LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY
DECISION-MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

By

James Henry Seroka

I have organized this dissertation to explain variation in local public policies and the public policy process, and have begun from the premise that local political variation exists and is important in Yugoslavia. It was my intent to contribute a detailed empirical study to the comparative local literature and to incorporate local research about a communist state with research about western societies.

The central focus of this work has been that local public policies and the public policy decision-making processes change radically across levels of economic development. The major hypotheses were that as a local unit becomes more developed, the political decision-making variables become more and more important, less variance in these variables occurs, more innovation results, and there tends to be a greater per capita level of public policy expenditures. The actual relationships observed, however, were not so straightforward or simple.

To test these hypotheses I constructed a general model, which incorporated theoretical hypotheses and research results from the fields of political development, public administration, and public policy analysis. Through the use of Kornhauser's typology on societal

differentiation, the general model became applicable to the Yugoslav political experience. The general model stressed that public policies result from the combined effect of economic variables, social characteristics, political structure, socio-political organizations, and the decision-making processes. The bulk of the dissertation examined the interaction of these variables with each other, and their combined and separate impact upon public policies. I examined three types of public policies: symbolic, distributive, and redistributive, and I used general econometric statistical techniques to explain their variation.

In general, the results indicate that the public policy process is much more complex than I initially expected. However, several specific observations can be made.

1. Yugoslav local government is relatively autonomous;
2. Local Yugoslav socio-political organizations are responsible for aggregating and moderating citizen interests;
3. As communes reach a higher level of development, there is a decline in the importance of socio-political organizations;
4. The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is distinct from socio-economic characteristics and is very complex;
5. The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is instrumental in the final public policy decision;
6. Republic authority over the political decision-making process and public policies is generally weak or vacillating;
7. The level of economic development alters the process of formulating policy decisions.

LOCAL PUBLIC POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN YUGOSLAVIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

By

James Henry Seroka

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To: Ki

za njeno strpljenje i pomoč

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In the final analysis, I owe the most to my wife, Ki, who patiently typed the first drafts of this dissertation, followed me to strange lands, learned to tolerate the finer points of Balkan life, and who endured many years of financial distress so we could place three simple letters after this name.

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PREFACE

I would like to begin by explicitly stating my sentiments about outside interference in the social system and internal affairs of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav system of "samoupravljanje" (self-management) permeates nearly everything that happens in the country today. Like any social system, it has its weaknesses, strengths, contradictions, and advantages. Personally, I found Yugoslav self-management at times to be frustrating and almost irrational, but it does seem to work for the Yugoslav people. Yugoslav self-management is a notable social experiment, an experiment which should be allowed to develop free of interference from other outside forces.

In years past the study of Yugoslav politics in the United States reflected the state of fraticidal conflict, misunderstanding and tensions as they existed in Yugoslavia. In recent years, however, these conflicts have subsided in Yugoslavia itself, but they have lived on in much of the literature on that subject. This dissertation is written, therefore, with the intent of providing an objective, dispassionate and fair treatment of a neglected sector of contemporary Yugoslav politics.

This research is based upon two points which are given careful scrutiny throughout the disseration. One point is that local level politics in a one-party state can be unregimented, semi-autonomous and

meaningful to its citizens. The second point is that American political science and Yugoslav political theory are not inherently mutually antagonistic towards each other, and may in some vital ways mutually support and complement each other's view of the political world.

The basic plan of this dissertation is quite simple. The first chapter lists some of the methodological and substantive concerns and limitations of the study. Chapter II provides a model for examining local political processes and public policies along with a rationale for forming that model. Chapter III looks at how political structural variables operate within the model, while Chapter IV performs the same function for socio-political organizations. Chapter V examines how the model affects the decision-making process, and Chapter VI analyzes how public policy decisions are actually arrived at. The conclusions and interpretations are provided in Chapter VII.

The data and much of the literature review were collected during 1973-1974 while I was in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Nearly all sources are public information although many of them are not available in the United States. The judgments of many Yugoslav economists, statisticians, local political leaders, public administrators, and professors with whom I met were also incorporated into the study.

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The dissertation examines selected locally-based public policies and the decision-making processes leading to these policies in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. My major thesis is that local public policies and the public policy decision-making processes change radically across levels of socio-economic development. In later chapters I formulate a specific model to help explain these policies and processes, and I examine the interactions of the sets of variables that are suggested by the model.

The fundamental premise of this work is that theoretically important variation exists in political behavior within nation-states.[1] This premise "allows us to use relationships within each country rather than a single characteristic of each country as the basic datum in cross-national analysis."[2] As such, reliance upon this premise permits a researcher to utilize more specified and complex models in his examination of political phenomena. Thus, the patterns of relationships drawn from data from a single country can be cross-nationally compared and can contribute to general comparative inquiry.[3]

A. Definition of the Subject

One of the most important political outputs which a political system can provide is its public policies. A public policy is "a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern," and it is public because it is developed by governmental bodies and officials.[4]

Public policies may be decisions or non-decisions[5] that determine governmental policy priorities or needs. These priorities/needs can be determined in either a statutory or fiscal manner by some governmental body. They become evident when guidelines are written, rules are set, or public funds are appropriated or collected. All policy activities aim at implementing some political goal; all are purposive; all are represented by some public policy decision.

This dissertation examines the policy outcomes as well as the processes leading to those outcomes on the local level. In general, the policy outcome and the decision-making process are intertwined; often the border between one and the other is indistinct.[6] Speaking metaphorically, the policy outcome can be considered a still life photograph of the ongoing policy process.

Three general types of public policy outcomes are examined: symbolic, distributive, and redistributive policies. Symbolic policies include different types of innovation policy decisions; distributive policies are limited to health and educational expenditures; and redistributive policies include various types of taxation decisions. I am interested in comparing and contrasting the behavior of the various

variables which are suggested by my general model upon these three types of policies.

B. Comparative Local Research Trends

Generally speaking, political science has not considered the comparative study of local public policies to be an area of vital interest.[7] Comparative local policy analysis is often considered pedestrian and not worthy of sustained and detailed attention.[8] Recently a growing body of literature that examines comparative local public policies has emerged.[9] Most of this literature centers on three substantive areas: community leadership studies, expenditure analysis, and policy process analysis.

Much of the community leadership research[10] is based upon Dahl's[11] or Hunter's[12] analyses of New Haven and Atlanta. These studies as well as others have tended to avoid many of the problems associated with the community power approach by limiting their inferences to the data itself. Among comparative community leadership studies, the International Study of Values in Politics project[13] has examined variation in the attitudes of local political leaders in four different countries. Unfortunately, the authors do not systematically relate the leadership values to actual policy decisions. Terry Clark's model of community decision-making[14] remedies the ISVIP's lack of policy relevance, and his precedent is followed up by Aiken and Alford's study of urban innovation in the United States.[15]

The second substantive contemporary area in comparative local public policy analysis is public expenditure analysis. Fried's study of Italian urban budgets[16] and of Swiss, Austrian and West German budjets,[17] along with Boaden's examination of British local expenditures[18] are very good examples of this type of comparative local research. Again, as in the case in the community decision approach, the research methods are borrowed from American state and local sources. Dawson and Robinson,[19] Hofferbert,[20] and Dye[21] are the outstanding examples of this approach in American state and local politics.

The third substantive area in comparative local public policy analysis is the examination of the public policy processes themselves, including analyses of such factors as decentralization, political participation, political parties.[22] This research area has expanded considerably but much more needs to be done. Kesselman and Rosenthal noted the relative weakness in this area and identified some crucial problem areas of the decision-making process which should be examined:

> We would argue that some of the most interesting questions for comparative local politics relate to such issues as the differential nature of societal mobilization, the variety of political structures employed to maintain local control, and different national and local styles of political conflict--matters not directly reflected in local budgetary data. . . ."[23]

Although interest in comparative local public policy research has expanded considerably, the research remains sparse and overly dependent on case studies of the structural bases of local government.[24] Much of the work which does exist is fragmented and does not contribute to general theory.

> If, so far, the impression has been conveyed that the proliferation of comparative urban research is an unmixed blessing, this should be promptly qualified. One obvious and discouraging consequence of this activity has been the extreme fragmentation of comparative work. . . . In short, there is no "field" of comparative urban studies as distinct from a disparate ensemble of disciplines, substantive concerns, methods, and theories that are unreliably classified under the reified category."[25]

In short, comparative local public policy analysis remains a neglected area and lacks a distinct focus in the discipline.

C. Importance of Comparative Local Public Policy Analysis

The first advantage of local public policy research is that it examines that level of government typically closest to the needs and demands of its citizens.[26] Local public policy decisions directly affect the individual, and it is at this level where most citizens have direct contact with their government.[27] Therefore, examination of local public policies and the processes through which these are formulated can provide important clues about the interrelationships between the citizen and government.

The second relative advantage is that local public policies can be easily compared. Local services and needs are relatively standard from local unit to unit within a political system even though the priority placed upon these services may vary.[28] The methodological implication of this point is that we can more readily employ nominal categorizations of public policies and be relatively certain that these categorizations have equivalent measures across local political units within the larger political system. The adoption of the local level as the

unit of analysis reduces the error caused by changes in the conceptual meaning of the policy categorizations.[29]

Third, local governmental units are commonplace. As a result, empirical tests of theories of the public policy decision-making process have more cases (a larger "n") and the probability of inferring false relationships based upon extreme cases from excessive aggregation of data is reduced.

D. Justification of the Test Site--Yugoslavia

While Yugoslav local government is the subject of this dissertation, the implications of this analysis are applicable to other countries as well. Yugoslavia is a good choice for a detailed analysis of local public policies and the decision-making process because the local Yugoslav political framework has considerable autonomy and wide variation in many political, economic and social characteristics. At the same time, Yugoslavia holds constant the effect of party competition, a variable which may have widespread confounding effects.

The effect of party competition on public policies is the subject of considerable but inconclusive debate. Studies in American state and local government have tried to establish a connection between the extent of party competition and various specific public policies. Beginning with V. O. Key's study of Southern politics,[30] American researchers have examined the proposed relationship. Key, Carminis,[31] and Morehouse[32] have concluded that there is a distinct relationship between party competition and public policies. Other scholars, notably Anton,[33] Cowart,[34] Dawson and Robinson,[35] and Dye[36] have found no

evidence for this relationship. A third group including Cnudde and McCrone,[37] Francis,[38] and Sharkansky[39] have noted that the strength of the party competition/policy relationship may vary according to the policy or region studied.

Comparative local public policy research parallels these findings. Fried's[40] and Tarrow's[41] work on parties in Italy found little or no relationship between party competition and public policies. Rigos' study of French local budgets[42] and Boaden's[43] and Ashford's[44] analyses of British local government found a stronger relationship but with nation-level limitations that reduced their generalizability.

Unfortunately, there is no consensus about the effect of party competition on public policies. We can conclude that party competition is a very difficult concept to measure. It may be more useful to compare local public policies within a nation-state that holds the level of party competition constant[45] and thus avoids the problem. Yugoslavia, a single party system, eliminates inter-party competition. While the role of the party may vary in Yugoslavia,[46] its primacy can never be challenged,[47] competing ideologies are never introduced into the political sphere,[48] and elections do not offer competing programs.[49] In other words, the lack of interparty competition in Yugoslavia will allow us to simplify our model.

Yugoslavia provides an additional advantage for an empirical examination of local comparative public policies. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a very diverse nation-state with six major languages, three distinct religious-cultural areas, various historical

traditions, considerable inequality in economic resources, social development and personal income. In other words, Yugoslavia has considerable variation in many of the determinants of public policies.[50]

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I

[1]Kryzstoff Ostrowski and Henry Teune, "Local Political Systems and General Social Processes," paper presented at the International Political Science Association meeting, Munich, 1970.

[2]International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 41.

[3]Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970).

[4]James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 3.

[5]Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review 57 (September, 1963): 632-642.

[6]Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971): 18-19.

[7]Bryan T. Downes and Timothy M. Hennessey, "Theory and Concept Formation in the Comparative Study of Urban Politics: Problems of Process and Change," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969.

[8]Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," Journal of Politics 30 (May, 1968): 510-538.

[9]For a good bibliography and literature review of current research in comparative public policy analysis, see: Francine F. Rabinovitz, "The Study of Urban Politics and the Politics of Urban Studies," Comparative Urban Research 6 (1975): 5-21; Michael Aiken, "Comparative Cross-National Research on Subnational Units in Western Europe," Journal of Comparative Administration (February, 1973): 437-471; and Michael Aiken, "A Preliminary Inventory of Machine-Readable Data on Urban and Other Sub-National Units in Western European Nations and the United States: Sources Located in the United States," Comparative Urban Research 3 (Summer, 1973): 9-42.

[10]For a survey of this literature in the comparative field, see: Mark Kesselman and Donald Rosenthal, Local Power and Comparative Politics (Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers, Series 01-049, vol. 5, 1974).

[11]Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

[12]Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

[13]International Studies of Values in Politics, op. cit.

[14]Terry N. Clark, "Citizen Values, Power, and Policy Outputs: A Model of Community Decision-Making," Journal of Comparative Administration (February 1973): 385-427.

[15]Michael Aiken and Robert Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation, Public Housing, Urban Renewal & the War on Poverty," in Comparative Community Politics, ed: Terry N. Clark (New York: Halstead Press, 1974).

[16]Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 1008-1951.

[17]Robert Fried, "Politics, Economics and Federalism: Aspects of Urban Government in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland," in Comparative Community Politics, ed: Terry N. Clark, op. cit.

[18]Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

[19]Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 25 (1963): 265-289.

[20]Richard Hofferbert, "Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review 60 (March 1966): 73-82.

[21]Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[22]A detailed literature review and examination of these variables will be provided in Chapter V of this dissertation.

[23]Kesselman and Rosenthal, Local Power and Comparative Politics, op. cit., p. 14.

[24]Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales, op. cit.

[25]John Walton, "Problems of Method and Theory in Comparative Urban Studies," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September 1975): 5

[26]This does not imply that the local level is the most responsive or normatively the best level of government. I do not wish to imply that the closer power is to the people, the greater will be their interest in and control over it. For a general discussion of this problem, see: Duane Lockhard, The Politics of State and Local Government, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1969): 27-58. For an analysis of the weaknesses of such an assumption in the context of federal structures, see: Richard Leach, American Federalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).

[27]Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky, "The Role of State and Community Political Systems," in State and Urban Politics, eds.: Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

[28]Oliver P. Williams, "A Typology for Comparative Local Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science 5 (May, 1961): 150-164.

[29]For some excellent discussions of the problems inherent in the categorization of public policies, see: Richard Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968): 151-178; and Lewis Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed: Austin Ranney, op. cit., pp. 41-54. On larger levels of analysis, nominal categories may shift meaning. For example, on the national level of analysis, educational expenditures may include different functions. In one country education may include occupational retraining programs. In another country this function may be included under "labor" or "social welfare." When we deal with local levels of analysis, services become more identifiable and, within a single political system, more likely to be conceptually equivalent.

[30]V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949).

[31]Edward Carminis, "The Mediating Influence of State Legislatures on the Linkage Between Inter-Party Competition and Welfare Policies," American Political Science Review 68 (September, 1974): 1118-1124.

[32]Sarah Morehouse, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process," American Political Science Review 67 (March, 1973): 55-72.

[33]Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).

[34]Andrew T. Cowart, "Anti-Poverty Expenditures in the American States: A Comparative Analysis," Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (May, 1969): 219-236.

[35]Dawson and Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," op. cit.

[36]Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, op. cit.

[37]Charles R. Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September, 1966): 858-866.

[38]Wayne Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

[39]Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (February, 1968): 41-61.

[40]Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," op. cit.

[41]Sidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," Comparative Politics 7 (October, 1974): 1-36.

[42]Platon Rigos, "Local Policy Choices and Party Control: Political Institutionalization among French Urban Communes," (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1974).

[43]Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales, op. cit.

[44]Douglas Ashford, "Parties and Participation in British Local Government and Some American Parallels," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September, 1975): 58-81.

[45]By abandoning the use of party competition as an explanatory variable, we probably reduce the amount of statistical variance in our model. However, the advantages of a more simplified model may outweigh the disadvantages.

[46]Sava Lukić, "Socijalna Struktura Kao Faktor Političke Stabilnost; i Akcione Sposobnosti Saveza Komunista" (1973).

[47]Josip Broz Tito, Pismo Presednika SKJ: Izvršnog Biroa Predsedništva SKJ, Komunist (October 17, 1972).

[48]Čazim Sadiković, SKJ: Vlast, in Komunisti i Samoupravljanje, ed: Anton Fiamengo (Zagreb, Vjesnik, 1967).

[49]Howard Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," Midwest Journal of Political Science 5 (May, 1961): 129-149; and Najdan Pašić, Klase i Politika (Beograd, Izdavačko Preduzeče "Rad," 1974).

[50]For an analytical description of this variation on the local level in Yugoslavia, see: Jack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia--A Multinational State (San Francisco: Chandler, 1966).

CHAPTER II

THE MODEL

This chapter introduces and discusses the public policy model that is empirically tested in the succeeding chapters. The first part of the chapter outlines the elements of the general model. The second part reviews the research that lead to its development. The third part suggests an approach to harmonize the general model to the special needs and political vocabulary of Yugoslavia.

A. The General Framework

Many shortcomings and problems have accompanied earlier attempts to develop a general public policy model. Philip Coulter listed seven of the most significant of them:[1]

--inattention to process variables
--overreliance on public expenditures as policy outputs
--failure to differentiate policy types
--inadequate quantitative analysis that is limited solely to factor analysis or correlation
--inference of individual political values from aggregate demographic data
--the improper use of regionalism as a control variable
--confusion between political structural variables and political behavioral variables

I have designed my general model and method for testing it so as to avoid these common pitfalls.

Figure 2.1 is a general outline of my basic public policy model. The model includes the variables most likely to have an impact on



⟶ = sufficient data exists to test these relationships by an econometric model.

- - - -▶ = these relationships are tested but data are insufficient for inclusion in the econometric model.

FIGURE 2.1.--Basic Models of Public Policy and Its Decision-Making Process.

public policy. We are interested not only in the direct link among the variables but in their combined effects as well.

I have designed the model to test the hypothesis that the level of economic development qualitatively changes public policies and their decision-making processes. The literature review on political development which follows this section suggests that such a procedure should be followed.[2] In testing the hypothesis I divide all the communes into one of three levels of economic development and then examine the changes in the behavior of the model.[3]

Social development and social conflict variables are included in the model. The identification of these variables and their hypothesized interrelationships, however, are presented in Chapter III.[4] The model also includes two other sets of variables, political structure and socio-political organizations. Both sets of variables are considered important in the policy-making process. Unfortunately, for both sets of variables there are insufficient data to allow their full and complete inclusion in the empirical testing of the model.

The decision-making process variables are discussed extensively in this chapter. We are concerned at this stage of the model not only with individual effects that the decision-making process variables have upon public policy but with their combined effects as well.[5]

The last stage in the model represents the public policies, the dependent variables. In Chapter II I do not identify fully the precise public policies that are studied because it is necessary to lay more groundwork about the Yugoslav local political system. The policies,

however, are not totally dependent on expenditure data. This avoids another of the potential pitfalls mentioned by Coulter. Chapter VI discusses these public policies in detail.

In succeeding chapters I intend to examine systematically the different impact of variables within the model, to develop particular hypotheses, and to test the validity of such hypotheses within the framework of four general hypotheses. These four general hypotheses are:

Hypothesis I: Political decision-making variables are more important in the determination of public policies at higher levels of development than at lower levels of development.

Hypothesis II: More variance in decision-making processes occurs at lower levels of development than at higher levels of development.

Hypothesis III: Public policies are more innovative and progressive at higher levels of development than at lower levels.

Hypothesis IV: Public policy expenditures are relatively higher at higher levels of development than at lower levels.

B. Conceptual Background

The model that I employ borrows extensively from three research areas: political development, public administration, and public policy analysis. All three areas independently contribute relevant points to the development of the conceptual model.

1. Political Development

The political development literature is especially relevant for this study because it has been noticeably successful in bridging the

analytical gap between communist and non-communist area studies.[6] The literature contributes three vital points, the understanding of which is essential for the development of a model that explains public policies and the public policy decision-making process. These points are:

a. economic development radically changes the social and political values, organization and structure of a community;

b. social and political development must occur at relatively similar rates to avoid social conflict;

c. the development of a community affects the political and policy options and needs of a community.

Research on each of these points can be reviewed on the broad national-systemic level; within the specific constraints of communist political systems, particularly Yugoslavia; and on more narrow, urban levels of government.

a. The Effect of Economic Development.--Many Western researchers have suggested that the level of economic and social development has an influence on various political processes. Apter[7] in his work on modernization noted the interlocking effect which the political system, political parties, and other political structures have upon modernization and values towards it. For Apter, modernization was the dependent variable and political characteristics the independent variable. Rostow[8] tended to disagree with Apter and argued that economic development, at least in pre-takeoff stages, was dependent upon social development within a society, and that political development followed from that. Horowitz[9] concentrated upon the impact which social development

has upon political development, but agreed that basic political system and value changes could follow from economic development. Finally Pye[10] and Black[11] among others reached the conclusion that economic, social and political development were so closely connected that it is misleading to consider one to be the prime determinant of the other.

A basic Marxist premise is that economic conditions create new social classes and new forms of power and relations among classes.[12] Stemming from this, Marx had determined that economic, social and political power are interconnected concepts so that the possession of one form of power necessitated possession of the reciprocal form.[13] Huntington and Brzezinski's[14] and Meyer's[15] work on convergence and Eckstein's[16] analysis of change in communist systems all tend to agree that, on a macro-level, we can expect pluralistically oriented changes in the decision-making process from changes in the social and economic development characteristics of society. For our purposes this means that in a socialist country such as Yugoslavia, economic and social development can be considered to have an important impact upon the policies and policy processes of a political system.

Economic, social and political development are also considered to be of crucial importance in comparative urban policy studies. Schnore[17] and Brazer[18] noted the interrelatedness and interdependence of these variables on the local level, and Kuroda[19] identified the threat of development on the autonomy of local units. Urban research conducted in Yugoslavia[20] notes the important impact which socio-economic development has upon different aspects of local public policy decision-making.

b. Change in Level of Development and Social Conflict.--The second point which political development adds to this study is that incongruities in developmental change may lead to social conflict. Davies[21] and Brinton[22] both discussed the divisive effect which social development may have upon societies, and Deutsch and Huntington[23] developed the point further by noting that economic, social and political development must move in unison in order to avoid social upheavals. Their point is significant because it permits us to predict more social conflict or instability in situations where social, economic, and political development are occurring at different rates.[24]

Comparative communist studies also have noted the disruptive effects that differing rates of social and political development have upon society.[25] In fact, this point forms the theoretical basis for much of the interest group literature[26] in these studies. Yugoslav social scientists, however, approach this problem from a different perspective. In their view, political development is the basic goal of society, but it cannot be advanced without concomitant increases in economic and social development.[27] Differences among local level political systems are expected because the social and economic bases of these systems differ.[28] In addition, differing socio-economic development rates of local units are also reflected in their political systems.[29]

c. Development and Societal Options.--The third major point of the development literature relevant to the model is that development will affect the policy and decision-making options available to a political unit. On the one hand poorly-developed areas cannot afford the

economic, social and political costs associated with some types of political systems.[30] On the other hand, as Organski[31] and Pečuljić[32] state, a more developed area must exclude types of decision-making processes incongruent with its stage of political and social development. This point allows us to make predictions about the type of political and policy-making structures which a government is likely to have.

In summary, the political development literature suggests several analytical points. They are: that economic development should be controlled in any model of public policies and the decision-making process; that we should be aware of incongrueties among economic, social and political factors; and that social and economic development can qualitatively affect the type of political decision-making process practiced by a local unit of government. The model introduced earlier incorporates these points.

2. Public Administration

There is a danger in relying too heavily upon the political development literature. From it we might incorrectly hypothesize that socio-economic characteristics determine political outputs to the extent that there is no room for autonomous variation. Glenn Paige restates this problem quite well.

> Are political systems to be considered as largely determined by the socio-economic characteristics of the societies in which they are found? Or are they to be considered as capable of largely autonomous variation which can result in profound economic, social and cultural change.[33]

The issue of socio-economic determinism is important to policy-makers. In the short run, social and economic characteristics are not

easily manipulated by political authorities[34] and the political cost of manipulating these variables is very expensive.[35] From a practical standpoint we must identify those factors that can be politically manipulated and identify the effect which those factors have upon policies themselves. In short, if we are involved in policy analysis, we must realize that "the scope of effective institutional change is the tightly confined residual of the environmental policy relationship."[36]

Public administration, particularly comparative public administration, is well suited for identifying the relevant political factors that make a difference in the formation of public policies. In fact, public administration "may be defined as the art and science of designing and carrying out of public policy."[37] As a result, this is a logical area to survey for a solution to the problem of economic determinism.

The subfield of comparative local public administration does offer some interesting observations on this problem. Riggs, for example, stresses that local administrative decision-making procedures must accommodate the local situation.

> Any program for local government reform will be unrealistic unless it confronts the dynamic forces of social, political and economic change as they affect and are affected by the administrative arrangements for local government.[38]

Thus, while the local public policy goals may be the same, the most effective decision-making method to achieve those goals is grounded in the socio-economic realities of the local government unit.

The public administration literature concentrates on three broad areas of the decision-making process that are most relevant for explaining public policies. These areas are: decentralization, participation,

and bureaucratization/professionalization.[39] Each of these three areas has definite linkages to public policies, and they are each affected by the local level of socio-economic development.

a. Local Decentralization.--Local decentralization can be viewed two different ways. One view is the degree of autonomy which is given to local political units.[40] A second view is the degree to which decision-making processes within the local political unit have been fragmented or passed on to even smaller political units.[41] These two measures are conceptually[42] and empirically[43] distinct. In general, we are mainly concerned with the second meaning listed. Decentralization as used here involves fragmentation of administrative decision-making; it does not imply democratization of the decision-making process.[44]

The degree of socio-economic development of the community may affect the degree of decentralization. Leeman,[45] for example, noted that one of the primary purposes of rationales for decentralization is to promote economic development or to reorganize the political structure to reflect a certain state of socio-economic development. Reis-Vierra[46] found that decentralization was associated with higher levels of development on the level of the nation-state. When we consider the local level there is considerably more concern about the problem,[47] but there has been relatively little direct empirical testing of it. It is an area that deserves more empirical examination.

Decentralization is a useful concept for inclusion in a general policy model even though the link with socio-economic development may

be tenuous. This issue is integrally related to the political process, and thereby to the public policies of governmental units.[48] It vitally affects the power position of individuals within a political system and affects the rules of decision-making.[49] Decentralization is also viewed as a way of defusing political conflict because it tends to fragment the arenas of conflict and creates local rather than nation-based conflict.[50]

The specific effect that the process of decentralization has upon public policies is ambiguous. Simon[51] argues that decentralization may lead to more innovation and changes in policies. Boaden[52] in his study of British local government tends to find evidence in support of Simon's argument, but Milch[53] in his study of French communes finds that decentralization is not a sufficient condition for preventing policy innovation or change. Vincent Ostrom[54] presents some strong arguments that indicate that the relationship between centralization and efficiency is spurious, but this view is not completely shared by other urban specialists.[55] While there may be disagreements about the nature of the effect of decentralization on public policies, it is quite clear that it is a vital factor for explaining public policies. A model of public policy formation, therefore, should include the decentralization factor within the decision-making process.

b. Political Participation.--Political participation is the second aspect of the decision-making process relevant for inclusion in the model. One of the important features that accrues to a decentralized political system is an increase in political participation. This participation, however, may have its drawbacks.

> Development has precipitated a participation crisis. The fundamental question is age old: how can individuals meaningfully participate in systems of ever increasing size and scale, or conversely, how can systems of large size respond to each and every individual? With increasing size and complexity the individual becomes submerged in numbers and confusion. The obvious alternative of reducing the scale of the system by breaking it up into small autonomous local political units also reduces the issues of participation to triviality.[56]

In many countries the stress on local government is associated with the idea that small units will stimulate intensive popular participation in public policy formation.[57] It must be pointed out, however, that decentralization and participation are not synonymous concepts. It is possible to have high participation in a highly centralized structure,[58] and it is also possible to have low participation in a very decentralized political system.

There is evidence that indicates that socio-economic variables have a relatively strong impact upon the quantity of political participation in a political system. On the comparative national level, Karl Deutsch[59] and Norman Nie et al.[60] found relatively strong relationships between increases in social and economic development and the expansion of political participation. There is no agreement, however, as to which particular factors of socio-economic development are responsible for political participation.[61] On comparative local levels, research results indicate that social development characteristics are important in explaining participation in local areas in Great Britain,[62] the United States,[63] France,[64] and Yugoslavia.[65] Again, there is disagreement as to the identification of the precise factors that are responsible for the political participation.

A possible explanation for the disagreement is suggested by Teune and Mlinar.[66] They state that socio-economic variables, in addition to having a quantitative impact upon political participation, may have a qualitative impact as well (i.e., socio-economic characteristics may affect the type of political participation that becomes dominant in a political system). Under low levels of development participation tends to be symbolic; under medium levels it tends to be institutional and group centered; under high levels of development participation is systemic and individually based. Teune and Mlinar's typology is useful because it allows us to develop testable hypotheses (e.g., Hypothesis I and II) about the dominant type of political participation in the political system. Chapter V examines this problem in detail.

Political participation should have some definite impact upon public policies in order to be included in the model, but identifying the specific impact which participation has upon public policies is difficult.[67] The policy impact of participation may vary according to which social groups participate, as Banfield and Wilson[68] suggest; the impact may vary according to the policy selected for study;[69] or the impact may vary according to the level of socio-economic development of the community.[70] A model of public policy analysis should therefore consider the different ways in which participation may have an impact on policy[71] and avoid a unidimensional approach to the problem.[72]

c. Bureaucratization/Professionalization.--Public personnel recruitment and management is the third area borrowed from public

administration. The model uses only a small segment of that field, namely, the professionalization and bureaucratization of the decision-making personnel. Although these two concepts are linked here, it must be stressed that bureaucratization and professionalization are distinct concepts.

> Bureaucracy is related to professionalism and centralization. But it is not identical with these. Bureaucratization, as we have defined it, means the elaboration of differentiated organizational units in a hierarchy, with appointed officials at the head. Professionalization (in an organization) means the appointment of technically trained experts to positions of autonomy and judgment. . . . Bureaucratization can exist without professionalization; a large staff may perform relatively unskilled jobs . . . Professionalization exists without bureaucratization where there is a relatively small staff performing highly specialized tasks.[73]

A model of public policy-making should continue to keep these variables empirically distinct even though the interrelationship between them is quite high.

Socio-economic development affects bureaucratization/professionalization. Eisenstadt[74] considers a political unit to be socially and economically developed when it becomes more complex, more organized, more bureaucratized (this is not to imply that no variation exists). Riggs[75] essentially agrees with Eisenstadt but adds that political stability can be threatened whenever the development of the bureaucracy (professionalism) is incongruent with the state of socio-economic development of the political unit. Kautsky[76] suggests that professionalization is highest at middle levels of development, but does not provide empirical evidence for this proposition. More research is needed to determine the strength of the relationship between socio-economic

development and the growth of bureaucratization and the development of professionalism within it.

Bureaucratization/professionalization can have an impact on public policies. Henry, for example, lists eight policy impacts which can be attributed to professionalism in the decision-making process.[77] They range from the discouragement of participation to poor coordination of policy outputs. March and Simon[78] imply that greater professionalization and bureaucratization are linked to fewer innovations and change.[79] But Williams and Adrian[80] have found that professionalization of the leadership encourages changes in policies, and Palumbo and Styskal[81] corroborate this finding in their research on U. S. school boards. Downs[82] concludes that professionalization may have a positive as well as a negative impact on orientation towards change depending upon the policy studied.

In general, the effect that professionalization and bureaucratization have upon local public policies is unclear. Sharkansky corroborated this when he examined within-state professionalism and found a moderately high positive relationship with various policies. He concluded that:

> Measures of the within-state distribution of professionalism show stronger relations with policy than are suggested in articles reporting on state-wide aggregate measures of professionalism. . . . As we develop more sensitive indicators of economic and political distributions, we may learn how the combinations of resources, competitiveness, professionalism, and other features exert their influence on public policy.[83]

Obviously, more work needs to be done.

In summary, public administration provides us with some additional tools with which to construct a model of public policy decisions. Decentralization, participation, and bureaucratization/professionalization should be included as variables in the decision-making process. The literature suggests that all these variables have an impact upon public policies and that they may be affected by the socio-economic characteristics of the community. A model of decision-making, therefore, should consider these possible linkages as well as the interlocking nature of these variables with each other.

3. Public Policy Analysis

Public policy analysis is the third research area from which this dissertation heavily borrows. Carl Friedrich defines policy analysis as the study of:

> . . . a proposed course of action of a person, groups or government within a given environment providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or a purpose. . . . It is essential for the policy concept that there be a goal, objective or purpose.[84]

Analyzing public policy decisions can give useful insights into such dynamic processes as the structure of the community, the existence and role of conflict, participation within the political system and the political structure of the community. In addition, public policies constitute a very useful criteria for comparing the operation of various political systems and the impact of government on citizens. In general, establishing policy relevance is a crucial problem in comparative local research,[85] and public policy analysis is useful in helping us establish that relevance.

The danger in relying on public administration is that it concentrates only on the decision-making process and does not provide a method of evaluation or a focus for that decision-making process. An over-concentration on public administration concerns would limit the area of investigation of local government decision-making and ignore the field of performance. Noel Boaden notes this danger as it affects comparative local politics.

> A further explanation of the preoccupation with size is that political scientists have been seeking solutions to the failings of the local government system. Had they been seeking explanations for what local authorities actually do it is likely they would have considered a number of factors other than size. Indeed it may also be necessary to ask about what is done before one asks how efficiently it is done. Efficiency is of course relevant, but what happens is just as important as whether it happens efficiently.[86]

Public policy analysis avoids this pitfall since it concentrates on what exactly happens in a political system.

In general, public policy analysis is more useful here for its conceptual precision and methodological implications than it is for broad theoretical generalizations. For us public policy analysis serves two broad purposes: it gives us a criteria with which to compare our dependent variables, and it provides the methodological tools to examine the behavior of the model.

There are four advantages to public policy analysis: it aggregates disparate political decision; it is concerned with the outcomes as well as the outputs of the political system; it deals with change; and it permits the testing of political theories or micro-applications of them.

A first advantage of public policy analysis is the aggregation of political decisions and outcomes into some broad policy area.[87] It provides a meaningful way of making political sense of disparate decisions and moves us towards greater generalization.

The second advantage is that public policy analysis deals with the outcomes as well as the outputs of the political system. In other words, it permits us to measure differences between the intent and actual performance of a political decision[88] and to evaluate the impact of a political decision, and it provides some normative evaluation of the success of a political system in meeting its goals.[89]

The third advantage with public policy analysis is its change orientation. It views the political system as a constantly changing system, constantly adapting to new demands and inputs, and varying its outputs accordingly.

Fourth, public policy analysis allows a researcher to concentrate on micro-applications in political science. It deals with objectively "real" phenomena which then permits sufficient methodological rigor and, in the final analysis, contributes to a greater understanding of the entire political system.[90]

Public policy analysis has one final advantage for model building and testing: it is very suitable for detailed econometric testing. Through econometric methods and their statistical tests, the application and effectiveness of policies can be studied,[91] and predictions about policy outcomes can be made.[92] Econometric modeling gives us a distinct

advantage in reaching generalizable statements about the behavior of local governmental units.

Summarizing the second part of the chapter, we note that there are a considerable number of questions about the determination of public policies that are still unresolved. We are also aware that a model for public policy formation can be constructed with ideas borrowed from research in developmental politics, public administration, and public policy analysis. Each subfield, however, if not complemented by the others, could lead to erroneous results.

C. Integration of the Western and Yugoslav Conceptualizations of the Policy Process

The second part of this chapter seeks to reconcile the constituent elements of the proposed model, which is primarily Western-based, into a pattern appropriate to the Yugoslav political experience. There are several advantages to such a procedure:

--we can improve comparative generalizations if we can find the proper way of translating political phenomena into mutually recognizable forms;

--we can better utilize the wealth of information available to us from Yugoslav sources;

--we can help break down the verbal ideological barriers that prevent a better understanding of non-democratic political systems.

In this section I specifically provide a brief Western perspective of the political process, followed by a brief description of Yugoslav political theory on the issue, and concluding with a proposed plan for synthesizing the Western and Yugoslav approaches.

1. A Western Perspective

Since Plato's Republic the process of decision-making has been thought to have an effect on general public policy outputs. Much of the recent political research centers on identifying the process on levels of analysis ranging from the nation-state[93] and city[94] to the level of the small organization.[95]

William Kornhauser provides a very useful conceputalization of the decision-making process that can help explain variation in public policy decisions.[96] According to Kornhauser, all social systems can be divided into one of the following four types: "communal, totalitarian, pluralist, and mass." Each of these societies differs according to their processes of decision-making operationalized by the characteristics of the elite and the characteristics of the general public. For Kornhauser the important considerations are the degree to which "elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites: and the degree to which "non-elites are readily available for mobilization by elites." The following figure summarizes his argument.

Accessability of Elites	Availability of Non-Elites	
	Low	High
Low	communal	totalitarian
High	pluralistic	mass

Figure 2.2.--Kornhauser's Classification of Social Systems.

The extent to which members of the society participate in the selection of elites is a rough indicator of the degree of access to elites. The degree to which members of the society lack attachment to independent groups is a similarly rough indicator of the degree of the availability of non-elites.

2. The Yugoslav Perspective

Yugoslav political theory is based upon self-management and it provides the criteria and conceptual framework necessary to explain political processes in Yugoslavia. Since self-management is the desired form of public policy decision-making, if we could define more precisely its constituent elements, we would then be able to find indicators which measure the degree to which the normative principle has been implemented. In addition we could then compare the different decision-making processes according to their impact on public policy outputs.

Three principles of self-management--direct decision-making, worker control, and the contraction of the role of the government--provide the basic yardstick with which to measure and compare political processes on the local level in Yugoslavia.

a. Direct Decision-Making.--The first element of self-management is direct decision-making, the right of citizens to make decisions which concern them most directly.

> Self-management is decision-making, that is the passing of self-managed decisions on all levels and in all socio-political communities--from the working organization to the federation.[97]

Decision-making as a variable can be classified along two dimensions. One such dimension is range; the other dimension is directness. In other words, there exists measurable variance as to the total number of issues open to self-management decision-making as well as variance measured by how directly a citizen can decide about these issues.

Both dimensions on the national level have changed over time. Decision-making has been consistently widened to include more policy areas and to be more direct. In the 1950's decision-making was limited solely to some economic relationships and the formation of workers' councils, and in those years the path of decision-making was indirect and bureaucratic-centralist.[98] By 1974, direct decision-making, at least by law, had been expanded to include the political arena and decision-making had become considerably more direct so that legally every citizen had:

> . . . the right to self-management on the basis of which every working man, equally with all other working people, decide about their own work, about their own and community interests and about directing societal development, implementing government and the management of other societal affairs.[99]

b. Workers' Control.--The second basic element of self-management is the concept of workers' control[100] or the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

> The platform (of the League of Communists) and the constitution start from the position that self-management in Yugoslavia is a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Its basic characteristic is direct management by the working class together with other working people over the conditions of work and life.[101]

In practical political terms the element of control by the workers (i.e., all working people) can be measured on two dimensions.

One measures the degree of workers' control vis-a-vis management in industry, and the other examines the importance given to the economic sphere in political life. Over time, this second role has expanded. By 1974 it was desirable that direct producers achieve a majority representation in all political institutions and socio-political organizations, and that they become the controlling community factor in decision-making.

c. Contraction of the Role of the Government.--The third principle element of self-management, the contraction of the role of central governments (the withering of the state) is integrally related to the other two elements and may even be considered a logical outgrowth of those two elements.

> The process of the withering of the state has two basic views, two strongly intertwined sides. From the one side, the state apparatus becomes increasingly democratic, increasingly approximates society and direct control by the working masses. . . . From the other side the circle of state business becomes increasingly narrow because the leadership of an increasingly greater number of state activities transfers to the organs of production and societal self-management.[102]

The "withering of the state" in self-management is not equivalent to the more utopian interpretations of the concept, but it can and does have some practical political significance. State functions can contract, i.e., the role of the state and its bureaucracy can contract according to an observable and measurable pattern.

In Yugoslavia formal state responsibilities have contracted or have been increasingly decentralized towards the local level over time.

> The process of building the system (of self-management) began in Yugoslavia in 1952. However, it is considered that the communal system was introduced in 1955 when the opštinа became a basic political-territorial unit. Communal self-management is thought of as that form of the withering of the state which allows the working class to achieve in the basic territorial communities a dominant position in socio-economic and socio-political life. . . .[103]

In other words, in contemporary Yugoslavia the local political unit--the commune/opština--is becoming increasingly more relevant in the study of societal self-management.

These three constituent elements of self-management are developing and changing over time. Even more interesting, however, is that we can analyze not only temporal changes in the application of these norms but spatial changes as well. In other words, at a given time, political units within Yugoslavia can and do vary according to the degree or stage of "self-management" that has been achieved.

> It is clear, even on the foundation of non-systematic observation, that these institutions, and self-management in them, in spite of identical norms, did not function equally well in developed and underdeveloped regions, in rural and urban settings, in technically complex activities and in mass production work.[104]

3. Synthesis

According to Yugoslav political theory, deviations from the goals of self-management are classified according to two dimensions; one is "anarcho-liberalism" while the other is "bureaucratic-statism."[105] These three different processes of decision-making--"anarcho-liberalism," "bureaucratic-statism," and self-management--are conceptually equal to Kornhauser's "mass, totalitarian, and pluralist"[106] societies. While the terminology used by Western and Yugoslav theorists differs, the

conceptualization of these processes is nearly identical.[107] Just as the Yugoslav political system perceives itself as consciously avoiding one or the other deviation from self-management socialism,[108] Kornhauser constantly points out the dangers of both totalitarian and mass societies.

"Anarcho-liberalism" in its pure form is a condition when intermediate groups, especially the socio-political organizations, lose authority and importance in society[109] and each citizen is free to pursue his own individual political ends at the expense of the community.[110] In the terminology of self-management, anarcho-liberalism occurs when organized worker control over the process of political decision-making is lacking.[111] This is directly equivalent to saying that an anarcho-liberal society is one in which the accessability of the elite is high and the availability of the non-elites is high as well, i.e., a mass society.[112]

"Bureaucratic-statism," another alternative in Yugoslav political thought, is directly equivalent to a Western conceptualization of totalitarianism. Both "bureaucratic-statism" and "totalitarianism" share the characteristics of a state in the hands of a few people, not directly responsible to the general public nor approachable by the public but to which the public must give its loyalties.

An essential characteristic of "bureaucratic-statism" that separates it from self-management is the inability of the system to "accept and develop competitive organizations and especially those forms of rule which place man in the place of an apparatus and place the joint

interest of 'average people,' producers and citizens, in place of a 'mistification of the general interest.'"[113] In the terminology of self-management, a bureaucratic-statism form of decision-making lacks the essential element of direct decision-making. In the Kornhauser framework, bureaucratic-statism becomes a situation in which the availability of the non-elites is high and the accessibility of elites to the masses is low. In other words, "totalitarianism" and "bureaucratic-statism" are conceptually equivalent.

In summary, if we adapt the Kornhauser decision-making process model to the Yugoslav experience and Yugoslav terminology, we arrive at a comparative model that is conceptually equivalent and internally consistent. The following figure summarizes this adaptation.

Accessibility to the Elites	Availability of Non-Elites	
	Low	High
Low	communal (feudal-communal)	totalitarian (bureaucratic-statism)
High	pluralist (self-managed)	mass (anarcho-liberal)

Figure 2.3.--Comparative Classification of Social Systems.

In short, this adaptation allows us to make joint use of both Yugoslav and Western-based theoretical concepts and past research results. By identifying the process of public policy decision-making in each Yugoslav commune, we can make theoretical statements about the effect that the process of decision-making may have on public policy outputs.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II

[1]Philip Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy, Polity 1 (Fall, 1970): 22-43.

[2]Andrew C. Tsantis in "Political Factors in Economic Development," Comparative Politics 2 (October, 1969, 76) suggests that such a procedure be followed.

[3]See: B. Guy Peters, "Public Policy, Socioeconomic Conditions, and the Political System: A Note on their Developmental Relationship," Polity 5 (Winter, 1972): 277-284.

[4]Since the relationships may not be linear and may be interactive in nature [see James C. Strouse and J. Oliver Williams, "A Non-Additive Model for State Policy Research," Journal of Politics 34 (1972): 648-657], it would be easier to present this additional material at a place in closer proximity to its eventual empirical testing.

[5]See Samuel Kirkpatrick, "Multidimensional Aspects of Local Political Systems: A Conceptual Approach to Public Policy," Western Political Quarterly (December, 1970): 808-828, who develops a very similar typology to the one I suggest here.

[6]Some scholars (Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed: Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 188-197; and John Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed: Frederic J. Fleron, op. cit., pp. 198-202) in the comparative communist studies field would prefer to say that comparative development has the potential to link communist and non-communist studies in the same analytical framework but that this potential has not yet been realized and a gap exists between theory and practice. However, recent work in comparative communist studies including John Michael Montias, Economic Development in Communist Romania (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Carl Beck, "Career Characteristics of East European Leadership," in Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed: R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 157-194; and Frederic L. Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968) tend to indicate that the gap between theory and practice has been narrowed, if not erased.

[7]David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[8]W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[9]Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

[10]Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

[11]C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[12]See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (London: C. J. Arthur, Lawrence and Wiskert, 1970), pp. 68-87.

[13]Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The German Ideology, op. cit.

[14]Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1963).

[15]Alfred Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Change in Communist Systems, ed: Chalmers Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 313-342.

