to thirteen districts each. Each district is sub-divided into divisions (Nyeri has six), which are then broken into locations, which are in turn broken into sub-locations. The heads of all administrative units are appointed by the Office of the President, though at a local level an effort is made to select persons who enjoy some popular support (see chapter six). Chiefs and Subchiefs (or Headmen) who head locations and sub-locations are permanent residents, but District Commissioners (DC's) and Divisional Officers (DO's) are frequently transferred, often more than once a year.

Political party structure usually parallels administrative structure. One can go to the farthest sub-location and find a party leader, just as he can go to Nyeri Town and find the district party head. The Kenya African National Union--KANU--is the only party to have significant support in Nyeri; although popular participation in the party is low, a full 85 per cent of all respondents reported they were "members," reflecting more a high sense of identification than a high level of formal membership.

Nyeri has three kinds of elected officials: members of Parliament (a total of four), County Councillors (one per location), and Area (Divisional) or Urban Councillors. All Councils are under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Government. Though these Councils have lost control of schools and health in a recent reshuffle of power, they oversee local markets and businesses, a fact which gives their members a certain amount of influence.

European Settlement

Prior to Independence in 1963 the two Kieni divisions in the northern part of the district were exclusively European-owned; several European landowners (less than two dozen) continue to reside there on fairly large farms, although much of the area has been turned over to African settlers. The settlement schemes there were started in the early and mid-1960's as a part of the Million Acre Scheme, through which the government eventually bought out 1.5 million acres of white-owned land and made it available for African settlers. These settlers were given thirty-year mortgages to pay off the purchase price of the land, and loans for such things as fencing and the acquisition of high-quality cattle. Some schemes are reserved for Nyeri residents; others are for outsiders. The general rule is that a plotholder in a scheme be landless, but with such stakes involved local influentials were able in some cases to acquire settlement land even though they owned land elsewhere.



Scheme	Acreage	Number of Settlers	Acres/Settler
Laikipia South	8,979	124	50
Observation Hill	9,578	208	50
Endarasha	13,013	577	7 or equivalent
Uaso Nyiro	6,416	127	30, 40
Mweiga	7,756	385	7 or equivalent
Island Farms	3,275	260	7 or equivalent
Naro Moru	10,576	379	40, 50
Maraza	10,028	221	16, 30
Totals	69,921	2,281	

Source: Nyeri District Annual Agriculture Report, 1965, Appendix H.

Figure 3-3. Settlement Schemes in Nyeri District.

In addition to these regular schemes there are three "free land" schemes locally known as Jet Schemes. The land in these schemes seems poorer than in the pay schemes, and acreages are small, probably seven acres or equivalent. These schemes total 5,802 acres.

Apart from these government-sponsored schemes, many Africans, acting either in Buyer's Companies or as individuals, have purchased land privately from departing Europeans. As of 1965 there were 58 registered Farm Purchase Societies in Nyeri District in addition to the 89 African individuals who had acquired 17,394 acres on a willing-buyer willing-seller basis.[4] This land transfer had reduced the permanent European community in Nyeri to a few dozen farmers, administrators, and retired persons.

Transport

In many ways transportation is one of the most essential changes which can be made in a society. A good road system facilitates commerce,

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the flow of men and materiel, and, perhaps most important, the spread of ideas. To this extent Nyeri probably is fairly well off. The transportation situation there can probably best be described as adequate during the dry season, but difficult during the rains. The main road running from Nairobi is paved; off it there are several main dirt roads which are generally considered all weather. From these main roads there branch a myriad of minor roads and paths which are mostly dirt and are passable only during good weather. Most of the main towns and markets are linked with Nyeri Town by a system of buses and private taxis known locally as matatus (the name dates to the time when one could go anywhere in Nairobi by taxi for three [tatu] ten cent pieces). These vehicles cover the main roads several times an hour, and the lesser roads upon demand. With the exception of Mukurweini division, which has the worst roads in the district, one can get almost anywhere in an hour or two.

Connections with other parts of Kenya are easy and quick. From Nyeri Town it is a short 90 miles to Nairobi, the capital. The ride takes less than two hours and costs 12 shillings ($1.70), making it possible for men working there to return home almost every weekend if they wish. Fort Hall and Thika, two other major towns in the area, are on the road to Nairobi. To Nakuru and Naivasha on the other side of the Aberdares, one has worse road but no real difficulty. It is possible to go by dirt road via Thompson's Falls, to the north, or by paved road via Nairobi to the south. In any case Nyeri residents can and do make the trip with some regularity, and many work in these two towns.

Nanyuki, another main urban center 40 miles to the north of Nyeri, is also easily accessible by paved road. In addition, the railroad stops at Kiganjo, less than ten miles by paved road from Nyeri Town. Nyeri also has two airports, used mostly by light planes to bring tourists to the famous Outspan Hotel and to other tourist attractions found in the area.

For the movement of agricultural commodies, people use either human labor or small carts for local transport (for example to semi-weekly markets held in most areas) or buses and collectively-owned vehicles for longer hauls or commercial produce. Oxen are unheard of in Nyeri, and the people have a fear of the tetanus-carrying properties of donkeys so common elsewhere in Kenya. In general, however, there is no real problem with getting goods to market, even the tons of coffee and tea produced annually.

The major impediment to transportation (and hence to certain forms of socio-economic development) is probably the system of gorges and ridges found throughout the district, and in fact, throughout all of Kikuyuland. These ridges criss-cross the district in an east-west direction, primarily as a result of the rivers which flow out of Mount Kenya and the Aberdares. Throughout much of the district they tend to be deep and steep. Roads can easily run along them, but crossing from one to another is difficult. In some areas the ridges are so difficult that accessibility is strictly limited, and one must walk if he wishes to get there. Needless to say areas such as these (for example the part of Nyeri which borders on Murang'a District in the south) lag behind the rest of the district in economic and social development.

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Education and Religion

Educationally, Nyeri District has one of the highest rates of school enrollment in the country, a fact of great importance which will be discussed in more detail in chapter six. Using figures from the Ministry of Education and the Census, it seems that almost every child in the district at least enters primary school.[5] In 1970 Nyeri had 191 primary schools with 74,025 students, meaning that over 20 per cent of all Nyeri residents were primary school students. An analysis of the enrollment records by sex shows that the ratio of boys to girls is in the range of 10:9, a figure which is nearly uniform across the district. This educational system dates back to the arrival of the first missionaries in Nyeri in 1903. Even today the administration of Nyeri's primary schools reflects the link between education and religion (see Figure 3-4).

Administration	Number of Schools
Catholic	70
Presbyterian	63
Anglican	2
Government	33
Private	1
Total	191

Note: All of these schools are now government regulated and financed and must be non-discriminatory in their admissions and management. In some areas religiously-linked schools have a majority of students from another denomination.

Figure 3-4. Administration of Primary Schools in Nyeri.

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The religious make-up of Nyeri reflects the educational situation. Catholics and Presbyterians are most common, with lesser numbers of Baptists, Anglicans, and Independents being found. Among the rural population it is difficult to locate a Moslem, though in the urban areas there are large concentrations of them. In Nyeri Town almost 90 per cent of all plots in the heavily-populated Majengo area are owned by Moslems,[6] and in some parts of Nyeri one has difficulty purchasing pork since the Moslem butchers refuse to sell it. Nevertheless the Moslems are a small minority who take a definite second seat to the Christians. The percentage of people who are Christian is very difficult to estimate. Probably one would be best off to say that if a person is educated he is likely to be a Christian; if he is illiterate he is more likely to be a traditionalist. Of the persons interviewed in this sample, 60 per cent claimed to be Christian, though this figure excludes the younger generations, who are not yet land-owners and hence were not included in the sample.

Trade

As mentioned earlier, trade is a major outlet for the energies of many Kikuyu. Across all of Kenya the Kikuyu merchant is a common figure, even rivaling the achievements of Asian merchants in some cities. In Nyeri District during 1970 there were almost 2500 licensed businesses, with about 25 per cent being restaurants, almost 70 per cent being retail, and the rest distributed among auto, wholesale, and miscellaneous.[7] Many of the bigger stores in the towns are owned by

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Asians, but since the government restricted business activities by non-citizens, their influence has dropped drastically. In 1965, just before trade restrictions were instituted, Nyeri Town had over 100 Asian businesses; in 1970 there were only about a dozen left (all citizens), with an additional ten or so (all non-citizens) operating under suspensions which were being appealed. During this same time the number of African-owned businesses had increased several fold. Many of these had received loans and other governmental assistance in their efforts to start their own enterprises.

The overall image which one gets of Nyeri District is of an area undergoing enormous changes, with a strong physical-economic intrastructure upon which to base a growing economy, and with a developing social-educational infrastructure to provide human skills. Because of the emergence of trade, commercial agriculture (to be discussed in chapter five), education, and the distribution of lands in the former white areas of Nyeri, the internal make-up of the society in terms of class structures and resource distribution has changed considerably in the past few decades. The causes of these changes and their impact on the political system will be covered more in chapters five and six. Prior to that, however, is a description of Nyeri as it existed before the arrival of the British.

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

[1]Most of these population figures come from the 1969 Kenya census. Kenya Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kenya Population Census, 1969 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970).

[2]Nyeri District is divided for administrative purposes into six divisions. In the early 1960's the European areas just north of Nyeri were designated for settlement by African farmers and a part of the district in which those European farms were located (Kieni East and Kieni West divisions) were attached administratively to Nyeri's previous four divisions. This new area is made up of plains which previously belonged to the Masai before the colonial government persuaded them to vacate it in 1908 in exchange for other lands to the south. Since it is fundamentally different from the rest of Nyeri in settlement pattern, geography and history, one often distinguishes between "the settlement areas" and "the reserve."

In the four divisions of old Nyeri, densities per square mile are as follows: North Tetu--1,295; Mathira--1,169; Othaya--958; Mukurweini (South Tetu)--952. In contrast the two settlement divisions to the north, which are very large in size, have densities of 193 and 85. The figure for all of Nyeri District is 367 per square mile, but this includes sections of the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forest reserves, and thus is not an accurate measure of actual density in inhabited areas.

[3]S. H. Ominde, Land and Population Movements in Kenya (Nairobi: Heineman, 1968), 119.

[4]Nyeri District Annual Report, 1965.

[5]These figures come from the Nyeri District Education Office. The 1969 Census showed that Nyeri had 66,000 children between the ages of 5 and 9. Roughly estimating that a child starts school when he is 7, this means that 3/5 of the 3-9 age group (or 39,600 children) should be in Standards 1, 2, and 3. The actual figure was 40,845. This calculation may be unreliable because of irregularity of attendance, lack of a uniform starting age, and other factors. The likely explanation for it is that many older children are returning to school after failing to start when they should have, or else are continuing after failing to be admitted at a higher grade. Stanley Meisler, "Tribal Politics Harass Kenya," Foreign Affairs, 49, no. 1 (1970), 118, also notes that the number of children in primary schools is more than the number of children in the 6-12 age group.

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[6]I am grateful to Father Carlo Dutto, who conducted research in Nyeri Town in 1970-1971, for pointing these figures out to me.

[7]Provincial Trade Office, Nyeri.

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CHAPTER 4

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

The origin and early history of the Kikuyu people are somewhat in dispute. The traditional story that they originated in Murang'a about fifty miles from Nairobi now seems questionable. According to recent research by Godfrey Muriuki of the University of Nairobi it seems more likely that during the 18th century proto-Kikuyu groups living on the eastern side of Mount Kenya migrated into present Kikuyu-land because of famine and/or pressure from the then-expanding Galla.[1] Other groups of proto-Kikuyu peoples settled in other places and eventually evolved into the Meru and Embu peoples. Initial Kikuyu settlements were in the region of present day Fort Hall (Murang'a) and Mukurweini (southern Nyeri). From these settlements expansion occurred into the surrounding forest regions until Kikuyu-speaking peoples occupied much of what is today's Kiambu, Murang'a, and Nyeri districts.

During the 19th century the Kikuyu began to develop extensive relations with other peoples, particularly with the Masai and with coastal traders. Contrary to common belief, relations between the Kikuyu and the Masai were generally good, though institutionalized raiding within acceptable limits was practiced by both sides. The Masai and Kikuyu traded freely, shared a common border, intermarried,




Figure 4-1. Map of Kenya in the Late Nineteenth Century.

and on occasion teamed up to fight common enemies. Nyeri Kikuyu adopted several aspects of Masai tradition, including a technique of circumcision and a more militarily organized age-set system.

During this time the Kikuyu also began to develop connections with the coastal traders.[2] At first they did this through intermediary Athi and Kamba, but around mid-century trading caravans began to penetrate into Kikuyuland itself. The Kikuyu had always traded with neighboring Masai, Kamba, and Athi, but this period marked a shift in the type of goods exchanged. Instead of trading agricultural produce for cattle produce they now began to trade ivory and other "exotic" products for foreign-made items such as blankets, jewelry, and metal tools. The higher value of tools and the arrival of foreign traders escalated the tensions involved in trade. Many caravan leaders had heard stories of Kikuyu hostility to foreigners (probably started by Kamba traders in an effort to maintain their monopoly in Kikuyu trade, since the Kikuyu at the time had no known contacts with any outsiders) and were overaggressive in their relationships. The era also spawned European adventurers who had little respect for non-European peoples and often used high-handed methods to assert themselves.

Following the death of the Kamba merchant-chief, Kivoi, about mid-century, the Kamba monopoly on interior trade began to decline and more and more foreigners reached Kikuyuland. Krapf, the missionary, came into the interior in 1849; Joseph Thompson passed through in 1883; Arab caravans began creeping in; Count Teleki came through as did von Hohnel, his Hungarian compatriot. At first these travelers

received reasonably warm welcomes from the Kikuyu, often to their surprise. It was not until later in the century that "incidents" became common. Several Arab caravans reported combat, and John Boyes, who attempted through political intrigue and a generous use of force to set up a "kingdom" in Kikuyuland, was killed during one of his many skirmishes.[3]

It was these skirmishes which prompted the British government to intervene in Kikuyuland. The British had acquired Kenya and Uganda by agreements with the Germans in 1886 and 1890. Prior to this, in pursuing their trade with Uganda, they had set up a string of forts reaching from Mombasa on the coast to Kampala on Lake Victoria. In relation to Nyeri, the major forts were in Machakos to the south and in Fort Smith and Naivasha to the west. All of these were far from Nyeri. However, as the result of an attack on a Goan caravan near present day Nyeri Town, the British in 1902 organized a two-pronged assault on the Nyeri area. After several days of fierce fighting Kikuyu elders agreed to meet British terms: no more interference with trade and cooperation in building a defensive trench around the British camp near Nyeri hill, a site which quickly became Nyeri Town.

The Traditional Political System

The organization of Nyeri before the Europeans arrived can best be understood by examining the interaction of two forces: geography and history. Geographically Nyeri is characterized by a series of east-west ridges which break the area into self-contained autonomous social

units which had formal dealings with neighboring units only on special occasions.

This geographical separation was reinforced by the manner in which Nyeri was settled; it was traditionally looked upon as a "frontier" where courageous individuals who were willing to risk the dangers and hardships of an untamed land could reap great benefits. The early frontiersmen who settled this area carved out a place from the wilderness to be their own. For purposes of convenience and security such claims usually corresponded to some natural geographical units, most often a ridge. Hence the ridges came to be agreed upon boundaries for delimiting land ownership.

Because of the respect accorded these frontiersmen they were much revered in Kikuyu society; following the death of such a man his offspring would continue to honor his name at religious and other special occasions and would identify themselves as his descendants. Such a group of people who identified themselves as coming from a common ancestor were called an mbari. The mbari was an essential unit in Kikuyu social organization, for through it one received the right to inherit land. Muriuki described the origin and significance of the mbari as follows:

> Land essentially belonged to an individual person or a small group of closely related people at the onset . . . with the increase in population this circle was widened through the generations to include the descendants of the original pioneers. The essential thing is that such a group had a strong community interest born of the need to defend themselves in a hostile environment of wild animals and other enemies, not to mention the cooperation demanded of them in the task of clearing the giant trees of the primeval forest. This then saw the birth of the ancestral land, to which in the course of time descendants became deeply attached for religious purposes.[4]

The head of the mbari (the muramati) was often its senior member; his authority rested not upon his power to impose sanctions but rather upon his ability to achieve agreement among his relatives. He was an arbitrator with the authority to speak in the name of his constituents, though his actions were bounded by custom and the necessity to maintain the consent of his support group, the other elders of the mbari.[5]

The main group which cut across mbari lines and contained people from different ridges was the age group (riika). An age group was made up of all boys circumcised during a given year. Each group was stratified in terms of those circumcised before and after it. An individual's status was determined by the seniority of this riika, plus by his own personal achievements. Whereas being a member of an mbari permitted one to participate in family affairs and to inherit land, being a member of a riika made him a member of society and entitled him to status and respect. His individual standing could in some cases be greater than his age mates, but it would never be less.

The system of government was closely related to the system of age sets. These age sets were aggregated into several grades ranging from junior warriors on the bottom, up through senior warriors, junior elders, senior elders, and several higher grades of elders at the top. Each of these grades had duties peculiar to it plus a kiama or council to regulate its own affairs and to rule on other areas where it may have had authority. Regarding duties, for example, the recently initiated were charged with defense, police functions, and communal work such as



the clearing of forests, while the older groups were in charge of those activities which require wisdom and maturity, such as political leadership, judicial affairs and religious functions. The rule-making power of the kiama was definitely present, but was not a very prominent aspect of government, especially below the senior elder level. What was more common was that in interpreting the rules of society during judicial proceedings, the elders, like judges everywhere, could in effect make law. In the course of arbitrating disputes or in the event of some unforeseen development it occasionally became necessary to lay down some new principle or rule, for example regarding the regulation of salt lick use or the preservation of food during a famine. In general, however, Kikuyu law was based upon arbitration, precedent, equity, and general principles of behavior, rather than upon formal codification.[6]

Formal proclamations of law, where required, were the exclusive reserve of the elders of the "ruling generation." Such a generation "ruled" for approximately thirty years. There were two of these generations--Mwangi and Maina--which alternated in power. Each male child was automatically a member of his grandfather's generation, thus making father and son of different generations. After their term in office, the ruling elders would transfer power to their juniors in a formal ceremony characterized by much ceremonial bribery on the part of the juniors. At that time something akin to a statute of limitations came into effect, through which all unsettled judicial cases were wiped from the books. The new generation assumed power with much pomp and circumstance and with a "clean slate."[7]

The last of these generational transfers occurred in the 1890's; an effort was made in the 1930's to hold another ceremony, but according to Kenyatta the government refused permission. Today few young people have much knowledge about the institution of ruling generation, and many are not even sure of the generation to which they belong. There is evidence, however, that the institution persists if in a somewhat truncated version. In 1965 the District Commissioner of Nyeri reported that he had been visited often during the year by "the elders of Irungu" with requests to hold meetings and sacrifice for rains. According to the DC, "Their main complaint is that the sophisticated youth do not respect them and that young girls go about dressed in indecent short skirts. They also would like members of the public to contribute for goats which would be used for sacrifices."[8]

Administratively speaking there was no formal permanent structure of government. There were no government offices, no taxes, no jails. Apart from the mbari, there were no territorial administrative units such as exist today. Instead government was diffuse; it was called upon only when needed.

Status in this system was based upon past performance. There was no ascriptively-based hierarchy of leadership. In childhood play, in combat, in the discussion of serious matters, leaders emerged in the eyes of their colleagues. The qualities which enabled one to advance were

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> "gentleman," something of the Ungwana" of the Swahili. . . . A "mugambi" is primus inter pares because of his exceptional courage and upright character, manifested in youth and maintained in manhood. . . .[9]

Among the top leadership group there was a definite differentiation of roles. Men would specialize in areas of government which appealed to their particular talents. Thus one man would specialize in religious functions, another in judicial affairs, a third in political leadership. None of these positions, however, was permanent or inherited. In the 1930's Kikuyu politicians tried to reinterpret Kikuyu history to include the idea of Paramount Chiefs. Their purpose was to create spokesmen for the Kikuyu who would have the authority of the tribe behind them. Though such chiefs would have been valuable in the 1930's and 1940's, they simply did not exist in the 1800's or before. The nearest one got to a chief was when different age groups selected one of their members to be a coordinator or spokesman (muthamaki). This did lead to the concentration of great power in the hands of certain individuals, such as Wang'ombe wa Ihora, who used his position as leader of his warrior's group to achieve a position of some military importance in Nyeri in the latter years of the nineteenth century.[10] Though some writers have argued that increasing military conflicts in the nineteenth century were leading to the evolution of a definite chieftanship system,[11] such evolutionary tendencies, if they existed, were made irrelevant by the arrival of the Europeans.

The absence of a formal structure of government was matched by the absence of a complicated system of demands upon the political system. Such demands as there were related mostly to security, the maintenance

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of order, or the arbitration of disputes. Demands for social services were minimal and where they existed had specialized structures within society to meet them. Education, for example, was taken care of during the initiation period when all initiates were instructed in the basic values and body of knowledge of the society.[12] Health was either a matter of fate or else could be treated by private means. Old people were taken care of by their families, as were orphans and widows.

Those demands associated with a rapidly changing society--such as calls for equalization of wealth--were absent. Inequality was not really a problem for two reasons: First, most people were landowners and hence had at least a minimum of economic standing in the society. Though there were certain members of society who were landless (ahoi) and who were of lower rank than their betters, they were relatively few in number. Furthermore, these people were usually resident on the land of some wealthy man, and hence had a place in society if not a fully desirable one. In addition there was a second fact which prevented the need for the political system to get involved in any equalization process: there was a frontier to which any dissatisfied person could go if he felt his standing in society was less than he desired. The forest was available for clearing to any who needed it--the poor. social malcontents, excess children, or simply the ambitious. As was true in America, the Kikuyu had long enjoyed the luxury of "free land." As in America also the presence of this free land seemed to provide an outlet for social discontent and political pressure. Free land was there any time anyone needed or wanted it. Since land was almost a prerequisite to a

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full standing in Kikuyu society;[13] this meant that no matter how low one was in society he could always hope to someday improve his standing, or if not his own at least that of his children. The landless tenants could be patient until the day they could move to the frontier, the old man with the small plot could dream of his son breaking new land and founding a large mbari; those who could not get along with their neighbors or who feared that Fate was against them in their present place could move away. Apart from providing practical outlets for individuals, this free land undoubtedly introduced into Kikuyu thinking a sort of optimism for the future, just as Frederick Jackson Turner suggested that it did for Americans.[14] The fact that this optimism existed and that free land did in fact help relieve pressures within the society can be seen by the almost instant increase in social tension which developed when the Europeans alienated the frontier in order for whites to settle. When the Europeans came and took empty lands for their own use, they deprived the Kikuyu not so much of land actually in their possession[15] but of something more important: their optimism and their future. They made it inevitable that the discontents and inequalities hidden and cushioned within Kikuyu society would come forth into the open in the form of political demands and discontent.

Demands for participation likewise were not an issue. Each person was allowed full participation in his own age-set organizations and councils. Such low ranking groups as the recently circumcised warriors knew furthermore that their present exclusion from higher and more important bodies was not permanent. As they and their age-mates

advanced to maturity they would themselves someday become elders with political and judicial powers. In addition they enjoyed a high status among the populace and were entitled to participate in various social and courtship affairs, activities which kept their minds off politics.[16] So, for the time being, they watched after the security of the countryside, regulated their own affairs through their own autonomous council, and performed those tasks required of them by their seniors. Their period of internship or public service lasted five to nine years, at which time they put down their weapons, married and became senior warriors. Then as subsequent milestones in their lives were reached (the birth of the first child, the circumcision of the first child, etc.) additional steps in rank were achieved. This gradual progression of status was as certain as the passing of the seasons. This certainty, plus the privileges peculier to the lower status ranks, gave virtually every person in society a vested interest in the status quo and kept demands for changes in the "seniority system" at a bare minimum. In addition there were special provisions whereby exceptionally talented and ambitious persons could advance through the ranks faster than their age-mates, by the payment of goats and other deference fees to the elders. The authority system which resulted was both widely accepted and generally effective, and provided for a maximum of participation.

The conservative and somewhat permanent nature of such a system, however, was dependent upon the monopoly of political power held by a single class--the land owners. The complete absence of alternatives to farming as a means of gaining a livelihood meant that one had

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ultimately to come to terms with the political system as it existed. Then, once one had advanced into the structure, his incentive for dissatisfaction was gone. To defy the elders meant that one could be left landless and wifeless. Fleeing to neighboring areas was possible but not probable because of the hostility often present between different regions. One could move to the frontier, but even there he needed help to survive. There was simply no way to challenge the system. So long as the pro-system elements of society controlled the land (the only real basis of wealth, status, and power) they retained an absolute monopoly over society's values, and constituted what amounted to a class dictatorship. Personality clashes were possible and internecine battles were common: ridge fought ridge with persistent regularity. But these combats were politically insignificant. They never involved the essential assumptions or values of society. They never involved the right to rule, the pattern of social organization, the distribution of wealth and authority, participation, or any of the basic characteristics of society. Not until the arrival of outside traders, the coming of European administrators, the growth of towns, and the advent of cash employment did the underlying assumptions upon which the whole society was based come into question. As Kenyatta put it, "People grow up to know what is expected of them and what are the limits of their obligations."[17]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

[1]Godfrey Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu Before 1904, unpublished dissertation, University of London, 1969. Muriuki based his research on a complicated and detailed evaluation of oral traditions and family histories. It is a unique and valuable work.

[2]D. A. Low, "The Northern Interior, 1840-84," in Roland Oliver and Gervase Matthew, eds., History of East Africa, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 297-351.

[3]For a general history of the exploration of East Africa see Oliver and Matthew, History of East Africa, Vol. I. Many first-hand experiences are published in the "Early Travellers in East Africa" series, put out by the East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi.

[4]Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 87.

[5]Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961), 33-36, talks of the procedure for removal of the muramati.

[6]See H. E. Lambert, Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) for a discussion of legislative and judicial activities among the Kikuyu. For a less sympathetic view of the Kikuyu judicial system, see C. Cagnolo, The Akikuyu (Nyeri, Kenya: Catholic Mission Press, 1933). For a list of crimes which apparently had a formal system of fines, see H. R. McClure, "Native Law and Custom," January, 1911, Nyeri Political Records, Kenya National Archives, Reel #79.

[7]See Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 186-200, for a discussion of this ceremony.

[8]Nyeri District Annual Report, 1965. "Irungu" is another name for Maina.

[9]Lambert, Kikuyu Institutions, 101. The actual quote refers to the neighboring Meru, but is intended to apply to the Kikuyu as well. Muriuki refers to the fact that prominent warriors did not always make good elders and vice versa. Warriors required self-assertion, courage, self-confidence, and diligence, while elders needed wisdom, tact, self-control, and wide experience. The two types of characteristics often operated independent of each other. Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 170-171.

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[10] See Carl G. Rosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau" (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966), 93-94, for a discussion of this. Wan'gombe's biography is Jomo Kenyatta, My People of Kikuyu and The Life of Chief Wangombe (London: United Society for Christian Literature, 1944). In this book Kenyatta referred to him as a "paramount chief."

[11] See Low, "The Northern Interior," for a discussion of this view.

[12] The traditional Kikuyu educational system is discussed in John Anderson, The Struggle for the School (Nairobi: Longman Kenya Ltd., 1970), 100-111, and Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 98-129.

[13] Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 309-318.

[14] See Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1921).

[15] M. K. P. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 176-189. Sorrenson points out that most of the "lost lands" were in the Kiambu-Limuru area north of Nairobi. Here 60,000 acres were "purchased" from Kikuyu at nominal prices, and perhaps another 40,000 acres alienated when the title was in doubt. Around Thika some dry areas were alienated. In Nyeri the areas taken by Europeans were either former Masai land or else "frontier." By 1910 in the Kiambu-Limuru area there were already 15,000-20,000 persons living as squatters on European land.

[16] Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 153, discussed some of the compensations for younger men.

[17] Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 312.

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CHAPTER 5

NYERI IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Events in Nyeri since about the turn of the century can be classified for purposes of simplification under six headings. Though these are not always dintinct in either time or space, they do constitute a fair summary of the several stages or processes through which the district has gone in the past seven decades. These categories are:

1. The consolidation of colonial authority.
2. The implanting of European institutions.
3. The stage of initial social disruption.
4. The process of structural separation.
5. The period of overt defiance.
6. The period of contemporary politics.

