LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION - MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY JAMES HENRY SEROKA 1976 7 . t... “ a- gth‘ 1:" iii-1.; {"1 exit] {In}; fim‘mrnmwmfi This is to certify that the thesis entitled Local Public Policies and Public Policy Decision-Making in Jugoslavia: An Empirical Analysis presented by James Henry Seroka has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. , Political Science degree in Major professor Date f' /3-fi’ 0-7 639 '\ LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS By James Henry Seroka I have organized this dissertation to explain variation in local public policies and the public policy process, and have begun from the premise that local political variation exists and is important in Yugo- slavia. It was my intent to contribute a detailed empirical study to the comparative local literature and to incorporate local research about a comnunist state with research about western societies. The central focus of this work has been that local public poli- cies and the public policy decision-making processes change radically across levels of economic development. The major hypotheses were that as a local unit becomes more developed, the political decision-making variables become more and more important, less variance in these varia- bles occurs, more innovation results, and there tends to be a greater Per. capita level of public policy expenditures. The actual relation- ships observed, however, were not so straightforward or simple. To test these hypotheses I constructed a general model, which incorporated theoretical hypotheses and research results from the fields of political development, public administration, and public policy analysis. Through the use of Kornhauser's typology on societal James Henry Seroka differentiation, the general model became applicable to the Yugoslav political experience. The general model stressed that public policies result from the combined effect of economic variables, social character- istics, political structure, socio-political organizations, and the decision-making processes. The bulk of the dissertation examined the interaction of these variables with each other, and their combined and separate impact upon public policies. I examined three types of public polhfies; symbolic, distributive, and redistributive, and I used general econometric statistical techniques to explain their variation. In general, the results indicate that the public policy process isrmmh more complex than I initially expected. However, several spe- cific observations can be made. l. Yugoslav local government is relatively autonomous; 2. Local Yugoslav socio-political organizations are responsi- ble for aggregating and moderating citizen interests; 3. As communes reach a higher level of development, there is a decline in the importance of socio-political organi- zations; 4. The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is distinct from socio-economic characteristics and is very complex; 5. The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is instrumental in the final public policy decision; 6. Republic authority over the political decision-making process and public policies is generally weak or vacillating; 7. The level of economic development alters the process of formulating policy decisions. LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS By James Henry Seroka A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1976 © Copyright by James Henry Seroka l976 To: Ki za njeno strpljenje i pomoE ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Ellen Mickiewicz, Charles Press, Robert Jackman, Brian Silver, John Nellor, and Hiram Fitzgerald for their advice and guidance in the preparation of this dissertation. In addition, I am grateful to the College of Social Science, Michigan State University, for their gener- ous grants of computer resources; the Center for International Studies, Michigan State University, whose grant allowed me to study in Yugo- slavia; and my colleagues in Berkey Basement, notably William Boyd, Frank Codispotti, and Andrew McNitt who patiently listened to my con- tinuous laments. Also I would like to acknoweldge and thank Rado's’ Smiljkovié, my sponsor in Yugoslavia, whose advice was always timely and wise; Najdan Pasic’, dean of the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, who helped me over many administrative hurdles; Vinka Tomic who was both a friend and colleague; Stojan Tomié who was very generous in his time; and so many others in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Novi Sad, Belgrade, and Sarajevo without whose assistance this project would have floundered. Special note is given to Charles Press who gave me the motivation to finish the project, and to my son, Mihail, who threatened to eat the manuscript at every turn. iii In the final analysis, I owe the most to my wife, Ki, who patiently typed the first drafts of this dissertation, followed me to strange lands, learned to tolerate the finer points of Balkan life, and who endured many years of financial distress so we could place three simple letters after this name. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST or TABLES vii 1’ LIST OF FIGURES xiv IJST 0F APPENDICES XVI PREFACE . XVII Chapter 1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS l A. Definition of the Subject . . . . . . . 2 8. Comparative Local Research Trends . . . 3 C. Importance of Comparative Local Public Policy Analysis . . . 5 D. Justification of the Test Site--Yugoslavia. 6 II. THE MODEL . l4 A. The General Framework . . . . . . . . . . l4 8. Conceptual Background . . . . . . . . . . l7 1. Political Development . . . . . . . . . l7 2. Public Administration . . . . . . . . . 2T 3. Public Policy Analysis . . 29 C. Integration of the Western and Yugoslav Conceptuali- zations of the Policy Process . . . . . . . . 32 l. A Western Perspective . . . . . . . . . 33 2. The Yugoslav Perspective . . . . . . . . 34 . . . . . . . . . . 37 3. Synthesis III. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY MODEL . . . 50 A. Theoretical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 5T l. Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 2. Autonomy . . . . 56 B. The Organization of the Political Structure . . . 54 64 l. Explanation of the Formal Structure 2. Centers of Influence in the Commune . . . . 68 3. Political Processes in the Conmune . . . . V Chapter IV. C. Political Structure as a Factor in the Policy- Making Process . . l. Is There Variance? 2. Linkages Between Political Structure and Socio-o Economic Variables . 3. Linkages Between Political Structure and Public Policy Decision- -Making. . . SOCIO- POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION- MAKING. - A. THE The Role of Socio-Political Organizations in the Commune l. The League of Communists 2. Socialist Alliance 3. League of Trade Unions . . 4. Combined Influence of the Socio- Political .Organ- izations - - Influence of Socio- Political Organizations on Specific Commune Policies . l. Distributive Policy--Budgetary Allocations 2. Integrative Policy--Leadership Recruitment Conclusions, Biases and Reservations 1. The Validity Problem . 2. The Problem of Bias in the Model PROCESSES OF PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING Interrelationship of the Decision- -Making Process Variables . . . . . . . . l. Theoretical Questions 2. Operational Measures 3. Examining the Hypotheses . The Multiple Regression Model . l. The Variables . - 2. Measurement . . 3. Simple Relationships . 4. Specifying the Equation 5. The Results . Level of Development and the Decision- -Making. Process 1. Problem One--Changes in Explained Variance 2. Problem Two--Identification of the Crucial Variables . . . . . . . vi Page 75 75 82 86 101 102 103 113 119 124 127 127 134 137 138 140 151 152 155 159 167 167 172 173 178 179 182 183 188 Chapter VI. THE GENERAL MODEL AND PUBLIC POLICIES A. Introduction . . B. The General Model . C. Symbolic Issues--Innovation 2 3. 4 5 6 D. D 1 2 3. 4. 5 6. E. R 1. 2. 3. 1. Defining the Dependent Variables. Interaction of the Innovation Measures with Each Other . Expected Interaction of Independent Variables with Innovation Actual Explanatory Strength of the Independent . Variables on Innovation Measures . . Examining Individual Variables in the Model . The Effect of Economic Development on Symbolic Policy istributive Policies--Health and Education Theoretical Issues Operational Measures . Examining Inequality in Distributive Policies Explanatory Strength of the Variables in the Model The Effect of Developmental Levels on Distribu-. tive Policies . Summary. edistributive Policy--Tax Policy Operational Measures of Redistributive Policy Interaction of Tax Policy Measures with the Independent Variables Level of Development and Redistributive Policy : F. Contrasts and Comparisons Across Policy Arenas VIL. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS APPENDICES . BIBLIOGRAPHY vii Page 208 208 210 212 212 216 219 223 227 234 250 251 257 258 265 272 282 283 285 286 289 293 306 317 350 TMfle 3.l 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 LIST OF TABLES Page Number of Communes Existing in Yugoslavia by Year, 1965- l975. . . . . . . . . . 53 Distribution of the Total Budget of the Yugoslav Govern- ment to its Various Levels: l965-l970 in Percent . . . 55 Average Actual and Desired Influence of Various Communal Organizations on Decision- —Making in a Sample of Sloven- ian Opgtina Assemblies in 1970 . . . . . . . . . 71 Summary Statistical Measures fer Political Structural Indices, T974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Indices of Formal Political Structure, l974 . . . . . . . . . . . 8T Correlation Coefficients of Socio-Economic Characteris- tics with Structural Characteristics . . . . . . . 85 Correlation Coefficients Between Political Structural Variables and Political Decision-Making Variables . . . 87 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Political Struc- tural Characteristics and Statutory Variables, l974 . . 90 Decisions Made by Op‘étina Party. Committees in Four Major Issue Areas . . . . . . l08 Opinions About the Reputation and Privileges of Members of the League of Communists in tater in l965 in Per— cents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . llO Reasons Given for Refusal of Membership into the League of Communists in Percents . . . . . . . . . . . lll Correlation Coefficients Between Indicators of Socio- Economic Devel0pment and the Influence of the 0p§tina League of Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 viii Table 4.5 Distribution by Republic of the Occupational Background of Members of the Op§tina Conference and Op‘Stina Execu- tive Committee of the Socialist Alliance in T969 4.6 Perceived Influence of the Socialist Alliance in Croatia by Type of Settlement in 1970 in Percents . . . 4.7 Rank in Importance of Perceived and Desired Influence of the Trade Union in Dealing with Various Problems 4.8 Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Economic Development and the Influence of the Trade Union for Two Slovenian Op‘§tina Leadership Samples . . . 4.9 Influence of the Socio-Political Organizations and the League of Comnunists on Decision-Making in the Opstina in Percents . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.10 Institutions Participating in Forming the Program of the Zagreb Opstina Assembly, 1969 . . . . . . . 4.11 Opinion about the Highest Priority for Investment in the OpS'tina by the Level of Socio-Political Activity of Respondents in 1964 . . . 4.12 Organizations Considered Most Effective for Influencing the Solution of Opstina Problems in Croatia in 1963 4.13 Influence of the Coordinating Committee Over the Nomina- tion of Candidates in 1969 by Elected Opstina Leadership Group. . . . 4.14 Major Influence over the Nomination Process by Social Group, 1967 and 1969 Elections, in Percents 5.1 Coefficients of Variation of Self-Management/Pl uralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Level of Economic Development, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Means of Self- Management/Pl uralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Level of Economic Development. 5.3 Coefficients of Variation of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Republic, 1972 . 5.4 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of the Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process at Different Levels of Development, 1972 . . . . ix Page 116 118 122 123 126 128 132 133 135 136 160 162 164 166 ti. TMfle 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 540 5.11 5.12 5.13 Page Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Pairs of Socio- Economic Variables Introduced into the Model . . . . 175 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Socio-Economic Development and Measures of Decision- Making Processes, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . 176 Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings of Each Independent Socio-Economic Variable for Each Self-Management/ Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variable, 1972 . . . 181 Multiple Squared Correlation Coefficients for the Com- bined Model Excluding Republic for Each Self-Management/ Pluralist Decision-Making Process Measure by Level of Economic Development, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . 186 Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Economic Model for all Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision- Mgking Process Variables at the Low Development Level, 72 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Economic Model for all Measures of Self— Management/Pluralist Decision- Making Process Variables at the Medium Developmental Level, 1972 . . . . . . . 193 Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Eocnomic Model for all Measures of Self—Management/Pluralist Decision- Making Process Variables at the High Developmental Level, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . 194 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Selananagement/Pluralist Decision—Making Processes for Social Mobility Derived from the Socio- Economic Model . . . . 196 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Self- -Management/P1uralist Decision- Making Processes for Personal Income Derived from the Socio- Economic Model . . . . . . . . . 197 Table Page 5.14 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals for Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Social Integration Derived from the Socio-Economic Model . . . . . . . . . 198 5.15 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Urbanization Derived from the Socio-Economic Model . . . . . . . . . . . 199 5.16 Summary Table of Significant Changes in All Slopes of Independent Variables from Low to Middle Range of Devel- opment for All Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . 201 5.17 Sumnary Table of Significant Changes in All Slopes of Independent Variables from Medium to High Range of Development for All Measures of Self-Management/Plural- ist Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . 202 6.1 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Pairs of Meas- ures of Dependent Variables of Innovation, 1972 . . . 220 6.2 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Illgriables in the Policy Model and Innovation Measures, 72 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 6.3 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the General Model for All Measures of Innovation, 1972 . . . . . . 229 6.4 Means, Standard Deviations, N, and T Score for All Meas- ures of Innovation in the Total Population and Highly Developed Conmunes . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 6.5 Total R2 Coefficients and Variance Explained by Varia- ble Groups Comparing Low and Medium Conmunes with Highly Developed Conmunes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 6.6 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the Model for All Measures of Innovation, Low and Medium Development Levels Com- bined,1972...............240 6.7 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the Model for All Measures of Innovation, High Developmental Level, 1972 . . . . 242 xi TMfle 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 616 6.17 95% Confidence Intervals of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Independent Variables of Innovation Measures of Low-Medium Communes Combined and Unstand- ardized Regression Coefficients fbr Highly Developed Communes . . . . . . . . . . . . Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coeffi- cients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing High Development Level with the Remaining Developmental Levels Combined, 1972 . . . . . . . . Coefficients of Variation for Measures of Educational and Health Resources of Yugoslav Communes by Level of Development, 1972 . . . . Coefficients of Variation (V) and Ordinal Rank of Republic (N) for Measures of Educational and Health Resources of Yugoslav Communes by Republic, 1972 . Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Independent Variables in the General Model and Health and Education Policy Measures . Standardized Regression Coefficients of all Independent Variables in the General Model fer Distributive Policy Measures Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings of all Independent Variables in the General Model for.Distributive Policy Measures, Low Developed Communes . . . . . . . . . . Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings of all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures, Mid Developed Com- munes . . . . . . . . . . . Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings for all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures, High Developed Com- munes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95% Confidence Intervals of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Independent Variables of Distributive Policy Measures . . . . . . . . . . . xii Page 245 246 259 263 267 269 274 275 276 277 Table Page 6.18 Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coeffi— cients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing Medium Development Level with Low Development Level, 1972 279 6.19 Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coeffi- cients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing High Development Level with Medium Development Level, 1972 . . . . . . . . . 280 6.20 Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables of the General Model and Tax Policy Measures . 288 6.21 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures 290 6.22 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures, High Developed Level 291 6.23 Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rank- ings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures, Medium and Low Developed Level . 292 xiii .4. Figure 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 LIST OF FIGURES Page Basic Models of Public Policy and Its Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Kornhauser's Classification of Social Systems . . . 33 Comparative Classification of Social Systems . . . . 39 Political Structue of the Yugoslav Op§tina . . . . 65 Graph of Average Influence of Various Opgtina Organiza- tions over Selected Policy Issues . . . . . . . 72 Operational Measures for the Characteristics of Socio- Economic Deve10pment . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Organizational Chart of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the Level of the 0p§tina . . . . . . 106 Organizational Chart of the opgtina Socialist , Alliance . . . . . . . 117 Organizational Chart of the Odfitina League of Trade Unions . . . . . . 12] Influence of the Socio- Political Organizations on Selected Important Op§tina Policies . . . . . . . 130 Schematic Representation of Various Possible Relation- ships Among Socio- Political Organization Influence, Social Development and Selvaanagement Decision- -Making Process Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 14] Proposed Relationship of the Mean Level of Variation of Communes in Self-Management Decision-Making Measures to the Level of Economic Development . . . . . . . 154 Expected Relationship Between Increases in Selected Socio-Economic Variables and Decision-Making Process Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 xiv Figure Page 5.3 Peters' Hypothesized Relationship of Political and Socio- Economic Variables Across Levels of Economic Deve10p- ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 5.4 Graphic Representation of Teune's, Peters' and Chapter IV's Proposals about the Importance of Socio-Economic Variables on the Institutional Decision—Making Process Across Levels of Economic Development . . . . . . . 185 6.1 Chart of Adoption Decisions and Public Policy Arenas Included for Analysis in this Study . . . . . . . 214 6.2 List of Dependent Variables and Operational Measures of theVariables............... 217 6.3 Distribution of Average Inequality Rankings for Five Policy Measures Across Republic According to Level of Development,1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 XV LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A. List of Communes Included in the Political Structure Sample in Chapter III . List of Items, Interpretive Key, and Calculating Formulas . . . . . . Data Sources . Definition of the Operational Measures xvi Page 318 322 330 334 H... p o... H. I. u 1 iv a .. .