[16]Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Development and Political Change in Communist Systems," World Politics 22 (July, 1970): 475-495.

[17]Leo F. Schnore, "Some Correlates of Urban Size," American Journal of Sociology 69 (September, 1963): 185-193.

[18]Harvey Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States (Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper 66, 1959).

[19]Yasumasa Kuroda, "Levels of Government in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 7 (January, 1975): 430-440.

[20]See for example International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: Free Press, 1971); Petar Jambrek, Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath Co., 1975); Eugen Pusić, Samoupravljanje u Općinama i Ustanovama Društvenih Službi Urazličitim Fazama Ekonomskog i Društvenog Razvitka (Zagreb: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja Sveučilista u Zagrebu, 1972).

[21]James C. Davies, "Revolution on the J-Curve," in Revolution and Political Change, eds: Claude Welch, Jr., and Mavis Taintor (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), pp. 122-153.

[22]Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965).

[23]See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 493-514.

[24]Erick A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequence and Rates of Change," in Political Development and Social Change, eds: Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

[25]Paul H. B. Godwin, "Communist Systems and Modernization: Sources of Political Crises," in Studies in Comparative Communism 6, No. 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer, 1973): 107-134.

[26]For examples, see: H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[27]Dragutin Bozić and Savin Jogan, Samoupravljanje u Komuni (Zagreb, Globus, 1974): 142-150.

[28]Eugen Pusić, Lokalna Zajednica (Zagreb, Narodne Novine, 1963), pp. 62-72.

[29]Radivoje Marinković, Ko Odlučuje u Komuni (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1971): 154-161.

[30]For practical explanations of that problem, see: Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Comparative Administration 1 (May, 1969): 5-38; and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit.

[31]A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

[32]Miroslav Pečuljić, Studija iz Političke Sociologije i Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Škola Političkim Nauka, 1965): 27-28.

[33]Glenn D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics," in Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change, eds: John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966): 52.

[34]This interpretation is based upon the discussion from the Workshop on the Comparative Analysis of Public Health and Education Policy at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, November 6-8, 1975.

[35]See Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development, op. cit., for an interesting case study of Romania which deals with this problem.

[36]David J. Falcone, "On Comparative Health Policy and Political Science," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, November 7, 1975, p. 11.

[37]Robert Presthus, Public Administration 6th ed. (New York: Ronald Press, Co., 1975): 3.

[38]Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974): 396.

[39]For a discussion of how each of these three subject areas affect local administration in a comparative perspective, see: Emil J. Sady, "Improvement of Local Government and Administration for Development Purposes," in Readings in Comparative Public Administration, ed: Nimrod Raphael (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967): 239-257.

[40]The literature about federalism normally employs this meaning of decentralization. It is often a matter of concern in comparative urban literature as well. See Yasumasa Kuroda, "Levels of Government in Comparative Perspective," op. cit., who attempts a measurement of the concept of local autonomy.

[41]This is the view of decentralization which Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974), uses in his statement on the reform of metropolitan areas.

[42]Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organization Strategy," in Comparative Urban Research, ed: Robert T. Dalond (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1969), p. 68, conceptually differentiates the two meanings somewhat differently than what I do here. He calls the first view "decentralization" but the second "devolution."

[43]See Philip Jacob, "Autonomy and Political Responsibility: The Enigmatic Verdict of a Cross-National Comparative Study of Community Dynamics," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September, 1975): 36-57, who finds that greater autonomy of the local leadership in Yugoslavia, Poland, India, and the United States is not linked to greater fragmentation of decision-making within local units.

[44]This point is well understood in Yugoslavia and is the subject of extensive debate. See: Dragutin Božić, Skupštinski Sistem u Komuni," in Ustavna Reforma Komune, ed: Fabrić, Pistalo i Tomać (Zagreb, Centar za Aktuelne Političke Studije, 1971).

[45]A. F. Leeman, Changing Patterns of Local Government (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1970), pp. 23-24.

[46]Paulo Reis Vierra, "Toward a Theory of Decentralization: A Comparative View of 45 Countries" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1967) cited in Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organization Strategy," op. cit.

[47]See Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration: Policy-Making in Government Agencies, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), pp. 17-47 and Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," op. cit.

[48]Elinor Ostrom, "Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions," Social Science Quarterly 53 (December, 1972): 474-493.

[49]The comparison of Sidney Tarrow, "Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," Comparative Politics 7 (October, 1974): 1-36, of Italian and French reactions to administrative decentralization is a good descriptive analysis of the intensity of political feelings on decentralism.

[50]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 51 (New York: The New American Library, 1961).

[51]Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 234-240.

[52]Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influence on County Boroughs in England and Wales (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971): 5.

[53]Jerome E. Milch, "Influence as Power: French Local Government Reconsidered," British Journal of Political Science 4, Pt. 2 (April 1974): 139-161.

[54]Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, op. cit.

[55]See, for example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism, Report M-31 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), cited in Controversies of State and Local Political Systems, eds. Mavis Marvin Reeves and Parris N. Glendering (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), which argues that greater concentration and centralization of local services is needed.

[56]Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, "Development and Participation," in Local Politics, Development, and Participation, eds: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1974), p. 136.

[57]A. F. Leeman, Changing Patterns of Local Government, op. cit.

[58]Jerome E. Milch, "Influence as Power: French Local Government Reconsidered," op. cit.

[59]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 493-514.

[60]Norman Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I" and "II," American Political Science Review 63, No. 2 and 3 (June and September, 1969): 361-378 and 808-832.

[61]See Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, eds: Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucien Pye, Myron Weiner and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 166-175.

[62]L. J. Sharpe, "Participation in a Major City: Some Aspects of Turnout in Greater London," in Local Politics, Development and Participation, eds: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1974), pp. 55-79; and Douglas Ashford, "Parties and Participation in British Local Government and Some American Parallels," Urban Affairs Quarterly 11 (September 1975): 58-81.

[63]Robert Alford and E. Lee, "Voting Turnout in America," in Community Politics, ed: M. Bonjean et al. (New York: Free Press, 1971).

[64]Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France," American Political Science Review 65 (June 1971): 341-357.

[65]Stojan Tomić, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and Citizen Participation," paper presented at the Prva Međunarodna Konferencija Participacije Samoupravljanja, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, December, 1972.

[66]Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, "Development and Participation," op. cit.

[67]Douglas Ashford, "Parties and Participation in British Local Government and Some American Parallels," op. cit., pp. 58-59, identifies two different views of participation's impact on public policies. One view is that participation is an obstacle to effective government while the other view, which is more generally accepted, is that participation results in more responsive, effective government.

[68]James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review 63 (December 1964): 876-887.

[69]Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfard Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 858-866.

[70]Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 265-344.

[71]See Lester W. Milrath, "Political Participation in the States: in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, eds: Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 55-58, for an interesting critique of the unidimensional view of political participation.

[72]See Michael Baer and Dean Jaros, "Participation as Instrument and Expression: Some Evidence from the States," American Journal of Political Science 18 (May, 1974): 365-383, whose analysis of participation indicates that the caution suggested here is well founded.

[73]Robert Alford, Bureaucracy and Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 18.

[74]S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed: Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 96-119.

[75]Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," op. cit.

[76]John Kautsky, "Patterns of Elite Succession in the Process of Development," Journal of Politics 31 (May 1969): 359-396.

[77]The eight results of professionalism of the public service which Henry notes include the following: potential conflict of interest, undue influence of special groups, insulation of public servants from control, lack of internal democracy, maintenance of unrealistic professional standards, overspecialization, lack of policy coordination, discouragement of participation. Nicholas Henry, Public Administration and Public Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 95.

[78]James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1958), p. 70.

[79]Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), in his explanation of the Cuban missile crisis does a very useful job of indicating how bureaucratization can affect the selection of public policy decisions. Even though the context of Allison is somewhat distant from the intent of this study, the theoretical lessons should be comparable.

[80]Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, "Community Types and Policy Differences," in City Politics and Public Policy, ed: James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 17-36.

[81]Dennis J. Palumbo and Richard Styskal, "Professionalism and Receptivity to Change," American Journal of Political Science 18 (May 1974): 385-394.

[82]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 203.

[83]Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Representative Mechanism, Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies: A Comparative Analysis of Within-State Distribution of Economic and Political Traits," Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 132.

[84]Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 79.

[85]Robert Gutman and Francine Rabinovitz, "The Relevance of Domestic Urban Studies to International Urban Research," Urban Affairs Quarterly 1 (June 1966): 45-64.

[86]Noel Boaden, Urban Policy-Making: Influence on County Boroughs in England and Wales, op. cit., p. 5.

[87]See Robert Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed: Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 154-159, for a discussion of the problems inherent in developing an adequate typology of policy decisions.

[88]Charles W. Anderson, "System and Strategy in Comparative Policy Analysis: A Plea for Contextual and Experiential Knowledge," in Perspectives on Public Policy Making, eds: William B. Gwyn and George Edwards III (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1975), pp. 233-238.

[89]Terry Clark, "Citizens Values, Power and Policy Outputs," Journal of Comparative Administration (February 1973): 385-427.

[90]Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories and Micro-Application in Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics (October 1968): 74-75.

[91]G. G. Cain and H. W. Watts, "Problems in Making Policy Inferences from the Coleman Report," American Sociological Review 35 (1970): 228-241.

[92]Daniel F. Luecke and Noel F. McGinn, "Regression Analyses and Education Production Functions: Can They Be Trusted," Harvard Educational Review 45 (August 1975): 325-350.

[93]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[94]Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

[95]Rensis Likert, The Human Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

[96]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 40.

[97]Andelko Veljić, Društveno Samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1973).

[98]Institut za Izučavanje Radničkog Pokreta Beograda, Pregled Istorije Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (Beograd: Kultura, 1963), pp. 516-517.

[99]Ustav SFRJ (Beograd: Prosveta, 1974).

[100]In Yugoslav political theory, the term "worker" has two usages. One meaning includes all working people in industry, agriculture, commerce, etc., excluding directors or higher administrative personnel. The other meaning includes only those individuals engaged in direct production activities (i.e., factory and agriculture workers, excluding management personnel). In practice the meaning of the term "worker" varies between these two meanings although, in general, the latter usage is substituted by the term "direct producers."

[101]Radoš Smiljković, Ustav i Platforma SKJ o Samoupravljanju (Beograd: Radnička Štampa, 1974), p. 7.

[102]Najdan Pašić, Klase i Politika (Beograd: Rad, 1974), p. 110.

[103]Milan Ramljak, Samoupravljanje (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1974), p. 89.

[104]Institut za Društvena Inštraživanja, Jugoslovenska Komuna (Zagreb 1972): 5.

[105]Miroslav Pečujlić, Studija iz Političke Sociologije i Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Škola Političkih Nauka, 1965).

[106]Many Yugoslav writers will refer to a "pluralist society" and "pluralism" to mean Kornhauser's "mass society." The two usages should be kept distinct.

[107]This does not imply that "self-management" and "pluralism" are equal on all counts since self-management legitimizes only certain specified groups in society.

[108]Radoš Smiljković, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969).

[109]Radoslav Ratković, "Liberalizam i Partija," in Šta Je Liberalizam? (Beograd: Institut za Političke Studije, 1973), pp. 36-44.

[110]Gligorije Zaječaranović, "Liberalizam i Marksistička Ideologija," in Šta Je Liberalizam?, op. cit., pp. 8-16.

[111]Josip Broz Tito, "Pismo Predsednika SKJ," Izvršnog Biroa Predsedništva SKJ, 18 Septembra 1973 (Beograd: Komunist, 1973).

[112]Miroslav Pečujlić, "Liberalizam, Socijalizam," in Šta Je Liberalizam?, op. cit., pp. 45-51.

[113]Jovan Đorđevic, Politički Sistem (Beograd: Privredni Pregled, 1973), p. 749.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE PUBLIC POLICY MODEL

This chapter discusses the role of the political system in the policy-making model that was introduced in Chapter II. It defines the essential aspects of local governmental administration in Yugoslavia, identifies variations in the local political structures, examines the sources of local political structural variation, and looks at the impact of the political structure on public policies and the decision-making process.

The focus of this analysis is the Yugoslav opština or commune.[1] The opština/commune is a territorially-based administrative unit averaging approximately 50,000 persons. Its boundaries have remained relatively fixed since 1968. The opština/commune possesses a civil service, executive, legislature, judiciary, commissions and boards, etc. It has considerable legal powers and can pass and enforce laws. It engages in large-scale public works, health care, education, cultural and other social welfare programs. In addition to public services, the commune gives a community a specific identity as well. Territorially communes may be quite large (for example, Niksic: 2,065 square kilometers) or very small (for example, Vracar: 3 square kilometers). They may be very populous (for example, Skoplje: 388,962 population) or relatively

unpopulated (for example, Lastovo: 1,210 population).[2] Communes differ in nearly every other aspect as well.

A. Theoretical Overview

The role and behavior of the commune has held an important place in Yugoslav political theory for a considerable period of time. The commune is considered the center of social self-management much as the factory is considered the seat of economic self-management. According to Jovan Đorđevic,

> One of the basic characteristics of the contemporary political system of Yugoslavia is the opština as a socio-political community. . . . There are no revolutionary social changes if they are not manifested in the fundamental cells of society. . . . Social self-management as a form of direct and actual political decision-making by the people can find its basis and affirmation in the defined structure of the basic social collectivities. In the opština a certain type of social relationship--social structure--develops and grows.[3]

In order to understand the study of communal public policy decision-making, it is necessary to consider several features of the theoretical and actual position of the commune in Yugoslav society. First, I shall discuss the general trends which direct the development of the commune. This is followed by a consideration of the amount of autonomy enjoyed by the commune and the role of the commune in the Yugoslav federal structure. Finally, I shall turn to the major duties and responsibilities of the commune as well as the major problems which impinge upon it. Taken together, these three considerations help identify the public policy boundaries which are amenable to control by the commune, the degree of authority which the commune has in meeting its needs, and the tools which are available to it for meeting these needs.

1. Trends

The theoretical basis of local self-government in Yugoslavia originates from Marx's writings on the Paris Commune.[4] In practice, however, the basic groundwork for the present communal system originates from the founding of the national liberation committees established by partisan operations during World War II. The liberation committees continued until 1955. These were locally based governments founded to expel the Nazis and later used to coordinate recovery efforts.[5] In 1955, in response to the adoption of self-management as the official practical ideology of Yugoslavia, they were reorganized into the present communal framework. Since 1955 the commune's structure, function, level of autonomy, responsibilities and basic societal position has changed several times. The basic changes occurred in 1955 with the establishment of the commune; in 1963 with the implementation of a new constitution; in 1970 following the execution of the constitutional amendments; and in 1974 with the adoption of the most recent constitution.

In general the stated intent of these structural changes has been towards greater democratization, more decentralization, less bureaucracy and professionalism, and more communal autonomy, powers and responsibilities.[6] In practice, however, the behavioral effect of these changes is not so clear and may have been, in part, counter-productive.

From the structual perspective three overall trends are evident from the changes in the structural arrangements of the commune which have occurred since 1955. They are: movement towards larger size,

growth in revenues and expenditures, and increases in the level of administrative autonomy and responsibilities. These changes seem to have progressed along a fairly linear continuum over time.

The first apparent structural change is the growth in the average size of the communes and the consolidation of communes which are physically or economically handicapped if they remain separate. Table 3.1 gives an indication of the extent of the general decline in

TABLE 3.1.--Number of Communes Existing in Yugoslavia by Year, 1956-1975.

Year	Number of Communes
1956	1479
1957	1441
1958	1193
1959	1103
1960	839
1961	782
1962	759
1963	581
1964	577
1965	577
1966	516
1967	510
1968	501
1969-1974	500
1975	510

SOURCE: Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1975), p. 554.

the number of communes which has occurred since 1955. In 1956 there were nearly three times as many communes in existence as there were twelve years later in 1968. Yugoslavia has undergone a rather substantial administrative reorganization during this period. From 1969 to 1975 no substantial changes occurred in the number and boundaries of the communes. This seems to indicate that the size, boundaries, and number of communes have reached some type of equilibrium point.[7]

The major reason for this reorganization in the size of the commune is to increase the capabilities of the commune to meet the expanding social, economic and political responsibilities placed upon it. This means that the communes must have a sufficiently large tax base from which to pay for public services. At the same time, however, the commune should be small enough to maintain the principle of popular local control.[8]

In addition to the consolidation of communes into larger, more economically viable units, there has been a rather dramatic increase in recent years in the financial responsibilities and expenditures of the commune. In fact, self-financing of commune programs has become the most serious problem that now confronts the commune.[9] Table 3.2 illustrates this growth. Since 1965 the communal budgetary expenditures have consistently exceeded 30% of the total budgetary expenditures of all socio-political levels combined, and this share has been consistently increasing. In the period from 1966 to 1970, tax revenues in the commune increased 83%, educational expenditures 240%, and the

TABLE 3.2.--Distribution of the Total Budget of the Yugoslav Government to its Various Levels: 1965-1970 in Percent.

Level of Government	Year					
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Federal	47.8	45.8	42.1	40.8	38.8	39.9
Republic	12.2	13.3	16.5	18.0	18.8	17.5
Autonomous Provinces	1.9	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.6	2.6
Commune	32.7	34.7	39.2	39.8	39.8	40.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Predrag Božević, "Kretanje Lične i Opšte Potrošnje u Periodu 1966-1970," Finansije 5-6 (1970).

budget 93%.[10] Thus the financial importance of the commune government is growing both in absolute and relative terms.

The third trend is the growth in communal administrative responsibilities. Local administrative independence has increased in accordance with the general Yugoslav policy of decentralization. This is a result of the reduction in central and republic administrative control over commune activities. An example of such a process is the economic development program which was originally controlled by the central government, later devolved to the republic level, and is now in the hands of commune-based economic councils.[11]

The extent to which this increase in administrative responsibilities has occurred is evident from a comparison of the number of laws passed by the communal legislative assemblies over time. In 1963

the communal assemblies passed approximately 73,900 acts; in 1964, 117,803 acts; in 1965, 124,735 acts. In 1968 the number of acts passed fell to 87,860, but through a general administrative consolidation plan this actually represented an increase over previous years.[12] In addition, the number of administrative reports received by the communal assemblies also dramatically increased. In 1963, 6,964 reports were received; in 1965, 11,257 reports; and in 1968, 12,217 administrative reports were received by the assemblies.[13] While these figures are not definite proof that the commune is administratively more important, it does indicate that the communes are administratively doing more.

The steady growth in administrative responsibilities has been burdensome to the administration of the commune itself. The problem of properly informing delegates in the commune legislature about current issues increases proportionately to the number of issues which are decided by the commune.[14] In addition, as communal responsibilities increase, there is constant pressure to increase the financial tax resources of the commune, a move often accompanied by citizen resistance.[15] As a result, the communes are always in a precarious fiscal or political situation.[16]

2. Autonomy

Yugoslavia has a formal political structure with three levels of authority: federal, republic and communal. Since Yugoslavia is a state with four official languages, six official nationalities, many other large ethnic groups, and a long history of inter-nationality tension and hostility, a federal structure was inevitable.[17]

Within this framework the commune is the basic local political administrative unit and it has a fundamental legal position in Yugoslav society. The federal constitution gives the commune considerable autonomy and defines its role in the following manner:

> The opštinа is a self-managed and basic socio-political community based on the authority and self-management of the working class and all working people.
>
> In the opština working people and citizens create and secure the conditions for their own life and work, they direct social development, realize and harmonize their interests, satisfy community needs, recognize authority and manage their other social affairs.
>
> The function of government and the management of other social affairs, except those which according to the constitution rest in the wider socio-political communities, reside in the opština.[18]

In addition the constitution very clearly ascribes two roles to the commune, one as an administrative unit and another as a community.

Both objective and ideological factors have influenced the decisions to grant a considerable amount of formal local autonomy. The dispersion of nationalities across republic borders, the existence of small nationality enclaves within republic boundaries, and the presence of non-represented national minorities have tended to force the national authorities to develop a local unit with sufficient autonomy to help diffuse the potential nationality tensions that exist within each of the federal republics. The opština commune became that local unit.

A second reason for the development of local autonomy is ideological; social self-management in the commune is a natural outgrowth from economic self-management in the industrial enterprises.[19] When the central planned economy was disbanded by 1963, and considerable

powers were given to the economic enterprises, strong, autonomous local units became progressively more necessary to promote the interests of the local community.

In theory, the effect of Yugoslav federalism on the local level should be a harmonious blend of different federal levels all working towards a common goal--self-management, with all levels equal and all levels complementing each other.

> As self-management develops more, the basic cohesion of the federal community is not in a greater state hierarchical apparatus of power but in a self-management process which on an equal and voluntary basis connects the parts of the social community. The role of all the social-political communities would be to hasten the widest self-management process of association and integration and to overcome the institutional and legal barriers which threaten that integration.[20]

Theoretically the Yugoslav federal system closely approximates the marble cake analogy used in American federalism literature.[21]

Administratively the ideal of cooperative federalism is enforced by two mechanisms. One such mechanism is the joint taxation system from which all levels of government share.[22] This reinforces the notion of the existence of a common Yugoslav community from which all federal levels share coequally and cooperatively. The second mechanism reinforcing cooperative federalism is the absence of republic or federation bureaucratic branches within the opština.[23] All laws, including federal and republic statutes, are administered by the communal civil service[24] --recruited and paid from local funds. The intent of this is to avoid the appearance of central pressures upon local governmental agencies.[25]

Unfortunately, the theory and practice of Yugoslav federalism are quite different. The commune does not possess quite the degree of

autonomy and equality vis-a-vis other units that is suggested by theory. In fact, the very administrative mechanisms designed to encourage cooperative federalism have discouraged the further development of local autonomy.

First, since the republic and federation have no local administrative standards and share the same tax base, they can put considerable pressure upon the communal administration. For example, before 1971 the activities of the commune were regulated by more than 1500 republic or federal regulations[26] involving 70% of the total budget of the commune.[27] This meant that often very little of the total commune income allocation was left to the citizen to determine.[28]

Second, since the taxation base of the republic, federation and commune are all statutorily interdependent, an individual commune often finds it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances and to determine completely independently the amount and rate of revenue collections. This procedure threatens the fiscal autonomy of the commune.[29]

These two weaknesses coupled with the increase in responsibilities place the commune in a very difficult situation.

> In practice we find a paradoxical situation whose basis is with the growth of legal administrative independence and the weak development of the material independence of the opština. This happens when the federation and the republic delegate rights and activities to the opština but do not simultaneously delegate the necessary material means by which these affairs may be financed. . . . In such situations the opština must use funds which were appropriated for some other activity or community on this activity.[30]

Since 1970 some changes have been made to alleviate this situation and to grant more actual autonomy to the commune. This includes a reform

of the system of taxation that begins to separate commune tax revenue sources from republic and federation sources, a formal political channel to improve communication across the levels of government,[31] and a conscious attempt to reduce interference by higher governmental levels in communal affairs.[32]

Even with these new changes local autonomy is not complete and varies by policy issue. Petar Jambrek[33] identifies four types of policy issues which allow varying degrees of local autonomy. They are:

1. Administrative tasks which are considered exclusively national, for example national defense, security services, or revenue collection. Local administration is in these matters subordinated to the higher level government unit.

2. Those tasks where no local modifications are possible, although there is no relationship of supra- and subordination between local and national administration except the normal control of legality; an example of such a function is the administration of the population registar.

3. Issues which are regulated by national norms only in general terms. Communal institutions are able to adopt and specify these decisions accordingly. Examples are local revenues, urban planning, handicraft, or house building.

4. Functions which are derived from national and state laws, and where the communes actually assume the role of self-governing territorial entities. Most municipal services, social problems, and some tasks in the field of education belong in this sphere of responsibility.

In summary, we can conclude that the Yugoslav commune has some autonomy but that it is limited to specific policy areas. We must, therefore, be very careful about the selection of the public policies that we wish to study.

3. Responsibilities

We must identify those specific activities over which the Yugoslav commune has considerable autonomy and freedom of action in order to make a rational selection of public policies for study. In particular we should specify those activities which fall into Jambrek's third and fourth categories.

The policy areas in which the commune has considerable autonomy and responsibilities include the following: economic development, urbanization, communal services, housing policy, manpower, and social services.[34] Each area involves a number of specialized activities that can be defined as activities over which communes exercise a degree of independent control.

In the field of economic development the commune has the right to implement and administer economic development investment funds in order to encourage investment in the commune. It can underwrite the cost of introducing new industries in the commune or of guaranteeing the business losses of already existing industries. The commune also develops a plan of economic development and works for its implementation.[35]

These activities can involve large sums of money and the allocation of these funds or the investment decisions can become vital community concerns. The actual influence of the commune is in reality quite high. In a survey of fifteen communes conducted in 1963, for example, 52.05% of all moves for economic expansion originated in the communal

administration, with only 28.77% being initiated by the affected working organizations themselves.[36]

The commune has the right to make all zoning decisions, develop a general urban plan, develop parks, finance road and sewer construction and generally regulate the environment of the opstina.[37] These public policies are generally less controversial and often purely administrative in function, although there are opportunities for abuse and private gain.[38]

Communal services include such activities as sewer, water, street maintenance, lighting, electricity, public transportation, garbage collection, market places, cemetaries, dog pounds, parking structures, tax collection, heating, playgrounds, etc.[39] In addition, the commune has control over such other vital functions as the supply and price of milk, bread, meat, taxis, etc. It also provides inspection facilities, sanitary regulations and the like.[40]

The third area of communal involvement is housing policy. Communes are responsible for developing and enforcing housing codes, providing public housing, building apartments and determining rental charges. Housing policy has been very problematic for nearly every commune. Political pressures keep rent low, investment capital is difficult to raise, the housing is often unattractive, and the available housing is in short supply.[41] The area of housing is one of the communal areas most difficult to administer[42] and one in which dissatisfaction is quite high.[43]

The fourth and final area in which the commune has considerable autonomy and responsibilities is social services. This includes education, culture, health and social welfare. Communes have responsibility for providing elementary, secondary, and technical education for their citizens. Educational policy may include such features as providing textbooks, board and lodging, transportation, etc. Schools are financed, staffed and built with communal resources. There is, therefore, room for considerable inter-commune variation in the provision of such services.[44] Culture includes libraries, theaters, museums, sports facilities, etc. Financing, staffing and initiating cultural programs is strictly a local prerogative with local variations in size and emphasis. Health protection and social welfare includes preventive medicine, health insurance, mother and child care, clinics, day care centers, rehabilitation centers, etc. Again, the programs are locally initiated, locally financed and locally maintained although the republic may provide additional funds to help support these programs in poorly-developed communes.

In summary, the Yugoslav commune is one unit within a federal structure with considerable autonomy and responsibilities in some selected policy areas. Knowledge of these areas permits a meaningful examination and comparison of policy-making processes in Yugoslavia. The policy areas that are most fruitful for analysis are economic development, urbanization, communal services, and housing and social services.

B. The Organization of the Political Structure

It is essential to understand the formal political structure in which the decisions are made in order to understand the policy-making process in the Yugoslav commune. This section outlines the formal political structure of the commune and discusses its constituent parts; it selects those sectors within the formal organization that are most relevant to the decision-making process; and it outlines how decentralization, participation, bureaucratism and professionalism operate within the commune.

1. Explanation of the Formal Structure

The commune as a socio-political community has a very complex formal structure. The commune administration includes a judiciary, executive, cabinet, tricameral legislature,[45] numerous smaller territorial units (mesna zajednica), commissions, policy boards and other political administrative units. Figure 3.1 provides a simplified chart of a typical commune's formal structure. Several of the constituent elements of the structure, however, deserve more explanation.

The opštinа assembly is a generally representative body directly chosen by citizens and working people in work organizations.[46] It is the body that represents the different elements of society[47] and establishes general policy through compromise and other political methods.[48]

Since the 1974 constitution the opštinа assembly uniformly has three different chambers to represent formally different interests of



FIGURE 3.1.--Political Structure of the Yugoslav Opština.

the community.[49] The chamber of "mesna zajednica" represents the neighborhood interests of the community; the chamber of socio-political organizations represents the interests of those organizations in the community; and the chamber of associated producers (workers) represents the functional or work-related interests of the community. The opštinа charter often formally delegates certain communal responsibilities to one or two of the chambers.[50] The majority of the decisions, however, are made in a joint session, rather than in separate or single sessions of the chamber.[51]

Members of the opštinа chambers are not paid except for expenses incurred while on communal business. They are also not free under the present delegate system to vote on any major issues without formally consulting the body which elected them and getting their formal approval.

The boards of the interests of the community (interesne zajednice) are special boards set up to determine administrative policies in specific service areas, provide a community board of review over different communal functions, and solicit funds and contributions for communal services. Members of the boards are elected and are nominally independent of the opstina assembly. Knowledge about the composition of the boards and sources of income can be very useful tools in comparing some qualitative aspects of public policies.

The executive council acts like a cabinet in many respects. It implements the policy determined by the assembly; suggests to the assembly that certain laws be implemented; formulates administrative regulations; coordinates the work of the civil service departments.[52] The executive council is composed of about ten members. The formal powers

of this organization have shrunk considerably since 1955 and considerable variation exists among opštinas in the formal as well as informal influence which the executive council has over public policies.[53] Members of the executive councils are usually limited to two consecutive terms and usually cannot simultaneously be members of the opština assembly. Because it is very important to keep the executive from dominating the legislature, the opština charters provide many barriers to enforce this division.[54]

The civil service's role varies considerably from commune to commune depending upon such factors as the level of services and size of the commune. The training and education of the civil service varies according to the job performed and the complexity of the commune administration.[55]

Theoretically the civil service is under the strong control and direction of the executive council and administrative staff of the opstina assembly.[56] In practice the opština assembly is often not periodically consulted about the opština administrative affairs, or consultations are given to only a few selected members.[57] The degree of the power of the civil service probably varies and tends to be more important in communes with a weak executive council or opština assembly.

The president of the opština assembly is elected from the ranks of the assembly and is generally limited to two terms. Often he is a paid full-time functionary and he is occasionally provided with a staff. His primary purpose is to coordinate the business of the opština

assembly and to function as its chairman. In practice the president often becomes involved in many more activities and may perceive himself as the executive and symbolic head of the commune.[58] In short, the strength of the president of the opština assembly varies according to the commune. In many cases the lack of clarity in his perceived role leads to conflict with the communal bureaucracy,[59] a conflict the outcome of which is often unclear.[60]

The secretary of the opština's legal and actual position varies greatly from commune to commune. His duties are similar to that of chief legal counsel for the commune.

> The secretary is required to consider and read every act which is brought before the assembly from the viewpoint of its legality, and when necessary to warn and explain to the assembly when a proposed act is illegal.[61]

The secretary is in a good position, because of his legal powers, to wield considerable influence over the proposed policies suggested to the communal assembly.

2. Centers of Influence in the Commune

As is apparent from Figure 3.1 and the preceeding explanation, the political system of the commune is very complex and possesses competing lines of authority and numerous levels which tend to separate the citizen from the final decision. Policy can be efficiently and democratically implemented only when the channels of communication remain open and each unit is working towards the same goals.[62] Thus, the greatest influence over the final determination of policy is

maintained by those units that have the authority necessary to harmonize divergent goals.

Within the formal political framework of the Yugoslav commune, two institutions usually possess the degree of access to channels of communication and authority that is necessary to influence communal public policy. These institutions are the opštinа assembly and the president of the opštinа assembly.

The opštinа assembly receives the formal power from the republic constitutions and opštinа statutes to initiate and determine public policies. Usually the opštinа assembly exerts a great deal of influence on public policy formation. Often, however, the president of the opštinа assembly can exert a good deal of influence as well. This is because of the fact that the president of the opštinа assembly is almost always a professional political functionary while opštinа delegates/representatives usually serve only as amateurs.[63] In addition, the president of the opštinа assembly can often claim direct contact with the "general interest" of the commune while opštinа assembly delegates/representatives tend to represent their own organizations rather than the interest of the commune as a whole.[64] Finally, the president of the opštinа assembly can sometimes more efficiently handle emergency problems and crises as they occur since he is able to maintain direct contact and control over executive functions.[65]

Together, both the president of the opštinа assembly and the opštinа assembly itself have considerable influence over communal public

policies. Table 3.3 gives an indication of the degree of influence held by various communal organizations over policy formation in a sample of representatives of opština assemblies from 16 Slovenian communes in 1970. This actual influence is contrasted with the amount of influence which the respondents throught was desirable for that organization.

The table indicates that the president of the opština assembly possesses more influence than do the opstina assembly members or separate assembly councils even though they are considered to be the desirable dominant factor in the commune.[66] Together, however, they seem to possess considerable influence in the affairs of the commune.[67]

When specific communal policies are examined, we find that the influence of the president of the opština assembly and the opština assembly have had consistently high and similar patterns across various policies in the commune. Figure 3.2 graphically portrays the pattern of influence across various vital communal policies in a sample of Slovenian communes.[68]

Apparently the only policies over which the president of the opština assembly and the opština assembly do not possess a very large degree of influence are the election of the president of the opština assembly and election of directors in economic enterprises. In short, the opština assembly and its president should be considered the focal points for the determination of communal public policies.

We should not infer from these arguments that other organizations, especially organizations independent of the political structure of the commune, do not have considerable influence over these policies

TABLE 3.3.--Average Actual and Desired Influence of Various Communal Organizations on Decision-Making in a Sample of Slovenian Opština Assemblies in 1970.[a]

Organizations	Average Score of Actual Influence	Average Score of Desired Influence	Index of Disharmony
Republic Organs	3.27	2.41	+0.86
President of Opština Assembly	3.22	3.05	+0.17
Councils of the Opština Assembly	3.01	3.20	-0.19
Opština Civil Service	2.92	2.71	+0.21
Opština League of Communists	2.66	2.73	-0.07
Members of Opština Assembly	2.41	3.55	-1.14
Enterprises	2.32	2.91	-0.59
Opština Socialist Alliance	2.28	2.79	-0.51
Opština Trade Unions	2.01	2.72	-0.71
Voter Meetings	1.86	3.49	-1.63
Voluntary Societies	1.54	2.31	-1.77

[a]See Petar Jambrek, "Kdo Odloča v Slovenskih Občinah," Pravnik 27 (Ljubljana 1972): 22-34. Two-hundred-fifty-six opština assembly representatives from 16 opština assemblies were asked the question, "How much influence in the opština assembly in your opstina (should) have the following institutions on decision-making in your opština?" Scores range from 1 through 9 where: 1 = very little influence; 2 = little influence; 3 = great influence; 4 = very great influence.



Figure 3.2.--Graph of Average Influence of Various Opština Organizations over Selected Policy Issues.

in the commune. Other organizations may help select both opštinа assembly members and the president of the opštinа assembly or they may exert influence over both these bodies in other indirect ways.

3. Political Processes in the Commune

The third step in this section is to define the context of the decision-making process in the Yugoslav commune. We wish to define the various aspects of the decision-making process. This means simply that we need to operationalize the concepts of decentralization, participation and bureaucratism/professionalism in the commune.

The extent of decentralization in the commune is largely measured through the importance and prevalence of an organization called the "mesna zajednica" which can be translated as "the local community."

> With the constitutional changes the place and role of the "mesna zajednica" changed fundamentally. The "mesna zajednica" is a result of the decentralization of government decision-making which is necessary for the development of self-management. With the extension of the responsibilities of the opštinа at the expense of the large social-political communities, the possibilities appeared for part of the responsibilities to be delegated to the still narrower community inside the opštinа. With the formation of the mesna zajednica the organs of the opstina were liberated from the worries about the needs of local settlements.[69]

The mesna zajednica is a local level political organization somewhat similar in size to the U. S. precinct. The mesna zajednica may be delegated responsibilities for the maintenance of day care centers, sport centers, meeting halls, libraries, road maintenance, etc.[70] Each mesna zajednica has an executive council which considers a large number of local questions.

A good measure of the degree to which decentralization has been accomplished in the commune can be the extent to which the mesna zajednica is important and does engage in local community affairs.[71] This is one of the important factors in determining how public policy decisions are reached.[72]

The problem of participation is the second aspect of decision-making that must be examined and defined in the context of the Yugoslav commune. Since voting turnout is not an accurate measure of participation in a one-party state, alternative measures must be employed. Romanić[73] lists several alternative measures of participation including participation in socio-political organizations, polls, referenda, town hall meetings, etc.

One of the best alternatives for measuring participation is to examine turnout at town hall meetings,[74] or at least the number of town-hall meetings called. These meetings are called by the mesna zajednica's executive council to inform citizens about community problems, vote on referenda, discuss general problems and nominate mesna zajednica and opštinа public officers.[75] One of the interesting features of the town-hall meetings is that there is considerable variation among opštinas in the degree to which they rely upon them.[76]

Professionalism is relatively easy to measure. Yugoslav authorities are very conscious that industrial and agricultural workers should be widely represented on decision-making bodies,[77] and that their absence is a reflection of a high degree of bureaucratism/professionalism within

the commune,[78] a feature contrary to the principles of self-management.[79] The extent of professional-managerial representation in decision-making bodies does vary from commune to commune.

C. Political Structure as a Factor in the Policy-Making Process

The third section of this chapter empirically tests several hypotheses about the relevance of the political structure to public policies and the decision-making process. We are concerned with answering, at least partially, the following questions:

--Is there variance among communal governments in their formal political structure?

--Is this variance, if any, linked to the socio-economic characteristics of the commune?

--Is this variance, if any, helpful in explaining public policies and the decision-making process within the commune?

The answers to these questions are clearly significant for the first step of the model that encompasses political structural characteristics.

1. Is There Variance?

Since socialist systems are considered to be highly centralized, American scholars usually assume that the formal political structure of the local units within them is essentially standardized throughout the country. Frolic[80] in his comparison of communist urban systems states that these systems suffer from a lack of autonomy. Hough[81] in a reply to Frolic argues that even though autonomy is limited, communist system local authorities have considerable power to intervene in nearly

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every aspect of urban life. In these studies, as well as others,[82] an assumption (stated or unstated) is made that there is little or no meaningful variation among communist urban governments in terms of their formal political structure, or that variation which occurs is simply an exception made to accommodate some specific circumstances.[83]

This assumption needs examination. If variance does occur, it will be important to determine what effect, if any, that variance may have upon political decision-making.

Two behavioral characteristics of the political system of Yugoslavia encouraged me to examine more closely this assumption. One is the constant emphasis of Yugoslav ideology on the value of decentralization and the establishment of local autonomy. A second characteristic is the continuous appearance of conflict within local governments. This conflict has variously been attributed to an overly ambitious executive,[84] to a weak executive,[85] or to a powerful local bureaucracy.[86] In nearly all these cases attempts were made afterwards to amend the communal charters to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

I examined the communal charters of a sample of communes in order to examine the possibility that local political structural variation occurs in Yugoslavia. Fifty-one communal charters were read and coded. All the communes were in Serbia and members of several strong regional associations. This reduces the possibility of republic factors being responsible for the variance.[87] (See Appendix A for a list of the communes included in this sample.)

Three separate indices were constructed. One index measures the degree of the formal executive power in the commune. The index includes such factors as limitations on the ability of the executive to discuss issues, to call meetings, to make decisions without legislative approval, and to select staff. It is generated by summing the scores of twelve items relating to the power of the executive. (See Appendix B for a list of the items included and scores associated with each item.) A high score on the executive power index indicates that the executive council and president of the opštinа assembly have relatively more formal powers and protection than is the case in other communes. The executive power scores in the 51 sample communes ranged from 1 to 14.

The second index considered is the bureaucratism/professionalism index. This index is composed of the sum of eleven individual items discussed in the opština charter. It includes such items as number of paid positions, extent of job protection, existence of reelection prohibitions, and types of collective decision-making bodies, etc. (See Appendix B for a complete list and explanation.) Bureaucratism/professionalism index scores ranged from 6 to 13. A high score on this index indicates that the formal political structure encourages bureaucratic patterns of behavior.

A third index which was developed from the communal charter is entitled the legislative index of worker control. This index measures the extent to which the legislature has control over policy formation in the commune and the extent to which the chamber of workers within

the opštinа assembly has a dominant position within the assembly. The legislative-worker control index is composed of ten items. (See Appendix B for a complete list and explanation.) The index includes such characteristics as the extent of control of fiscal issues held by the chamber of workers, prevalence of joint sessions, the extent of control over general community issues, the existence of veto power over the appointment of executive and officers. Actual scores on this index ranged from 4 to 19. A high score indicates greater relative power in the hands of the legislature, especially the chamber of workers.

In the Yugoslav theoretical context, these three indices are very useful. They are, in effect, operational measures of the extent of formal self-management within the Yugoslav commune. If political structure does vary in Yugoslavia, we would expect these indices to be the most important measures of the differences in the formal political system. If relatively little variation in scores is found, we have strong reasons to infer that formal local autonomy (i.e., the right of the commune to formulate its own political system) is lacking.

As is clear from the coefficient of variation measure in Table 3.4, variance does exist, especially in the executive power index. All the indices, seem to have captured some variation among Yugoslav local governments in terms of political structure. The distributions of all the indices are skewed slightly to the left which indicates that a small group of communes may have relatively high scores. This can imply one of two things: one, that the central political system provides

TABLE 3.4.--Summary Statistical Measures for Political Structural Indices, 1974.

Index	Maximum Value	Minimum Value	Mean	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variation	Skewness
Executive Power	14.0	1.0	9.2	3.4	.372	-.466
Bureaucratic Professionalism	13.0	6.0	9.9	1.9	.197	-.448
Workers' Control	19.0	4.0	13.7	3.1	.223	-.951

N = 51

basic minimum levels in all three indices but that communes are not restrained from exceeding these levels; or two, that the indices' scores do not reflect strict linear measures but rather a logarithmic function. The skewness of the index, however, is not so strong as to induce us to reject the normal distribution as the appropriate distribution.

If the executive power index, the bureaucratism-professionalism index and the legislative-workers' control index are valid measures of their respective concepts, we would expect certain specific correlations among them. First, the formal power of the executive should vary directly with increases in the formal level of bureaucratism/professionalism. Second, both the formal power of the executive and the level of formal bureaucratism/professionalism should vary inversely with the formal legislative power of the workers.

The rationale here is quite simple. The communal executive, in order to hold and maintain control over communal affairs, would need some form of reward structure, long-term security, and the administrative skills that a bureaucratized communal administration can provide. We would expect, therefore, that executive power and bureaucratism/professionalism would be positively related to each other. This is based on the assumption that the formal distribution of power within the commune approximates a zero-sum solution; that is, gains in authority for the legislative branch of government would come at the expense of other branches of government. Thus, we expect the legislative-worker control index to be negatively related to the other two structural indices. Some error may well exist, however, because of the measurement

error in the construction of the indices and to the possiblity that alternative power sources exist in the commune.

Table 3.5, which lists the correlation coefficients obtained among the three indices, provides some support for these hypotheses.[88]

TABLE 3.5.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Indices of Formal Political Structure, 1974.[a]

Index	Index		
	Executive Power	Bureaucratism/ Professionalism	Legislative Workers' Control
Executive Power	1.00		
Bureaucratism/ Professionalism	-.479	1.00	
Legislative Workers' Control	-.388	.522	1.00

[a]All coefficients are significant at the .05 level.

N = 51

Executive power and bureaucratism/professionalism are positively associated with each other while both are negatively associated with legislative-workers' control. This, in turn, gives us a greater sense of confidence in the validity of the measures employed.

2. Linkages Between Political Structure and Socio-Economic Variables

This portion of the chapter addresses itself to the second question listed on page 75: is the variance among political-structural variables linked to the socio-economic characteristics of the commune? According to Yugoslav political theory about self-management discussed in Chapter II, we would expect that as a commune becomes socio-economically more developed, it begins to show more of the structural characteristics of a self-managed/pluralist society.

As Pečuljić[89] and Smiljković[90] have stated, self-management/pluralism is impossible in conditions of low development. Unfortunately, research results from Yugoslavia are somewhat contradictory. The institute for social research in Zagreb, for example, in one of its major projects, examined precisely this problem[91] and concluded that self-management characteristics are not related to developmental characteristics. On the other hand, Jambrek's work with Slovenian communes suggested the opposite.[92] In neither study, however, were the formal political structural characteristics examined.

Generally, then, we expect increases in the level of socio-economic development to be positively associated with increases in the self-management/pluralism characteristics of the commune political structure. More specifically, the level of socio-economic development should vary directly with the formal workers' legislative power and inversely with the formal power of the executive and with bureaucratism/professionalism.

Several measures are employed for the operationalization of socio-economic development. They include societal complexity, industrialization, change in economic resources, education, urbanization, social mobility, social integration and potential social conflict. Figure 3.3 summarizes the construction of these measures.

Variable	Measure
Societal Complexity	Per capita spending on administration, 1973
Industrialization I	Percent national income from industrial sources, 1973
Industrialization II	Percent of work force employed by industry, 1974
Change in Resources	Percent change in national income, 1971-73
Education	Percent of the population with more than middle education
Urbanization	Population per square hectare
Social Mobility (negative)	Percent of the adult population who have lived in the same commune since birth
Social Integration	Strength of inter-nationality cooperation
Potential Social Conflict	Agricultural/industrial income inequality

Figure 3.3.--Operational Measures for the Characteristics of Socio-Economic Development.[a]

[a]See Appendix C for the sources of the data for all variables used in the dissertation.

Two of the operational measures of the socio-economic variables deserve more explanation. Social integration is measured by multiplying an index of nationality fragmentation[93] by the percent of the population claiming Yugoslav as a nationality. The nationality index of

fragmentation can only indicate how fractionalized the commune is. It does not, by itself, give us any indication that the fractional groups are reintegrating or coalescing together. This additional information, however, can be inferred by multiplying this index by the Yugoslav nationality percentage, an integrative measure.[94]

The potential social conflict score is based upon the premise that social conflict pressures would be higher when one group (i.e., agricultural workers) feels that its relative economic position is inferior to other groups and when such economically-advantaged groups are very visible. The exact computation of this score is:

$$\frac{\frac{a}{b} - \frac{b}{d}}{\frac{b}{d}} \times e$$

where: a = industrical income
b = agricultural income
c = industrial employment
d = agricultural employment
e = percent work force industrial.