One is perhaps reminded again of Deutsch's definition of social mobilization as a process in which there is "a breaking away from old commitments to traditional ways of living, and a moving into new situations where new patterns of behavior are relevant and needed, and where new commitments may have to be made." The history of Nyeri since the arrival of Europeans has been a constant process of social disorientation and re-integration. This process has centered on all the basic institutions of society: economic, political, cultural, social,

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Take, for example, the case of political authority. As just described, Nyeri was governed by a de-centralized acephalous egalitarian elite made up of mature men who relied upon wisdom and precedent in making their decisions. The British, on the other hand, quickly imposed a centralized, formalized, authoritarian system in which power rested in the hands of a small elite whose political base was independent of the society in which they functioned. As in other parts of the empire, the British were faced with the problem of setting up a working government in an alien land where there were few if any trained natives and a definite shortage of European administrators. Their response as elsewhere was to look for local rulers who could maintain legitimacy and administer day-to-day rules while policy was made in the district office. In the Nyeri context, however, there were no such "chiefs." What the British did find were local opportunists who were willing to misrepresent their authority in order to further their own positions. These self-proclaimed leaders were quickly sanctified by colonial authorities, bringing into being a new class of "traditional" leaders known as chiefs and headmen. European administrators, because of their lack of language facility, unfamiliarity with local conditions, and small numbers, permitted a great deal of <u>de facto</u> authority to reside in the hands of these chiefs, who were obeyed because of their authority but were not recognized as legitimate rulers. As one contemporary historian commented:

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> They are princelings like medioeval feudatories who report to their duke, the government officer: or, if you prefer, they are merely Government agents, and the native mentality only respects them as functionaries of a stronger power, which they must obey by force. The old generation, still remembering too well the former freedom, account them as mercenaries of the tribe.[1]

It seems in perspective that the arbitrary authority granted to chiefs and their abuses of that power, plus the fact that Nyeri had been subjected by force, created a problem of legitimacy which ultimately played a critical role in the outbreak of overt defiance in the 1950's. Prior to that break, however, several other intervening and contributing stages occurred which need to be discussed.

Social mobilization, as we have seen, requires a degree of disintegration as a prior condition. In the first few decades of European rule such disintegration was not lacking. In fact such disintegration had begun prior to the arrival of the Europeans. In the late 1890's Kikuyuland was hit with a series of natural disasters (drought, rinderpest, smallpox, and locusts) which had reduced the population of some Kikuyu regions by 50 to 90 per cent according to contemporary records.[2] The death of cattle herds and the human disasters led to a retreat into the higher and wetter "homeland" areas and to an evacuation of traditional grazing lands; this migration not only disrupted social relations among the Kikuyu but the evacuation of the grazing lands led British administrators to declare such areas "empty" and hence suited to European settlement. Within a short time European farmers had established commercial farms and ranches across the "White Highlands"; processing and service industries grew up along the newly constructed railway and Nairobi began to emerge as the major commercial center in East Africa.[3]

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The development of a commercial European-dominated economy had two impacts on Kenya, one socio-economic, one political. Economically the development of commercial agriculture in the White Highlands and of auxiliary industries elsewhere initiated a flow of personnel out of the high population areas to the farms and cities. Initially there was some coercion involved, but soon the migration became a self-perpetuating one.[4] The social redundance of junior warriors, the imposition of head taxes, and an increasing awareness of the benefits of cash employment accelerated the flow of workers. The following figures may illustrate the trend:

	Kikuyu Population	
Year	In Reserve	Off Reserve
1902	451,000	*
1923	447,000	50,000
1931	493,000	110,000
1948	733,924	292,000
1969	1,607,000	1,594,000

*Not estimated, but probably negligible.

Source: Sorrenson, Land Reform, 34-35.
1969 figures from Kenya Census.

Figure 5-1. Kikuyu Migration: Populations In and Out of Traditional Land Reserves.

Accelerating this migration were two other processes: the displacement of the ahoi and the spread of formal education. Data to trace the course of either of these processes is sketchy and unreliable, but some description can be made of the general drift of events.

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The ahoi, as discussed earlier, were landless Kikuyu who occupied surplus plots at the pleasure of their patrons. In the early years of the century when Europeans alienated part of the highlands and the Kikuyu first encountered written titles to land, a fear developed that the ahoi, who were converting to Christianity in large numbers, would use their influence with the powerful missionaries to have their "rights" to the land they cultivated legally recognized. Consequently the ahoi were driven off the land in large numbers.[5] There is no way to estimate either the percentage of converts who were ahoi (or conversely the percentage of ahoi who were converts) or the percentage of ahoi who were driven out of the reserve (as homelands are called). What is interesting is that the socially deprived elements of society were among the first to be caught up in the process of social mobilization. Though being expelled from the land was not of their doing, their involvement with missionaries was. Like the junior warriors who went to European farms to work, the ahoi seemed to be rationally responding to opportunities deemed preferable to those available in the traditional system.

Related to Christianity is the matter of education. Though the two are not identical, figures cited earlier in this chapter have shown that most primary schools were and are church-related. The first missionaries arrived in Nyeri in 1903 when the Catholic Consolata Mission (based in Turin, Italy) established Mathari Mission on the northeast side of Nyeri hill. They were followed in 1909 by the Church of Scotland (called Presbyterian Church of East Africa--PCEA--today) which settled at Tumu Tumu a few miles to the south.

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At first Kikuyu people were suspicious of European customs and resisted with particular vehemence the institutions of religion and education, which are so important to any culture. However, their lack of structural unity made it difficult to organize any collective resistance, and within a short time non-integrated or vulnerable elements of society (youth, ahoi, junior warriors, social undesirables) began to break away and respond to the opportunities of an alternate value system.

It is difficult to estimate either the rate of conversion to Christianity or the rate of education because of imprecise records kept at the time. Several rough estimates are possible, however: Though the Church of Scotland took six years to make its first convert,[6] conversions increased at a more rapid rate after that so that by 1938 approximately 8 per cent of Kenya's population was Christian (all churches).[7] In 1930 the Tumu Tumu baptismal roll had 2857 names[8] while the Catholics of Nyeri claimed in the early 1930's to have 14,000, which they said was double the number of protestants in the district.[9] Regarding education, Cagnolo reports that from 1924-1933 450 students had attended courses at the Mathari Mission school and one would suspect that the protestant figure was somewhat smaller than this.[10] The important fact, however, is that public interest in education increased considerably as time passed. In 1952, at the beginning of the Emergency, the Kenya education department reported that in Kikuyuland the Independent schools (to be discussed directly) numbered 220 with 28,000 students, while mission and government schools (numbers

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unspecified) had 105,000 students enrolled. Githinguri College (again run by the Independents) had opened in 1939 with 225 students and had expanded by 1947 to 573 students.[11]

Looking at the political implications of these socio-economic changes there seem to be two major thrusts: First, socio-economic mobilization created a stratum of people whose careers and lives were integrally tied up with the modern sector. Their jobs and livelihoods were derived from it. This stratum had within it several classes of people, some well off, some poor and insecure.[12] All, however, had objectively defined needs which were foreign to the traditional sector. Problems of job security, formal training, formal representation of interests, and housing, to name a few, were faced by all of them. Secondly, social mobilization led to a certain level of exposure to non-traditional standards and to what has been called earlier a "revolution of rising expectations." The Kikuyu, of all the Kenya peoples, were most exposed to Europeans and European customs. Kikuyuland was bordered on three sides by European settlement, and the city of Nairobi is kept only by an administrative boundary from being a part of Kikuyu territory. Kikuyus everywhere were exposed to European standards of living and European life styles, not to mention European authority. Though perhaps better off than most Kenya Africans, their perceived deprivation was greater because of their exposure to Europeans and Asians. In short, some needs were defined objectively, others by comparison. The political repercussions of comparative deprivation seem infinitely more far-reaching. Objectively defined needs can be

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satisfied in straightforward ways, such as by raising wages, improving housing, or reducing school fees. Perceptually defined needs hinge upon matters such as perceived inequality and differential status levels. Simple payoffs will seldom satisfy such needs.

Nyeri district records during the first few decades of British rule reveal two distinct processes at work.[13] First, the number of petitions, delegations, and complaints referred to by district officials seem to increase over time. Most of these dealt with

1. Complaints about official laws, especially taxes and public work projects, and the way chiefs were enforcing them;
2. Disputes between mobilized and non-mobilized strata about favors, influence, and status either demanded by or supposedly given to moderns;
3. Disagreements about the role of missions in the district, especially their opposition to local customs and their attempts to influence government policy.

The second interesting aspect of this era is the increasingly frequent mention (especially after World War I) of formal groups. It has been pointed out elsewhere that the Kikuyu learned very quickly from their European counterparts the advantage of formal organization.[14] Parties, interest groups, regional associations, and cultural groups all appear in the annals of Nyeri history with increasing frequency.

The development of political awareness and interests plus the evolution of formal organizations set the stage for a period of structural separation in the 1930's. Kikuyu politicians had been

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agitating for some time for rights to political representation, redress of grievance, and the return of "stolen lands" alienated to Europeans.[15] They had met with little success. In 1929 the Presbyterian missionaries gave them an issue which seems in perspective to have united Kikuyus of all types. For reasons not relevant here, the missionaries decided to stamp out the Kikuyu custom of clitoridectomy (which was an essential element of female age rites) and to require all converts and teachers in their schools to oppose it. The results of this action were two:

1. Membership in the Church of Scotland in Kikuyu areas dropped by approximately 90 per cent almost overnight.[16] Kikuyu Presbyterian Christians, unwilling to renounce either their religion or their culture, formed two separate churches, the African Orthodox Church and the African Independent Pentecostal Church.
2. Many Kikuyu teachers were fired or resigned from mission schools. Working with Independent church leaders they founded two mass education systems, the bigger of which was centered in Nyeri and called the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA). The response to KISA is interesting to note. Though twenty-five years earlier Kikuyu parents had often beaten or punished their children for attending school, now there was a mass outpouring of sympathy and support, as figures cited on pages 81-82 (taken from a time when the church had made amends with many of its converts) show.[17]

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African resentment continued to fester even as the base of educational and political skill expanded. The Second World War, like the First World War before it, was a critical event. During World War I Nyeri people had served in great numbers in the Carrier Corps but only in a servant-porter capacity.[18] In World War II they often saw combat in Burma and Madagascar while serving side by side with European recruits. The impact of this de facto equality, contrasted with the unimproved conditions to which they returned after the war, escalated the level of perceived inequality. "Served in Burma" was to become in a few years a frequent characteristic of guerilla leaders.[19]

After the war, demands for formal participation in the political process became more insistent.[20] Jomo Kenyatta had returned from schooling in Britain and emerged as the primary spokesman for Kenya's African people. But while he headed up the "constitutional" wing of African nationalism, there began to emerge a "radical" wing which seemed convinced that violence was the only way to break the stranglehold which Europeans held on Kenya.[21] The secret oath was developed as a means to unity, and violence became more frequent. By 1952 when a State of Emergency was declared by the Governor, Kenya was engaged in a full-scale guerilla war commonly known as Mau Mau. During this time political activity by Africans was restricted, civil rights were suspended, and political leaders (among them Kenyatta) were detained. The British army was brought in to suppress the rebellion.

Though this rebellion was found all over Kikuyuland (and in other parts of Kenya also), much of the fighting occurred in Nyeri, and

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all of the guerilla "generals" except one were from that district. The geographical location of Nyeri explains partially the incidence of combat there, since it lies between Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Mountains where the "forest fighters" had their bases. The prominence of Nyeri's people in the struggle, however, is more a reflection of socio-economic-political factors than of geographical ones.[22] They were touched by colonial authority, exposed to European settlers, mobilized into the economy, and organized around their cultural identity, yet their benefits were few. It is little wonder that the intensity of their rebellion would be greater than that of other Kikuyu regions.[23]

The Mau Mau rebellion, though ultimately suppressed, was a definite watershed in Nyeri history. Out of it emerged a series of political, economic, and social transformations which drastically altered Kikuyu society. To understand these transformations one must understand several essential facts about the rebellion.

First, though the purpose of the war was to gain independence for Kenya, in practice it was not a war of national liberation but a civil war. The ultimate enemy was the European settler and the British colonial government, but the immediate enemy was the African who was either openly supporting or passively accepting the status quo. The priority which political leaders put upon organizing and consolidating their political base (primarily through the institution of oathing) illustrates this, as do casualty figures. By way of illustration civilian deaths through 1956 (by which time the worst fighting was

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over) totaled 1877 of which only 32 were European; apart from 3 Asians, the rest were African. Of all war deaths (again through 1956), only 95 of 13,544 were European and 63 of these were security forces killed combat.[24] Most of the casualties--civilian or combat--were Africans killed by other Africans, and in most cases Kikuyu killed by other Kikuyu. In contrast, the Angolan revolution of 1961 produced 2,000 European deaths in less than six months.[25]

Secondly, the fighting did not occur on the fringes of Kikuyu society but at its very center. It was not a war where the line was carefully drawn between civilians and soldiers. Each man, woman, and child was a participant, whether or not he wanted to be. Whether in the forest, smuggling food, serving in the pro-government Home Guard, or just trying to stay alive, everyone was touched. Virtually the whole population of Kikuyuland, 950,000 civilians, were moved into fortified "villages" where they lived for the duration of the war. Kikuyu employees on European farms or in the cities were often repatriated en masse to the already overcrowded rural reserves. Rosberg and Nottingham describe the situation perhaps as well as it can be described:

> The seige of Kikuyuland, from Muguga in the south to Nyeri in the north, had turned the country into an armed camp. Nearly every hill was capped with a small fort, complete with a tall watch-tower, a deep moat full of needle-sharp spikes, extensive barbed wire defenses, and thick earth ramparts. Nestling below was a newly built village with sheds for all the cattle and goats. The whole population had been removed from their former homes to these new encampments. Many shops and markets were closed. For months at a time recalcitrant villages were put under 23-hour curfews, the inhabitants being allowed out for one hour a day, under armed guard, to get food. A strip a mile wide along the forest edge had

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> been made a prohibited area in which no cultivation was permitted and anyone moving could be shot on sight. Finally, the population had been set to work digging a wide, deep ditch along more than a hundred miles of forest boundary. The isolation of the forest fighters was complete.[26]

A third important fact about the Emergency was that the British used it as an opportunity to completely restructure the agricultural and land tenure systems. Long worried about unscientific practices and low productivity, colonial planners saw the Emergency as a golden opportunity to institute reforms. In the midst of the existing chaos, who would notice and how could anyone resist additional changes? Though several schemes (such as those for permanent villigization and a restructuring of the class system) were discarded as untenable, others were implemented.[27] Primary among these reforms were those relating to land consolidation and registration. Prior to this, land tenure was based upon the mbari system under which a man had full occupational and use rights to his land but could not sell it without consulting family members. A characteristic of the pre-consolidation system was that a holding was often split into several plots spread around the neighborhood. This made development difficult since it was hard to get loans or apply modern techniques to small non-contiguous plots. The traditional tenure system also provided for "redemption" (or right of repurchase) of all lands which had been sold. For a farmer to plant permanent crops such as tea or coffee on a plot which could be purchased back at any time was unlikely, even though such repurchase by law had to include payment for improvements.

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As a result of government actions, by 1959 all plots in Nyeri (a total of 43,107) had been registered and consolidated, and owners had been given freehold titles, with exclusive individual rights of ownership.[28] At that time the make-up of the district in terms of plot sizes was as shown in Figure 5-2.

Acres	Per Cent	Number	Cumulative Per Cent
0 -1	11.6	4897	11.6
1.1-2	16.74	7214	28.34
2.1-3	16.61	7160	44.95
3.1-4	15.2	6566	60.15
4.1-5	12.0	5175	72.15
5.1-6	8.08	3484	80.23
6.1-7	5.56	2395	85.78
7.1-8	3.71	1597	89.50
8.1-9	2.91	1254	92.21
9.1-10	1.98	852	94.19
10.1-15	3.88	1674	98.07
15.1-20	1.01	474	99.08
20.1-30	0.61	264	99.69
30.1+	0.23	101	100.00

Source: Nyeri District Annual Agriculture Report, 1959. Index.

Figure 5-2. Size and Number of Plots in Nyeri District, 1959.

Other agricultural reforms were either initiated or accelerated during this period. Scientific land use including terracing, anti-erosion measures, enclosure, and farm planning were encouraged (and sometimes required). The extension service was expanded to include farmers' training centers (complete with demonstration plots and short courses on management and farming practices) and 4-K clubs (similar to 4-H) for primary school children. Perhaps most important of all, though, the late 1940's and early 1950's saw the introduction of coffee, tea,

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pyrethrum, and grade cattle. These items (some of which Kikuyu had been trying to acquire for some time in the face of European settler resistance--on the grounds of quality control) quickly replaced wattle bark and goat skins as major commercial produce items. Figure 5-3 provides a breakdown of goods sold outside of the district in a recent year.

Commodity	Value (Kenya Pounds)*
Coffee	494,800
Dairy	272,000
Wheat	250,000
Tea	155,742
Pyrethrum	72,112
Maize	24,794
Wattle Bark	12,150

*One Kenya pound = $2.80

Source: Nyeri District Agricultural Report, 1970.

Figure 5-3. Agricultural Exports from Nyeri District.

Initial reaction to these reforms was highly negative, though certain progressive African farmers had in fact been agitating for similar programs for some time.[29] The reason for this opposition seems to fall into two categories:

1. There was a deep suspicion that such actions were either tricks by Europeans to destroy African agriculture or else a prelude to a European take-over of African lands.
2. This belief was reinforced by Kikuyu politicians who saw the land reform program as a battleground on which they could do

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symbolic combat with the colonial government. As one prominent politician-farmer commented,

> They were not opposed to these things because they were bad, but because they came from the Government. People were hating the Europeans very much by that time. The politicians did not want the people to think that the Europeans could bring good things so they told these things were bad. When I planted my coffee trees, they opposed me and told the people that the Government would take that land. The ignorant people could believe them.[30]

An interesting point is that the flow of information from the Government to the people (even on a superficially non-controversial subject such as agricultural reform) was viewed as a flow of political influence, so that one evaluated not merely the message content but its source as well. An area which was highly organized in its resistance to colonial authority was unlikely, for example, to opt for such non-compulsory projects as construction of cattle dips (which were virtually pre-requisites for the introduction of non-tick-resistant grade cattle). Since the transformation from native to grade cattle is a slow and expensive one, involving perhaps 10-15 years, one notices even today a close correlation between the extent to which a location resisted colonial authority and the quality of its cattle. Those locations with strong, pro-government chiefs which were pacified early are more likely to have upgraded their cattle, while those which resisted remain with the thin, low-production cows of their ancestors. But, strikingly, in 1971 when this research was being conducted, the only area in all of Nyeri District which had close to 100 per cent adoption of hybrid maize was one which had been so defiant during the Emergency that the Government had at one stage withdrawn its whole non-military staff. This area

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(Mungaria sub-location in Aguthi location) had only in 1969 constructed its first cattle dip, and the quality of cattle there was quite low. The level of political mobilization which had enabled Mungaria to resist colonial authority with such effectiveness was able with equal effectiveness to facilitate adoption of hybrid maize seed once the political significance of the message had been changed from unfavorable to favorable.

As a result of the constitutional changes made by Britain in 1960 (which led to an independent African government in 1963), the "message" associated with agricultural modernization became not only acceptable but desirable. Consequently the relationship between being a loyalist during the Emergency and growing cash crops, which had existed in the 1950's, is conspicuously absent. Since 1959 when the Emergency ended, ex-detainees have had ample time to "catch up" if need be. The potentially divisive cleavage which would have pitted rich loyalists against poor revolutionaries in an independent Kenya has not materialized.[31]

After the constitutional changes of 1960, Kenya rapidly progressed from internal self-government in 1962 to independence in 1963 and republic status in 1964. During much of this time the country had a two-party system, though the alignment of parties vis-a-vis the governing Kenya African National Union (KANU) has changed somewhat. Until 1964 the major inter-party issue took the form of a conflict over regionalism (majimbo) in which less densely populated areas vied for power with more densely-populated ones, in the manner of the New York-Virginia conflict at the

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American constitutional convention. The effort of the weaker regions to preserve their power, plus the image of KANU as a revolutionary change-oriented organization put KANU on the left of the political spectrum and the opposition KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) on the right. In 1964, however, as the result of accommodations and guarantees, KADU voluntarily joined KANU, creating a de facto one-party state and shifting KANU somewhat to the right. By 1966 the KANU left wing broke away to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU) which challenged KANU in several by-elections later that year. Though KANU remained the dominant national party, several challenges had been made to its supremacy. Ideologically KPU had argued that KANU was not only pro-West, but had "sold out" the poor man. Specifically they pointed to the role of foreign capital in Kenya, the creation of an African bourgeoisie, and the conservative position taken on European owned land. They appealed to peasants, urban workers, the landless, and neglected regions to join them. This attack was a serious one because it challenged the authority of regional "bosses" and hence sought to replace vertical alliances with horizontal ones.[32] In 1969, however, just a matter of months before the expected General Elections, Tom Mboya, a prominent nationalist leader and member of the cabinet, was assassinated. Since Mboya was a Luo (as was Oginga Odinga, the head of the KPU) and his assassin was a Kikuyu (as were President Kenyatta and several key ministers), the ethnic dimension quickly supplanted the class dimension as the primary difference between the two parties. Key Kikuyu leaders in KPU quit and "returned" to KANU, which under the leadership of Kenyatta

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had appeared to many Kikuyus as virtually their own party. The institution of the oath, dormant since the mid-1950's, was revived as a means of once again unifying the Kikuyu people. Indications are that virtually every adult Kikuyu (and many children) were oathed. Following a riot at one of Kenyatta's speeches, the KPU was banned, but the elections were held anyway. This banning of the KPU seemed to defuse the ethnic issue somewhat and to shift voter attention to the candidates. A full half of the parliament was defeated, indicating a high level of selectivity among the public.

In Nyeri the KPU found little success, though some of its appeals were more popular. An attempt to open an office failed and no KPU candidates were entered for either national elections or the local government (County Council) elections of the previous year (though in that election the District Officer had disqualified several candidates for technical reasons). In the General Election of 1969 all four members of parliament from Nyeri were defeated. Within KANU two factions emerged, called "A" and "B," but the motivation behind their existence seemed as much a power struggle as an ideological one. When these conflicts threatened to go beyond acceptable bounds, the District Officer would often intervene, indicating to many that, as in colonial times, government and politics were two distinct matters, and, in case of an overt conflict, it was government which would get the upper hand.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

[1]Cagnolo, The Akikuyu, 24. See also Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 217.

[2]Kiambu, just north of present-day Nairobi, is the only district where there were Europeans living. No estimate is available for death rates in Nyeri, though the fact that people fled to the Nyeri and Murang'a areas indicates that the famine at least may have been less severe there. Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 201, reviews the differing reports of events.

For another discussion of these events see Sorrenson, European Settlement, 177-189.

[3]One of the better histories of this era is the sympathetic biography of Lord Delamere by Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country (London: Chatto and Windus, 1953). Also see Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, for a discussion of settlement from a colonial point of view.

[4]For a discussion of labor policy during this time and the famous "Ainsworth memo," see F. H. Goldsmith, John Ainsworth (London: Macmillan and Co., 1959), 102-111.

[5]Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 225-230. See also Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 152-155, for a related discussion.

[6]Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 108.

[7]Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), 234-235.

[8]Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 115.

[9]Cagnolo, The Akikuyu, 284.

[10]Ibid., 283.

[11]See F. D. Corfield, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1960), 171-190, for a discussion of these schools. Corfield points out that KISA leaders were claiming many more students but discounts such claims as braggadocio. Anderson suggests that official

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figures may have underestimated enrollments for reasons which he discusses. Anderson, Struggle for the School, 128-129.

[12] See Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 234-276.

[13] See Kenya National Archive, Reel #79. These data were not quantified in any manner.

[14] See M. K. P. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 50-51. The Kikuyu have a saying, "The European gave the African a knife, and the African cut him with it."

[15] See Harry Thuku, An Autobiography (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970). Also see Corfield, Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, 38-63.

[16] Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 120 and 124.

[17] One of the best histories of this schism is F. B. Welbourn, East African Rebels (London: S. C. M. Press, 1961). The colonial government, which opposed the church position, viewed the effort favorably and lent advise, organizational assistance and even a small grant from time to time. One District Officer referred to the school system as "a respected and excellent African activity." Harries to Morgan, "Nyeri District Handing Over Report," December 18, 1943, Kenya National Archives, Reel #9.

[18] Official records show that 14,293 Nyeri Africans served in the Carrier Corps, though this figure reflects a somewhat expanded district boundary and does not consider those who were employed in essential jobs (such as on European farms) and hence were excused from service. J. R. Tate, "Carrier Corps Recruitment Returns: August 1914-August 1917." September 15, 1917, Kenya National Archives, Reel #79. See also Donald Savage and Forbes Munro, "Carrier Corps Recruitment in the British East African Protectorate, 1914-1918," Journal of African History, 7, No. 2 (1966), 313-342.

[19] A quote from General China's autobiography will illustrate the psychological impact of this re-entry process: "Among the shells and bullets there had been no pride, no air of superiority from our European comrades-in-arms. We drank the same tea, used the same water and lavatories, and shared the same jokes. There were no racial insults, no references to 'niggers,' 'baboons' and so on. The white heat of battle had blistered all that away and left only our common humanity and our common fate, either death or survival. . . . Late in 1944 we returned to Nairobi and at the Railway Station our troop-train was met by Eliud Mathu, the first nominated African member of the Kenya Legislative Council. The military bands were playing and beautifully dressed European ladies chattered while they served us with tea and cakes on the platform.

This was a very surprising thing, because we knew that, the next day, if we so much as looked at one of them in the Nairobi streets we would be arrested. But today we were heroes and they were grateful. Their tea and cakes nearly choked me." Waruhiu Itote (General China), "Mau Mau" General (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), 27-28.

[20] See Corfield, Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, 292-295, for the text of the most famous demand, presented in 1948 by Kenyatta to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

[21] Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 84-88, discuss the two wings and explain why they took different approaches to the problem.

[22] General China, who was from Nyeri, discussed the problems he had because of the fact that most prominent politicians (including Kenyatta) were from Kiambu while few men in the forest were from that district. Itote, "Mau Mau" General, 129-132.

[23] For a discussion of the three traditional Kikuyu districts and why they differed in their response and behavior, see Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 73-80.

[24] Corfield, Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, 316.

[25] Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency: An African Case," Comparative Politics, 4, No. 3 (April, 1972), 333.

[26] Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 293-294.

[27] Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, 113-150, discusses the evolution of government policy.

[28] The transition from traditional tenure to British-type tenure was, of course, not easy, and certain holdovers of the old system still exist. One example is the rule that no farm may be subdivided if it is below 5 acres in size. Since traditionally a man's land was divided among the sons of his wives (each set of sons receiving an equal share, unless the father decreed otherwise on his death bed), the new system provides a direct conflict between family solidarity on the one hand and the law on the other. Under the present system either the father or the family as a whole must choose to favor one son over the others. This not only causes social conflict of a serious nature but also leaves some sons landless, a terrible thing to a Kikuyu. As a result, there is evidence that many families simply neglect to change the title out of the name of the deceased father, and divide the lands as they wish. DeWilde in his chapter on Nyeri mentions this (John deWilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Vol. II (Baltimore:

John Hopkins Press, 1967). My own data has provided evidence of this same phenomenon since 11 per cent of the plots sampled are not actually owned and operated by the person who is the registered owner. In most cases the present occupant reported that the real owner is dead.

[29] See Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, 135-138.

[30] Lincoln Ngarua, Aguthi location, former County Councillor at beginning of Emergency, in 1971 conversation with author.

[31] I put this matter to local officials as often as possible and few of them felt a relationship existed. The only holdover seems to be the fact that occasionally a detainee was given poorer land during consolidation. An analysis of my data shows that 71 per cent of detainees and 66 per cent of non-detainees are members of cooperatives (indicating they produce cash crops). When asked if they were satisfied with land consolidation (a question which often tapped a feeling that one had been cheated, 86 per cent of detainees and 87 per cent of non-detainees expressed satisfaction, again showing no difference. See Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, 237-252, for a discussion of steps taken to protect the interests of detainees, and why the matter failed to materialize as a political issue in the post-Emergency period.

Rita Breen, who has conducted research in Kiambu District, feels that in that area at least there may be residual resentment among ex-detainees. Private communication, December, 1972.

[32] For a discussion of the role of "bosses" and also of the issues involved in the KANU-KPU conflict see Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya 1963-8 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970).

PART THREE

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

PART THREE

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

At the beginning of this century Nyeri was still a traditional society, existing much as it had for generations. There was no central government to contend with, no member of parliament to elect, no KANU to join, no taxes to pay, no foreigners to resent, no cities to visit. The last three chapters have shown how these conditions changed over time, and the impact of such changes on society. But the analysis so far has been at the macro level and has examined only major components of the political and social system. It is time now to turn to the individual to see how he reacted to the new conditions confronting him. Chapters six, seven, and eight will focus on the people who make up Nyeri society, on their attitudes, their characteristics, and their expectations. Chapter six is concerned with attitudes toward the social and political systems, and the overall type of society which has emerged out of the last 75 years of change; chapter seven will concentrate upon some of the specific characteristics of individuals, showing how the four patterns of modernization have produced different outcomes; chapter eight will focus upon discontent levels, political demands, and differential perceptions of system responsiveness.

The reader is again reminded of the 436 interviews on which this analysis is based. The details of how the survey was conducted and possible biases in the sample (such as the fact that all respondents were male land owners) are discussed in detail in Appendix A.

The reader also deserves an explanation as to why tests of significance were omitted from the tables in chapters seven and eight. The basic reason is that most statistics are tabulated for whole tables, whereas the analysis in this work concentrates more upon comparisons of one social mobilization type with another. These types are not arrayed along a single dimension. One could calculate tests of significance for the interrelationship between any two of them, but to specify the null-hypothesis for a table as a whole would be very difficult. For these reasons it was decided to omit statistics entirely and to concentrate upon simple percentages.

