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ABSTRACT

THE CONSTRUCT VALIDATION OF AN INSTRUMENT TO IDENTIFY
DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT OF
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN: A PILOT STUDY

BY

Sandra Jean Styer

This study was conducted to determine whether an
instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflict situ-
ations and accompanying probing questions related to typical
elementary classroom situations could be constructed which
would identify developmental stages of moral judgment in
accordance with Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment develope
ment.

The major question this study attempted to answer
was: Is it possible to construct an instrument composed
of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted
in the elementary classroom which has construct validity
consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment
development? In order to ascertain the construct validity
of the instrument, it was necessary to determine signifi—
cant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven year
old groups in the percent usage of each of the develop-

mental stages of moral judgment.

 

Sandra Jean Styer

Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment develop-
ment is sequential and that a child must progress through
each stage sequentially. This sequential progression,
further evidence of the developmental nature of moral judg-
ment, was investigated in this study. Was the attainment
of each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite
I to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental
stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the
simulated situations contained in the instrument for the
total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven
years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral
judgment responses are limited to one stage of development
in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

The instrument was developed to be used with
elementary school children. In this study, the interview
was conducted with forty-eight predominantly middle-class
children. There were sixteen subjects from each of age
groups seven, nine, and eleven years. Each individual
subject was presented ten hypothetical moral conflict
situations with accompanying probing questions. The
responses for each subject were copied verbatim by the
investigator who then qualitatively analyzed the responses.

On a situation-by-situation basis, the responses for

 

Sandra Jean Styer

individual subjects were assigned ratings according to the
stage(s) which was indicated by the response to one situ-
ation. The stages were-identified by reference to Kohlberg's
definitions of each developmental stage. From these ratings
for each subject, percent usage-scores were derived for each
situation and for the total instrument. The percent usage
scores were used to calculate weighted percent usage scores
which were summed to derive moral maturity scores.

The moral maturity scores for each of the indi-
vidual situations and for the total instrument were used
in analyses of variance to determine whether there were
significant differences in moral maturity related to age.
The differences among the three age groups were found to
be significant at the .05 level in the total instrument
and in eight of the ten individual situations.

The developmental sequence of moral judgment stages
was determined through an investigation of the correlation
between the use of two given stages by one individual. In
general, it was found that the correlations diminished as
the stages became more widely separated.

An analysis of the percent usage of each stage at
each age level revealed that there was a general tendency
for the use of stages 1 and 2 to decrease with age and for
stages 3 and 4 to increase with age, although this trend

was not perfectly consistent.

 

Sandra Jean Styer

The degree to which individual situations correlated
with the total instrument.ranged from -.08 to +.90 with nine
of the ten situations correlating significantly with the
total instrument at the .05 level.

It was found that 52% of the subjects-had a modal
percent usage of one stage of development in at least 45%
'of their responses. Thirty-five percent of the subjects
evidenced one stage of development in at least 50% of their
responses.

The individual responses which had been analyzed
in the qualitative analysis provided the basis for the
construction of the scoring manual.. The typical responses
of each of the four represented stages of moral judgment
development were summarized in the manual for each hypo—
thetical conflict situation. Directions were included
for the derivation of a weighted percent usage or moral
maturity score for the total instrument. The scoring manual

was designed to be used by elementary teachers.

 

THE CONSTRUCT VALIDATION OF AN INSTRUMENT TO IDENTIFY

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT OF

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CHILDREN: A PILOT STUDY

BY

Sandra Jean Styer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Elementary and Special Education

1974

 

Copyright by
SANDRA JEAN STYER

1973

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to my advisor,

Dr. Jean LePere for the valuable advice which she has
provided throughout this study.

The contributions of the members of my guidance
committee: Dr. Vera Borosage, Dr. Joe Byers, and Dr. Patricia
Cianciolo are sincerely appreciated.

I also wish to thank Mr. George Erickson, principal
of Stingel Elementary School, Mansfield, Ohio for his
cooperation in facilitating the data collection.

The assistance of Dr. Michael Compton of The Ohio
State University in the scoring of the data used in the
determination of the interrater reliability is most appreci-

ated.

ii

LIST OF
LIST OF

LIST OF

Chapter

I.

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES O O O O O O O O O O O O O
FIGURES O O O O O O O O O O O O
APPENDICES O O O O O O O O O O 0
THE PROBLEM O O O O O O O O O O 0
Statement of the Problem . . . . . .
Questions . . . . . . . . . .
Background of Theory . . . . . . . .
Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . .
Me thOd O O O O O O O O O O O 0
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . .
Definition of Terms . . . . . . . .
Educational Implications . . . . . .
Organization of the Remainder of the
Dissertation . . . . . . . . . .
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE . . . . . . .
The Cognitive—Developmental Approach . .

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to the
Study of Moral Judgment Development . .

Piaget's Theory of the Development of Moral
Judgment . . . . . . . . . . .

Critical Reactions to Piaget's Cognitive-
Developmental Approach to Moral Judgment

Research Related to Piaget's Theory of the
Development of Moral Judgment . .

J. M. Baldwin' 8 Theory of the Development of

Moral Judgment . . . .
Kohlberg' 8 Theory and Research in the

Development of Moral Judgment . . .
Studies Related to Kohlberg' 5 Theory and

Research . . . . . . . .
Moral Education in the Elementary Curriculum
Summary . . . . . . . .

iii

Page

vii

viii

21
22
26
29
32
36
46
47
53

57
69

Chapter

III. METHOD . . . . . . .

Population and Sample .
Design and Procedure . .
Instrumentation . . .

Scoring Manual Construction
Interview Procedure . .
Questions . .

Qualitative Analysis of the Data
e Data

Quantitative Analysis of th
Summary . . . . . .

IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA . . . .

Questions . . . . .
Construct Validity . .
Inter—Story Consistency .
Modal Percentages of Stage

Usa

ge

Relationship of Sex and Stage Usage .

Discussion of Findings .
Summary . . . . . .

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . .
Summary . . . . . .
Conclusions . . . . .
Educational Implications
Recommendations . . .

APPENDIX 0 0 O I O O O O O

BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O 0

iv

Page

93
94

101
102
104'
105
113

115
115
118
119
122
125

166

LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Coded Aspects of Developing Moral Judgment . . . 8
2. Summary of Characteristics of Six Moral Types . . 86
3. An Example of Scoring . . . . . . . . . . 89

4. Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Moral
Maturity Scores. . . . . . . . . . . . 97

5. Matrix of Intercorrelations between Four Stages of

Moral Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6. Inter-Story Consistency. . . . . . . . . . 102
7. Modal Percent Usages of One Stage . . . . . . 104

8. Differences in Moral Maturity Scores Related to
Sex. . . . . 105

‘EW‘. ~.-. “1w.—

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Percent Usage of Four Stages of Moral Judgment
at Three Age Levels . . . . . . . . . lOO

vi

Appendix
A. Letter to Parents . . . . . .
B. Selected Situation from Kohlberg's Interview
Schedule . . . . . . . .
C. Hypothetical Conflict Situations .
D. Scoring Manual . . . . . . .
E. Sample Protocol.

LIST OF APPENDICES

vii

Page

125

127
130
144

163

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

As an objective of the elementary school curriculum
in the United States, moral education has received varying
degrees of emphasis throughout the past century. There has
been a lack of consensus among people in our society as to
what institution is responsible for promoting specific moral
and social values in children. Some variation in amount of
emphasis has been a reflection of rapidly changing moral
and social values; while other variation has been attri—
butable to problems arising from differential conceptions
of moral education. Conceptions of moral education have
ranged from the authoritative inculcating of arbitrarily
chosen rules and regulations to the critical examination
of social problems.

Dewey emphasized the need for schools to provide
an approach to moral education through opportunities for
social living. He listed the three resources of the
school for moral education as:

l. 'the life of the school as a social institution
in itself

2. methods of learning and of doing work
3. the school studies or curriculuml

 

1John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1909), p. 44.
l

 

Dewey elaborated upon these three aspects as
follows:

In so far as the school represents, in its own spirit,
a genuine community life; in so far as what are called
school discipline, government, order etc., are the
expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far
as the methods used-are those that appeal to the
active and constructive powers, permitting the child
to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curri-
culum is so selected and organized as to provide the
material for affording the child a consciousness of
the world in which he has to play a part, and the
demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met,
the school is organized on an ethical basis.2

Dewey's concern with the development of individuals
who could participate effectively in a democracy has con-
tinued to be shared by many educators. Citizenship edu-
cation as an objective of contemporary elementary social
studies curricula emphasizes character development. This
development

. . . is accomplished slowly and gradually over the
years through a program which places increasing
responsibility on children for their own actions in
the classroom. As they grow in maturity, they are
placed in situations where they may make decisions

and choices relative to their own and group welfare
and progress. The extent to which the right decisions
and choices are made will indicate a growing sense

of responsibility and consciousness of group welfare
on the part of individual children.3

Miel and Brogan's concern with the development of

democratic citizens has led them to emphasize that cooper—

ation is not necessarily democratic.

 

21bid., p. 44.

3John Jarolimek and Huber M. Walsh, eds., Readings
for Social Studies (New York: The Macmillan Co., 19655,
p. 80.

 

For a person to be cooperative in such a way that he
submerges his individuality for the 'good of the
group' is not democratic even though the individual
sacrifices his difference willingly. Cooperation is
democratic only if it nurtures individuality for the
mutual benefit of the person and his society. Demo-
cratic cooperation implies that the individual is
integrating his desire to be with others, to fit into
the group and thus to belong, with his desire to be
himself, to be unique, to have self-respect, to be
competent, to achieve.

In continuing, they suggested the school's role:
The school, then, has the task of helping children
learn the skills and experience the satisfaction of
cooperating with a high degree of good feeling,
maintenance of individual integrity, and the use of
intelligence to create results beyond the capacity
of any one individual. At the same time, the school
must help children learn to deal with competition
realistically.5
In learning to cope effectively with both cooperation
and competition, children must receive some guidance in
their decision making. This requires classroom teachers
who are sensitive to the behavior and judgment of children.
If the teacher is to guide the child, the stage of develop-
ment at which the child presently functions must be recog-
nized. It is assumed that "cooperation" and "competition"
require moral judgments on the part of the individual.
Thus, knowing the developmental stage of children's moral

judgments will provide the basis for planning guided

instructional experiences to enhance this judgment.

 

4Alice Miel and Peggy Brogan, More Than Social
Studies, A View of Social Learning in the Elementary School
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1957),
p. 20.

 

 

51bid., p. 21.

Kohlberg has constructed an instrument which
identified developmental stages of moral judgment through
the analysis of responses to an interview composed of ten
hypothetical moral conflict situations, each followed by
probing questions designed to analyze and sometimes chale
lenge the child's choice of alternative responses to the
conflict situation. Kohlberg's instrument was originally
developed to collect data from subjects aged ten to sixteen
years. His hypothetical moral conflict situations were
designed to be intellectually challenging to educated
adults. It was assumed that these complex and unfamiliar
situations and questions would be more intriguing to the
subjects than would the presentation of familiar conflict
situations. It was expected that they would facilitate

the qualitative analysis of each case.6

Statement of the Problem

 

The purpose of this study was to construct (and
determine the construct validity consistent with Kohlberg's
theory) an instrument designed to identify, through re—
sponses to simulated elementary classroom situations, the
developmental stages of moral judgment (as defined by

Kohlberg)7 of children aged seven to eleven years.

 

6Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of
Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958), p. 76.

7Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization,"

 

Questions

 

The major question which this study attempted to
answer was:

1. Is it possible to construct an instrument
composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically
confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct
validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral
judgment development?

Related questions which this study attempted to
answer were:

1. What is the inter-story consistency of the
simulated situations contained in the instrument for the
total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven
years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral
judgment responses are limited to one stage of develop-

ment in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

Background of Theory

 

Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral
judgment was consistent with his cognitive-developmental
approach to socialization. As one component of sociali-
zation, moral judgment development was found to be charac-
terized by changes in cognitive-structural form which were

universal and related to age. Kohlberg was able to identify

 

Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by
David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969),
p. 376.

six developmental stages of moral judgment which met the
criteria of cognitive stages proposed by Piaget.8
The stages were defined on the basis of ten,
thirteen, and sixteen year old children's responses to
ten hypothetical moral dilemmas which required the child
to choose between two culturally acceptable or two cultur—
ally unacceptable alternative solutions to each dilemma.
Dependent upon their choice of alternative, each subject
was presented questions probing the reasoning underlying
his choices. The moral judgments were classified into
levels and stages of development which were found to form
an invariant sequence. These levels and stages were ex—
plicitly defined by Kohlberg:
Level 1
Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical
happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi—physical needs
‘rather than in persons and standards.
Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation.
Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige,
or a trouble—avoiding set. Objective responsi-
bility.
Stage 2. Naively egoistic orientation. Right
action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's
needs and occasionally other's. Awareness of
relativism of value to each actor's needs and
perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation
to exchange and reciprocity.
Level II
Moral value resides in performing good or right roles,

in maintaining the conventional order and the expectan-
cies of others.

 

81bid., p. 375.

Stage 3. Good-boy orientation. Orientation to
approval and to pleasing and helping others.
Conformity to stereotypical images of majority
or natural role behavior, and judgment of
intentions.

Stage 4. Authority and social—order-maintaining

orientation. Orientation to 'doing duty' and to

showing respect for authority and maintaining the
the given social order for its own sake. Regard

for earned expectations of others.

Level III
Moral vaIue resides in conformity by the self to
shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties.

 

Stage 5. Contractual legalistic orientation.
"—_—_l‘ n a .
Recogn1t1on of an arb1trary element or starting
point in rules or expectations for the sake of
agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract,
general avoidance of violation of the will or
rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Stage 6. Conscience or principle orientation.
Or1entation not only to actually ordained social
rules but to principles of choice involving appeal
to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual
respect and trust.9

Kohlberg identified twenty-five aspects of moral
judgment (see Table 1) each of which was defined specifi—
cally in terms of the above stages. Kohlberg explained:

These aspects represent basic moral concepts believed
to be present in any society. . . . Each of these
concepts is differently defined and used at each of
the six stages.1

. . . At each stage, the same basic moral concept or
aspect is defined, but at each higher stage this
definition is more differentiated, more integrated
and more general or universal.l

 

91bid., p. 376.

lOIbid., p. 376.

11Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philoso-
pher," Psychology Today, II (September, l968), p. 30.

 

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10

In addition to this logical consistency, these
stages had empirical consistency both across aspects and
verbal situations. There were three indications of
empirical consistency.

. . . First, by the fact that an average of 50 per
cent of a subject's moral judgments fit a single stage.
Second, such consistency is indicated by fairly high
correlations in moral levels from one story to another.
Third, it is indicated by the fact that these corre-
lations between situations are not specific, i.e.,
there is a general moral level factor.12

While Kohlberg demonstrated that moral judgment
development is an area of cognitive development, he sug-
gested that the rate and extent of development is partially
dependent upon role—taking experiences and general social

participation. Thus, Kohlberg's theory could provide the

impetus for modifications in elementary curriculum.

Assumptions

 

Basic to this study are the following assumptions:

1. Moral judgment is an area of structural develop—
ment. There are distinct changes in the form or structure
of the child's moral judgments related to age changes.

2. Kohlberg's definition of the six stages of
moral judgment development is a valid description of this

cognitive development.

3. Kohlberg's six stages of development of moral

judgment form an invariant sequence.

 

12Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 388.

 

ll

4. A child's developmental stage of moral judgment
may be identified through an analysis of his stated reason(s)
for taking a specific action related to a given incident
depicted in a hypothetical conflict situation.

5. The situations presented in the moral conflict
stories have no general influence upon the developmental
stage of the response which is elicited.

6. The alternatives chosen by the child in the
hypothetical conflict situations are not determined by
his knowledge of the "right" answers.

7. The child's moral behavior in the classroom
is a reflection of his developmental stage of moral judg-

ment.

Method

Subjects?

The study included forty—eight children aged seven,
nine, and eleven years from a school serving primarily
middle-class suburban and rural children. At each of
grade levels one, three, and five, sixteen children of
the appropriate age were selected randomly from those

with parental permission to participate in the study.

Procedure

 

The instrument was constructed according to
Kohlberg's prototypes for designing stories and accompany-

ing questions to elicit moral judgment.

 

12

The instrument consisted of hypothetical moral
dilemmas similar to those which the subject might con-
ceivably encounter in the elementary classroom. The
rationale for the use of hypothetical moral dilemmas to
elicit moral judgments has been given by Turiel.

By designing stories that do not have a culturally
correct answer it is possible to partially circum-
vent the normative problem and elicit moral reasoning
rather than moral knowledge or opinion. The reasoning
used in judging right and wrong in these situations
reflects a child's internally organized mode of
structuring the social and moral world.

The instrument was pretested to avoid the inclusion
of stories in which one alternative response was far more
frequently chosen.

The instrument was presented to the total sample.
A total of ten hypothetical conflict situations and
accompanying questions were orally presented to individual
subjects.

The subject's responses to the questions designed
to elicit the reason for the child's moral judgment
provided the data to be analyzed in terms of Kohlberg's
six developmental stages of moral judgment. All responses
were copied verbatim.

Initially, rapport was established through a

standard explanation to the subject relative to the

 

l3Elliot Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the
Child's Moral Thinking," Trends and Issues in Developmental
Psychology, ed. by Paul H. Mussen, Jonas Langer, and Martin
Covington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1969), p. 96.

 

 

13

interviewer's interest in learning more about children.
The need to copy responses in order to facilitate memory.
was explained to the subject. There was assurance of the
confidential nature of this material. Finally, the sub-
jects were requested to refrain from discussing the study

with other children.

Analysis of the Data

 

Each subject's responses to the proposed instrument
were analyzed and coded using Kohlberg's method. A score
was derived which identified each subject's developmental
stage of moral judgment on each story as well as on the
total instrument.

For each hypothetical moral conflict situation the
typical responses at each stage of moral judgment develop-
ment were summarized. These summaries composed the scoring
manual which provides a method of scoring future responses
to the instrument.

The data was analyzed to determine the individual
subject's consistency of responses. The percentage of
subjects indicating one stage of moral judgment develop—
ment in at least 50% of their responses was determined.

Another factor analyzed in relation to the proposed
instrument was the degree of intercorrelation among the
ten hypothetical conflict situations.

Since the major purpose of this study was to

determine the construct validity of the proposed instrument,

 

14

the scores were analyzed to determine whether the responses
formed a cognitive-developmental hierarchy of stages con-
forming to Kohlberg's three levels and six stages of moral

judgment develOpment.

Limitations

 

The subjects of this study were limited to indi-
viduals from one suburban, middle-class, traditionally
graded, elementary school.

The instrument, composed of one set of stories
presented to children of elementary grade levels one, three,
and five, may have been less intrinsically interesting than
one designed for a narrower age range.

Flavell suggested that a general limitation of
Piaget-type studies is that the subject's language may not
accurately reflect his thought structure, ". . . that what
the child says will lead you either to an overestimation

or an underestimation of his operant intellectual level."l4

Definition of Terms

 

The following terms are related to Kohlberg's theory
of moral judgment development and to the writer's instru—
ment.

Moral judgment.--The term "moral judgment," as

 

used in this study, refers to Kohlberg's definition which

he has clearly stated:

 

14John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of
Jean Piaget (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
Inc., 1963), p. 437.

 

 

 

 

15

l. Moral action is oriented to or preceded by a value
judgment.

2. Moral judgments are viewed by the judge as taking
priority over other value judgments.

3. Moral actions and judgments are associated with
judgments of the self as good or bad.

4. Moral judgments tend to be justified or based on
reasons which are not limited to consequences of
that particular act in that situation.

5. Moral judgments tend toward a high degree of
generality, universality, consistency and
inclusiveness.

6. Moral judgments tend to be considered as objective
by their makers, i.e., to be agreed to independently
of differences of personality and interest. 5

Aspects.--Twenty—five aspects of developing moral

l6

judgment have been identified by Kohlberg. Classification

of children's responses into the six stages ". . . was made
in terms of placement of each moral idea or judgment of the
child in a given stage with regard to one of twenty-five
aspects of morality."17 These twenty—five aspects are

listed in Table 1.

Classroom situations.--In this study, the term

 

"classroom situations” refers to the types of situations
depicted in the hypothetical moral conflict situations

in the writer's instrument.

 

15Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of
Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpub—
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958),
pp. 8—12.

l6Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education
and the Public Schools: A Developmental View," Religion
and Public Education, ed. by Theodore R. Sizer (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), pp. 170—173.

 

l7Ibid., p. 170.

 

l6

Construct validity.~-In this study, the term
"construct validity" refers to the degree to which the
subjects' responses to the interview situations reflect
developmental stages of moral judgment consistent with
Kohlberg's theory.

Hypothetical moral dilemma.--This term refers to
a moral conflict situation which ". . . poses a conflict
between two culturally unacceptable (or acceptable)

alternatives."18

Invariant developmental sequence.——This term refers
to the idea that the order of the developmental stages of
moral judgment is invariant. Kohlberg described this:

All movement is forward in sequence, and does not
skip steps. Children may move through these stages
at varying speeds, of course, and may be found half
in and half out of a particular stage. An individual
may stop at any given stage and at any age, but if he

continues to move, he must move in accord with these
steps.

Percent usage.--In this study, the term percent
usage refers to that quantity which indicates an individual
subject's relative use of a given developmental stage for
an individual hypothetical conflict situation or for the
total instrument. For example, a percent usage of 35 for
stage 2 for an individual subject for the total instrument

indicates that 35% of the responses (points assigned on

 

l8Turiel, "Developmental Processes in the Child's
Moral Thinking," p. 96.

19Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral," p. 28.

 

 

 

17

the basis of the qualitative analysis) of the individual
subject for the total instrument were identified as stage
2 responses.

Moral education.--For this study, Kohlberg's

 

comprehensive definition of "moral education" will be
used. It is the ". . . transmission of the values of
justice on which our society is founded."20

Moral principle.--The term "moral principle" was

 

defined by Kohlberg in his early researCh. He stated:
Essentially, a moral principle is a rule of choice
and a principled choice is one which fulfills the
criteria of regularity, universality and ideality.