‘u u.. ‘ PREFACE I would like to begin by explicitly stating my sentiments about outside interference in the social system and internal affairs of Yugo- slavia. The Yugoslav system of "samoupravljanje" (self-management) permeates nearly everything that happens in the country today. Like any social system, it has its weaknesses, strengths, contradictions, and advantages. Personally, I found Yugoslav self—management at times to be'fimetrating and almost irrational, but it does seem to work for the Yugoslav people. Yugoslav self-management is a notable social experi- ment, an experiment which should be allowed to develop free of inter- ference from other outside forces. In years past the study of Yugoslav politics in the United States reflected the state of fraticidal conflict, misunderstanding multensions as they existed in Yugoslavia. In recent years, however, these conflicts have subsided in Yugoslavia itself, but they have lived on hinmch of the literature on that subject. This dissertation is written, therefore, with the intent of providing an objective, dispas- shwmte and fair treatment of a neglected sector of contemporary Yugo- slav politics. This research is based upon two points which are given careful scnnfiny throughout the disseration. One point is that local level politics in a one-party state can be unregimented, semi-autonomous and xvii i" v ., .x. ,- - meaningful to its citizens. The second point is that American political science and Yugoslav political theory are not inherently mutually antagonistic towards each other, and may in some vital ways mutually support and complement each other's view of the political world. The basic plan of this dissertation is quite simple. The first chapter lists some of the methodological and substantive concerns and limitations of the study. Chapter II provides a model for examining local political processes and public policies along with a rationale for forming that model. Chapter III looks at how political structural variables operate within the model, while Chapter IV performs the same function for socio-political organizations. Chapter V examines how the model affects the decision-making process, and Chapter VI analyzes how public policy decisions are actually arrived at. The conclusions and interpretations are provided in Chapter VII. The data and much of the literature review were collected during 1973-1974 while I was in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Nearly all sources are public information although many of them are not available in the United States. The judgments of many Yugoslav economists, statisti- cians, local political leaders, public administrators, and professors with whom I met were also incorporated into the study. xviii CHAPTER I PRELIMINARY REMARKS The dissertation examines selected locally-based public policies and the decision-making processes leading to these policies in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. My major thesis is that local public policies and the public policy decision-making processes change radically across levels of socio-economic development. In later chapters I formulate a specific model to help explain these policies and processes, and I examine the interactions of the sets of variables that are suggested by the model. The fundamental premise of this work is that theoretically important variation exists in political behavior within nation-states.1 This premise "allows us to use relationships within each country rather than a single characteristic of each country as the basic datum in cross-national analysis."2 As such, reliance upon this premise permits a researcher to utilize more specified and complex models in his examina- tion of political phenomena. Thus, the patterns of relationships drawn from data from a single country can be cross-nationally compared and can contribute to general comparative inquiry.3 "I "\ ll 0"- I . I .‘1-I‘ _ . _I n n'. u u‘ 51.. . ‘ on - " Iv L,‘ _ " n u. r U I." I 3" 'o. . > A. Definition of the Subject One of the most important political outputs which a political system can provide is its public policies. A public policy is "a pur- posive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in deal- ing with a problem or matter of concern," and it is public because it is developed by governmental bodies and officials.4 5 that deter- Public policies may be decisions or non-decisions mine governmental policy priorities or needs. These priorities/needs can be determined in either a statutory or fiscal manner by some govern- mental body. They become evident when guidelines are written, rules are set, or public funds are appropriated or collected. All policy activi- ties aim at implementing some political goal; all are purposive; all are represented by some public policy decision. This dissertation examines the policy outcomes as well as the processes leading to those outcomes on the local level. In general, the policy outcome and the decision-making process are intertwined; often the border between one and the other is indistinct.6 Speaking metaphori- cally, the policy outcome can be considered a still life photograph of the ongoing policy process. Three general types of public policy outcomes are examined: Symbolic, distributive, and redistributive policies. Symbolic policies include different types of innovation policy decisions; distributive policies are limited to health and educational expenditures; and redis- tributive policies include various types of taxation decisions. I am interested in comparing and contrasting the behavior of the various ~o- 1.. » a “an 1' I . a "‘ n- I "' vd‘ '0 n. ‘ . ~- O . ‘- n ' . "a ‘. . n -.. a t a L. ‘3‘ n n I. .. - . '. . . 'V 1 n. variables which are suggested by my general model upon these three types of policies. B. Comparative Local Research Trends Generally speaking, political science has not considered the comparative study of local public policies to be an area of vital inter- est.7 Comparative local policy analysis is often considered pedestrian 8 and not worthy of sustained and detailed attention. Recently a growing body of literature that examines comparative local public policies has 9 Most of this literature centers on three substantive areas: emerged. community leadership studies, expenditure analysis, and policy process analysis. Much of the conmunity leadership research10 is based upon Dahl'sH or Hunter's12 analyses of New Haven and Atlanta. These studies as well as others have tended to avoid many of the problems associated with the comnunity power approach by limiting their infer- ences to the data itself. Among comparative community leadership studies, the International Study of Values in Politics project13 has examined variation in the attitudes of local political leaders in four different countries. Unfortunately, the authors do not systematically relate the leadership values to actual policy decisions. Terry Clark's 14 model of conmunity decision-making remedies the ISVIP'S lack 0f POIICV relevance, and his precedent is followed up by Aiken and Alford's study of urban innovation in the United States.15 The second substantive contemporary area in comparative local public policy analysis is public expenditure analysis. Fried's study of Italian urban budgets16 and of Swiss, Austrian and West German bud- 18 jets," along with Boaden's examination of British local expenditures are very good examples of this type of comparative local research. Again, as in the case in the comnunity decision approach, the research methods are borrowed from American state and local sources. Dawson and Robinson,19 Hofferbert,20 and DyeZI are the outstanding examples of this approach in American state and local politics. The third substantive area in comparative local public policy analysis is the examination of the public policy processes themselves, including analyses of such factors as decentralization, political par- ticipation, political parties. This research area has expanded con- siderably but much more needs to be done. Kesselman and Rosenthal noted the relative weakness in this area and identified some crucial problem areas of the decision-making process which should be examined: We would argue that some of the most interesting questions for comparative local politics relate to such issues as the differ- ential nature of societal mobilization, the variety of politi- cal structures employed to maintain local control, and different national and local styles of political conflictnmgiéters not directly reflected in local budgetary data. . . ." Although interest in comparative local public policy research has expandedconsiderably, the research remains sparse and overly dependent on case studies of the structural bases of local government.24 Much of the work which does exist is fragmented and does not contribute to general theory. If, so far, the impression has been conveyed that the prolif- eration of comparative urban research is an unmixed blessing, this should be promptly qualified. One obvious and discouraging consequence of this activity has been the extreme fragmentation of comparative work. . . . In short, there is no "field" of comparative urban studies as distinct from a disparate ensemble of disciplines, substantive concerns, methods, and theories that are unreliably classified under the reified category." In short, comparative local public policy analysis remains a neglected area and lacks a distinct focus in the discipline. C. Importance of Comparative Local Public Policy Analysis The first advantage of local public policy research is that it examines that level of government typically closest to the needs and demands of its citizens.26 Local public policy decisions directly affect the individual, and it is at this level where most citizens have direct contact with their government. Therefore, examination of local public policies and the processes through which these are formulated can provide important clues about the interrelationships between the citizen and government. The second relative advantage is that local public policies can be easily compared. Local services and needs are relatively standard from local unit to unit within a political system even though the prior- ity placed upon these services may vary.28 The methodological implica- tion of this point is that we can more readily employ nominal categoriza- tions of public policies and be relatively certain that these categori- zations have equivalent measures across local political units within the larger political system. The adoption of the local level as the f‘" u. . . in. a,» unit of analysis reduces the error caused by changes in the conceptual meaning of the policy categorizations.29 Third, local governmental units are comnonplace. As a result, empirical tests of theories of the public policy decision-making process have more cases (a larger "n") and the probability of inferring false relationships based upon extreme cases from excessive aggregation of data is reduced. 0. Justification of the Test Site--Yugoslavia While Yugoslav local government is the subject of this disserta- tion, the implications of this analysis are applicable to other countries as well. Yugoslavia is a good choice for a detailed analysis of local public policies and the decision-making process because the local Yugo- slav political framework has considerable autonomy and wide variation in many political, economic and social characteristics. At the same time, Yugoslavia holds constant the effect of party competition, a vari- able which may have widespread confounding effects. The effect of party competition on public policies is the sub- ject of considerable but inconclusive debate. Studies in American state and local government have tried to establish a connection between the extent of party competition and various specific public policies. Beginning with V. O. Key's study of Southern politics,30 American researchers have examined the proposed relationship. Key, Carminis,3] and Morehouse32 have concluded that there is a distinct relationship Other scholars, notably between party competition and public policies. 36 35 33 Cowart,34 Dawson and Robinson, and Dye have found no Anton, u...,‘ I J ..-a w .. 1 a h u c a l n In. \ I E ‘a.. ‘U a n ' ‘ l . ~ I ‘.. -. '.. h, n '- ’2:- “I - .5- l evidence for this relationship. A third group including Cnudde and 37 38 and Sharkansky39 have noted that the strength of McCrone, Francis, the party competition/policy relationship may vary according to the policy or region studied. Comparative local public policy research parallels these find- 40 ings. Fried's and Tarrow's‘n work on parties in Italy found little or no relationship between party competition and public policies. 42 43 44 Rigos' study of French local budgets and Boaden's and Ashford's analyses of British local government found a stronger relationship but with nation-level limitations that reduced their generalizability. Unfortunately, there is no consensus about the effect of party competition on public policies. We can conclude that party competition is a very difficult concept to measure. It may be more useful to com- pare local public policies within a nation-state that holds the level 45 and thus avoids the problem. Yugoslavia, 0f Party competition constant a single party system, eliminates inter-party competition. While the role of the party may vary in Yugoslavia,46 its primacy can never be challenged,47 competing ideologies are never introduced into the politi- cal Sphere,“ and elections do not offer competing programs.49 In other words, the lack of interparty competition in Yugoslavia will allow us to Simplify our model. Yugoslavia provides an additional advantage for an empirical examination of local comparative public policies. The Socialist Federal Rapublic of Yugoslavia is a very diverse nation-state with six major 1311903985. three distinct religious-cultural areas, various historical traditions, considerable inequality in economic resources, social devel- opment and personal income. In other words, Yugoslavia has considerable variation in many of the determinants of public policies.50 ’4 FO0TNOTES--CHAPTER I lKryzstoff Ostrowski and Henry Teune, "Local Political Systems and General Social Processes," paper presented at the International Political Science Association meeting, Munich, 1970. 2International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 41. 3Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970). 4James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Maki_ng (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 3. 5Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review 57 (Septem- ber, 1963): 632-642. 6Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971): 18-19. 7Bryan T. Downes and Timothy M. Hennessey, "Theory and Concept Formation in the Comparative Study of Urban Politics: Problems of Process and Change," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri- can Political Science Association, New York, 1969. 8Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Poli- t1cs," Journal of Politics 30 (May, 1968): 510-538. 9For a good bibliography and literature review of current research in comparative public policy analysis, see: Francine F. Rabino- v1tz, "The Study of Urban Politics and the Politics of Urban Studies," Comparative Urban Research 6 (1975): 5-21; Michael Aiken, "Comparative Cross-National Research on Subnational Units in Western Europe," Journal 9; Comparative Administratigfl (February, 1973): 437-471; and Michael A1ken, "A Preliminary Inventory of Machine-Readable Data on Urban and Other Sub-National Units in Western European Nations and the United States: Sources Located in the United States," Comparative Urban W 3 (Sumner, 1973): 9-42. 10 10For a survey of this literature in the comparative field, see: Mark Kesselman and Donald Rosenthal, Local Power and Comparative Politics (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers, Series 01-049, vol. 5, 1974). 11 1961). I2Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 13International Studies of Values in Politics, op. cit. MTerry N. Clark, "Citizen Values, Power, and Policy Outputs: A Model of Community Decision-Making," Journal of Comparative Adminis- tration (February 1973): 385-427. 15Michael Aiken and Robert Alford, "Comnunity Structure and Innovation, Public Housing, Urban Renewal & the War on Poverty," in Comparative Community Politics, ed: Terry M. Clark (New York: Hal- stead Press, 1974f 16Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 1008-1951. 17Robert Fried, "Politics, Economics and Federalism: Aspects of Urban Government in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland," in Compara- tive Community Politics, ed: Terry N. Clark, op. cit. 18Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County nglnighs in England and Wales (London: Cambridge University Press, 19Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 25 (1963): 265-289. 20Richard Hofferbert, "Some Structural and Environmental Varia- bles in the American States," American Political Science Review 60 (March 1966): 73-82. 2IThomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy gytcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 22A detailed literature review and examination of these varia- bles will be provided in Chapter V of this dissertation. . 23Kesselman and Rosenthal, Local Power and Comparative Politics, op. cit., p. 14. u. : .c a —-h—- , an ‘O a ... —. 11 24Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales, op. cit. 25John Walton, "Problems of Method and Theory in Comparative Urban Studies," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September 1975): ’ 5 26This does not imply that the local level is the most respon- sive or normatively the best level of government. I do not wish to imply that the closer power is to the people, the greater will be their interest in and control over it. For a general discussion of this problem, see: Duane Lockhard, The Politics of State and Local Govern- me;1_1_t_, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1969): 27-58. For an analysis of the weaknesses of such an assumption in the context of federal struc- tures, see: Richard Leach, American Federalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). 27Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky, "The Role of State and Community Political Systems,“ in State and Urban Politics, eds.: Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971). 28Oliver P. Williams, "A Typology for Comparative Local Govern- ment," Midwest Journal of Political Science 5 (May, 1961): 150-164. 29For some excellent discussions of the problems inherent in the categorization of public policies, see: Richard Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Robert H. Salis- buryf‘rThe Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Political Science and Public Poligy, ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968): 151-178; and Lewis Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed: Austin Ranney. 0p. cit., pp. 41-54. On larger levels of analysis, nominal categories may shift meaning. For example, on the national level of analysis, educational expenditures may include different functions. In one country education may include occupational retraining programs. In another country this function may be included under “labor" or "social welfare." When we deal with local levels of analysis, services become more identifiable and, within a single political system, more likely to be conceptually equivalent. 30v. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.. 1949). 3Edward Carminis, "The Mediating Influence of State Legisla- tures on the Linkage Between Inter-Party Competition and Welfare Poli- 11221," American Political Science Revieg 68 (September, 1974): 1118- BZSarah Morehouse, "The State Political Party and the Policy- ggkigg Process," American Political Science Review 67 (March, 1973): a I no. It. “A... - 12 33Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966Y 34Andrew T. Cowart, "Anti-Poverty Expenditures in the American States: A Comparative Analysis," Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (May, 1969): 219-236. 35Dawson and Robinson, “Interparty Competition, Economic Varia bles, and Welfare Policies in the American States,“ op. cit. 3'GDye, PoliticsL Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, op. cit. 37Charles R. Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States." American Political Science Review 63 (September, 1966): 858-866. 38Wayne Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNal 1y, 1967). 3gIra Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (February, 1968): 41-61. 40Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," 0p. cit. 4ISidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," Comparative Politics 7 (October, 1974): 1-36. 42Platon Rigos, "Local Policy Choices and Party Control: Politi- cal Institutionalization among French Urban Communes,“ (Ph.D. disserta- tion, Michigan State University, 1974). 43Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs ngngland and Wales, op. cit. 44Douglas Ashford, “Parties and Participation in British Local Government and Some American Parallels," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September, 1975): 58-81. 458y abandoning the use of party competition as an explanatory variable, we probably reduce the amount of statistical variance in our model. However, the advantages of a more simplified model may outweigh the disadvantages. 465ava LukiE, "Socijalna Struktura Kao Faktor PolitiEke Stabilnost; i Akcione Sposobnosti Saveza Komunista" (1973). 13 47Josip Broz Tito, Pismo Presednika SKJ: Izvr§nog Biroa Predsednistva SKJ. Komunist (October 17,1972). 486azim Sadikovic, SKJ: Vlast, in Komunisti i Samoupravljanje, ed: Anton Fiamengo (Zagreb, VjesnTk, 19.67) 49Howard Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," Midwest Journal of Political Science 5 (May, 1961): 129- 149, and Najdgn Pa‘fié, Klase i Politika (Beograd, IzdavaEko Preduzece “Rad, " 1974 50For an analytical description of this variation on the local level in Yugoslavia, see: Jack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia--A Multinational State (San Francisco. Chandler, 1966). 'nc .- ‘ V >4. . . 1. .’. . i "- .. . a" r. 5‘ ‘ i CHAPTER II THE MODEL This chapter introduces and discusses the public policy model thatis empirically tested in the succeeding chapters. The first part ofthe chapter outlines the elements of the general model. The second part reviews the research that lead to its development. The third part suggests an approach to harmonize the general model to the special needs and political vocabulary of Yugoslavia. A. The General Framework Many shortcomings and problems have accompanied earlier attempts 'hldevelop a general public policy model. Philip Coulter listed seven of the most significant of then:1 --inattention to process variables --overreliance on public expenditures as policy outputs -- ailure to differentiate policy types --inadequate quantitative analysis that is limited solely to factor analysis or correlation --inference of individual political values from aggregate demographic data --the improper use of regionalism as a control variable --confusion between political structural variables and political behavioral variables Iimve designed my general model and method for testing it so as to avoid these common pitfalls. Figure 2.1 is a general outline of my basic public policy model. The model includes the variables most likely to have an impact on 14 15 .mmouoga mcwxw21cowmwooo mpH vcm mowpoa owpnza mo mpwuoz owmmm11.P.N mmszm .Fmvos QPguoEocoum we» cw covmzpocw toe ucmwowmmzmcw men name one umpmpp mew mavgmcopumymg mmmgp .quoe owepoeocoow cm an mawgmcowpmpme omen» ummu op mumwxm mace acmwuwmezm Auwpoa qumpm .u mmszuwucqum .n copum>occa .m mocopeoa oppose ‘IIII .AIIIII1 D . . . ‘I II copumawoppemm .u 522288 .o A 111 111111 1 9.32:3 Emwpocowmmmmoea .n puerpwpom LII 5526323 .m . . ”338er .828 33.5 #4111. “ meowumecmmeo . A111 1 11111111w1111 1 1111 P83281263 11.... powpmcou new nausea—«>mg meoaumm pmwuom pmpuom - po>m4 pcosaopm>mo oweocoom “.a 1 - 1...; , firms: v I Na. 1 . Iii . 1 ... . J '| 1~-‘ .. I 16 public policy. We are interested not only in the direct link among the variables but in their combined effects as well. I have designed the model to test the hypothesis that the level of economic development qualitatively changes public policies and their decision-making processes. The literature review on political develop- ment which follows this section suggests that such a procedure should be followed.2 In testing the hypothesis I divide all the communes into one of three levels of economic development and then examine the changes in the behavior of the model.3 Social development and social conflict variables are included in the model. The identification of these variables and their hypothe- sized interrelationships, however, are presented in Chapter 111.4 The model also includes two other sets of variables, political structure and socio-political organizations. Both sets of variables are con- sidered important in the policy-making process. Unfortunately, for both sets of variables there are insufficient data to allow their full and complete inclusion in the empirical testing of the model. The decision-making process variables are discussed extensively in this chapter. We are concerned at this stage of the model not only with individual effects that the decision-making process variables have Upon public policy but with their combined effects as well.5 The last stage in the model represents the public policies, the dependent variables. In Chapter .II'. I do not identify fully the precise public policies that are studied because it is necessary to lay more groundwork about the Yugoslav local political system. The policies, ;..