Related to these percentages, the reader will also note that all were rounded to the nearest full unit, so that occasionally the total is slightly more or slightly less than 100.

CHAPTER 6

A PROFILE OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

There is a danger when looking at a group as a whole that one will lapse into unjustified and overdrawn generalizations. Efforts to attribute characteristics to whole groups of people often reveal more about the writer than about the group being discussed. Stereotypes, often based upon value judgments, are all too often the result of such efforts. Descriptions of the Kikuyu have in times past described them as "secretive," "irrational," or with a "forest mentality."[1] These stereotypes were not scientifically derived generalizations and can be discarded out of hand. In spite of these abuses, however, most societies seem to have "primitive beliefs" which are diffused throughout the society to the extent that almost everyone accepts them. These beliefs form an environment in which the political process takes place. They have been evolved over time through events, traumas, achievements, or precedents of various types. They are not "given" but grow out of common experiences, expectations, or conditions. Each has definite (if often unclear) causal beginnings or origins and is maintained in the society not because of some predisposition but rather because of social pressure or the continuation of the conditions which created it.

Though usually stable over time, they can change, so that an examination of patterns of agreement and disagreement over them may prove a valuable means of examining the political process.

In Part Two we re-examined some of the "conditions"--historical, physical, economic, social, political--which prevail in Nyeri or have prevailed in the past. Any examination of the fundamental beliefs and values of the society must begin with an analysis of these conditions. A primary purpose of this chapter will be to show that the predominant values and beliefs of Nyeri's political system are the results of two "revolutions" which have occurred in this century: the socio-economic revolution and the political revolution. Though these revolutions are not entirely distinct empirically, they can be separated conceptually for heuristic purposes. Evidence in the last chapter showed how those two revolutions proceeded historically: labor migration, literacy, the spread of Western influence, population increases, and a restricted opportunity structure all contributed to political discontent and set the stage for (or even led to) the political revolution which occurred. This chapter departs from simple historical narrative to show how these historical processes and events led to a distinctive set of attitudes and beliefs.

Results of the Socio-Economic Revolution

Question: Do you feel that a shortage of land is a problem in this district?

Responses: Yes--96%
No -- 4%

Question: Do you feel that difficulty in finding jobs is a problem in this district?

Responses: Yes--97%
No -- 3%

One of the overriding facts of life in Nyeri is the existence of a land shortage. As shown in the last chapter, a full 60 per cent of all farms are four acres or below. This fact is particularly serious when one considers the economic and cultural importance of land in Kikuyu society.[2] It was traditionally and remains today the primary resource. Possession of a plot assures a man of status and a link with society, in a sense, a home with which he can identify and remain a part. Economically, it provides him with a permanent livelihood, a hedge against unemployment, and social security for his family or himself in old age. The Kikuyu have a saying which illustrates their feelings, "A man is not a man without a piece of land."

In this century, however, pressure on the land has increased considerably through increased population and the elimination of the frontier. This pressure on the land has led to both a real and a perceived land shortage. One must consider both real and perceived shortage because there is a clear distinction between objectively and subjectively defined deprivation. An objectively defined shortage of land would have to be measured by the productive value of the land compared with the number of people it had to support. If, for example, it takes three acres of subsistence production for an average family to survive, then a real shortage of land would exist for the society as a whole if its collective holdings dropped below this, or for an

individual family if its individual holdings dropped below this. A subjectively defined shortage, on the other hand, would exist (regardless of acreage) if a landowner felt he had less land than he required for his needs, regardless of his actual acreage.

This ability to perceive inequality is derived from certain characteristics of modernization found only in changing societies. Exposure to differential levels of wealth is the primary of these, and Nyeri people are clearly "exposed," both to persons within the society who have modernized themselves and to persons from without but with whom they have frequent contact (such as Asian merchants or European settlers, missionaries, or administrators). These people clearly maintain a life style and standard of living which are preferable in many ways to that of the average peasant farmer. Their clothes are better, their homes nicer, and their children healthier. Thus, although people have been known to reject certain changes in the way of doing things, they have never rejected out of hand better clothes, nicer homes, or healthier children. In fact, if the means to these ends are not in fundamental contradiction with their values, they are likely to enthusiastically embrace both the ends and the means.

This may explain partially why Kikuyus were so quick to accept Western education. It became obvious within a short time that formal Western education was a means to a very desirable end. The means (for example, the attacks by missionary educators upon Kikuyu culture and social practices) were not always consistent with the value system of the Kikuyu. The results of these inconsistencies were quite obvious

in the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's. In fact one could almost argue that the Kenya nationalist movement centered upon an effort to purge Western innovations of their cultural bias: Kikuyu Christians broke away from the established churches not to destroy Christianity but to save it; they left mission schools not because they opposed education but because they cherished it; their opposition to agricultural reform, as shown in the previous chapter, hinged not upon the reforms themselves but upon the belief that in accepting them one was accepting part and parcel a whole cultural and political system as well. The separation of the means to modernization from the political message often associated with it was fundamental to the acceptance of the former. Once the separation had occurred, acceptance was rapid and eager.

The process was as shown in Figure 6-1. Nyeri was confronted not only with a relative decline in the traditional resource base (land) but also with the introduction of an alien economic system which made the productive capacity of their traditional system look meager by comparison. The dissemination of information about this system was widespread, leading to a high degree of perceived deprivation. Acceptance of the western model was rapid, but was hampered by the need to purge modernization of its European overtones, thus making it compatible with the local value system. Once this separation was complete, the eagerness of local people to "modernize" placed enormous burdens upon the responsive capacity of the political system.




Figure 6-1. The Process of Modernization in Nyeri.

We have already traced in chapter five certain aspects of this process. We have examined the increase in population, the closing of the frontier, the introduction of formal land titles, the setting up of schools in Nyeri, the arrival of European settlers and administrators, and the temporary migration of Kikuyu workers to cities and European farms from which they returned with changed perspectives and experiences. Though some of these processes continue today, the discussion of them was from a historical point of view; to illustrate the impact which they have had upon the political culture[3] of Nyeri we must turn to the contemporary period.

To attempt to assess the level of perceived deprivation respondents were asked several questions about their lives, standards of living, and immediate surroundings. The results are shown in Table 6-1. As one can easily tell, there is a remarkably high level of discontent: 75 per cent of the respondents are unhappy with farming as a means of earning a livelihood, 71 per cent are not happy with their houses, and so forth. One of these items--the question about satisfaction with farming--

deserves comment. This question seems to have ominous implications for a country which is already overburdened with unemployment for it indicates that a full 75 per cent of the people now living on farms would seek alternative employment if they felt it were available. This and the other questions indicate there is a high level of discontent with the economic benefits of farming as a means of earning a livelihood, though it is obvious from other data that the emotional attachment to the land is still very great.

Table 6-1. Measures of Dissatisfaction.

Item	Per Cent Yes Respondents	Total N
Satisfied with farming	25	356*
Would prefer another farm instead of this one	66	420
Can lead a good life with farm income	38	419
Satisfied with housing	29	427
Unhappy with standard of living	72	423

*Persons who had full-time, non-farm jobs were not asked this question.

As suggested earlier, one major result of this discontent is the emphasis which is put upon education as a means to escape poverty. Nearly every child in the district is enrolled in school for a time and large numbers receive primary certificates. Moreover, many of the schools they attend originated as harambee (self-help) projects, constructed by locally raised funds. In fact the proliferation of

privately constructed secondary schools in Nyeri prompted the government in 1970 to call a halt to further activity of this type unless sanctioned by the District Commissioner.[4]

This headlong drive for education has astounded observers of Kikuyu society for several decades now. Few of these observers, however, have offered any causal explanation for it, except to speak mystically of a "thirst for education" which presumably sprang full-blown from the heads of the Kikuyu people. More likely this thirst sprang from a realization that opportunities in the traditional farming sector were declining both in numbers and desirability, while opportunities were available to those who are educated and have command of the English language. The Kikuyu, through hard experience, have come to realize that land is a non-expandable resource which can only support a limited number of people. They have thus sought an alternative resource which they can make available to their children. Education is this resource. It can be expanded almost at will and in fact has been expanded to a point where society can no longer fully absorb its output.[5]

A study which David Koff and others conducted among Kenya school children will help to illustrate the situation.[6] Students in their final year of primary school were asked questions about their futures and about the importance of education. Several points about the responses in Central Province are worthy of note:

1. When asked the purpose of getting an education, 82 per cent listed some reason related to mobility, such as getting a job or increasing one's status or prestige.

2. Asked to describe a man without an education, 52 per cent said he was a man unable to get a job.
3. When asked an abstract question about the "best" job, only 23 per cent mentioned farming. Of these same students, however, 41 per cent said they expect to be farmers.
4. When asked what their preferred job was, 72 per cent mentioned a job in the urban sector.

Not only in education but in other ways the Kikuyu have shown a willingness to adopt modern attitudes. Table 6-2 shows how this has influenced their thinking regarding the role of women in society.

Table 6-2. Attitudes toward Women.

Item	Per Cent Yes Respondents	Total N
Education not important for girls since most of their work will be in the home.	7	427
Women should care for the homes and not go to the towns to work.	78	413

The two items on the role of women are interesting not only for what they show about the Kikuyu but because of what they show about the problems of measuring "modern" and "traditional" attitudes. Students of social change have always recognized the important role of women in preserving and transferring values from one generation to the next.[7] "The hand that rocks the cradle" is often critical in the process

of social change. An effort to preserve existing values which are threatened will often center upon an effort to isolate and protect females. For this reason questions about women in non-traditional roles (working in cash employment or becoming literate) would seem valuable items to tap basic attitudes about society. As one can easily see, the difficulty which emerged is that on one item respondents seem very modern while on another they seem much more conservative. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency lies in two places: in an analysis of who supported which attitude and in an analysis of why. Each of these points up the danger inherent in hasty interpretations of data.

An effort to compare responses with levels of social mobilization (discussed in the next chapter) revealed that in many cases the people who favored education for girls were the same ones who opposed women working in the towns. This meant that either the measures were in error, the respondents were answering at random, or that in fact both items were correct measures of the same process, which would then require further explanation. While keeping in mind the possibility that translation error may have accidentally invalidated one of the questions, I returned to the original questionnaires to see what comments, if any, had been volunteered by respondents when answering these questions. The volunteered comments on the two questions ultimately revealed an answer to the dilemma. Few respondents were opposed in principle to women being employed. In fact many who opposed women working urged moments later that girls be educated so they could have equal job

opportunities with boys. The clue to the attitude being tapped then lay not in the response but in the reason for the response, and in the fact that one question tapped an abstract attitude while the other tapped information about social conditions. In particular, in explaining why they opposed women going to towns to work many respondents took a "heaven help the working girl" approach, emphasizing the bad living conditions, job insecurity, and ultimate danger of prostitution to which many of them were subject (often greater if girls were not educated). It soon became obvious that the respondents who would support on principle equal female education were often the same ones who would be aware of the dangers of urban living and hence oppose on practical grounds the migration of women (especially uneducated women) to the cities. Thus in contrast to expectations at the beginning of the project (when the questionnaire was being designed), agreement (or disagreement) with both questions would in the eyes of many respondents be inconsistent. As it is, the response pattern shows a predominance of modern attitudes which are combined with (but not opposed by) a highly rational and realistic concern for the possibly undesirable implications of implementation.

When reading the figures on agriculture (Table 6-3) one should recall the resistance put up in the 1940's and 1950's to agricultural reform, in the time before agricultural modernization had been divorced from its colonial origins. It has often been suggested that there exists a zero-sum relationship between "modern" and "traditional," but such a distinction seems inaccurate here. It is obvious that the

Kikuyu have adopted modernization and accepted the modern economy not as a means of escaping the traditional land-oriented culture but rather as a means of preserving it. The wealth accumulated through holding a job in the modern sector (even a humble job) or through adopting modern farm techniques can be used to expand one's land holdings or to develop further those lands which one already possesses.

Table 6-3. Attitudes toward Agricultural Modernization.

Item	Per Cent Yes Respondents	Total N
Satisfied with land consolidation	87	432
Agree: New agricultural ways will <u>not</u> improve the crops.	16	416

Recalling again the conditions surrounding labor migration, there is clear evidence that seeking a job in the modern urban sector facilitates rather than breaks down many of the land-oriented values of the traditional society. Leys has argued along this line that Kenya has yet to create a true proletariat because residence in the urban area reinforces ties to the land.[8] The rich worker will use his surplus to buy land while the poor worker will leave his family behind in the reserve with relatives. Both look to the countryside for their future. Both live in a world which may be near permanent physically but which is psychologically temporary. Visits home are frequent; the urban residence may be no more than a bed in a cell-like room while savings are devoted to the construction of a nice home in the reserve.

Likewise the adoption of education seems to this observer to be less of a break with traditional values than an extension of them or an effort to reinforce them. To a very large extent education is viewed instrumentally, that is, not as an end in itself but as a means of achieving other ends (as the Koff study just cited shows). In fact there is evidence from the data that the people contacted view the whole modern economic-political system in highly instrumental terms. This instrumental orientation puts emphasis on the ends or outcomes of an act, and has been designated by some scholars as a distinguishing characteristic of a modern political system.[9]

In Nyeri it has produced a set of attitudes toward the governing elite which is most interesting. Tenure in office of elected leaders is contingent upon the ability of those leaders to effectively contribute to the satisfaction of public needs. There is not and has never been a class of leaders who enjoy office through inheritance or through sacredotal authority. Leaders are perceived as a functional class, recognized as an elite because of their ability to perform within the framework of the expectations of their supporters.

In an effort to examine this phenomenon respondents were asked for whom they had voted in the last parliamentary election, and then after they had given a name, why they had preferred this candidate over the others. The reasons which they gave are reported in Table 6-4.

Several of these response categories are highly instrumental in nature, in the sense that they emphasize the payoff potential in supporting the preferred candidate (the instrumental categories are

Table 6-4. Responses to the Question: "Why did you decide to vote for (candidate just mentioned) rather than his opponent?"

Reason	Per Cent (N = 328)
Was a friend or neighbor	12
Expectations of performance	27
Past performance	18
Qualifications (education, etc.)	5
Reputation or general belief that he was the "best man"	19
Bandwagon (recommended by others)	7
Don't know; unable to give reason	8
Other reason	5

the second, third, fourth, and fifth, constituting 69 per cent of the total responses). In all of these, respondents seemed to suggest that this man could "do more" for his constituency than his opponents. Typical examples from these categories referred to leadership in cooperatives or development projects, promises made during the campaign about goals to be pursued, and the skills, education or training of the candidate. In many cases respondents were openly blunt in their evaluation of their MP's, often saying, "We put this man in because we felt he could do something to help us. If he doesn't we will remove him just as we did his predecessor."

Such statements were made to this writer and his assistants quite often, indicating that they were not just an isolated fluke.

Furthermore there is no reason to believe such statements are an idle threat. In 1969 in the parliamentary election just preceding this study Nyeri district defeated all four of its incumbent MP's, all of whom had solid credentials as nationalist leaders. When asked why such leaders had been defeated, the response was almost always the same--"Those people had done nothing."

Ideological considerations and local clan or family ties, two responses which one would expect to occur quite often, were seldom mentioned (except in the case of the "friends and neighbors" category--a concept respectfully borrowed from V. O. Key).

The point is that instrumentalism is a logical outgrowth of the other aspects of the political culture just discussed: a high degree of social mobilization plus a resource base which is declining relative to the needs of the population have created a set of demands which require action. The action which results is purposefully and eclectically directed toward the achievement of the desired ends--the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the participants in the political system. Elected leaders who promote these ends will be returned to office; those who do not will be defeated.

Inherent in this acceleration of socio-economic mobilization has been a blurring of boundary distinctions between local and national problems. More and more the two are seen in the same framework as a logical continuum linking one with the other. The implications of this process are serious. Huntington has suggested that a stable rural hinterland can provide a counterbalance for the urban disruptions which

inevitably accompany economic modernization.[10] To the extent that this involves keeping separate the urban and rural sectors, such a counterbalance cannot be found in Nyeri. Though people are dispersed across the land (thus mitigating against certain problems associated with urban concentrations) they think to a large extent in terms of the urban context. Local problems thus become national problems, or at least fraught with national implications, and national problems become local.

Evidence of this blurring of boundaries is provided in Table 6-5, which reports answers received on two distinct questions, "What is the major problem facing the Kenya nation? and "What is the major problem facing this area?" The essential similarity of the two response patterns is too obvious to belabor much restatement. The "local problems" cited by respondents are not only similar to the national problems, but even when they are truly local require outside attention if they are ever to be solved. For example, the mention of physical infrastructure (primarily a desire for better roads and a regular water supply) can never be solved out of local funds alone. Alleviation requires national expertise and national resources.

An interesting point about this matter is that local problems are not only perceived in national terms (and vice versa) but they are national problems. The most critical local problems are integrally related to matters outside of the local environment. The resource base of the modern industrial sector (and the national government which controls it) forms the key to the political system in Nyeri. Whether

Table 6-5. Perceived Problems (National and Local).

Problem	Per Cent Mentioning It As	
	National (N = 334)	Local (N = 402)
Land shortage	27	24
Unemployment, finding jobs	24	4
Need for more social services (schools, health centers, etc.)	17	20
Poverty, hunger (frequent mention of the famine in Kenya's dry northern province, then receiving widespread publicity)	14	14
Agricultural problems	22	11
Physical infrastructure	nil	56
Other	8	4

Note: Some respondents mentioned more than one problem.

one is talking of individual benefits (such as jobs) or collective benefits (such as diversion of government resources into local projects), the day-to-day welfare of Nyeri people is closely linked to events outside the district.

Results of the Political Revolution

If the process of social mobilization has created a set of unique and distinctly "modern" attitudes in Nyeri, the process of political mobilization has also brought changes. As was seen in

chapters four and five, the colonial system of government was much more remote and authoritarian than the traditional system which had preceded it. Chiefs and headmen were generally thought to be intemperate, autocratic, and unresponsive to public opinion.[11] The struggle for independence involved a frontal attack upon them, promising to bring into being a government of the people (serikali ya wananchi) which would serve rather than rule.[12] Other goals of the movement (apart from independence) were a redistribution of wealth (especially the concentrations of land in European hands), an opening up of economic opportunities to Africans, and a redirection of government expenditures to better meet the needs of the people.

The response to this program was overwhelming. Starting in the 1940's mass rallies accompanied with membership drives and fund raising drew thousands of Kikuyu into the political arena. Though this movement was interrupted in the 1950's by the Emergency, the creation of KANU in 1960 revealed that, if anything, support for the nationalist movement among the Kikuyu was greater than it had been before.[13]

Out of this movement and the independence it achieved there emerged a distinct set of attitudes and expectations about the political system and the government. These can be summarized as follows:

1. A high level of identification with the Kenya nation and its symbols.
2. A high level of political efficacy, especially insofar as face-to-face contacts with government officials are concerned.
3. As mentioned earlier, a highly instrumental view of politics and the political system.

4. Relatively high levels of participation.
5. High expectations and demands.
6. A high level of optimism about the future.

To determine exactly how people felt about the government, respondents were asked a series of questions relating to their attitudes, expectations, and opinions. The first set of these questions[14] related to perception of leaders in present and past time periods. Respondents were told that they would be read a series of statements and were asked to say if they felt these statements were more true today or "in the past." The time period was left intentionally vague to avoid the possibility that respondents would feel obliged to go on record in favor of Independence if asked to compare conditions today with those of colonial times. Nevertheless most respondents, in their answers, indicated that their immediate comparison was "today" versus pre-independence times. Likewise, though the word "leaders" was left vague in the questions, most respondents seemed to think in terms of local government officials such as chiefs.

Table 6-6 shows the questions and responses to them. The responses show indisputably that there exists a definite sense of affinity with and support for leaders. In addition one can clearly see that the predominant opinion of leaders during colonial times is not nearly so favorable.

In examining this data and the data to be presented shortly on efficacy, one should remember that a man's perceived relationship to authority figures has two dimensions, one consisting of his own

Table 6-6. Perceived Differences between Leaders Today and in the Past.

Item	Per Cent Saying It Is More True			Total N
	Today	In Past	No Difference	
Leaders use force more	12	87	1	126
Leaders more able to solve problems	89	8	3	129
Leaders listen to people's opinions more	90	7	3	134
Leaders obeyed more by people	84	12	4	133
Leaders more generous	88	6	6	129
Leaders unify people more	88	9	2	129
Leaders have more power	46	53	1	134

sense of worth, one consisting of his expectations of responsiveness. Most scholars seem to concern themselves with the first aspect, emphasizing the role of education, for example, in increasing efficacy levels. The assumption seems to be that education will increase one's information about the political system, and hence his confidence that he can manipulate it to his ends. Though this is surely true, it is true only if the political system is a responsive one.[15] If the system is not responsive, increasing education and information levels should lead to lower levels of efficacy, not higher levels. The central concern of this analysis is with the perceived responsiveness of the system and its relationship to overall levels of political efficacy, rather than with individual differences. The difficulty of this approach is that there is no data available from before the change in government with which to compare present attitudes. However it seems safe to assume from what is available in Table 6-6 and from the fact that the general public was formerly in rebellion against the legally constituted government that expectations of responsiveness were generally low, so that to the extent that they are now high, the difference can be explained by the change in government and changes in actual responsiveness. Furthermore, since independence occurred a full seven years before the data was collected, any "honeymoon" period had long since passed. It thus seems fair to conclude that an explanation of why more favorable attitudes toward leaders prevail today lies somewhere in the behavior of the leaders themselves and in their relationship to the public. Particularly we

would suspect that leaders today are more responsive and sympathetic to citizens than they were in the past. There seem three good reasons why this is so.

First, there are constant exhortations from top national leaders (including the President) for government officials and especially chiefs to realize that they are servants of the people, not their masters. An unending flow of warnings goes out from District Commissioners and others against those who do not realize that the days are past when officials could treat people badly. Such officials are reminded that if they do not change their behavior they will lose their jobs.[16]

Secondly, there is an effort to select for office leaders who have support among the public. In the case of chiefs, this often means that politicians who have proven their popularity at the polls or men who have proven their ability to lead the people in rural development projects will get chosen. For a time after independence, Kenya tried a "popular election" method of choosing local officials, but this was soon replaced with a "wide consultation" method by which the District Commissioner and a broadly-based citizens panel interview and ultimately select by consensus (ideally) a candidate to be "recommended" to the President as the preferred of three top candidates. The President then makes the final selection.[17] Though this system lacks the democratic form of election, it nevertheless insures that all significant elements of local opinion will be considered.

Third, and perhaps most important, is the fact that within the localities there exist "countervailing powers" to which unhappy citizens can turn. In particular, party officials and candidates for election are often willing to renounce chiefs and sub-chiefs in a bid for popular support. Though evidence is incomplete, it also seems that such politicians see their purpose to be protectors of the small man against the government. They serve as a court of appeal to which abuses, incourtesies, irregularities, or simple failure to get through red tape can be publicized and perhaps rectified. In colonial times, the fact that politicians were persona non grata to most officials gave them little influence over policy. Today their ex officio position on most boards and committees, their frequent personal friendships with influential MP's or even with cabinet officers dating back to the Independence struggle, and the high regard for KANU for its role in winning freedom all give them a degree of influence and status which local officials cannot ignore. This structural pluralism breaks the monopoly on power which the government formerly had and makes it difficult for local officials to display insensitivity to local opinion. The result more often than not is that such officials, even while pursuing an unpopular policy, make an effort to cater to public opinion and to win public support. Respondents often mentioned in colonial times being kicked or beaten or being chased away when attempting to discuss a problem with a chief. Today such action would probably result in a delegation to the District Commissioner or perhaps even to the President.

Public officials, for their part, seem to go out of the way to avoid offending people. Chiefs, for example, seldom make arrests although they have the authority to do so. More often they contact the local police office (usually staffed by officers from another area) and have them make the arrest. Likewise, in assessing the unpopular graduated personal tax (GPT)--a combination head-property tax--they often assemble a committee of local notables to insure not only equity but joint responsibility.

The point is that independence has brought changes in the behavior of public officials. These changes have been reflected quite reasonably in the expectations which people have of treatment or by responsiveness of those officials. They still recognize the authority which such persons have (as shown by the fact that almost half feel leaders have more power today than in the past) but they feel that today that power is used with a greater sense of responsibility and awareness of public need.

From what has been said it is clear that efficacy levels should be high. Table 6-7 presents responses to a series of "administrative competence" type questions based upon similar measures used by Almond and Verba. As the reader can easily see, positive responses are very high. When one considers that every society has a certain percentage of personality clashes (not to mention an occasional misanthrope), it becomes obvious that the positive response rate is about as close to 100 per cent as is possible. In addition, positive responses vary little from office to office. What little variation there is exists

Table 6-7. Measures of Administrative Competence.

Item	Response by Percentage			Total N
	Would Listen	Would Not	Don't Know	
If you and some of your friends went to (the chief) with a suggestion or proposal, would he consider what you said or just ignore you?	91	3	6	429
If you went to the District Commissioner or Divisional Officer . . .	89	2	9	429
If you went to the Member of Parliament . . .	91	2	7	431
If you went to the local KANU leader . . .	94	2	4	428

when comparing the DC-DO item and the KANU item. As mentioned earlier, the DC's and DO's are usually from outside the district, appointed from Nairobi with virtually no public control over who is chosen. They stay a short time, then move elsewhere. At the time of the study, the District Officer was a popular Kikuyu who had been in Nyeri for over a year, and had served as DO 1 (assistant District Commissioner) before that. He was well known and well liked locally, which perhaps raised the expectation of responsiveness people had of him. Nevertheless it is remarkable that even so faceless a bureaucrat as the District Commissioner should be perceived as a sympathetic official.

Other measures of efficacy or government responsiveness indicate similar patterns. Table 6-8 shows two items which relate directly to the ability of citizens to influence government policy. Though the level of perceived influence drops considerably for the second item--a matter to be discussed and analyzed in chapter eight--it still remains relatively high and is extremely high on the first item. These figures are particularly interesting when one notices that the questions were open-ended, requiring the respondent to offer a suggestion of what to do, rather than just nod affirmatively.

The response pattern on the first item needs further discussion, for it relates to the custom of harambee or self-help which is so important in the creation of a social service infrastructure in Nyeri. Of the specific responses given on this item, 26 per cent mentioned making a direct appeal to the government, while a full 54 per cent

Table 6-8. Perceived Ability to Influence Government Decisions.

Item	Per Cent with Some Idea of What to Do	Total N
If the area needed something such as a new road or school, could the people do anything to make the government more likely to act? What?	89	423
If the government made a law--such as a tax law--which the people considered unjust, what could they do to get the law changed?	53	382

suggested that they could best influence the government to provide the desired road or school by starting a self-help project and then appealing for help. This fascinating strategy sheds interesting light not only upon the relationship of people to the government but also upon the attitude of the government to demand groups within society. People are not afraid to approach the government and point out their needs, especially if those needs are felt in the wider society. However, in a highly competitive situation where resources are scarce, articulating felt-need is not sufficient to elicit a government response. One must in addition prove that he deserves a share of government resources. Organization, effort, solidarity, and persistence over time are all evidence of an intensity of feeling which warrants government attention. The official philosophy of socio-economic progress and the role of government in that progress seems a combination of the puritan ethic, Bismarckian welfare capitalism, and the old rule of

the squeaking wheel. The Sessional Paper on African Socialism (the official statement of government philosophy) openly states that resources will go to those who have proven by past effort that they can use them profitably.[18] In the 1966 by-elections (mentioned in chapter five) when the KPU criticized the government for not redistributing resources, Kenyatta issued his famous taunt to his former personal friend, then the deputy leader of the opposition, "What have you done for yourself, Kaggia?"[19] Tom Mboya at another time had argued that "freedom is the opportunity to use your talents, nothing else."[20]

The interesting result of this is that the self-help phenomenon as seen from the top is quite different from self-help as seen from the bottom. Government officials view it basically as a means of reducing demands upon the political system by shifting some of the burden of infrastructure development back upon those who will benefit most from it. The citizenry, on the other hand, view self-help projects as a means of making their wants known to the government, and hence manipulating government priorities in favor of themselves.[21] Very often self-help project leaders tell their followers, "If we do something for ourselves, the Government must surely help us." Such statements are not made by charlatans out to deceive the unsophisticated, but by shrewd calculators who understand quite well the way priorities are determined. The government responds not only to need but also to intensity. What better way to show intensity than by starting a project, supported by mass contributions and efforts, and then asking outside aid to complete it?

Such an effort is, of course, based upon the assumption of mass participation, which can show the government the enthusiasm of the people. Such participation is not lacking. Table 6-9 summarizes three measures of participation.

Table 6-9. Measures of Participation.

Item	Per Cent Claiming Involvement	Total N
Self-help activity	62	433
Member KANU	84	431
Voted last general election	89	432

Though these figures speak for themselves, several points might be mentioned by way of clarification. Perhaps most important is the role of participation as an act of symbolic affirmation of loyalty to the community (nation). This seems particularly true in the cases of voting turnout and KANU membership. In other societies such activities might be viewed as reflections of economic involvement, social status, or perhaps information.[22] In Nyeri none of these factors shows any significant relationship to either voter turnout or party membership. Instead such acts seem to reflect a form of diffuse patriotism, perhaps on the level of flying the flag or standing during the national anthem. Since the 1930's acts of symbolic identification with the community have been of great importance to the Kikuyu.[23] These acts have increased in importance in

the face of internal divisions and external threats, both common in the 1960's. "Joining" KANU, for example, is almost a purely symbolic act of identification, since formal membership in the district hardly exceeds the number of MP's and district party officers. Instead people will say "We are KANU" the way someone else might say "I am a German."