Stages.—-Furth defined the term "stages" in

reference to Piaget's research. However, the definition

is equally applicable to Kohlberg's research. It is:
Successive developmental periods, each one charac-
terized by a relatively stable general structure that
incorporates developmentally earlier structures in a

higher synthesis.22

Structure.——Furth has also provided a concise

 

definition of the term "structure" as:

The general form, the interrelatedness of parts within
an organized totality. Structure can often be used

 

20Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A
Modern Statement of the Platonic View," Moral Education,
ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 68.

21Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes," p. 286.

22Hans G. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge, Theoretical
Foundations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice—Hall,
Inc., 1969), p. 265.

 

 

 

l8

interchangeably with organization, system, form,
coordination.23

Educational Implications

 

The establishment of the construct validity of an
instrument to identify developmental stages of moral judge-
ment through responses to simulated classroom situations
would provide an instrument possibly more relevant to
elementary school children's interests and problems.
Teachers may perceive the instrument as more relevant to
measuring citizenship and related social studies objectives.

To the extent that this instrument identified
children at relatively immature stages of moral judgment,
it would suggest a need for teachers to periodically
evaluate the developmental stage of the child's moral
judgment. Such a longitudinal approach would be accompanied
by instruction designed to stimulate higher levels of moral
judgment.

Dependent upon the teacher's philosophy, this
instruction would be direct or indirect. Scriven advocates
the former.

Our goal should be the straightforward develop-
ment of cognitive skills for handling value disputes--
not persuasion or indoctrination in the usual sense.
Moral reasoning and the moral behavior it indicates
should be taught and taught about, if for no other
reason than it is immoral to keep students ignorant

of the empirical and logical bases behind the morality
which is behind the law and the institutions which

 

23Ibid., p. 265.

 

l9

incorporate this country's virtues and permit its
vices. But in addition to this intellectual payoff
is the practical benefit to a society of possessing
members who are skilled in making value judgments.
Such a society becomes a moral community, offering
important benefits to all of its members.

The recent trend toward including psychology,
sociology, social psychology, and anthropology in elementary
social studies programs indicates the increased valuation
of the development of human relations skills through direct
instruction. This instrument would be a possible evalua-

tive measure of the effectiveness of new programs.

As an example, Lippett's Social Science Laboratory

 

Unit§,25 use inquiry techniques to help children understand
human behavior in a scientific manner. An examination of
the objectives for this program suggests that the attain~
ment of selected objectives would be related to children's
developmental stages of moral judgment.

Organization of the Remainder
of the Dissertation

 

 

The related literature will be reviewed in Chapter
II. In Chapter III, the method of the study will be pre-
sented. The results of the study will be given in Chapter

IV. Conclusions and recommendations for further study will

 

24Michael Scriven, "Values in the Curriculum,"
Readings for Social Studies in Elementary Education, ed. by
John Jarolimek and Huber M. Walsh (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1969); P. 83.

25Ronald Lippett, et al., The Teacher's Role in
Social Science Investigation (Chicago: Science Research
Associates, Inc., 1969), pp. 144-146.

 

 

20

comprise Chapter V. The instrument and scoring manual will
be included in the appendices.

In the chapter which follows, that literature will
be reviewed which is related to the major cognitive-

developmental theories of moral judgment.

 

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The review of the literature will be limited to
a survey of the major studies related to the cognitive-
developmental approach to the study of the development of
moral judgment. The reader who is interested in the two
other major theories of the development of moral judgment,
the associationistic and psychoanalytic theories, may refer

l and Hoffman.2

to the comprehensive selections by Kohlberg
Initially, there will be a description of the
cognitive-developmental approach. This will provide a
background for the comprehension of the cognitive—
developmental approach to the study of moral judgment
development. The rationale for the cognitive-developmental
approach in moral judgment research will be presented.

There will be a summary of the research of Piaget, whose

findings were an impetus for much of the recent research

 

lLawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identi-
fication," Child Psychology, The Sixty-second Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I
(Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press,
1963).

 

2Martin L. Hoffman, "Moral Development,"
Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology, ed. by Paul H.
Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970).

 

21

 

22

in moral judgment. Some of the studies related to selected
attributes of Piaget's theory will be reviewed. Critiques
of Piaget's theory and research by Kohlberg and others will
be examined. Kohlberg's theory and research related to the
development of moral judgment will be presented in some
detail and studies related to his theory will be reviewed.
Finally, there will be a discussion of several related
conceptions of moral education in the public school curri-

culum held by Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg.

The Cognitive—Developmental Approach

 

The cognitive-developmental approach to research
in general cognitive development will be examined inasmuch
as it is basic to the more specific cognitive-developmental
approach to research in the development of moral judgment.

Fundamental to the comprehension of the cognitive—
develOpmental approach is a recognition of the assumptions
upon which cognitive—developmental theory is based.
Kohlberg has listed those assumptions for the cognitive-
developmental approach in general as well as those for
the cognitive—developmental approach to social-emotional
development of which moral judgment development is a
component.

Some assumptions of cognitive-developmental
theory in general are:

1. Basic development involves basic transformations
of cognitive structure which must be explained

 

 

 

—"El——r_‘=n;::-_m mmsqa- «r v — - _. a

23

by parameters of organizational wholes or systems
of internal relations.

Development of cognitive structure is the result
of processes of interaction between the structure
of the organism and the structure of the
environment, . . .

Cognitive structures are always structures (schemata)
of action. While cognitive activities move the
sensorimotor to the symbolic to verbal-propositional
modes, the organization of these modes is always

an organization of actions upon objects.

The direction of development of cognitive structure
is toward greater equilibrium in this organism-
environment interaction, i.e., of greater balance
or reciprocity between the action of the organism
upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the
action of the (perceived) object upon the organism.
This balance in interaction, rather than a static
correspondence of a concept to an object, represents
'truth,‘ 'logic,‘ 'knowledge,‘ or 'adaptation' in
their general forms. This balance is reflected in
the underlying stability (conservation) of a
cognitive act under apparent transformation, with
development representing a widened system of
transformations maintaining such conservation.

The following related assumptions are specific to

social-emotional development:

1.

Affective development and functioning, and cognitive
development and functioning are not distinct realms.
'Affective' and 'cognitive' development are parallel;
they represent different perspectives and contexts
in defining structural change. '

There is a fundamental unity of personality
organization and development termed the ego, or

the self. While there are various strands of social
development (psychosexual development, moral
development, etc.), these strands are united by
their common reference to a single concept of self
in a single social world. Social development is,

in essence, the restructuring of the (l) concept

of self, (2) in its relationship to concepts of

 

3Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 348.

 

24

other people, (3) conceived as being in a common
social world with social standards. In addition
to the unity of level of social development due to
general cognitive development (the g factor in
mental maturity tests), there is a further unity
of development due to a common factor of ego
maturity.

3. All the basic processes involved in 'physical'
cognitions, and in stimulating developmental
changes in these cognitions, are also basic to
social development. In addition, however, social
cognition always involves role-taking, i.e.,
awareness that the other is in some way like the
self, and that the other knows or is responsive to
the self in a system of complementary expectations.
Accordingly developmental changes in the social
self reflect parallel changes in conceptions of
the social world.

4. The direction of social or ego development is also
toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between the
self's actions and those of others toward the self.
In its generalized form this equilibrium is the
end point or definer of morality, conceived as
principles of justice, i.e., or reciprocity or
equality.

An additional assumption of cognitive-developmental
theory is that ". . . basic mental structure is the result
of an interaction between certain organismic structuring
tendencies and the structure of the outside world, rather
than reflecting either one directly." As described by
Kohlberg:

This interaction leads to cognitive stages which
represent the transformations of simple early cognitive
structures as these are applied to (or assimilate)

the external world, and as they are accommodated to

or restructured by the external world in the course
of being applied to it.5

 

4Ibid., p. 349.

51bid., p. 352.

 

WWW,’&1’§.¢_Lgk—-ru" .

25

These cognitive stages as characterized by Piaget

were reviewed by Kohlberg:

1.

Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences
in children's modes of thinking or of solving the
same problem at different ages.

These different modes of thought form an invariant
sequence, order, or succession in individual
development. While cultural factors may speed

up, slow down, or stop development, they do not
change its sequence.

Each of these different and sequential modes of
thought forms a 'structured whole.‘ A given
stage-response on a task does not just represent
a specific response determined by knowledge and
familiarity with that task or tasks similar to
it. Rather it represents an underlying thought-
organization, . . .

Cognitive stages are heirarchical integrations.
Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated
and integrated structures to fulfill a common
function. The general adaptational functions of
cognitive structures are always the same (for
Piaget the maintenance of an equilibrium between
the organism and the environment, defined as a
balance of assimilation and accommodation).
Accordingly higher stages displace (or rather
reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages.6

This interactional conception of stages assumes

that the specific formation of stages is dependent upon

experience and that passage through the stage may be

accelerated by more frequent or more intensely stimulating

experiences.

 

6
Ibid., pp. 352—353.

 

26

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to the
Study of Moral Judgment Development

 

 

The validity of the cognitive-developmental approach
to the study of moral judgment development is supported by
the findings of the early and monumental research in moral
development conducted by Hartshorne and May. Although the
purpose of this research was to determine the degree of
consistency in an individual's moral behavior and corre-
lates of moral behavior rather than to identify cognitive
stages in moral judgment development, the implications of
the findings are pertinent to the cognitive-developmental
approach.

The Hartshorne and May studies in deceit evaluated
three types of deceptive conduct (cheating, lying, and
stealing) in specific situations. The results of these
studies demonstrated that deceit is not a unitary charac-
ter trait, but rather a function of specific situations.
These concomitants of deceit in the order of their impor-
tance were: (1) classroom association, (2) general personal
handicaps, such as relatively low IQ, poor resistance to
suggestion, and emotional instability, (3) cultural and
social limitations in the home background, and (4) such
other miscellaneous facts as are loosely correlated with

deception.7

 

7Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in
Deceit (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), p. 412.

 

27

Similarly, the Hartshorne and May studies in self-
control as measured by two series of tests (five persistence
and four inhibition tests) found conduct to be determined by
the nature of the specific situation. Relatively low
correlations were found among their measures of honesty,
service, and self-control.8

Piaget related his theory of moral judgment develop—
ment to his theory of general cognitive development. He
explained:

Everyone is aware of the kinship between logical and
ethical norms. Logic is the morality of thought just
as morality is the logic of action. Nearly all con-
temporary theories agree in recognizing the existence
of this parallelism--from the a priori View which
regards pure reason as the arbiter both of theoretical
reflection and daily practice, to the sociological
theories of knowledge and of ethical values. It is
therefore in no way surprising that the analysis of
child thought should bring to the fore certain
particular aspects of this general phenomenon.9

This parallelism was reflected in Piaget's concept
of egocentrism. Piaget wrote:

Just as the ideas which enter his mind appear from

the first in the form of beliefs and not of hypotheses
requiring verification, so do the feelings that arise
in the child's comsciousness appear to him from the
first as having value and not as having to be sub-
mitted to some ulterior evaluation. It is only through
contact with the judgments and evaluations of others
that this intellectual and affective anomie will.

 

8Hugh Hartshorne and Mark A. May, Studies in
Service and Self—Control (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1929), p. 445.

 

 

9Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child
(Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1948), p. 398.

 

 

28

gradually yield to the pressure of collective logical
and moral laws.

Piaget applied his theories of cognitive structure

and stages to moral judgment development. Kohlberg asserted

that this structural component of moral judgment development

is related to the development of motives and affects inasmuch

as these are primarily mediated by changes in thought

patterns. This implies that:

1.

There should be an empirical correlation between
moral judgment maturity and non-moral aspects
of cognitive development.

Moral judgment stages or sequences are to be
described in cognitive-structural terms even
in regard to 'affective' aspects of moral
judgment, like guilt, empathy, etc.

There should be an empirical correlation between
maturity on 'affective' and cognitive aspects of
morality, even if affective maturity is assessed
by projective test or interview methods not
explicitly focused on moral judgment.

They way in which moral judgment influences action
should also be characterizable in cognitive—
structural terms.

The socioenvironmental influences favorable to
moral judgment development should be influences
characterizable in cognitive—structural terms, 11
for example, in terms of role—taking opportunities.

The major proponent of this cognitive—developmental

approach to research in moral judgment development has been

Jean Piaget.

 

lOIbid., p. 401.

llKohlberg, "Stage and Sequence,‘ pp. 390-391.

 

29
Piaget's Theory of the Development
of Moral Judgment
Piaget proposed his developmental theory of moral

judgment in his classic volume, The Moral Judgment of the

 

Child. He investigated Swiss children's respect for rules
and their sense of justice through the presentation of
hypothetical situations followed by questions to which
subjects responded by choosing from predetermined alter—
natives designed to relfect stages of moral judgment.

An analysis of the responses related to children's
respect for rules found that:

. . . these answers present us with two distinct
moral attitudes—~one, that judges actions according
to their material consequences, and one that only
takes intentions into account. These two attitudes
may co-exist at the same age and even in the same
child, but broadly speaking, they do not synchronize.
Objective responsibility diminishes on the average

as the child grows older, and subjective responsi-
bility gains correlatively in importance. We have
therefore two processes partially overlapping, but of
which the second gradually succeeds in dominating the
first.

Objective responsibility as an aspect of moral
realism is one of several observable aspects of young
children's concepts of rules identified by Piaget. Kohlberg
listed these:

1. Objective responsibility (as opposed to inten—
tionalism). Objective responsibility is seen by

Piaget as a kind of literalistic evaluation of

an act in terms of its exact conformity to the

rule rather than in terms of its intent. It is
indicated by a judgment of the act in terms of

 

12Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 133.

 

 

w -—-~ ~ --*-'-'"‘-“;""""“"7"" i" '“ ’ ' 3‘

30

physical consequences rather than in terms of
intentions.

2. Unchangeability of the rules (as opposed to
flexibility). This is interpreted as fixity of
rules regardless of changed requirements of the
situation to which the rule is to be applied.

3. Absolutism of value (as opposed to relativism).
According to Piaget, the judgment of an act as
either right or wrong is believed by the child to
be shared by everyone, since only one perspective
is taken toward the act. In cases of clear con-
flict in judgments of the same act, the adult's
View is believed always to be right.

4. Moral wrongness defined by sanctions (as opposed
to moral judgments made independently of sanctions).
According to Piaget, the young child's definition
of an act as wrong is based on the fact that the
child is punished.

5. Duty defined as obedience to authority (as opposed
to duty being defined in terms of conformity
expectations of peers or equals). 'Any act
showing obedience to a rule or even to an adult
is right.‘13

Piaget identified three stages in the development
of children's sense of justice. They were:

One period, lasting up to the age of 7-8, during
which justice is subordinated to adult authority;
a period contained approximately between 8-11, and
which is that of progressive equalitarianism; and
finally a period which sets in towards 11—12, and
during which purely equalitarian justice is tempered
by considerations of equity.

The first stage of the sense of justice has the

five attributes of the first stage of the respect for rules

with the following additional characteristics:

 

13
p. 314.

Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification,"

l4Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 315.

 

‘ '5‘“. ~’1mea.m-..du l...” _ ._, I, l

31

6. Ignoral of reciprocity in defining obligations
(as opposed to defining obligations in terms of
the rights of contract and exchange).

7. Expiative justice (as opposed to restitutive
justice). Belief in severe, painful punishment
rather than in restoration to the victim.

8. Immanent justice (as opposed to naturalistic
causality). Belief that deviance will lead
nature or physical things to injure the culprit.

9. Belief in collective responsibility (as opposed
to individual responsibility).

lO. Punishment by authority (rather than retaliative
reciprocity by victim).

11. Favoritism by authority in distributing goods
rather than impartiality, equality, distributive
justice).

These attributes of the heteronomous stage of
moral judgment development are fostered by adult constraint
which results in a "morality of constraint" described by
Flavell as:

. . . formed in the context of the unilateral relations
between child as inferior and adult as superior. The
child adapts to the prohibitions and sanctions handed
down from on high by reifying them into moral absolutes--
sample 'givens' which are unquestioned and sacred, in
theory if not in practice.

With development, this morality of constraint is
at least partially replaced by a 'morality of cooper-
ation,‘ formed out of the reciprocal relationships
among status peers and based on mutual, rather than
unilateral respect.

 

15Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification,"

p. 315.

16John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of
Jean Piaget (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
Inc., 1963), pp. 295-296.

 

 

 

 

 

32

Children pass from this morality of constraint as
a consequence of moral experiences related to reciprocal
relationships among peers, and relationships with adults.
Piaget explained:

. . . we may assume that it is the discovery of the
imperfection of adult justice. When, as is almost
bound to happen, a child is submitted to unjust
treatment by his parents or his teachers, he will
be less inclined to believe in a universal and
automatic justice.

This rationale as well as other Piagetian con-
cepts have elicited negative reactions from Piaget's
critics.

Critical Reactions to Piaget's Cognitive—

Developmental Approach to
Moral Judgment

 

 

Flavell has provided an evaluation specific to
Piaget's theory and research in moral judgment development
as well as valid general critiCisms which may be extended
to Piaget's study of moral judgment. Kohlberg has criti-
cally discussed those aspects of Piaget's theory and
research which influenced the development of his theory
and research.

Two common, but inappropriate, types of criticism
of Piaget were identified by Flavell. One type was related
to the fact that Piaget designed his research to investi-
gate only those developmental questions which intrigued

him, with little interest in antecedent—consequent factors

 

l7Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 262.

 

33

such as general intelligence, socioeconomic background,
etc. The second criticism was that Piaget failed to
pursue one specific interest in great breadth and depth.18
Flavell reviewed those characteristics of Piaget's
research and reporting which could be validly criticized.
One such characteristic was that Piaget seldom precisely
described his experiments.19
In regard to sampling procedure, Flavell contended
that age and ready availability were probably the only
factors determining Piaget's selection of subjects.20
While Flavell approved of Piaget's use of the
clinical method in interviewing children, he suggested
that a semistandardization of procedure would have improved
Piaget's research designs. Related to this was the problem
of Piaget's unspecified sample sizes and the uncontrolled
Variation within his samples.21
Another problem was related to Piaget's organi-
zation and analysis of data. He has presented numerous

verbatim protocols which effectively illustrate develop-

mental stages, however, he has failed to provide even

 

l8Flavell, Developmental Psychology, p. 430.

 

19Ibid., p. 430.

20Ibid., p. 431.

21Ibid., p. 431.

 

34

rudimentary quantitative information which might have
made his findings more convincing.22
Flavell maintained that ". . . the child's

linguistic comprehension and usage is not independent of
underlying intellectual structure and orientation." How-
ever, he advised that one cannot expect the child's language
usage to provide for an accurate assessment of his intel-
lectual structure. In Piaget—type studies, evaluation of
the child's verbalization may lead to either an overestimate

1.23

or an underestimate of his intellectual leve Further-

more, the developmental level of the child's response may
be dependent upon the child's comprehension of particular
concept-relevant words used by the experimenter.24
Kohlberg was influenced by, but highly critical
of, Piaget's theory and research. He contended that
several of Piaget's moral judgment dimensions are repre—
sentations of thought content rather than cognitive
structure. For example:
. . . the dimension of responsiveness to peer as
opposed to adult expectations. While Piaget hypo-
thesizes this dimension as part of his autonomous
stage, his rationale for deriving this from a con—
sideration of cognitive form is vague and uncon-'

vincing. There is nothing more cognitively mature
to preferring a peer than an adult.25

 

22Ibid., p. 432.
23Ibid., p. 437.
24Ibid., p. 436.

25Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 325.

35

Kohlberg's extensive empirical study and logical
analysis have suggested that Piaget's criteria for stage
development have not been met by Piaget's two stages of
moral judgment.26

Kohlberg referred to the results of Turiel's
research to demonstrate that while Piaget's concepts and
methods do not adequately measure cognitive structure,
the area of moral judgment is one of structural develop-
ment.27

Kohlberg contended that Piaget's stories ". . .
do not reveal awareness or unawareness of intentions in
moral judgment, but simply how much these are weighted
against consequences."28 He critically compared his
assessment method with that of Piaget. Kohlberg classified
open-ended responses into one of six stage categories.
Piaget asked his subjects to choose between two given
alternatives. Piaget's "right answer" might have reflected
social learning of the content rather than understanding

of the basic structure of the right answer.29

 

26Ibid., p. 375.

27Elliot Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the
Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral
Judgments" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
1965).

28

Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence,‘ p. 407.

291bid., p. 407.

 

36

Such weaknesses and limitations of Piaget's theory
and research have led to numerous critical reactions by
other researchers as evidenced by the quantity of Piaget-
related studies in moral judgment development, several of
which will be reviewed in the next section.

Research Related to Piaget's Theory of
the Development of Moral Judgment

 

 

Most of the major studies related to Piaget's
theory of moral judgment development have focused upon one
or more of the fundamental aspects of this theory, and
have tended to be of the antecedent-consequent type.

Piaget contended that objective responsibility was
an attribute of the heteronomous stage, characterized by
the child's judging behavior in terms of physical conse-
quences rather than intentions.

Boehm and Nass, who presented Piaget-type stories
to children aged six to twelve years and of average intel-
ligence, found that at nine years of age, the majority of
American children reflected subjective more than objective
responsibility in their moral judgments. Only half of
Piaget's nine year olds gave subjective answers. The time
span between these studies was suggested as an important
factor. The only significant result related to social
class was in the response to one situation in which the
upper-middle class boys were significantly more concerned

with the motivation behind the material damage than the

 

37

working-class boys who were more concerned with the actual
damage.3O

Whiteman and Kosier interviewed children aged
seven to twelve years using pairs of Piaget-type stories
in which the first story of each pair involved an undesira—
ble outcome despite good intentions, while the second story
involved an undesirable outcome (with lesser consequence
than that in the first story), but without good intentions.
Decisions based upon intent were scored as mature, while
decisions based upon consequences were scored as immature
responses. It was found that the ability to make mature
judgments is a function of advances in age and increases
in IQ at each age. Maturity of moral judgment was not
significantly related to personality characteristics as
rated by teachers, sex of subject, Sunday School attendance,
or membership in scouting organizations. Maturity of
moral judgment was found to be related to children's
attendance in ungraded classrooms.31

The young child's absolutism of perspective as
opposed to the more mature individual's relativism of

perspective was an aspect of Piaget's theory of moral

realism which has been the focus of some research.