The index is simply a measure of percent difference in industrial and agricultural income times an intensity factor (e). The index attempts to measure the degree of the <u>potential</u> hostility or jealousy that agricultural interests may feel toward the industrial element in the commune.

Table 3.6 gives the simple correlation coefficients between the socio-economic and political-structural variables for the 51 communes studied. These coefficients are consistent with our expectations. In fact, not a single measure deviates from the predicted trend. In general,

TABLE 3.6.--Correlation Coefficients of Socio-Economic Characteristics with Structural Characteristics.

Socio-Economic Characteristics	Structural Characteristics		
	Executive Power	Bureaucratism/ Professionalism	Formal Legislative Workers' Control
Societal Complexity	-.229	-.372	.273
Industrialization I	-.024*	-.133*	.098*
Industrialization II	.129*	.076*	-.019*
Change in Resources	.127*	.135*	-.029*
Education	-.409	-.524	.425
Urbanization	-.300	-.235	.265
Social Mobility (negative)	.533	.669	-.475
Social Integration	.218	.025*	.001*
Potential Social Conflict	-.162*	-.159*	.119*

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

socio-economic development appears to be positively associated with greater formal pluralism/self-management.

We should be cautious about the interpretation we give to the results. First, most correlation coefficients are not very strong. This indicates that factors other than socio-economic development may have an impact upon the political structure. Second, since no controls were used, any relationships established may actually be spurious and the result of other variables. For example, it is very possible that socio-political organization may be a more accurate determinant of decision-making processes than socio-economic characteristics. This possibility is examined in Chapter IV.

3. Linkages Between Political Structure and Public Policy Decision-Making

The third question introduced in this section was: is the variance in political structure helpful in explaining public policies and the public policy decision-making process in the commune? I shall examine the relationship which the political-structural indices have upon the processes of decision-making within the commune, the types of laws and ordinances implemented by the commune, the legal basis of these laws and how those laws were passed.

We would expect that there would be a positive relationship between the formal decision-making structure and the actual processes of decision-making within the commune since the structure should facilitate specific forms of decision-making.

We can measure the behavioral characteristics of self-management/pluralist political processes with an examination of the degree of bureaucratism/professionalism, decentralization, progressivism and participative political decision-making processes in the commune. Bureaucratism is measured by the per capita budgetary expenditures for administration. A high score in this measure implies a low degree of self-management/pluralist political decision-making. Professionalism is measured by the percent of the opština assembly employed in professional occupations in 1974. An increase in this measure implies a decrease in self-managment/pluralist political decision-making. Decentralization is measured by the degree to which the commune in 1973 has been broken down into the smaller administrative mesna zajednica

discussed earlier in this chapter. More decentralization can be associated with more self-management/pluralism.

Progressivism is measured by the percent women and percent youth in the opstina assembly. Female and youth participation in decision-making bodies is often used in Yugoslavia as a measure of the strength of progressive attitudes. Conscious attempts are made to increase female and youth participation for that reason.[95] More progressivism is associated with more self-management/pluralism.

Unfortunately, no 1974 data measuring political participation exist at this time, therefore, participation will not be examined.

Table 3.7 examines the correlation coefficients of the relevant variables. In brief, we would expect that executive power and

TABLE 3.7.--Correlation Coefficients Between Political Structural Variables and Political Decision-Making Variables.

Decision-Making Characteristics	Political Structure		
	Executive Power	Bureaucratism/ Professionalism	Legislative Workers' Control
Bureaucratism	-.034*	-.404	.134*
Professionalism	-.271	-.511	.421
Decentralization	-.406	-.524	.496
Progressivism-Women	-.275	-.268	.304
Progressivism-Youth	-.256	-.164*	.228

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

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bureaucratism/professionalism would be positively associated with bureaucratism and professionalism but negatively associated with decentralization and progressivism; and that legislative-workers' control would follow an opposite pattern, namely, a negative association with bureaucratism/professionalism but a positive association with decentralization and progressivism.

The results from Table 3.7 are only partially consistent with these expectations. Progressivism and decentralization behave in the expected pattern but bureaucratism/professionalism behave opposite to the predicted. The tendency for professional personnel to avoid legislative service if their independence or collective influence as members of the legislature is weak may be a probable explanation for the reverse behavior of professionalism. Thus, the granting of powers to the opština assembly, which makes it a more prestigious body, may attract more professional personnel within its ranks.[96] Several different explanations can be given for the unexpected negative relationship between bureaucratism/professionalism and the strength of the bureaucracy. However, the data are not sufficiently refined to permit us to select the most appropriate justification.

The results from Table 3.7 do indicate that the various aspects of the decision-making process deserve more attention and examination. This is provided in Chapter V.

The second problem with which we are concerned is the relationship between structural variables and the type, number, legal justification and voting procedure of the laws and ordinances passed by the

opštinа assembly. In other words, our question is: does formal political structure influence what the legislature does and how it performs its job?

We expect that where the political-structural characteristics approach self-management/pluralism ideals, there is involvement of the assembly in administrative procedures and specific administrative tasks. This follows directly from the Yugoslav interpretation of self-management. We also expect in this case that the legislature is more involved as indicated by the number of laws and ordinances passed. Third, we expect that where the executive and bureaucracy is strong, the laws which are passed are passed more often through republic pressure rather than internal communal pressure. Finally, it would seem to be more likely that when the executive and bureaucracy are strong, laws which are passed will tend not to be sent to the opština assembly meeting as a whole. Such a procedure would be less controllable, would invite more changes and would result in less executive and bureaucratic control over public policy formation.

The data used to examine these expectations were derived from an analysis of all the laws passed and registered by 64 communes in Serbia in 1974.[97] Each law was analyzed for its content, type, method of passage, and legal justification. (See Appendix D for a more complete explanation of coding procedures.)

Table 3.8 lists the correlation coefficients obtained in our sample of communes. For none of the variables were there significant

TABLE 3.8.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Political Structural Characteristics and Statutory Variables, 1974.

Communal Statutory Characteristics	Political Structure		
	Executive Power	Bureaucratism/ Professionalism	Legislative Workers' Control
Number of Administrative Ordinances	-.614	-.343	.459
Number of Special Fund Ordinances	-.714	-.450	.370
Housing Code Ordinances	-.506	-.395	.280
Health and Social Welfare Ordinances	-.210*	-.142*	-.029*
Total Laws and Ordinances Passed	-.510	-.239	.265
Total Statutory Acts Justified Solely by the Communal Charters	-.670	-.354	.507
Total Statutory Acts Justified Solely by the Republic Statutes	.169*	.071*	.091*
Total Statutory Acts Passed in Combined Sessions	-.603	-.250	.231

*Correlation coefficients not significant at the .05 level.

differences from what was predicted; the legislature is more involved in general and specific tasks when the political structure moves toward self-management/pluralist norms; the legislature also passes more laws and more laws under its own initiative under conditions of self-managment/pluralism; and it tends to meet more as a unified body under those conditions. The results in general seem to indicate that political structure does relate in a predictable manner to actual political behavior. It gives some credence to the idea that political structure is important.

In summary, this chapter has defined and examined the local political system in Yugoslavia and has described how that system can fit into the model described in Chapter II. This chapter also examined the variation in political-structural characteristics among the Yugoslav communes and the interrelationship of environmental variables and political decision-making variables upon the political structure. In conclusion, we have strong evidence to indicate that the political structure does make a difference and should be included in a public policy-making model.

FOOTNOTES--Chapter III

[1]Both "opština" and "commune" are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation. There is a slight technical difference between the two, but it is not important to the concerns of this study.

[2]The source for all figures used in this paragraph is the Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije 1975 (Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Beograd, 1975), pp. 562-571.

[3]Translated from Jovan Đorđevic, Politički Sistem (Beograd: Privredni Pregled, 1973), p. 446.

[4]Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in On the Paris Commune, eds: Karl Marx and F. Engles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971).

[5]For a brief discussion of the structure and function of the national liberation committees, see: Milivoje Kovačević, Komunalni Sistem i Komunalna Politika (Beograd: Zavod za Isdavanje Udbenika, SRS, 1968), pp. 29-41.

[6]Since the official changes are justified by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, all structural changes can be justified by a dialectic operating in response to material changes in society. For an interesting application, see: Edvard Kardelj, O Komuni: Zbirka Napisa (Sarajevo: Prosvjeta, 1955).

[7]Bronislav Mirić, "Yugoslavia's Search for the Optimum Size of Commune," Studies in Comparative Local Government 1 (Summer 1967): 49, corroborates this point.

[8]Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Teritorijalno Organizovanje Samoupravljanja," Bilten 75 (September 1967): 4-13.

[9]Lazar Đurovski, Mesto i Uloga Opštine u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jogoslavije (Politička Škola JNA, 1972), pp. 28-29.

[10]Odbor Društveno-Političkog Veča, Aktuelna Pitanja Komunalnog Sistema (Beograd: Dragan Srnić, 1972), p. 20.

[11]"Nova Komora," Borba (May 20, 1975): 4.

[12]Lazar Đurovski, "Stvarni Položaj Opštinskih Skupština u Šferi Normativne Delatnosti," Socijalizam 1 (1971): 42.

[13]Source: Lazar Đurovski, "Stvarni Položaj Opštinskim Skupština u Šferi Normativne Delatnost," op. cit., p. 50.

[14]Jure Strgar, "Informiranje u Opčini u Uvjetima Delegatskog Sistema," Naša Zakonitost (January, 28, 1974): 42-47, analyzes in a rather detailed fashion the consequences and significance of the problem of information on the level of the commune.

[15]Toša Tišma, "Fiskalna Politika i Autonomija Opština," Komuna 19 (1972): 36-38.

[16]The socio-political implications of this should be rather obvious. As taxing authority is delegated to lower levels, hostility and resistance to governmental tax policies are confined to that level, thereby freeing higher levels of government from considerable potential citizen pressure. A second consequence, discussed more fully later, would be that inequality in services would exist and higher levels of authority would escape the onus of criticism for inequalities. This would tend to defuse considerably inter-nationality hostility, an argument reminiscent of Madison's Number 10 in the Federalist Papers (New York: The New American Library, 1961).

[17]See Vojislav Stanovčić, "Teritorijalni i Funkcionalni Aspekti Federalizma," Socijalizam 4 (1971): 413-438, who formally links the nationality and federalsim issues as they apply to Yugoslavia.

[18]Ustav Socijalističke Republike Jugoslavije (Beograd: Prosveta 974), p. 116.

[19]Balša Špadijer, Komunalni Sistem Jugoslavije (Beograd: Rad, 1965).

[20]Najdan Pašić, Nacionalno Pitanje u Savremenoj Epohi (Beograd: Radnička Stampa, 1973), pp. 192-193.

[21]Daniel Elazar, The American Partnership (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[22]Local tax revenues are basically surtaxes on the republic and federal base tax levels. In the 1974 constitution the fiscal system was altered to permit communes to collect some revenues independently of the federation and republics for specific purposes. The actual effect which this change has upon the fiscal problems discussed later is not yet clear.

[23]See Petar Jambrek, Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975), pp. 1-5.

[24]Exceptions to this are customs and national defense.

[25]In order to maintain personnel standards, each republic ministry provides recommended standards and the universities and higher schools are very cooperative in establishing training programs to meet administrative needs. In addition the standing conference of towns functions as a professional organization to raise and maintain relatively equal standards. See Branko Pesić, "Petnaesta Godišnjica Stalne Konferencije Gradova Jugoslavije," Materijali za XVIII Skupštine SKGJ (Priština: September 1968), cited in the Institut za Političke Studije Fakulteta Političkih Nauka, Položaj i Funkcije Komune u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije 2 (Beograd: May, 1971), p. 301.

[26]See Ramiz Crnišanin, "Razvoj Političkog Sistema i Struktura Opštinske Skupštine," Reforma 6 (1971): 18-20.

[27]Komuna na Drugom Kongresu Samoupravljača Jugoslavije, "Opština kao Samoupravna Zajednica," Komuna 18 (March 1971): 2.

[28]See D. Božić and S. Jogan, Samoupravljanje u Komuni (Zagreb, Globus, 1974), p. 67.

[29]See Ljubiša Ristović, "Detatizacija Odnosa u Komuni," in Od Etatizma Ka Samoupravljanju, ed: Milentije Popović (Bečej: Proleter, 1970), p. 324.

[30]Radivoje Marinković, "Komuna u Federativnoj Zajednici," in Karakter i Funkcije Federacije u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravnog Društva, ed: Ljubiša Stankov (Beograd: Institut za Političke Studija, 1968), pp. 315-316.

[31]See Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Neka Pitanja Metoda Rada Opštinskih Skupština," Bilten 42 (Beograd: April, 1965), pp. 14-15, for a discussion of the reasons for this change.

[32]"Opštine su za Selektivno Smananjenje Zajedničke Potrošnje," Politika (November 14, 1974): 7.

[33]Petar Jambrek, Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia, op. cit., p. 116.

[34]This is a list abstracted from Milivoje Kovačević, Komunalni Sistem i Komunalna Politika, op. cit.

[35]Standing Conference of Towns of Yugoslavia, The Yugoslav Commune (Beograd: Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, 1974), p. 51.

[36]Radivoje Marinković, "Uticaj Komune na Proces Integracije u Privredi," in Marks i Savremonost: II Deo, ed: Institut za Izučavanje Radničkog Pokreta (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1964), p. 329.

[37]Milivoje Kovačević, Komunalni Sistem i Komunalna Politika, op. cit., pp. 79-95.

[38]For example, in Čačak commune officials were prosecuted for abusing their positions and profiting from specific decisions. (See "Opštinski Komitet SK Komunista Odbornika," Čačanski Glas (May 25, 1973) p. 3. Sometimes the process is institutionalized. For example, every neighborhood in Voždovac opština in Belgrade is assigned by the opština a chimney sweep (privately employed) who must be paid by every resident even though many residences have central heating, oil heat, etc., and do not need this service.

[39]Milivoje Kovačević, Komunalni Sistem i Komunalna Politika, op. cit., pp. 98-106.

[40]See Milos Andrić, "Organizacija i Rad Inspekcijckih Službi u Opština Valjevo," Opština 25 (1972): 41-44.

[41]"Stambena Politika u Predsoblju," Borba (June 7, 1975): 4.

[42]See Stojan Tomić, "Determinante Devijantnog Ponašanja u Šferi Stambene Izgradnje" (Sarajevo, Akademija Nauka i Umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1972).

[43]Even though housing is important, this dissertation will not analyze housing policy. One reason is the lack of reliable information. Because of the widespread violation of housing codes and statutes, the official statistics do not adequately reflect the true housing situation.

[44]Bronislav Mirić, "Opština i Razvoj Društveno-Ekonomskih Odnosa u Oblasti Obrazovanja i Vaspitanja," Komuna 19 (1972).

[45]Since the adoption of the new federal and republic constitutions early in 1974, all opstinas have an equal number of legislative chambers.

[46]Lazar Đurovski, Organizacija i Funkcionisanje Opštinske Skupštine (Beograd: Republički Zavod za Javnu Upravu, 1968), p. 9.

[47]Momčilo Dimitrijević, "Položaj i Uloga Skupštine Društveno-Političke Zajednice," Arhiv za Pravne i Društvene Nauke 58 (January-March, 1972), p. 35.

[48]See II Kongres Samoupravlača Jugoslavije (Beograd: January, 1971), cited in Položaj i Funkcije Komune u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije, ed: Institut za Političke Studije (Beograd: Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1971), p. 49.

[49]Ilijaz Kurteši, "Opština u Novom Ustavnom Sistemu," Socijalizam 16 (1973): 675-683.

[50]"Izveštaj Potkomišiji za Položaj i Prava Opštini i Razvoj Samoupravljanje" 29 (April, 1968), cited in Institut za Političke Studije, op. cit., 55.

[51]In 1965, 64% of all sessions of the opstina assembly were joint sessions. Source: Lazar Đurovski, Organizacija i Funkcionisanje Opštinske Skupštine, op. cit., 43. In 1974 in a sample of 59 opstinas from which I collected the necessary data, 64.8% of all bills listed in the official registrars of the opstinas were passed in joint sessions.

[52]See Tomislav Milanović, "Položaj Funkcije i Uloga Izvršnog Organa Skupštine Opštine," Opština 27 (1974): 35-41.

[53]Ljubiša Savić, "Izvršni Organi Opštinskih Skupština," Opština 27 (1974): 25-34.

[54]Milivoje Andrejević, "Reforma Skupštinskog Sistema u Opštini," Zbornik Radova (1970): 137-153.

[55]See Dragan Mihajlović, "Organizacija i Funkcionisanje Opštinskih Službi Društvenih Prihoda u SR Srbiji," 20 Komuna (1973): 27, for an analysis of only one civil service department and Lazar Đurovski, Organizacija i Funkcionisanje Opštinske Skupštine, op. cit., p. 89, for older but more complete data.

[56]Đorđe Đurić, "Strucne Službe Opčinskih Skupština u SR Hrvatskoj," 20 Komuna (1973): 25.

[57]Lazar Đurovski, Organizacija i Funkcionisanje Opštinske Skupštine, op. cit., p. 85.

[58]See Lazar Đurovski, ibid., p. 62, for corroboration. In many respects the president of the opstina assembly sometimes behaves in a manner similar to a U. S. governor and they are criticized for such behavior. See Žika Minović, Politička Palanka (Beograd: Proleter, 1972).

[59]Leon Geršković, "Šta je Suština Ustavne Koncepcije Komune," Socijalizam 7-8 (1968): 907.

[60]Ljubiša Ristović, "Zavoravljena Komuna," Komunist 12 (1969): 17.

[61]Đuro Mladen, "Opštinski Organi Uprave u Novom Skupštinskom Sistemu," Opština 26 (1973): 38-44.

[62]Krsto Kilibarda, Samoupravljanje i Savez Komunista (Beograd: Sociološki Institut, 1966). The influence of such opstina political institutions sometimes exceeds the bounds determined by statute and has a great impact on policy in spheres other than opstina politics. For example, only 30% of the members of economic enterprises surveyed in a Serbian commune thought that in a conflict about the future growth of an economic enterprise the affected economic enterprise's viewpoint would predominate over the viewpoint of the communal leadership. Of those workers surveyed, 47% thought that the communal leadership had more influence over the final determination of a policy vital to the economic enterprise than did the enterprise itself.

[63]Vaskrsije Savilić, "Politička Kooperacija i Konflikti u Izbornom Procesu," in Komunalni Konflikti 5, ed: Stojan Tomić (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1973): 1082.

[64]Lazar Đurovski, Organizacija I Funkcionisanje Opštinske Skupštine, op. cit., p. 57.

[65]Lazar Đurovski, Mesto i Uloga Opštine u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije, op. cit.

[66]There were similar findings in a Macedonian study of six opstinas with 912 selected respondents in 1970. In this study 52.8% of all respondents selected the president of the opština assembly as the most influential factor in decision-making in the opština. The remainder were distributed among nine other groups. Members of the opstina assembly received only 3.8% of all first place votes. See Milan Nedkov and Dmitar Mirčev, "Politički Konflikti i Cezarizam u Opštini," in Komunalni Konflikti 5, ed: Stojan Tomić, op. cit., pp. 965-1004.

[67]It should also be noted, however, that many non-political administrative opština organizations had much more influence over policies in the opština (or claims to it) than the formal opština organizational chart had indicated. In particular, the League of Communists, Socialist Alliance, and Trade Unions were given a relatively high rating of desired influence over policy in the opština.

[68]See Janez Jerovšek, "Structure of Influence in the Commune," Sociologija Selected Articles 1959-1969 (Beograd: 1970), reprinted from Sociologija 2 (1969). Seventeen opštinas in Slovenia were selected, 18 high officials in each opština were interviewed. A five point scale of influence was used.

[69]Radivoje Marinkovic, "Uticaj Radničke Klase Beograda na Odlučivanje o Delu Dohotka Koji se Izdvaja i Troši za Zajedničke Potrebe," Samoupravno Pravo 1 (1974): 245.

[70]For a more complete description of the function of the mesna zajednica, see Đuraj Hrženjak, Mjesna Zajednica (Zagred: Globus, 1974).

[71]Radivoje Marinković, Ko Odlučuje u Komuni (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1971), pp. 214-225.

[72]Drago Radojnić, "Mjesne Zajednice Kao Faktor Neposrednog Odlučivanja i Samoupravne Integracije," Opredjeljenja 2 (1974): 87-91.

[73]Koviljka Romanić, "Odlučivanje u Opštini o Pitanjima od Zajedničkog i Opšteg Interesa," Socijalizam 15 (1972): 1011-1021.

[74]Radivoje Marinković, Ko Odlučuje u Komuni, op. cit., 219.

[75]Duško Milidragović, "Zborovi Birača Kao Oblik Učešća Građana u Samoupravljanju Opština," Naše Teme (1971): 229-230.

[76]Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Neka Pitanja Daljeg Unapredenja Rada Zborova Birača i Primene Referenduma," Bilten 75 (September 1967) and Institut za Društveno Upravljanje Zagreb, Građani-Društveni Plan i Budžet Opčine" (Zagreb, 1969).

[77]Čedo Nebeljković, "Prevazilazenje Staleškog Karaktera Zajednica Obrazovanje," Opština 26 (1973): 41-43.

[78]Milorad Radević, "Nejednake Mogučnosti Učešća u Odlučivanju Kao Izvor Socijalnih Nejednakosti," Socijalizam 15 (1972): 708-715.

[79]Radivoje Marinković, "Uticaj Radničke Klase Beograda na Odlučivanje o Delu Dohotka Koji se Izdvaja i Troši za Zajednicke Potrebe," op. cit.

[80]Michael Frolic, "Non-Comparative Communism: Soviet and Chinese Cities," Journal of Comparative Administration (November, 1972): 288-289.

[81]Jerry Hough, "Soviet Urban Politics and Comparative Urban Theory," Journal of Comparative Administration (November, 1972): 311-334.

[82]Four very useful studies which examine decision-making in Communist cities are: Jaroslav Piekalkiewicz, Communist Local Government: A Study of Poland (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1975); B. Michael Frolic, "Decision-Making in Soviet Cities," paper presented at the 66th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, 1970; B. Michael Frolic, "The Soviet Study of Soviet Cities," Journal of Politics 32 (August, 1970): 675-695; and William Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities (New York: Praeger, 1973).

[83]David T. Cattell, Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government (New York: Praeger, 1968).

[84]"Koreni Neslaganje," Politika 6 (January 14, 1974) and "Izglačano Poverenje Sekretaru Opština," Borba 8 (March 2, 1974).

[85]"Jacanje Moči Izvršnih Odbora Kao Vlasti u Opštinama," Borba (April 8, 1975): 5.

[86]"Politička Moč Ostinskih Vlada," Borba (May 11, 1975): 5.

[87]Serbia is a good selection for this type of analysis since it is the largest republic in the country and has the widest spread in terms of socio-economic characteristics. Also the communes in Serbia are well organized through the republic Secretariat for Public Management. This would tend to reduce political-structural variation among opstinas. If significant variation occurs in these Serbian communes, we can be more confident that variation will occur within other republics as well.

[88]I also examined the scatter plots of the combination of these variables to determine if possibly some extreme cases would account for the relatively high coefficients. The visual inspection of the scatter plots did not reveal any such discrepancies. Therefore, we can be reasonably confident that the correlation coefficients are meaningful.

[89]Miroslav Pečujlić, Studija iz Političke Sociologije i Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Institucija Škola Političkih Nauka, 1965).

[90]Radoš Smiljković, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969).

[91]Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, Jugoslavenska Komuna - Teritoriji Razvijenost i Samoupravljanje u Općini (Zagreb: Svevcilista u Zagrebu, 1972).

[92]Petar Jambrek, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Commune," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971), p. 14.

[93]The index of fragmentation is computed by the following formula:

$$\text{Fragmentation} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\frac{fi}{N}\right)^2$$

where: N = the total population
fi = the population for each nationality.

The index varies from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates no fragmentation. Eight nationalities were used: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim/Turkish, Yugoslav, and the largest other nationaltiy in each commune. See Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), for a more complete description of the measure.

[94]Most people do not claim Yugoslav nationality. When it is claimed, it is usually a sign that an individual perceives himself so well integrated into the Yugoslav federal structure that he cannot or does not wish to identify with any specific nationality.

[95]For women, see "Nedovoljno Učešće Žena u Odlučivanju," Komunist (July 14, 1975): 16; for youth, see Borislav Džuverović, "Omladina i Društveno-Politički Sistem," Socijalizam 15 (1972): 580-589.

[96]This observation may be applicable outside Yugoslavia. Discussion of legislative reform within the United States suggests that recruitment of highly trained and qualified personnel in state legislatures can be facilitated by making the job more attractive. See, for example, Wilder Crane, Jr., and Meredith W. Watts, Jr., State Legislature Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

[97]Because of postal and other irregularities beyond my control, some data is missing. This accounts for possibly 15% of the total laws passed in 1974 by these communes. I am making the assumption that the losses contribute to random error.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING

This chapter examines the effect that socio-political organizations may have upon the general model introduced in Chapter II. From the literature review in that chapter we would expect that socio-political organizations would have a strong moderating effect on other variables in the model, especially decision-making processes. In other words, since socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia are given very definite roles in the policy-making process and are expected to intervene systematically in that process, they may tend to encourage some policies and discourage others. This chapter examines the formal role of particular socio-political organizations, and how the socio-political organizations perform the function of intervention. It also examines the degree of influence that socio-political organizations have in the commune and finally it examines the effect and biases that socio-political organizations have in the entire model of the policy process.

Unlike previous and succeeding chapters, Chapter IV does not introduce any new data, but rather, utilizes the existing findings of Yugoslav researchers in the context determined by the model. For this reason, the conclusions reached here cannot be directly tested or

incorporated into the model, but they are useful in putting the role of socio-political organizations into perspective and may suggest what type of bias may be introduced into the analysis of succeeding chapters.

A. The Role of Socio-Political Organizations in the Commune

Socio-political organizations have a great practical and theoretical importance in the Yugoslav commune. In Yugoslav society they serve two primary functions--the socialization and direction of society. It is these functions that give the socio-political organizations a role in the policy process.

The role of socio-political organization as a socializing force is primarily directed towards the integration of individuals into a community. It is geared to providing services unavailable elsewhere, providing education and information on activities of interest to its members, fostering group unity and a sense of belonging for the individual, etc. In a political sense, socio-political organizations socialize their members to accept and to work within the current political institutions and framework. They are the essential link between the policy output and the individual.

Yugoslav socio-political organizations also perform a directive role for society. They aggregate citizen interests, provide alternatives and stimuli for change, encourage political participation and generally direct the path of political development within the state. The socio-political organizations provide the framework, discipline and goals for planned political development. In this sense

socio-political organizations perform an essential function in a planned political system. Thus, it is possible for socio-political organizations to influence the policy process.

The local political roles of three separate Yugoslav socio-political organizations will be examined. These are: the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance, and the League of Trade Unions. Each of these organizations serves a specific purpose and each socio-political organization theoretically performs its socializing and directive roles in a different social arena. Thus, excluding their influence from an analysis of the public policy decision-making process may seriously bias our conclusions in succeeding chapters.

1. The League of Communists

a. Doctrinal Role of the Communal League of Communists.--The role of the League of Communists in the commune in its widest sense is to promote the development of self-management in socio-political relationships in the commune.

> The organization of the League of Communists in the opštinа with its own directive ideological and political work is the basic initiator of the political activity of citizens for the protection and further development of the heritage of the socialist social relationships and especially for the strengthening of the socialist consciousness of the working people and citizens.[1]

Since the status of self-management varies from commune to commune and changes constantly, and since the level of socio-economic development varies accordingly, we would expect that the internal structure, activity and behavior of the League of Communists would also change and adapt to its local environment.[2] In other words, the Party

is encouraged to adapt its behavior to new economic and social conditions.[3]

> Every revolutionary vanguard if it wishes to remain the actual vanguard of society must change in accordance with the changes in the concrete and general condition of the struggle for Socialism. It must be qualitatively transformed; it must change its own organizations, its position, and its activity towards changes in society.[4]

As a community develops, there is less need for the League of Communists to behave as the directive force among social and political groups in a commune,[5] but a greater need to perform the serious role of integrating society as the commune develops more and more autonomous areas of decision-making.[6] At all levels of development the Party is encouraged not only to mediate among different, often opposing interests,[7] but also to be the integrating factor of ideological cohesion as well.[8]

In practical terms, as the commune develops, the League of Communists takes less direct action and direct influence on specific policy outcomes;[9] it becomes less of an authoritative social factor and works more within other groups, organizations and structures.

> In the context of a maturing and developing idea of self-management the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (i.e., the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) also changes its role; becomes oriented towards integration into the direct action of the working class as its most conscious and hardest working part.[10]

Thus, as a commune attains a higher level of socio-economic development, we would expect that the direct influence of the League of Communists as an organization would decline while its indirect influences through other organizations, the political structure, and mass media would correspondingly increase.

b. Structure of the Communal League of Communists.--The total membership of the League of Communists in recent years (since 1971) has been growing rapidly and during the Tenth Party Congress in May, 1974, numbered 940,861,[11] or more than 8% of the adult population. Of this total membership in 1974, 29.1% were classified workers and 5.6% peasants, percentages much smaller than their proportion of the total population. Since 1973 this social composition has been slowly and consciously altered to include more worker representation, thus reversing the trends of the past decade.[13]

The League of Communists is well organized in every commune and maintains a separate organizational framework in each. In 1974 there were 26,500 primary Party organizations, nearly twice the number registered in 1968.[15] Figure 4.1 provides a chart of the typical commune League of Communist organizational structure.

Individuals are elected to the opstina conference as delegates from their primary Party organizations. The opština conference forms commissions to handle various specific tasks of the League in the commune. The opština conference also selects an opština committee which becomes the executive arm for the Opština League of Communists. As in all other Communist Party organizations, Party affairs and discipline are managed on the principle of democratic centralism.

c. General Influence and Activities of the Communal League of Communists.--The opština League of Communists is generally a very important factor in the commune. It is often the chief rival for power to the



Figure 4.1.--Organizational Chart of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the Level of the Opštine.

[a]Based on the "Statut Saveza Komunista Bosne-Hercegovina," Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Šesti Kongres Saveza Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje, 1974), pp. 176-179.

communal assembly[16] and is ranked as very influential in general political affairs in the commune by elected decision-makers.[17]

If political reality approaches defined doctrine we would expect that the League of Communists would adapt its behavior to the local situation. In particular, we would expect that the Party would exercise more influence in more poorly developed areas than in the more highly developed areas. The problem of influence, however, is a very difficult concept to operationalize. The measurement of the concept rests upon the validity of such assumptions as who the decision-makers are, where the decisions are made, what are the crucial decisions, and the knowledge of the respondents. In general, there is no fixed procedure to assure the validity of any single measure of influence. In this respect the findings of socio-political organization influence may be inaccurate or misleading. We would also expect that the measurements of influence would tend to reflect less influence of the socio-political organizations than actually exists since the expectations of the organization's influence are high and failure to meet these high expectations would be overcompensated for in the measures. In addition, since the socio-political organizations can exercise influence in indirect ways, this additional influence may not be reflected in the measures of influence.

The activities of the communal League of Communists vary over a wide range. They can include anti-inflation programs,[18] mediation for the commune with republic agencies,[19] devising development programs,[20] opština housing policy,[21] and educational reform,[22] as well as more traditional activities including opština nominations, elections and debate over the distribution of public functions.

No single issue has absorbed the majority of the effort of the Party. A content analysis of the minutes of thirteen Slovenian opštinа committees for a period of one year (from September, 1963, through August, 1974) reveals that the decisions made by the opstina committee of the League of Communists were fairly well distributed over four major issue areas. (See Table 4.1.) It appears that the scope of Party influence or involvement is quite wide.

TABLE 4.1.--Decisions Made by Opština Party Committees in Four Major Issue Areas.

Issue Areas	Percent of Decisions
Internal Organization of the Party	47.0
Economy and Individual Enterprises	29.5
Public Services and Agencies	10.2
Local Government and Political Organizations	13.3
	100.0

SOURCE: "Gradivo iz Raziskav Šestav Vsebina Del in Vloga ZKS v Pogojih Družbenega Samoupravljanja" III (Ljubljana: Visoka Škola za Politične Vede v Ljubljani, 1964), p. 26, quoted in Petar Jambrak, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Commune" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971).

Even though the opština League of Communists may be well organized and active in the commune, its authority is not unlimited. In many cases the opština organization of the Party does not have a clear, concrete and coherent plan of direct social action, thereby being somewhat ineffectual.[23] In some cases decisions were adopted by administrative or factory authorities that actually were opposed by the League.[24]

The capacity of the Party to influence individuals in the commune is also apparently limited. The personal reputation of the League and its members is sometimes weak. It is sometimes the case that people join the League of Communists for personal material gain and that the reputation of the League suffers as a result of this phenomenon. A poll conducted in the opstina of Čačak in Serbia in 1965 revealed that members of the League of Communists received numerous privileges as members and were resented for it. (See Table 4.2.) A similar study conducted in Belgrade in 1967 found that 59% of those polled felt that many communists sometimes or often used the fact of their membership to promote their personal goals. Only 17% of the sample felt that communists rarely or never misused their membership in this manner.[25] This weakness in the reputation of the League may imply that the ability of the League to influence citizens, at least by moral suasion, is somewhat limited.

Another indication of the limits of the influence of the League of Communists is the fact that many citizens do not highly value membership in the Party and would refuse it if offered. In 1973 in a sample survey of 1435 respondents conducted in Zagreb, 899 or 63% of all respondents expressed a desire not to join the League of Communists if membership was offered to them.[26] A similar, but nationwide, study conducted in 1966 also revealed a large group of citizens who would not accept Party membership if offered.[27]

Reasons for refusal of membership vary, but do not seem to be more strongly related to organizational and personal factors than

TABLE 4.2.--Opinions About the Reputation and Privileges of Members of the League of Communists in Čačak in 1965 in percents (N = 496).

Does Membership in the Party Contribute to:		Total	Members	Non-Members	Workers		White Collar	
					Members	Non-Members	Members	Non-Members
Increase in Reputation	Yes	79	80	84	81	88	76	70
	No	15	19	15	18	11	22	29
More Personal Income	Yes	47	39	54	41	58	36	38
	No	34	47	31	46	29	47	40
Receiving an Apartment	Yes	43	7	50	35	53	32	40
	No	34	46	31	45	29	48	38
Educational Benefits	Yes	51	41	59	44	62	37	45
	No	32	38	33	33	28	45	34
Political Advancement	Yes	56	61	58	64	61	56	47
	No	21	25	17	20	19	32	26

SOURCE: Miroslav Kovalsica, "Politika Prijema u SK u Čačku" (Beograd, Diplomatski Rad, Visoka Škola Političkih Nauka), quoted in Miroslav Pečuljic, Studije iz Političke Sociologije: I Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Škola Političkih Nauka, 1965): 97.

political or ideological ones. Table 4.3 provides a summary of responses from a Belgrade poll which asked, "Try to explain why some people would not want to become members of the League of Communists." (See Table 4.3.)

TABLE 4.3.--Reasons Given for Refusal of Membership into the League of Communists in percents.[a]

Reason Given	Percent of Responses
No Answer	8.71
Do Not Know	4.47
Do Not Accept the Ideology and Attitudes of the League	5.18
Do Not Respect Some People Who Are Members of the League	28.23
Are Against Socialism	1.88
Are Not Political	13.65
Are Not Sufficiently Informed	13.18

[a]Slobodan Marković, Diskusija Deseta Gradska Konferencija Saveza Komunista Beograde (April 1967), quoted in Radoš Smiljković, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969(, p. 58.

Another problem that should be noted is that the degree of influence of the Party on political decision-making processes, expecially on the primary organization level, varies from organization to organization.[28] One possible explanation for the variation in the degree of influence of the League of Communists in the commune is the level of socio-economic development of the commune. As a commune

becomes more developed, we would expect that the activity and influence of the Party would decrease or become less direct. This appears to be the case in the study completed in a sample of the elected leadership in Slovenian communes in 1970 (see Table 4.4).

TABLE 4.4.--Correlation Coefficients Between Indicators of Socio-Economic Development and the Influence of the Opština League of Communists.[a]

Indicator	Influence of the Party
Mass Media	-.601
Economic Wealth	-.586
Standard of Living	-.640
Urbanization	-.443
Local Resources	-.654
Cultural Activities	-.419
Transportation Network	-.430
Economic Investment	-.292
Mobilization of the Population	-.573

[a]The sample is a combination of Jambrek's 1972 study and Jerovšek's 1969 samples. Source: Petar Jambrek, "Društveno-Ekonomski Razvoj: Političke Promjene," Sociologija Sela 9 (1971): 42-47. The measure of influence is influence as perceived by local leaders. The measurement is on a four point scale, ranging from 0 = no influence to 4 = very great influence. The respondents are randomly selected communal elected leaders.

The data indicate that the importance of the League of Communists and the socio-economic level of the commune are negatively related. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the Party loses its importance as the level of socio-economic development rises. We should be

cautious, however, in interpreting these results because measures of influence do suffer from some potentially serious problems of validity. It is possible that the actual decline in influence may be more perceived or subjective than real. For example, in more highly developed communes the Party may be exercising its influence in more indirect ways. It is also possible that the identification of communal leaders is incorrect and that confusion may result from the misspecification of the locus of decision-making.

In summary, studies of local Party behavior and influence in Yugoslavia indicate that the Party's influence is stronger, or at least more visible, at lower levels of development than at higher levels of development. This finding implies that the Party is an important determinant in the decision-making process and that the elimination of it from the test of the general model may have a substantive impact on the other findings in later chapters.

2. Socialist Alliance

a. The Role of the Socialist Alliance in the Commune.--The Socialist Alliance, unlike the League of Communists, has a very clear and predetermined set of responsibilities. These responsibilities are outlined in the Federal and Republic constitutions and center around two primary activities; informing citizens about community problems and suggesting alternative solutions to these problems.[29] Formally, at least, the Socialist Alliance determines the agenda for policy making.

On the level of the commune these responsibilities of the Socialist Alliance become even more defined and limited and its roles

and duties are precisely named in the communal statutes.[30] In brief, the Socialist Alliance is the mediator between the citizens and their political institutions. The influence of the Socialist Alliance, therefore, would theoretically affect the entire policy process in the commune.[31]

Unlike the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance is a mass organization, open to anyone who cares to join. This also implies that it is ideologically more open as well.

> The Socialist Alliance is neither a party nor a class organization but a general organization or political institution of all citizens who adopt a common socialist program for the development of Yugoslavia. While the League of Communists is an ideologically united organization whose ideological base is Marxist philosophy and science, the Socialist Alliance is in that regard an open organization to which belong those who are not formally League members and it is an organization in which members are not spearated on philosophical, religious, or other grounds but are all, on principle, equal.[32]

As a mass organization the Socialist Alliance formally represents the different interests of society and must integrate these interests into a workable program of action. The strength of its involvement, therefore, depends upon the need for a formal channel of citizen interest aggregation and articulation.

b. Structure of the Socialist Alliance.--The Socialist Alliance is considerably larger than the League of Communists. In 1970 it numbered 8,575,172 members.[33] The membership of the Socialist Alliance is fairly well-distributed across all segments of society. Even its leadership composition demonstrates a generally high degree of representativeness, although it is not perfect. Table 4.5 indicates the

distribution of the opštinа leadership's social background by republic for both major decision-making bodies of the opštinа Socialist Alliance. In the opštinа leadership of the Socialist Alliance neither workers nor peasants are fully represented on the basis of their proportion in the population; however, the representation of both these groups is considerably higher than their representation in the opstina political leadership bodies. (See Table 4.5.)

Like the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance maintains an organizational network in each commune in Yugoslavia. The delegates are selected for leadership positions from their economic, territorial and sometimes from other socio-political organizations on the basis of a prearranged apportionment formula. Figure 4.2 outlines the organizational characteristics of the Socialist Alliance. (See Figure 4.2.)

The structure of the Socialist Alliance can change rapidly. Sections are added or deleted depending upon the social problems undertaken by the Alliance. The sections are also a very important channel through which a member may make an impact on policy. The committees, however, are the arena that forms and determines the policies and activities adopted by the Socialist Alliance.

c. General Influence and Activities of the Socialist Alliance in the Commune.--The activities and behavior of the Socialist Alliance vary from locale to locale to fit individual circumstances. The Alliance tend to become involved in general community projects such as initiating new school construction[34] or rural electrification.[35] It

TABLE 4.5.--Distribution by Republic of the Occupational Background of Members of the Opština Conference and Opština Executive Committee of the Socialist Alliance in 1969.[a]

Republic	Opstina Conference						Total
	Workers		Peasants		Political Workers		
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	
Serbia							
Croatia	1,362	17	1,738	21	226	3	8,140
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2,320	29	2,083	26	256	3	8,006
Slovenia	947	29	448	14	85	3	3,263
Macedonia	183	8	600	26	72	3	2,279
Montenegro	169	14	256	21	30	2	1,222
Total	4,981	22	5,125	22	669	3	22,910
Percent of Total		21.7		22.3		2.9	100
	Executive Committees						
Serbia							
Croatia							
Bosnia-Herzegovina	312	21	158	10	139	9	1,509
Slovenia	55	8	42	6	44	6	716
Macedonia	23	6	22	6	44	12	379
Montenegro	45	24	52	27	26	14	190
Total	435	15	274	9.5	253	8.7	2,884
Percent of Total		15.0		9.5		8.7	100

[a]Ilija Vuković, Socijalistički Savez u Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije (Beograd: Doktorska Disertacija Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1971), p. 372.



Figure 4.2.--Organizational Chart of the Opština Socialist Alliance.[a]

[a]Ilija Vuković, Socijalistički Savez u Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije, (Beograd: Doktorska Disertacija Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1971), p. 372.

prefers to work through the communal assembly whenever possible[36] and often drafts programs of action that the communal assembly is pressured to adopt.[37] The communal assembly, however, is not required to and in practice often does not accept these plans.[38]

The importance of the communal Socialist Alliance, as in the case of the League of Communists, varies from commune to commune depending upon the level of development. We expect this to be the case since the need for formal interest articulation would tend to be unfilled in underdeveloped communes. A national study of elected opštinа leaders found a strong negative relationship (-.584) between an increase in the level of economic development and the perceived activity of the Socialist Alliance.[39] In other words, the Socialist Alliance was perceived to be less influential in more highly developed areas. A Bosnian study found that the Socialist Alliance was able to mobilize citizens more effectively as the commune became less urban,[40] and a Croatian survey found that the perceived influence of the Socialist Alliance was less in urban areas than in rural areas.[41] (See Table 4.6.)

TABLE 4.6.--Perceived Influence of the Socialist Alliance in Croatia by Type of Settlement in 1970 in Percents.

Influence of the Socialist Alliance	Rural	Urban	Total
Too Much Influence	2.7	3.5	3.0
Too Little Influence	13.1	21.1	16.0
As Much As Necessary	28.3	24.1	26.8
Don't Know	46.0	38.0	43.1
No Answer	9.9	13.3	11.2

Again the problem of validity may result from an interpretation of these findings. It is quite possible, for example, that the level of influence across areas is the same but that the urban residents may expect the Socialist Alliance to be more involved in more activities and to a greater extent. Thus, objectively the Socialist Alliance may be exercising the same degree of influence across types of settlements but may be perceived to be weaker in the urban, more developed areas. This question of validity coupled with the others mentioned earlier suggest that our findings about influence in the Socialist Alliance may be a conservative estimate and the actual influence which exists may actually be more pronounced.

In summary, the studies of the behavior and influence of the Socialist Alliance suggest that the Socialist Alliance is important but does not dominate the politics of the commune. It also appears that the Socialist Alliance is perceived to be stronger in less developed communes. As was the case for the Party the elimination of this organizational variable from the general test of the model may affect our conclusions and bias our results.

3. League of Trade Unions

The Yugoslav League of Trade Unions performs a socio-political role similar to the Socialist Alliance but for a more narrow clientele and for a more narrow range of concerns. Formally, the trade unions are immediately concerned with expressing the needs of non-private agricultural workers on thejob and outside it. In general, the League

provides social benefits ranging from housing to vacation benefits, and it socializes its members to the political and social norms of a self-managed society. It also provides an organizational focus to which the frustrations of its members can be directed.

As in the case of the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions have a very defined set of responsibilites in the commune.[42] Like the Socialist Alliance, the League of Trade Unions works with the communal assembly, participates in the elections of delegates to the assembly and becomes involved in the public expenditure policies of the commune. The trade unions, again like the Socialist Alliance, operate as a mediator or channel between the communal assembly and the membership of the trade unions.

a. Communal Structure of the League of Trade Unions.--The total membership of the League of Trade Unions was 3,911,188 in 1973[43] and it is divided into six primary groups, although the total number of unions may be much higher than that in some republics. The unions are organized on an industrial basis so that all the employees of one industry, regardless of actual occupation, belong to the same union. The communal level leadership, however, has recently become heavily weighted with blue collar workers, nearly 70% of the total in Serbia.[44]

Within a commune, each individual union that is represented joins together into an amalgamated communal trade union organization. The details of this organizational structure vary from republic to republic but it generally has the pattern illustrated in Figure 4.3.



Figure 4.3.--Organizational Chart of the Opština League of Trade Unions.