When looking at voting one must also be aware of the symbolic implications of the act. In terms of political strategy the fight for independence centered around a struggle for the vote. Voting has thus taken on significance as an expression of national pride which largely invalidates its usefulness as a measure of discrimination. Since nearly everyone voted in the election examined,[24] traditional political science theories--which are mostly concerned with the impact of socio-economic factors on differential turnout levels--are insufficient to "explain" turnout. Furthermore, those political scientists who have recognized that some people vote for reasons other than to express a preference among candidates have largely attributed such actions to "ritual behavior"[25] or to temporary agitation over short-term issues.[26] Few have considered the possibility that functional adaptation can occur which will completely change the raison d'etre of an act.[27]

If reason is to be made out of voting in Nyeri, one has to distinguish between what Abraham Kaplan calls act meaning and action meaning.[28] In particular one must distinguish between the act of appearing at the polling booth and the subsequent matter of choosing among candidates. The first of these--the appearance at the polling

booth--is motivated by a desire to show one's affinity with cultural values (i.e., to give a "vote of confidence" to national independence and integrity); the problem of selection among candidates, however, is not covered by this symbolic act. Once in the booth the voter is confronted with a second stage with which he has to contend. Often he came only to show his loyalty to the society but now he finds he must in addition choose among candidates, a totally meaningless exercise in light of his original motivation. At this stage more conventional theories of behavior become useful.

Basically we are dealing with two sets of people: those who vote to express solidarity with the political system and those who in addition vote to express a preference among candidates. For the first group the selection process is superfluous; for the second it is quite important. The problem is to determine what elements of society would vote, even if the symbolic meaning of the act were absent. As one would suspect, levels of social mobilization become important here. Basically those people who are more socially mobilized are more likely to have formal demands to make upon the political system (such as those discussed earlier in this chapter) and hence more likely to go to the polls with this thought in mind. An analysis of why voters chose a given candidate over his opponents revealed that more socially mobilized people are much more likely to cite instrumental reasons for their selection. Table 6-10 illustrates this quite well. In this table group 1 is the most socially mobilized and group 4 the least socially mobilized, as discussed in chapter two.

Table 6-10

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Table 6-10. Instrumentalism, by Social Mobilization Type.

	Social Mobilization Type			
	1	2	3	4
Per Cent Instrumental	76	74	65	59
N	180	48	51	34

This matter of symbolic identification gives evidence of another characteristic of the Nyeri political system mentioned but not yet discussed, the high level of identification with the nation, its institutions, and symbols. Measuring this level of identification was not done overtly, partially because no adequate measures could be devised at the time.[29] However, Almond and Verba suggested in their cross-national study that one means of measuring identification is to ask respondents what about their country makes them proud. The per cent mentioning some "national" characteristic (the political system, national prestige, historical greatness, level of development) are considered to have high identification levels, while those mentioning non-national characteristics (such as local terrain) or being unable to answer at all are considered low identifiers.[30] The results of this question in Nyeri are reported in Table 6-11. As the reader can see, most mentions were of the political system (independence, good government, good leaders), of land, farming and agriculture (many respondents mentioned cash crops and the exports of coffee or tea, though others referred to more locally oriented matters), and of relations among the people. This

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last category seems to reflect a confidence in the ability of the government to maintain order, to contain regional-ethnic conflicts, and to prevent intra-Kikuyu animosities of the past (loyalist v. freedom fighter) from re-emerging. As such it probably belongs under the "political system" category.

Table 6-11. Responses to the Question: Why are you proud of Kenya?"

Reason	Per Cent (N = 372)
Political system	49
Land, farming, agriculture	29
Relations among the people	16
Economic development	5
Social services	3
Other	3
Nothing, negative	3

Note: Some respondents mentioned more than one reason.

Although Almond and Verba's faith in this measure may overestimate its usefulness, to the extent that it is valid it places Nyeri in a favorable position vis-a-vis the countries of the cross-national study. As reported in The Civic Culture, only the Americans expressed a higher level of identification with the political system, showing 85 per cent expressing pride in "some feature of . . . government or political tradition." The British registered 46 per cent, Mexicans 30 per cent, Germans 7 per cent, and Italians 3 per cent.[31]

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Table 6-12

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The final characteristic to be discussed relates to improvement and mobility. Basically an effort was made to determine what a respondent's attitude was towards opportunities to advance, standards of living today as compared with the past, and possible changes in his life in the future. Table 6-12 reports the findings for these questions.

Table 6-12. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Opinions about Past Change and Future Opportunity.

Item	Percentage	Total N
How do you compare your life today with how your father lived when you were growing up?		
Better today	76	
Worse today	20	
No difference	4	420
Can a person born in poverty improve his life?		
Yes	97	
No	3	423
Which is more important in being successful: Hard work or connections with important people?		
Work	74	
Connections	6	
Both important	20	430
Will there be any changes in your life in the next five years?		
Yes, improvement	78	
Yes, decline	5	
No change	17	339

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Overwhelmingly respondents showed very high levels of optimism and expectations. Probably to an extent this optimism can be explained in terms of a perception of reality. Improvements have occurred over the past few years in terms of income, education, health, and level of development in the society. In the late 1950's Kikuyuland was largely decimated. There were few homes, few cash crops, few schools. The Kikuyu had been banished from many of their jobs outside the district and were living as refugees in their own land. The improvement since then (coinciding with the success of the nationalist movement) has revitalized the area. This revitalization is reflected in the optimism of the people.

The significance of this optimism in holding the society together is great. As suggested in chapter one, optimism about the future can often serve as a substitute for actual present benefits, instilling in people a willingness to tolerate present inequities. In chapter eight we will examine the role of optimism further and attempt at that time to integrate it into the more general process of social mobilization.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

[1]See Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 333, for a summary of these. Some of these unfortunately provide a background for analysis in Corfield's Origins and Growth of Mau Mau.

[2]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 309-318, discusses this.

[3]This term is often used to describe the type of attitudes and beliefs being discussed in this chapter. Though criticized for its lack of conceptual clarity, the term seems a useful one. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), and Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[4]Conversation with Martin Sika, Divisional Officer, North Tetu, Nyeri, Fall 1970.

[5]Any number of government reports and studies attest to the problems of school leavers and unemployment in Kenya. One good general study is James R. Sheffield, ed., Education, Employment and Rural Development (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

[6]David R. Koff, "Education and Employment: Perspectives of Kenya Primary Pupils," in Sheffield, Education, Employment and Rural Development, 390-412.

[7]McClelland discusses the role of women in determing the values and achievement levels of their children in McClelland, The Achieving Society. For a discussion of the role of women in preserving cultural values in the face of threats of assimilation, see Bernard J. Siegel, "Defensive Cultural Adaptation," in Graham and Gurr, History of Violence in America, 764-787.

[8]Colin Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society," British Journal of Political Science, 6, Part 3 (July, 1971), 307-337.

[9]Apter, Politics of Modernization, 84-85.

[10]Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 291-300.

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[11] See Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, 196; Muriuki, History of the Kikuyu, 217; Cagnolo, The Akikuyu, 217; Mugo Gatheru, Child of Two Worlds (London: Heineman, 1969), 86.

[12] See, for example, KANU's major position paper, "KANU Manifesto for Independence, Social Democracy and Stability" (Nairobi, 1961).

[13] See the intelligence report of Ian Henderson in which he describes a mass rally held at Nyeri in 1952. Corfield, Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, 301-308.

[14] These items were added to the questionnaire when it was administered in April 1971 in the settlement area (Kieni East Division), after interviewing in the reserve was complete. Respondents from this area are very similar to those from the reserve, though they are slightly younger, slightly more likely to be literate, slightly more socially mobilized, and slightly more likely to have been detained.

[15] Robert Lane has written a standard work on political efficacy, participation, and alienation in his classic Political Life (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959). Edward Muller has some interesting insights in "The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support," American Political Science Review, 64 (December, 1970), 1149-1166. A good case study is that by Hurwitz, which concludes that "an individual sense of political efficacy is based on a rational evaluation of the degree to which the political system is open to influence, and of the influence he may have. Political efficacy, therefore, varies between systems according to their structures and values, and between individuals within given systems according to their relation to its structure and their degree of adherence to its values." Jacob A. Hurwitz, Political Efficacy among Israeli Youth (unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1971), from the abstract. For a fuller discussion of the negative side of efficacy see Ada Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), 389-410.

[16] For a sense of the new attitudes towards chiefs, see Cherry Gertzel et al., eds, Government and Politics in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), 365-382.

[17] Interview with Mr. Makanga, Divisional Officer, Mathira, Nyeri, August, 1970.

[18] Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya" (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965).

[19] For two views of the background and significance of this comment, see Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, 73-94, and Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (Nairobi: Heineman, 1967), 310-312.

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[20] For Mboya's philosophy see Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood (London: Heineman, 1970). The quotation is from a speech in 1965 not reported in the book.

[21] Holmquist has made observations similar to this in Kisii. See Frank Holmquist, "Implementing Rural Development Projects," in Goran Hyden et al., eds., Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[22] See Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965) for some of the standard studies.

[23] See Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of "Mau Mau," 241-262, for a discussion of symbolic actions among the Kikuyu.

[24] Overall turnout for Nyeri in this election was around 75 per cent. When one subtracts the aged, the ill, and the absentee workers, the 89 per cent figure for the sample is probably fairly accurate. In local elections such as for County Council turnout drops significantly. Such elections are definitely "low stimulus" elections which lack the symbolic significance of national elections. For a discussion of "types" of elections classified according to voter turnout see Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order, especially chapter four by Angus Campbell.

[25] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, 12-32, talk of different types of participation.

[26] Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," in Campbell, Elections and the Political Order, 40-62.

[27] For two interesting discussions of how voting has been functionally adapted, see Barry Ames, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party," American Political Science Review, 64, No. 1 (March, 1970), 153-167, and Lipset, Political Man, 207-211.

[28] As Kaplan says, "The behavioral scientist must first arrive at an act meaning, that is, construe what conduct a particular piece of behavior represents; and then he must search for the meaning of the interpreted action, its interconnections with other actions or circumstances. He must first see the act of marking a ballot or operating a machine as the action of casting a vote, and then pursue his study of voting behavior." Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964).

[29] For some possible measures see David Koff and George Van Der Muhll, "Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies, 5, No. 1 (1967), 13-51.

[30] Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 102-105.

[31] Ibid., 102.

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CHAPTER 7

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN NYERI

The last two chapters have shown how the process of social mobilization was accelerated because of the real and perceived inability of the traditional socio-economic system to compete with the modern socio-economic system. This process of change has over time produced a society modern not only in terms of socio-economic indicators such as literacy rates and economic productivity, but also in terms of values and attitudes towards the political system. The discussion so far has been in macro-terms, that is, we have looked at Nyeri as a unit to see how overall change has occurred and how the society as a whole has responded. It is equally important to look below the surface at what might be called sub-system variables, that is, we must look at specific components of social mobilization to see how they are distributed within the society.

In particular it would seem useful to look at the four ideal types discussed in chapter two (page 38), since they form the basis of the theoretical analysis of this work. One way to approach this problem is to look at some of the similarities and differences among the four types. After doing this we will then examine one variable

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which seems to deserve a detailed analysis all of its own--the matter of age differences.

The reader might recall again that these four types are distinguished by their positions on two dimensions of mobilization: economic mobilization and perceptual mobilization. Type one is made up of those respondents mobilized on both dimensions, type two is mobilized on the perceptual dimension but not the economic one, type three is mobilized on the economic dimension but not the perceptual one, and type four is not mobilized on either dimension.

Table 7-1 summarizes some of the main background characteristics of the four social mobilization types. One of the interesting aspects of this table is that the order in which the cells are numbered corresponds to an increasing level of modernization insofar as education, language facility, and conversion to Christianity are concerned, with type one high and type four low. This pattern is perhaps to be expected in the relationship between types one and four, but what does it tell us that type two is above type three?

Basically it seems to indicate that the perceptual mobilization index is a better measure of modernization than the economic mobilization index. It also seems to point out the obvious importance of education in the modernization process. Though education was consciously left out of both indices because of the inability to specify its exact implications, it is clearly quite important in reflecting a man's perceptual level and is significant at a .001 level when compared with the perceptual mobilization index. In addition, education probably has definite causal relationships with the other two variables, Christianity

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Table 7-1. Background Characteristics of Social Mobilization Types.

Characteristic	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Education								
Literate	78	230	72	64	35	76	29	66
Four or More Years of Schooling	39	230	30	64	16	76	12	66
Speaks National Language (Swahili or English)	93	229	83	63	75	76	46	66
Christian	71	227	64	64	45	74	27	66
Ever Worked Outside of District	73	224	63	64	49	76	67	66

and knowledge of a national language. Though both of these could be acquired without ever entering a classroom, the fact that most primary schools are church affiliated, and that Swahili and English are required subjects, means that, although one can be Christian or fluent in Swahili without being literate, he can seldom be literate without being the other two. Furthermore, the educated person is more likely to move in a circle of people who have "modern" characteristics and would often acquire those attributes by osmosis if not by will.

One item which is a bit confusing is the high ranking of type four (non-mobilized) on the work migration measure. The explanation of this and also of why a group with so many people who worked

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away has not ranked higher on the perceptual mobilization index (which uses length of residence outside the district as one of its components) probably lies in the fact that many people, especially in past years, may have gone to work on nearby European farms for short periods of often less than a year. Since most of the workers on these farms were also Kikuyu and since the break with the rural area and rural style of living was not great, many of these short-term migrations had little impact on the attitudes of the participants. These temporary work migrations also had little impact on their perceptual mobilization index scores because of the rule that no points be awarded unless the respondent spent at least a full year away from the district, a rule established to exclude such short-term moves.

Modern Agriculture and Social Mobilization

Apart from the above characteristics, a second way of distinguishing among respondents is by their relationship to modern agriculture. Though value of production is one of the components of the economic mobilization index, there are other aspects of agriculture which could be examined for insights into the nature of both the economic system and the social mobilization process. We have already argued that the economic and perceptual dimensions of mobilization are distinct in a general sense; they are also distinct in the specific case of agriculture. One's attitude toward agriculture and agricultural modernization may be quite different from his actual agricultural holdings and practices. Since agriculture is the basis of the Nyeri

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economy, and since all the respondents are land-owners, the relationship of a man to the "means of production" is an important aspect of his overall role in society.

Table 7-2 summarizes the basic agricultural characteristics of the four types. Immediately one notices the obvious differences in land holding levels. These differences are very interesting, especially the per cent of each type below four acres. This is the point which many local agricultural officers use to distinguish a farm which is big enough for planning and development above subsistence. As the table shows, the type two's (perceptually mobilized) are relatively speaking worse off than any other cell in terms of acreage owned, while type three's (economically mobilized) seems to be the best off of the cells. The absolute number of acres owned of course is not nearly as important as other factors, such as quality of the land or its level of development. Nevertheless in a society where land is the basic wealth, one might be prone to predict that acreage would correlate positively with level of modernization. Table 7-2 shows this clearly not so and in fact in the case of the perceptual mobilization index, seems to be almost the opposite of the truth. One can clearly see that the type four's (non-mobilized) have more acreage than the type two's and that the type three's have more acreage than the type one's (fully mobilized). It seems then as if perceptual mobilization is inversely related to acreage, suggesting perhaps that those who are well endowed with locally valued wealth (land) do not feel a need to get psychologically involved in the modern sector, even if they may be involved in it physically.

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Table 7-2. Agricultural Characteristics of Social Mobilization Types.

Characteristic	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Acreage								
Nine or More Acres	25	226	6	63	31	75	20	66
Four or Less Acres	43	226	62	63	36	75	52	66
Acquired Land Apart from by Inheritance	29	218	10	59	16	71	2	62
Grows Cash Crops	74	228	44	64	72	76	36	66
Hires Help on Farm	58	226	6	64	29	75	12	66
Uses Hybrid Maize Seed	50	227	16	64	31	75	18	66

To some extent age might also be a factor in this relationship. As will be shown shortly, the economically mobilized and the non-mobilized are generally older than the other types, while the perceptually mobilized are the youngest of the four. Since the Kikuyu "frontier" was only extinguished at the beginning of this century and since individual farm boundaries were formalized in the 1950's, it is only logical that the younger a man is the more likely it is that he would have a smaller farm. If he inherited his farm since the mid-1950's for example, he probably had to divide it equally with his brothers. Furthermore, if he is young he is more likely to be literate or exposed to those who are literate, thus increasing his perceptual mobilization

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regardless of the amount of land he owns. Later in the chapter we will examine in greater detail the matter of age and expand upon some of these matters.

An important component in total acreage is the acquisition of land and here the relationship to the economic mobilization dimension is obvious. Unfortunately as in the case of many such instances where two variables are found together, it is nearly impossible to determine causality with any certainty. In other words, one cannot ascertain from the data available whether the components of economic mobilization lead to the purchase of land or whether the purchase of land resulted in a higher score on the economic mobilization index, though some evidence would indicate that the former is more likely the case.

In an effort to examine the matter closer, this writer did a detailed analysis of all land sales in one sub-location in Nyeri (Mungaria, in Aguthi Location) between 1959 and 1971 using data from the Nyeri District Land Office. The results of this analysis can be summarized as follows: most plots transferred were small (in the range of 2 acres), most purchasers were not full-time farmers, and most purchased plots were logical extensions of the farms to which they were added, perhaps squaring up a plot, adding a pasture or making a more convenient connection with a stream.[1]

If this small study is typical, it thus seems that the acquisition of land is a function of two factors: (1) the existence of a non-farm source of income to pay the purchase price and (2) a felt need resulting from a desire to expand present agricultural development

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levels. Both of these suggest that agriculturally there is a growing concentration of land in the hands of wealthier, more modern farmers who have economic ties off the land, which in turn reinforces their rural wealth.[2]

The fact that these farmers are also wealthy as well as landed can be seen by the figures on cash crops and the hiring of help. Both of these, however, need some comment. The cash crop figure is interesting as much for what it says about those less economically mobilized as about those more economically mobilized. Perceptually mobilized and non-mobilized respondents both show evidence of some cash crops, though noticeably less than fully mobilized and economically mobilized respondents. The economic mobilization index (as discussed in Appendix B) only classified as mobilized those farmers who produce crops above a very low minimum value. Thus one can tell from these figures that although some type two and type four respondents have made an effort to enter the modern cash economy, they have not done so very successfully.

Whether one hires help is again an interesting item, reflecting several things. First, it tells us that the employer probably has more than four or five acres, the amount that could probably be tilled by a family using the hand tools common in most of Kikuyuland. Secondly, regardless of farm size, it indicates that the employer has enough money to pay wages. These wages are generally low, amounting in some cases to only around 50¢ per day, but must be examined in light of the return expected. If the crop to be grown is of a subsistence nature,

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the cash is probably not available to pay for the labor. Furthermore, since a family can probably live off what it can cultivate, there would be little need to hire the cultivation of subsistence crops. It seems reasonable to conclude that most hiring is done by (1) wealthy farmers who (2) have more land than they need for subsistence and (3) produce cash crops on the surplus acreage. These facts again give evidence to the wealthier nature of fully mobilized and economically mobilized respondents.

The final item related to agricultural modernization--the adoption of hybrid maize seed--reveals a pattern somewhat different from what was expected. Though there is a certain cost factor in adoption (the maize seed must be used with commercial fertilizer), the economic benefits in terms of increased productivity are generally considerable. Since maize is the staple food of the area, every farmer could benefit from adoption regardless of the scale of his operation. Furthermore, because the development of Kenya-specific strains is fairly recent (within the past decade), one would predict that adoption would be as much a function of perceptual mobilization as of economic mobilization.

The results seem to indicate that economic mobilization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for adoption. In support of the original hypothesis, however, one should note that of those who are economically mobilized (type one and type three), those who are in addition perceptually mobilized (type one) are far more likely to adopt than those who are not. As a general rule adoption of an innovation

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has both economic costs and information costs. The previous belief of this writer was that the economic costs in this case were minimal (at least compared with the benefits), thus suggesting that those who were informed (i.e., perceptually mobilized) would be disproportionately likely to adopt. It is obvious from the data that this is not the case, and that the economic costs are in some cases prohibitive.

The possibility arises of course that the perceptual mobilization index does not correlate with favorable attitudes to modern agriculture. To determine if this is so, let us examine for a moment a purely attitudinal question, one which has no economic dimension at all. The question chosen is one used successfully by Miller in Tanzania. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "New agricultural ways will not improve the crops." The results in Nyeri are shown in Table 7-3. As the reader can easily see, the similarity between type two and type four which existed above has disappeared, and the type two respondents have in fact by-passed type three in level of pro-innovation feeling.

Table 7-3. Attitude toward Agricultural Modernization.

Item	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Agree: "New agricultural ways will not improve the crops."	7	224	18	61	23	73	46	57

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The overall result of these findings is to show that in terms of the dependent variables examined there is a clear difference between the impact of the two dimensions of social mobilization. Modernization and social mobilization appear to be concentrated disproportionately in different parts of society. Wealth seems disproportionately limited to type one and type three, while type two respondents, who are quite modern in terms of literacy, Christianity and language facility, lag far behind in their economic capacity. The impact on society of this potentially ominous imbalance will be examined in detail in the next chapter. Now, however, let us look at one further matter of some importance, that is, the relationship of age cohorts to the various indices of mobilization and modernization.

Age in the Proces of Social Change

Age is an interesting aspect of any study of change and is one which deserves a rather close examination. Some scholars have suggested that age-cleavages are in many ways the most critical which can occur in a society.[3] It is obvious from what we have already said that there should be some differences among young and old due to increasing educational opportunities, changes in the availability of land, and other such matters. The basic question, however, is not merely whether differences exist between age cohorts, but rather what types of differences they are, what impact they have upon society, and what impact they will have in the future.

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To examine this phenomenon more carefully we have broken the sample into three main age cohorts or generations. These three generations are:

1. Those under 40 years old, who constitute 27 per cent of the sample.
2. Those 41-60 years old, who are 41 per cent of the sample.
3. Those 61 years or older, who are 32 per cent of the sample.

A brief aside is perhaps justified here in order to point out a problem inherent in this analysis. Basically explanations of age differences can use one of three approaches: the "generation" approach, the "life cycle" approach, the "social change" approach. For example, if one finds that the attitudes of generations towards a given issue are significantly different, he could offer three possible explanations for why these differences exist:

1. The social change explanation: Where societies are in flux--such as in the case of a country undergoing modernization--generations are likely to be different in their make-up; for example, the old are probably less educated or the young more travelled. Thus the real reason for an observed difference lies not in the age of the person but in the fact that different age groups are different in other ways as well. If one could find old people who are educated he might find that their attitudes are similar to those young people who are educated, so that the difference lies not in age but in the socio-economic make-up of the different generations.

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2. The life cycle explanation: In spite of socio-economic characteristics, age groups are different because as a person matures his perspective changes. He becomes more conservative, more set in his ways, more fatalistic, perhaps wiser. The young men of today will in 40 years be very similar to the old men with whom they now disagree, in spite of the fact that their socio-economic characteristics may be quite different.

3. The generation explanation: Since each time period is unique, each generation comes to adulthood with a set of perspectives and expectations and orientations different from those of any other group. To understand a given age cohort one must look not merely at its socio-economic characteristics or its age but at the "temper of the times" during which it developed a value system and became an active element in society.

The logic of this latter approach is perhaps more relevant in Africa than elsewhere. Time in pre-European Africa was not viewed as a linear progression but rather as a series of eras or in some cases cycles. Years would be named according to the greatest event of that particular period (the year of the famine, the year of the railroad, the year of the airplane, the year of the comet). These years in turn would be aggregated into eras likewise named after great events. The Kikuyu Era of Cutting, for example, was a time when the Kikuyu expanded into the forests. Godfrey Muriuki has discussed the logic of this naming custom at some length and has shown that it is an accurate means of dating for over 200 years into the past.[4]

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But the difficulty with deciding which of these explanations is most likely to be the case in Nyeri is that the sample size is not sufficiently large for in-depth analysis. With more respondents it would be possible, for example, to control for social mobilization level and then look at age differences so as to tell with some accuracy which was more significant. With few respondents, however, and with the obvious overlap of age and modernization levels, such controls would produce unacceptably small cells so that any trends would be inconclusive. In this work we are basically relying upon social mobilization as an explanatory variable, but we still feel that the generational explanation may be of some importance.

In any case the three age groups mentioned above correspond very closely to the stages of Kenya's contemporary political development. The middle group includes within its numbers the famous anake a 40 (young men of 1940) age group which fought the Second World War and then the struggle for independence. This is surely Nyeri's most cohesive and politically mobilized generation. Though not all are beneficiaries of the educational system which largely paralleled their rise to adulthood, they have probably contributed more to Kenya's current achievements than any other group.

Looking at the data it is obvious that the oldest and youngest generations are predictably different from the middle group. Of the young group the very oldest would have been twenty when the Emergency began, a fact which largely made them political neutrals in the struggle. The elder cohort likewise were often neither young enough

to be threatening to the British nor politically mobilized enough to be involved. They also were likely to be political neutrals in the struggle. Many of this group, when asked what experiences they had had during the Emergency, replied: "Since I was an old man I was allowed to stay in my house without being bothered." These elders by and large were socialized into a system not much different from that which had existed in pre-European times. They were there as European power spread, they possibly knew in vague outline what was happening, but they were largely untouched by the socio-economic changes of the twentieth century.

The youngest cohort in contrast grew up at a time when modernization was in full swing. Schools were common, cash agriculture was beginning to spread, Christianity was widely accepted in one form or another. In short, they grew up in modern times, the product of a modern era. The oldest would have been 25 when the Lennox-Boyd constitution expanded African representation in parliament; most would have come to adulthood at a time when that body was run by an African majority. Though they lived through the Emergency they are really a post-independence generation, Kenya's first.

The differences between these generations are as one would suspect in most cases, though there are some interesting exceptions. To begin with, since the level of social modernization has increased over time we would predict that successive generations would be more "modern" in their characteristics. Tables 7-4 and 7-5 show this is generally true. Literacy, language facility, and Christianity all

Table 7-4. Some Characteristics of Age Groups.

Characteristic	Age Group					
	21-40		41-60		60+	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Literate	91	118	68	176	19	136
Christian	86	118	66	174	29	133
Speaks National Language (Swahili or English)	94	118	89	176	60	135
Worked Away	55	117	61	176	81	136

Table 7-5. Age Make-Up of Social Mobilization Types.

Age Group	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 228)	2 (N = 64)	3 (N = 75)	4 (N = 63)
21-40	30%	39%	17%	19%
41-60	50	34	33	25
61+	21	27	49	56

increase with youth. Work migration, which operates independently of these other three and which has an economic side as well as a perceptual one, seems in contrast to increase as age does. The distribution of the age cohorts in terms of the social mobilization types again shows that the more modern types are disproportionately young while the more traditional types are disproportionately older. All

in all there seems a clear correlation between age and level of modernization (or social mobilization).

The conclusions which can be drawn from these figures are not startling but are interesting. First it seems that within perhaps two generations Nyeri will be close to 100 per cent literate, 100 per cent Christian (at least nominally), and 100 per cent conversant in a national language (Swahili or English). The implications of this trend can well be seen when one recalls the likely impact of increasingly high perceptual mobilization levels upon social stability. These increasingly literate people will have aspirations which will more and more require that they leave the district or at least seek careers in the modern sector. They will demand more education for their children than they themselves have, and more social services for their communities (not to mention economic assistance) thus escalating the pressure upon the political system to increase its performance level.

The extent to which this aspiration-demand syndrome is already at work can be seen by the data in Table 7-6. Respondents were asked several questions about how happy they were with their lives, with farming as an occupation, and with their housing. It is obvious from these figures that satisfaction with what one has declines drastically among the younger groups who are more literate or perceptually mobile.

An additional fact revealed by this table is that the greatest decline in satisfaction occurs (as one would suspect) between the 41-60 age group and the 61+ group. The decline between the 41-60 group

and the younger generation continues, but at a much slower rate. This pattern is probably to be expected. Basically one would suspect that the presence of any indicators of perceptual mobilization would produce a drastic change in satisfaction levels, while additional indicators would make incrementally smaller changes. As discussed in Appendix B, it seems unlikely that any of Nyeri's population could be truly unexposed to modernization, and this is especially true of the 41-60 age group which, in spite of its lag behind the younger respondents in terms of literacy, is still a very active and involved cohort.

Table 7-6. Satisfaction Levels by Age Group.

Item	Age Cohort					
	21-40		41-60		61+	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Satisfied with Farming	18	84	27	147	45	120
Satisfied with Your Income	32	113	38	170	49	131
Satisfied with Housing	16	113	25	176	48	132

The extent of some of these activities can be seen in Tables 7-7 and 7-8. From these tables we can draw some interesting conclusions. The wealthiest generation by far is the middle group, with the older and the younger groups trailing in that order. In terms of political and civic involvement, this group is also the highest;

in self-help activities, cooperative membership, and leadership in such activities they are far more likely than any other cohort to be involved. Also of great importance is the fact that almost twice as many of them were detained as any other group.