 

 

30Leonore Boehm and Martin L. Nass, "Social Class
Differences in Conscience Development," Child Development,
XXXIII (1962), p. 571.

31

Paul H. Whiteman and Kenneth P. Kosier, "Develop—
ment of Children's Moralistic Judgments: Age, Sex, IQ, and
Certain Personal-Experiential Variables," Child Development,
xxxv (1964), p. 843.

 

 

38

Lerner studied perspective in the moral reasoning
of six to twelve year old boys of Geneva, Switzerland. He
studied three aspects of perspective, ". . . empathic
capacity, the ability to resist various prestige sug—
gestions, and the ability to resist various sociocentric
suggestions.32 Lerner found that until age eight or nine,
children's judgments were absolute. They judged the
exterior aspects of social behavior and assumed everyone
had the same opinion of others. After age eight or nine,
the child's judgments were more relativistic. His ability
to resist the prestige of majority opinion and seniority
was found to increase slightly with age. Even adults
retain some residue of moral heteronOmy.33

Absolutism of perspective in relation to members
of in-groups and out-groups decreased differentially with
increased age. The finding of a correlation among Lerner's
three aspects of perspective in some individual children
indicated the possibility of the existence of social
personality types in young children related to cultural
factors.34

MacRae tested two hypotheses related to the

research findings of both Piaget and Lerner. MacRae

 

2Eugene Lerner, "The Problem of Perspective in
Moral Reasoning," The American Journal of Sociology, XLIII
(September, 1937), p. 249.

33

 

Ibid., p. 260.

34Ibid., p. 249.

 
 

39

hypothesized that the questions of Piaget and Lerner
involved an underlying dimension of moral judgment other
than age and that this dimension was associated with the
type of authority relations experienced by the child.35

MacRae's study of the moral judgment of five to
fourteen year old boys indicated that the moral judgment
questions elicited three relatively independent clusters
rather than a single factor. These three clusters were
not found to be related to parental authority as measured
in this study.36

Piaget's distinction between his two moral judg-
ment stages in terms of the definition of duty, first as
obedience to authority and later as conformity to peer]
expectations, has been studied by Boehm. Boehm used
Piaget's clinical method with Piaget—type stories accompa-
nied by probing questions and found distinct differences
between the responses of Swiss and American children.
Compared to American children's responses, Swiss children
reflected less confidence in their peers and a longer
duration of the belief in the omniscience of adult
authorities. Boehm proposed that the American culture,
which promotes cooperation among children rather than

dependence upon adults, stimulates the more rapid

 

35Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Test of Piaget's Theories
of Moral Development," The Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, XLIX (1954), p. 14.

36

 

 

Ibid., p. 18.

40

development of social conscience as a result of pressure
to learn group social skills. The cultural differences
between an inner—directed and an other-directed society
may have accounted for the apparent differences in the
content of conscience. The American child's conscience
was oriented to social adjustment while the Swiss child's
conscience was oriented to character improvement.37

In a related study, Boehm investigated the effect
of mental and socioeconomic levels upon the development of
conscience and challenged Piaget's conclusion that the
child cannot reach the stage of mature moral judgment until
he is independent of adults and has achieved peer reci-
procity. Her subjects were six to nine years old, of
gifted and average intelligence from upper—middle—class
and working class socioeconomic levels. The interviews
related to peer reciprocity versus dependence on authority
elicited judgmental responses from the working-class child
at both intelligence levels which were of a higher level
than those of the upper-middle—class child. At both
socioeconomic levels the gifted children gave mature
responses at least one year earlier than the children

of average intelligence.38

 

37Leonore Boehm, "The Development of Independence:
A Comparative Study," Child Development, XXVIII (March,
1957), p. 92.

38Leonore Boehm, "The Development of Conscience:
A Comparison of American Children of Different Mental and
Socio-economic Levels," Child Development, XXXIII (1963),
p. 575.

 

 

 

41

A major attribute of Piaget's sense of justice in
the heteronomous stage was the young child's belief in
expiative justice (the preference for severe punishment
of the offender rather than restitution to the victim).

MacRae's investigation of the association of moral
judgment development with the type of authority relations
experienced by the child found that greater maturity of
moral judgment on MacRae's "punishment" index was signifi-
cantly related to the father's higher occupational status.39

Johnson found that higher IQ, increasing chrono-
logical age, and higher status parental occupation were
positively correlated with more mature moral judgment in
regard to the dimension of expiation vs. restitution.4O

Piaget's concept of immanent justice (the belief
that misbehavior will result in punishment by physical
calamities) has been the subject of some research.

Johnson found that age, IQ, and parent attitudes
were positively correlated with responses to immanent
justice items. He also found a high correlation between
responses to immanent justice items but a relatively low

correlation between responses to immanent justice items

and other attributes of moral judgment.41

 

39MacRae, "Piaget's Theories,‘ p. 18.

.4ORonald C. Johnson, "A Study of Children's Moral
Judgments," Child Development, XXXIII (1962), p. 352.

41

 

Ibid., p. 352.

 

42

Another body of research is a consequence of the
challenge to Piaget's thesis that the development of moral
judgment is primarily dependent upon age. Social learning
theorists have proposed that moral judgment development
may be accelerated by direct social learning instruction.

Bandura and McDonald attempted to demonstrate
". . . that children's moral orientations can be altered
and even reversed by the manipulation of response-
reinforcement contingencies and by the provision of

aPPrOPriate social models."42

Their subjects whose moral
judgment had been classified as either predominantly
objective or subjective were randomly assigned to one

of three experimental groups. In one group children were
positively reinforced for the adoption of the observed
adults model's evaluative responses which were contrary

to the group's orientation. The second group of children
were not reinforced for the imitation of the observed adult
model's evaluative responses. Children in the third group
were not exposed to models but were reinforced for moral
judgments that were counter to their dominant moral
orientation. It was found that subjectivity was positively
related to age but unrelated to sex differences. Objective

and subjective judgments occurred simultaneously rather

than as developmental stages. Subjective children exposed

 

42Albert Bandura and Frederick J. McDonald,
"Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of
Models in Shaping Children's Moral Judgments," Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVII (1963), p. 275.

 

 

43

to objective models, and those positively reinforced for
imitating models' objective moral judgments became more
objective in their moral judgments and retained this
orientation in their post—experimental behavior. Modifi-
cation of children's moral judgments was as effective with
exposure to models alone as with the combination of models
and social reinforcement. Operant conditioning alone
resulted in a slight but not statistically significant
increase in objective responses. Modeling combined with
reinforcement was more effective with girls, while boys
were more responsive to modeling without reinforcement.43
Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich, and Nathanson replicated
Bandura and McDonald's study with the addition of several

controls and extended analyses.44

The subjects, who were
five to twelve years old, were assigned to four groups on
the basis of pretest scores. These groups represented
tentative and definite high (subjective) and tentative

and definite low (objective) judgmental responses. The
low subjects were exposed to a model's low moral judgments.
The posttest consisted of six repeated items, six new
items, and six rather unusual items presented either

immediately or two weeks after the modeling phase.

Bandura and McDonald's results were replicated. Numerous

43Ibid., pp. 279-280.

44Philip A. Cowan, et al., "Social Learning and
Piaget's Cognitive Theory of Moral Development," Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, II (1969), p. 266.

 

 
 

44

variables were identified which influenced the modeling
effects. These variable included the subjects' pretest
scores, the particular measure, time between conditioning
and posttest, type of item, and direction of conditioning.45

The researchers suggested that Kohlberg's moral
judgment stages be used for future analyses replicating
the format of the Bandura and McDonald study to focus upon
stage changes.46 They concluded that social learning
theorists need to investigate developmental levels of
moral judgment as a possible variable related to the
influence of adult models on children's responses.47

Piaget's critics have generally failed to propose
more adequate and comprehensive theories with additional
or alternative aspects and stages of development of moral
judgment.

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of
moral judgment has been unique in its definition of
aspects and stages which are genuinely developmental.
A brief review of Kohlberg's criticisms of Piaget's theory
and research will provide a basis for understanding the
rationale of Kohlberg's approach.

Kohlberg has offered an explanation for the lack

of individual consistency to be found across Piaget's

 

4SIbid., p. 261.

46Ibid., p. 272.

47Ibid., p. 273.

 

   

45

items eliciting the judgments of the intentions versus the
consequences of acts.

Failure to find individual consistency beyond that
due to age suggests that development with regard to
such items merely reflects a process of moving from
ignorance to knowledge of cultural cliches, rather
than a process of moving from one level of thinking
to another.4

Piaget's interview items investigating intentions versus
consequences reflected typologically consistent orientations
but involved modes of thought more complex than those
inferred by Piaget's decision to score the items dichoto-
mously.49
Kohlberg contended that some of Piaget's moral
judgment dimensions were related to culture rather than
cognitive form. For example:
There is nothing more cognitively mature to preferring
a peer than an adult. It is not surprising to find,
then, that this dimension does not vary regularly with
chronological and mental age, that what age trends
exist are absent in some national groups (e.g., the
Swiss), and that in general this dimension is sensitive
to a wide variety of cultural and subcultural influences
which cannot be analyzed in rate of development terms.50
Piaget's method of interviewing required children
to choose between two prepackaged alternatives. Kohlberg
criticized this technique:
This facilitates children's social learning of the

content of the 'right answer' without necessarily
implying development of awareness of the structure

 

48Kohlberg, “The Development of Modes of Moral
Thinking," p. 186.

491bid., p. 186.

SOKohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 375.

 

46

underlying the right answer. Furthermore the Piaget
stories do not reveal awareness or unawareness of
intentions in moral judgment, but simply how much
these are weighted against consequences.

Kohlberg discussed the Cowan, Langer, Nathanson,
and Heavenrich replication of the Bandura and McDonald
research. Their finding of a reversability of moral
judgment responses has been explained by Kohlberg within
the framework of cognitive-developmental theory. Kohlberg
proposed:

. . . that morality is an area of structural develop-
ment but that Piaget's concepts and methods for
defining structure are not as adequate in the moral
field as are his concepts and methods in the area of
logical operations.52

Kohlberg, influenced by J. M. Baldwin's theory of
moral judgment development, has developed more adequate
concepts and methods for defining structure.

J. M. Baldwin's Theory of the Development
of Moral Judgment

 

 

J. M. Baldwin's theory influenced the development
of the theories of both Piaget and Kohlberg. Kohlberg
explained:

We accepted the more general characterizations
of Baldwin while rejecting some of Piaget's more
specific elaboration and causal explanations. Our
justification is based on identifying our first two
types with the first two theoretical types of Baldwin
and Piaget. We felt we found enough similarity to
Piaget's types to justify this equation, together

 

5llbid., p. 407.

52Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 407.

 

47
with enough differences to necessitate our reinter-
pretations.53
The similarity of Kohlberg's definitions of levels
and stages of development of moral judgment to Baldwin's
stages was apparent in Kohlberg's summary of Baldwin's
stages.54

Kohlberg's Theory and Research in the
Development of Moral Judgment

 

 

Kohlberg's theory and research was based upon the
cognitive-developmental approach to socialization which
stresses:

. . . that directed sequences of changes in behavior
organization or shape always have a strong cognitive
component. On the logical side, our approach claims
that social development is cognitively based because
any description of shape or pattern of a structure of
social responses necessarily entails some cognitive
dimensions. Description of the organization of the
child's social responses entails a description of the
way in which he perceives, or conceives, the social
world and the way in which he conceives himself.

Kohlberg continued:

On the empirical side the cognitive-developmental
approach derives from the fact that the most marked
and clear changes in the psychological development

of the child are cognitive, in the mental-age or IQ
sense. The influence of intelligence on children's
social attitudes and behavior is such that it has a
greater number of social-behavior correlates than any
other observed aspect of personality.56

 

53Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 346.

54Ibid., pp. 344—345.

55Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 372.

56Ibid., p. 373.

 
 
 
 

48

With this approach, Kohlberg has pursued the
following goals:

1. The empirical isolation of sequential stages in
the development of moral thought.

2. The study of the relation of the development of
moral thought to moral conduct and emotion.

3. The application of a stage analysis of moral
judgment to subcultural differences as well as
pathological deviance in moral orientations.

4. The isolation of the social forces and experiences
required for the sequential development of moral
orientations.57
The empirical isolation of sequential stages in

the development of moral judgment was the object of
Kohlberg's early research.58 The data for this developmental
analysis was provided by responses to interviews of boys

aged ten, thirteen, and sixteen from upper-middle and lower
to lower-middle-class suburban areas of Chicago. Half of
each age group had been classified as popular and half as
socially isolated on the basis of classroom sociometric
tests. IQ was evenly distributed among all groups.59 The
subjects were interviewed for approximately two hours.
Piaget's work inspired both the content and method of

Kohlberg's interview composed of ten hypothetical moral

dilemmas which were:

 

57Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's
Orientations Toward a Moral Order, I. Sequence in the Develop-
ment of Moral Thought," Vita Humana, VI (1963), pp. 11-12.

 

58Kohlberg, "Development of Modes,"

59Kohlberg, "Development of Children's," p. 12.

 

49

. . . ones in which acts of obedience to legal-social
rules or to the commands of authority conflicted with
the human needs or welfare of other individuals. The
child was asked to choose whether one should perform .
the obedience—serving act or the need-serving act and
was then asked a series of questions probing the
thinking underlying his choice.

When Kohlberg analyzed the specific alternatives
chosen by the children, age trends which would have been
expected on the basis of Piaget's theory were not evident.
Rather, it was found that the child's stated reason for
his alternative and his definition of the conflict situ-
ations were related to developmental levels.61

An extensive analysis of individual cases led to
Kohlberg's definition of six developmental types of
value-orientation represented in three levels (see pp. 6-
7).

This typology was based upon twenty-five aspects
of morality evident in children's thinking (see Table 1,
pp. 8"9).

An example of the six "types" for one aspect,

"Motive Given for Rule Obedience or Moral Action,’ follows:
1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.

2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned,
and so on.

3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.

4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities
and resultant guilt.

 

60Ibid., p. 12.

6lIbid., p. 12.

 

50
5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial
spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.62

The term "typology" referred to the form of his
six stages inasmuch as about fifty percent of most indi-
vidual's moral judgments are at one stage.

Kohlberg contended that his stages (types) repre-
sented an invariant developmental sequence. Though movement
through the stages must be forward, speed of progression
varies among children and an individual may be in two
stages at any one time. Development may terminate at any
age or stage. Kohlberg acknowledged uncertainty as to
whether Stage 6 always succeeds Stage 5 or whether Stages
5 and 6 are two alternate mature orientations.

Kohlberg found the following evidence for the
invariant developmental sequence of his stages.

1. The correlations between these types when so
arranged form a quasi-simplex.

2. This arrangement of the types provides a dimension
sharply differentiating are groups.

3. The arrangement provides a dimension significantly
differentiating groups expected to be environ-
mentally favored for social development. These
were groups higher in sociometric and socio—
economic status.

4. The arrangement provides a dimension correlating
to a moderate degree with intelligence, a variable
favorable to social development.

 

62Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Phi-
losopher," Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), p. 28.

 

 

 

 

51

5. The arrangement provides a dimension correlating
to a moderate degree with teacher's ratings of
internalized conformity and fairmindedness.

6. The arrangement provides a dimension differenti-
ating delinquent from non-delinquent boys similar
in age, socioeconomic status and intelligence.

Evidence that morality, as a dimension of social
development accounted for Kohlberg's findings, was provided
by the finding that the content of his developmental
schema:

. . . contains such varied elements of orientation
as roles, rules, self-image, punishment, approval,
sympathy, exchange, authority, indicates that we
have not been able to isolate any of these elements
as central in our account of the vague unity to
which they all seem related.64

The correlations between the six types of moral
judgment formed a quasi-simplex. There was a:

. . . trend toward negative correlations between the
higher and lower types of thought. Such negative
relations suggest that higher modes of thought replace
or inhibit lower modes of thought rather than being
added to them. This in turn suggests that higher
types of thought are reorganizations or preceding
types of thought.

Kohlberg's definition of levels of moral judgment develop—
ment was supported by the higher correlations of types
within the three levels than between levels.66

Kohlberg has demonstrated the universality of his

developmental sequence of moral judgment stages through

 

63Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 338.
64Ibid., p. 339.
65Kohlberg, "Development of Children's," p. 31.

66Ibid., p. 17.

 

52

his research in other cultures. He has conducted studies
in Great Britain, Taiwan, Mexico and Turkey which have
included preliterate and semiliterate villagers. Moral
judgment development in Mexico and Taiwan was found to

be a little slower but followed the same sequence of stages.

Stages five and six were absent from the groups in the two

67

isolated villages in Yucatan and Turkey. Kohlberg has

interpreted the comparable findings across cultures.

The social worlds of all men seem to contain the
same basic structures. All the societies we have
studied have the same basic institutions--family,
economy, law, government. In addition, however, all
societies are alike because they are societies--systems
of defined complementary roles. In order to play a
social role in the family, school or society, the child
must implicitly take the role of others toward him—
self and toward others in the group. These role taking
tendencies form the basis of all social institutions.
They represent various patternings of shared or
complementary expectations.68

This interpretation is congruent with the assumption
that ". . . moral development is dependent on role-taking
ability and on general social participation rather than on

"69 This assump-

the learning of specific habits or values.
tion has important educational implications. It suggests
the need for investigations of the effects of role-taking

experiences and general social participation in the class—

room.

 

67

Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence,‘ pp. 382-383.

68Kohlberg, "Moral Philosopher," p. 30.

69Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," p. 140.

53
Studies Related to Kohlberg's
Theory and Research

Several studies have been conducted relevant to
Kohlberg's theory and research.

Turiel experimentally tested Kohlberg's theory
of the sequentiality of stages in the developmental of
moral judgment. Kohlberg's research had provided two
types of evidence that the six stages defined a develop—

mental sequence.

1. . . . each of the six stages show significant
age differences in the expected directions.

2. . . . evidence based on a 'Guttman quasi-simplex'
correlation matrix indicated that these stages do
form a developmental order.

Turiel demonstrated experimentally that Kohlberg's
six stages represented a developmental continuum. Turiel's
research tested:

. . . the developmental proposition that Kohlberg's

stages form an invariant sequence by establishing

whether the stage attained by the child would determine
the type and amount of learning of new moral concepts.

The subjects were pretested with part of Kohlberg's
instrument. Forty—four subjects in stages two, three, and
four were equally distributed among three experimental groups
and one control group. The experimental treatment consisted

of exposure to an adult experimenter's moral reasoning in

individual role—playing situations derived from Kohlberg's

 

7OTuriel, "Experimental Test," p. 17.

7lIbid., pp. 18-19.

It‘-
. .-

 

 

54

hypothetical moral conflicts which were not used in the
pretest. Each of the three treatment groups varied in the
stage of moral reasOning presented to the subjects with
presentations of moral reasoning one stage below, one stage
above, and two stages above the initial dominant stage.
The control group received no treatment. The posttest was
the complete Kohlberg interview.72
Direct and indirect scores were derived. The direct

scores were "Stage scores . . . obtained from the posttest
responses to the three situations used in the treatments but
not in the pretest." Turiel defined the indirect scores:

Posttest stage scores for the six situations used in

the pretest represent the amount of indirect influence,

or the tendency to generalize the treatment influence

to situations differing from those on which subjects

were directly influenced.73
Turiel's hypotheses were confirmed by both the direct and
indirect scores.

Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg conducted a follow-up

study. Using a different experimental method, they
replicated Turiel's findings and isolated some of the

related developmental factors.74

 

72Elliot Turiel, "An Experimental Test of the
Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral
Judgments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
III (1966), P. 613.

73

 

Ibid., p. 614.

74James Rest, Elliot Turiel, and Lawrence Kohlberg,
"Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference
and Comprehension of Moral Judgments Made by Others,"
Journal of Personality, XXXVII (June, 1969), p. 227.

 

 

55

The subjects were twenty—two fifth graders and
twenty-three eighth graders. Each subject was pretested
using five situations from Kohlberg's interview. In the
exposure conditions, the subjects were given two booklets
each containing four parts. The first part contained one
of Kohlberg's conflict situations which had not been used
in the pretest. The second part contained six sets of
"advice" offering possible solutions to the conflict--two
sets of advice for one stage below the S's predominant
stage, two for one stage above, and two for two stages
above. Two opposing courses of action were advocated in
each set. The third section contained questions designed
to elicit the subject's preference for and comprehension
of the given advice. The final section elicited the
subject's personal advice.75

The results indicated that:

1. Children prefer concepts that are above their
predominant stage (whether one or two stages up)
to concepts that are below,

2. Children find thinking two stages above their
own more difficult to comprehend than thinking
one stage above, and thinking one stage above
more difficult than thinking one stage below,

3. Children assimilate thinking that is directly
above their own stage more readily than thinking

that is either one stage below or two stages
above their own.

 

7SIbid., pp. 228—230.

76Ibid., p. 237.

 

56

Another aspect of Kohlberg's research which has
stimulated additional study is the universality of stage
mixture in individuals. All of Kohlberg's subjects had
scores other than those in their predominant stage. Usually,
a subject indicated a dominant stage with fewer judgments
indicative of an adjacent stage and even fewer at more
distant stages. Probably, imprecision in the interviewing
techniques and scoring methods accounted for some of the
stage mixture.77

Turiel proposed that stage mixture was primarily
a function of the developmental process, being directly
related to the structuring process. He hypothesized
". . . that amount of stage mixture is an important measure
which, when considered with modal stage, reflects the nature
of the developmental process."78

While systematic and extensive longitudinal study
would be required to test Turiel's hypotheses, there has
been an analysis of the stage mixture of subjects repre—
senting a variety of backgrounds who have already been

interviewed. The results indicated that stage mixture was

an aspect of the developmental process and the interpretation

 

77Elliot Turiel, ”Developmental Processes in the
Child's Moral Thinking," Trends and Issues in Developmental
Psychology, ed. by Paul H. Mussen, Jonas Langer and Martin
Covington (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1969), p. 114.

78

 

 

Ibid., pp. 116—117.