-a:' '46. nip; 5,. Q oviclb u "" u- 1 n ”u- a l I a ‘. 17 however, are not totally dependent on expenditure data. This avoids another of the potential pitfalls mentioned by Coulter. Chapter VI discusses these public policies in detail. In succeeding chapters I intend to examine systematically the different impact of variables within the model, to develop particular hypotheses, and to test the validity of such hypotheses within the framework of four general hypotheses. These four general hypotheses are: Hypothesis 1: Political decision-making variables are more important in the determination of public policies at higher levels of development than at lower levels of development. Hypothesis II: More variance in decision-making processes occurs at lower levels of development than at higher levels of development. Hypothesis III: Public policies are more innovative and pro- gressive at higher levels of development than at lower levels. Hypothesis IV: Public policy expenditures are relatively higher at higher levels of development than at lower levels. , B. Conceptual Background The model that I employ borrows extensively from three research areas: political development, public administration, and public policy analysis. All three areas independently contribute relevant points to the development of the conceptual model. 1_.__ Political Development The political development literature is especially relevant for ‘Uns study because it has been noticeably successful in bridging the r-u C n ( Nu .n inuv 0- 18 analytical gap between communist and non-communist area studies.6 The literature contributes three vital points, the understanding of which is essential for the development of a model that explains public poli- cies and the public policy decision-making process. These points are: a. economic development radically changes the social and political values, organization and structure of a community; b. social and political development must occur at rela- tively similar rates to avoid social conflict; c. the development of a community affects the political and policy options and needs of a community. Research on each of these points can be reviewed on the broad national- systemic level; within the specific constraints of communist political systems, particularly Yugoslavia; and on more narrow, urban levels of government. a. The Effect of Economic Development.--Many Western research- ers have suggested that the level of economic and social development 7 in his work has an influence on various political processes. Apter on modernization noted the interlocking effect which the political sys- tem, political parties, and other political structures have upon moderni- zation and values towards it. For Apter, modernization was the depen- dent variable and political characteristics the independent variable. Ros tow8 tended to disagree with Apter and argued that economic develop- ment, at least in pre-takeoff stages, was dependent upon social develop- ment within a society, and that political development followed from that. Horowitz9 concentrated upon the impact which social development '1’. I u .. ‘C 1’! | ..1.- 1 0'1. . .1... \l . "I g I T n 'I a. .P u. 1 'I ' ‘I ‘a 1. F 'l - o ‘a I II I 5;" 19 has upon political development, but agreed that basic political system and value changes could follow from economic development. Finally Pye10 11 and Black among others reached the conclusion that economic, social and political development were so closely connected that it is mis- leading to consider one to be the prime determinant of the other. A basic Marxist premise is that economic conditions create new social classes and new forms of power and relations among classes.12 Stemming from this, Marx had determined that economic, social and politi- cal power are interconnected concepts so that the possession of one form of power necessitated possession of the reciprocal form.13 14 15 Huntington and Brzezinski ' s 16 and Meyer's work on convergence and Eckstein's analysis of change in communist systems all tend to agree that, on a macro-level, we can expect pl uralistically oriented changes in the decision-making process from changes in the social and economic develop- ment characteristics of society. For our purposes this means that in a socialist country such as Yugoslavia, economic and social development can be considered to have an important impact upon the policies and policy processes of a political system. Economic, social and political development are also considered to be of crucial importance in comparative urban policy studies. 17 18 Schnore noted the interrelatedness and interdependence of 19 and Brazer these variables on the local level, and Kuroda identified the threat of development on the autonomy of local units. Urban research conducted 20 in Yugoslavia notes the important impact which socio-economic develOp- ment has upon different aspects of local public policy decision-making. 20 b. Change in Level of Development and Social Conflict.--The second point which political development adds to this study is that incongruities in developmental change may lead to social conflict. 21 22 Davies and Brinton both discussed the divisive effect which social development may have upon societies, and Deutsch and Huntington23 devel- oped the point further by noting that economic, social and political development must move in unison in order to avoid social upheavals. Their point is significant because it permits us to predict more social conflict or instability in situations where social, economic, and political development are occurring at different rates.24 Comparative communist studies also have noted the disruptive effects that differing rates of social and political development have 25 upon society. In fact, this point forms the theoretical basis for 26 much of the interest group literature in these studies. Yugoslav social scientists, however, approach this problem from a different per- spective. In their view, political development is the basic goal of society, but it cannot be advanced without concomitant increases in 27 economic and social development. Differences among local level poli ti - cal systems are expected because the social and economic bases of these 28 systems differ. In addition, differing socio-economic development rates of local units are also reflected in their political systems.29 c. Development and Societal_Options.--The third major point of the development literature relevant to the model is that development will affect the policy and decision-making options available to a politi- cal unit. On the one hand poorly-developed areas cannot afford the .u y ': 'IZ‘J' . .- ;. ~ I. u 0 in" I u . a ! "VP" ".4. ‘9“... H... N a" o._ -. . 9.. ‘a-. pc. ., . .. . xi: ‘-.. . . J" 1 21 economic, social and political costs associated with some types of politi- cal systems. 30 3] On the other hand, as Organski and PeEuljic‘32 state, a more developed area must exclude types of decision-making processes incongruent with its stage of political and social development. This point allows us to make predictions about the type of political and policy-making structures which a government is likely to have. In summary, the political development literature suggests sev- eral analytical points. They are: that economic development should be controlled in any model of public policies and the decision-making process; that we should be aware of incongrueties among economic, social and political factors; and that social and economic development can qualitatively affect the type of political decision-making process prac- ticed by a local unit of government. The model introduced earlier incorporates these points. 2. Public Administration There is a danger in relying too heavily upon the political development literature. From it we might incorrectly hypothesize that socio-economic characteristics determine political outputs to the extent that there is no room for autonomous variation. Glenn Paige restates this problem quite well. Are political systems to be considered as largely determined by the socio-economic characteristics of the societies in which they are found? Or are they to be considered as capable of largely autonomous variation which can result in profound econ- omic, social and cultural change.3 The issue of socio-economic determinism is important to policy- makers. In the short run, social and economic characteristics are not v- 0 ,. -b 7 4 '5 .l ‘- 1 A..ll§¢n \' I no a. 1 ~ .. 1 ~ ' n ‘pl . a I I ‘ 1 u l ,. II " - ‘5‘ 22 34 easily manipulated by political authorities and the political cost of manipulating these variables is very expensive.” From a practical standpoint we must identify those factors that can be politically manipu- lated and identify the effect which those factors have upon policies themselves. In short, if we are involved in policy analysis, we must realize that "the scope of effective institutional change is the tightly confined residual of the environmental policy relationship."36 Public administration, particularly comparative public adminis- tration, is well suited for identifying the relevant political factors that make a difference in the formation of public policies. In fact, public administration "may be defined as the art and science of design- ing and carrying out of public policy."37 As a result, this is a logi— cal area to survey for a solution to the problem of economic determinism. The subfield of comparative local public administration does offer some interesting observations on this problem. Riggs, for example. stresses that local administrative decision-making procedures must accommodate the local situation. Any program for local government reform will be unrealistic unless it confronts the dynamic forces of social, political 23111151223211.3332.“ ”‘2 if“? “1‘" 35213122233 by the gemen s or oca 9 Thus, while the local public policy goals may be the same, the most effective decision-making method to achieve those goals is grounded in the socio-economic realities of the local government unit. The public administration literature concentrates on three broad areas of the decision-making process that are most relevant for explain- 199 Public policies. These areas are: decentralization. participation, "a a f‘; p Ole. '8' I - lt."\ - O klv' I h ne- " vii , 's--..,. " a. no _ a In. a F.‘ 1- ... . - o _ ‘ 1. ' I‘ ‘;j ‘- “_. " a. 23 39 Each of these three areas and bureaucratization/professional ization. has definite linkages to public policies, and they are each affected by the local level of socio-economic development. a. Local Decentralization.--Local decentralization can be viewed two different ways. One view is the degree of autonomy which is given to local political units.40 A second view is the degree to which decision-making processes within the local political unit have been 41 fragmented or passed on to even smaller political units. These two 42 and empirically43 distinct. In general, we measures are conceptually are mainly concerned with the second meaning listed. Decentralization as used here involves fragmentation of administrative decision-making; it does not imply democratization of the decision-making process.44 The degree of socio-economic development of the community may affect the degree of decentralization. Leeman,45 for example, noted that one of the primary purposes of rationales for decentralization is to promote economic development or to reorganize the political struc- ture to reflect a certain state of socio-economic development. Reis- 46 Vierra found that decentralization was associated with higher levels of development on the level of the nation-state. When we consider the local level there is considerably more concern about the problem,47 but there has been relatively little direct empirical testing of it. It is an area that deserves more empirical examination. Decentralization is a useful concept for inclusion in a general Policy model even though the link with socio-economic development may .1-gn‘ A .1 ‘f‘ .s . u v a I O '.' A . c. u. l .‘O I. . II uv.’ ‘ . ‘DI. - | \ - .‘.. ‘ .. '.- " 'ln- u 9“ I o h '1 , H‘ ‘- M. x u D " .1 .H ‘I v "- e 'o e u 1. 1 n. 24 be tenuous. This issue is integrally related to the political process, 48 and thereby to the public policies of governmental units. It vitally affects the power position of individuals within a political system and 49 affects the rules of decision-making. Decentralization is also viewed as a way of defusing political conflict because it tends to fragment the arenas of conflict and creates local rather than nation-based conflict.50 The specific effect that the process of decentralization has 5] argues that decentralization 52 upon public policies is ambiguous. Simon may lead to more innovation and changes in policies. Boaden in his study of British local government tends to find evidence in support of 53 Simon's argument, but Milch in his study of French communes finds that decentralization is not a sufficient condition for preventing policy innovation or change. Vincent Ostrom54 presents some strong arguments that indicate that the relationship between centralization and efficiency is spurious, but this view is not completely shared by other urban 55 While there may be disagreements about the nature of the specialists. effect of decentralization on public policies, it is quite clear that it is a vital factor for explaining public policies. A model of public policy formation, therefore, should include the decentralization factor within the decision-making process. b. Political Participation.--Political participation is the second aspect of the decision-making process relevant for inclusion in the model. One of the important features that accrues to a decentral- ized political system is an increase in political participation. This Participation, however, may have its drawbacks. ”1'. l- O. I If _ I:'.! D‘ I I... v.. 25 Development has precipitated a participation crisis. The funda- mental question is age old: how can individuals meaningfully participate in systems of ever increasing size and scale, or con- versely, how can systems of large size respond to each and every individual? With increasing size and complexity the individual becomes submerged in numbers and confusion. The obvious alterna- tive of reducing the scale of the system by breaking it up into small autonomous local political units also reduces the issues of participation to triviality.55 In many countries the stress on local government is associated with the idea that small units will stimulate intensive popular partici- 57 pation in public policy formation. It must be pointed out, however, that decentralization and participation are not synonymous» concepts. It is possible to have high participation in a highly centralized 58 structure, and it is also possible to have low participation in a very decentralized political system. There is evidence that indicates that socio-economic variables have a relatively strong impact upon the quantity of political partici- pation in a political system. On the comparative national level, Karl 59 Deutsch and Norman Nie et al.60 found relatively strong relationships between increases in social and economic development and the expansion of political participation. There is no agreement, however, as to which particular factors of socio-economic development are responsible 61 for political participation. On comparative local levels, research results indicate that social development characteristics are important 62 in explaining participation in local areas in Great Britain, the 64 and Yugoslavia.65 Again, there is disagree- United States,63 France, ment as to the identification of the precise factors that are responsi- ble for the political participation. 26 A possible explanation for the disagreement is suggested by Teune and M1 i nar. 66 They state that socio-economic variables, in addition to having a quantitative impact upon political participation, may have a qualitative impact as well (1'.e. , socio-economic character- istics may affect the type of political participation that becomes dominant in a political system). Under low levels of development participation tends to be symbolic; under medium levels it tends to be institutional and group centered; under high levels of development par- ticipation is systemic and individually based. Teune and Mlinar‘s typology is useful because it allows us to develop testable hypotheses (e.g., Hypothesis I and II) about the dominant type of political par- ticipation in the political system. Chapter V examines this problem in detail. Political participation should have some definite impact upon public policies in order to be included in the model, but identifying the specific impact which participation has upon public policies is difficult.67 The policy impact of participation may vary according to which social groups participate, as Banfield and Wilson68 suggest; the impact may vary according to the policy selected for study;69 or the impact may vary according to the level of socio—economic development of the community.70 A model of public policy analysis should therefore consider the different ways in which participation may have an impact 71 72 on policy and avoid a unidimensional approach to the problem. c. Bureaucratization/Professionalization.--Public personnel recruitment and management is the third area borrowed from public 0" \- . v I" - 6‘. n u' "I. u”. . .- Iv. o~'p~ '- . '9. ‘0 1 4 d A. I 'I. u. . ' 1 a a“. v. 27 administration. The model uses only a small segment of that field, namely, the professionalization and bureaucratization of the decision- making personnel. Although these two concepts are linked here, it must be stressed that bureaucratization and professionalization are distinct concepts. Bureaucracy is related to professionalism and centralization. But it is not identical with these. Bureaucratization, as we have defined it, means the elaboration of differentiated organi- zational units in a hierarchy, with appointed officials at the head. Professionalization (in an organization) means the appointment of technically trained experts to positions of autonomy and judgment. . . . Bureaucratization can exist with- out professionalization; a large staff may perform relatively unskilled jobs . . . Professionalization exists without bureaucra- tization where there is a relatively small staff performing highly specialized tasks.73 A model of public policy-making should continue to keep these variables empirically distinct even though the interrelationship between them is quite high. Socio-economic development affects bureaucratization/profession- 74 considers a political unit to be socially and alization. Eisenstadt economically developed when it becomes more complex, more organized, more bureaucratized (this is not to imply that no variation exists). RISISIS75 essentially agrees with Eisenstadt but adds that political stability can be threatened whenever the development of the bureaucracy (professionalism) is incongruent with the state of socio-economic devel— OPment of the political unit. Kautsky76 suggests that professionaliza- tion is highest at middle levels of development, but does not provide emPirical evidence for this proposition. More research is needed to determine the strength of the relationship between socio-economic 1'2" Witt" ..~.1 ,. up“ 1 - a .. o o... 1.1: 'P’A 1- 28 development and the growth of bureaucratization and the development of professionalism within it. Bureaucratization/professionalization can have an impact on mflflic policies. Henry, for example, lists eight policy impacts which can be attributed to professionalism in the decision-making process.7 lhey range from the discouragement of participation to poor coordination ofixnicy outputs. March and Simon78 imply that greater professionaliza- tion and bureaucratization are linked to fewer innovations and change.79 80 But Williams and Adrian have found that professionalization of the leadership encourages changes in policies, and Palumbo and Styska18] corroborate this finding in their research on U. S. school boards. Downs82 concludes that professionalization may have a positive as well as a negative impact on orientation towards change depending upon the policy studied. In general, the effect that professionalization and bureau- cratization have upon local public policies is unclear. Sharkansky corroborated this when he examined within-state professionalism and fomwla moderately high positive relationship with various policies. He concluded that: Measures of the within-state distribution of professionalism show stronger relations with policy than are suggested in articles reporting on state-wide aggregate measures of pro- fessionalism. . . . As we develop more senSTtive indicators of economic and political distributions, we may learn how the combinations of resources, competitiveness, professwnalism3 and other features exert their influence on public policy. Obviously, more work needs to be done. 29 In summary, public administration provides us with some addi- tional tools with which to construct a model of public policy decisions. Decentralization, participation, and bureaucratization/professionaliza- tion should be included as variables in the decision-making process. The literature suggests that all these variables have an impact upon public policies and that they may be affected by the socio-economi c characteristics of the community. A model of decision-making, there- fore, should consider these possible linkages as well as the interlock- ing nature of these variables with each other. 3. Public Poligy Analysis Public policy analysis is the third research area from which this dissertation heavily borrows. Carl Friedrich defines policy analysis as the study of: . a proposed course of action of a person, groups or govern- ment within a given environment providing obstacles and oppor- tunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or a pur- pose. . . . It is essential for the policy concept that there be a goal, objective or purpose.84 Analyzing public policy decisions can give useful insights into such dynamic processes as the structure of the community, the existence and role of conflict, participation within the political system and the political structure of the community. In addition, public policies constitute a very useful criteria for comparing the operation of vari- ous political systems and the impact of government on citizens. In general, establishing policy relevance is a crucial problem in compara- tive local research,85 and public policy analysis is useful in helping us establish that relevance. 