Table 7-7. Rural Wealth by Age Group.

Item	Age Group					
	21-40		41-60		61+	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Grows Cash Crops	46	118	77	176	62	135
Uses Hybrid Maize	25	117	51	175	27	135
Hires Help	39	116	48	176	26	134
Bought Land	17	116	26	164	15	124

Table 7-8. Activities by Age Group.

Item	Age Group					
	21-40		41-60		61+	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Detained	9	118	35	172	19	131
Active in Self-Help	57	118	76	176	52	133
Leader in Self-Help	10	118	16	176	9	133
Active in Cooperative	57	118	82	176	59	135
Leader in Cooperative	7	118	13	176	4	135

One wonders if maybe there isn't an imbalance involved here and, if so, why it has not had more serious repercussions on society. Basically in terms of generations it would seem that the young generation is very high on what might be called "value expectations" while it is the middle aged group which is highest on "value capabilities." This would surely seem to be a dysfunctional condition, and one which could produce very undesirable side effects.

The answer to this dilemma seems to lie in two places. First one could question whether it is actually the younger generation which has the most "value expectations." It is true that they have the highest rate of literacy of any generation, but though literacy rates and other indicators of social mobilization may reveal a great deal about a group, they cannot reveal everything. One must in addition look at the times and the conditions under which this group came to maturity. In this case there can be no doubt that Nyeri's middle-aged generation came to adulthood with expectations and aspirations far above those of any other Kenya generation either before or since. Their desire to change the political system and the distribution of rewards and privileges within the society was a major task which had never been attempted before. The fact that they were successful is surely the greatest achievement in Kenya's history. After achieving this goal, had they not in addition received personal benefits (in terms of increased wealth and status), <u>then</u> one would have seen a potentially explosive imbalance. As it is they now enjoy disproportionate wealth and influence, but probably not more than their expectations lead

them to believe they deserve. Any less would have produced serious problems.

The question remains, however, as to how it is that the youngest generation (whose value expectations are noticeably high but for different reasons) can be mollified with what is relatively a small share of resources. Though unhappy with what they have, this group has shown no observable predisposition to anti-system attitudes or behavior patterns. Some possible reasons for this containment of discontent will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but let us here offer some possible explanations. We saw in chapter four that young men were traditionally less rewarded and honored than their elders, and yet were willing to defer in expectation of future improvement. It seems quite likely that this traditional belief that young men undergo a period of deprivation vis-a-vis their elders is relevant here. An additional mitigating factor is that the people being examined are markedly better off than those of their age who have no land at all. Thus though they may perceive themselves to be deprived in real terms, they are relatively better off than other members of their age group (questions which would have tapped this attitude were unfortunately not asked in the survey). Furthermore, as will be shown in the next chapter, there is a great deal of optimism about future improvements in Nyeri society, a fact which again can help to moderate behavior and discontent patterns.

We have looked in this chapter at some of the components of modernization and at some characteristics of the four social



mobilization types. Perhaps the most interesting findings can be summarized under two headings, those relating to age and those relating to social imbalances. The first of these clearly indicates that many of the social indicators of modernization are found in almost all of the younger age cohort, indicating that the future direction of Nyeri's social change is fairly well set, at least in certain ways. The implications of this change are the crux of the second finding, that the process of social mobilization has produced several imbalances in society leading to a gap between aspirations and capacities. In chapter eight we will examine these imbalances in greater detail and attempt to assess the impact which they are having upon Nyeri society and upon the Nyeri political system.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7

[1]At the time of the study 37 of a total of 503 plots had changed hands. Eighteen of these 37 were 2 acres or less in size, 27 of 37 were 4 acres or less, and only 2 of 37 were 8 acres or more (both in the 8-9 acres range). An effort to identify the purchasers was largely unsuccessful, perhaps due as much to a shortage of time as anything else. However, of 14 purchasers definitely identified and interviewed, 10 were either employed or had some income supplement other than farming (such as being an artisan or owning a shop).

[2]See Joseph Ascroft et al., "Does Extension Create Poverty in Kenya?" East African Journal (March, 1972), 28-33.

[3]A good summary of the literature on age differences is included in S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1964). Two other useful studies are Everett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), and Paul Abramson, "Social Class and Political Change in Western Europe," Comparative Political Studies (1971), 131-155.

[4]See Godfrey Muriuki, "Chronology of the Kikuyu," paper presented at the conference of the Historical Association of Kenya, August, 1970.

CHAPTER 8

DISCONTENT AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY

It has been suggested already that the two dimensions of social mobilization work in different directions, producing results which are superficially similar but which are actually substantively different. To summarize, economic mobilization leads people to pursue and promote their interests through activities and memberships which seek favorable governmental action, but such activities are basically conservative in that they seek to reinforce, to protect, and to preserve what already exists. Perceptual mobilization, on the other hand, leads one to examine the inequalities and differences which exist within and across societies and to place his own environment and share of the resources into some comparative perspective. Having a larger share of those resources would to a degree moderate such discontent, but we should expect the person high on the perceptual mobilization index to be more discontented than the person low on that index, controlling for level of economic mobilization. His activities and demands, in short, would be more oriented toward redistribution and compensation than toward conservation and protection of existing patterns.

This chapter will test some of these hypotheses about the impact of the two dimensions on attitudes and behavior. It will show

that although the basic hypotheses about discontent levels and participation levels are valid, other factors seem to enter into the relationship. These factors alter the predicted impact which high discontent levels have upon society. In particular, it seems that the make-up of the elite and elite values have combined to channel discontent into productive directions. In addition, the direction which discontent will take in terms of policy alternatives is influenced considerably by the perceived causes and permanency of the deprivation.

The hypotheses that we will examine fall under two major headings: hypotheses about discontent and hypotheses about participation. The first of these relates to the impact of social mobilization on discontent levels and can be stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: Discontent will be higher if perceptual mobilization if higher.

Hypothesis 1b: Discontent will be lower if economic mobilization is higher.

The reader should recall that both of these dimensions relate to the level of involvement with the non-traditional system. Discontent primarily flows out of an awareness of what one does not have (promoted by a high level of perceptual mobilization), while discontent declines if one has more of a desirable thing than those with whom he compares himself. Economic mobilization is basically a measure of how much one has, since in the traditional economy the surplus one might acquire in cattle or produce was not sufficient to

purchase material goods. It is nearly inconceivable that a man practicing traditional agriculture could today produce enough surplus to build a stone house, put an iron roof on his home, or send his children to school. On the other hand, if he were economically mobilized it is far more likely that his needs would be met from his resources, thus reducing his level of discontent. Based upon this discussion we would predict that dissatisfaction or perceived deprivation would be highest among type two respondents (who are poor and aware of it), second highest among type one respondents (who are high on perceptual mobilization but whose discontent would be moderated by their wealth), and lowest among the type four respondents, who are poor but in contrast to type two are not likely to perceive their poverty because of lack of an ability to compare themselves with others. Type three respondents--those high on economic mobilization but low on perceptual mobilization--should be in third place between type two and type four.

Examining the data in Table 8-1 one finds that these expected relationships hold true. This table presents data on three items: discontent with farming as a way of life, dissatisfaction with one's housing, and dissatisfaction with the standard at which one's family lives. Comparing type one (fully mobilized) with type three (economically mobilized) and type two (perceptually mobilized) with type four (non-mobilized), thus controlling to some extent for wealth level, one sees that a basic pattern has emerged. In each case objectively defined condition of life is not the best predictor of satisfaction

with condition of life. Those who are better off (to the extent that the economic mobilization index measures that) will be more dissatisfied with what they have if they rank high on the perceptual mobilization index. On the other hand, when controlling for perceptual mobilization level, satisfaction does seem higher among those who are better off, thus indicating that wealth can moderate the dissatisfaction caused by high perceptual mobilization levels.

Table 8-1. Dissatisfaction by Social Mobilization Type.

Item	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Dissatisfied with Farming	72	173	77	60	66	67	57	56
Dissatisfied with Housing	73	226	76	62	73	75	56	64
Dissatisfied with Standard of Living	78	227	83	63	71	73	55	60

Other measures show basically the same pattern. Table 8-2, for example, presents the summarized results of an additive index which includes ten items, ranging across a whole series of social problems.[1] Once again the pattern which was predicted earlier seems to hold: the perceptually mobilized group are more likely than any other to feel dissatisfied with social conditions.

Table 8-2. Perception of Problems Index by Social Mobilization Type.

Position on Index	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 227)	2 (N = 62)	3 (N = 73)	4 (N = 62)
High	54%	60%	40%	31%
Low	46	40	60	69

It should be pointed out that this index covers not only personal deprivation but other matters as well, such as the care of the elderly, crime, and the presence of immigrant communities. Thus it seems that the perceptually mobilized are highest not only in a sense of personal deprivation but also in a general feeling that society as a whole is beset with problems of a serious and diverse nature. Their concern is not only with themselves but with the general society as well. In other words, the sense of discontent is not limited to their own specific circumstance but is generalized to the whole society.

The critical matter regarding discontent, however, is not merely what causes it but, more importantly, what a given level of discontent tells about the political characteristics of the society in which it occurs. Will a given level of discontent produce violence, disruption, and disorganization, or will it be diverted into other more peaceful channels? What direction will it take when translated into policy preferences?

It seems reasonable to predict that the perceptually mobilized would be disproportionately likely to favor policies inconsistent

with the preservation of the present economic system and the inequities which they perceive as flowing from it. Specifically if this group felt that there existed within society accumulations of wealth which were obviously greater than the needs of the people who possessed them, it is likely that they would favor taking that wealth and distributing it in a more equitable manner. Thus this group would seem likely to favor such radical redistribution policies because of their peculiar outlook on the political system. They are aware of the existence of disproportionate wealth levels and would be aware of concentrations of wealth, while themselves possessing little. In their mind's eye they would be more likely to feel that such accumulations were unjustified, wasteful, and socially undesirable, in short, a betrayal of the purpose of independence. Other groups would be far less likely to favor such policies. The non-mobilized, for example, do not perceive their poverty, while the fully mobilized and economically mobilized are moderated somewhat by their relative wealth, creating perhaps a rudimentary class bias in favor of a conservative position. Taking all these possibilities into consideration, we might suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2--The Radical Redistribution Hypothesis:
Type two respondents (the perceptually mobilized) will show a strong preference for a radical redistribution of wealth and resources. The other types will show a declining preference in the following order: type one (the fully mobilized), type three (economically mobilized), type four (non-mobilized).

It is unfortunate for this research that there are not several measures relating to radical redistribution. The difficulty with developing adequate measures is that most of Nyeri's people are capitalistically-minded individuals who staunchly defend property rights and private enterprise, and who themselves wish merely to gain a share of the output.[2] Questions based upon classic socialist redistribution ideas would surely produce overwhelmingly negative response patterns. Because of this it became necessary to adapt the measures somewhat to fit the circumstances of Kenya society. Specifically it was necessary to determine those elements of society which were generally felt to be unjustly favored by the present distribution of resources. Upwardly mobile Kikuyu, for example, who have purchased businesses or shops, or have acquired land, are not generally felt to be unduly rewarded for their enterprise. Their wealth is admired and respected. It is the well-deserved reward for hard work, sacrifice, and enterprise. Cries to expropriate their property fall largely on deaf ears.

However, groups do exist whose wealth is not viewed entirely as the legitimate product of hard work and perseverence. Kenya's land-owning Europeans and shop-owning Asians are often portrayed in political terms as parasites on the national economy--the undeserving rich. Asians are seen as exploiters, who overcharge Africans, have no loyalty to the society and illegally export their money to foreign banks. Europeans have a somewhat more favorable image but are still felt to have gained their land at no cost to themselves through the

removal of legitimate African owners. A discussion of either group is likely occasion for raised voices and heated charges. Neither community is felt to be an integral part of the society. Both are still looked upon as foreign elements (in spite of adoption of Kenya citizenship by many) which resulted from the colonial era. Both stay largely to themselves, which means that they have few primary group ties with the African community. They are foreign bodies existing within an overwhelmingly African society. For these reasons they are perfect to use for testing the Radical Redistribution Hypothesis.

In asking questions about these two immigrant communities it quickly became obvious that the level of dislike for Asians was significantly higher than the level of dislike for Europeans (see Table 8-3), a fact which decreases the usefulness of attitudes about Asian wealth as a measure of the dimension being examined. This intense dislike for Asians and relatively more favorable attitude toward Europeans may seem illogical in the light of the independence struggle, but there are several factors which help explain it:

1. The two communities are significantly different in size. In 1960 there were about 250,000 Asians in Kenya and 60,000 Europeans out of a total population of perhaps eight million. Moreover, while virtually the whole Asian community were permanent residents, the large bulk of Europeans were expatriates living in Kenya on a temporary basis. When one excluded these, only a few thousand Europeans were permanent holders of Kenya wealth or in long range competition with African interests.

Table 8-3. African Perceptions of the Characteristics of Asians, Europeans, and Africans.

Characteristic	Per Cent Who Say Characteristic Applies To			Total N
	Asians	Europeans	Africans	
Hard Working	34	77	99	96
Trustworthy	13	70	95	98
Hard to Get Along With	72	41	19	98
Feel Superior	69	84	40	98
Able to Work Well with Others	23	77	99	98
Polite	15	57	92	95
Able to Manage People Well	19	69	96	98

Respondents used in this table were from two settlement schemes in Nyeri District. In all they numbered 98.

2. African aspirations put Africans much more in conflict with Asians than with Europeans. Europeans constitute a landed aristocracy who are rather aloof and distant (there are also Europeans in professions and business, but these are largely expatriate, a distinction which Africans seldom make). The average African could resent the European for his wealth of land but could seldom aspire to that land. An Asian, on the other hand, might occupy a shop or small business to which an African might well aspire. The intensity of conflict would be much higher with the Asian than with the Europeans, because the focus of the conflict is far more immediate with the Asian.

3. The African is far more likely to come into contact with Asians than with Europeans. The European is a distant figure, passed on the road or glimpsed in the town. The Asian is a very real figure with whom one must haggle over the price of a pan or complain about the poor quality of a shirt.

4. In the eyes of many Africans it was the European, not the Asian, who brought modernization to Kenya. The Asian is like a scavenger who follows along to eat the scraps, while the European has done the work. This very unjust view of the historical role of Asians has meant that few Africans credit the Asian community with producing any benefits for Africans. Europeans in contrast are credited with economic development, education, Christianity, and modern medicines, all highly valued. In addition, many of these perceived benefits continue today, so that there exists a class of pro-European Africans who feel that future national development as well as their jobs are dependent upon the continued presence of European skills and capital in the country.[3]

5. Asian culture is highly exclusive, while Europeans tend to be more evangelical. Africans have little knowledge of or appreciation for the achievements of Asian civilization, while they learn European languages, adopt European religion, read European books, and often study European history.

For all of these reasons it is very difficult to ask Africans for opinions about Asian-held property, simply because there is so little sympathy for Asians among the African population. Europeans in contrast do produce differential attitudes, making meaningful

analysis possible. Consequently let us now turn to the matter of European lands to test the Radical Redistribution Hypothesis.

The Redistribution of European Lands

In 1960, 3,000 European landowners occupied approximately 20 per cent of the fertile land in Kenya (about 3 million acres in total), some of which bordered on Nyeri District. The question of what to do with this land has been a key issue in Kenya politics for 70 years. Before independence many promises were made by African politicians regarding the free distribution of these lands. Expectations for a time were very high. As independence came nearer, however, the new African government for a variety of reasons became committed to a policy of compensation for European settlers who left, and mortgages for African settlers who took their place.[4] The government policies on compensation and "free land" led to extreme disillusionment in some quarters and became a major issue in the struggle between KANU and the opposition KPU for national supremacy.

In Nyeri the large number of white settlers who occupied the two northern divisions of the district were gradually replaced by private sales of land or by settlement schemes. In 1970 the number left in the district was a few dozen at most, primarily found on estates which must be managed on a large scale for economic reasons. Nevertheless, in spite of their small and still declining numbers, the pressure from unemployment and an increasing population makes European farmers a contemporary political issue. Reduced to its

essentials, the matter seems to hinge upon whether or not there shall be a redistribution of wealth from a favored few to an impoverished many. An individual's position on these issues should be (if previous assumptions are correct) a function of his perceived deprivation level, with the greatest support for confiscatory redistribution policies being concentrated in the perceptually mobilized group. In fact, if one looks at Tables 8-4 and 8-5 he sees that this is decidedly not the case.

Table 8-4. Response to Question, "Should European farmers be paid for their lands?" by Social Mobilization Type.

Response	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 216)	2 (N = 60)	3 (N = 71)	4 (N = 61)
Yes	54%	61%	31%	19%
No	46	39	69	81

Note: Some respondents qualified their answers, saying perhaps, "They should be paid something, but not very much." Such respondents were coded in the "yes" category.

Table 8-5. Response to Question, "Should African Settlers be required to pay for lands transferred from Europeans?" by Social Mobilization Type.

Response	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 228)	2 (N = 63)	3 (N = 75)	4 (N = 66)
Yes	75%	66%	56%	44%
No	25	34	44	56

As one can see from examining these tables, type two is anything but "radical." On the question of paying European settlers for their farms (as opposed to confiscating the land), they seem more willing to concede payment than any other group. On the related but distinct matter of whether African farmers receiving vacated European lands should pay for them or get them free, they likewise appear far more conservative than one would expect. Overall these findings seem to contradict the prediction of Hypothesis 2, that this cell would be society's discontented revolutionaries. Though we have established earlier that they are discontented, their discontent does not seem to have taken a revolutionary or radical direction. If anything it appears to be almost embarrassingly conservative. Furthermore an argument often put forward by local observers--that the wealthier elements of Kenya society, those who can afford to buy European-owned lands, would be the ones who would favor payment since they would be the ones who would benefit--seems largely disproven. Though income does seem to be one factor involved, it is clearly not decisive. Furthermore the "radicalism" of cell four (the non-mobilized) shows that perceptual mobilization alone is equally insufficient to explain the attitudes being examined.

What is left then is an apparent contradiction. According to our data social mobilization produces a personal sense of discontent and dissatisfaction but does not lead to political demands for redistribution of resources. If we are to explain this contradiction in a meaningful way we must examine more closely the exact meaning of the discontent observed, and its implications for society as a whole.

In particular we must ask if it is necessary for discontent to be turned upon the political system or if it can perhaps take other outlets. Under what conditions would discontent with one's economic standing take on political implications, and under what circumstances would it be diverted into other arenas?

Alan Grimes in his study of American political thought observed once that competition can take two forms. In the first form men view themselves as united against a niggardly nature which is reluctant to release its resources. In another form, competitors see the amount of resources as fixed, hence making it necessary to compete against each other.[5] In the terminology of the rational calculists we might then say that when we have conditions of pareto optimality (that is, when making some people better off does not result in making others worse off), competition will be productive, not destructive. Blame for one's poor condition will not be placed upon other members of the political system or upon the political system itself, but rather upon nature, the resource base, or some other non-political abstraction.

Such an outcome would be contingent upon the perception which the individual had of the cause of his deprivation. In particular it would be necessary to determine if he felt that the political and economic systems (two possible outlets for his deprivation) are responsive. Inequality can have two different natures:

Contingency 1: The resource base is small. Each individual has an opportunity to advance, but because opportunities are limited some people remain poor.

Contingency 2: Resources may or may not be scarce; the important thing is that some people are not given equal opportunity to participate or advance.

If the first situation is the perceived one, it is likely that a sense of deprivation will be socially functional, that is, it will not produce "radical" demands upon the political system, or a sense of alienation, but will with proper impetus drive those with a high sense of deprivation into activities of a productive or developmental nature. In other words:

a sense of deprivation	+	a feeling that amelioration is possible	⟶	achievement-oriented activities

On the other hand, if one feels that his access to the instruments of eradication (which can eliminate or moderate his deprived position) is limited or restricted, his response will be different. Then the enemy will not be the inadequate resource base or his own yet underdeveloped potential, but rather the inequitable political and social system which denies its members just opportunity to enjoy their fair share of social output. If such a situation prevails in the perception of the individual, the likely outcome will be frustration, alienation, and pursuit of the radical alternatives suggested earlier.

In hypothesis form this is stated as follows:

Hypothesis 2a: In a population with a high sense of deprivation, the propensity to favor a policy of radical redistribution of resources will be greater in those who perceive themselves to be left with no alternative in the political and economic systems.

To test this hypothesis we must examine two attitudes:

1. Perception of economic opportunity
2. Perception of access to the political system, and political system responsiveness.

What this means is that the level of perceived deprivation in a given population tells us little about the impact which that deprivation will have upon society or about the alternatives which the deprived group will seek. What is far more important in understanding the implications of high perceived deprivation levels is an examination of two important and closely related matters: (a) What is the perceived cause of the deprivation? (b) What is the perceived probability that the deprivation is permanent?

We have already discussed the first of these and the likely outcome of the two alternative views. It is unfortunate that the data used for this research has no items relating to the perceived cause of deprivation, though most public documents or development plans show the official position to be that colonial inequities and low levels of development are the primary causes.[6] In any case future possibilities are more important than past inequities or even present inequities. A man makes permanent adjustment to his present condition only if he feels that condition to be permanent;[7] if he feels the condition to be temporary, he is far more likely to adjust to his expectations than to his situation. The response to his condition will be a function not so much of the condition itself as to the perceived permanency of that condition. To understand how a person will

respond to deprivation we must then look not at the deprivation but at the individual's view of his future probability of leaving the ranks of the deprived.[8]

Tables 8-6 and 8-7 illustrate this phenomenon. Here we have created an index (the Advancement-Optimism Index) which measures attitudes towards the responsiveness of the economic system. This index is discussed in detail in Appendix B. In short, it consists of responses to three items:

1. Can a person born in poverty improve his economic situation?
2. What is more important in being successful: hard work or connections with important people?
3. What changes do you foresee in your life in the next five years?

Respondents who anticipated improvement in their lives, or who felt improvement was possible, or who felt achievement was the basis of advancement were scored positively. As Tables 8-6 and 8-7 clearly show, perceptually mobilized respondents (who are generally characterized by high deprivation levels and no visible resource base sufficient to improve their conditions) are far more likely to favor confiscation of white-owned farms and their free distribution to the needy (presumably themselves) when they are pessimistic about economic responsiveness than when they are optimistic about it. Other groups examined either have lower deprivation levels which are affected very little by the Advancement-Optimism measure, or (as in the case of the fully mobilized) have their attitudes moderated by their wealth.

When these groups do change, however, it is generally in the direction predicted.

Table 8-6. Attitudes toward Property Confiscation by Social Mobilization Type, with Control for Perceived Economic System Responsiveness.

Perceived Economic Responsiveness	Per Cent Favoring Uncompensated Takeover of White-Owned Lands, by Social Mobilization Type							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
High	42	143	35	43	66	30	77	22
Low	50	50	57	7	69	32	85	26

Table 8-7. Attitudes toward Method of Property Redistribution by Social Mobilization Type, with Control for Perceived Economic System Responsiveness.

Perceived Economic Responsiveness	Per Cent Favoring Free Distribution to Needy Persons, by Social Mobilization Type							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
High	25	250	33	46	45	31	55	22
Low	27	51	50	8	45	31	54	26

Political Participation and Discontent

We thus seem to have confirmed the expectation that deprived people who feel their deprivation is not permanent will not behave the way deprived people should behave. In other words, if the economic system is (in their eyes) responsive to their needs, they are less likely to demand substantive changes in it.

Economic responsiveness is, of course, related to political responsiveness. Though scholars distinguish between the two systems it is clear that they overlap. Standard definitions of politics[9] ("who gets what, when, how" or "the authoritative allocation of values") recognize the economic implications of the system of political rewards. Marx has gone so far as to argue that politics is purely "epiphenomena," that political rewards are exclusively economic rewards. Though few scholars today would accept this argument, most would agree that "who gets what" is a good reflection of political influence.

But evidence persists of an independent political dimension. People participate in the political system not just to defend and expand what they have, but to pursue that which they do not have. Likewise political systems can develop which exclude from participation groups of people whose participation is deemed undesirable, perhaps because of the demands they make or because they themselves possess wealth which is the object of the demands of others.

In the Nyeri case we must consider three possible patterns of discrimination which would alter expected participation in a

negative direction. When considering these possibilities we should realize that none would be instituted into law, but would be the result of unwritten discrimination patterns or the de facto effort of one group to exclude others from authority.

The first discriminatory pattern might be by traditional elites against modern elites. For reasons presented in Part Two this seems very unlikely. As was pointed out, traditional elites were not bound together in a formal structure and hence could not collectively resist modernization. In addition, acceptance of modernization has been widespread in Nyeri, so that people are admired for their modern characteristics, not discriminated against for them. Furthermore, the independence struggle was led by modern people, a fact which carries great prestige with it.

A second possible pattern of discrimination seems far more likely. If the country is relatively poor (as it is in terms of land and jobs), and if the economically favored classes are nouveau riche (as they are, by and large), it seems that wealthy elements of society might perceive their favored status to be both precarious and threatened by those persons who desire to improve their standing but who as yet have no large share of resources. In other words, it seems possible that types one and three would feel themselves to be in zero-sum competition with type two, thus making it necessary to limit the access which that latter group has to the extremely powerful instruments of government.

There is also a third possibility, that being the reverse of the one just discussed; if the predominant values of the political

elite are "revolutionary," then there may be residual discrimination against the wealthy members of society, who as a class had their origins in the colonial period. If this is so, one would expect a disproportionately low level of participation among the wealthy groups, especially type one though also among type three.

The critical element in our analysis seems to be the relationship between type one (the fully mobilized) and type two (the perceptually mobilized). Both are high in perceptual mobilization levels, but the fully mobilized in addition are wealthy. If a class conflict is emerging in the rural area it should be apparent in the interaction pattern between these two groups. But in order to determine if there is a deviation from the norm we must first hypothesize about what is "normal" or expected.

As suggested earlier, each dimension of mobilization produces its own participation patterns: economic mobilization leads people to pursue those interests which they have; perceptual mobilization leads them to pursue those interests which they have not. Weighting these two dimensions is the key problem in prediction. Type four (the non-mobilized) will have the lowest participation levels; that is obvious. The question is, what will be the relationship between the remaining three groups? Since many types of participation are not directly related to pursuit of economic interests (such as election activity), we would not expect the perceptually mobilized to fall significantly behind the fully mobilized in total participation levels, and in fact their participation levels might well be higher. We might make the following prediction:

Hypothesis 3: If there is no pattern of political discrimination against any group, the expected order of participation will be as follows: Fully mobilized and perceptually mobilized high, followed by economically mobilized, with the non-mobilized significantly lower.

This assumes, of course, that there is no pattern of discrimination which creates an imbalance between natural participation levels and perceived capacity to participate. Such imbalance, if it exists, would cause serious repercussions in the political system. For example, if a group with high motivation to participate (as suggested by our indices) had low levels of perceived system responsiveness, it is quite likely that alienation from the political system would rise drastically, creating a highly unstable situation. We are thus assuming that the motivation to participate is real and fixed, given a certain level of social mobilization, and that it will lead to participation of some kind, the only question being whether it will be functional or dysfunctional in terms of the existing formal political structure. A critical step in our analysis then becomes an examination of the perceived responsiveness of the political system to see if imbalances of any kind do exist.

Tables 8-8 and 8-9 present two measures of perceived responsiveness, the first an abstract attitudinal measure, the second a more concrete contextual measure. The first involved asking the respondents two open ended questions: "If this area needed something such as a new road or a new school, is there anything the people could do to make the government more likely to act?" and "If the government made

a law--such as a tax law--which the people considered unjust, is there anything they could do to change that law?" This measure distinguished between two basic views of government: government as a distributor of resources and government as a defender of order and authority. Moving from medium to high on the scale involves not a simple arithmetic increase but a logarithmatic progression. To influence the government's distribution priorities is a reasonably simple and non-controversial matter and one in which the political culture of the day encourages people to participate. Challenging something so serious as a law touches not only upon the legitimacy of authority but also violates traditional political values which were roughly comparable to the concept of Democratic Centrism, i.e., full debate before a decision, full solidarity after it. In fact the "error" on this measure (those who felt they could influence authority but not distribution) was well below 1 per cent of the total sample.

Table 8-8. A Three Level Measure of Perceived Efficacy, by Social Mobilization Type.

Efficacy Level	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 226)	2 (N = 64)	3 (N = 74)	4 (N = 64)
High	63%	63%	57%	22%
Medium	31	30	38	50
Low	6	8	5	28

Table 8-9. Administrative Competence, by Social Mobilization Type.

Competence Level	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 226)	2 (N = 63)	3 (N = 75)	4 (N = 64)
High	81%	91%	79%	67%
Medium	18	10	17	20
Low	0	0	4	13

Table 8-9 is adapted from a similar measure used by Almond and Verba.[10] Of four different local officials (the chief, the member of Parliament, the local party leader, and the District Officer), the respondent was asked the following question: "If you and some friends went to this man with a suggestion, do you think he would listen to you and consider your ideas, or just ignore what you said?" In Table 8-9 high means four positive responses, low means no positive responses, and medium means 1-3 positive responses.