 

57

of the differences in degree of stage mixture must vary
throughout the developmental process.79

This stage mixture in individual children may
complicate attempts by the teacher to determine an indi-
vidual's developmental stage of moral judgment for the
purpose of providing stimulation to promote development,
yet teachers can become more aware of children's stages
of moral judgment development and provide for appropriate
levels of moral education in the elementary curriculum.

Moral Education in the Elementary
Curriculum

 

 

Proposals for programs of moral education in the
elementary curriculum represent a broad spectrum of phi-
losophies. The decisions made with regard to planning
moral education are dependent upon the school of psychology
with which the planner is identified as well as upon his
definition of the role of the school in moral education.

Kohlberg's conception of moral education was
derived from his cognitive—developmental theory of moral
judgment. Piaget did not present a systematically developed
conception of moral education, however, his random sug—
gestions were insightful. It was Dewey's philosophy of
moral education with which Kohlberg has most strongly

identified.

 

79Ib1d., p. 125.

 

58

In Moral Principles in Education, Dewey proposed

 

the notion (later supported by cognitive—developmental

research findings) that teaching about morals is ineffec-

80 He stressed the need for realistic experiences

81

tive.
in moral education.
Dewey further contended that the separation of
instruction and character and of learning and doing charac—
terized by ". . . formality, arbitrariness, and an undue
emphasis upon failure to conform was ineffective. Effective
moral education must be a consequence of the provision of

". . . opportunity for reciprocity, c00peration, and positive

personal achievement.82

In Dewey's discussion of standards by which to

evaluate moral education, he stressed the need for the

t.83

provision for the development of judgmen Dewey

described this development:

The child cannot get power of judgment excepting
as he is continually exercised in forming and testing
judgments. He must have an opportunity to select for
himself, and to attempt to put his selections into
execution; that he may submit them to the final test,
that of action. Only thus can he learn to discriminate
that which promises success from that which promises
failure; only thus can he form the habit of relating
his purposes and notions to the conditions that deter-
mine their value. Does the school as a system, afford

 

80John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (New
York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1959), p. 41.

8lIbid., p. 17.

 

 

82Ibid., p. 27.

83Ibid., pp. 54-55.

 

59

to present sufficient opportunity for this sort of
experimentation? Except so far as the emphasis is
upon intelligent doing, upon active investigation,

it does not furnish the conditions necessary for

that exercise of judgment which is an integral factor
in good character.

The relationship between moral judgment and behavior
suggested by Dewey and supported by subsequent psychological
research implied an educational need which Dewey described
as ". . . a genuine faith in the existence of moral princi-
ples which are capable of effective application." Dewey
stated these moral principles in social and psychological
terms which closely ressembled Kohlberg's definition of
moral principles. Dewey believed:

. . . that moral principles are not arbitrary, that
they are not 'transcendental'; that the term 'moral'
does not designate a special region or portion of
life. We need to translate the moral into the
conditions and forces of our community life, and
into the impulses and habits of the individual.

Dewey's volume on moral education (1909) was
published prior to Piaget's published report (1932) of
his research in moral judgment development. Piaget made
numerous proposals for moral education in the schools on
the basis of his philosophy and his research findings.
Distinct similarities between the views of Dewey and
Piaget are apparent.

Piaget recognized his bias as a psychologist in

his discussion of priorities in moral education and

 

84Ibid., pp. 55—56.

851bid., pp. 57—58.

 

60

emphasized that: "Educational facts are facts of social
psychology, . ."86
Piaget related his theory of the development of
the child's concept of justice to teacher behavior. He
noted that it has been demonstrated that teachers who
value cooperation as opposed to constraint accomplish
their objective through the use of punishment by reci-
procity rather than expiatory punishment.87
Piaget condemned the adult constraint which pro—
motes moral realism in the child. This adult constraint
exists in the school to the extent that the ". . . prestige
of the spoken word triumphs over any amount of active
experiment and free discussion."88
Piaget concluded that a curriculum similar to that
proposed by Dewey would facilitate moral judgment develop-
ment. He felt that an educational system promoting "group

work" and "self—government" was ideal.89

Piaget's final comments in The Moral Judgment of

 

the Child stressed the need for educational experiment to

supplement his purely psychological knowledge. He urged

 

86Piaget, Moral Judgment, p. 328.

87Ibid., p. 218.
881bid., p. 194.

891bid., p. 405.

 

61

that educational research be conducted by teachers or by
teachers with educational psychologists.90
Kohlberg discussed the implications of his research
in moral judgment development for the modification of some
objectives of the curriculum. As he studied the stages of
moral development and attempted to design a moral education
program, he ". . . realized more and more that its impli-

cation was the reassertion of the Platonic faith in the

power of the rational good." Any discussion of moral

 

education must necessarily be accompanied by a definition
of the nature of virtue. Relevant elements of the Platonic
View were summarized:

First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and
it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate
or culture.

Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.
Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is
knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses

the good.

Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which
is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of
the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or
acceptance of conventional beliefs.

Fifth, the good can be taught, but its teachers
must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.

Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is
because we know it all along dimly or at a low level
and its teaching is more a calling out than an
instruction.

Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be
taught is because the same good is known differently
at different levels and direct instruction cannot
take place across levels.

Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking
of questions and the pointing of the way, not the

 

90Ibid., p. 400.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

62
giving upward, not the putting into the mind of
knowledge that was not there before.
Kohlberg suggested that this point of View is
incompatible with that which defines moral education as
a "bag of virtues" (honesty, self-control, responsibility,
loyalty, etc.) to be adopted by children who are admonished

to "Be a good citizen," "Be generous,‘ etc. The weakness
of the assumption that anyone can be a moral educator was
suggested by Kohlberg.
If we think of moral education as something
carried on at the adult level, we recognize that
the effective moral educator is something of a
revolutionary rather than an instiller of virtues.92
Kohlberg argued that the teaching of justice in
the schools was the only constitutionally legitimate form
of moral education.93
This position implied no support for the value-
clarification approach to decision making which is based
upon the premise of ethical relativity. It is assumed
that there are no "right" answers and students need to

clarify their values. It teaches students:

1. to be more aware of their own values and how they
relate to their decisions,

 

91Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A
Modern Statement of the Platonic View," Moral Education,
ed. by Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 57—58.

921bid., p. 65.

 

93Ibid., p. 67.

 

 

63

2. to make their values consistent and order them in
hierarchies for decisions,

3. to be more aware of the divergencies between their
value hierarchies and those of others,

4. to learn to tolerate these divergencies,94

Kohlberg and Turiel criticized the value-clarification

approach:

Indeed, acceptance of the idea that all values
are relative does, logically, lead to the conclusion
that the teacher should not attempt to teach any
particular moral values. Such a position can present
problems for the teacher. The students of a teacher
who has been successful in communicating moral rela—
tivism will believe, like the teacher, that 'everyone
has their own bag and that 'everyone should do their
own thing.‘95

 

With Kohlberg's Platonic view, ". . . we inspire cognitive
conflict in the student and point the way to the next step
Up the divided line." The effectiveness of this approach
in the stimulation of development to advanced stages of
moral judgment has been demonstrated.
This we do experimentally by exposing the student to
moral conflict situations for which his principles
have no ready solution. Second, we expose him to
disagreement and argument about these situations with
his peers.

To further support their approach, Kohlberg and

Turiel offered these propositions which are basic to the

 

94Lawrence Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel, "Moral
Development and Moral Education," Psychology and Edu—
cational Practice, ed. by G. Lesser (Chicago: Scott,
Foresman and Co., 1971), p. 419.

 

 

95Ibid., pp. 419-420.

96Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 82.

64

cognitive-developmental approach and contrary to the

value-clarification approach:

1.

2.

We often make different decisions and yet have the
same basic moral values.

Our values tend to originate inside ourselves as
we process our social experience.

In every culture and subculture of the world the
same basic moral values are found. While social
environments directly produce different specific
beliefs (e.g., smoking is wrong, eating pork is
wrong) they do not engender different basic moral
principles (e.g., 'consider the welfare of others,‘
'treat other people equally,‘ etc.).

Insofar as basic values are different, then it is
largely because we are at different levels of
maturity in thinking about basic moral and social
issues and concepts. Exposure to others more mature
than ourselves helps stimulate maturity in our own
value processes. We are, however, selective in our
respbnses to others and do not automatically incor-
porate phe values of elders or authorities important
to us.9

While the exposure of students to moral conflict

situations accompanied by argument with their peers may be

effective in promoting moral judgment development, Kohlberg

and Turiel hold that it is not a sufficient condition for

moral education.98

The need for specified objectives in moral edu—

cation is obvious when one recognizes the typical moralizing

of elementary teachers. Kohlberg recommended that since

this moralizing about school rules and values is unavoidable,

 

97Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 430.

98Ibid., p. 111.

 

 

65

it should be conducted with reference to "consciously
formulated goals of moral development." Without explicit
goals, it is inevitable that teachers have primarily
focused upon the immediate and trivial aspects of class-
room management. Those teacher moral attitudes which
might stimulate children's moral development have been
less evident in the classroom.99 Instead, teachers have
frequently provided children with reasons for behavior
which were neither moral nor mature. Kohlberg found that:
Sixth-grade children tell us their teachers tell them
not to cheat because they will get punished (stage 1)
'or because the person you copied from might have it
wrong and so it won't do you any good' (stage 2,
expediency).

Kohlberg and Turiel described the danger inherent

in this lower level reasoning:

Moral reasoning below the child's level is,
therefore, not very likely to be educative (in the
sense of stimulating the development of his judg-
mental processes), nor is it very likely to influence
behavior. It is frequently necessary to show children
the wrongness of particular actions. However, by
coupling an admonition with lower—level reasoning,
the child may be reinforced in his behavior because
he can reject the reasoning on which the judgment is
based.

Since teachers necessarily engage in moral edu—

cation, it is the formulation of aims and content which

 

99Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education and
the Public Schools," p. 167.

100Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the
Schools: A Developmental View," The School Review, LXXIV
(Spring, 1966), p. 12.

101

 

Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 453.

 

 

66

present the real value problems. Kohlberg reviewed the
Russian system of "character education" described by
Urie Bronfenbrenner as one approach to moral education.
Such an approach consists of ". . . the imposition of a
state-determined set of values first by the bureaucrats
upon the teachers, and then by the teachers upon the
children.102

In addition to moralizing by individual teachers
and systems of state moral-indoctrination, a third alter-
native is proposed by Kohlberg. This alternative involves
the definition of the goal of moral education as the
stimulation of moral judgment and character development.
It means assisting the child in his natural development
rather than imposing an unnatural pattern upon him.103

To stimulate this type of development of moral
judgment ". . . a teacher's moralizings must be cognitively
novel and challenging to the child, and they must be related
to matters of obvious, real importance and seriousness."104
Therefore, the teacher's primary responsibility is guiding
the child to:

1. focus on genuine moral conflicts,

2. think about the reasoning he uses in solving such
conflicts,

 

102Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools,"
pp. 18-19.

103Ibid., p. 19.

104Ibid., pp. 22-23.

 

 

67
3. see inconsistencies and inadequacies in his way
of thinking,

4. find means of resplving such inconsistencies
and inadequacies. 05

Kohlberg recognized that his hypothetical conflict
situations were only a supplement to the discussions of
immediate and real issues in the classroom. He expressed
concern that moral judgment development as an objective of
moral education must be accompanied by the application of
this ability to the guidance and criticism of behavior.106

Correspondence between the development of the
child's moral judgment and his behavior is a function of
several complex factors. One aspect of this correspondence
concerns the development of ego abilities related to the
cognitive tasks of the classroom. The development of
these attentional ego capacities may be stimulated by
the general programming of classroom learning situations.107
The correspondence between the child's moral judgment and
behavior is further influenced by the nature of the demands
made upon the child's behavior. These demands must match
his existing moral values. Kohlberg found two major types
of mismatch. One type was a consequence of the moralizing

about petty classroom routines. This kind of mismatch can

be minimized by the teacher in two ways.

 

105Kohlberg and Turiel, "Moral Development," p. 454.

106Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools," p. 25.

107Ibid., p. 25.

 

 

 

68

The first is to insure that he does communicate some

of his values with regard to broader and more genuinely

moral issues. The second is to treat administrative

demands as such and to distinguish them from basic

moral demands involving moi8% judgment of the child's

worth and moral sanctions.
The second type of mismatch is a result of expectations of
behavior reflecting moral values not yet developed. For
example, since the five to seven year old child's moral
values do not determine his resistance to cheating on
tests, it is ineffective to treat his cheating as a moral
issue.109

If classroom teachers are to successfully use a
developmental conception of moral education as a basis for
stimulating children's moral development, they need to
Clarify their comprehension of the nature of moral develop-
ment. Knowledge of those aspects of moral development which
should be encouraged at a particular developmental level is
required.

According to Kohlberg, the most important edu-
cational implication of his theory is the need to listen
sensitively to the child's moral communications. The
teacher must be ". . . concerned about the child's moral
judgments (and the relation of the child's behavior to
these judgments) rather than about the conformity of the

child's behavior or judgments to the teacher's own."110

 

108Ibid., p. 26.
109Ibid., p. 26.

llOIbid., p. 27.

 

69

Summary

The review of the literature presented in Chapter
II provided a basis for understanding the cognitive-
developmental approach, in general, as well as the more
specific cognitive—developmental approach to moral judg-
ment. Kohlberg's theory and related research were pre-
sented. Finally, there was a presentation of the concep-
tions of moral education of Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg.

The discussion of conceptions of moral education
implied a need for greater understanding by the classroom
teacher of the child's moral judgment development. This
need could be met to some degree through further research
which was directly related to the moral judgments made by
children in the classroom. In Chapter III, there will be
a description of the construct validation of an instrument
similar to Kohlberg's instrument designed to identify
developmental stages of moral judgment. However, the
content of the instrument to be validated is directly

related to moral issues in the classroom.

 

 

CHAPTER III

METHOD

A description of the population and sample, design,

instrumentation, scoring manual construction, interview

procedure, and qualitative and quantitative analysis of

data will be presented in this chapter.

Population and Sample

 

The subjects of this study were students in an
elementary school located in a small suburban village
adjacent to a medium-sized midwestern city. The students
were predominantly from lower—middle-class or working
Class families, with many of the fathers employed in a
nearby automobile factory. The majority of the mothers
were employed, many by a large local shopping mall. A
small percentage of families were on welfare while a few
students were of upper—middle—class origin. In general,
the population of this sparsely populated area represented
a cross-section of socio—economic classes.

The elementary school in which the subjects were
students had two types of classroom organization.
Kindergarten through fifth grade was located in the

building. Children were assigned to each grade level

70

 

 

 

 

 

71

according to age and with continuous promotion being the
policy. In kindergarten through second grade, the class-
rooms were heterogeneously grouped and self-contained. In
third through fifth grade the classrooms were heterogene—
ously grouped with each grade level housed in a large Open
pod with four teachers teaming to instruct a group of
approximately one hundred children.

The subjects for this study were selected from the
first, third, and fifth grade levels. At each of these
respective grade levels those children were identified
who were seven, nine, and eleven years old. These age
levels were selected inasmuch as it was assumed that such
an arrangement would facilitate an analysis of the moral
judgment development stages related to age levels. It
was assumed that by including the chronologically more
mature first graders, there might be greater comprehension
by the subjects of the simulated situations, thus facili—
tating the qualitative analysis of the data.

From the permanent cumulative records of the
first, third, and fifth graders, those students of the
appropriate age levels were identified. A letter was sent
to the parents or guardians of each of these children
providing a general description of the proposed study
including the role of the subjects. Their signature
and return of the letter in an enclosed self—addressed,

stamped envelope signified their permission for their

 
  

72

child to participate in the study. A copy of this letter
is provided in Appendix A. Approximately one half of the
parents responded positively at each of the three age
levels. Of the population of 29 seven year olds, there
were 16 responses. Of the 48 nine year olds, 26 responded,
and of the 57 eleven year olds, 32 responded. At the

seven year old level the entire population of 16 composed
the sample. At each of the nine and eleven year old
levels, 16 subjects were randomly selected from the total
population of those with parental permission.

There was a preponderance of male subjects in the
seven year old group, with 4 females and 12 males. There
was more balance in the nine and eleven year old groups
with 8 male and 8 female nine year olds and 7 male and 9

female eleven year olds.

Design and Procedure

 

Several analytical procedures were used in this
study. The basic scores for individual subjects, derived
from the assessment of percent usages of each developmental
stage of moral judgment, were used in comparing the per-
formance among the three age levels and between the two
sexes.

The percent usages were also utilized in deter-
mining the percent of subjects whose moral judgment
reflected one developmental stage in at least 50% of

their responses.

 

73

Correlation coefficients were computed from the
percent usages to determine the inter-story consistency
of the instrument and the sequentiality of the develop-

mental stages reflected in the responses.

Instrumentation

 

The present instrument (see Appendix C) was con-
structed with reference to the instrument designed by
Kohlberg. The prototypes in Kohlberg's instrument were
carefully analyzed and the format and structure were
approximated for the instrument used in this study.1

The content of the hypothetical conflict situations
and accompanying probing questions in the instrument of
this study differened significantly from those of Kohlberg's
instrument. His hypothetical conflict situations, moral
dilemmas encountered by adults, were intentionally un-
familiar situations which he assumed would be challenging
and eliciting of conceptually rich responses from the ten,
thirteen and sixteen year old subjects for which they were
designed. An example of Kohlberg's situations is presented
in Appendix B.

Kohlberg presented four requisites for a test of

moral development which have been accepted in this study.

These were:

 

lKohlberg, "The Development of Modes," pp. 361-

375.

 

 

74
1. That it be developmental in nature or develop-
mentally differentiating.
2. That various tests or situations for its assess-
ment intercorrelate substantially and fairly
uniformly so that it cannot be broken down into

other factors.

3. That the test have some face relationship to the
concept at issue, e.g., morality.

4. That it show some correlation with whatever

external criteria be available, though no such

criteria can be definitive either for morality

or intelligence since these concepts are not

defined by an external cr1ter1on.

In the construction of the instrument for the
present study, it was assumed that younger, more egocentric
subjects would respond with more spontaneity and elaboration
to simulated school situations which were at least partially
familiar. It had been the investigator's experience as a
classroom teacher that young children are eager to discuss
moral issues which arise frequently and naturally in the
classroom. They will discuss these issues in some depth
given an adult who provides them with the time and the
guidance to explore these issues when they are pertinent.

Some of the representative moral issues typically
confronting the child in the elementary school situation
provided the general content for designing the ten
hypothetical moral dilemmas in the instrument used in

this study. These dilemmas were designed to . . . pose

a conflict between two culturally unacceptable (or

 

2Ibid., p. 98.

 

 

75

i‘acceptable) alternatives."3 Turiel presented the rationale
for the develOpment of such stories.

By designing stories that do not have a culturally
correct answer it is possible to partially circumvent
the normative problem and elicit moral reasoning
rather than moral knowledge or opinion. The reasoning
used in judging right and wrong in these situations
reflects a child's internally organized mode of
structuring the social and moral world.

To determine whether or not these situations truly
posed a conflict to children, the hypothetical conflict
situations with their alternatives were pretested. They
were presented orally to groups of children aged seven to
eleven who indicated their choice of alternatives through

their written responses of "yes" or no," "John" or "David,"
and so forth. The appropriate alternative responses were
written on the chalkboard following the oral presentation
of each situation and question. The children were required
to write only one word as their response to each situation.
A situation with two alternatives to which an approximately
equal number of children responded was considered suffi-
ciently conflictive. A situation in which one alternative
was more frequently chosen was redesigned and again pre—
tested until it conformed to the above criterion.

When the pretesting of the dilemmas was completed,

questions related to each dilemma were designed to probe

the child's moral reasoning. Some of the questions were

 

3Turiel, "Development Processes in the Child's-
Moral Thinking," p. 96.

4Ibid., p. 96.

 

 

76

constructed for all of the subjects. Other questions were
specified for those subjects who chose one or the other
alternative. Multiple questions were designed for each
situation for increased reliability and validity in the
measurement of the responses to these complex situations.
Many of the questions were open-ended, requiring the child
to make moral decisions and to give reasons for his
decisions. The questions were indirect to the extent

that they always were related to children in the stories,
never to the subject himself.

Each of the ten hypothetical moral situations and
accompanying probing questions were entities. It was
believed that a young child's attention could be more
effectively maintained through the presentation of
different unrelated stories than through a series of
related, continuing situations which might also have
increased problems of recall.

The investigator recognized the fact that moral
education is a sometimes controversial issue. When this
instrument was designed for use with children in the
elementary school, and as a possible basis for discussion
and other learning activities, issues were selected which
were assumed to be less controversial and more acceptable
to elementary teachers and the community as a whole.

The reliability of the scoring was determined

through correlating the scores assigned to a random sample

 
 

77

of the subjects by the investigator with scores assigned

by a psychology instructor with a Ph.D. in social psy-
chology and a special interest in child development. There
were eighteen subjects in this random sample, six from each
of the three age levels. The resulting product-moment
correlation was +.77. This was significant at the .001
level. This does indicate that there was a high degree

of agreement between the two raters.

Scoring Manual Construction

 

A scoring manual was constructed to accompany the
instrument. It was designed to be used by classroom
teachers in their assessment of their children's develop—
mental stages of moral judgment as reflected in the complete
interview or in portions of the interview (selected situ—
ations). The manual was constructed not only as a guide
in evaluating a formal interview with an individual, but
also as a guide in evaluating individual and small group
contributions to discussions of selected dilemmas.

The scoring manual presents stage descriptions in
concrete and practical terms. It is also intended to
serve as a means of further acquainting the elementary
teacher with the nature of each developmental stage of
moral judgment, and to assist the teacher in distinguishing
between moral judgment and other types of social judgments.
The purpose of the manual is to promote the teacher's

ordering of priorities so that the focus is upon the

 

78

stimulation of a child's moral development rather than
upon less serious kinds of classroom behavior.

The qualitative analysis of the data provided
the essential material for the construction of the scoring
manual. During the qualitative analysis those responses
reflecting each of the four represented developmental
stages for each conflict situation had been identified.
From these identified responses, the investigator selected
stereotypical responses which then comprised the content
of the scoring manual.

The directions for the assignment of scores to
subjects for individual situations as well as for the
entire instrument were presented and accompanied by an
example. Also included were several references to articles
by Kohlberg published in popular professional journals.
These were included in order to contribute to the scorer's
understanding of Kohlberg's theory and its educational
implications.