30 The danger in relying on public administration is that it com— centrates only on the decision-making process and does not provide a method of evaluation or a focus for that decision—making process. An over-concentration on public administration concerns would limit the area of investigation of local government decision-making and ignore the field of performance. Noel Boaden notes this danger as it affects comparative local politics. A further explanation of the preoccupation with size is that political scientists have been seeking solutions to the fail- ings of the local government system. Had they been seeking explanations for what local authorities actually do it is likely they would have considered a number of factors other than size. Indeed it may also be necessary to ask about what is done before one asks how efficiently it is done. Efficiency is of course relevant, but what happens is just as important as whether it happens efficiently.86 Hnflic policy analysis avoids this pitfall since it concentrates on what exactly happens in a political system. In general, public policy analysis is more useful here for its conceptual precision and methodological implications than it is for tnoad theoretical generalizations. For us public policy analysis serves two broad purposes: it gives us a criteria with which to compare our dependent variables, and it provides the methodological tools to examine the behavior of the model. There are four advantages to public policy analysis: it aggre- gates disparate political decision; it is concerned with the outcomes as well as the outputs of the political system; it deals with change; and it permits the testing of political theories or micro-applications of them. '0 'll‘ 1.1. n... ‘1 \ 'IL I 4 1:: I N0 o . 5| 31 A first advantage of public policy analysis is the aggregation 87 It of political decisions and outcomes into some broad policy area. provides a meaningful way of making political sense of disparate deci- sions and moves us towards greater generalization. The second advantage is that public policy analysis deals with the outcomes as well as the outputs of the political system. In other words, it permits us to measure differences between the intent and 88 actual performance of a political decision and to evaluate the impact of a political decision, and it provides some normative evaluation of the success of a political system in meeting its goals.89 The third advantage with public policy analysis is its change orientation. It views the political system as a constantly changing system, constantly adapting to new demands and inputs, and varying its outputs accordingly. Fourth, public policy analysis allows a researcher to concen- trate on micro-applications in political science. It deals with objectively "real" phenomena which then permits sufficient methodologi- cal rigor and, in the final analysis, contributes to a greater under- standing of the entire political system.90 Public policy analysis has one final advantage for model build- ing and testing: it is very suitable for detailed econometric testing. Through econometric methods and their statistical tests, the application 91 and effectiveness of policies can be studied, and predictions about Policy outcomes can be made.92 Econometric modeling gives us a distinct . o‘0\‘ p. . iu'v "' e 1 .. no; . "I :- ll". : ,. I . I v 'v‘l. e. Inc. I‘- . 3» 'i . 32 advantage in reaching generalizable statements about the behavior of local governmental units. Summarizing the second part of the chapter, we note that there are a considerable number of questions about the determination of public policies that are still unresolved. We are also aware that a model for public policy formation can be constructed with ideas borrowed from research in developmental politics, public administration, and public policy analysis. Each subfield, however, if not complemented by the others, could lead to erroneous results. C. Integration of the Western and Yugoslav Conceptualizations of the Poligy Process The second part of this chapter seeks to reconcile the constitu- ent elements of the proposed model, which is primarily Western-based, into a pattern appropriate to the Yugoslav political experience. There are several advantages to such a procedure: --we can improve comparative generalizations if we can find the proper way of translating political phenomena into mutually recognizable forms; --we can better utilize the wealth of information available to us from Yugoslav sources; --we can help break down the verbal ideological barriers that prevent a better understanding of non-democratic political systems. In this section I specifically provide a brief Western perspective of the political process, followed by a brief description of Yugoslav political theory on the issue, and concluding with a proposed plan for SVnthesizing the Western and Yugoslav approaches. - I 1 IQ) 44.. 'v .4 u a. 1.. II I o. ‘ . n '2 l.' 1‘1", .: 33 l. A Western Perspective Since Plato's Republic the process of decision-making has been thought to have an effect on general public policy outputs. Much of the recent political research centers on identifying the process on 93 94 levels of analysis ranging from the nation-state and city to the level of the small organization.95 William Kornhauser provides a very useful conceputalization of the decision-making process that can help explain variation in public policy decisions.96 According to Kornhauser, all social systems can be divided into one of the following four types: "communal, totalitarian, pluralist, and mass." Each of these societies differs according to their processes of decision-making operationalized by the characteris- tics of the elite and the characteristics of the general public. For Kornhauser the important considerations are the degree to which "elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites: and the degree to which "non—elites are readily available for mobilization by elites." The following figure summarizes his argument. Accessability of Elites Availability of Non-Elites pr High 1.9! communal totalitarian High pluralistic mass Figure 2.2.--Kornhauser's Classification of Social Systems. 1 o. I \ 6'. .a 1 Q my. 1 ~- 34 The extent to which members of the society participate in the selection of elites is a rough indicator of the degree of access to elites. The degree to which members of the society lack attachment to independent groups is a similarly rough indicator of the degree of the availability of non-e1 ites. 2. The Yugoslav Pergpective Yugoslav political theory is based upon self-management and it provides the criteria and conceptual framework necessary to explain political processes in Yugoslavia. Since self-management is the desired form of public policy decision-making, if we could define more pre- cisely its constituent elements, we would then be able to find indicators which measure the degree to which the normative principle has been implemented. In addition we could then compare the different decision- making processes according to their impact on public policy outputs. Three principles of self-management--direct decision—making, worker control, and the contraction of the role of the government--pro- vide the basic yardstick with which to measure and compare political Processes on the local level in Yugoslavia. a. Direct Decision-Makipg,--The first element of self-management is direct decision-making, the right of citizens to make decisions which concern them most directly. Self-management is decision-making, that is the passing of self-managed decisions on all levels and in all soCTo- political communities--from the-working organization to the federation. 7 alQI’ 1 ' 1.,- no u I}. ,; 0-14 . H‘- a.” n_.. p v m.» E 1 35 Decision-making as a variable can be classified along two dimen- sions. One such dimension is range; the other dimension is directness. In other words, there exists measurable variance as to the total number of issues open to self-management decision—making as well as variance measured by how directly a citizen can decide about these issues. Both dimensions on the national level have changed over time. Decision-making has been consistently widened to include more policy areas and to be more direct. In the 1950's decision-making was limited solely to some economic relationships and the formation of workers' councils, and in those years the path of decision—making was indirect and bureaucratic-centralist.98 By 1974, direct decision-making, at least by law, had been expanded to include the political arena and decision-making had become considerably more direct so that legally every citizen had: . . the right to self-management on the basis of which every working man, equally with all other working people, decide about their own work, about their own and community interests and about directing societal development, implementing govern- ment and the management of other societal affairs.99 b. Workers' Control.--The second basic element of self- management is the concept of workers' control100 or the "dictatorshi p of the proletariat. " The platform (of the League of Communists) and the constitution start from the position that self-management in Yugoslavia is a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Its basic charac- teristic is direct management by the working class together with other working people over the conditions of work and life.101 In practical political terms the element of control by the workers (i.e., all working people) can be measured on two dimensions. '0 "I ‘I. - 111, ‘ u '9‘ u. v "9., u.‘ . ql' 36 One measures the degree of workers' control vis-a-vis management in industry, and the other examines the importance given to the economic sphere in political life. Over time, this second role has expanded. By 1974 it was desirable that direct producers achieve a majority repre- sentation in all political institutions and socio-political organiza- tions, and that they become the controlling community factor in decision- making. c. Contraction of the Role of the Government.--The third prin- ciple element of self—management, the contraction of the role of central governments (the withering of the state) is integrally related to the other two elements and may even be considered a logical outgrowth of those two elements . The process of the withering of the state has two basic views, two strongly intertwined sides. From the one side, the state apparatus becomes increasingly democratic, increasingly approxi- mates society and direct control by the working masses. . . . From the other side the circle of state business becomes increas- ingly narrow because the leadership of an increasingly greater number of state activities transfers to the organs of production and societal self-management“)2 The “withering of the state" in self-management is not equiva- lent to the more utopian interpretations of the concept, but it can and does have some practical political significance. State functions can contract, i.e., the role of the state and its bureaucracy can contract according to an observable and measurable pattern. In Yugoslavia formal state responsibilities have contracted or havebeen increasingly decentralized towards the local level over time. 37 The process of building the system (of self-management) began in Yugoslavia in 1952. However, it is considered that the communal system was introduced in 1955 when the op§tina became a basic political-territorial unit. Communal self-management is thought of as that form of the withering of the state which allows the working class to achieve in the basic territorial communities a dominant position in socio-economic and socio-political life. . . .103 In other words, in contemporary Yugoslavia the local political unit--the commune/op‘sftinauis becoming increasingly more relevant in the study of societal self-management. These three constituent elements of self-management are develop- ing and changing over time. Even more interesting, however, is that we can analyze not only temporal changes in the application of these norms but spatial changes as well. In other words, at a given time, political units within Yugoslavia can and do vary according to the degree or stage of "self-management" that has been achieved. It is clear, even on the foundation of non-systematic observation, that these institutions, and self-management in them, in spite of identical norms, did not function equally well in develOped and underdeveloped regions, in rural and urban settings, in techni- cally complex activities and in mass production work.104 3. Synthesis According to Yugoslav political theory, deviations from the goals of self-management are classified according to two dimensions; one is “anarcho-liberalism" while the other is "bureaucratic-statism."I05 These three different processes of decision-making--"anarcho-liberalism," "bureaucratic-stati5m,“ and self-management--are conceptually equal to Kornhauser‘s “mass, totalitarian, and pluralist"106 societies. While the terminology used by Western and Yugoslav theorists differs, the \ v 10.. 'I _.—_-.~ -" ‘-__’4 __1—1—-"‘ 38 conceptualization of these processes is nearly identica1.m7 Just as the Yugoslav political system perceives itself as consciously avoiding one or the other deviation from self-management socialism,108 Kornhauser constantly points out the dangers of both totalitarian and mass societ- ies. “Anarcho-liberalism" in its pure form is a condition when inter- mediate groups, especially the socio-political organizations, lose authority and importance in society109 and each citizen is free to pur- sue his own individual political ends at the expense of the community.“0 In the terminology of self-management, anarcho-liberalism occurs when organized worker control over the process of political decision-making is lacking."1 This is directly equivalent to saying that an anarcho- liberal society is one in which the accessability of the elite is high and the availability of the non-elites is high as well, i.e., a mass society.”2 "Bureaucratic-statism," another alternative in Yugoslav politi- cal thought, is directly equivalent to a Western conceptualization of totalitarianism. Both “bureaucratic-statism" and "totalitarianism" share the characteristics of a state in the hands of a few people, not directly responsible to the general public nor approachable by the public but to which the public must give its loyalties. An essential characteristic of "bureaucratic-statism“ that separates it from self-management is the inability of the system to “accept and develop competitive organizations and especially those forms of rule which place man in the place of an apparatus and place the.joint 39 interest of 'average people,‘ producers and citizens, in place of a 113 In the terminology of 'mfistification of the general interest.'" self-management, a bureaucratic-statism form of decision-making lacks the essential element of direct decision-making. In the Kornhauser framework, bureaucratic-statism becomes a situation in which the avail- ability of the non-elites is high and the accessibility of elites to the masses is low. In other words, "totalitarianism" and "bureaucratic- statism" are conceptually equivalent. In summary, if we adapt the Kornhauser decision-making process model to the Yugoslav experience and Yugoslav terminology, we arrive at alcomparative model that is conceptually equivalent and internally con— sistent. The following figure summarizes this adaptation. Accessibility to the Elites Availability of’Non-Elites L211 High Low communal totalitarian —__— (feudal-communal) (bureaucratic-statism) . pluralist mass U190. (self-managed) (anarcho-liberal) lfigure 2.3.--Comparative Classification of Social Systems. In short, this adaptation allows us to make joint use of both Yugoslav and Western-based theoretical concepts and past research results. By identifying the process of public policy decision—making in each Yugoslav commune, we can make theoretical statements about the effect that the inocess of decision-making may have on public policy outputs. FO0TNOTES--CHAPTER II 1Philip Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy, Polity 1 (Fall, 1970): 22-43. 2Andrew C. Tsantis in "Political Factors in Economic Develop- ment," Comparative Politics 2 (October, 1969, 76) suggests that such a procedure be followed. 3See: B. Guy Peters, "Public Policy, Socioeconomic Conditions, and the Political System: A Note on their Developmental Relationship," Polity 5 (Winter, 1972): 277-284. 4Since the relationships may not be linear and may be interac- tive in nature [see James C. Strouse and ‘J. Oliver Williams, “A Non- Additive Model for State Policy Research," Journal of Politics 34 (1972): 648-657], it would be easier to present this additional material at a place in closer proximity to its eventual empirical testing. 5See Samuel Kirkpatrick, "Multidimensional Aspects of Local Political Systems: A Conceptual Approach to Public Policy," Western Political Quarterly (December, 1970): 808-828, who develops a very similar typology to the one I suggest here. 6Some scholars (Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed: Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 188-197; and John Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," in Commgnist Studies and the Socigl Sciences, ed: Fred- eric J. Fleron, op. cit., Pp. 198-202) in the comparative communist studies field would prefer to say that comparative development has the potential to link communist and non-communist studies in the same analytical framework but that this potential has not yet been realized and a gap exists between theory and practice. However, recent work in comparative communist studies including John Michael Montias, Economic Qeyelopment in Communist Romania (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and Nationflr Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Carl Beck, TrCareer Characteristics of East European Leadership,“ in Political Leadership in Eastern Euro e and the Soviet Union, ed: R. Barry Farral (Chicago: AIEIi'ne, 1970), pp. 157-194; and Frederic L. Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Ca italist Nations (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968) tend to indicate that the gap between theory and practice has been narrowed, if not erased. 4O I'Q‘ u a. . 1 p. . \ .. 11- ‘l a”. "J 41 7David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1965). 8W. W. Rostow, The Stgges of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 196(D. 9Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). 10Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1966). “C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). IzSee Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (London: C. J. Arthur, Lawrence and Wiskert, 1970), pp. 68-87. ”Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The German Ideology, op. cit. I4Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USMUSSR (New York: Viking Press, 1963). “Alfred Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Cfipge in Communist S stems, ed: Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970 . PP. 313-342. 16Alexander Eckstein, “Economic Development and Political Change in Communist Systems," World Politics 22 (July, 1970): 475-495. "Leo F. Schnore, "Some Correlates of Urban Size," American qurnal of Sociology 69 (September, 1963): 185-193. IBHarvey Brazer, Cipy_Expenditures in the United States (Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper 66, 1959). 19Yasumasa Kuroda, “Levels of Government in Comparative Perspec- tive,“ Comparative Political Studies 7 (January, 1975): 430-440. 20See for example International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: Free Press, 1971); Petar Jambrek, Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia (Lexington, Mass.: 11. C. Heath Co. , 1975); Eugen PusiE, Samoupravljanje u Opcinama i Ustanovama Dru'étvenih Slu‘ibi Urazl ititTm Fazama. Ekonomsko i Dru‘Stvenog Rm (Zagreb: Institut 2a Drugtvena Istrafivanja Sveu iTista u Zagrebu, 1972) . 2‘ James C. Davies, “Revolution on the J-Curve,“ in w and Political Chan e, eds: Claude Welch, Jr. 1 and Mavis Taintor (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972). PP- 122-153- vu. Par '4 42 22Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965). 23See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societ- _1'_e_s_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 493-514. 24Erick A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequence and Rates of Change," in Political Deve10pment and Social Change, eds: Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley, 1966). 25Paul H. B. Godwin, "Communist Systems and Modernization: Sources of Political Crises," in Studies in Comparative Communism 6, No. l and 2 (Spring/Summer, 1973): 107-134. 26for examples, see: H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Prince- ton University Press, 1971). 27Dragutin Bozié and Savin Jogan, Samoppravljgnje u Komuni (Zagreb, Globus, 1974): 142-150. 28 pp. 62-72. v 29Radivoje Marinkovié, Ko Odlutuje u Komuni (Beograd: Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1971): 154-161. 30For practical explanations of that problem, see: Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Comparative Administration 1 (May, 1969): 5-38; and Samuel P. Hunting- ton, Political Order in Changing Societies, 0p. cit. Eugen Pusié, Lokalna Zajednica (Zagreb, Narodne Novine, 1963), 3IA. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). 32Vliroslav Pe'éuljié, Studija iz Politigke Sociologije i S ciialna Struktura i Promene PolitiTkih Institucijg (Beograd: Visoka kola PolitiEkim Nauka, 1965): 27-28. 33Glenn D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics," in Approaches toy Development: Politics, Administration and Chang, eds: John 0. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966): 52. 34This interpretation is based upon the discussion from the Workshop on the Comparative Analysis of Public Health and Education P911911 at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Associa- tion, Nashville, November 6-8, 1975.. n \.H;-5 in. a \e... l. ,. ‘ - .- I .. ~4 "‘ u in. I . II ‘1 ‘J ' 3.. l .v.‘ . I v . r )- ‘. 43 35See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, op. cit., for an interesting case study of Romania which deals with this problem. 36David J. Falcone, "0n Comparative Health Policy and Political Science," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, November 7, 1975, p. ll. 37Robert Presthus, Public Administration 6th ed. (New York: Ronald Press, Co., l975): 3. 38Fred H. Riggs, Administration in Developing_Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, l974): 396. 39For a discussion of how each of these three subject areas affect local administration in a comparative perspective, see: Emil J. Sady, "Improvement of Local Government and Administration for Development Purposes," in Readings in Comparative Public Admijnjstration, ed: Nimrod Raphael (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, l9677: 239-257. 40The literature about federalism normally employs this meaning of decentralization. It is often a matter of concern in comparative urban literature as well. See Yasumasa Kuroda, "Levels of Government in Comparative Perspective," op. cit. , who attempts a measurement of the concept of local autonomy. 41This is the view of decentralization which Vincent Ostrom, 1h; Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974), uses in his statement on the reform of metropolitan areas. 42Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organization Strategy," in Comparative Urban Research, ed: Robert T. Dalond (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, l969), p. 68, conceptually differentiates the two meanings somewhat differently than what I do ltiere.