As one can see from these tables, there is no evidence of estrangement from the political system among either fully mobilized or perceptually mobilized groups. In fact, type two (the perceptually mobilized), who were perhaps the most likely to be estranged, seem if anything marginally higher in perceived influence than the fully mobilized (type one). One possible explanation for this is that 15 per cent of all respondents high on the economic mobilization dimension live away from their farms because of some occupational requirement, while none of the low economic mobilization respondents

live away. This physical absence may reduce in a marginal way familiarity with local officials and hence one's perceived influence with them. In any case, the fact that no single type one respondent fell into the lowest category on the Administrative Competence measure seems to indicate that the differences which do exist are not drastic ones.

The one element of society which does have noticeably lower sense of influence is the non-mobilized. Twenty-eight per cent of this group falls into the lowest category in Table 8-9, making their percentage for that level 3 or 4 times greater than the average. There seem two plausible explanations for this pattern which deserve comment at this point.

The first of these explanations may be related to the age make-up of the group. Since many respondents tend to be older (see chapter seven), this may reflect the political values learned in their youth when there was really no formal government which one could influence. Thus the structures and mechanisms of the modern political system may be so alien that they simply do not have the information or skills to manipulate them. In addition, political socialization patterns at an earlier time may have been significantly different, resulting in a different approach to the role of the individual in the political system. Illustrative of this change is the traditional belief in "generations" which was common in times past. In somewhat over-simplified form this idea holds that once a man's time has passed he should retire from the political arena and

pass the torch to younger men.[11] It is possible that some elders, even if they felt they could be influential, might be unwilling to express such feelings.

The second explanation of this pattern, which is somewhat more conventional, is that these respondents (regardless of their age) are politically astute enough to perceive their own capacity to influence the political system. They lack both wealth and exposure to the modern system, two major components of political influence. A high efficacy level in the absence of actual influence reflects not political sophistication but political immaturity. In addition, it would involve a certain element of instability since a high efficacy level without actual influence could lead ultimately to cynicism and alienation. Thus the fact that the non-mobilized, who are probably in actuality the least influential element of society, perceive their lack of influence is neither surprising nor particularly ominous. As shown earlier, these people seem to have a very low need level, reflecting perhaps their lower level of social mobilization. They are relatively content with what they have and do not represent an unsatiated need group.

The thrust of these findings is to establish the existence of the condition upon which we based Hypothesis 3, that the predicted participation pattern would hold only if there was no pattern of systematic discrimination against any element of society. Our examination reveals that in the eyes of the participants no such pattern of discrimination exists, and that perceptions of influence are about as

one would expect. We can now turn to participation itself to see what patterns emerge. For purposes of analysis we will examine three separate classes of participation:

1. Contacts with government officials.
2. Political participation levels in electoral activity.
3. Membership and leadership in various organizational activities.

In considering who will participate and in which way we must again recall the probable results of the two dimensions on which we have broken our sample. On the one hand we have the pursuit of personal interest which directs one's activity into purposeful and predictable channels; on the other hand we have the capacity to perceive inequalities in society, which leads to activities of a different type and for a different purpose.

This said, what patterns do we find? First looking at contacts with officials (Table 8-10), we find basically a pattern which we would expect, again with the exception of the perceptually mobilized. The expected order in declining frequency of contacts should be fully mobilized, economically mobilized, perceptually mobilized, non-mobilized. Since the fully mobilized and the economically mobilized have vested interests to look after, they should have a high fixed number of contacts to make while the perceptually mobilized and the non-mobilized should have a much lower frequency of contacts. Once again we must reach the conclusion that perceptual mobilization has a major impact--this time on behavior, not just on attitude--independent of the level of economic mobilization.

Table 8-10. Frequency of Contacts with Officials*, by Social Mobilization Type.

Frequency of Contacts	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 230)	2 (N = 63)	3 (N = 76)	4 (N = 66)
High	28%	19%	14%	8%
Medium	44	46	49	41
Low	28	35	37	52

*Respondents were asked if they had ever taken any problem or matter to the following officials: the District Commissioner or Divisional Officer, the Chief or Headman, the Member of Parliament, the KANU leader, or the member of the County Council.

Examining the reasons people gave for contacting officials (Table 8-11), we immediately notice that pursuit of a vested interest can account for only about half of all contacts even at the most. Since type two and type four are not without interests (merely low on the index, which can mean they have none or that they have some) and since there is a wide range of activities not of an economic nature for them to pursue, there is no reason why these figures should not occur as they do. Remember also the earlier hypothesis that the person who was high on perceptual mobilization and low on economic mobilization would pursue with greater intensity those interests which he did not have. This hypothesis seems to find some support in Tables 8-10 and 8-11.

Table 8-11. Reasons Given for Contacting Local Officials.

Reason	Frequency
Conflict Resolution	54
Seeking a Public Service	49
Seeking a Personal Service	112
Seeking a Farm	33
Technical (Pay Fees, etc.)	63
Agricultural Problem	11
Other	117
Total Contacts	439

Table 8-12 shows basically the same patterns, except the subject here is level of political activity. The index used to measure this is based upon one adapted from Milbrath.[12] In it the respondent is asked the following questions: Are you interested in politics? Do you talk about politics with friends? Did you vote in the last general election? At that time did you try to convince any of your friends to support a certain candidate? Apart from talking to your friends, have you ever done anything to help a candidate for office?

Total positive responses were summed and treated as an index, with four or five being "high," two or three being "medium," and none or one being "low." The index serves as a useful measure of political activity, revealing once again that the behavior of type two respondents (the perceptually mobilized) is more a function of their

perceptual mobilization level than of their economic mobilization level.

Table 8-12. Political Participation Levels, by Social Mobilization Type.

Political Participation Level	Social Mobilization Types			
	1 (N = 223)	2 (N = 63)	3 (N = 73)	4 (N = 60)
High	31%	33%	19%	10%
Medium	57	56	60	50
Low	11	11	21	40

It was previously suggested when talking about contacts with government officials that there were different types of contacts which would correspond to the nature of the different cells. In a similar vein when looking at participation in organizations one must consider the nature of the organization as well as the simple participation levels. Suppose for conceptual purposes we could distinguish between two types of organizations: those which have goals of a compensatory nature, that is, which seek to make benefits available to the poor as well as to the rich, and those which have goals relating to the pursuit of existing economic interests. In the second type of organization we would predict that the participation level of the fully mobilized and the economically mobilized would be high with the perceptually mobilized and the non-mobilized lagging behind. In the first type we would expect the perceptually mobilized to "catch

up" with the fully mobilized, this time with the economically mobilized and the non-mobilized lagging.

To test these hypotheses we might examine two types of organizations in Nyeri, farmers' cooperatives and self-help groups. Cooperatives represent the economic interest type organization. Anyone who produces cash crops, milk, or meat is compelled, sometimes by law as in the case of coffee, to join the appropriate cooperative or farm society. These organizations primarily serve to market crops, to advise and assist their members, and to influence government policy. Self-help organizations, on the other hand, are ad hoc public service organizations, often organized on a mass basis, which construct schools, health centers, and other public facilities when government action is either delayed or not forthcoming.

Table 8-13 summarizes participation levels in cooperative organizations, showing membership and leadership. They are as predicted, except for the fact that over half of all perceptually mobilized respondents are members of cooperatives. We must remember again that the economic mobilization index does not measure the presence or absence of such interests but rather distinguishes between the highs and the lows on that dimension. It is obvious then that the lows are not an entirely deprived group.

Leadership patterns within the cooperatives are interesting. A full 89 per cent of the cooperative leaders in the sample (31 of 35) are fully mobilized. This bias away from economically mobilized and even perceptually mobilized reflects perhaps the need for cooperative

Table 8-13. Membership and Leadership in Farmers' Cooperatives, by Social Mobilization Type.

Level of Participation	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Member	81	230	56	63	66	76	38	66
Leader	14	230	3	63	1	76	2	66

leaders to carry on business with the outside world.[13] The person who is not in contact with that world would not qualify for leadership. Thus a high ranking on perceptual mobilization items is a necessary but not sufficient precondition of leadership in such a group. Perceptual mobilization interacts with the second necessary but not sufficient condition--high level of economic mobilization--to produce a combination of conditions which virtually dominates cooperative leadership.

When one turns to the self-help group the patterns of both membership[14] and leadership change. Here the function of the leadership elite may be as much to organize the masses and to have legitimacy in their eyes as to have complicated dealings with the outer world. Their influence may be as much a function of their ability to be trusted as of their ability to play tribune with the modern sector. Table 8-14 shows participation and leadership in self-help societies. In this table we see the role of the perceptually mobilized expanded considerably.

Table 8-14. Participation and Leadership in Self-Help Groups, by Social Mobilization Type.

Level of Participation	Social Mobilization Types							
	1		2		3		4	
	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N	Per Cent	N
Member	71	228	70	63	58	76	37	66
Leader	15	228	14	63	11	76	2	66

In trying to assess the meaning of these findings, readers might keep in mind three points about the relationship between attitudes and behavior. First, attitudes themselves are meaningless unless somehow transformed into political action. A simple tabulation of the per cent of people holding a given attitude reveals very little in itself about the course of policy pursued by that society as a whole. Obviously some people are more influential than others. The weight to be put upon a given political attitude must be measured in light of the political influence of the holder of that attitude. If the holders of a certain attitude are well placed or intense in their feelings or active in expressing and organizing their needs, they may well be an important force in the political system whose influence outdistances their numbers. Attitudes must then always be examined within the context of effectiveness of articulation.[15]

A second point to be remembered is that insofar as the legitimacy of the political system is concerned, it is essential to determine if the discontented elements of society are inside of or outside of the

politically influential leadership strata, or as one would often say in contemporary terminology, the establishment.[16] A group with high perceived needs would behave much differently if it were a part of the leadership elite than if it were an outside group. If it has authority or influence over the allocation of resources, the dysfunctional implications of its discontent will surely be moderated by practical administrative realities.

In addition, a leadership group, regardless of its level of discontent, would be subject to information inputs from the political center which the populace would perhaps miss. Specifically in the case of Kenya's foreign-owned land, the President has time and again gone on public record as personally endorsing the "conservative" alternatives.[17] He has defended these alternatives on normative, economic, and humanistic grounds. Since these arguments are rather hard to grasp, especially for one who saw the struggle for independence as being a struggle over resources, it seems likely that those who are leaders would be most likely to have heard and accepted the arguments of the President. The conservative position might, in other words, reflect a degree of integration into the political system rather than some abstract policy preference and might help explain why types one and two are more conservative, but types three and four more radical.

In the Nyeri situation discussed above we see that much discontent is concentrated in the socially mobilized classes and that furthermore these classes produce most of the formal leadership elite

of the society. It thus becomes obvious that the process of social mobilization is responsible not only for producing discontent but also for producing the leadership classes which perceive this discontent. This leads to a situation in which much dissatisfaction is vented against a hostile environment rather than against another segment of society. If there had been a formally structured pre-modern elite which had retained control over many resources and perhaps even the structure of government, and which had kept itself distinct from the modern elite, the pattern might have been different. Then the conflict might have been one between the ins and outs of the elite class, resulting in polarization and intense conflict. One could in fact argue that this is basically the pattern which occurred during the anti-colonial struggle, when a highly exclusive European landed aristocracy and a relatively wealthy African administrative elite had combined to monopolize political influence, much to the chagrin of an emergent African bourgeoisie which was high on perceived deprivation but low on perceived political influence.[12] The result, of course, was a bloody revolution.

As evidenced by the data presented in this chapter one could argue that this polarization has not been repeated in the post-independence period for three reasons:

1. Leadership seems to be drawn almost exclusively from the socially mobilized elements of society. This has been facilitated by the absence of a traditional structurally-formalized elite and by the fact that the colonially-created

administrative elite was discredited during the Emergency, thus enabling positions of formal leadership to be taken over by the politically emergent classes described above.

2. A primary concern of the post-independence government has been economic development. Discontent has been made a part of the official ideology of "nation building."[19] Not only is discontent accepted, but in fact people are encouraged to be discontented with what they have. They are urged to strive for improvement. This has led to a very interesting situation in which . . .

3. The most socially mobilized and dissatisfied elements of society are those who are most highly integrated into the authority structure and most optimistic about the future. They constitute a leadership elite which is development-oriented, politically active, and yet basically conservative. Those elements of society which one would expect to be the most disgruntled with the management and direction of social change are in contrast its most highly integrated members. Their discontent has been harnessed, channeled, and made legitimate, thus neutralizing its potentially dysfunctional nature.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8

[1]Respondents were given 0, 1, or 2 points based upon how serious they felt the following problems were: their standard of living, inequalities in the society, crime, unemployment, care of old people, Asians, Europeans, dishonesty among local officials, land shortage, lack of respect for elders.

[2]See Gertzel for the ways in which this feeling was used to effectively counteract the socialist appeals of the KPU in 1966. Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 66-70.

[3]See Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," American Political Science Review, 64, No. 3 (September, 1970), 737-753. See also Republic of Kenya, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya."

[4]Gertzel, Government and Politics of Independent Kenya, 499-521.

[5]Alan P. Grimes, American Political Thought (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), 328-330.

[6]See Republic of Kenya, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya,"

[7]Schlesinger has written an excellent work on how politicians respond to permanent and non-permanent situations. Schlesinger, Ambition in Politics.

[8]A good practical example of this is the effort in the late 1960's to create a "Poor People's Movement" in the United States. The effort collapsed after a few weeks of national publicity. One likely reason was the people would rather rid themselves of their poverty than organize around it.

[9]Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1958), and David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 9 (April, 1957), 383-400.

[10]Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 106-114.

[11] cf. chapters four and seven of this work.

[12] Milbrath, Political Participation, 18.

[13] Hyden has suggested that the causal relationship goes in the other direction, that certain types of people seek out control of cooperatives for their own purposes. Goran Hyden, "Cooperatives and Their Socio-Political Environment," in C. G. Widstrand, ed., Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa (Uppsala: Scandanavian Institute of African Studies, 1970), 61-80.

[14] Technically there is not usually formal membership in a self-help society. Respondents were asked if they had been active in any such group in the past year. Leadership by contrast is formalized into officers and committees.

[15] For a discussion of the role of intensity in political influence, see Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, and Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).

[16] For a discussion of this matter see Harry Eckstein, "On the Causes of Internal Wars," in Eric Nordlinger, ed., Politics and Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 287-309.

[17] See Kenyatta, Harambee!; Gertzel, Government and Politics of Independent Kenya; and Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

[18] See Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau," 234-276, for a discussion of this point of view.

[19] This point is obvious from the activities and speeches of any of Kenya's ministers. One could also refer to any of Kenya's position papers: KANU, KANU Manifesto; Kenyatta, Harambee!; Republic of Kenya, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya."

PART FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

One phenomenon which seems to pervade much of the developing world is an almost obsessive desire to achieve what is commonly called "development." In Kenya as elsewhere there is a great desire to build roads, schools, industries, hospitals. One cannot help but admire this drive for improvement, but likewise one cannot ignore the possible unanticipated side-effects which it could produce. There is far too much evidence as to the undesirable nature of these side effects to doubt either their existence or their potentially disruptive impact upon society. Insecurity, disorder, and violence are too often all that remain of the shattered dreams of a better society.

As shown in chapter one, Gurr has focused his studies of political change upon the concept of "gap" as a means of explaining the violence potential of a society. He has suggested that the violence potential increases as a function of the distance between wants (value expectations) and resources (value capabilities). When examined in the light of related research this hypothesis is ominous indeed, for there is every indication that aspirations in a developing society far outdistance capabilities.

The research just reported has produced at least one modification of this hypothesis: the process is not deterministic; a gap does not automatically produce violence or extremist policies. In fact, as was shown, it is not sufficient to simply establish that discontent exists in a society. Discontent exists in all societies, so that the discovery of its presence in a particular place is like saying that "man is a social animal" and then finding that he is. Nothing has been explained, nothing resolved. The significance of discontent lies not in its presence but in its impact upon society. Only to the extent that we find discontent concentrated in politically influential elements of society, differentially distributed as it were, does it take on political significance. Only when it is related to conflicts within society, to competition among elites, to alternative policy-preferences does its importance become obvious. Even then we must determine the <u>direction</u> which it will take, and how it will be transformed into political action.

The interesting aspect of this problem is that there are really two forces at work, the first of which creates the discontent, the second of which transforms it into political action. Much of the research into perceptual mobilization and deprivation has concentrated upon the socio-economic forces which produce the gap. Perhaps because of limitations on the data available there has been less work on the second and by far more important question of why two societies with similar levels of relative deprivation should behave in entirely different manners. The answer seems to lie in the cultural-behavioral

characteristics of the society much more than in its level of socio-economic development. In other words, a given set of socio-economic conditions will produce in different societies approximately similar "gaps," but the transformation of these "gaps" into politically meaningful activities will be determined not so much by the objectively defined characteristics of the society as by the peculiar behavioral-cultural traits of that society. In the Nyeri case, for example, we have seen that the process of development created an overlap between high deprivation levels and perceived stake in the society, thus producing conditions under which high levels of deprivation have been channeled into the expansion of the resource base rather than into a struggle over existing resources.

But the skeptical observer must in all honesty ask several questions about the nature of these findings. The first of these relates to the fact that the whole sample consists of landowners. Though many of these are very poor, this fact might possibly introduce into their behavior a certain conservatism which would not hold elsewhere. What of those people who own no land? In the past almost every young man knew that if he waited long enough he would be a landowner some day. At some point his father would die and he would inherit a share of the estate. Everyone, whether landowner or not, thought as a landowner. Conservatism and co-optation were built into the system. The ultra-conservatising force of anticipatory socialization led everyone to assume the characteristics and values of a landowner whether or not he was in actual possession of land. Those who

temporarily wandered off to seek a job or an education knew they would soon be coming back. They kept in mind that their ultimate life would be that of a rural landowner. They wished to change that life and its value system only enough to improve them and increase their effectiveness.

Today this pattern seems to be breaking down. A five acre plot cannot be divided effectively among five sons. A whole generation of young men are coming up who cannot possibly inherit their father's land. Will social mobilization break down the inherent conservatism of Kikuyu society and produce the cleavages and chaos which many social scientists feel is inevitable? Certainly many people believe so. The very conservatism of the present generation contrasted with an anti-status quo posture in the next might lead to the conditions which Deutsch and others predict. The deprivation of land ownership in the next generation might lead to distrust of rural elites, rejection of rural values, and violent political behavior. A conservative rural bourgeoisie confronted by an unpredictable radical urban class might be what the future holds.

Already evidence exists that such a cleavage might be developing. In migration patterns, to cite one important example, there is a definite movement of young men and even young women out of the reserves. The Omindi data cited in chapter three give irrefutable proof of this trend. Furthermore, the work migration data generated by this study and cited by generation in chapter seven offers substantiation. As shown then, many members of the older generation sought short-term

work opportunities out of the reserve on European farms or elsewhere. Today these short-term opportunities are declining. The Africanization and fragmentation of the former White Highlands into family-sized economic units has reduced drastically the demand for agricultural laborers. What now occurs is that the people who leave the land often leave for prolonged periods, perhaps amounting to most of a lifetime. The off-again, on-again migration of the past is largely dying out. What is replacing it is a more substantitve and permanent pattern in which the city plays an increasingly important role.

There are several moderating factors which deserve mention:

1. The desire to own land is still great even among the younger generation. So long as land is available, the landless classes will use what resources they have to buy land, thus continuing the assimilation process. This will, of course, drive up the value of land beyond its commercial worth, a tendency which has already begun. At least temporarily though, land continues to be available in the settled areas, an enormous boon to the stability of Kenya during its critical development stage.

2. There is evidence that the economic structure serves to reinforce the ties of both the poor and the rich urbanites to the land. The ties of the rich are obvious. They use their money to buy more land and to increase their status in the rural area. But the poor who cannot afford more than modest subsistence life in the city are forced to leave their families with relatives in the rural area.

3. People are prone to believe that opportunity still exists for the man who works hard. This belief is definitely a "cement" which holds dissatisfied elements of society together. One is forced to wonder, however, how long this optimism will prevail. Presently it is the result of actual opportunity resulting from economic growth, Africanization of the civil service and business, and the transfer of white-owned lands to Africans. But the limits on some of these resources are obvious. The civil service is now largely Africanized, the economy increasingly so, especially at the lower levels; the land is still partially in the hands of whites but mostly in areas not subject to break-up for economic reasons. For the average man aspiring to what might be called a middle class life (involving a job or a shop or a farm), aspirations will increasingly lead to frustration. Unemployment, which in earlier times meant that a man was unable to find a job to supplement his farm income, will increasingly mean the absence of any real means of support. Under these conditions unrealistic aspirations could easily degenerate into a paroxysm of frustration.

The policy implications of this are unclear. It is natural and perhaps inevitable that given a gap between aspiration and capabilities a leader or government should strive to close the gap by increasing system capabilities. But such efforts seem self-destructive or at least self-limiting. To increase the level of economic development requires a corresponding increase in the socio-economic growth capacity of society (such as the literacy level), and this in turn increases the aspirational level of the society. In addition, as long

as there is economic growth in the modern sector, the ratio of desirability between the modern and traditional sectors will continue to rise and rural people will increasingly be pulled into the modern sector, thus increasing competition and conflict.

On the other hand, efforts to control the level of aspirations seem equally futile. It is not that such control is impossible but rather improbable, for it requires a consciously chosen slowdown in growth rates. Such slowdowns have been achieved in some societies (such as Tokugawa Japan and Medieval Europe), but only at great cost to certain segments of society. Those societies (usually described as feudal) were characterized by formalized occupational roles, legal stratification patterns, and the nearly complete isolation of localities from each other. Aspirations were at a minimum, competition was virtually abolished through compartmentalization, status inconsistencies were rare, cities were protected from overcrowding, and personal security was the order of the day. Needless to say, such a policy cannot be instituted without doing serious damage to the industrial-merchant classes which would be handicapped by it, classes which in Kenya are very powerful and which seem to dominate the government.

One possibly-acceptable alternative would be to reorient social growth toward the rural area. The Kenyatta government has for some time pushed a "back to the land" movement which would reverse or slow down the seemingly inexorable urbanization which Kenya has experienced over the past 75 years. But this policy has never reached the point of coersion it has in countries such as Tanzania, South Africa, and

Italy, where influx laws control migration. It has mostly consisted of exhortations to the unemployed to be unemployed in the countryside rather than in the cities. What is needed in addition to this, if the policy is to be effective, is a high-level decision to decentralize industrial development and shift expenditures to the provinces. In conjunction with this, one would require a system of social services in the urban areas which was self-financing, so that the attractiveness of urban residence would be reduced vis-a-vis non-urban residence.

The political feasibility of such an effort is unclear. Political analysts observed long ago that what is collectively rational may not be individually rational. Restricted or directed growth policies may be desirable from a society-wide point of view but may never be implemented for reasons which are quite logical to decision makers. If public opinion, as defined by the politically articulate classes of society, is opposed to such a change in priorities, then one would not expect to see the change implemented.

There are two points brought out in this study, however, which seem to increase the options of the Kenya government. First, the data on contemporary values, while indicating a clear shift to a modern socio-economic system, in no way suggest that this shift could not occur within the context of a rural or provincial environment. Ties with the land remain great. Elements of the peasant culture persist, even in the face of a massive transformation of the socio-economic sector. Many people are still emotionally attached to the rural area, even though they live in the city. A decision to direct government resources into

rural infrastructure development (already being done on a "harambee" basis) would probably be very popular, especially if it increased the number of jobs available locally.

In addition there is a political dimension to be considered. As shown in Part Three of this work, there is a great reservoir of support for the leadership of the country. That peculiar set of circumstances by which Kenya developed a political and economic nationalism produced a high level of trust in the wisdom and ability of government leaders to pursue "correct" policies. This reserve of good will would serve the government well if it ever became necessary to embrace an unpopular policy. Though such latent reserves often prove ephemeral, the one in Nyeri seems more than transitory. If carefully cultivated and not abused, it could prove a valuable weapon in what will surely be a coming crisis.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE SURVEY

APPENDIX A

THE SURVEY*

I had several doubts about the appropriateness of survey research in the rural African setting. The technique seems primarily suited to an industrial urban society where people are used to filling out forms, taking examinations, and in other ways answering questions in an impersonal manner. I could not, however, think of any other means of collecting extensive amounts of data of the type needed. There was also evidence that survey research had worked in East Africa before: The Marco Surveys had been conducted for several years before going out of business in the late 1960's;[1] Rothchild, Miller, and Hyden, among others, had conducted surveys successfully.[2] There are also several writings on ways to adapt the survey to the non-Western context.[3] Furthermore in Nyeri itself there had been several surveys in past years, though none of them related to social science. Agricultural officers were constantly collecting data on local agricultural matters and had prepared farmers for answering questions. Antony Somerset of the Institute of Development Studies

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*This chapter is intentionally related in an informal first-hand manner. It is intended to discuss practical problems, not theoretical issues. If the style is casual at times, perhaps the reader will consider the motivation.

in Nairobi had also conducted a survey several years ago in Othaya Division. A few respondents in fact reported being interviewed in previous studies. I also hoped that the educational level in Nyeri, the high physical mobility of the labor force, and the general cosmopolitanness of the people would help.

Designing the Questionnaire

I began the study with a general idea about the types of data I needed to collect. I was primarily interested in demographic and socio-economic data, information about political participation and political efficacy, attitudes to government performance and policies, attitudes to specific problems, ans several latent political attitudes. Had I been conducting the survey in my own country I could have prepared a rough draft of the questionnaire with relative ease. The difficulty was adapting the questions to the local context. To facilitate this adaptation I did two things:

1. I began by consulting with local scholars and local informants. I read past papers presented at the University and hired a full-time assistant to discuss with me matters specific to Nyeri. I toured the district and met local chiefs and government officials of all types.

2. I read in detail scholarly books and other works on Kenya or on Nyeri, and read through those annual reports in the microfilmed Kenya Archive related to Nyeri (as well as whatever contemporary records were available from local government officials). The Kenya Archive documents go back to the beginning of the century and are

very valuable both as background and for specific factual information. I also read almost all Kikuyu novels, of which there are many (in English).

Within a few months I felt enough confidence in my knowledge of local issues to begin preparing a preliminary questionnaire. Simultaneously I began selecting a sample of respondents and paving the way for a pretest to be conducted during the half term break of Fall term when my interviewers (all advanced students) would be free for a long weekend.

Selecting and Training Assistants

For interviewers I chose five Higher School students from Kagumo High School near Nyeri where I was living. Higher School students, one should realize, are something of an educational elite. They represent the best of the secondary school students, and have been selected for further training. Many will go on to college. In general they speak excellent English, are serious, mature, and intelligent.

The process of selection was as follows: First I gave a guest lecture to the whole Higher School (over 100 students) so they could get to know me and my project. About a week later I advertised the jobs on the school bulletin board, emphasizing the hard work and modest pay involved, and asked for applicants, specifying that only Nyeri residents could apply. The names of the twenty-two applicants were presented to the school's Headmaster and to senior teachers for

confidential evaluations. Candidates were then ranked and the top five were interviewed. All were employed. Subsequently three others (all secondary school graduates) were added to assist in areas where interviewing had been slow. The selection process for them was similar: references and interviews.

I met with the interviewers several times before the survey period, with two major meetings occurring the week before the pre-test. Each of these meetings lasted about two hours. In the first I explained the sampling techniques used, the importance of randomness and of interviewing the person actually on the list, and the techniques of interviewing. Subsequently I gave them a one-page list of "rules of interviewing" which summarized the main points of the talk. These rules were designed to reduce as much as possible biases which the interviewers might introduce by poor interviewing practices. Most of the rules were based upon a similar list in Backstrum and Hursh's book, Survey Research.[4]

A second meeting was held to familiarize the interviewers with the questionnaire and the purpose of the questions. I went through the questionnaire in English so they could follow the Kikuyu translation (which some of them had helped in making and which was on the questionnaire side-by-side with the English version). I explained some theoretical concerns and tried to make them feel a part of the study and to have some enthusiasm and interest in it.

The Sample

I used a stratified cluster sample. It is stratified because it only considers male farmers. The choice of landowners I think gives a good view of district opinion since local custom requires even people in a cash economy or urban job to maintain a plot of land if at all possible. Thus a sample of landowner opinion is a sample of male public opinion. Non-landowners present a problem but they are few. Many have got land in the settlement areas of Kieni East and Kieni West. Others are potential landowners (awaiting the death of their father so they can come into an inheritance). People who actually have no land or prospect of inheriting any (such as orphans or dis-inherited sons) are few and probably not living in the district except in Nyeri Town. The problem of land scarcity I believe will be reflected in the attitudes of the fathers who have nothing to leave to their sons.

The exclusion of women was done for four reasons: (1) Most women landowners are widows merely holding land until their sons take over. Women under traditional law did not inherit land, so we can assume they are merely executors or trustees, and female land ownership is merely temporary. It would be difficult to find out who were the real owners of the land. (2) Many of the questions of the survey were aimed at men and would be awkward or meaningless if asked of women. (3) Some women might be shy and reluctant to be interviewed. (4) The Kikuyu women present an interesting political phenomenon worth studying in and of itself. Their role in the struggle for independence

was a critical one, and their role in current economic development is in many ways more important than that of men. I had neither the time nor the knowledge to conduct such a study, and hence decided to omit women from the sample entirely.