In the construction of the scoring manual, each
situation was carefully analyzed. As part of the
qualitative analysis, an individual score sheet was
prepared for each situation for each individual. Upon
each sheet was indicated the choice of alternative by
the individual as well as those selected responses to
the probing questions which were expected to be of possible

value in the construction of the scoring manual.

 

  
 

79

All of the individual sheets were examined on a
situation-by-situation basis. The responses indicative
of a specific stage were analyzed to identify some
stereotypical responses which could be included in the
description of that stage for that situation. Frequently,
less stereotypical and more creative responses were
included when these were particularly illustrative of
the given stage of moral judgment. Quotations were some-
times included for illustrative purposes. There was a
similar descriptive summary of stereotypical responses
for each of the developmental stages identified in this
study for each situation.

Inasmuch as this manual was constructed on the
basis of the responses of this sample, it would be
expected that with additional use of this instrument, there
would be additions to and modifications of the descrip-

tions of each stage for each situation.

Interview Procedure

 

Each subject was interviewed individually by the
researcher. Each interview was approximately seventy-
five minutes in length. The data was collected during
a period of four weeks.

In the implementation of the interview procedures,
there were three sources of concern-—the physical situation,

the interviewer's behavior, and the respondent's behavior.

80

Each child was introduced to the interviewer by
his teacher who explained that the interviewer, who was a
teacher at Ohio State, wanted to talk with him.

The interview was conducted in a private conference
room free of distractions. The interviewer and the respond-
ent were seated facing each other at one side of a table,
facilitating the interviewer's recording of the responses.

At the beginning of each interview, the inter-
viewer presented the following standard instructions to
the subject:

I'd like you to listen to some short stories
which Itrgoing to read to you. These are stories
about things which sometimes happen to children in
school. After I read each story, I'll ask you some
questions. There aren't any right or wrong answers
to these questions. I just want you to tell me what
you think. I'll need to write down your answers in
order to help me remember. No one will see your
answers except me. I will be studying all of the
children's answers to learn more about how children
think. I'm asking that you not talk to any of the
other children about these stories and questions.
Alright? Listen very carefully.

The interviewer, with experience as an elementary
teacher in the primary grades, was permissive and non-
judgmental throughout the interview.

Each interview was presented in its entirety in
one session. The responses of each subject were copied

verbatim by the interviewer during the interview. This

did not appear to influence the spontaneity of the responses.

 
 

 

81

Children of this age range tend not to be inhibited by
this notetaking.5
Throughout the interviews, there was nondirective
probing when this was judged appropriate and necessary to
elicit responses which were clearer and more fully elabo-
rated. Frequently, this probing consisted of repeated
requests for the subjects to give reasons for their responses.
When responses were unclear, the interviewer requested clari—

fication. These clarifications were always presented inzsuch

a way as not to cue a response. Likewise, subjects who required

 

repetition or clarification of a hypothetical conflict
situation or question were accommodated.

Occasionally, when a child expressed a sincere
inability to think of a response to one of the probing
questions, the interviewer proceeded with the interview
without comment or censure. More frequently, children made
such comments as: "That's a hard question," or "That's
all I can think of."

Although the content of the hypothetical conflict
situations was related to rather sensitive issues, the
subjects were generally very open in their reactions and
seldom required probing due to reticence.

At the conclusion of each interview, the subject was

thanked for his cooperation and commended for his effort.

 

5Leon J. Yarrow, "Interviewing Children," Handbook
of Research Methods in Child Development, ed. by Paul H.
Mussen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 594.

 

 

82

Questions

 

The major question this study attempted to answer
was: Is it possible to construct an instrument composed
of hypothetical conflict situations typically confronted
in the elementary classroom which has construct validity
consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment
development? In order to ascertain the construct validity
of the instrument, it was necessary to determine signifi-
cant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven year old
groups in the percent usage of each of the developmental
stages of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment develop-
ment is sequential. A child must progress through each
stage sequentially. This sequential progression, further
evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment,
was investigated in this study. Was the attainment of
each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite
to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental
stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions were:

1. What is the inter—story consistency of the
simulated situations contained in the instrument for the
total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven
years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral
judgment responses are limited to one stage of development

in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

 
 

83

In addition, this study explored possible differ-
ences related to sex. Inasmuch as the number of females
in the seven year old group was limited (four) and the
sample of each sex at each of the other age levels was
relatively small (seven and eight), the question was
stated as follows: Do males and females differ in stage
of moral judgment development at the nine and eleven year

old levels?

Qualitative Analysis of the Data

 

A qualitative analysis preceded the quantitative
analysis of the data. The qualitative analysis provided
the basis for the assignment of scores utilized in the
quantitative analysis. In addition, the qualitative
analysis identified those responses to each hypothetical
moral conflict situation which were typical of each
developmental stage of moral judgment found in these age
groups. These typical responses were summarized as the
content of the scoring manual.

A score was assigned to each individual for each
of the ten hypothetical moral conflict situations. The
scoring was conducted by the investigator on a situation-
by-situation basis. The responses of the entire sample
to a given situation were analyzed and scored before pro-

ceeding to the next situation.

 

 

84

In the scoring of each situation, the entire
protocol for an individual analyzed. Kohlberg explained
this procedure:

. . . we never score each sentence or paragraph that
a subject utters, but only the moral position that
he takes on the issues raised by the situation. As
we shall see, this moral position may be made over
the course of the subject's responses repeated,
qualified, or elaborated.

The initial question in each situation required
the subject to choose between two alternatives to a
hypothetical moral dilemma. Occasionally, a subject
would refuse to choose one alternative, giving instead
the response "both right" or "both wrong." The response
to this question as well as to those questions probing
the reasoning behind the chosen alternative was scored
to provide the major score for that situation. In those
cases in which a subject reflected a second stage of
moral judgment development either in his responses to
the primary filemma, succeeding related probing questions,
or secondary dilemmas, he was assigned a second stage for
that orientation.

For example, a subject might have had a score of
3(2) for his responses to one situation indicating that
his given reasons for his choice of alternatives and his

major orientation was stage 3 while he evidenced some

stage 2 responses during the probing.

 

6Lawrence Kohlberg, "Basic Outline," Directions
for Scoring, p. 11 (mimeographed).

 

 

 

 

85

Those subjects whose responses clearly and con-
sistently were representative of one stage of moral judg-
ment development were assigned only one score for a given
situation. In those infrequent cases in which an indi-
vidual evidenced a third stage of moral judgment develop-
ment within one situation, his score was based upon the
two dominant stages.

To determine the appropriate score(s) to be
assigned to an individual for a given hypothetical conflict
situation, Kohlberg's description of the characteristics
of the six development stages of moral judgment was used.
He defines each stage by reference to eight different
modes of judgment.7 These modes are defined in Table 2.

Kohlberg's detailed scoring manual was also used.
While incomplete, it was sufficient for scoring the issues
represented in protocols from Kohlberg's instrument. This
manual contained a section devoted to the definition of
each aspect of moral judgment development at each of the
six stages. While the manual was designed to guide the
scoring of moral judgments made within any context, there
was a definite orientation to the responses to Kohlberg's
instrument. For example, illustrative examples of typical
stage responses included selected responses to his instru-

ment.

 

7Kohlberg, "Development of Modes," pp. 376—383 and
326-327.

 
  
    
 
  

86

TABLE 2.--Summary of Characteristics of Six Moral Types.a

 

1. Value.--Modes of attributing moral value to acts and
persons. Differentiating and relating means and ends,
intentions and consequences, one person's evaluation
and others, etc. Modes of assessing value-consequences
in the situation.

2. Choice.--The kind of identification with the actor in
conflict and methods of resolving the conflict. The
social process of moral argumentation and the capacity
for making and maintaining an independent choice. The
outcome chosen in the particular situation.

3. Sanction.--The dominant rewards, punishments or goals
to Wthh conformity is oriented.

 

4. Negative Standard or Rules.—-The type of concept against
which an act is assessed, on which guides conformity,
e.g., taboo, rule, law. The concept of duty or moral
compulsion.

 

5. Self-image and Role.—-Modes of defining concepts of
good person and good role.

 

6. Authority.--The kind of respect accorded to authority
and status and the reasons for which such respect is

 

accorded.

7. Content.--The particular rules or virtues stressed by
the type.

8. Justice.--Concern for and concepts of rights and the

“W .

legitimate relat1on of one act, as deserved, to
another. Standards of exchange, reciprocity,
contract, punishment and reward.

 

aLawrence Kohlberg, ”The Development of Modes of
Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958),
p. 376.

 

87

Frequently, the stage of the response was obvious
without reference to a guide. For example, this was
particularly true in regard to those immature responses
(stage 1) which reflected an orientation to fear of punish—
ment and avoidance of trouble as a rationale for a moral

decision.

Quantitative Analysis of the Data

The quantitative analysis was performed upon the
data resulting from the qualitative analysis. The stage
score(s) assigned to each subject for each situation were
analyzed for each individual subject. The procedure uti-
lized was one which Kohlberg described:

The child may be assigned more than one level of
response. If the child's response is of a single
type, one score is assigned, and is weighed 3 units.
If the child's score is mixed, two type scores are
assigned, e.g., 3(2). The major type 3 receives a
weight of 2, the minor type (2), a score of 1. As a
result, children receive a weighted score on each
level across situations.

The percent of usage of each stage for each indi—
vidual subject was determined to find the number of indi-
viduals the majority (50% and greater) of whose responses
were at one stage of moral judgment development. This
indicated the extent of individual Consistency in stage
of moral judgment. Another indicator was the correlation

in moral levels from one story situation to another.9

 

8Lawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for
Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations," (mimeographed).

9Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 388.

 
 

88

An example of this scoring is presented in Table 3.
To complete the individual score sheets, the scorer records
the points assigned to an individual child for each situ-
ation. Each situation receives three points. If a child
uses only one stage in responding to a situation, three
points are assigned to that stage. If a child uses a pri-
mary and a secondary stage, two points are assigned to the
primary stage and one point is assigned to the secondary
stage. When points have been assigned to each of the ten
situations, the points are summed across each stage. When
the sum for each stage has been determined, the percent
usage of each stage may be ascertained. The weighted
percent usages may be derived through multiplying the
percent usage by the number of the stage. For example,
the percent usage of stage three is multiplied by three.
The weighted percent usages for each stage represented
is summed to determine the total moral maturity score.10

To determine whether there were significant differ-
ences between mean scores of males and females in stage of
moral judgment development at a given age, the t test was
used. Since there were only four females in the seven
year old sample, this analysis was limited to the nine

and eleven year old samples.

 

loKohlberg, "Global Rating Guide," (mimeographed).

 

89

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90

To determine whether there were significant differ-
ences among the three age groups in the usage of each stage
of moral judgment, analyses of variance were performed.

Evidence was sought regarding the sequentiality of
developmental stages of moral judgment. This was necessary
to support the developmental theory of moral judgment in-
asmuch as the attainment of each stage of moral judgment
is prerequisite to the attainment of the next higher stage
in the sequence.

Kohlberg described his analysis of the sequen-
tiality of these stages:

The 'simplex' pattern of intercorrelations derives
from the expectation that the more two types of
thought are separated from one another in a develop-
mental sequence, the lower should be the correlations
between them. This expectation can be compared with
the actual intercpirelations obtained among the six
types of thought. -

The individual subject's profiles indicating the
percent of responses within each of the stages of moral
judgment were used_in constructing a product-moment cor—
relation matrix in which each correlation reflected the
extent to which individual subjects who used one stage
of judgment also used other stages of judgment. Kohlberg

explained:

The expectation applied to the matrix is that the
correlations between two types of thought should

 

llKohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orien—
tations," p. 16.

 

91

decrease as these two types are increasingly
separated in the developmental hierarchy. 2
Summary
In this chapter, the population and sample were
described including their age levels, socio-economic status,
and school organizational plan.
The design of the study was reviewed. There was
an account of the rationale and construction of the hypo—
thetical moral conflict situations and probing questions.
The construction of the scoring manual was explained. The
standard procedure for interviewing the subjects was pre-
sented.
The questions which this study investigated were
restated accompanied by a description of the method of
data analysis. Both the method of the qualitative analysis
of the data which provided individual's scores and the
method of the quantitative analysis which utilized the
individual's scores to determine the results were reported.
In the following chapter, the results of the study

will be presented.

 

121616., p. 17.

 

 

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The analysis of the data will be presented in
this chapter. The data was both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively analyzed. The qualitative analysis provided the
scores which were used in the quantitative analysis. In
addition, the qualitative analysis identified the responses
to each of the hypothetical moral conflict situations
typical of each of the stages of moral judgment develop-
ment. The qualitative findings are summarized in the
scoring manual (Appendix D) and will not be reviewed in
this chapter.

The findings reported in this chapter are those
derived from the quantitative analysis of the stage scores
assigned to each subject for each individual situation and
for the total instrument. These stage scores provided the
data to determine the percent usage by each subject for
each stage of moral judgment for each situation and for the
total instrument. Moral maturity scores were determined
from the percent usages for each situation and for the
total instrument. The total moral maturity scores pro-

vided the data used in determining the correlations between

92

 

 
 
  
 
 

93

percent usage scores for the four stages of moral judgment
development for individual subjects.

In order to determine inter—story consistency, the
moral maturity scores for each individual situation were
correlated with the moral maturity scores for the total
instrument. To further investigate the responses to each
individual situation, analyses of variance were performed
to determine the relationship of chronological age to

moral maturity scores. Similarly, an analysis of variance

 

was performed on the total moral maturity scores. A "t"
test was used to determine whether there were significant
mean differences related to sex in the total moral maturity
scores at the nine and eleven year old age levels. Finally,

there will be a discussion of the findings.

Questions

 

The major questions which this study attempted to
answer were:

1. Is it possible to construct an instrument
composed of hypothetical conflict situations typically
confronted in the elementary classroom which has construct
validity consistent with Kohlberg's six stages of moral
judgment development? In order to ascertain the construct
validity of the instrument, it was necessary to determine
significant differences among the seven, nine, and eleven
year old groups in the percent usage of each of the

developmental stages of moral judgment.

 

.3.
out
.

94

Kohlberg's theory holds that moral judgment develop-
ment is sequential. A child must progress through each
stage sequentially. This sequential progression, further
evidence of the developmental nature of moral judgment,
was investigated in this study. Was the attainment of
each developmental stage of moral judgment prerequisite
to the attainment of the next more advanced developmental
stage of moral judgment in the sequence?

Other questions which this study attempted to
answer were:

1. What is the inter—story consistency of the
simulated situations contained in the instrument for the
total sample of children aged seven, nine, and eleven
years?

2. What is the percentage of subjects whose moral
judgment responses are limited to one stage of development

in at least 50% of their responses to the situations?

Construct Validity

 

The construct validity of the present instrument
was ascertained by two different types of analyses. The
relationship of age and moral maturity was investigated
to determine whether increases in age were associated with
advances in moral maturity as evidenced by higher total
moral maturity scores. The second type of analysis was

an investigation of the sequentiality of the moral judgment

 

 

95

stages to determine whether there was evidence of a develop-

mental sequence from stage 1 through stage 4.

Relationship of Age and Moral Maturity

 

The major question which this study sought to
answer was related to the extent of the relationship between
chronological age and maturity of moral judgment as evi-
denced in moral maturity scores derived from an analysis
of the subject's responses to the hypothetical conflict
situations.

These moral maturity scores were derived from the
percent usage of stages calculated for each subject. The
percent usage of each stage was weighted according to the
relative maturity of the stage. The percent usage of stage
one was multiplied by one, stage two was multiplied by two,
and so forth. These weighted percent usages totaled for
each subject were the moral maturity scores. These scores
were calculated for each individual hypothetical moral
conflict situation as well as for the total instrument.
This provided data with which to determine whether there
were differences in the moral maturity scores which were
related to age. Analyses of variance of the moral maturity
scores of the seven, nine, and eleven year old groups were
performed. The differences among the three age groups
were found to be significant beyond the .05 level in the

total instrument and in each of the individual situations

 

 
 

 

96

with the exception of Situations I and VI. The percentage
point of the F distribution for 2 and 40 degrees of freedom
at the .05 level was 3.23. Summaries of these analyses of
variance are presented in Tables 4 through 14.1 The finding
of an insignificant relationship between age and moral
maturity for Situations I and VI will be discussed in a
later section (pp. 113, 114, 115).

Information concerning individual hypothetical
moral conflict situations was essential for two reasons.
First, if the total instrument were to be revised and
modified prior to its further use as a research instru-
ment, it would be necessary to identify those situations’
which were more and less discriminating according to age.
Second, if selected situations were to be used for dis-
cussion and/or instructional purposes in the elementary
classroom, the identification of the more discriminating
situations would facilitate a more stimulating learning

situation.

Developmental Sequence of Moral Stages

 

In order to determine the construct validity of
the present instrument, it was necessary to demonstrate
the developmental sequentiality of the moral judgment
stages identified by the instrument.

Kohlberg has demonstrated ". . . that attainment

of each mode of thought is prerequisite to the attainment

 
 

TABLE 4.--Ana1ysis of Variance Summary Table for Moral
Maturity Scores.

 

 

Score Source MS F
Total Treatment 29,830.271 15.358
Error 1,942.208
Situation I Treatment 6,993.187 1.283 0L8.)'
Error 5,452.054
Situation II Treatment 50,703.25 6.743
Error 7,519.061
Situation III Treatment 37,164.562 6.897
Error 5,388.136
Situation IV Treatment 30,092.896 4,621
Error 6,512.037
Situation V Treatment 42,670.146 7.280
Error 5,860.704
Situation VI Treatment 7,124.104 1.416 0L8.)
Error 5,029.243
Situation VII Treatment 128,107.895 27.031
Error 5,109.113
Situation VIII Treatment 39,725.145 8.450
Error 4,701.0528
Situation IX Treatment 35,472.395 7.926
Error 4,475.330
Situation X Treatment 45,193.583 4.879
Error 9,262.629

 

The percentage point of the F
degrees of freedom at the

distribution for 2 and 40
.05 level was 3.23.

‘98

of the next higher in a hypothetical sequence."l He
obtained evidence of the sequential nature of the develop-
ment of his stages through constructing a Guttman quasi-
simplex correlation matrix. "The 'simplex' pattern of
intercorrelations derives from the expectation that the
more two types of thought are separated from one another
in a developmental sequence, the lower should be the

"2 Kohlberg compared his inter-

correlations between them.
correlations with this expectation and reported that his
findings were in general agreement. ". . . the correlations
between two types of thought should decrease as these two
types are increasingly separated in the developmental
hierarchy."3

A matrix of product—moment intercorrelations was
constructed for this study. The product-moment correlations
presented in the matrix in Table 15 indicate the extent to
which individuals who use one stage of judgment also use a
second stage of judgment.

An examination of Table 15 indicates that the

intercorrelations do tend to decrease as two stages of

 

lLawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's
Orientations Toward a Moral Order, I Sequence in the Develop-
ment of Moarl Thought," Vita Humana, VI (1963), pp. 15-17.

 

21bid., p. 16.

3Ibid., p. 17.

99

TABLE 5.--Matrix of Intercorrelations between Four Stages
of Moral Judgment.

 

 

Stage 1 2 3 4
1 x .09 -.62 -.53
2 -.09 x -.16 -.53
3 —o62 —016 X +010
4 -.53 -.53 +.10 x

 

judgment are more widely separated. However, this pattern
is not as definite as in Kohlberg's data.

In addition to this analysis which found the inter-
correlations between the four stages of moral judgment
present in this data, another analysis identified the per-
cent of usage of each stage of moral judgment by each age
group. These trends are illustrated in Figure l.

The usage of stage 1 decreased with increased age.
Stage 2 decreased slightly from age seven to age nine
years, then essentially remained the same at the eleven year
level. Stage 3 increased from age seven to age nine years,
then showed some decrease from the nine year to the eleven
year level. The usage of stage 4 steadily increased from
age seven to age nine years and from age nine to age eleven
years.

These findings differ from those of Kohlberg to

the extent that his data reflected a decrease with age in

 

100

 

 

 

45

40
i3 35
5
s ' '
ro 3O 4‘0

.Y—

6’ V \a
73 25
H
o
E! o
m 20
O I
1%
o 15
o
H
83

10

5 Stage 1 0

Stage 2 0
Stage 3 ‘V
0 Stage 4 D
O
7 9 11
Age

Figure 1.——Percent Usage of Four Stages of Moral Judgment
at Three Age Levels.

 

'101

the usage of both stages 1 and 2 and an increase with age
in the usage of stages 3 and 4 until age thirteen at which
there was stabilization. Kohlberg noted that his findings
for age seven were based upon data from a limited number

of responses from twelve boys.4

Inter-Story Consistency

 

This study proposed to determine the inter-story
consistency of the simulated situations contained in the
instrument for the total sample of children.

If, for some instructional or research purpose,
it were necessary to give a shortened form of this inter-
view, it would be necessary to know which of the individual
situations correlated most highly with the total instrument.

To determine these intercorrelations, a moral
maturity score was derived for each of the hypothetical
moral conflict situations. A product—moment correlation
of the score from each individual situation with the score
from the total instrument was calculated. The correlations
are presented in Table 16. They ranged from -.08 to +.90.
There were significant correlations between each of indi—
vidual situations I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X and
the total instrument at the .05 level. The value of r
at the .05 level with 45 degrees of freedom was .2875.

The finding of an insignificant —.08 correlation between
situation IX and the total instrument will be discussed

in a later section (see page 115)-

 

102

TABLE 6.--Inter-Story Consistency.

 

 

N=48 Situation Correlation

I +.64

II +.61
III +.68
IV +.56

V +.90

VI +.61
VII +.76
VIII +.67
IX -.08

X +.67

 

Modal Percentages of Stage Usage

 

This study investigated the percentage of subjects
whose moral judgment responses were limited to one stage of
development in at least 50% of their responses to the
present instrument.

The percent usage of stages was calculated following
the assignment of points to each subject for each situation.
For each situation, three points were assigned to a stage
which was used exclusively in that situation. For a situ-
ation in which there was both a major and minor orientation,
the major stage received two points and the minor stage
received one point. The total number of points across the
ten situations for each developmental stage for an indi—
vidual subject were compiled to determine the percent usage

of each stage by an individual.