The communal structure of the trade unions parallels the structure of the Socialist Alliance in many ways. Also, many of the committees formed by the trade unions meet jointly with similar committees in the Socialist Alliance, and the executive committees of both organizations often meet together and issue joint resolutions about various community problems.

b. Influence and Activities of the Communal League of Trade Unions.--Like the Socialist Alliance, the trade unions are involved in a large number of programs in the commune ranging from wage equalization[45] and anti-inflation programs[46] to housing policy and vacations for its members. The unions are also involved in raising the standard of living[47] and mediating conflict situations.[48]

The perceived influence of the trade unions over the resolution of problems is relatively weak. For example, in a poll of 35,000 members, 16% wanted to withdraw from the trade union[49] and, in fact, the number of workers who are members is constantly declining. In a poll of the membership on the question of how much influence the trade union organization has in the work organization and how much influence it should have over certain problems, it was found that, in general, the trade union was more influential in those problems not highly valued by the workers. (See Table 4.7.) In a separate study even the directors of enterprises were found to be more influential than the trade unions.[50]

TABLE 4.7.--Rank in Importance of Perceived and Desired Influence of the Trade Union in Dealing with Various Problems.

Problem	Rank of Perceived Influence	Rank of Desired Influence
Business Policy	6	7
Investment	9	9
Distribution of Income	7	5
Use of Consumption Funds	2	4
Employment	8	3
Determining Work Norms	3	10
Accepting Work	5	6
Rejecting Work	4	1
Distribution of Apartments	10	2
Organizing Vacations	1	8

SOURCE: Mira Krizmanić, "Sindikat u Radnoj Organizaciji," 25 Kulturni Radnik (1972): 9. This was a stratified sample of 303 workers conducted in Croatia in 1971.

Just as for both the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance, the influence of the trade union in the commune declines as the commune becomes more developed. Table 4.8 provides correlation coefficients from the Slovenian study cited earlier examining the relationship between the perceived influence of the Trade Union in the commune and the level of development of the commune. (See Table 4.8.)

TABLE 4.8.--Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Economic Development and the Influence of the Trade Union for Two Slovenian Opština Leadership Samples.[a]

Measures	Opština Assembly Member Correlation	Opština Socio-Political Leadership Correlation
Urbanization	-.364	-.268
Economic Wealth	-.205	-.459
Transportation Network	-.231	-.475

[a]Petar Jambrek, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Commune" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971), p. 225.

While the strength of the coefficients is not large, they are in the expected direction and consistent with the findings for the other socio-political organizations. These findings seem to indicate that again perceived influence of socio-political organizations by communal leaders is inversely related to the level of economic development. Again, as explained earlier, these measures do suffer from the validity problems of determining actual influence as opposed to perceived

influence, identifying decision-makers and isolating the process and locus of decision-making.

A major reason for the relative weakness of the communal trade union organization is that the trade union has not been able to develop independently of both the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists. In fact, in Bosnia in 1970, 56% of the 120 presidents of communal assemblies of trade unions replied in a poll that the communal committee of the League of Communists and not the trade union organization was responsible for initiating their candidacies.[51]

In summary, the trade unions have limited influence over communal policies and the policy-making process, but as was the case for the other socio-political organizations, the influence appears to be perceived as more influential in less developed communes. Because of the question of validity we expect that the actual influence of the trade unions and other socio-political organizations is actually higher than recorded by the measures. We also expect, since trade unions do have some influence, that the elimination of trade union influence from the general test of the model would bias our conclusions and results.

4. Combined Influence of the Socio-Political Organizations

It is important to note that while we have examined the role, structure and influence of socio-political organizations separately, we should not neglect the combined or joint influence of these organizations. It is important to determine whether or not a strict compartmentalization policy is used in which socio-political organizations neither compete nor cooperate with each other.

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In general, the evidence seems to suggest that the influence of socio-political organizations varies similarly across policy issues. According to Jambrek's leadership study cited earlier,[52] the socio-political organizations tend to be weak or influential in nearly identical patterns. The correlation coefficients between the influence of the Socialist Alliance and Trade Unions are .886 and .769 respectively. The coefficient between the perceived influence of the Socialist Alliance and the trade unions in .904. In other words, the patterns of influence these socio-political organizations have, varies almost identically across communes. A strict compartmentalization of issues has not been adopted.

This finding is independently confirmed from the results of a sample of active Slovenian citizens who were asked to evaluate the influence of various groups and organizations on decision-making in the commune. Virtually no meaningful difference exists between the influence of the League of Communists and the influence patterns of the other socio-political organizations grouped together. (See Table 4.9.)

The pattern of influence of socio-political organizations on various issues is also very similar. Jerovsek[53] in a study cited earlier noted that in the Slovenian communes selected, the socio-political organizations varied together across issues consistently. Finally, the degree to which communal political leaders seek support from specific socio-political organizations does not vary greatly from organization to organization.[54] We can reasonably infer, therefore, that socio-political organizations tend to follow a cooperative policy with each other.

TABLE 4.9.--Influence of the Socio-Political Organizations and the League of Communists on Decision-Making in the Opštinа in Percents.[a]

Influence	Organizations	
	Socio-Political Organizations	League of Communists
None	1.1	2.0
Little	8.3	11.7
Average	29.4	26.8
Great	23.1	21.0
Very Great	6.4	6.8
Don't Know	36.7	31.7

[a]N. Toš, Slovensko Javno Mnenje 1968 (Ljubljana: Visoka Škola za Sociologija Političnе Vede in Novinarstvo, 1968), p. 34.

The tendency of socio-political organizations to follow a cooperative strategy in their dealings with each other is strengthened by their leadership recruitment policies. Generally, elected leaders of socio-political organizations cannot succeed themselves in office or are limited to no more than two terms. A large part of the leadership cadre, therefore, would seek an elected position in some other socio-political organization in order to improve their chances for upward mobility. In fact, it is unlikely for a career individual in a socio-political organization not to have served outside that organization, as was indicated by a survey of elected officials in Bosnia.[55]

In general, it cannot be assumed that socio-political organizations cancel each other out and leave the policy process unaffected.

Thus we can expect that the elimination of these organizational variables will have an impact on the general test of the model in succeeding chapters.

B. Influence of Socio-Political Organizations on Specific Commune Policies

A problem with examining general patterns of influence is that a group or organization may be perceived to be as generally influential but lacks specific control over specific policy decisions. In order to examine this possibility the second section of this chapter will examine the influence of socio-political organizations on the specific distributive and integrative policies of the commune as measured by influence on budgetary expenditures and influence on the electoral process in the commune. The role of the socio-political organizations may be direct or it may be exercised indirectly through the communal assembly members and the communal assembly president. The socio-political organization could participate as a buffer or mediator between the communal assembly and the citizens or as an independent articulator of its own interests. This section will examine these questions in order to pinpoint more exactly the nature of the role of the socio-political organizations in policy-making.

1. Distributive Policy--Budgetary Allocations

The socio-political organizations have wide discretion and responsibilities in the formation of the communal public policies in the distributive arena. At various times they discuss distributive problems,

formulate proposals, and pressure the communal assembly to accept them, and these activities are considered one of their primary activities.[56] If socio-political organizations are found to possess influence over these specific activities then the elimination of them as a variable in the general model may affect the conclusion and results of succeeding chapters.

Socio-political organizations actively participate in the agenda setting process in the communal assembly. In Zagreb, for example, a surprisingly large number of proposals considered by the communal assembly were originally prepared and submitted by the socio-political organizations. (See Table 4.10.) In this case only the administrative departments of the commune have more input into the program and agenda of the communal assembly.

TABLE 4.10.--Institutions Participating in Forming the Program of the Zagreb Opština Assembly, 1969.[a]

Organization	Proposals Submitted	Percent of Totals
Working Organizations	28	14.3
Socio-Political Organizations	44	22.5
Committees of Opština Assembly	0	0.0
Local Communisties and Voter Assemblies	24	12.2
Opština Administrative Bureaus	70	35.7
Other Social Factors	30	15.3
TOTAL	196	100.0

[a]Skupština Grada Zagreba, Aktuelna Pitanja Komunalnog Sistema u Gradu Zagrebu (Zagreb: Veljača, 1971), p. 146.

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When specific policies are examined, the socio-political organizations have considerable direct influence on nearly every important issue before the communal assembly. Figure 4.4 illustrates the direct influence of these socio-political organizations across several important communal policies. These results are again based upon the communal elected leadership survey and have the same problems of validity of measurement. For all the distributive policies listed in Figure 4.4, the socio-political organizations have rather strong and consistent influence on policies although their direct influence individually is less than that attributed to the communal assembly.

Figure 4.4 also illustrates that the socio-political organizations can wield indirect as well as direct influence on public policy. In general, the socio-political organizations may have a considerable amount of indirect influence over the communal president due to their strong influence over his selection.

The strength of this indirect influence over the commune president as well as over the communal assembly can be readily identified. For example, in a series of open conflicts which occurred between the commune president and assemblies against the socio-political organizations, the socio-political organizations almost always gained the upper hand.[57] Even recently in Čačak, a commune in Serbia, the President of the communal assembly, the commune secretary and five deputies to the communal assembly were forced to resign from office after an open confrontation with the communal committee of the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance.[58]



Key: Opština Assembly

President of Socialist Alliance

Secretary of the League of Communists

President of Trade Unions

Figure 4.4.--Influence of the Socio-Political Organizations on Selected Important Opština Policies.

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Interestingly, general conflict among socio-political organizations, citizens, and the communal assemblies about the distribution of public services in the commune is the exception and not the rule. This seems to be a result of the general agreement among citizens, socio-political organizations and the communal assembly members about the priorities for the investment of public funds. Table 4.11 compares the distribution of communal priorities as seen by various groups in a nationwide survey conducted in 1964. A chi square test executed on several relevant pairs of groups indicated no statistically significant difference in the distribution of responses.[59] (See Table 4.11.) From this data, however, we cannot infer that a single group is responsible for the agreement nor can we identify that group. A separate study conducted among a sample of communes in Croatia also confirmed a uniformly high level of agreement among the opinions of citizens, the communal assembly and the Socialist Alliance about the priorities for budgeting within the commune.[60]

A possible explanation for this apparent agreement about budgetary allotments in the commune rests with the integrating role of the socio-political organizations that help articulate citizen demands and present them to the communal assembly. A Croatian survey of 17 communes seems to substantiate this hypothesis by noting that citizens tend to choose socio-political organizations as being the most effective way of influencing budgetary policy in the commune. The Socialist alliance was considered to be an effective institution for this purpose by 53.5% of all respondents, while the communal assembly is ranked fifth and

Highest Priority for Investment in the Opština by the Level of

TABLE 4.11.--Opinion about the Highest Priority for Investment in the Opština by the Level of Socio-Political Activity of Respondents in 1964.[a]

Issue	Socio-Political Activity									
	Non-Active Citizens		Active Citizens		Self-Man. Council Members		Socio-Political Org. Members		Opština Assembly Members	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Schools	461	30.0	158	28.2	29	32.2	54	38.5	12	32.4
Hospitals	375	24.4	111	19.8	9	10.0	15	10.7	2	5.4
Culture-Sports	81	5.3	42	7.5	7	7.7	9	6.4	4	10.8
Nurseries	51	3.3	23	4.1	8	8.9	6	4.3	4	10.8
Housing	118	7.7	42	7.5	12	13.3	17	12.1	4	10.8
Administrative Building	14	0.9	20	3.6	3	3.3	2	1.4	0	0.0
Factories	263	17.1	114	21.3	11	12.2	19	13.5	7	18.9
Other	151	9.8	49	8.7	11	12.0	16	11.4	4	10.8
Don't Know	22	1.4	2	0.3	0	0.0	2	1.4	0	0.0
TOTAL	1,536	100.0	561	100.0	90	100.0	140	100.0	37	100.0

[a]Gledić and Z. Pandurović, Jugoslovensko Javno Mneje o Aktuelnin Ekonomskim i Socijalnim Pitanjima (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1964), p. 16. Active citizens are those which classified themselves as such when polled.

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sixth with 35.7% and 30.9% of all respondents respectively. (See Table 4.12.)

TABLE 4.12.--Organizations Considered Most Effective for Influencing the Solution of Opština Problems in Croatia in 1963.[a]

Organization	Rank	Percent Score
Socialist Alliance	1	53.5
Voter Meetings	2	51.7
Organs of Social Self-Management	3	46.2
Committees in the Opština	4	43.0
Chamber of Working Organizations[b]	5	35.7
Opština Chamber[b]	6	30.9
Local Communisties	7	29.6
Referendum	8	29.5

[a]The poll included a sample survey of 17 opstinas in Croatia conducted in 1962. Source: Milka Šeat-Lasić, Gradjani i Prednacrt Ustava SFRJ (Zagreb: Institut za Društveno Upravljanje, 1963), p. 34. In this question multiple responses were allowed.

[b]The Chamber of Working Organizations and the Opština Chamber were the two major divisions of the Opština assembly in 1963.

In summary, socio-political organizations exert considerable influence on the distributive function of the commune. This influence is exercised both directly and indirectly through influence over major communal actors. In addition, socio-political organizations influence public distributive policies by acting as the transmitters and articulators of citizen demands to the communal assembly. Elimination of socio-political organization variables from the general test of the

model may affect our explanations of the public policy decision-making process that occurs in Chapter VI.

2. Integrative Policy--Leadership Recruitment

Control or influence over the process of leadership recruitment implies eventual control over the direction and integration of society. In a short-term perspective, influence over the recruitment policies also implies an indirect control over the distributive policies of the elected bodies as well.

In the Yugoslav commune socio-political organizations have considerable responsibility in managing and directing electoral activity within the commune.[61] In fact, the management of elections in the commune is by statute given to the socio-political organizations to administer jointly.

The actual administration of the electoral system is delegated by the socio-political organizations to a joint coordinating committee which oversees the entire electoral process from nominations through the certification of winners. The formation of this coordinating committee is designed to assure united activity of all the political organizations and to avoid political factional disputes.[62] In a nation-wide survey conducted by the Institute of Social Research after the 1969 elections, the influence of the coordinating committee over nominations as evaluated by elected communal officials was very high. Only 15% of the respondents throught that the influence of this committee in their commune was non-existent or inconsequential. (See Table 4.13.)

TABLE 4.13.--Influence of the Coordinating Committee Over the Nomination of Candidates in 1969 by Elected Opština Leadership Group (N = 414).[a]

Evaluation	Percent Agreement				
	Opština Presidents and Presidents of Socio-Political Organizations	Presidents of Community and Work Organizations	Members of the Coordinating Committee	Unknown	Total
Very Great	13.4	24.8	15.3	10.5	16.9
Great	35.5	40.0	34.4	57.9	33.2
Some	29.9	21.9	27.0	5.3	25.6
Small	9.5	3.8	12.9	15.8	9.7
None	7.0	1.9	6.7	0.0	5.3
Don't Know	4.7	7.6	3.8	10.5	5.3

[a]Milan Matić, "Društveno-Političke Organizacije u Skupštinskim Izborima," in Skupštinski Izbori 1969 (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1970), p. 47.

In addition to the joint coordinating committee, each participating socio-political organization forms its own committee within their organization. In this way each organization can have a distinct impact on the electoral process.

As was noted in Figure 4.4, the influence of socio-political organizations on the selection of the communal president was very high. In fact, no other institution exceeded the level of influence enjoyed by socio-political organizations on this policy issue.[64] This conclusion is also confirmed by the results of a nation-wide survey conducted after the 1967 and 1969 elections that indicated that both the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists have considerable influence over the selection of candidates. (See Table 4.14).

TABLE 4.14.--Major Inlfuence over the Nomination Process by Social Group, 1967 and 1969 Elections, in Percents.

Social Group	Distribution in Percent	
	1967	1969
Individual Leaders	7	16.6
League of Communists	17	14.7
Socialist Alliance	19	19.7
Coordinating Committee	n.a.	14.1
Voters	16	19.1
No Answer	41	15.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

In summary, the perceived influence of socio-political organizations in the recruitment process is very high. This implies that these organizations have considerable control over the overall direction of the commune as well as considerable control over individual elected members. In this case as well, the elimination of socio-political organizations may have a substantive impact on our later explanation of the policy process.

C. Conclusions, Biases and Reservations

The primary conclusion of this chapter is that socio-political organizations are important in the determination of public policy in the Yugoslav commune and that their direct importance is greater in less developed communes. This relationship appears to exist for all socio-political organizations. This section examines the effect which this conclusion has upon the general model that was described in Chapter II and examined in detail in the succeeding chapters.

I have been forced to leave several points unexamined in this chapter because of the unavailability of the data. For example, although the studies used in this chapter discussed the direct influence of socio-political organizations on communal politics and policies, they have left unexamined the question of the indirect influence of these organizations. It is quite possible that in more highly developed communes the policy process is more complex; a process that may make the behavior of the socio-political organizations more subtle and sophisticated. For example, in more highly developed communes the party may exercise its influence on the worker's councils of enterprises

in the commune and these workers councils may exercise influence on communal policies. Thus the party's influence, although actually quite important, is indirect and hidden from public view.[65]

Second, we cannot determine whether local socio-political organizations independently affect policy or simply are an instrument of it. In other words, we cannot determine if policy or the policy process would be different without the participation in the socio-political organizations. Thus no causal relationship between the behavior of the socio-political organizations and the communal policy process should be assumed from this chapter's findings.

Third, this chapter has an implication on the discussion of political structure found in Chapter III. We cannot establish whether or not the political structure has an effect upon policy or the decision-making process independent of the socio-political organizations.

The conclusions of this chapter, if extrapolated, would have serious implications on the debate over convergence of socialist and capitalist states and interest group behavior in socialist states. Thus it may be necessary to introduce some words of caution concerning the validity of the measures of influence and the probable effect of bias from the exclusion of the socio-political organizations variables in the general test of the model.

1. The Validity Problem

In the studies of influence cited in this chapter, perceived importance over various communal events is the measure of influence. Communal leaders or active citizens are generally the subjects of these

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perceptions and the questions given to the respondents were generally Likert type scales. Various factors may affect the validity of the measures.

One problem includes establishing the correct identification of the leaders. It is possible that the elected leader is not the true decision-maker in the commune. If this were the case the next logical choice for actual decision-makers would be the central committees of the socio-political organizations. Thus, it is possible that the measures of influence may actually underestimate the actual influence of the socio-political organizations in the commune.

A second potential problem is the misspecification of when and how the influence of socio-political organizations is exercised as well as where the meaningful decisions are made. Decisions may be formulated before they reach the public forum and thus the true nature of influence may remain hidden. From the cited studies we may incorrectly judge that certain individuals have great influence when actually the policy decisions were made by other individuals at a different time or place or exercised in a less obvious manner. If decisions are not made in the communal assemblies the communal socio-political organizations are the next logical choice. If decisions are made unobtrusively, socio-political organizations are the groups most likely to behave that way. Thus, the elimination of socio-political organizations from the general test of the model may have more real significance than we have been able to measure.

A third potential problem in the measures of influence used in this chapter is the lack of control over the meaning of the word

"influence." It is possible that low influence may mean something qualitatively different in a developed commune as opposed to an underdeveloped commune. The studies cited here do not control for this factor and thus our conclusions about differential patterns of influence across levels of development may be inappropriate.

2. The Problem of Bias in the Model

Some bias may result from the inability to include socio-political organization influence variables in the general test of the model. In other words, the proposed relationships between social development and self-management decision-making processes may be affected when socio-political organization influence is removed from consideration.

In order to help examine the implications of this possible bias I introduce four general schematic representations of the probable relationships among social development, socio-political organization influence, and self-management decision-making processes. These representations also help to explicate and justify the ordering of the variables suggested by the general model in Figure 2.1. Figure 4.5 outlines these possibilities.

In general the evidence provided in this chapter suggests that there is a negative link between social development variables and the influence of socio-political organizations. It is also generally thought that the relationship proceeds from the social development variables to the socio-political organizations. Therefore, in Figure 4.5 the arrows connect social development to socio-political organization influence and carries a negative sign. Chapter IV also indicates that



Figure 4.5.--Schematic Representation of Various Possible Relationships Among Socio-Political Organization Influence, Social Development and Self-Management Decision-Making Process Variables.

socio-political organization influence affects self-management decision-making processes and the relationship between the two sets of variables is positive. Finally, the research cited in Chapter II strongly suggests that social development positively affects self-management decision-making processes. Thus we may draw arrows from social development to self-management decision-making processes and give them positive signs.[66] This implies that socio-political organizations have a differential effect on decision-making processes and that the relative effect they have is greater when the commune is less developed. In other words, socio-political organizations can compensate for weaknesses in the socio-economic development of the commune.

In Scenario A there is no direct relationship between social development and self-management decision-making processes. The socio-political organization influence behaves as an intervening variable. If this scenario reflects reality our general test of the model, which excluded socio-political organization influence, would not affect the explanatory effect (R^2) of social development factors on the self-management decision-making process, and the total explained variance would be less or remain the same depending upon the strength of the socio-political organization influence with decision-making process correlation.

Substantively, Scenario A hides the effect that socio-political organization may have on the self-management decision-making processes, and from it we could make incorrect theoretical statements about how social development directly affects the decision-making process. For example, we could suggest that more perceived social conflict induces

the Party to manage and direct political participation into formal channels so as to avoid inter-group conflict.

In practice this scenario is unlikely to reflect reality since we can reasonably expect social development variables such as social mobility and social integration to have a separate and positive effect on encouraging participation and political decentralization and other aspects of the self-management decision-making process in the commune.

The second scenario (Scenario B) claims that socio-political organization influence has no effect on self-management decision-making processes. Thus, the elimination of socio-political organization influence would not affect the development of the model. In practice, Scenario B seems unlikely since socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia are vitally concerned about self-management decision-making processes both in terms of doctrine and actual behavior. A large Party membership, if nothing else, would inflate membership involvement in communal affairs and thus affect the overall level of popular political participation.

The third scenario (Scenario C) suggests a direct and separate effect of social development and socio-political organization variables on decision-making processes. The exclusion of the socio-political organization variables in this scenario would reduce the total variance of decision-making explained but would not affect the variation that social development variables explain for self-management decision-making processes.

In Scenario C the elimination of socio-political organization influence would not substantively change any conclusion we may make about the relationship between social development and self management decision-making processes. Scenario C is unlikely to occur since the level of social development would affect the degree to which the Party can organize and communicate with large numbers of people.

The final possibility (Scenario D) is, in fact, the most probable since it seems most congruent with the research findings presented so far. The exclusion of socio-political organizations in this scenario would depress somewhat the explanatory power of socio-development characteristics and reduce the total variance explained for self-management decision-making processes.

Substantively, the elimination of socio-political organization influence variables would remove the partial interpretaive effect they have on the model and we would tend to ascribe less theoretical importance to the direct link between social development and self-management decision-making processes than is justified. We would be making the same error as occurred in Scenario A, although to a more limited extent.

We can extend the analysis to include the public policy outputs discussed in Chapter VI if we add a fourth variable to the scenarios featured in Figure 4.5. The elimination of socio-political organizations as an explanatory variable in this new set of scenarioes would affect the extended model similarly. This implies, provided that Scenario D is the correct representation of reality, that we may be depressing the importance of social development variables in our explanation of the public policy process.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER IV

[1]Statut Opštine Golubac, Opštinski Službeni Glasnik, No. 10 (Beograd, 1967), p. 203.

[2]Radoš Smiljković, Organizacija i Idejna Fizionomija SKJ (Beograd: Srboštampa, 1967), p. 18.

[3]Vladimir Goati, Uloga Saveza Komunista u Savremenim Uslovima (Beograd: Srboštampa, 1972), p. 5.

[4]Vladimir Goati, Perspektive Politicke Avangarde (Beograd, Komunist, 1972), p. 9.

[5]Jure Bilić, "Savez Komunista Jugoslavije i Revolucionarni Razvoj Samoupravnog Socijalističkog Društva," in SKJ i Socijalistička Revolucija Jugoslavije, ed: Ivo Cečić (Čakovec: Zrinski, 1973), p. 13.

[6]Mijalko Todorović, "Razvoj SKJ u Revolucionarnu Avangardu Novog Tipa," in Naš Put, ed: Veljko Vlahović (Beograd: Komunist, 1969), p. 255.

[7]Jovan Mirić, Interesne Grupe i Politička Moč (Čakovec: Zrinski, 1973), p. 177.

[8]Mahmut Bakali, "Interesne Grupe i Funkcija Socijalističkog Saveza," Socijalizam 13 (1970): 940.

[9]Budislav Soškić, "Položaj i Uloga Saveza Komunista u Sistemu Socijalističkog Samoupravljanja," in Teorija i Prasksa Samoupravljanja u Jugoslaviji, eds: Jovan Đorđević and Najdan Pašić (Beograd: Radnička Štampa, 1972), p. 441.

[10]Radoš Smiljković, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969), p. 108.

[11]Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, Deseti Kongress SKJ (Beograd: Komunist, 1974).

[12]Borba (March 30, 1974): 5.

[13]From 1960 to 1971 the workers' and peasants' share of total membership in the League of Communists has been steadily dropping. Since Tito's letter, Josip Broz Tito, Pismo Predsednika SKJ; Izvršnog Biroa Predsedništva SKJ, Komunist (October 17, 1972), late in 1971 a conscious attempt was undertaken to change this social composition. The following chart provides an aggregate analysis of changes in the social structure of the League of Communists.

Occupational Composition of League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1960-1973.

Year	Total Membership	% of Workers	% of Peasants	% of White Collar
1960	1,006,285	36.1	13.0	32.0
1962	1,018,331	36.7	9.6	36.4
1964	1,031,634	36.0	7.6	39.0
1965	1,046,202	35.0	7.4	39.2
1966	1,046,018	33.9	7.4	39.0
1967				
1968		30.4	7.4	
1969		30.8	7.3	
1970		29.6	6.5	
1971		28.4	6.3	
1972		28.3	6.0	
1973	1,076,711	29.1	5.6	

SOURCES: For years 1960, 1962, 1964-66: Svetozar Tempo, "Statistički Pregled Razvoja KPJ-SKJ u Periodu 1946-1966 i Struktura Članstva," in SKJ u Uslovima Samoupravljanja, ed: Miloš Nikolić (Beograd: Kultura, 1967), p. 755; for years 1968-1972: Boris Vušković, "Gibanje u Socijalnoj Strukturi Članstva SKJ," Socijalizam 17 (1974): 679-702; for years 1973: Borba (March 30, 1974): 5.

[14]Borba (May 19, 1974): 4.

[15]"Statut Saveza Komunista Bosne-Hercegovina," Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Šesti Kongres Saveza Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo, Oslobođenje, 1974), pp. 176-179.

[16]Milan Nedkov and Dimitar Mirčev, "Politički Konflikti i Cezavizam u Opštini," in Komunalni Konflikti No. 5, ed: Stojan Tomić (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena Istraživanje, 1973), pp. 965-1004.

[17]Petar Jambrek, "kdo Odloča v Slovenskih Občinah," 27 Pravnik (Ljubljana, 1972): 22-34.

[18]Borba (May 14, 1974): 5.

[19]Borba (July 22, 1974): 5.

[20]Politika (June 17, 1974): 9.

[21]Komunist (September 16, 1974): 12.

[22]Komunist (May 13, 1974): 15.

[23]Mitar Mihaljica, "Komuna Između Teorije i Prakse," Gledišta 13 (1972): 822.

[24]In a survey in Barajevo, Serbia, an economically balanced opstina, 600 randomly selected individuals were asked whether organizations of self-management pass decisions which are opposed to the attitude of the maternal League of Communists. Borislav Dimković, "Učešće Seljaka-Komunista u Radu Organizacija i Institucija Političkog Života na Selu," SociologijaSela 8 (1970): 4.

Answer	League Member	Percent	Non-Member	Percent
Often Pass	51	16.9	47	15.6
Sometimes	129	42.7	100	33.1
Never	67	22.2	38	12.6
Don't Know	54	17.9	112	37.0
Unknown	1	.03	5	.7
TOTAL	302	100.0	302	100.0

[25]Slobodan Marković, Diskusija Deseta Gradska Konferencija Saveza Komunista Beograda (April 1967), quoted in Radoš Smiljković, SKJ u Procesu Konstituisanja Samoupravljanja (Beograd: Hrono Metar, 1969), p. 58.

[26]Ivan Šiber, "Neki Elementi Socijalne Strukture Saveza Komunista," Naše Teme 12 (1973).

[27]Several years earlier in 1966 the Institue for Social Science in Belgrade conducted a similar study on a national level. In this study 24% of all respondents would refuse membership and only 19% would joyfully accept membership in the Party. B. Valčić, "Gradjani i Savez Komunista," in Jugoslovensko Javno Mnenje, ed: Institut Društvenih Nauka (Beograd 1966), p. 109.

[28]Mirdus Dzinić, Vladimir Milić, Vladimir Stambuk, and Vladimir Goati, "Gradjani i Savez Komunista," Izveštaj Instituta za Društvene Nauke 35 (1972): 39, and Krsto Kilibardo, Samoupravljanje i Savez Komunista (Beograd: Sociološki Institut, 1966), p. 105.

[29]Ustav SFRJ (Beograd: Prosveta, 1974).

[30]Statut Opštine Novi Pazar, Opštinski Službeni Glasnik No. 10/38 (Beograd, 1974), Article 219.

[31]Mitar Mihaljica, "Društveno-Političke Organizacije i Opštinske Skupštine," Naše Teme 16 (1972): 1877-1890.

[32]Jovan Đorđevic, Politički Sistem i Prilog Nauci o Čoveku i Samoupravljanju (Beograd: Privredni Pregled, 1973), p. 807.

[33]Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije 1971 (Beograd, 1971), p. 68.

[34]Opštinske Konferencije SSRNV Kula, "Socijalistički Savez i Samoupravna Integracija u Opštini," Priprema II Kongresa Samoupravljača Jugoslavije (Beograd: Radniuka Štampa, 1970).

[35]Opštinske Konferencije SSRN Srbije, Invanjica, "Socijalistički Savez i Samoupravnog Integracija u Opštine," Pripreme II Kongresa Samoupravljača Jugoslavije, op. cit.

[36]Politika (September 28, 1974): 6.

[37]Borba (November 1, 1974): 7.

[38]In a Serbian Study of 27 opštinas and 5030 respondents conducted by the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade a surprisingly large number of the respondents felt that programs adopted by the Socialist Alliance are often rejected by the opština assembly. Those that thought the proposals of the Socialist Alliance are always accepted were 6.5%; 19% that it happens often, 18% rarely, 8% hardly ever, and 22% no opinion. Boško Lukić, "Ostvarivanje Društvene Uloge Organizacija SSRN u Opštinama," Komuna 19 (1972): 13.

[39]International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community (New York: Free Press, 1971): 276. Need for support is measured as perceived by lcoal decison-makers. The measurement score is derived from a four point Likert scale.

[40]Stojan Tomić, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and Citizen Participation," paper presented at the International Conference of Participation in Self-Management, Dubrovnik, December, 1972.

[41]Mladen Zvonarević, Javno Mnjenje Stanovništva SR Hrvatske u Listopadu 1969 (Institut za Društvena Istraživanje: Svevčilista u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 1970): 80. Respondents were randomly selected from the population.

[42]Veča Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije, Predlog Nacrta Statuta Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije (Beograd, 1974).

[43]Savezni Zavod za Statistike, Statistički Godišnjak Jugoslavije 1974 (Beograd, 1974): 102.

[44]Politika (October 18, 1974): 8.

[45]Komunist (July 8, 1974): 6-7.

[46]Borba (April 19, 1974).

[47]Veča Saveza Sindikata Opština Pirot, "Delovanje Sindikata na Razvoj Samoupravljanja, Raspodele i Životnog Standarda" (Beograd: Radnička Stampa, 1970).

[48]Jesenice Železare, "Neposredno Samoupravljanje, Položaj Društveno-Političkih Organizacija i Razrešavanje Konfliktnih Situacija" (Beograd: Radnička Stampa, 1970).

[49]Vukašin Pavlović, "Sindikat i Interesi Radnika," Gledišta 14 (1973): 1140.

[50]Krsto Kilibarda, Rad i Samoupravljanje (Beograd: Privredni Pregled, 1973): 145.

[51]Vukašin Pavlović, "Sindikat i Interesi Radnika," op. cit.

[52]Petar Jambrek, "Socio-Economic Development and Political Change in the Yugoslav Commune," op. cit., p. 181.

[53]Janez Jerovšek, "Structure of Influence in the Commune," Sociologija: Selected Articles 1959-1969 (Beograd, 1970), reprinted from Sociologija 2 (1969): 124.

[54]The coefficients of variation in the distribution of the scores of leaders identifying the degree to which they seek support from socio-political organizations is very similar for the League of Communists (V=.254) and the Socialist Alliance (V=.265). See: International Studies of Values in Politics, Values and the Active Community, op. cit., p. 413.

[55]Stojan Tomić, Politički Profesionalizam (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1972), p. 232.

[56]Komunist (June 24, 1974): 11.

[57]Žika Minović, Politička Palanka (Beograd: Proleter, 1972).

[58]Cačanski Glas (May 25, 1973): 1 and 3; (June 1, 1973): 2.

[59]I performed some chi square tests on these combinations with results as follows. None were significant at the .01 level.

Combination	Chi Square
Active Citizens-League of Communists	19.6
Active Citizens-Opština Assembly	8.9
Self-Management Leaders-League of Communists	2.5
Self-Management Leaders-Opština Assembly	3.5
Self-Management-Activie Citizens	15.5
League of Communists-Opština Assembly	2.5

[60]Milka Šeat-Lasić, SSRNJ i Učešće Gradjana u Upravljanje Poslovima od Njihovog Zajedničkog Interesa (Zagreb: Institut za Društveno Upravljanje, 1966).

[61]Mirko Bošković, "Funkcije Sociajlističkog Saveza u Izbornom i Delegatskom Sistemu," Komuna 19 (1972): 10-11.

[62]Predrag Ajtič, "Aktuelni Politički Problemi i Zadaci SKS u Skupštinskim Izborima," in Savez Komunista Srbije i Skupštinski Izbori (1969): 5.

[63]Janez Jerovšek, "Structure of Influence in the Commune," op. cit.

[64]For 1967 the source is: Slavko Milosavlevski, "Izbor i Društveno-Političke Organizacije," in Skupštinski Izbori 1967 (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1968): 63; for 1969 the source is: Miro Gosnik, "Kandidovanje--Područuje Največih Mogučnosti Dalje Demokratizacije Izbora u Samoupravnom Društvu," in Skupštinski Izbori 1969 (Beograd: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1970), p. 137.

[65]The probability of such influence going unnoticed, however, is not very high.

[66]It should be noted, however, that the direction and existence of the relationships may be different from that suggested since the evidence is based upon bivariate analysis which lacks sufficient controls to firmly establish the proposed relationships.

CHAPTER V

THE PROCESSES OF PUBLIC POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Chapters III and IV examined two different and distinct sectors of the policy-making model. In Chapter III, which discussed the formal political system, considerable evidence was introduced which indicated that different political structures appear at different levels of social and economic development. In Chapter IV the discussion of socio-political organizations also provided strong indications that the role, function and strength of socio-political organizations also vary by the level of economic development of the commune. Unfortunately, even though we know that formal political structure is important and socio-political organizations are also important, we cannot, because of insufficient data, formally incorporate these two factors into the examination of the general model listed in Chapter II.

Chapter V approaches the problem of the role of economic development and the decision-making process more directly. In this chapter I intend to measure the effect of socio-economic variables upon specific aspects of the decision-making process, and to chart the changes which occur from one level of economic development to another in a mathematical model of the decision-making process.

Unlike Chapters III and IV, the data base for the analyses in this chapter includes all 500 communes which existed in Yugoslavia in

1972.[1] The year 1972 is selected since it is the most recent year in which all the decision-making process variables are available. The conclusions and implications discussed in this chapter, however, should not be considered as limited to this single year since theoretically there is no reason to do so. In general, this chapter examines in depth the hypothesis listed at the end of Chapter II that more variance in decision-making processes occurs at lower levels of economic development than at higher levels of development.

A. Interrelationship of the Decision-Making Process Variables

In Chapter II the discussion of the decision-making process identified four core variables for analysis. These variables are political participation, political decentralization, political professionalism, and bureaucratism. In this section I create operational measures for each of the decision-making process variables, establish some summary measures, examine the variation in decision-making process variables across levels of economic development and republic, and examine the interrelationship of each of the decision-making process variables within the system by level of economic development and republic. The intent of these efforts is to gain a clearer understanding of the process of decision-making in Yugoslavia and variation in that process.

1. Theoretical Questions

Until now I have assumed that variation does exist in the decision-making process variables among Yugoslav local governmental

units. It is first necessary, however, to establish the validity of this claim. If Pečuljić[2] and Organski[3] are correct, we would expect that as we move to higher levels of economic development there would be less overall variation in the individual political process variables, and the overall mean for each process variable would be higher. In other words, since development may close off retrogressive political decision-making processes (i.e., those more distant from self-management/pluralist ideals) as available options, the overall variation in the public policy decision-making processes will be less at higher levels of development and will more closely approximate self-management/pluralist ideals.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the proposed process schematically. Specifically, Figure 5.1 proposes that inter-opstina variations in the self-management/pluralist decision-making processes decline with increases in the level of economic development; and that the inter-opstina mean value of self-management/pluralist decision-making processes increases with increases in the level of economic development. Consonant with the meaning of self-management/pluralism, we would expect that the mean level of the participation and decentralization measures would increase with the level of economic development while bureaucratization and professionalization would decrease.

A third point relevant to variation in public policy decision-making variables which should be examined is the effect of republic upon that variation. We would expect that the republic origin of a commune will have little or no effect on the amount of variation that



Figure 5.1.--Proposed Relationship of the Mean Level of Variation of Communes in Self-management Decision-Making Measures to the Level of Economic Development.

occurs across communes in these variables. If variation is greatly reduced within communes, this should be considered an indirect indication that local autonomy may be limited. Also, the inter-republic discrepancies that exist in the degree of variation among the political process variables should be explained by differences in the average level of development for each of the communes.

In addition to questions of variation in each of the four aspects of the decision-making process, we are concerned with the interaction of these decision-making process variables with each other. It is necessary to establish that each of the four aspects of the decision-making process are actually independent of each other. However, if the existence of self-management pluralism is more predominant at higher levels of economic development, we would expect that the independence of the aspects of decision-making would become less noticeable at these higher levels.

2. Operational Measures

In order to examine the public policy decision-making processes, it is necessary to find operational measures for each of the four aspects of the process. These measures should also be applicable to as many of Yugoslavia's 500 communes as possible and be internally reliable measures across republic and across time periods, and should meet the usual requirements for validity.

Decentralization within the commune can be measured by noting the degree to which the "mesna zajednica" (local communities) have

been established in the communes and the average population size of these sub-local units. This is a reliably accurate representation of the decentralization concept since the creation of the "mesna zajednica" implies the establishment of a narrow based administrative structure independent of the commune. It also implies a devolution of authority from the commune to the lower levels since the mesna zajednica can assume many of the duties of the commune as they relate to neighborhood affairs. Most important, however, the creation of the mesna zajednica is a strong indication that decentralization is valued and is being accepted.

Information about the size and number of mesna zajednica is available for nearly every commune. Also, comparisons across time can be made since the mesna zajednica have been in existence since 1970.

Political Participation within the commune cannot be measured through voter turnout statistics as was mentioned in Chapter III. An alternative measure of political participation is involvement of the citizenry in town-hall assembly meetings held in the commune or mesna zajednica. The total number of questions introduced at these meetings is used as a rough indicator of the amount of citizen involvement in politics. These questions include formal complaints, citizen referenda questions, proposals to improve public services, etc. Statistics on the town-hall meetings have also been kept for nearly every commune since 1970.

Bureaucratization in the commune is relatively difficult to measure. Statistics on the size of the civil service employment in the

commune are misleading since such figures include military personnel. Using employment figures for some selected civil service departments is equally misleading since there are extensive differences in the organizational arrangements of the civil service across communes. A third alternative which measures the degree of non-defense expenditures on administration is the one adopted here. The most important weakness in this measure is that costs of administration are not related to the degree of bureaucratization in the commune in a strictly linear manner. Economics of scale exist in establishing a bureaucratic apparatus. In spite of this weakness, however, the third alternative is the best one available.

Professionalization is measured by the percentage of delegates of the communal assembly who are employed in the professional occupations. Professional occupations include economists, directors, managers, medical doctors, engineers, and agronomists.[4] Unlike the other three measures listed above, there is considerable missing data in the professional measures. Missing data approximates 30% of the total and those communes were dropped from consideration.

In addition to the four aspects of decision-making operationalized above, we can create some additional indices which more precisely reflect self-management/pluralism. One of these indices is an operationalization of the elite accessibility dimension discussed in the Kornhauser/self-management typology (Figure 2.2). This elite accessibility dimension is simply the product of the normalized scores for bureaucratization and professionalization.[5] Lower scores on this measure indicates more elite accessibility.

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The second summary index of self-management/pluralism is the dimension of mass availability which is the second dimension listed on the Kornhauser/self-management typology. The mass availability index is calculated by multiplying the normalized scores for participation and decentralization together.[6] Again, lower scores on this index represent greater mass availability.

The third summary index is an index of self-management. Its calculation is simply the product of the elite accessibility index score and the mass availability index score. A low score on this index reflects high self-management/pluralism. We cannot, however, with the use of this index distinguish among any other types of social systems. In other words, a high self-management/pluralism index score may be a reflection of a "statist," "liberal anarchist" or "traditional" political system.

The final operational measure which must be constructed is the definition of the level of economic development. Economic development is operationalized as the percent of the employed population engaged in agricultural pursuits. High agricultural employment is the indicator of low development while low agricultural employment indicates high economic development. There is some error involved in using this measure since some agriculture may be highly mechanized, efficient and developed. However, in Yugoslavia there is adequate justification and precedent[7] for using this as a measure of development. Three levels of development are used. Agricultural employment of 10% or less is considered highly development (264 communes); 10% to 20% agricultural employment

is considered moderate development (122 communes); and over 20% agricultural employment is considered to be poor development (114 communes). The divisions were made by separating the communes into quartiles. The lowest two quartiles were combined together for conceptual purposes. Thus, high development has twice as many communes as the other two levels of development.

3. Examining the Hypotheses

The hypotheses suggested in part one of this section require information about the inter-communal variation in the decision-making process variables. Specifically, the hypothesis that opstina variation in self-management/pluralist decision-making processes declines with increases in the level of economic development requires an analysis of the change in variation resulting from a change in the level of development. The coefficient of variation, which is simply the standard deviation divided by the mean, will provide this information. If the coefficient of variation declines as the level of economic development increases, this will provide some evidence that the above should not be rejected. Table 5.1 lists the results we obtained from this procedure.

The results in Table 5.1 do not seem to support the hypothesis. Variation in the decision-making process variables is not systematically reduced as we move to higher levels of economic development. In fact, for three of the four specific aspects of self-management/pluralism and for the general self-management index, the variation is greater at higher levels than it is at lower levels. Only the professionalism measure follows the pattern, but changes in its coefficients

TABLE 5.1.--Coefficients of Variation of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Level of Economic Development, 1972.

Decision-Making Process Variables	Level of Economic Development			
	Total Combined	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	1.960	1.252	2.493	1.772
(N)	(458)	(108)	(110)	(240)
Decentralization	1.154	.879	1.408	1.115
(N)	(450)	(107)	(114)	(247)
Professionalism	.352	.372	.358	.335
(N)	(295)	(76)	(73)	(146)
Bureaucracy	5.923	.333	.571	5.250
(N)	(499)	(114)	(121)	(264)
Mass Availability	6.313	2.587	6.222	5.643
(N)	(450)	(100)	(110)	(240)
Elite Accessibility	2.967	.656	.940	2.878
(N)	(295)	(76)	(73)	(147)
Self-Management	3.132	1.731	2.345	2.786
(N)	(273)	(69)	(69)	(135)

of variation are actually quite minor. The behavior of the bureaucracy measure is quite interesting. Apparently financial resources at lower and middle levels of development are too limited to permit much choice in the allocation of per capita administrative spending. Thus the variation which occurs, does so at the higher level of development--the level which has the freedom to choose its amount of administrative spending.

In general, no systematic pattern of change in the specific variables emerges across levels of development in Table 5.1. Two alternatives thus present themselves for future examination. One possible alternative is that the level of economic development is not a very important factor in the decision-making process. A second alternative is that other variables may intervene to change radically the relationship between economic development and the decision-making process. The later stages of this chapter examine these possiblities more closely.

The hypothesis that the mean value of inter-opstina self-management/pluralist decision-making processes increases with increases in the level of economic development can easily be tested by examining the mean level of each of the self-management/pluralist decision-making process variables across levels of development. Specifically, we would expect all the means of the measures to decrease across levels of development (according to the calculation of the measures, higher scores indicate less self-management/pluralism). Table 5.2 presents the results.

Generally speaking, the results of Table 5.2 are exactly the opposite from what we expected. The self-management/pluralist

TABLE 5.2.--Means of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Level of Economic Development.

Decision-Making Process Measure	Level of Economic Development			
	Total Combined	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	1689	1330*	1834	1769
(N)	(458)	(100)	(110)	(240)
(S.D.)	3310	1628	4585	3135
Decentralization	3988	3600	3903	4196
(N)	(450)	(107)	(114)	(247)
(S.D.)	4603	3165	5499	4680
Professionalization	.401	.376*	.385*	.421
(N)	(295)	(76)	(73)	(146)
(S.D.)	.141	.140	.138	.141
Bureaucracy	.013	.006**	.007*	.020
(N)	(499)	(114)	(121)	(264)
(S.D.)	.077	.002	.004	.105
Mass Availability	12889	4924*	19750	13063
(N)	(450)	(100)	(110)	(240)
(S.D.)	81370	12737	122897	73723
Elite Accessibility	4057	2057*	2550*	5851
(N)	(295)	(76)	(73)	(146)
(S.D.)	12036	1350	2399	16837
Self-Management	3413	945**	2445*	5168
(N)	(273)	(69)	(69)	(135)
(S.D.)	10690	1636	5733	14440

*Difference of means test with the high level of development indicates that means difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Difference of means test with the medium and high levels of development indicates that means difference is significant at the .05 level.

decison-making process ideals are more closely approximated at lower levels of development than at the higher level, and this is true for every specific process variable examined. Table 5.2 seems to indicate the existence of a situation in which the desirable political process traits become weaker as we shift our attention from less developed to more developed communes. The implications of this statement when fully extrapolated are quite important; however, it is still early in the analysis to form firm conclusions from these findings.