‘ He calls the first view "decentralization" but the second “devolu- ion.' 435ee Philip Jacob, "Autonomy and Political Responsibility: The Enigmatic Verdict of a Cross-National Comparative Study of Conlnunity Dynamics," Urban Affairs Quarterly ll (September, l975): 36-57, who finds that greater autonomy of the local leadership in Yugoslavia, Poland, India, and the United States is not linked to greater fragmenta- tion of decision-making within local units. 44This point is well understood in Yugosl via and is the subject of extensive debate. See: Dragutin Boiié, Skupstinski Sistem u Komuni," in Ustavna Reforma Komune, ed: Fabric, Pistalo i TomaE (Zagreb,,Centar za Aktuelne Politifk‘e Studije, l97l). 'l'l‘ u V"~, '\\ 44 45A. F. Leeman, Changing Patterns of Local Government (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, l970), pp. 23-24. 46Paulo Reis Vierra, "Toward a Theory of Decentralization: A Comparative View of 45 Countries" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, I967) cited in Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organization Strategy,“ op. cit. 47See Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration: Policy-Makinggin Goyernggnt Agengies, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, l975K pp. l7-47 and Fred H. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," op. cit. 48Elinor Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform: Prepositions Derived from Two Traditions," Social Science Quarterly 53 (December, l972): 474-493. 49The comparison of Sidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," Comparative Politics 7 (October, l974): l-36, of Italian and French reactions to administra- tive decentralization is a good descriptive analysis of the intensity of political feelings on decentralism. 50Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 51 (New York: The New American Library, l96l). 51Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, l957), pp. 234-240. 52Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influence on County Boroughs in England and Wales (London: Cambridge University Press, l97l): 5. 53Jerome E. Milch, “Influence as Power: French Local Government Rggonsidered," British Journal of Political Science 4, Pt. 2 (April l974): - 6]. 54Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, op. cit. 55See, for example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism, Report M-3l (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, l966), cited in Controversies of State and Local Political Systems, eds. Mavis Marvin Reeves and Parris N. Glendering (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, l972), whufliargues that greater concentration and centralization of local services is needed. . 56Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, "Development and Participa- 1:]On." in Local Politics, Develgpment, and Partigjpation, eds: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Niatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, l974), p. l36. (-;. ‘»~v TE'C. Y n l p lil“ in . v... in; v. s " .'.1 i. I \ ~T 45 57A. F. Leeman, Changing Patterns of Local Government, op. cit. 58Jerome E. Milch, "Influence as Power: French Local Government Reconsidered," op. cit. 59karl u. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Develop- nent,“ American Political Science Review 55 (September 196l): 493-5l4. 60Norman Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relation- ships, 1“ and "II,“ American Political Science Review 63, No. 2 and 3 (June and September, l969): 36l-378 and 808-832. 6ISee Myron Neiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, eds: Leonard Binder, James 5. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucien Pye, Myron Heiner and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l97l). pp. l66-l75. 62L. J. Sharpe, "Participation in a Major City: Some Aspects of Turnout in Greater London," in Local Politics, Development and Partici- pgtknu eds: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Hiatr (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity Center for International Studies, 1974), pp. 55-79; and Douglas Ashford, “Parties and Participation in British Local Government and ggmglAmerican Parallels," Urban Affairs Quarterly ll (September l975): 63Robert Alford and E. Lee, "Voting Turnout in America," in Qmmmnfity Politics, ed: M. Bonjean et al. (New York: Free Press, l97l). 64Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involve- nent: The Case of France," American Political Science Review 65 (June l97l): 341-357. 65Stojan Tomié, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and Ofifizen Participation," paper presented at the Prva MedUnarodna Konferencija Participacije Samoupravljanja, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, December, 1972. . 66Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, “Development and Participa- tion," Op. Cit. 67Douglas Ashford, "Parties and Participation in British Local Government and Some American Parallels." Op. Cit. PP- 53'59’ identifies two different views of participation's impact on public policies. One lnew is that participation is an obstacle to effective government while the other view, which is more generally accepted, is that participation results in more responsive, effective government. all 0‘1 \l.‘ £4 a a D s IP'U 46 68James O. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review 63 (December l964): 876-887. 69Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Helfard Policies in theAmerican States," American Political Science Review 63 (September l969): 858-866. 7oSidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Politi- cal Democracy and Social Equality) (New York: Harper and Row, l972), pp. 265—344. 7]See Lester H. Milrath, "Political Participation in the States: in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, eds: Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., l965), pp. 55-58, for an interesting critique of the unidimensional view of political participation. 72See Michael Baer and Dean Jaros, "Participation as Instrument and Expression: Some Evidence from the States," American Journal of Political Science 18 (May, 1974): 365-383, whose analysis of participa- tion indicates that the caution suggested here is well founded. 73Robert Alford, Bureaucracy and Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, l969). p. l8. 74S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed: Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 96-ll9. . 75Fred H. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspec- t‘ V99" Op. Cit. 76John Kautsky, "Patterns of Elite Succession in the Process of Development,“ Journal of Politics 3l (May 1969): 359-396. 77The eight results of professionalism of the public service lunch Henry notes include the following: potential conflict of interest, undue influence of special groups, insulation of public servants from control, lack of internal democracy, maintenance of unrealistic pro- fessional standards, overspecialization, lack of policy coordination, (fiscouragement of participation. Nicholas Henry, Public Administration éflgggublic Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, I975), p. . . 78James March and Herbert Simon, Orgpnizations (New York: 00h" Wiley, 1958), p. 70. u'u ol 1" p l. ' d u titl- l I‘I' I p-.. ,. \. .J’I" r” . \. "v“ ‘ - ‘1 "I“. V " 47 7QGraham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., l97l). in his explanation of the Cuban missile crisis does a very useful job of indicating how bureaucratization can affect the selec- tion of public policy decisions. Even though the context of Allison is somewhat distant from the intent of this study, the theoretical lessons should be comparable. 80Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, “Community Types and Policy Differences," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed: James O. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, l968), pp. l7-36. 8lDennis J. Palumbo and Richard Styskal, “Professionalism and Receptivity to Change," American Journal of Political Science l8 (May l974): 385—394. 82Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., I967), p. 203. 83Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Representative Mechan- ism,.Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies: A Comparative Analysis of Within-State Distribution of Economic and Political Traits," Journal of Politics 33 (l97l): 132. 84Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw- Hill. 1953). p. 79. 85Robert Gutman and Francine Rabinovitz, “The Relevance of Domestic Urban Studies to International Urban Research," Urban Affairs Quarterly l (June l966): 45-64. 86Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influence on County Boroughs in England and Wales, op. cit., p. 5. 87See Robert Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search fbr Theories and Roles,“ in Political Science and Public Policy, ed: AusthiRanney(Chicago: Markham, l96B), pp. l54-l59, for a discussion of gheinoblems inherent in developing an adequate typology of policy eelsions. 88Charles W. Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative lhflicy Analysis: A Plea for Contextual and Experiential Knowledge," in Perspectives on Public Policy_Making, eds: William B. Gwyn and George Edwards III (New Orleans: TuTane University, l975), pp. 233-238. 89Terry Clark, "Citizens Values, Power and Policy Outputs,“ Qernal of Comparative Administration (February T973): 385-427. 90Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Micro-Ap lication in Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics (October l968 : 74-75. ‘On 0 '45 48 91G. G. Cain and H. W. Watts, "Problems in Making Policy Infer- ences from the Coleman Report," American Sociological Review 35 (l970): 228-24l. 92Daniel F. Luecke and Noel F. McGinn, "Regression Analyses and Education Production Functions: Can They Be Trusted," Harvard Educa- tional Review 45 (August l975): 325-350. 93Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 94Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, l96l). 95Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). 96William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society_(New York: Free Press, l959), p. 40. 97Andelko Veljic, Drustveno Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji (Sarajevo: VeseJin Maslesa, l973). 98Institut za IzuEavanje RadniEkog Pokreta Beograda, Pre led Istorije Saveza Komunista Jggpslavije (Beograd: Kultura, l963 , pp. 516-517. 99Ustav SFRJ (Beograd: Prosveta, 1974). looIn Yugoslav political theory, the term "worker" has two usages. One meaning includes all working people in industry, agriculture, commerce, e.tc , excluding directors or higher administrative personnel. The other meaning includes only those individuals engaged in direct production activities (i. e. , factory and agriculture workers, excluding management personnel). In practice the meaning of the term "worker" varies between these two meanings although, in general, the latter usage is substituted by the term "direct producers.“ 10lRadoE Smil kovic, Ustav i Platforma SKJ o Samoupravljanju (Beograd: RadniEka tampa, l974), p. 7. ‘02 2Najdan PasiE, Klase i Politika (Beograd: Rad, l974), p. llO. 89 103Milan Ramljak, Samoupravljanjg(2agreb: Skolska Knjiga,l974), p. . lO4 Institut za Drustvena Instrazivanja, Jugoslovenska Komuna (Zagreb 1972):5. H-.. 1", - Pl- '- 49 105Miroslav Peo’ujlié. Studija iz Politié’ke Sociologije i Socijalna Struktura i Promene Polititkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Skola Politic'kih Nauka, 1965). 106Many Yugoslav writers will refer to a “pluralist society" and "phnalism" to mean Kornhauser's “mass society." The two usages should be kept distinct. 107This does not imply that “self-management" and "pluralism" are equal on all counts since self-management legitimizes only certain specified groups in society. 108Rado§ Smiljkovié, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samouprav- ljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, l969). 109Radoslav Ratkovié, "Liberalizamgi Partija,“ in Sta Je Liberalizam? (Beograd: Institut za Politicke Studije, l973). Pp. 36-44. noGligorije ZajeEaranoviE. "Liberalizam i MarksistiEka Ideo- logija," in Sta Je Liberalizam?, op. cit., PP. 8-16. 1l‘Josip Broz Tito, “Pismo Predsednika SKJ." Izvr§nog_Biroa Fhedsednistva SKJ. lB Septembra l973 (Beograd: Komunist, 1973): lleiroslav PeEujliE, "Liberalizam, Socijalizam," in Sta Je Liberalizam?, op. cit., pp. 45-5l. ll3Jovan 90rdévic, PolitiEki Sistem (Beograd: Privredni Pregled, l973), p. 749. 3. b... 'l., <- (I' s.‘ n l' l ‘l. ‘1 in ' l (1' CHAPTER I I I THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY MODEL This chapter discusses the role of the political system in the policy-making model that was introduced in Chapter II. It defines the essential aspects of local governmental administration in Yugoslavia, identifies variations in the local political structures, examines the sources of local political structural variation, and looks at the impact of the political structure on public policies and the decision-making process. The focus of this analysis is the Yugoslav ops’tina or conmune.1 The Opstina/comune is a territorially-based administrative unit aver- aging approximately 50,000 persons. Its boundaries have remained rela- tively fixed since l968. The Opstina/conmune possesses a civil service, executive, legislature, judiciary, comissions and boards, etc. It has considerable legal powers and can pass and enforce laws. It engages in large-scale public works, health care, education, cultural and other social welfare programs. In addition to public services, the conlnune gives a conmunity a specific identity as well. Territorially comnunes may be quite large (for example, Niksic: 2,065 square kilometers) or very small (for example, Vracar: 3 square kilometers). They may be very populous (for example, Skoplje: 388.952 population) 0" relatively 5O "T V- M... ’h 5] unpopulated (for example, Lastovo: l,2l0 population).2 Communes differ in nearly every other aspect as well. A. Theoretical Overview The role and behavior of the commune has held an important place in Yugoslav political theory for a considerable period of time. The commune is considered the center of social self-management much as the factory is considered the seat of economic self-management. According to Jovan Bordevic, One of the basic characteristics of the contemporary political system of Yugoslavia is the Opstina as a socio-political commu- nity. . . There are no revolutionary social changes if they are not manifested in the fundamental cells of society. . Social self-management as a form of direct and actual political decision-making by the people can find its basis and affirmation in the defined structure of the basic social collectivities. In the Opstina a certain type of social relationship--soc1al struc- ture--develops and grows. In order to understand the study of communal public policy decision-making, it is necessary to consider several features of the theoretical and actual position of the commune in Yugoslav society. First. I shall discuss the general trends which direct the development of the commune. This is followed by a consideration of the amount of autonomy enjoyed by the conmune and the role of the connlune in the Yugoslav federal structure. Finally, I shall turn to the major duties and responsibilities of the commune as well as the major problems which 1°"|Pl'nge upon it. Taken together, these three considerations help iden- tify the public policy boundaries which are amenable to control by the commune, the degree of authority which the commune has in meeting its "EEdS. and the tools which are available to it for meeting these needs. ll' \ 19- a! 52 l. Trends The theoretical basis of local self-government in Yugoslavia (wiginates from Marx's writings on the Paris Commune.4 In practice, however, the basic groundwork for the present communal system originates from the founding of the national liberation committees established by partisan operations during World War II. The liberation committees continued until l955. These were locally based governments founded to 5 In 1955. expel the Nazis and later used to coordinate recovery efforts. in response to the adoption of self-management as the official practical ideology of Yugoslavia, they were reorganized into the present communal framework. Since 1955 the commune's structure, function, level of autonomy, responsibilities and basic societal position has changed several times. The basic changes occurred in l955 with the establish- nent of the commune; in l963 with the implementation of a new consti- tution; in l970 following the execution of the constitutional amend- nents; and in 1974 with the adoption of the most recent constitution. In general the stated intent of these structural changes has been towards greater democratization. more decentralization, less bureaucracy and professionalism, and more communal autonomy, powers and responsibilities.6 In practice, however, the behavioral effect of these changes is not so clear and may have been, in part, counter- Productive. From the structual perspective three overall trends are evident from the changes in the structural arrangements of the commune which have occurred since l955. They are: movement towards larger size. A" 1 t J -A.wn ‘ II» '1 1): I. I- 53 growth in revenues and expenditures, and increases in the level of administrative autonomy and responsibilities. These changes seem to have progressed along a fairly linear continuum over time. The first apparent structural change is the growth in the aver- age size of the communes and the consolidation of communes which are physically or economically handicapped if they remain separate. Table 3.l gives an indication of the extent of the general decline in TABLE 3.l.--Number of Communes Existing in Yugoslavia by Year, 1956- l975. Year Number of Communes 1956 l479 l957 l44l l958 ll93 I959 ll03 l960 839 l96l 782 l962 759 l963 58l l964 577 l965 577 l966 5l6 l967 5l0 l968 50l l969-T974 500 l975 5l0 SOURCE: StatistiEki Godignjak Jugoslavije 1975 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Socijalistizka Federativna Republlka JugoslaVlja. Beograd. l975), p. 554. 3-. NJ M. i *h 54 the number of communes which has occurred since l955. In l956 there were nearly three times as many communes in existence as there were twelve years later in l968. Yugoslavia has undergone a rather substan- tial administrative reorganization during this period. From l969 to l975 no substantial changes occurred in the number and boundaries of the communes. This seems to indicate that the size, boundaries, and number of communes have reached some type of equilibrium point.7 The major reason for this reorganization in the size of the commune is to increase the capabilities of the commune to meet the expanding social, economic and political responsibilities placed upon it. This means that the communes must have a sufficiently large tax base from which to pay for public services. At the same time, however, the commune should be small enough to maintain the principle of popular local control.8 In addition to the consolidation of communes into larger, more economically viable units, there has been a rather dramatic increase in recent years in the financial responsibilities and expenditures of the commune. In fact, self-financing of commune programs has become the nest serious problem thatrunvconfronts the commune.9 Table 3.2 illus- trates this growth. Since l965 the communal budgetary expenditures have consistently exceeded 30% of the total budgetary expenditures of all socio-political levels combined, and this share has been consistently increasing. In the period from l966 to l970, tax revenues in the commune increased 83%, educational expenditures 240%, and the our '0') Q»— 0155‘ . . mu ,. a. Art 0"- ' I 55 TABLE 3.2.--Distribution of the Total Budget of the Yugoslav Government to its Various Levels: l965-l970 in Percent. Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Level of Government Federal 47.8 45.8 42.l 40. 8 38.8 39. 9 Republic l2.2 13.3 l6.5 l8.0 l8.8 l7.5 Autonomous Provinces 'l.9 l.6 l.8 2.4 2.6 2.6 Commune 32. 7 34. 7 39.2 39.8 39.8 40.0 TOTAL l00.0 lO0.0 lO0.0 lO0.0 l00.0 l00.0 SOURCE: Predrag Boievié, "Kretanje LiEne i Op§te Potro§nje u Periodu 1966-1970," Finansije 5-6 (1970). budget 93%.10 Thus the financial importance of the commune government is growing both in absolute and relative terms. The third trend is the growth in communal administrative respon- sibilities. Local administrative independence has increased in accord- ance with the general Yugoslav policy of decentralization. This is a result of the reduction in central and republic administrative control over conmune activities. An example of such a process is the economic development program which was originally controlled by the central government, later devolved to the republic level, and is now in the hands of conmune-based economic councils.11 The extent to which this increase in administrative responsi- bilities has occurred is evident from a comparison of the number of laws passed by the conmunal legislative assemblies over time. In l963 O. vu- 56 the communal assemblies passed approximately 73,900 acts; in l964, ll7,803 acts; in l965, 124,735 acts. In T968 the number of acts passed fell to 87,860, but through a general administrative consolidation plan this actually represented an increase over previous years.]2 In addi- tion, the number of administrative reports received by the communal assemblies also dramatically increased. In l963, 6,964 reports were received; in l965, ll,257 reports; and in l968. 12,2l7 administrative ‘3 While these figures are not reports were received by the assemblies. defhfite proof that the commune is administratively more important, it does indicate that the comnunes are administratively doing more. The steady growth in administrative responsibilities has been burdensome to the administration of the commune itself. The problem of properly informing delegates in the commune legislature about current issues increases proportionately to the number of issues which are decided by the conmune.M In addition, as comnunal responsibilities increase, there is constant pressure to increase the financial tax resources of the commune, a move often accompanied by citizen resis- 15 tance. As a result, the communes are always in a precarious fiscal or political situation.16 2. Autonomy Yugoslavia has a formal political structure with three levels of authority: federal, republic and communal. Since Yugoslavia is a state with four official languages, six official nationalities, many other large ethnic groups, and a long history of inter-nationality tension and hostility, a federal structure was inevitable.17 lap! \. via ~ ‘ | ' l L | | f". 'w ',s ." 57 Within this framework the commune is the basic local political administrative unit and it has a fundamental legal position in Yugoslav society. The federal constitution gives the commune considerable auton- cmy and defines its role in the following manner: The opgtina is a self-managed and basic socio-political commu- nity based on the authority and self-management of the working class and allgworking people. In the op tina working people and citizens create and secure the conditions for their own life and work. they direct social development, realize and harmonize their interests, satisfy com- munity needs, recognize authority and manage their other social affairs. The function of government and the management of other social affairs, except those which according to the constitution rest in the wider socio-political communities, reside in the opio’izina.