 

103

When the percent usage of each stage had been
determined for each subject, the stage with the modal per-
cent usage was identified. Those subjects whose modal
percent usage was 50 percent or above were tallied. This
dominance of one stage is evidence of the developmental
nature of moral judgment. In one reference, Kohlberg
reported that more than 50 percent of his subjects reflected
one major stage of development in at least 50 percent of

4 In another reference, Kohlberg sug-

their responses.
gested a 45 percent response as the criterion.5 In the
present study, both the 50 percent and the 45 percent
criterions were used. The findings are summarized in

Table 17.

Twenty-five, or 52%, of the 48 subjects evidenced
one stage of development in at least 45% of their responses.
Seventeen, or 35%, of the 48 subjects reflected one stage
of development in at least 50% of their responses.

The modal stage is the best estimate of a child's
current stage of moral judgment development. Knowledge of
the modal percent usages of one stage by individual subjects

is important if educational experiences designed to stimulate

moral judgment development are to be planned.

 

4Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philoso-

pher," Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), p. 28.

 

5Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orien-
tations," p. 15.

 

104

TABLE .7.--Modal Percent Usages of One Stage.

 

N=l6 N=l6 N=l6 N=48
7 year olds 9 year olds 11 year olds Total Group

 

45%+ 10 8 7 25

50%+ 7 5 5 l7

 

Relationship of Sex and
Stage Usage

 

 

The relationship of sex to stage usage could be
investigated at the nine and eleven year old levels only
inasmuch as there were only four females at the seven year
old level. The small number of subjects at the nine year
old (8 males, 8 females) and the eleven year old level
(7 males, 9 females) made the data less than conclusive,
but may at least suggest a direction for future investi-
gation.

The "t" tests applied to the mean scores for boys
and girls for the nine and the eleven year old groups
showed no significant differences at the .05 level in
stage usage between the males and females for either the
nine or the eleven year old groups. The t score for the
nine year old group was 1.658. The t score for the eleven
year old group was .049. The means and standard deviations

are reported in Table 18.

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 

105

TABLE .8.--Differences in Moral Maturity Scores Related to

 

 

 

Sex.
Age Sex Mean SD
Males 219.50
9 years
N=l6 20.27
Females 253.11
Males 271.11
11 years
N=l6 20.78
Females 272.14

 

Discussion of Findings

 

A critical review of some of the results of the
qualitative and quantitative analyses of the data may
provide the opportunity for various observations and
insights.

In discussing the results of this study, the limi—
tations of the sample must be recognized. The sample was
randomly selected from the population of seven, nine, and
eleven year olds whose parents had returned to the investi-
gator a signed letter signifying their approval of their
child's participation in the study. Thus the data cannot
be assumed to be normative, inasmuch as there may have been

an ongoing selective process. These parents who granted

    
   

106

permission for their child's participation in the study

may have had some common personal-social characteristic(s)
which might modify their children's moral judgments in some
systematic way. For example, the subjects may have
systematically responded at a higher or a lower stage than
the "norm" of the population of 7, 9, and 11 year olds in
general. This possible bias would not necessarily interfere
with the sensitivity of the instrument. This sensitivity
has been demonstrated by the finding that eight of the ten
moral conflict situations discriminated significantly
according to differences in age levels. Furthermore, this
sensitivity was reflected in the finding that the scores on
nine of the ten situations correlated significantly with
the scores on the total instrument.

Prior to the discussion of the more objective
analyses, a few brief comments pertinent to some subjective
observations may be of interest.

The first informal observation was made by several
of the investigator's student teachers who pretested the
situations through presenting the situations orally to
their groups of children and requiring them to choose
(written responses) from two alternative solutions to the
dilemma. The student teachers had been instructed to
permit no discussion until the written responses had been

submitted. They reported that both primary and intermediate

 

 

107

grade children were eager and enthusiastic to discuss the
situations at some length when given the opportunity.

A second kind of informal observation was made by
the investigator during the interviewing process. Without
exception, the children apparently considered each dilemma
and accompanying questions with considerable seriousness.
Occasionally, there were comments such as "That's a hard
one," or "I can't think of anything else." Frequently, a
child would relate a similar incident which they had
experienced or witnessed. In general, the children seemed
not to perceive the investigator as a teacher (authority)
figure. This was indicated by their openness in responding.
Some offered solutions to the dilemmas which would not have
conformed to school rules. Others "confessed" some of
their unacceptable school behaviors. These responses were
volunteered despite the fact that the investigator asked
no questions probing the child's experiences. This
egocentric orientation was observed at all age levels.

An interesting observation of behavior which was
apparently related to age was that the seven year olds
were the most spontaneous. Generally, they responded
quickly and without hesitation. This seemed to be a
function both of the younger child's greater openness
and lack of inhibition and their relatively simpler
approach to the problems. The younger children more

frequently seemed to be immediately sure of their response.

108

One seven year old even inquired as to whether or not the
fifth graders considered the questions too simple.

In discussing the quantitative analysis, it is
important to recognize that both the interviewing and
the scoring procedures were subjective to some degree.

Of necessity, the interviews were limited in time (1%

hours) and conducted in one continuous session. A fairly
rapid pace was maintained throughout the interview. Limited
probing was possible.

The scoring procedures were rather global. Further-
more, with this type of scoring procedure, there was some
subjectivity, some uncertainty at times as to the dominant
and/or secondary stage of moral judgment development which
has been expressed.

The finding that fewer than 50 percent of the
subjects had a modal response of more than 50 percent at
one stage of moral judgment may be a reflection of the
greater stage mixture at younger age and lower stage levels
(as compared to the 10 to 16 year old subjects of Kohlberg's
basic research). The finding that more seven year olds
than nine or eleven year olds had modal percent usages of
one stage of 45 percent and 50 percent indicated that as
they progress through the third and fourth stages at ages
nine and eleven, there continued to be some usage of the

first and second stages.

 

 

109

This stage mixture is quite apparent in the findings
of the intercorrelations between the four stages of moral
judgment. There is the unexpected finding of a -.09 corre-
lation between the usage of stage 1 and stage 2. In
examining the quantitative data, it was obvious that
subjects who used stage one frequently used it almost
exclusively. There was a very dominant tendency to respond -
in terms of taking a specific action in order to avoid
punishment. This finding may lead one to question the
source of this type of judgment. Is it a function of the
child's stage of moral judgment development or is it a
reflection (at least to some minimal degree) of the expec-
tations of teachers, parents and other adults who require
the child to behave in specified ways for the expressed
purpose of avoiding punishment? One might also question
the extent to which learning and cultural expectation
determined the finding that stage 2 usage decreased only
slightly from age seven to age nine with a slight increase
from age nine to age eleven.

The finding that the responses to Situation I did
not discriminate significantly according to differences in
age levels may be explained by the nature of the content
of the moral conflict situation and the accompanying
probing questions. In Situation I, the subject must
decide whether Carol should be in the science fair in

which she might win a prize or help Maria (who speaks

 

110

mostly Spanish) learn her English. In reviewing the data,
it was observed that the seven year old sample received a
higher total score for Situation I than for any other
Situation with the exception of Situation VI which also
failed to significantly discriminate according to differ-
ences in age level. It was further observed that the
eleven year old subjects received a lower mean score for
Situation I than for any other situation.

The seven year old subjects' comparatively more
mature and the eleven year old subjects' comparatively
less mature responses may be explained by the fact that
the seven year olds reflected a greater desire to help
Maria (a more mature response) because they had little or
no familiarity with science fairs or other such competitive
activities. Furthermore, seven year olds place less value
upon such individual competition and winning. By contrast,
eleven year olds place more value upon such individual
competition and would be less likely to choose to sacrifice
this opportunity in order to help someone. Generally, the
eleven year olds are more concerned about their grades and
academic status than are the seven year olds. This may
have stimulated their choosing participation in the science
fair and working for their personal benefit before helping
another.

The responses to Situation VI did not discriminate

significantly according to age level. An examination of

  

 

111

'the data revealed that, on the average, seven year olds
Inesponded at a more mature stage to this situation than to
.any of the other situations. Both the nine and eleven year
<old subjects' average stage of response to this situation
rmas slightly more mature than to the total instrument.

The relatively more mature average stage of response
Iby the seven year olds to Situation VI may be a function of
‘the content of the dilemma and accompanying probing ques-
tions. In Situation VI, the subject must decide whether
iMaria who has found a quarter on the playground, should
keep the quarter or give it to Jill who has insisted that
it is her quarter. The younger children, in making the
choice that Maria should give the quarter to Jill rather
than use it herself, may be responding to Jill's statement:
"Hey! That's my quarter. Give it to me!" Their responses
apparently reflecting helpfulness and generosity may
indicate, in fact, an immature submission to an aggressive
demand.

The finding that Situation IX did not correlate
significantly with the total instrument was interesting
inasmuch as it was found that Situation IX was signifi-
cantly discriminating according to differences in age
levels. An examination of the data revealed that the
average stage of response for the eleven year old sample
for Situation IX was the lowest of the ten situations.

For the seven year old sample, only one situation had a

     
  

112

lower average stage of response (Situation VII). The gener-
ally immature responses to this situation may be a reflection
of school learning. In Situation IX, the subject must
decide whether or not Barbara should spell her words wrong
on a spelling test so that Carl, who copies from her, will
get an F. Elementary school children are typically in-
structed not to cheat. Frequently, they are given immature
reasons supporting this required behavior. For example,
they are not to cheat because they will be punished if the
cheating is discovered. Another aspect of this situation
which may have stimulated immature responses is the
possibility that Barbara's copying the words wrong may
result in her receiving a lower grade. This concern with
grades above other responsibilities may reflect the exces-
sive preoccupation of the school (as an institution) with
grades.

Nine of the ten hypothetical moral conflict situ-
ations had a significant product—moment correlation with
the total instrument. With the exception of Situation IX
which correlated only —.08 with the total instrument, the
instrument could be divided for instructional or research
purposes. Different selected situations could be used as
a pretest and a posttest. Further information which could
be used in the selection of situations could be derived
from the findings of the analyses of variance performed

upon the moral maturity scores of each of the situations

 

  
 
 

113

'to determine differences between age groups. Those situ-
artions which were found to be more discriminating according
'to age might be assumed to be more challenging and in-
triguing for discussion and other instructional purposes.
These would include specifically situations II, III, IV,

\7, VII, VIII, and X. These seven items might comprise an
instrument. Just one of these situations might be chosen
for a fairly extensive instructional experience including

role-playing as well as discussion.

Summary

In this chapter, the results of the study were
presented. It was found that 35 percent of the subjects
had a modal stage response of 50 percent or above. An
assessment of the relationship between usage of stages
indicated a trend toward lower intercorrelations between
stages as they became more distant from each other. An
examination of the percent of moral judgments reflecting
each stage at each age level showed in general a decrease
in stage 1 and 2 usage with increased age and an increase
in stage 3 and 4 usage with increased age. Intercorrelations
of each individual situation with the total instrument found
correlations ranging from —.08 to +.9O with nine of the ten
correlations statistically significant. Analyses of
variance performed to determine differences in scores

related to age level indicated significant differences

 

 

114

in the total instrument and eight of the ten individual
situations. No significant differences related to sex
'were found.

From these findings, some important educational
implications may be suggested. The conclusions and edu-
cational implications will provide the bases for making
recommendations for needed research which will be dis-

cussed in the final chapter.

 

    

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS,

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

This study was conducted to determine whether an
instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflict situ—
ations and accompanying probing questions related to typical
classroom situations could be constructed which would
identify developmental stages of moral judgment in ac-
cordance with Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment develop—
ment.

The instrument was developed to be used with ele—
mentary school children. In this study, the interview was
conducted with forty-eight predominantly middle—class
children. There were sixteen subjects from each of age
groups seven, nine, and eleven years. Each individual
subject was presented ten hypothetical moral conflicts with
accompanying probing questions. The responses for each
subject were copied verbatim by the investigator who then
qualitatively analyzed the responses. On a situation—by-
situation basis, the responses for individual subjects
were assigned ratings according to the stage(s) which was

indicated by the response to one situation. The stages

115

 

116

were identified by reference to Kohlberg's definitions of
each developmental stage. From these ratings for each
subject, percent usage scores were derived for each situ-
ation and for the total instrument. The percent usage
scores were used to calculate weighted percent usage scores
which were summed to derive moral maturity scores. The
percent usages and the moral maturity scores were used in
the quantitative analyses.

The moral maturity scores for each of the indi-
vidual situations and for the total instrument were used
in analyses of variance to determine whether there were
significant differences in moral maturity related to age.
The differences among the three age groups were found to
be significant at the .05 level in the total instrument
and in eight of the ten individual situations.

The developmental sequence of moral judgment stages
was determined through an investigation of the relation-
ships between usage of stages by individuals. This was
determined through an investigation of the correlation
between the use of two given stages by one individual.

In general, it was found that the correlations diminished
as the stages became more widely separated.

An analysis of the percent usage of each stage
at each age level found that there was a general tendency

for the use of stages 1 and 2 to decrease with age and

117

for stages 3 and 4 to increase with age, although this
trend was not perfectly consistent.

The degree to which individual situations corre-
1ated with the total instrument was determined. These
intercorrelations ranged from -.08 to +.90 with nine of
the ten situations correlating significantly with the total
instrument at the .05 level.

The stage with the modal percent usage was identi-
fied for each subject. It was found that 52 percent of the
subjects had a modal percent usage of one stage of develop-
ment in at least 45 percent of their responses. Thirty-five
percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of development
in at least 50 percent of their responses.

The relationship between sex and stage usage was
investigated at the nine and the eleven year age levels.

No significant differences related to sex were found.

Finally, the individual responses which had been
analyzed in the qualitative analysis provided the basis
for the construction of the scoring manual. The responses
indicative of each of the four represented stages of moral
judgment development were studies for each hypothetical
conflict situation. A summary of the typical responses at
each stage for each situation was written. Included were
directions for the derivation of a weighted percent usage
or moral maturity score for the total instrument. The

scoring manual was designed to be used by elementary teachers.

 

 

118

Conclusions

 

The conclusions of this study have been organized
in relation to the questions which this study was designed
to investigate.

1. It is possible to construct an instrument
composed of hypothetical moral conflict situations typi-
cally confronted in the elementary classroom which has
construct validity relative to Kohlberg's six stages of
moral judgment development. The construct validity of
this instrument is demonstrated by two related findings.

a. There is a significant relationship of
age to moral maturity scores for the total instrument.
Increases in age level are associated with advances in
moral judgment stage attainment. There is a similar
significant relationship for eight of the ten individual
hypothetical moral conflict situations.

b. The intercorrelations between the four
represented stages of moral judgment reflect the sequen—
tiality of the stages indicating the developmental nature
of this cognitive process. However, this trend is not
perfectly consistent. The percent usage of each of the
four stages of moral judgment at the three age levels
reflects a distinct developmental trend, however, this
likewise, is not perfectly consistent.

2. There is a significant relationship between

the moral maturity scores for the total instrument and

 

l.
a

3.;

119

for nine of the ten individual hypothetical moral conflict
situations. These nine situations could be used indi-
vidually to determine children's moral maturity scores.
They could also be used in groups as pretest and posttest
research instruments.

3. Less than fifty percent of the subjects evi-
denced one stage of moral judgment development in at least
50 percent of their responses, however, slightly more than
fifty percent of the subjects evidenced one stage of moral
judgment development in at least 45 percent of their
responses. This instrument does not identify substantial
modal stages for individual subjects. This conclusion
must be tentative inasmuch as the stage mixture may be

partially a reflection of the ages of the subjects.

Educational Implications

 

Possibly the most important finding related to
elementary curriculum was that young children aged seven,
nine, and eleven years are truly challenged and find real
satisfaction in responding to questions and discussing
issues related to typical moral judgment problems which
they face in the classroom.

The present instrument should serve not only as
a diagnostic tool but also as a means of educating the
teacher in regard to the stages of moral judgment develop-

ment used by children. Through the teacher's use of the

 

 

120

scoring manual, such familiarity would necessarily develop.
This familiarity should facilitate the teacher's ability
to stimulate moral judgment development through the use

of moral reasoning one stage above the child's present
stage.

The dilemmas which have been developed for this
instrument could provide valuable bases for the types of
classroom meetings for discussion and problem-solving which
have been advocated by William Glasser in his Schools

Without Failure program. The dilemmas contained in the

 

present instrument would provide some genuine social
problems for discussion in classroom meetings. The
importance of this type of challenge has been stressed
by Glasser:

The kind of thinking that leads to the solution of
social problems is more difficult, but unfortunately,
less taught than the kind of thinking that leads to
the solution of technical problems. Students who are
taught social responsibility in school, who learn in

a living situation to think of ways to help each other
solve their problems both as individuals and as groups,
are better able to help solve, or at least to cope
with, the larger problems of society. We must get
more students involved with each other in an edu-
cational system that seems important enough to them so
that they will work to learn to think, to solye
problems, and to become socially responsible.

During the interviewing and the qualitative analysis,
several informal observations were made which have important

educational implications. Children tended to reflect the

 

lWilliam Glasser, Schools Without Failure (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 76.

 

 

 

 

 

121

values of teachers and other adults. This was particularly
evident in regard to questions related to punishment and

to evaluation. The use of punishment as a deterrent would
seem to retard moral judgment development to the extent
that the child fears punishment. The emphasis upon grades
would seem to encourage the child to value grades (things)
above people and principles.

Finally, the interest which children showed would
indicate that the moral conflict situations would provide
suitable material for role—playing. In addition to the
kinds of factors focused upon in the probing questions,
children themselves could identify various conditions which
might alter their moral judgments. Children might be less
inhibited in their role—playing of these types of situ-
ations which are very familiar and about which they care
deeply. Not only would the children benefit from the
cognitive stimulation of the role—playing process but the
teacher could observe firsthand the moral judgment of the
students.

After children had been presented this interview
or portions of it, they might begin to develop such
dilemmas for discussion and role-playing on the basis of
their experiences in school. This could easily become
a component not only of the social studies curriculum,

but of the language arts curriculum as well. Ideally,

 

 

122

this approach to moral education would pervade the ele—

mentary curriculum.

Recommendations

 

The recommendations for needed research are related
to the study of both moral judgment development and moral
education.

In regard to the study of moral judgment develop—
ment, it would seem advisable to further examine the
qualitative data (the responses) in order to develop some
.hypotheses related to reasons for the differences among
situations in the degree to which they discriminated among
age levels. It would also be worthwhile to collect data
with more extensive probing using those situations which
both correlated significantly with the total instrument
and significantly discriminated according to age.

It would also be worthwhile to collect data from
a larger number of children in the middle elementary grades,
and even junior high school, inasmuch as the data in the
current study provided a limited number of stage 4 responses
and no stage 5 responses. This could result in both a
refinement of the instrument and the further elaboration
of the scoring manual. The attainment of typical stage 5
responses would provide the teacher of stage 4 children
with material which could be used in presenting challenging

arguments to them to stimulate their moral development.

123

Inasmuch as this study involved children of mixed,
although predominantly middle—class, socio-economic status,
it would be informative to collect data using this inter-
view with lower-class and upper—middle—class groups in
order to determine the possible effect of social class
upon their stage of moral judgment as identified by this
instrument.

This interview needs to be conducted with larger
groups of both sexes at all age levels to determine possible
influences of sex upon moral judgment development. It would
be particularly interesting to investigate responses to
Situation VIII dealing with sex discrimination to determine
possible differences between males and females at various
age levels.

Finally, there needs to be some investigation of
the impact of the teacher's behavior (expectations, atti—
tudes, level of moral judgment) upon the student's stage
of moral judgment expressed in this interview composed of
classroom situations.

In regard to the development of moral education in
the curriculum, it is first of all obvious that teachers
must be educated through inservice courses, workshops, and
the examination and use of newly developed materials, to
systematically include moral education in the curriculum
through discussion of community events as well as personal

experiences, role-playing and through experiences in

 

124

literature. In addition, teachers need to become sensitized
to their own impact upon children's moral development
through their decisions, judgments, and behavior in the
classroom.

Kohlberg has expressed this need most effectively.

He stated:

The creation of a moral atmosphere is not a matter
of one educational technique or ideology or means or
another, but springs from the moral energy of the
educator, of his communicated belief that his school
or classroom has a purpose. In short, promoting moral
development requires moral conviction on the part of
the teacher. And it implies that the teacher must
listen carefully to the child's moral judgments rather
than seek conformity between the child and the teacher.

Since the survival of moral education in the cur—

riculum is dependent upon its acceptance by teachers,
administrators, and community members; and since moral
education has been such a typically sensitive and contro-
versial topic; it is important to demonstrate to these
groups that moral education is of extreme value and that

it need not be biased or threatening. This could be
accomplished by increasing these persons' awareness of

the prevalence of moral education in the existing cur—
riculum even though it may not be labeled "moral education."
Furthermore, it must be accomplished through the intro-
duction of materials such as those contained in the instru—

ment presented in this study; not as a frill, but as a

regular component of the total curriculum.

 

2Lawrence Kohlberg, "Understanding the Hidden
Curriculum," Learning, I (December, 1972), p. 14.

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX A

LETTER TO PARENTS

125

 

APPENDIX A

LETTER TO PARENTS

March 30, 1973

Dear Parents:

I am an instructor in Early and Middle Childhood
Education at the Mansfield Campus of The Ohio State Uni—
versity. Concurrently, I am a doctoral candidate in ele-
mentary education at Michigan State University.

I am particularly interested in child development as
it is related to the elementary curriculum. For my doctoral
dissertation I have constructed an interview for elementary
school children. This interview is composed of ten brief
stories about boys and girls in the elementary classroom.
Each of these stories poses a dilemma and is followed by a
series of related questions. These questions require the
child to make judgments. The responses to the questions
will be analyzed according to developmental stages of
judgment.

My interest is in how children's judgments differ
according to age level. I plan to interview 20 children
selected randomly from each of age levels seven, nine, and
eleven years.

Each child will be interviewed individually for
approximately one hour at a time which is convenient to the
classroom teacher. In this study the child will be identi-
fied only by age and sex.

Your signature below will indicate your permission
for your child to participate in this study. The return
of this form at your earliest convenience will be most
appreciated.