One possible factor that may help explain the unexpected changes in variation among communes is the role of the republic. It is possible that variation in the political process variables may be seriously circumscribed within some of the republics. In other words, some of the republics may permit less autonomy in local level decision-making processes than others. Our hypothesis predicts little or no difference among the republics in regard to the coefficients of variation. To reject this hypothesis we need to find a common pattern of reduced coefficients of variation for all political process variables for some set of republics. Table 5.3 provides the necessary data to examine this propostion.

There is no evidence from Table 5.3 to imply that a single republic or set of republics is systematically reducing or expanding variation in the inter-opština political decision-making process scores; thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis. Deviations which occur in the table do not follow a systematic pattern and can be explained quite easily by other means. For example, low coefficients of variation for

TABLE 5.3.--Coefficients of Variation of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables by Republic, 1972.

Decision-Making Process Measure	Republic						
	Total Combined	Bosnia	Montenegro	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia
Participation	1.960	1.662	.919	1.237	1.269	.717	1.206
(N)	(458)	(87)	(9)	(96)	(29)	(60)	(169)
Decentralization	1.154	1.043	.752	.963	1.294	.634	.920
(N)	(450)	(90)	(12)	(103)	(29)	(60)	(174)
Professionalism	.352	.354	.325	.329	.595	.220	.241
(N)	(295)	(53)	(10)	(25)	(16)	(16)	(175)
Bureaucratism	5.293	7.318	.777	.600	.571	2.105	2.500
(N)	(499)	(106)	(20)	(104)	(30)	(60)	(179)
Mass Availability	6.313	3.892	1.513	3.029	2.144	1.207	3.151
(N)	(450)	(87)	(9)	(96)	(29)	(60)	(169)
Elite Accessibility	2.967	.913	.812	.817	.826	.669	3.094
(N)	(295)	(53)	(10)	(25)	(16)	(16)	(175)
Self-Management	3.132	2.220	.927	1.851	2.109	1.276	3.368
(N)	(273)	(48)	(5)	(23)	(16)	(16)	(165)

Montenegro may simply be the result of its small "N" while Bosnia's large coefficients for bureaucratism may simply reflect the fact that Bosnia is a very diverse republic. The implication of the results found in Table 5.3 is that the source of the differences in the predicted variation in self-management decision-making processes is not in the republic.

The final concern we have in this section is to examine the interrelationship of the specific political process variables with each other across different levels of economic development. We expect that the measures of political decision-making processes should be statistically independent of each other and that this independence should be weakest at the level of development where self-management/ pluralism is most pronounced.

An examination of the matrices presented in Table 5.4 reveals that the pairs of variables, participation and decentralization, and professionalism and bureaucratism, are positively related to each other. This finding is expected since they measure similar conceptual dimensions. It is also interesting to note that there is no significant correlation across the pairs of variables, which seems to indicate that these dimensions of self-management are distinct from each other. There are no significant changes in the interrelationship of these variables across levels of development. In fact, they remain remarkably constant which leads us to reject this hypothesis.

Table 5.4, however, does reveal one significant problem. There is a high degree of multicollinearity between decentralization and

TABLE 5.4.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of the Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process at Different Levels of Development, 1972.

	Participation	Decentralization	Professionalism
		Total	
Participation			
Decentralization	.89		
Professionalism	-.01*	.04*	
Bureaucratism	.03*	.01*	.22
		Low Development Level	
Participation			
Decentralization	.81		
Professionalism	-.07*	.00*	
Bureaucratism	.07*	.00*	.25
		Medium Level of Development	
Participation			
Decentralization	.91		
Professionalism	-.06*	-.01*	
Bureaucratism	.03*	.17*	.27
		High Level of Development	
Participation			
Decentralization	.79		
Professionalism	-.06*	.13	
Bureaucratism	.02*	.08	.25

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

participation for all levels of development which suggests that the mass availability index may be unnecessary.

In summary, the analyses executed so far reveal that economic development, by itself, does not seem to have a considerable overriding positive influence over the determination of the type of public policy decision-making process used in local governmental units in Yugoslavia. In fact, economic development may actually have the reverse influence on the decision-making process. Also the republic does not apparently determine the pattern of variation in the political process.

The political process of decision-making is considerably more complex than anticipated and cannot be adequately explained by a bivariate analysis. What is needed, therefore, are more controls and the specification of a formal socio-economic model to test.

B. The Multiple Regression Model

The previous section indicated that the pattern of interrelationships among public policy decision-making variables is not as simple and straightforward as was proposed earlier. This section analyzes the same type of problems discussed in the first section, but specifies a more general model that may help explain the behavior of the public policy decision-making process variables.

1. The Variables

Over time there has been a number of explanations for specific aspects of the decision-making process. Many of these explanations have utilized either singly, or in combination, such variables as

education, income, social integration, social mobility, urbanization, social conflict and change in economic resources.

The general level of education is considered to have a relatively strong and positive effect on the mass availability dimension of self-management/pluralism (i.e., participation and decentralization). Education tends to raise the general information level of the population, improves the ability of the population to understand abstract concepts, and often helps socialize individuals into the political system.[8] In general, education is considered to be crucially important.

Past research has indicated that the level of political participation is affected somewhat by the educational level of the population,[9] and the general tendency is that higher education results in more political participation.[10] While most of these results are based on individual-level data, we would expect that the relationship would hold on more aggregate levels. In general, we expect a strong positive relationship between mass availability measures and education.

The level of education may also have a positive impact on the other aspects of the decision-making process. Because education is often related to greater success of socialization measures and is, in fact, an instrument of socilization, a higher level of education may be positively correlated with the other behavioral traits required in self-management/pluralism, namely, less bureaucratization and professionalization.

A second variable that may have an impact on the decision-making process is the income level of a community. The argument can

be made that decision-making processes such as decentralization are less efficient and, therefore, more expensive to maintain than a centralized political system. High participation levels are also expensive to maintain and should also be positively associated with income.[11]

In addition to the mass availability dimension of self-management/pluralism, there should be some relationship between income and elite accessability measures as well. Generally, high income might be an indication that the average citizen can afford to participate in the communal assembly, and that professionalization in that assembly would be reduced. We do not expect, however, that the income factor would be of crucial importance to professionalization, only that it may have a marginal positive effect upon it. Higher income is probably associated with greater bureaucratization and complexity since it is possible to support an absolutely larger system of administrative services with a relatively smaller piece of the economic pie.[12]

A third variable which may have an impact upon the decision-making process is social integration. This variable tries to measure the degree of community identity. The effect which this variable has upon the decision-making process is problematic. For example, community integration may result in greater participation and decentralization, and greater involvement of the masses in politics. On the other hand, community integration may have the opposite effect because of the greater differences and opportunity for conflict.

A fourth variable introduced into the model is social mobility. Again the proposed effect that this variable might have upon the

process of decision-making is problematic. While migration is known to have a serious impact on the commune,[13] its effect on political processes within the commune has not been resolved.[14] Increased mobility may imply a greater openness in the decision-making process or it may imply that it is more difficult to get involved and to have access to the decision-making process.

The fifth variable added to the model is urbanization. Urbanization is often considered a major link in a chain of political changes. There exists a considerable body of literature which examines the impact of urbanization on the decision-making process. Deutsch[15] noted that a major effect of urbanization was an increase in political participation. Tomic,[16] however, noted that in Yugoslavia an opposite relationship (i.e., participation and urbanization were negatively related) existed, and Nie et al.,[17] concluded that urbanization has a very weak independent impact upon participation, when other measures of development are controlled.[18] Urbanization may also have an effect on decentralization but its effect may not be a simple linear function. In areas of low urbanization, decentralization may be a political necessity. In mid-range urbanized areas centralization may be the rule for reasons of economic efficiency. In the very urbanized areas decentralization may become a political necessity.[19]

Urbanization may positively affect both the level of professionalization and bureaucratization in the commune. Urbanization creates pressures for new services which in turn create pressures for greater bureaucratization and professionalization to handle the new services.[20]

In general, urbanization seems to have a varying effect upon decision-making processes in local governmental units.[21] While the precise nature of its effect may not be known, urbanization is considered an important enough variable for inclusion in the model.

The sixth independent variable used in the model is social conflict. One of the primary roles of local government is the resolution and adjudication of conflict.[22] It stands to reason, therefore, that the intensity of conflict may have some importance for political processes.[23] In Yugoslavia, social conflict within communes has been the subject of voluminous research[24] and is generally held responsible for much of the variance in political decision-making.[25] Social conflict ostensibly increases participation, creates pressures to decentralize in order to lessen conflict, generates pressures to institutionalize conflict through bureaucratization and tries to turn over decisions to professionals.[26]

The seventh variable in the model is change in economic resources. Positive and negative changes in the economic base of the commune can radically change the expectations of political participants in the commune. Positive changes can bring out renewed political participation by interest groups seeking to obtain a bigger share of the surplus. At the same time, positive changes in the economic base would encourage greater decentralization in the commune since it would become economically more feasible to undergo that change. Negative changes in the resource base can theoretically encourage retrenchments which would also encourage greater bureaucratization and participation on the part of the affected elements in the population.

The final element in the model is the inclusion of republic variables. They can be considered summary measures that indicate the existence of social, economic, or administrative factors not previously accounted for.

Figure 5.2 summarizes the expected individual behavior of the variables in the model.

Socio-Economic Variables	Decision-Making Process Variables			
	Partici-pation	Decentral-ization	Bureau-cratism	Profes-sionalism
Education	+	+	-	+ or -
Personal Wealth	+	+	+	-
Social Integration	+ or -	+ or -		
Social Mobility	+ or -	+ or -	+ or -	+ or -
Urbanization	+ or -	+ or -	+	+
Social Conflict	+	+	+	+
Positive Changes in Resources	+	+	-	-
Republic	Unknown	Unknown	Unknonw	Unknown

Figure 5.2.--Expected Relationship Between Increases in Selected Socio-Economic Variables and Decision-Making Process Variables.

2. Measurement

Education is measured by the percent of the population of the commune in 1971 with higher education. Higher education includes any post-secondary formal education.[27]

Personal wealth is measured by per capita income in 1972.

Social mobility is measured by the percentage of the adult population in the commune who have resided in that commune since birth. A low score indicates high mobility.

Social integration is measured by the nationality index of fragmentation multiplied by the percent of the population claiming Yugoslav nationality in 1971.[28]

Urbanization is measured by the population of the commune per hectare in 1971.

Potential social conflict is measured by an industrial/agricultural income disparity score for 1972.[29]

Economic development is measured by the percentage of the population employed in agriculture in 1972.

Republic identification, the final set of independent variables, are really categorized as dummy variables. Separate dummy variables were constructed for each republic excluding Serbia. The value of the republic dummy variables was either zero or one. A score of one meant that the commune belonged to that particular republic.[30]

3. Simple Relationships

Before we can examine the effect which the independent socio-economic variables have upon the processes of decision-making, it is necessary to establish the statistical independence of the independent variables and to get a general idea about how the variables interact with each other. In general, we would expect a positive relationship

between the pairs of the independent social and economic variables because they are measuring different aspects of a similar concept--socio-economic development. On the other hand, we would expect that each variable is measuring a distinct or separate aspect of the concept; therefore, the correlation coefficients should be only moderately strong between them. Table 5.5 summarizes the results.

Table 5.5 indicates that no single pair of variables vary together in a highly related pattern.[31] The direction of the coefficients was expected except for social integration which is weakly but still negatively associated with the other socio-economic measures. This can be explained quite easily by noting that in relatively underdeveloped areas, the degree of nationality homogeneity can be quite high, a fact which can profoundly affect the index. This lack of nationality fragementation coupled with a relatively large percentage of the population who fought as partisans and tend to identify as Yugoslavs could account for the contrary findings.

The next step is to observe the simple relationships between the independent variables and the decision-making process variables which we are examining. Figure 5.2 listed the results which we expect to find and Table 5.6 gives the actual coefficients.

When we compare the actual results found in Table 5.6 with the predicted results in Figure 5.2, several discrepancies are very apparent. The most prominent of these discrepancies is the large number of insignificant coefficients. Most noticeable here are the participation and decentralization columns, the two variables from

TABLE 5.5.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Pairs of Socio-Economic Variables Introduced into the Model.

	Education	Personal Wealth	Social Integration	Social Mobilization	Urbanization	Social Conflict	Resource Change
Education							
Wealth	.478						
Social Integration	-.099	-.073					
Social Mobility**	-.648	-.470	.060*				
Urbanization	.681	.167	-.049*	-.293			
Social Conflict	.154	.183	.085	-.156	.088		
Resource Change	.028*	-.027*	-.086	.076	-.019*	.115	
Economic Development**	.261	.149	-.126	-.100	.099	-.589	-.011

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

**Sign on the measure was reversed for easier interpretation.

TABLE 5.6.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Measures of Socio-Economic Development and Measures of Decision-Making Processes, 1972.

Socio-Economic Measures	Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes						
	Partici-pation**	Decentral-ization**	Bureau-cratism	Profes-sionalism	Elite Accessibility	Mass Availability	Self-Management**
Education	-.027*	.059*	.173	.359	-.041*	.691	.623
Personal Wealth	-.090	-.034*	.076	.146	-.066*	.392	.335
Social Integration	.172	.228	.062*	-.070*	.070	.044*	.098
Social Mobility	.070	-.043*	-.065*	-.403	.064	-.406	-.352
Urbanization	.026*	.060*	.114	.153	.000*	.374	.355
Social Conflict	-.019*	.019*	.012*	-.083	-.023*	.087	.080
Resource Change	.005*	.002*	.019*	-.077	.010*	-.080	-.075
Economic Development	-.040*	-.046*	-.079	-.199	-.148	-.036*	-.161

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

**For proper comparison with Figure 5.2, it must be remembered that "+" on Figure 5.2 means a "-" here.

which most was expected by the literature. Among the significant correlations in these two columns are participation with wealth (r=-.09), a finding which seems weakly to contradict Tomić's finding.[32] Another deviation is the professionalism with wealth coefficient. This coefficient may result from the fact that wealth and education are relatively highly related (r=.481). In this case the coefficient may change signs to the predicted direction when education and other variables are controlled for. The third significant deviation is the bureaucratism with education coefficient which was predicted to be negative but is positive. A probable explanation for this phenomenon is that as the general level of education increases, the need for public services, hence bureaucratization, correspondingly increases.

In general, excluding the insignificant relationships, Figure 5.2 and Table 5.6 match up quite well. These results, nevertheless, may change dramatically once the variables are entered in individually and statistical controls are placed upon them.

When we compare Table 5.6 with Table 3.7 in Chapter III, we find that the individual political structural characteristics are much more powerful than individual socio-economic characteristics in explaining the variation in the political decision-making process. On the basis of these two sets of simple correlation matrices, we can tentatively suggest that social and economic variables are relatively weak explanatory variables for the decision-making process; however, much more testing is necessary. This leads us to hypothesize that variance in self-management/pluralist decision-making processes is largely undetermined by the socio-economic environment.

4. Specifying the Equation

The next step in the analysis is to examine the combined effect of the seven variables suggested earlier. The mathematical model utilizing the independent variables should provide sufficient controls to test the hypotheses mentioned above.

The mathematical model that I introduce is a simple linear least square estimating equation of the form:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 \ldots + b_{11}x_{11} + E$$

where: Y = the dependent variable (decision-making process)

b_0 = the constant

x_1 = personal income per capita

x_2 = urbanization

x_3 = social integration

x_4 = social mobility

x_5 = potential social conflict

x_6 = change in economic resources

x_7 through x_{11} = dummy variables for the republics of Bosnia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia

E = the error term

The variables were entered into the equation in this order according to how distant they were from the policy-making process. This procedure, by definition, minimizes the explanatory impact (R^2) of such variables as change in economic resources, which theoretically has an immediate impact on the decision-making process. It will not affect the regression coefficients themselves.

5. The Results

From the hypothesis suggested earlier we seek to determine if variance in the process of decision-making is relatively poorly explained by the social variables acting together. The hypothesis can be tested relatively easily by examining the multiple correlation coefficients (R^2) of the combination of the independent variables for each dependent variable. If the R^2 is relatively low, the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Theoretically, there is no reason to assume that any single dependent variable will be more adequately explained by this model than any other; however, Table 5.6 gives evidence that implies that variance in participation and decentralization will be largely unexplained by the model.

In addition, we have little basis for predicting which independent variables will have the most significant impact upon the dependent variables, and again Table 5.6 provides some hints. We can get more information about the behavior and adequacy of the model by examining the standardized regression coefficients for each of the equations. These coefficients can be interpreted as a system for ranking variables within an equation and giving the independent impact of a single variable after controlling for all other variables in the equation. They, however, cannot be directly compared across equations.

For our purposes the standardized regression coefficients can be used to determine the direction of impact for each of the independent variables across equations, and to determine if the relative rankings of variables across equations is similar; this would be an indication

that a similar explanatory model can be employed. We would expect to find that the ranking of variables across equations is somewhat different and that the direction of the relationship would match with what was proposed in Figure 5.2.

Table 5.7 lists squared multiple correlation coefficients for the equations, the standardized regression coefficients for each independent variable, and relative ranking of variables within the equation for each of the decision-making variables studied. In this table the republic variables are excluded from consideration and the regression coefficients do not reflect their influence.

The results from Table 5.7 as seen from the R^2 coefficients indicate that the mathematical model does not explain very well the participation, decentralization, bureaucratism and mass availability measures. It is somewhat useful in explaining the remaining variables. What is most interesting from this table is that the rankings of the professionalism variables compared with self-management and elite accessibility are different. This is further evidence that elite accessibility measures a distinctly different concept than professionalism or bureaucracy by themselves.

A comparison of Table 5.7 with Figure 5.2 reveals that the only significant deviation from the predicted is between social conflict and professionalism where the actual coefficient is negative.

In summary, Table 5.7 graphically points out that the process of decision-making is considerably more complex and considerably more difficult to explain than is suggested by the literature. Levels of

TABLE 5.7.--Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings of Each Independent Socio-Economic Variable for Each Self-Management/ Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variable, 1972.*

Decision-Making Process Variables	Social Development Characteristics						
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobility	Social Conflict	Resource Change	R^2
Participation	.060*	.060*	.169 (1)**	.041*	-.019*	.019*	.039
Decentralization	-.054*	.061*	.234 (1)	-.071*	-.009*	.029*	.062
Professionalism	-.076*	.028	-.039*	-.454 (1)	-.138 (2)	-.003*	.191
Bureaucratism	.061*	.105 (1)	.077*	.016*	-.022*	.033*	.023
Elite Accessibility	.250 (2)	.267 (1)	-.037*	-.191 (3)	.002*	.020*	.276
Mass Availability	-.038*	.025*	.066*	.044*	-.017*	.015*	.010
Self-Management	.196 (2)	.272 (1)	.124 (4)	-.176 (3)	-.105*	.053	.231

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

**Numbers in parentheses indicate ranking of variables within the equation.

participation, decentralization and mass availability, in particular, cannot be accurately predicted from individual basic socio-economic variables.

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 jointly indicate that the residual variance in the decision-making process is indeed quite large and that additional variables must be used to explain the decision-making process. Chapters III and IV indicated that the political structure and socio-political organizations may provide some of the important missing links.

Considering the model presented in Chapter II, however, it seems that the link between social variables and the decision-making process may be weak. This result, however, may be biased by the exclusion of socio-political organization variables. The third and concluding section of this chapter will try to determine whether we should moderate this conclusion after we control for level of development.

C. Level of Development and the Decision-Making Process

In this section we are concerned with two significant problems. One problem is to determine if the combined effect of the mathematical model will differ according to the level of economic development, and to predict how the level of development will affect the model. The second problem is to analyze how changes in the level of economic development affect changes, if any, in the behavior of specific independent variables in the model.

1. Problem One--Changes in Explained Variance

It was noted in Chapter IV that the influence of socio-political organizations is strongest at lower levels of development and becomes progressively weaker as the communes become more developed. An implication of this finding is that socio-political organizations may confound the "natural" relationship between social development and decision-making processes which would exist at these levels. Therefore, while the overall relationship of social development to political processes may be negligible, by level of development there may be strong and substantive changes which cancel out when the economic developmental levels are combined.

Teune and Mlinar[33] make a very similar point in regard to participation, and postulate that the qualitative aspects of political participation change by level of development. We may expand this argument to cover the other decision-making processes as well. Therefore, because the combined model tests for only one type of participation, decentralization, etc., it is quite possible that significant relationships are being hidden or weakened.

Guy Peters[34] generalizes Teune and Mlinar's point about participation to public policy decision-making in general and suggests that political variables are relatively equal to socio-economic considerations at low levels of development, that political variables are much more important than socio-economic variables at middle levels of development, and that socio-economic variables are significantly more important than

political variables at higher levels of development. Peters' hypothesis is presented in graphic form in Figure 5.3.



Figure 5.3.--Peters' Hypothesized Relationship of Political and Socio-Economic Variables Across Levels of Economic Development.

Teune, the findings in Chapter IV, and Peters all disagree about the pattern of change of the interrelationships between political and socio-economic factors in decision-making across levels of development. Teune's generalization would imply that the qualitative type of participation and decentralization that I am measuring can only be explained adequately by socio-economic variables at the mid-level of economic development, and that very little would be explained at the lower and higher levels of development. The findings in Chapter IV seem

to indicate that socio-economic characteristics become increasingly important in a linear fashion across levels of development. Peters' proposal is evident from Figure 5.3.

If we make the assumption that much of the unexplained variance in the decision-making process can be attributed to political factors, we can test each of the three proposals against each other.

Figure 5.4 illustrates what this test entails.



Figure 5.4.--Graphic Representation of Teune's, Peters' and Chapter IV's Proposals about the Importance of Socio-Economic Variables on the Institutional Decision-Making Process Across Levels of Economic Development.

The squared multiple correlation coefficients of the combined socio-economic model, excluding republic,[35] for each of the decision-making process variables provide the testing instrument among the various proposals. Since the explained variance for professionalism, elite accessibility and self-management was relatively high in the general model tested earlier, we would not expect dramatic changes in the amount of variance explained for those variables across levels of development. Table 5.8 lists the results which were obtained.

TABLE 5.8.--Multiple Squared Correlation Coefficients for the Combined Model Excluding Republic for Each Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Measure by Level of Economic Development, 1972.

Decision-Making Process	Level of Economic Development			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Participation	.075	.089	.043	.039
Decentralization	.091	.141	.068	.064
Professionalism	.410	.174	.245	.220
Bureaucratism	.525	.729	.058	.042
Elite Accessibility	.695	.822	.588	.547
Mass Availability	.049	.045	.019	.010
Self-Management	.221	.252	.505	.460

The results from Table 5.8 do not give a complete endorsement to any of the three proposed hypotheses. Even when we control for level of economic development, the participation, decentralization and mass availability variables remain largely unexplained.

The pattern of R^2 across levels of development follows the pattern suggested by Teune and Mlinar. Most of the constituent elements of self-management/pluralist decision-making processes (i.e., participation, decentralization and bureaucratization) follow the Teune proposition in that the variance explained is highest at mid-levels of economic development. The elite availability dimension of self-management also follows this pattern. However, the Teune and Mlinar pattern can only be partially endorsed since the professionalism, mass availability and self-management index follows other patterns.

The most significant deviation from the Teune and Mlinar proposed relationship is the case of the combined self-management index which follows a linear pattern of strength across levels of development as suggested by the findings in Chapter IV. For the self-management index the explained variance from the basic socio-economic model is considerably higher in highly developed communes than for the lower levels of development. This finding is congruent with the proposition that as higher levels of economic development are reached, the role of socio-political organizations declines dramatically and socio-economic characteristics achieve dominance in the basic decision-making process. The significance of this finding to Yugoslav political theory about self-management and to the general propositions about the future importance of the Party is self-explanatory.

2. Problem Two--Identification of the Crucial Variables

The second problem is to identify the specific independent variables which account for the changes across levels of development. A satisfactory answer to this problem would be useful in arriving at a firmer understanding of how the decision-making process operates. This task can be accomplished through a two-step analytical procedure.

The first step involves an examination of the standardized regression coefficients in order to get an idea of the relative rankings of the independent variables and to examine how these rankings change across levels of development. This would give us a general idea about whether or not a similar explanatory model applies to all the decision-making process variables across levels of development. We are also interested in determining if the changes in the independent variables across levels of economic development are consistent for each of the dependent measures.

The second step involves an examination of the unstandardized regression coefficients of selected independent variables across levels of development. Through this procedure we can determine if the slopes of the independent variables change significantly across levels of development and, if so, in which direction. This can help us in identifyint the nature of changes in the role of specific explanatory factors of the decision-making process across levels of economic development.

Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 provide the standardized regression coefficients and their relative ranking of the independent variables

for each of the measures of decision-making process at each level of development. We expect, based on Table 5.8, that there will be considerable differences across the dependent measures in the relative importance of the independnet variables. We would also expect, based on the implications of the Kornhauser/self-management model, that the dissimilarity of rankings across the decision-making process variables will lessen at the higher levels of economic development. We may hypothesize that if self-management/pluralism is more prevalent at higher levels of development, it is quite possible that the same factors may account for the behavior of all decision-making process variables.

Table 5.9 reveals that, in general, the variables in the social development model are not very important for explaining decision-making processes in economically under developed communes. Only the social mobility and social integration variables are significant for more than a single decision-making process measure, and income and urbanization have no impact on any measure at all at the low developmental level. Second, of all the independent variables, social integration has a very substantial impact. Significantly,social integration is the only significant variable in explaining the self-management index. For low developed areas, at least, socio-economic factors do not strongly influence the self-management decision-making process, a finding congruent with the conclusion of Chapter IV.

In Table 5.10, which deals with the middle level of development, we find a little more activity among the independent variables. While the mass availability dimension is completely unspecified by the

socio-economic model, nearly every other measure makes use of at least one of the independent variables. The measures of participation, decentralization and the self-management index follow a single pattern which stresses the importance of social integration and change in economic resources. Bureaucratism, professionalism and elite accessibility follow different patterns, each one stressing the importance of different variables.

We can conclude from Table 5.10 that at middle levels of development, no single socio-economic measure is dominant for explaining all aspects of the decision-making process. It should also be noted that potential social conflict has no significance for any of the decision-making process variables at this level of development.

In Table 5.11, which discusses the higher level of economic development, there is again considerable activity among the independent variables. Participation and the mass availability measures remain uspecified but most of the other measures use at least two of the six variables in the model. In Table 5.11, professionalism, elite accessibility and the self-management index follow a relatively similar model. Bureaucratism does not share this pattern and decentralism behaves quite differently. The important variables in the dominant pattern are income, social mobility and urbanization. Social conflict is insignificant for every dependent measure.

When we compare the behavior of individual independent variables from Tables 5.9 through 5.11, several interesting observations can be made. For high development levels, there is no diminant explanatory

variable. The importance of personal income shifts considerably across developmental levels. For bureaucratism it becomes important at mid-developmental levels and weakens considerably at high developmental levels; for elite accessibility, it becomes progressively more important. Social integration behaves similarly for the participation, decentralization, and self-management index. Social mobility becomes more important across development levels, while urbanization does not become significant until the higher development levels. Conflict remains generally unimportant along with change in economic resources.

In general, Tables 5.9 through 5.11 indicate a single major point, that the effect of the socio-economic model on decision-making processes does vary considerably by level of economic development. In other words, the level of development makes a difference in the decision-making process.

The second part of the problem is to identify if there are any significant differences in the slopes of individual variables as we shift from one level of economic development to another. For example, does personal income become in absolute terms a significantly less or more important factor in explaining decision-making processes? The examination of the unstandardized regression coefficients provides the additional necessary information.

Tables 5.9 through 5.11 indicated that income, social integration, and social mobility and urbanization are the significant variables the slopes of which may change radically across development levels.

TABLE 5.9.--Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Economic Model for all Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables at the Low Developmental Level, 1972.*

Decision-Making Process Variables	Socio-Economic Characteristics						
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobility	Social Conflict	Resource Change	R^2
Participation	.017*	-.040*	.246 (1)	.103*	.045*	-.052	.073
Decentralization	.003*	.028*	.262 (1)	.128*	-.003*	-.004*	.076
Bureaucratism	.059*	-.166*	.047*	-.463 (1)	.029*	.287 (2)	.321
Professionalism	.203*	-.034*	.022*	.426 (1)	-.338 (2)	.149*	.381
Elite Accessibility	.114*	-.098*	.057*	-.522 (1)	-.197*	.140*	.336
Mass Availability	.022*	-.068*	.183*	.118*	-.024*	.030*	.046
Self Management	.145*	.097*	.253 (1)	-.179*	-.098*	.143*	.181

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 5.10.--Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Economic Model for all Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables at the Medium Developmental Level, 1972.*

Decision-Making Process Variables	Socio-Economic Characteristics						
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobility	Social Conflict	Resource Change	R^2
Participation	-.016*	.081*	.268 (1)	.049*	-.038*	.149*	.019
Decentralization	-.006*	.145*	.321 (1)	.009*	-.067*	.191 (2)	.140
Bureaucratism	.297 (1)	.106*	.025*	-.414*	.055*	.105*	.400
Professionalism	-.019*	.160*	.020*	-.354 (1)	-.032*	-.066*	.164
Elite Accessibility	.212 (3)	.222 (2)	.072*	-.511 (1)	-.008*	.039*	.593
Mass Availability	.031*	.068*	.195*	.076*	-.030*	.076*	.043
Self-Management	.060*	.165*	.304 (1)	-.280*	.025*	.297 (2)	.223

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 5.11.--Squared Multiple Correlation Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients and Relative Rankings for the Independent Variables in the Socio-Economic Model for all Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process Variables at the High Developmental Level, 1972.*

Decision-Making Process Variables	Socio-Economic Characteristics						
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobility	Social Conflict	Resource Change	R^2
Participation	-.117*	.070*	.110*	.066*	.088*	.045*	.043
Decentralization	-.103*	.050*	.205 (1)	-.118*	.088*	.053*	.068
Bureaucratism	.079*	.101*	.117*	.003*	.030*	.131 (1)	.040
Professionalism	-.214* (2)	.045*	-.135*	-.408 (1)	.089*	.003*	.188
Elite Accessibility	.299 (1)	.224 (2)	-.061*	-.139* (3)	.062*	-.062*	.309
Mass Availability	-.094*	.029*	-.019*	.068*	.068*	.048*	.019
Self-Management	.216 (2)	.224 (1)	.111*	-.145*	.103*	.073*	.281

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

Specifically, among the standardized slope changes in Tables 5.9 through 5.11, there are the following relationships that should be examined:

--social mobility for the professionalism and elite accessibility measures across all levels of development;

--income for elite accessibility from medium to high development;

--social integration for participation and self-management from low to medium development and for decentralization across all levels;

--urbanization for elite accessibility from medium to high levels of development.

Tables 5.12 through 5.15 give the unstandardized regression coefficients for social mobility, income, social integration and urbanization of all the self-management/pluralist decision-making process measures across levels of development. For each of the variable interactions with which we are concerned, 95% confidence intervals were calculated.[36] Regression coefficients outside the range of the confidence intervals can be considered a significant change.

Interpreting the results of Table 5.12 through 5.15, we find that when we consider the social mobility variable with professionalism, the slopes become progressively weaker but not significantly so across all levels of development. The social mobility slopes for elite accessibility remain negative across all levels of development, but become stronger at the mid level of development and remain so at the high level of development. In an applied sense this means that social mobility is a major determinant of professionalism and elite accessibility. The direction of the slopes indicates that social mobility

TABLE 5.12.--Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Social Mobility Derived from the Socio-Economic Model.

Decision-Making Process	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	1374	2036	1341
Decentralization	3381	479	-3660
Professionalism	-.4988	-.4223	-.3615
Bureaucratism	.0094	-.0156	-.0025
Elite Accessibility	-5921	-10593	-14842
Mass Availability	12340	84889	32513
Self-Management	-24523108	-135414790	-130417550
95% Confidence Intervals for Professionalism			
High Range	-.2417	-.0643	-.1733
Low Range	-.7559	-.7803	-.5497
95% Confidence Intervals for Elite Accessibility			
High Range	-3340	-6251	6144
Low Range	-8503	-14934	-35828

TABLE 5.13.--Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Personal Income Derived from the Socio-Economic Model.

Decision-Making Process	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	11350	-21698	-96376
Decentralization	-4167	-9416	-125996
Professionalism	11.976	-.7790	-8.342
Bureaucratism	.0564	.3790	2.1998
Elite Accessibility	65127	150713	1405496
Mass Availability	113519	1145589	-1819659
Self-Management	1010701900	-1026984300	8703988400
95% Confidence Intervals for Elite Accessibility			
High Range		281231	2232990
Low Range		20196	578003

TABLE 5.14.--Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals for Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Social Integration Derived from the Socio-Economic Model.

Decision-Making Process	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	2408	6602	1889
Decentralization	5062	9559	5221
Professionalism	.0198	.0148	-.1013
Bureaucratism	.0007	.0006	.0676
Elite Accessibility	489	925.5	-5529
Mass Availability	14054	128391	-7732
Self-Management	26219224	92985778	86403801
95% Confidence Interval for Participation			
High Range	4431	11386	
Low Range	385	1818	
95% Confidence Interval for Decentralization			
High Range	8902	15038	8492
Low Range	1221	4073	1950
95% Confidence Interval for Self-Management			
High Range	52542615	164443190	
Low Range	-104167	21528364	

TABLE 5.15.--Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Relevant 95% Confidence Intervals of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Processes for Urbanization Derived from the Socio-Economic Model.

Decision-Making Process	Low Development	Medium Development	High Development
Participation	-2.423	9.756	.1069
Decentralization	3.246	20.879	.1163
Professionalism	.0002	.00020	.00001
Bureaucratism	-.00001	.00001	.00001
Elite Accessibility	-5.136	12.759	1.4760
Mass Availability	-32.153	220.49	1.0247
Self-Management	64089	225539	12183
95% Confidence Intervals for Elite Accessibility			
High Range		23.571	2.486
Low Range		1.947	.4660

encourages elitism and works counter to self-management/pluralist ideals.

The income slopes for elite accessibility become significantly stronger from the mid to high level of development. When we consider the slope of social integration on participation, we find a significantly stronger slope at the mid level than at the lower level. Finally, the slopes of social integration on decentralization increase significantly from the low to mid development level, but no significant change occurs for the mid to high level of development.

In order to facilitate overall comparison and general statements about the behavior of the individual independent variables, I have combined the results of Tables 5.9 through 5.11 and 5.12 through 5.15 into Tables 5.16 and 5.17. Table 5.16 lists all the significant changes which occurred in the slopes of the regression coefficients from the low to mid level of development. Table 5.17 performs a similar task for changes in the regression coefficients from the mid to high level of development.

A glance at both Table 5.16 and Table 5.17 indicates that there are indeed a number of changes in the regression slopes across the levels of development. The same socio-economic model behaves differently at different levels of development. The effect of individual variables also changes radically across levels of development. For example, comparing the medium with the high level of development (Table 5.17), we find that income tends to become significantly more prominent for many aspects of decision-making at higher levels of development. In fact,

TABLE 5.16.--Summary Table of Significant Changes in All Slopes of Independent Variables from Low to Middle Range of Development for All Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process.

Decision-Making Process	Independent Variables					
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobilization	Social Conflict	Resource Change
Participation	--	S	--	--	--	--
Decentralization	--	S	--	--	--	S
Professionalism	--	--	NC	--	W	--
Bureaucratism	S	--	--	--	--	W
Elite Accessibility	S	--	S	S	--	--
Mass Availability	--	--	--	--	--	--
Self-Management	--	NC	--	--	--	S

KEY: S = change in coefficients in which the coefficient becomes stronger.

W = change in coefficients in which the coefficient becomes weaker.

NC = no significant change.

-- = not significant at these levels.

TABLE 5.17.--Summary Table of Significant Changes in All Slopes of Independent Variables from Medium to High Range of Development for All Measures of Self-Management/Pluralist Decision-Making Process.

Decision-Making Process	Independent Variables					
	Income	Urbanization	Social Integration	Social Mobilization	Social Conflict	Resource Change
Participation	--	W	--	--	--	--
Decentralization	--	NC	--	--	--	W
Professionalism	S	--	NC	S	--	--
Bureaucratism	W	--	--	--	--	S
Elite Accessibility	S	--	NC	W	--	--
Mass Availability	--	--	--	--	--	--
Self-Management	S	W	--	S	--	W

KEY: S = change in coefficients in which the coefficient becomes stronger.

W = change in coefficients in which the coefficient becomes weaker.

NC = no significant change

-- = not significant at these levels.

there are only three instances where a statistically significant variable did not have a significantly altered slope when level of development changed.

In short, we may conclude that the effect of socio-economic development characteristics is not the same for different aspects of the decision-making process, nor even for the same aspect of decision-making across levels of development. The implication of these findings is that the decision-making process is considerably more independent of socio-economic characteristics than expected, based on the research reported in Chapter IV; and that explanations for the decision-making process are much more complex than originally anticipated. More research needs to be done in this area.

The final implication of these findings is that the decision-making process variables may be separately incorporated into a general model explaining public policy decisions. Even though we may not completely determine the decision-making process, we may still utilize these characteristics in an attempt to explain public policy decisions.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V

[1]Sometimes as a result of missing data the "N" will drop slightly below 500.

[2]Miroslav Pečuljić, Studija iz Političke Sociologije: Socijalna Struktura i Promene Političkih Institucija (Beograd: Visoka Škola Politicke Nauke, 1965).

[3]A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

[4]For most of the communes the occupational data was coded from the individual biographies of communal assembly members in 1969. While every precaution was taken to be accurate, there may be some occupational inflation due to incorrect occupational responses on the part of the assembly members.

[5]The elite accessibility score is:

$$\left(\frac{\text{Per capita administrative expenses}}{\text{Standard deviation of per capita administrative expenses}} \times 100\right) \times \left(\frac{\text{Percent Professionals in Opština Assembly}}{\text{Standard deviation of percent professionals in opština assembly}}\right) \times 100$$

[6]The mass availability index score is:

$$\left(\frac{\text{Population per zbor birača}}{\text{Standard deviation for Population per zbor birača}} \times 100\right) \times \left(\frac{\text{Population per mesna zajednica}}{\text{Standard deviation of population per mesna zajednica}} \times 100\right)$$

[7]Božidar Stefanović, Raspored Opština u Jugoslaviji (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1974).

[8]James Coleman, "Education and Political Development," in Education and Political Development, ed: James Coleman (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 3-50.

[9]Gabriel Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965).

[10]Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), and Sidney Verba and Normal Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[11]L. J. Sharpe, "Participation in a Major City: Some Aspects of Turnout in Greater London," in Local Politics, Development and Participation, ed: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1974), pp. 55-79.

[12]For a discussion of this problem, see Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Representative Mechanisms, Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies: A Comparative Analysis of Within-State Distributions of Economic and Political Traits," Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 112-132.

[13]George W. Hoffman, "Migration and Social Change," Problems of Communism (November-December 1973): 16-31.

[14]Tomo Apostolski, "Migraciona Kretanja u Opštini Gostivor-Ožbiljan Društveni Problem," Komuna 19 Broj. 3 (1972): 40-41.

[15]Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961).

[16]Stojan Tomić, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and Citizen Participation," paper presented at the Prva Međunarodna Konferencija Participacije i Samoupravljanja, Dubrovnik, December, 1972.

[17]Norman Nie, B. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships I," American Political Science Review 63 (June 1969): 361-378.

[18]The problem of multicollinearity and conceptual distinctiveness among these variables will be discussed later in this chapter.

[19]See Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974), who makes the argument for greater decentralization at higher stages of urbanization.

[20]Lorand Dabasi-Schweng, "The Influence of Economic Factors," in Public Administration in Developing Countries, ed: Martin Kriesberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1965), pp. 21-22.

[21]Samuel H. Barnes, "Decision-Making in Italian Local Politics," Administration and Society 6 (August 1974).

[22]Oliver P. Williams, "A Typology for Comparative Local Government," Midwest Journal of Political Science 5 (May 1971): 150-164.

[23]See Stojan Tomić, "Savremena Društvena Podjela Rada i Ruralni Socijalni Sistem," Sociologija Sela 9 (1971): 33-41.

[24]See Stojan Tomić, Komunalni Konflikti (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, 1968-1973).

[25]Nada Čatović, and Azra Fazlić, "Socijalna Diferencijacija i Politički Konflikti Prozašli iz Socijalne Diferencijacije," in Komunalni Konflikti, ed: Stojan Tomić (Sveska Broj 5, Ibid.): 1149-1164.

[26]See the analysis of Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1968), about leadership importance and behavior in areas with strong tendencies towards social conflict.

[27]For data sources and actual calculating procedures, see Appendices C and D.

[28]See Chapter III, p. 83-84.

[29]See Chapter III, p. 84 for an explanation.

[30]For a discussion of this technique, see J. Johnston, Econometric Methods, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 176-186.

[31]This does not mean that no multicollinearity exists. For example, the R^2 of six of the social and economic variables combined on the seventh may be quite high. When this possibility was examined, the multiple R for education was found to exceed .80. Due to this finding, education was dropped from the multivariate analysis.

[32]Stojan Tomić, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and Citizen Participation," op. cit.

[33]Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, "Development and Participation," in Local Politics, Development and Participation, ed: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), pp. 136-172.

[34]B. Guy Peters, "Public Policy, Socio-Economic Conditions, and the Political System: A Note on Their Development Relationship," Polity 5 (Winter 1972): 277-284.

[35]Republics are excluded due to the fact that level of development and republic are sometimes statistically related. In addition, republic does not theoretically belong in a test of these hypotheses.

[36]Confidence intervals of 95% can be calculated as follows:

High range = B + 1.96 s.e.

Low range = B - 1.96 s.e.

where: B = unstandardized regression coefficients
s.e. = standard error of the estimate.

CHAPTER VI

THE GENERAL MODEL AND PUBLIC POLICIES

In this chapter I examine the final stage of the Yugoslav local political process described in Chapter II, the political outputs of the community, i.e., the public policies of the commune. I am interested in determining how the entire model described in Chapter II actually behaves, how it all fits together. Specifically, I examine in depth Hypotheses I, III, and IV listed on page 17 of Chapter II:

> Hypothesis I: Political decision-making variables are more important in the determination of public policies at higher levels of development than at lower levels of development.
>
> Hypothesis III: Public policies are more innovative and progressive at higher levels of development than at lower levels.
>
> Hypothesis IV: Public policy expenditures are relatively higher at higher levels of development than at lower levels.

A. Introduction

Chapter VI analyzes specific public policies in the commune. The public policies range from administrative innovation to industrial tax policies. The range of policies is so great because we are interested in minimizing as many of the public policy analysis weaknesses listed by Coulter[1] as possible. We wish to examine not only

expenditures, but orientation towards change and orientation towards social groups in society.

In general, the public policies examined here fall into one of three categories:

--public policies which indicate symbolic orientation toward change and progress (i.e., innovation);

--public policies which distribute basic social services such as health and education;

--public policies involved with the redistribution of wealth.

The grouping of these categories is not accidental. They correspond to three of the four categorizations of public policy discussed by Lewis Froman.[2] Symbolic, distributive, and redistributive policies are represented; only the regulative policies in Froman's classification schema are excluded.[3]

There are two primary reasons for dividing the public policies into the categories listed above. One is that this grouping of policies is necessary in order to facilitate comparative generalization.[4] The other reason is the high probability that the model explaining public policy may vary according to the type of policy examined,[5] and that the entire process of policy-making may change accordingly.[6] In effect, we are testing this proposition.

This chapter has three substantive sections. One section examines the policy-making process for some specific symbolic questions generalized here as innovations. The second section analyzes health and education policy as representative issues in the domain of distributive policy. The third section studies redistributive policies in the

area of taxation. Within each section we are concerned with several points, including: establishing variance and actual authority of the commune in that policy arena, establishing operational measures for each policy, suggesting and testing simple relationships between specific independent variables in the model, examining the combined effect of the policy-making model, studying the effect of the model across various operational measures, and determining the precise effect of the level of development upon the formation of the public policy.

In addition to the three sections mentioned above, the chapter concludes with a fourth section that compares and contrasts the policy-making process across policies.

B. The General Model

The mathemathical model used in this chapter is a simple linear least square estimating equation resembling the model in Chapter V. Its basic form is:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 \ldots + b_{19}x_{19} + E$$

Where: Y = the dependent variable (i.e., public policy)

b_0 = the constant

x_1 = personal income

x_2 = urbanization

x_3 = social integration

x_4 = social mobility

x_5 = potential social conflict

x_6 = change in economic resources

x_7 = decentralism

x_8 = political participation

x_9 = bureaucratization

x_{10} = political professionalism

x_{11} = administrative/national income interaction term

x_{12} = mass availability

x_{13} = elite accessibility

x_{14} = self-management index

x_{15} through x_{19} = republic dummy variables for Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia

Except for the administrative/national income interaction term, all the variables in this model have been previously defined and operationalized. The administrative/national income interaction term is simply the multiplicative function of national income times bureaucratism. Theoretically, administrative costs should be fundamentally linked to the national income base and this linkage should be weaker at higher levels of national income. We would expect that administrative costs are proportionately higher for relatively poor communes since the base investment in administration is relatively constant and cannot be reduced.

As was the case in the mathematical model introduced in Chapter V, the order of the variables presented in this chapter is not accidental. The variables were entered into the equation according to how distant they were from the policy-making decision as represented in the theoretical model presented in Chapter II (Figure 2.1). Thus, socio-economic variables (Variables x_1 to x_6) are entered first,

followed by the political decision-making variables (variables x_7 to x_{14}), followed by the political structural variables (x_{15} to x_{19}).