‘8 In addition the constitution very clearly ascribes two roles to the commune, one as an administrative unit and another as a community. Both objective and ideological factors have influenced the decisions to grant a considerable amount of formal local autonomy. The dispersion of nationalities across republic borders, the existence of small nationality enclaves within republic boundaries, and the presence of non-represented national minorities have tended to force the national authorities to develop a local unit with sufficient autonomy to help (Hffuse the potential nationality tensions that exist within each of the federal republics. The op§tina commune became that local unit. A second reason for the development of local autonomy is ideological; social self-management in the comune is a natural out- growth from economic self-management in the industrial enterprises.19 When the central planned economy was disbanded by T963. and considerable OP: U‘S .,. \ VIVO 0‘ n i.“ v‘v‘ v - .1, " n- ,n 58 powers were given to the economic enterprises, strong, autonomous local infits became progressively more necessary to promote the interests of the local community. In theory, the effect of Yugoslav federalism on the local level should be a harmonious blend of different federal levels all working towards a common goal--self-management, with all levels equal and all levels complementing each other. As self-management develops more, the basic cohesion of the federal community is not in a greater state hierarchical appa- ratus of power but in a self-management process which on an equal and voluntary basis connects the parts of the social community. The role of all the social-political communities would be to hasten the widest self-management process of association and integration and to overcome the institutional and legal barriers which threaten that integration.20 Theoretically the Yugoslav federal system closely approximates the nerble cake analogy used in American federalism literature.2] Administratively the ideal of cooperative federalism is enforced by two mechanisms. One such mechanism is the joint taxation system from infich all levels of government share.22 This reinforces the notion of the existence of a common Yugoslav community from which all federal levels share coequally and c00peratively. The second mechanism rein- forcing cooperative federalism is the absence of republic or federation bureaucratic branches within the Opstina.23 All laws, including federal and republic statutes, are administered by the communal civil service24 --recruited and paid from local funds. The intent of this is to avoid the appearance of central pressures upon local governmental agencies.25 Unfortunately, the theory and practice of Yugoslav federalism are quite different. The commune does not possess quite the degree of 3 0- firzlil I‘Ol 0-, d..‘ I”.- ' in. 1 :46- ‘ib 1 n 9". ~v.| A. W“ "- 'Jl . “r- 59 autonomy and equality vis-a-vis other units that is suggested by theory. In fact, the very administrative mechanisms designed to encourage coop- erative federalism have discouraged the further develOpment of local autonomy. First, since the republic and federation have no local adminis- trative standards and share the same tax base, they can put considerable pressure upon the communal administration. For example. before l97l the activities of the commune were regulated by more than l500 republic or 26 27 federal regulations involving 70% of the total budget of the commune. This meant that often very little of the total commune income allocation was left to the citizen to determine.28 Second, since the taxation base of the republic, federation and commune are all statutorily interdependent, an individual commune often finds it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances and to determine completely independently the amount and rate of revenue collections. This procedure threatens the fiscal autonomy of the commune. These two weaknesses coupled with the increase in responsibili- ties place the commune in a very difficult situation. In practice we find a paradoxical situation whose basis is with the growth of legal administrative independence and the weak. development of the material independence of the Opstina. This happens when the federation and the republic delegate rlghts and activities to the Opstina but do not Slmultaneously dele- gate the necessary material means by whlch these affalrs may be financed. . . . In such situations the Opstina must use funds which were appropriated for some other act1Vlty or commu- nity on this activity. Since 1970 some changes have been made to alleviate this situation and to grant more actual autonomy to the commune. This includes a reform 60 of the system of taxation that begins to separate commune tax revenue sources from republic and federation sources, a formal political channel to improve communication across the levels of government,31 and a con- scious attempt to reduce interference by higher governmental levels in communal affairs.32 Even with these new changes local autonomy is not complete and 33 varies by policy issue. Petar Jambrek identifies four types of policy issues which allow varying degrees of local autonomy. They are: l. Administrative tasks which are considered exclusively national, for example national defense, security serv- ices, or revenue collection. Local administration is in these matters subordinated to the higher level government unit. 2. Those tasks where no local modifications are possible, although there is no relationship of supra- and sub- ordination between local and national administration except the normal control of legality; an example of such a function is the administration of the population regis- tar. 3. Issues which are regulated by national norms only in gen- eral terms. Communal institutions are able to adopt and specify these decisions accordingly. Examples are local revenues, urban planning, handicraft, or house building. 4. Functions which are derived from national and state laws, and where the communes actually assume the role of self- governing territorial entities. Most municipal services, social problems, and some tasks in the field of education belong in this sphere of responsibility. In summary, we can conclude that the Yugoslav commune has some autonomy but that it is limited to specific policy areas. We must, therefore. be very careful about the selection of the public policies that we wish to study; i. - vo - f g .I T. vll ' if“ I ‘4‘ 1"" 'I it.” fr v-r ‘nn. . ‘u-. ‘1 “A. \ vJ. Wu; 61 3. Responsibilities We must identify those Specific activities over which the Yugo- siav commune has considerable autonomy and freedom of action in order to nuke a rational selection of public policies for study. In particular we should specify those activities which fall into Jambrek's third and fourth categories. The policy areas in which the commune has considerable autonomy and responsibilities include the following: economic development, urbanization, communal services, housing policy, manpower, and social 34 services. Each area involves a number of specialized activities that can be defined as activities over which communes exercise a degree of independent control. In the field of economic development the commune has the right to implement and administer economic development investment funds in order to encourage investment in the commune. It can underwrite the cost of introducing new industries in the commune or of guaranteeing the business losses of already existing industries. The commune also develops a plan of economic development and works for its implementa- tion.35 These activities can involve large sums of money and the alloca- tion of these funds or the investment decisions can become vital commu- nity concerns. The actual influence of the commune is in reality quite high. In a survey of fifteen communes conducted in l963, for example, 52.05% of all moves for economic expansion originated in the communal .. .,.‘, .d. 4 .. I .1" U.- . -'-P‘ 62 administration, with only 28.77% being initiated by the affected working organizations themselves.36 The commune has the right to make all zoning decisions, develop a general urban plan, develop parks, finance road and sewer construction and generally regulate the environment of the opstina.37 These public policies are generally less controversial and often purely administra- tive in function, although there are Opportunities for abuse and private gain.38 Communal services include such activities as sewer, water, street maintenance, lighting, electricity, public transportation, garbage col- lection, market places, cemetaries, dog pounds, parking structures, tax 39 collection, heating, playgrounds, etc. In addition, the commune has control over such other vital functions as the supply and price of milk, bread, meat, taxis, etc. It also provides inSpection facilities, sani- tary regulations and the like.40 The third area of communal involvement is housing policy. Com- nmnes are responsible for developing and enforcing housing codes, lupviding public housing, building apartments and determining rental charges. Housing policy has been very problematic for nearly every commune. Political pressures keep rent low. investment capital is difficult to raise. the housing is often unattractive, and the available 41 housing is in short supply. The area of housing is one of the communal areas most difficult to administer42 43 and one in which dissatisfaction is quite high. ‘1‘. a . 0A! A ii'ua C.:. O! O at. in,” b- '. .r O Si (It 63 The fourth and final area in which the conmune has considerable autonomy and responsibilities is social services. This includes educa- tion, culture, health and social welfare. Communes have responsibility for providing elementary, secondary, and technical education for their citizens. Educational policy may include such features as providing textbooks, board and lodging, transportation, etc. Schools are financed, staffed and built with communal resources. There is, therefore, room for considerable inter-commune variation in the provision of such services.44 Culture includes libraries, theaters, museums, sports facilities, etc. Financing, staffing and initiating cultural programs is strictly a local prerogative with local variations in size and emphasis. Health protec- tion and social welfare includes preventive medicine, health insurance, nether and child care, clinics, day care centers, rehabilitation centers, etc. Again, the programs are locally initiated, locally financed and locally maintained although the republic may provide additional funds to help support these programs in poorly-developed communes. In summary, the Yugoslav commune is one unit within a federal structure with considerable autonomy and responsibilities in some selected policy areas. Knowledge of these areas permits a meaningful examination and comparison of policy-making processes in Yugoslavia. The policy areas that are most fruitful for analysis are economic development, urbanization, communal services. and housing and social services. a 1.. d riv» .- LJ 5‘- o "w h, 'J ‘1. 'v- a 1 .- a 64 B. The Organization of the Political Structure It is essential to understand the formal political structure in which the decisions are made in order to understand the policy—making process in the Yugoslav commune. This section outlines the formal politi- cal structure of the commune and discusses its constituent parts; it selects those sectors within the formal organization that are most rele- vant to the decision—making process; and it outlines how decentraliza- tion, participation, bureaucratism and professionalism operate within the commune. l. Explanation of the Formal Structure The commune as a socio-political community has a very complex fOrmal structure. The commune administration includes a judiciary, executive, cabinet, tricameral legislature,45 numerous smaller terri- torial units (mesna zajednica). commissions, policy boards and other political administrative units. Figure 3.] provides a simplified chart of‘a typical commune's formal structure. Several of the constituent elements of the structure, however, deserve more explanation. The ppgtina assembly_is a generally representative body directly chosen by citizens and working people in work organizations.46 the body that represents the different elements of society47 and estab- It is lishes general policy through compromise and other political methods.48 Since the l974 constitution the opstina assembly uniformly has three different chambers to represent.formally different interests of —»J.-.vdqa diubvau.-.. V. nlfitdflh _ LL It!) .u Lu... v . a V1: N .mcwpmno >mpmoms> mcu mo ogapuzepm "muwpwnomnu.p.m mmame mcoN_b_u Fa3o_>waeH 65 mcompMchmmLo guzo> memewum> mcovca month toeet_F< bm__meoom mow=WNMMN mumwc:EEou mo mammm4 z mcorpmnwcmmeo mpwcs qu_pppoa oruom mecopweewh g mcofimmwpwo Icofimmwfio E mcwzpo corpumuoea Foruom “cmEAoFQEm weaupzu quwmxcm compumpoea ufiwgu smem: wasp—3o mewusu0La meowprwcomco muwcumnuN :o_pmu:um .uomm< to Fauruwyoatowuom acme: xuwczeeou wzp to r1111. apnewmm< mo AFnEwmm< mo zrnswmm< umwcmucH to muemom pcmuwmwea pcmvwmmta pcwurmmea mcmwwmmmonMwmmow zanmmm< mcwpwao . . mucoEpeenmn Magi—5.8 8.;me :39 m>wp=omxu , nevuMno ucwnwmmga 66 the community.49 The chamber of "mesna zajednica" represents the neigh- borhood interests of the conmunity; the chamber of socio-political organizations represents the interests of those organizations in the community; and the chamber of associated producers (workers) represents the functional or work-related interests of the community. The opstina charter often formally delegates certain communal reSponsibilities to one or two of the chambers.50 The majority of the decisions, however, are made in a joint session, rather than in separate or single sessions of the chamber.51 Members of the opstina chambers are not paid except for expenses incurred while on communal business. They are also not free under the luesent delegate system to vote on any major issues without formally consulting the body which elected them and getting their formal approval. The boards of the interests of the community_(interesne zajednice) are special boards set up to determine administrative poli- cies in specific service areas, provide a community board of review over cfifferent communal functions, and solicit funds and contributions for communal services. Members of the boards are elected and are nominally independent of the opstina assembly. Knowledge about the composition of the boards and sources of income can be very useful tools in comparing some qualitative aspects of public policies. The executive council acts like a cabinet in many respects. It inplements the policy determined by the assembly; suggests to the assem- bly that certain laws be implemented; formulates administrative regula- tions; coordinates the work of the civil service departments.52 The executive council is composed of about ten members. The formal powers FA... '61 «11 A. 67 of this organization have shrunk considerably since 1955 and considerable variation exists among opstinas in the formal as well as informal influ- ence which the executive council has over public policies.53 Members of the executive councils are usually limited to two consecutive terms and usually cannot simultaneously be members of the opstina assembly. Because it is very important to keep the executive from dominating the legislature, the opstina charters provide many barriers to enforce this division.54 The civil service's role varies considerably from commune to commune depending upon such factors as the level of services and size of the commune. The training and education of the civil service varies according to the job performed and the complexity of the commune admin- istration.55 Theoretically the civil service is under the strong control and direction of the executive council and administrative staff of the opstina assembly.56 In practice the opstina assembly is often not periodically consulted about the opgtina administrative affairs, or consultations are given to only a few selected members.57 The degree of the power of the civil service probably varies and tends to be more important in communes with a weak executive council or opstina assembly. The president of the opstina assembly is elected from the ranks of the assembly and is generally limited to two terms. Often he is a paid full-time functionary and he is occasionally provided with a staff. His primary purpose is to coordinate the business of the op§tina (I) ‘1- nA-. u; t ]:::/'\’ (i? 375 ¢ _? 68 assembly and to function as its chairman. In practice the president often becomes involved in many more activities and may perceive himself as the executive and symbolic head of the commune.58 In short. the strength of the president of the opstina assembly varies according to In many cases the lack of clarity in his perceived role 59 a conflict the out- the commune. leads to conflict with the communal bureaucracy, come of which is often unclear.60 The secretary of the opstina's legal and actual position varies greatly from commune to commune. His duties are similar to that of chief legal counsel for the commune. The secretary is required to consider and read every act which is brought before the assembly from the viewpoint of its legal- ity, and when necessary to warn and explain to the assembly when a proposed act is illegal. The secretary is in a good position, because of his legal powers, to wield considerable influence over the proposed policies suggested to the communal assembly. L Centers of Influence in the Commune As is apparent from Figure 3.l and the preceeding explanation, the political system of the commune is very complex and possesses com- peting lines of authority and numerous levels which tend to separate the citizen from the final decision. Policy can be efficiently and democratically implemented only when the channels of communication remain open and each unit is working towards the same goals.62 Thus, the greatest influence over the final determination of policy is CST. I .‘1 F‘Ul 1n: y .. 71" vu‘ . :i" l" - f A..‘ J?) 69 naintained by those units that have the authority necessary to harmonize divergent goals. Within the formal political framework of the Yugoslav commune, two institutions usually possess the degree of access to channels of communication and authority that is necessary to influence communal public policy. These institutions are the opstina assembly and the president of the opstina assembly. The opstina assembly receives the formal power from the republic constitutions and opstina statutes to initiate and determine public policies. Usually the opstina assembly exerts a great deal of influence on public policy formation. Often, however, the president of the opstina assembly can exert a good deal of influence as well. This is because of the fact that the president of the opstina assembly is almost always a professional political functionary while opstina delegates/ representatives usually serve only as amateurs. In addition, the president of the op§tina assembly can often claim direct contact with the "general interest“ of the commune while opstina assembly delegates/ representatives tend to represent their own organizations rather than the interest of the commune as a whole.64 Finally, the president of the opstina assembly can sometimes more efficiently handle emergency lupblems and crises as they occur since he is able to maintain direct contact and control over executive functions.65 Together, both the president of the opstina assembly and the opstina assembly itself have considerable influence over communal public 7O policies. Table 3.3 gives an indication of the degree of influence held by various communal organizations over policy formation in a sample of representatives of Opstina assemblies from T6 Slovenian communes in l970. This actual influence is contrasted with the amount of influence which the respondents throught was desirable for that organization. The table indicates that the president of the op§tina assembly possesses more influence than do the opstina assembly members or separate assembly councils even though they are considered to be the desirable dominant factor in the commune.66 Together, however, they seem to possess considerable influence in the affairs of the commune.67 When specific communal policies are examined, we find that the influence of the president of the opstina assembly and the op§tina assembly have had consistently high and similar patterns across various policies in the commune. Figure 3.2 graphically portrays the pattern of influence across various vital communal policies in a sample of Slovenian communes.68 Apparently the only policies over which the president of the op§tina assembly and the opstina assembly do not possess a very large degree of influence are the election of the president of the opstina assembly and election of directors in economic enterprises. In short, the op§tina assembly and its president should be considered the focal points for the determination of communal public policies. We should not infer from these arguments that other organiza- tions, especially organizations independent of the political structure of the commune, do not have considerable influence over these policies 71 TABLE 3.3.--Average Actual and Desired Influence of Various Communal Or anizations on Decision-Making in a Sample of Slovenian Op tina Assemblies in l970.6 Average Score of Average Score of Index of Organizations Actual Influence Desired Influence Disharmony Republic Organs 3.27 2.4l +0.86 President of Opgtina Assembly 3.22 3.05 +0.l7 Councils of the Opstina Assembly 3.01 3.20 -0.19 0ps’tina Civil Service 2.92 2.71 +0.21 Opgtina League of Comnunists 2.66 2.73 -0.07 Members of Opstina Assembly 2.4l 3.55 -l.l4 Enterprises 2.32 2.9l -O.59 Opstina Socialist Alliance 2.28 2.79 -O.5l Opstina Trade Unions 2.01 2.72 -O.7l Voter Meetings l.86 3.49 -l.63 Voluntary Societies l.54 2.3l -l.77 aSee Petar Jambrek, "Kdo OdloEa v Slovenskih Obtinab." Pravnik 27 (Ljubljana l972): 22-35. Two-hundred-fifty-six opstina assembly representatives from l6 opstina assemblies were asked the question, "How much influence in the opstina assembly in your opstina (should) have the following institutions on decision-making in your op tina?" Scores range from T through 9 where: l = very little influence; 2==little influence; 3 = great influence; 4 = very great influence. 72 .mmzmmH Aowpoa cmgowpmm Lm>o mcowueNecmmeo «crumao maowce> co wucwapecH wmmcm>< mo :ameo--.