The results of this study will be made aveilable to
the principal, the teachers, and anyone else who might be
interested. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Sandra Styer, Instructor,
Early and Middle Childhood Educ.

 

Parent's signature
126

 

APPENDIX B

SELECTED SITUATION FROM KOHLBERG

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

127

 

 

APPENDIX B

SELECTED SITUATION FROM KOHLBERG
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

Situation I

 

Joe was a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp
very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved
up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his
paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go, and a little
more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his
father changed his mind about letting him go. His father's
friends had decided to go on a special fishing trip and Joe's
father was short the money it would cost him to go with them.
So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the
paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so
he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

Q. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money or
should he give it to him? Why?

Probing Questions

 

A. If should give

 

1. Would a loyal son have to loan his father the
money or is it up to Joe? (Does Joe have a right
to refuse?)

2. Does his father have the right to tell Joe tO give
him the money? (a) Would a good father have asked
for the money like that?

3. What would be the best reason for Joe to refuse?

B. If should refuse

 

1. Would a loyal son loan his father the money?

2. Does his father have a right to ask Joe for the
money? (Would a good father?)

 

*
Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes Of

Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (unpub—
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958),
pp. 361—362.

128

 

129

What would be the best reason for Joe to give his
father the money?

Joe wanted to go to camp but he was afraid to out-
right refuse to give his father the money. SO he
gave his father $10 and told him that was all he
had made. He took the other $40 he had made and
paid for the camp with it. He told his father
that the head of the camp said he could go then
and pay for it later. So he went off to camp, but
his father didn't have enough money to go on the
fishing trip with only the $10.

Did Joe do wrong in doing that or was he justified

in doing that under the circumstances?

C.

Both

5.

 

Joe's father broke his promise about letting Joe
go to camp. Was that wrong or was it all right
under the circumstances?

Which is worse: a son breaking a promise to his
father or a father breaking a promise to his son?
Why?

(a) Why shouldn't someone break a promise anyhow?

Later Joe's father found out that Joe had lied to
him about the money. What should his father do when
Joe gets back from camp? (If not mentioned) Should
he punish Joe for lying?

(If merely predicts) What would you do if you were
Joe's father?

Would the punishment do Joe good when his father
had broken his promise in the first place?

APPENDIX C

HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS

130

 

APPENDIX C

HYPOTHETICAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Situation I

 

Maria speaks mostly Spanish. She must work hard
to learn English. Carol helps her with English for an hour
every day. Carol speaks both Spanish and English well.

The sixth grade is planning a science fair. Several
prizes will be given for the best science projects. The
children will work on science projects during their free
time when Carol usually helps Maria. Carol has a very
good idea for a science project on plants. All of the sixth
graders could learn a lot from her project. Also, she might
win a prize. The teacher told Carol that she could either
be in the science fair or help Maria.

Q. Should Carol be in the science fair? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

 

1. What would be the best reason for Carol tO choose
to help Maria with her English rather than to be
in the science fair?

2. Suppose Maria couldn't go to junior high school
the next year if she didn't know English well
enough. Then would you say that Carol should
help Maria with her English rather than be in the
science fair?

3. If you knew Carol could not possibly win a prize
in the science fair, would you still say that
Carol should be in the science fair rather than
helping Maria with her English?

4. Suppose that instead of giving Carol a choice, the
teacher had said that Carol must go on helping
Maria with her English and could not be in the
science fair. Would that have been right?

Subjects responding no

 

1. What would be the best reason for Carol to choose
to be in the science fair rather than to help
Maria with her English?

131

 

132

2. Suppose you knew that Carol would win the first
prize (five dollars) in the science fair. Then
would you say that she should enter the science
fair?

3. Suppose that instead of giving Carol a choice, the
teacher had said that Carol must be in the science
fair and stop helping Maria with her English.
Would that have been right?

4. If Carol chose to be in the science fair, the
whole sixth grade could learn a lot from her
science project. Would it be better for the whole
class to learn a lot from Carol rather than only
Maria learning from Carol?

All subjects:

 

1. Suppose a child spent so much time helping another
child that he got lower grades himself. Would it
have been better not to help another child and get
higher grades?

2. When children help each other in school, should
they only help their friends? Should they ever
help those who have caused them trouble? What
would be a good reason to help someone who had
been mean to you?

3. Suppose a teacher only gave five A's to the whole
class in arithmetic. The five children who got
A's helped children who were getting B's. Then,
some of the B students did so much better that
the teacher gave them A's and some of the A students
who had helped the B students got B's. Would it
be better to help another child even if you then
got a lower grade because the teacher would only
give five A's?

Situation II

 

Mrs. Jones, fourth graders were working on a social
studies unit about Indians. Mrs. Jones had told them that
at the end of the unit each child could tell her what grade
he thought he deserved for his work on the unit.

Peter had to decide what grade to give himself. He
thought of the two ways that teachers usually grade children.
Peter would have to choose one of these two ways to grade
himself. If he graded himself one way, he'd have to give
himself an A because he had done his best work. If he

Ev

 

133

compared his work with the other children's work, he'd have
to give himself a C because almost all of the children had
done much better work than he had done.

Q. Should Peter give himself an A because this was the
best work he could do or should he compare his work
with the other children's work and give himself a

C?

Why?

Subjects responding "A":

 

l.

2.

What would be the best reason for Peter to give
himself a C?

Suppose every child in the whole class had worked
very hard and had done their best. Would it be
right to give the whole class A's? Why or why
not?

Subjects responding "C":

 

l.

2.

What would be the best reason for Peter to give
himself an A?

Some peOple say that it isn't fair for a child to
do his best work and get a C while another child
who does not do his best work gets an A. Would
you agree? Why or why not?

All subjects:

 

1.

Who could best decide what would be the fairest
grade for a child—-the child himself or his
teacher?

When do you think it would be best to let a child/
his teacher (choose the one opposing above response)
decide what grade he should have?

When a teacher lets a student give himself a grade,
would it be all right for the student to give
himself an A even though he hadn't done his best
work and he had done worse than many other students?

What would be the best reason for a child to get
an F and fail?

Would it be fairer if children did not get any
grades such as A, B, C, D, and F?

 

134

Situation III

 

Mrs. Reed gave her fifth graders two pages of
review arithmetic homework every Friday. They were supposed
to do it all by themselves.

John and David almost always had trouble with their
arithmetic homework. They usually handed it in unfinished
on Monday. This Friday, Mrs. Reed said that unless every-
one had their arithmetic homework finished Monday morning,
the whole class would miss their noon recesses during the
coming week. ‘

John's mother told John that she'd help him. Then
he'd be sure to have it finished by Monday morning. Some-
times Mrs. Reed asked Sam to help David with his work in
the classroom. This time Sam told David that he'd help
him with his homework. Then he'd have it finished by
Monday.

Q. Who would be doing the worse thing--John for letting
his mother help him or David for letting Sam help him?
Why?

Subjects responding "John for letting his mother help him":

1. What would be the best reason for John to let his
mother help him?

2. If John let his mother help him, who would be doing
the worse thing—-John for letting his mother help
him or his mother for telling John that she'd help
him when they both knew that John's teacher wanted
him to do it alone?

3. Would a good son refuse to let his mother help him?
Subjects responding "David for letting Sam help him":

1. What would be the vest reason for David to let Sam
help him?

2. If David let Sam help him, who would be doing the
worse thing——David for letting Sam help him or
Sam for telling David that he'd help him when they
both knew that the teacher wanted him to do it alone?

3. Would a good child refuse to let his friend help
him?

 

 

 

.L' _‘.‘r: r. . ‘

135

All subjects:

 

1. If the whole class had to stay in for noon recesses
for a week because one or two children didn't
finish their homework, would that be fair? Why
or why not?

2. Suppose there were thirty children in the class
and twenty didn't finish their homework, then would
it be fair to keep the whole class in for noon
recesses for a week?

3. Would it ever be fair to punish the whole class for
something only part of the class did? If yes, when?

4. Do you think the children who didn't finish their
homework should have been punished? If.yes--What
would be the best punishment for them?

5. What would be the best reason for doing homework
without any help from anyone?

Situation IV

 

When the fifth grade boys had outdoor gym, they
liked to play a ball game. Only four boys could play at
once. One afternoon, the teacher asked Danny to be a
leader. He chose his three friends—-Bob, Jim, and Paul
to play with him. After they had played for a few minutes,
Jerry came up to Danny and told him that he wanted to play.
Danny didn't want to make Bob, Jim, or Paul quit the game,
but Jerry said, "Danny, if you don't let me play, I'll
fight you!" When the teacher found children fighting,
they always had to go inside.

Q. Should Danny let Jerry take the place of one of his
friends in the game? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

 

1. What would be the best reason for Danny to not let
Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the
game?

2. Suppose Jerry cheated a lot in games. Would you
still say that Danny should let Jerry take the
place of one of his friends?

3. Would it ever be right to fight for your friends?

 

136

4. Suppose Jerry wanted to take Danny's place. Should
Danny let him? Would it be right to fight for
yourself but not for your friends?

Subjects responding "no":

 

1. What would be the best reason for Danny to let
Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the
game?

2. Suppose Jerry could play the game better than any-
one else in his classroom. Then should Danny let
Jerry take the place of one of his friends in the
game?

*3. Why might fighting be the wrong Way to settle this
problem?

4. Suppose Jerry wanted to take Danny's place. Should
Danny let him?

All subjects:

 

1. If a leader in a game had to choose between two
children, which should he choose-~a child who
played very well and sometimes cheated or a child
who played very badly and never cheated? Why?

2. Which is worse—~a child who fights with other
children on the playground or a child who says
mean and nasty things to other children on the
playground? Why?

Situation V

 

Mrs. McDonald was giving her second graders a very
important arithmetic test. She gave directions very care-
fully for each part of the test. She gave the children a
certain length of time to work on each part of the test.
When the time was up, she'd say, "Stop!" The children were
supposed to stop right away so everyone would have the very
same length of time to work on the test questions and
problems.

After each part Of the test, when Mrs. McDonald
said, "Stop!" Mark would keep on writing for a little while.
This gave Mark extra time to finish questions and problems.

Q. Would what Mark did be worse than copying answers from
your neighbor's paper? Why or why not?

 

 

137

Subjects responding "yes":

 

1. If a child kept on doing his own problems, he'd be
showing that he was able to do the problems even
though it did take him longer. Why would it be
wrong to take longer?

2. Why would it be wrong to take more time on this
arithmetic test when teachers often want children
to take all the time they need to finish their
arithmetic papers correctly?

3. What would be the best reason to take longer on
a test?

Subjects responding "no":

 

1. Would it be more honest to take longer on a test
than copying from your neighbor's paper?

 

2. What would be the best reason to copy answers from
a neighbor's paper?

3. Do you think that children would copy from their
neighbor's papers if they knew for sure that they'd
get a good grade? Do you think children sometimes
cheat because they're afraid of getting poor grades?
Would children cheat if they didn't get any grades
at all?

All subjects:

 

1. Should a child who kept working on the arithmetic
test after the teacher said "Stop!" be punished?
If yes——How should he be punished?

2. Do you think a test that is timed is a fair test?

3. What would be the best reason for not cheating on

a test?

Situation VI

 

One afternoon Central School was going to have a
special Walt Disney movie. Each child who wanted to see
the movie had to bring a quarter from home. Marcia's mOther
couldn't give her a quarter so Marcia would have to go to
the library while the others were seeing the movie.

While Marcia was outside on the playground after
lunch, she found a quarter near the swings. Marcia picked

138

up the quarter. Along came Jill. Jill almost never brought
money for anything. Jill saw that Marcia had found a
quarter. Jill said, "Hey." That's my quarter. Give it

to me!"

Q. Should Marcia use the quarter she found for the movie
or should she give it to Jill? Why?

Subjects responding "She should use the quarter":

1. What would be the best reason to give the quarter
to Jill rather than use it?

2. Suppose Marcia had brought a quarter from home for
the movie. Then do you think she should have kept
the quarter?

3. Suppose that when the children were back in the
classroom, a girl told the teacher that she had
left a quarter by the swings but couldn't find
it when she went back to look. What should Marcia
do? Why?

 

 

 

Subjects responding "She should give it to Jill":

1. What would be the best reason for Marcia to use
the quarter rather than give it to Jill?

2. Do you think Jill was telling the truth when she
said that it was her quarter? Should you always
believe what a classmate tells you? Why or why
not?

3. Suppose that Marcia found a dollar rather than a
quarter. Should she have given that to Jill?
If not-—Why would that be different?

All subjects:

 

1. Is it right for a school to make students pay
money to see a movie when some students can't
bring the money?

2. Which would be worse-—taking a quarter from beside
the swings on the playground or taking a quarter
from the top of someone's desk in the classroom?
Why?

 

139

Situation VII

Miss Brown's third grade class was going to have
a Mother's Day program. The children were writing their
very own Spring poems to recite at the program. Sally was
trying to write a poem about Spring flowers. All of the
poems she wrote sounded terrible. Finally, Sally decided
that she just could not write her own Spring poem.

On her next trip to the library, Sally looked
through some books of poetry. One book had many poems
about Spring flowers. Sally found a poem she was sure
the teacher wouldn't know and copied it. When the class
had their Mother's Day program, Sally recited the poem she
had copied from the book.

Q. Should Sally have asked her friend Janet who wrote good
poetry to write a poem for her rather than copying a
poem out of a poetry book? '

Subjects responding "yes":

 

1. What would be the best reason for Sally to use
one of the poems from the book?

2. Which would be worse-—reciting a poem which was
written for you by your friend but which should
have been written by you or copying answers from
your close neighbor's paper?

Subjects responding "no":

 

1. What would be the best reason for Sally to use
one Of the poems Janet wrote?

2. Suppose that the teacher was very interested in
poetry for children and knew many poems. Then
should Sally use a poem from the book rather than
one of Janet's poems?

All subjects:

 

1. Why would it be wrong to copy a poem from a book
or a friend when the teacher had asked children
to write their own poems?

2. What would have been the best reason for Sally to
have written and recited her own poem even if it
did sound terrible?

 

 

140

3. Suppose a child had to write a book report. FOr
his whole report he copied what was written on
the front flap of the book jacket. Would that be
right? Why or why not?

Situation VIII

 

The sixth grade social studies class was studying
different jobs. Many different people visited the classroom
to talk to the children about their jobs. ome of these
visitors talked to the whole class. Some talked to only
the girls and some talked to only the boys. Some of the
children were interested in being doctors or nurses. They
invited a doctor and a nurse to speak. They asked the
doctor to speak to the boys and the nurse to speak to the
girls.

Q. Was it wrong to have the doctor talk to the boys and
the nurse talk to the girls? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

 

l. A person who wants to be a doctor has to study a
lot of science. DO you think that girls could
do as well as boys in science? Why or why not?

2. Would it be best for a boy or a girl to want to
be a very great and famous heart surgeon? Why?

no:

Subjects responding

 

1. Should a girl have a chance to become a doctor if
she's interested in medicine? Why or why not?

2. Suppose one of the boys wanted to be a kindergarten
teacher. Should a boy want to be a kindergarten
teacher? Why or why not?

All subjects:

 

1. Most of the doctors in books, movies, and television
shows are men, not women. Is this wrong?
2. What would be a good reason for having more women

doctors in books, movies, and television shows?

3. Most of the kindergarten teachers in books, movies,
and television shows are women, not men. Is this
wrong?

 

 

 

141

4. What would be a good reason for having more men
kindergarten teachers in books, movies, and
television shows?

5. Do you think it would be a good idea for schools
to encourage girls to be interested in becoming
doctors, lawyers, and scientists?

6. Do you think it would be a good idea for schools
to encourage boys to be interested in becoming
kindergarten teachers, nurses, and secretaries?

7. (If inconsistency in above two responses)--Why
would you say (repeat response)?

Situation IX

 

Barbara was the best speller in Mrs. Johnson's
third grade. During spelling tests, Carl, who sat next to
Barbara often COpied Barbara's spelling words. Barbara had
told Carl to stop copying. Finally, Barbara's friend Jenny
told Barbara that she should spell a lot of her words wrong
on the next test and then correct them after Carl had copied
the wrong ones. Then Carl would get an F.

Q. Should Barbara do this? Why or why not?

Subjects responding "yes":

 

1. Suppose that Carl copied the wrong words. He
could become confused and be an even worse speller.
If Barbara's copying the words wrong confused
Carl, should she do that?

2. Suppose that instead of Carl, it was Barbara's
best friend who was copying, then would you say
Barbara should spell the words wrong? If not--
Why would this be different?

Subjects responding no

 

1. Should Barbara tattle to the teacher about Carl's
copying the words?

2. Which would be worse--Jenny having the idea of
spelling words wrong and telling Barbara to do it
or Barbara actually spelling the words wrong?
Why?

 

 

142

3. Suppose Barbara let Carl copy and tried to help
him by writing very large and clear. Who would
be doing the worse thing--Barbara or Carl? Why?

Situation X

 

Ann and Diana liked the clay which the children
could use when their work was finished. One afternoon
when they were alone in the classroom after school, they
went to the cupboard, took out the bag of clay, divided
it between them, and took it home with them.

The next day the teacher, Mrs. Fox, found that
the clay was missing. "Who took the clay?" she asked.
"If whoever took the clay admits it, I won't punish them."
Diana said, "I did not take the clay." All during this
time Ann did not say a word.

Q. Who did the worse thing-—Diana or Ann? Why?

Subjects responding "Diana":

 

1. If Diana wanted to do the fairest thing for her
friend Ann, what would she have done?

2. Why would some people say that it was worse for
Ann to not say a word?

3. What would have been the best reason for Ann
to not say a word?

4. DO you think Ann was more honest?
5. Suppose that it had been Ann's idea to take the
clay. Diana just followed her. Would you still

say Diana did the worse thing?

Subjects responding "Ann":

 

1. If Ann wanted to do the fairest thing for her
friend Diana, what would she have done?

2. Could you say that Ann was not honest? She didn't
tell a lie.

3. When a teacher asks the class for someone to admit
something, must the person who did the wrong thing
admit it? Why might they sometimes not admit it?

4. Why would some people say that it was worse for
Diana to say that she did not take the clay?

 

 

5.

143

Suppose that it had been.Diana's.idea.to take the
clay. Ann just followed her.. Would you still say
that Ann did the worse thing?

All subjects:

 

1.

Sometimes when a person admits doing something
wrong, they may get others in trouble. Should
they still admit what they did even if it gets
others in trouble.

Suppose Mrs. Fox had said that she would punish
whoever took the clay. Would you still say
(Diana or Ann) did the worse thing? 'If changed-—
Why did you change your mind?

If Joan say Diana walking home with the clay,
should she have told Mrs. Fox? If no--When
would it be right to tattle? If yes--When
would it be wrong to tattle?

 

 

APPENDIX D

SCORING MANUAL

 

144

APPENDIX D

SCORING MANUAL

This scoring manual has been developed to accompany
the instrument composed of hypothetical moral conflicts
related to elementary classroom situations. The manual
was designed to guide the elementary teacher in determining
the developmental stages of moral judgment of children who
are seven to eleven years old.

The manual consists of summaries of exemplary
responses of children aged seven to eleven years to each of
the ten hypothetical moral conflict situations of this
instrument. Whenever possible, these typical responses
(or portions of) have been recorded verbatim to enhance
their reality. Some sample protocols are presented in

Appendix E. For each conflict situation, these responses

have been organized into four sections reflecting each of
the first four stages (of a total of six stages) of moral
judgment development. While these summaries Of typical
responses are specific to the instrument, however, they
are consistent with Kohlberg's general definitions of the
first four stages of moral judgment development.

These are:

Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation. Ego—
centric deference to superior power or prestige, or a
trouble—avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action
is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and

145

 

 

W i l __

146

occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value
to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarian-
ism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval
and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to
stereotypical images of majority or natural role be-
havior, and judgment by intentions.

Stage 4: Authority and social—order maintaining
orientation. Orientation to 'doing duty' and to showing
respect for authority and maintaining the given social
order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations
of others.

The scorer should be very familiar with thesegeneral
definitions prior to scoring children's responses to the
instrument. Recall of these definitions should increase
the scorer's comprehension of the relationship between the
summaries of the stereotypical responses in the scoring
manual and the specific responses which the scorer is
evaluating. The scorer should also have a general under-
standing of Kohlberg's theory as it is related to educational
Objectives. The scorer would be well advised to read at
least one of the articles listed in "Suggested References"
(see p. 148). A detailed description of the construction
and validation of this instrument is to be found in Styer's

dissertation.2

 

Lawrence Kohlberg, ”Stage and Sequence: The
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," Hand-
book Of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by David A.
Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), p. 376.

 

2Sandra Styer, "The Construct Validation Of an
Instrument to Identify Developmental Stages of Moral
Judgment of Elementary School Children" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973).

 

 

147

Directions for Scoring

 

In scoring the responses of an individual child to
a specific situation, the scorer should first read through
the entire response. Then, the scorer should review the
summary of the stereotypical responses for each develop-
mental stage as listed in the scoring manual for that
specific situation. The summary which is most congruent
with the child's responses should be identified. In some
cases, a second summary reflecting a child's secondary

orientation may be identified. The stage(s) identified

 

for an individual child for an individual situation should
be recorded on an individual score sheet (see page 149)
which was developed by Kohlberg.3
In completing the individual score sheets, the.
scorer should record the points assigned to each individual
child for each situation. Each situation receives three
points (see sample scoring sheet). If a child uses only
one stage in responding to a situation, three points are
assigned to that one stage. If a child uses a primary and
a secondary stage, two points are assigned to the primary
stage and one point is assigned to the secondary stage.
When points have been assigned to each of the ten situ—

ations, the points should be summed across each stage.

When the sum for each stage has been found, the percent

 

3Lawrence Kohlberg, "Global Rating Guide for
Kohlberg Moral Judgment Situations" (mimeographed).

 

 

148

usage of each stage may be determined. The percent usage
is determined by dividing the sum for each stage by the
total possible, which is 30. From the percent usage, the
modal percent usage may be identified. A modal percent
usage of 50 percent or greater indicates one dominant stage
usage.