C. Symbolic Issues--Innovation

1. Defining the Dependent Variables

Innovative changes are not viewed as important for their substantive impact, but for their symbolic orientation towards change, towards absorbing the new goals of the political system, and towards such Yugoslav values as progress and self-management.

Specifically, this section deals with four problem areas:

--to what extent and in what manner do local political, economic, and social variables affect the decision to innovate, the speed of innovation and the extent of innovation in the commune;

--what impact do central political authorities have upon the innovations in the commune;

--does the pattern of innovation vary by issue or can communes be grouped into progressive/non-progressive categories;

--does level of economic development radically change the predictive model.

The aim of innovation is defined as that of "introducing functional change."[7] In other words, innovations are changes that may alter an organization's administrative processes in order to make the organization more rational, efficient, or congruent with the stated values and norms of the organizations. They are not intended to revolutionize, seriously disrupt or replace administrative processes. Instead, they are designed to protect or strengthen the organization.[8]

The entire process of innovation within an organization is very complex and can embrace a large number of different independent decisions, so that it becomes very difficult to state precisely what are the boundaries and limits to the concept of innovation.[9] While all of an organization's decisions about an innovation are heavily intertwined and dependent upon each other,[10] each decision may be made independently, under different conditions, at different times and may be implemented and executed in a different manner.[11]

This section discusses three different types of innovative decisions. These decisions include the initial decision to adopt an innovation, the speed of adoption of an innovation, and the extent of commitment to an innovation. The types of decisions were selected on the basis of the availability of reliable, extensive, empirical data and constitute the first dimension of innovation.

When examining political phenomena, a second dimension about innovation should also be considered. This is the question of the applicability of a single model of innovation to a series of qualitatively different public policy decisions. In recent years debate has centered upon the need to dissect models of innovation according to the type of specific policy.[12] This suggestion, while departing from the scientific goals of greater parsimony and extensiveness of generalization, does appear, however, to be empirically warranted and certainly should be tested. Accordingly, I have selected five areas of political policy innovation for comparative study: legislative innovation, educational policy innovation, cultural policy innovation, administrative

innovation, and participation innovation. All these areas are highly emotive and symbolic.

Figure 6.1 summarizes the innovation adoption decisons and policy arenas that are examined in this section. Innovation decisions were excluded whenever every Yugoslav commune had made the initial adoption decision or when there was insufficient data to examine.

Adoption Decisions	Policy Arenas				
	Legislative	Education	Cultural	Administrative	Participation
Existence of Innovation	a	X	X	a.	a.
Speed of Adoption	b.	b.	b.	X	X
Strength of Adoption	X	X	X	X	X

where: a. = no variance exists

b. = insufficient data available

Figure 6.1.--Chart of Adoption Decisions and Public Policy Arenas Included for Analysis in this Study.

The strength of legislative innovation is measured by the percent of the communal legislature who are women. This measure adequately represents an innovative concept since the admission of women to the communal legislature does involve a sharp change from past practice, and opposition and delaying tactics have accompanied this change even though the state ideology strongly supports such changes.

Educational innovation is measured through the existence, composition, and financing of the communal school board (Interesna Zajednica za Obrazovanje). Since the presence of elected school boards is a recent phenomenon, they tend to replace the appointed commissions which served as part of the communal departments of education. The school boards are designed to increase popular participation and involvement in educational policies. One goal of the elected school boards is to reduce representation by members of educational institutions and to increase general worker involvement. A second goal is to attempt to get economic working organizations more directly involved in the financing of education in the commune in order to reduce public expenditures on educational programs. Both criteria are reflected in the measures used to define the strength of education innovation.

Cultural innovations are defined by measures functionally equivalent to those listed for education since the arguments for the educational policy areas can be advanced for cultural innovation as well. However, only the worker representation measure of strength of cultural innovation is used because insufficient data exist to include the financial aspect of the strength of cultural innovation.

The democratization of administrative functions is a very important symbolic change in the organization of communal administration. One measure of the extent to which this innovation has been adopted is the number of issues formally discussed by local administrative units (Mesna Zajednica). The measures used for democratization of

administrative procedures identify the extent to which the innovation has been implemented as well as the rate of change in its implementation.

The final measure is involved with democratization of participative institutions. It attempts to quantify the extent to which citizens are encouraged to become involved in local public policy decision-making. Referendum questions (Zbor Birača) are used much more widely than in the United States, and are decided in the context of a townhall meeting rather than an election booth. Referendum questions are discussed at public meetings and new questions may be introduced at these meetings. Obviously, participation is higher and more genuine when more questions are introduced and discussed.

Figure 6.2 summarizes the operational measures of the different types of innovation decisions in various policy areas which were introduced in Figure 6.1 and discussed above. This set of operational measures constitutes the list of dependent variables in this section.

2. Interaction of the Innovation Measures with Each Other

The first stage in the analysis is to establish the independence of the dependent variables. If we are measuring different types of innovation decisions, we would expect that the relationship among them would be positive since they are all conceptually linked, but relatively weak since they should be independent of each other.

Table 6.1 summarizes the results found for all the measures of the dependent variables. First is the unexpectedly high number of insignificant pearson r correlation coefficients among the dependent

Variable	Measure
1. Strength of Legislative Innovation	1. Percent of the communal assembly who are women, 1969-1972.[13]
2. Education Innovation, Existence	2. The existence of a popularly elected school board, 1972.[14]
3. Education Innovation, Political Strength	3. The percent of the school board membership elected from economic organizations, 1972.[15]
4. Education Innovation, Economic Strength	4. The percent of the school board income derived from contributions by communal economic organizations, 1972.
5. Cultural Innovation, Existence	5. The existence of a popularly elected cultural board, 1972.[15]
6. Cultural Innovation, Strength	6. The percent of the cultural board income derived from communal economic organizations, 1972.
7. Administrative Democratization, Change	7. Percent increase in formal local community proposals, 1971-1972.[16]
8. Administrative Democratization, Strength	8. Average number of local community proposals per local community, 1972.[16]
9. Participative Democratization, Change	9. Percent increase in referendum questions in local communities, 1971-1972.[17]
10. Participative Democratization, Strength	10. Referenda called per local community, 1972.[17]

Figure 6.2.--List of Dependent Variables and Operational Measures of the Variables.

variables. The occurrence of these insignificant relationships seems to provide some support to the notion that individual innovations may not be empirically linked and that a single mathematical model may not explain individual innovation decisions.

The second interesting point about Table 6.1 is the existence of two negative correlation coefficients. One is the negative correlation coefficient between the strength of legislative innovation and the strength measure of participation innovation ($r = -.11$), and another is between the existence of educational innovation and the strength of administrative innovation ($r = -.12$). We should be cautious about interpreting these findings since the total variance explained barely exceeds 1% of the total.

The third interesting characteristic in Table 6.1 is the appearance of some moderately strong coefficients. Two possible explanations may justify the appearance of these coefficients. In some cases the high positive correlation coefficients result when different aspects of the same policy area are compared (e.g., change in administrative innovation with administrative innovation strength ($r = .39$) or participation innovation change with participation innovation strength ($r = .56$). In other cases the moderately strong relationships (e.g., existence of school board with existence of cultural board ($r = .48$) and administrative innovation change with participation innovation change ($r = .48$) can be expected when we compare similar types of innovation decisions across different policy areas.

In spite of the deviations from the expected pattern, the general thrust of Table 6.1 is that the measures of the dependent variables are indeed distinct and independent of each other. In addition, although independence has been established, the variables tend to interrelate positively with each other, an indication that they are measuring different aspects of a single concept.

3. Expected Interaction of Independent Variables with Innovation

A considerable number of explanations for innovations in organizations have been proposed that employ as independent variables such characteristics as economic resource base, changes in the economic resource base, the political system, social integration, organizational professionalism, bureaucratism and regional diffusion effects.

The economic resource base is a variable often adduced to explain innovation. The argument is made that "if all the resources of an organization are busily employed in carrying on existing programs, the process of initiating new programs will be slow and halting at best."[18] Thus, variance or change in policy should be associated with the relative size of economic resources in the commune. This finding has been confirmed within the political context of American state public policies by Dawson and Robinson,[19] Hofferbert,[20] and Dye.[21] The economic resource base was also found to be a powerful variable for explaining the adoption of innovations in public policies within American states,[22] and within county public health bureaus.[23]

TABLE 6.1.--Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Pairs of Measures of Dependent Variables of Innovation, 1972.*

Dependent Variables	Dependent Variables								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Legislative Strength									
2. Education Existence	-.03*								
3. Education Innovation, Political Strength	-.08*	.14							
4. Education Innovation, Economic Strength	-.01*	.02*	.27						
5. Cultural Existence	.08*	.48	-.09*	.06*					
6. Cultural Strength	.20	.03*	.08*	.14*	---				
7. Administrative Change	-.07*	-.05*	-.05*	.13	-.07*	-.06*			
8. Administrative Strength	.27	-.01*	-.04*	-.05*	.03*	-.08*	.39		
9. Participative Change	-.06*	-.02*	.01*	-.02*	-.03*	.10	.55	.29	
10. Participation Strength	-.11	.03*	-.00*	-.05*	-.01*	.14	.39	.50	.56

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

Changes in the resource base may also be an important consideration in explaining innovation in public policies. "The degree of stability or rate of change calls for different systems by which the activities of the 'organization' are controlled, by which information is conveyed throughout the organization, and by which decisions and actions are authorized."[24] As available resources rapidly increase, the potential for initiating innovative solutions also increases. Inversely, as change in available resources rapidly decreases, organizations may be forced to become highly innovative.[25]

The political system may be considered an explanatory factor in the adoption of innovation since we assume that different political units would put varying degrees of pressure or obstacles to innovative behavior within their political sub-units. In the American context the availability of federal funds[26] or the pressure of federal authorities[27] can have a substantial impact upon the adoption of innovations. We can conceivably expect a similar pattern within other federal structures as well.

Michael Aiken and Robert Alford have suggested that community integration can have a considerable impact upon innovation in urban renewal programs[28] and public housing programs.[29] They originally suggested that innovation in public policies is higher in integrated communities but their results seem to indicate the opposite. Certainly, this relationship should receive more consideration.

Professionalism and bureaucratism are two variables which nearly every researcher in policy innovation considers important. Downs, for

example, argues that the presence of professional personnel has ambiguous implications for organizational innovation. "Such persons are heavily influenced by ideas generated within their profession and therefore outside the control of the bureau." The professionals may act as radical innovators or as rigid conservatives.[30] Hage and Aiken[31] found a weak but positive relationship between professionalism of personal and program change, and Sharkansky[32] discovered that administrative professionalism was a strong determinant of public policies.

Bureaucratism has also been subject to extensive examination in American-based research on innovation. The theoretical justification for the inclusion of this variable is the Weberian notion that bureaucratic organizations are resistant to change and innovation.[33] Unfortunately, however, results from empirical tests of the effect of bureaucratism on innovation have been contradictory.[34]

The last explanatory variable considered here is regionalism, or more precisely, the effect of regionalism on the diffusion of innovation. Jack Walker[35] considered this variable of primary concern in his research on innovation in American states and found that regional diffusion had a substantial impact on policies. Ira Sharkansky[36] provided evidence which corroborates the importance of region for the adoption of public policies. The difficulty in using regionalism as an explanatory variable, however, is that regionalism avoids the problem of identifying those factors that actually account for the regional diffusion effect.[37] Thus, regionalism should be considered as a summary measure or variable. Regionalism is measured by republic origin.

In addition to the variables listed so far, several other variables may also have an impact on innovation in public policies. These variables include potential social conflict, which may promote or oppose innovation; decentralization, a variable with which some innovations are closely connected; and participation, which supposedly promotes change as well. We do not expect, however, that these variables will have an important independent impact on determining all types of innovation decisions in all types of innovation policy areas. It is possible, nevertheless, that some of these variables may have a very strong effect on one or two of the innovation measures selected.

4. Actual Explanatory Strength of the Independent Variables on Innovation Measures

The next stage in the study is to examine the actual effect of the individual independent variables on the innovation measures. Table 6.2 contains the simple correlation coefficients of the independent variables with the dependent variables. If any single variable is dominant in explaining variance in innovation, we would expect the simple correlation coefficients to reflect that fact. Second, if a similar model can be used to explain many different types of innovation, we would expect the direction and strength of the simple Pearson correlation coefficient to be roughly similar across innovation measures.

What is most striking in Table 6.2 is the general paucity of strong relationships. Excluding the legislative strength innovation measure, there are only three coefficients with values exceeding .300.

TABLE 6.2.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables in the Policy Model and Innovation Measures, 1972.*

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Legislative Strength	Educational Existence	Educational Political Strength	Educational Economic Strength	Cultural Existence
Personal Income	.454	-.002*	.143	.112	.005*
Social Integration	.052	-.178	-.042	-.077	-.128
Social Mobility**	-.593	.050	.151	.007*	-.071
Urbanization	.387	-.104	-.016*	-.055	-.076
Potential Conflict	.027*	-.202	-.125	.064	-.150
Change in National Income	-.138	.080	.104	.194	.009*
Bureaucratism	.439	-.055	-.008*	-.084	-.025*
Decentralism**	.224	-.210	-.097	-.083	-.059
Participation**	.095	-.163	.016*	-.093	-.098
Professionalism	.272	.153	-.223	.128	.258
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.210	.184	.138	.028*	.189
Mass Availability**	.036	-.167	.025*	-.092	-.091
Elite Accessibility**	.433	-.062	-.136	.037*	-.016*
Self-Management**	.445	-.153	-.113	-.073	.055

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measures with the direction of the concept.

TABLE 6.2.--Continued

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Cultural Strength	Administrative Change	Administrative Strength	Participative Change	Participative Strength
Personal Income	-.073*	-.008*	.220	-.068*	-.183
Social Integration	.194	-.027*	-.008*	.024*	-.002*
Social Mobility**	.039*	.039*	-.401	.071*	.110
Urbanization	-.012*	-.008*	.055	.011*	.003*
Potential Conflict	-.000*	.049*	.080	.100	-.008*
Change in National Income	.119	.045*	-.052	.100	.180
Bureaucratism	-.021*	-.005*	.117	-.012*	-.036*
Decentralism**	.120	.239	.303	.533	.252
Participation**	.180	.210	.080	.210	.200
Professionalism	-.044*	-.082	.112	-.059*	-.098
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-.054*	-.075	.153	-.106	-.136
Mass Availability**	.142	.192	.089	.233	.180
Elite Accessibility**	.001*	-.009*	.106	-.017*	-.036*
Self-Management**	.104	.056	.148	.076	.032*

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measures with the direction of the concept.

Obviously, no single variable suggested by the literature or included in the model has a dominant influence on different types of innovation. Innovation, apparently, is a very complex and not easily manipulated policy categorization.

When we compare the size and strength of the coefficients across innovation measures, we find that there are no general patterns which emerge among the socio-economic variable groups. Legislative strength innovation follows a distinct pattern with generally strong coefficients across the range of the independent socio-economic variables. Cultural strength innovation is also distinct with generally weak coefficients across the range of variables. All the remaining innovation measures follow separately some type of deviation from these two extreme patterns. An examination of the patterns across the political process variables is somewhat more fruitful. In this group of independent variables, three patterns emerge. Legislative strength has generally strong and positive coefficients which implies that self-management decision-making processes are associated with less legislative innovation.

The second pattern contains the educational and cultural innovation measures. In this pattern improvement in self-management/pluralist decision-making processes tends to relate weakly but positively with improvements in educational and cultural innovation. There are, of course, deviations from this tendency.

The third pattern which emerges includes the administrative and participative innovation policy areas. Many of the decision-making process variables are positive which may indicate these innovations are

more predominant when self-management/pluralist decision-making processes are least developed.

Within the political decision-making process variables, all three patterns divide according to policy areas rather than by the type of adoption decision. This may be an early indication that it is theoretically more meaningful to categorize innovation by policy area than by the type of adoption decision. More work, however, needs to be done.

In general, Table 6.2 does not provide us with a focus for our attention. No single independent variable behaves the same way across all policy innovations. No single independent variable is dominant or even universally strong.

5. Examining Individual Variables in the Model

A crucial problem in public policy analysis is to identify the relative effect that specific variables have upon the public policy. In this analysis of innovation decisions, we are concerned with establishing which independent variables are significant, what is their relative importance in the equation, and what is the direction of their relationship when controlling for other variables. A second issue area with which we are concerned is the determination of whether the general model explaining innovation in public policies follows a similar pattern across all innovation measures or follows a pattern which is determined by policy area or type of adoption decision.

The first issue area involves an examination of the relative effect of the independent variables in the general model upon the innovation measures. This concern is somewhat different than that handled by Table 6.2 because we are interested not in the explained variance or strength of some combination of variables but in the direction and strength of individual regression slopes. This means, for instance, that it is possible to have an independent variable which explains relatively little of the total variance in the dependent variable but which has a very significant slope and, when other variables are controlled for, can be a very useful policy instrument or tool.

Another advantage which the regression analysis permits that is not possible with correlational analysis is that a policy-maker can have information about the expected magnitude of the effect on the dependent variable that a change in an independent variable may have. The policy-maker with this information can affect the dependent variable by properly manipulating those variables which can be manipulated. Thus, for example, a local decision-maker may increase the rate of change in an innovation by consciously manipulating those specific political decision-making variables. While the effect of this change on the innovation measure may be less than a change in a republic measure, changing republic is not a viable policy option for the local decision-maker.

As in Chapter V, the examination of the standardized regression coefficients in the model will inform us which variables are significant in the analysis as well as the relative importance of each of the

TABLE 6.3.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the General Model for All Measures of Innovation, 1972.

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Legislative Strength	Educational Existence	Educational Political Strength	Educational Economic Strength	Cultural Existence
Personal Income	.156 (7)	-.062*	.147*	.515 (1)	-.108*
Urbanization	.141 (8)	-.035*	.034*	-.067*	-.050*
Social Integration	.136 (10)	-.035*	-.053*	-.076*	-.092*
Social Mobility**	-.426 (2)	.090*	.039*	.062*	.045*
Potential Conflict	-.080*	-.171 (3)	-.093*	.057*	-.121 (5)
Change in Resources	.097*	.027*	.121*	.284 (2)	.028*
Decentralization**	.017*	-.076*	-.380*	-.002*	.149*
Participation**	.327 (4)	.126*	.170*	.024*	-.025*
Bureaucratism	.101*	.738*	.296*	-.218*	-.565*
Professionalism	.035*	.244 (1)	.224*	.300*	.148*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-.160 (6)	.187 (2)	.057*	-.078*	.299 (1)
Mass Availability**	-.458 (1)	-.121*	.114*	-.161*	-.126*
Elite Accessibility**	-.283*	-.653*	-.639*	-.052*	.629*
Self-Management**	.416 (3)	-.167*	.233*	.046*	-.125*
Montenegro	-.012*	.131 (6)	-.001*	.122*	.191 (2)
Macedonia	-.105 (11)	.169 (4)	-.003*	-.019*	-.126 (4)
Croatia	.161 (5)	.164 (5)	.190*	.001*	-.167 (3)
Slovenia	.139 (9)	-.016*	.164*	-.070*	.019*
Bosnia	-.097*	-.192*	.228 (1)	.073*	-.092*
R^2	.525	.273	.217	.199	.232

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the concept.

TABLE 6.3.--Continued.

Independent Variables	Innovative Measure				
	Cultural Strength	Administrative Change	Administrative Strength	Participative Change	Participative Strength
Personal Income	-.170*	.081*	-.001*	-.064*	-.160*
Urbanization	-.068*	-.017*	-.062*	.032*	.037*
Social Integration	.113*	-.238 (3)	-.135*	-.179*	-.167 (4)
Social Mobility**	-.123*	.143*	-.261 (3)	.195 (3)	.147*
Potential Conflict	.027*	.047*	-.021*	.094*	-.031*
Change in Resources	.156*	-.071*	-.000*	.048*	.080*
Decentralization**	-.364*	.619 (1)	.976 (1)	.799 (1)	.824 (1)
Participation**	.251*	.109*	-.273*	.093*	.070*
Bureaucratism	-.039*	-.184*	.011*	.071*	.226*
Professionalism	-.003*	-.017*	-.119*	-.008*	-.102*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.114*	-.075*	.095*	.056*	.109*
Mass Availability**	.034*	-.177*	-.259*	-.303*	-.350 (3)
Elite Accessibility**	-.044*	.567*	.266*	.374*	.221*
Self-Management**	.240*	-.500 (2)	-.384 (2)	-.542 (2)	-.508 (2)
Montenegro	.035*	-.002*	-.071*	.171 (4)	-.067*
Macedonia	.035*	.117*	-.007*	.107*	.145 (6)
Croatia	-.047*	.039*	-.070*	.018*	-.043*
Slovenia	.236*	.021*	-.067*	-.053*	-.162 (5)
Bosnia	-.027*	.079*	-.094*	.001*	-.013*
R^2	.137	.141	.333	.241	.235

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the concept.

independent variables in the equation and the direction of their influence on the dependent variables. These coefficients are listed in Table 6.3.

The first observation from the data in Table 6.3 is that some of the independent variables included in the model are not individually significant for understanding any of the innovation measures. Urbanization, bureaucratization and elite accessibility do not contribute significantly to any innovation measure.

The second observation is that when we consider the innovation measures, we find that some of the measures are completely undetermined by the model. For example, the measure of the strength of cultural innovation is not affected by economic, social, political and decision-making variables, and the only factor of significance for the measure of strength of educational innovation in the political area is whether or not a commune is located in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Possibly republic influence is very important here.

The third general observation deals with the relative importance of the socio-economic, political and decision-making process variable group. For most measures of innovation, the most significant variables for determining the innovations are political process variables; the second most important group, in general, is the socio-economic variable group, while republic origin is generally least important. The implication of this finding is rather significant because the decision-making political process variables are the easiest to manipulate, socio-economic variables are more difficult to manipulate, and republic

membership is basically out of the control of the local policy maker. This means that, in general, innovations are in the hands of decision-makers and can be influenced, albeit weakly in some cases, by them.

From Table 6.3 it does not seem very likely that a common model can be applied to all aspects of innovation across all policy areas. First, there are considerable differences across innovation measures in terms of identifying which variables are significant. This implies that the independent variables which are to be manipulated must be selected very carefully since what is useful in one innovation measure may be counterproductive in another. For example, increase in mass availability in a commune could substantially increase the amount of legislative innovation but it would not have any significant impact on nearly every other innovation measure. Second, even among the regression coefficients of the independent variables which are significant, the direction of their impact may be different. Education has a positive impact on the strength of legislative innovation but a negative impact on the rate of change of participative innovation. Similar changes occur in social integration, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and the self-management index. In short, innovation is not a simple concept which can easily and predictably be manipulated at whim by decision-makers. What may strengthen one innovation will depress another.

When we try to catalogue innovations into a common pattern based upon their standardized regression coefficients, we have only limited success. There are only two patterns that apply to more than a single innovation measure. The measures of the initial adoption decisions

follow one pattern which indicates that the initial decision to adopt an innovation is the result of increases in the capacity to pay (i.e., bureaucratic income interaction term), the attitude of the republic in which a commune is a member, and a general lack of potential social conflict. The model indicates that these innovations are avoided unless the commune really can afford it, there is strong republic pressure to adopt, and no resistance is expected from important sectors of society.

The second pattern which emerges is by policy area. This pattern includes the administrative innovation change, participative innovation change and participative innovation strength measures. This model suggests that positive increases in these innovations are the result of more centralism, more self-management, and less social integration. This pattern in the slopes of decentralism is unexpected because we had expected that innovation would be more likely to occur and to occur more rapidly in a decentralized political environment.

This contrary finding may be explained in one of two ways. Either decentralism makes innovation more difficult due to the difficulty in communication which arises, or the percentage changes that we are measuring are affected by a lower threshold level. This would mean that where innovation is low, a 100% positive improvement may actually reflect a very small absolute change, while a 100% improvement in a commune which previously has had a considerable amount of innovation may be in the aggregate quite substantial. Both alternatives can be examined more closely when I divide the population of communes into levels of economic development.

Summarizing this sub-section, we can conclude that no general model of innovation exists. However, there are common patterns in the decision to adopt innovation and for decisions in the administrative and participative policy areas. Also, political process variables are important. Innovations as representative of symbolic issues are not largely determined by socio-economic characteristics. For innovations, at least, politics does make a difference.

6. The Effect of Economic Development on Symbolic Policy

The problem addressed here is to determine what changes, if any, in the behavior of the independent variables explain innovation when we stratify the communes by level of development. In other words, are more highly developed communes qualitatively different than medium and low developed communes in regards to forming innovative policy? There is a strong possibility that in more highly developed communes, innovation in public policies is more prevalent, that the public policy decision-making process tends to have a more direct and substantive impact on the implementation of such symbolic policies as innovation, and that specific innovations will tend to group around a single policy-making model. Specifically, we are suggesting three hypotheses:

1. The mean level of innovation (across policy areas and type of adoption decision) is higher in the more highly developed communes;

2. Political process variables will tend to explain more of the variance in innovation decisions at lower levels of development;

3. Innovation decisions will tend to follow a similar predictive model at higher levels of development.

The first hypothesis is based upon the proposition widely held in Yugoslavia and elsewhere that receptivity to change, progressive orientation and an innovative attitude are more prevalent in economically developed communities. Underdeveloped communities are considered to be more traditional and generally hostile towards change. On the other hand, innovation may be more difficult to implement in an economically developed community because more divisions exist, more group pressure exists, and more individuals may feel directly threatened by change. We can examine this proposition quite simply by comparing mean score in innovation measures in highly developed communes against the other communes combined. A difference of means test can be calculated to determine if significant differences exist between the two groups. Table 6.4 provides the mean scores and accompanying statistics for each innovation measure.

Table 6.4 reveals that for eight of the ten measures of innovation, the mean score of innovation is higher in the more highly developed communes than in the total population of communes; however, only two of these changes is significant at the .05 level--that for legislative innovation strength and educational innovation existence. Table 6.4, therefore, does not provide strong evidence in support of the first hypothesis. A possible implication of this finding is that innovation decisions are not quantitatively different at different levels of development; however, this finding does not imply that the behavior of variables upon innovation does not change by level of development.

TABLE 6.4.--Means, Standard Deviations, N, and T Score for All Measures of Innovation in the Total Population and Highly Developed Communes.

Innovation Measure	Low and Medium Development			High Development			Total
	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	
Legislative Strength	.0621	.0447	132	.0852	.0607	128	-3.472*
Educational Existence	.4234	.4959	137	.5672	.4973	134	-2.374*
Education Strength Political	.0981	.0764	61	.1103	.0975	78	- .821
Educational Strength Economic	.0040	.0132	55	.0063	.0251	68	.647
Cultural Existence	.3285	.4714	137	.4254	.4963	134	-1.641
Cultural Strength	.3145	.1666	45	.3383	.1609	57	- .720
Administrative Change	.2612	1.0549	136	.2755	.6713	134	- .246
Administrative Strength	25.3882	19.3724	137	23.7900	10.7987	134	.838
Participative Change	.1800	1.2883	133	.2769	1.2757	133	.632
Participative Strength	3.4581	4.1441	137	3.2428	2.2124	134	.533

*Denotes a significant difference at the .05 level of significance for a one-tailed test.

The second hypothesis directly examines the question of change in the strength of the predictive model across levels of development. It can be easily tested by examining and comparing the explained variance attributed to political processes of the total population of communes with the highly developed communes. Table 6.5 provides the results. We expect that political process variables will explain less of the variance at higher levels of development than when we consider the other two levels together.

Comparing the R^2 coefficients from the low and medium communes with the highly developed communes, we find that in many cases the total variance explained by the model is weakened at the higher levels of development, and for some innovation measures the decline is quite marked. But, political process variables sometimes explain considerably more of the variance at the higher levels of development than they do for the remaining population of communes. Generally speaking, however, the hypothesis is not supported by the data.

These results lead us to the test of the third hypothesis. Because political process variables are generally stronger in the more highly developed communes, it is quite possible that their influence may also change radically at this level as well. It is our prediction that the slopes of the political process variables will be stronger at the higher levels of development and will tend to behave more consistently across innovation measures than when all levels of development were combined.

TABLE 6.5.--Total R^2 Coefficients and Variance Explained by Variable Groups Comparing Low and Medium Communes with Highly Developed Communes.

Innovation Measure	Low and Medium Development				High Development			
	Socio-Economic	Political Process	Republic	Total R^2	Socio-Economic	Political Process	Republic	Total R^2
Legislative Strength	.268	.171	.091	.530	.504	.084	.042	.630
Educational Existence	.131	.070	.087	.288	.074	.154	.129	.357
Educational Political Strength	.249	.160	.083	.492	.140	.170	.058	.368
Educational Economic Strength	.053	.099	.014	.166	.223	.176	.063	.462
Cultural Existence	.116	.091	.072	.279	.045	.122	.083	.250
Cultural Strength	.169	.242	.102	.513	.080	.070	.090	.240
Administrative Change	.172	.093	.041	.306	.063	.248	.018	.329
Administrative Strength	.159	.325	.042	.526	.356	.062	.060	.478
Participative Change	.122	.226	.100	.448	.130	.164	.073	.367
Participative Strength	.081	.227	.077	.385	.094	.097	.008	.198

Tables 6.6 and 6.7 supply some of the data which can test this hypothesis. This table lists the significant standardized regression coefficients for all variables in the model and provides relative rankings across the innovation measures for the low-medium and higher level of development.

From Table 6.7 we can see that political process variables tend to have the strongest standardized regression coefficients in the equation for nearly every innovation measure tested. This finding is similar to the results in Tables 6.3 and 6.6. It is evident that the level of development has not radically changed the relative importance of the variables.

An important change from the results of Table 6.6 occurs in the distribution of significant coefficients across independent variables. In Table 6.7 variables such as personal income and social mobility are significant for more innovation measures than they were earlier. Most other variables, however, are less significant. Also, the frequency of sign changes of independent variables across innovation measures remains high at higher levels of development.

The implication of this finding, which is made more evident by an inspection of Tables 6.3, 6.6, and 6.7 is that predictive models do not become more identifiable when stratified by level of development. In fact, when development is stratified it becomes more apparent that each innovation measure must be explained differently. It appears that at all levels of development, economic, social and political processes are complex and difficult to manipulate. Planned politics of symbolic

TABLE 6.6.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the Model for All Measures of Innovation, Low and Medium Developmental Levels Combined, 1972.

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Legislative Strength	Educational Existence	Educational Political Strength	Educational Economic Strength	Cultural Existence
Personal Income	-.023*	-.080*	.037*	.263*	-.122*
Urbanization	-.109*	.048*	-.504 (1)	-.056*	.161*
Social Integration	.204 (7)	-.257 (4)	-.214*	-.149*	-.219 (2)
Social Mobility**	-.083*	-.087*	-.082*	.143*	.036*
Potential Conflict	-.011*	-.151*	-.297 (2)	.023*	-.215 (3)
Change in Resources	.068*	.053*	-.050*	.024*	.002*
Decentralization**	.078*	.060*	.669*	.502*	.038*
Participation**	.533 (2)	.106*	.384*	.040*	.199*
Bureaucratism	-.154*	.657 (2)	-.497*	.023*	.391*
Professionalsim	-.392 (3)	.506 (3)	-.522*	.295*	.323*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-.013*	.211*	-.061*	.139*	.399 (1)
Mass Availability**	-.302*	-.254*	-.860*	-.210*	-.156*
Elite Accessibility**	.982 (1)	-.897 (1)	.632*	-.140*	-.462*
Self-Management**	-.336 (4)	-.065*	-.118*	-.323*	-.212*
Montenegro	-.046*	-.000*	--	--	-.110*
Macedonia	-.293 (5)	.208 (6)	-.036*	.104*	-.110*
Croatia	.048*	.225 (5)	.228*	-.050*	-.173*
Slovenia	.108*	-.086*	.354*	-.123*	-.083*
Bosnia	-.305 (6)	-.046*	-.176*	--	.044*
R^2	.530	.288	.492	.166	.279

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the Concept.

TABLE 6.6.--Continued

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Cultural Strength	Administrative Change	Administrative Strength	Participative Change	Participative Strength
Personal Income	-.238*	-.040*	-.016*	-.109*	-.078*
Urbanization	-.034*	-.198*	-.151*	-.252 (3)	-.104*
Social Integration	-.266*	-.292 (3)	-.187 (8)	-.212 (4)	-.261 (4)
Social Mobility**	.039*	-.073*	-.255 (6)	-.012*	.072*
Potential Conflict	.297*	-.006*	-.159 (9)	-.002*	-.107*
Change in Resources	.431*	-.126*	.025*	.128*	.070*
Decentralization**	.748*	1.262 (1)	1.404 (1)	1.136 (1)	.988 (1)
Participation**	.733*	-.602*	-.604 (4)	-.068*	.184*
Bureaucratism	-1.023*	-.100*	.696 (3)	.256*	.224*
Professionalism	-.243*	-.227*	.088*	-.258*	-.196*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.454*	-.127*	.083*	.031*	.052*
Mass Availability**	-2.110*	-.009*	-.532 (5)	-.246*	-.458 (2)
Elite Accessibility**	.339*	.321*	-.763 (2)	.019*	-.035*
Self-Management**	1.124*	-.437 (2)	.803*	-.531 (2)	-.394 (3)
Montenegro	.118*	-.119*	-.198 (7)	-.205 (6)	-.162*
Macedonia	-.103*	.181*	-.005*	.135*	.160*
Croatia	-.109*	.039*	-.110*	-.130*	-.087*
Slovenia	.315*	-.048*	-.120*	-.205 (6)	-.211 (5)
Bosnia	.001*	.050*	-.118*	-.210*	-.078*
R^2	.513	.306	.526	.448	.385

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the concept.

TABLE 6.7.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Rankings for Each Independent Variable in the Model for All Measures of Innovation, High Developmental Level, 1972.

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Legislative Strength	Educational Existence	Educational Political Strength	Educational Economic Strength	Cultural Existence
Personal Income	.215 (5)	-.048*	.122*	.254*	-.106*
Urbanization	.148 (8)	-.030*	.236*	.119*	-.076*
Social Integration	.166*	.157*	.007*	-.086*	-.006*
Social Mobility**	-.568 (3)	.193*	.165*	.177*	.070*
Potential Conflict	-.088*	-.057*	.003*	.489 (1)	-.021*
Change in Resources	.073*	-.009*	.053*	.390 (2)	.051*
Decentralization**	-.129*	-.217*	-1.195 (1)	-.371*	.109*
Participation**	.426 (4)	-.046*	.056*	.039*	-.195*
Bureaucratism	-.725*	.696*	.277*	-.570*	-1.178*
Professionalism	-.078*	.364 (1)	.580 (2)	.370*	.183*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-.197 (6)	.184*	.339*	.064*	.298 (1)
Mass Availability**	-.569 (2)	.144*	.775*	-.224*	.066*
Elite Accessibility**	.103*	-.492*	-.977*	-.098*	1.235*
Self-Management**	.906 (1)	-.347 (2)	.523*	.419*	-.138*
Montenegro	-.022*	.207*	.093*	.025*	.203 (2)
Macedonia	-.084*	.232 (3)	.014*	.307 (3)	-.074*
Croatia	.166 (7)	.142*	.097*	.066*	-.160*
Slovenia	.109*	.062*	.180*	.138*	.070*
Bosnia	-.148*	-.186*	.340 (3)	.073*	-.137*
R^2	.630	.357	.368	.462	.249

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the concept.

TABLE 6.7.--Continued.

Independent Variables	Innovation Measure				
	Cultural Strength	Administrative Change	Administrative Strength	Participative Change	Participative Strength
Personal Income	-.084*	.382 (3)	.148*	-.101*	-.302 (2)
Urbanization	.007*	-.055*	-.104*	.017*	.077*
Social Integration	.147*	-.147*	-.217 (5)	-.134*	-.056*
Social Mobility**	-.262*	.336 (4)	-.399 (4)	.358 (3)	.263*
Potential Conflict	-.074*	.211 (5)	.123*	.306 (4)	.145*
Change in Resources	.120*	-.051*	-.050*	-.095*	-.038*
Decentralization**	-.724*	.281*	.573 (2)	.666 (2)	.632 (1)
Participation**	-.179*	.585 (2)	-.415 (3)	.077*	-.286*
Bureaucratism	.057*	-.883*	-.464*	-.478*	.073*
Professionalism	-.066*	.072*	.066*	.071*	.199*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.025*	-.230*	-.095*	-.076*	.107*
Mass Availability**	.668*	-.048*	.273*	-.025*	.061*
Elite Accessibility**	-.076*	1.410*	.913*	1.151*	.435*
Self-Management**	.213*	-.802 (1)	-.670 (1)	-.852 (1)	-.571*
Montenegro	.078*	.032*	.098*	.285 (5)	.028*
Macedonia	--	-.076*	-.094*	-.045*	.028*
Croatia	.067*	.009*	.010*	.047*	.019*
Slovenia	-.232*	.111*	.050*	.094*	-.034*
Bosnia	.300*	-.083*	.142*	.017*	.126*
R^2	.240	.329	.478	.367*	.198*

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs should be reversed to harmonize the direction of the measure with the direction of the concept.

issues, in effect, is not certain at higher levels of development and our third hypothesis should be rejected.

The question now becomes which independent variable slopes change and how do they change when the level of development is altered. Some of the changes are obvious, as when a coefficient is insignificant for one level of development and becomes significant at another, or when the signs of the coefficients change. Others are not so obvious. The unstandardized regression coefficients, however, can help us examine these changes more closely.

Table 6.8 lists the 95% confidence intervals for all the significant regression coefficients of the total population of communes in which the highly developed communes share significant coefficients. Regression coefficients of the highly developed communes which are outside the 95% confidence interval established can be classified as significant changes.

When we combine the results of Table 6.8 with the obvious significant changes in regression coefficients, we can have a very specific idea about what changes are occurring in the model as we move across levels of development. Table 6.9 summarizes the results. If the model is relatively similar across level of development, there should be few significant changes in the regression coefficients. If the slope of a variable is becoming stronger or weaker across all innovation measures, that should also be evident.

The results listed in Table 6.9 illustrate more than any other table presented so far the variability in the predictive model of

TABLE 6.8.--95% Confidence Intervals of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Independent Variables of Innovation Measures of Low-Medium Communes Combined and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Highly Developed Communes.

Measure of Innovation	Independent Variable	Low-Medium Development		High Development
		Low Range	High Range	Regression Coefficient
Legislative Strength	Participation	.3249	2.1057	1.2650
	Self-Management	.6562	3.3507	.3745**
Educational Existence	Macedonia	.0195	.6817	.7175*
	Professionalism	.3183	3.2577	1.2709
Cultural Existence	Montenegro	.1695	2.0999	.5901
	Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-41.4937	138.5006	8.8927
Administrative Change	Self-Management	-4.8745	1.4068	-.3726
Administrative Strength	Social Integration	-40.5604	.6671	-12.6092
	Social Mobility	-71.1848	-9.8039	-26.8663
	Decentralization	.5671	.9801	.1638**
	Participation	-.9846	.2293	-.2145
Participative Change	Montenegro	-5.3706	-.7304	2.5962*
	Decentralism	.2621	.5713	.2787
	Self-Management	-.2544	-.0615	.9269*
Participative Strength	Decentralism	.6615	1.6680	.3703**

*Significantly stronger slope
**Significantly weaker slope

TABLE 6.9.--Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing High Development Level with the Remaining Developmental Levels Combined, 1972.

Independent Variables	Innovation Measures				
	Legislative Strength	Educational Existence	Educational Political Strength	Educational Economic Strength	Cultural Existence
Personal Income	S	---	---	---	---
Urbanization	S	---	W	---	---
Social Integration	W	W	---	---	W
Social Mobility**	S	---	---	---	---
Potential Conflict	---	---	---	S	W
Change in Resources	---	---	---	S	---
Decentralization**	---	---	S	---	---
Participation**	NC	---	---	---	---
Bureaucratism	---	W	---	---	---
Professionalism	W	NC	---	---	---
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	S	---	---	---	NC
Mass Availability**	S	---	---	---	---
Elite Accessibility**	W	W	---	---	---
Self-Management**	W	S	---	---	---
Montenegro	---	---	---	---	NC
Macedonia	W	S	---	S	---
Croatia	S	W	---	---	---
Slovenia	---	---	---	---	---
Bosnia	W	---	S	---	---

KEY: W = Significantly weaker coefficient at higher levels of development than for the other levels.
S = Significantly stronger coefficient at higher levels of development than for the other levels.
NC = No significant change in regression coefficients across levels of development.
--- = Coefficients are insignificant at all levels of development.

TABLE 6.9.--Continued

Independent Variables	Innovation Measures				
	Cultural Strength	Administrative Change	Administrative Strength	Participative Change	Participative Strength
Personal Income	---	S	---	---	S
Urbanization	---	---	---	W	---
Social Integration	---	W	NC	W	W
Social Mobility	---	NC	S	S	---
Potential Conflict	---	S	W	S	---
Change in Resource	---	---	---	---	---
Decentralization	---	W	NC	NC	W
Participation	---	S	W	---	---
Bureaucratism	---	---	W	---	---
Professionalism	---	---	---	---	---
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	---	---	---	---	---
Mass Availability	---	---	W	---	W
Elite Accessibility	---	---	W	---	---
Self-Management	---	NC	S	S	W
Montenegro	---	---	W	S	---
Macedonia	---	---	---	---	---
Croatia	---	---	---	---	---
Slovenia	---	---	---	W	W
Bosnia	---	---	---	---	---

KEY: W = Significantly weaker coefficient at higher levels of development than for the other levels.
S = Significantly stronger coefficient at higher levels of development than for the other levels.
NC = No significant change in regression coefficients across levels of development.
--- = Coefficients are insignificant at all levels of development.

symbolic policies across measures of innovation. No independent variable behaves in a completely consistent manner across innovation measures. No set of innovation measures is affected identically by the independent variables across level of development. The patterns which do emerge are rough and general at best.

One general observation that can be made from Table 6.9 is that the strength of the slopes of the independent variables tends to decline across levels of development. Nearly all stronger coefficients occur in the administrative and participative change innovation measures and the educational innovation strength measures. This general finding may indicate that at higher levels of development the interaction of the variables upon symbolic policy outputs becomes more complex and much more difficult to manage and predict.

Considering variable groups we find that in the socio-economic group, the slopes of social integration decline significantly at higher levels of development while social conflict tends to become more important for non-initial innovation adoption decisions. This may be weak evidence that there exists some sort of economically-based rising expectation frustration which is more prevalent at higher levels of development and which transcends tension measured by the social integration measure. The results, however, are not firm enough to justify acceptance of this proposition without more testing.

Within the republic group of variables we find a general decline of significance of the regression slopes at higher levels of development. While there are exceptions to this tendency, it is quite clear that

republic pressure is not quite as important a factor for highly developed communes as it is for the entire set of communes. This result is not unexpected since we would expect the republic administration to have less leverage over economically viable communes.

Within the group of political process variables, the only pattern evident occurs in the decentralism variable whose slopes tend to decline in strength, and this pattern exists only for administrative and participative innovation measures. Interpretation of this phenomenom would not be warranted by the available evidence.

Summarizing, this section of the chapter examines a specific form of symbolic public policies--innovation. We had expected that different types of innovation decisions in general would be explained similarly by an identical model. We found instead that variance in innovation decisions are generally explained by the model but that the form of this explanation tends to be idiosyncratic, especially at the higher level of economic development. This indicates that innovation decisions represent very complex public policy decisions and that possibly some other set of variables, for example, socio-political organizations, may act as a rationalizing agent upon these policies.

Some general conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence presented so far are that political processes are important for explaining symbolic public policies; that republic characteristics do not have overriding importance on the adoption of innovation; and that socioeconomic variables do not possess as much influence on symbolic policies as was attributed to them. The most significant conclusion is

that politics on local symbolic public policies even within a one-party state makes a difference, but that the type and quantity of that effect vary according to the symbolic policy decision studied.

D. Distributive Policies--Health and Education

The second general policy area examined in this chapter is the distributive policy. In this section we wish to determine if this policy area behaves similar to the symbolic policy area. Two specific distributive policies are selected for detailed analysis, namely health and education.

In this section I make the assumption that public health and education resources are rough indicators of general community social status expectations. In other words, relatively more educational and health resources in a Yugoslav commune would be a reflection of that community's higher self-perceived social status.[38] In addition, I wish to make clear that I am not concerned with analyzing the effect which increases in health and educational resources would have on the quality of the population's health or educational services.

This section also examines how Yugoslav political authorities must reconcile the two opposing tendencies present in the determination of the distribution of health and education resources. One pressure is the need, clearly expressed in the State ideology, to provide equality of opportunity in the availability of such public services. The other, which is considerably more subtle and which accompanies modernization, is the desire of relatively advantaged groups or communities to maintain

or further their advantaged position by providing their members with disproportionate amounts of health and educational resources. The conflict between these opposing tendencies should be most pronounced at the local level where the actual decisions to collect and disperse public resources are made. This section examines certain facets of that process.

1. Theoretical Issues

The first theoretical issue examined is that of achieving equality of opportunity in socialist systems. Equality is a primary social value in such societies and can be translated into a mandate that public services be provided on an equitable basis to all Yugoslav citizens.[39]

Two public policies that easily lend themselves to an examination of this problem of equality in socialist systems are education and health policies. The advantage in examining these distribution policies as a general test of the equality thesis in socialist systems is that the need for health and education is constant when we control for population size.[40] Thus, any substantial inequality in the per capita distribution of these policy resources cannot be attributed to outside environmental or other objective factors.[41] Substantial inequality in these areas must be the result of conscious political decisions.