~.m oezmpm muw>cmm Pw>wu McPuMao 1. l. apnsmmmm mcwmeo we» we sumumgomm xpnsmmme nevquo on» to acvamwea 4. +. apaemmme ocwmeo 1T11+l "aux acme Lopumcwo pcmuwmmea inopm>ma Agogucm we co mFoosom to :e_¢ mo cope ummc:m cowuumpm compumpm mcwucmcwu mcwmzo: wavmeo acrmeo o 304 m cam: mucm:_mcm co cumcmgum ,r-u ' 73 in the commune. Other organizations may help select both opstina assem- bly members and the president of the ops'tina assembly or they may exert influence over both these bodies in other indirect ways. 3. Political Processes in the Commune The third step in this section is to define the context of the decision-making process in the Yugoslav conmune. We wish to define the various aspects of the decision-making process. This means simply that we need to operationalize the concepts of decentralization, participa- tion and bureaucratism/professionalism in the commune. The extent of decentralization in the commune is largely meas- ured through the importance and prevalence of an organization called the "mesna zajednica" which can be translated as "the local conmunity." With the constitutional changes the place and role of the "mesna zajednica" changed fundamentally. The "mesna zajednica" is a result of the decentralization of government decision-making which is necessary for the development of self-management. With the extension of the responsibilities of the opgtina at the expense of the large social-political communities, the possi- bilities appeared for part of the responsibilities to be dele- gated to the still narrower community inside the opstina. With the formation of the mesna zajednica the organs of the opstina were lggerated from the worries about the needs of local settle- ments. The mesna zajednica is a local level political organization somewhat similar in size to the U. S. precinct. The mesna zajednica may be delegated responsibilities for the maintenance of day care centers, 70 Each sport centers, meeting halls, libraries, road maintenance. etc. mesna zajednica has an executive council which considers a large number of local questions. 74 A good measure of the degree to which decentralization has been accomplished in the commune can be the extent to which the mesna zajednica is important and does engage in local community affairs.71 This is one of the important factors in determining how public policy decisions are reached.72 The problem of participation is the second aspect of decision— naking that must be examined and defined in the context of the Yugoslav comnune. Since voting turnout is not an accurate measure of participa- tion in a one-party state, alternative measures must be employed. RomaniE73 lists several alternative measures of participation including participation in socio-political organizations, polls, referenda, town hall meetings, etc. One of the best alternatives for measuring participation is to 74 or at least the number of town- examine turnout at town hall meetings. hall meetings called. These meetings are called by the mesna zajednica's executive council to inform citizens about community problems, vote on referenda, discuss general problems and nominate mesna zajednica and opstina public officers.75 One of the interesting features of the town- hall meetings is that there is considerable variation among opstinas in the degree to which they rely upon them.76 Professionalism is relatively easy to measure. Yugoslav author— ities are very conscious that industrial and agricultural workers should 77 be widely represented on decision-making bodies, and that their absence is a reflection of a high degree of bureaucratism/professionalism within op 9‘ .1: bl- t..:. 1v“- pm... .I 47" r» n}, Tie Eli ol- 75 78 79 the commune, a feature contrary to the principles of self-management. The extent of professional-managerial representation in decision-making bodies does vary from commune to commune. C. Political Structure as a Factor in the Policy-Making Process The third section of this chapter empirically tests several hypotheses about the relevance of the political structure to public policies and the decision-making process. We are concerned with answer- ing, at least partially, the following questions: --Is there variance among communal governments in their formal political structure? --Is this variance, if any, linked to the socio-economic characteristics of the commune? --Is this variance, if any, helpful in explaining public policies and the decision-making process within the commune? The answers to these questions are clearly significant for the first step of the model that encompasses political structural characteristics. 14* Is There Variance? Since socialist systems are considered to be highly centralized, American scholars usually assume that the formal political structure of the local units within them is essentially standardized throughout 80 in his comparison of conmunist urban systems states that these systems suffer from a lack of autonomy. Hough8] in a the country. Frolic reply to Frolic argues that even though autonomy is limited, communist system local authorities have considerable power to intervene in nearly Dr ‘I L." 76 every aspect of urban life. In these studies, as well as others.82an assumption (stated or unstated) is made that there is little or no mean- ingful variation among communist urban governments in terms of their f0rmal political structure, or that variation which occurs is simply an exception made to accommodate some specific circumstances.83 This assumption needs examination. If variance does occur, it will be important to determine what effect, if any, that variance may have upon political decision-making. Two behavioral characteristics of the political system of Yugo- slavia encouraged me to examine more closely this assumption. One is the constant emphasis of Yugoslav ideology on the value of decentraliza- tion and the establishment of local autonomy. A second characteristic is the continuous appearance of conflict within local governments. This conflict has variously been attributed to an overly ambitious execu-‘ 86 In tive,84 to a weak executive,85 or to a powerful local bureaucracy. nearly all these cases attempts were made afterwards to amend the com- nunal charters to prevent similar occurrences in the future. I examined the communal charters of a sample of communes in order to examine the possibility that local political structural varia- tion occurs in Yugoslavia. Fifty-one communal charters were read and coded. All the communes were in Serbia and members of several strong regional associations. This reduces the possibility of republic factors being responsible for the variance.87 (See Appendix A for a list of the communes included in this sample.) 77 Three separate indices were constructed. One index measures the degree of the formal executive_power in the commune. The index includes such factors as limitations on the ability of the executive to discuss issues, to call meetings, to make decisions without legislative approval, and to select staff. It is generated by summing the scores of twelve items relating to the power of the executive. (See Appendix B for a list of the items included and scores associated with each item.) A high score on the executive power index indicates that the executive council and president of the opgtina assembly have relatively more formal powers and protection than is the case in other communes. The executive power scores in the SI sample communes ranged from l to 14. The second index considered is the bureaucratism/professionalism jmggm. This index is composed of the sum of eleven individual items discussed in the opstina charter. It includes such items as number of paid positions, extent of job protection, existence of reelection pro- hibitions, and types of collective decision-making bodies, etc. (See Appendix B for a complete list and explanation.) Bureaucratism/pro- fessionalism index scores ranged from 6 to 13. A high score on this index indicates that the formal political structure encourages bureau- cratic patterns of behavior. A third index which was developed from the communal charter is entitled the legislative index of worker control. This index measures the extent to which the legislature has control over policy formation in the commune and the extent to which the chamber of workers within 78 the opstina assembly has a dominant position within the assembly. The legislative-worker control index is composed of ten items. (See Appen- dix B for a complete list and explanation.) The index includes such characteristics as the extent of control of fiscal issues held by the chamber of workers, prevalence of joint sessions, the extent of control over general community issues, the existence of veto power over the appointment of executive and officers. Actual scores on this index ranged from 4 to l9. A high score indicates greater relative power in the hands of the legislature, especially the chamber of workers. In the Yugoslav theoretical context, these three indices are very useful. They are, in effect, operational measures of the extent of formal self-management within the Yugoslav commune. If political struc- ture does vary in Yugoslavia, we would expect these indices to be the most important measures of the differences in the formal political sys- tem. If relatively little variation in scores is found, we have strong reasons to infer that formal local autonomy (i.e., the right of the commune to formulate its own political system) is lacking. As is clear from the coefficient of variation measure in Table 3.4, variance does exist, especially in the executive power index. All the indices, seem to have captured some variation among Yugoslav local governments in terms of political structure. The distributions Of all the indices are skewed slightly to the left which indicates that a small group of communes may have relatively high scores. This can imply one of two things: one, that the central political system provides 79 Pm u z Pam.- MNN. _.m e.m_ o.e o.mp Poceeoo .mcexcez mee.- em_. a._ m.m o.e o.m_ smt_eeeemmoceca u_umeu=mwe=m ece.- mum. e.m ~.m o._ o.ep Loses o>ee=ooxm cowumwee> to cowpmw>wo mapm> mzpm> mmmczmxm acmwuwemwoo uemncmpm new: Easwcwz Esewxmz xmvcm .eem_ .meoeeea Fmgzpusepm ~mowuw—om so» mwezmemz Fauwpmppmpm >guEE=mti.¢.m u4m ff? LI’ 99 83David T. Cattell, Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government (New York: Praeger, 1968). ',84"Koreni Neslaganje," Politika 6 (January 14. 1974) and "Izglacano Poverenje Sekretaru Op§tina," Borba 8 (March 2, 1974). 85HJacanje MoEi Izvrsnih Odbora Kao Vlasti u Opstinama," Borba (April 8. 1975): 5. 86"Polititfka MoE Ostinskih Vlada," Borba (May 11. 1975): 5. 87Serbia is a good selection for this type of analysis since it is the largest republic in the country and has the widest spread in terms of socio-economic characteristics. Also the communes in Serbia are well organized through the republic Secretariat for Public Manage- ment. This would tend to reduce political-structural variation among opstinas. If significant variation occurs in these Serbian communes, we can be more confident that variation will occur within other repub- lics as well. 881 also examined the scatter plots of the combination of these variables to determine if possibly some extreme cases would account for the relatively high coefficients. The visual inspection of the scatter plots did not reveal any such discrepancies. Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that the correlation coefficients are meaningful. 89Miroslav Petujlié, Studjja iz Politicke Sociologije i Socijalna épruktura i Promene Polititkih Institucijp_(Beograd: Visoka Institucija kola Politigkih Nauka, 1965). 90Rado§ Smiljkovié, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisahja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969). 9lInstitut za Drustvena Istraiivanja, Jugoslavenska Komuna - Teritoriji Razvijenost i Samoupravljphje u prini (Zagreb: Svevcilista u Zagrebu, 1972). 92Petar Jambrek, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav CommuneJ'(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971 , p. 14. 93The index of fragmentation is computed by the following formula: N Fragmentation = 1 -.2 fi 2 (-—1 1-1 N 1198' 100 the total population the population for each nationality. where: N fi The index varies from O to 1 where 0 indicates no fragmentation. Eight nationalities were used: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim/Turkish, Yugoslav, and the largest other nationaltiy in each commune. See Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), for a nore complete description of the measure. 94Most people do not claim Yugoslav nationality. When it is claimed, it is usually a sign that an individual perceives himself so well integrated into the Yugoslav federal structure that he cannot or does not wish to identify with any specific nationality. 95For women, see "Nedovoljno ucesce Zena u Odlubivanju," ' Komunist (July 14, 1975): 16; for youth, see Borislav Dfuverovic, "Omladina i Dru§tveno-Politicki Sistem," Socijalizam 15 (1972): 580-589. 96This observation may be applicable outside Yugoslavia. Dis- cussion of legislative reform within the United States suggests that recruitment of highly trained and qualified personnel in state legis- latures can be facilitated by making the job more attractive. See, for example, Wilder Crane. Jr., and Meredith W. Watts, Jr., State Legisla- ture Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968)? 97Because of postal and other irregularities beyond my control, some data is missing. This accounts for possibly 15% of the total laws passed in 1974 by these communes. I am making the assumption that the losses contribute to random error. CHAPTER IV SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING This chapter examines the effect that socio-political organiza- tions may have upon the general model introduced in Chapter II. From the literature review in that chapter we would expect that socio- political organizations would have a strong moderating effect on other variables in the model, especially decision-making processes. In other words, since socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia are given very definite roles in the policy-making process and are expected to inter- vene systematically in that process, they may tend to encourage some policies and discourage others. This chapter examines the formal role of particular socio-political organizations, and how the socio-political organizations perform the function of intervention. It also examines the degree of influence that socio-political organizations have in the commune and finally it examines the effect and biases that socio- political organizations have in the entire model of the policy process. Unlike previous and succeeding chapters, Chapter IV does not introduce any new data, but rather, utilizes the existing findings of Yugoslav researchers in the context determined by the model. For this reason, the conclusions reached here cannot be directly tested or 101 a" hi all (I) 102 incorporated into the model, but they are useful in putting the role of socio-political organizations into perspective and may suggest what type of bias may be introduced into the analysis of succeeding chapters. A. The Role of Socio-Political Organizations in the Commune Socio-poli ti cal organizations havea great practical and theor- etical importance in the Yugoslav commune. In Yugoslav society they serve two primary functions-~the socialization and direction of society. It is these functions that give the socio-political organizations a role in the policy process. The role of socio-political organization as a socializing force is primarily directed towards the integration of individuals into a community. It is geared to providing services unavailable elsewhere, providing education and information on activities of interest to its members, fostering group unity and a sense of belonging for the indi- vidual, etc. In a political sense, socio-political organizations socialize their members to accept and to work within the current poli- tical institutions and framework. They are the essential link between the policy output and the individual. Yugoslav socio-political organizations also perform a directive role for society. They aggregate citizen interests, provide alterna- tives and stimuli for change, encourage political participation and generally direct the path of political development within the state. The socio-political organizations provide the framework, discipline and goals for planned political development. In this sense r‘f Vi - a} ,1»: Di 103 socio-political organizations perform an essential function in a planned political system. Thus, it is possible for socio-political organiza- tions to influence the policy process. The local political roles of three separate Yugoslav socio- political organizations will be examined. These are: the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, and the League of Trade Unions. Each of these organizations serves a specific purpose and each socio- political organization theoretically performs its socializing and directive roles in a different social arena. Thus, excluding their influence from an analysis of the public Policy decision-making process may seriously bias our conclusions in succeeding chapters. 1. The Lepgue of Communists a. Doctrinal Role of the Communal League of Communists.--The role of the League of Communists in the commune in its widest sense is to promote the development of self-management in socio-political rela- tionships in the commune. The organization of the League of Communists in the opstina with its own directive ideological and political work is the basic initiator of the political activity of citizens for the protec- tion and further development of the heritage of the socialist social relationships and especially for the strengthening of the socialist consciousness of the working people and citizens. Since the status of self-management varies from commune to commune and changes constantly, and since the level of socio-economic development varies accordingly, we would expect that the internal structure, activity and behavior of the League of Communists would also change and adapt to its local environment.2 In other words, the Party . Q ‘1 f l v . In 104 is encouraged to adapt its behavior to new economic and social condi- tions.3 Every revolutionary vanguard if it wishes to remain the actual vanguard of society must change in accordance with the changes in the concrete and general condition of the struggle for Socialism. It must be qualitatively transformed; it must change its own organizatiogs, its position, and its activity towards changes in society. As a community develops, there is less need for the League of Communists to behave as the directive force among social and political groups in a commune,5 but a greater need to perform the serious role of integrating society as the commune develops more and more autonomous areas of decision-making.6 At all levels of development the Party is encouraged not only to mediate among different, often Opposing interests,7 but also to be the integrating factor of ideological cohesion as well.8 In practical terms, as the commune develops, the League of Communists takes less direct action and direct influence on specific policy outcomes;9 it becomes less of an authoritative social factor and works more within other groups, organizations and structures. In the context of a maturing and developing idea of self- management the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (i.e., the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) also changes its role; becomes oriented towards integration into the direct action of the working class as its most conscious and hardest working part.10 Thus, as a commune attains a higher level of socio-economic development, we would expect that the direct influence of the League of Communists as an organization would decline while its indirect influences through other organizations, the political structure, and mass media would correspondingly increase. 105 b. Structure of the Communal League of Communists.--The total nembership of the League of Communists in recent years (since 1971) has been growing rapidly and during the Tenth Party Congress in May, 1974, numbered 940,861,11 or more than 8% of the adult population. Of this total membership in 1974, 29.1% were classified workers and 5.6% peas- ants, percentages much smaller than their proportion of the total popu- lation. Since 1973 this social composition has been slowly and con- sciously altered to include more worker representation, thus reversing the trends of the past decade.13 The League of Communists is well organized in every commune and maintains a separate organizational framework in each. In 1974 there were 26,500 primary Party organizations, nearly twice the number regis- tered in 1968.15 Figure 4.1 provides a chart of the typical commune League of Communist organizational structure. Individuals are elected to the opstina conference as delegates from their primary Party organizations. The opgtina conference forms commissions to handle various specific tasks of the League in the com- mune. The opstina conference also selects an opgtina committee which becomes the executive arm for the Opgtina League of Communists. As in all other Communist Party organizations, Party affairs and discipline are managed on the principle of democratic centralism. c. General Influence and Activities of the Communal League of Communists.--The opgtina League of Communists is generally a very impor- tant factor in the comnune. It is often the chief rival for power to the 106 .aa .Aaea_ .oneeuoeo_mo ox wummm .mcp>ommuemz w memom azumume on» :o ummmme no>mnmcmmv mcw>ommuewz w mcmom mumwczsox m~o>mm mm; : emep=Eo¥ ~m>em e.tcp>ommuem:1m:mom opmwcaeox e~m>mm .mcmunao we“ mo Pm>m4 we» co mp>w—mom=> mo mumwcsseou to cameo; we» to pause _mcowpm~wcameo-u.P.¢ ocamwd mcoppm~wcmmco uwmmm meowue~_cemco awmmm . Axgouumwv Auocwumcuv «zoo cumcumnmN memo: memcpo cowmr>emn=m _mucmeoecou mcwumqo meowumwsa zgouzpmpm . “so; meowmmwssou .mmppwssoo m:_umao ucwummmea xuznmo acoummmea ummcaumeumm xgmumgumm xuanmo xgwumLoom 107 16 and is ranked as very influential in general politi- 17 communal assembly cal affairs in the commune by elected decision-makers. If political reality approaches defined doctrine we would expect that the League of Communists would adapt its behavior to the local situation. In particular, we would expect that the Party would exercise more influence in more poorly developed areas than in the more highly developed areas. The problem of influence, however, is a very difficult concept to operationalize. The measurement of the concept rests upon the validity of such assumptions as who the decision-makers are, where the decisions are made, what are the crucial decisions, and the knowl- edge of the respondents. In general, there is no fixed procedure to assure the validity of any single measure of influence. In this respect the findings of socio-political organization influence may be inaccurate or misleading. We would also expect that the measurements of influence would tend to reflect less influence of the socio-political organiza- tions than actually exists since the expectations of the organization's influence are high and failure to meet these high expectations would be overcompensated for in the measures. In addition, since the socio- political organizations can exercise influence in indirect ways, this additional influence may not be reflected in the measures of influence. The activities of the communal League of Conmunists vary over 18 a wide range. They can include anti-inflation programs, mediation ‘9 devising development pro- and educational reform,22 as well as for the commune with republic agencies, grams,20 opstina housing policy.21 more traditional activities including op§tina nominations, elections and debate over the distribution of public functions. 