From the percent usages, the weighted percent usages
may be derived. The percent usage should be multiplied by
the stage number to determine the weighted percent usage,
e.g., the percent usage of stage three should be multiplied
by three. The weighted percent usages should be summed to
ascertain the total moral maturity score. These total moral
maturity scores range from 100 to 400 for this instrument.
The following ranges indicate the child's moral judgment
development stage in terms of total moral maturity scores:

Stage 1: 100-150
Stage 2: 151-250
Stage 3: 251-350
Stage 4: 351—400

The range of possible scores for stage 1 is only
fifty points inasmuch as a child whose performance was
consistently stage 1 could not score below 100. The range
of possible scores for stage 4 is only fifty points inasmuch
as no subjects in this sample responded at stage 5.

It is important to recognize that elementary

teachers will identify responses which are indicative of

 

 

 

 

’149

a specific developmental stage for a given situation, but
are not included in the scoring manual. This is to be
expected since the questions are open-ended and the scoring
manual was constructed on the basis of a limited number Of
responses. The elementary teacher who has become familiar
with Kohlberg's general definitions, the summaries in the
scoring manual, and children's responses to this instru-
ment should be able to reliably determine the stage level

Of these varied responses.

 

Suggested References

 

 

 

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Child as a Moral Philosopher."
Psychology Today, II (September, 1968), 25-30.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Development and the New Social
Studies." Social Education, XXXVII (May, 1973),
369-375.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Understanding the Hidden Curriculum."

Learning, I (December, 1972), 10—14.

Styer, Sandra. "The Construct Validation Of an Instrument
to Identify Developmental Stages of Moral Judgment
Of Elementary School Children." Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973.

Situation I

 

Stage 1:

Carol should be in the science fair because if she
won a prize, she would get five dollars which she could
spend. She could buy toys with the money. Winning the
money is better than helping somebody. Carol would have
more money and she would learn more about science than
the other children.

If Carol's teacher had told her that she must be
in the science fair and stop helping Maria, Carol should
listen, so she doesn't get a whipping.

 

 

i150

 

 

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151

A good reason to help someone (in school) who had
been mean to you would be to keep out of arguments and fights.

Stage 2:

Carol should be in the science fair because maybe
she likes science better than what Maria is studying. Carol
made the science project. She could help Maria later. It
might help Carol get a better grade in science. She could
have a lot of fun. Working with Maria wouldn't be much fun.

Carol should not be in the science fair because she
does not want to be in the science fair. It's more important
to help people, then they can help you later.

A child should not worry about another child's
grades. If he keeps helping the other child, he might fail.

You should help people who have been mean to you
because next time they will be nice to you.

Stage 3:

Carol should be in the science fair because she'll
help other children learn from her science project.

Carol should help Maria in order to make friends
with her. Then, Maria could speak better English. She
wants to make Maria Happy. You're supposed to help people,
not make them feel bad.

You shouldn't help someone else if you then get a
lower grade, because your parents might be disappointed in
you. They'd wonder why you were not getting high grades.
The teacher would wonder what you were doing all the time.

Stage 4:

Carol should help Maria because Maria must learn
how to speak English. She might not learn it Carol entered
the science fair. Carol could be in the science fair the
next year after Maria had learned English. The science
fair is just something she could do but helping Maria is
something she should do because Maria probably wouldn't
have any other chance to learn English.

When children help each other in school, they
shouldn't only help their friends because other children
might need a lot of help and nobody else might want to
help them.

Situation II

 

Stage 1:

Peter should give himself an A, because an A is
a higher grade. A "C" is bad. If he got a C, his mother
would be mad.

 

 

152'

Peter should give himself a C because if he gave
himself an A, he would be "acting big." ‘

A child should never be allowed to give himself
a grade. If he did badly, he'd probably give himself a
good grade, and that's bad.

The teacher can always better decide what grade
to give a child because the teacher is older than the child.
She's bigger than the children. The teacher has already
been through the children's grade. The teacher has the
grade book and the child doesn't.

Stage 2:

Peter should give himself an A because he tried
very hard and he wanted to get an A. It would make him
feel better. If he gave himself a C, he wouldn't feel
good. If he gave himself a C, he might not go into a
higher grade. He did his work without copying. ‘

Peter should give himself a C because other.children
did better jobs than Peter did. Peter wasn't very smart
and other children were smart. Peter should try to do
better. Maybe if he tried harder, then he could get an A.

When the teacher allows a child to grade himself,
he shouldn't give himself an A, because then he won't try
harder.

 

A child could give himself a grade when he's in
the fifth or sixth grade and knows more about grades.

Stage 3:

Peter should give himself an A. The teachers
grade that way. Then his parents would know that he'd done
his best work. He only can do his best work, he can't do
better.

Peter should give himself a C. If he gave himself
an A, it wouldn't be too fair to other people because their
work was better than his work. The teacher would think
that he was giving himself an A just because he wanted it..

The teacher can better decide what grade a child
should have because they know what grade the child should
get and why they should get them. The child might give
himself a better grade than he should have. That would
be cheating.

The child could best give himself a grade when.
there was a substitute teacher who did not know much about
grading.

Stage 4:
Peter should give himself an A because he worked

hard on it and if he compared his work with that of other
children and gave himself a C, it wouldn't be fair to him.

 

153

A child who's allowed to grade himself.should not
give himself an A when he doesn't deserve it because he'd
be cheating himself. He would not learn the material.

A child should receive an F when he's cheated,
because cheating wouldn't be fair to the other children.

Situation III

 

Stage 1:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him
because the teacher might see them and David would be sent
to the corner.

It would be worse for John to let his mother help
him because she might make a mistake. The teacher would
get mad and spank John because he did a bad thing.

The best reason for John to let his mother help
him would be that the teacher wouldn't know about it.

The best reason for David to let Sam help him would
be to get his school work done so that he could get an A.

Children who didn't finish their homework should
be punished. Whip them. Sit them in the corner. Send
them to the principal's Office.

Stage 2:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him
because David might not know all of the answers or how
to do it.

The best reason for John to let his mother help
him would be that he wanted to go out for recess.

The best reason for David to let Sam help him would
be that if Sam got good grades, you could get good grades
yourself.

If twenty out of thirty children in the class
didn't finish their homework, it would be fair to keep
the whole class in for noon recesses for a week. More
than one half is a lot. The others should stay in.

The children who didn't finish their homework
should have been punished. They should do the whole paper
and if they missed any, they should do two problems for
each one which they missed.

Stage 3:

It would be worse for John to let his mother help
him. His mother should know better. She has probably had
homework herself. The mother should know that the teacher
wanted John to do it by himself. John should have asked
the teacher if he could have help from his mother. David

 

 

 

154

was in the classroom. The teacher probably knew what was
going on with David.

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him.
John would probably tell his mother not to give answers,
just explain. Sam would just give the answers.

A good son would refuse to let his mother help
him because he would listen to his teacher.

Only the children who didn't finish their homework
should be punished. If other children were punished, it
wouldn't be fair.

A good child would not refuse to let his friend
help him, because he wouldn't want to break up a good
friendship.

Stage 4:

It would be worse for David to let Sam help him.
If Sam weren't trustworthy, he might tell David some
answers. John's mother would probably know better how
to help him fairly.

It would be worse for John to let his mother help
him because his mother would probably know all the answers
and tell him the answers. Sam would just help David.

It would not be fair to keep thirty children in
for recess because twenty didn't finish their homework.

It would never be right to punish the ten for what they
didn't do. It was not their fault.

The best punishment for children who didn't finish
their homework would be to keep them in for recess. Children
like to go out to play. Paddling wouldn't help.

Situation IV

 

Stage 1:

Danny should let Jerry play so that he could have
a bette team and win. You could get in trouble for
fighting or get hurt. The school year where they're playing
doesn't belong to Danny.

Fighting is the wrong way to settle this problem
because somebody might get hurt. Children are tOO little
to fight.

A child who fights is worse than a child who says
mean and nasty things because fighting could hurt someone
very badly. Saying mean and nasty things wouldn't hurt
anyone.

Stage 2:

Danny should let Jerry play because then they
wouldn't have to go inside.

 

 

.1

155

Danny should not let Jerry play, because Danny didn't
want Jerry to play.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played
very well and sometimes cheated because he was good and
didn't cheat all of the time. The one who played badly
would make your team lose the game.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played
very badly and never cheated because the other team (without
the cheater) could win.

Stage 3:

Danny should let Jerry play because it would be
nicer than not letting him play. He shouldn't have picked
only his friends in the first place. It would make other
children feel left out.

Danny should not let Jerry play because the child
who had to quit might be Danny's best buddy and might be
sad. '

 

It would be better for a leader in a game to choose
a child who played very badly and never cheated rather than
one who played well and sometimes cheated because if the
team with the cheater won, everyone would say that his team
cheated.

The child who says mean and nasty things is worse
than the child who fights with other children because it's
not nice to call people nasty names.

Stage 4:

Danny should not let Jerry play because he started
the game with his friends and shouldn't make one quit. That
way, he'd probably lose all of his friends, not just one.

Danny should let Jerry play so everybody could
have a turn. It wouldn't be fair for the three boyfriends
to play all of the time and not let anyone else play.

A leader in a game should choose a child who played
very badly and never cheated because at least they would
have a fair game, even if they didn't win.

Situation V

 

Stage 1:

It would be worse to take longer on a test because
the teacher might see you and you'd get in trouble. You
might get an F.

It would be worse to copy answers from your
neighbor's paper. The teacher has told you not to copy
lots of times. You'd be whipped.

 

 

156

A child who took longer on a test should be punished.
Put him in the corner and don't let him out for a minute.
Take his pencil away. Break the end of his pencil off to
make him stop.

The best reason for not cheating on a test would
be to avoid getting a spanking. If you were caught, it
would make your grade lower.

Stage 2:

It would be worse to take longer on a test. When i
he works longer, he may not hear what the teacher is saying
about the next part of the test.

It would be worse to copy answers from your neighbor's
paper. You wouldn't learn anything.

The best reason to copy answers from a neighbor's
test would be if the child were real smart and you knew
that he wouldn't get a wrong answer.

To punish a child who worked longer on a test, the
teacher should make him stand in the hall to miss some
time on the next test.

The best reason for not cheating on a test would be
that you'd probably get an A if you didn't cheat. You'd
more likely get it right without cheating.

 

Stage 3:

It would be worse to take longer on a test. If
you copied from another person, their answers would be
wrong. If you both got the same answers wrong, the teacher
would know what was going on.

It would be worse to copy from a neighbor's paper
because you would not learn what you should if you didn't
do it on your own. Copying is bad. If you work longer,
it would mean that you knew the answers.

Stage 4:

It would be worse to take longer on a test because
he may get an A. It wouldn't be fair to those who stopped
right away.

It would be worse to copy answers from a neighbor's
paper. In taking longer, at least they would be your answers.
The teacher would see what you could do. If you were copying,
you wouldn't learn how to do the problems. If you worked
longer on a test, you'd learn more, although you shouldn't
continue working.

It is wrong to take longer on a test because the
other children didn't have that length of time. You'd be
cheating the whole class. It would be fair if all Of the
children had that much time.

 

157

The best reason for not cheating on a test would
be to avoid feeling guilty.

Situation VI

 

Stage 1:

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill because Jill
said that it was her quarter. If she didn't, Jill would cry.
If Marcia found a dollar rather than a quarter,
she should not have given it to Marcia because a dollar
is more than a quarter.
It would be worse to take a quarter from the top
of someone's desk because the teacher or someone else might
see you take it. You would get in trouble for stealing.

Stage 2:

 

Marcia should use the quarter because she found it.
She wanted to see the movie and her mother hadn't given her
money. Then she wouldn't have to stay in the library.

The best reason for Marcia to give the quarter to
Jill would be so that she could sit beside her in the movie,
if she wished.

Marcia should use the quarter rather than give it
to Jill, if Jill were nasty about the quarter.

Stage 3:

Marcia should use the quarter because Jill just
came walking along. She wasn't near the swings. She was
probably lying so that she could go to the movie.

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill because
Jill doesn't have extra money. Jill might be kind of poor.

The best reason to give the quarter to Jill would
be that Jill might have been her best friend. A lot of
people would just give it to her (Jill) to make a friend
or just to keep a friend.

It would be worse to take a quarter from someone's
desk than from the playground because you might not know
whether it belonged to someone on the playground. To take
it from someone's desk would be stealing. It wouldn't be
fair. The person would come in and find the quarter gone.

Stage 4:

Marcia should use the quarter because she doesn't
know whether or not Jill is telling the truth. Jill might
just want the quarter. It might not be hers at all.

 

 

158

Marcia should give the quarter to Jill, because
it could have been Jill's quarter. If Jill's lying, she's
only hurting herself.

It would be worse to take a quarter from someone's
desk because you'd know whose quarter it was and it would
stay on your conscience.

If Marcia learned that a girl had left a quarter
by the swings, Marcia should give it to the teacher. Other-
wise, she'd be stealing.

Situation VII

 

Stage 1:

Sally should copy the poem out of the book if nobody
saw her copying it.

Sally should ask Janet to write a poem for her. The
teacher might recognize the poem which would be copied from
a book.

 

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or
a friend because it would be disobeying and that's real
bad.

If Sally used Janet's poem, she'd get a worse
whipping.

Stage 2:

Sally should use one of the poems Janet wrote. It
isn't fair to copy from a book because the poems in the book
are good.

Sally should use one Of the poems from the book
because it would probably make more sense. A book would
have better poems.

The best reason for Sally to use one Of the poems
from the book would be that it would be better to have a
poem from a book than to not have a poem.

The best reason for Sally to use one Of the poems
from the book would be that her friend might not have given
her a poem.

The best reason for Sally to use one of the poems
from the book would be that her friend might not have given
her a poem.

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or
a friend because you would want to have a poem which was
different.

Stage 3:

Sally should use one of the poems from the book
because the teacher knows how the work is that Janet does

 

159

and she'd probably have known that Sally asked Janet to
write a poem for her.

Sally should use one of Janet's poems because the
poems in the book are good. She wouldn't deserve to have
the best poem.

The best reason to copy a poem from a book would
be that Sally would not be embarrassed in front of all
those people by having no poem.

The best reason for Sally to have written and
recited her own poem would be that the poem would be
original and new. The poem would probably sOund pretty
to mother.

It would be wrong to copy a poem from a book or
a friend because it would not be fair to the rest of the
class. They wrote their poems by themselves. They did what
the teacher asked them to do.

Stage 4:

 

Sally should OOpy a poem from a book because then
she wouldn't be getting anyone else involved. Then, Janet
wouldn't get in trouble. I

Sally should use one of Janet's poems. If she took
it out of a poetry book, it would be like stealing. If
Janet gave it to her, it wouldn't be like stealing. Some-
body wrote it for her.

It would be better for Sally to ask Janet just for
ideas, not for the whole poem.

It would be just as bad for Sally to copy from a
book as to have another child write a poem for her. Some-
one wrote the book. She should ask the teacher for help.

Situation VIII

 

Stage 1:

It was not wrong because girls are girls and boys
are boys. A doctor is usually a boy and a nurse is usually
a girl. The man tells you what the man's doing and the

woman tells you what the woman's doing.

A boy should not be encouraged to be a kindergarten
teacher, nurse, or secretary. Girls are kindergarten
teachers. Men teach upper grades. Little children wouldn't
understand the big men. Men like to have harder jobs,
where they make more money. Men wouldn't look so well
in nurse's clothes.

A girl should not be encouraged to be a doctor,
lawyer, or scientist. A girl couldn't become a doctor
because she's a girl and a doctor is a man. Girls couldn't
become doctors because they can't grow up to be men. When
you're a girl, you grow up to be a woman.

 

160

Stage 2:

It was not wrong because boys would rather have
men than ladies talk to them. Maybe the nurse wanted to
talk to the girls and the doctor wanted to talk to the
boys.

It was wrong because some of the girls might want
to be doctors rather than nurses.

If a boy really wants to be a kindergarten teacher,
if he thinks it would be fun, he should be one.

Stage 3:

It was not wrong because mostly girls want to be
nurses. Usually, men are doctors. No boy wants to be a
nurse.

It was wrong. The doctor and nurse should talk
to the whole class so the boys and girls would know what'
doctors and nurses do.

A girl should be encouraged to be a doctor if she's
smart like a man and interested in being a doctor.

Boys, not girls, should be encouraged to be doctors
because boys have steadier hands and can stand the sight
of blood. Girls might faint. Boys can handle tools better.

Men shouldn't be encouraged to be kindergarten
teachers, nurses, and secretaries because men like to work
hard and being a secretary is easy.

Stage 4:

It was wrong because there are women doctors.
Chances are that some girls would want to be doctors instead
of nurses. There are boy nurses. The doctor and nurse
should talk to the whole group.

Girls should be encouraged to be doctors, lawyers,
and scientists because women have the same ability as men
to do things.

There should be women doctors on television because
there is women's lib. If some women saw women on television
being doctors, they'd want to be doctors.

Situation IX

 

Stage 1:

Barbara should not do this. If the teacher picked
up her paper, she might get in trouble. The teacher might
get real mad.

Barbara should do this because she doesn't want
Carl to get an A. It would be a punishment for Carl. She

 

 

161

could trick Carl because that would be the only way to
make him stOp copying.

Barbara shouldn't tattle to the teacher about
Carl's copying because she'd get in trouble, too, if they
weren't allowed to tattle.

Stage 2:

Barbara should not do this because she might not
be able to correct them. She might just forget some of
them. She'd probably get more wrong than she did before.
She could fail. Carl might tell the teacher that she had
copied them wrong.

Barbara should do this because it would teach Carl
not to copy. Carl would get a poor grade, then Barbara
would correct hers and she wouldn't get a poor grade.

Stage 3:

She should not do this. She should just tell the
teacher so she could be moved. It wouldn't be helping
anybody if she did this.

She should do this because it's not right to copy
on a spelling test.

If Barbara's best friend copied, Barbara should
not spell the words wrong. She wouldn't want her best
friend to get a poor grade.

If her best friend got them wrong, she would blame
Barbara, be mad, and not like her.

Barbara should not tattle to the teacher because
it's not nice to tattle. You should talk to the person
who's copying to try to make him stop.

Stage 4:

Barbara should do this because then Carl will never
copy again. Barbara wouldn't want Carl to cheat.

Barbara should not do this. You shouldn't do any-
thing which would make another person get a bad grade.
Barbara could tell the teacher that Carl was copying SO
that the teacher could move him away so he couldn't copy.
Barbara would still get it right.

If Jenny had the idea of spelling words wrong and
told Barbara to do it, Barbara would be doing the worse
things, because she would know that it wasn't right to
take her friend's advice.

Barbara should spell the words wrong if her best
friend copied, because it's basically the same thing. It
would teach her a 1esson—-to quit copying.

Barbara should tattle about Carl's cheating because
it isn't fair to the class if they must spell without
cheating.

 

 

162

Situation X
Stage 1:

Ann did the worse thing. She could get in trouble.
If the teacher said something to her and she didn't answer,
the teacher might think that she took the clay.

Diana did the worse thing. She could get in
trouble for lying.

An example of a time when it would be wrong to
tattle would be when somebody hits you real softly.
Another example would be when you did one little thing--
like playing football wrong.

Stage 2:

Ann did the worse thing. She should have said
something because teachers know from the look on the child's
face whether or not they did it.

Diana did the worse thing. She should have told
the teacher that she took the clay because the teacher
wouldn't punish her.

It's wrong to tattle when the person to whom you
tattle might not believe you.

It's wrong to tattle when someone does something
to someone else. They should tattle, not you.

Stage 3:

Ann did the worse thing. The teacher asked them a
question. She wouldn't say anything.‘ That's like not
telling the truth.

Diana did the worse thing because Diana said that
she didn't take it. She would tell the truth, if she
wanted to be nice.

Diana should have told the teacher that Ann didn't
do it either, so her best friend wouldn't get in trouble.

Jean should tattle when she was alone with the
teacher. She wouldn't want the other children to know.

Jean should tattle because the class might have
needed the clay.

Stage 4:

Diana did the worse thing. She told a lie. You
shouldn't lie. You should tell the truth even if you get
punished. Since Ann didn't say anything, she wouldn't
be lying, but in a way she would be.

Diana should have told the teacher that she had
taken the clay, then maybe Ann would have confessed, too.

You should admit what you've done wrong. If you
lie, you just feel guilty.

 

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE PROTOCOLS

163

 

H7

 

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE PROTOCOLS

For illustrative purposes, sample protocols have
been selected from the qualitative data. These are repre-
sentative of stage 1, 2, 3, and 4 responses to the hypo—

thetical moral dilemma presented in Situation V (see p. 140).

Stage 1:

"No. When I was in kindergarten, I did that once
and I had to go over and sit in the corner."

 

"NO. If he copied, that would be badder. Because
the teacher told you not to copy lots Of times. If you
copy, you get whipped by the principal. If you keep going
on, you just get whipped by the teacher."

"NO. Because if you copy Off Of someone else's
paper, you might get in trouble."

"No. Because the teacher would probably be looking
and she'd say, "Quit copying Off that person," and maybe
they'd have to change places with another person."

Stage 2:

"No. Because if you copied an answer from a paper
and the other person was wrong, you'd get the same answer
wrong."

"NO. Because if you copied, maybe one of them
would be wrong, and I think it would be better to think
of your own things."

"Yes. Cause your neighbor's paper could be wrong
and you'd get what they got. If they get a bad grade,
you'd get it."

"No. Not if Mark was pretty smart because Mark
would get them right."

164

 

 

165

Stage 3:

"Yes. If he copied, the other children would tell
him to stop. It wouldn't be fair to those who stopped
right away."

"Yes. That's disobeying. If I was him, I wouldn't
disobey. If the teacher told me to do something, I wouldn't
say "no" even if it wasn't good."

"Yes. Because it isn't fair to the others, because
he could get an A."

"No. Because copying is bad. Going on means that
you know the answers. You won't learn if you don't do it
on your own."

 

Stage 4:

"Yes. Because you're cheating the whole class.
Because if you're going to get extra time, everybody
ought to, if they needed extra time."

"Yes. Because it wouldn't be fair to the other
children. Mark would have more time to work on it. You
should have the same amount of time as the other children."

"No. Because if you were copying, you wouldn't know
how to do it. If you worked more, you'd learn more, but
you shouldn't work over."

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

 

 

.

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