Nyeri district covers over 400 square miles and had over a third of a million people. To reduce the area to one which could be manageable by five interviewers I decided to concentrate on five locations within the district. A location is a sub-division of the district, ranging in size from 2-8 square miles. It is headed by a Chief, who is the top government official in the area. In turn it is subdivided into sub-locations headed by sub-chiefs (often 3-5 per location if the location is a big one). A person away from his location will often identify himself as coming from the location, thus indicating that it is a unit of identification. In retrospect I believe that were I conducting the study again I would concentrate upon one or two locations, thus limiting even further the area examined. As it was, five locations were chosen, representing each division of the traditional Nyeri District. These locations were chosen for a variety of reasons, the most common being the availability of a qualified interviewer from the area. Muhoya's in addition was the subject of a government development project (Special Rural Development Project or SRDP) and local government officials were eager to learn what they could of the area. Othaya, Ruguru, and Magutu were chosen for no particular reason except that Magutu was famous for producing several prominent Kenyans. Lower Muhito was selected because it was somewhat poorer than the rest of the

district. My initial hopes of being able to compare locations proved futile due to the fact that there was one interviewer from each location and thus there is a danger of confusing interviewer bias with real differences in the locations. Furthermore, the number of respondents from each location is not large enough to deal with effectively in statistical terms.

To draw the sample I first went to the Nyeri District Land Registry, located in Nyeri Town. Since land consolidation had been completed in the late 1950's and early 1960's this office has a complete listing of all plots or farms in the district, plus the owner's name, size of holding, transfers of title, and whether the farm has ever been used as security for a loan. For each chosen location I calculated the total land holdings and divided by 40. Since I had decided to take clusters of three farms (clusters are cheaper, simpler, and quicker than the simple random method, even though slightly less reliable[5]) with a total sample from each location of 120 names (100 interviews needed plus 20 others in case of death or non-availability[6]), this meant 40 clusters. Dividing total plots by 40 then gave me my interval for that location. The plots are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . to the end of the sub-location, then begin again at 1 for the next sub-location. I chose a number at random from 1 to 10, then began sampling by taking three names. I then added the interval and took three more, continuing until reaching 120 names.

Land holdings were taken as the basis of the sample for several reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, almost every male in the district is a landowner or potential landowner, so that a sample of land holdings is really closer to random than to stratified. There were two other alternatives for sampling, but both seemed less desirable. Tax records are unreliable and may or may not include the whole population. They also exclude the poor, who are often able to get an exclusion. Evasion is also common, according to government reports. Aerial photos are available, but are often out of date (many were made in the early 1960's or even late 1950's) and have no advantages over land holdings; in addition one cannot tell from an aerial photo who is the owner of the plot, and the tendency would be to interview the person who was there at the time, thus introducing a bias in favor of non-mobile people.

Regarding people who are away, perhaps working in Nairobi or someplace else, interviewers were given explicit instructions: If the person listed is living and has not permanently handed the farm over to someone else, he and only he is to be interviewed. If he is away at the time you visit his farm, find out when he is coming back and set up a time to interview him. If he is permanently off the land (for example, his neighbors or local government personnel cannot recall seeing him for several years), his name should be returned to me for exclusion from the sample. If the man is away from the farm for an extended period and all efforts to interview him fail, the interviewer is authorized to ask the wife several questions on a shortened interview schedule, mainly dealing with the farm and simple matters about the

owner such as his age or education (there were 52 of these wives' interviews; they are not reported here). If two men are listed as co-proprietors, interview the one who is available and list the amount of land which he cultivates as his share.

The Pretest

For the pretest each of the five interviewers was asked to contact five people from his list of respondents. Each was given a folder with five copies of the typed questionnaire, a list of 120 respondents, a list of *marika* (age grades) for estimating the age of old men, and a letter of authorization to conduct research. This letter was a xerox copy of the original provided to me by the Office of the President. It was on official stationery and had the Kenya national emblem on the top. Since it was in English, a typed letter in Kikuyu (signed by me) was stapled to it which said the following:

> The attached letter explains that I and the person bearing this letter have been given permission to talk to people in Nyeri District. Our purpose is to study the process of development and the way people view some of the problems and activities in the area. Once we have completed the study we will write a book on what we have learned. Your cooperation is of great importance to us. This research has been approved by the President's Office, the Provincial Commissioner, the District Commissioner, the Chief and the University of Nairobi.

Interviewers were advised not to show this letter unless someone questioned the legality of the study and asked for proof of legitimacy. This did not occur very often, though occasionally a local official who had not been informed of the study or a suspicious respondent

would ask for proof of the purpose of the study. In such cases the letter almost always worked.

There were certain other problems which had to be anticipated. The study had to be cleared through the administrative hierarchy. This was fairly simple since I had received the letter of authorization from the President's Office prior to my arrival in Kenya. This letter then had to be taken through the hierarchy from the Provincial Commissioner to the District Commissioner to the four District Officers to the five chiefs, each providing me with a letter of introduction to the next subordinate level.

Once we had received official sanction, the other side of the coin was to disassociate ourselves from the government. This was important for two reasons: First, many of the questions we would ask related to the government. If people thought we were government officials their answers could be biased. Second there is a fear by many people of Kenya's intelligence branches, the CID (Central Intelligence Division) and the Special Branch. Unless we established our identity as independent scholars, there might be a fear to give honest answers on all questions. Interviewers were therefore provided with an introduction and a set of answers to questions which might be asked. These covered the following points:

1. The project is connected with Nairobi University. The person conducting it is a teacher. The interviewers themselves are students hired to assist in the project.

2. Many people from across the district are being asked the same questions. All were chosen at random from a list of all farmers kept at the Land Registry in Nyeri Town.

3. All answers are confidential.

4. The government has approved the project but it is not a government project.

5. When the results are compiled a book will be written on Nyeri District and its problems. Copies of this book will be provided to government officials, who can read it if they wish.

To further facilitate the study all interviewers were taken to the Kenya Survey Map Office where they were allowed to examine detailed plot maps which showed the approximate location of farms by number. Though all interviewers were working in their home locations and hence were familiar with the general terrain, specific farms may be difficult to locate since sequentially numbered plots may in some cases be far apart; this half day spent in the map office may have saved many hours of wasted time later.

Twenty people were interviewed in the pretest. The following week was spent by me examining these interviews in detail, searching for questions which had not worked or had been misunderstood, or which for other reasons showed unexplainable patterns which required either explanation or correction before the main survey could begin. Later in the week I held a meeting with my interviewers in which we discussed problems they had encountered and ways to ease their labor. They reported that people were willing to participate even with items which

I had feared might be sensitive (such as what the respondent had done during the Emergency). The major difficulty they had encountered had been the distances which they had to walk each day and the problem of not finding people at home. Both of these problems remained with us throughout the survey and resulted ultimately in a reduction of the number of people interviewed and a greatly increased cost per respondent (total out-of-pocket expense per interview was still probably less than $1.00, though this does not include coding).

Following these discussions I made significant revisions in the questionnaire and then went out myself and interviewed an additional fifteen people (not from the random sample). After making a few additional changes the final questionnaire was typed and made ready for the main interviewing period.

The Interview Period

During the peak interviewing period, which covered about five weeks during December 1970 and January 1971, I tried to visit with each interviewer at least one time each week. I usually spent at least an hour with each, discussing interviews which had been conducted during the week and making on-the-spot decisions about minor problems which came up from time to time. One problem which was discussed each week with each interviewer was changes in the sample. They had been told in advance that I would have to make a personal decision about whether to delete any name from the list. The only deletions which they could make were of men who had died and whose widows now held the land. If ownership of

the plot had changed, the new owner could be interviewed as if he had appeared in the original list. In other cases I made the decision myself. I usually deleted those who were physically or mentally unable to participate, those who were unknown by their neighbors or local officials (on the assumption that they were either dead or permanently off the land), those who had farms elsewhere and did not cultivate the farm in the sample, and those who were working away and had not been seen for an extended period (see Figure A-1). Of the latter we often interviewed the wives (52 of them, as mentioned earlier), asking questions about the farm, the husband's frequency of visits home, and other related items, though that data is not reported here.

At the end of the initial interview period there were close to 370 interviews including the pre-test interviews which were tabulated even though about a third of the questions were punched "no data" because of changes in the questionnaire. The low number of completed interviews (compared with the hoped-for return of 500) necessitated hiring three other interviewers who were out of school and hence did not have to quit working in early January as did the original five. By the end of February these interviewers had added another 70 interviews, bringing the total to 436.

The second interviewing period occurred in April during the school vacation. Three interviewers from the original five plus two from the replacement group were taken to two settlement schemes (Warazo and Island Farms) just near Mount Kenya. There an additional 141 respondents were interviewed, using basically the same questionnaire, though altered

Status	Location					
	Chinga	Lower Muhito	Ruguru	Magutu	Muhoya's	Total
Original Sample	148	136	148	117	120	669
Interviewed	95	92	90	74	94	436
Not Interviewed	53	44	58	43	25	233
Removed from Total Because:						
Deceased	3	3	3	3	1	13
Infirm, Underage, Women	1	2	7	2	0	12
Not Known	1	9	5	2	1	18
Vacant Farm	9	3	2	0	0	5
Adjusted Total Not Interviewed	48	27	41	36	23	185
Reason Not Interviewed:						
Refused	6	0	1	0	1	8
Live or Work Away	27	23	10	11	2	73
Reason Unclear	18	14	30	25	20	107

Figure A-1. Interview Success Rate.

slightly to account for the fact that the sample came from a newly settled area and not from the former native reserve area. The sampling technique used in the schemes was essentially the same as used in the reserve, except that the lists of farmers was gotten from the Settlement Office and not from the Land Registry. These interviews were (like the wives' interviews) treated separately. Whenever used in the text they are so identified.

Problems of Item Selection and Translation

To give the reader a better feel for the difficulties encountered in conducting a survey in a foreign area I propose to discuss several items which caused problems in either the asking or the translating. Anyone who has done surveys in his own country knows that certain matters of exact wording or selecting meaningful questions always present considerable difficulties. These problems are intensified in a foreign area where one often has to depend upon others to decipher sophisticated meanings and translate them into the local language. Alternative patterns of social organization or basic value systems also mean that questions which have proven useful in the Western context may be meaningless overseas. For these reasons a pre-test is absolutely essential. The following examples will help illustrate some of the problems encountered in the early stages of preparing the instrument.

I had initially hoped to ask several questions about a man's family. I was especially interested in his background, his father's

education or past experiences, his father's religion, the amount of land his father owned, the order of his birth vis-a-vis his brothers, the number of children he had, their ages, what aspirations he had for them, etc. In general I found that these questions caused me great trouble. The questions about the father were almost a complete failure. The great changes which had occurred in society in the last generation or two had made many of the questions meaningless. Few fathers were educated even to the point of simple literacy; few were Christians; few if any had any formal memberships. The most common answer on father's memberships (apart from a blank stare) was that he was a member of the kiama (elder's council). Unfortunately the word kiama can apply to several bodies of differing levels and at the time neither I nor my interviewers knew the sophisticated distinctions between them. My hope that I could relate a man's behavior or leadership tendencies to characteristics of the father was untestable. Almost all of these questions (except on father's education and religion) were dropped. In retrospect even these two seem of little value.

On questions regarding children there was equal difficulty. In the traditional value system one does not give with precision the number of items which he owns of something regarded as having wealth of high value. Such enumeration ("I own fifty cattle") is looked upon as bragging and may leave one open to the wrath of god. In practice the Kikuyu have worked out a system of understating their wealth (or the number of children they have) in such a way that the listener knows what they mean. A man with eight children will say, "I have seven

children," by which one knows he means eight. Determing the number of children a respondent had then presented no problem to my Kikuyu interviewers who understood this convention. What did present difficulty was an item in the pre-test (dropped from the final questionnaire) which attempted to determine the age of the children. In the pre-test we simply asked, "How many children do you have? What are their ages?" The second half of this question caused infinite troubles. The difficulty was that people simply did not keep track of their children's ages. One old man struggled to calculate the ages of two or three, then in frustration called for the rest to come to him. He turned to my interviewer and said, "Here they are. You determine their ages." What was really important to me in asking the age of the children was whether or not they were of school age. This inability of people to answer my question as asked made me reconsider my approach. Finally I decided to ask the question in such a way as to determine whether or not the child was above or below the age of 18, an approximate upper limit for most school-age children. Fortunately 1970 minus 18 is 1952, the year of Kenya's most momentous experience--the start of the Emergency. I was able to change the question to read, "Of your children, how many were born after 1952, the year of the Emergency?" Since Kikuyus like other peoples in Kenya often use historical events as a means of dating, this simplified matters somewhat both for my respondents and for me.

A second set of problems which caused problems were those relating to perception of problems. These were of two types: Those

relating to one's own life (which began with "Are you satisfied with . . . schools, health facilities" . . . etc.) and those relating to the society as a whole (which took the form "Is theft . . . unemployment, care of the old, . . . etc. . . . a problem in this area?") One difficulty which immediately presented itself is the fact that there is no direct translation of the word "problem" into the Kikuyu language. Eventually we worked out a satisfactory translation using a verb which means "to bother" or "to cause difficulty." Hence our questions in Kikuyu say, "Is unemployment something which bothers the people of this area?" In a similar manner when translating the question (used by Almond and Verba) "What about Kenya makes you proud?" we found that the word "pride" produced complications. As mentioned earlier, when speaking of enumerating wealth, pride is considered an undesirable attribute. It was necessary to retranslate the question slightly to say, "What about Kenya makes you the most happy?"

To code these questions (the satisfaction questions and the problems questions) I wanted to set up ordinal categories of responses. For the satisfaction questions I wanted 1. satisfied, 2. very satisfied, 3. dissatisfied, 4. very dissatisfied. For the problem questions I wanted 1. It is a problem, 2. It is a serious problem, 3. It is not a problem. In practice this did not work. Respondents (especially older respondents who knew no English) had difficulty in placing themselves into such categories. In their minds they had said they were satisfied or that the matter was a problem, now what more could they say? In addition, Bantu languages have a means of expressing comparative

and superlative which does not lend itself to such ordinal measures. Put simply (and perhaps somewhat simplistically since this writer does not claim to be an expert in any African language), it is easy to compare two items on the basis of which has more of a given attribute, but it is difficult to state the amount of an attribute which a single item has. In other words, it would have been easier to ask which of two problems is more serious than to ask if a given problem is serious or very serious. Ultimately the various categories were put onto the pre-coded questionnaire, but the decision to put a respondent into one category or another was left to the interviewer. I had worked out in advance a rule of thumb to aid in the classification (if the respondent is emphatic or expounds upon his answer, classify him "very"), but interviewer differences are probably so great that the distinctions of degree seem useless.

Several other questions also caused difficulty. One was a straightforward question, "Are you interested in politics?"--a question familiar to anyone who has ever examined even a few American surveys. This question furthermore was the first of a series of questions used to measure level of political activism. In the pre-test this question produced such unpredictable answers that I simply could not understand what was happening. One local party leader insisted that he was not interested in politics, an answer which convinced me people were either lying (a terrible thought since it could invalidate the whole study) or else there was something drastically wrong with the question. As it turned out, the word for "interested in" which had been chosen had a

dual meaning. Though it meant "interested in," it also meant "drawn towards." In the final form the question reads, "Are you interested in what happens in Parliament?" Though this is obviously not perfect, it changes the thrust from political participation to interest in political events and affairs, the reason for asking the question in the first place.

One final question was never asked, though it was of great interest to me personally; the reason for its rejection in many ways reveals more about the matter than asking the question ever could have. I had wanted to ask people what they understood by the term African Socialism. This is the official name of the Government's strategy of economic and social development and it is referred to constantly in Government reports and parliamentary debates. When I suggested this question to one of my assistants, he looked confused and asked what I had said. I repeated "African Socialism" and asked how we should translate it into Kikuyu. He said there was no translation for this in either Kikuyu or Swahili. Since I knew there was a translation in Swahili, I told it to him--Ujamaa wa Kiafrika. He agreed that that would be a fair translation in Swahili, but said people would not understand what it meant unless we defined it for them. Such a definition of course would invalidate the question. He agreed, however, to return to his dormitory that night and ask his fellow classmates how to translate the phrase. After two days he returned and said that no one had been able to come up with a translation. None were even able to identify it except as a government policy. The question was dropped.

Three Possible Sources of Systematic Error in Gathering the Data

1. There was a danger of lying. There were some questions which people seemed reluctant to answer, either out of feeling that they were too political or too sensitive. Often these were questions which seemed to be very non-political ("What is the major problem of the area?" for example) but which to many seemed to infringe upon the prerogatives of the government. There were also occasional fears expressed that we were members of the Central Intelligence Division or the Special Branch (FBI and Secret Police), and some people thought we were organizing secret societies (a common and illegal occurrence in Nyeri). Others thought we were connected to the government in various ways, such as with the Agriculture Department or with Community Development. To reduce the probability of such misunderstandings the interviewers were instructed to emphasize in their introductions that they were (1) connected with the University, (2) had nothing to do with the government or any government department, and (3) were maintaining complete confidence on the replies given.

2. There was a danger of omitting significant segments of opinion from the survey due to the high migration rate out of the district. This is discussed in the section on the sample, and the reasons are given why I decided it was not critical.

3. There was a danger of error on the part of the interviewers. Though they were given several hours of instruction and several pages of written instructions, there is still reason to fear for their

non-uniformity of behavior. In particular there is danger that they (a) omitted to ask certain questions or failed to record full answers to the questions they did ask so that subsequent coding may be with incomplete data, (b) they failed to understand some questions and hence asked them in an unreliable manner, (c) they were careless or sloppy in interviewing and recording, or (d) they failed to report full answers and used pre-coding categories when they did not fully understand them. The questionnaire was pre-coded where this was possible, but interviewers were instructed to write their answers out except in case of objective groupings such as age or yes-no answers. They often disregarded these instructions, using the coding categories anyway and leaving me with no basis of determining the motivation or reasoning behind answers.

Coding and Punching Data

Much of the questionnaire was pre-coded with column numbers written into the left margin of the questionnaire. As soon as the interviewing was completed the interviewers (then back in school) were put to work coding the pre-coded section. I myself began working on the non-pre-coded section, consisting mostly of open-ended questions such as "What is the major problem facing this area?; Why did you vote for that candidate?; What type of problem have you taken to the chief?" In these cases there was no way to anticipate the pattern of responses, so the creation of categories had to wait until after the results were in. The practice I used in constructing categories was to take a sample

of interviews and write down all responses found in these on a given item, then consolidate responses into logical groupings of answers. With this preliminary set of coding categories I then spot-coded several more questionnaires to make sure there had been no major oversights. Once the categories were established I personally coded all open-ended items on which there was a coder's judgment involved, thus eliminating the probability of inter-coder error. I also checked each and every questionnaire for errors on the pre-coding section, spending a great deal of time on the work of those coders who seemed to have a higher rate of error than others (of five coders, three were nearly perfect in their work; two others required some supervision).

Once the coding was completed the data was then transferred to coding forms. Again at this stage I initiated a procedure calculated to reduce errors to a minimum. Each interview was recorded twice, each time by a different person. Then two other people would sit down with the two coding sheets, one calling out the recorded answer, the other checking to make sure the first recorded response matched the second. Errors were checked against the original to determine the correct response. Not only did this procedure catch many recording errors, but it also gave me a duplicate set of data which could be secreted away in case the original was for some reason lost.

Since I wanted to initiate preliminary data analysis while still in Kenya, I decided to have the first 349 interviews punched onto cards immediately (these 349 interviews represent those completed during the regular interviewing period, i.e., the school Christmas holiday.

The 436 total includes also 20 interviews from the pre-test, and 67 done in February and March after the original interviewers had returned to school). Punching those 349 interviews onto cards was done on a private pay basis at Nairobi University by Timothy Ahutah, described to me as "the best keypunch operator in Kenya." This recommendation, by someone whose opinion I respected, was important since the commercial keypunch operators in Kenya leave something to be desired. The major difficulty with these commercial operators is that their machines cannot duplicate cards. Hence when they verify and find an error in say column 50, they re-punch the card, making sure they correct the error in that column but not re-verifying columns 1-49. This strange practice led at least one scholar at the University to completely discard a commercially punched deck and re-do the whole job himself.

Nevertheless Ahutah punched the 349 interviews and machine verified the result. This machine verification corrected all illegal and inconsistent punches and produced a data deck in which I had confidence. Punching of the remaining interviews was done at Michigan State University by university keypunch operators.

Transporting the Data to the United States

I must admit to a fear throughout the whole project that somehow everything would be lost and I would be left with no data. The following description may seem overly cautious to the observer, but it was comforting at the time:

Four safety procedures were followed in returning the data to the United States:

1. I personally carried on the plane with me copy "A" of the complete code sheets for all data.

2. Copy "B" of these code sheets was left with a friend in Nyeri, to be sent to me air mail in case the first was lost.

3. The data deck including the first 349 interviews was sent air freight.

4. A copy of that deck was left in Nairobi with a second friend, to be air freighted to me in case the original was lost.

Needless to say, no losses occurred.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A

[1]Marco Surveys, Inc., Nairobi, Kenya. Many libraries have these surveys, classified under the name of the company.

[2]Rothchild, "Kenya's Africanization Program"; Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, No. 4 (1969), 689-711; Goran Hyden, Political Development in Rural Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969); Norman N. Miller, "Village Leadership Survey: Tanzania," unpublished codebook, June, 1967.

[3]Gerald D. Hursh, ed., Survey Research Methods in Developing Nations: The Criterion of Variance (forthcoming); William F. O'Barr, David H. Spain, and Mark A. Tessler (eds.), Survery Research in Africa: Its Application and Limits (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972); see also the numerous papers presented in recent years at annual meetings of the African Studies Association.

[4]Charles Backstrum and Gerald D. Hursh, Survey Research (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

[5]Ibid., 23-29.

[6]A total of 69 extra names were added in Ruguru, Chinga, and Lower Muhito when it became obvious that several potential respondents would be unavailable. No extra names were needed in Muhoya's where the interviewer was extremely aggressive and successful, or in Magutu where the survey ended before new names were needed.

APPENDIX B

THE INDICES

APPENDIX B

THE INDICES

There were four indices used in this work which need to be described in detail. Following this description there is a short discussion of the problem of validity.

The Economic Mobilization Index

This index attempts to measure the extent to which a man's economic interests are non-traditional in the sense that they direct his attention away from the local setting and into the national-modern arena. Since the measures used here involve the flow of resources, this index also reflects wealth.

This index consists of three items for a total of four points:

1. Does the respondent now have a job or is he exclusively a farmer? Twenty-four per cent of all respondents have some kind of employment and were given one point.
2. If the respondent has a job, does it require him to live off his farm? If so, he receives an additional point. Eleven per cent of all respondents live off their farms.

   The meaning of living off the farm deserves some justification. Basically it seems in a crude sort of way to measure income. Though one might argue that the man who lives on his

farm is able to live cheaper (no rent, for example), he is also more likely to receive a rural wage which is often very low. For this reason residence seems to reflect income and certainly it seems to reflect "interests" in a broader social sense.

3. If the respondent grew cash crops worth more than 500 Kenya shillings ($70.00) per year, he received one point. Thirty-three per cent of the respondents reached this level. If he grew crops worth 1500 shillings or more ($210.00) per year, he received two points. Twenty-nine per cent of the respondents reached this level. It should be noted here that respondents who grew cash crops worth less than 500 shillings were classified as "low," even though this put them in a category with those who grow no cash crops.

The percentage distribution of respondents was as shown in Figure A-2.

Points on Index	Frequency	Per Cent
0	130	30
1	130	30
2	118	27
3	47	11
4	11	3

Figure A-2. Tabulation of the Crop Value Index.

For purposes of analysis any respondent getting one or more points was classified as high. Though this break was arbitrary, it seems justified because of the practical necessity of distributing

respondents as evenly as possible into high and low groups so that the total "n" in a given cell will remain at a reasonable size for analysis. In practical terms this means that anyone classified as "low" is of necessity a farmer with no outside source of income and with cash crops worth less than 500 shillings per year.

The Perceptual Mobilization Index

This index consists of four items which were tabulated as follows:

1. On a separate information index respondents were asked seven questions. They were asked to identify by name the chief, the Divisional Officer, the local KANU leader, the Vice President of Kenya, and their member of Parliament; they were also asked the significance of Madaraka Day (a national holiday commemorating internal self-government) and also to give the date of Independence. Eighteen per cent of the respondents got two or less correct and were given no points on the perceptual mobilization index. Thirty per cent got three or four correct and got one point. Fifty-three per cent got five or more correct and were given two points.
2. Respondents were asked how often they listened to daily news programs on the radio. Those who reported listening most days (defined as five or more days per week) were 26 per cent of the sample and were given one point. Others got nothing.

3. Respondents were asked if they have ever lived or worked outside of the district. Those who have lived away five or more years (42 per cent of the sample) were given two points; those who were away up to four years (20 per cent of the total) were given one point; those who have never worked away or who have worked away less than a year (36 per cent of the total) were given no points.
4. Respondents were asked how often they visit Nyeri Town, the district capital and the only town of its size (10,000) in the district. Those who reported regular visits (defined as once per month or more) were given a point. These were 51 per cent of the sample.

Total points available on the index were six. Respondents were distributed as shown in Figure A-3.

Points on Index	Frequency	Per Cent
0	16	4
1	44	10
2	82	19
3	125	29
4	88	20
5	46	11
6	35	8

Figure A-3. Tabulation of the Perceptual Mobilization Index.

During analysis any respondent getting three or more points was classified as "high."

The Social Mobilization Typology

The purpose of developing the perceptual mobilization and economic mobilization indices was to use them as the basis of the social mobilization typology. By breaking the two just-discussed indices as indicated into high and low categories and then juxtaposing them against each other, one gets the typology shown in Figure A-4.

Perceptual Mobilization \ Economic Mobilization	High	Low
High	Cell One	Cell Two
Low	Cell Three	Cell Four

Cell Number	Frequency	Per Cent
one	230	53
two	64	15
three	76	17
four	66	15

Figure A-4. Tabulation of the Social Mobilization Typology.

The Advancement-Optimism Index

This index is made up of three items and is designated to measure the level of optimism which one has about opportunities to advance within the present socio-economic system. The method used to weight these three items is a standard "inverse weighting" technique.

The logic of such a technique is that the weight assigned to an item is based on the number of respondents who do not respond to the item "correctly." Thus if 90 per cent of the people agree with a statement, then a person agreeing with it gets 10 points (or some multiple thereof). If 20 per cent agree with a statement, then a person agreeing gets 80 points or some multiple. The items and their weightings were as follows:

1. "Do you expect any change in your life in the next five years?" There were 265 respondents (61 per cent) who said they expected some improvement in their lives and were given 8 points. Those who said they expected no change or expected to be worse off in five years were given no points.
2. "Can a man born in poverty change his economic condition?" A full 95 per cent of the respondents answered this positively and received one point each.
3. "Which is more important in being successful: hard work or connections with important people?" There were 321 respondents (74 per cent) who said hard work was the best explanation for success and were given 5 points each. Of the remaining respondents (none of whom received any points on this item), four out of every five felt that both work and connections were important, while only one of five felt that connections alone were the best explanation. Respondents receiving eight or more points were scored as high. These constituted 67 per cent

of all respondents excluding those whose scores were incomplete due to missing data.

Points	Frequency	Per Cent of Total
0	2	1
1	26	6
52	4	1
6	95	22
8	5	1
9	73	17
13	5	1
14	180	41
Incomplete	46	11

Figure A-5. Tabulation of the Advancement-Optimism Index.

Comment on Validity

What is as important as these details is the logic of the measures and an estimate of their validity, particularly in regards to the perceptual mobilization index. The economic mobilization index is fairly straightforward because it measures what is more objective and visible, in a sense more real. Though errors undoubtedly occur in it because of lack of data from jobs or because of errors in calculating the value of cash crops, these are technical problems which probably do not detract significantly from the general validity of the measure. Likewise the advancement-optimism index is fairly straightforward, since it involves simply asking people how they feel and then tabulating their responses.

The perceptual mobilization index, however, presents more serious difficulties. Wealth can be measured or at least estimated

because there will be overt signs and indications of its existence. The absence of these indicators shows an absence of wealth. Awareness or exposure is more difficult to tap. Relying upon indicators such as information about the political system or visits to urban centers (as this index does) can only reflect the presence of the dimension, not its absence. An index of this type running, for example, from zero through five can determine that the respondent at the top has five points, but it can never say for certain that the respondent at the bottom has zero points. To adequately assess zero on such a dimension one would have to include all possible causes of that dimension, including such random items as a conversation overheard at the cattle dip, a speech attended by accident while on the way to the forest, or a discussion with the college-educated son of a neighbor. Particularly in the case of Nyeri residents it seems inconceivable that anyone could be completely unaware or unexposed. The disruption during the Emergency, the constant interaction of urban and rural areas, and the high incidence of modern people within the rural areas makes 100 per cent isolation impossible.