108 No single issue has absorbed the majority of the effort of the Party. A content analysis of the minutes of thirteen Slovenian op‘sftina committees for a period of one year (from September, 1963, through August, 1974) reveals that the decisions made by the opstina committee Of the League of Communists were fairly well distributed over four major issue areas. (See Table 4.1.) It appears that the sc0pe of Party influence or involvement is quite wide. TABLE 4.1.--Decisions Made by Op§tina Party Committees in Four Major Issue Areas. Issue Areas Percent of Decisions Internal Organization of the Party 47.0 Economy and Individual Enterprises 29.5 Public Services and Agencies 10.2 Local Government and Political Organizations 13.3 100.0 SOURCE: "Gradivo iz Raziskav gestav Vsebina Del in V1 ga ZKS v Pogojih Druibenega Samoupravljanja" III (Ljubljana: Visoka kola za Polititne Vede v Ljubljani, 1964), p. 26, quoted in Petar Jambrak, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Com- mune" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago, 1971). Even though the opgtina League of Communists may be well organ- ized and active in the commune, its authority is not unlimited. In many cases the opstina organization of the Party does not have a clear, con- crete and coherent plan of direct social action, thereby being somewhat 23 ineffectual. In some cases decisions were adopted by administrative or factory authorities that actually were opposed by the League.24 109 The capacity of the Party to influence individuals in the com- mune is also apparently limited. The personal reputation of the League and its members is sometimes weak. It is sometimes the case that people join the League of Communists for personal material gain and that the reputation of the League suffers as a result of this phenomenon. A poll conducted in the opstina of Cabak in Serbia in 1965 revealed that members of the League of Communists received numerous privileges as members and were resented for it. (See Table 4.2.) A similar study conducted in Belgrade in 1967 found that 59% of those polled felt that neny communists sometimes or often used the fact of their membership to promote their personal goals. Only 17% of the sample felt that commu- 25 This nists rarely or never misused their membership in this manner. weakness in the reputation of the League may imply that the ability of the League to influence citizens, at least by moral suasion, is some- what limited. Another indication of the limits of the influence of the League of Communists is the fact that many citizens do not highly value mem- bership in the Party and would refuse it if offered. In 1973 in a sample survey of 1435 respondents conducted in Zagreb, 899 or 63% of all respondents expressed a desire not to join the League of Communists if membership was offered to them.26 A similar, but nationwide, study conducted in 1966 also revealed a large group of citizens who would not accept Party membership if offered.27 Reasons for refusal of membership vary, but do not seem to be more strongly related to organizational and personal factors than 110 .um ”Amo¢F .ozooz zeznoo__oo o_ozm1ozooe> ”oocooomvlooeooo_ooeo zoxwoeepoo oeoEoco e ocoozocom oe_oozoom H ”oozmozoooom ozwwozzoo Ne ozoooom .oez_oooo sopooc_z ea oooooo .Aozooz zezweoo_oo o_ozw ozoopz .ooz ozoooEopoeo .oocooomv ==zoow o mm o oeoz_co ozeoo_oo= .oooo_o>oz sopoocez "mozzom om mm oz om a, mu Pm oz oeoEooeo>o< No om _o oo mm Po om aoz Poooeo_oa am we mm mm mm mm mm oz mooceeom mo am No oo mm _o Pm mo» .oeo_eoo=om om mo om mo ~m oo om oz ooaeocooz oo No mm mm on a mo mo» eo oee>eoooz oo so om oo _m No om oz esoooH mm on ma Fe om om No 3oz _oeoocoo ocoz mm mm P_ m_ mp mg mp oz eooooooooz ON on mm _m om om me we» ow oooocooa mLm m mew Em 95 E 98 E mam mew Em a mac“ n 2 mom“ a m: mum“ a z — “oh no» muznzepcou cop_oo oo_zz mcmxcoz zucoo oz» =_ oozocooEoz mooo .zooo . zv moooocao ea moo_ o_ zo mpmw:=EEoo to waaomz beg to mcmaEmz co mmmwFW>zeo new co_uou:qmm ecu paoa< mcop wm we _QO11.N.v m4mo_mo an aempmwm Eozwwuz_oa a ~m>am wapum__m.zuom .wz>oz:> onPFH m o.mucozpz< pmppowoom wcppmno mew we usage chozua~wcmmc011.~.¢ mezmwu 111111111. Lease: 117 emguo .u . emcpo .u mmcm m .o . upsocoo .u mcozuumpm .a mucweomcou we=u_:w .o mczuocwueoou .o Paco; meowpmmao eppomztozoom .o Aucmcoeemav mmmuuwesoo Azyocanmuv mcompuom mucwomecou oczywno mmppzesou m>zp=omxm oeoowooco 118 36 prefers to work through the communal assembly whenever possible and often drafts programs of action that the communal assembly is pressured to adopt.37 The communal assembly, however, is not required to and in practice often does not accept these plans.38 The importance of the communal Socialist Alliance, as in the case of the League of Communists, varies from commune to commune depend- ing upon the level of development. We expect this to be the case since the need for formal interest articulation would tend to be unfilled in underdeveloped communes. A national study of elected op§tina leaders f0und a strong negative relationship (-.584) between an increase in the level of economic development and the perceived activity of the Socialist 39 Alliance. In other words, the Socialist Alliance was perceived to be less influential in more highly developed areas. A Bosnian study found that the Socialist Alliance was able to mobilize citizens more effec- 4O tively as the commune became less urban, and a Croatian survey found that the perceived influence of the Socialist Alliance was less in urban 41 areas than in rural areas. (See Table 4.6.) TABLE 4.6.--Perceived Influence of the Socialist Alliance in Croatia by Type of Settlement in 1970 in Percents. Influence of the Socialist Alliance Rural Urban Total Too Much Influence 2.7 3.5 3.0 Too Little Influence 13.1 21.1 16.0 As Much As Necessary 28.3 24.1 26.8 Don't Know 46.0 38.0 43.1 No Answer 9.9 13.3 11.2 119 Again the problem of validity may result from an interpretation of these findings. It is quite possible, for example. that the level of influence across areas is the same but that the urban residents may expect the Socialist Alliance to be more involved in more activities and to a greater extent. Thus, objectively the Socialist Alliance may be exercising the same degree of influence across types of settlements but may be perceived to be weaker in the urban, more developed areas. This question of validity coupled with the others mentioned earlier suggest that our findings about influence in the Socialist Alliance may be a conservative estimate and the actual influence which exists may actually be more pronounced. In summary, the studies of the behavior and influence of the Socialist Alliance suggest that the Socialist Alliance is important but does not dominate the politics of the commune. It also appears that the Socialist Alliance is perceived to be stronger in less developed communes. As was the case for the Party the elimination of this organi- zational variable from the general test of the model may affect our con- clusions and bias our results. 3. League of Trade Unions The Yugoslav League of Trade Unions performs a socio-political role similar to the Socialist Alliance but for a more narrow clientele and for a more narrow range of concerns. Formally, the trade unions are immediately concerned with expressing the needs of non-private agricultural workers on thejob and outside it. In general, the League 120 provides social benefits ranging from housing to vacation benefits, and it socializes its members to the political and social norms of a self- managed society. It also provides an organizational focus to which the frustrations of its members can be directed. As in the case of the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions have a very defined set of responsibilites in the commune.42 Like the Social- ist Alliance, the League of Trade Unions works with the communal assembly, participates in the elections of delegates to the assembly and becomes involved in the public expenditure policies of the commune. The trade unions, again like the Socialist Alliance, operate as a mediator or channel between the communal assembly and the membership of the trade unions. a. Communal Structure of the Leagye of Trade Unions.--The total 43 membership of the League of Trade Unions was 3,911,188 in 1973 and it is divided into six primary groups, although the total number of unions may be much higher than that in some republics. The unions are organ- ized on an industrial basis so that all the employees of one industry, regardless of actual occupation, belong to the same union. The communal level leadership, however, has recently become heavily weighted with blue collar workers, nearly 70% of the total in Serbia.44 Within a conmune, each individual union that is represented joins together into an amalgamated communal trade union organization. The details of this organizational structure vary from republic to republic but it generally has the pattern illustrated in Figure 4.3. 121 President Executive Committee Assembly of Trade Unions Committee a. Housing b. Work Conditions 0. Other Trade Union Trade Union Council B Council A Work Unit B Work Unit A Figure 4.3.--Organizational Chart of the Opgtina League of Trade Unions. The communal structure of the trade unions parallels the struc- ture of the Socialist Alliance in many ways. Also, many of the commit- tees formed by the trade unions meet jointly with similar committees in the Socialist Alliance, and the executive committees of both organiza- tions often meet together and issue joint resolutions about various community problems. 0. Influence and Activities of the Communal League of Trade Unions.--Like the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions are involved in a large number of programs in the commune ranging from wage equaliza- 46 thnflsandanti-inflation programs to housing policy and vacations for its members. The unions are also involved in raising the standard of 47 48 living and mediating conflict situations. 122 The perceived influence of the trade unions over the resolution of problems is relatively weak. For example, in a poll of 35,000 mem- bers, 16% wanted to withdraw from the trade union49 and, in fact, the number of workers who are members is constantly declining. In a poll of the membership on the question of how much influence the trade union organization has in the work organization and how much influence it should have over certain problems, it was found that, in general, the trade union was more influential in those problems not highly valued by the workers. (See Table 4.7.) In a separate study even the direc- tors of enterprises were found to be more influential than the trade unions.50 TABLE 4.7.--Rank in Importance of Perceived and Desired Influence of the Trade Union in Dealing with Various Problems. 1221.21.39”: 1121.21.28in Business Policy 6 7 Investment 9 9 Distribution of Income 7 5 Use of Consumption Funds 2 4 Employment 8 3 Determining Work Norms 3 10 Accepting Work 5 6 Rejecting Work 4 1 Distribution of Apartments 10 2 Organizing Vacations 1 8 SOURCE: Mira Krizmanié, “Sindikat u Radnoj Organizaciji,“ 25_Kulturni Radnik (1972): 9. This was a stratified sample of 303 workers conducted in Croatia in 1971. 123 Just as for both the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance. the influence of the trade union in the commune declines as the commune becomes more developed. Table 4.8 provides correlation coefficients from the Slovenian study cited earlier examining the relationship between the perceived influence of the Trade Union in the commune and the level of development of the commune. (See Table 4.8.) TABLE 4.8.--Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Economic Devel- Opment and the Influence of the Trade Union for Two Sloven- ian Opgtina Leadership Samples.a Measures Op§tina Assembly Opgtina Socio-Political Member Correlation Leadership Correlation Urbanization -.364 -.268 Economic Wealth -.205 -.459 Transportation Network -.231 -.475 aPetar Jambrek, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Commune" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971). p. 225. While the strength of the coefficients is not large, they are in the expected direction and consistent with the findings for the other socio-political organizations. These findings seem to indicate that again perceived influence of socio-political organizations by conmunal leadersis.inversely related to the level of economic development. Again, as explained earlier, these measures do suffer from the validity problems of determining actual influence as opposed to perceived ‘ 124 influence, identifying decision-makers and isolating the process and locus of decision-making. A major reason for the relative weakness of the communal trade union organization is that the trade union has not been able to develop independently of both the Socialist Alliance and the League of Commu- nists. In fact, in Bosnia in 1970, 56% of the 120 presidents of communal assemblies of trade unions replied in a poll that the communal committee of the League of Communists and not the trade union organization was responsible for initiating their candidacies.5] In summary, the trade unions have limited influence over commu- nal policies and the policy-making process, but as was the case for the other socio-political organizations, the influence appears to be per- ceived as more influential in less developed communes. Because of the question of validity we expect that the actual influence of the trade unions and other socio-political organizations is actually higher than recorded by the measures. We also expect, since trade unions do have some influence, that the elimination of trade union influence from the general test of the model would bias our conclusions and results. 4. Combined Influence of the Socio- Political Organizations It is important to note that while we have examined the role, structure and influence of socio-political organizations separately, we should not neglect the combined or joint influence of these organiza- tions. It is important to determine whether or not a strict compart- nentalization policy is used in which socio-political organizations neither compete nor cooperate with each other. 125 In general, the evidence seems to suggest that the influence of socio-political organizations varies similarly across policy issues. According to Jambrek's leadership study cited earlier,52 the socio- political organizations tend to be weak or influential in nearly identi- cal patterns. The correlation coefficients between the influence of the Socialist Alliance and Trade Unions are .886 and .769 respectively. The coefficient between the perceived influence of the Socialist Alliance and the trade unions in .904. In other words, the patterns of influ- ence these socio-political organizations have, varies almost identically across communes. A strict compartmentalization of issues has not been adopted. This finding is independently confirmed from the results of a sample of active Slovenian citizens who were asked to evaluate the influ- ence of various groups and organizations on decision-making in the commune. Virtually no meaningful difference exists between the influence of the League of Communists and the influence patterns of the other socio-political organizations grouped together. (See Table 4.9.) The pattern of influence of socio-political organizations on various issues is also very similar. Jerovsek53 ir1 a study cited earlier noted that in the Slovenian communes selected, the socio- political organizations varied together across issues consistently. Finally, the degree to which communal political leaders seek support from specific socio-political organizations does not vary greatly from 54 We can reasonably infer, therefore, organization to organization. that socio-political organizations tend to follow a cooperative policy with each other. 126 TABLE 4.9.--Influence of the Socio-Political Organizations an the League of Communists on Decision-Making in the Opstina in Percents.a Organizations Influence Socio-Political League of Organizations Communists None 1.1 2.0 Little 8.3 11.7 Average 29.4 26.8 Great 23.1 21.0 Very Great 6.4 6.8 Don't Know 36.7 31.7 aN.To'g,$10vensko Javno Mnenje 1968 (Ljubljana. Visoka Skola za Sociologija Politign—e Vede in Novinarstvo, 1968), p.34. The tendency of socio-political organizations to follow a coop- erative strategy in their dealings with each other is strengthened by their leadership recruitment policies. Generally, elected leaders of socio-political organizations cannot succeed themselves in office or are limited to no more than two terms. A large part of the leadership cadre, therefore, would seek an elected position in some other socio- political organization in order to improve their chances for upward mobility. In fact, it is unlikely for a career individual in a socio- political organization not to have served outside that organization, as was indicated by a survey of elected officials in Bosnia.55 In general, it cannot be assumed that socio-political organiza-‘ tions cancel each other out and leave the policy process unaffected. 127 Thus we can expect that the elimination of these organizational varia- bles will have an impact on the general test of the model in succeeding chapters. 8. Influence of Socio-Political Organizations on Specific Commune Policies A problem with examining general patterns of influence is that a group or organization may be perceived to be as generally influential but lacks specific control over specific policy decisions. In order to examine this possibility the second section of this chapter will examine the influence of socio-political organizations on the specific distribu- tive and integrative policies of the commune as measured by influence on budgetary expenditures and influence on the electoral process in the conmune. The role of the socio-political organizations may be direct or it may be exercised indirectly through the communal assembly members and the communal assembly president. The socio-political organization could participate as a buffer or mediator between the communal assembly and the citizens or as an independent articulator of its own interests. This section will examine these questions in order to pinpoint more exactly the nature of the role of the socio-political organizations in policy-making. 1;» Distributive Policy-- BudgetaryAllocations The socio-political organizations have wide discretion and responsibilities in the formation of the communal public policies in the distributive arena. At various times they discuss distributive problems, 128 formulate proposals, and pressure the communal assembly to accept them, and these activities are considered one of their primary activities.56 If socio-political organizations are found to possess influence over these Specific activities then the elimination of them as a variable in the general model may affect the conclusion and results of succeeding chapters. Socio-political organizations actively participate in the agenda setting process in the communal assembly. In Zagreb, for example, a surprisingly large number of proposals considered by the communal assembly were originally prepared and submitted by the socio-political organizations. (See Table 4.10.) In this case only the administrative departments of the commune have more input into the program and agenda of the communal assembly. TABLE 4.lO.--Institutions Participating in Forming the Program of the Zagreb Opgtina Assembly, l969.a Proposals Percent 0’93"lzatl°" Submitted of Totals Working Organizations 28 14.3 Socio-Political Organizations 44 22.5 Committees of OpStina Assembly 0 0.0 Local Communisties and Voter Assemblies 24 12.2 Op§tina Administrative Bureaus 70 35.7 Other Social Factors _§Q_ _l§;§_ TOTAL 196 100.0 aSkupS'tina Grada Zagreba, Aktuelna Pitanja Komunalnog Sistema u Gradu Zagrgbu (Zagreb: VeljaEa, 1971), p. 146. 129 When specific policies are examined, the socio-political organi- zations have considerable direct influence on nearly every important issue before the communal assenbly. Figure 4.4 illustrates the direct influence of these socio-political organizations across several impor- tant communal policies. These results are again based upon the commu- nal elected leadership survey and have the same problems of validity of measurement. For all the distributive policies listed in Figure 4.4, the socio-political organizations have rather strong and consistent influence on policies although their direct influence individually is less than that attributed to the communal assembly. Figure 4.4 also illustrates that the socio-political organiza- tions can wield indirect as well as direct influence on public policy. In general, the socio-political organizations may have a considerable amount of indirect influence over the communal president due to their strong influence over his selection. The strength of this indirect influence over the commune presi- dent as well aS over the communal assembly can be readily identified. For example, in a series of open conflicts which occurred between the commune president and assemblies against the socio-political organiza- tions, the socio-political organizations almost always gained the upper hand.57 Even recently in Cadak, a commune in Serbia, the President of the communal assembly, the commune secretary and five deputies to the communal assembly were forced to resign from office after an open con- frontation with the communal committee of the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance.58 130 .mmzuw_oo oczquo “copeoasH umpumzww co meowuo~zcmmco FonszFoa1ozuom men do mocw3_mcm11.¢.¢ meamwm mcomca moose mo ucmuwmwea .411119. mucowpz< um_—mpuom we ucwuwmmea apasmmm< enzymes Home gouumewo ucmvpmmea m—oogum 1ao_m>mo zgopuou eo mo mo :o_o co co_o ummuam cowuumpm compumpm unwound m:_m=o: o:_pMQo eczemao “1 “(1 01 )1 JDJL 7%? If: V. ‘/ n / mummczssou mo mzmomz oca mo zeouoeumm 1Jlidiie 141'! ”aux o :3 m cow: mucmspwcz mo cpmcmeum 131 Interestingly, general conflict among socio-political organiza- tions, citizens, and the communal assemblies about the distribution of public services in the commune is the exception and not the rule. This seems to be a result of the general agreement among citizens, socio- political organizations and the communal assembly members about the priorities for the investment of public funds. Table 4.11 compares the distribution of communal priorities as seen by various groups in a nationwide survey conducted in 1964. A chi square test executed on several relevant pairs of groups indicated no statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses.59 (See Table 4.11.) From this data, however, we cannot infer that a single group is responsible for the agreement nor can we identify that group. A separate study conducted among a sample of communes in Croatia also confirmed a uni- formly high level of agreement among the opinions of citizens, the communal assembly and the Socialist Alliance about the priorities for budgeting within the commune.60 A possible explanation for this apparent agreement about budget- ary allotments in the commune rests with the integrating role of the socio-political organizations that help articulate citizen demands and present them to the communal assembly. A Croatian survey of 17 conlnunes seems to substantiate this hypothesis by noting that citizens tend to choose socio-political organizations as being the most effective way of influencing budgetary policy in the commune. 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