Officially, socialist political systems often try very hard to reduce inequalities in the distribution of health and educational resources, although it may be impossible to erase all differences in

practice.[42] Medlin[43] notes the constant effort within the Soviet Union to provide to all citizens equal educational opportunities, while Azrael[44] notes how this commitment leads to rigid but standard educational procedures and policies throughout the Soviet Union. In the Soviet health area, Field[45] states that the Soviet commitment to equal health service is very real and provides a general model for imitation by other developing one-party states.

In Yugoslavia, there is also a strong public commitment to equality of opportunity in the distribution of these public resources. Equality of opportunity has been a constant theme among Yugoslav administrators for many years,[46] and suggestions have been made continually to improve the capability of the system to provide such equal services.[47] Recently, there have even been public campaigns pressuring public officials to encourage more equal distribution of public health and educational resources through tax reform programs[48] and especially in the rural areas.[49] However,[50] unlike the Soviet Union and other East European states, Yugoslavia does not have a centrally directed and controlled mechanism for distributing educational and health resources. Such decisions are made primarily on the local level[51] and would, therefore, be susceptible to local community pressures.[52]

A second theoretical issue which is relevant concerns the status attributed to health and educational resources and the implication this attributed status has upon policy making. Although previous research in educational and health policies seems to indicate that more health or educational resources do not necessarily improve the quality

of health or educational outputs,[53] these resources are perceived to be closely connected with qualitative outputs in the eyes of the public. In fact, the desire for more health and educational resources is associated with rising social expectations.[54] Those with higher perceived social status seek or demand more public services such as health and education. In education, for example, Boudon[55] noted that "social status is now more than ever dependent on the level of educational attainment. School is naturally considered as the basic agency responsible for social inequality," even though the school cannot effectively solve this problem. One result of this status perception is that "youth and their families increasingly strive to gain more control over schools, and in this way over their own future." This is a tendency which creates greater inequality.

This problem of status perception is relevant within socialist systems as well. Osborn[56] and Mickiewicz[57] both noted that in the Soviet Union high status was attributed to education and accounted for many of the pressures to move away from the ideal of equality of opportunity. Inkeles[58] in his research indicates that the relatively advanaged tend to hold on to their advantage and try to pass it on to their children through the educational system. Lane[59] quoted Soviet-based research which may indicate similar problems of aspiration in the health field as well.

Yugoslavia also must face the problem of status perception in the fields of education and health.[60] In education the tendency of the advantaged to pass on their status position to their children through

education has been very visible and has come under attack.[61] The general response to this has been to reform the educational structure in order to give to workers and peasants improved access to education.[62] Attempts to solve the problem have been the foundation of such programs as the Tito stipend for workers' children. In Yugoslav health policies the major problem has been getting enough public health services and personnel in the rural areas, and no adequate solution has been arrived at yet.

Since health and educational resources may be perceived by the general public in Yugoslavia to be associated with higher social status, it may be appropriate to consider the inequalities in the distribution of health and educational resources as a measure of differences in social status expectations. Thus, where health and educational resources are well above the mean, we could conclude that status expectations are quite high. Where health and educational resources are relatively low, we could conclude that social status expectations are correspondingly low. The extent to which the distribution of health and educational resources approach equality could be considered a rough indicator of the degree to which the social norm of equality is dominant over social status expectations.[63] Thus, this section indirectly tests the proposition that status expectations and public policy resources are related by examining empirically which variables can explain the variance in health and educational resources.[64]

Past research using data from the United States and other national units suggests several social, economic and political

variables which may account for variance in the distribution of educational and health resources. Auster,[65] Fraser,[66] and Peroff[67] found that such social characteristics as increased education and urbanization were strongly related to increases in the distribution of health resources in various countries. Education and urbanization variables also were found by Brazer[68] and James[69] to be positively related to educational resource distribution. In the Soviet Union, Mickiewicz[70] noted the existence of a strong relationship between educational resources and urbanization, while in Yugoslav research[71] the connection between social variables and educational and health resource distribution is also pronounced.

Economic characteristics such as personal income, industrialization and general wealth were found by Dye[72] in the context of American states, and by Garms[73] and Pryor[74] in their cross-national comparisons to be important determinants of the quantity of public health and educational resources of a governmental unit. Some Yugoslav social scientists also found corresponding trends.[75]

Political variables have also been considered possible explanations for the distribution of public policies in general and education and health in particular. Within the American context, Linberry and Fowler[76] noted an effect of the type of governmental structure on public policies in general, while Brazer[77] measured the impact of political decentralism on urban expenditure patterns. Ostrom[78] has also developed a strong argument justifying the inclusion of

decentralization and political participation as determinants of the distribution of public policies.

Research within Yugoslavia parallels these developments. Tomić[79] in his work on political professionalism strongly expresses the idea that political professionalism does make a difference in the formulation of public policies. Pusić[80] examines political decentralization and political participation and finds a strong influence of these variables on public policy decisions. These scholars, however, have left unexamined the question of how political variables affect specific health and education distribution policy decisions.

The third issue is the examination of the effect of economic development on the public policy decision-making process. We wish to determine if the policy-making process which determines the amount of inequality differs substantively at varying levels of development within a state. In other words, does the level of development change the degree of inequality in health and educational resources and does it alter our explanations for that inequality?

Brian Silver[81] in his work on socio-cultural inequality in the Soviet Union suggests that inequality when measured against economic development may follow an inverted "U" shaped distribution in which inequality is relatively low at both extremes of the development continuum and is relatively high at moderate levels of development. Yugoslav researchers ascribe great importance to the role of economic development on nearly every aspect of the policy-making process.[82] They tend, however, to suggest a more simple linear relationship, that

more development tends to lead to a greater degree of equality. In this section I examine how high social status expectations can translate into concrete distributive policy decisions and how the level of economic development may alter that process.

2. Operational Measures

The literature review of distributional policy decisions indicates that we can employ the same model and same set of variables that were used in the previous section on symbolic policy decisions. Accordingly, no changes were made in the model. However, several operational measures are used for the dependent variables. Educational resources are measured by per capita expenditures earmarked for education from the commune budget, total per capita expenditures for education in the commune, and the student/teacher ratio. The total expenses for education exceed the commune budgetary allotment since the total includes transfer payments from republic and federal units of government as well as various local contributions.[83]

Health resources are measured in a manner parallel to educational resources. The measures include the per capita budget expenditures for health, total per capita expenditures for health, and the patient/doctor ratio. As in the case of educational resources, total expenses for health exceed the budgetary allotment as a result of transfer payments. The hospital bed ratio is not used as a measure for health resources in this study since communes make cooperative agreements to finance jointly and share hospital facilities in order to

avoid duplication of services. We would, therefore, not expect equality from such a measure.

3. Examining Inequality in Distributive Policies

We can examine the extent of inequality in health and educational resources by analyzing the dispersion which occurs in these policies both across republics and levels of development. Three hypotheses were suggested by the literature. One is that there is no difference across levels of development. Another is that the degree of inequality becomes greater at higher levels of development, and a third possibility is that inequality will be high at medium levels of development and relatively low at the extremes. We can test this set of hypotheses by examining changes in the coefficients of variation for educational and health policy measures across levels of development. We would expect that health and educational policies would follow a similar pattern in regards to changes in the degree of inequality as measured by the coefficient of variation. Table 6.10 presents the findings.

The results listed in Table 6.10 indicate that inequality in the measures of health and education does vary by level of development. Unfortunately, however, no clear pattern of inequality is maintained across our various measures. The per capita budget expenditure for health and education do seem to follow the inverse "U" pattern as suggested by Silver. These two measures are the measures of policy-making most directly under the control of the commune since they do

TABLE 6.10.--Coefficients of Variation for Measures of Educational and Health Resources of Yugoslav Communes by Level of Development, 1972.

Development	Health			Education		
	Per Capita Budget	Total Per Capita Expenditure	Patient/ Doctor Ratio	Per Capita Budget	Total Per Capita Expenditure	Student/ Teacher Ratio
High	.949	1.704	5.710	2.324	.736	.184
Medium	1.305	1.401	.670	2.620	1.430	.173
Low	1.100	2.482	.895	2.119	2.125	.165
All Developmental Levels	1.207	2.843	.786	2.362	2.262	.172

n = 500

not reflect the financial influence of private groups or republic/ federal authorities on health and educational policies. For these reasons, the inequality pattern which does emerge is very interesting.

The measures of total expenditures for health and education behave differently from the previous two measures and differently from one another. The total expenditure measures include transfer payments from republic and federal agencies as well as contributions from various economic enterprises.[84] Thus, these measures may be more susceptible to outside political pressues. Excluding the category of health in highly developed areas,[85] these two measures follow a positive linear pattern in which high development is associated with greater equality. Therefore, it appears that transfer payments and voluntary contributions help developed communes achieve relatively more equality in services than in the underdeveloped communes.

This conclusion seems congruent with the fact that more specialized or larger economic enterprises exist within developed communes and that they would tend to contribute more economic support for special health and educational services. In addition, republic and federal funds in the underdeveloped communes would tend to be concentrated in specific showplace communes and thus tend to exacerbate overall inequality.[86]

When we compare the measures of inequality of budgetary health expenditures with total expenditures across levels of development, we find that republic or federal influence in reducing inequality in this area is not effective and in fact may be counterproductive. In

education, total expenditures across level of development shows a movement towards equality. Possibly the republic funds may act as an equalizing force in education. This hypothesis is examined later.

The difference in the interaction between budget and total expenditures across policy areas could be the result of one of the following factors: greater commitment of the republics to educational equality, or different explanatory models from one policy area to another. Later stages of the analysis examine these possibilities more closely.

Table 6.10 also indicates that our health and education performance measures, patient/doctor ratio and student/teacher ratio, follow a somewhat different pattern. For the patient/doctor ratio (excluding the high development category for reasons cited earlier), inequality increases with a decline in development. This may indicate that it is very difficult to recruit medical personnel to practice in the underdeveloped communes in Yugoslavia, a problem shared by many other countries as well. This finding may also suggest that the patient/doctor ratio is not subject to the same degree of manipulation by local or central authorities as are the financial measures.

Considering the student/teacher ratio, the lack of any strong difference in inequality across levels of development may indicate that this variable is a poor operational measure of our concept. For example, while doctors have strict certification and licensing requirements, teacher requirements are much more lax. In other words, teachers as a group, unlike doctors, may not be consistent in terms of

professional qualifications, and this would reduce inequality for the student/teacher ratio. A second limitation on the measure is that the range in permissible class size is relatively narrow; for practical reasons, classes have very narrow maximum as well as minimum size possibilities.

It is possible that the republics may act as constraints or catalysts on the degree of inequality which exists among the distributional policies of their communes. We can examine this problem by comparing the coefficients of variation for distributive public policies across republics. Comparing the republics, the sources of dispersion allow us to discover if some particular republic is very successful at reducing inequality in health and educational policies, and whether the republics follow a consistent pattern based on their level of development.

Table 6.11 examines the inequality index for the health and education measures across republics. It indicates wide dispersion in the inequality scores across republics. Table 6.11 also provides a relative ranking of every republic for each policy measure except student/teacher ratio. Average rankings for all policy measures were also provided.

When we order the republics according to their level of socioeconomic development and plot their average inequality scores on a chart (see Figure 6.3), it becomes apparent that the policy measures combined follow the inverted "U" shaped distribution. The moderately developed republics have the greater inequality while

TABLE 6.11.--Coefficients of Variation (V) and Ordinal Rank of Republic (N) for Measures of Educational and Health Resources of Yugoslav Communes by Republic, 1972.

Republic	Health			Education			Average Rank*
	Per Capita Budget	Total Per Capita Expenditure	Patient/ Doctor Ratio	Per Capita Expenditure	Total Per Capita Expenditure	Student/ Teacher Ratio	
Bosnia							
(V)	.885	2.465	.685	1.522	1.681	.154	
(N)	3	3	2	5	3	2	3
Montenegro							
(V)	1.026	1.404	.540	1.841	1.257	.151	
(N)	2	6	5	4	6	3	5
Croatia							
(V)	.818	3.122	.612	2.549	3.233	.148	
(N)	4	1	3	1	1	4	2
Macedonia							
(V)	.736	2.273	.473	1.113	2.253	.140	
(N)	5	4	6	6	2	5	5
Slovenia							
(V)	.636	2.204	.551	2.027	1.518	.156	
(N)	6	5	4	3	5	1	5
Serbia							
(V)	1.074	2.783	.889	2.345	1.644	.109	
(N)	1	2	1	2	4	6	2
All Republics							
(V)	1.207	2.843	.786	2.362	2.262	.172	

*Excluding student/teacher score.



Figure 6.3.--Distribution of Average Inequality Rankings for Five Policy Measures Across Republic According to Level of Development, 1972.

the poorly developed and highly developed republics both show less inequality in their average policy score.

The conclusion we can make thus far is that there is some indication that level of development of a commune may have a substantial impact upon how much a commune allocates to primary public services. Therefore, there is some empirical as well as theoretical justification for examining models of public policy resource allocation by level of development and for empirically comparing the variables which may account for the inequality.

4. Explanatory Strength of the Variables in the Model

We are most interested at this point in determining what is the explanatory strength of the independent variables in the model on the various measures of distributive public policy. In general we expect, based upon similar research in the United States,[87] that socio-economic characteristics will be quite highly and positively related to these distributive public policies. It has also been suggested in Yugoslavia (see Chapter II) that self-management/pluralist decision-making processes should be positively related to increases in the level of distributive policies such as health and education. This proposition can easily be examined from an analysis of the simple correlation coefficients between the independent variables in the general model and the different measures of health and educational policy. Table 6.12 provides these coefficients.

The coefficients listed on Table 6.12 are interesting for several reasons. First, the largest coefficients for all policy measures tend to be political decision-making variables. This may be an early indication that the decision-making process variables will make an important contribution to the model.

Second, there is little variation in the direction of the signs of the coefficients across the policy measures. Generally, all the coefficients except budgetary expenditures for education have the same signs. The measure of budgetary expenditures for education behaves in a most puzzling manner. It is quite possible that some other variable confounds the relationship and is responsible for this deviance.

Third, socio-economic variables tend to have positive coefficients with the dependent expenditure measures as predicted, but the political process variables tend to have an opposite effect from the predicted. Again, this may be the result of some yet uncontrolled for variable. We can conclude, however, that most of the independent variables individually explain an appreciable amount of the total variance for some dependent measure.

Our next objective is to determine the explanatory power of the general model as applied to health and education policies, and the contribution of the socio-economic, political and political process variable groups toward explaining that variance. In general, we would expect that the general model would explain an appreciable amount of the variance. Table 6.13 lists the R^2 coefficients for each distributive policy measure. The multiple squared correlation coefficients for

TABLE 6.12.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between Independent Variables in the General Model and Health and Education Policy Measures.

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio**	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio**
Personal Income	.44	.35	.32	-.19	.39	.15
Social Integration	-.08	-.01	-.10	.12	.02	-.37
Social Mobility*	-.26	-.41	-.46	.19	-.52	-.23
Urbanization	.09	.22	.11	-.04	.24	.08
Social Confict	-.06	.05	--	-.08	--	.13
Change in National Income	-.04	-.11	-.16	.14	-.07	--
Bureaucratism	.42	.78	.23	-.06	.56	.13
Decentralism*	-.07	.17	-.04	.02	.27	-.19
Participation*	-.10	.07	-.14	.05	.12	-.20
Professionalism	.10	.32	.36	-.28	.37	.23
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.53	.13	.36	-.17	.11	.23
Mass Availability*	-.12	.04	.16	--	.08	-.17
Elite Accessibility*	.38	.78	.21	-.07	.56	.14
Self-Management*	.23	.75	.15	-.08	.61	.03

*The signs of the coefficient should be reversed to conform with the meaning of the concept.

**The signs were reversed to conform to the direction of the other variables.

the health and education policy measures are quite large, ranging from 33.8 to 72.7% of the total variance explained. Evidently the general model is quite effective in explaining variance in some distributive policy measures.

Our third objective is to determine how the individual variables in the model perform when all other variables are controlled for. Again, as in the previous section, the standardized regression coefficients are the most effective mechanism for examining this point. If the rankings of the independent variables are relatively constant across the policy measures, we can conclude that a similar predictive model is operative for the distributive policies. If the variable rankings do differ, we should try to discover patterns and explanations for these differences. Table 6.13 also lists the necessary information.

The results in this table are encouraging in that there is no strong pattern or similarity in the direction, significance and ranking of the standardized slopes of the independent variables across the measures. While we obviously do not have a single predictive model, there are striking parallels across many of the measures.

When we analyze the coefficients across policy measures, we can isolate the variables responsible for any gross differences. First, within the socio-economic variable group, there are few discrepancies from what was originally predicted. Across all the policy measures the coefficients have the same sign and a generally similar ranking whenever the coefficient is significant. The only major difference across

TABLE 6.13.--Standardized Regression Coefficients of all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures.*

Independent Variables	Distributive Policy					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio**	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio**
Personal Income	.030*	.102*	.030*	.036*	.171(8)	.079*
Urbanization	.004*	-.123(6)	.010*	.024*	-.079*	-.009*
Social Integration	.011*	-.043*	.118*	.020*	-.028*	.073*
Social Mobility***	.067*	-.053*	.248*	.052*	-.240(6)	.085*
Potential Conflict	-.075*	-.037*	.053*	-.136(7)	-.091(10)	-.144(4)
Change in National Income	-.013*	-.012*	.073*	.050*	.064*	-.047*
Decentralism***	.133*	.009*	.026*	.273(4)	.188*	.100*
Participation***	.071*	-.001*	.122*	.084*	.038*	-.179*
Bureaucratism	-.185*	1.770(1)	2.686(2)	-1.164(2)	1.701(2)	.226*
Professionalism	.061*	.202(5)	-.422(3)	-.223(5)	.296(5)	.120*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.346(2)	-.059*	-.154(5)	.033*	-.220(7)	-.225(2)
Mass Availability***	-.169*	-.295(4)	.142*	-.254*	-.474(4)	.117*
Elite Accessibility***	.662*	-1.610(2)	2.911(1)	1.441(1)	-1.939(1)	-.257*
Self-Management***	-.161*	.745(3)	-.298(4)	-.303*	.762(3)	-.050*
Montenegro	.005*	-.033*	-.103(7)	.006*	-.014*	.080*
Macedonia	.051*	.082(7)	-.120(6)	.431(3)	.119(9)	.168(3)
Croatia	.061*	.002*	-.047*	-.070*	.069*	.052*
Slovenia	.406(1)	-.060*	.121*	.064*	-.004*	.050*
Bosnia	-.037	.061*	.073*	.205(6)	.083*	.594(1)
R^2	.520*	.725*	.417*	.338*	.604*	.442*

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs were reversed to match the meaning of the other measures
***The signs of the coefficient should be reversed to conform with the meaning of the concept.

policy measures within the socio-economic variable group occurs for health policies where conflict is not important but in educational policies it is.

Such a difference could be expected because the distribution of health resources is more difficult to compare and becomes the subject of political logrolling. On the other hand, greater social conflict could have a negative influence on educational expenditures because distributing educational resources under a high conflict situation creates more conflict, something which political leaders tend to avoid.

One unexpected behavior in this variable group is urbanization, which is negatively associated with the distribution of educational resources. A plausible explanation is the fact that due to economies of scale in urban areas, similar services can be provided but at a lower unit cost to urban residents. The second unexpected result is the generally weak ranking of the socio-economic variables in the model. These characteristics do not seem to have predominant influence on determining distributive policies within the commune, a significant finding by itself.

The republic variable group, when republics do exercise influence over policy, tends to act as a positive force. Among the republics, Macedonia exercises influence over both communal distributive policy areas, which may indicate that Macedonia's political administrators are intervening in the communal political process in order to improve the general health and education of the population. Bosnia seems to limit its efforts to education, a situation which may be influenced by the

high traditional Muslim influence in this area.[88] In general, however, the importance of the republic slopes in the overall regression model is secondary. The third varible group is the policical process variables. Most of the significant slopes are located in the group which indicates that health and education resource policy is a political problem influenced and handled by political processes. Interestingly, however, different political process variables have a different impact upon the final policy outcomes. Bureaucratism is a very strong positive factor in health policy but it is sometimes negatively significant in education. This may be a weak sign that health policy is considered more technical and more properly an area for "impartial" bureaucratic decision-making. The lack of significant coefficients for decentralization and participation serves to corroborate this proposition. If the proposition is correct, we may expect the slopes of bureaucratism to decline significantly in highly developed communes where the general population may not be as intimidated by medical technology.

A second interesting observation from the political process group is the fact that the political process interaction terms such as elite accessibility are more significant and important than are the process measures from which they were constructed. When we look at the direction of the slopes for these measures, we find a significant change. Total expenditures for health and education are negatively associated with more elite accessibility, while budgetary expenditures are just as strongly related in the opposite direction. In fact, this is the only substantial difference in the predictive model within policy

areas. The tentative conclusion which I draw from this is that professionalism and bureaucratism within the commune restrict (or are restricted in) their influence over formal political decisions such as budgets and do not, or cannot, transfer their influence onto the wider social scene. The analysis of this problem alone is worthy of considerably more study.

In summary, the general model introduced in Chapter II is useful in explaining distributive policies in the commune. Research such as Dye's[89] which implies a strong determining effect of socio-economic characteristics upon distributive policies neglects the process of decision-making. This decision-making factor is found to be also important in determining public policies in the Yugoslav commune.

5. The Effect of Developmental Levels on Distributive Policies

The final concern in our treatment of distributive policies is to determine the effect which the level of development has upon the behavior of the variables in the general model. Paralleling the analysis which was undertaken for symbolic policy measures, I suggest the following set of hypotheses for testing: (1) political process variables will tend to be less important for distributive policies at progressively higher levels of development; (2) socio-economic characteristics will be more important for distributive policy measures at progressively higher levels of development; and (3) distributive policy decisions will tend to follow a more similar predictive model at progressively higher levels of development.

The first hypothesis is based upon the discussion of the relative affect of socio-economic over political variables discussed in Chapter V. Referring back to Figure 5.4, one of three probable results can be expected for the test of these hypotheses. The Guy Peters[90] proposal states that policital variables will be relatively less important than socio-economic variables at lower levels of development and at higher levels of development but that political variables will be dominant over socio-economic variables at mid-levels of development. The Teune and Mlinar[91] proposal parallels Peter's proposal but suggests that the socio-economic factor will also decline at higher levels of development. The Chapter IV proposition suggests that there is a positive and linear increase of strength for socio-economic variables across level of development and a decline in the importance of political process variables.

In short, we expect that as communes increase in level of economic development, political process variables slopes will become weaker and socio-economic variable slopes will become stronger. In addition, we expect that at higher development levels, the behavior of the general model will become more uniform across policy measures.

Tables 6.14 through 6.16 provide the standardized regression coefficients and variable rankings which can test these two hypotheses. Table 6.17 examines the significance of the changes in the regression coefficients and Tables 6.18 and 6.19 summarize the trends in the regression coefficients. These tables reveal a very interesting trend. Socio-economic characteristics are most relevant for distributive

TABLE 6.14.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings of all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures, Low Developed Communes.*

Independent Variables	Policy Measures					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio**	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio**
Personal Income	.147*	.538(5)	-.210*	-.127*	.443(2)	-.054*
Urbanization	.106*	.093*	.254(2)	.110*	.243(4)	.031*
Social Integration	-.049*	.108*	.056*	.213*	.213*	-.026*
Social Mobility	-.174*	.114*	.198*	.136*	.146*	.155*
Potential Conflict	-.034*	-.286(7)	.034*	-.004*	-.229*	.178*
Change in National Income	.126*	-.097*	.024*	-.060*	-.069*	-.055*
Decentralism	-.088*	-.252*	-.056*	-.148*	-.071*	.540(4)
Participation	.116*	-.156*	-.063*	-.499*	-.039*	.810(2)
Bureaucratism	-.338*	.219*	-.930(1)	-.962(1)	-.214*	.265*
Professionalism	.162*	-.684(4)	-.531*	-.439*	-.497*	-.041*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.517(1)	-.720(3)	-.054*	.144*	-.597*	-.179*
Mass Availability	-.359*	.722(2)	.414*	.194*	.160*	-2.111(1)
Elite Accessibility	.073*	1.260(1)	.874*	.884*	1.216(1)	-.381*
Self-Management	.251*	-.441(6)	.232*	.327*	.061*	.600(3)
Montenegro	--	--	--	--	--	--
Macedonia	.348(2)	.211(8)	.041*	.613(12)	.368(3)	.050*
Croatia	.020*	.039*	.053*	.044*	.104*	-.047*
Slovenia	-.143*	.021*	.017*	.055*	.186*	.008*
Bosnia	.216*	-.123*	.128*	.399*	.008*	.224*
R^2	.414	.794	.628	.500	.642	.712

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs are reversed to conform in meaning with the other measures.

TABLE 6.15.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings of all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures, Mid Developed Communes.*

Independent Variables	Policy Measures					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio**	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio**
Personal Income	-.005*	-.063*	.194*	.075*	.042*	.035*
Urbanization	.38(5)	-.025*	.268(4)	.288*	.107*	.423(3)
Social Integration	-.074*	-.050*	.206*	-.108*	.004*	.287(5)
Social Mobility	.391(4)	.531(4)	.238*	.456(1)	-.027*	.038*
Potential Conflict	-.214(6)	-.097*	-.169*	-.365(3)	.051*	-.089*
Change in National Income	.047*	-.092*	.190	.178*	.027*	.028*
Decentralism	.395*	.332*	-.048*	.552*	-.016*	-.699(1)
Participation	.459*	.305*	.085*	.178*	.152*	.513*
Bureaucratism	1.005(1)	-.718(2)	-1.540(1)	.031*	-.691(2)	.243*
Professionalism	.260*	-.334(5)	-.477(3)	-.209*	-.425(3)	.376*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.441(3)	.543(3)	.176*	.171*	-.264(4)	.057*
Mass Availability	-.632(2)	.241*	.322*	-.556*	-.135*	.114*
Elite Accessibility	-.902*	1.768(1)	1.284(2)	.188*	1.723(1)	-.697*
Self-Management	-.331*	-.252*	-.070*	-.213*	.057*	.170*
Montenegro	.060*	.048*	-.127*	.049*	.033*	.092*
Macedonia	-.050*	.137*	-.182*	.383(2)	-.006*	.335(4)
Croatia	-.037	-.217(6)	.021*	-.208*	.065*	.027*
Slovenia	.275*	.038*	.285(5)	-.036*	.028*	.217*
Bosnia	-.119*	.161*	.088*	.196*	.010*	.574(2)
R^2	.592	.790	.692	.531	.862	.702

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs are reversed to conform in meaning with the other measures.

TABLE 6.16.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings for all Independent Variables in the General Model for Distributive Policy Measures, High Developed Communes.*

Independent Variables	Policy Measures					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio**	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio**
Personal Income	-.144*	.033*	.041*	-.198*	.076*	.143*
Urbanization	-.007*	-.164(6)	-.018*	.005*	-.111*	-.035*
Social Integration	.017*	.035*	.132*	.072*	.063*	.052*
Social Mobility	.083*	-.087*	.326(5)	-.101*	-.307(6)	.193(3)
Potential Conflict	.053*	.010*	.155*	-.205(7)	-.073*	-.041*
Change in National Income	-.033*	-.044*	-.078*	.012*	.068*	-.020*
Decentralism	.040*	-.080*	-.049*	.326*	.098*	.267*
Participation	.060*	.168*	.409(4)	.593(4)	.215*	-.052*
Bureaucratism	-.981*	2.206(2)	-2.774(2)	-1.768(2)	1.659(2)	-.258*
Professionalism	.099*	.260(5)	-.499(3)	-.308(6)	.371(5)	.083*
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	.387(2)	-.086*	-.154*	.121*	-.158*	-.225(2)
Mass Availability	-.190*	-.562(4)	-.247*	-.771(3)	-.694(4)	-.047*
Elite Accessibility	1.413*	-2.389(1)	2.848(1)	2.165(1)	-2.144(1)	.312*
Self-Management	.010*	1.119(3)	-.131*	-.382*	1.023(3)	-.249*
Montenegro	.005*	-.044*	-.152*	.001*	-.020*	.051*
Macedonia	-.042*	.121(7)	-.054*	.396(5)	-.229(7)	.075*
Croatia	.112*	.054*	-.157*	-.066*	.119*	.026*
Slovenia	.565(1)	-.016*	.121*	.017*	.067*	-.034*
Bosnia	.030*	.127*	-.217*	.148*	.129*	.627(1)
R^2	.622	.781	.420	.448	.674	.618

*Coefficients not significant at the .05 level.
**Signs are reversed to conform to meaning with the other measures.

TABLE 6.17.--95% Confidence Intervals of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Independent Variables of Distributive Policy Measures.

Distributive Policy Measure	Independent Variable	Low Development		Medium Development
		Low Range	High Range	Regression Coefficient
Health Budget Expenditures	Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	673	19987	10191
Health Total Expenditures	Professionalism	-719.0	-148.1	-262
	Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-9095	-3917	5096*
	Elite Accessibility	.0016	.0161	.0792*
Doctor/Patient Ratio	Urbanization	.6661	36.224	11.547
	Bureaucratism	-1223222	-128080	-589582
Education Budget Expenditures	Macedonia	378	975	241**
Education Total Expenditures	Mass Availability	-.0041	.0063	.0008
Student/Teacher Ratio	Decentralism	.0003	.0081	-.0005*

TABLE 6.17.--Continued.

Distributive Policy Measure	Independent Variable	Low Development		Medium Development
		Low Range	High Range	Regression Coefficient
		Medium Development		High Development
Health Budget Expenditures	Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	3264	17117	8394
Health Total Expenditures	Bureaucratism	-33342	-104	38308*
	Professionalism	-521	-3.337	918*
	Elite Accessibility	-.0391	.1194	-.0684*
Doctor/Patient Ratio	Bureaucratism	-920470	-258694	-146139
	Professinalism	-11321	-1005	-5344
	Elite Accessibility	.1474	1.745	.2474
Education Budget Expenditures	Social Mobility	158	.407	-106**
Education Total Expenditures	Bureaucratism	-46416	-4052	.17860*
	Professionalism	-854	-194	812*
Student/Teacher Ratio	Bosnia	3.912	9.287	4.999

*Significnatly stronger coefficient
**Significantly weaker coefficient

TABLE 6.18.--Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing Medium Development Level with Low Development Level, 1972.

Independent Variables	Distributive Policy Measure					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio
Personal Income		W			W	
Urbanization	S		NC		W	S
Social Integration						s
Social Mobility	S	S		S		
Potential Conflict	S	W		S		
Change in Income						
Decentralism						NC
Participation						W
Bureaucratism	S	S	NC	W	S	
Professionalism		NC	S		S	
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	NC	S				
Mass Availability	S	W			S	
Elite Accessibility		S	S			W
Self-Management		W			NC	
Montenegro						W
Macedonia	W	W		W	W	S
Croatia		S				
Slovenia						
Bosnia						S

KEY: W = Significantly weaker coefficient at medium levels of development.
S = Significantly stronger coefficient at medium levels of development.
NC = No significant change across levels of development.

TABLE 6.19.--Effect of Changes in Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables in the Model Comparing High Development Level with Medium Development Level, 1972.

Independent Variables	Distributive Policy Measure					
	Health			Education		
	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Patient/ Doctor Ratio	Budget Expenses	Total Expenditures	Student/ Teacher Ratio
Personal Income						
Urbanization	W	S	W			W
Social Integration				W		
Social Mobility	W	W	S	W	S	S
Potential Conflict	W					
Change in Income						
Decentralism						W
Participation			S	S		
Bureaucratism	W	S	NC	S	S	
Professionalism		S	NC	S	S	
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	NC	W			W	S
Mass Availability	W	S		S	S	
Elite Accessibility		S	NC	S		
Self-Management		S			S	
Montenegro						
Macedonia		S			S	W
Croatia		W				
Slovenia	S	W				
Bosnia						NC

KEY: W = Significantly weaker coefficients at higher levels of development.
S = Significantly stronger coefficients at higher levels of development.
NC = No significant change from medium to high levels of development.

policies at low levels of development and at mid levels of development, and almost completely irrelevant at the higher levels of development. The actual pattern is opposite from what we expected as stated by the second hypothesis. This hypothesis must be rejected.

The pattern of strength for the political process variables is not exactly the inverse of the socio-economic group pattern. While political process variables are definitely predominant at the high development level, political process variables do not become noticeably weaker at the other levels of development. Therefore, concerning the first hypothesis, we can conclude that more testing is necessary before rejection or confirmation of the hypothesis can be contemplated.

The implication of these findings is that choice in distributive public policies is severely constrained at lower levels of development, and socio-economic variables can have a relatively large impact on the outputs. At higher levels of development the resources for choices and selection of options exist and socio-economic characteristics become less relevant in deciding these issues.

Our second concern stated in this section is that the predictive model should become more similar across the policy measures at higher levels of development. This hypothesis is only partly substantiated by the data in Tables 6.14 through 6.16. The positive evidence for movement towards a common model across level of development comes solely from the reduction of the relative importance of socio-economic characteristics in explaining distributive public policy. Within the group of republic variables there is little movement toward greater uniformity across level of development.

When we consider the political process variable group, one pattern can be noted which persists to some extent across all the levels of development and becomes very distinct at the highest level of development. The pattern encompasses total health expenditures, patient/doctor ratio, total education expenditures and the student/teacher ratio.

The simplified version of the behavioral model at all developmental levels implies that more educational and health resources are a function of greater elite accessibility, more mass availability, and professionalization of the legislature. In short, especially at higher levels of development, health and educational resources can best be predicted by examining the dimensions of the self-management/pluralist decision-making process. For lower levels of development, however, we should also consider education as a relevant important factor.

6. Summary

This section has examined the variation and reasons for this variation in the distribution of health and educational policies in the Yugoslav communes. We found a considerable degree of inequality for all our measures of health and education, except student/teacher ratio. The inequality was considerable across levels of development as well as republics. Factors outside the communal government tended to exacerbate health inequality and only marginally decreased educational inequality. In general, the distribution of inequality across levels of development resembled an inverted "U." This distribution implies

that unequal distributions of health and education are greatest for the moderately developed communes and least for the two extreme types.

We also found that, except for per capita educational budgetary expenditures, all the dependent measures tended to respond the same way on a correlation matrix to a considerable number of independent variables. When we examined the multiple correlation coefficients for the dependent measures by level of development, a high proportion of the variance was also explained. The evidence also seems to indicate that republics will, in some cases, force communes to reduce relative inequality among themselves but they employ legal/authoritative and not financial methods to achieve that goal.

The regression coefficients revealed that, as in the case of symbolic policy formation, political decision-making processes are important for understanding distributive policies. Excluding the budgetary measures the distributive public policies seems to share a common model of behavior. The model becomes more distinct at higher levels of economic development and socio-economic factors become much less important at these higher levels as well.

E. Redistributive Policy--Tax Policy

The third type of public policy decision analyzed in this chapter is redistributive policy. These are policy decisions which seek to take proportionately more from one group of society in order to accomplish some social objective. While we usually think of redistributive policy as an attempt to reduce inequality among social groups, redistributive policies may serve other purposes as well.

For example, in order to finance some social or industrial good, peasants may be taxed more heavily than their urban counterparts. This may reflect a government attitude that it can more easily squeeze the peasant than the industrial worker, or the recognition that it is politically more dangerous to squeeze the industrial worker. On the other hand, a redistributive policy may be egalitarian in intent and execution.

In socialist societies a primary goal is equality, often viewed as a redistribution of the wealth on a more egalitarian basis. Yugoslavia formally shares this goal and a primary mechanism for accomplishing this goal is the taxation policy. The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect which the general explanatory model has upon the development of a taxation policy that encourages the redistribution of the wealth.

When we consider the general model from Chapter II, we can postulate two possible outcomes. Under one scenario we would expect that redistributive tax policy would be most pronounced where self-management/pluralist decision-making processes are most advanced. This scenario is based upon the assumption that citizens are sufficiently well socialized into self-management/pluralist norms to permit the adoption of a policy which may be economically painful to them. Economic development variables under this scenario would not be relevant. For purposes of brevity this scenario is referred to as the "good government model."

A second scenario is based upon a different assumption of political behavior. The scenario expects that political participants will avoid redistributive policies except under conditions in which they are compelled to do so or in which they have sufficient financial resources to accomplish that goal without serious cost to the commune. Under this scenario redistributive policies would be negatively related to self-management/pluralist decision-making processes and positively related to increased levels of economic development or to specific republic pressure. This scenario is labeled the "self-interest model."

Both models predict different patterns of interaction with the independent variables in the general model, and we can select between these two models by examining how communal redistributive policies are explained by the general model.

1. Operational Measures of Redistributive Policy

This section limits the study of the redistributive policy arena to the type of tax policy practiced by the commune. I have created two measures to examine different aspects of tax policy. One measure is the industrial favoritism index which measures the extent to which industrial elements are favored by the tax code over agricultural interests.

The formula for the industrial tax favoritism index is:

$$\text{Favoritism} = \frac{\left(\frac{a}{b} - \frac{c}{d}\right)}{\frac{a}{b}}$$

where: a = percent national income from industry, 1972.

b = percent communal income tax from industrial sources, 1972

c = percent national income from agricultural, 1972

d = percent communal income tax from agricultural sources, 1972

A high positive score on this index indicates industrial favoritism, zero indicates tax equality between industrial and agricultural interests, and negative scores indicate tax favoritism for agricultural interests. Since, in Yugoslavia, the intent of redistribution is to improve the relatively poor position of agricultural workers, a progressive redistribution taxation policy would indicate favoritism for agricultural interests.

The second measure of redistributive tax policy is the regressive tax index which is simply the percent of all communal tax revenues not derived from income tax sources. In the commune alternative tax sources are sales taxes, transit taxes, transfer and license taxes, etc. All these taxes are regressive and the extent to which a commune depends upon these taxes is an indication of a weak redistributive taxation policy.

2. Interaction of Tax Policy Measures with the Independent Variables

The first analytical objective of this section is to examine the effect which the independent variables of the general model have upon the tax policy measures. According to the good government model, we would expect relatively weak correlation coefficients in the socio-economic variable group and republic group with relatively strong and

positive coefficients for the appropriate political process variables. The alternative model, the self-interest model, predicts strong and positive correlation coefficients for socio-economic and republic variables and weak or negative coefficients for the political process variables. Table 6.20 lists the simple correlation coefficients between the general model, independent variables, and tax policy measures.

The coefficients on Table 6.20 do not provide any clues to help reveal which of the two models is mot appropriate for explaining taxation public policy but seem to indicate that the good government scenario deserves careful consideration. The coefficients of the political process variables are generally in the right direction but the table also indicates that republic may be important along with socio-economic characteristics, both of which should be insignificant according to the good government scenario.

Another point worth noting is that apparently the index of industrial tax favoritism does not lend itself to being examined by the variables in the general model. Nearly every variable with which it is paired results in an insignificant relationship. Reasons for the behavior are unclear.

Table 6.21 examines the actual behavior of the individual independent variables more carefully. In this table I provide the standardized regression coefficients of the independent variables and give the relative rankings of these variables in the equation. The procedures are identical to those followed in the previous sections.

TABLE 6.20.--Simple Correlation Coefficients Between the Independent Variables of the General Model and Tax Policy Measures.*

	Tax Policy Index	
Independent Variable	Industrial Advantage	Regressive Taxation
Personal Income	-.01*	-.27
Social Integration	-.07	.16
Social Mobility	.01*	.27
Urbanization	-.00*	-.13
Social Conflict	-.15	-.01*
Change in National Income	.02	.29
Montenegro	-.01*	-.03*
Croatia	-.02*	.22
Macedonia	-.02*	.42
Slovenia	-.02*	-.10
Bosnia	-.03*	.38
Bureaucratism	-.01*	-.19
Decentralism	-.02*	.16
Participation	-.03*	.24
Professionalism	.08	-.40
Bureaucratic National Income Interaction	-.06*	-.31
Mass Availability	-.02*	.22
Elite Accessibility	-.00*	-.28
Self-Management	-.02*	-.03*

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

The results in Table 6.21 indicate that many of the independent variables in the general model do not have significant slopes. Excluding the industrial advantage index, the strongest coefficients for the remaining index are the political process variables. Although the evidence is weak and I cannot make any claims about the validity of either of the scenarios, an explanation is still possible. I suggest that tax policy may not be a publically understood and debated measure but is left to the professionals to decide. If this theory is accurate, it would explain the fact that professionalism, bureaucratism and elite accessibility are the only significant regression slopes and are in the negative direction.

3. Level of Development and Redistributive Policy

One alternative which we should test is that the level of development will affect the procedures under which taxation policy is formulated. It is quite possible that in highly developed communes there is more time, expertise and willingness to encourage mass participation in tax policy. We can examine the validity of this proposition by examining the standardized regression coefficients for the highly developed communes as against the remaining levels combined. Tables 6.22 and 6.23 provide this data.

The coefficients in Table 6.22, which examines only highly developed communes, tend to reinforce the patterns which were found for the combined population listed in Table 6.21. Professionalism remains the dominant explanatory variable with Croatia and Macedonia providing

TABLE 6.21.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures.

	Taxation Policy Index	
Independent Variable	Industrial Advantage	Regressive Taxation
Personal Income	.157*	.141*
Social Integration	-.076*	-.074*
Social Mobility	.013*	.016*
Urbanization	-.051*	-.032*
Potential Conflict	-.167(1)	-.084*
Change in National Income	.002*	.004*
Montenegro	.004*	.005*
Croatia	-.006*	.222(6)
Macedonia	.018*	-.392(4)
Slovenia	-.034*	.010*
Bosnia	-.006*	.263(5)
Bureaucratism	.140*	.847(2)
Decentralism	-.037*	-.044*
Participation	.156*	.076*
Professionalism	.073*	-.592(3)
Bureaucratic/National Income Interaction	-.146*	-.090*
Mass Availability	-.040*	.044*
Elite Accessibility	-.016*	-.882(1)
Self-Management	-.173*	-.042*
R^2	.046	.510

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6.22.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures, High Developed Level.*

	Taxation Policy Index	
Independent Varibles	Industrial Advantage	Regressive Taxation
Personal Income	.220*	-.047*
Social Integration	-.036*	-.309*
Social Mobility	.078*	-.253*
Urbanization	-.013*	.124*
Potential Conflict	-.299(1)	.093*
Change in National Income	.030*	-.091*
Montenegro	-.012*	.064*
Croatia	-.022*	.410(2)
Macedonia	-.027*	-.322(3)
Slovenia	-.108*	.176*
Bosnia	-.067*	.046*
Bureaucratism	1.289*	.863*
Decentralism	.158*	.051*
Participation	-.028*	-.177*
Professionalism	.148*	.868(1)
Bureaucratic/National Income Interaction	-.123*	-.111*
Mass Availability	-.069*	.059*
Elite Accessibility	-.1207*	-1.227*
Self-Management	-.099*	.124*
R^2	.082	.559

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 6.23.--Standardized Regression Coefficients and Variable Rankings of the Independent Variables in the General Model for Redistributive Policy Measures, Medium and Low Developed Level.

	Taxation Policy Index	
Independent Variables	Industrial Advantage	Regressive Taxation
Personal Income	-.269*	.055*
Social Integration	-.210*	.209*
Social Mobility	.002*	.145*
Urbanization	.217*	.034*
Potential Conflict	-.137*	.103*
Change in National Income	-.050*	-.177*
Montenegro	-.320*	--
Croatia	.373(3)	-.004*
Macedonia	.118*	-.601(2)
Slovenia	.558(1)	-.155*
Bosnia	.388(2)	-.490(3)
Bureaucratism	-.147*	1.422*
Decentralism	-.408*	-.220*
Participation	-.623*	-.489*
Professionalism	.316*	.644(1)
Bureaucratic/National Income Interaction	.330*	.026*
Mass Availability	1.023*	-.288*
Elite Accessibility	-.104*	-1.474*
Self-Management	.332*	-.002*
R^2	.396	.694

*Coefficient not significant at the .05 level.

an additional impact. The unstandardized regression coefficient for professionalism in highly developed communes is not significantly different from the coefficients for the other levels using a 95% confidence interval. The behavior of the professionalism variable is, therefore, similar across levels of development. In general, however, republics are important variables across levels of development.

In summary, the general model explains a considerable amount of the variance in redistributive public policies. However, when we try to examine the behavior of specific variables in the model, there are very few significant findings. Only professionalism, a political process variable, has a significant slope for more than a single redistributive policy measure.

We do not have any findings which would help us select from the good government model or the self-interest model of redistributive policy-making. The suspicion that I have is that redistributive public policy is too technical and specialized and is not, in fact, in the general public domain, although other explanations may be evident.

F. Contrasts and Comparisons Across Policy Arenas

It is the intent of this section to pull together the disparate sections of the chapter and to establish whether the general model affects the symbolic, distributive and redistributive policy areas similarly or differently. There are three foci to this comparison:

--the overall explanatory strength of the general model;

--the behavior of the major independent variable groups;

--the effect of the level of development.

The explanatory strength of the general model is quite high across all policy areas. Of the nineteen policy measures examined, only three had R^2's of less than .200. In other words, for more than 80% of the policy measures the general model explained more than 20% of the variance. In many cases the variance explained exceeded 50%. The implication of this finding is that we can predict public policy decisions of Yugoslav communes reasonably well provided we know the socio-economic characteristics, the republic, and the pattern of political decision-making of the communes.

The second comparative focus is the behavior of the major independent variable groups across policy areas which entails an identification of the significant individual independent variables in the regression analysis. Comparing the significant regression coefficients of the variable groups across policy areas, we can conclude that some individual political process variables are independently important for each policy area. Politics does make a difference, but the utility of this statement is low because the political process variables which are important change with the policy arena. Within some symbolic policy areas, the self-management index and decentralization are important independent political process factors for some measures but not for all. Within the distributive policy area nearly all the political process measures can be independently important, but the direction of their impact varies across the measures. Within distributive policies only professionalism is a significant independent factor. The implication of this finding is that political processes will have a varying impact

upon public policies. The impact depends upon the policy area and in some cases upon within policy area difference. We cannot legitimately claim uniformly positive responses across all policy areas with any single change in the political decision-making processes.