What this means is that the perceptual mobilization index can only distinguish between more and less rather than between presence or absence. If one were doing a formal experiment he could perhaps overcome this problem by exposing a control group to some bit of information and then determining if the information had influenced any attitudes. With a survey such precision is impossible. Slippage and contamination are always unavoidable.

But such contamination is not intolerable in a measure so long as one is aware of its presence and of its likely impact on the findings. In this case the contamination will probably mean that a certain number of so-called traditional respondents may show non-traditional attitudes and characteristics. Thus when such an unpredictable result occurs one will never be certain if it is the measure or the theory which is at fault. Certainty is reduced, though for what reason one cannot be sure.

The danger of not being aware of such contamination can be illustrated by a statement Lerner made in his The Passing of Traditional Society. After discussing five indices of modernization (all of which relied heavily upon communications-type items) and defining a "traditional" as one who was at zero on all items, Lerner went on to conclude that "Traditionals consistently register the most unhappiness in all countries."[1] This finding is impossible considering the type of unhappiness Lerner was considering. A man cannot be unhappy with what he has if he is unaware of any alternative, as is the case with Lerner's goatherd, presumably a prototype of a Traditional. What happened obviously is that Lerner mistook zero on his measure for true zero. Without realizing it he had developed measures which had not tapped the full ranges of the dimension as they exist in the real world. Lerner cannot be faulted for the shortcomings of his measures; he can be faulted for his failure to distinguish between the dimension he was examining and the index with which he measured it. Such failures lead

to erroneous conclusions, a point which the reader should keep in mind as he examines and attempts to evaluate data presented in this work.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX B

[1]Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, 101.

APPENDIX C

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

APPENDIX C

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

Interviewers were given several sheets of instructions containing rules of thumb, examples, explanations, and standard follow-up questions for use during interviewing. These are not included in this Appendix.

The Kikuyu translation was altered in some cases at the last meeting held with the interviewers before the interview period. Because of these alterations and because of other unrecorded changes in the Kikuyu translation, only the English wording is included here.

Respondents were never read response categories as one might find in an American survey (i.e., "Would you say you agreed with that statement very strongly, strongly, only a little, not at all, or very definitely not at all?"). The pre-coding categories were for convenience in coding. They were not used to elicit responses.

As discussed in Appendix A, many of these questions were found to be invalid or meaningless when analyzed. These are included here in spite of their invalidity. Other items were not included in the analysis simply because they were not directly relevant to the topic.

APPENDIX C

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

TO BEGIN THE INTERVIEW

Locate the respondent.

Introduce yourself.

Introduce the study by saying:

"I am working with a group of people from Nairobi University who are doing a study of this location. We would like for you to help us by answering some questions. Could we sit down somewhere for a while and talk?"

AFTER YOU BOTH SIT DOWN:

"Before we start let me tell you something about the study. We are interviewing over 500 people in this district so that we can learn how people feel about the area and some of its problems.

"The answers you give will be completely confidential and no one will ever be told how you answered the questions. We are not connected with the government in any way, though after all the people have been interviewed we will write a book on our findings. This book will be available to government officials who wish to read it.

"This interview will cover many different subjects and will involve asking you many questions. Some of these questions may seem strange and some may be difficult to answer. All I ask is that you try to answer each question as best you can. There are no right or wrong answers. Give the answer you feel is correct and that will be enough for me.

"Now we will start."

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO THEM:

Q. How did you choose me?
A. We went to the Land Office in Nyeri and got a list of all farmers in this Location. We then picked certain names at random and yours was one of them.

Q. I am only a common man. You should interview someone else.
A. But if I did that we would only know the opinions of the important people in the area. It is important that we know what other people think also.

Q. I don't have time.
A. Offer to come back later. Set up an appointment.

Q. What is the relationship between this study and the government?
A. The President's Office, the Provincial Commissioner, the District Commissioner, the Divisional Officer have all given their permission for us to conduct this study. No government official, however, will ever know how you answer the questions; the book which we are going to write will be given to government officials so they will know better what the people are thinking.

Q. Exactly who is doing this study?
A. The man heading the study is a teacher from Nairobi University. He is doing the study so he can write a book on Nyeri District and on this location. He has hired several students from Kagumo High School to help him, and I am one of them.

Q. What benefits will come to my location if I answer the questions? Will we get new schools or roads, etc.?
A. Since this project is not being conducted by the government, it has no connection at all with what the government does in this area. However, we believe that by presenting to the government the views of the people they will be more aware of what the people need and will be more likely to help.

Name _____

Plot Number _____

How to find respondent _____

Was respondent there the first time you attempted interview? If not, describe subsequent arrangements to interview him.

_____

Date of Interview _____

Time Started _____

Time Ended _____

Others Present (avoid this, if possible, especially non-family members)

_____

/C1. Interviewer
1. Muhoya
2. Muriithi
3. Gichuki
4. Mwai
5. Ndirangu

/C2. Respondent number. Leave blank for time being.

/C3.

/C4. Location
1. Muhoya's
2. Lower Gethi
3. Chinga
4. Ruguru
5. Magutu

/C5. Has respondent ever had loan?
1. Yes
2. No
9. NA

/C6. Has plot ever been sold?
1. Yes
2. No
9. NA

/C7. Is listed owner actual owner?
1. Yes
2. No (explain)
9. NA

/C8. How many houses on the plot (not counting sheds, etc.)?
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five
6. Six
7. Seven or more
9. NA

/C9. Do houses have mabati?
1. All do
2. Some do
3. None do
9. NA

/C10. What is your overall impression of the houses and living compound?
1. Very good
2. Good, above average for area
3. About average for the area
4. Below average for the area
9. NA

/C11. Attitude of respondent to interview (fill out after interview).
1. Very pleasant, eager to cooperate
2. Polite, courteous
3. Cooperative, but showed some reluctance, suspicion or irritation.
4. Very reluctant to cooperate, very suspicious, or very irritated at the interview.
9. NA

/C12. Articulateness of respondent (fill out after interview).
1. Very articulate, answered well, without confusion, was thoughtful, gave good answers and good reasons for them, etc.
2. Average, understood questions, and answered them reasonable well.
3. Below average, did not answer well, seemed not to understand all questions, often gave meaningless answers, etc.
9. NA

/C13. Occupationally is the respondent (fill out after interview):
1. Exclusively a farmer
2. A farmer but with some outside economic interest (such as a shop or part ownership in a farm).
3. Primarily a non-farmer who also owns a farm (for example, a teacher, a businessman, someone who works full time in Nairobi, etc.)
9. NA

/C14. Nature of the farm (fill out after interview):
1. Exclusively or almost exclusively subsistence
2. Mixed
3. Strong cash orientation
9. NA

/C15. Sample identification
1. Nyeri Reserve
2. Settlement schemes

Did respondent ask any questions about the study (such as those covered in the Q-A section)? If yes, explain

---

Do you have any general comments on the interview? Were there any problems? Did the respondent impress you in any way, good or bad? Was atmosphere ok? Etc.

/C16. Card number (always #1).

TRANSITION: TO BEGIN WITH I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR FAMILY AND YOURSELF.

Are you married?

/C17. Number of wives
1. Not married
2. One
3. Two
4. Three
5. Four or more
9. No answer

/C18. How many children do you have?

0. None
1. 1-3
2. 4-6
3. 7-9
4. 10-12
5. 13-15
6. 16-18
7. 19 or more
8. All deceased
9. No answer

/C19. Number under 18 years--literally, how many were born after the year of the Emergency, i.e., 1952?

1. None
2. 1-2
3. 3-4
4. 5-6
5. 7-8
6. 9-10
7. 11-12
8. More than 12
9. No answer

/C20. Of those, how many are in school?

1. None
2. 1-2
3. 3-4
4. 5-6
5. 7-8
6. 9-10
7. 11-12
8. More than 12
9. No answer

/C21. For those not in school, why are they not in school?

/C22. Of those born before the Emergency--sons only--what are they doing now?

/C23. Were you born in this location or somewhere else?

1. Born in location
2. Not in location, but in Nyeri District
3. Outside of district
9. No answer

/C24. How far did you go in school?

0. None. Not educated at all
1. 1-2 years, or literate without schooling
2. 3-4 years
3. 5-6 years
4. 7-8 years, or primary certificate
5. 9-10 years, or some secondary schooling
6. 11-12 years, or secondary certificate
7. 12-13 years, or beyond secondary school
8. Primary certificate plus additional training school
9. NA

/C25. If he attended school ask: What kind of school was it: government, mission, or independent?
1. Government
2. Mission school
3. Independent school
4. Respondent not educated
9. No answer

/C26 What is your age?
1. Under 21
2. 21-30
3. 31-40
4. 41-50
5. 51-60
6. 61-70
7. 71-80
8. Over 80
9. Not answered

/C27. Have you ever lived or worked outside of Nyeri District?
1. Yes
2. No
9. No answer

/C28. All together, how long have you lived outside of this district?
1. Never
2. Less than a year
3. 1-2 years
4. 3-4 years
5. 5-6 years
6. 7-8 years
7. 9-10 years
8. More than 10 years
9. No answer

/C30. Did you like living outside the district, or was it an unhappy experience?
1. Expressed great satisfaction
2. Some satisfaction
3. Mixed feelings
4. Some dissatisfaction
5. Great dissatisfaction
6. Never lived outside district
9. No answer

/C31. If he worked outside of district but now lives on his farm ask: Why did you decide to come back?
1. Personal reasons
2. Emergency
3. Lost job, finished work, etc.
4. Dissatisfied with work, wages; lonely, etc.
5. To return to real home, to retire
6. (Other)
7. Still away
8. Never away
9. No answer

/C32. YOU NEED NOT ASK THIS QUESTION IF YOU KNOW THE ANSWER: IS THE RESPONDENT NOW LIVING ON HIS FARM, OR ELSEWHERE?
1. Now resident on farm
2. Now lives off farm, except for weekends or visits

/C33. How many times did you go to Nairobi last year?
1. Never been to Nairobi
2. Less than once
3. 3-4 times
4. 5-6 times
5. 7-8 times
6. 9-10 times
7. 11-12 times
8. More than 12 times
9. Now lives in Nairobi
+. No answer

/C34. How many times in the last month did you visit Nyeri Town?
1. None
2. 1-2 times
3. 3-4 times
4. 5-6 times
5. 7-8 times
6. 9-10 times
7. More than 10 times
8. Now lives in Nyeri
9. No answer

/C35. Are you a Christian? Which denomination?
1. Traditional religion (Kikuyu)
2. Catholic
3. PCEA
4. Anglican
5. Baptist
6. Independent or pentecostal
7. Other protestant
8. Moslem
9. No answer

/C36. If Christian: Have you attended any religious services in the last month?
1. None
2. One
3. Two
4. Three
5. Four
8. Not Christian
9. No answer

/C37. BASED UPON THE ANSWER IN C35, IS THE RESPONDENT A CHRISTIAN?
1. Yes
2. No
9. No answer

/C38. Apart from Kikuyu, which languages do you speak? NOTE: IN CASE HE IS NOT SURE, ASK HIM IF HE COULD CARRY ON A SIMPLE CONVERSATION WITH SOMEONE WHO SPOKE ONLY THAT LANGUAGE.
1. Kikuyu only
2. Swahili
3. English
4. Swahili and English
9. No answer

/C39. Did your father attend school?
0. None. Not educated at all
1. 1-2 years, or literate without schooling
2. 3-4 years
3. 5-6 years
4. 7-8 years, or primary certificate
5. 9-10 years, or some secondary schooling
6. 11-12 years, or secondary certificate.
7. 12-13 years, or beyond secondary school
8. Primary certificate plus additional training school
9. NA

/C40. Was your father a Christian?
1. Yes
2. No
3. No answer

/C41. Are you a member of a cooperative? If so, are you an officer or committee member? NOTE: YOU COULD GIVE AN EXAMPLE SUCH AS TEA, COFFEE, PIG, DAIRY, OR PYRETHRUM IF HE SEEMS CONFUSED. List those of which he is member.
1. Not a member
2. Member, not office bearer
3. Member and office bearer
9. No answer

/C42. HAVE YOU EVER HELD ANY GOVERNMENT POSITION SUCH AS CHIEF, HEADMAN, OR ANY OTHER POST? WHAT? _____
1. No
2. Past government employment
3. Present government employment

ASK: HAVE YOU EVER HELD ANY ELECTED OFFICE, SUCH AS ON A COUNCIL? WHAT? _____

/C43. Were you active in the past year in any self-help group? If yes, were you an officer or committee member?
1. Not member
2. Member, not officer or committee member
3. Member and officer or committee member
9. No answer

/C44. Are you a member of KANU? If so, have you paid dues in the last year? Are you an officer of any kind?
1. Not a member
2. Member, not dues paying
3. Member, dues paying
4. Officer or with some responsibility

/C45. Is your wife a member of a mabati group or any other women's organization?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Not married
9. No answer

/C46. Were you or any member of your family detained during the Emergency?
1. Family member detained, respondent not detained
2. Respondent detained
3. Respondent detained, family member also detained
4. Respondent not detained, family member not detained
9. No answer

/C47. IF NOT DETAINED ASK: What did you do during the Emergency?
1. Was detained
2. Working in government, in home guard, or in some loyalist activity
3. Working on farm, doing communal work, doing nothing, just living, doing my work, etc. (some passive answer)
4. Working somewhere in an occupation--teaching, on a European farm, etc.
9. No answer.

TRANSITION: NOW LET ME ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR FARM.

/C48. How many acres of land do you own? NOTE: YOU HAVE HIS OFFICIAL ACREAGE. IF THERE IS ANY CONFUSION IN HIS MIND ABOUT HOW MUCH HE OWNS, MENTION THE AMOUNT AND ASK HIM IF THAT SOUNDS RIGHT. IF HE LISTS MORE THAN THE OFFICIAL AMOUNT, ASK IF HE OWNS EXTRA FARMS. LIST HIS TOTAL ACREAGE.

0. 1-2 acres	5. 11-12 acres
1. 3-4 acres	6. 13-14 acres
2. 5-6 acres	7. 15-16 acres
3. 7-8 acres	8. More than 17 acres
4. 9-10 acres	9. No answer

/C49. Have you ever bought any land, or do you just own that which you inherited?
1. Inherited only
2. Have purchased some
9. No answer

What crops do you grow here? GET ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF COFFEE OR TEA TREES, ACREAGE OF PYRETHRUM OR VEGETABLES GROWN EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALE, ETC.

/C50. Approximately how many coffee trees does he own?

/C51. Approximately how much tea does he own?

/C52. What is the value of other cash crops, such as vegetables, fruit, etc.?

/C53. How many cattle do you own? How many of these are grade or part grade?
Total cattle _____
Number grade or part _____
Amount of milk sold (daily) _____

/C54. Index of wealth level (compute later).

/C55. How well is the farm maintained? Look at the fences, unused or unkept areas, weeds, etc. Write your observations down briefly (this can be done later). Mark one of these categories now, however.
1. Well kept, above average for the area
2. About average for the area
3. Below average level of maintenance

/C56. Did you use fertilizer or hybrid maize seed during the last year?
1. Used hybrid seed
2. Used fertilizer
3. Used both fertilizer and hybrid seed
4. Used neither
5. No answer

/C57. Do you ever hire people to work on this farm, or do you and your family do all the work?
1. Owner and family do all the work
2. Hire help for short periods during peak work seasons
3. Hire help quite often, though not full time
4. Seem to have more or less full-time help
5. No answer

/C58. How many people do you support on this farm?
1. 1-2
2. 3-4
3. 5-6
4. 7-8
5. 9-10
6. 11-12
7. 13-14
8. 15 or more
9. No answer

/C59. Question not asked.

/C60. Apart from the farm, do you have any other source of income? (If yes, determine percentage of income non-farm.)

/C61. Are you happy being a farmer or do you sometimes think you would like to have another type of work? (Do not ask of people who are primarily non-farmers.)
1. Expresses great satisfaction
2. Generally satisfied
3. Mild dissatisfaction
4. Great dissatisfaction
9. No answer

/C62. Do you ever think you might be happier with another farm instead of this one?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
9. No answer

/C63. Is it possible for you to lead a good life with the income you get from your farm?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4. No answer

/C64. In general, are you satisfied with the houses in which you and your family live?
1. Expresses great satisfaction
2. Generally satisfied
3. Mild dissatisfaction
4. Great dissatisfaction
9. No answer

/C65. In general, are you satisfied with the health facilities available to you and your family?
1. Great satisfaction
2. Generally satisfied
3. Mild dissatisfaction
4. Great dissatisfaction
9. No answer

/C66. Are you satisfied with the number of schools in this area?
1. Great satisfaction
2. General satisfaction
3. Mild dissatisfaction
4. Great dissatisfaction
9. No answer

/C67. Are you satisfied with land consolidation? Why?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
9. No answer

/C68. Have any members of your family--brothers, uncles, sons, step-brothers) received any land vacated by European farmers?

1. Yes
2. No
9. No answer

/C69. The government has argued that the people who get those farms should pay for them. Others feel they should not have to. What do you think?

1. Should pay
2. Should not pay
3. No opinion, don't know
9. No answer

/C70. Why do you feel that way?

/C71. Do you think those European farmers who leave Kenya should be paid for their farms, or should the government just take them and distribute them to the African people?

1. Should be paid
2. Should not be paid
3. Don't know
9. No answer

/C72. Index (to be completed later).

/C73. Index (to be completed later).

/C74. (BASED UPON THE QUESTION AFTER /C42, p. 267) Has respondent ever held an elected post?

1. Yes
2. No

/C75. (DO NOT ASK) Is he a leader of some kind, or was he ever?

1. Yes
2. No

/C76. (DO NOT ASK) Is he a member of any organization?

1. Non-member
2. Member of some organization

/C77. Total memberships

0. None	5. Five
1. One	6. Six
2. Two	7. Seven
3. Three	8. Eight
4. Four	9. No answer

/C78. (DO NOT ASK) BASED UPON ANSWERS /C25 and /C35:
Is respondent in any way associated with independency?
1. Yes
2. No

/C79. (To be completed later)

/C80. (To be completed later)

CARD TWO

/C1. Interviewer number
1. Muhoya
2. Muriithi
3. Gichuki
4. Mwai
5. Mdirangu

/C2. Respondent number

/C3. Respondent number

/C4. Card number (#2)

TRANSITION: NOW LET US TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF THIS AREA AND SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES WHICH GO ON THERE.

/C5. What would you say is the major problem facing this area?
/C6.

/C7. What would you say is the main difficulty which you have here
/C8. on your farm?

/C9. Do you think the government is doing all it can to solve the problems of this location, or could it do more?
1. Doing all it can
2. Could do more
3. Mixed feelings, no clear opinion
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C10. If the government had some extra money to spend in the area, what
/C11. should they spend it on?

/C12. I asked you what the major problem was in this area. Now not
/C13. thinking of this area alone but of the whole of Kenya, what would you say is the major problem facing the nation?

TRANSITION: NOW I WOULD LIKE TO READ YOU SOME PROBLEMS WHICH ARE MENTIONED FROM TIME TO TIME BY PEOPLE FROM THIS AREA. I WANT TO KNOW WHICH OF THESE YOU THINK ARE IMPORTANT.

/C14. Do you think that the condition in which your family lives is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Moderate problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C15. Do you think that inequality among the people is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Mild problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C16. Do you think crime is a problem in this area?
1. Serious problem
2. Mild problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C17. Do you think finding jobs for people is a problem?
1. Serious
2. Moderate
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C18. Is care of old people a problem? Literally, are old people being properly cared for?
1. Serious problem
2. Moderate problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C19. Do you think the presence of Asians in Kenya is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Moderate problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C20. Do you think the presence of European farmers is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Moderate problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C21. Do you think dishonesty among local officials is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Moderate problem
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C22. Do you think that shortage of land is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Problem (moderate)
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C23. Do you think lack of respect for elders is a problem?
1. Serious problem
2. Problem (moderate)
3. Not problem
8. Don't know
9. No answer

TRANSITION: NOW LET ME ASK YOU THIS:

/C24. Have you ever gone to the DC or DO with a problem? What problem?
1. Yes, has gone to him
2. No
9. No answer

/C25. Have you ever gone to an agriculture officer with a problem?
1. Yes, has visited
2. No
9. No answer

/C26. Have you ever gone to the chief or headman with a problem? If yes, what kind of problem?
1. Yes, has visited
2. No, has not
9. No answer

/C27. Have you ever gone to an MP with a problem? If yes, what problem?
1. Yes, has gone
2. No, has not
9. No answer

/C28. Have you ever gone to KANU with a problem? If yes, what?
1. Yes, has gone
2. No, has not
9. No answer

/C29. Have you ever gone to any member of the County Council with a problem? If yes, what problem?
1. Yes, has gone
2. No, has not
9. No answer

/C30. Total places visited. (DO NOT ASK--Compile from C24, C25, C26, C27, C28, C29)
0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five
6. Six

/C31. Type of problem taken to DC or DO (code later).

/C32. Type of problem taken to Chief or headman (code later).

/C33. Type of problem taken to MP (code later).

/C36. Type of problem taken to KANU (code later).

/C37. Type of problem taken to Councillor (code later).

/C38. Some people have argued that the government collects taxes and gives little in return. Do you feel the people get benefits from the government, or would they be better off without it?
1. Benefits greater than taxes
2. Better off without taxes
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C39. Are you interested in what happens in Parliament? Do you like knowing what goes on there?
1. Is interested
2. Is not interested
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C40. Do you ever talk about politics with your friends?
1. Yes, talks with friends
2. No, does not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C41. Did you vote in last year's election?
1. Yes, voted
2. No, did not vote
9. No answer

/C42. IF YES: For whom did you vote? _____
1. Voted for winner
2. Voted for loser
3. Did not vote
9. No answer

/C43. IF VOTED: Why did you decide to vote for that candidate?

/C44. During that election did you ever try to convince your friends that one candidate was better than the others?
1. Yes, tried to convince
2. No, did not try
3. Did not vote
9. No answer

/C45. Apart from talking informally to friends, have you ever done anything to help a candidate for office? If yes, what?
1. Yes, helped candidate
2. No, did not
3. Did not vote
9. No answer

/C46. Index of political activism (total "yes" answers C39, C40, C41, C44, C45).
0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five

/C47. If you and some of your friends went to the chief with a suggestion, would he listen to you or just ignore what you said?
1. Yes, would listen
2. No, would not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C48. If you went to the DC or DO, would he listen or ignore you?
1. Yes, would listen
2. No, would not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C49. If you went to your MP, do you think he would listen or just ignore you?
1. Yes, would listen
2. No, would not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C50. What about the local KANU leader? Would he listen or just ignore you?
1. Yes, would listen
2. No, would not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C51. Index of efficacy. (Total "yes" answers C47, C48, C49, C50.)
0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four

/C52. Do you think MP's represent the interests of the people, or do they have other interests which are more important to them?
1. Represent people
2. Represent other interests
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C53. Is it better to have one party or two?
1. One party better
2. Two parties better
3. Mixed feelings, no clear answer
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C54. Why is this number better?

/C55. Suppose you met someone from another country who was visiting Kenya for the first time. If he asked you what about Kenya made you most proud, what would you say?

/C56. Now let me ask you this: Apart from getting independence for Kenya, what do you think is the most important thing Kenyatta has done for the country?

/C57. Do people ever come to you for information or advice?
1. Yes, they do
2. No, they do not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C58. Do people ever come to observe your farming techniques?
1. Yes, they do
2. No, they do not
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C59. When you are with other people and you express your opinion, do you feel they listen to you?

1. Yes, they do
2. No, they do not
8. DK
9. NA

/C60. Index of Self-Designating Opinion Leadership (total "yes" answers C57, C58, C59).

0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
9. All questions not answered

/C61. If your area needs something such as a new road or school, do you think the people could do anything to make the government likely to act? What?

/C62. If the government made a law--such as a tax law--which the people considered unjust, could they do anything to get the law changed? What? How likely is it that you would do this? Likely; perhaps; not likely. If you did, do you think you would be successful? Yes; no. Have you ever tried anything like this? Yes; no. Were you successful? Yes; no.

/C63. Do you own a radio?

1. Yes
2. No
9. No answer

/C64. How often do you listen to the news (times per week)?

1. Seldom (less than once per week)
2. Occasionally (1-2 times per week)
3. Often (3-4 times per week)
4. Most days (5, 6, 7 times per week)

/C65. Comparing your life today with how your father lived when you were growing up, would you say you are better off, worse off, or about the same?

1. Better today
2. No difference
3. Worse today
8. DK
9. No answer

/C66. Will there be any changes in your life in the next five years?

1. No change
2. Negative changes
3. Vague improvement
4. Specific improvements (mentions specific changes)
5. Substantive changes, i.e., different job, etc.

/C67. What does KANU do for the people?

TRANSITION: NOW I WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT HOW WELL KNOWN CERTAIN PEOPLE AND EVENTS ARE IN THIS AREA.

/C68. Do you know the name of the divisional officer for this area?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect or don't know
9. No answer

/C69. What is the chief's name?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect or don't know
9. No answer

/C70. Who is the MP for this area?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect
8. Don't know
9. No answer

/C71. Who is the local KANU leader? (SINCE THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL KANU LEADERS, ANY NAME WILL BE CONSIDERED RIGHT.)
1. Correct
2. Incorrect, don't know
9. No answer

/C72. Who is the Vice-President of Kenya?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect, or don't know
9. No answer

/C73. When did Kenya become independent?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect, or don't know
9. No answer

/C74. What is the meaning of Madaraka Day? Why do we celebrate it?
1. Correct
2. Incorrect
9. No answer

/C75. Total Correct C68-C74.
0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five
6. Six
7. Seven

/C76. Index National/local information. (National questions are C72, C73, C74. Local are C68, C69, C70, C71.)

	3-4 local	1-2 local
2-3 national	1	2
0-1 national	3	4

TRANSITION: NOW I WOULD LIKE TO READ YOU SOME STATEMENTS. YOU SIMPLY TELL ME IF YOU BELIEVE THESE ARE TRUE OR NOT.

/C77. "Since life is changing very quickly, it is not as important as in the past to listen to the advice of elders."
1. Agree 8. Don't know
2. Disagree 9. No answer

/C78. "Since some people are more talented than others, it is only fair that some live better than others--agree or disagree?"
1. Agree 8. Don't know
2. Disagree 9. No answer

/C79. "A politician cannot be trusted to keep the promises he makes during a campaign."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C80. "Some people have the power to bring harm and misfortune to others through magic."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

CARD #3

/C1. Interviewer number
1. Muhoya
2. Muriithi
3. Gichuki
4. Mwai
5. Ndirangu

/C2. Respondent number (fill in later)

/C3. Respondent number (fill in later)

/C4. Card number (#3)

/C5. "Those foreigners still holding jobs in Kenya should be replaced immediately with Africans."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C6. "Women should care for the homes and not go off to town to work." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C7. "Most rich men are dishonest." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C8. "New agricultural ways will not improve the crops." Agree or disagree?
1. True 8. DK
2. False 9. NA

/C9. "Education is not very important for girls since most of their work will be in the home."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C10. "Most politicians and government leaders are not interested in what people like me think." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C11. "Kenya's freedom fighters have not received the rewards and respect they deserve."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C12. "Political matters should be left to the government; farmers should not get involved."
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C13. "Can a person born in poverty improve his life?"
1. Yes 8. DK
2. No 9. NA

/C14. "Which is more important in being successful: hard work or connections with important people?"
1. Work 8. DK
2. Connections 9. NA

/C15. "The government does not understand the people and their needs." True or false?
1. True 8. DK
2. False 9. NA

/C16. "Politics and government are so complicated the average man cannot really understand what is going on." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C17. "Too many of the fruits of independence have gone to the rich. The poor people have not benefited enough." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C18. "Most people do not know what is good for them unless someone tells them." Agree or disagree?
1. Agree 8. DK
2. Disagree 9. NA

/C19. INDEX OF POLITICAL ELITISM. (Card 3, one point for each "yes" answer on C12, C16, C18.)
0. None
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
9. All questions not asked

/C20. INDEX OF ETHNIC FEELING. (Card 1, C71, 1 point for "yes"; Card 2, C19, 2 points for "serious," 1 point for "problem"; Card 2, C20, 2 points for "serious," 1 point for "problem"; Card 3, C5, 1 point for "yes.")
0. None 4. Four
1. One 5. Five
2. Two 6. Six
3. Three 9. Not complete

NOTICE: CONTINUE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THESE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

/C21. "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people. Which of these do you feel is closest to the truth?"
1. Can be trusted 8. DK
2. Can't be trusted 9. NA

/C22. Is this statement true or false: "No one is going to care much for you when you get down to it."
1. Yes, people don't care 8. DK
2. False, they do care 9. NA

/C24. (DO NOT ASK) Using Card 1, C56, did respondent use either fertilizer or hybrid maize seed?
1. Yes
2. No
9. Not asked

/C25. (DO NOT ASK) Using Card 2, C57, does respondent hire help?
1. Yes
2. No
9. Not asked

INTERVIEW COMPLETE

THANK RESPONDENT.
CHECK BACK TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ALL DATA.
FILL IN OBSERVATION QUESTIONS SOON AFTER INTERVIEW.

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