The importance of republic factors in all the policy areas is clearly secondary. Republic origin does not determine public policy. At best it influences some particular policy decision. For each policy area some republic(s) has a noteworthy influence but the identification of that republic varies across policy measures and policy areas. Yugoslav communes, therefore, are not completely autonomous of the republic in making public policy decisions.

Within the socio-economic variable group we can conclude that social characteristics are generally important across policy areas but their role is usually secondary to political process variables. No single social factor, however, is significantly important across policy areas. This leads to the conclusion that the effect of social variables on public policy decisions is neither constant nor unidimensional.

The third focus for cross-policy comparison is the role of economic development in altering the behavior of the variables in the general model. This problem is geared towards establishing future trends in public policy behavior in Yugoslavia. The general cross-policy expectation was that political process variables would become more important and socio-economic variables less important in determining policy at higher levels of development.

In this area our findings were not so clear. For symbolic policy decisions political process variables remained strong and constant at high levels of development, but social variables also remained strong although there were changes in the identification of the important social variables. Distributive policies most closely met our expectations with social variables declining in importance and political process variables remaining strong across levels of development. Redistributive policy did not change at all across development levels. The general conclusion we can make, therefore, is that public policies in the future as Yugoslavia achieves higher development will probably be as confused and complex as they are today.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI

[1]Philip Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public Policy," Polity 3 (Fall 1970): 22-43.

[2]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Political Science and Public Policy, ed: Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968).

[3]Housing policy would have been a very useful operationalization of regulative policy in the Yugoslav commune. However, due to data inaccuracies and the problem of developing equivalent measures, I could not include it in this dissertation.

[4]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," op. cit., p. 52.

[5]Charles Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 858-866.

[6]T. Alexander Smith, "Toward a Comparative Theory of the Policy Process," Comparative Politics 1 (July 1969): 498-515.

[7]Chadwick Haberstroh, "Organizational Design and Systems Analysis," in Handbook of Organizations, ed: James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 1172.

[8]Theodore Lowi, "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," American Political Science Review 57 (September 1963): 570.

[9]For a systematic discussion of the complexity of the innovation process and the problem of identifying innovation, see: Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[10]For example, it is impossible to discuss the speed or extent of an innovation unless the original decision to adopt had been made previously.

[11]Elihu Katz, Martin Levin, Herbert Hamilton, "Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation," American Sociological Review (April 1963): 237-252. Very systematically reviewed the problem and

the need for more precision in the definition and use of the concept of innovation. Their guidelines are very instructive as well.

[12]For a good review of the debate on this subject, see: Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 880-899; and "Comment: Problems in Research on the Diffusion of Policy Innovation," American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1186-1191; Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," op. cit.; and Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1174-1185.

[13]Three different sources were used to obtain this information. The dates in which the information was published varied from 1969 to 1971. The term of office which this variable encompasses was five years (from 1969 through 1973). Thus, it is possible that there are small discrepancies in the data applicable to 1972 due to deaths, retirements, and resigniations from the time of election in 1969 to 1972.

[14]Previous to 1970-1971, school boards were not popularly elected and were part of the education department of the communal administration. The popularly elected school baords are not yet a fixed feature in communal public policy decision-making. A similar situation is applicable for cultural boards as well.

[15]Recently the republic and federal authorities have been promoting the idea that educational and cultural activities should be managed and supported by the working community and the economic organizations. This is a major change from past procedure.

[16]Administratively, republic and federal authorities have been encouraging greater administrative decentralization. The existence and importance of local communities within the commune is a reflection of that concern.

[17]Referenda are being promoted as a new form of direct democracy and active involvement of the people in their political affairs.

[18]James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 187.

[19]Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 2 (1963): 265-289.

[20]Richard Hofferbert, "The Relationship Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review 73 (March 1966): 73-82.

[21]Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966(.

[22]Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," op. cit.; and Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," op. cit.

[23]Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," American Political Science Review 63 (March 1969): 111-126.

[24]Tom Burns and G. M. Slather, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock Publication, 1961), p. 97.

[25]John Foster, "Innovation in Governmental Structures: Minnesota School District Reorganization," American Journal of Political Science, 19.

[26]Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," op. cit.

[27]Richard Rose, "Models of Governing," Comparative Politics 5 (July 1973): 465-496.

[28]Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," American Political Science Review 64 (September 1970): 843-864.

[29]Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal," American Sociological Review (August 1970): 650-665.

[30]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p. 203.

[31]Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Program Change and Organizational Properties: A Comparative Analysis," American Journal of Sociology (1967): 503-517.

[32]Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Representative Mechanisms, Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies," Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 112-132.

[33]Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1960).

[34]For a representative sample of divergent opinions on this point, see: Robert Z. Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict: The Flouridation Decision (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 182-190; Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, op. cit.; David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 324-362; and Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Program Change and Organizational Properties: A Comparative Analysis," op. cit.

[35]Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," op. cit.

[36]Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Development, Representative Mechanisms, Administrative Professionalism and Public Policies," op. cit.

[37]For an interesting discussion of possible methods for handling this problem, see: Raoul Naroll, "Some Thoughts on Comparative Methods in Cultural Anthropology," in Methodology in Social Research, eds: Hubert and Ann Blalock (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968): 258-262.

[38]It may seem that an ecological fallacy is present in this assumption since individual characteristics could be improperly inferred from the aggregate data present in the paper. However, I do not directly nor indirectly wish to infer that any of the community aggregated characteristics explain individual behavior. For an interesting analysis of this problem, see: Timothy Hennessey, "Problems in Concept Formation: The Ethos Theory and the Comparative Study of Urban Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science 14 (November 1970): 537-564.

[39]A good example of the extent of this constitutional guarantee is found in Article 165 of the Yugoslav federal constitution (USTAV Socijalističke Republike Jugoslavije, Beograd: Prosveta, 1974) pertaining to educational opportunity: "Citizens have the right, under equal conditions determined by law, to receive learning and vocational preparation in all schools and in other institutions of education."

[40]We are assuming that such factors as genetic defects and other determinants of poor health or low intelligence are randomly distributed throughout the society. Thus the objective need for health and education should be roughly equal when we control for population size. For a very good discussion of how this assumption affects health policies, see: David J. Falcone, "On Comparative Health Policy and Political Science," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, Tennessee, November 7, 1975; and Odin W. Anderson, Health Care: Can There Be Equity (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).

[41]We would expect a certain amount of inequality within health and educational resource distribution since there is a definite advantage and need to centralize such institutions as universities and hospitals. This factor would contribute some error to the overall analysis.

[42]David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 416-417.

[43]William K. Medlin, "Education," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed: Allen Kassof (New York: Praeger, 1968).

[44]Jeremy Azrael, "Education and Political Development in the Soviet Union," in Man, State, and Society in the Soviet Union, ed: Joseph Nogee (New York: Praeger, 1972).

[45]Mark G. Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[46]Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Teritorijalno Organizovanje Samoupravljanje," Bilten, Broj 75 (Beograd, 1967).

[47]Institut za Političke Studije, Položaj i Funkcije Komune u Društveno-Političkom Sistemu Jugoslavije, Tom II, Sveska 4 (Beograd: Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1971), pp. 151-172.

[48]Borba (September 22, 1974): 7; 4-6.

[49]Borba (May 24, 1975): 4; 4-6.

[50]A major effort of the Tenth Party Congress of the League of Communists held in 1974 was directed towards reform of the system of distributing health and educational resources. See, for example, "Rezoluciju o Zadacima Saveza Komunist Jugoslavije u Socijalnoj Politici" and "Rezoluciju o Zadacima Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije u Socijalističkom Samoupravnom Preobražaje Vaspitanja i Obrazavanja" in Deseti Kongres SKJ: Dokumenti, ed: Savez Komunista Jugoslavije (Beograd: Komunist, 1974). This effort was tied in with the promotion and development of the interest of the community board (interesne zajednica). See: Edvard Kardelj, speech given to the Standing Conference of Cities in Herceg-Novi, October 4, 1974, in Borba (October 5, 1974, 1: 5-7); and Politika (November 21, 1974): 8; 4-5.

[51]Milivoje Kovačević, Komunalni Sistem i Komunalna Politika (Beograd: Zavod za Izdavanje Udbenika, 1968).

[52]For a thorough examination of the practical political implications which the decentralization of administrative responsibilities has had on the local level, see Stojan Tomić, Komunalni Konflikti (seven volumes), (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena istraživanja, Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1973).

[53]For some interesting evidence about the lack of relationship between more health resources and improved health in the context of American states, see Kathleen Peroff and Gillian Dean, "Death by Default? Income and Health Resources in the American States," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, May, 1976. For a comparative perspective, see: Richard Auster, Irving Leveson, and Deborah Sarachek, "The Production of Health, An Exploratory Study," The Journal of Human Resources 4 (1969): 411-436.

In educational policy the lack of a connection between resources and qualitative outputs has been subject to considerably more debate but the weight of the evidence apparently denies any important connecting link. See J. S. Coleman, E. Q. Campbell, C. J. Hobson, J. McPartland, A. M. Mood, F. D. Weinfeld, and R. L. York, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D. C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1966); and Christopher Jencks and Marsha D. Brown, "Effects of High Schools on Their Students," Harvard Educational Review 45 (August 1975): 273-324.

[54]Lester C. Thurow, "Education and Economic Inequality," Public Interest (Summer 1972): 66-81.

[55]Raymond Boudon, Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 195.

[56]Robert J. Osborn, Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 95.

[57]Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 7.

[58]Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union 1940-1950," American Sociological Review 15 (1950).

[59]David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, op. cit., p. 397.

[60]Veče Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije and Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Socijalna Politika u Radnoj Organizaciji i Opštini: Rasprava na Savetovanje" (Sarajevo: June 1972): 31-35; 49-51.

[61]Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, Rezolucija Treče Konferencije SKJ (Beograd: Komunist, 1972).

[62]Politika (February 8, 1974): 6, 1-3; and Marko Bulc, "Idejne Osnove Samoupravnog Socijalističkog Preobražaja Obrazovanja i Vaspitanja," Komuna 21 (1974): 3-8.

[63]This hypothesis cannot be directly tested since we do not have a direct measure or indicator of the strength of the social norm or equality.

[64]We are making the assumption that health and educational distribution policies are explained by similar factors. Empirically, this assumption may not be justified, but in a broader context there exists no theoretical reason to separate health from educational policies. See: Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974).

[65]Richard Auster, et al., "The Production of Health, An Explanatory Study," op. cit.

[66]R. D. Fraser, "An International Study of Health and General Systems of Financing Health Care," International Journal of Health Services 3 (1973): 369-397.

[67]Kathleen Peroff and Gillian Dean, "Death by Default? Income and Health Resources in the American States," op. cit.

[68]Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States, Occasional paper 66 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959).

[69]H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966).

[70]Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data, op. cit.

[71]Veče Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije and Stalna Konferencija Gradova Jugoslavije, "Socijalna Politika u Radnoj Organizaciji i Opštini: Rasprava na Savetovanju, op. cit.

[72]Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[73]Walter I. Garms, Jr., "The Correlates of Educational Effort: A Multivariate Analysis," Comparative Education Review (October 1968): 281-299.

[74]Frederic L. Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968).

[75]Katarina Milosavljević, "Aktuelni Problemi Socijalne Politike i SR Srbiji," Opština 25 (1972): 5-16; and Institut za Društvena Istraživanje, Jugoslavenska Komuna-Teritorij, Razvijenost i Samoupravljanje u Općina (Zagreb: Svevčilista u Zagrebu, 1972).

[76]Robert L. Linberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review 61 (September, 1967): 701-716.

[77]Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States, op. cit.

[78]Vincent Ostrom, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974).

[79]Stojan Tomić, Politički Profesionalizam (Sarajevo: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja, Fakultet Političkih Nauka, 1972).

[80]Eugen Pusić, Samoupravljanje u Općinama i Ustanovama Društvenih Služba u Različkim Fazama Ekonomskog i Društvenog Razvitka (Zagreb: Institut za Društvena Istraživanja Svevčilista u Zagrebu, 1972).

[81]Brian Silver, "Levels of Sociocultural Development Among Soviet Nationalities: A Partial Test of the Equalization Hypothesis," American Political Science Review 68 (December 1974): 1618-1631.

[82]See Chapter III for an extensive review of the literature on this subject.

[83]Milivoje Jeličić, "Problemi i Pravci Daljeg Razvoja Samoupravljanja i Financiranja Interesnih Zajednica i Društvenih Fondova u Vanprivrednim Delatnostima na Teritoriji SR Srbije," Opština 25 (1972): 14-25.

[84]An example when an economic enterprise makes a voluntary contribution to the education fund would be the case of a factory that wishes to train personnel in some specialized skills and would agree to subsidize the cost of that training. In health, if an enterprise wishes to establish a clinic on its premises it would agree to subsidize the cost of the operation.

[85]The total per capita health expenditures and patient/doctor ratio at high levels of development may reflect more inequality than actually exists. Many of the highly developed communes are located in urban metropolitan areas such as Belgrade which pool medical resources into one large complex. In practice, these facilities are equally available to all residents of the metropolitan area and not only the residents of the commune in which the facilities exist.

[86]While I have no empirical evidence to confirm this final point, it does seem consistent with much of the political culture of Yugoslavia. For an excellent description of the process, see; Žika Minović, Politička Palanka (Beogred: Proleter,1972).

[87]For a good example of this type of research, see: Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, op. cit.

[88]For example Bosnian officials must put considerable pressure on local authorities to encourage female educational programs.

[89]Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, op. cit.

[90]Guy Peters, "Public Policy, Socio-Economic Conditions, and the Political System: A Note on Their Developmental Relationship," Polity 5 (Winter 1972): 277-284.

[91]Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar, "Development and Participation," in Local Politics, Development, and Participation, eds: F. C. Bruhns, F. Cazzola, and J. Wiatr (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies), pp. 136-159.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

I have organized this dissertation to explain variation in local public policies and the public policy process, and have begun from the premise that local political variation exists and is important in Yugoslavia. It was my intent to contribute a detailed empirical study to the comparative local literature and to incorporate local research about a communist state with research about western societies.

The central focus of this work has been that local public policies and the public policy decision-making processes change radically across levels of economic development. The major hypotheses were that as a local unit becomes more developed, the political decision-making variables become more and more important, less variance in these variables occurs, more innovation results, and there tends to be a greater per capita level of public policy expenditures. The actual relationships observed, however, were not so straightforward or simple.

To test these hypotheses I constructed a general model that incorporated theoretical hypotheses and research results from the fields of political development, public administration and public policy analysis. Through the use of Kornhauser's typology on societal differentiation, the general model became applicable to the Yugoslav political experience. The general model stressed that public policies result

from the combined effect of economic variables, social characteristics, political structure, socio-political organizations and the decision-making processes. The bulk of the dissertation examined the interaction of these variables with each other, and their combined and separate impact upon public policies. I examined three types of public policies: symbolic, distributive, and redistributive. I used general econometric statistical techniques to explain their variation.

The results of this dissertation are constrained by two limitations of the available data. One limitation is the inaccessibility of commune by commune data on socio-political organizations. The bias that the lack of these variables introduces may radically alter nearly all the conclusions reached. In fact, I would expect that the inclusion of such variables would moderate the last four specific observations listed in this chapter and would have strong implications on the development of self-management.

The second constraint is attributed to the lack of information about the effect of nationality on the political decision-making processes. The factor of inter-nationality competition and conflict may alter all these decision-making processes. Since there is considerable nationality variation within republics, any findings about the effect of republics should not be applied to this problem. Nationality fragmentation was used as an independent variable in the analysis but this variable cannot measure the degree to which a single nationality dominates the local political process in practice. In general, nationality tension is a variable best handled on the individual level of analysis.

The probability of misspecification or misinterpretation is too high at more aggregated levels of analysis.

Past experience suggests that nationality would be an important factor in the decision-making process. Individuals tend to identify with those from their own nationality group; and, speaking objectively, if discrimination did not occur some groups would perceive that they had been discriminated against. These factors could affect the policy process. Nationality may operate directly upon the decision-making process as in the recruitment of political leadership personnel or it may operate indirectly through social development factors which give an advantaged position in communal society to specific nationality groups.

In general, the results indicated that the public policy process is much more complex than I initially expected. However, several specific observations can be made.

1. There is considerable variation in the formal political structure of the commune in Yugoslavia and this variation has a meaningful impact upon the policy-making process;

2. The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is distinct from socio-economic characteristics and is very complex;

3. In general, the political decision-making process is important in determining policy outputs, but the model explaining policy outputs varies according to the specific policy examined;

4. Republic authority over the political decision-making process and public policies is generally weak or vacillatory;

5. The level of economic development alters the process of formulating policy decisions.

Each of these observations is individually dealt with in this chapter. In addition, the implication that each observation has for local public policy-makers, future trends in Yugoslavia, and comparative political science is discussed.

> Observation 1: There is considerable variation in the formal political structure of the commune in Yugoslavia and this variation has a meaningful impact upon the policy-making process.

In Chapter III we discovered that all local governmental formal structures are not the same. This is true even within a single republic. Some structures are more open than others; some formally encourage more participation; some encourage more efficiency and economy. Some formal structures are more centralized and bureaucratized; others encourage more direct legislative control over communal activities. We also found that these formal structures are related systematically to actual policy outputs and actual political behavior. In other words, the formal political structure can encourage certain forms of behavior, and can make a difference even within a one-party state.

These structural differences would be meaningless unless the commune had some freedom and autonomy to make its own decisions. Yugoslav communes seem to be receiving more and more of this autonomy. It is a process that is resisted by some communal authorities who view the growth of autonomy as a republic or federal effort to transfer responsibilities onto the local level. Although this is a successful political maneuver for higher level governments, the growth of local autonomy and its accompanying devolution of responsibilities may eventually overburden the commune.

The implication of this observation for Yugoslav local decision-makers and for political activity in the commune is that control over selected communal governmental institutions is essential for control over the policy process. This means that Dahl's dictum about constitutional rules is applicable for Yugoslavia.

> Constitutional rules are mainly significant because they help to determine what particular groups are to be given advantages or handicaps in the political struggle. In no society do people ever enter a political contest equally; the effect of the constitutional rules is to preserve, add to, or subtract from the advantages and handicaps with which they start the race. Hence, however trivial the accomplishments of the constitutional rules may be when measured against the limitless aspirations of traditional democratic thought, they are crucial to the status and power of the particular groups who gain or suffer by their operation. And for this reason, among others, the rules have often been the cause of bitter and even fraticidal struggle.[1]

We can expect that as the autonomy of the commune grows and its responsibilities become broader, control over the formal apparatus of government will become a more crucial problem, intra-communal conflict will become more intense, and the formal political rules expressed by the charter will take on an added dimension of importance. If we possess a knowledge of the formal rules, we can pinpoint the precise structural arenas of these communal conflicts and then, on a case by case basis, we may be able to predict more accurately actual political outcomes.

The significance of this observation to general comparative inquiry is obvious. Someone-party states can be compred with multi-party states provided that the correct level of analysis is selected. Politics is conflict and, at least in Yugoslavia, this conflict can be most easily observed on the local level.

> Observation 2: The local Yugoslav political decision-making process is distinct from socio-economic characteristics and is very complex.

In Chapter V we examined the behavior of the decision-making process variables. We found that, although they were related to the socio-economic variables, considerable variance was left unexplained. In addition, we found that in some cases socio-economic variables explained processes such as participation very poorly or, as in the case of professionalism, opposite from what was predicted.

For the decision-maker the implication of this observation is that socio-economic factors will not determine completely the political processes within the commune. Basically, a commune is free to develop its own system of political decision-making. Economic determinism is not an accurate explanation.

From a different perspective this observation means that movement towards self-management/pluralism is not assured and that the more highly developed communes have a considerably more difficult and complex set of decisions to make. If we assume that the more highly developed communes are the precursors of future development in the Yugoslav commune, then over the long term we can predict that decision-making processes among communes will become more varied and that the direction of change may not always be in the direction of more developed self-management/pluralist decision-making processes.

The observation here is congruent with general comparative studies. This observation reinforces the notion that as societies develop, their political processes become more complex, more varied, and freer of socio-economic constraints.

Observation 3: In general, the political decision-making process is important in determining policy outputs, but the model explaining policy outputs varies according to the specific policy examined.

Our analysis of varied public policy decisions ranging from symbolic to redistributive reveals that different aspects of the decision-making process are very important in determining public policies. All the socio-economic factors combined did not explain most of the variance in the equation, and separately they were not the most important variables in the general model. This finding is significant because we have determined that local input makes a difference in public policies in a one-party socialist state. Also, there is uncertainty in the determination of public policies, and individual effort may be instrumental in resolving such problems.

For the Yugoslav decision-maker, this observation is also significant. Since socio-economic and central political forces are basically outside the control of the local political institutions, these variables cannot be easily manipulated to generate the desired public policy. The decision-making process, on the other hand, can be more easily directed. Thus, since these decision-making variables can influence the decision-making process, local decision-makers do have some influence and responsibility over the determination of public policies in the commune. The problem introduced by the finding is that the decision-maker is not provided with a wholistic model explaining public policy outputs. Each policy seems to demand its own explanation. What may succeed for implementing one public policy may fail for another.

Observation 4: Republic authority over the political decision-making process and public policies is generally weak or vacillatory.

This observation runs counter to the generally accepted view of politics that attributes to the republic or federation the determination of local public policies. In Chapters V and VI we found that the influence of the republic over the decision-making process and over public policies is generally weak, that considerable variation exists, and that the degree of individual republic influence is dependent upon the specific policy measured. Local units of government have considerable freedom to make and implement local political decisions within the Yugoslav political context. In short, the analysis indicates that political decentralism has occurred.

For the Yugoslav decision-maker this observation implies that republic interference is no longer a convenient scapegoat for local problems and crises; he must rely on his own resources. In fact, I expect that soon there will be local requests for more republic involvement in communal affairs as communes find it increasingly difficult to provide the goods and services expected by a modernizing population.

In terms of general comparative analysis, this observation implies that general models of federalism and organizational behavior can be applied in a one-party socialist state, and that party competition is not a necessary condition for a truly federal structure and the preservation of local autonomy.

This observation differs from those made by other scholars who explicitly state that Yugoslavia's differences and problems are the

result of Pan-Serbism or other republic-based factors. The inequality that does exist seems to be based on factors other than republic. We find no indication that the communes in a single republic qualitatively differ from other republic communes solely (or even largely) on the basis of their republic identification.

It is still possible that all the republics or even the federation may intervene in the local policy process and that its effect has not been measured. If that is the case, the criteria for involvement would be the same across all republics and would not be completely determined by developmental factors. Logically we could expect that republic intervention may occur systematically when a commune has been mismanaged, when internal communal conflict paralyzes the political process, or when local residents achieve important republic positions and can reward their locales with special grants and favors.

Observation 5: The level of economic development alters the process of formulating policy decisions.

Our final observation is the basic theme of the dissertation. We find that the level of economic development qualitatively changes the models for predicting public policy decisions. In general, decision-making process variables become more important at higher levels of development. Socio-economic factors tend to decline in importance and republic influence remains fairly constant over levels of development.

For the local decision-maker this implies that he must adapt his political behavior and activities to match the economic level of his

community. It also implies that the process of recruitment of local level leadership will change as a commune becomes more developed. At higher levels of development the decision-maker must deal with a more complex society. The general Yugoslav orientation towards deprofessionalization, therefore, may run counter to the basic social trends and may result, if pursued, in less efficient, less adaptive, more conflictual and less innovative communal politics. It is possible that Yugoslav administrators will foresee these trends and will propose future constitutional changes, for example, changes in the direction of civilian review boards, rather than further deprofessionalization of political life.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VII

[1]Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 137.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF COMMUNES INCLUDED IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE SAMPLE IN CHAPTER III

APPENDIX A

LIST OF COMMUNES INCLUDED IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE SAMPLE IN CHAPTER III

Commune Name	Communal Charter Available	Communal Laws Available
322 Barajevo	X	X
323 Čukarica	X	X
324 Grocka	X	X
325 Lazarevac	X	X
326 Mladenovac	X	X
327 Novi Beograd	X	X
328 Obrenovac	X	X'
329 Palilula	X	X
330 Savski Venac	X	X
331 Sopot	X	X
332 Stari Grad	X	X
333 Voždovac	X	X'
334 Vračar	X	X
335 Zemun	X	X
336 Zvezdara	X	X
337 Aleksandrovac	X	
339 Aleksinac	X	X
340 Aranđelovac	X	X
347 Arilje	X	X
350 Bošilj Grad	X	X
351 Brus	X	X
352 Bujanovac		X

Commune Name	Communal Charter Available	Communal Laws Available
353 Crna Trava	X	X
355 Čajetina	X	X
356 Čičevac	X	
357 Čuprija	X	X
358 Despotovac		X
362 Golubac	X	X
363 Gornji Milanovac	X	X
364 Ivanjica		X
369 Kosjerić	X	X
372 Krupanj		X
374 Kučevo		X
376 Lajkovac	X	X
377 Lebane	X	X
380 Lučani		X
381 Ljig	X	X
382 Ljubovija		X
384 Mali Zvornik		X
385 Malo Crnice	X	X
386 Međveđa		X
388 Mionica	X	X
391 Nova Varoš	X	X
392 Novi Pazar	X	X
393 Osečina	X	X
394 Paračin		X
395 Petrovac		X
398 Požega	X	X
399 Preševo	X	X
400 Priboj		X
401 Prijepolje	X	X
404 Raška	X	X
406 Rekovac	X	X

Commune Name	Communal Charter Available	Communal Laws Available
407 Sjenica	X	X
411 Surdilica		X
412 Svetozarevo	X	X
413 Svilajnac	X	X
418 Trgovište	X	X
420 Tutin	X	X
421 Ub		X
422 Valjevo	X	X
423 Varvarin	X	
425 Veliko Gradište	X	X
426 Vladičin Han	X	X
428 Vlasotince	X	X
432 Žabari	X	X
433 Žagubica	X	X
438 Bač		X

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ITEMS, INTERPRETIVE KEY, AND CALCULATING FORMULAS

APPENDIX B

LIST OF ITEMS, INTERPRETIVE KEY, AND CALCULATING FORMULAS

The following is a list of the items found in the Communal Statutes from which the Executive Power Index, Bureaucratism/Professionalism Index, and Workers/Legislative Control Index were constituted. Accompanying each list of items is the interpretive key. Following each list of items is the calculating formula for computing the index score.

A. Executive Power Index

Item 1. Existence of a prohibition of communal functionaries from simultaneously serving as delegates in the Communal Assembly.
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 2. A delegate to the Communal Assembly has the right to demand reports from the communal civil service
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 3. A delegate to the Communal Assembly has the right to demand reports from the Executive Council
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 4. A group of delegates has the right to demand explanations from the Executive Council
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 5. A group of delegates has the right to demand explanations from civil servants
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 6. The President of the Assembly can convene a general convention
No Mention = 0
With Consent of the Assembly = 1
With Consent of the Socialist Alliance = 2

Item 7. Some members of the Executive Council are members of the general convention
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 8. The Executive Council may suggest policy to the Communal Assembly

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 9. The charter specifies the types of laws over which the Executive Council has jurisdiction

None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 10. The Executive Council may abolish administrative regulations

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 11. The Communal Assembly elects some members of the Executive Council

None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 12. The President of the Executive Council cannot be a delegate in the Communal Assembly

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 13. The President of the Executive Council has the power to ask for the resignation of members of the Executive Council

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 14. The President of the Executive Council may convene the Executive Council on his authority alone

No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 15. Members of the Executive Council have the power to convene an Executive Council session

0 Members = 0
3 Members = 1
5 Members = 2

Item 16. The Executive Council may suggest that the Communal Assembly postpone or hasten decisions

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 17. The Communal Assembly may demand the collective resignation of the Executive Council

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 18. The Communal Assembly may demand individual resignations of the Executive Council

No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 19. Each chamber of the Communal Assembly must have __ members call for a vote of confidence on the Executive Council

0 Members = 0
5 Members = 1
10 Members = 2

In order to construct the executive power index, the items were recoded in the following manner. The first number is the old value; the second is the new value.

Item 1: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 2: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 3: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 4: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 5: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 6: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 7: 0 = 0; 1 = 2
Item 8: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 9: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 10: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 11: 0 = 2; 1 = 0
Item 12: 0 = 2; 1 = 0
Item 13: 0 = 1; 1 = 0
Item 14: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 15: 0 = 0; 3 = 1; 5 = 2
Item 16: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 17: 0 = 1; 1 = 0
Item 18: 0 = 2; 1 = 0
Item 19: 0 = 1; 5 = 0; 10 = 1

The final executive power score is the sum of the recoded values of the following items.

Executive Power Index = Item 1 + Item 3 + Item 4 + Item 5 + Item 6 + Item 11 + Item 14 + Item 15 + Item 16 + Item 17 + Item 18 + Item 19

B. <u>Bureaucratic/Professionalism Index</u>

Item 1. Communal Charter specifies that the chamber of "mesna zajednica" supervises the mesna zajednica

No mention = 0
General Responsibility = 1
Specific Duties = 2

Item 2. Communal charter specifies that the townhall meetings are supervised by the chamber of "mesna zajednica"
No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 3. There is a vice-president for each communal chamber
No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 4. A delegate to the communal assembly is granted job protection while conducting communal business
No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 5. The President of the Communal Assembly is limited to ___ terms
No Mention = 0
2 terms = 2
3 terms = 3

Item 6. The President of the Opstina chamber is limited to ___ terms
No Mention = 0
2 terms = 2
3 terms = 3

Item 7. The President of the Communal Assembly is a paid position
No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 8. The Vice President of the Communal Assembly is a paid position
No Mention = 0
Yes = 1

Item 9. There is a communal collective presidency
No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 10. There is a limitation on the reelection of the members of the presidency
No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 11. The Secretary of the commune has authority over the mesna zajednica
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 12. There is a presidency of the general convention
None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 13. There is a limitation on the number of times the President of the Executive Council can be relected

None = 0
2 terms = 2
3 terms = 3

Item 14. There is a limitation on the number of terms to which members of the Executive Council can be reelected

No Mention = 0
2 terms = 2
3 terms = 3

In order to construct the bureaucratic/professionalism Index, the items were recoded in the following manner. The first number is the old value, and the second number is the new value.

Item 1:	0 = 2; 1 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 2:	0 = 2; 1 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 3:	0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 4:	0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 5:	0 = 2; 3 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 6:	0 = 2; 3 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 7:	0 = 0; 1 = 2
Item 8:	0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 9:	0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 10:	0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 11:	0 = 0; 1 = 3
Item 12:	0 = 0; 1 = 2
Item 13:	0 = 2; 3 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 14:	0 = 2; 2 = 0; 3 = 1

The final bureaucratic/professionalism index is the sum of the recoded values of the following items.

Bureaucratic/professionalism = Item 1 + Item 2 + Item 3 + Item 4 + Item 5 + Item 6 + Item 9 + Item 11 + Item 12 + Item 13 + Item 14

C. <u>Workers Legislative Control Index</u>

Item 1. Size difference between the chamber of workers and other chambers

Workers chamber larger than other chambers combined = 3
Workers chamber larger than 2/3 of the other chambers combined = 2
Workers chamber larger than 1/2 of the other chambers combined = 1

Item 2. There are joint sessions of the Mesna Zajednica chamber and worker's chamber

None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 3. There are joint sessions of the mesna zajednica chamber and workers chamber to discuss housing policy

None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 4. There are joint sessions of the worker's chamber and socio-political chamber

None = 0
Yes = 1

Item 5. Joint sessions of two communal chambers are specified in the charter

No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 6. Educational policy is handled by:

Worker's chamber = 0
Separate sessions of each chamber = 1
Joint session of all chambers = 2

Item 7: Social policy is handled by:

Worker's chamber = 0
Separate sessions of each chamber = 1
Joint session of all chambers = 2

Item 8: "Other" matters are handled by:

Worker's chamber = 0
Separate sessions of each chamber = 1
Joint session of all chambers = 2

Item 9: The workers chamber has final authority in financial matters

No = 0
Yes = 1
Yes but with a referendum = 2

Item 10: The President of _____ chamber is the Vice-President of the Communal Assembly

None = 0
Any chamber = 1
Worker's chamber = 2

Item 11: The charter recognizes separate sessions of the communal chambers

No = 0
Yes = 1

Item 12. The worker's chamber has veto power over all spending
No = 0
Yes = 1

In order to construct the Worker's Legislative Control Index, the items were recoded in the following manner. The first number is the old value; the second is the new value.

Item 1: 0 = 0; 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3
Item 2: 0 = 0; 1 = 2
Item 3: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 4: 0 = 0; 1 = 2
Item 5: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 6: 0 = 3; 1 = 2; 2 = 0
Item 7: 0 = 3; 1 = 2; 2 = 0
Item 8: 1 = 2; 2 = 0
Item 9: 0 = 0; 1 = 2; 2 = 1
Item 10: 0 = 2; 1 = 1; 2 = 0
Item 11: 0 = 0; 1 = 1
Item 12: 0 = 0; 1 = 2

The final Worker's Legislative Control Index is the sum of the recoded values of the following items:

Workers Legislative Control Index = Item 1 + Item 2 + Item 3 + Item 4 + Item 5 + Item 7 + Item 9 + Item 10 + Item 11 + Item 12

APPENDIX C

DATA SOURCES

APPENDIX C

DATA SOURCES

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APPENDIX D

DEFINITION OF THE OPERATIONAL MEASURES

APPENDIX D

DEFINITION OF THE OPERATIONAL MEASURES

Below is a list of the operational measures, their purpose, calculation, interpretation and chapter location. The measures are listed in the order in which they are introduced in the dissertation.

1. Executive Power Index

   Purpose: To measure the degree of power and responsibility which is formally granted to the communal executive organs by the communal charter.

   Calculation: See Appendix B

   Interpretation: Scores range from 1 to 14. A high score indicates more formal executive power.

   Location: Chapter III.

2. Bureaucratism/Professionalism Index

   Purpose: To measure the degree to which the communal charters encourage professionalism within the commune administration and bureaucratization of staff functions.

   Calculation: See Appendix B.

   Interpretation: Scores range from 6 to 13. A high score on this index indicates more formal bureaucratic/professional tendencies.

   Location: Chapter III.

3. Legislative Index of Worker Control

   Purpose: To measure the amount of formal control exercised by the legislative branch and the workers assembly within that branch over communal activities.

   Calculation: See Appendix B.

Interpretation: Scores range from 4 to 19. A high score on this index indicates greater formal authority is granted to the workers assembly.

Location: Chapter III.

4. Societal Complexity

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the commune has developed formalized, routinized and bureaucratic procedures.

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where a = total spending on administrative services in the commune in 1973
b = population of the commune from the 1971 census

Interpretaion: a higher number indicates greater sociatal complexity.

Location: Chapter III.

5. Industrialization

Purpose: To measure the degree to which a commune is modernized.

Calculation: There are two distinct measures of industrialization

1. $\frac{a}{b}$

where a = total national income of the commune in 1973 from industrial sources
b = total national income of the commune in 1973

2. $\frac{c}{d}$

where c = total employment of the commune engaged in industrial activities in 1974
d = total employment of the commune in 1974

Interpretation: Both measures range from 0.00 to 1.00. A higher score on both measures indicates a greater degree of industrialization.

Location: Chapter III.

6. Change in Resources

Purpose: To measure the change in available economic resources in the commune and indicate the general growth direction of the commune

Calculation: $\frac{(a - b)}{b}$

where: a = total national income in the commune in 1973
b = total national income in the commune in 1971

Interpretation: Scores may range from the negative to positive. A positive score indicates general growth in the economy. Negative scores indicate a general decline in the economy.

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI.

7. Education

Purpose: To measure the degree of technical and professional training of the population

Calculation: $\frac{(a + b + c)}{d}$

where: a = population with university education, 1971
b = population with some university education, 1971
c = population with non-university higher education, 1971
d = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A high score indicates a high level of education

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI.

8. Urbanization

Purpose: To measure the degree of urban concentration in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total population of commune, 1971
b = total land area of the commune in hectares, 1971

Interpretation: A high score indicates a high population density, thus urbanization

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI

9. Social Mobility

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the population of the commune is changing and growing; also a rough measure of parochialism/cosmopolitanism

Calculation: $\frac{(a + b)}{c}$

where: a = total population born in the same mesna zajednica where they now reside, 1971
b = total population born in a different mesna zajednica but the same commune where they now reside, 1971
c = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A higher score indicates the lack of social mobility. Lower scores indicate more social mobility.

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI

10. Social Integration

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the commune is a cohesive community

Calculation: Social Integration = $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} (\frac{fi}{N})^2 \times e$

where: N = the total population
fi = the population for each nationality
e = percent of the population who are Yugoslavs

Eight nationalities were used: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim/Turkish Albanian, other

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A high score indicates more social integration

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI

11. Potential Social Conflict

Purpose: To measure the degree to which basic social groups in society are unequal

Calculation: $$\frac{\frac{a}{b} - \frac{b}{d}}{\frac{b}{d}} \times e$$

where: a = industrial income
b = agricultural income
c = industrial employment
d = agricultural employment
e = percent of the work force engaged in industrial employment

Interpretation: Mathematically, scores may range from the positive to the negative. Practically speaking, however, scores will all be in the positive range. A higher score indicates more potential social conflict.

Location: Chapters III, V, and VI.

12. Decentralization

Purpose: To measure the degree to which communal government has been broken down into smaller territorial units

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total population of the commune, 1971
b = total number of mesna zajednica, 1972

Interpretation: A lower score indicates more decentralization

Location: Chapters V and VI

13. Political Participation

Purpose: To develop an integral measure of the degree of political participation of citizens in communal affairs

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total number of questions introduced at zbor biraca, 1972
b = total number of mesna zajednica, 1972

Interpretation: A lower score indicates more participation

Location: Chapters V and VI

14. Bureaucratization

Purpose: To develop an intergral measure of the degree of formalized bureaucratized formalization of functions in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total administrative expenditures in the commune, 1972
b = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: A higher score indicates more bureaucratization

Location: Chapters V and VI

15. Professionalization

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the communal decision-makers come from the more highly trained elements of society

Calculation: $\frac{(a + b + c)}{d}$

where: a = total number of managers and directors in the communal assembly
b = total number of professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers) in the communal assembly
c = total number of full time socio-political organization employees in the communal assembly
d = total size of the communal assembly

Interpretation: A higher score indicates more professionalism in the communal assembly. Scores range from 0.00 to 1.0

Location: Chapters V and VI

16. Elite Accessibility

Purpose: To measure the dimension on the Kornhauser typology which indicates the degree to which elite recruitment is open

Calculation: $\frac{a}{c} \times \frac{b}{d}$

where: a = bureaucratism
b = professionalism
c = standard deviation of bureaucratism
d = standard deviation of professionalism

Interpretation: A higher score indicates less elite accessibility

Location: Chapters V and VI

17. Mass Availability

Purpose: To measure the second dimension of the Kornhauser typology: the availability of participation in the political process of the masses

Calculation: $\frac{a}{c} \times \frac{b}{d}$

where: a = participation
b = bureaucratism
c = standard deviation of participation
d = standard deviation of bureaucratism

Interpretation: A higher score indicates less mass availability

Location: Chapters V and VI

18. Self-Management Index

Purpose: To develop an integral measure of the extent to which general self-management processes are followed by the commune

Calculation: a X b

where: a = elite accessibility
b = mass availability

Interpretation: A low score equals more self-management

Location: Chapters V and VI

19. Level of Economic Development

Purpose: To develop a single measure to separate communes by level of development

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = agricultural employment in the commune, 1972
b = total employment in the commune, 1972

Interpretation: Scores range from 0 to 1.0. Scores less than .10 are categorized as highly developed; scores between .10 and .20 are categorized as mid level of development; and scores greater than .20 are categorized as low development.

Location: Chapters V and VI

20. Republic

Purpose: To provide a general measure of political structure

Calculation: None

Interpretation: Scores vary between 0 and 1. A score of one indicates that a commune is a member of that particular republic. Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro are the republics included. Serbia is not.

Location: Chapters V and VI

21. Legislative Innovation Strength

Purpose: To measure the degree of progressive attitudes within the communal assembly

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total number of women in the communal assembly, 1971
b = total size of the communal assembly

Interpretation: Scores vary from 0.00 to 1.00. A higher score indicates stronger legislative innovation

Location: Chapter VI

22. Educational Innovation Existence

Purpose: To measure whether or not a commune has adopted a major educational policy innovation

Calculation: a

where: a = existence of school board

Interpretation: Scores are 0 or 1. 1 indicates the existence of educational innovation

Location: Chapter 6

23. Educational Innovation Political Strength

Purpose: To measure the extent to which educational innovation has had a political effect

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = school board members from work organization, 1972
b = total size of the school board, 1972

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A higher score indicates an increase in this measure

Location: Chapter VI

24. Educational Innovation Economic Strength

Purpose: To measure the extent to which educational innovation has had an economic effect

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = school board income from economic organizations, 1972
b = total school board income, 1972

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A higher score indicates more of this innovation measure

Location: Chapter VI

25. Cultural Innovation Existence

Purpose: To determine whether cultural innovation has been adopted by the commune

Calculation: a

where: a = existence of a popularly elected cultural board, 1972

Interpretation: Scores are 0 or 1. 1 indicates the presence of this innovation

Location: Chapter VI

26. Cultural Innovation Political Strength

Purpose: To measure the extent to which cultural innovation has had a political effect

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total members of the cultural board who work in economic enterprises, 1972
b = total membership of the cultural board, 1972

Interpretation: A higher score indicates stronger cultural political innovation. Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00

Location: Chapter VI

27. Administrative Democratization Innovation Change

Purpose: To measure the rate of change in the adoption of the administrative democratization innovation

Calculation: $\frac{(a - b)}{b}$

where: a = number of savet questions per mesna zajednica, 1972
b = number of savet questions per mesna zajednica, 1971

Interpretation: Scores may be positive or negative. Higher scores indicate a faster positive rate of change in administrative democratization

Location: Chapter VI

28. Administrative Democratization Innovation Strength

Purpose: To measure the strength of the effect of democratization of administrative decentralization

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total population of the commune, 1971
b = total number of questions discussed in mesna zajednica, 1972

Interpretation: A higher number indicates a weaker measure of administrative democratization

Location: Chapter VI

29. Participative Democratization Innovation Change

Purpose: To measure the rate of change in the adoption of innovations which democratize the participation process

Calculation: $\frac{(a - b)}{b}$

where: a = per capita zbor biraca questions, 1972
b = per capita zbor biraca questions, 1971

Interpretation: Higher scores indicate a more rapid rate of change

Location: Chapter VI

30. Participative Democratization Innovation Strength

Purpose: To measure the effect of measures of democratization on the participatory process

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total population of the commune, 1971
b = zbor biraca questions introduced in the commune, 1972

Interpretation: A higher number indicates a weaker form of participative democratization

Location: Chapter VI

31. Budgetary Expenditures on Health

Purpose: To measure the degree of official communal commitment to improved health care

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total expenditures of the communal budget on health care, 1972
b = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: A higher score indicates greater official commitment to health

Location: Chapter VI

32. Total Expenditures on Health

Purpose: To measure the degree of actual involvement with health care in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total funds expended on health care in the commune, 1972
b = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: A higher score indicates a greater commitment to better health care

Location: Chapter VI

33. Patient/Doctor Ratio

Purpose: To measure the degree of accessibility of health care in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total population of the commune, 1971
b = total medical doctors in the commune, 1972

Interpretation: A higher score indicates poorer accessibility of health care in the commune

Location: Chapter VI

34. Budgetary Expenditures on Education

Purpose: To measure the degree of official communal commitment to improved education

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total expenditures of the communal budget on education, 1972
b = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: A higher score indicates greater official commitment to education

Location: Chapter VI

35. Total Expenditures on Education

Purpose: To measure the degree of actual involvement with education in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total funds expended on education in the commune, 1972
b = total population of the commune, 1971

Interpretation: A higher score indicates a greater commitment to better education

Location: Chapter VI

36. Student/Teacher Ratio

Purpose: To measure the degree of accessibility of education in the commune

Calculation: $\frac{a}{b}$

where: a = total number of students in the commune, 1972
b = total number of teachers in the commune, 1972

Interpretation: A higher score indicates poorer accessibility of education in the commune

Location: Chapter VI

37. Index of Industrial Advantage

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the communal tax code favors industrial elements in the commune over agricultural interests

Calculation: $$\frac{\left(\frac{a}{b} - \frac{c}{d}\right)}{\frac{a}{b}}$$

where:
- a = percent national income of the commune derived from industrial sources, 1972
- b = percent communal personal income taxes from industrial sources, 1972
- c = percent national income of the commune derived from agricultural sources, 1972
- d = percent communal personal income taxes derived from agricultural sources, 1972

Interpretation: A high positive score on the index reflects industrial tax favoritism. A zero score indicates equality. A negative score indicates agricultural favoritism

Location: Chapter VI

38. Regressive Tax Index

Purpose: To measure the degree to which the commune bases its fiscal policy on a progressive income tax

Calculation: $$\frac{(a + b + c + d)}{e}$$

where:
- a = total communal sales tax revenues, 1972
- b = total communal license fee revenues, 1972
- c = total communal transference tax revenues, 1972
- d = other communal non-income tax revenues, 1972
- e = total communal tax revenues, 1972

Interpretation: Scores vary between 0 and 1. High scores indicate a low communal commitment to progressive taxation

Location: Chapter VI

39. <u>Fragmentation Tax Index</u>

Purpose: To measure the degree to which a commune maintains a balanced tax policy

Calculation: $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left(\frac{fi}{N}\right)^2$

where: N = total communal tax revenues, 1972
fi = the total communal revenues for each type of tax

Interpretation: Scores range from 0.00 to 1.00. A high score indicates a well balanced tax policy

Location: Chapter VI

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